

MILITARY RESPONSES
TO CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

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In a world not too different from this one Civilitas and Militaria are two countries that constitute respectively the western and eastern half of a large island. Militaria is more densely populated than Civilitas but contains less natural resources than the other island-nation. As its name suggests, Militaria also boasts an impressive army and recently it has threatened to use that army against its largely unarmed neighbor. Militaria demands a fair share of the island's natural resources and in order to accommodate its large population wants to move the border between the two countries westward. Because Civilitas has steadfastly refused to comply with Militaria's demands, the latter is preparing itself to invade Civilitas and take by force what it could not obtain through diplomacy.

Common sense predicts that if Militaria attacks Civilitas, the latter can do little else than capitulate and passively accept its fate. However, there exists an alternative view of the situation. That view suggests that Civilitas rely on nonviolent struggle to withstand and ultimately to defeat its opponent. According to that view, an aggressor cannot fulfill its objectives as long as its occupation forces have to cope with continuous and massively supported acts of noncooperation and defiance. If Civilitas were to counter Militaria's aggression with nonviolent obstruction, defiance, sabotage and noncooperation, it could keep the occupier from reaching its objectives and in the end force it to withdraw its troops.

Militaria may try to brutally suppress the resistance but the excessive use of violence will be taxing on the morale of the occupation troops and will tend to erode the political support for the invasion within Militaria. Faced with the prospect that the costs of the invasion may be much greater than its benefits, Militaria refrain from invading and occupying Civilitas. In this way a nonviolent defense policy may enable Civilitas not only to prevail against an invader but also to deter potential aggressors such as Militaria from ever carrying out their invasion plans.

In a nutshell this is how advocates of civilian-based defense (also known as social defense, nonviolent defense or nonmilitary defense) would suggest that Civilitas counters Militaria's threat. Civilian-based defense has nowhere yet been introduced as a substitute for military defense. But some European countries notably Sweden and Austria have implemented some form of civilian-based defense as a supplement to their military defense system.³ In addition according to one count close to two hundred methods of nonviolent struggle are known to have been successfully applied in practice by a wide array of social movements.⁴ Nearly all of them could be integrated in a structured national defense and further perfected through advance training and organization. Historical evidence shows that even improvised nonviolent resistance has been somewhat effective against military aggression. Hence if tactics of nonviolent resistance were channeled into a well-organized national defense strategy there can be no doubt that their power to deflect military force would be greatly enhanced.

Suppose that by adopting a civilian-based defense Civilitas would, indeed be able to deter Militarism from overrunning its territory and appropriating by force what it cannot secure by more peaceful means. From a traditional military perspective possessing such a deterrent capability suffices as a bulwark against military aggression as such. The presumption is that if a defense system can thwart plans for a massive invasion it can stave off lesser military threats as well. Advocates of civilian-based defense have tended to go along with this reasoning. They have concentrated on showing that nonviolent resistance would render a military invasion so unprofitable for the aggressor that invasion plans against nations that rely on civilian-based defense are unlikely to be carried out. However they have overlooked the possibility that small scale attacks instead of massive invasions may be the real military threat to a civilian-based defense system. The potential impact of small-scale military operations on a civilian-based defense system has remained undiscussed so far. There is thus a serious gap in the research on the viability of civilian-based defense. The purpose of this article is to help fill this gap.

In order to set up a framework for the investigation I will show first how civilian-based defense forces a redefinition of the costs and benefits of warfare. Applied to the case of a full-scale military invasion of a country that relies on nonviolent defense this framework predicts that the aggressor will amass many more costs than benefits. The picture becomes much more complex however when it comes to calculating the costs and benefits for the two sides in lower

level conflicts. In such conflicts, the effectiveness of civilian-based defense is considerably hampered by its nonterritorial nature. As a result, I will argue, the resiliency of civilian-based defense depends to a considerable degree on the kind of society it is meant to protect.

The Strategy of Civilian-based Defense

In order to prevent an enemy from invading one's country, the enemy has to be deterred from doing so. The enemy has to become convinced that the costs of an invasion would be much higher than its benefits. A prerequisite for obtaining that result is nearly always that one is actually capable of denying an invading army the benefits it seeks and of burdening it with the costs it wants to avoid. From a military perspective, costs refer mainly to deaths, injuries, and destruction, and benefits to control over territory, its people, and its resources. Hence, to defeat an invader militarily, one has simultaneously to "out-injure" him and prevent him from making territorial gains. But this can only be done by opposing the aggressor's military might with military forces of one's own, that is, by risking to incur the same kind and amount of costs that one wants to burden the enemy with. Thus, resisting an invasion militarily implies a high toll of casualties and destruction on one's own side as much as on the enemy's side.

