REFLECTING ON URBAN RESILIENCE BASED ON ANALYSES OF AL-ZAA’TARI CAMP FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES IN AL-MAFRAQ, JORDAN

BY

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

Exile and other forms of displacement are not new phenomena. Human beings have always moved, desirably or forcibly. Scholars have also been writing about the different kinds of people’s movements but analytic visibility of forced displacement in our academic studies and research is more recent. Nonetheless, nowadays, the world has been living record-breaking incidents of forced displacement to escape wars, conflicts, persecutions, or natural disasters resulting in people fleeing their homes and seeking refuge and safety elsewhere. As of June 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were roughly around 66 million refugees and refugee-like persons worldwide (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2017).

Since theorizing about spaces of refuge in the urban discourse did not take place until the late twentieth century, our understanding of the phenomenon of “refugeeness” remains limited in the planning field. The few studies that exist on spaces of refuge by in large seek to explain these spaces and their internal dynamics not on their own rights, but based on the common perception of cities – in short, based on external views on them. This disregards the possibility that refugees can be subjects rather than objects in the urban scholarship. The focal concern of refugee-related projects in the planning profession is the management of camps in the name of emergency, while the focus of planning theories is the analysis of refugee camps in relation to cities with little efforts geared towards the recognition of their economic and the spatial dynamics.

In the ever-growing number of refugees of the twenty-first century, and where the average stay in a refugee camp is roughly seventeen years (UNHCR, 2012), can we still manage these populations from an emergency perspective? Is using the city as a comparison-unit to explore their spaces still valid? This thesis sheds the light on the urban practices that emerge
within spaces of refuge. In doing so, this research recognizes spaces of refuge as urban
agglomerations. It also acknowledges the life-producing actions of refugees which challenge
understanding the complex social dynamics of camps through Agamben’s “state of exception.”
Following a thorough examination of literature that engages with refugeeness as an
interdisciplinary subject, the key dominant notions in this literature will be revisited through the
experience of al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees in al-Mafraq, Jordan. The case of al-Zaa’tari
will be used to argue for the importance of spaces of refuge in the planning thought and practice
as it sets a profound example of urban resilience. The study concludes with some reflections on
the planners’ expected role and intervention in the development of refugee settlements.
If I have the gift of prophecy and can fathom all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have a faith that can move mountains, but do not have love, I am nothing.

(1 Corinthians 13:2)
hiraeth

*noun* | \hɪraθ, ‘hEr-rIth \n
: a homesickness for a home to which you cannot return, a home which maybe never was; the nostalgia, the yearning, and the grief for the lost places, people, or objects of your past

Origin: *Welsh*
To those who were, are, or will be courageous enough to seek refuge in a tent, a house, a school, a country, a prayer, a poem, a job, a star, or a heart.

To my 13-year-old hopeful self.

To my 15-year-old troubled self.

To my family, friends, significant fractions, teachers, advisors, mentors, interns, and students; the ones who know themselves and the rest who do not; the present dears of them and the gone.

To my 19-year-old happy self.

To my 22-year-old exasperated self.

To each and every person who tirelessly, regardless of all the failed attempts, tries to finish my sentences whenever I stammer.

To those who care about my endless “whys”.

To the ones who never grew tired of the tiny “letters” I kept leaving on their Post-its.

To the urban-outcasts struggling to fit-in.

To the 2013 helpless us; the ones who never graduated.

To my 23-year-old melancholic self.

To “Habeebet Galbi” – the love of my life.

To my 24-year-old enervated self.

To my sad Turkish songs homies.

To everyone who helped me get into/through the graduate program of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

To whoever carved “one day at a time” on some table at a café on Oregon Street in Urbana, the United States of America.

To my cohort; the ones who kept me sane.

To these who admire Weeping Willows or lose themselves to the lights of a firefly; or else, guide others to their spots and sightings.

To the precious soul that I look forward to experiencing its growth.

To the beloveds who accompanied my solitude and contained my anxiety.

To my family-to-be, friends-to-be, significant fractions-to-be, teachers-to-be, advisors-to-be, mentors-to-be, interns-to-be, and students-to-be; the ones who are going to know themselves and the rest who are not going to; the dears who will stay and the dears who shall leave.

To my 26-year-old hurt self.

To the tents, the houses, the schools, the countries, the prayers, the poems, the jobs, the stars, and the hearts that were, are, and will be generous enough to allow those who were, are, and will be seeking refuge to settle in them.
To all the relics who can relate...
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Abu Hussein, 69, is originally from the Palestinian village of Biyar ‘Adas, northeast of Jaffa. He was forced to leave the Yarmouk Camp [for Palestinian Refugees] in south Damascus, Syria at the beginning of 2018 and was evacuated to Idlib in the northwest of Syria. He worked as an Arabic teacher at a school [– United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) –] in Yarmouk but retired seven years ago. He left his homeland, Palestine, in 1967 after the Israeli occupation of his village when he was 17 years old. Abu Hussein’s father left the house to buy groceries and a group of settlers were standing in their yard waiting for him. They showered him with beatings... he went out with his brother to push them away from his father, but they beat them all up until Abu Hussein passed-out. Next thing he knew was waking-up in a Syrian hospital. Three days later, he got-out and went to his new home in the Yarmouk Camp, which he was forced to leave when the Syrian conflict struck the camp, too.

Abu Hussein may not be hopeful about returning to Palestine, but he still has hope for his children: ‘I woke-up as my mother was wiping blood off my face, and I heard my father say that we had to leave that night, [because] ‘Palestine is no longer ours.’ My father rented a car, and we filled it with some of our furniture. That night, we drove for around eight hours, the moment we left Palestine was a moment of death for me and my family. In Yarmouk, I kept thinking of returning to Palestine, to our house, which I will not forget the details of, despite my young age back then. The streets of our neighborhood are still in my mind. But, the Yarmouk Camp was my second homeland, and I got used to living there, with my wife and children, for 60 years... before the [Syrian] war, I taught Arabic at one of the UNRWA schools in the camp. Like any other Syrian in this country [– Syria –], I looked for ways to cover my basic needs and secure a decent life for my children. The Syrians and Palestinians living in the camp were like brothers... and during war we lived through the siege together... we bled together... we could not find so much as a loaf of bread in the camp... despite my experience with the bitterness of displacement, it was the only option that I had, there was nothing in Yarmouk other than waiting to die. After the past seven years of siege and killing in the Yarmouk Camp, the only thing I cared about was getting out of [it]. I no longer thought of returning to Palestine. But hope remains for my sons... the hope of returning to Palestine faded for me, but I planted this hope in my children.’”

– Amjad Alhawamdeh, a freelance photographer and journalist covering the conflict in Syria, reporting the story of Abu Hussein, an UNRWA teacher from the Yarmouk Camp for Palestinian Refugees in Syria, to Syria Direct in 2018
Abu Hussein is a refugee, just like many others scattered around the world, including myself. We, refugees, have unique stories to tell about our journeys of seeking refuge. If the “Story Mountain”¹ that my 10th grade English Literature teacher, Miss Deema Aqqad, taught me is true in real-life/nonfiction stories, then our “unique stories” would differ in the Backgrounds, the Rising Actions, the Climaxes, and the Falling Actions, but we may share one Resolution: displacement; forced displacement, to be more precise. My thesis narrates the Resolution of seeking refuge and this chapter is meant to introduce the reader to it. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first one (1.1) presents the background of the research and gives a general idea about the state of knowledge we have on spaces of refuge, the definitions related to refugees, and a historical overview on the subject. The second section (1.2) explains the problem with our current understanding of the phenomenon of mass refuge, in both theory and practice, and clarifies how refugee-related issues remain understudied in urban planning. It also indicates why there is a need for further research around the matter. The third section (1.3) renders the questions of the thesis, defines the goals and the purpose of carrying-out such a research, and argues for its importance. The fourth section (1.4) identifies the study methodology used for preparing the thesis and describes its overall organization.

1.1: Background: Spaces of Refuge

According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, a “phenomenon” is defined as “a fact or an event of scientific interest susceptible to scientific description and explanation” (Merriam-

¹ In English Literature, the plot’s structure of a story consists of five elements: a 1) Background, an introduction of the characters of the story and its setting; a 2) Rising Action, the portion of the story where the action increases – events leading-up to the main problem; a 3) Climax, the point when the main problem becomes most complex – the peak of action or conflict; a 4) Falling Action, the portion of the story where the action decreases – events sorting-out the main problem; and a 5) Resolution, the ending or the outcome, it explains how the characters changed throughout the story (if they do), the morals of it (if there are any), or the solution (if the main problem is solved) (Scholastic, n.d.).
Webster’s Online Dictionary, n.d.). Exile and other forms of territorial displacement are not, of course, new phenomena. People have always moved, whether through desire or through violence. Scholars have also written about these movements for a long time and from diverse perspectives (Arendt, 1966; Mauss, 1969; Fustel de Coulanges, 1980; Zolberg, 1983; Marrus, 1985; Heller and Feher, 1988; Moore, 1989; Malkki, 1992). According to Article 1 of the United Nations’ 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and as modified by the 1967 Protocol², refugees are persons who have been forced to flee their countries because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group (United Nations [UN], 1951, 1976).

Most commonly, refugees cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War, ethnic, tribal, and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries. Some theorists refuse to identify refugees in certain ways. Peter Nyers³ (2006) coined the term “refugeeness” to describe the phenomenon of mass refuge. He uses it to refer to the experiences of those who are forcibly displaced, yet do not necessarily fall under the various specific refuge-related definitions of the United Nations (UN). The term “refugeeness” is admittedly ambiguous and broad as it is concerned with various qualities and characteristics that are associated with and assigned to the refugee identity. Ambiguity is an inevitable, if unintended, consequence inherent to the practice

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² As of April 2015, the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol have been ratified by 142 states. The Convention was drafted under the specific conditions of the post-war period, applying only to persons who became refugees as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951 in Europe. This temporal and geographical limitation was removed by the 1967 Protocol (UN, 2015).
³ Peter Nyers is a scholar in critical security studies, international relations theory, citizenship studies, and refugee and migrant politics. He is the Acting Director of the Institute of Globalization and the Human Condition at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. He is also the author of Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency (2006). His current book project, Irregular Citizenship: Anti/Deportation and Struggles for Political Subjectivity, will be published by the end of 2018. Nyers is also a Chief Editor of the journal Citizenship Studies.
of definition. The concepts of refugeeness embrace this ambiguity by refusing to fix the meaning of a “refugee” to any absolute definition. To do otherwise would be to enact closure on a concept that is constantly in motion (Nyers, 2006). According to Giorgio Agamben⁴ (1995), global attention around mass refuge as a phenomenon began gaining momentum after the end of World War I, when the collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires and the new order created by the peace treaties, profoundly upset the demographic and territorial structure of Central and Eastern Europe (Agamben, 1995). Ever since, and as wars continued to take place around the world, various international commissions attempted to deal with the problem of refugees. These include the Nansen Bureau for Russian and Armenian refugees (1921), the High Commission for Refugees from Germany (1936), the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (1938), the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations (1946), and the High Commission for Refugees (1951).

Addressing refugee-related issues by the aforementioned commissions, International Law, and the governments of the countries hosting refugees resulted in setting-up a legal system of rights, laws, and policies to manage the new populations and the places they inhabit. It was not until 1943 when theories around this phenomenon started appearing in literature. That was when Hannah Arendt, a German-born American political theorist, published her famous article titled “We Refugees” in a Jewish periodical, the Menorah Journal, where she overturned the condition of a refugee and a person without a country in order to propose this condition as the paradigm of a new historical consciousness. Although theories around refugeeness started

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⁴ Giorgio Agamben is a leading figure in philosophy and political theory. He currently holds the Baruch Spinoza Chair and serves as a professor of Philosophy at The European Graduate School (EGS). He is best known for investigating the concepts of the “state of exception” and the Homo Sacer. His publications include The Coming Community (1993), Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), State of Exception (2005), and The Highest Poverty (2011).
appearing in 1943, theorizing about spaces of refuge in the urban discourse did not take place until the late twentieth century – thanks to Agamben’s decision to investigate refugee camps through urban politics, and Michel Agier’s\(^5\) comparisons of refugee camps to cities.

1.2: The Problem with Our Current Understanding of Refugeeness

The rise of global displacement and the unprecedented high numbers of refugees have motivated increased attention and initiated scholarly discussions around mass refuge as a phenomenon. As of June 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were roughly around 66 million refugees and refugee-like persons worldwide (UNHCR, 2017). About one in every 122 humans is either a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum (UNHCR, 2015). In addition, there are now third generations of refugees living in camps established around the globe, and the average stay in a refugee camp is roughly seventeen years (UNHCR, 2012). The following diagram (Figure 1: Forced Displacement in Numbers) illustrates the previous statistics:

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\(^5\) Michel Agier is an anthropologist, a professor at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, Paris), and senior researcher at Institut de Recherches pour le Développement (IRD). His publications include At the Margins of the World (2008), Managing the Undesirables: Refugees Camps and Humanitarian Government (2011), and Borderlands: Towards an Anthropology of Cosmopolitan Condition (2016).
Theorizing spaces of refuge, be it a camp, a settlement, or any other spatial configuration has become a difficult task, because the stateless condition of their inhabitants makes such places an anomaly to the – taken-for-granted – state’s sovereignty of the twenty-first century (Malkki, 1995), and because their spatio-temporal condition mimics that of slums around the world (Sanyal, 2014). Within the frame of urban planning, there are two interrelated prevalent assumptions that affect both of its theory and practice when understanding/working with refugeeeness: a governmental aspect and a philanthropical one. The plight and problems of refugees are usually narrated in terms of human suffering caused by innumerable wars and inter-tribal conflicts, or in terms of the humanitarian assistance brought (or neglected to be offered) by contractual or voluntary international agencies (Bauman, 2002).

While spaces of refuge offer the possibility of flight from atrocity, it is worth noting that the refugee camp, as it is currently conceptualized and constituted, is both a “policing measure and a rescue effort.” This is predicated on a logic of “giving human rights and protection to those who have lost their rights” while simultaneously condemning them to “living in various degrees of impermanence in inhospitable conditions” (Isin and Rygiel, 2007). In addition to camps, state
and non-state entities have employed spatializing practices based on the elasticity, fragmentation, and even virtualization of sites of capture and abandonment. These include source reduction techniques, such as the creation of Regional Protection Areas and Off-territory Transit Processing Centers bent on keeping asylum seekers away by preventing their arrival at a country’s territorial borders (Haddad, 2007).

The main issue we face as scholars and practitioners in the urban planning field is that our comprehension of the spatial processes and practices of the ever-growing populations of refugees is limited and our understanding of the phenomenon of “refugeeness” remains understudied in the urban discourse. This is because the basic nature of our urban realities has been long understood under the particular, common perception of the “city.” Can we still use this definition as a module to analyze spaces of refuge? Using the city as the only lens to study spaces of refuge means that the discussions around them and their internal dynamics will continue to be predominately shaped by our external views on them. Today, refugees enter and leave the urban discourse as objects; they are, so to speak, the sediments of other people’s actions, and it is from other people’s actions that they derive their social characteristics and their identities (Bauman, 2002). Hence, the few studies that exist on spaces of refuge by in large seek to explain these spaces and their internal dynamics not on their own rights. This perception in the urban rhetoric disregards the possibility that refugees can be subjects with full capacities to take control over their lives, rather than objects to be solely managed.

1.3: Research Question, Goals, and Purpose

It is apparent that refugees have been detached from both their homes and the definition of the “urban,” but can the concepts of refugeeness contribute to the field of urban planning? Do spatial practices of refugees have a meaningful insight for planning scholars and practitioners? If
so, in what ways? What can we learn from refugees and the spaces they inhabit? Although regularly built as emergency devices for the management of the displaced and the undesirable populations, and justified as temporary necessities, camps often turn into durable socio-spatial formations (Picker and Pasquetti, 2015). Whether in the practice or the theory of planning, the shift from the management of camps, in the name of emergency, towards the recognition of their economic and spatial dynamics does not take place (Agier, 2002).

Refugees’ actions to transform their own living conditions would reorient our perceptions of them as objects being managed to subjects with sufficient skills of self-making and place-making. Refugee camps are considered as complex places that challenge the socio-spatial imaginations of practitioners and academics alike (Sanyal, 2014). By carrying-out this research, I aim at shedding the light on the urban practices that emerge within spaces of refuge. This thesis argues for the need to start conceiving spaces of refuge as resilient urban agglomerations where their overall character is not constant, and where their economies and built environments shape and evolve over time. It also calls to incorporate a broader spectrum in our understanding of the dynamics of urbanization beyond and outside the physical boundaries of a city.

In a global capitalist system, refugees have little or no say in how to tackle their own issues. They live in spaces managed by top-down structures of governance that perpetuate constructing temporary realities for indeterminate periods. This research establishes the importance of acknowledging refugees as a civil society in order to challenge the reproduction of camps as mere representations of Agamben’s (2005) “state of exception;” where constitutional

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6 Henri Lefebvre’s 1974 publication, the Production of Space, laid out the socio-spatial theory that claims a dialectical connection between space and social relations. Lefebvre’s conceptualization was to look not at the production in space, but at the production of space. This acknowledgement of space as produced rather than pre-arranged indicates that social relations are both producing space and being shaped by it (Lefebvre, 1991).
rights can be diminished, superseded, and rejected in the process of claiming extension of power by a government in times of crisis or within a situation of emergency (Mutsaers, 2016). Through this thesis, I also work towards pushing for a planning intervention which would ensure the participation of refugees in decision making. Future dialogues based on this may result in creating a legal system that encourages the societies of refugees to prosper.

1.4: Methodology and Organization of the Thesis

The way the present thesis was conducted can be summed-up in three phases: first, desk research. In this phase, I engaged with the questions posed in the previous section by looking at refugeeness through different disciplines. Second, site analyses. In this phase, I used al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees in al-Mafraq, Jordan as a guiding specimen to answer the aforementioned questions, and to explore the accuracy of the arguments I raised during the research. Third, contextualizing information. In this phase, I examined how relevant the information, obtained from the first and the second phases, is to the notions of urban resilience. It should be noted that while the notions of urban resilience have only been showcased by, applied to, understood with, and observed through cities, this research analyzes a space that has not been recognized as a city – al-Zaa’tari – to achieve its purpose.

Ideally, refugeeness is better to be studied from multiple spatio-temporal coordinates in order to understand refuge as an urban phenomenon and to help fathom the necessity of having a vague term to justify it. This requires us to investigate refugeeness from the perspective of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, and to showcase it within various refugee enclaves, camps, and diasporas. Taking the limitations of both time and capacity, it would be unrealistic to cover all the aspects of the phenomenon in one study. In addition, understanding refugeeness as whole is not the concern of my enquiries per se. Also, it is important to mention that for the
purpose of this research, the case used here will be discussing refugeeeness through the specific definition of a refugee, which was provided in Section 1.1: Background: Spaces of Refuge of this chapter; according to Article 1 of the United Nations’ 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (as modified by the 1967 Protocol).

Being born and raised in a family of a second generation of Palestinian refugees living right on the edges of Jordan’s first Palestinian refugee camp (Zarqa Camp), and later on coming to this Country (the United States of America) as a US-immigrant, I always questioned why I had been considered as a burden to the places that I counted as my “home.” My personal history definitely made the definition of “home,” appear to be more distorted with time. However, growing up in a close proximity to and in constant contact with refugee populations, whether Palestinian, Iraqi, or Syrian, I have had the chance to form certain interpretations and beliefs based on personal observations upon spaces of refuge. These interpretations and beliefs were sharpened after becoming heavily-involved in al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees in al-Mafraq, Jordan between 2012 and 2016 as I volunteered there to distribute aid. The literature which I was exposed to while preparing for this research made me realize that there is misinformation rather than lack of information about spaces of refuge, which, if looked at from a different perspective, would enable us to start perceiving camps beyond assumptions about unresponsiveness, unjust treatment, and top-down governance.

What makes al-Zaa’tari an important space to study is how much it resembles Agamben’s “state of exception” from the outlook of an outsider. Yet, to an insider far from that, al-Zaa’tari can be seen as a space of agency. On January 3, 2017, Jordan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Nasser Joudeh (2017), was quoted by Lebanon’s National News Agency – Ministry of Information (NNA) saying: “we are [– Jordan –] suffering from the humanitarian consequences
of the Syrian crisis and the problem of Syrian refugees, which is causing a lot of burden on our economies” (para. 3). While the Jordanian discourse has been looking at Syrian refugees in that manner ever since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, I have been witnessing al-Zaa’tari evolving from a small collection of tents into a human settlement that encompasses schools, healthcare and community centers, an informal market, and a gigantic solar power plant. Today, the camp houses around 80,146 Syrian refugees making it the largest camp for Syrian refugees around the globe (UNHCR, 2017).

Since its inception, al-Zaa’tari has attracted an enormous amount of attention from the world’s media, diplomats, artists, and TV-personalities. Among past visitors to the camp are world leaders like Prince Charles, the previous United States Secretary of State John Kerry, Nobel Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzai, the former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, as well as celebrities like Angelina Jolie, John Kerry, and Jon Stewart. Al-Zaa’tari has also been studied extensively; it is a space about which a lot has been written, and has a wide presence in the web universe. The camp is featured in more than 5,000 video clips posted on YouTube (Crisp, 2015), it even has its own Twitter account (managed by the UNHCR) which offers its audience with a look at the life inside the camp through photos and short stories.

The data used for carrying-out the study is secondary, ranging from reports, articles, and publications to factsheets, statistics, and policy papers. These are produced by different operating agencies inside the camp (such as the UNHCR, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund – UNICEF –) or outside it. Examples of the latter include the Human Rights Watch, the Middle East Research and Information Project, the International Labour Organization, and the World Bank. Further evidence featured in this research come from NEWS and media platforms which mostly consists of images and videos.
from al-Zaa’tari, as well as interviews with refugees living in it and Humanitarian Aid workers serving in the camp. Those platforms contain the Huffington Post, the New York Times, the Daily Telegraph, Al Jazeera Media Network, Al Arabiya Television Network, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and the Economist.

