Track-Two Diplomacy in South Asia

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Preface to the Second Edition

The first edition of this paper was brought out by the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) in March 1994. The wide interest that the paper evoked all over South Asia and among South Asia experts outside the region proves that track-two diplomacy has arrived in South Asia.

I am grateful to Professor Stephen P. Cohen of ACDIS for encouraging me to write the original paper, providing a fellowship which made the research for it possible, and prodding for the last eighteen months to bring out a second, revised edition.

In the first edition, I had written about several projects which were then new or being conceptualized. Most of these have now matured and those under planning have been successfully launched. Besides, a few projects which were then not in the pipeline have come up. Abortions there were, but only a few.

Track-two activity has emerged as a subject of study. Newspaper articles focusing on the process have been published, and on 6 August 1995 the Times of India (Bombay) carried a front page news analysis piece making a wider audience aware of a new discipline.

It is hoped that this paper, in its revised form, will continue to serve as a useful resource for researchers as well as practitioners of track-two diplomacy in South Asia.

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Introduction

Since President Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh circulated a letter proposing the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1980 the process of regional cooperation and conflict resolution has attracted the interest of the nongovernmental community in South Asia. Many initiatives involving academics, former government officials, grass-root workers, technical experts, the media, trade, and industry have been launched to promote people to people confidence building measures. Initially the emphasis was on economic and technical cooperation; the rising awareness of the implications of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear sector, has recently led to a change in the emphasis from cooperation to conflict resolution. With a new emphasis, new constituencies such as politicians and young strategists are being addressed by the nongovernmental conflict resolution experts and managers.

Both external and local elements can be credited for the growth of conflict resolution activity in the private sector in South Asia. The United States Information Agency, through its centers in various South Asian cities, and some American universities and think-tanks have played a key role in encouraging their South Asian counterparts to undertake track-two activities. They have been supported by such U.S. foundations as Ford, W. Alton Jones, and Rockefeller. Japanese, German, and Australian institutions have also played a catalytic role in facilitating peace-making exercises in South Asia.

What is even more interesting is the development of indigenous track-two diplomatic capacity in South Asia. Almost every regional state can boast of having some peacemakers with a record of resolving conflicts either internally or in the course of working for the United Nations. Some institutions harness this expertise for addressing conflicts in the region.

This paper profiles the evolution and current operation of track-two diplomacy in South Asia. The first section defines its scope and focuses on action-related work and exclude purely academic research on regional issues; grass-roots work by well meaning citizens will not covered unless it has implications for public opinion or public policy. The second section discusses economic cooperation diplomacy that dominated the early period of regional track-two dialogue and is followed by a discussion of the recent shift in emphasis from cooperation to conflict resolution and profiles some current initiatives. The final section assesses the strengths and weaknesses of track-two diplomacy in South Asia. The appendices provide a chronology of South Asian conflict, a listing of all known track-two and related efforts, and some contact addresses.

Background

South Asia is known for its ethnic, communal, and interstate conflicts. But it is also a region where many experiments for peace-making and peace-building have taken place in both governmental and nongovernmental sectors. Much has been written about the official “track-one” efforts for peace, but our focus is on track-two diplomacy—which may be defined as a process of unofficial dialogues between disputing polities conducted, directly or with the help of a third party, by influential citizens who normally have access to their governments and/or an ability to influence the public opinion. The goal of track-two diplomacy is usually to prevent or resolve conflicts, or build confidence between the polities they represent. Such elite exercises are distinct from well meaning peace efforts made by individuals or grass-root level organizations that do not have an impact on state policy or a wider public audience.

Our emphasis on elite efforts does not mean that peace efforts by common citizens are insignificant. Cultural exchanges, youth programs, and conventions of grass-root level public interest groups are not uncommon in South Asia. Some of them are useful in facilitating exchanges of information and ideas and for creating a feeling of solidarity among groups working on common concerns. For example, many Nepalese groups are active in the environment field while Pakistani human rights groups have been at the forefront.
promoting discussion about atrocities directed against South Asian women. SIMORGH, a Lahore-based group, organizes a South Asian Women’s Court, a conference of regional women activists, to discuss common approaches to rape—certainly one of the most serious problems in South Asia undermining human dignity and creating frustrations that are often channeled into violent sectarian conflicts. A proper analysis of the sources of frustration and conflict by groups such as SIMORGH may contribute to significant changes in public protest movements and improve prospects for domestic peace. But such groups so far have had a very limited impact, primarily because of organizational weaknesses. Similarly efforts to arrange parallel meetings of nongovernmental organizations at the time of the annual South Asian heads of government summits have not yielded much success. Therefore, while recognizing the potential significance of grass-root level efforts this paper focuses on result-oriented elite initiatives.

There is another constraint on the scope of this study. While it is recognized that some of the most successful people’s initiatives for peace have been made in the domestic context we will only deal with regional peace-making efforts. Internal peace-making efforts would require a volume. They include traditional conflict-resolution strategies, such as “peace marches” organized for communal harmony in the aftermath of religious or ethnic riots. There are also many nontraditional strategies for domestic conflict resolution, such as the dramatic initiative in the mid-1980s by Inder Jit, an Indian journalist, who arranged secret talks between India’s federal and state governments and the Gurkha separatist group, the Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), demanding an autonomous homeland. It resulted in an unique accord between the state and a nonstate party (GNLF) that was replicated in Bangladesh in the form of a peace accord between the government and Chakma separatist groups. However, the Gurkha model has not been used to address Sikh and Kashmiri issues in India.

The discussion on track-two diplomacy in this paper does not cover purely academic research. Regional studies have attracted the attention of research institutes in South Asia since the 1950s. Some institutes are lead players in conducting research and advancing the academic debate on regional cooperation and strategic issues, and often work together. In India the Center for Policy Research (CPR), the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), and Research and Information System (RIS) have been most active in the field both in terms of independent studies as well as joint ventures with institutes from other regional countries. The Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), a think-tank of the Indian Ministry of Defense, studies regional strategic issues, but mostly from the Indian government’s perspective.

In Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Institute of Strategic Studies and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies host workshops to bring together regional scholars. Nepal’s Tribhuvan University has a Center for South Asian Studies and some private research centers, and the United Nations’ regional Asian disarmament center is nominally located in Kathmandu—it does not yet have a permanent facility, but holds an annual conference on disarmament with an all-Asian focus. Pakistan has a specialized Institute for Regional Studies that is engaged in both research and policy dialogues. Both the Institute for Strategic Studies, Islamabad, and the Pakistan Institute for Developing Economies addresses regional issues as part of their broader mandates.

