XSEDE Security Risk Assessment
Prepared by Adam Slagell, NCSA
This is the executive summary of the security risk assessment revised during the fourth year of the XSEDE project.
Potential Threat Actions 22
Existing Controls 22
Recommended Control Changes 23

Risk #3  Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L 23
Vulnerability 23
Potential Threat Source 23
Potential Threat Actions 23
Existing Controls 23
Recommended Control Changes 23

Risk #4  Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: M Impact: L 23
Vulnerability 23
Potential Threat Source 23
Potential Threat Actions 23
Existing Controls 23
Recommended Control Changes 24

Risk #5  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M 24
Vulnerability 24
Potential Threat Source 24
Potential Threat Actions 24
Existing Controls 24
Recommended Control Changes 24

Risk #6  Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: M Impact: L 24
Vulnerability 24
Potential Threat Source 24
Potential Threat Actions 24
Existing Controls 24
Recommended Control Changes 25

Risk #7  Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: M Impact: L 25
Vulnerability 25
Potential Threat Source 25
Potential Threat Actions 25
Existing Controls 25
Recommended Control Changes 25

Risk #8  Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L 25
Vulnerability 25
Potential Threat Source 25
Potential Threat Actions 25
Existing Controls 25
Recommended Control Changes 25

Risk #9  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M 26
Vulnerability 26
Potential Threat Source 26
Potential Threat Actions 26
Existing Controls 26
Recommended Control Changes 26

Risk #10 Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: M Impact: L 26
Vulnerability 26
Potential Threat Source 27
Potential Threat Actions 27
Existing Controls 27
Recommended Control Changes 27

Risk #11  Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L 27
Vulnerability 27
Potential Threat Source 27
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Risk #12  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M 28
Vulnerability 28
Potential Threat Source 28
Potential Threat Actions 28
Existing Controls 28
Recommended Control Changes 28

Risk #13  Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: L Impact: M 28
Vulnerability 28
Potential Threat Source 28
Potential Threat Actions 28
Existing Controls 28
Recommended Control Changes 28

Risk #14  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M 29
Vulnerability 29
Potential Threat Source 29
Potential Threat Actions 29
Existing Controls 29
Recommended Control Changes 29

Risk #15  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M 29
Vulnerability 29
Potential Threat Source 29
Potential Threat Actions 29
Existing Controls 29
Recommended Control Changes 29

Risk #16  Total Risk: N/A Likelihood: N/A Impact: N/A 30
Vulnerability 30

Risk #17  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M 30
Vulnerability 30
Potential Threat Source 30
Potential Threat Actions 30
Existing Controls 30
Recommended Control Changes 30

Risk #18  Total Risk: N/A Likelihood: N/A Impact: N/A 31
Vulnerability 31

Risk #19  Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L 31
Vulnerability 31
Potential Threat Source 31
Potential Threat Actions 31
Existing Controls 31
Recommended Control Changes 31

Risk #20 Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: M Impact: L
Vulnerability 31
Potential Threat Source 31
Potential Threat Actions 32
Existing Controls 32
Recommended Control Changes 32

Risk #21 Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L
Vulnerability 32
Potential Threat Source 32
Potential Threat Actions 32
Existing Controls 32
Recommended Control Changes 32

Risk #22 Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: L Impact: M
Vulnerability 32
Potential Threat Source 33
Potential Threat Actions 33
Existing Controls 33
Recommended Control Changes 33

Risk #23 Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M
Vulnerability 33
Potential Threat Source 33
Potential Threat Actions 33
Existing Controls 33
Recommended Control Changes 33

Risk #24 Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L
Vulnerability 34
Potential Threat Source 34
Potential Threat Actions 34
Existing Controls 34
Recommended Control Changes 34

Risk #25 Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M
Vulnerability 34
Potential Threat Source 34
Potential Threat Actions 34
Existing Controls 34
Recommended Control Changes 35

Risk #26 Total Risk: N/A Likelihood: N/A Impact: N/A
Vulnerability 35

Risk #27 Total Risk: 50 Likelihood: H Impact: M
Vulnerability 35
Potential Threat Source 35
Potential Threat Actions 35
Existing Controls 35
Recommended Control Changes

**Risk #28**  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M

- Vulnerability
- Potential Threat Source
- Potential Threat Actions
- Existing Controls
- Recommended Control Changes

**Risk #29**  Total Risk: N/A Likelihood: N/A Impact: N/A

- Vulnerability

**Risk #30**  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: L Impact: M

- Vulnerability
- Potential Threat Source
- Potential Threat Actions
- Existing Controls
- Recommended Control Changes

**Risk #31**  Total Risk: 50 Likelihood: H Impact: M

- Vulnerability
- Potential Threat Source
- Potential Threat Actions
- Existing Controls
- Recommended Control Changes

**Risk #32**  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M

- Vulnerability
- Potential Threat Source
- Potential Threat Actions
- Existing Controls
- Recommended Control Changes

**Risk #33**  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M

- Vulnerability
- Potential Threat Source
- Potential Threat Actions
- Existing Controls
- Recommended Control Changes

**Risk #34**  Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M

- Vulnerability
- Potential Threat Source
- Potential Threat Actions
- Existing Controls
- Recommended Control Changes

**Risk #35**  Total Risk: N/A Likelihood: N/A Impact: N/A

- Vulnerability

**Risk #36**  Total Risk: 50 Likelihood: H Impact: M

- Vulnerability
- Potential Threat Source
- Potential Threat Actions
- Existing Controls
Risk #37  Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: M Impact: L
Vulnerability
Potential Threat Source
Potential Threat Actions
Existing Controls
Recommended Control Changes

Risk #38  Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L
Vulnerability
Potential Threat Source
Potential Threat Actions
Existing Controls
Recommended Control Changes

Risk #39  Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: L Impact: M
Vulnerability
Potential Threat Source
Potential Threat Actions
Existing Controls
Recommended Control Changes
Introduction

Purpose
At a strategic level, this risk assessment forms the foundation on which we continue to build a formal, risk-based security program for XSEDE. This risk assessment informs our security plans and activities.

Tactically, this risk assessment serves two purposes. First, it helps the security operations team prioritize its work for the next few years by recommending specific countermeasures to implement to address the identified risks. It further prioritizes these actions based on the severity of the risks they address. Second, this risk assessment serves as a template for other XSEDE service providers (SPs) who are encouraged to follow a similar process at their specific institutions. This is recommended as a complete picture of risk for XSEDE depends both on the high-level federation issues, and the SPs on which much of its infrastructure and services are built.

The purpose and context into which this risk assessment fits is more fully described in A Risk-based Security Program for XSEDE.1

Scope
In 2012, a project sizing2 was completed to prior to beginning the risk assessment for XSEDE. This was critical to scope the risk assessment to the proper level for both the resources available to the assessment team and time given for completion. Without clear scope it is always possible to drill deeper and deeper with a risk assessment, but at the risk of never finishing it.

A risk assessment can be scoped both in terms of threats and assets considered. Congruent with our stated goals, we performed a risk assessment at the federation-level and asked that individual Service Providers (SPs) follow a similar process for their local XSEDE resources. Therefore, threats that do not affect more than a single site, the fundamental shared resources of XSEDE, or its underlying trust fabric are not considered. For example, threats specific to the architecture of a particular HPC resource would not be considered at this level, but threats to an XSEDE shared authentication system (e.g., our Kerberos realm) would be.