I also used maps, geodata, and infographics made available to me through numerous public mapping projects managed by the UNHCR, the Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique Et au Développement (ACTED), and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). These mapping projects were produced by initiatives and information sources including REACH, ReliefWeb, and UNOSAT using imagery provided by Open Street Map, Google Earth, DigitalGlobe, and Mapbox. Typically, the data I have in hand is written in English. However, occasionally, some of the texts I used are originally found in Arabic. Translating them into English was not an issue since Arabic is my mother-tongue and I am fluent in it.

Although, I consider myself well-informed in issues relating to al-Zaa’tari, the thesis does not include my day-to-day observations and regular interactions with the camp’s field-workers. I only used these as a base for setting my research questions. All the arguments presented in the thesis are backed-up by information from the previously-identified resources. On the one hand, I want to show that the necessary evidence for studies concerned with how spaces of refuge relate to urban planning may be present, yet it needs to be utilized by urban academics in order to achieve their research purposes. On the other hand, growing up as a refugee and an immigrant, I have lived as a subject of study for several scholars from all around the world. Being the Guinea Pig of social scientists shortly became uncomfortable. The questions of their surveys and
interviews started to sound more repetitive over time without being able to sense their tangible outcomes.

As a camp volunteer, I could see the same thing happening to the inhabitants of al-Zaa’tari. I surely was not going to put any refugee through feelings of further unease which I once lived only to reproduce the same data that can mostly be obtained from the UNHCR’s Operational Portal. Furthermore, the interest of this research is in how the camp evolved into an urban agglomeration through exploring the spatial and socio-economic processes of refugees inside al-Zaa’tari. Therefore, there was no need to dive into the details of any of their personal stories by carrying-out a primary study highlighting their experiences (e.g., their journey to settle in the camp, their sufferings from war and displacement, or their individual narratives about how they used to live in Syria, etc.).

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Following this introductory one, Chapter 2 will provide the reader with a thorough examination of the relevant literature on spaces of refuge. The idea behind studying this literature is to present refugeeeness as an interdisciplinary subject. Chapter 3 will examine how applicable our current knowledge on refugeeeness is to al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees in al-Mafraq, Jordan by presenting how it was founded. Chapter 4 will engage the socio-economic and socio-spatial – informal and formal – dynamics of al-Zaa’tari with the notions of urban resilience, and which will be used to argue for the importance of spaces of refuge in the planning thought and practice after comparing the camp to the propositions of cityness. Chapter 5 is the conclusion part of the thesis. It sums-up the analyses and the findings presented throughout the research. In addition, Chapter 5 ends with a discussion on the expected role of a planner in the context of the rising numbers of refugees and the spaces they inhabit around the world.
"My husband and I have been living with Steve for six months. I was doing a panel comedy show, Steve came-up onto the stage and that is how I got introduced to him... Steve was studying architecture in Damascus when the [Syrian] war began. At 20 years old, he was forced to flee to Turkey, he crossed to Greece in a dinghy and spent five years travelling from country to country. He reached [Calais Jungle, a refugee and migrant encampment in France], and built his shelter in the Jungle. He had been living there for a year before entering the United Kingdom illegally, but he has now been granted asylum. Steve was a contestant on [the show] and I was like a show host. He came to mind our cats for three weeks and told us his story: 'I had to run, basically, I tried to stay [in Syria], I tried to stay, I thought it is going to be OK, it is just some hard times. It is just... something is going on, it is going to be OK, they are going to end it. But it just kept escalating, and then it got out of control. [From Turkey to Greece,] the dinghy nearly sank many times. It was very heavy, so much water getting in. I was lucky that it worked well, but the dinghy that was next to us did not. So, it sank and we hardly... well, we were still far from the coast, and there was hardly a chance to do much. In 2016 the demolition of the camps in Calais was horrifying. It was disastrous in many ways, but I should be grateful that I made it. Sadly, so many people did not, and I see it in a way: 'never forget,' I think to myself: 'never forget where you come from.'" After listening to his story, we just were like 'why do not you stay?' We have a spare room. And we became really good friends.

Now Steve is here, he has got a real calm, like a lovely sort of gratitude for life, and that really has rubbed-off on me... there is so many millions of people now who are on the move... [but] I am super happy to allow Steve to have some stability for a while... he has a big passion to... building things and filling space. Just making the best out of anywhere he goes; Steve recalls: 'one of the things I did is I have collected stones from each country I have been to. I have kept so many things from the journey and from when I was in the Jungle. And I have some very little things from home. I will always keep them. I will always keep all these things because... they are very valuable to me and I would love to have them wherever my house or my home is going to be, or maybe one day I will just take them back home.'

I would really like him to go to Oxford, like... I am not his mother, just to be clear. We have known each other six months, but I imagine Steve and I will be family forever now. I really do, he told me that, too: 'I am recognized again now because I have a card that says my name and it is issued by the government [of the United Kingdom], which makes me a full human being. I have been completely marginalized and disregarded and then suddenly [came] back to normal life... a legal immigrant... at some point, of course I will go somewhere else, have my own place hopefully, or, then go to university. But I do feel we have bonded so, I just think we are going to be family forever.'"

– Deborah Frances-White, an English comedian, recounting the story of her Syrian housemate, Steve Ali, to London’s Channel Four in 2018
Steve was a stateless person, a camp dweller, an illegal immigrant, etc. and today, he is a war survivor, a refugee, a legal immigrant, an asylum seeker, and so on. The journey of forced displacement may be daunting, but living with the ambiguity that the refugee identity holds is overwhelming. Scholars have been studying forced displacement and spaces of refuge for a long time and this chapter aims at exploring the literature written on them while paying special attention to refugee camps and the phenomenon of “refugeeness.” The chapter consists of five sections. The first one (2.1) informs the reader about refugeeness; how its concepts were developed and its relation to the notions of sovereignty. The second section (2.2) sheds the light on the “state of exception” and its production in spaces of refuge with specific emphasis on Giorgio Agamben’s identifications of the Homo Sacer and the Soglia. The third section (2.3) shows how the management of refugee camps, through the victimization and the humanitarian discourses, is essentially the management of the state of exception. The fourth section (2.4) engages in the thoughts about the urbanization of refugee camps and Michel Agier’s views on them as “cities in the making.” Finally, the fifth section (2.5) presents a system to study refugeesness as an interdisciplinary subject in order to provide a better understanding of the phenomenon of mass refuge.

2.1: Studying Refugeeness

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Peter Nyers (2006) came-up with the term “refugeeness” to describe the phenomenon of mass refuge. It is a term that illustrates the experiences of those who are forced to flee their homes, yet do not essentially identify with the several precise definitions related to displacement, and which have been long set by International Law. Today’s world, it is often remarked, is on the move like never before. Across the wide spectrum of human activities, there has been a vast expansion in the scope of socio-economic
and cultural relations, and a dramatic acceleration and intensification in their pace (Held et al., 1993). The fact that a single term – globalization – is usually attached to these dynamic processes should not efface the unevenness of their impacts and effects (Nyers, 2006). Globalization may have spurred some to proclaim the onset of an unprecedented condition of “time-space compression.” However, the question of how different people experience and are affected by this disruption of their received spatio-temporal orientations is still one that needs to be explored (Harvey, 1990). Doreen Massey (1994) comments on the time-space compression by noting the unequal forms of power and privilege involved in one’s relation to flows and movement. Different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway differentiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others do not; some are more on the receiving-end of it than others; and some are effectively imprisoned by it (Massey, 1994).

The recognition that people are increasingly moving targets (Breckenridge and Appadurai, 1989) of anthropological enquiry is associated with the placing of boundaries and borderlands at the center of our analytical frameworks, as opposed to relegating them to invisible peripheries or anomalous danger zones (van Binsbergen, 1981; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1987; Balibar, 1991; Gupta and Ferguson, 1992). Often, the concern with boundaries and their transgression reflects not so much corporeal movements of specific groups of people, but, rather, a broad concern with the cultural displacement of people and their traditional products (Goytisolo, 1987; Hannerz, 1987; Clifford, 1988; Torgovnick, 1990). The politics of global movements involve many dimensions, as the flows of capital, labor, goods, services, information, and culture all have distinct, yet interconnected, dynamics. The departure point for
studying refugeeness, however, is the movement of people in particular – the politics of people who are forced to leave their homes and flee them as refugees (Nyers, 2006).

While the urgency of finding an enduring solution to the global refugee crisis is one that is widely shared, the basis of this consensus goes well beyond feelings of moral obligation that come with the knowledge of human suffering. Indeed, at the same time that refugees are defined as “humanitarian emergency” and thus as an object of ethical concern, they are also defined as representing a crisis to world order and, therefore, as an immediate political concern. Refugees and their movements regularly emerge as a problem to world order represented by the boundaries of nation-states and the identities of their dwellers (e.g., citizens and residents). To those whose principal concern is with the maintenance and security of this order, any situation that is constructed as a problem – or worse yet, a crisis or an emergency – is of obvious significance and warrants immediate action. The speeches of politicians, the scripts of news anchors, the field manuals of Humanitarian Aid workers, and the pages of the academic policy journals all contain anxious expressions of concerns over the global refugee crisis and its effects on the nations that host refugees (Nyers, 2006).

We are accustomed to distinguishing between refugees and stateless persons, but this distinction, now as then, is not as simple as it might at first glance appear. Many of the refugees who technically are not stateless, prefer to become so rather than to return to their homeland. This was the case of Polish and Romanian Jews who were in France or Germany at the end of World War I, or today of victims of political persecution, as well as of those for whom returning to their homeland would mean the impossibility of survival. It is important to note that starting with the period of World War I, many European states began to introduce laws which permitted their own citizens to be denaturalized and denationalized. These laws and the mass statelessness
that resulted mark a decisive turning point in the life of the modern nation-state and its definitive emancipation from the notions of “people” and “citizen,” as well as its primary political category – sovereignty – embodied by a “government” (Agamben, 1995).

Sovereignty underpins and guarantees the basic discourse about the politics of the modern era. It provides a solution to the problem of political order while establishing the right conditions for legitimate authorities to last over time and within a particular space. Moreover, questions of order inevitably lead to questions of identity; sovereignty provides a powerful historical description to the kind of political subjectivities we possess (i.e., citizenships) and to where political relations can be practiced (i.e., nations or states). There is, therefore, an immanent connection between our subjectivities and the societal processes that sovereignty makes possible for us through political relation – sovereign relation – (Edkins, Persam, Pin-Fat, 1999) where this connection is a spatial one because sovereign relation frames and fixes the politics spatially. Modern politics, Rob Walker (1995) claims, is a spatial politics; its crucial condition of prospect is the distinction between an inside and an outside – between citizens themselves, nations and the communities they encompass, as well as states and their enemies (Walker, 1995).

From this perspective, the violence involved in securing international borders of a certain nation becomes justified as a necessary precondition for civil political relations to flourish within the political community (Walker, 1993). These ideas are highly significant when synthesizing the politics of refugeeeness in today’s world. Spaces of refuge, according to the nation-state system, are considered to be external bodies infiltrating or bordering the nation, which makes political tension an unavoidable result of establishing spaces of refuge. The host countries become responsible for taking care of external bodies (spaces of refuge) which are seen as competing
entities. Therefore, caretaking, in this case, turns into bestowing control over refugee populations and managing their newly-established societies, instead of integrating them with the nation itself. Moving forward from there, the concept of the “state of exception” becomes central to understanding how sovereign power constitutes the refugee identity.

2.2: Producing Exception

The main argument of refugeeness can be found in Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) opinions about the subjectivity of the diasporic body which produces the phenomenon of mass refuge – the refugee. Agamben, who used the concentration camp as a model to rest his analyses, argued that this subjectivity is established by exposing refugees to the violent limits of the sovereign. These limits are not necessarily physical, they are, yet, manifested by the laws (of a legal system) enacted to keep the refugees apart from the nation that hosts them (Agamben, 1998). According to Agamben, by enacting these laws, refugees become held in a state of exception that sentences them to be excluded from their supposedly new nation. This state would be defined as a condition where constitutional rights can be diminished, superseded, and rejected in the process of claiming extension of power by a government in times of crisis or within a situation of emergency (Mutsaers, 2016).

The basic idea behind the state of exception is that a nation’s juridical order can be legally suspended for the purpose of preserving the nation from some grave internal or external danger. Two different thinkers recognized this element of sovereignty. Perhaps, most famously, was Carl Schmitt (1985), who declared that the sovereign is what decides on the exception. Sovereignty is that borderline concept which marks the limit of the normal and the beginning of the exceptional (Schmitt, 1985). The second thinker was Walter Benjamin (1978), whose views on situations of emergency and counter-emergency provide a useful way to begin the critical
questioning of the politics of refugeeness. Benjamin explained that this dimension (situations of emergency and counter-emergency) of the sovereign relation is rooted in “the laws of making and preserving violence.” He argued that every legal system of a nation necessarily involves a dimension of violence in its founding. The violence, however, is not a discrete event, unique to the particular time and place of the act of the founding itself. To the contrary, a component of this violence returns through the production of the state of exception in the nation in different times and places (Benjamin, 1978).

Exception is captured in a specific relation with sovereign power (Agamben, 1998). Those who inhabit the state of exception cannot be said to be freed from the juridical order and the sovereign rule that led to their current condition. From Agamben’s point of view, exception is not simply set outside the legal system and made indifferent to it. Through its own suspension, the legal system encompasses living beings (Agamben, 2005) who are simultaneously bound to and abandoned by the system itself. He refers to these living beings as “Homo Sacers” (Latin for “the sacred man” or “the accursed man”). Homo Sacers are in a continuous relationship with the power that banished them precisely insofar as they are at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death (Agamben, 1998). Stripped of legal status and expelled from the political community, a Homo Sacer is subjected to the potentiality of being violated by anyone at any time. A Homo Sacer is someone who is living a life which, at some point, got transformed into a bare one without rights through the relation with the sovereign power. The “bare life,” signified in the state of exception, occupies the threshold (the margin) of the community’s legal system (O’Donoghue, 2015).

Shedding the light more specifically on refugee camps, Agamben (1998 and 2005) hints at the notion of “the Soglia” (Italian for “threshold”) as an expression of the sovereign in
conceptualizing the state of exception (Agamben, 1998). The Soglia is a metaphor that finds in
the camp its most visible and violent expression. Usually, the camp is presented as a foreign
body, a piece of land placed outside the normal juridical order, nevertheless, legally speaking, it
is not simply an external space. From Agamben’s outlook, the relationship between the refugee
identity and the political subjectivity is not merely oppositional; the refugee is not
straightforwardly excluded from the political realm, instead, refugees are included in the nation’s
discourse of normality and order. This inclusion, however, is only achieved by the virtue of their
exclusion from normal identities and ordered spaces of the sovereign (Agamben, 1998). As
explained before, the legal system of a certain nation includes rulings that, if enforced, excludes
the refugees from the same system. Agamben argued that this ambiguous identity of refugees
inhabiting the camp (included through their own exclusion) portrays it as a “Soglia”.

The camp as a Soglia traps the refugee within the sovereign relation of exception, an
extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion (Agamben,
1998). Just like how a refugee becomes a Homo Sacer, the camp becomes a Soglia. Whoever
entered the camp moved into a zone of indistinction between the licit and the illicit; in which the
very concepts of subjective rights and juridical protection no longer made any sense (Agamben,
1998). Refugees cannot tell whether they are following the juridical order or are going against it,
because every act of violence against them can be justified by the legal system itself; there are no
clear rules of what makes the acts of a refugee lawful or not. According to this notion, the camp
is considered as a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but
rather blur with each other (Agamben, 2005), and, therefore, the camp becomes a space where
dichotomous categories (open/closed; internal/external; friend/enemy; human/inhuman;
norm/exception; sovereign/subordinate; etc.) are vague and unmappable (Giaccaria and Minca, 2011).

2.3: Managing the Camp: Managing Exception

Refugee camps are often perceived as transient settlements, reflecting the temporary nature of the phenomenon of mass refuge. Yet, some camps have been in existence for years and can be compared to cities in view of their population and demographic density (Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000). Most contemporary refugees flee in large numbers from low-intensity conflicts and civil wars in countries of the Global South. Usually, host countries negotiate with Humanitarian Aid agencies to create refugee camps that are meant to be temporary. The UN, for example, registers refugees and conducts health screenings, or calculates the approximate refugee population through aerial photography and the Global Positioning System (GPS). Registration is important for ascertaining numbers of refugees and developing a cost-effective method of delivering aid. It also enables the UN to separate genuine refugees from bogus ones and thwarts attempts by refugees to acquire multiple registration documents. Finally, registration allows individuals and families to receive aid rations and health cards, which are important in obtaining regular supplies of food, water, shelter, and healthcare, and for asserting refugee status. The UN, along with various Humanitarian Aid agencies, such as the Red Cross, provides technical expertise on camp planning to refugees for the duration of their displacement. Such practices of care have evolved from the post-Second World War era and are ultimately devised to control and manage populations in an orderly fashion (Malkki, 2002).

Romola Sanyal (2014) argues that humanitarian intervention provides a convenient carrot for host governments to allow refugees to remain in their country, as aid flows not only to the refugees but also to the governments themselves to help them carry the burden of rehabilitation.
In these camps, refugees are often forced to languish for years, if not generations, while awaiting the right conditions to return (Sanyal, 2014). Prolonged exile has become the norm, compelling Humanitarian Aid agencies to rethink spaces of refuge as transitional settlements that require more careful negotiations and planning around issues including education and employment (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005). Hannah Arendt’s (1966) theorization on the rise of totalitarianism and the condition of statelessness between the two World Wars is appropriate here: the figure of the refugee is the body that marks the growing ethno-nationalism and racism of modern nation-states legitimated by international consensus (Arendt, 1966). Politics, policy, and legality of contemporary refugee protection continue to legitimate the violence of nation-states and the marginalization of refugees in wider geopolitics (Sanyal, 2014).

The phenomenon of mass refuge has long been considered an artifact of the victimization and the humanitarian discourses. In both cases, the focus is on other categories than the refugees – on the perpetrators and culprits of the massive uprooting that condemned the settled populations to the fate of refugees, or, alternatively, on the benefactors, mostly on the ethically inspired volunteers, who at a great expense to their own careers and safety bring food to the famished and shelter to the homeless (Boltanski, 1993). Zygmunt Bauman (2002) indicates that through the victimization and the humanitarian discourses, refugees enter and leave our discussions as objects with no control over their lives (Bauman, 2002). Unfortunately, even with a new description of the phenomenon of mass refuge (refugeeness), there have not been any substantial changes in refugees’ realities. There is no doubt that the establishment of infrastructure and social amenities by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the UNHCR can be valuable for economic development and can benefit both the refugees and the indigenous populaces. Yet, Humanitarian Aid in refugee camps appears to be only present to keep the
refugee populations controlled within their boundaries for an unlimited time. Giovanni Picker and Silvia Pasquetti (2015) call this condition: “permanent temporariness”.

Camps’ condition of permanent temporariness is central to how they are planned, managed, and experienced. This condition is the result of a plurality of factors and social forces – first and foremost Humanitarian Aid agencies’ actions, but deep-rooted understandings of sovereignty and statehood also play an important role, as does spatial confinement. State and non-state Humanitarian Aid agencies generally perpetuate camps’ temporariness, benefiting from it for the sake of controlling undesirable and dispossessed subjects (the refugees). The temporariness of camps plays a key role in projects of global capitalism as varied as territorial occupation, ethnic domination, and the pursuit of neoliberal governance (Picker and Pasquetti, 2015). Furthermore, because of their economic implications for underdeveloped areas, Humanitarian Aid agencies around refugee camps sometimes acquire a political dimension. An example on this can be drawn from the Kakuma Camp in Kenya, where international aid was rushed-out in response to the arrival of refugees after a massive drought hit the country in 1992. The situation quickly became a major issue as Humanitarian Aid agencies obtained political leverage in the area and, as a result, Humanitarian Aid workers ran for the 1997 elections in Kenya’s Turkana County. Some Kakuma councilors supported a local Oxfam representative in North Turkana constituency, while an accountant in Kakuma camp and the head of a Kenyan NGO, Intermediate Technology Development Group, competed for the South Turkana seat (Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000).

At every level for all the “emergency” action and discourse, contemporary humanitarian intervention displays a marked tendency to implant itself and take root in the places where it operates, as well as to transform the initially empty spaces where the refugee camps are
constructed; the camps gradually become the sites of an enduring organization of space, social life, and system of power that exists nowhere else (Agier, 2002) – unique agglomerations. For instance, these agglomerations are prevalent in the Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon. After years of their presence in the Lebanese cities, the Palestinian refugee camps developed into spatial formations which are integrated with the Lebanese urban fabric as they ended-up housing Lebanon’s poor, religious minorities, and other refugees who are not necessarily Palestinian. Diana Martin (2015) reported that about 30% of the population of the Shatila Camp (one of Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps) is non-Palestinian with a heavy-presence of underprivileged Lebanese and other foreigner populations in it, such as Syrian, Egyptian, and Bangladeshi. Martin explained that what these formations suggest to those who study refugee camps is that the very exception which once produced bare life might be transformed into a form of resistance, where the development of informal economies in the camp must be seen as a coping strategy that exploits the exceptionality of this space (Martin, 2015).

