SOVIET PROPAGANDA
AND THE PROCESS
OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

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In his monumental study of the Bolshevik Revolution E. H. Carr claimed that "The initiative of introducing propaganda as a regular instrument of international relations must be credited to the Soviet Government" [Carr, 1950, p. 137]. More than ten years later Frederick C. Barghoorn began his classic study of Soviet Foreign Propaganda by stating "Words and pictures have played a more continuous, and perhaps a more vital role than bullets or rubles in Moscow's struggle to undermine the social order of capitalism and to reconstruct society on 'Marxist-Leninist' foundations" [Barghoorn, 1964, p. 3].

As these authors—and many others who have been concerned with detailing the record of Soviet propaganda activities—have demonstrated, propaganda of all sorts has been an important instrument in the efforts of Soviet leaders to accomplish their foreign objectives ever since the creation of the Soviet state.

During the two decades since Barghoorn published his study the foreign propaganda activities of the Soviet Union have expanded significantly and now extend into virtually all reaches of the world. According to estimates of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency the Soviet leadership spent more than $3 billion per year at the end of the 1970s on various forms of foreign propaganda [CIA, 1980, p. 60]. By 1982 the estimated cost of foreign propaganda had risen to more than $4 billion [U.S. Congress, House, 1982, p. 30].

Soviet propaganda is conducted in a broad array of activities. In 1982, for example, the Soviets published books in sixty-eight foreign languages, primarily for distribution abroad. In English alone almost 1,200 books and pamphlets were published in more than twenty-four million copies [Pechat'y SSSR, 1983]. In addition to books and brochures the Soviets already by the early 1970s distributed abroad foreign language editions of ninety-one Soviet periodicals [USIA, 1973, pp. 36-37]. The weekly Moscow News, for example,
appears in more than 800,000 copies in English, French, Spanish and Arabic translations [Sanakoev, 1980, p 191] By 1980 a network of Soviet radio stations that included Radio Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress and a number of more specialized stations was broadcasting more than 2,750 hours a week in over 80 languages to foreign audiences Of the total hours of weekly foreign broadcasting more than sixty percent was targeted at Third World audiences 270 hours were beamed toward Africa, 544 toward East Asia and the Pacific, 133 toward Latin America, 345 toward the Middle East and North Africa, and 370 toward South Asia [USIA, 1980] Two Soviet press agencies, TASS and Novosti Press Agency, maintain a wide network of contacts with foreign newspapers, press agencies, and radio and television companies 3

Besides direct dissemination of its own propaganda materials the USSR can rely on a wide network of foreign communist parties and front organizations to distribute Soviet-oriented propaganda For example, Problems of Peace and Socialism (published in English as World Marxist Review), the international theoretical organ of communist parties allied to the CPSU, appears monthly in forty languages in a total edition of more than a half-million copies [Staar, 1985, p 77]

The purpose of this network of propaganda facilities is to support the general and specific foreign policy objectives of the Soviet leadership—more specifically, "to weaken the United States and NATO, and to extoll the achievements of the Soviet Union, thereby creating a favorable environment for the advancement of Moscow's objectives" [Shultz and Godson, 1984, p 39] The definition of "propaganda" to be used in this paper is based on that developed by Baruch A Hazan in his study of Soviet propaganda. Propaganda is the preconceived, systematic and centrally coordinated process of manipulating
symbols, aimed at promoting certain uniform attitudes, beliefs, values and behavior within mass audiences—these expected attitudes, beliefs, values and behavior are congruent with the specific interests and ends of the propagandist [Hazan, 1976, p 1214]

Related to, but distinct from, propaganda is disinformation, defined as any government-sponsored communication containing intentionally false and misleading material (often combined selectively with true information) which is passed to targeted individuals, groups, or governments with the purpose of influencing foreign elite or public opinion [Shultz and Godson, 1984, pp 37-38]

"Propaganda" differs from "disinformation" in two important ways. Propaganda is targeted at a mass audience and is not necessarily deceptive, while disinformation is aimed only at specific foreign targets and is always purposely deceptive.

Propaganda and disinformation belong to a category of activities which the Soviets refer to as "active measures"—including both overt and covert techniques employed for the purpose of influencing events and behavior in foreign countries. "These measures are employed to influence the policies of other governments, undermine confidence in the leaders and institutions of these states, disrupt the relations between various nations, and discredit and weaken major opponents" [Shultz and Godson, 1984, p 16]. They are also used to generate abroad favorable views toward the Soviet Union and its policies and support for specific Soviet policy initiatives. Included among active measures are covert support for terrorist and insurgency activities, as well as propaganda and disinformation. Active measures, including both propaganda and disinformation, are an integral aspect of the "ideological struggle" between communism and capitalism that is, in the Soviet view, an essential component of
To oversee and coordinate the broad array of propaganda and disinformation activities the Soviets have created a complex network of organizations and facilities. At the top of the network is the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU which approves the major themes of Soviet propaganda campaigns and the means used to implement them. Under the guidance of the Politburo, party and governmental organizations carry out the propaganda and disinformation activities, as well as other active measures. The first of the three most important of these organizations, the International Department of the CPSU, headed by candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev since its creation in 1957, maintains ties with foreign organizations employed to disseminate Soviet propaganda—including more than seventy pro-Soviet communist parties, numerous international front organizations, and national liberation movements.