The most general kind of risk assessment would consider all kinds of threats, including environmental, application error, physical failure and natural disasters. However, a primary goal for this risk assessment is to more wisely choose cyber security controls to give us the most return on our investment of resources. Therefore, we primarily considered application errors and insider/outsider threats (e.g., i.e. hacking, cracking and attacks). So while hackers stealing credentials were considered, fire damage at a particular service provider's data center was not. The latter would more appropriately be considered by a site-specific risk assessment.

1 https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/A+risk-based+security+program+for+XSEDE
2 https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Risk+Assessment+Project+Sizing
Risk Assessment Approach

The Charge
Senior management, including the project PI John Towns, approved the approach and scope of this risk assessment prior to any work beginning in 2012. While a risk assessment was promised in the XSEDE proposal, it was still necessary to get management buy-in to the process as it is ultimately up to management to decide how to act upon the recommendations made in this report. Furthermore, it was important to get the support of management as the first risk assessment required resources and cooperation from many people across many groups in addition to the formal members of the risk assessment team.

The Team
Adam Slagell, a security analyst and the CISO at the NCSA, led the original risk assessment team and updated it in 2015. This original team was composed of a representative from each division of Operations: Security, Data Services, XSEDENet, Accounting, and System Operations Support. Jim Basney, Gary Rogers, Benny Sparks, Amy Schuele, Anjana Kar (and later Derek Simmel) fulfilled these roles, respectively. The level 3 Security manager, Randy Butler, and the Operations level 2 manager, Victor Hazlewood, provided additional support and advisement. Additionally, the XSEDE security operations team was invited to provide feedback at each stage of the process.

NIST 800-30
There is literally an alphabet soup of risk management approaches (e.g., NIST 800-30, OCTAVE, AS/NZS 4360:2004, ISO 31000 series, etc.). We chose NIST 800-30 for several reasons. First, Carnegie-Mellon’s OCTAVE builds upon the NIST process, Australia and New Zealand’s process upon OCTAVE, and ISO 31000 upon AS/NZ 4360:2004. Because of this, and the relative simplicity of the NIST process, it is often recommended that organizations start their first risk assessment with the NIST process. If it is later deemed insufficient, effort is not wasted as follow-up reassessments can build upon what was already done.

Secondly, these other approaches aren’t as well suited to the geography and resources of XSEDE. For example, the OCTAVE approach relies heavily upon a series of self-directed workshops with management, operations, security and business heads walking through several scenarios, questionnaires and checklists. This is a significant commitment from the whole organization that XSEDE would not likely have made. And even if it would have, this approach is difficult to do with teams so geographically distributed. For these reasons, we followed the NIST 800-30 process of a qualitative risk assessment which ranked risks in two dimensions according to a high, medium or low ranking (defined later). The first dimension was the likelihood of a risk being realized, the second

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3 https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/A+risk-based+security+program+for+XSEDE
4 https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Risk+Assessment+Project+Sizing
dimension the impact of a risk if it is realized. Combining the scores in those dimensions then allows one to create an overall risk rating to prioritize activities.

The overall process of a NIST 800-30 risk assessment is shown in the figure below.

**Figure 1: NIST 800-30 process**
**Vulnerability Analysis Process**

A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in a system’s security procedures, design, implementation or internal controls that could potentially be exercised by a threat agent to result in a breach or violation of the system's security policy. In this phase of the risk assessment we identified as many federation-level vulnerabilities in XSEDE as we could, mapping each vulnerability to a threat action and threat source.

We developed this list by thoroughly investigating each asset from the System Characterization\(^6\) (described in a later section), reviewing other risk assessments for generic vulnerabilities, and conducting interviews with people from each operations domain. For each vulnerability, we identified a potential threat source from the XSEDE Threat Profile\(^7\) (described in a later section) and a threat action that could be taken to exploit the vulnerability. Finally, this was all compiled into a table\(^8\) reviewed by the operations security and risk assessment teams for completeness and accuracy.

In 2015, updates were made to the vulnerability table after revising the system characterization. As some systems and services were retired, some vulnerabilities were removed or mitigated. Four new ones were also added as new services had been deployed like Unicore and Genesis II. Feedback was solicited from the XSEDE Security Working Group regarding this and other updates.

**Control Analysis Process**

Security controls are mechanisms in place to mitigate the risk of threats being realized and hence exploiting vulnerabilities in your infrastructure. Controls can be administrative (e.g., policies, standards, guidelines, training and other processes), technical/logical (e.g., authentication and authorization systems, file permissions, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc.), or physical (e.g., locked file cabinets, secured data centers, cameras, fences, etc.).

Since risks are addressed by controls, it is important to understand the security controls already in place or planned. Without this step, you don't know where there are gaps. One of the outputs of the risk assessment is to recommend changes and additions to controls to address the highest impact and most probable risks.

The Control Analysis Matrix\(^9\) lists all the existing and planned controls with current status and notes. The sources for the list of these controls came from brainstorming, reference to the security controls catalog in NIST Special Publication 800-53\(^10\), and a review of previously identified controls in the XSEDE System Characterization. Updates in 2015 were also made as security operations activities over the past few years had added some controls or made others obsolete.

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\(^6\) https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/XSEDE+System+Characterization

\(^7\) https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Threat+Profile

\(^8\) https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Vulnerability+Identification

\(^9\) https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Control+Analysis+Matrix

**Risk Likelihood Evaluation Process**

This phase of the assessment originally required the risk assessment team to rank the likelihood of each vulnerability being exploited as high, medium or low. In this ranking, three things are considered:

- Motivation and capabilities of the threat source
- Specifics of the vulnerability
- Effectiveness of current controls to mitigate associated risks

The following definitions for high, medium and low were used:

- **High**: The threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and controls to prevent the vulnerability from being exercised are ineffective.
- **Medium**: The threat-source is motivated and capable, but controls are in place that may impede successful exercise of the vulnerability.
- **Low**: The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are in place to prevent, or at least significantly impede, the vulnerability from being exercised.

To come to consensus on the rank for each vulnerability we used the following process. As a first round, we used blinded (to all but the risk assessment lead) votes via email for each item. As long as 2/3 of the team voted on an item and the votes had a standard deviation less than 0.7, we took the average of the votes and chose the closest probability ranking. To compute a numerical average, each ranking received a numerical value of 0, 1 or 2, and the average was simply the arithmetic mean.

For other items, there was either widespread disagreement or a lack of understanding to gain quorum. These were resolved over phone meetings. If quorum was the problem and the team lead could not get enough votes, then a threat scenario would need to have been written up on the issue by the most expert person of the team for that item (this did not happen as we always had quorum). Each contentious item was discussed on a phone meeting with quorum until a majority decision was made. The call started with a reminder of what the different rankings of high, medium and low mean, and the chair's synopsis of the disputed items and why he voted how he did. Detailed results of the individual votes and meeting notes can be found on the wiki11.

The 2015 updates to the likelihood ratings were made by the security analyst alone, while feedback was solicited from the whole XSEDE Security Working Group.

**Impact Analysis Process**

After determining the likelihood of each identified vulnerability being exploited, we then focused on the impact if it were actually exploited. The impact of any exploit is going to depend upon (1) the mission of XSEDE, (2) the criticality of the vulnerable system or data to XSEDE, and (3) the sensitivity of the affected system or data. This information is usually found in a mission or business impact analysis, but XSEDE has no such documentation. However, there is a mission statement noted in the XSEDE System Characterization12, and there is a categorization of XSEDE services into tiers in the XSEDE ser-

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11 [https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/XSEDE+Federation+Risk+Assessment#section-XSEDE+Federation+Risk+Assessment-LikelihoodDetermination](https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/XSEDE+Federation+Risk+Assessment#section-XSEDE+Federation+Risk+Assessment-LikelihoodDetermination)

12 [https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/XSEDE+System+Characterization](https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/XSEDE+System+Characterization)
vices master spreadsheet. In cases where it was not clear how critical a system is, we relied upon the specific system owner or maintainer's advice.

