

IS THE EUROPEAN UNION BECOMING A GREAT POWER?

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ABSTRACT

This thesis determines whether the European Union is becoming a great power. To do so, it addresses two questions: 1) Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy and 2) is the EU developing the military capability required of a great power? The biggest barrier to EU great power status is a unified foreign policy. The EU needs to modify its voting procedures and develop a single representative voice before it can have a unified foreign policy. Such changes will probably occur, but not in the immediate future. The EU also needs a military capability to become a great power. It is currently developing a rapid reaction force that will constitute a military capability when it comes to fruition in 2003. A secondary purpose of the thesis is to assess the utility of Neo-Realist theory for explaining EU security and defense cooperation, an area in which it has been neglected

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INTRODUCTION

Topic Definition

The European Union (EU) brings together fifteen sovereign states in a cooperative institutional arrangement. Since 1957, when the European Economic Community was created, the EU states have cooperated extensively in the realm of trade and economics. They now have a single currency and a common market, and they negotiate in trade matters as one, through the European Commission. Because of its member states' economic cooperation, the EU has become an important economic actor. Until recently, this has been in stark contrast to the EU's role as a political actor. The EU has not been a serious political entity because it has consistently failed to cooperate in security and defense matters, a history I outline at the end of this chapter. However, following some recent developments, the EU is now starting to take its place on the international political scene. At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit the EU made plans to develop a rapid reaction force (RRF) of 50,000–60,000 troops so that it will be able to use military means to defend its interests in broader Europe. It has also developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which, despite some weaknesses, often enables it to respond to international events as a single entity.

As a result of these developments, the EU has become the focus of much scholarly interest. It comprises some of the world's wealthiest and most powerful nations whose collective potential is enormous. The EU is one of the very few international actors potentially capable of challenging U.S. hegemony. This makes it a highly significant force in international politics. The EU also has theoretical significance because it is the first coalition of states ever to reach the position of a potential great power. Therefore it may herald the beginning of a new type of political actor joining the rank of importance currently occupied only by states. It is also theoretically significant because it is the world's most advanced example of cooperation between states. It provides International Relations (IR) scholars with the challenge of explaining why fifteen states are willing to cooperate to such a great extent. Considering the changes that have occurred within the EU, we can no longer relegate it to the sidelines. It is an extremely important entity, capable of changing both the polarity of the international system, and our understanding of world politics. We must begin to seriously consider what its future will be.

Is the EU becoming a great power? This is the question I seek to answer in this thesis. To do so I draw upon the criteria offered by neo-realist theorist Kenneth Waltz. He argues that a great power achieves that rank based upon how it scores in all of these areas: population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; political stability and competence; and military strength (Waltz 1979, 131). The EU unambiguously meets four of these five criteria (see Table 1.1). First, it has a population of 375 million and territory covering 3.14 million square kilometers. Second, it has large oil reserves, particularly in the North Sea and off Ireland's south coast; coal deposits; natural gas reserves; and forests, among other resources. Third, it has a Gross National Product (GNP) of \$8.6 trillion and its share of world trade is about 20 percent. Finally, it is made up of fifteen liberal democracies, all of which hold regular elections.

TABLE 1.1 Comparison of the EU and the United States in some Great Power criteria

	United States	European Union
Population	276.2 million	374.8 million
Territory	9,166,600 sq. km.	3,137,785 sq. km.
Total Oil Reserves (bbl)	24,682 billion	6,548,741 billion
GNP	\$7.8 trillion	\$8.6 trillion

Share of World Trade	25 percent	20 percent
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Source: World Desk Reference, 1999–2000 statistics. On-line. Dorling Kindersley Publishers.

Where the EU falls short of great power status is in Waltz's fifth criterion: military strength. For this reason, I analyze whether the EU is developing the military strength required of a great power. In Chapter 3, I assess how much military strength is actually required. The combined military strength of the individual EU nations already meets the requirements of a great power. But, the problem is that this power has not yet been combined. The plans made at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 are exceptional because they signal EU willingness to pool military resources. I believe that when these plans come to fruition, which should occur within the next three years, the EU would have the military strength required, elevating it to great power status. These are issues I discuss at length in Chapter 5.

The EU will not become a great power with greater military strength alone. Military strength is meaningless without the political capacity to decide when to use it. In the case of an actor like the EU, a sixth criterion needs to be added to Waltz's list: a unified foreign policy. This is presumed to exist for any state, but we cannot make the same presumption when analyzing a non-state actor. Another question I examine, therefore, is whether the EU is developing a unified foreign policy. Although the EU has a CFSP, this does not yet constitute a unified foreign policy. A unified foreign policy must consistently produce a single policy position, which can be articulated to the outside world by an authoritative representative. Because it has a general principle of unanimity voting and because it has no single voice, the CFSP does not fulfill these requirements. However, since its inception, the CFSP has undergone considerable reform. I am optimistic that it will continue to do so, particularly as the EU prepares for enlargement and the possibility of twice the membership. Although it may take a number of years, I believe the CFSP will eventually meet the requirements of the unified foreign policy criterion. On this point, I disagree with Waltz who argues that the EU will only have the foreign policy unity required of a great power if it becomes a state (Waltz 1993, 52). I believe that the EU can achieve sufficient unity in foreign policy matters and still comprise fifteen sovereign states. These are issues I discuss at length in Chapter 4.

The term "foreign policy" traditionally refers to the plans and actions of national governments toward external actors (Rosenau 1987, 3). Because it is viewed as an act of government, it is considered exclusive to states (Allen 1998a, 43). In this thesis, I employ a meaning of foreign policy, which is both broader and narrower than this. On the one hand, I adopt a broader meaning because the EU is clearly not a state with a government, yet it is capable of formulating foreign policy. Therefore, I extend the meaning to encompass non-state actors like the EU. At the same time, I adopt a narrower meaning of foreign policy. Foreign policy typically refers to any position taken toward the external world. It embodies trade policy and foreign aid policy, as well as security and defense policy (Soetendorp 1999, 2). I focus solely upon the security and defense end of the foreign policy spectrum, because this is the area in which the EU falls short of great power status.

Thesis Aims and Significance

This thesis has empirical and theoretical ambitions. The empirical ambition is to determine whether the EU is becoming a great power. This involves answering two questions: Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy? And, is the EU developing the requisite military strength? I do this in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. My conclusion is that considering that the EU will probably develop its rapid reaction force within the next few years, it is the absence of a unified foreign policy, which is the biggest barrier to EU great power status. The EU must reform its CFSP before it can have a unified foreign policy. At this stage, there are no concrete plans to do so.

The theoretical ambition is to explain EU security and defense cooperation using Neo-realism. As the dominant paradigm in international security studies, Neo-realism is a logical theoretical framework to adopt (Vasquez 1997, 902; Katzenstein 1996, xii). Surprisingly, though, it is a neglected framework in the study

of EU security affairs. In this context Neo-realism has been criticized for being too state-centric. It overlooks the importance of institutions and focuses too heavily upon structural dynamics (Peterson and Sjursen 1998; Sjursen 1999, 37–38; Duke 2000, 9–11; Long 1997, 198; Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 24; Becker 1998, 13; Taylor 1996, 169; van Ham 1996, 188; Keohane 1996, 233). Such criticism has mainly come from the liberal institutionalized school of thought, which is optimistic about the prospects of state cooperation through institutions and which highlights the importance of non-state actors. It claims that with Neo-realism's emphasis upon state actors, it cannot accommodate a non-state actor like the EU. This criticism has tended to treat Neo-realism very cursorily, and it has also overlooked the diversity of thought within Neo-realism. As I discuss in Chapter 3, Neo-realism comprises "offensive" and "defensive" variants. Defensive Neo-realism explains EU security cooperation better than offensive Neo-realism, a point I discuss at length in Chapter 6. Nevertheless the criticism of Neo-realism within the EU security cooperation literature reacts only to offensive Neo-realist arguments. In this thesis I correct the dismissal of Neo-realism in the literature by drawing upon the theory in its entirety.

This thesis is significant for two reasons. First, it sheds light upon the likelihood of the EU becoming a great power, which has important ramifications for international relations more broadly. The number of great powers determines the polarity of the international system, which in turn can affect the behavior of states (Rosenau and Durfee 2000, 24). Some scholars argue that a bipolar system is more likely to produce peace because it introduces stability and certainty into international relations (Mearsheimer 1990, 7). Others insist that multi-polarity can be just as peaceful (Van Evera 1990, 33–40). Regardless of which argument is more plausible, the polarity of the system is essential to understanding state behavior. To gain insight into the future of international politics, we must have some idea of which actors are likely to emerge, alongside the United States, as great powers.

Second, this thesis makes a contribution to international relations theory in its assessment of Neo-realism. There is a dearth of literature applying Neo-realism to the field of EU security and defense cooperation. Although Neo-realism has been used extensively to understand states' security, it has been judged inapplicable to the EU. But the EU is as much a product of states cooperating as it is an actor in its own right. If Neo-realism is a useful theoretical tool it should be able to help explain EU security cooperation. By applying Neo-realism to this research topic I am able to reach conclusions about whether this paradigm is, in fact, helpful for understanding EU security and defense cooperation. In doing so, I refine Neo-realism.

The Evolution of Security Cooperation in the European Union

In the past few years, there has been an enormous momentum towards security cooperation within the EU. Understanding this momentum requires a brief discussion of past efforts in this field. European security cooperation has been an arduous process dating back almost fifty years. In 1952 the six member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, West Germany, Italy, and France) established the European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC stemmed from Jean Monnet's idea that Europe should strengthen its collective military potential against an increasing Soviet threat. The EDC envisaged the creation of a common European army with troops supplied by the six members. These forces were to be accompanied by the European Political Community, established in 1953, which set up federal-type political institutions (Eliassen 1998, 3; Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 173; Missiroli 1999, 22).

These efforts at security integration would be short-lived. The EDC Treaty stalled in the French Parliament in 1954, primarily because of the supranational nature of the Treaty (Council of the European Union 1999). However, the French did indicate a willingness to cooperate at an intergovernmental level I foreign and security policy through the Fouchet Plan of 1961. In sharp contrast to the federalist provisions of the EDC, the intention in the Fouchet Plan was to curtail supranationalism by undermining the role of the European Community (EC) institutions, in particular the European Commission (Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 174; Dale 1999). The Fouchet Plan collapsed in 1962, when the members failed to reach a consensus on British involvement (Cameron 1999, 16).

The Luxembourg Report of 1970 unambiguously favored cooperation on an intergovernmental basis, operating entirely outside the EC framework. This marked the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC), which related exclusively to foreign policy and lasted until 1993. EPC involved regular consultation between national foreign ministers supported by a political committee. All EPC meetings took place in the capital of the country holding the EC presidency. This changed in 1986, when the Single European Act, which gave EPC a formal treaty basis, established an EPC Secretariat in Brussels (Cameron 1999, 17).

EPC was superseded in 1993 by the CFSP. This was established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (also known as the Maastricht Treaty), which, as its name suggests, created the European Union. CFSP, like EPC, is based upon intergovernmental decision making. It constitutes the second pillar of the European Union, which is based upon a tripartite pillar structure. The first pillar consists of the European Community, and the third pillar is dedicated to Justice and Home Affairs. Article 17 of the TEU states that the CFSP “shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense” (see Appendix).

The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam clarified and strengthened the TEU provisions on CFSP. Its most significant changes include the increased use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and the introduction of “constructive abstention” to try to overcome the difficulty and inflexibility of unanimity voting; the creation of the new post of High Representative (HR), which was intended to give the CFSP a higher profile and make it more coherent and consistent; and the establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) designed to give the EU an independent common planning and analysis capability (Peterson 1998, 9).

Recent Momentum

Since its first attempt at political cooperation, the EU has been under constant criticism for its inability to formulate a single voice and respond effectively to external developments threatening its security. However, the last couple of years has produced significant momentum towards the development of a unified foreign policy and a military capability. The decision at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council to create a 50,000–60,000 person rapid reaction force is a clear example of this (Presidency of the European Union 1999b).

Considering the relative inertia of EU security cooperation since the 1950s, this momentum is surprising. It can be explained by four factors. First, since the end of the Cold War, the EU has become increasingly disturbed by its military reliance upon the United States. It has assumed that with the Soviet threat gone, Washington will want to wind down its military presence in Europe, leaving the EU to develop its own capability. The end of bipolarity has also led to a greater divergence in EU and U.S. interests. The Soviet threat gave a consistency to the security interests of Europe and the United States, which no longer exists. While there is still broad agreement on many issues, the EU is more sensitive than it previously was about its dependence upon the United States.

Second, its inability to act in the Kosovo war made the EU fully cognizant of its heavy reliance upon the United States and the poor state of its own military assets. It simply lacked the military hardware to contribute more than a small fraction of the aircraft, bombs and munitions needed to defeat Slobodan Milosevic. Instead, the EU resorted to economic embargoes and diplomatic measures. Since Kosovo, the EU has realized that if it wants its diplomacy to be more effective, and it wants to protect itself against security threats in its own backyard, it must create an independent military force (Pond 1999a).

Third, the EU has emerged as a significant economic power and now wants to adopt a commensurate political role (Council of the European Union 1999). The EU has a borderless market, a single currency, and worldwide trade relations. Integration in the economic realm has sparked a desire for further integration in the security sphere. As integrationists often note, this is the final frontier in cooperation. The EU will never possess full international credibility until it takes this last step.

Finally, there has been a dramatic shift in the British attitude toward European security and defense cooperation. This change can be attributed to the preferences of Prime Minister Tony Blair, whose thinking marks a sharp break from the anti-European rhetoric and policies of his conservative predecessors Margaret Thatcher and John Major. Blair wants to see the EU emerge as a capable political entity. In a recent speech he commented that “the EU can, in its economic and political strength, be a superpower” (Blair 2000). These are strong words from the leader of a country, which has been opposed to a politically powerful EU for so long. With Britain on board, the push toward EU security cooperation no longer emanates mainly from France’s efforts to minimize United States influence. The EU now has a more unified approach, which is a vital component of any security cooperation.