The second of the major coordinating organizations, the International Information Department of the CPSU, oversees all aspects of Soviet foreign propaganda activities. The head of the department, Leonid Zamiatin, was director of TASS until he was appointed chief of the Information Department at the time of its creation in 1978.

The third major organization involved in external propaganda and active measures is Service "A" (Disinformation and Active Measures) of the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) of the Committee of State Security (KGB). Service "A" has the responsibility of coordinating and planning the dissemination of false and provocative information designed to deceive foreign governments or the public in countries outside the Soviet bloc under the name "active measures."
In the present study we are not interested primarily in either the history of Soviet propaganda or in the organizational framework within which propaganda and disinformation are carried out. Rather, we are concerned with the content of Soviet propaganda directed toward the Third World. More specifically, we wish to examine the importance of propaganda and disinformation in Soviet policy directed toward "national liberation movements" (both those in power and those few that are still attempting to achieve political power). However, before beginning our assessment of Soviet propaganda and disinformation, we must first outline the main developments over the course of the past three decades of Soviet policy toward the Third World.

A. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

At the time of Stalin's death in 1953, the Western opponents of the Soviet Union maintained political, economic and military relations with all areas of the world--much of which was still under European colonial control--while Soviet international contacts were limited primarily to the countries that formed their newly-created empire in Eastern Europe and to their allies in China. The Soviet ability to project military--and in most cases political--power was limited to those regions under direct control of the Soviet army. The United States and its European allies had already become engaged in a process of expanding a network of military bases from Europe through the Middle East to East Asia as part of the policy of containment. To counter these efforts, the Soviets initially entered upon a policy of "denial" aimed at ensuring the neutrality of those developing countries--especially Afghanistan, India and Egypt--which professed a nonaligned approach to foreign policy and opposed the intrusion of
military alliances into their region. The Soviets sought to expand their ties with such countries in order to prevent the uncontested growth of Western political and military influence, to ensure that gaps would remain in the US-sponsored alliance network, and to win the support of the nonaligned states for international political issues of importance to the Soviet Union (Lowenthal, 1977, pp 185-186). Measured in terms of political contacts, economic relations (including assistance), or military aid, Soviet involvement in the areas of special strategic concern along the southern borders of the USSR expanded rapidly. In addition, however, the Soviets did attempt to take advantage of a number of opportunities in other areas, such as the civil war in Zaire (then Congo-Leopoldville) and the radicalization of the governments of Sukarno in Indonesia, Nkrumah in Ghana and Touré in Guinea.

Although the initial Soviet push toward expanding contacts with the countries of the Third World was accompanied by optimistic statements about the prospects for the development of a revolutionary climate in these countries, the immediate Soviet goal was the reduction of Western influence in regions of strategic significance for Soviet security. This at times led to a contradiction between the imperatives of Soviet policy and the USSR's ideological assessments of these countries, since the leaders involved could no longer be depicted as reactionaries who ought to be swept away by the tide of revolution. At the authoritative level, this change in doctrine was heralded at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 with Khrushchev's introduction of the concept of the "zone of peace." The nonaligned states were no longer to be regarded as mere outposts of Western imperialism but as independent proponents of peace and, therefore, worthy of Soviet support and assistance. Thus, despite rhetoric about support for the construction of 'scientific socialism' in
developing countries, the Soviets were willing to provide support to such evidently non-socialist countries as monarchical Afghanistan and the Ethiopia of Emperor Haile Selassie in an attempt to undermine the Western position.

By the time of Khrushchev's overthrow in late 1964, however, Soviet policy toward the developing countries was in partial disarray. The optimism of the 1950s was already under attack and was being replaced by a growing realism concerning prospects for political and economic developments in most of the Third World. Although the Soviets had ended their isolation from these countries, they had not succeeded in establishing significant influence relationships. Where Soviet goals had been partially accomplished—e.g., the reduction of the Western presence in the Middle East—success resulted far more from the initiatives of the developing countries themselves than from Soviet policy. Soviet hopes that many of the emerging nations would be willing to cut or reduce their economic and political ties with the West proved unfounded. Rather than emulate the Soviet Union as an alternative socio-political model, the majority of leaders in Asia and Africa chose instead to use the Soviet Union as a means to lessen their dependence on the former colonial powers and give them an additional source of military and economic assistance. Additionally, the USSR's capacity to provide support to their friends—such as Lumumba, Nkrumah and Keita—in periods of crises was made difficult by its inferior position vis-à-vis the West—particularly by the virtual absence of an ocean-going navy.

