THE NEW “OLD COUNTRY”
THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE CREATION
OF A YUGOSLAV DIASPORA 1914-1951

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation reviews the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s attempt to instill “Yugoslav” national consciousness in its overseas population of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as well as resistance to that same project, collectively referred to as a “Yugoslav diaspora.” Diaspora is treated as constructed phenomenon based on a transnational network between individuals and organizations, both emigrant and otherwise. In examining Yugoslav overseas nation-building, this dissertation is interested in the mechanics of diasporic networks—what catalyzes their formation, what are the roles of international organizations, and how are they influenced by the political context in the host country. The life of Louis Adamic, who was a central figure within this emerging network, provides a framework for this monograph, which begins with his arrival in the United States in 1914 and ends with his death in 1951.

Each chapter spans roughly five to ten years. Chapter One (1914-1924) deals with the initial encounter between Yugoslav diplomats and emigrants. Chapter Two (1924-1929) covers the beginnings of Yugoslav overseas nation-building. Chapter Three (1929-1934) covers Yugoslavia’s shift into a royal dictatorship and the corresponding effect on its emigration policy. Chapter Four (1929-1939) deals exclusively with political parties from Yugoslavia that aspired to organize overseas Yugoslav subjects. Chapter Five (1934-1941) deals with Yugoslav overseas nation building and cultural outreach after King Alexander’s death. Chapter Six (1941-1945) covers the formation of a Yugoslav diaspora organization, the United Committee of South Slavic Americans, during the Second World War. Lastly, Chapter Seven (1945-1951) covers the disintegration of the Yugoslav diaspora in Cold War Era America.

This dissertation draws five major conclusions. First, there was, for a period in history, a “Yugoslav” diaspora rather than just a Serb, Croat, and Slovene diaspora. Secondly, this diaspora
emerged due to factors specific to interwar America: closed border policies, America’s reputation as a “melting pot,” and the cultural pluralist movement, all of which had a centripetal effect on Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations and gave them a reason to cooperate. Third, the Yugoslav nationalism espoused by these organizations was distinct from Yugoslavism in Yugoslavia, exhibiting syncretism with the nationalism of the host country, the United States. Fourth, old-country tourism—and travelers more broadly—are crucial to the formation of diasporic networks, (re)awakening national consciousness and giving the traveler symbolic capital within emigrant organizations. And fifth, the strength of diasporic networks lies not in their ability to shape “old country” politics, but in their ability to resist “old country” control.
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All errors are my own.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION** ................................................................................................................................. 1

**CHAPTER ONE: THE NEW ‘OLD COUNTRY’** ....................................................................................... 30

**CHAPTER TWO: ANSWERING THE ‘EMIGRATION QUESTION’** ....................................................... 78

**CHAPTER THREE: THE DICTATORSHIP AND THE ‘TENTH BANOVINA’** ........................................... 125

**CHAPTER FOUR: YUGOSLAV POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ‘TENTH BANOVINA’** ....................... 178

**CHAPTER FIVE: ON THEIR OWN: YUGOSLAV CULTURAL POLITICS FROM 1934-1941** ............... 249

**CHAPTER SIX: YUGOSLAVS UNITE!: THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE YUGOSLAV DIASPORA** ................................................................................................................................. 307

**CHAPTER SEVEN: THE YUGOSLAV DIASPORA DISINTEGRATES** .................................................... 365

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ................................................................................................................................. 407

**APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF YUGOSLAVS IN THE UNITED STATES** ................. 415
INTRODUCTION

In April 2017, while in Buenos Aires for a conference, I, along with two sociologists from Croatia, attended an event organized by the Union of Croats in Argentina. My Croatian companions referred to this, tongue-in-cheek, as “an anthropological expedition,” as if we were going to observe the customs of a remote uncontacted tribe rather than my colleagues’ co-nationals. The reason for their witticism soon became apparent, as it turned out that the morning and afternoon’s entertainment were the 76th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), a genocidal fascist state established in 1941 after the Nazis invaded and dismembered Yugoslavia. Following a Catholic Mass held in a nearby chapel, a flag-waving procession, and speeches in a nearby ethnic club in Croatian and Spanish condemning Yugoslavia (a state that has been defunct since 1992), we listened to a choir of around fifteen youths in Croatian folk costume singing folk songs. Afterwards, the adults communed in the back for plum brandy and gossip. In the program I saw advertisements for Croatian language schools, bars, radio stations, and podiatrists. At the time, I was struck by the banality of the event—less a fascist rally than a high school concert.

The banality of fascism is hardly a fresh observation.1 But my companion’s quip—“an anthropological expedition”—was more than a witticism; it hinted at a deeper insight. After all, the kind of diaspora nationalism there was foreign to all of us: to me, because I was an American, and to my Croatian colleagues because Argentina’s Croats had a reputation of being further to the right than Croats in Croatia. Argentina, after all, was where Ante Pavelić, the leader of the NDH, fled in 1948. There, Pavelić founded the Croatian Liberation Movement, the grandfather of several far-right groups that carried out several acts of terrorism in the 1960s and

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1970s, causing communist authorities to start referring to the “enemy Yugoslav migration.” The relationship between Yugoslavia and “its” diaspora was not always thus. Traces of a forgotten period of Yugoslav activism can still be found in the United States today: two sculptures by Ivan Meštrović in Grant Park, Chicago, a “Yugoslav Room” in the Cathedral of Learning in Pittsburgh, and a “Yugoslav garden” in Cleveland, to name a few examples. And in Buenos Aires, in 1918 and 1941, the Yugoslav National Defense was one of several emigrant organizations calling for a unified Yugoslav State. Still, there was a reason Pavelić went to Argentina—during the interwar period, Buenos Aires was a major hub of Ustaša activity, both publishing and recruitment. Aside from being a gibe about Buenos Aires, however, my companions’ witticism—“an anthropological expedition”—suggested that diaspora nationalism was not simply homeland nationalism transposed abroad, but a distinctive phenomenon that ought to be studied and explained in its own right. How is diaspora nationalism different from “regular” nationalism and what makes it so?

**Diaspora Nationalism: A Review of the Literature**

Much like the study of regular nationalism, the study of diaspora nationalism owes a debt to Benedict Anderson, who coined the term “Long-distance Nationalism” in a lecture in 1992, helping to popularize a growing field of study. For Anderson, “Long-distance Nationalism” was a side-effect of international capitalism and technology in the twentieth century. Since the 1930s, the accelerating improvement of travel, from steamships to commercial airliners, along with advancements in telecommunications, from radio to the internet, has made it ever easier for migrants to maintain sentimental and political ties with their country of origin. Although Anderson concedes that it would “be a mistake to assume that long-distance nationalism is

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necessarily extremist,” citing the benign effect of migrant remittances, Anderson’s assessment of long-distance nationalism was pessimistic, calling it a “menacing portent for the future.” Long-distance nationalists, Anderson argues, are insulated from the consequences of their political demands by geography, which encourages a certain irresponsibility. Writing in the early nineties, Anderson could observe firsthand how long distance nationalists were fanning conflicts in the Caucasus and Sri Lanka. The breakup of Yugoslavia loomed especially large for Anderson, who cites several examples of diaspora meddling, including the ill-fated Yugoslav premiership of the Serbian-American Milan Panić or the Canadian pizza restauranteur Gojko Šušak, who bankrolled the election of the Croatian far-right politician Franjo Tudjmann, later serving as Tudjmann’s minister of defense. In part, this monograph is a reaction to this negative portrayal, to show how long-distance nationalism helped develop the Yugoslav idea, fifty years before it contributed to its destruction, that diaspora nationalists could pour oil on troubled waters instead of igniting the powder keg.

Of course, Anderson was not the only scholar to observe the increasing salience of diaspora nationalism in the modern world, nor even the first. One year earlier, Khachig Tölöyan had founded the journal Diaspora, arguing that, over the last few decades, a cartography of sovereign and bounded nations was being undermined by the forces of globalization and an increasingly-mobile population, which he called “our transnational moment.” Like Anderson, Tölöyan identified the proliferation of diaspora national movements in the twentieth century, even if the phenomenon of “diaspora” could be dated back centuries or even millennia. Nonetheless, transnationalism, Tölöyan argued, meant less the end of nations-states and more a

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4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid, 71-74.
transformation in which national communities were imagined, calling on new studies that would
document these new diaspora movements. Unlike Anderson, Tölölyan hesitated to pronounce a verdict on whether diaspora nationalism was malign or benign.

Since the founding of *Diaspora*, the numbers of studies of diasporas have ballooned. And with this growth, as Rogers Brubaker documents, the meanings of the term “diaspora” have also stretched. Although the original meanings of “diaspora” were built around “classical” diasporas—Greeks, Jews, and Armenians—since the 1980s the meaning of “diaspora” has evolved to encompass any group of people living abroad who maintain political and economic ties to their original homeland. This includes both economic and political migrants, so long as they constitute a population, defined by religion, culture, or subculture that is somehow dispersed in space, oriented toward a real or imagined homeland, and separate from the general population through self-maintained cultural boundaries. The latter two characteristics make diaspora a category of practice—maintaining ties with the homeland along with the culture of that homeland requires work. But what percent of a population needs to be engaged in such activities for them to count as a diaspora? Gabriel Sheffer distinguishes between “core,” “marginal,” and “dormant” or “silent” members of diasporas, a framework borrowed by several other scholars of diaspora. It is uncontroversial to claim that, even in several universally-acknowledged “diasporas,” such as the Jewish, Chinese, Armenian, or Greek diasporas, only a small percentage of the population is engaged in the “work” of diaspora, of running organizations, fostering cultural retention, and maintaining ties with the homeland. Of course, this is no less true for

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regular nationalism—as Michael Billig has argued, most people devote little time or conscious thought to their national identity, save in times of crisis, when “banal nationalism” evolves into conscious patriotism or even jingoism.\(^9\) It would be unfair to hold “diaspora nationalism” to a different standard.

Nonetheless, the low level of participation for “diaspora nationalism” has led one scholar of the “Croatian diaspora,” Francesco Ragazzi, to provocatively claim that “there is no such thing as diaspora.” Rather, Ragazzi argues, diaspora is a speech act—someone, typically a representative of a diaspora civil society organization, or of the host or sending country, claims to speak on behalf of an imagined community of overseas nationals.\(^9\) Several scholars have echoed this point. Brubaker, for instance, characterizes diaspora as a political “claim” or a “category of practice,”\(^11\) as does Zlatko Skrbiš\(^12\) and Øivind Fuglerud.\(^13\) A related approach, proposed by Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick-Schiller, involves treating diaspora as “social field,” multiple interlocking networks of relationships that act as conduits for ideas, practices, and resources. Political movements, on which Brubaker, Skrbiš, and Fuglerud focused, are one type of network, but they are by no means the only kind. Levitt and Glick-Schiller identify remittances, family ties, and the dual-citizenship practices of sending states as other kinds networks.\(^14\) Tsypylma Darieva has identified travel and leisure as another such transnational

\(^11\) Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” 12
\(^12\) Zlatko Skrbiš, *Long Distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands, and Identities* (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999) 4-5.
practice as well, one that might, this dissertation argues, even be the most powerful in creating diaspora nationalists and stitching together movements.

Treating diaspora as practice and/or as network also dovetails with theories of “regular” nationalism that sidestep the question of “identity” to look at nationalism as practice. Treating nationalism as identity introduces two problems. First, it is impractical to prove that everyone in a “nation” thinks themselves a member of a nation, which is only doable through interviews or surveys, data which usually not available in historical cases. And secondly, identity-based theories of nationalism may ignore the existence of multiple identities—regional, professional, and so on, among which the national identity may not even be the most important. This is especially true for migrants, as a recurrent theme of the historiography on emigrant nationalism is “hybridity.” Yossi Shain, for instance, argues that diaspora lobbies in the United States, while maintaining an interest in homeland affairs, have worked to export “American values” such as democracy and pluralism to their homelands. On the other hand, as Tara Zahra argues, diaspora “hybridity” may be in the eye of the beholder—nationalizing states, seeking to exert authority over “their” population, often identify “national indifference” as a symptom for which better national indoctrination is a cure.

Nonetheless, it seems clear that when explaining the character of diaspora nationalism, one needs to consider both the host and the sending country. Rogers Brubaker, for instance, proposes a triadic model to think about the relationships between diaspora nationalists, the host

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17 Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad.
country, and homeland nationalists. Basing his conclusions on the case study of Russians living outside the Russian Federation in the former Soviet Union, Brubaker observed that host countries, newly nationalizing states like Estonia or Finland, often discriminate against or try to assimilate their Russian minorities. This, in turn, brings them into conflict with the second member of the triad, homeland nation nationalists, who seek to defend these embattled minorities, insofar as this is compatible with the national interest, and using them to rally support for a domestic nationalist agenda. This limited and instrumental commitment, in turn, creates tension with the third member of the triad, the national minority, which seeks to preserve their cultural distinctiveness and political rights.\textsuperscript{19} Although originally intended to describe the post-1991 political situation in Eastern Europe, Brubaker’s model has proven adaptable to other places and times, forming the implicit framework to many studies of diaspora nationalism, including my own. Yet Brubaker’s triadic model, runs the risk of what Andreas Wimmer and Nina Schiller term “methodological nationalism.” By methodological nationalism, Wimmer and Schiller have three methodological sins in mind. The first is teleology—assuming, in a world of nation-states, that nation-states are both natural and inevitable, weakening explanations of success with the presumption of destiny.\textsuperscript{20} Studying Yugoslavia, a nation-state most now treat as artificial and doomed, at least circumvents Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene methodological nationalism.

A second path to methodological nationalism is limiting the bounds of inquiry—which archives one visits, which organizations or phenomenon one studies, to the boundaries of the


\textsuperscript{20} Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State building, migration, and the social sciences” \textit{Global Networks} 2, no. 4, (2002): 304.
nation-state. A good example of this would be writing a political history of interwar Yugoslavia, as Ivo Banac does, but only looking at the activities of Yugoslav politicians when they are inside Yugoslavia. This monograph also avoids this pitfall by extending its bounds of inquiry as far afield as Western Europe and North and South America. Yugoslav’s politics, as this dissertation will show, were not so neatly bounded, as political parties from Yugoslavia constituted a political force abroad on par with the agents of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Despite the aesthetic and numerological appeal of the trinity, it would be better to amend Brubaker’s triad to a tetrad. This monograph is not the first to propose such a revision—David Smith, for instance, based on his work on post-Soviet Estonia, has likewise argued for a “quadratic nexus.”

International organizations, he argues, contribute to shaping diasporic identity politics in Eastern Europe. However, the kinds of international organizations he refers to—NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe—are starkly different from transnational parties in terms of their resources, agenda, and structure. The EU and its associated institutions of transnational governance typically pressure the host country to respect minority rights—they do not attempt to stoke diaspora nationalism or raise money to support various causes in the EU. Despite these differences, transnational parties, along with international organizations like the Comintern and the Catholic Church, likewise shaped the organizational development of the Yugoslav diaspora. This, in turn, suggests that quadratic nexus is a valid methodological model for the diasporic politics even before the era of globalization in the 1990s.

Interwar Yugoslavia was much more affected by global currents than historians typically assume. For this reason, my study of the “tenth banovina” will supplement the work of historians

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of Yugoslavia. Andrew Wachtel, Sabrina Ramet, Pieter Troch, and Dejan Djokić, have discussed, for instance, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s effort to propagate Yugoslav unity among its subjects. Additionally, Ivo Banac has an excellent overview of Yugoslav interwar political parties that remains unparallele
d, despite being three decades old. Nonetheless, each monograph’s examination of interwar Yugoslavia’s society, culture, and political problems stop at Yugoslavia’s borders. As a result, the picture these works present of Yugoslavia is incomplete, as Yugoslavia’s borders are not coterminous with the population that it desired to influence and control. On the contrary, as this dissertation will argue, the diaspora functioned, in effect, as the antechamber of Yugoslav politics and society. Programs to create good Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia, for instance, such as the law on holidays, were also implemented in the diaspora. Likewise, Yugoslav politicians regularly traveled to the tenth banovina to raise support, especially after the ban on political activity in Yugoslavia in 1929. For that reason, this monograph will be a useful supplement to anyone interested in interwar Yugoslavia, as it enriches our understanding not just of Yugoslav political parties, but also on the development of the Yugoslav idea and its viability.

Used incautiously, Brubaker’s treatment of the diaspora as an actor with an agenda may lead to oversimplification. After all, the third risk of “methodological nationalism” is to assume that the national minority is politically homogenous, ignoring divisions based on class, gender, region, or politics—some of which are fostered by diaspora political parties. Indeed, diasporas

can have many internal divisions. As Nadejda Marinova documents in her study of the Iraqi diaspora, no émigré organization represents everybody: Sunni and Shia, Left and Right, Kurd and Arab. To take other examples, the “Lebanese diaspora” is split between Christians and Muslims, just as the “Cuban diaspora” is divided between anti-Castro political migrants and a newer generation of economic migrants.27 If these are treated and studied as “diasporas,” there is no reason why we should not look for a “Yugoslav diaspora,” or even several “Yugoslav diasporas,” even if this frame of inquiry may not always find one. By the same token, there is no reason a “Serbian diaspora” and a “Yugoslav diaspora” cannot both exist at different places and times. As will be shown in the upcoming chapters, the divisions between migrants from Yugoslavia—Serb, Croat, and Slovene, Left-wing and Right-wing, religious and secular, are no more severe than these examples. So long as there is as a trans-oceanic political network characterized by the integration and participation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovene organizations, that is large enough to represent plausibly, in the eyes of contemporaries, represent the will of an imagined diasporic community, and that is mobilized in support of a common Yugoslav homeland, then we can speak of a “Yugoslav Diaspora” as well. This dissertation examines how such a diaspora emerged, or rather, was made, during the interwar period.

Similar studies already exist for other “diasporas.” Donna Gabaccia has written an enormously influential study of Italian emigration. Building on the theory of diaspora based around networks and practice rather than identity, Gabaccia argues that Italy had not one diaspora, but many, which were variously linked together by village origin, family, profession, class, or political ideology. Although professing agnosticism at the idea of a singular “Italian diaspora,” Gabaccia nonetheless argues that a transnational methodology, broadening the frame

of inquiry beyond the confines of specific nation states to examine Italians around the world, can yield new insights not just into the sort of networks that make a diaspora, but also the formation of the Italian nation and the global labor movement. Particularly illuminating are Gabaccia’s fifth and sixth chapters, which cover Liberal Italy’s and Mussolini’s attempts to make Italians abroad, contemporaries of a similar project in Yugoslavia. Liberal Italy’s nation-building project is covered in more detail in Mark Choate’s Emigrant Nation, which argues that the projects of “making Italians” at home and abroad were interrelated and mutually-reinforcing. Italian consuls claimed emigrants as an organic part of the Italian nation, including them in the census and supporting ethnic schools, churches, and patriotic societies in order to maintain Italian nationalism in the face of assimilative pressures. A loyal diaspora, in turn, could be a source not just of money, but technical expertise and national pride.

Although Italy pioneered this model of transnational nationhood, it was not the only state to do so. For instance, during the interwar period, Hungary fought attempts to assimilate Hungarians abroad by subsidizing language schools and forging relationships with diaspora political parties. Simultaneously, Hungary gathered demographic data on Hungarians living outside of Hungary, using this information both to formulate policy and for patriotic propaganda. Similar policies were pursued by Poland and Germany in the interwar period

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29 Ibid, 129-152.
and at various times by China\textsuperscript{33} and Mexico,\textsuperscript{34} as well. Likewise, several states have even adopted similar language in referring to “its” diaspora. Haiti, like Yugoslavia, calls its overseas community its “tenth province,”\textsuperscript{35} just as the diaspora is the “fourth district” of Poland\textsuperscript{36} or the “fifteenth department” of El Salvador.\textsuperscript{37} So, Yugoslavia’s ambitions for “its” diaspora were hardly unique. Although one could argue that another study of overseas nation-building is superfluous, the Yugoslav case is special in one important respect: it failed. Unlike its contemporaries, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia neither forged a lasting emigrant “Yugoslav” identity or a loyal “Yugoslav” political diaspora, although a temporary “diaspora” did emerge whose Yugoslavism differed markedly from that of their titular homeland. Just as the best way to understand a bicycle is to fix it oneself when it breaks down, dysfunctional national projects can yield new insights into the inner workings of nationalism and national movements.

There have, of course, been studies of the Serbian and the Croatian diaspora as well. George Prpić, a Croatian scholar who emigrated from the Independent State of Croatia following the German surrender in May, 1945,\textsuperscript{38} published a well-researched but tendentious history of the “Croatian diaspora” in 1971. Prpić’s decision to examine the “Croatian diaspora” in near-complete isolation from the Serbian and Slovenian diaspora organizations should be a cautionary tale of the dangers of methodological nationalism. Restricting his frame of inquiry to purely-

\textsuperscript{35} Choate, \textit{Emigrant Nation}, 223.
\textsuperscript{36} Donna Gabaccia, Dirk Hoerder, and Adam Walaszek, “Emigration and Nation Building During the Mass Migrations from Europe,” in Nancy Green and Francois Weil, eds. \textit{Citizenship and Those Who Leave} (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 77-79,
\textsuperscript{38} Francis Eterovich and Christopher Spalatin, eds. \textit{Croatia: Land, People, Culture}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), Appendix A.
Croatian nationalists leads him, for instance, to focus his account of the interwar period on the *Hrvatski Kolo* (Croatian Circle), a small and relatively unimportant far-right organization, rather than the Croatian Fraternal Union, the largest Croatian organization which, inconveniently, had a substantial Yugoslavist following. The fact that in the 1930s the CFU also joined a federation of Yugoslav societies, alongside Serbian and Slovene organizations, goes completely unmentioned, just as the participation of the CFU in the United Committee of South Slavic Americans during World War II is spun as support for “Sovietization,” rather than Yugoslavism.39 Conversely, the fascistic Domobran movement receives very gentle treatment, with Prpić presenting it as a patriotic organization of Croatian emigrants, making no mention of its acts of violence, intimidation, and racketeering.40 Despite being rather dated, Prpić’s book continues to distort scholarship on this period and region. A chapter by Saša Božić on Croatian diaspora activism in an edited collection published in 2005 sources much of its information from Prpić, and as a result ignores Yugoslavist activism during the period, discussing, for instance, the support of the Croatian Fraternal Union for Tito while eliding the fact that the CFU was doing so as part of the United Council for South Slavic Americans, an organization with a Yugoslavist political program and the participation of Serbs and Slovenes.41

We also see the effects of methodological nationalism in the work of Ivan Čizmić, a Croatian historian who published a history of the Croatian Fraternal Union in 1994, in the latter years of the Croatian war for Independence, a struggle in which the financial support of Croatian emigrants was instrumental. Marinating in a nationalistic discourse in which the “Croatian

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40 Ibid, 275, 298
41 Saša Božić, “From Diaspora to Transnation and Back: Croatian Migrant Institutions and the (Re)making of Croatia,” in Riegler, Henriette, ed. *Beyond the Territory within the Nation: Diasporic Nation-Building in Southeastern Europe* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005).
“diaspora” was held up as bulwark of Croatian nationhood, it is not surprising to find that Čizmić omits or glosses over the CFU’s relationships with Serbian and Slovene organizations during the interwar period, as well as support within the CFU for the Yugoslav idea. While “diaspora” is a significantly more popular subject of research in Croatia, methodological nationalism has also affected Serbian scholars. In Mirjana Pavlović’s Srbi u Čikagu, which was published in 1990, the author complains “how few works there are dedicated to Serbs in the United States…relevant information is contained only in works that are concerned with Yugoslav emigrants more generally or Croats in particular,” citing the works of Croatian scholars like Čizmić as recent examples of this tendency. Pavlović, in contrast, was concerned only with whether Serbs abroad “have preserved their ethnic identity,” identity being an expression of group cohesion maintained through institutions and symbols. While one might question now whether it made sense to examine Serbs in isolation from other south-Slavic groups, put in context it made more sense. At that time, the emblematic work on the “Yugoslav diaspora” was Ivo Smoljan’s Tito and the Emigrants (1984), which was just as, if not more, ideological than these nationalist histories. Focusing on the activities of emigrants during World War II in support of Tito, Smoljan’s work elides any evidence that would suggest that emigrants were anything other than fervent supporters of Tito and Yugoslavia. Smoljan is less interested in establishing how these movements came to be than transcribing emigrant praise of Tito. According to Smoljan, “Tito's new Yugoslavia not only germinated during the National Liberation War, but also on distant continents,” which is, I argue in my last chapter, greatly overstates the case. For scholars like Pavlović or Čizmić, then, focusing on just the Serbs or just the Croats was a way to rebel against

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44 Pavlović, Srbi u Čikagu, 5, 86.
scholarly works produced over the previous decades that tried to use the existence of a “Yugoslav diaspora” for propaganda.

This pattern has continued even after the Yugoslav wars have ended. Take, for instance, Mirjana Pavlović’s article, published in 1999, on how print media in Serbia used the figure of Mihajlo Pupin, a Serbian scientist in the United States during the interwar period, for national propaganda. Despite covering the interwar period, when Pupin was active in several Yugoslavist organizations, the word “Yugoslavia” is mentioned just once, the author elsewhere referring only to Pupin’s “patriotism” and loyalties to a homeland, without specifying whether this was to Serbia or Yugoslavia.46 One also finds scholars from the Western Balkans shying away from studies of South-Slavs in the United States, especially during the interwar period, choosing instead to focus on smaller, newer, and more nationalistic “colonies” in Europe, South America, or Oceania. In an edited collection by Saša Božić on the development of Croatian migrant institutions (churches, self-help societies, etc), not one chapter deals with the United States, which had the oldest and richest associations, focusing instead on emigrant communities in Western Europe, Chile, and Australia.47 The same holds true for another edited collection from 2014 by Caroline Tomić et. al. Of the thirty chapters in this book, just three deal with Croatian communities in the United States, compared to twelve that address Croatian communities in Australia/New Zealand, Central Europe, or South America. And of those three that deal with the United States, none deal with the interwar period, when Croatian political life was deeply

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intertwined with the Yugoslav movement.\textsuperscript{48} Marin Sopta’s 2012 monograph emblematises this tendency as well, focusing only on Croatians in Canada, and only after 1945, even though Croatian migration to Canada began in the interwar period.\textsuperscript{49} As these examples show, what felt like liberation in the 1990s has now become an academic straitjacket. In conversations over coffee, several Serbian scholars, including Mirjana Pavlović, have expressed frustration with the continued academic pressure to tell the history of diaspora from a nationalist perspective—that they maintained their identity, resisted assimilation, and implicitly had nothing to do with Yugoslavism.

Outside the Western Balkans, on the other hand, scholarship on the emigrants from Yugoslavia has belonged more to the disciplines of political science, focusing on the emigrants’ connection to the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s\textsuperscript{50} or anthropology/sociology, studying contemporary migrant communities and looking at questions of transnationalism, identity, and the lived experiences of migrants.\textsuperscript{51} While there is nothing inherently wrong with these approaches, it is also clear that there is currently a shortage of \textit{historical} studies of emigrants from Yugoslavia that are up to date on the theoretical developments in the study of nationalism.


that have emerged since the 1980s and are disentangled from the nationalizing agendas of Yugoslavia and its successor states.

This has begun to change, however, with the publication of an excellent study of Yugoslavia’s emigration policy, by Ulf Brunnbauer, in 2016. Looking at the period between the 1860s to the 1960s, Brunnbauer argues that the history of migration from Southeastern Europe is also a history of social organization in this region. By his own admission, Brunnbauer is not interested in “diaspora nationalism,” but rather the second member of Brubaker’s “triad,” the sending country. Too often, Brunnbauer argues, migration histories adopt the perspective of the host country, analyzing the degrees to which migrants acculturate and contribute to their new homelands, rather than their old. In contrast, Brunnbauer’s explores the political, economic, and social effects of migration on the Western Balkans.\(^{52}\) As a result, for instance, when Brunnbauer covers the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s emigration policy, the focus is on what administrators in Belgrade and Zagreb thought about the emigration, the evolution of the bureaucratic legal apparatus to deal with the emigration, and triumphant reports to the foreign ministry from Yugoslav diplomats.\(^{53}\)

This approach, Brunnbauer concedes, has a major blind spot, in that Yugoslav diplomats had an incentive to deceive their superiors in Belgrade, and so it was difficult to determine the degree to which Yugoslavism had a following overseas.\(^{54}\) Based on his sources, Brunnbauer concludes that “the ‘Yugoslav’ diaspora mainly existed in the minds of Yugoslav policymakers” and that diaspora activism on behalf of Tito was a “temporary diaspora [that] emerged when the lives of family, kin, friends, and former neighbors were at risk” and that “the various Yugoslav


\(^{53}\) Ibid, 207-248.

\(^{54}\) Ibid, 243.
diaspora-building initiatives contributed to fertilizing the soil from whence a short-lived diaspora identity could grow after receiving an external impulse.\footnote{Ibid, 230, 244.} While largely correct, this is not the whole story. Instead, I would argue that the “Yugoslav diaspora” formed gradually and in opposition to the Yugoslav state and its nation-building efforts over the course of the interwar period, rather than suddenly as a result of those same efforts. Put succinctly, Yugoslav officials failed their way to success—a “Yugoslav diaspora,” albeit united by anti-monarchism and republicanism rather than reverence for the Karadjordjević dynasty.

**A Note on Sources**

These different conclusions are based on different sources. Although like Brunnbauer, the source-base of this monograph derives primarily from the state archives of Kingdom of Yugoslavia, this monograph relies on Yugoslav officials outside rather than inside Yugoslavia—the diplomats, the metaphorical front line in Yugoslavia’s campaign to teach “its” overseas population to be good Yugoslavs. As sources, these diplomats have both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand Yugoslav diplomats tend to refer to all leftists as “Communists” and all Croatian nationalists as “separatists,” and were prone to exaggerating their own successes. Taken with a grain of salt, however, diplomatic sources are still valuable. After all, unlike the higher-ups in Belgrade and Zagreb, Yugoslav diplomats worked directly with emigrant civil society organizations, such as fraternal unions, and knew many emigrant leaders personally. Although this is still a history “from above,” the meso- and micro-historical approach that these sources are conducive to dovetails with the predominant scholarly approach to diaspora, which is to examine transnational networks. With this source base, one can look at just who is networking with whom, the field of alliances, family bonds, friendships, and rivalries that
help weave migrants into a “diaspora.” Beyond illuminating the way “diaspora” works, this approach can also yield ancillary insights into far-right politics, far left politics, and the ways in which migrants become nationalists. Additionally, Yugoslav diplomats assiduously tracked the movements and activities of Yugoslav ésiger politicians, an independent and unpredictable force in the relationship between homeland, host country, and diaspora.

Although Yugoslav diplomats were hostile and suspicious of any critic of the regime, diplomatic sources nonetheless provide a good picture of the ever-evolving relationships between emigrant civil society, its leaders, their peccadillos, and the constant ebb and flow of factionalism and alliances. Moreover, I argue, Yugoslav diplomats were in large part responsible for designing Yugoslavia’s overseas nation-building project, turning vague directives into concrete actions, which not infrequently, they also funded. Diplomats, of course, are not the only sources used by this monograph, which required visiting archives on both sides of the Atlantic. The personal papers of prominent emigrant figures, as well as records from the FBI and OSS, help round out the biases inherent to official Yugoslav sources.

Lastly, these sources are conducive to an approach that looks at Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene diaspora histories together, which, as I have argued, helps avoid methodological nationalism. Attentive observers will, however, notice several South Slavic groups missing from this framework. Up until Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s, “Yugoslavs” were not just Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but also Bosniaks, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. During the interwar period, however, none of these “nations” were considered as such by official sources—Montenegrins and Bosnians were seen as Serbs and Croats, just as Macedonians were considered by official sources to be “southern Serbs” or, occasionally, Bulgarians. While there were Macedonian nationalist organizations in the United States, just as there were Serb, Croat, and
Slovene organizations, neither the government nor Yugoslav diaspora organizations paid them any more attention than Czech or Ukrainian groups—they were Slavs, but not Yugoslavs. In Ivan Mladineo’s *Narodni Adresar*, a thousand-page directory of “Yugoslav” emigrant organizations in the United States compiled by an Croatian emigrant in 1937, there is not a single mention of any Macedonian organization of any type—no newspapers, fraternal unions, businesses, social clubs, or singing societies.\(^5^6\)

Explaining the Yugoslav state’s silence regarding Macedonian emigrant groups is straightforward—to treat these organizations as they treated Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations would have been a tacit admission that Macedonians, were, like Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, a distinct national group rather than a subset of Bulgarianized Serbs. This went against Yugoslav policy on the highest level. But why did Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups also ignore the Macedonians? One possible explanation is language—the fact that Macedonians speak a different language from Serbo-Croatian made it difficult for Serbian and Croatian groups to network with the Macedonians. This is a weak explanation, however—speaking from experience, Macedonian is much more intelligible to a Serbo-Croatian speaker than Slovene. It seems more likely that the Macedonian emigrant groups did not mix much with Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups (except within the Communist Party) because their political goals did not align. The Macedonian Political Organization, for instance, favored a Bulgarian annexation of Macedonia rather than the preservation of Yugoslavia. What reason, then, would they have to cooperate with other South-Slavic organizations?

Nonetheless, regardless of the reasons, this dissertation’s source base of diplomatic and intelligence sources and émigré periodicals renders Macedonian diaspora life nearly invisible.

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Nonetheless, where possible, I have tried to identify the involvement of Macedonian and Montenegrin nationalists in the Yugoslav movement or in the opposition to it, but there is still less material than I would like.

This source base also leads to a focus on South Slavs living in the United States specifically. In part, this is for reasons of demography. During the interwar period, most emigrants from the Western Balkans lived in the United States. According to contemporary tallies, between 600,000 and 700,000 settled in the United States. This number dwarfed the roughly 170,000 South Slavs in South America and Europe. The North American settlement was also concentrated in urban centers, especially compared to migrants to South America. Urban life led to much denser network of newspapers and cultural associations and the newer communities in South America, Western Europe, and Australia. Consequently, it was on this diaspora that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia focused most of its efforts—not only was the diaspora in the United States perceived to be wealthier (and thus able to benefit the fatherland more), the emigrants in the United States were also the most threatened, Yugoslav officials thought, by assimilation—the legend of the American “melting pot” crossed the Atlantic. As a result, Yugoslav officials concentrated their efforts to promote national consciousness where it was most at risk. Where possible, and considering limitations of space, I have tried to include snapshots of political activity in other Yugoslav diasporas, in particular South America or the Low Countries. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav diaspora in the United States remains the focus of this dissertation, just as it was the focus of contemporary Yugoslav politicians.

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57 Dr. T. M. Lutković, “Jedno Važno Pitanje: Koliko nas ima i gdje smo?,” Zajedničar, April 19, 1928. Fond 967, kut. 26, HDA; Emigration Museum, “Hrvatsko Iseljeništvu Sijetu” (MAP), [undated, probably 1934-1937]. Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.
No history of nationalism would be complete without defining the terms of analysis. Although diaspora was been well defined by now—this dissertation treats it as a transnational network that can credibly speak for a larger emigrant community—‘‘Yugoslav’’ and ‘‘Yugoslavism’’ have not received nearly as exhaustive treatment. Both terms are potentially politically loaded, with multiple potential meanings. ‘‘Yugoslav,’’ for instance, which literally translates to ‘‘South Slav,’’ can be a neutral blanket term used to refer to the Slavic peoples of the Balkans: Slovenians, Croatians, Serbians, Montenegrins, Bosnians, Macedonians, and Bulgarians, although during the interwar period it was just the first three, the titular groups of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. When not in quotation marks, this is the sense meant—it is more convenient to write Yugoslav instead of Serb, Croat, and Slovene.

When in quotation marks, however, ‘‘Yugoslav’’ refers to the idea of Yugoslav nationhood, a term which brings us to Yugoslavism, a political movement which dates back to the early 19th century. Germinating in the universities of the Habsburg empire where Serbs, Croats and Slovenes mingled, Yugoslavism began as an intellectual movement that tried to synthesize South Slav culture.58 By the turn of the 20th century Yugoslavism had become a small political movement that found its expression in 1918, when, following the breakdown of order in the dying Austro-Hungarian Empire, national councils in Croatia and Slovenia seceded, proclaiming their unification with the Kingdom of Serbia, thereby laying the foundation for the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which would be renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929.59

Over the decades of this Kingdom’s existence, ‘‘Yugoslavism’’ took on several additional ‘‘flavors,’’ each with their own political program. Three-tribe Yugoslavism, which was also the

59 Kosta Pawlowitch, ‘‘The First World War and the Unification of Yugoslavia,’’ in Djokić, ed. *Yugoslavism*,
state ideology of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1929, claimed that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are three “tribes,” subnational groups, of a single people in much the same way that the Sicilians, Tuscanese, and Piedmontese were part of a single, Italian nation despite their linguistic and cultural differences. Integral Yugoslavism, which was the state ideology of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia between 1929 and 1935, asserted that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are a single nation that required a single, standardized language and national culture, and quickly. After 1935, the ruling elites of Yugoslavia favored so-called "real Yugoslavism," which hoped that cultural tolerance and political autonomy would lead to the gradual emergence of a Yugoslav nation.60 And lastly, there is Titoist Yugoslavism, which acknowledges that the cultural differences between Serb, Croat, and Slovene (and also Bosnians, Montenegrins and Macedonians) are likely to endure, but argues that these peoples should nonetheless live together in a single, federally organized state, under the slogan of “Bratstvo i Jedinstvo,” or Brotherhood and Unity.61 Whenever possible, I try to identify which variant of Yugoslavism is being advocated. The point, however, is that in arguing for a study of a “Yugoslav” diaspora, I am not effacing the possibility of there being Serb, Croat, and Slovene “diasporas” as well. As Pieter Troch argues, aside from integral Yugoslavism, Yugoslavism was not incompatible with Serb, Croat, and Slovene nationalism.62 Nor is, I argue, Yugoslavism incompatible with host-country nationalism. As June Alexander argues in her study of Slovak nationalists in the United States, demonstrating Slovak nationalism was a way to demonstrate belonging in the American “Nation

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62 Troch, “Yugoslavism between the World Wars,”
of Nations,” to borrow a term from Louis Adamic.63 Diaspora Yugoslavism worked much the same way.

**Research Questions**

In the conclusion to his ambitious attempt to create a general theory of diaspora nationalism, Gabriel Sheffer identifies several questions for future researchers. Why do migrants choose to become nationalists, to join “diasporas” and to maintain transnational ties with their homeland? Beyond remittances, what sorts of exchanges—guns, soldiers, political opinions—link together diasporas and their homelands? And lastly, what sorts of tensions arise between these (over)generous diasporas and a homeland that takes diaspora loyalty for granted and diaspora donations as its due?64 While this dissertation cannot provide definitive answers to these questions, its focus on the minutia of people, relationships, and organizations seems the most productive way to begin. In addition to these three questions, this dissertation is also interested in a fourth: how is nationalism affected by a diaspora context? This question encompasses not just the question of syncretism, of influence from the host nation, but also from other organized diasporas. Would diaspora nationalism take one form in the cities of United States, surrounded by other diasporas, like the Irish or Italian, from which organizational templates could be borrowed, and another in, say, Argentina?

Each chapter of this dissertation, which spans the period from 1914-1951, is interested in one or more of these questions. This timeframe is both an aesthetic and an analytic choice, using the life and death of a prominent Yugoslav activist to bookend a broader discussion of diaspora political life. This activist is Louis Adamic, born Alojz Adamič, a Slovene-American who rose to

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64 Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, 250-256.
become a public intellectual during the 1930s and a leader of the Yugoslav movement in the United States before his death (which was probably a murder) in 1951. Adamic is well-known to American historians and historians of migration—although he has been criticized for his Eurocentrism, 65 Adamic’s prolific writings on the emigrant experience in the United State has contributed to theories of American multi-culturalism, dual nationality, and the mutability of assimilation and acculturation. Adamic’s advocacy of Yugoslavism, on the other hand, has attracted much less attention. In the two most recent biographies of Adamic, the focus has not been on Adamic’s role within the Yugoslav movement, but the American side of his activism: his support for multiculturalism, his opposition to fascism, and how both were received by the Anglophone public. 66 Nonetheless, Adamic’s central role in the Yugoslav movement should come as little surprise to those familiar with his life and work—multiculturalism is only a few steps away from bratstvo i jedinstvo (brotherhood and unity), the central thesis of Tito’s version of Yugoslavism.

The first chapter, which covers the years 1914-1925, documents an unusual situation in world history, where a government of a new nation-state discovers that it had an old diaspora. Nearly all Yugoslav migrants had emigrated from Austria-Hungary, not Yugoslavia. In effect, Yugoslavia had to become the new “Old Country,” an imagined homeland for which the emigrant feels nostalgia. But before it could win those migrants’ affection or loyalty, Yugoslavia had to learn as much as possible about “its” diaspora. Focusing on the initial encounters between Yugoslav diplomats and overseas “colonies,” Chapter One both introduces basic information

about Yugoslavia’s overseas community—the major population centers, personages, and political tendencies—as well as the “emigration question,” an official debate about how to incorporate the emigration into the national body.

Chapter Two picks up where chapter one left off, looking at the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes’ early attempts to foster diaspora Yugoslavism and win the loyalty of its diaspora during its stint as a constitutional monarchy, which lasted until 1928. Despite the grand ambitions outlined in its first systematic program to promote national consciousness in emigrants, this chapter argues that Yugoslav diplomats did not have the resources to effectively support emigrant schools, churches, or cultural institutions, as a result offloading much of the work, and costs, of overseas nation building on emigrants themselves. As a result, emigrant institutions remained largely independent from Belgrade, the major exception being the Serbian emigrant exarchate, which was established during this period to exert control over the overly independent Serbian orthodox clergy in the United States.

In 1929, Yugoslavia became, like many of its neighbors in Eastern Europe, a royal dictatorship, a dictatorship which lasted until the assassination of King Alexander in 1934. Chapter Three, which covers this period, argues that authoritarianism at home was matched by authoritarianism abroad, with attempts by Yugoslav diplomats to censor, deport, and blackmail emigrant dissidents. Although the ‘tenth banovina,’ as the diaspora came to be called in this period, was well outside the jurisdiction of Yugoslav police, Yugoslav officials often found the host country police to be willing collaborators in their efforts to punish and control “their” emigrants. This chapter will be of interest to those interested in contrasting the way authoritarian governments interacted with the diaspora with the methods of democratic governments, as well as those interested in diaspora-homeland tensions, of which this period had plenty. Nonetheless,
this chapter argues, transnational repression discredited mainly the government in Belgrade, rather than the Yugoslav idea, which emigrants began to reinterpret.

Chapter Four, which spans roughly the same period as chapter three, is interested in the other major consequence of Yugoslav dictatorship, a topic so large it needed its own chapter to adequately cover. This is a comparative study of diaspora politics of four Yugoslav political parties that went into exile under Alexander’s dictatorship—the Demokratska Stranka, the Croatian Peasant Party, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and the Ustaša. All four political parties each attempted, in their own way, to set up their own transnational network and become the “leader of the emigration,” be it Croatian or Yugoslav. Particular attention is devoted to the fascistic Ustaša/Domobran movement, an analysis that contains much of interest to anyone interested in why emigrants become not just nationalists, but ultranationalists, including individual case-studies of migrants who were recruited by the Domobran. The failure of the Domobran movement in North America is likewise explained by comparing its relationship to emigrant civil society to the more-successful German-American Bund.

Chapter Five, like Chapter Two, is interested more in culture than politics, although culture can be deeply political. Covering the years between 1935 and 1941, the years following Alexander’s death and the leadup to the second world War, this chapter argues that, when one thinks in terms of transnational networks between diaspora individuals and organizations, the groundwork was laid in these years for a “Yugoslav diaspora,” even if no organization claimed yet to speak on its behalf. During this period, Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups worked together to establish Yugoslav rooms, gardens, and radio stations, even as official Yugoslav attempts to use emigrants for propaganda reached their apotheosis in the creation of a “Museum of the Emigration” in Zagreb and in the development of Yugoslav pavilions for several international
expositions in the United States. In these contrasting exhibitions of national culture, Chapter five argues, one finds a growing gulf between the Yugoslavism espoused by emigrants and that favored by the Yugoslav state.

Chapter Six, which covers 1941 to 1945, explores the effects of World War II on the transnational networks developed over the preceding two decades. The relationships that were forged between emigrant self-help groups, Yugoslav exile political parties, and the government of Yugoslavia all affected both the spread of information about conditions in Yugoslavia as well as the manifestation of several competing diaspora lobbies. Particular attention is devoted to the United Committee of South Slavic Americans (UCSSA) in North America, comparing it with the Yugoslav National Defense in South America. In addition, Chapter Six analyzes the surprising emergence of a far-right organization in North America, the Serbian National Defense. Using the Domobran movement of earlier years as a comparison, Chapter Six argues that the government of Yugoslavia’s attempt to suborn emigrant institutions actually undermined Yugoslavism, which only flourished in organizations that did not take subsidies or orders from the government of Yugoslavia.

And finally, Chapter Seven, which covers 1945 to 1951, serves as an epilogue, documenting the disintegration of the Yugoslav diaspora in the aftermath of its success. As a transnational network, I argue, the Yugoslav diaspora was nonetheless fragile and contingent on a political climate in both the host and sending country that was friendly to New Deal liberalism. And, unfortunately, neither Tito’s Yugoslavia, which was an authoritarian communist state, nor the United States, which would be wracked by the Second Red Scare, met that definition any longer. In addition, the deaths or marginalization of several key figures within this network—Zlatko Baloković, Sava Kosanović, and Louis Adamic—deprived the movement of leaders and
made it difficult for the organizations within the Yugoslav diaspora to exchange information, resources, or otherwise coordinate their activities.

In almost every chapter, Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene diaspora organizations, political parties, and their history is examined side by side, rather than separately, as previous histories have done. From an organizational perspective, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had much in common, and the development of their organizations and political life during this period was intertwined. For example, American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes seem to have kept track of politics in their respective fraternal unions. The American Srbobran, for instance, reported on the Croatian Fraternal Union convention in 1929, just as Srpski Glasnik and the Slovene newspaper Prosveta reported on the CFU convention in 1935. Or if one looks the growth of emigrant tourism to Yugoslavia as an example, one cannot explain it without noting that the first trip was organized by a Croatian Yugoslavist, who got the idea from Swedish-Americans, after which Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups all began organizing their own trips, seemingly in imitation of one another, and within a broader boom of trans-Atlantic tourism within US immigrant populations in the 1930s. Emigrant groups learn from each other and are influenced by each other, despite the boundaries of language or culture. For future historians, it may just as it might be revealing to do a diaspora history of Czechs and Slovaks, or Croatians and Italians, or Poles and Ukrainians, or even diaspora pan-Slavism in the United States, which, like Yugoslavism, had a strong following during the Second World War. In defining the frame of inquiry, we should not be limited by national boundaries.

67 “Skok i pad,” American Srbobran, June 26, 1929. Fond 967, kut. 32, HDA.
On December 31st, 1913, a fourteen-year-old Slovene named Alojz Adamič embarked on a steamship to the United States. Adamic was the eldest living son of a well-to-do peasant family from Blato and a high-school student in Laibach (now Ljubljana). According to his later autobiography, Alojz had come to the attention of the Austrian police for his membership in a cell of the revolutionary Yugoslav nationalist movement, a gang of young romantics whose activities, at least at first, consisted of “singing ribald parodies of the Austrian anthem” and writing graffiti of “insulting words after the name of the Emperor Francis-Joseph.” Although Alojz confessed no belief in “the cause” (unity between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), having mainly joined the group for the adventure, Alojz nevertheless was caught in a police dragnet after a demonstration turned bloody. Expelled from the local gymnasium and put on a watchlist, Alojz’s prospects if he stayed in Laibach looked grim.69

Alojz had heard stories about the United States from returned migrants in his village decided to follow in their footsteps.70 Like Alojz, hundreds of thousands of South Slavic emigrants, encouraged and assisted by friends and family already overseas, settled en-masse in the United States between 1880 and 1914. Young Alojz joined the toiling masses, finding work in the mailroom of Prosveta, a newspaper for New York City’s “Slovene colony.”71 Around

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69 Louis Adamic, Laughing in the Jungle, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932), 25-28; According to a recent biography of Adamic, Adamic’s autobiographical emigration narrative took several liberties with the facts. First, Adamic was not from Blato, but Praproče pri Grosupljem, a village on the outskirts of Ljubljana. Blato was Adamic’s father’s birthplace. Secondly, Adamic did not belong to the Yugoslav resistance group. Instead, his older brother Ivan was a member. The riot in Adamic’s story did not take place in 1913, but 1908. As a corollary, Adamic only became the eldest sibling after Ivan was killed in that same riot. Adamic’s reasons for emigrating are thus obscure, but may stem from his family’s financial troubles at that time, which forced him to drop out of the gymnasium to earn money for his family. Nonetheless, I have chosen to include Adamic emigation story as written, since it makes for a good introductory anecdote and does not meaningfully alter my argument. See: John Enyeart, Death to Fascism: Louis Adamic’s Fight for Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019), 8.
70 Ibid, 32-5.
71 Ibid, 68-69.
1900, this and similar enclaves had reached a critical mass—Serb, Croat, and Slovene newspapers, clubs, and mutual benefit societies began sprouting up across the United States. While primarily they provided insurance and entertainment to their members and subscribers, these organizations also nurtured national consciousness in emigrants, who could then be mobilized in support of political causes. They would soon have that cause.

Alojz had gotten out of Europe just in time. Six months after his departure, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by another Yugoslav revolutionary named Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb just five years Alojz’s elder. A month after that, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia—the Great War had begun, setting in motion events that would lead to the end of Austro-Hungary and the creation of Yugoslavia. Fleeing Austrian censorship, a group of Yugoslav-minded intellectuals went into exile, setting up an organization in London called the Jugoslavenski Odbor (Yugoslav Committee). The Yugoslav Committee lobbied for the creation of a federal South-Slavic State, preferably a republic.72

In 1915, to enhance their leverage and to fill their coffers, the Yugoslav Committee sent several leading members as emissaries to the United States to rally the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes living there to their cause. They were warmly received and shortly thereafter, in Pittsburgh, 615 representatives from various emigrant groups in North America, and three delegates from a likeminded organization in South America, the Jugoslavenska Narodna Odbrana (Yugoslav National Defense), met and formed the Jugoslavensko Narodno Vijeće (Yugoslav National Council), an auxiliary of the Yugoslav Committee in London.73 At the

72 Ivan Čizmić, Jugoslavenski Iseljenički Pokret u SAD i stvaranje jugoslavenske države 1918 (Zagreb, Liber, 1974).
73 Ibid.
council’s head were the biggest Serb, Croat, and Slovene names in the United States: Mihajlo Pupin\textsuperscript{74}, Ante Biankini,\textsuperscript{75} Josip Marohni\textsuperscript{c}\textsuperscript{76} and Niko Grškovi\textsuperscript{c}\textsuperscript{77}, to name a few.

In early 1916, after losing his job at Prosveta, Alojz joined the United States Army—again largely for adventure.\textsuperscript{78} On April 6, 1917, the United States entered the war, and Alojz found himself in the trenches on the Western Front.\textsuperscript{79} Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front, Austria had overrun the small Serbian Kingdom, driving its army to the island of Corfu. There, the Yugoslav Committee met with the Serbian government-in-exile, which harbored territorial designs on the western Balkans. On July 20, 1917, the Committee and the representatives of Serbia reached a compromise, laying the groundwork for a Yugoslav state.

The Corfu Declaration of August 1917 was received with jubilation and optimism by Zajedničar, the official organ of the Croatian Union and the most widely read newspaper in Serbo-Croatian in all of North America.\textsuperscript{80} Finally, they wrote, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would live together, with the rights they now only enjoyed in the United States and Canada: freedom of religion, equality, and a constitution, in a “progressive and Western state.”\textsuperscript{81} The Yugoslav National Council in the United States backed the Corfu declaration without reservation.\textsuperscript{82} Even from the beginning, however, there were misgivings about the Serbian King. Proletarec, the Slovene-language organ of the Yugoslav Socialist Union in the United States, called the Corfu

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\textsuperscript{74} A wealthy Serbian inventor and rival of Nikola Tesla.
\textsuperscript{75} A well-known surgeon and prominent Croatian activist.
\textsuperscript{76} Founder of the National Croatian Union, which went on to become the Croatian Fraternal Union, the largest and most influential Croatian organization anywhere outside of Yugoslavia.
\textsuperscript{77} A left-leaning Croatian former-priest, newspaper editor, and indefatigable national activist.
\textsuperscript{78} Only seventeen, he lied about his birthday to the recruiter. Adamic, \textit{Laughing in the Jungle}, 114-5.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, 175.
\textsuperscript{80} A news article from 1930 put the number of subscribers to Zajedničar at 85,000-90,000. See: “Jugoslovenska Štampa u Sjedinjenim Državama Amerike,” \textit{Novosti}, February 2, 1930. Fond 967, kut. 36, HDA.
\textsuperscript{81} “Resolucija Konferencija na Otoku Krfu,” Zajedničar, August 8\textsuperscript{th}, 1917, Reel 3, Microfilm Collection, Immigration History Research Center Archives.
\textsuperscript{82} “Proglas Jugoslavenskog Narodnog Vijeća Povodom Deklaracija na Krfu,” Zajedničar, August 29\textsuperscript{th}, 1917. Reel 3, Microfilm Collection, Immigration History Research Center Archives.
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declaration a monarchist ruse.\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Zajedničar}, however, was willing to be wooed. Shortly after the Corfu declaration, Milan Pribićević, a Serbian politician and integral Yugoslavist, contributed to \textit{Zajedničar} a series of editorials arguing for a unified Yugoslav state, promising freedom, justice, and prosperity for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.\textsuperscript{84}

But by late 1918, disappointment had set in—the new Yugoslavia was not what the Yugoslav committee had promised. Instead of federalism and equality, power was concentrated in Belgrade, with the Serbian king presiding over a constitutional monarchy, which Croatia’s republican political parties would not abide. Eventually, this division would tear the Yugoslav Council apart, with its monarchists and republicans parting ways.\textsuperscript{85} And over the next year in South America, the JNO would disintegrate, having lost most of its members.\textsuperscript{86} As for Alojz—he had naturalized, dropping the haček above the “c” to become Louis Adamic. Yugoslavia and the Vidovdan constitution did not interest him at that point. Although Adamic felt some cultural affinity with his neighbors in the Croato-Slovene district of San Pedro, California, American concerns now filled his writing, which was now in English.\textsuperscript{87} Acculturation, however, was not a one-way street, but a “two-way passage,” to borrow the title from a book written by Adamic two decades later, after he had “rediscovered” his ancestry and become associated with Yugoslav émigré politics.

Likewise, 1918 was not the end for overseas Yugoslavism. As will be shown, despite the disintegration of the Yugoslav National Council, many Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were willing

\textsuperscript{83} “Monarhija Kaže Roge,” \textit{Proletarec}, August 7\textsuperscript{th}, 1917, Reel [GET], Microfilm Collection, Immigration History Research Center Archives.

\textsuperscript{84} Milan Pribićević, “Sveti cilj i sadržina naše borbe,” August 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1917 \textit{Zajedničar}, August 8\textsuperscript{th}, 1917, Reel 3, Microfilm Collection, Immigration History Research Center Archives.

\textsuperscript{85} Čizmić, \textit{Jugoslavenski Iselejenički Pokret}, 277-297.

\textsuperscript{86} It was revived shortly thereafter, and again in the 1930s, but never regained its WWI-era strength. Consulate KJ in Chile to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1932. Fond 385, Fasc. 3, AJ.

\textsuperscript{87} Adamic, \textit{Laughing in the Jungle}, 221-329.
to give Yugoslavia’s new government a chance. However, one could not speak of there being in 1919 a “Yugoslav diaspora”—here defined as a trans-oceanic political network characterized by the integration and participation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, that is large enough to plausibly represent the will of an imagined diasporic community, and that is mobilized in support of a common Yugoslav homeland. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes overseas had some limited experience working together in the Yugoslav Committee and collecting postwar relief, but otherwise generally kept to themselves in their own “colonies,” each with their own newspapers, fraternal organizations, and cultural clubs. In fact, it would even be difficult to speak of a Croat, Serb, or Slovene diaspora, as localism was still pronounced, since people tended to settle nearby people from the same village or island. And on a regional level, according to one consular report, “Croats” were fragmented between the Dalmatians, Islanders, Banovci, and Slavonians, “Slovenes” between Carniolans, Korušani, and Štajerci, and the “Serbs” between Ličani, Hercegovci, Vojvodani, and Montenegrins (sic).88 Many more, like Adamic, remade themselves into Americans. As such, it would be better to borrow Donna Gabaccia’s formula of there being “many diasporas” rather than a “Yugoslav diaspora.”89

For the “Yugoslav diaspora” to reemerge, the social, organizational, and cultural barriers between these smaller diasporas would need to be broken down. This was the ambition of interwar Yugoslav diplomats and politicians. But before they could begin to put together a grand strategy, they needed to scout out these various overseas “colonies” of “Yugoslavs.” This chapter focuses on these first encounters between Yugoslav officials and emigres. Conveniently, this also introduces the “Yugoslav emigration” to the reader—its main personages, organizations, and

88 “Opšti izveštaj o našim kolonijama i delokrugu ovog Gener. Konsulata,” report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the GK in Chicago, February 2nd 1925. Fond 14, Fasc. 34, AJ.
political quirks—exploring the various contours of the emigrant community that Yugoslavia would begin to systematically woo in 1925. Chronologically, this chapter covers the period leading up to 1925, with occasional references to later events.

The Development of Yugoslavia’s Diplomatic Service

Although Yugoslavia was formed on December 1918, archival records dealing with the iseljeništvo (emigration or diaspora) for the first two years of the interwar period are scarce. This is understandable, however—whenever a country triples in size, like when Serbia became Yugoslavia, one expects disruption, chaos, and poor record-keeping as its bureaucracy grows to meet the needs of a tripled population. And Yugoslavia’s first two years had no shortage of chaos. Following unification, the Serbian, now Yugoslav, army was sent to occupy Croatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro and to govern through martial law while elections were held and a constitution was drafted.90 Croatian administrators were, in certain places, sacked and replaced with Serbs. Yugoslavia’s new subjects took poorly to beatings and authoritarianism and rebellions broke out in several places, including in Montenegro and in Croatia.91 Making matters worse, the Italian adventurer D’Annunzio had seized Fiume (Rijeka) in Istria, hoping to establish the ‘facts on the ground’ that would lead to an Italian annexation of the city and its Slavic hinterland.92 Elections in Yugoslavia were not held until November 1920, which was followed by the ratification of the Vidovdan constitution of June 28, 1921, which made a compromised centralism the basis for the new state. The Triune Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would be the national state of a “single people with three names.” The Croatian Diet, the Sabor, was

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91 Ibid., 248-260, 296-291.
92 Ibid., 384.
abolished, and the Kingdom would henceforth be governed as a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral legislature, the Skupština.93

With its home-front pacified, Yugoslavia’s government turned its attention to the tenth of their population living overseas and their diplomatic service. Much like Yugoslavia’s bureaucracy, its diplomatic service was a hodgepodge of Serbian and Austro-Hungarian elements. Austro-Hungary had a tradition of emigration from its Croatian and Slovenian territories and had an experienced Emigration Office in Zagreb. For decades, this Emigration Office oversaw the flow of Croats, Slovenes, and the occasional Serb overseas, helping migrants with paperwork and informing them about destination countries. Perhaps because of this long experience dealing with emigration, the Austro-Hungarian Emigration Office was retained in its entirety, except for its name, which became the Emigration Commissariat (IK) in 1922.94 To surveil emigrants once they arrived, Yugoslavia was forced to expand Serbia’s small network of consulates and legations; Austria, after all, still existed as a rump state and retained its proprietary claim to the Habsburg consulates in the United States.

With over half a million Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes scattered across the world, from Argentina to Canada to Belgium to Australia, the Yugoslav diplomatic service was spread thin. Smaller overseas settlements, consisting of hundreds to several thousand people, often did without any nearby consulates. In 1923, Yugoslavs in South America were served by only one general consulate in Buenos Aires, a condition that persisted through most of the interwar period. North America was better served, receiving a legation in Washington DC and Ottawa, two general consulates (one in New York and one in Chicago), as well of a host of regular

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93 Ibid., 397-405.
consulates, in San Francisco, Denver, and, eventually, Pittsburgh. 95 This arrangement made the best use of Yugoslavia’s limited resources, as the overwhelming majority of overseas Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, over 600,000 by some estimates, lived in the United States. 96 And since most of that overseas population was from Croatia, the foreign ministry made an effort to include a few Croats in the diplomatic apparatus; letting an exclusively Serbian diplomatic service lord over a primarily Croatian diaspora would have been politically tone-deaf. 97 Accordingly, Ante Trešić-Pavičić, a Croatian writer and intellectual, was chosen to head the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, where he would oversee the work of the consulates and keep an eye on emigres. Trešić-Pavičić, was specifically chosen for his conservative leanings and his support for Serbian centralism at the Paris peace conference. Most diplomats, however, were Serbs—Trešić-Pavičić later complained that he was the only Croat in the legation with any power. 98 That power, moreover, was very limited. If one visualized the emigration as a province of Yugoslavia (as became common in the 1930s), Trešić-Pavičić would be its governor, albeit one without the formal authority to tax, levy soldiers, or issue edicts. The emigration could not be ruled like a regular province, as Yugoslav officials would find out the hard way.

“Colony” Visits: Toward a Diaspora Census

By 1921, having expanded their diplomatic apparatus, the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, determined that

Given the fact that our national unification has been (in the main) achieved, we sense the…need to more strongly link emigrants from our provinces, most of which are in

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95 Iseljeničke Vijesti, vol. 6, (Zagreb: Tisak Hrvatskog štamparskog zavoda, 1923), p 38-39. Found in Fond 14, Fasc. 34, AJ. The diplomatic service in South America, as Ulf Brunnbauer shows, was dramatically expanded after the establishment of the dictatorship. See Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 243.
96 Dr. T. M. Lutković, “Jedno Važno Pitanje: Koliko nas ima i gdje smo?,” Zajedničar, April 19, 1928. Fond 967, k. 26, HDA.
97 The policy is alluded to directly in: “Dr. Ante Biankini, Lekar iz Čikaga,” GK KSHS in Chicago to KP in Washington, March 13, 1923, Fond 371, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
98 See the memoirs of Ivan Meštrović, who spoke with Trešić-Pavičić later in the 20s: Ivan Meštrović, Uspomene na Političke Ljude i Događaje (Zagreb: Matice Hrvatske, 1993), 165-7.
America, with our national body and to preserve their national distinctiveness…So we can take steps toward this goal, we need to have at our disposal the necessary information so we can evaluate where and how educational-cultural (prosvetni) establishments should be organized.\footnote{Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, April 6, 1921, Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.}

These orders were coupled with the 1921 Law on Emigration, which called for emigrant outreach.\footnote{Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 220.} Shortly thereafter, consular officials began to visit Yugoslav “colonies” across the US. The official use of the term “colony” is suggestive—from the beginning, emigrants settlements were seen as the overseas dominion of Yugoslavia. Likewise, “colony” visits soon acquired the aspect of a census or territorial survey, with diplomats reporting on population, location, and the ethnic balance between Serb, Croat, and Slovene. Macedonians emigrants in the United States, despite being numerous, were typically excluded from these surveys—they were not imagined as part of the “Yugoslav diaspora.”

One of the earliest recorded visits by a Yugoslav consul to a “colony” was on December 10, 1921, in Sacramento, an invitation to the yearly convention of “Yugoslav,” “Serbian,” and “Croatian” Sokols from Los Angeles, Oakland, San Jose, and San Francisco. As athletic clubs for Slavic youths, the Sokol has long been a pillar of Slavic nationalist movements. After prompting by the Yugoslav consul, these Californian Sokols agreed to denounce a Croatian “separatist” periodical and pledged their loyalty to King Alexander of Yugoslavia. In his subsequent report, the consul in question found this willingness to embrace Yugoslavism and Alexander remarkable, since only two out of the three hundred present at this meeting were Serbs, whom officials usually considered the most politically reliable of the south Slavic peoples. Galvanized, the consul wrote directly to the Yugoslav Minster of Foreign Affairs, urging him to publicize the results of this convention, ostensibly to propagate the Yugoslav idea throughout the
diaspora, and perhaps in Yugoslavia as well. 101 This was also one of the very earliest proposals to link Yugoslav nation-building abroad with that same project in the homeland.

Nonetheless, Yugoslav diplomats remained suspicious of Croats—sometimes to the point of absurdity. On July 22, 1922, a lodge of the Hrvatska Zajednica in Watsonville, California, celebrating their fifteenth anniversary, decided to invite a Yugoslav consul. The consul noted that:

This was the first time since unification that our people in Watsonville contacted an official representative of our monarchy, [probably] because a majority of these so-called Austrians-Konavljani,102 who even today keep a portrait of Franz-Josef and other Habsburgs in their homes, hope to reestablish Austro-Hungary under Habsburg rule. 103 This was a misunderstanding—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were often called “Austrians” (or a contraction of “Bohemian-Hungarians”) by unaware Americans, but that did not make them pro-Habsburg. But despite his reservations, the consul’s speech about Yugoslav unity was well received by attendees, causing him to recommend to his superiors in the legation that more frequent contact between Yugoslav diplomats and Yugoslav colonies would “be of great use” and would help heal “the great division between our people, that is, Serbs and Croats.” 104 At the very least, it could bring an end to the official suspicion of Croats.

Evidently, the legation took this advice to heart, as visiting Yugoslav colonies and learning about their denizens seems to have become a regular diplomatic duty. By autumn of 1922, consular information gathering was becoming more methodical, expanding from purely national/political concerns to the economic and demographic. “Colony” populations, geographic

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101 Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Yugoslav General Consul in Chicago, 15 December 1921, Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
102 Someone from Konavlje, a small municipality southeast of Dubrovnik. Regionalism, as I have noted, was pronounced in the 1920s.
103 Letter to Minister Grujić of the Royal Yugoslav Legation from the Consulate of KSCS in San Francisco, 27 June 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
104 Ibid.
distribution, occupations, living conditions, careers, ethnic makeup, social institutions, and political affiliations were all of interest to the Yugoslav authorities. For instance, when visiting “our colony” St. Louis, Missouri, the consul reported on the number of Yugoslav emigrant organizations (fifteen), whether there were enough shop-owners, merchants, and factory owners among them (there were), and whether those present at the meeting seemed well-disposed toward King Alexander of Yugoslavia (they were). On consular prompting, representatives of these organizations agreed to form a Yugoslav Club to improve Serb-Croat relations, as well as an organization of “Yugoslav” businessmen. While seemingly quotidian in its concerns, this report shows that official interest in the American emigration was partly pecuniary—a prosperous diaspora had more political clout and could potentially invest in the still-industrializing Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Moreover, this report also provided further evidence that consular suspicion of overseas Croats was misplaced. After meeting with the colony’s merchant community, the consul met with a group of Croatian “separatists” who wished to denounce a favorite of the Consulate, Vinko Budrović, as an “anti-Yugoslav” opportunist and to petition for the establishment of another general consulate in St. Louis. The consul demurred, seeing both requests as a ruse. He may have been wrong to do so: these so-called “separatists” were willing to embrace, or at least pay lip-service to, the Yugoslav idea. Moreover, they wanted more representatives of the Yugoslav government nearer by—hardly hostile behavior. It is no mystery why they were so eager: in a separate meeting with representatives of Chicago’s Slovene colony, the consul’s Slovene interlocutor observed that Austro-Hungarian diplomats generally refused to meet with

105 Letter to the Political Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the GK of the KSHS in Chicago, 29 August 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
Slavic emigrants. Whether this was true or not, south-Slavic migrants were probably pleased to have co-ethnics as consuls, whom they assumed would be more sympathetic to their material concerns. The stormy debates in the Belgrade *skupština* had little weight compared to avoiding deportation, supporting one’s mutual benefit society, or getting a passport to visit one’s relatives in ‘the Old Country’—Stjepan Radić and the Vidovdan constitution were mentally and physically far away.

The sort of behavior identified in these “colony” visits does not fit the model of “long-distance nationalism” as identified by Benedict Anderson or of “vicarious nationalism” as explained by Anthony Smith. In Anderson’s formulation, émigré nationalists tended to be more nationalistic rather than less, largely because their distance from the homeland meant that they could take extreme political positions with impunity. For Smith, a militant political defense of or advocacy for their titular homeland is a strategy by which immigrants cope with the “pain and loss” of assimilation into their host nation as well as their geopolitical liminality. Granted, this model works for the 1990s, when the Serbian and Croatian “diasporas” supported and funded secessionist militants in Yugoslavia. But as the accounts from these early colony visits suggest, distance does not necessarily make extremists. The willingness of American Serbs and Croats to tactically embrace Yugoslavism fits better with Tara Zahra’s exploration of the term “national indifference.” For Zahra, “national indifference” is often a charge lobbed by national

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106 *Dvadesetogodišnjica Slovenske Narodne Potporene Jednote,* report to the political division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Yugoslav Consul in Chicago. April 18, 1924. Fond 449, Fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
missionaries (like consular officials) who are frustrated by a gamut of un-national behaviors in
the people to which they preach: cosmopolitanism, regionalism, national hybridity, side-
switching, and so on. ↑109 “National ambivalence” might be a better term. Sometimes, emigrant
national flexibility could be useful to the missionaries of the Yugoslav idea, as these previous
examples of emigrants tactically declaring their loyalty to Yugoslavia has shown.

But national ambivalence could also backfire. After a visit in 1924 to several “colonies”
of factory workers and miners in Colorado and Wyoming, Consul Ađemović (a Serb)
pronounced a failure the emigrant efforts to preserve “Yugoslav” national consciousness and that
of their offspring, who were “ashamed of their ancestry.” Many did not know “their own
language” and had little knowledge of “their national culture.” Even worse, according to the
consul, their standards of hygiene were deplorable, with many using their free time for “negative
work” (meaning drinking and gambling). Someone needed to teach them to be a “human being,
rather than a typical animal.” ↑110 Yugoslav attitudes toward the emigration had at their core a
paradox: emigrants were seen as simultaneously entrepreneurs who could industrialize a
backward Yugoslavia, while also being savages in need of Yugoslav civilizing. In civilizing and
Yugoslavizing the emigrant, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, would, through encouraging
repatriation and investment, industrialize and Yugoslavize her own people. In any event, one
major finding of this informal census was that assimilation was a major problem.

Expanding the Census beyond North America

In 1924 the Emigration Commissariat (IK) in Zagreb published its discoveries about the
emigration in its yearly report on its own activities, contrasting the North American and South

↑110 Consul Ađemović in Colorado to the GK KSHS in Chicago, July 14th 1924. Fond 414, Fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
American emigration and evaluating each’s capacity to both prosper and reproduce their culture overseas. The major metric of nationalist organization was the number of ethnic organizations among the various “Yugoslav” emigrations. Emigrants in North America (meaning the United States and Canada) were the most organized, with five major mutual-benefit societies—the *Hrvatska Narodna Zajednica*, the *Hrvatska Zajednica Illinois*, the *Srpski Savez*, the *Slovensko Dobrotvorno Drustvo*, and the *Krajsko-Slovensko Katolička Jednota*.\(^{111}\) Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes each had their respective fraternal unions, all of which were in no danger of disappearing. In fact, these organizations continue to exist today, albeit with some name changes. In this respect, the North American emigration were preserving their “Yugoslav” culture, even if they lacked a pan-Yugoslav society (which consular officials were lobbying for at the time.)\(^{112}\)

South America had the opposite problem. Although it had a pan-Yugoslav society, the *Jugoslovenska Narodna Odbrana*,\(^{113}\) that society was financially troubled and chronically unstable: after having imploded in 1921, it briefly revived, only to fail some years later. There would be another attempt to revive in the 1930s and again in 1941, but the JNO would never regain its WWI-era glory and was perpetually on the verge of bankruptcy.\(^{114}\)

One potential cause for this organizational disparity was the different ages of the emigrant communities in North and South America. Most “Yugoslavs” had emigrated to North America between 1880 and 1914. They had had decades to build up their own fraternal unions, newspapers, and clubs—their national movements were much more developed. The IK did not see it that way, however. Thanks to their long stay and of “intensive propaganda of

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\(^{111}\) Yearly Report of the Immigration Commissariat in Zagreb (1924), Statistics Section, Fond 1071, Kut. 548, HDA.
\(^{112}\) “Ujedinjenje Srpskih Saveza u Americi,” Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Division, from the Vice Consul in Chicago, August 1, 1923. Fond 414, Fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
\(^{114}\) Consulate KJ in Chile to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 24\(^{\text{th}}\), 1932. Fond 385, Fasc. 3, AJ.
Americanization,” many in North America had alienated themselves (otuđili) from our ethnic and national idea.”\(^{115}\) Although the greater number of South Slavic fraternal societies in the United States might seem to contradict this assertion, the IK did not seem to believe it was possible for its overseas population to be loyal to two countries: one was either an American citizen or a good Yugoslav.

In comparison, the emigration in South America was much younger, as the USA’s new quota laws for South-Eastern Europeans, part of a nativist backlash, simply redirected the flow of emigrants to South America, Canada, and (to a small extent) Australia. It took roughly ten years for the emigration in North America to start getting organized after they started arriving en-masse in the 1880s. The Hrvatska Zajednica and the Krajnsko-Slovensko Katolička Jednota were both founded in 1894, the Srpski Savez in 1901, and the Slovensko Narodno Potporna Jednota in 1904.\(^{116}\) Twenty years later, in 1924, emigration to South America had just begun in earnest. But there was an economic element to South American emigrant disorganization as well. While industrial jobs in the United States were plentiful, the same could not be said of Argentina and Brazil. Both countries simply did not have enough factories to employ its Yugoslav emigrants. Some could find work on farms and plantations, herding cattle or cultivating coffee or cacao.\(^{117}\) Of course, this dispersed them over the vastness of the South American continent, hundreds of miles from the nearest Yugoslav consulate. This also it very difficult for them to form the kinds of social and fraternal organizations common in North America, which were fundamentally urban.\(^{118}\) Perhaps as a result, this state of disorganization persisted through the entire interwar

\(^{116}\) Ivan Mladineo and Berislav Angjelinović, Jugoslovenski Almanak (New York: 1931), 5.
\(^{118}\) Ibid.
period and would prove to be a major Achilles heel for Yugoslav authorities after 1928 as South America became the main recruiting ground for the Croatian far-right.

The emigration census that was pioneered by consular officials in the United States was extended to migrant communities in Europe by the late twenties. On April 16, 1927, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recognizing that because emigrants living overseas “constitute a meaningful proportion of our nation,” established a sub-department for Emigrant Politics. The responsibility of this sub-department, at the time of its founding, would be “to accumulate, sort, and centralize all material which relates to the numerical status of colonies of our emigrants, [as well as] their cultural-educational and social position, their interpersonal relationships, and their political activity with regard both to the country in which they live as well as to our own state.” This data would be collected by the diplomatic service and by whatever collaborators they could find in the emigration.\(^{119}\) In other words, this was a census, at least in its goals. Its methods were less standard: disregarding the fact that foreign ministries do not typically conduct censuses, the reliance on volunteers from the population being surveilled is atypical. Following the census, the responsibility of this new sub-department would be to “issue needed directives…so that [emigrants’] political activities are more efficaciously controlled and their activities abroad are better used for state-national and state-political purposes.”\(^{120}\) Put more plainly, émigré politics needed to be regulated and channeled, somehow, to serve the interests of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav idea.

But for this to happen, the Foreign Ministry needed to learn more about the overseas workers outside of the United States. In Belgium, where tens of thousands of Croats and

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\(^{119}\) Directive from the Ministry of Foreign affairs to all General Consulates, April 15, 1927, Fond 414, Fasc. 5, BO 9, AJ.

\(^{120}\) Ibid.
Slovenes were employed in the mines and foundries around Seraing, the Legation there, after a wait of around half a year, enlisted the help of a Catholic priest, Father Mašić, to report on the activities of the workers and to conduct “national-patriotic” work. Apparently, based on the delay, they presumably had some difficulty finding someone who lived among the workers but was literate enough to relay information, a difficulty which was surely compounded by the Legation’s location in distant Brussels rather than near the primary sites of Yugoslav settlement in Wallonia. In the first report, a handwritten note from 1927, Father Mašić called the majority of “our workers” in Seraing “entirely dissipated in both a national and a religious sense.” What this means by this is not elaborated: were the workers Communists, nationally indifferent, or simply infrequent churchgoers? Nor was there mention of workers’ living conditions, typical occupation, or even an estimate of how many workers there were in total. For this terse report he charged the Yugoslav legation two-hundred Belgian Francs. Detailed and typewritten statistics did not appear in the Legation’s records until 1931—until then they presumably had to rely on Father Mašić’s terse, scrawled notes and to tolerate his frequent requests for more money. In what is a recurring theme, the Yugoslav diplomatic service and their ambitious program of overseas nation-building was often hamstrung by shortages of will, talent, and cash.

**Publishing the results: Census as Propaganda**

Statistical information about the “Yugoslav diaspora” was eagerly consumed and publicized by Serbo-Croatian-language newspapers in the United States. In 1923, *Yugoslavia*, a reliably pro-regime newspaper from Chicago, aggregated the Foreign Language Information Service (FLIS) data on the number of “Slovenes” and “Serbo-Croats” in the United States into a statistical overview of the number of “Yugoslavs” in the United States. According to the author,

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121 Filip Mašić to the Legation of the KSHS in Brussels, October 12th, 1927. Fond 392, Fasc. 1, BO 5, AJ.
the United States was home to about four-hundred thousand Yugoslavs. Of that number, around two-hundred ten thousand were Slovene, one-hundred forty thousand were Croatian, fifty-thousand Serbian, and five-thousand Montenegrin. Although spread over thirty-one states, the most “Yugoslavs” were in the Old Northwest, the top five states being, in order of magnitude, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, New York, and Minnesota.122 This was not new information—FLIS had originally published the data in 1920—that this article was printed in 1923, after Yugoslav diplomats began to take an interest in the “Yugoslav” diaspora’s demographics, was probably not coincidental. Even so, it was good propaganda: it would be much more satisfying for a typical emigrant to imagine himself part of a large community of four-hundred thousand “Yugoslavs” than a comparatively paltry one-hundred and forty-thousand Croats.

There was clearly an appetite for demography among American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. And the elusiveness of exact estimates meant that newspapers could argue about demography so long as that interest held. In 1928, emigrants could read about “How many of us there are and where we are,” as one on-the-nose headline from Zajedničar, the organ of the North American-based Croatian Fraternal Union, put it. Referring to an earlier article published also in Zajedničar on the same subject, this article referred to the difficulties associated with estimating the number of “us,” an “us” that explicitly included Serbs and Slovenes in the collective. That this paper, the organ of the largest and richest organization in the entire emigration, had no problem accepting the Yugoslav idea showed that Yugoslavism was still alive and well in the emigration. Moreover, this tally typified the national flexibility of emigrants: one could be both a Croat and a Yugoslav. And, perhaps, an American as well, since, as the article pointed out, naturalization could obscure the number of ethnic “Yugoslavs.” However, as the

122 “Jugosloveni u Pojedinim Državama Unije,” Yugoslavia, June 16, 1923, in Fond 1071, Kut. 566, HDA.
article notes, this basic ambiguity at the heart of emigrant identity made estimating the number of Yugoslavs in the United States very difficult, a point they made by comparing wildly different estimates for the number of “Yugoslavs” in each state. Moreover, since most had emigrated from the Habsburg Monarchy rather than Yugoslavia, some are mistakenly listed as “Austrian” or “Hungarian” in official US statistics. What this meant was that an earlier estimate of 664,500 Yugoslavs in the United States was potentially much greater—perhaps even a million. This was an exciting idea for readers: there is strength in numbers, as the old saw goes.

In any event, there is little question that these articles were planted by the Yugoslav Emigration Commissariat. Ivan Mladineo, who wrote the original article in Zajedničar that set off this debate, was under IK sponsorship, and was, moreover, deeply involved in the diaspora census effort. In fact, he was the once of the principle actors. Mladineo would eventually publish the preliminary results in a slim booklet in 1931, the Jugoslovenski Almanak, as well as in a much fatter tome, the Narodni Adresar, in 1937. The former also contains an interesting attempt to visualize the “Yugoslav” settlement as territory (See Figure 1). While both books will be analyzed in more detail as nationalist projects in later chapters, they are also useful sources of information.

123 Dr. T. M. Lutković, “Jedno Važno Pitanje: Koliko nas ima i gdje smo?,” Zajedničar, April 19, 1928. Fond 967, Kut. 26, HDA.
In “Census, Map, and Museum,” Benedict Anderson introduced the concept of “logoization” to describe the effect of maps and museums on national consciousness. Using the example of Borobudur, Anderson argued that the museums use cartography and archeology to produce symbols/logos of the nation-state, which are infinitely reproducible propaganda. Borobudur, for instance, has become virtually synonymous with Cambodia and now adorns its flag. While maps do not generally end up on flags, they likewise function as logos. I would argue that logoization also applies to censuses. Aside from producing the ethnic categories with which people see themselves, they can also, when published, reproduce and reinforce a national

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imagined community. We see this clearly in the Yugoslav case, as Yugoslavia, in counting ‘its’
emigration, reified it. Of course, census data is not usually used for propaganda—I would
hypothesize that most people do not find learning about how many people live in one’s own
country terribly scintillating. However, as these early examples show, “Yugoslavs” in the United
States were excited to learn of the existence of an “us” spread across the globe.

