SOLVING THE EUROPEAN RUBIK'S CUBE

Edward A. Kolodziej
Research Professor of Political Science and Director, Project on European Arms Control and Security

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Edward A. Kolodziej
Director, Project on European Arms Control and Security
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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Wise men once said there could be light. So why should there be darkness now?

— Alexander Dubček to a mass rally in Wenceslas Square, Prague, Czechoslovakia, November 1989

Europe as a Rubik’s Cube

Sir Edward Grey would be pleased to see the lamps of Europe again being lit. The revolutionary changes sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe spring hope that, seventy-five years after World War I, freer political systems may again flourish from the Atlantic to the Urals, that all of Europe’s peoples may share in its prosperity, that all may feel secure within settled national frontiers, and that Europe may again be united as ideological differences dissolve and as underlying common values surface and converge to forge new European bonds across national boundaries. Whether these aims, shared by an increasing number of Europeans from Moscow to Madrid, will be achieved depends critically on our understanding of Europe’s crises and their global implications. We need new conceptual tools as a precondition for refashioning the collective will and resources of Europe’s peoples and those of the United States to turn turmoil to good purpose.

The conceptual and psychological barriers to understanding are formidable. The Cold War had so conditioned our thinking and responses that, until the abrupt collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, it appeared wildly visionary to think, much less to suggest, that the European Cold War regime might be dismantled. The Brezhnev-Nixon-Carter-Reagan years froze the European Cold War regime that essentially crystallized in the allied defeat of Nazi Germany and in the subsequent superpower struggle for global ascendancy. The regime’s components included a European order that divided the continent and Germany ideologically, and consolidated the split into two military blocs that established governments based on opposing principles of legitimacy—the Western half on open, pluralistic systems, the Eastern half on one-party, Communist rule, and that applied contrasting solutions to the imperatives of socioeconomic welfare—one affirming the private ownership of the means of production and market practices, the other trumpeting socialist norms and command economies. These provisional solutions to European order, legitimacy, and welfare were the microcosm of a regime that the two superpowers strove to impose, in fits and starts and with varying degrees of failure, on other peoples and states in their global struggle, as superpower bipolarity temporarily supplanted the Euro-centric system in the immediate years after World War II.

Vietnam and Afghanistan and the relative (but differential) economic decline of both superpowers reveal an inability to shape the world beyond.
Europe in preferred ways. Now the superpowers' provisional solutions to Europe's postwar problems no longer hold, repudiated by some of their once most ardent partisans. What is disturbing, however, is that there are no clear and universally accepted remedies for the current crises in Europe to replace the Cold War regime and the perversely reassuring expectations that it generated once installed. As a first step toward re-assessment, we should disabuse ourselves of old ways of thinking and doing business and shake the the comfortable, but misguided, belief that they will be relevant and responsive to the powerful forces that have produced the present crises. These forces are themselves partly in reaction to the sclerosis engendered by the Cold War stalemate. An incrementalist mentality risks misconstruing the depth and the global proportions of the challenges we now face and minimizing the efforts that will have to be made by Europeans and Americans to ensure that Western preferences prevail—to keep the lamps lit and to multiply their number.

As Dean Acheson might have said, we are again present at the creation. Who can gainsay that the fall of the Berlin Wall is equal in significance, real and symbolic, to the storming of a British ship in Boston harbor, of the Bastille in Paris, or of the Winter Palace in Leningrad? The discussion below sketches the complexities and inner contradictions of the crises of order, legitimacy, and welfare which today put Europeans and Americans at risk, but before rare and inviting opportunities. Each of these three domains of crisis is itself trifurcated into at least three additional components—a kind of Rubik's Cube whose parts, now disassembled, pose a puzzle about how they are once again to be put back together.

A closing section identifies some of the principles that should guide us through this transition to a post-Cold War Europe, in re-assembling, if you will, the European Rubik's Cube. We need to return to the breadth of strategic thinking that animated the early postwar period that led to the Marshall Plan and to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance. Two world wars and successive economic depressions argued against over a hundred and fifty years of deliberate isolation from Europe's problems as if they were not our own or of interest to us. A narrow focus on military strategy and crisis management, until now the concentrated concern and product of a Cold War mentality, must be discarded if the current crises are to be surmounted. We have to relearn how to fashion grand strategies (though not necessarily Grand Designs) that meet these crises on their own terms. These are defined not only by their multiple dimensions but also by their simultaneity, synergism, and systemic impact. Since we do not have a world war to jolt us from our Cold War thinking and tinkering, we will have to simulate the perturbation associated with these convulsions to see, conceptually and psychologically, the old world in a new light.
Crisis of Order

A Receding Soviet Threat

This crisis initially assumes three dimensions. The first, and most important dimension, is the increasing unreliability of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as adversaries on which to base NATO military planning and the political cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. The evidence of a declining Soviet threat is persuasive and accumulating. Politically, a vast campaign has been launched to expose the atrocities and oppression of Stalinist totalitarianism and the corruption and economic failings of Brezhnev authoritarianism. Glasnost and perestroika have ushered in limited elections to a newly created parliament as well as efforts to protect the rights of Soviets to enjoy a greater measure of personal freedom of expression, religion, and movement, against an all-powerful state and party. The mellowing of the Soviet state and party, as Kennan envisioned, now propels the arms control process with the West forward, promotes détente in Europe and around the globe to unprecedented postwar levels, and prompts the passing of Communist, one-party rule throughout a gradually dissolving Eastern bloc.

New strategic thinking pervades Soviet military doctrine to keep in step with Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's new political thinking aimed at de-nuclearizing and de-militarizing international relations. What first appeared as a piece of propaganda, the January 1986 party statement on disarmament, now appears to be a planning document. Notions, like defensive-defense, war prevention (not fighting), and asymmetrical cuts to assure opponents, have now become common currency in the Soviet military literature. Soviet arms control goals now include the elimination of the possibility to launch a surprise attack and decreasing capabilities to carry out large-scale offensive operations, [and] establishment of an unquestionable superiority [on] the side [of] defensive potentials over offensive potentials.

Deeds match words. In December 1986, Moscow agreed to an elaborate process of monitoring troop movements and exercises in Europe, including provision for intrusive intervention to inspect Soviet forces and facilities. Under the Stockholm accord, engineered within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), military activities involving more than 75,000 troops require two years notice, those over 40,000, one year. In December 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons in ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The Soviet Union then proposed negotiations on eliminating all nuclear missile systems from Europe and, presumably, from Asia in harmony with the INF formula. Double-zero would become triple-zero. On December 1988,
Gorbachev announced a unilateral cut of 500,000 Soviet troops, along with several nuclear weapons batteries, and the destruction of 5,000 tanks.

