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INFORMATION AND IDENTITIES IN DYNAMIC ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENTS

BY

CHARLA S. WAEISS

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2019

Urbana, Illinois

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Brian Gaines, Chair
Professor Damarys Canache
Professor James Kuklinski
Assistant Professor Avital Livny

ABSTRACT

Electoral environments in democracies are complex. One of the key tools voters use to simplify the information environment in elections is the party-label heuristic. However, party labels themselves change and with considerable frequency. Therefore, this dissertation investigates the consequences of party-label changes for voters' information, partisan identities, and corresponding behavior. As a result, this dissertation makes a series of contributions to our understanding of voter decision-making and partisanship. First, I create an original dataset of party-name changes across 43 democracies from 1990-2017, allowing scholars to quantify instances of party relabeling. Second, using these data paired with electoral surveys, I demonstrate that party relabeling limits the information voters have about the party, alters their voting considerations, and is associated with decreased levels of partisanship to such parties. Third, using a case study in Germany, I demonstrate that changes as innocuous and a party relabeling itself alters how that party's followers see themselves, other parties, and even limits their willingness to engage with political actors. Fourth, I use the same case in Germany to highlight that parties can opt for new names that include informative signals, thereby improving voters' knowledge about them. Finally, I contend that voters may come to rely on different heuristics when party labels are no longer reliable information shortcuts, pointing to party leaders as an alternative heuristic. In doing so, I develop two new measures to capture how voters view the "typicality" of party leaders vis-a-vis the party and the level of attachment voters express toward leaders over the party, expanding our extant understanding of partisanship and personalization.

In memory of my grandfather, for encouraging my curiosity and my ambitions without limitations. You shaped me into who I am today and I am forever grateful to you.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project would not have been possible without the many people who have helped me along the way.

My undergraduate advisor, Heather Tafel, was the first person to recommend that I attend graduate school – something I hadn't known was even an option for me to pursue. Her mentorship throughout my undergraduate career and in the years afterward directly determined my choice to pursue this Ph.D.

Brian Gaines has been a remarkable advisor. He saw the potential in my dissertation idea and encouraged my interests, wherever they took me. His willingness to review and edit all aspects of my writing has been invaluable. My committee has also played a pivotal role in my graduate career. Throughout this project, Damarys Canache has been able to clarify my thoughts with a single question and has helped me see the connections between my ideas. Jim Kuklinski is the type of mentor that I aspire to be. Every time I met with him, I would leave his office with greater clarity and confidence. His enthusiasm for social science research and the pursuit of knowledge is contagious – and one of the primary reasons I was determined to finish this degree. Avital Livny has a knack for finding the exact pieces of a project that need further development and each of these chapters are much better for it. She consistently pushed me to think of the bigger picture and be more confident in my research.

I'd also like to thank Sowmiya Raju and Sanjiv Sarma for their valuable research assistance on this project. It was a joy to serve as their Graduate Mentor and they both raised insightful questions about my research. I am also thankful for all of the students I

have had the pleasure of instructing over the years. It has been inspiring to witness the inquisitive nature of the next generation.

This Political Science Department could not function without our exceptional office staff. Brenda Stamm has helped me navigate the administrative and bureaucratic processes at this University. When my (countless) questions couldn't be answered via email, she was always happy to sit down and walk me through requirements and guidelines.

I am incredibly fortunate to have developed and retained the friendships that I've had during this process. The graduate students here are, unequivocally, the best parts of this Department. Çağlayan Başer, Ekrem Başer, Nuole Chen, Chris Grady, and Alice Iannantuoni have helped me improve every piece of writing they've read. More importantly, they have been reliable friends over the years. Ekrem has relentlessly pushed me to be confident in myself – and it finally worked! Nuole has always provided me with sound advice and words of encouragement. Chris's positivity and ability to make me laugh has kept me going on the hardest of days. Alice has been one of the most thoughtful and dependable friends I could ask for. I'm also grateful for Rebeca Agosto Rosa; along with being an engaging and detailed co-author, she has consistently reminded me of the importance of staying true to myself. Kristin Bail seems to know exactly what to say – or not say – whenever I need it the most. Jillian Evans has been a great commiserator and cheerleader throughout these final months. And I'd like to thank my best friend, Jamie Roy, for keeping me grounded and being my perpetual sounding board. These friendships have been affirming and fulfilling, even when I felt like I didn't have any answers or direction.

My family has been a profound source of strength and guidance throughout these years. I am thankful to my wife's parents, Brian and Denise Rajala, for being there whenever I needed some perspective. I am deeply indebted to my sister, Jessica, who has always helped me keep my head above water. Even on days when I didn't know how to take the next step forward, she was at my side, ready to walk with me. Without my grandmother, Lorraine, I

never would have finished this degree. Her unwavering support has been the foundation that has held me up throughout this process. This degree is just as much hers as it is mine. Finally, I cannot adequately express my gratitude for my wife, Betsy. Her partnership, patience, and love are three of the greatest gifts I have ever been given. I'm excited to see what's in store for us and I couldn't have found a better person for this journey.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research Question

Electoral environments in democracies are complex. Even in the most stable of contexts, voters are faced with a menu of political parties and candidates and extensive information during campaign periods. Such stability, however, is rare. Parties enter and exit the electoral arena, new candidates come on to the political scene, and parties change the way they present themselves to their electorates. How do voters navigate and adapt to these dynamic electoral environments?

Political scientists have identified that voters frequently use party-label heuristics and their own partisan identities to process and understand information in these arenas. However, our extant knowledge about the ways in which voters use these shortcuts and partisan lenses to traverse complex information environments is often grounded in the assumption of stability; situations which, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, are not archetypal features of democratic politics. In other words, the very information shortcut that voters often rely on to navigate complex electoral environments, frequently change. We have not yet accounted for: (1) the role that these changes play in the knowledge voters have about parties, (2) how their partisan identities are shaped by such changes, and (3) the alternative heuristics voters seek out when party-labels are no longer informative. Therefore, this dissertation endeavors to address these three features of electoral politics.

Plan for the Dissertation

This dissertation is not an exhaustive investigation of party-label change and their myriad consequences for voters. It is, however, the first study to my knowledge that documents cross-national instances of party relabeling beyond the borders of Europe. In Chapter 2, I introduce a novel dataset of party-label changes across 43 democracies from 1990-2017. I provide some descriptive investigation of these changes and find that they have occurred in approximately 18% of political parties in old democracies and around 40% of parties in new democracies. I also identify that they often co-occur with other structural changes to parties.

This further amplifies the complexity that party relabeling can represent for voters: not only do popular party-name heuristics change with considerable frequency, but they also take place in the context of other structural changes like party mergers, splinters, and joint-list modifications. This means that not only will the average voter face new party names in a given election, but that these names can come along with larger, underlying modifications to party options. In this chapter, I argue that party-label change will decrease the utility of the label heuristic and, subsequently, the information that voters have about the party. I find support for this argument as well as correlational evidence that party relabeling is associated with voters' decreased willingness to vote for or declare partisanship to such parties.

Chapter 3 provides a deeper examination into the consequences of party relabeling for partisans. This chapter builds on Chapter 2 by providing a causal investigation into the relationship between party relabeling, voters' partisanship, and their engagement in politics. I also use this chapter to advance an updated theory of partisanship in the context of social identities. I argue that party labels, in addition to serving as information shortcuts for the average voter, also act as an identifying heuristic for partisans. I apply this theory to the phenomenon of partisan stability, arguing that political scientists have

largely neglected to consider the role of political parties in imbuing instability in voters' partisanship. Using the case of the Party of Democratic Socialism's name change to the Left Party.PDS in Germany, I adjudicate between the social identity perspective of partisanship and the revisionist perspective, testing the observable implications of each in the context of PDS partisan's stability and behavior.

I find no support for the revisionist perspective of partisanship in this case. Instead, I find that the PDS-relabeling decision diminished PDS partisans' views of parties and their willingness to engage with them in politics, and weakened their partisan attachments. These results underscore the importance of party labels and parties' behavior for partisan identities. Therefore, I contend that studies of partisanship and heuristics should pay closer attention to the consistency of party names when attempting to document these phenomena. Furthermore, by providing evidence in favor of the social identity perspective of partisanship, this chapter highlights that partisanship need not be an "unmoved mover" in order to act as a social identity. Instead, partisans respond to changes that their parties undergo – a key finding that, I argue, should encourage scholars to move away from the expectation that partisan instability is only common if it is the result of instrumental considerations.

Does party relabeling only pose negative consequences for voters? In Chapter 4 I use the same case of the PDS to illustrate that parties can opt to include meaningful and informative signals in their new name that can allow voters to overcome informational deficits about the party. In particular, I use variation in the PDS renaming to identify how the length of time and the magnitude of the party-name change (full versus partial) can influence the variation in the information that voters have about the party's ideological position. I find that the PDS's new name: The Left Party(.PDS), by virtue of including the strong ideological signal "left" in its name, improved the consensus with which voters placed the party on an ideological spectrum. This chapter highlighted one instance wherein party relabeling actually improved the information that voters have about the party. In

conjunction with the original dataset presented in Chapter 2, it paves the way for future research into the relationship between party-label change, the informational content of new party labels, and the information voters' have about parties.

An underlying theme in this dissertation is that scholars have often taken for granted the ubiquity of party-labels as information shortcuts for voters. In Chapter 5, I contend that party-label changes could compound such that the party-label no longer stands as a viable information shortcut for voters. In the absence of these useful heuristics, I argue that voters will seek to develop other shortcuts that will still allow them to make political decisions while cutting the costs of becoming fully informed. I offer party leaders as one such alternative to party-labels in these circumstances.

Therefore, I create measures of leader attachment and leader prototypicality for scholars' future use in this research arena. These measures are also useful for addressing concerns in comparative politics about growing political personalization that often conflate growing leader affect with waning partisan attachment and decreased importance of the party in determining vote choice. I validate these measures using a sample of U.S. college students. Given the current political climate in the United States in the aftermath of the 2016 election, some American politics scholars have also started to consider the role of personalist appeals from leaders in voter decision-making. Therefore, in addition to offering new measures that can help us determine whether voters use party leaders as heuristics in the absence of meaningful party labels, this chapter also demonstrates the role of leader attachment in the U.S. and provides useful measures for political personalization scholars to capture better their phenomenon of interest.

In Chapter 6, I offer some concluding remarks regarding party-label change and its consequences for voters, the nature of partisanship, and the role of party leaders in voters' political identities. I also discuss some potential avenues for future research on these topics.

CHAPTER 2

A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME? PARTY-LABEL CHANGE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR VOTERS

Are names important? Some parents agonize over selecting a name for their child, as names can signal information to others about a person's gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (Kasof 1993), have psychological consequences (e.g. Harari and McDavid 1973), and even correlate with individuals' decisions, like where to live or which occupation to choose (Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones 2002). But names are important not only for individuals. In fact, scores of research on the naming conventions of different brands emphasize that companies should choose names deliberately and with certain characteristics in mind to improve the image conveyed by the name (e.g. Argo, Popa, and Smith 2010; Klink 2003; Lowrey and Shrum 2007; Robertson 1989). In a similar vein, scholars have found that political parties often choose names that convey important information to voters, such as the ethnic groups they represent (Ishiyama and Bruening 2011), their ties to specific social movements (Mensah 2017) or rebel organizations (Ishiyama and Marshall 2017), and, more broadly, their ideological leanings (Mair and Mudde 1998).

Voters make use of political parties' names as informational shortcuts. These condition their choices, attitudes, and behavior. Voters use these heuristics to overcome (or reduce) the cost of acquiring information in a complex electoral environment (Downs 1957). In particular, many voters will draw conclusions about the expected behavior from a party, or candidate under a party's label, based on the ideological position, policy stances, and even general affect they associate with the party (Butler and Powell 2014; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994; Lupu 2013; Popkin 1991; Rahn 1993; Stokes 1963). At times, these shortcuts can aid voters in making decisions as if they were fully informed, while bearing a

fraction of the cost to becoming fully informed. When parties behave in ways that do not conform to the heuristics voters have developed about them, these information shortcuts can also lead voters to make incorrect inferences (Kuklinski et al. 2000; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Merolla, Stephenson, and Zechmeister 2008), and vote in ways they may not have, had they been fully informed (Althaus 1998).

While scholars have built a mountain of knowledge on partisan heuristics in democracies, most of this information comes from examining environments where party labels are constant, which is rarer than most of these studies imply. This is not to say that scholars have ignored how voters respond to party changes; however, the changes on which research has concentrated have remained separate from these name changes. Baker et al. (2016) and Lupu (2016) addressed partisan identification when party brands (or, reputations) change, but their focus was on parties with constant labels. Marinova (2016) examined variation in voters' information about parties when parties undergo structural changes, but does not examine the consequences of name changes, which often accompany such structural modifications to parties. Finally, Kim and Solt (2017) is the only study of which I am aware that has quantified party-label changes. The purpose of their study, however, was to determine the factors that led parties to change their name; they were not focused on assessing the consequences of these changes for voters, nor were they focused on quantifying name changes for parties that underwent any structural changes (e.g. mergers, splinters, etc.).

The lack of attention to the consequences of party-name changes for voters stands in stark contrast to the frequency of such changes across democracies. Figure 2.1 illustrates the proportion of parties that have undergone name changes from 1990-2017.[1] Because many scholars have established that party systems in new democracies are characterized by

[1] Author's data. The description of the coding process is discussed in the *Cross-National Instances Party Relabeling: an Original Dataset* section. Values for each country were computed by taking a count of the number of party-name changes that occurred between 1990-2017 divided by the total number of political parties that had competed electorally in the same time period. (Parties with less than 1% of the vote share were excluded.)



Figure 2.1: Proportion of Parties with New Labels (1990-2017)

instability due to the relatively young nature of democratic parties and voters (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Marinova 2015; Tavits 2008), I distinguish between new and old democracies in the figure. Grey bars represent new democracies and black bars, old democracies. Although an imperfect distinction, it is apparent that a number of new democracies have exhibited high rates (nearly 50% or above) of party-label change during the past 27 years. A group of old democracies also demonstrates some sizable rates of label changes (at or above 25%), meaning that these trends are not merely an artifact of the age of a democracy.

Why do these changing labels matter? Given the fundamental role they play as heuristics and partisan markers, I argue that label changes can alter their heuristic value and voters' subsequent behavior. Generally, this chapter provides answers to the following question: how do voters respond to party-label changes? In particular, how does party-label change affect the information that voters have about the party?

I argue that changes to party labels reduce the information that voters can rely on about the party. Using an original dataset of party-name changes across 43 democracies from 1990-2017, I demonstrate that party relabeling results in voters who are more likely to be unaware of the parties' ideological leanings and, more drastically, unfamiliar with the parties themselves such that they do not even feel comfortable guessing how they feel about the party or placing the party on an ideological spectrum in something as low stakes as a survey. I also show that voters shy away from voting for as well as declaring partisanship to parties that have undergone label changes.

This chapter introduces a novel dataset of party-name changes across a large span of countries. To my knowledge, it is the first dataset to track party renaming decisions along with structural changes parties underwent (as such changes often come with new party labels). It also contributes to our understanding of the role of heuristics in voters' electoral decision-making, highlighting how something as innocuous as a name change can reshape how citizens vote and see their partisan identities.

Party Labels as Information Shortcuts

Party labels are a ubiquitous information shortcut, or heuristic, for voters. Specifically, a heuristic is "a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods" (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, 454). The benefits voters obtain for actively finding information about the parties (and candidates) competing in an election rarely outweigh the costs of doing so, because information-seeking can be a costly endeavor when it comes

to politics (Downs 1957). As a result, voters will rely on sources that aggregate information about parties (e.g. the media or elites) (Mondak 1993) as well as passively acquire information from their exposure to electoral campaigns and political processes over time within a country. This information helps to shape the effectiveness of party label heuristics for voters. These label shortcuts allow voters to infer information about the party (and, in some cases, the candidate competing under a specific party label), like potential issue positions (Lupia 1994), general ideological stances (Woon and Pope 2008), expectations about the types of voters who support the party (Lupu 2013; Lupu 2014; Lupu 2016), the party's established reputation and image (Kim and Solt 2017), and other valence issues (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Butler and Powell 2014; Stokes 1963).

Although voters could use a party's label as a heuristic as soon as they find out *any* information about a party, the effectiveness of a heuristic improves as voters' experience with a party's repeated behavior increases. This can occur as the result of citizens observing a party's positions on specific issues over time, where consistent stances on the same issues can help reinforce what voters may expect from that party. However, this is not to say that heuristics will always improve as the length of time with a party increases. Merolla, Stephenson, and Zechmeister (2008) highlight that some Canadian political parties are not as clearly differentiated ideologically than others, decreasing the utility of the party label as a heuristic for Canadian voters. Therefore this effect is conditional on the cohesiveness of elites' behavior within a party and the consistency with which a party stands on particular issues or, more broadly, ideology. Nevertheless, consistency in party labels will contribute to voters' familiarity with the party, even if at a superficial level.

Therefore, if a party changes its label from one election to the next, the utility of the party's label as a heuristic inherently changes. In the least disruptive of circumstances, voters are able to recognize the continuity between the party's names and determine the applicability of existing shortcuts for reasoning about the party under the new label. Of course, this still requires considerable cognitive effort on the voter's part, as they must first

recognize that the two party names are related and then undergo some decision-making calculus to recognize which information they associated with the party's previous name that can be transferred to the new one and which is no longer applicable.

Given that acquiring information during elections is already a costly endeavor that most voters try to avoid, it is likely that a party-label change could result in voters' having fewer informational items associated with the new label, thereby inhibiting their knowledge about the party. By limiting voters' knowledge and increasing the costs required to amass the same level of information they had about the party previously, this could drive some voters to opt for a different party for which they feel they have more information, or diminish the information they are using to make a voting decision. Finally, in addition to altering the factual information voters associate with a relabeled party, their affect toward that party might even change under the presence of a new label, as the name no longer evokes the same affective reaction as the previous one had.

Therefore, I expect that, all else equal, party-label changes will diminish the information that voters have about the party, driving the following hypotheses:

> *H1*: Voters will be less familiar with relabeled parties than with parties with constant labels.

However, not all name changes are similar in magnitude. Some parties change their name to variants of their old ones (what I describe as partial name changes later in the chapter), whereas others opt for wholesale changes in their names (what I describe as full changes later in the chapter). Therefore, I also expect:

> *H1a*: Voters will be less familiar with parties that undergo full name changes than with those that have made partial name changes.

> *H2*: Voters will be less familiar with the ideological positions of relabeled parties than with parties with constant labels.

As I argue, party relabeling reduces voters' information and familiarity with the parties, therefore I also expect this to affect their voting behavior. In particular, limiting the information that voters can glean about a party because of a name change should also deter voters from casting a ballot for these parties or declaring partisanship to the party.

> *H3*: Voters will be less likely to vote for relabeled parties than parties with constant labels.

> *H4*: Voters will be less likely to declare partisanship to relabeled parties than those with constant labels.

To test my hypotheses, I use an original dataset of party relabeling across 43 democracies from 1990-2017. Next, I detail the coding decisions used to create the original dataset and provide an overview of party relabeling decisions in those countries.

Cross-National Instances Party Relabeling: an Original Dataset

In this section, I describe the coding process for the party relabeling dataset. Then, I provide a descriptive overview of name changes: their frequency, the rate of co-occurrence with structural changes, and some text analysis of party labels.

I included parties in this dataset provided that they had obtained at least 1% of the vote share in the election at time t. I selected the countries to include in this dataset based on whether they met the following criteria: (1) their elections were considered democratic at the time they were held (according to Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) and, for later years, Polity IV) and (2) the country appeared in at least one election survey in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). This latter criterion was for practical purposes to allow me to evaluate the effects of relabeling decisions on voters. I collected data during the 1990-2017 time period to allow for comparisons between established democracies and those that developed just after the collapse of the communism. The observations in the dataset are at the party-election year level, and I refer to the country's

most recent election as time t and previous election as time $t-1$. Below I describe the variables included in the dataset and the coding decisions I employed to create them.

Name Change: I coded a party as changing its name provided that the party label used at time t differed from the label it used at time $t-1$. I focused here on substantive differences to the name – changes that entailed only the inclusion or removal of an article (e.g. "the" or "a") or punctuation were not coded as name changes.

Full Change: I coded name changes as full changes provided that none of the substantive words in the party label at time t were included in the party label at time $t-1$.

Partial Change: I coded name changes as partial changes provided that at least one of the substantive words in the party label at time t were included in the party label at time $t-1$.

Therefore, the full and partial change variables are mutually exclusive. As I show later in this chapter, name changes rarely occur in isolation from other party changes. In fact, they often occur in conjunction with or because of structural changes parties undergo like a merger, splinter, or joint-list endeavor. In these instances, name changes may act as signals that alert voters to the structural changes of the party. Therefore, attributing any change in voters' perceptions or behavior solely to name changes in these instances would be spurious. As a result, I also code for structural changes, as described below.

Merger: I coded a party merger provided that the party at time $t-1$ merged with another party after time $t-1$ and before time t. This includes instances where two parties merged together to form a newly named party and situations where a party acquired another one under its same name.

Split: I coded a party split provided that the party at time t was created as the result of party members splintering off from its parent party after time $t-1$.

Joint-list Entry: I coded a joint-list entry provided that the party at time t entered into a joint-list agreement with another party after time $t-1$ for the election at time t. I do not code joint-list entries for parties that retained standing joint-list agreements across



Figure 2.2: Rates of Party Change by Type

the electoral periods.

Joint-list Exit: I coded a joint-list exist provided that the party at time t exited a joint-list agreement that it had been in for the election at time $t-1$.

New: I coded a party as new provided that it existed at time t but did not exist at time $t-1$. As this variable is intended to capture genuinely new parties, parties that participated in mergers or underwent a split are not coded as new.

Disbanded: I coded a party as disbanded provided that it existed at time $t-1$ and ceased to exist by the election at time t. Similar to new parties, this variable is intended to capture parties that no longer participated in elections in any form; therefore, joint list exits, and constituent parties of mergers are not coded as disbanded.

The rates of name changes and structural changes that parties have undergone between 1990 and 2017 are displayed in Figure 2.2, separately for new and old democracies. Some trends are noticeable from these data. First, name changes that are not accompanied by any structural changes to parties are relatively uncommon (they occurred approximately

7.4% of the time in new democracies and 4% of the time in old democracies). If we allow for instances where parties that underwent structural changes also changed their name, the frequency of new labels is fairly high: approximately 40% in new democracies and 18% in old democracies. In terms of the types of name changes that parties employ, full name changes are more popular than partial ones, across both new and old democracies. This may be due, in part, to an artifact of the label-change coding scheme: new parties and disbanded parties, by their very nature, cannot have the same name as they did in the previous election or in the subsequent election, respectively.



Figure 2.3: Types of Names Changes

Therefore, Figure 2.3 illustrates the proportion of name changes that correspond with structural changes to the party, the overall proportion of name changes that are partial or full changes to the label, and the proportion of name changes that happen absent of structural changes. Based on this figure, party-name changes overwhelmingly occur in conjunction with structural changes, regardless of the age of the country's democracy. The proportion of party-name changes that occur simultaneously with specific structural



Figure 2.4: Rates of Partial and Full Name Changes

changes also appear largely uniform between new and old democracies. Finally, a majority of label changes are full changes rather than partial ones.

Figure 2.4 shows the proportion of label changes, broken down by full and partial changes, that correspond with different structural changes. This figure reveals some interesting variation between the types of structural changes that tend to correspond with different types of name changes. In particular, a higher proportion of partial name changes (relative to full changes) are due to party mergers. Additionally, a larger proportion of partial name changes take place absent any structural changes to parties at approximately 30% than compared to full name changes (approximately 20%).

Party-label changes are inherently endogenous to voter behavior: parties often make strategic considerations based on their previous or projected electoral performance and, among these considerations, relabeling stands as an option. As the previous figures illustrate, relabeling often occurs in conjunction with structural changes. Scholars have established that structural changes, specifically mergers and electoral coalitions like

joint-lists, are associated with parties' attempts to overcome an electoral threshold (Ibenskas 2015; Ibenskas 2016), which means that smaller parties may be more likely to undergo name changes as a result. Splinters, however, are associated with larger parties (Ibenskas and Sikk 2017).[2] Perhaps, then, a majority of label changes occur among smaller parties, which are likely less known among voters by virtue of having less electoral influence and lower levels of popularity among the electorate. Kim and Solt (2017), however, find no relationship between party size and relabeling decisions.

To address this possibility, I examine parties' vote share in the election prior to relabeling among the European[3] countries in my data, shown in Figure 2.5. The average vote share in the election prior to relabeling among these parties was 10.53, with a median of 6.3 and a standard deviation of 11.19. This descriptive assessment of the data does highlight that changes appear to be more popular among smaller parties. However, it is important to note that even the median vote share preceding parties' relabeling stands above every electoral threshold in European countries. Therefore, while relabeled parties do tend to be smaller in size, they do not appear to be so small that the results in my subsequent analyses are directly a result of these parties being unknown among voters regardless of label change decisions. However, future work directly testing this relationship would be valuable to uncover the costs and benefits that parties face when relabeling.

Altogether, these figures highlight some key aspects of party labeling in democratic elections: (1) party-name changes occur both in new and old democracies; (2) most name changes take place in conjunction with structural changes; (3) full name changes happen more often than partial name changes; (4) name changes are more frequent in new democracies than in old democracies; (5) although name changes are more popular among smaller parties, they are by no means exclusive to them. Each of these dimensions of party labeling illustrates that the electoral information environment for voters is likely more

[2]Ibenskas and Sikk (2017) measured party size as the vote share of the party in the previous election.

[3]The selection of countries for this descriptive assessment was due to data availability.



Figure 2.5: Rate of Vote Share in Election Prior to Relabeling

complex than typically understood. Not only are voters likely to face some instances of party-name changes, all else equal, but when these changes happen, they also tend to happen in tandem with other structural changes to the party – further complicating the information environment – *and* more name changes tend to be wholesale rather than partial. This complexity appears to be further amplified in new democracies given the greater rates of name changes when compared to old democracies.

Beyond the mere occurrence of names changes, I also examine the content of party labels, both changed and unchanged. Figure 2.6 illustrates the frequency of substantive words among new and old party names. New labels are those that parties opted for upon relabeling, whereas old names are those that parties initially had before relabeling. Figure 2.7 indicates the frequency of words among labels that did not undergo any changes in my dataset. Across all three groups, "party" and "democratic" are the first- and second-most popular words, respectively. Although the words "union", "national", "alliance", "social", "people's", and "christian" were among the most frequently used in each group, the popularity of these words did fluctuate between each type of party label.

Interestingly, some words that were used in one type of label are notably absent in others. In particular, "new", "first", "wins", "great", and "young" are among the most-used

substantive words in new party labels that do not appear among old and unchanged labels. This difference seems rather intuitive: parties with new labels may be trying to capitalize on their "newness" to the electorate. Unsurprisingly, "communist" did not appear in any new party labels, which fits the time period of the data and is likely a reflection of the waning popularity of communism among democracies after the collapse of the Soviet Union.



Figure 2.6: Frequency of Words among New and Old Labels



Figure 2.7: Frequency of Words among Unchanged Labels

Among old labels, excluding country-specific words like "Finnish" or "Peruvian", the

most popular words that were not shared by the other types of labels were “majority” and “rural”. For unchanged labels, “ecological” is the most popular word (excluding country-specific words as described above) that did not appear in the other types of labels. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the differences from these two groups are artifacts of larger trends.

Finally, it is important to note that party labels across each group are much more similar than they are different. Aside from the word “new”, each of the words that were unique to their constituent groups occurred less than 0.01% of the time. Similarly, the frequency of words between each group are highly correlated with one another (r>0.9).

Data and Methods

To test my hypotheses, I use my original dataset of party-name changes and the CSES to examine voters’ self-reported behavioral outcomes that follow from label changes from 1996-2016.[4] This produced a dataset at the respondent-party-election year. Therefore, each respondent appears in the data multiple times during a given election year – the same number of times as the number of parties included in the country’s survey. It is important to note that the CSES is comprised of post-election surveys. This means that all respondents in the data will have already experienced their country’s election. This increases the likelihood that they will have, at the very least, heard of the parties competing – even those that changes their names. Therefore, using this sample could potentially dampen the effects that party-name changes appear to have on voters. In this respect, using the CSES serves as a more conservative test of my expectations than using pre-election surveys where voters may not have had any exposure to all party alternatives and had not begun preparing to make their ballot box decisions.

[4]This encompasses all available waves of the CSES.

Separating Old and New Democracies

Because party-label changes are considerably more frequent in new democracies than in old democracies, I perform my analyses separately on these populations to allow for heterogeneity in the effects that label change has on voters. As mentioned previously in this chapter, scholars have demonstrated that new democracies are characterized by greater electoral instability than old democracies. Scholars have argued that this instability is due, in part, to the young age of party systems and voters (e.g. Marinova 2015; Tavits 2008) and others have contended that the instability in new democracies appears to be unique in kind relative to older democracies (e.g. Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Powell and Tucker 2014). Marinova (2016) operationalized instability using a new measure, the Electoral Instability of Parties, which is an additive index of structural party change[5] between subsequent elections within a country. She illustrated that this measure was strongly correlated with Powell and Tucker (2014) measure of vote share volatility driven by party entry and exit; where new democracies exhibited much higher rates of such instability than old democracies. Powell and Tucker (2014) and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) both showed that younger democracies had much greater levels of vote volatility than did old democracies in the same time period, and Powell and Tucker (2014) found that such distinctions were due to the fact that volatility in new democracies was largely driven by party changes (entry and exit).[6]

As a result, I separate old and new democracies in my analyses, not only because of the different rates of party instability, but also because the length of time that voters have experienced democratic elections in these two different groups has been shown to shape the levels of attachment that voters develop toward parties (Converse 1969; Lisi 2015) and

[5]This is comprised of the six types of structural change that I also coded in my dataset.

