ISLAM IN BLACK AND BROWN: THE MAKING OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES, INTRA-FAITH
RELATIONSHIPS AND DIVERSITY IN EAST-CENTRAL ILLINOIS

BY

TSELEQ YUSEF

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education Policy Studies
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2018

Urbana, Illinois

Doctoral Committee:

    Associate Professor Yoon Pak, Chair
    Associate Professor Chris Span
    Assistant Professor Arshad Ali
    Professor James D. Anderson

ABSTRACT

This project explores the origins of Muslim communities in East-Central Illinois with specific attention given to intra-faith relationships and diversity as experienced by African-American Muslim males. Employing an oral history methodology, this research explores the themes of identity, transitions, and diversity as narrated by the participants. Utilizing the theoretical framework of symbolic power to explore conceptions of "whiteness" while simultaneously addressing matters of privilege, and power, the accounts of the participants are placed in conversation with literature as well as concepts associated with symbolic power. Ultimately the findings of this research suggests that the differences among African-American Muslim and immigrant Muslim communities are byproducts of being fundamentally different in who they are historically, and culturally.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Admittedly, I was never particularly intrigued by discussions of identity, or intra-faith dialogue until I moved to Champaign. It was just prior to coming to Champaign that I decided I wanted to make a conscious effort to grow as a Muslim and learn more about the spirituality that I identified with. Back in 2010, I decided I was going to go to jummah (Muslim prayer service) at The Central Illinois Masjid and Islamic Center (CIMIC). As I was walking up to the building, I caught stares and several glares. I immediately felt very uncomfortable. Although no one said or behaved particularly rude to me, I felt a hostility of sorts, and immediately felt very unwelcomed. I began to wonder if I was overly sensitive for some inexplicable reason and my reservations were just some sort of subconscious insecurity that I was experiencing. Nevertheless, I felt so uncomfortable in fact that I did not attempt to attend [1]jummah at CIMIC again for almost three years.

During my first three-and-a –half years in Champaign, I took on boxing as an extra-curricular activity. One summer afternoon in 2011 after my team competed in a suburb of Chicago called Harvey, we stopped at a neighborhood gas station and convenient store for Gatorade after our matches. As I'm scanning the selection of sports drinks in the coolers adjacent to the check-out counter, I hear the two clerks behind the counter speaking what I recognized to be Arabic. While by no means fluent in the language, I recognized the use of "abd" or "abeed." Fully aware that it carries the same connotation as "nigger," I looked around the store and noticed that all my teammates were outside and I was the only person, black or otherwise, in the store. As I approached the counter I hear more conversation in Arabic, and "abeed" being used repeatedly being followed by laughter that suddenly stopped as I approached the counter. Without a greeting or glance, the cashier told me what I owed for my items. Visibly agitated with

---

[1] "Jummah" is a Muslim congregational prayer that is held every Friday afternoon

clenched fists, I just stared at him for a moment and said "hal-anti-majnoon-ahki" (Are you crazy my brother?) Seemingly alarmed at his recognition that I was aware of at least some of what was being said, he started apologizing and saying "ahki, la, la" (My brother no, no). Grossly offended, I paid for my items and left.

One Friday afternoon in late April 2015, I was at jummah at CIMIC , and the imam was concluding the khutba (sermon) with a request for dua (prayer) for the world as a whole. The imam mentioned just about every natural disaster, human rights violation, or geopolitical conflict that effected Muslims and non-Muslim alike around the world. What was mysteriously absent in his list of concerns was the unrest in Baltimore after a 25 year old black man (Freddie Gray) died in police custody. The flames in Baltimore were still burning as the khutba was being delivered and not only was there no mention of the unrest that was currently taking place in Baltimore, there was no mention of any issues facing the black community or even Africa. Somehow, his list covered the span of the United States, Europe, The Middle East, and Asia but nothing specific to the black community of Africa.

In the summer of 2016, I was awarded a Foreign Language and Area Studies Summer Fellowship (FLAS) to participate in the Summer Institute of Languages of the Muslim World (SILMW). Due to the long period that has passed since I had taken Arabic classes in succession, I was moved from an advanced class to an intermediate class. In a conversation with my instructor (Arab and practicing Muslim Woman) after class on the first day, she tells me that she "questions" whether I can be successful in her class. Never having had this instructor before, I was curious as to what would prompt her to say that. I ignored it. The following day I had a question regarding the textbook for the class and the accompanying assignment because I hadn't received my book yet. The instructor proceeds to raise her voice and literally berate me

suggesting that I needed to "work harder," and that I needed to take my coursework seriously. Aware of the possibility that any response expressing my dissatisfaction with her attitude and behavior towards me could exacerbate a bad situation, I emailed her expressing my concerns about ideas about me as a student and forwarded copies to the acting coordinator of SILMW, and the acting-chair of the department that awarded me the fellowship. Later that week, I took a test on which I did not perform well. When she returned my test, it was covered with comments that not only suggested that she had something against me personally, but these comments also referenced information she could have never known without talking to my former instructors. As the summer would go on, other students noticed how she seemed to have a "thing" against me with her continuous antagonistic attitude.

It was well before the last two experiences that I really began to interrogate the intra-faith relationships among black and immigrant Muslims as there were numerous other microagressions. The first two incidents were instrumental in raising my awareness of the black and brown divide in the Muslim community, and the last two convinced me of the necessity of such work. Conscious of my own experiences, I began to ask other Blackamerican Muslims about their experiences. When it was suggested that I could incorporate this topic into a dissertation project, I was immediately excited as I would have the opportunity to tell what I came to find was an unfortunately familiar story with Blackamerican Muslims. I became very interested in how diversity influences intra-faith relations in the American Muslim community. Particularly, I wanted to interrogate the changing as well as differing notions of what constitutes being a "Muslim" and "Islam" in East-Central Illinois from the 1960's to the present. Fully aware that I was taking on a very complicated project, I had to carefully and meticulously map out the steps to addressing my research question.

The first objective was to gain an understanding of the development of Muslim identity, particularly in the United States. This proved to be an arduous task because what I learned fairly early in my research was that examining the historical trajectory of Muslim identity involved observing immigration patterns, the demographic information on these immigrants, conceptions of race, and the role that immigration policy had in influencing these things. This task was complicated further by the fact that each of those previously mentioned measures are not necessarily independent of each other as some of them yielded causal relationships with others. Central to this discussion of identity is "whiteness." Determined based on discriminatory attitudes and perceptions about skin color, known as "common sense knowledge," whiteness became a prized identity for immigrants from the Muslim world. It is this conception of "whiteness" that becomes essential to the examination of intra-faith dialogue because different experiences of race between Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims tend to become points of contention in their interactions with one another, and ultimately begins to play a role in the shaping of Muslim identities.

My next challenge in understanding the role of identity and its influence on intra-faith relations was finding a theoretical framework that addresses a very complicated and oftentimes competing narrative of difference between Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims. Bourdieu's symbolic power seemed to be the most appropriate "fit" as it addresses power, identity, and privilege while stressing their interconnectedness and interdependence on one another. Offering discussions related to legitimation and misrecognition, symbolic violence, habitus, and symbolic capital, symbolic power was the most appropriate framework to examine the complicated and nuanced role of identity, privilege, and power as it relates to what is termed the "indigenous-immigrant" divide (Khabeer 2009). These different discussions were then applied to whiteness as

a prized identity to be obtained, and also as an identity historically denied to Blackamericans. Additionally, this relational-whiteness (Kayyali 2004) would not only serve to ease the integration of immigrant Muslims into the socioeconomic mainstream, but it would also come to influence their attitudes and treatment of their black coreligionists as well as black non-Muslims.

My next task in preparation for this study was to choose a methodology. After careful consideration, I concluded that I needed to utilize an oral history methodology. Considering the nature of this project, and what I aimed to accomplish, the benefits of oral history were very attractive. There were two in particular: 1) Oral history places primacy on oral sources in the creation of a historical narrative which can, in turn, reveal new information. I think this methodology was especially appropriate being that my research focuses on a population whose representation in the discussion of Islam in America tends to either be colored with condescension, is one-sided, or absent altogether. 2) Oral history democratizes the past. Being reminded throughout my formal academic training that history is "his-story," or written by those who were the victors of power struggles, the affording of space for Blackamerican Muslims to share their experiences and perspectives is something that is denied at times if what they have to offer does not fit within a dominant narrative. Therefore, an oral histories methodology not only affords space for these different narratives, it also serves as a means of finding competing or conflicting information with what is more popularly understood.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The evolution of Muslim identity in the United States has been a very complicated one. This is primarily the case for two reasons: 1) In order to establish the framework in which to address this subject, there must be an exploration of immigration patterns and demographics, racial identity, and policy. 2) This topic is also complicated because all the aforementioned attributes are not necessarily always distinct from one another as one or more can be interdependent on the trends taking place with the next. With this in mind, I will begin this discussion by tracing the historical trajectory of the earliest immigrants from the Muslim World and their experiences with race and identity.

One important thing to note about early 20th century America is that citizenship rested on an established conception of "whiteness" that was constructed using what the author referred to as "common knowledge." Also important, is the fact that "common knowledge" was largely made of prejudicial attitudes regarding skin complexion, Muslims and Islam, their attitudes towards democracy, and marriage (polygamy). In 1790, Congress explicitly restricted naturalized citizenship to "free white persons." This was later expanded further by the 14th amendment in 1868 which limited citizenship explicitly to those born in the United States. However, it was in 1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act that courts actively engaged in attempts to interrogate how citizenship was understood and established, but these conceptualizations were largely informed by the 1790 policy passed by Congress. Utilizing this construct would eventually lead to, the conclusion that Philipino's, those that would come to be identified as Hawaiian's, and Native American's were non-white, whereas Armenians and Mexicans were "white." Syrians, Arabs, and Indians were "difficult" to classify. Using much of the racialist ideas of 1790, the decisions

reached by courts were pivotal as they determined political life in terms of who was a citizen and consequently, who could vote (Kayyali 2004).

Despite the lack of clarity that characterized Arab citizenship-status, they generally enjoyed all the privileges of "whiteness," until 1919. Even with their questionable citizenship status, they were thought to be so numerically insignificant and not visible in the manner that the Chinese and blacks were, that allowing them to participate in "whiteness" was not a problem (Haddad, Senzai, & Smith 2009) until 1965. However in 1910, census data changed, and Arabs (largely Palestinians and Syrians) became "Asiatic" overnight due to the location of the Syrian Province in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. This was understood to be a strategic move on behalf of the US government to bar further immigration from those areas (Kayyali 2004).

Returning to the problematic generalizations and prejudicial ideas that informed "common knowledge," it is also important to understand that these early immigrants from the Muslim world were in fact Christian. Being that the first Muslim immigrants' original homelands were not polities that operated within an established racialized social order, "majority" status was predicated primarily on religious identification. With America being a "Christian nation," and with immigrants being ignorant to the nuances of racial identity, these immigrants came to America under the assumption that their identity as Christians would not only render them citizenship, but also a "majority" experience that was absent of "minority" discrimination (2004).

Between the years of 1909 and 1923, American court systems began to reexamine the blurry color line as a 1/3 of all cases related to racial categorization involved Indians (Southeast Asians) and Arabs. Early in their arrival to America, Arabs tried to utilize the racialist pseudo-scientific arguments that were the order of that period. For instance, because Jews were

7

"semites," and accepted as "white," they argued that they should be as well. However, prosecutors again cited "common knowledge," and all its accompanying problematic ideas (which included assumptions that they were Muslims) as the parameters of "whiteness" and citizenship. At one point, these immigrants used a "Jesus Defense." This was when immigrants reformulated "common knowledge," and Eurocentric depictions of Jesus to argue that because He (Jesus) hailed from their region of the world, and was white, being that they shared a homeland, they should be understood as white as well (Kayyali 2004).

The first Arab/Asian immigrant breakthrough into "whiteness" came in 1909 when George Shishim won his citizenship case against the federal government. The judge ruled that scientific knowledge outweighed "common knowledge" and skin complexion, and ruled Syrians were Caucasian. The situation began when a Lebanese police officer (George Shishim) arrested the son of a prominent lawyer in the Venice, California community. The boys' father argued that because Shishim was Lebanese, and Lebanon was part of Asia, Shishim was of Chinese and Mongolian stock and therefore was not a citizen. Therefore, Shishim was not a citizen, and could not legally arrest his son. Alarmed at the potential implications of this case, the local Lebanese community raised money for Shishim's defense. The defense sought after academics to speak on their behalf, and again offered the "Jesus Defense" stating, "If I am Mongolian, so was Jesus." Being themselves Christian, and cognizant of the image that Islam held in the popular imagination of America during this time, this tactic was used to distance themselves from Islam, and forged a connection with the judge and the majority population. The judge ruled in favor of Shishim citing that religion was not an adequate indicator for racial identity (Kayyali 2004).

Despite Shishim's victory in court, Syrian would continue to be denied citizenship in following cases as early as 1911. Due to the Shishim's victory of "common knowledge"

conceptions, following denials of citizenship for Syrians were upheld based on the location of the Ottoman Empire as well as the assumed incompatible and unassimilable attitudes, and practices of those from that region. Rulings informed by these ideas additionally cited that since the Ottoman Empire had "subjects" as opposed to "citizens," immigrants from that region lacked the intellectual capacity to fully participate in a democratic system. Others cited that the Ottoman Empire siding with Germany in World War II brought immigrants' loyalty to the United States into question (Kayyali 2004).

In 1913 and 1914, common knowledge arguments were again invoked to deny citizenship to Syrians. In the instance of the 1913 case (ex parte Shahid), the defendant was denied "whiteness" because he had the "complexion of a walnut." In 1914, George Dow was denied citizenship on these bases twice (ex parte Dow and re Dow). However, Dow finally won on his final appeal when the immigration commission submitted paperwork to the court stating the Syrians were of Semitic/Caucasian stock. Shortly thereafter, it was the Immigration Act of 1917 that officially declared Palestinians and Syrians "white," and suggested that their national origin had nothing to do with their racial identity.

Finally, and briefly alluded to earlier, many of the early immigrants had to ward off the stigmas associated with Islam even though they themselves were Christian. The majority Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire in turn led immigration officials to assume and ultimately conclude that they were Muslims as well. In addition to the aforementioned stigmas of intellectual inability, and having compromised allegiances, they also were confronted with concerns of polygamy. The concerns over polygamy were heightened with an anti-Mormon campaign that was fresh in the minds of the late 19th century American imagination. This too was also used as a justification to deny them citizenship. This ultimately led to them emphasizing

their Christian identity. Being that many legislators thought that Muslims had no place in America, and unaware that there were already Muslims living in the United States, in 1922, all Arabs seeking citizenship were required to renounce Islam. Arabs largely remained uncomfortable with their citizenship status well into the 1940's. In 1942, a Yemeni man in Detroit was denied citizenship based on a combination of factors. In particular, it was argued (in re Ahmed Hassan) that the geographical distance of Yemen from Europe, his dark complexion, coupled with an assumed inability to successfully assimilate because he was a Muslim. It was only in 1944, that the immigration authorities decided Arabs could be naturalized offering Yemeni immigrants the opportunity to become citizens (Kayyali 2004).

During this period of the early and mid-twentieth century, Arabs were fully aware of the negative baggage their ethnic and assumed religious identity carried, and they went as far as even abandoning cultural markers such as peddling and shop-keeping. However, during the 1920's , the slurs tended to "hit closer to home" as they were called "dirty Syrian," "camel jockey," "Turks," "blackie," and in some instances, were barred from white-only spaces. With estimates numbering from 130,00-350,000 (Arab Immigration - Arabs In America 2017) by 1930, they began moving out of their ethnically homogenous communities, relocating into the suburban predominately white areas, and eventually intermarrying. They joined Catholic Churches, both Muslims and Christians changed their names to those more Anglicized names (Yacoub to Jacobs) and made other pointed efforts to assimilate to American culture. However, these efforts did not always necessarily guarantee acceptance, or help them avoid detection. This was evidenced by the fact that despite their European names and reorientation towards American culture, they were still confused as being members of other groups particularly Spanish, Portuguese and Mexicans. Consequently, they were called things like "dago," "wetback," and

"sheeny." It was not until 1952 with the passage of the Walter-McCarran Act removed many of the restrictions that tended to have racialized consequences. In particular, it removed the Asian exclusion clause from immigration policy, and gave preferential immigration status to those with marketable skills and those immigrating for family reunification purposes (Kayyali 2004).

As can be seen, the historical narrative of citizenship and racial identity of immigrants from the Muslim World is a complicated one. With citizenship fluctuating in a manner similar to other racialized ethnic groups, Arabs were "white" in 1909, 1910, and 1915, but not in 1913 or 1914. With "whiteness" being essential to the attainment of citizenship, they had to construct, and then negotiate their racial identities. Even with the early Arab immigrants being largely Christian themselves, they still dealt with the stigmas associated with Islam, and how it was particularly racialized. Problematic notions of "common knowledge," and racialized science also oftentimes served as barriers. In this history, we see the influence of conceptions of "whiteness" their associated stereotypes, geopolitics, religion, and immigration policy . All of which functioned together to foster a social context that was dually antagonistic to their presence, and for the relatively small Muslim population, their faith as well. Even being officially designated as "white" by census authorities in 1924, their continued experiences of discrimination suggests that their acceptance was still minimal and troublesome.

In order to examine manifestations of racial identity regarding early 20th century Islamic Movements in the black community, it is also necessary to trace the historical and contemporary trajectory of immigrant, or "brown," Muslim racial identities as well. The reason for this is because mapping out the path(s) of racial identity for brown Muslims provides a means of contextualizing articulations of racial identity of black Muslims as their experiences of race tend to become points of contention in their interactions with one another. This is central to the

analysis because of much of the particularities and nuances of Islam in the black community are responses to the needs, changes, and challenges they face in simultaneously negotiating two stigmatized identities of being black and Muslim. In focusing on manifestations of racial identity of early Islamic movements in the black community from 1960 to the present, there is no better point to start than with the year of 1965.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This section begins with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 as the starting point from which to explore racial identity among Islamic movements in the black community. For the purposes of this project, there are several things that must be kept in mind: 1) The Immigration Act of 1965 was spurred by the discourses of diversity that were largely the result of the Civil Rights Movement and political mobilization of racialized minorities (Waters 1990). 2) This particular legislation did away with the Asiatic Barred Zone and the National Origins Act (Jackson 2005, Karim 2009, and Kayyali 2004). This provided the opportunity for most of the contemporary brown Muslim population we see to immigrate to America. In examining the existing commentary on this policy, there will be specific attention afforded to the demographic particulars of this group of immigrants 3) This review will examine the varying effects this policy has had on the Muslim community as a whole, and specifically how Blackamerican Muslims have negotiated their racial identity and politics from this period to the present. Additionally, what also must be understood is that the efforts of early immigrants from the Muslim world to be classified as "white" not only served to foster a "Muslim" status quo of sorts that began to understand and be versed in the workings of the racial order in the United States, but also sought to distance itself from other racialized groups. This was especially the case with blacks (Kayyali 2004), although most blacks, by the mid to late 1970's identified with Classical

Islam (Karim 2008). Within this literature review there are several discussions on key matters. The first is "who" these post-1965 Muslim immigrants were. What was their family, socioeconomic or educational background? The next will be a discussion of attitude. What were the attitudes or understanding of the immigrant Muslims when they arrived?, regarding the existing Muslim community and ethnic difference? Then, there will be a discussion of how interaction between the two groups takes place. How do the two interact when they share space? and under what circumstances are the two groups sharing space? Finally, there will be a discussion of religious authority within the American Muslim community. Who has authority? Why and based on what?

I would also like to draw attention to the fact that "black," "brown," nor "white" are capitalized. I have chosen not to capitalize these terms primarily because they are descriptive terms whose use, for the purposes of this study, does not go beyond merely describing the appearance of phenotypical features. For instance, "black" is used as a term specific to those who have "black" skin, and/or phenotypical features that suggest African ancestry. However, this term does not address the vast range of differing histories, and experiences of all individuals who may have "black" skin. Admittedly, this is at best a murky conceptualization of "black," and a problematic one at worst. This is best evidenced best by the fact that while many immigrant Muslims, officially identify as "white," they are oftentimes darker in complexion than many of those who identify as "black," and can also have phenotypical features (such as the shape, size, and width of the nose and thickness of lips) that are "typical" to those with African ancestry. For all these reasons, "black," nor any of the other color based references to groups will be capitalized in recognition of their problematic use, meanings, and inability to provide understanding beyond an assumed ancestry, history, and experience. To reference these groups, I

will simply use "black," "brown," or "white," with lower case representatives of their initial letter. I will borrow Sherman Jackson's term of "Blackamerican" for blacks, "white" for Caucasian, and "brown," or "immigrant" for those with ancestry hailing from Asia or the Middle East (Jackson 2005).

"WHO" WERE THESE IMMIGRANTS?

As was briefly alluded to earlier, a majority of the contemporary brown Muslim population in America immigrated after 1965. In understanding more about this group, Kayyali (2004) contextualizes their immigration to the United States by way of examining several socioeconomic and political trends taking place in the Middle East: 1) The region was experiencing a rise in "fundamentalist" articulations of Islam. This made the United States attractive to moderate and secular Muslim's due to its promises of tolerance, individual rights, and political institutions. 2) This period also corresponds with the "Arab brain-drain." After independence, the Muslim World experienced a period of rapid development of university systems, but there were not enough jobs to sustain the highly- educated population. Also relevant is the fact that the tThe the Immigration Act of 1965 gave preference to those immigrating under the parameters of family reunification, political refugees, and those that were educated and/or skilled professionals. According to Kayaali this population made up 15% of all Arab immigrants between 1965 and 1976. 3) Related to the last point, the United States offered superior academic programs in medicine and engineering. Consequently, wealthy Arab families sent their children to be educated in the United States. This also coincided with the establishment of academic training programs at American universities that aimed to educate these immigrants, who were to return to their homelands once they completed their programs. However, flat economies, political corruption, and limited job opportunities in their homelands led most of them to stay.

Consequently, not only did they help establish job and career networks for those who would immigrate later, but they enjoyed higher salaries and better qualities of life than they would have in their home countries. 4) The gains of the Civil Rights Movement established a social and political context of increased multiculturalism. This allowed Arabs to immigrate, but also allowed them to openly take pride in, and display their ethnic heritage (Kayaali 2004).

The parameters of immigration established by the 1965 legislation, in combination with the socioeconomic and geopolitical factors in the Middle East and Asia, facilitated a class of Muslims that would grow to be largely educated professionals. By the year 2000, 73% of all Muslim immigrants worked in managerial, professional, technical, sales, or administrative fields (Kayyali 2004). This and the previously mentioned factors served to create a gulf of sorts in the American Muslim community based on socioeconomic status, identity, and experience. From the outset, Muslim immigrants came to the United States with a pointed assimilationist/integrationist mindset. This was also heightened by the higher educational attainment and professional skills of immigrants that afforded a considerably smoother transition and integration into the socioeconomic order than blacks . Kayyali (2004) acknowledges this in his assessment that black Muslims, due to their historical narrative of racial discrimination, are more likely to question the discourses of mainstream American society and focus their efforts on education-related issues, and poverty in urban areas. According to the author, the socioeconomic placement of brown Muslims vs. that of black Muslims provides a pointed difference of experience, perspective, financial means, and ultimately religious articulation.

The socioeconomic mobility of the post-1965 Muslim immigrants is also briefly addressed in Sanders (2012), Gerber (2011), and Bald (2013). It is specifically noted in (Sanders (2012) that they are dubbed "educational successes." He notes that 40% of Muslim adults have

either college, or advanced degrees which renders them the second most educated group in the United States behind Jews. Gerber (2011) adds that many immigrants from the Muslim world specifically came to take advantage of economic opportunities that did not exist in their homelands as was referenced in Kayyali (2004), and Bald (speaking specifically of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent) notes that many of these immigrants would come to be the businessmen, doctors, and engineers of the 1980's and 1990's (Bald 2013). The 1965 Immigration Act, favoring those with higher levels of education and professional skills, facilitated the growth of a new professional class of immigrants[2].

THE ATTITUDES IMMIGRANTS BROUGHT WITH THEM

Howell (2013) touches on the educational credentials and socioeconomic status of these immigrants. In a discussion of the post-1965 Muslim immigrants, Howell notes that many of the immigrants from the Muslim worlds came from "elite" backgrounds, and arrived as students as opposed to workers, as the Immigration Act of 1965 gave preference to those immigrating for the purposes of family reunification, were political refugees, or were educated/skilled professionals, and these parameters made up fifteen percent of all Arab immigants from 1965 to 1976 (Howell 2013). They were joining an already established middle class Muslim minority that was in the process of leaving their ethnic enclaves for white suburbia and establishing larger, more extravagant masjids in the suburbs which served as symbols of their socioeconomic success. Additionally, these masjids were built and operated to serve the needs of their predominately immigrant, and middle class constituency. The newcomers were increasingly critical of both the

---

[2] The information provided by Bald (2013), Sanders (2012), and Gerber (2011) reinforces the information provided by Kayyali (2004). A large portion of these immigrants came to the United States with the tools to integrate into the socioeconomic order. They either already had the marketable skills, or were coming with direct access to the means of acquiring skills that would eventually yield high paying jobs and comfortable middle-class lifestyles. Again, these pointed differences in educational attainment, socioeconomic standing, as well as the immigrant admission into "whiteness" facilitated a different experience of America. This difference in experience generally would cause Islam to be articulated, experienced, and ultimately serve different purposes than for black Muslims. As will be seen later, these differences will also feed into other racialized discourses that are specific to the American context.

established Muslim community that sought after and embraced "whiteness" or those that were "relationally white" Muslims and the Nation of Islam. More specifically, they felt like the presence of "sock hops" (social events involving dancing), and holding religious events on Sunday's as opposed to Friday's were evidence that there was too much assimilation on behalf of existing Muslim populations. The new arrivals   also particularly dismayed at the racialized and unorthodox discourses of the Nation of Islam. Generally speaking, they felt that American Muslims or more appropriately, the first generation of immigrants from the Muslim world put too much emphasis on social and political matters and there was not enough attention afforded standard precepts of Islam . This critique would quickly entend to the Nation of Islam as well. (Howell 2013)[3].

Grewal (2009) uses the 1996 National Anthem controversy involving Muslim NBA player Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf as evidence of differences among the two communities. The author notes that prior to 1965, the majority of America's Muslim's were black and currently make up roughly 30%-40%. Despite the appearance of diversity, most masjids, and Muslim organizations are typically led by highly educated immigrants from South Asia and the Middle East, and tends to suffer from "racial and class tensions, and cultural misunderstandings." In citing the differing histories as a source of divide, the immigrant narrative tends to be situated as one in which political and economic refugees are torn between their loyalty as American

---

[3] Echoing some of the sentiments of Kayyali (2004), Howell (2013) delves a bit deeper into the rationale or perspectives of the newly arrived Muslim immigrants. In terms of the black (or indigenous) and brown Muslim divide, immigrant Muslims tended to hold dismissive views of the Nation of Islam's theology as being "un-Islamic," and their practice of Islam barred them from being "real" Muslims as far as they newcomers were concerned. Related to this is the fact that this new generation of Muslim immigrants assumed a critical stance in regard to the established Muslim community and they quickly dedicated efforts to move them away from their focus on political and social concerns . This too could only aid in fostering a gulf between the two communities because, ideally, the focus on political and social issues could have served as a bridge connecting the two communities considering both groups endured racial discrimination and were denied the rights and privileges of citizenship. What will become clear later in this project, is that even at the point that black Muslims aligned themselves with Classical Islam, many of these issues persisted.

citizens, the privileges they enjoy as citizens, pressures to assimilate, experiences of racism, and

alienation at the hands of American foreign policy towards Muslim nations. For black Muslims

on the other hand, Islam serves as a vehicle to address and cope with their painful history in

America , and a desire to reshape America to be a more adequate representation of its ideals of

liberty and justice. Also as a source of contention, is the black Muslims mistaking immigrants

disdain towards the West's colonial conquests and foreign policy as being one and the same as

their disdain for white supremacy. They were not. The chasing of the "American Dream" that

brought immigrants to the United States combined with a general ignorance to the role that race

played in organizing social space. This typically had the consequence of leading Muslim

immigrants to distinguish "whiteness" from being "Western." Consequently, as was discussed in

Howell (2013), Friday sermons rarely addressed issues of race, police brutality, or social issues

that resonated with blacks. In the minds of immigrants, these concerns were insignificant when

compared with the issues related to foreign policy that affected many of their homelands (Grewal

2009).

The discussion of the changing of the face of Islam will be explored in more depth in a

later discussion. The differing socioeconomic indicators of immigrants when compared to that of

Blackamericans had been explored in Howell (2013), Kayyali (2004), and others. Of principle

interest for Grewal (2009), is the assessment that the central points of contentions between the

black and brown Muslim communities are those of history and experience. These two factors

have yielded drastically different perspectives on, and experiences of America. I would think this

is a perfectly logical explanation for the roots of some of the division between the two

communities. Effectively, the variances of the two groups would also render them facing

differing issues and consequently, having different concerns. I think this is arguably the most

fundamental understanding to have when exploring the black and brown divide in the American Muslim community.

In a related discussion by Abdullah (2013), he notes much of the same demographic information regarding the Muslim immigrants that was noted in Kayyali (2004), Bald (2013), Gerber (2011), and Sanders (2012), but what is central to his discussion is their (brown Muslims) treatment and understanding of ethnic difference. Abdullah (2013) counters the general assessment that Muslim immigrants were ignorant to how race functions by noting that Muslim immigrants entered the United States "with their own colonial ideas about skin color and ethnic difference." The author goes on to note that despite most Muslims considering each other brothers and sisters in a "universal faith," the interaction between black and brown Muslims is fairly rare. Many black converts (or reverts) to either Sunni or Shi'i brands of Islam found themselves renouncing their racial identities because for many Sunni Muslims, race-consciousness was heretical in nature. Because of this, black Muslims established national networks (Darul Islam, Islamic Party of North America, etc.) that fused classical Sunni doctrines with discourses of racial justice and black pride. However, these groups oftentimes were not successful, and disbanded with the exception of the Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood. In fact, black Muslims became increasingly frustrated with the "color-blind" presentation of Islam, and continued to form their own coalitions with the most notable being the establishment of the Muslim Alliance of North America in 2005. For some, religion trumped race, but others did not feel this way. Those contending that religion and conservative Islamic theology in particular should be the exclusive focus of Islamic discourse argued that attention to such matters (such as race) created a gulf between those whom they shared a common faith. Others argued that the two were not mutually exclusive, and any attempt to disavow or ignore racial issues would only serve

to not only make discriminatory experiences more salient, but also enable them to continue with no recourse if no space afforded the topic (Abdullah 2013)[4].