Having said that, refugee camps as spatial formations take various arrangements and distinguishing between them may be difficult because definitions of refugee situations frequently lack objective criteria and clear demarcations. Anna Schmidt (2003) research, Forced Migration Online (FMO) Thematic Guide: Camps Versus Settlements, highlights the considerations to differentiate these arrangements and the nuances which take place between them. Refugee camps can be generally classified into two types: integrated refugee camps – or non-camps – and segregated refugee camps – or closed camps – (Van Damme, 1999). What follows are four parameters which frequently underlie the usage of the terms “integrated refugee camps” or

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7 This is according to Martin’s documentation of informal statistics acquired from the UNRWA’s office in Beirut during her field-work in the Shatila Camp (Martin, 2015).
“segregated refugee camps” and which serve to define refugee accommodation. Most of the below criteria are not dichotomous measures, they are more of a scale used to identify what qualifies a certain refugee camp to be considered as segregated or integrated:

1) Freedom of movement: the more this is restricted, the more a refugee camp is generally seen to be segregated. Even though the general perception is that movements outside refugee camps are rare, refugee camps show that verities of legal restriction and even lax and arbitrary enforcement on the mobility of the camps’ refugees have large implications for refugee livelihoods (Malkki, 1995).

2) Mode of assistance and forms of economies: one may distinguish between refugee camps based on relief handouts and food distribution. While segregated refugee camps allow little possibility for refugees to engage in subsistence farming or other economic activities (making them almost-entirely dependent on the aid they get), integrated refugee camps show that refugees can engage in a wider range of economic activities. In segregated refugee camps, normally only limited income-generating programmes are permitted, yet refugees of integrated refugee camps tend to be more incorporated with the local economy of the host societies, be it with or without legal permissions (Jacobsen, 2001).

3) Mode of governance: this indicates the mechanisms of decision-making within or over the refugee camp. Segregated refugee camps are notably distinguished from integrated ones by parameters of control: the restrictions on socio-economic, political, and cultural freedoms that are placed on their inhabitants over and above those existing for local populations (Chambers, 1979). In terms of governance, segregated refugee camps can be perceived as sites of neo-colonial relations of power where refugees are counted, their
movements monitored and mapped, and their daily routines disciplined and routinized by the institutional machinery of Humanitarian Aid agencies (Hyndman, 1997).

4) Designation as temporary or permanent agglomerations: although, all refugee camps are constructed as temporary settlements, some of them develop to become more permanent than others. While segregated refugee camps mostly encompass temporary lodgings (such as tents or caravans), integrated ones often include more permanent shelter structures (for instance, concrete or brick housing units) (UNHCR, 1959).

In conclusion, investigations of refugee camps that are based on Agamben’s emphasis on the management of life and death of refugee populations are useful in interrogating the biopolitics of camps. Nevertheless, Stuart Elden (2009) argues that the term “exception” does not capture the complex violent and non-violent power relations penetrating the intimate existence of refugees in their everyday lives (Harker, 2011). In addition, there are issues with Agamben’s particular analysis of sovereignty within camps; Agamben’s overemphasizes the “exceptional” nature of the camp, as similar models have existed since colonial times. The concentration camp (the model on which Agamben rests his studies) was used as an administrative tool to deal with domestic opponents and others. A crucial aspect was that it denied the right to mobility (Elden, 2009), which is not the case in all the refugee camps around the world. Refugee camps are seldom isolated as new local and international networks expand between them and their surrounding areas, and with other towns and diasporic groups. Furthermore, Elden points-out that Humanitarian Aid agencies intervene from beyond, taking on the role of the nation-state while preserving its territorial integrity. By establishing solidarity with the host government, Humanitarian Aid agencies become sovereigns acting on these spaces (Elden, 2009).
Urban planning is clearly a way to proceed in order to address refugee-related issues (to accommodate newcomers, to manage waste disposal, to lay roads, to be environmentally friendly, to prevent floods and epidemics, etc). However, discussions of these issues in urban studies do not go beyond the management of refugee camps and their populations through Humanitarian Aid, which make them more prone to become mere representations of Agamben’s state of exception. One cannot be sure that refugees would remain if aid was withdrawn; what is the future of refugees if aid stops? Humanitarian Aid is temporary by its nature because it cannot support indefinitely an economic dynamic which would create and develop a market town in a refugee camp. In the same way, it cannot sustain over a long period a business network that was created in response to the refugee influx. An urban complex based on economic activities of that kind is highly fragile and the containment policies of the host countries, usually, penalize any initiative by refugees for investment and settlement (Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000). These containment policies according to Mona Fawaz (2016a) are rather a planning strategy that introduces a margin of maneuver for planning authorities, without conceding radical changes in the structure organizing access to the city. Furthermore, like other planning interventions, “exceptions” perform to define, and consolidate, and/or reconfigure the entitlement of various social groups to dwell in the city but also to take part in its government, materializing hence in the reorganization of urban territories and sovereignty arrangements (Fawaz, 2016a).

2.4: A Refugee Camp or A City?

After a certain period of time, refugees appear to be some sort of urban dwellers in the making and camps to be a preliminary step towards urbanization. For pastoral people especially, the cosmopolitan make-up of the camps and the change to a sedentary lifestyle play a major role in this regard. Cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics are all involved in such a
development. Refugee camps are concentrations of humans, trading centers, as well as labor markets (Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000). Mostly, contemporary refugee camps, particularly those located in the Global South, do not conform to neat and bounded geographies or to one-way relations of power (Abourahme and Hilal, 2009). Rather, the transgression between the space of the camp and the space of the host territory is messy, creating political “gray spaces” (Yiftachel, 2009). Refugee camps can permute from emergency temporary devices into durable socio-spatial formations that are integrated with the nation, and whose logics of functioning and effects are articulated at the intersection of global, state, and urban scales (Picker and Pasquetti, 2015).

The great merit of Michel Agier’s (2002) analyses of camps through relating them to cities was to extricate the phenomenon of mass refuge from the two discourses in which they have been, by common habit, enclosed – the victimization and the humanitarian discourses. Agier attempts to return to the refugees their human subjectivity of which they have been expropriated by the dominant discourses. In his discussions, Agier argues to restore to the refugees their status of “Auctori” – the authors of their life – trajectories. He depicts refugees as fully-fledged actors in the life-drama; people, like all of us, endowed with motives that reach beyond the instinct of survival and purposes that transcend the breadline, and who engage in interaction or decline interaction, weave networks of social bonds or tear them apart – thereby construing, in the course of all that, their own routines, “Doxa,” and webs of relationships. The structure of the emergent routines and common sense are volatile at first, yet, like all structures, show the tendency to fixation and turn gradually into a frame in which the ranges of options are designated, and the strategies of action conceived (Bauman, 2002).
To Agier, once the city, a self-constituting form of human cohabitation, has been selected as a metaphor organizing the experience of the camp, questions could be addressed to the refugee life that are ordinary in urban studies, but have not been addressed thus far to the assemblies of the refugees. The reason why these questions have not been addressed to spaces of refuge yet is because of their tight entanglement in, besides the victimization and the humanitarianism discourses, the counterfactually that presumes the nature of these settlements as “transitional” and “temporary.” The status of the refugee was misleadingly deemed to be too brief and too evidently transitory to generate processes natural in the history of cities with their usually extensive past and expectation of an infinite future (Bauman, 2002).

Agier’s ideas around “camps as cities” came from his earlier research experience in the poor neighborhoods and urban peripheries in Black Africa and Latin America. His field-work in and observations from the district of Agua Blanca in Cali, Colombia and the Dadaab Camp in Kenya, led him to approach the question of forced displacements in an urban periphery and, as a result, devise the term “city-camps” or “camps-villes” along a twofold track, at once practical and theoretical. In practice, Agier explored what connections and differences there are between the least assisted and the most assisted among the people displaced by war: 1) the nation’s internally displaced persons arriving in large numbers but generally very discreetly, and 2) the nation’s internally displaced persons arriving in small groups in the dispossessed peripheries of cities where they settle in the margin of the margin (Agamben, 1998), and 3) the nation’s refugees who come from other nations; those live in refugee camps and are the most impacted by the humanitarian response (Agier, 2002).

In theory, Agier concluded that the dominant, even massive, use of the camp formula in the most cast-out regions of the world suggests the first of the two hypotheses guiding his
research, the formation of a global space for the humanitarian management of the most unthinkable and undesirable populations of the planet. Here, the camps are both the emblem of the social condition created by the coupling of war with humanitarian action, the site where it is constructed in the most elaborate manner, as a life kept at a distance from the ordinary social and political worlds, and the experimentation of large-scale segregations that are being established on a planetary scale. A second hypothesis follows directly from the first and gives it more complexity by refining it; formation of the novel socio-spatial form of “city-camps.” Created in a situation of emergency as a protective device intended to provide for the physical, food, and health safety of all kinds of survivors and fugitives from wars, at a minimum level and at a distance from the existing socio-economic areas, refugee camps agglomerate tens of thousands of inhabitants for periods that generally last far beyond the duration of the emergency. The precise length of time is moreover difficult to determine even for the officials of the Humanitarian Aid agencies themselves (Agier, 2002).

City-camps are hybrid paradoxical devices. On the one hand, the individuals brought together in these spaces are so solely because they have the recognized status of victims. The justification of their presence and of the existence of the camps makes them, from a humanitarian standpoint, nameless, in the sense that no identity referent is supposed to affect the support provided to the physical maintenance of the victims (security, health, and food); this care is aimed at persons belonging indifferently to factions, regions, or states which may be friendly or hostile. Thus, the humanitarian system induces the social and political non-existence of the recipients of its aid. On the other hand, this survival system that is the camp; its organization, and above all the fact that it constitutes a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals (Wirth, 1938), creates opportunities for encounters, exchanges, and
reworkings of identity among all who live there. In this sense, the humanitarian device of the camps produces cities, “de la ville,” if one considers the city from the point of view of its essential complexity (Agier, 2002). Agier’s use of “cityness” to guide his analyses on refugee camps was based on Bernard Lepetit’s (1996) perception of the “extraordinary complication” that the city holds: “the very being of the city,” Lepetit stresses, is a heterogeneous ensemble of identity resources whose confrontation defines “the space of action of city-dwellers” and determines “the transformative capacities of the urban” (Lepetit, 1996).

However, Liisa Malkki (2002) argues that choosing to talk about the camp as a “not-yet-city,” as Agier does, is unhelpful (Sanyal, 2014). According to her, conceiving the city as a “stage” that the camp cannot reach leads to question the analytical reasons and stakes in trying to conceptualize a refugee camp as a city in the first place. She concludes that this conceptualization is not analytically productive and uses Frederick Cooper’s (1983) argument as the reason behind such a conclusion: “the concept of urbanization, as Castells (1977) [poses], is less powerful as an analytical tool than as ideology: it defines a certain kind of social structure as inherently modern, inevitable, and superior” (p. 13). In short, Malkki believes that the “city” should not be our only guiding principle to measure what qualifies a certain space to be considered as “urban” because it is more of an ideology than an analytical tool. This ideology has been directing our views on urbanism for a seemingly endless period of time (Malkki, 2002).

The basic nature of our urban realities has been long understood under the singular, encompassing rubric of “cityness” (Wachsmuth, 2014; Brenner and Schmid, 2015). An ideology is a fixed set of concepts while “urban” agglomerations, on the contrary, should neither be seen as static geographies, nor their subjects, networks, or processes (Amin and Thrift, 2002). Hence, perhaps the objective of urban scholars would be to investigate the ways in which refugee camps
urbanize (not whether they are “cities” or not), and more critically question our perception of the “urban” in general through the exploration of how the camps’ politics of increasing informalization and marginalization can inform our current understanding of urban studies (Sanyal, 2014).

2.5: Refugeeness as an Interdisciplinary Subject

It is unquestionable that with his call for “an urban anthropology of camps,” Agier has challenged scholars to go beyond an engagement with Agamben’s philosophy of urban ethnography, which was intended to make it possible to go further than can be done with a philosophy of camps (Bauman, 2002; Malkki, 2002). Agier interrogated camps, especially refugee camps, from an urban lens (since the “city” is our “urban lens”), fundamentally asking one question: “can the refugee camp become a city in the sense of a space of urban sociability, an ‘Urbs,’ and indeed in the sense of a political space, a ‘Polis?’” (Picker and Pasquetti, 2015).

While the urban debate triggered by Agier’s call has tended to frame camps in opposition to cities and to conceptualize them as ultimately deficient or incomplete urban formations (Malkki, 2002), it has also opened an analytical space for looking at camps beyond assumptions about passivity, victimization, and top-down management (Bauman, 2002).

It is interesting that now particular theoretical shifts have arranged themselves into new conjunctures that give the phenomena of human displacements greater analytic visibility than perhaps ever before. In this new theoretical crossroads, examining the place of refugees in the national order of things becomes a clarifying exercise. On the one hand, trying to understand the circumstances of particular groups of refugees illuminates the complexity of the ways in which people construct, remember, and lay claim to particular places as homelands or nations. On the other hand, examining how refugees become an object of knowledge and management suggests
that the displacement of refugees is constituted differently from other kinds of deterritorialization by those states, organizations, and scholars who are concerned with refugees. Here, the contemporary category of refugees is a particularly informative one in the study of the socio-political construction of space and place (Malkki, 1992).

What makes refugeeness a unique phenomenon is the fact that it establishes a connection among three terms (body, politics, and motion) to invoke a very complicated politics. Lester Ruiz (1999) argued that as refugees (people in motion) have been disembodied from the known “political body” (the nation-state), the only way to resolve this dilemma becomes by situating the volatile bodies of the dispersed, the displaced, and the dislocated (in other words, refugees) in the relation to contested accounts of political space, time, and practice (Ruiz, 1999). However, refugees that proliferate the contemporary political landscape immediately complicate this resolution. They, as Elizabeth Grosz (1994) has argued, are neither neutral, nor passive but rather actively reconfiguring, re-inscribing, and resisting as they move through, across, and between political spaces (Grosz, 1994). In short, there is a diasporic quality to political bodies today, with refugees playing a key role in pushing the boundaries of their sovereign accounts. The challenge that this diasporic quality puts on our understanding of politics is difficult and proactive because it directly subverts the received premises and tacit agreements on which modern conceptions of the “political” are based on (Nyers, 2006).

It should be noted that Agamben also argued that if we want to be equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead, we will have to abandon decidedly, without reserve, the fundamental conceptions through which we have so far represented the subjects of the political bodies (the citizen and its rights, the sovereign, the worker, and so forth) and build our political philosophy anew starting from the one and only figure of the refugee (Agamben, 1996). Refugeeness seeks
to demonstrate that the state of emergency which governs the refugee identity is an emerging complex of identity performances. These performances are constantly recasting the meaning of the phenomenon of mass refuge in ways contrary to the binary logic of sovereignty. In this manner, refugeeness becomes a response to the challenge that Agamben set for rethinking sovereign forms of political philosophy and action (Nyers, 2006). There is a need for further research on the process of “urbanization-in-the-making.” Studies on the geographical origin and the previous socio-economic status of refugees would help to explain whether this process really marks the birth of a city or is only an intermediary step in a structural rural exodus (Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000).

To sum it up, refugeeness can be perceived as an interdisciplinary subject that is under constant questioning. For a long time, refugee issues have been addressed through a legal system of rights, laws, and policies that came to the fore through the investigation of the concepts of forced migration. However, not all the notions of forced migration are being considered in this investigation. This legal system is only influenced by social theory and its discussions around biopolitics (e.g., sovereignty and victimization), and by moral philosophy and its discussions around humanitarian intervention (e.g., aid distribution and emergency management). This kind of investigation would lead to a legal system shaped by the nation-state and Agamben’s state of exception.

A broader examination of forced migration would allow us to address refugee issues through a legal system that does not only include social theory and moral philosophy, but also urban studies. Urban studies give us the chance to analyze spaces of refuge from the prisms of urban geography (e.g., cities and towns) and urban informality (e.g., squatter settlements and slums), and through the lenses of cultural anthropology (e.g., socio-economic dynamics and
socio-spatial formations) and urban politics (e.g., governance and political structures). These urban perspectives would push the legal system of refugees, as well as the theoretical discussions around refugee populations and the spaces they inhabit into global and planetary scales. The following diagram (Figure 2: Refugeeness as an Interdisciplinary Subject) explains how refugeeness can be studied as an interdisciplinary subject:

![Figure 2: Refugeeness as an Interdisciplinary Subject](image)

August 2017, Source: author

Figure 2: Refugeeness as an Interdisciplinary Subject
“Khadija was one of the first babies born in al-Zaa’tari Camp [for Syrian Refugees] in [al-Mafraq.] Jordan. This refugee camp is all this five-year-old has ever known. In August 2012, Khadija’s family made the dangerous journey from Damascus to the Jordanian border. Khadija, at the time, was still in her mother’s womb. Khadija’s mother came to the camp alone with her other children. The journey was very difficult; the road was full of dust and stones... they walked for six hours and she was nine months pregnant. When Khadija’s mother arrived in the camp, she did not have anyone by her side, neither her mother and nor her husband – it was just her and her children living in a tent. Khadija was born a month later. Her father had stayed behind in Syria and joined his family after eight months.

Khadija’s father recalls the first time he met his daughter: ‘I arrived at 1:00 AM, I found my small daughter asleep, I did not recognize her. I knew her only from pictures... I started to cry. I hugged her and kissed her, I never thought I would have a newborn baby outside of her country. When Khadija was born in a caravan at the camp, the camp was not sanitary at the time. Life here was very, very rudimentary, but now Khadija goes to a preschool nearby. Her mother keeps thinking about her... wondering how she will grow up, live, and learn here... ‘what kind of future will she and her siblings have?’ When my wife and I talk about our days in Damascus and Syria, my daughter, Khadija, hears us and says, ‘I was with you guys in the car, and we went to eat Shawarma.’ She imagines herself living in Syria, but she was born here... Sometimes, I ask my daughter, Khadija: ‘where were you born? Are you Syrian or Jordanian?’ Sometimes she says she is Jordanian and other times she says she is Syrian. She does not know, but she keeps saying she wants to go back to Syria.’”

– Taeko Itabashi, a film producer at Al Jazeera Media Network, reporting the story of Khadija, a five-year-old girl who was born in al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees in al-Mafraq, Jordan, to AJ+ English in 2018
Although Khadija and her family are now safe from bombings, their life in a refugee camp came with its own challenges, freedom of movement being the most prevalent one. This chapter aims at highlighting the fact that the way in which al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees in al-Mafraq, Jordan was established is meant to detain its Syrian refugee inhabitants within the camp’s boundaries. Thus, this chapter uses al-Zaa’tari as a guiding specimen to examine how our current knowledge about refugeeness and spaces of refuge, which was explained in Chapter 2: Literature Review, is applicable to it. The chapter is organized in two sections (3.1 and 3.2). Section 3.1 offers a background on the Syrian refugee populations around the world and on Jordan’s refugees. It also provides an overview of al-Zaa’tari’s demographics, the services it encompasses, and its amenities. Section 3.2 sheds the light on founding the camp by the Jordanian Government and the UNHCR and posits the practices of the Jordanian Government towards the camp’s dwellers. It links the Jordanian Government’s unjust policies to Agamben’s (1995, 1996, 1998, and 2005) ideas and the thoughts of Picker and Pasquetti (2015) about spaces of refuge, which were investigated in Chapter 2: Literature Review.

3.1: About the Camp

Since the eruption of the Arab Spring in Syria in 2011, around 5.5 million Syrians have fled their homes to other countries including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq (UNHCR, 2017) in search of peace, safety, and normalcy. Eight percent of these populaces ended-up living in refugee camps and almost 6.3 million people became internally displaced within Syria itself. Meanwhile, about one million Syrians have requested asylum to Europe (UNHCR, 2017). Moreover, in terms of population size, of all the world’s refugee camps, al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees, which was established by the Jordanian Government and the UNHCR, stands-out as the fifth largest one and ranks first amongst the other camps built for Syrian refugees
around the globe. The camp stretches over a two-square-mile piece of land located in the desolate northern Jordanian desert in al-Mafraq Governorate (UNHCR, 2017). The following map (Figure 3: Situation Map of Syrian Refugees) shows the distribution of Syrian refugees:

![Figure 3: Situation Map of Syrian Refugees](https://example.com/map.png)

September 2017. Source: UNHCR | Mercy Corps, edited by author

Jordan borders countries beset by grave and enduring humanitarian problems. As a consequence of several political crises that the region has been living for the past few decades, millions of people sought refuge in Jordan, especially from Palestine, Iraq, and Syria. On average, 20% of Jordan’s refugees live in refugee camps (UNHCR, 2017), while the majority are absorbed into urban, suburban, and rural areas scattered across the nation, informally and formally. Around 80% of these refugee populations live below poverty level (UNHCR, 2017), where according to the 2010 Jordanian Census, the poverty line in Jordan is equivalent to an annual income of USD 1,147 per person (Jordanian Census, 2010). Jordan currently hosts
approximately 1.4 million Syrians (around 654, 582 of which are actually registered as refugees) making up to 14.8% of Jordan’s population (UNHCR, 2017).

As the general narrative goes, Jordan is stable, secure, and generous, which is why it hosts all these refugees. However, it is the country with the world’s second highest share of refugees compared to its population (89 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants) (UNHCR, 2018). As a host country, Jordan is estimated to spend USD 870 million a year supporting Syrian refugees (Oxfam, n.d.). With a total population of 9.5 million people (World Bank, 2016), the influx of refugees poses a serious challenge on the Jordanian Government in different respects: socially, economically, and physically (Abouzeid, 2013; Ryan, 2014; Maani, 2015; Learn Imagine Vocalize Emphasize and Document Organization [LIVED], 2015; Thorn, 2016; Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2016; Joudeh, 2017; International Labour Organization [ILO], 2017). Jordan, therefore, receives practical and financial support from the UNHCR, numerous donor countries, and dozens of Humanitarian Aid agencies (LIVED, 2015; Specia, 2015; Thorn, 2016; HRW, 2016) equivalent to up-to one million American dollars a day (Kimmelman, 2014).