Yugoslavs and Labor: A Tale of Two Stjepans

While Yugoslav authorities concerned about assimilation paid close attention to emigrant
organizations organized around ethnic identity, they tended to overlook those based around class.
These became increasingly important during this period. Beginning in the first years of the 20\textsuperscript{th}
century, American labor unions attempted to broaden their membership beyond skilled laborers,
often of Western European extraction, to incorporate the new wave of migrant laborers from
Eastern Europe. Their reasoning was simple: better that these workers be union members than
strikebreakers. Meetings and reading materials were frequently translated into the languages
languages of new migrants—Polish, German, Lithuanian, and so forth.\textsuperscript{125} In addition, following
the October Revolution in 1917, an upsurge of vigorous and aggressive communist parties
around the world bolstered the old socialist left. The CPUSA, for instance, had nearly eighty
thousand members at its peak during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{126} Like contemporary trade unions,
Marxist parties sought to harness the energies of emigrant workers by talking to them in their
native language. The CPUSA, for instance, was subdivided into language-based “fractions”\textsuperscript{127}
with their own cells and foreign-language newspapers. Among them was the Yugoslav Fraction,

\textsuperscript{125} James Barrett, \textit{Work and Community in the Jungle: Chicago’s Packing House Workers, 1894-1922}, PhD
Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1981, 196-230
\textsuperscript{126} Steve Nelson, James Barrett, and Rob Ruck, \textit{Steve Nelson, American Radical} (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
\textsuperscript{127} “Faction” was something of a dirty word in the Communist Party, implying bickering and less-than-total
ideological coherence.
founded 1919, which published Radnik (The Worker) in Serbo-Croatian. In addition, the
Yugoslav Socialist Union, which had between one and two thousand members, published three
newspapers: Proletar (The Proletarian) in Slovene, Radnička Straža, and Narodni Glas (The
Worker's Guard and the People's Voice, in Serbo-Croatian). Likewise, the Slovene National
Benefit Society, which was a socialist fraternal union, published two newspapers, Enakopravost
and Prosveta (Equality and Education, in Slovene)—Louis Adamic worked briefly in the latter’s
mailroom. While James Barrett characterizes these unions as agents of “Americanization,” in
that they integrated migrants into American political life, they were nonetheless preserving
emigrant literacy in their native language—just what Yugoslav authorities wanted.

Although American socialist organizations were oriented toward Marxism rather than
Yugoslav nationalism, politically engaged Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes often had a foot in both
ethnic and class-based activism. Moreover, activism in these organizations tended to reinforce
Yugoslavism as a principle of organizational cooperation. The story of Stjepan Mesaroš, better
known as Steve Nelson, was a good example of how the labor movement brought Yugoslavs
together. Several years Adamic’s junior, Stjepan Mesaroš emigrated from Subocka, a village in
Croatian Slavonia, to the United States in 1920. Although his family connections in the United
States helped Mesaroš land his first job, the factory floor integrated him into a broader network
of Serb, Croat, and Slovene activists, who were often his neighbors and coworkers. In 1921, after
being persuaded by a Serbian co-worker, Mesaroš joined the South Slavic branch of the Socialist
Labor Party. His cell was predominantly Serbian. Once in the world of labor activism, however,
Mesaroš found himself drawn to the Yugoslav section of the CPUSA, which seemed more
dynamic. When Mesaroš moved to Pittsburgh, where many Serbs and Croats worked in the

128 “Politički život, Jugoslovenski almanak, October 10, 1931. Fond 967, kut. 27, HDA.
mines of the Monongahela river valley, it was a Slovene activist who connected him with the labor movement there.\footnote{Nelson, Steve \textit{Nelson}, 17-22.} Emigrant ethnic societies like the Croatian Fraternal Union or the Slovene National Benefit Society often served as arenas for CPUSA activism, which is why when Mesaroš moved to Detroit to work in the automobile plants, he remained an active member in the local Croatian Fraternal Union Lodge. Aside from being a hub for socialization, CFU lodges were a convenient venue to fundraise among emigrant workers for things like shop newspapers or to recruit more members to the Party.\footnote{Ibid,44-46.} By the end of the 1920s, however, Nelson had drifted away from CFU-based activism, choosing instead to focus on agitating among labor unions.\footnote{Ibid, 69.} Symbolizing this shift, Stjepan Mesaroš changed his name to Steve Nelson.\footnote{Ibid, 67.} Calling this assimilation, however, could be misleading. Nelson retained his ability to speak Serbo-Croatian and became much more involved in “nationality work” once he ascended to the National Board of the CPUSA in 1945.\footnote{Ibid, 283.}

While Nelson devoted most of his energies in his early years to building socialism in the United States, other socialist activists, like Stjepan Lojen, remained interested in old country affairs. Lojen, a Croat from Karlovec, emigrated to work in the steelworks of Youngstown, Ohio in 1912.\footnote{Stjepan Lojen, \textit{Uspomene Jednog Iseljenika} (Zagreb: Znanje, 1963), 7-11.} Before he left, Lojen had met few Croats from outside his village. Only once he arrived in the United States did he become aware that “a million of our people [emphasis mine] had emigrated from the Yugoslav territories that were under Austro-Hungarian rule, along with a lesser number of Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Serbs from Serbia.” Lojen was already
imagining himself as part of a diasporic, *Yugoslav* community.\textsuperscript{136} American factories not only awakened Lojen’s national consciousness, he also quickly came to see the common class interests of his fellow migrants. He found himself, like Nelson, swept up in labor activism. In Lojen’s case, following a workplace accident in 1913, he joined the Croatian National Union, a fraternal organization that would later become the Croatian Fraternal Union.\textsuperscript{137} He subsequently joined the Yugoslav Socialist Federation in 1916,\textsuperscript{138} jumping ship to the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA in 1920.\textsuperscript{139} Like Nelson, Lojen encountered his share of Serbs and Slovenes in the Party. For instance, as a correspondent for the party newspaper, *Radnik*, which was edited by a Croat, Lojen became acquainted with a Vojvodina Serb named Dragan, who worked as an editorial assistant. However, because Dragan was a speaker of the *ekavian* dialect, he proved unable to adapt to the *ijekavian*\textsuperscript{140} dialect in which the paper was written and was subsequently replaced by a Slovene, Franjo Preveden.\textsuperscript{141} Unlike Nelson, however, Lojen remained engaged in the politics of the Croatian Fraternal Union, especially at their conventions, where he consistently fought against hardline and exclusionary Croatian nationalism and advocated for cooperation between Serb, Croat, and Slovene emigrant organizations.\textsuperscript{142} And during the Second World War, Lojen supported the United Committee of South Slavic Americans, a progressive Yugoslavist organization that will be discussed in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid, 32-33.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid, 41-43
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid, 64.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid, 101.
\textsuperscript{140} The main difference between ijekavian and ekavian lies in how certain words are pronounced and written with either an ije or an e. For example, “beautiful” is written at “lijepo” in ijekavian and “lepo” in ekavian. However, the rule is not consistent—ijekavian speakers say “meat” as “meso,” not “mijeso,” hence Dragan’s difficulty. As a rule of thumb, ijekavian is used in most of Croatia and Bosnia, whereas ekavian is spoken primarily in Serbia.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, 120.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid, 128-133, 142-145, 163-165, 188-190, 197-202, 218-251.
Although Stjepan Mesaroš and Stjepan Lojen lived in very similar circumstances, their attitude toward Americanization revealed that “assimilation” was less a question of identity than tactics—Nelson chose to become an “American” because it made it easier for him to agitate among native-born union workers, whereas Lojen found that preserving his Croatian or Yugoslav identity was better suited to the world of fraternal union politics. Nonetheless, while the interconnected nature of South-Slavic socialists showed that there was potential for Yugoslavism as a working-class movement, during the 1920s such a movement could only get limited traction—times were good, work was plentiful, and the repression against labor activists was vicious and ubiquitous, especially against foreigners. Deportation was a favorite tactic of the American authorities. In 1919 and 1920, the attorney general Alexander Palmer ordered a series of raids against leftist organizations in over seventy cities, rounding up over ten-thousand workers, including thirty-five hundred migrant workers who were threatened with deportation. Eight of Stjepan Lojen’s comrades in Detroit were caught up in what became known as the “Palmer raids,” Lojen only escaping because he was not yet prominent within the Party.\textsuperscript{143} Being found to be a member of the Party risked one’s naturalization status—Nelson only registered as a Party member after he had become an American citizen.\textsuperscript{144} Throughout the 1920s, workers who got involved with left wing organizations risked their jobs. Nelson rarely worked in any factory longer than several months—fortunately, the lack of social security numbers made it difficult to enforce blacklists, and Nelson found it easy to find work in another city.\textsuperscript{145} The constant movement of workers, however, undoubtably disrupted Party activism in Yugoslav fraternal societies. There was also the threat of violence: while Nelson was handing out leaflets outside a

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, 101.
\textsuperscript{144} Nelson, \textit{Steve Nelson}, 47.
copper factory in New York, he was attacked by company thugs armed with blackjacks. After receiving a severe beating that would require months of recuperation, Nelson was subsequently arrested for “disturbing the peace” and fined.\textsuperscript{146} In short, socialist activists, Yugoslav and otherwise, did not enjoy basic civil rights within the United States, hamstringing any potential for a mass movement. Likewise, Yugoslav socialists could count on little support from the government of Yugoslavia; this was not the sort of Yugoslavism the government of Yugoslavia wanted to promote.

**The Yugoslav ‘Old Guard’ in the 1920s**

Yugoslav diplomats were also dismissive of the emigrant political, economic, and intellectual elite in the United States. Reporting in 1922 to the Yugoslav foreign ministry, the Yugoslav consul in Chicago wrote that the “greatest number of our emigrants” he wrote, “learn nothing, read nothing, and do not participate in local public life…and often return [to Yugoslavia] more savage than when they left [emphasis mine].” Moreover, the consul noted, those emigrants who did become entrepreneurs, scientists, or professors in America also Americanized. And having sunk time and effort into America’s complicated naturalization process, successful Yugoslav-Americans scorned repatriation. Emigrant notables seemed to be of little use to the consul—not only could they “be counted on the fingers,” but many seemed unwilling to serve as spokespeople for the new Yugoslav state or to establish commercial ties with the old country.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, 60.
\textsuperscript{147} Letter to Minister Ninčić from the General Consulate of the KSHS in Chicago, 7 September, 1922, Fond 414, Folder 5, Broj Opis 9, Generalni Konzulat Kraljevina Jugoslavije u Čikagu, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
However, the consul’s assertions about emigrant notables were misleading. Even if they were not willing to repatriate, the United States had many veteran Yugoslavist activists and public figures, their ardor undiminished by their acculturation to American life. In fact, ironically, the most Americanized were often also the biggest proponents of the Yugoslav idea. In this regard, Anderson’s take on Long-Distance nationalism is entirely correct—emigres tend to be more nationalistic than their counterparts in the old country, largely because their distance from that old country allows them to stake out more starkly nationalist positions without having to worry about the consequences in the old country. Where Anderson and those who agree with him are wrong, however, is when they conclude that this radicalization pushes emigrants to the right, toward nationalist chauvinism. One case in point was Niko Gršković, a Croatian priest from Krk, then an Austrian dominion. In 1901, Gršković’s pro-Yugoslav views, which were verboten in Austria, compelled him to leave for the United States. In America, Gršković continued to lend his charisma and oratory talents to various Yugoslav causes, the most prominent of which was his support of the Yugoslav Committee during WWI. Although the adoption of Centralist Yugoslavism after the Vidovdan constitution of 1921 pushed Gršković into the anti-Belgrade opposition, Gršković remained devoted to the Yugoslav cause. Throughout the interwar period, he would edit the left-wing but stalwartly pro-Yugoslav newspaper Jugoslovenski Svijet out of New York City.


149 Letter to Minister Miloje Smiljanović from Minister-Plenipotentiary Konstantin Fotić about Gršković’s life, December 22, 1939, Fond 371, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
Aside from Gršković, another potential friend of Yugoslavia in America was Dr. Ante Biankini, a Croatian surgeon from Chicago and brother to the Juraj Biankini, a politician in Croatia. Ante Biankini, like Gršković, had been in the Yugoslav Council. Additionally, Biankini had organized the then-bankrupt American-Yugoslav Import-Export Society. In other words, he was willing to establish commercial ties with Yugoslavia, just as the consul wanted. Perhaps because of this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed in 1923 to make Biankini a consul, as well as on the grounds that “here in America it is particularly necessary that our consuls be Croats.” The “Yugoslav diaspora” was, after all, around 50% Croatian. However, one problem with Biankini, according to the Yugoslav consul vetting him, was that he had a record of embezzling and otherwise wasting money, and was far too old to be of much use anyway. Ante Biankini would pass away in 1934 and be buried with pomp in Yugoslavia—ironically, he would be much more useful to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a dead symbol than a living activist.

Another potential Croatian collaborator was Ivan Mladineo. Originally from the island of Brač in Dalmatia, Mladineo emigrated sometime before 1909, eventually settling in New York in 1918. Aside from his efforts to count the “Yugoslav” emigration, which I have already touched upon, Mladineo was a lifelong collaborator with the Foreign Language Information Service. Mladineo was also president of various Yugoslav Sokols and singing societies, and for a time dabbled in editing a newspaper. Later, he would organize the first mass-excursions by emigrants to Yugoslavia. Mladineo saw no contradiction between a Yugoslav and Croatian identity, also

150 Consul Vukimirović to President Milan Stojadinović about the death of Ante Biankini, October 15, 1935, Fond 371, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
151 “Dr. Ante Biankini, Lekar iz Čikaga,” GK KSHS in Chicago to KP in Washington, March 13, 1923, Fond 371, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
publishing a short history of Croatians in the United States sometime after 1923.\textsuperscript{152} In fact, parts of that work would later be recycled to form the introduction to his later works, the \textit{Jugoslovenski Almanak} (1931) and \textit{Narodni Adresar} (1937), both of which attempted to provide a complete catalogue of the ‘Yugoslav’ emigration and their organizations the 1930s. These works will be analyzed in greater detail in later chapters.

Yet another possible collaborator was Paul Radosavljević, a Serbian professor at New York University. Radosavljević’s 1919 opus, \textit{Who Are the Slavs: A Contribution to Race Psychology Vol. 1}, revealed him to be an ardent panslavist and Yugoslavist (albeit one with a strong dislike of the Bulgarian “race,” which he calls “cold-blooded and calculating….with the characteristic Bulgarian tenacity and ruthless, silent persistence that is positively Asiatic”\textsuperscript{153}.) Blending the latest scholarship on Slavic linguistics, history, and culture with currently-fashionable racist pseudoscience, Radosavljević adumbrated the typical psychology of each Slavic “tribe.” Goaded by nativist stereotypes about “Hunkie” sloth and barbarism, Radosavljević lauded each Slavic tribe—Russians (“Great, Small, and White”)\textsuperscript{154}, Poles, “Czecho-Slovaks,” “Lusatian Serbs,”\textsuperscript{155} “Serbo-Croats,” Slovenes, and “Bulgars”—noting for each their bravery, industriousness, creativity, honesty, and democratic spirit. Even the Bulgarians he praised for their business savvy.\textsuperscript{156} These racial traits, he argued, made Slavs worthy of having their own super-state, a “United States of the Slavs,” which could serve as a counterweight to an imperialist Germany.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{152} “Smrt Ivana Mladinea”, \textit{Svijet}, 1938. Found in HDA 967, k. 36.
\textsuperscript{154} In modern terminology, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians.
\textsuperscript{155} In modern terminology, Lusatian Sorbs or Wends.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid, 38-39, 116.
In fact, Radoslavljević’s ethnology was the forerunner of similar racial analyses that would be published over the next two decades in Yugoslavia. For instance, Jovan Cvijić would also attempt a typology of each Yugoslav tribe in 1926 in article form. And in 1939, Vladimir Dvorniković would expand Cvijić’s work into book form, using craniology, anthropology, and cultural studies (just as Radosavljević did exactly twenty years before) to prove the existence of a Yugoslav race and describe its psychology. Their conclusions are even quite similar. Just as Dvorniković stated that the Yugoslav’s primary traits are a capacity for self-sacrifice, a strong sense of idealism, a peaceful spirit, and an elemental creativity, Radosavljević argued that the Serbo-Croat is “impulsive, tempestuous, sensitive, he distinguished for the vigor of his frame, his personal valor, his love of freedom, and his glowing poetical spirit.” While this might simply be a coincidence, it shows that Radosavljević was in Yugoslavism’s intellectual vanguard even if his enthusiasm for American political models clashed with the vision of the ruling Serbian Radical Party.

To belabor the point still further, Americanization often went hand-in-hand with Yugoslavism. Besides Radoslavljević, there was also Joseph Goričar, a former Austro-Hungarian diplomat who had defected in 1914 to campaign for Yugoslav cause in the United States. In 1920, echoing Radosavljević, he sought to found a “United States of Slavia,” a pan-Slavic federative state in Eastern Europe that would be modeled on the United States. Both Radosavljević and Goričar were proof that Americanization did not diminish one’s Yugoslavism

159 Ibid, 94.
161 William Mogerman to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, February 5, 1938, Fond 371, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
so much as give it an American flavor. Nor did long residence in the United States cause emigrants to forgot about their ‘Old Country.’ Anton Grdina, a mortician from Cleveland and one of the founders of the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union,163 and Vincent Cankar, head of the Slovene National Benefit Society,164 had both lived in the United States for decades but nonetheless both pledged their loyalty to the government of Yugoslavia and to the Yugoslav idea in 1920 and 1924, respectively. Additionally, there was Thomas ‘Tomo’ Blažina, who had emigrated from Croatia in 1904, fought in World War I as an American soldier, but nonetheless went on to found and lead the stalwartly pro-regime Yugoslav-American Legion.165 There was also John Palandech/Ivan Palandačić, who had emigrated from Montenegro some time prior to 1900, become a naturalized citizen, and Americanized his name. Nonetheless, Palandech still edited the newspaper Yugoslavia through the interwar period while tirelessly advocating for the Yugoslav idea.166 And lastly of course, there was Mihajlo Pupin, a Serbian-American inventor who had been in the United States since 1874, longer than even Nikola Tesla! Despite being arguably “Americanized,” Pupin already had an impressive track record for a nationalist: he had founded the Savez Sjedinjenih Srba- “Sloga,” one of the first Serbian fraternal unions. He had also served as honorary consul of the Kingdom of Serbia during the interwar period, and during the war, Pupin supported the Yugoslav committee. Lastly, at the peace conference, Pupin’s testimony that his birthplace, the Banat, was ethnically Serbian helped get Yugoslavia a slice of it (Romania got the other half). Pupin aside, Yugoslavia would have no shortage of potential

163 Anton Grdina to Minister Trešić-Pavičić, June 6, 1920, Fond 372, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
164 “Dvadesetogodišnjica Slovenske Narodne Potporne Jednote,” report to the political division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Yugoslav Consul in Chicago. April 18, 1924. Fond 449, Fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
165 “Thomas Blažina-Komandir Jugoslav-Američke Legije,” Nova Doba, October 26th, 1937, In Fond 967, Kut. 29, HDA.
166 Short biography of John. R. Palandech, undated, found with 1937. Fond 967, Kut. 36. HDA.
friends in the United States if it was willing to tolerate their personal idiosyncrasies, ideological eclecticism, and republican idealism.

The consul was right about one notable, however: Nikola Tesla. A Serb from Croatia and a world-renowned scientist, Tesla would have been an ideal spokesperson for the Yugoslav idea. Unfortunately, Tesla, then in his seventies and something of a recluse, preferred the laboratory to the podium. In 1926, Yugoslav officials attempted to award Tesla their most prestigious medal, the Order of St. Sava, 1st Degree, an exercise designed to link his prestige with that of Yugoslavia. Tesla accepted the award but refused ceremony or publicity—he apparently had little appetite for pomp or large crowds. Yugoslav officials acquiesced, although this defeated the entire purpose of giving him the medal in the first place. According to the legation’s later report to their superiors in the Yugoslav foreign ministry, Tesla “lived modestly and withdrawn from society.” Elaborating further on Tesla’s suitability as a spokesperson, they compared him to Pupin, writing: “although Tesla is by education higher than Mihajlo Pupin…” “unlike his contemporary Mihajlo Pupin, who is altogether normal, Tesla displays here and there various abnormalities…his greatest joy is to feed pigeons…which he does by scattering grain while they sleep..., and treating the lame or wounded ones at home.” Completing his portrait of an eccentric eremite, the legation noted that “he flees from society, particularly female,” which doubtless would prove an obstacle to him participating in diaspora politics to the degree Pupin did. Tesla probably also wanted to avoid Pupin, as the two Serbs famously despised one another. In 1931, Pupin remarked in a letter to his friend that he had not seen Tesla in over twenty years.

167 GK KSHS in NYC to KP in Washington, September 20th, 1926. Fond 371, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
168 KP in Washington to MIP, October 1st, 1926. Fond 371, Fasc 60, BO 78, AJ.
169 Mihajlo Pupin to Mr. Swezey, May 29, 1931, quoted in Marc J. Seller, Wizard: The Life and Times of Nikola Tesla, Biography of a Genius, (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1998), 436-7. While Pupin is cryptic about the nature of the quarrel, Tesla’s biographer suggests it had it was a combination of Pupin’s friendship with Marconi, who Tesla
Tesla was reclusive in general, having “rarely been in contact with our own [representatives of the Yugoslav government],” although during those brief contacts Tesla had allegedly displayed “an entirely Serbian soul” and “could recite by heart our national songs.” Unfortunately, Yugoslavia needed Tesla’s voice, not his soul.

But while Tesla’s agoraphobia made him a poor avatar of Yugoslavism in the United States, he could still be made, through selective reporting, to serve the Yugoslav cause in Yugoslavia. *Nova Doba*, a newspaper from Split, proudly announced in 1926 “the decoration of our countryman the inventor Nikola Tesla.” Based on the lack of further introduction of Tesla or his achievements, one may conclude that Tesla was already famous in Yugoslavia. Upon receiving the award, according to *Nova Doba*, Tesla dispatched a radiogram in Serbo-Croatian to Yugoslavia, which *Nova Doba*, (and presumably other newspapers) reprinted. After praising the efforts of Yugoslav scientists and Yugoslavia’s brave soldiers, “to whose titanic efforts for their ideals and European culture Europe is indebted, and which have earned the recognition and respect of the entire world, particularly great America,” Tesla concluded his short message with a round of “Long Live Yugoslavia! Long live his Majesty your brave and patriotic ruler! And again, as a Serbian-American I must repeat: Long Live his Majesty and his exalted family!”

Their hero Tesla, domestic audiences now knew, supported Yugoslavia and the king. Moreover, they now ‘knew’ that their plucky little country of 12 million people was respected by the citizens of a great power. While that last bit was demonstrably false, (in 1924 one Yugoslav official quipped that most Americans neither knew nor cared about “Jugoslovakia and Czechoslovakia,” considering their inhabitants “half-barbarians who might as well live on

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170 KP in Washington to MIP, October 1st, 1926. Fond 371, Fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
Mars”)\textsuperscript{172}, Tesla’s fame lent it credibility. And if Yugoslavia was a ‘great country,’ the Yugoslav idea was vindicated. This episode aside, Tesla showed no inclination to actively participate in the Yugoslav cause in the United States and so Yugoslavia’s government essentially forgot about him until his eightieth birthday.

The Political Dangers of Repatriation

Another issue shaping official attitudes toward the emigration was the question of repatriation was not regarded with favor by all sectors of Yugoslav government. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MUP, which processed, surveilled, and interrogated returnees, suspected that mass repatriation could bring political contagion, like communism or separatist nationalism, into Yugoslavia. Their suspicions were somewhat justified by events in immediate postwar period. During the Great War, many Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had been conscripted into Austro-Hungarian armies and sent to the Eastern Front, where many deserted or were captured. These soldiers (one of them a certain Josip Broz), were then caught up in the Russian Civil War, where many became communists. Still more former soldiers were caught up in the 1919 Hungarian revolution. Based on the Yugoslav interrogation of Milorad Vlaškalić, a Serbian soldier from the Austro-Hungarian army, many had little choice but to become communists. Getting travel papers, not to mention surviving the various waves of arrests, often meant pinning a red star on one’s cap. Once in the party, Milorad and others like him were indoctrinated in special schools that the Bolsheviks had set up for expat soldiers. These soldiers, the Bolsheviks hoped, would form the core of a Yugoslav brigade, which the Bolsheviks planned to infiltrate back into Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{172} “Izveštajna Služba u Americi,” undated, found with 1924. Fond 414, Fasc. 7, Broj Opis 16.
\textsuperscript{173} MUP report to Zagreb provincial government, March 8th, 1921. Fond 1356, k. 1, HDA.
Whether they were caught up with the Russian revolution or not, many former soldiers still wanted to return home to Yugoslavia, where they could potentially bolster Yugoslavia’s own nascent communist movement. From 1918 to 1922, we see in the archived records from the Zagreb municipality that many did. One highlight of these cases was in 1919, when a communist operative was caught trying to lead an armed band of roughly four-hundred and fifty former soldiers into Yugoslavia via the railway from Kaposvár in Hungary. This, the report averred, was part of an organized operation by the communist party in Hungary to funnel militants into Yugoslavia, information they presumably wrung from the several agitators now languishing in Zagreb jails.174 Whether that was true or not ultimately did not matter, as on February 10, 1920, the current minister of Internal Affairs, Svetozar Pribičević, warned the provincial government in Ljubljana (through which many returnees passed) that the local Bolsheviks were becoming both more numerous and noisier, urging local police to be more vigilant. Known and suspected communists were to have their names, occupations, place of residence, and nationality recorded and were to be placed under police surveillance. Lastly, more attention was to be paid to their perambulations into and around Yugoslavia.175 Just as would-be emigrants were to be filtered by their potential usefulness or danger to Yugoslavia, so too were these early returnees.

This barebones system of surveillance was not especially effective, owing in part to the lackadaisical attitude of Yugoslav police. As chance would have it, Josip Broz was caught up in this dragnet against returnees from Russia. His recollections of this, recorded by Louis Adamic in 1948 and by Vlado Dedijer in 1950, provide a rare glimpse at how Pribičević’s directives were actually enforced. Broz returned to Yugoslavia (or rather, entered it for the first time), in

174 Directive to all local prefects from the Croatian-Slavonian provincial government, 14 May 1919, Fond 1356, Kut. 1, HDA.
175 Minister of Internal Affairs Svetozar Pribicevic to the Ljubljana Provincial Government, 10 February 1920., Fond 1356, Kut. 1, HDA.
September, 1920, having taken the train from Stettin (Szczecin). At the border, two of his fellow-passengers denounced him as a Bolshevik and asked the authorities to arrest Tito. They obliged, but only held him for a few days. 176 Tito gave a somewhat different account in 1948 in an interview with Louis Adamic. 177 Then, he made no mention of being denounced. Rather, the guards saw his Russian clothing and arrested him on that basis, holding him for a week and putting him on a watch list afterwards. 178 In both versions, however, the border controls were so perfunctory that Tito’s experience at the border earned only a short paragraph. Presumably, those who were prudent enough to shed their Russian greatcoats had no problems at all with the Yugoslav border police.

For these lapses, however, the police can be forgiven—there were far too many returning POWs to track effectively. A report from 1921 on Yugoslav returnees provides some sense of scale. As if November 1, 1921, over 27,000 Yugoslav prisoners of war and nearly one hundred and fifty officers had returned to Yugoslavia after being processed through POW camps in Ljubljana and Maribor. Of that number, roughly 15,000 had returned from Russia. Since all 27,000 were supposed to be watched for any sign of latent bolshevism, 179 it is easy to see how security forces could be overwhelmed.

In addition to returning POWs, the kingdom of Yugoslavia also had to contend with communist deportees from the United States. After the First Red Scare, membership in any organization that advocated the armed overthrow of the US government became a deportable

177 This technically made Adamic Tito’s first biographer, not Dedijer. Tito originally resisted telling his own story because the focus on a single individual’s achievements, rather than those of the whole Party, seemed un-Marxist to Tito.
179 Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Zagreb local government and to the police, November 15, 1921. Fond 1356, Kut. 1, HDA.
offence. Very few Yugoslav emigrants, however, were deported for political reasons throughout the 1920s—in the Croatian State Archive section on returnees there is only record of two. The more detailed record is a dossier of one P. Marković, a cobbler, who had immigrated to the US in 1910, only to be expelled twelve years later in 1922 after he was found to be a member of the Yugoslav Section of the CPUSA. Based on details in the description, notably, the fact that his height was given in feet rather than meters, the Yugoslav authorities were likely informed of his arrival by the American authorities. In the 1930s, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia would have their consular service warn them about potentially troublesome deportees, but for this decade they relied on the American authorities for tip-offs, which might also account for the low volume of known communists among the inflow of repatriates. Yet although America’s contribution to the Yugoslav communist underground was negligible, at least in the 1920s, we can still see from Marković’s story that Yugoslav police forces were theoretically on guard against all returnees of objectionable political persuasion, rather than just those from Russia.

Nor was this suspicion restricted to returnees—both the police and the Foreign Service were concerned about subversive potential of all Yugoslavs living abroad, which Yugoslavia’s foes, Italy and Hungary, could then exploit to advance their irredentist claims. At the Versailles peace talks, Yugoslavia had taken the Bačka, and Banat, and Slavonia from Hungary. Italy, in turn had been promised Dalmatia and Istria by the British in exchange for switching sides during WWI, only to be denied them in the final peace settlement—the “mutilated victory,” as D’Annunzio would later call it. Thus, both Italy and Hungary were willing to harbor or fund revolutionary or secessionist émigré groups.

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180 The Mayor of Modruško-Riječke to the Kotar Oblast. September 1922, Fond 1356, Kut. 3, HDA.
In 1921, Yugoslav police discovered a covert society of Croatian separatists and revolutionaries, code named “Orchid,” although the accounts of this conspiracy by Yugoslav police were probably exaggerated or embellished. The ringleaders allegedly lived in Budapest and received subsidies from the Hungarian government. The goal of this society was the creation of an independent Croatia through armed revolution and, naturally, the return of Bačka and Banat to Hungary. They would achieve this by slipping across the border, persuading discontented Frankists, Croatian Peasant Party members, and even communists to rise up, arming them with Hungarian weapons. Of course, this scheme was highly unrealistic—Communists would never work with the far-right Frankists, and the chances that a cell of sixteen activists could ignite a successful war of Croatian secession were slim. What “Orchid” could do, however, was encourage even more paranoia toward emigres. Nor was it the only such organization doing so.

Aside from “Orchid,” there was also the “Yugoslav Legion.” Much of the information about this organization is contradictory. Even its name is unclear: the Croatian historian Ivo Banac claims that the organization was called the “Croat Legion,” and it very well may have been at the top echelons, which were filled with far-right Croatian nationalists like Josip Metzger, who famously promised to “fry Serbs in boiling oil.” Banac mentions that the Yugoslav or Croatian Legion recruited Croats by “one device or another” and “under false pretenses.” That may have included representing the organization as Yugoslav rather than Croatian, since much of what Yugoslavia knew about this organization was gleaned through interrogation (and probably torture) of Mustafa Dohojčić, a young Bosnian recruited to serve as a

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181 Colonel Jurišić’s report to the Commanders of the Fourth and Fifth Army Brigade and to the Croatian-Slavonian Provincial Government, March 4th, 1921, Fond 1355, Kut 1, HDA.
183 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, 264-5
foot-soldier. According to his account, after escaping from an internment camp for Serbs, Mustafa fled to Hungary in 1918, where he then found work in a logging enterprise. In 1919, when Bela Kun’s revolution was in full swing, Mustafa, along with his other South-Slavic co-workers, was recruited by mysterious figures into a “Yugoslav Legion” and whisked away to a paramilitary training camp in Zalaegerszeg. At this camp, according to Mustafa, there were about two-thousand trainees. Their goal: “the return of Karl Habsburg to the throne.”

In addition, Mustafa provided descriptions of sixty people in the organization, including leaders, proving that the “Yugoslav legion” was the same as the “Croatian legion” described by Banac. Ethnically, the organization seems to have been truly Yugoslav, with Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, and even Serbs among the recruits that Mustafa knew. Among the Serbs were Karlo Šmit, a “Serbian Soldier,” Sergeant Ilija Živanović, from Vršac, a small town in the east Banat, a predominately Serbian region, and Tomo Segar, from Pančevo, which is twenty kilometers (or about thirty minutes by bus) from Belgrade going east. It seems unlikely that an organization calling itself the “Croatian Legion” could attract such people. Moreover, as Banac concedes, the organization’s leadership contained both Croatian separatists and genuine Yugoslavists, like Stjepan Duić and Baron Stjepan Sarkotić, who both wanted “a confederation of the South Slavs in which all their historical traits would remain intact.” Others, of course, wanted a fully independent Greater Croatia that might include large numbers of Serbs and Slovenes. In other words, the Yugoslav/Croat legion, as many of its members understood it, was less a statement of pure Croatian nationalism (as Banac presents it), than an ideologically-incoherent violent protest against the Serbian centralism.

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184 Inspector Lazarević of the Ministry of Internal Affairs report on the Yugoslav Legion, December 1st, 1921, Fond 1355, Kut 1, HDA.
185 Ibid.
Political Exiles and Trans-Atlantic Politics

Demobilized soldiers were not the only targets for foreign intrigue, but they did seem to be the most convenient for early-twenties-era Hungary, a defeated, impoverished, and revolution-wracked rump state with little ability to project power beyond its own borders. Italy, in contrast, had a well-developed diplomatic service and the financial wherewithal to meddle in overseas diaspora politics. Italian diplomats also had a great deal of practice doing so; they had been “making Italians” in Italy’s enormous overseas emigration since the late 1880s. Nor did Italian diplomats limit themselves to ‘their own’ overseas nationals. In 1922, the Yugoslav general consul in Chicago learned of the existence of a Montenegrin separatist movement within the United States. While small and short-lived, its history merits retelling because it anticipated the pattern of émigré politics during the 1930s.

The movement had its origins in 1919, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes annexed the principality of Montenegro via referendum. Displeased by this outcome, some elements of the government of Montenegro went into exile, most notably Jovan Plamenac, the former Minister of the Interior of the Montenegrin government. Plamenac had previously made a name for himself by launching an insurrection in Montenegro in January, 1919. It failed: the insurgents were both outgunned (the government had artillery) and badly outnumbered: Ivo Banac put their numbers at only several thousand. Nonetheless, Montenegrin separatism represented an opportunity for Italy, which coveted Yugoslavia’s Adriatic littoral. Three years later, in 1922, Montenegrin separatist organizations began springing up in the United States.

188 General Consul of New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Crnagorska Propaganda,” June 15th, 1922, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
Their Italian backing was only thinly disguised. For instance, the Detroit-based *Federacija Nezavisnih Crnagoraca* (Federation of Independent Montenegrins), was by an Italian, Luigi Criscuolo, although it had a Montenegrin figurehead.\(^{190}\) Other “Montenegrin” organizations made no pretensions toward Slavdom: take, for instance, *Montenegrini Central Relief Association*, whose program at its fundraiser concert consisted almost entirely of Italian artists,\(^{191}\) or the *Associazione Centrale Montenegrina di Beneficenza*. Despite the name, the latter organization was headed by Jovan Plamenac, who had reemerged in émigré politics in 1922 when he wrote to Vladimir Petrović, a former member of the Montenegrin Diplomatic Service, unilaterally appointing him Delegate General of his new organization, which in 1922 fronted as an apolitical charity.\(^ {192}\)

In spring of 1923, Plamenac was permitted entry the United States over the protests of Yugoslav diplomats.\(^ {193}\) This would come to be a leitmotif of diaspora politics—American officials were generally indifferent to the pleas of Yugoslav consular officials to bar entry to opposition political figures. Furthermore, Plamenac, in what would also become a pattern, circumvented the need for a Yugoslav passport by obtaining a passport in Italy. In this case, it was a “Montenegrin” passport, although later it would be more common to simply use Italian, Hungarian, or German passports. Once he arrived in New York City, Plamenac contacted his nephew, Dr. N. Kaludjerović, a prominent Yugoslav-American. This too was not unusual: many Yugoslav public figures had family on both sides of the Atlantic. Svetozar Pribićević’s son

\(^{190}\) Ibid.  
\(^{191}\) Program for Montenegrini Central Relief Association Concert for the Benefit of the Starving Women and Children of Montenegro, Found with 1922, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ. 
\(^{192}\) Charter of the Associazione Centrale Montenegrina di Beneficenza, found with 1922, Fond 449, Facikl 6, Broj Opis 17, Generalni Konzulat Kraljevina Jugoslavije u Nju-Yorku, Arhiv Jugoslavije; Jovan Plamenac to Vladimir Petrović, March 4\(^{th}\) 1922, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ. 
\(^{193}\) Letter to Minister Trešić-Pavičić from the Yugoslav General Consulate in New York, April 9, 1923, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, Generalni Konzulat Kraljevina Jugoslavije u Nju-Yorku, Arhiv Jugoslavije; Letter to Minister Trešić-Pavičić from the Yugoslav General Consulate in New York, April 12, 1923, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
Stojan lived and worked in the in America after 1932. There were many others: Nikola Tesla had a nephew in the Yugoslav parliament: Sava Kosanović. Ante Biankini, an American surgeon, was the brother of Juraj Biankini, a Croatian politician. The Yugoslav consul in Chicago, Božidar Purić, was married to Nikola Pašić’s daughter. Stjepan Radić’s son, Petar, would continue his late father’s work in the United States and in South America after 1929. And so on. Family ties formed one part of the web of transnational connections that linked the emigration, and its debate over the Yugoslav idea, to the old country. Moreover, family ties made it easier for overseas politicians to navigate the treacherous waters of émigré politics and allowed them to circumvent the bounds of acceptable meddling for foreigners. Using Kaludjerović as a proxy, Plamenac was able to abandon the Associazione Centrale Montenegrina di Beneficenza’s apolitical pretense, issuing a declaration that “Montenegro will never submit to Serbian domination.” While in the United States, Plamenac also collaborated and coordinated with Luigi Criscuolo and the openly “separatist” Federation of Independent Montenegrins. Plamenac even printed his own money, ten-dollar bonds to be redeemed if Montenegro achieved independence. Although they were a poor investment in hindsight, at least a few Americans bought them.

Among Montenegrin-Americans, however, the idea of an independent Montenegro had little appeal; the Federation of Independent Montenegrins had only about one-hundred members, according to consular estimates. And one could speculate as to what percentage of that was Italian-American. Nevertheless, Plamenac’s connections to the American political elite made

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194 “Around the Lobbies,” Examiner, June 12th, 1923, page 6. Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
195 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the General Consulate in New York, August 21st, 1925, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
196 Ten Dollar Bond Certificate to Brigadier General F. E. Burnham, September 1st, 1923. Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ. He would not recoup his investment.
197 Royal Yugoslav Consul in Chicago to the Yugoslav Legation, July 31st, 1923, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
him a threat. In May 17, 1923, coinciding with Plamenac’s arrival, Hamilton Fish III, a prominent congressman, attempted to organize a political committee “for the sole purpose of advocating the right of the people of Montenegro to hold a plebiscite to determine whether they shall enter Yugoslavia, or maintain their own independence and territorial integrity.” He also invited the editor of the New York Times, Louis Wiley, to join, according to correspondence intercepted by the Yugoslav consulate.¹⁹⁸ In the opinion of the New York Yugoslav general consulate, Plamenac was behind it all. Having identified the problem, they proposed as that they round up some loyal Montenegrin Americans into a counter-lobby, which would receive a $200 monthly subsidy from the consulate. This lobby, like Plamenac’s, would also raise money for the victims of the famine in Montenegro, thereby denying Plamenac the moral high ground. From this bully pulpit, this committee would issue scathing denunciations of Plamenac, accusing him of embezzling donations, funding terrorism in Montenegro, taking money from Italy, and being an Italian hireling.¹⁹⁹ This was, in fact, the first proposal by Yugoslav officials to organize emigrants into a political lobby, albeit a temporary one.

In any event, smearing Plamenac proved superfluous, as Plamenac was neutralized through deportation and bribery. By enlisting the help of prominent Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian Americas in petitioning several congressmen, the General Consulate in Chicago was able to prevent the extension of Plamenac’s six-month stay in the United States.²⁰⁰ Plamenac’s departure fractured his movement’s unity. Plamenac and Criscuolo parted ways after 1923 over an unspecified dispute. Barred from staying further in the United States and having found little traction for his movement there, Plamenac cut a deal with Yugoslav authorities, agreeing to

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¹⁹⁸ Hamilton Fish Jr. to Louis Wiley, May 17th, 1923, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
¹⁹⁹ GK KSHS NYC to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 24, 1923, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
²⁰⁰ GK KSHS in Chicago to the Royal Yugoslav Legation in Washington, “Jovan Plamenac” November 13th, 1923, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
inform on Criscuolo and to join the pro-regime Serbian Radical Party. The movement for Montenegrin independence in America petered out soon after.

The Croatian Republican Peasant Party (HRSS), however, proved to be a more tenacious overseas critic. As the backbone of the opposition through both the entirety of Yugoslavia’s parliamentary period as well as during the dictatorship, which began in 1929, the HRSS stood for autonomy for Croatia within a decentralized, federal Yugoslavia, which made them the enemy of the ruling People’s Radical Party (NRS), which, while neither particularly radical and nor populist, did support a strong central government based in Belgrade. Because the Yugoslavia’s emigrant population was around fifty-percent Croatian, it is not surprising that HRSS politicians made campaigning in the diaspora one part of their fight against Belgrade’s ‘tyranny.’

In January, 1922, the same year that Plamenac began his effort to organize a movement for Montenegrin Independence, the Yugoslav foreign ministry learned that Ljudevit Kežman, a member of the HRSS’s central committee, intended to visit the United States. According to intelligence from the General Consul in Chicago, sympathizers in the United States had been preparing for Kežman’s arrival for some time. Near the end of 1921, HRSS sympathizers in the United States had founded the Croatian Republican League, modeling their new organization on the Irish Republican League. Like the Irish Republican League, the Croatian Republican League was also dedicated to financing nationalist political parties in the homeland. Despite the Croatian Republican League’s youth, this organization was already flourishing: over fifty branches (which could be from ten to one hundred people) had been founded and they had

\[201\] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the GK KSHS in Chicago, August 21st, 1925, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ
\[203\] Forwarded Message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, February 10th, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
\[204\] GK KSHS in Chicago to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, February 13th, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
already begun to collect donations.\footnote{GK KSHS in Chicago to the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.} This made them magnitudes more threatening to Yugoslavia than Plamenac’s hundreds. One reason the CRL were so popular was that, unlike Plamenac, the Croatian Peasant Party sought no assistance from Italy or Hungary—being identified as foreign provocateur could undermine an organization’s credibility.

Both the HRSS’s and Montenegrin Green’s overseas operations movements suggest that this sort of trans-Atlantic politics depend on a symbiotic relationship with émigré notables. First, while émigré nationalists are capable of organizing on their own (the original organizer behind the Croatian Republican League drive was actually a priest from Kansas City named Krmpotić),\footnote{GK KSHS in Chicago to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, February 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.} the arrival of ‘old country’ politicians like Kežman lent strength and credibility to these efforts. These political celebrities, regardless of their actions or speeches, function as rallying points for overseas nationalists. Additionally, the emergence of the Croatian Republican League shows how existing “diasporas” provide templates for the ways newer arrivals form their own cultural and fraternal organizations—the existence of the Irish Republican League meant that the creators of the Croatian Republican league did not have to reinvent the organizational wheel. And since these organizations are the main vectors of diaspora nationalist activity, a country with many of them, like the United States, may be better at creating diasporas than even the emigrants’ country of origin.

Visiting Croatian enclaves and making speeches across America for the next two years, Kežman attempted to enlist the support of Croats in America for the parliamentary opposition in Yugoslavia. Of course, it was not phrased in those terms. According to the Consulate in Chicago, which had someone eavesdropping on his speeches, Kežman adopted the language of universal human rights and national self-determination, arguing that only the head of the HRSS, Stjepan
Radić, could liberate the “oppressed Croatian people” from the Serbian yoke.207 In November of the same year, Radić himself attempted to come to the United States, showing the degree to which outreach to overseas Croats had become a pillar of HRSS strategy. However, the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, did not think Radić would be able to achieve anything since he lacked any contacts in Washington; the support of the hoi polloi was apparently not enough to effect kind of radical change Radić wanted.208 Put another way, Radić was just as dependent on collaboration with local notables as the Emigration Service or Jovan Plamenac. Naturalized ‘Yugoslavs’ and community leaders were vital intermediaries between Yugoslav politicians and the people that they were trying to persuade. But while Radić and Kežman’s efforts were not total successes, in the sense that they were not able to induce the US government to support Croatian independence, they were not the total failures predicted by the Legation: the HRSS had sunk organizational roots in the United States that would prove difficult to dislodge over the next two decades. More broadly, these early experiences with Croatian and Montenegrin “separatists” conditioned Yugoslav officials to view emigres as a security threat. In their view, emigres were a potential source of national renewal, but they were uniquely vulnerable to the suasion of disloyal politicians.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, from 1922 onward, the newly formed Kingdom of Yugoslavia sought to learn all it could about the hundreds of thousands of overseas Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that it inherited from Austria-Hungary. While their basic assumption was that the emigration ought to support Yugoslavia both economically and politically, Yugoslav officials discovered that, for the

207 “Dr. L. Kežman,” General Consul of the KSHS in Chicago to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, June 19, 1923, Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
208 Yugoslav Legate in Washington to GK KSHS in New York, October 4, 1923, Fond 449, Fasc. 6, BO. 17, AJ.
emigration to do this, they must first combat assimilation and make its overseas “subjects” into
good Yugoslavs. Only then could they be permitted to repatriate and put the money and skills
they acquired overseas to use in Yugoslavia. This conviction was reinforced by their early
experience with émigré paramilitary groups like the Yugoslav Legion as well as more peaceful
activists like Jovan Plamenac of the Montenegrin Greens or Ljudevit Kežman of the Croatian
Peasant Party. Yugoslavization, at least as practiced overseas, was a direct reaction both to
Americanization and the efforts of émigré politicians and dissidents.

Yet Yugoslav diplomats understanding of Americanization was flawed. Assimilation and
“Americanization” was not incompatible with Yugoslavism, but often complementary. We see
this, for instance in the activities and proclamations of émigré activists in the United States,
whose Yugoslav patriotism was often grounded in support for a republic and/or federalism. In
this, we can find the beginnings of an answer to the question posed in my introduction: how is
diaspora nationalism shaped both by the host country (in this case, a federal republic)? Further
evidence that Americanization and Yugoslavization were compatible can be found within the
nascent Yugoslav labor movement within the United States. Although building socialism in the
United States remained the goal of many Yugoslavs in the CPUSA, much of their activism took
place within and created connections between emigrant organizations like the Croatian Fraternal
Union or the Slovene National Benefit Society. As such, there existed the potential for a
Yugoslav diaspora united by the left, although political repression in the United States made
such a network politically unviable, at least for the moment.

Similarly, we see the influence of US-based diasporas in the overseas activism of the
Croatian Peasant Party or the Montenegrin Greens. From these existing political networks
émigré activists could borrow templates for their own activism, like the Irish Republican League or even obtain financial assistance in the case of Italian migrants.

Moreover, the cases of Kežman and Plamanac relate back to the question posed in the introduction about what, besides remittances, anchor diasporic networks. Travel and travelers, I argue, possess symbolic capital no less significant to migrants than the flow of money to family in the ‘old country.’ Given the difficulties and costs associated with trans-Atlantic trouble, being seen to possess the “truth” about Yugoslavia, derived from personal experience, gave instant credibility and celebrity to travelers, their audience hungry for news about the country of their birth. Kežman and Plamanac would be the first of many Yugoslav politicians to take advantage of this.
CHAPTER TWO: ANSWERING THE ‘EMIGRATION QUESTION’

On the March 12, 1922, Jutarnji List, a major Yugoslav newspaper published in Zagreb, issued a dire warning about “the propaganda of Americanization” in the United States, stating:

When an emigrant brings his wife and child overseas, when they liquidate their [Yugoslav] property, when they break all ties that link them to the Old Country, when they settle down in their new homeland and become citizens: then they are lost to us, then they have ceased to become a factor in our national calculus, despite the pure national blood of them and their offspring.209

Yet despite the handwringing in the “Old Country” about the “threat” posed by the American “melting pot,” during the first half of the 1920s the number of “Yugoslav” emigrant organizations surged. The Sokol organization, a gymnastic society for youths long associated with Slavic national movements, were a case in point. In 1921, the Croatian Sokol groups in the San Francisco bay area decided at their yearly convention to rebrand as Yugoslav Sokols and to reaffiliate with the Yugoslav Sokol organization, which was based out of Ljubljana, rather than the Croatian Sokol organization, which was based in Zagreb.210 The Yugoslav zeitgeist influenced other groups as well. In St. Louis in 1922, Serbian and Croatian community leaders in the “colony” agreed to form a “Yugoslav Club,” which would work toward “ever closer rapprochement between Serb and Croat.” A group of Serbian and Croatian businessmen also agreed to form an “Association of Yugoslav Traders,” which sought to build commercial ties between the two groups, as well as linkages between America and Yugoslavia.211 In Detroit of the next year, local Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes formed another “Yugoslav Club,” which would

210 “Sokolska Župa na Pacifiku,” Consulate KSHS in San Francisco to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 15, 1921. Fond 414, Folder 2, BO 4, AJ.
211 “Naša Kolonija u San Luisu, Misuri” report to MIP from the GK KSHS in Chicago, August 19, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
be headed by a Croat from Bosnia, with a Prečani Serb as Treasurer, and a Croatian and Montenegrin secretary. It is difficult to say how common these new “Yugoslav” clubs and organizations were at the time, as the evidence for them is mostly anecdotal—Yugoslavia, as noted in the previous chapter, initially knew very little about “its” emigrant population. But we can extrapolate backward: Ivan Mladineo’s *Narodni Adresar*, a snapshot of diaspora political life in the 1930s, reveals that roughly one-third of their national cultural organizations, mutual benefit societies, athletic societies, and newspapers were “Yugoslav” in name, rather than Serb, Croat, or Slovene.

Even critics of these organizations found it necessary to pay lip-service to Yugoslavism. After the Organization of Yugoslav traders formed, for instance, a group of Croatian businessmen denounced one of the organizers of these initiatives in a private meeting with the consul. Yet, remarkably, they still couched their opposition in the Yugoslav idea, noting that one of the organizers was “not a good Yugoslav,” a Serbian chauvinist and an Italian flunky, (concerns that the consul dismissed as “stupidities”). Yet even if the consul did not see it, the Yugoslav idea enjoyed legitimacy if even criticism of Yugoslavist initiatives was couched in Yugoslavist language.

As such, the postwar period represented a golden opportunity for the Yugoslav Emigration Commissariat to promote a “Yugoslav diaspora.” As was discussed in the previous chapter, during the immediate postwar period (1918-1923), Yugoslav officials came to see the “Yugoslav diaspora” that Serbia inherited from Austria-Hungary as both an Achilles heel as well as a source of national regeneration. The diaspora harbored both terrorists and entrepreneurs,

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212 GK KSHS Chicago to KP in Washington, January 29, 1923, Fond 414, Fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
214 “Naša Kolonija u San Luisu, Misuri” report to MIP from the GK KSHS in Chicago, August 19, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
extremists and the apathetic. The economic potential and industrial expertise of the diaspora could only be tapped if assimilation was averted and Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, and Slovenian “separatism” reigned in.

This attitude of Yugoslav diplomats reflected a broader discourse in the “old country” surrounding what came to be called the “emigration question.” The “emigration question,” in turn, affected the development of Yugoslavia’s policy toward “its” diaspora. This chapter focuses on the Yugoslav state’s efforts to address the “emigration question” during Yugoslavia’s parliamentary period, which ended on January 6, 1929 with the proclamation of a royal dictatorship. The 1920s was a formative period for the “Yugoslav diaspora,” during which it developed many of the cultural and political institutions and debates that would become important nodes in a growing diasporic network during the thirties. During the twenties, we see the genesis of the Serbian Exarchate, joint charity drives, Yugoslav clubs, and the major Yugoslav fraternal societies, along with a variety of political and cultural interpretations of the Yugoslav idea, both by emigrants and cultural missionaries from the ‘Old Country.’ While outlining these developments, this chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of the Yugoslav bureaucracy at implementing its own proposals, as well as the role of emigrants and their organizations, which often picked up the slack.

The Emigration Question

But what was the emigration question? The “iseljeničko pitanje” or “emigration question” was not new—it had roots in prewar debates over the evils of emigration in various South-Slavic newspapers of the Habsburg monarchy. Like the Eastern Question, Macedonian Question, and Jewish question, the Yugoslav Emigrant Question was a convenient shorthand for many interrelated policy debates and concerns: depopulation of areas contributing emigrants,
mistreatment of emigrants by steamship companies and by American capitalists, vices acquired by emigrants living in American cities, and so on. The Croatian politician Stjepan Radić even attacked emigration as an attempt by Austro-Hungary to expel its Slavic subjects and colonize their former villages with Germans and Magyars. While that was debatable, Austro-Hungary had done little to hinder emigration. Nor had provincial governments had much success either: all three attempts (in 1906, 1910, and 1914) by the Croatian Sabor to pass emigration reform had ended in failure.\textsuperscript{215} The creation of Yugoslavia represented an opportunity for those who wanted to “do something” about emigration.

Likewise, news stories about emigres and their activities across the Atlantic had been an established genre in old-country newspapers for decades. Prewar Serbo-Croatian newspapers from Austro-Hungary regularly bemoaned emigration as a force that sapped the vital energies of the Croatian or Serbian people. In this form, the “emigration question” was already almost two decades old by the time of Yugoslavia’s formation.\textsuperscript{216} Yet the formation of a Yugoslav state caused some periodicals to take an interest in “Yugoslav” rather than Croatian, Serb, or Slovene emigrants. On November 12, 1921, \textit{Jutarnji List}, a major Zagreb newspaper, launched a new column about “our emigrants.” In typical fashion, \textit{Jutarnji List} focused almost exclusively on the American emigration, probably because of the emigration’s size, as well as longstanding fascination with America as a nascent great power and the famed ‘land of opportunity.’ The United States’ reputation as a “melting pot” also proved influential, as almost from the beginning, \textit{Jutarnji List} homed in on the issue of assimilation.

In this first article, \textit{Jutarnji list} introduced its audience to the history of European emigration to the United States and provided estimates for the percentage of each ethnic group to

\textsuperscript{215} Brunnbauer, \textit{Globalizing Southeastern Europe}, 159-161.
\textsuperscript{216} Brunnbauer, \textit{Globalizing Southeastern Europe}, 160.
have become Americanized, statistics they acquired from an Emigration Commission Report from 1912. The English, Germans, Scandinavians and the Irish were, unsurprisingly, the most Americanized, with an acculturation rate above eighty percent. “Yugoslavs” were significantly less so, with an overall naturalization rate of 23.7%, which broke down to 35.8% for Slovenes, 22.5% for Croats, and 12.8% for Serbs. This encouraging data notwithstanding, Jutarnji List concluded by warning that Yugoslavs in America, like the groups of emigrants who preceded them, were starting to set down roots in America, taking wives and having children, children who were “our future national strength.” Jutarnji List continued: “We should not permit our strongest and healthiest to serve another...let us return them [to Yugoslavia]...as qualified workers to serve our own national renewal.”

Even before the Yugoslav government began to address the “emigration question,” the Yugoslav press was debating how the energies of Yugoslavia’s newly-discovered diaspora could be harnessed and its ethnic identity “preserved.”

Jutarnji List was not finished with the issue. On the March 12, 1922, Jutarnji List publicized several alarmist anecdotes about returning emigrants. One involved a couple, “fanatical Americans” deluded by “egalitarian dreaming or inflated jingoism,” gushing about the ease of acquiring a factory job in America, the kindness of police, and respect with which workers were treated. Another of their anecdotes recounted how a returning emigrant bragged about his three children “who speak only English and who rarely speak Croatian aloud, asserting that to do so would bring them shame.” And a third recounted how another emigrant only sent his children to American schools (instead of Croatian-language schools.) The article concluded:

“As we can see from these examples of precipitous denationalization, our world is not immune to Americanization, there are those who have already...gone mad from Americanism, and if our state does not make an effort to attack [Americanization] in the same measure, the percentage of emigrants breaking ties with the Old

217 “Naši Iseljenici: O Prirodi Evropskog, Napose Jugoslovenskog Iseljevanja u Sjedinjene Države,” Jutarnji List, November 12th, 1921, Fond 1071, Kut. 566, HDA.
Country, who are already sinking into the American milieu, and whose children may even lose the memory of the land of their fathers, will steadily grow. The cardinal assignment of our Emigration Policy should be the examination of all threats to our emigrants analogous [to Americanization] around the world and the redoubling of efforts to preserve their national consciousness…[because] it is in our national and economic interest [that these emigrants] return richer to the homeland, as a factor in economic reconstruction.”

As we can see, Jutarnji List had a visceral reaction to Americanization, portraying it as an unnatural process that deprived Yugoslavia of its rightful citizens. American nationality is conceived of as a delusion masking emigrants’ true nationality. In this, their take on the emigration question differed slightly from that of the consuls, who, at least at the beginning, were more concerned about money. Of course, as Jutarnji List pointed out, émigré dollars mattered as well, but, as they correctly observed, the ‘diaspora dollar’ could only be tapped if Yugoslavia could “preserve” emigrant national consciousness.

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218 “Naši Iseljenici: O Propagandu Amerikanizacije u Sjedinjenim Državama,” Jutarnji List, 12 March, 1922, Fond 1071, Kut. 566, HDA.
This belief that emigrants would bring all the benefits of industrial civilization to a backward Yugoslavia, along with the belief that the emigration was, for whatever reason, not doing nearly enough in that direction, lasted through the entire interwar period. Eventually, emigrants would develop their counter-narrative, in which despite all their charitable initiatives, Yugoslavia was not doing enough to help them. But the heart of the emigration question is most poignantly captured by this 1936 political cartoon from the Belgrade daily Politika, titled “Tesla and his fellow Likans” which depicts two hard-bitten peasants from Lika, Tesla’s birthplace. One says to the other in the local dialect: “Hey, it’s said in the newspapers that every ‘lectric (appliance) that shines in the world was a gift of that Tesla of ours,” to which the other grouses: “Eh, I wish he would

Fig. 2: Cartoon in Politika, April 30, 1936. “Nikola Tesla and his Ličani” Fond 967, kut. 38, HDA.
remember to send us at least one little match.”

In their view, Tesla was clearly not doing his part if Likan peasants were still using matches while electric lighting spread across the world.

The intervention of the Yugoslav state gave the “emigration question” a statist flavor—its priorities shifted. For the interwar period the emigration question could be distilled down to a single root question: How can citizens abroad, whose country of origin cannot tax, draft, arrest, or otherwise coerce them, be persuaded to contribute to the fatherland? While this proprietary attitude was implicit in the emigrant “census” and the “colony” visits, Yugoslav officials’ first systematic consideration of the “emigration question” comes in a five-page policy paper from the general consul in Chicago from 1922, addressed directly to Momčilo Ninčić, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs. Since both its reasoning and conclusions laid the foundation for Yugoslav’s emigration-politic in the interwar period, it merits scrutiny. The beginning of the report notes that from the date of their founding in America, neither the legation nor the general consulates had received any broad policy directives about the “emigration question.” Their activity had been largely directionless—according to the consulate, they did not know whether emigration to America ought to be discouraged, allowed, or reversed entirely with the aim of repatriating Yugoslavs, who were overwhelmingly factory laborers, to Yugoslavia. With this lack of direction in mind, the consul laid out what were, in his view, the benefits and drawbacks of Yugoslavia’s overseas population.

In the consul’s estimation, the emigration’s potential was primarily economic. Families in Yugoslavia depended on remittances, which provided an influx of hard currency that could be used to pay off Yugoslavia’s war debt and fund growth. In this, the consul was probably

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219 “Nikola Tesla i Njegovi Ličani,” Cartoon in Politika, April 30th, 1936, found in Fond 967, kut. 38, HDA.
220 Letter to Minister Ninčić from the General Consulate of the KSHS in Chicago, 7 September, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 5, BO 9, AJ.
221 Ibid.
thinking of Italy, which had harnessed remittances from overseas Italians to fund industrialization before WWI. Nonetheless, the consul averred, this economic benefit would be greater if the overseas Yugoslav was instead working in a factory in Yugoslavia, where their labor would be benefiting Yugoslav industrialists and their wages supporting Yugoslav shopkeepers and merchants. Of course, in 1922 these factories only existed on paper.

According to the Chicago consul, emigrants were valuable to Yugoslavia not just for what they earned in the United States, but also for what they learned. Working in factories and mines, emigrants became familiar with manufacturing techniques and labor organization, which the emigrants could then, theoretically, use to benefit Yugoslavia when they repatriated. This idea had been circulating for some time—the US progressive intellectual Randolph Bourne argued in 1916 in *Atlantic Monthly* that “To stigmatize the alien who works in America for a few years and returns to his own land…is to ignore the fact that the returning immigrant is often a missionary to an inferior civilization…this continued passage to and fro has already raised the material standard of living of these backward countries.”

Nonetheless, the Chicago consul’s overall conclusions were grim: emigrants constituted a net loss for the fatherland. Because most overseas workers remained unmarried, they were hurting Yugoslav population growth. The six-hundred thousand “Yugoslavs” in the United States drained Yugoslavia of roughly one-hundred thousand draftable men, or, as the consul bluntly put it, “seven whole divisions…that could save our state in a critical moment from annihilation.” By his calculus, ninety-percent of Yugoslav earnings were being retained in America and the

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223 Letter to Minister Ninčić from the General Consulate of the KSHS in Chicago, 7 September, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 5, BO 9, AJ.
224 Ibid.
benefits of their labor were accruing to American capitalists. And making the situation even worse, thanks to “the traitorous propaganda of our [emigrant] newspapers, most of our emigrants are alienated from their new state,” by which he meant Yugoslavia, not the United States. Based on these assessments, the consul concluded that the “momentary benefit of the emigrant dollar cannot make up for the enormous losses that the (Yugoslav) state and the (Yugoslav) national body endure from their departure for foreign lands.” But although he was able to diagnose the problem, the “emigration question” as he outlined it was far too large for a mere consul to provide policy prescriptions, and as such the consul urged his superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convene a meeting with the Ministries of Social Policy and Finance to discuss the problem further at a cabinet meeting and determine how the state should address the emigration question.226

**Toward a Solution**

In response to this meeting, the Emigration Service’s first steps were to tighten border controls, preventing the emigration ‘problem’ from growing any larger. Their officials were instructed to “make difficult the granting of passports in both a material and formal manner.”227 Very likely, this meant high fees and bureaucratic obstruction—escalating demands for increasingly-exotic supporting documents, long lines, long lunch breaks, and short office hours. This process would be expedited, however, for non-Slavs (i.e. Germans or Hungarians) desiring to emigrate—emigration was seen as a way to rid Yugoslavia of non-Yugoslavs, a non-violent form of ethnic cleansing.228 Acknowledging that Yugoslavia had neither enough consulates nor

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226 Letter to Minister Ninčić from the General Consulate of the KSHS in Chicago, 7 September, 1922, Fond 414, Fasc. 5, BO 9, AJ.
227 "Organizacija Državne Iseljeničke Službe," p. 22, undated, found before 1923. Fond 14, Fasc, 34, AJ.
228 Ibid. See also Aleksandar Miletić, *Journey Under Surveillance: The Overseas Emigration Policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Global Context, 1918-1928* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012) and Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe.*
had budgeted enough money to defend overseas emigrants, the Emigration Service instructed consulates to build ties with emigrant fraternal societies, which shared their goals of defending emigrant finances and fighting assimilation. Further underlining the need for cooperation with the emigration, the emigration service also supplemented its official budget with a Emigration Fund, which would be filled by donations from “those who benefit from emigration,” namely steamship companies, the various banks that handled emigrant remittances, and the emigrants themselves.\textsuperscript{229} Essentially a slush fund for consular officials, the Emigration Fund allowed consuls to patronize emigrant activists and their organizations without seeking formal approval for the expenditures from the Skupština or foreign ministry.

While ‘Yugoslavs’ could be prevented from leaving Yugoslavia, they could not be so easily compelled to return. Of course, Yugoslav officials might not have anticipated this as a problem; they had reason to expect repatriation. After all, during the pre-war period, the rate of return for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had been quite high—over two thirds of migrants surveyed in 1910 expressed their intent to work for several years in the United States, save up money, and then return to their families in the old country. Over half actually did so, according to Ulf Brunnbauer’s estimate.\textsuperscript{230} And while World War I disrupted the flow of migrants, the prewar pattern seemed to have hesitantly resumed in the immediate postwar period: 1,950 repatriated in 1923 and 4,821 in 1924.\textsuperscript{231} 1924, however, proved to be a turning point: the 1924 quota law capped the allowed number of ‘Yugoslav’ emigrants to 671 \textit{per annum}.\textsuperscript{232} Consequently, those who repatriated would find it difficult to return to the United States (legally, anyway) if they changed their mind. As Brunnbauer points out, wages were higher and prices

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{229} Ibid, 20, 28.
\item \textsuperscript{230} Brunnbauer, \textit{Globalizing Southeastern Europe}, 110-11.
\item \textsuperscript{231} Yearly report of the IK for 1924, part 1, page 32. Fond 1071, kut. 548, HDA.
\item \textsuperscript{232} Yearly report of the IK for 1924, part 2 (Information Division), page 2. Fond 1071, kut. 548, HDA.
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were lower in the United States\textsuperscript{233}—better to be stuck in the United States (where a worker could eat meat every day) than in Yugoslavia. As a result, overseas return migration plummeted after 1924 and stayed depressed through the entire interwar period.\textsuperscript{234}

A more systematic plan by Yugoslavia to address the emigration question emerged following a conference on the “emigration question” sponsored and hosted by Italy in 1924.\textsuperscript{235} After all, Yugoslavia was not the only country with an “emigration question”—Italy too had struggled with imposing a national identity on a restive emigrant population, most of whom were from southern Italy. The IK was not able to attend the event, although they were invited. They did, however, request and receive transcripts and various other conference materials, which they thought would be “of great importance for the construction of our own emigration service.”\textsuperscript{236}

One year later, Yugoslavia published a comprehensive plan for promoting national identity in emigrants. We can assume that many of this conference inspired many of the following proposals, although the exact material that the IK requested unfortunately does not appear in the archive.

In 1925, the Emigration Commissariat (IK) of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (KSHS) authored their first reply to the emigration question, a blueprint for creating a “Yugoslav diaspora.” Declaring that “the Emigration Question is so important that it should not be left to a few state functionaries to resolve; it requires the cooperation of our entire society, which heretofore has shown too little interest in the tenth of our People residing overseas,”\textsuperscript{237} the IK broke with the practice of leaving overseas cultural propaganda to a handful of Yugoslav

\textsuperscript{234} Brunnbauer. Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 217.
\textsuperscript{235} Donna Gabaccia, Italy’s Many Diasporas (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 142.
\textsuperscript{236} Yearly report of the IK, 1924, Information Division subsection, p. 27. Fond 1071, Kut. 548, HDA.
\textsuperscript{237} Yearly Report of the Emigration Commissariat of the KSHS, 1925, p 22.Fond 1071, Kut. 548, HAD.
diplomats living in the United States. Recognizing that mass-repatriation was no longer likely, the IK nonetheless resolved to combat Americanization, stating, “if [emigres] must be Americans, let them be Americans who nurture sympathy for our narod and our people.” To accomplish this, the IK laid out a twelve-point program for ‘preserving’ Yugoslav culture overseas and cultivating ties between overseas “Yugoslavs” and their new ‘Old Country.’ Many elements of this program overlapped, however, and it can be distilled into four major themes: supporting organized religion, sending national “missionaries,” disseminating literature, and promoting tourism. We will go through each proposal in turn.

The Founding of the Serbian Exarchate in America

The first proposal of the IK was to fund emigrant churches and parish schools, while simultaneously bringing them under control of the Yugoslav state. Support for these organizations was not merely about piety; organized religion and Yugoslavia’s conservative government were natural allies in the fight against both denationalization and “separatism.” To wit, Eastern Orthodoxy was linked with “Serbian-ness,” which could sow confusion in the ranks of overseas Montenegrin and Macedonian “separatists,” who were also Orthodox. In much the same way, Catholicism was linked to being Croatian and Slovenian. And parochial schools for both faiths could ensure that the children of emigrants would continue to speak “Serbo-Croat-Slovene,” thereby preserving (or creating) a “Yugoslav” linguistic community. Lastly, religion was a natural antidote to communism, a specter that Yugoslavia (like most other European governments) feared.

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238 Ibid, 42-44.
239 Ibid, 45.
240 Although Slovene is a separate language from Serbo-Croatian, this is how it was referred to in the Yugoslav constitution.
But according to the IK’s sources, both ethnic churches and schools were in a woeful state throughout the overseas settlement—not only were they poor and badly managed, there were just too few of them. In the entire United States, to meet the needs of over six-hundred thousand people, there were thirty-eight Slovene, twenty-eight Croatian, and twenty-three Serbian churches. The situation was even grimmer elsewhere: Canada had only a single Serbian Orthodox Church! As for parish schools, there were, again in the United States, altogether twenty-six: fourteen for the Slovenes, twelve for the Croats, and none for the Serbs. And in South America, there was only one school, in Antofagasta, Chile.241 These statistics made a powerful argument for state intervention in religious affairs. Unless Yugoslavia could do something to support organized religion, the second generation of overseas Yugoslavs was going to grow up speaking English, Spanish, or Portuguese and, unfortified by religion, might even become Communists.

In the case of religious support, the IK’s plan was merely an attempt to get out ahead of something already being done on the consular level. Since 1923, the consulates had been working to build up the Serbian Orthodox church in the United States. Their goal was to establish an exarchate. After all, there were neither enough churches nor priests for the Yugoslav diaspora, with the Serbs being the worst affected. Establishing a Serbian Orthodox exarchate (a kind of autonomous diocese one rank below a full patriarchate), would subordinate Serbian orthodox churches in America to the Church in Yugoslavia and allow the Yugoslav government to shape and direct their cultural activities. Moreover, this move would legally justify Yugoslavia sending money and priests, who would then, in theory, preach Yugoslav patriotism.

241 Ibid.
To head this exarchate, Archimandrite Mardarije, a Montenegrin, was selected. This choice was explicitly about promoting national unity, both at home and abroad. The Yugoslav consulate in Chicago hoped that this choice would stymie Montenegrin separatist agitators like Dr. Vladimir Petrović, a former minister in the Montenegrin government, or Jovan Plamenac, who was discussed in Chapter One. Mardarije’s selection, the consulate privately admitted, would prove to both the broader American public and to Montenegrins in America that Montenegrins from Yugoslavia were firmly behind the new Yugoslav government. Moreover, the arrival of Mardarije, they argued, would “encourage the intensification of the nationalistic work of Orthodox priests, particularly the subduing of Bolshevik and Montenegrin propaganda.”

There is no ambiguity—the work of Orthodox priests was explicitly political: to fight Bolshevism and Montenegrin nationalism. Shortly after his arrival, Mardarije met with Serbian Orthodox priests in Gary, Indiana to rally them behind the exarchate. Attendance at this summit was lukewarm; only eighteen out of the twenty-eight Serbian Orthodox priests in the United States attended.

But despite this halfhearted turnout and the vociferous opposition of a handful of these priests to the loss of their autonomy, Mardarije was nonetheless able to muster the support he needed to declare a Serbian exarchate in the United States. Its headquarters were to be in Chicago, where their work could be supervised by the nearby General Consulate. Not surprisingly, Mardarije was in the pay of the Yugoslav foreign ministry—earning forty dollars per month, an amount the Consulates proposed be raised to one-hundred dollars in 1923. In

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242 General Consulate of the KSHS in New York to the General Consulate of the KSHS in Chicago, January 10, 1923 Fond 449, Fasc. 5, BO 11, AJ.
243 “Archimandrite Mardarije and the Founding of the Serbian Orthodox Eparchate in America,” General Consulate of the KSHS in Chicago to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington. March 14, 1923 Fond 449, Fasc. 5, BO 11, AJ.
244 Ibid.
modern-day dollars, that is roughly $1,500 per month (a graduate student stipend); Yugoslavia was a poor country. Still, Mardarije had probably earned it. A skilled administrator, Mardarije would, within a single year, establish numerous churches, schools, and orphanages, reorganize the Serbian clergy in America, and go on a whirlwind speaking tour of the United States, extolling to those present the virtues of their new ‘Old Country.’

Mardarije worked closely with the Yugoslav legation in Washington, which oversaw and directed his propagandistic activities. In 1923, the head of the Yugoslav legation, Minister Trešić-Pavičić (a Croat), wrote to Mardarije, further confirming that the exarchate and the Yugoslav diplomatic service were working together. After congratulating Mardarije on the successful founding of another orphanage, Trešić-Pavičić expressed his hope that Mardarije’s charitable work on behalf of Serb war-orphans could help unite Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes into a single Yugoslav people in the United States. While the problem of war-orphans was more of a problem for Serbia, which had been bled dry by the Great War, the problem of workplace accidents in the United States affected Serb, Croat, and Slovene equally, and could provide a basis for cross-ethnic cooperation and perhaps even the creation of a single pan-Yugoslav fraternal society. Yugoslav harmony in the United States could then be held up as an example for Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia, Trešić-Pavičić enthused. Trešić-Pavičić’s correspondence with Mardarije reveals how the Yugoslavization program in the United States was interlinked with domestic nation-building efforts—successes on one shore of the Atlantic could be used to reinforce the Yugoslavization drive on the other.

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245 General Consulate of the KSHS in New York to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, April 17, 1924 Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 11, AJ.  
246 Ante Trešić-Pavičić to Archimandrit Mardarije, June 20, 1923. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 11, AJ.
Conversely, priorities from the domestic Yugoslavization campaign tended to bleed over into the emigration. Throughout the interwar period, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia struggled with the problem of Macedonian nationalism. Officially, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia did not recognize the existence of a separate Macedonian people—Macedonia was called “Southern” or “Old” Serbia and its inhabitants were called Serbs, even though they spoke a language far closer to Bulgarian than to Serbian. Across the Atlantic, however, Macedonian-American diaspora nationalism barely registered on the radar of the diplomatic service—in all their records about the various “anti-regime” groups in the United States throughout the twenties, Macedonian separatists are mentioned only in passing—and then only rarely. At the time of the campaign to build a Serbian exarchate in the United States, the diplomatic service did not seem to regard Macedonians as a real threat. Nonetheless, they felt they ought to take proactive measures. A note from October 23, 1923 reveals that, in addition to using Mardarije’s Montenegrin background as an olive branch Montenegrin Americans, they sought to use the same trick with Macedonian Americans, bringing in at least one priest from “Old Serbia” to minister to an enclave of “Southern Serbs” in Kansas City.\textsuperscript{247} By folding Macedonian Americans into a Serbian Orthodox exarchate and supplying them with pro-regime priests from Macedonia, the Yugoslav Foreign Service sought to dampen the expression of Macedonian separatism.

There is no evidence of an analogous effort to support Croatian or Slovenian Catholicism in the United States. This may be because their churches did not need as much assistance. According to the assessment of Ante Trešić-Pavičić, the Croatian head of the Yugoslav Legation, “our [Yugoslav] Catholic element in America is far more numerous, organized, and wealthy.”\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{247} Note from the General Consulate of the KSHS in New York to the General Consulate in Chicago, October 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1923. Fond 449, Fasc. 5, BO 11, AJ.

\textsuperscript{248} Ante Trešić-Pavičić to Archimandrit Mardarije, June 20, 1923. Fond 449, Fasc. 5, BO, AJ.
But while the Serbs undoubtedly did need the help, Croatian and Slovenian Catholics also needed institutional support. After all, according to the IK’s own report from 1925, there were only thirty-eight Slovene and twenty-eight Croatian churches for the United States, and only twenty-six parish schools altogether: fourteen for the Slovenes and twelve for the Croats.²⁴⁹ Moreover, those same parish schools threatened to work against the Yugoslav project, rather than for it. Cardinal Mundelein, as Bishop of Chicago until his death in 1939, worked to turn the Catholic Church into an agent of Americanization. Instruction in Catholic Schools had to be in English. According to Mundelein, “the people of the United States must be Americans or something else. They cannot serve two masters.” In a separate missive to Theodore Roosevelt, Mundelein asserted that “there is hardly any other institution here in the country that does so much to bring about a sure, safe and sane Americanization of the children of emigrant people as do our parochial schools.”²⁵⁰ This rhetoric coming from the Bishop of Chicago, where tens of thousands of Croats and Slovenes lived, ought to have alarmed the Yugoslav diplomatic service. But it did not.

But while Croatian and Slovene Catholic churches were not funded, individual priests sometimes enjoyed state support. Just as the consulates found the Orthodox clergy willing collaborators in national propaganda, there is at least one documented instance in the 1920s of a Catholic priest filling a similar role: Father Mašić, who conducted national propaganda for the Yugoslav legation, beginning in 1927, in Seraing, Belgium.²⁵¹ There were probably others—according to a report from 1930 from the Chicago General Consulate, most Croatian catholic priests were “on our side” and were “patriots and good priests,” even after the assassination of

²⁴⁹ Yearly report of the IK, 1924, Information Division subsection, p. 45. Fond 1071, Kut. 548, HDA.
²⁵¹ Filip Mašić to the Legation of the KSHS in Brussels, October 12th, 1927. Fond 392, Fasc. 1, BO 5, AJ.
Stjepan Radić sent shockwaves through émigré Croatian communities. The troublemakers, in the official view, were not the regular clergy, but Franciscan monks. These monks, unlike the regular clergy, were not suborned to American bishops, but to the Franciscan organization in Yugoslavia itself. These transatlantic ties made them, in the view of the consulate, more likely bearers of a far-right version of Croatian nationalism. Moreover, disloyal priests were also an Orthodox problem. Resistance among Serbian-American priests to Mardarije’s exarchate continued well into the 1930s. So despite the attention Yugoslavia showered on the Serbian exarchate and their neglect of Croatian and Slovenian Catholicism, Yugoslav religious policy vis-à-vis the diaspora cannot be described as pro-Orthodox and anti-Catholic, or pro-Serb and anti-Croat, although it was certainly anti-Montenegrin and Macedonian. Priests of both Christian denominations were potential allies in the Yugoslavization project, so long as they accepted Belgrade’s leadership.

**The Role of Charity**

As Yugoslav diplomats discovered through their support of emigrant churches, charitable work, such as orphanages, provided a palatable way for Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene organizations to work together as a Yugoslav whole. They had already witnessed one such initiative: post-war relief for Yugoslavia, which had been devastated (along with the rest of Europe) by the Great War. Organized in 1919 in the United States, the Committee for Yugoslav relief sent 1,616 chests full of clothes, shoes, and other sundries to Yugoslavia, worth $41,595.64, or roughly six-hundred thousand dollars today. While most of these chests were addressed to individuals, presumably relatives or friends of the sender in the old country, sixty-

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252 General Consul of Chicago Gjuro Kolumbatović to the General Political Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 17, 1930. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
253 General Consul of New York to Patriarch Varnava of the Serbian Orthodox Church, June 19, 1930, Fond 449, Fasc. 5, BO 11, AJ.
six were addressed to neighborhoods or districts, and eighteen to all the people of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{254}

While this suggests that most regular people had more affection for their family or their neighborhoods in the old country than for the country itself, that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from across the United States collected money as part of a single organization meant that the Yugoslav idea held some sway on an organizational level.

In the middle of 1926, heavy rains inundated Yugoslavia, with floods drowning livestock, demolishing homes, and destroying the harvest. Since this catastrophe affected all parts of Yugoslavia equally, it also represented an opportunity for the diplomatic service to recreate the success of post-war relief, but this time under government control. The Yugoslav legation in Washington immediately took charge of the relief drive, putting Minister Trešić-Pavičić at the organization’s head. Prominent Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from the emigration were recruited into the organization. Representing the Slovenes, there was Vincent Caınkar of the largest Slovene mutual-benefit society, the SNPJ, as well as Etbin Kristan, a Slovene politician from Yugoslavia now working for the Emigration Commissariat in New York. Representing the Croats, there was the newly formed Croatian Fraternal Union, the largest Croatian mutual benefit society, as well as the largest and richest South Slavic organization of any type in the entire overseas settlement. Nikola Tesla and Mihajlo Pupin, the two famous Serbian inventors, represented the Serbs. The newly-founded Serbian exarchate, as well as two lodges of the Serbian fraternal society Srbobran-Sloga also sponsored the effort.\textsuperscript{255} These names, written side by side in a flyer that was distributed across the United States, were a potent argument for the Yugoslav idea, an implicit demonstration of what could be achieved if Serb, Croat, and Slovene worked together. For the same reason, those who donated had their names printed in émigré

\textsuperscript{254} “Pripomoćna Akcija ‘Jugoslav Relief’ u Americi,” undated, found with 1926. Fond 414, Fasc. 5, BO 10, AJ.