Meanwhile, concessions have been made at START to U.S. urgings, including counting bombers as only one warhead. (That means actual warhead levels of perhaps up to 9,000 will be counted as 6,000 warheads.) Both sides also agreed to disagree on the broad U.S. interpretation of what research, development, and testing is permitted under the ABM treaty. At Vienna, the Soviets presented a plan that closely approximated the Western position, a convergence that has since narrowed when President Bush included aircraft in the scope of the negotiations. Limited, but discernible, progress has also been made on controlling the production and transfer of chemical weapons and on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty where the United States, not the Soviet Union, has been dragging its feet. Moreover, in announcing cuts in military spending (confirmed by U.S. intelligence), Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov admitted for the first time that the Soviet Union spends more than four times as much on the military than had previously been acknowledged. Several months later, Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze also conceded that the Soviet Union had violated the ABM treaty in building a phased-array radar station at Krasnoyarsk and pledged that the facility would be dismantled.

These military cutbacks and arms and disarmament initiatives have been supplemented by a gradual Soviet withdrawal from regional conflicts around the globe and the pointed repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine that attempted to legitimate Soviet intervention abroad. Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan and the intervention was declared to have been a contravention of international law (although Soviet military aid still sustains the Najibullah regime). Moscow also reduced its military assistance to the Luanda government and facilitated Cuban military withdrawal both from Angola and Ethiopia. CIA reports also confirmed that military supplies to Nicaragua have slowed. This pattern of disengagement and reductions in overseas commitments reached doctrinal status in Gorbachev’s Helsinki pronouncement of fall 1989, preceding only by weeks, the demise of the old guard Communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, that the socioeconomic and political institutions of other states were matters to be decided by the domestic populations of those states, and not by outside intervention.

Excessive Defense Spending

But even if the Soviet threat were not dramatically diminishing, there would still be heavy pressures within the Western alliance to cut forces. This forms a second crisis affecting European security and order. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has already announced the prospect of $180 billion in defense spending over the next five years. These cuts will inevitably affect
NATO since European defense is the single largest spending program within
the Pentagon budget. House Armed Services chairman, Les Aspin, has put
the Pentagon on notice that FY 1991 will be a Gramm-Rudman-Gorbachev
budget. Since 1985, Congress has annually cut defense requests to bring
spending closer into line with national means. At the start of the Bush
administration, it was conservatively estimated that a $300 billion defense
budget was chasing and rapidly losing ground to $400 billion planning goals.
Service on the national debt has doubled since 1980 from approximately 8 to
15 percent. Interest rates remain high relative to European and Japanese
competitors, braking U.S. economic investment and inhibiting
competitiveness abroad.\(^{15}\)

As the popularity of Paul Kennedy's bleak assessment of the negative
impact of military spending on economic growth suggests,\(^{16}\) there is a
widening consensus in the United States that the principal long-term threat
to the United States is economic, not strategic. Competition from Asia and
Europe—specifically Japan and the European Community—threaten to erode
further declining U.S. economic and technological competitiveness, the
source of its political influence and military prowess. That the assistance
package offered by South Korea to Poland was equal to that of the proposal of
the Bush administration (until doubled by Congress) to assist the new non-
Communist government, reveals how narrowly conceived are current
American policies. They confuse muddling through, marginal adjustments,
temporizing pronouncements, and reflexive pragmatism with an integrated
strategy, directed by clear, long-term, national aims.

Other Western governments are under the same economic and welfare
pressures as Washington to cut their budgets. If Thatcher's Britain is the
most vociferous advocate of holding the line in NATO, the British
government has been among the first to cut defense spending, particularly for
conventional arms, which are more needed in this transition period beyond
the Cold War than Trident missiles for NATO defenses. A declining birthrate
and a reduction in the length of compulsory military service will lead to a cut
in Germany's armed forces, the bulwark of NATO's conventional posture,
from 600,000 to 420,000. The cumulative total of unilateral cuts in NATO
numbers and readiness, driven by budgetary imperatives, may well be greater
than the reductions proposed by the West at Vienna.

While a declining Soviet threat could not have been more fortuitous,
it does not follow that arms control by happenstance will naturally result in a
safer and stabler Europe. The arms control, budgetary, and strategic processes
within allied governments and NATO are simply in disarray, each pushed by
its own logic and parochial interests. The dispute between West Germany
and its allies over short-range nuclear weapons, up to the eleventh hour
prior to the opening of the April 1989 NATO meeting, illustrates how even
evident need has not been enough to bring them permanently into
alignment NATO's strategy of flexible response, already in question, can no longer be considered a sound basis for planning since it cannot be sustained under present circumstances. But what new defense concepts are at the ready to replace it?

We should expect, as seasoned observers anticipate, that reductions in armed forces will be driven by service and bureaucratic imperatives for organizational survival. In the present climate, we are not likely to see a radical revision of strategic doctrine based on a clear reassessment of threats to national security with matching new military requirements to meet them. Nor can Congress be fully counted upon to demonstrate the discipline needed to buy the defense that is needed and to resist eliminating redundant bases or purchasing outmoded weapons when these cuts might damage constituent interests. Quite aside from these barriers to reform of defense planning and to calculated cuts in military spending, guided by a reevaluation of changing but receding external threats, there are also pent-up welfare demands that may at any moment erupt into a budgetary earthquake as the charged tectonic plates of competing military and civilian demands no longer prove containable, a risk that will be particularly acute if the economy slips into a recession.

Rising Nationalism

As the alliances break up, yet a third crisis of order emerges. The Cold War obscured the critical role that both superpowers played in fostering postwar reconciliation in Europe and in regulating European nationalism. The German problem was provisionally resolved by division. Within each bloc, Moscow and Washington encouraged (or imposed) rules for national harmonization. Unreserved American support for European union—through the Marshall Plan and subsequently through defense and economic cooperation—contributed to West Germany's rehabilitation and reintegration into Western Europe. For Cold War reasons, Moscow played a similar role with respect to East Germany. Both alliances and their superpower hegemony arbitrated age-old national rivalries, Moscow between its East European clients, the United States between France and Germany, as well as Greece and Turkey. Now the prospect of a united Germany and heightened Eastern European national conflict, Baltic state secessionism, and ethnic civil war in Azerbaijan, raise prominently into view problems that were only shelved, not solved. Within the span of a single, brief lifetime, Europe and the world were plunged into two global wars as a consequence of Europe's unremitting national rivalries. There is little historical precedent for the belief that national self-determination, however much an antidote to the excesses of the Cold War, will necessarily lead to a more peaceful Europe if it is again released, uninhibited by countervailing international restraints or alliance commitments and obligations.
The superpower dilemma is yet more complex. On one hand, there is much to be said for weakening the link between the superpower rivalry in Europe, with its potential for ruinous nuclear war, and age-old national and communal enmities. A dissolution of the two alliances dictates a dilution of nuclear-suffused commitments. On the other hand, except for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and a weak Western European Union, there are no ready European institutions to replace the superpowers and the two alliances in the performance of their regulating and arbitrating functions in mediating between European national rivalries and, specifically, between Germany and its neighbors. The danger arises that civil strife or national conflict in Eastern Europe (both ills already widely abroad within the Soviet Union) may elicit Moscow's military (or the West's economic and political) intervention with the inadvertent but untoward effect of arresting the European détente process and the reform movement within the Soviet Union. In kicking over the traces of their respective spheres of influence, which furnished a provisional peace for Europe, the superpowers cannot escape the consequent challenge still to be addressed—of defining new demarcation lines to specify the limits of permissible intervention in the affairs of European states.