Sri Lanka has several important research institutes working on regional issues. The Colombo-based Marga Institute played a key role in the early 1980s in initiating regional research projects and the academic debate on cooperation, although it has not been very active since the early 1990s. However the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), located in both Colombo and Kandy, has been quite active and has produced a number of volumes on problems stemming from the region’s complex ethnic mix.

Despite the existence of many national institutes and university departments specializing in regional studies, a regional institute was lacking in South Asia. The vacuum was filled by the creation in 1993 of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) based in Colombo. It was a brainchild of late Professor Shelton Kodikara, a retired Sri Lankan professor, and several Indian and Pakistani scholars who had encountered difficulties in conducting joint research or even in meeting with each other. RCSS will connect national institutes in South Asia, sponsor regional research projects involving scholars from more than one country, and operate as an information clearing house. It plans to set up e-mail and fax networks and serve as a link between a group of South Asian centers and selected American, European, and Asian programs.

Some foreign research centers have undertaken regional projects involving participation of South Asian scholars since early 1994. The most prominent of these are: Asia Society, New York, addressing of all aspects
of U.S.–South Asian relations; a three-nation, India–Pakistan–U.S., project that examined lessons to be drawn from recent regional crises; and a project by the Indian Ocean Center for Peace Studies, Australia, on confidence building measures in South Asia. A unique feature of this last project is that it was coordinated by a young Pakistani woman scholar, Dr. Samina Yasmeen, and attracted input from other second-generation scholars from the region.

Economic Diplomacy

Track-two diplomacy, involving efforts by influential citizens for peace-making between countries of South Asia through various dialogues and meetings, has had two objectives: economic cooperation and conflict resolution. H. T. Parekh, an Indian financial wizard, is credited with the initial effort at expanding regional economic cooperation in the 1960s. Parekh rose through the ranks of the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India to become its managing director in the mid-1960s. He formed an informal group of Bombay-based business executives and financial professionals to lobby for a South Asian common market. The group conducted a few mini-seminars and held consultations with government authorities. Parekh published a series of articles on the South Asian common market in the Indian newspapers that were compiled in a book *India and Regional Development* (Bombay: Vora and Company Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1969). The objectives of Parekh’s efforts were clearly spelled out in his preface:

> The object of this little book is to plead for the cause of regional cooperation between India and the neighboring countries. This part of South Asia is at present a weak region economically with very small intraregional trade and without much contact between the constituent units. With economic integration this region can be transformed into a strong, prosperous, and powerful group of countries which can take a proud place in the comity of nations. This vision of the promised land has captured my imagination. I fervently hope that through this publication a wider public would be also able to see this vision with me. This great objective can be realized only if we are able to create a public opinion for it in this country as well as the other countries.

Within two years of the publication of Mr. Parekh’s book, a war took place between India and Pakistan resulting in the partial dismemberment of the latter. There were no supporters for any regional cooperation effort. The Bombay group slowly disappeared.

Ten years after Mr. Parekh’s efforts the actions of a regional government provided impetus to nongovernmental efforts for regional cooperation. The new initiative came from Bangladesh, which was then followed by nongovernmental efforts undertaken by Sri Lankan scholars. Perhaps the fact that neither India nor Pakistan—the two largest and most bellicose countries in the region—did not take the lead helped the process. Any plan conceived by one of these two states would have been suspected of undesirable motives by the other.

The Bangladesh initiative was launched by its President, Zia-ur-Rahman, in May 1980 when he wrote to the heads of government of Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka proposing the formation of a seven-nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The original proposal emphasized economic cooperation; India objected but agreed to join the association in 1981 when it was agreed that the forum would not be used to discuss bilateral or contentious issues. Meetings of the foreign secretaries were held almost every six months to shape the idea. In August 1983 the first meeting of foreign ministers was held to finalize the launch of the regional association. Bangladesh hosted a summit meeting of the heads of state and government in December 1985 to inaugurate the association.

Taking a clue from the foreign ministers’ meeting in 1983, Sri Lankan scholars took an initiative to bring together their counterparts from all seven countries to analyze prospects for cooperation. The most prominent of these early efforts was the Committee for Studies in Cooperation and Development (CSCD) coordinated by the Marga Institute of Colombo. For about five years CSCD produced several papers presenting cost-benefit analysis of cooperation in different economic sectors.

By 1987 CSCD had moved to the periphery of the regional cooperation debate as new institutional actors stepped in. The most prominent of them was the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) headed by Dr. V. A. Pai Panandiker, reputed to be one of Asia’s most efficient institution builders. CPR had three stalwarts from the
media—Bhabani Sen Gupta, Pran Chopra, and George Verghese—who had decided to devote themselves to regional cooperation. Besides research, CPR encouraged its faculty to travel in the region and promote regional cooperation behind the curtain. It had a working relationship with the Marga Institute, the Pakistan Institute for Developing Economics, and the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies.

CPR’s activities in analyzing and promoting regional cooperation were joined by Dinesh Singh, a leading Congress Party parliamentarian, who was to become the foreign minister in the P. V. Narasimha Rao government. Singh headed a varied group of New Delhi professors and retired civil servants and established the Indian Council for South Asian Cooperation. It was expected that the Council would have counterparts elsewhere in the Subcontinent, but this expectation was never fulfilled. The Council did not play any known track-two diplomatic role and was eventually orphaned when Dinesh Singh became a cabinet minister. But the Council made a significant academic contribution by successfully bringing out *South Asia Journal*, (now *South Asia Survey*) an acknowledged high-quality publication. In fact, it was the only professional periodical on regional issues in South Asia until Gowher Rizvi, then an Oxford-based Bangladeshi scholar, launched *Contemporary South Asia* in 1992. Recently a new Coalition for Action on South Asian Cooperation has emerged from various conferences organized by the Freidrich Ebert Foundation, notably a mega conference at Kathmandu in May 1994. K.K. Bhargava (India), Jared Jaffar (Pakistan), Farooq Sobhan (Bangladesh), and Ibrahim Zaki (Maldives) lead the coalition which has branches in all countries of the region.

In terms of track-two diplomacy—not research—where participants engage in a dialogue, arrive at solutions to problems, and influence state policies to implement the solutions, the most successful initiative has been that of the Independent Group on South Asian Cooperation (IGSAC). It was a brainchild of Dr. Ponna Wignaraja, a former UN official from Sri Lanka. The group was primarily funded by the United Nations University. It worked on the assumption that peace and cooperation in South Asia would be always elusive until the problem of poverty was tackled and advocated that various institutions in all the seven countries should join forces to fight their common enemies: poverty and malnutrition. As a first step, it recommended the establishment of a Poverty Alleviation Commission. The Heads of Government Summit held in Colombo in 1991 accepted the group’s main recommendations. Accordingly, a commission of independent experts and civil servants was set up under the chairmanship of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, former prime minister of Nepal. Dr. Ponna Wignaraja was asked to serve as the coordinator of the commission. In April 1993 the Heads of Government summit at Dhaka released the report of the commission advocating collective action to mobilize people’s participation. The report should have been publicized widely in South Asia, but it was handled in the conventional South Asian bureaucratic style making it difficult for scholars to obtain it, not to mention the grass-root organizations and common citizens who were to be mobilized for poverty eradication.