Despite shortcomings, the Khrushchev years were not without successes upon which future Soviet policy could be built. In South Asia, India had already begun to depend heavily upon the USSR for both military assistance and for support in the development of heavy industrial projects in the state sector of
the economy. In the Middle East both Egypt and Syria were now indebted to the Soviets for military and economic assistance, while Turkey and Iran had begun to expand their ties with their northern neighbor as a means of lessening their dependence on the United States. Throughout Asia and Africa the Soviet Union had become a force to be dealt with by the U.S. and its allies, even through the West still commanded more influence and was able to exert more military capabilities in most areas of the developing world.

The first few years of the regime of Brezhnev and Kosygin saw a continuing reassessment of Soviet attitudes and policies. Confidence in the development of Soviet-type socialist systems and an emphasis on economic "show projects" were replaced by the effort to establish firmly-based relations with Third World countries that would begin to provide the Soviets with bases of operation from which they could expand contacts and attempt to increase their activities and build their influence. Even more than in earlier years, Soviet policy focused on countries and political groupings that had inherent importance for their own purposes. First, they re-emphasized close ties with those countries along the southern boundaries of the Soviet Union—from India to the Arab countries of North Africa. The importance of this area for the strategic security interests of the Soviet Union is self-evident, as Soviet commentators have repeatedly noted (Gorshkov, 1968). Support for minor revolutionary groups and for activities in Sub-Saharan Africa was generally downplayed in the late 1960s—to the point where some Western commentators mistakenly argued that the Soviets had virtually lost interest in that continent (Kanet, 1975, pp. 344-345 and Esseks, 1975, p. 114).

Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have continued to provide substantial support to groups or countries of potential importance to their strategic and
global interests, despite what seems to be a preference for supporting "progressive" regimes and movements. In spite of the upsurge of Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past decade, Soviet interest is still concentrated heavily in the arc of countries that border the southern flank of the USSR. Here the Soviet goal continues to be the reduction of Western influence and military capabilities and the concomitant expansion of the military and political capabilities of the Soviet state. This has meant that the Soviets have continued to provide military and political support to such countries as Iraq, Syria and South Yemen. In several cases they have signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with important South Asian and Middle Eastern countries, such as Iraq and India. In fact, during the 1970s they increased their efforts to improve relations with countries formally allied with the West, such as Turkey and Iran (prior to the overthrow of the shah) by offering economic assistance and military sales as a means of reducing these countries dependence on their Western allies—in particular the United States. Another important element in Soviet policy has been the search for access to both naval and airport facilities that would enable them to expand the reach of their military capabilities.

Throughout the last thirty years Soviet policy toward the developing countries has relied heavily on the provision of economic and military assistance as a means of developing and consolidating relations [Kanet, 1981, Kanet, 1983]. In general the terms of Soviet assistance are favorable when compared with commercial loans available to emerging nations on the international market, though the Soviets offer virtually no nonrepayable grants and all aid is provided in the form of credits for the purchase of Soviet goods and equipment. Soviet trade with Asia and Africa has grown rapidly as well,
though an important aspect of this trade has been the degree to which it has been related to the provision of economic assistance. With few exceptions (e.g., the sale of military equipment to Libya and the purchase of rubber from Malaysia) trade has resulted from agreements between the Soviet leaders and their Afro-Asian counterparts which include the commitment of Soviet economic and technical assistance. Examples of this type of agreement have been those with Egypt and India which called for the Soviet Union to provide capital equipment on the basis of long-term credits. These loans were to be repaid with the products of the recipient country over a period of twelve years at an interest rate of 2.0-2.5 percent. Such agreements have been especially attractive to those countries which have had problems obtaining the convertible currency necessary to purchase on the world market machinery and equipment needed for economic projects.

By the early 1980s, then, the relative position of the two major power blocs in the Third World had changed markedly. The collapse of the Western colonial empires and the ensuing rise of numerous anti-Western political regimes in the developing world, voluntary Western military retrenchment, and various other developments have resulted in the contraction of the Western military presence and of Western political influence throughout most of Asia and Africa. At the same time the Soviets have been able to establish a network of economic, political, and military relationships that permits them for the first time in their history to play the role of a global power with worldwide interests and the capabilities to pursue many of those interests effectively. The change in the relative position of the Soviet Union in the international political system stems in part from the continued buildup of Soviet military power and the willingness and ability of the Soviet leadership to take advantage of the
conflicts between the less developed states and the major Western powers. Already in the 1970s the Soviets were able to employ their newly developed military power— including an ocean-going fleet and long-range transport aircraft—in conjunction with access to port and air facilities in order to support distant and dispersed political and strategic goals. Examples include the use of the Soviet fleet in the Bay of Bengal to demonstrate support for India in the 1971 war with Pakistan, the transport of large numbers of Cuban troops to Angola four years later to support the MPLA and a virtual repeat of this operation in Ethiopia in 1978, and the provision of substantial military supplies to revolutionary groups in Central America in the 1980s.