Thesis Structure

In Chapter 2, I conduct a literature review, which identifies the dearth of theoretical literature examining EU security cooperation. Most of the literature is either purely descriptive or normative. The very small percentage, which is theoretical mostly, stems from the liberal institutionalist school of thought. In this chapter, I more closely examine the broad rejection of Neo-realism in the EU security context.

Then, in Chapter 3, I examine the core assumptions of Neo-realism and separate the paradigm into its “offensive” and “defensive” variants, to capture more thoroughly the full spectrum of Neo-realist thought. I particularly focus upon how each variant explains cooperation between states and the role of institutions. Chapter 3 demonstrates that Neo-realism is more diverse than many analysts give it credit for. In this chapter I also detail my methodology, which centers on Waltz’s five criteria of great power and the sixth criterion I have added.

Chapters 4 and 5 constitute the empirical section of the thesis. Here I put theoretical considerations aside. In these chapters I answer the two questions: Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy? And is the EU developing the requisite military capability? In Chapter 4, I examine the CFSP and assess whether it constitutes a unified foreign policy. My conclusion is that it does not, because it lacks sufficient external representation. However, it could develop into a unified foreign policy with some institutional reform and with further state cooperation. In Chapter 5, I assess the EU’s defense capability. My conclusion is that if the 1999 plans for a rapid reaction force eventuate, and I am confident that they will, the EU will have the requisite military capability.

In Chapter 6 I assess the utility of Neo-realism in this research context and make refinements to it. In this way, the theory is made progressive. I also address the main question of whether the EU is becoming a great power. My conclusion is that even though the EU will possess the requisite military capability when its plans for a crisis management force come to fruition, it still does not possess a unified foreign policy. The EU must reform its CFSP before it can achieve great power status. In the concluding sections of the thesis, I discuss the implications of my analysis for the theory and practice of international politics.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on EU security cooperation is more voluminous than theoretically rigorous. Much of the literature is purely descriptive, with a particular focus upon the EU institutions and the changes implemented by the EU treaties. A great deal of it is normative and centers around the debate over whether or not the EU should develop a security and defense dimension. A smaller percentage of the literature provides a theoretical contribution to the study of the EU's security cooperation, most of which stems from the liberal school of thought. Neo-realism is virtually neglected in this field of study. In this thesis I use Neo-realist theory to explain EU security and defense cooperation and thereby address both the dearth of theoretical literature and the neglect of Neo-realism.

I. Descriptive Literature

Because the EU is a relatively new entity that is constantly changing and maturing, a body of literature has emerged devoted purely to describing its latest developments in the security realm. Much of the descriptive literature emanates from the EU itself. The EU has several web sites, which detail its developments and offer access to important primary sources such as Presidency Conclusions and treaty texts. The web sites of both NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) also provide helpful primary sources. For the very latest news, newspaper articles are also a good source. More and more of these can be obtained over the Internet.

A number of monographs and chapters within monographs describes security and defense affairs in the EU (Forster and Wallace 1996, 411–435; Regelsberger, Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wessels 1997; Holland 1994; Henderson 1999; Cameron 1999; Jorgensen 1998, 79–94; Flockhart 1998; Edwards and Nuttall 1994, 84–103; Pryce 1994, 36–52). Many of the sources focus upon the institutions of the EU and the various roles they play in the CFSP, as well as the changes implemented as a result of the Amsterdam Treaty. All in all, the descriptive literature on EU security provides detailed overviews of the institutional mechanisms underpinning the CFSP, but little analysis of the CFSP's broader significance.

II. Normative Literature

Much of the normative literature describes the current security and defense dimension of the EU and then contributes to the debate over whether or not the EU should continue developing this dimension. One school of thought or another usually implicitly guides the authors. Those who caution against the development of a military capability and unified foreign policy usually base their stance on two arguments. First, some say that the EU's strength lies in the fact that it has thus far been a "civilian power." It has proved to the world that force is unnecessary and in doing so encourages the spread of peace. From this perspective, the EU should put its efforts into developing diplomatic adeptness and encouraging democratization throughout Europe (Rosecrance 1998; Smith 1998). This argument is clearly influenced by liberal thinking, but is not, in itself, theoretically sophisticated.

The second argument cautions against the development of an *independent* security and defense dimension. Scholars making this point contend that a limited defense capability is acceptable, so long as it is created alongside the United States, within the context of NATO. It can be used for humanitarian missions and to provide EU diplomacy with some teeth. In this view, a more robust EU can also help balance out an alliance where the United States currently carries a disproportionate burden. However, some fear that if the EU develops its own foreign policy and military, it could emerge as a competitor against the United States. If the EU and the United States continue to cooperate in the defense and security realm, no balance of power will emerge between the two and peace is more likely (Garter 1998). This is an "Atlanticist" point of

view, which runs contrary to the “Europeanist” one arguing for the development of an independent force. More broadly, it is also liberal.

On the other side of the debate are those who encourage the full development of an EU security and defense dimension. Their argument is basically that this is essential to the EU if it is to emerge as an international actor. As Helene Sjursen says, “From this perspective the issue of autonomy and independence is primordial, and the ability of the EU to act in the security and defense realm is seen as a fundamental component of the EU’s political identity” (Sjursen 1998, 98–99). However, this position does not necessarily advocate a termination of Europe’s alliance with the United States. Many authors have stressed that while the EU should be a capable political actor, it should assure the United States that its intentions are benign and work to keep strong Trans-Atlantic ties (Kupchan 2000). Though it is not explicitly stated, this normative argument stems from the realist school of thought. It is also a position favored by “Europeanists.”

III. Theoretical Literature

There is a dearth of theoretical literature examining security and defense within the EU. This is somewhat difficult to understand. Some scholars suggest that the *sui generis* nature of the EU make the use of traditional theories obsolete. The EU is “pre-theory” in this regard (Peterson and Sjursen 1998, 170; Bretherton and Vogler 1999). This reasoning is unsatisfactory. A new entity like the EU provides International Relations scholars with a good opportunity to test the explanatory utility of established theories. If a theory cannot explain the empirical data then it needs to be refined. Abandoning theory altogether is not a sound alternative.

Liberalism

Most of the theoretical literature on EU security is broadly located in the liberal paradigm (Moravcsik 1993; Long 1997; and Soetendorp 1999). Liberal institutionalism explains security and defense cooperation in the EU by focusing upon the role of institutions. It suggests that institutions are not simply outcomes of state preferences, but that they have an independent quality that enables them to shape state preferences, prompting further cooperation (McKenzie and Loedel 1998, 11). From this point of view, the rules and norms that were originally adopted by the EU member states have tempered any competitiveness and provoked their desire for further cooperation. Integration theory views the most recent developments as part of the broader process of economic and political integration. It argues that one step towards integration “spills over” into another, and that the integrative process will continue until full political union results (Haas 1958; Taylor 1989).

Neo-realism

Despite the fact that it is generally regarded as the dominant paradigm in security studies, Neo-realism has been virtually disregarded in the study of EU security cooperation. Following the end of the Cold War, two prominent Neo-realists, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, made predictions about European affairs, but both wrote prior to the creation of the EU, and thus their contribution has not filled this gap in the literature. Mearsheimer was pessimistic about European cooperation. He predicted that Europe would be substantially more prone to violence under the multi-polarity of the post-Cold War era than it has been since World War II. He was not confident that institutions could overcome conflict between the European states (Mearsheimer 1990).

Waltz predicted that Germany or a “West European state” might rise to great power rank. The fact that he foresaw the possibility of Western Europe making “the collective decision to become a single state” is

telling. It suggests that, according to Waltzian Neo-realist logic, state cooperation in security affairs is possible, indeed even that states will pool their sovereignty to achieve security (Waltz 1993).

In a 2000 article, Waltz revisits the notion of a European power—this time the EU or a German-led coalition—rising to great power status. He suggests this will not occur “in the absence of radical change” (essentially Europe becoming a state). He is dubious about the prospects of this and, therefore, predicts a European great power is unlikely (Waltz 2000, 31–32). I believe the EU could be a great power and retain an intergovernmental system, a point I will discuss further in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, Waltz’s article is the only Neo-realist piece that discusses EU security cooperation. However, it does so only very briefly and does not conduct a discussion of the theoretical considerations behind EU security cooperation. Therefore, I do not consider that it fills the gap in the literature.

Most analysts conclude that Neo-realism is an inappropriate theoretical tool in the study of EU security (Duke 2000, 9; Bretherton and Vogler 1999, 24; Becker 1998, 13; Taylor 1994, 169). This rejection of Neo-realism is based on two main criticisms: first, that it does not take sufficient account of international institutions; and second, that it cannot adequately explain cooperation between states. These criticisms are only valid, however, when a very small slice of Neo-realist thought is considered. As I shall discuss in the next chapter, Neo-realism embodies a diverse range of thinking about cooperation between states. It is not limited to the arguments of “aggressive” or “offensive” Neo-realists like Mearsheimer. It also includes the thoughts of “defensive” Neo-realists, such as Stephen Walt (1987), Robert Jervis (1999) and Charles Glaser (1994–1995), which are more optimistic about the prospect of state cooperation. If Neo-realism is represented properly, the standard criticisms are invalid.

In sum, most of the literature on EU security cooperation is descriptive or normative. The small amount of theoretical literature largely stems from the liberal school of thought. In this thesis I will use Neo-realism to assess EU cooperation in the security realm. In doing so I will address the two imbalances in the literature: first, the scarcity of theoretical literature and second, within the theoretical literature itself, the dearth of Neo-realist theory.

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Neo-realism is the dominant paradigm in international security studies. As such, it would seem to be a logical starting point for understanding EU security cooperation. Surprisingly, Neo-realism is a neglected paradigm in this field of study. It has been rejected mainly because of the widespread belief that it is unable to account for cooperation between the EU states and the impact of the EU institutions upon its members. But this rejection rests on a flawed understanding of the paradigm. There is more to Neo-realism than the arguments of John Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer is an “offensive” Neo-realist and, as such, he sees the world in a more competitive and pessimistic light than his “defensive” Neo-realist counterparts. Defensive Neo-realists are able to explain cooperation between the EU states and the role of EU institutions better than offensive Neo-realists. In this chapter I examine the core assumptions of Neo-realism and then explain their different interpretations by the two Neo-realist variants. I particularly focus upon the two variants’ explanation of state cooperation and the role of institutions. These two Neo-realist schools provide the framework for my subsequent analysis of EU security cooperation.

In this chapter I also discuss the methodological approach I have adopted in this thesis. To answer the question, “Is the EU becoming a great power?” I have drawn upon the methodology offered by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of Neo-realism. Waltz uses a set of five criteria to determine great power: population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; political stability and competence; and military strength (Waltz 1979, 131). I focus only upon one of these, military strength. In the case of the EU, the other four are fulfilled. I have modified Waltz’s methodological framework by adding a sixth criterion: a unified foreign policy. As I discuss below, this criterion fits well within the Neo-realist approach.

I. Neo-realist Theory

The Assumptions of Neo-realism

Realism is a general approach to international politics, not a single theory. It dates back as far as Thucydides, the chronicler of the ancient Peloponnesian Wars, who wrote, “The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept” (Thucydides 1978, 402). Neo-realism draws on Realist core beliefs to build a deductive, social-scientific theory of international politics.

Neo-realists base their understanding of the world upon four key assumptions. First, anarchy (the absence of any common sovereign) is the distinguishing feature of international politics. Without a central authority to guarantee states’ security, a self-help system exists, where states must rely upon their own means to protect their interests. In this anarchic international system, security is the highest goal of states.

Second, states are the most important actors in the international system. While non-state actors (NSAs), like corporations and multinational organizations, do play an important role, the state is paramount. Neo-realism is often criticized for overlooking the importance of NSAs. But this is a mischaracterization of Neo-realism. As Waltz says, “The importance of nonstate actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious.” Parsimony is an essential part of theory, though. As Waltz explains: “States are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them, but by the major ones” (Waltz 1986a, 88).

Third, states are rational actors. Robert Keohane explains this term: “To say governments act rationally . . . means that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality” (Keohane 1986a, 11). Neo-realists point out that the preferences of

states are strongly constrained by the anarchy in the international system, which makes security the most important preference of any state. Although states are rational, they may miscalculate from time to time because they operate in a world of imperfect information (Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 337).

Fourth, states are unitary actors. States do not speak to the rest of the world through multiple voices. Although there may be domestic disputes over a particular policy direction, only one policy will be directed internationally (Rosenau and Durfee 2000, 14). For this reason, Neo-realists argue that domestic dynamics are inconsequential for explaining state interaction. This does not mean, however, that analysis must always remain at the structural level. Neo-realism freely admits that to get a complete explanation of any event a unit level or individual level of analysis may be used (Waltz 1979, 126; Buzan 1996, 51). In fact, Waltz insists that a complete understanding of international politics cannot be reached without looking at domestic factors.

Beyond these four assumptions, there are differences of opinion within Neo-realism. This is particularly the case regarding the role of institutions and the prospect of cooperation between states. Dividing Neo-realist scholars into offensive and defensive composites captures this variation of thought well.