Thus efforts for economic cooperation in South Asia have been limited to scholars and economic administrators. The real economic actors, business enterprises, have generally been left out of regional cooperation efforts. However, the Punjab–Haryana–Delhi Chamber of Commerce in India and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Pakistan have exchanged a few business delegations of small or medium scale businessmen in search of small trade opportunities. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) initiated a study in 1995. CII has a high profile, but its involvement in regional trade efforts is on a low key. There has been little discussion by regional businessmen and industrialists about the policy framework and strategic environment in which they operate. As a result, intraregional trade continues to be below 5 percent of the total trade of each country—the only exception being bilateral trade between India and Bhutan as well as India and Nepal. The Heads of Government summit at Dhaka in April 1993 announced plans to launch a South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) whereby trade within the region would attract duty concessions. But the response from South Asia’s trade circles was not very enthusiastic. South Asian businessmen are culturally and historically attracted to the West. Lately some reorientation has been taking place with India attempting to join the Asia Pacific Economic Community and Pakistan trying to bring together the Central Asian countries. Therefore, regional economic cooperation does not hold much attraction. The SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry was created in 1991, but its work is not well known and it is treated with apathy by important business magnates in the region.

The beauty of the original initiative of Parekh’s Bombay group was that it was a project of practicing businessmen. It is unfortunate that nobody in industry has pursued the subject with Parekh’s passion. In fact,
when he organized a half-day seminar in Bombay in 1987 in order to revive his efforts, he could only attract
Indian and Pakistani scholars and officials from the capitals. Bombay’s business community was conspicuous
by its absence.

There were some prospects for the private sector engaging in regional economic diplomacy if the UN Center
for Traditional corporations had succeeded in its plans to hold a meeting of economic administrators,
industrialists, and multinationals to discuss regional approaches to business development in South Asia. The
meeting, planned for late 1994, intended to bring together leading industrialists and multinational executives to
discuss the policy environment rather than specific trade opportunities. It has not materialized. But, such an
exercise is timely since all countries in the region have liberalized their economies to attract foreign goods and
investments since the beginning of the 1990s. If a South Asian government wants to lure extraregional capital
in order to create employment and income at home, there is no logical reason why it should not welcome capital
from other countries in the region. Also, transnational capital finds it attractive to invest in a region where
several countries have common trade and investment rules and easy mobility of capital, goods, and labor rather
than a region where constituent countries are separated from each other by political or economic barriers. The
more South Asian states attempt to lure transnational capital and technology, the more they are bound to find a
need to move to a common market. If political decision makers oppose such economic integration, business
enterprises will themselves demand it. The local business leaders may be sensitive to the politicians, but
multinationals need not be so. Besides the multinationals have access to powerful instruments such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank donor governments that can be mobilized to pressure
South Asian states to move close to economic cooperation. Instead of waiting for external pressure it would be
advantageous for South Asian economic administrators and business leaders to engage in quiet diplomacy and
develop their own common approaches to economic interaction.

Political Containment Diplomacy

In the absence of enthusiasm by business enterprises track-two diplomacy in economic cooperation had declined
by the early 1990s. But policy researchers realized that economic cooperation would not be viable unless there
were a political breakthrough and unless internal systems of governance changed. The decision-making elite in
all South Asian countries saw nothing much to gain by regional cooperation under the prevailing system of
governance and policy priorities.

This realization led to a shift in the focus of track-two diplomacy in South Asia from economic cooperation
to the containment of political conflicts. The U.S. government and private U.S. institutions played a key role in
initiating various confidence building measures and track-two diplomacy projects in 1991. Washington may
have been emboldened by its success in launching the Middle East Peace talks, but it knew that the South Asian
governments would not be willing to enter into a similar dialogue. At the same time the United States would
not want to ignore South Asia altogether as it has been projected by the media as a potential theater for a nuclear
war. A nuclear or near-nuclear crisis in South Asia could jeopardize the nonproliferation regime and create
unnecessary decision-making problems for U.S. foreign policy. The initial U.S. goal was to encourage South
Asian influential citizens to design and popularize a nuclear restraint regime, but it was soon realized that the
nuclear issue in South Asia could not be separated from other elements in India–Pakistan relations, such as the
conventional arms race, Kashmir, and economic development. Accordingly, Washington began to encourage
private Indian and Pakistani individuals and groups to address all conflicts that could reduce tensions in the
region.

Under the auspices of the U.S. Information Agency (USIS) International Visitor Program prominent
professionals from all over the world are regularly invited to visit the United States. In 1991 it designed the
International Visitor Program to enable the visitors from South Asia to visit research centers and public interest
groups involved in conflict resolution. The visitors were so influenced by the experience that most of them,
though not all, decided to form a South Asian Network for Conflict Resolution. The network never took off.

USIS has also hosted a series of WORLDNET dialogues between Indian and Pakistani experts, facilitated by
U.S. experts, on issues such as nuclear proliferation, regional economic cooperation, and confidence building
measures. These dialogues have enabled Indian and Pakistani scholars to exchange views without traveling away from their homes.

Another USIS innovation was to have Dr. Harold Saunders conduct a series of workshops on conflict resolution in the region. Dr. Saunders had been involved in the Camp David negotiations as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia. After his retirement from government service, Saunders joined the Kettering Foundation where he was instrumental in arranging dialogues between influential U.S. and Soviet citizens. These dialogues were known as the Dartmouth process, named after the place where they were held.

Along the lines of the Dartmouth process, USIS launched the “Neemrana process” in South Asia. A group of distinguished citizens from India and Pakistan were invited to meet at Neemrana fort in the state of Rajasthan, India. The participants identified the following issues that they thought should be discussed over a long period of time: the conventional arms race, nuclear proliferation, Kashmir, and economic relations. The group has held ten meetings by the fall of 1995 despite a sharp decline in official relations between India and Pakistan. The meetings alternate between the two countries. The governments of India and Pakistan have not commented on the process but facilitate it by granting visas on a priority basis—a major contribution to the success of the process. The Pakistani group is diverse: two of its members have known influence with the military; one of them was considered for the interim prime ministership in the transition government prior to the 1993 polls. The Indian group includes a retired general, a retired admiral, several retired civilian officials, two editors, a scholar, and a specialist on regional conflict resolution (the author).