Prashad's (2000) work provides an in-depth exploration of the attitudes immigrants had toward race that were mentioned briefly in Abdullah (2013). Speaking specifically from the perspective of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent (called Desis), Prashad begins with an explanation of white supremacy. Acknowledging that white supremacy denies blacks any greatness whether it be past, present, or future, its relationship with India is nuanced as Europeans acknowledged an Indian past that produced worthwhile artifacts and ideas. However, it is accompanied by the belief that they suffered from a "lack of development" that left them "ritualized," or in "ruin" from the European perspective. In terms of negotiating white supremacy for Indians, it's better to have some value than to be denied any at all. Their attitudes began to change once they were thrown into competition with freed blacks. Prosperity was gained on the backs of black workers especially when land was provided to immigrants for exploitation. Blacks effectively provided the bulk of surplus value and means of economic mobility of white migrants. Prashad further posits that moving into the mainstream for immigrants usually means positioning blacks as the "real" aliens to America and American culture, and with blacks at the bottom, opportunities for social mobility for the incoming immigrant is higher. As time moved forward, the deterioration of black income allowed many immigrants to see themselves as immune to the same poverty that

---

[4] Echoing some of the sentiments of Kayyali (2004), Howell (2013) delves a bit deeper into the rationale or perspectives of the newly arrived Muslim immigrants. In terms of the black (or indigenous) and brown Muslim divide, immigrant Muslims tended to hold dismissive views of the Nation of Islam's theology as being "un-Islamic," and their practice of Islam barred them from being "real" Muslims as far as they newcomers were concerned. Related to this is the fact that this new generation of Muslim immigrants assumed a critical stance in regard to the established Muslim community and they quickly dedicated efforts to move them away from their focus on political and social concerns . This too could only aid in fostering a gulf between the two communities because, ideally, the focus on political and social issues could have served as a bridge connecting the two communities considering both groups endured racial discrimination and were denied the rights and privileges of citizenship. What will become clear later in this project, is that even at the point that black Muslims aligned themselves with Classical Islam, many of these issues persisted.

appeared to be endemic to blacks. This was exacerbated further by media reports that made it seem as if poverty was the cultural inheritance of poor blacks. While stereotypes of criminality and laziness were always present, they gained momentum around 1977 as Time magazine announcement of the birth of an "underclass ." The presence of urban rebellions, the way they were framed in media, as well as the aforementioned stereotypes led immigrants to fear blacks. Oblivious to the history of blacks and nuances of structural racism, immigrants bought into a benign form of racism that entailed the adoption of anti-black attitudes rather than an examination of enduring forms of anti-black racism. Immigration reform in 1965 allowed scores of "techno-professional" workers to enter the United States. This influx of Asians was coopted in direct opposition to blacks with the creation of the "model minority" thesis which implied that some minorities are able, through their own efforts, to experience upward social mobility without the help of the state. The Chinese being the group posited as evidence of this idea, were juxtaposed to blacks. During the Black Liberation Movement, the Chinese were morphed into a "worthy minority." As was addressed in Abdullah (2013), Kayyali (2004) and others, although Asians were latecomers to the feast of "capital" just as blacks were, they came with cultural capital, and an inheritance sufficient for advancement. According to Prashad notes that this provided a welcomed opportunity for Asians to enter into the American mainstream and they "immorally accepted it." The ahistorical Asian is set aside the ahistorical black to make the claim that the successes of the former shows that the problem is with the latter (blacks). Prashad (2000) described this as inferential racism. Specifically, this is the naturalization of racialized explanations pertaining to the lack of advancement that attributed to blacks that the author speaks of. Whether factual or fictional, these explanations have racist premises and propositions inscribed within them as a set of unquestioned assumptions. The uniqueness of this form of

racism is that it is not considered offensive. An allegation of racial discrimination at the hands of

someone who praises a particular group while making no mention or comparison to another

quickly take the appearance of absurdity. However, under such circumstances, the comparison

(particularly to blacks) is assumed and/or understood rather than explicitly stated. Attacking

blacks by paying tribute to Asian intelligence makes one immune to the charges of racism and

the "model minority" thesis is exemplary of inferential racism. This stereotype was a godsend

for Indians regardless of its negative effect on blacks, and its' strengthening of white supremacy

because it provided an avenue towards advancement for Desis. Being that most of them

immigrated to the northern states, they did not experience Jim Crow, and because many of them

did not participate in the Civil Rights Movement, they did not value the rights won by those who

couldn't actually enjoy them. Arriving as educated professionals and quickly advancing within

the socioeconomic order, they too were used as a means of demonstrating blacks' inability to do

for themselves. Prashad (2000) offers the prescription that most Indians do not hold these views,

but the conservative Desi culture that was created in the United States leans towards anti-black

racism. Also, those who go to that culture in search of a cultural identity take on these ideas as

well because in fighting against it, they would have to undergo a process of undoing the very

paradigm that they've benefitted from. Particularly this is the case in older generations. The

difference is seen among younger Desis (children of immigrants) because as was discussed in

Kayyali (2004) don't feel this pressure because they identify as white (Prashad 2000[5]).

---

[5] Prashad (2000) explores the attitudes related to race and difference particularly among Indian immigrants.
However, I would think it would be reasonable to assume this was universally representative of other immigrants
from the Muslim world. Primarily due to the rationale that if this applied to Indians with their darker skin
complexion, it would be reasonable to assume it especially applies to lighter skinned ethnic groups, or those who
could "pass" for white. Additionally noted, is the fact that part of assimilating socially entailed an ideological
assimilation of sorts in that South Asian, and presumably Arab immigrants as well, adopted anti-black attitudes.
What is presented to us in Prashad's (2000) explanation is an elaborate detailing of anti-black attitudes among
immigrants as being a consequence of contextual factors related to temporal context, and necessity. With the "model
minority" thesis in full swing, South Asian immigrants were allowed to effectively operate within a system of

Karim (2009) continues this discussion with a specific examination of how the racial, political, and ideological climate worked interdependently to create the space for both South Asian advancement, as well as their embracing of anti-black racism. For the author, the most ironic aspect of this learned racism against blacks, is that as non-whites, they too were subject to racial discrimination. Yet, it is this very fear of anti-immigrant discrimination that leads them to overlook anti-black racism as their own fears of unsuccessful integration within the socioeconomic order is always present. Further, it is the nuanced structure of white supremacy that allows one discriminated-against group to discriminate against others. As Prashad (2000) noted, it is better to have "some value," as opposed to none at all. This in particular served as the necessary catalyst for South Asians to posit themselves as "better," than blacks as they were very aware that they (blacks) represented everything despised in America. Evidenced by the South Asian embracing of the "model minority" idea, blacks themselves became the source of all the problems plaguing black communities. As was alluded to in Prashad (2000), the author notes that this form of racism (inferential racism) tends to wear a cloak of "innocence" as celebrating the accomplishments of Asians at the expense of blacks is seemingly safe. However, their educational and socioeconomic success was used to castigate blacks and offer them condescending questions along the lines of "what is wrong with you?" The socioeconomic and

---

oppression that located them somewhere in the center of an existing racialized order. With this particular positionality, they saw an opportunity for advancement. I question whether this explanation affords Desis' their full compliment of responsibility and agency in their acceptance of, and even participation in anti-black racism. Abdullah (2013) offers that these were attitudes and ideas were already present when they immigrated to the United States with, whereas Prashad (2000) explains them as attitudes they adopted once they arrived. The "truth" is probably somewhere between those two narratives. I would think with India fresh out of colonialism during the period of the mid-20th century, they would in fact be at least minimally knowledgeable to how a racial order functions and how to navigate within it. Nonetheless, whether it was through set examples of the American racial order, or biases they carried with them from their homelands, attitudes and conceptions of race colored their perceptions of blacks and, as was discussed in Abdullah (2013) and Howell (2013), more than likely their interactions with blacks as well. These ideas provide another lens through which to examine that black and brown divide within the Muslim community. With the pervasiveness of anti-black racism influencing the views of brown or immigrant Muslims as well, it is reasonable to assume that these views influenced how blacks were treated in their interactions with their immigrant counterparts.

political contexts of the time fostered and ensured the presence of boundaries between blacks and South Asians. The "model minority" idea was a byproduct of a political space in which it was suggested by neoliberal and conservative political bodies that race and racism were no longer impediments to advancement. By the arrival of the 1970's, state policy advanced an idea of "merit," as opposed to race being the sole attribute of relevance when being afforded access to opportunity. Consequently, the success of South Asians was attributed to their possessing of "higher cultural" values. The author noted that the fallacy with this line of thinking is that South Asians and many other post-1965 immigrants for that matter, arrived already with the necessary credentials to integrate within the existing socioeconomic order as was also referenced in Howell (2013), Kayyali (2004), and several others. Yet, the author notes that it was their already-present skills that even offered them the opportunity to immigrate. Instead, their success should have been attributed to the skills they had prior to coming to the United States, but was attributed to their cultural values. It was this constructed imagery and set of ideas that provided the backdrop of an appearance that racism had all but ended, affirmative action-based programs were no longer needed, and blacks lagged behind because of their own culture-specific ineptitudes. The author also notes that these things are important for black Muslims to understand in order to avoid the pitfalls of perpetrating anti-immigrant racism in response. Conversely, brown Muslims need to understand that because being "American" is constructed within a "whiteness," that they can never achieve fully achieve, and that no act of anti-black racism will ever accomplish that for them (Karim 2009).

Again, we see in this discussion the adoption of anti-black attitudes among South Asians explained as being the byproduct of political context, racial climate, and a relative "necessity" for the sake of assimilation. This is pointedly different from Abdullah (2013) who assess

24

immigrants themselves with more agency with regard to their attitudes of race and difference. For Abdullah (2013), these, or at least the basis for these ideas, were present when they arrived. Nonetheless, being able to enter the United States with the possibility of being labeled as "model" afforded South Asians, (and other immigrants from the Muslim world) the opportunity to have instant cultural capital on arrival. This cultural capital was complemented further by their educations and wealth which more than likely provided an experience and perspective of America that was alien to most blacks even today. With their successful and quick integration into the socioeconomic order, and being ignorant to the nuances of how white supremacy and structural racism operate, it would be easy as well as productive for immigrants to buy into the model minority myth and the inferential racism that accompanies it. I can imagine being subject to such discourses, and being able to visibly juxtapose the condition of the black community with their own, these problematic ideas were given the appearance of legitimacy. With anti-black racism being incredibly pervasive, it is reasonable to assume that these biases accompanied blacks when they entered classical Islam as well as the mosque. Understanding this affords a more complete vision and understanding of the black/brown Muslim divide. Recognizing the efforts to navigate the racial order on both sides, and that both sides have experienced racial discrimination allows to one to better contextualize the historical as well as contemporary experiences and interactions they have with each other.

Tuner (1997) addresses the deracialization of Islamic discourses by acknowledging that despite the fact that black and brown Muslims pray and worship together in the masjid, looks can be "deceiving." He explains that even though orthodox Islam has had great success in spreading among Blackamericans, and that racialist discourses are considerably less prominent than they once were, "true" integration has not occurred among the two groups as even non-black ethnic

25

Muslim communities tend to be segregated. Additionally, differing Muslim communities tend to forge their own Islamic agendas by establishing their own organization as was discussed in Abdullah (2013). More specifically, second and third-generation brown Muslims tend to have their needs met through Muslim Student Organizations (MSA's), and the Islamic Society of North America to name a few. However black Muslims, orthodox or not, are negotiating both a racial, and religious identity that entails a unique and separate set of particularities regardless of how much they mainstream, and deracialize their brand of Islam. Black Muslims tend to worship at masjids that are located in predominately black, urban, and poorer areas and in order to do any level of effective missionary work, they must deal with the realities of those whom populate their masjids, and the communities they inhabit (1997[6]).

Further examination of the different characteristics of the black and brown Muslim communities takes place in Mamiya (2003). He notes that 74% of the predominately black masjids examined in his study had operational budgets of less than $40,000. Additionally, 47% of their members earn less than $20,000 a year, and only 2% earned $50,000 or more a year. The author notes that black masjids do not have the financial freedom or stability that brown Muslim communities enjoy. Due to the Immigration laws favoring educated professionals, it was increasingly difficult for poor people from those areas to immigrate to the United States. Consequently, the communities brown or immigrant Muslims to tend belong to are significantly

---

[6] In Turner (1997), we see further exploration of the differences between the two groups. As was addressed in Abdullah (2013) and Howell (2013), the features and needs of each ethnic community tends to be different. Consequently, they tend to search for their own individual and separate mediums to address their own unique needs and interests. Two things to consider in this discussion, is that 1) black Muslims make efforts to negotiate two particularly stigmatized identities being both black and Muslim and 2), the Muslim constituencies they speak to are significantly different than those that make up Arab and South Asian communities. The differences in socioeconomic status, identity, experience, and even locale foster a social and religious landscape that commands different focuses and strategies than those in other communities. Drawing back to the discussion in Abdullah (2013), we see the differing levels of socioeconomic power in the fact that attempts by newly converted black Muslims to facilitate alternative agendas were largely unsuccessful with the exception of a few. When compared with brown Muslims, we see that not only were their efforts more successful, they had the means, and enough of a numerical presence to establish MSA's on college campuses. This in itself speaks to a certain presence on college campuses, influence and affluence that is not typical to the black experience in general much less the black Muslim experience.

more affluent as are the masjids they frequent. What was of special interest in Mamiya's (2003) discussion in his mapping out the racial discrimination that black Muslims experience at the hands of brown Muslims. Paraphrasing an Imam who spoke on the topic that was referenced in Mamiya's (2003) discussion, there are frequent allegations among brown Muslims that black Muslims "mismanage," and or "waste," their funds, and are "always" asking for more than they need. The Imam added that another critique of brown Muslims is that black Muslims are ignorant to Arabic, and the basic precepts of the faith. The Imam explained (in Arabic) that those types of criticisms have an effect of driving people away from Islam. On the initial charge of mismanaged money, he countered by citing the construction of 96th Street masjid in Manhattan that only holds 800 worshipers, has no school or offices attached to it, yet costs $33 million dollars. Mamiya (2003) continued that black Muslims are unappreciative of the fact that while many brown Muslims may come to masjids located in black communities to worship, they (brown Muslims) have a reluctance to get involved with issues that did not specifically speak to the interests of their own immigrant communities. Shortly after many blacks converted (reverted) in the 1960's and 1970's, this particular type of experience is what led them to establish their own communities. There was also the issue of intermarriage. Despite cultural differences, many black Muslim men felt that immigrant Muslims were influenced by the racial baggage of American society in their aversion, and oftentimes rejection of the idea of their daughters marrying black men. Finally, the differences in patterns of accommodation of black and brown Muslims are a source of conflict as well. Brown Muslims articulate Islam with an assimilationist mindset fueled by a middle to upper class social mobility. Whereas black Muslims are more apt to use the racial discrimination and racial separatism typical to the general Blackamerican experience as inspiration to form their own communities separate from American society. It was also noted that

27

brown Muslims tend to frequent "Islamic Centers" that contain masjids, schools, and community centers. Black Muslims tend to attend "masjids" which are primarily worship centers. Following in the tradition of the black church that yielded much of the black Muslim population, they may serve dually as schools and community centers as well, however due to the stark differences in financial resources, immigrant Muslims build Islamic Centers from the ground up, whereas black masjids tend to operate in storefront spaces which not only afford less space, but less flexibility in its use (2003).

In Mamiya (2003) we see much of the discussion of differences between black and brown Muslims that was discussed in Howell (2013), Abdullah (2013), and several other authors to this point. With regard to the explanation provided by the Imam whom participated in the Mamiya's (2013) study, whether funds are "mismanaged" or not, there is considerably more room to mismanage millions of dollars in comparison to $40,000. The disparity in spending in itself can serve as a root division between the two communities. This is especially the case with brown Muslims positing themselves as the authority, and assuming that Islam as a whole should look and function identically across class and racial categories. The mirroring of that example is a privilege not typically afforded black Muslims. There is also an arrogance of sorts among some immigrant Muslims that situate themselves as the only "real" Muslims. Accompanying this assumption of authority is the presumption of ignorance on the part of black coreligionists regarding religious matters, or Arabic. While there is probably some factual basis in the assumption that many black Muslims are not fluent in Arabic, cases of such being used as a justification for being condescending towards, or discriminating against black Muslims serves as a reinforcing of the gulf between the two communities. Complimenting these factors is the lack of support brown Muslims tend to have for any agendas not related to their own ethnic groups, or

the international Muslim community. With the understanding that the Muslim community is "united," the disparities in support for issues related to certain communities tends to correlate to those with the least financial resources. From the sources provided to this point, this was seemingly one of the earliest roots of the contemporary separation of the two groups. As far as the discussion of intermarriage, that is not quite as clear cut. As Abdullah (2013) suggested in immigrants having their own ideas about race and ethnic difference, some of that probably is at play in these situations, but one cannot underestimate the influences of culture and tradition in matters such as this. Drawing the line as to what is culture vs. racism would be very difficult. Finally, we see that differences in socioeconomic status of the two groups not only influences their articulations of Islam, but also the "appearances" of Islam among the two groups. The fact that immigrant masjids (or Islamic Centers) are considerably more grand in comparison to those with predominately black memberships, and tend to be in more affluent areas mirrors the disparity in access to financial resources, and socioeconomic status of their respective constituents. One thing that must also be considered is that being that many of the immigrant Muslims have maintained ties to organizations in their homelands, they also have access to resources and finances beyond what is provided by their members. Black Muslim communities tend to be among the lower classes having little money to contribute, and generally being without readily available additional support. All of which serve as distinct differences between the two communities that can facilitate division.

How do the two groups share space?

Elliot (2007) explores tensions within the masjid further. The discussion is centered on an observation at the Long Island Islamic Center (LIIC) during a meeting in which they (The LIIC) were being soliciting for funds by al-hajj Talib Abdur –Rashid for a Harlem masjid that was in

acute need of structural repair. Imam Talib's community was predominately black, whereas the

LIIC (led by Dr. Khan) was made up of South Asian and Arab doctors and engineers. The prayer

lines at LIIC were littered with expensive purses, and the parking lot was lined with BMW's and

Mercedes-Benz's. Most of the congregants in the Harlem Masjid take the subway. Additionally,

the author notes that Islam for blacks is an "experience both spiritual and political, an expression

of empowerment in a country they feel is dominated by a white elite" as we saw in Curtis (2013),

Howell (2013), and Abdullah (2013). For immigrant Muslims on the other hand, Islam is an

inherited identity, and America symbolized a place worthy of their efforts at assimilation due to

the opportunity it offered. Narrating some of Imam Talib's challenges, she recalls him explaining

how he unsuccessfully tried to generate support at immigrant masjids to protest the shooting

death of an African Muslim (Ahmadou Diallo) at the hands of police. He noted on domestic

affairs like police brutality, "all of a sudden we are by ourselves" as immigrant Muslims

preferred to send money overseas as opposed to addressing the issues of poor Muslims in

America similar to what was referenced in Howell (2013), Turner (1997), and others.

Immigrants Muslims say they are unappreciative of the "racial politics" of some black Muslims.

Yet, black Muslims counter with the assessment that they (brown Muslims) need to learn the

historical narrative of black Muslims which includes FBI surveillance that dates back to the

1960's. Finally, there is the discussion of leadership. As was alluded to earlier in Howell (2013),

Abdullah (2013), and Mamiya (2003), immigrant Muslims have posited themselves as the

authorities on Islam much to the chagrin of an indigenous black Muslim community that has

been present almost a century at the point that this article was written in 2007. Immigrant

Muslims respond with the same discussion of knowledge of Arabic that were discussed in

Mamiya (2003), but the article cites the response of University of Kentucky professor Ihsan

Bagby (also black) who asked "What does knowing Arabic have to do with quality of your prayer, your fast, your relationship with God?" Finally, the tension heightened in 2000 when an influential group of immigrant Muslims endorsed George Bush after a promise to stop profiling Arabs. This further alienated black Muslim leadership because they were not consulted and left out of the discussion altogether (Elliott 2007[7]).

In a related discussion in Jackson (2005), several things that we have discussed are tied together. The discussion begins with the author making it clear that the "valuation of race" is owed more to the contextual particularities of America than any orthodox precept of Islam, and American "whiteness" has been situated as the "prize" achievement of any citizen. When the 1965 Immigration Act opening the floodgates to immigrants from the Middle East and Asia, it not only facilitated opportunities for a better material life, but it also allowed them to participate in "real whiteness." We saw this same discussion in Kayyali (2004), Turner (1997), Karim (2009), and others. By this time however, "whiteness" had become "sanitized" in the regard that

---

[7] In Elliot (2007), what is central in this discussion is the rift between black and brown Muslims. As was noted previously, brown Muslims tend to be removed from the realities and concerns of their black co-religionists which frustrates the perceived "unity" of the American Muslim community. When black Muslims are galvanized by issues facing their communities, but cannot get support from their brown counterparts, it is reasonable to assume that this would have a racially polarizing effect especially when brown Muslims generate lots of interest and money to support issues specifically related to their own experiences, while black Muslims are left feeling "on their own" as Imam Talib referenced. Next and as has been addressed on several occasions to this point, due to the differences in experience, socioeconomic status, history, and background, Islam is going to be articulated differently among the different groups. This arguably would be doubly true if you are a group whose identity is historically shaped by experiences of racial discrimination, and you cannot get the support of your brothers and sisters in faith whom have made painstaking efforts to not only integrate into "whiteness," but assume positions of authority of a community that your ancestors established well before their arrival, and at the same time disassociate themselves from you. Consequently, despite efforts to deracialize their Islamic practice, the Blackamerican experience of racial discrimination remains to be a staple of their experience as being black, American, and Muslim. In regard to the endorsing of George Bush, it could be argued that this serves as evidence of an assumed superiority complex among brown Muslim, and the presence of an immigrant hegemony. At minimum, this suggests a disavowal of their presence as the decision was made without the input of black Muslim leadership. However, it is important to recognize that this is, on some level, is supported by the American mainstream's understanding of Islam as "foreign" and non-black. President Bush was very specific in his promise to address the profiling of "Arabs," but not "Muslims" as a whole. Assuming that "Arabs" was used to be synonymous with "Muslims," this idea plays on the associated foreignness of , and the racialization of Islam by positing the face of Islam as an "Arab" one. Additionally, the fact that they were used as part of this political maneuver addresses the disparity of cultural capital (recognition, visibility, and influence) that is typical to the Blackamerican experience whether they are Muslim or not.

countless others had gained admission into "whiteness," and this had an homogenizing effect on

very different groups of people. Yet, Jackson (2005) makes very clearly that the one racial

epithet that maintained its edge was that of "nigger" and the new arrivals would make every

possible effort to distance themselves from this stigmatized category. Drawing back on

Abdullah's (2013) discussion of immigrants already having preconceived notions of race before

their arrival in the United States, Jackson (2005) notes that the existing racial climate of America

was guaranteed to entrench any existing bias they had. Additionally, as discussed in Kayyali

(2004) and others, the construction of "whiteness" was utilized by brown Muslims as a way

authenticating their presence in America and their quick climb up the socioeconomic ladder,

while those same parameters continued to marginalize blacks. Also key to this discussion is that

the immigrants' "deracialized," and "putatively universal" brand of Islam was helpless in the

face of a pronounced American racial order. Like Abdullah (2013) and Turner (1997), the author

notes that there has been an explicit discourse of resistance to anti-black discrimination that has

been central to articulations of Islamic identity among black Muslims (2005[8]).

 In a related discussion regarding authority, Jackson (2009) offers an exploration of the nature of

the change of authority of Islam in America by exploring the origins of early Islam in the black

community. For Jackson (2009), Islam in the black community should be understood as a child

---

[8] Simply put, what can be gathered from Jackson's (2005) discussion is that where the Muslim community is
concerned, the same "whiteness" that embraced and facilitated immigrant Muslims' ascension up the socioeconomic
ladder, is the same "whiteness" that continued to marginalize black people in general, and almost permanently
situate them at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. This rendered the "deracialized" discourses of Islam brought
by brown Muslims futile in addressing the issues related to racism that were typical to the black experience. Also, it
is possible that the condescending attitude assumed by brown Muslims towards emphasis on race that was discussed
in Abdullah (2013), Elliot (2007), and Turner (1997) also functioned to further alienate black Muslims from their
brown counterparts. To this point, brown Muslims have challenged the "Muslimness" of black Muslims because of
their emphasis on race, an assumed ignorance to Arabic as well as the basic tenets of Islam, and have shown a
pointed reluctance to support agendas the speak to the experiences of black Muslims. In combination with a
construct of "whiteness" working for brown Muslims and working against black Muslims, black Muslims are placed
in situation in which they either have to make great compromises with regard to their identity and Islamic discourses
that speak to them in order to fit in, or separate themselves as black Muslims tend to have experiences with
immigrant Muslims and in immigrant Muslim communities that mirror those they have with mainstream white
America.

of black religion. Black religion, absent of any particular religion, theology, orthodoxy, or ecclesiastical authority, is more appropriately understood as an orientation of sorts. One which is characterized as a "deism" typical to Blackamericans that entails a belief in a "God" that is independent of human history, yet manifests itself in the "crucible" of America race relations. For the author, Abdullah (2013), Elliot (2007) and others, black Islam should be understood as a "holy protest" against white supremacy and all its associated consequences and effects. Effectively, prior to 1965, Black Religion was the self-authenticating force through which black articulations of Islam were validated. It was with the influx of immigrants from the Muslim world, that the image of Islam in America changed, and a new authority on Islam was introduced to the American imagination (2009).

Who speaks for Islam in America?

In exploring the rift between black and brown Muslims, to this point we have examined many of the fundamental differences in history, experience, and socioeconomic status that were addressed in Kayyali (2004), but here Jackson delves into the differences in the said authority of each group. Being that early articulations of Islam in the black community typically did not include, and was not governed by the classical Islamic sciences, their brand of Islam was self-authenticated through a narrative of oppression that stemmed from slavery and Jim Crow-based discrimination as was discussed in Abdullah (2013), Elliot (2007), Curtis (2013), and others. This "orientation" of Black Religion, and subsequently black Islam, situates an experience of race-based marginalization at the center of Islam for black Muslims, whereas brown, or immigrant Muslims governed their articulations of Islam through discourses associated with classical Islam and the Islamic sciences. This particular point cannot be overstated when trying to contextualize the black and brown divide among Muslims.

33

Continuing with Jackson (2005), he offers further explanation regarding the issue of leadership that was mentioned in Abdullah (2013), Howell (2013), and Mumiya (2003). Jackson (2005) mentions several things that contributed to the battle of authority over Islam in America. The first thing he mentions is that black Muslims assumed that the immigrant Muslims'critical posture against Western imperialism could be used to forge a commonness with their challenge to anti-black racism. Not only were they wrong in this assumption, but they would soon find out that in the minds of immigrant Muslims, anti-black racism, nor many other issues related to the black experience would be received as having no "Islamic value." The author states that this is largely the case because the perspectives and ideological stances of each group tend to reflect the positionalities, histories, and experiences that inform their articulations of Islam. This in itself is not a problem so much as is the tendency to posit ones particular narrative as the lens through which Islam is to be received, understood, and represented. However the author notes that these histories do not have to be viewed as antagonistic towards one another as the differing histories could serve as the bridge to connecting the communities if there was both a mutual recognition and respect for each other's experience and cultural legacy. Yet, the author notes that "both groups remain locked in a racial and ethnic essentialism that impedes their ability to embrace their Western heritages." What is authentically "American" or "Western," and all the implied superiority that accompanies it, is at the mercy of a dominant group that has dubbed "blackness," (and all that is non-white) as alien, consumerist, and mere subjects of Western culture as opposed to acknowledging their contributions to it. It is precisely this ideological space that has made it difficult for all non-white (especially black) Muslims to find a "home." Finally, Jackson (2005) notes that immigrant Islam tends to operate within an ethos that has a "will to dominate," as opposed to the "will to liberate" that is more typical to black religion. This speaks to the existing

gulf between the two groups being largely a byproduct of "difference" of history, perspective, experience, and historical narrative (2005)[9].

Regarding the discussion of authority of Islam in America, Curtis (2013) and adds a new perspective. Echoing similar sentiments of Elliot (2007), Kayyali (2004), Mamiya (2003), and Sanders (2012), the author notes that from a period beginning in 1965, roughly 1.1 million Muslims arrived in the United States prior to the end of the 20th century. As was noted in Howell (2013), members of this new group challenged and eventually displaced existing immigrant leaders. Their challenge was complimented by the fact that the newcomers had significantly higher levels of capital in the form of educational credentials, and money when compared to the preexisting brown or immigrant Muslim community. Shortly after their arrival in the United States, not only did they displace the existing bodies of leadership, but during the decades of the 1960's through to the 1980's, they posited themselves as the voice of "authentic" Islam. According to the author, the media, scholars, and varying agencies, ignorant to diversity among Muslims and within Islam as a whole, took their word for it. The author notes that this drastically changed the landscape of Islam in America because prior to 1965, black Muslims represented the face of Islam in America. However, Curtis (2013) suggests that immigrant Muslim's becoming the face of Islam also fit a pointed governmental agenda as well. It was during the period of the 1960's that the political, racialist, and separatist discourses of the Nation of Islam (NOI) were deemed as a potential threat to upset the established racial and

---

[9] Jackson (2005) offers a unique perspective on some discussions that have already taken place to this point. The Blackamerican Muslim's assumption that their coreligionists' stance against American imperialism would mesh with their resistance to racial discrimination was a faulty one. Not only did the two positions not mesh, but the latter's concern was not afforded the privilege of even being an Islamically relevant one in the minds of immigrant Muslims. Again, this in league with all the aforementioned experiences of condescension and discrimination at the hands of brown Muslims have mirrored black Muslims experience as Muslims, as well as Blackamericans. Not only did they find that the seemingly common thread shared between the two groups would not be received, but it would not be received because of a pronounced immigrant Muslim hegemony, and assumption of authority with regard to Islam in America. As a result, their narratives, prescriptions, and articulations of Islam were the only authentic ones with no recognition of those associated with the indigenous (or black) Muslim community.

socioeconomic order of society. The fact that the NOI were dually a political as well as religious organization posed a problem to the government as religious activity was protected under the constitution. Being that the political and religious activities were not mutually exclusive from one another, in order to create an opportunity for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (or FBI) to infiltrate these groups and get convictions for alleged "criminals," they launched a campaign to destroy the NOI's credibility as a religious organization. This was also referenced in Elliot (2007). Consequently, they (black Muslims and the NOI in particular) became "cults," religious leaders became "charlatans," and followers were labeled as "misguided," or "improper" believers. The religious aspects of these groups and their political activities were painted as a smokescreen of sorts for scams to makes money, or orient blacks towards political radicalism. This was the crucial point at which brown Muslims with their assimilationist and apolitical articulations of Islam were chosen as the face of Islam in America, black Muslims became "not real" or "fake" Muslims (Curtis 2013)[10].

Furthering the discussion of authority, Grewal (2014) offers an important, yet different contribution to this discussion. Grewal (2014) maps out the perpetual competition of religious authority and meshes it with a critique of tradition. According to the author, after the mid 1960's when the sole arbiter of Islam moved from Black religion and its' ethos of social activism, 1965

---

[10] The usurping of authority from the existing immigrant Muslim community, and becoming the "face" of Islam in America at the expense of the already established Blackamerican Muslim community set the stage for a gulf that would only widen between the two groups. Initially, black Muslim organizations where deemed threatening in regard to their racialized discourses and politics of separation, yet they were granted an heir of authority and legitimacy because they were the primary representation of Islam in America. Once the immigrants from the Muslim world arrived with their advanced educations and large bank accounts, their positing themselves as the authorities on Islam mutually served their own interests as well as the agendas of the government agencies that were searching for a way to discredit The NOI. At this juncture, brown Muslims' apolitical deracialized articulations of Islam in combination with their pro-assimilation attitude could be easily juxtaposed to the anti-establishment, separatist racialized discourses of The NOI. This not only served as the "in" needed to discredit The NOI as a religious organization and circumvent their constitutional rights as a religious groups, but the ideological differences were used to make villains of The NOI in the media. This fueled the public perception of black Muslims in general, and impetus for immigrant Muslims to further disassociate themselves from Blackamerican Muslims. Essentially, immigrant Islam becoming the representation of Islam in America served their own (immigrant) interests, as well as the federal governments, and both were at the expense of the comfort, credibility, and rights of black Muslims.

36

ushered in a period where immigrant Islam quickly became the most numerous and visible representation of Islam as noted in Kayyali (2004), Jackson (2005) and others. What makes Grewal's (2014) discussion unique from the others is the assertion that religious authority, not just in America, but within the Sunni immigrant community as a whole, was restructured along class lines. This had the effect of situating educated professionals as the custodians of religious authority, as opposed to those who had been formally trained in the Islamic sciences. Consequently, those charged with being the leaders of the Muslim community were engineers, accountants, and doctors as opposed to imams.

The aforementioned factor could account for why much of what was propagated as "Islam" from these individuals was heavily predicated on "tradition," which is also situated in particular culture-specific understandings. Although Grewal (2014) contextualizes her critique of "tradition" in a discussion specific to American students traveling to the Muslim World for Islamic instruction, I'd argue that this particular critique holds true for the general usage of the term "tradition" regardless of the context in which it is used. Grewal notes that the treatment of "tradition" as a static object that is internally transferred and handed down through time uninterrupted will not take us very far in understanding any religion. Conceiving of tradition as a uniform, unchanging entity creates a situation in which anything that appears outside of that narrow realm becomes inherently problematic (Grewal 2014). Instead, the author advocates a view of tradition as an analytical tool and set of discourses attached to interpretations and fundamental precepts that Muslims apply to their lives. This is preferred and more beneficial as opposed to understanding Islam as a uniform system in which Muslims simply "behave," and act as agentless beings that do not do any actual thinking.

