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**THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICIES
OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE THEORY
AND NUCLEAR STABILITY**

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Part 3

STATEMENT OF PLANS

THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICIES OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE THEORY AND NUCLEAR STABILITY

SUMMARY

This study has two purposes. First, it attempts to explain why the Western nuclear states pursue divergent and partially competing deterrence policies. Differences will be shown to derive principally from differential perceptions by American, French, and British policy-makers of external threats (including those posed by the nuclear systems of alliance partners), dissimilar technological and economic resource constraints and, most critically, the varying domestic political divisions within each state and its responses to the imperatives of alliance cohesion.

Second the study will try to identify the implications of differential nuclear policies for the maintenance of nuclear stability.

CURRENT STATE OF DETERRENCE THEORY


The model currently used to explain nuclear deterrence is derived largely from the work of such seminal theorists of the 1950s and 1960s as Thomas Schelling (1960, 1966), Herman Kahn (1960, 1965), William Kaufmann (1954), Bernard Brodie (1946, 1959), Glenn H. Snyder (1961), et al. Despite variations in emphasis (and at the risk of simplification),¹ they may be said to share four principal assumptions about deterrence behavior. First, the state is perceived as a unitary actor, seeking, through the manipulation of nuclear threats, to maximize security as a dominant value. Second, nations pursuing nuclear deterrent policies are perceived as following similar, prescribed strategies. Third, changes in a state's deterrence policy is viewed as externally determined, the result of anticipated reactions to the behavior of its opponent. Fourth, the domestic policy-making process for deterrence is conceived as a "black box" from which similar patterns of deterrence behavior emerge regardless of regime, national differences or divisions within the society.

First-wave theorists formulated their analyses in terms of responses to three central questions or imperatives. First, what are the threats to a state's security? Second, what kind of strategic doctrine, weapon systems, and force levels best respond to these threats? And, third, what arms control policies best complement the state's strategic doctrine and military posture? Responses to these questions constitute the key components of a state's deterrence strategy.

Figure 1 outlines the causal relations implied in first-wave thinking. Threat perceptions, doctrinal and weapons responses, and arms control strategies are pictured as the products of logically ordered cognitive processes. The object of

¹ The approach of first-wave thinkers has considerably more power than can be described here. That the theoretical approach first sketched by analysts like Schelling is still a very powerful tool is suggested by the work of Brams et al (e.g. Brams, 1985).

Figure 1 UNITARY ACTOR PARADIGM



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each decision is the maximization of national security values. Other values are subordinated to the security imperative. Nuclear policy is adversary driven and the resulting nuclear balance between them tends toward equilibrium if the opponents cooperate. If not, the stage is set for a potentially destabilizing arms race or war.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO FIRST-WAVE THEORY

Over the past several years, a growing body of literature has raised serious theoretical and empirical problems (not to mention moral questions) about first-wave thinking. First, the United States, France, and Great Britain do not conform to a unitary actor model (Allison, 1971, Scheinman, 1965, and Freedman, 1981). Second, the nuclear strategies of the Western nuclear states diverge on key elements of deterrence (Kolodziej, 1985). Third, the deterrence behavior of the Western nuclear states can only be partially attributable to adversary moves and messages (Neustadt, 1970 and George and Smoke, 1974). Fourth, conflict between adversaries is partially a domestic phenomenon (Lebow, 1981, Jervis, 1985).

Figure 2 presents an alternative understanding of the causal relationships that explain a state's deterrent policy as a function of its response to the three imperatives outlined in Figure 1. It identifies key variables which potentially provide a more accurate explanation of the determinants of the nuclear policies of the Western democracies than first-wave analysis. It not only includes the notion of the reciprocal impact of adversary behavior but also (1) the decision-making processes of the antagonists, (2) the perceptual, valuational, and cognitive biases of the opponents that affect their interpretation of adversary behavior, and (3) the economic, technological, and political constraints under which decision-makers must operate within a state.


Figure 2 presents a coalitional paradigm of deterrence. It assumes a non-unitary actor with heterogeneous and often inconsistent values -- security being only one of several important goals that are pursued at any one time. Decisions are made through a political process characterized by competing coalitions of individuals and groups within and outside the government. Bargaining and negotiation, not command decisions, are central features of governmental decision-making.

Coalitional competition among multiple domestic actors impacts simultaneously, not sequentially, on the three sub-domains of deterrence. Decision flowing from each realm must be coordinated and compromised to approximate a coherent deterrent posture. Decisions made by one policy sub-community about threats, for example, are not necessarily linked to weapons or arms control accords initially defined by other sub-groups. The membership of these coalitions overlap, but are not congruent.