By the fall of 1995 the Neemrana process had reached a state where the two sides could agree on most issues except Kashmir. It was easiest to reach an agreement on improving economic relations. Eventually, as the Indian and Pakistani governments faced real constraints in increasing defense expenditure, the Neemrana group also found it easy to agree on containing the conventional arms race. It is expected that the group will soon publish papers jointly signed by experts from both sides.

The Neemrana process was launched by USIS, but it soon became independent—albeit with funds from an U.S. foundation and with a U.S. moderator. In 1991, around the same time of Neemrana, many other similar processes were launched—some by independent American institutions and some by local actors. They included one time regional conferences on strategic issues by Time Magazine and the Frontier Post, Lahore. The most prominent of these initiatives was coordinated by O. P. Shah, a Calcutta-based chartered accountant and publisher. He organized two sessions of an “India–Pakistan Dialogue” in Islamabad and New Delhi. In each meeting over fifty prominent professionals paid their own way to attend and contribute. Shah’s special success was in attracting mainstream politicians—other groups primarily featured retired bureaucrats or defense personnel. Shah even had the leading lights of the Hindu nationalist party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), involved in his dialogues, and his meetings received wide press coverage. He attempted to institutionalize the Dialogue and also launch a similar one between India and Bangladesh but failed due to organizational weakness. Instead, Topan Bose from India and Mubashir Hasan from Pakistan came together to launch the Pakistan India People’s Forum. The Forum has had two meetings. The second meeting took place in New Delhi in March with one-hundred Indian and one-hundred Pakistani participants. It attracted wrath from the Pakistani media while the Indian press projected it positively. The main weakness of the forum is that it is dominated by have been government officials like Mubashir Hasan of Pakistan and Nirmal Mukherjee of India who have no influence on state policy and hence the prospects of the forum contributing to a real change are not serious.

Besides bilateral dialogues, various regional dialogues have been set in motion. In January 1992 academics from the region gathered in Kathmandu to discuss a research agenda for South Asia in strategic studies in the 1990s. Earlier, the South Asia Dialogue was launched in New Delhi under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Research with support from the Ford Foundation. The New Delhi round in 1991 has been followed by more rounds in Colombo and Lahore in the last two years. In another initiative, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation has brought scholars from the region together to assess the costs of noncooperation and benefits of cooperation. A series of small seminars were organized culminating in a major conference in Kathmandu in May 1994. Two sets of regional dialogues are annually held in Tokyo with funding from the Japanese foreign ministry, one through a newly created Japan–South Asia Forum and the other through the Japan Institute of International
Affairs. Similarly, the U.S. Institute of Peace has held two workshops in Washington, D.C., on the Kashmir problem, and plans to hold a third in October, 1995.

Besides O. P. Shah’s dialogues and the South Asia Dialogue launched by CPR, where politicians joined scholars and civil servants, the conflict resolution process has been limited to bureaucrats, retired bureaucrats, and aspiring bureaucrats. There has been little involvement of those who can directly influence policies, those who can mobilize opinions of the masses or the young generation who hold the key to the future. It appeared at one stage that much of the track-two diplomacy in South Asia might not be relevant beyond the close circuit of a few retired diplomats. But a series of initiatives since 1992 have been aimed at new constituencies involving real policy makers and the future generation in the process.

The initiative to tap the younger generation came from Chris Smith of King’s College, London, UK; George Perkovich of the W. Alton Jones Foundation; and Stephen P. Cohen, then with the Ford Foundation, India. The idea was to hold a summer school on arms control and conflict resolution for young regional strategists, journalists, government officials, and scholars. Participants have include Chinese, Nepalese, and Sri Lankans, although the group—including the faculty—is dominated by Indians and Pakistanis. The first Summer School was held at Bhurban, Pakistan, in May 1993. A second session was held in May 1994 also in Pakistan, and the third session in India in August 1995. The Summer School is noteworthy for the active participation of women scholars and journalists and because India and Pakistan each allowed one young government official to participate in their personal capacity.

Another program for young people was launched by the Henry L. Stimson Center of Washington, D.C. Under this program a young Indian and a young Pakistani scholar are invited to spend a few weeks together at the Center’s Washington, D.C., facilities to study confidence building measures. The Center has also commissioned Abha Dixit and Samina Yasmeen, young women scholars from India and Pakistan respectively, to write a joint paper on nonmilitary confidence building measures.

Apart from the “tiny tots” movement, as one of the architects of the Bhurban experiment describes the post-independence generation of Indians and Pakistanis, big shots have also shown an interest in conflict resolution. The beginning was made by Mohartama Benazir Bhutto, currently Prime Minister of Pakistan. In 1992 as the leader of opposition in the Pakistani parliament, she invited all of the opposition leaders in South Asia to Karachi to discuss a common vision for the future of the region. In the same year speakers of parliaments of the South Asian countries met in Sri Lanka and Nepal to form an Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians. In April 1993 the heads of government at their Dhaka summit welcomed the formation of the Speaker’s Association. In July 1995 the Association organized the first in a series of conferences at New Delhi. The focus of the Association is on exchanging information on parliamentary procedures, not on regional conflict management.

The International Centre for Peace Initiatives, a Bombay based organization, has been active in involving political leaders from South Asia in the peace-making process. In May 1993 the Centre collaborated with the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation to organize a meeting in New Delhi of senior statesmen from all parts of the world to support phased elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Special efforts were made to involve leaders from South Asia in the meeting resulting in the participation of Kamal Hossain, former foreign minister of Bangladesh; Lyonpo Dr. T. Tobgyel, communication minister of Bhutan; R. Venkataraman, former President of India; I. H. Zaki, former deputy foreign minister of the Maldives; K. P. Bhattarai, president of the Nepalese Congress Party; and J. R. Jayewardene, former president of Sri Lanka. The absence of a delegate from Pakistan was accidental as Benazir Bhutto, who was expected to participate, encountered an unexpected constitutional crisis at home.

Since 1994 the International Centre for Peace Initiatives (ICPI) has been collaborating with the Parliamentarians for Global Action and the International Peace Academy for their program of workshops in peace-making and preventive diplomacy for parliamentarians in South Asia. The program is steered by eminent conflict resolution experts and political leaders from within the region. The first workshop was held in Kathmandu in May 1994 and the second in the Maldives in May 1995. President M. Abdul Gayoom of the Maldives inaugurated the second workshop and called for a new approach to security management. The workshop was attended by thirty political leaders from the region including ten serving or former ministers. It has resulted
in several follow-up processes. The most significant is the idea of a multi-party dialogue between leading political parties in India and Pakistan. ICPI is also bringing out a handbook on conflict resolution.