Crisis of Legitimacy

The three crises of order now convulsing Europe are symptomatic of even more profound distress. These concern the legitimacy of the Soviet regime, the bankruptcy of one-party Communist systems in Eastern Europe, and the division of Germany.

The Legitimacy of a Leninist Party and Stalinist State

The paradox of the Soviet reform movement, advanced by glasnost and perestroika, is the reliance of Party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and his collaborators on the power and authority of the Communist party and state to effect the socioeconomic and political transformation of the Soviet Union. The security of the West and the prospects of détente hinge critically, therefore, on Gorbachev's use of authoritarian institutions, the very legitimacy of which must be raised into question as a consequence of the reforms they are charged to implement. Unlike Eastern Europe, Soviet reform was initiated and conducted primarily from the top down, without initial broad-based insistence or popular support mobilized against an entrenched party and governmental bureaucracy, habituated to unquestioning rule and skeptical of changes that would weaken their power and status.

However much Gorbachev may appear to be in formal control of the state and party apparatus and the military, obstacles to reform should not be underestimated nor should excessive trust be placed in the reliability of the
delicate and internally contradictory alliances on which his power and the reform movement appear to depend. Party and governmental bureaucracies must still be convinced, cajoled, and even coerced to implement a reform program that will decrease their influence, not to mention personal status and privileges. Moreover, judged by short-term economic measures, the Gorbachev reforms, now in train for a period longer than an American presidential term in office, have not been able to break the bureaucratic gridlock of central planning. Worse, as the worker strikes in Siberia revealed, the regime has even failed to provide for basic needs, like food and soap, or to convince Soviet workers that working harder and more efficiently, under conditions of lowered certainty about job retention (or about access to enough vodka to dull daily cares) is necessarily a sure prescription for a better life.

Ironically, the reformist forces unleashed by glasnost and perestroika contribute to their erosion. Ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan and Georgia has been unwittingly incited, religious fervor and fundamentalism, Christian and Moslem, have been aroused, and national sentiment and calls for independence, centered in the Baltic republics, have been stirred, extending to demands for political pluralism, greater freedom of expression, and the end of one-party rule. However, the reforms, unleashed by glasnost and perestroika, have yet to be fully applied to the Soviet Union itself since the Communist party continues to monopolize power. Meanwhile, the Gorbachev regime is caught between its own supporters of renewal who want even more sweeping changes to be applied at a faster pace, and still powerful conservative forces throughout the party and government who remain unreconciled to reforms at home and to the concessions made abroad on matters of socialist principle and national interest. The latter is exemplified by the INF treaty in which Moscow will destroy many more missiles than the United States. In contrast to Eastern Europe, there persists in the Soviet Union a conjectural, if objectively contradictory, convergence of bureaucratic and mass interest in stemming or slowing internal reform.

Identifying the diffuse elements of Gorbachev’s coalition reveals the delicacy of his position. First, in a formal sense, much of his power rests on his position as party chief and as the elected president of the newly constructed national legislative assembly. To this base must be added those from scattered sources who support his efforts those in the liberal professions, intellectuals, and reformist-minded clusters of party and governmental officials. Externally, he also depends on the mass support of Eastern European populations for the internal reform of their regimes and the elimination of one-party Communist rule which, paradoxically, is precisely his principal instrument to effect reform in the Soviet Union. This circularity and the dilemmas that it implies have not gone unnoticed either to the partisans or the opponents of reform. The struggle between Gorbachev and the now discredited regime of Erich Honecker in East Germany is a case study of how the politics of reform were being played out in Eastern Europe.
for the highest stakes—survival. But a reversal of fortunes cannot be excluded.

Gorbachev is also banking on increased support from Western states and corporations for greater trade, investment, credits, and technological know-how to ensure the success of his reforms. And, in light of his visit to the Vatican in November 1989, organized religion has also been enlisted into service to save and extend Soviet reforms. Could one imagine more unkindly cuts delivered to Marxist-Leninist dogma in the Soviet Union than for the Communist regime in power to rely on the opiate of the people and capitalists to ensure the success of socialism? Can one confidently predict, however, that a loose and uncoordinated group of reformers in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, of Western governments and bureaucracies, capitalist banks and corporations, and institutional religions is, necessarily, a winning coalition?

The Demise of Coerced Social Compacts

Furthermore, we cannot be certain that the political and economic revolutions spreading like a prairie fire through Eastern Europe will achieve the heady expectations putatively attributed to them. None has had a history of commitment to democratic government or much experience in making its slow and cumbersome processes work. Czechoslovakia, an untidy creation of World War I and still divided against itself along ethnic and communal lines, had only a brief encounter with democracy before succumbing, first to Nazi and then to Communist rule. Poland, having emerged after over a century of domination by three empires, did not long sustain democratic institutions after World War I and slid gradually into army rule. The experience of the other Eastern European states has hardly been more encouraging. All of these states are in a free fall where the coerced social compacts of the postwar era no longer apply, but where new, representative, and popular instruments of rule have yet to be fashioned and tried.

These emerging democratic regimes, forced to the surface by crisis and necessity, will inevitably be held responsible for surmounting the economic and political crises that vaulted them to power. Their failure can only damage the good will and confidence that their populations will have entrusted to them. The legitimacy of open institutions does not solely depend on their intrinsic worth in allowing greater pluralism and free expression. As Sir Henry Maine, no friend of popular government, observed more than a century ago, it would be a mistake to assume that the functions of democracy and those of a monarchy were essentially different.

Like their authoritarian predecessors, the fragile and still ill-formed democracies of Eastern Europe must still deliver on security and welfare, while burdened, perhaps beyond the breaking point, by a history of accumulating economic disasters, gross inefficiency and mismanagement,
and flagrant corruption. There is now much talk throughout the Soviet Union and its Eastern empire that a whole generation was lost to flawed social experimentation. Is it reasonable to expect that, simultaneously, the sins of the past can be quickly overcome and that present urgencies can be addressed? But if the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe fail, can corrosive cynicism and the demoralization of these populations be stayed? While historical analogies always limit themselves, the experience of the Weimar Republic is not encouraging in these respects. Widespread unrest and social dislocation, first with the impoverishment of the middle class in the 1920s and then the misery of the working classes in the Great Depression of the 1930s, provoked the search for radical solution to escape from the impasse and prepared the way for the rise to power of the Nazi regime.