[6]For their measure of such volatility (Type A), entries and exits are not restricted exclusively to genuinely new and disbanded parties. The authors also develop a strategy for coding party mergers and splinters; some of which contribute to this party system volatility measure. See Powell and Tucker (2014) for greater detail on their coding strategy.

voters' electoral behavior (Tavits and Annus 2006). Similarly, I expect that voters could adapt to instability when it is largely the norm for their electoral experience and be less affected but any individual party-label change. Marinova (2016) finds some evidence for this, wherein voters in new democracies are generally more knowledgeable[7] about parties that have undergone structural changes than voters in old democracies; but knowledge about such parties decreases as the rate of overall party instability in an election increases. As I demonstrated previously, party-label changes quite often go hand-in-hand with structural changes that parties undergo. Structural party changes are generally more popular among new democracies than old democracies, which also lends to my decision to distinguish countries based on this characteristic.

Of course, as Figure 2.1 shows, this dichotomy is an imperfect proxy for party-label instability. Some older democracies, like Italy, exhibit considerably high levels of party-label change, whereas some newer democracies, like Spain and Portugal, exhibit very low levels. However, because the rate of generational experience with democratic elections has been shown to affect citizens' rates of strategic voting (Tavits and Annus 2006), political socialization (Converse 1969), and partisan attachment (Lisi 2015), I find this distinction to be analytically and theoretically useful. Future work on the consequences of party-label change for voters that assesses how increasing and consistent rates of such instability affect voters would be valuable.

Dependent Variables

Familiarity with parties. For hypothesis 1 (*voters will be less familiar with relabeled parties than parties with constant labels*), I measure voters' familiarity with parties using two survey questions from the CSES. Respondents were asked to place each party on an ideological spectrum and were also asked about their general affect toward each party. For

[7] As mentioned previously, Marinova (2016) operationalizes party knowledge as the degree of closeness between a voter's and an expert's ideological placement of a party; the smaller the value, the more knowledgeable the voter is about the party.

both questions, while respondents were not encouraged to indicate whether they were familiar with the party or confident in their placements, the CSES did code unprompted answers that expressed the respondent's unfamiliarity with the party. Specifically, this was coded as "Volunteered: haven't heard of party."[8] The order in which respondents were asked about their affect toward parties and their perception of parties' ideological positions varied depending on the country in the survey. By asking respondents about specific parties and naming those parties, I expect that respondents would be less likely to volunteer that they had not heard of a party after already being introduced to it in a previous survey question. Therefore, I create a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent answered at least one of the party questions (ideology or affect) by stating they had not heard of the party and 0 indicates otherwise.

Familiarity with parties' ideological position. For hypothesis 2 (*voters will be less familiar with the ideological positions of relabeled parties than parties with constant labels*), I measure voters' familiarity with parties' ideological positions using the party ideological placement question from the CSES. I created a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent answered that they did not know the ideological position of the party and 0 indicates otherwise. This differs from others' approaches to measuring ideological familiarity with parties. For example, Marinova (2016) compared respondents' placements of parties to that of experts and created a measure of distance between the two where larger values indicated less accuracy on the part of respondents and smaller values, greater accuracy. I avoid using this measure as it is unclear to me whether party relabeling would also affect how country experts perceived the party, or whether experts are the appropriate reference category to which to hold voters.

Voting. For hypothesis 3 (*voters will be less likely to vote for relabeled parties than parties with constant labels*), I measure respondents' voting behavior using the CSES

[8]This differs from answers that indicated the respondents didn't know where to place or how they felt about the party, whether the respondents were unfamiliar with the scale the CSES enumerator asked them to use, or if respondents refused to answer the question.

survey question that asked voters which party they voted for in the most recent election. I focus specifically on respondents' party list votes. I do not examine how voters' candidate selections differed, alleviating any concerns regarding the interactive effects of relabeling and individual political candidates. I use this question to create a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent voted for the party and 0, otherwise. For those who did not vote in the election, each party-respondent observation is coded as 0 and these respondents are included in my later analyses.

Partisanship. For hypothesis 4 (*voters will be less likely to declare partisanship to relabeled parties than those with constant labels*), I measure respondents' partisanship using the CSES party identification question that asked respondents which party they felt closest to, among respondents who indicated they felt close to one party over others. I use this question to create a binary variable where 1 indicates that the respondent declared partisanship to the party and 0, otherwise. Functionally, apartisans are coded NA as they do not have partisanship to declare.

Independent Variables

I measure a party's *name change* using a binary indicator where 1 indicates that the party changed its same between the previous election and the current one and 0 indicates the party did not undergo any name change. In subsequent models, I separate *full* changes from *partial* ones using binary indicators for each, coded according to the scheme discussed previously. I expect that full name changes will create greater informational burdens for voters than partial name changes, because a full name change necessarily means that the party's new name does not correspond in any way to its old one; whereas, for partial changes, the new name bears some substantive similarity to the party's old name, which may lessen the informational complexity for voters relative to full name changes.

Control Variables

Given the hierarchical nature of my data, I control for characteristics of political parties, respondents, and the electoral system.

Control Variables: Parties

As illustrated in the previous section, party-label changes often correspond with other structural changes to the party. Therefore, I use binary indicators to control for these types of structural changes, including mergers, splits, new parties, joint-list entries, and joint-list exits, as these types of changes can have disparate effects on voters (see Marinova 2016 for a detailed discussion). These are also coded according to the scheme discussed previously. Because of the nature of the CSES survey, respondents were not asked about parties that no longer existed (i.e. that disbanded); therefore, these are not included in the subsequent analyses.

Control Variables: Respondents

A variety of individual characteristics have been shown to moderate how voters seek out information and participate in politics. I control for *age* to account for the possibility that older voters may be more habituated with their country's elections and, subsequently, be marginally more informed about the menu of political options (Lau 2003). Additionally, older voters are more likely to participate in elections, increasing the likelihood that they will be more familiar with political parties (Franklin 2004). It is important to note that the role of age is contextual: aging voters in old democracies will have had more experience with democratic elections than aging voters in new democracies. Therefore, I anticipate age to have less of an effect on respondents' behavior in new democracies. I control for respondent *gender*, as well, because women are generally less confident than men in their political knowledge, which would extend to party knowledge (Mondak 2004) I also include controls for respondents' *income* and *education*, as wealthier and more educated individuals

are more likely to be interested in politics and, likely, more informed about politics (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).

Control Variables: Elections

Finally, I include some election-level control variables in my analyses. Specifically, I control for the *total number of label changes* in any given election, as I expect that additional changes to parties will further increase the complexity of the electoral environment and make it more difficult for voters to navigate the party competition (Marinova 2016). For testing hypotheses 1 and 2, I also control for the *type of election* included in the CSES, as different types of elections shape the informational environment for voters. For example, voters in a presidential election are likely more concerned with candidate-specific information than they are general party information; whereas, for parliamentary elections, information about the party may dominate. The types of elections included in these data are parliamentary elections, presidential elections, and parliamentary-presidential elections. I do not control for election type when testing hypotheses 3 and 4. The population of respondents within the data I use to test hypothesis 3 come from countries with the same election type: parliamentary elections. I don't control for election type when testing hypothesis 4 as I do not have clear theoretical expectations for the consequences of election type on partisan identification.

Results

To test my hypotheses, I use a series of hierarchical logistic regressions, which allow me to account for the nested nature of the data. Because each individual is repeated in the dataset as many times as the number of parties they are asked about and the only individual-level data that differ across these observations are the dependent variables, each model includes a random intercept for each respondent in the data. I also include fixed effects for the election year and country (not reported here). As I mentioned previously, I

conduct my analyses separately for old and new democracies. I discuss results for these populations in turn.

Familiarity with Parties

The results from the analyses assessing the relationship between party-label change and voters' familiarity with parties (*H1*) are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for old and new democracies, respectively.[9] Positive coefficients indicate an increase in the likelihood that respondents declare they have not heard of the party before. With regard to old democracies, party-name changes generally increase the likelihood of respondents indicating they are unfamiliar with the party (Model 1). This effect disappears once controlling for general structural change to the party (Model 2), but reappears in Models 3 and 4, once the type of name change (full or partial) are separated. After controlling for the different types of structural changes, it becomes clear that full name changes significantly increase the likelihood that respondents in old democracies are unfamiliar with the party; however, partial name changes exhibit no effect. These results support my additional expectation that voters will be less familiar with parties that undergo full name changes than partial ones (*H1a*).

Although the total number of name changes in an election significantly increase the likelihood of voters' unfamiliarity with parties (Models 1 and 2), this effect disappears after separating the name changes by type (Model 3) and including additional controls for parties' structural changes (Model 4). This is likely due, in part, to the fact that few country-election years exhibit high rates of total name changes within this sample and, the inclusion of fixed effects for election years and countries in the data explain the variation in that variable. The specific type of structural change that a party experiences also yields some interesting results for voters in old democracies. Specifically, mergers, splits, and new parties do not have any statistically significant effects on voters' familiarity with parties.

[9] Although included in the analyses, election and country fixed effects and the controls for election type are not reported in the tables.

These findings contrast with Marinova's (2016), who finds that new parties and mergers significantly decrease respondents' knowledge of them.[10] The decision to enter or exit a joint-list, however, does have a significant effect for voters: when parties enter a joint-list, voters are statistically significantly more likely to indicate that they have not heard of the party, whereas, when parties exit a joint-list, voters are significantly *less* likely to be unfamiliar with the party.

The manner in which the CSES asks respondents about parties is likely playing a large role in these results: when parties enter a joint-list or electoral alliance, rather than inquiring about each constituent party, the CSES only refers to the list itself (by its distinct name). Therefore, even if a party did not change its name upon entering a joint-list, it will appear under a new name in the CSES (provided that the joint-list itself had a different name). Therefore, participants are likely responding to the joint-list name similarly to how they would if the party had actually changed its name. For joint-list exits, however, the opposite may be the case. In other words, if parties exit a joint-list, the CSES will no longer refer to them by the name of the list and, instead, as the party itself. Therefore, respondents may appear to be more familiar with parties upon their joint-list exits as they are "returning", in a sense, to their "old" name. To test this explanation, however, we would need panel data of the same respondents over time who were asked about parties before, during, and after their joint-list experiences, which is outside the scope of this chapter.

Among new democracies, name changes have a positive and statistically significant effect on voters' familiarity with parties (Models 5 and 6), supporting *H1*. In contrast to label changes in old democracies, the total number of name changes in an election among new democracies has a profound effect on voters' familiarity with parties: they are

[10]Marinova (2016) operationalizes knowledge as the distance between the respondent's and an expert's ideological placement of the party. While not directly comparable with respondent's familiarity with a party, it does point to some differences worth exploring further in future work. The results regarding my second hypothesis also shed some light on this relationship.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Name Change	0.81^{***}	-0.05		
	(0.07)	(0.12)		
Total Name Changes	-1.17^{*}	$-1.00^{\dagger}$	-0.19	0.12
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)
Structural Change		0.94^{***}	0.80^{***}	
		(0.12)	(0.12)	
Full Change			0.28^{*}	1.08^{***}
			(0.13)	(0.24)
Partial Change			-1.48^{***}	-0.27
			(0.24)	(0.32)
Merger				0.21
				(0.23)
Split				0.37
				(0.26)
New				-0.31
				(0.26)
JL Entry				1.21^{***}
				(0.15)
JL Exit				-2.55^{***}
				(0.57)
Age	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	-0.14^{***}	-0.14^{***}	-0.14^{***}	-0.14^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.23^{***}	-0.23^{***}	-0.24^{***}	-0.24^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender	0.58^{***}	0.58^{***}	0.58^{***}	0.58^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
AIC	26273.87	26219.24	26147.60	26068.38
Log Likelihood	-13088.94	-13060.62	-13023.80	-12980.19
Num. obs.	408135	408135	408135	408135
Num. groups: resid1	68229	68229	68229	68229

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2.1: DV: Familiarity with Party (Old Democracies)

significantly more likely to be unfamiliar with parties as the total number of name changes increases, across all models. Here, too, the type of name change conditions the effect that relabeling has on voters. Facing full name changes, respondents are significantly more likely to be unfamiliar with a party (Models 7 and 8), standing in stark contrast to partial name changes, which leads voters to be *less* likely to indicate unfamiliarity with a party, as compared to parties with names that went unchanged (Model 8). Although this difference in effects supports my expectations (*H1a*), it is somewhat surprising that respondents seem more likely to be familiar with parties that have undergone partial name changes than

those with constant labels. These changes happen less frequently than full changes, so this effect may be due to the individual parties that partially changed their names rather than the nature of the name change itself.

Structural changes also affect voters' familiarity with parties, albeit differently than in old democracies. Mergers and joint-list entries significantly increase the likelihood that respondents are unfamiliar with the party, while joint-list exits and splits significantly decrease this likelihood. These findings are directly opposed to those from Marinova (2016) who finds, among democracies in eastern Europe, mergers and joint-list entries increase the knowledge that voters have about the parties' ideological positions while splits and joint-list exits decrease voters' knowledge. Although the purpose of this chapter is not to replicate Marinova's (2016) analyses, these disparities are worth investigating further in future work to improve our understanding of the effects that structural changes have on voters' knowledge of parties.

Overall, these findings support my expectations that voters will be less familiar with relabeled parties than parties with constant names (*H1*), with strong evidence among new democracies than old democracies. Similarly, my expectations that full name changes will have larger effects on voters' unfamiliarity as supported in both samples (*H1a*), although partial changes in new democracies are associated with a decrease in the unfamiliarity among voters as compared to parties without name changes. Thus far, these findings highlight that party-name changes have negative implications for the information voters have available about them – even after participating in the election that would be most likely to introduce the parties. Next, I discuss the results from tests of my second hypothesis (*voters will be less familiar with the ideological positions of relabeled parties than parties with constant labels*), separately for old and new democracies.

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Name Change	1.55***	1.53***		
	(0.06)	(0.08)		
Total Name Changes	6.65***	6.69***	6.34***	7.50***
	(1.17)	(1.17)	(1.16)	(1.18)
Structural Change		0.03	0.31***	
		(0.08)	(0.07)	
Full Change			1.51***	1.05***
			(0.08)	(0.10)
Partial Change			−0.08	−0.65***
			(0.15)	(0.17)
Merger				1.80***
				(0.12)
Split				−0.81***
				(0.12)
New				−0.02
				(0.21)
JL Entry				0.75***
				(0.09)
JL Exit				−2.00**
				(0.63)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	−0.11***	−0.11***	−0.11***	−0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	−0.25***	−0.25***	−0.25***	−0.26***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender	0.43***	0.43***	0.43***	0.43***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
AIC	26574.29	26576.25	26617.20	26313.10
Log Likelihood	-13240.15	-13240.12	-13259.60	-13103.55
Num. obs.	165191	165191	165191	165191
Num. groups: resid1	32765	32765	32765	32765

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2.2: DV: Familiarity with Party (New Democracies)

Familiarity with Parties' Ideology

The results for my tests of *H2* are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for old and new democracies, respectively. As a reminder, familiarity is reverse-coded in these analyses, such that positive coefficients indicate an increase in a voter's unfamiliarity with a party's ideology (more specifically, an increase in the likelihood that a voter indicates they don't know a party's ideology). Among old democracies, as anticipated, name changes significantly increase the likelihood that voters are unfamiliar with a party's ideology (Models 9 and 10).

Against my expectations, however, is the effect that the total number of name changes has on this outcome. As total name changes increase, the likelihood that voters are unfamiliar with any given party's ideology decreases (Models 9-12). This could be an indication that changes to multiple parties in an election motivate voters to find additional information about each party, as the number of potential, "constant" alternatives is smaller. Or, in an electoral environment where multiple parties undergo changes, this may prompt the media to report more about the changes, as they become more widespread. Further tests of these conjectures, however, are outside of the scope of this chapter.

When separating the types of name changes, both full and partial changes elicit similar effects among voters: a small, statistically significant increase in the likelihood that they are unfamiliar with the party's ideology (Models 11 and 12). Structural changes also increase the likelihood that respondents are unfamiliar with a party's ideology (Models 10 and 11); and these effects are consistent across different types of structural changes (Model 12), with the exception of new parties (insignificant) and joint-list exits (negative and statistically significant).

Within new democracies, name changes similarly increase the likelihood that respondents are unfamiliar with the party's ideology (Models 13 and 14), in support of *H2*. The total number of name changes does not have any statistically significant effect on this outcome, however (Models 13-16). Interestingly, structural changes to the party appear to *decrease* the likelihood that a voter is unfamiliar with the party's ideology (Models 14 and 15). After controlling for the different types of structural change, it becomes clear that this is effect is driven by mergers and joint-list entries (Model 16), which both significantly decrease the likelihood of respondents' unfamiliarity with a party's ideology.

These findings comport with Marinova's (2016) that mergers and joint-lists in eastern European countries appear to increase the knowledge that voters have about the parties' ideology. This concordance, and the contrast with the previous findings, could be explained as follows: any changes to parties are likely to increase the likelihood that voters have not

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Name Change	1.52***	0.84***		
	(0.04)	(0.07)		
Total Name Changes	−2.60***	−2.54***	−2.51***	−1.90***
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Structural Change		0.78***	1.01***	
		(0.07)	(0.06)	
Full Change			0.47***	0.53***
			(0.07)	(0.07)
Partial Change			0.64***	0.60***
			(0.07)	(0.07)
Merger				0.63***
				(0.07)
Split				1.26***
				(0.09)
New				−18.11
				(2036.85)
JL Entry				2.02***
				(0.07)
JL Exit				−1.77***
				(0.23)
Age	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	−0.14***	−0.14***	−0.14***	−0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	−0.28***	−0.28***	−0.28***	−0.28***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender	0.72***	0.72***	0.72***	0.72***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
AIC	79647.13	79499.11	79586.96	78558.79
Log Likelihood	-39775.56	-39700.56	-39743.48	-39225.39
Num. obs.	408135	408135	408135	408135
Num. groups: resid1	68229	68229	68229	68229

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2.3: DV: Familiarity with Party's Ideology (Old Democracies)

heard of the parties that have undergone such changes; however, among those voters who are familiar with the party name, mergers and joint-lists help further clarify ideological positions, such that voters are less likely to be unfamiliar with where to place the party. Finally, full name changes have a stronger and larger effect on the likelihood that respondents do not know the party's ideological position than partial name changes (Model 16).

Overall, these findings support by second hypothesis. Altogether, these analyses, and the previous ones that assessed the effects of name changes on general unfamiliarity with

parties, underscore the potential problems that name changes pose for an electorate. Navigating electoral competition can already be a cognitively costly process; facing parties with different names, which thereby reduces the effectiveness of party-label heuristics, only further exacerbate informational deficits.

There is an important caveat to interpreting these findings, however. Some subsets of individuals are more likely to declare that they do not know the answer to a question than are others. In particular, those with low self-confidence, competitiveness, and propensity to take risks are more likely to answer "don't know" to questions; or, put another way, less likely to guess the answers to questions designed to tap into their knowledge (Mondak 2000). Unfortunately, the CSES does not include any personality questions that would allow me to control for such traits. However, concerns that personality differences are the primary factor driving these results should be assuaged by the fact that respondents were not encouraged to indicate when they did not know the answer to a question or were unfamiliar with a party; instead these responses are indicated only if the respondent volunteered them, which dampens the concern that personality alone is driving these results (Mondak and Davis 2001).

Thus far, these findings do not provide any insight into how the informational deficits brought on by party-label changes affect voter behavior. Therefore, I test these relationships in the next two sections, for hypotheses 3 (*voters will be less likely to vote for relabeled parties than parties with constant labels*) and 4 (*voters will be less likely to declare partisanship to relabeled parties than those with constant labels*), among old and new democracies.

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Name Change	0.16^{**}	0.47^{***}		
	(0.05)	(0.06)		
Total Name Changes	0.02	0.15	0.13	0.02
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Structural Change		-0.51^{***}	-0.50^{***}	
		(0.07)	(0.06)	
Full Change			0.52^{***}	0.38^{***}
			(0.06)	(0.07)
Partial Change			0.23^{*}	$0.18^{\dagger}$
			(0.09)	(0.10)
Merger				-0.25^{**}
				(0.08)
Split				-0.05
				(0.11)
New				0.32
				(0.25)
JL Entry				-0.14^{*}
				(0.07)
JL Exit				0.32
				(0.21)
Age	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.10^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.26^{***}	-0.26^{***}	-0.26^{***}	-0.26^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender	0.49^{***}	0.49^{***}	0.49^{***}	0.49^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
AIC	52382.66	52322.02	52300.08	52365.20
Log Likelihood	-26144.33	-26113.01	-26101.04	-26129.60
Num. obs.	165191	165191	165191	165191
Num. groups: resid1	32765	32765	32765	32765

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2.4: DV: Familiarity with Party's Ideology (New Democracies)

Vote Choice

I discuss the results[11] relating to hypothesis 3 in this section, separately for old (Table 2.5) and new democracies (Table 2.6). Among old democracies, voters are less likely to vote for a party that underwent a name change (Models 17 and 18) in support of *H3*, or a structural change (Models 18 and 19). This relationship holds regardless of the type of name change or structural change (Model 20), with the exception for joint-list exits, which significantly increase the likelihood of a respondent voting for the party.

Given the endogeneity of party change, interpreting these results as evidence for a causal story where party-name changes deter citizens from voting for them would be spurious. Broadly speaking, name changes can occur as the result of a party's decision to change it, or, more indirectly, the result of a party's decision to change its structure, thereby necessitating a name change as well. A party's decision to change its name usually results from a considerable loss in vote share (Kim and Solt 2017), something that might signal to the party that it is no longer as viable as it once was. Structural changes can result from a wider variety of causes, with mergers and entries into joint-lists more common when parties are seeking to overcome an electoral threshold or improve their chances at gaining access to office (Ibenskas 2015; Ibenskas 2016). Party splinters are causally distinct from other structural changes (Ibenskas and Sikk 2017), and are likely to occur due to in-fighting among elites within the party (Ceron 2013). Therefore, given the motivations parties have to change their names and the informational deficit that these changes can create for voters, the direction of the causal arrow in the relationship between party-name

[11] As I discussed previously, I use hierarchical logistic regressions to test the effects of party-label change on vote choice and partisanship. Using this estimation strategy afford me the ability to assess the average effect of party-label change on vote choice and partisanship across countries, but it does not allow me to make any claims regarding how party-label change affects voters' propensity to vote for (or declare partisanship to) a specific, newly labeled party over another. To do this, multinomial logistic regressions would be necessary for each country-election-year to assess how, among the party options available to voters, party-label change influences the likelihood that a voter chooses a relabeled party over the other party options.

change and voter behavior is likely bidirectional.

Without the counterfactual where some of these parties faced incentives to change their name but opted not to, it is impossible to tell whether name changes on their own drive voters away from parties. They do, however, decrease the likelihood that voters are familiar with the parties, which should further deter voters from selecting these parties on election day. Finally, because name changes take place less frequently in old democracies than in new ones, their occurrence could foster some risk-aversion among voters, where they are less inclined to cast a ballot for a party that has changed its name when a number of stable alternatives exist. Next, I examine the results within new democracies (Table 2.6).

This relationship plays out very differently in new democracies. Specifically, voters are *more* likely to cast a ballot for a party that has undergone a name change (Models 21 and 22), contradicting *H3*. These disparate effects could be due to the fact that name changes happen more frequently in new democracies and, despite creating additional information complexity for the electorate, voters are more accustomed to these changes, making them less risk-averse to changed parties. The total number of name changes in a given election, however, does have a dampening effect on whether citizens cast a ballot (Models 21-24). While voters in new democracies may be more adept at coping with such changes and the consequences they have for their information environments, the accumulation of these changes are likely difficult to overcome.

Not only are voters more likely to cast a ballot for any party that has undergone a name change, but also both types of name changes are associated with an increase in the likelihood that citizens voted for such parties (Model 24). Interestingly, partial name changes seem to encourage a greater likelihood in casting a ballot for the party than full name changes, do. This fits in line with my expectations that partial name changes pose less informational complexity for voters, as the name bears some resemblance to the party's previous name.

Among the different types of structural changes, splits and both entries and exits into

	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Name Change	-0.64^{***}	-0.48^{***}		
	(0.03)	(0.04)		
Total Name Changes	0.58^{***}	0.57^{***}	0.54^{***}	0.35^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Structural Change		-0.18^{***}	-0.17^{***}	
		(0.04)	(0.04)	
Full Change			-0.68^{***}	-0.37^{***}
			(0.05)	(0.06)
Partial Change			-0.28^{***}	-0.65^{***}
			(0.05)	(0.06)
Merger				-0.08
				(0.06)
Split				-1.35^{***}
				(0.11)
New				-1.04^{***}
				(0.17)
JL Entry				-1.00^{***}
				(0.05)
JL Exit				1.09^{***}
				(0.08)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	$0.01^{\dagger}$	$0.01^{\dagger}$	$0.01^{\dagger}$	0.01^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
AIC	202155.44	202139.66	202080.36	201085.10
Log Likelihood	-101039.72	-101030.83	-101000.18	-100498.55
Num. obs.	268109	268109	268109	268109
Num. groups: resid1	40150	40150	40150	40150

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2.5: DV: Vote Choice (Old Democracies)

joint-lists are associated with a decrease in the likelihood that the respondent votes for the party. New parties overwhelmingly elicit the largest positive effect on vote choice, which falls in line with extant findings in electoral politics of new democracies (see for example, Tavits 2007). Overall, while these findings support my general expectations regarding types of name changes and their effects on voters, they do not support my expectations about party relabeling and vote choice (*H3*).

This section illustrated some mixed evidence for *H3*. In old democracies, party relabeling is associated with a decreased in voters' propensity to vote for such parties;

	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
Name Change	0.40^{***}	0.51^{***}		
	(0.03)	(0.04)		
Total Name Changes	-1.59^{***}	-1.56^{***}	-1.75^{***}	-1.41^{***}
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Structural Change		-0.17^{***}	0.03	
		(0.04)	(0.04)	
Full Change			0.18^{***}	0.14^{**}
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Partial Change			0.48^{***}	0.61^{***}
			(0.05)	(0.06)
Merger				0.41^{***}
				(0.05)
Split				-0.82^{***}
				(0.10)
New				2.10^{***}
				(0.09)
JL Entry				-0.86^{***}
				(0.05)
JL Exit				-0.26^{**}
				(0.10)
Age	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	$-0.02^{\dagger}$	$-0.02^{\dagger}$	$-0.02^{\dagger}$	-0.02^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.04^{*}	0.04^{*}	0.04^{*}	0.04^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
AIC	81510.90	81498.27	81553.35	80334.44
Log Likelihood	-40714.45	-40707.13	-40733.68	-40120.22
Num. obs.	100965	100965	100965	100965
Num. groups: resid1	18349	18349	18349	18349

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2.6: DV: Vote Choice (New Democracies)

however, the relationship is inverted in new democracies: voters are more likely to select parties that changes their names, regardless of the extent to which the name differed from its previous one. It is unclear whether this differences means that voters in new democracies are more acclimated to party changes and, consequently, better at navigating changing party competition. Future work that directly addresses this possibility would help clarify these differences. Next I evaluate the results for tests of hypothesis 4 (*voters will be less likely to declare partisanship to relabeled parties than those with constant labels*).

Partisan Identification

Similar to previous analyses, I discuss results for old (Table 2.7) and new democracies (Table 2.8) separately. In support of *H4* and corresponding with previous results, voters in old democracies are less likely to declare partisanship to parties that have undergone name changes (Models 25 and 26). These findings hold when differentiating between full and partial changes (Model 28) and are similarly reflected for parties that undergo any type of structural change (Models 26 and 27), with the exception of joint-list exits (Model 28). This result, where voters are more likely to declare partisanship to parties that exited joint-lists could be due to voters' preferences for parties that are distinct from others (Lupu 2016), where voters are pleased once parties decide to compete on their own rather than in conjunction with other parties.

Similar to the relationship between voting and party-name changes, these overall findings are likely manifestations of two things: (1) parties opting to modify their names and/or structure in the face of waning partisan attachment; and (2) voters shying away from identifying with parties that recently changed, because they cannot rely on information they had stored on the party's old name to make inferences about the behavior they expect from the newly named party or, because they are put off by the party changing its name (see chapter 1 for a greater theoretical discussion of this possible relationship).

The results among new democracies are less consistent and differ again from that of old democracies. Per Models 29 and 30, voters in new democracies appear more likely to be partisans of parties that have undergone name changes. These findings are inverted, however, once the structural changes that parties experienced are also included in the analysis (Model 32). The initial positive associations between name change and partisanship appear to have been driven by party mergers and new parties, which are the specific types of structural changes that exhibit this relationship. This contrasts with party brand scholars, like Lupu (2016), who argue that voters dislike when parties' brands become less distinctive, especially through alliances or coalitions with other parties.