The core idea of civilian-based defense is that military invasions can be deterred and resisted without paying that toll. Instead of resisting an invasion militarily, civilian-based defense

proposes to resist it through nonviolent struggle⁸ By reacting to the violent penetration of one's national territory with the nonviolent protection of one's institutions and ways of life the costs and benefits involved in warfare are redefined Territorial gains are no longer benefits to the enemy for they do not result in control over its people and its resources That control is withheld from the enemy through active and sustained political and economic noncooperation (e g , strikes slow-downs, and refusals to carry orders) Rather than protecting economic and political institutions with a hard shell of military violence civilian-based defense turns the popular power that is inherent in these institutions as a weapon against the enemy Thus not only do the benefits of territorial control become void they turn into costs for the enemy by providing the context in which civilian-based defense is activated

The costs consist only partly in the enemy's frustrations at being unable to obtain the benefits it is after Yet they indicate the general nature of these costs psychological instead of physical damage The role of psychological factors for determining the outcome of international conflicts should not be underestimated Nations are primarily psychological phenomena they exist because people identify with groups on the basis of common characteristics Perhaps the most concise and encompassing way of defining a nation is as "a body of people who feel that they are a nation"⁹ Through identification national characteristics help to define a person's self-concept Persons thus become part of a nation by making the nation part of themselves This explains why most people find it unproblematic to

talk about nations as if they were persons. Pride and honor, a sense of accomplishment, achievement and efficacy, and feelings of revenge and resentment are as easily attributed to nations as to human individuals. Even if nations are fictitious entities and their attributes empirically nonsense, they form the social-psychological basis of all national enterprises, including war.

The military perspective takes the personification of nations for granted. Not groups of individuals go to war but nations that are presumed to be monolithic entities. The strength and originality of civilian-based defense is that it tries to attain victory by disintegrating this assumed substratum of international warfare. Since it cannot destroy the physical power wielded by an enemy, it attacks the basis of that power: the feelings of national unity and pride, the expectations of national glory and honor, and the emotions and loyalties that sustain the war effort. Its strategy is to erode the enemy's self-esteem, that is, to take away the reasons why people take pride in their nation and, by doing so, to remove the reasons people have to identify with their nation. If people no longer identify with their nation, national loyalty and patriotism evaporate, and without them national enterprises fall apart. Instead, other loyalties and group identifications based on religion, social class, ethnic background, party affiliation, or even family membership will substitute for the loss in sense of national unity.

Probably the most significant way in which civilian-based defense erodes the self-esteem of its adversaries is by targeting their sense of moral worth or integrity. It can do so because even

armies are bound to some extent by the moral rules that govern their society and will be restrained by them in using violence against a civilian population. While it is true that moral rules against cruelty and murder are in war circumstances easily trespassed, the trespassing is always accompanied by a legitimation. The cruelties and murders are by their perpetrators not recognized for what they are but presented as acts of justice or rightful punishment.¹⁶ Hence the contradiction between the reality of war and rules of morality does not result in an outright denial of the validity of morality. It yields a denial of the reality of war by discursively transforming it into a fiction that affirms the validity of morality. At the same time, however, the social credibility of fictions is limited and determined by the extent to which acts of war clash with moral rules. For instance, if both parties in a conflict use violence, it is relatively easy and credible for them to justify their behavior as self-defense. But if only one side uses violent means, it can hardly claim to act in self-defense when it tries to repress a nonviolent resistance.

Because most societies regard the intentional use of violence against an unarmed opponent as immoral, an invader is forced to violate morality in order to oppress nonviolent resistance. The invader will undoubtedly try to legitimize such violations by blaming the enemy, but it is hardly plausible to present nonviolent resisters as aggressors or as being in any other way responsible for the suffering caused to them. Consequently, the violence that the occupation soldiers inflict will tax their moral conscience and negatively affect their morale. Furthermore, international opinion

will probably become vehemently opposed to the invasion and this may find an outlet in diplomatic and economic sanctions against the invader's country. And finally there is the effect of the violence on the political support at the home front. The violence used by the occupation troops, the declining morale among them and the storm of international disapproval the violence will produce are all factors that will conspire in disintegrating the patriotic fervor in the home country. Vietnam and Afghanistan have proved that even wars in which both sides use violence can become rapidly unpopular among the occupier's home population. How much more swiftly then will occupiers lose their home support if the enemy they fight is not a treacherous guerilla force but an unarmed civilian population.