In Figure 2 the policy positions of the coalitions operating in the three sub-domains of deterrence overlap only at A. Intersections also occur between two of the sub-domains at B, C, and D, leaving the third sub-domain with no input into the decisions flowing from the other regions. Large areas of the policy formation process within each sub-domain are as depicted, non-intersecting. These areas are insulated from the other deterrence sub-domains although the decisions made within each sector are mutually interdependent.

Figure 2 also suggests how groups and rival coalitions, forming with the specific sub-domains of deterrence, seek to control the state's decision within these

Figure 2 NON UNITARY ACTOR PARADIGM



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areas. These sub-domains are drawn as spheres to suggest independent centers of decision. Groups within these spheres compete for political support and for resources to define the state's nuclear deterrence policies. While their actions may be initially guided by the same perceptions of external threat (Janis, 1982), Figure 2 suggests that later responses are increasingly influenced by unique domestic political demands and shaped by resource limitations. The initial reaction to perceived external threats creates a growing number and variety of conflicting groups within a state with a stake in their particular conception of the threat (the military officer corps, scientists and engineers, pressure groups, parties, bureaucratic and governmental elites).

As the deterrence policy process becomes domesticated and diffused throughout the internal governmental process, the influence of the policy process itself and the influence of the competing groups within it help explain what otherwise appear to be gaps and inconsistencies in a state's deterrence posture. From a cognitive or unitary actor perspective, the latter may appear illogical, risky, costly, and de-stabilizing, from the viewpoint of internal political pressures, it may appear to be an understandable and even sensible adjustment to domestic imperatives or responses to economic and technological constraints and opportunities.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A COALITIONAL PARADIGM FOR WESTERN DETERRENCE SYSTEMS

A coalitional conception of nuclear policy-making, has several sets of policy implications. Three will merit special attention. First, the management and promotion of stable deterrence implies the harmonization of three competing imperatives: domestic politics, alliance cohesion, and the differential security needs of each Western nuclear state vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as the principal adversary. Deterrence assumes as much the character of an ongoing internal political and external diplomatic bargaining process as a strategic dialectic between only two adversaries, as it has often been depicted by many first-wave strategic analysts.

Second, deterrence hinges critically on the stability of the domestic politics of nuclear states and on the finely spun internal political arrangements that have been precariously stitched together by ruling coalitions within these states to guide the strategies governing their nuclear weapons.

Third, deterrence must be conceived in multilateral, not bilateral, terms. Neither the Western democracies nor the Soviet Union can be indifferent to the policies pursued by each other.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY AND APPROACH

The study will be provisionally organized as follows. Chapter one will summarize the current state of deterrence theory and present an alternative paradigm by which deterrence behavior can be understood. Chapters two, three, and four will trace, respectively, American, French, and British nuclear policies to demonstrate the applicability of the paradigm sketched in Figure 2. Examined will be the evolving conceptions of threat, doctrinal and weapons responses, and arms control strategies pursued by each state. These policies will be related to the domestic coalitions within each state that reflect opposing tendencies with respect to these

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three levels of analysis Chapter five will identify the threats to nuclear stability arising from the divergent deterrence policies pursued by the Western nuclear states within the Atlantic alliance and between the East-West blocs A final chapter will suggest ways to enhance alliance cohesion, to improve the management of the East-West nuclear balance, and to promote the conditions for detente

The analysis will be largely based on a review of the abundant primary and secondary literature covering the Western nuclear systems Since emphasis will be placed on current behavior and problems, my analysis will be supplemented by interviews with relevant decision-makers and analysts in the respective countries

SCHEDULE OF RESEARCH

This project will require approximately two years to complete if I can be adequately supported, freeing me from other academic responsibilities It will take longer if funding is only partially available I expect to spend one year in Washington D C and another in Europe, divided equally between the United Kingdom and France

In London, I expect to have access to Chatham House In France, I expect to be associated again with the Institut Français des Relations Internationales where I stayed in 1977-78 and again in 1983 while completing my most recent manuscript on French arms production and transfer policy

With respect to this proposed study, I have already had several papers accepted for publication, including parts of my manuscript on French arms policy, an evaluation of U S deterrence practices since the signing of SALT I (Kolodziej, 1985), and an analysis of European reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative (Kolodziej, 1986) I will also contribute an article on the implications of the British and French nuclear systems as part of an arms control impact statement project sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) I have reviewed the theoretical deterrence literature in a seminar on deterrence theory that I conducted in fall 1984 Currently, I will be teaching a seminar in international relations theory as a complement to my work on deterrence theory

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