	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28
Name Change	-0.82^{***}	-0.41^{***}		
	(0.02)	(0.04)		
Total Name Changes	0.78^{***}	0.74^{***}	0.77^{***}	0.64^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Structural Change		-0.48^{***}	-0.61^{***}	
		(0.03)	(0.03)	
Full Change			-0.43^{***}	-0.45^{***}
			(0.03)	(0.04)
Partial Change			-0.00	-0.38^{***}
			(0.04)	(0.04)
Merger				-0.44^{***}
				(0.04)
Split				-0.74^{***}
				(0.07)
New				-1.49^{***}
				(0.20)
JL Entry				-0.83^{***}
				(0.04)
JL Exit				1.12^{***}
				(0.07)
Age	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	$0.02^{\dagger}$	$0.02^{\dagger}$	$0.02^{\dagger}$	$0.01^{\dagger}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
AIC	341725.70	341501.26	341444.76	340790.98
Log Likelihood	-170817.85	-170704.63	-170675.38	-170344.49
Num. obs.	408135	408135	408135	408135
Num. groups: resid1	68229	68229	68229	68229

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2.7: DV: Partisan Identification (Old Democracies)

Overall, these findings do mirror those for voting behavior in new democracies.

All other changes, including full and partial name changes, are associated with a decrease in voters' likelihood of declaring partisanship to such parties. This is an interesting departure from the voting behavior results discussed previously, where voters in new democracies are *more* likely to vote for parties that have undergone name changes. This highlights the distinction between partisanship and voting – although voters may be strategic and recognize that voting for a party with a new name may be necessary, it does not mean that voters are inclined to identify or feel close to that party. Altogether, these

	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31	Model 32
Name Change	0.22***	0.30***		
	(0.03)	(0.04)		
Total Name Changes	0.42***	0.42***	0.44***	−0.06
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Structural Change		−0.12**	0.12***	
		(0.04)	(0.03)	
Full Change			−0.11***	−0.23***
			(0.03)	(0.04)
Partial Change			0.11**	−0.14**
			(0.04)	(0.05)
Merger				0.69***
				(0.04)
Split				−1.10***
				(0.10)
New				1.36***
				(0.07)
JL Entry				−0.66***
				(0.04)
JL Exit				−0.88***
				(0.09)
Age	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Income	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
AIC	141581.88	141573.96	141621.83	140234.13
Log Likelihood	-70745.94	-70740.98	-70763.91	-70066.07
Num. obs.	165191	165191	165191	165191
Num. groups: resid1	32765	32765	32765	32765

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 2.8: DV: Partisan Identification (New Democracies)

results support *H4* that voters are less likely to be partisans of parties that underwent name changes as compared to parties with constant labels.

Discussion and Conclusion

Although party-label heuristics are considered a near ubiquitous information shortcut for voters, this chapter drew attention to the fact that party-labels change with considerable frequency in democratic politics. In particular, party-name changes occurred around 40% of the time in new democracies and around 18% of the time in old democracies from

1990-2017. While the frequency of this phenomenon alone warrants further investigation, the importance of party-labels for the inferences that voters make about parties and the partisan identities voters attach to them make these changes all the more important to understand. This chapter introduced an original dataset on party-label changes in 43 democracies from 1990-2017. I found that these changes rarely occur in isolation of structural changes – in fact, in both new and old democracies, these changes took place alongside structural changes over 90% of the time. That these tend to co-occur could introduce an additional burden for voters: not only do they often face new party names in elections, but these party names represent parties that have merged, splintered, or modified their joint-list agreements.

While these types of changes are more common among smaller parties, they are by no means exclusive to parties that are trying to overcome electoral thresholds or enter office for the first time. Therefore, voters are likely familiar with (in some capacity) the parties that opt to change their names, making it less likely that this is an electoral phenomenon that occurs at the fringes of political competition such that the majority of voters can ignore these changes and remain relatively well informed about their electoral options. Some cursory text analysis of new, old, and unchanged party labels revealed remarkable similarity in the names that parties have across these groups. One key difference, however, was the use of words that signaled newness among new party names. Further research as to the effectiveness of such signals in a party label would be advantageous to understand if such strategic considerations imbue excitement among the electorate or encourage a distinction between these parties and those with unchanged labels.

This chapter also illustrated how voters react to such relabeling decisions. In particular, I found that, when faced with a new party label, voters are more likely to offer that they have not heard of the party or do not know the party's ideological position, especially if that label was a full change from the one previous. These findings pose some concerns for citizen competence: given the frequency of party relabeling, the fact that such changes

increase the likelihood that voters are unfamiliar with such parties, particularly in *post-election* surveys, indicates that these changes might be reducing the set of electoral choices that voters are willing to consider at the ballot box. This means that some voters may be making suboptimal electoral decisions when, in fact, a relabeled party might be the best option for them. This perspective, however, presumes that voters' uncertainty about such parties is not, on its own, an informative signal to voters about the utility of a political party. In other words, if a voter has not heard of a party before, they could infer that the party is not effective enough at campaigning or popular enough to gain attention in the media such that the voter would hear about them. Therefore, it is not my intention to cast a normative perspective on whether party relabeling is good or bad for democratic politics, but instead to point to the implications it may have for voters' information and behavior.

I also find that voters in old democracies are less likely to vote for relabeled parties, while I find the opposite for voters in new democracies. These findings could be due, in part, to the fact that relabeling is more common in new democracies. Therefore, voters in these contexts may find it nearly unavoidable to encounter relabeled parties in an electoral contest. Furthermore, these voters could adapt to the frequency of relabeling such that they opt to rely on other heuristics to make their electoral decisions, which ultimately lead them to vote for these relabeled parties. From another perspective, in these new democracies, renamed parties could be signals of refreshed political competition that might galvanize the electorate. Additional research addressing these possibilities would be valuable for our understanding of how voters interpret these changes.

For partisanship, I find that in both old and new democracies, voters are less likely to identify themselves as partisans of relabeled parties. In this chapter, I did not examine the mechanisms that explain these results, nor did I establish a causal relationship between party renaming and partisan identification. Instead, I can simply point to a relationship that is likely bidirectional: parties are strategic actors that make decisions designed to improve their electoral chances and their political power; therefore, parties may opt to

relabel themselves when they face waning support in the electorate or dissatisfaction among their partisans, similar to Lupu's (2016) examination of party rebranding in Latin America that contended that parties would seek to revamp their reputation (i.e. their brand) in the face of scandal or crisis. On the other hand, partisans could grow disillusioned with their party if they find that the party decided to change its label independent of partisans' preferences.

Chapter 3 examines a case where party relabeling was the result of an entrepreneurial attempt to expand a party's electoral base. In that chapter, I establish the causal relationship between party relabeling and partisan responses, illustrating that, although relabeling can be a successful move at widening a party's electoral support, it can also leave partisans disillusioned with parties, hindering their willingness to engage with them and weaken their partisan attachments.

CHAPTER 3

OF HEURISTICS AND PARTISAN (IN)STABILITY

If political scientists could use only a single piece of information about voters to predict their political behavior, many would likely choose partisan identification. Knowing voters' partisanship can help us predict whether and for whom they will vote, how they seek out and interpret political information, and how they participate in politics. If partisanship is so important for determining voter behavior, then under what conditions will voters *retain* their partisanship? Most studies on partisan stability have focused on the voter side of the partisanship dynamic. On the other side of that relationship stands the party — the group without which such partisan identity would not be possible. Therefore, in this chapter I examine how party decisions affect partisans and their identities. In doing so, I build on the social identity perspective of partisanship to develop a theory of partisan stability that considers further how partisans interact with their parties and their information environment. To test the implications of this theory, I examine how a party's seemingly innocuous decision — to undergo a partial name change — affects partisans, using a series of difference-in-difference designs along with a natural experiment. Specifically, I find that this decision diminished partisans' attitudes toward political parties, inhibited their political engagement, and fractured their partisanship. These findings have implications for our conceptualization of partisanship, expectations for partisan stability, and political engagement.

Partisan Identity and Stability

The notion that partisanship should be stable comes out of the perspective that partisan identities are the "unmoved mover" within political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960). In this vein, scholars view partisanship as an emotional attachment to a political party that mirrors the psychological bonds that people have with other social groups (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Because of the nature of these attachments, scholars expect that changes to partisanship should be rare: only in the face of large-scale, cataclysmic political events should partisans be inclined to change their identities (Miller and Shanks 1996). Yet, as early as Converse (1969), scholars recognized that some partisans would be more susceptible to changes than others; namely, younger voters and those with less experience participating in a political system would have weaker ties to parties and be more likely to alter their partisan identities as they had yet to habituate their relationship to a specific political party (see also Dinas 2014; Gomez 2013; Lisi 2015).

Other scholars, however, disagree about the social identity nature of partisanship. These "revisionists" argue that voters are rational actors seeking to maximize the utility in their partisan identification (and vote choice). Voters do this by selecting the party that most closely aligns with their own (perhaps fleeting) ideological position or stances on specific issues (Fiorina 1981). Within this framework, that means that partisan identification can be influenced by short-term changes to the political environment, such as presidential performance in office, affinity toward individual political candidates, or changes in the economy. Therefore, revisionists contend that partisanship should *not* behave as a stable construct in voters' lives and will instead be influenced by an array of short-term political factors.

One can envision these two characterizations of partisan stability as opposite poles on the same spectrum. At one end is the perspective that partisanship functions as a social

identity and should therefore change rarely and, at the other end, is the revisionist view, where partisanship is a running tally of considerations that are constantly updated in the face of new political information. The empirical reality appears to sit somewhere between these two poles. While scholars have found substantial levels of partisan identification[1] across Europe (e.g. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema 2017), Latin America (Lupu 2016; Samuels and Zucco 2014), and even in nascent democracies (Brader and Tucker 2012; Carlson 2016; Conroy-Krutz, Moehler, and Aguilar 2016), others have also shown that individual-level party attachments *do* vacillate between parties and between attachment and independence (e.g. LeDuc et al. 1984; Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 2006; Zuckerman and Kroh 2006). Although some of these fluctuations have been due to measurement error (Schickler and Green 1997; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), they are also driven by a variety of individual factors, such as personality traits (Bakker, Hopmann, and Persson 2015; Gerber et al. 2012), socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (Converse 1969), social networks (Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 2006; Zuckerman and Kroh 2006; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007), and life events (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 2006). In other words, while some voters are more predisposed toward stable partisanship than others, variation in individuals' social contexts and lifespans can also generate changes to partisan identities.

The Role of Heuristics in Partisan Identification and Stability

This evidence has led to the continued debate about the nature of partisan identities. While there is much to be gained from evaluating the individual characteristics that drive partisan (in)stability, we have largely neglected the other side of the partisan coin: political parties. This call for bringing the party back into our understanding of partisanship and

[1] A body of literature has also found evidence of decaying levels of partisan identification, particularly within developed European countries (Dalton 1984; Dalton 2012).

stability is not a novel one.

Lupu (2013) made a similar argument regarding our extant conceptualization of partisan stability. He argued that instability and the social identity perspective of partisanship need not be incompatible. Developing a branding model of partisanship, Lupu (2013) emphasized the importance of comparative fit for voters' partisan attachments. Specifically, he highlighted that parties' brands are the group prototypes that voters use to assess how closely they align with each party group; and, voters will develop their partisan attachments based on the degree of closeness between themselves and a party's brand, along with the distinctiveness of the party (Lupu 2013, 50). Put simply, voters not only seek closeness between themselves and their party, but they also prefer parties that are distinct from other options. In fact, using a survey experiment, he demonstrates that voters are not only more likely to declare partisanship to parties that appear distinct from others, but also their attachments are stronger in those contexts than when parties' brands appear to converge with others'.

Following the substantial evidence presented by Huddy and colleagues,[2] I also contend that partisanship operates as a social identity for voters. As others have argued, this partisan identity forms a perceptual lens through which voters see themselves, political information, their party (and other parties), and other voters (Campbell et al. 1960; Gaines et al. 2007; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012); it also motivates and conditions partisans' participation in politics (Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). Much of these perceptions are tied to the name of the party with which partisans identify. In other words, their preferred party's name acts as a heuristic not only for the behavior they expect from the party, but also for their own identity.

Like Lupu, I also argue that instability can be a feature of partisanship when it functions as a social identity, particularly when the party itself undergoes a change. However, the type of change I investigate in this chapter is not one where a party obscures

[2]See Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017), Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe (2015), Huddy and Bankert (2017), and Huddy, Bankert, and Davies (2018).

its brand – instead, it is a change that seems far more superficial and innocuous: a change to a party's name. Based on our extant theories of partisanship, and assuming that partisans are fully informed, we would not expect such a change, all else being equal, to alter partisans' identities. From the revisionist perspective, we would only expect a name change to alter voters' partisan attachments provided that the change alerted them to another modification of the party, like a change in its ideology or position on a key issue. From the extant social identity perspective of partisanship, a name change alone should similarly elicit little reaction from partisans, provided that the name change did not tip them off about a change in the group's prototype, esteem, distinctiveness, or other key characteristics.

However, psychologists and sociologists have demonstrated that social group names are central to groups' identities and how they are conveyed to others (Larkey, Hecht, and Martin 1993; D. Mason 1990; Sigelman, Tuch, and Martin 2005; Zola 1993). Therefore, the names that parties choose are meaningful for voters; and changes to such names are important, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2. Yet, unlike the consequences for the average voter that I investigated in the previous chapter, I do not expect that a change to the name of a party will necessarily result in the same loss of information for partisans, as these voters are already more likely to follow their party in politics and seek out information about them (Lodge and Hamill 1986; Redlawsk 2002; Redlawsk 2004). Therefore, I assume that these partisans are similarly more likely to identify a name change and its relationship to the party.

Although these voters are likely more informed about their party undergoing a name change, partisans are still navigating electoral environments where the cost of becoming fully informed is high, leading them to rely on informational shortcuts to make decisions. Because the name associated with a party is central to the party itself and partisans' identities, I argue that a party's decision to change its name will act a signal – or heuristic – for partisans that the party is no longer the same as it once was, similar to Marinova's

(2016) argument that voters will use structural changes to individual parties as heuristics for party instability. Using relabeling as a heuristic for the party undergoing a change will result in observable implications for partisans that are conditional on the nature of partisan identities.

If voters' partisanship fits the revisionist perspective, a party-label change will affect partisans' attachment to the party provided that they interpreted the name change as a signal of a substantive change to the party, like its ideology. If voters' partisanship fits the social identity perspective, as I argue, a party-label change will alter their partisan identification, which will consequently affect their perceptions of parties and their political engagement. To test these expectations, which I state formally later in the chapter, I use the case of Germany's Party of Democratic Socialism and its 2005 name change to The Left Party.PDS. I turn to a discussion of this case and the factors that led to the name change and then state my hypotheses in the context of this case.

The Case of Germany's *Die Linke* (The Left)

As Chapter 2 illustrated, party-name change is not an uncommon phenomenon; and the case of the PDS's name change mirrors relabeling decisions among other, smaller European parties in recent history that reflected successful attempts to expand parties' electorates, like the Left Party-Communists in Sweden dropping "Communists" from its name in 1991, Lega Nord in Italy dropping "Nord" from its name in 2018, the Finnish Christian Union's change to the Christian Democrats in 2001, and the Christian Democratic Socialist Party in Sweden changing its name to the Christian Democrats in 1996. As I demonstrate in this chapter, the PDS's attempt at expanding its electorate, like the parties mentioned above, was successful. The party improved on its prior federal election vote share by 4 percentage points and achieved the largest vote share (8.7%) in the party's history. The relabeling decision was not as successful, however, for the PDS's partisan base, as I demonstrate later. This suggests that, not only can voters heed party relabeling as a signal that the party has

undergone some sort of change, but that this heuristic can be interpreted differently among non-partisans and partisans. Therefore, such changes, while successful, can ultimately leave some voters behind.

Although Germany presents a unique case of a democracy that is both old (among western states) and new (among eastern states), the PDS itself was the holdover party from former East Germany, representing an old party in a new context for its partisans. Therefore, this case can also suggest the types of consequences that partisans of parties that withstand democratization and subsequently attempt to expand their electorate.[3] Although the case of the PDS relabeling shares similarities with other parties, as I have described, it is also unique in that the decision to change the party's name was quick and unexpected, propelled by unforeseen political events, as I discuss in the next section. The abruptness of the change is analytically useful, as it allows me to rule out other factors that could have conditioned the results I present later, but it also means that this case may be distinct from others. Additionally, the party's relabeling was driven by elite-led negotiations. Although that is not anomalous to many name-change decisions, it is dissimilar from cases where partisans were urging their party to make such a change or cases where parties were forced to change their name due to being outlawed, as with the Flemish Bloc in Belgium[4] or Islamist, Kurdish, and parties with names that included "Communist" in Turkey (Hakyemez and Akgun 2002).

The German Party of Democratic Socialism's (PDS) abruptly changed its name and effectively entered a joint-list with the Electoral Alternative for Work and Social Justice (WASG) prior to the 2005 *Bundestag* (federal parliament) election. Although the parties' decision to enter a joint-list reflected a desire to improve electoral performance in western Germany, the events described below illustrate that neither the PDS's name change, nor

[3]As Dalton and Weldon (2007) show, some voters in new democracies exhibit standing partisan ties to the parties from the *ancien regime*.

[4]The party was outlawed for violating a Belgian anti-racism law and reemerged as the Flemish Interest in the subsequent election (Erk 2007).

the party's decision to compete together with the WASG were conditioned on waning interest from PDS partisans or an electoral disruption to their established voting base. In what follows, I provide an overview of the evolution of the PDS until the party's decision to enter a cooperation agreement with the WASG, discuss the key components of the joint-list agreement that I will leverage in my analyses, and detail my expectations for the consequences of this agreement for voters. The case of the PDS relabeling allows me to adjudicate between the competing expectations derived from the social identity and revisionist theories of partisanship.

Why the PDS Changed its Name

The Party of Democratic Socialism emerged on Germany's political scene following the reunification of East and West Germany,[5] enjoying considerable support among eastern Germans through the 1998 federal election. In 2002, the party realized its precarious position among the German electorate when its vote shares decreased in eastern Germany and, without additional support in the west to buoy its votes, the party did not surpass the 5% electoral threshold. However, in the subsequent *Landtag* (state parliament) elections in 2004, the PDS staged a comeback and improved on its vote shares in each state, both in comparison to their performance in the 2002 *Bundestag* elections and the 1999 *Landtag* elections. If we were to only examine how the PDS performed in the national parliamentary elections prior to changing its name, we might conclude that their poor performance in 2002 was the catalyst. However, the considerable improvement in their electoral success in the 2004 elections paints a different picture. I discuss their electoral performance in the context of Figures 3.1-3.3.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the party vote share[6] that the PDS obtained in the 1994, 1998,

[5]The PDS was the successor to the ruling party of the German Democratic Republic, the Social Unity Party of Germany (SED).

[6]In Germany's mixed electoral system, voters' first vote is for a candidate in their single-member district and the second vote is for the party list competing at the state-level. The vote share from voters' second vote is presented in the figure.



Figure 3.1: PDS Vote Share in Each State (Federal Elections)

2002, and 2005 *Bundestag* elections by state. The grey lines represent states from former East Germany and the black lines, states from western Germany. The vertical dashed line represents the timing in which the PDS changed its name – approximately two months before the 2005 federal election. First, it is important to note the change in vote share trends from 2002 to 2005. In the election just following the PDS's change, they improved on their vote share across the board, both in eastern and western states. This illustrates the electoral success of the party after its change – the PDS improved on its previous vote share by approximately 4 percentage points and secured 8.7% of the party vote. That the PDS was successful following its change is a stark distinction from the way PDS partisans seem to have reacted to it, as I examine in this chapter. Next, this figure highlights the negligible vote share that the PDS received among western states prior to the party's name change. Among eastern states, as mentioned previously, the PDS struggled somewhat in the 2002 election, where vote shares appear to have returned to 1994-levels, if not lower.

The PDS's state-level performance in *Landtag* elections illustrate a bit of a different



Figure 3.2: PDS Vote Share in Western State Elections



Figure 3.3: PDS Vote Share in Eastern State Elections

trend. Figure 3.2 shows the party's vote share in western state elections between 1990 and 2005 – prior to the federal election that September. The range of the y-axis in Figure 3.2 is from 0 to 5, to illustrate better the marginal fluctuations in the party's performance. Four states are entirely absent from this figure, as the PDS did not compete in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Hessen, or Rheinland-Pfalz. Relatedly, the party did not start competing in Hamburg, Niedersachsen, or Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine Westphalia) until the late 1990s to early 2000s.

In eastern states, the PDS generally improved on its vote share in *Landtag* elections prior to the 2005 federal election. Only in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern did the PDS's vote share drop between its penultimate and final state election prior to the 2005 *Bundestag* election. Otherwise, assumptions that the PDS's waning support was the catalyst for its change are not reflect in the party's 2004 state-level performance in eastern states. In fact, it was not until the beginning of 2005 that the PDS started to consider the possibility of modifying their party to improve their competitive advantage.

On January 22, 2005, the Electoral Alternative for Work and Social Justice (WASG) was registered as a political party. From the perspective of PDS elites, the WASG occupied a similar ideological space as the PDS and appeared poised to capitalize on the western Germans who had evaded the PDS thus far (Heunemann 2008). For WASG politicians, the PDS had far more resources than the new party possessed. These differences presented the parties with an opportunity to cooperate: for the PDS, this could help secure them the western votes they had been hoping for and, for the WASG, this could vastly improve their available resources for electoral participation (Heunemann 2008).

Elites from both parties expressed a desire to see how the parties fared when competing against one another, before committing to future cooperation (Heunemann 2008). On May 22, 2005, the parties competed against each other for the first time in the *Landtag* election in North Rhine-Westphalia. Both parties performed poorly and neither of them amassed enough votes to secure any seats. Despite their poor electoral outcomes, elites from both

parties expressed their preferences to wait for future contests to see how the parties continued to perform against one another (Heunemann 2008).

However, events immediately following the election changed their calculations. That evening, in the wake of the poor performance of the nationally governing party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the SPD-party leader and the Chancellor unexpectedly announced plans to hold early elections in the fall of 2005 (Niedermayer 2007). Days later in a media interview, Oskar Lafontaine, a prominent SPD politician, urged the SPD, PDS, and WASG to join forces and form a left coalition similar to that of Italy's *L'ulivo* (Heunemann 2008). Scholars and former leaders of both the PDS and WASG contend that Lafontaine's statement, combined with the now-looming federal elections, drove representatives from both the PDS and WASG to meet later that week to discuss possible avenues for cooperation in the upcoming *Bundestag* election (Heunemann 2008; Olsen 2007). Consequently, on June 10, 2005, the parties signed an agreement detailing their plans for cooperation: the parties would start negotiations over a "new Left in Germany," they would not compete against one another in any district, the WASG would field candidates on the PDS's list, and the PDS would change its name – they later settled on "Die Linkspartei.PDS" (The Left Party.PDS) and the change took effect on July 17, 2005 (Heunemann 2008). Obviously, a strong ideological signal was included in the new label, making it likely that partisans would be primed to pick up on any ideological or issue changes the party underwent.[7]

As these events illustrate, the PDS name change (and the "joint-list" with the WASG), were primarily driven by elite actions rather than voter behavior. Although the PDS suffered an electoral setback in the 2002 federal election, the party had made substantial gains in the 2004 state elections. Furthermore, according to Heunemann (2008) and Olsen (2007), the parties' decision to cooperate hinged on the PDS's goal to improve its foray

[7]Interestingly, the inclusion of the ideological signal "Socialism" in the PDS's initial name did not seem to be as meaningful to western voters than did the inclusion of "Left" in the new name. I explore this in greater detail in Chapter 4.

into the west and the WASG's goal to increase its resources ahead of the unexpectedly early 2005 federal election.[8] Therefore, the decision to change was not the result of any waning interest among existing supporters, nor did the press at the time interpret this impending cooperation agreement as a sign that the PDS had somehow weakened – in fact, it was seen as an entrepreneurial attempt at capturing more votes and becoming a "third force" in the German party system (Dausend 2005). I use this case to examine how partisans' attitudes and behavior are affected by elite-led party relabeling.

Hypotheses

The case I examine in this chapter includes a name change that resulted from elite responses to unexpected political events. I develop my expectations with these events in mind. In other words, had the PDS's decision to relabel itself been a result of a scandal or a demand from voters, my expectations would differ. Therefore, from the instrumental view, I do not expect a change to a party's name to influence directly partisans' perception of the party or their own identification. Instead, in order for such a change to have an effect, it would need to be indirect: by alerting voters to other changes the party has undergone, be it ideological or issue movement, leadership turnover, or an altered coalition agreement. Therefore, from the instrumental perspective, I expect the following:[9]

First, if voters are behaving instrumentally, then the closer the ideological position of the PDS is to their own position, the more likely they will be to declare partisanship to the party. If the PDS name change alerted voters to a change in the party's ideological

[8] It is also important to note that this agreement did not require that the two parties dissolve their individual organizations and combine to form a new party. Neither did the parties put forth a collective party program in the election; they still submitted their own, separate manifestos (Dietzel, Hoffmann, and Woop 2005).

[9] It is also possible that detecting a shift in a party's position on an issue could affect voters' partisan identification independent from a perceived shift in the party's ideology. Unfortunately, given the data available, this hypothesis is difficult to test directly. In the available, only two issues were discussed (nuclear energy and EU unification) across multiple time periods and very few respondents placed the party along these issues across more than one survey wave.

position, I expect:

H1a: *After the name change, partisans will perceive a change to the PDS's ideology from 2002.*[10]

H1b: *If the change that partisans perceive moves the party closer to their own ideological position, they will be more likely to declare partisanship to the PDS than those who perceive the party as further from their ideological position.*

Whereas, from the expressive partisanship perspective, I expect that:

H2: *Partisans' perception of parties will be negatively affected by their party relabeling, as compared to partisans of other parties.*

H3: *Partisans will be less likely to engage with their political party than partisans of other parties.*

H4: *Partisans will be less likely to declare partisanship to their party after the relabeling.*

Data and Methods

To test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, I use the German Legislative Election Survey to assess the consequences of the PDS-label change in 2005.[11] The GLES survey data consist of four panels, each executed across three federal electoral periods (GLES 2017). The surveys from

[10]Partisans could become aware of the party's ideological or issue position change either directly, through the party label changing, or indirectly, through the party-label change alerting them to a change in the party's leadership or coalition agreement, which then leads them to update their perception of the party's ideology and/or issue positions.

[11]As discussed previously, the party did not change only in 2005. In 2007, the party officially merged with the WASG to form The Left. This is another analytically useful change to examine, which I account for in my discussion below of the informational consequences the label changes had for voters. Unfortunately, as I explain later, data limitations prevent me from thoroughly examining the 2007 change and its effect on partisans.

overlapping waves in each panel were fielded during the same time frame and the survey questions were consistent across each panel. Therefore, to increase the number of observations in my data,[12] I created a cumulated dataset from 1994-2005 including Panels 1 through 3.[13] Because the 2005 election surveys were fielded after the PDS-label change in July, these surveys allow me to assess the respondents' reactions to the label change shortly after it took place. To test Hypothesis 4, I use a natural experiment embedded in the Politbarometer, a national, rolling cross-sectional survey in Germany.

Testing the Instrumental Hypotheses

To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I limit my sample to only respondents who declared partisanship to the PDS in the previous survey wave. This allows me to capture the effect that perceiving a change in the PDS's ideology had on PDS partisans' likelihood of declaring partisanship to the PDS *again*, after the party changed its name, rather than capturing respondents who were drawn to the party because of the change. To measure the dependent variable for H1a, *ideological perception*, I use an item from the GLES that asks respondents to indicate where they place the PDS on an ideological scale from 1 (left) to 11 (right).[14] The independent variable of interest for H1a is an indicator for the year 2005, after the PDS changed its name. To account for additional factors that could drive differences in partisans' perceptions of their party's ideology, I control for the respondent's ideology, political interest, education, and income as each of these characteristics could influence how they perceive PDS's ideology.

To measure the independent variable for H1b, *ideological proximity*, I take the absolute

[12] I aggregate the surveys to increase my sample size as the sample of PDS partisans for any particular survey version in the same wave is small.

[13] Due to substantive changes in attitudinal and behavioral questions after the 2005 survey, I do not extend my analyses past the 2005 survey waves.

[14] "Don't know" responses were not solicited from respondents and, instead, were coded only if the respondent volunteered that they did not know the party's ideology. Only 8 respondents answered "don't know" when asked about the party's ideology; these respondents were subsequently dropped from the analyses.

value of the difference between respondents' ideological position and their perception of the PDS's ideological position during the same survey. This provides me with a measure of ideological proximity of the party to the respondent where smaller values indicate that the party and respondent's ideology are closely aligned whereas larger values indicate that they are further apart. The dependent variable, *PDS partisanship*, takes the value of 1 if respondents declare partisanship to the PDS and zero otherwise.

