GROUP VIOLENCE AND PLANNING: STATE AND GRASSROOTS PROCESSES,
POLITICS, & OUTCOMES FOR THE HAZARA IN QUETTA

BY

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

My thesis is a qualitative study that explores the philosophical and policy debates surrounding violence in the postcolonial city. I focus on how violence shapes the city and lived experiences of Hazara residents in Quetta, Pakistan. I place the ethnicized creation of violence in its historical context, relating it to legal structures and state processes which operate at the federal, provincial, and city levels in the city. I argue that these processes and structures – and thus violence – in Quetta are ethnicized and connected to the city’s colonial past, and this understanding is central to studying how the city is defined, organized, and experienced today. Planning and policymaking revolve around security, giving the military tremendous political and institutional power even over local issues and infrastructural development. While the state takes specific security steps in response to the violence, these actions have largely been ineffective. Overtime, these conditions have impacted the built forms of Quetta and created social and psychological barriers for the Hazara. The community suffers economically, socially, and politically, including limited access to educational institutions and public spaces. In response to the violence and an ineffective state, the Hazara have self-organized locally and transnationally, filling in where the state fails in service provision and planning. The failure to adequately respond to structural violence, particularly physical violence, sheds light on the limitations of the western liberal and neoliberal frameworks in the postcolonial city. In this context, urban scholars must understand ethnicized violence as part of the postcolonial condition. Thus, intervention requires a democratic postcolonial framework, one that deracializes political power, deethnicizes political identities, and emphasizes group justice.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the Hazaras of Quetta, who continue to build hope in hopelessness; to the people of Pakistan, who make, break, and remake hope and hopelessness every day.

To the police, who have given more blood than any other occupational group in Pakistan and receive more distrust than all other occupational groups in Pakistan; to the jawans, who follow orders committed to defending and saving the homeland; to every honest officer in a sea of dishonesty; to the committed civil officers and administrators who continue to believe in progressive change in spite of the situation around them; to the faces, known, and powers, unknown, who play in the political minefield that is Quetta.

To my hosts who let me eat, sleep, and just let me be; to my respondents and informants without whom nothing would have materialized.

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To Mama, who I’m sure is watching proudly from somewhere beyond us; to Ammi for filling in against all odds; to Baba for making everything possible with his sweat, blood, and wisdom.

To my wife for putting up with me.

Most of all, to Quetta, the city that shall soon see its new dawn.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Additional Chief Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Annual Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorist Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCS</td>
<td>Balochistan Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUITEMS</td>
<td>Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit TV Cameras</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Chief Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Command and Staff College</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Civil Service of Pakistan</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Civil Superior Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIG</td>
<td>Deputy Inspector General (Capital City Police Officer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMG</td>
<td>District Management Group (of the CSP) – now called PAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>EME</td>
<td>Electrical &amp; Mechanical Engineering</td>
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<td>FC</td>
<td>Frontier Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIA</td>
<td>Federal Investigation Agency</td>
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<td>FIR</td>
<td>First Investigation Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPSC</td>
<td>Federal Public Service Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Hazara Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRCP</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IB</td>
<td>Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Indian Civil Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGP</td>
<td>Inspector General of Police</td>
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<td>IS (also ISIS or ISIL)</td>
<td>Islamic State (also Islamic State in Syria or Islamic State in the Leviant)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>LeJ</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
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<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member of the National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Member of the Provincial Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWM</td>
<td>Majlis Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;D (colloquially PnD)</td>
<td>Planning and Development Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Pakistan Administrative Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPSC</td>
<td>Provincial Public Service Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDP</td>
<td>Public-Sector Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHO</td>
<td>Station House Officer</td>
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<td>SSP</td>
<td>Sipah Sahaba Pakistan</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Quetta, the city, and Hazara, the people, have long witnessed violence and unrest of unprecedented magnitude and complexity. Located near Pakistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Iran, the city has witnessed spillovers from violence in its international backyard. Additionally, a longstanding armed Baloch insurgency has created further challenges for residents and planners.

Several different layers of violence have befallen the city. Afghanistan has intermittently been at war for decades, and people are able to cross over into Quetta relatively freely. This occasionally permits the conflict in Afghanistan to play out in Quetta, along with allowing armed fighters to find refuge in the city. Quetta is also at the center of global drug trade, which has flourished amidst the lawlessness in the region. The insurgency has also introduced a nationalist element to the violence. Amidst the complex situation of the city, perhaps the gravest situation is that of the Quetta Hazara.

Apart from the international conflict and the local uprising, the Hazara face additional, endemic violence because of their ethnic and religious identity. The Quetta Hazaras are an ethnic minority, most of whom are Shi’i Muslims and moved to Quetta from Afghanistan in the late 19th century. Several Islamist militant organizations regard Shi’is as heretics and regularly attack them. The Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have emerged as two of the deadliest such organizations for Shi’is in general and Hazaras in particular in Pakistan (Zakaria, 2012).

It is this violence, deadly, targeted at a specific group, and based on ethnic and sectarian identity, that I study in this work. I explore how this violence has contributed to the making of the city. I study the complex processes, internal politics, power struggles, and decision-making channels and behaviors that define state activity in Quetta. I also describe how the Hazaras experience the city today, ranging from the construction of walls around their neighborhoods to mundane things like everyday shopping for vegetables. I then analyze grassroots organizing by the Hazaras to fill critical gaps left by a weak state and to exert political, economic, and social claims against it.

Situating Quetta in Philosophical Debates

There are several discussions within which Quetta’s situation can be placed. Targeted violence, the likes of which the Hazara face, is a question of justice and oppression. How the state and the people act in this violence to produce urban life in Quetta is of interest to social
sciences, and particularly urban studies, scholars. At the same time, Quetta is at the crossroads of historical European colonialism, making the situation pertinent for postcolonial scholarship. Within each debate, there are notable strands and viewpoints that facilitate further discussion: liberal democratic perspectives rooted in the North American and European experiences, or postcolonial thought emerging from centuries of colonial exploitation in the Global South. I find liberal democratic scholarship on violence and justice to be ill-equipped for my study of Quetta, and use critical and postcolonial philosophical perspectives instead. There are several grounds on which I base this framing of my study within a critical postcolonial framework. I will introduce more detailed discussion on these perspectives, especially in postcolonial contexts, in Chapter 2.

Violence targeted at the Hazara has often been exclusive to their ethnicity, religion, or other identifying characteristic that sets them apart from other groups. Several other groups in the world today face similarly oppressive violence: the Yazidis in Iraq, for example, or Muslim Kashmiris in India, or Arabs in Palestine ("Global Conflict Tracker," 2018). How does “equal treatment” respond to decades of violent suppression of these people? What is a suitable unit of analysis for such treatment: individuals from persecuted groups or the groups themselves? How do policy and policy questions change with a shift in this unit of analysis? There are important policy questions as well: how can an individualistic policy ensure a level playing field for members of a targeted group, when those members are targeted solely because of their membership in such group? Any policy will necessarily have to be scaled up to some form of collective unit.

I therefore find the Rawlsian, liberal premise for justice (1971) inadequate to analyze situations of violent conflict and oppression in postcolonial contexts. Someone who has experienced privilege all their life cannot begin to imagine life as the poorest of the poor. Similarly, in violent contexts, somebody who has full access to all public urban spaces cannot imagine life as a targeted minority group member who fears violent attacks in both private and public spaces of the city. I devote substantial focus to planning and grassroots organization processes and lived experiences in this work, and yet, as somebody who does not fall in the same social group as the Hazara, I can write about it but not completely live the experience. At the same time such a framework cannot be dismissed entirely, for the state continues to exist as an edifice of liberalism, with a bureaucracy constructed by colonial rulers and still firmly entrenched in Weberian principles (1968).
Critical scholarship on politics of difference, in turn, comes closer to describing the oppression that the Hazara face. However, Iris Marion Young defines oppression as economic in many cases. Her ideas of exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness reflect on questions of economic well-being and inequality of resources and power. Young advocates for structural change. Most useful to my work is her description of how the “faces of oppression” (1990, p. 37) can vary in combination and in intensity for different groups at different times. However, physical violence is still inadequately dealt with. I suggest that physical conflict and the threat of violence, especially the kind prevalent in Quetta, can become a primary determinant of economic as well as social exploitation and marginalization, powerlessness in the face of perpetrators, cultural imperialism through disappearance of the oppressed group from public spaces, and an internalization of the fear of violence. Physical violence can therefore further exacerbate the already oppressed state of a group by recreating violent oppression as well as introducing new faces of oppression to the situation. In effect, I argue that violence can be the most potent face of oppression that can singlehandedly invoke all other faces that Young has theorized. The more important question, then, would deal with the specific group identities that face or create violence – identities that may or may not interact with economic class. Nevertheless, the “faces of oppression” framework is a useful starting point.

Like the philosophical debate, work on actual cases of violence is also incomplete or otherwise focused too specifically on different elements of violence. Bollens theorizes 4 types of states (2002), but there is very little discussion on what leads a state along the path that it takes: does a government of the majority make a state “partisan”? Are technocratic governments necessarily “neutral”? He also ignores power plays within and among different institutions of the state. Davis (2009) and Bryson (2011), on the other hand, explore urban violence in a different context. Their work comprises all forms of violence – from petty theft to organized crime, many forms of which Davis shows indeed to be prevalent in cities like Karachi and Mumbai. They argue that this violence is structural, and the prevalence in certain areas certainly causes some measure of oppression to citizens in those specific areas. However, it may or may not be specifically targeted at particular social groups; borrowing from Young’s politics of positional difference and politics of cultural difference (2005), it may represent positional injustice but does not necessarily point to cultural injustice. Because of the incomplete analysis of contextual intricacies of violence, this body of work leads to problematic or, at best, incomplete policy recommendations. Improving accessibility to an area with high crime rates can, for example, be a
function of policing or physical characteristics like lighting or commercial and public attractiveness. It may also be structural (inefficient criminal justice system, for example, or rampant corruption and patronage of violent criminals). However, because the violence is assumed to be universal and every citizen an equal victim, none of these measures can adequately respond to violence targeted at specific groups.

Unlike liberal democratic and neoliberal, market-oriented policy frameworks, postcolonial perspectives historicize violence and connect it to the creation of power inequalities rooted in racialized and ethnicized political identities in the colony. The idea of violence shifts from one from inequality to one for justice; ideas of justice shift from recognition and redistribution to complete restructuring of the social, political, and economic order. There is some discussion on the spatial ordering of the postcolonial city, but most urban scholarship retains focus on informalities, patronage, and crime. It minimizes criticism of the “informal” in cities like Quetta, but in retaining focus on class and general ideas of crime, urban scholarship on postcolonial cities continues to ignore ethnicized violence that is central to justice in the colonial city.

I grapple with these competing conceptual frameworks throughout this study. The Hazaras’ situation is unique in that they are very violently oppressed, but the state does not explicitly take sides with or against the group. Similarly, the involvement of other social groups by ethnicity or religion in this oppression is not immediately apparent. While some groups may share religious or sectarian beliefs with peddlers of violence, and therefore contribute to the social exclusion of the Hazaras, their everyday interactions with the group do not consist of physical conflict and violence.

In this context, planning scholarship can play an important role in untangling the less visible but critical forms of oppression. Yet I find insufficient exploration of lived experiences of groups that are violently oppressed. The particularities of such violence can shape placemaking for the group and determine access to public spaces and services. It can also morph into other forms of oppression; a possibility Young has raised in her writings and I have discussed earlier.

**Research Questions & Propositions**

My work focuses on the philosophical and policy debates surrounding violence in the postcolonial city, particularly targeted violence by “non-state actors” (Davis, 2009), individual and group experiences in violent contexts, and the relation of state processes to this violence.
These questions can be further refined when combined with the unique context of the Hazara. I start off with the following main questions:

i) At what levels, and how, does the state act in Quetta’s violent context?

ii) How has this violence shaped placemaking and the Hazara experience of Quetta?

iii) How have the Hazara articulated their political, social, economic, and other concerns within this context?

iv) How do local and transnational organizations respond to this localized violence?

Taking stock of the multi-faceted conflict, Pakistan’s socio-political context, and my previous interactions with Hazara activists, I developed a set of propositions as a starting point for my study. The Hazaras are a strong community with robust interconnections amongst one another. At the same time, Pakistan has historically placed huge emphasis on security (many analysts call it a national security state) but repeated incidents of violence suggest that security institutions are stronger on paper than in reality. In spite of an organized bureaucracy, civilian institutions, including the judiciary and criminal justice systems, are ineffective. However, in recent years, the state has publicly and vocally expressed its opposition to violent terrorism. This declaration has been coupled with ongoing military and police operations against terrorist groups active within the country (Bilal, 2017). Accounting for the complexity of this situation, and the state’s national position against religious and sectarian violence, I have the following main proposition:

Ethnicized violence plays a key role in determining Hazaras’ experience of the city.

Planners and administrators at different levels of government take steps to specifically ameliorate their disadvantaged position, improving their access to the city as well as allowing the Hazaras to self-organize at the grassroots level.

This proposition raises other questions about the mechanics, scope, and effectiveness of state strategies and grassroots organizing. I will study the following sub-propositions:

i) The state’s focus shifts from physical, infrastructural, and social development planning to planning for security.

ii) State-sanctioned security agencies assume significance in the planning process.

iii) The state makes local planning processes including identification and approval of development projects more accessible to the Hazara.

iv) The state and community take specific steps to improve mobility for the Hazara.
Hazara activists and organizations use their political strength to negotiate group interests with the state. Note here that the “state” includes all levels of government and both civilian and military bureaucracies. I will describe this structure in more detail in Chapter 3.

**Research Design & Methodology**

Most work on planning in violent contexts has been qualitative because of the difficulties in unpacking the complexity of violence and the challenges of accessing informants. Bollens’ work (2002, 2008) is a compilation of several case studies carried out over many years, as is Davis’ (2009, 2012) and Bryson’s (2011). Other authors have followed similarly structured methods to study the specificities of violence in particular contexts. I follow the same tradition. I am studying state and community strategies within a context of violent oppression. My area of interest is geographically and ethnically focused on the Quetta Hazara. I devote substantial space to lived experiences of the people. Moreover, most of my analysis focuses on process – of the civilian and security bureaucracies and of grassroots organizations and groups. It is important to point out that I had no control or influence over these experiences and processes before, during, or after my research.

My study is an exploratory qualitative study, based on semi-structured interviews and field observations. It is a critical case in that the Hazaras face a particularly extreme context, but state processes can inform research on other critical contexts in which the state must respond, and grassroots processes can supplement further work on community and radical planning models. As part of my study, I formulate an idiographic explanation of bureaucratic and community processes and how extreme levels of violence have shaped the Hazara experience of the city and their strategies. In that sense, my study can lay the groundwork for further analysis in other postcolonial cities that have experienced or are experiencing ethnicized violence and targeted persecution of specific populations. Perhaps more significantly, I intend for this study to inform further research on violence, oppression, and state and community-led planning. It is an attempt to tie theoretical descriptions of group identities, oppression and violence with academic work within the planning discipline.

The situation in Quetta is highly sensitive in security, administrative, and social terms. The prevailing levels and types of violence and international geopolitics render trust extremely hard to gain. It is, however, precisely this context that makes it a motivating case to study. To fulfil the rigorous requirements of a qualitative study, I embedded myself in the city for two
months between May and July of 2017. I spent many hours with civil, police, and military officers and in both Hazara settlements of the city. In a highly sensitive context, I used my contacts in the city – within the civil and security establishments and Hazara community leaders – to gain trust and facilitate my observations and discussions. Even before starting this research project I had a network of contacts from several years as a policy analyst from a reputed thinktank in Pakistan. Similarly, my links in the community were based on years of activism, solidarities, and protest movements that I had volunteered for in the context of severe violence against the Quetta Hazara. I had a unique position of trust in both circles as an analyst and activist with experience in the city.

I reached out to “key informants” in the civil and security bureaucracies and the community who provided basic information and further contacts for my interviews and observations. These key informants represented a range of political, bureaucratic, and administrative interests (including religious and tribal elders, members of both main political parties, military officials, police officials, and civil bureaucrats). My informants helped me build an initial list of people to observe and speak to, and I employed snowball sampling from there on to reach out to more contacts in each direction.

From there, I observed the community’s interactions with the bureaucracy, their local political organization and activism, and how rival claims and contests within the community play out. I also took notes from observing bureaucratic procedures that take place behind the scenes before, after, and between contacts with the community. Additionally, I observed and took note of political and administrative differences in approach and priorities between the various wings of the state including armed (coercive) wings like the military, paramilitary, or the police and the civil bureaucracy.

I use unstructured and semi-structured interviews and focus groups with state officials and community activists to supplement my field research and observations. I categorized activists as politicians, tribal elders, and grassroots activists and organizers. I also categorized state officials as civil bureaucrats (including planning officials and the district and provincial administrations), police officers, and military/paramilitary officers. I had a different set of guiding questions for each of these categories; however, all of my discussions revolved around law and order, effectiveness of security plans, public perceptions about the state’s legitimacy and efficacy, bureaucratic perceptions about the community and the efficiency of their methods, and
the real and perceived role of different civil and security institutions in determining planning outcomes (see Appendix A).

Specifically, for interviews with Hazara respondents, I also explored how violence has changed their interaction with and experience of the city. These discussions included access – to educational facilities, public offices, public recreational spaces, markets, and other public and private spaces in the city – and social and economic impacts like engagement and interaction with other ethnic and religious groups, economic opportunities in the city, and general thoughts on life in the Hazara enclaves of Quetta.

In total, I conducted 28 interviews, including 13 with public officials and 18 with Hazara representatives (including activists and politicians). Three individuals belonged to both groups – as Hazara public officials, they were able to represent both the bureaucracy and the community. The 13 public officials included current and former administrators, police officers, paramilitary officers, and military officers. Hazara representatives included educationists, health activists, volunteers, tribal elders, and, among others, representatives of the two main political parties in the area.

In addition to interviews and interactions, I obtained correspondence between key bureaucratic stakeholders from the respective offices. This correspondence included situation assessments, updates, and political discussions on publicly funded infrastructure in Hazara areas. It also included discussions on security arrangements.

Another key source, especially for information on grassroots activism, was social media. All activists I spoke to maintain significant social media presence to engage with locals, build support, and collect financial and other contributions. These social media pages also highlight activism, difficulties, and achievements of many of these initiatives.

My logistical arrangements were facilitated by key stakeholders in civil and military bureaucracies in Quetta. Access to Hazara leaders and activists was facilitated by community leaders who I have been in touch with previously. I traveled frequently between the two Hazara settlements of Marriabad and Hazara Town (see Chapter 5), linking up with and using the support of various local residents and leaders. My driver, a local Pashtun, had lived in different areas of the city and was able to take me to public officers and Hazara settlements without difficulties.

The prevailing environment of insecurity and distrust has compelled me to withhold all names and identities of people I interviewed or otherwise interacted with for this project. The
nature of social work in Hazara areas is such that even the gender and area of work can serve as identifying information. At the same time, public officials are constantly at risk of both political reprisals and violent attacks by the same terrorist organizations that target the Hazara population. I have therefore avoided using names, pseudonyms, and all information about political or social position that can help point to the individual who I interviewed. At best, I use paraphrased quotations and a generic description (e.g. “public official”, or “security official”, or “community representative”) where appropriate.

**Analytical Framework & Validity**

This thesis includes an exploration of the state, lived experiences, and grassroots organization. Most of my insights are based on observations, interviews, and public documents and correspondence. Through carefully constructed interview questions, I tried to cross-check and verify the accuracy of my observations from relevant stakeholders – for example, I discussed observable processes in bureaucratic offices with relevant officers to ensure accuracy of my understanding. Where applicable, I refer to existing laws and formally published rules to substantiate my claims; this is especially true for state processes that I have broken down by *de jure* and *de facto* procedures.

My analysis consists of identifying and highlighting specific steps that respondents mention and how they perceive the planning process has changed in Quetta in light of ongoing violence. I also look for similarities and differences between my observations and the narratives brought forward by different people in different positions (e.g. junior bureaucrat, senior bureaucrat, security official, community activist, community political leader). Figure 1 describes the bigger picture: it can be further broken down for different levels of bureaucracy, political actors, and

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**Figure 1: Community and Bureaucratic Narratives - Similarities & Differences**
different perspectives from within the community.

In my analysis of collected material, I focus on how violence has shaped experience of the city for Quetta Hazaras. More than quantifiable measures, it is an analysis of civil, security, and grassroots processes. Some descriptions are generic – bureaucratic hierarchies, for example, are based on rules and laws laid down rather rigidly. Actual decision making, on the other hand, may or may not follow defined hierarchies, and may elicit different perspectives from different respondents. I use such differences and similarities in perspectives to construct a bigger picture of how the state functions. I also learn more about institutional and political power struggles within the state. Moreover, the degree of similarity of narratives explains how closely in contact the state is with the violently oppressed Hazara. Figure 1 charts these perspectives; this information can be very helpful for policymakers in trying to take specific steps to deal with the situation.

Limitations

My study has a number of limitations. Safety and security are primary concerns for residents of Quetta. These concerns definitely shaped my conversations with officials, residents, and activists. The situation is critical for public officials as well as ethnic Hazaras, and it is possible that both would construct their answers and discussions carefully to avoid escalating existing threat perceptions. Before I went in, I also faced the added prospect of state functionaries refusing to allow my research or stopping it outright because of the sensitivity of the situation. Some of these are representations of the general risks of response bias, reflexivity, and selectivity while others are specific to Quetta’s unique context.

While some participants in my study chose their words carefully, my personal connections with the community and state bureaucrats gave me trusted access to many others who were more forthcoming with their responses. This also enabled me to make additional contacts in the community and state machinery. I was able to identify several key informants representing different parts of my sample: city administrators, planners, police officers, and military officers from the state, and politicians, activists, and tribal elders from the Hazara. Each informant then pointed me to a different set of respondents, which allowed me to start multiple snowballs and include a wide range of perspectives. These include political perspectives, where I was able to reach out to both the main parties and several smaller ones active in Hazara areas in Quetta.
I tried to utilize my contacts to extend my reach in order to corroborate stories, but the security situation was such that I was unable to interview residents living in non-Hazara areas. That I have omitted other groups does not suggest that they are the oppressors, or even that they are not themselves oppressed in one form or another. It suggests nothing about political or other social organizing among those groups either. I feel that while this study is useful as it is, looking into other ethnic/religious communities might clarify some of the nuances of the situation. It would also allow me to isolate community-specific characteristics in how people respond to violence.

I am also concerned about my inability to have a more gender-conscious discussion with people. Barring very few exceptions, all of my respondents were men. Part of the reason is abysmally low female participation in politics and state jobs. The other part is the difficulty in approaching women who are in the privacy of their homes or other private spaces. Discussions on economic and social costs of violence are from the male perspective, as is my analysis of access to public services and community support.

All of that said and done, my analysis remains very specific to a highly contextualized situation of the Hazara in Quetta. However, this exploratory study provides the foundation to identify key factors that influence outcomes in planning and urban life. These factors can be used for future studies, or for comparisons of Hazara activism with other groups within Quetta. It is also useful in highlighting the intricacies of Quetta’s particular situation. I do not seek to quantify the exact impact of violence on the Hazara, nor do I wish to test policy alternatives that can lead to different outcomes. My findings can, instead, show how different theoretical models interpret violent conflict and the implications for planning processes; how these processes can reinforce violence and oppression or undo colonial relationships at the same time.
CHAPTER 2: VIOLENCE, JUSTICE, AND THE CITY

The specter of violent conflict has reared its head time and again, in different cities and countries of the world and with varying degrees of intensity and cruelty. Be they concerns of street crime in cities like Cape Town, or the 1994 massacre of ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda, or the ongoing campaign of violent dispossession and displacement of Palestinian Arabs, or the mass targeting of Quetta Hazaras for their ethnic and religious identities; these are just some examples that show how violence has assumed different forms and has erupted for different reasons.

What is prevalent, however, is the human cost of such conflict. Thousands have lost their lives, many more have been injured, and countless people have been thrown out of their ancestral homes and/or exiled from their homelands. The immense human cost of conflict has contributed to the constant attention that conflict receives in social sciences (Cordell & Wolff, 2009). The violence that people experience is both influenced by and influences their experience of space. This space is predominantly urban; the world is increasingly an urban place, and crime and violence exist disproportionately in cities (Rotker, 2002). Postcolonial cities account for most of these increases, both in urbanization and urban violence (Shappard, 2014).

