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**American Foreign Policy
in the Third World: New
World Order, Rhetoric or
Reality?**

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American Foreign Policy in the Third World: New World Order, Rhetoric or Reality?

James Alexander

Embodying an absolute moral ethos, 'Americanism,' once it is driven onto the world stage by events, is inspired willy-nilly to reconstruct the very alien things it tries to avoid. Its messianism is the polar counterpoint of its isolationism . . . An absolute national morality is inspired either to withdraw from 'alien' things or to transform them: it cannot live in comfort constantly by their side.¹

Writing in 1955, Louis Hartz argued that American foreign policy was constrained by its history. Coupled with its isolationist past, America's unique historical background engendered the formation of a "liberal absolutism" that was not adaptable to the outside world. Yet, as Hartz argued, when acting in an international role, the United States still tried to push its ideals. Hartz believed, however, that

America must look to its contact with other nations to provide that spark of philosophy, that grain of relative insight that its own history has denied it[] [] [] []

What is at stake is nothing less than a new level of consciousness, a transcending of irrational Lockianism, in which an understanding of self and an understanding of others go hand in hand.²

Writing at the height of the Cold War, Hartz' primary concerns included the United States' competition with the Soviet Union—a competition that Hartz believed required the United States to adapt its ideals to the realities of the world if it was to compete effectively.

Looking back from the present, we can ask whether the United States has learned the lessons that Hartz prescribed. The answer to such a question is a non-committal "maybe." As will be discussed below, the "New World Order" rhetoric expressed by President George Bush exhibits either or both sides of the argument. During the Cold War the Soviet-American competition for the allegiance of the Third World was acute. The competition required both sides to make numerous compromises of their "ideals" in order to achieve influence in disparate regions. Yet, with the decline of the Cold War and the accompanying disappearance of the Soviet threat, American foreign policy-makers have a great deal more flexibility in crafting United States' political and economic policies in the Third World. The Bush Administration has taken advantage of that flexibility.

In attempting to define Bush's conception of the New World Order in the Third World, it must be noted that many analysts are extremely skeptical of finding anything of substance in the body of rhetoric. They argue that the decline of the Cold War gives Bush a unique opportunity to mold American policy for the 1990s and beyond. To do so Bush needs a strategy (or vision) for that future; instead what emerges are compromises in foreign policy that lack the necessary leadership to take advantage of revolutionary times.³ The primary purpose of this article is not to judge whether or not current American policy in the Third World is proceeding in the right direction; rather it is to identify whether or not Bush's "New World Order" rhetoric has substance, or even a vision for the future. And, regardless of one's political views, current American foreign policy in these regions exhibits both of these qualities.

Above all else Bush has shown a commitment to constructing and following international legal norms. This commitment was first expressed in the United States' strict adherence to United Nations' resolutions during the Gulf War. Closely tied to international legal norms, Bush is striving for a certain uniformity in international relations. This is a rather vague approach to achieving a common rationality through compromise among nations, a sort of "businessman's" attempt to begin negotiations with a clean slate. This process was most apparent in the preparatory period for the Middle East Peace Conference held in October 1991 in Madrid.

¹ Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955), p. 286.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 287, 308.

³ Terry L. Diebel, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction," *Foreign Policy*, no. 84 (Fall 1991), p. 3. See also Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1 (1990/91), pp. 5-22. Published nine months before the Diebel Piece, Mandelbaum's article presented an almost identical argument.

Yet, while aspects of Bush's foreign policy might have achieved the "new level of consciousness" that Hartz recommended, the framework in which they have been expressed may just be further examples of America's "manifest destiny" for the world.⁴ While Bush denies a vision of *Pax Americana*, the overall strategy of American policy in the Third World shows otherwise. When Hartz wrote, a coherent strategy to export "Americanism" was doomed to failure. However, the recent decline of the Soviet Union makes the success of such policies more probable. Events prompted one member of the Soviet military to write of Bush's goals:

The United States is the only superpower, and it is predestined by fate itself to rule the world. And it at once becomes obvious that the new concept is not actually that new. It is a question of the same old *Pax Americana*.⁵

Given such reactions to U.S. policy, it is important to understand what is truly behind the concept "New World Order." Largely based on an indepth survey of official speeches and press conferences published in the *New York Times* covering the period from Bush's inauguration until the present, this paper will attempt to flesh out Bush's conception of American policy in the Third World. It will examine Bush's foreign policy in three periods: 1) from President Bush's inauguration until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, when policy in the Third World lacked a clear focus; 2) the period of the Gulf Crisis, when Bush's conception of a "New World Order" emerged; and 3) changing patterns of U.S. behavior in the post-crisis period, with special attention given to the correlation between policy and rhetoric.

While the decline of the Soviet Bloc was the most significant event leading to a change in American-Third World policy, initial implications of this event were unclear. The first real evidence of the changing quality of relations arose with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In recognizing this change, this paper employs a loose *ex post facto* time series design. In this design Bush's rhetoric during the Persian Gulf Crisis acts as a treatment which qualitatively separates post-crisis U.S. foreign policy in the Third World from pre-crisis policy. Yet, as will become clear, there is no decisive separating point. Rather, the pre-crisis period exhibits aspects of New World Order policy which are also evident in the post-crisis policy; while the post-crisis era exhibits aspects of foreign policy which have long been exhibited in United States' foreign affairs.

The Pre-War Period: Begging Unity

Though policy changed throughout 1990, for the most part, pre-crisis Bush foreign policy did not exhibit uniformity and consistency. Comparisons of American foreign policy in the Middle East, Latin America and Asia exhibited striking differences.⁶ United States policy demonstrated a reactive quality which clearly identified the level of American influence from region to region. This meant policies of persuasion in the Middle East, of domination in Latin America, of mediation and flexibility in Asia, and disinterest in Sub-Saharan Africa. As for incongruities within regions, they primarily took place where the United States had its greatest influence, Latin America. Across all regions, however, Bush's foreign policy exhibited aspects of post-crisis policy; an appeal to law, a recognition of an expanding role for international organizations and of regional uniformities and the call for democratic and economic reform. What these disconnected elements lacked that appears in the post-crisis era was a unified strategy for their achievement and a vision of the future. The present section of this paper examines the disparate policies by region, just as it appears U.S. foreign policy was also organized.