Impact from a security incident could affect the integrity, availability or confidentiality of a system or data. Depending on the subsystem affected, we could be concerned more with one kind of impact than another. Particularly, in light of XSEDE’s mission, it would most often be that integrity and availability are of more concern than confidentiality. However, the impact on each of these three properties should be considered for any potential exploit. If the impact were unclear to the general risk assessment team, we would have asked the system/data owner to write a brief impact analysis for the particular vulnerability being exploited. However, that was not necessary for our disputed items.

The following definitions for high, medium and low were used:

- **High**: Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the highly costly loss of major tangible assets or resources; (2) may significantly violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human death or serious injury.
- **Medium**: Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the costly loss of tangible assets or resources; (2) may violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human injury.
- **Low**: Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in the loss of some tangible assets or resources or (2) may noticeably affect an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest.

We followed the same process of semi-blinded voting on impact as in the previous phase of likelihood determination. The difference is that contentious items could potentially have been resolved with an impact analysis. The system/data owner would have written a short impact analysis, less than one page, and the risk assessment team would have re voted after reading it and applying the definitions above. However, since most of the vulnerabilities are discussed in generalities and we are doing a qualitative risk assessment, this was not required for any of our risks. Detailed results of individual votes can be found on the staff wiki13.

The 2015 updates to the impact ratings were made by the security analyst alone, while feedback was solicited from the whole XSEDE Security Working Group.

**Risk Determination Formula**

With likelihood and impact analysis complete, we calculated numeric values for each risk to rank them. We used the table below, which gives a weight for both likelihood and impact.

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13 https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/XSEDE+Risk+Assessment#section-XSEDE+Risk+Assessment-ImpactAnalysis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low Impact (10)</th>
<th>Medium Impact (50)</th>
<th>High Impact (100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Likelihood</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$10 \times 1.0 = 10$</td>
<td>$50 \times 1.0 = 50$</td>
<td>$100 \times 1.0 = 100$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Med. Likelihood</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$10 \times 0.5 = 5$</td>
<td>$50 \times 0.5 = 25$</td>
<td>$100 \times 0.5 = 50$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Likelihood</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$10 \times 0.1 = 1$</td>
<td>$50 \times 0.1 = 5$</td>
<td>$100 \times 0.1 = 10$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
System Characterization

The first official step of this risk assessment was performing a full system characterization, whose details can be found on the XSEDE staff wiki\(^\text{14}\). While the project sizing focused us on the kinds of threats and assets to be considered, the system characterization specifically enumerated these pieces and system boundaries. This phase further focused our risk assessment and helped to systematically break up the larger system into logical areas that could be delegated to appropriate people for further evaluation and information gathering. It has also provided a nice single point of reference for anyone wanting to know more about a particular piece of XSEDE.

Our system characterization identified the boundaries of XSEDE (as opposed to site-specific resources suited to a lower-level risk assessment) along with the resources, organizations and information that constitute XSEDE. This included identifying the system's mission; major hardware components; key software and services; data and information with sensitivity assessment; user and support communities (includes XSEDE staffing groups as well as service providers); logical network topology; system interfaces (both internal and external connectivity); flow of information (particularly if sensitive); references to existing security architecture and policy documentation; and management and monitoring controls (e.g., availability monitoring, intrusion detection systems).

Two subsections of the system characterization deserve further description as they required all members of the risk assessment team to gather information and interview domain experts beyond the simple review of existing XSEDE documentation: the Systems & Services section and the XSEDE Software Stack section.

Systems & Services

For each system or service we created a separate subpage of the System Characterization linked to from a common table. These subpages provided the following for each item:

- Summary description
- Location and administrator of the system or service
- Data types involved and whether or not any data was sensitive
- Flow of this data between systems
- System interfaces and protocols used to communicate with the system/service

We created such pages, interviewing the appropriate administrators, for the following services—a list which comes primarily from XSEDE Enterprise page\(^\text{15}\) maintained by the SysOps group.

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\(^{14}\) https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/~wiki/Main/XSEDE+System+Characterization

\(^{15}\) https://sysops.xsede.org/xes-index/
• Level 1 SP Compute & Storage Resources
• User portal, knowledgebase, website & wiki
• Ticket system
• XSEDE central database
• Resource description repository
• AMIE
• XSEDE.org DNS
• XSEDE Kerberos realm
• Certificate authorities
• InCommon Portal
• OAuth MyProxy service
• Security wiki
• Jira
• Security Jabber server
• Email list server
• XUP file system services
• Conference call system
• XRAS
• SharePoint
• CI Tutor
• Virtual Workshop
• Source repository
• XSEDE Bugzilla
• perfSONAR
• Integrated Information Services (IIS)
• User profile service
• Metrics for IIS
• INCA
• RSA SecurID
• Single SignOn Hub
• Speedpage
• Karnak Predictor
• Globus Listener
• Sciforma
• GlobusOnline
• Nagios
• CI Logon
• Genesis II

**XSEDE Software Stack**

Here we list key pieces of software, such as toolkits and services, run at different SPs. Local customizations, particulars of base OSs and other software run at the individual sites were not included but belong in individual, site-specific risk assessments. We focused on software and configurations (e.g., the XSEDE trust store of certificates and Common User Environment) configured in XSEDE specific ways to support the services layer described in the XSEDE architecture. Much of this content is derived from the XSEDE Production Baseline for Service Provider Software and Services document.

• Registration Services
• INCA
• AMIE
• Globus Toolkit
• XSEDE CA Tarball
• UberFTP
• Globus-wsrf
• Unicore
• Glue2 Publishing
• Local Resource Management System
• Gx-map
• XDusage
• Modules
• Tgproxy
• Genesis II
• Common User Environment
• tginfo
• Tgresid
• SAGA
• MCP
• GUR
• CommSH
**Threat Profile**

A threat is the potential for a particular actor to exploit a particular vulnerability towards a malicious end. If there is no vulnerability, there is no threat. Furthermore, a threat is not the person or event that triggers a threat, that is the threat source/actor (e.g., a hacker, inept programmer, flood, etc.).

A threat profile is usually performed before a vulnerability assessment. Even though one may not know specifically if they have vulnerabilities for the threats to exploit, they can state what are the expected common threat actors as well as what they are not going to protect against or address within the scope of an assessment. For XSEDE, we are ignoring natural and environmental threats, which would need to be determined separately one level lower by the major service providers. Instead, we focused on human threats, both intentional (e.g., direct attack or theft) and unintentional (e.g., poorly written software). Furthermore, we only considered threats to shared XSEDE infrastructure, XSEDE’s trust fabric and the overall stability of the federation as noted in the risk assessment’s scope.

In our XSEDE threat profile we identified potential threat sources and made an estimation of their motivations, resources and capabilities. To gather this information, we created a large table with rows for potential threats, and columns for the corresponding threat sources, motivations and potential threat actions (e.g., credential harvesting, privilege escalation, social engineering, criminal activities, data theft, sabotage).