\textsuperscript{255} “Proglas Našem Narodu u Americi,” 1926. Fond 414, Fasc. 5, BO 10, AJ.
newspapers, as well as in newspapers in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{256} Once again, the actions the emigration took on behalf of Yugoslavia were turned into domestic propaganda.

This Yugoslavization aim was also reflected in their call for donations. Addressed to “Our People in America,” they both claimed the overseas population and declared them to be part of a single (Yugoslav) people. Invoking the memory of Yugoslav postwar relief, they declared that the flood “had done enormous harm to our frequently-attacked people,” implicitly equating it with the war’s ravages. Stating repeatedly that the floods affected Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and “Southern Serbia” almost equally, they implored all “Yugoslavs in America to help, in these difficult times their brothers, just as they have acted before for the advancement of our united homeland and the well-being of our three-named brethren.” The relief money was to be routed to Yugoslavia through the General Consulate in New York. This way, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes who donated were giving to the fatherland rather than to their overseas kin or their neighborhoods. Despite all this overt Yugoslavism and the open involvement of the Yugoslav diplomatic service, this effort was a qualified success. While they could not match the $40,000 raised for Yugoslav post-war relief, the Committee for the Gathering of Aid for Flood Victims nonetheless announced proudly that they had already raised $2,706 dollars in the first half of 1926.\textsuperscript{257} Their implicit message was that much could be achieved when Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene societies pooled their resources and acted collectively, solidifying a tradition of collective action by the newly unified fraternal societies.

**The Consolidation of the South-Slavic Fraternal Unions**

While the consolidation of the Yugoslav fraternal societies was not a part of the IK’s 1925 plan, they would nonetheless prove instrumental in its implementation. It is difficult to

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
overstate the importance of fraternal societies for this period and subject. Around one in three “Yugoslavs” in America was in one of these organizations, and it is not hard to see why: in exchange for membership dues, fraternal societies provided their members with insurance in case of accidents or workplace mishaps.\textsuperscript{258} Given the near absence of a social safety net in the United States during the 1920s, coupled with the dangerous nature of industrial labor, it is difficult to overstate the importance of these benefits to workers. Moreover, fraternal unions were a major hub of diaspora social and political life for the emigrant working class, especially those that did not attend church regularly. Fraternal Unions contributed to ethnic schools, ethnic clubs, and ethnic churches. They had their own newspapers, and thus had an enormous influence over the minds of their members.\textsuperscript{259} When sufficiently large, they could even influence American politicians. Thus, control of the fraternal unions could both bring the Yugoslav idea to regular Serb, Croat, and Slovene-Americans, and perhaps also determine the policy of the United States toward Yugoslavia. But in 1918, not only was there no single Yugoslav Fraternal Society, there was no dominant Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene fraternal organization.

This began to change in the early 1920s. In 1923, consular officials began to float the idea that the various Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal societies ought to consolidate and merge on Yugoslav lines. Larger and richer organizations, in their view, would be better equipped to support libraries, reading rooms, and language courses for their members—in other words, better able to fight assimilation and promote the Yugoslav idea. While they asserted that the eventual goal of “the unification of all our Unions [meaning fraternal organizations]…of our three tribes:

\textsuperscript{258} Berislav Angjelinović and Ivan Mladineo, \textit{Jugoslovenski Almanak: Jugosloveni u Sjedinjenim Državama Amerike} (New York, 1931), 4-5.

\textsuperscript{259} Ulf Brunnbauer, \textit{Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State since the late Nineteenth Century}, (Lanham: Lexington, 2016), 104-6.
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” was “temporarily impossible to carry out,” the consolidation of Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations “by tribe” was a satisfactory stepping stone.  

Even facilitating this “tribal” consolidation would prove nettlesome, as the Serbian fraternal societies were especially fractured. According to diplomatic records, after the first Serbian fraternal organization was founded in 1901, the *Srpski Pravoslavni Savez-Srbobran* (Serbian Orthodox Union-Serb Defender), Serbian fraternal societies had “splintered into many smaller groups that were constantly in interpersonal quarrels...one could write whole books on these quarrels [as well as] on the misuse of funds, deficits, and the waste of the hard-earned dollars of our working world here in America.” For this reason, the diplomatic service opted to focus their efforts on the Serbs. Fortunately, consular blandishments had swayed the leaders of the two largest Serbian societies, the *Srpski Savez Svesne Srbadije* (Serbian Union of the Conscious Srbadija), from New York, and the *Sjedinjenji Savez Srbobran-Sloga* (United Union of the Serb-Defender-Unity) to consider unification at their twelfth convention in 1923. There, they debated a merger, with the (mercifully less alliterative) title: the *Srpski Narodni Potporni Savez* (Serbian National Self-Help Society). Unfortunately, the *Srpski Savez Sloboda* (Serbian Union Freedom), another relatively large organization from Pittsburgh with 3,000 members, refused to attend the summit.  

And at the meeting, the proposal for unification was rejected by an overwhelming majority of the members of *Sjedinjenji Savez Srbobran-Sloga*. In a resolution delivered to the vice-consul in attendance, they protested also against “those who would force our organization to put itself in the hands of those malefactors who have ruined us in

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260 “Ujedinjenje Srpskih Saveza u Americi,” Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Division, from the Vice Consul in Chicago, August 1, 1923. Fond 414, Fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
261 “Ujedinjenje Srpskih Saveza u Americi,” Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Division, from the Vice Consul in Chicago, August 1, 1923. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
the past.” They evidently did not appreciate consular interference—consular heavy-handedness could, and would, often backfire. Despite this, the consul vowed to not give up, keeping up the pressure throughout the 1920s. While their determination would eventually pay off in 1929, with the formation of the Srpski Narodni Savez (the Serbian National Union, or SNS), reconciling the Serbian self-help-societies kept the Yugoslav diplomatic service busy and prevented them from mediating the disputes between Croat and Slovene mutual-benefit societies.

The Croats and Slovenes muddled through nonetheless. In 1921, at the fourteenth convention of the National Croatian Society, the strongest Croatian fraternal union at the time, a resolution was passed, apparently without difficulty, calling for a merger of all Croatian fraternal societies in America, beginning with the Croatian League of Illinois and the National Croatian Society. The merger was carried out smoothly in 1926, forming the Hrvatska Bratska Zajednica (Croatian Fraternal Union, or CFU), but not without opposition. One Ivan Lupis-Vukić, writing in Hrvatski Glasnik, a Croatian émigré newspaper, criticized the merger, citing various illegalities in its execution. Ivan Čizmić, a Croat writing during the Yugoslav wars of the 90s, conjectured that Lupis-Vukić, a Croat, was, in fact, a Belgrade saboteur and provocateur—Yugoslavia allegedly did not want a powerful Croatian organization. However, as we have seen, such an attitude contradicted official policy, which, as we have seen, favored unification. It seems unlikely that Yugoslav authorities would seek to sabotage the formation of the Croatian Fraternal Union, since that was supposed to be a stepping-stone to a Yugoslav Fraternal Union. Moreover, Yugoslav diplomats would later harass the editor of Hrvatski Glasnik in 1929 because

263 “Rezolucija Treće Konvencija Saveza Sloga,” Report to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington from the General Consul in Chicago, October 25th, 1923. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
of his Croatian nationalism—\textsuperscript{266} it is implausible that they would use that newspaper as a mouthpiece in 1926, or that its editor, a nationalist, would consent to such an arrangement.\

\textit{Hrvatski Glasnik} only became a regime mouthpiece in 1932 after it went bankrupt and its presses were bought by the pro-regime newspaper \textit{Hrvatska} with the help of a secret loan from the Chicago general consulate.\textsuperscript{267} Such an action was also out of character for Lupis-Vukić, who returned to Yugoslavia in the 1930s. When Louis Adamic met Lupis-Vukić for the first time on his trip to Yugoslavia in 1934, Adamic immediately liked “Lupis” (as he nicknamed him), finding him to be “charming” and “uncommonly quiet-mannered for a Dalmatian.”\textsuperscript{268} Given that Louis Adamic was a vocal critic of Belgrade and, as an author, a keen judge of character, it is difficult to imagine his “Lupis” as a Belgrade saboteur, driven by hatred for the Croatian cause. It seems more likely that Lupis-Vukić either genuinely believed that the merger of fraternal unions that created the CFU was illegal or was driven by the same sort of inter-organizational rivalries that had stymied the Serbian fraternal unification. If there was sabotage by the Yugoslav government, it left little trace in the diplomatic archives, where it almost certainly would have appeared—Yugoslav diplomats, as the availability of the abovementioned information should indicate, tended to document their schemes.

Regardless of whether its formation was supported by the government of Yugoslavia, the Croatian Fraternal Union, or CFU, instantly became the most important emigrant association. With nearly 54,000 members, 467 lodges, and $3,628,932 dollars in assets in 1926,\textsuperscript{269} the CFU was the largest émigré organization and the largest Croatian organization outside of Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{266} Letter from Consul Djuro Kolumbatović to the Royal Legation, found with 1929. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.\n\textsuperscript{267} “Hrvatska Separatisticka Akcija; Sabiranje Potpisa Protesta; Prestanak Izlaznja ‘Hrv. Glasnika’; Izbori Delegata za Konvenciju Hrv. Bratska Zajednica,” report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Consul Djuro Kolumbatović, March 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1932. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.\n\textsuperscript{268} Louis Adamic, \textit{The Native’s Return} (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1934), 161, 166.\n\textsuperscript{269} Čizmić, \textit{History of the Croatian Fraternal Union of America}, 209.
And even contrasted with organizations within Yugoslavia, the CFU was respectable. For comparison, the preeminent Croatian organization, Stjepan Radić’s Croatian Republican Peasant Party (HRSS) had several hundred-thousand supporters, as measured by their vote tally in the 1923 Yugoslav parliamentary elections.\footnote{Banac, \textit{The National Question in Yugoslavia}, 227.} The CFU’s relative importance would only grow after the HRSS was outlawed in 1929. By 1930, the CFU would have over 92,000 members. The second and third largest fraternal societies were both Slovene: the leftist \textit{Slovenske Narodne Potporna Jednota} (SNPJ) and the pro-Clerical \textit{Kranjsko Slovenska Katoliško Jednota} (KSKJ), with 63,000 and 34,000 members respectively. In a distant fourth was the Serbian National Union (SNS), with nearly 22,000 members.\footnote{Mladineo, \textit{Jugoslovenski Almanak}, p. 5} Fifth place was occupied by the only major “Yugoslav” organization, the Yugoslav Catholic Union, with 21,000 members, which for obvious reasons had limited appeal to the Orthodox Serbs. There remained many minor unions with a few thousand members, like the ultraconservative Croatian Catholic Union or the leftist Slovene Progressive Benefit Union. However, the CFU, SNPJ, KSKJ, and SNS were the most important. Any advocate of a “Yugoslav” fraternal union would have to reconcile these four organizations.

This would eventually happen in the early 1930s. The eventual driving force behind this and the head of the SNPJ, Vincent Cainkar,\footnote{No relation to the famous Slovenian poet, Ivan Cankar.} may have been planning it for some time. In 1924, just when the consulates were floating the idea of a Yugoslav Fraternal Society, Vincent Cainkar approached the Yugoslav General Consul in Chicago to invite him to the twentieth anniversary gala of the SNPJ, expressing his delight in having a “homeland founded on national and economic freedom,” whose diplomatic service, unlike their Austrian predecessors, took the time...
to visit Slavic emigrant communities. Furthermore, he asserted that all 50,000 members of the SNPJ were “always prepared to suffer for total national unity (narodno jedinstvo) and democracy.” Because of his deliberate invocation of the Yugoslavist slogan of narodno jedinstvo, meaning the unity of Serb, Croat, and Slovene, it is possible that Cainkar was attempting to signal his willingness to support a Yugoslav Fraternal Union. The consul did not spot this subtext, however, noting later only that “it is interesting that this socialist organization is one of the most patriotic organizations in America and that of all our ethnic organizations and they respect the authority of our state and its representatives the most.” In other words, the SNPJ was a curiosity rather than an opportunity—Yugoslav officials did not generally see leftists as allies. While Cainkar’s Yugoslavist ambitions survived, his efforts to consolidate the fraternal unions would not begin again in earnest until 1928.

It is telling that these efforts at unification only began after 1918 and the formation of Yugoslavia. It is possible that Yugoslav unification may have shown the benefits of Yugoslav unity to the leaders of these fraternal organizations. After all, larger organizations had more political clout and were in a better position, though economies of scale, to meet the financial needs of their members. But there was another factor at work: American emigration quotas. In 1921, the Emergency Quota Act limited incoming emigration by national origin, with the per-year emigration quota being set at 3% of the number of residents from that country living in the United States as of the 1910 census. Since far fewer Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes lived in the United States then, this choked off the flow of emigration, redirecting it to Canada and South

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273 "Dvadesetogodišnjica Slovenske Narodne Potpore Jednote,” report to the political division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Yugoslav Consul in Chicago, April 18, 1924. Fond 449, Facikl 4, Broj Opis 10, Generalni Konzulat Kraljevina Jugoslavije u Nju-Jorku, Arhiv Jugoslavije;
America. Three years later, the Immigration Act of 1924 reduced that percentage to 2%—or 671 Yugoslavs per annum. Yugoslav emigration to the United States was effectively over.  

This had one surprising repercussion. In general, ethnic fraternal societies need a constant influx of new members to offset the losses from Americanization, demographic attrition, and apathy. Since they could no longer recruit new members ‘off the boat,’ Yugoslav fraternal societies were left with two other ways of getting new members: absorbing other organizations and recruiting the children of existing members. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons for unification cited by the CFU. After all, it was in the interest of all working-class South Slavs that their respective fraternal organizations continue to provide the same benefits. That Yugoslav fraternal societies did not undergo a similar consolidation in South America or Belgium, coupled with the fact that these drives for unity all began after 1921, suggests that the consolidation of fraternal societies was more a product of American quota legislation, and the common class interests of immigrant workers, than of consular encouragement or Yugoslavist idealism.

Nonetheless, these mergers benefited Yugoslavism in North America. After all, Yugoslavism was not incompatible with Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene nationalisms, as Pieter Troch has argued. Moreover, the formation of strong fraternal unions gave each fraternal union more resources to devote to cultural work, like schools or newspapers, which could potentially be taken in a Yugoslav direction. Sturdy fraternal unions also helped North American workers weather the Great Depression better than their counterparts elsewhere in the globe, making it difficult for far-right anti-Yugoslav groups like the Ustaša to gain traction. And, lastly, these mergers, by simplifying the political terrain, laid the groundwork for the formation of the

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274 Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 130.
Yugoslav National Federation, a confederation between the CFU, SNPJ, and SNS, in the 1930s. It is easier to unite three large organizations than forty small ones.

**Educational Politics in the 1920s**

Several initiatives during the 1920s failed or had to be delayed due to lack of state support. One of those was the creation of a Yugoslav Press-bureau in New York City. There was certainly need for it. Despite all this activity going on in their midst, Americans in the 1920s knew nothing about Yugoslavia. To them “Jugoslovakia and Czechoslavia” were the same: their citizens “half-barbarians who might as well live on Mars,” as one diplomat put it. Louis Adamic, in his biography, wrote how Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were the same as “Austrians” to ignorant Americans. Furthermore, American parochialism and its confusing taxonomies interfered with Ivan Mladineo’s efforts to count the number of “Yugoslavs” in the United States, part of the ad-hoc diaspora census discussed in Chapter One. Because of this, from 1922 to 1924, Mladineo lobbied the legation in Washington and the Yugoslav foreign ministry for permission to create a Yugoslav-American information service.

This new information service was modeled on the Foreign Language Information Service, an organization that was founded in the wake of America’s entry into the first World War, in 1918. Although initially formed to help a non-English-speaking audience understand draft and enlistment paperwork, after the war FLIS’s goal became something called “constructive assimilation.” Declared that “assimilation cannot be forced on the immigrant,” FLIS’s goal was to demolish the language barrier, “to interpret America to the Alien and the Alien to America,” translating information about of variety of subjects, from the naturalization

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277 Izveštajna Služba u Americi,” undated, found with 1924. Fond 414, Fasc. 7, BO 16, AJ.
278 Louis Adamic, *Laughing in the Jungle*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932). This is still better than conflating Austria and Australia, however.
process to child care, into a host of European languages and dispersing them as press releases to immigrant newspapers.\(^{279}\) Ivan Mladineo headed and managed the Yugoslav section of FLIS.\(^{280}\)

Mladineo’s proposed organization’s goal superficially resembled that of FLIS: to “teach the American public about our land and people (narod).” Emigrants of Yugoslav origin were also a target audience. Had it been founded, Mladineo’s new pressbureau would have shown how Americanization and the promotion of ethnic distinctiveness were complementary projects. The Yugoslav legation, however, shot down his proposal in 1924, allegedly because the legation, which already put out press releases, saw it as redundant. It is also possible that Yugoslavia was unwilling to let an American citizen and an employee of an organization whose stated goal was assimilation to decide what Yugoslav culture was.\(^{281}\) Regardless, Yugoslavia would not seriously attempt to steer press coverage in the diaspora until after 1929.

Another initiative that foundered because of Yugoslav tightfistedness was language instruction. At the beginning of the 1920s, according to reports collected from the General Consulate in Chicago, language instruction for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was controlled by priests, who “from time to time teach our children.” Occasional instruction was not enough—formal schools with daily instruction, paid teachers, and a schoolhouse were needed. But there were none. In 1921, the Chicago Consulate found no formal schools in its entire jurisdiction, which included the entire Midwest and the three major “Yugoslav” cities: Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Chicago.\(^{282}\) And on the West Coast, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were far too dispersed for

\(^{279}\) Those languages were Czechoslovak, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, German, Hungarian, Italian, “Jewish,” “Yugoslav,” Lithuanian, Norwegian, Polish, Russian, Swedish, and Ukrainian.


\(^{281}\) Izveštajna Služba u Americi,” undated, found with 1924. Fond 414, Fasc. 7, BO 16, AJ.

\(^{282}\) Report from the General Consulate in Chicago to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, September 13, 1921. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
language schools to be practical, according to a report by the Consul in San Francisco. Most secular language schools were only afterschool programs that operated for only two or three days of the week. For that reason, the consul in San Francisco was “very pessimistic” about the possibility of establishing full-time schools, noting that previous attempts had had trouble getting enough students and had quickly become “unprofitable.” Emigrant education apparently had to pay for itself—the emigration was something that contributed to Yugoslavia, rather than vice-versa. Instead of funding full-time secular language education, the consul recommended that, “if there is still an intention to do something to preserve the national identity of our emigrants,” the best approach would be a system of “traveling teachers.”

Despite their dissatisfaction with parochial schools, building a network of secular schools was apparently too expensive. For the remainder of the 1920s the official policy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was to leave language education to the clergy—according to a survey of Yugoslav schools in the United States from 1930, parochial schools still predominated. And since, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was only supporting the Serbian Orthodox church, they were effectively leaving Croats and Slovenes to educate themselves. Emigrants, however, were not significantly worse off, education-wise, than Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia. As Pieter Troch notes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia did not form a standardized curriculum to inculcate Yugoslav patriotism until the establishment of the royal dictatorship in 1929. Even after, 40% of the population continued to be illiterate.

The reluctance or inability of Yugoslavia to support emigrant cultural initiatives was not restricted to North America. In 1926, local notables (a university professor, two architects, and

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283 Report from the Consulate of the KSHS in San Francisco to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington. November 25, 1921. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
284 “Kulturna Družba u Delokrugu Generalnog Konzulata u Čikagu,” January 10, 1930. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
several businessmen) in Buenos Aires also founded a Yugoslav club in 1926 and immediately sought support from the Yugoslav legation. They received assistance no more substantial than “moral support” and had to pay for the club themselves. Possibly as a result, this Yugoslav club proved short-lived as its support among the urban elite dwindled over the next few years. Some lost interest, others, including the club’s original founder, were driven out. Its original cultural mission likewise fell by the wayside. Bereft of state support, the club had relied overmuch on games of chance as a revenue source, turning it into a “typical gambling den.” In 1935, the club, having no more than twenty members, went bankrupt.\textsuperscript{286} Part of the problem was that the Yugoslav legation in South America lacked both the will and the funds to interfere in émigré politics until it was far too late. Because many of the emigrants were recent arrivals, it is possible that they assumed that emigrants already \textit{were} Yugoslavs and had no need to be made into them, unlike their counterparts in North America.

In other cases, Yugoslav officials failed to support emigrant Yugoslavist organizations in other ways as well. Alongside the new crop of Yugoslav clubs and schools existed an older stratum of Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene clubs, which continued to have much larger memberships. However, the diplomatic service did not see those “tribal” organizations as anti-Yugoslav, nor were these organizations hostile to the Yugoslav idea. We know this because in the case of Detroit, the consul admonished the head of the Yugoslav legation, Ante Trešić-Pavičić, for visiting only the Yugoslav club, “which has altogether fifty members…[rather than] the Serbian and Croatian clubs in which is concentrated the majority of our people.” The decision not to visit them, the consul observed, was treated as a snub and caused both to voice

their official protest.\textsuperscript{287} That, in turn, implied that these “tribal” organizations wanted the diplomatic service present at their gatherings. While this blunder did not cast the diplomatic service in a good light, it nonetheless reveals both that most Serbs and Croats, even if they were unlikely to abandon preexisting clubs, were still sympathetic to Yugoslavia and wanted the patronage of its officials.

Nonetheless, local activists were sometimes frustrated by the lack of initiative shown by Yugoslav officials. In 1926, Mladineo, having recovered from his failure to gain official support for his pressbureau, declared that “for us who live here…it is our duty, not waiting for our [brethren] from the old country to act, to teach America about us.” Moving toward that goal, Mladineo announced the founding of two sections of the JUGoslovenska Kulturna Matica in New York, the purpose of which was to act as a center of ‘Yugoslav’ culture in the United States, with a particular focus on translating Yugoslav literature into English and disseminating it to the broader American reading public, as well as to the assimilated children of Yugoslav emigrants.\textsuperscript{288} Again, we see how local activists often sought to blend Yugoslav culture with American and vice versa—Yugoslav culture in English was still Yugoslav culture.

The lack of support for a Yugoslav pressbureau did not mean that the IK had abandoned the cause of literacy: ensuring that emigrants and their children could continue to read emigrant newspapers in Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian, not to mention Yugoslav literature, was critical. Moreover, literacy in both Yugoslav languages made possible the writing of letters to overseas kin, which in turn preserve sentimental ties between the diaspora and the fatherland. To promote literacy, the third and fourth points of the IK’s plan was to support Yugoslav-language libraries.

\textsuperscript{287} GK KSHS Chicago to KP in Washington, March 23, 1923, Fond 414, Folder 2, BO 4, AJ.
\textsuperscript{288} Ivan Mladineo, informational letter from the Jugoslovenska Kulturna Matica, January 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1926. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
and reading rooms by sending them patriotic literature, and to supply extant Yugoslav language schools with up-to-date textbooks. Completing this outreach to the second generation, the IK would try to revive the flagging institution of Sokols, a gymnastic society which had, for over half a century, been unobtrusively involved in mass-based national movements across Eastern Europe. According to the records of the IK, the number of Yugoslav Sokols for the diaspora had fallen precipitously in recent years, from twenty-two to a mere three.\textsuperscript{289} Lastly, to reach those in the second generation who, for whatever reason, could not attend a Yugoslav language school, the IK sought to sway the American school system in areas where many Yugoslavs lived, into allowing Serbo-Croatian to be taught as a second language. This was not as far-fetched as it seemed. Cleveland had recently allowed Ukrainian to be taught in its public schools. If Ukrainian could be taught, why not Serbo-Croatian?\textsuperscript{290}

Emigrant associations also made efforts to support education and youth outreach, something made more effective by their consolidation. The newly-formed Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), for instance, also took up the challenge of fighting assimilation after their first convention in 1927. The first prong of this was a general membership drive, declaring that “only a small percentage of Croats and other Yugoslavs can justify not being a member of the Union…[but] as Croats, as Yugoslavs, none can justify not participating in our public work [emphasis mine].”\textsuperscript{291} Croatian and Yugoslav nationalism were complementary. Furthermore, enrolling new members was linked with making them into good Croats and Yugoslavs. Lodges that succeeded in enrolling large numbers were awarded Serbo-Croatian language textbooks,
readers, and dictionaries. Periodic ads were run for new books in Serbo-Croatian coming out of Yugoslavia and European publishing houses. Lastly, the CFU also sought to attract young people, adding new amenities to lodges like dance floors, bowling alleys, billiards, libraries, and bars. What people would drink at those bars was unclear, as Prohibition was in force.

The generational divide, however, could be difficult to bridge—among the second generation, enthusiasm for Croatian clubs was tepid. Georgeanna Kirin, a second-generation Croat from Los Angeles, who wrote to *Zajedničar* in 1927, was alienated by the mandate that club business be discussed in Croatian, “of which the majority of us, young people, understand little or nothing.” Moreover, “the active members of these lodges…in most cases older, European-bred people…cannot accept us, young people, as intelligent persons with opinions and ideas of our own, but as children.” Lastly, the clubs seemed to have “too many lengthy arguments…over apparently insignificant matters.” For that reason, she argued that English-speaking lodges were the CFU’s best hope for attracting the second generation. She was not proposing to abandon her Croatian national identity—after all, she was still coming to an ethnic club. But some within the organization believed that one could not be Croatian without speaking Croatian. Replying to Georgeanna, George Stublar, of Roundup, Montana, believed that “it would be unjust to the founders of this organization to change this into an English-speaking society,” as such a move would alienate those who spoke only Croatian and would deprive the CFU of its raison d’etre. Of course, that was not what Georgeanna was proposing, which was only that second-generation Croats be allowed to form their own English-speaking lodges. This

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293 As an example, see “Knige I Listovi” *Zajedničar*, March 9th, 1927, Reel 5, IHRCA Microfilm Collection.
294 Mark Vinski, “Croatian Halls” *Zajedničar*, April 13th, 1927. Reel 5. IHRCA Microfilm Collection
was the generational conflict within the CFU, a consequence of the membership drive—in bringing the Yugoslav idea to the second generation, they had to let the second generation also be Americans. In any event, the move toward English speaking lodges could not be halted, and the very first was organized in Cleveland later that year. Lacking facilities of their own, they borrowed Grdina Hall from the local Slovenes—Yugoslav cooperation paid off.297

These debates aside, the Americanization of teenage Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes could always be reversed in adulthood, as consular officials would learn from their collaborators in the emigration. In 1925, Franjo Preveden, a Croat from Sremska Kamena with a doctorate from Winona, Minnesota, was recruited by the University of Chicago to teach of subject of his choice. To the delight of the Yugoslav legation in Washington, Preveden elected to teach Serbo-Croatian on the college level, possibly the first course of its kind. He also sought to teach Serbo-Croatian literature. Such a course, the legation opined, could help reach “the great numbers of the Americanized children of our emigrants who are now in high school and college...[and] could be very useful in...reminding them of their mother tongue.” For this reason, they proposed that Preveden’s $500 stipend from the University of Chicago be supplemented by another $500 to be paid out of the Yugoslav state coffer, which is remarkable given Preveden’s checkered political past. This was also five times what they were paying Archimandrite Mardarije. While Preveden had joined a patriotic Yugoslav society in Paris and briefly worked as a translator for the Press-bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, he had also spent time in Russia during the civil war and worked for the Communist Party in the United States as a propagandist for several years before being expelled from the party as an “opportunist.” 298 “Opportunism”

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297 “Our English Speaking Lodges” Zajedničar, August 3rd, 1927, Reel 5, IHRCA Microfilm Collection.

298 “Naučna Propaganda,” Report from the GK KSHS in Chicago to the Political Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 7th, 1925. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
regardless, Dr. Preveden was apparently too good of an opportunity to pass up—there were still relatively few Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes in academia.

**Making Leisure “Yugoslav”: Cultural Politics in the 1920s**

The emigration commissariat (IK) had great ambitions in the realm of cultural politics, a catch-all term to describe a variety of musical and artistic initiatives that are less about literacy and more about entertainment. In this area, the biggest failure of the Yugoslav state was tourism. Part of the IK’s 1925 blueprint was to bring emigrants to Yugoslavia as tourists, generally in large excursion groups (*izleti*). Unlike many of the other forms of cultural propaganda and outreach planned by Yugoslavia, tourism could both turn a profit and build sentimental ties between Yugoslavia and the emigration.⁹⁹ Since so much was not implemented due to lack of funding, this makes the total lack of *izleti* during Yugoslavia’s parliamentary period a particular anomaly. In fact, the first mass trip to Yugoslavia, an excursion by the Yugoslav Sokols, did not take place until the summer of 1929, months after the royal dictatorship was proclaimed.⁰⁰⁰ although after that the number of *izleti* surged. In 1930, the Slovene National Mutual Benefit Society (SNPJ) organized their own *izlet*.⁰¹ In 1931, the other major Slovene fraternal society, the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, followed suit. In 1937, both the Croatian Fraternal Union and the Serb National Federation organized their own excursions.⁰² In all these cases, it was the emigrant activists, not the government of Yugoslavia, who took the initiative. The issue was not the price of passage, which could be earned in a month by an unskilled laborer.⁰³ Rather, one possible explanation for the lag in promoting *izleti* was that funding tourism was politically

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⁹⁹ Ibid.
⁰⁰⁰ Letter from Ivan Mladineo to GK KJ in NYC, May 21, 1929. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO. 10, AJ.
⁰¹ “Veliki izlet SNPJ v letu 1930,” Prosveta, July 17, 1929. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
⁰² “Hrvatski Izletnici u Domovinu,” Consul Stojanović’s report to MIP Political Division, June 30th, 1937. Fond 449, fasc. 10, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
⁰³ Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 100.
dangerous for Yugoslavia. Emigrant tourists did not always like what they saw in Yugoslavia, nor was it practical to vet them such that only pro-regime Yugoslavs could go.

In other areas, the KSHS did somewhat better. Support for singing societies were a major part of the IK’s 1925 blueprint, and was one of the areas in which they followed through on their intentions. Music was a particularly convenient mode of propaganda. Neither the performers nor the listeners of folk songs needed to be particularly literate. Moreover, music reminded audiences of the ‘old country’ and all its sentimental associations, which emigrants, living in bustling multiethnic metropolises and working arduous factory shifts, sometimes forgot. A 1936 article from Srbobran, a major Serbian-American newspaper, is illustrative. Reviewing the performance of the “Maksimovich Quartet,” a group of Montenegrin musicians who traveled to Ohio as national missionaries, a continuation of the program begun with this document, the author (herself an Americanized Serb) wrote:

Dressed in their dashing, colorful Montenegrin costumes, the brothers Maksimovich silently stood. Our tongues were paralyzed for a few moments. To think that after years and years of anxiety for our homeland, some of our brothers came to see us!...We always felt as if Yugoslavia were another world, another planet...When the Brothers Maksimovich sang, it was like a bomb exploding within us and opening our eyes, mind, and hearts to the realization that Yugoslavia is supreme in her culture, her music, and her soul!...Sincere and earnest tears flowed freely down the faithful Serbians’ faces...There were many who knew that they were Serbian yet never felt it until that moment [emphasis mine].

While the tears might have been artistic license, singing societies were nonetheless one of the most effective tools in the Yugoslav kit. Yet, as with churches, there were too few of them: there were, in all, sixty-five Yugoslav singing societies with 10,000 male members and only 385 female members. Moreover, these societies lacked both teachers and fresh material to sing. This

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304 Yearly Report of the Emigration Commisariat of the KSHS, 1925, p. 22. Fond 1071, Kut. 548, HDA.
305 Millee is an Americanized version of the Serbian name “Mila.” She also wrote in English. Milee Velimirovic, “Maksimovich Quartet Captivates Youth,” American Srbobran, June 25, 1936. Fond 967, Kut. 34, HAD.
was a need that Yugoslavia could meet: the fifth point of the IK’s program was to supply the aforementioned singing and theater societies with patriotic Yugoslav songs, plays, and excerpts “from our glorious history.” In this way, they could turn singing societies into mouthpieces of Yugoslav unity. And if that failed, they could also supply the performers, as the eighth part of their plan stipulated. Lastly, moving beyond song, Yugoslavia could also send traveling exhibitions to bring Yugoslav art, culture, and history to the Yugoslav masses overseas.  

As with education, these sorts of cultural initiatives often relied on activists from the diaspora rather than the old country. Interestingly, rather than preserving Serb, Croat, and Slovene culture unchanged, however, many of these exhibitions attempted to situate Serb, Croat, and Slovene culture into an overarching “Yugoslav” culture. Take, for instance, the very first of these cultural exhibitions, a “Symposium of Jugoslav Genius” held in St. Mark’s Church-In-the-Bowery in New York City. By choosing an Episcopalian, rather than a Catholic or Orthodox church, the organizers sidestepped accusations of pro-Croat or pro-Serb bias. This evenhandedness was extended to the program as well. Attendees were treated to lectures on “Yugoslavia, the New Nation,” “The Literature of Yugoslavia,” “the Music of Yugoslavia,” as well as a capella renditions of Serb, Croat, and Slovene folk songs. While the general consul attended, his involvement was relatively minimal—the Federation of the Jugoslav Singing Societies, based in the United States, did the actual singing. The lectures and performances at this event were not solely Slavic-themed, however. Just as Serb, Croat, and Slovene culture was situated within a Yugoslav framework, Yugoslav culture was situated within a broader “Western” culture by incorporating music by non-Yugoslav composers like Matheson and Schubert, as well as patriotic American hymns like “All Hail America.”

306 Yearly Report of the Emigration Commissariat of the KSHS, 1925, page 47. Fond 1071, Kutija 548, IK, HAD.
307 Program from “A Symposium of Jugoslav Genius,” April 23, 1922. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
planers of the symposium signaled that its attendees could be both Yugoslavs and Americans. While the Emigration Commissariat, unlike some in the foreign ministry, saw both identities as compatible, it was up to their collaborators in the Yugoslav-American intelligentsia to find ways to synthesize Yugoslav and American culture.

One consequence of the reliance on Yugoslav-American intellectuals was that the Yugoslav culture being created and promulgated in the United States generally lacked great-Serbian overtones. Take, for instance, a play performed by the Yugoslav Cultural/Educational Society in Chicago in 1926, titled “Osloboditelji,” or “Liberators,” written by the Croatian playwright Srđan Tucić, who had been living in New York City since 1914.308 A committed Yugoslavist, Tucić left Yugoslavia after “Liberators” was published in August 1914, two months after the outbreak of the First World War. This was an inauspicious time for a play that was sympathetic to the Serbs, and “Liberators” was promptly banned by the Austro-Hungarian authorities.309

A tragedy set during the Second Balkan War, the plot of “Liberators” centers around a romance between a Dragoljub, a wounded Serbian officer convalescing in Sofia, and Katja, the daughter of a Bulgarian general. There is, however, remarkably little romance in this romance, with most of the dialogue consisting of political commentary on the ongoing conflict. Following the victory of Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Bulgaria over the Ottoman empire in the First Balkan War in 1913, the Second Balkan War erupted when Bulgaria refused to accept its share of the territorial spoils and declared war on Serbia and Greece. Having already overestimated its military capabilities, Bulgaria found itself overwhelmed when the Ottoman Empire and Romania

308 Dunja Fališevac, Krešimir Nemec, and Darko Novaković, Leksikon Hrvatskih Pisaca (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 2008), 737.
intervened on the Serbian side and was forced to accept a humiliating peace. In “Liberators,” Tucić repeatedly deplored the Second Balkan War as “fratricidal,” implying South Slav brotherhood.\textsuperscript{310} Likewise, attention is drawn to the human cost of war, particularly invalids, who make up much of the male cast—Dragoljub, for instance, has a missing right arm.\textsuperscript{311} Other characters, the older generation, bear psychological scars as their sons perish on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{312} War between brothers benefits nobody but “greedy diplomats and ambitious politicians,” as Katja points out,\textsuperscript{313} a sentiment unlikely to be appreciated by Yugoslav politicians in Belgrade or their diplomatic representatives overseas.

Unlike official Yugoslav propaganda, which was based on a heroic myth of Serbian military prowess, Tucić portrays the Serbian army as both tragic and unheroic. During the second act, Dragoljub monologues that the Serbs are “a victor who cannot rejoice because he has shed his brother’s blood” and that “this war is even more tragic for the Serbs than for the Bulgars because it has robbed us of our faith in our brothers, and until quite recently this faith seemed our best guarantee of a happier future for the Slav Balkans.”\textsuperscript{314} Furthermore, Tucić depicts national chauvinists as absurd, grotesque figures. In one scene, a trio of madly grinning paraplegic Bulgarian soldiers threaten Dragoljub for his (non-existent) role in the Serbian advance into Bulgaria and then proceed to hop around on crutches singing the Bulgarian national anthem.\textsuperscript{315} Physical impairment becomes a metaphor for a deformity of the soul—they lack legs, but more importantly, they lack hearts. Not all Bulgarians are depicted negatively, and the women of the

\textsuperscript{310} See, e.g.: Srdjan Tucić, \textit{The Liberators: A Drama in Three Acts}, (Stratford-upon-Avon: The Shakespeare Head Press, 1918), 8-9, 15, 35-6, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid, 10, 16.
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid, 26.
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid, 42-3
\textsuperscript{315} Ibid, 49-50.
general’s household often act as the cast’s conscience and voice of reason. With his themes of brotherhood, equality, and pacifism, Tucić exhibited a very different sort of Yugoslavism than the sort found among political elites in Belgrade. The diaspora, however, was a natural home for this sort of freethinker and iconoclast.

As an additional Yugoslav touch, the play was written entirely in the Croatian dialect of Serbo-Croatian. Given the sympathetic approach to Bulgarians, who fought on the opposite side of the Serbs, as well as the cross-cultural romance, it is difficult to characterize this play as anything other than “Yugoslav”. This was also the conclusion of Hugh Seton-Watson, who wrote the introduction to the English translation of the play, published in 1918. At the Chicago performance of “Liberators,” we can also see how “Yugoslav” culture received a Croatian gloss: from after the play until midnight, attendees could stay and dance the kolo, a traditional folk dance, while being serenaded by the local “Zvonimir” orchestra, which, based on the name, was almost certainly Croatian.

Cultural syncretism also appeared in the work of David Brčin, a Serbian-American sculptor that the Chicago consulate recruited in late 1927. While, in the appraisal of the local consul, Brčin had “neither deep artistic creative force…nor originality,” he nonetheless had “adequate nobility in his conception of things.” In other words, in their view, though he was no Meštrović, he was a competent artist and a good propagandist. Moreover, Brčin was already famous, particularly in Chicago, where he was hailed as “our sculptor.” For that reason, the consul stated that “we need to help him as a Serb who has broken through into this ruthless

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318 Ibid. Zvonimir was an 11th-century king of Croatia and is strongly identified with Croatian national consciousness.

119
American world.” Of course, they only did this after Brčin contacted the consul seeking their patronage, which, Brčin pointedly noted, he had not yet received. As usual, emigrant activists were the initiators, and the role of the Yugoslav foreign service was largely reactive. To link Brčin’s success with the prestige of Yugoslavia, the local consul attended an exhibition of Brčin’s sculptures. But although Brčin characterized the body of his work on display as “decidedly Slavonic and Serbian,” Brčin’s exhibition was also about Yugoslav unity, with sculptures titled *The Dalmatian Express, The Women of Ragusa*, and *The Bard of Bosnia*. His exhibition also had a distinct American flavor: alongside sculptures of Božidar Purić (the charge d’affaires in the Legation in Washington), *Razin the Cossack Bandit, Dostoievsky*, and (Kraljević) *Marko*, Brčin put *Woodrow Wilson, Mark Twain*, and *Washington and Kosciusko*.

With his predilection for heroic figures, Brčin was clearly well suited for national propaganda. However, the message of his exhibition was left unclear: was he trying to promote Americanism, Panslavism, or Yugoslavism? Did he believe they could be synthesized?

Yugoslav officials were not wholly dependent on local talent, however—several of these national missionaries were imported from the Yugoslav cultural elite. In late 1924, Milan Šimić, a well-known photographer from Belgrade, decided to visit the United States as a national missionary. Presumably, he was recruited by the foreign ministry, which had vetted him as a “good patriot and a nationalist,” ordering the diplomatic service in America to assist him in this “mission.” That mission was explicitly national propaganda: a traveling exhibition of photographs depicting of the living conditions of the singular Yugoslav people. This traveling

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319 General Consul of the KSHS in Chicago to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, December 5, 1927. Fond 371, Folder 56, BO 72, AJ.
320 David Brčin to Radoje Janković, Consul General in Chicago, December 3rd, 1927. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
321 Program from an Exhibition of Sculpture by John David Brčin at Chicago Galleries Association, January, 1928. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
exhibition, they hoped, would facilitate the “our land’s…rapprochement (zbliženje) with her scattered children.” Presumably, viewing these photographs would, like hearing a familiar folk song, remind emigrants of their homeland. The same held true for Žarko Savić, the director of Belgrade’s operatic school, who was induced to travel to the United States on a concert tour in 1924 “for the purpose of state propaganda.” Of course, outsiders like Šimić or Savić, unlike their Yugoslav-American cultural elite, were often entirely dependent on the Yugoslav diplomatic service to parade them around, limiting their exposure.

Lastly, no discussion of Yugoslav cultural propaganda in the twenties would be complete without mention of the sculptor Ivan Meštrović, its most prominent cultural exponent. Meštrović is best known for his unfinished Kosovo Temple project, which first debuted at the Rome Exhibition of 1911. Combining motifs from Catholicism and Orthodoxy, and depicting Serbian heroes like Kraljević Marko with the more “Croatian” medium of sculpture, Mestrović’s temple was a powerful argument for Yugoslav cultural synthesis. Mestrović remained active in the interwar period, though the messages of his sculptures were not always as obvious.

In 1928, a pair of Meštrović’s sculptures, The Bowman and the Spearman, traveled from his studio in Zagreb to Grant Park, Chicago, where they are still on display. While these two sculptures of Native-American horsemen were of themselves no statement on Yugoslav unity, their installation was nonetheless intertwined with the Yugoslavization project in the United States. It is no coincidence that Chicago, with its large ‘Yugoslav’ population, was chosen--these sculptures were another way for Yugoslavia to ‘remind’ its emigrants of their old country.

322 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, September 24, 1924. Fond 371, Fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
323 Directive from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington to all consulates in the United States, August 7th, 1924. Fond 371, Fasc.56, BO 72, Poslanstvo Kraljevina Jugoslavije u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama-Vašingtonu
In theory, the many Yugoslavs in Chicago would look at these sculptures and know their origin, from an artist whose name and prestige were bound up in the Yugoslav idea, an artist who had not forgotten about his overseas brethren. For that reason, it is not surprising that the unveiling of these sculptures in October of 1928 was so politicized. The unveiling committee asserted that the ceremony’s “importance to our entire people (narod)” required “Croats in unity (u zajedništvu) with their brother Serbs and Slovenes.” Each “tribe” would thus be given opportunity to perform national songs and to parade around in their national costumes.\textsuperscript{325} But the crux of the controversy was whether they would do so divided, as a Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene group, or united as Yugoslavs. Some in the Croatian contingent of the unveiling balked at this. The Croats were also divided over how they should act toward representatives of Yugoslavia’s diplomatic service, who would also be present at The Bowman and The Spearman’s unveiling.\textsuperscript{326} In other words, they were debating whether Yugoslavs were a single people, or a people with three-discrete tribes (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), and whether that people supported the government of Yugoslavia. Eventually, it was decided, albeit by a narrow majority, to participate as Croats, but to march with the Serbian and Slovene delegations, a fine distinction that suggested support for the Yugoslav idea, provided the Croats could retain their cultural and political distinctiveness. Regarding the diplomatic service, the Croatian party resolved to participate “alongside,” but not with. They were unwilling to endorse the government of Yugoslavia, but they would grudgingly cooperate with it—for now.

The Croatian delegation at the unveiling ceremony were almost certainly reacting an event from earlier that year: the death of Stjepan Radić, the charismatic force behind the Croatian

\textsuperscript{325} Stjepan Babić and Valenta Suša, “Svi Na Proslavu Otkrića Meštrovićevih Kipova” Hrvatski Glasnik, October 16, 1928, Fond 414, Fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.

\textsuperscript{326} “Sjednica Odbora za Proslavu Otkrića Meštrovićevih Kipova” Hrvatski Glasnik, October 16, 1928, Fond 414, Fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
Peasant Party, the party of mainstream Croatian nationalism. On June 20, 1928, Radić was gunned down by Puniša Račić, a deputy of the People’s Radical Party on the floor of the Yugoslav Parliament. Radić succumbed to his injuries on August 8, igniting a political crisis. Seeing an opportunity, King Alexander Karađorđević abolished the parliament, banned all political parties, and proclaimed a royal dictatorship in January, 1929. Yugoslavia’s parliamentary period was over, as was the first cautious phase of diaspora Yugoslavization.

**Conclusion**

In general, this first phase of overseas Yugoslavization project was characterized by a disjuncture between the program designed by the IK in 1925 and its implementation. Yugoslav diplomats did not have the resources to do many of the things they wanted, whether it was building churches, supporting schools, or teaching people about Yugoslav culture. For that reason, they offloaded much of the work on émigrés themselves, who often had their own interpretation of the Yugoslav idea. One some occasions, Croatian culture predominated. On others, activists tried to syncretize ‘Yugoslav’ and American culture. This, again, relates back to the question of host-country influence posed in the introduction, from which we can derive two lessons. First, the sorts of borrowing that take place are not limited to political prescriptions, i.e. federalism or republicanism or pacifism, but extend to the symbolic vocabulary in which these ideas are expressed. Figures as diverse as Washington, Mark Twain, or *The Bowman and the Spearman* could become symbols of a transnational Yugoslav community, despite their lack of Slavic content. In much the same way, the emergence of English language lodges in the fraternal unions showed that the loss of language proficiency by second-generation migrants was entirely compatible with ethnic activism. Secondly, although this may seem obvious, the degree of
syncretism in the expression of emigrant nationalism is inversely related to the extent to which the Yugoslav state attempted to curate cultural production.

Where the Yugoslav state *was* involved, Yugoslavization, at least during the 1920s, was not synonymous with Serbianization. While Serbs were given more institutional support via the exarchate or in fraternal union politics, they probably also needed it the most; the Serbs were the least numerous, had the fewest churches, and the smallest and most fractured fraternal unions. In other words, this was a kind of affirmative action for their national movement, rather than pro-Serb bias. Even so, the most significant development in diaspora politics during this period, the consolidation of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions, was driven less by Yugoslav encouragement than by demographic demands. The xenophobic turn in the United States, as reflected by its new immigration quotas, forced these working-class organizations to set aside old grudges and band together. Still, encouraging self-reliance among Croat and Slovene emigrants would come back to haunt Yugoslavia, once Yugoslavia’s approach to émigré politics became much more authoritarian after 1929.
CHAPTER THREE: THE DICTATORSHIP AND THE ‘TENTH BANOVINA’

On August 8, 1928, Stjepan Radić succumbed to the wounds he had sustained several weeks earlier in the Belgrade Parliament at the hand of Puniša Račić, a Serb MP. In the United States, the outrage of Croats took varying forms. Hrvatski Glasnik of Chicago, for instance, denounced the “persecution, violence, and murders committed by Serbian Belgrade,” asserting that Radić’s murder was part of a broader campaign “organized by the Belgrade government to kill all the leaders of the Croatian people.” In Pennsylvania, Croats gathered to issue a series of protest resolutions against “the tyranny of Belgrade” and the murder of Radić, calling for “Croatia for the Croats, and Serbia for the Serbs” and for American Croats elsewhere to unite behind this cause. A more conciliatory note was struck by Ivan Mladineo, a Croat and close collaborator with the Yugoslav diplomatic service, who issued his own resolution as a leader of the Yugoslav Sokol in New York. Deploring “the ominous and reprehensible deed that took place in the Belgrade skupština on July 20,” as well as Puniša Račić’s “felonious clique” and the “intertribal conflict” between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Mladineo nonetheless asserted that the slogan “United we stand, divided we fall” was still useful and valid for the people of Yugoslavia. That quintessentially American slogan, it seemed, made Mladineo reluctant to embrace ethnic separatism—was not Yugoslavia, like the United States, stronger as a unified nation? Regardless, the following decade would see hundreds of similar protest resolutions from American Croats—some calling for Croatian independence and some not, but all voicing their displeasure at the autocratic and tyrannical government in Belgrade.

327 “Nezadovoljstvo Amer.Hrvata,” Hrvatski Glasnik, October 18, 1928. Fond 967, Kut 29, HDA
329 Ivan Mladineo, “Resolution from the Yugoslav Sokol in New York,” June 24, 1928. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
While the “tyranny of Belgrade” may not have been a cause of Radić’s assassination (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was, after all, a parliamentary democracy), tyranny was certainly a consequence—Radić’s death gave King Alexander a pretext to proclaim a royal dictatorship on January 6, 1929. Declaring his intent to forge Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes into a single Yugoslav people, King Alexander banned all political parties, as well as any political organization with “Serbian,” “Croatian,” or “Slovene” in its name. Accompanying this, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Police terror was introduced against political dissidents, both communists and ethnic “separatists,” and newspapers were censored. Lastly, Yugoslavia was reorganized into nine banovine (singular banovina), or provinces, that were named after geographic features rather than national signifiers. Croatia, for instance, became the Savska and Primorska Banovine, Macedonia and parts of Southern Serbia became the Vardar Banovina, and so forth.

Soon after, Yugoslavia’s overseas population came to be called the “tenth banovina” by the political and journalistic class, although it is unclear who originally coined the term. Regardless, this nickname was symptomatic of a broader overhaul of the entire legal and bureaucratic apparatus dedicated to controlling and indoctrinating Yugoslavia’s overseas population, which is the main subject of this chapter.’ First, this chapter will examine the new laws, decrees, and organizations that dictatorship introduced to govern its “tenth banovina”: the Citizenship Law of 1928, the Emigration Law of 1929, the Law on Holidays, and the failed expansion of the Postal Savings Bank of Yugoslavia. Then, turning from high-level law to low-level practice, this chapter will show that the dictatoral period was also characterized by

331 Ulf Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State since the Late Nineteenth Century (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 224.
attempts by Yugoslav diplomats to censor, arrest, intimidate, and deport emigrant critics of the regime. In short, the ‘tenth banovina’ was treated like the other nine. Also like in the other nine, these new laws and new practices created a great deal of bitterness toward Alexander’s government. But Belgrade’s abuses did not, I will argue, delegitimize Yugoslavism as an idea, which manifested in three important developments for Yugoslavism in the United States: the attempted creation of a Yugoslav fraternal union, the rise of old-country tourism, and the emergence of Louis Adamic as a public figure.

From Emigrants to Citizens Abroad

Above all, Alexander’s dictatorship was characterized by a proprietary attitude toward emigrants, as well as efforts to translate this into law. One of the first changes, even slightly predating the January 6 dictatorship, was Yugoslavia’s new citizenship law of 1928. This law gave everyone who emigrated from the territory of Yugoslavia citizenship, even if they emigrated before Yugoslavia’s formation in 1918, so long as they did not renounce their citizenship. And to prevent that from happening, emigrants were given a very short window of time to do so—within three years of their twenty-first birthday, they had to travel to one of Yugoslavia’s consulates and formerly renounce their Yugoslav citizenship. If they forgot, or were simply ignorant of this regulation, they were out of luck, and could even be drafted if they entered Yugoslavia. Yugoslav citizenship was not a privilege, but an obligation. Emigrants who had emigrated prior to 1918, and had thus missed the three-year window, were given until 1936 to formerly renounce their citizenship. Adding insult to injury, renouncing one’s Yugoslav citizenship also involved paying a small fine.332 While not exorbitant, the fine, along with the difficulties associated with getting time off work to travel hundreds of miles to Yugoslav

consulate, put renunciation beyond the reach of many ordinary emigrants, particularly during the Great Depression. This was probably intentional—to make it as difficult as possible for emigrants to shed their Yugoslav citizenship, which could be used to justify more interference from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into their daily lives.

This tendency to treat emigrants as Yugoslav subjects was developed even further by the Emigration Law of 1929, passed soon after the country’s renaming and the provincial organization. Declaring in a press release that “the emigration question has become even more complicated and important, and as such we dare not delay its resolution any longer,” the Emigration Commissariat declared its intent to make sure that “our emigrant’s life be tightly connected with the national life in the fatherland, that they will become part of the national whole.” That, in turn, involved combating the “problem of de-nationalization,” ensuring that Yugoslavia’s overseas citizens remained good Yugoslavs, loyal to their fatherland. Admittedly, the law contained few specifics on how this propagandistic work would be accomplished—the focus of this law was restricting further immigration and establishing legal and financial protections for migrants from unscrupulous foreign capitalists. Section four proposed education for emigrants and their children, but remained vague on specifics. The primary innovation, if it could be called that, was the “emigration fund,” the consular slush fund established in 1925, was now explicitly to be used for propaganda activities. In effect, this meant that the specifics of overseas Yugoslavization were left to the Yugoslav diplomatic service. While it made sense in theory to delegate these decisions to a group that spent the most time among emigrants, in

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333 “Nacrt Iseljeničkog Zakona,” *Starokrajski Vjesnik*, December 30, 1929
335 Zakon o Iseljevanju, Ministarstvo Socijalne Politike i Narodnog Zdravlja, § 4
practice, as we will see, Yugoslav diplomats seemed more concerned with quashing dissent than cultivating loyalty.

The Postal Savings-Bank Disaster

As I have emphasized in previous chapters, much of Yugoslavia’s interest in the “tenth banovina” was pecuniary—emigrant wealth had to be tapped by the fatherland, either through remittances or investment. Once the dictatorship was proclaimed in January 1929, one of the earliest legal reforms was the centralization and coordination of the flow of remittances through a state-owned bank, the Poštanska Štedionica, or postal savings-bank.336 Until that point, emigrants had to rely on a panoply of private banks, which on occasion swindled their customers (at least, Yugoslav officials thought so). This threatened to choke the flow of remittances, (which Yugoslav authorities did not want). To resolve this problem, Yugoslav officials plotted the overseas expansion of the Poštanska Štedionica, which could offer emigrants better rates than American banks. In a sense, this was a way for Yugoslavia to “tax” its new “citizens.”

The Poštanska Štedionica was publicized via coordinated ads in émigré newspapers by the general consulates, which were tasked with promoting the bank.337 Housed in the Palace Rossiya, a Belgrade architectural landmark (now better known as the Hotel Moskva), the bank oozed respectability. Its backing by the government of Yugoslavia was mentioned at every opportunity in advertisements—four times in as many pages in one leaflet. At the same time, the bank also emphasized its proletarian character to appeal to emigrants. Around the margins of one

336 General Directorate of the Postal Savings Bank to the New York General Consul, January 23, 1929. Fond 449, Fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
337 Ibid.
leaflet, we can see depictions of farming, factory work, and mining, the main occupations of migrants, along with Slavic embroidery patterns.\textsuperscript{338}

![Leaflet for the Postal Savings-Bank, 1929. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.](image)

Ads for the Poštanska Štedionica framed its use as a patriotic duty. Readers were enjoined to “not forget kin in the old country” and to “help their countrymen” by working hard and “saving

\textsuperscript{338} Fig. 3. Leaflet for the Postal Savings-Bank, 1929. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ
as much as you can. In essence, the state was inserting itself between emigrants and their families in the old country, turning a traditional familial and economic relationship into a statement of identity and loyalty to a would-be nation state.

The ‘patriotism’ of those who switched to the Poštanska Štedionica soon would be punished. The Poštanska Štedionica shared the fate of most banks after the crash of 1929. By 1931, it was on the verge of collapse. To survive, the bank needed a bailout of around 50,000,000 dinars to cover all emigrant deposits. On Vidovdan (June 28) 1931, an emigrant delegation approached King Alexander to ask him to intervene to save emigrant deposits. Alexander assured the delegation that he would act immediately to resolve the problem. He did not. After a delay of six months, the government of Yugoslavia finally acted to save the bank, but its solution left much to be desired, according to Zajedničar, the main émigré paper for Croats. To be reimbursed by the state treasury for their lost savings, former patrons of the bank had to submit legal proof that they were citizens of Yugoslavia along with their claim—the postal savings bank was ultimately about the control of a state over its overseas “citizens.”

Migrants who had become American citizens occupied an uncertain position, on which the official government statement offered little clarity. Even for the non-naturalized, obtaining legal proof that one had emigrated from Yugoslavia could be a problem, especially since many had emigrated before the widespread adoption of passports during World War I. After all, back then travel to the United States from the Balkans was as simple as buying a steamship ticket—passport controls only became endemic during World War I. As a result, determining who was

339 Ibid.
340 A date with enormous political resonance to Serbs, June 28 marks the defeat of the Kingdom of Serbia at Kosovo Polje in 1389, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914, and the first Yugoslav constitution in 1921. In 1948, the Cominform expelled Yugoslavia. Bad things tend to happen on June 28.
eligible for reimbursement rested in the hands of Belgrade bureaucrats, who were, according to the fine print, under no obligation to pay out at all!\textsuperscript{342} A long wait for response, bureaucratic hurdles, and no guarantee of payout—in the eyes of emigrants, these were not the actions of a government that cared about its overseas subjects.

This debacle mattered because its affected regular people who may not have participated in émigré political life. In aggregate, only about four in ten people in the “tenth banovina” were in a fraternal union.\textsuperscript{343} Even the largest oppositional newspaper, \textit{Zajedničar}, only had a subscribership of between 85,000-90,000 people, a little more than a tenth of the “tenth banovina.” \textsuperscript{344} Therefore, we can safely say in 1929, most Serb, Croat, and Slovene emigrants were still apathetic toward Yugoslav politics. After all, the murder of Stjepan Radić was an ocean away, and they had more immediate concerns, like earning enough money in the ironworks support one’s family in the old country. The savings bank disaster gave these people a reason to resent the King, who did nothing while their savings vanished. Moreover, Yugoslavia had foolishly linked support of the bank with one’s patriotic duty to the old country—when the bank failed, the legitimacy of the Yugoslav government was likewise undermined. This would cast a pall over future attempts by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to create a Yugoslav diaspora.

\textbf{Pomp and Parades}

Another immediate change brought about by King Alexander’s dictatorship was the use of official holidays and, more broadly, public demonstrations of loyalty, to promote loyalty to

\textsuperscript{342} “Zdrava Kvočka, Koji Dočeka,” \textit{Zajedničar}, March 4, 1931. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO. 10, AJ.
\textsuperscript{343} According to Ivan Mladineo’s count in his \textit{Jugoslovenski Almanak}, published 1934, there were around 700,000 Yugoslavs in the United States. The number of Yugoslavs in the top fifteen self-help societies, according to the same book, is 271,867. Since the smallest fraternal union in the top fifteen had less than a thousand members, we can safely say that the number of Yugoslavs in fraternal societies is less than 300,000. See: Ivan Mladineo, \textit{Jugoslovenski Almanak}, (New York, 1934), 4-5. 
\textsuperscript{344} “Jugoslovenska Štampa u Sjedinjenim Državama Amerike,” \textit{Novosti}, February 2, 1930. Fond 967, kut. 36, HDA.
Yugoslavia. The Law on Holidays (Zakon o Praznicima), promulgated in late 1929, introduced several official holidays for citizens of Yugoslavia, like celebration of the royal birthday, or Unification Day, which commemorated the proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on December 1, 1918. Through the central press bureau, Yugoslav officials worked to ensure that these holidays were well attended and received favorable press coverage. Celebration of these holidays in Yugoslavia was mandatory, with abstainers being fined and put on watchlists.\textsuperscript{345} Ostensibly, the purpose of these holidays was to unite Yugoslavs through the common celebration of patriotic rituals.

Tellingly, the Yugoslav state also tried to implement the Law on Holidays in the ‘tenth banovina,’ further proof that they considered the Yugoslav diaspora part of the national body. Shortly after the Law on Holiday’s promulgation, the Central Pressbureau began to distribute press releases for emigrant newspapers.\textsuperscript{346} Reporting on the celebration of these holidays, these press releases told emigrants that all of Yugoslavia unanimously supported the provincial reorganization and the royal dictatorship. To quote from one example: “All across the land, and even in Zagreb, today is the day of the most-solemn Unification Day, a state that now bears the common, single name, Yugoslavia. In every banovina celebrations were led by the new bans [governors], who in state in their speeches the importance for the future of the state that this year’s celebrations be conducted under the auspices of these new circumstances and in a new spirit.”\textsuperscript{347} With these sorts of stilted statements, Yugoslav officials hoped to undercut emigrant

\textsuperscript{345} Christian Axboe Nielsen, \textit{Making Yugoslavs: Identity in King Alexander’s Yugoslavia} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 121-2
\textsuperscript{346} See, e.g., “Proslava Dana Ujedinjenja,” Starokrajski Vjesnik, December 2, 1929. Fond 38, Fasc. 111, AJ; “Proslava Kraljevog Rodjendana,” Starokrajski Vjesnik, December 2, 1929. Fond 38, Fasc. 111, AJ. Starokrajski Vjesnik was essentially a propaganda organ for the Savez Organizacija Iseljenika (organized 1929 in Yugoslavia), which was itself a front for the emigration commissariat.
\textsuperscript{347} “Proslava Kraljevog Rodjendana,” Starokrajski Vjesnik, December 2, 1929. Fond 38, Fasc. 111, AJ.
opposition to the new regime, by claiming that it enjoyed popular legitimacy, “even in Zagreb”—the implication being, of course, that overseas Croats, who were fifty percent of the diaspora, should follow the example of their old-country counterparts. Of course, as Christian Nielsen documents, support for these new holidays, Croatian or otherwise, was negligible, and resistance to these holidays was pervasive.  

While Yugoslav diplomats could not arrest emigrants for not attending official holidays, they nonetheless assiduously tracked attendance, as well as counter-celebrations organized in protest of these official holidays. Even the first celebration of Unification Day in 1929 in New York City proved to be a fraught affair. One group of Croats, grouped around the Croatian nationalist newspaper Danica Hrvatska, refused to attend altogether. Even Niko Gršković, editor of the pro-Yugoslav but anti-regime left-wing Croatian newspaper Svijet, stayed home for fear of being labeled a Belgrade hireling. Although Croats were split on the idea of Yugoslavia, social pressure deterred even pro-Yugoslav Croats from attending these events. In Chicago, Unification Day that year fared similarly, despite several concessions intended to attract Croats, such as holding the opening ceremony in both a Croatian Catholic and a Serbian orthodox church, as well as an effort by the consul to involve emigrant notables “from all three tribes.” The response was weak. Although General Consul tried to spin events positively by noting the attendance of some minor Croatian organizations, a close reading reveals that the event was boycotted by both the Croatian Fraternal Union and the Slovene National Benefit Society (SNPJ). In fact, the only fraternal union represented at the event was the conservative Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union (KSKJ). Likewise, only the KSKJ’s newspaper, along with Ujedinjeno Srpstvo (United Serbdom) and Yugoslavia (both integral Yugoslavist paper published by a Serb) agreed to reprint

348 Nielsen, Making Yugoslavs, 123.
349 Radoje Janković to MIP, Political Division, December 10, 1929. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
official press releases about the event. Attendance was around two-thousand people,\textsuperscript{350} at number that was probably inflated, and yet still represented a minority of the roughly 58,000 “Yugoslavs” living in Chicago at that time.\textsuperscript{351} The government of Yugoslavia clearly had a legitimacy problem.

The emigrant opposition to Unification Day or the King’s birthday intensified over time, uniting Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and sometimes even Macedonians. In his report on the 1931 celebration of Unification Day, the general consul of Chicago was forced to note that the event was not only boycotted, but publicly protested by a panoply of “anti-state elements,” which included “Communists,” “clericals,” Croatian “separatists,” “republican-socialists,” partisans of the Croatian Peasant Party, and Macedonian nationalists.\textsuperscript{352} One year before King Alexander’s assassination in 1934, the general consul of Chicago opened his report on the 1933 proceedings of Unification Day with the remarkable admission that “Never have there been so many attacks and organized campaigns in the separatist Croatian, Slovenian, Clerical, and Communist, and, more generally, the anti-state and anti-regime press to weaken and belittle the celebration of Unification Day, as there have been this year.” All across Chicago a “United Opposition” of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians demonstrated, besieging official celebrations. In Milwaukee, Communists disrupted the General Consul’s speech there by littering the assembly hall with anti-regime leaflets.\textsuperscript{353} Even the staunchest allies of the regime were beginning to have misgivings—in Chicago, one group of Serbs, led by veteran Yugoslavist activist John Palandech, a Montenegrin, publicly joined the opposition. In previous years, Palandech had loyally

\textsuperscript{350} Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP, Political Division, December 18, 1929. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ; Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP, Political Division, December 28, 1929. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.

\textsuperscript{351} \textit{Glavna Naselja Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca u Sjedinjenim Državama Amerike}, [map], 1 cm = 3 km, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Commissariat of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.

\textsuperscript{352} Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP, Political Division, December 18, 1931. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.

\textsuperscript{353} Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP, Political Division, December 20, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
supported and worked with Yugoslav diplomats to ensure the success of Unification Day. But by 1933, Palandech was fed up with the general consul’s “rude and incorrect management… and use of the Yugoslav name for his own personal gain,” which had “created a chasm between Croat and Yugoslav.” To protest, Palandech and his followers held their own parallel Unification Day celebration, one with no diplomatic representatives of Yugoslavia present. \(^{354}\) Ironically, Unification Day was working, having united the “tenth banovina” against King Alexander.

**Censoring the ‘Tenth Banovina’**

After 1929 and the introduction of strict censorship laws in Yugoslavia, most émigré newspapers were banned in Yugoslavia. Although the Kingdom had banned a few newspapers in the 1920s (primarily Communist and socialist newspapers) \(^{355}\), after 1929 that trickle became a torrent. By 1931, out of the thirty-so major Serbo-Croatian and Slovene newspapers published in North America, only thirteen were permitted entry into Yugoslavia. \(^{356}\) Among those allowed in were the official organ of the (conservative) Serbian National Union and the (conservative) Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, as well as a few smaller integral-Yugoslavist newspapers (at least one of which was secretly subsidized by the General Consulate in Chicago, see below). In South America, the ratio of banned-to-unbanned was somewhat better: two out of seven. \(^{357}\)

Some of these newspapers, like Buenos Aires’s *Hrvatski Domobran*, the official organ of the fascist Ustaša, were genuine dangers. But many of the banned newspapers were not anti-Yugoslav at all. Take, for instance, *Svijet*, a New York newspaper that was edited by Don Niko

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\(^{354}\) Djuro Kolumbatović to Leonid Pitamić, head of the legation in Washington, November 27, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO. 4, AJ.

\(^{355}\) See, e.g. MUP Department for the Defense of the State Directive no. 2844 banning *Crveni Kalendar*, April 8, 1926. Fond 14, Fasc. 87, BO 160; MUP Department for the Defense of the State Directive no. 2225 banning *Radnička Borba*, April 6, 1926. Fond 14, Fasc. 87, BO 160, AJ.

\(^{356}\) “Štampa iseljenička u Americi-izveštaj,” report to Fedor Aranicki of the IK, December 22, 1931. Fond 1071, kut. 567, HDA.

\(^{357}\) Ibid.
Gršković, a veteran Yugoslavist activist who had participated in the WWI era Yugoslav National Council. Banning Svijet made little sense even to Yugoslav diplomats—the Chicago General Consul observed in 1933 that Don Niko’s newspaper, despite being “rather to the left…was altogether Yugoslav and patriotic.”

That same statement held true for many of other newspapers on the banned list: Prosveta and Proleterec (both affiliated with the left-leaning SNPJ), Radnik and Radnička Borba (Yugoslav Communist), Novi Svijet (Croatian progressive), Ednakopravost (Slovene liberal), and Naroden Glas (Macedonian progressive).

But the most important and influential newspaper to be banned was Zajedničar, the official organ of the Croatian Fraternal Union, the largest and wealthiest organization anywhere in the “tenth banovina,” and the largest Croatian organization anywhere except for the now-banned Croatian Peasant Party. It was a bizarre decision. In the words of the Chicago general consul, Zajedničar was “anti-regime, but not anti-Yugoslav.” Politically, its editor, Milan Petrak, tended toward republicanism. Apparently, monarchism, not Yugoslavism, was the criterion that determined whether a newspaper would be allowed entry into Yugoslavia. And in demanding absolute loyalty, the royal dictatorship made powerful enemies, including the two largest and wealthiest fraternal unions.

Banning Zajedničar provoked an immediate backlash. Some in the diplomatic service regarded it as a serious blunder. Radoje Janković, the consul general for Chicago, complained to his superiors in the ministry of foreign affairs that “there are small newspapers that periodically...

358 “Pobijanje Protivnicke propaganda nase I tudjinske sa osobitom obzirom na reviziju mirovnih ugovorova,” January 26, 1933, Djuro Kolumbatović to Božidar Purić. Fond 414, fasc. 7, BO 16, AJ.
359 Ibid.
360 “Stampa iseljenička u Americi-izveštaj,” report to Fedor Aranicki of the IK, December 22, 1931. Fond 1071, kut. 567, HDA.
361 “Pobijanje Protivnicke propaganda nase I tudjinske sa osobitom obzirom na reviziju mirovnih ugovorova,” January 26, 1933, Djuro Kolumbatović to Božidar Purić. Fond 414, fasc. 7, BO 16, AJ.
362 As of 1931, the CFU had 92,456 members and the SNPJ had 63,448. See: Mladineo, Jugoslovenski Almanak, 6.
appear to create disorder, which need to be immediately suppressed, but there are also older constructive newspapers, behind which stand organized masses of emigrants, that we need to approach with more caution” and that “we need to always keep in mind the sums that emigrants send to the fatherland.” In effect, there was a tacit covenant: emigrants believed that they had a right to say what they liked about Yugoslavia, so long as they continued to send home remittances.

*Zajedničar’s* editor, Milan Petrak, articulated this covenant explicitly when he wrote directly to Aranicki, chief of Yugoslavia’s emigration commissariat, to protest this wave of censorship. Noting that “nearly all of our emigrant newspapers, among them *Zajedničar*, the organ of the largest fraternal organization not just in America, but anywhere, are now banned in Yugoslavia” Petrak asserted that, because of the Croatian Fraternal Union’s charitable donations to the Old Country and its government, “which it helped create,” it “had the right to say whatever it thought about what is going on over there [in Yugoslavia].” Continuing with his theme of betrayal, Petrak noted “he was sorry to answer your previous letter thus, since only recently he had “heard praise from the mouth of a returning emigrant regarding your work as emigration commissioner.” Nonetheless, he promised, “so long as the government [of Yugoslavia] continues to treat our newspapers in America this way, we will be compelled to return the favor in kind.”

With that, *Zajedničar* declared war on Yugoslavia’s government. It is also worth noting that this idea of an emigrant-old country covenant imagines diaspora Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as a single community that was wronged by official censorship. Just as was the case with the law on holidays, political repression was creating Yugoslavs—just not the kind King Alexander wanted.

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363 Letter to MIP Political Division from Radoje Janković, April 5, 1929, Fond 414, fasc. 7, BO 16, AJ.
364 Letter from Milan Petrak to Fedor Aranicki, April 9, 1929. Fond 1071, kut. 567, HDA.
But quarantining the political contagion that Yugoslav officials thought émigré newspapers represented was not enough, particularly since that quarantine was ineffective—Yugoslav police regularly discovered subversive newspapers getting smuggled into Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{365} Opposition had to be rooted out at the source, and so soon after the dictatorship was proclaimed, Yugoslav diplomats began trying to crush hostile newspapers or bribe them into silence. The main instigator of this policy was the General Consul of Chicago, the Serb Djuro Kolumbatović. Born in Split in the Austro-Hungarian empire, Kolumbatović studied law in Zagreb, Prague, and Lvov, before enlisting as an officer in the Habsburg army. Sent to Galicia, he deserted to the Tsar, and would later fight on the side of the Whites in the Russian civil war. After serving as consul in Dusseldorf, Kolumbatović was transferred to Chicago in 1929,\textsuperscript{366} presumably for his credentials as a stalwart monarchist. This appointment was probably connected with Yugoslavia’s attempt to exert control over its overseas population, and it would be Kolumbatović in Chicago who would be the main architect of their censorship and punishment.

A report from October 1929 from the Chicago general consulate identified the three biggest targets: \textit{Zajedničar}, \textit{Hrvatski Glasnik}, and \textit{Hrvatska}, all Croatian newspapers.\textsuperscript{367} Although the Chicago consulate could not seriously damage a major newspaper like \textit{Zajedničar}, which had a guaranteed subsidy from a major fraternal society, the same could not be said of

\textsuperscript{365} “Vtihotapljanje prepovedanih inozemskih listov (Infiltration of illicit foreign newspapers),” Letter from the Chief of Police in Ljubljana to the Ministry of Internal Affairs Department for the Defense of the State, December 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1933., Fond 14, Fasc. 87, AJ; Decision banning \textit{Radnička Borba} from sale and distribution in Yugoslavia, December 7\textsuperscript{th}, 1933, Fond 14, Fasc. 87, AJ; “Zabranjeni strain listovi (Forbidden foreign newspapers),” Ministry of internal affairs order to the monitoring commission in Sušak, March 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1934, Fond 14, Fasc. 87, AJ; “Prebacivanje antideržavnih elemenata I njihovog propagandnog materijala u Jugoslaviju na našim brodovima,” General Consul of NYC to MIP Security Division, November 10, 1938. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.

\textsuperscript{366} “Jugoslav General Consul to Attend Reunion” –\textit{News, Calumet, Michigan} (Newspaper title cut off), found with 1934, Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.

\textsuperscript{367} Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP, October 18, 1929. Fond 414, Fasc. 7, BO 16, AJ
Hrvatska or Hrvatski Glasnik, which both depended on sales to stay solvent. Both newspapers had narrow profit margins and deep debts, making them financially vulnerable. To “isolate and disable” these two newspapers, the consul proposed a hostile takeover, funded by an extension of credit from the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The newspapers were pressured to accept consular money, in return for accepting an “approved patriot” as editor. Hrvatska buckled several months later, becoming a mouthpiece of the Chicago consulate, receiving regular subsidies in return for printing pro-Yugoslav propaganda and attacks on “separatists.”

Likewise, the ban on its entry into Yugoslavia was lifted, suggesting that the government of Yugoslavia wanted its own people to think that American Croats were loyal to the government.

Hrvatski Glasnik’s editor, Ivan Horvat, a music teacher from Karlovac and longtime US-resident, declined the bribe. Horvat was a consistent advocate for Croatian independence but was politically flexible; a former Frankist (conservative Croatian Nationalist), Horvat later switched sides to the more moderate Croatian Peasant Party. Kolumbatović’s retribution was truly baroque. While Horvat’s US citizenship made it difficult for the consul to punish him directly, his Achilles heel was his son-in-law, Juraj Abzac, who had been employed by Hrvatski Glasnik as an assistant since 1923. Specifically, Horvat’s daughter Borislava and Juraj Abzac had entered the US in 1923 on a visitor visa, which they subsequently overstayed. To deprive Horvat of Abzac, his right-hand-man, the Chicago consulate sought, and subsequently obtained from the

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368 Ibid.
370 Report from Đuro Kolumbatović to MIP, December 28, 1929. Fond 414, Fasc. 7, BO 16. The report states that Hrvatska received $900.00 for its assistance in the fight against anti-Yugoslav propaganda.
371 Đuro Kolumbatović to KP Washington, [undated], found with 1929. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ; Đuro Kolumbatović to MUP, December 28, 1929. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ. The report states that Hrvatska received $900.00 for its assistance in the fight against anti-Yugoslav propaganda.
372 Unidentified sender (likely Đuro Kolumbatović) to Governor Josip Milović of the Savska Banovina, May 14, 1930. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ;
government of the Savska banovina, documentation that Abzac and his wife had emigrated in
1923 and thus overstayed their visa. This was then submitted to the American immigration
authorities. Borislava Abzac was deported, but her husband only lost his American citizenship,
which he had obtained under false pretenses. Simultaneously, Kolumbatović used his new
mouthpiece Hrvatska to run polemics against Ivan Horvat, presumably to confuse and
demoralize Hrvatski Glasnik’s readership. Pressured from multiple fronts, Hrvatski Glasnik’s
circulation plummeted, from 4500 to a mere 2000 issues, and Ivan Horvat openly contemplated
selling his newspaper, forsaking politics, and moving to Canada. In 1932, Hrvatski Glasnik
ceased publishing altogether, after Kolumbatović prevailed on Kaspar State Bank to repossess
Hrvatski Glasnik’s linotype machine, offices, and all of their property.

But Kolumbatović’s intrigues ultimately accomplished little. Croatian discontent had
found a new voice in other newspapers, like Hrvatski List and Danica Hrvatska. Protest
resolutions continued to flood in. But the ultimate irony was that Borislava Abzac, Ivan Horvat’s
daughter, after being deported, joined the Ustaša in the port city of Rijeka, where she worked as
a courier, carrying messages and helping Ustaša militants travel around Yugoslavia unnoticed by
the authorities. Kolumbatović’s intrigues had turned a member of the moderate and pacifistic
Croatian peasant party into a far-right extremist and terrorist. Throughout this enterprise,

373 Signed statement from the Chief of Police in Karlovac about Abzac’s departure in 1923. May 30, 1930. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO. 7, AJ.
374 Djuro Kolumbatović to Charge d’affaires Božidar Stojanović of KP Washington, December 10, 1930. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO. 7, AJ.
376 Djuro Kolumbatović to Ivan Mladineo, May 14, 1930. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO. 7, AJ.
377 Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP Minister Vojislav Marinković, March 18, 1931. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO. 7, AJ.
378 “Hrvatska separatistička akcija; sabiranje potpisa protesta; prestanak izlazenja Hrv. Glasnika; Izbori delagata za konvenciju Hrv Bratska Zajednica,” Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP Political Division, March 15, 1932. Fond 414, Fasc. 4, BO. 7, AJ.
379 Ibid.
380 “Abzatz, Borislava: Podatci,” Dossier from the Civil Police in Sušak, January 19, 1933. Fond 1355, Kut. 4, HDA.
Kolumbatović worked closely with the Ministry of Internal Affairs—emigrants were treated, even on an administrative level, as if they were part of Yugoslavia and subject to the same repressive forces. That attitude is even more apparent in another clash between Kolumbatović and Ujedinjeno Srpstvo and Yugoslavina—not all attempts to silence hostile emigrant newspapers targeted Croatian publications.

Ivan Palandačić, or John Palandeč as he typically Americanized his name—he had emigrated from Montenegro around 1900 and had become a naturalized citizen—ought to have been an ally of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. An editor of two pro-Yugoslav newspapers in Chicago, Yugoslavina and Ujedinjeno Srpstvo (United Serbdom), Palandeč also headed the planning committee for the Yugoslav pavilion for the upcoming 1933 World Fair in Chicago, where he was working to introduce “Yugoslav” culture to fairgoers. For that reason, Kolumbatović judged his newspapers to be the perfect vessel to promote the Jugoslovenska Centralna Organizacija (JCO), a new consulate-backed organization dedicated to promoting and preserving “Yugoslav” culture overseas. The JCO will be discussed in more detail toward the end of this chapter within the context of the drive toward a Yugoslav Fraternal Union.

For now, what matters is that, to promote the JCO, Kolumbatović had Hrvatska, now a regime mouthpiece, draft an article for other supposedly regime-friendly newspapers: the Amerikanski Srbobran (which Yugoslavia also now probably subsidized) and Palandeč’s two

381 Short biography of John. R. Palandeč, undated, found with 1937. Fond 967, Kut. 36. HDA.
382 This can be seen in the survey of the Yugoslav American press contained in: “Pobijanje protivnicke propaganda nase I tudjinske sa osobitom obzirom na reviziju mirovnih ugovora,” report from the Consulate General of Chicago to Minister of Foreign Affairs Božidar Purić, January 26, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 7, BO 16; “Druga Svijet. Izložba u Chicagu,” Yugoslavina, April 25th, 1928. Fond 967, kut. 34, HDA.
383 “Program Rada Družtva ‘Jugoslovenska Žena,’” Program of work for the “Jugoslovenska Žena” organization, the female contingent of the JCO. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
384 According to Vaso Trivanović, who worked for CBS and had contacts in the State Department, it was an open secret that Srbobran had “always” been subsidized by Belgrade and its editors usually printed whatever they were told by Ambassador Fotić, who became ambassador in 1935. See: Letter from Vaso Trivanović to Srđan Budisavljević, April 4, 1942, Fond 83, fasc. 5, BO 42, AJ. Although I have found no direct evidence of this
newspapers, *Ujedinjeno Srpstvo* and *Yugoslavia*. But instead of reprinting the article, Palandech chose to lambast the JCO, accusing it and *Hrvatska* of being “paid for by the State Treasury in Belgrade.” The JCO actually was receiving state subsidies, although how Palandech intuited this is unclear. Despite the truth of these allegations, the consul saw them as “treasonous”—making emigres into overseas citizens apparently turned criticism into treason. Rationalizing Palandech’s ‘betrayal,’ Kolumbatović complained to his superiors in the foreign ministry that Palandech considered the Chicago Yugoslav community a fiefdom “from which he profits.” Of course, that contradicted Kolumbatović’s theory from an earlier report, in which he asserted that Palandech was trying to get the consulate to buy his silence since his paper lacked readers and was in dire financial straits. That accusation also made no sense in light of the Kolumbatović’s earlier choice of Palandech’s paper as a propaganda platform for the JCO—why use a newspaper that nobody read?