**How Effective Is Track-Two Diplomacy?**

Most of the efforts described above are aimed at preventing conflicts and reducing tensions. We cannot precisely quantify their contribution to peace and stability in the region. They are not as dramatic as diplomatic efforts that might prevent a war or stop one that has broken out. But the process of track-two diplomacy, however young in South Asia, has made a few gains.

One clear accomplishment is that it has opened new lines of communication between decision makers from India and Pakistan in particular and South Asia in general. The Indian government has opposed Pakistani proposals for a five nation conference on nuclear nonproliferation but it supports track-two discussions that deal with the subject. Both governments support these efforts in other ways, also. The Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad holds a reception for the Neemrana group, as does his Pakistani counterpart in New Delhi. Both the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministries sent a young officer to participate in the first Bhurban Summer school; the President, the Vice President and the Prime Minister of India spoke at the Rajiv Gandhi Memorial Initiative conference. In November 1993 the Indian government cosponsored a seminar on nuclear nonproliferation at the University of Pennsylvania. Similarly, the Pakistani government has been warm to most of the track-two efforts. Distinguished parliamentarians were involved in ICPI’s Kathmandu and Maldives workshops.

It has become prestigious to be involved in regional conflict resolution efforts. This is a great psychological change since the mid-1980s when conflict resolution used to be dismissed as an irrelevant Western concept. At a time when various fundamentalist groups advocate antagonism towards neighboring countries in the national interest—normally responding to some abnormal crises such as Ayodhya or Cherar-e-Sharif—the current prestige of track-two diplomacy is remarkable.

The involvement of new constituencies—such as young people, women, and politicians—may make some real breakthroughs possible. It has been reported that the young women at Bhurban often got together, sharing a special sense of solidarity and a vision of the future. For them they were women first; Indians and Pakistanis later. For the younger generation who have not personally experienced the traumas of partition, it is much more interesting to discuss the future than events in the past—which could best be left to the historians. The generation gap is clearly evident in other track-two dialogues. Most retired army or government officials tend to be obsessed with problems in terms of some treaty, resolution, or conflict of ten or twenty years earlier. Most young people look at problems in terms of what it means for their future.

The response to the SIMORGH Women’s Court in Lahore in December 1993 from Indian women’s groups also indicates that young women from across the Subcontinent consider their own dignity and rights more important than the national egos of those who oppress them. When communication and travel facilities are opened, interest or issue-based solidarity networks may pave the way for the real unification of the people of South Asia.

The role of political actors in the track-two process is most delicate. Personal rapport between Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi led to the signing of an agreement on not attacking each others’ nuclear installations and to the decision to establish a hot-line and warning systems about border military exercises. The Bhutto–Gandhi accords underline the importance of personal rapport between political leaders.

But interaction between politicians can be counterproductive if it is not managed with care. In April 1993 at the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference, Indian and Pakistani delegates clashed over bilateral issues. Some participants extended the conflict beyond the conference to the media. The net result was a worsening of the political atmosphere. Therefore, the International Centre for Peace Initiatives and Parliamentarians for Global Action carefully structured their parliamentary workshops in such a way that the possibilities of confrontation would be reduced. It worked. There was such a camaraderie in the Maldives that the politicians are asking for more workshops.
If track-two diplomacy is to be meaningful, it must not only involve political decision makers but also attract representatives of groups that are generally perceived to be opposed to conflict resolution. In India this includes the Bharatiya Janata Party, which represents Hindu nationalism, and the Jamaat in Pakistan and Bangladesh, which represent Islamic fundamentalism. If BJP and Jamaat leaders were to meet and exchange views they might surprise themselves by discovering a few common interests. In any case, there would not be much to lose. It is significant that Pramed Mahajan, BJP Secretary General, serves on the steering committee of ICPI’s workshops.

Another important constituency so far ignored by track-two diplomacy is the vernacular press, which plays a crucial role in shaping the opinion of the masses. Journalists from vernacular newspapers need to meet and discuss their perceptions in Hindi, which is spoken in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and to some extent Nepal. Otherwise translation facilities from one vernacular language to another should be provided at such a meeting.

Track-two diplomacy in South Asia must be also extended to address interests of all countries in the region. Most efforts emphasize India–Pakistan relations, which is justifiable considering the history, geography and demography of the region. But other countries should not be ignored. The Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi and a young Nepalese engineer, Dipak Gyawali, have made some efforts to address the problem of water resources between Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. The Quakers have mediated in the conflict between India and Sri Lanka over the latter’s Tamil autonomy agitation. The Maldives, which feels a distinct sense of insecurity because of its small size, finds that threats to its security are not covered by most track-two efforts in South Asia. As a result Ibrahim Zaki, who played a pivotal role in the development of SAARC culminating into his appointment as the Secretary General of the organization for 1992–93, is understood to be involved in establishing the Maldives International Centre. It will provide a forum to enable prominent Maldivian citizens to interact with their counterparts in the SAARC countries. The center is specifically planning to address youth cooperation in the region, as suggested by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the Republic. Budgetary problems have prevented its launch until the end of 1995.

There are other cases of Bombay-based institutions taking the initiative to launch change in institutions in other South Asian countries. Credit Capital Finance Corporation contributed to the development of the Stock Market in Dhaka, and the Housing Development Finance Corporation is engaged in helping the Sri Lankans set up a housing finance agency of their own.

Despite the many microscopic efforts mentioned above, much needs to be done for conflict resolution in South Asia’s small countries. The projects mentioned above are in the areas of institutional development, not direct conflict resolution exercises. For example, the violent conflict between Nepal and Bhutan over the status of people of Nepalese origin in southern Bhutan has resulted in a few hundred deaths. Yet there is no track-two initiative to resolve the conflict. However, considering the growth of track-two diplomacy it would not be surprising if these lacunas are covered in the near future.

Finally, there is a problem of financing that affects nongovernmental work in all sectors. The International Centre for Peace Initiatives is rare in drawing resources from indigenous business and industry. Most other projects are funded by foreign foundations, notably, the Ford, W. Alton Jones, Friedrich Ebert and, most recently, Rockefeller Foundations. South Asian industrialists prefer glittering projects of high publicity value; they are, therefore, not temperamentally oriented towards quiet diplomacy. Also, despite liberalization politicians and government bureaucrats still have considerable control over economic decision making and, therefore, industrialists do not like to intervene in an area that they consider to be a government monopoly. Thus there will always be constraints on local sources of funding for track-two diplomacy. But the experience of Peace Initiatives shows that an innovative and tactful approach to industry can yield results.