A Military Counter-strategy for Civilian-based Defense

The argumentation so far suggests that civilian-based defense may be able to resist a full-scale invasion. On the assumption that potential aggressors are convinced by that reasoning they will have to follow alternative courses of action to reach their goals. Armies will have to develop strategies that are less costly and more effective than a full-scale invasion. In that case the real test for civilian-based defense is not whether it can resist full-scale invasions but whether it can resist strategies that are specifically designed to counter civilian-based defense. Therefore a closer look must be taken at the weak spots of civilian-based defense and how these could be exploited by certain military strategies.

The effectiveness of civilian-based defense depends on a strong

sense of national unity Without pervasive feelings of national belonging civilian-based defense lacks the social cohesion and discipline that is required for an adequate nonviolent resistance However, unlike military defense systems, civilian-based defense is unable to protect an important aspect of that unity namely the national territory In fact, civilian-based defense can only be fully activated by letting the national territory be overrun by enemy forces As a result it cannot defend the traditional national security interest of preserving the integrity of the national territory This may explain why the few countries that have showed some interest in civilian-based defense are countries that can have little hope of stopping a military invasion at their borders It also provides an additional explanation for why a civilian-based defense system can successfully resist an occupation For paradoxically only under occupation circumstances does the goal of defeating the enemy neatly coincide with the goal of expelling the enemy from the national territory Only then can a civilian-based defense system attach value to the integrity of the national territory

Military operations that violate the integrity of an opponent's territory without occupying it considerably reduce the amount of contact between the armed forces and the population As a result hostile border penetrations can largely avoid the costs that nonviolent resistance inflicts on occupation forces More specifically they can neutralize the resistance by meeting three conditions The first one is that the interventions are at least initially not direct means for fulfilling the ultimate objectives

that instigated them. Their use has to be restricted to pursuing goals the fulfillment of which requires no significant compliance from the opponent's population. In this way the noncooperation and defiance strategies of the resistance remain useless. The second condition is that the violence that is inherent to military weaponry must be directed against carefully selected targets and should not be displayed in a massive or random way. Military means have to serve primarily as vehicles for psychological warfare, not as tools for physical destruction. The final condition is that the violence must be used in a way that is least in contradiction with generally accepted moral standards. More specifically the targets have to be material objects rather than persons and, if persons they have to be official and political figures rather than ordinary citizens. In this way the attacker can safeguard its sense of moral integrity.

These three conditions seriously restrict the nature of hostile border penetrations. Yet they still allow the execution of a broad gamut of commando attacks. These include cutting of the water, electricity, gas and oil supply lines, sabotaging transportation and communication systems, interrupting and destabilizing industrial and agricultural production processes, and destroying and stealing private and public property.¹¹ A country that possesses a military defense system can prevent such attacks by sealing off its national borders with troops and armor. Theoretically, civilian-based defense systems could use nonviolent barriers to serve the same end. For instance people that are trained in nonviolent obstruction could be stationed in the country's outlying areas to function as living walls against

intruders A network of material defense structures consisting of canals and concrete and steel obstacles could complement the human barriers However, it is doubtful whether the costs of such a system are in proportion with the ease with which they can be circumvented For access to the country through the air cannot be prevented with nonviolent means and probably not much violence will be needed to break through the land barriers At any rate, since the most cost-effective way of damaging the territorial integrity of a nation that rests its defense on nonviolence is not through a massive invasion but through the repeated penetration of its boundaries commando units rather than tank divisions will carry out the attacks And obviously the former can penetrate boundaries in a much smoother way than the latter