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relationship, the case of *Hrvatska* shows that planting articles in sympathetic diaspora papers was standard practice for Yugoslav diplomats, as was giving papers subsidies to ensure friendly coverage. There is also substantial correspondence between the leaders of the SNS, which owned *Srbobran*, and Ambassador Fotić, in Box 41, Folder 7 of the Konstantin Fotić Papers at the Hoover Institution Archive.

385 “*Hrvatska Separatisticka Akcija; Sabiranje Potpisa Protesta; Prestanak Izlazenja ‘Hrv. Glasnika’; Izbori Delegata za Konvenciju Hrv. Bratska Zajednica,”* report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Consul Đuro Kolumbatović, March 15th, 1932. AJ Fond 414, Folder 4, BO 7; “*Pobijanje protivnice propagnda nase I tunjinske sa osobitim obzirom na reviziju mirovnih ugovora*” Report from Đuro Kolumbatović to Božidar Purić of MIP Political Division, 26 January 1933, Fond 414, Fasc. 7, BO 16, AJ.

386 Telegram from the Ministry of Social Politics and National Health to the GK KJ Chicago, Feb 16, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.


389 “*Rad i delatnost ‘Jugoslovenske Centralne Organizacije’ i kampanja g. l. Paladačić protiv iste,”* report from Đuro Kolumbatović to Minister Bogoljub Jeftić of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, July 12, 1932. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
It is more likely that Palandech wasrankled by Kolumbatović’s campaign against newspapers. After all, Palandech was a veteran newspaperman in a country that prided itself on its free press. Reflecting on the incident a year later in 1934, Palandech wrote:

He (Kolumbatović)…thinks that he is somewhere in Albania and not in free America, which values and respects the honor and character of people…This gentleman does not take into account that in this affair of individuals…all patriots whom he characterizes as separatists, traitors to the fatherland, and chauvinists, are harmed. Also harmed are all of our societies and organizations, in which he has, through his intrigues, sown conflict, disunity, and in many, disintegration and ruin.390

Here, Palandech explicitly sides with the Croatian newspapers that Kolumbatović targeted for “suppression;” “separatist” was the most common epithet used in government documents to refer to Croatian nationalists, even those who did not advocate for Croatian independence. In a separate article, Palandech rhetorically asked: “does Mr. Kolumbatović really expect that our nation here [emphasis mine], American citizens, loyal to the fatherland…will run from his oppression and the slanders of his spies and agents, just as we were forced to flee from our own hearths by Austrian terror? No!”391 Once again, grievances against Alexander’s dictatorship prompted people to imagine themselves part of a single Yugoslav diasporic community.

Kolumbatović retaliated by smearing Palandech’s management of the World Fair, again through Hrvatska. Palandech was accused of usurping the presidency of the planning committee, of having been unsanctioned by the Yugoslav consul, of embezzling money intended for the fair, of refusing to permit Yugoslav diplomats attend to Yugoslav day at the pavilion, and rebuffing the assistance of other “Yugoslavs” in the setting up the Yugoslav pavilion.392 As a consequence, Hrvatska asserted, attendance had suffered, with only five to six thousand Yugoslavs present on

390 “Zainteresovnim za Razmišljanje,” Yugoslavia, June 28, 1934. Fond 967, k. 39, HDA.
391 “Tako je moralo da bude,” Ujedinjeno Srpsko, June 10, 1934. Fond 967, k. 39, HDA.
392 “Izjava Jugoslovenskog Comiteta za Svetsku Izložbu u Čikagu,” Yugoslavia, October 28 1933. Fond 967, kut. 34, HDA.
Yugoslav day rather than the anticipated twenty-thousand. 393 Although unsigned, the article’s author was probably Kolumbatović’—the article reproduced exactly Kolumbatović’s complains about Palandech’s corruption and defiance of Yugoslav officials, both of which were in classified documents. In effect, Kolumbatović’s crusade against hostile immigrant publications led him to disparage his own country’s pavilion at a World Fair—truly bizarre behavior.

If these attempts to silence emigrant critics prove anything, it was that censorship of the emigrant press was connected, both on a rhetorical and bureaucratic level, with the treatment of emigrants as part of the Yugoslav national body. However, culling a few small newspapers could not quell criticism of the royal dictatorship. If anything, it probably made it fiercer, turning potential friends into implacable enemies through heavy handed half-measures. After all, if one is going to censor the press, one had best do so systematically, lest the uncensored newspapers notice! Of course, Yugoslavia lacked the legal authority to do any such thing overseas.

The censorious policies of Yugoslav diplomats also did not consider the English-language press in the United States, which tended to be critical of Yugoslavia’s government, especially the limitations on press freedom and political expression. The New York Times, for instance, repeatedly characterized Alexander’s personal rule as “fascist” and compared it to the regime of Mussolini. 394 American newspapers were important since emigrant newspapers lacked the resources to support foreign language correspondents. This, in turn, meant that much of what was printed in emigrant newspapers came either from English-language reporting or press

393 Ibid.
releases from Yugoslav authorities—Yugoslav diplomats did not have a monopoly on information coming out of Yugoslavia. Moreover, the broader anti-dictator discourse created a supportive environment for critics of Yugoslavia’s government like John Palandech.

**Arresting the Tenth Banovina**

Yugoslavia’s diplomats did not stop at censorship, however. The case of Reverend Bono Andačić, who became a cause célébre among American Croats in 1930, eloquently captures both the risks and limits of applying repressive force overseas. Andačić was one of eight Croatian Franciscan priests stationed in the United States. He came to the attention of the Yugoslav authorities in January 1930 for his alleged “anti-national and anti-state” activities. These were left vague, but Andačić’s crime was probably Croatian nationalism.395 Croatian priests like Andačić had a central role in Croatian communities, both because churches were a social hub, but also because parochial schools were responsible for transmitting Croatian language and culture to the second generation. In the 1920s, Yugoslavia’s policy toward the Croatian Catholic church abroad had been neutrality: while they saw their activities as a useful bulwark against assimilation, and their priests as potential national activists, emigrant Catholic churches received no administrative or financial assistance from the Yugoslav state, the justification being that the famously wealthy Catholic church, unlike the Orthodox, needed little assistance.396 But as we have already seen, with the advent of Alexander’s dictatorship, Croatian national organizations were no longer tolerated, and priests like Andačić could suddenly find themselves enemies of the state if their support of Croatian national organizations and newspapers was too outspoken.

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395 Report from the Chicago Consulate to MIP, general political directorate, January 17, 1930. Fond 414. Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
396 Ante Trešić-Pavičić to Archimandrit Mardarije, June 20, 1923. Fond 449, Fasc. 5, BO. 11, AJ.
Of course, Yugoslav gendarmes could not simply arrest a priest on the streets of Chicago—extraordinary rendition is only tolerated if a great power does it. But in May 1930, Andačić unwisely visited the General Consulate in Chicago to request a visa to visit the old country. Seeing an opportunity, consul Kolumbatović immediately contacted the foreign ministry, calling Andačić “one of the worst priests,” and alleging several instances where Andačić or people in his company had said unkind things about King Alexander or the Yugoslav state.\(^397\) The visa was granted, Andačić left the safety of the United States, and in the picturesque Bosnian town of Mostar, Andačić was arrested by Yugoslav police. Word quickly got back to American Croatian priests (whom Kolumbatović had previously judged to be loyal\(^398\)), who then approached the vice-Consul Cerrezin, a Croat, to voice their outrage. Cerrezin, himself a former emigrant, and a lawyer from Cleveland,\(^399\) was sympathetic, recognizing that arresting Andačić was like cutting off a hydra’s head. In his words:

> It is my opinion that if they can fasten the Rev. Andačić arrest on the Jugoslav government or on you, his friends and fellow clergymen will do so, as they have been looking for something of this kind for a long time. They may then use it as a propaganda to further the hatred and prejudice against the Jugoslav government and against those who disagree with them. Friends of Rev. Andačić will undoubtedly seize this opportunity and endeavor to make a martyr out of him.\(^400\)

Kolumbatović brushed off Cerrezin’s warning, contending that Andačić’s arrest would “have very good consequences here, as each and every friar and priest will now think twice before they attack the state and [the principle of] national unity.”\(^401\) Presumably, all these critics would deliver themselves to Yugoslavia to be arrested.

\(^397\) Report from the Chicago Consulate to MIP, general political directorate, May 15, 1930. Fond 414. Fasc. 4, BO 7., AJ.
\(^398\) Report from the Chicago Consulate to MIP, general political directorate, January 17, 1930. Fond 414. Fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
\(^399\) Žarko Bunčić, “From Immigrant to Consul,” _Srpski Dnevnik_, January 16, 1930. Fond 967, kut. 39, HDA.
\(^400\) Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Djuro Kolumbatović, July 21, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
\(^401\) Letter from Djuro Kolumbatović to Michael Cerrezin, July 23, 1930. Fond Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7. AJ.
Cerrezin’s predictions proved prescient. Andačić’s arrest, instead of intimidating Yugoslavia’s critics, galvanized them. The remaining seven Franciscan monks in the United States, who had previously been neutral to or supportive of the Yugoslav state, made common cause with sympathizers of the Croatian Peasant Party, lobbying senators for Andačić’s release. That release was secured almost immediately. Andačić, as it turned out, was an American citizen, and American diplomats had intervened on his behalf. Kolumbatović learned nothing from this setback. Several months later, he immediately began plotting to “liquidate” another Croatian priest, Reverend Blaž Jerković, a move that Kolumbatović predicted would decapitate the opposition to the royal dictatorship. Jerković, Kolumbatović suspected, had been responsible for the campaign to free Andačić, orchestrating rallies, newspaper editorials, and protest resolutions calling for Andačić’s release. Kolumbatović, however, would never get the chance to act against Jerković, who would remain a fixture of the “anti-Yugoslav” opposition for the remainder of the thirties. Yugoslav officials had few legal options against critics abroad.

One workaround was to hold emigrants’ old-country relatives hostage. The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed this technique in early 1934. Family members of suspected émigré troublemakers were compelled in their correspondence, to “warn emigrants

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403 “Fra Bono Andačić, urednik lista ‘Hrvatska’ u Čikagu, uhapšen u Mostaru,” Report from MIP to the Chicago General Consulate, August 4, 1930. Fond 414. Fasc. 4, BO 7., AJ.
404 “Komesarijat u ‘Hrvatskom Radiši’; uhapšenje fra. Bone Andačića u Mostaru,” Report from Chicago general consulate to MIP, general political directorate, July 29, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 4, bo. 7, AJ.
406 “Hrvatski separatistički pokret; Fra Bono Andačić, ‘Hrvatski Radiša,’ i dolazak inž. Kožutića,” Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP general political directorate, August 8, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO. 7, AJ.
about the consequences that they could expect from their anti-state activity.” By using family members to write these messages, the foreign service was making an implicit threat that these consequences might fall on an emigrants’ family, who were, as the letter demonstrated, in their power. If emigrants were members of a terrorist organization, family members were also instructed to inform their emigrant relatives that they could be condemned to death or imprisoned should they ever return to Yugoslavia.408 As appalling as this policy was, it tells us that émigré dissidents represented a dilemma for Yugoslav officials. They did not want émigré dissidents back in Yugoslavia, and yet at the same time they feared the damage that they could do while abroad.

Hostage-taking was not, however, a common practice—or at least one that left little archival trace. It was much simpler to have emigrant troublemakers arrested and/or deported by the American police. We have already seen how this tactic was used against Ivan Horvat’s daughter. Deportation seemed to work best against Communists, which the United States was extremely willing to deport. Take, for instance, the case of Karl Novak, a communist leader from Detroit who, early in 1929, intended to hold a small meeting of Croatian and Macedonian communists to protest police terror in Yugoslavia. Learning of this, the Chicago consulate wrote to the Detroit police, emphasizing that those at the meeting were insulting an ally of the United States, and were, moreover, Bolsheviks. Despite only a few days advance warning, the Detroit police broke up the meeting and arrested Novak. Afterwards, the consulate contacted the police again, informing them that Novak had entered the US illegally and should be deported.409 This was not an isolated incident. A very large cell of Yugoslav communists in Chicago suffered a

408 “Suzbijanje separatističke akcije,” directive from MIP to the general consulate in Chicago, April 23, 1934. Fond 414, fasc. 4, bo. 7, AJ.
409 Report from Consul Janković to MIP political division, January 28, 1929, Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7.
setback when two of its three leaders were arrested by local police, apparently also on consular prompting. They too were deported. At least for deporting communists, Yugoslav diplomats found willing accomplices in the American police.

However, deportation was less effective against non-communists. One notable instance where it failed to work was in 1934, when Yugoslav diplomats attempted to deport Stojan Pribićević. Stojan was the son of Svetozar Pribićević, the leader of the Demokratska Stranka, (DS), a pro-Yugoslav political party that during the thirties aligned itself with the Croatian Peasant Party against Alexander’s dictatorship and in favor of a federal reorganization of Yugoslavia. The DS were not communists, but liberals. Stojan Pribićević entered the United States in March 1934 on a tourist visa, although his real purpose was probably to rally support for the Yugoslav opposition. Following what was by now a well-established procedure, Yugoslav diplomats attempted to get him deported later that year by writing to the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, claiming that Stojan’s passport was a forgery, demanding that “this man be delt (sic) with…and be deported from the United States, as has been done in previous instances [emphasis mine].” By now, this was apparently routine. But this time, Hull refused, explaining that “an official of this government is without authority to deprive Mr. Pribichevitch of [his passport] except by appropriate judicial proceedings based on a formal complaint and supported by competent evidence.” In other words, this time the Americans were not going to take the word of the Yugoslav government that Stojan Pribićević had a fake passport. After all,

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410 Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political division, January 21, 1930, Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7.
411 “Pribicevic Stojan, dolazak u SAD,” Report from Consul Radoje Janković to MIP, political division, May 1, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO 66, AJ.
412 Letter to Cordell Hull about Stojan Pribićević’s passport from the Yugoslav charge d’affaires, November 8, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO 66, AJ.
413 Letter to the Yugoslav charge d’affaires from Cordell Hull, undated, found with 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO 66, AJ.
Stojan Pribićević was not a communist, and thus had the right to due process in the United States.

Was the authoritarian turn in Yugoslavia’s diaspora politics purely the doing of Kolumbatović or was it emblematic of the entire diplomatic service? To answer this question, it is helpful to turn briefly to South America, where many of the same repressive techniques were on display. For example, Consulates compiled enemy lists of “anti-state elements.” Moreover, Macedonians were denied return visas to Yugoslavia on suspicion that they were working for the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO). In Argentina, for instance, Yugoslav diplomats repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) requested that Argentine police arrest and deport Marko Vujeva, a Croatian national activist sympathetic to the Croatian Peasant Party. In 1930, Argentine police finally obliged, sentencing Vujeva to six months imprisonment, after which Vujeva fled to Montevideo. In Uruguay, Vujeva then fell under the influence of Branimir Jelić, where joined the growing Ustaša movement—like Borislava Abzac, here was another moderate nationalist turned into an extremist by the inability of Yugoslav diplomats to tolerate dissent. In general, however, the police in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil were less willing than police in the “land of the free” to arrest and deport whomever Yugoslav diplomats

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414 Orders from the Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires to consulate in Rosario, June 16, 1930. Fond 385, fasc. 5, BO 36, AJ.
415 Orders from the Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires to all consulates in South America, July 23, 1929. Fond 385, fasc. 5, BO 35, AJ.
416 See, e.g. Letter from Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires to the (Foreign?) Secretary of Argentina, September 8, 1928. Fond 385, fasc. 5, BO 34, AJ; Report from the Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires to MIP, November 12, 1929. Fond 385, fasc. 5, BO 35, AJ; Letter from Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires to MIP, May 5, 1930. Fond 385, fasc. 5, BO 36, AJ.
418 Orders from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A. to the consulate in Rosario de Santa Fe, April 24, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ; “Akcija Hrvatskih Separatista,” Report from Yugoslav legation in B.A. to MIP, February 14, 1933. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 39, AJ.
indicated. Thus, Yugoslav attempts to police its diaspora in South America were generally not as severe, although this was not for lack of trying.

**Federalism and Centralism**

As these individual cases show, the ideological commitment to treating emigrants as part of the nation, epitomized by their calling the emigration the “tenth province” of Yugoslavia, provoked a backlash without seriously impairing dissent. The rebellious mood of the ‘tenth banovina’ and their attitude toward Yugoslav unity can be gauged by a consular survey of the emigrant press in the United States from 1933. Of the nine Croatian newspapers, all but one were “anti-regime,” the exception being *Hrvatska*, which received a subsidy from the legation. Yet of those nine, only two advocated the secession of Croatia! For the seven Slovene newspapers, all supported the continued existence of Yugoslavia except for *Prosveta* and *Proleterec*, both affiliated with the SNPJ, the largest Slovene fraternal society, attacked Belgrade from the left. For the Serbian press, all supported Yugoslav unity and King Alexander’s dictatorship (although within a year two of those newspapers, *Ujedinjeno Srpstvo and Jugoslavija* would join the opposition), and one other was flirting with the ideas of Svetozar Pribićević, a notable critic of the regime. Although both the right-wing and the left-wing Macedonian newspapers opposed the dictatorship, although only the right-wing advocated the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In general, although support of the regime was generally confined to Serbian and some Slovene organizations, opposition to the regime was frequently paired with continued support for Yugoslav unity and left-wing politics.

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419 Report from the Argentine Legation to Vojislav Marinković, MIP, January 27, 1931, p. 8. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO. 37, AJ.
420 Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political division, January 26, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 7, BO 16, AJ.
As these statistics suggest, North American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes tended to embrace alternative forms of Yugoslavism rather than ethnic separatism. Moreover, this was put into practice. In late 1930, after over a year of talks, the leadership of the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU) and the Slovene National Benefit Society (SNPJ) agreed to form an umbrella organization for their fraternal societies. These talks later expanded to include the Serb National Federation and several smaller fraternal societies, fourteen in total. The name of this organization was the *Jugoslovenska Bratska Federacija*, or Yugoslav Fraternal Federation (JBF). True to its name, the JBF was organized on the federal principal—each fraternal society retained its autonomy but resolved to work together. Each fraternal society would collaborate on charitable initiatives (like supporting orphans), lobbying for better conditions for workers, recruitment, and conducting cultural propaganda. In this, we can see the common interests of the South-Slavic working class. However, at its root the JBF remained a Slovene-Croat condominium, with the numerically-inferior Serbs as junior partners. Slovenes and Croats dominated the leadership and set the agenda. Whether the JBF would eventually unify into a single self-help society was left unresolved in these early meetings. In part, this was because the CFU’s president was wary of complete unification, even as he saw the benefits of cooperation with other self-help societies. Still, the formation of the JBF was an enormously significant step, showing that Serb, Croat, and Slovene diaspora politics were becoming increasingly integrated on Yugoslav lines.

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422 “Ujedinjenje potpornih saveza u Sjed. Am. Državama u ‘Jugoslovenskom Bratskom Federaciju,’” Report to MIP political division from Djuro Kolumbatović, November 12, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
423 “Ujedinjenje potpornih saveza u Sjed. Am. Državama u ‘Jugoslovenskom Bratskom Federaciju,’” Report to MIP political division from Djuro Kolumbatović, November 12, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 2, BO 4, AJ.
The formation of the JBF was a result of the same centripetal forces that had caused the confederation of Croatian self-help societies into the CFU in 1926 or the various Serb societies to unite into the SNS in 1929. Explaining the CFU’s reasons to pursue confederation with the SNPJ at their second convention in June 1929, the CFU declared that “there exist in the Unites States numerous Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene self-help organizations that have the same goals and interests.” Concretely, “emigration laws…have become stricter, preventing the emigration of our people from the old country….which would have given an inflow of new members for our organizations.”

Their membership was getting older and financial pressure from the Great Depression was getting worse. This mergers between fraternal organizations, in short, was driven by working class interests. Yet a genuine belief in Yugoslav unity also unquestionably also a factor. In one section, the CFU asserted that that “our three-named people is already mixed together to a great degree in these organizations.” The SNPJ, for instance, had around 5000 Serbs and Croats in its ranks. The Croatian Fraternal Union likewise had a minority of Serbs within it. In other words these “ethnic” fraternal societies were already somewhat Yugoslav in practice, if not in name. Note also the use of “our three-named people,” an explicit recognition of Yugoslav unity! The timing of this resolution was also suggestive. Proclaimed a mere six months after Alexander declared his dictatorship (and before anyone knew how repressive it would be), this drive toward Yugoslav unification of the fraternal societies may have been motivated by a mixture of Yugoslav idealism and pragmatism.

425 “Rezolucija o Ujedinjenju,” Svijet, July 10, 1929. Fond 967, k. 32, HDA.
427 “Rezolucija o Ujedinjenju,” Svijet, July 10, 1929. Fond 967, k. 32, HDA.
428 “Komentarji,” Prosveta, December 12, 1934. Fond 967, k. 33, HDA.
Although the JBF’s inclusion of the three largest South-Slav fraternal organizations made it a hegemon, there were two major fraternal organizations that remained aloof. The first organization to avoid federation was the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union (KSKJ), which debated joining but ultimately decided not to join the federation.\(^{429}\) The other major fraternal union, the Croatian Catholic Union, was much more vocal in its opposition, calling in 1929 for “war to the knife” against the emergent JBF.\(^{430}\) This opposition seemed to have stemmed, in part, for their distaste for the “forty thousand unbelievers” in the SNPJ.\(^{431}\) Opposition to the JBF seemed to come chiefly from Catholic organizations, which treated left-wing rhetoric like the scent of brimstone. Moreover, devout Catholics, if they were paying attention to events in the “old country,” had good reason to be suspicious of Yugoslavism. King Alexander of Yugoslavia, due to his desire suborn all institutions in Yugoslavia to the crown, worked to undermine the influence and independence of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. The Catholic church was starved of state subsidies while the Orthodox church proselytized in traditionally Catholic lands. Catholic clergy were prevented from teaching in schools. And in the press, the Catholic church was attached as being pro-fascist.\(^{432}\) Regardless of the reasons for Catholic animosity to Yugoslavia, it was already becoming apparent that the main divide among emigrants was not between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but between the left and right.

In addition, Yugoslav diplomats were not entirely sympathetic to the JBF’s model of federal Yugoslav cooperation. In December 1931 they founded a new fraternal organization


\(^{430}\) “Poziv na boj ‘na noževe,’” Prosveta, July 3, 1929. Fond 967, k. 33.

\(^{431}\) Ibid.

calling itself the Yugoslav Central Organization, or JCO. Conceived as an alternative to the still-ethnically-split fraternal unions, the Yugoslav Central Organization was supposed to bring Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes together in a single organization dedicated to promoting and preserving “Yugoslav” culture overseas. Though the JCO had a Yugoslav-American figurehead, Kolumbatović was clearly the man behind the curtain, personally organizing new lodges, recruiting speakers, inviting people to meetings, and arranging for favorable press coverage, all the while reporting directly to the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs about the organization’s popularity (which never amounted to much). The JCO was also subsidized by the Yugoslav Ministry of Social Politics and National Health, which routed its donations through the General Consulate in Chicago. Superficially, the JCO was apolitical. But in practice, according to Kolumbatović, apoliticism meant fighting against “destructive elements,” which included both “the Communist-Croatian-Separatist movement” and Macedonian nationalists, who were becoming increasingly active in the American Midwest. The JCO did this primarily, as one would expect, by holding Unification Day parades and denouncing “separatists” in rallies and in their official newspaper, Jugosloven.
Aside from the JCO, the HKZ, and the KSKJ, the other main source of opposition to the Yugoslav Fraternal Federation came from Yugo-skeptics within the Croatian Fraternal Union. As one political observer at the time noted in 1931, the JCO seemed to be evolving into the Yugoslav Fraternal Union, as the central committee of the JBF, still dominated by the SNPJ, gradually usurped more and more authority from its constituent organizations. Moreover, the question of full unification was increasingly raised at meetings. Ultimately, everything depended on which way the CFU would tip—for unification, or against? In 1932, the conservative wing of the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Narodna Zajednica, or National Bloc, elected the most delegates to the CFU’s annual convention, defeating the Levičari (communists) and Prosvetaši (center-leftists) factions opposing them. The presidency of the CFU passed from Anton Gazdić, who was sympathetic to Yugoslavism, to Ivan Butković, a Yugo-skeptic. A rumor that Gazdić had accepted the Order of St. Sava from the Yugoslav ambassador had discredited his presidency, allowing the National Bloc to take over. Apparently, any association with Yugoslav officials was politically toxic, something that should not be surprising by now.

In 1933, the JBF’s Slovene president, Vincent Cainkar, declared at the annual meeting of the Central Committee that the “critical economic circumstances have made it such that we must begin to seriously consider the unification of our organizations.” The proposal was received

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440 “Jugoslovenska Bratska Federacija,” Svijet, July 30, 1931, Fond 967, k. 32, HDA; “Ujedinjenje srpskih saveza, slovenskih jednota, i hrvat. zajednica,” Svijet, July 17, 1931, Fond 967, k. 32, HDA.
relatively favorably by the central committee, even by the Croatian delegates. The National Bloc’s resurgence was mainly confined to the presidency; the delegation to the JBF seems to have been less affected. Unification seemed inevitable. But at next year’s meeting, in 1934, the CFU’s new president Butković showed up in person, declaring that the CFU was “neither Slovene nor Yugoslav, but rather solely Croatian” and signaled his desire to withdraw from the JBF by stating “let us Croats go free.” Records about the JBF, or mention of it in the press, stopped after 1934. It seems very likely that the withdrawal of the Croatia Fraternal Union, the largest and richest constituent organization of the JBF, caused the JBF to collapse. This was an enormous setback for the Yugoslav movement in the United States—fraternal unions were the main guardian of national identity in the ‘tenth banovina’—their very existence as organizations depended on maintaining their titular culture among emigrants and their children. A unified organization might have smoothed over cultural differences between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Moreover, the JBF could have plausibly spoken on behalf of a “Yugoslav diaspora;” if the CFU, SNPJ, and SNS had merged, they would have had, at roughly 176,000 members, two-thirds of the population of the ‘tenth banovina’ in the United States that was in a fraternal society. Still, all hope was not lost for the Yugoslav movement in the United States. That the JBF lasted until at least 1934 illustrated that the clumsy attempts of Yugoslav diplomats to import political terror to the tenth banovina had not delegitimized the Yugoslav idea. Moreover, the JBF had demonstrated that the main divide in the emigration was not between Serb, Croat, and Slovene, but the pro-Yugoslav center-left and the anti-Yugoslav right. Thus, the foundation for a future “Yugoslav diaspora” among emigrants still existed.

445 “Komentarji,” Prosveta, December 12, 1934. Fond 967, k. 33, HDA.
446 Mladineo, Jugoslovenski Almanak, 5.
The Rise of Transatlantic Tourism

Additionally, it was during the dictatorship that another form of engagement with the homeland, tourism, rose dramatically. Encouraging group tourist excursions (izleti, in Serbo-Croatian and Slovene) to Yugoslavia had been part of the Emigration Commissariat’s original 1925 plan to combat denationalization. These excursions, they believed, would build sentimental ties between the emigration and the fatherland.\textsuperscript{447} But nothing was done to implement this vision until 1929. In May 1929, Ivan Mladineo, an emigrant collaborator with the diplomatic service, approached representatives of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with a detailed written proposal to organize regular trips to Yugoslavia for the children of the Yugoslav sokols. According to Mladineo, the intent of these trips was explicitly nationalistic, intended to cultivate sympathy for Yugoslavia in the second generation of “Yugoslavs,” who were in danger of being Americanized. In keeping with the Yugoslav theme, excursioners would visit the major Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene cities—Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, and Cetinje—although much of the itinerary focused on littoral Croatia—no doubt to take advantage of Yugoslavia’s Adriatic beaches and picturesque renaissance architecture in cities like Dubrovnik or Split.\textsuperscript{448}

Ironically, Mladineo was inspired to organize this trip not by the emigration commissariat’s 1925 plan, but by American Swedes, who were doing something similar. Every year, Mladineo noted, between fifty and one-hundred Swedish schoolchildren went on an excursion to Sweden. This was nearly totally subsidized by the Swedish government (the excursioners only had to pay for their transatlantic steamship ticket).\textsuperscript{449} Just like the Irish Republican League in the United States inspired the Croatian Republican League, techniques of

\textsuperscript{448} Letter from Ivan Mladineo to GK KJ in NYC, May 21, 1929. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO. 10.
\textsuperscript{449} Ibid.
nationalist mobilization spread memetically from one diaspora to another, making the United States uniquely fertile ground for creating a Yugoslav diaspora. Moreover, that Mladineo learned this technique from Swedish-Americans was symptomatic not of Yugoslav overseas nation-building, but the growth of a transatlantic tourism industry that catered to Americans of European origin. After the 1924 emigration law, which dramatically reduced the number of emigrants allowed into the United States, steamship companies like Cunard could no longer turn a profit by hauling large numbers of would-be immigrants to the United States. To fill these now-empty third-class births, steamship companies in the late 1920s began advertising to these former-immigrants and their children, encouraging them to revisit the ‘old country.’ Transatlantic tourism, which had previously been a preserve of the wealthy, had become accessible to the urban working class, allowing it to become a tool of nationalist activists.

After Mladineo’s first mass-excursion to Yugoslavia, izleti proliferated. The Slovene fraternal unions were the first, with the SNPJ organizing their first izlet in the summer of 1930. In 1931, the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union organized their own izlet. In 1932, Anton Grdina, a Slovene, organized the American Yugoslav Tourist club and another youth izlet. Yugoslav sokols in the United States visited again in 1934 and 1937. In 1937 the Serbian National Union and Croatian Fraternal Union both organized their own respective izleti. The

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451 “Veliki izlet SNPJ v letu 1930,” Prosveta, July 17, 1929. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
452 “Zavadjanje neupućenih ljudi,” Svijet, March 18, 1931. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
453 Letter from Milan Marjanović (President of SORIS) to Ban Drago Marušić, May 31, 1932. Fond 1071, kut. 565 HDA.
454 “Sokoli iz Amerike u Zagrebu,” Novosti, July 23, 1934. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
455 “Braća iz Amerika Razgledala Zagreb,” Jutarnji List, June 24, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
456 “Himna Domovini,” Novi Iseljenik, August 1, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA; “Izlet u Domovinu,” Jugoslavia, March 27, 1937, Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
size of a typical excursion could range from a few dozen to hundreds of people, tending to grow larger over time. One of the last, the SNS’s excursion, had 138 people.\footnote{457} The government of Yugoslavia capitalized on this trend. Emigrant tourist groups were welcomed with crowds, pomp, parades, and speeches from government officials, as a mass return of Yugoslavia’s prodigal sons and daughters. In choreographing these events, Yugoslav officials showed the great importance that they attached to emigrant tourism.\footnote{458} At the visit of the SNS to Yugoslavia, for instance, one young Serb woman reported being greeted at the train station with a marching band. Later, her group shook hands with Prime Minister Stojadinović in the Yugoslav cabinet building. They ate well too: beer, vermouth, whiskey, pastries, roast pigs and spinach pies at just one mealtime!\footnote{459} Based on other accounts, lavish receptions were standard for izlet-goers from America. Nor were these displays intended solely to impress emigrants, as these events were documented assiduously by the Yugoslav press.\footnote{460} They were proof, in the eyes of the Yugoslav government, that emigrants continued to feel affection for their old country.

Part of tourism’s power was its ability to combine pleasure and patriotism, allowing nationalism to reach a broader audience. Even those who were indifferent to the idea of Yugoslav unity could nonetheless be attracted by the warm beaches of Dalmatia, the forested peaks of the Dinaric alps, the picturesque old towns of Belgrade or Zagreb, or the prospect of

\footnote{457} “Utisci sa posete Jugoslavije,” \textit{Srbobran}, October 1, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 41, HAD.  
\footnote{459} Marica Vuković, “Reminiscences of my Trip to Yugoslavia,” \textit{Američki Srbobran}, October 19, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.  
reconnecting with one’s extended family who had stayed in the ‘old country.’ Moreover, traveling to the ‘old country’ had a preternatural ability to convert regular people into nationalists. Many of those who went on these excursion trips, upon their return to the United States, felt compelled to share their experiences in articles in emigrant newspapers. There emerged a whole genre of articles recounting the experience of awakening to one’s own nationality on an izlet. For instance, Kristina Kolar, a young Slovene from Minnesota, writing in the official organ of the KSKJ, recalled her awe at the seeing the Savica waterfall and the caves in the Slovenian highlands.\textsuperscript{461} Branko Pekić, an American Serb, likewise commented on Yugoslavia’s natural beauty multiple times in a lengthy account of his trip that was printed as a serial in \textit{Srbobran}.\textsuperscript{462} Marica Vuković was particularly explicit, beginning her article with the exhortation: “to every reader, we say, if it is possible, visit Yugoslavia and be proud of the land of your birth and ancestry.”\textsuperscript{463} Even if the total number of izlet-goers was probably less than a few thousand, the izlet reached a broad audience through newspapers.

It is important to note, however, that travel did not necessarily make Yugoslav nationalists: five years later, for instance, Branko Pekić would become editor of \textit{Srbobran}, turning it from a Yugoslav paper to a greater-Serbian newspaper.\textsuperscript{464} Pekić’s trip might have nudged him toward national chauvinism; before entering Yugoslavia, Pekić had been curious about the “Croatian question” and immediately questioned the locals in Belgrade, who all told him that Croatian nationalists were “fanatics” and malcontents. Thus primed, everything he saw

\textsuperscript{461} Kristina Kolar, “Kaj piše Minnesotčanka iz stare domovine,” \textit{Glasilo KSK Jednote}, August 20, 1935. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
\textsuperscript{462} “Utisci sa posete Jugoslavije,” (part 2), \textit{Srbobran}, October 23, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
\textsuperscript{463} Marica Vuković, “Reminiscences of my Trip to Yugoslavia,” \textit{Američki Srbobran}, October 19, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
in Croatia confirmed his suspicions that Croats were overreacting to Alexander’s personal rule. Alternatively, Pekić might have held latent anti-Croat beliefs even before his trip. Regardless, having been to Yugoslavia and seen the conditions there gave a Serbian nationalist greater credibility among emigrant audiences—travel was often a springboard toward greater prominence in emigrant media.

Branko’s case reveals that tourism had a significant downside—tourists’ interactions with locals could not be totally circumscribed. Ivan Mladineo, recalling his own travel experience in the Croatian newspaper *Narodni Glasnik*, noted that, despite his satisfaction with the warm welcome from Yugoslav officials and the personal freedom enjoyed by regular people, allegiances to the now-banned political parties of the twenties remained alive and Croats remained suspicious of the Belgrade government. Moreover, that regime, he observed, was somewhat ineffectual at combating partisanship and national disunity, with many problems being left to fester or tackled with inadequate preparation. Kristina Kolar, a Slovene who visited in 1935, also mentioned in her account her dissatisfaction with the poverty in which ordinary Slovenes lived. All the parades in the world could not conceal the misadministration of Alexander’s regime or the dissatisfaction of regular people with that government.

Moreover, there was always the risk that tourists would stir up trouble in Yugoslavia. One dramatic instance of this occurred in 1937, on the *izlet* of the Croatian Fraternal Union. Prior to the trip, Yugoslav diplomats twice interviewed the leader of the excursion, CFU president Ivan Butković. Butković said all the right things in these conversations, reassuring the charge d’affaires that he had “sympathy and respect for Serbs, many of whom are his personal friends

466 “Izjava sokolskog izletnog odbora,” *Narodni Glasnik*, August 14, 1930. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
[and] that he believed in the current need for national and ethnic unity [in Yugoslavia].” He also expressed the desire to visit Belgrade, although during his second visit to the consulate he dropped the Yugoslav capital from his planned itinerary, which included several cities in Croatia and Bosnia. That made the diplomat suspicious.\textsuperscript{468} It seems to have been important that tourists visit all parts of Yugoslavia, and, moreover, that tourist groups be screened to keep troublemakers out. After all, tourism was as much about promoting Yugoslavism in Yugoslavia by making it into a display of immigrant loyalty, and so ‘disloyal’ emigrants could not be permitted to visit.

Likewise, per custom, Yugoslav officials greeted the izlet with parades and pageantry, on which Yugoslav newspapers reported. \textit{Novi Iseljenik}, a government mouthpiece, reported how all Zagreb was covered in flags. Windows are ornamented with flowers in sacred expectation. They await our immigrant brothers from America. Shoulder to shoulder…they await the joyous moment when they can greet Croatian emigrants, who have returned to visit their fatherland. Everything seemed like it was a great national holiday.

At the train station, this tourist group was greeted by cheering crowds, a folk music ensemble, a singing society, and local dignitaries.\textsuperscript{469} The event was also covered by Zagreb newspapers \textit{Hrvatski Dnevnik}, \textit{Jutarnji List}, and \textit{Večer}, where it made the front page.\textsuperscript{470} The proceedings were even reported on by \textit{Politika} in Belgrade!\textsuperscript{471} Clearly, emigrant visits were important sources of symbolic capital to the Belgrade regime. Butković gave a brief speech at the train station in Zagreb, promising “the most energetic cooperation with all needs of the fatherland.”\textsuperscript{472} However,

\textsuperscript{468} “Hrvatski Izletnici u Domovinu,” Report from the charge d’affaires of the Washington Legation to MIP, Political Division, June 30, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
\textsuperscript{469} “Triumfalni doček hrvatskih iseljenika u Zagrebu,” \textit{Novi Iseljenik}, August 1, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
\textsuperscript{471} “Hrvatski izeljenici iz Amerike u Zagrebu,” \textit{Politika}, July 9, 1937, Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
\textsuperscript{472} “Triumfalni doček hrvatskih iseljenika u Zagrebu,” \textit{Novi Iseljenik}, August 1, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 41, HDA.
these puff-pieces concealed an embarrassing episode. During a reception hosted by a local cultural organization, Butković delivered an incendiary speech denouncing Regent Paul, who had succeeded Alexander. According to Yugoslav authorities, those present, Yugoslavs and Americans alike, then began to chant “Down with Yugoslavia” and “Down with bloody Belgrade!” For “abusing Yugoslavia’s hospitality,” Butković was deported back to America, where he used the incident to portray himself as a victim of Yugoslav police brutality. While the visit of the CFU to Yugoslavia might have helped Yugoslavia reassure its citizens that emigrants had not forgotten about their fatherland, it provided yet another demonstration for emigrants of King Alexander’s hatred of free speech.

The Native’s Return

No instance better illustrated the potential and risks of tourism than the case of Louis Adamic, who went to Yugoslavia in 1932 after winning a Guggenheim fellowship for creative writing in Europe. This trip eventually resulted in a book, The Native’s Return, the most important book to come out of the Yugoslav émigré community for the interwar period. Not only was it the only bestseller, it also marked Adamic’s debut into Yugoslav diaspora politics—travel, after all, gave emigrants the authority to speak about the old country to their brethren.

Of course, Louis Adamic’s journey to Yugoslavia was unlike that of the large tourist groups in three important ways. First, he stayed in Yugoslavia significantly longer—an entire year, rather than a few weeks. Secondly, while izleti were choreographed, Adamic’s itinerary was improvised. This unpredictability hindered official efforts to keep Adamic from meeting anybody or seeing anything embarrassing. The length of Adamic’s stay compounded

474 “Ivan Butković,” Report from the charge d’affaires of the Washington Legation to MIP, Political Division, September 3, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
this risk. Lastly, Adamic was a classic muckraker. Adamic’s time in the states had afforded him the opportunity to read Upton Sinclair, who may have inspired Adamic to write his own exposé/history of labor conditions and racketeering in his first book, *Dynamite* (1931).\(^{475}\)

Adamic’s second book, *Laughing in the Jungle* (1932), uses Adamic’s own life to examine the conditions of emigrants in America. *Laughing in the Jungle* was also a tribute to Sinclair’s *The Jungle*, which Adamic had read to teach himself English at age sixteen.\(^{476}\) Modeling himself after Sinclair, Adamic would not stay on the beaten tourist track.

Thus, it is not surprising that Adamic met with large sections of the Yugoslav underground on his journey. In Montenegro, Adamic met with both progressives and radical youth, some of whom were communists, from whom he received grisly accounts of how government torturers would “put live coals under their armpits…stuck needles under their finger- and toe-nails…[drive] awls into their heels,” and so forth. Some even corroborated their stories by showing Adamic their scars.\(^{477}\) In Split, Adamic heard complaints about the lack of political freedom under the dictatorship.\(^ {478}\) In Sarajevo, Adamic met with young writers, who griped about censorship and the ban on importing books, one young worker, who supplied him with statistics about the awful wages and conditions for factory workers and lumberjacks, and still more dissidents who told him more about conditions in Alexander’s prisons.\(^ {479}\) In Macedonia, Adamic found and spoke with colonies of political prisoners, communists and some members of the Croatian Peasant Party, who had been exiled to malarial villages as punishment.\(^ {480}\) In Belgrade, Adamic had coffee with a university professor who diverted him with anecdotes of

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\(^{478}\) Ibid, 172.

\(^{479}\) Ibid, 196.

\(^{480}\) Ibid, 222.
corruption, nepotism, graft, and even assassinations within the Yugoslavia’s political and economic elite.\(^{481}\) In Zagreb, Adamic met with a procession of students, professors, writers, union-leaders, and party organizers, all of whom were dissatisfied with the government. Adamic was told that the wages of industrial workers in Yugoslavia were pitifully low, that the industrial proletariat was on the verge of insurrection, that various western European capitalists were pillaging Yugoslavia of its natural resources, that landlords were colluding with the government to charge exorbitant rent and pay no taxes. One radical even took him to a communist safehouse, where Adamic was shown still more burned-out armpits.\(^{482}\) This is just more proof that allowing tourism is risky for authoritarian governments.

Adamic’s rapidly-dimming view of Alexander’s regime worsened when he noticed detectives shadowing him and monitoring his speaking engagements.\(^{483}\) And he was appalled when gendarmes crushed a demonstration on Ban Jelačić square, which his hotel in Zagreb overlooked. Adamic called it “the speediest, most efficient piece of terroristic brutality I have ever witnessed.”\(^{484}\) Adamic summed up the cumulative effect of these experiences thus:

> When I arrived in Yugoslavia, the country had been for over three years under the ruthless military dictatorship of King Alexander, which I knew but vaguely before I came here. *I did not know what that really meant. I was not interested* [emphasis mine]. I did not fully realize till months later that dictatorship meant that thousands of people were in prisons...;that every city swarmed with secret agents; that newspaper, magazine, and book editors and publishers were under strict censorship; that public meetings...were forbidden; and so on.\(^{485}\)

Reading about “bloody Belgrade” in *Zajedničar* or *Svijet* was one thing, seeing it firsthand was another—this was the great risk that tourism posed for Yugoslavia, and by extension, every ‘old

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\(^{481}\) Ibid, 251-9.
\(^{482}\) Ibid, 280-284.
\(^{483}\) Ibid, 284-5.
\(^{484}\) Ibid, 287-8.
\(^{485}\) Ibid, 32.
country’ with an oppressive government. But on the other hand, travel also renewed national sentiment and prompted Adamic to think about how Yugoslavia’s government could be reformed.

Ironically, that government treated him quite well, extending to Adamic the same treatment that they afforded to the izlet-goers. Stepping off the boat in Trieste, Adamic was greeted personally by a representative of the ban (provincial governor). In Split, government officials gave him the use of state-owned cars, and orchestrated a meeting between him and the ban. Adamic received the same service in Sarajevo and Zagreb. True to their habit of using the achievements of emigrants as propaganda, Yugoslavia’s government announced his arrival to all the major Yugoslav newspapers. Articles written about Adamic exaggerated Adamic’s fame and prominence in the United States, making him into a “great writer,” living proof of Yugoslav greatness. Although Adamic’s first two books had been well received by critics, in the United States he had been a relatively obscure figure. But in Yugoslavia Adamic became an instant celebrity, a peer to Yugoslavia’s intellectual and cultural elite. While in Yugoslavia, Adamic would meet with Yugoslavia’s preeminent sculptor, Ivan Meštrović, and one of their leading writers, Miroslav Krleža. Adamic was particularly impressed by Meštrović, whom he called “a mystic, an adventuruer, a Christ, a devil, a lover, a child, a seer, an ascetic, a Rabelaisian, a cheap politician and opportunist…but—basically, essentially—always an artist, a genius.”

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486 Ibid, 10-11.
489 Ibid, 11-12.
490 Ibid, 296-307
491 Ibid, 294.
492 Ibid, 302.
Adamic was less impressed by the Yugoslav political and economic elite (often overlapping categories), who chauffeured him around, showing him new parks, bridges, and housing developments while urging Adamic to write glowing reviews of Yugoslavia and attract foreign investment. Later, the government press-bureau offered Adamic a bribe of several thousand dollars if he would write favorably about Yugoslavia. Adamic declined. A Slovene politician allied to the government took Adamic out to lunch at one of the nicest restaurants in Belgrade, promising Adamic a “bright future” if he would “cooperate” with the Belgrade government. Adamic demurred. Adamic was offered the Order of the White Eagle. Adamic refused that too. The Yugoslav authorities, concerned by Adamic’s intractability, made a last-ditch bet that Alexander’s royal charisma would win Adamic over. It did not. Their anti-climactic meeting (which lasted no more than thirty minutes) was characterized by small talk, awkward silences, and passive-aggression: Adamic declined to call King Alexander “your majesty,” Alexander declined to offer Adamic an autograph (as was customary). Adamic had already made up his mind months before. If anything, attempts to dazzle Adamic with wealth and authority backfired, offending Adamic’s inchoate socialistic-republican sympathies.

Though his time in Belgrade kindled a lasting hatred for Alexander’s dictatorship in Adamic, his time in Yugoslavia also rejuvenated Adamic’s interest in his Slovene and Yugoslav heritage. Indeed, the narrative arc of The Native’s Return strongly resembles those of the izlet travelogues. Contrast Adamic’s declaration of his national sympathies at the beginning and the end of his A Native’s Return Before traveling to Yugoslavia, Adamic was interested in “events

494 Ibid, 254.  
495 Ibid.  
496 Ibid, 255.  
and things outside of America…only in so far as they…affected the United States. I spoke, wrote, and read only in English…I had practically no close contact with immigrants of my native nationality…I had become an American writer, writing on American subjects for American readers."499 Yet by the end of his journey, Adamic was declaring: “I love Carniola, all Yugoslavia. I am glad I was born there; that by origin I am a Slovene, a Yugoslav."500 Moreover, Adamic declared that henceforth he would be an evangelist for the Yugoslav idea in the United States: “It’s grand to be a Yugoslav-American and to come back after a visit to the old country…I guess my job in the next few years, perhaps for the rest of my life, will be…to interpret my old country to America. I love Yugoslavia and I think Americans should be interested in it.”501 He would be true to his word.

What about travel had such a strong effect on Adamic? In part, travel renewed his personal and familial ties to Yugoslavia. Over the nearly twenty years he had spent in the United States, Adamic had grown distant from his family. In his own words: “before I returned home, they had not meant much to me; now, I feel great affection for them…it was fine to get reacquainted with Uncle Mikha, to see Uncle Yanez before he died, to play a part in the marriage of Tone and Yulka.”502 His family gave Adamic a personal investment in his new ‘old country.’ Part of the power of travel is that it creates and renews personal ties between the tourist and the friends and family they meet abroad, allowing the tourist to imagine themselves as part of a diasporic national community, which, in this case, was Yugoslav, rather than, say, Serb, Croat, or Slovene.

499 Ibid, 3-4.  
500 Ibid, 360.  
502 Ibid, 360.
More interestingly, Adamic’s appreciation for Yugoslavia’s people and scenery was mediated through his own experiences as an American; being an American helped him understand Yugoslavia—both its faults and its positive qualities. Belgrade, the capital, he compares to “a ‘boom’ town—and this in the most thorough sense of that 100-per-cent American phrase” much like “Chicago was thirty years ago.”503 The Belgrade economic elite “reminded [him] very much of American boosters.”504 The political elite Adamic compares to American racketeers, and their leader, King Alexander, Adamic compares to Al Capone.505 Stjepan Radić Adamic compares to William Jennings Bryan.506 And so forth—these are not even half of Adamic’s analogies between America and Yugoslavia.

Adamic made implicit comparisons as well. One of Adamic’s arguments in The Native’s Return is that Yugoslavia’s economy and people are becoming like those of the United States, and a major theme in this book was the disjuncture between the old and the new Yugoslavia. For instance, Adamic contrasts Dubrovnik’s the old merchant elite and their “palaces…[whose] corridors and rooms virtually smell of tragedy and death” with “the peasants who daily come to town from near-by villages, and the porters, laborers, would-be laborers, bums and vagabonds” who make the old city seem “very much alive with people utterly unlike the declining gospari,” the Dubrovnik elite.507 In Split, Adamic juxtaposed the Roman ruins around which the city was built with the “booming harbor and growing business enterprises,” a contrast that struck him as “vastly ironical, downright funny.”508 In Montenegro, Adamic harshly critiqued the “professional heroes” in traditional folk costume, whom he asserts “should be pickled clad in

504 Ibid, 251.
505 Ibid, 256.
506 Ibid, 276.
507 Ibid, 156.
their costumes and posed in characteristic attitudes and put in a museum,” with the younger generation, whom he calls “the most determined section of the progressive and radical-revolutionary element in the Balkans.”509 In general, Adamic was “deeply impressed by the tremendous vitality, physical and spiritual, of the plain people of Yugoslavia,” a vitality that, through immigration, “is frozen in America’s present-day greatness; in the tall buildings of New York…in the bridges and railroads throughout America; in nearly everything that is important in her material equipment. A thin, imperceptible threat of our Slavic energy runs in every track of America’s railway system.”510 Adamic’s American nationalism, became, through travel, his Yugoslav nationalism, which was not about folk costumes and national songs, but technology and “modernity."

Adamic’s travelogue of his time in Yugoslavia, *The Native’s Return*, published in 1934, became Adamic’s first bestseller.511 The *New York Times* called it “one of those rare unclassifiable ‘originals’ that turn up once in every blue moon. We cannot think of a person living who won’t like at least portions of *The Native’s Return*. ”512 Written in accessible English and filled with analogies with American history and culture, *The Native’s Return* made Yugoslavia accessible to an American audience. And some parts, like Adamic’s lush description of a Slovene wedding, are equal parts poignant and comical. Moreover, its core premise, of an American rediscovering his European roots, fed into the general growth of old-country tourism in the United States.

For Yugoslav-Americans, *The Native’s Return* managed to tap into the prevailing pro-Yugoslav but anti-regime mood among emigrants, who had already suffered for years under

509 Ibid, 144-5.
Belgrade’s (ineffectual) attempt to import censorship and police terror to the tenth banovina. *The Native’s Return* was hyped heavily—even before it went on sale, excerpts from Adamic’s book were printed in an ideologically diverse group of “anti-regime” emigrant newspapers. On the lecture circuit for his new book, Adamic was welcomed again by every “anti-state and anti-regime element” in the diaspora, according to consul Kolumbatović, from communists to clericals, republicans to revolutionaries. Adamic even persuaded a group of Macedonian nationalists based in Chicago, *Nezavisima Makedonija*, to host a rally which was attended by “every destructive element” in the area, meaning, very likely, HSS sympathizers and Croat and Slovene leftists. Since Adamic was a newcomer to émigré politics, he had few enemies and was therefore a potentially unifying figure. Moreover, having been to Yugoslavia made him popular on the lecture circuit—people were curious about the way things really were. In this way, travel enhances the authority of national activists. Lastly, *The Native’s Return* argued that it was possible to be both a patriotic American and a proud Yugoslav; one did not have to choose between them. This must have appealed to south Slavs, who were not always treated as racial equals to Anglo-Americans.

The Yugoslav government, however, was not charmed by *The Native’s Return*. In fact, despite making a case for Yugoslavism, Adamic’s book was banned by special decree in Yugoslavia almost immediately after it was published. Possession of a copy was punishable with a two-year jail sentence. Newspapers in Yugoslavia were not even permitted to mention the

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513 “Hrvatski Separatiste; Sukob Kola sa HRSS; Memorandum; Ujedinjeni Front; akcija Adamica,” Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP Political Division, December 26, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
514 “Raspustanje Hrvatskog Veca; Sukob izmedju HRSS i hrvatskog Kola; Adamiceva Knjiga ‘Povratak Jednog Iseljenika,’’ Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP Political Division, February 31, 1934. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
515 “Zabrana Adamićeve knjige,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Yugoslav Legation in Washington, March 2, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
book’s existence.\footnote{516 “Adamic’s Book Forbidden in Jugoslavia by Decree of Alexander’s Government,” Zajedničar, April 11, 1934. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 16.} However, in the United States, this merely gave The Native’s Return the allure of the forbidden; as Zajedničar put it, the ban “proves in most simple words just how far the autocratic government of Jugoslavia must go to suppress the freedom of mind…to maintain its ‘right’ to rule over an unfortunate people. For Adamic’s book, this is the best advertisement ever written and it is given without cost.”\footnote{517 Ibid.} Here is yet more proof that attempts to censor the ‘tenth banovina’ were counterproductive.

Yet the reaction to Adamic’s book within the diplomatic service was ambivalent. Consul Cerrezin, reporting on a speech Adamic gave in Cleveland, asserted that Adamic “spoke very nicely pertaining to the country” excluding one mildly critical comment about the Belgrade government. Adamic’s talk, Cerrezin argued “had done more good than harm to the Yugoslav government.”\footnote{518 Consul Cerrezin to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, April 13, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.} Just after Adamic’s book was published, Consul Unković attended one of Adamic’s speeches in Pittsburgh. Reporting to his superiors in the Washington legation, Unković underlined that Adamic spoke very highly of Yugoslavia and its people, asserting that “it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Adamic is rendering great services to our Nation as a whole and to our emigrants specifically.”\footnote{519 Letter from Kosto Unković to the Yugoslav legation in Washington, March 28, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.} Of course, Unković, like Cerrezin, was a migrant himself. Having emigrated from Korčula to Pittsburgh in 1906, Unković had resided in the United States for almost two decades, working for several emigrant newspapers before he became Yugoslav vice-consul in Pittsburgh in 1930.\footnote{520 “Iz Naših Kolonija,” Pučka Prosveta 7 (1930), p. 164. Fond 967, kut. 39, HDA.} It seems that Yugoslav diplomats who had spent decades in
the American milieu were more likely to see critiques of Yugoslavia as harmless, perhaps because of their experience of American press freedom.

Yet for Kolumbatović, who outranked Cerrezin and Unković, Adamic’s promotion of the Yugoslav cause did not outweigh his criticism of Alexander’s government. Through various proxies, he launched a press war against Adamic, hoping that this would “weaken the impression that some of our unguarded countrymen might get upon reading Adamic’s book.” The American Srbobran, which had a close working relationship with the Yugoslav consulate and may have received state subsidies, wrote to the Foreign Language Information Service, which employed Adamic as a naturalization expert, asking them to quash Adamic’s discussions of political conditions in Yugoslavia on the grounds that those discussions might incite ethnic hatred. In January 1935, Kolumbatović tried to persuade the Council of Foreign Relations to drop Adamic as a speaker and substitute someone more sympathetic to the Yugoslav government. Mihajlo Pupin, an ally of the consulate, denounced Adamic on October 20, 1934 in a letter to the editor of the New York Times, saying that Adamic “looks upon the rule of King Alexander with the spectacles of a man who at one time prided himself to be a hobo. He finally degenerated into a Bolshevik.” Nikola Tesla did the same four days later, asserting that The

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521 “Hrvatski Separatiste; Sukol Kola sa HRSS; Memorandum; Ujedinjeni Front; akcija Adamica,” Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP Political Division, December 26, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ
522 According to Vaso Trivanović, who worked for CBS and had contacts in the State Department, it was an open secret that Srbobran had “always” been subsidized by Belgrade and its editors usually printed whatever they were told by Ambassador Fotić, who became ambassador in 1935. See: Letter from Vaso Trivanović to Srđan Budisavljević, April 4, 1942, Fond 83, fasc. 5, BO 42, AJ. Although I have found no direct evidence of this relationship, the case of Hrvatska shows that planting articles in sympathetic diaspora papers was standard practice for Yugoslav diplomats, as was giving papers subsidies to ensure friendly coverage. There is also a substantial amount of correspondence between the leaders of the SNS, which owned Srbobran, and Ambassador Fotić, in Box 41, Folder 7 of the Konstantin Fotić Papers at the Hoover Institution Archive.
524 Predavanje L. Adamica u Čikagu,” Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political division, January 29, 1935. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
Native’s Return “indulges in political defamation, denunciation of the ruler of the country and promulgation of ideas as unwelcome here as in Yugoslavia” and that Adamic’s “denunciations of the King and reflections on his character can be contemptuously passed.”526 While there is no direct proof that Kolumbatović put Tesla and Pupin up to it, the close interval between the editorials bespeaks some sort of coordination, particularly since Tesla and Pupin were not on speaking terms.527 Moreover, Mihajlo Pupin had delivered pro-Government lectures on behalf of the consulate on other occasions.528 But being written about, even critically, by Mihajlo Pupin or Nikola Tesla merely proved that The Native’s Return had transformed Louis Adamic from an obscure writer to a central personality within the growing Yugoslav movement within the United States.

Conclusion

Although The Native’s Return and the success it enjoyed demonstrated that the Yugoslav idea still enjoyed popular legitimacy, it also showed that emigrants were no longer willing to defer to the Yugoslav state’s authoritarian interpretation of Yugoslavism. Some emigrants, like Adamic, turned to leftism and federalism as guiding principles for a hypothetical Yugoslav state.

This, in turn, answers Gabriel Sheffer’s theoretical question about the sorts of tensions that arise between the ‘old country’ and the diaspora.529 Moreover, the Yugoslav case tells us one potential consequence of such a strained relationship. The Yugoslav emigration was becoming increasingly independent, even as the web of connections between individuals and organizations that is essential to the functioning of a “diaspora” grew denser. We see this, for instance, in the

528 “Predavanje L. Adamica u Čikagu,” Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political division, January 29, 1935. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
529 Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 250-256.
failed attempt to create a Yugoslav Fraternal Union, which nonetheless reinforced the habits of collaboration between Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions. This incipient diasporic network in the United States was anchored by the dual principles of leftism and anti-authoritarianism, a product both of Yugoslavia’s attempts to export repressive governance, but also anti-authoritarian discourse within the United States. Yugoslavism in the United States seemed poised to become a mass working-class movement, decades before something similar occurred in Yugoslavia.

Moreover, travel and travelers played an outsized role within the South Slavic milieu. Not only was travel fatal to indifference about the ‘old country,’ reversing “Americanization” if you will, being seen to possess “the truth” about Yugoslavia elevated previously liminal figures into central nodes within this network. Yet this significance of travel also made the ‘tenth banovina’ fertile soil for disaffected Yugoslav politicians and the communist and fascist underground, now seeking to make their case overseas. The contestation between these parties forms the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR: YUGOSLAV POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ‘TENTH BANOVINA’

In 1938, Yugoslav police in Vojnić, a village in central Croatia, detained and interrogated a man named Mate Valentić. Born in Selnica, another village in Croatia, Valentić had gone to Paris in 1926 in search of work. Upon his return, he was questioned: had he participated in any strikes? Were the strikes organized by communists? With whom did he associate abroad? Did he join any political organizations or labor unions? Did he attend any speeches by Vlatko Radić (of the Croatian Peasant Party) or Svetozar Pribićević (of the Independent Democrats)? How did he react to the (Ustaša-organized) assassination of King Alexander in Marseille in 1934? Eventually, Valentić’s case reached the provincial governor of the Savska Banovina, who prepared a dossier on this emigrant worker. Ultimately Valentić was released but put under “strict surveillance.”

Although Valentić answered each question in the negative, his interrogation, and the many like it in Yugoslav archives, reflect official anxiety over the overseas activities of four Yugoslav political parties: the Croatian Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and the Ustaša. Although banned in Yugoslavia, over the 1930s all four parties carved a new niche for themselves in emigrant communities, with varying degrees of success. Although emigrants could not vote in Yugoslav elections, their donations could keep these opposition parties alive. More importantly, Yugoslav emigrants could be a source of symbolic capital. As underlined in previous chapters, the “emigration question” and the ideal of a “loyal diaspora” was a pillar of official Yugoslavia’s legitimacy—in contesting the diaspora,

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530 “Valentić, Mate, iz Selnice, povratnik iz Franzuske, Podaci,” Sresko Načelnstvo Vojnić, July 28, 1938. Fond 1356, kut. 4, HDA; “Valentić, Mate, iz Selnice, povratnik iz Franzuske, Podaci,” Banska Uprava Savska Banovina, July 31, 1938, Fond 1356, kut. 4, HDA
these four parties both reinforced the importance of Yugoslavia’s emigrants, but also shifted the trajectory of émigré politics.

Even though one of these parties, the Ustaša, was anti-Yugoslav, all four parties competed within the same political arena and were aware of the others. The rivalries and alliances between these parties led to ever more sophisticated strategies to connect emigrant communities on multiple continents. Despite this fact, studies of these political parties have tended to examine them in isolation, rather than comparatively. Only Ivo Banac examines these parties as players within the broader framework of Yugoslav politics, although his monograph does not cover the activities of these parties in exile. As such, this chapter is a necessary supplement to Yugoslav historiography, both in its subject matter, but also in its comparative approach.

This comparative approach is also important because all four parties connected emigrant communities on multiple continents and linked discontent with Belgrade with the struggle between fascists and anti-fascists. National identity is frequently built in reference to an “other,” and combating the Ustaša abroad gave the Croatian Peasant Party, Democratic Party, and the Communists a common cause in émigré politics, letting their ideological affinities manifest on an organizational level. In so doing, these four parties inadvertently laid the foundation for the emergence of a “Yugoslav diaspora,” a transnational network of Serb, Croat, and Slovene emigrant organizations mobilized in support of their homeland.

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This chapter examines each political party in turn, beginning with Croatian Peasant Party and concluding with the Ustaša, comparing how these parties recruited and mobilized emigrants, engaged with civil society organizations, and maintained the cohesion of their respective organizations. These parties faced common challenges, and the solutions they devised show the degree to which they learned from one another, despite their differing attitudes toward the Yugoslav idea. By analyzing these parties, it becomes possible to understand not only how nationalist parties appealed to economic migrants, but also the effects of different national contexts on diaspora nationalism. Most importantly, comparing the Croatian Peasant Party, DS, and Communists to the Ustaša can explain why the Ustaša was unable to gain a foothold in Croatian communities in the United States, preventing the ethnic polarization that could have undermined later efforts by Serb, Croat, and Slovene emigrant groups to work together.

What About the Macedonians?

There is, however, a noticeable omission from this chapter: the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) and its leader, Vančo Mihailov. During the interwar period, VMRO, like the Ustaša, became a transnational political party, even coordinating with Ante Pavelić the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934. Moreover, one finds sporadic mentions of Macedonian emigre nationalist groups in the archives of Yugoslav diplomats monitoring “subversive” immigrant associations. Nonetheless, VMRO is excluded from this chapter because of the paucity of both primary and secondary sources dealing with its organization during the interwar period. For the Yugoslav authorities surveilling emigrants, VMRO did not draw the same level of attention as the four abovementioned parties.

533 An organization called Nezavisima Makedonia is mentioned in: “Raspustanje Hrvatskog Veka; Sukob izmedju HRSS i hrvatskog Kola; Adamiceva Knjiga ‘Povratak Jednog Iseljenika,’” Report from Dijuro Kolumbatović to MIP Political Division, February 31, 1934. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ; The MPO is also mentioned here: “Sixteenth Congress of the Macedonian Political Organization,” September 1937. Fond 449, fasc. 13, AJ.
We see this tendency, for instance, in the interrogation of Valentić, who was not asked about VMRO. More broadly, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was never able to plant a mole in VMRO’s subsidiary in the United States, the Macedonian Political Organization (MPO), something they were able to do for both the HSS and the Domobran. As a result, the Yugoslav diplomatic archives yield little insight into VMRO’s inner workings. Also, unlike the Domobran, the MPO was not broken up by the FBI, meaning there are no casefiles to read.

The MPO’s parent organization, VMRO, is also largely opaque. Because it was a clandestine terrorist organization, primary source coverage of its inner workings is largely limited to Mihailov’s three-volume autobiography, which details his political activities in exile up to 1934. As a result, studies of VMRO are forced to rely on Mihailov’s autobiography—about which historians frequently complain. Leaving aside the issue that his autobiography was written decades after the fact, Mihailov rarely let the truth interfere with self-glorification. Mihailov’s autobiography also tells us little about VMRO’s ground game with emigrants. During these years, Mihailov lived in Bulgaria, orchestrating assassinations against prominent figures in Yugoslavia and members of his own organization who displeased him. In 1934, Mihailov was forced to leave Bulgaria for Turkey and subsequently Poland. In 1941, Mihailov resurfaced as a guest of Ustaša in Zagreb, where he remained for the remainder of the Second World War. For historians, this part of Mihailov’s life—after his exile from Bulgaria and before his re-appearance in Zagreb, is largely a mystery. Stefan Troebst, an authority on VMRO, even labeled

534 The mole in the HSS was unnamed but suspected: Chief Committee of Organization of the Croatian Peasant Party Abroad, “Circular No. 5,” 1930. Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO. 65, AI. The mole in the Domobran was Ante Zubak. See: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Supplement Part I, Exhibit 1, A Glossary of Terms and Names, 1944. Alex Dragnich Papers, Box 32, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.


the 1934-41 period “terra incognito.” Although Mihailov wrote a fourth volume of his autobiography which dealt with this period, he never published it and the manuscript remains largely inaccessible. Since this chapter is concerned with the 1930s, this lacuna makes it difficult to include VMRO.

This paucity of sources also makes it difficult to compare VMRO and the DS, Ustaša, and Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Although there is a wealth of information on the DS, Ustaša, and KPJ’s attempts to sway emigrants, the same cannot be said for VMRO. We do not know how the VMRO’s daughter organization in America, the Macedonian Political Organization (MPO), recruited migrants. Also unclear is the extent to which VMRO directed the activity of the MPO. Although there is evidence that Mihailov wrote a few articles for the main MPO newspaper, the MPO claimed to be independent of VMRO. Moreover, Mihailov remained in Poland and Turkey for most of the interwar period, unlike the DS, Ustaša, and Communists, which all sent party members overseas to coordinate political activity. Mihailov, however, was not permitted entry into the United States. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, however, and the MPO’s archives from this period might yield interesting finds. As such, VMRO’s involvement in diaspora politics remains a direction for future research.

541 Troebst, “Ivan Mihajlov,” 177.
The Croatian Peasant Party

Although it had established a beachhead in the United States in the 1920s, the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) only became a major force overseas after 1929, when they were able to capitalize on a groundswell of Croatian nationalism that followed the murder of HSS leader Stjepan Radić. While difficult to quantify, this zeitgeist was on full display at a rally in Pittsburgh in 1930, where fifteen hundred Croats gathered to protest the “bloody, criminal, tyrannical, and brutal Yugo-Serbian dictatorship” and to call for freedom for the Croatian people.\footnote{Protest resolution from an assembly of Croats in Pittsburgh, March 30, 1930. Fond 38, Fasc. 111, BO 250, AJ.} \textit{Kanadski Glas}, reporting on the event, noted with pride how people seemed to be deliberately acting more Croatian—how “one saw more and more Croats, all telling each other what they thought about their unfortunately homeland Croatia...Aside from those who were born in the Croatian fatherland, there were also their children, who were born in America...Everyone everywhere was speaking exclusively in Croatian, even those youngsters who found it easier to speak English were speaking Croatian with a particular but sweet American accent.”\footnote{“Veličanstena protestna skupština u Pittsburghu,” \textit{Kanadski Glas}, April 21, 1930. Fond 38, fasc. 111, BO 250, AJ.}

Assimilation, the great threat of the “Emigration Question,” it seemed, was reversible; the second generation, mobilized by Radić’s death, were reconnecting with their Croatian heritage.

The Croatian Peasant Party took advantage of this Croatian revival, although the impetus came initially from below, not from the party leadership in Geneva or London. Beginning in early 1930, HSS-sympathetic activists established many new lodges in Croatian enclaves across the Midwest.\footnote{“Hrvatski Separatistički Pokret,” Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP, general political directorate, April 3, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ; “Hrvatski Separatistički Pokret,” Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP, general political directorate, May 8, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ; “Pokret Hrvatskih Separatista,” Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP, general political directorate, May 20, 1930, Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ} The central committee of the HSS’s overseas division was in Chicago.\footnote{Proclamation of the Financial Committee of the HSS u Inozemstvu, found with 1931. Fond 1990, Kut. 4, HDA.}
Ironically, the HSS’s supporters in the Rust Belt were not typical of the its base in the home country. In Yugoslavia, the HSS did not do well in cities—in the 1920 Yugoslav parliamentary elections, the Croatian Peasant Party only won 6.77% of the vote in Zagreb. Of course, for American Croats, the HSS was a nationalist rather than agrarian party.

In the summer of 1930, August Košutić, a member of the HSS’s central committee, departed for the United States to harness this political energy. Entering the United States was not a simple matter, however, as the Yugoslav legation immediately declared his passport and visa forgeries (apparently without having examined them) and petitioned the US immigration service and State Department to bar him entry. As the previous chapter notes, using the American immigration regime to limit the spread of dissent in the emigration was standard practice for Yugoslav diplomats. In this case, however, the attempt to bar Košutić’s entry backfired, making him a cause célèbre for American Croats, who raised funds to pay Košutić’s legal bills and to free him from detainment on Ellis Island. Although this effort did not prevent his subsequent deportation, Košutić was nonetheless able to successfully reenter the United States one year later in July 1931 on a German passport. Yugoslav diplomats, despite several months forewarning, had no legal basis to prevent Košutić’s entrance to the United States. Moreover, the drama surrounding Yugoslav attempts to keep Košutić away from American

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547 Unsigned copy of a letter from August Košutić’s Attorney (unnamed) to Secretary of Labor James Davis, August 12, 1930. Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO 65, AJ.
Croats probably improved his overseas standing and sustained the anger of HSS activists in the United States.

Ironically, despite the terror of Yugoslav diplomats that Košutić would rile up émigré Croats, Košutić was pessimistic about his chances within diaspora political life. Writing his observations on the back of a hotel laundry form, he noted that factionalism was rife, with Communists and a local faction of conservatives, the *Hrvatski Kolo*, or “Croatian Circle.” scheming to take control of the Croatian Fraternal Union. Other Croat notables were “in Yugoslav hands,” along with several newspapers. Even worse, eighty percent of regular Croats were nationally “apatheitic,” in Košutić’s estimation.⁵⁵¹

As with Krnjević, the HSS emissary to the United States in the 1920s, Košutić sourced much of this information from a local activist, Ivan Horvat, who both edited the main HSS newspaper, *Hrvatski Glasnik* (The Croatian Herald), and headed the HSS organization in the United States.⁵⁵² According to Horvat, Croats in the United States were generally indifferent to old-country politics. This was especially true for the second generation. Košutić’s chief task, then, was not to build up cells of the HSS in the United States per-se, but to ensure that a faction sympathetic to his cause controlled the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), which Horvat perceived as the key to the entire diaspora.⁵⁵³ And for good reason: an emigrant self-help society, the Croatian Fraternal Union had, in 1931, over 90,000 members and 5 million dollars in assets—the most of any South Slav emigrant society.⁵⁵⁴ The CFU was also, after the Croatian Peasant Party,
the second largest “Croatian” organization in the world. With the CFU on its side, the HSS could plausibly speak on behalf of the “Croatian diaspora.”

Although its primary mission was to provide insurance to its members, the CFU elected its leaders and had internal factions. There was a right wing, *Narodna Zajednica*, or National Bloc, a medley of socially-conservative Catholics, pro-secessionist, and pro-autonomist Croats. There were the *Levičari*, or Leftists, a mixture of socialists and communists.⁵⁵⁵ And there was *Prosvetaši* (lit. the Educators), who took their name from the *Jugoslavenski Prosvetni Savez*, the Yugoslav Educational Union, a pro-Yugoslav cultural organization. As their name suggested, the *Prosvetaši* were Yugoslavists, albeit critical of Belgrade.⁵⁵⁶ Of these three factions, the National Bloc, with its many HSS sympathizers, were the obvious choice for Košutić. With the National Bloc’s help, Košutić hoped both to raise awareness and money from American Croats.⁵⁵⁷ Relying on diaspora generosity was critical to the HSS, which refused to accept subsidies from enemies of Yugoslavia like Germany, Italy, or Hungary.⁵⁵⁸

Although the HSS seems to have focused on American Croats, with their large and rich fraternal organizations, the HSS also reached out to newer migrant communities in Western Europe. Because many of these workers returned home after a few years abroad, and were subsequently interrogated by Yugoslav police, these interviews can illuminate what the Croatian

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⁵⁵⁷ Chief Committee of Organization of the the Croatian Peasant Party Abroad, “Circular No. 5,” 1930. Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO. 65, AJ.

Peasant Party meant to its rank-and-file. As it turned out, Košutić’s concerns about lack of emigrant enthusiasm had some foundation.

Take, for instance, Antun Drožijibob, who worked a series of short-term contracts in construction, industry, and agriculture in and around Paris. Drožijibob joined the HSS in 1931, having been recruited by door-to-door HSS organizers in St. Denis, an enclave of Croats near Paris. At that time, Drožijibob estimated the number of HSS members in Paris at around four hundred. These numbers did not bespeak enthusiasm. Moreover, Drožijibob was quite critical of the HSS’s organization in Paris. Although membership dues were one franc per month, Drožijibob refused to pay, believing that the HSS cell’s treasurer was embezzling. The leadership apparently ignored both the embezzlement and Drožijibob’s refusal to pay dues, suggesting disorganization and incompetence. The goals of the leadership did not always make sense either: Drožijibob could not understand why the HRSS local organization was raising money for a library, since he was, in his own estimation, “not entirely literate.” Not wanting to pay dues, he eventually left the organization. The speeches also apparently bored him, since he could recall little of their contents and left early. Moreover, one of the speakers apparently gave his speech entirely in Russian, which none of the Croats present could understand.559

Mate Jurišić, Mije Jurišić, Janko Mejved, Jandro Grgić, other members of the same HSS cell, corroborated much of Drožijibob's account, including the numerical weakness of the organization, the incomprehensibility of the speeches, the drinking problem of the leadership, and the difficulty members had in paying dues. In particular, the organization seemed to be held together entirely by the charisma of Vlatko Radić, the son of Stjepan, who, like Košutić, had gone abroad to work in the emigration after 1929. There was apparently neither a rulebook for

members nor clearly defined political aims, other than “to free Croatia from the Serbian yoke.”

This was a vague goal with equally ambiguous benefits for Croats living overseas. In short, although the HSS was able to establish a base of supporters overseas, the impression given by the sources is of a disorganized party bureaucracy and an unenthusiastic membership. Moreover, this is corroborated by Košutić’s earlier claims that 80% of Croats overseas were “apathetic.”

Košutić’s earlier complaints about factionalism among Croats in the United States also proved prescient, as he faced pushback from the right (at least according to the Yugoslav legation, who were kept well informed by their mole). The Croatian Circle, a right-leaning American-grown Croatian nationalist movement based in New York City, continuously feuded with the HSS organization in the United States, weakening the HSS’s attempt to appeal to the National Bloc in the Croatian Fraternal Union. Košutić’s attempt to mediate between the Croatian Circle and the Croatian Peasant Party ended in failure—their differences were apparently insurmountable. In the eyes of the Circle, Košutić was insufficiently committed to the cause of Croatian independence—to them, Croatian autonomy within Yugoslavia was a poor half-measure. Nor were the leaders of the Circle willing to share power—only the Circle could, in their view, legitimately represent the will of the Croatian emigration at the head of a “United

560 Ibid.
561 The Yugoslav legation was especially well informed about the activities of the HSS in the US, suggesting the existence of a mole. Moreover, the HSS organization also suspected the existence of a mole, although they did not know the identity of the double agent. Finally, the Yugoslav legation also had a confirmed mole within the Domobran, making the existence of one in the HSS as well more plausible. See: Chief Committee of Organization of the Croatian Peasant Party Abroad, “Circular No. 5,” 1930. Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO. 65, AJ.
Croatian Front."\(^{563}\) Before long, the Circle’s main newspaper, \textit{Hrvatska Danica} (Croatian Morning Star), was printing vigorous broadsides against Košutić.\(^{564}\)

Having failed to win over the Circle, Košutić decided to make his case to regular people, visiting Croatian enclaves across the Midwest, before ending his journey in California. In his speeches, Košutić appealed not to Croatian nationalism, but to class—it was Belgrade versus peasants and republicans, not Serbs versus Croats. He repeated this message several times during his stay in Chicago, calling for unity between Serb, Croat, and Slovene—Serbian peasants and Croatian peasants were still peasants, and had common interests.\(^{565}\) In appealing to class rather than nationalism, Košutić may have been adapting to the supposed “apathy” of American Croats.

This tactical adjustment created friction with the head of the HSS organization in the United States, Ivan Horvat, who had been calling for Croatian independence prior to Košutić’s arrival.\(^{566}\) These tensions came to a head once Košutić reached the West Coast, with Horvat resigning his position and withdrawing into a private life as a music instructor. Horvat would be replaced by the more Košutić-friendly Juraj Abzac as editor of \textit{Hrvatski Glasnik}.\(^{567}\) This was the same Abzac whose daughter Consul Kolumbatović had deported back to Yugoslavia following a failed attempt at editorial blackmail, as documented in Chapter Three.

Although Košutić’s trip to the United States had mixed results, the HSS organization in the US endured, despite the so-called “apathy” of American Croats, possibly due to Košutić’s pivot

\(^{563}\) “Hrvatska Separatistička Akcija u vezi sa Boravkom i radom Ing. Košutića,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington to MIP, October 6, 1931. Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO 65, AJ.
\(^{564}\) “Akcija Separatatista Hrvatskih u Americi,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington to MIP, March 20, 1932. Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO 65, AJ.
\(^{565}\) “Košutićev boravak u U.S.A. i borba protiv njegovog rada i propaganda,” Report to MIP minister Marinković from Đuro Kolumbatović, August 28, 1931. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
\(^{566}\) “Košutićev boravak u U.S.A. i borba protiv njegovog rada i propaganda,” Report to MIP minister Marinković from Đuro Kolumbatović, August 28, 1931. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
\(^{567}\) “Hrvatska Separatistička Akcija u vezi sa Boravkom i radom Ing. Košutića,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington to MIP, October 6, 1931. Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO 65, AJ.
away from nationalism and toward class. The HSS could also present itself as the moderate alternative to the Ustaša, which will be discussed in the second half of the chapter, and thereby benefited from anti-fascist sentiment. The antifascist stance of the HSS was reinforced by Krnjević, who, on a subsequent visit to the United States in 1935, made clear that fighting the Ustaša overseas was the duty of every HSS member.  

Nor did the HSS limit its struggle with the Ustaša to the United States. Beginning in 1933, the HSS tried to expand into Belgium and South America, where the Ustaša, which had attained conspicuous success organizing migrants into so-called “Domobran” groups. In contrast to their mixed successes in North America, the HSS experienced undiluted failure elsewhere—the Ustaša were entrenched and acted decisively to marginalize the HSS. In Belgium, the HSS alternative to the Ustaša emigrant group quickly folded after Ustaša members falsely reported that it was a communist organization to the local police. The HSS did little better in South America, even though they sent Petar Radić there to agitate. The nephew of Stjepan Radić, the martyred leader of the HSS, Petar departed for South America in late 1933 from the United States, where he had previously been working to organize emigrants. Arriving in Brazil in November, 1933, Radić declared his intent to organize new HSS lodges in South America, denouncing the local Domobran leadership. Several days later, the Domobran and the HSS held competing assemblies, of which the HSS was much poorer attended, attracting a mere sixty people. Humiliated, Radić apparently gave up and fled to Uruguay. He achieved little in Uruguay either—in 1937 the Yugoslav

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568 “Dr. Juraj Krnjević,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation to MIP, August 5, 1935. Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO. 66, AJ.  
569 “Šarolić, Marko, povratnik iz Belgiji, podaci o radu protivdržavnih elemenata medju našim radnicima u Belgiji,” Interrogation report from the Savska Banovina Department of National Defense, May 21, 1934. Fond 1355, kut. 5, HDA.  
571 “Radić Petar, Bavljene u Južnoj Americi,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Buenos Aires to MIP, March 12, 1934. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 40, AJ.
Legation in Buenos Aires reported that Petar Radić was living in poverty in Villa Mugueta and that they “had not heard anything about any sort of activity by the Croatian Republican Peasant Party.” The HSS was simply insufficiently organized, funded, or ruthless enough to compete with the Domobran outside of North America, especially given the Domobran’s two-year head start.