Offensive Neo-realism

Offensive Neo-realists believe that the international system promotes aggression and conflict. It is a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other and have little reason to trust each other (Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 336). Security is scarce, making international competition intense and war likely. Rational states are often compelled to adopt offensive strategies in their search for security. Mutual security is rarely sought or cannot be gained: states have security requirements that are incompatible with other states or they are willing to risk war to expand (Lynn–Jones and Miller 1995, xi; Jervis 1999). Power is the most important factor in international relations, because the more power states have, the less likely they will be overcome by other states. States seek to maximize power and also seek to balance the power of other states. Mearsheimer provides the preeminent example of an offensive Neo-realist. Waltz displays some characteristics of both offensive and defensive Neo-realism, and has been described as having “a foot in both camps” (Snyder 1991, 12, n 36).

A. The Prospects for State Cooperation

Offensive Neo-realists are pessimistic about state cooperation, but they do not rule it out altogether. The balance of power will often produce cooperation in the form of alliances, but any alliance must be viewed in temporary terms. Because of the self-help system, which arises from international anarchy, no state can entirely depend upon another for security. According to Mearsheimer, alliances “are only temporary marriages of convenience, where today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s alliance partner” (Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 338). For this reason, cooperation is likely to be short-lived, and no state can become reliant upon it. Because cooperation is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, it will always be difficult. States are not rewarded for trusting each other in a self-help system, and so no amount of cooperation will override the presence of international competition. According to Mearsheimer, there is no such thing as a “status-quo” power, that is, a power which is content with the amount of security it has. All states have aggressive intentions, although not all states will have the capabilities to act upon those intentions.

According to offensive Neo-realism, cooperation is inhibited by two main factors: relative-gains considerations, and concern about cheating, both of which stem from the logic of anarchy (Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 339; Grieco 1990, 28). When a state contemplates cooperation it can think about it in terms of absolute gains, which means the state cares only about what it gains from the cooperation. Or it can think about it in terms of relative gains, which means the state considers how well it does compared to the other side. According to offensive Neo-realists, in an anarchic and competitive world, states try to maximize

power to survive. Therefore they must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation. This makes cooperation difficult because no state will want to do worse than the state it is cooperating with.

Randall Schweller responds to this reasoning by pointing out that while state A might be relatively worse off by cooperating with state B, it could be better off vis-à-vis all outsiders to the agreement. If A turned down cooperation with B based on relative-gains considerations, B might cooperate with C, leaving A worse off in absolute and relative terms (Schweller 1996, 109–110). This is a strong retort to the offensive Neo-realist position on cooperation and one, which I shall address in Chapter 6 in the context of EU security cooperation.

The second factor inhibiting cooperation, according to offensive Neo-realists, is concern over cheating. The reasoning here is that states are often reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements for fear that the other side will cheat on the agreement and gain a relative advantage. In a world where there is no ultimate arbiter, this will always be a possibility.

B. The Role of Institutions

The title of Mearsheimer's article, "The False Promise of International Institutions," sums up the offensive Neo-realist position on institutions (1994–1995). In this article Mearsheimer concludes that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior. Defined as "a set of rules that stipulate the way in which states should cooperate and compete with each other," institutions, according to Mearsheimer, merely reflect state calculations of self-interest. States operate through institutions, but they are not shaped by those institutions. Institutions do not have an independent quality; they only mirror the distribution of power in the international system (Mearsheimer 1994–1995, 340).

Not only are institutions exclusively dependent upon states, but they also matter very little, according to offensive Neo-realists. They do not promote peace, and placing too much reliance upon them can simply have pernicious effects (Mearsheimer 1995, 376). Basically offensive Neo-realism views the world as a place of extensive competition between states, which is barely modified by the presence of institutions.

In the spectrum of thinking about the role of institutions, this position sits at one end. The position at the other end of the spectrum is that occupied by liberal institutionalists, who contend that institutions can take on "a life of their own" and shape the interests of their members (McKenzie and Loedel 1998, 11). Defensive Neo-realists occupy a position somewhere between these two.

Defensive Neo-realism

Unlike offensive Neo-realists, defensive Neo-realists do not believe that the international system necessarily generates war and conflict. States that understand the international system will realize that security is plentiful and that defensive strategies are the best route to security. From this viewpoint, two potential competitors would be happy with the status quo of mutual security. Conflict results when one side's attempts to increase security are viewed externally as acts of aggression. This is the security dilemma (Taliaferro 2000–2001, 129). International politics represents tragedy rather than evil. Of course states do act aggressively sometimes, and when this happens, conflict is unavoidable (Jervis 1999, 49). Rather than focusing upon the state's search for power, defensive Neo-realists emphasize the search for security. They do not see an automatic relationship between power and security in the same way that offensive Neo-realists do (Waltz 1993; Mearsheimer 1990). Defensive Neo-realists argue that the level and direction of threat is more important than the distribution of power. The quintessential defensive Neo-realist piece is *The Origins of Alliances*, written by Stephen Walt (1987). Other defensive Neo-realists include Charles Glaser, Stephen Van Evera, Robert Jervis, and, occasionally, Waltz.

A. The Prospects for State Cooperation

Defensive Neo-realists argue that states seek security, not power, *per se*. For this reason, there are good prospects for cooperation. Competition is not an inevitable logical consequence of Neo-realism's basic assumptions (Glaser 1995, 378). Cooperation is possible where two status quo powers face each other in a security dilemma, but not where a status quo power faces a revisionist power. In the former situation, security will be made more likely where there is increased transparency; where the gains from cheating and the costs from being cheated on are low; where mutual cooperation is more beneficial than defection; and where each side employs strategies of reciprocity (Jervis 1999, 52). Defensive Neo-realists seek to overturn the "competition bias" established by offensive Neo-realism by illustrating the range of cooperative options available to states.

B. The Role of Institutions

There is divergence within the defensive Neo-realist composite about whether institutions have causal significance. This can be illustrated by reference to the arguments of Glaser and Jervis. Glaser understands cooperation between states as a product of the international system. He argues that offensive Neo-realist predictions about the limits of cooperation rest on flawed deductions from Neo-realism's core assumptions. According to Glaser, because security, not power, is the highest goal of states, and cooperating will often be the best way to achieve security, cooperation follows deductively from Neo-realist assumptions. Because Glaser sees cooperation as arising logically from anarchy, he does not grant a special role to institutions. Like Mearsheimer, he argues that they are dependent upon state preferences (Glaser 1995, 411).

Jervis, on the other hand, argues that institutions can play a special role. He argues that "when the actors have limited foresight" institutions can be autonomous by affecting actors' preferences over outcomes. He argues that when states enter institutional arrangements, they will often seek to bind others and even themselves to behave in certain ways in the future, only rarely will they seek to alter their preferences over outcomes. This, however, is an unintended consequence of institutions. Not only do they bind the members more than the founders foresaw they would, but they also change beliefs about what is possible and desirable (Jervis 1999).

Defensive Neo-realists generally argue that states are willing to cooperate extensively through institutions. Though this requires transferring some of their sovereignty, states are willing to do this. Waltz's suggestion that the EU could become a single state shows that from his view states could potentially cooperate to the point of transferring all their sovereignty to an institution. Defensive Neo-realists broadly agree that institutions are outcomes of their members' interests, but they also provide a forum for extensive cooperation, which does make them significant. They disagree with Mearsheimer's assertion that institution matter very little.

These differences between the two Neo-realist composites illustrate the inadequacy of judging Neo-realism solely upon the arguments of Mearsheimer. As an offensive Neo-realist, Mearsheimer has a pessimistic view of international politics. He sees the world as an extremely competitive place, prone to conflict. Neo-realism embodies more diverse views than this, though. In its defensive variant, it finds that cooperation between states is a likely outcome when they do not behave aggressively. Unlike offensive Neo-realism, it also considers institutions significant, though generally dependent. I shall draw upon these variants in Chapter 6 in order to understand EU security cooperation.

II. Methodology

To address the question of whether the EU is becoming a great power, I draw on the criteria offered by Waltz for great power status: population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; political

stability and competence; and military strength (Waltz 1979, 131). As I discussed in Chapter 1, the EU already meets four of these criteria, but as a single entity, it currently lacks military strength. Thus, I seek to answer the question: Is the EU developing a requisite military capability? The second question I address is: Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy? I believe this is an important sixth criterion that needs to be added to Waltz's list when a non-state actor is being considered. As noted, Waltz agrees that this criterion should be added for clarity.

The Sixth Criterion: A Unified Foreign Policy.

In Waltz's framework for understanding what makes a great power, he refers specifically to states. The EU is clearly not a state and to understand whether it is developing as a great power, some consideration needs to be made of how it differs from a state. An obvious source of difference is foreign policy. As I discussed in the previous section, Neo-realism assumes that states are unitary actors. They speak with one voice and direct one foreign policy to the world. Although the EU has a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its member states also retain separate foreign policies. Waltz seems to suggest that so long as these fifteen different policies exist alongside an EU policy, the EU will not become a great power. He says that only if the EU makes "the collective decision to become a single state" will it take this step (Waltz 1993, 52). Waltz believes that the EU needs to be a state to become a great power because only states have central governments with enough authority to make the foreign policy decisions required of a great power. He argues that any entity short of a state is unlikely to have the necessary decision-making capabilities. Waltz concedes, however, that this is a question open to further research and examination.

I do not agree with Waltz that the EU needs to be a single state to be a great power. It does need a unified foreign policy so that it can act authoritatively, but this does not require its transformation into a state. A unified foreign policy provides only one external position, which is represented by a central authoritative body or figure. In the case of states, governments provide this. A foreign policy position must be accepted domestically whether it is approved of or not. For example, a national peace movement may disapprove of its country's decision to go to war, but it nevertheless acknowledges that the decision is binding upon the state. But a state is not necessarily the only actor able to formulate foreign policy. Any actor who meets the requirement of unity could conceivably possess a foreign policy.

In this thesis, I call this sixth criterion of great power a unified foreign policy. Using the simpler term "foreign policy" is inadequate, because the EU already has a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The CFSP, at this stage, does not meet the requirements of a unified foreign policy because it does not consistently produce a single policy position, which adequately represents the fifteen EU members, and it lacks an authoritative voice. These are issues I take up in Chapter 4.

Waltz's requirement that the EU must become a single state before it can be considered a great power is a threshold that, in my opinion, is too high. Of course, allowing the member states to retain some autonomy potentially creates divisiveness, but this need not be any different from the domestic competitions, which arise with the formulation of a state's foreign policy. Domestically, one voice always wins over the others. The other points of view remain, but they are not expressed externally. The same goes for an entity like the EU. Each member state may have differing opinions about which foreign policy stance should prevail, but as long as one position eventually prevails, and no other position is adopted to undermine it, this should be enough to place the EU into the category of a great power. If the EU has a collective position, which can be backed by an adequate military capability (the fifth great power criterion), then considering its rating in other criteria, it would be a great power.

The Fifth Criterion: Requisite Military Capability.

To determine whether the EU meets the fifth criterion, I establish an appropriate standard of military strength. Three important points influence the formulation of this standard. First, the rank of great power

depends upon how an actor scores “on a combination” of the criteria set out by Waltz (Waltz 1993, 48). Therefore, if an actor is particularly strong in a few areas, it can be less strong in the others and still be ranked as a great power. The EU is a very strong economic actor. According to Waltz, this is a particularly important attribute of great power: “. . . without a considerable economic capability no state can hope to sustain a world role” (Waltz 1993, 48). For this reason the EU need not rely so much on military strength the way, for example, the Soviet Union needed to (Waltz 1993, 48–49). Of course, military strength is important. As Waltz says, “no state lacking the military ability to compete with other great powers has ever been ranked among them” (Waltz 1993, 52). But it need not be an actor’s main strength if it rates well in other areas.

Second, nuclear weapons are particularly important in the calculation of military strength. In his analysis of whether or not Japan and Germany will emerge as great powers, Waltz assesses whether either will obtain nuclear weapons (Waltz 1993). Although he says that, “nuclear weapons alone do not make states into great powers,” a nuclear-capable secondary power can become great. Nuclear weapons make the size of an actor’s conventional forces less important. So long as an actor has enough nuclear force to adopt a deterrent strategy, then large conventional forces are unnecessary. Some conventional force is required, but only enough to act as a “trip-wire,” that is, only enough to require the adversary to attack on a scale large enough to reveal the extent of its aggressive intentions (Waltz 1993, 50). When an aggressor’s intentions are revealed to a nuclear power, that power has the option of stopping the aggressor with nuclear weapons. This knowledge deters potential aggressors. Even a small nuclear force provides deterrence because as Bernard Brodie explains: “Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and superior types” (Brodie 1973, 321).

Third, military strength does not just protect a power from attack; it also enables a power to carry out its foreign policy. An actor’s military capability should be measured according to its interests and the security threats it faces. Since the end of the Cold War, Western Europe’s main concerns have shifted from the Soviet Union to the more diverse threats in Central and Eastern Europe. Among the most serious of these new threats are political and economic instability (for example, in several Balkan countries), ethnic and border problems (Chechnya and the former Yugoslavia), terrorism, organized crime, and environmental degradation. In order to protect its interests in places like Kosovo, the EU must have the conventional military force to back up its diplomatic efforts in a wider European context.

These three points enable me to formulate a standard for measuring the military strength criterion. Because the EU rates so well in the other areas of great power, particularly economic strength, it need not have overwhelming military strength, like the Soviet Union needed in order to compensate for its economic weaknesses. If the EU is covered by nuclear deterrence, it does not require a large conventional force either. It only needs a conventional force big enough to act as a “trip-wire,” and to protect its interests and support its diplomacy in wider Europe. Using this standard allows me to reach the conclusion in Chapter 5 that the EU *is* developing the requisite military capability.

Determining whether the EU is developing a unified foreign policy and a military capability enables me to address the question: Is the EU becoming a great power? At this point in time, there is only one great power on the international scene—the United States. If the EU were to become a great power, it would join the United States’ ranks. This would change the polarity of the international system, which has important ramifications for the behavior of all states.

IS THE EU DEVELOPING A UNIFIED FOREIGN POLICY?