The Division of Germany

The Soviet and Eastern European crises of legitimacy have led inexorably to a third, the bonded parts of which, while conceptually distinguishable, are politically and morally indissociable. The bankruptcy of the East German regime and the division of Germany. As offspring of the Cold War, both violate universally recognized principles of legitimacy, national self-determination and popular sovereignty, both stand against nationalism, the most powerful and durable emotional force of the past several centuries. Toleration of these exceptions (or ignoring them) could be justified since, under Cold War conditions, there was little that could be practically done about them except to ameliorate their harshest features (hence Bonn’s passionate commitment to détente since the formation of the Grand Coalition in the 1960s). Moreover, the frustration of principle and emotion were partly the price and the provisional solution to a German national expansionism that, arguably, had plunged Europe into war three times in less than a century.¹⁸

The barriers to posing the issue of German unification now appear to have breached along with the Berlin wall. The initiative of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, without prior consultation with foreign capitals, in proposing a ten-point plan for the gradual German confederation and eventual unification, evidences the rapid Germanization of the unification issue beyond the control, if still not the weighty influence, of the Big Four powers.¹⁹ Both the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties are on record as favoring discussion of the problem which, as late as early November 1989 would have been considered premature at best.

The political vacuum in East Germany and the call of reformers and New Forum leaders for free elections and a vote on unification swells internal support for addressing unification and linking it with East German democratization. Unlike the other states of Eastern Europe, East Germany is a progeny of the Cold War. Its existence and tenuous legitimacy hinges...
decisively on that power arrangement and regime. As the Cold War unravels, it is no accident that the East German regime followed suit at an even faster rate of dismemberment. That it may be able to retain a separate state existence, if the issue were put to a free vote of the German people, would appear to be problematic. The continued existence of two German states would signify a reversal of historic trends. That would imply, as de Gaulle would have been the first to deny, that the German people, who had been activated to support gigantic national efforts for the sake of national union and then to sustain two world wars in this century at incalculable cost, would abandon their past. It would also mean an exception to the rule applied by all other peoples who have affirmed the nation-state and their own national identity, quite apart from differing ideological or political persuasion or regional differentiation, as the principal sources of legitimate authority.

Aside from these powerful atavistic urgencies for national union, there are also persuasive practical considerations pressing for unification now that the Cold War wall has been breached. Why should East Germany be a burdensome ward of West Germany, as reformers in East Germany recognize, when its population can speed their economic development by being integrated within a larger German polity and European Community, freeing their own underutilized human and material resources in the bargain? If the ruling Christian Democratic Party is prepared to confront the issue, despite the obvious costs to the West German economy in the shortrun, the Social Democratic Party also has incentive to continue its embrace of unification, a mark of the party since its formation. As former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer feared, the SPD might well be the principal beneficiary at the polls of an expanded electorate, although this outcome is by no means a certainty. Economic and political interests conspire with moral imperatives and deep-seated nationalism to erode the supports for anomalous German exceptionalism.

No one can predict how the issue of German unification will be resolved. The Cold War solution is no longer viable unless it is reinstated by Soviet arms. The neighbors of the two Germanies and the Big Four will undoubtedly exert pressures, already at work in their initial reaction to the German crisis, to retain as much of their receding wartime rights and their droit de regard over German security policy. The Germanization of the German issue limits the influence of these external forces when they come into clash with those arising from within the two Germanies and from deep within the German volk. *Le Monde*’s editor, André Fontaine, has captured this new political condition within Europe as well as anyone. It is the assumption and point of departure on which further speculation about Germany must henceforward proceed. Whatever one may hope or fear, whatever one may think of polls, more or less contradictory, conducted on the subject of the two Germanies, it leaps out at you that [the German people]
are engaged down the path of their unification, if not as a state, then as a
nation. The men, women, and children who mixed together for three days
from one end of the wall to the other, suddenly breachable, belonged to the
same people, spoke the same language, repaired to the same moral and
cultural references, [and] constituted one single family.  

If the division of Europe and Germany were illegitimate, then the Cold
War regime that produced it is also illegitimate and has to be undone. But
if German unification can be achieved—a concession that, as Walter
Lippmann recognized over forty years ago, only the Soviet Union had the
power ultimately to grant—what purpose then do the two alliances serve?
Much of the raison d'être of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to protect each
bloc's German segment, would no longer exist if Germany were peacefully
unified. The two Germanies could no longer function as key elements of
rival military organizations, nor could German soil be prepared as the future
battleground between the two blocs. The problem for the West will be
particularly acute. Most of NATO's conventional forces are now supplied by
West Germany, and they would have no purpose to serve aside from policing
their own territory. The problem of checking possible future German
expansionism would remain (to the degree that it is still a problem), but,
however resolved, this residual of World War II cannot be addressed within
the framework of the existing bloc system since it rests squarely on Germany's
continued division.

Crisis in Welfare

From Command to Market Economies

The crises in order and legitimacy are entangled—and reinforced—by
the crisis of welfare that, while most dramatically played out in the Eastern
European uprisings, is in actuality of global proportions. Its European
dimension has at least three components of differing insistence and priority.
The first is the obvious failure of the socialist economic systems of Eastern
Europe to provide for basic consumer needs, to sustain innovation and
technological development, and to compete in a world market. The GNP of
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states is one-third that of the
Western alliance states and Japan. The gap is widening, not closing. Japan,
with half the population, may well surpass the Soviet Union in output before
long. As Paul Dibb persuasively argues, the Soviet Union is a one-sided
superpower—Upper Volta with nuclear weapons, as German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt disparagingly observed.

Transforming command economies will be neither easy nor cheap.
There is, first of all, the thorny issue of public ownership and privatization.
Aside from the problems of how a socialist state sells, leases, and divests itself
of the national ownership of the means of the production, it is not clear how
these bankrupt enterprises can be made attractive to foreign investors or foreign governments with credits to spare, even if these proprietary issues could be solved. The absence of managerial talent accustomed to market competition and the labor resistance to expose itself to unemployment and fluctuating wage rates are also formidable barriers to reform. Habits die hard. Western models of family ownership and entrepreneurship in agriculture are not readily adaptable to collectivization. Shock treatments that would permit the price of food to rise steeply to reflect true production costs might well prompt riots similar to those in other countries where such unpalatable remedies were applied (Egypt and Poland). In any event, this option is hardly calculated to win the support of workers and peasants for reforms. Finally, those who enjoy privilege and status under the existing system do not appear ready, without a fight, to relinquish their hold on the economy.

An Open or Closed Europe

The second crisis of welfare is less obvious but in the long run it is more critical for Europe's (and the globe's) future. If a capitalist-based, market system has performed better than command economies (arguably, a matter of faint praise rather than a fully satisfying accomplishment), the chronic problems of unemployment, poverty, and the uneven and unequal distribution of wealth continue to plague the developed states. Exposing the dismal failure of Stalinist socialism, however, does little to quiet the demands for greater social welfare endemic to contemporary mass society. The renewed determination of the European states to achieve an integrated market by 1992 responds to imperatives that cannot be met solely within a national framework. It is no accident that France has been in the forefront of this movement and that Community President Jacques Delors, a former French economics minister under the first Socialist government of the Fifth Republic, is the Community's most prominent spokesman for market integration. The conspicuous failure of the French Socialist government's failure in the early 1980s to solve France's unemployment and underinvestment problems through national pump-priming techniques—classical Keynesianism—testifies to the impotence of purely national initiatives that defy market forces and that run counter to the fiscal policies of other, more powerful states.