In 2018, the UNHCR’s requirements to assist refugees in Jordan reached a total of USD 274.9 million and as of February 2018, the UNHCR has received only USD 17.8 million in funding, which is equal to six percent of its total needs (UNHCR, 2018). Initially designed to accommodate 60,000 people (Lived, 2015), al-Zaa'tari camp reached a population of over 150,000 refugees within a year of its construction (UNHCR, 2014). It has since declined in population size to 80,146 as occupants have been relocated to other camps, resettled in other countries, or returned to their homes (UNHCR, 2017). The lack of stability in the region prohibits any accurate estimation of how long the shelter provided will continue to be needed (UNHCR, 2018).
Since its opening on July 28, 2012, 461,701 refugees have passed through the camp (UNHCR, 2017). As of August 2017, most of the refugees inhabiting the camp were originating from the Dar’aa Governorate in Syria’s south-west (around 80%) and other Syrian rural areas (UNHCR, 2017). It should be noted that the actual population of the camp is subject to uncertainties, including incomplete camp departure information and other variables (the UNHCR is currently implementing measures to improve the registration accuracy). The 80,146 Syrian refugees residing in the camp are known as the “population of concern,” in other words, people who have active registrations in the UNHCR database (UNHCR, 2018). 57% of the camp’s inhabitants are under the age of 24, 20% of whom are under five years old. The average number of births that the camp witnesses is around 80 newborns per week. In addition to that, one in five of the camp’s households are headed by women (UNHCR, 2017).

It costs about USD 371,112 a day to run the camp (The Economist, 2018), with around 792,516 gallons of water distributed daily to all of its residents (UNHCR, 2017). The camp is currently jointly administered by the Jordanian Government and the UNHCR (together, they play the role of the camp’s authorities) and is run by multiple Humanitarian Aid agencies. Occupants of al-Zaa’tari are served by 29 schools where 22,000 school-aged children are enrolled (just a quarter of the school-aged children in the camp join classes), one hospital with 55 beds, ten health care centers, one delivery unit, as well as 27 community centers providing psychosocial support and recreational activities (UNHCR, 2017).

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8 In 2014, the Jordanian Ministry of Interior created the Syrian Refugee Affairs Directorate (SRAD), which is the main governmental entity for the coordination of refugee issues in the country, including the refugees living in the camps. The Jordanian Royal Police and the Jordanian Gendarmerie, as well as Siren Associates are the responsible bodies to keep the security of the camp. The UNHCR is responsible for supervising all the Humanitarian Aid agencies operating inside al-Zaa’tari. Operating agencies, other than the UNHCR, are as follows: ACTED, AMR, Ard-Legal Aid, EMPHNET, FCA, FPSC, HI, Holy Land, NHF, ICRC, IFH, IMC, IOM, IRC, IRD, JEN, JHAS, KFHI, KNK, LWF, MDM, MFH, MSF, Mercy Corps, NRC, Oxfam, QRC, Questscope, RAF, REACH, RI, RMS, Saudi Clinic, Save the Children, UN Women, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP, and WV (UNHCR, 2017).
In 2017, 183 mortalities were reported in the camp with a mortality rate of 2.3/1,000 population/year (UNHCR, 2017), which is lower than the reported mortality rate in both Syria prior to the conflict in 2010 (4/1,000 population/year) (World Bank, 2010) and in Jordan in 2015 according to the Department of Statistics (6/1,000 population/year) (Jordan’s Department of Statistics, 2016). The camp includes a formal street level electricity system, an informal household level electricity distribution network, and a solar power plant to be activated by the end of 2018. The camp also encompasses an informal market with 3,000 refugee-owned shops and businesses, as well as 200 restaurants lining the camp’s thoroughfares (UNHCR, 2017).

To ensure integration in the camp, many international donors are carrying-out initiatives that tackle recreational, capacity building, and empowerment purposes inside it, most of which are geared towards the children of the camp (Ryan, 2014; LIVED, 2015). Multiple Humanitarian Aid agencies have established playgrounds, children’s activity centers, and dirt and gravel soccer pitches. The latter spaces are part of the efforts of the Asia Football Development Program and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to engage both boys and girls in soccer, in the interest of their physical health and psychological wellbeing, as well as to serve as a semblance of community feeling for children who may have been severely affected by the war in Syria (Ryan, 2014). Mercy Corps, the Japanese embassy in Jordan, and the UNICEF supported founding and operating Makani Centers\(^9\) for children and youth around the camp, which have been providing tens of thousands of refugees with support services around Jordan (United Nations International

\(^9\) Makani is a UNICEF initiative which translates into “My Space.” The initiative aims at expanding learning opportunities for all children not accessing any form of education in Jordan’s host communities and refugee camps. Makani Centers have a holistic approach in providing vulnerable children and youth with life-skills training and psychosocial support (UNICEF, 2015).
Children’s Emergency Fund [UNICEF], 2016; HRW, 2016). The following image (Figure 4: Aerial View of al-Zaa’tari) shows al-Zaa’tari from above:

![Figure 4: Aerial View of al-Zaa’tari](image)

**3.2: Exception, Spatially and Legally**

The Jordanian Government delimits the camp with an artificial hill of sand known as “al-Satter,” which is a military term that literally translates into “the curtain” and is usually used in army barracks for defending fortifications (Ryan, 2014). The Jordanian Government requires any structure inside the camp to be constructed temporarily\(^\text{10}\) by the operating Humanitarian Aid agencies (al-Makhadhi, 2014; Pizzi, 2015). Nevertheless, significant improvements to the camp’s infrastructure made it a little more livable, and therefore more permanent (Touaibia, 2015; Pizzi, 2015). On the one hand, Jordan’s preceding experience of fully-integrating the Palestinian refugee populations into the Jordanian cities has taught its Government a lesson – the Palestinians stayed, and political conflicts have been occurring ever since, some of them were

\(^{10}\) The only kind of structure that is established in a permanent manner is al-Zaa’tari’s sanitary network as it would be costlier to run a temporary sanitary system inside the camp (Kimmelman, 2014; Oxfam, 2018).
deadly (Touaibia, 2015). Jordan, which had already witnessed more than one million Palestinian refugees stream across its borders in 1948 and 1967 and never leave (Pizzi, 2015), could ill-afford to accommodate hundreds of thousands of Syrians in addition to the refugees that it has already been hosting (Abouzeid, 2013; Pizzi, 2015). On the other hand, not only was the Jordanian Government worried about infiltrators from the Syrian regime coming in to wreak revenge, it was also nervous about refugees leaving. If Syrians could come and go freely, al-Zaa’tari could become a regrouping base for rebel battalions, turning this chunk of the Jordanian Territory into a target for the Syrian Regime (al-Makhadhi, 2014).

To keep the movement of refugees restricted within the camp, multiple security-guard stations are established around it, some of them are reinforced by military tanks (Ryan, 2014; Paszkiewicz, 2017). The entrances of the camp are not ordinary gates, instead, they are military checkpoints where anything and anyone entering or leaving the camp should go under inspection and present supporting legal permits (Ryan, 2014; al-Makhadhi, 2014; Paszkiewicz, 2017). This constraint goes beyond physically-restraining the dwellers of the camp. It affects their virtual connectivity with the outside world; while the camp is covered with a cellphone network and its refugees can obtain television mediums with satellite modems, it remains disconnected from internet¹¹ (Pizzi, 2015). Although there are not any actual studies to support this argument, the Jordanian Government fears a loss of control, that when people are able to freely communicate, it can promote camp militarization (Maitland, 2015). It is unclear what a difference an internet connection would do as militias have been present in many countries that host refugee camps across the globe with or without cyber-level bonds, from the camps of Somalia to the camps of

¹¹ The Wi-Fi in al-Zaa’tari is only accessible to the employees of the Humanitarian Aid agencies working there (Pizzi, 2015).
Lebanon, the lack of evidence on how internet accessibility may exacerbate this issue makes its argument unconvincing (Pizzi, 2015; Maitland, 2015).

The original camp was built in nine days (Weston, 2015), with some 100 refugee families, as a temporary emergency accommodation in the wake of the large-scale traumatic acts of violence occurring just a few miles away in neighboring Syria (Meo, 2012). Over the past six years, what initially started as an ad-hoc, makeshift, and chaotic camp evolved rapidly and exponentially from a small collection of tents into an agglomeration of 24,000 durable prefabricated caravans, also referred to as cabins, cabinet homes, trailers, or containers (UNHCR, 2018). Once the cabins began replacing the tents as the main shelter elements in the camp in early 2013, the layout of al-Zaa’tari started being developed according to the UNHCR Handbook for Planned Settlements (Rutgers, 2016). A grid layout has emerged in which the size of the plots was determined by the original structure of the tented camp, where the original tents were distributed randomly around it by the refugees themselves (Rutgers, 2016). The camp was encircled with a five-mile perimeter road, also known as the “ring-road,” that followed the course of al-Satter which demarcates the camp (al-Makhadhi, 2014). A trip around al-Zaa’tari’s ring-road would take about twenty minutes by car (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2013). Transportation inside the camp is predominantly carried-out by walking (Rutgers, 2016) or cycling (The Economist, 2018).

To control the accessibility to/from the camp, al-Zaa’tari was served with four entrances, only one of these is designated for the use of refugees, the rest are used by the staff of the Humanitarian Aid agencies and the service vehicles entering it (Ryan, 2014). In an attempt to have the camp organized as a city, al-Zaa’tari was divided into twelve districts (Ryan, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; LIVED, 2015). The oldest part of al-Zaa’tari consists of Districts One
and Two which are recognized as “the old city” (Ryan, 2014; LIVED, 2015) This part benefits from close access to community facilities, such as schools and hospitals. However, it is known to be the camp’s highest populated area in regard to density and its most underserviced one in terms of basic infrastructure and communal amenities, such as sanitary network, water closets, and kitchens (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014; LIVED, 2015). When the UNHCR began planning al-Zaa’tari, it was hard to let this area follow the camp’s grid since it was already inhabited before adopting the new layout. Therefore, this part appears to be under-planned and less-structured (Ryan, 2014; LIVED, 2015). The following map (Figure 5: Al-Zaa’tari’s Districts) highlights the districts of al-Zaa’tari:

Figure 5: Al-Zaa’tari’s Districts

International Law prohibits refoulement, which is the forced return of refugees to a place where their lives are under threat. Although, any person of concern is protected by the UNHCR
under the International Law\textsuperscript{12}, the Jordanian Government has been practicing what is known as “al-Qathef,” which translates into “ejection” (Hamawi and Shawabkeh, 2015; Su, 2017) since 2012 (HRW, 2017). In the case of ejectment, people are, and according to about a 10-minute extrajuridical interrogation, forced to get back to their country of origin (Hamawi and Shawabkeh, 2015). The aforementioned protection becomes a luxury to the residents of the camp who are set for ejectment as they are not even brought into trial. Documentation of these interrogations is not required, yet the generic stories behind deporting refugees from the camp remain widely associated with connections to terrorist groups, such as ISIS and al-Nusra, or with disseminating extremist agendas to its outside (Hamawi and Shawabkeh, 2015; HRW, 2017; Su and Laub, 2017; Su, 2017). Rumors around the camp say that about 400 – 500 families have been ejected throughout the past couple of years, nevertheless, refugees of al-Zaa’tari do not have access to accurate deportation statistics and consistently express their perception and belief that there has been a noticeable emptying of certain areas of the camp for no obvious reasons (HRW, 2017).

Ejectment is not exclusive to the camp, though. At the beginning of the Syrian war, Jordan allowed hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees to cross its borders on foot, providing them with a safe haven under the patronage of the UNHCR (Su, 2017). Starting from 2012, the Jordanian Government has been enacting a policy of “Selective Admission” for Syrian refugees (Su, 2014, 2017). The Selective Admission policy is endorsed against a certain minority group from the populations seeking refuge outside their country of residence and where refugees

\textsuperscript{12} Article 33 of the UN’s 1951 Convention puts forward what has become known as the principle of non-refoulment: “No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” This protection does not apply, however, to persons who represent a security threat to their host country (Article 33(2)). Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, but it has a memorandum of understanding with the UNHCR that, technically, holds it to the same standards.
belonging to these groups are being quietly denied entry, detained, deported, and pushed-out in different ways (Su, 2014). In June 2016, Jordan closed its border with its war-torn neighbor, Syria, after a suicide car-bomb near a crossing there killed six Jordanians (HRW, 2016; Su, 2017). In the first five months of 2017, Jordanian authorities were deporting about 400 registered Syrian refugees per month, while another 500 – registered Syrian refugees per month – were estimated to return to Syria with little known about their circumstances (HRW, 2017). Ejectment escalated after al-Karak terror attack in December 2016, as part of a wider security crackdown across Jordan (HRW, 2016; Su, 2017).

As of July 10, 2017, 10,707 individuals were inactivated since the beginning of the year (UNHCR, 2017). Inactivation means that the active registration of the camp’s residents is ceased because people no longer dwell in it (UNHCR, 2017). If someone is reported by the Humanitarian Aid workers as absent from the camp or their current location is unknown, then their registration is consequentially terminated (UNHCR, 2017). Also, once a refugee living in the camp is granted asylum (has been registered or has effective registration appointments in other locations outside it), then they become unregistered (UNHCR, 2017). In addition, people who end-up returning to Syria voluntarily or involuntarily are automatically inactivated. Syrian refugees living inside the camp can leave the camp through a “bail-out system” that enables them

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13 Both of the Jordanian and the Lebanese authorities have acknowledged that Palestinians from Syria are not welcome to asylum in the same way that other Syrian refugees are (HRW, 2014; Su, 2014). Jordan and Lebanon have respectively been barring Palestinians residing in Syria from entry since January and August 2013, in contrast with the treatment of some 600,000 Syrian nationals in Jordan and 1.5 million in Lebanon (HRW, 2014). In addition, Jordan and Lebanon carried-out multiple forcible deportations of Syrian refugees from Palestinian origins including women and children (HRW, 2014; Su, 2014).

14 Statistics presented here showcase the number of deportations and returns among registered Syrian refugees leaving Jordan from the different Jordanian cities they live in and the camps they reside in (including all the camps for Syrian refugees within Jordan) combined, unless indicated otherwise.
to obtain identification documents (also known as “service cards”) from the Jordanian Ministry of Interior, the registration of these people is also inactivated (UNHCR, 2017).

Refugees requesting to be bailed-out of the camp need to find “Kafala,” or “sponsorship,” from its outside by which a Jordanian citizen (should be a first-degree relative older than 35) posts a bond of about USD 22 per refugee seeking sponsorship. Should this refugee break local laws or leave the country, the sponsor must pay an additional USD 7,050 (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014). Since February 2015, Jordan has also required that all Syrians obtain new service cards. Nevertheless, schools have allowed children to enroll with older cards (HRW, 2016). An estimated 45% of Syrians residing in the refugee camps of Jordan left these camps without going through the bail-out process and have not been allowed to register with the UNHCR (and thus obtain asylum seeker certificates or service cards). This situation renders them ineligible to receive humanitarian assistance or to enroll their children in public schools (Norwegian Refugee Council [NRC], 2015; International Human Rights Clinic [IHRC], 2015; HRW, 2016). From April 2014 to September 2015, the Jordanian police involuntarily relocated more than 11,000 refugees to al-Zaa’tari and al-Azraq15 camps, including dozens of children unaccompanied by their parents, largely because they had left the camps without service cards or the UNHCR’s asylum seeker certificates (Save the Children, 2015; HRW, 2016).

Despite Jordan’s security concerns, its refugees’ deportations are considered a violation of International Law (HRW, 2016; Su and Laub, 2017; Su, 2017). It also should be noted that Jordan denies its deportations of Syrians who work without permits and acknowledges that doing

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15 Al-Azraq Camp for Syrian Refugees is located in al-Zarqa Governorate in Jordan. It was inaugurated in April 30, 2014. As of April 2017, 35,529 Syrian Refugees were registered in it. The camp covers an area of 5.7 square-miles and has an operating capacity to accommodate 50,000 people. However, the camp can provide shelter up to 100,000 people in cases of extreme emergency (UNHCR, 2017).
so would violate the prohibition on refoulement (HRW, 2015, 2016). Moreover, the enactment of
the Jordanian Government’s tight policies on Syrian refugees living outside the camps makes
their accessibility to basic services, such as health care\textsuperscript{16} and education\textsuperscript{17}, almost impossible
(HRW, 2016). Issues relating to these policies include, but are not limited to, failure of acquiring
refugee identification documents (HRW, 2015, 2016; ILO, 2017), inadequate subsidization of
basic services (HRW, 2016), and inability to find sponsorship by a Jordanian citizen. The latter is
a fundamental problem for those who work illegally because they would risk an increased
likelihood of exploitation and, therefore, deportation or being sent back to the camps (HRW,
2016; ILO, 2017). These policies are out of the scope of this research as they are concerned with
refugees residing outside al-Zaa’tari. However, pointing them out is important because it shows
that practices against refugees by the Jordanian Government are not affecting the camp’s
dwellers solely.

Agamben’s (1998) ideas which were discussed in Section 2.2: Producing Exception are
manifested by the previously-discussed practices of the Jordanian Government on both the
spatial and the legal levels. On the one hand, the Syrian refugees living in al-Zaa’tari become
Homo Sacers – people who are in a continuous relationship with the power that banished them
precisely insofar as they are at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death
(Agamben, 1998). The over-policing of the camp’s borders heightens the risks of death of

\textsuperscript{16} According to the UNHCR’s 2017 Health Services Access for Syrian Refugees report, only 29% of Jordan’s
Syrian urban refugees who needed health services actively sought them. Also, Syrian urban refugees would spend an
average of USD 140.5 on health care which is about 41% of their total income (UNHCR, 2017).

\textsuperscript{17} According to the Human Rights Watch’s 2016 “We’re Afraid for Their Future:” Barriers to Education for Syrian
Refugee Children in Jordan report, registration policies that require school-aged children to obtain service cards to
enroll in public schools may have prevented thousands from doing so (HRW, 2016). While Jordan has made public
schools free to Syrian refugees, the regulations by the Jordanian Ministry of Education that bar school enrollment to
all children, Jordanian and Syrian, who are three or more years older than their grade level, pose yet another barrier
to Syrian children (HRW, 2016). The “three-year rule” barred some 77,000 Syrian children from formal education in
2014 (UNHCR, 2014).
anyone who tries to escape it. Also, the ejectment of refugees would send them back to Syria which is still inflamed by war and, therefore, increases the chances of them dying. On the other hand, the sovereign role of the Jordanian Government over the camp reproduces the state of exception – where constitutional rights can be diminished, superseded, and rejected in the process of claiming extension of power by a government in times of crisis or within a situation of emergency (Mutsaers, 2016). After fleeing war, and in the name of regulating security, the residents of the camp do not only end-up incarcerated in their new home for an indefinite period of time, but also denied their rights. Forcing them to live in the condition of permanent temporariness (Picker and Pasquetti, 2015). This renders them as one of Jordan’s most vulnerable communities (HRW, 2016). Having said that, it is no wonder that the camp is described as al-Habs, or “the prison,” by many of the camp’s refugees or those who work closely with them (al-Makhadhi, 2014; Talash, 2015).

The unjust policies of the Jordanian legal system examined before suggest that this system spills out of the camp’s boundaries to affect other Syrian refugees. The policies turn into hegemonic practices carried-out by the Jordanian Government towards the refugees living outside the camp or entering Jordan. However, these practices, unlike the ones inside the camp, do not restrain the refugees’ physical connection with their surrounding per se. They, instead, develop into discriminatory laws forcing urban refugees to live under harsh conditions as they lack the accessibility to vital amenities and are more prone to refoulement. Additionally, Syrians trying to seek refuge by coming to Jordan are heavily-affected by its Selective Admission policy.
"Most of refugee camps create a handout culture. But if refugees are confined in places like al-Zaa’tari for many years, they would find ways to start their own economies unleashing their untapped entrepreneurial talent[s]. For example, Qassim, from Dar’aa in Syria came to al-Zaa’tari five years ago and opened a bike shop. The difference between his previous work in Syria and his work here is that he used to work on cars... and now he fixes bicycles. Although Qassim does not own the only bike shop in al-Zaa’tari, but it is the most famous one there. This is because he is the man with the flyest wheels in the City [of al-Zaa’tari].

Most of the bicycles at al-Zaa’tari were donated by the Dutch. They are popular but functional until Qassim gets his hands on them. He pimps out people’s rides. His customized service comes with bells, whistles, [stickers, and colorful wheels]. Customization is key to his business strategy and his success. It is a model that would impress any management consultant. When asked why he is so well-known around the camp, he answered with: ‘this is my specialty. This is my niche. Young people love decorations and things like that [when they] go out for a ride. This business is better for me than to just sit around in an idle manner. It helps me manage my affairs and of course, it helps me support and provide for my children. I would love to live my life and return home to Syria, but you see, here it is safest.’"

– Joe Smith, a producer director at the Economist Films, reporting the story of Qassim, a bike shop owner in al-Zaa’tari, to the Daily Watch films in 2018
Even though refugees living in camps are not in theory allowed to start their own businesses, refugee camps are unlikely hotbeds of resiliency; they prove that markets can form in the most extreme conditions, and that these markets can change the harshest environments. Qassim’s story is one out of many from al-Zaa’tari to confirm this. This chapter delves into how al-Zaa’tari engages with the notions of urban resilience in order to argue for the importance of spaces of refuge in the planning thought and the planning practice. It discusses how the processes which the community of the camp is developing are a result of its socio-economic dynamics. This chapter consists of four sections. All of them present the literature on urban resilience while projecting it on al-Zaa’tari.