The sixth criterion for determining whether an actor is a great power is the presence of a unified foreign policy. This criterion is unnecessary when examining states, but not when assessing a non-state entity like the EU. At this point in time, the EU has a “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP). In the first section of this chapter I will explain how this falls short of a unified foreign policy as I defined it in Chapter 3. To do so, I will provide an overview of how the CFSP operates. In the second section, I will determine the likelihood of the CFSP developing into a unified foreign policy. This requires assessing the impact of EU enlargement and the likelihood of CFSP reform. If the EU reduces unanimity voting on CFSP matters and provides the CFSP with a single voice, then its prospects for developing a unified foreign policy are good.

I. The Current Absence of a Unified Foreign Policy in the EU

As I discussed in Chapter 3, the defining quality of foreign policy is that it is unified. This means that it consists of only one external position. Domestically, there is always a range of differing opinions about the best course of action. Foreign policy distills these opinions and formulates a single position. Outsiders must be able to rely upon this single position as the direction that the actor will take. Outsiders must also be able to obtain this position from an authoritative foreign policy representative. In the case of states, governments fulfill this role.

I will examine four key aspects of the CFSP in order to explain why it does not satisfy the requirements of a unified foreign policy. First I will look at the two treaties which created the CFSP: the TEU (Maastricht Treaty) and the Amsterdam Treaty. Second, I examine the agents of the CFSP, including, among others, the fifteen EU member states, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, and the Presidency. Third, I discuss the CFSP instruments, in particular, common strategies, common positions and joint actions; and fourth, the CFSP decision-making procedures, particularly the voting methods within the CFSP.

1) The CFSP Treaties

The EU is founded not upon a constitution, but upon international treaties among sovereign nations. It differs from an international organization, though, because it has the power to enact laws that are directly binding on all EU citizens throughout the EU territory (Davidson 1994, 6). The CFSP was brought into existence by Title V of the TEU. Its objectives, as stated in Article 11, include “safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union”; “strengthening the security of the Union and its member states in all ways”; and “promoting international cooperation.” The EU was to pursue these broad objectives by establishing systemic cooperation between member states. More controversial is the TEU that deals with the possibility of a defense dimension within the CFSP via Article 14. It states that the CFSP “shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”

One of the main purposes of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which preceded the draft Amsterdam Treaty, was to make the CFSP more effective and to equip the Union better for its role in international politics. This stemmed from the broad agreement that during its first three years, the CFSP had not lived up to expectations (Cameron 1999, 60). The final Amsterdam Treaty made important changes to the CFSP, such as the reduction of unanimity voting and the creation of the new post of High Representative (HR). These amendments have certainly improved some of the problems plaguing the

CFSP, but others persist. I shall discuss the CFSP in its current form throughout this section to explain why it does not constitute a unified foreign policy.

2) The Agents of the CFSP

The Member States

The fifteen member states of the EU are obviously key actors within the CFSP. This is more the case than in other areas of EU policy making, like trade policy, because the CFSP remains largely at the intergovernmental level. The Commission (the supranational EU institution) has little CFSP authority. The EU member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The members have undertaken to support the CFSP “in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” (Article 11). Each member can lay before the Council any foreign and security policy issue and submit proposals to it. Member states ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions (an instrument I shall discuss later) and they defend these common positions in the international forum. Under Article 11 of the TEU, members “shall refrain from any action, which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.”

The European Council

The EU members formulate the CFSP largely by operating through intergovernmental institutions. The most important institution in this regard is the European Council. It is composed of Heads of State and Government and the Commission President, who meet at least once every six months. The European Council has the responsibility for setting the guidelines for the CFSP, and its decisions are important both substantively and for the catalytic effect they have on the policy process. While the European Council is the most authoritative EU institution, it rarely has the time to engage in detailed debate on foreign policy. Such debate generally occurs in the General Affairs Council (GAC) which is the main CFSP decision-making body. The GAC meets monthly and considers policy options, addresses and resolves disagreements, and issues foreign policy statements and initiatives.

The Council of the European Union (the Council)

The European Council is distinct from, and easily confused with, the Council of the European Union, which was formerly known as the Council of Ministers and is usually referred to simply as “the Council.” The Council is composed of ministerial representatives from each member state. For CFSP matters, the Council comprises Foreign Affairs Ministers who meet in the GAC. The Council, through the GAC, has to take decisions concerning the formulation and implementation of the CFSP on the basis of the general guidelines, which the European Council lays down. The Council works with the Commission to ensure that there is consistency across the EU pillar structure.

Bodies Responsible for GAC Proceedings

The GAC proceedings are prepared by both the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) and the Political Committee (PoCo) and, at a lower level, working parties. Coreper has overall responsibility for preparing the work of the Council in all its compositions. This means that all items submitted to the Council must previously have been placed on the agenda of Coreper. PoCo is composed of the Political Directors of member states and the Commission. Its main tasks include monitoring the international situation in CFSP areas, contributing to the definition of policies, and monitoring the implementation of agreed policies. CFSP working parties are composed of experts from EU member states and the Commission. They meet to elaborate policy documents and options for the consideration of the PoCo.

The Presidency

Every six months a member state takes the combined Presidency of the European Council, the Council, Coreper, PoCo, and the working parties. The Presidency is responsible for the implementation of CFSP decisions and represents the EU in CFSP matters. It expresses the position of the EU in international organizations and at international conferences. At the moment the Presidency is held by France; in 2001, it will be held first by Sweden and then by Belgium.

The regularity with which the Presidency changes has been a source of criticism. First, the Presidency is not easily identifiable as a visible and continuous actor on the international scene. Second, each Presidency tries to make its mark within its six-month term in fields of national importance, which creates a focus on short-term results and erratic changes of emphasis (Kudlich 1998). On the other hand, the frequency of the change in Presidency has been praised for ensuring a regular injection of new political will (Ricketts 1998). It also bolsters the popular legitimacy of the EU, because each country, regardless of size, is given a turn at the helm.

The High Representative

The Presidency is assisted in its tasks by the new post of High Representative (HR), created by the Amsterdam Treaty. The High Representative is the Secretary-General of the Council. According to Article 18, the HR will assist the Presidency in the external representation of the EU and in the implementation of decisions in CFSP matters. The HR also has the task of assisting the Council, in particular through “contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third countries” (Article 26). The HR is placed under the authority of the EU’s foreign ministers and the Presidency in particular. The former NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, is the first person to hold the position of HR.

The HR post was created to give more continuity from one Presidency to another and to give a face to the CFSP. It was hoped that it might respond to the well-known question posed by Henry Kissinger: “Whom do I call when I want to speak to Europe?” However, this prospect is unlikely considering that it is the Presidency, not the HR, which actually represents the EU in matters concerning CFSP. The authority, which the HR exercises will depend largely upon how, the rotating Presidency interprets the HR’s ability to “assist.” As Simon Duke points out, it is difficult to imagine the HR having significant sway in one of the presidencies of the major members (Duke 1999, 8).

The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit

The HR is aided in his or her task by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which was also established by the Amsterdam Treaty. The PPEWU’s mandate includes monitoring, analysis and assessment of international developments and events, including early warning on potential crises. It also includes drafting, upon Council request or on its own initiative, of policy options which may contain recommendations and strategies for presentation to the Council. The PPEWU provides a response to the question asked by John Peterson: “how could the EU ever have a ‘common’ foreign policy without a common planning and analysis capability?” (Peterson 1998, 9). In this way, it is an important institutional step forward for the EU. It provides the EU with another means by which to bring together its member state interests.

The Commission

The Commission, unlike the European Council or the Council, is a supranational EU institution. Its twenty Commissioners—two each from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and one from each

of the other member states, act in the Union's interest, independently of the national governments that nominated them. In the EU's first pillar, the Commission is a central actor. It is not central in Pillar II, though, because member states have been adamant about keeping the CFSP at the intergovernmental, as opposed to the supranational level.

The Commission is "fully associated" with the work of the CFSP (Article 27) and in many ways acts like a sixteenth member state. Like any member it may refer to the Council any question relating to CFSP and request the Presidency to convene an extraordinary Council meeting. The Commission also works with the Council to ensure overall consistency of EU external activities as a whole.

The Commission, upset about its estrangement from foreign policy making, sought to obtain a more important role in the Amsterdam Treaty. However, no important concessions were made to it as the Treaty fortified the preeminence of the Council over EU foreign policy making. This served to emphasize the already tense relationship between the Commission and the Council. This tension is an institutionally based reflection of the two "cultures" of the EU: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (Allen 1998a, 42). The move to supranationalism will only come when the member states provide the political will. As the Amsterdam Treaty illustrated, the Commission's own desire to have a heightened role is virtually meaningless.

3) CFSP Instruments

There is a wide range of instruments available to the EU in the implementation of the CFSP. The Amsterdam Treaty added two new instruments, common strategies and international agreements, to the instruments already provided for in the TEU (common positions, joint actions and declarations). The CFSP instruments are roughly outlined in Article 12.

Common Positions

The purpose of a common position is to define the approach of the Union to a particular matter and to make cooperation between the member states more systematic (Article 15). The Council can adopt a common position to set out the Union's position on particular geographical or topical issues. The members then ensure that their national policies are in line with the common position and they support it at international conferences and within international organizations. As a result of this instrument, member states are increasingly aligning their voting strategies internationally. A common European voice has become a decisive factor within the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Joint Actions

The Council adopts joint actions in certain situations requiring operational action by the EU. Joint actions enable member states and the EC to commit material and financial resources, within the framework of a concerted action. The joint action is a legal instrument, which is binding on the EU states and may only be deviated from under special circumstances. It differs from a common position because it forms a basis for a common Union approach at the international level, rather than simply setting the ground plan for member states' national foreign policies (European Commission 1999). Examples of joint actions include monitoring elections and supporting democracy in Russia and South Africa; supporting the Middle East Peace Process and lobbying for the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Cameron 1999, 43).

Common Strategies

The common strategy is a new instrument available to EU foreign policy makers. Its purpose is to enhance the coherence of the EU's external action through a systematic inter-pillar approach. To do this, common strategies call into play the instruments of the EC (for example, trade policy and technical and financial assistance), the CFSP and the third pillar—Justice and Home Affairs. The European Council decides common strategies in areas where the member states have important interests. Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration, and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the members individually.

The Conclusion of International Agreements

Where an agreement needs to be concluded with one or more states or international organizations in the international sphere, the Council may authorize the Presidency to enter into negotiations. The Commission during such negotiations would assist the Presidency as necessary. The Council acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency would then conclude the agreements. It should be noted that no international agreement is binding on a member state that has to comply with the requirements of its own constitution. The other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply to them provisionally.

Declarations

Declarations give public expression to a position, request or expectation of the EU vis-à-vis a third country or an international issue. This flexible instrument makes it possible to react very quickly to sudden incidents in a particular part of the world and to state the EU's point of view. There is no provision for declarations in Title V of the TEU, but they were a feature of EPC which are still frequently used under CFSP (Cameron 1999, 142).

These five instruments do not attract much controversy. Their overarching purpose is to encourage as much cooperation as possible between the member states and to provide the EU with as much unity as the current level of political will allows. The decision-making procedures used are more controversial.

4) Decision Making Procedures

Generally speaking, decision making on CFSP matters requires a unanimous vote. The criticized outcome of this is the "lowest common denominator" whereby the wishes of the most conservative country, closest to the status quo, prevails. There are, however, three circumstances where the unanimity rule is abandoned and "qualified majority voting" (QMV) is used. First, any instruments being used to implement a common strategy are decided by a qualified majority of the Council. The common strategies themselves are adopted unanimously by the European Council. Second, joint actions and common positions, which do not form the basis of a common strategy, are also decided using QMV. Third, since the Nice Summit of December 2000, QMV is also used to appoint the High Representative (Conference of Member States, 2000). A qualified majority requires sixty-two Council votes in favor (out of eighty-seven), cast by at least ten members (McCormick 1999, 131).

The scope for QMV is restricted by the fact that no such vote will be taken if a member state declares that, for important reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority. In such a situation, the Council can, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council, for decision by unanimity. Furthermore, QMV does not apply to decisions with military implications.

Following the Amsterdam Treaty, a new mechanism has been introduced, known as “constructive abstention,” to dilute the inefficiencies surrounding the unanimity rule. Constructive abstention allows a decision to proceed when not all the EU members want to be involved. If member states abstain, they are not obliged to apply the EU decision; but they must accept, in a spirit of solidarity, that the decision commits the Union as a whole and they must not adopt any national policy that might conflict with the Union’s decision. The constructive abstention mechanism will not apply if the members abstaining account for more than one-third of the Council votes.

Constructive abstention has been criticized by Europeanists for entrenching the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, because it allows EU members to act for reasons of national rather than European interest (Walker 1999). Nevertheless, it also allows more decisions to proceed at the EU level, which encourages member states to identify with broader European interests. As Stavridis argues, “diverging national interests have to be considered not as an impediment for the emergence of a common European international stance, but instead as the starting point from which such a development might occur” (Stavridis 1997, 89).

II. The CFSP: Not a Unified Foreign Policy

At this stage, the CFSP clearly does not fulfill the requirements of a unified foreign policy. Its problems lie not so much with the formulation of a single policy position, although this could be improved by further reducing the use of unanimity voting. Rather, the biggest flaw of the CFSP is the absence of a single body able to state the EU’s policy position authoritatively.

A Single Policy Position?