Although archival research turned up no evidence that would allow a numerical estimate for HSS membership in the United States or in South America, measuring the footprint of the HSS in terms of its card-carrying members would be an oversimplification—the influence of the HSS was amorphous but ubiquitous—antimonarchism and republicanism permeate emigrant critiques of Belgrade. Within the Croatian Fraternal Union, it would be the HSS sympathizers, alongside with the communists, who would lead the charge against the attempts of the Ustaša to establish itself as a diaspora organization. Moreover, the HSS inspired two other old country political parties to begin agitating in the diaspora, the Democratic Party and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, both of which devised their own solutions to the challenges of maintaining a transnational political party.

**The Independent Democrats**

Originally an ally of the ruling Serbian Radical Party during the 1920s, the Demokratska Stranka, or Democratic Party, joined the Croatian Peasant Party in opposition to Alexander’s royal dictatorship during the 1930s. Deeply committed to a unified Yugoslavia, the DS fought a two-front war against outright Croatian separatism on one hand and greater Serbianism on the other. The pillars of the DS were the Pribićević brothers: Svetozar, Valerijan, Milan, and Adam, such that a common synonym for the Democratic Party is the “Pribićevići,” or

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572 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Buenos Aires to MIP, September 15, 1937. Fond 385, fasc. 7, BO 43, AJ.
“Pribićević-ites.” After the Croatian Peasant Party, the DS was the earliest opposition party to become involved in diaspora politics. Of the four parties discussed, the DS’s overseas operation was the smallest. Nonetheless, the degree to which it resembles and departs from the HSS strategy suggest that the DS was watching and learning from the HSS’s mistakes.

The Pribićevići’s campaign in the “tenth banovina” began in December 1931 with the sudden appearance of editorials by a mysterious “Argus” in Zajedničar (The Unionist), the main organ of the Croatian Fraternal Union. “Argus’s” critiques of the dictatorship displayed an insider’s level of knowledge, so it was no surprise that this turned out to be the pen name of Svetozar Pribićević who had arrived in New York that same month, just six months after Košutić.574

The CFU organ Zajedničar, with its circulation of around 60,000, was a shrewd choice for a mouthpiece.575 But it was also an unusual one—in Yugoslavia, the main base of the Democratic Party were Serbs, not Croats.576 Yet Svetozar’s decision to appeal to Croats rather than Serbs in the United States appears deliberate, as the other major émigré newspaper for which Svetozar Pribićević wrote for was Svijet (The World), which was also a Croatian newspaper. Edited by ‘Don’ Niko Gršković, Svijet aligned with the Yugoslav Committee during World War I and had remained loyal to the Yugoslav idea since then, although it opposed the dictatorship.577 Common enemies made Don Niko and Svetozar Pribićević natural allies. However, Svetozar Pribićević did not stay forever in New York City, eventually heading back to

574 Dolazak Svetozara Pribićevića u Ameriku i njegov rad u inostranstvu,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation to MIP, December 30, 1931, Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO 65, AJ.
575 Dolazak Svetozara Pribićevića u Ameriku i njegov rad u inostranstvu,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation to MIP, December 30, 1931, Fond 371, fasc. 50, BO 65, AJ.
577 Letter to Minister Miloje Smiljanović from Minister-Plenipotentiary Konstantin Fotić, December 22, 1939, Fond 371, Folder 60, Broj Opis 78, Poslanstvo Kraljevina Jugoslavije u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama-Vašingtonu
Paris in 1933, where he published *La Dictature du Roi Alexandre*, a booklet denouncing King Alexander as a tyrant. In 1934, however, Svetozar did dispatch his son, Stojan, to the United States, where he would write for *Svijet* for the remainder of the interwar period. During the Second World War, Stojan, now writing for *Time*, would also become involved with the pro-Titoist movement and Louis Adamic. Although Stojan is a subject for a later chapter, his example evokes the connection between Yugoslavia’s transnational political sphere in the 1930s and the formation of a Yugoslav emigrant lobby during the 1940s.

Unlike the three other parties discussed in this chapter, the Democratic Party did not build an overseas party organization. They established no cells or lodges, perhaps recognizing that the political landscape was already saturated and the path to victory lay through the Croatian Fraternal Union. However, like the HSS, the DS chose to support a faction within the Croatian Fraternal Union. *Svijet* gave the Pribićevići a platform to do just that, through its editor, Don Niko, who led (although this may be too strong a term) a centrist faction within the Croatian Fraternal Union, the *Prosvetaši*, or “Educators.” Mediating between the National Bloc and Leftists, the *Prosvetaši* occupied the center, and were a natural fit for the liberal Pribićevići. Thus, if the *Prosvetaši* could overcome the other two factions in the HBZ’s annual convention (or make common cause with the leftists), Svetozar Pribićević’s influence over the emigration could grow even further.

In *Svijet*, both Svetozar and Stojan Pribićević voiced many familiar criticisms of the dictatorial government of Yugoslavia—denunciations of monarchy, monarchism, and police

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578 Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia*, 171,
terror—but combining it with a full-throated defense of Yugoslav unity. But evaluating the success or failure of the Pribićevići is difficult. First, it is unclear how many emigrants read Svijet—unlike many diaspora newspapers, Svijet’s circulation was unknown to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Moreover, it is impossible to determine how much of the Prosvećaši success in the HBZ elections in 1935 and 1939 was due to the writings of the Pribićevići in Svijet. Moreover, because the Democrats did not attempt to build a party organization overseas, counting membership numbers or donations is impossible. Yet for the same reason, the Pribićevići evaded many of the problems faced by the HSS—the logistics of transatlantic organizing seem to lead to ideological deviance, political apathy, and administrative corruption, unless one’s overseas operation was limited to a trusted family member. The Pribićevići, after all, understood the importance of family.

The Communists

The approach of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) toward diaspora politics, as will be shown, was a synthesis of the HSS and DS strategies. Like the DS, the KPJ focused on propaganda and cooption of civil society organizations in the United States, but like the HSS the KPJ sought to build a mass movement in places like Belgium or France, which had newer and less established migrant communities. Nonetheless, the KPJ distinguished itself from the DS and

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HSS by building a rudimentary emigrant affairs bureau in whose language and tactics we see the echo of Yugoslav public diplomacy from the 1920s. Ironically, the KPJ, despite its revolutionary pretensions, ended up talking and acting very much like the state it wanted to overthrow.

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) began its involvement with diaspora politics in 1932. Unlike the Croatian Peasant party or the Pribićevići, the KPJ’s decision to involve itself with “tenth banovina” politics had little to do with the ban on political parties in Yugoslavia—the KPJ, after all, had been illegal since 1920. Rather, it was a reaction to the overseas activities of Svetozar Pribićević and August Košutić, whom Central Committee of the KPJ monitored. The Central Committee knew, for instance, that the Croatian Peasant Party had recently suffered a setback, after their main newspaper in the USA, Hrvatski Glasnik succumbed to pressure from the Yugoslav consul Kolumbatović (see Chapter Three). The KPJ also had someone in New York shadowing Svetozar Pribićević, whom they nicknamed “professor,” perhaps a nod to his prolific writing. Lastly, the KPJ was also concerned about the influence of fascists in the emigration, the Ustaša in particular. The KPJ had to get in on the action. For these reasons, in 1932, the KPJ repeatedly reached out to the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), which had a Yugoslav section, asking them to inform their membership about conditions in Yugoslavia and the struggle of the KPJ, to demonstrate against police terror in Yugoslavia, and to collect donations on their behalf. Much like the Pribićevići, the KPJ was more interested in coopting existing migrant associations in the United States, in this case the Yugoslav section of the CPUSA, rather than setting up KPJ cells in the United States.

584 Letter from ‘Ivašić,’ August 28, 1932. Fond 790/1, KI 1932/75, AJ.
585 Letter from ‘Miloš,’ January 26, 1932. Fond 790/1, KI 1932/11, AJ.
586 Letter from ‘Kralj,’ [undated], Fond 790/1, KI 1932/9, AJ.
587 Letter to the Bureau of the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA, June, 1932, Fond 790/1, KI 1932/32-35, AJ
Working with the CPUSA was attractive because it was doing well. After the Stock Market Crash of 1929, many American citizens and residents, including Yugoslavs, joined the Communist Party. In Chicago in February 1930, for instance, 32,000 proletarians braved the cold to demonstrate against the existing order. Of course, the police crushed the demonstration in the usual manner. While it is difficult to estimate the percentage of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes present at the demonstration, five of the one-hundred and sixty arrested were of Yugoslav background.\(^{588}\) If we treat that as a representative sample, roughly three percent of the protesters were of Yugoslav origin, an impressive figure if one considers that South Slavs were less than one percent of the total population of the United States.

Perhaps because of their overrepresentation within the CPUSA, Yugoslavs in the CPUSA had their own sub-organization, called the Yugoslav fraction, based out of Chicago. Its main newspaper, *Radnik*, (The Worker), had a circulation of around 4,000,\(^ {589}\) although this an imprecise measure of the Yugoslav fraction’s numerical strength or number of sympathizers. For comparison, the most popular émigré newspaper, *Zajedničar*, had a circulation of around 60,000, even though the Croatian Fraternal Union itself had over eighty thousand members.\(^ {590}\)

While some of the Yugoslavs in the CPUSA may have been concerned about events in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Fraction’s leadership were preoccupied with building socialism in the United States. When Yugoslav agents persuaded American authorities to deport one of those leaders in 1930, they found no discussion of conditions in Yugoslavia while ransacking his

\(^{588}\) Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political direction, March 13, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.

\(^{589}\) Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political direction, March 13, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ; Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political division, January 21, 1930, Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7.

\(^{590}\) Iseljenički Komissarijat, “*Iseljeničke Novine u Sjevernoj Americi,***” 1935-1941. Fond 1071, fasc. 565, HDA.
personal papers.\textsuperscript{591} This should not be surprising, since these early activists had little connection with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ). This would soon change.

The KPJ, like the DS and the HSS, recognized the importance of the Croatian Fraternal Union from the outset. As the KPJ began its involvement in the “tenth banovina,” the Yugoslav fraction of the CPUSA was struggling to gain control of the Croatian Fraternal Union through their proxies, the levičari, or “leftists.”\textsuperscript{592} The levičari opposed the other two factions—the National Bloc because they believed them to be fascists and traitors, and the prosvetaši because they suspected that they were “agents of the Belgrade regime.”\textsuperscript{593}

Communist paranoia about moderates was reigned in in 1935, however, when the Seventh Congress of the Comintern adopted gave the green light to coalitions with liberal and social-democratic parties in broad, anti-fascist “popular front” movements. By 1937, the levičari and moderates in the Croatian Fraternal Union were allies on the basis of common antifascism.\textsuperscript{594} For the communists, a political alliance with the Croatian Peasant Party and the Democratic party was a matter of pragmatism, and vice versa. But there were ideological affinities as well. For instance, Svetozar Pribićević, in his 1933 book, \textit{La Dictature du Roi Alexandre} outlined his vision of federally-organized and democratic Yugoslavia,\textsuperscript{595} which was also the Communist’s favored solution to the Serb-Croat issue in Yugoslavia. As for the Croatian peasant party, we have already seen how easily August Košutić shifted away from direct appeals to Croatian nationalism to underlining the common class interests of Serb, Croat, and Slovene

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{591} Report from Djuro Kolumbatović to MIP political direction, March 13, 1930. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
  \item \textsuperscript{592} Letter to the Bureau of the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA, June, 1932, Fond 790/1, Kl 1932/32-35, AJ; Letter from the Secretary of the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA, May 7, 1932, Fond 790/1, Kl 1932/38, AJ.
  \item \textsuperscript{593} Letter from the Secretary of the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA, May 7, 1932, Fond 790/1, Kl 1932/38, AJ.
  \item \textsuperscript{594} Letter from the Central Committee of the KPJ to the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA, 1937. Fond 790/1, Kl 1937/120, AJ.
  \item \textsuperscript{595} Svetozar Pribićević, \textit{La Dictature du Roi Alexandre}, (Paris: P. Bossuet, 1933).
\end{itemize}
workers, peasants, and republicans in the United States.\textsuperscript{596} Class based rhetoric, antifascism, and opposition to the authoritarian government in Yugoslavia made it easier for these parties to cooperate.

Popular-front tactics paid off outside the Croatian Fraternal Union as well, with the KPJ urging activists working in the emigration “to work in all existing mutual-benefit or cultural organizations in which Yugoslav workers can be found, in order to strengthen and widen the influence of communists and class-consciousness among workers.”\textsuperscript{597} What this meant, concretely, was that Serbian and Slovene fraternal organizations needed to be infiltrated as well. Ironically, the Slovene National Benefit Society (SNPJ) was more difficult to infiltrate, given that leftist Slovenes in the United States tended toward moderate socialism rather than full Leninism, at least according to the Central Committee.\textsuperscript{598} However, in 1935, the KPJ succeeded in uniting a coalition of left-wing and anti-fascist Serbs from the Serbian National Union in a new organization which called itself the Vidovdan Congress. Although much of the organization was built around the Serbian emigrant periodical \textit{Slobodna Reč}, (Free Speech), which was edited by KPJ member Mirko Marković, three delegates at the Congress were priests, community leaders who aligned themselves with the Serbian Democratic Party (DS). Even more notably, Stojan Pribićević was instrumental in planning the conference, although he was later forced to withdraw by his father, Svetozar, who insisted that “we must not collaborate with communists.” The three DS delegates did not, however, withdraw from the Vidovdan congress alongside

\textsuperscript{596} “Košutićev boravak u U.S.A. i borba protiv njegovog rada i propaganda,” Report to MIP minister Marinković from Djuro Kolumbatović, August 28, 1931. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
\textsuperscript{597} “Odluka Centralnog Komiteta Kommunističke Partije Jugoslavije s radu među radnicima-iseljenicima u inostranstvu,” Central Committee KPJ announcement, undated, Fond 449, fasc. 6, BO. 17, AJ.
\textsuperscript{598} Letter from the Central Committee of the KPJ to the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA, 1937. Fond 790/1, KI 1937/120, AJ.
Stojan and after Svetozar’s death in 1936 Stojan would return to left-wing circles. Although initially quite small, the Vidovdan Congress mattered, not only because it showcased the cooperation between the DS and KPJ, but also because the Vidovdan Congress would later join the Croatian Fraternal Union and SNPJ in a pan-Yugoslav anti-fascist organization during WWII. In other words, the Vidovdan Congress was a stepping stone to a “Yugoslav diaspora,” based around a common opposition to fascism.

Like the HSS, the KPJ did not ignore the rest of the “tenth banovina.” In fact, the KPJ seemed to have a presence wherever there were Yugoslav emigrants. At the same time that it was trying to forge a partnership with the CPUSA, the KPJ began investigating Seraing, Belgium, to see if the small Yugoslav community there was friendly to the KPJ and if there were any organizational rivalries that it could exploit. The KPJ apparently also recruited among emigrants in South America, Czechoslovakia, Holland, France and Australia, with varying degrees of success. In an undated but probably genuine circular that Yugoslav agents intercepted in June 1933, the KPJ’s central committee put forth an additional justification for involving themselves in diaspora politics—“because in various European and other lands (North and South America, Australia, and New Zealand), work tens and hundreds of thousands of workers.” Workers were the KPJ’s natural base. Moreover, “these workers have neither merged themselves with domestic labor in the countries concerned, nor have they cut ties with the homeland, but rather intend to return to Yugoslavia.”

599 Mirko Marković, Jugoslovenski Napredni Pokret u SAD i Kanadi 1935-1945 (Toronto: Nordram, 1983), 31-34.
600 “Izveštaj o stanju u Serenu, od Ivića,” Report from a KPJ agent in Seraing, June 28, 1932. Fond 790/1, KI 1932/213, AJ.
601 Letter to the Bureau of the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA, June, 1932, Fond 790/1, KI 1932/32-35, AJ
602 “Kommunistička propaganda među našim radnicima u inostranstvu,” Report from MIP to General consulate KJ in NYC, June 17, 1933. Fond 449, fasc. 6, BO. 17; “Odluka Centralnog Komiteta Kommunističke Partije Jugoslavije s radu među radnicima-iseljenicima u inostranstvu,” Central Committee KPJ announcement, undated, Fond 449, fasc. 6, BO. 17, AJ.
government’s thinking on emigration—the KPJ, on the basis of the unassimilated character of migrants and their potential to repatriate, were proposing to treat them as an extension of the Yugoslav proletariat, just as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia treated the diaspora as an extension of their territorial domain.

**Migrants Workers and Socialism**

But how did the KPJ recruit immigrants? Unfortunately, unlike with the Croatian Peasant Party or the Ustaša, the interrogations records of returning migrants yielded little information. Among this group, almost no migrants confessed to having joined the communist party. And migrants who were recruited remained tight-lipped about their experience. Ivan Ružić, for example, who worked as a locksmith in the United States for several years before returning to Yugoslavia, vehemently denied joining any group other than the Croatian Fraternal Union. Like many returning migrants, Ružić was placed under surveillance. Those reading Ružić’s mail uncovered that he had been smuggling anti-regime literature into Yugoslavia with the help of his brother, who was in Russia.603 We see a similar pattern with Jakov Kovačević, who joined the communist party in Canada. After he returned to Yugoslavia, he admitted joining the organization, but denied any knowledge of its internal workings and refrained from any further action on behalf of the KPJ, knowing he was being watched.604 Both refrained from implicating others or explaining how they were recruited. On the one hand, the reluctance of migrants to become informants would suggest that the appeal of the Communists was their ideas—true believers would not betray “the cause.” And the harsh economic conditions of the 1930s

doubtless drove many Yugoslav migrants into the arms of those who promised economic and social justice.

On the other hand, the theory that the KPJ’s main attraction was ideological is undermined by the fact that the KPJ constantly struggled with a muddled message. One KPJ assessment of Yugoslavs in Belgium from 1933 observed said that the general population had the characteristics of peasants: “a very low cultural level…widespread, extreme illiteracy…diminished interest in political questions…vulnerability to crude demagoguery…fear of repression, reluctance to undertake organized and systematic action…and so on.” They were the opposite of the disciplined, politically-conscious factory workers that the KPJ wanted as foot soldiers. Heterodoxy among local activists was a problem everywhere, but was most pronounced in France, Belgium, and Australia, all relatively recent recipients of Yugoslav emigration. In one egregious example, in Paris, one local party leader, a worker, “considers our central assignment…to conduct a most-energetic war against Jews.” Another activist, also in Paris, embraced syndicalism (an Anarchist heresy), instead of building a nationalist-revolutionary movement. A third activist there proposed that the class struggle be sidelined in the fight for national liberation for the peoples of Yugoslavia. There had also been instances where communist activists in Belgium had decided that the best way to combat the Ustaša organization was with actual violence, a stance the KPJ regarded as an error. The leadership of the KPJ emphasized picking their battles: “Our main adversary is neither…Pavelić, nor the emigrant Pribićević, nor the leadership of the H.S.S., but the military dictatorship of the greater-Serbian authorities.” While fighting these organizations abroad was still important to the central

605 Report to the CK KPJ, 1933, Fond 790/1, KI 1933/56, AJ.
606 Letter from ‘Oncle Sam’ (Nikola Kovačević) to ‘Winter’ (Vladimir Čopić), ‘Sommer’ (Gorkić), ‘Richard’ (Lovro Kuhar), April 2, 1934, Fond 790/1, KI 1934/78, AJ.
committee, they were not the primary target, which was Yugoslavia. Nor should they be combatted with fists or curses, the Central Committee argued, but by unmasking their hypocrisy and deconstructing their ideology.607

One cause of the KPJ’s struggle with heterodoxy was logistics. As the Central Committee acknowledged in one meeting in 1933, “people [in the diaspora] are not informed about conditions in the Party, everyone is hermetically sealed from the Party, even though these people represent the most important source of cadres.” Rank and file party members from the emigration “that come here are often entirely ignorant of the most recent Party decisions.”608 Imposing ideological conformity on an activist in Uruguay, Chicago, or Sydney from an office in Vienna, Paris, or Madrid was no easy task. Communist literature was piling up with nobody to transport it.

To remedy this, the KPJ decided in 1933 to engage a heretofore neglected element of the Yugoslav diaspora—sailors.609 At that time, around 4,600 Yugoslavs worked aboard transatlantic steamers. Their pay was low, conditions aboard were wretched, and as a result many sailors, in the assessment of the KPJ, were inclined toward communism. By 1934, sixteen transatlantic steamers had communist agitators aboard working as deckhands, cooks, and stokers.610 With these couriers, the KPJ made sure that their political sympathizers, unlike those of the HSS, were kept constantly appraised of the Party line without having to rely on the infrequent visits of important party members like Košutić or Krnjević.

607 Directive to communist activists in Belgium, August 17, 1933, Fond 790/1, Kl 1933/413, AJ.
608 “Izveštaj CK KPJ Kominterni sa proširene sednice politbiroa CK KPJ,” May 15, 1933, p. 28. Fond 790/1, Kl 1933/413, AJ.
609 Letter from ‘Oncle Sam’ (Nikola Kovačević) to ‘Winter’ (Vladimir Čopić), ‘Sommer’ (Gorkić), ‘Richard’ (Lovro Kuhar), April 2, 1934, Fond 790/1, Kl 1934/78, AJ.
610 “Jugobrodovi i Mornari,” May 2, 1934. Fond 790/1, Kl 1934/192, AJ.
The KPJ and “Uncle Sam”

In the United States, the KPJ faced different challenges. The proprietary attitude of the KPJ toward overseas workers, however, caused tensions with the Yugoslav fraction of the CPUSA. At the beginning, the CPUSA refused to work with the KPJ, ignoring their letters and refusing to meet in person. In one letter, the KPJ griped that “of all the [parts of the] emigration with whom we are in contact, only you in the United States show a lack of understanding for the difficult fight of the KPJ and the interconnectedness of the work in your country with the work of the KPJ.” The CPUSA, in their view, did not work to raise awareness about conditions in Yugoslavia nor did they exert themselves to help the beleaguered KPJ in other ways, like raising money. There is an echo here, too, of the Emigration Question, with its attendant worries about emigrants’ alleged disloyalty to the fatherland.

According to the KPJ leadership, “the revolutionary element of our emigrants in the United States are among the best and most self-sacrificing fighters for the Communist Party...[and] understand well that their primary task is to assist the American proletariat in all actions against the American bourgeoisie. Unfortunately, the comrades over there do not understand nearly so well that this primary task is inseparable from their second primary task—[providing] moral and material assistance for the struggle in the old country.” This, they believed, was the reason for the stonewalling from the CPUSA.

To combat this, the KPJ dispatched an unnamed trio of trusted party workers in 1933 to bring emigrant activists under control. This commission was also given a letter from the KPJ leadership, along with an up-to-date statement of the KPJ line vis-à-vis emigrants. They were

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611 Letter to the Bureau of the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA, June, 1932, Fond 790/1, KI 1932/32-35, AJ.
612 Letter to the leadership of all revolutionary emigrant organizations in Australia and New Zealand, Fond 790/1, KI 1934/71, AJ.
tasked with observing problems in the KPJ’s emigrant outreach and proposing solutions to the KPJ leadership. The commission reported directly to Grgur Vujović, the representative of the KPJ in the Comintern, which showed the high priority the KPJ attached to the “tenth banovina.” Since the KPJ was a clandestine organization and rarely called people by their proper names, identifying all members of this trio was not possible. In fact, only one name could be confirmed, an individual who seemed to be the most prolific sender of reports to the KPJ. This was Nikola Kovačević, whose pseudonym was usually a variant of “Uncle Sam”—Serbo-Croatian has several words for “Uncle.” As one might infer, “Uncle Sam” worked in the United States.

“Uncle Sam” behaved as if he were a Yugoslav consul from the 1920s. Like his predecessors, he traveled around Yugoslav settlements in the United States, informing his superiors about local conditions—demography, economic conditions, and disposition toward communism, an activity that mirrored the “colony visits” of Yugoslav diplomats in the 1920s that I discussed in Chapter One. Even the language of these reports was similar, up to and including the use of the word “colony.” In Cleveland, for instance, ‘Uncle Sam’ summarized conditions thus: “Our colony here is large, Slovenes are in the majority, they say around sixty thousand. Our movement is adequately developed, although it is far from where it needs to be…these masses are good, but very crude politically.” ‘Uncle Sam’ also helped the KPJ establish and manage several new newspapers in the United States, while monitoring the state of

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613 “Pismo Komisiji,” May 27, 1933, Fond 790/1, KI 1933/192, AJ.
615 See, e.g. Letter from ‘Ujak,’ Chicago, April 22, 1934, Fond 790/1, KI 1934/84, AJ; Letter to Pico from Stric, Cleveland, July 16, 1934, Fond 790/1, KI 1934/361, AJ.
616 Letter to Pico from Stric, Cleveland, July 16, 1934, Fond 790/1, KI 1934/361, AJ.
the left-wing press in Serbo-Croatian and Slovene in the United States. 617 It is worth noting that Yugoslav consuls also tried to manage and monitor the emigrant press.

Uncle Sam struggled to interest Yugoslavs in the United States in the KPJ’s problems. The solution, Sam believed, was for the KPJ to pay more attention to workers in the United States. To that end, Sam proposed in 1934 that the KPJ organize an “Emigraciona Komisija” (Emigration Commission), based in Madrid and composed of Grgur Vujović, Lovro Kuhar, and several others. The Emkom did eventually get established, possibly as early as 1935, based on correspondence between Sam and Kuhar, 618 although the Emigration Commission was forced to relocate to France in 1936 because of the Spanish Civil War. 619

The Emkom’s responsibility was “to collect material about the life and the work of the emigration in various countries, with an eye toward preparing these materials for press and conduct correspondence of political character [and to] study the emigration question [emphasis mine] and…publish popular brochures about the work and struggle of the party” 620 The similarities between the Emkom and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s “Iseljenički Komesarijat” (Emigration Commissariat) are striking. Besides having similar names, both acted as hybrid press bureaus and research institutions into the “emigration question.”

When the KPJ spoke about interesting the diaspora in the situation of the KPJ, they meant the issue of political prisoners. By publicizing conditions in King Alexander’s political prisons, the KPJ hoped to rally emigrants behind a cause célèbre, thereby pressuring Yugoslavia to

617 Letter to ‘Gregor’ from Čiča, June 6, 1934, Fond 790/1, Kl 1934/354; Letter to Pico from Stric, Detroit, July 20, 1934, Fond 790/1, Kl 1934/383; Letter from ‘Čiča,’ November 5, 1934, Fond 790/1, Kl 1934/402, AJ.

618 Since Kuhar was on the Emkom, we can infer, from Sam writing to Kuhar in 1935, that the Emkom existed then. See: Letter from ‘Sam’ to ‘Richard’ (Kuhar), April 21, 1935, Fond 790/1, Kl 1935/696; Letter from ‘Sam’ to ‘Richard,’ May 10, 1935; Fond 790/1, Kl 1935/699, AJ.

619 Some materials at AJ that I requested had been misplaced, and so the earliest record of Emkom’s meeting that I was able to locate dates from 1936. They do speak of ongoing work, including the move to Paris, however, so this was probably not their first meeting. See: “Sednica Emkoma od 5/1/1936,” Fond 790/1, Kl 1936/29, AJ.

620 Letter from ‘Uncle Sam,’ April 2, 1934, p. 5, Fond 790/1, Kl 1934/78, AJ.
release the Central Committee members in the Sremska Mitrovica prison.\textsuperscript{621} This campaign got an unexpected boost with the release of Louis Adamic’s \textit{The Native’s Return} in 1934. In his first bestseller, Adamic detailed the system of police surveillance, imprisonment, and torture which awaited political dissidents in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{622} Upon his return to the United States, moreover, Adamic supplied the International Committee for Political Prisoners (ICPP) with documentation about conditions in Yugoslavia’s prisons, prompting the ICPP to send the Yugoslav legation a sternly-worded letter cosigned by thirty-six American intellectuals.\textsuperscript{623}

Although Adamic was no KPJ member, being more of a liberal “fellow-traveler,” the KPJ took full advantage of this boon, mobilizing their network of supporters in the Croatian Fraternal Union. In early 1936, ten lodges of the CFU took part in a conference in Chicago to discuss conditions of political prisoners in Yugoslavia. It would be this issue that cemented the alliance in the Croatian Fraternal Union between the Levičari and supporters of the Croatian Peasant Party, whose members likewise languished in Regent Paul’s prisons. Overall, this petition exemplified the KPJ’s new Popular Front strategy: besides the CFU, the Chicago conference attracted five International Workers of the World lodges and ten independent worker clubs and singing societies. After deliberations found overwhelming support for the release of political prisoners, the conference drafted and sent a protest resolution to the Yugoslav legation.\textsuperscript{624} Archival evidence suggest that this campaign against police terror was diaspora wide, with protest resolutions being sent from Yugoslav enclaves in Australia and France as

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\textsuperscript{621} Letter from the Central Committee of the KPJ to the leaders of all revolutionary organizations in Australia and New Zealand, February 1, 1934. Fond 790/1, KI 1934/37, AJ.
\textsuperscript{622} Adamic, \textit{The Native’s Return}, 255, 280-284
\textsuperscript{623} Letter from Roger Baldwin to Leonid Pitač, November 24, 1933, Fond 449, fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
\textsuperscript{624} Notes from the Conference on February 23, 1936. Fond 790/1, KI 1936/63, AJ.
\end{flushright}
well. Although the KPJ was unable to secure the release of high profile Communists in Sremska Mitrovica, this campaign was nonetheless a promising beginning at coordinating diaspora-wide activity, especially for a clandestine organization.

The KPJ’s overseas apparatus resembled that of a state in another respect as well—military recruitment. After the prisoner campaign, the focus of Emkom shifted to smuggling overseas Yugoslavs over the Pyrenees to fight in the Spanish Civil War. The Spanish Civil War, which began on July 17, 1936, after right-wing elements in the military launched a putsch against a democratically-elected left-wing government, quickly became a theater for Berlin, Rome, and Moscow to wage a proxy war for their respective ideologies. To aid the Republic, the Comintern organized “International Brigades” composed of leftists and fellow-travelers, who would travel to Spain to fight fascism. The United States would be the source of two such brigades, the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and the George Washington brigade, the latter having Mirko Marković, a KPJ member, as a captain.

But despite the high profile of Marković, few Yugoslavs in the United States were attracted to the international brigades. Although Yugoslav communities in France, Belgium, and Yugoslavia itself would supply hundreds of recruits, judging by the dossiers of Spanish Civil War veterans in the Yugoslav archives, only eight Spanish Civil War veterans, counting Mirko Marković, came from the United States, although the number of Yugoslav volunteers from the U.S.A. who did not survive the conflict was probably somewhat higher.

626 Letter to “Sommer” (Gorkić) from “Vlada,” 1936. Fond 790/1, KI 1936/359, AJ.
627 R. Dan Richardson, Comintern Army: The International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War (Lexington: UP Kentucky, 1982), 31-46.
628 The catalogs for Fond 724, AJ, which deals with Spanish Civil War Volunteers, are organized by country of origin.
Nonetheless, given that there were roughly ten times as many Yugoslavs in the United States as there were in France or Belgium, this is a noteworthy discrepancy that requires some explanation. The most obvious is that naturalized Yugoslav immigrants in the United States were loath to jeopardize their citizenship or their legal residency in the United States by travelling illegally to Spain, thereby outing themselves as Communists. They had much more to lose than their counterparts in France or Belgium, who typically stayed in those countries to work for a few years at most before returning to Yugoslavia. Moreover, it was Communist practice to confiscate the passports of all Spanish volunteers, thereby making it difficult for them to return home once the conflict ended. Given how difficult it was (and still is) for migrants to obtain American citizenship, the reluctance of Yugoslav migrants to throw it away is understandable.

At least one Spanish volunteer from the United States experienced difficulties because of his participation in the Spanish Civil War, that being Mirko Marković. Fleeing Spain with neither papers nor money, he was forced to stow away on a ship leaving the port of Le Havre, where he was found by the captain and turned over to the immigration authorities in the United States. Although Marković was obligated to leave the United States, he faced a catch-22: without a passport, he could not obtain travel documents to travel to Cuba and back to the United States, which would have regularized his immigration status. As a result, Marković faced the threat of deportation back to Yugoslavia, which for him meant prison, torture, and possibly death. To deport Marković, however, the US immigration service needed authorization from the Yugoslav consulate, which, ironically, the consulate declined to give—apparently, Yugoslavia did not want

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629 Richardson, *Comintern Army*, 43.
Marković either, ultimately deciding to revoke his citizenship. Ultimately, Marković was able to stay in the United States, although how (or if) he had permission remains unclear. 

The relative inability of the KPJ to recruit volunteers for the Spanish Civil War in the United States can also be attributed to bad timing—the Spanish Civil War coincided with a power struggle within the KPJ which eventually resulted in overseas work being deprioritized. During Tito’s takeover of the KPJ following KPJ General Secretary Gorkić’s death in Moscow in 1937, the KPJ downsized its operation in the United States. On January 15, 1938, the Central Committee of the KPJ removed several party members from their position overseeing agitation among migrants, citing their “sectarian errors” and “incapability for collective work,” replacing them with Tito loyalists. Although “Uncle Sam” escaped the purge and remained in the United States, after 1938, the number of central committee documents dealing with overseas agitation dramatically declined, which suggests that Sam was increasingly cut off from the party leadership.

Additionally, Tito may not have seen diaspora agitation as important—ironic, given the diaspora enthusiasm for Tito during World War II. Ivan Marić, one of Tito’s rivals during the interregnum after Gorkić’s death, recalled that Tito criticized what he saw as Gorkić’s overemphasis on overseas work. Unlike Gorkić, Tito believed that a communist revolution in Yugoslavia could not be orchestrated from Paris or Vienna—activists had to be in Yugoslavia, seeing conditions firsthand. It probably also did not help that the Emkom was too associated

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630 Letter from Consul Stojanović of New York to Konstantin Fotić, December 29, 1938. Fond 449, fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
631 Reports place Marković as the editor of the Serbian communist paper Slobodna Reč in May, 1940. See: “Izveštaj o Kommunističkoj Skupštin be Radničkom Centru, u Nju-Yorku,” Report from the New York consulate to the Washington Legation, June 7, 1940. Fond 449, fasc. 6, BO 17, AJ.
632 Meeting Notes for February 15, 1938. Fond 790/1, Kl 1938/4, AJ.
633 Unaddressed handwritten letter from Željezar (Ivan Marić), August 5, 1937. Fond 790/1, Kl 1938/8, AJ.
with Marić, who began overseeing Emkom’s work in 1937, and had been implicated with opposition within the party to Tito’s ascent. For instance, Marić’s “Parallel Center,” a rival group to Tito’s clique, was based in Paris, just like Emkom. Thus, despite the Emkom’s promising successes in coordinating activity by communists on four continents, it would be undone by the communist proclivity toward factional infighting.

From a broader perspective, however, one could argue that the ambitions of KPJ activists to replicate aspects of Yugoslavia’s emigration apparatus (the Emkom, “colony visits,” fundraising, educational work, and military recruitment) were incompatible with the clandestine nature of the KPJ. KPJ ambitions outstripped logistical capabilities, and it quickly emerged that the party line of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could not be enforced, especially given the difficulty of transatlantic communication. Even after the KPJ began using sailors as couriers, the Central Committee was frequently in the dark about its overseas operation. A Central Committee letter to “Uncle Sam” from 1935, for instance, complained that it was impossible to critique Sam’s work editing *Slobodna Reč* because the Central Committee had not received a copy in a long time.

In short, the KPJ encountered the same problem as the HSS—ideological deviancy among its overseas activists. Although a party like the HSS could tolerate some incoherency in its message (which tended to be quite simple: “free Croatia”), this was impossible in a party like the Communists, where quibbles over the Marxist canon could lead to deep and bitter schisms.

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634 Letter from Valter (Tito) to Wilhelm Peak, Secretariat of the Comintern, November 2, 1937. Fond 790/1, KI 1937/102, AJ.
636 Letter from Central Committee to Sam, June 29, 1935. Fond 790/1, 1935, no. 777, AJ.
(e.g. Kautskyites, Trotskyites, Maoists, etc). Unlike the Third Internationale, the diaspora could not be rigidly controlled.

**The Ustaše Abroad**

![Leaflet depicting Branimir Jelić, found in the United States. “Without an independent Croatian state there is no salvation for the Croatian people! Without the *Hrvatski Domobran* there is no Croatian state!” Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO 66, AJ.](image)

Of the four parties discussed in this chapter, the Ustaša, a fiercely chauvinistic terrorist organization devoted to Croatian independence, is the most unusual. It is also the party that has attracted the most scholarly attention. Before 1991, studies of the Ustaša were mainly authored by conservative emigres or anti-fascist historians living in Communist Yugoslavia. In both cases, the focus was on the years the Ustaša were in power in Croatia (1941-1945), rather than the years spent in political exile. In Jelić-Butić’s 1977 study of the Ustaša, a scant thirty pages deal with
the interwar Ustaša. Of this thirty, only four pages deal with the Ustaša’s intervention into émigré politics. This short space contains no explanations of why migrants would want to join the Ustaša or why the Ustaša organization thrived in Argentina but foundered in the United States.\footnote{Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Ustaše u Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941-1945 (Zagreb: SN Liber, 1977), 13-40.} We see a similar pattern in Bogdan Krizman’s 1978 opus, the lengthiest and most authoritative monograph on the Ustaša. Although Krizman provides a more complete overview of Ustaša activity during the interwar years, he nonetheless concentrates on Pavlić and his coterie in Italy and Hungary rather than the rank and file members in emigrant communities in Belgium and South America.\footnote{Bogdan Krizman, Pavelić i Ustaše (Zagreb: Globus, 1978).} It is possible that these writers were hamstrung by restrictions on their source-base. After all, the Ustaša was a sensitive subject that could inflame nationalist tensions in Yugoslavia, and so communist authorities restricted access to some archival material. Alternately, these works might reflect a mentality characterized by a top-down approach to political history—what matters in political parties are the activities and writings of party leaders and what they do when they attain power, rather than seemingly mundane things like recruitment practices or the logistical challenges of running a trans-national organization.

As a result, after 1991 this top-down pattern persisted. In addition, nationalism distorted scholarship. A good example of this can be found in Srdja Trifković, a Serbian-American historian (and a paleo-conservative who defended Radovan Karadžić at his trial in The Hague) who published a tendentious account of the Ustaša movement in 1998. Trifković treats the decision of Croatian migrants to join the Ustaša as self-evident, stating at one point that the migrants in question came from a region with “a long tradition of national and religious atavism.”\footnote{Srdja Trifković, Ustaša: Croatian Separatism and European Politics (London: The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, 1998), 47.} Having thus presupposed that economic migrants left Croatia as radical nationalists
(a view I argue against), Trifković devotes little further space to this topic, focusing, again, on the 1941-1945 period.

In fact, the first monograph to deal exclusively with the Domobran, the Ustaša’s emigrant contingent, was not published until 2007. Its author, Mario Jareb, argues that the Domobran was an “integral and important part of the Ustaša-Domobran movement“ and therefore “deserves much more attention.” Heretofore, the Domobran had essentially been treated as a sideshow to studies of Ustaša leaders or their time in power.640 While a rich source of information, Jareb was hampered by his source base. For example, because Jareb was unable to access the Archive of Yugoslavia, Jareb was unable to obtain reliable estimates of the Domobran’s membership in South and North America641—primarily because Ustaša-produced sources tended to embellish their numbers to project strength. These inflated membership totals, combined with Jareb’s own desire to justify the Domobran’s importance to scholars, leads him to conclude that the Domobran created a successful mass-organization of emigrants in the United States that only ended because the FBI shut it down in 1941.642 In contrast, I argue that the Domobran organization in North America (unlike its South American counterpart) was both marginal and dysfunctional, having collapsed even before the FBI intervention. Moreover, the cross-party comparative approach used in this chapter can help us understand why the Domobran succeeded and failed where it did. Although it became a diaspora organization at around the same time as the HSS, DS, and KPJ, the Ustaša’s approach to diaspora politics, as will be shown, was radically different, both in terms of its focus on South America and the Benelux rather than

641 Jareb, Ustaško-Domobranski Pokret, 354-375.
642 Ibid, 414
North America, and in terms of its combative, rather than conciliatory, approach to emigrant civil society organizations. The Domobran thrived only where it had no competition.

**The Domobran: Beginnings until 1934**

In early 1931, Ante Pavelić dispatched Branimir Jelić, his second in command, to South America. First arriving in Montevideo, Uruguay, on a Hungarian passport, on March 8, Jelić declared his intent to become a leader of the emigration.\(^{643}\) In order to avoid explicit association with Pavelić, the Ustaša’s overseas contingent adopted a new name: Domobran, or Home Guard, a name borrowed from Austro-Hungarian honvéd units recruited in Croatia and Slavonia before the Great War.\(^{644}\) Despite the name, the Domobran aimed not toward Habsburg restoration, but was rather an association of “energetic youths…ready to sacrifice their lives for a free Croatia.\(^{645}\) What “free” meant was left ambiguous—the Domobran offered a simple message for simple people.

After setting up several Domobran lodges, Jelić headed south to Buenos Aires, Argentina on April 10.\(^{646}\) South America was fertile soil for the Domobran. As the Yugoslav legation wrote at the beginning of 1931,

> The basic principle among the broader emigrant masses is the total misunderstanding of the relationship between citizens and state. According to the emigrant ideology, the state only has obligations, unlimited obligations, to feed them, cloth them, nurture them, pamper them—and they only have to live, not feeling any obligation or duty toward that same state.\(^{647}\)

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\(^{643}\) Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Buenos Aires to MIP, March 8, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.

\(^{644}\) Report from the Argentine Legation to Vojislav Marinković, March 30, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.


\(^{646}\) Top secret missive from the charge d’affaires of the Yugoslav Legation in Buenos Aires to Consul Ivan Kokić in Rosario de Santa Fe, April 24, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.

\(^{647}\) Report from the Argentine Legation to Vojislav Marinković, MIP, January 27, 1931, p. 13. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.
More than just revealing the contempt the Yugoslav legation felt for Yugoslavia’s overseas residents, this quote also reveals the reluctance of the legation to help emigrants, now suffering during the Great Depression—they believed that migrants should help the state, not vice versa. This attitude won them little love. A few months before Jelić’s arrival in Montevideo, the consulate there had been attacked by a mob of “separatists and communists,” who pelted the building with stones. Minor damage was inflicted (to the consul’s outrage) but soon Yugoslav diplomats in South America would have bigger things to worry about.

Fig. 5: Photograph of the aftermath of the “attack” on the Montevideo consulate. January, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.

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648 Report from the Argentine Legation to Vojislav Marinković, January 20, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.
Many of the Domobran’s early recruits in South America were poached from an indigenous emigrant organization calling itself the *Hrvatski Iseljenički Dom*, or Croatian Emigrant Home. Previously sympathetic to the Croatian Peasant Party, HID was nonetheless glad to host Jelić in Montevideo, at least until orders came in from the HSS leadership in Geneva ordering them to cut ties, triggering a schism within the organization, with the more radical members joining the newly-founded Domobran.649

The Domobran found an enthusiastic collaborator in the HID’s leader, Marko Fil Vujeva, a man who drifted from continent to continent and ideology to ideology. Born to a peasant family in Herzegovina, Vujeva perambulated around Europe following the first World War before finally ending up in South America. Vujeva first aligned himself with first-wave feminism, then the Croatian Peasant Party, anti-Catholicism, and pan-Slavism.650 When approached by Branimir Jelić in Montevideo in 1931, Vujeva became a convert to fascism.651 Jelić did not reward Vujeva with leadership of the South American Domobran, however, entrusting this position instead to Ante Valenta, an Ustaša activist brought in from Europe.652 Although Vujeva did oversee the Domobran in Uruguay and later Brazil, he was never permitted into the higher echelons.653

By late 1933, Vujeva was of no further use to the Ustaša, which apparently had him killed and thrown into the ocean.654 Why they did so was left unexplained. Nonetheless, Vujeva’s murder epitomized the Domobran approach—instead of allying with more moderate

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649 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A to Vojislav Marinković, March 30, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.
650 Marko Fil Vujeva, “Moj Politički Životopis,” [Pamphlet], found with 1928. Fond 385, fasc. 5, BO 34, AJ.
651 Orders from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A. to the consulate in Rosario de Santa Fe, April 24, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.
652 “Akcija Hrvatskih Separatista,” Report from Yugoslav legation in B.A. to MIP, February 14, 1933. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 39, AJ.
653 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A to Vojislav Marinković, July 4, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.
654 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A to MIP, May 3, 1940. Fond 385, fasc. 7, BO 46, AJ.
nationalist groups, the Domobran preferred to set up an independent organizational structure and maintain ideological purity—with violence, if necessary.

Initially, the Yugoslav delegation in Argentina thought that Jelić “did not represent any sort of threat to the state.”

Montevideo, they thought,

does not offer enough organizational material for a group such as the Domobran. Although there are admittedly separatists in Montevideo—in fact, one could say that most emigrant Croats that are not communists are inclined toward separatism—these separatists are all people without any intelligence or money, who join the separatist masses more out of disappointment and dissatisfaction with the suffering here in America than any real understanding of the political meanings of separatism.

Even as late as 1939, there were just two university-educated emigrants from Yugoslavia in South America, both of them Slovene—the population was overwhelmingly working class and agricultural, working in virtual “peonage” on the countryside or as factory workers in the cities. No intelligentsia and no money meant, in turn, meant few newspapers or large self-help societies. South America had no equivalent to the Croatian Fraternal Union, or any of the other large and wealthy self-help societies in the United States. This, in turn, led the Yugoslav delegation to dismiss this large mass of discontented people as politically harmless. The weakness of emigrant civil society, however, could work to the Domobran’s advantage—given that their approach toward civil society was parasitic or even antagonistic, they would face little resistance from this quarter.

655 Orders from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A. to the consulate in Rosario de Santa Fe, April 24, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.
656 Report from the Argentine Legation to Vojislav Marinković, March 30, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 37, AJ.
657 Report to Milan Stojadinović from the Argentine Legation, January 15, 1939. Fond 385, fasc. 2, BO 22, AJ.
Nor did the host country governments pose a threat—the police in Argentina or Uruguay were disinterested in meddling in emigrant affairs or policing the speech of emigrant groups. As a result, Argentina rapidly became an Ustaše stronghold, even though most Croats there shied away from the fascist organization. According to the Yugoslav governments network of informants, the first Domobran congress, held in 1931 in Buenos Aires’s Dock Sud district, attracted an audience of five-hundred people out of a total urban population of roughly ten-thousand Yugoslavs (of which eighty percent were Croatian). By 1935, Yugoslav intelligence put the number of active Domobranci in all of Argentina to be twenty-eight hundred, with Buenos Aires alone contributing over a thousand. In other words, roughly one in ten Croats in Buenos Aires were in the Domobran. Lodges had also appeared in Brazil and Uruguay, but Yugoslav intelligence services were unable to ascertain how many or how many members these lodges had. Jelić also set up two newspapers for his burgeoning organization in Argentina, the Spanish-language Croacia and the Croatian-language Hrvatski Domobran. These newspapers would continue to be published until the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

In 1932, the Domobran spread to Belgium, where it called itself the “Hrvatski Savez,” or Croatian Union. Its main base was in Seraing, where Croats guest workers toiled in the

658 Report from the Argentine Legation to Vojislav Marinković, MIP, January 27, 1931, p. 8. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO. 37, AJ.
660 “Domobranska Organizacija,” Letter from the Charge d’Affaires of the Yugoslav Legation in Buenos Aires to MIP Political Division, May 7, 1935. Fond 385, Fasc. 6, AJ.
661 Diplomatic telegram from Dragutinović to the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 18, 1931. Fond 385, Fasc. 6. AJ; “Croacija: Separatistička Revija u Buenos Airesu,” Charge d’Affaires of the Legation in Buenos Aires to the Central Pressbureau of the Presidency of the Council, March 30, 1931, Fond 385, Fasc. 6, AJ.
Wallonian ironworks. According to the Yugoslav legation, Belgium had a population of around fifteen thousand “Yugoslavs,” of which around half were Croats.

Beginning in 1932, the Ustaše began recruiting foot soldiers in Belgium and South America. Training camps existed in Uruguay and Brazil where recruits practiced military drills. Although some of these drills were rather outdated—hussar charges in 1937!—these camps periodically dispatched recruits in groups of around thirty for further training in Ustaša camps in Hungary and Italy. These numbers added up. One informer in Belgium estimated that, between 1932 and 1934, three-thousand Croat emigrants received subsidized trips from Belgium to Ustaša training camps in Italy, a number that was probably inflated, but still represents a shockingly high percentage of the roughly seven-thousand Croats in Belgium.

Put in context, however, these numbers are plausible. These Croatian migrants were hit particularly hard by the Great Depression, and even those who were able to hold on to their jobs had their hours dramatically cut. It is no coincidence that Seraing, the headquarters of the Hrvatski Savez, was significantly affected by the depression, accounting for two-thirds of

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663 "Šandr Marko, povratnik iz Belgiji, daje podatke," Report from the provincial government of Savska Banovina, division for national security, June 1, 1934. Fond 1356, Kut. 3, HDA.
666 Report from Yugoslav Consulate in Montevideo to Yugoslav Legation in B.A, May 2, 1932. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 38, AJ.
667 Report from Bogdan Stojkov to Yugoslav Legation in B.A, November 3, 1937. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 43, AJ.
668 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in B.A. to MIP, February 5, 1934. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO, 40, AJ;
669 "Šandr Marko, povratnik iz Belgiji, daje podatke," Report from the provincial government of Savska Banovina, division for national security, June 1, 1934. Fond 1356, Kut. 3, HDA.
Yugoslav unemployment in Belgium. Yugoslav factory workers in Belgium lacked strong fraternal organizations on which to rely and so joining the Ustaše may have been their only option.

**Migrants into Fascists**

In general, the Domobran did best where migrant civil society organizations—sokols, self-help societies, singing clubs, language schools—were weakly developed. In Belgium, there were only thirty such groups. Similarly, in France there were only one-hundred eighty and in Central and South America there were merely three hundred. The United States, in comparison, had nearly six thousand (!).

Why did the Domobran do best where civil society was weakest? Why do immigrants become Ustaše? Variants of this question have long preoccupied scholars of fascism, who dispute the relative importance of ideology versus economics: did the brownshirts believe, or were they just cashing in on fascism? Peter Fritzsche, for instance, in *Germans into Nazis*, argues that fascist parties appeal to different classes for different reasons. For workers, the Nazi party promised economic prosperity on a national basis. For the middle class, the Nazi appeal was more ideological, blending nationalism, antisemitism, and the promise of future utopia, setting them apart from traditional conservatism, which favors either the preservation of the status quo or the return to a past “golden age.” Of course, workers were not insensitive to Nazi ideology either.

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672 Iseljenički Komisarijat, “Kulturno-Prosvjetne i Potpore Društve,” found with 1932. Fond 1071, kut. 567, HDA.


674 Ibid, 209-211.
Conversely, Max Bergholz, in his study of Ustaša violence in Kulen Vakuf during the Second World War, argues that in explaining the outbreak of interethnic violence, “nationalist ideology and ‘ethnic hatred’ was much less important than one initially might assume,” at least on the local level. While ideology mattered to the party leadership around Pavelić, for Ustaša footsoldiers the true appeal of the movement were the opportunities for plunder: opportunistic merchants who wanted to put their Serb rivals out of business, farmers who wanted to settle old scores with Serbian neighbors, down-and-out people who saw in Pavelić’s movement the opportunity for legalized banditry. In short, greed outweighed hate.

But how would this translate to an emigrant context? Since fascist parties build their appeal on what they will offer loyalists once they take power in their homelands—steady factory jobs in the war industries, an opportunity to rob Jews or Serbs, etc, migrants living overseas would see few of the benefits thereof.

Some insight can be gained by looking at Domobran recruiting policies, about which we can learn by examining the interviews Yugoslav police conducted with returning migrants. In a typical interrogation, emigrants were asked where and with whom they worked while abroad. Returnees were also asked whether they joined or were recruited by any political parties or emigrant associations while abroad. Lastly, emigrants were asked if they subscribed to any emigrant newspapers. Although in most cases, this inquest turned up nothing, some

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migrants freely confessed experiences with the Domobran overseas. Being interrogations, these accounts should be read with some skepticism. Nonetheless, they provide a rare first-hand look at Domobran recruitment practices.

The Domobran lured in migrants by acting as a fraternal society where “normal” self-help groups were absent. Ćiril Mikelotić, who left his village in Slavonia to work as a miner in Aisden, Belgium in 1929, noted that when he arrived there were no political or cultural organizations in Aisden for Yugoslav emigrants. That changed in December 1930, when Ustaše organizers from Seraing arrived to set up a branch of their organization, with the vaguely patriotic name “Hrvatski Savez,” or Croatian Union. Within a year, most Croats in Aisden had joined the organization, which acted as a self-help society, offering health insurance for workers at very reasonable rates. For five Belgian francs per month, a worker could be guaranteed a payout if he got injured or sick. For comparison, Ćiril was earning sixty to eighty francs each day, so this was quite affordable. For regular members, the Ustaše, at least in Seraing, maintained a canteen where members could both eat and sleep. For many regular people, the Ustaše movement did not mean blood and soil, but soup and beds.

The leadership of Domobran in Belgium, in turn, seems to have been attracted by a mixture of money and social status. The former held true for one leader of the Hrvatski Savez in Seraing: Ivan Milas, a twenty-seven-year-old student from Herzegovina, had his studies paid for by the Ustaše, with a monthly stipend of seven hundred Belgian francs. Another two

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678 “Mikelotić, Faustina Ćiril iz Brestače član Hrvatskog Saveza u Belgiji iz Belgije povratio se,” Report from the Police Station in Novska, April 17, 1934. Fond 1356, kut. 3, HDA.
680 “Šandr Marko, povratnik iz Belgiji, daje podatke,” Report from the provincial government of Savska Banovina, division for national security, June 1, 1934. Fond 1356, Kut. 3, HDA.
ringleaders had been prominent community figures since the late 1920s. One, named Stipe Marušić, was a former worker who became a foreman after his employer noticed his ability to speak both French and Serbo-Croatian. The other, named Luka Čulić, arrived penniless in Seraing but attained modest wealth and local notability as the community’s barber. Although neither professed to any ideology before the Great Depression, becoming fascists allowed them to maintain their position as community leaders as part of the Domobran.681

Ustaša recruitment depended on occupying the niche of fraternal societies, and so it made sense that the Ustaša would seek to destroy their few competitors. In 1932, the Croatian Peasant Party attempted to establish their own self-help society among emigrants in Seraing, called the Hrvatski Seljački Savez, or Croatian Peasant Union. To destroy this new organization, the Hrvatski Savez libeled the HSS as communists, collecting signatures for a petition which they submitted to the constabulary. The police then raided the HSS offices. Branded as communists, the HSS organization in Belgium did not survive long.682 The Hrvatski Savez also launched a campaign against a recently-founded self-help society called Jugoslavensko Jedinstvo, or Yugoslav Unity, accusing members of being traitors to the Croatian nation.683

Being labeled a traitor by the Ustaša carried the risk of a beating or worse. Marko Šandr, a Bosnian, went to Belgium in 1929 to work in the ironworks of Seraing. According to his testimony (which was so revealing that it was distributed to municipal governments and police stations across Yugoslavia) soon after he arrived, Ustaša activists moved in and quickly managed

681 Šarolić, Marko, povratnik iz Belgiji, podaci o radu protivdržavnih elemenata medju našim radnicima u Belgiji,” Interrogation report from the Savska Banovina Department of National Defense, May 21, 1934. Fond 1355, kut. 5, HDA.
682 Šarolić, Marko, povratnik iz Belgiji, podaci o radu protivdržavnih elemenata medju našim radnicima u Belgiji,” Interrogation report from the Savska Banovina Department of National Defense, May 21, 1934. Fond 1355, kut. 5, HDA.
683 Mikeloti Faustina Ćiril iz Brestače član Hrvatskog Saveza u Belgiji iz Belgiji povratio se,” Report from the police chief of Novska, April 17, 1935. Fond 1356, Kut. 3, HDA.
to enroll “almost all” of the Croatian workers, likely with the promise of health insurance, although that was not mentioned in his testimony. Although the organization also reached out to Bosnians, Marko stayed aloof. Shortly thereafter, Marko and his roommate Ilija (a Montenegrin) were set upon by Ustaše thugs with knives in their apartment. Marko was wounded in the brawl and Ilija fled after his revolver misfired. Marko fled Seraing shortly thereafter. 684

This was not the only documented violent incident. According to Djuro Gojak, a returnee from Argentina, one of his fellow returnees Matije Živčić, repeatedly pestered him about joining the Domobran. After being rebuffed several times, Živčić assaulted Gojak and was subsequently detained by the Argentine police. 685 Nikola Beljan, a returning worker from Eisden, Belgium, also reported having been pressured to join the Domobran and beaten up after he demurred. He also reported being cursed at and attacked after he informed on the Domobran organization to the Yugoslav legation in Brussels, although he may have added that detail to ingratiate himself with the Yugoslav police interrogating him. 686

In 1935, Yugoslav police detained and interrogated a group of nine returnees from Belgium who confessed to having joined the Ustaša in Seraing. All claimed that they had been pressured to join the Hrvatski Savez. Namely, members of the organization told them that “when Croatia becomes independent they will set their homes on fire, and they will not dare to return to the fatherland.” Moreover, the nine added, the Hrvatski Savez “presented itself as a professional organization with the goal of helping its members in case they were laid off, became sick,

684 “Sandr Marko, povratnik iz Belgiji, daje podatke,” Report from the provincial government of Savska Banovina, division for national security, June 1, 1934. Fond 1356, Kut. 3, HDA.
Taken together, these personal stories suggest a pattern of recruitment that could be euphemistically called “carrot and stick.”

**Why Belgium and South America?**

But what about Belgium and South America made these countries such fertile soil for the growth of Croatian fascist movements? The weakness of emigrant civil society in these places, as has been noted, certainly played a role. But it is not the whole story—the Domobran movement did not grow in a bubble. In much the same way that the emerging Yugoslavist movement in the United States was shaped by anti-fascist, pro-democratic, and pro-federalist tendencies in American political discourse, so too was the Domobran in Belgium and South America influenced by governments that tolerated or were friendly to fascist movements.

In 1930, Argentina’s democratically elected president, Hipólito Yrigoyen, was overthrown by General José Felix Uriburu, an authoritarian with fascist tendencies. That same year, military coups elevated Getúlio Vargas, a nationalist and a populist, to the presidency of Brazil and Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro to the presidency of Peru. In 1933, Gabriel Terra declared a dictatorship in Uruguay, with David Toro and Rafael Franco following suit in Bolivia and Paraguay in 1936. While none of these dictatorships were exactly alike, most shared a similar ideological underpinning in corporatism. A school of thought now associated with fascism, corporatists seek the abolition of any institutional barrier between labor unions and management in the form of state-run unions. More broadly, corporatists sought the abolition of any

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687 “Propadalo Jakov i drugovi, povratnici iz Belgije, izveštaj,” Report from the Savska Provincial government, May 9, 1935. Fond 1355, Kut. 6, HDA.

independent civil society—all organizations had to serve the nation-state. In short, the ability of Croatian emigrants to organize on non-fascist lines was sharply curtailed in Latin America.

Aside from corporatism, Latin-American dictatorships modeled themselves after the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera in Spain, António Salazar in Portugal, and Benito Mussolini in Italy. During the 1930s, dozens of small fascist parties emerged in Latin America, particularly in Argentina, which had a large population of Italian and German immigrants who brought their politics with them. Diplomats from these countries may have also contributed to the transnational spread of ideas—the Spanish ambassador to Argentina in the late 1920s, Ramiro de Maeztu, was the theorist behind the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and a vocal critic of liberal democracy. Given that Argentina was also the center of Domobran activity in South America, it seems clear that the Domobran was influenced by the broader social context, which also enabled its aggressive style of recruitment. Fascism had become normalized.

Another mechanism of ideological transmission was the Roman Catholic Church. In 1932, the head of the Vatican foreign ministry, Cardinal Pacelli (who in 1939 became Pope Pius XII) launched a transnational campaign against Communism, a “Catholic International” to combat the Comintern. In 1933, the Vatican established a single organization to coordinate this activity, the Secretariat on Atheism. Working through a global network of bishops and through partnerships with Catholic organizations around the world, like Catholic Action, the Secretariat on Atheism hoped to discredit and demoralize leftist movements around the world. The Secretariat on Atheism emphasized that their movement was distinct from Fascist anti-communist diplomacy, in that it was not anti-Semitic. To wit, Communism was bad not because

689 Ibid, 7-12.
690 Ibid, 19.
691 Ibid, 19.
it was a “Judeo-Bolshevik” global conspiracy, but because it was an atheistic global conspiracy. However, it should be emphasized that the Catholic Church is more oligarchy than absolute monarchy—the Pope may issue encyclicals, bulls, and briefs, but bishops are mostly sovereign within their diocese. As a result, the fine distinction between Catholic and Fascist anti-communism was sometimes blurred in practice. Anti-communist Catholics, when implementing Rome’s directives, often sided with or even collaborated with ultranationalists. In Argentina for instance, Catholic priest and activist Gustavo Franceschi articulated a vision of the Argentine nation based on the principle of “national Catholicism” and anti-communism. In Brazil, (another country where the Domobran did well), the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, Sebastião Leme, praised the quasi-fascist Vargas dictatorship as “consistent with the Church’s hierarchical vision of society.” Moreover, corporatism had a strong following within the Jesuit order, and many Jesuits from Europe vocally advocated for corporatism in the Catholic press.

While Belgium was not a fascist country or even a dictatorship, it did have Nazi Germany on its eastern flank. Acting against fascist parties, which Germany would take as a diplomatic insult, would have been tremendously risky. Complicating matters further, Catholicism was also central to Belgian politics. Interwar Belgian politics were dominated by the divide between the Catholic Union, which was socially conservative but somewhat economically liberal, the Liberal Party, which was centrist and anticlerical, and the Socialist Party, who were reform socialists a la Eduard Bernstein. Aside from the usual debates over economic policy, we can see the Catholic Church was central to political debates in Belgium. The Catholic church. Interestingly, Belgium’s

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693 Pinto, *Latin American Dictatorships*, 17.
694 Ibid.
695 Ibid, 18
own pseudo-fascist movement, the Rexists, was likewise rooted in Catholicism and had a strong base, like the Domobran, in Wallonia. Founded in 1935 by Léon Degrelle, formerly of the clericalist Catholic Union party, the Rexists called for an authoritarian corporatist state based on Christian values. In the 1936 election, the Rexists won 31.1 percent of the vote in Luxembourg and 9.4 percent in Hainaut, both subregions of French-speaking Wallonia. Rexists did well especially among the more fervent Catholics (as measured by Church attendance). While the Rexist movement postdates that of the Domobran, its geographic distribution and clerical background nonetheless speaks to a conservative, Catholic social climate that was not intolerant of fascism.

Given that Croats are overwhelmingly Catholic, it is easy to see how this zeitgeist could have spilled over into the Croatian emigration in Belgium and Argentina. Moreover, the relative lack of fraternal organizations among Croatian emigrants would only increase the relative importance of organized religion. There is, moreover, evidence that Croatian Catholic priests in South America were enthusiastic collaborators with the Domobran movement. On January 20, 1931, for instance, the Yugoslav legation in Argentina reported that a number of “anti-Yugoslav” Croatian Catholic priests had been causing trouble within the emigrant community. A more detailed report from 1937 details how a Croatian Catholic, Father Rusković, hosted a Domobran meeting in the Dock-Sud district of Buenos Aires. Also at that meeting was Cardinal Coppello, the Archbishop of Buenos Aires, showcasing the degree to which the Domobran enjoyed the support of Catholic institutions in Argentina. Copello even gave a speech! In his address, Coppello argued that Croatia was the “antemurale christianitatus,” the bulwark of Christiandom,

697 Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Argentina to MIP, January 20, 1931. Fond 385, fasc. 6, BO 38.
defending “western civilization” from the “threat” of Serbs and Orthodoxy. The Catholic clergy in general and Copello in particular wielded enormous power within Argentina, the Yugoslav consul lamented—“here in Argentina you cannot do anything without Cardinal Copello’s permission and you cannot do anything against his will.” This made Yugoslav officials powerless to get Rusković recalled or to rid themselves of other “turbulent priests” such as Father Blaž Štefanić, a Franciscan monk from Croatia invited in 1939 by the Domobran organization in Argentina to serve as a “national missionary.” We see a similar pattern of cooperation in Belgium. When Yugoslav diplomats attempted to organize a Yugoslav fraternal society in Seraing in 1930, Father Bilobrk, the local Croatian Catholic priest, was front and center in the campaign against it. Not only did he fulminate against it in his sermons, he also met secretly with Croatian ultranationalists behind the scenes to coordinate his criticisms with theirs. In short, the reason the Ustaša did so well in Argentina and Belgium was that the Catholic church, a strong organization in both countries, was a major network for the transmission for conservative, nationalist, and fascist ideas to the broader public. This resonated as well with the Ustaša’s political program, which was pure clerico-fascism.

It is also worth contrasting the situation in Belgium and South America with that in the United States, where the Domobran would not prosper. To begin the Catholic Church apparatus in the United States was nowhere near as influential as its Belgian or South American counterparts. Both Belgium and South America were majority Catholic countries; the United States was not. Moreover, despite the arrival of millions of Irish and Italian migrants during the

699 “Fra Blaž Štefanić, misioner u Buenos Airesu,” Report from the Yugoslav legation in Argentina to MIP, March 6, 1939. Fond 385, fasc. 7, BO 44,
19th century, anti-Catholicism was still a feature of American political life. It torpedoed, for instance, the ambitions of Al Smith, who ran for president as a Democrat in 1928. As a result, the Catholic church had to tread lightly to avoid offending American sensibilities. Take, for instance, the case of Charles Coughlin, a Catholic priest in Detroit, Michigan. Before Father Coughlin became a vocal anti-Semite during the late 1930s, his public pronouncements concerned the Vatican mainly for their “Communistic” content. Rome could do little to reign Coughlin in, however—not only did Coughlin have the support of his direct superior, Bishop Gallagher of Detroit, even publicly censuring Coughlin would have raised American fears about Papal interference with Coughlin’s “free speech.”

So much for the Secretariat on Atheism!

It is debatable, however, whether Catholic bishops in the United States were less friendly to fascism than their South American counterparts. On the one hand, Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago, for instance, when addressing the priests of his diocese at a conference in 1937, issued a scathing denunciation of Hitler and fascism, calling him “an Austrian paperhanger, and a poor one at that” and questioning his right to “dictate every move of the people’s lives.” Mundelein, it should be noted was Archbishop of Chicago, which had a sizeable Croatian population. Mundelein’s remarks were widely circulated in the press, sparking a diplomatic incident between the Holy See and Nazi Germany. In the ensuing brouhaha with the Nazi Foreign Office, Mundelein’s denunciation of the Reich was supported by other American bishops of German ancestry, as well as the main Catholic newspapers. American Catholic public opinion was behind Mundelein as well. But while this episode suggests Mundelein was critical of German fascism,

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703 Ibid, 175.
which was militantly atheistic, there is no evidence that Mundelein was hostile to Croatian fascism as well. According to a 1936 report from the Yugoslav general consul in Chicago, the consul noted that the Domobran movement in the Chicago was in marked decline (for reasons that will be explored in the next section). Despite the Domobran’s organizational weakness, it “had been morally and materially supported by all the local Croatian Catholic priests, almost without exception.” In particular, the consul highlighted the activities of Blaž Jerković, a Franciscan monk from Mostar, who, as the priest for a parish in Chicago, fell under Mundelein’s jurisdiction. After years of protests from the consulate, Mundelein finally took action in 1936, shuffling the priest off to a different parish in Minnesota. Not only did this fail to curb Jerković’s activities, Jerković’s replacement in his old parish, Father Spiro Andrijanić, was apparently just as bad. Andrijanić, like Jerković and the pro-Ustaša priests in South America and Belgium, supported the Domobran in his sermons. He also attended Domobran meetings. And when the consulate wrote to Mundelein to complain about Andrijanić, the consul received a terse acknowledgement and no promise to do anything about Andrijanić. Although Mundelein, unlike Copello in Buenos Aires, never spoke at Domobran meetings, he also seemed unwilling to do anything about his subordinates’ support for a terrorist organization.

As the case of Jerković and Andrijanić indicates, the weakness of the Domobran movement in the United States was not a matter of American Catholic opposition to fascism. Moreover, that the Catholic Church was unable to prop up the Domobran in the United States suggests, again, that the Catholic church was less influential in the United States. Moreover, the Catholic Church had weak links to Yugoslav emigrant institutions in the United States, hindering

704 “Domobranski Pokret u USA,” Letter from Consul Vukmirović to MIP, August 31, 1936. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
705 Letter from Consul Vukmirović to George Mundelein, September 5, 1936. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
706 Letter from George Mundelein to Consul Vukmirović, September 15, 1936. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
the Domobran’s ability to win over migrants. The two largest Yugoslav fraternal organizations, the Croatian Fraternal Union and the Slovene National Benefit Society, were both secular, the latter militantly so. While the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union and the Yugoslav Catholic Union were both Catholic organizations, they were, for obvious reasons, of little interest to a Croatian fascist movement. In 1931, the only hardline conservative Croatian Catholic fraternal union of any significance, the Croatian Catholic Union, had 4,758 members to the CFU’s 92,458.\textsuperscript{707} While Catholicism may have been important to immigrants on a personal level, the disconnect between the Catholic church and emigrant fraternal organizations made it difficult for the Vatican to work with anti-communist forces among American Croats. This was not the only reason for Domobran weakness in the US, however. As will be shown, the failure of the Domobran in the United States had a variety of causes.

**The Domobran Defeated**

The Domobran’s efforts to expand into North America began in July 1934, when Branimir Jelić gatecrashed a Croatian Day celebration in Cleveland. Despite being given only a few minutes speaking time, Jelić ended up speaking for two hours. Few present knew who he was.\textsuperscript{708} Subsequently, Jelić decamped to Pittsburgh, setting up an office in the Croatian Fraternal Union’s headquarters, apparently with either the consent or connivance of the CFU’s president Ivan Butković. Jelić’s intentions for the Domobran organization in North America appeared to be identical to those of its counterparts in South America and Europe: namely, it was to be an

\textsuperscript{707} See: Berislav Angjelinović and Ivan Mladineo, *Jugoslovenski Almanak: Jugosloveni u Sjedinjenim Državama Amerike* (New York, 1931), 4-5.

organization that recruited and raised money from the diaspora, and which bolstered its numbers through a mix of intimidation of other fraternal societies and offering generous benefits.\textsuperscript{709}

However, the Domobran did not flourish in the United States. One estimate of its membership, acquired by obtaining a list of subscribers to the Domobran’s main newspaper in the United States, put their numbers at around four hundred in 1937.\textsuperscript{710} This type of estimate is unreliable: not all subscribers to the Domobran newspaper subscribed to its views, and not all of the Domobran faithful subscribed to its newspaper. A more accurate estimate is provided by a list of dues-paying members, which the Yugoslav consulate in Pittsburgh obtained that same year. The Domobran organization in 1937 was quite small: around seventeen-hundred members.\textsuperscript{711} Whereas in Buenos Aires one in ten Croats were Domobranci, in the United States roughly one in two hundred were, if we put the number of American Croats at 350,000, based on FLIS’s 1923 data.\textsuperscript{712} Although the population of American Croats could have swelled since 1923, growing the pie only makes the Domobran’s share look smaller.

With so few dues-paying members, the Domobran’s finances suffered. The Domobran’s 1937 convention, held on Memorial Day in Akron, Ohio, revealed an organization in disarray. Around a thousand attended, although many, according to the Yugoslav legation, were there only for the buffet and spectacle, to gorge and gawk. Moreover, the Domobran’s treasurer reported that the Domobran organization in the United States was running a deficit of around $1000, that their rainy day fund, intended to cover the legal fees of arrested members, contained a mere

\textsuperscript{709} Report from the Yugoslav consulate in Pittsburgh to the Yugoslav Legation, August 21, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51 BO 66, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
\textsuperscript{710} “Spisak i dve kopije akta,”Report from the Yugoslav Legation to MIP, Political Division, May 17, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
\textsuperscript{711} Letter from Kosto Unković to Konstantin Fotić, January 8, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
\textsuperscript{712} Ivan Mladineo and Berislav Angjelinović, \textit{Jugoslovenski Almanak} (New York: 1931). This estimate also allows for some population growth since the estimates of the I Dr. T. M. Lutković, “Jedno Važno Pitanje: Koliko nas ima i gdje smo?,” \textit{Zajedničar}, April 19, 1928. Fond 967, Kut. 26, HDA; Brunnbauer, \textit{Globalizing Southeastern Europe}, 216.
$600, and that financial contributions to the organization had sharply declined over the last
year.713 Moreover, the treasurer and president refused to speak to one another, each blaming the
other for the organization’s financial troubles.714

The leaders of the Domobran organization in the United States were a colorful group.
Franjo Budak, the treasurer, was known in his hometown of Youngstown, Ohio as the “Tsar of
racketeering,” organizing illegal bets on various games of chance and horse races. He was also
reputed to have been in a shootout with revolvers.715 In addition, Budak operated a brothel and
illegally sold liquor, back when Prohibition was still in force.716 Although his “entrepreneurial”
background naturally suited him for the position of treasurer, Franjo Budak probably gained his
position through nepotism—Mile Budak, the later architect of the Independent State of Croatia’s
genocidal campaign against Serbs and a highly ranked member of the Ustaša, was his uncle.
Blood ties also distinguished the president of the Domobran organization in the United States,
Ante Došen, who was the son of Marko Došen, the organizer of the Velibit uprising who would
go on to become president of the Parliament in Nazi-puppeted Croatia during the Second World
War.717 Compared to Budak, Došen had a relatively clean criminal record, with only two
indictments for perjury and one for inciting violence.718 Luka Kalanj and Ante Zubak also had
criminal records, the former for fraud, and the latter for embezzling money from the Croatian

713 “Skupština Domobranaca u Akronu 31. Maja o. g.,” Report from the Washington Legation to MIP, June 3, 1937.
Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
714 “Pismo A. Došen,” Report from the Washington Legation to MIP, August 3, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
715 Report from Consul Gabrić to the Yugoslav embassy, “Domobranske Vodje u Sjeninjenim Državama,
Državljanstvo i imovinske prilike njihove,” August 14, 1940. Fond 371, fasc.54, BO 70, AJ.
716 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Memorandum for Mr. James R. Sharp Re: Hrvatski Domobran, Ante Doshen,
Luka Grbich, Frank Budak, and Nikola Sulentich, April 3, 1944, p. 83-85. Alex Dragnich Papers, Box 33, Folder 1,
Hoover Institution Archives.
717 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Supplement Part I, Exhibit 1, A Glossary of Terms and Names, 1944. Alex
Dragnich Papers, Box 32, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.
718 Report from Consul Gabrić to the Yugoslav embassy, “Domobranske Vodje u Sjeninjenim Državama,
Državljanstvo i imovinske prilike njihove,” August 14, 1940. Fond 371, fasc.54, BO 70, AJ.
Fraternal Union. Zubak was also a double agent (although nobody knew this at the time), working as a mole for the Yugoslav government. Luka Grbić, editor of the party organ of the Domobran in the United States, *Independent State of Croatia*, had a clean record, however, as did Nikola Sulentić, the proprietor of a machine tool factory in Iowa. However, a common theme running through this rogue’s gallery is fraud—everything seems to indicate that most of the Domobran’s leadership saw this organization as an opportunity to defraud ultranationalists, rather than as an ideological calling.

In this regard, the Domobran can be productively compared to the German-American Bund, a contemporary organization among German-American immigrants sympathetic to fascism. During its peak years between 1935 and 1939, the Bund was led by a naturalized German-American named Fritz Kuhn. Although outwardly a zealous devotee of National Socialism and Hitler, Kuhn treated the Bund as a money-making operation, eventually embezzling thousands of dollars to pay for gifts for several mistresses. In addition to regular dues, members of the Bund were faced with voluntary-mandatory uniform purchases, newspaper subscriptions, book sales, pins, badges, armbands, bookends, dishware, and music records. All payments were made out to Fritz Kuhn, who, according to the Führerprinzip, could treat the treasury of the Bund as his personal checking account, disposing of the money as he saw fit. Although the Domobran did not have the Führerprinzip as such, its rulebook contains many

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720 Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Supplement Part I, Exhibit 1, A Glossary of Terms and Names*, 1944. Alex Dragnich Papers, Box 32, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.

721 Report from Consul Gabrić to the Yugoslav embassy, “Domobranske Vodje u Sjeninjenim Državama, Državljanstvo i imovinske prilike njihove,” August 14, 1940. Fond 371, fasc.54, BO 70, AJ.


723 Ibid, 173.

724 Ibid, 53.
similar practices, including requiring uniform purchases for members and absolute obedience to the leadership and the poglavnik. Fascist movements can be lucrative for their leaders, and thus it is not surprising that they attract the avaricious and unprincipled.

Given the pecuniary motives of the Domobran leadership, it was not surprising that the infighting grew as the treasury shrank. Toward the end of 1938, the President, Ante Došen, faced open insurrection, accused by fellow Domobran leaders of illegally misappropriating organizational funds for his personal use. The leader of the internal opposition to Došen appears to have been Budak, the treasurer, and a far more likely culprit who was, moreover, in a position to manipulate the ledger to incriminate Došen. Finally, in January 1939, Došen was removed from the leadership of an organization that he had founded and led. Then, a few months later, he was expelled from the organization entirely, forced to return a Ford Coupe, two typewriters, a microphone, and a “Dario set”. While this bolstered the Domobran’s immediate resources, it also cut them off from Jelić, who seemed to relay most of the organizations information and orders through Došen. As a transnational network, the Domobran was quite fragile.

725 Croatian Home Defenders, Principles and By-Laws of the Croatian Home Defenders in North America, Chapter 2, 1936. Alex Dragovich Papers, Box 32, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.
726 “Spor Došen sa starešinstvom hrv. Domobrana u S.A.D,” Report from the Washington Legation to MIP, November 21, 1938. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 69, AJ.
729 Letter from Frank Budak to Ante Došen, March 30, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 69, AJ.
730 In February 1938, an instance was documented where Došen received publishing material and orders from Europe to attack the Croatian Peasant Party. See: Letter from Kosto Unković to Konstantin Fotić, February 15, 1938. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO. 69. Došen also regularly received mail directly from Rome, presumably orders, money, or publishing material for the Domobran newspaper. See: Letter to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, October 8, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ. Došen’s relationship with the higher-ups in the Ustaša can also be inferred by Jelić’s immediate demands for his reinstatement.

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As a result, the new leadership found out only belatedly that Jelić had been interned on Ellis Island while attempting to visit the United States in 1939. Jelić would eventually be allowed entry to the United States. Jelić’s return visit had been intended to set the American Domobran’s affairs in order: to reinstate Došen, quell infighting, expand the subscribership of the Domobran newspaper, and to found new lodges. Despite having apparently unlimited financial resources at his disposal, possibly supplied by Hungary, with which to fund these activities, Jelić’s second visit accomplished relatively little. Despite boasting that he would soon establish twenty-five new branches of the Domobran in North America, by the end of his visit he had established only three, none with more than fifteen members. Jelić’s speeches were weakly attended due to a general boycott of his brand of politics by Croatian leftists, moderates, and the non-fascist traditional right. Moreover, several of his planned assemblies were disrupted by other Croats hostile to his message: socialists and followers of the Croatian Peasant Party. Antifascism drew them together. Shortly after, Jelić would be removed from the picture entirely. On his way back to Europe after his failed attempt to resuscitate the

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731 “Dr. B. Jelić on Ellis Island,” Announcement from the Domobran headquarters, undated, found with 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.

732 Letter from Jelić to the leadership of the Domobran movement in the United States, March 5, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ; Report from Kosto Unković to the Washington Legation, April 4, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 71, AJ.


734 Report to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, August 20, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.


Domobran organization in the United States, Jelić was arrested by British authorities in Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{737} Jelić would remain in British custody for the entirety of the Second World War.