We used two methods to gather information. First, we used threat profile examples from other projects and systems to capture the generic sorts of threats that affect almost any system on the Internet. Then to get more specific we created a survey, which included questions on past security incidents, and had the security leads from each level 1 SP fill it out. This not only allowed us to come up with a list of threats, but to generally rank the likelihood of them. These surveys, the results, the full table, the external sources, and full threat statement can be found on full threat profile wiki page\(^16\). The summary follows.

**Summary Threat Statement**

The threats to XSEDE largely did not change from the threats to TeraGrid, and our historical data supports this. One new threat we predicted in 2012, bitcoin mining, was actually realized in the first years of XSEDE.

We expect the most common problem to continue to be the cycle of credential harvesting, followed by privilege escalation, then Trojaning, and finally more credential harvesting. This is unlikely to change unless we strengthen authentication or move away from direct command line access to resources. We will continue to see many, mostly unsuccessful dictionary-based attacks as well as bot herding for criminal activities. Other than that, our biggest threats are misconfigurations or software errors that must be addressed through configuration management and good software engineering practices, which have improved with XSEDE. Fortunately we avoid some significant threats by the nature of the customers we serve. However, if that ever changes and we start serving more private in-

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\(^16\) https://www.xsede.org/web/staff/staff-wiki/-/wiki/Main/Threat+Profile
dustry with valuable intellectual property or governments with classified data, we will have to reevaluate our threat profile.
Summary Results

There are 34 current risks, none of them considered high. Their distribution by severity based on likelihood and impact can be seen in the table below. The 3 highest risks were ranked 50 out of 100 possible points and should be our primary risks to address. There are a further 12 medium risks of rank 25, one that we recommend just accepting. Finally, there are 19 low risks ranked no more than 5 of 100 potential points, half of which we recommend accepting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low Impact</th>
<th>Medium Impact</th>
<th>High Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Likelihood</strong></td>
<td>Low (10)</td>
<td>Medium (50)</td>
<td>High (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No risks</td>
<td><strong>3 risks</strong></td>
<td>No risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Med. Likelihood</strong></td>
<td>Low (5)</td>
<td>Medium (25)</td>
<td>Medium (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>6 risks</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 risks</strong></td>
<td>No risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Likelihood</strong></td>
<td>Low (1)</td>
<td>Low (5)</td>
<td>Low (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9 risks</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 risks</strong></td>
<td>No risks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommended Controls

**High Priority Controls**
- Move towards random, system assigned passwords or passphrases for XSEDE. Give the option for users to protect their account and profile with two-factor authentication.
- Develop a more robust training program, targeted at different audiences. Staff security training should become mandatory and cover security best practices as well as familiarization with policies and procedures. Social engineering should not be neglected. Good dissemination plans are equally important.

**Medium Priority Controls**
- Maintain strong leadership and regular meetings for XSEDE security operations. Participation of level 1 SPs should not be optional. Security personnel and resource allocations should also be evaluated and redistributed at least annually to be proportional to where the work is done or needs to be done.
- Perform audits to make sure XSEDE systems and services stay true to these baselines. Audits need not be invasive, and may consist in part of questionnaires to be filled out by SPs or checklists for them to complete.
- Develop per service security baselines for services critical to XSEDE’s trust fabric.
- Have regular security incident drills and require participation from all level 1 SPs.
- Identify unsupported software in the XSEDE software stack and either (a) retire and eradicate it, (b) update or replace it, or (c) commit resources to adopt and maintain it.
- Identify services not replicated across at least two XSEDE SPs and either replicate them or move to a service provider with DoS protections. Focus on critical services first.
• Either internally or using an external service, perform code audits of commonly deployed XSEDE software. This could mean requiring them to use SWAMP or Coverity as part of the SD&I review.
• Identify remotely accessible services listening on XSEDE systems, and disable unnecessary and insecure services.
• Identify and minimize services running as root on XSEDE systems; reconfigure to run as non-root wherever possible, and recommend jails or other containment mechanisms where this is not possible.
• Inventory how system accounts are used for various services and identify those using unencrypted certificates or SSH keys. Protect the credential as best as possible, limit the capabilities of the credential and corresponding account to only those needed, and monitor for any unexpected use of such accounts.
• Deploy DNSSEC on all XSEDE.org subzones and the root domain.

Low Priority Controls
• Migrate from majordomo to an email list service that requires login over HTTPS for list and subscription management, rather than plaintext emails with plaintext passwords for management.
• Require a second email address to be registered for account creation.
• Create a standard for authentication to acquire an XSEDE acceptable certificate, and audit for compliance with the standard.
• Identify and remove local or non-XSEDE authentication systems for XSEDE services and replace with XSEDE Kerberos or GSI where possible.
Appendix A: Comparison to 2012 Assessment

There is almost the same number of risks because while 5 were retired, 4 new ones were added. There are also fewer medium risks, and more low ones. Neither report found high risks.

The biggest impact on retiring those risks and downgrading others came from rolling out two-factor for admins, developing security policies and standards for XSEDE, and rolling out a vulnerability management program for XSEDE central services. All of these projects came out of recommendations from the 2012 risk assessment.

New risks came from newly deployed services as well as failures to realize certain expectations. For example, we originally assumed that each SP would follow on with their own risk assessment, but they did not. Also, password compromises and attacks that jump from organization to organization continue. Security training has not been as widely disseminated as we originally expected either.

Therefore our primary recommendations focus on addressing the issue with passwords head-on, and working on security training with a dissemination plan. We also want to build on some of the successes from the past few years. While we have standards and policies in place as well as a vulnerability management program, we need to audit against these standards to see how well we are doing. We also need to perform drills to test our processes and agility before the next emergency.
## Appendix B: Complete List of Risks

### Risk #1

**Total Risk:** 1  
**Likelihood:** L  
**Impact:** L

**Vulnerability**  
Shared accounts make auditing difficult.

**Potential Threat Source**  
Malicious user or cracker

**Potential Threat Actions**  
Science Gateway accounts are shared and possibly a few service accounts. Incident response involving gateway accounts may require the assistance of a third party if appropriate attributes are not passed along, thus allowing attackers to better obfuscate their identity.

**Existing Controls**  
For science gateways there is policy and procedure before they are approved, and the gateways must retain records to allow actions to be mapped to a user. Also, the user actions are restricted, and they do not get a full shell.

**Recommended Control Changes**  
No action is recommended at this time. Very few of these accounts exist anymore in XSEDE except for community accounts, which already have multiple controls applied.

### Risk #2

**Total Risk:** 1  
**Likelihood:** L  
**Impact:** L

**Vulnerability**  
Inconsistent authentication standards make XSEDE authentication only as strong as the weakest SP.

**Potential Threat Source**  
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**  
Through use of x.509 certificates, users have single-sign-on capabilities to move between level 1 SP resources. The requirements for authentication mechanisms, identity vetting and operating a CA between SPs are different, making the whole system only as strong as the weakest link. However, all the CAs are IGTF accredited now, and the password policies are roughly equivalent among the XUP and level 1 SPs. So while an attacker might leverage a slightly weaker password standard at one site, the bigger risk is from reliance on passwords which users often reuse.

**Existing Controls**  
CAs added to the tarball must be IGTF accredited. Certificates are also short-lived, limiting the exposure window to some extent.
**Recommended Control Changes**
Continue to retire unneeded CAs, which don’t use XSEDE Kerberos. Create a standard for authentication policy to receive an XSEDE acceptable certificate and audit for compliance.