CONCLUSION

The discussion of how racial identities and politics of both black and brown Muslims have evolved since 1965 is a very complicated discussion. One in which the discussion regarding brown or immigrant Muslims entails a prerequisite examination of how they navigated race prior to that period. They initially were not white, but enjoyed the privileges of "whiteness." Then they became Asian. They then became white again. The navigation of racial identity for blacks has not followed the same course. Primarily due to many blacks have darker complexions, and phenotypical features "understood" as being black or African, they tend be marked in a way that permanently situates them within a racial hierarchy that places them at the bottom. There is also some similarity in the experiences of the two Muslim communities. Both have been embattled trying to gain citizenship, both are pathologized as threats, and both are or have been under FBI surveillance at one point due to their being framed and ultimately understood as threats. Yet racial harmony eludes them because one group (brown Muslims) was granted admission into "whiteness," and all its perceived benefits that the other (blacks in general) has historically been barred from. This sets the stage for the entrenching of fundamental departures between the two groups. Brown Muslims tend to be educated, and middle to upper-middle class, whereas black Muslims tend to be uneducated, and poor to lower-class. These fundamental differences, in combinations with the complexities of identity and experience, have facilitated unique articulations, experiences, perceptions, and positions within the racial order that tend to be specific to each group. Because all the aforementioned attributes are different, effectively so is their "Islam" and the gulf between black and brown Muslims should probably be understood as the consequence of fundamental differences in "who" these groups are culturally, historically, and socially.

CHAPTER 3: THE NEW FACE OF ISLAM IN AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

My interest in the development of Muslim identity in the United States and its subsequent influence on intra-faith relationships entails an exploration of a very complicated, nuanced, and at times competing narrative of difference between the black and immigrant Muslim communities. The differences in these narratives tend to center around differences in history, experience, conceptions of race, and class. Further, differences in the aforementioned areas will generally yield differences in the appearance, and articulation of Islam. This is central to the analysis because in observing the differences between the two communities, much of the particularities and nuances of Islam in the black community are best contextualized and understood as responses to the needs, changes, and challenges they face in simultaneously negotiating two stigmatized identities of being black and Muslim.

The largest challenge however, was finding a theoretical framework that would address power, identity, and privilege while simultaneously addressing their interconnectedness and interdependence on one another. The theoretical framework that I employ in my dissertation is Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power. In discussing symbolic power, however, there are several key interrelated components that are essential to understanding how symbolic power works, and subsequently its application to this research. More specifically, legitimation and misrecognition, symbolic violence, habitus, and symbolic capital are all working parts of the symbolic power paradigm. This essay will begin with an exploration of the theoretical roots of symbolic power, as well as what it "is." This will be followed a discussion of legitimation and misrecognition which will then feed into a discussion of symbolic capital. At this point, a discussion of symbolic violence and its contributions to symbolic power will begin. Finally, "habitus" will then be

examined to situate and contextualize the dynamics of the particular power relations of interest. All are complimentary to one another, and function simultaneously as cognitive, communicative, and dominating functions that are present in all cultural expressions. It should be noted that due to the interrelatedness of all of these concepts and their functions, these concepts will frequently appear in sections devoted to other concepts and at times will used be interchangeably with varying emphasis on their nature and function for the sake of explanation (Swartz 2013). Each of these discussions will also offer specific applications to the development of Muslim identity and intra-faith relations in the American Muslim community.

SYMBOLIC POWER

Symbolic power is the ability to give the impression of natural, inescapable, and disinterested appearances to symbols that function as relations of power. These symbols and their associated meanings are posited in a manner that assumes "legitimacy." In this regard, symbolic power is a "meta power" in that it both designates and legitimates power (Loveman 2005). These symbols and their meanings go on to shape "reality" by imposing cognitive lenses through which people understand the world. Symbolic power also preserves and alters "realities" by molding representations through the use of classifications that shield the arbitrary nature of their authority. Imposed, symbolic power is effectively a culture specific form of domination which functions as a constitutive power in the regard that it forms social identities and influences intergroup interactions. For Bourdieu, the act of naming and classifying is responsible for the formation of associations and divisions, and these acts not only bring competing groups into existence, but it tends to define the relationship they will have with each other. That particular attribute will be key to the project (Swartz 2013).

The roots of Bourdieu's conception of symbolic power stem from the structuralist, constructionist, and power traditions of sociology. It is "structuralist" in the regard that symbols are understood as instruments that construct meaning, "constructionist" in that symbols serve as instruments of communication, and "power" related as symbols serve to legitimize varying uses of force or domination (Swartz 2013). Explaining the structuralist angle further, Bourdieu states that there exists "objective structures which are independent of the consciousness and desires of agents and are capable of guiding or constraining their practices, or their representations." Symbolic power also utilizes "constructivism" in the regard that it serves as a "social genesis" of worldviews, ideas, and behaviors (Bourdieu 1990). The emphasis on domination in this paradigm is reminiscent of Bourdieu's criticism of producers of culture. For Bourdieu, they have a tendency to attach value to culture in a manner that suggests an intrinsic value rather than acknowledging that power relations are at play (Swartz 2013).

Located within his extensive work in the exercise and reproduction of class-based power and privilege, Bourdieu's view of the world is one in which society is fundamentally made up of individuals, groups, and institutions that facilitate hierarchical structures. These structures, in turn, foster conflict, competition, and ultimately stratify society. This fundamentality is located within Bourdieu's assessment that all cultural symbols, practices, ideas, knowledge, and language embody specific interests that function to strengthen existing social distinctions (Swartz 1996).

As an imposed power, symbolic power is an expression of domination typically at the hands of the state in modern societies, and generally only available to those in power. Oftentimes, but not exclusively, the power relationship is expressed through language. As a "world-making" power that finds its expression in varying social classifications that tend to

organize individual, groups , and social space itself, symbolic power must also be understood as a stratifying power that reproduces, and secures existing social hierarchies (Swartz 2013). A unique attribute of symbolic power is that while it is imposed, it does not manifest itself unilaterally, but is situated with a context of struggle over understandings of the social world and serves as the site of struggle for marginalized and dominated groups.

"WHITENESS" AS SYMBOLIC POWWER

In symbolic power functioning to bring groups into "existence" and establish the relationship they will have with each other, it should be noted that prior to 1965, blacks were the face of Islam in America. This idea is central to the analysis because it was the preexisting racial order of America that seasoned articulations and understandings of Islam, as well as Muslim identity. In this instance, the symbolic power is that of "whiteness." Due to the racial order of the United States, "whiteness" has been the prized identity. With immigrants from the Muslim World officially becoming white in 1924 (Kayyali 2004), and being clear on the stigma attached to the label "nigger" (Jackson 2005), the racial binary that is the United States necessitated a situation in which the best way for Muslim immigrants to take advantage of their ascribed "whiteness" was to disassociate themselves as much as possible from blacks in general, which also included their brand of Islam (primarily the NOI). Being that black articulations of Islam during the early 20th century to the 1960's was largely political, separatist, and racialized, immigrant Islam fashioned itself in the farthest polar opposite available. Thus, the apolitical, integrationist, and deracialized brand of Islam associated with immigrants was born. This exemplifies Bourdieu's idea that "objective" structures that are independent of agents' consciousness, desires, guiding behavior, practices, as well as representations (Swartz 2013). "Whiteness" and all that encompassed it served as a guiding principle or idea for how immigrant

Muslims would fashion their racial and religious identity which in turn, fashioned interactions with their black coreligionists. The symbolic power attached to the construction of "whiteness" as well as the immigrant Muslim relational admission into this construct not only facilitated a racial division between the two groups (bringing them into existence), but the racially charged context informed by "whiteness," in addition to the accompanying stigma of blackness functioned to incentivize the distancing of immigrant Muslims from blacks whether they were Muslim or not. Under such circumstances, a hierarchy of sorts is created dually in both the racial order, as well as within the Muslim community. The granting of "whiteness" to Muslim immigrants in combination with their advanced educations and labor skills served to facilitate a fairly smooth assimilation into the socioeconomic order. However, it was the exact same "whiteness" that served as a barrier for assimilation for blacks (Jackson 2005), which would come to represent a similar obstruction for their successful integration into the American Muslim community.

Speaking of "whiteness" becoming "sanitized" by the 1960's due to differing groups being incorporated into at times and removed from it at others, both Jackson (2005) and Kayyali (2004) speak to the idea of "whiteness" having an arbitrary element to it much like Bourdieu suggests about all objective structures. Further, the worldview that is facilitated by "whiteness" functioned as a structuring of social space for immigrant Muslims which also encompasses a worldview of themselves, their black counterparts, the spaces they should inhabit, which would come to influence how they should practice Islam. Returning to their efforts to separate themselves from blacks, their imposed positionality within the racial order placed them in a situation that was below that of whites, but above blacks. In fact, the construction of "whiteness" was so pronounced and hegemonic in nature that immigrant Muslims still distanced themselves

from blacks even after blacks started to identify more closely with Classical or "Islam-proper" in the 1970's (Karim 2009). Followed by their mass movement to white suburbia, brown or immigrant Muslim efforts to assimilate were primarily predicated on being as "white" as possible which also included the emulation of anti-black attitudes (Prashad 2000). Yet we should all remember that "whiteness" in and of itself, has no intrinsic value, but the value that is associated with it is just a byproduct of the power relations that construct it. Further, this emulation of "whiteness" speaks to the class-based power and privilege associated with the symbolic power of "whiteness." Being that "whiteness" functions unilaterally as a marker of location within the racial order as well as being correlated to socioeconomic class, the construction of "whiteness" and all those things associated with it gain a privileged status. More specifically, the privileging of white associated spaces (suburbia), behaviors, and attitudes (anti-black racism, and/or racial know-nothingism) speak to a privileging of "whiteness."

Finally, as symbolic power reproduces preexisting relations of power, so too does "whiteness." From the perspective of immigrant Muslims, their efforts to be considered "white" despite their obvious cultural, and occasional phenotypical differences speaks to an acknowledgement of the benefits of "whiteness." Considering this, their efforts to be included in "whiteness" served to reproduce a class and color system in the sense that despite the fact that brown Muslim immigrants were "white," their "whiteness" only had value in the regard that they were "not quite" black. This effectively places brown Muslims in a racial hierarchy that still situates white people at the top of a racial order, and blacks at the bottom. As noted in Prashad (2000), the racial order situated "blackness" as being "alien" to being "American" and this offered an "in" to brown Muslims aiming to assimilate to do so as a "go-between" of sorts in the

regard that their conditional "whiteness," suggested that although they were not-quite white, they were still in a better than, and in a better place than blacks.

LEGITIMATION AND MISRECOGNITION

For Bourdieu, all forms of power require legitimation. Legitimation or "cultural schema," are the ideas situated within everyday assumptions that both individuals and groups make about the governing structures of their "world." Arbitrary in nature, these assumptions are effectively a "taken-for-granted" set of widely held and shared understandings that appear self-evident, become internalized, and only have "relational" meaning (Swartz 2013, Bourdieu 1990, and Moore 2004). These understanding then become a dominant vision or point of view that prevailed against competing perspectives. For Bourdieu, it is precisely this worldview that becomes the site of contention and establishes the limits and possibilities by shaping the "reality" of a social space. As a consequence of its triumph against competing narratives, and its subsequent internalization, this worldview becomes posited as universal and takes on the appearance of "common sense." A key feature of legitimation is that these understandings take on the appearance of being "objective" and appear both disinterested and disconnected in the very power relations that bore them (Swartz 2013). The legitimation of the existing social order is not simply the byproduct of a propaganda so much as it is the result of the application of associated ideas that are themselves products of these arbitrary understandings. Utilizing what Reeves (1995) calls the "anti-language of disprivilege," legitimations'" function becomes a dual one: By not acknowledging the arbitrary nature of the structures that govern ones' world, it simultaneously grants the very privilege it disavows, and further entrenches existing power relations. In this regard, legitimized power is more "apparent" than real (1995).

Imperative to the discussion of legitimation is "misrecognition." Misrecognition is the failure to recognize the arbitrary nature of the order itself (Swartz 2013), or the failure to recognize that power relations are even involved (Loveman 2005). For Bourdieu, social actors misrecognize the arbitrary nature of their power or powerlessness as a consequence of the internalization of the associated benefits or costs attached to their given position. Under these circumstances, symbols, behaviors, ideas, etc. become divorced from context and become misconstrued as resulting from some universal understanding or concept of justice (Swartz 2013). Misrecognition is said to appear at both the levels of the dominant as well as the dominated, and are thought to be most effective with the complicity of either those whom don't know that they exercise power, or are subject to the whims of the powerful. Yet, it is pointedly more sinister for the dominated as their misrecognition of arbitrary authority not only leads them to become active participants in their own marginalization by adopting the worldviews of those in power, but they also fail to recognize that they are working against their own interests (Swartz 2013). Further, due to the internalization of these arbitrary structures, the dominated don't entertain the idea of rejecting this authority, because they have internalized the idea that challenging these discourses is beyond their scope of possibility (Swartz 2013).

BROWN MUSLIMS, LETITIMATION, AND UNIVERSALIZING THE PARTICULAR

At this juncture it is key to note that Bourdieu argues that legitimation is necessary for any exercise in power. Understood as cultural schema, because the Islam associated with immigrant or brown Muslims has been posited as the "real" Islam by the American government, their articulations of Islam are privileged over all others. Curtis (2013) has a discussion that implicates the United States government as having a pointed agenda in displacing black articulations of Islam with those of brown or immigrant Muslims'. More specifically, it was

during the period of the 1960's that the political, racialist, and separatist discourses of the Nation of Islam (NOI) were deemed as a potential threat to upset the established racial and socioeconomic order of society. With the NOI being dually politically as well as religiously active, and being that neither was mutually exclusive, this posed a problem to the government as religious activity was protected under the constitution. This forced the FBI had to frame the NOI as "criminals," and "not real Muslims" in an effort to destroy the credibility that this organization had as a religious one. As a result, there was a government sponsored attack on this group that utilized propaganda that dually functioned to villainize black Muslims (The NOI) and juxtapose their brand of Islam to the apolitical, deracialized, and integrationist discourses associated with educated and largely middle class brown or immigrant Islam. The dictates of the latter would come to constitute "real" Islam.

Discussing this image of "real" Islam, Curtis also (2002) speaks on a "tension" that exists between "universalism" and "particularism" that has always been present in Islam. This tension is one in which differing groups entered into competition among themselves for the power to posit their "particular" lens as "universal." Not only as Bourdieu suggests in his analysis, do the victors of these competitions. Curtis (2002) went on to speak of these particularisms as "exclusionary and hierarchical" in nature. Central to his analysis is that the ambiguous (or as Bourdieu called arbitrary) nature of these "universals" tend to provide opportunity to forge a "universality" that can be either "egalitarian" or increasingly "exclusive."

Further, the arbitrary nature of this image of what "real" Islam is is addressed by Jackson (2005). Jackson speaks to the presence of what he terms "false universals in Islam." Describing them as "history internalized, normalized, and then forgotten as history," he notes first that false universals come to function to serve the material and/or psychological interests of those with the

power to define these parameters. This consequently leads to the "universalization" of "particular" perspectives which renders the consequent false universals a tool of domination in and of themselves. With that in mind, immigrant understandings, applications, and perspectives on Islam are granted a particular legitimacy and authenticity that tends to get internalized by many Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Arbitrary and relational, this serves Bourdieu's conceptualization very well as the "power" to establish what Islam "is," and "what" it looks like became a site of struggle for black and brown Muslims. Internalized as "legitimate" and misrecognized as "real," these structures are, as Bourdieu noted, more apparent than "real."

SYMBOLIC CAPITAL

The exercise of symbolic power requires the recognition of authority. This aspect is what Bourdieu described as capital (symbolic or cultural). Functioning in a manner similar to that of legitimation, it is understood as a faith-in, or reverence of sorts. It is a widespread and publicly recognized authority attached to an individual or group from which the symbolic power emanates. This gives authority figures the power to impose specific social realities on others and these "realities" take the appearance of being "legitimate." These activities, ideas, and resources accumulate so much symbolic power that not only do they appear disinterested from relations of power, but they are also misrecognized as being disinterested in the very relations of power that they emanate from (Swartz 2013).

Cultural capital is best understood as a resource(s) that functions as a relation of power by becoming the source of both competition and valuable resources. Bourdieu notes that this competition extends to non-material things such as prestige, knowledge, and educational credentials as was referenced earlier. Focusing on class-based meanings and usages of cultural capital, Bourdieu notes that actors are not conscious of these relationships, nor are they engaged

in explicit efforts to achieve specific ends. The choices made by these individuals are "tacit," and are a reflection of their own accumulated capital and internalization of discourses associated with their given position (Swartz 1996).

Symbolic capital is a power source that appears in the form of authority accumulated by individuals' but is often associated to the position(s) that individual holds. This authority, or capital associated with the individuals' position then becomes understood to be the result of some personal characteristic of the individual themselves. For instance, a teachers' authority actually comes from the institution, but is understood to be the result of some personal quality of the teacher themselves. In such a situation, systemic properties are dwarfed and misrecognized as attributes that are owed to the individual rather than being associated with the title or the given position (Swartz 2013). Due to symbolic (or cultural) capital being embedded within social networks, membership within these networks is necessary to access the benefits associated with the said networks. Social capital also functions in a similar manner when titles or distinction are awarded. In these cases, symbolic capital is gained by an actor endowed with credentials by those in power (Swartz 2013).

Additionally, because symbolic capital is "social," it is closely associated with identity. For Bourdieu, identity is dependent on symbolic capital because identity emerges from "insignificance" and under such circumstances, identity can only come from being recognized by those with power. Identity in itself is thought to be the byproduct of a struggle for recognition. What is key in this idea is that everyone has symbolic capital, but the caveat is that the distribution of this capital is not equal as high levels of recognition tend to appear in situations characterized by bureaucratic and/or hierarchical relations. The lowest levels of symbolic capital

or "negative symbolic capital" can be observed in those that carry stigmatized statuses or identities (Swartz 2013).

Returning briefly, to symbolic power, one of its most exemplary forms is the power to create groups and this is based on two things in particular: 1) Symbolic power must be based on the possession of symbolic capital. The power to impose on other minds a worldview, or regime of understanding depends on the level of authority acquired in previous symbolic struggles. Symbolic capital, functioning as a credit of sorts, is what is granted to individuals or institutions that have the power to impose recognition, or have the power of constitution. This power can be manifested in the creation, mobilization, maintenance of, or endorsement of a group as an agent that is recognized as "official." Secondly, symbolic effectiveness is heavily predicated on the degree to which the imposed vision is understood to be rooted in "reality." "It is only if it is true, that is, adequate to things, that a description can create things" (Swartz 2013). Because symbolic power tends to create with words, it has the power of allegiance and exposure of things that are already present. For Bourdieu, the struggle of classification is as fundamental to class struggle as is the power to impose worldviews and make things explicit, and visible distinctions invisible (Bourdieu 1990).

SYMBOLIC CAPITAL, "ARABIZATION," AND THE ARBITRARY

As was noted earlier, in order for symbolic power to function, it also requires symbolic capital. In this instance, the symbolic or cultural capital of interest in this case is that which is assumed by immigrants due to their being posited as the "real" Muslims as was discussed in the last section, but also due to the "Arabization" of Islam. According to Ghosal (2010), Arabization is best explained as the homogenization of, or forming of identities based on specific institutions, practices, and beliefs attached to the ever-changing and growing Muslim community in Arabia in

the years immediately following the death of The Prophet Muhammad (SAW). It is this process that aimed to cleanse the practice of Islam of all "aberrations" in Islamic practice that resulted from long encounters with Un-Islamic beliefs and customs of other societies. Due to the original Muslim community consisting primarily of Arabs, all that is associated with them (family structure, names, and culture) has dually been associated with Islam and has come to constitute what is authentically "Islamic." However, Ghosal (2010) notes that this is problematic for several reasons: 1) Most of the worlds' Muslims are not Arab, 2) there is no monolithic, or standardized culture or brand of Islam that is practiced among the Arabs, and 3) passing off "Arab culture" as "Islam" is exclusionary, and potentially disrespectful to other Muslims. As a consequence, emulation of Arabs and Arab culture has been endowed with symbolic capital and the associated behaviors are incentivized as a consequence. Ghosal (2010) notes that this becomes clearest in observing the behaviors of converts who take on Arab names, and adopt Arab styles of dress which in turn, reinforces the Arab cultural hegemony that many converts and non-Arab Muslims suggests marginalizes them. Additionally, the Arabic language plays a key role in this as well. Because Arabic is the language of revelation for Islam, it also functions to reinforce the hegemonic nature of Arab culture and functions as a tool of power.

In the context of our discussion of the American ummah (Muslim community) non-Arab Muslim immigrants have had longer and greater exposure to the forces of Arabization due to the geographical and cultural proximities of their countries of origin. In terms of intra-faith dynamics, the cultural, geographic as well as racial identity of American blacks oftentimes bars them from this exposure, which in turn bars them from having access to this capital. What Arabization presents is an exemplary case of "reverence" for arbitrary cultural articulations that come to be associated with "true" Islam. Consequently, even non-Arab Muslim associated with

51

these particular articulations and forms have been granted a capital to impose those forms on others which speaks explicitly to Bourdieu's discussion of how capital can function as a courtesy of association with social networks.

This same idea is spoken of in Jackson (2005). Albeit in a more general way, he speaks of how the spread of Islam in Africa, did not require complete and total emulation of, or absorption within Arab culture. However, due to the globalization of Islam, this "Arabized" brand of Islam has been granted a certain level of "capital," both symbolically and culturally that no other nation, or group can compete with. Consequently, many ethnic groups in many nations have come to identify themselves as "Arabs," or have been acculturated by an Islamic influence that is largely Arab in origin. In the end, as symbolic capital suggests, their association with this particular cultural identity grants immigrant Muslims a certain capital based on geographic and cultural proximity to the origins of Islam that inherently excludes most blacks. While there is nothing intrinsic, or anything specific to immigrant Islam that necessarily makes it any more "real," or "Islamic" than articulations of Islam by blacks, Arabized Islam carries with it a symbolic capital that is exclusive to that particular brand. Another example of this imposition associated with immigrant Islam would be the scoffing of immigrant Muslims at the racial discourses that tends to be present in black articulations of Islam (Abdullah 2013, Elliot 2007, and Turner 1997). This served to alienate black practitioners from their immigrant coreligionists thus reinforcing an arbitrary hierarchy within the Muslim community as they assume the power to establish the parameters of what is "authentic." In addition to dubbing discussions of race "un-Islamic," other issues arise with a seemingly common hesitance on behalf of immigrant Muslims to support concerns of the black community. This speaks to Bourdieu's recognition of class distinctions, and class based struggles as generally the support of any cause requires money, and

52

there is a drastic disparity in disposable income and access to resources of the Blackamerican

Muslims and brown Muslims as well as the communities they inhabit.

There are some black Muslims whom have taken these criticisms to heart, and have made

pointed attempts to appear more "Arab-like" under the guise that these changes were necessary

to be Muslim, and/or represent Islam properly. This speaks to Bourdieu's assessment that

cultural capital is closely aligned with identity. The effort of some black Muslims to assimilate

by appropriating the attire, approaches, articulation, names, and even (at times) immigrant-like

accents speaks to an effort to be recognized as "real" by brown Muslims as well as within the

American imagination. This struggle over the right to "name," represent, and be recognized is all

situated within the vestiges of symbolic/cultural capital.

SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

Symbolic violence is the "misrecognized" adherence to dictates of symbolic power.

Understood as legitimate, individuals and groups are unaware of the arbitrary nature of the

dictates in question. Described as a "gentle violence," it oftentimes takes on the characteristics of

being undetectable, and invisible. This is especially applicable to those whom are victims of it.

Although attempts by dominant groups to consciously dupe others with propaganda does take

place and would qualify as symbolic violence, that is not the focal point of Bourdieu's analysis.

Symbolic violence suggests the there is a preexisting set of ideas that are "taken-for-granted"

understandings that situate more pointed ideological symbols and messages in "reality."

Symbolic violence is somewhat similar to ideology and hegemony in the regard that it addresses

the effects of "legitimation" that "ideology-as-beliefs" and "justification" seem to ignore.

However, an analysis of symbolic violence critically approaches the practical ideas that

substantiate the existing social order as opposed to focusing on the explicit discourses associated

with it. While ideology tends to suggest emphasis on specific symbols, messages, and the socialization of certain ideas, symbolic violence suggest there is a pre-existing layer of schemes that work in combination with these things that make their internalization feasible. It is thus the symbolic power and violence that facilitates the capability of the state to display its ideological power (Swartz 2013).

Symbolic violence is understood as a "soft" violence. The use of this label is an intended "break" from conventional understandings of violence. The idea is to call attention to the arbitrary nature of all pedagogical content and forms of transition as opposed to just those that utilize physical coercion. Understood as part of the larger theory of legitimate violence that locates the attribute of "interchangeability," they are thought to be interchangeable because they are both rooted in hierarchical relations characterized by inequality (Swartz 2013). Symbolic violence generally manifests itself through the use of language. However, symbolic violence also occurs through bodily gestures that take place at the individuals as well as collective levels. This includes secular and religious rituals as they too mark social boundaries as space that goes misrecognized.

Symbolic violence shapes the classifications we employ in our everyday lives as even the cognitive understandings of the social space we inhabit are influenced by power relations. This influence ranges from the terminology we use, connections we make, the positions we assume, and the parameters of "possibility" that we accept (Swartz 2013). All of which are latent operations of power that are structured by the habitus which will become the focus of the following section. Bourdieu notes that the "structures of domination" require the never-ending work of all individuals and institutions within a given social space. Symbolic violence does not function within the realm of explicit "consciousness-as-consent." Instead, the work is done at

the point that everyday adaptations and applications of institutionally socialized ideas take place and it is at this point that symbolic violence is accomplished. Thriving on its "invisibility," it achieves this appearance through early and extensive socialization at the hands of the structures of domination (Swartz 2013). Also central to this analysis is the fact that actors of symbolic violence misrecognize the arbitrary nature of their power just as the dominated groups and individuals do. Removing from consideration the idea that power relations are even at work, associated practices become isolated, divorced from their arbitrary context, and take the appearance of being disinterested in power relations (Swartz 2013).

Additionally, symbolic violence also commands blind obedience. The social reproduction aspect of the interaction is stressed in power relations, as well as those consequences connected to personal and group identity. This suggests a pressure of sorts that results in a distortion of as well as an attack on both individual and group identities. In fact, Bourdieu labels it a "possession" of sorts as the effectiveness of symbolic violence is based on an individuals' or groups' previous exposure to institutional powers that yield conformity. It is at this point, that the dominated actors become active participants in the symbolic violence that is achieved. Absent of agency in this context, they are acting in accordance to the "fit" prescribed to them through their understanding of what is "possible" within the parameters associated with their given position. Whether dominant or dominated, they fully submit to it because they have internalized it and by internalizing these worldviews, individuals and groups become active agents in the maintenance of their attributed power and positions. This idea suggests that domination extends beyond objective structures as it is also situated in dispositions as it limits the perceived alternatives available to dominated individuals and groups (Swartz 2013).

"ARABIZATION" AS SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

In discussing symbolic violence, again we turn to Arabization. This time however, we understand it as an example of symbolic violence as it (sometimes) serves as a misrecognized adherence. To this point it has been established that the Arabization of Islam in America was primarily facilitated by the state. Consequently, the state designated power and legitimacy to the otherwise arbitrary "authenticity" of brown Muslims' understandings, articulations, and appearances of Islam. These things then become rooted in a "reality" that tends to structure the popular imagination of what "real" Islam looks like in a way that Bourdieu suggests is typical to the state.

Bourdieu asserts that symbolic violence is oftentimes carried out through the use of language. These terminologies then influences connections we make, the positions we assume, and the parameters of possibility associated with those imposed positions. I think that race, racial markers, or terms associated with race that are used in this project are exemplary of this power. In using any combination of the terms "immigrant," or "brown," within a discussion of Islam, those terms tend to conjure up an image in the American imagination that carries associations related to socioeconomic status, and ethnic/racial classifications that will more-than-likely exclude American blacks. Brown Muslims are thought to be foreign-born, apologists for "Islamic Terrorism" at best, or terrorists themselves as worst. Likewise when "black" and "Muslim" are combined in any fashion, the association is that the individual(s) is a convert, converted in jail, and/or is a member of the Nation of Islam. These are responses that tend to be more typical of other blacks when confronted with someone who is black and Muslim. All of which ignore the fact that at this point, Islam in the post-slavery black community is well over 100 years old (Jackson 2005, and Curtis 2002). Additionally, some of these same leaps are made occasionally by immigrant Muslims when they interact with black Muslims, but tend to be more nuanced.

There is an assumption that there is no literacy or competency in Arabic, a general ignorance to the most basic tenets of Islam (Turner 1997), and an implied association of stereotypes such as laziness or criminality that are associated with being black whether one is Muslim or not. These associations speak to Bourdieu's acknowledgement of how language not only speaks to reinforce existing hierarchies of knowledge and understanding, but also how it informs peoples' understanding of what is possible. It is here that the symbolic violence and an attack on identity is achieved. These associations and the cognitive parameters that these labels form effectively exacts symbolic violence.

However, symbolic violence is also exacted at the point that these associations are internalized and adapted to by the victims of symbolic violence. The invisibility of the problematic and pathologizing nature of these associations speaks to Bourdieu's noting that these parameters are divorced from the power relations that bore them. Being that much of these associations can be attributed to the representations of Islam for both black and brown Muslims utilized in media and "pop-culture," these associations have come to be situated in reality. Additionally, once these associations become legitimized and misrecognized, they tend to serve as prescriptions of sorts that govern behavior and understanding. For instance, in the discussion of Arabization, because the "brown" or immigrant Islam has become the face of American Islam as opposed to the preexisting black one, many black Muslims have come to try to "Arabize" themselves and their articulations of Islam as was discussed in the last section. Consequently, to avoid the attack on their identity as Muslims, and appear "legitimate" or as a "real" Muslim, the parameters of which Bourdieu speaks that form a "fit" of sorts become the guiding principle of Islam. It is also at this juncture that the internalization of the prescribed worldview occurs and actors become active, yet unconscious participants in their own marginalization.

HABITUS

Habitus is a term for the mental structuring of individuals' and groups' perception, thought and action (Bourdieu 1989), that functions as internalized dispositions that create "common sense" (Swartz 2013). This provides the lens through which individuals understand, and internalize their world. Being that the habitus is a perceptive disposition, it tends to vary according to position, place, and actor. Central to this idea is the fact that the most disadvantaged tend to perceive existing power relations as "natural" and tend to cause the "dominated" to look through the lenses of the "dominant" (Bourdieu 1989). Also called the "principles of vision and division," it not only shapes peoples' understanding of the world, but also provides guidelines through which to understand their place within it (Loveman 2005).

Acting dually as a system of "schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices," habitus tends to express not just the position of the actor themselves, but also that of those whom are not acting. This idea speaks to the fact that actors tend to produce "classifiable" behaviors. These behaviors are effectively labeled by those with the power to do the "naming." This tends to lure individual into selecting forms of behavior that are most likely to render success. In this regard habitus moves beyond being an embodiment of power as it also links stratified social structures through the facilitating of unconscious assessments of possibilities, and impossibilities. Individuals then "self-select" towards or away-from opportunities based on internalized schema of the likelihood of success. Therefore, what is "possible" too is a relation to power as these assumptions frame the parameters of what the "possible" is (Swartz 2013).