The CFSP certainly goes some way toward providing a single EU position to be directed to the world. Through the common positions, joint actions, common strategies and other CFSP instruments, the EU generally produces a policy response to issues falling within its scope. Prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, when there were more rigid rules on unanimity voting, this common position often reflected the “lowest common denominator” of the member states, and subsequently dissatisfied many of the EU members and also made agreement difficult. With the new rules governing QMV and constructive abstention, however, the CFSP produces a better compromise of the fifteen varying positions. Furthermore, the path leading to this single position is faster and more efficient, because the blockages associated with unanimous voting have been eradicated. Nevertheless, the general rule of unanimity voting remains, especially in the context of decisions with military or defense implications, where QMV cannot be used. Although unanimity voting does not usually prevent the formulation of a single policy position, the resulting position is more representative and easier to reach when QMV is used.

Unlike EU trade policy, which I shall discuss in some detail next, the CFSP does not require the member states to abandon their national foreign policies. Instead it runs alongside them. In this way, it is intergovernmental, not supranational. Although this may seem contrary to the idea of a single policy position, the member states are required to keep their national policies in line with the EU one. Thus, intergovernmentalism does not, in itself, pose a hindrance to a single policy position. Nevertheless, if the use of QMV were extended, it would be easier to reach single policy positions. The issue of broadening the use of QMV is one, which came under scrutiny at the December 2000 Nice Summit. Other than extending the use of QMV to the appointment of the High Representative, no changes were made in the realm of CFSP. This was a disappointing outcome for those hoping to see the EU work towards a more unified foreign policy position. Despite this setback, the extension of QMV remains an important issue of EU reform and it will undoubtedly be revisited at the next EU summit.

An Authoritative Foreign Policy Representative?

The CFSP's biggest weakness is that it lacks a representative, which authoritatively asserts its position in the way that a government does for a state. This task is fulfilled by the Commission in the realm of trade. Under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), the Commission has been given exclusive competence in trade. It negotiates tariff levels with third parties and it articulates the Community position externally. The CCP has replaced national trade policies (Soetendorp 1999, 82). Should an outsider want to know the EU's stance on a particular trade issue, the Commission provides the answer. Because of the sensitive political nature of the issues coming within the CFSP's scope, the EU member states have been unwilling to cede nearly as much of their competence to the Commission in CFSP as they have in trade policy. Instead, the CFSP's various agents speak for the EU at different times. The end result is that the EU still lacks a focal point and a leadership capable of acting authoritatively (Allen 1998a, 42).

According to the TEU, the Presidency represents the EU in matters coming within the CFSP (Article 18). However, the Presidency fails as an authoritative representative of the CFSP for several reasons. First, because it consists of just one country, it cannot claim to represent EU interests like the Commission can in the realm of trade policy. Each Presidency tends to push its national interests because it has such a short tenure, with so much time between offices. For this reason, the Presidency cannot enter into negotiations without Council authorization, nor make any meaningful commitments on the EU's behalf. Second, because it changes every six months, it lacks the continuity and external familiarity required of a CFSP representative. As soon as a Presidency begins to be recognized internationally, it changes office. Third, within the CFSP's institutional structure, authority has been granted to various other bodies and figures, too. This creates a confusion of representation, which detracts from the Presidency's voice.

The CFSP's Multiple Voices

In addition to the Presidency, there are four other voices representing the EU in CFSP matters. These voices make the task of attaining an EU policy position more difficult, because they compete with the Presidency's representation, weak as it is. First, there is the post of HR, required to act on behalf of the Council to conduct political dialogue with third parties (Article 26). The HR was created in order to give the CFSP a face and voice. Although it does play an important role in giving the CFSP an identity, particularly when held by a prominent political figure like Javier Solana, it also adds more confusion to CFSP representation.

Second, a new breed of special envoys appointed either by the Council or the Presidency since the late 1990s are articulating the EU's voice. These envoys have represented the EU in places such as the Middle East, Bosnia, Central Africa and Cyprus. Third, although it has no formal role in the CFSP's representation, the Commission has 127 delegations around the world, operating under its external relations authority. These delegations play an important role in representing the broader EU position overseas. Because the Council does not have any diplomatic service, outsiders sometimes mistakenly believe that the Commission delegations represent the CFSP. Last, because there is not a single EU voice, outside countries will often contact one or more of the member states in an effort to ascertain the European position. Although members are expected to tow the CFSP line, one purpose of the CFSP is to eradicate the need to contact fifteen different governments.

The absence of a single authoritative voice is the most glaring way in which the CFSP differs from the foreign policy of a state. Each state has a central government, which represents its foreign policy position. In the EU, different actors represent the CFSP at different times. Despite attempts to correct this, there is still no meaningful answer to Kissinger's question, "who do I call when I want to speak to Europe?" Surrendering national foreign policy to supranationality is not the only way in which a single voice can be formulated, though. This works in the field of trade policy, but that does not make it obligatory. The EU could have a single CFSP representative without becoming supranational. Intergovernmentalism does not, in itself, stand in the way of authoritative representation. If a single foreign policy position can be

formulated, then so too can a voice to represent it. The problem the CFSP faces at the moment is that there are too many voices. The EU needs to give just one the authority to represent the CFSP on every occasion.

Creating a Single Voice

Considering its current role, the Presidency would be the most appropriate institution for this position. The Presidency is responsible for the implementation of CFSP decisions and it represents the EU in CFSP matters. The main problem with the Presidency at this stage is that it changes every six months and it is held by only one member at a time, which means that it is not an easily recognizable player internationally, nor is it representative of the fifteen EU members. The EU foreign policy representative should have longer tenure and be less nationally oriented. Ben Hall has proposed a remedy that suggests:

“The tidiest solution would be for the member states to divide into four teams. The teams would take it in turns to run presidencies lasting two-and-a-half years, thus coinciding neatly with the terms of the Commission and European Parliament. The member states in the presidency team would share out responsibility for policy areas . . . at the beginning of each 30-month term” (Hall 2000b).

Considering that there are fifteen EU Members, perhaps three “teams” with a longer term would be even tidier. Whatever the specific situation, if the member states could cooperate within presidencies, instead of having a term each, this would help produce the continuity required of a foreign policy representative and it would also take the national focus away from the Presidency, thereby making it more representative. Although not all the fifteen members would have control at any one time, it must be remembered that for the most part, the Presidency would be representing a previously decided policy, rather than making decisions directly. Of course, there would be times when the Presidency would have to make commitments on the EU’s behalf, but it would receive guidance from the Council about important matters.

Because all EU nations need to be involved, decision-making authority should not be transferred to the Presidency. The decision-making authority that rests with the European Council and the Council already generally produces a single foreign policy position. However, the Presidency should be responsible for representing this position in every forum. Accordingly, the post of HR should be dissolved. It simply adds confusion and an extra voice to the CFSP.

The changes I have proposed are feasible. They do not require a move to supranationality, nor do they suggest the creation of costly new institutions. They are well within the realm of changes the EU has approved in previous years. Nevertheless, they are unlikely to emerge within the next few years. The EU has not unveiled any concrete plans to make the proposed changes. The only reason for optimism is that the EU member states regularly express the desire to form a single voice. However, translating this political will into reality is not easy. Institutional reform of this nature was not discussed at the Nice Summit, and it will probably not be addressed until other more pressing issues, such as enlargement, are taken care of.

III. Is the EU Developing a Unified Foreign Policy?

To develop a unified foreign policy, the EU does not need to create any new posts or bodies. More importantly, it does not need to adopt supranational decision-making in the realm of CFSP. I disagree with Waltz’s assertion that the EU needs to become a single state to become a great power (Waltz 1993, 52). Sufficient unity can be achieved through intergovernmental means. As Tony Blair recently stated, the EU “can be a superpower, but not a superstate” (Blair 2000). To develop a unified foreign policy, the EU simply needs further cooperation and a refinement of its existing institutions. Although the CFSP currently produces a single policy position, this position would be more representative and more easily formulated if the use of QMV was extended, particularly to decisions with military implications. This seems likely to occur, as it is high on the EU’s agenda. However, more important is the reform needed to create a single voice to represent the CFSP. At this stage, the EU has not unveiled any specific plans for improving the

CFSP in this way. However, the EU is keen to be a bigger actor on the international scene. It is aware that a single voice is a prerequisite to meeting this goal. On many occasions, the member states have expressed a willingness to cooperate to formulate a single voice. As long as this political will exists, the prospects for a unified foreign policy are good. One potential barrier to such political will is EU enlargement, the impact of which I shall discuss now.

The Impact of Enlargement

The issue of enlargement is an important one because it could produce more heterogeneity and less cohesiveness in the EU. The EU's accession negotiations with third countries are taking place in two "waves." The first wave of negotiation began in 1998 with six countries: Cyprus, the Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. These negotiations will be followed by a second wave of five countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. In addition to these eleven candidates, there are two more: Malta and Turkey. Malta reactivated its application for membership in September 1998 and it will join the second wave of negotiations. At the Helsinki Summit it was agreed that Turkey would be offered candidate status but that negotiations would begin only after it overcame EU concerns over its human rights record. In theory, the second wave group could overtake the first wave to gain membership: Cyprus and Malta are considered the best positioned to join (Sutherland 2000). There has been no date set for the first enlargement. Some estimates suggest 2003, but any time prior to 2005 is unlikely. The EU has refrained from providing an exact date.

In order to qualify for membership in the Union, applicant states must satisfy a series of strict economic and political conditions. First, they must fulfill the conditions of European identity, democratic status, and respect for human rights. Second, they must accept the Community system and have the capacity to implement it; and third, they must accept and have the ability to implement the CFSP "as it evolves over the coming years" (Presidency of the European Union, 1999a; Sjursen 1997, 162).

Enlargement could disrupt the progression towards a unified foreign policy by introducing more diverse interests into the EU, thereby making cooperation more difficult. Although unanimity voting has been relaxed in several areas, and will likely be relaxed further, at this stage, it remains the guiding principle of CFSP voting. This causes enough problems when there are fifteen members; with twenty-eight, the "lowest common denominator" could become even lower. On the other hand, this new diversity of interests might prompt important EU reform. With almost double the national interests to consider, the EU could not simply expect the current system to continue working smoothly. Voting procedures would probably have to be relaxed even further and the rotating Presidency would certainly be assessed. Under the current system, if there were twenty-eight members, each country would be President every fourteen years, instead of every seven. This would certainly encourage countries to team up. Enlargement might, therefore, help produce the unified foreign policy that the CFSP lacks at this point in time. Of course, this will not just eventuate via institutional reform. The political will for a unified foreign policy must also be present. But considering the stringent criteria the candidates must meet before accession will be granted, getting them to see things the "EU way" might not be so difficult.

Conclusion

The EU does not yet possess a unified foreign policy. Its biggest problem lies not in the formulation of a single policy position—although this would be more representative and easier to formulate if the rules surrounding unanimity voting were relaxed further—but in the absence of an authoritative representative. The Presidency, which has been given the responsibility of external representation, lacks the continuity and broad EU representation that such a task requires. To change, the EU does not need to become a state; it does not even need to make the transition from intergovernmentalism to supranationality. What it must do is reform the Presidency to give it a more effective voice, and eliminate all other competing voices.

If the EU member states teamed up in a few groups and worked together for several years in each Presidency, the Presidency would have far more significance on the international stage. Outsiders could keep track of it and form stronger links. The problem of each country trying to push its short-term agenda would be alleviated and the Presidency would represent EU interests more broadly.

Whether all of these necessary changes will eventuate is difficult to determine. The use of QMV will almost certainly be extended, although little progress was made at the Nice Summit. I am also optimistic about the proposed reform of the Presidency, which would create a single foreign policy representative, because it does not ask too much of the member states. They can retain their national foreign policies and an intergovernmental system. They do not need to become a single state. However, such change will probably be a long time coming. Enlargement of the EU would not necessarily cause disruption to the process of developing a unified foreign policy. It may, in fact, serve as a catalyst for EU reform. Although there is no decisive response to the question of whether the EU is developing a unified foreign policy, I believe that the answer is "yes, but it will take time." It may not happen within the next few years, but it could well occur before the decade ends.

IS THE EU DEVELOPING A REQUISITE MILITARY CAPABILITY?

The fifth criterion for determining whether an actor is a great power is the presence of military strength. Obviously all countries possess some military strength. Even a small population can provide this. But for a great power the standard is higher. How much military strength is actually required of a great power depends upon three factors: how it scores in the other areas of great power; whether it possesses nuclear weapons; and finally, what security threats it needs to respond to. These are factors I outlined in Chapter 3. My conclusions were that because the EU rates so well in the other areas of great power, particularly economic strength, it need not excel in military strength. Since the EU possesses nuclear deterrence (a point I will discuss in further detail in this chapter), it does not require a large conventional force. It only needs a conventional force big enough to act as a “trip-wire,” and to protect its interests and support its diplomacy in wider Europe.

In this chapter, I will address the question of whether the EU is developing this requisite military strength. I first explain why the EU possesses nuclear deterrence, because this shapes the conventional force required of the EU. Following on from this, I will adopt the same structure I used for Chapter 4. In the second section, I will explain why the EU does not have a requisite military capability at this point in time. All previous attempts at forming a defense capability, outlined in Chapter 1, have failed. In the third section, I shall examine the prospects for the eventual development of an EU military capability, via the proposed rapid reaction force (RRF).

I. A Nuclear European Union?

At this stage, the EU does not have its own nuclear force. But two of its Member States, France and the United Kingdom do possess nuclear weapons. Whether or not either or both of these nations would be willing to supply the EU with their weapons, and whether the EU would be willing to accept them, are difficult questions to address. My argument in this section, however, is that regardless of whether or not there is a formal surrendering of nuclear force from the national to the EU level, EU nuclear deterrence exists anyway.

An EU Nuclear Capability?

The EU does not have its own, independent nuclear capability at this point in time. Since the early 1990s, there has been a strong push by the French towards an EU nuclear force. On 10 January 1992, President François Mitterrand unexpectedly raised the issue of a common European nuclear doctrine, stating that it would “quickly become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defense” (Tertrais 1999, 56). Later, in September 1997, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin confirmed that France wants to “deepen the dialogue with its main partners on the whole range of questions pertaining to deterrence” (Tertrais 1999, 56).