By 1980 the Soviet Union was truly a superpower with the ability to influence developments in areas far from Soviet territory. Although the primary means available to the Soviets in their attempts to accomplish their short- and long-term objectives throughout the Third World has been the provision of various forms of military support, that support has been accompanied by a wide range of other Soviet activities—relations with revolutionary movements and political parties, modest amounts of economic assistance, political support in various international forums and a vast assortment of propaganda activities. We turn now to an examination of the propaganda offensive that the Soviets have mounted in their relations with the Third World.

B THE NATURE OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA IN THE THIRD WORLD

In our discussion of Soviet propaganda and disinformation in the Third World we shall, for the sake of simplicity, employ the broad term "propaganda," unless otherwise noted. As we have already mentioned, Soviet propaganda in the
Third World is disseminated through a great variety of channels. In addition to distributing scores of thousands of copies of books, pamphlets, periodicals and newspapers in developing countries, beaming hundreds of hours of radio broadcasts to audiences in these countries, and using friendly local organizations to expand the number of those who receive Soviet propaganda messages, the Soviets also use such activities as cultural and sporting events for the purpose of generating favorable views about the Soviet Union among foreign observers. Barach Hazan distinguishes two different types of Soviet propaganda. The first, which he refers to as operational propaganda, is meant to produce "concrete specific results, i.e., a predetermined behavior. It is connected with specific issues, raises questions relating to those issues, suggests or recommends the answers, shows the way and the time of action, and guides the audience. A second form of propaganda, which Hazan calls impregnational propaganda, is oriented toward creating in the target audience "goodwill" toward the Soviet Union and is expected to make the target more amenable to accepting future operational propaganda. This form of propaganda employs means such as the arts, sports, etc., as well as other more traditional forms of propaganda. [Hazan, 1974, p. 29]

Since our major concern in the remainder of this paper will focus on operational propaganda, we shall discuss only briefly those aspects of Soviet impregnational propaganda meant to soften up prospective targets. Already in the early years of Soviet involvement in the Third World a Soviet journalist pointed out that one of the purposes of a tour of Soviet musicians in Nigeria had been to overcome the false views of the Soviet Union and of Soviet society which had been implanted in Africa by the West. [Tarelin, 1961, p. 27] In line with this view of artists and athletes as propagandists, one Soviet writer has
asserted that "Scientists, artists, writers, painters, musicians as well as radio and television workers, are active fighters on the ideological front, passionate and insatiable propagandists of Communist ideas." [Krotov, 1972, p 123] In his study of Soviet cultural diplomacy Frederick C Barghoorn noted that it is a special form of propaganda meant to generate attitudes generally favorable to the Soviet Union and to Soviet culture [Barghoorn, 1960, p 12].

As Hazan has demonstrated, the Soviets have expended substantial efforts to establish in Third World states a broad network of facilities through which they are able to project the type of information meant to establish such an image. Cultural agreements have been signed with the majority of developing countries which create the framework within which the Soviets are able to carry out their activities.

Of special importance for the Soviets in their efforts to generate a positive image abroad has been the creation of local friendship societies, whose major function is to develop positive views toward and strengthen local "friendship" with the peoples of the USSR. Included within their activities are the promotion of the study of the Russian language, the development of libraries, reading rooms, and discussion groups, the showing of films, etc. Although the activities of friendship societies often extend into the area of supporting Soviet operational propaganda, their primary function is to influence the attitudes of as broad a range of the local population as possible toward the Soviet Union, the goals of socialism, and related topics.

Pro-Soviet international front organizations comprise a second important component of the network of organizations through which the Soviets attempt to influence both general attitudes toward the Soviet state and to generate support for specific Soviet policy initiatives. This type of organization, designed to
mobilize and unite individuals across national boundaries on the basis of sex, age, profession, etc., has been an integral part of Soviet policy since the 1920s (See Chart 2). Officially these organizations have no connection with either the USSR or with the Soviet communist party.

The distribution abroad of films, books and periodicals—usually available abroad at very low prices—represents another element of the Soviet attempt to generate a favorable image abroad and to create in target audiences favorable attitudes conducive to the acceptance of specific aspects of Soviet operational propaganda and to support for Soviet policy objectives. Soviet involvement in international sporting activities also has clear political purposes. Foreign sports delegations competing in the USSR are usually exposed to a wide range of activities so that, in the words of Moscow News in referring to the Universiade-'73 Games: "Everything has been done so that our guests could become better acquainted with the Soviet way of life and spend their spare time usefully.

In concluding his discussion of Soviet impregnational propaganda, Hazan notes:

While it may be pointed out that every country of the world is interested in improving its image and promoting goodwill and friendship, it can also be emphasized that no other country in the world attributes so much operational political importance to these issues. No other country strives so vehemently to promote the study of its language abroad, to demonstrate its achievements in culture, sports and arts, to prove its superiority, or to enhance its prestige.