"ARABIZED" ISLAM AS HABITUS

With habitus being the mental structuring of individuals' and groups' perception that informs "common sense," the imposition of brown or immigrant Islam as the face of Islam serves a similar function. More specifically, the resulting "Arabized Islam" functions much like a habitus in the context of Islam in America. What is interesting about habitus as a perceptive disposition that varies from one position to the next is that it also produces "classifiable" behaviors. This is clear when examining "Islam-as-creed" versus "Arabized Islam-as-creed." As was previously noted, the universality of Islam is what accounted for its vast spread across the globe, yet Arab (specifically Saudi) influence stemming from great wealth, sociopolitical power, as well as it's prominent place in the historical narrative of Islam has yielded it symbolic capital and power that functions hegemonically. This is evidenced in the regard that this particular brand of Islam has become a universalized "particular" that has come to (arbitrarily) represent "true" Islam. With that power and capital, this image is internalized and has come to produce the said behaviors that are of the classifiable nature that Bourdieu speaks of, or what Loveman (2005) termed the "principles of vision and division."

These behaviors have been discussed at length to this point. But what is central to this discussion is the fact that the struggle of interest is the ability to represent Islam, as Muslim immigrants have had much longer exposure to the pressures of Arabization, and have been more Arabized in their articulation of Islam which speaks to Bourdieu's noting that "naturalization" tends to correlate to the amount of exposure to structures of power. In this instance, "Arabization" would serve as that structure. Consequently they, with the help of the United States government, have the power to do the "naming." What's more is that this image of "true" Islam is misrecognized as naturally occurring and divorced from the historical, cultural, and political factors that account for its existence. Also falling in-line with the Bourdieu's

description, is the "dominated" looking through the eyes of the "dominant" which encourages them to "self-select" behaviors that yield the intended consequences. In this case, the intended consequences would be acceptance and recognition within the larger brown Muslim community. This agenda would prompt individuals' or groups' to take on behaviors that move them toward acceptance and away from those that do not fit the schema of what "true" Islam looks like. Internalizing this imposed representation idea of what Islam "looks like" is a direct relation of power as the act of self-selecting behaviors speaks to the internalization of the parameters of possibility associated with certain classifiable behaviors.

CONCLUSION

Symbolic power is the ability to give the impression of natural, inescapable, and disinterested appearance to symbols that are actually relations of power (Swartz 2013). With Muslim immigrants receiving "relational whiteness" in 1924 (Kayyali 2004), it would from that point forward serve as a capital that facilitated their successful integration into the racial and socioeconomic order of the United States. Additionally, this "whiteness" encouraged them to emulate the anti-black biases that were typical to whites. This served not only to incentivize behaviors that distance themselves from blacks, but also encourages them assume critical, and powerful stances with regard to their black coreligionists.

Symbolic power requires legitimation. This is "cultural schema" situated within everyday assumptions that arbitrarily structure the "world" that come to be "taken-for-granted" and inform "reality" (Swartz 2013). The decidedly agenda-driven efforts to situate immigrant-specific articulations of Islam as legitimate served to "legitimize" a particular brand of Islam at the expense of their black coreligionists, or as Curtis (2002) terms "universalized the particular." Misrecognized as being absent of any displays of power, this image of "true" Islam is

additionally internalized, and comes to constitute "reality." This serves as a structure of knowledge that governs behavior and understanding of given positions as well as what is within the realm of possibility for those in that position (Swartz 2013).

The exercise of symbolic power requires the recognition of authority, or what is called capital (symbolic or cultural). Similar to legitimation, it is a faith-in, or reverence of sorts. It is a widespread and publicly recognized authority that gives the power to impose specific social realities on others and these "realities" take the appearance of being "legitimate" (Swartz 2013). In combination with immigrant Islam being posited as the "legitimate" or "real" Islam, its Arabized form has served to strengthen the capital already afforded it in the American context. Due to Arabization leading to the faulty assumptions that all that is Arab or Arab-like as truly "Islamic," it has had an alienating and exclusionary effect on non-Arab Muslims and converts. Further, the arbitrary nature of this association is "misrecognized," and facilitates a prescribed order of behaviors that tends to be met with a blind obedience.

Closely related to the last discussion, symbolic violence is the "misrecognized" adherence to dictates of symbolic power. Understood as legitimate, individuals and groups are unaware of the arbitrary nature of the dictates in question as they take on the characteristics of being undetectable, and invisible. This is especially applicable to those whom are victims of symbolic violence (Swartz 2013). In examining the "Arabization" of Islam, the use of language, labels and their accompanying associations tend to reinforce existing hierarchies of knowledge and understanding, as well as peoples' understanding of what is possible as both "Islamic" and "Muslim." Consequently, these associations and cognitive parameters formed by these labels exact symbolic violence on Muslims who does not fit those molds. Additionally, symbolic violence also takes place at the point that individuals misrecognize the arbitrary nature of these

hierarchical relationships as they internalize, and act in accordance to these associations for the sake of accommodating these arbitrary and relational constructs of what a Muslim "is" and what Islam "looks-like."

Finally, habitus is a term for the mental structuring of individuals' and groups' perception, thought and action (Bourdieu 1989), that functions as internalized dispositions that create "common sense" (Swartz 2013). Further, habitus tends to yield the production of "classifiable" behaviors among dominated groups that coincide with power relations as these behaviors are then labeled by those whom have the power to do the "labeling" (Swartz 2013). Returning again to "Arabization," the imposition of brown or immigrant Islam as the face of Islam in America serves as a habitus. As a perceptive disposition that varies from one position to the next that simultaneously produces "classifiable" behaviors, these cognitive structures lead individuals to "self-select" behaviors that coincide with the dictates of immigrant Islam in an attempt to seek the desired recognition.

CHAPTER 4: FRAMEWOK AND METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

In examining the American Muslim community, there is an appearance of two distinct communities: One consisting largely of immigrants or descendants of immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia (brown Muslims), and the other consisting of blacks which sometimes includes American blacks (African-Americans) and immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (Abdullah 2010). Additionally, there appears to be minimal interaction between the two groups which brings intra-faith dialogue into question. On the surface, ethnic, racial, and cultural differences are the most glaring point of departures between the two groups. I began to ask: How does diversity operate in intra-faith relations in the American Muslim community? More specifically, I am interested in interrogating changing as well as differing notions of what constitutes being a "Muslim" and "Islam" in East-Central Illinois from the 1960's to the present. My project aims to explore the nuances of what it means to be a Muslim amongst local black and immigrant Muslim communities, and the processes by which modes of Muslim identity are developed and are learned over time. I think this type of work is important for three reasons: 1) It explores the development of Muslim identity for black Americans in a geographical locale, and through a temporal frame of reference that has not been the focus of academic inquiry. 2) It examines intra-faith relations within the American Muslim community with specific attention paid to the particularities of each group with the intent to facilitate greater understanding, and appreciation of the nuances and diversity. 3) Finally, this project contributes new knowledge about Islam in the black community to the field of Islamic Studies that comes from a black perspective. Additionally, this work also broadens the body of existing work on black religion as a whole and Islam in particular. In addressing this question, there will be a review of literature of

early Islamic Movements in the black community. There will be specific attention afforded the evolution of both black and brown Muslim identities from the 1960's to the present. This will be followed by an exploration of relations of power and privilege within the American Muslim community within the understanding of symbolic power. Next, there will be a detailed explanation of what the oral history methodology consists of as well as the benefits of its use for this project. Finally, there will be an examination of how religion can be situated within a discussion of education.

MUSLIM IDENTITIES

In surveying the literature, the appearance of two distinctly different Muslim communities (black and brown) should be understood as the consequence of fundamental differences in "who" these groups are culturally, historically, and socially. The central themes that emerged out of the literature that explain the appearance of a gulf between the two communities were 1) the experience, understanding, and navigation of the racial order for immigrants from the Muslim world was markedly different than that of blacks, 2) policy initiatives in America as well as sociopolitical shifts in the Muslim world largely colored "who" from the Muslim world immigrated to the United States, and finally, 3) The aforementioned factors have facilitated stark differences between the two groups that has colored immigrant relations with blacks in general and black adherents to Islam in particular. Prior to the exploration of these themes, I will map the historical trajectory of Islam and Muslims in the black community to better contextualize and situate the variances between the two groups.

BLACK MUSLIMS

Islam in the black community has its roots in the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Diouf 1998, Turner 1997, and Gomez 2005). The exact numbers of Muslims among the enslaved Africans is

unknown and estimates are oftentimes disputed for a host of reasons, but general estimates range

at roughly 20 percent (Esposito 2005). However, what is agreed upon is that based on the

homelands than many African's were taken from in combination with slave narratives, surviving

artifacts, and slave registries, there was at least a pronounced minority of Muslims among

enslaved Africans. Due to the harsh conditions and heavily policed the movements of slaves, it

was very difficult for them to maintain Islamic practices they brought with them from their

homelands (Gomez 2005 and Diouf 1998). It was not until the early 20th century that Islam

reappeared in the black community in what Esposito (2005) calls "proto-Islamic" movements or

Jackson (2005) dubs as the "early Islamizers."

The first Islamic revival among blacks begins with the Ahmadiyyah. Labeled heretics by

many practitioners of traditional forms of Islam due to their ordination of Ghulam Ahmad as a

prophet, Ahmadiyya (or Ahmadi's) were Muslims who complimented Islamic precepts with the

ideological teachings of Indian reformer Ghulam Ahmad whom endorsed a peaceful and spiritual

form of Islam that stressed the interconnectedness of all religions. The teachings of the

Ahmadiyya however were most successful in reaching blacks through the efforts of Indian

immigrant Muhammad Sadiq whom established himself in south side Chicago during the early

1920's. He quickly recognized that the newly arrived blacks from the rural south were especially

receptive to his message because their previous Christian identity and religion did not adequately

speak to their new urban surroundings and Sadiq tailored his message accordingly. He spoke of

Islam being a universal faith that endorsed equality of all people regardless of differences of race

or socioeconomic status, and Sadiq was especially critical of the racism present in the Christian

church. The Ahmadi's were also supporters of the Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro

Improvement Association (UNIA) in hopes that Garvey would designate Islam as the "official"

religion of the UNIA. Additionally, Sadiq forged a connection between Blackamerican experience of racism and the Indian experience of British colonization which served well with the appropriation of Islam among American blacks as a source of racial pride in addition to a religious identity (Curtis 2009). Between 1921 and 1925, the Ahmadi's attracted more than a thousand members but tensions would eventually develop between black members and the largely South Asian leadership (Knight 2014).

The Ahmadi's were followed by Noble Drew Ali's (Timothy Drew) Moorish Science Temple (MST) in 1919. Ali hailed from the coastal regions of Georgia and South Carolina. It is this same region that is dubbed the center of antebellum American Muslim communities (Gomez 2005). Ali would travel the world as a seaman during which he spoke of an initiation into priesthood at the pyramid of Cheops in Egypt. It was from this initiation that he returned to America with a new name, a prophet status, and a new revealed scripture (called the Circle 7 Koran). The MST held that Allah (SWT) was humanity's "higher self," whereas the "devil" was humanities "lower self." Additionally, heaven and hell were actually states of "being" that can be experienced on earth. Similar to the Ahmadi's, the unity of all religions was stressed and followers were to except the prophet status of all prophets including those that did not hail from the Abrahamic tradition. Also appealing was its treatment of identity for blacks. Ali taught that American blacks were descendants of Moroccan's (Moors) whom he claimed were of the same lineage as the Pharonic Egyptians. Shortly before Ali's death in 1929, the MST registered a membership of around 3,000 members (Knight 2014).

In late summer 1930, a peddler with an unknown ethnicity appeared in Detroit named Wallace D. Fard whom claimed to be from the city of Mecca. He frequented the homes of poor blacks whom bought his goods and were eager to listen to his stories and ideas. He spoke of the

rich history of their homelands in "the east" while also addressing the dangers of poor character, poor diet, alcoholism, adultery, dancing, smoking, and wasteful spending. Shortly thereafter, he would reveal himself as a prophet and speak about the great religion of their ancestors in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. While using the Christian Bible to substantiate his claims of black glory and success, he harshly criticized The Bible and Christianity. For Fard, the proper thing for blacks to do was to reclaim their original identity as Muslims. In August 1931, he spoke at a UNIA gathering where he stated that American blacks were not Americans, but Asiatics (similar to the MST's Moor designation). He explained how Europeans raided the Asiatic-African world in the name of Christianity and that they were descendants of the tribe of Shabazz (Turner 1997).

In the audience that night was Elijah Poole. Believing Fard was "God," he became an ardent student of Islam. He would eventually become Elijah Muhammad and Fard's chief minister and eventual successor for leadership of the Nation of Islam (NOI). Poole would adopt many of the techniques and ideas of the UNIA with the exception that he did not believe migration back to Africa would solve the problems of the black community. When Marcus Garvey (leader of the UNIA) was deported in 1927, and Noble Drew Ali died in 1929, beginning in 1930, the Ahmadiyya grew silent and largely absent as a voice for the articulation of issues pertinent to the black community. This created an open space of sorts that the NOI would come to fill with an emphasis on assigning new identities and ethnic pride among American blacks. Similar to the Ahmadi's and the MST, the NOI were understood as a heretical group. This was largely because of their designation of blacks being fundamentally different from whites, coming from different Gods, and whites being inherently evil. Their racial politics is what separated them from the larger global Muslim community. By 1960, with the missionary efforts of the

charismatic Malcolm X, the membership of the NOI grew to more than 100,000 and the NOI

would be the major outpost of Islam in the Western world (Turner 1997).

It was from this period of the early 20th century to the 1960's that the face of Islam in

America was largely black. It was primarily though the ideological exploits of Malcolm X and

the Nation of Islam that colored America's understanding of Islam. However, the momentum of

the NOI's racial politics, discussion of self-defense, racial separation, and growing membership

was deemed threatening by the United States government. With the passage of the Immigration

Act of 1965, the face of Islam in America changed from a black, religious, poor, urban, political,

and separatist social movement to a religious, largely educated, well-to-do, integrationist,

apolitical, and immigrant, or brown face. In the following section, the historical development and

trajectory of immigrant Muslim identities will be explored and juxtaposed to that of black

Muslims.

EARLY 20TH CENTURY EXPERIENCES OF WHITENESS

Early 20th century American citizenship rested on a conception of "whiteness" that

entailed a construct of "common knowledge." "Common knowledge" consisted of prejudicial

attitudes regarding skin complexion, Muslims and Islam. In 1790, Congress restricted citizenship

to "free white persons," which was later expanded further by the 14th amendment in 1868. In

1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act led courts to actively interrogate how citizenship was

contextualized, but these conceptualizations were largely informed by the same racialist ideas.

While other ethnic groups were fairly easily classified, Syrians, Arabs, and Indians were

"difficult" to not classify (Kayyali 2004). Despite the lack of clarity that characterized Arab

citizenship-status, they generally enjoyed all the privileges of "whiteness," until 1919. Being a

numerically insignificant and less visible than Indians or blacks, they freely participated in

"whiteness" (Haddad & Smith 2002) until roughly 1965. In 1910, census data changed, and

Arabs (largely Palestinians and Syrians) became "Asiatic" overnight due to the location of the

Syrian Province in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. This was a strategic move

on behalf of the United States government to bar further immigration from those areas (Kayyali

2004).

Functioning within the realm of ignorance established by "common knowledge," what

gets lost in this narrative is that these early immigrants from the Muslim world were in fact

Christian. Being that their original homelands were absent of a specific racialized social order,

"majority" status was granted based on religious identification. Therefore, many immigrated to

the United States expecting to enjoy the benefits of majority identification because it identified

itself, as did they, as Christian (Kayyali 2004). Between 1909 and 1923, American courts

systems addressed this blurry color line as one-third of all cases related to racial categorization

involved Indians (Southeast Asians) and Arabs. Early in their arrival to America, Arabs tried to

utilize the aforementioned racialist pseudo-scientific arguments in their favor. For instance,

because Jews were "semites," and accepted as "white," they argued that they should be as well.

However, prosecutors again cited "common knowledge," as the parameters of "whiteness" and

citizenship. At one point immigrants used the "Jesus Defense" which was the Arab and Indian

attempt to utilize Eurocentric depictions of Jesus to argue that because he (Jesus) hailed from

their region of the world, and was white, they should be understood as white as well (Kayyali

2004).

The first Arab/Asian immigrant breakthrough into "whiteness" came in 1909. The courts

ruled that scientific knowledge outweighed "common knowledge" and skin complexion, and that

Syrians were Caucasion. In the same year, a Lebanese police officer by the name of George

Shishim arrested the son of a prominent lawyer in the community. The boys' father argued that because Shishim was Lebanese, and Lebanon was part of Asia, Shishim was of Chinese and Mongolian stock and therefore was not a citizen. Utilizing the "Jesus Defense" to distance themselves from Islam, and forge a connection with the judge and the majority population, the judge ruled in favor of Shishim citing that religion was not an adequate indicator for racial identity (Kayyali 2004).

In 1911, Syrians were denied citizenship again. This led to more court cases in which the denial of citizenship was based on the location of the Ottoman Empire, assumed incompatible and unassimilable attitudes, and the marital practices of those from that region. Rulings informed by these ideas cited that since the Ottoman Empire had "subjects" as opposed to "citizens," immigrants from that region lacked the intellectual capacity to participate in a democratic system. Others cited that the Ottoman Empire siding with Germany in World War II brought immigrants' loyalty into question (2004). In 1913 and 1914, "common knowledge" arguments were again evoked to deny citizenship to Syrians. In 1913, the defendant was denied "whiteness" because he had the "complexion of a walnut" and in 1914, George Dow was denied citizenship twice. He finally won on his final appeal when the immigration commission submitted paperwork to the court stating the Syrians were of Semetic/Caucasion stock. However, it was the Immigration Act of 1917 that officially declared Palestinians and Syrians "white," and that their national origin had nothing to do with their racial identity.

Finally, many of the early immigrants were stigmatized as Muslims even though they were Christians. In addition to the aforementioned stigmas of intellectual inability, and having compromised allegiances, they also were confronted with concerns of polygamy. This too was also used as a justification to deny them citizenship. This ultimately led to them emphasizing

their Christian identity. Being that many legislators thought that Muslims had no place in America, and were unaware that there were already Muslims living in the United States, in 1922, all Arabs seeking citizenship were required to renounce Islam. Arabs remained uncomfortable with their citizenship status into the 1940's. In 1942, a Yemeni man in Detroit was denied citizenship based on the geographical distance of Yemen from Europe, his dark complexion, and an assumed inability to successfully assimilate because he was a Muslim. It was only in 1944, that the immigration authorities decided Arabs could be naturalized rendering Yemeni immigrants the opportunity to become citizens (Kayyali 2004).

During this period, Arabs went as far as even abandoning cultural markers such as peddling and shop-keeping, moving out of their ethnically homogenous communities into the suburban predominately white areas, and intermarrying. They joined Catholic Churches, both Muslims and Christians changed their names to those more commonly recognized, and made other pointed efforts to assimilate to American culture. However, it should be noted that these efforts did not necessarily guarantee acceptance. This was evidenced by the fact that despite their European names and reorientation towards American culture, they were still confused as being members of other groups. Consequently, they were called things like "dago," "wetback," and "sheeny." However, as time moved forward during the 1920's, the slurs tended to "hit closer to home" as they were called "dirty Syrian," "camel jockey," "Turks," "blackie," and in some instances, were barred from white-only spaces. It was not until 1952 with the passage of the Walter-McCarran Act that race-based naturalization guidelines were eliminated (Kayyali 2004).

As can be seen, the historical narrative of citizenship of immigrants from the Muslim World is a complicated one. Arabs were "white" in 1909, 1910, and 1915, but not in 1913 or 1914. With "whiteness" being essential to citizenship, they had to reconstruct, and then

renegotiate their racial identities. Even with the early Arab immigrants being largely Christian themselves, they still dealt with the stigmas associated with Islam of which problematic notions of "common knowledge," and racialized science oftentimes served as barriers. In this history, we see the influence of conceptions of race, their associated stereotypes, geopolitics, religion, and policy. All of which functioned together to foster a social context that was dually antagonistic to their presence and their faith. Even being officially designated as "white" by census authorities in 1924, their continued experiences of discrimination did not speak to their acceptance.

A majority of the contemporary brown Muslim population in America immigrated after 1965. Kayyali (2004) contextualizes their immigration to the United States in terms by way of examining the socioeconomic and political trends taking place in the Middle East: 1) The region was experiencing a rise in "fundamentalist" articulations of Islam. This made the United States attractive to moderate and secular Muslims. 2) After independence, the Muslim World experienced a period of rapid development of university systems, but there were not enough jobs to sustain the highly educated population. The Immigration Act of 1965 gave preference to those immigrating under the parameters of family reunification, were political refugees, and educated/skilled professionals. Consequently, this population made up 15 percent of all Arab immigrants between 1965 and 1976. 3) Related to the last point, the United States offered superior academic programs in medicine and engineering and wealthy Arab families sent their children to universities in the United States. 4) The gains of the Civil Rights Movement established a social and political context of Multiculturalism, which allowed Arab new-comers to openly take pride in, and display their ethnic heritage. These immigrants grew into a class of largely educated professionals. As of the year 2000, 73 percent of all Muslim immigrants worked in managerial, professional, technical, sales, or administrative fields (Kayyali 2004). The

socioeconomic mobility of the post-1965 Muslim immigrants is also addressed in Sanders (2012), Gerber (2011), and Bald (2013). It is specifically noted in Sanders (2012) that they are dubbed "educational successes" as 40 percent of Muslim adults have either college, or advanced degrees rendering them the second most educated group behind Jews. Gerber (2011) adds that many immigrants from the Muslim world specifically came to take advantage of economic opportunities that did not exist in their homelands as was addressed in Kayyali (2004), and Bald (speaking specifically of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent) many of these immigrants would become the businessmen, doctors, and engineers of the 1980's and 1990's (Bald 2013). Howell (2013) touches on these matters as well. In a discussion of the post-1965 Muslim immigrants, several of the author note that many of them came from "elite" backgrounds, and arrived as students as opposed to workers. They were joining an already established middle class Muslim minority that was in the process of leaving their ethnic enclaves for white suburbia and establishing larger, more extravagant masjids in the suburbs which served as symbols of their socioeconomic success.

These factors served to create a gulf of sorts between blacks and immigrant Muslims in general and these social relations drifted into the American Muslim community. Muslim immigrants came to the United States with a pointed assimilationist/integrationist mindset. This was only complimented further by the fact that their high educations and skills they brought with them provided the tools to afford a considerably smoother period of transition into the socioeconomic order than did blacks. The information provided by Bald (2013), Sanders (2012), Gerber (2011) reinforces the information provided by Kayyali (2004). They either already had the marketable skills, or were coming with direct access to educational opportunities that would eventually yield high paying jobs and/or comfortable middle-class lifestyles.

Differences of experience, history, and intra-faith relations

Again, these pointed differences in educational attainment and socioeconomic standing facilitate a different experience of America. This difference in experience generally causes articulations and experiences of Islam that will ultimately serve different purposes than those for black Muslims. As will be seen later, these differences will also feed into other racialized discourses that are specific to the American context. Kayyali (2004) acknowledges that black Muslims, due to their historical narrative of racial discrimination, are more likely to question the discourses of mainstream American society and focus their efforts on education-related issues, and poverty in urban areas. This led to pointed difference of experience, perspective, and articulation of Islam once the American Muslim community became more diversified.

For instance, Howell (2013) noted that the immigrant newcomers were increasingly critical of The Nation of Islam. More specifically, they were also particularly dismayed at the racialized and unorthodox discourses of the Nation of Islam. Generally speaking, they felt that American Muslims put too much emphasis on social and political matters and there was not enough attention afforded standard precepts of Islam (2013). The newcomers held that The Nation of Islam's theology was "un-Islamic," and their practice of Islam barred them from being "real" Muslims. Further, they dedicated efforts to move the existing Muslim communities away from their focus on political and social concerns. This too could only aid in fostering a gulf between themselves and black practitioners because, ideally, the focus on political in social issues could have served as a bridge connecting the two communities. Further, Grewal (2009) notes that the immigrant narratives are constructed within realms of political and economic refugees that are torn between their loyalty as American citizens, the privileges they enjoy as citizens, pressures to assimilate, experiences of racism, and alienation at the hands of American

foreign policy. For black Muslims on the other hand, Islam is a marker of their painful history of America, and a desire to reshape America as a more adequate representative of its ideas of liberty and justice. Also as a source of contention, is the assumption among many black Muslims that immigrant disdain towards the West is one and the same as their disdain for white supremacy (2009).

Abdullah (2013), Prashad (2000), Muhammad (2010), Karim (2009 and 2006) delve into immigrant Muslim attitudes towards blacks. Abdullah (2013) notes that it is specifically noted that Muslim immigrants entered the United States "with their own colonial ideas about skin color and ethnic difference." Despite most Muslims considering each other brothers and sisters in a "universal faith," the interaction between black and brown Muslims is fairly rare. Many black converts (or reverts) to Islam found themselves renouncing their racial identities because for many Muslims, race-consciousness was heretical. Frustrated with the "color-blind" presentation of Islam, many black Muslims started their own organizations and masjids. This was perceived as fostering separation by some citing that "religion trumped race," but those whom chose to separate retorted with the assertion that the two were not mutually exclusive, and any attempt to disavow or ignore racial issues would only make discriminatory experiences more salient, and enable them to continue with no recourse (2013). Muhammad (2010) also speaks to the adoption of anti-black attitudes with a wide scale construction of black criminality that reached its height in the late 19th century. This discussion continues in Prashad (2000). Oblivious to the history of blacks and nuances of structural racism, immigrants bought into a benign form of racism that entailed the adoption of anti-black attitudes rather than an examination of the enduring forms of racism. As was addressed in Abdullah (2013), Kayyali (2004) noted that the "model minority" thesis suggested that the problem was with blacks and this line of thinking created an opportunity

for Asians to enter into the American mainstream and they "immorally accepted it." Prashad (2000) described this as Inferential Racism. Specifically, this is the naturalization of racialized explanations related to race that the author speaks of. Whether factual or fictional, they have racist premises and propositions inscribed within them as a set of unquestioned assumptions (Prashad 2000). Karim (2009) notes that the most ironic aspect of this learned racism against blacks, is that as non-whites, they too were subject to racial discrimination. Yet, it is this very fear of anti-immigrant discrimination that leads them to overlook anti-black racism as their own fears of unsuccessful integration within the socioeconomic order is always present. This in particular served as the necessary catalyst for South Asians to posit themselves as "better," than blacks as they were very aware that they (blacks) represented everything despised in America (2009). Karim (2006) also references inferential racism, and a disparity in power, privilege, and authority that plagues interactions between black and brown Muslims.

Turner (1997) notes that despite the fact that orthodox Islam has had great successes in spreading among blacks, and that racialist discourses are considerably less prominent than they once were, "true" integration has not occurred among the two groups as even non-black ethnic Muslim communities tend to self-segregate. Black Muslims tend to worship at masjids that are located in predominately black, urban, and poorer areas and in order to do any level of effective missionary work, they must deal with the realities of those whom populate their masjids, and the communities they inhabit (1997). Mamiya (2003) specifically addresses allegations of racial discrimination that black Muslims experience at the hands of brown Muslims. Shortly after many blacks converted (reverted) in the 1960's and 1970's, this particular type of experience is what led them to establish their own communities. Additionally, many black Muslim men felt that immigrant Muslims were influenced by the racial baggage of American society in their rejection

to the idea of their daughters marrying black men. In Turner (1997), the author notes that Islam for blacks is an "experience both spiritual and political, an expression of empowerment in a country they feel is dominated by a white elite" as we saw in Howell (2013), and Abdullah (2013). In a related discussion in Jackson (2005), clearly the "valuation of race" is owed more to the contextual particularities of America than any orthodox precept of Islam, and American "whiteness" has been situated as the "prize" achievement of any citizen. We saw this same discussion in Kayyali (2004), Turner (1997), Karim (2009), and others. "Whiteness" had become "sanitized" in the regard that countless others (European immigrants, Indians, and Arabs) had gained admission into "whiteness," and this had a homogenizing effect on very different groups of people. Yet, the one racial epithet that maintained its original universal stigma was that of "nigger" and the new Arab immigrants would make every possible effort to distance themselves from this stigmatized label. Finally, Curtis (2013) suggests that shortly after the arrival of the post-1965 immigrants in the United States, they posited themselves as the voice of "authentic" Islam. According to the author, the media, scholars, and varying agencies, ignorant to diversity among Muslims, took their word for it. The author notes that this drastically changed the landscape of Islam in America because prior to 1965, black Muslims represented the face of Islam in America. Immigrant Islam's usurping of the "face of authority" from the existing black Muslim community, and becoming the "face" of Islam in America at the expense of black Muslims set the stage for a gulf that would only widen between the two groups (2013).

The discussion of how racial identities and politics of both black and brown Muslims have evolved since 1965 is a very complicated discussion. They initially were not white, but enjoyed the privileges of "whiteness." Then they became Asian. They then became white again. The navigation of racial identity for blacks has not followed the same course. Primarily due to

many blacks have darker complexions, and phenotypical features "understood" as being black or African, they tend be marked in a way that permanently situates them at the bottom of the racialized social order, and squarely within "blackness". While there is a commonality in their both being stereotyped, viewed as threats, and experience of discrimination, racial harmony eludes them because one group (brown Muslims) was granted admission into "whiteness," and all its perceived benefits that the other (blacks in general) has been barred from. This sets the stage for the entrenching of fundamental departures between the two groups. Fundamental differences have facilitated unique articulations, experiences, perceptions, and positions with the racial order that are generally specific to each group. Because all the aforementioned attributes are different, effectively so too is their "Islam" and the gulf between black and brown Muslims should probably be understood as the consequence of fundamental differences in "who" these groups are culturally, historically, and socially.

SYMBOLIC POWER

My interest in the development of Muslim identity in the United States and its subsequent influence on intra-faith dialogue entails an exploration of a very complicated, nuanced, and at times competing narrative of difference between the black and brown Muslim communities. The differences in these narratives tend to center around differences in history, experience, conceptions of race, and class. Further, differences in the aforementioned areas will generally yield differences in the appearance, and articulation of Islam. This is central to the analysis because in observing the differences between the two communities, much of the particularities and nuances of Islam in the black community are best contextualized and understood as responses to the needs, changes, and challenges they face in simultaneously negotiating the two stigmatized identities of being black and Muslim. The largest challenge however, was finding a

78

theoretical framework that would address power, identity, and privilege while simultaneously

addressing their interconnectedness and interdependence on one another. The theoretical

framework that I will use for my project is Bourdieu's conception of Symbolic Power. In

discussing symbolic power, however, there are several key interrelated components whose

understanding is essential to understanding how symbolic power works. This section will map

out those components, how they work, and how they relate to one another.

Symbolic power is the ability to give the impression of natural, inescapable, and

disinterested appearances to symbols that are actually relations of power (Swartz 2013).

Symbolic power requires legitimation. This is "cultural schema" situated within everyday

assumptions that arbitrarily structure the "world" that are "taken-for-granted" and inform

"reality" (Swartz 2013). As it is misrecognized as being disinterested in power, it is also

internalized, and comes to constitute "reality." This serves as a structure of knowledge that

governs behavior and understanding of given positions as well as what is within the realm of

possibility for those in that particular position (Swartz 2013).

The exercise of symbolic power also requires the recognition of authority, or what is

called capital (symbolic or cultural). Similar to legitimation, it is a faith-in, or reverence of sorts.

It is a widespread and publicly recognized authority that gives the power to impose specific

social realities on others and these "realities" take the appearance of being "legitimate" (Swartz

2013). Further, the arbitrary nature of this association is "misrecognized," and facilitates a

prescribed order of behaviors that adhered to with blind obedience.

Closely related to the last discussion, symbolic violence is the "misrecognized"

adherence to dictates of symbolic power. Understood as legitimate, individuals and groups are

unaware of the arbitrary nature of the dictates in question as they take on the characteristics of

being undetectable, and invisible. This is especially applicable to those whom are victims of symbolic violence (Swartz 2013). Consequently, these associations and cognitive parameters formed by these labels exact symbolic violence on those whom do not fit the mold. Additionally, symbolic violence also takes place at the point that individuals misrecognize the arbitrary nature of these hierarchical relationships as they internalize, and act in accordance to these associations for the sake of accommodating these arbitrary and relational constructs.