France has made it clear that it does not wish to replace the NATO deterrent, but that it would like it to have a specifically European dimension. As one of the only two EU countries with a nuclear force, France is in a position to be a decisive player in this field. The British position has been more conservative than the French position. The British have signaled some willingness to form a common deterrent, but they are more cautious about disrupting Atlantic ties.

The willingness of the two nuclear countries to donate their forces is not the only relevant issue in the calculation of an EU nuclear capability. The remaining thirteen countries must also be willing to accept the nuclear force on offer. There is a spectrum of attitudes within the EU towards the idea of a common nuclear

force. At one end lie the Southern European countries, like Spain and Italy, which have been receptive to the concept, particularly to the idea that the vital interests of European countries are increasingly intertwined. Germany, closer to the center, has taken a similar stance to Britain. It would be happy to see an EU capability develop, so long as it complements and reinforces the US commitment. At the other end of the spectrum lie the Northern European countries, where strong anti-nuclear sentiment is combined with reluctance to develop a common European defense dimension. These countries, along with Ireland, have most adamantly opposed cooperation on nuclear issues.

Overcoming such sensitivities would be the biggest hurdle for a European nuclear capability, particularly in light of the fact that the EU does not at the moment face a unifying threat. Nevertheless, it is my contention that the EU possesses nuclear deterrence despite the absence of a formal EU nuclear capability, a point I explain below. Therefore the EU does not need to overcome the problem of differing national attitudes towards a unified nuclear force. French and British nuclear deterrence is sufficient.

Nuclear Deterrence in the EU

Eleven of the EU Member States are also members of NATO; as such, they are covered by United States extended deterrence (Yost 1999, 9). In this thesis, however, my focus is upon the capabilities of the EU as an *independent* entity. While NATO deterrence may impact upon the EU, this is unimportant in the calculation of EU military strength. In assessing the independent capabilities of a state or an actor like the EU, I cannot take into account the promises provided by an alliance like NATO. The EU could only be considered a great power if it could continue to function if NATO fell apart. If it relies upon NATO nuclear deterrence, then this would not be the case. Therefore, despite the fact that most of the EU countries are provided with deterrence via NATO, in this thesis, I do not regard this as EU deterrence.

The nuclear forces of Britain and France are not particularly sizable compared to those of the United States and Russia. Both countries' nuclear arsenals have been significantly reduced in the 1990s. Britain has the distinction of being the world's first nuclear state to rely exclusively on a submarine-based nuclear force. However, this does not affect the deterrent capability of these forces since, as Bernard Brodie explains, nuclear weapons forces do not have to fight there like (Brodie 1973, 321). A relatively small, even submarine-based, nuclear force can still provide a second strike. As long as this second-strike capability exists, which it does, deterrence is created because retaliation is possible.

Because of the enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons, they prompt caution in any would-be aggressors. This is what the logic of nuclear deterrence rests upon. Because of the integration that has occurred in Europe thus far, any power contemplating an attack upon any of the thirteen non-nuclear EU countries would be unsure of whether Britain or France would respond with nuclear force. This doubt would deter a potential aggressor from attacking. While this deterrence might not be as potent as that which exists for a nuclear country itself, it still allows the EU to operate with a smaller conventional force than it would otherwise need. For this reason, the standard of military strength I outlined in Chapter 3 (a conventional force big enough to act as a "trip-wire," and to protect the EU's interests and support its diplomacy in wider Europe) would be enough to elevate the EU to great power status.

II. The Current Absence of a Requisite Military Capability

At this stage, the EU does not have the military capability of a great power. In fact, it does not have an independent, unified military capability at all. The defense of the EU members is currently taken care of by the individual members via national defense forces, by NATO under the collective defense guarantee outlined in the Washington Treaty (excluding Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden), and by the Western European Union (WEU) for the ten EU countries that constitute its full membership. Previous attempts at forming a defense capability, outlined in Chapter 1, have not come to fruition. The bulk of this chapter, therefore, will examine the prospects for an EU defense capability.

III. Is the EU Developing a Requisite Defense Capability?

In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, the EU laid down concrete plans to establish a defense capability of 50,000–60,000 troops by 2003. In this section I shall concentrate on two questions in order to determine whether the EU is developing a requisite military capability. First, what is the precise nature of the 1999 plans? And second, if they eventuate, would they constitute a great power defense capability?

1) What is the Precise Nature of the 1999 Plans?

In December 1999, at its Helsinki Summit, the European Council signaled its determination “to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” It decided that “Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within sixty days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks” (Presidency of the European Union 1999c). The Petersberg Tasks, which were first created by the WEU, and have since been codified in the TEU, consist of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (Article 17, Para. 2). The establishment of this proposed rapid reaction force (RRF), also referred to as the Helsinki “headline goal,” raises some important issues. I shall address each of these in turn, in order to explain the current status of the 1999 plans.

The Role the Rapid Reaction Force Is Expected to Play.

According to the Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, the purpose of the RRF is to give the EU means, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to respond to international crises in support of the CFSP (Presidency of the European Union 1999c, Para. 27 and Annex 1). The Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions of June 2000 affirm this statement and add that the EU should be provided with all the necessary means and capabilities to “play its full role on the international stage” (Presidency of the European Union 2000b, Annex 1, Para. 1).

As the French Presidency explained in an address before the WEU Assembly, the Petersberg Tasks are “humanitarian missions or the evacuation of nationals, missions for the maintenance of peace, combat missions for the handling of crises, including military operations for the reestablishment of peace” (Masseret 2000). On several occasions the EU has stated that the headline goal is not an attempt to create EU collective security. Collective security forms part of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, and the EU has been cautious about superseding NATO’s role.

The EU wants to achieve its headline goal so that it is not so reliant upon NATO when situations like the one in Kosovo arise. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has increasingly faced the threat of instability caused by territorial and ethnic conflicts to its east. Although the threat of attack is always a possibility for any country at any time, the biggest threat for the EU at this stage simply comes from the instability caused by these neighboring disputes. As the Presidency Report explained, crisis management “is the area where a European capacity to act is required most urgently” (Presidency of the European Union 1999b). The EU is aware that such disputes will not necessarily be so significant to the United States, which may decide not to intervene. The EU must, therefore, have the independent capability to protect its interests.

The Capabilities of the Rapid Reaction Force

The operational side of the RRF calls for between 50,000 and 60,000 troops, which will require a pool of over 100,000 troops, to enable rotation. According to the EU these forces are “part of a complete military logic” since they are to be militarily self-sufficient and endowed with the necessary capacities of command, control, and intelligence, logistics, combat support units, as well as, if necessary, air force and naval elements (Masseret 2000; Presidency of the European Union 1999c). The force must have the capacity to

collect intelligence, analyze situations, plan and carry out military operations, constitute an adequate volume of military forces, deliver high intensity combat, and implement interoperability at all levels.

The RRF will also have a decision-making mechanism, which will work within the CFSP. Three new permanent bodies will be established within the Council. First, there will be a Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of national representatives at the senior-ambassadorial level. The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, in accordance with the TEU. In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation (Presidency of the European Union 2000a). The second decision-making body will be the Military Committee (MC), which will be composed of the Chiefs of Defense, represented by their military delegates. This committee will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC. Third, will be the Military Staff (MS), which is to be established within the Council structures to provide military expertise and support to the security and defense aspects of the CFSP. It will receive direction from the MC. These three bodies were established as an interim decision-making structure on 1 March 2000, and will become permanent early next year.

Member State Contributions

The headline goal is an outcome of Member State cooperation in the European Council. All of the fifteen states are entitled to participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU force. How much each state decides to commit to both the force and individual operations is entirely based upon its sovereign decision. The resources, which are committed, remain under national control. They do not become EU property, and therefore, the RRF does not constitute an EU army. When military operations are carried out, an ad hoc committee of contributors will be set up. While all EU members are entitled to attend the committee, only contributing states will take part in the actual conduct of the operation (Ojanen, Herolf and Lindahl 2000, 66).

On the 20 November 2000, the Defense Ministers of the EU Member States met at the Capabilities Commitment Conference to decide upon how much each country would commit to the RRF. The final contributions, set out in a "Force Catalogue," constituted a pool of more than 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels (General Affairs Council 2000). The largest contributor is Germany, which has pledged 13 500 troops, while the UK pledged 12 500 and France followed with 12 000 (Lewis 2000). The only country, which declined to take any part in the commitment of resources, was Denmark. Of interest was the fact that all the neutral or non-aligned EU countries, namely Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden; pledged resources. There had been some concern from various sources that these countries would prove to be a problem for the development of an EU defense dimension (Gourlay and Remacle 1998, 64). This concern can now be put aside.

Although these contributions bode well for the RRF, the EU countries are deficient in some key areas, which they will need to address to reach the 2003 goal. Capability gaps include command and control of forces; all-weather intelligence systems; targeting and evaluation of damage; cruise missiles; all-weather strike capability; suppression of air defense systems; and logistical support (Mackenzie 2000). French Defense Minister, Alain Richard, suggests that intelligence would be the most difficult bridge to gap. Although efforts are being made to correct this situation—Italy, Germany and France, for example, have put some new generation satellites at the RRF's disposal—it will take considerable effort to ensure interoperability (Mackenzie 2000).

This problem of a capability gap would be addressed if the EU had access to NATO resources. Whether or not this access will be provided is an issue currently being assessed in NATO and one, which I address later in this thesis. Nevertheless, the EU, at this stage, is aiming towards developing sufficient resources to carry out the Petersberg Tasks independently so that NATO does not tie its hands.

The Role of the Western European Union

The WEU is a military alliance that was set up in 1948 by the UK, France, Italy and the Benelux countries for the purposes of cooperation on defense and security. Today, the WEU has ten members (all the EU countries, except Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden). Under Article V of the WEU Brussels Treaty, the full members have a collective defense guarantee. The WEU has no forces or standing command structure of its own. Its Member States makes military units available to it on a case by case basis. Up until recently, the WEU has played an important role as the EU's defense arm despite the difference in EU and WEU memberships. This is evidenced by Article 17 of the Maastricht Treaty, which describes the WEU as an "integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability."

Developments in the implementation of the headline goal have severely reduced the WEU's role in European security affairs. One of the WEU's most important roles, working to carry out the Petersberg Tasks, has been completely transferred to the EU since the Marseille Ministerial Council of 13 November 2000 (WEU Ministerial Council 2000). In addition, the WEU will no longer continue its routine consultations with NATO or its dialogue and cooperation with any third countries. These, too, are responsibilities the EU will take up (WEU Ministerial Council 2000). However, the WEU will retain residual structures and functions, including the collective defense commitment of the 1954 Brussels Treaty.

The Role of NATO

NATO's main rationale lies in the collective defense it offers under Article V of the Washington Treaty. The main rationale of the RRF, on the other hand, lies in crisis management. Although NATO has undertaken crisis management (Kosovo is an example), the EU has concerns that situations may arise where NATO (or more specifically, the United States) does not want to be involved. For this reason, the EU wants its own force so that it can act if NATO does not. The EU has been very cautious about undermining the role of NATO through the new force. For this reason it has stressed that the force does not offer collective security—this remains NATO's domain.

The plans to develop the RRF have created divisions within NATO which center around how much autonomy the RRF should have. There are those countries that would like to see the RRF develop essentially as part of NATO—drawing upon NATO assets and capabilities and using NATO planning structures. The United States is the strongest advocate of this position because it fears that if the EU becomes too independent militarily and begins to duplicate NATO's resources, the United States may be left out of European security affairs and lose influence in the region. The United States supports the EU's efforts to shoulder more responsibility in the realm of defense, but it does not want the EU to go too far. As U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, commented at a recent Press Conference, there is "the need to support the creation of this EU rapid reaction capability provided that it is not seen as being in competition with NATO itself . . . we should not have dual planning institutions" (Cohen 2000b, 2). Other EU countries such as Britain, Germany and the Netherlands have also supported a RRF with close NATO ties, although they have signaled some willingness to develop an independent EU planning structure. On the other side of the debate lies France, who wants to see the RRF develop completely independent capabilities, including planning structures. This is not surprising considering France's longstanding desire for greater European independence from the United States.

At a recent NATO Ministerial Meeting, the foreign ministers of the NATO countries attempted to sort out their differences concerning the RRF. The United States was keen to create assured EU access to NATO assets and capabilities to discourage the EU from duplicating NATO resources in developing the RRF, and thereby gaining greater independence. Such access to NATO assets met the approval of the EU members who still fall short militarily in some key areas. Despite French objections, it was agreed that access to assets would only be permitted if NATO planning structures were utilized. If it had not been for the veto, which Turkey imposed, this access would have been approved. Turkey, who has not been granted EU

membership, refused to allow the EU assured access to NATO assets and planning capabilities because of its serious territorial disputes with Greece (which is an EU member) over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea (Hamilton 2000). Turkey said that it would only agree upon EU assured access if it could be included in EU decision making—a request that has been flatly rejected by the EU.

Turkey's veto has led to an impasse within NATO regarding the EU's RRF. The final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting simply asserted that

“We intend to put in place arrangements for: assured access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations; the presumption of EU availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations . . .” (Ministerial Meeting 2000, Para. 33).

Clearly all the other eighteen NATO members hope to persuade Turkey to change its veto by the next Ministerial Meeting. In order to do so, they will need to address Turkey's concerns more adequately.