What lurks behind this tremendous effort is an unusual attempt to facilitate the action of Soviet operational propaganda. In other words, to further Soviet foreign policy objectives and to project the best possible image of the USSR [Hazan, 1976, p 137].

After this rather extensive introduction we are now ready to turn to our discussion of the major elements of Soviet operational propaganda concerning the
Third World and, more specifically, the process of national liberation

C SOVIET VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION PROCESS

For the Soviets "national liberation" is part of the broader world revolutionary process that will eventually result in the destruction of the dominant capitalist system and its replacement by a global socialist system. Already at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 Lenin called on all communists to "give active support to the revolutionary movements of liberation." [In Kun, ed., 1933, p 128] More than thirty-five years later at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU Khrushchev introduced the idea of a world "peace zone" which united the communist countries, the proletariat in the advanced capitalist states, and the newly independent states and liberation movements in the developing world [In Gruliov, ed., 1957, p 37]. Soviet writers, even those who did not share Khrushchev's optimism about likely developments in the Third World, viewed national liberation as an objectively anti-imperialist process [See Simonia, 1966, p 8]. As S. Neil MacFarlane has noted in his excellent recent study of Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism, since the beginning of the 1970s Soviet writers have argued most strongly "that the national liberation movement is an inseparable part of the world revolutionary process and a constructive factor of fundamental importance in world politics [MacFarlane, 1985, p 146]. However, these analysts have continued to emphasize the primacy of the worldwide struggle between socialism and capitalism and of the role of the Soviet Union and the world socialist system in the world revolution [See, for example, Ul'yanovsky, 1980, p 20, Tiagunenko, 1970, p 1970, p 54]. The national liberation revolution is granted
only secondary importance. As Karen Brutents, one of the chief Soviet specialists on the Third World, has argued, the point is that left opportunists and many nationalist ideologists of the Third World have clearly overrated the worldwide importance and revolutionary role of the national liberation struggle. [Brutents, 1977, vol. 1, p. 15]

In the Soviet view the national liberation movement can only be understood as an ongoing process that includes at least three important stages. The first of these stages, the winning of political independence and the gaining of national sovereignty by former colonies is an "important prerequisite," in Khrushchev's view, "of their complete independence." [Khrushchev, 1956, p. 3] However, political independence alone is not the end in itself. It must lead to the second stage of national liberation, the elimination of economic dependence on the capitalist West. After political independence the goal of national liberation becomes the elimination of foreign economic domination, "which goes hand in hand with the plunder of the oppressed country, subjugation of its economic life to the purposes of this domination, and preservation of backward socio-economic forms." [Brutents, 1977, vol. 1, p. 29]

The final stage of national liberation, in the Soviet view, involves the movement toward social revolution. Writing twenty years ago V. Tiagunenko noted that national liberation would be completed only with the turn from capitalist forms of development towards socialism. [Tiagunenko, 1964, p. 78] The Soviets have continued to emphasize the importance of radical social change as part of the liberation process—including even strong pressures on various Third World client states to establish vanguard political parties. 14

It is within the context of this perception of the process of national liberation and of the global revolutionary process that pits socialism,
represented by the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, and imperialist
capitalism, that the specific aspects of Soviet propaganda to the Third World
must be understood. In the following pages of this paper we shall examine the
most important themes that characterize current Soviet propaganda toward the
Third World and relate them to the broader aspects of Soviet policy.

D GENERAL THEMES IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA TO THE THIRD WORLD

We shall divide our discussion of the major themes in Soviet propaganda
into two broad categories—those of a general nature that have remained
relatively permanent over the course of the past three decades and more specific
propaganda campaigns meant to influence attitudes and behavior on specific
issues of current concern. In reality, these two sets of propaganda are not
always neatly divisible, and we shall attempt to show in our discussion how
issues of immediate concern to specific propaganda campaigns are also related to
the long-term interests of general Soviet propaganda.

1 Themes concerning the World Revolution, the Future of Socialism, and
Soviet Unity with the Third World

One of the most important sets of themes characterizing Soviet propaganda
in the Third World is the all-pervasive nature of Soviet attempts to associate
the aspirations of the peoples and leaders of the developing countries with the
historical experience of the Soviet Union and to demonstrate that the Soviet
Union—alone among the industrialized states—can provide the assistance
required for the further development of the struggle for national liberation.

The Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of a socialist state in the USSR
are pictured as the most important developments of the modern era—events without which the colonial system created by the capitalist West would not have been overthrown. As was noted in an editorial in Pravda after the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, "the successes of the national-liberation movement are inseparably tied up with the successes of world socialism and the international working class." [1966, p 1] The mere existence of the socialist states and the shift in the "international correlation of forces" in favor of the USSR no longer permits the imperialist powers to act with impunity in the developing world. For example, the victories of the national liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola and the successes of revolutionary forces in Ethiopia and in other African countries "are also a result of the enormous influence exerted on the course of world development by the policy of peaceful coexistence and detente. " [Tarabrin, 1977, p 14]

Closely related to the Soviet emphasis on the importance of the Bolshevik Revolution and developments in Soviet policy for the success of the process of liberation are the specific claims that Soviet propaganda makes concerning the nature of direct Soviet support for national liberation. An analysis of Soviet propaganda to virtually any region of the Third World reveals that by far the most attention is given to continual expressions of Soviet solidarity with and support for all movements committed to liberation from Western imperialism. The Soviets are presented as committed to the just cause of exploited people chafing under the yoke of imperialist/Zionist/racist/reactionary oppression (depending upon the nature of the target of the propaganda). 15 While the imperialists continue to attempt to dominate the political and economic structures of the developing countries, the Soviets are committed to relations based on equality. One standard technique employed by Soviet propagandists has been to cite
important foreign officials or publications concerning the significance of Soviet support for a particular liberation struggle. In 1957, for example, the Prime Minister of Syria was quoted as saying that Soviet policy toward the Arab states differed from that of the Western imperialist Powers. While the latter "have no aim but to preserve their positions in the Arab East, so that they may be free to exploit the national wealth of the Arab peoples," the Soviet Union "has no economic or other designs on the Arab East, all it desires is to strengthen peace in this area." [BBC, 1957] In the words of Anatoly Gromyko, Head of the African Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and son of the long-time Soviet foreign minister, "The USSR and Africa's independent countries are closely cooperating to eliminate the vestiges of racism and colonialism and fight against neo-colonialism, and that brings notable results and promotes closer relations between this country and the young African states." [Gromyko, 1982, p 33] In North Africa, it is claimed:

The line pursued by the Soviet Union as regards the North African countries, as well as all the developing states, is highly principled and is based on the Leninist tenet that the forces fighting for socialism and national liberation are great international allies.

The USSR has always furnished all manner of aid and support to the just struggle of the North African peoples for their legitimate national political and economic rights. [Shvedov and Podtserov, 1983, p 55]

Not only is the Soviet Union pictured as a firm and reliable supporter of national liberation whose interests coincide with those of the developing states, but the experience of the Soviet Union (in particular of Soviet Central Asia) is presented as a model for the developing countries. G Kim, one of the most prolific of Soviet writers on the Third World, presents the experience of the peoples of Central Asia in state building as an example, especially for states of socialist orientation. He notes that, at the beginning,
representatives of the traditional propertied class had participated in the new state organs, as class-consciousness grew, however, they were gradually removed from positions of authority and replaced entirely by representatives of the workers and peasants. The Central Asian republics of the USSR, once "backward outlying regions of tsarist Russia," have become major industrial centers. "In opposition to the situation taking shape in the newly-free countries under capitalist development, the flexible purposeful policy of industrialization based on socialist relations ensures fundamental conditions for eliminating relative agrarian overpopulation" [Kim, 1983, pp 41, 38]. Ever since the 1950s, when the Soviets first established relations with newly-independent states, they have emphasized the importance of Soviet experience in restructuring the economies of Third World states [See Kanet, 1966, pp 275-297].

The non-capitalist path of economic development has been extolled as the solution of the development problems of Third World states, as in a 1962 radio broadcast:

"the Soviet Eastern republics have shown the whole world that all the oppressed peoples can throw off the imperialist yoke forever. The Soviet Eastern Republics, like a bright torch, are an example to those countries where the labour of the peoples and the wealth of the country are still being plundered and looted by the Western monopolists" [BBC, 1962]

As Theodore H Friedgut has noted, "The Soviet model of development presented in the newspapers and journals, is one of rapid transformation, the injection of newly activated masses into the political system, destroying and removing old ruling classes and political structures" [1979, p 171].

Another related theme in the general Soviet propaganda message concerns the status of the USSR as a global power with legitimate interests in all regions of
the world. For example, in a speech to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress in 1971, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko expressed the Soviet leadership's global aspirations when he stated "Today, there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it." [Gromyko, 1971] Several years later the Soviet minister of defense made explicit the global importance of Soviet military force when he stated the historic function of the Soviet armed forces is not restricted merely to their function in defending our Motherland and the other socialist countries. Aggression by the Western imperialist states should be resisted "in whatever distant region of our planet it occurs." [Grechko, 1974]

Throughout the 1970s the Soviets devoted substantial effort to support the claim that the "international correlation of forces" has changed dramatically and that the forces of socialism and progress, headed by the Soviet Union, are now far more influential in international political developments than those of imperialist capitalism. They point to the military strength of the Soviet Union, the successes of the socialist states and the growing number of developing countries that have chosen the non-capitalist path of development as evidence that supports this claim.