---

**Risk #3**
Total Risk: 1  
Likelihood: L  
Impact: L

**Vulnerability**
Some XSEDE services use their own authentication system, which is not subject to the same security requirements or account deactivation process.

**Potential Threat Source**
Disgruntled former employee/user or crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
Several services (e.g., Sharepoint & CI Tutor) use one-off authentication systems separate from the XSEDE Kerberos and CA systems. Users could exploit the fact that disabling an XSEDE Kerberos account does not deactivate these, and adversaries could exploit unknown vulnerabilities in these outside authentication systems if users synchronize their passwords for the portal and these other accounts.

**Existing Controls**
There are no existing controls to mitigate this risk.

**Recommended Control Changes**
We should identify and remove local or non-XSEDE authentication systems for XSEDE services and replace them with XSEDE Kerberos or GSI where possible.

---

**Risk #4**
Total Risk: 5  
Likelihood: M  
Impact: L

**Vulnerability**
Anyone can create an XSEDE account, and identity vetting is dependent upon trusting email, delegations to PIs, and self-asserted attributes.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers or malicious users

**Potential Threat Actions**
Having a lower level of assurance in the user's identity, there is potential for a person to impersonate another or supply false contact information. This makes it difficult to always hold a real person accountable for the malicious actions on the system or theft of intellectual property.

**Existing Controls**
The process has been formalized enough that TAGPMA is satisfied with it. Emails can only be used once, and it is expected that users would notice never getting an account ac-
tivation email. And while the PI is not vetting to a high level of assurance, the PI is likely to notice a problem in account creation when her researcher cannot login later.

**Recommended Control Changes**
We recommend no changes at this time. While a more rigorous process could be developed for account creation and vetting, it would become much more manual and time intensive. Since this is a very low risk, such a decrease in usability is not justified.

---

**Risk #5**  
**Total Risk:** 25  
**Likelihood:** M  
**Impact:** M

**Vulnerability**
Plaintext authentication is used for mail list management.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
Majordomo email lists are managed by cleartext passwords in the emails and trust the source address for authentication. This opens up the possibility for eavesdropping, list denial of service, exposure of private archives, and list hijacking for spam.

**Existing Controls**
There are spam filters to prevent some types of abuse of email lists. Security personnel use PGP encryption for confidential email to thwart eavesdropping. Finally, staff can use the wiki and just send URLs in the email for sensitive documents.

**Recommended Control Changes**
Because private lists are now archived and meetings tend to just be protected by a URL sent via email, we recommend migrating from majordomo to an email list service that requires login over HTTPS for list and subscription management, rather than plaintext emails with plaintext passwords for management.

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**Risk #6**  
**Total Risk:** 5  
**Likelihood:** M  
**Impact:** L

**Vulnerability**
The conference call system uses weak or loosely managed PINs.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
PINs or passwords aren't used for most conferences, and the call invitation is in the clear in emails and on attendee's calendars. This opens XSEDE up to the threat of eavesdropping on private meetings.
Existing Controls
The incident response team uses its own number that is a secret. There are no controls in place for most conference calls or meetings.

Recommended Control Changes
We recommend no changes at this time. While a system could be developed to securely generate, delivery and rotate these PINs, a more onerous process could be very disruptive to meetings for some time. Since this risk is only ranked level 5, it is recommended to simply accept it at this time. Stronger privacy is supported by the system if needed on occasion.

Risk #7 Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: M Impact: L

Vulnerability
Any adversary able to intercept or monitor emails can utilize self-service password resets to their advantage.

Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
An attacker could try to reset a user's account from the portal, capturing the email with the reset code. Then they could log onto resources that they do not have access to normally and/or act as another person maliciously.

Existing Controls
Users would be unable to login themselves if their passwords were changed. An adversary simply able to read the message would not be able to prevent the user from seeing the reset email and being alerted to the issue.

Recommended Control Changes
Completely addressing the problem would make it more difficult to serve users who forget their passwords, a common occurrence. Instead, we should mitigate by simply requiring a secondary email address to be registered with the portal. Therefore, an attacker would have to stop 2 different emails to different accounts to prevent the user from seeing them. We also recommend applying optional two-factor to the XUP, allowing security conscious users to better protect their profile.

Risk #8 Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L

Vulnerability
User credentials are not always encrypted on disk.

Potential Threat Source
Crackers or curious users
**Potential Threat Actions**
Kerberos tickets and proxy certificate keys are usually unencrypted on disk on the HPCs. Anyone able to steal these could masquerade as another user.

**Existing Controls**
File permissions and short life spans are the primary mitigation against credential abuse in this case. On most systems, users are also alerted to their previous login details to help them identify someone using their credentials illicitly. Gateways such as Globus Online, which store many more credentials at a given time, have more protections in place.

**Recommended Control Changes**
We recommend no changes at this time. While shortening ticket or certificate lifetime could reduce this risk, it would decrease usability even more. It is currently balanced so that shortening it more provides diminishing returns for this very low risk.

---

**Vulnerability**
Some services use unencrypted private keys to access XSEDE resources.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers or curious users

**Potential Threat Actions**
Several services run on the backend transferring data to/from the XDCDB, IIS, RDR, IIS metrics, etc. These often depend on permanent SSH keys or GSI certificates to run in automated scripts. Depending upon the lifetime of these credentials and the restrictions on the corresponding accounts, an attacker who compromises one of these systems could steal credentials to leverage elsewhere in an attack on the XSEDE infrastructure.

**Existing Controls**
Files system permissions and some security through obscurity are the main existing controls. Some services utilize a trusted proxy renewal service so that short-lived certificates can still be used in these cases, limiting the abuse of a one-time exposure.

**Recommended Control Changes**
Inventory how system accounts are used for various services and identify those using unencrypted certificates or SSH keys. Protect the credential as best as possible, limit the capabilities of the credential and corresponding account to only those needed, and monitor for any unexpected use of such accounts.

---

**Vulnerability**
Users control their keys and may not protect them adequately.
**Potential Threat Source**  
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**  
XSEDE does not control how users protect SSH private keys or keys corresponding to their X.509 certificates on their own systems. Keys may be unencrypted, or encrypted with poor passphrases. This means a compromise on a user's system could allow an attacker to steal their credentials to logon to an XSEDE resource and spread their attack.

**Existing Controls**  
Automatically created proxy credentials are protected by file permissions, and default umasks, and home directory permissions protect user SSH keys installed onto XSEDE systems. However, nothing protects keys on user systems. Therefore, some SPs do not allow users to login with SSH keys. Short-lived certificates mitigate these problems somewhat by constraining the window of exposure.

**Recommended Control Changes**  
Education can mitigate this risk some, and therefore we recommend putting something about protecting your credentials into the training. Really addressing the issue would mean disabling authentication mechanisms, or taking management of these credentials out of the users’ hands. That is impractical for such a low risk.

---

**Risk #11**  
**Total Risk: 1**  
**Likelihood: L**  
**Impact: L**

**Vulnerability**  
XSEDE lacks a centralized logging infrastructure.

**Potential Threat Source**  
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**  
There is no centralized logging for XSEDE services. This makes it easier for an attacker to erase his digital trail. It also makes it more difficult for incident response teams to investigate a complex, cross-site attack.

**Existing Controls**  
Most individual sites do backup and logging as required for central services, but this is not consistent across every service. XSEDE mitigates some of these challenges by trying to keep a tight collaboration between the incident response teams at various SPs, actively funding security at these different sites.