Although the EU and NATO have so far failed to agree upon the subject of assured access to assets, NATO has still developed links to the RRF in other ways. First, it contributed military and technical advice to the EU experts who were working on the “catalogue of forces” for the Capabilities Commitment Conference. Second, NATO–EU ad hoc working groups have been established to discuss security issues, permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation, modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and capability goals. Finally, regular meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the RRF's interim Political and Security Committee have been established to enhance the understanding of the two institutions and their members on the most effective cooperation. In this way, the EU is taking over the WEU's consultations with NATO.

Non-coincidence of Membership

One problem the EU faces in the implementation of its headline goal is the non-coincidence of membership in the EU and NATO. The European countries can be divided into four categories for the purpose of this analysis. First, those countries which are members of both NATO and the EU; namely Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and France (although, strictly speaking, France is only a halfway member of NATO because it still declines to rejoin its military command structure). Second, those countries that are members of the EU, but not NATO; namely Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. Third, those countries which are members of NATO, but not the EU; namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey. Fourth, those countries which are neither members of the EU, nor NATO, that is, any remaining European countries.

The first category is not problematic. Countries that are members of both NATO and the EU provide an important link between the two organizations. The second category of country is not particularly problematic either. These countries are not involved in any NATO decisions regarding access to assets, but they will enjoy decision-making power within the EU. They must simply rely upon their fellow EU members to protect EU interests in NATO. The third category, non-EU NATO members, is problematic. The most obvious example of this is Turkey's veto of assured EU access to NATO assets and planning capabilities. Because Turkey is not involved in EU decision making, it does not want the EU to have access to NATO capabilities, and its veto power in NATO makes this possible. But the EU is determined to preserve its decision-making autonomy. The EU has informed non-EU countries in the third and fourth categories that they are welcome to donate any resources to the RRF, and they will be consulted about any operations, but they have no actual power over the decisions made. Of course, they retain control over their own resources. Many countries in these categories have already offered resources to the RRF, despite their lack of decision-making power (Lewis 2000).

2) If The 1999 Plans Eventuate, Will They Constitute a Requisite Military Capability?

The prospects of the RRF coming to fruition are good. The toughest task, getting Member States to commit resources to the force, has already been accomplished. Even the neutral countries, traditionally opposed to the use of force, have pledged troops. Although the EU currently suffers from a capability gap, it is working towards addressing this. In addition, if the eighteen other NATO members persuade Turkey to remove its veto, the EU will be assisted by an assured access to NATO assets and planning capabilities. Although tensions between the EU member states on the details of the RRF will undoubtedly arise along the way, all the EU nations do want to see this force realized. As the French Minister for Defense commented:

“The approach we are following is based on the joint political commitment of the fifteen, which is growing ever more solid. Don’t these countries agree on most of the major issues of international politics? Don’t they share the same societal values and the same ambitions regarding the political organization of the globalized world? The conditions for their common commitment to the settlement of a crisis are better than they have ever been” (French Embassy in the United Kingdom 2000c).

The important question, then, is whether this RRF constitutes the military capability required of the EU to elevate it to great power status. According to the standard of military strength I established in Chapter 3, because of the EU’s nuclear deterrent and its economic strength, it only needs a conventional force large enough both to act as a “trip wire” and to support its diplomacy and protect its security interests. In this section, I shall determine whether the crisis management force meets this standard.

A “Trip Wire” Conventional Force

A military force serves as a “trip wire” when any adversary planning an attack would need to create a force so big to overcome the target’s force that it reveals its aggressive intentions, and thereby opens itself to the possibility of nuclear attack from its intended victim. Even though the intended victim may not use nuclear weapons in retaliation, the logic of deterrence suggests that no aggressor would be willing to take that risk. There are no specific ways to measure what constitutes a trip wire force, but it is helpful to note that the force need only have defensive capabilities. A trip wire force is not required to project its power in large-scale wars. It must only be able to pose such an obstacle to aggressors that they would not be able to overcome the force before the victim could retaliate with nuclear weapons.

The EU’s RRF would certainly serve as such an obstacle in an aggressor’s calculations. In fact, the forces of the EU countries as they stand now, would already constitute such an obstacle. Even though they are not unified, the EU nations have more troops than any individual country. These troops are enough to act as a trip wire because an outside aggressor would know that the EU could call on them in an emergency. The added capabilities and assets being developed as a result of the RRF would be useful, but they are by no means necessary.

Protecting Security and Supporting Diplomacy

The second task an EU military needs to be able to fulfill is protection against security threats and support of EU diplomatic efforts. In Chapter 3, I explained that the threats facing the EU today emanate from the east, from intrastate conflict and territorial disputes. The most important task of the EU military, therefore, is to stabilize the region through crisis management. A military capable enough to perform crisis management will also be supporting EU diplomacy, which to date has been afflicted by the absence of military support.

The purpose of the RRF is precisely to meet these security threats in wider Europe and stabilize the region. The force was formed as a response to EU paralysis over the war in Kosovo. Its main task is to manage crises such as that one. At this stage, commitments include 60,000 troops (deployed from a group of over 100,000), 400 combat aircraft, and 100 vessels. In addition, NATO assets may be made available. There is

no reason why the RRF would be unable to protect EU security and support its diplomacy. In fact, it may work further afield than originally expected. Some sources have estimated it will be capable to carry out operations 4000 kilometers from Europe's shores and take part in UN operations (Lewis 2000; Fitchett 2000).

Conclusion

Because the EU is served by nuclear deterrence, it only needs a conventional force large enough to act as trip wire, to protect it from security threats, and to support its diplomacy. The RRF, which the EU proposed at the Helsinki European Council, meets these requirements. If the force eventuates, and there is every reason to believe that it will, it would satisfy the fifth criterion of great power: military strength.

CONCLUSION

NEO-REALISM, EU SECURITY COOPERATION AND GREAT POWER

The goal of this thesis has been to address whether the EU is becoming a great power. My analysis so far has focused upon empirical considerations. In this chapter, I turn my attention back to theoretical considerations and address two key questions. First, how well does Neo-realism explain EU security and defense cooperation? As I discussed in Chapter 2, most of the literature on EU security cooperation has been descriptive or normative, rather than theoretical. Of the small amount of theoretical literature, none draws upon Neo-realism, the dominant framework in security studies. In this chapter I fill this gap in the literature by assessing Neo-realism's utility in the study of EU security affairs. My main conclusion is that "offensive" Neo-realism fails to explain EU security cooperation, but that "defensive" Neo-realism is a useful theoretical tool. Second, how well does Neo-realism explain the potential emergence of a non-state great power? At this stage, Neo-realism focuses exclusively upon states as the most important actors in the international system. In order to make Neo-realism progressive, Neo-realist scholars should be willing to broaden this view to encompass non-state actors like the EU, which may reach great power status in the future. I begin this chapter by reiterating my analysis and findings from previous chapters. I build upon these to make this chapter's final conclusions.

Previous Chapters' Analysis

In Chapter 1, I introduced the thesis question and Waltz's five criteria of great power. I also added a sixth criterion: a unified foreign policy. The EU falls short in this sixth criterion and in Waltz's fifth criterion: military strength. For this reason, I have sought to determine whether the EU is likely to develop a unified foreign policy and the requisite military capability. In Chapter 1, I also provided an historical overview of the European states' attempts at security cooperation and explained the recent momentum towards such cooperation.

In Chapter 2, I surveyed the literature on EU security cooperation and found that it is more voluminous than theoretically rigorous. The existing theoretical literature stems almost entirely from the liberal tradition. Neo-realism has been rejected as a theoretical framework, because, based solely upon the writing of Mearsheimer, it has been considered inapplicable. One reason this thesis is significant is that corrects both the dearth of theoretical literature and the neglect of Neo-realism within the theoretical literature.

In Chapter 3, I examined Neo-realist theory more closely, dividing it into its offensive and defensive variants. I particularly focused upon the explanation offered by each variant for state cooperation and the role of institutions. Offensive Neo-realism views power as the most important determinant of international politics. Security is scarce and states act aggressively. The prospects for state cooperation are poor and will not be helped by institutions, which have no independent causal effect on actors, but are simply a reflection of their preferences. Defensive Neo-realism, on the other hand, views security, not power, as the main goal of states. It believes that the prospects for state cooperation are good, where states can achieve mutual security. With the exception of Jervis, defensive Neo-realists generally view institutions as having little causal significance, too. In Chapter 3, I also set out the methodology adopted in the thesis. I have used Waltz's criteria for great power, as well as my own sixth criterion, to ask whether the EU is developing a unified foreign policy and the requisite military capability.

In Chapter 4, I addressed the question: Is the EU developing a unified foreign policy? At this stage, it has a Common Foreign and Security Policy, but this does not constitute a unified foreign policy. In order to make the CFSP into a unified foreign policy, the EU must extend the exceptions to its unanimity voting principle,

thereby improving the formulation of a single EU policy position. It must also provide the CFSP with a single voice. The most obvious way to do this is to reform the Presidency to give it more continuity and authority. It is difficult to estimate the prospects of these changes taking place. The EU has made no plans, at this stage, to reform the CFSP in these ways. Nevertheless, the changes I have proposed are not dramatic. The EU does not need to become a single state, and indeed, the CFSP can even remain at the intergovernmental—as opposed to supranational—level. As the CFSP’s continuing maladies plague the EU’s ability to perform, it may well decide to make the necessary changes. Although a unified foreign policy is unlikely to emerge in the next few years, we may see one within the next decade.

In Chapter 5, I addressed the second empirical question: Is the EU developing a military capability? In the EU’s case, the requisite military capability is not a large conventional force, because EU security is safeguarded by nuclear deterrence. The EU only needs a conventional force large enough to act as a “trip wire” and to support its diplomacy. If the EU’s 2003 plans for a rapid reaction force come to fruition, and there is every reason to believe that it will, the EU will have such a conventional force. A 50,000–60,000 person force will be able to stabilize wider Europe and give EU diplomacy some teeth. Unlike the United States, the EU’s strategic interests are not spread globally; they are generally restricted to the European continent. The EU does not require a military that can project its force worldwide. For this reason, the rapid reaction force would constitute the EU’s requisite military capability.

My general empirical conclusion is that the EU is unlikely to emerge as a great power in the immediate future. Its biggest barrier is the absence of a unified foreign policy. However, if this were to change, the EU could achieve great power status. This has practical significance for international politics because the number of great powers affects the polarity of the system. As I discussed in Chapter 1, this in turn affects the behavior of states and the prospects for peace. One need only think of how bipolarity shaped global politics from 1945 to 1991. Whether or not a peer competitor will arise to challenge U.S. global dominance is a matter of tremendous importance for 21st century world politics.

These issues also have *theoretical* significance. First, the cooperation between the EU’s sovereign members is more extensive than that ever witnessed in the modern state system. These countries respond to international issues using CFSP, rather than national, instruments which are increasingly decided by QMV; they have introduced constructive abstention to produce EU responses more easily; and, most recently, they have agreed to create a crisis management force. To date, these steps towards cooperation have not been explained by Neo-realist theory. In fact, most of the EU security literature has not drawn upon theory at all. The small portion, which has, has largely used liberal theory. Below, I shall fill this gap in the literature by assessing how well Neo-realism can explain such cooperation.

Second, if the EU became a great power, it would be the first non-state actor to do so. Although in many ways it would be acting like a state, its members would retain their sovereignty. This is the most important distinction between the EU and a state, particularly a federation. Each EU member would retain decision-making authority over its domestic affairs. Each member could even have foreign policy autonomy in matters relevant only to it. If the EU became a great power, a non-state actor would be joining the rank of importance, which is currently held only by states. To continue to be a useful theory Neo-realism must be able to accommodate changes such as the rise of a non-state actor, like the EU. In order to make Neo-realism progressive, it is necessary to relax its insistence on the primacy of states.

I. How Well Does Neo-Realism Explain EU Security and Defense Cooperation?

Never before has security cooperation between states existed to the extent that it now does in the EU. More and more, the EU states are uniting behind one policy position and being represented externally as one entity, instead of fifteen. Such cooperation can be explained by defensive Neo-realists, but it leaves offensive Neo-realists puzzled.

Offensive Neo-realism: What Explanation Does It Offer?

Speaking at a roundtable recently, John Mearsheimer admitted that the EU is the toughest case for offensive Neo-realism. He said that the EU's security evolution is an anomaly, which offensive Neo-realism has no answer for. The reason for this is that offensive Neo-realism considers power maximizing to be the main characteristic of state behavior. According to Mearsheimer, there is no such thing as too much power. States engage in an endless search for relative power to try and dominate others. The more power a state has, the less likely it will be dominated. For this reason, all states have aggressive intentions. Though states may form alliances to overcome aggressors, those alliances will only be temporary. Both relative gain considerations and concern about cheating inhibit cooperation.

From this perspective, security cooperation between the EU states is inexplicable. On the one hand, cooperation has given each EU member more power and reduced its chances of domination by another, which makes sense to an offensive Neo-realist. But, the EU states have started to cede decision-making authority to the EU level. They have willingly entered a situation where their decision-making freedom is being curtailed by an international institution. The new rules allowing QMV and constructive abstention illustrate that the EU states are not inhibited by concerns about cheating. Regardless of an individual member's position on a particular stance, it is expected to follow the EU position "in a spirit of loyalty and solidarity" (Article 11). The EU has also decided to form a crisis management force based on the expectation that each country will offer contributions from its own defense force. This is not the behavior of untrusting and aggressively intentioned states. Offensive Neo-realism fails as a useful theoretical tool to understand the security cooperation between the EU states.