However, planning literature, formulated on decades of European neoliberal experiences, has largely skirted the issue of violence; concepts of justice and violence are often steeped in economics. Nuanced discussions on violence have largely remained on the periphery of planning literature and are now becoming relatively center stage. For example, planning theorists and practitioners have started discussing the inherent violence of Jim Crow, or how land use regulations and property values provided the perfect cover for social violence and segregation (Ritzdorf & Thomas, 1997). A lively debate now exists between group-enabling and individualist perspectives on violence and justice in social science. At the same time, a remarkable difference is noticeable between Western liberal and postcolonial approaches to violence. This difference is critical since former colonies in Africa, South Asia, and other parts of the world now form the bulk of the population, suffer from disproportionate levels of conflict, and will also witness the greatest proportion of urbanization in the years to come. Despite being anchored in a different conception of justice and violence, planning scholarship on postcolonial cities – cities of the Global South, as they are often called – has also avoided the issues of ethnic violence that is central to justice.
In this section, I compare studies on violence and justice in postcolonial cities from liberal democratic, critical, and postcolonial perspectives. By exploring their application on violence in postcolonial cities, I study key differences in analytical frameworks that the two perspectives use. I use this comparison to establish my choice of critical, postcolonial literature as my framework for my analysis of the Quetta Hazara.

**Western Liberal Frameworks on Violent Conflict**

Most scholarship on violence in the Western framework opts to separate ethnicized and racialized forms of mass violence from others like crime (Bollens, 2002; Collier, 2007; Cordell & Wolff, 2009; Rotker, 2002; Varshney, 2002). However, some scholars have combined all forms of violence in their studies, focusing instead on the violent urban experience that many citizens face (Bryson, 2011; Davis, 2012). Other perspectives include using the incidence of violence to study its causal determinants or correlations with other factors, or, like Varshney, studying the lack of violence in contested situations to theorize causal reasons for ethnic conflict.

Varshney studied ethnic conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India, using three pairs of cities to analyze how and why one city descended into violence and chaos while the other did not. His research focused on studying the creation and prevention of violence with specific reference to groups and networks. He argued that, because researchers commonly only studied violence and omitted peace, they were able to describe the emergence of violence but unable to suggest what caused one situation to remain peaceful and another to turn violent. He theorizes interethnic (bridging) and intraethnic (binding) networks and suggested that these forces and networks play a critical role in determining conflict outcomes of communally charged situations.

Within networks, Varshney differentiates between organized and quotidian networks. He defines organized networks as formal institutions, groups, and associations (e.g. the Stock Exchange, Chambers of Commerce and Industry, political parties, NGOs), and quotidian networks as interactions carried out in everyday life. Varshney suggests that, as the size and population of a city increase, the number of connections required to maintain full connectivity increases – meaning that as connections become impersonal in larger cities, the likelihood of violent outcomes increases. This relationship highlights the importance of cities in studying violence, and further strengthens the need for planners and urbanists to think more deeply about conflict and violence.

While larger cities increase likelihood of conflict, organized networks are stronger and better able to deal with both endogenous and exogenous shocks that can lead to violence. An
interesting insight from Varshney’s work is that of intraethnic networks and forces. In situations of conflict and violence, if intraethnic forces are stronger, they can potentially harm or even rupture interethnic forces by encouraging segregation and stronger grouping and lead to more violent outcomes.

Varshney provides important insights into how communal violence develops. His case study is located in India – a former colony – which puts him in a useful position of a postcolonial scholar studying violence in a postcolonial society. However, his entire focus remains on communal violence and how some situations avoid while others embrace conflict. He builds his study on large-scale, inter-communal differences and conflict that gripped India for parts of the 20th century. Those conflicts involved thousands of ordinary citizens, angry at the status quo, charged with communal and/or religious fervor, and often instigated by sporadic incidents of terrorism perpetrated by unspecified groups. Incidents of violence were accompanied by accusations of the state’s complicity through ruling politicians and other institutions.

Varshney’s generalizations can be extended to other situations involving entire communities at war – Sudan is a useful recent example – but not to states that fight increasing urban insecurity. Strong networks may not, for example, help states deal with violence created by international crime syndicates operating in many cities of the world. Similarly, it may be difficult to categorize network forces as “intraethnic” or “interethnic” in more complex conflicts involving global terrorists, states, and targeted communities.

Additionally, Varshney based his research in the social networks theory, which is rooted in European and North American experiences of liberal democracies. His definition of “formal” institutions included elements of the global neoliberal economy like the Stock Exchange and Chambers of Commerce and Industry. However, he ignores the importance that many postcolonial and developing societies attach to informal institutions like tribal jirgas, family elders, and religious clergy.

Many other scholars have conducted research on violence and conflict in postcolonial contexts. Collier, after working for the World Bank, theorized the “conflict trap” (2007) and laid the foundations for subsequent research on violent conflict in cities and its implications for development. Collier’s focus was ostensibly on civil wars but had larger implications on other forms of conflict and violence. He studied civil wars in different regions of the world and presented his ideas about why and where they happen and how countries deal with them.
Collier suggests that civil wars have ripple effects that the combatant parties rarely (if ever) consider. The most severe is on noncombatants, mostly women and children, while the international world also suffers as uncontrolled territories facilitate terrorism and crime. They also suggest that individual characteristics of each country can help define risks of civil war and violence erupting in its cities – developing countries that are unable to maintain economic growth are most likely to suffer most, which they suggest fall into the “conflict trap” of enduring violence, conflict, and civil war. Because of the international ripple effects of such conflict, Collier recommends the global order should collectively build strategies to reform states and help them pull out of the conflict trap.

From a critical perspective, Collier’s work can be seen as an effort to help sustain the global system through corrections like international powers helping pull nascent states out of their conflict traps. Their descriptions of ripple effects help fill gaps in existing literature by contextualizing the implications of violent conflict and its human cost outside of immediately affected areas. However, the idea that global powers can help states fight their conflict trap is more wishful than effective; a large body of literature shows how a lot of conflict is in fact rooted in colonial policies or neoliberal policies formulated by the same global powers.

Like Collier, Davis has conducted pioneering research on conflict and violence in postcolonial societies. Coming from a planning and sociological background, she builds focus on how states and communities operate in situations of conflict. Davis extends Collier’s analysis to include modern realities of armed, violent non-state actors that operate from both the center and margins of society. She asserts that these actors have economic and political claims over the state; cities and urban spaces serve as the arenas for their violent activities (2009).

Davis suggests that many non-state actors find space to operate within the context of a neoliberal, capitalist state with weak grassroots associations. In an era where the state’s role in everyday life is increasingly turned over to private parties and capital, non-state actors are able to access the capital required to respond to the state’s monopolization of violence. These armed groups, like many Latin American gangs that she has studied, then work to restrict the state’s ability to extract resources and assert its writ. Building on Collier’s “Conflict Trap”, Davis suggests that this escalation of violence by non-state actors is more likely to happen in “late developers” (2009, p. 221) such as countries in South East Asia, Central/South America, and South Africa. The idea that “late developers” face the brunt of conflict is backed by postcolonial
perspectives on violence, its creation, and perpetuation. I discuss several prominent postcolonial perspectives in the next section.

**Postcolonial Perspectives on Violent Conflict**

Many postcolonial perspectives on violence find their roots in Franz Fanon’s work, who brilliantly took apart the European superiority complex and predicted a rise of the “native”. Fanon used the “native” and “settler” dichotomy adopted by many colonial regimes around the world (2004); the same subsequently became a repeated feature in postcolonial work around the world (Mamdani, 2001; Mbembé, 2001; Yiftachel, 2011; Yiftachel & Roded, 2011). Other scholars chose to analyze institutions and informality in postcolonial societies (Good, 2008; A. Roy, 2009), which can be connected to the creation of violence through ineffective institutions, archaic systems of patronage, and urban informality.

Fanon laid the groundwork for postcolonial studies, particularly the study of violence in postcolonial contexts. For him, the colony itself was a manifestation of violence, and postcolonial states caught in violence were still going through the same process set up by colonial masters. He argued in *Black Skin White Masks* for a subjective, contextualized understanding of colonization and the colonized; he spoke of the “impossibility of explaining man outside the limits of his capacity for accepting or denying a given situation” (1968, p. 62). He quotes Mannoni’s construction of the “civilized” and the “primitive” man (1964), which translates to his idea of the “native” and the “settler”.

With this characterization of colonized society, Fanon describes the setup as inherently violent, racialized, and stratified (2004). He suggests that, to maintain power, the “settlers” cultivate a “native elite” – a bourgeoisie from within the colony, that can speak for the colonizers in a language of the natives and facilitate their violent exploitation of resources. He calls the colonial world a “world cut in two”, divided by “barracks and police stations”; a world consisting of “the policeman and the soldier” who use “rifle butts and napalm” (p. 37) to enforce the colonial idea of order. Inequalities are gross and manifest: where natives live on “huts (…) built one on top of the other”, the settler lives in clean streets, with “no holes or stones”, in a “well-fed town” whose “belly is always full of good things” (p. 38).

The violence that has “ruled over the ordering of the colonial world” comes back to haunt the colonial masters when the natives decide to rise. For him, this is the source of violence even today in postcolonial societies; Fanon contends that postcolonial states are mere extensions of
colonies, ruled over by the very “native elite” that the colonizers created to further their own motives.

Fanon’s characterization of the “native” and “settler” identities was furthered by Mahmood Mamdani, who studied the violence between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda (2001). He studied the creation of the “native” and “settler” identities – even though none, in Rwanda’s case, were European. Mamdani differentiates between “cultural”, “political”, and “market-based” identities (p. 34), and argued that in creating native elite, colonial masters perpetuated the settler identity even after the end of the colonized regime. This “settler” and “native” dichotomy was racialized and a result of direct colonial rule; in indirect rule, Mamdani contends that local racial identities are fractured into separate racial, ethnic, and other identities.

Settler and native therefore became political identities, and, depending on the colonial state’s definitions of “native”, these groups gained different positions within the political setup. Mamdani argues that this demarcation of identities led to further divisions – indigenous and nonindigenous, for example, and led to polarized political positions. Mamdani found that the colonial state treated people who already occupied those land as “natives”, while those who migrated afterwards were “aliens” (p. 46). For European masters, they were both third-rate – political power was thus racialized. For locals, power was ethnicized; natives and settlers became distinct political identities.

Any democratic postcolonial state should have deracialized and deethnicized political and civil power, and then worked to bring all groups together under the new disposition. However, because colonial institutions persisted and the “native elite” assumed power after colonial masters left, those political identities persisted. This led to similar kinds of violence both during and after direct and indirect colonial rule. Fanon contends that, in the absence of avenues to inflict violence on occupying colonialists or the elite, natives would resort to violent acts against other non-Europeans (2004). Mamdani reinforced this argument with his study on the genocide in Rwanda; the prevailing “settler” identity for non-European Tutsis meant that they were targeted as a group. Where a Hutu was a victim, he was an individual, but Tutsis were attacked for their collective identity (Mamdani, 2001).

Mamdani brings important arguments to the discussion on violence in postcolonial societies. Where liberalist and institutional perspectives stick to issues like networks, or legitimacy and effectiveness of the postcolonial state, he explores the creation of identities that facilitate or hinder those networks and institutions. His reinforcement of Fanon’s characterization
of natives provides a useful framework to study communal violence in many parts of the world. However, this framework would necessarily be restricted to situations that involve entire communities in conflict; racialized or ethnicized identities can serve as the basis for large-scale disagreements and spiral into violence. This would not explain other forms of urban violence, including ethnic violence against specific religious groups perpetrated by fringe terrorist and militant groups outside of mainstream society.

Such themes of targeted violence and radicalization that lead to violence are explored by Oren Yiftachel. He extends assertions on colonialism by Fanon and Mamdani to Israeli administration of Palestinian and Arab territories, studying power sharing, right to land, economic well-being, and state-led violence before calling Arab citizenship in Israel “ghetto citizenship” (2011). Yiftachel and Roded suggest that, contrary to common approaches that link violent terrorism to global phenomena (like “jihadism”), radical religious mobilization that leads to violent outcomes is influenced by “national territorial struggles or conditions of urban marginality” (2011, p. 178).

What determines the degree of radicalization and violence in Israel is the “depth” of colonization (p. 182). Yiftachel and Roded compare the different ways in which the Israeli state creates “new colonial conditions” (p. 190) in different parts of Israel – militarized occupation and displacement in some parts, nominal citizenship in others, and some urban development rights in others. What is common, perhaps, is that the state seeks to “construct a hegemonic status” and a “domination of a particular system of beliefs and values” as a “‘taken-for-granted’ truth” (p. 184).

In a fascinating, contrarian approach, they study violence created and perpetuated by the Israeli state instead of violent and nonviolent insurgencies amongst the Palestinian Arab population. He notes that the state puts religion in the “frontier” (p. 192) thereby creating radicalization “from above” (p. 189). However, this creates an enabling atmosphere – exploitation, unequal membership and citizenship, and restricted movement and thought – that ferments radicalization “from below”.

Yiftachel’s work contributes to postcolonial scholarship on how urban spaces end up mired in conflict. Like Fanon, he points to colonial exploitation, segregation, and violence, and identifies a regime where religion, not race, becomes the determinant of who is in control. This provides useful points of departure from Mamdani, Fanon, and other postcolonial scholars:
religion and sect can become racialized in similar ways as race under European colonialism, and thence create similar conditions for ongoing and future violence.

The postcolonial lens of studying violence is different from liberal democratic frameworks in key ways: violence adopts an intertemporal dimension, flaring up many years after the colonial regime ended and still intricately related to the creation of identities and other social realities under colonization. Unlike most liberal analyses that study the current state of sociological factors – strength of formal networks, legitimacy of the state, relative strengths of states and armed violent actors – postcolonial perspectives study the evolution of feelings and identities over decades, or even centuries. This has far-reaching implications for seeking justice in situations of urban violence which I will discuss in the next sections.

**Urban Violence and the Pursuit of Justice**

I have so far explored liberal democratic and postcolonial frameworks that explore urban violence in former colonies. The difference in time horizons means that ideas of justice are also inherently different; violence is a “face of oppression” or a means to justice, and the victims are oppressed or are tools in the hand of exploitative powers.

Western liberal debates on justice for urban violence are predominantly focused on the question of group versus individual identities. The ideal of justice is based in Rawlsian ideas of individuality. This ideal is almost solely economic and focuses on redistribution for the individual citizen who is the primary constituent deserving of such justice. Rawls suggested a groundbreaking way to establish some consensus around the very concept of justice through a veil of ignorance – he suggested that individuals would choose just outcomes were they to face equal probability of experiencing life as anybody in society. The goal of justice should, therefore, be to improve the lives of the worst off in society. The practice of justice was thus through redistribution, particularly of material resources (1971).

In his original work, Rawls insisted on individual identities and his ideas of common moral grounds seemed to suppress contextualized morals rooted in group or other forms of collective identity. However, Rawls revealed an acknowledgement for groups in a revised edition of A Theory of Justice (1999), but the individual identity remained primal. The Rawlsian idea of redistributive justice and liberal principles of individualism became the basis for planning practitioners and theorists like Krumholz (1990) and Davidoff (Checkoway, 1994); their focus remained catering to individual needs within the city without explicitly acknowledging group disparities.
In contrast, studies on violence in postcolonial contexts reveal the opposite approach. Mamdani wrote about how, in Rwanda, Tutsis were attacked for their collective ethnic identity of being Tutsis, while Hutus who suffered just happened to be the wrong individuals in the wrong place at the wrong time. Similarly, there is almost complete unanimity on the role of ethnicized identities (e.g. natives and settlers) in creating and perpetuating violence. This is not to suggest that Western scholars have completely ignored group dynamics. Critical scholars like Young have rejected the domineering assumptions of liberal, individualistic justice, arguing that focusing on groups allows policy to address structural issues (2001) that perpetuate oppression instead of offering piecemeal, temporary solutions to repetitive, long term problems. Taylor et al. have presented group membership and “cultural context” as “basic interests” for individuals (1994, p. 5) even within the individualistic liberal framework, and thus aligned with the liberal ideal of individual liberties. Young further argues that because oppression is a group experience, and it is groups that face disadvantages by virtue of their identities, any focus on justice should be targeted similarly at the group. Institutional structures and processes can discriminate against or otherwise disadvantage groups and enable one or more of the five faces of oppression that she has detailed. She argues for revised institutions that seek to enhance and support group difference instead of suppressing it, and mutual respect amongst people for such differences. States can thus validly support specific, relatively disadvantaged groups through policies that facilitate or support them (1990).

Young and other authors also raise concerns about the common norms or basic principles that Rawls and other individualist scholars allude to. Young posited that the dominant culture would be represented in “basic principles”, leading to a comprehensive reformulation of oppressive practices on the group already oppressed. The oppressed would again be subject to double consciousness and would again be powerless in the face of this status quo. There are many critiques to this group-enabling framework that Young promotes, most of which come from the liberal individualist ideal of justice. She describes many of them in her own work: the notion of group primacy is against the liberal, individualistic ideal of identity. Giving preferential treatment to one group is unfair to all other groups, and for the liberal tradition, the transcendence of group differences is the ultimate goal.

Other writers like Wasserstrom suggest that the construction of groups itself is arbitrary and focusing policy on groups makes the entire practice arbitrary and unfair. For him, the goal is not enhancing group differences, but complete assimilation leading to erasure of group
differences themselves. He also argues that maintaining uniform standards for everybody is rational and avoids confusions and contests around privileges or special treatments that a specific group receives (1977).

Several writers like Taylor (1994), Habermas (1994), and Fainstein (2010) have tried to reconcile these competing narratives, or, more relevantly, to show that group justice is possible within the individualistic liberal framework. Taylor’s essay called “The Politics of Recognition” formed the basis for some of Young’s most prolific works, and he started by acknowledging the role of social relations and groups in shaping our identity as citizens. He argued for “due recognition” of these identities – as “not just a courtesy we owe people”, but a “vital human need” (1994, p. 26). He explores the role of dialogue, interactions, and language in framing our consciousness, and posits that “withholding recognition can be a form of oppression” (p. 36). However, in defining justice, Taylor goes back to Rousseau and Kant, and their principles of “freedom, absence of differentiated roles, and a very tight common purpose” (p. 51) and “autonomy, that is, the ability of each person to determine for himself or herself a view of the good life” (p. 57). While Taylor is critical of liberalism’s fixation with the individual, he nevertheless seeks to place group justice within the same framework and “basic political principles” (p. 63).

In a response to Taylor’s essay, Habermas continued to focus on the individual – instead of protecting group identity, he posited that justice would ensure protecting the “integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed” (1994, p. 116). He sees preference for certain groups as an “illegitimate division” of society (p. 117) and insists instead on looking for and establishing common goals that everybody can aspire to. Fainstein presented similar ideas in The Just City (2010) where diversity, equity, and democracy would be held as guiding principles – though, self-admittedly, one that would function within the liberal capitalist order and would not look to upend the system.

Any reconciliation between these narratives therefore maintained the primacy of individual autonomy over group specificity. To contrast with the specification, Young developed her ideas of “positional difference” and “cultural difference”. She countered claims and concerns about fairness by pointing out the structural injustices that exist, and how meting out the same treatment to people from oppressed and non-oppressed groups would most certainly lead to different outcomes for the two since the oppressed would be unable to take full advantage of the opportunity. She was also critical of the sole focus on redistributive justice, pointing out that
“marginalization does not cease to be oppressive when one has shelter and food” (1990, p. 55). Such steps, she claims, only serve to recreate and perpetuate oppression by addressing the symptoms and failing to remove causes.

It is apparent that justice in Western, liberal frameworks focuses predominantly on economic inequalities and injustice, and violence is not a dominating feature of such discussions. Barring Young’s contribution defining violence as a face of oppression, scholars have mostly skirted the issue. Even in discussing racial violence, the discussion has revolved around economic inequalities – indeed, many scholars today suggest that economic inequality is at the heart of urban crimes today.

This approach to justice produces market-based suggestions, targeted at both individuals and groups, to counter violence by state and non-state actors. Suggestions have included global powers aiding weaker countries (Collier, 2007), improving access to inaccessible or no-go areas (Davis, 2012) and empowering targeted groups to negotiate their own settlements with violent actors (Bryson, 2011). Other approaches have included redistributing wealth and other resources to create a less unequal society. None of these methods, however, acknowledge the historical depth of problems that may be contributing to violence; as a result, liberal democratic frameworks preclude using violence as a source of justice except when the state exercises it through a predefined criminal justice system.

In contrast, postcolonial ideas of violence help build a different, almost opposing concept of justice in violent situations. Postcolonial scholars trace violence back to the original violence of colonialism and racialization and ethnicization of power. The creation of the original native-settler dichotomy, the ethnicization of other groups within the population, the support and upbringing of a native “elite” (or “colonized intellectuals” (2004, p. 43) as Fanon calls them) are all instantly recognizable as the creation and perpetuation of various kinds of group dynamics. For Fanon, “the native” singularly represents the entire colonized population struggling to find his agency amidst violent colonialism and a patronizing native bourgeoisie. Indeed, he goes so far as to assert that in a process of decolonization, “individualism is the first to disappear” (p. 46). The Tutsis, millions of whom were massacred in Rwanda, were all one group and were attacked for the same reason. The colonial Jewish state of Israel, with its promotion of religious radicalization “from above”, acts as a group, and treats Arabs as a group, albeit with different “depths of colonialism” in different contexts (Yiftachel, 2011; Yiftachel & Roded, 2011). The entire paradigm of individual justice and liberty, so central to the Western debates on justice,
thus stands invalidated and unable to deliver justice in postcolonial thought on justice and violence.

This approach has other, important implications in seeking justice. The focus for liberal justice has remained on those who suffer from violence at that specific point in time; perpetrators are therefore assigned liability for the creation of that violence. Postcolonial thought approaches the topic from a more nuanced, historical perspective. This approach explores the creation of violence through decades of racialization and ethnicization of power – therefore shifting focus from victims to creators and facilitators of violence. Such focus is almost necessarily critical and produces new perspectives on conflict; Yiftachel’s study, for example, explores radicalization amongst Jewish Israeli states instead of the more common exploration of Islamic militancy in the region (2011). Similarly, Mamdani calls his work “When Victims Become Killers”, referring to a “criminal population” (2001, p. 21) produced as a result of colonial machinations for power and control.

Using colonial realities to study violence and, in the process, shifting responsibility (at least partially) from killers to former or current colonial masters, muddles the very idea of justice for victims of violence. Fanon is no less eloquent in his assertions of “revenge” (2004, p. 42), and of how native recourse to violence simply insists on ensuring that “the last shall be first” (p. 45) in the political, economic, and social order. The target of violence, therefore, is a complete reordering of the society. He insists that this aggression, long built up by decades of powerlessness and violent subversion, will first uncover itself against other natives. Like other acts of revenge, this is the native’s way of asserting his identity, and builds up to other acts of violence directed at colonial institutions and the elite.

Postcolonial scholarship therefore puts violence beyond individual acts and liabilities. It is attributed, instead, to the “implements of violence” (p. 63), and surrounding conditions – the extent or “depth” of colonialism in Yiftachel’s words. Colonialism and the brutality with which “natives” are oppressed is then responsible for violence. When the natives respond to colonial violence with their own violence, they are merely taking the first steps towards decolonization which, as an opposing force to the dominant distribution of power, is inherently violent.

Many scholars have compared postcolonial violence with “disorders” (Good, 2008), insisting that liability lies squarely with colonial regimes and not with natives who commit violence – “Victims” have become “Murderers”. Bloodshed is seen as natural to the process of natives rediscovering their own identities, their agency, and redistributing power in a setup that
has oppressed them for long. This approach then questions the status of “victims” of this violence by natives. If revenge-seeking natives are not directly responsible for the suffering of those who are attacked – not European settlers, but ethnicized aliens – who must be prosecuted for there to be justice? Can the traditional system of police, treated by critical postcolonial scholarship as a symbol of domination by settlers, work to reestablish peace and trust between groups now ethnicized by colonization?