To tap local resources, it is also necessary that track-two diplomacy managers learn to think beyond the capitals where foreign offices and foreign foundations are located. In India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh the major commercial centers are different from the political capitals; yet there are hardly any peace institutes outside the capitals.

Is the expenditure on nongovernmental peace efforts justifiable when results are abstract? South Asia is a land of wastage. The funds spent on official and unofficial military establishments, on the internal security
apparatus, on political corruption, social malpractice, and so forth, runs into billions of dollars. Amidst such wasteful and counterproductive patterns of expenditure it is the height of hypocrisy to consider spending a few million rupees on learning about peace a luxury.

And why assume that track-two diplomacy in South Asia will not yield results? In the early 1990s a Norwegian professor researching the problems of the Palestinian people developed an idea for secret talks between Palestinian and Israeli hard-liners. He involved the leadership of his country in arranging the dialogue. In 1993 Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Yitzak Rabin, the Israeli prime minister, walked onto the White House lawns with the President of the United States to announce an end to one of history’s bitterest disputes. Was the Arab–Israeli conflict more difficult to resolve than any of the conflicts in South Asia? Did not people once believe that the earth was flat?
Appendix One:
A Chronology of South Asian Conflict

Table 1. Conflict in South Asia, war related deaths from 1508 to 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location and Identification of Conflict</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>2,302,000</td>
<td>1,171,000</td>
<td>3,610,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,337,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837–38 Iran vs. Afghanistan</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838–42 UK vs. Afghanistan</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878–80 UK vs. Afghanistan</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885–85 Russia vs. Afghanistan</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919–19 Afghanistan vs. UK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924–25 Anti-Reform vs. Government; UK intervenes</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928–29 Anti-Reform vs. Government</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–89 USSR intervened in civil war</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–71 India intervenes; famine and massacre</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864–65 UK vs. Bhutan</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,223,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1508–09 Gujerat–Egypt vs. Portugal</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1509–12 Portuguese conquered Goa</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1525–26 Mogul vs. Delhi</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1526–29 Rajput vs. Mogul</td>
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<td>45,000</td>
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<td>1537–39 Afghans vs. Moguls</td>
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<td>1565–65 Muslims vs. Vijayanagar</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<td>1622–23 Iran vs. Mogul Empire</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1657–59 Civil war of four brothers</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<td>1708–08 Mogul civil war</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1738–39 Iran invaded Mogul India</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1756–57 Bengal vs. UK</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>1758–61 Afghanistan capture Delhi</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>75,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1763–65 Bengal Rulers vs. UK</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>1778–81 UK vs. Marathas</td>
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<td>1782–84 UK East India Company vs. Mysore</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>1790–92 UK East India Company vs. Mysore</td>
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<td>1792–99 Tippu Sahib vs. UK</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>1802–06 Marathas vs. UK</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>1802–02 Maratha Civil War</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1806–06 Sepoy mutiny vs. UK</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1814–17 Gurkhas vs. UK</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1817–18 UK conquered Marathas</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1825–26 UK besieged Bharatpur</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1843–43 UK vs. Baluchis, Sind Army</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1845–46 UK vs. Sikhs</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1848–49 Sikhs vs. UK</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1852–52 Dards vs. Dogras</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1855–55 Santals vs. UK</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1857–59 Sepoy Revolt vs. UK</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
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<td>1863–66 Muslim rebellion vs. UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>1897–98 Muslim rebellion vs. UK</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914–18 World War I</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
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<td>1918–19 Amritsar massacre by UK</td>
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<td>1921–22 UK intervention in civil war</td>
<td>11,000</td>
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<td>1939–45 World War II</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>49,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946–48 Muslim vs. Hindu; UK intervenes</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>800,000</td>
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<td>1947–49 Muslims, Pakistan vs Kashmir (India)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>1948–48 India vs. Hyderabad</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<td>1962–62 China vs. India at border</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965–66 Pakistan vs. Kashmir (India intervenes)</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–71 Pakistan vs. India; border war</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983–90 Ethnic and political violence</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973–77 Baluchis vs. Government; Afghan intervenes</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–71 Maoists vs. Government</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984–90 Tamils vs. Sinhalese government</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix Two:
Selected Track-II, Conflict Resolution, and Peace-Related Projects in South Asia

Current Projects

1. The Neemrana Dialogue on regional security issues began in 1992 by the U.S. Information Service (USIS). Now funded by private sources, it involves sixteen Indians and Pakistanis meeting twice a year. The chair is an American (Paul Kreisberg). So far, there is little agreement on specific subjects but jointly written papers may soon be forthcoming.

2. The Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois–Urbana, has had a South Asian Security and Arms Control Training Project since 1978. ACDIS brings South Asian strategists, scholars, and journalists, to Urbana for one semester or one academic year to work on arms control-related projects or otherwise enhance their skills and knowledge. Over sixty individuals have been resident in Urbana, and a reunion-conference was held in Kathmandu in 1992, resulting in a book on South Asian security in the post-Cold War period, South Asia After the Cold War: International Perspectives (Westview Press, 1993).

3. The Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., has, for the past two years, had a special subprogram for the training of South Asians in current developments in confidence building measures. Matthew Rudolph manages this program for Stimson, which is directed by Michael Krepon. ACDIS and Stimson share in the training of their grantees.

4. The U.S. Information Agency has organized a series of WORLDNET (closed-circuit television) broadcasts linking Indian, Pakistani, and American experts in discussions of regional issues. These, and Neemrana, had their origins in a series of 1990–91 regional “Dartmouth” seminars organized by Harold Saunders, a former U.S. government official closely associated with the Middle East peace process in several administrations, and Gennady Chufrin, Deputy Director of the Russian Oriental Institute.

5. The O. P. Shah Initiatives. Mr. Shah, a Calcutta-based businessman, has organized at least two India–Pakistan meetings using his own funds and contributions by participants who range across the political spectrum. Each meeting (held so far both in India and Pakistan) features one or more public sessions and extended private or closed sessions.

6. The PHD Initiatives. The joint Chambers of commerce of Punjab, Haryana, and Delhi (from offices located in Delhi) have initiated a dialogue among small-scale businessmen in India and Pakistan.

7. The Regional Policy Dialogues brings together representatives from South Asia’s leading policy studies centers for discussions on contemporary policy issues. Members typically are retired civil servants, journalists, and senior academics. The Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, is the chief organizer of this group, the most recent meeting was held in Lahore in early November 1993.