The Middle East

⁴. As Hartz has pointed out, the moral conviction of its political, economic and cultural superiority has long been a part of U.S. foreign policy. Often referred to as "Wilsonian" (after President Woodrow Wilson), these convictions have been clearly evident since the early 20th century. For a brief examination of Wilson's moralism in U.S. foreign policy see Part VI of E. David Cronor, Ed., *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965).

⁵. M. Ponomarev, "Bush's 'NWO' Seen as 'Old' Idea," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, May 21, 1991, p. 13, from *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 17, 1991, p. 3.

⁶. As compared to other regions, other than sporadic initiatives, Sub-Saharan Africa has not played an important part in American policy. Therefore, other than a few references, American policy in this region will not be highlighted.

In this region the Bush administration focused primarily on the Arab-Israeli conflict. As has been the case after the Gulf War, Secretary of State Baker attempted to lay the groundwork for a peace conference. The preliminary goal was the achievement of a tentative uniformity of perceptions between Palestinians and Israelis before negotiations could start. American policy exhibited the belief that only through compromise could the foundations be laid for an international conference.⁷ While compromise had already been a component of American policy in the region, support for Israel was slipping as other actors were included in the peace process. Baker told the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) that peace required a halt to Israeli discussion of a "greater" Israel which would arise through the annexation of the occupied territories. Baker linked peace negotiations to a halt in the settlement of these territories and an Israeli commitment to open schools as part of recognizing Palestinian political rights.⁸

The changing United States perceptions of Arab-Israeli relations included the requirement that the Palestinians (though not the Palestine Liberation Organization) participate in the negotiations. In striving to build a foundation that included the Palestinians, Baker also made it clear that the United States did not support the P.L.O. On an issue that arose twice in 1989, the United States threatened to cut off funds to any United Nation's agencies considering recognizing the P.L.O. as more than just an observer organization. Baker argued in legal terms that recognition cannot be granted unilaterally; it must proceed through negotiation.⁹ Eventually, the United States suspended its dialogue with the P.L.O. following the latter's refusal to condemn a May 1990 attack on Israel by one of its splinter organizations.¹⁰

The primary reason behind the suspension of dialogue is ultimately reduced to the issue of terrorism. Terrorists, or groups that do not condemn them, are not recognized by the Bush administration. Such has been the driving issue behind President Bush's rhetoric toward Iran. After the Ayatollah Khomeini's death in 1989, Bush linked improvement in bilateral relations to Iranian renunciation of terror and a demonstrated effort to facilitate the release of American hostages.¹¹ Yet, his policy has been somewhat inconsistent in this area. Though there was no evidence of movement on the hostage issue, the United States began the process of returning Iranian assets in November 1989.¹² Thus, in the pre-crisis period, it was difficult to know when morals or some form of *realpolitik* was guiding policy. In the post-crisis era, however, the two often signify the same thing.

Latin America

The spread of democracy has been the primary focus of Bush Administration policy in Latin America. The two major areas of attention in the pre-crisis era were Panama and Nicaragua. While policy in the Middle East and Asia largely focused on diplomatically encouraging an environment for future elections, in the cases of Nicaragua and Panama, U.S. policy still included direct intervention. In Nicaragua continued economic sanctions were coupled with financial support not only for the Contras, but for the internal opposition as well. In Panama, initial hopes were that General Manuel Noriega would be removed through the electoral process. Following fraudulent elections, the evolution of American policy culminated in the invasion of December 1989. American intolerance for the governments in power was the common factor influencing policy toward these two

⁷ Thomas L. Friedman, "P.L.O. and Israel to Get Bush Ideas on Mid East Peace," *New York Times*, March 12, 1989, p. 1.

⁸ James Baker, "Excerpts From Baker's Mideast Talk," *New York Times*, May 23, 1989, p. 10. The settlement issue has persisted and has become the ultimate obstacle to the success of the Middle East peace talks begun in October 1991 in Madrid.

⁹ Robert Pear, "Baker Would Ask Cutoff of Funds if U.N. Agencies Upgrade P.L.O.," *New York Times*, May 2, 1989, p. 12, and Paul Lewis, "U.S. May Cut Dues to U.N. Over Arab Resolutions," *New York Times*, November 26, 1989, p. 12.

¹⁰ George Bush, "Excerpts From President's News Conference on the P.L.O. and Other Issues," *New York Times*, June 21, 1990, p. 10.

¹¹ George Bush, "President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues," *New York Times*, June 9, 1989, p. 22.

¹² George Bush, "Excerpts From the President's News Conference," *New York Times*, November 8, 1989, p. 14.

countries. If “fair” elections could not be achieved naturally, the United States intervened to direct the democratic process.

The fraudulent May 1989 Panamanian election led to swift U.S. condemnation, the institution of economic sanctions and President Bush’s calls for the popular overthrow of Noriega. The failure to achieve Noriega’s overthrow led to military intervention. After the December 1989 invasion, Bush justified the use of American forces while also claiming international support.¹³ Yet, as Bush eventually admitted, this support had not been readily forthcoming from Latin American states, which have long been wary of United States intervention in the region.¹⁴ In making a plea to international law, Secretary of State Baker further justified the action on the basis of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and Article 21 of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) Charter.¹⁵ When faced with international criticism, President Bush defended the use of force: “[The] U.S. used its resources in a manner consistent with political, diplomatic and moral principles.”¹⁶ For several reasons which will be discussed below, these same principles were to be applied in a manner that was internationally acceptable in the Persian Gulf Crisis.

Bush’s policy in Nicaragua was built on a more solid foundation. Early in the process, Secretary of State Baker called for multilateral cooperation among the Latin American countries.¹⁷ Yet, contradictions in policy were evident. Only a month earlier these same countries questioned whether proposed U. S. aid to the Contras violated the regional peace agreement calling for their disbandment.¹⁸ Baker raised the classic American paradox in Latin America: the desire for multilateral policy if it served U.S. interests, coupled with the intention to carry out unilateral action if the situation was deemed to merit such action. The policy that was followed in Nicaragua did not raise strong protest from the countries of the region, nor was it as intrusive as the Panamanian invasion. Yet, the United States’ provision of special campaign funds earmarked for opposition candidates was only a less direct way of “setting” policy in its sphere of interest.¹⁹ Furthermore, by not rescinding U.S. economic sanctions until after the February 1990 election, Bush’s policy offered the Nicaraguan voter a choice between continued economic hardship under the Sandinistas and the possibility of improvement under the opposition candidate, Violeta Chamorro.