Finally, habitus is a term for the mental structuring of individuals' and groups' perception, thought and action (Bourdieu 1989), that functions as internalized dispositions that create "common sense" (Swartz 2013). Further, habitus tends to yield the production of "classifiable" behaviors among dominated groups that coincide with power relations as these behaviors are then labeled by those whom have the power to do the "labeling" (Swartz 2013). As a perceptive disposition that varies from one position to the next that simultaneously produces "classifiable" behaviors, these cognitive structures lead individuals to "self-select" behaviors that coincide with the necessary dictates in an attempt to seek the desired recognition.

Symbolic power's attention to identity, privilege, and power make it the ideal theoretical framework to apply to an examination of how diversity operates within the American Muslim community. It offers a lens through which to situate behaviors, trends, experiences, and histories. Further, it also contextualizes ideas, and regimes of knowledge to understand how power relations operate in an ethnically diversified community.

METHODOLOGY

Being that much of my data collection will be talking to individuals and gathering their personal accounts of the period of interest, the methodology best suited for this project will be that of oral history. According to the Oral Histories Org website, "Oral History is a field of study

and a method of gathering, preserving and interpreting the voices and memories of people, communities, and participants in past events. Oral history is both the oldest type of historical inquiry predating the written word, and one of the most modern, initiated with tape recorders in the 1940s and now using 21st-century digital technologies" (Oral Histories Association n.d.). In this section, what I will explore what those benefits are, and how they will translate to this project.

The process of interviewing places the researcher into a situation in which they have direct contact with the time period of interest, and it places emphasis on the role of oral sources in the piecing-together of a historical narrative. Additionally, the interview does not simply give rise to a new source(s), it also generates new data as the interview pushes new things to plain-view, and subsequently new information is explored. The oral history interview moves to become a deconstruction of a historical narrative for the purposes of recreation through an operation of memory. The interview then serves as the basis for the production of historical narrative (Chagas 2012). Further, the storytelling that is central to this particular methodology allows the respondents to make sense of their experience of a history that took place within the wider societal context of life and society specific to their generation. Of course as with any interview process, there are always concerns of choice, subjectivity, and bias, however the agenda of oral history is not necessarily interested in error-free accuracy of respondents', so much as the process as it highlights the subjective significance of the period in question (Ester 2008).

Oral history also has a tendency to democratize the past. Generally, archives hold the documents and accounts of those endorsed by, or whom themselves hold power. But by recording the stories of those whose title does not warrant an archive, a more nuanced account of

81

the past appears which includes and values the stories of ordinary people as opposed to those with wealth, scholars or politicians. Oral History also provides a more full and inclusive account of the incident or period in question which in turn allows for the discovery of anomalies that can shift popular paradigms (Hunner 2011). This methodology is especially useful in imparting a humanistic value into projects that span across social barriers. Because it focusses on experience and language, it can be helpful in communicating thoughts, values, and feelings to other cultural groups (Martin 1987). Additionally, many have argued that a passage of time is necessary in order to utilize this methodology effectively as the presence of temporal distance between the event and its resultant reflection allows for larger frameworks and historical analogies to manifest themselves (Sloan 2008).

The work of the researcher, therefore, is not exhausted by an analysis of the interview itself, but rather, this is where it begins (Chagas 2012). Much of the work regarding this particular topic is written by historians, scholars, and other professional "producers of knowledge." This work and this particular methodology aims to prioritize the voice of the participants in order to gather new information, new perspectives, and afford space to experiences, understandings, and narratives that may be different from more popular ones. Reliance on dominant narratives tend to monopolize discussions and understandings at the expense of meaningful "outliers" that can lend insight into unexplored causes and factors for the interactions we see among immigrant and black Muslims.

COMMONALITIES OF RELIGION AND EDUCATION

One thing that is essential to this research is drawing the connection between education and religion. The popular imagination tends to conceive of religion and education in a manner that associates education as a "public" matter, and religion as a "private" matter. This suggests that

the two are necessarily distinct from one another and easily dislocated. This could not be further from the truth. This line of thinking situates education within the "secular" which, (along with secularism) is uncritically associated with the loss of personal religiosity and a separation of church and state (Qadir 2013).

However, religion and education are very interrelated. Oftentimes educational discourses of efficiency, diversity, and accountability encompass religious-moral ideals. While the fusion of religion and education is thought to never be equal, or static, they both tend to be coopted in ways that entail an enmeshment the two (Stambach 2006). With education being understood as a secular entity, it should be noted that religion is always, at the bare minimum, latent within the discussion of the secular even when its' presence is not explicitly clear (Kateb 2009). Education has come to be identified with the development of the modern secular state, is state-endorsed, "rational," and includes conceptions that understand education as being the impetus for change, whereas religion is assumed a challenge of sorts to state secularism. This particular view ignores the fact that secularism is a protestant (Christian) idea that emerged as a consequence of the development of science and rationality, as opposed to a repudiation of religion (Stambach 2006 and Cassanova 2009). Therefore, the dialectic between the secular and the sacred is relational. Further, the idea that the privatization of religion necessarily rendered individuals responsible for the attainment of their own salvation is distinctly Christian in its origin (Madan 1987). In this section, I will explore the relationship between education and religion by placing popular conceptions of education within the discussion of the secular and/or rational to situate education as a meta-religion. Additionally, with this project being primarily concerned with the religion of Islam, I will briefly discuss the Islamic view of knowledge, and education to situate the practice of al-Islam (or being a Muslim) as an inherently educational one.

As was previously noted, secularism does in fact support some religious views. This suggests that secularism should not be seen as opposition to religion per se, so much as an appropriation of religion that fuses together non-religious institutions and ideologies (Stambach 2006). In fact, theological ideas often are used to reinforce and offer ideological cover to processes, and ideas that are secular in their nature and agenda (Yelle 2011). The phenomenon of education and accompanying educational institutions are not immune to this. This fusion yields what is called the "secular disposition" which is the tendency to subject religious ideals and concepts to standards that are themselves non-religious. The secular disposition does not facilitate new political or moral agendas from new theological predispositions. Rather, it creates new agendas (usually by the state), and constructs either a new theology or "god" alongside the preexisting ones to assist the state in the attainment of its new objectives. It draws on the advantages and disadvantages of existing religion, and subordinates it by restructuring it to suit advantageous and instrumental non-religious ends (Kateb 2009).

This is what Laine (2015) termed meta-religion. Meta-religion-is something that stands in the place of the authority once afforded religion. Under such circumstances, religion is demoted from being the apex of authority, and demoted by something "unstated" that is posited as something that all "reasonable," "civilized," and "rational" people accept. There is an assumed distinct disruption or lack of continuity that makes secularism possible, that posits secularism as new and replaces religion. However, modern secularism just serves as a meta-religion where in more ancient times, it was assumed that individuals were still governed by religious practices, whereas today, religion does not have the same claim on lives that it would've had in previous contexts (2015).

Under this process, particular discourses and behaviors are systematically removed, prohibited, decried, and made reprehensible while others were incorporated, accepted, encouraged, and coopted into narrative of "truths" that were afforded a sacred-like social capital (Asad 1993) in the same way religious one are. Thus, the subordination of faith to the secular (or rational) was accompanied by a "sacrilization" of secularity (Pabst 2012 and Cassanova 2009), or "dogmatic expression by those not interested in dogmatics" (Aziz & Attas, 1979). At this juncture, the relationship between religion and education becomes existential as the existence of religion, faith-based, or sacred ideals become necessarily necessary for the existence of the secular or rational. It is in this sense that secularism functions as a meta-religion and facilitator of social relations across boundaries created by "belief," which in turn, makes "unbelief" possible (Urban 2008). This attribute becomes especially viable considering the origins of empirical laws are largely unknown. Thus, this absence of understanding creates a gap of sorts that is easily replaced, or filled in by "belief," which in turn make the "truths" of religion "adaptively true" even in instances where they are "empirically absurd" (Rappaport 1999).

With those things in mind, education should be understood as being about internalizing a specific "socio-morality." One in which discussions over religion and education are not about whether the two are connected, but about the embodiment of a particular regime of knowledge that establishes the parameters of "what" to internalize, "what" is defined and "how", and "what" to establish as orthodox. In this way, education functions much like religion as it takes on sacrilized attributes. Exemplary of this is the fact that education is afforded a redemptive quality in the regard that it is dubbed as a "savior" of sorts, and assumed the cure for all societies' problems (Stambach 2006) which speaks to the characteristic of meta-religiosity, the lines between the subjective and the objective becoming blurred (Lambeck 2000), and particular

regimes of knowledge becoming "abstracted and universalized" (Asad 1993).Consequently, not only does this yield a sacred-like faith in rationality, but it tends to overestimate the powers associated with intellectualism (rational) at the expense of those associated with emotional, or in this case, the religious or sacred. This perspective fails to recognize the interactive relationship shared by the two as 1) feeling (adaptive truth) depends on fact (gaps in understanding) for its existence, and 2) it is facts that produce feeling (Benedict 1903 and Stambach 2006).

To this point, it has been established that education functions as a meta-religion, and the separation of the secular (education) and the sacred (religious) exists within the popular imagination, but not so much in reality. The assumed distinction of between the two is primarily a characteristic of Eurocentric, Enlightenment inspired conceptions of rationale, education, and knowledge. This line of demarcation between the sacred and the secular does not exist in the Islamic view of either education or knowledge. Islam does acknowledges that there can be distinctions drawn between different types of knowledge (as in sacred and the secular) for the purposes of being of use to man. Generally, there are thought to be two types of knowledge: One brand of knowledge is for man to equip himself for the practical needs of the world, and the other is for the enrichment of his soul (religious matters). However, even though such distinctions are present in the Islamic conception of knowledge, the fundamental difference is that it is understood that all knowledge comes from Allah (SWT). The Islamic view of knowledge encompasses and fuses the objective with the subjective, and the empirical with the experiential. Therefore, the Islamic view of knowledge and education holds that there is no contradiction, or distinction between knowledge gained for practical purposes or religious ones as sacred concepts simultaneously promote the acquisition of knowledge, and govern its application (Aziz & al-Attas 1979).

In conclusion, all the aforementioned ideas are exemplary of the idea that education and religion are "natural allies" and "co-workers" as they both recognize and encompass spiritual qualities over explicit attention to physical and material matters (DeWitt 1924). The absence of "superstition" reordered knowledge in such a way that has facilitated a hostility of sorts to the "sacred" (Rappaport 1999) that was accompanied by a popular misconception that the secular and the sacred were mutually exclusive. Both education and religion are concerned with producing good citizens (Lambeck 2000, Aziz al-Attas 1979, and Sullivan 1966), and the idea of the "secular" has its origin in a distinctly Christian mode of thought. Also, the "secular" co-opts elements of the sacred, thus producing a new "natural religion" (Pabst 2012) or meta-religion (Laine 2015) and rearticulating it within secular frameworks as evidenced by the deification if you will, of the pursuit and attainment of education. The assumed separation of the two entails an idealism of sorts which seeks to co-opt methods from sources outside of itself. However it (education), nor religion, has a "pet psychology." Therefore, the relationship of religion and education is one of agendas and not procedure (Shouse 1935). The treatment of knowledge and education in Islam on the other hand does not adhere to an idea of mutual exclusion of the secular from the sacred. Islam calls for a balance of the two realms of knowledge that enjoins practical knowledge for navigating the physical (secular world) that is complimented by an emphasis of character and virtue (the sacred).

CONCLUSION

The inspiration for this project was the appearance of two separate (black and brown) Muslim communities separated only by race and ethnicity which sparks my interest into observing how diversity operates in Muslim communities in east central Illinois. In mapping the history of Islam in the black community, Islam first came to America in large numbers through

the trans-Atlantic slave trade. After being dislocated and disassembled by the institution of slavery, Islam was largely absent among the latter generations of slaves and their descendants until the beginning of the 20th century. With the work of the proto-Islamic groups (Ahmadiyya, the Moorish Science Temple, and the Nation of Islam), Islam was slowly introduced back into the religious landscape of the black community. No group was more influential in doing this than the Nation of Islam as this organization was the face of Islam in America until the influx of immigrants from the Middle East, and Asia in 1965. Upon exploring both groups more closely, what separates both groups beyond racial and ethnic identity is fundamental differences in history and culture. These differences necessitated a space in which Islam served different purposes, and addressed different needs for each group. In observing these differences, I am also interested in observing how relations of identity, power, and privilege operate within and between the two communities and symbolic power is the ideal framework to situate those observations. Additionally, much of the available information regarding intra-faith relations and identity is the product of research conducted by scholars. Utilizing an oral history methodology allows space for differing or competing narratives while simultaneously prioritizing the voices and experiences of the participants. Lastly, education and religion are natural allies in the regard that the secular (associated with education) is not diametrically opposed to the sacred so much as it extracts characteristics of the sacred and co-opts them into secular ideas. Also education, like religion, aims to create better individuals and affords attention to quality of character as opposed to explicit material concerns.

CHAPTER 5: INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS

IDENTITY

From the minds of early 20th century Pan-Africanists such as Edward Blyden to more

prominent figures such as Marcus Garvey and Malik el-hajj Shabazz (Malcolm X) in the 1960's,

the subject of identity in the black community is one in which there has been both enduring

debate and disagreement. These differences have revolved around issues regarding the

appropriate label that Blackamericans should accept for themselves, or whether the concept of

"blackness" itself should center on biological, historical, or theological factors. What can be

agreed upon within this discussion is that there is a semblance of agreement that "blackness," at

least minimally, consists of a shared language, and history (Curtis 2002). Understanding the

centrality of the importance of discussions of identity within the black community, it is natural

that the discussion of identity be pivotal to Islamic thought within the black community as well.

In examining what constitutes Islam and being a Muslim in East-Central Illinois from 1965 to

the present, the discussion of identity was just as important to those who participated in this

project. What was especially interesting about the theme of identity is that it generally mirrored

the historical discussions that have taken place, but interpreted and explained differently based

on varying social predispositions of the individual in question. In this section, I will map the

discussions of identity that took place within my interviews with the participants. In examining

these discussions, participants' ideas regarding identity will be contextualized within the

historical narrative of identity and blackness.

When I interviewed Hasimali, one of the key ideas he expounded upon was the

discussion of identity. As he was sharing his experience as a convert to Islam, he spoke about the

challenges he had to establishing his Muslim identity:

"The image. The image of that Causasion Christ that was on the walls that we all grew up with. You know with the blonde hair and the long beard and everything. The image was really bad and then like uh---the images in the bible who would have pictorial things about it where all the angels were one color and everything like this. But we accepted it because it was from God. But then after a while we look at it and say "there's no black angels, no Asian angels, you don't see anything but all white angels in the books and stuff we grew up with. Now keep in mind that I grew up in the 50's and 60's. And so all these images was in my mind the whole time and so, even when I tried to pray to Allah, I had this image in my head. And so, I had to try to get that image out of my head in order to make the transition to pray to Allah properly because before, or my whole life, and everything in my family's life, we always had this image, and we praying, so subconsciously, we see this image of Jesus so, you know, this other guy, and we praying, so subconsciously, we see this image of Jesus so, you know, this other guy, and so uh--- that was kind of tough."

What can be seen in this response is the remnants of what Dr. Sherman Jackson refers to as "Black Religion." Absent of a particular theology, or ecclesiastical authority, Black Religion is described as a tool of holy protest against white supremacy and it's material and psychological effects. Black Religion does not recognize a binary existence between the salvation of the next life and efforts towards a dignified existence in this life. All of which point to the American black person as what Jackson calls a "protest people" whose experience and frames of reference are centered on a history that involves slavery, Jim Crow, and anti-black discrimination (Jackson 2005). Islam in particular is included within this description as Islam, for blacks it is both spiritual and political, as well as an expression of empowerment in a country in which blacks

understand and experience the hegemonic nature of "whiteness" (Curtis 2013, Howell 2013, and Abdullah 2013). In this quote, we see the recognition of the psychological effects of the representation of Jesus (or Isa in the Qur'an), and all the angels as white. In recognizing the depicted lack of diversity in the imagery of the Bible, Hasimali understands this to be a byproduct of white supremacy that was so enduring and pervasive, that even after he converted to Islam, the image of a white Jesus still permeated his psyche as he prayed to Allah (SWT). With aniconism, or the prohibition of representations of The Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and Allah (SWT) as a standard part of Islam, the imagery of Jesus as white that was particular to being a Christian influenced his most intimate spaces as a Muslim and prohibited him at times from praying properly.

His challenging of all the "whitewashed" representations of all the inhabitants of heaven he had been given as a Christian involved an intellectual and cognitive reworking of his understandings of God, his relationship with God, and his proximal relationship to God. The fact that he saw no "black angels or Asian angels" depicted in heaven facilitated a feeling of exclusion of blacks and other racialized minorities. This was accompanied by a subsequent elevation of Europeans or whites which were the only groups represented within this Christian imagery. This challenge led to a pointed and conscious effort to establish his own spiritual identity in combination with affirming his social identity as a black man. This speaks to the lack of a distinction between a dignified existence in the physical world and a dignified existence in the next-world that characterizes Black Religion.

Hasimali reaffirms the importance of identity later in the interview when he shares his thoughts and perspectives on diversity and discussing his position as a board member at CIMIC (Central Illinois Masjid and Islamic Center). Viewing diversity as a "necessity," he speaks to the

importance of maintaining and establishing not just his own identity, but he advocates that others do the same:

> "…when Islam comes to a community, that community is entitled to its own identity. It don't have to be like the Arabs, or have to be like the Indians, or have to be like the Sudanese, I can be an American Muslim. And that's the one thing I try to express to them, We're not going not to conform to a-uh---just being an Arab mosque, or this kind of mosque or that kind of mosque."

Being able to relate to the experience of feelings of exclusion in his Christian past, Hasimali tries to use his position as a board member at the masjid to be a "sounding board" of sorts for other to express their concerns to him and minimize any pressure they may feel to conform to anyone else's culture. The removal of any pressure to conform to cultural norms outside of one's own is an important idea because Islam, at times and in certain spaces, is thought to contain a culture-specific hegemony that Ghosal (2010) has labeled "Arabism." Explained as the blending of, or establishment of identity predicated on cultural specificities of the Arab world during the time of The Prophet Muhammad (SAW). As a result of the Muslim community consisting primarily of Arabs, all that is culturally-specific to them has been granted a certain level of legitimacy or authenticity that is seemingly only reserved for attributes or remnants of their culture. However this tends to be problematic primarily because most of the world's Muslims are not Arab. The idea of a universal brand of Islam or consistent "Arab" Culture that is practiced among the Arabs is a misconception creates binaries that tend to be not only exclusionary to those that don't fit within them, but equally disrespectful . Hasimali's personal experience with feeling excluded inspires him to use his position as a board member to serve as liaison to

members of the masjid community who may experience feelings of exclusion. He then brings their concerns to board meetings and speaks on their behalf.

The discussion of identity was a prominent part of the discussion I had with Muhammad as well. As the Muslim Chaplain of the Illinois State Penitentiary in Aurora, he's considerably more knowledgeable about Islam from a theological standpoint, and more learned regarding the history of Islam in the black community. In my discussion with Muhammad, as we discussed "when" and "where" he was born, the conversation flowed and seemed to shift at its own volition. Shortly after sharing his biographical information, we were talking about how Islam gained its popularity among blacks in the early to mid-nineteenth century. He specifically explained how during this period, a desire to be connected to Africa was part of the Blackamerican's search for identity. He talked of how this manifested itself within Christianity first with the development of the African Methodist, and African Episcopal churches. However, even once Blackamericans got their own congregations, they still couldn't feel comfortable in those spaces because they felt Christianity as a whole was too white-controlled. It is at this point that Islam became a major attraction to many Blackamericans because they felt Islam gave them an identity that was effectively for them and by them. At one point, Muhammad says…

> "So there's always this sense of search for-I'm here but I haven't found myself, so there is this searching for identity so you get to the Churches and they take on African names. So the African Methodists were very popular, but they've all taken on these names to have an African identity, because the African identity was still there in the late 1800's and early part of the 1900's, that sense of an African identity was still there. And then some felt like the African's could not worship and feel comfortable when they were segregated, so they started to form their own, so that sense not being comfortable in a

93

singular church setting—a singular white congregation of setting where they had to

separate into particular pews, so that played out for some AA's, but others didn't feel

comfortably in Christianity. Because they felt like Christianity was too white controlled.

They couldn't find their expression there or their identity in Christianity. Because it

was too white controlled. So they separated in terms of congregations, others just didn't

feel comfortable with the religion at all so they stepped out and came to Islam. But that

identity was just Islam as a label, but it was still Christianity in terms of its ideas, the

theology was still Christianity."

Despite the fact that much of the ethos in which these Blackamericans practiced Islam, we see

the continued importance of establishing an identity within the Blackamerican community on

their own terms even if it closely resembled the Christianity that they left. The importance of

"identity" as a concept is fitting considering their identity as "slave," or "negro," exerted great

influence on every social relationship they could possibly have whether it was during the period

of slavery or the period immediately following. Consequently, taking the initiative to create

one's own label, or self-identify based on one's own understandings and lenses was immensely

important. In the midst of the marginalization that Blackamerican Christians continued to

experience at the hands of their white coreligionists, these experiences led them to the conclusion

that being "Christian" in and of itself was not enough because their continued physical

dislocation from whites in shared spaces maintained Blackamerican feelings of subjugation.

Blackamerican Christians began to move away from churches in which they shared space with

whites to establish their own congregations. Outside of the obvious difference of their churches

being predominately black, they added the moniker "African" (like African Methodist) to their

particular sect of the Christian church to self-identify and draw a distinction from their white counterparts.

However, regardless of adding "African" to the names of their congregations, they were still controlled by what was a predominately white ecclesiastical authority and found themselves under the control of whites even in their own their own physical spaces. It was at this point that there was fertile ground for Islam in the black community. In their continued search for identity, as Abdullah states, this longing for an identity of place of their own led many of them to leave Christianity for Islam. With Christianity being the most readily known mode of spirituality known by Blackamericans at this time, it was also a Christian ethos that was used to articulate their "Islam" as Abdullah recognizes when he says "…that identity was just Islam a label, but it was still Christianity in terms of its internal working, its ideas, the theology was still Christianity." This effectively makes that use of "Islam" or "Muslim" as a label effectively an act of appropriation. By "appropriation" Jackson (2005) references the use of nonindigenous ideas to suit one's individual, or groups agendas with the only distinction between it and "borrowing" being that the former, does not acknowledge the ideas are not their own. However, Jackson (2005) notes that the "appropriation" is not an attempt to hijack the identity of others. Rather the use of appropriation in this case enables the "appropriator" to become the "truest" selves as Islam afforded them an identity that was uniquely their own, an experience and identity that they could have ownership of without having to answer to anyone outside of themselves. Additionally, the act of appropriating Islam allowed for the validation of their past and inspire more positive images for the future of their communities (2005).

The theme identity occurs in the following discussion with Ramon, yet it occurs differently. It should be noted that Ramon is the youngest participant in this study and while he

was not born Muslim, his parents joined the Nation of Islam (NOI) when he was eight years old. Therefore, at the age of 49, he has been Muslim for a vast majority of his life. When asked specifically about the barriers to establishing his Muslim identity, he effectively said that they were minor and very few.

"I felt like my transition to becoming Muslim at the time that my parents converted, it was an easy one. It was easy, it was normal, it was natural. You know, so the transition was a very smooth one for me as a youth. One of the things that happened once my parents converted, is that, you know, we were no longer allowed to practice the Christian holidays. You know, so Halloween , Christmas, all that, you know, was jettisoned. And again, as a student, who is in first grade-second grade, so much of what happens in the school revolves around those holidays. So immediately my parents told the school 'he doesn't celebrate those holidays, he's Muslim.' So right away, there was a distinction, you know, I'm different now. I'm not able to do what they do. I'm not able to participate in those programs, I'm not able to celebrate those holidays. So from that standpoint, I knew there was something different from my peers. And as a result, maybe there was some awkwardness, but the feeling I got from that was not one of feeling ashamed. So I didn't feel ashamed, you know, about this. It was a hardship from the standpoint that I wasn't able to participate in this, but I don't recall having the feeling that—of regret."

I think the "ease" of which Ramon speaks is related largely to the fact that he was very young when the transition to being Muslim began. At the age of eight, he has not had much of an established way of life in any particular direction so the transition was considerably easier for him than it might be for an adult. Even with the exclusion of the school-sponsored celebration of Christian holidays, the other children in his school did not seem to view him any differently and

96

were accepting of that difference. Also aiding in the ease of this transition was the role that his father played. He spoke of how his father frequented the mosque and took him along. Once at the mosque, there were always other children in his age range for him to interact with. This also facilitated a smooth transition to Islam for Ramon because while he noted the feeling of occasional "awkwardness" in school, his time at the mosque exposed him to other children that identified with him and shared a common experience. Even in his occasional mild discomfort, he never felt alone. Combined with the acceptance of his school mates, and enjoying the company of other children who he could identify with, the transition for Islam was a smooth one.

A key idea that can be gathered from Ramon's conversion experience is the importance of community built on an established identity. Converting to Islam in the mid-1970's, Ramon's parents joined when the Nation of Islam's reputation as an active and visible pillar of the black community as well as a force of reform was well established. Also of importance in this period, it was in 1975 that NOI leader Elijah Muhammad passed away. This was also the same year that his son, Warithudin (WD) Muhammad inherited the leadership of the Nation of Islam (Curtis 2002 and Jackson 2005). This event is key because it was at this time that Muhammad ushered in major theological changes to the organization. Much of the racialist articulations of Islamic theology typical to his father was both removed and refuted. For instance, the discussion of whites being "devils," according to WD Muhammad, was a referent to a particular "devilish" state of mind typical to whites as opposed to whites acting as a physical manifestation of the "devil," or a "devil." Further he added that being black did not afford anyone any special place where Allah (SWT) was concerned. WD Muhammad would explain that the idea of whites being devils, Blackamericans being "chosen," and many other hyperbolic and racialist sentiments his father echoed were allegorical as opposed to literal (Curtis 2002). This was one of the initial

steps to moving the NOI toward "Islam-proper," or global Sunni-Islam. Muhammad (W.D.) would shortly thereafter begin to identify himself as "Bilalian" to forge a connection with Bilal ibn Rabah who was an Abyssinian (or Ethiopian) companion to The Prophet Muhammad (SAW), and first to perform the call the prayer (muezzin) (2002). Those that followed him would become known organizationally as The American Society of Muslims (Jackson 2005).

Consequently the "Islam," that Ramon would eventually come to know as a youth would be absent of much of the racialized theological discourses typical to the brand of Islam propagated by Elijah Muhammad. Therefore, this particular brand of Islam would be considerably less "anti-establishment," less preoccupied with racism, and less concerned with positing itself as a mode of protest (2005). Further, the act of identifying as "Bilalian" allowed for yet another layer of self-identification. What was unique about this particular label is that it not only spoke to both an identity that connected religion and race, but it also had a distinct Qur'anic connection with references to Bilal ibn Rabah, a black African. The period in which Ramon's parents converted to Islam afforded him a more universally accepted articulation of Islam that was well equipped with a well-established identity, and communal institutions based on a shared identity.

My next interview was with Ramon Portee (Ramon's father). Being one of the elder participants, he too, like Muhammad, had a wealth of knowledge and spoke from the lens of the same generation. Similar to the discussion I had with Hasimali , he talked of the feelings of exclusion that he felt at the hands of a white Jesus depicted in churches and the psychological damage he felt like it did to him. Like Muhammad, Ramon (Portee) came to Islam through The Nation of Islam (NOI). In our discussion about the establishment of his Muslim identity, he shared that there weren't any "barrier" per se, but I was drawn to his brief discussion of his

98

"new" name. More specifically, his eventual alignment with the NOI and getting his "X." At that particular time he was renamed "Ramon X." He explained:

> "When I joined the Nation of Islam and got my "X" and all that -you joined the Nation of Islam, you got an "X." You had lessons that you got to study (a test), then you had to send them back to Chicago, and if you pass it, they'd say 'we the board read your response, you passed and you receive your 'X.' So I got my 'X'—Ramon X."

In this very brief but rich detailing of his name-change, we again see the importance of identity. The mentioning of his name being changed was by no means the focus of our discussion at any point, however much of what Islam aimed to do in the black community from the period of the early 20th century to the 1960's was heavily centered around identity politics. The reason the name-change is so interesting and fitting to this particular conversation is because changing ones' name is a more intimate change than simply shifting ones religious affiliation. Indicative of Jackson's (2005) prescription of black religion's tendency to be focused on protest and its influence on early articulations of Blackamerican Islam, the name-changing that was typical to the NOI at one point speaks to that as well. When one converts to Islam, they are generally not expected to undergo a name-change unless their given name expressly connotes an idea that runs counter to the principles of Islam such as the worship of other gods or shirk. However, conversion to Islam (according to the NOI) in the Blackamerican community generally entails a "restoration" of an "original" identity that was simultaneously religious, racial, and nationalist in nature. In 1934 however, new members of the NOI were simply assigned an "X" as a surname. There is some variation among scholars as to exactly "what" the "X" symbolized. Knight (2013), and Turner (1997) suggests that the "X" functioned similar to that of the "X" variable in mathematics in that it is unknown. Being that much of the identity, ethnic and national origin of

enslaved African's was lost as a result of the renaming practices that were common during the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, the "X" functioned in a similar manner in that their original name and all that was associated with it was unknown. Esposito (2005) on the other hand, offers a more symbolic understanding of the "X" surname. Particularly in a discussion of Malcom X, it was suggested that the strict code of personal conduct and discipline rendered him (Malcom X) an "ex-smoker" "ex-drinker," "ex-Christian," and "ex-slave."

Regardless of the intended purpose or signification of the "X" surname, its intent to forge a new religious, and racial identity is clear. Operating under the understanding that the experience of slavery has 1) stripped the slaves and their descendants of everything that is indigenous to them, and 2) all things they came to understand about "God" or themselves only functioned to further psychologically cripple them. With this shared understanding, early 20th century Muslim movements in America (the NOI in this case) sought to empower themselves by establishing their own identity that was dually racial as well as ethnic. The establishment of these alternate identities was empowering in the regard that it allowed Blackamerican converts to Islam to not only take ownership of how they understood themselves, but also construct their own parameters for how they would be understood by others.

ANALYSIS

Within a discussion of symbolic power, Bourdieu reminds us that symbolic power necessitates authority, or capital (cultural or symbolic). Because both are "social" in nature, they are closely aligned with identity. Identity's dependence on capital derives from identity emerging from a sense of "insignificance" and under some circumstances, identity only comes from being recognized by those with power. Central to this idea is that the presence of an identity altogether is the result of a struggle for recognition. While everyone has "capital" per se, the distribution of

capital tends to mirror the bureaucratic and/or hierarchical relations that organize a given social space. Those with "negative social capital" or the lowest levels are generally those that carry stigmatized or defamed identities (Swartz 2013).

The aforementioned circumstances align well with the early 20th century experience of Blackamericans. Drawing on Jackson's (2005) description of the Blackamericans as a "protest people" whose experience of America is viewed through the lenses of Jim Crow segregation, slavery, and anti-black racism, this aligns with Bourdieu's assessment that identity can come from a sense of "insignificance." Also of importance is the accompanying understanding that there is oftentimes a need to be "recognized" by those with power. All of which culminates into the prescribed ongoing struggle for recognition as Blackamericans, by shear fact of being "black," have "negative social capital" as a consequence of the stigmas attached to blackness. With "whiteness" serving dually as the hegemonic standard and apex of social capital (Curtis 2013, Howell 2013, and Abdullah 2013), it is those who have the prized identity of "whiteness" who have the power to attach labels to individuals and make those labels not only "stick," but make them appear natural as their arbitrary nature goes misrecognized.