There are no direct, straightforward answers to these concerns. Unlike liberal and neoliberal perspectives, where policy recommendations are rooted within the global order and markets, recommendations for decolonization are drastic. Blood must be shed, arms raised, and violence responded to with violence, before the oppressed can regain control of their own lives, thought, and resources. There can be no compromise, for it “involves the colonial system and the young nationalist bourgeoisie at one and the same time” (Fanon, 2004, p. 61). There can be no peace until the “colonized man finds his freedom” (p. 85).

The way out is to deconstruct the colonial regime, and then to establish a society that acknowledges, respects, and reasserts native identity. This involves deracializing power – which may be achieved by removing it from the hands of the settlers. However, it would also involve deethnicizing the postcolony; freeing it from the hands of the native bourgeoisie, and freeing “native” thought from the clutches of colonialist and neocolonialist narratives and knowledge.

**Violence & Planning Theory**

Violence, and its analysis from a postcolonial lens, therefore neutralizes all key tenets of liberal debates on violence and justice. This difference in positions also leads to markedly different approaches for planning; Habermas’s ideas of communication (1994) contributed to the communicative or collaborative planning theory within the neoliberal state, while critical scholars have propounded an insurgent planning theory with collective action and informality at its center (Miraftab & Wills, 2005; A. Roy, 2009). Planning theorists have generally explored violence from within a neoliberal system, however, which has led them to focus on urban violence in general (Bryson, 2011; Caldeira, 2000; Davis, 2009, 2012; Rotker, 2002) or communal radicalization and violence (Bollens, 2002, 2008; Yiftachel, 2011; Yiftachel & Roded, 2011). While these theories acknowledge power to varying degrees, none explicitly deals with physical violence. I explore theorizations of the postcolonial city within the framework of violence and justice and argue that postcolonial scholarship has ignored the ethnicized creation of violence and its role in space-making in the postcolonial city.
Communicative, or collaborative planning theory was among the first in dominant planning theories to explicitly acknowledge power dynamics within cities and societies where planners work. It is, like other ideas of justice, based in Rawlsian individualist ideas of justice and acknowledges the multiplicity of experiences, knowledge, and practical application. While it calls for better understanding of differences in perspective, it remains within the liberal framework of formal institutions and processes (Habermas, 1994). Apart from obvious questions about the validity of individualist perspectives in situations of long-lasting inequities, communicative planning has also been criticized for being unresponsive to structural oppression. It has also been criticized for being a continuation of the neoliberal order and reinforcing the same economic and political disparities (P. Roy, 2015).

On the other hand, discussions on the postcolonial city have predominantly included ideas of marginalization, poverty, the “subaltern”, and informality. They are critical of neoliberal classifications of cities such as “global cities”, and many go so far as to suggest postcolonial societies cannot ‘plan” in the sense that liberal scholarship knows planning (A. Roy, 2009). Extensive studies on cities in the postcolonial world have revealed a unique mix of colonial and post-colonial influences, including those of anti-colonialist nationalism and an elite that functions similarly to the colonial occupation. The postcolonial city’s built form is still “compartmentalized”; the native elite still lives in separate areas with open spaces while the poor live in shanty settlements built one on top of another. These settlements are separated in the same way by police, and physical force is manifested in barracks and batons.

Postcolonial scholars have devoted substantial attention to this compartmentalization and the perpetuation of informal built forms. Studying India, Ananya Roy (2009) suggested that the planning apparatus is itself informal, which treats different classes of informality differently even while it engages in equally (if not more) informal processes of its own. She describes how planning now works to facilitate capital (deregulation), has different standards for different people and constructions (ambiguous), and allows for or even creates special cases where laws are not enforced, and exceptions are created (exceptions). Combined, she explains, all of these factors allow the state to engage in large scale projects even as it faces off against citizens who use the same informality against state decisions.

The focus of the postcolonial city then becomes politically expedient, modernist development; large-scale infrastructural projects are carried out even as the state negotiates with informal political actors who resist such attempts at modernization. Global neoliberal institutions
try to exert requisite influence through policy recommendations and the production of knowledge to steer such development towards greater privatization and market-friendly regimes (Shappard, 2014). Such inequalities can shift form if required and even gain strength in some cases. Inequalities, and the widespread exclusion of people, leads to complicated social and economic outcomes including high rates of crime and urban violence, segregation, barricading, and militarized mobility. These phenomena can be observed in many former colonies including all of the Indian subcontinent, South America, and other regions (Caldeira, 2000; Rotker, 2002).

It is hard to argue that the barricaded built form prevalent in many postcolonial cities is not influenced by historic inequalities and crime. However, and perhaps unfortunately for the discipline, these studies have opted to focus on specific phenomena – informality, inequality, crime, the subaltern – instead of the ethnicized distribution of political and economic power that may have contributed to the creation of these phenomena. While omitting certain postcolonial forms of violence, these studies nevertheless confirm that physical violence may be at the center of how cities have shaped and how specific communities have experienced them.

Where planners have sought to explicitly study ethnicized identities and the resulting violence, they have done so in a communal violence framework (Bollens, 2002, 2008), or one focusing deeply on the state’s role in delivering violent outcomes to sections of the population (Yiftachel, 2011; Yiftachel & Roded, 2011). This establishes the ethnicized nature of violence to varying specificities in different postcolonial places, and reinforces the importance of theorizing different kinds of ethnicized violence. These cities are not simply informal networks with radical political movements and resistances led by the subaltern. They are manifestations of racialized control, ethnicized power, and disproportionate distribution of tools of economic, political, social, and even violent activity.

Young’s focus on recognizing oppression may be helpful in trying to reconcile postcolonial urban theory with the violence that it ignores. Urban crime may not be just a manifestation of inequality; it can be the outcome of ethnicized violence against certain groups, members of which may have no recourse but to revert to violence to reassert their identity. Such outcomes need not be physically violent. They can be “insurgent” (Miraftab, 2009; Miraftab & Wills, 2005); disruptive, imaginative, and political; they may represent new forms of claims that the oppressed start to exert over their cities. They may represent radical forms of citizenship, which assert rights and responsibilities of citizens over one another in spite of official status (Holston, 1999; Isin & Nielsen, 2008). Or they can include “street politics” (Bayat, 1997) and
“nonmovements”. As a consequence of decades of colonialism, postcolonial cities may witness both physical violence and insurgent responses thereto, both by groups which may have been oppressed to similar or varying degrees by the colony.

This retention of focus on groups and primacy of politicized identities allows further theorization on how violence, placemaking, and the lived urban experience have all been ethnicized in the postcolonial city. It can also allow for the development of effective reconciliation that can facilitate decolonization of the state, planning, intellect, and people. However, it also runs the risk of attaching stigma to certain groups; acknowledging higher likelihood of certain groups to commit violent crimes, for example, can stoke prejudice amongst other groups within the population, making reconciliation less likely.

I have already established the inadequacy of dominant neoliberal frameworks on planning. They ignore crucial aspects of the postcolonial city and treat other particularities (like informality) as necessarily negative characteristics, and many cities of the Global South can thus be read as non-cities because of these particularities. On the other hand, there is space to extend and inform critical and postcolonial scholarship about the prevalence of violence and its contribution to placemaking, state planning, and community activism and organization. These perspectives therefore inform my study; however, I do not call for completely dismissing neoliberal planning paradigms and their application to the postcolony, including cities like Quetta. Continuing global hegemony by capitalist neoliberalism has meant that most, if not all, postcolonial cities continue to be influenced by neoliberal practices and policies to varying degrees. The trick, then, would be to study this influence in conjunction with other aspects like informality, oppression, the subaltern, and ethnicized discrepancies in the urban experience for different groups in the city.
CHAPTER 3: POSTCOLONIAL QUETTA

I have previously introduced Quetta as a city that has witnessed unprecedented levels of violence. This violence has also shaped the accompanying media and public narrative around the city and its people, and most discussions include target killings and security planning. And yet the city is, at its core, a conglomeration of people and settlements: of human beings living in a space that does not afford them the attention they need to solve their problems. So dynamic and profound is Quetta’s geopolitical context that everyday people leading everyday lives are left ignored in media and even political narratives. Given its history of colonization by the British, I place the violent city of Quetta in critical and postcolonial scholarship. I have discussed some elements of the postcolony in previous chapters; there is widespread agreement even among many scholars of the liberal democratic tradition on the continued influence of colonization on institution building, markets, and societies in modern states.

This chapter uses information collected through interviews, field observations, and experience to argue that the modern state of Pakistan is an extension of the colonial “Empire” with similar structures and principles. Many different types of conflict have reared their heads within this context; combined with international geopolitical realities, they have made Quetta an administrative and planning nightmare for the state. I start by situating Quetta in space and time to establish the context within which my analysis is relevant. I then proceed to explore colonial institutions and policies that persist and define Pakistan’s administrative structure today. Subsequent sections explore violence and links to colonial policies.

Postcolonial Cities and Colonial Overhang

Scholars and researchers from various fields have written extensively about colonial influence on modern states. This scholarship has come from all around the world, and different studies have led to an intriguing mix of findings on how colonial traditions have impacted institution building in the modern state. One of the pioneering, empirical works in this regard is by Acemoglu et al. (2001). Their study serves, in many ways, as the starting point in any analysis of colonial legacies and development trajectories of postcolonial nation states. Using empirical data, the researchers establish links between early settler mortality and modern institutional development: long-standing, strong institutions were established in places like North America and Australia where the colonizers felt they could survive, and extractive and centralized systems were set up in places like Congo where settlers encountered disease and death.
Banerjee and Iyer build on this work to study the specific case of Indian institutions of land ownership and agricultural productivity (2005). They analyze colonial land tenure systems and compare them against postcolonial economic performance in different geographic regions in India; they found that there have been significant and long-running differences in performance between areas where different land tenure systems were used. Where the colonizers left landlords, postcolonial investments declined, leading to lower productivity. On the other hand, where land rights were distributed amongst a larger number of people, productive investments (and resulting productivity) were higher. These studies establish credible links between colonial histories and long-term development of countries. Other scholars and writers including Fanon, King, and Miraftab have studied the link between the built environment – segregated cities – and colonial histories. King is particularly insightful in describing three stages of colonial cities: the first consolidating political and administrative control through codes and principles, the second through master plans, and a postcolonial third stage that continues colonial policies. He also explores globalization and neoliberal regimes as an extension of colonialism, which is relevant to my analysis of administrative structures in Quetta (1976).

There is also substantial work on segregation and conflict. Colonizers routinely used divide and rule strategies to both avoid and perpetuate some level of conflict. The creation of physical and social divisions through planning has been seen both as a tactic to consolidate control through neutralization (Saikal, 2007; Turok, 1994) and mitigate intergroup conflict (Bhavnani, Donnay, Miodownik, Mor, & Helbing, 2014). While there are mixed views on whether segregation mitigates (DiPasquale & Glaeser, 1998; Olzak, Shanahan, & McEneaney, 1996) or exacerbates intergroup violence, there is agreement around the use of zoning and segregation for social control. Much of this scholarship comes from the apartheid regime of South Africa (Davenport, 1991). The modern violence is intrinsically rooted in this colonial past. Today’s state represents continuity of colonial priorities as its response mechanisms represent similar contests for space and power.

**Contextualizing Quetta and Pakistan**

**International and Regional Geopolitics**

Pakistan is situated at the crossroads of the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and China. The country’s coastline faces the Gulf of Oman, and there is direct land access to Iran, Afghanistan, China, and India (see Appendix B). The Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan is separated from Pakistan by a narrow strip of land that the British colonial regime left with
Afghanistan as a buffer against the Soviet Union. The location of the country exposes Pakistan to a unique set of strategic opportunities and challenges which are not a subject of this paper.

Peter Blood, writing for the United States Library of Congress, highlighted Pakistan’s unique geographic and geostrategic advantage (1995). This importance has manifested itself repeatedly even after Blood made the observation; Afghanistan has remained mired in war, Iran is among the pariahs of the global order, China continues to grow economically and politically, and India has emerged as another regional powerhouse over the years. The international geopolitical cauldron boils over in Quetta. As the capital of the Balochistan province, the city hosts discussion, debate, and decision making around the province’s significant natural and mineral resources and its deep-sea port at Gwadar. Quetta itself is perilously close to the Afghan border (see Appendix B); it takes approximately an hour’s westward journey to cross the border from the city center. The fact that this route is a major arms, weapons, and contraband smuggling route does not help the situation much.

Quetta: Population and Settlements

Quetta is, on the face of it, a multi-ethnic city. Several ethnicities add up into its 2.2 million population (PBS, 2017), including Baloch, Pashtun, Punjabis, and Hazaras. For the first time, this census estimate also included Afghan nationals and refugees living in regular settlements (Afghan refugees living in refugee camps are still excluded).

Latest census figures reveal that approximately half of the district’s population lives in areas that fulfil the state’s criteria for “urban”, while the rest lives in rural areas. However, the definition of “urban” can differ significantly from how the term is conceptualized; most parts of the city are clearly segregated, with names reflecting the ethnicity or community or tribe living therein. Places like Pashtun-abad, Hazara Town, and Kharot-abad do little to conceal their respective ethnic and/or tribal compositions. Other features stand out as well: many ethnicities (like Punjabis) are still called “settlers” generations after they moved to Quetta. The term itself implies a lack of ownership and can be studied in greater detail separately.

Over the years, the space for interaction between these ethnicities and communities has shrunk dramatically. The comparison is immediate and striking: Owtadolajam, who lived in Quetta in the early 1970s, described the city as:

a culture of its own. It cannot be said to be a purely Baluchi culture or a purely Pashtoon culture; or, for that matter, a Brahui or a Punjabi culture or the culture of the Urdu-speaking people (...) the culture of Quetta city, viewed
as an entity, presents itself as an amalgam of these heterogeneous cultural elements of the city’s population (2006, p. 7)

However, my experience in Quetta was remarkably different. Owtadolajam’s account from before the Afghan War speaks of a different era that has left its mark but has not survived the subsequent onslaught of insecurity and violent conflict. I experienced segregated, inward-looking communities, limited spaces for commercial and cultural interaction, and an unrivaled focus on security and basic survival. Quetta’s markets exemplify this shift: while city administrators insist that different communities have historically lived in a semi-segregated fashion, the bazar has been the point of confluence for trade and interaction. I encountered the same markets as inherently unsafe, heavily militarized spaces, with people eager to rush back home immediately after fulfilling the purpose of their visit and shopkeepers making elaborate arrangements for armed security guards and escorts.

Emergence and Consolidation of the Colonial State

Most of what is Pakistan today was under direct or indirect British rule for many decades before it emerged as an independent state in 1947. The British adopted different strategies to retain control in different areas; Acemoglu et al.’s analysis (2001) seems relevant even to jurisdictions and subjurisdictions within the Indian subcontinent. In this section I explore the continuity of both colonial domestic administrative strategies, including deals and agreements with local elite, and international treaties that impact Quetta today.

Domestic Administration

In order to consolidate their power, the colonial regime used different strategies in different areas. British India was a mix of presidencies (under direct rule, e.g. Bombay, Madras), provinces, (e.g. Sind), agencies (e.g. British Balochistan), and semi-autonomous princely states ruled by Khans, Nawabs, or Sardars under British paramountcy and loyal to the British crown (Kerr & Wright, 2015; Stein & Arnold, 2010).

Quetta city was first occupied by the British Raj in 1839 during the first Afghan War. It had been under the Khanate of the Khan of Kalat, and administrative control exchanged hands a few times before the Raj finally decided the city was too important to let even a pliant Khan take control. It thus came under the Balochistan Agency, administered by a Chief Commissioner. In the midst of strong tribal structures, the regime used various tactics to ensure resource extraction and continue political and administrative control. Annual Administrative reports of the Balochistan Agency all contain vivid descriptions of British officers bestowing awards, honors,
and titles on local tribal sardars of the agency and surrounding states with similar political arrangements.

Strategies for control also differed within areas that the Raj administered directly. All regions were divided into “A” and “B” areas depending on the strength of tribal affiliations, and different administrative, policing, and even legal frameworks were used to govern these areas. “B” areas, representing tribes, were governed under principles of collective responsibility, while the civilian administration under the Assistant Commissioner or other relevant official was responsible for “A” areas.

Most legal, constitutional, and administrative structures enacted by the colonial regime have persisted even today. The Constitution of Pakistan 1973, passed 26 years after independence, is substantively identical to the Government of India Act of 1935 which the Crown used to control India. Even Balochistan’s Local Government Act, passed in 2010, is an eerie reproduction of colonial era legislation that authorized the district administration to form councils and manage certain affairs within their jurisdiction.

Administratively, Governors are still appointed to provinces by the federal government, and each province’s bureaucracy is headed by a Chief Secretary – appointed, again, by the federal government. The civil service, colloquially called the Civil Superior Service (CSS), follow the same hierarchy, rules, and responsibilities as those of the colonial Indian Civil Service (ICS). To top it off, the colonial era policies of dividing regions into “A” and “B” areas continue even today, and the principles of collective responsibility are often used in tribal disputes in spite of a different legal framework enforced for other parts of the country. The division of territory into administrative units has also remained largely the same, with some readjustments and subdivisions taking place after independence. Provincial boundaries, however, have remained consistent.

Much like the civilians, the military also follows the same command and control structure as that of the Royal British Indian Army. Most units trace their origins back to colonial times; almost all military training institutions were established by the British Raj, and the institution continues to use cantonments as a way to exert spatio-legal control over civilian affairs. The continuity of the colonial state is made even more apparent in the way the state has dealt with tribes and sardars. The first demonstration of the state’s imperial ambitions was its takeover of the semi-autonomous state of Kalat; thereafter, colonial policies of appeasement,
aggrandizement, and empowering of the sardars were adopted to consolidate state control. Where agreements and treaties failed, police and military power was used to reassert control.

**International Treaties and Agreements**

Domestic administration was not the only longstanding baggage that the state of Pakistan chose to carry after independence. International treaties and policies, specifically those pertaining to Iran and Afghanistan, were continued after the British left. The state faced other international problems including disputed borders and long-running ideological disputes with India; however, I will explore only Iran and Afghanistan for the specific impact they had on the people of Quetta and Balochistan. While in power in India, the British had led multiple military campaigns into Afghanistan. They had also helped the Khan of Kalat consolidate control over a region that was historically connected to both Afghanistan (the movement of people between the countries is frequent and remains impossible to monitor or regulate) and Iran (British officers referred to it is “Persian Balochistan” in their reports, and it is called “Sistan-Balochistan” today).

Handling Iran was relatively easy for the Raj. They had helped the Shah of Iran, Reza Pehlavi, come to power during the Second World War, and claims over Herat notwithstanding, he was predisposed to solving territorial disputes amicably. It was Afghanistan where the bigger problems lay. The British had led several military expeditions into Afghanistan between the late 19th and mid 20th centuries. They had seized Kabul multiple times, removed multiple rulers and installed others in their place, and had suffered losses running into thousands of lives during these adventures. The British had also wrestled with the Soviets in determining who would exercise control over Afghan foreign and domestic policies; finally, a British civil servant determined the international borders for the modern state of Afghanistan in 1896 (Leake & Haines, 2017).

These dynamics presented the toughest challenges in Balochistan for the nascent state of Pakistan. Many ethnic Baloch tribes trace their origins to modern day Iran, and there were longstanding trade and travel links with Afghanistan. Pashtuns, who form a significant portion of Balochistan’s population today, had repeatedly rejected the idea of borders that divided what was their ethnic homeland (Basit & Sial, 2010). The formal distribution of a historical “Balochistan” between Iran and Pakistan has subsequently encouraged insurgencies in both countries. There is no territorial conflict at the level of the state, and the two countries enjoy warm official relations.
However, the free movement of separatist militants across the border remains a concern on both sides.

The issue of borders has morphed into a more complicated problem with Afghanistan. After the British left, Afghanistan refused to recognize the Durand Line as the international border, claiming Pashtun areas that today constitute around 60% of Pakistan’s total landmass (see Appendix C). The Afghans have argued that the border was imposed upon a weaker state (Afghanistan under Abdul Rehman) by a stronger power (British rulers of India) under the threat of military warfare. This has snowballed into cross border firing by the two armies, a steadfast refusal to secure the border, and frequent accusations of trespassing from both sides (Leake & Haines, 2017).

The Pakistani state has also continued the colonial policy of indirect interventions in Afghanistan. It was the military that facilitated the recruitment and training of Mujahideen to fight the Soviets, and it was this training that allowed the Afghan Taliban to establish themselves as a political force in Afghanistan. When the tide shifted and the United States decided to invade Afghanistan, Pakistan was at the frontline again, this time hosting both the US and the Afghan Taliban. The country has subsequently been accused of playing a double game, and many analysts believe Pakistan deliberately destabilizes the Afghan government to ensure its own influence in Kabul.

Between these wars, and claims and counterclaims, millions of Afghan (mostly Pashtun) refugees have sought and found refuge in Pakistan. Quetta has become a major destination for many refugees owing to its proximity to the border and ease of access. This has created new political and administrative challenges for the state.

**Colonial Heritage and the Creation of Violence**

This section explores post-colonial violence in and around Quetta, with a specific focus on Balochistan. I argue that most violence today is rooted in the region’s colonial heritage and in the modern state’s continuation of imperial policies.

**Nationalist Separatist Movements**

Balochistan has witnessed nationalist separatist violence since the early days of Pakistan’s creation in 1947. This violence has engulfed natural resource facilities, state officers and facilities, and non-Baloch ethnic residents in Quetta and other cities of the province. Interestingly the movement spills across the border with Iran, with rebels using guerrilla tactics to attack state apparatus in both countries. Many analysts divide the insurgency into waves
across time; however, while triggers for renewed vigor among insurgents may be different, most grievances have remained consistent.

Exploitation and extraction of natural resources by the central government is one of the main drivers of this insurgency today. The fact that the province remains the poorest, and least developed in socioeconomic terms, adds salt to the injury. An oft-cited example is that of natural gas; discovered in 1952, it was supplied from Balochistan to all parts of the country. However, people living in Balochistan were only allowed to use this gas in 1984, and even then this usage was restricted to military settlements (cantonments) (Khosa, 2010). This attitude of the state clearly mirrors colonial attitudes, whereby the generation of economic rents was a main long-term goal (along with other goals like “civilization” and evangelism).

Another rallying cry for the separatist movements is the perceived differential treatment that the Baloch receive at the hands of the government and other ethnicities. Other provinces are at the receiving end of suspicion and distrust because of the thin representation of Baloch officers in state and private employment across the country. Low representation becomes problematic and another reflection of colonialism; absence of native officers means that senior positions in the civil administration, police, and military are occupied by “aliens” who can reasonably be seen as representatives of an imperial (central) government.

The influx of refugees represents another contentious point for separatist movements. Most of the millions of refugees are Pashtun, and many of them live in camps or other settlements in Quetta. This has drastically altered the demographic makeup of the city and the province but has received prominence only recently in census results released in 2017. Nationalist Baloch have expressed concerns about redefining political constituencies based on census results that include a significant number of refugees who are not eligible to vote. That this influx is facilitated by a central government they dislike further worsens this animosity; many Baloch insurgents see these developments as a tactic to minimize their political clout in national and regional politics and division of economic resources.

Religious and Sectarian Militancy

The phenomenon of religious and sectarian violence is relatively recent in Balochistan but threatens to completely upend the system due to simultaneous international and national events. While prejudice is much older, much of the violence can be traced back to the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in supporting and training Mujahideen – religiously driven militants, trained to operate advanced weapons, and supplied with the same using American
money. That war coincided with and provided unique opportunities to a military dictatorship in Pakistan, eagerly seeking legitimacy using religion and Islamization. As if to bring things full circle, the Islamic Revolution concurrently took place in Iran.

What Pakistan had then was a Saudi and American funded, Sunni (Deobandi) *Jihad* in one neighboring country and a Shi’i Islamic Revolution in another. These events inspired different sects within the population differently, and the state’s support for the Afghan jihad meant that it necessarily took sides in a sectarian conflict that was not domestically bred.

Quetta has remained, since the 1980s, the theater for the global sectarian and religious conflict to play out, not least because of the nearby porous borders to both Iran and Afghanistan. Saudi funded seminaries provided sustenance for thousands, if not millions, of Sunni Pashtun refugees, and Iran quickly moved to establish a diplomatic office in Quetta to accommodate Shi’i residents and Hazara Shi’i refugees moving in from Afghanistan. These developments are all intrinsically linked to the state’s fascination with Afghanistan and its approach to governance and legitimacy. Religion had long been used as a potent tool both before and after independence; mixed with sectarian colors, it formed a lethal combination that facilitated the emergence of dozens of armed, ideologically driven militant organizations.