Integrating the Community's markets is only half the problem. Doing so in a fashion that addresses Eastern European, U.S., and world needs is quite another matter. There is no plan, nor was one contemplated, to define Community integration in a way that would respond to the upheaval in Eastern Europe. There are the specific issues of East Germany and of a stronger, united Germany. These raise new and nettling questions of special Community rules to adapt to circumstances radically different from those underlying the initial decision in 1985 to set 1992 as the target date for integrating Western European markets. Keeping West Germany focused on
the Community as its top priority will also be difficult enough under the pressure of resolving the East German revolution.

There is also the question of Community discrimination. It can assume many forms, from classical tariffs and quotas to special rules and criteria for access to the European market, resting quite conceivably on a common currency under central European bank management. The stakes are high since the European market will exceed that of the United States. Protectionist pressures are clearly abroad, evidenced by trans-Atlantic controversies over corporate investiture, the status of foreign banks, meat health standards, and European limits on the purchase of TV programs from offshore sources falling below a certain percentage of European investment. These pressures show no sign of abatement in the immediate future, partly as a consequence of the progressive decentralization of the global economic system and the emergence of new centers of economic power and influence. It would be an irony of epic proportions that, at the very time that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states were demanding entry into the liberal capitalist system, the beneficiaries of that system would retreat from their own success.

**Strengthening the Liberal Economic System**

This ironic circumstance exposes a third crisis, viz., the current challenge to the liberal capitalist regime that must work within a political order composed of sovereign nation-states under pressure from domestic populations and corporate and labor interests to maximize national advantage even at the expense of others. Whereas a hegemonic United States was prepared and endowed in the postwar period to assume the global burden for the security of a capitalist market system and to absorb the cost and discrimination for its effective operation and extension, it is no longer willing or of sufficient economic weight to play these roles alone, yet there exists no ready substitutes for their performance. Neither Germany nor Japan, despite their economic strength and dynamism, is eager or fully able to fill the vacuum. While international economic cooperation is a precondition for surmounting current welfare crises and for contributing to the resolution of the order and legitimacy imperatives sketched earlier, there is no agreed upon formula on how to proceed. Nor are international economic institutions adequate to the task of eliciting and institutionalizing needed reforms and initiatives to meet the demands of populations everywhere for more—now—the useful phrase of Samuel Gompers in describing the aims of the early labor movement in the United States.

Indeed, the increasing budget deficits and decreasing competitiveness of the U.S. economy—matched by unprecedented borrowing from abroad to finance a lifestyle that exceeds its national means—deepen the global welfare crisis. The bankruptcy of the socialist model and the relative misery of
developing states only serve to temporarily mask these issues. The market crash of fall 1987 suggests that structural fault lines persist within the international economic system, subjecting the system to unforeseen shocks and even threatening its collapse. Symptomatic is the progressive rise of protectionism to protect home markets and to increase exports and to control investments at home and abroad. Nationally driven mercantilist incentives are inherent in the nation-state system and they cannot be tamed or tempered simply by pious, if well-intentioned, appeals to international cooperation.

Crisis or Opportunities?

The crises confronting Europe are systemic and simultaneous in their reinforcing challenge to the efficacy and legitimacy of the existing European order and welfare system. The strategies that we pursue—and the hard choices that they imply—to turn these crises to advantage must also be synchronous with their evolution and equal in scope to their sweep and complexity. Incrementalism won't do, whatever its allures in simpler and seemingly stabler times. Nor should we be distracted by contrived debates about the end of history, with the purported triumph of liberal egalitarianism. Incrementalism is mindless since it provides no criteria or goals other than short-term expediency to shape the future. Conversely, recent specious appeals to Hegelian dialectics for understanding are directionless since the future is explained as a linear projection of a simplistic interpretation of the past. So much is explained that little is revealed. There would also be no little irony in the West's adoption of an outmoded form of historical analysis to guide policymaking at the very time that it has been rejected by its Marxist-Leninist proponents.

So what should we do and how should we proceed to reassemble the European Rubik's Cube to suit our purposes? Only the barest outlines of an approach can be sketched here. Several obvious principles suggest themselves to assist us in orienting ourselves to the crises before us. First, we must recognize that the crises outlined above are not matters simply of managing conflict within a Cold War regime, but the end of that regime and of all its essential components. As with all old regimes, past habits, interests, and fears—rooted in the old order—will persist. As de Tocqueville eloquently describes, remnants of the feudal and aristocratic Ancien Régime survived even as they were overtaken by new and more powerful democratic forces. The demise of military blocs, German unification, Eastern European democratization, the reinstitution of market practices and open institutions in the Soviet Union will not be accomplished overnight, if ever. The arrest of these trends—even their reversal—cannot be excluded from a projection of the future, now only dimly discernible in the countervailing forces at play in the foreground of our present view. What is ruled out, however, is any notion that the comfortable assumptions of the Cold War will prevail or,
despite the best hopes generated by the present upheavals, that the future will necessarily be better than the past.

Second, what we do—or don't do—will count in the same way that the titanic efforts mounted by the West since World War II to protect and promote its interests and values have counted until now. As Kennan and the architects of the postwar world partially foresaw, many of Europe's problems today, not ironically, are in appreciable measure the product of the example and attraction of Western ways, which flourished behind the protective glacis of the Western military alliance. In contrast to those that now argue that we can do little to help, especially in assisting the process of glasnost and perestroika, we should be aware that the gap between the socioeconomic development of the West and the East urged a radical break from the Soviet past. To be sure, a small and determined group of men acted in the Kremlin to initiate internal change; however, they did not act within a vacuum but rather in reaction to the comparative disadvantage of the Soviet Union in its competition with the West. That competition could not be sustained within the oppressive political atmosphere of the Stalinist-Brezhnev system under conditions of stifling bureaucratic stasis and of hypertrophied expenditures for a sprawling military establishment dedicated to bolstering coercive state power at home and a faltering empire abroad.

But ideas and example will not be enough to effect desirable change anymore than they were during and after World War II. The success of the Soviet reform effort and of the Gorbachev regime depends on a tenuous and uncoordinated coalition of forces, as sketched earlier, that are by no means internally coherent, cumulative, or consistent in the direction toward which they are pointing. If the powerful elite and mass pressures that have produced irresistible demands for greater personal and social freedoms (ethnic, national, and communal), for more welfare now, and for a new political order are to be satisfied short of devouring the revolutions that are heir to them, the West will have to coordinate its collective thinking and resources to meet them for the sake of its own self-interest. Need we be reminded of the Iranian case in our time or of the French and the first Russian Revolution? These movements released destructive forces that negated the high ideals that were, purportedly, their announced aim to achieve.