The Bush policy in the cases of Nicaragua and Panama was to ensure a democratically elected government. To achieve this goal, the administration strategy was initially minimalist in Panama and Nicaragua: let the democratic process flow naturally. Yet, undesirable results and/or unfavorable projections resulted in increased U.S. involvement in order to achieve the ultimate goal, democracy. In reaction to initial success, Bush employed economic aid instrumentally to keep the two countries on the correct path. The aid was earmarked to: (1) help build democracy, (2) to spark economic development, and (3) to demilitarize the national forces.²⁰

¹³ George Bush, “A Transcript of Bush’s Address on the Decision to use Force in Panama,” *New York Times*, December 21, 1991, p. 19. The four points of justification were: (1) the safety of American lives, (2) the defense of Panamanian democracy, (3) combatting drug traffic, and (4) the protection of the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty.

¹⁴ George Bush, “Transcript of Bush News Conference on Noriega and Panama,” *New York Times*, January 6, 1990, p. 10.

¹⁵ James Baker, “Excerpts From Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy,” *New York Times*, December 21, 1989, p. 19. Both of these Articles provide justification for the use of force in the case of self-defense. In this case, Bush claimed to be protecting the lives of Americans still in Panama. For texts of both charters see Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, *The Encyclopedia of The United Nations and International Relations* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1990).

¹⁶ George Bush, “Text of Bush Announcement on the General’s Surrender,” *New York Times*, January 4, 1990, p. 12.

¹⁷ Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Asks Venezuela to put Pressure on the Sandinistas,” *New York Times*, March 31, 1989.

¹⁸ James Baker, “Baker Plea for Interim Contra Aid Evokes the Skepticism of Congress,” *New York Times*, March 4, 1989, p. 1.

¹⁹ Robert Pear, “U.S. Revises Plan to Aid Opposition in Nicaragua Vote,” *New York Times*, September 22, 1989, p. 1.

²⁰ George Bush, “Excerpts From President’s News Session on Foreign and Domestic Issues,” *New York Times*, March 14, 1990, p. 14.

El Salvador and regional trade relations were the other two major foci of U.S. policy in Latin America. Two separate events in El Salvador exemplified America's historical willingness to tolerate authoritarian regimes which it can dominate. First, President Bush continued to fund the Cristiani government, even as human rights abuses received unwanted publicity.²¹ Second, Bush unilaterally sent U.S. forces to El Salvador to rescue American hostages. Without requesting the consent of Cristiani, Bush "told him what we were going to do and he acquiesced."²² In regional trade the Bush administration announced proposals to expand relations in Latin America. In general the policies were employed as instruments intended to achieve political and economic reform in the relevant countries. The proposals included a free trade pact with the Mexican government, trade initiatives as alternatives to drug trafficking in several of the Andean countries, sanctions on countries which were not cooperating in fighting drug production, and debt relief as a result of aid transfers to Eastern Europe.²³

Asia

Reflecting its less powerful position in Asia, U.S. policy was more flexible than in Latin America. Negotiations to end the crisis in Cambodia dominated U.S. participation in the region. Even before Bush's inauguration, Baker set two goals for this process: Vietnamese withdrawal and barring a return to power of the Khmer Rouge.²⁴ While Bush initially provided aid to the non-communist rebels under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk, congressional fears of the Khmer Rouge caused a policy shift. The shift toward relations with the Vietnamese-backed government was conditioned on the guarantee that any future coalition government would reserve power for Sihanouk.²⁵ In Afghanistan United States policy was also flexible. Becoming less bellicose in its call for the overthrow of the formerly Soviet-backed Najibullah government, U.S. policy began to focus on the possibilities for a negotiated settlement and popular elections.²⁶ Finally, fearing Pakistani nuclear development, Bush tried to slow down the Pakistan-India arms race by requesting that then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, speak to then Pakistani leader, Benazir Bhutto. As part of U.S. policy against nuclear proliferation, U.S. aid is dependent on the president's ability to certify that Pakistan neither has the bomb nor is moving toward its construction. While the Bush administration certified Pakistan in 1989, it was not without reservations.²⁷

Bush pre-crisis policy exhibited the major elements of post-crisis policy that really coalesced during the Persian Gulf Crisis. Yet no particular policies were uniformly applied. In one situation Bush called for compromise in the Middle East, while in another situation he had U.S. forces invade Panama. Furthermore,

²¹ Maureen Dowd, "Bush Seeks a Rise in Aid to Salvador," *New York Times*, February 2, 1990, p. 14. The murder of six Jesuit priests by government troops added fuel to the divisiveness of this situation. Bush found justification in American policy when the Cristiani government arrested suspects in the murders.

²² Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Claims role in Hostage Rescue in Salvador Hotel," *New York Times*, November 23, 1989.

²³ Known as the Brady Plan (after Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady), the debt relief program became most significant as a part of U.S. foreign policy in the Post-Gulf War era. The program will be examined more thoroughly when discussing the period following the cessation of hostilities. For more information see Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Mexican-U.S. Pact Reached on Trade and Investments," *New York Times*, October 4, 1989, p. 1, and "Trade Alternatives to Drugs," *New York Times*, November 2, 1989, p. 16. and George Bush, "President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues," August 16, 1991, p. 8. and Andrew Rosenthal, "President Announces Plan for More Latin Debt Relief," *New York Times*, June 28, 1990, p. 1.

²⁴ James Baker, "Excerpts From Baker's Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee," *New York Times*, January 19, 1989, p. 8.

²⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, "Bush Said to Shift Cambodian Policy," *New York Times*, July 7, 1989, p. 1. This shift took a full year to be completed. For further information on criticisms from the Association of South East Asian Nations, see Clifford Krauss, "Baker Hints of Direct Contact with Phnom Penh," *New York Times*, July 28, 1990, p. 5.

²⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, "Gorbachev Accepts Deep Cuts in European Forces as Equal; Baker Hints Shift on Germany," *New York Times*, February 10, 1990, p. 6.

²⁷ Stephen Engelberg, "Talk to Pakistan Bush Urges India," *New York Times*, July 9, 1989, p. 5. and Michael R. Gordon, "Nuclear Course set by Pakistan Worrying U.S.," *New York Times*, October 12, 1989, p. 1.

while President Bush had received international support for the embargo of Panama, *ex post facto* appeals for support for the unilateral invasion were not overly successful.²⁸ In essence, as exhibited by these inconsistencies, Bush had no vision on which to found American policy. Yet, sparked by the declining East-West confrontation, Bush soon saw the opportunity afforded the United States as the one remaining superpower to shape the world in its image. This meant not only altering defense doctrines, but strategizing to ensure the spread of democracy. In the State of the Union message on January 31, 1990, President Bush saw the time not only for the spread of democratic freedoms but for the spread of free markets. This process would be served through the strength and ability of American leadership to defend its own national interests.²⁹ Thus, the decline of the Cold War would allow Bush to unite many aspects of traditional American foreign policy into a vision of the future. The initial test of Bush's vision would occur following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Learning from the fallout after Panama, Bush began to build a foundation of legality before any action was taken.