This violence has taken thousands of lives in Pakistan in recent years, and some of the most harrowing incidents of bombings and target killings have taken place in Quetta. Some of these are facilitated by the state’s response to overall instability, while the state’s failure perpetuates other kinds of attacks.

**Maladministration in the Modern Postcolony**

The cauldron that is Quetta represents unique difficulties for the state to handle as it seeks to extract coal, natural gas, gold, and other minerals from Balochistan. The age-old policy of appeasing tribal leaders has created space for them to engage in financially questionable conduct – indeed, pro-state politicians insist that Balochistan’s underdevelopment stems from tribal *sardars* misappropriating funds intended for public welfare. The unending violence has also created other problems, including weaponization of the city and a concurrent privatization of security.

These circumstances weaken the civil administration significantly, making space for military influence to increase drastically. The constant exposure of Quetta to geopolitical contests already provides strong grounds for the military to sideline civilian and political governments – the consequences of these contests only makes those grounds stronger.
In this context, it would not be unreasonable to claim that the civilian arms of the state are on the brink of failure in Balochistan in general and Quetta specifically. The province formally requested for the military’s help in policing, anti-corruption, and even civil administration many years ago, and the influence of the Quetta-based Commander of the Southern Command at all levels of decision making is an open secret.

The civil administration’s failure is represented aptly by the police department. In 6 years, Balochistan Police has faced dozens of retaliatory attacks by both nationalist and sectarian militants. These attacks have included dozens of large-scale suicide bombings that took hundreds of civilian lives. Many of the most senior, and most well-reputed officers (including some of the very few natives) have lost their lives in these attacks; many residents of Quetta see the police as an ineffective force that cannot even protect its own officers.

And yet the situation is not as straightforward as the public perceives. Institutions like the police have taken center stage in these conflicts by engaging with militant movements head-on, without having much input in policies that create those movements in the first place. They face unprecedented challenges, while other institutions including the military shape policy that many believe perpetuate these challenges.

We therefore witness a state that has continued colonial practices and political structures, perpetuated ethnicized violence amongst religious, sectarian, and ethnic groups, and also faced global, national, and local consequences of these policies in the form of insurgencies and terrorism. At the same time, several dynamic individuals from the police and military are genuinely interested in addressing the core issues that lead to violence, and hundreds have laid their lives for the cause. A proud history of gaining independence from colonial rule goes concurrently with continuing manifestations of colonial power and violence. The state, then, adopts different strategies to deal with this internal contradiction. The next chapter explores administrative and political structures and the role of different state institutions in Quetta’s violent context.
CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The neocolonial state’s role in Quetta has been multipronged, both responding to violence and contributing to it. The level of conflict and violence in Quetta—including geographic and political constraints—means that implementation of plans and policies, especially in the realm of service delivery, is extremely difficult. In this chapter I describe the structures, processes and various roles of the state’s planning apparatus in Quetta. This analysis focuses on security and administration performed at multiple levels of government: the national (Pakistan), the provincial (Balochistan), and the local (Quetta). I include aspects of planning and administration specific to the Hazara community, with detailed discussions on community and grassroots organizing and activism in later chapters.

Structure here refers to, at each level of government, institutions, hierarchies, and the division of power. Process refers to the way in which these institutions work to make planning decisions. It is important to note here that planning remains interlinked with, and almost synonymous to, “development” in Quetta’s (and Pakistan’s) context. Functions such as zoning, which have defined planning in the Global North for decades, are relegated to resource-starved local governments that are not in a position to make meaningful “plans” on their own. While planning literature has typically not treated law enforcement and security as central planning concepts (compared to, say, land use), Quetta’s context is different—as I detail in subsequent sections, security is often at the center of policy decisions as well as lived experiences of residents in the city.

Overview

Every institution relevant to Quetta’s planning landscape derives its powers principally from the Constitution of Pakistan and secondarily from federal and provincial legislation. The Constitution of Pakistan remains the overarching framework within which all other laws and institutions are made and operate; structures are, therefore, very similar across all provinces in Pakistan. The Constitution historically provided for a very rigid “federal list”, of subjects that only the center could legislate on, and a “concurrent list”, of subjects that both the center and provinces could govern subject to federal supremacy. The federal list included very specific language for planning, allowing the center to set up institutions such as the Planning Commission and directing provincial planning under the same.
Recent constitutional reforms have been targeted towards devolving power to the provinces and at even lower levels where possible. The “concurrent list” was abolished, central authority was explicitly restricted to the federal list, and provincial limits on planning and local government were significantly eased. With these amendments, each province was able to set up devolved planning institutions as well as context-specific local government systems.

**Institutional Structures: Civil and Infrastructural Planning & Development**

**Federal Government and Planning Commission**

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**Figure 2: Federal Government: Political and Bureaucratic Hierarchy**

The Federal Government, under the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Cabinet, plans through the Planning Commission of Pakistan. This commission is headed by the Prime Minister, with an appointed deputy chair who enjoys the rank and privileges extended to a Federal Minister. There also exist other cabinet committees such as the National Economic Council, which discusses planned developments before cabinet approval, and the Council of Common Interests, where all provinces attend to determine division of resources and prioritization of national projects (see Figure 2).

The federal government’s legal role in planning has reduced significantly in recent years. Where it once planned for the whole country, and even formulated a uniform local government
structure for all territories, the federal government is now restricted to planning for federally owned infrastructure, critical national security related projects, and large-scale projects that provinces are unable to plan and execute on their own. The Planning Commission is responsible for this planning and evaluation of project proposals; it consists of members who lead sectional teams of economists and specialized analysts. The commission is chaired by the Prime Minister, with a minister or technocrat serving as the Deputy Chairperson. It is empowered to finalize and consolidate development proposals that go on to form the Federal Public-Sector Development Program (PSDP). The National Assembly, of which the Prime Minister is a member, remains the principal law-making body in the country. This body is empowered to amend the Constitution and approve national budgets, including the Federal Public-Sector Development Program (PSDP). The legal scope of the federal PSDP has also reduced in recent years.

There are other federal bodies that function in Quetta under the ambit of the constitution. They include federal ministries and departments, the military, several intelligence agencies, and important law enforcement agencies. I will focus on federal influence through law and order and the military in subsequent sections; however, I will omit discussions on other federal departments because of their negligible influence on planning in Quetta.

The Bureaucratic Establishment: Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions

The structure of the bureaucracy in Pakistan presents a mix of federal and provincial influences. The federal bureaucracy – hereinafter called the Civil Service of Pakistan (or CSP), is the most prestigious public service institution that exists, both in terms of power dynamics and public perception. Selection to the CSP is managed by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). The Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS), formerly called the District Management Group (DMG), remains the most prestigious group within CSP and contributes a majority of officers to district administration posts across the country even under devolved local governments.

At the same time, however, each province has its own Public Service Commission and regularly selects and hires candidates to provincial civil service positions (the Balochistan Civil Service, or BCS, in Balochistan’s case). This service is locally well-respected but CSP officers hold BCS officers in widely-acknowledged contempt. CSP officers also hold the distinct advantage of serving across the country, while BCS officers remain confined to Balochistan.

There is no bar on federal bureaucrats serving in provincial governments or provincial bureaucrats serving on federal or provincial positions in other provinces. However, such
opportunities are mostly accessible only to federal bureaucrats. The federal government accounts for considerable bureaucratic manpower across all provinces. It decides to allocate the services of selected CSP officers to a provincial government, which subsequently decides the exact assignment for each of these officers. For as long as they remain at the disposal of a province, it pays for wages and other benefits from its own resources.

One aspect of the bureaucracy that has continued since colonial times is the appointment of the Chief Secretary (CS) – the provincial head of bureaucracy and effectively the head of all administrative affairs – and the Inspector General of Police (IGP) – the provincial head of the police force. Both these appointments are made by the federal government, with “consultation” of the province and, often, accommodating provincial preferences. Once appointed, these officers are legally required to comply with the Chief Minister’s and provincial government’s directives insofar as they comply with the law. Within this compliance, these heads are responsible for all job assignments and tasks in the bureaucracy and the police force respectively. The post of “Chief Secretary” does not exist at the federal level, where the Prime Minister has administrative discretion. This will serve as background knowledge for power dynamics that I will discuss in subsequent sections.

**Provincial Government and Administration**

The legal framework places the provincial government at the forefront for development planning in Quetta. This importance is consistent across all provinces and not unique to Balochistan; there are differences in provincial legislation for local governments, but each province has discretion to formulate its own local government and planning structures.
The provincial chief executive is the Chief Minister, who is an elected member of the provincial assembly. The rest of the structure is similar across national and provincial levels: there is a cabinet of ministers for individual departments, and the provincial legislature decides on budgeting and the Provincial Public-Sector Development Program (Provincial PSDP). Implementation of plans is done through line departments, led by a senior bureaucrat (called “Secretary”) and staffed by technocrats (see Figure 3).

Along with line departments, the provincial government also manages district and divisional administrators. These administrators are bureaucrats, from both CSP and BCS in Quetta’s case, who work to coordinate line departments and local government functions within their jurisdictions. They are also responsible – in fact, some bureaucrats feel principally responsible – for revenue collection. These administrators are appointed directly by the Chief Secretary, who often acts on the wishes of the Chief Minister and/or other cabinet members.

**Balochistan Planning and Development (P&D) Department**

![Figure 4: The provincial bureaucracy in Balochistan]

The P&D Department serves the most critical role for planning in Quetta. The Provincial PSDP is formulated with the assistance of the Planning and Development Department (referred to within government circles as P&D, or PND) and (legally) projects cannot be approved or financed without the department’s vetting.
Balochistan P&D is structured in sections that represent various divisions of public planning and implementation. Some of these sections are Water and Power, Communication & Transport, Education & Local Government, and Health and Social Welfare. There are also special sections for specific, large-scale projects and programming. Each section is led by a section chief who is a career technocrat and has specialized knowledge about the respective field. Plans are presented, evaluated, and proposed through these sections, and subsequent monitoring and implementation is also coordinated at the level of sections. Approval, however, involves the Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) and the Chief Secretary (see Figure 4).

All Section Chiefs report to the Chief Economist for new development, and coordinate with the Director General (Implementation) for plans already approved. Depending on availability and political priorities, there may be a Joint Chief Economist to assist the Chief Economist with evaluation of proposals. At the level of P&D, the Chief Economist is responsible for giving final (technical) recommendation to projects which is then vetted by the Additional Chief Secretary.

The Planning and Development Department is led by one of the senior-most bureaucrats in the province. Called the “Additional Chief Secretary”, or ACS, (s)he is subordinate only to the Chief Secretary and holds coordinating authority over Secretaries of all line and implementation departments. The ACS also plays a key role in collaborating with line departments to formulate the annual PSDP (see section on “Balochistan Planning and Development). I will discuss later Local Governments.

Balochistan, like other provinces, was governed by the Local Government Ordinance 2001 (Balochistan Provincial Assembly) until it was replaced in 2010. The previous ordinance set up elected bodies at the union council level with very powerful mayors. Federal and provincial control over these mayors was minimized, and the district administration (bureaucrats) and the police were all placed at the disposal of the mayor. While the previous system devolved a significant chunk of local planning to the level of very small constituencies, the overall legal framework retained decision making about planning, policymaking, and development structures with the federal government. This was modified through Constitutional amendments in 2010. The National Assembly repealed the Federal Local Governments Ordinance and authorized provinces to legislate on their own local government systems and a host of other planning, policymaking, and administrative matters ("Ten ministries to be abolished, shifted to provinces," 2010).
In line with this revised status quo, the Balochistan Assembly passed an “independent” local government law (also referred to as the Local Governments Act) in 2010. That law has seen several, albeit minor, amendments over the years, but has largely retained its character. The Local Governments Act 2010 divides Balochistan into urban and rural areas, with rural areas represented by Union Councils and larger District Councils comprising of all union councils within the district. Urban areas are now represented at the level of the municipality with a municipal committee for small towns (15,000 to 100,000 people) and a municipal corporation for larger cities (100,000 to 500,000 people). For towns over 500,000, the law prescribes a Metropolitan Corporation. Quetta is the only city in Balochistan with a Metropolitan Corporation.

The Local Governments Act 2010 lists vital functions that urban local governments are expected to fulfil. The “compulsory” functions are categorized broadly as public health (including sanitation, registration of births and deaths etc. but excluding hospitals and health facilities), water supply, drainage, price and quality control, education (including enforcement of right to primary education and establishment of institutions), public safety (including firefighting, emergency response, and civil defense), town planning and building control (including master planning “for development expansion and improvement” and construction approvals), and streets management (including street lights, encroachments, and regulation of traffic). Optional functions include expansion of public health to include hospitals and other institutions, cultural functions like civic education and maintenance of public health, social welfare including coordinating voluntary services. The Act also leaves space for the provincial government to direct local governments to carry out other functions it may deem necessary.

The power struggles between levels of government are built into the Local Governments Act, and directly impact local planning, administration, and governance. For example, the language of the Balochistan Local Governments Act is steeped in its colonial heritage. It envisages representation for “peasants” and demands of local governments to make arrangements for the “burial of paupers found dead in city limits”. Additionally, it undermines local authority and autonomy by empowering provincial governments to arbitrarily appoint members to local councils and remove elected members from the same. Resource allocation, which often determines the extent of planning and development possible, is almost entirely controlled directly by the provincial government or its appointed agents. Finally, it is also important to point out that local government councils are chaired, depending on the level of
operation, by the Divisional Commissioner or the District Deputy Commissioner, both of whom are appointed bureaucratic representatives of the provincial government.

**The Legal Process for Planning and Development**

This section explores legally defined processes to plan for cities and localities in Balochistan. Unlike the previous section, I will zoom in further on Quetta, describing specific processes in planning for new infrastructure, upkeep of existing infrastructure, or other projects that impact Quetta in general or Hazara areas in particular. where appropriate.

**The Quetta Metropolitan Corporation (Local Government)**

The Quetta Metropolitan Corporation is the only local council to qualify as a metropolitan council as defined by law. It is able to conduct small-scale planning, including routine matters of zoning and building regulations, on its own. Legally, it is also empowered to enforce building laws and carry out small scale uplift and/or maintenance work on street lights, pavements, sanitation, and other functions defined by law.

Election to the council is based on wards, with each ward represented by a councilor. Wards are based on neighborhoods – and there may be multiple wards in large neighborhoods, allowing councilors to focus on and identify issues at the street and neighborhood level. The council meets frequently to allow representatives to identify projects and needs from the level of their *mohalla* (neighborhood). Using what is a democratic process, all representatives’ proposals are pooled, discussed in open sessions, and prioritized before the eventual approval of the metropolitan’s budget. This budget is then approved by the provincial government through an authorized representative, who vets any monetary inflows that the council expects to receive from the province. Once approved by the Metropolitan Corporation and the provincial government, implementation starts. The government authorizes disbursement of funds for approved projects, and a specified process for selection of contractors begins.

Where the Metropolitan Council finds itself unable to approve and implement a plan because of resource constraints, it submits to the provincial government’s planning process. Such proposals are compiled by the Secretary of the Local Governments Department, who is also the administrative in charge of all local councils and committees in the province. There is no explicit provision in the law for municipalities or metropolitans to raise their own funds through borrowing; there is no explicit restriction either, but such an example does not exist so far.

**Balochistan Planning and Development (Provincial Government)**
In spite of the existence of a comprehensive local government structure, the provincial government is the most important and powerful planning authority in Quetta. I have previously described the administrative and planning structure as it exists; I will now describe how the law requires it to work.

Stakeholders continuously identify local needs and requirements, then propose them to the Planning and Development (P&D) department. These stakeholders include line departments, local government councils (the Quetta Metropolitan Corporation in this case), politicians, and even members of the public. While individuals and politicians can submit their proposals throughout the year, line departments and local governments compile them with their respective Secretaries. The requirement for a new hospital, for example, or a new bus stop, will be noted and evaluated by the health or the communication and works department respectively, or by the local governments department if proposed by a local council. The P&D department collects these proposals as part of a year-round process. Once proposals are received, they are allotted to relevant section chiefs who hand them to their analysts for further evaluation. Feasibility studies, cost benefit analyses, prioritization of available resources are all done in relevant P&D sections. Section Chiefs then deposit their work with the Chief Economist, who vets their analyses, compiles this information, runs a finer shortlisting if required, and submits it to the Additional Chief Secretary for final approval.

Once a year, in what is the most significant budgetary exercise in the province, the Additional Chief Secretary corresponds with all line departments requiring them to submit their shortlisted proposals for the upcoming financial year. The ACS reviews this submission and submits a final proposed Annual Development Program (ADP) to the Minister for Planning & Development. This document is discussed by the Cabinet where a further layer of analysis, evaluation, and possible shortlisting is done. Once through, it becomes part of the government’s budget proposal, and after final passage in the legislature, it is enacted as the Provincial Public Sector Development Program (Provincial PSDP). As soon as the Provincial PSDP is approved and execution starts, the Director General Implementation and the Secretary Implementation coordinate with line departments and P&D sections to ensure plans are followed and projects are executed as laid down in the PSDP. Figure 5 visually illustrates the planning process.
Brief Analysis of the Process and Comparison with other Provinces

The planning process followed in Quetta, and indeed in Balochistan, is very similar to other provinces and also the federal government. Provincial P&D Departments, as well as the Federal Planning Commission, all have stated aims to curb decision making based solely on political interests. The processes are also largely the same, barring the federal government which is restricted to planning for items in the “federal list” or projects that provincial governments are unable to plan for on their own. The government emphasizes logical reasoning and analysis to curb political interference in planning decisions. At the provincial level, the law defines identical processes for Quetta and all other cities in Balochistan, and all proposals are meant to be held to the same standards before they can be approved.

Local governments, on the other hand, are different between provinces and even between cities in Balochistan. Each province prefers some form of centralized control over local councils, but the exact form and fit of this control varies. Some provinces even go so far as to give magistracy powers to their district administrators.

The government, and its planning structure, is slow to introduce legal reform that respond specifically to violence. Instead, much rests on individual officers and administrators who take steps to suit the level of violence in their areas. As I will explain in subsequent sections, legal processes and on-the-ground realities are far apart from one another.

Law and Order and Security: The Legal Framework

Planners in the liberal democratic tradition have typically treated law and order - especially security of life, protection from physical violence etc. – as a peripheral concern, focusing instead on land use, building controls, and property law. Postcolonial scholarship has dealt with informality and violent crime, but not with ethnicized violence targeted at specific groups in the society. On the other hand, protection of civic life and other security concerns are at the heart of Quetta’s unique context today. Given the level of violence and number of lives lost, I imagined the state has actively introduced legal reforms to accommodate victims of
violent attacks. However, throughout my interactions with several top functionaries in different provincial and federal governments, and specifically with those working in Balochistan, I found no claim of such reforms in the planning process. While laws governing civil planning structures and processes seem indifferent to this situation, the framework around policing and security seems to have adapted more visibly. Policing and security, in turn, have a direct impact on planning and development in Quetta.

Quetta Capital City Police

The police are the most visible law enforcement agency in Quetta. It is structured like a smaller-scale version of the provincial bureaucracy. The City Police is led by a Deputy Inspector General (DIG), also called the Capital City Police Officer (CCPO). Like the geographically defined district administration, the police have a jurisdictional chain of command down to police stations, which are led by Station House Officers (SHOs), the lowest devolved level of policing. The SHO leads their respective police stations, reporting to an Assistant Superintendent or a Superintendent of Police. An area SHO also coordinates extensively with resident representatives including religious and political leaders, and is generally expected to be fully aware of his jurisdictions. This expectation is consistent across officers and citizens – both believe that the SHO is, or should be, aware of everything in his area. There are separate chains of command for Operations, Security, and Investigations, all of which are led and coordinated by the DIG.

The Provincial command of the police force, also headquartered in Quetta but with jurisdiction across the province, is held by the Inspector General (IGP) or the Provincial Police Officer. The Inspector General also controls the Counter-Terrorism Department.

Reserve and Parapolice

The presence of a reserve police force is unique to provinces on the Western border of Pakistan: Balochistan has the Balochistan Constabulary, while Khyber Paktunkhwa has the Frontier Constabulary. These are both colonial forces set up specifically to cater to tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan and Iran. In Quetta, the Balochistan Constabulary serves as a backup force which is often called to assist the police and/or district administration.

Quetta, and Balochistan in general, also has another parapolice force called the “Levies”. This force operates at the district level and is commanded directly by the deputy commissioner. The roots of this force are connected with the semi-tribal, semi-urban areas (called “B” areas in public nomenclature) where conventional policing is inefficient. The Levies have traditionally played the role of a “tribal police”: hiring local tribesmen and setting up their own police stations.
and check-posts. Most of Quetta is not classified as a “B” area, which minimizes the role of the Levies force inside urban areas. However, they remain in active duty even in the city, assisting the district administration in carrying out its duties. They are also called in aid of the police where they are assigned with the approval of the deputy commissioner.

**Paramilitary (Frontier Corps)**

The Frontier Corps (FC) is a dedicated corps of the military, originally raised to serve as a border force along Pakistan’s Western border. The nomenclature for top commanders of the FC is similar to that of the police – it is led by an Inspector General, with Deputy Inspector Generals looking after specific geographic regions. The nomenclature departs from here – while the police has Senior Superintendents and Superintendents, the Frontier Corps has Wing Commanders and is divided into “Scouts”. As a border force, the FC is paramilitary and led by active, serving members of the armed forces. The force is legally subservient to the Federal Government through the Federal Ministry of Interior; as military officers, however, commanders of the FC also follow their own chain of command and report to the Commander of the Southern Command who is deputed in Quetta.

The presence and role of the FC inside Quetta further complicates Quetta’s administrative situation. Under pressure from a deluge of violent incidents, the province has requested and received FC’s assistance with policing from the federal government ("FC given police powers in Balochistan," 2013). This assistance is legally restricted to patrolling, setting up check-posts, and facilitating the police as they conduct raids and operations to arrest suspected terrorists in coordination with the police. It is important to note that, within the legal allocation of powers, the FC is not allowed to arrest or detain suspects. It is also disallowed from conducting investigations or getting involved in the criminal justice system.

**Military**

In addition to FC, other branches of the military have significant presence in Quetta. The Quetta Cantonment, consisting of military bases, operational headquarters, and other facilities, occupies a large part of the city – which no civilian agency or administration can interfere in. Administration and planning for the Cantonment is done by the Station Commander, who also manages a separate local government system therein. The military also has a significant influence over Marriabad, one of the Hazara settlements of Quetta, because of its proximity to the Cantonment.
Legally the military is insulated and separate from both civilian planning and development and law and order. The province has one military command – headquartered inside Quetta Cantonment – led by the Commander Southern Command (of the rank of Lieutenant General). Any legal influence that the commander has is through the Frontier Corps, which is led by a Major General who reports to both the federal government and him. With the complete freedom and independence, and added law and order concerns, the military has managed to seal off the entire Cantonment and heavily restrict entry and exit of people. The entire area is walled, and citizens must use specially issued security passes and submit to thorough checking should they wish to enter. This makes it among the safest areas in the city; indeed, many senior civil bureaucrats and police officers prefer to reside inside the Cantonment.

Comparison with Other Provinces

Unlike the civil planning and development process, law and order and security in Quetta presents unique frameworks and realities. There are several things specific to Quetta and/or Balochistan: the nomenclature of the paramilitary, for example, is “Frontier” Corps on the western border and “Rangers” on the eastern frontier. This is important as a colonial relic because the British Raj only saw the Western edge as a “frontier”; it controlled vast territories east of modern-day Pakistan. Also unlike other provinces and cities is the almost-permanent position that FC now enjoys in assisting local police with law and order in Quetta. Military and paramilitary units have been called in assistance in other cities as well, but their scope has remained limited in terms of powers and time. In Quetta, they seem to have become a perpetual alternative to the police.