The immediate effect of repeated border penetrations is to foster a sense of vulnerability and powerlessness For even if the penetrations do not cause much perceptible damage they destroy a nation's most tangible symbol of unity and identity, its territorial integrity This psychological damage could be repaired to some extent by retaliating with economic and diplomatic sanctions If such sanctions are severe enough and exercised by the international community at large they may be sufficient to deter further actions However there is little reason to assume that the international community would actively support tough sanctions Sanctioning involves severing economic and political ties that as a whole have proved to be beneficial to all the countries involved In view of the limited nature of the boundary violations breaking these ties may be

considered a too heavy sacrifice. The country that relies on civilian-based defense is confronted with a humiliating show of force, not with bloodshed. Other nations may, therefore, suffice to condemn the aggressor as a violator of international law. Moreover, these other nations will also be tempted to blame the victim. They may reason correctly, that if only the attacked country would put up a military defense -- like all other countries let us suppose -- it would not have become subject to border violations. In short, sympathy for the country under attack will be much smaller than when it would be overrun by a war machine in full gear. Correspondingly, the country will have a much harder time mustering the international support that would be needed to have the hostile interventions cease.

Left without significant international support, vulnerable to repeated surprise raids by enemy forces, a nation that rests its hope on civilian-based defense is likely to experience a lowering of its morale. A lowered morale will, at its turn, easily provoke disagreements about how to tackle the enemy threat. The civilian-based defense consensus may come under fire from proponents of military action or adherents of appeasement. Such disunity could easily be exploited by the enemy, not only by persisting in its war of attrition, but also by ordering agents provocateurs to stir up dissent.

To some extent, order could be preserved and enemy actions neutralized through police involvement. But here lurks another danger for a society that relies on civilian-based defense. The enemy may specifically try to provoke police violence so as to have a legitimate

basis for escalating its own violence. A society that wants to hold on to civilian-based defense will, therefore, have to impose stringent limits on the police violence it will allow. Not doing so would blur the boundaries between when to use violence and when to use nonviolence, and this vagueness would very readily be exploited by an enemy.

The Territorial Imperative

The immediate purpose of the hostile border penetrations is to weaken the national unity of the attacked country. This purpose is attained by revealing the inability of civilian-based defense to protect the country against violations of its territory. Defenders of civilian-based defense are likely to object that this way of formulating the border penetration problem overestimates the psychological significance of the national territory. National unity and identity, they would argue, result primarily from belonging to the same political, social, and cultural institutions, and not from living within the same geographical area. The significance that is currently attached to territorial integrity is viewed by them as a product of the predominance of military ways of thinking. As Boserup and Mack have put it: "It is no doubt precisely the military importance of even territorial outposts which has made the national territory' its sanctity and integrity such important national symbols."¹

If Boserup and Mack are right, in a society that relies on civilian-based defense the national territory will largely lose its

importance as a symbol of unity. However, there are three reasons that cast serious doubt on the reliability of that prediction. The first one is that social groups including nations come into existence when people define themselves in contradistinction to other groups. The process of group formation is always a process of differentiating between groups. The extent to which a group manifests a separate identity will consequently depend on the clarity of the boundaries between itself and other groups. The importance boundaries have for preserving and reinforcing a group's identity will increase with the ease with which they can be recognized as setting one group apart from another. Territorial boundaries have a recognition potential that is probably higher than that of any other kind of boundaries. That is because as Sack has observed, territoriality makes classification by type subservient to classification by area.

When we say that anything in this area or room is ours or is off limits to you we are classifying or assigning things to a category such as 'ours' or 'not yours' according to its location in space. We need not stipulate the kinds of things in place that are ours or not yours. Thus territoriality avoids, to varying degrees, the need for enumeration and classification by kind and may be the only means of asserting control if we cannot enumerate all of the significant factors and relationships to which we have access.¹³

A territory like a flag provides a unique and concrete signifier for a nation whereas cultural, political, and social characteristics of a

nation are a cluster of not always clearly delineated and often abstract signifiers. For that reason, it is unlikely that such characteristics will be able to provide as strong a sense of identity and unity to a nation as its territorium does.

The second reason why the national territory is likely to continue playing a significant psychological role is because people attach themselves emotionally to their physical environment. The visible landscape in which they grow up and reside provides a background for the things they value in life and, by association, comes to be valued itself. Among the ancient Greeks and Romans, Tuan has observed, attachment to the homeland ran deeper than any other bond. "Attachment to one's native land, the place of one's birth, the hearth in which one was nurtured, was so strong that the ancients could scarcely conceive a fate worse than exile, unless it be the destruction of the country itself."¹⁴ It is true that modern means of transportation and communication have dramatically diminished people's dependency on the Heimat, but most people still reside most of their lives in the same region. Even though technological progress has made it possible to quickly move from place to place, territorially based economic and political ties have hardly become unraveled. As a result, people's psychological attachment to their habitat has anything but become obsolete.¹⁵