Section 4.1 contextualizes the camp in the dialogues around cityness and resiliency. It serves as a preface to the upcoming sections of this chapter. It explains why urban resilience is being deployed in studying al-Zaa’tari while providing a summary on the urban resilience rhetoric. Section 4.2 defines urban resilience through analyzing the four main stresses that burden the camp – unemployment, lack of electricity and internet access, shortages of food and other relief items, as well as violence and crime. Section 4.3 identifies the seven characteristics of urban resilience (robustness, redundancy, flexibility, reflectiveness, resourcefulness, integration, and inclusiveness) as showcased by the various practices taking place inside al-Zaa’tari. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 also investigate these practices within Martin’s (2015) argument about the exploitation of exception and Agamben’s (1998 and 2005) thoughts around the Soglia as explored in Chapter 2: Literature Review.

Section 4.4 aims at initiating future discussions around urbanization in relation to the theoretical construct of urban resilience, the internal dynamics of refugee camps, and the propositions of cityness. The section re-opens the debate on whether the refugee camp is a city or
not, which was presented in Sections 2.4: A Refugee Camp or A City? and 2.5: Refugeeeness as an Interdisciplinary Subject. This section uses the ideas posed throughout the whole chapter and positions them around the debate. I revisit the debate in this section to argue for the importance of changing our presumptions about how urbanization should look like by introducing a new visualization of urban agglomerations under the label of, what I call, a “neo-city”.

4.1: The Camp Between Cityness and Resiliency

It is not unusual for the refugees of al-Zaa’tari or the practices they carry-out to be epitheted as “resilient” by those who work amongst them and the many journalists covering the life inside the camp (Ryan, 2014; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014; Touaibia, 2015; Maani, 2015; Thorn, 2016; Dajani, 2017; Panter-Brick, 2017; Singh, 2017; Blanchett, 2018; Lee, 2018). Also, several camp’s field-workers and scholars who study al-Zaa’tari consider it to be a “city” (Meo, 2012; Riley-Smith, 2013; al-Makhadhi, 2014; Ryan, 2014; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014; Kimmelman, 2014; Garden, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; Specia, 2015; Pizzi, 2015; Weston, 2015; Corbett, 2015; Maani, 2015; Thorn, 2016; Ching and Martinez, 2016; Lee, 2018; The Economist, 2018). In addition, various media platforms and Humanitarian Aid agencies have been referring to al-Zaa’tari as one of Jordan’s largest cities since its establishment, including the Telegraph (2013, 2015), Al Jazeera Media Network (2015), Al Arabiya Television Network (2015), and Oxfam (n.d.).

While the perception of how a “city” looks like is widely-known (Chelleri, 2012; Brenner and Schmid, 2015), resilience might be a vague term and can be used in different contexts that do not necessarily relate to each other, which makes it harder to bring it into practice (Wilkinson, 2012). In order to explore the precession of the previous descriptions – “resilient” and “city,” this
chapter of the thesis will study the camp\textsuperscript{18} form the viewpoint of urban resilience since it integrates the notions of both cityness and resiliency (Evans, 2011; Arup, 2014). The idea of the resilient city has proved highly influential in recent years, referring to the ability of a city to respond to external sources of disorder and maintain its basic functioning (Evans, 2011). Notions of urban resilience are derived largely from ecology and systems theory (Dalziell and McManus, 2004) which emphasize the self-organizing properties of complex, adaptive systems in responding to external disturbances and threats (Dalziell and McManus, 2004; Evans, 2011). As such, resilience can be seen as the latest in a line of ecological concepts to be applied to cities, viewing them as self-contained and autonomous entities or units analogous to ecosystems (Evans, 2011).

It is important to mention that resilience seems to be the new buzzword in urban and regional matters (Stumpp, 2013). It is argued that without a sound theoretical framework for urban and regional contexts, it is difficult to apply resilience as a new paradigm to planning practice (Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011; Stumpp, 2013). However, in December 2013, and in an attempt to establish solid bases for urban resilience, the Rockefeller Foundation\textsuperscript{19} in association with Arup Group\textsuperscript{20}, initiated a movement called 100 Resilient Cities. It aims at helping cities around the world become more resilient to the physical, social, and economic challenges that are a growing part of the twenty-first century (Rockefeller Foundation, 2013).

\textsuperscript{18}Although, up until today urban resilience has only been showcased by, applied to, understood with, and observed through cities, this research attempts to reflect its notions on a camp (Al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees in al-Mafraq, Jordan) instead of a city.

\textsuperscript{19}The Rockefeller Foundation is a private foundation established in 1913, and which is based in New York, USA. It aims at promoting the well-being of humanity through catalyzing transformative innovations (Rockefeller Foundation, n.d.)

\textsuperscript{20}Arup Group is an independent firm of designers, planners, engineers, consultants, and technical specialists operating across more than 35 countries to address the challenges facing the built environment in the twenty-first century (Arup, n.d.).
4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp

The 100 Resilient Cities movement sets the definition of urban resilience as the capacity of systems that include individuals, communities, institutions, and businesses within a city to survive, adapt, and grow regardless of the chronic stresses and the acute shocks they experience (Rockefeller Foundation, 2013, 2015). On the one hand, acute shocks are sudden, critical events that threaten a city, such as earthquakes, floods, disease outbreaks, wars, or terrorist attacks (Rockefeller Foundation, 2013, 2015; Arup, 2014, 2015). On the other hand, chronic stresses are incidents that weaken the city’s fabric on a daily or cyclical basis, for instance, high unemployment rates, inefficient public transportation system, electricity and internet unavailability, food shortages, water inaccessibility, violence and crime, etc. (Rockefeller Foundation, 2013, 2015; Arup, 2014, 2015). Resilient cities demonstrate reactionary practices that allow them to withstand, respond to, and adapt to shocks and stresses (Rockefeller Foundation, 2013).

Many attribute the transformation of al-Zaa’tari to the UNHCR’s previous Senior Field Coordinator, Kilian Kleinschmidt (al-Makhadhi, 2014; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014; Kimmelman, 2014; Garden, 2014; Specia, 2015). Kleinschmidt came to al-Zaa’tari in March 12, 2013 and was tasked with restoring the camp’s order (Kleinschmidt, 2014). When Kleinschmidt started his job at the camp, its inhabitants were aggressive towards the camp’s field-workers; they were attacking Humanitarian Aid workers and stone-throwing journalists (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; al-Makhadhi, 2014). The camp’s field-workers were scared to go into it. Up to five of them would be injured every week and end-up being hospitalized (Kleinschmidt, 2014). The aggression soon led to protests. In April 5, 2014 one Jordanian policeman was killed, another was severely injured, and several policemen were brutally assaulted, a unit of the Jordanian
Gendarmerie had to interfere as a result of these disturbances (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; al-Makhadhi, 2014). Between April 5 and April 7, 2014 multiple NEWS agencies reported the death of a Syrian refugee in these clashes after the unit used tear gas to disperse refugees who set fire to official offices and caravans in al-Zaa’tari (Reuters, 2014; BBC, 2014; Al Jazeera, 2014; The Jordan Times, 2014). The same reports also explained that the reasons behind the deadly demonstrations were related to the low-quality of the services and the relief items provided in the camp and their inadequate distribution procedures.

Following that, Kleinschmidt decided to go live in the camp amongst refugees to figure-out how to solve those issues (al-Makhadhi, 2014). Some months later, Kleinschmidt noticed that the cause of this hostility was not only driven by aid-related issues, but also by the way in which the camp was being managed (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; Kimmelman, 2014). His observation was that the camp suffered from difficulties that are not exclusive to “the low-quality of the services and the relief items provided in the camp and their inadequate distribution procedures.” Al-Zaa’tari rather suffered from issues that burden a city (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015) including the four-aforementioned chronic stresses – unemployment, lack of electricity and internet access, shortages of food and other relief items, as well as violence and crime. The upcoming analyses will investigate how the refugees of al-Zaa’tari have been reacting to withstand, respond to, and adapt to these stresses by positing precedents from the camp which relate to them.

**Unemployment**

Al-Zaa’tari’s micro-economy started emerging in the first six months of its opening. It got underway when some entrepreneurial residents decided to initiate few businesses inside the camp. At the beginning, refugees sold few of the basic goods they have acquired from the aid they received, or some of the belongings they managed to bring with them before fleeing home.
At that time, the only commerce present inside the camp was children kneeling behind cardboard boxes selling cigarettes. In addition, some people set-up Falafel stands using gas canisters and pots of oil, while others were selling cups of hot tea to the shoppers (al-Makahdhi, 2012; Kimmelman, 2013). The businesses, afterwards, began flourishing and encouraged more people to establish their own shops on the edges of Districts One and Two. The clusters of shops eventually evolved into a vibrant street (also known as “al-Souq” or “the Souq”). As a result of the energy that al-Souq brought to the area, Districts Three and Four were founded on its other side by the UNHCR (Maani, 2015) – see Figure 6: Growth of al-Zaa’tari in Relation to the Evolution of Its Informal Market.

Al-Souq was humorously-named “the Champs-Élysées” by the field-workers of the Humanitarian Aid agencies, who drew parallels to the bustle of Paris’ famous Street (Kimmelman, 2014; Ryan, 2014; Garden, 2014; Specia, 2015; Maani, 2015; Thorn, 2016; Paszkiewicz, 2017). Later on, the camp’s main roads followed the locations of the shops (LIVED, 2015; Maani, 2015; Rutgers, 2016) as they grew to encompass 3,000 different businesses and 200 restaurants (Kimmelman, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014; Garden, 2014; Specia, 2015; Maani, 2015) – see Figure 6: Growth of al-Zaa’tari in Relation to the Evolution of Its Informal Market. Today, the camp’s shops generate a gross domestic product of about USD 12.3 - 14.4 million per month by selling a wide range of merchandises and services (Kimmelman, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014; Garden, 2014; Specia, 2015; Maani, 2015). These profits do not just come through the trade of bare-essentials (such as groceries and fresh bread). Businesses of the al-Zaa’tari include bicycle shops, hardware stores, furniture dealerships, shoe stalls, and plethora of fashion outlets (Kimmelman, 2014; Ryan, 2014; Garden, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015;
Garden, 2014; Specia, 2015; LIVED, 2015; Rutgers, 2016; Thorn, 2016; Maani, 2015; Paszkiewicz, 2017).

Where did this economy come from (see Figure 7: Al-Zaa’tari’s Informal Market – al-Souq)? It is understandable that the buyers of the goods are the Humanitarian Aid workers and the refugees of the camp themselves (since no one else is allowed to enter it). The latter purchase the goods from the savings they carried from Syria or from the money their camp’s businesses generate. The sellers of the merchandises and the owners of the shops are al-Zaa’tari’s inhabitants, nevertheless, the stock rotation of the shops would not be possible without business partners (Garden, 2014; Specia, 2015). The Souq of al-Zaa’tari is technically a black market; all
of the shops are illegal, and the goods are smuggled into the camp from the neighboring Jordanian or Syrian cities (Kimmelman, 2014; Pizzi, 2015). Most of the camp’s refugees come from the Dar’a Governorate, where many people were originally involved in smuggling to/from Jordan/Syria before the war erupted, so refugees already had connections to the northern Jordanian populations (including preexisting relationships with traders) who eventually became their main suppliers in al-Zaa’tari (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; Garden, 2014; Specia, 2015). This did not stop at smuggling merchandise into the camp, but also to its outside – refugees of the camp were selling relief items (Kleinschmidt, 2014) and benefiting both themselves and the host country from this informal economy (Kleinschmidt, 2014; Garden, 2014; Touaibia, 2015).

Figure 7: Al-Zaa’tari’s Informal Market – al-Souq

After seeing the success story of these economic acts, the UNHCR decided to try an innovative approach to produce more revenues which would help in running the camp and in enhancing its livelihood opportunities. Al-Zaa’tari appeared to be an appropriate environment to carry-out the concept of Cash-for-Work (CfW), an initiative exclusive within the boundaries of
the camp and in which refugees are remunerated for providing help to the UNHCR’s partner Humanitarian Aid agencies operating there. The UNHCR and the operating Humanitarian Aid agencies have focused their efforts on offering a significant number of services through the CfW initiative, such as recycling and cleaning activities. The CfW opportunities stand-out as an effective tool to enhance community engagement inside the camp and to improve its living conditions. Approximately, 6,000 CfW beneficiaries are engaged every month in several CfW activities across the various programs introduced by the Humanitarian Aid agencies of al-Zaa’tari. These activities generate about USD 50,776 per day for the entire camp (UNHCR, 2017). However, it is worth mentioning that these opportunities are only generated by the organizations that are running the camp (UNHCR, 2017). This means that refugees working through this initiative are entirely-dependent on the presence of Humanitarian Aid.

Jordan barred Syrian refugees who entered the country irregularly or who live in refugee camps from applying to work permits21 (ILO, 2015) until April 2016 (ILO, 2017). In February 2016, Jordan pledged issuing to the extent of 50,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in sectors where they would not compete with Jordanians and said it would open, depending on future investment and donor support, “special development zones” where up to 150,000 Syrian refugees could be hired to manufacture products for export, primarily for European markets (HRW, 2016). This meant that issuing these permits should result in creating a total of 200,00022 jobs for Syrian refugees inside and outside the camp. In addition, in April 2016, Jordan temporarily stopped enforcing penalties against Syrian refugees working without permits and waived the fees

21 All the statistics on work permits and job opportunities presented in this section reflect the numbers of permits issued/to be issued or of jobs created/to be created for the populations of Syrian refugees residing in the different Jordanian cities and the camps (including all the camps for Syrian refugees within Jordan) combined, unless indicated otherwise.

22 It is expected that these 200,000 jobs will be secured through the formalization of existing jobs and the decrease of reliance on migrant workers (ILO, 2017).
to obtain them during a three-month grace period, which has been continually extended for three-month intervals since December 2016 (ILO, 2017). Also, some 20,000 work permits were issued by August 2016 (HRW, 2016). Moreover, between December 2015 and December 2016, the number of Syrians with work permits grew from roughly 4,000 to 40,000 (ILO, 2017).

In efforts to legalize the informal economy of al-Zaa’tari, in the beginning of 2017, the Government of Jordan announced that Syrian refugees living in camps were entitled to obtain work permits and to be employed in other Jordanian areas. As part of the efforts to bring employment services closer to refugees in the camp, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UNHCR inaugurated the first employment office inside al-Zaa’tari. Al-Zaa’tari Office for Employment, which was set-up in coordination with the Jordanian Government, has been facilitating access to formal work opportunities across Jordan for refugees living in the camp. By August 2017, over 800 refugees in al-Zaa’tari benefited from the presence of the job center. A specific database programmed by the UNHCR records the work permits and facilitates the movement of the workers in and out of the camp. The facility allows refugees to receive employment advice, counselling, and information from ILO officials stationed in the job center on a daily basis. The center hosts job fairs and provide job matching services to bring employers and refugees together. A second office is now under construction in al-Azraq camp to bring job opportunities closer to its residents. (ILO, 2017; Kattaa, 2017).

After taking a closer look at the requirements for acquiring work permits by the Syrian refugees in Jordan, it becomes clear how difficult the procedures of obtaining them are. It also explains why, sometimes, Syrian refugees held inside the camp are limited to the job market that only the camp can offer, legally or illegally, regardless of the work-related easements that have been issued recently by the Jordanian Government. Under the Jordanian regulations applicable to
all foreign workers, in order to be eligible for work permits, Syrian refugees must show that they have specialized skills and that they would not compete for jobs with the Jordanians. This, indeed, is a major challenge for the camp’s refugees as most of its dwellers can solely fit into low-skilled jobs (HRW, 2016). To obtain work permits, refugees need to find an employer to sponsor them, which is difficult for the refugees who live in al-Zaa’tari since they are not allowed to leave the camp to look for a sponsor in the first place (ILO, 2015). Moreover, some professions and jobs remain closed to non-Jordanians (ILO, 2015) and many Syrians find obtaining work permits prohibitively expensive (HRW, 2016). Whereas issuing permits has been free of charge since April 2016, renewing these permits has not (HRW, 2016); the permits must be renewed annually at a cost ranging from USD 240 to USD 522, and up to USD 986, depending on the sector and the type of work (ILO, 2015; HRW, 2016). Because of these hurdles, an estimated 100,000 Syrian workers were ineligible to acquire work permits by December 2016 (HRW, 2016).

Furthermore, the UNHCR’s 2017 study for the assessment of skills among refugees inside the camp showed that while 70% of the study participants said they would like to acquire work permits, only seven percent of them knew the procedures of obtaining them and their benefits, or how they can contribute to refugees’ protection and ability to move freely. Seven percent is a low percentage if compared to how heavily-invested the field-workers of the Humanitarian Aid agencies are in spreading awareness among refugees about healthcare, Cash-for-Work openings, recreational activities, where/how to report issues, etc. (UNICEF, 2016; HRW, 2016). It, therefore, may be worth investigating, in future researches, why informing the camp’s residents about gaining work permits remains inadequate.
Lack of Electricity and Internet Access

When the UNHCR provided the camp with street lights, their purpose was to light-up al-Zaa’tari’s thoroughfares offering people more safety while walking around, especially when going to use the shared communal facilities during nighttime (Oxfam, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015). Nonetheless, the camp’s inhabitants had a different idea, they decided to draw electricity from the street poles to power their shops, and later on the electrical appliances found in their caravans (which were purchased from the Souq) (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; Kimmelman, 2014) – see Figure 8: Drawing Electricity from al-Zaa’tari’s Street Poles. At the end of the day, electricity provides an essential lifeline for the camp’s residents, from lighting the camp to preserving food and maintaining hygiene (Hashem, 2017). Shortly, the UNHCR’s electricity bill increased to an average of USD 750,000 – 1,000,000 a month (Kimmelman, 2014; Etyemezian, 2015), around USD 500,000 – 650,000 were technically “stolen” (Kleinschmidt, 2014; Kimmelman, 2014).

Figure 8: Drawing Electricity from al-Zaa’tari’s Street Poles

Connection to electricity was followed by finding a way to access the internet. One might not consider access to the internet as a priority in a refugee camp where people are usually
shown fighting for basic services, such as food and water (Pizzi, 2015). Yet, access to the internet in al-Zaa’tari is as important as connection to electricity since it is the only mean of contact for its refugees with the outside world, particularly their family members who ended-up being scattered all around the world (Talash, 2015; Pizzi, 2015). With the help of smugglers, the residents of the camp managed to pull down 3G data from nearby cell towers and join the virtual world (Pizzi, 2015). Connecting to the internet, encouraged by the resident’s demand, created some additional business opportunities in the camp’s black market (Talash, 2015). Many mobile shops selling a wide variety of laptops, smart phones, as well as satellite modems opened in the camp, and dozens of bootleg charging stations had been set-up around it, where customers can pay to refuel their phones and computers with electricity pulled from the camp’s electricity grid (Pizzi, 2015) – see Figure 9: Shops Selling Connectivity Devices in al-Zaa’tari.

Figure 9: Shops Selling Connectivity Devices in al-Zaa’tari

The unsustainable burden that drawing electricity put on the UNHCR’s electricity bill and the camp’s electricity grid forced the camp’s authorities into regulating powering al-Zaa’tari through rationalizing the use of electricity into six to eight hours a day after sunset (Hashem, 2017). Also, the UNHCR managed to persuade shop owners to install circuit breakers so the
system would not collapse (Kleinschmidt, 2014; Kimmelman, 2014; Etyemezian, 2015). In addition, the UNHCR has been working on a plan since 2014 to institute monthly fees for refugees “stealing” electricity to power their shops and caravans, this plan has not come to life yet (Kleinschmidt, 2014). Moreover, many of the wires have been buried underground, making the informal system safer and more reliable (al-Makhadhi, 2014). Furthermore, and inspired by the lengths refugees have gone to for connecting to electricity and internet services in al-Zaa’tari, Internet and Communications Technology (ICT) experts at Pennsylvania State University in the United States of America and the UNHCR have begun since 2015 to explore the feasibility of setting-up a public Wi-Fi in the camp (Pizzi, 2015). The idea is far-fetched, especially given the frequent funding shortfalls for coping with the Syrian crisis and the opposition it has been getting from the Jordanian Government for reasons related to security (Maitland, 2015).

In 2015, the Jordanian Government gave the green light to the UNHCR’s plans for establishing a solar power plant that would provide the electricity which the camp’s residents have already been “stealing” (Pizzi, 2015). The largest solar power plant ever built in a refugee camp was inaugurated in November 13, 2017 (Hashem, 2017) – see Figure 10: Al-Zaa’tari’s Solar Power Plant. The plant is expected to reduce annual carbon dioxide emissioned from the camp by 13,000 metric tons per year, equivalent to 30,000 barrels of oil (Hashem, 2017). It will also deliver annual savings of around USD 5.5 million, which the UNHCR will be able to reinvest in vital humanitarian assistance (Severe, 2017; Hashem, 2017). The 12.9-megawatt peak plant was funded by the Government of Germany through the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) Development Bank at a cost of USD 17.5 million and is projected to offer families with 12 to 14 hours of electricity each day (Severe, 2017). The solar power plant, which was constructed on the outskirts of the camp consisting of 40,000 photovoltaic panels, provided
employment to workers from the local Jordanian communities, as well as 75 Syrian refugees living in the camp under the UNHCR’s CfW initiative during its construction phase (Hashem, 2017). While the refugees of the camp are considered to be the prime beneficiaries of the project, the plant is connected to Jordan’s national power grid – meaning that any unused power is fed back into the network to support the energy needs of the local communities of Jordan and to help the country meet its renewable energy goals (Severe, 2017; Hashem, 2017).