Although research has accounted for a variety of factors that influence voters' propensity to declare partisanship to a party, and to one party over another, it is less clear which factors should influence a voter's likelihood of retaining partisanship with the same party. For the purposes of examining changing perceptions of the party's ideology and issue positions, I control for political interest, as it is likely that it plays a role in whether voters perceive these changes in the first place. I also control for the respondent's age in 2005, as older voters are more likely to remain consistent in their partisan attachments than younger ones (Converse 1969; Dinas 2014).

I present the results of each test in turn. Figure 3.4 displays the coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals from ordinary-least squares regressions with standard errors clustered on the individual. Each line represents a different model specification, where the model description in the legend indicates the additional controls included in the regression equation.

As Figure 3.4 illustrates, regardless of the controls included in the model, respondents do not perceive a significantly different ideological position for their party after the relabeling. Although the relabeling did not appear directly to alert partisans to a change in the party's ideology, it is possible that the name change altered their own ideological positioning relative to the party, which would manifest in the ideological distance between the party and the respondent.

The coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals from the logistic regression model used to test H1b are displayed in Figure 3.5. As these results show, the ideological



Figure 3.4: Change in Partisans' Perception of PDS Ideology (2002-2005)



Figure 3.5: The Effect of Ideological Proximity on Likelihood of Retaining PDS Partisanship

distance between the party and its partisans did not have a significantly different effect on partisans' likelihood to retain their attachment to the PDS after the relabeling as compared to before the name change occurred. This evidence does not provide support for the revisionist perspective of partisanship.

However, other characteristics of the party could have driven voters' instrumental considerations and thereby altered partisans' attachment to the party. Another high-profile signal to partisans that the party underwent change would be turnover in the party's leadership. However, the PDS retained the same leader that it had since 2003: Lothar Bisky. It is important to note that Bisky took the helm of PDS leadership *after* its 2002 electoral performance. One might presume that a new leader for the PDS could have affected partisans' evaluations of the party with regard to the utility of their partisanship – a new leader could introduce uncertainty into the direction of the party. However, Bisky was not a new face for the PDS – he had been the leader of the party from 1993 to 2000 as well. Therefore, if his leadership posed instrumental concerns for PDS partisans, these partisans would have likely already left the party during his leadership the first time around.

Although the party's relabeling did not signal to its partisans that the party underwent any ideological change, it is possible that such a change could signal to voters that the party was no longer effective under its old label, reducing the utility that PDS partisans would gain from their partisanship. Although this was a long-term concern among PDS leaders (Heunemann 2008), neither the media nor scholars interpreted this relabeling as a sign of the PDS's waning efficacy, as I described above. The role of the media is particularly worth highlighting here, as their framing of the relabeling likely informed how many voters and partisans perceived the change (see Chong and Druckman 2007 for a review of framing theory and framing effects). Therefore, it is very unlikely that the party's relabeling signaled to its partisans that their partisan utility was decreasing because of PDS ineffectiveness. Overall, if relabeling had any effect on how partisans perceived their

party or considered their attachment to their party, this effect does not appear to be the result of instrumental considerations. I examine the expressive consequences of party relabeling next.

Testing the Expressive Partisanship Hypotheses: Comparison Groups

To assess the causal effect of the PDS-label change for partisans' attitudes and behavior (H2 and H3), I compare PDS partisans to similar groups of voters whose behavior was arguably unaffected by the relabeling. What makes a group of voters similar to PDS partisans? Because there is no true control group of voters who did not see any change in the PDS label in 2005, I construct reasonable groups of voters who share similarities with the PDS partisans but differ on one particular characteristic: the object of their partisan identification. No single group of voters presents the perfect comparison to PDS partisans. Therefore, I construct a series of groups that share different similarities with PDS partisans and all differ in their partisan identification. By making multiple comparisons, I am confident that the findings presented in these analyses are due to the PDS relabeling. A description of each comparison group is included below.

Table 3.1: Characteristics of Comparison Groups

Group	Ideology	Party Size	Party Age	Geography	Partisan Attach.
PDS Partisans	Left-Leaning	Small	Young	Eastern	Unclear
Greens Partisans	✓	✓	✓	–	–
SPD Partisans	✓	–	–	–	–
Eastern Apartisans	–	–	–	✓	✓
Left-wing Apartisans	✓	–	–	–	✓

Table 3.1 illustrates the similarities and differences between the comparison groups

discussed below. A description of PDS partisans' ideology, party size, party age, geographic location, and expected attachment to their party (prior to the change) is included in the table. For the remainder of the groups, a check-mark denotes that the group shares the characteristics with PDS partisans whereas a dash indicates that the group does not. Overall, these comparison groups allow me not only to determine the effect that the PDS relabeling had on partisans' views of parties, but also account for a number of alternative explanations for PDS partisans' behavior, like their ideology, the size of their party, age of their party, limited experience with democratic politics (as PDS partisans overwhelmingly came from eastern Germany), and a preexisting lack of partisan attachment.

Greens partisans: To account for the possibility that a party's ideology may play a role in how partisans behave and attach themselves to a party, I compare the PDS partisans with Greens partisans as they are the most ideologically similar party in Germany. Of the main parties in Germany, both parties are rather small (as opposed to the larger "catch-all" parties like the SPD or CDU), so this comparison rids me of the concern that PDS partisans are unique in their partisanship because of the smaller nature of the party. Furthermore, both are the youngest of the main parties in Germany, alleviating concerns that the age of the party might be playing a role in partisan outcomes. Lastly, both have experience governing with the SPD.[15] Therefore, while partisans of these parties might have been affected by the SPD's unexpected loss in the North-Rhine Westphalian state election and the sudden call for early elections by the SPD, I expect that they would have been affected similarly. Therefore, any difference in the change in their attitudes and behavior from 2002 to 2005 should be the result of the PDS-label change and not other political events that occurred during that time period.

SPD partisans: The SPD is also a left-leaning party, although it is a large, catch-all party in German politics while the PDS is a small, opposition party. However, I expect that, if the SPD state-election loss and call for early elections drove a change in partisans'

[15]The Greens governed with the SPD as a junior coalition partner at the national-level, whereas the PDS governed as a junior coalition partner at the state-level.

attitudes and behavior rather than a change to the PDS-label, I would expect to see the effect of those events most clearly among SPD partisans.

Eastern Apartisans: Most PDS partisans are from eastern Germany. Given their experience with the German Democratic Republic and the unification of Germany, their views of parties and their engagement in politics may be substantively different from those in the west due to a general disillusionment with politics and parties. Therefore, to account for the possibility that the behavior of PDS partisans is the result of their experience and nostalgia for the GDR (*Ostalgie*), I compare them with apartisan easterners.

Left-wing Apartisans: Perhaps PDS partisans' views and behavior reflect from their ideological leanings and not their partisan identification. Therefore, to account for the possibility that PDS partisans are already relatively unattached to their party, I also compare them to apartisans who are left-leaning (i.e. apartisan respondents whose ideological position fell between [1,5] on a 10-point scale).

I construct the groups described above based on those who fit the descriptors (e.g. PDS partisan, SPD partisan, left-wing apartisan, etc.) in the panel prior to the label change in 2005. I then examine their attitudes for the year in question (e.g. for those who said they were PDS partisans in the 1998 panel, I look at their attitudes in 2002). This ensures that the inferences I make are drawn from partisans' reactions to the label change and not those who were drawn to the party in 2005 because of the change.

Perception of Parties

To address Hypothesis 2, that partisans' perception of parties will be negatively affected by their party relabeling, as compared to partisans of other parties, I examine the how PDS partisans' evaluations of political parties in Germany changed following the PDS label change in 2005. I compare their evaluations to the perceptions of the groups discussed above. To do measure perceptions of parties, I use ten items from the GLES that gauge

attitudes towards political parties as a class, rather than as specific parties.[16,17]

I re-scaled respondents' answers to each question such that higher values indicate a more positive attitude toward parties. I then took the average of respondents' answers to all ten questions to create a variable that captures respondents' general attitudes toward parties. The measure of party attitudes ranges from 1-5, where 1 indicates very poor views of parties and 5 indicates very positive views.

The figures below show the mean respondents' party attitudes within the comparison groups discussed previously, with 95% confidence intervals. The black lines represent those who declared partisanship to the PDS in the previous wave and the grey lines represent the relevant comparison group according to each figure title. The larger the value on the y-axis, the more positive the respondents' attitudes about parties.

All four groups saw small improvements in attitudes from 1998 to 2002, with PDS partisans not standing out.[18] From 2002 to 2005, however, PDS partisans and non-partisans "stood still" while SPD and Greens supporters continued to increase their affect for parties. This distinction could be the result of the label change detaching PDS backers from their party and the party system. However, it could also be the case that PDS partisans are fundamentally different from other partisan voters: more disenchanted with political parties and, as a result, comparable to apartisans. With the data presented here, I cannot rule out that possibility. However, the results in the next set of analyses alleviate this concern.

[16] Questions pertaining to specific parties were limited and did not ask respondents to evaluate each party or even "their" party in relation to different characteristics or statements. Therefore, I use these ten items from the GLES under the assumption that, although partisans are likely considering all parties in their evaluation of each statement, they will weight their consideration of their own party more heavily. While this is a relatively strong assumption, I expect that, even for partisans who also possess negative partisanship toward another party and, as a result, may be evaluating the parties they dislike more heavily than others, I do not expect that partisans of any specific party will be systematically more likely to have strong negative partisanship toward a party than partisans of other parties.

[17] The questions used to create this measure are available in the Appendix.

[18] Unfortunately, extending this analysis to 2009 is not feasible, as only one survey version included the 10-item party responsiveness section.



Figure 3.6: Respondents' Attitudes toward Parties by Comparison Groups (1998-2005)

In comparison to the other partisan groups, PDS partisans did appear to react differently to the 2005 events. Therefore, to test the effect of the PDS relabeling on PDS partisans' attitudes about parties, I use a pooled difference-in-difference design with the SPD and Greens partisans included in the sample.[19] In testing these differences, I also account for the demographic factors that could predict partisanship to the PDS (the independent variable) as well as partisans' views about parties (the dependent variable). Therefore, I control for respondents' political interest, ideology, education, and income as these are often correlated with partisanship and/or perceptions of the political environment, which includes political parties. Because some respondents appear in the data at multiple time points, I use standard errors clustered on the individual.

[19]The formal test for common trends is in the Appendix.

Political interest: I control for political interest because politically interested respondents may feel more acquainted with the party environment and therefore espouse more positive views of the parties. This is an ordinal variable ranging from 1-5 where 1 indicates no interest in politics and 5 indicates a very strong interest in politics. I treat this variable as interval-valued.

Ideology (standardized): I control for ideology for because it is likely associated with respondents' partisan identity (i.e. the more left-leaning a respondent is, the more likely she is a PDS partisan, all else equal). Therefore, it is important to determine whether ideology alone explains respondents' views about parties, or if partisanship has an effect independent of ideology. To compute this variable, I subtract respondents' raw ideological position (ranging from 1 to 11) from their mean placement of themselves and the political parties in Germany. I use this standardized measure instead of the raw score to account for the possibility that PDS partisans, as most of them come from east Germany and have experience living under the GDR, might use the ideological scale substantively differently from Greens or SPD partisans.[20] This variable ranges from -7.5 to 7.875, where greater negative values indicate a more left-leaning respondent and greater positive values indicate a more right-leaning respondent.

I control for educational level and household income to account for the socioeconomic factors that likely influence how people view parties and politics. In other words, I expect that those with high SES will have more political resources and subsequently have the potential to yield greater influence in politics, improving their evaluations of parties and the political environment. I also expect that, given most PDS partisans reside in eastern Germany, they are likely to be poorer than SPD and Greens partisans, on average.

Education level: This variable is ordinal from 1-6, where 1 indicates that the respondent did not finish the equivalent of high school and 6 indicates the respondent received a post-graduate degree. I treat this variable as interval-valued.

[20] I report the regression results using the raw ideological scores in the Appendix in place of the standardized ones. The results do not substantively differ.

Household income: This variable is ordinal from 1-12, where 1 indicates the lowest income bracket included in the survey, and 12, the highest. I treat this variable as interval-valued.

Partisanship among these respondents will not be entirely static over the years. Therefore, to account for respondents whose partisanship switched between the parties I am comparing, and for the possibility that their behavior and attitudes were consequently affected by such a change, I drop respondents who switch between parties in the comparison groups. Specifically, I drop anyone who was a PDS partisan in the previous survey wave and declared partisanship to the SPD[21] or Greens[22] in 2005. Likewise, I also dropped respondents who declared PDS partisanship after identifying with the Greens[23] or SPD[24] in the previous wave, respectively. The results displayed below are robust to keeping these respondents in the sample, as reported in the Appendix. I did not drop respondents who switched from apartisan to PDS partisan or vice versa as scholars have shown that this switch is fundamentally different from changing identification between specific parties.[25]

Figure 3.7 illustrates the coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals from the pooled difference-in-difference analyses, where Greens partisans are the reference group. As these results show, when comparing PDS partisans SPD and Greens partisans, in support of H1, respondents who declared partisanship to the PDS in 2002 show systematically less positive views of parties in 2005 than the relevant outpartisans (*2005 × Prev. PDS Part.*). Specifically, regardless of the specification of the difference-in-difference models, PDS partisans exhibited worse attitudes about parties following the PDS relabeling than both

[21] 11.97% of the sample.

[22] 1.7% of the sample.

[23] 1.96% of the sample.

[24] 1.88% of the sample.

[25] Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph (2006) and Zuckerman and Kroh (2006) demonstrate that, given the wording of the conventional German survey question regarding partisan identity, it is considerably common for Germans to vacillate between declaring partisanship to a specific party in one year and apartisanship in the next. It is much less common and, the authors argue more deliberate, for respondents to switch partisan identification across parties from one year to the next.

partisan groups.



Figure 3.7: Partisans' Change in Attitudes toward Parties following the PDS Relabeling

The comparison to the SPD partisans is especially telling, because their views of parties improved even in the wake of the SPD's unexpected electoral loss that spurred the early *Bundestag* election in September 2005. If those political events influenced partisans' views of the political parties in Germany, it would follow that SPD partisans would have been the most affected. However, their change in party attitudes are statistically indistinguishable from Greens partisans. From this analysis, then, it appears that PDS partisans' views of parties were negatively affected following the PDS relabeling. This may have been due to a weakening of partisans' attachments to their party and subsequent disillusionment following the PDS name change; or, PDS partisans' views may have been unique relative to other partisans in the way they viewed parties in the political environment, such that they appeared more similar to apartisans (as shown in Figure 3.6). The next analyses help adjudicate between these two possibilities.

Engagement with Political Party

To address H3, that partisans will be less likely to engage with their political party than partisans of other parties, I measure engagement with a partisan's political party using respondents' answers to the following statement:[26]

> "If you aimed to exercise political influence in an issue of importance to you and express your point of view, which of the following things would you do? Try to get support from a party/politician."

This variable ranges from 1-5 where 1 indicates the respondent would definitely not try to get support from a party or politician and 5 indicates the respondent definitely would. Unfortunately, questions regarding engagement with specific parties were not available in the survey during the 1994-2005 time period. Therefore, I use this survey question as a proxy for partisans' engagement with *their* party, under the assumption that, if they were attempting to exercise political influence on an issue they found important, they would be more likely to contact the party to which they were closest.[27]

I again compare PDS partisans to respondents in the comparison groups mentioned above (e.g. SPD partisans, Greens partisans, left-wing apartisans, and eastern apartisans). I make these comparisons as I argue that non-PDS partisans' likelihood of engaging a political party should be similarly unaffected by the PDS relabeling as their attitudes toward parties (in the previous section). Again, using these comparison groups allows me to account for other political events (like the early election) or characteristics (shown in

[26] I avoid other generic measures of political engagement like voting likelihood because of the usual lack of variation in respondents answers to questions about voting in an upcoming election.

[27] One concern here is that some parties have more influence than others, leading voters to be more willing to contact a larger party to address a problem rather than a small one. If this is the case, then based on the comparisons I have constructed, Greens partisans and apartisans should also be more likely to seek help from a larger party. Therefore, if voters do prefer to seek help from a larger party regardless of their partisanship, this behavior should be evident in all of the comparison groups.

Table 3.1) that would have affected respondents' engagement.



Figure 3.8: Respondents' Likelihood of Seeking Party Support by Comparison Groups (1998-2005)

The average response among each group (with 95% confidence intervals) for each survey year is shown in Figure 3.8. The black lines represent those who declared partisanship to the PDS in the previous wave and the grey lines represent the relevant comparison group according to each figure title. The larger the value on the y-axis, the more likely that respondents would be to seek help from a politician/political party.

Figure 3.8 demonstrates how PDS partisans' declared likelihood of soliciting help from a political party or politician changed following the PDS-label change in 2005, in

comparison to other groups of voters. PDS partisans appear to behave most like apartisans (and to a lesser degree, like SPD partisans) from 1998 to 2002, decreasing in their likelihood to solicit party support on an issue. In 2005, however, as compared to PDS partisans, respondents' likelihood of seeking political help increased at a greater rate regardless of their partisan identification.

To formally test this hypothesis, I again use a pooled difference-in-difference design, comparing PDS partisans to the three comparison groups with which they showed common trends on the outcome: left-wing apartisans, SPD partisans, and apartisan easterners.[28] In doing so, I also account for factors that could influence respondents' propensity to seek help from a party or politician as well as predict their partisanship. Therefore, I again control for respondents' political interest, ideology, education, and income as these are often correlated with partisanship and/or political engagement. In addition to these controls, I also control for age (continuous variable) and gender (binary variable where 1 indicates a woman). I control for age, because PDS partisans tend to be older, on average, than other partisans and more men tend to comprise this partisan group than others (Decker and Neu 2013). Because some respondents appear in the data at multiple time points, I use standard errors clustered on the individual.

The results are displayed in Figure 3.9. Again, each line represents a different model specification, where the model description in the legend indicates the additional controls included in the regression equation. From these results, PDS partisans are systematically less likely to solicit support from a party or politician on an issue important to them than SPD partisans, left-wing apartisans, and apartisan easterners by 2005. This difference is particularly striking, because one might expect that apartisans would be the least interested in engaging with political parties. Instead, by 2005, apartisans from both comparison groups increased in their willingness to seek help from a political party and this change was indistinguishable from SPD partisans' behavior. Given the nature of the

[28]Tests of the common trend assumption for each comparison are available in the Appendix.



Figure 3.9: Willingness to Solicit Help from Party

comparison groups I constructed, the results here lend support to H2. If the lack of improvement from PDS partisans were the result of disappointment with the SPD's performance, this should have also been reflected among SPD partisans. Similarly, if PDS partisans happen to be more disillusioned with parties than other partisans, they should more closely mimic the apartisan respondents.

Placebo Test

Despite the support for H2, it is possible that PDS partisans just behave differently than other voters. Because PDS partisans are drawn to the SED's successor, some might expect that these partisans are nostalgic for the political and economic systems they experienced as part of authoritarian East Germany. Although this perception has been disputed among scholars (see Doerschler and Banaszak (2007)), it still warrants further examination to ensure that the changes identified in the attitudes and behavior among PDS partisans are not merely a reflection of large-scale changes in their beliefs. To address this concern, I conduct a placebo test, examining PDS partisans' attitudes toward democracy and society in comparison to the other groups across the same time period. If PDS-partisans' attitudes were undergoing a shift between 2002 and 2005 unrelated to the PDS-label change, I expect that this shift should also be reflected in their feelings about politics and society more generally. Similar to the party responsiveness variable, I constructed a measure of respondents' attitudes toward political and society using six related questions from the GLES.[29] In this test, PDS partisans are indistinguishable from the other groups; their attitudes toward democracy and society follow the same trend as respondents in the comparison groups.

[29]Details for each item are included in the Appendix.



Figure 3.10: Respondents' Attitudes about Politics and Society by Comparison Groups (1998-2005)

As Figure 3.10 shows, PDS partisans' broader attitudes about politics in Germany, do not appear to have been affected by the PDS-label change such that they differ from respondents in any of the comparison groups. In fact, with the exception of SPD partisans from 1998 to 2002, PDS partisans' sense of political efficacy and feelings towards politics in Germany move in remarkable parallel to the respondents in the corresponding comparison groups. Although not a definitive test, this lends support to the possibility that PDS partisans' views of parties were affected by the PDS-label change in 2005 and not reflective of a general shift in their political attitudes during that time period. I also test for any statistical differences in the change in respondents' attitudes from 1998-2002 as well as 2002-2005 (reported in the Appendix). The results show that PDS partisans' change in attitudes about politics and society are statistically indistinguishable from the change in

any other groups' attitudes, both from 1998-2002 and 2002-2005, except for SPD partisans in 1998-2002, as the figures also show.

Change in Partisanship

Thus far, I have shown that PDS partisans responded to the party changing its name in a way that supports the expressive conception of partisanship: their attitudes toward parties and willingness to seek help from a party were both negatively affected by the change in 2005. Additionally, however, among those who declared partisanship to the PDS in 2002, the perception of a rightward shift in the party's ideology significantly increased the likelihood of retaining PDS partisanship in 2005. Of course, the expressive perspective of partisanship and the instrumental perspective need not be mutually exclusive. Following theories on social identification, group members will be more inclined to identify with a group when they see themselves reflected in it. While this identity can follow from demographic characteristics, for political parties and partisans, ideology is a crucial aspect of the group. Therefore, it may well be a characteristic that voters look to, among others, when assessing their partisan identity. From a strictly instrumental perspective, however, if voters detected a change in the party's ideology, it is unclear why this would also alter their perceptions of parties as a whole or their willingness to seek assistance from a political party, especially if the party's ideological change were incremental. Unless the party underwent a large change, instrumentally rational voters who were previously inclined toward the party because of its ideology should still remain with the party, provided that another had not surpassed it in ideological proximity.

Of course, this logic presumes that the ideological change voters may have inferred about the party followed from an actual change in ideology. It is just as possible that voters observed the cooperation agreement with the WASG and took this as a strong signal about impending ideological change from the party. Conversely, the party's new name may have signaled to partisans that their group was changing, yielding the behavioral results

discussed above. However, with these data it is impossible to separate whether effects on partisans were from the party changing its name or simply entering a cooperation agreement with the WASG. Therefore, to test Hypothesis 3, that partisans will be less likely to declare partisanship to their party after the relabeling, I use a natural experiment that allows me to disentangle those effects.

Natural Experiment in the Politbarometer

The Politbarometer is a rolling cross-sectional survey of a random sampling of Germans that took place every two weeks in the summer before the September 2005 election. For the purposes of this chapter, I focus on three consecutive waves of the 2005 Politbarometer: May 23-26, June 6-9, and June 20-23. Near the very end of each of these surveys, respondents were asked about their partisan identification. The May 23-26 wave took place just after the North-Rhine Westphalian state election and the call for an early *Bundestag* election. The June 6-9 wave was fielded just before the PDS and WASG officially entered their cooperation agreement. Unlike the May 23-26 survey, the June 6-9 survey questionnaire included a statement to voters that read:

> "The PDS and WASG plan to compete together as a left-alliance in the *Bundestag* election."

The June 20-23 survey took place after the parties formally entered their cooperation agreement, but before the PDS changed its name. This survey questionnaire indicated to respondents at multiple points that the PDS had changed its name to "Democratic Left.PDS" and, later in the survey, included a different statement:

> "The PDS and WASG want to compete together in the *Bundestag* election under the name 'Democratic Left.PDS'."

Given the timing and content of each of these surveys, I consider the May survey wave to be the control, the June 6-9 survey the "Cooperation Treatment", and the June 20-23

survey the "Cooperation and Label Treatment." Because the June 6-9 survey informed respondents about the intended PDS and WASG alliance prior to the official agreement, any variation in partisan outcomes between this survey and the control should be the result of the treatment included in the survey and not the extant political climate. The June 20-23 survey did take place after the parties' agreement but before the PDS changed its name. Therefore, it is possible that partisanship variation in this survey is not due to the treatment itself, but instead due to respondents' knowledge of the agreement and reaction to it. Based on the German news coverage of the PDS/WASG alliance during this time, however, it does not seem to the be the case that the media environment was remotely saturated with such information. This is unsurprising given that the media were occupied with stories about the SPD's stunning loss in the North-Rhine Westphalian election, the Chancellor's unexpected call for early elections, and the CDU fielding Angela Merkel as its Chancellor candidate for the first time.[30]

Therefore, I consider at variation in partisanship from the June 23-26 survey wave to be the result of the treatment and not respondents' (unlikely) existing knowledge about the cooperation. Of course, the treatment from the June 23-26 survey does not allow me to disentangle the effect of the PDS changing its name from the cooperation agreement entirely. Instead, I can only assess the effect that the name change had in conjunction with the alliance. Furthermore, the new name of the PDS included in the Politbarometer was incorrect. Although the party was considering that name at the time, a local party by a similar name threatened to sue, postponing the PDS-name change until July (Heunemann 2008). I pursue this analysis with the assumption that the inclusion of "Democratic" in the party's name should not inhibit the applicability of the results to partisans' responses to the party's actual name change the following month.

[30]Further details regarding the amount of media coverage of the PDS/WASG alliance are available in the Appendix.

Testing the Partisanship Change Hypothesis

In order to determine whether partisans' attachment to the PDS was negatively affected by its name change, I wish to restrict my attention to respondents who were PDS partisans before the name change. However, the Politbarometer is a cross-sectional survey and did not ask about respondents' partisanship before and after the treatments in the same questionnaire. Therefore, I use respondents' vote in the previous election as a proxy for their partisanship, as partisanship is often correlated with voting behavior (Bartels 2000; Gschwend 2007; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). Although respondents' previous vote is a proxy for their partisanship, it is not a perfect predictor. Therefore, I also control for respondents' ideology, education, age, and gender.[31] Furthermore, I expect that eastern respondents who previously voted for the PDS were likely more inclined toward the party than westerners, as the PDS was a predominantly eastern party up until this point. To account for the likelihood that easterners' partisanship was affected more negatively by the party's name change, in the logistic regression models, I include an interaction term for easterners in each treatment group.

Results from the logistic regression models are displayed in Figure 3.11.[32] Easterners in the Cooperation Agreement and Label Change condition (*East* × *Coop. Agmt. and Name*) were significantly less likely to declare partisanship to the PDS than easterners in the control group (*East*), in support of H3. Substantively, when holding other variables at their means, easterners in the Cooperation Agreement and Label Change condition were 10.6 percentage points less likely to identify as PDS partisans than easterners in the control group.[33] Western respondents were not similarly affected. Interestingly, informing

[31]Unfortunately, the Politbarometer did not include a question pertaining to political interest across the three waves included in my analysis. Therefore, I use education as a proxy for political interest, under the assumption that more educated individuals would be more likely to have followed the evolution of the PDS in the news.

[32]The full model output is available in the Appendix.

[33]The probability of easterners in this treatment condition declaring partisanship to the PDS was 63.76%, whereas it was 74.38% for easterners in the control group.

respondents that the PDS and WASG formed an alliance for the upcoming election did not appear to have an effect, either for western PDS voters (*Coop. Agmt.*) or easterners (*East* × *Coop. Agmt.*).



Figure 3.11: Likelihood of Declaring PDS Partisanship (compared to control group)

Based on these analyses, it appears as though the cooperation agreement on its own did not elicit any effect on voters' likelihood of being PDS partisans. If partisans were responding to the cooperation agreement alone, then it becomes less clear that the name of a party is an important sign for the partisan group, and perhaps highlights that partisans were behaving instrumentally, but that behavior was not detected with the tests I ran. Instead, it was only once eastern respondents were informed about the party's name change *in conjunction with* the cooperation agreement that their partisanship was effected. Given the timing of the survey, this result is particularly useful for adjudicating between the expressive and instrumental perspectives of partisanship. At the time of the second treatment condition, the PDS and WASG had signed their cooperation agreement, but had not officially settled on a new name for the PDS nor had the two parties released updated

manifestos. This latter point is especially important, as these results could thus not be driven by a change in the party's ideology.

Even for the most politically engaged voters, available information about the party's ideological position would have only updated in the context of the North Rhine Westphalian election, an event that occurred even before the control condition survey. Furthermore, if voters used the cooperation agreement as a signal of the party's ideological change (and their subsequent partisan attachment), then we would expect to see a significant difference in respondents' partisanship following the first treatment condition (Cooperation Agreement). These analyses cannot isolate the effect of the cooperation agreement separately from the name change, but they do lend support to the notion that voters take name changes seriously and these signals can prime them to the notion that their party is undergoing a change.

Discussion and Conclusion

Altogether, these analyses revealed the partisan consequences of an elite-led decision to change a party's label and adjudicated between the revisionist and social identity perspectives to partisanship. The results were neither driven by differences in the comparison groups nor by structural changes that the party underwent. The name change did not alter partisans' perceptions of the party's ideology, nor did change in the partisans' ideological closeness to the party affect their partisan attachment, providing no support for the revisionist perspective of partisanship. From the social identity perspective, however, it did diminish their attitudes toward parties, reduced their willingness to engage parties on political problems, and considerably decreased the propensity of likely supporters to declare partisanship to the party.