The War: The Art of Rhetoric

The actual policy that arose out of the Gulf Crisis was not a departure from the earlier era. What was a departure, however, was the foundation of a coherent strategy to carry out the mission in the Gulf. The strategy differed greatly from that used in Panama because of the consistent application of a combination of openness, international and United Nations' participation, and strict adherence to international law. It is true that U.S. influence in the Middle East is not directly comparable to its influence in Latin America. Yet, what was significant about the strategy employed in the Gulf, was the role that it played in shaping Bush's vision for the world and America's future. As will be shown in the discussion of postwar policy, this would be a universal, not particular, application of American foreign policy. Yet, George Bush's conception of "universal" policy envisions employing American leadership to spread American ideals to the world. In essence, Bush envisions a *Pax Americana* (though he denies it) that combined with the decline of the Soviet Union, permits the practice of a more unified and coherent U.S. foreign policy. In order to show the evolutionary process of "new" American foreign policy, this section of the paper is organized chronologically.

Initial statements from President Bush following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were based on traditional principles of American foreign policy and rested on four points: (1) an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, (2) the return of the legitimate Kuwaiti leadership, (3) a longstanding commitment to security and stability in the Gulf, and (4) the protection of American lives. Realizing that any threat to oil also threatened American economic health, Bush instituted sanctions against Iraq. Yet, as compared with past practices certain differences arose. Instead of a unilateral U.S. decision to send troops, as was done in Panama or the hostage rescue in El Salvador, the Saudi Arabian government "requested" U.S. military assistance from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney who had been dispatched to the Gulf soon after the crisis began. Furthermore, Bush saw this as an opportunity to exhibit the same "stalwart" stand against Iraq as had led to "victory" in the Cold War. In essence, Bush was trying to show to the world the continued willingness of the United States to stand against aggression and protect its friends.³⁰

By August 15, Bush had recognized the benefits of a world role in the crisis, though old habits of unilateral action were still being exhibited. He called for the implementation of the U.N. resolutions condemning the Iraqi aggression, while (as in Panama) justifying the U.S. initiation of a naval blockade of Iraq on an *ex post facto* appeal to international legality based on Article 51 of the U.N. charter.³¹ While recognizing the importance of the crisis to help reestablish U.S. credibility, by August 31 Bush explicitly raised the prospects for a "new

²⁸ Maureen Dowd, "Bush Hardens Line on Noriega Ouster," *New York Times*, May 14, 1989, p. 13.

²⁹ George Bush, "Transcript of Bush's State of the Union Message to the Union," *New York Times*, February 1, 1990, p. 22.

³⁰ George Bush, "Excerpts From Bush's Statement on U.S. Defense of Saudis," *New York Times*, August 9, 1990, p. 15. and George Bush, "Excerpts From Statements By Bush on Strategy in Gulf," August 12, 1990, p. 12.

³¹ George Bush, "Excerpts of News Conference By Bush on Budget and Gulf," *New York Times*, August 15, 1990, p. 21. As for the invasion of Panama, this action was justified on the basis of self-defense.

world order” to arise out of the cooperative spirit engendered by the common defense of the region.³² Secretary of State James Baker was even more explicit than Bush. He saw the post-Cold War world order standing at a critical juncture; and the Iraqi invasion was a defining moment of a new era. Baker saw an opportunity to solidify the ground rules of the new era on the basis of the United Nations. Additionally, as Bush had before him, Baker linked impediments to the flow of energy resources from the Middle East to the health of the global economy, a particular threat to the viability of the struggling democracies of the world.³³

In a clear example of post-Cold War relations, Bush and then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a joint statement which called for the recognition of all U.N. resolutions. They also envisioned a post-crisis world where the erstwhile enemies would work together to set up a regional security structure.³⁴ Finally, on September 11, 1990 President Bush explicitly added a fifth objective to the four objectives which had been stated at the outset of the crisis: that of a “New World Order.” With this announcement, Bush made a more systematic effort to define the substance of the “order.” Building on the immediate principles of halting aggression and allowing the free flow of oil, Bush saw the opportunity for the nations of the world to prosper in harmony under the umbrella of a United Nations free to carry out the roles envisioned for it by its founders. He went on to predict that U.S. leadership would be an integral part of the new “world partnership.” Furthermore, the President believed that the Persian Gulf operation would restore American credibility by affirming that there is no substitute for American leadership against tyranny. In keeping with this theme, post-crisis American leadership would have a lasting role in the security of the region through mediation, security agreements, and a curb on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.³⁵

Speaking before the United Nations, Bush refrained from appeals to patriotism and described his vision of the U.N.’s role in a post-crisis era. He optimistically predicted the continued spread of democracy and greater economic prosperity and peace which would be accompanied by a decline in the proliferation of weaponry. Closer to home, Bush envisioned the Americas as the first “democratic hemisphere.” Bush predicted that, in addition to its response to the Iraqi invasion, the United Nations would expand its participation in environmental issues, the limitation of terrorism, the management of the debt burden, policing the international drug trade, and aiding refugees as well as its traditional role of peace keeping. In all, Bush expected the U.N. to be an active force in future world politics.³⁶

As the January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait approached, Bush stressed the role of the United Nations: “Saddam is to comply with the United Nations resolution, not a deadline of our own Armed Forces.” In addition to threats to world economic and human well being, Bush feared the threat to the development of democracy in regions previously unaccustomed to democratic institutions. For Bush, high

³² George Bush, “Excerpts From the President’s News Conference on Gulf Crisis,” *New York Times*, August 31, 1990, p. 11.

³³ James Baker, “Excerpts From Baker Testimony on U.S. and Gulf,” *New York Times*, September 5, 1991, p. 14. Baker referred to the nations of the Third World and Eastern Europe. Later, in justifying the participation of the United States to American citizens, Baker claimed that dictatorial control of oil was a threat to American jobs. Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Jobs at Stake in Gulf, Baker Says,” *New York Times*, November 14, 1990, p. 14.