Third, as the Gorbachev example suggests, we must be prepared to embrace the future, not only to be relieved of the heavy and multiple costs, risks, and burdens of the Cold War, but also to exploit the opportunities of new beginnings in Europe. The French have a useful phrase for this unsettling condition and the recommended solution—une fuite en avant—in which the impediments and uncertainties of the present are resolved by a leap into the future—not a senseless and ill-directed leap, but one acutely informed by the unexpected conclusion, reached through sober analysis, that
conventional wisdom and old habits are unable to surmount Europe's crises. How else can one fully explain what is at play in the wholesale changes initiated by Gorbachev and his reformist collaborators or the breathless pace with which they are moving, but to ensure that their innovations are implemented quickly to have some promise of success?

**Arms Control Negotiations**

We can embrace the future in several ways. We should press hard at Vienna and Geneva to reach early arms accords that will ensure, through comprehensive and intrusive verification and monitoring procedures, that neither side can attack the other and that, if an attack is launched, it will fail. In short, we should work for no surprises or breakthroughs. But, deep Soviet cuts of nuclear strategic forces and offensive conventional forces (tanks, artillery, armor, helicopters, ground support aircraft) will have to be matched by the West. Call the Soviets hand on their announced commitment to defensive-defense and their acceptance of the principle of asymmetrical cuts but not with the idea that the West can expect to emerge militarily ascendant from the exercise.

Moreover, we should not exclude anything from negotiations. Notwithstanding civilian and military bureaucratic interests (not to mention fear of a conservative backlash in Congress), naval forces, short-range nuclear weapons, and shared rules for limiting the modernization of Soviet and American forces will have to be addressed. Arms control accords must provide for genuine disarmament, and not cover and legitimate the modernization or actual expansion of military capabilities as they have in the past. At a minimum, in the next several months, the West should reach quick accord with the Warsaw pact on lowered conventional and nuclear force levels that it will have to accept in any case, as internal budgetary and welfare pressures at work on Western governments inexorably weaken and hollow out NATO forces. Turn Necessity and wavering commitment to virtues.

**Adapting the Military to a New International Environment**

We should bring armed force levels and military spending into line with a receding Soviet threat and with shrinking resources available for defense. There is obviously no easy or unexceptional formula to strike the right balance. The new political and strategic realities emerging from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, outlined above, provide a reasonable and prudent set of assumptions on which to plan for the gradual but ordered diminution of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces in lockstep with Soviet and Warsaw Pact reductions to ensure Western security and a basis for meeting new strategic needs.
First, budget cuts should be calculated in real dollars, and not in phony bureaucratic bargaining chips. The $180 billion cuts announced by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney are based on the optimistic assumption of an actual rise in defense spending over five years against which the $180 billion in Pentagon cuts is then deducted, leaving the military essentially untouched. The days of Weinberger and roses are over. The successive fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the disarray within the Soviet empire and the Warsaw Pact, the rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine, and lowered Soviet military spending dramatically reduce U.S. and Western military requirements in Europe. The awesome (and growing) nuclear capabilities of the Western states, including the United States, Britain, and France, also counsel a slowdown in producing redundant nuclear forces, pending the outcome of current and follow-on nuclear arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

As for strategic nuclear weapons, the relevant question is what mix of nuclear forces is formidable enough to preclude any Soviet incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons, yet sufficiently reassuring to the Soviet Union to forestall the perpetuation of a costly and risky nuclear arms race. The nuclear stalemate between the superpowers since the 1950s affords ample proof that unlimited spending for offensive and defensive nuclear capabilities in pursuit of a nuclear warfighting strategy—the ill-considered responses of the early Kennedy and Reagan administrations to their exaggerated projections of the Soviet military threat—provides neither a fruitful nor a feasible answer. The answer lies in coordinating the shared U.S. and Soviet interest in avoiding a nuclear war and in decreasing the costs and risk of a nuclear arms race.

The United States could take several steps to assist unilaterally this superpower coordination process while putting pressure on the Soviets to agree to deep cuts in their nuclear forces and to slow their modernization program. Spending for the rail-mobile MX and the Midgetman missile could well be halted without risk to national security. The moratorium could be used as a bargaining lever in the START talks to induce the Soviets to eliminate one or both of their mobile systems. There is no need to imitate the Soviet Union simply for imitation's sake. The U.S. nuclear triad today, and its planned modernization, especially with the expansion of Trident II forces, is sufficiently powerful and invulnerable to discourage a Soviet first strike.

The B-1 force should be improved as a stand-off platform with all deliberate speed. No one seriously argues that it can perform the role of a penetrating bomber. Its shortcomings, not least among them its flawed electronics countermeasure package, fall short of requirements for such a
mission. Arming this aircraft with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) would strengthen the triad at a reasonable cost.

In tandem with upgrading the B-1 bomber force as a stand-off delivery platform, no more B-2s should be purchased than the thirteen already under contract until its cost-effectiveness can be demonstrated and a realistic military mission devised for it. At a cost of up to $1 billion a copy, the B-2 raises serious questions about its dubious mission and the claim of supporters that it will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses. It makes little sense to pay so high a price for destroying Soviet targets in a post attack environment. It is by no means clear that there will be any lucrative military installations worth destroying, nor certain that, once B-2s turn on their radar to find them, they will remain in a stealth mode. There are other, less costly ways to deliver ordnance on target. The Air Force's fixed attachment to a penetrating bomber confuses a commitment to a particular weapon system—the manned bomber—with the fulfillment of a strategic mission, somewhat akin to the Army's pre-World War II attachment to the horse cavalry which inhibited its adjustment to the new conditions of tank warfare.

The Trident II and the D-5 missile are still the most cost-effective segments of the triad, although this weapon systems also has its economic and strategic drawbacks. Particularly troubling is the Navy's limitation of its nuclear missile capabilities to so few platforms. If the Geneva talks succeed, each Trident submarine will very likely be forced to carry a smaller payload than the twenty-four MIRVed missiles for which it was originally designed. Moreover, as insurance against Soviet improvements in ASW, a new generation of smaller ballistic missile submarines might well be undertaken if savings can be made in cutting back on other, more vulnerable, costly, and suspect strategic capabilities, like the rail-mobile MX or the B-2. While the triad is a useful hedge against a surprise Soviet attack, aimed at disarming the United States, it does not follow that all segments should be expected, independently, to execute the nation's single integrated operational targeting plan.

Complementing these initiatives should be a Soviet-American accord on nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. A total ban could conceivably be verified at the production facilities phase of these weapons, reducing the verification requirements of inspections at sea, while leaving the Navy free to develop conventionally armed cruise missiles. Moreover, given the greater vulnerability of the U.S. coastline to cruise attack than that of the Soviet Union, the United States has greater incentive to seek such a ban than does the Soviet Union.