The latter idea specifically speaks to Hasimali's experience in establishing his Muslim identity. The image of a white Jesus and white angels left him feeling excluded as a Christian. In this example, the positing of god or Jesus and all the inhabitants of heaven as white led to Hasimali's feelings of exclusion or insignificance thus it fostered a need to belong or be recognized. In a sense, this feeling of exclusion is accelerated in the regard that as a Blackamerican, not only are you excluded from meaningful social interactions and hold a negative social capital in them specifically because of your "blackness," but you are even excluded in the eyes of "god." This suggests that there is a social hierarchy of sorts that exists

even in the afterlife that excludes not just blacks, but all other races of people as well. However, because identity is "social" or socially constructed, it can be deconstructed and reconstructed (Hampton and Duncan 2011). The embracing of Islam effectively deracialized "god" for Hasimali in the sense that the removal of Eurocentric depictions of Jesus from his psyche allowed for both the inclusion and recognition that he sought after.

Muhammad's discussion about "control" or the lack thereof that was typical to Blackamerican Christians during the early 20th century specifically speaks to the necessity of establishing identity, and pointed efforts to establish an identity that they felt properly spoke to "who" they were. Initially, Blackamerican Christians during this period wanted to set themselves on a level-playing field with their white co-religionists as they both shared an identity as "Christian." However, their continued segregation in places of worship led them to establish their own congregations. Yet, even after establishing their own spaces for worship, and establishing an identity for themselves by adding "African" to names of their congregations, many still felt these all-black spaces were still too white-controlled so they branched out into Islam. What is central to this discussion is the fact that, as Muhammad stated, it was still Christian-like at its core, but it was called Islam. This appropriation of Islam, as Jackson (2005) noted, allowed for these Blackamericans to become their "truest selves," or more appropriately, take control of their "selves" by establishing their own identity on their own terms. The establishment of these all-black congregations and the appropriation of "Islam" are byproducts of a struggle for "recognition" initially by white Christians, and then by white society altogether. The stigma of blackness, or its inherent capital deficit, did not allow early 20th century Blackamerican Christians to operate on a basis of equality with their white Christian counterparts, and they longed for the recognition of their presence, humanity, and legitimacy as

Christians. Those who wanted to be get out from under the umbrella of what they understood to be predominately-black yet white controlled spaces appropriated Islam to situate themselves within a narrative that they controlled.

Ramon's interview displayed an ease and fairly uneventful identity formation process atypical to the other interviews because of his coming to Islam at such a young age directly related to his parents' conversion. More than any particular discussion of identity he had for himself was the time period in which his parents converted. It was at this period that WD Muhammad removed much of the racialized discourses previously typical to the NOI and contextualized them as allegory and metaphors as opposed to literal references. Accompanying this theological shift was the introduction of a new identity: Bilalian. Being that this term is a referent to the Ethiopian historical figure and close companion of The Prophet Muhammad (SAW), this marker compleimented an additional layer of identity that went beyond a referent to racial identity, but also spoke to a religious identity as well. The move to "Bilalian" as an identity marker is dually relevant as it stems from a sense of insignificance as Bourdieu suggests, as well as a lack of recognition that was previously afforded the NOI as an "authentic" religious or Islamic organization (Curtis 2013). The move to "Bilalian" not only identified WD Muhammad and his community with a readily recognizable figure in Islamic history, but in doing so, it increased their "authenticity" with the global Muslim community, and the deracialized discourses eased the tensions of the United States government. Consequently, this recognition strengthened the WD Muhammad community's capital as a religious organization. As for Ramon, the period in which his parents transitioned into Islam left him with an Islam that was less-protest oriented, and absent of racialized discourses that would have led him to view the those around him (particularly white people) with intense suspicion and disdain. Identifying as

"Bilalian" or Muslim without having the added pressure of having to scrutinize white people and the United States government at the age of 8 also definitely made his transition easier.

In examining Ramon's "X," we have a solid but unique "fit" within Bourdieu's assessment of identity. The "X" surname emerges from a sense of insignificance, and a desire to be recognized by those with power. However, it's unique in the regard that it served as a symbolic reminder of the horrible cultural particularities believed to be byproducts of the slave trade that still plague their descendants. Yet, it serves dually as a reminder both the blacks themselves as well as whites. Blacks with an "X" surname demonstrate a certain cultural "consciousness" that reminds blacks of this history, and any whites that came across them would (ideally) be reminded of it as well. Like we saw in Hasimali's interview, we have the deconstruction and reconstruction of an identity (Hampton and Duncan 2011), only this time, instead of deconstructing and reconstructing the identity of "god," identities that speak to one's or a groups racial, religious, and cultural identities follow this pattern, and it is also here, that the move for recognition and power takes place when Ramon and others assert their own identity on their own terms.

TRANSITION, "ISLAM PROPER" AND W.D. MUHAMMAD

Another interesting common thread that seemed to connect most of my participants was a transition of sorts from the Nation of Islam (NOI) to "Islam proper." A term borrowed from Hasimali, "Islam proper" is a referent to the transition from The NOI to classical, or "global Islam," as it is practiced and understood across the world. The individual that was instrumental in facilitating this transition was Wallace (later to be named Warith Deen or "WD") Muhammad. WD was the son of Nation of Islam (NOI) leader Elijah Muhammad who received his Islamic education in Egypt and Scotland on his way to become a renowned scholar. Regardless of the

(sometimes public) disagreements he had with his father that at one point led to his excommunication for denying the divinity of W.D. Fard, WD Muhammad would go on to win the favor of his family and assume leadership of the NOI after his father's death (Esposito 2005 and Turner 1997).

Shortly afterwards, he began to reforming the NOI's doctrines and organizational structure (Esposito 2005, Curtis 2002). It was also at this particular point that he redirected all the NOI's economic programs in a manner in which their religious identity and missions were at the forefront (Esposito 2005). These efforts also served to begin a process of integration of the NOI into the global Muslim community. He changed the name of the NOI to the World Community of al-Islam in the West (which would be renamed to The American Muslim Mission, and be renamed again to the Muslim American Community), NOI ministers became imam's, members were encouraged to study Arabic to better understand Islam, invited white converts to join his organization, and Muhammad himself went on hajj (Esposito 2005, Turner 1997 and Abdullah 2013).

Even in his efforts to mainstream the NOI's theology with classical sunni Islam, he did not move away from critiques of racism, and taking up the causes of the urban poor. Rather, Muhammad integrated and complimented critiques of racism, emphasis on black identity and the fundamentals of Islam into the mission of his organization (Esposito 2005). He did away with what was conceived to be the NOI's "anti-American" stance with the organizations leadership no longer asking for a separate state for blacks, and allowing members to vote (Turner 1997). Considering all the organizational, operational, and theological changes WD Muhammad brought in, they also had profound affects on Blackamerican Muslims who became Muslim under the theological precepts of his father.

As Hasimali was discussing how supportive his family (specifically his mother) was of his conversion conversion to Islam, he noted that she and other members of his family were particularly uncomfortable with the racialize theology that was associated with the NOI (or Fruits of Islam-FOI). More specifically, they were concerned about his wearing of suits and bow ties and marching. They were particularly concerned with the prescription that white people were "devils." As the conversation continued, he would express some discomfort with that particular line of thinking as well. Ironically, he had a friend in high school (a white woman) who he noted has always treated him well and been nothing short of respectful to him. Their friendship continued into adulthood and even as a member of The Nation, he always felt what could be described as a tension of sorts with regard to what his new suggested views on white people were and his personal experience with this particular white person. He went on to say "Our relationship from high school to adulthood made me very uncomfortable thinking that somehow because of the color of her skin-- I know her character and her personality was much bigger than her skin color."

> After expressing difficulty with accepting the racialized discourses associated with the
> NOI, it was at this point that he mentioned WD Muhammad and his different approach to
> Islam. "So when Wallace Muhammad came on the scene in '75, it was almost like what
> he was teaching us about orthodox Islam , you know, Islam "proper", and the readings of
> the Qur'an, it was almost something that relaxed me so it wasn't hard for me to
> transition from that because my nature was telling me that I cannot dislike this person
> because of the color of their skin. No matter what happened, I can't do-I can't
> become them-the people that oppressed me, I can't become the people---an
> oppressor. And so, she helped me-and like I told her years later, I said 'you have no idea

how much you helped me get through this thing.' But she helped me make the transition."

In this quote we see the importance of WD Muhammad for Hasimali. Already struggling with The Nation's racialist theology, WD Muhammad's assumption of the leadership of the NOI, and consequent movement away from unyielding animosity toward whites afforded Hasimali several benefits: 1) it allowed him to maintain a Muslim identity while maintaining his relationship with his friend, 2) it no longer placed him "out of bounds" philosophically with The Nation in particular by not sharing their racialist perspectives, and 3)He also was being seasoned to a more universally accepted and historically grounded articulation of Islam. For Hasimali, it was just as much about becoming grounded spiritually as it was about not becoming the person he fought against (oppressor). More specifically, he understood the racialized discourses of the NOI to be an ideological response to the historical treatment of blacks by whites ranging from chattel slavery and Jim Crow segregation to the more contemporary instances of contempt like police brutality. Despite those factors, it was still important to him to not become a victim of both the anti-black contempt as well as not becoming a victim in the regard that he becomes hardened to the idea of accepting that not all white people would be a barrier to his success and a threat to his well-being.

In my discussion with Brother Hakim, he clearly made the most references to the Imam WD Muhammad, in regard to his leadership, intelligence, and importance to the Blackamerican community. He also frequently talked about his experiences with immigrant Muslims. However, one discussion in particular stood out as the most profound and pointed was a conversation in which the two were somewhat combined. Like Hasimali, he spoke on how WD Muhammad resonated with him personally. In a discussion about calling people to Islam or dawa, he

emphasized that those called to the faith should be called on the basis of equality suggesting that their needs, and cultural particularities be respected as equally important. In that, Brother Hakim was critical immigrant Islam's tendency to exert a cultural (specifically Arab) influence that tends to function hegemonically in the regard that what is associated with, typical to, and generally preferred by immigrants tends to take precedent. Brother Hakim's went on to say:

> "You know they will help build a masjid, and what they did, was they give you, this is what woke us up, they want to tell you what to say--this is a script. That's why folks don't like taking money from them. That's' right. And Muhammad said 'No. We're not like that. We're going to do whatever the spirit leads us to do, or whatever we think the community needs to hear. That's what we're going to talk about.' You see what I'm saying? And so uh—that was one of the things that really divided the community a lot, and they finally got to the point where they couldn't do it with us, they probably still tell the Arabs what to say, but we ain't gone do it like that."

In Jackson (2005) there is a discussion about an arrogance or "will-to-dominate," of sorts that tends to be typical of immigrant Islam. However, he situates this discussion within a larger context of "self-authentication," or the inability of the Blackamerican Muslim community to do this. More specifically, when juxtaposing the religious landscape in which Christianity came to West and Central Africa, unlike that particular religion in those regions, Islam in the Blackamerican community already had a previously-existing indigenous regime of religious authority prior to the waves of immigrants from the Muslim world that came in the 1960's and 70's in what was previously termed the proto-Islamic groups. As previously noted, it was these groups that were the faces of Islam in the American imagination prior to 1965. However, Jackson (2005) notes the critical weakness of the Blackamerican Muslim community was and

continues to be its inability to self-authenticate itself with any Islamic criterion that is recognizable beyond the Blackamerican Muslim community. For this reason, the eventual presence of post-1965 immigrants from the Muslim world would effectively challenge the "Islamicity" (to borrow Jackson's term) of Blackamerican Islam by it being evaluated on parameters that were in existence prior to Blackamerican Islam, are outside of the Blackamerican Experience, and presumed both the intellectual and cultural property of those from the Muslim world (Jackson 2005).

In this example we can see presumptuous behavior or arrogance that Brother Hakim was so critical of. Much of this audacity comes from the vast disparity in economic power immigrant communities have when compared to that of Blackamerican Muslim communities. Elliot (2007) gives voice to Imam Talib Abdur-Rashid's coining of the term "Muslim elite" when speaking of the more affluent and typically immigrant Muslim community. Brother Hakim had an appreciation for the fact that Muhammad (WD) recognized the tendency of immigrant Muslims (specifically Arabs) to offer assistance and then take over, and was firm in his belief that the most effective way to govern his community was to continue addressing issues pertinent to the community he served as opposed to accepting the money and following a script that probably would not necessarily speak to the Blackamerican community, if at all. However, as was said earlier about the two communities, Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims share a common religious identity, but are distinctly different in "who" they are culturally, historically, and even experientially. Further, these differences would necessitate different understandings, articulations, and applications of Islam that can easily become a source of tension when one group has a presence that dominates the other. This dominance, or hegemony, is oftentimes manifested in one of two ways: 1)The initiation of debates about whether certain ideas, practices

, etc. are authentically "Islamic," or 2) being overly concerned with issues facing the Muslim

World at the expense, and complete ignoring of domestic issues. For instance, Elliot (2007) talks

of how Imam Adur-Rashid experienced great difficulty in generating support for Amadou Diallo,

a West African Muslim immigrant who was slain by New York City Police officers after they

had mistaken a wallet for a pistol in 1999 (2007). In explaining a presence of a hierarchy of sorts

with regard to issues immigrant Muslims will afford their attention, issues such as police

brutality are central concerns of the Blackamerican community as a whole, but not pressing to

the immigrant Muslim community. When solicited for support, Imam Abdur-Rashid says "…all

the sudden, we're by ourselves" (2007). In Brother Hakim, the presence of the aforementioned

attributes could be observed throughout the interview. One of the things that became clear was

his willingness and comfort being critical of the immigrant Muslim community. He made

mention of their owning stores in largely black community of Champaign and selling pork,

alcohol, and cigarettes, and their refusal to "give a dime" to, or address issues relevant to the

Blackamerican community. Further, he acknowledged their tendencies to pool their financial

resources and establishes businesses of their own. In these regards, the influence of WD

Muhammad was clear.

In my discussion with Ramon, he also talked about the importance of WD Muhammad.

At one point during the interview, we talked specifically about the changes he brought to the

NOI. In this discussion the common threads of deracializing the religious discourse, identity, and

bringing the organization in-line with "Islam proper." However, within this discussion, he talked

about the bridges that WD Muhammad built between preceding NOI precepts and those that

were aligned between "Islam-proper." Understanding the NOI's existence and it's theology to

be a distinct byproduct of the Blackamerican experience or "indigenous African-American

Islamic expression" as noted in McCloud (1995), as was noted earlier in this project, a key part

of the success of the NOI was it's addressing the Blackamerican need for an identity that was

awarded to them on their own terms, and that spoke to "who" they were culturally. This was the

starting point of our discussion when he noted:

> "He didn't do away with our identity as an African-American people. So it's not like one
>
> he came to power he stripped us of our African-American culture. But what he did
>
> was using Qur'an, and sunna, he looked and said 'okay. What are the things that we can
>
> keep, and what are the things we need to jettison. And then he taught that to us."

The changes that his ascension to leadership brought to the NOI are well documented at earlier

points in this project and will not be revisited here. What I would like to move the discussion to

at this point is a different facet of the discussion of immigrant hegemony. It has been established

with the coming of the post-1965 immigrants from the Muslim world, the NOI was dubbed as

not "real" Muslims (Curtis 2002 and 2013, McCloud 1995, and Jackson 2005). This assessment

of the NOI and other proto-Islamic groups as not "real" Muslims was predicated on a

combination of theological underpinnings, feelings of cultural superiority that culminated in an

assumed owernership of Islam or will-to-dominate (Jacison 2005), and anti-black racism

(Prashad 2000) that culminated in the incentivization of drawing a distinction between

themselves and Blackamericans both religiously and socially (Kayyali 2004, and Jackson 2005).

All of which fostered the appearance of immigrant Islam being what was described as

"culturally predatory." A term used by Dr. Umar Fauq Abd-Allah, it is argued that Islam

understood or practiced in this manner falls short of Islam's original "wisdom. " In building upon

this idea, Abd-Allah goes on to cite several examples in which The Prophet Muhammad (SAW)

was sensitive to differing culture-specific articulations of Islam that were situated outside those

norms more commonly recognized as "Arab." In one example, The Prophet (SAW) interceded on behalf of Ethiopians who were beating drums, and performing a ritual dance. When criticized, he (The Prophet) demanded that they be allowed to continue arguing effectively that that is "who" they were culturally (2004). In Abd-Allah's (2004) recognition that these types of tensions and discussions reach back to the times of The Prophet (SAW) ties in to an earlier point in this project with Curtis' (2014) discussion of "universalism" and "particularism" (2002). Operating under an understanding that each group or groups present within Islam will offers something uniquely culture-specific or "particular," similar to Bourdieu's prescription of the inner-workings of capital, Curtis (2003) argues that differing groups encounter one another and engage in a competition for the power to "universalize" their "particular" brands. These brands go on to function in an hierarchical and exclusionary manner. This phenomenon was alluded to earlier in Jackson (2005) as well with regard to his discussion of "false universals." Noting that they function to serve the interests of those with the power to establish parameters, they then become tools of domination (2005).

Returning to Ramon's discussion of WD Muhammad, he (Muhammad) recognized the centrality of identity in the practice, understanding, and even history of the development of Islam in the Blackamerican community and was careful not to remove that emphasis. Rather, he built around it in a similar manner that his father did with the key difference being that, and as was alluded to in Muhammad Abdullah's interview, he (WD) engaged in a process of critical analysis and application of classical Islam in an attempt to discern what was applicable or useful to Blackamericans and what was not. The end result was the fusion of classical Islam with an ethos that acknowledged the particularities of the Blackamerican experience that made Islam simultaneously viable, authentic, and distinctly "black."

Unpacking the discussion of WD Muhammad I had with Mr. Portee, it began with his recalling of the power-vacuum of sorts that was created by the passing of his father, and Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad. He detailed how he was involved in a discussion with some younger gentlemen at Milliken University who were expressing differing opinions on who should assume leadership of the NOI following the passing of Elijah Muhammad. According to Mr. Portee, the names that entered the conversation ranged from the obscure to the prominent. Names were suggested from Muhammad Ali to the one who would become Minister Farrakhan. However, at the point that this conversation was taking place, WD Muhammad had already assumed leadership of the NOI, and the conversation was generally centered on their disapproval of or preference for someone other than WD Muhammad.

> "Like I told them-they were younger brothers, 'Look here: You haven't met The Honorable Elijah Muhammad. I have. You haven't even heard him talk. I have. I was at one of his meetings in Chicago at the Stony Island Mosque and he told us that he wasn't here to teach the religion. Hewas here to take all this stuff away that you all are into now—to get your mind away from all that. And that 'I (Elijah Muhammad) wasn't here to teach the religion of al-Islam.' He said 'My son will take you there.' And when I'm gone…' we didn't think he'd ever die, but he said 'My son Warithudeen Muhammad—we called him Wallace back then, he said 'he will take over. He will take you into the religion of al-Islam. I was there when he said it out of his mouth."

What can be observed here is that, as per Mr. Portee, things progressed within The Nation of Islam in the manner and order that Elijah Muhammad intended. Beyond demonstrating his familiarity with Elijah Muhammad and the alleged plan he had for WD Muhammad to assume leadership of the NOI in his absence, Mr. Portee relayed some interesting ideas. In particular, the

utterance "all this stuff you are into now." This was a referent particularly to the nationalist and racialist overtones that made up the theology of the NOI. Understanding these things to be problematic, it aligns well with Elijah Muhammad's alleged assertion that his son (WD) would lead them to "al-Islam." What can be potentially confusing in this idea, is that this particular statement seems to not account for the fact that these Blackamerican's already identifies as Muslim.

However, the last comment should be contextualized within the framework of understanding that as Dr. Sherman Jackson says, "Islam is a process, and not an event" (2010). According to Jackson (2010) early articulations of Islam in the black community (or the early Islamizers) typically held racialist/nationalist discourses and other theological underpinnings that would be unfamiliar to immigrant Muslims because early 20th century Blackamerican Muslims were undergoing a process of indigenization. Explained as a process in which individuals "carve out a space for themselves in a society," Jackson applies this idea to the early Islamizers in the regard that much of the problematic ideas prevalent within the proto-Islamic groups (which includes the NOI), were present because they were undergoing a process in which they were simply attempting to make Islam relevant and viable to their own culture experiences and particularities. Being that these groups came about in a racially charged sociopolitical context of Jim Crow segregation, within a discussion of indigenization, it stands to reason that their experiences as Blackamericans would read heavily into their understanding and articulations of Islam. Therefore, at this early juncture of Islam in the Blackamerican community, these things would be just part of the process of Blackamerican Muslims indigenizing Islam.

ANALYSIS

In order to properly address the role of WD Muhammad and symbolic power's

relationship to Hasimali's experience, we must first revisit the Bourdieu's discussion of capital.

At its core, symbolic power requires the recognition of authority or capital. Understood as a

reverence of sorts, it's a widespread and easily recognizable authority attached to a particular

group or individual from which power itself is thought to emanate. With this power, this group or

particular individuals can impose realities that are granted legitimacy. Consequently, the

behaviors and/or ideas attached to this group or individual take on the appearance of being

disinterested in the assumption of power or power relations (Swartz 2013). Bourdieu notes that

cultural capital specifically is what functions as the source of competition. What is of specific

importance is how the capital associated with the source becomes attached to other things

external to it such as varying types of credentials, prestige, and knowledge. These actors are not

necessarily conscious of these relationships, nor are the engaged with specific ends in mind.

These decisions and behaviors are understood to be tacit and merely reflections of their own

accumulated capital and their internalization of discourses associated with the assumed position.

Thus, the authority comes to be associated with the position(s) held, which then becomes

attributed to personal characteristics. From this point, because capital tends to be embedded

within social networks, membership within a particular group becomes necessary to access this

capital as it acquired once endowed by those with power (Swartz 2013).

WD Muhammad's authority or capital emanated from several different places. Much of

it came from his religious educational credentials that he obtained in Egypt. Beyond this, he also

had a great deal of capital (cultural in particular) that came with being not only the son of Elijah

Muhammad, but Elijah Muhammad's chosen predecessor to become leader of The Nation upon

his death (Lincoln 1994). Having "Islamic" credentials from the Muslim world in combination

with becoming the leader of a very large and well established Muslim community afforded him an immediate far-reaching influence and authority. Both of which fortified his ideas, behaviors, perspectives, and articulations of Islam with authority and legitimacy. As Bourdieu suggests, the changes he made to the NOI's theology and organization are what he genuinely believed to be "authentically Islamic" centered on what he had come to know and understand about Islam as he learned it in the lands of Islam. This meets Bourdieu's assessment that ideas and behaviors of individuals endowed with capital tend to be more tacit and absent of specific ends-driven agenda. Consequently, not only did his Islamic education grant him religious authority among Blackamerican Muslims and The Nation, it also served as a facilitating factor that aligned The Nation with global sunni Islam or what Hasimali referred to as "Islam proper."

Returning to Hasimali, the discussion of capital becomes relevant through an examination of his use of language or terminology when discussing his transition from the racialized theological precepts of the NOI (or FOI) as it was under the leadership Elijah Muhammad to the more nuanced and universally accepted ideas of WD Muhammad. It appears as if all the aforementioned attributes that endowed WD Muhammad with capital and legitimacy was dually transferred to those members of The Nation who were led by him. Hasimali's use of the term "proper" as a referent to a more "accurate," "appropriate," or "correct" understanding of Islam not only situated his theological understanding within a more universally accepted space, but it aligned his faith with what could be argued was his conscience (referred to as his "nature") as his transition made sense of his lack of animosity towards white people as a collective. This served to "relax" him through the suggested reevaluation of the importance of race. It provided him a more comfortable and universal understanding of Islam, as well as granted him the moral superiority of not becoming like the very people who mistreated him.

Building off the previously established parameters for capital, what can be gathered from Brother Hakim's interview is the amount of (social, economic, and cultural) capital WD Muhammad had. First he garnered great cultural capital with regard to the Blackamerican Muslim community in his refusal to accept funds from immigrant (specifically Arab) donors because he was insistent on addressing issues that were most pressing to the communities he served. It arguably served as a moment of assertion of authority, or a "taking a stand" of sorts, while simultaneously maintaining a culture-specific space in which Islam remains relevant and applicable to Blackamerican Muslims. Additionally, most Blackamerican masjids tend to struggle financially much like Imam Abdur-Rashid's community. However, Imam Muhmammad's refusal of funds suggests not only an audacity and strength atypical to Blackamerican Muslims in this time and space, but also a socioeconomic situation which afforded him the opportunity to refuse to have Islam dictated to him from an immigrant perspective, as well as the ability to maintain his community without their help. Further, this move was a show of social capital because the spirit of resistance to immigrant hegemony, his promotion of self-sufficiency, and the articulation of a culture-specific space for Islam resonated with his followers as well and this was observed with Brother Hakim.

For the discussion of capital, in Brother Hakim we again see the presence of capital (cultural in particular) becoming the sight of competition. Particularly within the discussion of what an "authentically Islamic agenda" is. As alluded to previously, the economic resources typically associated with immigrant Muslim communities combined with their direct access and oftentimes support from institutions located in the Muslim World affords them a "power" or "authority" denied both Blackamerican Muslim communities as well as their most of their leaders. This becomes clear in the discussion of "which" causes are supported. Typically those

117

that are most pressing in Blackamerican communities are not afforded the economic or moral support because they are in fact not pressing to immigrant Muslims who tend to have the largest influence and/or largest pocketbooks. As Imam Abdur-Rashid noted, whenever issues that are of great concern in the black community are the subject of discussion, they are not afforded the same attention or support. One of the ways in which immigrant Muslim communities assert their influence is by awarding funds or support "conditionally" in the regard that their leaders expect to have a certain level of influence with regard to what goes on, is said, or promoted in masjids they offer their offer assistance to. Unlike Bordieu's prescription of taking the appearance of being disinterested in power, this particular example is increasingly difficult to disassociate with the assumption of power, nonetheless, what can be observed in this and other similar examples is the immigrant Muslim communities ability to impose a particular "reality," (or authentically Islamic concern) that is granted "legitimacy" just by the act of attaching themselves to or announcing their support of it. Additionally, their access to international Muslim organizations and finances function as the social networks that Bourdieu suggest are necessary to have access to the power associated with that particular body.

WD Muhammad, just as was seen in the discussion of Hasimali, assumed a persona that ran counter to the manifested immigrant hegemony that was both deliberate and conscious. Brother Hakim's discussion of Muhammad's recognition of the differences, and the necessity to address and cater to those differences even if it was at the expense of their financial support is what won the respect of Brother Hakim. Not only did WD Muhammad show an economic independence that did not place him at the mercy of the immigrant Muslim community for support of any kind, but he suggested and posited an alternative "reality" of the Blackamerican

community, and consequently Blackamerican Muslims as authentically Islamic in the face of a lack of support and even criticism at the hands of their immigrant coreligionists.

In a similar vein to what we observed in the discussion with Brother Hakim, Ramon is acknowledging that WD Muhammad is again challenging immigrant Muslim hegemony. In what is apparently the workings of capital being re-worked, his membership, or association with the dominant social network (The Muslim World) through his religious education afforded him the cultural capital (with regard to his own community) to engage in a process of sending Islam through the sift of Blackamerican reality to effectively create a nuanced, relevant, applicable, yet (presumably) authentically Islamic culture-specific expression of the religion. Understanding the necessity of "identity" within Blackamerican Islam, rather than removing it and other identity-specific issues altogether from Islam due to the lack of shared emphasis with the immigrant Muslim community, he placed them in conversation with, and fused them with the classical Islamic sciences to generate an Islam that entailed all the theological precepts of "Islam-proper" that spoke to the Blackamerican experience. However, it would be remiss to discount that fact that his association with the Muslim World rendered his articulation of Islam a legitimacy that Blackamerican Islam did not have previously. This served to move the Blackamerican Muslim community toward integration into the global Muslim community that yielded a different type of attention and recognition that was different from what Blackameriacn Islam had under his father.

Mr. Portee's detailing of his experience with other during the period in which WD Muhammad would assume leadership of the NOI, speaks to the magnitude to which those invested with power have the ability to impose their lens on others. In this particular instance, the question of whether WD Muhammad's understanding of Islam was more "authentic," or "universal" than that of his father's is of no relevance. Rather, the point of interest for our

discussion of symbolic power resides in the fact that WD Muhammad was implementing a different and arguably contradictory lens of Islam than that of his father. However, being that the power and capital endowed to him emanated from the relationship he had with Elijah Muhammad, we simultaneously see a reproduction of an existing hierarchy in that the line of authority primarily stayed within a single family. Additionally, as symbolic power does not manifest itself unilaterally, it tends to come about in a struggle of understandings and ideas as was detailed in Mr. Portee's experience with other members of the NOI.

DIVERSITY

Another common theme that emerged in these interviews was that of diversity. Admittedly, it was a common theme primarily because it was a core question I asked of all interviewees, but ironically, their responses to those questions were also very diverse. Additionally, just as the responses to questions of diversity were diverse, the possible range of benefits and concerns, solutions and problems, and potential topics related to diversity covered an exponentially wide range in itself. Nonetheless, it would be inappropriate to not introduce this particular theme without an introduction to the topic itself. All of these possibilities cannot be covered within this section or with the amount of participants in this study, so this introduction will address prevalent themes and discussions of diversity as they pertain specifically to the United States. More specifically, the introduction to this section will address some particulars of demographic diversity, racial diversity as it relates to Islam in America.

Currently, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States and boasts numbers that estimate between four and twelve million people identifying as Muslim. These figures render the US with more Muslims that many Muslim countries like Libya, and Kuwait (Esposito 2005); but with the recent presidential election, these numbers might stagnate or decline.

Historically speaking, America's first contact with Islam came prior to the 19th century through the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade as at least twenty percent of the Africans brought to the United States were Muslims (Esposito 2005 and Diouf 1998). They would eventually lose their religious identity as they were forcibly converted to Christianity. Towards the end of the 19th century, Muslims became a visible minority in the United States with immigrants coming into the labor force from Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Additionally, in the mid-20th century, numbers of Palestinian refugees immigrated to the United States after the establishment of Israel in 1948. Consequently, Islam in America is rich in racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity with groups from the Middle East, Africa, South/Southeast Asia, and Blackamericans. Roughly two-thirds are immigrants or descendants of immigrants with Blackamericans constituting a vast majority of the remaining 30 percent making them a significant numerical minority. Most identify as Sunni, but there is a sizeable Shii minority.

Muslims, like any other group have been forced to negotiate their identities within the hostile social and political spaces created by both America's peculiar treatment and placement of race. Without revisiting the historical development of racial identity for various immigrant groups that was discussed at an earlier point in this research, it should be noted, as was stated in a New York Times article, relations between black and brown Muslims is a "unique struggle for Islam in America" (Elliot 2007). After the 1960's, many immigrant Muslim communities steered away from inner city areas and focused on establishing themselves in middle class, suburban communities. This move was thought to be made that much easier for immigrants with lighter complexions that could pass for white and with, in many instances, adopted anglicized names. A similar move was made by South Asian Muslims, however their darker complexions made assimilation into these spaces that much more difficult. Consequently, they relied on their

foreign-born, and higher socioeconomic status to navigate a racialized socioeconomic order that did not hold a fixed space for them. Meanwhile Blackamerican Muslims were left fighting the same battles with racism, and their experience as Muslims complicated these matters as many of them were made to feel as though their embracing of Islam required a disavowal of who they were racially (Abdullah 2013).

In my discussion with Hasimali, when we talked about diversity, he reflected on his past positions as a president and vice-president of Muslim organizations associated with Masjids. Despite the aforementioned issues that can accompany diversity, Hasimali held overwhelmingly positive views of diversity. When asked specifically what his views on diversity were…

> "I think that it's necessary. I think that uh---the diversity, to me, is a geographical
> environment knowledge that a person brings to the table. As far as a skin color thing, I
> think that I've been blessed to be about 90% past looking at that. But when someone
> comes from uh---let's say Morocco, or they come from uh---South Africa, or the come
> from India or from Pakistan, you know---if they come from the east coast, the west coast
> that kind of diversity is always helpful because like then you bring different experiences
> to the pot. And so, there's a case in the Quran where it says I made you different so
> that you may learn from each other not so you may despise and reject one another. So
> diversity is something that, every time I think that it happens, it's a blessing for all of us.
> It's not something that's challenging, you know---the only thing that challenges you in
> diversity is your cultural norms--things that you are not able to let go of because of your
> culture."