**Recommended Control Changes**  
If XSEDE provided a centralized syslog service, that would address this risk and potentially make it easier to detect attacks. However, that costs resources to run a new service, set it up, and provide for hardware. Also, it is difficult politically since institutional policy may prevent sharing of log data. The recommended action for this risk is to audit compliance with existing policy and baselines, which require external logging.
Risk #12  Total Risk: 25  Likelihood: M  Impact: M

**Vulnerability**
DNS system lacks authentication for response and synchronization.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
DNSSEC is not used for clients and inconsistently used for server synchronization. This lack of authentication could be exploited to give false responses or poison servers. Besides DoS attacks, this could allow man-in-the-middle attacks for non-certificate based services like regular SSHD and default Globus configurations that rely on DNS for hostname canonicalization.

**Existing Controls**
Syncs are done over XSEDENet, which is somewhat private, and there is a hidden master DNS server. Given that syncs are only allowed between certain IPs, that reduces the risk of some attacks that could corrupt the DNS tables and lead to denial of service. For services that require certificates, we control the trust store of XSEDE certificates and it would be difficult for a man-in-the-middle attack to succeed in those instances. However, some services, like SSHD, would give no indication of false DNS responses being used except for a change in the public key fingerprint.

**Recommended Control Changes**
Some subzones, such as xsede.psc.edu, already use DNSSEC. We recommend implementing this for all subdomains and the xsede.org root as this is becoming standard industry practice.

Risk #13  Total Risk: 5  Likelihood: L  Impact: M

**Vulnerability**
XSEDE hardening guidelines for SPs are unaudited lending to the possibility weaker security at some SPs.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
XSEDE has developed new guidelines for system hardening, but these are not enforced nor audited for compliance. Because of the shared trust fabric, XSEDE is again only as strong as its weakest link, and an attacker could exploit a more lenient security posture at one SP to spread an attack on XSEDE.

**Existing Controls**
Policies and standards exist but are not enforced nor audited.
Recommended Control Changes
SPs must be trained to be aware of existing standards and their importance. Regular auditing should be done to ensure compliance. Finally, services critical to our trust fabric may need special per service baselines.

Risk #14   Total Risk: 25   Likelihood: M   Impact: M

Vulnerability
XSEDE has inconsistent or non-existent backup processes for key resources.

Potential Threat Source
Accident or incompetent staff

Potential Threat Actions
There are many services and systems distributed across XSEDE, but there is no centralized backup or backup policies for critical resources. The hosting SP determines what if anything is backed up. Equipment failure or a major security incident could make it difficult to bring these systems back online in a secure state (especially since not all sites test their restore processes).

Existing Controls
Most services are redundant across more than one SP. This limits the impact of any one failure.

Recommended Control Changes
It would be expensive and politically challenging to create a centralized backup service for XSEDE. Instead, we recommend regular auditing against existing standards, which require backups.

Risk #15   Total Risk: 25   Likelihood: M   Impact: M

Vulnerability
XSEDE does no centralized security monitoring.

Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
XSEDE networks and many publicly facing systems do not utilize any sort of intrusion detection systems and could be compromised with delayed notice. Defacement or disruption of the portal, XSEDE's public face, would be potentially damaging, and lack of monitoring increases the exposure time during incidents. Given the large bandwidth and capabilities of HPCs and perfSonar nodes, a sizable amount of damage from a DoS attack using XSEDE resources could occur in even a short amount of time.
Existing Controls
Most SPs do some network monitoring, and there is considerable Bro expertise within the community that can be leveraged by other SPs. But not all are equal, and not all have a robust monitoring infrastructure. There is monitoring of intelligence channels that would help detect some attacks originating from XSEDE, but that is not a replacement for an IDS.

Recommended Control Changes
Due to the high bandwidth pipes of XSEDENet, it is prohibitively expensive to instrument it with a full IDS. Even filtering out gridFTP traffic, you still need very expensive networking hardware to passively tap this infrastructure. Add to that the cost of expertise, and we can see why SPs with smaller security groups do not do this. Even if all SPs had an IDS and we wanted to correlate alerts, many legal and political issues prevent easy, automated sharing of such data. Therefore, we recommend accepting this risk.

Risk #16 Total Risk: N/A Likelihood: N/A Impact: N/A

Vulnerability
Admins are not required to use strong authentication for management of XSEDE services.

RETIRED: TWO FACTOR IS REQUIRED AND SUPPORTED FOR ALL ADMINISTRATIVE INTERFACES OF XSEDE CENTRAL SERVICES NOW.

Risk #17 Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M

Vulnerability
A critical service is vulnerable to a denial of service attack.

Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
Any Internet facing system could be vulnerable to a DoS attack, given sufficient adversarial resources. Even though XSEDE tries to mitigate this by having replication across multiple sites and redundant network paths, it is still possible for an adversary to mount such an attack, especially against non-replicated services like the XUP and XRAS.

Existing Controls
Replication in most cases mitigates the risk of a service going down because a particular SP is targeted in a DoS, but it does much less if someone is purposefully targeting XSEDE as they could target all replicas. Large network pipes help to keep floods from bringing down the network, but one does not have to saturate the network to bring down something like a web server. Virtualization and good backups, where used, help with a quicker recovery. Finally, some services use Amazon’s EC2 OR CloudFlare for hosting which has its own DoS protections.
**Recommended Control Changes**
Services without offsite replication should be identified. Then those should be replicated in order of criticality. This helps protect against more threats than just targeted DoS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk #18</th>
<th>Total Risk: N/A</th>
<th>Likelihood: N/A</th>
<th>Impact: N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Vulnerability**
There is no consistent patch management process for all XSEDE services and systems. RETIRED: XSEDE NOW UTILIZES REGULAR QUALYS SCANNING FOR A VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND THE MAIN CONCERN IS JUST AUDITING ITS USE NOW.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk #19</th>
<th>Total Risk: 1</th>
<th>Likelihood: L</th>
<th>Impact: L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Vulnerability**
User data has weak isolation guarantees on most resources.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers and curious users

**Potential Threat Actions**
There is little besides file system permissions or ACLs that isolate users and their data on most XSEDE systems. There is potential for such basic mechanisms to be overcome and allow data snooping by adversaries. When networked file systems are used without encryption, this threat is increased.

**Existing Controls**
Users are warned that they should not put highly confidential materials on XSEDE, or if they do to use encryption appropriately. However, the onus is completely on the user.

**Recommended Control Changes**
This is a very low risk considering the types of data used on XSEDE. While more complicated file systems that use encryption could be utilized, the performance cost would be significant for such a low risk. Therefore we recommend accepting this risk and just reminding users during regular security training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk #20</th>
<th>Total Risk: 5</th>
<th>Likelihood: M</th>
<th>Impact: L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Vulnerability**
Helpdesk tickets are emailed in plaintext.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers
Potential Threat Actions
Much of the ticket system communication is done over plaintext emails. Since some of the tickets are sensitive and contain security relevant information, attackers snooping those emails could gain an advantage.

Existing Controls
We have alternative, secure communication channels for security issues. Staff can also link to content on the staff wiki rather than email it directly.

Recommended Control Changes
We could stop putting the contents of the tickets in the email, but instead just send a URL to the ticket. However, this does not address the first email that creates a ticket, and it decreases usability measurably. Being such a low risk, we do not recommend making any technical changes. However, it would be prudent to remind users in training not to put very sensitive information in these emails. Sensitive details could instead be revealed over the phone or through other means.