Figure 10: Al-Zaa’tari’s Solar Power Plant

Shortages of Food and Other Relief Items

When the camp first opened, the main concern of Humanitarian Aid was to provide the refugees of the camp with equal amounts of relief items and fair accessibility to their mobile distribution points (Kleinschmidt, 2014). Distribution of assistance was done through handing-out standardized portions of pre-packaged food rations, uniform amounts of water, equal quantities of blankets, evenly-balanced numbers of personal hygiene products, etc. (Kleinschmidt, 2014; al-Makhadhi, 2014). However, the camp’s inhabitants were not happy with the aid they got (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015). As mentioned before, many credit the demonstrations that used to occur on a daily basis in the camp and the aggression towards the
Humanitarian Aid workers to the fact that al-Zaa’tari’s residents were frustrated with the quality of relief items or with the way in which they were being handed-out (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; al-Makhadhi, 2014). The main reasons that would prevent refugees from going to the distribution points of relief items had to do with security concerns associated with in-crowds verbal and physical harassments (Oxfam, 2014). These concerns were amplified by the long waiting lines, which may take up to five hours (Oxfam, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014). Relief distribution would take place once every two weeks, which meant that refugees would run-out of aid by the time the next distribution of assistance would take place (Kleinschmidt, 2014) – see Figure 11: Mobile Relief Distribution Points in al-Zaa’tari.

To solve this issue, and based on the high-demand of the businesses selling food in the Souq, the United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) inaugurated two international supermarkets in the camp (Safeway and Tazweed) along with 16 other shops with a voucher system where refugees can swap these vouchers for food and other relief items – see Figure 12: Al-Zaa’tari’s Supermarkets. Those shops and supermarkets also provide many refugees of the camp with work opportunities under the UNHCR’s CfW initiative (Ryan, 2014). The voucher
system permits every refugee of al-Zaa’tari to get strict rations of daily four pieces of bread and monthly food allowance worth approximately USD 25 (The Economist, 2018). This, nevertheless, does not mean that the camp got rid of assistance distribution points. Assistance distribution points were transformed into distribution centers with fixed locations, instead (Kleinschmidt, 2014; Ryan, 2014; Garden, 2014). In this manner, the voucher system was being put in place so that those who can afford to pay for services do (with a wholesale value), and help would be available for those who cannot, which sounds more like social welfare than Humanitarian Aid (Garden, 2014).

![Al-Zaa’tari’s Supermarkets](image)

**Figure 12: Al-Zaa’tari’s Supermarkets**

By the end of November 2014, the WFP had announced that its food voucher system would have to be halted due to a chronic lack of funding and, as a result, the UN warned that the consequences would be devastating (United Nations’ World Food Programme [WFP], 2014; UN, 2014; al-Makhadhi, 2014). On December 9, 2014, just over a week after the WFP’s potentially catastrophic announcement, the food voucher system was reinstated (WFP, 2014). Massive support from the public and the private sectors, and donor countries helped the WFP overtake its initial fundraising goal of USD 64 million and hit USD 80 million by the end of 2014 (al-
Makhadhi, 2014). In August 2015, the WFP ran-out of adequate funds again, and temporarily cut-off all support to about 229,000 of the Syrian refugees living in host countries, including the ones in camps (UNHCR, 2017). As a result, many refugees could not afford the living costs without Humanitarian Aid and voluntary returns of refugees to Syria accelerated to an average of 340 per day by the end of September 2015 (HRW, 2016).

Violence and Crime

While al-Zaa’tari has become synonymous with chaos and violence, especially inside Jordan, legal complaints and formal reports of assault (including sexual and gender-based violence) are extremely hard to come by, as are exact figures about the number of violent incidents (Bindel, 2013; Kleinschmidt, 2014; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014). Despite the widespread fear of violence, refugees are not reporting such incidents to the Jordanian police for a variety of reasons, not least of which is that it lacks a durable, formalized security apparatus (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014). Ever since its opening, the camp has been witnessing assaults, burglaries, and homicides that are mostly carried-out by gangs trying to control its trade dealings and gain more power over relief items and food vouchers, so they can exchange them for cash later (al-Majali, 2013; Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; LIVED, 2015). The lack of information on the matter, combined with the well-known fact that violence and crime are present in al-Zaa’tari, raises fundamental questions on who is in charge of policing and how the security of this community is being safeguarded (Bindel, 2013; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015).

Until mid-2014, and right before the fatal riot took place (see Figure 13: Protests in al-Zaa’tari), the Jordanian Royal Police and the Jordanian Gendarmerie were the responsible bodies for keeping the safety inside the camp and the security of its borders (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014). The heavy presence of these bodies inside the camp was intimidating and many of the camp’s
inhabitants chose to go back to Syria in order to escape the prison-like treatment meted-out in the name of community policing (McDonnell, 2014; al-Makhadhi, 2014). Refugees expressed mixed-feelings about the presence of the Jordanian police in the camp (Oxfam, 2014; McDonnell, 2014). After the report of Oxfam’s 2014 Refugee Perceptions Study: Zaatari Camp and Host Communities in Jordan was published, some central community policing measures and changes took place. The study showed that the majority of persons living inside the camp would seek help from family members or other acquaintances from the camp’s refugees if confronted with a security concern, while only 19% of the total survey respondents and 24% of the female-headed-households would seek help from the police (Oxfam, 2014). The study also showed that the residents of al-Za’atari avoided the Jordanian police as much as possible because they were still traumatized by their experiences with the Syrian police and feared that they will be threatened with deportation by the Jordanian Government, if caught working illegally or having confrontations with Jordanian citizens (Oxfam, 2014; Siren Associates, 2015).

Based on the study, the UNHCR decided to let the community policing inside the camp be handled through a privately-hired security firm by the British Embassy in Jordan, Siren Associates, 2015.

Figure 13: Protests in al-Zaa’tari

April 2014, Source: David Maurice Smith
February 2013, Source: Khalil Mazraawi
Associates (UNHCR, 2015). The firm also employs refugees from the camp as part of the UNHCR’s CfW initiative to serve as community police officers after providing them with intensive training (McDonnell, 2014). Otherwise, the Jordanian security units were asked to have no presence inside the camp (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014; al-Makhadhi, 2014); rather, they would keep their duties of the camp’s border protection after undergoing a specialized training with Siren Associates (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014; McDonnell, 2014). The Jordanian Gendarmerie would only be called into al-Zaa’tari when the Jordanian Royal Police cannot maintain its order (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014). After carrying out the previous measures and changes in the security system of al-Zaa’tari, the camp inhabitants perceived the camp to be safer by the end of 2015 in comparison to perceptions from 2013 (Siren Associates, 2015). As of 2017, more people have been perceiving the camp as a safe space with less observed incidents of violence and crime, yet sexual and gender-based violence inside the camp remains present with no successful methods to measure it (Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Sub-Working Group [SGBV SWG], 2017).

Since the original communities of the refugees of the camp were torn apart by the Syrian war, their traditional protection networks have broken down, and which has increased the vulnerability of women, girls, boys, and men to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV SWG, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017). Survivors of sexual and gender-based violence are often afraid to speak openly about it and to discuss what has happened to them, owing to stigmatization and fear of retaliation by family and community members (SGBV SWG, 2017). Minority groups within the residents of the camp are more vulnerable to violence (LIVED, 2015; SGBV SWG, 2017). As a result, a number of Humanitarian Aid agencies have been establishing response units in the camp’s community centers and healthcare facilities providing sexual and gender-based violence-related services ranging from psychological and physiological help to capacity building and
empowerment, as well as recreational activities (UNHCR, 2017). Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex individuals (LGBTI), people with disabilities, and women heading their households face additional challenges to access specialized sexual and gender-based violence response services (LIVED, 2015; SGBV SWG, 2017). Some female refugees report that they are not allowed to leave their homes unaccompanied because of perceived insecurity, making it difficult for them to access some of al-Zaa’tari’s services (SGBV SWG, 2017).

Articulating the camp’s chronic stresses (unemployment, lack of electricity and internet access, shortages of food and other relief items, as well as violence and crime) all together reflects the fact that urban resilience recognizes spaces as systems situated in a state of “permanent change” (Scheffer, 2009) where change is an essential trait of how the space operates. According to this, urban resilience is understood not as a fixed asset, but rather as a continually changing process; not as a being, but as a becoming (Davoudi et al., 2012). Resilient urban systems are always transforming through time. Al-Zaa’tari, is not an alien to this notion because each and every reactionary practice presented previously has been going through change since the establishment of the camp in order to allow it to withstand, respond to, and adapt to the four stresses which were discussed before. Accordingly, these reactions appear to position the camp in a state of permanent change that continues to take place until this very moment.

Also, the Jordanian Government has been mostly flexible, authorizing “smuggled” goods to filter through the gates of the camp, hence, letting al-Zaa’tari’s informal economy flourish (Touaibia, 2015). The previous analyses suggest that the socio-economic dynamics which emerged within the camp are the driving force behind reacting to its stresses. Unemployment was a product of the lack of economy within the camp in the first place and reacting to it resulted in creating al-Souq, starting the UNHCR’s CfW initiative, and inaugurating al-Zaa’tari’s job
center. Lack of electricity became an issue when the needed power to run the informal economy was not present, people also needed electricity to power the electrical appliances in their caravans that they bought from the Souq. Shortages of food and other relief items was dealt with by the WFP. The WFP established supermarkets and shops in the Souq where aid vouchers can be used. Significant incidents of violence and crime were brought to the camp by gangs attempting to control its economy. All these reactions ended-up providing the camp’s inhabitants with job opportunities inside al-Zaa’tari or outside it. In short, the economy of al-Zaa’tari would not have been present without all the informal and formal socio-economic processes taking place to address its chronic stresses.

It can be inferred that while establishing al-Zaa’tari itself was a result of an acute shock (the Syrian conflict), the four chronic stresses that the camp has been living were a product of its establishment; as if an acute shock can lead to chronic stresses. In addition, the socio-economic dynamics of al-Zaa’tari can be considered as a representation of Martin’s (2015) argument that was posed earlier in Section 2.3: Managing the Camp: Managing Exception. According to her, the very exception which once produced bare life might be transformed into a form of resistance, and the development of informal economies in the camp must be seen as a coping strategy that exploits the exceptionality of this space (Martin, 2015). The actions of control over the camp, which are enacted by the camp’s authorities and are producing conditions that Agamben (1998) calls the “state of exception,” led to the occurrence of illegal economic reactionary practices by the dwellers of the camp (resistance). The response from the camp’s authorities was accepting these practices and resulted in a series of informal and formal reactions (by both the camp’s dwellers and its authorities). The socio-economic dynamics of these informal and formal
practices exploited Agamben’s exception as they managed to succeed in making the camp a somewhat more comfortable place to live (coping strategy).

It should be noted that exploiting the exception in al-Zaa’tari is not exclusive to the socio-economic dynamics discussed previously. Some other practices of refugee populations residing in the al-Zaa’tari resist the camp’s authorities (see Figure 14: Al-Zaa’tari’s Built Environment). For instance, most of the camp’s households do not restrain the boundaries of the lots they live on to the distinguished areas specified by the camp’s authorities (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; Maani, 2015; Rutgers, 2016). Refugees surpass the grid lines to establish their own landscape and, most of the times, grow their own herbs and vegetables. A number of them even established fountains around their caravans (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; Maani, 2015; Rutgers, 2016). Some families have linked two caravans together, with aluminum or other ad hoc paneling, to create a kind of a courtyard, a sitting room, or a storage space between them (Kleinschmidt, 2014).
The case of al-Zaa’tari suggests that the socio-economic processes, which are carried-out by its refugees, eventually got translated into socio-spatial formations denoted by the change of the camp’s built environment (the change includes establishing al-Souq and launching gardens). The question to ask here would be: when studying urban resilience in spaces of refuge, should exploitation of exception be present? Meaning, can we spot urban resilience in systems that host refugees without their resistance being a response to the stresses that burden their new environments? Is resistance needed to achieve urban resilience within communities of refugees? Or, is the occurrence of urban resilience dependent on resistance in these contexts?

4.3: Characteristics of Urban Resilience: Traits of the Camp

In addition to setting a concrete definition of resilience in the urban discourse (which was conveyed in the prior section), the 100 Resilient Cities movement identifies the characteristics of urban resilience. The reactionary practices associated with urban resilience demonstrate seven
characteristics: robustness, redundancy, flexibility, reflectiveness, resourcefulness, integration, and inclusiveness (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). The next analyses will explain how the camp’s previously-investigated reactionary practices (unemployment, lack of electricity and internet access, shortages of food and other relief items, as well as violence and crime) correlate to those characteristics. The analyses also present further cases that would help the reader to better understand them.

Robustness, Redundancy, and Flexibility

Through the formerly-examined reactionary practices, one can trace three characteristics of urban resilience. Those are: robustness, redundancy, and flexibility. Together, these three characteristics are known as well-conceived reactionary practices with different qualities and assets that would support urban systems in withstanding shocks and stresses (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). Robustness, redundancy, and flexibility also demonstrate the willingness of the systems’ inhabitants to use alternative strategies in order to facilitate rapid recovery from the issues disturbing and weakening them (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015).

Robust practices are well-conceived, well-established, and well-administered actions carried out to ensure that failure is predictable, yet not disproportionate to the cause (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). While responding to change in the camp is not well-imagined per se, it appears from the previous precedents that responding to stresses, from the sides of both the camp’s authorities and its refugees, is well-constructed and well-managed. Al-Zaa’tari’s reactionary practices were carried-out and administered in a manner that made the best out of the camp’s limited resources without distorting the main purpose of such practices – to enhance the living conditions in al-Zaa’tari (not disproportionate the cause). The reason why the
camp does not seem to be well-imagined is because the way in which the reactions are put-through includes expecting failures, not predicting them, which makes mitigation through a well-imagined scenario not possible. Since every reaction is a unique trial in al-Zaa’tari, failure might become inevitable. However, it is not possible to predict how a new experiment would fail or how this failure would look like for the lack of comparable instances. Additionally, failures in this case are not meant to damage the reactions which have already been established. The new reactions are mostly based on the previous ones. For instance, when the camp’s authorities failed to pay their electricity bill, they did not cut-off the power from the shops and the caravans, they established a solar power plant instead.

*Redundancy refers to sparing capacity purposively to accommodate disruption\*(happening due to extreme pressures, surges in demand, or an external event) through *presenting multiple ways to achieve a given need* (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). The reactionary practices in al-Zaa’tari spare the camp’s capacities in a purposeful manner. They give different options to solve the same issue if one of them happens to stop being effective. Various solutions are present in order to accommodate the disruption created by incidents of malfunction. A representation of this is the reaction to violence and crime in the camp. When Siren Associates fail to keep the security of the camp, the Jordanian Royal Police would take control. If the Jordanian Royal Police cannot maintain its order, the Jordanian Gendarmerie would be called into al-Zaa’tari. In this sense, multiple ways are set to achieve a certain need – maintaining the camp’s safety.

*Flexibility indicates the willingness and ability to adopt alternative strategies in response to changing circumstances through making the system more flexible and by introducing new technologies or knowledge to it* (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). Al-Zaa’tari’s
reactionary practices show a serious will and remarkable abilities to accept and implement alternative schemes in response to its changing circumstances. The way in which a single stress is handled in the camp would be through a number of reactions, not just one. An example of this may be the voucher system which was introduced to the camp as a different method to distribute assistance than handing-out relief items through mobile points. This new method made assistance distribution more flexible as it has been giving refugees who can afford to pay for services a chance to do so, while providing those who cannot with the needed relief.

**Reflectiveness and Resourcefulness**

Urban resilience operates in phases at multiple scales and timeframes (Davoudi et al., 2012). These phases flow from one to another and are not necessarily sequential; however, they are distinct from each other (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). They interact at different scales; for instance – hypothetically speaking –, the interaction between governmental bodies, local communities, private companies, and international educational institutions to develop a cultural-exchange program with indigenous high-school students. Those phases also use various timeframes to guide their interactions; the current interaction in the previous example (happening now) may have been based on a former partnership between the entities (happened in the past) to guide their upcoming project (will happen in the future). This allows systems to be both efficient and innovative; they are highly-connected yet also free to experiment because their properties manifest themselves at diverse scales and times as they stream amongst the phases (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). This can be clearly spotted in the case of al-Zaa’tari through its socio-economic dynamics.

Urban resilience here operates at three scales: Syria, the camp, and Jordan. As mentioned earlier in Section 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp, the camp’s
The camp’s informal economy is benefiting both the host country (Jordan) and al-Zaa’tari’s dwellers. Most of the camp’s refugees come from the Dar’aa Governorate where many of them had previous trading relations with the northern part of Jordan before the war in Syria took place. The informal economy of the camp would not have been possible without these relations; the prior traders became the camp’s suppliers. In addition, a number of the camp’s refugees sell relief items to the outside of the camp – to other Jordanian and Syrian cities. The camp’s economic dynamics serve as a connection between these three scales.

Timeframes in al-Zaa’tari do not follow our normal perception of time being split into past, present, and future. Timeframes here can be understood differently. One should keep in mind that the refugees of the camp are reminded of war on a daily basis; al-Zaa’tari is close to the Jordanian-Syrian borders and the camp’s residents are able to hear the war’s artillery fire all the time (Kleinschmidt, 2014, Garden, 2014). Refugees of the camp are, and as discussed in Section 3.2: Exception, Spatially and Legally, also living in the condition of permanent temporariness, which means that their future is not fixed to the physical space they are currently living in or to the one they once inhabited. This makes them sentenced to think about the future constantly as they cannot expect what the upcoming periods hold (Garden, 2014; al-Makhadhi, 2014; Specia, 2015).

The fact that refugees are settling in the camp and attempting to make their lives somewhat better does not necessarily mean that they are not looking forward to going back to Syria anymore (Touaibia, 2015; Specia, 2015). Instead, refugees of the al-Zaa’tari perceive improving their quality of life inside it as an opportunity to equip themselves with the right tools before going back to their homeland (al-Makhadhi, 2014; Touaibia, 2015; Kripke; 2015). For
example, some refugees of the camp conceive getting higher education through university scholarships, and being involved in construction projects within al-Zaa’tari through CfW opportunities as important means to obtain better knowledge and experiences, which are necessary to rebuild Syria (UNHCR, 2015; Specia, 2015).

In this sense, the past, the present, and the future are experienced at the same time; with the sound of conflict providing a backdrop to al-Zaa’tari’s everyday life, the past is always existing in the refugees’ present time as they continue to question their unknown future. Illustrating how urban resilience inside the camp operates at multiple timeframes can be comprehended through explaining another two characteristics of it – reflectiveness and resourcefulness. These characteristics are qualities concerned with the ability to learn from the past and to act during emergency periods (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015).

While reflective practices use past experiences to inform future decisions by amending knowledge to suit the current situation, resourceful ones can recognize alternative ways in employing resources at times of crisis in order to meet people’s needs (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). In an effort to utilize skills and create a home-from-home (create al-Zaa’tari from Syria), most of al-Zaa’tari’s residents have set businesses based on their previous professions (Garden, 2014; Specia, 2015). However, some of them had to be adjusted to fit their living conditions in the camp. An example of this is a travel agency which opened in al-Zaa’tari. The owner of the travel agency was a travel agent in Syria and started organizing trips for Syrians who work afar from it or outside Jordan, mostly in the Gulf Region, and want to visit their families in al-Zaa’tari (Kleinschmidt, 2014). The travel agency works with the Jordanian Government to help the visitors in obtaining permits, it also provides them with an airport pick-up service to/from the camp (Kleinschmidt, 2014).
The camp’s dwellers had recognized alternate modes to use the assets of the Souq to meet the needs of other refugees living in al-Zaa’tari. The way competition is created between businesses in the camp goes as follows: a unique business with high-demand would make more revenues, therefore, the residents of the camp would fill competence shortages through spotting gaps in their “black market” (Garden, 2014). For instance, a pizza delivery service is the last thing someone would expect to see in a refugee camp. However, this pizzeria actually exists in al-Zaa’tari. The owner of the business is a former electrician who had no familiarity in pizzerias before, nonetheless, he noticed that there is a high-demand on food, so he partnered with another man who had experience making pizzas and Syrian pastries, and inaugurated the pizzeria (Touaibia, 2015). Then he spotted a gap in the market where no restaurant in the camp would deliver food, so he enhanced his business through adding a bike-delivery service to it (Specia, 2015).

From the previous outlooks, one can evidently tell that al-Zaa’tari’s reactionary practices to its chronic stresses at a time of crisis used the past experiences of the camp’s refugees to change their new realities (current situation). Hence, producing reflective practices that eventually became a resource to develop the capacities of its residents (amending knowledge) through the camp’s economy. Al-Zaa’tari’s economy was only possible through responding to the challenges affecting the needs of its refugees. The produced reflective practices will eventually be, and according to the camp’s dwellers, deployed in helping them to transform Syria if they get back there (using a resource to inform a future decision).

Integration and Inclusiveness

It is important that power relations are considered when applying the concepts resilience (which are mostly derived from ecology and systems theory, as mentioned in Section 4.1: The
Camp Between Cityness and Resiliency) to our understanding of cities in order to achieve a coherent discourse on the subject. The decisions made by city stakeholders are driven by particular motivations and human needs that may be different and, sometimes, conflicting (da Silva, Kernaghan, and Luque, 2012). Therefore, one cannot simply examine urban resilience without investigating the motivations and needs that are driving transformation in a particular urban system, and how they affect, inform, and shape each other.

Interpreting the last two characteristics of urban resilience, integration and inclusiveness, will lead us to figuring-out how power relations function in the camp. These characteristics are qualities that point-out and outline processes of good governance and effective leadership (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). They should be present to ensure that the reactionary practices of urban resilience are appropriately equitable and collective when addressing the privations of a system (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). As it was stated in Section 3.1: About the Camp, both the Jordanian Government and the UNHCR play the role of the camp’s authorities in al-Zaa’tari. However, some informal practices of power can be traced inside the camp (UNHCR, 2013; Würger, 2013; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014).