³⁴ “Text of Joint Statement: Aggression ‘Will Not Pay,’” *New York Times*, September 10, 1990, p. 7. While not directly applicable to the Persian Gulf, a year later the United States and the Soviet Union did join together to eliminate weapons shipments to the Afghan rebels and government by January 1, 1992. While the United States sees this as a means to force elections on Afghan President Najibullah, it is likely that cutting foreign outlays was the prime motivator behind the post-coup Soviet agreement. See Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. and Soviets to End Arms Sales to Afghan Rivals,” *New York Times*, September 14, 1991, p. 1.

³⁵ George Bush, “Transcript of President’s Address to Joint Session of Congress,” *New York Times*, September 12, 1991, p. 20. For Iraq this was to include international guarantees to eliminate their chemical weapons capabilities and halt the advance of research on nuclear weapons. See “Bush Plan for Iraqi Arms,” *New York Times*, November 16, 1990, p. 12.

³⁶ George Bush, “Transcript of President’s Address to U.N. General Assembly,” *New York Times*, October 2, 1990, p. 12.

energy prices posed a direct threat to the development of democracy in Eastern Europe. In a somewhat contradictory fashion Bush stated, "We are ready to use force to defend a new order emerging among nations of the world, a world of sovereign nations living in peace. [] At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit."³⁷ As the war began Bush envisioned a world where the rule of law, not the jungle, would govern the conduct of nations.³⁸

Throughout the whole process, however, Bush's vision of multinational participation in a cooperative future of international relations was inconsistent with an evident attempt unilaterally to control the direction of events in the Persian Gulf. While Secretary of State Baker claimed to welcome all diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis peacefully, rhetoric emanating from Washington seemed to preclude this possibility as early as August 15, 1990.³⁹ Furthermore, the quick U.S. rejection of French and Soviet plans to solve the crisis without bloodshed undermined the validity of Baker's comments. Finally, while the meeting date proposed by Saddam Hussein of January 12, 1991, just three days before the U.N. deadline, raised certain logistical problems, Bush's principled stand against meeting on that date could also be attributed to the desire to maintain the strong image projected by American leadership.⁴⁰

The final prescription for the new world order, really a summary of Bush's foreign policy development throughout the crisis, was expressed on January 29, 1991 in the State of the Union Address. Bush described the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and law. These characteristics, he claimed, were being exhibited in the 28 nation coalition against Iraq. Reverting to patriotism, or what might be interpreted as *Pax Americana* rhetoric, Bush said,

For generations America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And, today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable []

But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans, we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work for freedom. And when we do, freedom works []

Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort [Gulf War]. Among nations of the world only the United States of America has both the moral standing and the means to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace.⁴¹

A quick summary of the essence of Bush's vision for the world is in order before analyzing specific policies. The President envisions a world that is ruled by law and rationality moving toward the freedoms of democracy—all to be under the supervision and guidance of the United States in areas of political, economic and military affairs. What has become apparent is that, while the United States will be heavily involved in this process, Bush encourages the participation of other nations, particularly under the umbrella of international organizations like the United Nations. To follow is a discussion of how this image of a new world is exhibited in contemporary American foreign policy.

During the Crisis: Evidence of Evolving Policy?

³⁷ George Bush, "Text of the Radio Address by the President," *New York Times*, January 6, 1991, p. 14.

³⁸ George Bush, "Transcript of the Comments by Bush on the Air Strikes Against the Iraqis," *New York Times*, January 17, 1991, p. 14.

³⁹ James Baker, "Remarks by Baker at News Conference in Geneva on Standoff in the Gulf," *New York Times*, January 10, 1991, p. 14. For the earlier reference see George Bush, "Excerpts of News Conference By Bush on Budget and Gulf," *New York Times*, August 15, 1990, p. 21.

⁴⁰ George Bush, "Excerpts From Bush's Remarks on Gulf Meetings," *New York Times*, December 15, 1990, p. 8. While this statement is conjecture, it becomes clearer in the post-crisis era that not only does U.S. foreign policy require that the United States be the dominant player in all areas of interest, but that it be involved in as many regions and organizations as possible.

⁴¹ George Bush, "Transcript of President's State of the Union Message to Nation," *New York Times*, January 30, 1991, p. 12.

As would be expected, foreign policy initiatives in other regions were minimal during the crisis. From a strictly legalistic perspective, the policy which was publicized was largely in keeping with Bush's rhetoric. In promoting international cooperation, Bush's initiatives were clearly exhibited in four instances. First, a Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group was formed to provide aid to those Third World countries hit hardest by the economic limitations on trade. An important precursor of things to come was a proposal to forgive Egypt's huge debt.⁴² Second, the United States supported a U.N. Security Council plan to form a governing council of the four competing factions in Cambodia.⁴³ Subsequently, this council and efforts to solve the Cambodian crisis were placed entirely under U.N. supervision. To employ the U.N. in this fashion in such a sensitive region could not have occurred during the Cold War. Third, while following long-term American policy, Bush was required to suspend foreign aid to Pakistan because of its advancing nuclear program.⁴⁴ Finally, a definite example of Bush's economic rhetoric was found in the quick confirmation of "most favored nation" status for Mongolia.⁴⁵

Interestingly, two apparently contradictory episodes (one in line with Bush's rhetoric, one not) occurred in Central America. The first involved the U.S. release of military aid to the Salvadoran government following the murder of two American soldiers by rebel forces. Instead of contributing to an escalation in the internal conflict, Bush decided to back a delay in dispersing the funds. This would allow continued negotiations and permit legislative elections to be held two months later.⁴⁶ The second episode involved a Bush administration request that the Soviets halt supplying minor military supplies to the Sandinista army. The Chamorro government protested that such a policy could destabilize already tenuous relations between conservative and leftist forces.⁴⁷ The dichotomous nature of these two examples rests on the fact that one policy encouraged the legal process, a process of achieving uniformity through negotiations and elections, while the other subverts the internal policy of a sovereign state. It is true that a U.S. request of the Soviets does not violate international law, but it does violate the sovereignty of a state that the United States now supports. In essence, this second example exemplifies the *Pax Americana* policy—a United States employing technically legal means in order to mold the world according to its specifications.

The Post-War Era: Policy Coherence?