Risk #21 Total Risk: 1 Likelihood: L Impact: L
Vulnerability
Incident response team members may log sensitive IM chats.

Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
The incident response Jabber server uses SSL and does not log conversations. However, there is no control over the endpoints when using the Jabber server for incident response. So messages could be logged on client hosts and accessed more easily or exposed if a laptop is lost. This inside information could be used for gain by an attacker.

Existing Controls
There are no controls other than the fact that these are very security conscious people who likely harden their systems and don’t log sensitive chats without encryption. However, there is no way to be sure the person on the other end is not logging.

Recommended Control Changes
We could create a policy requiring people on the incident response team to use full disk encryption on their workstations or turn logging off. However, there would be no way to verify this, and it is somewhat onerous to require for a very low risk.

Risk #22 Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: L Impact: M
Vulnerability
Deployed software could be out of date with stale CTSS registrations info.
Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
While there is a common software stack for XSEDE compatibility, there is an inconsistency across sites on versions deployed, with some sites using very out-of-date pieces software. This affects major software and central services less as we are using Qualys. However, there is a threat that an attacker could leverage an exploit at one site to gain a foothold at another.

Existing Controls
There is a list of current software for the XSEDE software stack, but this is not audited nor enforced for patch-levels.

Recommended Control Changes
Security operations should regularly audit for compliance with this patch management policy, and SEI should work with SPs to update as appropriate.

Risk #23  Total Risk: 25  Likelihood: M  Impact: M

Vulnerability
XSEDE relies heavily on in-house software that has not had code audits.

Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
Many applets and pieces of software for XSEDE have been developed in-house without code reviews or expertise in security. There are likely unknown security flaws that could be exploited in a targeted attack. This is especially true of something as complex as the user portal, whose compromise would be harmful to XSEDE's reputation.

Existing Controls
There are few existing controls, but XSEDE benefits from the obscurity of much of this software, especially the pieces installed on HPCs. The XUP is scanned with a Qualys web app vulnerability detection service.

Recommended Control Changes
Either internally or using an external service, perform code audits of commonly deployed XSEDE software. This could mean requiring them to use SWAMP\textsuperscript{17} or Coverity\textsuperscript{18} as part of the SD&I review. This only helps for open source code bases.

\textsuperscript{17} https://continuousassurance.org/
\textsuperscript{18} https://scan.coverity.com/
**Risk #24**  
Total Risk: 1  
Likelihood: L  
Impact: L

**Vulnerability**  
Some XSEDE resources depend upon proprietary, unvetted protocols.

**Potential Threat Source**  
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**  
Some proprietary protocols have been created for services (e.g., Globus listener over UDP). Developing secure protocols in nefariously hard, and in some cases there is no indication that any encryption or signing has been done. A very targeted attacker could exploit protocol vulnerabilities in ways that are very difficult to detect or deter.

**Existing Controls**  
Obscurity, lack of a likely threat source, and the fact that there are many simpler methods of penetration make this unlikely. However, there are few controls deployed to protect against this threat other than generic methods to detect compromises. The only effective control we see used is that some of these protocols are tunneled through SSH or over SSL.

**Recommended Control Changes**  
New protocols get reviewed as part of the design review in SD&I, and here we try to identify protocol weaknesses. Also, we push hard for communicating over secure tunnels to mitigate these types of risks. While we could try and force all existing protocols through the review process, this is infeasible as SD&I struggles to keep up with its current load. Furthermore, this is a very time intensive process. Therefore, given the low risk and the difficulty of running every grandfathered-in service through a new review, we recommend accepting this risk.

---

**Risk #25**  
Total Risk: 25  
Likelihood: M  
Impact: M

**Vulnerability**  
XSEDE depends upon software that is no longer actively supported.

**Potential Threat Source**  
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**  
XSEDE depends on some software that no longer has active development. This means there may be no one there to fix security or reliability bugs which could be exploited maliciously (e.g., gaining shell access, privilege escalation or DoS), and it has caused migration challenges as we have had to move to new standards like SHA-2 certificates.

**Existing Controls**  
There are no controls currently applied to this general problem. In fact, not even all of the currently unsupported software is identified in one place.
**Recommended Control Changes**
Identify unsupported software in the XSEDE software stack and either (a) retire and eradicate it, (b) update or replace it, or (c) commit resources to adopt and maintain it.

---

**Risk #26**  
**Total Risk:** N/A  
**Likelihood:** N/A  
**Impact:** N/A

**Vulnerability**
Globus Online does not follow best practices with all of their key handling.  
**RETIRED: THE GLOBUS TEAM MADE SEVERAL CHANGES AFTER A SECURITY REVIEW BY XSEDE SECURITY OPERATIONS.**

---

**Risk #27**  
**Total Risk:** 50  
**Likelihood:** H  
**Impact:** M

**Vulnerability**
There is a zero-day root escalation exploit in the wild for Linux or some common piece of the XSEDE software stack.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
Software vulnerabilities are commonly found, and there are often crackers sitting on harvested user credentials waiting for the next Linux zero-day that could allow them to escalate their privileges to obtain root on an XSEDE resource.

**Existing Controls**
Short-lived certificates reduce the usefulness of harvesting those credentials. Some sites ban public key authentication for this reason. Portals like GlobusOnline are provided an OAuth MyProxy service so that users do not have to expose their XSEDE credentials to more places where they could potentially be harvested. The security operations team also monitors Bugtraq and other intelligence channels looking out for new exploits in the wild and recommend reactions based on the estimated threat to XSEDE. Finally, users are notified of the time and hostname from where they last logged in, helping them to notice if their account is compromised.

**Recommended Control Changes**
This is one of our highest risks because it has traditionally been one of our largest problems, and we still rely on basic password authentication for XSEDE. While we do not yet recommend forcing OTP for all users as it is costly for our user base and decreases usability, there is an additional mitigation we recommend beyond training and education. Password weaknesses are one of the key components of this vulnerability. Moving XSEDE towards randomly assigned passwords would make it much less likely that their XSEDE password is the same that they use for other accounts, especially if it doesn’t meet the construction rules for other accounts. This has worked well for the past several years on Blue Waters when we need to issue passwords in bulk for classes and work-
shops. This won't eliminate the problem as passwords can still be harvested, but the spread of exploits can be hindered.

---

**Risk #28**  **Total Risk: 25**  **Likelihood: M**  **Impact: M**

**Vulnerability**
There is a common XSEDE service with a remote exploit.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
By virtue of having services online, there is always a risk that a new vulnerability is discovered that allows remote exploitation that could either be combined with a local root escalation or that gives root itself. If such an exploit is in the wild and XSEDE is vulnerable, it is only a matter of time before scans by crackers discover it and exploit it.

**Existing Controls**
The security operations team monitors Bugtraq and other intelligence channels looking out for new exploits in the wild and recommend reactions based on the estimated threat to XSEDE. Also, we have deployed a vulnerability management program based on Qualys.

**Recommended Control Changes**
We recommend identifying remotely accessible services listening on XSEDE systems and disabling unnecessary and insecure services. This is already a part of the existing security standards, but we need to start auditing them.

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**Risk #29**  **Total Risk: N/A**  **Likelihood: N/A**  **Impact: N/A**

**Vulnerability**
Security policies and procedures from TeraGrid are out-of-date.

**RETIRED: KEY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN UPDATED AND ACCEPTED.**

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**Risk #30**  **Total Risk: 25**  **Likelihood: L**  **Impact: M**

**Vulnerability**
Services and software grand-fathered into XSEDE have not gone through the formal review processes that are now a part of XSEDE.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
With inconsistent standards, attackers could target grand-fathered services which might not pass security reviews today, though many of these are retired or replaced in time.
Existing Controls
Nothing currently mitigates the specific risk of targeting grandfathered-in services. These services are protected by the many generic security controls in place already, but nothing extra is done for specifically for them.