*Integrated processes of governance bring together hierarchies of power. These hierarchies catalyze additional benefits to the populations by sharing resources and enabling actors to work together to achieve greater ends* (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). At the formal level, the purpose of leadership in al-Zaa’tari is to make sure that the camp reflects both the needs and aspirations of its residents, and that it is being run as a transition to a more predictable, cost effective, and participatory platform for the delivery of assistance (UNHCR, 2017). The camp’s authorities work towards achieving this purpose through enhancing the livelihoods of al-Zaa’tari’s inhabitants by carrying-out duties to maintain their
control, to manage its refugee populations, to distribute assistance in a fair method, and to keep it secure (Ryan, 2014; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014).

These duties are performed by four parties. The first one is the Jordanian Government keeping order through ensuring that the legal system is endorsed and that the administrational practices of the UNHCR are not in conflict with it. The second party is the UNHCR administering the Humanitarian Aid agencies that are running the camp. The third party consists of the Humanitarian Aid agencies allocating assistance to the refugees of the camp. The fourth party is the Jordanian police and Siren Associates maintaining the security of the camp. According to this, there is a hierarchy of power denoted by four parties all working together to achieve the purpose of such leadership (benefiting the livelihood of al-Zaa’tari’s residents) by not only handing-out relief items, but also by allowing the refugees there to start their own informal businesses and by legalizing them.

Inclusive processes emphasize the need to create a sense of shared ownership to build the resilient city (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). When Kilian Kleinschmidt arrived at the camp in the beginning of 2013, he used to refer to himself as the mayor of al-Zaa’tari (Kleinschmidt, 2013, 2014). He came to reestablish order in the camp through attempting to enlist allies among refugees, and to encourage grassroots initiatives by allowing informal leadership to come to the fore in it (Kimmelman, 2014). As a result, street leaders emerged within al-Zaa’tari, and just like their self-proclaimed mayor, they used to self-appoint themselves (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014). These informal leaders held major tribal positions in Syria and had great influence at home, consequently, they retained this influence with the people of the camp (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014). The UNHCR had no official numbers for these leaders, yet they assigned them some formal responsibilities in the camp, such as deciding who will
receive a caravan and who will get a CfW opportunity (Kleinschmidt, 2013; Rudoren, 2013). Street leaders were also asked to attend the camp’s planning meetings with the purpose to let them work together in building al-Zaa’tari (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015). Shortly, this informal leadership turned against the UNHCR’s original intentions. These informal leaders attempted to run the camp by trying to take over its community policing after forming gangs to steal and trade al-Zaa’tari’s relief items (Kleinschmidt, 2014; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014).

Following the deadly protests in 2014 (highlighted in Section 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp), and right before Kleinschmidt’s departure from al-Zaa’tari to launch his own NGO (the Innovation and Planning Agency in Vienna, Austria), the power given to street leaders was diminished when Siren Associates took control over the community policing of the camp (LIVED, 2015). Since then, street leaders started to be elected in a casual manner where Humanitarian Aid workers would go to the districts of the camp and ask people to gather and elect their representative (LIVED, 2015). Today, this kind of representation is limited to reporting issues to the relevant authorities. These issues range from filing assault complaints to asking to fix a broken sanitary pipe (LIVED, 2015). What one should keep in mind is that reporting issues in the camp can be conveyed directly to the concerned Humanitarian Aid agency, without the need to report the issue to the representative first (Ryan, 2014; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014).

Leadership in the camp remains an issue with the presence of gangs, which is why the UNHCR is aiming to have Syrian refugees who were previously-involved in their communities of origin (back in Syria) stepping up as positive mentors in the districts (Kleinschmidt, 2015). In addition, and in hopes to foster a sense of community within each district, the UNHCR has been
trying as much as possible to regroup refugees from the same families into the same districts (Kleinschmidt, 2015). The numbers of street leaders remain unrecorded.

As it can be inferred from the formerly-posited relations of power, each of the actors involved in it has distinct understandings of governance and how leadership is being managed, both informally and formally (Sullivan and Tobin, 2014). Therefore, questions on power holding, resource brokering, and access to services and supplies in the camp should raise to the surface. The informal leadership and informal commerce examples in al-Zaa’tari suggest that Humanitarian Aid may have become a political tool to facilitate the objectives of the Jordanian Government at some point: why did the Jordanian Government allow the refugees of the camp to carry-out their own practices, with the help of the Humanitarian Aid agencies, while being deemed illegal? How can that benefit the Jordanian Government? Is this flexibility present only to keep the refugee populations held inside the camp? Did the Jordanian Government anticipate initiating conflicts inside al-Zaa’tari, by giving power to gang leaders, so it can enact some decent numbers of ejectments in the name of keeping security? Does this not portray the Humanitarian Aid agencies as the Jordanian Government’s allies in perpetuating the refugees’ condition of permanent temporariness?

In short, even though the power of street leadership appears to be symbolic after the departure of Kleinschmidt, residents of al-Zaa’tari are considered to be given more control over their lives by the UNHCR (Kleinschmidt, 2014, 2015; LIVED, 2015). Maybe this control is not effective, but by permitting representation in the camp, it can be noticed that the need to create a sense of shared ownership by the refugees is still present. The camp’s authorities are willing to have street leadership but their previous experience with this kind of governance is perhaps holding them back. It is understandable that representation, today, does not have a substantial
role in the lives of the residents of al-Zaa’tari or in its power relations structure – street leaders formed gangs and camp’s authorities learned their lessons. Nevertheless, in my opinion, leaving the dwellers of the camp to live under the mercy of a legal system of rights, laws, and policies that is only set and sustained by International Law and the camp’s authorities is not the best solution. This system, and according to the legal endorsements which were discussed previously in Section 3.2: Exception, Spatially and Legally, is unfair, to say the least and causes the Syrian refugee populations to be more vulnerable. Other solutions to representation in al-Zaa’tari should be thoroughly-studied in the future to achieve a more resilient system.

Examining the reactionary practices in al-Zaa’tari further shows that the characteristics of urban resilience are actually the traits of the camp. These traits portray al-Zaa’tari as robust, redundant, flexible, reflective, resourceful, integrated, and inclusive system. The seven traits are also deeply-connected to the socio-economic dynamics in the camp. Robustness, redundancy, and flexibility were explained through the socio-economic reactions pointed-out in Section 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp (unemployment, lack of electricity and internet access, shortages of food and other relief items, as well as violence and crime). Reflectiveness and resourcefulness were conveyed through two examples drawn from the Souq (the travel agency and the pizza place) which is a specific reaction to unemployment (a socio-economic stress). Integration and Inclusiveness were highlighted through exploring the formal and informal relations of power in the camp which can be seen as a tool to regulate the camp’s socio-economic initiatives (formalizing the informal economy) or to control them in some cases (attempts to control the informal economy by street leaders).

Al-Zaa’tari’s socio-economic dynamics reflect Agamben’s (1998 and 2005) idea of depicting the camp as a threshold, or “the Soglia” which was discussed in Section 2.2: Producing
Exception. According to this idea, the camp is a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other (Agamben, 2005). Here, whoever entered the camp moved into a zone of indistinction where the concepts of subjective rights and juridical protection no longer made any sense (Agamben, 1998). Al-Zaa’tari can be clearly seen as a “Soglia” because the legal distinction between the inside and the outside of the camp is not definite, it is vague, instead. In contrast to how spatially the camp’s borders are evidently demarcated with military checkpoints, the legal status of its inhabitants is ambiguous.

This can be spotted when the camp’s authorities started permitting the informal economic practices to take place inside the camp after the exploitation of exception took place. The unjust policies of the Jordanian legal system (examined in Section 3.2: Exception, Spatially and Legally) make it obvious that Syrian refugees in Jordan are ordained to be extraterrestrials to its juridical order, yet what we saw in Sections 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp and 4.3: Characteristics of Urban Resilience: Traits of the Camp is different (allowing these practices). One cannot understand when the Jordanian Government’s acts of violence against the refugees would be validated by its legal system; it is not apparent when the Jordanian Government’s rules would cease being “mostly flexible” and deem the practices of al-Zaa’tari’s refugees “illegal” once again.

While Agamben’s theory suggests that the camp is included in the legal system through being excluded from it (refugees are included through their own exclusion), the Soglia here is a result of excluding al-Zaa’tari from the legal system through being included in it. The same juridical order that imprisons the refugees within the camp and criminalizes their informal practices legalizes them and allows them to flourish (excluded through their own inclusion, not the opposite as the theory indicated). Additional examination on the idea of the Soglia may
depict “ambiguity” as another characteristic of urban resilience in spaces of refuge. Should the legal status of refugees be in the limbo of the juridical order so that the urban system can be rendered “resilient”? Is there value, when studying refugeeeness, in adding more characteristics to urban resilience (see Section 4.3: Characteristics of Urban Resilience: Traits of the Camp)? If yes, what are they?

4.4: Discussion: To Resiliency and Beyond; Is al-Zaa’tari a City? A Neo-City

Urban resilience is a theoretical construct that narrates how a system responds to future events (Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011). Al-Zaa’tari correlates to the theoretical construct of urban resilience which was deployed to analyze its internal dynamics. This theoretical construct used in the camp’s analyses encompassed two parts: the first situated the internal dynamics in the definition of urban resilience (Section 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp) and the second explored how they ascertain the characteristics of urban resilience (Section 4.3: Characteristics of Urban Resilience: Traits of the Camp). Accordingly, the insights shared in the past two sections of this chapter (Sections 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp and 4.3: Characteristics of Urban Resilience: Traits of the Camp) about the various internal dynamics of al-Zaa’tari make us perceive it as a resilient urban agglomeration. It may be also safe to acknowledge this agglomeration as a city. Since urban resilience assimilates the concepts of cityness and resiliency at once, the descriptions that were mentioned at the beginning of Section 4.1: The Camp Between Cityness and Resiliency would be considered true: the refugees of al-Zaa’tari or their practices can be epitheted as “resilient” and the camp can be referred to as a “city.” Nevertheless, the discussion should not end here. Many questions are still left hanging: Who is resilient in al-Zaa’tari? The refugees themselves or the camp’s authorities? Is al-Zaa’tari a camp or a city? Why would that even matter?
On the one hand, it is significant to note that the reactionary practices of urban resilience in al-Zaa’tari are not carried-out solely by the refugees of the camp. The permanent change23 (Scheffer, 2009) – where urban resilience is understood as a continually changing process – that is presented here is a result of a series of reactions (to a certain stress) performed by both the inhabitants of the camp its authorities. These reactions take the form of a dialogue between the two ends (multiple stages of acting and reacting), which implies that the role of both (the camp’s dwellers and authorities) is rather complementary than conflictive. This becomes vital while studying camps in general, because perceiving the relationship amid their residents and authorities as conflictive means that one party may start looking into finding ways to eliminate the other, which perhaps will not be as effective as preserving the presence of both parties in the camp. The refugee community of al-Zaa’tari that is responsible for keeping the state of permanent change does not consist of the refugees only, it includes the camp’s refugee populations and its authorities. Urban resilience here defines the system as a whole, it is not exclusive to a certain party or the practices it achieves. On the other hand, the purpose of this conclusion is not to make the camp’s authorities look good; depicting this thought here does not exclude the possibility that the camps’ authorities are sometimes capable of using their power in an oppressive manner (as showcased in Section 3.2: Exception, Spatially and Legally).

Just like how there are debates around whether camps are cities or not in academia24 (Agier, 1999, 2002; Bauman, 2002; Malkki, 2002; Sanyal, 2014), many of those who work closely with al-Zaa’tari’s inhabitants decide to depict it as a city-to-be, a pseudo-city, or a primitive city (Riley-Smith, 2013; Kimmelman, 2014; Garden, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014;)

23 Please refer to Section 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp for more information on permanent change.
24 Please refer to Sections 2.4: A Refugee Camp or A City? and 2.5: Refugeeeness as an Interdisciplinary Subject for more information on the literature that represents these debates.
Weston, 2015) instead of a city. As discussed in Section 2.4: A Refugee Camp or A City?, the reason why the urban discourse is faced with these debates is because of Agier’s (2002) point of view which compares refugee camps to cities. To Agier, the refugee camp looks like a city: its organization, combined with the fact that it constitutes a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals (Wirth, 1938), creates opportunities for encounters, exchanges, and reworkings of identity among all who live there, and, therefore, it can be seen as if it is going under the process of urbanization (Agier, 2002). The same analogy can be seen in al-Zaa’tari. Understanding that the majority of refugees living in the camp come from a border rural region in Syria (the Dar’aa Governorate) means that they have been living in villages before the war struck. They were simply not used to live in large numbers within little spaces inside a densely-populated area, and as a result, the camp, over the past six years, grew into an urban agglomeration. As if the conditions that the camp provided turned it into an ideal field for rural populations to seize the opportunity of urbanization (Kleinschmidt, 2014).

According to Agier, “city-like” conditions are urbanization conditions that, once become available in a refugee camp, turn it into a “city,” a “city-camp,” or a “camp-ville.” The common perception is not different from Agier’s. The basic nature of our urban realities has been long understood under the singular, encompassing rubric of “cityness” (Wachsmuth, 2014; Brenner and Schmid, 2015), which indicates that one cannot think of a space being “urban” without it being a “city.” In a very short time, al-Zaa’tari has become one of the largest concentrations of people in Jordan (Riley-Smith, 2013; Weston, 2015; Lee, 2018; Oxfam, n.d.). Its infrastructure and services are being progressively enhanced, and its refugees, with the support of the camp’s

25 Please refer to Chapter 3: Al-Zaa’tari’s Incarceration: Establishing the Camp for more information on the growth of the camp.
authorities, have succeeded in making it a somewhat more comfortable place to live than when it was hastily established. Since urbanization, for us, is intrinsically a process that would only produce cities, the refugees’ new environment of al-Zaa’tari started looking more like a city, and from this perspective, people ended-up describing the camp as such (see Section 4.1: The Camp Between Cityness and Resiliency). Therefore, the general impression of the camp has turned-out not to be entirely inaccurate.

Malkki (2002) argued against Agier’s previously-mentioned views. According to her, choosing to talk about the camp as a “not-yet-city,” as Agier does, is unhelpful. She believes that the “city” should not be our only guiding principle to measure what qualifies a certain space to be considered as “urban,” because the city is more of an ideology (a fixed construct) than an analytical tool (Malkki, 2002). I agree with Malkki that the camp is not a city and that we should not use the city’s construct to define what is urban and what is not. However, in contrast to her opinion, I think that discussions on whether the camp is a city or not are actually effective in changing our presumptions about what makes spaces eligible to be “urban.” In order to support this argument, I would need to confirm that al-Zaa’tari can still be an urban agglomeration without being a city. Articulating how different al-Zaa’tari is from a city or how similar it is to one, through comparing it to the common perception of a city, may enhance our understanding of urbanization in general. In his 1937’s What is a City?, Lewis Mumford laid-out the fundamental propositions about city planning and the human potential, both individual and social, of urban life (LeGates and Stout, 2011). Mumford (1937) writes:

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26 Please refer to Sections 2.4: A Refugee Camp or A City? and 2.5: Refugeeeness as an Interdisciplinary Subject for more information on Liisa Malkki’s (2002) argument.
“The city is a related collection of primary groups and purposive associations; the first, like family and neighborhood, are common to all communities, while the second are especially characteristic of city life. These varied groups support themselves through economic organizations that are likewise of a more or less corporate, or at least publicly regulated, character. And they are all housed in permanent structures within relatively limited area. The essential physical means of a city’s existence are the fixed site, the durable shelter, the permanent facilities for assembly, interchange, and storage; the essential social means are the social division of labor, which serves not merely the economic life, but also the [societal] processes.” (p. 93)

The urban agglomeration of al-Zaa’tari, aside from it lacking the aspects of “permanency,” would perfectly fall under Mumford’s common propositions of “the city.” The camp has a defined site and its inhabitants are living in durable caravans. It encompasses community centers for public assembly and al-Souq (that includes shops and supermarkets) for interchange and storage. The informal economy of the camp is run by al-Zaa’tari’s socio-economic dynamics, which means that labor does not merely serve the economy of camp, but also its societal processes. The camp in all measures operates like a city, and the precedents which this chapter posed and the concepts it discussed are the evidence. Mumford’s physical and social means are entirely-embodied in the camp, yet it remains lacking the permanency trait that a city must have, and accordingly, theoretically speaking, it cannot be considered as one in its current form. Also, almost any planner, architect, philosopher, or economist will agree that the city in itself represents the maximum societal and economic capacities of a territory (Chelleri, 2012), which renders the camp as a primitive form of a city no matter how many parallels can be drawn to the fundamental propositions of cityness.
Same finding, in my opinion, is echoed on a practical level; al-Zaa’tari is not a city because its existing conditions are peculiar. The popular narrative of “al-Zaa’tari is a city or a city-in-the-making” is a deceptive one because it characterizes the camp by normalcy (Garden, 2014; Touaibia, 2015; Specia, 2015; United Nations Institute for Training and Research [UNITAR], 2016; Paszkiewicz, 2017). Establishing the conditions of al-Zaa’tari as “normal or normal-in-the-making” would hold us back from thinking that there is something abnormal about the camp, or that there might be some room to improve the lives of the camp’s refugees. This is because it is already a city (therefore, it has reached its “maximum societal and economic capacities”), or it will, eventually, become one (as if a city is the natural complete stage of urbanization). It is true to say that the camp’s residents are doing whatever they can to make the best of a very difficult situation (Crisp, 2015). But it is not normal for any city’s inhabitants on earth to be imprisoned within its boundaries for indeterminate periods. It is not normal to live in a city where its entire population lacks the rights and entitlements of citizens. And it is certainly not normal to live in a city where its residents do not know when or even if they will ever be able to return to the place that they consider to be home.

As reasoned before in Chapter 3: Al-Zaa’tari’s Incarceration: Establishing the Camp, by incarcerating refugees inside al-Zaa’tari, they became positioned in a temporary space for unlimited time – situated in permanent temporariness. Can the anomaly of being situated in permanent temporariness allow us to think about the “urban” differently? In 2015, Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid called for a new epistemology of the “urban.” They argued for a radical rethinking of the inherited epistemological assumptions regarding urbanization. Even though the

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27 Please refer to Section 2.3: Managing the Camp: Managing Exception for more information on what the condition of permanent temporariness is and to Section 3.2: Exception, Spatially and Legally for more information on how this condition can be seen in in al-Zaa’tari.
phrase, “the city,” persists as an ideological framing in mainstream policy discourse and everyday life (Wachsmuth, 2014). Brenner and Christian suggested that the newly-established urban concepts cannot be understood as a singular condition derived from the serial replication of a specific socio-spatial condition (e.g., agglomeration) or settlement type (e.g., places with large, dense and/or heterogeneous populations) across the territory. This is because, according to them, the “urban” has become more differentiated, polymorphic, variegated, and multi-scalar\(^{28}\) than in previous cycles of capitalist urbanization\(^{29}\) (Brenner and Schmid, 2015).

So, perhaps the camp, as al-Zaa’tari, in its present arrangement, suggests, is a new form of a city. This form may be called a “neo-city.” An urban space that does not fit into the common definition of a city, because it lacks its fundamental characteristic of permanency. It is, additionally, a space that will always be considered embryonic to the cities that we already know, because it will not reach the maximum societal and economic capacities which they carry, unless it fully-develops into one. This urban space functions according to a recently-established theory in urban planning (urban resilience), however, its visualization does not indicate that it is an advanced stage of the cities we live in today or a fake embodiment of them. On the contrary, a neo-city can be perceived as a primitive form of a city (because it is still growing and developing), nevertheless, its conceptualization does not point-out that it is deemed to become one (since the future of this urban agglomeration remains unknown until today and it is difficult to be predicted).

\(^{28}\) Multi-scalar ethnography delineates how movements are constituted at different scales (smooth flows at one level can be disruptions or encapsulations at another), and how the scales of place-making processes for people in motion intersect with states’ scale management. Multi-scalar ethnography enables an explanation of why mobility in some areas is more consequential than in others and identifies strategic sites where critical engagement can be grounded (Xiang, 2013).

\(^{29}\) Al-Zaa’tari is used to argue for the necessity of such a new epistemology because it can be considered as a product of contemporary cycles of capital urbanization; it is an outcome of a recent crisis (the Syrian war), which was facilitated by the global capital system that sustains conflicts over power.
The debate on whether the camp is a city or not can be summed-up in this new visualization of a city. A neo-city is a current configuration of a resilient urban agglomeration that serves as a camp and functions like city. It is characterized by an amalgam of traits that consists of the permanent change of urban resilience and its seven characteristics (see Sections 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp and 4.3: Characteristics of Urban Resilience: Traits of the Camp, respectively), the exception and the permanent temporariness of the camp (see Sections 2.2: Producing Exception and 2.3: Managing the Camp: Managing Exception, respectively), as well as the Mumfordian physical and social means of the city (mentioned in this section). Conceptualizing a new form of a city answers the call of Brenner and Schmid to have a new epistemology of the “urban” represented by the “neo-city.” Al-Zaa’tari can be seen as one in terms of its unique socio-spatial conditions and exceptional settlement type. Further studies on spaces of refuge may be beneficial in developing the visualization of a neo-city.