Although these findings support the social identity perspective of partisanship, they differ from some key findings regarding partisan responses to party brand changes. In particular, as the analyses in the Testing the Partisanship Change Hypothesis section

show, receiving information indicating that the PDS had entered into a joint-list agreement with the WASG did not alter partisans attachments, as compared to the control. Per Lupu (2013), we would expect that, by highlighting similarities between two parties, this information would weaken voters' partisan ties to the PDS; however, it had no effect on partisans' identities. Instead, it was not until voters were informed about the party's name change that we see any effect on their partisanship. Perhaps these findings are due to the fact that PDS was a well-established political party and the WASG had not existed as an alternative option, except for in a single state election. Therefore, voters were likely less familiar with the WASG and did not see the resulting joint-list agreement as a sign that the PDS was converging with the party. Evaluating such disparate findings in future research would be valuable for uncovering the specific circumstances in which "muddying" a party's brand poses negative consequences for partisanship.

Similar to Marinova (2016), I argued that partisans used the name change as a heuristic for change to the party. This name change consequently affected their partisanship and other attitudes, reflective of the social identity perspective to partisanship. I argue that these findings support the social identity perspective of partisanship, but they also lend provide evidence that may seem counter-intuitive. As the success of the minimal group paradigm shows, humans are so inclined toward self-categorization and group identification that randomly, artificially, and arbitrarily induced groups generate ingroup and outgroup behaviors (see Diehl 1990 for a comprehensive overview). Yet something as simple as a change to the name of the group with which individuals identify can be enough to weaken their attachments to the group and thereby alter their perceptions of groups (i.e. political parties) and their willingness to engage in politics. This evidence, combined with the role of groups names in shaping the perceptions people have as well as ingroup esteem (e.g. Larkey, Hecht, and Martin 1993), suggests that future research on the consequences of name changes for voters' partisanship would not only be valuable for our understanding of identities, but also help inform how changes to group names can influence the attachment

that members feel toward the group.

This study also highlights a paradox in the utility of party relabeling. On the one hand, it can help bring new voters to the party – after its name change, the PDS improved its vote share in the 2005 *Bundestag* election by over 4 percentage points (to 8.7%). On the other hand, it can not only drive partisans away from the party, but also away from politics in general and color their perceptions of the parties available to them. Such name changes can therefore leave some voters disenchanted and also alter the composition of a party's electorate, changing the demands placed on the party by its voters and potentially weaken the durability of its support (as partisanship can take time to solidify).

This study also speaks to the role of party labels as identifying heuristics. As the natural experiment showed, it was not until respondents were informed about the party's name change that they appeared significantly less likely to consider themselves partisans of the party – merely notifying them of the planned cooperation did not alter their partisan considerations. Relatedly, this study finds further supports for the expressive perspective of partisanship. From an instrumental perspective, a name change to a party should not, on its own, change partisans' behavior and attitudes. Only if partisans also perceive a substantive change to the party (e.g. ideological change) should their behavior be affected. Although I did not find evidence that partisans perceived such a change to the party, I nevertheless found that, in line with the expressive theory of partisanship, partisans' attitudes and behavior were negatively affected by the party changing its name.

Party labels are one of, if not the most, popular information shortcut that voters use in politics. Not only can these labels represent the stored information voters have about the party's ideology, issue positions, or types of supporters, but the consistency in these labels and their change send signals to voters about the nature of the party itself (Marinova 2016). Label constancy, *ceteris paribus*, illustrates to voters that the party competing in the current election is the same party that competed previously; whereas label change signifies to voters that the party competing in the current election differs in some way from

the party that competed previously – that is, if voters even recognize continuity between the relabeled party and the party's previous name.

Therefore, studies of partisanship and heuristics, especially in the comparative context, should be attentive to whether party labels are changing as these decisions have meaningful consequences for the way voters understand their political options, behave in politics, and identify themselves. Given the substantial rates of party-label change shown in Chapter 2, such changing parties could be driving the diminished rates of partisanship that some scholars have identified, particularly in new democracies (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Tóka 1998). Additional research into the relationship between party-name change in new democracies and partisan attachments would help us better understand the empirical evidence.

CHAPTER 4

TO THE LEFT? TO THE LEFT! THE CASE OF THE LEFT PARTY.PDS IN GERMANY

Thus far, these findings have underscored that an overlooked phenomenon, party-name changes, pose negative consequences for the information voters have about parties, their willingness to vote for such parties (in old democracies), and their identification with these parties. Chapter 3 further clarified the consequences of elite-led relabeling and attempts at electorate expansion for partisans. Altogether, these findings beg the question: if, by changing its name, a party inherently reduces the information available to voters, which could further deter them from engaging with the party, why change names in the first place?

Not all name changes are created equal. Despite the informational deficit that party-name changes can create for voters, parties can use different signals in their new name to provide additional information for voters. Using the German Party of Democratic Socialism's 2005 relabeling decision as a case study, I demonstrate that parties can choose new labels such that they improve the information available to voters; in this instance, by providing a signal to the electorate about the party's ideological leanings.[1]

Of course, if party-label change only yields negative consequences for voters and, ultimately, the relabeled party's vote share, then it would be surprising to see the frequency of party relabeling that we do. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, scholars have shown that parties sometimes choose labels that deliberately convey key pieces of information to voters, like ideological position or the group they seek to represent.

[1] Note, again, that the party's name already included a strong ideological signal which, for a variety of reasons, voters did not appear to interpret as clearly as the new party label.

Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that parties, knowing that such a label change could obfuscate information for voters, might also attempt to choose a new label that imparts some information that may have otherwise been lost by the relabeling, like a specific issue (e.g. the Conservative Peasant Party in Poland), ideological stance (e.g. the Left Wing Alliance in Finland), or the structural change the party underwent (e.g. the Union of Peasants' and New Democracy in Lithuania). Such information from the label could help attenuate the loss of information that resulted from the label change in the first place.[2] Furthermore, instances of party relabeling may be less disruptive in environments where the party label had not existed very long in the first place and voters had not yet come to rely as heavily on the label as an information shortcut than they would have had the label been around for longer.[3]

Therefore, I expect that:

> The inclusion of ideological or issue position signals in a party's new name will reduce the informational deficit voters face toward the party.

In the next section, I describe the case I use to examine this possibility, before turning to the tests of my hypothesis.

A Case Study: Germany's Left Party (*Linkspartei.PDS*)

As a condition of a joint-list agreement, Germany's Party of Democratic Socialism changed its name to *die Linkspartei(.PDS)* in 2005. Because of the party's history in former East Germany and the variation in its name change, this case allows me to examine the consequences of full and partial changes on the information voters have about the party, as

[2] Parties could also opt for the opposite tactic and pick a name that obscures their true position. For example, some contend that the Center Party of the Netherlands deliberately chose their name to hide their right-wing extremist tendencies.

[3] Kim and Solt (2017) suggest that this might be the case, as they find that parties with younger labels are more likely to than older parties to change their name.

well as how the length of experience with a party conditions the effects of relabeling for voters. I provide a brief overview of the evolution of the party and its naming decision before turning to empirical tests of my hypothesis.

Following the fall of the Berlin wall, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the reigning party of the authoritarian German Democratic Republic (former East Germany), found itself in need of serious reform if it were to have any chance of political survival in the newly unified, democratic Germany (Hough, Koß, and Olsen 2007). After considerable debate among party members and multiple party congresses, the SED was renamed to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) on February 4, 1990. Although many now-PDS members hoped that this change would distance the party from its SED-past, many Germans remained unconvinced that the party had broken ties with its past and saw the party as a rebranded version of the SED (Bastian 1995).

Although many Germans, particularly those in the West, were skeptical of the PDS and unhappy to see it involved in German politics (Hough, Koß, and Olsen 2007), the party's electoral fortunes steadily improved until 1998, when the party managed to cross the five-percent threshold necessary for representation in the Bundestag with 5.1% of the vote. In the 2002 Bundestag election, however, the party's support fell to 4% and it thus failed to cross the electoral threshold.[4] Geographically, the PDS did not fare much worse in the western states than it had previously, but a loss of approximately 4.7 percentage points in eastern states was sufficient to put it on the wrong side of the representation threshold. This electoral result was cause for concern among party members regarding its future prospects and highlighted the PDS's anemic support in western states, as many realized they could not rely on their performance in western states to insulate the party from any potential fluctuation in vote share in the east. Therefore, following the unforeseen circumstances outlined in Chapter 3, the party opted to change its name following a joint-list agreement with the WASG. In the next section, I detail the specific aspects of the

[4] The party did manage to secure two seats from single-member districts.

party's name change that I leverage in this chapter.

From PDS to Left Party(.PDS)

The relabeling process was rather arduous for the PDS, as they needed the WASG to agree on their new name. Ultimately, they decided on "*Die Linkspartei*" or, The Left Party. Members of the PDS from eastern states worried that PDS partisans had developed a strong identity with the PDS and changing the name altogether could be alienating and disenfranchising for their voters.[5] Therefore, members of both parties agreed that the PDS's new name would be "*Die Linkspartei.PDS*" (The Left Party.PDS) in eastern states. This led to a debate among members of both parties in western states, as some PDS members were concerned about a similar effect on their voters if "PDS" were excluded from the name, but WASG members opposed the idea.

Members of the WASG were concerned that including the PDS in the name would present problems: (1) it would signal to their voters that they were socialist when, in fact, they considered themselves as social democrats and were attracting voters from the SPD; (2) the WASG did not want to be swallowed up by the PDS and subsequently assimilated. Therefore, after much debate, members of both parties agreed to vote on the name of the party that would be used in each state. In Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg, they voted to keep ".PDS" in the name and the remaining seven western state parties opted to remove it.[6] This meant that the term "PDS" was omitted completely from any election material, including campaign posters and electoral ballots, and instead the party competed only as

[5]This paragraph and the next draw heavily on Heunemann (2008).

[6]For the states that opted to omit the PDS from its name, the PDS's vote share does not appear to differ systematically when compared to Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg, the three western states that chose to keep PDS in its name. Furthermore, of those three states, the PDS did not appear to have a substantially larger voter base to warrant keeping PDS in the name. This is especially true for Bavaria, the state in which the PDS receive the lowest party vote share across all German states in 2002. The PDS vote share in Bremen and Hamburg do appear slightly larger than average for the western German states, with around 2% as opposed to 1.2% in 2002.

The Left Party in these states.

It is unclear whether the decision in Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg to keep "PDS" in the party's name was motivated by concerns over how a label change would be received by PDS partisans within those states. Although this may well have been the case,[7] the PDS hardly seemed to have an established voting base within these states such that a change in the label could yield deleterious effects from its supporters. In fact, in neither Bavaria nor Hamburg did the PDS run in state-level elections. Furthermore, in Bavaria, the PDS had historically obtained the smallest party vote share out of every German state in Bundestag elections prior to the relabeling decision, with an average of 0.67% of the vote. I contend that it was more likely that the WASG similarly lacked an established voting base within the states[8] to drive related concerns about retaining "PDS" in the label. Additionally, it is unclear whether the WASG had an established group of party elites within Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg to influence the negotiations with the PDS-party elites to prevent the inclusion of "PDS" within the party's new label.

From this point forward, I examine each of these groups separately: (1) eastern voters, who had more experience with the party than western voters and saw the name change as Left Party.PDS; (2) western ".PDS" voters, the voters in Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg, who also saw the name change as Left Party.PDS; and (3) western voters, the voters in the remaining western states who saw the name change as Left Party.

Before turning to the tests of my hypothesis, it is worth noting that the initial PDS label already included an informative ideological signal in its name: socialism. However, as I demonstrate later in this chapter, "socialism" did not appear to be as uniformly informative to western Germans as did the word "left" in the party's new name. Part of

[7] As far as I am aware, Heunemann (2008) is the only scholar to examine the decision to relabel across the PDS's state-level party organizations. In his interviews with party officials, he cites the trepidation from the eastern organizations to change the label given how it might affect partisans. However, he did not appear to ascertain explicit reasons from party officials in the western states that voted to keep "PDS" in the label.

[8] Unfortunately, WASG membership statistics are unavailable by state for the time period before the party entered the cooperation agreement with the PDS in 2005.

this difference is likely an artifact of survey design, as I discuss later. However, it is also likely due to western voters' distaste for socialism (Rohrschneider 2004) and the PDS's historical affiliation with the authoritarian GDR, which German political parties sought to emphasize in the years immediately following unification (Thompson 1996). Therefore, many western voters likely knew that they disliked the PDS and had a negative perception of socialism, but did not necessarily agree on the left-right ideological position associated with it. Additionally, the conflation of socialism with authoritarianism could have lent to some confusion as to the ideology.

Case Study Data and Methods

I use survey data from the German Legislative Election Study to test my hypothesis (*the inclusion of ideological or issue position signals in a party's new name will reduce the informational deficit voters face toward the party*). I measure the informational deficit using survey respondents' ideological placements of the party. To assess the informational consequences of the PDS name change in 2005, I first examine voters' placement of the party on a left-right ideological spectrum before and after the name change. This is not intended as a test of any of my hypotheses. Instead it provides an overview of the variation in where voters' perceived the ideological position of the PDS, the variation in which I examine in further detail to test my hypothesis. As indicated in Chapter 3, "don't know" responses were not solicited and, instead, were only coded if the respondent offered that they did not know where to place a party on the ideological spectrum. These responses were dropped from the subsequent analyses.[9]

Because of the variation in voters' length of exposure to the party as well as variation in the name change in 2005, I group voters into three distinct regional categories: (1) East,

[9]As a complementary analysis to Chapter 2, Appendix C examines the effect of the PDS-label change on respondent's propensity to indicate that they "don't know" where the party sits ideologically, broken out by the three regional groups I describe in the subsequent paragraph.

(2) West .PDS, and (3) West. The East category includes voters who reside in the former eastern German states[10]. The West .PDS category includes voters who reside in Bavaria, Bremen, or Hamburg (the three western states in which the party presented itself as The Left Party.PDS in 2005). Finally, the West category includes voters who reside in the remaining western states (where the party presented itself as The Left Party in 2005).

An important caveat here, however, is that the 2005 GLES survey used only the label "The Left Party.PDS," regardless of the region the respondent was in. That decision on the part of the survey designers makes it less likely that I will be able to detect the consequences of the label distinction between western states. Another concern with assessing the consequences of the name change for voters' ideological perceptions of the party is the way in which the survey question regarding parties' ideological positions is phrased:

> "Parties are often assessed as being 'left' or 'right'. Please tell me how you assess the following parties by using this scale. Let me now read the parties one by one."

This question, followed almost immediately by the survey enumerator asking respondents about where they would place The Left Party(.PDS) (in 2005), likely primed respondents to associate the party with the leftward side of the scale. Of course, if voters do tend to think ideologically about parties, the inclusion of "Left" in the party name alone already signals an ideological position to voters, and such a signal is not exclusive to the design of the survey.

[10]Of course, breaking respondents into these comparison groups does not account for the fact that some respondents could have moved to eastern Germany after unification and consequently not had the same experience with the SED (and impression that may give them of the PDS) as compared to those respondents who never left eastern Germany. Unfortunately, the GLES does not include a question about the location of respondents prior to unification in its 2005 survey. However, based on respondents' answers to the question in 2002, only 7% of eastern respondents had lived in western Germany prior to unification.

I compare respondents' placement of the PDS (and its successor parties) to their placement of the remaining five major parties in German politics[11] and across the three categories (eastern states, Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg, and the remaining western states) discussed above.

Respondents' raw placement of parties' ideological positions range from 1 to 11, where 1 indicates the left-most position on the scale and 11, the right-most. The following figures show respondents' mean placement of parties over time with 95% confidence intervals distinguished by the party exposure and labeling decision of the party discussed above.[12] Respondents' placements of the parties in 1994 are not available as the survey did not include such questions. As the below figures show, respondents' placement of the CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, and the Greens, across the three regions, tend to trend together with rather small regional differences in the placement of the parties (with slight exception for variation in eastern respondents' placement of the FDP in 2005 and 2009). Time series variance is correlated across group as well. For instance, all three series show the SPD being perceived to shift rightward from 2005 to 2009 and again from 2009 to 2013.

For respondents' placement of the PDS, a different pattern emerges. Respondents in both western regions place the party considerably more rightward in 1998 and 2002 than their eastern counterparts. Interestingly, with the change in the party's name in 2005, while we do see a decrease (leftward shift) in western respondents' placement of the party, the same shift does not occur among eastern Germans, even though they also saw the change in the label from PDS to Left Party.PDS. Part of this discrepancy could be due to a floor effect. Given that the leftmost place on the scale is 1 and the average placement of

[11] These parties include: The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), Free Democratic Party (FDP), Social Democratic Party (SPD), and Alliance '90/The Greens (Greens).

[12] To account for the possibility that eastern voters use the ideological scale in a substantively different way from western voters, I also standardize respondents' placement of each party. To do this, I subtract the mean of respondents' placements of the parties from the placement of a specific party. These results are substantively similar to the raw scores reported here.

the party among eastern Germans was approximately 2.2 in 2002, an average movement of the same magnitude as that made by as western Germans from 2002 to 2005 would be nearly impossible. However, it is impossible to distinguish in the data between this possible floor effect and the eastern Germans merely knowing where the PDS stands ideologically.



Figure 4.1: Respondents' Left-Right Placements (raw) of Parties

Is the change in ideological placement of the PDS simply a reflection of westerners learning about the party – independent of the information gleaned by the party's

relabeling? I cannot disprove this possibility given the data available. However, if westerners' convergence with easterners' placement of the party were evidence of learning, then it is unclear why we do not see similar pathways toward convergence for easterners' placements of the other German parties. Most easterners did not have any experience with these other parties until after the reunification of Germany in 1990. There are two potential explanations for this disparity. Eastern Germans are substantively different from westerners in that they learned about five of the main political parties so quickly that their ideological perceptions of the parties mirrored those of western respondents (either in trend, exact placement, or both) within 8 years of reunification, whereas westerners took more time to learn about one of the parties. Or, although westerners may have been learning about the ideological position of the PDS prior to the label change, the label change facilitated additional learning that would not have otherwise occurred.

Given the difference in trends among eastern Germans' placements of the initially-western German parties and the fact that the PDS did not appear to be making any substantial inroads in its campaigns in western German states prior to the change, I argue that the change in western respondents' placement of the party between 2002 and 2005 was due, in part, to the relabeling of the party. Now that I have provided a picture of where respondents' perceive the PDS on an ideological spectrum, both over time and in comparison to other parties, let us turn to formally testing the informational hypothesis.

Tests of Variance

To formally test whether there is a significant difference in the variation within the regional groups' ideological placements of the PDS from 2002 to 2005 and across the regional groups' placements in 2005, I conduct a series of tests for differences in variance within the groups. I use Levene's test (also with a trimmed mean), the Brown-Forsythe test, and the Fligner-Killeen test. Each of these tests are designed to assess whether the variances of two or more groups are equal. Although Levene's test is less sensitive than others to

non-normally distributed data, it does not perform well with relatively large deviations from normality (Conover, Johnson, and Johnson 1981). Therefore, I also conduct the Brown-Forsythe test which determines the spread of the data from the median rather than the mean, which is used in Levene's test. Lastly, I use the Fligner-Killeen test, which is more robust against departures from normality than other tests, include Levene's and the Brown-Forsythe test (Conover, Johnson, and Johnson 1981). I perform these tests on respondents' raw left-right placement of the PDS as well as their standardized placement (their placement of the PDS subtracted from their mean placement of all German parties they placed in the survey.)

Table 4.1: Variance Tests: Raw Left-Right Placement of PDS (2002-2005)

Test (Statistic)	West	West(.PDS)	East(.PDS)
Levene's (F)	481.12***	189.41***	0.59
Levene's: trimmed mean (F)	284.03***	106.23***	0.01
Brown-Forsythe (F)	219.77***	57.56***	0.03
Fligner-Killeen (med. chi-sq)	372.35***	41.03***	0.13

Table 4.2: Variance Tests: Standardized Left-Right Placement of PDS (2002-2005)

Test (Statistic)	West	West(.PDS)	East(.PDS)
Levene's (F)	332.73***	168.03***	0.07
Levene's: trimmed mean (F)	195.01***	96.30***	0.25
Brown-Forsythe (F)	126.47***	53.04***	0.29
Fligner-Killeen (med. chi-sq)	115.61***	31.98***	0.34

As the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate, regardless of the test used or the specification of the test (e.g. Levene's test vs. Levene's test with a trimmed mean), the variance in eastern respondents' placement of the The Left Party.PDS in 2005 was statistically indistinguishable from their placement of the PDS in 2002.[13] For both groups

[13]These findings are also robust to excluding PDS partisans from the analysis, demon-

of western respondents, however, the variance in their placement of the party in 2005 as compared to 2002 is statistically significantly different from each other. In conjunction with the figures above, these results illustrate that, not only are the variances between the years different from one another, but the variance in respondents' placement of the party decreased considerably from 2002 to 2005. These results therefore support hypothesis that the relabeling increased the information available to voters. Importantly, these results do not hold for eastern voters. This is unsurprising as the PDS retained its abbreviation in the new name and easterners had more experience with the party in order to have a clearer idea of where the party stood ideologically even before it changed its name.

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, this chapter examined a case where a political party used a strategic signal within its new name and doing so helped reduce the information deficit that voters faced toward the party. This chapter also provided further distinction regarding the relationship between party label change, the age of a party, and voters' exposure to it. In particular, I found that voters who had been exposed to the PDS for longer (i.e. those in eastern Germany) were unaffected in their knowledge of the party's ideological position.[14] Those with less experience with the PDS (i.e. voters in western Germany) appear to have gained information by the party's new label, improving the consensus with which voters placed the party's ideological position in both western groups.

It is worth noting, again, that this is likely not just an effect of the party's new name, but also the survey question itself asking voters to place parties on a left-right scale.

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strating that it is not the consensus of PDS partisans regarding the party's ideology driving these results.

[14]Interestingly, according to the analyses in Appendix C, eastern voters were more familiar with the PDS's ideological position after the name change, similar to voters in both western groups. Therefore, although the party relabeling did not elicit an aggregate effect in the variation in easterner's placement of the party, it did appear to reduce ideological uncertainty for some voters.

Therefore, it is difficult to infer the degree to which the new name improved the inferences that voters made about the party's anticipated behavior or general party platform. It is, however, remarkable that such a name change drastically reduced the variance in voters' placement of the party; even if it is in part an artifact of the survey design, such findings lend support to the notion that new party names can provide informative signals to voters. Therefore, future work that examines the types of inferences voters make about relabeled parties, particularly with respect to the information conveyed in a party's new name, would be valuable for further understanding the consequences of party relabeling and the dataset provided in this dissertation offers a resource for doing so.

CHAPTER 5

ADDITIONAL HEURISTICS: PARTISAN IDENTITIES AND LEADER ATTACHMENT

Thus far in this dissertation, I have examined the rate and consequences of party-label change for voters. I have demonstrated that party relabeling can introduce additional information complexity into voters' electoral environments, wherein they are less likely to be familiar with these parties and their ideologies, deterred from voting for parties with new names (in old democracies), and generally less attached to such parties. I showed that the consequences of elite-driven party relabeling can be especially troubling for partisans – weakening their attachments, engendering disillusionment with their party options, and reducing their likelihood of engaging with parties in politics. The picture is not entirely bleak, however: the signals that parties opt to include in their new labels can help voters overcome informational deficits and improve the accuracy and consensus with which they identify parties' ideological leanings.

None of these studies, however, provide a glimpse into the compounding effects of party relabeling. Although some of the analyses in Chapter 2 highlight the heterogeneous effects of party relabeling, particularly when they are frequent, this dissertation has not established how repeated instances of relabeling, over time, alter the information that voters take in and the shortcuts they use to make political decisions. If the effectiveness of a given heuristic decreases over time, we would generally expect voters to rely less on that heuristic, as it is not a reliable or informative shortcut for the behavior or outcomes that voters are attempting to infer by using them.

This is not to say that voters never use heuristics inappropriately, or that they always make more accurate decisions when they employ heuristics (see Lau and Redlawsk (2001)

for an overview of common political heuristics and their influence on biased decision-making). However, a heuristic is only as valuable as the information that voters can associate with it (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993). In contexts where party labels change frequently, as I argued in Chapter 2, voters must, at the very least, engage in an additional cognitive step in order to import the information they had associated with a party's previous label with the new label – they must recognize the continuity in the party that the names represent. As Chapter 2 also illustrated, voters are less familiar with relabeled parties, which further emphasizes the likely infrequent scenario where voters seamlessly update their party-label heuristics as parties rename themselves.

Therefore, in contexts where party labels change with considerable frequency, voters will likely rely less on party-label heuristics to make inferences about candidates and parties. This does not mean, however, that these voters will rely less on heuristics altogether. The electoral environments they find themselves in are at least as complex as others that are not characterized by such relabeling. As a result, these voters will still employ information shortcuts as a cost-saving measure to make political decisions; however, the specific heuristics that these voters rely on will likely be different as the party-label shortcut will no longer be as popular. To which heuristics do these voters turn?

One possibility is party leaders. In a variety of electoral environments, party leaders are high-profile politicians who, in some cases, become inseparable from the party itself, especially when they are charismatic and cultivate their own political following; some examples include Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, Emmanuel Macron in France, and numerous leaders in South Korea who have become tied to their party's label (Gale 2016). If voters come to rely on the leaders of parties as an information shortcut to infer information about the party's expected ideology, policy positions, or other characteristics, particular in contexts where the name of the party itself is less meaningful, how might this condition the way these voters interact with such organizations or develop their own political identities? One possibility is that voters develop attachments to a specific leader instead of a party

group.

This possibility clashes with the growing concern that has emerged among political scientists in recent years: democratic politics is becoming increasingly personalized. Some scholars fear that gone are the days where political parties operate as mass-based organizations, aggregating preferences of large portions of the electorate into effective policies. Instead, politics appears to be ever more personalized, where power is being consolidated among executive leadership positions and individual candidate evaluations have usurped other identity-based factors in voters' ballot box decisions (Garzia 2013a; Rahat and Kenig 2018), albeit with some mixed evidence (see King (2002); Kriesi (2011)).

From the voter perspective, this increasing attention to individual candidates could imply that partisan attachments are falling by the wayside and, instead, voters are being drawn to political parties because of a few charismatic party members. This concern has been bolstered by studies that show that voters' candidate evaluations appear to be stronger predictors of their vote choice than partisanship (Garzia 2013a; Garzia 2013b; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2015). Some scholars have argued that this evidence highlights the waning role of partisanship as an affective attachment or social identity (Garzia and Angelis 2016), where voters are instead engaging in short-term evaluations of a few political actors to determine their partisan leanings rather than a strong, emotional and psychological pull toward one party group over the others. These conclusions, however, appear to be founded on flawed interpretations of the social psychology foundations of social identity, and ignore the relationship between group leaders and group membership.

In order to disentangle the relationship between partisanship and the behavioral personalization of politics, we must develop a stronger understanding of the role of archetypal group membership in social identity strength and conceptually separate group identities from identities formed around individual politicians. Therefore, using an original survey instrument fielded on a convenience sample of undergraduate students, I adapt a measure of leader prototypicality from social identity of leadership studies to identify the

degree to which partisans believe their party's leader embodies prototypical group characteristics. I also create a measure of leader attachment and compare rates of this attachment across partisans and leaders to better understand the political personalization among voters. This study provides new measures for capturing this phenomenon and illustrates some interesting patterns of leader prototypicality and attachment among U.S. partisans.

The concern regarding political personalization is one that has been near absent among scholars of American politics in recent years, who, instead, have been largely preoccupied with concerns over growing political polarization both in the American electorate and between the American political parties (see Hetheringon 2001; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Hetheringon and Rudolph 2015 for overviews and Fiorina and Abrams (2008) for a rebuttal to the mass polarization thesis.) In the aftermath of the 2016 election, however, some political scientists have shifted their focus to the role of personalist aspects of the presidential candidates and how they influenced voters' electoral decisions (e.g. Fortunato, Hibbing, and Mondak 2018). Therefore, although this chapter is largely motivated by theoretical perspectives advanced outside of U.S. politics, this investigation is a timely one following the 2016 election.[1]

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the role of leader prototypicality in social identity formation and strength and apply this perspective to interpretations of existing findings. Next, I describe the measures I develop to capture leader prototypicality and leader attachment separately from partisanship. Afterward, I discuss the sample of respondents used in this study, including the advantages and drawbacks of the making inferences from the population. Then, I show the perceived prototypicality of leaders among the respondents as well as the relationship between leader attachment and partisanship, highlighting key differences among Democrats and Republicans. Finally, I discuss these findings in the context of the political personalization phenomenon, highlight

[1]Analyses in Appendix D lend additional support to the role of candidate evaluations in vote choice in the 2016 election.

limitations to the study, and offer some future directions for this work.

The Social Identity of Leadership and Role of Prototypicality

According to social identity theory, group members develop "prototypes" that they associate with their group (Hogg 2003; Turner et al. 1987). This prototype can be comprised of demographic characteristics, personality traits, values and beliefs, and other normative attributes that group members consider to be archetypal to membership (Knippenberg 2011). Because group members are often exposed to similar information about their group, these prototypes are generally shared among members (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995).