The weakness of the Domobran branch organization (and possibly the cupidity of its leadership) diminished official funds still further. By 1940, the Domobran in North America were over fourteen hundred dollars in debt. Many members had stopped paying dues. Although some lodges had independent treasuries, Budak had no idea who had how much (not much of a treasurer!).\textsuperscript{738} Responding to the central organization’s financial emergency, Budak pillaged the financial reserves of Domobran branches to cover immediate expenses, although how much money this raised is unclear—Budak’s bookkeeping was not the best.\textsuperscript{739} Recognizing that their financial situation was untenable, the remaining leaders of the Domobran organization began meeting in the first half of 1941 to discuss shutting down branch organizations but to continue publishing the newspaper. In the face of widespread apathy or hostility to their message, \emph{Nezavisna Hrvatska Država} ceased publishing in February 1942.\textsuperscript{740}

The deathblow was delivered by the FBI several months later, after they were warned by Michael Cerrezin, a Croatian-American acting as Vice-consul in Pittsburgh, that the Domobran were a subversive organization potentially harmful to the war effort.\textsuperscript{741} In prosecuting organization, the FBI chose to focus on four ringleaders: Došen, Sulentić, Budak, and Grbić, rather than the rank-and-file, whom the FBI considered dupes and small fry. As unregistered

\textsuperscript{737} “Pisanje Nezavisne Hrvatske Države i Hrvatskog Lista i Danice Hrvatske o interniranju Dr. Branimira Jelića,” Report from Consul Stanojević to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” November 25, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
\textsuperscript{738} “To all Branches of the Croatian Home Guard in North America,” undated, found with 1940. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
\textsuperscript{739} “To all Branches of the Croatian Home Guard in North America,” undated, found with 1940. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
\textsuperscript{740} Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Exhibit No. 2: Chronology.” Alex Dragnich Papers, Box 32, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.
\textsuperscript{741} Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Consul Stanojević, May 21, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ; Letter from Kosto Unković to the Yugoslav Legation, June 2, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.
foreign agents and propagandists in a country with which the United States was at war, the Domobran ringleaders faced potentially steep penalties under the Voorhis Act.\textsuperscript{742} Došen, however, was well connected: both Senators from Pennsylvania came to his defense. Although Došen was initially indicted for perjury, he would ultimately serve only six months in jail on a technicality relating to his immigration status.\textsuperscript{743} The FBI also faced problems prosecuting Budak for his work with the Domobran, but would eventually convict him of income tax-evasion, presumably from his sideline as an illegal gambling magnate.\textsuperscript{744} Of course, by the time the FBI stepped in, the Domobran in the United States was moribund—we cannot credit state intervention for its destruction.

One could argue that the Domobran failed in the United States because of a political discourse that was, at that time, hostile to fascism. To be sure, the Domobran faced no shortage of hecklers at its meetings. On the other hand, this environment did not deter the German-American Bund. On February 10, 1939, for instance, the Bund held a rally inside Madison Square Gardens that attracted twenty-thousand people.\textsuperscript{745} While there was an even larger crowd of protesters outside the Gardens (some estimate one hundred thousand), the Bund was a prosperous and self-sufficient organization consisting of six to twenty-thousand members (and an even larger number of sympathizers) before the FBI shut it down.\textsuperscript{746} The American Domobran, in comparison, never had more than 1,700 dues-paying members.\textsuperscript{747} Nor did the embezzlement of funds by the Bund’s leader, Fritz Kuhn, prove an obstacle to success. Similar to

\textsuperscript{742} Federal Bureau of Investigation, \textit{Memorandum for Mr. James R. Sharp Re: Hrvatski Domobran, Ante Doshen, Luka Grbich, Frank Budak, and Nikola Sulentich}, April 3, 1944. Alex Dragnich Papers, Box 33, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives
\textsuperscript{744} Ibid, 100.
\textsuperscript{745} Bernstein, \textit{Swastika Nation}, 68.
\textsuperscript{746} Bernstein, \textit{Swastika Nation}, 62-68.
\textsuperscript{747} Letter from Kosto Unković to Konstantin Fotić, January 8, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
the Domobran, the Bund was badly led and widely hated—why did the Bund succeed and the Domobran fail?

The key to the Bund’s success was its ability to exploit the dense network of German emigrant civil society organizations in the United States. Founded in 1933 as the *Bund der Freunde des Neuen Deutschland*, the original founder of the Bund, Heinz Spanknöbel, quickly reached out to previous fascist and far-right German immigrant associations such as Teutonia and Gau-USA, absorbing these small and declining organizations into his own. In summer of 1933, the Bund absorbed the similarly named Friends of New Germany organization, and in the fall the Bund forced its way into the mainstream by acquiring a seat on the United German Societies, an umbrella organization of German migrant groups. In 1934, the Bund won over members of the German-American Business League, recruiting storeowners in German-American enclaves to their cause. These businessmen then proudly displayed their affiliation with the Bund in their store windows, spreading awareness of the Bund to their customers, many of whom also joined the Bund.748

By coopting sympathetic elements of German-American civil society, the Bund was able to expand beyond a core group of extremists, acquiring enough members to be taken seriously, and thereby acquiring a veneer of respectability. The Bund even acted as a “normal” emigrant self-help organization—it ran summer camps, coordinated various “cultural” activities, and acted as a hub for socializing.749 All this destigmatized fascism, at least enough to lure twenty thousand people in New York to a Nazi rally.

In contrast, the Domobran’s approach to existing emigrant groups was more belligerent—it sought to compete with them and poach their members, rather than swallow them outright.

749 Ibid, 34-36.
After all, these tactics had worked in South America and Belgium. As a result, the Domobran did not seek to absorb an ideologically-similar immigrant organization, the *Hrvatski Kolo*, or Croatian Circle. Although the Circle shared the Domobran’s goal of an independent Croatia, were indigenous to the US, having no affiliation or guidance from old-country parties.750 This was the Croatian counterpart to the Teutonia organization that the Bund assimilated. Shortly after Jelić’s surprise arrival in the United States, Circle leaders invited Jelić to speak with them in Youngstown, Ohio and proposing an alliance. Jelić, however, rebuffed their offer. Instead of using existing emigrant societies, Jelić apparently thought it better if the Domobran founded its own lodges, rather than piggybacking off of the Circle. Moreover, the Circle was a relatively small organization and Jelić believed the Domobran would be able to recruit more effectively on its own.751 After all, this strategy of independent organizing had worked well in South America. Nevertheless, the Croatian Circle and the Domobran, despite their ideological similarities, soon became bitter enemies, with the main Circle newspaper, *Danica Hrvatska*, started issuing sharp polemics against Jelić.752 With both the HSS and the Domobran as enemies, the Circle seemed to have trouble making friends.

The Croatian Circle’s press attacks on the Domobran and Jelić were soon supplemented by the communist and socialist-minded Croats, who began to publicly assert that the Ustaša movement was funded by Mussolini and served the interests of Italian expansionism into the Balkans. A Croatian Day event in Chicago in October, 1934, at which Jelić was scheduled to

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750 “Separatistička Organizacija ‘Hrvatski Domobran,’” Informative Bulletin from MIP Political Division to the Chicago General Consulate, June 19, 1933. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.
751 Report from Kolumbatović to MIP, political division, August 23, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51 BO 66, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
speak, was hijacked by Communists, who passed a resolution denouncing both Mussolini and Jelić as Mussolini’s collaborator. Shortly thereafter, Jelić essentially became a *persona non grata* among a majority of American Croats. Ironically, this backlash against the Domobran had the effect of pushing the Croatian Circle slightly toward the center, such that their primary newspaper, the *Danica Hrvatska*, renounced their support for Mussolini. The shelter of the Croatian Fraternal Union was likewise forcefully withdrawn as Jelić and his staff were expelled from their office in the Croatian Fraternal Union headquarters in 1934, a move that took place on the authority of William Boyd/Boić, the pro-Yugoslav Vice President of the Croatian Fraternal Union, who also served as an Ohio State Senator.

The tactic of linking the Domobran and Italy proved so effective that it was also adopted by the Yugoslav diplomatic service, who, by 1935, were continuously supplying the entire émigré press, including “separatist” newspapers otherwise unfriendly to the Yugoslav government, with material alleging that the Domobran movements organizers were subsidized by Mussolini. As unpopular as the Yugoslav monarchy was with American Croats, Mussolini and Italy were still seen as greater threats.

The Domobran movement faced a more mundane hurdle as well, according to Kolumbatović: “those few Croats who still occupy themselves with old-country politics have already aligned themselves with the Croatian Circle or the Croatian Peasant Party, or the Clericals, or, as is most common, the Communists, and as a result the Ustaša movement can only act as a spoiler, poaching members from these other groups.” In general, Kolumbatović did

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753 Report from Kolumbatović to MIP, political division, October 5, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO 66, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
756 Report from Kolumbatović to MIP, political division, August 23, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51 BO 66, Arhiv Jugoslavije
not regard the Domobran as a serious threat, cynically noting in a separate report that “it is difficult to believe that they will send assassins from America, because such an action requires the kind of financial means that few organizations here possess, especially the local leaders of Croatian separatists, who are generally the type that collect money in the name of patriotism and then find a pretext to keep it all to themselves.” In other words, the financial resources of migrants interested in old country politics were already being tapped by organizations like the Croatian Circle. As such, existing emigrant organizations had both a financial and an organizational reason to quash the Domobran.

Based on the FBI investigation, it appears as though the Domobran continued to employ the same pressure tactics, threats of violence, and so on, in order to keep members loyal to the organization. Intimidation tactics may have been less effective in the United States, where migrant associations had more members—it is one thing to beat and threaten a member of an organization with two-hundred members, and quite another to do the same thing to a member of an organization like the Croatian Fraternal Union with ninety thousand. Moreover, large fraternal unions were also better able to weather the Great Depression and provide insurance and various social welfare benefits to their members, thereby negating the main attraction of the Domobran organization in Argentina and Belgium. And lastly, large fraternal unions, in contradistinction to their counterparts in South America, had their own newspapers with a much greater circulation than the Domobran newspapers, meaning that they could win any polemical contest with the Domobran.

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758 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Memorandum for Mr. James R. Sharp Re: Hrvatski Domobran, Ante Doshen, Luka Grbich, Frank Budak, and Nikola Sulentich, April 3, 1944, p. 8. Alex Dragnich Papers, Box 33, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives
As a result, the Domobran, unlike the Bund, never acquired the critical mass of dues-paying members needed to become self-sufficient or respectable. Moreover, unlike the Domobran, the Bund did not rely on subsidies from the German (or Italian) government—the German chancellery considered the Bund an embarrassment and avoided any organizational ties.\footnote{Bernstein, Swastika Nation, 163-5.} Being funded from abroad, in turn, exposed the Domobran to the charge of being agents of a foreign power. The Bund, in comparison, could not be disbanded in this way, and so the FBI had to resort to the Al Capone gambit: nailing the Bundesführer for tax-evasion and embezzlement.\footnote{Bernstein, Swastika Nation, 229-283.}

Of course, the Domobran might have been more successful if it had tried to infiltrate existing civil society organizations, rather than compete with them. Besides working for the Bund, this strategy proved to be fruitful for several European fascist movements, as Dylan Riley documents. Success depended on whether the existing leadership of these organizations can be coopted or forced out—the rank and file generally follow suit so long as their self-help organization continues to provide benefits. For instance, the early Italian fascist movement, the squadristi, when faced with direct competition from various socialist and peasant organizations, opted to assassinate the leaders of these organizations, inheriting their membership, and retaining the rank and file by continuing to provide many of the same welfare services: health insurance, a mutual fund, youth excursions, and so forth.\footnote{Dylan Riley, The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain, and Romania, 1870-1945 (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2010), 53, 62-4.} Likewise, in Spain, Carlists drew upon an existing dense network of Catholic civil society organizations, who were threatened by the anti-Clerical policies of a leftist government.\footnote{Ibid, 99.} Conversely, the traditional organization of

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\footnote{Bernstein, Swastika Nation, 163-5.} \footnote{Bernstein, Swastika Nation, 229-283.} \footnote{Dylan Riley, The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe: Italy, Spain, and Romania, 1870-1945 (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2010), 53, 62-4.} \footnote{Ibid, 99.}
conservatives in Catalonia, the Lliga, was not threatened with extinction by the Catalan left, and thus had no reason to turn to fascism.\footnote{Ibid, 102-103.} Cooption and infiltration of existing civil society organizations and their leaders works best when traditional conservatism appears illegitimate and unrepresentative of the will of the people, a vacuum that fascist organizations can fill.\footnote{Ibid, 194.}

For the Domobran in the United States, this strategy meant winning over the leader of the Croatian Fraternal Union, Ivan Butković, who had previously given the Domobran office space in CFU headquarters. But although Butković-as-a-person may have been sympathetic to the Domobran, Butković-as-a-politician had little to gain and much to lose from cooperation with the far right. In fact, this was the assessment of Došen himself. Confiscated correspondence in his FBI file expresses Došen’s repeated disappointment with Butković’s failure to fully commit to the Ustaša cause. On September 22, 1937 Došen complained that Butković was attempting to influence the coverage of Nezavisna Hrvatska Država in order to make it friendlier to the Croatian Peasant Party.\footnote{Federal Bureau of Investigation, Supplement Part II, Exhibit 29, 1943. Alex Dragnich Papers, Box 33, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.} On that same day, in his diary, Došen called Butković a “bum.” A week later, Došen called Butković a “beast” in his diary, following a pro-Maček editorial in Zajedničar.\footnote{Federal Bureau of Investigation, Supplement Part II, Exhibit 30, 1943. Alex Dragnich Papers, Box 33, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.} Butković’s fickleness had political motivations. His political base within the CFU, the nationalists, tended to sympathize with either the Frankists, a traditional conservative party, or the Croatian peasant party.\footnote{“Hrvatski Separatistički Pokret; sabiranje potpisa protesta; sukob izmedju HSRS i Hrvatskog Kola; Izbori Delegata na Konvenciju Hrvatske Bratske Zajednice,” Report from the Chicago Consulate to MIP, April 12, 1938. Fond 414, fasc. 4, BO 7, AJ.} Moreover, the hold of the nationalist bloc over the CFU was somewhat precarious—the left and center wings of the CFU gained ground in the 1935 and 1939 conventions of the CFU, winning the vice presidency and a host of administrative positions,
including the editorship of the English-language section of Zajedničar. By aligning himself entirely with the Domobran, Butković risked splintering the nationalist bloc and falling from power. Thus, it is not surprising that his flirtation with the Domobran remained just a dalliance.

**Conclusion**

Each of these four parties—the Pribićevići, Croatian Peasant Party, Communists, and Ustaša—approached diaspora politics differently. Yet, through these different approaches ran several common threads. First, the KPJ, HSS, and Ustaša all struggled with independent-minded activists in the “tenth banovina.” Both the Domobran and the Croatian Peasant Party fought the Croatian Circle, just as the KPJ struggled with the CPUSA.

Second, these parties articulated similar complaints about the common people—about their low cultural level and disinterest in conditions in Yugoslavia. This ties back to a question posed in the introduction about what motivates economic migrants to become national activists. As we see in the various recruitment narratives, emigrants who joined national organizations were often motivated by their material concerns as migrant workers (the need for insurance, a social hub, or a political platform that promises workers liberation) than by outright nationalism.

Third, to combat heterodoxy and indifference, each party realized the importance of physically stationing trusted non-emigrant party figures, i.e. Jelić for the Domobran, Košutić for the HSS, Stojan Pribićević for the DS, or “Uncle Sam” for the KPJ, to ensure that immigrant activists were kept informed about the Party line. This, in turn, answers another of our research question about how transnational networks are maintained. Using family members to forge

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durable transatlantic ties was a common strategy, particularly for the Domobran, many of whose members were relatives of Ante Pavelić’s inner circle. The major exception to this trend were the KPJ, which developed a rudimentary bureaucracy, the Emkom, and a courier/smuggling system based on sailors. Within this network, travel and travelers, once again, occupied an outsized role. The continued existence of these parties overseas depended on regular infusions of capital, both symbolic and financial, that were related by political figures crossing the Atlantic. Their credibility and authority within emigrant communities depended on their ability to speak from personal experience about conditions in the ‘old country.’ This, in turn, made them able to smooth over the differences between various emigrant factions, such as the left and center wings of the CFU or the various squabbling individuals within the Domobran organization. In short, travel and travelers made denser the network of emigrant organizations necessary to the functioning of a “diaspora.”

And fourth, all four Yugoslav parties regarded the Croatian Fraternal Union as the key to the “tenth banovina,” although the KPJ also meddled in the politics of the Serbian National Federation and the SNPJ. These similarities are not coincidental. A recurrent theme of this chapter has been that all four parties paid attention to what the others were doing and sought to learn from the others’ mistakes. All four political parties, both through their cooperation and their competition, helped reshape the political geography among emigrants in North America. Spurred on by the advocacy and speeches of old country politicians and activists like Košutić, Krnjević, Pribićević, and “Uncle Sam,” Communists, socialists, liberals, and HSS-sympathizers overcame mutual suspicions and forged an alliance against the tyranny of Belgrade and the fascism of the Domobran. Common enemies make for steadfast friends. In fighting against the Domobran with one hand and the Belgrade regime with the other, partisans of the HSS, DS, and
Communists in the United States helped shift the political mood toward Yugoslavism and antifascism. This is critical to understanding the development in the second half of the 1930s of a broad leftist coalition in the United States that favored preserving Yugoslavia but overthrowing its government.
CHAPTER FIVE: ON THEIR OWN: YUGOSLAV CULTURAL POLITICS FROM 1934-1941

On October 9, 1934 in Marseille, King Alexander of Yugoslavia was assassinated by a member of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, who was working in concert with Ante Pavelić’s Ustaša movement. The first assassination to be caught on film, Alexander’s death stunned a worldwide audience. While Louis Adamic may have also been shocked, he was not surprised. The day after the assassination, Adamic was quoted in the New York Times stating that he “predicted the end of King Alexander nearly a year ago,” and that “Alexander, with his absolutist and tyrannical character and his terrorism over the last six years, is far more to blame for his own death than is the man who fired the shots.”769 Indeed, in the conclusion to his bestseller, The Native’s Return, Adamic had predicted that Alexander would be violently overthrown á la Nicholas II.770

But while the death of the Russian Tsar heralded political revolution, what would follow Alexander was unclear. In a follow-up essay in The Nation titled, “What Next in Jugoslavia,” Adamic predicted that, following a few years of regency under Prince Paul (whom Adamic characterized as a “decadently handsome fellow…with no outstanding qualities”), Yugoslavia would become a “union of four semi-autonomous republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia—with Belgrade as federal capital.” This union would soon also include Bulgaria, all following another revolution. Russia, Adamic believed, would be this federation’s natural ally, and if war in Europe broke out, Adamic predicted that the communists would win.771 All of this, save the inclusion of Bulgaria in a Yugoslav federation, would come to pass by 1945.

769 Louis Adamic, quoted in “King was a Tyrant, Louis Adamic Holds,” The New York Times, October 10, 1934.
Although Adamic was off by a decade, his anti-monarchist, leftist, federalist, and pan-Slavic prescription for Yugoslavia would, by Yugoslavia’s destruction in April 1941, become a unifying political view within the “tenth banovina.” But this was hardly predetermined. As Chapter Four argues, the emergence of a “Yugoslav diaspora” was partly a reaction to the overseas intrigues of activists from four old-country political parties: the HSS, DS, KPJ, and Ustaša. But it also depended on whether the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could right the ship, transcending the excesses of the dictatorship that were documented in Chapter Three, thereby allowing advocates of Yugoslav unity an official outlet.

As this chapter will argue, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was unable to salvage its failing attempt to win the loyalty of the “tenth banovina.” Although Yugoslav diplomats during Alexander’s dictatorship created much ill will through their clumsy efforts to censor and intimidate overseas critics, this chapter will show that Yugoslav diplomats during the regency of Prince Paul blundered by underfunding emigrant efforts to articulate and commemorate Yugoslav culture. Emigrant commentators began arguing that, in official eyes, the “Yugoslav diaspora” existed only as a source of money and staged displays of national loyalty that could be used for internal Yugoslav propaganda. They were not wrong, as this chapter will show through a brief excursion through the Emigration Museum in Zagreb, which was open between 1934 and 1941, as well as the Yugoslav Pavilion at the 1939 World Fair in New York.

Yet migrants in this period would also erect their own monuments: a Yugoslav Room in the Pittsburgh Cathedral of Learning and a Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland. Emigrant efforts, these cultural projects showcased not only the initiative of migrants who understood that they could no longer rely on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but also the cooperation between emigrant self-help societies. The imagined community of the “Yugoslav diaspora” was increasingly
interlinked by joint fundraising efforts for these projects, a common immigrant narrative, and even a Yugoslav Radio Station. These habits of cooperation would ease the way toward Adamic’s envisioned pro-Yugoslav, anti-regime diaspora coalition, whose outlines were already beginning to emerge in 1939 in the context of a rising tide of panslavic sentiment.

From Yugoslavism to Serb Chauvinism?

Although Yugoslav diplomats always doubted the loyalty of American Croats, Alexander’s murder hardened suspicions into paranoia. For instance, the Yugoslav legation’s survey of emigrant press attitudes toward Alexander’s death reveals how Yugoslav diplomats increasingly thought about loyalty in ethnic terms. The Serbian National Union mourned, “except for a small Bolshevik and extreme separatist minority.” Most American Slovenes, the charge d’affaires was confident, also grieved, although this conclusion was based on a few conversations and may have been wishful thinking. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Croatian Fraternal Union and their main organ, Zajedničar (The Unionist), was jubilant. Even more concerning, Nezavisna Hrvatska Država (The Independent State of Croatia), an organ of the fascist Domobran, had begun to be printed and distributed in Pittsburgh. It too rejoiced (for obvious reasons). But the most common reaction was indifference—few Croats mourned Alexander’s passing, the legation believed.\textsuperscript{772} Serbs, however, were another matter. The next month, the charge d’affaires enthused in a report to MIP minister Bogoljub Jeftić, “in all colonies where one can find our national churches and organizations, \textit{wherever Serbs live} [emphasis mine], memorial services for our blessed King Alexander I were held.” The Slovenes also held services, although their participation was more muted, whereas American Croats, “poisoned by

Catholic priests and foreign mercenaries,” manifested either indifference or defiant schadenfreude.\footnote{Report from the charge d’affaires of the Washington Embassy to Bogoljub Jevtić, November 5, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51, broj opis 66, Arhiv Jugoslavije.}

A less biased portrait of loyalty to the Yugoslav regime can be extracted from the list of roughly forty organizations in North America that sent their condolences to the Royal Chancellery in Belgrade, a list that contains only a few “Yugoslav” named organizations and not one Slovenian or Croatian organization\footnote{Letter from the palace minister Milan Antić to the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, November 16, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 51, broj opis 66, Arhiv Jugoslavije.}

But while Yugoslav diplomats may have thought about the diaspora as composed of loyal Serbs, slightly less loyal Slovenes, and traitorous Croats, this ethnic conception of loyalty would lead Yugoslav diplomats and their program of diaspora Yugoslavization down a dangerous road, a bias that would be reinforced by a personnel reshuffle in the Yugoslav diplomatic apparatus in the United States in 1934. Kolumbatović, the Chicago consul responsible for the anti-press campaign of the dictatorship period, was reassigned to the Chilean embassy, where he could do less damage.\footnote{“Oproštaj Čikaške Kolonije Konsulom Dr. Kolumbatovićem,” Srbobran, [undated], found with 1934, Fond 967, kut. 39, HDA.} Since Kolumbatović had been the driving personality behind Yugoslav cultural diplomacy in the United States, the Yugoslav diplomatic service in the United States drifted along rudderless for most of 1934 and 1935.

In 1936, however, a new helmsman appeared: Konstantin Fotić, who was appointed head of the Yugoslav Legation in Washington in 1936 by Milan Stojadinović. Stojadinović’s controversial tenure as prime minister of Yugoslavia was characterized by the pursuit of closer relations with Nazi Germany and Italy, which he viewed as existential threats to Yugoslavia that
needed to be appeased. Fotić, the first Serb to head the Washington embassy, was part of that effort. Formerly the permanent Yugoslav representative to the League of Nations, Fotić was famously inscrutable, rarely articulating his personal views regarding Croats or fascism. Although the full extent of Fotić’s activities during World War II will be discussed in the next chapter, it will suffice to note that after 1941, when Germany invaded Yugoslavia and set up puppet governments in Serbia and Croatia, Fotić stoked ethnic tensions by supplying Serbian nationalist groups with information about Croatian atrocities. Additionally, Fotić was a blood relation of Nedić, the Nazi quisling in occupied Serbia, and Dmitri Ljotić, leader of a fringe Serbian fascist party in interwar Yugoslavia, whom Fotić in 1942 called “a good patriot.” As such, Fotić’s commitment to Yugoslavism was weak and his appointment as head of the Yugoslav diplomatic apparatus in the United States boded poorly for national unity.

However, in 1936 few knew where Fotić stood politically, and his arrival was greeted with optimism by some, like John Palandech’s newspaper Yugoslavia, which expressed the hope that Fotić’s appointment heralded a “new era in the emigration—where the Yugoslav state would care for us emigrants.” After all, Yugoslavia had just recently paid for the funeral of Ante

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776 The first Yugoslav to head the legation, Ante Trešić-Pavičić, was a Croat. His successor, Leonid Pitamić, who took over in 1929, was a Slovene.

777 Fotić initially believed he had official support for this course of action, and reported it to his superiors in MIP, who rebuked him and ordered him to halt newspaper polemics between Serbs and Croats in the US. Fotić subsequently denied responsibility for the offending article in Srbobran. See: Letter from Konstantin Fotić to MIP, November 12, 1941, Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; Letter from Ninčić to Fotić, November 20, 1941, Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; Letter from Konstantin Fotić to MIP, November 21, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ. Lastly, in 1945, Additionally, in 1945 the Yugoslav embassy in Washington, now under new leadership, collected depositions from several of Fotić’s subordinates, including Bogdan Radica, who worked for the Yugoslav pressbureau in New York, stating that Fotić had aligned himself with far-right Serb groups in the United States and had been supplying them with details about Croatian atrocities in Yugoslavia and opposed the recreation of Yugoslavia on the grounds of anti-Croat animus. See: “Proces Fotić ’P.M.‘,” Report from the Washington Embassy to MIP, August 11, 1945. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ.

Biankini, a Croat and Yugoslav activist.\textsuperscript{779} Moreover, speaking at the opening of a Yugoslav Pavilion at the Pacific Internation Exposition in San Diego, Fotić had promised the emigrants present that “your fatherland has not forgotten you.”\textsuperscript{780} However, Yugoslavia’s first impression would prove misleading, as many émigré Yugoslav cultural initiatives over the next half-decade would suffer from financial neglect.

**Jurisdictional Disputes**

Language schools for second generation of American Yugoslavs were a case in point, and it is worth contrasting Yugoslav support for emigrant schools in the early and later half of the thirties. Parochial language schools had, of course, existed prior to 1934, being the dominant venue for language education among the second generation, particularly among Croats and Slovenes—the Catholic church had more financial resources to fund such schools than did the Serbian Orthodox Church. Even so, these parochial schools had their share of problems, including shortages of money and reading materials. They also met infrequently, typically once or twice a week. As a result, many children of emigrants were growing up ignorant not just of the sound of their parent’s language, but also of the culture and history of the old country. Writing to the ministry of Social Policy and National Health, which oversaw the Emigration Commissariat (IK) in Zagreb, Adela Milčinović, the Yugoslav Emigrant Commissioner in New York, requested new textbooks, preferably with pictures, as her students’ grasp of Yugoslav culture was often weaker than their command of the language.\textsuperscript{781} The IK complied, sending textbooks to an unspecified number of schools in the United States.\textsuperscript{782}

\textsuperscript{779} “Nova Era u Emigraciji,” *Yugoslavia*, May 23, 1936. Fond 967, kut. 39, HDA.
\textsuperscript{780} “Govor. Dr. Konstantin Fotića,” *Yugoslavia*, May 23, 1936. Fond 967, kut. 39, HDA.
\textsuperscript{781} Adela Milčinović, “Izveštaj o školama i školskim prilikama u Sjedinjenim Državama,” Report to the Yugoslav Ministry of Social Policy and National Health, February 20, 1932. Fond 1071, fasc. 567, HDA.
\textsuperscript{782} Letter from Adela Milčinović to the IK, February 9, 1932. Fond 1071, fasc. 567, HDA.
Fortunately, the IK did identify the title and publisher, making it possible to track down a copy. Produced by a Slovene press based in Ljubljana, these were high-quality textbooks whose content did not inordinately privilege Serb, Croat, and Slovene culture. Predominantly picture books, these textbooks contained several maps and hundreds of black-and-white photographs of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in folk costumes, archeological and geographical sites of interest from across Yugoslavia, as well as depictions of mines, factories, farms, and government buildings. Interestingly, the captions for many of these pictures are not in the local dialect—locations in Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia (but not Slovenia) are captioned in both Cyrillic and Latin script, with subcaptions in French, German, and English. The production quality was high, as well—although the pages have yellowed ninety years later, the binding remains intact, the typeface crisp and the pictures glossy. In short, the IK spared no expense to promote a synthetic Yugoslav patriotism among migrants, at least in North America. The IK also sent textbooks to South America, although there were very few schools there for them to support. In fact, in South America there was only one formal Yugoslav school, in Antofagasta, Chile, although by 1939, that number had improved, such that there were now five in Argentina as well.

Over the second half of the 1930s, however, the IK’s outpost in New York suffered a series of setbacks that stemmed from a decade-old interbureaucratic rivalry. Established in 1923, the iseljenički izaslanstvo, or “emigrant deputation,” was a bureau in New York responsible for propaganda work among the diaspora and collecting demographic information. As a distant appendage of the Department of Social Policy and National Health, the Emigrant Deputation had

783 Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata, i Slovenaca, (Ljubljana: Jugoslovanska tiskarna, 1927)
784 Letter from the Yugoslav Legation in Buenos Aires to MIP, July 20, 1933. Fond 385, fasc. 3, BO 26, AJ.
many of the same responsibilities as the Yugoslav Consulates, which were under the Department of Foreign Affairs. The stage was set for a jurisdictional dispute.

The Yugoslav foreign service repeatedly petitioned their superiors to abolish the deputation, citing its redundancy and expense—once in 1923, again more forcibly in 1928, again in 1930, and again in 1932. In 1931, the general consulate in New York also asked the Minister of Education to fire Adela Milčinović, a Croat, on the unsubstantiated contention that she “did not relate to the Yugoslav question as if she belonged to our people” and had consequently “done nothing to shield our children from denationalization.” In short, an anti-Croat dogwhistle.

Some time after, she was replaced as head of the Emigrant Deputation bureau by Slavoj Trost, a Slovene, who had an unstable and choleric temperament. Simultaneously, the budget of the Emigrant Deputation was slashed and many of its responsibilities were transferred over to the consulates. Finally, in 1935, Trost lost his temper and hit a consular employee in the nose during a heated argument. Trost was then transferred to a different posting. This incident probably did not enhance the prestige of the Yugoslav diplomatic service. Moreover, it seems to have coincided with a transfer of jurisdiction over migrant schools from the Emigration Deputation to the Yugoslav Legation. As we will see, they would not be as generous as the IK.

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787 “Pitanje Iseljeničkih Komesara u Americi,” Letter to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington from the Yugoslav Consulate in Chicago, December 3, 1923. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 12, AJ.
788 Letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Political Directorate, from the General Consulate of Yugoslavia in New York, June 16, 1928. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 12, AJ.
789 Letter from Radoje Janković to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 16, 1930. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 12, AJ.
790 Letter from Radoje Janković to the Ministry of Social Policy and National Health, March 17, 1932. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 12, AJ.
791 Letter from the Radoje Janković to the Minister of Education, September 1, 1931. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 12, AJ.
792 Report from Radoje Janković to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 27, 1935. Fond 449, fasc. 6, BO 12, AJ.
**Yugoslav Language Schools**

This shift in jurisdiction coincided with a new emigrant drive for Yugoslav language schools that would be independent of the Church. The first organization of this type was the “Yugoslav School” in New York City. Founded in either 1934 or 1935, little record remains of its origins—it was not on the radar of the Yugoslav consulate. In a subsequent investigation from 1936, New York Consul Radoje Janković discovered that shortly after its founding, the Serbian students split off from this group to found a Serbian school, which soon collapsed.\(^{794}\) We can presume the remaining students were primarily Croat and Slovene. In contrast to the Serbian school, this Yugoslav school prospered, at least for a short time.\(^{795}\) Although the reason for the Yugoslav school’s success was left unexplained, the Croat and the Slovene communities in the United States were more numerous, and thus better able to share the financial burdens of supporting a school.

This drive to educate the second generation spread memetically, illustrating the degree to which the Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities already intermingled and worked together. In Cleveland, in 1936, thirty-five youths of Croatian, Slovene, and Serb ancestry, who belonged to an English-speaking lodge of the Croatian Fraternal Union in Cleveland, pooled their resources to hire someone to teach them Serbo-Croatian. Although their first choice, a Croatian professor at Cleveland College, demanded too high a price for his services, ($5 per evening) they eventually found a Serbian Orthodox priest who was willing to work pro-bono. Notwithstanding the Serbian instructor, the Croatian Fraternal Union contributed $25 to the running of the school, as did several unnamed local notables. The prospective students benefitted from the connections

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\(^{794}\) Radoje Janković, “Jugoslovenska Škola u New-Yourku; informacije,” Report to the Washington Legation, June 11, 1936. Fond 449, fasc. 6, BO 12, AJ.

\(^{795}\) Ibid.
of Michael Cerrezin, a Croatian-American working as vice-consul. It would be Cerrezin who helped the prospective students solicit donations from his contacts, and found them a classroom and an instructor.796

Continuing the trend, in 1937, a national activist and teacher established in San Pedro the Yugoslav-American Educational Society, which set up biweekly afterschool programs in Serbo-Croatian for both adults and children at the local high school, again the first of its kind. The Croatian community in San Pedro was large and affluent, and seemed willing to support not only this school, but also a new Yugoslav-oriented newspaper. The major bottleneck was an insufficient supply of language textbooks, a shortage that motivated this activist to write to Konstantin Fotić.797 Aside from timing, the thread running through these examples is how these schools emerged organically through the efforts of diaspora activists, and often enjoyed the support of local Croats, whom the diplomatic service tended to regard as disloyal.

Community support for all three organizations dried up shortly after they sought the backing of the Yugoslav diplomatic service. The first to fail was the Yugoslav School in New York City. According to its president, Anka Sarapa, it could not raise enough money from the diaspora community to support its activities and was forced to request assistance from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington.798

A similar pattern held for the Yugoslav School in Cleveland. Cerrezin wrote to Fotić suggesting the Yugoslav government contribute financially as well, asking for $150. But the wording of his proposal for doing so suggested the degree to which consular money had become tainted. He wrote, “in giving this donation, for perhaps political and other reasons, it may be best

796 Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Konstantin Fotić, March 11, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ; Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Konstantin Fotić, March 25, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
797 Letter from Mihajlo Rokić to Konstantin Fotić, July 5, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
798 Letter from Anka Sarapa to Konstantin Fotić, May 8, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
not to mention the source from which this money is coming. If the matter is handled through me, I can very well say that some American friends contributed the money [emphasis mine].” As an well-to-do attorney in Cleveland who worked pro-bono as a vice-consul, Cerrezin was known for various acts of charity, although he did not advertise his sideline as a Yugoslav diplomat. In other words, donations from the diplomatic service had to be laundered before they could be accepted! Cerrezin’s advice for discretion was ignored, and a smaller sum of $50 was ceremoniously presented to the class with Fotić named as a donor. The students were apparently surprised to learn the donation’s source, and no doubt confused as to why a ceremony was needed for such a small sum.

Roughly a year later, vice-consul Cerrezin wrote his superior Fotić a three-page letter angrily complaining that Fotić had unfairly accused him (a Croat), of ulterior motives and disloyalty in his scheduling of the 1937 Yugoslav Day celebrations. Another anti-Croat slur, similar to the insults directed against Adela Milčinović—showing that the loyalty of Croats was suspect to the Yugoslav diplomatic service. Cerrezin presumably resigned shortly thereafter, stating: “I personally feel like I am not being treated fairly…Candidness compels me to inform your excellency that as long as I feel the way that I do, it would be most difficult for me to…carry on the program for Yugoslav Day or other things that had been planned.” As with Adela Milčinović, Croats in the diplomatic service were slowly being driven out. The subsequent fate of the school is unknown, but without Cerrezin to act as a go-between, it surely experienced difficulties.

799 Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Konstantin Fotić, March 11, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ; Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Konstantin Fotić, March 25, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
800 Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Konstantin Fotić, May 20, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
801 Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Konstantin Fotić, April 6, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ
802 Letter from Michael Cerrezin to Konstantin Fotić, May 20, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
Cerrezin’s comment about the need to conceal the source of governmental donations does, however, illuminate the cause of the failure of the Yugoslav-American educational society. At one school that they had set up to serve the large Yugoslav enclave in San Pedro, California, enrollment had collapsed from 175 to 38 students. Even worse, the Yugoslav club in San Pedro had cut the school’s monthly subsidy to $15, which could only cover rent. This was not for lack of resources—writing to Minister Fotić, the president of the Yugoslav-American educational society observed that “it is a regrettable fact that, in this large and rich colony of ours, it is not possible to get enough support from either individuals or organizations to achieve the cultural successes that the reputation of our nation demands. The reasons for this lie both in prewar ignorance and confusion and in the present-day influence of separatism and partisanship [emphasis mine].” In other words, political opposition to the Yugoslav state made it difficult for this group to solicit donations from the emigration, which had heretofore funded a full-time language school for second-generation Yugoslavs. These conditions forced the Yugoslav-American educational society to seek assistance from the Yugoslav Legation.\footnote{Letter from Mihajlo Rokić and Stjepan Stambuk to Konstantin Fotić, June 1, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.}

But in typical fashion, Fotić’s help was a counterproductive half-measure. Instead of money, the Yugoslav Legation contributed seventy textbooks and ten readers. Not only was this donation smaller than had been sent in previous years, but half the textbooks and every reader were useless to an overwhelmingly Croatian group of students, having been printed in Cyrillic, which the Latin-alphabet-using Croats could not read.\footnote{Letter from Mihajlo Rokić to Konstantin Fotić, June 1, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ; Letter from Mihajlo Rokić to Konstantin Fotić, November 25, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ} These presented a stark contrast to the textbooks sent by the IK, which were printed in both Latin and Cyrillic.
Yugoslav support for higher education was similarly deficient. Take, for instance, the case of Anthony Joseph Klančar, a second-generation Slovene and a graduate of the University of Illinois, where he worked to translate the Slovene nationalist literary canon into English. In 1934, Klančar wrote to the Yugoslav legation asking for a graduate fellowship to study Slavic literature at the University of California. In his request, Klančar explained that “I have always felt that my mission in this country lay in showing our American friends what the Jugoslav stands for. I have, therefore, interested myself profoundly in Jugoslavia [and]…hope one day to become an expert on Jugoslavia.”\textsuperscript{805} Here was someone who, like Adamic, demonstrated that acculturation was not incompatible with Yugoslavism, and, moreover, appeared poised to become a spokesperson with the Yugoslav idea. Nor did the similarities with Adamic end there.

After the Yugoslav legation rejected his request (with no explanation), Klančar wrote back:

\begin{quote}
Before I received your letter of June 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1934, I was in the hope of having a lifelong ambition realized. Frankly, I must say that I am deeply disappointed. I wrote out of a naïve hope that His Excellency or you, Mr. Stoianovich (the charge d’affairs) would recognize the value of my work and deal with it accordingly. It seems my fate will be such as Louis Adamic’s…[emphasis mine]\textsuperscript{806}
\end{quote}

Clearly new to graduate student life, Klančar had not yet become inured to rejection letters.

Despite his prediction, Klančar never quite became another Louis Adamic, although in 1939 he did translate into English Dragotin Lončar’s \textit{The Slovenes: A Social History}, which interpreted Slovene history through a populist lens.\textsuperscript{807} Nonetheless, Klančar's irate response illustrated how Adamic had already become a symbol of emigrant discontent with Yugoslav’s neglect toward its overseas population, as well as its expression in a critique of Yugoslavia’s government.

\textsuperscript{805} Letter from A.G. Klančar to the Yugoslav Legation, May 19, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
\textsuperscript{806} Letter from A.G. Klančar to the Yugoslav Legation, July 20, 1934. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
Shaken by Adamic’s example, Yugoslav officials were also wary of supporting any emigrant group that was critical of the royalist government. We see this, for instance, in the emergence of exchange programs for Yugoslav-American students. In 1934, the Serbian National Union founded a scholarship fund that sent twelve students of Serbian heritage to study at Belgrade University for four years. The Ministry of Social Politics and National Health in Belgrade got wind of this initiative the following year, arguing that it could be a bulwark against the “danger of assimilation.” The ministry then contacted the emigrant deputation in America, asking them to persuade Croatian and Slovenian fraternal organizations in the United States should follow suit.808 A spokesperson for one of the Slovene colleges proposed for the exchange program was skeptical, however. The members of the SNPJ, the Slovene Mutual Benefit Society, they argued, “were all extreme socialists, practically communists,” and their newspaper presses had “reprinted Adamic’s infamous book.” Even if they were to agree to set up a study abroad program, the emigrational deputation argued, exchange students would need to be politically vetted to ensure they were not communists.809

Croatian and Slovene fraternal organizations in the United States were also reluctant to cooperate. Ivan Butković, president of the Croatian Fraternal Union, expressed his wish that students be sent only to Croatian territories where they would study Croatian history and customs.810 The KSKJ, a conservative Slovene organization, was likewise non-committal, only promising to raise the issue with the central committee.811 And the SNPJ never replied at all. The

808 Yugoslav Ministry of Social Politics and National Health to Slavoj Trost, January 31, 1935. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
809 Letter from P. Kazimir Zakrajišek to Yugoslav Ministry of Social Politics and National Health, February 14, 1935. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
810 Letter from Ivan Butković to Slavoj Trost, June 3, 1935. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
811 KSKJ President to Slavoj Trost, June 16, 1935. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
Yugoslav consul in Chicago relayed the reasons for their reluctance. The main problem, he argued, was that “there has not been sufficient support on our part for this sort of action.” After all, Yugoslav authorities had made no offer to subsidize these programs, hoping emigrant associations would do it themselves. Moreover, the parents of prospective students were concerned that their children would be drafted into the Yugoslav army—it should be recalled that Yugoslavia had extended citizenship to emigrants and their children in 1928, making young men draftable if they entered Yugoslavia.812 In other words, Yugoslavia’s legal attempts to claim its immigrants were only driving them away. Moreover, their reluctance to spend money on immigrant outreach, combined with their fear of criticism, made it difficult for them to win back alienated emigrants.

The Maksimović Brothers Go to Hollywood

Yugoslav diplomats also failed to adequately support cultural missionaries from Yugoslavia. In 1936, the Maksimović Brothers, a quartet of music students from Belgrade, traveled to the Midwest to perform Serbian folk music for emigrant communities. They were quite popular, according to contemporary accounts.813 A year later, however, the Yugoslav legation received a letter from a woman working in the motion picture industry. As it turned out, the Maksimović brothers, following their successes in the Midwest, had traveled to Los Angeles and auditioned with several Hollywood studios. Although they had been rejected everywhere, they could not, the letter writer averred, “be made to realize that they aren’t to have a ‘break in pictures.’” Broke, visibly undernourished, and wearing threadbare clothes, they had worn out their welcome in Hollywood.814 The quartet also wrote to Fotić directly to ask for money—

813 Millee Velimirovich, “Maksimovich Quartet Captivates Youth,” American Srbobran, June 25, 1936. Fond 967, Kut. 34, HAD.
814 Letter from Helen Scheuer to the Yugoslav Embassy, undated, found with 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
apparently they had been living entirely off ticket sales from concerts. In his reply, Fotić thanked them for their efforts, informed them that he could not extend them credit, and assured them that they “will find some sort of work in the United States and the financial means to return to the Fatherland.” In other words, “get a real job, musician!” The Maksimović brothers would have the last laugh, however. After having their request rejected by the legation, the Maksimović Brothers nonetheless promised their landlady that they were “wards of the Yugoslavian government” and were certainly going to pay the two-months back rent they owed. They then skipped town, leaving Fotić a tremendous mess to clean up when their landlady, along with the other people they borrowed from, came to the Yugoslav legation to collect. The brothers, on the other hand, had a “Hollywood ending,” enrolling later that year at Temple University in Philadelphia, where they exchanged their musical services for reduced tuition. At the end of this amusing saga, the penuriousness of Yugoslav diplomats had cost them four talented national activists who could have worked to promote national consciousness among emigrants.

The Reverse Midas Touch: the Case of the Zora Singing Society

Even when it was not inadequate, any support that the Yugoslav diplomatic service gave to emigrant cultural projects tended to discredit and destabilize those same projects, due to the widespread antipathy toward Yugoslav diplomats. Take, for instance, the case of the Croatian singing society “Zora,” which, in 1937, petitioned the Chicago general consulate for help paying their travel expenses for a singing tour of Yugoslavia. Although “Zora,” one of the most venerable singing societies in the United States, preferred Croatian songs, its members supported Yugoslavia’s continued existence, according to the consulate, and, moreover, their proposed tour

815 Letter from Maksimović Quartet to Konstantin Fotić, undated, found with 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
816 Letter from Konstantin Fotić to Maksimović Quartet, April 26, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
817 Letter from Blanche Ballagh to Konstantin Fotić, July 6, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
818 Letter from J. C. Seegers to Konstantin Fotić, October 15, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
could be held up as proof of the “tenth banovina’s” patriotism. Moreover, upon return, they could tell emigrants in the United States of their warm reception in Yugoslavia. They were also, in the assessment of Fotić, quite talented. A “Zora Tour” had propaganda potential, particularly since they intended to visit every major city in Yugoslavia, from Maribor in Slovenia to Skoplje in Macedonia. Consequently, “Zora” received very generous subsidies: in addition to paying the fare for the transatlantic passage and giving them free tickets for Yugoslavia’s trains, Yugoslavia contributed over six-thousand dollars to their travel fund (!).

Some within “Zora,” however, saw this as a Faustian bargain, prompting a fierce internal debate. The members first passed a resolution against the leadership, accusing them of highhandedness and negligence in their handing of the society treasury and of having ignored the wishes of their membership to visit all parts of Yugoslavia. The issue for these revolting members, then, was not so much a lack of support for Yugoslavia, but rather the way this trip was paid for and arranged.

As a result, “Zora”’s old leadership was deposed and were the target of a critical resolution that was published in the newspapers. Although the new leadership was reportedly Yugoslav-oriented, they were wary of appearing to be too closely tied to the Yugoslav state, an association that had badly damaged the prestige and social standing of “Zora” among their fellow


migrants. In short, Yugoslav diplomats had a reverse Midas touch—even when they meant well, their subsidies damaged the reputations of their recipients.

**The “Emigration Question” Evolves**

Although Yugoslav diplomats could not openly subsidize emigrant projects without undermining them, their lack of financial support nonetheless generated ill will toward a country that seemed only to take, never to give. In this discussion, we see the echo of the Emigration Question, the debate in the 1920s about how the resources of the diaspora could be tapped to benefit Yugoslavia, ideally through repatriation or financial or intellectual remittances. This time, migrants were challenging the extractive logic of Yugoslav emigrant outreach. Instead of giving more to the fatherland than they received in return, these editorial writers argued that the relationship between ‘tenth banovina’ and Yugoslavia should be more reciprocal.

From 1934 onward, complaints about official tight-fistedness began appearing in a variety of émigré newspapers, many otherwise pro-Yugoslav in character. The first such complaint appeared in 1934 in *Yugoslavia*, a newspaper edited by John Palandech, a pro-Yugoslav Montenegrin, criticizing the efforts of national missionaries from Yugoslavia to teach the diaspora patriotism when, in fact, “the three branches of our people have created much with our own efforts. We have built national institutions that could not have existed in Yugoslavia without state support. In our colonies we have erected churches, schools, cultural centers, and reading rooms…all this without the help of the Yugoslav state…Now, let those lords…who send us missionaries to teach us ‘patriotism’ open their eyes and see the people who now suffer because of their negligence.”

A former member of a Yugoslav sokol, writing in *Jugoslavenski Glasnik* (The Yugoslav Herald) several months later, directed his ire toward the phrase “Tenth banovina,” noting that “anyone who follows news from the homeland can always find nice words and phrases about us emigrants, calling us the ‘tenth banovina.’” Nonetheless, in practice, “we Yugoslav emigrants are, in short, a milking cow (*krava muzara*) for the homeland,” a phrase with harshly negative connotations in Serbo-Croatian—cows are known for docility, not intelligence. Yugoslavs abroad, the author argued, have repeatedly shed blood and donated money to the homeland, which had done little in return. From the efforts of the emigration during World War I, to postwar relief, the efforts of emigrants on behalf of the old country had only resulted in the elevation of a pro-German political elite, who “don’t look at us, but at our dollars.” Nonetheless, the author did not abandon his belief in the Yugoslav idea, believing, perhaps naively, that by articulating these sentiments he could reach and persuade “the Yugoslav people in our homeland Yugoslavia.”

This idea would be developed further by the veteran Yugoslav activist Niko Gršković (a Croat) in a series of editorials, titled “Domovina i iseljeništvo,” or “the Homeland and the Diaspora,” published in his newspaper *Svijet* (The World) in 1938. In the first, Gršković argues that emigrant cultural life, especially newspapers, is oriented around a sense of nostalgia for and interest in events in the homeland, a sentiment that is not reciprocated by the intelligentsia and political elite of the homeland. As evidence, he cites the different reactions to two floods, one in the Yugoslavia in 1926 and another which had happened in Pittsburgh in 1936, a major population center of American Croats. After the first flood, practically every emigrant newspaper took up the call for donations to mitigate the suffering of “the old country.” Whereas the old

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country newspapers, in 1936, raised “not one Dinar” for flood relief in the United States. More broadly, emigrant donations to the homeland had been enormous, Gršković argued, numbering in the millions of dollars during and after World War I. One could also add investments of wealthy emigrants in Yugoslavia, like Paško Baburica, who built a church tower in Dubrovnik, or Mihajlo Pupin, who had given vast sums to Yugoslav charities.  

Yugoslavia, Gršković implied, needed to make similar investments in poor emigrants.

In his second article, Gršković argues that further proof of the old country’s “indifference” and “selfishness” can be found in its school textbooks, which barely mention the tenth of Yugoslavia’s population living overseas, and in the disinterest of its elite in emigrant life apart from parades, banquets, and public celebrations, which are only used for propaganda in the old country.

And in the third editorial, Gršković turned his ire on Yugoslav citizenship laws, noting that even though, according to the law, emigrants and their children are Yugoslav citizens, this citizenship gives them no rights, only obligations, up to and including conscription should they visit Yugoslavia before they turn thirty. Moreover, Gršković argues, this measure makes it more difficult for emigrants to obtain citizenship in the US, which does not allow dual citizenship.

In these editorials, we see, in compact form, how almost every ordinance introduced over the last fifteen years to promote emigrant loyalty, from the Law on Holidays to the Law on Citizenship, has backfired, uniting overseas Yugoslavs in their sense of grievance to an old country that sees its “tenth province” as a resource to be mined rather than an investment to be cultivated.

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825 Niko Gršković, “Domovina i iseljeništvo,” Svijet, 1938, Fond 967, kut. 36, HDA.
826 Niko Gršković, “Domovina i iseljeništvo II,” Svijet, 1938, Fond 967, kut. 36, HDA
827 Niko Gršković, “Domovina i iseljeništvo III,” Svijet, 1938, Fond 967, kut. 36, HDA
The Emigration Museum

Gršković’s complaint that Yugoslavia was interested in emigrant life only to the extent that it made for appealing photographs in old-country newspapers was particularly insightful—nowhere do we see this tendency exemplified more than in the opening in 1934 of a museum in Zagreb that milked the “Yugoslav Diaspora” for propaganda. As Benedict Anderson has observed, “museums, and the museumizing imagination, are both profoundly political.” The museum, along with censuses and maps, are ways in which the nationalizing state thinks about its domain, claims its past, its people, and its territory, and uses all three, through a process Anderson dubs “logoization,” to produce and disseminate the national idea. Artifacts are turned into easily recognized symbols of the nation.

Although the Emigration Museum opened in 1934, preparations for the museum’s opening had been going on for several years, having been initiated by the Emigration Commissariat in Zagreb, which, on October 31, 1930, ordered all Yugoslav consulates situated near emigrant colonies to begin collecting material for a museum. The consulates, in turn, solicited the help of the major emigrant self-help societies: the Yugoslav Catholic Union, the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, the Holy Name Society, the Slovene Freethinkers Support Society, the Slovene-Croat Union, the Croatian Union of the Pacific, the Serbian Support Society “Unity,” the Croatian Brotherhood of North America, the Yugoslav Support Society “Harmony,” the Slovene Women’s Union, the Serbian National Union, the Slovene National Support Union, and of course, the Croatian Fraternal Union.

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830 Form letters soliciting donations from the Yugoslav Catholic Union, the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, the Slovene Freethinkers Support Society, the Slovene-Croat Union, the Croatian Union of the Pacific, the Holy Name Society, the Serbian Support Society “Unity,” the Croatian Brotherhood of North America, the Yugoslav Support Society “Harmony,” the Slovene Women’s Union, the Serbian National Union, and the Croatian Fraternal Union.
Concretely, the consulates were supposed to obtain copies of emigrant newspapers, books, leaflets, prayer books, and song books, as well as rulebooks for the major emigrant self-help groups and cultural associations. Additionally, the Emigration Museum needed pictures of emigrant notables, of emigrant clubs, banks, orphanages, churches, newspaper offices, and neighborhoods, and of emigrant national manifestations like parades, dances in folk costume, or church services. Based on the type of artifacts requested, the museum’s narrative was obvious: that emigrants were preserving and reproducing Yugoslav culture overseas—and that the audience, the “Yugoslav people,” should be proud. The founders of the museum admitted as much in 1934, stating that the “museum would be a mirror of our national organization, unification [between Serb, Croat, and Slovene], and our effective work in the hard fight for survival in alien lands, just as it would be enduring proof of…the development of Yugoslav settlements in a national, political, cultural, and economic respect.” In another flyer, the organizers wrote that mission of the Emigration Museum was “to interpret to our people (Yugoslav citizens) what the Yugoslav emigration is.” Answering their own question, the Emigration Commissariat continued: “Emigrants are…the strongest fortress for the present and future…[and are] a foundation from which we can live as a Nation around the world…In this repository of valuables, the Museum will describe and delineate the importance of the emigration as an organic part of our general life.”

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831 “Iseljenički Muzej’-Osnivanje.” Directive addressed to all consulates in the lands of emigration from the Emigration Commissariat. October 31st, 1930. Fond 1619, k.1, HDA.
832 Obavijest o Organizovanju Muzeja,” October 30th, 1933. Fond 1619, k. 1, HDA.
833 “Iseljenički Muzej,” supplement to Novi Iseljenik, March 3rd, 1935. Fond 1619, k. 1, HDA.
834 Ibid.
Just as Anderson predicted, this museum was about claiming emigrants as part of the national body, as well as about creating an impression that South Slavs overseas functioned as a cohesive community, a “tenth banovina” of Yugoslavia. But how was that message conveyed? What artifacts of emigrant life did visitors see, and how were they presented?

The most prominent exhibits of the Emigration Museum were the maps, which visualized the “tenth province” as Yugoslav territory. This is most explicit in the map titled *Naša Deseta Banovina* (our tenth province). With the tagline of “1,000,000 Yugoslavs around the world,” this map extended Yugoslav borders far beyond the Western Balkans, depicting a global network of Yugoslav settlements, asserting possession over them, and making a statement about emigrant national identity (see Figure 3). It was a propaganda masterstroke. Reinforcing this message, the emigration museum also produced other maps tracking various bellwethers of diaspora nationalism. There was a map depicting overseas Serb, Croat, and Slovene churches and parochial schools, which, the map declared “are the greatest contributors to the preservation of national consciousness among emigrants” (see Figure 4).

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835 This, not coincidently, coincided with the Citizenship Law of 1928, which made into citizens everybody who emigrated from the territory of Yugoslavia, even if they emigrated before Yugoslavia’s formation in 1918, so long as they did not renounce their citizenship. And to prevent that from happening, emigrants were given a very short window of time to do so—within three years of their twenty-first birthday, they had to travel to one of Yugoslavia’s consulates and formerly renounce their Yugoslav citizenship or they were stuck with it for good (and could even be drafted if they entered Yugoslavia!) See: Državljanstvo Jugoslavenskih Iseljenika u Americi,” *Jugoslovenski Glasnik*, September 16, 1937. Fond 414, Fasc. 5, BO 14. Emigrants who had emigrated prior to Yugoslavia’s creation, and had thus missed the 3-year window, were given until 1936 to formerly renounce their citizenship.

836 *Our Tenth Province*[map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, no year given. Fond. 1619, Kut. 3, HDA.

837 *Emigrant Churches* [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, no year given. Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.
implicitly reflected emigrant national identity (See Figure 5). A fourth map tracked secular emigrant schools, another bulwark against assimilation (See Figure 6).

Aside from these, there were a number of smaller maps depicting the overseas settlement of “Yugoslav” emigrants for separate regions like the United States, Canada, Central and South America, or Australia, allowing visitors to learn, for instance, that “Yugoslavs” in the United States favored the Midwest or that ‘Yugoslavs’ in South America tended to live in Argentina. Again, this conforms entirely with Anderson’s thesis about maps, which reify and logoize national territory, just as a museum does with a national past.

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838 The Emigrant Press of Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) around the world [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.
839 Emigrant Schools [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, no year given. Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.
840 Emigrant Settlements of Yugoslavs in Central and South America [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, 1934, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.
Fig. 6, “Our Tenth Province,” Fond. 1619, Kut. 3, HDA.
Fig. 7: “Emigrant Churches,” Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA. “Our emigrant churches are the greatest preservers of national consciousness among the emigration.”
Fig. 8 *The Emigrant Press of Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) around the world* [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.
Fig. 9 Emigrant Schools, [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.
The museum was not always on message, however, as not all maps dealt with “Yugoslavs.” Several maps were devoted to Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes individually, muddling the museum’s message of Yugoslav overseas unity. There is, for instance, one map tracking the Serbian Fraternal Societies in the United States and Canada\(^{841}\) and another doing the same for the Croats.\(^{842}\) One map even asserted that there are 1.2 million “Croats” around the world, which,

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\(^{841}\) *Serbian Fraternal Societies in the United States and Canada* [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.

\(^{842}\) *Croatian Fraternal Societies in the United States and Canada* [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA
coincidentally, was the number of “Yugoslavs” or “Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” in other maps. Clearly, there was a slippage of meaning.

Whatever it was, the political message of these maps was not lost on visitors. One of the most valuable (and charming) sources about the Emigration Museum is a collection of essays written by schoolchildren who had visited the museum on a field trip in 1940, allowing us to see the museum through the eyes of nationally-suggestible children. The maps made a strong impression, as several of the schoolchildren recreated them as colored-pencil sketches in their essay headers, albeit with some geographical distortions (See Figure 5). But the key element, the visualization of Yugoslav territory as a constellation of emigrant enclaves spread across North and South America, was retained with remarkable fidelity.

But was it the right impression? Young Đurđa’s essay, whose header is depicted above, fixated on statistics but repeatedly conflated “Croat” with “Yugoslav.” One example: “Today in America there are around 800,000 emigrant Croats,” a number that he could have reached only by counting Serbs and Slovenes as Croats as well. Students Ružica Koprivnjak, Zlata Bouška, Marica Ključarić, Marija Kocijančić, Elza Toplek, Zolenka Mesarić, Štefanija Glad, Marica Embreuš, and Ivka Gustec all made the same conflation and several repeat that same figure of 800,000 “Croats” in the United States. They were probably parroting their schoolteacher or museum guide.

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843 Emigration of Croats around the World Canada [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA; The Croatian emigration in the world Canada [map], Scale not given, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, Emigration Museum, no year given, Fond 1619, kut. 1, HDA.
844 Đurđa Juršić, “Visit to the Emigration Museum,” November 5th, 1940. Fond 1619, kut. 2, HDA.
845 Đurđa Juršić, “Visit to the Emigration Museum,” November 5th, 1940. Fond 1619, kut. 2, HDA.
846 See: Ružica Koprivnjak, Zlata Bouška, Marica Ključarić, Marija Kocijančić, Elza Toplek, Zolenka Mesarić, Štefanija Glad, Marica Embreuš, and Ivka Gustec’s essays in “Posjet Iseljeničkom Muzeju: Zagreb 31 Listopad 1940,” Fond 1619, kut. 2, HDA.
Others such as Nada Novačić, Kota Kovač, Boža Zorbas, Đurđica Drevenšek, Ivanka Čerovšek, or Mira Ilić, refer to “our emigrants” or “our people” but do not say whether they were Croats or Yugoslavs. But not one of the essays referred to emigrants as Yugoslavs—despite the titles of the maps. Put in context, that is not surprising—Croatian identity had been officially recognized in the Cvetković-Maček Sporazum of 1939, which reestablished Croatia as a province within Yugoslavia and gave it substantial political and cultural autonomy. This broader environment of Croatian assertiveness might have inflected the museum’s presentation. Still, it was better for Yugoslav unity for the children to call Serbs and Slovenes “Croats” and “our people” than to exclude them entirely from their imagined community. And in that regard, the maps functioned as intended.

The Emigration Museum did not merely cite statistics, but also individuals in its argument that the “tenth banovina” were good Yugoslavs. To that end, the Emigration Museum prominently featured figures involved with the Yugoslav Committee, a WWI-era group of émigré politicians and intellectuals that lobbied for the creation of a federal Yugoslav state. The Yugoslav Committee’s agreement of the Corfu declaration, the Serbian government’s proposal for a Yugoslav state, in 1917 laid the foundation for the creation of Yugoslavia. Consequently, several émigré intellectuals in the United States and South America who supported or participated in the committee were represented in at least two exhibits, one of which is pictured below. (see figure 6).
Fig. 11 “Champions and Leaders of the Yugoslav Liberation Movement in South and North America, 1914-1919” Fond 1619, Kut.1, HDA.

In captions the museum explained each activist’s role in the Yugoslav liberation movement, as well as their geographic location, thereby creating the impression of a network of overseas Yugoslavists. The second exhibit, not pictured due to its poor condition, likewise aggregated North and South American efforts on behalf of the Yugoslav Committee into an “Emigrant Patriot” collage featuring group portraits of Yugoslav Committee affiliates in North and South America, alongside figures detailing how much North and South American donated

847 “Champions and Leaders of the Yugoslav Liberation Movement in South and North America, 1914-1919” Fond 1619, Kut.1, HDA.
for a “Free and United Yugoslavia.” In both exhibits Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were given equal representation.

The other pillar of the Emigrant Museum’s narrative was the “emigrant success story,” which the museum cleverly linked to support for Yugoslavia. This comes out clearly in the field trip reports. Ružica Koprivnjak, for instance, retelling the museum’s version of the history of the “Yugoslav emigration,” recounted how “more and more people went [overseas], and many became millionaires, like our scientist Tesla, who now lives in New York, Baburica (Baburizza) from Dubrovnik, Pupin, Gršković, Mihanović, and many others.” Several of the other essays likewise mention Tesla, often in the same breath with Paško Baburica, a Croatian business magnate in Chile. The implication was that Tesla was also successful. He was not. Tesla was never good with money and was, by 1940, a pauper. The Yugoslav government knew this—they were paying him a monthly stipend of six-hundred dollars. The children were not told this. After all, admitting that Tesla was a pauper would have interfered with the museum’s attempt to mythologize “Yugoslav emigrants.”

Other reports, like that of Marica Ključarić, likewise focused on the emigrant success story. In her words: “Our Croats went to foreign lands impoverished, but became rich over there, and some even became millionaires. They founded schools and churches…The first emigrant newspapers [sic] were founded by Dalmatians…many Croats became rich over there and returned to their fatherland and erected beautiful houses and palaces.” Although outwardly dazzled by the emigrant success story, Marica repeatedly linked emigrant success with support of cultural institutions overseas, such as newspapers, and with returning to Yugoslavia to spend

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848 “Emigrant Patriots,” Exhibit of the Emigration Museum in Zagreb, Fond 1619, kut.1, HDA.
849 Ružica Koprivnjak, “Visit to the Emigration Museum,” November 5th, 1940. Fond 1619, k.2. HDA.
851 Marica Ključarić, “In the Emigration Museum,” November 5th, 1940. Fond 1619, k.2. HDA.
their earnings. Emigrant success and national awakening were intertwined. Thus, impoverished Tesla had to be transformed into a milijoner (millionaire).

Overall, the purpose of the Emigration Museum was propagandistic. In creating a narrative about a “Yugoslav diaspora” that was loyal to the monarchy, the museum’s creators hoped to show that the divisions between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes could be overcome and that this diaspora supported the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In tying narratives about economic success and technological innovation with emigrant displays of Yugoslav loyalty, the Emigration Museum tapped the discourse of the Emigration Question, positioning of the “loyal Yugoslav emigrant” as a source of national renewal. The migrant was made into a metaphorical subject of Yugoslavia whose economic success and patriotic loyalty could serve as a model for Yugoslavia’s de jure citizens.

Yugoslav Pavilions

Ironically, while the Emigration Commission was using emigrant displays of loyalty to promote Yugoslav consciousness in Yugoslavia, several of those displays were actually staged by the Yugoslav foreign service to promote Yugoslav consciousness among emigrants. The Emigrant Museum in Zagreb can be productively compared to the Yugoslav Pavilion at the World Fair in New York in 1939. Although, as Chapter Three shows, the pavilion for the Chicago World Fair in Chicago in 1934 was largely an emigrant effort spearheaded by John Palandech, Yugoslav diplomats insinuated themselves into the planning process for future pavilions.

For the California Pacific International Exposition, held in San Diego in 1936, the New York and Chicago General Consuls, the head of the Washington legation, and the charge
d’affaires were present on the planning committee as *honorary* members.\(^{852}\) This was probably in return for their financial contribution—the planning committee, composed of naturalized emigrants, had called the response to their original call for donations “very weak,” writing to the General Consul of Chicago for additional support.\(^{853}\) Apparently, Yugoslavia’s original donation of $1,200 had not been enough.\(^{854}\)

By 1939, however, Yugoslav diplomats had successfully risen from honorary to full members of the planning committee, which was headed by Konstantin Fotić.\(^{855}\) Additionally, material for the exhibition itself was collected not by emigrants, but by the Yugoslav Emigration Service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and its subsidiary, the Emigration Museum in Zagreb.\(^{856}\) In large part, the reason was fiscal—this fair was very expensive. Each participating nation, Yugoslavia included, contributed millions of dollars to the fair.\(^{857}\) This time, the cost could not be offloaded onto Yugoslavia’s emigrants.

According to Ambassador Fotić, the intent of the Yugoslav pavilion was to show Americans

not only the beauty and natural resources of this country [Yugoslavia] but also the efforts of the people of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Prince Regent Paul to contribute their part towards peace and progress…The exhibit will present a general view of the social and economic institutions of Yugoslavia, beginning with the historical organization of the peasants and ending with the most modern exhibits in the fields of social welfare, public health, sports, and public education.\(^{858}\)

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852 Letter from Mirko Bukorovich to vice-consul Pavelić of the GK KJ NYC, September 14, 1935. Fond 449, Fasc. 4, BO. 10, AJ.
853 Letter from Mirko Bukorovich to vice-consul Pavelić of the GK KJ NYC, September 14\(^{th}\), 1935. Fond 449, Fasc. 4, BO. 10, AJ.
854 “Jugoslavija na Kaliforniskoj Međunarodnoj Izložbe u San Diego,” *Politika*, May 19, 1936. Fond 967, k. 34. HDA.
856 “Svjetska Izložba u New-Yorku,” *Novi Iseljenik*, February 3\(^{rd}\), 1939. Fond 967, kutt 34, HDA.
857 “Pripreme za Veliku Svetsku Izložbu u Njujorku,” *Amerikanski Srbobran*, December 1938. Fond 967, kutt 34, HDA.
In other words, the exhibit would focus on the technological and economic achievements of the “Yugoslav people”—mainly to impress Americans.

But Yugoslav emigrants were also a target audience. To attract them, a special section would be devoted to the achievements of “people of Jugoslav origin living in the United States.” The content was very similar to the Emigrant Museum, with portraits of Nikola Tesla, Mihailo Pupin, Henry Suzzalo, and Bishop Baraga. Another graphic listed the number of “Yugoslav settlements” around the globe. Lastly, maps showing the relative concentrations of ‘Yugoslavs’ in each American state were donated by the Emigration Museum. Also just like the Emigration Museum, the “emigrant success story” was coupled with devotion to the Karadjordjević monarchy and a territorial conception of Yugoslavia. A bust of King Peter the Second occupied a central position, as did an enormous map of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the National Crest—reminding emigrants of “their” King and “their” old country.

**Yugoslavism in the United States: Rooms and Gardens**

The Yugoslav government, however, was not the only curator of the public image of emigrants from Yugoslavia. During the 1930s, American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes erected several monuments during the same period, creating a narrative about themselves that differed markedly from Yugoslavia’s monarchist mythmaking.

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859 Tesla and Pupin, both Serbs, have already been introduced. Suzzalo, a Croat and an academic, served as President of the University of Washington. Bishop Baraga, a Slovene, was a Catholic missionary to several Native American tribes of the Great Lakes area during the 19th Century. “Svjetska Izložba u New- Yorku,” *Novi Iseljenik*, February 3rd, 1939. Fond 967. Kut 34, HDA.

860 “Yugoslav Settlements Around the World,” Graphic at the Yugoslav Pavilion at the 1939 World Fair. Fond 61, box 1, Konstantin Fotić Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.


862 Tesla and Pupin, both Serbs, have already been introduced. Suzzalo, a Croat and an academic, served as President of the University of Washington. Bishop Baraga, a Slovene, was a Catholic missionary to several Native American tribes of the Great Lakes area during the 19th Century. “Svjetska Izložba u New-Yorku,” *Novi Iseljenik*, February 3rd, 1939. Fond 967. Kut 34, HDA.
In Pittsburgh, for instance, American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes collaborated to design and construct a Yugoslav nationality room in Pittsburgh’s Cathedral of Learning. A classroom with themed décor, the nationality rooms in the Cathedral of Learning function as a space for immigrant groups in Pittsburgh to memorialize their ethnic heritage—in 2018, there were thirty, and rooms are still being added.

The campaign to build a Yugoslav room was initiated in 1926 by the then-president of the Croatian Fraternal Union, Anton Gazdić. American Serbs took note—one article in Srbobran, the main Serbian newspaper, asked whether “we will be adequately represented in [the proposed room],” claiming that “our brother Croats…do not intend [to make] this section [of the Cathedral of Learning] to be exclusively Croatian, but rather Yugoslav, thereby opening the door of cooperation to their brother Serbs and Slovenes.” The solution, they argued, would be to match the fundraising efforts of “our brother Croats and Slovenes.” It would be hard to find a more clear-cut example of how the Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities thought and acted as part of a broader Yugoslav community while still maintaining their national distinctiveness.

Although largely funded by immigrants, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia did contribute. Not the Foreign Ministry, however. Instead, the Yugoslav Ministry of Education donated approximately $5,000 dollars to support the room’s construction, funds which were supplemented by the efforts of immigrants like Zlatko Baloković, a Croatian-American violinist, who raised money by giving concerts.

863 The Yugoslav Classroom in the Cathedral of Learning (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1942), found in Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; “Koncerti g. Balokovića i razmirice izmedju Domobrana i Hrvatske Bratske Zajednice,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington to MIP, November 30, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ; Program from the Dedication of the Statues of Ivan Cankar and Simon Gregorčič in the Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland, November 26, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
The architect Vojta Braniš, who was director of the Industrial Art School in Zagreb, based his design on motifs that he had observed in peasant villages across Yugoslavia. Hand-carved Slavonian oak featured prominently, as did portraits of various Yugoslav figures: Vuk Karadžić (a Serb), Josip Strossmayer (a Croat), Jurij Vega (a Slovene), Petar Njegoš (a Montenegrin), Rugjer Bošković (a Dalmatian Croat), and France Prešeren (a Slovene). The two Slovene portraits were provided by a committee in Ljubljana, the two Croatian portraits by Ivan Meštrović, and the Serb and the Montenegrin portraits by Mihajlo Pupin. Despite their ethnic diversity, every person depicted in portrait was an intellectual of some sort—linguist, mathematician, poet, or astronomer. In contrast, several portraits are conspicuously absent—Karadjordje is missing, as are his descendants, the Kings of Yugoslavia, which suggests an attempt to divest Yugoslavism as an intellectual project from its (unsatisfactory) political manifestation. Moreover, the Yugoslav room quietly resists a Serb-dominated vision of Yugoslavia: besides in the portraiture, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were deliberately represented equally in the display of the national crests and in the book cabinet, which contained books written in both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets.

The room opened in 1939 and remains open to this day under its original name—a lonely remnant of a forgotten Yugoslav moment in the United States.

The same cannot be said for the Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland, which became the Slovene Garden in 1991. The Yugoslav Garden opened in 1935, although new statues would be continuously added to it over the next few years. Like the Yugoslav room in Pittsburgh, the

865 The Yugoslav Classroom in the Cathedral of Learning (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1942), found in Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; “Koncerti g. Balokovića i razmirice izmedju Domobrana i Hrvatske Bratske Zajednice,” Report from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington to MIP, November 30, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ; Program from the Dedication of the Statues of Ivan Cankar and Simon Gregorčič in the Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland, November 26, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland allotted equal representation for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the statuary, which featured statues of various Yugoslav figures: Njegoš, Strossmayer, Simon Gregorčič, (a Slovene poet) Ivan Cankar (a Slovene writer), and Bishop Baraga, whose inclusion attests to differences between diaspora and homeland nationalism.\(^{866}\) Again, intellectuals, not Karadjordje and his royal descendants. The inclusion of Baraga is particularly telling. Baraga, a Catholic priest of Slovenian origin, was sent as a missionary to North America in the nineteenth century, where he ministered to the Ottawa and Ojibwe people in upper Michigan.\(^{867}\) In effect, Baraga helps to situate Slovenia within the history of the United States, just as his bust in the Yugoslav Garden signified that Slovenians were part of the Yugoslav people.

Although its message was simple, the Yugoslav Garden is significant because its creation, like the establishment of the Yugoslav Room, demonstrates how the Serb, Croatian, and Slovene communities in Cleveland maintained a fraternal rivalry, effectively functioning as an interconnected community split into three sections. Planning for the Yugoslav Garden in Cleveland was initiated by the Slovene community, who then invited the Serbian and Croatians of Cleveland to cooperate. Each group would fundraise for their own statues separately, although costs for the trees (linden, of course), grass, and flowers were shared. This equal division of responsibility caused some difficulty for the Serbs, as there were around forty-thousand Slovenes living in Cleveland, but only thirteen-hundred Serbs, and thus fewer donations. The Serbs, worried that they would be outdone by the Slovenes, eventually wrote to the Yugoslav Legation for financial assistance.\(^{868}\)

\(^{866}\) Letter from Michael Cerrezn to the Yugoslav Legation, April 12, 1935. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
\(^{867}\) Emily Green Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens* (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910), 232.
\(^{868}\) Letter from the Serbian Orthodox Church St. Savo to the Yugoslav Legation, July 1, 1936. Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
Yugoslav “colonies” in different cities were also, it seems, aware of one another—the head of the Slovene part of the planning committee, Jože Grdina, also wrote to the General Consulate in Chicago, pointedly noting that the Yugoslav Room in the Pittsburgh Cathedral of learning had received financial support from the Yugoslav government, whereas the Yugoslav Garden, so far, had not. It is unclear whether the Yugoslav Garden subsequently received support. Likewise, Srbobran, which was published in Pittsburgh, ran an article about the Yugoslav cultural garden in Cleveland, noting what the Croats and Slovenes had already accomplished and calling on Serbs to do their part to support the garden. While not as rigorous as a survey of public opinion, the case of these monuments does suggest that politically-engaged American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes saw themselves as part of a larger diasporic community.

**Building a Yugoslav Address Book**

The increasingly interconnected nature of Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups also manifested in a book: Ivan Mladineo’s *Narodni Adresar* (National Directory), published in 1937. A directory of Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations, institutions, businesses, and prominent figures in North America, the *Narodni Adresar* marked the conclusion of Ivan Mladineo’s attempts to conduct a pseudo-census during the 1920s of the North American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. An owner of the *Narodni Adresar* could (if they lived in the 1930s) move to any city in the United States and Canada and immediately know which local restaurants, grocery stores, florists, dancing halls, churches, legal offices, barbershops, funeral parlors, and churches were operated by “Yugoslavs” (the book does not distinguish between Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene establishments). Although this should be no surprise by now, Mladineo’s *Narodni Adresar*

869 Letter from Jože Grdina to the Yugoslav General Consulate in Chicago, November 17, 1937. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
870 Bogdan Filipović and Stevo Matić, “Njegošev Spomenik u Klivlandu,” *American Srbobran*, April 8, 1936. Found in Fond 967, kut. 29, HDA.
received little support from the Yugoslav government. By his own account and that of the Yugoslav government, Mladineo compiled all this information himself, with no outside assistance, and died soon after the publication, apparently with an outstanding debt to the printing house, having drained his bank account and exhausted himself in the process of creating a twelve-hundred-page tome. Belatedly recognizing the value of such a book for their work, the Yugoslav foreign ministry in Belgrade bought up most of the copies. As a strange but probably meaningless coincidence, the purchase was orchestrated by Ivo Andrić, a Bosnian writer who would become famous after World War II for *The Bridge on the Drina*, a pro-Yugoslav historical novel. Regardless, Mladineo’s death provides was a particularly expressive of Yugoslavia’s stingy approach to diaspora relations.

The extent to which this directory influenced people to think of themselves as part of a “Yugoslav diaspora” cannot be determined. Nonetheless, its introduction, a history of the Yugoslav diaspora in the United States, reveals that the *Narodni Adresar* was also a political statement about what it meant to be a Yugoslav in the United States, a narrative in which many of the figures and themes from the Yugoslav Room and Garden are reprised and expanded.

Mladineo’s narrative begins by debunking the notion that Yugoslavs were newcomers to the United States, asserting that several sailors on Columbus’s ship were Dalmatians, and that a wrecked Croatian ship, whose survivors may have been assimilated to the local Native-American population, gave its name to Croatan County in North Carolina in the 16th century and to the cryptic “CROATAN” inscription found on a tree in the remains of the Roanoke colony.

Mladineo also names several missionaries and explorers of south-Slavic background, including

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872 Letter to Ivo Andrić from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
873 Letter to Ivo Andrić from the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, Fond 371, fasc. 56, BO 72, AJ.
Frederick Baraga who was commemorated in the Yugoslav Garden and Yugoslav Room.\textsuperscript{874} Although some of this information is apocryphal (particularly Mladineo’s explanation for the CROATAN inscription), its purpose is clear: to establish for the Yugoslavs a similar place in American history to that occupied by the English, Scots, French, Germans, Dutch, and Spanish—to establish that America’s southern Slavs are “true Americans,” whatever that might mean, as well as Yugoslavs. After this, Mladineo cites several contemporary figures in the Yugoslav community as evidence of “the inventive genius of the Yugoslavs in America”: Nikola Tesla, not surprisingly, appears first, followed by Mihajlo Pupin, Henry Suzzalo, and Dr. Radosavljević. Yugoslavia had also, Mladineo argued, supplied the United States with a famous writer, Louis Adamic (whose inclusion the Kingdom of Yugoslavia would not have approved), as well as several sculptors and musicians, most prominently Zlatko Baloković.\textsuperscript{875}

Not once does Mladineo mention the Yugoslav Committee or its role in creating the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, although Pupin was a notable member of the former. Instead, when discussing their political activities, Mladineo states “the activities of Yugoslavs in America are by no means confined to their own group. Their names are prominently mentioned in many fields of our national life. Their \textit{loyalty to the country of their adoption} has been attested to by the thousands of Yugoslav immigrants who enlisted in our Army and the Navy during the World War.”\textsuperscript{876} In other words, what mattered was not loyalty to Yugoslavia, but loyalty to the United States, loyalty that was balanced with preserving their ethnic heritage through schools, churches, singing societies, and fraternal organizations.\textsuperscript{877}

\textsuperscript{874} Mladineo, \textit{Narodni Adresar}, xx-xxii.
\textsuperscript{875} Ibid, xxiv-xxv.
\textsuperscript{876} Ibid, xxvi-xxviii.
\textsuperscript{877} Ibid, xxv.
Not forgetting about the average laborer, Mladineo also argues that, “Yugoslavs as industrial workers have contributed their full share to the development and upbuilding of this country,” particularly as coal and steel miners.\(^ {878}\) This recitation serves much the same purpose as that of the Dalmatian sailors on Columbus’s ship or Frederick Baraga—to create a narrative that the Yugoslavs, “individually and collectively…may well stand alongside any other racial group…that the Yugoslav immigrant belongs to a young and vigorous race…[and] our American national entity…will find this group a valuable asset toward the creation of a better American civilization.”\(^ {879}\)

Mladineo’s story about the Yugoslav emigration reveals how the desire for American belonging could lead migrants down the path of Yugoslavism. To wit, to make the strongest case for the belonging of South-Slavic emigrants in the United States, one needs Serb, Croat, and Slovene “heroes.” To establish the antiquity of Yugoslav settlement, one needs Columbus’s Croatan sailors and the Slovene Bishop Baraga. To establish the scientific brilliance of one’s nationality group, one needs the Serbs Tesla and Pupin. And to make the case for one’s national creativity, one needs the Slovene Adamic, the Serb Savine, and the Croat Baloković. In other words, to make the strongest argument that they are Americans, American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes also needed to be Yugoslavs. This is one possible explanation for the parallels in representation between Mladineo’s book and the various Yugoslav-themed structures produced in the latter half of the thirties.