8. The Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) in Colombo evolved as a result of discussions among regional scholars. It’s goals are assist regional scholars and centers to interact with each other and to sponsor individual and collaborative research on a wide range of security issues. RCSS’ founder was the late Professor Shelton U. Kodikara. The current Director is Dr. Ifitkaruzzaman, of the Bangladesh Institute for Strategic Studies. RCSS first projects (all now completed and awaiting publication) examined the influence of refugees on regional relations, the foreign policy process in South Asian democracies, and nuclear proliferation. RCSS will also link South Asian centers to selected Western and Asian programs through a two-way distribution of material. There are plans for a fax network and full internet connections. A directory of nearly six hundred individuals and centers with an interest in South Asian security and strategic issues is available from RCSS or ACDIS at the University of Illinois.

9. The South Asian Summer School in Arms Control. Conceived by George Perkovich this is an annual summer school for younger South Asian (and Chinese) journalists, officials, and scholars (about 25–30 participants, 6–8 international faculty). The first School was held in 1993 at Bhurban, Pakistan, a hill-station above Islamabad. The second session was held in May 1994, also in Pakistan; while the third took place in India in August 1995. The goals are to transfer state-of-the-art knowledge about arms control,
verification, and conflict resolution, and to create a network of younger scholars that transcends regional borders. Faculty include South Asian, Chinese, and Western experts. The School Chair is Stephen P. Cohen, the Director is Chris Smith (King’s College, London). Professors P. R. Chari and Pervez Hoodbhoy are the Indian and Pakistani organizers.

10. **India–China Dialogues.** In recent years at least five Chinese groups have been to India to study various Indian economic, commercial, administrative systems (e.g., rural banking). A few Indian delegations have visited Chinese strategic centers (one was organized by the United Services Institution of India in 1992, the most recent was a CPR delegation in October 1993).

11. **U.S.–Indian Strategic Talks.** Three years ago the National Defense University (NDU), Washington, D.C., with the encouragement of the Department of Defense, began a series of “strategic dialogues” between Indian and American strategists. The Indian cosponsor has been the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi. The fourth dialogue was held in October 1993; it is unlikely there will be a fifth. The dialogue has resulted in two books and has often been less notable for in-conference discussions than for serving as the venue for informal talks between participants and officials, in out-of-conference settings.

12. **U.S.–Pakistan Dialogues.** NDU recently (July 1993) organized a joint seminar with the Institute for Strategic Studies, Islamabad, in the United States. This is a revival of several quasi-official academic dialogues held between Pakistanis and Americans in the 1980s. There is some discussion of combining this with a revived U.S.–India dialogue in a three-way meeting.

13. **The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific** was established in 1988 as part of a UN effort to create regional disarmament centers. It organizes an annual conference in Kathmandu on Asian disarmament issues and has sponsored conferences on regional disarmament, confidence building, and related subjects in Japan. Funded by NGO, Japanese, and other sources (some Scandinavian countries), the Centre hopes to establish a permanent center in Kathmandu.

14. **Chinese Initiatives.** The PRC built a very substantial conference center in Colombo several years ago in connection with a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement and has just finished a similar center in Kathmandu. These have extensive facilities for international conferences. The Colombo center (the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall—BMICH) also houses the Bandaranaike Center for International Studies (BCIS) and will, beginning 1 January 1994, house the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies.

15. **TOUCH (The Organization for Universal Communal Harmony)** is a Chicago-based intercommunity organization devoted to promoting “intercommunal peace and harmony” in South Asia. Its founder-director, Nazar Hayat Tiwana, has sponsored a number of programs in India, but the group also has strong contacts in Pakistan (Tiwana’s father was the head of the prepartition Unionist Party in undivided Punjab).

One-Time Events, or Incomplete Information

16. The **Frontier Post Seminars.** This leading Pakistani newspaper organized a public seminar with Indian and Pakistani participants in 1995.

17. The **Shanghai Institute for International Affairs** organized a conference on China and South Asia in January 1994 with Chinese, South Asian, American, and other scholars contributing papers.

18. The **Chinese Association for International Friendly Contact** has inquired into the possibility of organizing a more systematic exchange or dialogue between China and India, especially on strategic issues. Possible South Asian counterparts are CPR and RCSS.

19. A joint **Indian–Pakistani–Chinese–American Conference** on science and nonproliferation was held in February 1994 in Shanghai. It was followed by a meeting in Goa, India. The American cosponsors are the Federation of American Scientists; the Chinese sponsors are the State Committee on Education and Fudan University.

21. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace held a major conference on U.S.–Indian relations in New Delhi as the culmination of a year-long Washington seminar on U.S. policy in South Asia. The group then made a presentation in Pakistan. Much criticized in the region and the U.S., it was, still, the only such report or statement on U.S.–South Asian relations in many years.

22. In November 1993 a high-level workshop on nonproliferation, organized by Kathleen Bailey of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, was held in New Delhi.

23. The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), a global group, held a meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in November 1993 with a special focus on South Asian proliferation issues.

24. An October 1993 seminar on nonproliferation was organized by Professor Francine Frankel, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, with the assistance of the Government of India.

25. An Allahabad University research project on regional security will begin soon. This will involve studies by Indian and foreign scholars of regional economic, security, and related problems. The final reports will be translated into Urdu and Hindi for wider distribution.

26. Other Indian universities with projects on security studies or arms control include Jawaharlal Nehru University School of International Studies, Bombay University, Baroda University and, very likely and very good, Calcutta University History Department, which intends to start India’s first peace studies program.

27. A project on Regional CBMs was organized by Professor Sumit Ganguly and Dr. Ted Greenwood with meetings in both Delhi and Islamabad in 1993. Papers were contributed by Indian, Pakistani, and American scholars and at least one Pakistani official.

28. The Swedes, the Germans, and the Finns each fund one or more South Asian scholars each year to come to their country and study arms control. The Japanese are building expertise and have recently held annual South Asian conferences at the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo, with regional invitees.

29. In 1994 the Asia Society sponsored a major study examining all aspects of U.S.–South Asian relations: economic, environmental, security, cultural, human rights, etc. A study group visited South Asia and published a report. Meetings were held in the United States to disseminate its findings. The groups was led by Carla Hills, former U.S. Special Trade Representative, and Arthur Hartman, the former U.S. ambassador to Moscow.

30. Operation Brasstacks: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Crises in South Asia, co-organized by Kanti Bajpai and P. R. Chari, India; Pervaiz Cheema, Pakistan; and Sumit Ganguly and Stephen Cohen, U.S., was a retrospective, “lessons learned” study of the Brasstacks crisis of 1987; it brought together many of the key American, Pakistani, and Indian figures in the crisis and published a book, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (Manohar Press, 1995); the group intends to conduct a similar study of the 1990 crisis.