Political science research that has found a strong relationship between candidate evaluations and voter behavior could be driven by the prototypicality of political leaders rather than voters' waning attachment to their party and increasing attraction to individual candidates. Building on social identity theory, the social identity of leadership theory contends that, when group leaders exhibit the attributes that are deemed prototypical to the group, other members are likely to profess greater trust and affect toward the leader than they would in the absence of such prototypicality (Knippenberg 2011; Ullrich, Christ, and Dick 2009). How does this relate to the personalization of politics? Studies in political science that seek to capture the degree to which voters are exhibiting politically personalized behavior frequently rely on measures of affect toward political candidates to capture this personalization (e.g. Garzia 2011; Garzia 2013a; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2015). Drawing from social identity of leadership theory, however, we see that group members are likely to profess not only greater affect and trust toward those group members who demonstrate attributes that are prototypical to the group, but also greater propensity to *endorse* leaders who they perceive as group prototypical (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995; Hogg, Knippenberg, and Rast 2012; Knippenberg and Knippenberg 2005; Ullrich, Christ, and Dick 2009). Therefore, using leader affect as an indicator of

personalization among voters conflates the role of leader prototypicality in engendering leader affect and presumes that when partisans indicate strong, positive feelings towards a party leader, this comes at the detriment to their feelings toward the party.

Even if it were the case that the growing leader affect were the result of g, it does not necessarily dispel the concerns that voters may be exhibiting greater personalization in the political behavior. In fact, in the company of a prototypical group leader, "followers allow the leader to be innovative in taking the group in new directions" (Hogg and Reid 2006, 20). In other words, by embodying characteristics that are closely associated with the group itself, leaders can find latitude in their ability to redefine what it means to be a group member, thereby reconstructing the group prototype, in extreme cases (Hogg and Reid 2006). Therefore, it is also possible that increased rates of candidate affect and the greater explanatory power of candidate evaluations for voting behavior are demonstrative of this phenomenon, where voters are growing more tolerant of leaders who behave in ways that are not typical of party members.

It is impossible to differentiate between these two possibilities with existing studies or data. In order to do so, we would need to measure partisan identity, leader prototypicality *and* leader attachment separately. Therefore, I develop two new measures in this chapter: (1) a measure of leader prototypicality and (2) a measure of leader attachment. While the social identity of leadership theory provides us with a meaningful framework for understanding the role of leader prototypicality in group membership and leader evaluations, it does not provide much in the way of distinguishing leader attachment from group attachment. This is largely an artifact of the contexts in which this theory has been applied: primarily within fixed groups and organizational structures like the military, corporations, or universities. In these contexts, the concern that group members may develop an attachment to a particular leader separate from their own group identity, to my knowledge, has not been evaluated. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this possibility would pose a concern for such groups in the same way that it would for political parties as

the individual cost for leaving the military, a job, or school, if a leader does as well is much higher than the individual cost for abandoning a political party. Therefore, I create a measure of leader attachment based on the concerns that scholars have for the way voters make their decisions in personalized political contexts.

Measures of partisan identity in voter personalization studies are also in need of revision. To my knowledge, these studies have relied on the following types survey questions to capture voters' partisanship: "Do you think of yourself as close to any particular political party?"; "If yes, which one?"; and finally, "How close do you feel toward [party]?". As Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe (2015) and Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017) have shown, these questions do not adequately capture the degree to which partisans are attached to their party, nor do they account for the nature of their identity: some partisans may be inclined toward a party simply because of a policy position, whereas others may feel a strong, psychological connection to the group. In order to make inferences about the role of partisan attachment in voter personalization, it is necessary also to update the traditional measures of partisan identity and use the social identity measure developed by Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe (2015) and Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017). This allows us to better identify whether voters' identities toward parties are weakening in favor of specific leaders.

Design: Capturing Leader Prototypicality and Attachment

I created a survey instrument to measure respondents' attachment toward party leaders, the perceived prototypicality of leaders, as well as respondents' partisan attachment. The survey began by asking respondents whether they felt close to any particular political party. Following that question (and regardless of whether they indicated that they felt close to a party), respondents were asked which political party they felt closest to: the Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Libertarian Party, and the Republican Party. Respondents were then presented with the social identity of partisanship battery developed

by Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017). Following these questions, respondents were asked who they believed to be the leader of the party they professed feeling closest to. This question was open-ended. Then, participants were asked about their general affect toward the leader they named in the previous question, where zero indicated very negative feelings toward the leader and ten, very positive. Finally, respondents were presented with a battery of questions designed to measure their perceptions of leader prototypicality and attachment to the leader.

Leader Prototypicality

To measure respondents' perceptions of party leader prototypicality, I adapted survey items from Platow and Knippenberg (2001). Social psychology's measures of leader prototypicality are usually captured with the following questions: "Overall, I would say that the leader: (a) represents what is characteristics about [group members]; (b) is representative of [group members]; (c) is a good example of the kind of people who [belong to the group]; and (d) stands for what people [in the group] have in common; (e) is *not* representative of the kind of people who [belong to the group]; and (f) is very similar to most people [in group]" (Platow and Knippenberg 2001; for a similar measurement strategy, see Knippenberg and Knippenberg 2005).

Because representation in a political context can be interpreted in a number of a ways (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999), I did not include the "representative" questions in my measure (items a, b, and e). Instead, I included survey items 1 and 2 listed below. I opted to ask respondents about the typicality of the leader when it comes to other politicians and supporters separately. I separated these two types of group members to ensure that I had some indication about the group members respondents had in mind when answering the questions. The remaining two items, 3 and 4, were adapted from items (c) and (d) listed above, respectively. The only difference between them is that I refer to the group as the party.

These items (included below) followed the prompt: "Thinking about this party leader, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements."

1. This leader is typical of other politicians in the party. (*Typ. Pol.*)
2. This leader is typical of people who support the party. (*Typ. Supp.*)
3. This leader is a good example of the kind people who belong to the party. (*Example*)
4. This leader stands for what people in the party have in common. (*Common*)

Leader Attachment

To my knowledge, a measure that captures attachment to leaders does not exist. Furthermore, the type of leader attachment that is of concern for personalization scholars is not merely positive feelings toward a party's leader. Instead, it is the type of attachment that would weaken voters' partisanship in the absence of the leader or, in more extreme cases, lead voters to abandon their partisan identity altogether should the leader no longer be part of the group. Therefore, a measure of leader attachment that captures this type of behavior must tap into voters' feelings toward a leader with respect to their feelings toward a party. Designing the survey items in this way also allow me to push respondents to "control" for their feelings toward the party in their leader attachment evaluations. In this way, I am creating a measure of relative leader attachment, where both those who are strongly and weakly identified with the party would score high on leader attachment so long as their feelings toward the leader were stronger than their feelings to the party. Therefore, to measure leader attachment effectively, I aimed to create statements that explicitly required respondents to evaluate their attachment toward the leader in comparison to or in light of their attachment to the party.

1. If this leader left the party, I would feel less connected to the party. (*Connect*)
2. I care more about this leader than I do the party. (*Care*)

3. If this leader left the party, I would be less likely to vote for the party. (*Left*)
4. If this leader formed a new party, I would consider voting for this new party. (*New*)

In my creation of the leader attachment measure, I aimed to include questions that tapped into how voters felt about the leader relative to the party (items 1 and 2) and how the leader encouraged their voting behavior (items 3 and 4). If voters are growing more inclined toward specific leaders at the consequence of their partisan identity, then the degree to which voters feel connected to the party should be conditioned on the leader's presence within the party (item 1). Additionally, if voters are growing more politically personalized, the positive feelings that voters have as members of a partisan group should be usurped by their feelings toward the leader (item 2). Finally, from a behavioral perspective, personalized voters should make ballot box decisions driven by the leader's membership in their party (item 3) and even encourage vote-switching if the leader left the party to form a new one (item 4).

Survey Population

In order to assess the rate of leader attachment and leader prototypicality evaluations among partisans, I created a survey instrument administered to undergraduate students enrolled in political science courses at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in October 2018.[2] Of the approximately 500 students who were fielded the survey, 385 completed it. Of those respondents, 250 indicated they felt closest to the Democratic Party, 82 toward the Republican Party, 25 toward the Libertarian Party, and 4 toward the Green Party.[3]

Administering a survey designed to capture leader prototypicality and partisans' leader attachment among respondents living in a presidential system is likely to bias my results

[2]A complete copy of the survey instrument is included in the Appendix.

[3]See Appendix D for comparisons between this sample and a nationally representative one.

upward. In other words, because of the personal nature of presidential regimes (Carey and Shugart 1994; Curtice and Lisi 2015; Samuels and Shugart 2010), respondents in my sample are likely already more inclined toward individual politicians than those in pure parliamentary systems. However, this study can still provide meaningful information and, perhaps, a glimpse at the upper limit of leader attachment in a system that encourages such behavior.

Who Are the Leaders?

Before turning to the validation of the survey instruments I created, let us first examine who respondents believed to be the leader of their party. Table 5.1 includes the politicians named as leaders of the Democratic party along with the proportion of respondents who named that particular politician.[4] Table 5.2 shows the same information for Republicans. Two coding decisions are worth mentioning here. First, the name of a party leader was coded as "other" when the name listed referred to a group of people, more than one named candidate, or a general concept (e.g. some Democratic respondents wrote "The People" as the leader of the Democratic Party; some Republican respondents wrote "Not Trump" or "Republican Candidates"). Second, the party leader is coded as "none" only if the respondent's answer indicated they did not believe the party had a leader.

[4]To code each of the answers while accounting for variations in spelling and name usage (e.g. some referred to leaders by both their first and last name while others opted to include their professional title or last name only), I used the `agrep` function in `R` to execute fuzzy matching against a list of politicians and the leaders included in the survey results. After the initial matching procedure, I manually fixed any errors and coded the remaining, unmatched observations.

Table 5.1: Perceived Democratic Party Leaders

Politician	Named as Leader	Percent
Barack Obama	79	31.60
None	32	12.80
Other	31	12.40
Chuck Schumer	30	12.00
Nancy Pelosi	19	7.60
Don't Know	18	7.20
Tom Perez	10	4.00
Elizabeth Warren	8	3.20
Hillary Clinton	8	3.20
Bernie Sanders	7	2.80
Cory Booker	3	1.20
Joe Biden	2	0.80

Table 5.2: Perceived Republican Party Leaders

Politician	Named as Leader	Percent
Donald Trump	40	48.78
Paul Ryan	11	13.41
None	8	9.76
Other	7	8.54
Don't Know	6	7.32
Mitch McConnell	4	4.88
Ben Shapiro	1	1.22

Two things stand out among the perceived leaders of the Democratic Party: (1) the largest proportion of respondents coalesced around Barack Obama as the party leader, even though he has largely stayed out of the political spotlight after leaving office in 2016; and (2) the next most common response to the perceived leader question is "none". In a study motivated by concerns over the increasing personalization of politics, this result is a bit surprising. On the one hand, the survey itself was administered just before the 2020 presidential primary season started to pick up speed – before any major politicians announced their campaigns – so it is likely that this result is partly an artifact of the time

period in which the survey was administered. On the other hand, for a system that embodies the structural incentives for personalized politics, it is curious that so many Democrats did not immediately associate a specific politician with party leadership. One possible explanation for these findings is unique the timing and sample of my survey. Just weeks before this survey was administered, Barack Obama delivered a speech at the University's campus. Attendance to this event was determined via a lottery; therefore, while I might expect that political science students would be more inclined to enter such a lottery, I do not expect that even a sizable number of them could attend. Furthermore, among those who would be interested in attending, I expect that these same respondents would already be more inclined to name Barack Obama as the leader of the Democratic Party.

The results among Republicans are less surprising. Respondents named Donald Trump as the party leader almost with majority and Paul Ryan was the second most common name mentioned in the survey. Like the Democratic respondents, although with less frequency, a sizable minority of Republican respondents did not name a specific leader when prompted, and approximately 16% indicated they did not believe the party had a leader or they did not know who the leader was.

A Caveat on Measuring Leader Prototypicality and Attachment in this Sample

Asking respondents an open-ended question about who they believed to be the leader of their party could drive some selection problems when assessing the prototypicality of and attachment to the leader they named. Specifically, it is possible that respondents named a specific leader *because* they believed the leader to be the most archetypal member of the party. Likewise, it is also possible that respondents named the politician to whom they felt the most attached, regardless of whether the politician stood as the leader of the party. The variation in the perceived prototypicality and attachment to the leaders named in the survey assuages some of these concerns. Nevertheless, a survey where respondents rank

each possible leader would be the only way to know.

Validating the Prototypicality and Attachment Measures



Figure 5.1: Factor Analysis with Partisanship, Leader Prototypicality and Leader Attachment Batteries

My validation procedure is as follows. First, I dropped from my data the respondents who did not name a specific leader to their party,[5] which resulted in a remainder of 235 respondents. Next, I rescaled these the prototypicality and attachment items between [1,4] to match the range of values for the partisan identity items. Then, I conducted parallel analysis (Horn 1965; Preacher and MacCallum 2003) by (1) simulating a random data set with n=235[6] and 16 variables[7] each with range=[1,4]; (2) extracting the eigenvalues from the random data and, separately, from the observed data; (3) plotting eigenvalues from the random data and observed data in the plot in Figure 5.1; (4) retaining the maximum number of factors with observed eigenvalues larger than those extracted by the random

[5]This includes respondents who left the question blank, answered “none”, “don’t know”, or whose answers were coded in the “other” category. I offer descriptive comparisons between

[6]The same number of actual respondents in my data.

[7]The same number of total variables for the partisan identity, prototypicality, and leader attachment measures, combined.

data (demarcated by the dashed vertical line in the plot); (5) conducting factor analysis for all 16 variables from the partisanship, prototypicality, and leader attachment measures, allowing for three factors (the number of factors determined in step 4).

Table 5.3: Factor Loadings for Partisanship, Leader Prototypicality, and Leader Attachment Batteries

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
We (Partisanship)	0.7		
Think (Partisanship)	0.34		
Insult (Partisanship)	0.68		
Opinion (Partisanship)	0.52		
Common (Partisanship)	0.56		
Connect (Partisanship)	0.67		
My (Partisanship)	0.7		
Praise (Partisanship)	0.78		
Typ. Pol. (Prototypicality)			0.61
Typ. Supp. (Prototypicality)			0.79
Example (Prototypicality)		0.32	0.72
Common (Prototypicality)		0.31	0.59
Connect (Attachment)		0.74	
Care (Attachment)		0.9	
Left (Attachment)		0.8	
New (Attachment)		0.78	

The factor loadings are included in Table 5.3.[8] The information in parentheses next to each factor indicate the concept that it is intended to measure. As the factor loadings illustrate, the battery of partisanship questions capture a separate factor from both leadership survey instruments. Within the leadership survey instruments, the factors generally load as expected, with the exception of two items with loadings over 0.3 for two factors ("This leader stands for what people in the party have in common"; "This leader is a good example of the kind of people who belong to the party."). However, both of these items have larger factor loadings for Factor 3, together with the other items that are intended to measure prototypicality. Therefore, I include these two items within the

[8]Factor loadings with values less than 0.3 are omitted from the table.

prototypicality factor score (α=0.77) and include the remaining four items loading onto Factor 2 within the attachment score (α=0.88).

Now that I have validated the measures intended to capture prototypicality and leader attachment,[9] I turn to examining the prototypicality respondents' associated with the leaders they named in the survey.

Perceived Prototypicality of Leaders

How prototypical are the leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties? The histograms presented in Figure 5.2 illustrate respondents' perceived prototypicality for the leader they associate with their party. The dashed vertical line represents the mean prototypicality rating for respondents who named that politician as the party leader. Leaders are included in the figure provided that more than ten respondents named them in the survey.



Figure 5.2: Perceived Prototypicality by Leader

As Figure 5.2 illustrates, the prototypicality of each leader is slightly greater than 3 (the maximum of the scale is four), with the exception of Donald Trump. His prototypicality

[9]I also conducted confirmatory factor analysis. These results are available in Appendix D.

appears to be roughly a full point lower than the other leaders. This result fits the conventional wisdom that he appears to be an unconventional Republican as president (Lieberman et al. 2018; Ware 2016). These results also lend some support to the idea that respondents did not simply name the politician that seemed the most prototypical to them, although with existing data it is impossible to determine if this is true.

At this point, it is unclear whether the prototypicality perceptions among respondents are driven by the leaders they named in the survey or by variations in the types of respondents who listed one leader over another. I use an Ordinary-Least Squares model to try to adjudicate between these two possibilities. In the model, I control for respondents' strength of partisan identification, political interest, ideology, age, gender, citizenship status. I also include indicator variables for the five leaders discussed above to see whether, after controlling for demographic differences among respondents, the perceived prototypicality of these leaders[10] differ significantly from one another. The model results are shown in Figure 5.3.

Strength of Partisan Identification: I control for respondents' strength in partisanship to account for the possibility that stronger partisans may have different perceptions than weaker partisans about the prototypical qualities associated with their group. In addition, stronger partisans may associate different politicians as party leaders than weaker partisans. This variable is the factor-based score from the partisan battery that ranges from 1 to 4 where higher values indicate stronger partisan identification.

Political Interest: I control for respondents' political interest to account for the possibility that politically interested respondents are more aware of the prototypical traits associated with their partisan group than politically uninterested respondents.

Ideology: I control for respondents' ideology to account for the possibility that ideologically similar respondents name the same party leader and subsequently assess that leader's prototypicality in the same way, particularly relative to their ideological position.

[10]Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Chuck Schumer, Nancy Pelosi, and Paul Ryan.

This variable ranges from 1 to 7 where higher values indicate the respondent is more conservative.

Age and Gender: I control for respondents' age and gender to account for the possibility that they may make respondents more inclined toward one leader over another.

Citizenship Status: I control for respondents' citizenship status to account for the possibility that U.S. citizens in this sample may be more attentive to U.S. politics or more aware of the prototypical characteristics associated with partisan groups. However, as all students in the sample are enrolled in at least one political science courses, I expect that this would have less of an effect in this population than it would among a general population. This is a binary variable where 1 indicates a citizen of the U.S. and 0, otherwise.

As the results in Figure proto.print illustrate, demographic variation among respondents seemed to bear no effect on the prototypicality they associated with the leader they named in the survey. Partisanship strength is positively and statistically significantly associated with leader prototypicality. After controlling for demographic differences among respondents, it is clear that the prototypicality ratings for Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and Paul Ryan are all statistically significantly different. Specifically, Donald Trump's prototypicality rating is approximately 0.75 lower than the average, whereas Barack Obama's and Paul Ryan's ratings are approximately 0.28 and 0.41 points higher than the average, respectively.

I also examine whether heterogeneous effects among Democrats and Republicans exist. As it is unclear whether any single variable is accountable for variation in the perceptions of the two partisan camps, I run the same analyses on each of the sub-populations separately. The results are reported in Figure 5.4. The results of these analyses largely mirror those from the previous analysis: demographic characteristics appear to bear no statistically significant effect on respondents' leader prototypicality ratings.[11] One

[11]Democratic women tend to rank leaders as slightly more prototypical (0.14) than men, however this effect is only significant at the $p < 0.1$ level.



Figure 5.3: Leader Prototypicality Coefficient Plot

interesting difference, however, is the role of partisanship strength. Among Democrats, partisanship strength has no statistically significant effect on the perceived prototypicality of the leaders; however, for Republicans, a one unit increase in partisanship strength corresponds to a statistically significant 0.51 increase in leader prototypicality ratings.

Leader Attachment

In the previous section, I examined the prototypicality ratings of the main leaders named to the Republican and Democratic parties. Now, I turn to assess the level of attachment respondents profess toward the leaders. The histograms in Figure 5.5 show the distribution and average level of attachment (dashed vertical line) for the main 5 leaders mentioned in the survey. Among the Democratic leaders, attachment toward Barack Obama appears to be nearly a full point higher than attachment toward Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi. Among the Republicans, attachment toward Donald Trump and Paul Ryan looks nearly the same.

Just as with the prototypicality ratings, different types of respondents may have named different leaders, which could then affect the levels of attachment they professed. To



Figure 5.4: Leader Prototypicality: Heterogeneous Effects between Democrats and Republicans

address this possibility, I use an Ordinary-Least Squares model to tease out the effects driven by the specific candidates versus respondents. I control for respondents' partisanship strength, age, gender, citizenship status, political interest, and ideology. I also control for leader prototypicality.

Strength of Partisan Identification: I control for respondents' strength in partisanship as this may be inversely related to leader attachment. Because the nature of the leader attachment items required respondents to compare their inclination toward the leader to their party, it is possible that those with stronger partisan attachment may be less inclined toward feeling attached to any particular leader.

Political Interest: I control for respondents' political interest as those who follow politics more closely may be more aware of leader behavior and activities, which could condition their level of attachment to the politician (Gidengil 2002).

Ideology: I control for respondents' ideology as those who share ideological similarities



Figure 5.5: Respondents' Attachment to Leader

with a specific politician may have been more inclined to name that politician as the leader of the party, subsequently affecting the level of attachment they professed toward the leader.

Age and Gender: I control for respondents' age and gender to account for the possibility that respondents' age or gender may make them more inclined toward one leader over another.

Citizenship Status: I control for respondents' citizenship status to account for the possibility that U.S. citizens in this sample may be more attentive to U.S. politics or more attached to U.S. politicians than non-citizens. However, as all students in the sample are enrolled in political science courses, I expect that this would have less of an effect in this population than it would among a general population.

Leader Prototypicality: I control for leader prototypicality as this may be a key determinant of leader attachment. This expectation relates back to the social identity of leadership theory. While group leaders tend to be looked on more favorably when they exhibit characteristics that are prototypical of the group, this can also engender a certain amount of leeway that fellow group members may grant the leader. In other words, as a leader's prototypicality increases, their ability to represent the group with which they

belong can lead group members to be more inclined toward that leader reframing or shifting the types of attributes associated with group membership, particularly if that leader is new to their leadership position (Abrams et al. 2008; Hogg, Knippenberg, and Rast 2012).



Figure 5.6: Leader Attachment Coefficient Plot

The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 5.6. Again, the demographic variables have no statistically significant effect. However, leader prototypicality is positively and statistically significantly associated with leader attachment. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the prototypicality of a leader corresponds with a 0.27 unit increase in respondents' attachment to the leader, on average. Of particular interest are the results for the individual leaders: naming Barack Obama as the leader corresponds with a 0.36 unit increase in leader attachment; whereas naming Chuck Schumer or Nancy Pelosi result in a 0.75 and 0.72 unit *decrease* in leader attachment, respectively. The two Republican leaders, Donald Trump and Paul Ryan, do not appear to elicit any statistically significant differences in leader attachment as compared to the other leaders named in the survey.

To account again for the possibility that demographic variation, along with prototypicality differences, elicit disparate effects for Democrats and Republicans, I also run the same analyses separately on the two populations. These results are presented in Figure 5.7. Some key differences between the two partisan groups stand out from the



Figure 5.7: Leader Attachment: Heterogeneous Effects between Democrats and Republicans

analysis. In particular, it appears that leader prototypicality plays no role in Democrats' attachment to a leader, but is positively and statistically significantly associated with leader attachment among Republicans. Specifically, a one-unit increase in perceived leader prototypicality corresponds with a 0.54 unit increase in Republicans' leader attachment. Gender also appears to have disparate effects among the two groups. While it bears no effect among Democrats, Republican women indicate statistically significantly lower levels of leader attachment than Republican men (their average level of leader attachment is 0.67 units lower than their male co-partisans). Among Republicans, attachment to Donald Trump and Paul Ryan is also statistically significantly higher than for other leaders. Specifically, those who named Donald Trump as the leader demonstrated, on average, a level of attachment to him that was 1.03 units higher than the remainder of the Republican respondents; and those who named Paul Ryan, 0.86 units higher.

Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter, I reexamined political personalization in the context of voters: their perceptions of party leaders and their attachment to individual politicians. I argued that the personalization literature has overlooked key components of the social identity of leadership. In particular, leader prototypicality encourages positive feelings towards leaders, irrespective of feeling *attached* to a leader to the detriment of group membership. Therefore, I set out to develop measurements of leader prototypicality and leader attachment. I demonstrated that these new measures appropriately measure their corresponding concepts and that these concepts are distinct from partisan attachment.

This chapter also provided insights into the leaders that partisans associate with their party. Surprisingly among Democrats, many could not think of a specific politician that they associated with leading the party and many others explicitly believed that no clear leader existed. Furthermore, the politician most often considered the leader of the Democratic Party, Barack Obama, is a politician who has been largely absent from the political arena since the 2016 presidential election. The lack of leader recognition and continued association between Obama and party leadership could be driven by the timing of the survey (October 2018), where Democratic front-runners of the 2020 presidential campaign had not yet come to the fore. Therefore, additional studies conducted at multiple points in time would help clarify whether the lack of perceived leadership among the Democratic Party is a persistent trend among its partisans. The results among Republicans were less surprising, where Donald Trump and Paul Ryan were the most common politicians that partisans considered to be leaders of the party.

The prototypicality ratings of each party leader revealed some stark differences. Controlling for partisanship and other demographic characteristics, Barack Obama and Paul Ryan appeared to be especially prototypical party leaders, whereas Donald Trump was particularly less prototypical. While this study did not intend to identify *why* certain

leaders were considered more prototypical than others, future research to ascertain whether specific characteristics that partisans associate with their party are mirrored in their party's leader could help address this question. It would be especially interesting to see a study similar to this one run during the height of the 2020 presidential campaign to determine who partisans start to see as their party's leader as election time looms and how leader attachment changes during such a high profile, candidate-centric election period.

Examining the two partisan groups separately revealed that partisanship strength played a role only in Republican's prototypicality evaluations: stronger partisanship was associated with higher prototypicality ratings of the leader. While these results do not point to the specific cause for this relationship, it is possible that stronger Republicans are engaging in some motivated reasoning. For example, they may feel very strongly aligned with their party and, when faced with party leaders that may not encompass all of the necessary characteristics to constitute the party prototype, be inclined to reconfigure those necessary characteristics such that they fit the leader at hand. However, if this were the case, social identity theory would predict that those Republicans would also have to reevaluate their own place in the group in light of these revised characteristics. Therefore, future research to determine the direction of the causal arrow is necessary.

In terms of leader attachment, this study revealed interesting differences between the two partisan groups. First, partisanship was unrelated to leader attachment, lending to the possibility that, while these are separate concepts, they are not directly related to one another. Second, the more prototypical Republican respondents believed the party leader to be, the greater their attachment to that leader. The relationship between prototypicality and leader attachment among Republicans could pose a concern for personalized political behavior among voters. In particular, this relates back to some theoretical expectations in the social identity of leadership theory where group members afford newer leaders with greater latitude to change the narrative about the attributes that make a group member archetypal (Hogg and Reid 2006). This could point to signs that Republican leaders have

started to modify the narrative and subsequently have attracted group members to their own leadership such that they express willingness to follow the leader away from the party. However, this analysis cannot provide definitive proof of this phenomenon and is instead merely suggestive about its existence. Further research into the connection between prototypical leaders and leader attachment is necessary to understand the magnitude of this relationship.

Is politics becoming more personalized for voters? If this phenomenon were of particular concern for any electorate, we would expect it to be most stark within a presidential system where voters are already incentivized to make decisions about their partisanship and behavior based on candidate-centric evaluations. The results presented in this chapter do not necessarily correspond with the pressing concern that some scholars have about this phenomenon. Even if some voters appear to be developing strong attachments to individual party leaders, it is unclear that this is at the expense of their own partisan identity. Furthermore, the average rates of leader attachment among respondents remain lower than their average rates of partisanship strength, across each of the five main leaders discussed in this chapter.[12] However, it is not clear the conditions under which partisans would be more or less inclined to abdicate their partisan ties in favor of a specific politicians *or* how certain politicians have reshaped what it means to be a member of the partisan group, such that voters have already reconfigured their own partisan identification. Therefore, future research that tracks leader attachment over time and experimentally manipulates the conditions under which voters are faced with the opportunity to behavior in a more personalist manner would help shed light on this phenomenon.

While this chapter does not offer a definitive say on the development of personalization in politics, it does provide scholars with a new measure to capture better this phenomenon. One of the key advantages that the leader attachment measure has over other ways that scholars have tried to capture this concept is that this measure is created by requiring

[12]Results not reported here.

individuals to evaluate their feelings toward the leader in comparison to their feelings toward the party. Therefore, as the measurement validation shows, this measure is not conflated with partisan attachment. It also captures individuals' willingness to "follow" the leader should they leave the party – a possibility that would be of key concern to political personalization scholars.

However, the results of the chapter should be interpreted in light of the sample from which they are derived. College students enrolled in political science classes undoubtedly differ from the general electorate in important ways, most obvious of which are political interest, age, and general experience in politics and elections. Furthermore, this study cannot offer any information about trends in political personalization outside of the United States. Therefore, additional research validating the measures proposed in this chapter and tracking leader attachment over time would be fruitful additions to this line of work. Studies using the measure to predict rates of personalist voting could help offer a solution to the mixed results that have popularized this field of study. Examining the role of voters' personalities in their propensity to feel attached toward a leader over a party (Caprara 2007) would help address the relationship between individual characteristics and the manifestation of personalized voting behavior.