**Yugoslavism and Cultural Pluralism**

Louis Adamic’s *A Nation of Nations*, a history of the “new” migration to the United States that he published in 1944, offers corroboration to this hypothesis. In his chapter on

\(^{878}\) Ibid, xxvi-xxvii.

\(^{879}\) Ibid, xxviii.
“Americans from Yugoslavia,” Adamic almost exactly reproduces Mladineo’s story about Yugoslav Americans: Columbus’s Dubrovnik Sailors, the CROATAN inscription on Roanoke Island, Bishop Baraga, the Croats and Serbs drawn into the mines and steelworks of the Midwest, Tesla, Pupin, and Zlatko Baloković. Of course, Adamic added some more names to the list of notables, such as Baron Ivan Rataj, a Croatian Catholic missionary who got scalped by the indigenous people of New Mexico in 1683.\footnote{Louis Adamic, \textit{A Nation of Nations} (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 234-249.} Still, the basic outline was the same. And yet, there is no evidence Adamic ever interacted with Mladineo—he certainly did not cite him in his bibliography.\footnote{Ibid, 360.} Instead, the similarities between the two accounts can be chalked up to convergent evolution—similar authorial motives produced a similar product. As he explained in the preface, Adamic believed that “there was an enormous mass of American history...that had been ‘suppressed,’ that did not appear in the standard books.” In schools, migrants had been told “that the United States was an Anglo-Saxon country with a White Protestant-Anglo-Saxon civilization struggling to preserve itself against infiltration and adulteration by other civilizations brought here by Negroes and hordes of ‘foreigners.’” As a result, “the immigrant and his children and grandchildren find their continuity cut off not only from the land of his origin and their descent, but from their heritage here, bequeathed them through the share their forebears...had in building America.”\footnote{Ibid, 3, 7-8.} In short, highlighting the achievements of these “Yugoslav” migrants (even those that got scalped) was a way for Adamic and Mladineo to stake a claim to the United States on behalf of their co-nationals.

Popularizing the achievements of American Yugoslavs also resonated with the broader mood within the United States at that time. The wave of xenophobia in the 1920s that had found
its expression in restrictive immigration quotas, the (re)birth of the Ku Klux Klan, and the trial of Sacco and Vanzetti had ebbed (somewhat) by the mid 1930s. A combination of economic crisis and the rise of ultranationalist movements in Europe moved some to reconsider their assumptions about what it meant to be “American.” Was America a White, Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation, or something else? A new idea had emerged: “cultural pluralism.” Rejecting assimilationism and demands for cultural homogeneity, some public intellectuals in the United States, Adamic among them, instead called for celebrating the achievements and culture of immigrants and African Americans. Cultural pluralism had another advocate in the CPUSA, which spread cultural pluralist ideas into both leftist organizations, like the International Workers Order, and into various immigrant fraternal organizations during the era of Popular Front tactics. Blue-collar migrant workers and African Americans, as part of the New Deal coalition that brought Roosevelt to power in 1933, now had a voice in government. The Roosevelt administration gave institutional support to cultural pluralism via the Common Council for American Unity, established in 1939. Adamic was a founding member of the CCAU and would edit its journal Common Ground. Like the Foreign Language Information Service that preceded it, the CCAU sought to highlight the history, culture, and achievements of non-Anglo Americans. The CCAU had a louder megaphone, more funding, and more clout than FLIS, however, pressuring public schools to update their curriculum to include more on non-Anglo Americans. Moreover, the CCAU also enhanced Adamic’s position within a diasporic network. By necessity, journal editors develop thick Rolodexes of contacts from whom they can

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solicit articles, reviews, and submissions. Although the Rolodex would not be invented until
1956, Adamic, as editor of Common Ground from 1940-1942, nonetheless forged connections
with many powerful and influential people, including Eleanor Roosevelt, Woodie Guthrie, and
Langston Hughes. These connections would prove useful for Adamic’s Yugoslav activism
during the Second World War.

It was no coincidence that Adamic was so involved with both the cultural pluralist
movement and with Yugoslavism—there was an ideological affinity. Both cultural pluralism and
American Yugoslavism shared a similar origin. Cultural pluralism was, as has been mentioned,
partly a reaction to fascism and authoritarianism in Europe and partly a product of working-class
immigrant activism. Similarly, American Yugoslavism grew out of immigrant discontent with
the royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia, as outlined in Chapter 3, as well as the activism of
Yugoslav communists, as outlined in Chapter 4. Moreover, both the cultural pluralists and
American Yugoslavists were committed to a liberal democratic society. Finally, both the cultural
pluralists and American Yugoslavists like Adamic viewed national identity as a “salad bowl”
rather than a “melting pot.” The creation of an “American” or “Yugoslav” people did not require
Anglicization or Serbianization, but the conceptual inclusion of every ethnic group’s history with
a common national imaginary.

The Emergence of “Yugoslav Radio”

Although past cultural achievements linked American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, so did
a new technology—radio. Beginning in 1934, every Sunday morning, from 9 to 9:30 AM, and
later, every Wednesday from 11AM to 12 PM listeners could tune in to “Yugoslav Radio Hour.”

886 Wiliam Beyer, “Creating ‘Common Ground’ on the Home Front: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in 1940s Quarterly
Magazine, in Kenneth O’Brien and Lynn Parsons, eds. The Home-Front War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995);
Yugoslav Radio Hour was the creation of George Marčan, a Chicago Croat who paid the start-up costs out of pocket (again, no surprise) and worked tirelessly to find new material for his radio program, according to Jugoslavenski Glasnik (The Yugoslav Herald), which called Marčan’s radio station “one truly great Yugoslav institution little discussed by the media.”

*Jugoslavenski Glasnik* and *Yugoslavia*, emigrant newspapers owned by the naturalized Montenegrin-American John Palandech, also helped advertise Marčan’s new radio station. Additionally, Yugoslav Radio Hour’s founding received blurbs in one Serbian and one Croatian newspaper, suggesting that this was not merely Serbian or Croatian nationalism, but genuinely Yugoslavist. Yugoslav Radio Hour broadcast a variety of Yugoslav-themed content, which was generally apolitical—what went on the airwaves depended on who walked into Yugoslav Radio Hour’s offices. As a result, Yugoslav Radio Hour usually functioned as a venue for emigrant singing societies or tamburica orchestras to perform and reach a broader audience. Not all submissions were musical—Yugoslav Radio Hour sometimes featured lectures about specific topics in Yugoslavia, like national health, and sometimes even political speeches, such as one speech arguing that Governor Horner of Illinois ought to be replaced with someone better.

As its profile increased, Yugoslav Radio Hour’s cultural cachet grew, and it began to get submissions by more famous emigrants. The year 1936 was a turning point. Alexander Savine, a

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Serbian-American composer, used Yugoslav Radio Hour for the debut of his new opera.\textsuperscript{892} The Yugoslav Radio Hour also attracted the attention of musicians in Yugoslavia, with performances from musicians in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Ljubljana.\textsuperscript{893} That same year, Yugoslav Radio Hour broadcast a soloist (presumably a bass or baritone) from the Chicago Opera who sang the Volga Boatman Song and an aria from Faust. These classical offerings accompanied the usual fare of folk tamburica music.\textsuperscript{894} Zlatko Baloković, a world-renowned Croatian violinist with the New York Philharmonica, was a regular listener of Yugoslav Radio Hour, according to an interview given in 1937.\textsuperscript{895}

Yugoslav Radio Hour was even known outside the Yugoslav community, featuring prominently in the Chicago \textit{Sunday Times} front-page article about “Yugoslavia in Chicago,” a human interest piece showcasing the various sights, sounds, and, most importantly, recipes of Chicago’s “Little Yugoslavia.”\textsuperscript{896} The Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities were interconnected in the eyes of outsiders as well.

Even though Yugoslav Radio Hour was an emigrant initiative, the Yugoslav state also tried to use radio broadcasts to link the diaspora to the homeland. Although Yugoslavia would not invest in a full-time radio station for the diaspora until 1940,\textsuperscript{897} beginning in 1934 specific transatlantic radio broadcasts were treated as a symbolic bridge linking the diaspora and the old country. The earliest such broadcast occurred in 1934, using NBC’s radio transmitters in the United States to broadcast from Zagreb and Ljubljana thirty minutes of folk songs. Opening with

\begin{footnotes}
\item[892] “Yugoslav American Radio Hour,” \textit{Yugoslavia}, January 25, 1936. Fond 967, kut. 34, HDA.
\item[893] “Jugoslavenski Radio Sat,” \textit{Jugoslavenski Glasnik}, June 2, 1936. Fond 967, kut. 34, HDA.
\item[894] “Jugosl. Radio Program Sve Bolji i Klasičniji,” \textit{Yugoslavia}, March 21, 1936. Fond 967, kut. 34, HAD.
\item[895] “Na Srcu Nek Nam Leži, Ljubav i odanost prema Zajedničkoj Grudi,” [paper title cut off], December 9, 1937. Fond 967, kut 34, HDA.
\item[896] Bruce Grant, “Yugoslavia in Chicago: A Land of Work and Song!,” \textit{Sunday Times Magazine Section}, June 2, 1935. Fond 967, kut 29, HDA.
\item[897] “Dnevne Redovne Radio Emisije iz Jugoslavije za Iseljenike u Sjevernoj Americi,” \textit{Jugoslavenski Glasnik}, March 29, 1940. Fond 967, kut. 29, HDA.
\end{footnotes}
the statement “Halo Amerika, this is Jugoslavija! We greet our brothers in America and send
them greetings from the fatherland,” this broadcast was explicitly framed as the voice of a
nation, rather than of the musicians and performers.\textsuperscript{898} The broadcast, and the reactions to it from
emigrants, made for good propaganda in Yugoslavia—\emph{Jutarnji List} ran a two-page article
consisting entirely of emigrant letters “that showed how our nation in the United States were
happy to hear the voice of the old country, even for such a short time.”\textsuperscript{899}

Nonetheless, Yugoslav-Americans were slow to broadcast back to Yugoslavia—the first
west-to-east transatlantic broadcast did not occur until September 1936, a short message of
greeting to Yugoslavia during the dedication of a monument to Njegoš in the Yugoslav Garden
in Cleveland.\textsuperscript{900} Nonetheless, it was dutifully reported in the \emph{South Slav Herald} in Belgrade\textsuperscript{901}
and \emph{Jutarnji List} in Zagreb, which called it “an opportunity for our radio listeners to hear how
our people far away across the sea are trying to maintain connections with the old country, such
that they are not completely drowned in the American sea.”\textsuperscript{902} Radio waves, in other words,
could serve as a lifeline and perhaps prevent assimilation.

In 1939, radio was used to broadcast a short speech from Regent Paul, another first,
congratulating American “Yugoslavs” on their pavilion at the 1939 World Fair. Radio now had
royal approval.\textsuperscript{903} In March 1940, Yugoslavia set up a regular radio station, broadcasting out of
Belgrade folk and classical music, news, short lectures, and national hymns.\textsuperscript{904} By that point,
however, Yugoslavia had little time remaining—the April War was a year away. Moreover,

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\textsuperscript{898} “Trideset ugodnih i slatkih časaka u vezi sa domajom preko Radija—Hvala ti Domovinol,” \emph{Yugoslavenski Glasnik},
March 1, 1934. Fond 967, kut. 34, HDA.
\textsuperscript{899} “Glasovi naših sunarodnjaka iz Sjedinjenih Država”
\textsuperscript{900} “Prvi Radio Prenos iz Sjedinjenih Država,” \emph{Novi Iseljenik}, October 1, 1936. Fond 967, kut. 34, HDA.
\textsuperscript{901} “Historic Radio Broadcast,” \emph{The South Slav Herald}, September 15, 1936. Fond 967, kut. 34, HDA.
\textsuperscript{902} “Prvi Radio Prenos iz Sjedinjenih Država,” \emph{Jutarnji List}, September 6, 1936. Fond 967, kut 34, HDA.
\textsuperscript{903} “Govor Nj. Kr. Vis. Kneza Namjesnika,” \emph{Novi Iseljenik}, April 1939. Fond 967, kut. 34, HDA.
\textsuperscript{904} “Dnevne Redovne Radio Emisije iz Jugoslavije za Iseljenike u Sjevernoj Americi,” \emph{Yugoslavenski Glasnik}, March
29, 1940. Fond 967, kut. 29, HDA.
\end{flushright}
broadcasts from Yugoslavia could hardly compete with the more professional Marčan’s Yugoslav Radio Hour for more discerning and sophisticated listeners in the United States. Even Srbobran, the most loyalist of émigré newspapers, called one Yugoslav broadcast a “disappointment,” complaining that

The preciseness of American radio programs was unknown to them. We heard many opera singers singing national songs that did not fit them at all. Speakers, to some extent, were interesting, but could hardly be heard. Once, they gave some poetry at which everyone here could hardly keep from laughing because of the “melodramatic” passion in which it was given.\textsuperscript{905}

If even Srbobran found these broadcasts “absurd” and “laughable,” the government of Yugoslavia was surely in trouble. After all, the Serbs were supposed to be the most loyal section of the emigration, according to Yugoslav diplomats. Yet even some Serbs were beginning to question the Yugoslav monarchy. And while ridiculous radio programs probably did not spark this crisis of faith, they certainly did nothing to prevent it.

**Yugoslavism and Panslavism**

As distasteful and ridiculous as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia may have seemed to migrants, who mocked its broadcasts and shunned its diplomatic representatives, opposition generally did not take the form of ethnic separatism. This emerges clearly, for instance, from an examination of the conventions of the Croatian Fraternal Union in the mid-to-late 1930s. At the 1935 convention, for instance, the delegates passed a resolution denouncing both the government of Yugoslavia as well as Mussolini and Hitler, a statement that was clearly intended to group the former with the latter.\textsuperscript{906} In other words, Prince Paul’s principal flaw was not that he was Serbian, but that he was a “fascist.” As argued in Chapter Four, this anti-fascist rhetoric was

\textsuperscript{905} Michael Petrovich, “Yugoslav Broadcasts Disappointing to Cleveland,” *Srbobran*, July 22, 1937. Fond 967, kut. 29, HDA.

\textsuperscript{906} Letter from Kosto Unković to the Washington Legation, June 25, 1935. Fond 371, fasc. 51, BO 66, AJ.
linked to the interventions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Croatian Peasant Party, and the Serbian Independent Democrats in the Croatian Fraternal Union. It also overlapped with American press’s coverage of the Yugoslav government (see Chapter 3), which tended to compare the dictatorship in Yugoslavia with Mussolini’s Italy.

In the 1939 convention, advocates of Croatian independence suffered a major setback, with an alliance between the leftist and moderate factions taking half the seats in the administrative and oversight committees and a majority in the legal committee. The power of the editor of Zajedničar to determine the paper’s ideological stance, which had previously been deployed in a Croatian nationalist direction, was likewise curbed, and a moderate was employed to edit the English-language section of Zajedničar.907 Further evidence of the rising leftist tide was evinced by Butković’s concealment of his personal ties to the leader of the Domobran movement in America908 and his opening of the convention with a moderately left-wing speech, denouncing all dictatorships, including that of Prince Paul and Mussolini, and praising the CFU as a workers’ organization so that he could retain the presidency of the CFU.909 Furthermore, earlier that year in May, the Croatian Fraternal Union, the Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union, and the Serbian National Union, together representing the three largest South-Slavic fraternal societies, had held a joint celebration in Pittsburgh to manifest “how much we love our dear homeland, its freedom, and unity.”910 Even Butković signed this declaration, which he would not have done unless there was great pressure on him to do so.

907 Letter from Kosto Unković to the Washington Legation, September 18, 1935. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
908 “Jelićev boravak u S.A.D. i aktivnost domobranaca,” Report from the Washington Legation to MIP, August 15, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70
909 “Izveštaj o Radu i Resultatu V Konvencije Hrvatske Bratske Zajednice u Pittsburghu, PA,” Report from Dr. Stanojević to MIP, September 23, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
910 Telegram from the Washington Legation to Belgrade, April 28, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70.
Of course, when one considers developments in Europe in 1939, this support for Yugoslavia and its independence is not surprising. Slavdom was very much under threat. This panslavist and antifascist mood had been building since September 1938, when the governments of Great Britain and France permitted Hitler’s annexation of the Czech borderlands at the Munich conference. The reaction in the United States was immediate and fierce. American Czechs and Slovaks held what the Chicago consul called a “monster meeting,” where over 50,000 gathered to protest the Western powers’ abandonment of their ally Czechoslovakia. Although the leaders of the Serbian community in Chicago were relatively quiet regarding the annexation of the Sudetenland, the Croats and the Slovenes vocally sided with the Czechs.911 A few weeks later, from the Croatian Day celebrations in San Francisco, the Yugoslav Legation in Washington received the first of many resolutions condemning both the Nazi annexation of the Sudetenland and the continued “unslavic” dictatorship in Belgrade, calling for panslavic solidarity, freedom of speech, assembly, and press, and free elections in Yugoslavia.912

But supporters no less than opponents of the Belgrade government were shocked by these events. On the annual Yugoslav Unification Day celebrations in New York, on December 4, 1938, the organizers expressed their solidarity with Czechoslovakia by holding the celebrations in the Czech Sokol building and by inviting Edvard Beneš, the president of Czechoslovakia, as a guest speaker. This, too, was infused with panslavism, with the brochure hyperbolically calling Beneš “the greatest living Slav, democrat, and supporter of justice and freedom.”913 And at the

911 Report from the Chicago consulate to the Washington Legation, September 28, 1938. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
912 Resolutions from the Croatian Day Committee in San Francisco, October 12, 1938. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
913 Brochure from the Unity Day Celebrations in New York City, December 4, 1938. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
Unity Day celebrations in Pittsburgh, the organizers invited the Czech consul as a guest speaker.914

The government of Yugoslavia’s attempts to befriend, or at least appease, Nazi Germany put its diplomats in an awkward position during this wave of anti-Nazi sentiment, particularly the head of the Yugoslav Legation, Konstantin Fotić, a Stojadinović appointee, who found the presence of the Czechoslovak consul at the Pittsburgh celebration “inconvenient.”915 Stojadinović’s tenure as Prime Minister was characterized by German appeasement, and so it is not surprising that his protégé in Washington would realize that the presence of the Czech consul at such a time could be viewed as a diplomatic insult by Nazi Germany. But such caution was at odds with the popular mood, both overseas and in Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, appeasement of Germany would precipitate mass demonstrations on March 26, 1941, with crowds in Belgrade shouting “Bolje Rat Nego Pakt” – “Better War than the Pact,” which was followed, in turn, by a coup d’etat by anti-German military officers. War with Germany ensued.

Less inhibited by censorship and the fear of arbitrary arrest, Yugoslavs in the United States had begun articulating their opposition to Yugoslavia’s pro-German policy years earlier. Beginning with in 1938, emigrant groups began petitioning Yugoslav diplomats to cut ties with Nazi Germany and implement democracy. One of the first such petitions came in April 1938, following the German annexation of Austria, from the Club of Serbian Progressive Workers. This petition called for an end to “Italianophile” and “Germanophile” diplomacy and the formation of a “panslavic policy, carried out in a democratic spirit,” which concretely meant a military alliance with Czechoslovakia and diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union.916

914 Program from the Unity Day Celebrations in Pittsburgh, December 4, 1938. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
915 Letter from Konstantin Fotić to Kosto Unković, November 26, 1938. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
916 Letter from the Club of Serbian Progressive Workers to Konstantin Fotić, April 10, 1938. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, AJ.
April 14, 1939, for instance, an assembly of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Cleveland sent the Legation a resolution again calling for severing diplomatic ties with Hitler and Mussolini, autonomy for Croatia and Slovenia, and an alliance with the European democracies against the fascists. In May and in June, the Legation received four nearly identical petitions from four heavily-Yugoslav lodges of the International Workers Order, again calling on Yugoslavia to align herself with Europe’s democracies against fascism, implement democracy, preserve Yugoslavia’s borders, and the resolve the Croatian question by plebiscite. In the archives one also finds an ungrammatical but passionate letter written by a Montenegrin-American in English to the legation asserting that “The Yugoslavian nation joining in the Hitler, Mussolini Fascists regime. That slaps the Yugoslav Nation in the Face,” and calling, like the others, for Yugoslavia to cut ties with Berlin and Rome and align herself with Europe’s democracies. An assembly of Serbs, Croats, and, surprisingly, Macedonians, in the Canton-Massillon metropolitan area in Ohio likewise sent the Legation a sternly-worded resolution calling for a Croatian plebiscite, alliance with Europe’s democracies, diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, and “Brotherhood and Unity” among Yugoslavia’s peoples. As early as 1939, the slogan of Tito’s Yugoslavia was being aired in America—a coincidence, but evocative nonetheless.

Despite coming from organizations spanning the ideological spectrum, the demands from all these petitions are remarkably consistent, and suggest a broader consensus among Yugoslav-

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917 Letter from P. Margetić to Konstantin Fotić, April 14, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
918 Letter from Vera Prizevich to Konstantin Fotić, June 1, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ; Letter from James Latin and Marie Tomasin to Konstantin Fotić, May, 1939, Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ; Letter from Miki Kelac and Frank Grabac to Konstantin Fotić, May, 1939, Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ; Letter from Toni Mikac to Konstantin Fotić, May, 1939, Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ;
919 Letter from Mike Chetkovich to the Yugoslav Legation, April 27, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ
920 Resolution from the conference of Serbian, Croatian, and Macedonians in the Canton-Massillon area, May 15, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ
Americans on what Yugoslavism meant, namely, democracy, panslavic solidarity, and opposition to fascism.

Yugoslavia’s Final Years

The outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939 reinforced this anti-fascist tendency, even though Yugoslavia would not become involved in World War II until April 1941. News from Europe was avidly read and discussed, both among Yugoslavs and the general public. Yet this too provided another manifestation of hybrid nationality. As Fotić reported on October 14, 1939, Yugoslavs in the United States were influenced by a general milieu of “Americanized…elements and by constant public discussion about the importance of freedom for [Europe’s] peoples, particularly the small ones.” The fate of Yugoslavia, despite its neutrality, attracted particular interest—except for the few remnants of the Domobran movement in the United States, Yugoslav newspapers in the United States all expressed concern for their homeland in an increasingly dangerous Europe. Furthermore, calls for an independent Croatia had virtually ceased. Influenced by the broader American media milieu, an anti-German and anti-Italian mood prevailed. Having read a number of editorials from migrant newspapers, Fotić also concluded that, despite the Soviet Union’s pact with Nazi Germany and its complicity in partitioning Poland once more, many continued to see Russia as a “Slavic Big Brother” and the principal obstacle to German expansion into Eastern Europe. Affection for Russia was driven by panslavic sentiment, rather than agreement with the principles of Bolshevism. 921

In the spring of 1940, Hitler turned his attention toward Western and Northern Europe. On June 4, France surrendered—Hitler’s ambitions for pan-European conquest were becoming increasingly apparent, aspirations which boded ill for Yugoslavia. Reporting on the response

921 Konstantin Fotić, “Naši iseljenici i evropski konflikt,” Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Washington Legation, October 14, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
among Yugoslav migrants three days later, Fotić observed that everyone was “constantly discussing conditions in the ‘old country’… the attachment our emigrants feel toward their home country grows stronger every day, just as the idea of united life (between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) sinks deeper roots.” Croatian newspapers such as Zajedničar increasingly advocated working and living together with Serbs and Slovenes in the US to preserve the Yugoslav state in the face of the German and Italian threat. A proposal to form a committee to coordinate activity of the fraternal organizations was once again floated.922 Of course, given the increasingly interconnected nature of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities in the United States over the late 1930s, a federation of fraternal unions was a logical next step.

Despite the increasingly precariousness of Yugoslavia’s international position, however, official celebrations like “Yugoslav Day” and “Unification Day” continued to be poorly attended. Although the Fifth Annual Yugoslav Radio Hour picnic, held in Hibbing, Minnesota in May, 1940 was attended by over ten-thousand Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,923 Unification Day in Chicago that same year attracted a mere three thousand people.924 While Hibbing was a remote and obscure location compared to Chicago, the Radio Hour Picnic was a beloved emigrant institution and funded by donations from migrants rather than from the Yugoslav foreign service. Moreover, given that Yugoslav diplomats only learned of this celebration in 1940 and had to be introduced to it, this event had probably not been visited by consuls, thus avoiding conspicuous association with the government of Yugoslavia. The combination of these factors allowed the Radio Hour celebration to avoid any backlash from Croatian groups opposed to working closely

922 Konstantin Fotić. “Raspoloženje medju naših iseljenicima pogledom na današnji ratni konflikt u Evropi,” June 7, 1940, Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
923 Letter from Peter Fugina to Konstantin Fotić, May 6, 1940. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
924 “Three Thousand to Observe Jugo-Slavia’s 22nd Anniversary,” Chicago Tribune, December, 1940, found in Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
with the Yugoslav state. Indeed, the Croatian boycott of official holidays continued. Unification Day in New York City in 1940, for instance, counted only a single Croatian organization among its fifteen sponsors.\textsuperscript{925} Despite the looming war, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had remarkably little non-Serb support overseas.

**Conclusion**

Nonetheless, on the eve of Yugoslavia’s involvement in World War II, and the subsequent formation of the United Committee of South Slavic Americans, substantial progress had been made toward uniting the Yugoslav diaspora. Although a unified diaspora political lobby had not emerged, the latter half of the 1930s had seen collaboration between Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups in a wide variety of cultural endeavors: a room in the Pittsburgh Cathedral of Learning, a garden in Cleveland, language schools, a common directory of organizations, and even Yugoslav Radio Hour. As Rogers Brubaker argues, diaspora ethnicity is often embedded in routines and institutions.\textsuperscript{926} Not only did these cultural endeavors sustain the habits of organizational cooperation that are so important to the functioning of a diaspora according to Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick-Schiller,\textsuperscript{927} they also proved that American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did not need subsidies from the consulates, that their resources were sufficient to chart their own course in the cultural sphere. In this, we find an answer to Gabriel Sheffer’s question, posed in the introduction, about the sorts of tensions between the ‘old country’ and a diaspora that is treated like “a milking cow” rather than an ally.\textsuperscript{928} Although Yugoslavia’s transactional

\textsuperscript{925} Report from Consul Stanojević to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Proslava Dana Ujedinjenja u New Yorku,” December 3, 1940. Fond 371, fasc. 54, BO 70, AJ.
\textsuperscript{928} Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, 250-256.
approach drove a wedge between Yugoslavia and “its” emigration, it also led to a diaspora that was more independent, politically assertive, and interconnected on an organizational level.

Moreover emigrant cultural projects during this period reveal that the Serb, Croat, and Slovene communities in the United States shared a common symbolic vocabulary. There was a common pantheon of figures that nationalists could cite as proof of national greatness—Tesla, Pupin, Baraga, Adamic, and Baloković, as well as a host of anonymous figures: Columbus’s Ragusan sailors, the Roanoke colonists, and the hundreds of thousands of migrants whose labors made the United States an industrial society. Being a Yugoslav became a way to stake a claim to America, a claim that was based not on martial feats of the Serbian army during World War I or the Karadjordjević dynasty, but scientific genius, artistic creativity, and hard work. This tendency was reinforced by the cultural pluralist zeitgeist in the United States during the late 1930s. As such, Yugoslavism in the United States was both an example of the syncretic influence of homeland nationalism, but also a demonstration of how acculturation to the host country did not weaken diaspora nationalism, but invigorated it. Yugoslav diaspora nationalism had become distinct from its manifestation in Yugoslavia. If we continue the theoretical approach of treating “diaspora” as a transnational network of emigrant organizations, the foundation for the “Yugoslav diaspora” already existed by the late 1930s—all that remained was for a political cause to mobilize this incipient network.

This, too, acquired a firm outline during the late 1930s. Perhaps as a syncretic influence from other Slavic groups in the United States, American Yugoslavism seemed increasingly based on an advocacy for panslavism, antifascism, and democracy. As such, World War II, covered in the next chapter, did not create the Yugoslav diaspora, it merely redirected its activity from cultural activism to political lobbying.
On April 6, 1941, following a coup d’état that ousted the pro-German government of Yugoslavia, Nazi Germany declared war on Yugoslavia. On April 18, Yugoslavia surrendered. While no mainland European country long withstood the German steamroller (Poland and France lasted little more than a month), Yugoslavia’s swift defeat was hastened by desertions and defections by Croatians within the Yugoslav army, many of whom surrendered without fighting. On the approach to Zagreb alone, the Wehrmacht captured over twenty generals and fifteen thousand soldiers. To control their newly-captured territory, Germany set up a Croatian puppet government headed by Ante Pavelić in Croatia and Bosnia. Another puppet government was established in Serbia, headed by Milan Nedić, a Serbian general with pro-German leanings. Finally, Italy annexed Dalmatia and Montenegro and Germany annexed Slovenia. Yugoslavia’s government went into exile, eventually settling in London.

Although Yugoslavia’s government had lost control of its European territory, it still had the metaphorical “tenth banovina.” In early 1942, the government-in-exile took its proprietary attitude toward the diaspora to its logical conclusion—military recruitment. After all, as discussed in Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5, Yugoslavia had already created an emigrant census, an emigrant museum, and maps of the major centers of population, while also seeking to censor speech and tap remittances, a form of indirect taxation. Using a new American law that made it possible for emigrants to either serve in the military or form international battalions under the authority of Allied or co-belligerent governments, Yugoslav diplomats sought to create a

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“Yugoslav legion” in the United States. The Yugoslav Legation in Washington directed all consulates to inform “our citizens” of this new law, hoping that overseas Yugoslavs could carry on the fight. Owing to Yugoslav laws which made their citizenship hereditary and difficult to renounce, Yugoslavia had a wide pool of potential recruits, maybe even enough for a full division of ten thousand soldiers. The response from emigrants, however, was comically weak—Chicago, one of the largest population centers of American Yugoslavs, supplied only four volunteers. Serving in the American army was simply more attractive—American soldiers were better equipped and better fed, and, more importantly, military service was a shortcut to American citizenship. The “Yugoslav diaspora” would not serve as cannon fodder for King Peter II Karadjordjević, particularly considering their alienation from the royalist government of Yugoslavia. However, the failure of a “Yugoslav legion” does not suggest that that emigrants had no attachment or loyalties to Yugoslavia. Rather, it illustrates the central theme of this chapter, namely, that migrants had loyalties to their host nation as well as their old country, something that is reflected in their support for the resistance to the Nazi occupation.

This chapter chronicles diaspora agitation for and against Yugoslavia during World War II, from its beginnings, when support coalesced around Draža Mihailović, to its conclusion, the United Committee of South Slavic Americans (UCSSA), which was supported by several major Croat and Slovene organizations, along with a disparate coalition of Serb liberals and leftists. While focused primarily on the United States, this chapter also includes for comparison a similar effort to create a Yugoslav emigrant lobby in South America, an effort that ended in failure. The

930 “Svi Stranci Klasificirani sa Ostalim Vojnim Pozvanicima,” FLIS Press Release, May 16, 1942. Fond 414, fasc. 6, BO 15, AJ.
931 Directive from the Yugoslav legation in Washington to the General Consulate in New York, August 3, 1942. Fond 414, fasc. 6, BO 15, AJ
932 Report from the Chicago General Consulate to the Legation in Washington, November 7, 1942. Fond 414, fac. 6, BO 15, AJ.
other half of this chapter’s argument concerns UCSSA’s opposite number, a small far-right Serbian organizations called the Serbian National Defense, and more broadly the Serbian National Federation, which backed the Serbian National Defense. Arguing against previous scholars who have presented Yugoslav émigré politics during the Second World War as an expression of the “Serb-Croat conflict,” wherein the Serbs moved toward nationalism and the Croats toward leftism, this chapter contends that this portrait is inaccurate for several reasons.

First, UCSSA (and its organizational predecessors) were not “Croatian” but “Yugoslav.” As a political coalition of a sufficiently large and diverse group of Serb, Croat, and Slovene (and later Macedonian) organizations, UCSSA meets Gabriel Sheffer’s definition of a “diaspora:” a sociopolitical formation created by migration whose members regard themselves as part of a national community and who form a trans-state network. This definition does not require unanimity or active participation of every member of a “diaspora,” but rather the political activity of a core group of activists on behalf of their homeland. By the same token, the diaspora does not need to exist everywhere there are migrant communities: Donna Gabaccia, who famously applied this theory to Italian migrants, postulates the existence of several “Italian diasporas,” transnational networks, at different times and in different parts of the world. As such, the “Yugoslav diaspora” as represented by UCSSA was limited to emigrant communities in North America. The reason for this will be explained through a comparison to an unsuccessful contemporary attempt to organize “Yugoslav” migrants in South America.

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934 Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (New York: Cambridge UP, 2003), 9, 100, 180-201.

Another issue with the “Serbo-Croat conflict” framing is that both “sides” were not evenly-matched. As this chapter will show, opponents of Yugoslavism were a definite minority, and American Serbs were not a political monolith. Secondly, this chapter argues that UCSSA’s political program was fundamentally left-liberal, rather than socialist, representing a syncretic blending of American political prescriptions and Yugoslav ideology. Support for Tito did not make UCSSA communist. Moreover, UCSSA’s platform was as much an expression of American nationalism as it was of Yugoslav patriotism and builds on the previous chapters’ argument that American and Yugoslav patriotism were complementary and mutually-reinforcing.

And third, this chapter argues that the Serbian National Defense was not the expression of latent Serbian diaspora national chauvinism, but rather the work of a small group of Serbian nationalist ideologues from the ‘old country.’ Comparing the relatively successful Odbrana to the ineffective Domobran, this chapter argues that the explosive development of a Serbian far-right movement was a consequence of the Serbian National Federation’s close relationship to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington and the Serbian Exarchate. This gave Serbian chauvinists a backdoor to emigrant institutions, allowing them to escape from the political margins into leading roles in Serbian newspapers, churches, and fraternal societies. These activists then used their offices to marginalize pro-Yugoslav voices among émigré Serbs. Ironically, the institutions that were supposed to promote Yugoslavism ended up undermining it among the Serbs, whom Yugoslav diplomats considered the most loyal. Only where emigrant institutions remained autonomous from the Yugoslav government did Yugoslavism flourish.

Nonetheless, as the outcome of the rivalry between UCSSA and the SNO indicates, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were more influential together than apart, winning over both the
public and politicians to their vision for Yugoslavia which, despite their support for Tito, was fundamentally liberal and democratic.

The Origins of the United Committee of South Slavic Americans

Although it would take some time for UCSSA to mobilize a “Yugoslav diaspora,” the foundations for the committee were laid almost immediately after the German attack by the major Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions. Following the pattern set by the Yugoslav Fraternal Federation a decade earlier, attempts were begun to establish a pan-Yugoslav umbrella organization to coordinate the charitable and lobbying efforts of these emigrant groups. Even so, coaxing the leaders into such an organization took some maneuvering. Galvanized by the German declaration of war in April 1941 and Yugoslavia’s rapid collapse, the head of the Serbian National Union and the two major Slovene fraternal unions approached Ivan Butković, the president of the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), proposing federation into a united relief effort. This organization called itself the Jugoslovenski Centralni Odbor, or Yugoslav Central Committee (an allusion to the Yugoslav Committee which had lobbied for the creation of Yugoslavia).

Butković, a Croatian nationalist, initially balked. Even when promised a leadership position, Butković believed that the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU) should support a postwar independent Croatia. But there was pressure on him to change his mind. Thanks to the interventions of the Croatian Peasant Party, Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and Svetozar Pribićević in Croatian Fraternal Union politics during the late 1930s, the CFU’s leftists and liberals had formed a popular front of sorts, winning control over a majority of seats in the central committee of the CFU. Although the nationalist faction headed by Butković still held the presidency, his position was precarious. Still, as a nationalist, he had to try for a nationalist
organization, setting up a purely Croatian alternative to the Odbor, the Croatian National Council. But the organization’s membership was too small to be viable. Further weakening the Croatian National Council, Peter Radić, the nephew of Stjepan Radić, the martyred leader of the Croatian Peasant Party and the Croatian nationalist movement, now living in America, had sided with the leftists and liberals, insisting that the CFU cooperate with Serbs and Slovene organizations to raise money for Yugoslavia. Additional pressure would be placed on Butković after Operation Barbarossa (the German invasion of the Soviet Union) in June 1941. Predictably, the Nazi onslaught against Soviet Union supercharged the pan-Slavic mood among Americans of Slavic origin that had been growing since the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938. As the Battle of Moscow continued on Christmas Day, 1941, Butković finally endorsed the Slav Congress of America, a loose organization of anti-fascist immigrant groups founded in the aftermath of the Munich agreement. Since Panslavism was a cousin of Yugoslavism, Butković was caught in a contradiction—he could hardly support the brotherhood of all Slavs while denying any fraternal relation between Croats and Serbs and Slovenes. Three months later, in March 1942 the Croatian National Council would be disbanded by pro-Yugoslav forces within the CFU, which joined the Yugoslav Central Committee.

Initially, the Yugoslav Central Committee’s supported the Četniks, a name that refers to a loose grouping of Serbian monarchist guerillas in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. That there was a communist insurgency as well as a royalist one was virtually unknown until late 1942. Because no American periodical would send a journalist into Yugoslavia until 1944, the

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936 Report from the Washington Legation to Dušan Simović, June 30, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.
937 Report from Kosto Unković to Konstantin Fotić, March 31, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.
938 Open letter to all Slavic organizations from John Butković and Stephan Zeman, December 25, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.
American media had to get their news from a few representatives of the government-in-exile, such as Sava Kosanović (or Konstantin Fotić) who were in contact with the Četniks by radio, telegraph, or courier.\textsuperscript{940} As a result, support for the royalist guerrillas, led by Draža Mihailović, was virtually unanimous. At the April 1942 meeting of the Slav Congress of America, for instance (which Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene delegates chose to attend as Yugoslavs rather than separately), one of the major props was a portrait, hand painted by a Yugoslav artist from Detroit, of Mihailović with an American flag in his right hand, a Yugoslav flag in his left, and a swastika being crushed under his boot.\textsuperscript{941} Not even the \textit{Daily Worker}, the organ of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), knew about Tito. In July 1942, for example, the \textit{Daily Worker} interviewed Kosanović and asked whether “the freedom army of Draža Mihailovich” would be able to open a second front in Europe, thereby taking the pressure off of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{942} Among the Communists, however, support for the royalists ended a month later, when the \textit{The Daily Worker} and the Serbian periodical \textit{Slobodna Reč} (Free Word) began to attack Mihailović as a “traitor,” “fascist,” and “Serbian chauvinist,” and to describe Tito in glowing terms.\textsuperscript{943} Since the CPUSA controlled \textit{The Daily Worker} and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) \textit{Slobodna Reč} (its editor, Mirko Marković, was a KPJ member), this sudden shift bespoke coordination from Moscow.

Apart from the Communist press, however, the existence of Communist insurgents in Yugoslavia remained unknown until Tito convened a provisional government in Bihać, Bosnia, in November 1942. After several weeks, news of the ideological split within the anti-fascist

\textsuperscript{940} See, e.g.:”Yugoslav diplomat talks to Chetniks via shortwave,” CBS Radio Bulletin, March 27, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
\textsuperscript{941} Report from Kosto Unković to Konstantin Fotić, April 27, 1942. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.
\textsuperscript{942} “Questions submitted to Sava N. Kosanovich July 1942 by Oakley Johnson of the Daily Worker,” July, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
\textsuperscript{943} Konstantin Fotić, \textit{The War We Lost}, (New York: The Viking Press, 1948), 184-5.
resistance began to trickle back to the United States. The earliest mainstream writer to publish this information was Louis Adamic (who else?) in an exposé of Mihailović’s guerrillas for the *Saturday Evening Post* issue of December 12, 1942, titled “Mikhailovich: Balkan Mystery Man.”

Although Adamic described Mihailović as “a good professional soldier” and a “good Yugoslav… unlike a relatively small element of ultra-nationalistic Serbians, most of them aging politicians in Belgrade,” he nonetheless revealed that Mihailovic had been fighting the Communist Partisans along with the German occupation, and that Mihailovic stood for the restoration of the monarchy in Yugoslavia, unlike the Partisans, who wanted “a new deal in Yugoslavia,” a reference to Roosevelt’s New Deal in America. As gentle as Adamic’s treatment of Mihailović was, he nonetheless made the Partisans look more appealing, more in tune with American values. In one instance, Adamic compared the Partisans to American freedom fighters in the War of Independence, calling them “some of the finest people in Yugoslavia.” Moreover, Adamic disclosed, the Partisans were both more numerous than Mihailović’s forces and untainted by any cooperation with the German occupiers.

Adamic did not name his sources. However, there were KPJ infiltrators in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), some of whom, it was later revealed by an FBI inquest, corresponded with Adamic and had been continually leaking information on military matters in Yugoslavia to Adamic for an indeterminate period of time. Adamic could also have gotten his information from the *Daily Worker*, although, considering the timing and his relatively sympathetic portrayal of Mihailović, that seems unlikely. Regardless, the ideological split in the resistance movement

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944 Louis Adamic, “Mikhailovich: Balkan Mystery Man,” *Saturday Evening Post*, December 12, 1942, attached to FBI Dossier on Adamic, Louis Adamic Papers, Folder 1, Box 1, IHRCA.
945 Louis Adamic, “Mikhailovich: Balkan Mystery Man,” *Saturday Evening Post*, December 12, 1942, attached to FBI Dossier on Adamic, Louis Adamic Papers, Folder 1, Box 1, IHRCA.
946 “Re: Office of Strategic Services,” FBI Report to J. Edgar Hoover, April 19, 1944, Louis Adamic Papers, Folder 5, Box 1, IHRCA.
had been revealed. Three days later, the *New York Times* mentioned, for the first time, the
conflict between Mihailović and unnamed Communist Partisans (although it predictably sided
with Mihailović), reprinting a statement from the Yugoslav government-in-exile that claimed
that “Mikhailovitch… remains the central figure of Yugoslav resistance.”\textsuperscript{947} In fact, Tito’s name
would not appear in the *New York Times* until June 1943.\textsuperscript{948} Even though Tito’s name leaked
relatively late, there was now a non-monarchist, non-Serbian alternative to Mihailović.
Yugoslav emigrants in the United States now had the option to support either the Partisans or the
Četniks.

These revelations about Mihailović spurred each of the main Serb, Croat, and Slovene
fraternal unions into holding congresses, at which they would debate both their plans for aiding
the resistance and proclaim their aspirations for a post-war Yugoslavia. Of the three groups, the
Slovenes were the most flexible about Yugoslavia’s postwar organization. At the Slovene
Congress, held in December 1942, the left-liberal SNPJ (Slovene National Benefit Society) took
the lead, supplying most of the speeches, although representatives of the clericalist KSKJ were
also present. Not coincidentally, the SNPJ was still headed by Vincent Cajnakar, who was the
architect of an earlier attempt to unify Serb, Croat and Slovene fraternal organizations, the
Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, a decade earlier. Representatives of the Yugoslav government
attended, but contributed little to the discussion—Franc Snoj, a minister without portfolio, was
present only as an observer and Konstantin Fotić, the head of the Yugoslav Legation was invited
to speak but was booed (for reasons that will be explained later). Despite the gesture toward
compromise with the government-in-exile that Fotić’s presence represented, the Slovene
Congress’s resolutions represented a break with official Yugoslav doctrine and an embrace of a

new kind of Yugoslavism. Emphasizing both Slovenian and American identity, the Slovene congress called not only for a federal Yugoslavia, but also democracy, a Balkan Union, a European Union, and even a single world government. Although ahead of their time, this internationalist utopianism reflected the zeitgeist in the United States. Many within the United States saw the United Nations Declaration in January 1942, which united the countries fighting the Axis into a formal alliance, as a prelude to a global world federation. The Slovene Congress elected Louis Adamic as honorary president, not only because he was the most famous living Slovene-American, but also because he shared their vision and idealism.

Whereas the Slovenian Congress was characterized by compromise and concord, the Croatian Congress, held two months later, was split by factionalism. On one side was a coalition of liberals and leftists, supporters of Yugoslavia, led by the Croatian Fraternal Union’s vice president, the Ohio congressional representative Bill Boić. On the other side, conversely, were the nationalists, led, as always, by CFU President Butković, who wanted Croats to organize their own relief effort for the resistance in Yugoslavia. Attendees at the Croatian Congress were joined by an eminent guest, Ban Šubašić, the leader of the Croatian Banovina, who, like Stjepan Radić over a decade earlier, functioned as a symbolic leader of the Croatian people. Šubašić, like the minister Snoj, had arrived in the United States in September 1941. Although Butković hoped to lend Šubašić’s symbolic capital to the nationalist cause, the distinguished Croat leader gave his support to the Yugoslavists instead. Moreover, Butković’s proposal that the Croats

951 Letter from Minister Ninčić to the Yugoslav Legation in Washington, June 10, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 82, BO 105, AJ; Letter from Konstantin Fotić to unknown recipient, January 16, 1942. Fond 371, fasc. 82, BO 105, AJ; Letter from Sava Kosanović to Dewitte Poole, June 17, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
undertake a separate relief effort probably smacked too strongly of the fascist Domobran movement, which was currently being dismantled by the FBI (See Chapter 4). Yugoslavism, in contrast, could have been a way for delegates to reaffirm their loyalty to the United States. Ultimately, the leftists prevailed, with the Congress issuing resolutions recognizing Tito’s government at Bihać, denouncing the King and Mihailović, and calling for a federally-organized democratic Yugoslavia that would include Bulgaria. These were same demands as the Slovene congress (minus the call for a European Union and One World Government, of course). Sensing the zeitgeist, (and unable to openly defy Šubašić), Butković jumped on the Yugoslav bandwagon.952

The Croatian Congress elected Zlatko Baloković, a famous concert violinist, as honorary president. Baloković was a relative latecomer to Yugoslav diaspora politics, having been active only since 1937, when he gave concerts to raise money for the Yugoslav Room in the Pittsburgh Cathedral of Learning.953 Untouched by two decades of factionalism, Baloković had few enemies and was universally palatable. Observers from the OSS characterized Baloković as a naive idealist; Šubašić regarded him as more figurehead than leader.954 Nonetheless, Baloković was also an ally of Louis Adamic, having cosigned a message of greetings and support to the Bihać government a month earlier.955 As a result, despite Šubašić’s intervention, the Croatian Congress was (relatively) united behind Tito and linked to the Slovene Congress, both by personal ties and political objectives.

Despite having the support of virtually all the fraternal organizations within the United States, the UCSSA never won the support of the Serbian National Union. Instead, Serbian support for Tito coalesced around a group calling itself the “Vidovdan Congress,” named after the Serbian national holiday. A breakaway splinter of the Serbian National Union, the Vidovdan congress had its origins as a KPJ initiative in 1935, as discussed in Chapter 4, although it also received support from Stojan Pribićević and the liberal Serbs who sympathized with him. Once again, we see the extent to which Yugoslav opposition parties in the 1930s laid the organizational foundation for the Yugoslav diaspora. Although a list of active members of the Vidovdan congress eluded this researcher, most contemporaries stated that the Vidovdan congress represented a minority among politically-engaged Serbs. But how large was that minority—were they thirty percent, or just five? A rough estimate of their numbers can be gleaned by looking at subscriptions to the Vidovdan Congress’s associated newspaper, Slobodna Reč, which was edited by Mirko Marković, a KPJ member and veteran of the Spanish Civil War. With a circulation of around five thousand compared to Srbobran’s twelve to fifteen thousand, Slobodna Reč was read by a substantial minority of American Serbs. Support for the Partisans was not just restricted to Communists, socialists, and fellow travelers, however. The Vidovdan Congress would be joined by three dissident Orthodox priests (and their congregations), headed by Strahinja Maletić, in late 1941. It would be these three groups that formed the Serbian core

957 “Yugoslavs,” OSS Report from Francis Kalnay to Dewitt Poole, June 8, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 150.
of a pro-Tito Yugoslav diaspora in the United States. Although they were a minority, they were hardly insignificant.

Despite being organized on a separate basis, the crystallization of pro-Tito movements among American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes suggest that these groups functioned as an extended family, in the sense that each monitored and sought to match or emulate the political activities of the other. This was the natural outgrowth of their collaboration in the cultural sphere, as discussed in Chapter Five. Moreover, the holding of separate congresses as a stepping stone to pan-Yugoslav cooperation reproduced a pattern of activity established by the formation of the Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, which formed in the thirties. In fact, the leadership of the American Slovene Congress anticipated this unifying pressure. Approaching the OSS’s foreign nationality branch to talk about emigrant affairs, the Slovene delegation reportedly stated that “since they, the Slovenians, had so successfully got together at the Slovene National Congress in Cleveland, December 4 and 5, and were at present so well-united, it was in order that the Croatsians should do likewise, the Serbs being in their turn also organized [emphasis mine].”

When asked by their OSS interlocutors whether

the separate organization of the Croatsians [would] prove to be the final nail driven into the Yugoslav coffin so far as Yugoslav elements in the United States were concerned…the answer was emphatically negative. When each of the three groups had its organization then steps could be taken toward some sort of common adjustment directed toward the federal idea of Yugoslavia…and so coordinate the political activity of American Croats and Serbs and Slovenes. ⁹⁵⁹ It was no coincidence that Vincent Cainkar of the SNPJ, who had employed this stepping-stone strategy a decade previously with the Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, headed the Slovene delegation. And once again, this was affirmation that Yugoslavism as an organizational principle was entirely compatible with Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene patriotism, especially since this was ingrained in the political habits of Yugoslavs in the United States.

True to Cainkar’s prediction, on June 19 and 20, 1943, representatives from the Slovene, Croatian, and Serbian Vidovdan Congresses met in Pittsburgh and agreed to confederate in a new organization called the “United Committee of American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,” which would be renamed the United Committee of South-Slavic Americans (or UCSSA) in August, an implicit recognition of Yugoslavism both as a nationality and as an organizing principle. Later that year, they were joined by the Bulgarian-Macedonian Congress, headed by George Pirinsky.\textsuperscript{960} Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes remained, however, the dominant element, with Louis Adamic being elected president, Zlatko Baloković (Croat), Žarko Bunčić (Serb), and Etbin Kristan (Slovene) becoming Vice Presidents, and Petar Radić (Croat), Mirko Marković (Serb), and Janko Rogelj (Slovene) becoming secretaries. Of this group, only Marković was a KPJ member; the rest were either Social Democrats or Agrarians, in the case of Radić. Moreover, it should be noted that the offices of Vice-President and Secretary each had a Serb, Croat, and Slovene occupant. In accord with their organizational principle, this new organization proclaimed both its support for “Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene fighters for liberty,” expressing their belief that “the National Army of Liberation (meaning Tito’s Partisans) will create a basis for a new Jugoslavia in which the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will enjoy in freedom equal rights and perform equal duties.” This call for a new Yugoslavia based on equality under the law and freedom was accompanied by a proclamation of loyalty to the United States and a promise that “Americans of Serb, Croatian, and Slovene descent…must employ all their energy to expedite the complete victory of the United States and her allies.”\textsuperscript{961} With this proclamation, UCSSA

\textsuperscript{960} Letter from Louis Adamic to George Pirinsky, July 13, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
signaled that they were not just Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and Yugoslavs, but Americans as well. American, Serb, Croat, Slovene, and Yugoslav patriotism coexisted in this document, bound together by a political program based on civil liberties. This was American Yugoslavism.

A “Yugoslav Diaspora” in South America?

The Yugoslav Central Committee and UCSSA had an organizational counterpart in South America as well, albeit one that was significantly less influential and effective. Immediately following the German invasion of Yugoslavia, a group of Yugoslav-minded businessmen, with the support of the Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires, founded a new organization, calling itself the Jugoslovenska Narodna Odbrana (JNO), the Yugoslav National Defense. Taking the name of a similar organization that had rallied support for the creation of a Yugoslav state during the first World War, the JNO aspired to create, more or less from scratch, a Yugoslav ethnic lobby in South America that would create and distribute propaganda on behalf of Yugoslavia and collect money from emigrants to support the government-in-exile.

In terms of ideology, this was a staunchly royalist organization; its slogan—“everything for the King and Fatherland”—left few doubts about its sympathies. Other than monarchism, however, the JNO had no political program. As the central committee of the JNO admonished one branch in Chaco in 1943, “the JNO, as a patriotic rather than internationalist organization, does not involve itself in the affairs of political parties, be they communist, clerical, monarchist, or republican…and will not dictate to the people in the old country what kind of regime they will

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962 “Čirem Jugoslovenskom Odboru,” April 24, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ; Letter to the Yugoslav Legation in Buenos Aires from the JNO, May 14, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.

963 ibid.

964 Letter from the Central Committee of the JNO to the Yugoslav Legation, August 8, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ; Resolution passed by the JNO at their first Congress in Santiago de Chile, July 27, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.
have after the war. The existence of such a letter, however, suggested that some in the JNO disagreed with this neutral stance. After all, the JNO regularly sent money to the government-in-exile and worked very closely with its diplomatic representatives in South America, including, ironically, Djuro Kolumbatović, who was now stationed in Santiago de Chile, far away from the milieu in the United States that he antagonized during the royal dictatorship.

One could also connect the self-professed apoliticism of the Yugoslav Central Organization (a short-lived patriotic emigrant organization in the United States that Kolumbatović founded and effectively ran) and that of the JNO. In both cases, “apoliticism” was a ruse to quash republican or leftist movements within an organization that was intended to support the government of Yugoslavia unconditionally. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia wanted emigrant money, not emigrant opinions.

Perhaps because of its missing political program and close ties to widely disliked Yugoslav diplomats, the JNO struggled to win the support of pre-existing emigrant societies in South America. Winning the loyalty of these societies was central to the JNO’s claim to represent the diaspora—the JNO was meant as an umbrella organization for South American emigrant civil society, gathering their leaders into a single central committee. Nonetheless, from the beginning, its leadership consisted of independently affluent businessmen, rather than

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965 Letter from the JNO central committee to the Draža Mihailović branch in Chaco, January 10, 1943. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ
966 See, e.g. Letter to Charge d’Affaires of Yug. Legation in B.A., December 4, 1942. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ; Notes of the JNO proceedings at the JNO at their first Congress in Santiago de Chile, July 24-27, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ; Letter from the Central Committee of the JNO to the Yugoslav Legation in B.A., August 8, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ; Resolution passed by the JNO at their first Congress in Santiago de Chile, July 27, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.
968 Letter to the Yugoslav Legation in Buenos Aires from the JNO, May 14, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.
representatives of worker self-help groups. It was a major source of organizational weakness that the JNO, unlike UCSSA, was not an organization rooted in working-class activism. In the United States, class-based activism had created habits of cooperation between Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal organizations. These organizations, which were themselves cooperative enterprises, grew accustomed to pooling their resources to reach common goals. In South America, there was no similar network. Moreover, the relationship between employer and employee, on the other hand, is competitive, not cooperative, weakening any potential for a diasporic network. Likewise, the JNO’s conservative agenda had little to offer migrant workers, many of whom intended to return to the “old country” after a few years abroad.

As a result, the JNO’s efforts to forge a coalition made little headway. Half a year after the JNO was founded, the central committee had grown so impatient with its attempts to woo other Yugoslav societies that it openly discussed “forcing an end to talks.” Croatian emigrant groups were particularly reluctant to join the JNO, choosing to federate instead into an organization calling itself the “Main Croatian National Committee.” Leftist organizations, in turn, joined the All-Slav congress based in Montevideo (which the JNO boycotted). And following the spread of news that Draža Mihailović had been making common cause with the German occupation to fight Tito’s partisans, the JNO itself experienced a schism, led by the vice president and an indeterminate number of discontented members. While this new group, which also called itself the JNO, did not support Tito, they did denounce the Yugoslav diplomatic

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970 “Drugi Izveštaj Rada,” October 31, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.
972 Letter from the JCO to the Inter-allied coordination committee, November 30, 1942. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.
service in South America, for their conciliatory approach to fascist governments, as well as for their tacit support from the government-in-exile. While the parent group reluctantly recognized the London government, the JNO rebels rejected apoliticism, calling for a free and democratic Yugoslavia organized as a federation. With all this fragmentation and discord, then, the JNO could not credibly speak on behalf of an imagined “Yugoslav” diasporic community. The JNO came nowhere near the hegemonic position of UCSSA in North America, which linked together Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, along with leftists and liberals, with an articulated political program.

Why did political support for Tito remain marginal in South America? In answering this question, it is helpful to return to Sheffer’s conception of a “diaspora” as a political network that acts as a conduit for resources, people, information, and ideas. As we have already seen, the spread of information about the resistance in Yugoslavia is crucial in understanding the development of the Yugoslav movement in North America, especially during the chaotic conditions of war, where many channels of communication, like the postal service or telegrams, became inoperative. In North America, this field of connections between various South Slavic groups was dense. As documented in the preceding chapters, Serb, Croat, and Slovene self-help societies in North America had a tradition of working together and paying attention to what the others were doing and saying. Louis Adamic, in turn, was at the center of this spiderweb, disseminating knowledge about Tito that he obtained through his own connections with the OSS, the team of ministers, and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, through these same Serb, Croat, and Slovene societies, many of which were honeycombed with leftists and Yugoslavists, thanks to the transnational activities of Yugoslav political parties in the 1930s.

973 “Naša Linija,” Statement made by JCO breakaways, June 18, 1943. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.
The emigrant community in South America, on the other hand, was only weakly connected with civic life in North America. In August 1941, for instance, the JNO wrote to the head of the Yugoslav Legation in North America, Konstantine Fotić, whom they believed could put them in contact with representatives of the “Yugoslav diaspora” in North America. Fotić never replied.\footnote{Letter from the President of the JNO to the Central Committee, November 22, 1941. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.} Unfortunately for the JNO, Fotić was quietly but covertly opposed to the Yugoslav movement in the United States, and (against the orders of the foreign ministry) had been leaking information about Ustaša atrocities to the Serbian emigrant newspaper Srbobran (translate) (see the next section). On the other hand, North American newspapers like Srbobran seldom reached South America, let alone the many small and dispersed emigrant colonies in the hinterlands. This was a source of great relief to the JNO and to the Yugoslav legation in Buenos Aires, which thought that the spread of information about emigrant affairs in North America would be “catastrophic” and “must be prevented.”\footnote{Report from the JNO Central Committee, December 19, 1942. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.}

At the same time when revelations about the existence of the Partisans triggered the formation of UCSSA, the rebellious members of the JNO professed to be “not well enough informed on the reason of the quarrel between the two resistance forces in Yugoslavia, whether tribal, religious, or ideological.”\footnote{“Naša Linija,” Statement made by JCO breakaways, June 18, 1943. Fond 385, fasc. 4, BO 28, AJ.} Only the Communists in South America seemed to be aware of Tito, sponsoring a resolution at the All-Slav Congress in Montevideo in support of Tito’s government in Bihac in April, 1943,\footnote{Telegram from Dominiković to thw Yugoslavia Government in London, April 25, 1943} over five months after Adamic’s expose of Mihailović and six months after the formation of the Bihac government. The lateness of this announcement attests to the weakness of the transnational network in South America, which, again, was due to
its lack of a base in the working class. Moreover, the Yugoslav Communists lacked a popular figure (like Adamic) who could publicize their cause in the mainstream press. Consequently, information about Tito did not spread outside the pages of communist periodicals.

The Government-in-Exile and the Serbian National Defense

While the Yugoslavist movement in South America was weaker, the movement in North America would be more consequential, causing the government-in-exile to give priority to winning the loyalty of “Yugoslavs” in the United States. In September 1941, they sent a team of heavy-hitters, all ministers-without-portfolio: Bogoljub Jevtić, the former prime minister; Sava Kosanović, Nikola Tesla’s nephew; Božidar Marković, the minister of justice; and Franc Snoj, leader of the Slovene Clerical party. In addition, the governor of Croatia and the unofficial leader of Croatdom, Ban Šubašić, led the delegation, reflecting the government-in-exile’s concern for the numerically-dominant Croatian element of the Yugoslav diaspora. In January 1942, this team of ministers set up an information bureau aimed at rallying support among Yugoslav-Americans for the continued existence of Yugoslavia through speeches, press releases, and collaboration with emigrant activists. This propaganda work was nominally divided up by “tribe,” with Kosanović working with the Serbs, Šubašić the Croats, and Snoj the Slovenes. In practice, however, Kosanović and Šubašić ended up shouldering most of the work, as Jevtić, Marković and Snoj left for London in the first half of 1942. In 1943, Kosanović and Šubašić would go on to play an important role in UCSSA.
Upon arriving, however, Kosanović and company found the emigrant press in an uproar over the head of the Yugoslav Legation, Konstantin Fotić, and his alleged ties to a group of “greater Serbianists” called the Srpska Narodna Odbrana (Serbian National Defense) as well as the newspaper of the Serbian National Union, Srbobran, which acted as a mouthpiece for the SNO.982 Beginning in November 1941, Srbobran had launched a blistering press campaign against Croats, labeling them as traitors to Yugoslavia and questioning the viability of a future Yugoslav state. The opening salvo would be lurid descriptions of Ustaša atrocities in occupied Yugoslavia, for which all Croats everywhere were blamed. The source of much of this information was the Dankelmann memorandum, a set of grisly photographs and other documents compiled by a Serbian Orthodox bishop on behalf of a German general. These documents elided the German role in the Ustaša atrocities, placing the blame solely on Croats.983 And somehow, Srbobran had gotten its hands on a copy.

Who was to blame? Because Srbobran had previously acted as a mouthpiece for the Yugoslav government—it had enthusiastically supported both Yugoslavia’s pact with Hitler and the anti-Nazi coup of March 27, 1941—many believed that the editors were writing on the behest of someone within the Yugoslav diplomatic service. In addition, the timing was suggestive, with Srbobran beginning its anti-Croat campaign in November, rather than in April, when Croatian defections allowed the German Wehrmacht to overrun Yugoslavia in a single month. November, however, coincided with the arrival in the United States of Jovan Dučić, the former Yugoslav minister to Bucharest and Spain, who could easily have used the diplomatic pouch to smuggle in documents. A poet from a peasant background, Dučić was more inclined toward greater-

982 Ibid.
Serbianism than Yugoslavism.\textsuperscript{984} In any event, soon after Dučić’s arrival, at a meeting in South Chicago, the \textit{Srpska Narodna Odbrana} was founded, taking the name of an earlier organization founded by Mihajlo Pupin during WWI to support the creation of Yugoslavia. Although American law prohibited Jovan Dučić, a foreign national, from leading this organization, it did not bar his cousin Mihajlo Dučić, a naturalized American citizen and Indiana dairy magnate, from occupying a leadership role or hosting his uncle in his home.\textsuperscript{985} As with the Domobran, familial relationships played a vital role for the Odbrana, helping old country politicians adapt to an American context.

The Odbrana was a small far-right organization whose anti-Croatian provocations were a frequent subject of discussion, polemic, and criticism among emigres. Although this chapter compares the Odbrana with the Domobran, this comparison is not meant to suggest that the Odbrana were fascists. For one, their organizational structure was oligarchical, lacking any \textit{poglavnik/Führer}-type figure.\textsuperscript{986} The Odbrana also lacked flashy uniforms and a paramilitary wing. Nevertheless, the Odbrana attracted the attention of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (the preceessor of the CIA), which regarded the Odbrana’s feud with UCSSA as harmful to American wartime unity, especially given that Yugoslavs were overrepresented in the munitions industry. As observers, the OSS were relatively neutral, interested more in quashing the feud than in choosing sides.\textsuperscript{987} Perhaps as a result, advocates and detractors of the Odbrana felt no

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\item \textsuperscript{984} “Jovan Dučić, the Balkan Rosenberg,” \textit{Yugoslovenski Američki Glasnik}, August 21, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 167.
\item \textsuperscript{986} Albert Parry, “Yugoslavs of Chicago and the Vicinity,” OSS report, November 25, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 271.
\item \textsuperscript{987} Lorraine Lees, \textit{Yugoslav Americans and National Security during World War II} (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007)
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qualms about telling the OSS what they thought about each other. Based on interviews with its leadership and its critics, the OSS estimated SNO membership to be between three thousand and forty-five hundred, small compared to the largest Serbian émigré association, the Serb National Union (which had twenty thousand members), but quite large compared to the Domobran in the United States, which only had around seventeen hundred members at its peak, which, by 1941, was long past. Even so, membership does not tell the whole story, as not all the Odbrana’s members agreed with its anti-Croat political program. In December 1942, for instance, the Odbrana branch in McKeesport Pennsylvania announced that it was cutting ties with the national organization, pointing out that the original mission of the Odbrana (that is, the organization that existed during World War I), was promotion of the Yugoslav idea, to which many members of the McKeesport branch were still faithful. Because the Odbrana was not run democratically, however, members had no control over the anti-Yugoslav position chosen by the organization’s leadership in Gary, Indiana. Over time, however, the Odbrana would become more ideologically homogenous as dissenters were pushed out or left voluntarily.

The Odbrana first purged the primary Serbian newspaper, Srbobran. After having somehow acquired the position of editor, the Odbrana leader, Branko Pekić, nicknamed “The Srbobran dictator,” threatened reporters and columnists with dismissal if they did not adopt an anti-Croatian line; one columnist, George Kovačević, a self-identified Yugoslavist, chose

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989 Letter from Kosto Unković to Konstantin Fotić, January 8, 1937. Fond 371, fasc. 53, BO 69, Arhiv Jugoslavije.
990 “Memorandum issued by the Independent Serbian National Defense Organization of McKeeseport Pa, on September 6, 1942,” OSS report, National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 397.
unemployment. After that, the rest presumably fell in line.\(^{991}\) With *Srbobran*, the Odbrana had a platform to persuade the rank-and-file of the Serbian National Union, in some cases using misinformation. It was apparently standard procedure at *Srbobran* to edit speeches of King Peter of Yugoslavia to remove references to Yugoslav unity or Croatian resistance to the Nazis. Likewise, *Srbobran* altered press releases from the Yugoslav Information Bureau, regularly substituting the word “Serbian” for “Yugoslav.” In addition, *Srbobran* inflated statistics of Serbian deaths at the hands of the Ustaša death squads in occupied Croatia, over five hundred thousand (contrasted with the official estimate in 1942 of one hundred sixty thousand).\(^{992}\) One wonders why this was necessary; the reality was already appalling. In any event, the rapid turn of the main Serbian emigre organization toward Serbian chauvinism was more a coup than a mass-movement, executed through pressure, threats, and disinformation by a small group of extremists.

Although its membership never numbered more than a few thousand, the Odbrana had an outsize influence on its parent organization, the Serbian National Union (SNS), from which it received a subsidy. Odbrana sympathizers dominated the Supreme Board of the SNS, controlling nine out of twelve seats, and could therefore bully and browbeat the SNS’s centrist president, Sam Vrličić.\(^{993}\) In 1943, the Odbrana faction within the SNS succeeded in ousting Vrličić, who had been president of the SNS since its creation, and installing one of their own, Luka Kristoforović. Vrličić had been (ineffectually and covertly) opposed to the Odbrana for some time.


\(^{992}\) Untitled OSS Report, April 9, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 12; “Luka Kristoforovich,” OSS Report from Peter Klassen to Dewitte Poole, November 17, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 347.

\(^{993}\) “The Executive Meeting of the Supreme Board of the Serb National Federation,” OSS Report, July 6, 1943. OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 996.
time, but dared not act openly against them for fear of the sizable nationalist bloc within the SNS. When he finally openly declared his opposition by proposing an alliance between leftists and liberals within the SNS, the nationalists used his alleged Communist sympathies to get him expelled from his office. The final vote at the SNS electoral convention was a lopsided 60-40.994

The Odbrana received another boost from the Serbian exarchate in the United States, (itself a client of the Yugoslav Legation) through its chief cleric, Archbishop Dionisije, who had succeeded Mardarije. In an interview with OSS agents, Dionisije admitted both to membership in a sort of joint directorate (along, presumably, with head of the SNO Dučić, president of the SNS Kristoforović, and Odbrana leader Pekić) managing the Odbrana, SNS, and the exarchate, although his exact role was unclear. Among the “greater Serbianists,” Dionisije was probably the most moderate, being “openly although not too virulently anti-Croat” in his conversations with an OSS interlocutor, expressing suspicion of anti-axis Croats, like Ban Šubašić, and skepticism about the potential for Serbs and Croats to live together in a single state.995 Dionisije also authored at least one article in Srbobran complaining about the collective responsibility of Croats for atrocities in the Independent State of Croatia.996

The Odbrana, it seemed, had the endorsement of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Moreover, during Dionisije’s leadership, there were reports of Serbian parish priests going door-to-door, reminding their parishioners not to participate in any Yugoslav organizations or associate with any Croats, and to join the Odbrana. Those who resisted were obliquely threatened

996 Untitled OSS Report, April 9, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 12
with ostracism or even excommunication. Although some priests may have willingly canvassed for the Odbrana, others acted under duress. According to one rumor, Father Andre Popović, who previously supported Yugoslavia in his sermons, was transferred (by Dionisije) from an affluent parish in South Chicago to a poor one in Pittsburgh. After Popovic begged for his old parish back, Dionisije assented, only requiring that he begin sermonizing against the Croats. Popović complied.

However, just as there was resistance in Srbobran, local Odbrana organizations, and the SNS, there were three Serbian Orthodox priests (out of the thirty-two in North America) who refused to adopt an anti-Yugoslav line. Reverends Nikola Drenović of Youngstown, Ohio; Emiljan Glocar of Akron, Ohio; and Strahinja Maletić of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania all filed suit in 1943 against the Serb National Federation, accusing it of libel and interfering with their pastoral duties. These three had attracted Srbobran’s ire through their involvement with the United Committee of South Slavic Americans. Since many in their congregations read Srbobran, all three priests had been confronted by outraged churchgoers. Reverend Drenović, elaborating on his experience, mentioned that several in his congregation, on the basis of what they had read in Srbobran, accused him of communism and atheism, accusations that the writers of Srbobran evidently believed could either silence these dissident priests or result in their dismissal.

Given that Dionisije apparently had some influence over Srbobran editorial policy, this instances

997 Memorandum for Hugh Wilson from Allen Dulles, originally from “S.K” (probably Sava Kosanović), May 7, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 271.
of coercion would suggest that the rightward turn of the Serbian Orthodox Church was dictated by Dionisije, who was coordinating his actions with Dučić’s clique of “greater Serbianists.”

In many ways, the *Srpska Narodna Odbrana* resembled in its tactics, if not its goals, the Croatian *Domobran* movement, discussed in Chapter Four. Like the Odbrana, the Domobran expanded its ranks by coopting emigrant mutual aid organizations, bullying and intimidating those who resisted. Also similar are their paramilitary symbolism—even their names derive from the same root, *odbraniti*, to defend. The key difference, however, is that the Odbrana succeeded in flipping a fraternal union to its cause, whereas the Domobran did not. In fact, as Chapter 4 shows, the Domobran only thrived in areas where preexisting emigrant associations were weakly developed.

The tolerance or support of the Yugoslav Legation in Washington for the Odbrana may account for the difference. Without support from the legation, the Odbrana could not have gained control of *Srlobran* or the exarchate, both of which received subsidies through the legation. These two organizations gave the Odbrana a voice far out of proportion to their size, normalizing their extremist political views. This, in turn, would not have been possible without attempts by Yugoslavia to gain control over the Serbian Orthodox Church in the 1920s or the campaign to purchase the loyalties of various émigré newspapers during the period of Alexander’s dictatorship. Efforts by Yugoslavia to create a loyal diaspora had created a backdoor for a few anti-Yugoslav extremists to infiltrate and usurp control over a major emigrant association, bypassing the usual barriers to entry that kept the Domobran on the fringes. Without the Yugoslav government’s assistance, the Odbrana would have remained a marginal force in émigré political life.
The Odbrana and the Ambassador

Why would Konstantin Fotić, head of the Yugoslav Legation, a person who was ostensibly committed to promoting Yugoslav consciousness among migrants, embrace the Odbrana? Fotić was a polarizing figure whose exact motives and sympathies may never be definitively proven. After World War II, he was tried in absentia and sentenced to twenty years of hard labor by Tito’s Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁰¹ To supporters of Tito, Fotić was an unrepentant Serbian chauvinist who deliberately incited ethnic conflict in the United States.¹⁰⁰² But to his supporters, he was a hero to the Serbian (not Yugoslav) nationalist cause. In his autobiography, for instance, Fotić portrayed himself as a martyr to Communist terror, unfairly “accused of being a reactionary, a Serbian chauvinist, and…even a collaborator with the enemy” and “associated with the Serbian newspaper Srbobran, and…held responsible for its impassioned editorials denouncing the crimes of the Croat Ustashis.”¹⁰⁰³ However, as this section will argue, Fotić was neither as guilty as his detractors made him out to be, nor as innocent as his autobiography suggests.

Fotić’s involvement with the Odbrana began with a misunderstanding. Following the collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Fotić had been put in charge of disseminating information about conditions in occupied Yugoslavia by Prime Minister Ninčić.¹⁰⁰⁴ Unfortunately, those conditions were of internecine strife. When Fotić obliged and supplied Srbobran with information about Croatian atrocities (which possibly included the Dankelmann memorandum), he proudly reported doing so to the foreign ministry. Foreign Minister Ninčić rebuked Fotić, who

¹⁰⁰³ Ibid.
¹⁰⁰⁴ Letter from Ninčić to Fotić, June 2, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ.
then denied responsibility for the articles in *Srbobran*. Unfortunately, there is no smoking gun, such as a signed letter from Fotić, that proves Fotić was dictating editorial policy at *Srbobran*. On the other hand, Fotić did not pressure *Srbobran* to change its editorial line. Fotić tolerated *Srbobran* because, after its initial salvo against Croatdom, many of *Srbobran*’s jeremiads were directed at the team of ministers and the Yugoslav Information Bureau, whose presence in the United States he seems to have resented as a rebuke for his earlier blunder with *Srbobran* and an encroachment on his role as an propagandist for the government of Yugoslavia. As the fate of the Emigrant Deputation (as documented in Chapter 5) indicates, Yugoslav diplomats in the United States were territorial about their responsibilities.

After this incident, Fotić denied that he passed any additional information to *Srbobran* or the SNO. Nonetheless, he was ideally placed to do so. In 1943, Fotić bragged that he had enough documentary evidence of Ustaša atrocities in the embassy files to incite a “blood bath in all the Serb-Croat communities in the United States,” were they to be released to *Srbobran*, but he denied doing so. Yet his possession of these documents was suspicious—how did he have access to this documentation, if his own government did not want him to pass them to *Srbobran*’s editor?

Fotić must have had other channels. In reports presumably collected for Fotić’s trial in absentia by Tito’s Yugoslavia, one former official who had worked with the government-in-exile in Cairo testified that Fotić obtained these reports via a Colonel Putnik and Branislav Denić, who

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1005 Letter from Konstantin Fotić to MIP, November 12, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; Letter from Ninčić to Fotić, November 20, 1941, Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; Letter from Konstantin Fotić to MIP, November 21, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104.


 acted as a liaison between royalist guerrillas in Yugoslavia and the government-in-exile. These two figures, in turn, obtained their information by amalgamating news from the party organ of Ante Pavelić in quisling Croatia, the party organ of General Nedić in occupied Serbia, and the *Donau Zeitung*, published by the German garrison in Belgrade. Admittedly, a Communist show trial is not the most reliable source. But there are other corroborating accounts as well. In 1947, Milan Sekulić, the former Royal Yugoslav government’s minister to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association, sued Harper and Brothers for a claim in Louis Adamić’s book *My Native Land* that Sekulić had been the main point of contact between Prime Minister Nedić and Fotić. According to Adamic, Sekulić used a passport issued by Nedić to bring extensive documentation of Ustaša atrocities to the government-in-exile to London in 1941, from which Fotić smuggled it in to the United States via the diplomatic pouch. This too is speculation, and it could well have been Jovan Dučić who brought the Dankelmann memorandum from London instead. The chronology lines up better. However, Dučić passed away in April 1943, so anything brought to the USA afterwards, such as, for example, articles written by Sekulić in London and published in *Srbobran* in June, 1943, cannot be linked to Dučić.

That said, Fotić did exercise a moderating influence on the Odbrana. For instance, a few months after the Odbrana was founded in September 1941, the president of the Odbrana wrote to Fotić asking whether his organization ought to attend the yearly Yugoslav Unity Day celebration.

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1008 “Proces Fotić P.M.,” Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, August 11, 1945. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ.
and whether it could be renamed, probably to something Serbian.\textsuperscript{1011} Fotić replied in the affirmative to the former, informing the Odbrana that Yugoslavia represented the culmination of “those ideals for which the best sons of our people laid down their lives for over a century.”\textsuperscript{1012} In another instance, in May 1942, Šubašić, through his contacts in the OSS, sought to pressure Fotić to persuade \textit{Srbobran} to adopt a pro-Yugoslav line.\textsuperscript{1013} The OSS obliged, mainly to test whether Fotić held any sway over \textit{Srbobran}.\textsuperscript{1014} As it turned out, he did—less than a week later, \textit{Srbobran} abandoned its call for a greater Serbia, ceased to use irony quotations to refer to Yugoslavia, and came out in support of a (Serb-dominated) Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{1015} A partial success, but better than nothing at all.

In another incident in February 1943, Fotić called the editors of \textit{Srbobran} to account after they had accused Slovenes of collective treason against Yugoslavia. Fotić was apparently fine with imputing the collective guilt of Croats, but insulting Slovenes was a step too far. The Foreign Ministry agreed, notifying Fotić that “the writing of \textit{Srbobran} against Slovenes does not serve the interests of Yugoslavia” and ordering him to “make sure that they are categorically aware of this.” Fotić replied, stating that he had already done so,\textsuperscript{1016} again confirming the working relationship he had with Branko Pekić, \textit{Srbobran}’s editor.

Another instance of Fotić moderating Odbrana demands came in June 1943, when the Washington legation received a petition from the Odbrana urging Peter II of Yugoslavia to

\textsuperscript{1011} Letter from Blaze Kalabić to Konstantin Fotić, November 3, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.
\textsuperscript{1012} Letter from Konstantin Fotić to Blaze Kalabić, November 6, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.
\textsuperscript{1013} Letter from Dewitt Poole to Harold Hoskins, May 27, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 81.
\textsuperscript{1014} Letter from Dewitt Poole to Harold Hoskins, May 13, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 84.
\textsuperscript{1015} Report from Dewitt Poole, June 4, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 108;
\textsuperscript{1016} Letter from Fotić to MIP, February 24, 1943. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; Letter from Minister Jovanović to Fotić, March 3, 1943. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ; Letter from Fotić to MIP, March 5, 1943. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ.
change his title to King of Serbia. Fotić refused to convey this petition to his government, explaining to the petitioners that doing so was against the policy and interests of his government.  

None of these attempts to blunt the exclusive Serbian nationalism of the Odbrana, however, seemed to have a lasting effect. Moreover, they showcase Fotić’s influence over Srbobran and the Odbrana—making him partially responsible for not curbing their otherwise anti-Yugoslav activities. Lastly, these instances reveal that regardless of what Fotić may have thought of the matter, the Odbrana viewed Fotić as a leader and sympathizer to their cause. For a diplomat who had, in the OSS’s assessment, “been spoiled to a certain extent by his successes in Washington,” acquiring “a taste for authority (which is often found among the Serbs),” the allure of embracing the Odbrana may have proved irresistible.

**Fotić's Questionable Friendships**

Aside from Srbobran, Fotić supported some leading figures in the Odbrana. There was, for instance, the matter of Ruth Mitchell, the honorary president of the Odbrana, to whom Fotić may have fed information on Croatian atrocities (Fotić denied doing so to his superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).  

Ruth Michell is a fascinating figure. An American with British citizenship, Mitchell formed a romantic attachment to the Serbs after living in Yugoslavia for several years. Although ostensibly a correspondent for the London periodical the *Weekly Illustrated*, Mitchell’s 1943 account of her time in Yugoslavia reveals skills more characteristic of a spy than a journalist: shooting, riding, evading surveillance, managing informants, bribing officials, and withstanding

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1017 Telegram from Fotić to MIP, June 28, 1943. Fond 371, fasc. 55, BO 71, AJ.
1019 Letter to MIP from Konstantin Fotić, December 8, 1942. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ.
torture.\textsuperscript{1020} Mitchell also knew of Bill Donovan (the founder of the OSS) and was closely connected to the British legation in Yugoslavia (spies typically operate out of embassies or consulates). Finally, the Italian, Yugoslav, and German intelligence services all thought she was a spy and tried to have her arrested or deported several times.\textsuperscript{1021} Where there is this much smoke there is probably fire. It is possible that Mitchell was a case officer with non-official cover for the British intelligence service, assigned to the Western Balkans in 1939 to organize resistance if Germany or Italy invaded.

Buttressing this hypothesis, Mitchell joined the Četnik organization of Kosta Pečanac almost immediately after her arrival, and, once war broke out in 1941, worked for him as a spy.\textsuperscript{1022} Mitchell was based in Dubrovnik, where she collected information about the Italian and German garrison. In May 1941, Mitchell was captured by the Gestapo, who accused her of spying for the British (a charge her subsequent memoir never quite denies) and imprisoned her. Because Germany was reluctant to execute an American citizen, Mitchell survived her captivity and was eventually able to return to the US through a prisoner exchange in June 1942. Her cover blown, Mitchell continued to assist the Četniks as a propagandist and public speaker in the United States. Once in the US, she switched her allegiance to Draža Mihailović from Kosta Pečanac. This was a pragmatic move— Pečanac had begun to cooperate with the Nedić quisling government against communist guerrillas, which would not play well among an American audience.\textsuperscript{1023}


\textsuperscript{1021} Ibid, 17, 40, 44, 52, 58-9.