At the end of the Gulf War American foreign policy-makers faced a much different situation than the one that they had faced following the Panama invasion. Whereas in Panama the American focus of the attack had been the removal of General Manuel Noriega, the removal of Saddam Hussein had not been codified in the United Nations' resolutions. Realizing that the United States was committed to following U.N. guidelines, Baker imitated the pre-invasion policy in Panama by trying to pressure the Iraqis to overthrow Hussein through hints of lighter reparations.⁴⁸ These hints contributed to the rebellions of Iraqi Shi'ites and Kurds in the southern and northern portions of the country, respectively. The Kurdish situation became a problem for Bush. While calling

⁴² Clyde H. Farnsworth, "New Group to Direct Flow of Crisis Aid," *New York Times*, September 26, 1990, p. 8.

⁴³ Reuters, "US Opens Talks with Cambodian Communists," *New York Times*, September 6, 1990, p. 7.

⁴⁴ Michael R. Gordon, "Nuclear Issue Slows U.S. Aid to Pakistan," *New York Times*, October 1, 1990, p. 3. As part of an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Bush was bound by law to suspend aid. This process was not without some attempts by the State Department to waive the Act's applicability to this case. In the end, however, aid was halted.

⁴⁵ Associated Press, "Mongolia Gets U.S. Trade Aid," *New York Times*, January 22, 1991, p. 7. One could also argue that by quickly offering such trade status the United States' is simply trying to neutralize any influence from both the Soviet Union and China. Instead of being new policy, it is old policy that has only recently become possible.

⁴⁶ Associated Press, "Bush Backs but Delays Payment to El Salvador," *New York Times*, January 17, 1991, p. 5.

⁴⁷ Clifford Krauss, "Managua Faults U.S. Bid to Soviets," *New York Times*, March 2, 1991, p. 5.

⁴⁸ Clifford Krauss, "New U.S. Hint on Hussein," *New York Times*, March 4, 1991, p. 8. The linkage between Hussein's removal and the lifting of economic sanctions continues to exist.

for Hussein's overthrow did not technically violate U.N. resolutions, the plight of the Kurds placed the United States in the moral dilemma of protecting the refugees without an official international sanction for U.S. forces to enter Iraqi territory. In finally providing relief, Baker used the pretext of Security Council Resolution 688 to protect the Kurdish people from genocide. As this resolution did not explicitly sanction the unilateral action taken by Bush, it was suggested by Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar that United Nations' troops be sent in place of American forces.⁴⁹

Even with some inconsistencies, U.S. foreign policy exhibited a more unified direction. In a speech shortly after the termination of the War, Bush codified the American objectives for the Middle East: (1) shared security arrangements with Arab nations, (2) control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (3) a peace accord between the Arabs and Israelis, and (4) the fostering of economic development in the region as a part of the peace process. This last point was to be fulfilled through the redirection of military resources both in the region and in the United States.

In recognizing a new world based on the "principles of justice and fair play," Bush reiterated the linkages between the decline of the Cold War and the enhanced position of the United Nations.⁵⁰ This approach to foreign policy-making demonstrated continuity with the process that had originally formed the United Nations' coalition prior to the war. In contrast to the approach in Panama, Bush policy had gained greater coherence. If nothing else this coherence came from clearly and openly stated objectives prior to any action. Additionally, while past rhetoric was based on words with little substance, for the most part Bush has followed the stated objectives. In fact, since the end of the war the four objectives in the Middle East have been generically applied throughout the world.

In the area of security arrangements, initial attempts for a permanent military base in Bahrain or weapons' storage in Saudi Arabia have not succeeded. Yet, new security pacts have been signed with Kuwait and Qatar, while old security pacts with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were enhanced.⁵¹ Attempts to limit weapons proliferation are closely related to the security arrangements. At first, the United States' commitment focused on destroying Iraqi capability in the areas of nuclear and chemical weapons. This soon became a comprehensive plan for the entire Mideast that involved the members of the Security Council, and eventually spread to the problem of arms sales to the Third World as a whole.⁵² Through further weapons sales, however, the United States raised some questions as to its commitment to arms control. These sales were justified by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney: "It is not inconsistent to say, on the one hand, we're interested in arms control and, on the other hand, we want to make certain our friends can defend themselves."⁵³ Yet, while the sale of American

⁴⁹ Steven Greenhouse, "Baker Defends Refugee Plan at European Meeting," *New York Times*, April 8, 1991, p. 18. While concerned directly with the Kurds, the text of the resolution makes no reference to sending troops. It does recognize, however, the sovereign integrity of Iraq. The only aspect of the article upon which the action could have been founded follows: "6) Appeals to all member states and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts." Given this, the legal foundation of the action was extremely weak. U.N. Security Council. 46th Session, Resolutions, New York, 1991.

⁵⁰ George Bush, "Transcript of President Bush's Address on End of the Gulf War," *New York Times*, March 7, 1991, p. 8.

⁵¹ Patrick E. Tyler, "Gulf Security Talks Stall Over Plan for Saudi Army," *New York Times*, October 13, 1991, p. 1. and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Negotiating New Security Pacts in Gulf," *New York Times*, August 1, 1991, p. 6. Note also that while the United States reluctantly agreed to give up a military presence in the Philippines, it continues to support the NATO alliance and as recent events in Haiti have exhibited the O.A.S. has become a more accepted means by which to enforce democratic change in the Western hemisphere.

⁵² For discussion of this issue refer to the following sources: "Bush Plan for Iraqi Arms," *New York Times*, November 16, 1991, p. 12. and Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Unveils Plan for Arms Control in the Middle East," *New York Times*, May 30, 1991, p. 1. and Alan Riding, "Talks Begin on Arms Sales to Third World," *New York Times*, July 9, 1991, p. 3.

⁵³ Eric Schmitt, "Cheney Says U.S. Plans New Arms Sale to the Mideast," *New York Times*, June 5, 1991, p. 3. Also, The United States became the premier arms dealer to the Third World during 1990. The jump was an astronomical 137%, from \$7.8 billion dollars

arms has grown there is an increased concern in the Bush administration about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as exemplified by U.N. inspections in Iraq. The issue of nuclear weapons development forms the backdrop for the U.S. denial of aid to Pakistan and greater vigilance in the cases of North Korea and Algeria.