Finally, this chapter provided a way forward for operationalizing leader prototypicality and attachment – a necessity for uncovering the compounding consequences of party-label change. Although the United States is arguably somewhat unique in that its parties' labels are especially consistent (at least for Democrats and Republicans), this case demonstrated that leader attachment takes place even in this constant context. In some respects, that is unsurprising, given the electoral system of the United States, as I discussed earlier. Nevertheless, investigating the phenomenon of leader attachment in contexts where the party-label heuristic is less useful could help improve our understanding of voter decision-making, offer another explanation for the perceived persistence of personalization in a comparative perspective, and aid in our conception of voters' political identities.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Review

This dissertation began with a discussion of the various elements of electoral politics that can engender instability and increase the complexity of information environments voters confront. I argued that one of the primary tools that political scientists have found voters to use to simplify this complexity – party-label heuristics – can themselves change due to party relabeling. As a result, one of the hallmarks of information shortcuts in politics can actually lend to greater complexity rather than serve as ways to reduce it. Therefore, I sought to examine (1) the role that these changes play in the knowledge voters have about parties, (2) how voters' partisan identities are shaped by such changes, and (3) the alternative heuristics voters seek out when party-labels are no longer informative.

In Chapter 2, I assessed the relationship between party-label change, voters' information about parties, their voting behavior, and partisanship. Using an original dataset of party-label change in 43 democracies from 1990-2017, I characterize the rate of name changes and demonstrate the frequency of the phenomenon in new and old democracies. Overall, I find that party-name changes inhibit the information that voters have about the party. With less information about such parties, I argue and find that citizens will be less likely to select such parties at the polls and less inclined to declare partisanship to them.

These findings demonstrate that consistency in the electoral menu presented to voters is rarer than may be expected. Additionally, changes to parties' names are not trivial superficialities of electoral politics. They reduce the information that voters have and alter the utility of the party-label heuristic such that these changes are associated with a

decrease in citizens' willingness to vote or identify with these parties. Therefore, scholars of partisanship or voter decision-making to take into account the nature of the electoral environment when assessing variation in these facets of voters.

Chapter 3 investigated the phenomenon of party-label change more deeply using the case of the Party of Democratic Socialism in Germany. In particular, I assessed the consequences of the PDS relabeling for its partisans. In this chapter, I argued that the nature of partisanship does not fit neatly into either of the two predominant perspectives in extant scholarship: an unwavering identity, or a sum of short-term considerations. Instead, political scientists should be more attentive to the object of partisans' attachments in order to understand partisan instability: the political party. I used the case of the PDS to advance an updated theory of partisanship as a social identity, while addressing the observable implications of my theory and those of the revisionist theory of partisanship.

In doing so, I adjudicated between these two theories and also pinned down the causal effect of party relabeling. Overall, I found no evidence in favor of the revisionist perspective of partisanship in this case. Instead, I found that the PDS's decision to change its name, while successful in expanding its electoral based and nearly doubling its vote share from the previous election, ultimately disenchanted its partisans, diminishing their views of political parties, decreasing their willingness to engage with parties in politics, and weakening their partisan attachments. These findings highlight the need to attend to the party side of the partisanship coin to understand better the phenomenon of partisan instability.

Party relabeling is not exclusively a hindrance for voters, however. As Chapter 4 illustrated, again using the case of the PDS in Germany, that political parties can use informative signals in their new names to improve the information that voters have about them. By leveraging variation in the length of time voters were exposed to the party and variation in the new name of the party, I illustrated that the effects party relabeling can be contingent on the amount of time a party has been involved in the electorate and the content of the party's new name. In particular, I found that the relabeling decision

dramatically reduce the variation in voters' placement of the party and, in an appendix analysis, also improved voters' familiarity with the party.

Finally, Chapter 5 began to address the types of heuristics that voters might come to rely on once party labels are no longer meaningful information shortcuts, namely, party leaders. Using the case of the United States, I validated two new survey measures: (1) leader prototypicality and (2) leader attachment. These measures offer new ways to operationalize political personalization without conflating the phenomenon with partisanship or leader affect.

Future Work

This dissertation offered some initial steps for identifying the role of party-label change in voter information and behavior, reevaluating partisanship; and understanding the relationship between party leaders, parties, and voters. In offering some answers to my initial research agenda, this line of study also opens new questions for examination that fell outside the scope of the dissertation.

First, how do voters adapt to frequent instability in the names that parties present to them? Although Chapter 2 identified some distinctions for the manifestation of party-relabeling consequences in new and old democracies, it could not assess how the persistent occurrence of relabeling affects voters over time. It would be interesting to discern whether voters in these contexts adapt such that the party-label heuristic's utility diminishes and, instead, voters rely on other heuristics to reason about their party options. Chapter 5 offered a new direction for heuristics in these contexts and provided new measures to capture voters' leader attachment and their perceptions of the typicality of a leader relative to the political party.

Second, how does partisanship, leader prototypicality, and leader attachment affect one another in contexts outside of the United States? Although the purpose of Chapter 5 was to develop measures of the two latter concepts and not quantify its existence in a variety of

electoral contexts, it is important to note that the substantive findings from the U.S. sample are difficult to generalize to other contexts – particularly those with different electoral incentives and constraints. Regardless, these measures provide scholars with the opportunity to better capture these phenomena and start to address more directly the concerns relating to leader attachment usurping partisan identity in voter decision-making.

Third, what is the causal relationship between party relabeling and voter behavior? Chapter 3 started to address this question in the context of partisan stability among PDS-partisans in Germany. The answers to this question were likely fairly unique to the party being examined: an unexpected call for early federal elections and a rogue politician making an unanticipated statement to the media about a coalition initiated the party to consider changing how it presented itself to voters. To better understand the overall phenomenon of party-label change, attending to the endogeneity between partisan attachment, anticipated electoral outcomes, and the strategic incentives parties face to revamp themselves must be accounted for.

Fourth, how do the names that parties choose signal information to voters? Chapter 4 provided an initial examination of this question in the context of a party in Germany. However, the dataset that I introduced in Chapter 2 provides a rich source of information to address this question more broadly. In particular, it would be valuable to compare the types of information conveyed in a party's old label with the information conveyed in its new label. Although I provided an aggregate, descriptive examination of the words that parties use in their labels (both old, new, and unchanged), additional work specifically on old and new party-name pairs would be valuable for further understanding this phenomenon.

Fifth, how does party relabeling alter voters' ballot-box decisions. Chapter 2 provided a first cut at this question, demonstrating that, on average, party relabeling is associated with a decreased willingness among voters in old democracies to vote for such parties. There are many worthwhile extensions to be made to those analyses. In particular,

examining the relationship between party relabeling and voters' propensities to switch their votes (particularly among those who voted for a party prior to its relabeling) could help us better understand how party relabeling affects voters' decision-making. Furthermore, time series analyses that account for compounding party relabeling in a given country could help us understand the nuances of this phenomenon rather than the average, aggregated effects.

APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2

A.1 Description of Coding Process

As discussed in the main text, the unit of observation for the party-label change dataset is a country's party-election year. I use the coding of Belgium's 2003 election as a guiding example throughout this description of the coding process (presented in Table C.1). The *ID* column is included for ease of reference to observations in this discussion. The column labeled $t-1$ represents the previous election year, whereas the column labeled t, the current election year (in this case, 2003). *Party* $(t-1)$ is the name of the party during the 1999 election, and *Party* (t), the name during the 2003 election.

Name Chg. is coded as 1 if the observation's name differs between *Party* $(t-1)$ and *Party* (t). Here, seven parties' names differed between 1999 and 2003, found in IDs 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13. *Full Chg.* is coded as 1 if none of the substantive words in the party label at time $t-1$ were included in the party label at time t. For example, the Flemish Christian People's Party's (ID 1) name changed to Christian Democratic & Flemish by the 2003 election. Because both names included the "Christian" in their labels, this is not coded as a full change. Whereas, the Christian Social Party (ID 5) changed its name to Humanist Democratic Center for the 2003 election. As these labels differ entirely from one another, this was coded as a full change. *Partial Chg.* is coded 1 provided that at least one of the substantive words in the party label at time t were included in the party label at time $t-1$, like the Flemish Christian People's Party's name change.

Struct. Chg. is coded as 1 if the party underwent any structural change subsequently

coded in the data (e.g. new party, disbanded, merged, entered or exited a joint-list, split from an existing party). This category is not mutually exclusive from the name change variables. In other words, if a party changed its name *and* underwent a structural change, both *Name Chg.* and *Struct. Chg.* will be coded as one. For example, People's Union split into two parties in 2003: New Flemish Alliance (ID 8) and Spirit (ID 9). Therefore, *Struct. Chg.* is coded as 1 for both observations in the dataset.

New is coded as 1 so long as the party existed by time t but did not exist at time $t-1$. Parties that participated in mergers or underwent a split are not coded as new. *Disb.* is coded as 1 provided that the party existed at time $t-1$ but ceased to exist by the election at time t. Similar to new parties, this variable is intended to capture parties that no longer participated in elections in any form; therefore, joint list exits, and constituent parties of mergers are not coded as disbanded. No new parties or disbanded parties exist in the data for Belgium's 2003 election.

Merger is coded as 1 if the party at time $t-1$ merged with another party by time t. This includes instances where two parties merged together to form a newly named party and situations where as party acquired another one under its same name. For example, the Francophone Democratic Front (ID 10) and the Liberal Reformation Party (ID 11) merged by 2003 to form the Reformists' Movement. Each of these observations are coded as 1 under *Merger*. Because both parties also underwent a name change as a result of the merger, *Name Chg.* is also coded as 1.

JL Entry is coded as 1 provided that the party at time t entered into a joint-list agreement with another party after time $t-1$ for the election at time t. For example, Spirit (ID 9) and Socialist Party – Different (ID 13) entered into a joint-list for the 2003 election; therefore, both parties are coded as 1 under this variable. It is important to note that these structural changes are not generally mutually exclusive categories.[1] If a party

[1]The only exception here is a logical one wherein a disbanded party cannot opt to enter a joint-list, merge with another party, split from a previous party, or emerge as "new" on the electoral scene.

mergers with another before time t *and* consequently leaves a prior joint-list agreement, both *Merger* and *JL Exit* would be coded as 1.

JL Exit is coded as 1 provided that the party at time t exited a joint-list agreement that it had been in for the election at time $t-1$. *Split* is coded as 1 provided that the party at time t was created as the result of party members splintering off from its parent party after time $t-1$. Spirit (ID 9) is an example of a party that split from its predecessor (People's Union); between this time period, the prior joint-list agreement between the People's Union and ID21 was also dissolved. Therefore, *JL Exit* is also coded as one. Finally, because Spirit entered a joint-list with Socialist Party – Different, as mentioned above, *JL Entry* is also coded as one. The other main component of the People's Union split was the New Flemish Alliance (ID 8), which was also coded as one for *JL Exit* and *Split* for the same reasons as Spirit.

As this example illustrates, different types of structural changes can occur in conjunction with one another and I code them accordingly. Therefore, the description of party-label changes and structural changes from this dataset represent somewhat of an upper bound of these changes (conditional on the party receiving at least 1% of the vote in the previous election, or current one for *new* parties). I chose this manner of coding as I believe it most closely approximates the reality that voters face. For example, a joint-list between two parties could be their pick in the previous election, only for voters to see that, not only does that joint-list no longer exist, but the constituent parties are no longer options on the ballot.

Table A.1: Coding Example (Belgium's 2003 election)

ID	t-1	t	Party (t-1)	Party (t)	Name Chg.	Full Chg.	Part. Chg.	Struct. Chg.	New	Disb.	Merger	JL Entry	JL Exit	Split
1	1999	2003	Flemish Christian People's Party	Christian Democratic and Flemish	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	1999	2003	Flemish Block	Flemish Block	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	1999	2003	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	1999	2003	Francophone Ecologists	Francophone Ecologists	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	1999	2003	Christian Social Party	Humanist Democratic Center	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	1999	2003	Live Differently (AGALEV)	Live Differently (AGALEV)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	1999	2003	National Front	National Front	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table A.1: Coding Example (Belgium's 2003 election) *(continued)*

ID	t-1	t	Party (t-1)	Party (t)	Name Chg.	Full Chg.	Part. Chg.	Struct. Chg.	New	Disb.	Merger	JL Entry	JL Exit	Split
8	1999	2003	People's Union	New Flemish Alliance	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
9	1999	2003	People's Union	Spirit	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
10	1999	2003	Francophone Democratic Front	Reformists' Movement	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
11	1999	2003	Liberal Reformation Party	Reformists' Movement	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
12	1999	2003	Socialist Party (French)	Socialist Party (French)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	1999	2003	Socialist Party (Flemish)	Socialist Party – Different	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
14	1999	2003	Vivant	Vivant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3

B1. Testing the Common Trends Assumption: Attitudes toward Parties Analyses

Table B.1: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. Greens Partisans (1998-2002)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	2.77^{***}	2.56^{***}	2.57^{***}	2.57^{***}	2.55^{***}	2.62^{***}	2.49^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.20)
2002	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Prior PDS Part.	-0.25^{***}	-0.25^{***}	-0.25^{**}	-0.25^{**}	-0.26^{**}	-0.25^{**}	-0.24^{**}
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
2002 x Prior PDS Part.	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Pol. Int.		0.06^{*}	0.06^{*}	0.06^{*}	0.06^{*}	0.07^{*}	0.06^{*}
		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideol. (norm)			-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Gender				0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age					0.00	0.00	-0.00
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Edu.						-0.02	-0.02
						(0.02)	(0.02)
Income							0.03^{***}
							(0.01)
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.07
Num. obs.	720	708	698	698	698	670	582
RMSE	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.55

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table B.2: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. SPD Partisans (1998-2002)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	2.70^{***}	2.48^{***}	2.71^{***}	2.72^{***}	2.76^{***}	2.61^{***}	2.45^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)
2002	0.09^{**}	0.08^{*}	0.08^{*}	0.08^{*}	0.08^{*}	0.10^{*}	0.14^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prior PDS Part.	-0.18^{**}	-0.19^{***}	-0.25^{***}	-0.25^{***}	-0.25^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.24^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
2002 x Prior PDS Part.	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Pol. Int.		0.07^{***}	0.05^{**}	0.05^{**}	0.05^{**}	$0.03^{\dagger}$	0.03
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideol. (norm)			-0.04^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.03^{**}
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Gender				−0.00	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age					−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Edu.						0.05^{**}	0.04^{**}
						(0.01)	(0.02)
Income							0.02^{***}
							(0.01)
R^2	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
Num. obs.	1817	1775	1734	1734	1734	1570	1359
RMSE	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.56

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B2. Model Output: Attitudes toward Parties Analysis

Table B.3: Partisans' Attitudes about Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	2.89***	2.52***	2.53***	2.34***	2.27***
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)
2005	0.30***	0.29***	0.27***	0.27***	0.25**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Prior PDS Part.	−0.27***	−0.28***	−0.31***	−0.29***	−0.25***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Prior SPD Part.	−0.05	−0.03	−0.02	0.02	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	−0.27*	−0.26*	−0.27*	−0.28*	−0.43**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
2005 x Prior SPD Part.	−0.13	−0.13	−0.07	−0.07	−0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Pol. Int.		0.10***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideol. (std.)			−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.03*
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Edu.				0.05**	0.03*
				(0.01)	(0.02)
Income					0.02***
					(0.01)
R^2	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09
Num. obs.	1871	1858	1669	1668	1380
RMSE	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.59

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B3. Robustness Checks: Attitudes toward Parties Analyses

B3.1. Keeping Party Switchers (Attitudes toward Parties)

Table B.4: PDS Partisans' Attitudes about Parties (compared to Greens Partisans)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	2.85^{***}	2.65^{***}	2.62^{***}	2.44^{***}	2.28^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.16)
2005	0.25^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.24^{***}	0.19^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Prior PDS Part.	-0.21^{***}	-0.20^{***}	-0.20^{**}	-0.18^{**}	-0.13^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.22^{*}	-0.22^{*}	$-0.21^{\dagger}$	-0.23^{*}	-0.31^{**}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Pol. Int.		0.06^{*}	0.06^{*}	$0.06^{\dagger}$	0.07^{*}
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideol. (norm)			0.01	0.01	$0.03^{\dagger}$
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Edu.				$0.04^{\dagger}$	0.02
				(0.02)	(0.03)
Income					0.04^{***}
					(0.01)
R^2	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.13
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.12
Num. obs.	685	680	621	619	512
RMSE	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.57

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table B.5: PDS Partisans' Attitudes about Parties (compared to SPD Partisans)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	2.79^{***}	2.53^{***}	2.57^{***}	2.33^{***}	2.30^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
2005	0.17^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.15^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Prior PDS Part.	-0.14^{**}	-0.16^{***}	-0.21^{***}	-0.24^{***}	-0.22^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.14	-0.14	$-0.17^{\dagger}$	$-0.17^{\dagger}$	-0.24^{*}
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Pol. Int.		0.07^{***}	0.06^{***}	0.05^{**}	$0.03^{\dagger}$
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideol. (norm)			-0.03^{***}	-0.03^{**}	-0.02^{*}
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Edu.				0.07^{***}	0.06^{***}
				(0.01)	(0.02)
Income					0.02^{***}
					(0.01)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07
Num. obs.	1905	1885	1661	1660	1360
RMSE	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.61

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B3.2. Separate Analyses by Comparison Group (Attitudes toward Parties): Greens, SPD

Table B.6: PDS Partisans' Attitudes about Parties Compared to Greens Partisans

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	2.89^{***}	2.67^{***}	2.69^{***}	2.56^{***}	2.41^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.18)
2005	0.30^{***}	0.29^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.23^{**}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Prior PDS Part.	-0.27^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.27^{***}	-0.26^{***}	-0.18^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.27^{*}	-0.27^{*}	-0.27^{*}	-0.27^{*}	-0.41^{**}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Pol. Int.		0.06^{*}	$0.06^{\dagger}$	0.05	$0.06^{\dagger}$
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideol. (std.)			-0.00	0.00	0.02
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Edu.				0.03	0.01
				(0.02)	(0.03)
Income					0.03^{***}
					(0.01)
R^2	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.16
Adj. R^2	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.15
Num. obs.	566	561	521	521	432
RMSE	0.58	0.58	0.59	0.59	0.57

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table B.7: PDS Partisans' Attitudes about Parties Compared to SPD Partisans

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	2.84^{***}	2.52^{***}	2.55^{***}	2.36^{***}	2.28^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)
2005	0.17^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.18^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prior PDS Part.	-0.22^{***}	-0.26^{***}	-0.31^{***}	-0.35^{***}	-0.33^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.13	-0.13	$-0.19^{\dagger}$	$-0.19^{\dagger}$	-0.42^{**}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Pol. Int.		0.09^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.07^{**}
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideol. (std.)			-0.04^{***}	-0.03^{**}	-0.03^{**}
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Edu.				0.05^{***}	0.04^{*}
				(0.02)	(0.02)
Income					0.02^{***}
					(0.01)
R^2	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.09
Num. obs.	1497	1484	1326	1325	1096
RMSE	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.60

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B3.3. Raw Ideology instead of Standardized Ideology Score as a Control (Attitudes toward Parties)

Table B.8: Partisans' Attitudes about Parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	2.89^{***}	2.52^{***}	2.70^{***}	2.46^{***}	2.38^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)
2005	0.30^{***}	0.29^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.25^{**}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Prior PDS Part.	-0.27^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.32^{***}	-0.30^{***}	-0.27^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Prior SPD Part.	-0.05	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.27^{*}	-0.26^{*}	-0.25^{*}	-0.25^{*}	-0.38^{**}
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
2005 x Prior SPD Part.	-0.13	-0.13	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Pol. Int.		0.10^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.08^{***}
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideol. (raw)			-0.03^{***}	-0.03^{***}	-0.03^{**}
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Edu.				0.05^{***}	0.04^{**}
				(0.01)	(0.01)
Income					0.02^{***}
					(0.00)
R^2	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.10
Num. obs.	1871	1858	1825	1824	1512
RMSE	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.59

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B4. Testing the Common Trends Assumption: Engagement with Parties

Table B.9: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. SPD Partisans (1998-2002)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.21^{***}	2.45^{***}	2.93^{***}	3.00^{***}	3.77^{***}	3.21^{***}	3.29^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.26)
2002	-0.16^{*}	-0.19^{**}	-0.18^{*}	-0.18^{*}	-0.15^{*}	-0.04	$-0.15^{\dagger}$
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Prior PDS Part.	$0.22^{\dagger}$	0.15	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.08	-0.07
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.14)
2002 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.15	-0.15	-0.16	-0.15	-0.16	-0.25	-0.10
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Pol. Int.		0.23^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.23^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.19^{***}
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ideol. (norm)			-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.07^{***}
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender				-0.07	-0.12^{*}	-0.10	-0.15^{*}
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age					-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Edu.						0.11^{***}	0.08^{**}
						(0.03)	(0.03)
Income							0.04^{***}
							(0.01)
R^2	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.09
Num. obs.	2259	2190	2111	2111	2111	1924	1648
RMSE	1.32	1.30	1.29	1.29	1.26	1.25	1.23

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table B.10: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. Eastern Apartisans (1998-2002)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	2.86^{***}	2.08^{***}	2.56^{***}	2.51^{***}	3.21^{***}	2.62^{***}	2.70^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.32)
2002	-0.21^{*}	-0.21^{*}	-0.18^{*}	-0.18^{*}	$-0.16^{\dagger}$	-0.17	-0.16
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Prior PDS Part.	0.58^{***}	0.43^{***}	0.31^{*}	0.32^{*}	0.28^{*}	0.21	0.21
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)
2002 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.10	-0.14	-0.15	-0.16	-0.16	-0.14	-0.13
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Pol. Int.		0.26^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.23^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.28^{***}	0.25^{***}
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ideol. (norm)			-0.07^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.07^{**}
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender				0.05	0.03	0.05	-0.01
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age					-0.02^{***}	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{***}
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Edu.						0.11^{**}	0.06
						(0.04)	(0.04)
Income							0.04^{***}
							(0.01)
R^2	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.12	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.11	0.11
Num. obs.	1483	1402	1321	1321	1321	1185	1008
RMSE	1.31	1.28	1.27	1.27	1.25	1.23	1.22

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table B.11: Parallel Trends: PDS vs. Leftwing Apartisans (1998-2002)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.17^{***}	2.34^{***}	2.67^{***}	2.64^{***}	2.94^{***}	2.02^{***}	2.12^{***}
	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.53)	(0.59)
2002	−0.16	−0.26	−0.21	−0.21	−0.13	0.07	0.12
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Prior PDS Part.	0.26	0.06	−0.00	0.00	0.08	0.22	0.31
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.36)
2002 x Prior PDS Part.	−0.15	−0.09	−0.13	−0.13	−0.20	−0.38	−0.42
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.39)
Pol. Int.		0.29^{***}	0.26^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.29^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.28^{***}
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Ideol. (norm)			$-0.05^{\dagger}$	$-0.05^{\dagger}$	-0.06^{*}	−0.04	−0.05
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender				0.02	−0.02	0.01	−0.08
				(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Age					-0.01^{*}	$-0.01^{\dagger}$	-0.01^{*}
					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Edu.						0.16^{**}	0.07
						(0.06)	(0.06)
Income							0.05^{*}
							(0.02)
R^2	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.08
Num. obs.	594	571	561	561	561	526	459
RMSE	1.30	1.27	1.27	1.27	1.27	1.26	1.22

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B5. Model Output: Engagement with Parties

Table B.12: PDS Partisans' Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(Intercept)	3.04^{***}	2.37^{***}	2.39^{***}	3.14^{***}	3.23^{***}	2.68^{***}	2.69^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.20)
2005	0.53^{***}	0.48^{***}	0.52^{***}	0.58^{***}	0.58^{***}	0.58^{***}	0.57^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Prior PDS Part.	0.07	0.00	−0.12	−0.10	−0.11	$-0.17^{\dagger}$	−0.14
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
W/L apart.	−0.03	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.01	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
East apart.	-0.40^{***}	-0.31^{***}	-0.23^{***}	-0.21^{**}	-0.20^{**}	-0.21^{**}	-0.26^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.38^{*}	$-0.36^{\dagger}$	$-0.34^{\dagger}$	$-0.37^{\dagger}$	$-0.36^{\dagger}$	$-0.36^{\dagger}$	−0.36
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)
2005 x w/l apart.	0.03	0.02	−0.01	−0.10	−0.11	−0.13	−0.20
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.27)
2005 x east. apart.	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.13
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Pol. Int.		0.20^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.24^{***}	0.21^{***}	0.23^{***}
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideol. (norm)			-0.07^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.06^{***}	-0.05^{**}
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender				-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age					$-0.10^{\dagger}$	$-0.10^{\dagger}$	−0.09
					(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Edu.						0.13^{***}	0.11^{***}
						(0.02)	(0.03)
Income							$0.02^{\dagger}$
							(0.01)
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12
Num. obs.	3437	3351	2804	2802	2802	2802	2300
RMSE	1.38	1.36	1.33	1.30	1.30	1.29	1.29

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B6. Robustness Checks: Engagement with Parties

B6.1. Keeping Party Switchers (Engagement with Parties)

Table B.13: PDS Partisans' Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(Intercept)	3.04***	2.37***	2.39***	3.14***	3.23***	2.68***	2.69***
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.20)
2005	0.53***	0.48***	0.52***	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***	0.57***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Prior PDS Part.	0.07	0.00	−0.12	−0.10	−0.11	−0.17†	−0.14
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
W/L apart.	−0.03	0.01	0.05	0.00	0.01	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
East apart.	−0.40***	−0.31***	−0.23***	−0.21**	−0.20**	−0.21**	−0.26***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	−0.38*	−0.36†	−0.34†	−0.37†	−0.36†	−0.36†	−0.36
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)
2005 x w/l apart.	0.03	0.02	−0.01	−0.10	−0.11	−0.13	−0.20
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.27)
2005 x east. apart.	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.13
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Pol. Int.		0.20***	0.20***	0.25***	0.24***	0.21***	0.23***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideol. (norm)			−0.07***	−0.07***	−0.07***	−0.06***	−0.05**
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender				−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02***
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age					−0.10†	−0.10†	−0.09
					(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Edu.						0.13***	0.11***
						(0.02)	(0.03)
Income							0.02†
							(0.01)
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12
Num. obs.	3437	3351	2804	2802	2802	2802	2300
RMSE	1.38	1.36	1.33	1.30	1.30	1.29	1.29

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B6.2. Separate Analyses by Comparison Group (Engagement with Parties): SPD, Eastern Apartisans, Leftwing Apartisans

Table B.14: PDS Partisans' Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party (compared to SPD Partisans)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.09^{***}	2.43^{***}	2.46^{***}	3.41^{***}	3.59^{***}	3.25^{***}	3.19^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.26)
2005	0.53^{***}	0.49^{***}	0.52^{***}	0.59^{***}	0.59^{***}	0.59^{***}	0.57^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Prior PDS Part.	0.11	0.02	−0.06	−0.04	−0.04	−0.09	−0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	$-0.37^{\dagger}$	$-0.36^{\dagger}$	-0.45^{*}	-0.45^{*}	-0.42^{*}	-0.42^{*}	$-0.47^{\dagger}$
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.25)
Pol. Int.		0.19^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.24^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.21^{***}	0.22^{***}
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ideol. (norm)			-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.08^{***}	$-0.04^{\dagger}$
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Gender				-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age					-0.17^{*}	-0.16^{*}	$-0.14^{\dagger}$
					(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Edu.						0.07^{*}	0.05
						(0.03)	(0.03)
Income							0.02
							(0.01)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Num. obs.	1865	1839	1588	1588	1588	1588	1313
RMSE	1.36	1.35	1.32	1.28	1.28	1.28	1.28

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table B.15: PDS Partisans' Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party (compared to Eastern Apartisans)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	2.64^{***}	1.93^{***}	2.07^{***}	2.67^{***}	2.67^{***}	2.09^{***}	2.15^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.31)
2005	0.69^{***}	0.63^{***}	0.65^{***}	0.69^{***}	0.69^{***}	0.69^{***}	0.72^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Prior PDS Part.	0.47^{***}	0.30^{**}	0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.06
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	-0.54^{**}	-0.51^{*}	-0.46^{*}	-0.48^{*}	-0.48^{*}	-0.48^{*}	-0.51^{*}
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.23)
Pol. Int.		0.24^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.29^{***}	0.29^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.24^{***}
		(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ideol. (norm)			-0.10^{***}	-0.11^{***}	-0.11^{***}	-0.10^{***}	-0.08^{**}
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Gender				-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{***}
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age					-0.00	0.02	0.04
					(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Edu.						0.13^{**}	0.10^{*}
						(0.04)	(0.05)
Income							0.03
							(0.02)
R^2	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.10
Num. obs.	1223	1177	976	974	974	974	821
RMSE	1.37	1.35	1.32	1.30	1.30	1.29	1.29

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table B.16: PDS Partisans' Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party (compared to Left-Wing Apartisans)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	3.01^{***}	2.38^{***}	2.46^{***}	2.66^{***}	2.44^{***}	1.42^{**}	1.43^{**}
	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.44)	(0.48)
2005	0.55^{**}	0.50^{*}	0.52^{*}	0.50^{*}	0.52^{*}	0.50^{*}	0.41
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.26)
Prior PDS Part.	0.11	−0.00	−0.10	−0.09	−0.07	−0.09	−0.00
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	−0.40	−0.38	−0.35	−0.32	−0.37	−0.35	−0.23
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.32)
Pol. Int.		0.20^{**}	0.19^{**}	0.23^{**}	0.25^{**}	0.20^{*}	0.26^{**}
		(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Ideol. (norm)			−0.02	−0.03	−0.02	0.02	0.04
			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Gender				−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age					0.17	$0.23^{\dagger}$	0.18
					(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Edu.						0.24^{***}	0.17^{**}
						(0.06)	(0.06)
Income							0.05^{*}
							(0.02)
R^2	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.06
Num. obs.	554	540	464	464	464	464	394
RMSE	1.35	1.34	1.34	1.34	1.34	1.32	1.29

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B6.3. Raw Ideology instead of Standardized Ideology Score as a Control (Engagement with Parties)

Table B.17: PDS Partisans' Likelihood of Soliciting Help from Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(Intercept)	3.04***	2.37***	2.83***	3.65***	3.76***	3.21***	3.28***
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.21)
2005	0.53***	0.48***	0.46***	0.52***	0.52***	0.52***	0.50***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Prior PDS Part.	0.07	0.00	−0.11	−0.11	−0.11	−0.17†	−0.16†
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
W/L apart.	−0.03	0.01	0.01	−0.07	−0.06	−0.07	−0.10
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)
East apart.	−0.40***	−0.31***	−0.30***	−0.27***	−0.27***	−0.27***	−0.27***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	−0.38*	−0.36†	−0.33†	−0.35†	−0.34†	−0.34†	−0.33
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)
2005 x w/l apart.	0.03	0.02	0.04	−0.03	−0.05	−0.07	−0.13
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.26)
2005 x east. apart.	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.17
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Pol. Int.		0.20***	0.17***	0.23***	0.22***	0.18***	0.19***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideol. (raw)			−0.07***	−0.07***	−0.07***	−0.06***	−0.06***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Gender				−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02***	−0.02***
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age					−0.11*	−0.11*	−0.12*
					(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Edu.						0.12***	0.09***
						(0.02)	(0.03)
Income							0.02**
							(0.01)
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12
Num. obs.	3437	3351	3181	3179	3179	3179	2589
RMSE	1.38	1.36	1.35	1.32	1.32	1.31	1.30

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B7. Placebo Test: Attitudes toward Politics and Society

If PDS-partisans' attitudes were undergoing a shift between 2002 and 2005 unrelated to the PDS-label change, I expect that this shift should also be reflected in their feelings about politics and society more generally. Similar to the party responsiveness variable, I constructed a measure of respondents' efficacy using the six questions from the "Efficacy" section of the GLES. These items followed the prompt:

> "Here is a list of often-heard opinions about politics and society in Germany. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, rather agree, neither agree nor disagree, rather disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements."