Nor does offensive Neo-realism provide insight into the impact of the EU's institutions upon its members. Not only do offensive Neo-realists believe that institutions cannot shape state preferences; they also argue that institutions have very little impact at all. Institutions, in this view, can do virtually nothing to modify the competitive instincts of states. Having analyzed the institutions of the EU, I do not find this a helpful perspective. Although I have not found evidence of the institutions taking on a life of their own (the EU institutions are certainly outcomes of the members' interests and preferences, and they remain intergovernmental) they have generated extensive cooperation, by providing a forum for common decision-making. Without these institutions, the EU states would not have achieved any cooperation and, consequently, competition would be rife in Europe. These institutions have allowed the Western European states to be more transparent and trusting of one another. For these reasons, institutions have played a crucial role. In sum, offensive Neo-realism fails to account for the role of the EU institutions.

Defensive Neo-realism: What Explanation Does It Offer?

Unlike offensive Neo-realism, defensive Neo-realism can explain EU security cooperation. Defensive Neo-realists view security as the underlying aim of states, but they do not believe that states maximize power to achieve security; nor do states necessarily have aggressive intentions. Anarchy does produce a self-help system and inherent competition, but this does not necessarily produce aggression. States are often able to achieve their security interests by cooperating with other states. Defensive Neo-realists also concede that institutions can play an important role in facilitating that cooperation. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is some divergence within defensive Neo-realism about the independent causal role of institutions, but there is broad agreement that institutions provide an important forum for cooperation.

Defensive Neo-realism provides a good explanation for both cooperation between the EU states, and EU institutions' role in assisting in that cooperation. The EU states have chosen to cooperate in order to produce mutual security. Relative-gains considerations have not restricted that involvement. This is because, as Schweller explains, even though France, for example, may be relatively worse off by cooperating with all of the EU states because they will become more powerful, it is better off vis-à-vis all outsiders to the EU. Drawing upon Schweller's terminology, which I outlined in Chapter 3; France, in this case is A, all the other EU states are B, and outsiders are C. According to offensive Neo-realist logic,

France would choose not to cooperate in the EU, because doing so would give each of the other EU members a relative advantage. However, in practice, this is not the logic that has governed the decisions of the EU members. Defensive Neo-realism provides a far more insightful explanation. It suggests that all states seek to maximize security, not power. The EU states have chosen cooperation as the best means to maximize security. Because states do not necessarily have aggressive intentions, they are willing to cooperate to achieve security. So long as their intentions are transparent; their gains from cheating are low; their mutual cooperation is more beneficial than defection; and they adopt strategies of reciprocity, they can cooperate to achieve mutual security.

The EU institutions have served to meet the conditions necessary for cooperation. The EU members have an array of fora, such as GAC proceedings and the intergovernmental conferences, for interaction and discussion. They have also set up a telex network, to allow enciphered messages to be transmitted between capitals. Communication between the states occurs at many levels, from the working parties to the Council. Although these institutions may not be independent (they are operating in the way that the states founding them intended them to, and have not taken on a life of their own) they are, nevertheless, extremely important. The cooperation the EU states have achieved relies upon their existence.

Defensive Neo-realism explains EU cooperation and the role of the EU institutions by drawing upon the Neo-realist core assumption of anarchy. It overcomes the “competition bias” present in offensive Neo-realism by explaining how anarchy can, in fact, produce cooperation. The offensive Neo-realist focus upon power maximizing and aggression cannot explain EU security cooperation. Its rigidity fails to encompass an entity like the EU. For this reason, the literature dismissing Neo-realism based purely upon Mearsheimer’s work is highly unsatisfactory. In this thesis I have sought to overcome this misunderstanding and consequent rejection of Neo-realism by drawing upon a defensive Neo-realist understanding of cooperation.

In some ways, defensive Neo-realism resembles liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalists concede that the anarchy pervading the international system affects the behavior of states, and they also regard states as the most important actors. They are optimistic about the prospects for state cooperation, and they consider that institutions have a key role to play in enabling such cooperation. However, the differences between the two perspectives outweigh their similarities. Liberal institutionalists criticize Neo-realists, both defensive and offensive, for placing too much emphasis upon states to the exclusion of other actors. Unlike Neo-realists, liberal institutionalists believe that non-state actors can actually change states’ preferences. They believe that institutions have pronounced causal significance. (Although Jervis, a defensive Neo-realist, has also expressed this view, it is not one broadly shared within defensive Neo-realism). Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions can mitigate the competitive effects of anarchy, because they help produce cooperation. Defensive Neo-realists, on the other hand, believe that anarchy *itself* produces cooperation.

II. How well does Neo-realism explain the potential emergence of a non-state great power?

Considering that Neo-realism (in its defensive variant) has been a useful theoretical tool for understanding EU security cooperation, we might expect that it could explain the emergence of a non-state great power. But this is not a logical conclusion. Neo-realism explains EU security cooperation by focusing on state interests and state behavior. In order to explain the emergence of a *non-state* great power, Neo-realists need to relax their insistence that states are the main actors in the international system. Neo-realism needs to be flexible enough to accommodate an actor, like the EU, which does not possess state-like qualities, such as a central government. Although the EU is unlikely to become a great power in the next few years, it will probably become one within a decade. Potentially, it may prove to be the first example of a new type of entity comprising sovereign states, grouped geographically. Theories must be able to accommodate changing realities in order to remain useful. If Neo-realism cannot account for the emergence of non-state great powers, it may not survive as a useful theory of international politics.

Realism in its traditional form perceives the world in state-centric terms. However, it does concede that this is a consequence of history that could change and states may not always be the principal actors in international politics. Evidence of this can be found in the writing of Hans Morgenthau:

“The contemporary connection between interest and the national state is a product of history, and is therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character” (Morgenthau 1967, 9)

Neo-realism builds directly and explicitly on the assumptions of classical Realism (Waltz 1979). If nothing in classical Realism “militates against the assumption” that nation states may be replaced by different actors, there is logically nothing in Neo-realism that does so, either. Simply because Neo-realism conceives of states as the main actors in the international system today, there is no reason that it has to indefinitely. Neo-realists can, without compromising their essential understanding of world politics, admit other actors to the first rank of significance. To brand Neo-realism an outdated theory because of its contemporary focus upon states, as so many scholars do, is unsatisfactory. As illustrated in this thesis, Neo-realism is an extremely useful theoretical tool for understanding a *sui generis* non-state entity like the EU. Rather than dismiss Neo-realism, we need to make it progressive enough to accommodate new realities.

In summary, to make Neo-realism progressive, we must relax its insistence that states are the main actors in the international system. States do not face the threat of being supplanted by other actors, but they do face the possibility of being joined in the top rank of international politics. In the trade realm, the EU already possesses the importance of a state. This could become the case in all areas. The EU may prove to be the “larger unit of a quite different character” that Morgenthau foresaw. Neo-realism is a useful framework that does not require reconstruction. It simply needs to be able to modify its focus to encompass new sorts of actors, alongside states. By doing this, Neo-realism will be able to thrive in parallel with historical changes and remain a useful theoretical framework.

Conclusion

The goal of this thesis has been to address the question: Is the EU becoming a great power? This question embodies both empirical and theoretical ambitions. In order to ascertain whether the EU is becoming a great power, I have used Waltz’s five criteria of great power: population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; political stability and competence; and military strength. The EU already fulfills four out of these five. Where it currently falls short is the last criterion: military strength. The military capability required of a great power varies according to three factors: its performance in the other criteria, whether it has nuclear weapons, and its foreign policy interests. Because the EU is such a powerful economic actor, is covered by nuclear deterrence, and has fairly modest security interests, it does not require a large conventional force. It only needs a military large enough to act as a “trip wire,” so that it can reveal the aggressive intentions of a potential attacker and to protect its interests. At this point in time, the EU does not have such a force. However, it has plans to develop a crisis management force of 50,000–60,000 troops, to be ready by 2003. The crisis management force would be large enough to act as a “trip wire,” and it would also support EU diplomacy and protect EU interests in wider Europe. All the EU members have been supportive of this force and so its chances of coming to fruition are good, particularly considering the success of the November 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference.

In the case of a non-state actor, like the EU, I have argued that a sixth criterion needs to be added to Waltz’s list: a unified foreign policy. Waltz supports this addition. The EU has a CFSP, but this does not presently fulfill the conditions of a unified foreign policy. The problem lies not so much with the formulation of a single policy position (although this could be improved by extending the exceptions to the general principle of unanimity voting), but with the lack of a single authoritative voice. The European Council, the Council, the Presidency, the High Representative, the Member States and various other agents all play a role in the CFSP’s representation. Although the Presidency formally has the task of representing

the CFSP externally, its six-month term and its lack of authority make this infeasible. To overcome this impediment, the Presidency should be reformed so that it consists of a number of countries working together with tenure of several years. It is difficult to determine whether these changes will take place. Although they have not been planned, they are not demanding and the EU states have illustrated previous willingness to carry out such reform. It is unlikely that enlargement would interfere too much with this process. In fact, it may even serve as a catalyst for CFSP reform.

The empirical ambition of this thesis has been to determine whether the EU is becoming a great power. My conclusion is that the EU is unlikely to emerge as a great power within the next few years. It must first create its proposed crisis management force and it must also reform the CFSP. However, these are not demanding changes, and considering the political will expressed by the EU members, we will probably see the EU emerge as a great power within the next decade.

The question of the EU's emergence as a great power prompts important theoretical considerations. There is a void in the literature on EU security and defense cooperation. The little theoretical literature, which does exist completely, neglects Neo-realist theory, even though Neo-realism is the dominant paradigm in security studies. Neo-realism has been rejected because it is considered too state-centric, too rigid and unsuitable for understanding institutions. However, these criticisms apply only to offensive Neo-realism. As my analysis shows, offensive Neo-realism does not offer a useful explanation for EU security cooperation. But Neo-realism, in its entirety, should not be dismissed. Neo-realism in its defensive variant *can* explain EU security cooperation. Drawing upon the logic of anarchy, which forces states to protect their own survival, defensive Neo-realists deduce that cooperation will often be the best means available to states in the pursuit of security. They argue that institutions help create the conditions necessary for cooperation by providing a forum for discussion and helping ensure transparency and adherence to rules. In this task, defensive Neo-realists generally agree, institutions merely reflect the wishes of states—they are not independent.

Although defensive Neo-realism is able to explain EU security cooperation, it may be unable to account for the future rise of non-state great powers, like the EU, because of its state-centric focus. However, Neo-realism should not be discarded as an outdated theory if this situation were to arise. Neo-realist scholars must relax their insistence upon the primacy of states. In order to remain relevant, Neo-realism must be able to encompass the importance of new non-state actors, which may arrive upon the international scene. Traditional Realism has illustrated a willingness to do so and Neo-realism can learn from this. By accommodating historical changes, Neo-realism will continue to be a useful theoretical tool.

In this thesis I have fulfilled three significant tasks. First, I have addressed the question of whether the EU is becoming a great power. The number of great powers in the international system dictates polarity, which in turn impacts upon the behavior of states. Although the EU is unlikely to be a great power in the immediate future, it is an entity that International Relations scholars need to examine carefully. Second, I have addressed the flaw in the literature on EU security cooperation, which has dismissed Neo-realism as an unsuitable theoretical tool. Neo-realism in its defensive variant can, in fact, explain EU security cooperation very well. Until now, defensive Neo-realism has been overlooked in this research area. Third, I have attempted to make Neo-realism progressive by encouraging Neo-realist scholars to accept the potential rise to great power status of a non-state actor. Neo-realism has traditionally viewed states as the most important actors in international politics. It should be willing to broaden this view to encompass actors like the EU. Classical Realists like Morgenthau argued that the state's primacy in global politics might be temporary. The time may soon arrive for states to share the top rank with non-state actors.

APPENDIX

Title V of the Revised Treaty on the European Union

PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Article 11

1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:

to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;

to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;

to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;

to promote international cooperation;

to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

2. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.

The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action, which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

Article 12

The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by:

defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy;

deciding on common strategies;

adopting joint actions;

adopting common positions; and

strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.

Article 13

1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defense implications.

2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.

Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.

3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.

The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.

The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.

Article 14

1. The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.

2. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.

3. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.

4. The Council may request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action.

5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures, which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.

6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.

7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council, which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

Article 15

The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.

Article 16

Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

Article 17

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defense aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework. The progressive framing of a common defense policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

3. The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications.

The competence of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article 13 shall also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself of the WEU.

When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question. The Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, shall adopt the necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision taking in the WEU.

Decisions having defense implications dealt with under this paragraph shall be taken without prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, third subparagraph.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.

5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be reviewed in accordance with Article 48.

Article 18

1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.

2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under this Title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organizations and international conferences.
3. The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary–General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.
4. The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to hold the Presidency.
5. The Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues.

Article 19

1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.

In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those, which do take part, shall uphold the common positions.

2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.

Member States, which are also members of the United Nations Security Council, will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States, which are permanent members of the Security Council, will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defense of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Article 20

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.

They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 20 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Article 21

The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy.

The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

Article 22

1. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
2. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

Article 23

1. Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted.

2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:

when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy;

when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position.

If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favor, cast by at least 10 members.

This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defense implications.

3. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.

Article 24

When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or international organizations in implementation of this Title, the Council, acting unanimously, may authorize the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting unanimously on a recommendation from the Presidency. No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply provisionally to them.

The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling under Title VI.

Article 25

Without prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.

Article 26

The Secretary–General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.

Article 27

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

Article 28

1. Articles 189, 190, 196 to 199, 203, 204, 206 to 209, 213 to 219, 255 and 290 of the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title.
2. Administrative expenditure, which the provisions entail for the institutions in the areas referred to in this Title, shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities.
3. Operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defense implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European Communities it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defense implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

4. The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European Communities.

ABBREVIATIONS

bbf	billion barrels
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
EC	European Community
EDC	European Defense Cooperation
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
GAC	General Affairs Council
GNP	Gross National Product
HR	High Representative
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IR	International Relations
MC	Military Committee
MS	Military Staff
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PoCo	Political Committee
PPEWU	Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union

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