The Realpolitik of Planning, Development, and Security

I have so far defined the structures and processes around planning and law and order as they exist *de jure*. However, this framework of systems and laws plays out in very different ways in different situations, giving space to power struggles and malpractice and even violence even as it tries to restrict the same. I have suggested previously that there has been no legislative or formal procedural response to Quetta’s unique context. In this section I will extend that analysis to suggest that practice of planning manifests itself very differently from what existing legislation envisages.

Civil and Military

The perpetual struggle for power and influence between civil and military institutions and personalities is almost as old as Pakistan itself. This struggle repeatedly manifests itself at all
levels, including nationally, provincially, and in the city of Quetta. But the relationship between civilian and military institutes plays out very differently in Balochistan when compared to other provinces. The military has an extended – even outsized – role in determining the province’s and city’s fate, which it has both seized and accepted from the civilian leadership.

Democratic and Political Practices: It has long been suggested that the military plays a direct role in determining electoral outcomes in Pakistan. These allegations are especially pronounced in Balochistan; however, documented evidence does not exist or rarely comes to the forefront if it does. In my conversations with politicians, community leaders, civilian administrators and bureaucrats, and even military officials, there was general acknowledgement of the military’s covert and overt roles in the city’s political environment.

One example which respondents brought up repeatedly involved the Hazara protests in 2013. As members of the community staged a prolonged sit-in, military vehicles ensured a continuous supply of food from the Cantonment, delivered in sealed packages to ensure safety. This protest movement led to the removal of the provincial government, an extension of the powers that the paramilitary Frontier Corps enjoyed in Quetta, and the construction of a wall around Hazara areas. Given the outcome, it is not surprising that people acknowledge military support for the protestors. On the flip-side, many informants concurrently believe that the military is directly involved in creating and perpetuating violence that then leads to sustained involvement of FC in the city.

Law and Order and Security: The military effectively has direct influence, if not an almost complete monopoly, over law and order and security in Quetta. It can, through deployment of the FC, operate with impunity in matters not otherwise under its purview. This is in spite of the legal framework that requires only restricted input from the force. The FC virtually operates independently in Quetta. They arbitrarily detain and investigate suspects, and often conduct raids independent of the police. While they are required to follow the police’s security plan, they frequently overrule them and demand the police follow their plans – a demand that does not go unfulfilled very often.

Civil and Infrastructure Planning and Development: The influence of the military over civilian planning practices is extensive. This influence, exerted through both the FC and by the Commander Southern Command himself, is widely accepted and acknowledged to varying degrees by bureaucrats, politicians, and military officers alike.
Quetta’s unique position means that security remains at the center of many decisions. The military’s experience and specialized role allows it to frame security issues in ways that facilitate certain plans and development projects. One example is the Quetta Safe-City Project. A multi-year, Rs. 5 Billion ($50 million) plan, it has retained top priority in successive Public-Sector Development Programs of Balochistan and is expected to stay there until fully implemented. The plan includes closed-circuit television cameras, computerized vehicle license plates and recognition systems, explosive detectors, and a web of surveillance and monitoring equipment connected through fiber-optic cables throughout the city. The plan also includes a “control room”, which will serve as a centralized hub for military, FC, intelligence, and police officials.

Several informants reported other forms of influence as well. Some quoted “tea parties” hosted by the Commander of the Southern Command and attended by the Chief Minister, cabinet, and senior bureaucrats and policy makers as an example: the perception is that these are not merely tea-parties, but occasions for the Commander to make demands and for the political planning apparatus to cede to them. I found widespread support for such influence among all informants from all walks of life. Even ideologically committed “democrats” acknowledged the military and FC’s operational exposure – a common argument I encountered was, “If the military fights insurgents and terrorists, and forces them to give up their weapons, it should also be able to ensure the political government provides the right resources to stop them from rebelling again!” Many claim that the Commander Southern Command is the single most powerful person in the province.

**Political and Administrative Failures**

Much of the space now thought to be claimed by the military may have been created by the civilian political and administrative leadership’s own failures. Balochistan is believed to be the most corrupt province, with a very arbitrary planning process that was even criticized by the country’s highest court.

Identification of Projects and Plan-making: How planning happens in Quetta and Balochistan is in direct contrast with the legally defined process involving due diligence by line departments and P&D. There is more partisan politics than analysis; more arbitrary allocations that budgetary stipulations. For the most part, legislators (from both the provincial and national assemblies) approach their relevant chief executive (the Chief Minister or the Prime Minister) with proposals for constituency-driven plans. They are arbitrarily assigned varying amounts of “development funds” that they use to identify and commission projects.
Proposals developed under this process are rarely evaluated with any rigor. Legislators take them straight to the Additional Chief Secretary P&D or the Secretary of a relevant line department, both of whom have no choice but to approve it and send it to the next stage in the planning process. In effect, all of these projects combine to form the PSDP – which is frequently modified to suit political whims. Supplementary budgets are then passed by rubberstamp legislatures to provide legal cover to all this activity.

Corruption and Inefficient Implementation Mechanisms: The extent of the role played by P&D, in this context, is closer to avoiding criminal liability than actually carrying out analysis that leads to addressing local needs and requirements. And yet, in spite of all the “flexibility” involved, Balochistan remains one of the most inefficient implementers in Pakistan. The PSDP is overshot every year, funds lapse, and projects are never carried out. Projects that do see implementation are believed to be fronts for misappropriation more than actual plan implementation.

There are several ways for this misappropriation to take place. Patronage and bribery are rampant at every step of the process: officers inside P&D acknowledge the existence of “formalized rate lists” at every office (from the line department to even P&D) that indicate how much an officer can charge to approve a plan or release funds already approved and authorized. Contractors who actively pursue such approvals – many of whom also happen to be relatives of legislators or fronts for legislators’ own businesses – are thus incentivized to siphon off a bigger proportion of total budgetary allocation to meet these “administrative costs”.

Local Governments: Local governments are perhaps the biggest losers in this entire political game of development planning. There is a general perception that, while provincial and federal legislators often win their seats because of state and/or military support, such interference does not happen at the local level. If true – and I say this because I did not see sufficient evidence – this can explain intriguing situations like that in my study area. Marriabad in Quetta elects one legislator to the provincial assembly and almost a dozen councilors to the metropolitan corporation. At the time of my field research, all of these councilors belonged to one party, while the provincial legislator belonged to the other party. I explain in my chapter on grassroots organizing how the two parties are ideologically and socially opposed to one another. This military support for provincial legislators over local governments empowers the legislators at the cost of local government councilors.
The contest between provincial and local governments also plays into fund allocation for local governments and their ability to perform their duties efficiently. Provincial legislators have an incentive to cater to visible needs of their constituents; they are able get local government plans put in the PSDP by utilizing funds allocated to them. This leaves local government councilors without funding and unable to formulate their own plans and priorities. All councilors in my study area complained of not receiving a single rupee for any project they had proposed, while the opposing party’s legislator from their constituency got away with carrying out projects of his choice in areas of his choice. The legislator, on the other hand, acknowledged this lack of funding for local government councilors but blamed it on their own corrupt practices.

Institutional Disinterest: Many civil institutions, in general, seem to have given up on Quetta and Balochistan. This ranges from the office of the Prime Minister to bureaucratic appointments and down to local accountability mechanisms. All politically connected informants had a common complaint against the Prime Minister: until the time of my interviews, he had never, in 3 terms, spent a night in Quetta or anywhere else in Balochistan. They suggested that the only interest the federal government takes is at the request of the military, and federal level support also extends only to “strategic” projects championed by the military and other state agencies.

I observed similar “strategic” decisions in bureaucratic appointments. The federal government appoints Balochistan’s Chief Secretary. The Additional Chief Secretary of Planning & Development, on the other hand, is almost always the senior-most bureaucrat from the Balochistan Civil Service regardless of performance or suitability. This has led to interesting situations – a senior technocrat at the P&D mentioned how an officer, responsible for approving the entire PSDP of the province, was once unaware of what GDP meant!

There is also potential for the federal government to actively interfere in provincial matters through the office of the chief secretary. This has not happened in the current tenure since both governments are from the same party, but has happened many times in the past and continues to happen in other provinces.

Perhaps the most critical obliviousness in Quetta is what citizens perceive to be deliberate disinterest exhibited by federal and other accountability authorities and institutions. It is possible that the state allows financial misappropriations for as long as concerned politicians and officials remain loyal to the state. Tribal leaders in Balochistan have long been accused of accumulating
wealth through royalties that the government pays them in return for loyalty; political personalities who I interviewed suggested that accountability follows similar principles.

Balochistan, and Quetta, are at the forefront of Pakistan’s Western Frontier. With the Afghan War happening in its backyard, the military’s Southern Command cannot afford to be disinterested – unlike political and state institutions. This entire context feeds into the military’s influence. Political workers feel that the federal government has left Balochistan for the military to manage, with prolonged roles in policing, policymaking, and security.

The Reality of Law and Order and Security

Unlike legal frameworks that do not make specific accommodations for security and law and order, actual planning practice in Quetta is heavily focused on the same. I have discussed how the military is able to dictate planning and development priorities; this influence extends to law and order through the paramilitary Frontier Corps.

There are many, dare I say justified, reasons for increasing military and paramilitary influence in Quetta. The police, responsible for civil law enforcement, is widely perceived to be a corrupt, inefficient force. There are problems associated with prosecution – acknowledged in detail by the top hierarchy of the police department – and rogue elements exist even inside the department. Every Hazara community member I met spoke of a local police officer in the anti-terrorism squad facilitating the escape of 2 notorious sectarian terrorists from inside a court; local police officers, on the other hand, expressed their helplessness over the situation. A lot of police hours are spent communicating and coordinating the simplest things in Hazara areas. Things like buying groceries are significant programs that require extensive coordination with the police. The police, in turn, are misused by politicians for personal protection and protocol.

As a result, the Quetta police department finds itself under-resourced, understaffed, and simply unable to take on the magnitude of tasks that it faces. Within this deficit, the paramilitary is able to build trust among residents and arbitrarily enhance the scope of their functions. Extrajudicial detentions, investigations, and other intelligence gathering is routine for the FC, and there exists public support for the same in lieu of an ineffective police department.

Brief Analysis and Comparisons

There are multiple factors that play into planning and practice as it stands in Quetta today, including de jure and de facto. Figure 6 illustrates how planning actually happens, which includes external and internal influences on the process.
Focus of planning on development: This is a common feature across the country and, indeed, across many growing nation states with colonial histories. Planning in Pakistan is done on multiple levels: local governments engage in zoning and building control without much fanfare, and provincial and federal governments plan for larger scale projects with substantial publicity. Generally, in my observations across Pakistan, town planning is treated as a subset of civil engineering, and junior engineers often engage in these functions at the level of local governments. Provincial and federal planners, on the other hand, are often economists, engineers, or business administrators, with a few social scientists. The focus there shifts to growth, development of infrastructure, and efficient implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. There is variation between provinces in how they define planning structures and who they hire, but all provinces are legally required to engage in similar exercises in devising the provincial Public-Sector Development Program and annual budgets.

Huge deviations from law in planning practice: While practitioners were unaware of legal adjustments to account for violence, they were quick to point out the huge deviations from the law when it comes to practice. This deviation protects provincial interests over local ones by prioritizing legislators, ignores (or even enables) financial misappropriation, and leaves the entire local government framework at the mercy of provincial and provincial framework at the mercy of federal administrations. This deviation in identification of needs and plan making is not a rare occurrence restricted to Balochistan, and the practical power balance between local, federal, and provincial governments is similarly skewed across the country. Several bureaucrats have suggested that the frequency, magnitude, and rampancy with which it happens in Balochistan is magnified; they assert their claim by pointing to the particularly lax prosecution of financial malpractice and focus on political convenience in the province. However, while the conflict
probably does feed into institutional effectiveness and efficacy in Balochistan, evidence of similar practices in other provinces suggests that conflict is not the only reason behind them.

Increased military influence: Issues of security are at the center of planning practice in Quetta. At the same time, the military’s structure in Balochistan is highly centralized – there is one Command and one General whose power extends to all of Balochistan and other tribal areas beyond it. This gives the military a unique position to assert influence in a very centralized fashion. The degree of military influence in Balochistan, and Quetta, is definitely unlike other provinces and cities. I have not been able to interact with a lot of officials and planners in other provinces, but it is highly unlikely that they have “tea-parties” for military officials to dictate planning priorities and policies to the civilian leadership or that they are able to directly influence law and order at the level of neighborhoods and streets.

Very little legal accommodation for the city’s unique context: The entire legal framework that governs planning and associated processes is uniform across Balochistan, and very similar across other cities and provinces in Pakistan. Bureaucrats and practicing planners were not aware of any policy or procedural efforts to reshape the planning paradigm and account for sustained conflict and violence. This leads me to question the stickiness of the existing framework; are legislators of the opinion that this conflict does not impact planning and development, or are there other reasons? I have explored stories of corruption – does the current system survive because it enables political and financial interests of legislators?

These features and aspects of public policy and planning play out in the lives of all residents of Quetta. They impact different communities at different levels and in different ways; in response, different communities react in different ways which leads to a range of outcomes for residents across the city. Local government councilors, perhaps in closest touch with residents, are powerless, while provincial legislators who may represent specific group interests are empowered to influence planning. Ethnicized violence thereby plays the most significant role in determining both policy outcomes and lived experiences of Quetta’s citizens. My next chapter focuses exclusively on the Hazaras of Quetta, a small religious and ethnic minority that has been targeted in a spate of violent incidents in recent years.
CHAPTER 5: HAZARAS AND THE CITY OF VIOLENCE

In previous chapters, I have provided a brief overview of violence that has engulfed Quetta, as well as an introduction to the Hazara of Quetta. I have also explored how the state deals with issues of planning, development, and law and order and security. It is clear that security and law and order are fundamental to how residents experience the city. And, within the Hazaras’ particular case, mobility and livability is determined almost exclusively by law and order, police/paramilitary directives, and the walled enclave that they now live in. These chapters study this experience of the Hazara and describe grassroots organization and activism that help them cope with the situation. In this chapter I explore the lived experiences of Hazara residents in Quetta. I will place particular emphases on the city as a violent space, an analysis of the various physical and psychological barriers that hinder mobility and other activities, and the built form of Hazara settlements in Quetta.

The City of Violence

I have described the context of violence in Quetta in earlier chapters; as religious and ethnic minorities in a region plagued by ethnic, religious, and separatist nationalist violence. Within this context of violence, the Hazaras of Quetta have witnessed horrific incidents including the violent death of family and friends. Hazaras have faced violent aggression from multiple fronts for decades. In spite of their small numbers, they remained on the forefront of economic activity in Balochistan. Hazara men integrated readily into state institutions including the military and civil service; many reached the top tier of military and civilian bureaucracies both under the British Raj and in the new state of Pakistan. This created resentment among Baloch nationalists, and when the rebellion started, the Hazaras became targets for both Baloch separatism and religious militancy.

Over time, this violence evolved. Religious warfare gained prominence in the region during and after the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s (Mufti, 2012), and various sectarian militant outfits gained foothold in Balochistan, Punjab, and other provinces of Pakistan. The Hazaras were in the crosshairs again. The Mujahideen, who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan were mostly Pashtun from the Sunni sect of Islam; the Hazaras, on the other hand, are mostly Shi’is and ethnically different from the Pashtuns. In fact, their initial displacement from Afghanistan under King Abdul Rehman (Owtadolajam, 2006) also took the form of ethnic warfare, as a result of which many Hazaras settled in Quetta and other parts of the country. There also exists a long
history of ethnic animosity between Pashtuns, Baloch, and the Hazaras both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These conflicts put the Hazaras at the center of struggle: one an ethno-nationalist, against militant Pashtun and Baloch nationalists, and the other religious, against militant Wahhabi and Sunni outfits. Both represent ethnicized political identities created and furthered in a colonial/postcolonial state.

The conflicts are exacerbated by physical and religious characteristics of the Hazaras, and by an escalation of targeted terror incidents against Shi’is in Pakistan. Unlike most other cities, and most other ethnicities, where populations are divided between Sunnis and Shi’is, the Hazaras are almost exclusively Shi’i. They also have markedly different phenotypical features and are easily identifiable. For the ideologically charged sectarian militant, Hazaras thus present an easy, identifiable target, attacking whom will also ensure as few Sunnis are killed as possible.

Within this context, the Hazaras have faced unprecedented incidents of terror. Hazara shopkeepers and shoppers have been killed inside their shops in the city’s dense commercial center; families traveling between the two Hazara settlements in Quetta have been shot and killed in brazen targeted attacks; Hazara government officials have been targeted on their way to and from work; Hazara traffic sergeants have been shot to death in the middle of busy intersections; Hazara worshippers have been targeted inside their mosques and Imam Bargahs; and, tragically, Hazara residents and youngsters have been blown up by suicide attackers in recreation facilities in the middle of their residential settlements. Such is the nature, frequency, and brutality of violence; every single Hazara I spoke with during field work had lost a family member in recent years.

“No-Go Areas” and “Safe Routes”

The pattern of violence against the Hazaras has created new spatial dynamics for the community. The police and paramilitary have specifically earmarked “no-go areas” for members of the community, and Hazaras are generally reluctant to go into areas where violence has previously occurred. At the same time, the police have also attempted to safeguard a fixed route for travel between the two Hazara settlements, designating it as a “safe route” for community members.

The breadth and nature of “no-go areas” tells a story of social, territorial, and economic exclusion. My interactions with the community revealed that they are discouraged from traveling to what is effectively the city’s main commercial district; security officials I spoke to concurred
with this assessment and suggested that Hazaras in the main *bazar* should keep a low profile and quickly go back after finishing their business if they absolutely must venture out.

Similarly, there are other no-go areas in the city. Many of the city’s most prominent routes are known as “kill zones” among community members. There have been targeted incidents against Hazaras and community members have been discouraged from traveling on several main arteries including Sabzal Road, Joint Road, Brewery Road, and Sariab Road. Most routes between the two Hazara settlements in Marriabad and Hazara Town have been declared unsafe for travel, and security agencies actively discourage and even disallow ethnic Hazaras from approaching or using those roads. Figure 7 illustrates these no-go zones and a designated safe route between the two main Hazara settlements.

![Figure 7: No-go roads (red lines), no-go areas (areas shaded red), and a designated "safe route" between Marriabad and Hazara Town](image-url)
There are 17-18 entry points for Hazara Town. We can only use 1, through Spinny Road opposite Sardar Bahadur Khan University, and paramilitary soldiers refuse to let us in from any other point. I can’t even exit from one of the other points; the soldiers there will tell me it is unsafe and tell me to use the designated exit,” an informant narrated. Police and security officials, on the other hand, justified this restriction by directing my attention to the high incidence of targeted attacks on Hazaras on every other approach to Hazara Town.

Even the designated “safe route” is problematic for Hazara travelers. The police and paramilitary have set up multiple pickets along this route, including several on a short stretch near the area police station. And yet, despite multiple permanent and temporary check-posts, random picketing, constant patrols, and the presence of dozens of armed policemen, Hazara commuters are attacked frequently. What is even more frustrating, for both the community and senior law enforcement officials, is the impunity with which militants operate: not only do they shoot at unarmed Hazara commuters, but they are also able to leave the scene undetected. In the aftermath of repeated, unrelenting, and horrific attacks – two of them inside the two main Hazara settlements – the government decided to cordon off the main settlements, restrict entry and exit points, and set up permanent paramilitary check posts at these designated entry points.

The City of Fear

The overall security environment in Quetta demands heightened security arrangements in the city, with even stricter arrangements in and around Hazara settlements. The state has responded by effectively segregating Hazara areas from the rest of the city by walling entire settlements and restricting the movement of people in both directions.

Physical Barriers

Marriabad: Marriabad is the older of the two Hazara settlements in Quetta. It is located at one edge of the city, at the foot of mountains that surround Quetta. To one side lies the military cantonment, and to two sides are mountains. One side opens into the city, with 3 entry points at main roads. There were smaller streets that led to the city after passing through non-Hazara areas – many streets were thus shared between Hazaras and non-Hazaras.

In responding to the violence and a large suicide attack inside a Marriabad youth club that killed over a hundred people, the government fortified the entire settlement. Walls were constructed – sometimes even in the middle of streets – around Hazara settlements, the military cantonment’s boundaries were reinforced, and the 3 main entry points were secured by permanent paramilitary check posts.
The paramilitary soldiers on these posts serve as gatekeepers for the Marriabad area. They stop and search each vehicle that enters, and non-residents need to justify their trip before they are allowed to enter. This justification can be in the form of depositing their ID if they are heading to the hospital; for every other purpose, they must be accompanied by a resident Hazara. Even ethnic Hazaras need to submit to this search procedure and verify their identity.

Hazara Town: This is the second, newer Hazara settlement in Quetta. It is outside the legal jurisdiction of the city – limits have not been adjusted in many decades – and is built on the western border of the city. Hazara Town is bordered by the Western bypass, a main inter-city highway, and dense, mostly Pashtun, settlements on three sides.

In order to prevent bombing in Hazara Town, the state walled the entire settlement, with only one access point left open for locals and visitors alike. Even with the wall, Hazara Town was witness to one of the deadliest episodes of terror in February 2013; it is said that a suicide bomber blew up more than 2000 pounds of C-4 stuffed inside a water tanker. The blast took more than 90 lives, destroyed nearby houses and shops, and left the entire country shocked.

The access point for Hazara Town operates similarly to those of Marriabad and is manned by paramilitary soldiers assisted by local volunteers. Search procedures are also similar; every visitor must either be a resident of the walled enclave or should be accompanied by a resident. Hazaras are subject to similar procedures, with occasional exceptions for people identified as friends by volunteers assigned to assist the soldiers.

Quetta City: Police and paramilitary pickets, patrolling, and heightened presence is not restricted to Hazara areas. The entire city is teeming with paramilitary soldiers, tasked to assist the police in enforcing law and order and pursuing violent terror outfits. All entry and exit points of the city are extensively patrolled and manned by the Frontier Corps, police, Customs Enforcement, and other local and federal agencies. All entering and exiting vehicles are subject to search and seizure. There are check posts and intense patrolling inside the city too. The administrative district, containing the provincial legislature and key government offices, is heavily barricaded. Similarly, there are pickets at key intersections inside the city and outside police stations, as well as other temporary arrangements that security agencies make on a day to day basis. The law enforcement, district, and paramilitary authorities also station their personnel at intersections and on the sidewalks in commercial areas.

Quetta Cantonment: The Cantonment is the military’s central base and host to residential and office facilities of key commanders. The Southern Command is headquartered inside the
Cantonment, as are several key national military formations like Electrical & Mechanical Engineering (EME), Command and Staff College (CSC), and the Frontier Corps (FC). The Cantonment also contains some of the city’s main commercial areas. The entire cantonment is sealed off to nonresident or unrelated civilians. All cars – even military vehicles – are subject to comprehensive search procedures, and entrance is not allowed without a pass.

Figure 8 shows a paramilitary picket at the entrance of Marriabad, the bigger of the two Hazara settlements in Quetta.

The City of Psychological Barriers

The city of Quetta is a city of physical barriers, ostensibly erected to keep the people safe. Almost the entire Hazara population lives inside the two ethnic concentrations of Marriabad and Hazara Town. Living under strict security restrictions and never knowing when another violent incident will take place also contributes to psychological barriers. The intense weaponization of the city adds to the fear of violence and keeps many Hazara from venturing far from their home, and even that is not guaranteed to be a safe place. Hazaras also do not trust the state to protect them and prosecute militants.

Need for Security: The paramilitary, police, and even parapolice force are all equipped with semi-automatic rifles. These personnel are then deputed at check posts and pickets around the city, making them and their weapons a highly visible feature of the city. This weaponization is in addition to the steady increase in weapons over the decades since the Afghan War.
Moreover, the movement of key political and administrative personalities is accompanied with extensive arrangements including road blockades, multiple police and paramilitary escort vehicles, and heavily armed guards. These arrangements are justified by the volatile security scenario – the state is in a long-drawn battle against separatists, extremist militants, and the emerging Daesh or IS, and state officers and institutions have repeatedly been targeted. Almost all state officials I talked to also carry their own personal firearm in addition to those of accompanying security personnel. The weaponization is further intensified by the presence of armed paramilitary soldiers along all access points of the Hazaras settlements. These personnel were appointed after protests and an unrelenting spree of massacres which continues sporadically even today and is hard to forget.