While discussing how to label refugee camps allows us to explore other urban formations, this discussion will not change the realities of the camp. I believe the naming does not achieve much; we can call it a camp, a city, a city-camp, a camp-ville, a not-yet-city, a city-in-the-making, a city-to-be, a pseudo-city, a primitive city (Agier, 1999, 2002; Bauman, 2002; Malkki, 2002; Meo, 2012; Riley-Smith, 2013; Sanyal, 2014; Kimmelman, 2014; Garden, 2014; Kleinschmidt, 2014; al-Makhadhi, 2014; Ryan, 2014; Sullivan and Tobin, 2014; Specia, 2015; Weston, 2015; Pizzi, 2015; Corbett, 2015; Maani, 2015; Thorn, 2016; Ching and Martinez, 2016; Lee, 2018; The Economist, 2018), or as I identified it, a “neo-city,” yet that will not make the refugee camp a better place to live in. What matters here is that the refugee camp is an urban agglomeration which is worthy of the investigations of urban planning scholars and practitioners.
We can keep making these comparisons or channel our efforts towards analyzing refugee camps through other urban scholarships. I would suggest taking the discussions into urban informalities with specific attention to radical planning when studying how refugee camps develop and urbanize.

Notions of radical planning involve insurgent practices; known as purposeful actions that aim at disrupting domineering relationships of oppressors to the oppressed, and to destabilize such a status quo through consciousness of the past and imagination of an alternative future (Miraftab, 2009). The hegemonic policies of the Jordanian Government towards the Syrian refugees (see Section 3.2: Exception, Spatially and Legally) resulted in illegal reactionary practices by the refugees of the camp. The practices of refugees (the “oppressed”), which provoked the camp’s authorities (the “oppressors”) into changing the camp’s original state according to a different imagined future led to social transformation. Getting the dialogue started between the camp’s authorities and the refugees of al-Zaa’tari can be narrated as follows: the refugees of the camp offered the camp’s authorities two options; either to allow their socio-economic processes to happen and become involved in them, hence, start a dialogue; or they will keep disturbing the security of the camp by carrying-out demonstrations and attacking Humanitarian Aid workers.

The socio-economic dynamics of launching informal businesses and shops are the purposeful actions in the case of al-Zaa’tari. These actions were also based on a state of knowledge and a level of skillfulness that the refugees gained from their past experiences in their country of origin, Syria. Informality here may be perceived as a form of insurgency if enough evidence affirms that the reactionary practices of urban resilience within the camp correlate with the characteristics of insurgent practices: counter-hegemonic, imaginative, and transgressive
(Miraftab 2009). Accordingly, these practices would be considered as insurgent. More research is needed on the link between insurgency and urban resilience in order to explore if the notions of radical planning are inherent components of urban resilience in communities of refugees. In other words, can urban resilience take place in spaces of refuge without having insurgent practices?

Vulnerability lends a further aspect to understanding urban resilience as vulnerable populations experience risk, disruption, and change differently (Lucini, 2013). The reactionary practices of al-Zaa’tari’s urban resilience can be perceived as an urban expression of the vulnerable. I believe that studying the urban expression of one of Jordan’s most vulnerable populations (the Syrian refugees of al-Zaa’tari) pushes the theoretical construct of urban resilience to another level because it allows us to understand it not only from the prism of cities, but also through other urban dimensions. This research proved that the theoretical construct of urban resilience can be showcased by, applied to, understood with, and observed through urban agglomerations other than cities (a refugee camp, in this case).
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

“There is so much misinformation about refugees. I think that is part of the thing that really upsets me most from my experience in the field and these very resilient, resourceful, generous people who have been forced to flee, are yet vilified often in the media... it does not really connect with the actual people that I have met. I visited, in Jordan, Abu and Umm Mohammad. They left one daughter, who had been married in Homs. And they loved Homs and they did not want to leave. They were internally displaced for eighteen months... they were being shot at from all sides. They had one daughter with cerebral palsy and one four-year-old boy, who at the time I met him, had not spoken for almost two years – he was so traumatized by the internal displacement. And I asked [Abu Mohammad] who was shooting at them, and he looked at me like I was insane. He said, ‘I do not know who is shooting at me. I have no idea.’ So, you do not even know who to trust. Finally, they were forced to flee.

I asked him [(Abu Mohammad)] what they brought with them and he said ‘well, we had three suitcases,’ but as they got closer and closer to the border, they had to run because they were being shot at. And he said he had one choice – he had the choice to carry his suitcases or his children, and he had to carry his children. The countries that I come from are being told this narrative that somehow, these refugees who have so much to offer are... are a terrorist threat, or we are going to be burdened by them. I think it is the misinformation that I find distressing. We got to remember, these are not terrorists, these are innocent people. I mean everyone I met, they all want to return home. And they want to be useful to their host countries... it is the developing world that is actually shoudering the deep burden. What crises have been solved, you know? They have just got worse. As the crises go on longer, then the [aid] money does not spread as far, and it means that organizations like the UNHCR can only provide those essential services like water and shelter... and medical attention. They cannot deal with the longer-term issues of generations of children being out of education, for example.”

– Cate Blanchett, an Australian actress and a Goodwill Ambassador for the UNHCR, recounting a story about Syrian refugees she met in Jordan at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in 2018
Abu Muhammad and his family are refugees and the story of their refuge was certainly different from the stories of Abu Hussein, Steve, Khadija, or Qassim. Nevertheless, they all shared one present reality – forced displacement. The thesis showed how this present reality of refugees is far from the one assumed to be correct. This chapter highlights the significant components of such a reality, it serves as a conclusion to the whole research. This chapter, the final part of the thesis, encloses two sections. The first one (5.1) wraps-up the arguments and the thoughts emphasized in the course of the study. The second section (5.2) is more of a personal reflection that explains how, in my opinion, the practices found in al-Zaa’tari would be of a great help in the planning field, especially, when it is aspiring to achieve cities of resilience. The questions of my thesis shall be answered by the end of Section 5.1, however, I wanted to bring a final discussion to this analyses in Section 5.2. The latter lays-out the anticipated role of a planner in spaces of refuge, from my viewpoint. Through this section, I also raise a number of questions for future practical and theoretical investigations.

5.1: Spaces of Refuge: Spaces of Resilience in a Nutshell

This thesis called for conceiving spaces of refuge as resilient urban agglomerations by studying the concepts of refugeeeness through al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian Refugees in al-Mafraq, Jordan. This study used al-Zaa’tari to argue for the importance of spaces of refuge in the planning thought and practice, and its analyses suggested that refugee settlements (represented by al-Zaa’tari) set a clear example of urban resilience. It also showed that resilient urban agglomerations are constantly changing by allowing their economies and built environments to shape and evolve over time. In addition, the thesis proved that the notions of urban resilience are not exclusive to cities, and that urbanization is not an oligopoly of the Mumfordian propositions of cityness.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the research was limited by the fact that the phenomenon of refugeeness is very broad. It includes all the populations of those who escape state atrocities, legally and illegally, and end-up living in spaces of refuge, formally and informally. Therefore, it would have been best to investigate the subject from multiple spatio-temporal coordinates in order to form a profound understanding of refuge as a mass phenomenon. The investigation of urban resilience from multiple spatio-temporal coordinates would also help us to better-comprehend the need for having such an ambiguous term (refugeeness) to describe the phenomenon.

Al-Zaa’tari Camp for Syrian refugees was established in 2012 by the Jordanian Government and the UNHCR as a response to the crisis that Syria has been witnessing since 2011. Together, the Jordanian Government and the UNHCR are considered as the camp’s authorities. Al-Zaa’tari is run by multiple Humanitarian Aid agencies, and its dwellers have access to various services and community facilities providing education, healthcare, and recreational activities. According to its population size, al-Zaa’tari is the world’s fifth largest refugee camp and the most massive one around the globe to be housing Syrian refugees. The influx of refugees coming to Jordan from different neighboring countries has been putting it under a lot of pressure on many levels. Today, the camp houses around 80,146 Syrian refugees.

The Jordanian Government requires any structure inside the camp to be constructed temporarily. With multiple security-guard stations placed around al-Zaa’tari, the camp’s authorities make sure that its refugees will not leave it and that no outsider would be able to enter it. Hence, al-Zaa’tari’s residents become incarcerated inside the camp – connection with the outside world is not allowed, physically and virtually. If refugees are to leave the camp legally, they must be “bailed-out” through a sponsorship, or a “Kafala” in Arabic; even the term used to
describe the process itself indicates that refugees are living in incarceration. The policies enacted by the Jordanian Government upon the refugees of the camp are present to make sure that these populations remain under its control, reproducing Agamben’s (2005) “state of exception” by all means and situating them in the condition of “permanent temporariness” (Picker and Pasquetti, 2015).

The Jordanian Government’s control does not appear to be solely endorsed on al-Zaa’tari’s refugees. Several policies catered by the Jordanian Government are also enacted to control the Syrian refugees entering Jordan, or living outside the camp in urban, suburban, and rural areas of the nation; and who make about 80% of the total Syrian refugee populations residing in Jordan. Since these policies are not limited to the boundaries of the camp, the Jordanian Government looks as if it is trying to dominate all the populations of Jordan’s Syrian refugees. Throughout the prolonged crisis, maintaining security has been the Jordanian Government’s rationale for blocking and deporting the increasing numbers of Syrians seeking refuge in Jordan.

Urban resilience is the capacity of systems that include individuals, communities, institutions, and businesses within a city to survive, adapt, and grow regardless of the chronic stresses and the acute shocks they experience (Rockefeller Foundation, 2013, 2015). Resilient cities demonstrate reactionary practices that allow them to withstand, respond to, and adapt to shocks and stresses (Rockefeller Foundation, 2013). Urban resilience is explained through seven characteristics: robustness, redundancy, flexibility, reflectiveness, resourcefulness, integration, and inclusiveness (Arup, 2014, 2015; Rockefeller Foundation, 2015). Up until this research was carried-out, urban resilience has only been showcased by, applied to, understood with, and observed through cities. The policies of control over the camp, which were enacted by the
camp’s authorities, paved the way to the occurrence of reactionary practices by the dwellers of the camp and its authorities together.

The reactionary practices taking place to address the chronic stresses that al-Zaa’tari has been dealing with ever since its opening was articulated through understanding the socio-economic dynamics of the camp. The socio-economic dynamics of al-Zaa’tari can be explained by four stresses: unemployment, lack of electricity and internet access, shortages of food and other relief items, as well as violence and crime. Unemployment was a product of the lack of economy within the camp in the first place and reacting to it resulted in creating al-Souq, starting the UNHCR’s CfW initiative, and inaugurating al-Zaa’tari’s job center; all of which were accompanied by many legal changes relating to work permits. Lack of electricity became an issue when the needed power to run the informal economy was not present, people also needed electricity to power the electrical appliances in their caravans which they bought from the Souq. Reacting to this stress burdened the camp’s electricity grid and raised the UNHCR’s costs of running al-Zaa’tari. A solar power plant was eventually established in the camp to resolve these issues. Shortages of food and other relief items were tackled through employing the camp’s economy to solve the problem. The WFP swapped food and relief rations with vouchers and founded supermarkets and shops in the Souq where these vouchers can be used. Significant incidents of violence and crime were brought to the camp by gangs attempting to control its economy. To address problems related to violence and crime, the UNHCR asked for the support of a specialized security firm to run and supervise al-Zaa’tari’s community policing, while restricting the responsibilities of the Jordanian police to securing the camp’s borders.

All of the former reactions led to providing the camp’s inhabitants with job opportunities inside al-Zaa’tari or even outside it. The shift of the nature of the relationship between the
camps’ authorities and its dwellers (from conflict to dialogue) suggests that a change in the perception of how the camp operates started taking place. At some point, the Humanitarian Aid agencies stopped trying to run the camp in a standardized way (a way that aims at providing the residents of the camp with equal access to aid), and the Jordanian Government became more flexible when dealing with the camp’s dwellers (by legalizing their informal economy). This means that the camp’s authorities began acknowledging the agency of al-Zaa’tari’s refugees in order to enhance its conditions.

While the socio-economic dynamics of the camp render it as robust, redundant, flexible, reflective, and resourceful, the power relations in al-Zaa’tari (represented by informal and formal leadership models) portray it as integrated and inclusive. The internal dynamics of the camp make it fall under the theoretical construct of urban resilience. Examining the internal dynamics of one of Jordan’s most vulnerable populations (the Syrian refugees of al-Zaa’tari) shows us that the theoretical construct of urban resilience may also relate to urban theories other than urban resilience, e.g., radical planning. Additionally, it raises a number of questions on our presumptions about urbanization. Such relations and questionings would instigate more discussions around the theoretical construct of urban resilience and urbanization, hence, improve them in the future. I believe that, perhaps, by studying how refugee camps develop and urbanize through the scholarship of urban informalities, our state of knowledge on resilient urban systems can be pushed further. There also might be other forms of cities waiting for our exploration if such studies are carried-out.

5.2: Moving Forward: What Can Planning Offer Refugees?

In 1995, Judith E. Innes suggested that the study of planning practice shows that what ordinary people know is at least as relevant as what is found through systematic professional
inquiry (Innes, 1995), and that much of the important knowledge to our field can be found in
their stories and implicit understandings which have been long shared and implemented amongst
the inhabitants of their communities (de Neufville and Barton, 1987; Mandelbaum, 1991). Innes
(1995) elaborates:

“Social processes turn information into meaningful knowledge and knowledge into
action. As a profession, however, we know little about developing or carrying-out such
processes. If professionals actually create such processes instead of following the rules of
scientific inquiry, they have far more power and discretion than is legitimate, according
to the norms that govern public choice. [Nevertheless,] if knowledge that makes a
difference is constructed through a process in which a planner is not only a player, but a
guide and manager, initiating and framing questions and directing attention, then ethical
principles for this planner become even more essential.” (p. 185)

Throughout the thesis, I tried my best to show that the actual knowledge possessed by the
Syrian refugees of al-Zaa’tari (ordinary people), represented by its internal dynamics, is at least
as relevant as what is found through the theoretical construct of urban resilience (developed
through systematic professional inquiry). It was hard to evaluate this unquantifiable knowledge,
yet I tend to believe that, somehow, I managed to succeed in doing so. I shared as much I could
of their applicable stories and relevant implicit understandings through shedding the light on
various precedents from the camp. I wanted to prove that al-Zaa’tari has been extensively
studied, therefore, I chose not to use any personal observations from my work experience there,
and made sure not to carry-out a new field-study which may only reinvent the wheel. This
research was meant to highlight that there is misinformation rather than lack of information
about spaces of refuge. I think that scholars can bring original discussions on refugeeness to the
urban rhetoric by contextualizing the information which we already have about the subject, and without the need to put any refugee through feelings of unease for being under constant academic investigation.

Studying refugeesness has been offering significant knowledge to the planning field. Mona Fawaz (2016b) reaffirms Innes’ (1995) elaboration as she reflects on her experience with the question of housing the very large number of Syrian refugees who had arrived into Lebanon after the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011. She argued that her own training as a planner had taught her that the answer to this question rested less in the recipe book, the “trash can” of previous planning experiences (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972), than in the actual practices of the refugees themselves, many of whom had visibly found shelter and organized their livelihoods during the long months in which public agencies and international organizations negotiated the possibility of establishing camps (Fawaz, 2016b). Section 2.3: Managing the Camp: Managing Exception also implied that planning mostly fails to provide refugees with durable solutions as it keeps them almost-entirely dependent on the aid they get (al-Zaa’tari may be different from these cases, though).

The analyses of al-Zaa’tari raise a number of questions on what the planning profession can offer refugees, and on the ethical principles for planners working in their proximity. In cities, urban planners must contend with both broader ideological conflict and the specific planning issues of daily urban life (Bollens, 2002). But planners in spaces of refuge are expected to deal with more expansive conflicts and issues related to political and ethnic polarization. So how can planners address them? Should we, as professional planning practitioners, stand still in front of refugee camps, and wait until time changes the abnormal conditions their refugees are living? Or, do we owe them anything? If we are to plan for refugeeeness while operating under the global
capital system which sustains the production of refugee camps through wars, can we be facilitators of change in the status of a refugee?

The thesis indicated that refugee issues are currently being addressed through a legal system of rights, laws, and policies which has been set by International Law and the governments of host countries. Also, it suggested that the way in which Humanitarian Aid agencies run refugee camps maintains this legal system, whether intentionally or unintentionally. This is problematic because it ignores the political dynamics which develop inside spaces of refuge. Residents of refugee camps are living under a top-down structure of governance with no political involvement of their society in it; they have no say in a legal system which happens to tackle their own issues. In this system, refugees become objects rather than subjects (see Section 2.3: Managing the Camp: Managing Exception); incarcerated in a state of exception (Agamben, 2005) and situated in permanent temporariness (Picker and Pasquetti, 2015).

So, what can planners do when the duties of the host governments and the responsibilities of the concerned Humanitarian Aid agencies do not exceed managing the exception and the permanent temporariness of refugee camps? Before answering the aforementioned questions, the urban discourse has to consider refugee camps as urban agglomerations, no matter what the duration of these settlements is. Acknowledging the spatiality of refugee camps, albeit uncommon, is crucial for future planning and for constructing a medium for refugees to recover their agency (Sanyal, 2014). Camps might be, in fact, unique incubators of urban evolution where change can take place, where the growth of people can take place, and where developing opportunities to bring-in diverse urban thinking methods and concepts can also take place.

In 2002, Scott A. Bollens identified four planning strategies that urban systems might adopt under conditions of political and ethnic polarization. These are as follows:
1) A neutral urban strategy that distances itself from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities, and political exclusion. In this strategy, planning acts as an ethically neutral or “color-blind” mode of state intervention responsive to individual level needs and differences. This approach is rooted in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and is commonly applied in liberal democratic settings (Yiftachel, 1995). Here, planners channel disagreements between ethnic groups away from sovereignty and identity-related issues towards day-to-day service delivery issues solvable through planning procedures and professional norms (Forester, 1989; Rothman, 1992).

2) A partisan urban strategy, which, in contrast to the previous approach, furthers an empowered ethnic group’s values and authority and rejects claims of the disenfranchised groups (Yiftachel, 1995). Here, planners seek to entrench and expand territorial claims or enforce exclusionary control of access (Lustick, 1979; Sack, 1981).

3) An equity strategy, which gives primacy to ethnic affiliation in order to decrease intergroup inequalities. Criteria such as an ethnic group’s relative size or need are used to allocate urban services and spending. Equity-based criteria will often be significantly different from the functional and technical criteria used by the ethically neutral professional planner (Krumholz and Forester, 1990.) An equity planner is much more aware, than a neutral planner, of group-based inequalities and political imbalances and recognizes the need for remediation and affirmative action policies based on group identity.

4) A resolver strategy, which seeks to connect urban issues to root causes of urban polarization: power imbalances, competitive ethnic group identities, and disempowerment. Planners challenge the impacts, and even authority, of government
policies and attempt to link scientific and technical knowledge to processes of system transformation (Benvenisti, 1986; Friedmann, 1987).

So far, the planner’s role has been entrenched in the first two strategies. There is a silencing of refugees’ voices by Humanitarian Aid agencies, governmental bodies, and other groups claiming to work on their behalf (Silverman, 2008). The case of al-Zaa’tari suggested that questions on power relations should be raised to investigate if Humanitarian Aid agencies can become a political tool in the hands of the Jordanian Government to facilitate their objectives of keeping the camp’s residents incarcerated inside its boundaries. The fact that many refugees of the camp challenge the status-quo of imprisonment demonstrates that confinement, whether on the physical or the cyber level (see Section 3.2: Exception, Spatially and Legally), works against the needs of the refugee populations. The camp’s authorities might be pioneers in founding initiatives under the concepts of social inclusion and community engagement, or refugees’ empowerment and capacity building. The rest of the world would applaud for these societal innovations and advocate for the enterprises of the responsible authorities. However, it keeps forgetting to ask these authorities the following questions: what kind of inclusion excludes the camp’s residents from engaging with their host countries? What kind of empowerment strips-down the camp’s residents from the capacities of having control over their own lives? And what kind of advocacy denies the camp’s residents from a basic human right – the right to move freely?

Residents of al-Zaa’tari are still being treated like objects to be managed, if not a burden; their agency is being delineated by the ring-road which stands as a de facto border between the camp and neighboring Jordan. The authorities’ allegations that the camp reflects both the needs and aspirations of its residents, and that the authorities have been running it as if it is a transition
to a more predictable, cost effective, and participatory platform for the delivery of assistance (UNHCR, 2017), are not entirely wrong. But I believe this is not enough; we can celebrate the resiliency of the camp without normalizing its conditions. We can use this resiliency to argue for the importance of incorporating the camp’s refugees in the Jordanian society, not to keep them imprisoned in al-Zaa’tari. This research suggests that refugees may end-up becoming fundamental assets in the Jordanian community, only if given the opportunity to be integrated in it. Yet, in order to achieve this kind of integration, there should be a serious change in the presumptions that the Jordanian Government has about refugees being a threat and a burden. From my perspective, further investigation and research on decentralization, inter-municipal cooperation, and refugee participation in spaces of refuge should be carried-out as it might provide us with more answers to how this integration would look like in the future.

Planning intervention is needed to ensure that there is involvement from the refugees end in decision making. This involvement would possibly lead to creating a legal system that encourages a refugee civil society to thrive. To achieve this goal, planners should consider Bollen’s (2002) last two strategies – the equity strategy and the resolver strategy. This system, unlike the one that addresses refugee issues today, cannot be only dependent on Humanitarian Aid, because Humanitarian Aid is provisional by its nature; in other words, it is not sustainable. What would happen if it suddenly stops? As illustrated in Section 4.2: Urban Resilience: Reactionary Practices from the Camp, when the World Food Programme ran-out of adequate funds and had to temporarily cut-off the support provided to Syrian Refugees in Jordan, their voluntary returns to Syria accelerated to an average of 340 per day by the end of September 2015 as a result of that (HRW, 2016). Humanitarian Aid alone cannot support the internal dynamics of refugee camps. It can facilitate their socio-economic processes, but the effects will not be stable
unless accompanied with legal endogenous economic practices enabled by urban social integration (Montclos and Kagwanja, 2000). A legal system that gives more power to the refugees over their lives may well, eventually, allow us to start conceiving the spaces that they inhabit as urban agglomerations of reception rather than exception.
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