31. The Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, is expanding its work in the area of security and regional arms control. CPR is the best think-tank in South Asia and has, in the past, taken the lead in initiating several policy and security dialogues. New faculty members, P. R. Chari and Brahma Chellaney, add arms control and security-related expertise.


33. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) has launched a major South Asian regional initiative. Its regional consultant is Dr. Gururaj Mutalik, formerly of WHO.
Dr. Bernard Lown, who received the Nobel Peace prize on behalf of IPPNW, spoke in India and Pakistan in 1993. IPPNW branches in India, known as Indian Doctors for Peace and Development published “Agenda for Peace” in cooperation with the International Centre for Peace Initiatives with input from prominent Indian and Pakistani scholars. A South Asia conference is planned for the winter of 1995–96.

**New Projects**

34. **Peace Initiatives**: A bimonthly journal launched by International Centre for Peace Initiatives, Bombay, for facilitating interaction in the region on peace processes. ICPI is a Bombay based think-tank supported by the corporate sector and headed by Sundeep Waslekar.

35. **India Pakistan Multi-Party Political Dialogue**: At a workshop on the role of parliamentarians in conflict resolution, held in the Maldives in May 1995, Indian and Pakistani parliamentarians decided to launch multi-party, continuous, uninterrupted, unconditional dialogue between the nominees of five leading parties from each side. The nominees of the parties will be essentially appointed by and speak for their leaders. They will meet two or three times every year. A project of International Centre for Peace Initiatives, Bombay.

36. **Kashmir Humanitarian Initiative**: The first ever CBM between people of Kashmir and the rest of India. A fact finding mission of International Centre for Peace Initiatives visited Srinagar in June 1995 and decided to launch health care and employment generation projects in the Srinagar area with cooperation between Kashmiri community groups and Bombay NGOs. Militant leaders have assured safety of the projects. ICPI is also organizing seminars on political dimension of the Kashmir issue involving top militant leaders and Indian political leaders. The first seminar in the series was held in August 1995 when senior leaders of all national political parties came together for the first time to discuss the issue.

37. **India Bangladesh Dialogue**: Regular exchange of views between politicians and scholars on trade, transit, water and refugees. The first session took place in Dhaka in May 1995. A project of Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and Centre for Policy dialogue, Dhaka.

38. **South Asian Women Leaders for Peace and Cooperation**: Friedrich Ebert Foundation is planning to bring together women political leaders, especially members of parliament, from the seven SAARC member countries—with a view to develop the female perspective on peace and cooperation and contribute it to the region’s policy agenda. A conference was held in New Delhi in August 1995 and a study tour of Europe is being planned.

39. **Pakistan–India People’s Forum**: It is a group of NGO representatives from the two countries meeting in Lahore and New Delhi on an alternative basis to advocate diversion of funds from military to rural development. Tow meetings of the forum have been held. Over 200 people participated in the last meeting in March 1995. The next meeting is under planning. Dr. Mubashir Hasan, Pakistan’s former finance minister is the project coordinator.

40. **South Asia Media Association** is lobbying for the inclusion of bilateral conflict resolution in the framework of SAARC. SAMA held a seminar in Islamabad, a week before the New Delhi SAARC Summit in 1995, to urge the heads of government to consider its proposition.

41. **Coalition for Action on South Asian Cooperation (CASAC)** was established in May 1995 to mobilize individuals and NGOs to promote regional cooperation. About 18 seminars and two publications are planned for 1995/96. Mr. K.K. Bhargava is the convenor. The group is supported by Friedrich Ebert Foundation and emerged from a conference on regional cooperation organized by FES in May 1994 at Kathmandu.


Please send corrections, additions, and suggestions to: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 359 Armory Building, 505 E. Armory
Avenue, Champaign, IL 61820. Phone: (217) 333-7086; fax: (217) 244-5157, e-mail: acdis@uiuc.edu or spcohen@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu
Appendix Three:  
Selected Contact Addresses¹

Regional

- **South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)**
  Secretariat  
  Tridevi Street  
  Kathmandu, Nepal

- **Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS)**
  Dr. Iftekharuzzaman, Director  
  Regional Centre for Strategic Studies  
  4-101 BMICH (Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall), Baudhhaloka Mawatha  
  Colombo-7, Sri Lanka  
  telephone: 691131 ext. 219  
  fax: 94-1-688602  
  e-mail: <@rcss.ac.lk.>

- **Science, Technology and Arms Control Workshop (formerly Bhurban Summer School)**
  Dr. Chris Smith, Director  
  Centre for Defence Studies  
  King’s College, University of London  
  The Strand, London WC2R 2LS, Great Britain  
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  Dr. P. R. Chari, India Coordinator  
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  Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Pakistan Coordinator  
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  Islamabad, 45320, Pakistan  
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  e-mail: hoodbhoy@isb.imran.ar.pk

¹ A comprehensive list of scholars, centers, and programs interested in South Asian security and foreign policy issues is available from the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), 4-101 BMICH (Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall), Baudhhaloka Mawatha, Colombo-7, Sri Lanka; or from the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 359 Armory Building, 505 E. Armory Ave., Champaign, Illinois, 61820, USA.
Bilateral

India Pakistan Nimrana Initiative

India co-chair: Professor A. M. Khusro, Editor
Financial Express
New Delhi, India
Pakistan co-chair: Amb Niaz Naik, Chair
Institute of Strategic Studies
P.O. Box 1173, Section F-5/2
Islamabad
telephone: 51 824-628
fax: 51 824-658

National

Bangladesh

Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)
Major General Ghulam Quader, Director General
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India

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India International Centre (IIC)
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India International Centre
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Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director
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International Centre for Peace Initiatives
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Bombay 400 058 India
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**TATA Institute for Advanced Studies**

Dr. Raja Ramanna, Director  
National Institute of Advanced Studies  
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fax: 91-080 334 6634  
e-mail: [naisnik?]niasrik@nais.iisc.emet.in

**The Maldives**

Maldives International Center  
I. H. Zaki, Convenor  
Male

**Nepal**

Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology  
Dipak Gyawali, Pragya  
P.O. Box 3323, New Baneswar  
Kathmandu

Center for Nepal and Asian Studies  
K. Bikram Shah, Director  
Tribhuvan University  
Kirtipur  
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Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA)  
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Programme Coordinator  
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Karachi, 74400 Pakistan  
telephone: 455 1625
Sri Lanka

(see Regional Centre for Strategic Studies)

Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS)
Ray Forbes, Director
c/o BMICH, Baudhaloka Mawatha
Colombo, 7 Sri Lanka
telephone: 91131
fax: 94 1 697 420

Poverty Commission (Follow-up group)
Dr. Ponna Wignaraja, Coordinator
75 Kynsey Road
Colombo, 8 Sri Lanka