Hasimali's mentioning of culture, as well as the manner in which it is referenced in a discussion of diversity speaks a dynamic that Grewal (2014) refers to as "culture talk." A borrowed term

from Mahmoud Mamdani, "culture talk," is a referent to a limited and binary view of culture that is typically more in our minds than in reality. More specifically, it is a view of culture as a "museumized," unyielding, and static set of customs that has not only never changed, but is vehemently opposed to change. It tends to reduce "culture" to a common sense-like uniformity that reproduces imbalances in power between Westerners that claim to understand Muslim lands and groups as was previously discussed in Jackson (2005) and Curtis (2009). All these attributes tend to be especially present in our discussions of Muslims as they occur in the West (Grewal 2014).

Naturally this problematic and binary understanding of culture influences discussions of Islam. For the record, culture as was discussed by Hasimali is not what would be classified as the problematic "culture talk." However, two things must be kept in consideration: 1) The understanding or treatment of culture that is typical to "culture talk" is what typically serves as a barrier to the positive attributes of diversity, and 2) that this particular brand of understanding influences how some Muslims understand Islam. Returning briefly to the discussion of "Arabization" that took place earlier, the fact that the original Muslim community consisted primarily of inhabitants from the Arabian Peninsula, has facilitated an incentivization of emulation Arab cultural forms and norms in order to qualify as authentically "Islamic" (Ghosal 2010). Effectively "culture talk" put-to-practice, tends to recreate "false-universals" (Jackson 2005), and "universalizes the particular" (Curtis 2002) thus creating a fusion of culture and Islam that has led to a situation in which those that hail from the Arab world, or those that feel as though they best emulate Arab culture, posit themselves as having a spiritual monopoly of sorts over those whose practice or understanding of Islam differs from their own. In combination with the complications of the workings of race and class that were addressed earlier, this particular

treatment of culture tends to serve as a barrier to realizing the fullness of the enriching aspects of diversity.

In a later discussion I would have with Brother Hakim, the discussion of diversity took a decidedly different tone. To this point, some of the issues regarding intra-faith interactions and dialogue between Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims have been explored at length. In comparison, Brother Hakim's discussion of diversity took a different perspective as he began to reflect on his experiences with immigrant Muslims (specifically Saudis). As the conversation continued, we briefly shared unfortunate experiences that we both had as Blackamerican Muslims interacting with our immigrant coreligionists. As I listened intently, he shared an experience that seemingly disturbed him if not more than the others, definitely in a way that his other experiences of racism and discrimination did not. He shared an experience that his son had at the hands of his Saudi friends:

> "…you know Arabs love to start speaking a foreign language—you know it's impolite to start speaking a foreign language among people when you can speak the same language as them. It's impolite and you don't do that. And so uh—they would start talking and they were referring to my son as an "abd" and the boy said "nah. He ain't a abd brother." This is a human being, this is a Muslim. So forth and so on. So he said he remembered that conversation but uh—so—anyway, the um—we had this thing and to answer this thing about diversity, NO- I think they're still just as biased and the whole nine yards. You know—the pudding is in the eating.

Immediately hearing this story I was reminded of a khutba (lecture or sermon) by Imam Abdul Malik entitled "Are We A Racist Umma." Blackamerican as well, he detailed how he's witnessed racism in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. He explained that he observed a young boy say to a

black-skinned person on the street what translates to "Oh, you slave! You black tar, you Zanji of African descent, get out of here" and spit at him. He also explained that he personally had an experience where he was referred to as "abd." He (Imam Abdul Malik) asked the person who labeled him as such why he felt the need to use that term, and was told that the term meant "righteous person." Fluent in Arabic, the Imam explained to him that if that term meant "righteous person," in turn, he would call him (the man), his sons, and his father "abd" (Malik 2014)

Although "Abd" is an Arabic term that literally means "slave," and makes common appearances in names such "Abdul" meaning "servant," or "Abdullah" meaning "servant of Allah," it simultaneously carries a colloquial meaning in which it is applied pejoratively to those thought to be inferior or in positions of servitude (Segal 2001 and Akande 2012), and carries a connotation that is reminiscent of "nigger." So obviously, "abd," is an offensive term and this is especially the case when a Blackamerican Muslim or non-Muslim is being labeled as such. Typically using their familiarity with the Arabic language in combination with an assumed lack-thereof on behalf of Blackamericans, it serves as a shield to speak freely and oftentimes offensively when in the presence of blacks. Consequently, sometimes racial slurs or condescending sentiments about black people are communicated and the blacks are unaware of it. This is exactly what happened to Brother Hakim's son. However, as can be observed in the quote, one of the other young men present spoke in his defense. Nonetheless, his son's experience of discrimination at the hands of Saudis in combination with his own experiences seemingly soured him (Brother Hakim) on the idea of inter-ethnic or racial dialogue within the Muslim community. Brother Hakim would go on to later say that he does not struggle with

feelings of resentment as a result of these experiences the way he used to. Nonetheless, his views

on the utility of diversity within the Muslim community was at times condescending.

As Brother Hakim shared this story, his speech got intense and once he finished the story,

he rhythmically shook his head in silence for a moment. Both this experience and perspective

have unfortunate familiarity among Blackamerican Muslims. Already expounded upon at length,

the phenomena is known more commonly as the "indigenous-immigrant divide." As Khabeer

(2009) explains, it is marked by, and is the inevitable consequence of the placement and

performance of race and racism in the American context. As can be observed in the previous

example, and discussed at length at earlier points in this project, face-to-face interactions

between Blackamerican Muslims and immigrant Muslims tend to lend overwhelming legitimacy

to the idea that immigrant Muslims reproduce and internalize white supremacists attitudes

toward blacks. Reflective of the pursuit of what Jackson (2005) referred to as the attainment of

"nouveau whiteness," immigrant Muslims tend to take on these attitudes where blacks are

concerned in an effort to more effectively assimilate (Khabeer 2009 and Prashad 2000).

In my interview with Mr. Abdullah, the contribution to the discussion of diversity didn't

come following the specific question on diversity. Rather, within a discussion about regular

operations at Central Illinois Masjid and Islamic Center or "CIMIC," Mr. Abdullah referenced an

element of diversity that does not necessarily cause problems per se, but can be potentially

problematic in the regard that differing groups tend to have differing expectations. In particular,

differing groups tend to have different expectations for how the masjid should operate. Mr.

Abdullah went on to note that these expectations also extend to how religious services (jummah)

should function and how the sermon (khutbuh) should be delivered:

"…because of group diversity in terms of individuals in the jummah services, there are individuals who are expecting to hear khutba as they always hear the khutba. You know you say a number of different sura from the Qur'an, connected with a number of hadiths from The Prophet and you mention the sahaba—they're expecting to hear that type of khutba. And if you don't follow that model then essentially you haven't given an appropriate khutba. So there are people expecting that kind of thing. There's another generation of Muslims, who want to hear something that's relevant to things in today's society. They heard about the early companions, they heard about that growing up, they heard about the prophet, but they want to hear something that's relevant to today's society. And so it's difficult to try to create a setting where what's needed in the jummah is actually given in the jummah, because some people will complain if you don't put enough hadith in there, surah from the Qur'an you this is a spiritual experience they don't want to hear anything about the social problems in the world or what's going on in society."

What can be seen within this quote is a conflict that is both generational as well as cultural. Oftentimes, the immigrant communities are generally more in-line in terms of their expectations for what jummah would look like or how the khutbah should be delivered. The proverbial odd-man-out tends to be Blackamerican Muslims. Being that differing groups having differing experiences and histories, it would be reasonable to assume that their needs or what they seek from jummah would also be different. Abdullah (2013) notes that the tension between religion and race has been an ongoing issue and that black Sunni converts to Islam quickly became disenchanted with the deracialized discourses and established their own organizations. Jackson (2005) speaks to this phenomenon and notes that at times Islam poses barriers to Blackamerican

Muslims. More specifically, immigrant Muslims have a tendency to treat issues regarding racism and white supremacy as the explicit historical baggage of Blackamericans rather than receiving it as a standard ingredient in the historical fabric of America. Being that many Blackamerican Muslims belonged and currently do belong to predominately immigrant masjids, and that many immigrant Muslims cater to a "nouveau whiteness" that prioritizes an assimilationist ethos, khutbas and other masjid activities tend to largely ignore the social, and cultural particularities of the Blackamerican experience.

The aforementioned situation tends to be a fundamental departure where both expectations and arguably the needs of Blackamerican Muslims are concerned. Considering issues such as education, poverty, police brutality, and racial discrimination are staples of both the Blackamerican historical and contemporary experience, Blackamerican Muslims value a social justice component to their articulations of Islam. There are some imams and scholars that have incorporated discussions of social justice in their khutbah's and even some that advocate its inclusion. One of which is Yasir Qadi. An open critic of American foreign policy, Islamophobia and racism, in a lecture entitled "Speaking truth to power: Speaking up against oppression," he was openly critical of the post-9/11 American context in which he feels that there is a focus on social injustices taking place in the Muslim world that are not only in fact more about purposely misrepresenting Islam and Muslims, but are focused upon at the expense of totally ignoring the social injustices that take place in America. He went on to cite the deaths of Eric Garner, Philando Castille, and 12 year-old Tamir Rice (Qadi 2015). He then went on share a story in which he was pulled aside by someone who was unnamed and told that he could be very useful to the American Muslim community if he avoided addressing such controversial topics in his lectures and focus only focused on religious and theological matters. In this particular

discussion, Qadi let it be known that Muslims have a responsibility to speak "truth to power" and speak openly about ones' disapproval of problematic and unfair policy initiatives and actions at the hands of the government (Qadi 2015).

In my following discussion with Ramon, he took a somewhat unique perspective on diversity. While he acknowledged that diversity is by and large a positive thing, he noted that it tends to be viewed in a somewhat narrow way. He explained that diversity is more than dress, or appearance and that those things are talked about within a discussion of diversity at the expense of experience. Further, he explained that there is a lot to be learned from the diversity of the American Muslim community, but he noted that he feels like diversity, as it currently exists, is not appreciated. He went on to say:

> "In my opinion, diversity within the Muslim community is undervalued. It's like a box
>
> that has a gift in it, but we don't want to open the box to see what's in it. It's what's
>
> inside that has the value. So we don't value what's inside and a lot of times we don't
>
> even value the box, because that box doesn't look like my box. Muslims, like all people,
>
> we are not immune to racism. Yes, I know what the Qur'an says about racism, but, the
>
> Qur'an is infallible as the word of God. Muslims are not infallible. We're not infallible.
>
> Just because it says 'no racism,' that doesn't mean that you 'can't' be racist." That
>
> doesn't stop Muslims from being racist. All it takes to be a Muslim is saying "la illaha
>
> illa Allah Mahammad abduhu rasul-Allah" There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad
>
> (SAW) is his messenger." Now according to the tenets of the religion, I make that
>
> declaration and I'm Muslim. But I can still go and have a beer after work, or do some
>
> drugs after work, I can go and discriminate, or I can go and be racist, I can exploit, I can
>
> do anything under the sun. I'm still Muslim. I may be a bad Muslim, but I'm still

Muslim. And that's my point, we have this line of thinking that because the Qur'an says

certain things, that it extends to us."

Fairly explanatory, the message to be gathered from this particular conversation is that "Islam is

perfect. Muslims are not." Oftentimes this particular principle has to be regurgitated in

discussions about Islam and racism. In fact, when presented with experiences of, or allegations

of racial discrimination, the common retort among immigrant Muslims is "There is no racism in

Islam," or even the more audacious "real Muslim's can't be racist." This response calls for a

reminder of the aforementioned principle.

This particular instance also speaks the idea that the Blackamerican experience of anti-

black racism is perceived a matter that only pertains to Blackamericans as discussed in Jackson

(2005). This particular line of thinking is what fuels responses like those previously mentioned.

Consequently, allegations and/or discussions of discrimination that Blackamericans experience at

the hands of any other group is oftentimes dismissed or met with condescension. Because of this,

it becomes very easy to posit any experiences of alleged discrimination Blackamericans have as

the fault of blacks themselves. This is exemplary of how many immigrant Muslims adopt

attitudes toward Blackmericans that mirror anti-black biases typical to many whites that was

discussed previously.

This idea is further explored in Mr. Portee's interview. The first thing to be noted about

this interview is when he was asked about diversity within the American Muslim community, he

laughed. To this point, there has been a great deal of discussion exploring, and unpacking racism

and immigrant hegemony within the American Muslim community. In this particular interview,

Mr. Portee shared a story that would without question serve as a pointed example of both racism,

and immigrant hegemony. In a discussion about an article that he had read about interactions

between Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims, he recalled an article that he read about a

Blackamerican Muslim who detailed a "takeover" of a predominately black masjid:

> "As soon as they opened their doors to everybody, the immigrant Muslims came in and
> took over. The things they did, like the sisters used to sit behind the brothers, you know,
> they wanted them in a separate room. And a lot of their culture stuff, their food, and all
> that stuff they came in droves and drove all the African American brothers out. And they
> really took over that mosque and so all the things they did and their culture, their food,
> Indian food, sisters in separate room and all that, took over. So they are just 'there' now.
> And what he said is exactly what happened here in Decatur. They come with their
> culture-we started off all African-Americans. We did the hard work. We put up with
> harassment, you know, been called 'niggers,' had it wrote on the wall and stuff, and
> white folks and all that. And they weren't here. There were some here, but they weren't
> coming to the masjid. They were named Muhammad, but they became 'Moe' and all that
> stuff they didn't go by their Islamic names. And so they were here, but they didn't
> participate."

The first part of this quote and the discussion of the nuances between black and immigrant

Muslim practice reminds me of the discussion of indigenization. As described by Jackson

(2010), indigenization is effectively when a group forges a space for themselves within a society.

This is complemented by forging their own identity while simultaneously positing themselves as

an organic part of that society (2010). I think this particular process would describe Islam in the

black community prior to the wave of immigrants from the Muslim world that would come after

1965. Beyond the meshing of emphasis on identity and politics to address the particularities of

the Blackamerican experience, they also tended to appropriate elements of Islamic practice. For

instance, the Blackamerican masjids were gender segregated like the immigrant masjids, with the subtle, yet pointed differences, being that in many immigrant masjids, there is actually a physical separation between the men and the women that did not typically take place in Blackamerican masjids. Mr. Portee noted how this change alienated Blackamerican women of the masjid, and they were not as comfortable as they were previously.

In a similar vein to what Mr. Portee was saying in reference to Blackamerian's doing all the "work," Jackson notes that Islam has been indigenized in America by a portion of the Muslim community whose role in the process goes unrecognized. Rather, the indigenousness of Islam as posited by Blackamericans is one that should be one that is invested-in, rather than ignored. In a discussion facilitated by Dr. Sherman Jackson focused on intra-faith relations among Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims, Jackson (2010) described a current post-9/11 American context as one in which Islam has been successfully framed in the American imagination as a foreign entity. This is then complemented with the acknowledgement that coming to Islam, or "Islamization" is a "process" as opposed to an "event" that must be afforded the space to take place for the collective interest of Islam as a whole. Although this discussion was taking place in reference to the proto-Islamic groups and their theology not being in line with Classical Islam, in principle, the idea of Islamization being a process extends to Mr. Portee's critiques as well. In the lecture, Jackson (2010) noted that one of the byproducts of not allowing for the process of Islamization to take place is that newcomers (especially Blackamericans) tend to be held to the highest standards of piety almost immediately and he cautions that "…that is not the way it happens. That is not the way it ever happened." What additionally complicates this process is the processes of Arabization that were discussed previously. This leads to a faulty standard that suggests that what is distinctly "Arab" or "Arab-

like" should be the litmus test of what is authentically Islamic. This type of thinking tends to

reproduce existing power dynamics between the two groups and facilitates an immigrant

hegemony where other non-immigrant groups are concerned. Mr. Portee's critique also points to

the hardships many Blackamericans faced during the era of the Civil Rights Movement when

racial tension was at an apex particularly for Blackamericans. The use of racial slurs like

"nigger,' and the defacing of black institutions like churches assumed a semblance of normalcy.

During this period, the immigrant Muslim presence was not yet pronounced in America, nor

were they the proverbial face of Islam in America. However, as Mr. Portee notes, during this

period and after 9/11, many immigrant Muslims altered their Islamic names or changed them

altogether in an effort to hide their identities and blend in just as they had done in the early

twentieth century (Kayyali 2004). As has been explored at length previously in this project the

immigrant Muslim became the face of American Islam shortly after the Civil Rights era.

However, it is arguably the Civil Rights Movement that links Mr. Portee's disaffection with

many of the immigrant's attempts to not only assimilate but also disassociate themselves from

Blackamericans. It was largely the Civil Rights generation that got the Hart-Cellar Immigration

Act that removed many of the racist immigration laws that restricted immigration from Asia

(Grewal 2013), which presented the opportunity for many immigrant Muslims to come to the

United States. More specifically, credit can be afforded to the Civil Rights and Black Power

movements for facilitating an era of social and political change that would eventually shame

America into doing away with its racist immigration policies (Howell 2013 and Rashid 2012).

ANALYSIS

Abdul-Khabeer (2009) describes the "Black vs. Brown" dynamic (or what she described as the "indigenous-immigrant divide") is largely defined by dictates of symbolic power. More specifically, it is noted that it is the power to constitute "givens" through utterances, establishing what is believed and seen, constructing and then confirming worldviews. Additionally, and key to the discussion of symbolic power is its ability to give the impression of natural, inescapable, and disinterested appearances to symbols that function as relations of power (Swartz 2013).

In Hasimali's discussion of culture, Mamdani's concept of "culture talk" was introduced. Understood as a binary and unchanging understanding of culture, that is opposed to any change, it falls in line with the concept of Arabization. It is precisely the aspect of Arabization that posits immigrant and specifically Arab culture as exclusively and authentically Islamic. With Arab culture serving as the symbol that in turn dually functions as a tool of power, and the construct through which many judge the litmus test of what is authentically" Islamic," those who identify as, or best imitate Arab cultural nuances are vested with a certain level of legitimacy and authority where either the practice of or knowledge of Islam are concerned. Additionally, being that Islam originated in the Arabian peninsula, and The Prophet of Islam was an Arab, the resultant tendency towards "Arabism" easily takes on the appearance of being disinterested in the attainment or maintenance of power. Yet many of those who claim Arab ancestry assume a self-appointed position of authority where Islam is concerned that at times, centers solely on their "Arab-ness."

Brother Hakim's recollection of his son's discriminatory experience, and the role that the Arabic language played in that particular experience speaks to symbolic power as well. Again, because Islam was revealed in Arabic, Arabic effectively serves as the lingua franca of Islam.

134

Consequently, competence of Arabic is oftentimes complimented with an assumed competency of the religion which also affords an esteem or authority where Islam is concerned. Beyond the assumed religious competency that knowledge of Arabic awards, Arabic also functions as a "particularism" of which Curtis (2002) notes tend to be extremely exclusionary and hierarchical in nature. This is primarily due to the fact that the language functions within a system of power that "universalizes" it and at the same time attaches it to an Islamic authenticity that is reserved for those competent in Arabic. This has the additional consequence of effectively "othering," or completely dislocating those that do not have fluency from the realms of the authentically "Islamic" or, as can be seen in this instance, literally removing them from the conversation. Functioning as a tool of power, the "universalization" of Arabic to a position of "standardness" empowers a very "particular" set of knowledge and mode of communication that is not readily available to everyone. Further, the use of Arabic in this case would also classify as a "false universal" that was referenced earlier in Jackson (2005). Here, the universalization or standardization of Arabic functions to directly serve both the psychological and material interests of those with the power to establish those parameters, which in turn, allowed these the young men to insult Brother Hakim's son with relative impunity.

In examining Mr. Abdullah's contribution to the discussion of diversity, and its relationship to symbolic power, one need not look any further than the account shared by Mr. Abdullah himself. Those with the power or capital to establish parameters of "normativity" where khutbas and other religious aspects are concerned have posited a particular ordering of religious services as authentic or appropriate that is not necessarily predicated on anything religious, as much as it is predicated on a preference to be in accordance with a particular cultural tradition. However, this can be problematic in instances where even minimal diversity is

present within a given Muslim community. As was noted previously, differing groups tend to have differing needs and expectations. Therefore, under the described adherence to traditions that are rooted in particular cultures, those not within the dominant group or groups tend to have their expectations and needs go unacknowledged. Consequently, immigrant understandings, traditions, and preferences assume a legitimacy or hegemony that comes to be colored as "authentic" or "real." This hegemony also potentially has a negative influence on the viability or relevance to numerically marginal groups in the Muslim community which could also potentially have a negative impact on the diversity of the Muslim community in question. If people feel like they are ignored, or not wanted, there is a greater chance that they will not continue to be members of the community. Even in the example of prominent Islamic scholar Yasir Qadhi, there is apparently some diversity in regard to how the khutba is understood to be delivered and conducted as he not only addresses issues of social justice, he encourages these discussions. Yet, the hegemonic nature of particular traditions and cultural preference can still be observed as it was suggested that he could have a greater status in the American Muslim community if he explicitly lectured on religious issues. The particular formula for a "proper" khutba functions as an instrument of power as it assumes a position of legitimacy and power that simultaneously empowers some groups while it excludes others. While both the legitimacy and power afforded this formula has more arbitrariness behind it than is acknowledge or recognized, it gets to disassociate itself from being a tool of power by attaching it to a construction of Prophetic "history" that too is arguably a constructed narrative that is largely colored by specific cultural preferences and understandings. These issues have been a long-standing element of the Blackamerican Muslim experience when sharing spaces with their immigrant Muslim

coreligionists as these issues inspired Blackamerican Muslims to establish their own

organizations like The Muslim Alliance of North America (Abdullah 2013).

Ramon's explanation of how a Muslim can engage in or take on attitudes that are thought

to be adverse to the religion and still be "Muslim" speaks well to the arbitrariness that can come

within a discussion of "who" is, or the title of being "Muslim." On the other hand, the retort of

"there is no racism in Islam" in response to (typically) Blackamerican allegations of

discrimination and racism not only enables the dismissal of the concern, it also speaks as if the

presence of racism in and of itself is a mere impossibility. It should be noted that the

fundamental characteristic of symbolic power's ability to construct "realities" and give the

impression of "naturalness" works dually to also establish what is in fact unnatural. Applying

that principle, the appearance of racism is dismissed as unnatural, and impossible. Therefore, the

individual(s) making the claim are easily dismissed as well. As symbolic power designates, and

legitimates power, it also disempowers and delegitimizes. Blackamerican Muslims are already

faced with a situation where their "Muslim-ness" is frequently challenged, and there is an

assumed lack of knowledge of both Arabic and the fundamental precepts of the religion, the

condescension with which their experiences of racism and discrimination are met only serve to

exacerbate feelings of exclusion and marginalization on behalf of Blackamerican Muslims. This

devaluing of their accounts and experiences in turn effects their interactions with other groups as

the immigrant (specifically Arab) ability to not only establish parameters of Islamic legitimacy,

and make labels "stick" influences others perception of Blackamerican Muslims as other

immigrant and non-black groups adopt a similar attitude towards them. This is exemplified in the

establishment of the predominately Blackamerican MANA.

In exploring Mr. Portee's interview, symbolic power's role is clearest in the establishing of arbitrary standards that oftentimes cater to specific cultural norms and preferences. For instance, Mr. Portee described the gender-segregation that took place before there was a large immigrant population, and what it came to look like afterwards. The separation went from an imaginary line of sorts that was typical in NOI masjids, to a separation in which they were in fact in a separate room and were no longer visible. This physical dislocating of, and removal of women from view in the masjid exemplifies the Arab hegemony that has been explored throughout this project. What was especially interesting about this particular example is that I have seen gender-segregation executed in both manners in predominately immigrant masjids. Yet, the Indo-Pak immigrants that would grow to have influence at Mr. Portee's masjid, preferred a physical separation. The endowment of immigrant Islam as "authentic," and "legitimate" not only created a hierarchy of sorts once it came into contact with Blackamerican Islam, but it effectively subordinated the latter despite the Blackamerican Muslims' presence in the masjid and the community prior to the immigrant Muslims' arrival. The arbitrariness with regard to the magnitude or degree to which the separation of men and women should take place is clearly arbitrary as evidenced by the presence of both techniques being employed in predominately immigrant masjids. This suggests that the method of choice tends to be determined by the cultural preferences of those designated with power. Yet, this power not only takes on the appearance of being natural, it is also presented as the appropriate or "legitimate" way in which the gender-separation should take place. These arbitrary cultural preferences would soon spread into other areas like the choices of food to be served. Of course, this does not explicitly bar the Blackamerican members from bringing their own food to share, but oftentimes Blackamerican Muslims would be questioned about the ingredients of their dishes as if they were

unclear on what ingredients were permissible for consumption and which were not. This would

further feelings of Blackamerican alienation and literally add insult to injury. This leads to a

faulty standard that suggests that what is distinctly "Arab" or "immigrant-like" should be the

litmus test of what is authentically Islamic. This type of thinking tends to reproduce existing

power dynamics between the two groups and facilitating an immigrant hegemony whose

legitimation frames this hegemony as immune to critique. Over time, the masjids immigrant

membership eventually, as Mr. Portee says, "took over," and the evidence of the presence of

Blackamericans gradually disappear.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION/FINAL THOUGHTS

This project began with an analysis of the evolution of Muslim identity from 1965. Prioritizing that narrative of brown Muslims, it turned out to be a complicated discussion. In short, brown Muslims were "white" in 1909, 1910, and 1915, but not in 1913 or 1914. With an officially recognized "whiteness" essential to attainment citizenship, brown Muslims had to reconstruct and negotiate their identities. The navigation of racial identity for blacks, on the other hand, has not on not followed a similar course, but has been fairy static. Primarily due to blacks generally having darker complexions, and phenotypical features "understood" as being black or African, they are oftentimes marked in a way that permanently situates them within a racial hierarchy that places them at the bottom. Post 9/11 America has been fairly unforgiving to the international Muslim community placing them in social spaces similar to that that are or have been inhabited by blacks. Both groups were embattled in their quest for citizenship, framed as proverbial threats, and have received the attention of federal agencies such as the FBI as a result of being framed as situated as threats. Yet racial harmony eludes both groups largely due to one group, brown Muslims, being granted a conditional admission into "whiteness" and it's perceived benefits that the blacks have generally and historically been barred from. This has culminated into what is now known as the "Black and Brown Divide." Regardless of what label is attached to the differences between these two groups, what can consistently be seen in an analysis of these differences is that they tend to stem from fundamental differences in "who" these groups are culturally, historically, and socially.

To this point, the best way to examine the differences between the two groups was to employ a theoretical framework that examined identity, privilege, and power while acknowledging their interdependence on one another. Using Bourdieu's symbolic power to

explore "whiteness," the granting of "relational whiteness" to brown Muslims in 1924 (Kayyali 2004), provided the capital that facilitated their fairly successful integration into the racial and socioeconomic order of the United States. Additionally, this "whiteness" encouraged them to emulate the anti-black biases that were present in the social spaces of the early 20th century. This served not only to incentivize Muslim immigrants distancing themselves from blacks, but also began to color their relationships with their black coreligionists. Additionally, elements of symbolic power were used to explore "Arabization." Explained by Ghosal (2010) as the homogenization of, or forming of identities based on specific institutions, practices, and beliefs attached to the ever-changing and growing Muslim community in Arabia in the years immediately following the death of The Prophet Muhammad (SAW). Largely due to the fact that the first Muslim community consisting primarily of Arabs, all that is associated with Arab culture comes to constitute what is authentically "Islamic." In terms of intra-faith relations, the prolonged exposure of many immigrant Muslims to the processes of Arabization generally leads to the privileging of culture-specific articulations, understandings, and practices of Islam that tends to be exclusionary to their black coreligionists.

Another critical question to address is the relationship that religion has to education. Oftentimes, the popular imagination understands religion and education in a manner that posits education as "public" and religion as "private" which suggests that the two are mutually exclusive from one another. Additionally, that frame of thought situates education within the realm of the "secular" or alongside "secularism" thus their association with the loss of religiosity and a separation of church and state (Qadir 2010). Contrary to the aforementioned ideas, education and religion are closely related. This is especially true considering educations' relationship with secularism.

141

In particular, prominent education discourses of efficiency, diversity, and accountability are fused with religious ideals. While the ideas that encompasses both education and religion is generally never equal, or fixed, they tend to be articulated in a way the joins them together (Stambach 2006). Even in understanding education to be among the secular, religion or religious ideals are always present even when it's presence is latent (Kateb 2009). Educations' association with the modern-secular state, and rationality assumes religion to be a challenge to secularism. However, this assumption ignores that fact that secularism has its' roots in the Protestantism that emerged alongside the development of science and rationality, as opposed to an abandonment or rejection of religion (Stambach 2006 and Cassanova 2009) rendering the relationship between the two a dialectical one. Effectively, both recognize and encompass spiritual qualities over explicit attention to physical and material matters (DeWitt 1924), and are interested in producing good individuals (Lambeck 2000, Aziz al-Attas 1979, and Sullivan 1966). Additionally, "secular" and/or educational ideas tend function "meta-religiously" in the regard that they co-opt characteristics of the sacred, and create a religious-like entity that is rearticulated within secular frameworks. This is best evidenced by the deification if you will, of the pursuit and attainment of educational credentials. Therefore the relationship between education and religion is one of itinerary rather than practice (Shouse 1935).

In examining the conducted interviews, three prominent themes emerged as pertinent to most if not all the discussions: 1) Identity, 2) transitioning from the NOI, to global Islam or "Islam proper," and 3) diversity. In my exploration of identity with Hasimali, the imagery of Jesus as white leant the discussion to the concept of black religion. Absent of a particular theology or ecclesiastical authority, it is a referent to the experience of spirituality through a lens particular to Blackamericans that tends to understand fuse spiritual enrichment with effort to

attain civil rights. In a later interview with Mr. Abdullah, the discussion of the importance of a search for identity played in the development of Islam in the black community was addressed. In this particular discussion, it was suggested that identity was such a pertinent part of Blackamerican's becoming Muslim in the early 20th century, that they oftentimes maintained Christian, or "Christian-like" theological underpinnings similar to those they had prior to becoming Muslim. The central difference being, that they appropriated the label of "Islam." "Islam" as a label in and of itself not only satisfied a communal search for identity, but it also provided a sense of ownership of their personal and spiritual "selves" as being "Muslim" was a label they had given to themselves. In a following interview with Ramon, identity became a topic of discussion in the regard that Muslim identity was affirmed by membership in a Blackamerican Muslim community. The existence of a Blackamerian Muslim community was largely facilitated first by Elijah Muhammad, but it was his son (W.D.) that took this community and while maintaining the already-established emphasis on identity, did away with the racialist and anti-white discourses associated with his fathers' leadership. Considering the absence of a largely anti-white theology in Ramon's earliest experiences of being a Muslim, the general disdain and distrust of whites and the federal government afforded him both a community and theology that was shared among Blackamericans as well as the international Muslim community. In my discussion with Mr. Portee, our dialogue about identity ventured into a discussion about the "X" that was typical to members of the NOI. The "X," in a manner similar to what we saw with calling ones' Muslim, was a means of establishing an identity for themselves. Whether, the "X" was taken to signify the unknown lineage of the descendants of enslaved Africans, or whether it served as a moniker for behavior that they no longer engaged in, the X surname was predicated on the establishment of their own identity on their own terms.

As Bourdieu's ideas regarding symbolic power suggest, a search for an identity can be spurred by a feeling of insignificance. Characteristic of Hasimali's feelings of exclusion related to the depiction of Jesus, all his companions and angels as white, those emotions led him to seek an identity that addressed his needs for community. This is also applicable to the general search of early 20th century black Muslims. Disaffected from the Christian church as a result of enduring racism and discrimination, they appropriated the label of "Islam," and "Muslim," and these labels were enough to satisfy that search for identity as evidenced by the fact that their theological understandings did not necessarily change. This is accompanied by a need or desire to be recognized by those with power or capital. This speaks dually to the capital afforded WD Muhammad based on his Islamic education as well as his efforts to align the NOI with "Islam-proper." Additionally, WD entertained a need for identity as well with the designation of his new community as "Bilalians" to draw a connection with the Bilal of the Qur'an. The same can be observed with Mr. Portee's discussion of his former "X" surname. Emanating from a desire to establish an identity that dually addressed, and resisted a position of insignificance, it simultaneously was a reminder of the horrors and consequences of the African slave trade.