The Mideast peace process is relatively simple to describe. James Baker has spent substantial time mediating the disputes between Israel and the Arabs. In essence, he has tried to achieve a uniform base of compromise upon which to build the negotiations themselves. As before, this means prohibiting P.L.O. participation in the conference because of Israeli opposition. Concurrently, Israel's request for \$10 billion dollars in loan guarantees to fund settlement construction was delayed because providing this money would be tantamount to tacit acceptance of a greater Israel. In calling for a 120-day delay in considering the Israeli request, Bush was unwilling to upset the long balancing process upon which he felt the peace negotiations could begin.⁵⁴

Direct U.S. participation in international diplomacy, as exemplified by the Mideast peace conference, is less prevalent than prior to the end of the Cold War. Now, true to Bush's call for enhancing the diplomatic role of international organizations, the United Nations has recently produced breakthroughs in Cambodia and El Salvador.⁵⁵ Furthermore, it is important to note that, as certain dictatorial abuses by President Jean Bertrand Aristide of Haiti came to light, the Bush administration did not publicly contradict the O.A.S. policy calling for his return.⁵⁶ Yet, while working through international organizations to solve some situations, Bush seems to believe that the United States is better at solving some of the more intractable problems. Similar to the Mideast peace process, Bush unsuccessfully tried to solve the Cyprus Crisis by the end of 1991.⁵⁷

While President Bush failed to require postwar democratic reforms from the Kuwaiti Emir, the driving forces behind his foreign policy are economic growth and the spread of democracy.⁵⁸ In pushing for both, Bush believes that economic progress, as exemplified by free markets, is the "soil in which democracy grows best." While denying a *Pax Americana*, President Bush proclaims the movement toward "*Pax Universalis*, [a process] built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations."⁵⁹ While the *Pax Universalis* appears to define the U.S.

in 1989 to \$18.5 billion dollars in 1990. While much of the increase was due to the war, the pre-war period during 1990 also exhibited high sales. Until we see the breakdown of the 1991 numbers, it will be difficult to determine exactly which direction U.S. arms sales are going. However, given the excellent performance of American weaponry in the war and the relatively poor performance of Soviet weapons coupled to USSR/Russian decline as a superpower, it would not be surprising to see sales continue at a high level. This seems even more possible as Pentagon cutbacks force American arms producers to seek other markets. See Robert Pear, "U.S. Ranked No. 1 in Weapons Sales," *New York Times*, August 11, 1991, p. 10.

⁵⁴ George Bush, "Excerpts From President Bush's News Session on Israeli Loan Guarantees," *New York Times*, September 13, 1991, p. 10.

⁵⁵ Alan Riding, "3 Cambodian Factions Sign a U.N.-enforced Peace Pact; Khmer Rouge Shares Rule," *New York Times*, October 24, 1991, p. 1. and Shirley Christian, "Salvadoran Chief and Rebels Reach Broad Agreement," *New York Times*, September 28, 1991.

⁵⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, "The White House Refuses to link Aristide Return and Democracy," *New York Times*, October 8, 1991, p. 10. This came as private discussions seemed to indicate that American enthusiasm was not that great for Aristide's return. While Bush's wartime rhetoric predicted current U.S. behavior toward Haiti, to conclude that this is the sole issue is to forget Haiti's negligible economic importance to the United States.

⁵⁷ Marlise Simons, "Bush Hopes Are Dwindling for a Settlement in Cyprus," *New York Times*, October 10, 1991, p. 16. The Arab-Israeli negotiations may see greater U.N. participation following the General Assembly's repeal (December 1991) of its 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism. This resolution had been an obstacle to Israeli acceptance of an active U.N. role in the negotiations. Ahmed Nafie, "Israel Remains a Fascist State," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, January 2, 1992, p. 5.

⁵⁸ Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush Not Pressing Kuwait on Reform," *New York Times*, April 3, 1991, p. 1. To not do so, of course, is a major inconsistency between policy and rhetoric. While Bush did suggest "political reconstruction," he claimed to be cautious because the war itself was fought over the question of one country's right to intervene in another.

⁵⁹ George Bush, "Excerpts From Bush's Address to General Assembly: For a 'Pax Universalis'," *New York Times*, September 24, 1991, p. 14.

policy on certain diplomatic levels, it is in the area of economics that Bush is trying to mold the internal policies of Third World states.

As an integral part in U.S. foreign economic policy the Brady Plan (originally introduced in March 1989) has been increasingly applied in international relations. A multilateral approach to improving world economic conditions, the plan's most important provision concerns the reduction of debt for Third World states. Treasury Secretary Brady argued that the U.S.

should encourage debt and debt service reduction on a voluntary basis, while recognizing the importance of continued new lending. This should provide an important step back to the free markets, where funds abound and transactions are enacted in days, not months.⁶⁰

The World Bank and I.M.F. approved plan aimed to reduce the Third World's \$1.3 trillion dollar debt by 20% (about \$350 billion dollars) over the three year period ending Spring 1992.⁶¹

Even in "rewarding" Egypt for its role in the Gulf War, debt forgiveness was contingent on economic reform.⁶² Furthermore, the instrumental use of foreign aid/economic incentives is evident in other regions and appears to have become an integral part of current policy in Latin America and has even appeared in relations with Ethiopia.⁶³ As a clear byproduct of the end of the Cold War, United States' policy-makers no longer have to compete for influence in the Third World. This signifies that the U.S. can be direct in requiring that Third World states desirous of aid comply with the free market and democratic reforms demanded by the Bush administration. In essence, such a non-competitive situation places the United States in an extremely strong position to use aid as an instrument to influence states in need. Moreover, Third World states are in a weak position because to participate in the international system, they must relinquish a certain degree of sovereignty.⁶⁴

In addition to bilateral relations, the Bush administration is also pushing existing and future alliances. As in the case of NATO, following the Cold War members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

⁶⁰ "Excerpts From Brady Remarks on Debt," *New York Times*, March 11, 1989, p. 37.

⁶¹ Clyde H. Farnsworth, "World Bank and I.M.F. Approve Plan to Cut Debt of Poorer Lands," *New York Times*, April 9, 1989, p. 1. The plan was approved as partial reaction to Venezuelan debt riots which lead to a significant number of fatalities. The comments of Egyptians notwithstanding (see footnote #62), at this juncture it is difficult to judge the program's success.

⁶² Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Egypt's 'Reward': Forgiven Debt," *New York Times*, April 10, 1991, p. D1. Approximately \$10 billion dollars of debt was forgiven by the United States and its allies. Of this amount, approximately \$7 billion dollars was held by the United States. Furthermore, from discussions with educated Egyptians during a December 1991 trip to the Middle East, the general view of debt relief and economic reform is not one for optimism. Those interviewed only saw this process as a further example of U.S. domination over Egypt. One individual remarked that past aid has gone largely into the pockets of government officials instead of national development. Predictions for the future were unchanged from the present.