As for conventional forces, the recent build up and modernization of U.S. nonnuclear forces counsels against the acceleration of new systems, like the advanced tactical fighter at $100 billion a copy or the Burke class destroyer.
at $1 billion each. If the Soviets can be induced to reduce substantially their offensive conventional forces in Europe at the conventional arms talks in Vienna, the current U.S. arms control position to limit U.S. cuts to a level of 275,000 troops or 10 percent appears to be both too cautious and unduly costly. It takes scant account of the precipitous erosion of Warsaw Pact military capabilities in the wake of the political reforms in Eastern Europe. The maintenance of high U.S. troop levels, as Senator Sam Nunn has argued, means that Soviet troop levels would then be maintained at levels above those desired by Western and Eastern European states. Current planning goals to have ten divisions, 100 tactical air squadrons, and a Marine brigade in Europe within ten days of Warsaw Pact mobilization should be considered a contingency plan subject to reductions pending follow-on accords between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Meanwhile, increased funds should be earmarked for reserves over active forces and units in Europe should be gradually redeployed in phases to U.S. bases. Carrier forces can also be safely reduced to twelve carrier battle groups from the current level of fourteen, if reduced Soviet military spending, particularly for naval forces, is taken into account and if the Navy can be led to cooperate with the other armed forces, particularly the Air Force, in eliminating Soviet naval forces and coastal installations in the event of war.

Resolving the German Problem

As for the issues of political legitimacy and economic welfare, several lines of thinking recommend themselves. Let the people of the two Germanies decide the question of how they will associate themselves, including the terms and conditions of unification, through free elections. That confederation or unified government can be expected to negotiate with the Four Powers and its neighbors to assure them that the past is indeed past—German revanchist sentiments and a desire for expansion, if still present, are containable within a larger Europe—and that the political and economic futures of Germany's(ies) neighbors will be the product of peaceful bargaining and negotiations.

We are not without precedents and incipient institutions to encourage this evolution. The German Grand Coalition and the Bonn government under Willy Brandt demonstrated that mutual accord and accommodation can be reached on war guilt and on settling national boundaries. The Conference on Security and Cooperation, the framework for the Vienna talks, is a ready instrument within which to resolve the question of U.S. and Soviet presence in Europe (both are European powers under the Helsinki Accords) and to facilitate the gradual transformation of the military blocs into guaranty pacts as bulwarks of a peaceful, free, and prosperous Europe. None of this will be easy, all of it will take time and anguish to accomplish in some fashion, but a process of East-West engagement that leads from detente to entente and cooperation from the Atlantic to the Urals holds out more hope.
and benefit than the inertial perpetuation of Cold War thinking for want of explored alternatives

It also appears heroically optimistic to believe that a unified Germany can remain solely within the Atlantic Alliance. President Bush insisted on this condition in his Brussels speech of December 1989 in his report to NATO allies about the Malta talks. Gorbachev’s subsequent speech to the Soviet Congress, insisting on the sovereign rights of the GDR, should lay to rest any illusions about a Western dictated solution to German unification. One helpful way to approach the future is to return to the past—to the point in time referred to as zero by the Germans when the Third Reich fell and the power vacuum in Central Europe was filled by the Big Four. The members of the Allied Coalition that defeated Nazi Germany have equal claims to be protected from any possibility of future German expansionism. If casualties and damage are counted, the Soviet Union has an even stronger claim than its wartime allies to be assured of its security. The logic of these contradictory forces—Big Four security interests, differences over assuring them, and German sentiment for unity—leads to the conclusion that Germany must either join both alliances within the framework, say, of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or withdraw from both, following the Austrian example. In either case, Moscow and Washington will have to join to guarantee Europe’s security and Germany’s pacification in a post-Cold War world. On the assumption of a genuine demilitarization of the central front and of Soviet offensive capabilities, would such a security arrangement be all that bad?

Economics of Peace

Why not consider the proposition of massive aid for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Why should the West be hesitant to spend a fraction of the trillions that it spent on defense to ensure that the changes that it has long demanded are preserved and promoted in Eastern Europe? It is not a question of throwing money at the problem in the naive hope that simply transferring resources to the East will be efficacious. First, in the short run, the Western nations, including a reluctant Japan, must expand and coordinate its efforts to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of Eastern Europe. For the long run, they must simultaneously develop plans, in cooperation with the Eastern Europeans, for meeting the capital, managerial, and technological requirements that are preconditions for the transformation of these flawed economic systems in adapting to an open, market system.

Acute shortages of food and basic necessities (soap, fuel, medicines, and clothing) should be met to preclude mass unrest and disillusionment, the conditions for a conservative backlash in Eastern Europe. For the future, a pooled Western developmental fund should be organized, an idea floated by French President François Mitterrand, to furnish the capital needed to force-
start new enterprises in socialist states on the condition that the reforms continue. Foreign assistance will be needed, as Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, an adviser to the non-Communist Warsaw government, argues, to tide the Eastern European states over in this long transition process by providing safety nets of unemployment insurance, job retraining, and health care. This would establish a supportive economic structure and a salubrious investment climate encouraging to private investors. Such long-term assistance must obviously be dovetailed with the progressive extension of political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and accompanied by assurances that they would not be overturned. Otherwise, as Andrei Sakharov suggested, the West would be pouring water into loose sand.

The United States should also press its European partners to widen the Economic Community beyond the twelve as soon as possible to encompass the states of Eastern Europe, including eventually the Soviet Union. German energies will then be absorbed in a greater Europe to which its own political and economic ambitions will be irretrievably entangled. Such a large and admittedly sprawling assemblage, whether partially integrated or open to flexible arrangements for conditional association, would relax some of the concern about the prospect of a protectionist Europe emerging in 1992. Such a Europe of patres (national fatherlands) is not likely to become any time soon a political force for expansion, but it would be an antidote to war and the framework within which regional and global economic cooperation could be facilitated based on most-favored nation principles. As a gesture of good faith, the United States should immediately repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment that denies application of this principle to the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union is a partner within an enlarged European Community—which might give form and substance to Gorbachev's vague reference to a common European home—then the criticisms of those who fear foreign intervention into Soviet affairs through Western economic imperialism might be somewhat stilled.

Reform at Home

How well the United States will profit from favorable changes within the international environment will critically depend on how well it reacts internally to these opportunities for ending the Cold War in Europe and for relaxing the global superpower struggle. First, unless there is a fundamental reform of the budgetary and strategic planning and decision making process, there will be no effective way of knowing that the nation will get its money's worth for defense or of assuring that it will have an adequate defense. The decentralization of the defense policy process inhibits an economically efficient and strategically effective military posture. Several bad habits must be curbed—the ability of the services to resist cooperation and the rationalization of roles and missions, must be curbed along with the political clout of the iron-triangle of Congress, the military services, and arms.
producers that foster waste and redundancy, and Congressional habits of micromanagement and constituent intervention that substitute for strategic direction and oversight of defense policy.

Recent efforts, like the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Goldwater-Nichols, to strengthen the coordinating power of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are steps in the right direction, but reform has not gone far enough to provide the President and the Congress with military plans and budgetary proposals independent of parochial service interests and those castellated around them from Congressional and corporate sources. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS should be given greater authority to evaluate service capabilities in terms of over-all roles and missions, to reduce unnecessary duplication in weapons procurement, and to elicit service cooperation in devising a national strategy based on national needs rather than on narrow bureaucratic, corporate, or pork barrel interests.