The homeland and the country are not identical, but the fact that people's homelands are usually integral parts of their countries makes that they will want to defend the national boundaries in order to prevent hostile intrusions of their homelands. Hence, the patriotic

glorification of the national soil can be considered as a logical extension of more local Heimat-sentiments ¹⁴ It is true that the attachment to one's physical surroundings is the indirect product of valuing the cultural and social events that take place in these surroundings. But it does not follow that we should try to protect these events rather than their surroundings. For events evolve and change over time, vary in their nature, function, and degree of organization. All this makes them elusive and difficult to protect -- the very effort to protect them might even change their nature. The physical surroundings of the events, on the other hand, can be trusted to provide a relatively constant background to them: the landscape provides a measure of stability that is greater than that of the flux of social and cultural life. Hence, protecting the land is both a more simple and more secure way of protecting a people's way of life.

The willingness of people to defend the national boundaries is finally also due to people's attachment to their property. As with the homeland, there is a transitive relationship between protecting one's property and defending one's country. One's property is part of one's country, and since vigilantism is not accepted in most modern societies, the defense of one's property presupposes the defense of one's country. Moreover, threats to one's personal property do usually not come from abroad but from within one's country. The country's legal system, enforced primarily by the police, helps to avert these threats, but this means that ultimately the protection of one's property rests on the use or threat of violence. If intranational threats to one's property can be warded off through violence, why can

extranational threats to it not be averted with the same means? Is furthermore public property not the governmental equivalent of private property, and should it not be rightfully expected then that public property gets protected as if it were private property? These questions strongly suggest that there is a dissonance between allowing private property boundaries to be enforced through the use of violence but not allowing public property boundaries to be enforced in that way. To be sure the dissonance does not amount to a logical inconsistency, but it may enhance feelings of insecurity among people whose defense relies on civilian-based defense. People tend to reason by analogy as a result civilian-based defense will make them feel about as safe as when the defense of their personal property would depend on nonviolent resistance. Barring major changes in our society this is far more unlikely to happen than the introduction of a civilian-based defense system. Hence defending the national territory is likely to be considered important as long as the protection of private property through a legal-cum-police system remains the rule.

The role of the territorial factor in achieving national unity suggests that border penetrations per se can corrode a country's social cohesion. Military interventions can further aggravate the corrosion effect through their choice of targets and tactics. The weakening of patriotic loyalties is reflected in the growing prominence of other loyalties. Long-standing social rifts become more visible and threatening to the social stability of the society. Agent-provocateurs I suggested could fan such internal conflicts. More

importantly the border penetrations could deepen social divisions by targeting only certain groups within the country. If for instance ethnic minorities show reluctance to bear the cost of defending the nation against the hostilities, their restiveness could be encouraged by exempting them from attacks. The effectiveness of such tactics would be considerably augmented if the groups that are singled out for preferential treatment live in a separate geographical region rather than interspersed among the rest of the population. This would facilitate a discriminatory targeting policy as well as heighten the minorities' sense of territorial apartheid. An added advantage of discriminatory targeting is finally that it provides an ideological cover-up for the military operations. By aiming their assaults at the dominant powers within a society and by supporting minority groups the intervention troops can try to acquire a Robin Hood aura. In the end minority groups within the assaulted society may even come to consider the aggressor as a liberator rather than as an enemy.

Winning the War

The most effective military strategy against civilian-based defense turns out to be a strategy with a primarily psychological impact. The violence used by the aggressor is mainly symbolic. It is a vehicle for disintegrating the other country's national unity. This has two important implications. The first one, that will be returned to in a moment, is that the strategy can by itself not fulfill the aggressor's objectives. The second one is that the nonviolently defended society could try to use very similar means to try to

destabilize its military opponent. It also could attempt border crossings. Depending on the length and nature of the border penetrations by nonviolent protest groups will be either impossible to prevent or only be possible to prevent at the price of an expensive border control network. Furthermore, agents provocateurs could try to infiltrate the other society in order to fan nonviolent struggle against the regime. Widespread information campaigns could be set up to discredit the regime in the eyes of its own population. Whether such methods would work better against this society than against the nonviolently defended society will depend on the social and political structures in the two societies. If the nonviolently defended society is thoroughly democratic, egalitarian and sensitive to the needs of its ethnic, religious and other minorities, the military aggressor will have a hard time fostering national discord. If simultaneously the stability in the aggressor's society depends on an elitist and oppressive regime, paralyzing dissension will be much easier to provoke in this than in the other society. In short, the fact that one country can use military force as a means to inflict psychological damage to another country does not imply that this country is invulnerable to counter-strategies by the nonviolently country it is attacking.