Diversity was a common theme primarily due to its being the topic of a specific interview question. The responses to this question covered a vast range of benefits and concerns, solutions and problems, and related topics. Of course, restricted by limits of the scope of the project, the discussions surrounding diversity were specific to the spatial context of the United States, and particular to the lens of individuals who were black, male, and Muslim. While Hasimali's perspectives avoided the pitfalls of the static and museumized "culture talk," he explicitly noted that he feels as though culture, at times, is a barrier to the realization of the benefits of diversity. More specifically, immigrant Muslims tend to be partial to particular cultural norms or

preferences that are neither a requirement nor universal to Islam. Rather, they are very culture-specific matters of taste that have been endowed with enduring legitimacy and situated as authentically "Islamic." Reminiscent of the "Arabization" phenomena that incentives emulation of Arab understandings, expressions, and appearances of Islam, these mimicries function to exclude those unfamiliar with them. Thus, the benefits of diversity can easily be muted when faced with a hegemonic force that necessitates a false uniformity that centers one group and situates others on the periphery. The discussion with Brother Hakim regarding diversity largely centered on the experience of anti-black racism. He detailed an experience his son had with some young Saudi men who referred to him as "abd." Although regularly a part of many Islam-inspired names and surnames, in the contemporary American context, "abd" functions idiomatically similar to "nigger." All things considered, this term is grossly offensive and especially so when applied to Blackamericans whether they are Muslim or not. Experiences such as this one has made Brother Hakim as well as many other Blackamerican Muslim somewhat condescending with regard to the discussion of diversity. Understanding anti-black racism in the Muslim community as a byproduct of the combination of the attainment of what Jackson (2005) calls "nouveau Whiteness," and learned behavior (Khabeer 2009 and Prashad 2000), discrimination against blacks and black Muslims alike should be contextualized within the discussion of the quandary of geopolitics, assimilation, and the context of early 20th century race-relations. My discussion with Mr. Abdullah yielded that diverse populations can experience differences beyond culture as the example he provided was cultural as well as generational. Older members of a masjid community may have a preference for more traditional khutbahs and masjid activities and outreach that may not necessarily speak to the interests or needs of younger members or the concerns of all groups. Also present within this discussion is power-relations in

145

the regard that those with power tend to determine what is "standard." As has been outlined at other points in this research, standards are oftentimes "universalized particulars" endowed with legitimacy by those with power. With the marginal positionality typical to black Muslims, the particulars that come to be universalized tend to marginalize them further from their immigrant coreligionists. Further, in terms of the subject matter of khutbahs, or social issues that the masjid tends to is also a relation of power. Being that white-supremacy is treated as a social ill typical to, and specific to Blackamericans, issues that resonate with the black community tend to not resonate with their immigrant coreligionists. Ramon reminded me that Islam is "perfect," but Muslims are not. He went on to note that because Islam views racism as a grave sin, many immigrant Muslims imagine themselves immune to, or exempt from being racist. Combined with their tendency to reproduce the anti-black racism they've observed over the generations, not only are there times when Blackamerican Muslims experience racial discrimination at the hands of immigrant Muslims, but there is a tendency to dismiss Blackamerican allegations of racial discrimination whether it is levied at the immigrant Muslims themselves or not. Consequently, such attitudes tend to not only render issues of the black communities "un-Islamic," but also unworthy of masjid efforts or attention. This same principle was present in Mr. Portee's experience albeit differently. He spoke specifically of how his all-black masjid community transitioned from the NOI to "Islam-proper" and opened its doors to immigrant Muslims. Once this happened, they started making changes and doing away with any trace of the Blackamerican culture that the masjid was built on to the point of creating a situation of discomfort for some of the Blackamerican Muslims that were present prior to their arrival. This speaks to the work to rearticulate, or indigenize Islam that had been done by Blackamericans as well as the disavowal of "Islamization" being a process rather than an event. Being treated as the latter, and in

combination with the universalization of culture-specific preferences, Blackamerican articulations and expressions of Islam were treated as invalid because they did not mirror those of their immigrant counterparts. All of which was especially insulting considering, as Mr. Portee noted, the efforts of the Blackamericans during the Civil Rights and Black Power Eras are largely responsible for the removal of racist immigration policies the enabled immigrant Muslims to come to the United States to begin with.

The "Black vs. Brown" dynamic is largely established by the directives associated with symbolic power. The ability to establish "givens," what is believable, constructed and confirmed situates these appearances as natural and dislocated from power relations (Swartz 2013). In my discussion with Hasimali, the exploration of culture as static and opposed to variation ("culture talk") was a segway to a discussion of "Arabization." With immigrants serving as the standard of sorts for all that is "authentically Islamic," the incentivization of emulating immigrant (specifically Arab) articulations and appearances of Islam serves as an element of power. This is particularly so in the regard that it centers one or a few groups, and marginalizes others that don't identify with those particular cultural specificities. Consequently, the emulation of immigrant-Islam is endowed with legitimacy and authority where Islamic practice and knowledge is concerned. This legitimacy extends to emulating all-things-Arab as far as names, family structures, and even accents. This is arguably an understandable and maybe expected occurrence being that The Prophet of Islam and a majority of his early companions were Arabs. Therefore, there is a natural primacy of both Arab cultural, and historical narratives that serve a benchmark of sorts that either dictates at most, or influences at least the do's and don'ts of Islamic practice. It is this historical and cultural circumstances that situates the primacy of the Arab narrative that

becomes appropriated as a tool of power as those who mimic these cultural expressions are endowed with, or endow themselves with Islamic legitimacy.

When I decided to take on this project I was curious as to what I would find. I was even more curious once I started doing my literature review and collecting data. Ironically, now that the data has been collected and analyzed, I find myself still interrogating what I actually found or learned. In answering this question, I realized how complicated the answer is. In particular, four things come to mind: 1) I got a glimpse of how the varying identities we subscribe to in combination with the varying positionalities we hold influence what we need, expect, understand, and even offer to Islam. While all my participants were Blackamerican, male, and located in East-Central Illinois, there was a common theme of identity in all our discussions. In particular, there was recognition of the need to establish an identity that was for, by, and spoke to the self-determination and autonomy of Blackamericans. 2) Many of the discussions, issues, and antagonisms of the early Blackamerican Muslim communities continue to this day. Just as the early Blackamerican Muslim communities focused on addressing the concerns of identity, so to are contemporary Blackamerican Muslim communities. Just as these early communities (Ahmadis in particular) felt discriminated against by their immigrant counterparts, oftentimes, today's Blackamerican Muslims do as well. 3) I also feel like I better understand how diversity necessitates a flexibility or malleability of Islam. In short, as much as Muslims believe in the universality of Islam as a divine message, I think the universality of Islam comes from its ability to account for differences. However, many Muslims themselves have lost sight of this. The implications of "false universals," "culture talk," and "universalized particulars" are the products of human interests that speak to the existence of power dynamics. It is here that those whose "Islam" is most visible tend to lose sight of the fact that Islam also must account for the

populations that are socially, culturally, and historically different. If it were not for Islam's ability to do this, it would have never spread beyond the several tribal groups in which it originated. 4) Related to the last point, I think my research shows how Islam spoke to the cultural, social, and historical particularities of Blackamericans. When you look at a group whose origin in a given space has been one of being socially, politically, and economically marginalized, with an starting point of physical bondage that has implications that reverberate among their descendants generations later, the "Islam" of this groups is going to be different. Their needs, expectations, and articulations of Islam are going to be different. In fact, I argue that the Islam of any racialized group in the context of post-industrial, post 9/11 America must be different and speak to the specificities of that group if it is to maintain its viability and relevance to those groups. That is not to say that the foundational principles of Islam change, but their understanding, application and realization of those principles must adapt. To quote W.D. Muhammed in his lecture entitled "Cause and effect," he says "You can hear the most beautiful thing ever, but if it doesn't communicate with your condition, it'll be just another beautiful song…"(W.D. Muhammed Speaks 1992).

Further, while it has been discussed at length about how Blackamerican Islam is a spin-off of the black church, I would like to add that (in my opinion) many of the "hang-ups," and insecurities that facilitated the exodus of Blackamericans from Christianity accompanied the Blackamerican to Islam: In particular, an inability, or unwillingness to think for ourselves. As slaves, what many Blackamerican's were given was a "Christianity" that was a manipulated and piecemeal version that was aimed at creating and ultimately maintaining a "slave" subject (Young 1992). Consequently, they initially were not given the freedom to articulate their Christian identity in a way that spoke to their "lived" conditions and clung to much of the ideas

149

and imagery that maintained a sense of social, psychological, and spiritual subordination. Even as small pockets of African slaves began to gain literacy, and find creative way to express their intellectual prowess and audacity to articulate and ultimately understand Christianity on their own terms, it still necessitated a strength-of-sorts that was not available to everyone. I think Blackamericans face a similar circumstance as practitioners of Islam. Due to Islam's "changing-of-face" that is the subject of much of this research, and the accompanying "immigrant" or "Arab-only" imagery that functions as an implied parameter for what is "authentically Islamic," many Blackamericans have, in my opinion, succumbed to an implicit suggestion that all that is culturally familiar to them is "haram" or forbidden. Consequently, there can be a pressure to emulate immigrants as only "immigrant Islam" is endowed with "legitimacy," and "misrecognized" as such because the arbitrary, and power-vested elements take on the appearance of being both natural and neutral. This has many Blackamericans oftentimes looking outside of themselves, for understanding of what is suitable, what works, and what is best for themselves. This behavior has led to an insecurity of-sorts, or assumed inability to approach appropriate Islam in a manner that makes it dually viable and relevant to them. This leads to the emulation of immigrant accents, and cultural preferences among Blackamerican Muslims at the expense of things that are familiar or authentic to themselves. This very behavior is what W.D. Mohammad spoke of when he said that Blackamerican Muslims have lost sight of the "common sense" attributes of Islam, and replaced it with "decorated non-sense" (W.D. Muhammed Speaks 1991), with "decorated" being a referent to those ideas or cultural specificities that have come to be associated with religious piety.

That point brings me again to why this type of research is important. I think that this type of research that interrogates conceptions of "Islamic orthodoxy" is extremely important for the

future of Islam in the Blackamerican community in particular, and Islam in America as a whole. Specifically as it relates to the black community, I think one of the things that operates as a hindrance to the spread of Islam is the "Black Orientalist" view that blacks have went from the "back of the bus, to the back of the camel" (Jackson 2005) which speaks to a perception that Blackamericans that embrace Islam commit what amounts to cultural apostasy. Speaking of the emulation of immigrant behaviors, accents, and dress, there is some contextual legitimacy to the allegation. Projects like this interrogate and potentially widen the scope of understanding regarding Islamic orthodoxy and imagery which in turn can have the effect of allowing Blackamericans as well as other groups to "see" themselves in Islam without doing away with "who" they are culturally. At the point that Islam can successfully be presented in a way that does not appear to be culturally predatory (Abd-Allah 2004) to non-Arab sensibilities, the viability of Islam increases for all groups, and strengthens the Muslim community as a whole.

The one disappointing thing that I take away from this project is finding out that my feelings of isolation and experiences of discrimination were not specific to me. As someone who admittedly experiences anxiety in spaces that have historically not been welcoming of blacks, or what P. K. Sam described as "racial fatigue" (2015), I know I am very sensitive to those histories and have been guilty of projecting and expecting racial bias. I really wanted to believe that I was just looking through my personal baggage that is related to growing up in a predominately white area, going to private and predominately white schools, and being an alum of two PWI's (predominately white institutions) at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Unfortunately, much of the information shared with me that is and is not discussed in this project suggest that not only where my feelings and experiences not specific to me, they have an unfortunate commonality among many Blackamerican Muslims. The reason this is disappointing is because I think as

Blackamericans, negotiating a history of Jim Crow segregation and anti-black racism leaves us hoping to transcend that history through a successful integration into a community that is not defined by what you look like. For me personally, Islam informs my personal, moral, as well as spiritual constitution and with it informing so much of the intimate aspects of my person, I want to believe I offered myself to a faith that is devoid of calamities of "man." However, in reflecting on my own experiences and those of the participants in this study, I am quickly reminded that the religious landscape is largely informed by both the successes and failures of humanity. This is evidenced best by the poster that was allegedly posted at CIMIC regarding a Muslim woman who was looking to get married yet the poster was explicit in its suggestion that interested blacks not bother to pursue the woman's hand. While several interviewees substantiated the existence of this poster, I could not come up with any pictures or anything concrete beyond the accounts of participants that this did actually happen. Ideally, with CIMIC being my "spiritual home," in addition to the aforementioned intimate roles that Islam plays for me, I would like to think too that CIMIC would be absent of such thinking. But understanding religion in general as a social phenomenon and the influence of context, I also understand that a poster expressing such open and explicit racial bias could only be done by someone who either saw nothing problematic about letting those biases be known, and/or on some level had the support of the masjid environment to do so.

Additionally, I think my work adds significantly to several academic disciplines maximizing the interdisciplinary nature of research. In particular, I think my work adds to religious/Islamic studies, African-American studies, history, and education. It's contribution to the study of religion and Islamic Studies simply because it focuses on the religious articulation of a particular segment of the American Muslim community. However, it also contributes

something unique in the regard that there has not been any work dedicated specifically to the growth of the Muslim Communities in East-Central Illinois with a focus on the Blackamerican community. This project contributes to African-American Studies because while the research centers on the religion of Islam, it centers Blackamerican ideas, articulations, experiences, and perspectives of Islam. This research also contributes to the field of history as it juxtaposes the historical conditions of Muslim identity among both Blackamerican and immigrant Muslim populations. This entailed an examination of immigration patterns, geo-politics, and policies as they influenced a period of roughly 100 years. This period was then placed in conversation with contemporary experiences of Blackamerican Muslims. Additionally, the data was collected using an oral histories methodology which centers the experiences, perspectives, and voices of individual persons and groups of historical periods. Finally, I think this project contributes to education as well. Beyond the theoretical relationships between religion and education that were addressed earlier in this research, the Black Church was the first black-controlled institution in the black community and served simultaneously as a religious, political, as well as educational institution. Being that The Bible was the first means of literacy for many enslaved Africans, and their understanding of Christian theology informed their perspectives on behavior, life, and morality, Christianity served as means type of education that enabled them to acquire a very purpose-driven type of knowledge. As Jackson (2005) and others have noted, Islam in the Blackamerican community is an outgrowth of the disaffection Blackamericans had with the Christian church and at its earliest periods, merely supplemented the work of Christianity among those newly identifying as Muslim. Becoming Muslim for Blackamericans would eventually forge an encounter with Arabic, knowledge of the early history of Asia and Arabia, as well as morality, conduct, and comportment. Looking through this lens, the educational component is

definitely present. Considering all the aforementioned benefits and contributions of this research, I hope that this project can become a springboard of sorts to other similar projects that afford as many, if not more contributions.

However, it would be remiss to not address that as important as I believe this project and other like it are, for this particular project there are limitations. To begin with, the scope of this particular topic is much larger than what I can address with five participants, eighteen months, or a single dissertation project. The temporal and logistical limitations to taking on this type of project necessitate the researcher to carefully address research questions within the scope of what is available and be careful not to overgeneralize the findings. Last but certainly not least, my intimate relationship with the subject matter is a limitation. Combined with being black, male, and Muslim, my familiarity with the experiences shared call for an acute knowledge of the literature regarding the subject in addition to great attention to distance myself enough from the material to be able to maintain an objective position. Nevertheless, I hope not only that this project contributes something new, and unique to all relevant bodies of scholarship, I hope to personally continue this type of research and scholarship in and for the duration of my career.

REFERENCES

Abd-Allah, U. F. (2009). Islam and the cultural imperative. Islam and Civilisational Renewal, 1(1), 10.

Abdullah, Z. (2010). Black Mecca: the African Muslims of Harlem. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Abdullah, Z. (2013). American Muslims: 1965 to present. In O. Safi & J. Hammer, The Cambridge Companion to American Islam. (pp. 65-82). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Adamson, M., Raymond, G., Thompson, J., Bourdieu, P. and Bourdieu, P. ed., (1991). In: Social and symbolic space. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Aidi, H., Marable, M. and Grewal, Z. ed., (2009). In: Lights, camera, suspension: Freezing the frame on the Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf anthem controversy. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

Akande, Habeeb. 2012. Illuminating the Darkness. 1st ed. Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd.

Akbari, S. and Puchner, M. (2012). The Norton anthology of world literature: Vol: D. 3rd ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Al-Attas, M. and al-Aziz, J. (1979). Aims and objectives of Islamic education [general recommendations of the First World Conference on Muslim Education]. United Kingdom: Hodder and Stoughton.

Al-Attas, M., al-Aziz, J. and Hossain, S. ed., (1979). In: A plea for a modern Islamic university: Resolution of the dichotomy. United Kingdom: Hodder and Stoughton.

Al-Attas, M., al-Aziz, J. and Sharifi, H. ed., (1979). In: The Islamic as opposed to modern philosophy of education. United Kingdom: Hodder and Stoughton.

Asad, T. (1993). Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. United States: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Bald, V. (2013). Bengali Harlem and the lost histories of south Asian America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bellow, A. and Bauerlein, M. (2015). The state of the American mind: 16 leading critics on the new Anti-Intellectualism. United States: Templeton Foundation Press.

Benedict, W. (1903). International Journal of Ethics. Journal of the study of religion, [online] 14(1) pp. 66-80. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2376023 [Accessed 23 Mar. 2015].

Blatz, P. (1990). Craftsmanship and Flexibility in Oral History: A Pluralistic Approach to Methodology and Theory. The Public Historian, [online] 12(4). Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3378782 [Accessed 13 Apr. 2015].

Bloech, J. and Swindal, J. ed., (2012). In: Habermas, religion, and post secular society. United States: University of Notre Dame Press, pp.217-238.

Bourdieu, P. (1989). Social Space and Symbolic Power. Sociological Theory, [online] 7(1), pp.14-25. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/202061 [Accessed 22 Jan. 2015].

Casanova, J. (2009). The Secular and Secularisms. Social Research, [online] 74 no.4. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972201 [Accessed 22 Feb. 2015].

Chagas, V. (2012). Grassroots journalists, citizen historians: the interview as journalistic genre and history methodology. Oral History, [online] 40(2). Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41806357 [Accessed 9 Apr. 2015].

Collins, S.P.K. 2017. "Black People Aren'T Making Things Up: The Science Behind 'Racial Battle Fatigue'". Think Progrss. https://thinkprogress.org/black-people-arent-making-things-up-the-science-behind-racial-battle-fatigue-9726fcebc938.

Curtis, E. (2009). Muslims in America: a short history. New York: Oxford University Press.

Curtis, E. ed., (2002). In: Introduction. United States: Albany : State University of New York Press, 2002.

David, S. (2013). In: For a sociology of symbolic power. United States: The University of Chicago Press.

de Witt Burton, E. (1924). Religion and Education. The Journal of Religion, [online] 4(6) pp. 561-575. Available at

http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1195346?sid=21105751130491&uid=2&uid=4&uid=373 9256 [Accessed 23 Mar. 2015].

Diouf, S. (1998). Servants of Allah: African Muslims enslaved in the Americas. New York, NY: New York University Press.

Duncan, E. and Hampton, L. (2011). Identities and inequalities: An examination of the role of racial identity in the formation of social capital inside a voluntary youth organization. Social Identities, 17(4), pp.477-500.

Elliot, A. (2007). Between black and immigrant Muslims: An uneasy alliance. New York Times.

Esposito, J. (1991). Islam: The straight path. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Esposito, J. (2005). Islam: The Straight Path Updated with New Epilogue. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Essien-Udom, E. and Udom, E. (1972). Black nationalism: A search for an identity in America. 8th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ester, P. (2008). "It Was Very, Very Churchy": Recollections of Older Dutch-Americans on

    Growing up in Holland, Michigan. The Oral History Review, [online] 35(2). Available at:

    http://www.jstor.org/stable/20628028 [Accessed 11 Apr. 2015].

Galloway, S. (2015). What's missing when empowerment is a purpose for adult literacies

    education? Bourdieu, gee and the problem of accounting for power. Studies in the

    Education of Adults, 47(1), pp.49-63.

Gerber, David A. (2011). American Immigration: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford

    University Press.

Ghoshal, (2010). Arabization: The Changing Face of Islam in Asia. India Quarterly: A Journal of

    International Affairs, 66(1), pp.69-89.

Gomez, M. (2005). Black crescent: the experience and legacy of African Muslims in the

    Americas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grewal, Z. (2009). Lights, camera, suspension: Freezing the frame on the Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf

    anthem controversy. (pp. 191-205). In M. Marable & H. Aidi, Black Routes to Islam.

    United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grewal, Z. (2013). Islam is a foreign country: American Muslims and the global crisis of

    authority. United States: New York University Press.

Hamilton, P. (2005). The Oral Historian as Memorist. The Oral History Review: The Oral

    History Review, [online] 32. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3675447

    [Accessed 13 Apr. 2015].

Hammer, J. and Safi, O. ed., (2013). In: Converts and conversions, 1st ed. New York, USA:

    Cambridge University Press.

Hammer, J., Safi, O. and Abdullah, Z. ed., (2013). United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Hammer, J., Safi, O. and Michael Muhammad, K. ed., (2013). In: Converts and conversions, 1st ed. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Howell, S. (2013). Laying the groundwork for American Muslim histories: 1865-1965. In J.

Hammer and O. Safi (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to American Islam. (pp. 45-64). New York, NY: Cambridge university press.

Hunner, J. (2011). Historic Environment Education: Using Nearby History in Classrooms and Museums. The Public Historian, 33(1), pp.33-43.

Husu, H. (2013). Bourdieu and social movements: Considering identity movements in terms of field, capital and Habitus. Social Movement Studies, 12(3), pp.264-279.

Imam Talib Abdur-Rashid. (2012). Race as a social construct (part 1 of 2). (2012). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hhiv88GJpSI.

Jackson, Abdal Hakim. (2010). Abdal Hakim Jackson. Understanding the role of Blackamerican Muslims for Islam in America. [online] Available at: https://www.halaltube.com/abdal-hakim-jackson-understanding-the-role-of-blackamerican-muslims-for-islam-in-america#.WDHGpNUrKM8 [Accessed 20 Nov. 2016].

Jackson, S. (2005). Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Jahan, I. and Hamid, M. (2015). Language, identity, and social divides: Medium of instruction debates in Bangladeshi print media. Comparative Education Review, 59(1), pp.75-101.

James, A. and Gillies, C. (1994). Reminiscence work with old people. United Kingdom: Chapman & Hall.

James, A. and Gillies, C. ed., (1994). In: Reminiscence and oral history. United Kingdom: Champan & Hall, pp.13-22.

Jefferson, A. (1984). Echoes from the South: The History and Methodology of the Duke University Oral History Program, 1972-1982. The Oral History Review, [online] 12. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3675282 [Accessed 11 Apr. 2015].

Kalin, I., Esposito J., Kalin, I. and Esposito, J. (2014). Islamophobia: The challenge of pluralism in the 21st century. New York: Oxford University Press.

Karim, J. (2006). To Be Black, Female, And Muslim: A Candid Conversation about Race in the American Ummah. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 26(2), pp.225-233.

Karim, J. (2008). American Muslim women: Negotiating race, class, and gender within the ummah. New York: New York University Press.

Kateb, G. (2009). Locke and the Political Origins of Secularism. Social Research, [online] 76(4) pp. 1001-1034. Available at:
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40972199?sid=21105770981741&uid=4&uid=2& uid=3739256 [Accessed 25 Mar. 2015].

Kayyali, R. (2004). Arab Americans (New Americans Series). United States: Greenwood Press.

Kumar, S. (n.d.). What is the Relation Between Religion and Education? | Education | Knowledge Hub. [online] Available at: http://www.publishyourarticles.net/knowledge-hub/education/what-is-the-relation-between-religion-and-education.html [Accessed 23 Mar. 2015].

Lambek, M. (2000). The Anthropology of Religion and the Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy. Current Anthropology, [online] 41(3), pp.309-320. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/300142 [Accessed 22 Feb. 2015].

Leavy, P., Hesse-Biber, S. and Foote, T. ed., (2003). In: Beginning where we are: Feminist methodology in Oral History. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, pp.224-242.

Leef, G. (2016). Why colleges churn out poor writers and poor thinkers. [online] Available at: http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/article.html?id=3247 [Accessed 7 Feb. 2016].

Loveman, M. (2005). The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power. American Journal of Sociology, [online] 110(6), pp.1651-1683. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/427675 [Accessed 22 Jan. 2015].

Madan, T. (1987). Secularism in its place. The Journal of Asian Studies, [online] 46(4), pp.747-759. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2057101 [Accessed 24 Feb. 2015].

Malik, A. (2015). Are we a racist umma?. [URL no longer available].

Marcin, T., Mindock, C. and Whitman, E. (2015). What is Islamophobia? The history and definition of Anti-Muslim discrimination in the US. Media & Culture. [online] Available at: http://www.ibtimes.com/what-islamophobia-history-definition-anti-muslim-discrimination-us-2218446 [Accessed 1 Apr. 2016].

Martin, R. (1987). Oral history in social work education: Chronicling the black experience. Journal of Social Work Education, [online] 33(3). Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23042846 [Accessed 11 Apr. 2015].

Meadows, B. (2009). Capital negotiation and identity practices: Investigating symbolic capital from the 'ground up'. Critical Discourse Studies, 6(1), pp.15-30.

Muhammad, K. (2010). The condemnation of blackness: race, crime, and the making of modern urban America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

W.D. Muhammed Speaks (1992). Cause and effect. [online] Atlanta: WDMohammedSpeaks.

Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8eetLgLj4Q&t=688s [Accessed 8 Apr.

2017].

W.D. Muhammed Speaks (1991). How Muslims regard common sense. W.D. Mohammed

Speaks. 1992. How Muslims Regard Common Sense. Image.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JA6doeATQkw.

Nemetz, A. (1959). Religion as an Academic Discipline. The Journal of Higher Education,

[online] 30. Available at:

http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1978922?sid=21105744451401&uid=4&uid=2&u

id=3739256 [Accessed 23 Mar. 2015].

Oral History Association, O. (n.d.). Search Results what is oral history. [online] Available at:

http://www.oralhistory.org/?s=what+is+oral+history [Accessed 27 May 2015].

Oral History Association, O. (n.d.). Oral History: Defined. [online] Available at:

http://www.oralhistory.org/about/do-oral-history/ [Accessed 21 Apr. 2015].

Pabst, A. (2012). The secularism of post-secularity: religion, realism, and the revival of grand

theory in IR. Review of International Studies, 38(05), pp.995-1017.

Peña, M. (1994). Liberation theology in Peru: An analysis of the role of intellectuals in social

movements. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, [online] 33. Available at:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1386635 [Accessed 11 Apr. 2015].

Prashad, V. (2000). Of antiblack racism. In the karma of brown folk. (pp. 157-183). Minneapolis,

MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Qadhi, Y. (2015). Speaking truth to power and standing up against oppression. [video] Available
   at: https://www.halaltube.com/yasir-qadhi-speaking-truth-to-power-and-standing-up-
   against-oppression#.WOrsLGnyuM8 [Accessed 10 Apr. 2017].

Qadir, A. (2013). Between secularism/s: Islam and the institutionalisation of modern higher
   education in mid-nineteenth century British India. British Journal of Religious Education,
   35(2), pp.125-139.

Rana, J. (2011). Terrifying Muslims: Race and Labor in the South Asian Diaspora. United States:
   Duke University Press.

Rappaport, R. and R., R., (1999). In: The breaking of the holy and its salvation. Cambridge
   University Press.

Reeves, E. (1995). power, resistance, and the cult of Muslim saints in a northern Egyptian town.
   American Ethnologist, 22(2), pp.306-323.

Ryan, K. (2009). "I didn't do anything important": A pragmatist analysis of the Oral History
   Interview. The Oral History Review, [online] 36. Available at:
   http://www.jstor.org/stable/41000043 [Accessed 13 Apr. 2015].

Sanders, D. (2012). The myth of the Muslim tide: Do immigrants threaten the west. New York:
   Vintage Books.

Scherer, M., Scherer, M. and Rawls, S. ed., (2013). In: The miracle of secular reason. New York:
   Cambridge University Press, pp.132-167.

Segal, Ronald. 2001. Islam's Black Slaves. London: Atlantic Books.

Shouse, J. (1935). Education and Religion. Peabody Journal of Education, [online] 12. Available
   at:http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1488436?sid=21105745974941&uid=3739256
   &uid=4&uid=2 [Accessed 23 Mar. 2015].

Slepian, Z. (2012). The verbal GRE: Dirty secrets on its role in grad school admission. [online] Available at: http://astrobites.org/2012/09/18/the-verbal-gre-dirty-secrets-on-its-role-in-grad-school-admission/ [Accessed 7 Feb. 2016].

Sloan, S. (2008). Oral history and hurricane Katrina: Reflections on shouts and silences. The Oral History Review, [online] 35(2). Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/206280310 [Accessed 13 Apr. 2015].

Smith, J., Senzai, F. and Haddad, Y. (2009). Educating the Muslims of America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stambach, A. (2006). Revising a four-square model of a complicated whole: On the cultural politics of religion and education. Social Analysis, 50(3), pp.1-18.

Sullivan, P. (n.d.). John Dewey's philosophy of education. The High School Journal. [online] Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40366240 [Accessed 24 Feb. 2015].

Swartz, D. (1996). Bridging the study of culture and religion: Pierre Bourdieu's political economy of symbolic power. Sociology of Religion, [online] 57(1), pp.71-85. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3712006 [Accessed 22 Jan. 2015].

Taussig-Rubbo, M., Yelle, R., Sullivan, W. and Agrama, H. (2011). In: Is Egypt a secular or a religious state. United States: Stanford University Press.

Taussig-Rubbo, M., Yelle, R., Sullivan, W. and Bargu, B. ed., (2011). In: Stasiology: Political theology and the figure of the sacrificial enemy. United States: Stanford University Press.

Taussig-Rubbo, M., Yelle, R., Sullivan, W. and Dressler, M. ed., (2011). In: The religio-secular continuum:Reflections on the religious dimensions of Turkish secularism. United States: Stanford University Press.

Taussig-Rubbo, M., Yelle, R., Sullivan, W. and Yelle, R. ed., (2011). In: Moses' Veil: Secularization as Christian myth. United States: Stanford University Press.

Taylor, C., Stepan, A., Taylor, C., Stepan, A. and Taylor, C. ed., (2014). In: How to define secularism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.59-78.

Teresa, W. and Angel, J. (2013). Mosque-building rises as Muslim American clout grows. [online] Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/23/local/la-me-ln-mosque-building-booms-as-muslim-american-clout-grows-20130623 [Accessed 26 Feb. 2017].

Thompson, P. (1988). The voice of the past: Oral history. New York: Oxford University Press.

Turner, R. (1997). Islam in the African-American Experience. United States: Indiana University Press.

Turner, R. (2003). Islam in the African-American Experience. 2nd ed. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Urban, G. (2008). The Circulation of secularism. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 21(1-4), pp.17-37.

Vansina, J. and Vansina, J. (1985). Oral tradition as history. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Waters, M. (1990). Ethnic options: Choosing identities in America. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Whelchel, L., Pollard, A. and Mamiya, L. (2003). In: Islam in America: Problems of legacy, cooperation, and conflict among African American and immigrant Muslims. Palgrave Macmillan.

Winant, H. and Omi, M. (2013). Racial formation in the United States. United Kingdom: Routledge.

Young, Josiah Ulysses. 1992. A Pan-African Theology. 1st ed. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World

Press.

Yow, V. (2005). Recording oral history: A guide for the humanities and social sciences. United

States: AltaMira Press,U.S.