Moreover, it is not enough that the Department of Defense be reformed to effect cuts in defense spending. These cannot be resisted anyway by the Pentagon if current political and economic trends persist. The more challenging task is to make cuts that make strategic sense. As military requirements in Europe diminish, new and heretofore neglected strategic missions need to be addressed. These include the protection of allies, such as Israel, peacekeeping operations under UN and international auspices, and intervention abroad for humanitarian purposes to protect life and property and, where feasible, to ensure open institutions and international standards of conduct. New weapons, organizational units, training, and strategies will have to be designed for these missions. In reorienting and adapting the military establishment to a post-Cold War international environment, we should not deceive ourselves into believing that defining new roles and missions will be easy or conflict free. As U.S. interventions in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama reveal, these are not self-evident aims nor are they mutually compatible. The best we can hope for is candor and accountability in their pursuit—criteria recognized more in the breach than in the observance in Iran-Contra—as a basis for military planning. A precondition for a domestically supportable, internationally viable, and cost-effective strategic posture is the fixing of greater responsibility for decisions within the Pentagon in the offices of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. In the absence of pinpointing authority, responsibility, and accountability, we will be held hostage to a diffuse and decentralized decisionmaking and political process that has produced almost untold waste, that has fostered corruption, and that, arguably, has not always produced the kinds of military capabilities and plans we needed to meet our own long-term security and welfare needs.

Second, real cuts in defense spending should be redeployed to arrest receding United States economic competitiveness and declining techno-
scientific leadership which are the principal threats to U.S. strength today. While a national debate is needed to determine how this defense dividend should be spent, there are several worthy, and not necessarily mutually exclusive, targets for these released funds. Among these are reductions in the national debt (aimed at lowering interest rates and increasing incentives for investment), tax breaks for innovation and product development as well as for faster write-offs for plant renewal to increase efficiency and exports, and improvement in the nation's education, transportation, and logistics base to promote productivity and economic growth.

Finally, strong U.S. leadership is needed as never before precisely because of the relative decline of U.S. economic power compared to the immediate postwar period when Washington was pretty much able to have its way. If raw American power does not weigh as much as before, then intelligent direction and careful use of the resources that we have assume heightened importance. The margins for error are narrower and the prospects of having a positive impact are lower, yet the stakes have never been greater. We might do well to stop lamenting the loss of hegemony that may have been illusory—certainly fleeting—in a world of over four billion contentious peoples, grouped in states, still at sixes and sevens with themselves. We should not count out quickly an economy of over four trillion dollars, nor military forces unsurpassed by any other nation on the globe. Nor should the asset of an energetic and talented population be forgotten or denigrated as the most decisive and replenishable resource at our disposal.

The American experiment is also relevant to the European crises. They are microcosms of larger global problems associated with the continuing quest for a more durable, prosperous, and just socioeconomic and political regime than those that came before. Like the American experiment, the world community is engaged more in a continuing process of change and renewal than in the pursuit of a fixed or Grand Design. The American experience testifies to the possibility—forged admittedly by civil war and strife—that regional, ethnic, national, racial, and communal differences can be transcended in defining a rule of law and social compact that rests on solid popular consent.

A great people does not need great leaders. What is needed simply are leaders of sufficient inner light and strength to explain the State of the Union to each age and to mark out plainly, without adulteration, the sacrifices, material and psychological, that have to be made to achieve a more perfect Union whose frontiers—traced in the European revolutions partly of our own making—have no clearly discernible limits.
Notes

1 The reference is, of course, to the remark of Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, at the start of World War I. The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime. Quoted in Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 122.

2 There are exceptions. President Charles de Gaulle, so much a burr in the saddle of successive Washington presidential regimes, was one of the few who predicted, and strove for, the eventual demise of the Cold War regime although he, too, did not foresee that it would be generated by a second Russian Revolution. See Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle Le Souverain* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), vol. 3 and the author's *French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1974.

3 There is no better place to start to understand why neither superpower got the Europe it wanted, but gradually adjusted to the divided Europe it got, than Anton De Porte's *Europe and the Superpowers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, 2nd ed.).


7 See n. 5. What Kennan could not foresee, nor could anyone else, was that reform would emerge from the top, within the ruling party, and not from below from the disgruntled masses.


12 Ibid

13 *Chicago Tribune*, June 8, 1989

14 *New York Times*, October 24, 1989


18 See DePorte’s authoritative discussion, n 3

19 *New York Times*, November 29, 1989

20 See the penetrating evaluation of the German problem and the need to create a European political framework to enlist and absorb Germany’s national power, energy and talents into a larger political enterprise than national aggrandizement. Charles de Gaulle, *Discourse et Messages* (Paris: Plon, 1970), IV, pp. 337-342. De Gaulle was the only political leader in the West, including Konrad Adenauer, who took the issue of unification
seriously and attempted, through the Fouchet Plan and the opening of detente process with the Soviet Union to resolve this issue


22 *Le Monde*, Selection Hebdomadaire, November 16-22, 1989, p 4

23 This argument is De Gaulle’s. It is a critical of the Cold War was as incisive as it was powerless in convincing either superpower to settle their struggle, at least in Europe. See n 2


27 Ortega y Gasset’s *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York Mentor Books, 1950), a reprint of a 1932 publication, can still be read with profit

28 The motivation underlying the 1985 decision of the European Community to integrate Western European markets is perceptively reviewed by, Martin Wolf of the *Financial Times* in 1992 Global Implications of the European Community’s Programme for Completing the Internal Market, Lehrman Institute Policy Paper, April, 1989. Supportive analysis for French motivation is found in Janice McCormick, *Thorns among the Roses A Year of the Socialist Experiment in France*, *West European Politics*, VI, No 1 (January 1983), especially pp 42-56


30 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History? The National Interest*, No 16 (Summer 1989), pp 3-18. Alexis de Tocqueville would have had considerable trouble understanding the mystical argument of Francis Fukuyama, drawn from Hegel, that the end of history is at hand with the putative victory of the liberal egalitarian paradigm. The experience of developed and certainly of developing states is certainly not altogether encouraging in this regard. Even if the optimistic assumption were made that democracy as a mass concept will triumph, the profound tensions resulting from the conflicting claims of freedom and equality remain. See n 31. And as de Gaulle and Schumpeter
remind us, there is also the fissiparous force of nationalism that has yet to be tamed. As a force in international politics, it presumes differentiation and discrimination, and, as a principle guiding behavior, it is neither necessarily consistent nor compatible with either freedom or equality.


33 This is hardly a novel posing of the issue. What is remarkable is the resistance of powerful elements within the security community and the Pentagon to internalize this assumption in their strategic thinking. Thomas Schelling's characterization of this strategic dilemma, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960) remains the classic statement.


35 These suggestions closely follow those advanced by Lawrence Korb in the *New York Times*, November 23, 1989.

36 Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who should know better, shares these illusions. See his analysis of the events in Eastern Europe in *Newsweek*, December 4, 1989, p. 52.