Every community activist and volunteer (political, social, and religious leaders) who I spoke to referred to these three factors as creating a heightened sense of insecurity among Hazaras in Quetta. This was accompanied by other factors, which I will discuss later in this section, but the appearance of heavy weaponry was frequently cited by many as creating psychological barriers to mobility that residents find hard to overcome, especially outside of the walled neighborhoods. One Hazara explained the situation, “We invited (an administration official) to our event. The individual came in a convoy, 5 pickup trucks and 20 guards with machine guns. We cannot afford that kind of arrangement when we go out. But should we stay indoors with our fears?”

Unrelenting Violence and Failure of Security Arrangements

The violence and targeting of Hazaras has continued in spite of all the arrangements that security agencies have made. The February 2013 attack in Hazara Town was a particularly damning indictment of the government’s arrangements, including the FC that stood guard at the entrance to the area. Similarly, the only route declared “safe” by the government is also witness to frequent attacks, with perpetrators escaping the scene on most occasions.

The police and military have also suffered massive losses in this violence. The police, in particular, has lost more senior officers to targeted shootings, IED attacks, gun-and-bomb attacks, and suicide attacks than all other law enforcement agencies combined. In Quetta, a policeman is considered to be the most vulnerable, public-facing state official. FC soldiers handling key intersections in the city or their patrol vehicles are also routinely targeted by the myriad of militant organizations that operate in the region.
Security and law enforcement agencies, therefore, appear to the public to be too inefficient to even protect their own. This perceived inefficiency is exacerbated by internal failures within security agencies. Various human rights reports and community activists have alleged that the state is complicit in religious and other violence (State of Human Rights in 2011, 2012). While senior security officials reject these allegations, they concede internal failures and the existence of black sheep within their organizations.

There are several particularly incriminating incidents that erode any semblance of trust that the police and paramilitary may enjoy. I will quote one incident that was narrated by representatives from all of the community, paramilitary force, police force, and the provincial and district administration.

Several agencies, including the military intelligence, the civilian intelligence, the police, paramilitary, and regular military units, worked together to arrest a notorious sectarian militant who had publicly accepted responsibility for dozens of attacks on Hazara Shi’is that had killed hundreds of people. The militant was brought to a specially-designated prison inside Quetta cantonment, from where he was tried in an anti-terrorist court. Somehow, he escaped from the court that was trying him – from inside a high security compound inside the highly fortified military cantonment (Shahid, 2008). Subsequent investigations revealed that the escape was facilitated by a member of the police’s elite anti-terrorist force (ATF). Appointments to the ATF are made after comprehensive background checks by several civilian and military agencies, and this lapse illustrated severe shortcomings in the process. The police hierarchy moved to terminate the individual policeman from service. Several weeks later, an attempt was made on the life of a senior Hazara government official in a targeted gun-attack. The official survived and ran over the gunman, killing him on the spot. That gunman turned out to be the fired policeman: such had been the indoctrination that he readily turned into an assassin after dismissal from service.

Incidents like these do no help to the already flailing trust that the Hazaras have in state agencies. The police frequently and vehemently complain about a lack of cooperation from witnesses in general and the Hazara community in particular, and the community complains of indifference and complicity on part of the police and paramilitary. There is a perception that the police and paramilitary would rather protect themselves than respond to violence against Hazaras. In 2011, a Hazara boxer who was nationally recognized for his achievements in the ring, was killed by sectarian militants only a few yards from one of the city’s biggest combined
police and FC check posts. The assassins left “in no hurry,” says a community representative. “Nobody from the check post responded.”

There are debates, allegations, and counter-allegations surrounding many such incidents and the cause for police ineffectiveness and lack of trust. I cannot prove the veracity of each claim except those that are acknowledged by all sides; however, the existence of these stories creates serious doubts in the minds of Hazara residents about their security in Quetta and even inside Hazara areas. This amplifies their reluctance to experience the city outside of Hazara enclaves of Hazara Town and Marriabad.

**Targeting of Hazara Intelligentsia, Students, and Business Owners**

There has been a consistent campaign to target Hazara business owners, students, and leaders in violent attacks. The Hazara Organization for Peace and Equality has compiled detailed descriptions of most incidents, including those that specifically attacked businesses renowned to be Hazara-owned ("Hazara Organization for Peace and Equality," 2018). Respondents from inside the community often referred to the “integrity and trust” that Hazara businesses enjoyed among all residents of Quetta, which was quickly sidelined by pressing security concerns that shoppers developed. The prevailing situation has forced most businesses to relocate inside Hazara areas or close altogether. This has impacted the economic health of these businesses in particular and the community in general, and continuing attacks have held most business owners from attempting to move out again.

The more crucial barrier is the sustained targeting of Hazara students in Quetta. Balochistan University, the city’s only public university, is located on Sariab Road which has become an effective “no-go area” for the community. Respondents who had studied at the university spoke with fondness and nostalgia about their experiences, including interactions with their Baloch, Pashtun, and Punjabi friends. It is not the geographical placement alone that has created barriers around education. There have been attacks specifically targeting buses, vans, and other vehicles carrying Hazara students at all levels. Hundreds of students have laid down their lives in these attacks after refusing to drop out, creating new uncertainties and insecurities for other students who had also decided to continue their education.

Universities including Balochistan University, Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management Sciences (BUITEMS), and the Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University have been attacked. Repeated incidents have led to an almost complete withdrawal of Hazara students from institutions outside of Hazara areas. Numbers varied by
respondent; however, everyone spoke about how the Hazaras had gone from being a “hardly uneducated” community to a “hardly educated” one in a matter of less than a decade.

The focus of Hazara youngsters has now shifted to finding educational resources inside Hazara areas or, for those who can afford it, outside the city. Many even make it to institutions outside the country. Those who cannot leave, however, receive the worst treatment due to limited opportunities and facilities.

“Otherization” and Limited Interactions with Other Communities & Groups

As Hazara business owners and students have become restricted to the Hazara enclaves of Marriabad and Hazara Town, their interactions with other groups and communities has reduced alongside. This has “otherized” the Hazara for non-Hazaras and vice-versa, creating further psychological barriers that impede the Hazara lived experience of Quetta. The “otherization” phenomenon appears to have a complex interrelation with all of the other psychological and physical barriers at play in Quetta. Increased insecurities force Hazaras to avoid leaving their enclaves; at the same time, their absence from “public spaces” decreases opportunities for interaction between the various ethnic and religious groups and contributes to social distancing in the communities that reside in Quetta.

On a similar note, continued targeting of Hazara business owners, shoppers, and students has led to fears among other communities should they associate with Hazaras. Respondents from the community narrate incidents wherein other ethnic residents asked Hazaras to stay away from them in spite of decades of association. Similarly, university and college students demanded of university administrations to separate buses that transport Hazara students – nobody wants to die as collateral damage in an attack on Hazara Shi’is.

In addition to Hazaras avoiding commute outside their enclaves, outsiders are also now discouraged from visiting Hazara areas. The first is the perpetual threat of violence. Another, perhaps equally (if not more) significant, discouragement is the check posts. The checking procedures are strict, officials are often agitated, and heated altercations are not uncommon.

The entire situation has been exacerbated by insecurities of Hazara within their enclaves. Any outsider can be suspect; a non-Hazara driving an ambulance, after all, blew up and killed dozens of people in Marriabad in 2013. Several respondents accepted the perception that some Hazara residents would be hostile to non-Hazara visitors in Hazara areas, but blame this attitude on isolationist and sectarian-identity based politics that has gained strength in the aftermath of large-scale massacres. This perception would discourage non-Hazaras from visiting Hazara
areas, to meet acquaintances or continue their retail relationship with a Hazara-owned shop that now exists inside the walled enclave.

I would add here that I did not experience any such hostilities during my time in Hazara areas. Perhaps it was because I was accompanied by local Hazaras at all times, many of whom have long histories of volunteering and are acquainted with most people on the street.

Even though I do not establish it quantitatively, it is reasonable to suggest that the psychological barriers that breed insecurity lead to further isolation between Hazara and other communities. At the same time, this isolation serves as a barrier in and of itself by introducing and strengthening perceptions of “others” that are hard to refute in the absence of meaningful interaction. This is in effect an infinite loop that only aggravates the already bad situation, and further strengthens ethnicized identities in the city.

**Life in the City of Violence, Barriers, and Fears**

In this section, I would use two specific examples to explain how life plays out for the Hazara in the City of Barriers and Fears. The first example concerns a routine activity for most people in most places: buying vegetables from the wholesale market. The second is an occasional pilgrimage that many people from around the country make to Iran.

**Routine Activity: Buying Vegetables**

Quetta has one, main wholesale vegetable market called *sabzi-mandi* (*sabzi*: vegetable, *mandi*: market). It is located on the outskirts of the city in Hazar Ganji, which is almost 10 miles south of Hazara Town along the Western Bypass. As the only wholesale market, it is critical for supplies across the city. Small-scale retailers, who set up carts, stalls, and other retail locations in the city purchase their vegetables in bulk from the market. With their unique phenotypical features, it can be very easy to identify and target Hazara shoppers in such a setting. This has manifested in several attacks on Hazaras in and around the vegetable market. Everybody from shoppers, to van drivers who drive bulk purchases to retail outlets, have been attacked over the years; the violence has even featured in work by local artists (see Figure 9). The entire road and surrounding area has since been declared a “no-go” area for Hazaras. However, as can be expected, Hazaras need to buy vegetables. As a result, the police have now made an elaborate plan to facilitate Hazara shoppers who wish to go to the vegetable market. Hazaras are strongly discouraged from visiting the market on their own, and are even blamed if they do visit and are attacked. Instead, the police now coordinate their vegetable shopping visits.
After discussions with community leaders and other agencies, the police fix a certain day and time every week when Hazaras can go to the vegetable market. Everybody who wants to visit the market from Hazara areas is required to get their vehicles and gather at a predetermined point, from where a heavy contingent of heavily armed police vehicles escorts them to the vegetable market. This is necessarily a large convoy; it consists of several police and security vehicles, vegetable retailers, and household members who wish to stock for the entire week. The entire route is secured by stationed policemen, pickets, and patrolling parties.

From Hazara areas, the convoy speeds towards the vegetable market. If required, roads are blocked for other traffic. Sirens blaring, and with commandoes manning mounted guns on each police vehicle, the vegetable purchasing party reaches the vegetable market. Once they reach, the purchasers are given a fixed time to complete their shopping and return to the designated parking area. In the meantime, the vegetable market is thoroughly checked and secured. Non-Hazara shoppers are either kept out for the time or checked thoroughly before being allowed inside. After the announced time has passed, most shoppers return to their vehicles and the convoy heads back in much the same style as it arrived, only this time loaded with potatoes, tomatoes, spinach, and other vegetables they may have purchased.

As a resident who can just take the next bus to the nearest supermarket, or drive to the nearest market in Pakistan, I cannot begin to imagine the amount of police work and

Figure 9: Local art depicting targeted attacks on Hazara vegetable buyers
(Artwork by anonymous local artist, posted at Hazara News Pakistan)
coordination that goes into realizing weekly grocery visits for the Hazaras. The entire police department remains on red alert; coordination is swift, on an emergent basis, and passes through multiple layers before a plan is approved. New security plans are drafted for each visit, and the route is randomized to reduce predictability. Even after all the effort, the entire movement remains a high-threat event. Police officers, including city and regional chiefs, remain alert for any untoward incident. Past experience with such plans, and acknowledgment of leaks and black sheep within the force, mean that these plans are volatile; they can be canceled or modified at the shortest notice.

For the Hazaras, the simple act of buying vegetables has transformed into a complicated task. They must wait the full week, arrange for transport, and then speed through the city as a group, hoping nothing happens. At the time of my interviews, since this arrangement was put in place, there had not been any Hazara casualty during these trips. The police and other security agencies saw it as a big success.

Occasional Travel: Pilgrimage to Iran

The Hazara settlement of Marriabad serves as a central node in the occasional pilgrimage of mostly Shi’i Muslims to Iran. Those who travel by road go from Quetta, to Taftan on the Iranian border, from where they cross into Iran. The route from Quetta to Taftan is extremely volatile, with all kinds of militant groups present around it. Separatists tend to attack all state institutions, while sectarian militants specifically target Hazaras and Shi’is. There have been repeated attacks on this route leading to hundreds of deaths – in many cases, militants have stopped buses, and killed only Hazara and/or Shi’i passengers after verifying their identity. This has also featured prominently in local art (see figure 10).

In light of the volatile situation, the provincial security apparatus gives heightened attention to the movement of pilgrims between Quetta and Taftan. This attention comes with its caveats; pilgrims are only allowed to travel in very large convoys and these convoys are not allowed to move until the state is reasonably certain of appropriate security arrangements. The starting point for this trip is usually Quetta. As a result, Marriabad has become the hub of bus owners and service providers who facilitate pilgrims. Convoys consisting of 50 or 100 or an even larger number of buses leave together; movement is not allowed until a specific number of vehicles is reached.

On the day of departure, the entire route is sealed off by police and the Frontier Corps. The convoy is provided pilot and trailing vehicles, and all areas around the route come to a
complete standstill as security agencies secure the route to let the convoy through. This convoy requires coordination between the administrations of all districts between Quetta and Taftan, police, paramilitary forces, and parapolic. The convoy is escorted through each jurisdiction and makes frequent stops near military or paramilitary bases. Each base may impose a different size requirement for convoys depending on available resources and the security situation; as a result, thousands of people may have to wait for days in makeshift camps until more buses arrive and they are allowed to pass through.

The escort assigned to the convoy changes with each change in jurisdiction and with each stop. I was able to study the movement through Quetta and am not fully aware of specific arrangements made outside the city. However, much like the routine activity of buying vegetables, occasional pilgrimages become an exhibition of nervous security agencies escorting thousands of people who can be targeted for no reason other than their ethnicity and beliefs.

It is clear that the prevailing security concerns play heavily with people’s experience of the city. By illustrating the city-wide significance of something as simple as buying vegetables, I have illustrated the pressures that both the state and the community face in leading a normal life. This contributes to why most Hazaras I interacted with were reluctant to travel outside their enclaves. This also explains the suspicion that many non-Hazara visitors experience when they move around in Hazara areas (especially alone).
Activists I interviewed were also concerned with rising levels of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, especially amongst Hazara youngsters who had a highly restricted social circle and were limited in their mobility. “We are imprisoned here,” one respondent told me, “but the barriers and armed soldiers are critical to our survival. They would have killed all of us without the check posts and the wall.” Community elders point to increased drug use, street fights, and frustration among youngsters as evidence of stress and pressure of everyday life as a Hazara in Quetta. This raises questions about strategies that the state can employ in such situations – is an armed escort really the best way to facilitate vegetable shopping?

**Built Form in the City of Violence, Barriers, and Fears**

Having narrated human experiences in high levels of ethnicized violence, I will now describe the built form of Hazara settlements in Quetta that shapes their experience of the city. I have previously introduced the two main settlements, Marriabad and Hazara Town, along with brief introductions. I will now go into specific elements of the built form that illustrate the city’s situation and respond to it. I would point to the significance of the graveyard in both Marriabad and Hazara Town before I make specific observations about either. The graveyard is a common feature in both and is a crucial part of life for most Hazaras. I discuss that in more detail in the next chapter.

**Marriabad**

Marriabad is the older of the two Hazara settlements in Quetta. It was populated under British rule, when the Hazaras first fled Afghanistan in the late 19th century. It houses most of the city’s Hazara population today and comprises of dense residential and commercial areas within the secured enclave. As a dense, highly populated settlement, residents elect several local government councilors and a provincial assembly legislator. The election of a legislator from this area allows certain forms of planning and development to take place in this settlement that is difficult in the other main settlement.

Physically, the settlement is surrounded by mountains and the military cantonment on three sides. There are adjoining residential areas on the other sides; however, after the construction of the wall and check posts, those areas have become disconnected. A lot of commercial activity in Marriabad is concentrated along the main access roads, with higher concentration near the check posts. Many shopkeepers have moved in from other areas of the city, and they hope to keep their old clientele by staying as close as possible to the check post and minimizing inconvenience for their customers. This commercial activity continues until
Shuhada Chowk, which serves as a commercial center for this area. Apart from commercial outlets, several political offices are also located in and around Shuhada Chowk.

For the Hazaras of Marriabad, their area ends at the paramilitary check post. Most new development of all types now takes place along the slope of surrounding mountains. Almost all land below is occupied and used densely right until the check post, and in-fill development is not possible in most cases. As a result, as one goes deeper into the settlement, streets become narrower and winding, and finally culminate in steps where construction is almost vertical along the mountain slope (see figure 11). An under-construction university, built by cutting out large chunks of the mountain to grade the land, is perhaps the biggest sign of the provincial legislator elected from this area. There are disputes over the exact purpose of the building; the legislator insists it is a university for local students deprived of higher education by the situation, while political opponents see it as a way to misappropriate money without being caught. Nevertheless, the prevailing administrative structures and processes have allowed the legislator to propose and get approval for this construction.

The fact that all construction is now almost vertical along the mountain slope has important implications. Residents of houses higher up the slope cannot keep cars, motorcycles, or even cycles, especially if their house is only accessible by steps. It also gets progressively difficult to climb up and down on foot, restricting mobility for many. To accommodate this constraint, many residents lock their two-wheelers to electricity poles or other structures, or entrust them with their friends living below them. This kind of construction also impacts the supply of water. The settlement falls within the formal limits of the city, so the city supplies water to formally approved areas. However, most new construction does not go through formal procedures for approval, and the community takes its own initiatives to connect new houses with existing infrastructure for water and sewers.
The constrained spatial layout of Marriabad also impacts land and building values. The area is perhaps amongst the most expensive areas in the province, with demand soaring as families grow in size and new entrants come in from Afghanistan. Land values betray the lower/middle class status of most residents – indeed, many residents sell their houses to new entrants when their children marry and the size of the family grows. They use that money to buy a house in the other settlement, Hazara Town, and often still have enough left to also buy a car.

There is a very interesting spatial dynamic within Marriabad of class-based segregation. A walled compound, called Gulistan Town, exists within the secure Hazara enclave. This compound, though older than the walls and check posts around Marriabad, houses the upper-middle and upper class Hazaras. Interestingly, Gulistan Town is not as homogenous as the rest of Marriabad: other residents of Quetta who feel threatened by the violence (non-Hazara Shi’is and Punjabis for the most part) have also moved in. Additionally, Benazir Hospital, which is the city’s best public hospital, is located inside Gulistan Town.

What we see then are class walls within “security” walls, with the segregated upper-class areas demonstrating more hospitality to non-Hazara residents. It is interesting, and indeed important, to note that non-Hazara residents are willing to bear strict checking at check posts to be able to live there – state and security authorities believe this signifies a success of their security strategy. It is also important to note that this walled compound does not have sealed gates or restricted entry, but is still physically segregated by walls. It is said that Gulistan Town is the most expensive land within Marriabad, and possibly the most expensive residential real estate in the entire province.

Hazara Town

Hazara Town, located at the Western edge of Quetta and outside formal city limits, is a newer settlement that appeared in the 1980s. It was populated mostly by Afghan Hazara refugees who were fleeing the Afghan War and other forms of ethnic and religious persecution in Afghanistan. The population steadily grew even after the war; community leaders narrate dreadful tales of persecution at the hands of the Taliban government that took power after the War. Population of Hazara Town continues to grow even today.

Unlike Marriabad, Hazara Town is so far unable to elect a legislator to the Provincial Assembly. Constituencies were demarcated many decades ago; Hazara Town’s old classification as a rural area has never been revised, and the resultant constituency is dominated heavily by neighboring Pashtun populations. Hazara Town is also unable to elect councilors to the
Metropolitan Corporation owing to its location outside city boundaries. However, it does send several councilors to the relevant rural council.

Physically, Hazara Town is at the foot of the mountains that surround Quetta to the west. The Western Bypass, a key trade and travel corridor, runs at substantial elevation between the mountain and Hazara Town. It is surrounded on other sides by Pashtun and some Baloch populations, and the Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University to the North. This settlement is walled on all sides, and access is strictly controlled by paramilitary soldiers stationed at each access point. Hazara residents are allowed to enter and exit from just one point. All other routes have been closed off as part of security measures.

While the entire area is walled off and access is controlled, it is worth noting that there is a significant Pashtun and other non-Hazara population inside the walled enclave. The area was populated by labor class Pashtuns before new Hazara refugees started moving in, and most of the original settlement has persisted to date. Most Hazaras from Hazara Town claimed that relations are cordial or even warm; however, the names of many mosques in non-Hazara areas honored historical personalities that Shi’is do not associate with. This indicates underlying sectarian differences but is not evidence of active conflict at the level of the community.

Hazara Town’s location outside city limits presents unique challenges: infrastructure and other urban services are not provided by the Quetta Metropolitan Corporation or other metropolitan institutions. Rural councils, on the other hand, do not have the resources, capabilities, or even incentives to provide services to what is now an underdeveloped urban settlement. There is no running water supply – water is supplied by private vendors using water tankers – and the community relied on self-help and external donations to build its sewers (more discussion in the next chapter). There is no formal garbage collection service, and most streets are dusty and unpaved.

As if to compensate for Hazara Town’s lack of representation in the provincial assembly, the legislator from Marriabad sometimes announces and gets approval for projects in the settlement. Many residents, however, are not aware of specific initiatives that the legislator may have taken. In spite of these challenges, Hazara Town is a more expansive settlement than Marriabad. There is plenty of land to the south for expansion, and the lack of service provision has kept prices depressed. As a result, it presents opportunities for residents of Marriabad to move to a bigger house in Hazara Town and save some money in the process.
The persistence of ethnicized violence has created a violent city, full of physical and psychological barriers, for the Hazara. People have responded with impressive levels of coordination, solidarity, and self-help: the Hazaras have exerted political claims against the state, carried out their own infrastructural development, and sought to introduce innovative, disruptive solutions to everyday problems. I discuss grassroots organizations and movements in the next chapter.
The postcolonial city of Quetta, with all its historical, ethnic, and violent baggage, does not have the will nor capacity to enforce formal citizenship requirements for residents. The state finds itself in a mix of ethnicized political identities, exposed to an unending war across the border in Afghanistan, and unable to cater to the basic right to security of its residents. The Hazaras, on the other hand, find themselves stuck between Afghanistan, where thousands of their group have been killed over many years, and Quetta, where the state is unable to prevent targeted attacks on the community. Those who can, escape to other cities in Pakistan or even in the world. Those who cannot are stuck in an area historically dominated by ethnic Pashtuns, open to free movement across the border with Afghanistan, and prone to sudden, brutal instances of violence that can take dozens of lives in a flash.

The activities of Hazara community organizations and activists are a direct response to the ethnicized violence in the postcolonial state. In this chapter, I focus on the experience of death as a lived experience. The Hazaras constantly live with the impending death of friends, family, neighbors and coworkers. Because of these conditions, graveyards have become important public spaces. The high level of insecurity has also led the Hazaras to develop creative ways to meet their daily needs. At times, this occurs in the form of political protests to push back against violent actors and the state’s perceived inaction, which I analyze from Isin and Nielsen’s “acts of citizenship” framework. National and transnational networks supplement local, Hazara-run grassroots organizations and social and political movements.

**Death: A Lived Experience for the Hazara**

The violent oppression of the Hazara is perhaps most visible in how they cope with death and destruction that have been unleashed upon the group. In my years of organizing against violent oppression and partnerships with dozens of Hazara organizations, every single respondent I interviewed; every single Hazara I met in Quetta; every single Quetta Hazara I have ever met anywhere or known or spoken to has their own tale of woe. Each tells about the loss of a close relative or friend to violence, as well as being eyewitnesses to injuries caused to dozens of others by the many attacks on the Hazara. The experience of death is all too familiar for Hazara residents of Quetta. Respondents claim that every single resident – not limited to people I met or have spoken to over the years – has lost a loved one and remain alive only because they have narrowly escaped attacks. Being Hazara in Quetta means living with violence and death.
Naming Conventions

Death is visible in the built environment of Hazara neighborhoods and other places frequented by Hazaras. Death of the Hazaras is marked through naming conventions, especially in the older settlement of Marriabad. The main intersection in Marriabad, around which shops, political offices, restaurants, and clubs are located, is called “Shuhada Chowk” (translation: Martyrs’ Intersection). It honors the 106 martyrs of twin suicide blasts that took place in a snooker club in the intersection in 2013. Similarly, the road leading to the Quetta graveyard, where a majority of the buried were violently killed, is called “Hazara Qabristan Road” (Hazara Graveyard Road) because so many Hazaras are buried there.