Psychological warfare dominates only the first stage of the conflict. In the second stage, the aggressor will try to reach the objectives for which it instigated the hostilities. One can distinguish between political objectives, economic objectives and territorial objectives.

Political objectives are geared towards assuming control over the other country's state bureaucracy. Because a state can only exist by the consent of the population it governs, an aggressor will only be able to take over its opponent's state apparatus if it managed to destroy the population's clout to resist. Thus, only if the first stage of the conflict has been very successful can an aggressor hope to extend its political power over the other society.

Territorial objectives are aimed at possessing certain parts of the other country's territory for either military purposes (e.g. building a marine base in case the attacker did not previously have an outlet to the open sea) or demographic purposes (e.g. the Nazi's Lebensraum policy).

The objectives are predominantly economic when the hostilities are directed towards achieving control over an area with special economic significance (e.g. the presence of oil-fields) meant to make an end to harmful economic competition (e.g. by destroying certain means of production) or simply aimed at enriching one's own society through piracy.

Even if the aggressor gained a psychological edge over its opponent through its commando attacks, reaching the ultimate objectives is not unproblematic. The psychological damage to the attacked society may get repaired as it regains a focus to organize its nonviolent resistance around. Suppose for instance that the aggressor wants to build a naval base on the other country's territory. The execution of that wish provides the attacked society with at least two complementary nonviolent resistance strategies.

blocking the roads that lead to the port and blocking the port at sea (e g with fishing-boats) If no violence is used against them the blockades could virtually prevent the construction and operation of the base On the other hand, using violence to remove the blockades may produce costs to the morale of the troops that outweigh the benefits of having a naval base

Even the second and final phase of the conflict then is not sure to turn out advantageous for the aggressor On the whole a counter-civilian-based defense strategy may be more likely to succeed and certain to be less costly than a full-fledged military invasion However whether that strategy can overpower civilian-based defense is difficult to predict As has been suggested earlier much will depend on the the nature of the societies that are involved in the conflict Although a nonviolently defended society need not be a perfect democracy and a military aggressor need not be a horrible tyranny the odds that this is the case are definitely greater than the odds for the opposite being the case For nonviolence is as effective against internal usurpers as against external aggressors and will, therefore not be taken up as a defense method by unpopular regimes Moreover as the examples of Sweden and Austria indicate countries that adopt civilian-based defense tend to have a stable and democratic social system

Conclusion

To underscore the preliminary nature of this inquiry its results need to be related to avenues for future research Three

issues in particular deserve special attention

(1) Nonviolent defense methods prove to be largely powerless against military border penetrations. As has been mentioned in passing however, that weakness could be compensated by employing nonviolent retaliation tactics. Presently, little is known about the nature and efficacy of such tactics. Further research on them should be able to clarify their potential for responding to aggression as well as for initiating and executing it.

(2) Currently, most countries are internally divided along ethnic, religious or social class lines. Since internal rifts make a nation especially vulnerable to a counter-civilian-based defense strategy it seems to follow that only very few countries possess the luxury to adopt a civilian-based defense. On the other hand the presence of an external threat is known to unite instead of to divide people and may counterbalance internal divisions. Therefore additional mainly empirical research is required to find out the minimal conditions a society has to meet in order to be able to withstand a counter-civilian-based defense strategy.

(3) Because of the danger of hostile border penetrations, it may seem desirable to complement civilian-based defense with some kind of military border defense. More thought has to be given to the dangers and advantages of such a combined defense system. For, at any rate if civilian-based defense becomes widespread, it will initially be as part of a predominantly military defense system. The question to be answered is whether combined defense should be regarded as destabilizing or, on the contrary be welcomed as an ideal end state. ¹⁷

Notes

1 I would like to thank John Leppingwell for his comments on an earlier version of this paper

2 See Swedish Commission on Resistance, Complementary Forms of Resistance SOU # 10 (Stockholm Swedish Official State Reports 1984) and Maislinger Andreas Möglichkeiten gewaltfreier Verteidigung im ahmen der ULV (Wien Bundesministerium für Inneres Abteilung III/5, 1985)