Recommended Control Changes
The software that hasn’t gone through SD&I and is open source should be run through SWAMP or Coverity.

| Risk #31 | Total Risk: 50 | Likelihood: H | Impact: M |

Vulnerability
There is no regular security training for XSEDE staff, and the annual training for new users is optional and only available at the XSEDE conference.

Potential Threat Source
Staff or users making mistakes

Potential Threat Actions
If users do not know what they should and should not do with respect to security, it is more likely that they can be taken advantage of by social engineers and that they do not protect their credentials well enough. Because we don't audit SPs, this makes it more likely that XSEDE staff are not following security baselines either. Failures to implement policy and procedure are therefore more likely and could result in more downtime and slower response to an incident.

Existing Controls
Optional new user training at the XSEDE conference is the only security training provided. Adherence to policy and procedure is not audited for either staff or users.

Recommended Control Changes
We should develop targeted training for different levels of SPs, users & XSEDE staff. One goal is to familiarize them with important policies and procedures, another is to bring awareness of threats such as social engineering. Some of this should be interactive (whether online or at meetings) and perhaps mandatory for staff. Just as important as developing materials is planning for adequate and regular dissemination (including at the annual XSEDE conference).

We also need to support regular audits at level 1 SPs, to verify that training is working and policies and procedures are followed.

| Risk #32 | Total Risk: 25 | Likelihood: M | Impact: M |

Vulnerability
Incident response resources at different SPs vary, and the XSEDE incident response (IR) team is geographically distributed.
Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
Different sites are more or less prepared to detect and respond to incidents, giving adversaries strategic options when deciding where to attack XSEDE. Being geographically and institutionally separated, the XSEDE IR team members must work harder to coordinate activities and overcome hurdles with information sharing that could slow response.

Existing Controls
We have bi-weekly security meetings and weekly incident response calls, both of which are rarely cancelled. We also have an incident response shared wiki space, a shared GPG email key, and a secure Jabber server for communication.

Recommended Control Changes
In addition to all that we regular do with the existing controls, XSEDE should have regular security incident drills, requiring participation from all level 1 SPs. There should also be mechanisms in place to hold SPs accountable for participation.

Risk #33 Total Risk: 25 Likelihood: M Impact: M

Vulnerability
There are no special security baselines for most services, and there is no regular auditing with respect to security.

Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
As time goes by, systems likely drift from more secure and up-to-date configurations to less secure states. Crackers can target such infrastructure and find vulnerabilities to exploit more easily.

Existing Controls
The System, Software & Engineering group does have a change control and testing process, which helps keep XSEDE-specific software more up-to-date. Qualys does this for the base OS and common software. Also, the SD&I security reviews and collaboration with the deployment team helps to ensure that when new services initially go online they are up-to-date.

Recommended Control Changes
We recommend developing individual baselines for critical services to the trust fabric of XSEDE, and we need to audit against those and other baselines.
Risk #34    Total Risk: 25    Likelihood: M    Impact: M

**Vulnerability**
XSEDE has very complex organizational and procedural structures.

**Potential Threat Source**
Mistakes or oversights by staff

**Potential Threat Actions**
With a large complex organizational structure with many geographically separated employees only part-time committed to XSEDE, there is increased risk of inaction or slow action at critical moments. This is exacerbated when roles and process are unclear and has an impact beyond just security—though agility is particularly important for security.

**Existing Controls**
In many ways this is a generalization of risk #32. So some of those controls are applicable to at least the security team, which is more tightly knit than many groups. But where security interacts with other groups, these organizational issues can become a security risk.

**Recommended Control Changes**
We should maintain strong leadership and regular meetings for XSEDE security operations. Participation of level 1 SPs should not be optional. Security personnel and resource allocations should also be evaluated and redistributed at least annually to be proportional to where the work is done or needs to be done. While we cannot do anything about XSEDE’s overall organizational structure or geography, we can keep the operations security group tight knit with good lines of communication.

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Risk #35    Total Risk: N/A    Likelihood: N/A    Impact: N/A

**Vulnerability**
Resources for security in XSEDE could be inadequate.

**RETIRED. SECURITY OPERATIONS HAS REMAINED SUPPORTED DURING THE FIRST 5 YEARS AND IS A PART OF THE RENEWAL PROCESS.**

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Risk #36    Total Risk: 50    Likelihood: H    Impact: M

**Vulnerability**
Passwords can be compromised and harvested.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers
**Potential Threat Actions**
Crackers can sit on passwords that are compromised and wait for privilege escalation vulnerabilities. These exposures may not even happen on XSEDE resources, but bleed over to XSEDE because of password reuse.

**Existing Controls**
Users are notified of the time and hostname from where they last logged in, helping them to notice if their account is compromised.

**Recommended Control Changes**
We recommend moving users away from choosing their own passwords to choosing from a set of randomly generated passwords. This will require changes in password policy and reset mechanisms.

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**Risk #37**  
**Total Risk:** 5  
**Likelihood:** M  
**Impact:** L

**Vulnerability**
Most SPs have not done risk assessments.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers

**Potential Threat Actions**
Because individual SPs have not completed similar risk assessments a level lower, XSEDE cannot fully understand its risks. We assume the physical and cyber security of these centers as a starting point, and we may miss important vulnerabilities that should be addressed.

**Existing Controls**
We have vulnerability management in place for XSEDE central services and a lot of shared expertise and threat knowledge across SPs. Baselines exist that should be utilized by SPs and cover the basics of security.

**Recommended Control Changes**
We should perform audits to make sure XSEDE systems and services stay true to baselines. Audits need not be invasive, and may consist in part of questionnaires to be filled out by SPs or checklists for them to complete.

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**Risk #38**  
**Total Risk:** 1  
**Likelihood:** L  
**Impact:** L

**Vulnerability**
XSEDE has no social engineering awareness training for staff.

**Potential Threat Source**
Crackers
Potential Threat Actions
Social-engineering is addressed in the optional annual user training for users help at the XSEDE conference. However, staff aren't trained to protect against social engineering, and it isn't considered as a part of most processes. Mitigating this though, account resets are automated and don't require a person in-the-loop anyway, and resources are physically spread out across many organizations. Finally, open scientific research isn't often threatened by targeted attacks for data.

Existing Controls
There are no current controls.

Recommended Control Changes
As we develop staff training, we should make sure staff who can affect user accounts or allocations are taught the importance of integrating social-engineering protections into processes they develop or implement.

Risk #39 Total Risk: 5 Likelihood: L Impact: M

Vulnerability
Passwordless remote root keys used for XWFS.

Potential Threat Source
Crackers

Potential Threat Actions
The XWFS is configured in a way that requires remote root logins across sites via passwordless SSH keys for GPFS. While some mitigations have been in place, this could allow a root exploit to spread across sites undetectably.

Existing Controls
Remote root login is only available from 3 IP addresses, and the private keys only exist on those 3 replicas. Password authentication for root is disabled in the SSHD config on those hosts. Finally, admins must authenticate via two-factor to manage those hosts.

Recommended Control Changes
This risk was already accepted with the controls above as part of the operational readiness review.