⁶³ Clifford Krauss, "Chamorro Wins Bush Promise on Debt," *New York Times*, April 18, 1991. A portion of the Nicaraguan debt was officially forgiven in September 1991. Debt has also been forgiven for Chile and is being considered for Honduras. The amounts are relatively small (all far less than \$1.0 billion dollars) because the United States government only holds a small percentage of loans to Latin America; the rest are held by private banks. In Ethiopia, the Bush administration has tied any provision of aid to human rights and institutional freedoms (such as the press). See Jane Perlez, "Ethiopian Factions Seek Broad Coalition," *New York Times*, July 2, 1991, p. 9.

⁶⁴ An important issue here, as Terry L. Diebel and Michael Mandelbaum have pointed out, is whether or not the American domestic economic situation is strong enough to sustain its foreign program. If world diplomacy is shifting from military power to economic power, the United States, with such high budget and trade deficits, cannot afford a long term process of aiding and guiding other states. Nor will these states continue to respect United States' influence if states such as Japan or Germany are better able to fulfill their needs. Diebel, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction," and Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy," (see footnote 3, p. 2).

(ASEAN) have questioned the necessity of relying on the United States for security arrangements. In a speech before the association, Baker expressed fears that new regional security organizations will weaken existing bilateral agreements between the United States and Southeast Asian states.⁶⁵ Yet, as exhibited by earlier attempts to form regional trading blocs in the Pacific Basin and current attempts in Latin America, foreign policy-makers are trying to avoid the erosion of American international influence by expanding its participation in international organizations.⁶⁶ Though not a member of ASEAN, Cold War politics allowed the United States to have significant influence on the association. The formation of new organizations, without U.S. participation, threatens to undermine American attempts to insert its guiding hand in shaping the world.

As stated earlier Bush's foreign policy is no longer a haphazard collection of initiatives; it is a vision of expanded American influence based on international legality and uniformity. Bush's recent attempts to expand presidential powers in the allocation of foreign aid provides a broad overview of those objectives. The five objectives are: (1) the promotion of democratic values, (2) strengthening United States' competitiveness, (3) promoting peace, (4) protecting the United States from transnational threats, and (5) meeting humanitarian needs. In essence, as discussed above, Bush wants to use foreign aid as an instrument to ensure the achievement of American policy.⁶⁷

Concluding Thoughts

While current U.S. foreign policy in the Third World exhibits a number of inconsistencies, the process arising out of the Gulf War is more coherent than the process that came before. In all, current policy shows a general uniformity through the greater role of international legal norms, compromise and international organizations as the means of policy achievement rather than the ends. Part of the process includes aspects of idealism and self-interest which are expressed in the term *Pax Americana*. The United States emerged from the war with restored credibility and world recognition that it was now the only true superpower. The environmental change signifies greater policy latitude for the United States when dealing in the Third World and has been most notably exhibited in the instrumental use of foreign aid. Additionally, the Soviet decline gives American foreign policy a dominant position on the U.N. Security Council (though China's role is unclear). Finally, while the commitment to international legality has been strong, part of the policy of *Pax Americana* is the tendency for the Bush Administration to justify policy on legal technicalities. This was most obvious when the administration was justifying the Panama invasion and the institution of the Iraqi blockade as self defense measures. While it was true that American nationals were still in these two countries, this is likely to be the case in any world crisis. To rely too heavily on the "self defense" justification is to gradually undermine the foundations of international law.

It may be too early to determine whether or not the policies of the American "New World Order" will play a long term role in international relations. One of the primary considerations in predicting the future of Bush's policies are current economic problems in the American domestic economy. Many have criticized Bush for devoting too much time and resources to foreign policy instead of solving problems at home. Foreign aid is expensive; and it is especially expensive when foreign debt is forgiven. Not only does increasing the deficit auger poorly for the future strength of the American economy, but it also signifies an increasing inability to continue to provide foreign aid. If one of Bush's main goals was to restore American credibility as the world

⁶⁵ Philip Shenon, "Baker Asks Asian to Move Warily in New Pacts," *New York Times*, July 25, 1991, p. 14.

⁶⁶ "Pacific Rim Initiative Seen," *New York Times*, June 26, 1989, Section IV, p. 9.

⁶⁷ Janet Battaile, "Bush Seeks Expanded Powers on Foreign Aid," *New York Times*, April 14, 1991, p. 14. Currently foreign aid is calculated through a congressional formula which decides the allocation of 90% of the funds. Bush argued that governmental rules guiding the allocation of aid to countries such as the certification of Pakistan's nuclear program would still be followed. Yet, the president would have the prerogative instead of having requirements thrust upon him. It is important to note that Bush has been able to wrestle certain aspects of control over foreign aid away from congress. An example of this is Bush's acceding to a congressional freeze on aid to Jordan, but being permitted to reserve the right to unfreeze the aid when deemed appropriate.

leader, the inability to provide continued aid, coupled with a state supported by international banks, will not instill international confidence about the leadership of the United States. Furthermore, while the Soviet Union is no longer a competitor in the Third World, the same cannot be said for Germany and Japan. It seems likely that the Germans and the Japanese will be less concerned with the type of government and economy in Third World countries as long as these countries can provide a stable climate for investment. Thus, in the long term it will be to the Third World's interest to focus relations on countries less demanding than the United States.⁶⁸

Yet, if the *Pax Americana* portion of American foreign policy has a dubious future, what are some long-term positive factors that will arise out of the end of the Cold War? It would appear that for whatever reason President Bush has been committed to legality and uniformity, the rising role of international organizations should provide the structure to continue the development of these factors long after the current U.S. strategy is altered. Of course, such a future is contingent on avoiding something cataclysmic (and given the possible ramifications of nuclear proliferation it is not unforeseen) or the arrival of a new hegemon. Out of this process, it seems that the writings of Louis Hartz on the United States continue to be relevant. Yet, even as some factors in American foreign policy remain relatively unchanged, it is likely that certain positive aspects of the post-Cold War policy exhibited in the "New World Order" will continue to be felt in the future.

⁶⁸ It is important to note as well that any attempts by Bush to shape the world will encounter resistance from the varied cultural traditions in the Third World. This has already occurred in the era of modernization especially notable in the Kennedy Administration. Coupled with American economic problems, cultural resistance to change will play a strong role in determining the success of American foreign policy.