Yet another of the general themes that runs throughout virtually all Soviet written and verbal propaganda disseminated in the Third World concerns the crucial role played by the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace and security in the World. As we shall see in more detail below, the United States and its imperialist allies (supported by reactionary elements in the Third World) are presented as the primary source of conflict and war. Yet, "The USSR's approach to the search for peace in the Middle East and to the task of easing the tensions there is appreciated not only by socialist countries but also by many
Arab and West European political figures" [Osipov, 1985, p. 65] According to the Soviet writer, O. Kasyanov, "The USSR has always opposed this course [the U.S. and Israeli attempt to force an unjust settlement] with the only correct alternative—to turn developments in the Middle East towards the search for an all-embracing and just Middle East settlement" [Kasyanov, 1984, p. 59]

2 Themes concerning Western Imperialism

Although the Soviets devote substantial efforts in their propaganda activities to extolling the virtues of socialism, the Soviet state, and Soviet support for the goals of national liberation, they devote almost equal space and time to denigrating the United States and its allies and attributing virtually all the world's ills to the evils of capitalist imperialism. Conflict in the Third World results almost solely, according to Soviet propaganda, to the machinations of the West. According to one Soviet analyst, the one circumstance common to all conflicts in Africa is the fact "that the conflicts flare up exactly there where the forces of imperialism and its ilk try by means of force to suppress the national liberation movement, to reverse the march of history and erect obstacles to the independent development of young states" [Tarabrin, Y., 1984] In discussing the difficulty of reaching political settlements in local conflicts, Dmitry Volsky argues that "the reason is the same everywhere, the unwillingness of the imperialist quarters to recognize the principle of the equality of states and peoples, the striving of some countries to dominate others, to exploit their natural resources and to use their territory for their own strategic purposes" [Volsky, 1983a, p. 5] Volsky even goes so far as to claim that U.S. imperialist aggression in various regions of the world is interconnected
It is hardly a coincidence that at the very time that the wide-scale incursion into Nicaragua was started, the threat of aggression against countries like Syria and Angola also increased. All these add up to a chain of interconnected operations prepared and carried out for the time being through the agency of others. Meanwhile the chain of conflict situations created by Washington's imperial policy encircles the whole globe at the Equator [Volsky, 1983b, p. 9]

Elsewhere Volsky has also asserted that those who are bombing and shelling Third World countries are hatching militarist designs primarily targeted at the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. This underscores the imperative need to strengthen the solidarity of the socialist and developing countries [Volsky, 1984, pp. 5, 7] The message presented by Volsky—and by many other Soviet propagandists who emphasize this theme—has two parts: First, it is the imperialist West, in particular the United States, that is the source of problems and conflict in the Third World and that is currently threatening the security interests of "progressive" states; in addition, however, this threat makes it all the more imperative that developing countries ally themselves with the Soviet Union and the forces of world peace.

The picture presented by Soviet propaganda of the U.S. as the major source of conflict in the Third World and the ultimate source of opposition to revolutionary change is supplemented by the argument that the U.S. is invariably allied to the local or regional forces of reaction. In concerning the hypocrisy of U.S. concerns for violations of human rights, for example, two Soviet writers ask

Where are the sources of the long-standing friendship those politicians clad as democrats and moralists maintain with all kinds of dictators, 'hereditary' and 'for life,' like Duvalier of Haiti, with the racists who rule in South Africa, and with the South Korean, Salvadoran and Chilean generals who brutalize their own nations?

The answer, they say, lies in the important assistance that such reactionary
regimes provide Washington in its attempt to accomplish its imperial interests [Samarin and Tolstov, 1984, p 104] In their attempt to weaken ties between the United States and various Third World governments, the Soviets invariably attempt to tie the United States to those regional forces viewed as most hostile or oppressive by target populations In Africa, for example, U S policy aims reputedly include "coalescence with the racist upper crust" of South Africa [Tarabin, 1983, p 42], in the Middle East Israel is pictured as carrying out U S imperial aims in the region [Viktorov, 1983, Osipov, 1985]

3 Themes Concerning Chinese Hegemonism

During the past twenty years the People's Republic of China has been added to the category of states—along with the capitalist imperialist states—that represent a major threat to the security and developmental interests of the Third World The post-Mao political leadership is accused of an "overt programme of military and political collusion with imperialism" China's main long-term goals in relations with developing states have remained unchanged during the past twenty years "to subject them to its influence, isolate them from the socialist world and to harness the economic potential of the developing countries to its own 'four modernizations'" [Alexeyev and Nikolayev, 1984, pp 34, 39] These accusations sound quite similar to those traditionally brought against Western imperialism

China has regularly been accused of attempting to undermine the security of liberation movements throughout the Third World—from Indochina and Afghanistan in Asia to Southern Africa [See, for example, Isayev, 1985, p 23] In sum, China has shared with the United States and the West, though on a much more limited basis, in the diatribes and condemnations emanating from Moscow
E SPECIFIC THIRD WORLD THEMES AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS

While the major themes of Soviet propaganda toward the Third World discussed above have remained relatively constant over the course of the past three decades, other themes (often associated with a specific crisis or current developments in Soviet foreign policy) have changed. However, these more specific elements of the Soviet propaganda message are almost always associated with the more general themes of the global struggle between the forces of progress represented by the Soviet Union and those of reaction and imperialism led by the United States.