3 See Gene Sharp The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston Porter Sargent, 1973)

4 Historical cases of nonviolent struggle are amply documented in Gene Sharp The Politics of Nonviolent Action The integration of nonviolent struggle tactics in a national defense strategy is discussed in Adam Roberts ed Civilian Resistance as a National Defense (Harrisburg PA Stackpole 1968), esp pp 215-308 Herbert M Kritzer "Nonviolent National Defense Concepts and Implications," Peace Research Reviews 5 (1974), 5 (April), pp 1-57, Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War without Weapons Non-Violence in National Defense (New York Schocken Books, 1975) Johan Galtung, "On the Strategy of Nonmilitary Defense Some Proposals and Problems," in Peace, War and Defence Essays in Peace Research Vol II (Copenhagen Christian Eljers, 1976) pp 378-426 and Gene Sharp Making Europe Unconquerable The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defense (Cambridge MA Ballinger 1985)

5 A notable exception is that some authors have paid attention to the case of an aggressor who aims at territorial control over a sparsely populated area Towards the end of the paper more will be said about this case The main argument of this paper however assumes that the aggressor also wants to control human resources in the attacked country

6 Within the confines of this paper a detailed argumentation in support of this framework is impossible Hence, it should not be conceived of as an attempt to prove the thesis that a civilian-based defense system can successfully withstand a full-scale military invasion and occupation Rather, its purpose is to accentuate the particularity of the danger of small-scale attacks for a country that is defended through nonviolent methods

7 Elaine Scarry goes as far as to define war as "the activity of reciprocal injuring where the goal is to out-injure the opponent " See her The Body in Pain The Making and Unmaking of the World (N Y Oxford University Press, 1985), p 63

8 The Oxford English Dictionary (Sec Ed , 1989) defines "violence" as "The exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or cause damage to persons or property action or conduct characterized by this treatment or usage tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal freedom " Advocates of nonviolent action generally employ a somewhat narrower definition for they do allow causing damage to property on condition that there is no danger that people get hurt Hence "nonviolence" should primarily be understood as the absence of violence against persons

9 R Emerson From Empire to Nation (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1960) p 102 For more specific definitions of nationality and nationhood see Philip L White "What is a Nationality?" Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 12 (1985), pp 1-23

10 This is made possible by creating and propagating distorted enemy images For more on enemy images see Sam Keen Faces of the Enemy Reflections of the Hostile Imagination (San'Francisco Harper & Row, 1986) and Brian McNair, Images of the Enemy Reporting the Cold War (London Routledge 1988)

11 It should be observed that these actions do not need a full-fledged national army to be carried out They could be executed also by guerilla movements or organized crime gangs that have their bases in a country that supports or at least condones their behavior Indeed the weakness of civilian-based defense is I want to argue that, while it may be able to defeat military occupation forces it is not very efficient in fighting limited forms of violence such as terrorism organized crime guerilla activity, piracy and raiding

12 Boserup & Mack War Without Weapons pp 74-75 For a similar argument see Galtung, "On the Strategy of Nonmilitary Defense " p 390

13 Robert David Sack Human Territoriality Its Theory and History (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1986) p 32 On the role of boundaries for group formation see, e g Michael A Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London Routledge 1988) and Anthony P Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community (London Tavistock 1985)

14 Yi-Fu Tuan, "Geopietry A Theme in Man's Attachment to Nature and to Place " pp 23-24 Geographies of the Mind Essays in Historical Geosophy (N Y Oxford University Press 1976) pp 11-39

15 See e.g. Albert Hunter "Persistence of Local Sentiments in Mass Society " Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life Ed by David Street et al (San Francisco Jossey-Bass 1978) pp 133-162

16 For more about Heimat-sentiments and their relationship with love for the fatherland see Chapter 2 of Robert Michels' Der Patriotismus Prolegomena zu seiner soziologischen Analyse (Munchen Duncker & Humblot, 1929)

17 The first thorough discussion of this question can be found in "Can Non-violence Be Combined with Military Means for National Defense?" Journal of Peace Research 25 (1988), pp 69-80

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(a) of the University *Statutes*
all books and other library
materials acquired in any man-
ner by the University belong to
the University Library When
this item is no longer needed
by the department it should
be returned to the Acquisition
Department University Library