1. People like me do not have any influence on the government.
2. The Members of the Bundestag try to get in close contact with the population.
3. Everyone should have the right to defend their own views.
4. Politics is such a complex issue that people like me cannot understand what is going on.
5. Democracy will not work without a political opposition.
6. In a democracy it is the duty of all citizens to vote regularly in elections.

I also test for any statistical differences in the change in respondents' attitudes from 1998-2002 as well as 2002-2005. The results show that PDS partisans' change in attitudes about politics and society are statistically indistinguishable from the change in any other groups' attitudes, both from 1998-2002 and 2002-2005, except for SPD partisans in 1998-2002, as the figures also show.

Table B.18: Efficacy: Common Trends (1998-2002)

	Apart. East.	Left-Wing Apart.	Greens	SPD
(Intercept)	3.04^{***}	3.18^{***}	3.30^{***}	2.98^{***}
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.09)
2002	$-0.08^{\dagger}$	-0.16^{*}	0.01	0.13^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Prior PDS Part.	−0.05	$-0.16^{\dagger}$	−0.10	−0.02
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Pol. Int.	0.11^{***}	0.13^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.10^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideol. (norm)	-0.02^{**}	−0.01	$-0.02^{\dagger}$	$-0.01^{\dagger}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Edu.	0.04^{**}	0.02	−0.01	0.04^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Income	0.01	−0.00	0.01	$0.01^{\dagger}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
2002 x Prior PDS Part.	0.06	0.12	−0.07	-0.15^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
R^2	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.09
Num. obs.	606	372	412	973
RMSE	0.39	0.37	0.37	0.39

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table B.19: Efficacy among PDS Partisans and Comparison Group (2002-2005)

	Apart. East.	Left-Wing Apart.	Greens	SPD
(Intercept)	2.90^{***}	3.07^{***}	3.25^{***}	3.02^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.07)
2005	0.18^{***}	0.20^{**}	0.27^{***}	0.15^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Prior PDS Part.	0.01	−0.03	-0.15^{***}	-0.18^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pol. Int.	0.12^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.12^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Ideol. (norm)	-0.02^{*}	−0.01	$-0.02^{\dagger}$	-0.02^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Edu.	0.05^{**}	0.03	0.01	0.05^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Income	0.01	−0.00	0.02^{**}	0.01^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
2005 x Prior PDS Part.	−0.03	−0.05	−0.11	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
R^2	0.14	0.11	0.26	0.16
Adj. R^2	0.13	0.10	0.25	0.15
Num. obs.	599	404	471	1287
RMSE	0.41	0.39	0.36	0.41

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B8. Distribution of Prior PDS Partisans' Perception of Ideological Change in the Party



Figure B.1: Distribution of Prior PDS Partisans' Perception of the PDS's Ideological Change between 2002 and 2005

B9. Model Output: Propensity to Declare PDS Partisanship

Table B.20: Propensity to Declare PDS Partisanship

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	-0.25	0.80	0.51	0.56	-0.25
	(0.50)	(0.59)	(0.72)	(0.74)	(0.88)
East	$0.96^{\dagger}$	1.52^{*}	1.52^{*}	1.54^{*}	1.49^{*}
	(0.56)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.61)
Coop. Agmt.	-0.73	-0.20	-0.17	-0.20	-0.29
	(0.84)	(0.89)	(0.89)	(0.90)	(0.90)
Coop. Agmt. and Name	0.84	$1.33^{\dagger}$	$1.34^{\dagger}$	1.32	$1.44^{\dagger}$
	(0.75)	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.82)
East x Coop. Agmt.	0.65	-0.18	-0.22	-0.20	-0.12
	(0.91)	(0.97)	(0.97)	(0.97)	(0.98)
East x Coop. Agmt. and Name	-1.10	$-1.71^{\dagger}$	$-1.75^{\dagger}$	$-1.74^{\dagger}$	-1.94^{*}
	(0.84)	(0.90)	(0.90)	(0.90)	(0.91)
Ideol.		-0.32^{***}	-0.32^{***}	-0.31^{***}	-0.31^{***}
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Edu.			0.07	0.07	0.08
			(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Gender				-0.12	-0.12
				(0.30)	(0.30)
Age (cat.)					$0.11^{\dagger}$
					(0.07)
AIC	330.32	293.91	294.97	296.80	295.92
BIC	351.36	318.13	322.61	327.90	330.47
Log Likelihood	-159.16	-139.96	-139.48	-139.40	-137.96
Deviance	318.32	279.91	278.97	278.80	275.92
Num. obs.	246	235	234	234	234

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B10. Total Number of News Stories with Keywords by Weeks in the Politbarometer

Table B.21: Number of News Stories by Keyword

Until	PDS + WASG	Angela Merkel	SPD	Election (Bundestagswahl)
May 25, 2005	157	871	2226	475
June 9, 2005	402	2306	5802	1371
June 23, 2005	958	3288	9426	2177

Note: Number of articles identified through Nexis Uni.

B11. Predicting Partisanship in the Politbarometer Sample (Control Week)

Table B.22: Predictors of Partisanship in Control Group (full sample)

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	-3.67^{***}	-4.33^{***}
	(0.53)	(0.89)
East	2.09^{***}	2.02^{***}
	(0.44)	(0.45)
PDS Vote in 2002	4.32^{***}	4.29^{***}
	(0.34)	(0.35)
Ideology	-0.40^{***}	-0.39^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Age (cat.)		0.08
		(0.07)
Gender		0.03
		(0.35)
Education		0.05
		(0.12)
AIC	271.86	276.41
BIC	293.20	313.69
Log Likelihood	-131.93	-131.21
Deviance	263.86	262.41
Num. obs.	1532	1518

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

B12. PDS / Linkspartei.PDS Ideology Over Time

One concern regarding the PDS-name change is that the party *did* undergo an ideological change that altered the way the voters saw the party. Figure 1 in the main text illustrates that PDS-partisans' perception of the party's ideological position did not significantly differ from 2002 to 2005. However, it is still possible that the party did, in fact, modify its ideological stance in ways that were not perceptible from the German survey data. Therefore, I include information about the party's ideological stance in 2002 and in 2005 according to the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The CMP classifies party manifestos across electoral periods; therefore any change in the party's ideological position as indicated by their manifestos will be captured with these data. The left-right position computed from classifying the manifestos ranges from -100 to 100, where -100 indicates the left-most party and 100, the right-most. The CHES relies on expert judgements of parties and, following a series of issue position questions, creates a composite left-right ideological score ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates the left-most party and 10, the right-most. I rescaled the CMP left-right score to 0 to 10 for comparison with the CHES.



Figure B.2: Ideological Position of PDS (before and after label-change)

As Figure B.2 shows, the PDS underwent a small leftward ideological change from 2002 to after the name change (for the CMP, 2005; for the CHES, the party was not coded until 2006). This small change was not captured by PDS partisans. Interestingly, this change *was* identified by non-partisans, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. I do not anticipate that this is a reflection of ignorance among PDS partisans; instead, that non-partisans identified a leftward shift in the party is likely a reflection of the informativeness of the new party label rather than politically attentive voters.

APPENDIX C

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4

As a complement to the analyses in Chapter 2 that assessed the relationship between party relabeling and voters' unfamiliarity with parties' ideologies, I conduct the same analysis here on the Germany sample, using voters' responses to placing only the PDS's ideology. Separating these voters into the three groups I described in this chapter, I find that the PDS's relabeling decision improved voters' familiarity with its ideology across the board. Note that this sample excludes partisans, as I expect that they would be distinct from other voters in their familiarity with the party.

	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3	Model C4	Model C5
2005	-0.05^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.03^{***}	-0.03^{***}	-0.03^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Western States	0.06^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.06^{***}	0.07^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Western .PDS States	0.08^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.08^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
2005 x Western States	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03^{**}	-0.03^{**}	-0.04^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
2005 x Western .PDS States	-0.04^{*}	-0.06^{***}	-0.07^{***}	-0.08^{***}	-0.06^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Political Interest		-0.04^{***}	-0.03^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Ideology			0.00^{*}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education				-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}
				(0.00)	(0.00)
Income					-0.00
					(0.00)
AIC	5817.42	4581.99	1632.93	1481.67	408.42
Log Likelihood	-2901.71	-2283.00	-807.47	-730.84	-193.21
Deviance	1164.46	1025.84	761.17	748.39	563.46
Num. obs.	12503	11961	11264	11221	9229

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table C.1: DV: Familiarity with PDS Ideology

APPENDIX D

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 5

D1. Model Output: Prototypicality Analysis

	Republicans	Democrats
Partisanship	0.52^{***}	0.11
	(0.14)	(0.07)
Age	−0.07	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.02)
Gender	−0.18	$0.15^{\dagger}$
	(0.16)	(0.08)
Citizen	−0.01	0.04
	(0.29)	(0.16)
Political Interest	0.19	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.06)
Ideology	−0.13	−0.02
	(0.08)	(0.03)
Trump	-0.79^{**}	
	(0.24)	
Ryan	$0.54^{\dagger}$	
	(0.30)	
Obama		0.35^{***}
		(0.08)
Schumer		0.21^{*}
		(0.10)
Pelosi		0.17
		(0.12)
R^2	0.58	0.17
Adj. R^2	0.51	0.12
Num. obs.	61	164
RMSE	0.51	0.41

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table D.1: DV: Leader Prototypicality

D2. Model Output: Leader Attachment Analysis

	All	Republicans	Democrats
Partisanship	0.04	0.18	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.20)
Leader Proto.	0.27*	0.01	0.54**
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.17)
Age	−0.03	−0.00	−0.10†
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Gender	−0.05	0.12	−0.67**
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.19)
Citizen	−0.05	0.13	0.01
	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.35)
Political Interest	−0.04	−0.08	0.28†
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Ideology	−0.05	0.05	−0.22*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.11)
Obama	0.36**	0.37*	
	(0.14)	(0.14)	
Trump	0.10		1.03**
	(0.22)		(0.32)
Schumer	−0.76***	−0.75***	
	(0.17)	(0.17)	
Pelosi	−0.72***	−0.74***	
	(0.20)	(0.20)	
Ryan	−0.11		0.86*
	(0.29)		(0.38)
R^2	0.31	0.37	0.44
Adj. R^2	0.27	0.33	0.34
Num. obs.	225	164	61
RMSE	0.71	0.69	0.63

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table D.2: DV: Leader Attachment

D3. Survey Instrument

1. Do you think of yourself as close to any particular political party?

   ○ No

   ○ Yes

2. Which party do you feel closest to?

   ○ Democratic Party

   ○ Green Party

   ○ Libertarian Party

   ○ Republican Party

   ○ Other

3. Thinking about that political party, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Somewhat disagree (2)	Somewhat agree (3)	Strongly agree (4)
When I speak about this party, I usually say ‘‘we’’ instead of ‘‘they’’.	○	○	○	○
I am interested in what other people think about this party.	○	○	○	○
When people criticize this party, it feels like a personal insult.	○	○	○	○
I have a lot in common with other supporters of this party.	○	○	○	○
If this party does badly in opinion polls, my day is ruined.	○	○	○	○
When I meet someone who supports this party, I feel connected with this person.	○	○	○	○
When I speak about this party, I refer to them as ‘‘my party’’.	○	○	○	○
When people praise this party, it makes me feel good.	○	○	○	○

4. Who do you consider to be the leader of this party?

____

5. Generally speaking, how do you feel about this leader? Please use the following scale. "10" means that you have a very positive view of this leader and "0" means that you have a very negative view of this leader.

- ◯ 0
- ◯ 1
- ◯ 2
- ◯ 3
- ◯ 4
- ◯ 5
- ◯ 6
- ◯ 7
- ◯ 8
- ◯ 9
- ◯ 10

6. Thinking about this party leader, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.

	Strongly disagree (1)	Somewhat disagree (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Somewhat agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
This leader is typical of other politicians in the party.	○	○	○	○	○
This leader is typical of people who support the party.	○	○	○	○	○
This leader is a good example of the kind of people who belong to the party.	○	○	○	○	○
This leader stands for what people in the party have in common.	○	○	○	○	○
If this leader left the party, I would feel less connected to the party.	○	○	○	○	○
I care more about this leader than I do the party.	○	○	○	○	○
If this leader left the party, I would be less likely to vote for the party.	○	○	○	○	○
If this leader formed a new party, I would consider voting for this new party.	○	○	○	○	○

D4. Partisanship Rates

One concern with convenience samples is about their representativeness to other population groups. Given that my sample include students enrolled in political science courses at a large, public university, these students are likely to be more politically interested and potentially more partisan than other subsets of the U.S. population. Therefore, I compare rates of Democratic partisanship in my sample to those in the 2016 U.S. wave of the CSES.[1] Because of the demographic composition of my sample (college-educated adults generally under the age of 30), I compare rates of Democratic partisanship[2] to respondents in the CSES who are also college-educated and under the age of thirty.[3]



Figure D.1: Rates of Democratic Partisanship in CSES vs. My Sample

Figure D.1 shows the rates of Democratic partisanship in each sample with 95% confidence intervals. As the figure illustrates, although rates of Democratic partisanship are high in both samples, hovering around approximately 75%, and are not statistically distinguishable from one another.

[1]Ideally, this comparison would be with a more recent sample of the population around the time of the 2018 midterm elections; however, I was not able to get access to any data of such recency.

[2]Among those who declare partisanship to Democrats or Republicans.

[3]The distribution of age in these two samples still differs from each other. My sample is skewed younger, with a median age of 20; whereas the subsetted CSES sample has a median age of 26. Unfortunately, the youngest respondents in the CSES were 22, making it impossible to compare a population of respondents with the same distribution of ages.

D5. Partisanship Strength

I also examine the differences in partisanship strength between the two samples. In both samples, partisan strength ranges from 1 to 3. In my sample these numbers correspond with "independent leaning [partisan]", "[partisan]", "strong [partisan]". In the CSES, these numbers are in response to the question "how close do you feel to [party]" and correspond with "not very close", "somewhat close", and "very close". As both figures illustrates, respondents in the CSES sample were strong partisans than the respondents in my sample, with Republican partisans appearing especially weak as compared to those in the CSES.



Figure D.2: Democrats' Partisanship Strength in CSES vs. My Sample

It is unclear how these differences might alter the generalizability of my results, because I do not rely on this measure of partisanship strength in my analysis. Unfortunately, the measure I do use – the one created from the social identity of partisanship battery – has been shown to better capture partisanship strength than this conventional measure here (Huddy et al. 2015) and is not easily comparable to it.



Figure D.3: Republicans' Partisanship Strength in CSES vs. My Sample

D6. Dropped Respondents

As discussed in the main text, survey participants who did not provide the name of a specific politician when asked who they believed to be the leader of their party were dropped from my analyses. These respondents may differ in substantively important ways from those who could think of a specific party leader when prompted. I examine this possibility with regard to partisanship strength, ideology, and political knowledge.

B6.1. Dropped Respondents: Partisanship Strength



Figure D.4: Distribution of Partisanship Strength among Dropped and Retained Respondents

As Figure D.4 shows, respondents who indicated that their party did not have a leader (i.e. dropped respondents) express much weaker partisan attachment than those who named a specific leader. One potential reason for this difference could be that weaker partisans are dissatisfied with the efficacy of their party because they do not feel it is being effectively led, thereby generating the concentration of "none" responses when prompted about the party leader.

D6.2. Dropped Respondents: Ideology

With regard to ideology, the distribution among dropped respondents indicates that these participants were generally more left-leaning than those who remained in the sample. Based on the proportion of Democratic respondents who answered “none” to the party leader question, this result is unsurprising. It would be interesting to replicate this analysis after party changeover in the executive, to see whether Republicans were more likely to state that they did not believe their party had a leader after the president no longer represented their party.



Figure D.5: Distribution of Ideology among Dropped and Retained Respondents

D6.3. Dropped Respondents: Political Knowledge

Finally, I examine the differences in the distribution of political knowledge among dropped and retained respondents. Dropped respondents may be less knowledgeable about politics than their retained counterparts, leading some of them to state that the party did not have a leader. However, these dropped respondents do not include those who volunteered “don’t know” in response to the question, so these participants may be just as knowledgeable as those who named a specific leader, especially among Democrats who did not necessarily

have an easily identifiable leader in office at the time of the survey. Figure D.5 shows the distribution of respondents' average political knowledge across 19 political knowledge questions in the survey, where 1 indicates the respondent answered all 19 questions correctly and zero, none.



Figure D.6: Distribution of Political Knowledge among Dropped and Retained Respondents

Based on this figure, it is clear that the dropped respondents were generally less knowledgable about politics than those who remained in the survey. This could point to an interesting distinction for personalization studies: perhaps those who are less knowledgeable about politics are less likely to be attracted to a specific leader than those who are knowledgeable about politics. Of course, I cannot test that conjecture with these data, but it would be worth exploring in the future.

D7. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Because I have theoretical expectations about the manner in which individual survey items should load onto the latent concepts I am interested in (partisanship, leader prototypicality, and leader attachment), I also conduct confirmatory factor analysis using the `lavaan` package in `R`. I hypothesized a three-factor model where the social identity of partisanship items, leader prototypicality items, and leader attachment items respectively load onto the latent concepts mentioned above. I standardized the variables such that they each have mean equal to 0 and standard deviation of 1. The distributions of each variable are presented below.



Figure D.7: Density Plots of Each Variable

The factor loadings from the confirmatory factor analysis are included in the table below.

Table D.3: Factor Loadings

Latent Factor	Indicator	Estimate	SE	Z	p-value	Beta
psocid	psoc_we	0.698	0.061	11.454	0	0.700
psocid	psoc_think	0.371	0.067	5.528	0	0.372
psocid	psoc_insult	0.678	0.061	11.183	0	0.679
psocid	psoc_opinion	0.448	0.066	6.821	0	0.449
psocid	psoc_common	0.565	0.063	8.917	0	0.566
psocid	psoc_connect	0.691	0.061	11.397	0	0.692
psocid	psoc_my	0.689	0.061	11.273	0	0.690
psocid	psoc_praise	0.786	0.058	13.586	0	0.788
proto	lead_typ_pol	0.380	0.069	5.529	0	0.380
proto	lead_typ_supp	0.659	0.063	10.374	0	0.660
proto	lead_example	0.887	0.058	15.287	0	0.890
proto	lead_common	0.735	0.060	12.249	0	0.737
ldrattach	lead_connect	0.758	0.057	13.286	0	0.760
ldrattach	lead_care	0.895	0.052	17.065	0	0.897
ldrattach	lead_left	0.796	0.056	14.323	0	0.798
ldrattach	lead_new	0.788	0.056	14.151	0	0.790

D8. Factor-Weighted Index

Finally, using the factor weights presented in the table above, I constructed factor-weighted indices using the standardized variables for each of the latent concepts (partisanship, leader prototypicality, and leader attachment). I replicated the analyses from the main text using these variables. These findings are similar to those from the main text, but the role of partisanship appears to differ. Instead, partisanship strength among Democrats is positively associated with perceptions of leader prototypicality; whereas it bears no effects among Republicans (Table D4). For predicting leader attachment, perceptions of leader prototypicality are positively associated with leader attachment for both Republicans and Democrats. It appears to have a stronger and larger effect among Republicans than Democrats. These results highlight the robust relationship between leader prototypicality and leader attachment, but also the inconsistent relationship between partisanship and these two outcomes. Therefore, further validation of these measures is necessary to adequately capture these concepts.

	All	Republicans	Democrats
Partisanship (wt.)	0.13^{**}	0.16	0.13^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.06)
Age	−0.03	−0.04	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Gender	0.09	0.00	$0.14^{\dagger}$
	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.08)
Citizen	−0.04	−0.22	−0.01
	(0.13)	(0.37)	(0.17)
Political Interest	0.05	−0.03	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.06)
Ideology	0.00	−0.06	-0.07^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Trump	-0.61^{***}	$-0.55^{\dagger}$	
	(0.12)	(0.28)	
Ryan	0.42^{*}	0.48	
	(0.16)	(0.35)	
Obama	0.28^{***}		0.39^{***}
	(0.08)		(0.09)
Schumer	0.04		0.18
	(0.10)		(0.13)
Pelosi	−0.00		0.11
	(0.12)		(0.14)
R^2	0.43	0.40	0.30
Adj. R^2	0.40	0.30	0.26
Num. obs.	225	55	158
RMSE	0.41	0.46	0.45

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table D.4: DV: Leader Prototypyicality

	All	Republicans	Democrats
Partisanship (wt.)	0.04	0.32	−0.01
	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.08)
Leader Proto (wt.)	0.33***	0.64**	0.23*
	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.11)
Age	−0.03	0.03	−0.04
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Gender	−0.05	−0.16	−0.04
	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.10)
Citizen	−0.04	−0.13	−0.11
	(0.18)	(0.56)	(0.22)
Political Interest	−0.05	−0.20	−0.04
	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.08)
Ideology	−0.05	−0.14	−0.03
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.03)
Trump	0.13	0.69	
	(0.18)	(0.44)	
Ryan	−0.12	0.34	
	(0.24)	(0.53)	
Obama	0.28*		0.29*
	(0.12)		(0.13)
Schumer	−0.61***		−0.53**
	(0.14)		(0.18)
Pelosi	−0.57***		−0.59**
	(0.17)		(0.18)
R^2	0.32	0.28	0.29
Adj. R^2	0.28	0.13	0.24
Num. obs.	225	55	158
RMSE	0.59	0.70	0.60

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table D.5: DV: Leader Attachment

D9. Effect of Candidate Evaluations on Vote Choice (over Time)

In this section, I assess the role of candidate evaluations in American voters' vote choice for each presidential election year from 1984 to 2016. I examine voting for Democratic candidates and Republican candidates separately, using data from the American National Election Survey. The outcome for both analyses are respondents' vote choice, where 1 indicates they voted for the candidate of the party with which they identified and zero, otherwise. I control for respondents' education, age, gender, ideology, and race. I also include respondents' evaluations of the economy in the current year (ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates the economic was much worse than the year prior and 5, much better). Finally I include an indicator for voters' partisanship. The main variable of interest in these analyses are respondents' evaluations of the presidential candidate, on a scale of 0 to 5. This variable represents an average of respondents' considerations of the candidate's strength in leadership, perception that the candidate really cares about voters, and perception that the candidate is very knowledgeable. As the analyses for both partisan candidates show, candidate evaluations played a significant, but relatively small effect on vote choice in comparison to partisan identification from 1984-2012. Interestingly, the magnitude of candidate evaluations appears to become more important in 2016, echoing some political scientists' impressions and investigations that candidate characteristics played an important role in the most recent presidential election.

	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Democrat	2.69***	2.29***	2.22***	1.61***	2.05***	2.17***	2.28***	2.06***	0.94***
	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Candidate Eval. (avg.)	1.06***	0.82***	1.11***	1.54***	1.01***	1.19***	0.90***	0.83***	1.36***
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Econ. Eval.	−0.30***	−0.30**	−0.33***	0.41***	0.12	−0.29**	0.01	0.36***	0.28***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Education	0.32***	0.15**	0.25***	0.24***	0.41***	0.26***	0.22**	0.20***	0.15***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Age	0.01†	0.02**	0.02***	0.02***	0.01*	0.02**	0.01	0.02***	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	0.17	−0.10	0.22	−0.11	−0.11	0.01	0.43*	−0.08	0.02
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Ideology	−0.19**	−0.31***	−0.27***	−0.17*	−0.29**	−0.25**	−0.33***	−0.23***	−0.35***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Black	0.39	0.30	0.46*	−0.28	0.09	0.56†	0.52†	0.61***	0.89***
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.42)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Latinx	−0.05	0.05	−0.54†	−0.03	−0.50	0.23	0.06	0.07	0.41**
	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.16)
Other	0.05	0.32	−0.14	0.27	−0.62	−1.39*	0.51	−0.10	0.18
	(0.63)	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.19)	(0.17)
AIC	982.17	956.88	1167.99	1055.35	491.95	611.19	579.98	3210.59	2689.64
BIC	1038.31	1011.94	1225.45	1111.48	539.38	662.50	629.48	3281.09	2758.88
Log Likelihood	-480.08	-467.44	-572.99	-516.67	-234.98	-294.59	-278.99	-1594.29	-1333.82
Deviance	960.17	934.88	1145.99	1033.35	469.95	589.19	557.98	3188.59	2667.64
Num. obs.	1217	1103	1372	1215	551	784	665	4487	4002

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table D.6: DV: Voting for Democratic Presidential Candidate

	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Republican	1.37^{***}	1.85^{***}	1.91^{***}	2.55^{***}	2.15^{***}	2.07^{***}	2.42^{***}	2.00^{***}	0.66^{***}
	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Candidate Eval. (avg.)	1.06^{***}	1.12^{***}	1.25^{***}	1.43^{***}	1.05^{***}	1.30^{***}	0.93^{***}	0.90^{***}	1.37^{***}
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Econ. Eval.	0.32^{***}	$0.19^{\dagger}$	0.31^{***}	-0.18	-0.02	$0.24^{\dagger}$	-0.39^{*}	-0.31^{***}	-0.20^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Education	0.34^{***}	0.29^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.34^{***}	0.07	0.33^{***}	0.20^{*}	0.14^{***}	0.08^{*}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.02^{**}	0.02^{***}	0.01^{**}	0.02^{**}	0.02^{*}	-0.00	0.00	0.01^{***}	0.01^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Gender	0.14	0.11	0.43^{**}	0.05	0.21	0.34	-0.28	0.03	-0.13
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Ideology	0.23^{***}	0.42^{***}	0.43^{***}	0.50^{***}	0.38^{***}	0.45^{***}	0.39^{***}	0.26^{***}	0.43^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Black	-1.20^{**}	-2.51^{***}	-1.49^{*}	-3.05^{**}	-1.40	-0.83	-17.41	-1.94^{***}	-2.05^{***}
	(0.45)	(0.64)	(0.58)	(1.16)	(1.05)	(0.56)	(885.14)	(0.32)	(0.40)
Latinx	-0.74^{*}	-0.63	-0.38	-1.12^{*}	-0.63	-1.22^{**}	-0.93^{**}	-0.43^{**}	-0.93^{***}
	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.31)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.35)	(0.16)	(0.21)
Other	-0.13	$-1.63^{\dagger}$	-0.03	-0.77	-0.28	-0.54	-0.34	-0.53^{*}	-0.31
	(0.58)	(0.84)	(0.46)	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.79)	(0.22)	(0.19)
AIC	1183.11	889.27	1106.22	768.89	456.51	542.94	417.52	2576.80	2421.47
BIC	1240.22	944.60	1165.01	824.58	503.84	594.86	466.95	2647.19	2490.69
Log Likelihood	-580.55	-433.63	-542.11	-373.44	-217.26	-260.47	-197.76	-1277.40	-1199.73
Deviance	1161.11	867.27	1084.22	746.89	434.51	520.94	395.52	2554.80	2399.47
Num. obs.	1329	1130	1548	1168	546	829	661	4444	3995

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table D.7: DV: Voting for Republican Presidential Candidate

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