The remainder of the paper has not yet been completed. It will include discussion of Soviet propaganda on specific current issues relating to the Third World. The following list is not all-inclusive.

1. States of socialist orientation, the importance of the vanquard party, the failure of capitalist development in the Third World

2. A new international information order

3. State terrorism of the United States as a counter to assertions that the USSR supports terrorism

4. The debt crisis of developing countries—the result of Western exploitation

5. Western arms merchants in the Third World

6. Western economic aid as exploitation, brainwashing of Third World elites through training in the U.S.
7 A new international economic order

8 Specific regional developments
   a Southeast Asia revived Japanese aggression, Chinese-U.S. collusion vs Vietnam
   b Afghanistan foreign intervention, progressive developments
   c Middle East Lebanon, Israel as U.S. agent, Zionism
   d Southern Africa South African racism, U.S. support for South Africa, Western
   e Central America Nicaraguan revolution, U.S. intervention

As noted above, Soviet propaganda campaigns on specific issues related to the Third World will be related to the broader, more lasting themes discussed earlier.
Chart 1

Soviet Organization Structure for Propaganda and Active Measures

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Sources Shultz and Godson, 1984, p 20 and CIA, 1980, p 61
### Chart 2

**Pro-Soviet International Front Organizations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Claimed Membership</th>
<th>Affiliates</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Peace Conferences</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>ca 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Association of Democratic Lawyers</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>ca 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization of Journalists</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120 plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Union of Students</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's International Democratic Federation</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>E Berlin</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Federation of Democratic Youth</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>ca 270</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Federation of Scientific Workers</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>ca 33</td>
<td>70 plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Federation of Trade Unions</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>ca 206,000,000</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Peace Council</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>142 plus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Staar, 1984, p xxiv
NOTES


2 According to Soviet publication statistics books and brochures were published in 68 foreign languages in 1982, including:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number of titles</th>
<th>Total number of copies (in thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>285 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amharic</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>93 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>893 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>24,308 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>6,645 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages of India</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>2,262 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>193 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laotian</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>114 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malgash</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepalese</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persian</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>294 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1,250 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singhalese</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>245 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>11,636 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swahili</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>190 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>843 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Pechat' v SSSR, 1983]

3 By the late 1970s more than three hundred foreign news agencies, services and companies in 93 countries used TASS materials [USIA, 1978, pp 1-6], at the beginning of the 1970s Novosti had dealings with more than one hundred news agencies, 120 publishing firms, more than one hundred radio and television
firms, and 7,000 newspapers and magazines [USIA, 1973, pp 36-37]

4 Hazan does not include the reference to attitudes, beliefs and values in his definition, although they are implied in his definition and explicitly discussed later in his book [Hazan, 1976, pp 12, 16] The definition of propaganda used here includes all of the elements from the Encyclopedia Britannica definition provided to participants in the conference In my view the Encyclopedia's definition is too restrictive, for it limits the goal of propaganda to the influencing public opinion and makes no reference to influencing behavior

5 For an excellent discussion of the importance of the continuation of the ideological struggle during the period of peaceful coexistence see Rubinstein, 1981, pp 269-271

6 The following discussion draws heavily on the 1980 CIA study of Soviet propaganda and covert operations [CIA, 1980] For a good survey of the organizational aspects of Soviet propaganda and active measures see Shultz and Godson, 1984, pp 17-39 See, also, Background Brief, 1985

7 U S Congress, 1982, p 235

8 For information concerning the expansion of Soviet military and economic assistance in the 1960s see U S Department of State, 1965, p 6 and U S Department of State, 1966, pp 12-19

9 For the full development of this argument see Valkenier, 1983

10 For a Western assessment of Gorshkov's major writings see McConnell, 1977

12 Hazan devotes an entire chapter of his study of Soviet propaganda to
impregnational propaganda. In the following section I have drawn heavily on
that discussion [Hazan, 1976, pp 96-143].

13 Relevant Soviet publications that have taken this line include

14 For more recent references to Soviet views on the importance of social
change see Gromyko, 1982, p 31, Brutents, 1977, vol 1, p 29. For a Soviet
discussion of the importance of vanguard parties see Irkhin, 1982

15 Two studies of the content of Soviet propaganda toward the Middle East can
be found in Hazan, 1977, pp 144-229, Dawisha, 1979, pp 186-188

16 For discussions of the Soviet concept of the correlation of forces see
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