The Hazara Qabristan (Graveyard)

Such naming conventions remind residents of the sites of attacks as well as the loss of loved ones. Graveyards represent a unique example of placemaking by the community, not only for the names they are given, but also how they are used by people. The graveyards in Marriabad and Hazara Town are transformed from spaces of somber reflection and reminiscence, to places that are very deeply revered, attentively maintained, and ornately decorated spaces where people “celebrate life”.

The experience of the graveyard in Marriabad begins several hundred yards out. Life-sized pictures of those killed – including children, teenagers, Hazara policemen, shopkeepers, professors, doctors – line the Qabristan Road. Banners are filled with odes and photos to commemorate the lives and achievements of the victims of violence. Verses and poetry depict the sorrow of parents who lost their children, of wives who lost their husbands, or of children who lost their parents. Hazara also adorn walls, doors, and other surfaces leading to the graveyard.

The graveyard itself is an intensely emotional community space that people have built for themselves. Hazara residents, including the elderly, families, and even young men and women, frequent the graveyard to pray and reflect, burn incense, and shower the graves with petals. People gather to reminisce about their loved ones and share stories, both their own and others that they have heard in the same space. One story told is about the woman who lost her son in a bombing and died standing by his graveside the next day.
The graveyard has a park like feeling. The landscape includes lines of trees and a walking path that weaves through the graves. Trees serve as signposts for photographs and other banners, while the walking path allows people to stroll through the area. All of this is cared for by an informal association of retired Hazaras who tend to the park and the graves. Figure 12 shows an old man taking a stroll with his grandchild in the graveyard (Ali, 2018).

This treatment of death and the graveyard represents a unique form of lived experience for the Quetta Hazara. It is a very public display of loss and violence; an attempt to assign agency to those whose lives were brutally taken. The signs, decorations, and regular visits keep alive the extremely violent reality they face. At the same time, death and its commemoration visually, emotionally, and physically bind the Haraza tightly together. The graveyard therefore transforms into something larger than a place to lament the death of loved ones – it becomes a place of solidarity and activism to demand justice.

**Political Protests and Activism**

That the Hazaras display a vivid acknowledgement of death does not imply that they have resigned themselves to a violent fate. Community activists and leaders from a variety of political perspectives and parties frequently lead protests against this violence and its perpetrators. Several activists also lead protests against other state inefficiencies in provision of basic services like healthcare.

Grassroots political actions by the Hazara against violence are particularly energetic. People often stage marches, sit-ins, and strikes to decry frequent and bloody attacks on Hazaras. Protestors frequently chant slogans against known terrorist and sectarian organizations, and often against the state as well. In response, large sectarian organizations have occasionally conducted their own political show of strength. Where the Hazaras are mostly restricted to their enclaves and surrounding areas, sectarian organizations like LeJ and SSP have responded to Hazara protests and are able to organize more effectively and in more prominent areas of the city. The
perception of their involvement in violence cannot be ruled out; however, while many non-Shi’i and non-Hazara citizens join these sectarian protests and lend support to a divisive ideology, security and investigative agencies insist that the actual attacks are planned and carried out from the fringes of mainstream society.

I will use a specific protest from 2013 to elaborate how the Hazaras engage in what Isin and Nielsen have called “acts of citizenship”.

The Marriabad Attack of 2013

On Thursday, January 10, 2013, a suicide blast occurred inside a snooker club in what is now called Shuhada Chowk in the predominantly Hazara area of Marriabad. As locals, emergency services, and security forces gathered to respond to the attack and help victims, another, much more powerful blast occurred. The tally from the twin-attack stood at 106 dead, at least 140 injured, and countless traumatized. Casualties from that attack were mostly Hazaras. However, because the second blast took place after a response to the initial incident, the second included non-Hazara emergency workers, police officers, paramilitary soldiers, and journalists.

Several incidents of targeted killings, kidnappings, and explicit threats by known sectarian leaders of LeJ preceded the twin-attack in Marriabad. The build-up was long and painful – there had been smaller scale protests, and while the state had “instructed” Hazara protestors to remain inside “safe” Hazara areas, local leaders had been adamant to protest in main city areas. This had brought them in direct confrontation with state security forces (especially the police), and the police had used physical force to suppress protests on several occasions in the past.

In view of the state’s perceived rigidity about protests and the concurrent frequency of attacks, Hazara leaders decided to gather for the religiously significant Friday prayers on the day after the attack. They also decided to bury their dead after the prayers. On Friday, however, charged by emotional sermons before prayer, thousands of Hazaras walked out in protest, refused to bury their dead, and conducted what may be the most effective peaceful political protest in provincial history.

In the freezing cold of Quetta Januaries, Hazara protestors placed all 106 bodies on the road, refusing to bury them until the state took concrete action against perpetrators and the political leadership of the province. This refusal reverberated nationally and among Muslim societies internationally – religious tradition demands that dead bodies by buried as soon as possible, and the community had garnered significant attention by breaking from tradition.
Images from the protest quickly captured the world’s attention. By then, protestors were demanding resignations from the provincial government, changes to the top tier paramilitary (FC) command, and better measures for security for the community. This unprecedented sit-in continued for several days, and by the time it ended, the federal government had dismissed the full provincial government and imposed Governor’s Rule (Appendix D). Additionally, security for the city was formally handed over from the police to the paramilitary, and construction of the wall that now surrounds Hazara areas was started.

A change in government was one of the protestors’ main demands. The political government was also known to have had a testy relationship with the security establishment – as a result, when the government was finally dismissed, claims and counter-claims of a deeper institutional struggle quickly emerged. Civil bureaucrats and politicians eagerly point to the constant logistical support that the military and paramilitary lent to the sit-in.

Activists who were part of the protest acknowledged that the military sent them food and blankets as the weather got progressively colder and international sympathy for the protesters rose. “They sent us food. Large, sealed pots with cooked food were delivered in army trucks regularly, and nobody except our designated community representatives was authorized to break those seals.” While respondents expressed their obliviousness to behind-the-scenes pressure that the military may have exerted on the federal government to dismiss the provincial government, most said it was “understandable” if that happened.

2013 Protest as Act of Citizenship

The Hazara protest of 2013 is remarkable in that it remained peaceful, represented a significant departure from established religious, political, and social norms, and achieved a primary (stated) aim of a change in the top political government in the province. I argue in the subsequent paragraphs that this protest fits the definition of an “act of citizenship” by the community: it represented a rupture, was imaginative, anticipated rejoinders from real and imagined adversaries, and had a “completion”.

The protest represented a complete breakdown of accepted norms. Not burying the dead; women, children, and the elderly sitting out in freezing cold with dead bodies, and outright demands for the dismissal of the government represented ruptures from social order that the government had failed to anticipate. The community had also been cautioned against venturing out into public spaces because of the violent atmosphere; a days-long protest with thousands of protesters was unimaginable. It challenged religious, political, and security status quo all at once.
The entire protest was an exercise in creative decision-making; an act that was not pre-planned or deliberated upon and emerged spontaneously as thousands of Hazaras and other citizens decided to protest after the weekly Friday congregation. It violated all ideas and customs of how people “should” respond and set up a show that the state had no idea how to deal with. The actors, even if they were non-Hazara and from other parts of the country, traveled to Quetta, joined the protest and were welcomed.

The muddled notions of citizenship were especially highlighted during this protest. Ethnic Hazaras – Pakistani citizens and Afghan refugees alike – came together to do a protest that did not care for their formal citizenship status. The claim of collective, substantive citizenship thus overpowered formal citizenship. Other residents of Quetta’s limited civil society joined the protest. While the group Hazara identity held ground, no questions about individual identities or ethnicities were put to non-Hazara activists who chose to join the sit-in. When people from other parts of the country flew in for solidarity, they were instantly accepted as part of the “Quetta Hazara protest”. What was predominantly an expression for ethno-religious nationalism quickly became a representation for many different voices against oppression, united in opposition to ethnicized violence in the postcolony. It demonstrated a very fluid, dynamic expression of group identity that was hitherto unseen and, for the state, unanticipated.

The sit-in was entirely focused on demanding justice for those killed, security forces’ action against peddlers of violence, and removal of the political government in the province. As the cold days (and colder nights) passed, protesters anticipated rejoinders from both real and imagined adversaries. Militant groups threatened to attack the protest; young volunteers provided elementary security in response. The state threatened to clear out protesting Hazaras by force and the political chief executive of the province passed sarcastic remarks about the protesters; more people joined those protests to push back against these threats. Political opponents made claims of “Afghan influence” by pointing to the presence of Afghan Hazara refugees; large numbers of allies from other parts of Pakistan traveled to Quetta to join the Hazara protest. Imagined adversaries included religious clergy that may have objected to using dead bodies as a political tool; protesters strengthened their narrative of violence and oppression to preempt those objections.

A protest built on years of violence and oppression and smaller scale demonstrations thus reached “completion” with the sacking of the government and an overhaul of the city’s security apparatus. The civilian bureaucracy and police lost political legitimacy and operational space in
the city as the paramilitary took greater control of security in Quetta. This shift in power has further raised speculations about the military’s role in instigating the protest – however, the community has a long history of protesting against violence and activists have continued to raise their voice in the years since.

Contested Identities and Everyday Politics

The ideas of identity also play out into everyday politicking in the community and discussions on security, welfare, and public expenditure. The Hazara identity has multiple layers, each of them ethnicized, politicized, and with its share of violence: ethnic (Hazara), religious (Muslim), sectarian (Shi’i), national (Pakistani or Afghan). There are obvious subdivisions within those common strands such as gender, age, and educational background but they are not politically constructed and not a subject of this study. Two of the most contested ideas of identity include sect (Shi’i) and ethnicity (Hazara). The community has historically been attacked for these two identity markers both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and there is constant ongoing debate on which to prioritize. This debate plays into local politics which are dominated by a national religious party (MWM) and a local ethnic party (HDP).

One of the two most prominent political parties in Hazara areas is the Majlis Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM). The party is generally pro-state and promotes a strong Shi’i identity while extending solidarities to Shi’is around Pakistan. The MWM is also active in other Shi’i majority areas in Pakistan and does not associate specifically with the Hazara ethnicity. At the time of this report, the elected provincial legislator from Marriabad, and the sole Hazara representative in the provincial assembly, was associated with the MWM. Several intriguing dynamics accompany the MWM’s strong Shi’i identity. They engage with and receive spiritual as well as operational guidance from Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran. Khamenei’s “guidance” is independent of the state of Iran and delivered in his capacity as the Supreme Ayatollah in Shi’i Islam – however, his influence as Iran’s Supreme Leader means that his guidance reflects both religious and national Iranian priorities.

Political opponents of the MWM often accuse the provincial government and law enforcement agencies of treating the religious party as representative of the entire Hazara community. They claim that by giving center stage to a religious sectarian party, the state is able to present the violence as a result of broader disagreements between various sects, and further ethnicize the sectarian identity. Notable activists also argue that the MWM presents a convenient escape for a weak state by acting as the “face” of Shi’ism while Hazara Shi’is get attacked for
other markers of their identity. Additionally, critics use Khamenei’s influence and Shi’i Islam’s close ties to Iran to accuse the MWM of spreading Iranian propaganda.

The second of the two major parties in Hazara areas is the Hazara Democratic Party (HDP). Where the provincial legislator is from the MWM, the HDP holds most local government seats across both Marriabad and Hazara Town at the time of writing of this report. The HDP is a decidedly secular, ethno-nationalist political party that shies away from controversies around religion and sect. They focus on the ethnic Hazara identity; the HDP encourages members to take part in or organize cultural events that highlight and promote what they call “Hazaragi culture”. As an avowedly secular political group, the HDP has also resisted attempts to label the violence as a sectarian “issue” between “people”. A party leader opined,

This is not common Sunnis attacking common Shi’is. This is a handful of militants who find ideological support among very few sections of the society. The state tries to present it as a sectarian issue by calling sectarian Sunni and Shi’i leaders in Muharram and appealing for peace. I ask them, what problems do I have with Sunni leaders? None!

Because the focus of HDP is ethnicity, it includes and is widely supported by Afghan Hazara refugees who do not have formal status in Pakistan. The HDP also frequently raises its voice about problems that Hazaras face in Afghanistan and strongly advocates rehabilitating and resettling Afghan Hazara refugees in Pakistani areas. However, they deftly avoid Iranian influence and advocate for strong, secular control over political parties, policymaking, and planning.

All representative seats in all Hazara areas are held by these two parties. However, unlike the provincial constituency where MWM won, the secular HDP holds an overwhelming majority of local seats in local and district councils. Additionally, tribal bodies like the Hazara Jirga perform important intermediary roles and facilitate coordination of resource generation and activism between local activists, political parties, and the state. Most respondents were of the view that, since the mainstreaming and popularity of HDP and MWM, tribal bodies have largely become dormant and are merely used by the state to seek legitimacy among Hazara people.

The posture of the HDP and ethnic solidarities that it focuses on creates space for critics to label it an “Afghan” party. Like the MWM that is perceived to be “pro-Iran”, HDP is perceived to be “pro-Afghanistan”, and these allegations and cross-allegations are frequent.
These two perspectives represent diametrically opposite views of the Hazara identity and explanations for why the Hazara people are targets of violence. Interestingly, this debate features prominently in everyday political discussions, and most activists are often affiliated with the MWM or HDP. There is intense acrimony between the religious and the secular perspectives and their followers, and allegations of supporting Iran or Afghanistan are noticeable components of almost all election campaigns.

Local Government and “Grassroots Ownership” of Planning & Development

I have described in the previous section how local politics is steeped in debates around identities. This political debate extends to local government politics, public service delivery, and grassroots activism to fill in for an inefficient state. At the same time, local politics in Hazara areas is situated within the realpolitik of planning (see Chapter 4). Personal connections with politicians and quite simply the ability to deliver from within the system therefore also play a role in determining political outcomes. Historically, MWM and HDP have also had contrasting views on solutions to important problems. While I was not able to observe other communities in Quetta and cannot make a comparative analysis, I witnessed Hazara citizens show significant interest in local politics and issues. Despite the differences many grassroots Hazara social initiatives receive bipartisan financial and operational support from the community.

A local government councilor I spoke to described representing Hazaras as “the world’s most difficult task”, especially in light of the provincial government’s inefficiencies and immense public pressure from his constituents. Councilors coordinate with residents and resident associations at the street or muhalla level, go door-to-door to solicit suggestions and support, conduct corner meetings and speaker sessions, and engage with active grassroots organizations and initiatives. Additionally, they must navigate the complex bureaucratic structure of local governments, political opposition from the more powerful provincial legislature, lack of or hindrances in the release of funds and other resources, and security contingencies for meetings and other events.

Grassroots Accountability for State Functions

I have described the perilous state of local and provincial government development and implementation processes in previous chapters. Hazara voters, on the other hand, make conscious efforts to exert relentless pressure on their elected representatives in local councils and the provincial legislature. Common Hazara men and women pursue political promises and
election-season commitments after election, raising questions about the allocation and release of funds as well as assigning of contractors and eventual completion of approved projects.

This level of what I call “grassroots accountability” of taxpayer funded projects is unprecedented in the city and, perhaps, the province. Bureaucrats, politicians, and even contractors spoke at length about the “difficulties” of working in Hazara areas:

A volunteer will always be present to supervise public employees or publicly-funded work. The Hazara volunteers will educate themselves even about technical standards – ratio of sand and water in concrete, for example – and then raise a fuss if workers don’t follow those standards.

This ownership ensures some level of quality in the face of an inefficient state and extremely weak local government bodies. The provincial legislator from the MWM holds considerable authority in determining public expenditure on new projects in Hazara areas (see chapter 4 for details on this process). Within the community, expenditures are hotly debated and criticized. Proposals receive support and opposition, often along partisan lines. The politics include allegations of corruption with respect to the misappropriation of funds.

This sense of ownership prevails across service provision and maintenance of existing public infrastructure as well. I witnessed Hazara community elders and volunteers sitting in public schools, observing their functioning, and pressuring public employees to perform simply by virtue of their presence. Public schools in Hazara areas are exactly as they are supposed to be on paper: they have buildings, restrooms, water coolers, swings, and furniture to exact specifications stated in official paperwork.

Like schools, volunteers monitor public health facilities with similar zeal. The city’s (and perhaps the province’s) best public hospital is located inside Marriabad – and is known among bureaucratic circles as the only “good” public hospital in the entire province. Volunteers constantly visit and check to make sure doctors and nurses follow their schedules, medicines are available, facilities and equipment work as intended, and public expenditure is appropriately directed and not misappropriated. I am not suggesting consensus on how things are run – debates on the hospital are endemic – but there is active participation and volunteers quickly build up pressure through protests and letters written to relevant government functionaries. In fact I encountered a protest outside the hospital that had been going on for “months” and alleged massive irregularities and appointments based on favoritism in the hospital. While many locals
disagree with that perception, they commend the protest for keeping the hospital management in the spotlight, leading to better performance and upkeep.

While the community is very active and takes ownership of service provision and maintenance of public infrastructure using public money, they are subject to the same development process as everybody else. In spite of their efforts, elected local government councilors rarely get the resources or power needed to initiate new projects in their areas. The provincial legislator commands the most influence in selecting new projects that receive public money, and the degree of public involvement in choosing how these funds are allocated is fairly arbitrary and void of formal procedures. There is significant public pressure, but it does not always influence final decisions.

This power dynamic means that the provincial government is involved in doing what are essentially neighborhood or street level, local government tasks. The political differences between most local government councilors and the provincial legislator make this situation even starker – projects are chosen to reflect political realities, and people complain of feeling powerless in the process. Even when local opinion is sought for a particular new project, party priorities often overshadow local feedback. I asked a councilor if they were able to collaborate with the provincial and/or federal governments (through elected representatives or otherwise). “We try to go to the other branches of government. They tell us, “Why are you protesting? We are doing your work!”” What they don’t understand is, this is exactly the problem. They are doing our work!”

**Infrastructure and Service Provision**

The overall inefficiencies attributable to the public development process and political difficulties in pushing welfare projects through the civil and political bureaucracy have combined with the Quetta Hazaras’ social awareness and activism to breed a robust culture of self-help. This manifests as grassroots ownership of infrastructure development and service provision. While all communities face bureaucratic and political hurdles, the Hazaras are particularly disadvantaged – they cannot approach public offices outside of their settlements without incurring significant risks to life and safety. I am not suggesting that other communities are particularly proactive about approaching these offices for redressal of grievances. However, the relatively disadvantaged position of the Hazaras has further catalyzed the self-help traditions that the community thrives upon.
I have detailed in previous paragraphs and chapters how local issues like streets, pavements, street lights, and the likes are constrained by the political structure that excludes local government bodies from decision making processes. Councilors from Hazara areas spoke extensively about how they were unable to “get a single light bulb” in “5 years” from the government in spite of the “availability and arbitrary allocation of funding”. What has followed is the large-scale, internalized identification and implementation of infrastructural projects by community groups and their partners. This implementation is rarely (if ever) accompanied by oversight by public officials and funds are raised through partnerships with NGOs or support of influential local Hazaras.

This self-help model is manifested in the remarkably better sanitation and sewerage in Marriabad as compared to all other areas of Quetta. The community, through expatriates, identified a foreign NGOs that was able to fund the development of underground and street-level sewers. They raised money from residents – each household had to pay a certain amount – which the NGO matched, and then proceeded to construct and upgrade the existing sewers as required. The participation by each household was driven by responsibility and, to some extent, social and civic pressure. An activist involved in that project claimed that the community “did not have a single free-rider”.

The community has also worked for its own water supply. Marriabad is formally part of Quetta city and formally “approved” constructions receive connections to public pipelines. Hazara Town, on the other hand, is still formally “rural”. There is no public water supply and no formal regulating agency for new constructions. Additionally, most new construction in Marriabad involves cutting into mountains and constructing vertical structures along steep slopes. Very few of them are formally approved, and thus do not receive public water supply or other services.

The community has developed its own solutions for water supply in both Marriabad and Hazara Town. They dig motorized wells into the mountains and install motors at the base to lift water up to new construction in Marriabad. Each house has a water storage tank, that is filled up at fixed intervals when the motors are operated. This uses a mix of groundwater extracted through wells and – illegally, as many bureaucrats told me – public water supplied to approved constructions at the base of the mountain. For Hazara Town, the community has contracted water supply to tanker operators. These operators fill up at wells outside the settlement and bring water to supply to residents of Hazara Town. This has had its problems – militants with access to a
vendor’s water tankers once stuffed a tanker with explosives and blew it up in the middle of Hazara Town – but the community continues to rely on its own, innovative strategies to deal with the (lack of) public supply of essential infrastructure like water supply pipelines.

While the Hazaras are financially constrained in constructing new infrastructure, they are more visible in service provision that requires smaller, repetitive costs and the occasional larger investments that help keep the service running. These efforts are particularly visible in education and career development. Other examples of “grassroots ownership” in service provision include health, counselling, gender equity and empowerment, trash removal, security, and social support and rehabilitation for victims of violence.

Countless community and grassroots organizations, associations, and societies are active in Hazara areas in Quetta. They vary in scale and connectivity as well as in scope of operations, but most have a stated focus on education and skills development in addition to their own specialized area of interest. Some, like the Tanzeem-e-Nasl-e-Nau Hazara Mughal (Association for the youth of the Hazara Mughal, often referred to as just the Tanzeem) and Ummat, run and/or support schools, clinics, cultural centers, printing presses, and libraries along with supporting other initiatives in other areas as they deem fit. Others focus on specific problems like gender empowerment, provision of food to people who cannot afford a warm meal, or volunteering for security on community events.

Almost all organizations I interacted with operate through a “board”, which consists of community elders and notables and conducts large-scale fundraising for projects and initiatives. The board also decides where, when, and how to spend available resources with very little support from the government. Most fundraising is internalized and depends on the nature and scale/ scope of the task. Methods of fundraising include door-to-door collection drives, membership fees for societies and organizations, assigning fixed contributions to each household in target areas, and personal contributions from influential and notables. It is also notable that fundraising drives continue throughout the year and are not restricted to specific times or events.

The work of grassroots organizations in education, skills, and career development has become a highlight of activism for the Quetta Hazara. Education has become the single most important emphasis for activism in general, and its importance stands amplified by the inaccessibility of quality educational institutes outside Hazara areas. All locals I spoke to expressed strong opinions on the “erosion of social capital” due to “inaccessible education” and lamented how the community had suffered due to young men and women being unable to attend
universities and colleges in Quetta. Grassroots activism has responded to this situation by opening new or supporting existing schools, libraries, language training centers, skill development institutes, and information technology (IT) institutes that impart critical computing skills to youngsters. The provincial legislator also claims that a new university will be inaugurated inside Marriabad soon that will allow Hazara students to access college education without having to risk their lives by traveling across the city to other areas.

As things stand, there are dozens of small, privately run schools in both Marriabad and Hazara Town that impart school education to children at all levels. Many schools even go so far as to provide uniforms, shoes, books, and even meals for children, especially those who lost their parents to violence targeted at the community. Additionally, there are dozens of language centers that help Hazara youth learn English and other European languages. This is directed primarily towards Hazara applicants for immigration and/or refugee status in North America, Europe, or Australia, where the ability to speak another language strengthens their case.

Along with education, there is a strong emphasis on cultural advancement and development of the "Hazaragi" language and culture. Several educational organizations work independently or collectively to support cultural initiatives like performance centers, museums, printing presses, and publishing houses. A prominent activist suggested that the recent wave of violence and restriction on movements around the city has “made (the Hazara) more cognizant and conscious of culture”. The secular Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) has seized on this sentiment to support ethnic initiatives and events and oppose the religious MWM that promotes religion as the basis for culture and abandons ethnic elements of culture in the process.

In addition to education and culture, Hazara areas are also known throughout the city for privately provided, low-cost health services that locals can access. The area has a drug rehabilitation center that is targeted at Hazara youth but caters to everybody. There are also clinics, hospitals, and burial services that operate in the area to facilitate Hazara residents.

One of the most significant traits of almost all organizations I interacted with was a direct or subtle focus on female empowerment and equity. The theme recurred across areas of interest; education would include special incentives for girls to attend; skills development included focus on skills that women can learn to become economically productive; health services included community maternity and other health services targeted at girls and women. This is complimented brilliantly with recent news of a restaurant – run entirely by Hazara girls and
possibly the first or one of very few in the entire country. “We are a very patriarchal tribe,” a women’s rights activist told me. “But today our women don’t hold back.”

Provision of Private Goods and Services

While the focus of this chapter has been on the ways that Hazara push the state to perform basic tasks, provide quality services, and protect the Hazara people from violence, the Hazara have not been able to fully participate in the private market either. Violence has forced Hazara businesses to relocate from other parts of Quetta into Hazara areas, and shopping often is restricted to Hazara areas only. The social, psychological, and physical barriers hinder the free movement of non-Hazaras into Hazara areas and vice versa. As a result, the market that these small businesses operate in is a fraction of the total city. Businesses and consumers both have improvised to adapt to the highly constrained situation.

Almost every citizen I spoke to in Quetta spoke longingly of the “Hazara baker”: small bakeries and confectionaries, run by Hazara bakers, were and continue to be known for their quality. Similarly, Hazara jewelers were known for their integrity and designs. And, perhaps most famous were Hazara shoemakers and their uniquely crafted shoes. These businesses once were spread out around the city and province in general; after the relocation, Hazara settlements have become centers of ethnic economic activity.

The main entrance to Marriabad, manned by several armed paramilitary personnel, is surrounded by small, Hazara-owned businesses including bakeries, jewelers, and shoe stores. Many of these businesses have relocated from elsewhere in the city. Business owners now try to locate as close to the entrance as possible, making access convenient for their clients from other parts of the city. In addition to traditionally known Hazara businesses, new sectors have now opened up. Marriabad has become the hub for pilgrimages to holy sites in Iran. Hazara travel agents and facilitators now dominate the annual movement of hundreds of thousands of pilgrims from across Pakistan. I have described the degree of state and security arrangements that accompany this movement; pilgrims from across the country converge on Marriabad where locals offer them lodging, food, and travel arrangements for their onward journey.

Hazara businesses are very uniquely placed to capture this market for pilgrimages. Community elders and politicians coordinate extensively with law enforcement and military and civil security agencies for everything they do. Secondly, a significant portion of pilgrims is Hazaras from Quetta who need travel and security arrangements anyway. The marginal effort of
coordinating for security for pilgrimages is thus very low for Hazara businesses as compared to facilitators from other cities.

In these ways, while the community has lost substantially due to the violence, they have tried to create new opportunities out of the situation. A broad-based culture of helping and supporting grassroots initiatives exists amongst successful Hazara professionals and businesspeople, and the national and international Hazara community quickly comes together to support their counterparts in Quetta.

**National & Transnational Networks and Grassroots Activism**

Networks are critical to the success of Hazara politics and organization at all levels. These included networks within local organizations – I have described how organizations come together to support critical issues and to identify areas of common interest – and those with Hazaras who migrate to other parts of the country or the world. These connections are subsequently useful as the community presses political claims against the state and also as it self-organizes to address critical service and infrastructure shortages. Additionally, strong ethnic ties among the Hazara translates to stronger networks inside the city and beyond.

**Refuge as the Cornerstone to Networking**

The availability of living space to Hazara refugees from Afghanistan is almost guaranteed in Quetta. I met countless young men and women who traveled from Afghanistan and were able to live at a friend’s or a relative’s place at least for a short duration. Strong familial ties exist among Afghan and Quetta Hazaras – those who migrated to Quetta in the last century have maintained their ties with family members in Afghanistan and are happy to host them in Quetta.

This facilitation acts as a social support system for refugees who come to Quetta from Afghanistan. Hazara Town, the newer Hazara settlement outside city limits, has a significant population of Afghan Hazara refugees who have settled in Quetta; most of them started by visiting their relatives or friends in Marriabad, staying with them for a few months or years, and then moving out to live independently in Hazara Town once they found adequate economic and social opportunities.

The support system thus constructed acts both for Hazaras coming to Quetta and moving to other cities. There are small Hazara populations in Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and other cities in Pakistan. Hazaras have also migrated to Australia, Europe, and North America in recent years. A Quetta Hazara who is willing and able to move from the city would be inclined to move in with a Hazara in one of the other places, from where they find and build their own
opportunities. This creates Hazara clusters in other cities as well – and creates or supports strong networks that are able to organize very quickly to respond to financial, political, or other needs of the community in Quetta.

The Hazara Transnational Network

Perhaps one of the most prominent features of Hazara activism is how emigrants continue to maintain financial, social and political ties with the community in Quetta. Almost all educational and career development organizations rely on their Hazara “alumni” for program and syllabi development. These alumni, in turn, are usually ex-students who were part of the organization’s efforts and successfully found opportunities outside Quetta. Surprisingly, it is not just communication that sustains this connection. I met countless activists – based in Lahore, Islamabad, and even the United States, who visit Quetta at fixed intervals and engage with the program that they once took part in as students. Students who went to college in Islamabad, for example, are able to describe the exact admission procedure, merit requirements, strengths and weaknesses, and other aspects of their institution that can help motivate youngsters in Quetta and also inform their decisions.

Other organizations also see considerable human resource contributions from emigrants. Hazaras fly in from around the world for notable political and social movements, working as volunteers and helping swell numbers and grab attention. Film-makers who now reside abroad return to shoot in Marriabad and Hazara Town. Sportsmen and women return to their settlements to train the next generation of aspiring sportspeople.

These, and other emigrants who cannot return to Quetta, also contribute financially and politically. Remittances, especially from countries in the North, contribute a major portion of the income of many Hazara households. The involvement of foreign currencies makes them more attractive and helps many families educate their children, renovate their houses, buy cars and other means of transport, and send more youngsters to other cities and countries. Remittances received by grassroots organizations help fund educational, health, and other social projects. Indeed, donations are a significant part of all fundraising that Hazara organizations do.

Transnationalizing Political Claims

The 2013 protests undertaken by the local Quetta Hazara at the city scale was also a transnational effort to exert global pressure on the state through multiple fronts. Moreover, a significant subtext of the entire effort was organizing with and collecting material, moral, financial, and political support from partners both inside and outside Pakistan.
The transnational dimension of the 2013 protests included using social media to create and market “events” – organized, synchronized gatherings of supporters of the Hazara cause (including Hazara expatriates) at visible public places in prominent cities around the world. Many of these gatherings transformed into protests, and a large portion of such protests took place outside the Pakistani consulate, embassy, or state office in the respective city. The selection of a date, time, and venue lent global publicity to the protest movement. This not only highlighted the plight of a persecuted community, but also exerted substantial international pressure on the state of Pakistan to respond to an untenable situation and protect the life and dignity of its people. Representatives of the international media in Pakistan responded by questioning the Foreign Office in Islamabad, while Pakistani ambassadors in other parts of the world were questioned in public in other cities.

It is difficult to isolate the exact impact of this global pressure on the state of Pakistan from the myriad other political forces in play during and after the protests. Nevertheless, as I have detailed earlier, the provincial government was sacked, federal rule was imposed on the province, and the military gained substantial policing powers in the city. Hazara activists saw (and continue to see) the protest as a successful endeavor to force the state to respond after many years of relentless targeting.

The 2013 protests demonstrate the strength of external networks supplements internal networks within and between Hazara activists and organizations. As a result, the community remains one of the most connected, active, and socially conscious in the city. Hazaras are also able to find better connections in new places, reinforcing the overall resilience of the community.

My analysis raises questions about violence. Would the same networks have existed if the community had not been targeted so mercilessly? Would similar solidarities and activism be prevalent in times of peaceful prosperity? I have not attempted to answer these questions, but they would make for a useful study of their own. Perhaps a future comparative study can explore these and other such questions in more detail.
CHAPTER 7: FINDING JUSTICE FOR QUETTA

This project started around several key propositions: that the ethnicized violence in Quetta is a key determinant of lived experience for Quetta’s Hazara citizens, and that the focus of planning and development shifts to steps and projects to improve security infrastructure in Hazara areas. I also explored whether the state took specific steps to enable Hazara citizens to access the city. In studying these propositions, I have explored an intricate complex of ethnicized violence, state action and inaction, and grassroots activism and organization in the postcolonial city of Quetta. My explorations are backed by a long tradition of postcolonial writings on racialized conceptions of power, creation of ethnicized political identities, and resulting violence in postcolonial societies.

My findings make it clear that the violence that Hazaras face plays the most critical part in determining planning outcomes and lived experiences for the community. This is alongside a multifaceted mix of colonial legacy, local organizing, and internal power plays within different levels of government that is manifested in planning and policymaking processes. The state lacks the resources or will or both to contain violence, and I have described how this violence creates the psychological and physical experience of the city for Quetta’s Hazara population. Ethnicized violence has factored into their perceptions of safety, mobility, educational and other social attainment, and even the built form of their part of the city. The general insecurity has also directly impacted the city’s overall built form, with frequent placement of police and paramilitary pickets and check posts on public roads.

In this section, I conclude my study by reasserting the primacy of ethnicized violence in creating the postcolonial city. I borrow from critical and postcolonial scholarship and suggest that existing planning solutions – based in neoliberal democratic experiences – are not suitable for Quetta’s context.

Ethnicized Violence and the Making of the City

I have described in previous chapters some of the vicious attacks that have been directed towards the Quetta Hazara. It is futile to try and downplay the seriousness, or the targeted nature, or the role of the ethnic and sectarian Hazara identity in the creation of this violence. However, time, logistics, and security concerns prevented me from indulging in a more comparative study of Hazaras and other groups in Quetta, or even of sectarian militants who use sect and ethnicity as markers of political identity to carry out violent attacks.
The ethnicized violence that Quetta witnesses is at the center of the practice of public administration, law and order, and community organization in Quetta. I have shown that the state reproduces colonial order through laws, structures, and practices, and as a result it does not engage in any substantial legal reform to respond to this violence. However, I have also shown how the realpolitik of planning and administration has become a direct function of the levels, types, and severity of violence in the city. Military and paramilitary institutions have gained influence over civilian planning and administration processes, and projects like installation of CCTV cameras now receive priority in the formal planning process.

The prevalent violence also manifests itself in the city’s built-form and residents’ experience of the city. Police and paramilitary check posts dot the entire city; walls around private and public constructions are taller than ever and lined with barbed wire; gates to individual houses, compounds, and offices are manned by heavily militarized guards; the cantonment appears to be a fort. Hazara areas are surrounded by physical walls on all sides, and all routes connecting Hazaras with the rest of Quetta are manned by heavily armed paramilitary personnel. Graveyards, especially in Hazara areas, have assumed new built forms with decorations, pictures, poetry, flags, and spaces for public gatherings.

Physical manifestations of violence supplement the overall influence on residents’ experience of the city. This influence is even more pronounced for the Hazara; they cannot leave their areas and be sure of returning safely. With multiple attacks inside their residential areas killing hundreds, even their houses are not safe spaces anymore. Public spaces like markets are not so “public”; a task as simple as buying vegetables involves extensive coordination and preparation with the police.

In this context, the Hazara cannot access schools, colleges, or libraries. They cannot set up businesses except in restricted areas. Markets – the center of neoliberal thought and experience – have shut their doors to the Hazara.

The question of group and individual identities does not arise in this situation; indeed, the liberal framework of individuality fails to both explain the situation and provide suggestions for significant change. Accessibility, for example, can no longer be a scientific function of distance and quality of service, but a political question of building an environment more conducive to accessibility. The question then is which group identity should assume primacy: is it the ethnic (Hazara), or the sectarian (Shi’i), or the national (Pakistani) identity that is under attack? Which of these identities will help the community recover?
With the state failing to respond effectively, the Hazaras have made their own city in Quetta. It is a city of restricted space – it stays within the walls of Marriabad and Hazara Town. It is also a city of grief, where spaces like the graveyard have assumed importance as public spaces for shared solidarities. At the same time, it is a city of the grassroots; it caters to victims of violence by providing for their food and education, monitors public expenditure on infrastructure and service provision, and ensures contribution by residents from all socio-economic classes within the Hazara ethnic group.

To add to its significance, the Hazara city is also a connected city; not in the sense of “global cities” propounded by capitalist planning scholarship, but in terms of connected loss, grief, consolation, solidarities, and resource collection. Political protests can be organized across the world over social media, funds collected by expatriates and repatriated to movements in Quetta, and manpower made available to carry out crucial voluntary duties that keeps Hazara activism going.

**The Postcolonial State and the Grassroots**

The prevailing situation, with its violence, administrative and security failures, and community and grassroots organizing, presents serious questions for the postcolonial state. Official responses to violence have included providing Hazara politicians and tribal elders with a security guard, militarizing routine activities like buying vegetables and special events like pilgrimages, and restricting the movement of Hazaras to specific areas and roads in the city. Part of this restriction on movement is exemplified by “no-go areas”, “safe routes”, and the walled enclaves where Hazaras live, manned by armed paramilitary soldiers and in a constant state of high alert.

The wall around Hazara areas of Marriabad and Hazara Town is a caricature of the state’s failure to secure Hazara lives even inside their homes. At the same time, it is a manifestation of the raging debate on the need and efficacy of a measure that projects security at the cost of segregation and disconnection from other citizens of Quetta.

The state’s strategy in building a wall and check posts is simple. It is easier to protect someone when their movements are known. For an entire group, it is easier to secure their life by keeping them all in one place. The state does not have the resources, neither money nor manpower, to secure Hazara lives had they been spread around the city. A wall, similarly, restricts “unauthorized” entry of unwelcome people (e.g. militants and terrorists), and check posts allow the state and the community to keep a thorough record of everyone who visits. Along
similar lines, the logic behind restricting movement and providing heavily armed escorts to Hazara residents on periodic trips to the vegetable market is not hard to see. Individual visitors often get shot and killed, many areas of the city are difficult to secure, and without the escort, many shoppers would simply be walking into a deathtrap. Prominent individuals like politicians and tribal elders need to move to other parts of the city more frequently, which justifies the assignment of personal (heavily armed) security guards to them.

However, every single measure is laden with problems. A wall projects security, but the social costs of such security have a crippling effect on the Hazaras’ economic, social, political, and educational well-being. It presents the state with a justification to ignore protests: if life is secure in segregated areas, Hazaras should not venture out of those areas and they are not the state’s responsibility if they do. It further ethnicizes identities that have already been segregated and subjected to extreme violence: I have described how people from other ethnic groups have stopped visiting Hazara areas, both out of fear of reprisals from militants and an aversion to dealing with paramilitary guards. The wall therefore reproduces the very fear it seeks to combat.

The restriction on mobility also presents other problems. It creates a dedicated enclave for the Hazara, justifying discrimination and marginalization outside of those areas. Hazara students lose access to schools outside the enclave or other “safe” areas. Businesses can’t operate outside the enclave. All of this happens in the presence of a resource-starved, inefficient state that, even if it were successful in providing security, would be unable to provide social, economic, and educational opportunities.

And if the state were to overcome all challenges and provide them with all services in their restricted enclaves, the Hazaras would only stand more isolated, more marginalized, and more powerless than before, and the disconnect with other groups would only grow. Like the wall, this militarized notion of security does little to promote intergroup contact and build bridging forces that can help curb violence. On the contrary, it creates a barrier – armed policemen and paramilitary soldiers – between Hazaras and other groups. It also provides space – within state institutions – for the military to assume more importance, thereby diminishing the power and influence of public representatives.

Reforming Planning, Administrative, and Security Policies

The questions I have asked, and the debates around them, do not provide a clear answer on what can or cannot, or should or should not, be done in this situation. I have also not included
perspectives of violent attackers – what drives them to conduct terrorist violence? How is their identity defined and ethnicized?

Policy recommendations from existing planning scholarship is rooted in liberal democratic experiences and fails to answer any of the critical questions that the state and community face. The state is stuck in its own paradox at all levels; from internal power struggles to militarization of urban policing to walled Hazara settlements, it keeps contributing to the reproduction of militarized violence, fear, and insecurity. Using market-oriented tools like mobility and access to markets, or empowered negotiation, for violently persecuted communities like the Hazara has its own structural problems. The existing balance of arms is heavily tilted against the Hazara, with an attacking party that possesses heavy weaponry and expertise in guerilla warfare. Any negotiation has to guarantee safety and security of life; with one group heavily armed and intent on wiping the other off the face of this earth, that may not be possible.

Liberal democratic strategies would necessarily require strengthening the armed police and/or paramilitary and military forces active in Quetta to improve security for the Hazara, even if the objective is to enable empowered negotiations. In a context of institutional power struggles and political dominance by the military, such measures have the potential to push the city further into what Collier has called the “conflict trap”. It would thus recreate the colonial state; representative political institutions would become less effective, policing would become a garb for social control and repression, and the native elite would accumulate even more power at the expense of ordinary residents.

What is needed, instead, is a thorough decolonization process that deracializes and deethnicizes power and influence by eliminating power asymmetries between various subnational groups. The state needs to work closely with the Hazara and other communities to rebuild trust and initiate structural reforms to respond to group disadvantages. Part of such policies can include informal practices like reaching out to neighborhood associations, ascertaining immediate concerns, and then taking specific steps to address them. This must be supplemented through formal reforms and empowering local representatives with planning, decision making, and financial powers that they do not currently possess. Larger scale initiatives to reduce the intensity of conflict would also be needed, including at the provincial and federal levels, to empower locals and politically contain the separatist insurgency. Ultimately, the state will need to reassess its practices that lead to the production and reproduction of various, including contradictory, forms of violence.
These constraints make Quetta a particularly complex problem to solve. To avoid further violence, and a possible recourse to violence even by persecuted communities like the Hazara, political leadership at each level should commit to deeper, structural reforms that can address problems of patronage and distribution of power in the society. Administrative and planning prerogatives should be localized and contextualized, and stronger engagements between different groups and communities should be made an official priority. Weberian ideals of an impartial, formally structured, hierarchical bureaucracy have not done well by the Hazaras, and as I have illustrated in this study, have further complicated their oppression.

At the same time, the state and people have to be careful about the geographical and functional explanations for local problems. Bollens (2008) has suggested that cities can serve as catalysts for peacebuilding; problems in cities like Quetta may be a complex mix of local, regional, and national issues that are difficult for any level of government to handle on its own. While empowered local governments can manage municipal services, for example, their success hinges on managing the production of ideological violence which is not possible below regional national levels.

Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this thesis was to explore how ethnicized, postcolonial violence has shaped the city in Quetta’s context, and how the state and Hazara community are dealing with the context they find themselves in. I did not start out with policy prescriptions, nor do I intend to present concrete proposals for the same. I do, however, analyze common recommendations and suggest critical issues that must be considered in devising policy.

Unfortunately for this study, my analysis is restricted to the single group of the Hazara. There is room to study other ethnic and racial identities, their interactions with violence, and specific policies that the state adopts in specific situations. The need to study violent actors’ perspectives, identities, and strategies is also apparent. Policy-making processes would have to engage in a conscious assessment of oppression and power to be successful and genuinely beneficial for the public in the long run.

I hope my study can serve as a reference point for postcolonial as well as Western scholarship in planning. Given the frequency of violent conflict in postcolonial states, there is a pressing need for planners to focus on ethnicized imbalances and violence that colonialism has left behind. I make no suggestions about the prevalence, nature, or brutality of violence in other contexts. What I do suggest, however, is that the city of the Global South is more than a
collection of informalities, insurgencies, and political expediencies. It is a remnant of colonial viciousness, with ethnicized political identities that have spilled into or are on the precipice of violence.

I also hope that groups like the Hazara, who have improvised in extremely tough situations to use both market-based strategies (e.g. starting new kinds of businesses that are suited to their unique context) and grassroots insurgencies and movements to assert their rights over the state, gain successes in the years to come. I hope that these and similar movements would be strengthened with time, the state would initiate a conscious process of decolonization, deracialization, and deethnicization, and the people will at last have policies that are genuinely emancipatory and enable them to achieve their full potential.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRES

Interview Guide for Community Members

Settlement Patterns and History
1. How would you describe the history of the Quetta Hazara? How did they come to settle in Quetta?
2. How have Hazara settlements developed over the years?
3. What factors have determined the spatial organization of Hazara settlements, and how?

Local Plans and Initiatives
1. What are some of the community led initiatives that you are aware of?
2. What measures do you use to engage with the community?
3. How do you plan your projects and activities? What factors do you consider before making decisions?
4. As an activist, how would you describe the government’s role in the performance of community-led initiatives?
5. What initiatives has the government taken that are pertinent to your community? What role does the community play in government-led initiatives?
6. How has the situation affected mobility for the community?

Violence and reactions
1. There has been an atmosphere of violent conflict for many years now. What impact has this had on the lifestyles of Hazara residents of Quetta?
2. How has the government responded to these incidents?
3. Do you think the government’s role in responding to violence is satisfactory? If not, what critical issues should the government immediately address?
4. How does the community organize to voice its concerns? Is it effective?

Security and law enforcement agencies
1. How important is it for activists to coordinate with security agencies on community-led projects? What are some of the forums for this coordination/collaboration?
2. How does security and safety factor into your projects and plans?

Note: Not all questions would be asked from every respondent.

Unstructured interviews: guiding questions for Hazara community members
Interview Guide for Public Officials

Administrative Structure
1. How are planning and administrative powers divided between the federal, provincial, and local governments?
2. How is the structure in Balochistan different from other provinces?
3. What role do security agencies have in planning/administration in Quetta? How is this different from other cities like Lahore, Islamabad, and Karachi?
4. How is the overall situation different in Quetta from other cities?

Planning for the Hazara
1. How has the government planned historically for the Hazara community? Does the government engage in specific plan making measures for the community? If yes, what steps have been taken for the community?
2. What is the current spatial/social status of the Hazara within Quetta?
3. From an administrative perspective, what factors have contributed to the position that the Hazara are in today?
4. Does the government work with the community for welfare projects/activities? What are some of the engagement methods employed?
5. What forums do Hazara residents have to reach public officials?
6. Does the government sponsor or support the community’s own projects?

Note: Not all questions would be asked from every respondent.

Unstructured interviews: guiding questions for public officials
APPENDIX B: LOCATING PAKISTAN AND QUETTA

Geopolitical Location of Pakistan (Google Maps)

Quetta, Afghanistan, and Iran (Google Maps)
Afghan Rejection of the Durand Line and the international border. Area shaded blue is claimed by Afghanistan (Leake & Haines, 2017)
APPENDIX D: DISMISSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN

Notification to dismiss the provincial government in Balochistan
APPENDIX E: IRB APPROVAL

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects
805 West Pennsylvania Ave
Urbana, IL 61801

June 6, 2017

Stacy Harwood
Urban & Regional Planning
111 Temple Buell Hall
611 Lorado Taft Drive
Champaign, IL 61820

RE: Planning in Conflict: A Case Study of the Quetta Hazara
IRB Protocol Number: 17799

Dear Dr. Harwood:

This letter authorizes the use of human subjects in your project entitled Planning in Conflict: A Case Study of the Quetta Hazara. The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved, by expedited review, the protocol as described in your IRB application. The expiration date for this protocol, IRB number 17799, is 06/04/2020. The risk designation applied to your project is no more than minimal risk.

Copies of the attached date-stamped consent form(s) must be used in obtaining informed consent. If there is a need to revise or alter the consent form(s), please submit the revised form(s) for IRB review, approval, and date-stamping prior to use.

Under applicable regulations, no changes to procedures involving human subjects may be made without prior IRB review and approval. The regulations also require that you promptly notify the IRB of any problems involving human subjects, including unanticipated side effects, adverse reactions, and any injuries or complications that arise during the project.

You were granted a three-year approval. If there are any changes to the protocol that result in your study becoming ineligible for the extended approval period, the RPI is responsible for immediately notifying the IRB via an amendment. The protocol will be issued a modified expiration date accordingly.

If you have any questions about the IRB process, or if you need assistance at any time, please feel free to contact me at the OPRS office, or visit our website at https://www.oprs.research.illinois.edu.

Sincerely,

Rebecca Miller, MSW
Human Subjects Research Specialist, Office for the Protection of Research Subjects

Attachment(s): 1 Research Team Application, 1 Waiver of Documentation, 1 Consent Form
c: Faizaan Qayyum

IRB Approval (Protocol # 17799)