\textsuperscript{1022} Ibid, 47-51 132-152

\textsuperscript{1023} Zlatko Baloković, Letter to the editor of the New York Herald Tribune, April 6, 1943, Zlatko Baloković papers, box 1, folder 8, IHRCA; “Information on collaborators with General Nedich,” OSS report, August 28, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 165;
Mitchell would also write articles for *Srbobran*, where her devotion to Serbian ultranationalism was made all the more remarkable by her lack of Serbian ancestry. Mitchell’s view of the Balkans were shaped by a deep hatred of Germans (a product of her captivity), coupled with a quintessentially American racial essentialism. Croats were, to Mitchell, “a guilty race.¹⁰²⁵” Mitchell believed in the collective guilt of all Croats for the defections of Croatian army officers during the invasion and the atrocities of the Independent State of Croatia. Croats were, in her view, too Germanized and too fond of intrigue, in contrast to the Serbs, who she characterizes as a naïve and martial “race.”¹⁰²⁶ Every disaster or mistake in interwar Yugoslavia was, according to Mitchell, the fault of Croat provocations, from Punša Račić’s assassination of Stjepan Radić to Yugoslavia’s decision to join the Tripartite Pact!¹⁰²⁷ Not surprisingly, Mitchell did not believe in the viability of a future Yugoslav state. Despite her opposition to Yugoslavism, Fotić nonetheless recommended Mitchell for a medal to the foreign ministry in October, 1942, long after her political opinions had become public knowledge.¹⁰²⁸

In addition, Fotić had both personal and ideological motives to pass on propaganda from occupied Serbia. Through blood or marriage Fotić was related to General Nedić, leader of quisling Serbia, as well as Dimitrije Ljotić, who headed a fascist party in interwar Yugoslavia.¹⁰²⁹ As previous chapters have underlined, family ties were often also political—one needs only look at Jovan and Mihailo Dučić, Svetozar and Stojan Pribićević, or Mile and Frank Budak. In addition, Fotić’s beliefs, expressed in confidence to an OSS interviewer, also aligned

¹⁰²⁶ Ibid, 231-241
¹⁰²⁷ Ibid, 244-7.
¹⁰²⁸ Note from Konstantin Fotić to MIP, October 26, 1942. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104.
him with the “greater Serbianists.” Serbs, Fotić averred, could not forgive the crimes committed against them by the Ustaša regime. Furthermore, Fotić believed that all Croats, including the Croatian Peasant Party, bore some responsibility for the killings and for the collapse of Yugoslavia during the April War.\textsuperscript{1030} Similarly, in his autobiography, which was written after World War II, Fotić stated that his “position was this: the theory of Yugoslav nationhood which had been tried out in the period between the two world wars had failed completely,” a failure for which he blamed the Croats at length.\textsuperscript{1031}

In view of these connections with the Nedić regime in Serbia, as well as his support for greater-Serbianists, Fotić may have been laying a contingency plan for a postwar settlement, possibly Nazi-dominated, that involved the creation of an independent Serbian state. In such a situation, Fotić probably would have kept his comfortable and prestigious job. After all, until the Battle of Stalingrad ended in defeat for Germany in early 1943, the Nazi juggernaut appeared unstoppable. In other words, Fotić was not a committed Serbian nationalist, but an opportunist who was hedging his bets.

It is for this reason that the upgrading of the Washington legation to an embassy and Fotić’s promotion from minister to ambassador in late 1942 (over the objections of Sava Kosanović, the rest of the team of ministers, the Yugoslav Information Bureau in Washington, and majority of the government-in-exile) infuriated emigrants, who saw it as an official endorsement of Fotić’s covert, but widely suspected, support for “greater Serbianism.”\textsuperscript{1032} In 1943, Kosanović and the rest of the team of ministers were dismissed, except for Ban Šubašić,

\textsuperscript{1031} Fotić, \textit{The War we Lost}, 285.
\textsuperscript{1032} Letter from Sava Kosanović to the New York Times, February 9, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ; Letter to William Culbertson from Frano Petrinović, September 14, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 5, AJ.
who followed through on his threat to resign King Peter appointed Fotić to be ambassador.\textsuperscript{1033} This governmental crisis also brought down Foreign Minister Ninčić, several months later, following a series of attacks on him in the emigrant press.\textsuperscript{1034}

Clearly, what the “tenth banovina” thought mattered to the government-in-exile. But the damage had already been done, and Fotić moved quickly to marginalize pro-Yugoslav voices in the diplomatic service in the United States. In April, 1943 Fotić disbanded the Yugoslav Information Bureau in New York, which had sided with Sava Kosanović against him. With the team of ministers out of the way, there was no one in a position to contest Fotić’s control over propaganda. Perhaps as a result, Fotić became more open in his opposition to a post-war Yugoslavia, now proclaiming it impossible unless “the Croats have expiated their crimes.”\textsuperscript{1035} As such, 1943 may be regarded as the end of the Royal Yugoslav government’s support for the promotion of overseas Yugoslavism.

By 1943, however, the government-in-exile had become largely irrelevant. Even before this final shake-up, changes in the government-in-exile were greeted with apathy or derision by the émigré press—the popular quip being that the new government was “neither new nor a government.”\textsuperscript{1036} Moreover, by 1944, the government-in-exile was bankrupt—one rumor, subsequently denied by the Yugoslav government, was that their account in London had been

\textsuperscript{1033} Letter to Dewitt Poole from Sava Kosanović, June 17, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ; Letter from Viscount Halifax to the British Government, October 16, 1942, Fond 83, fasc. 5, AJ.


\textsuperscript{1035} OSS Interview with Konstantin Fotić, April 22, 1943. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 839.

\textsuperscript{1036} “More on the reaction to the change in the Yugoslav Government,” OSS Report, January 7, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 534; “Reaction to the Change in Yugoslav Government,” OSS Report, January 6, 1943. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 532;
frozen by Barclays following another cabinet shakeup, which left the position of minister of finance empty. True or not, the government-in-exile was clearly in desperate straits. Sava Kosanović, for instance, had his pension illegally cut off on April 1, 1944, which was both retaliation for his support for Tito and a way to economize. Lastly, the paper records of the Washington Embassy for 1944 are sparse compared to previous years, hinting at shutdown or dysfunction. The Yugoslav government-in-exile, it seemed, was a spent force.

**Sava Kosanović Defects to the Titoists**

Although emigrants from Yugoslavia were split between UCSSA and the Odbrana, the evident decline of the Yugoslav government, and the defection of one of its members, Sava Kosanović, to the Tito-supporters gave UCSSA a shot of much-needed legitimacy. Kosanović’s “Road to Damascus” ran through Louis Adamic. Beginning in 1942, as part of his work in the team of ministers and efforts to rally the diaspora, Kosanović contacted Louis Adamic, who consulted with Kosanović and Snoj about the internal politics of American Slovene organizations. Adamic advised them that monarchism was unlikely to win over many Yugoslav Americans, Slovenes in particular being fiercely anti-royalist (Adamic certainly was). Apparently Kosanović found Adamic’s advice useful, as he began seeking his council on other topics in the first half of 1943, such as Kosanović’s meetings with foreign heads of state like Beneš, or the postwar political organization for Yugoslavia. For the latter, Adamic favored a “fresh beginning” rather than prewar arrangements like the Croatian banovina.

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1037 Telegram from Konstantin Fotić to the Yugoslav Embassy in London, May 31, 1944. Fond 371, fasc. 81, BO 104, AJ.
1038 Letter to Sava Kosanović from James Sharp, DOJ, May 13, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
1039 Note from Louis Adamic to Sava Kosanović, August 22, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
1040 Letter from Louis Adamic to Snoj, February 15, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
1041 Letter from Louis Adamic to Sava Kosanović, May 30, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
1042 Letter from Louis Adamic to Sava Kosanović, July 16, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
Kosanovic would be increasingly exposed to Adamic’s opinions when he began proofreading chapters of Adamic’s new book, called *My Native Land*, published 1943, which glamorized Tito’s Partisans. Only trusted friends read chapter drafts, and Kosanović had to have been sympathetic to the Partisans, or he would not have agreed on to this task. Kosanović may have also begun leaking information about the government-in-exile to Adamic at this point, as *My Native Land* had an entire chapter detailing backbiting and intrigues within the government-in-exile. It is likely that Kosanović was Adamic’s anonymous source for this chapter—no one else had had access to that sort of information and the motive to reveal it to Adamic. Although still a minister, Kosanović, like Fotić, had begun to work against his own government, which appeared increasingly moribund.

Through Adamic, Kosanovic also became acquainted with another of Adamic’s allies, the mayor of New York, Fiorello la Guardia, whom Adamic had befriended in 1940 at a fundraiser. Adamic even had a nickname for la Guardia: “Cvyetko,” a Slovene translation of “Fiorello,” Italian for “Little Flower.” La Guardia, although of Italian origin, was sympathetic to the Yugoslav cause, based on his time spent as a consul in Italian Fiume, which had a Slavic hinterland. Although la Guardia knew a few score “Yugoslav” words, (chiefly profanity) he could not read the letters written to him in Serbo-Croatian that he occasionally received as mayor of a multiethnic metropolis. Kosanović helped la Guardia translate. La Guardia, in turn, helped Kosanović deliver a radio address in Italian on September 18, 1942, on Yugoslav-Italian diaspora relations. Interestingly, this would be the first speech where Kosanović dropped

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1043 Note from Louis Adamic to Sava Kosanović regarding chapters for My Native Land, [undated], probably 1942 or 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
1045 Louis Adamic, “My Friend Cvyetko,” *Times and Tides*, undated, probably 1947, found in fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
1046 Ibid.
1047 Letter from Fiorello la Guardia to Sava Kosanović, June 19, 1943. Fond 83, fasc 15, AJ.
explicit references to Mihailović and adopted some leftist phraseology, addressing the “peasant and worker masses.” Kosanović, spending time with Adamic, was drifting left. Once Kosanović lost his position in the government-in-exile in June 1943, he had little keeping him from joining the pro-Tito camp. By November, 1943, Kosanović was writing articles for *Slobodna Reč* and the UCSSA bulletin (which Adamic edited), and openly praising Tito. In December 1943, Kosanović sent cordial greeting to the Tito-Ribar government and placed himself at their disposal. Just as Fotić bet on a postwar Nedić-governed Serbia, it seems Kosanović’s embrace of Tito’s Yugoslavia was partially opportunistic. Nonetheless, Kosanović, as a former minister, diplomat, and elite accustomed to moving in high circles, was a valuable ally for the lobbying efforts of UCSSA.

Kosanović’s defection was not welcomed by the Odbrana, who repeatedly denounced him as a traitor, and, bizarrely, as a descendent of a notorious 19th century Ottoman official, a crypto-Croat, and a Nazi. Kosanović also received at least one death threat, in which the writer promised to “break all the bones, that the Germanic Croats have put in your body (sic)” if the writer saw “in the newspapers any more attacks on our Serbian Knightly Chetnik Ruth Mitchell.”

Diplomacy with the Odbrana seemed increasingly futile as their rejection of Yugoslavism became louder and more vehement. On June 27 and 28, 1943, the Odbrana held a “Serbian Congress,” a response to the pro-Tito Croat, Slovene, and Serb Congresses held earlier that year.

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1048 “Zajednički Govor Majora La Guardije i Ministra G. Kosanovića,” September 18, 1943. Fond 83, fasc 4, AJ.
1050 Note from Sava Kosanović to the Tito-Ribar government, December, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
1051 Sava Kosanović, “Zašto me Srbobran Napada,” draft of an article probably intended for *Slobodna Reč*, September 15, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
1052 Letter from Phillip Markovich to Sava Kosanović, April 7, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 5, AJ.
At this new congress, the Odbrana backed Draža Mihajlović to the hilt, but endorsed a platform of full-throated Serbian nationalism. The honorary president of the Odbrana, Ruth Mitchell, dressed up in a Četnik outfit, was the keynote speaker. In her speech, Mitchell denounced Yugoslavia, Croats, and Slovenes, calling for an ethnically pure Serbian state including all Serbian settlements outside of Serbia proper—a project that would have required ethnic cleansing, given that Serbian exclaves in the Western Balkans were not territorially contiguous with Serbia proper. Additionally, Mitchell called for the expulsion of all non-Serbian members of the government-in-exile.1053 New converts tend to be overzealous. In any event, by mid 1943, the main division in the diaspora, the rivalry between Serbian nationalists and Serb, Croat, and Slovene Titoists, had hardened.

The division between the pro-Mihailovic faction and the pro-Tito faction manifested themselves in the 1943 Unification Day celebrations in New York in December. As an invented tradition, Unification Day now served to unite the diaspora, but also, paradoxically, to divide it. Unlike previous years, there were two competing events. There was, of course, the usual celebration, which was held in a Serbian Orthodox and Slovenian Catholic church, supported by the legation, and boycotted by Croats. For the first time in the consul’s memory, the Slovene priest withheld the customary benediction—an inauspicious sign. Even more ominous for the regime, there was also an anti-government Unification Day gala hosted by UCSSA, despite the holiday’s origins as a propaganda tool for the Yugoslav monarchy. Of course, UCSSA renovated the holiday somewhat, removing the religious elements and bringing in several speakers, including Kosanović, who praised Tito and denounced Mihailović, Fotić, and the government-in-exile. In lieu of the Yugoslav anthem, the organizers played a mix of American songs and “Ej

1053 “Vidovdanski Kongres S.N.O, Chicago, Juna 27 i 28, 1943.” Report from Consul Vukmirović to the Washington Legation, Fond 371, fasc.55, BO 71, AJ.
Sloveni,” or “Hey Slavs,” a patriotic song whose chief virtue was the lack of a King in its lyrics.

Unbeknownst to UCSSA, “Ej Sloveni” was popular among Tito’s Partisans as well and would eventually become Yugoslavia’s postwar national anthem. Although just a coincidence, it was a striking one—the sounds and rhetoric of Yugoslavia’s future were being heard in Arlington Hall, New York.

The Death of Nikola Tesla

The bitter divisions between the supporters of Tito and those of Mihailović were even more apparent during the death and funeral of Nikola Tesla in 1943. Tesla was universally revered by Yugoslav emigrants, and although he had never shown much interest in the disputes between Belgrade’s supporters and detractors over the previous decades, his endorsement was avidly sought nonetheless.

Beginning in 1937, Tesla, now impoverished, began periodically approaching the Washington legation for short-term loans of several thousand dollars. Over the next few years, this evolved into a monthly stipend of $600. Ironically, the legation was far more generous with Tesla than they were with the various emigrant educational and cultural initiatives designed to promote Yugoslavism. But Tesla had something that could pry open Fotić’s tight fist, some sort of theoretical energy weapon, a “death ray.” Keeping Tesla solvent could help keep Yugoslavia secure from foreign foes, the legation reasoned. Moreover, Tesla seemed quite close to death, reasoned Fotić in 1937— the stipend would only be a short-term investment. Ironically, Tesla

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1054 “Proslava Dana Ujedinjenje u Nju-Yorku, “Report from Consul Stanojević to the MIP, December 6, 1943. Fond 449, fasc. 4, BO 10, AJ.
1055 See, e.g.; Letter from Konstantin Fotić to Milan Stojadinović, October 20, 1937, Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ; Letter from General Maksimović to Konstantin Fotić, June 26, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ; Telegram from Cincar-Marković to Konstantin Fotić, December 12, 1939. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
would outlive the first Yugoslavia by a few years, although Yugoslav soldiers armed with “death rays” might have saved it from German invasion. After 1941, despite the strained finances of a government without people to tax, the stipend continued, albeit diminished by a third. Clearlv, Tesla’s stipend was never just about military hardware, but also propaganda.

For that reason, it is not surprising that Louis Adamic, over the course of 1942 and early 1943, lobbied a number of American public figures, from Wendell Wilkie to Eleanor Roosevelt, insisting, without corroboration, that Tesla resented receiving a pension from the Yugoslav government-in-exile and asking about securing a pension for Tesla from an alternate source. Ironically, in 1934 Tesla had issued a scathing denunciation of Adamic’s first book, A Native’s Return, for the New York Times, calling it “malicious.” Tesla resented Adamic’s antimonarchism and revered King Alexander I, whom he called “a heroic figure…both the Washington and the Lincoln of the Yugoslavs.” Adamic apparently did not hold a grudge.

Neither, it seemed, did Tesla. In the last years of his life, Tesla devoted himself to fighting the growing influence of the Odbrana while seeking to unify the rest of the diaspora. Addressing the Serb National Federation in 1941, Tesla denounced the Nazi invasion but subtly declined to implicate Croats, calling Ante Pavelić simply a “criminal” without appending an ethnic signifier, and reminding his audience that King Alexander’s last words were “Preserve Yugoslavia.” A year later, Tesla wrote an open letter in Serbo-Croatian to “his brothers in America,” publicizing the epistle with the help of Sava Kosanović and the Yugoslav Information

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1056 Letter from Konstantin Fotić to Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, August 15, 1941. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
1057 See, e.g. Letter from Louis Adamic to Wendell Wilkie, January 4, 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ; Letter from Louis Adamic to Eleanor Roosevelt, September 20, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
Bureau in New York. In the letter, Tesla underlined that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had to support the war effort together to show their loyalty to the old country and their new adopted land.\footnote{Open letter from Nikola Tesla, April, 1942. National Archives Microfiche Collection, OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Files, INT-30-YU, Slide 99.} Tesla addressed the Serbian Vidovdan Congress in Detroit a few months later with much the same message,\footnote{Telegram from Nikola Tesla to the Serbian Vidovdan Congress in Detroit, June 4, 1942. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.} a tacit endorsement of UCSSA. Moreover, in 1942, Tesla rejected the Odbrana’s attempt to make him honorary president of their organization (they would eventually choose Ruth Mitchell for that position).\footnote{Letter from Sava Kosanović to the 1943 SNS convention, August 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AI.} Tesla, despite his monarchism, was not interested in the Odbrana’s brand of politics. Tesla spoke to the All-Slav Congress insisting that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes support the war effort together and that efforts to undermine this unity were “helping the enemy.”\footnote{Nikola Tesla telegram to All-Slav Congress and War-Bond Rally, December 5, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 5, AJ.} And there matters stood, when Tesla passed away on January 7, 1943 of coronary thrombosis, aggravated by poverty. He was eighty-six.

Instead of halting with Tesla’s death, the battle for his endorsement only intensified during the scientist’s funeral, which featured competing eulogies by both Partisan and Četnik supporters. Fotić delivered the Četnik eulogy, emphasizing Tesla’s “great love for science and his two fatherlands.” But which “fatherland” did Fotić mean—Yugoslavia or Serbia? The rest of Fotić’s speech implied it was the latter. For instance, Fotić emphasized Tesla’s “modest Serbian home… in Smiljevo” and his early memories of Orthodox churches, while promising to build an engineering institute named in honor of Tesla in postwar Belgrade,\footnote{Konstantin Fotić, Eulogy for Nikola Tesla, [undated], probably 1943. Konstantin Fotić papers, Box 24, folder 15, Hoover institution archives.} (even though Tesla was born in Croatia and had only spent a single day in Belgrade, in 1892\footnote{Marc Seifer, Wizard: The Life and Times of Nikola Tesla (Toronto: Carol Publishing, 1998), 95.}). Fotić also refused to specify whether Belgrade would be the capital of a postwar Yugoslavia or a postwar Serbia.
A diametrically opposed portrait of Tesla’s political sympathies was presented by Sava Kosanović, in one final message to the Serbian National Federation, which he still hoped to bring back to the Yugoslav fold. In his address, Kosanović claimed that Tesla “hated chauvinism and nationalist blindness,” that Tesla had told him that he “was a Serb but at the same time a Croat, because we are one.” He represented Tesla’s decision to rebuke the Odbrana’s offer of membership as part of a lifelong commitment to Yugoslavism and anti-fascism.1066 A further effort to associate Tesla with Yugoslavism was made by having UCSSA ally and Croat Zlatko Baloković play “Tamo Daleko,” a Serbian song, over the radio announcement of Tesla’s death. “Tamo Daleko,” a song in a minor key whose name translates to “There, far away,” expresses nostalgia for a distant homeland. In the original lyrics, that homeland was Serbia. However, because Baloković’s performance lacked lyrical accompaniment, which homeland remained unspecified. Within this context, “Tamo Daleko” was less about Serbia and more about the experience, common to all Yugoslav migrants, of exile and old-country nostalgia. Ironically, Adamic’s eulogy, delivered after Baloković’s performance by Fiorello la Guardia, was probably the most faithful to Tesla’s politics. Presenting him as a man above nationality or the pursuit of profit, a dreamer concerned only with scientific possibility, Adamic wrote and la Guardia spoke:

Why mourn Tesla? His life is a triumph…which is our triumph, a triumph of all the people of the world…we celebrate his contributions to our life, to the sum total of civilization, and human potentialities in America and everywhere, which will be as permanent as man himself…he is a feather in the cap of the whole human race, and Yugoslavia and America can be proud of him.1067

After all, Adamic was not just a Yugoslav patriot, but also an American nationalist and a socialist internationalist, and his Tesla could fit that mold as well (so long as one glossed over

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1066 Letter from Sava Kosanović to the 1943 SNS convention, August 1943. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
Tesla’s monarchism). Ultimately, Tesla’s funeral, like Unification Day, was another example of how the symbolic vocabulary of Yugoslav legitimacy were being repurposed and given new meanings, both toward a socialist version of Yugoslavism, but also toward national separatism.

**Syncretism of the South Slavs in America**

In the last years of the war, the activities of the UCSSA consisted not only of fundraising and lobbying on behalf of the Partisans, but also articulating a specific form of Yugoslavism that drew political lessons from the United States. The three major speechmakers of the UCSSA, Zlatko Baloković, Louis Adamic, and Sava Kosanović, stayed relentlessly on message.

At a press conference discussing the formation of a Tito-led provisional government for Yugoslavia, Kosanović described the new government as “liberal and progressive” and argued that the “forces of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes…tend toward unity, freedom and democracy.”\(^{1068}\) In a radio interview for WHN conducted a few days later in New York, Kosanović emphasized that the partisan struggle had laid the groundwork for “a real people’s democracy,” that Tito’s government was “unequivocally pledged to the peaceful democratic development of Yugoslavia,” and that the problem of Serbo-Croat relations would be resolved with “unity and democracy.” The glorification of democracy is, of course, not unique to American political discourse. But it was certainly calculated to appeal to an American audience, a motive we also discern in Kosanović’s decision to call King Peter the Liberator (whose grandson had a brief place in Tito’s government) “Yugoslavia’s George Washington.”\(^ {1069}\) In another undated speech found in his papers, Kosanović developed on this theme, drawing extended political parallels between the United States and Yugoslavia. Like Yugoslavia, he argued, the United States, when it was still a young nation and “politically immature,” went

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1068 “Statement by Sava Kosanovich at the Hotel Navarro in New York,” July 8, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
1069 “William Gailmore Interviews Sava Kosanovich,” WHN New York, July 13, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
through a bloody civil war, and yet emerged united and wiser for the experience. Yugoslavia, Kosanović argued, would undergo a similar evolution.\textsuperscript{1070} Time will tell whether he was overly optimistic for both states, or just one of them.

Fig. 12: UCSSA Fundraiser with Zinka Milanov singing. At bottom, from left to right, Louis Adamic, Fiorello LaGuardia, Zlatko Balokovic, and three unidentified people. Undated, 1943-45?. Zlatko Baloković papers, Box 3, Folder 7. IHRCA.

Regardless, American history could be mined and repurposed to serve the UCSSA version of Yugoslavism. The committee’s events, as we can see above, tended to deploy the symbols of American patriotism alongside their efforts to rally support behind Yugoslavia.

\textsuperscript{1070} Sava Kosanović, “Politička zrelost stvorila je Jugoslavija,” undated, found with 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
Moreover, the leaders of UCSSA repeatedly compared the American and Yugoslav experience in their speeches and writings. Adamic, for instance, repeatedly highlighted the parallels between the American revolution and Yugoslavia’s struggle for independence. Speaking at one luncheon hosted by the *New York Herald Tribune* in early 1944, Adamic argued that “Tito’s military force, now so valuable to us, grew as a revolution, grew from political and spiritual motivations in the people which are democratic and in line with the American revolution.”\textsuperscript{1071} In another speech held a few weeks later in the Serbian enclave of Gary, Indiana, Adamic argued that “the spirit of idealism which we here call Americanism lives elsewhere, under other names, or without a name. In Yugoslavia, for instance.”\textsuperscript{1072} In fact, Adamic made this connection in almost every speech made after 1943. Nor was he alone.

Zlatko Baloković, in a speech made at a luncheon in late 1944, commented that the “Yugoslav people,” in their struggle against foreign domination, exhibit “the same indomitable resolve which inspired Patrick Henry’s outcry: ‘Give me liberty, or give me death.’” Within the same interview, Baloković quoted Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, asserting that the political goal of the partisans was a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.”\textsuperscript{1073} Baloković clung to this view even after the war ended and it became apparent that Tito was not, in fact, a democrat. In a 1946 interview Baloković argued that because of the long history of migration from Yugoslavia to America, “the contact between Yugoslavian democracy and American democracy is absolutely something living and Yugoslavia will never stop until she has

\textsuperscript{1071} Louis Adamic, Address at the Book and Author Luncheon, March 7, 1944. Louis Adamic Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, IHRCA.
\textsuperscript{1072} Louis Adamic, “America and Yugoslavia,” Speech in Gary Indiana, March 18, 1944. Louis Adamic Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, IHRCA.
\textsuperscript{1073} Zlatko Baloković, Speech delivered at Ms. Emma Mills Book and Play Luncheon, November 2, 1944. Zlatko Balokovic Papers, Box 1, folder 8, IHRCA.
Indeed, UCSSA’s support for Tito was based not on support for socialism, but on the perceived resonance of Tito’s Partisan movement with American-style democracy and federalism.

Moreover, it is possible, albeit unlikely, that the committee’s activities and lobbying contributed to Roosevelt’s decision to begin supporting the Partisan movement at the Tehran conference in late November, 1943. Although this is speculative, Adamic did have the ear of the president. Adamic famously met with Roosevelt for dinner in January 1942, after which he jotted down his recollections, later collected (and probably embellished) in a book published in 1946 after Roosevelt’s death. 1075 This meeting took place, however, before Adamic knew of Tito. Adamic also corresponded with Eleanor Roosevelt over the course of 1942. 1076 Lastly, Adamic mentioned in the afterward to his book that he had written Roosevelt in 1943 to urge him to support the Partisans, but a copy of this letter eluded this researcher. 1077 Although the evidence for a continued relationship between Adamic and Roosevelt during and 1943 is rather sparse, there exists the possibility that Adamic may have helped persuade Roosevelt to support Tito.

On the other hand, evidence suggests that Roosevelt was not particularly interested in Southeastern Europe—at one speech in late 1942, Roosevelt mistakenly substituted “Serbia” for Yugoslavia in his list of countries fighting the Axis, a lapse which the Odbrana immediately seized upon, to the annoyance of UCSSA’s leadership. 1078 And when making conversation with Adamic at dinner in January 1942, Roosevelt asked Adamic if he knew King Peter of Yugoslavia

1074 Zlatko Baloković, “Yugoslavia: Test Tube For Democracy,” The Reviewing Stand, February 10, 1946. Zlatko Balokovic Papers, Box 1, folder 8, IHRCA.
1076 See, e.g. Letter from Louis Adamic to Eleanor Roosevelt, January 25, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ; Letter from Louis Adamic to Eleanor Roosevelt, September 6, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
1077 Adamic, Dinner at the White House, 160.
1078 Blair Bolles, “Author Fears Error in President’s Talk May Hurt Jugoslavsm,” The Evening Star, December 10, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 4, AJ.
and told him with a dated anecdote about how in 1919 he had met with “King Nikita of Montenegro (sic).” Afterwards, Roosevelt realized, to general amusement (and Adamic’s disquiet), that he had forgotten to get Albania’s signature for Declaration of the United Nations, which laid the groundwork for the UN Charter. If anything, the decision of the Allies to switch their support to Tito had more to do with British realpolitik and Tito’s military acumen than Adamic’s weak influence over Roosevelt. Still, with books like *Two Way Passage* and *My Native Land*, or with speeches that emphasizing that Tito was a democrat in the American mold, UCSSA helped make public opinion more amenable to Tito, making Roosevelt’s support of a Communist guerrilla leader a political possibility.

**Stojan Pribićević’s Partisan Adventure**

The Allied endorsement of the Partisans, in turn, made it possible for UCSSA to expand the scope of its activities in favor of a postwar Yugoslavia. As the previous chapters have underlined, travel to the old country plays an outsize role in diaspora nationalism, helping migrants “rediscover” their heritage and giving these travelers symbolic capital in nationalist movements. During World War II, for obvious reasons, travel to the old country was beyond the reach of all but the most adventurous and heavily-armed. This, however, simply improved its symbolic cachet.

In UCSSA’s rivalry with the Odbrana and the supporters of Mihailović, having first-hand experience of conditions in occupied Yugoslavia could give an organization additional credibility and legitimacy. We see this, for instance, in an acrimonious epistolary exchange between Konstantin Fotić and Stojan Pribićević, who wrote an article for *Fortune* in late 1943 insinuating that Fotić had been fabricating telegrams from Mihailović to drum up support for the

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1079 Who was actually named “Nikola.”
1080 Adamic, *Dinner at the White House*, 59-60.
Četniks. This exchange, which Fotić called “angry and threatening,” ended with both Pribićević and Fotić claiming to have possession of “facts which… could not possibly be placed at [the other’s] disposal.”

Winning the argument was less important than being seen to have an inside line to Yugoslavia, as the latter was prized by the diaspora nationalist imagination. There are few better examples of this than the case of Ruth Mitchell, who, based on her experiences with the Četniks, became an “honorary Serb.” It was difficult for Kosanović to dispute or debunk Mitchell’s lurid descriptions of Croatian atrocities in occupied Yugoslavia, forcing him to sidestep the issue of Mitchell’s veracity and attack her as an agent-provocateur for fascists. After all, Mitchell had been in occupied Yugoslavia and Kosanović had not. To counteract the effects of Mitchell, one group of pro-Tito Yugoslavs based in the Santa Clara valley of California tried to publicize their own Ruth Mitchell, a Partisan woman who went by the pseudonym Milka Kovačević. According to her account, she, like Mitchell, escaped from Yugoslavia with the help of the Partisan underground. Also like Mitchell, she had a few exciting anecdotes, such as when she robbed a train carrying munitions, after which she and her partisan compatriots “returned those munitions in our own way!” Nonetheless, Ms. Kovačević never achieved the same level of notoriety as Mitchell, perhaps because California was too geographically removed from the main hubs of Yugoslav activism in the Midwest. UCSSA needed someone else.
That person would be Stojan Pribićević, another ally of Adamic, who shared Adamic’s desire to make the Partisans more widely known. They were also on friendly terms and edited each other’s work.1084 Pribićević had gotten a job as a war correspondent for *Time* magazine, and in May 1944, he was deposited by an allied plane on a mountain airfield behind partisan lines, accompanied only by the Reuters correspondent and two photographers. This would be his first time in his “old country” since 1932,1085 when he was sent to the United States by his father Svetozar to polemicize for the *Demokratska Stranka* (Democratic Party). Now Stojan was writing for *Time* and Tito—the involvement of Yugoslav parties in American politics had a legacy that few in the 1930s could have predicted.

Pribićević’s articles were not brief—one ended up being five columns spread over three pages, with pictures. That *Time* would give Pribićević so much space speaks volumes about the increasing acceptability of Tito in American political discourse. As a nod toward American tastes, his depiction of Tito neglected all mention of ideology, focusing instead on appearances: Tito’s underground base; his “permanent flicker of a smile on [his] boldly-carved face”; his “German police dog the size of a calf”; his tastes in food, cigarettes, and automobiles; and lastly his various offensives against the Germans. The effect was to convey a portrait of a swashbuckling figure, a bold guerrilla leader with a taste for Camel cigarettes, brandy, and jeeps.1086 When avoiding ideology was not possible, Pribićević chose to downplay it. When describing the hammer and sickle and the red star on the partisan caps, for instance, Pribićević wrote that “this does not mean that the members of the corp are communist, since the majority

1084 See, e.g. Telegram from Louis Adamic to Stojan Pribićević, December 31, 1942. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ; Telegram from Louis Adamic to Stojan Pribićević, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ; Telegram from Louis Adamic to Stojan Pribićević, June 29, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
1086 Stojan Pribićević, “Press Story #3, Yugoslav Diary, May 10, 1944, Somewhere in Yugoslavia,” May 10, 1944. Zlatko Baloković papers, Box 3, Folder 1, IHRCA.
are non-communist.” Rather, he asserted, it was simply the “traditional emblem” of a single
brigade, one which, moreover, would soon be replaced with a national emblem of five flames,
each symbolizing one Yugoslav nationality. In another dispatch, Pribićević discussed the
supposed freedom of speech in Partisan-occupied Yugoslavia, claiming that in Bosnia “all
political opinions are allowed except those advocating or justifying collaboration with the
Germans or the quislings.” Even monarchism was permitted, he claimed, although not
popular. In another, Pribićević wrote that “there is no collective farm planning…every
peasant sows and plants what he thinks best. Collectivization was, of course, a bugbear for
many Americans leery of communism. In making Tito seem more American, Pribićević’s
account was entirely consistent with the UCSSA platform.

But what turned Pribićević’s educational (but quotidian) documentary about life in
occupied Yugoslavia into a propaganda masterstroke was his dramatic capture by German
paratroopers. Though quick thinking and knowledge of German kept him from being shot as a
spy, Stojan would spend the next day a prisoner, unarmed, and under sharpshooter fire—his
German captors kept him on the front line and forced him to carry their wounded. Stojan only
finally managed to escape after the Germans were routed, at which point he was rescued by the
partisans—ironically, by a brigade named after Nikola Tesla. It was an adventure out of a
Hollywood script, and it would be this article, according to Adamic, which would really excite
the American public. How could it not?

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1087 Stojan Pribićević, “Cable 6, Yugoslav Diary, May 13, 1944, Somewhere in Yugoslavia,” May 13, 1944. Zlatko Baloković papers, Box 3, Folder 1, IHRCA.
1088 Stojan Pribićević, “Cable 9, Yugoslav Diary, May 15, 1944, Somewhere in Yugoslavia,” May 13, 1944. Zlatko Baloković papers, Box 3, Folder 1, IHRCA
1089 Stojan Pribićević, “Cable 10, Yugoslav Diary, May 18, 1944, Somewhere in Yugoslavia,” May 13, 1944. Zlatko Baloković papers, Box 3, Folder 1, IHRCA
1090 Stojan Pribićević, “Cable 16, Yugoslav Diary, June 9, 1944, Somewhere in Yugoslavia,” May 13, 1944. Zlatko Baloković papers, Box 3, Folder 1, IHRCA
1091 Telegram from Louis Adamic to Stojan Pribićević, June 29, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
UCSSA and Democracy

Adamic and UCSSA sought to influence the postwar development of Yugoslavia by convincing politicians on both sides of the Atlantic to support their vision of a postwar democratic Yugoslavia. At his meeting with FDR in early 1942, Roosevelt briefly discussed another of Adamic’s books, *Two Way Passage*, published in 1941, which proposed that the postwar reconstruction of Europe be accomplished through the voluntary repatriation of “immigrants who have entered the United States during the past fifty years…to their respective fatherlands, taking with them all their cultural, education and financial attributes and possessions, to transplant them among their people in all walks of life and watch the great transformation which will take place in those lands.” The great transformation, Adamic believed, would be “an American revolution in Europe,” democratizing Europe through “these European immigrants [that] founded a democracy here in America.”

This was much the same program as UCSSA had for Yugoslavia—writ large. Roosevelt thought Adamic’s *Two-Way Passage* proposal “opens vistas,” if Adamic’s account is to be trusted. But why Roosevelt liked this proposal is left vague—he may have simply been being polite. On the other hand, the victorious allies would have had to install provisional governments in liberated countries (outside the Russian sphere of influence), and having emigrants who were already politically vetted as reliable democrats might have proved useful.

Adamic also corresponded with Eleanor Roosevelt, again about his *Two-Way Passage* proposal. In one letter sent in January, 1942, Adamic made a detailed proposal for the export of American-style democracy to postwar Yugoslavia. Citing the example of Czechoslovakia, Adamic noted that the post-WWI Czechoslovak government had its origins in a movement by

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1092 Louis Adamic, *Two-Way Passage* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), 263, 266
Czech and Slovak emigrants in Pittsburgh. Because of this immigrant and American influence, Adamic, argued, Czechoslovakia had become “one of the most Democratic governments in Europe…her system of government was patterned closely after ours.” By setting up provisional governments for postwar Europe in the United States, and by placing emigrants in high government offices, Adamic believed that the US could thereby create strong, indigenous democratic movements in all the states of Europe, including Yugoslavia. Naturally, Adamic believed he would be just the person to lead such a government, even though ill-health had compelled him to resign his honorary presidency of UCSSA in early 1944 (he nonetheless remained involved in UCSSA’s work).

Adamic’s speeches even reached the halls of the US Congress, where they were cited by Senator Homer Bone of Washington in 1944 in a debate over the shape of postwar Yugoslavia. While Adamic’s Two Way Passage proposal was never actually implemented, his idea was nonetheless significant because it amounted to an emigrant reply to decades of the old country rhetoric surrounding the “Emigration Question”: “how can migrants, living abroad, benefit their fatherland?” The Kingdom of Yugoslavia answered this question by, as we have seen, imposing increasing obligations on migrants—making them part of the nation by subjecting them to national law: a census, censorship, punitive deportation, pseudo-taxation via remittances, and even military recruitment, all the while using them for propaganda displays. In talking about the origins of his Two Way Passage idea, Adamic identified this phenomenon:

The dollars which immigrants sent from America spread their balm beyond the family, beyond the village; they penetrated the entire economic life of the old countries. Yugoslavia, for instance…received from her people [in the United States] from twenty to forty million dollars a year. This sum was a boon to the

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1094 Letter from Louis Adamic to Eleanor Roosevelt, January 25, 1942. Zlatko Baloković papers, Box 2, Folder 2, IHRCA.
Belgrade regime. It helped to keep it in power. It enabled the government to way foreign debts and the interest on them, cover trade balances, maintain the value of its currency on foreign exchanges, pay its diplomatic corps, and hold taxes lower than they would otherwise have been.\textsuperscript{1096}

Adamic was also certainly no stranger to Yugoslavia use of famous immigrants to drum up investment and improve Yugoslavia’s international image, having encountered this on his trip to Yugoslavia in 1933. But although emigrants had obligations to the fatherland, they had almost no voice in how their old country was run, despite all the rhetoric surrounding the “tenth banovina.” This phenomenon held true for many countries with diasporas, and as a result, Adamic was hardly the only person in 1941 to ask whether migrants should have a greater voice in old-country politics. Adamic recalled reading similar suggestions in the \textit{New York Post}, \textit{Saturday Evening Post}, and the English section of a Japanese-language paper from Los Angeles, or hearing them in a conversation with an Italian American acquaintance, as well as Vaso Trivanović, a Serbian acquaintance. Several regular Americans of European origin also wrote to Adamic with variations on this idea.\textsuperscript{1097} Looking at a Europe engulfed by war and ethnic nationalism, many Americans of foreign extraction identified a sickness in their old country’s body politic, an affliction which they, inoculated by their experience living in a multicultural democratic state, might be able to cure.

Adamic’s ambitions to lead a postwar Yugoslav government brought him to the attention of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI in 1944. According to their investigation, Adamic believed that he was backed by several highly-placed American officials to lead a postwar “Allied-controlled puppet government” in Yugoslavia. Moreover, despite the legendary anti-communism and arguable paranoia of this organization, the FBI ultimately concluded, on the basis of several

\textsuperscript{1096} Adamic, \textit{Two Way Passage}, 53-54,
\textsuperscript{1097} Ibid, 257-262,
interviews with Adamic’s close associates, that he was no communist, merely a “militant liberal,” suggesting again that Adamic really did want to export democracy to Yugoslavia.  

Adamic was not simply telling powerful Americans what they wanted to hear either—in 1943, following the proclamation of a new partisan government at Bihac, UCSSA addressed a radio message to Ivan Ribar, the official head of the Partisan government (Tito was instead the de-facto head), asserting that UCSSA was “deeply and sympathetically impressed by the coalition of all democratic and anti-fascist parties…in the formation of the constituent assembly under your leadership…we see in your movement an effort to preserve what unity and promise of the future was realized within Yugoslavia between the two World Wars.” In pledging their support to the new government, even from the beginning, UCSSA underlined their support for democracy and Yugoslav unity.

Adamic also corresponded with Josip Smodlak, another member of Tito’s nascent government, sending him copies of his book, where he argued for a “free, democratic, and federative Yugoslavia which sees her model just in these same United States of America.” Smodlak welcomed the advice, passed on word about Adamic to Tito, and promised Kosanović a cabinet position. However, Tito’s subsequent message to Adamic contained no comment on Adamic’s political program, only an expression of thanks for his support of the Partisans and his exposure of “traitors” in the emigration who had supported Mihailović. Although this was an ominous sign, UCSSA, Kosanović, and Adamic nonetheless seemed poised to have a voice in Yugoslavia’s postwar development (although whether they were listened to will be discussed in the conclusion).

1098 FBI Report on Louis Adamic, June 1, 1944. Louis Adamic Papers, Box 1, folder 1, IHRCA.
1099 Open letter to Ivan Ribar from UCSSA, January 16, 1943. Louis Adamic Papers, Box 1, folder 4, IHRCA.
1100 Letter from Josip Smodlak to Louis Adamic, July 27, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
1101 Letter from Josip Broz Tito to Louis Adamic, March 29, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 15, AJ.
Conclusion

Discussing the formation of UCSSA and the rallying of American Yugoslavs in support of the new “Old Country” during World War II, Ulf Brunnbauer refers to them as a “temporary diaspora [that] emerged when the lives of family, kin, friends, and former neighbors were at risk.” Furthermore, he argues that the “various Yugoslav diaspora-building initiatives [of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia] contributed to fertilizing the soil from whence a—short lived—diaspora identity could grow after receiving an external impulse.”\textsuperscript{1102} This is largely correct—after all, Louis Adamic’s friends and family in Yugoslavia doubtless gave a personal edge to his activism. But it also does not tell the whole story. If anything, Brunnbauer’s description is more accurate for the Odbrana movement, a far-right Serbian-American reaction to the slaughter in Yugoslavia that became prominent as a result of the close relationship between Srbobran, the Serbian Exarchate, and the Yugoslav Legation.

The United Committee of South Slavic Americans, on the other hand, had more influences than Yugoslav cultural diplomacy of the 1920s and 1930s. If anything, the UCSSA was more a rebellion against official Yugoslavism than an outgrowth of the metaphorical soil it fertilized, the fullest expression of the tensions, identified by Sheffer, that, due to the selfish and self-serving policies of the old country, emerge between it and “its” diaspora. Moreover, the organizations involved in UCSSA, like the Serbian Vidovdan Congress, or the Prosvetaši and Levičari wings of the Croatian Fraternal Union, were influenced by three Yugoslav political opposition parties that agitated among Yugoslav-Americans in the 1930s—the DS, the Croatian Peasant Party, and the KPJ. These parties also provided several individuals to the American milieu that would contribute to UCSSA—Petar Radić, Stojan Pribićević, and Mirko Marković.

\textsuperscript{1102} Ulf Brunnbauer. “Globalizing Southeastern Europe,” 244.
showcasing, again, the role played by transnational organizations in a Brubakerian “quadratic nexus.” And we can also see the traces of emigrant cultural and political initiatives in the 1930s, such as Vincent Cainkar’s attempts to create a Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, or the cooperation between Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene groups to build a Yugoslav Room, which provided a blueprint for future confederations of Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations. In times of crisis, these habits of cooperation could coalesce into a “Yugoslav Diaspora.” But although Yugoslavism prevailed in 1945, supporters of the UCSSA would soon find the new Yugoslavia was not what they envisioned, testing the durability of this diaspora movement.
On September 4, 1951, Louis Adamic was found dead of a gunshot wound in the burning remains of his home in Milford, New Jersey. Although the police ruled his death a suicide, the circumstances were suspicious. Both the .22 caliber rifle, with which Adamic had allegedly shot himself, and the axe, with which Adamic had supposedly punctured the kerosene tins used to set the blaze, had no fingerprints. Moreover, the latter showed evidence of having been wiped clean with an oily rag. The arson, had it fully destroyed Adamic’s house, would have obliterated any evidence of foul play, such as the unfired .38 caliber bullet found in the kitchen. The firearm associated with this bullet was never found, being a match neither to Adamic’s hunting rifle nor to the pistols used by police. State police blamed “money troubles” for the “suicide,” although six years later $12,350 dollars were found cached inside one of the walls of Adamic’s burned house. Adamic left no note, leaving any motive for suicide unclear. Although Adamic had a nervous disposition, he hardly seemed suicidal—he had, after all, just submitted the manuscript for a new book to his publisher, suggesting he felt like he still had work to do. Moreover, that upcoming book—whose purpose was to rally American public opinion behind Tito in his feud with Stalin—had already led to several threats against Adamic’s life.

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1103 “Adamic Found Dead, Threat is Disclosed,” Washington Post, September 4, 1951. Louis Adamic Papers, Folder 3, IHRCA.
1106 Henry Suydam Jr., “Adamic Death Probe Widened; State police sift threat talk,” Newark Star Ledger, September 13, 1951. Louis Adamic Papers, Folder 3, IHRCA.
1107 “Find $12,350 Hoard in Wall of Adamic Home,” Newark Star Ledger, August 2, 1957. Louis Adamic Papers, Folder 3, IHRCA.
1949 and early 1950, Adamic had been approached by men (who were familiar enough with Slavic phonology to pronounce his name “Adamich”) who called him “a traitor to the working people” and warned him that there would be “a bad ending” for him if he persisted in publishing his book. In March, 1951, Adamic was badly beaten by more men who threatened to kill him unless he turned over his manuscript. Adamic suspected the men who beat him were working for Ante Pavelić, who had emigrated to Argentina, or Stalin.\textsuperscript{1108} Stalin was known to use assassination to resolve differences of opinion—as Lev Trotsky could attest—and had sent multiple assassins after Tito. None succeeded.\textsuperscript{1109} Adamic was the most prominent public intellectual associated with Tito, had influence over American public opinion, and was much less well-guarded.

Adamic had grown increasingly isolated in diaspora politics over the past two years. In April, 1950, over a year before Adamic supposedly took his own life, Adamic’s close friend and ally in UCSSA, Sava Kosanović, left his position as Tito’s ambassador to the United States. At the farewell dinner hosted by the embassy, one reporter was amused to note that the embassy silverware still bore the royal seal.\textsuperscript{1110} It was an unintentional metaphor—as ambassador, Kosanović had griped to the foreign ministry in 1947 that the new Yugoslavia was repeating the mistakes of its predecessor, treating the diaspora as “a part of our national organism,” rather than citizens of their new homeland.\textsuperscript{1111} Moreover, thanks to the Cold War, Washington’s relations with Yugoslavia had grown rather chilly. The effects of the Cold War had also driven Zlatko Baloković, Adamic’s other UCSSA ally, from the public light. Accused by the House Un-

\textsuperscript{1110} Austine, “These Charming People,” \textit{Times Herald}, April 13, 1950. Fond 83, fasc. 19, BO 88, AJ.
\textsuperscript{1111} “Propaganda u Emigraciji,” Report from Sava Kosanović to MIP, April 22, 1947. Fond 93, fasc. 7, BO 57, AJ.
American Activities Committee of being a red, Baloković withdrew from public life, resigning from his position in a host of left-leaning diaspora organizations. Between Tito, Stalin, and Truman, the existence of a center-left Yugoslavist organization no longer seemed tenable. Diaspora politics had become a dangerous game. And yet, in 1945, UCSSA seemed poised to orient Yugoslavia toward the West and democracy. What happened?

While a detailed overview of postwar Yugoslavia’s relationship with “its” diaspora would require another book-length monograph to do justice, this chapter nonetheless attempts to provide an epilogue for the people and organizations discussed in the previous chapters. Political change often has a generational element, and many of the individuals discussed in the previous chapters would be dead or politically marginalized by 1959, if not earlier. As endings go, this makes for depressing reading, but it is nonetheless necessary to show the constructed, fragile nature of diaspora political networks. As such, this chapter argues, the “Yugoslav diaspora,” defined again as a transnational network between Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations that is large enough to plausibly represent an imagined diasporic community, fell apart in the decade following V-Day. The causes of its demise are many, but are chiefly rooted in a political climate in the United States and in Yugoslavia that was unfriendly to the kind of New-Deal liberalism represented by UCSSA. Moreover, this chapter argues, the New Yugoslavia continued many of the practices of its predecessor when dealing with the emigration. While this speaks to the importance of interwar Yugoslavia for studies of socialist Yugoslavia’s emigration policy, it also meant the disappointment of many diaspora hopes. The diaspora had achieved less than they thought.
The Honeymoon

Although the half-decade following UCSSA’s triumph at the end of World War II was deeply demoralizing for the Yugoslav movement in the United States, the immediate aftermath of Victory Day had the atmosphere of a parade. A shower of medals and patronage awaited Tito’s supporters in the United States. Louis Adamic and Zlatko Baloković were the first to be decorated, receiving the Order of Brotherhood and Unity in October 1944. Mirko Marković (KPJ member and editor of the communist periodical Slobodna Reč) and Etbín Kristan (an venerable Slovene-American activist who had been active since before the Great War) received the Order of Unity the following January. That same month, Fiorello la Guardia, another ally of Adamic, received a signed photograph of Tito, along with Tito’s own revolver. Medals, Adamic thought, would be just the thing to “put new pep into the movement here,” passing on a list of individuals to be decorated to Sava Kosanović, who became Minister of Information in Tito’s cabinet in March, 1945. In 1946, Kosanović became Yugoslavia’s ambassador to the United States as well. Besides Kosanović, several members and supporters of UCSSA in the United States received jobs in Yugoslavia, including Steve Dedijer, who became editor of Politika and the Serbian priest Strahinja Maletić, who became commissioner of immigration. Adamic rapidly became the go-to person for returnee jobseekers, receiving

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1112 Ivo Smoljan, Tito i Iseljnici, (Zagreb: Matica Iseljenika Hrvatska, 1984), 205
1115 Letter from Louis Adamic to Sava Kosanović, January 15, 1945. Fond 83, fasc. 15, BO 72, AJ.
1116 “New Yugoslav Cabinet Named March 7, 1945.” Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO 55, AJ.
1118 Joyce Baloković, Travel Diary for Yugoslavia, 1946, p. 33. Zlatko Baloković Papers, Box 1, Folder 7, IHRCA.
1119 Telegram from Sava Kosanović to Strahinja Maletić, February 4, 1945. Fond 83, fasc. 15, BO 73, AJ.
letters from as far afield as New Zealand.\textsuperscript{1120} In 1947, Adamic was still being contacted by Yugoslav-Americans; he confessed to being “very tired of people…who have given a little money for Yugoslav relief…and now expect special favors and special treatment for their people over there.”\textsuperscript{1121} But Adamic should have anticipated this behavior—a common complaint among emigrants about the old Yugoslavia, and part of the broader discourse surrounding the “emigration question,” was Yugoslavia’s neglect of its overseas population. Emigrants were expected to give remittances but were not given a voice in how their old country was run. With this shower of patronage, the government of Yugoslavia was signaling that it would give emigrants a voice in the administration of their old country.

Nonetheless, there were more continuities than ruptures in the way the new Yugoslavia interacted with its overseas population. For instance, the practice of handing out medals to emigrants to use them as patriotic symbols for the homeland hearkened back to the old Yugoslavia. This was primarily a feature of the period of royal dictatorship, although the policy had its beginnings as early as 1924, when the Yugoslav foreign ministry decided to award Mihajlo Pupin the Order of the White Eagle.\textsuperscript{1122} In 1926, the other Serb scientist, Tesla, received the order of St. Sava.\textsuperscript{1123} In 1927, the Yugoslav foreign ministry sent out a directive to its consulates in the United States asking them to suggest other “prominent emigrants” for decoration. Awarding medals to emigrants, the old Yugoslavia’s foreign service thought, would show “our people” that “they are not forgotten and that the old country is paying attention to

\textsuperscript{1120} See, e.g. Letter from Louis Adamic to Sava Kosanović, July 11, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 15, BO 72, AJ; Letter from Miroslav Crkvenac to Louis Adamic, May 23, 1944. Fond 83, fasc. 15, BO 72, AJ
\textsuperscript{1121} Letter from Louis Adamic to Sava Kosanović, September 21, 1947. Fond 83, fasc. 15, BO 72, AJ.
\textsuperscript{1122} “Decoracija Prof Pupina,” Letter from the Washington Legation to MIP, October 14, 1924. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
\textsuperscript{1123} Letter to FK KSHS NY from Washington Legation, September 15, 1926. Fond 371, fasc. 60, BO 78, AJ.
their work, even when they are living in far-off lands.” Nikola Tesla, for instance, would be decorated again in 1931 with the Order of the Yugoslav Crown 1st Class, just for good measure. Although Tesla contributed little to the Yugoslav movement in the United States, the residual shine of Tesla’s achievements could reflect onto Yugoslavia via these gleaming medallions. During the years of the royal dictatorship, the trickle of decorations became a flood, with a whole host of emigrants receiving various Yugoslav medals for their management of singing societies, gymnastic groups, and the like. Put in this light, the decoration of the leaders of UCSSA in 1944 and 1945 was the continuation of a longstanding policy that substituted flashy awards for a genuine investments in emigrant political institutions.

Official holidays for emigrants were another early sign of continuity. In 1929, the royal dictatorship implemented the Law on Holidays, which made celebration of several state holidays mandatory in Yugoslavia. And as Chapter Three showed, Yugoslav diplomats tried to make it so that emigrants in the “Tenth Banovina” celebrated these holidays as well, although their powers of compulsion were limited. Under Tito, the practice continued, although the holidays changed. Under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the main holidays had been the royal birthday and Unification Day, December 1. In the Federal People’s republic of Yugoslavia, the main holidays became the anniversary of the beginning of the Yugoslav uprising, March 31, took the place of Unification Day, along with “Republic Day,” November 29—conveniently nearby Unification Day on the calendar. As before, the government of Yugoslavia took great interest in

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1124 Letter to Yugoslav Consulate in New York from MIP, July 18, 1927. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 13, AJ.
1125 Letter from MIP to GK KJ NY, December 7, 1931. Fond 449, fasc. 5, BO 13, AJ.
1127 Christian Axboe Nielsen, Making Yugoslavs: Identity in King Alexander’s Yugoslavia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 121-2
these proceedings, sending Sava Kosanović, now an ambassador, to preside over staged displays of emigrant patriotism.\textsuperscript{1129}

Although parades and medals were only superficial continuities, they nonetheless reflected an administrative mentality that was carried over to Tito’s new government: the diaspora existed to be milked for propaganda. The myth of the loyal emigration could grant legitimacy to the new Yugoslavia as well as the old. For instance, a popular topic in the postwar Yugoslav press were telegraph greetings from emigrant groups to Tito. These messages were reprinted in major Yugoslav newspapers with minimal commentary, along with Tito’s replies to “our emigrants.”\textsuperscript{1130} Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia, for instance, were told in newspaper headlines that “Millions of Slavic Americans Congratulate the Victory of the National Front,”\textsuperscript{1131} that “Americans of Yugoslav Origin Congratulate Tito on his Election Victory”\textsuperscript{1132} and “250,000 Slovenes Living in the United States Seek the Annexation of Trieste and the Julian Marches to Yugoslavia.”\textsuperscript{1133} A contested territory between Italian Veneto and Yugoslav Slovenia, Trieste (or Trst) and the Julian March had been split between Italy and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia after World War II. Although Yugoslavia received the Istrian peninsula and the Slavic speaking hinterland of Trieste, the city itself (which was Italian-speaking) remained out of Tito’s grasp. Using the diaspora in the United States to lobby for Trieste’s annexation to Yugoslavia was the primary objective of Yugoslavia’s embassy in Washington. Prominent Slovene Americans, particularly Louis Adamic, were to be enlisted in the service of

\textsuperscript{1129} Invitation list to Republic Day Celebrations, Washington Embassy, 1949. Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO. 61, AJ.
\textsuperscript{1133} “250,000 Slovenaca, koji žive u Americi, traže prisajedinjenje Trsta I Julijanske Kraje Jugoslavije,” \textit{Politika}, October 3, 1945. Fond 967, kut. 14, fasc. 94, HDA.
irredentism. This, too, came from the playbook of the Old Yugoslavia, which had used the testimony of Americans like Mihajlo Pupin to support its claims to Bačka and the Banat after World War I.

**Tensions with the United States**

Unlike Woodrow Wilson, however, Harry Truman was less willing to humor the territorial ambitions of small countries, particularly if they were communist. The Trieste issue rapidly poisoned relations between the U.S. and Yugoslavia. Altercations between Americans and Yugoslav soldiers on the Italian border became more frequent. American planes repeatedly violated Yugoslav airspace, a clear provocation in Yugoslav eyes. On August 9 and 19, 1946 two American C-47 planes entered Yugoslav airspace over the contested area of the Julian March and were shot down by Yugoslav fighters, triggering an international incident.

Although the frustration of Yugoslavia was understandable, lashing out against the United States was a tactical error. Joyce Baloković, who was en-route to Yugoslavia at that time with her husband Zlatko, commented in her travel diary that “the anti-Jugoslav press campaign built up to a furor around the airplane incidents, [which] had done so much damage that it would take ‘years’ to recover the lost ground. Even the American-Jugoslav groups have been scared [emphasis mine]…Those Jugoslav pilots certainly provided the enemy with devastating ammunition.” As Joyce Baloković astutely perceived, hostile relations between Yugoslavia and the United States had a chilling effect on the activities of émigré groups like UCSSA. While it was easy to argue during World War II that Yugoslav and American patriotism were

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1134 “Plan Rada u SADu,” 1947. Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO 61, AJ.
1137 Joyce Baloković, Travel Diary for Yugoslavia, 1946, p. 198. Zlatko Baloković Papers, Box 1, Folder 7, IHRCA.
complementary (since Yugoslavia and the United States were allies), the effect of worsening relations between Washington and Belgrade made this stance appear increasingly contradictory, demoralizing Yugoslav-American groups like UCSSA. Were they American patriots, or Yugoslavs?

This, in turn, was complicated by the disconnect between what Tito was and what American Yugoslavs had imagined him to be. Although UCSSA had based its support for Tito during World War II on the conviction that he was a social democrat, the fact remained that, at least before the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, Tito was an orthodox Stalinist. Like Stalin, Tito cultivated a cult of personality—his men referred to him as stari, or “The Old Man,” a parallel to Stalin’s nickname of vozhd, or “the Leader.” Likewise, his rank, Maršal, or Marshall, was a Russian borrowing—the Serbo-Croatian equivalent was vojvoda. Milovan Djilas, a close confidant of Tito before his fall from favor, recalled that Tito made efforts to imitate Stalin’s manner of speaking and style of signature. Articles written about Tito in the press borrowed phrases and styles common to press descriptions of Stalin. The Yugoslav constitution of ’46 cribbed heavily from the Stalin constitution of ’36. Likewise, Yugoslavia’s central planning bureaucracy, and judicial system were based on Soviet models. Collectivization, although it would never be implemented in Yugoslavia, appeared imminent by early 1948. Repression against political enemies, although never as extreme as during the Soviet Union during the late 1930s, did exist. Alleged collaborators and sympathizers with the Četniks or Ustaše faced

Soviet-style show trials. Draža Mihailović would be executed in 1946 in one such trial. Konstantin Fotić would be sentenced at the same trial to twenty years of hard labor—which he never served, opting to continue his role as leader of the Serbian right wing in the United States after the war. In trying to punish its overseas critics, Tito’s Yugoslavia was repeating yet another mistake of its predecessor— even if Fotić was probably guilty of inciting tensions between American Serbs and Croats during WWII, receiving such a draconian penalty from Tito just made him into a martyr. By passing a sentence they had no ability to enforce, Tito’s Yugoslavia just enhanced Fotić’s stature in the United States, allowing him to re-brand as an anti-communist and defender of civil liberties. In his 1959 obituary, the New York Times eulogized Fotic as a “man convinced representative government would return to the world” even though Fotić was the ambassador of a repressive and undemocratic government and covertly stoked greater Serbianism during the Second World War.

While Tito’s authoritarianism helped opponents of Yugoslavism like Fotić, it placed Yugoslavia’s advocates like Kosanović and Adamic in a bind. Tito’s defenders needed to prove to their readers (and perhaps to themselves) that Tito was still the liberal UCSSA had billed him as. In 1946, the UCSSA Bulletin, which Adamic edited, put out a pamphlet complaining about the “anti-Tito propaganda in the press and radio” and refuting several common criticisms of Tito’s new regime. The new Yugoslavia, Adamic felt compelled to assert, had neither religious nor ethnic persecution or favoritism. Moreover, there was no censorship, the secret police in Yugoslavia was no worse than the FBI, and that there was private property and free elections.

1142 Ibid, 38.
Of these issues, freedom of the press acquired the greatest salience, with Kosanović’s embassy being forced to issue several statements in August 1945 asserting that Yugoslavia’s new press law had not introduced censorship,\(^{1146}\) and that foreign journalists would be not be interfered with.\(^{1147}\) Ironically, just several months later, the government of Yugoslavia expelled a foreign journalist, Mary Thayer, for alleged “tendentious” statements,\(^{1148}\) again putting Kosanović and the Washington embassy on the defensive. Journalists from *Time*, *Newsweek*, and the *New Yorker* all wrote to the embassy in protest.\(^{1149}\) Tito’s Yugoslavia had apparently learned little from the example of its predecessor, whose attempts to silence its overseas critics simply made martyrs and more enemies.

**Kosanović and Kardelj**

Kosanović was publicly blamed for these incidents, although his instinct, expressed privately in correspondence, was to handle the foreign press more delicately. In fact, Kosanović was sharply critical of Yugoslavia’s propaganda efforts in the United States. Representatives of Yugoslavia had been making a variety of basic errors—translating Yugoslav press-releases into English, making no effort to tailor them to American sensibilities, which reacted to the word “socialism” with horror.\(^{1150}\) On at least two occasions, Kosanović wrote to Tito with his concerns.\(^{1151}\) After the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 made cultivating the West more urgent, Kosanović advised Kardelj that heretofore Yugoslavia had been simply dispensing information through *Tanjug*, *Borba*, or *Politika* press releases, sources American journalists did not take

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\(^{1147}\) Kosanović’s speaking notes for press conference, August 27, 1945. Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO 52, AJ.

\(^{1148}\) Letter from Mary Thayer to Sava Kosanović, September 15, 1945. Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO 55, AJ.

\(^{1149}\) Protest letter to Vladislav Ribnikar, October 2, 1945. Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO 55, AJ.

\(^{1150}\) “Yugoslav Fortnightly,” Memorandum from Sava Kosanović to MIP, May 16, 1949. Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO 57, AJ.

\(^{1151}\) Letter from Kosanović to Tito, April 7, 1948. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 68, AJ; Letter from Kosanović to Tito, August 8, 1950. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 68, AJ.
seriously. Such an approach, Kosanović tartly noted, could prompt a foreign journalist to “supply his own ‘interpretations’ of what he reads in the Belgrade press—and from such ‘interpretations’ may the good Lord spare you.” Foreign journalists should not be kept at arm’s length, Kosanović argued, as a sense of “isolation from the real source of news” could “foster a feeling of resentment” and “drive the correspondent to seek information from embassies and other foreign observers here, or from reactionary Yugoslavs.” Such as, for instance, Konstantin Fotić.

Kosanović then provided Kardelj with a detailed description on how to run a Western-style press conference, what a press officer did, the meanings of the terms “on/off the record” and “attribution,” and how to buy journalists’ affection with complementary tickets to sporting events and concerts.\footnote{\textit{Memorandum on Use of the Foreign Press}, Sava Kosanović to Edvard Kardelj, July 8, 1949. Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO 57, AJ.} Kardelj, although a veteran revolutionary, was only a novice at public relations. Kosanović, on the other hand, had nearly a decade of experience of American political life. Based on his experience in the United States, Kosanović correctly apprehended that giving journalists access usually translated into sympathetic coverage, negating the need for clumsy state propaganda.

Kosanović also attempted to acquaint Kardelj with the principles of American liberalism in 1950, suppling Kardelj, at his request, with a reading list of ten books on American history, including works by the famous historians Arthur Schlesinger Sr. and Charles Beard.\footnote{Letter from Sava Kosanović to Edvard Kardelj, March 1, 1950. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 68, AJ.} At that time, Kardelj, as Tito’s main theorist, was brainstorming a formula for “Yugoslav Communism” that would give the break with Stalin and the Cominform an ideological tinge. As previously noted, prior to 1948 both Stalin and Tito were both Leninists. As such, the dispute between them had been geopolitical—Stalin believed in the leading role of the Soviet Union and wished to
preserve his accommodation with Churchill at Yalta that allowed for a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, something which was not compatible with Tito’s ambition of a Balkan socialist federation that included Greece (as Greece had been awarded to the United Kingdom at Yalta). This did not, however, make for a compelling narrative that could legitimize Tito’s continued rule. In attempting to frame the break with Moscow as an ideological dispute, it seems Kardelj turned to the United States for inspiration. In 1952, Kardelj also called in Kosanović to provide commentary on the new Yugoslav constitution being drafted, which departed from the Stalinist model of the 1946 constitution, allowed for greater local autonomy and civil liberties, and tried to institute a new model of Yugoslav socialism based around “Worker Self-Management,” an invention of Kardelj. Although Kosanović’s commentary was unrelated to Kardelj’s flagship idea, he did draw on his experience in the United States to critique the structure of the presidium, parliament, and the powers of the executive branch vis-à-vis these bodies. Candidates for the Council of Nations, Kosanović argued, ought to be chosen by direct election. Kosanović was also concerned about the power of the President (Tito), who, he believed, ought not to vote in the National Assembly. Kosanović was also concerned about the consequences of the president’s veto power over this assembly. Taken together, these proposals reveal that Kosanović, in a cautious and limited way, was trying to import American-style separation of powers and to weaken the power of the executive. While some suggestions of Kosanović were discarded, such as his suggestion that candidates be chosen democratically

1155 Letter from Kardelj to Kosanović, October 25, 1952. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 69, AJ.
rather than appointed, others, like his critique of Tito’s influence over the legislature, appear to have been taken seriously.\footnote{Compare, for instance, “Nacrt Ustavnog Zakona,” Yugoslav constitution draft appended to letter to Kardelj, October 24, 1952, Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 69, AJ; “Nacrt Ustavnog Zakona,” Yugoslav constitution draft appended to letter to Kardelj, December, 1952. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 69, AJ.} As such, to Kosanović we can assign partial credit for the liberal turn in Yugoslavia’s constitution in 1953, although the real impetus for these changes was Yugoslavia’s desire for closer relations with the United States and the West after the Tito-Stalin Split had turned the Soviet Union into a threatening adversary.

Kosanović’s advice for how Yugoslavia should handle “its” emigration were largely ignored, however. Kosanović raised several complaints about the ways his underlings and fellow functionaries were interacting with the diaspora, his correspondence creating the impression of an isolated figurehead ambassador within an embassy of apparatchiks. Yugoslav functionaries in the foreign service had been writing to émigré organizations, nakedly inquiring about their political loyalties and deluging them with pompous propaganda pamphlets.\footnote{Letter from Sava Kosanović to Tito, April 7, 1948. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 68, AJ.} Outlining his guiding principles in dealing with the diaspora in 1947, Kosanović wrote:

The emigration in the United States…cannot be considered a part of our national organism that can remain as such. Facing the vast majority of Americans of Yugoslav origin, one must never present their old national affiliation as something contradictory to their new—American—affiliation. As soon as we present things that way, \textit{as we frequently and forcefully do [emphasis mine]}, we lose whatever support and assistance we might have had in our emigration. In the emigration there exists a sentimental feeling of blood ties with us…This is the capital that we must cultivate in a suitably unobtrusive manner, but we cannot overvalue it and think that it, among the majority of our emigration, is stronger than their feelings toward America.

Kosanović had learned from the last two decades, when the emigration was called the “tenth banovina” and expected to send remittances, donations, investments, and even, during the early years of the Second World War, military recruits. Such an approach inevitably disappointed Old
Country representatives and triggered emigrant resentment at being treated like a “milking cow,” as one emigrant memorably phrased it in 1934. At the same time, Kosanović alludes to Yugoslav representatives “frequently and forcefully” repeating the mistakes of the past, treating Americans of Yugoslav origin as subjects rather than friends.

A prime example of this was Socialist Yugoslavia’s citizenship laws. Royal Yugoslavia, it should be recalled, not only allowed for dual citizenship, it also made Yugoslav citizenship, which carried the obligation of military service should migrants return, extremely difficult to shed. Like its predecessor, the FNRJ initially considered emigrants and their children as citizens by default, unless they chose to renounce their citizenship. Thanks to a travel advisory by the US State Department, “American citizens who may be regarded by Yugoslavia as Yugoslav citizens are warned that in case they should enter that country they will become subject to the laws of Yugoslavia, under which difficulties may be encountered particularly with respect to obtaining permission to depart therefrom.” Assuming Yugoslav-Americans were able to parse this prolix prose, the State Department’s missive threatened to discourage émigré tourism. Emigrants, after all, did not want to visit the old country only to be drafted or arrested. Besides being lucrative, tourism was important, Kosanović argued, because “visitors usually return home satisfied, which has a very positive political effect, particularly in subduing hostile propaganda.” This too was a lesson from the interwar period—the izlet was particularly effective at turning emigrants into nationalists. Although Kosanović proposed amending the law such that naturalized Yugoslav-Americans would automatically lose their Yugoslav citizenship

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1160 Marko Jelavić, “Mi = iseljenici,” Jugoslavenski Glasnik, September 20, 1934. Fond 967, kut. 39, HDA.
1162 Department of State, “Information for Bearers of Passports, No. 54 Yugoslavia,” December 1, 1948.
or informing citizens abroad that they could travel to Yugoslavia and back unmolested, elements within the bureaucracy suggested that doing so amounted to a “capitulation” to the United States and suggesting that those who would return to Yugoslavia should renounce their American citizenship instead (!). Although it is unclear whether Kosanović won this dispute, it is nonetheless illustrative of the persistence of old attitudes within the new Yugoslavia’s foreign service bureaucracy, the idea that emigrants belonged to Yugoslavia, not the United States.

Despite the prescience of his observations, Kosanović's views on the diaspora were not representative of the new Yugoslavia’s diplomatic service. Nor were they, for the most part, harmonious with the views of Tito. When Kosanović wrote directly to Tito in 1948, underlining again the importance of not treating the diaspora as an extension of Yugoslavia and of treating the American English-language press gently, Tito’s terse telegraphed reply agreed only with the latter premise. Tito did not take Kosanović seriously, treating him as a token liberal to assuage Western anxieties about one-party rule. According to one observer, by 1948 Kosanović was a figurehead within his own embassy, even being assigned a political chaperon who ran things in his stead. It should be remembered that Tito, during his rise to power in the 1930s, put little stock in campaigning among the emigration, mainly to distinguish himself from Gorkić, who did. Party members, Tito believed, would only make a difference by agitating in Yugoslavia. Tito’s previous indifference to émigré politics perhaps explains the tendency, during the early years of his rule, to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors—bureaucratic inertia is a powerful thing, particularly if one is not well informed on a subject. In 1950, Kosanović would

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1164 “Pitanje državljanstva Amerikanaca Jugoslovenskog Porekla,” May 19, 1949. Fond 83, fasc. 7, BO 57, AJ.
1165 Letter from Sava Kosanović to Tito, April 7, 1948. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 68, AJ.
1166 Missive from Tito to Kosanović, found with 1949. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 68, AJ.
1168 Unaddressed handwritten letter from Željezar (Ivan Marić), August 5, 1937. Fond 790/1, KI 1938/8, AJ.
be recalled to Yugoslavia to advise Tito on how to improve Yugoslavia’s diplomatic relationship with the United States. Kosanović’s replacement as ambassador, a close confidant of Tito and veteran party functionary, promised to be less trouble.\textsuperscript{1169} Although given a cabinet position as a consolation prize, by August 1950, Kosanović had had enough and tendered his resignation to that as well.\textsuperscript{1170} In 1956, Kosanović passed away in Belgrade of apparently natural causes, despite only being sixty-one.\textsuperscript{1171}

Before his untimely death, Kosanović wrote a memoir of his political work on behalf of Yugoslavia, titled \textit{Jugoslavija Bila je Osuđena na Smrt}, or “Yugoslavia was Condemned to Death.” Writing during the early 1950s, when Yugoslavia was internationally isolated, Kosanović argued that during World War II Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin flirted with the idea of dissolving Yugoslavia after the war and never fully committed to its defense.\textsuperscript{1172} While a questionable historical argument, Kosanović’s memoir nonetheless reveals a deep disillusionment with the United States, which no longer seemed to be a force for good in the world. Given the sensitive nature of Kosanović’s work and the delicate balancing act between East and West that was postwar Yugoslav diplomacy, it is not surprising that Kosanović’s memoir would not be published until 1984, after Tito’s death. Still, this was yet another case pf the sort of censorship applied to émigré critics of Yugoslavia.

Although Tito’s Yugoslavia treated “its” diaspora similarly to its predecessor, the message of its overseas propaganda had changed in an important way—gone was any theory of the ethnic unity of “Yugoslavs.” Beginning in 1951, the new Yugoslavia founded a series of

\textsuperscript{1170} Letter from Sava Kosanović to Tito, August 8, 1950. Fond 83, fasc. 13, BO 68, AJ.
\textsuperscript{1172} Sava Kosanović and Bogdan Krizman, ed., \textit{Jugoslavije Bila je Odudena na Smrt: Smisao Moskovskog sporazuma} (Zagreb:Globus, 1984).
cultural organizations for emigrants all collectively bearing the name *Matica* (pl. *matice*), which meant, variously, queen bee, magnet, or source. These organizations, based in Yugoslavia, focused on maintaining and celebrating emigrant culture and nurturing ties with the old country.\textsuperscript{1173} In interwar Yugoslavia, this sort of cultural outreach was handled by Yugoslav consulates and the Emigration Commissariat. However, breaking from previous practice, the work of the *Matica* were split up by nationality—the Croatian *Matica* dealt with Croatian emigrants, the Serbian *Matica* with the Serbs, and so on. This led, in turn, to the abandonment of any attempt to promote a synthetic Yugoslav culture in emigrants, and, in 1967 and 1968, the Croatian Matica would be reprimanded for its narrowly Croatian “nationalist spirit.”\textsuperscript{1174}

We can also see the abandonment of Yugoslavism in the various speeches Kosanović delivered to emigrant organizations in the United States as part of his duties as ambassador. Speaking at the Second Croatian Congress in Cleveland in April 1947, for instance, Kosanović praised the “unity of American Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians in America in the fight for the unity of the *Yugoslav peoples* in Yugoslavia” and how they “manifested their sympathy for the national-liberation war under the leadership of Tito.”\textsuperscript{1175} In the new mythmaking about the diaspora, three key elements emerged. First, when referring to the diaspora, Kosanović almost invariably called them “Americans of Yugoslav origin” or “Americans of Serbian/Croatian/Slovenian origin” rather than Yugoslavs in America, a recognition of their loyalties and acculturation to the United States. Secondly, Kosanović acknowledged the separate people-ness of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and now Macedonians, rather than insisting, as the old Yugoslavia did, that “Yugoslavs” were a single people with three branches or tribes. And third,

\textsuperscript{1173} Ulf Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State since the late Nineteenth Century* (Lanham: Lexington, 2016), 271-277.
\textsuperscript{1174} Ibid, 277.
\textsuperscript{1175} Sava Kosanović, speech at the Second Croatian Congress, Cleveland, April 20, 1947. Fond 83, fasc 8, BO 62, AJ.
when referring to the diaspora specifically, Kosanović underlined that all Yugoslav peoples contributed to the national-liberation struggle. This seems to have been the official line, as one month later, when Kosanović called upon the Slovene American National Alliance, he delivered much the same message, praising the efforts of “Americans of Slovenian and Yugoslav origin…to support your brothers in the old country in the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene resistance to fascism [emphasis mine].” And at the Serbian congress held in October of the same year, Kosanović again highlighted how “Americans of Serbian origin, together with other Yugoslav-Americans proved to your fellow American citizens that you support the resistance of your brothers in the old country against fascism.” Per official rhetoric, what tied American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes together was ideology and a history of opposition to fascism and support of Tito, rather than a unified “Yugoslav” culture. Nonetheless, while using socialist ideology to hold Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes worked in Yugoslavia (at least for a while), this was an unviable tactic in the United States, currently in the grip of its second Red Scare.

The Yugoslav Diaspora and the Second Red Scare

Although republicans and conservative democrats opposed to the New Deal had been accusing their political enemies of being Soviet agents since the late 1930s, the witch hunt dramatically worsened after 1945. Following the sensational defections of the Soviet spy Elizabeth Bentley and Daily Worker editor Louis Budenz, lawmakers and the FBI began to treat Soviet infiltration as a serious threat. In that same year, the Dies Committee, a temporary House committee that investigated subversive activity, acquired permanent status as the House

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1176 Sava Kosanović, speech at SANS, May 30, 1947. Fond 83, fasc. 8, BO 62, AJ.
1177 Sava Kosanović, Speech at Serbian Congress, Pittsburgh, October 26, 1947. Fond 83, fasc. 8, BO 62, AJ.
1179 Ibid, 119-121.
Un-American Activities Committee, or HUAC. In March 1947, President Truman, having received a pummeling from the Republicans in the 1946 elections over the “Communists in government” issue, instituted a federal employee loyalty program.\(^{1180}\) In 1948, sensationalist reports of Bentley and Budenz’s activities reached the press.\(^{1181}\) The “Red Menace” acquired even more threatening dimensions with the testimony of former party-member Whittaker Chambers before HUAC that Alger Hiss, a government official, had been spying for the Soviet Union,\(^{1182}\) which acquired atomic weaponry the following year. And in 1949, Mao Zedong triumphed in the Chinese civil war.\(^{1183}\) Communists seemed to be on the rise everywhere. In the eyes of the media and public officials, US government and society was riddled with a vast communist conspiracy. Accusations, even if never proven, ruined lives and careers, subjecting social-democrats and liberals to ostracization, blacklists, and FBI harassment. The “Old Left” in American politics was virtually annihilated, pushing the center of gravity in American politics firmly to the right for the next seventy years.\(^{1184}\)

UCSSA and Adamic were early victims of what would come to be known as the Second Red Scare, since both Bentley and Budenz fingered Adamic as a spy for the “Reds.” The accusation was nonsense—Adamic was not even a Party member, as the FBI found out, and was far too “mercurial” and “obstreperous” to submit to Party discipline.\(^{1185}\) Budenz was also a crackpot—in 1945, he left the Party and converted to Catholicism,\(^{1186}\) after which he

\(^{1180}\) Ibid, 110-111.
continuously fed conspiracy theories to credulous congressmen. Among his bigger hits was his claim that “All Communists Here are Spies” and his assertion that the CPUSA had been ready to start a “civil war” in 1939.\textsuperscript{1187} And aside from Budenz, with whom Adamic had occasionally discussed events in Yugoslavia between 1943 and 1945, Adamic had no relationship to any of the other individuals implicated by Bentley’s testimony.\textsuperscript{1188} Additionally, Adamic’s support for Tito placed him at odds with the CPUSA, which was staunchly Cominformist.

Although the case for “espionage” was weak, the FBI investigation nonetheless cast suspicion on the long list of organizations where Adamic had a leadership role, including the Slovene American National Council, the American Croatian Congress, the American Slav Congress, the American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, and the United Council of South Slavic Americans.\textsuperscript{1189} Zlatko Baloković was implicated as well, although the full list of individuals tarnished by their association with Adamić has been heavily redacted in his FBI file.\textsuperscript{1190} Nonetheless, it seems clear that the same web of connections linking together Yugoslav civil society organizations and self-help groups, connections that were instrumental in the formation of the “Yugoslav diaspora,” now facilitated accusations of guilt by association. Even if the leaders of these organizations were not prosecuted or convicted, there now existed pressure for their leaders to move toward the center and downplay their sympathy for Yugoslavia, which was, after all, a Communist country.

\textsuperscript{1188} “Louis Adamic,” FBI File on Louis Adamic, September 9, 1949, p 3-5. Louis Adamic Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, IHRCA.
\textsuperscript{1189} “Louis Adamic,” FBI File on Louis Adamic, September 9, 1949, p 7-11. Louis Adamic Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, IHRCA.
\textsuperscript{1190} Ibid, p 14.
Following the investigation of Adamić, Zlatko Baloković found himself in the crosshairs. In June 1949, in *The New York Times*, Baloković was accused, falsely, of having been “bitten by the communist bug” and of being a “professional revolutionary at the upper levels of the Stalinist apparatus,”¹¹⁹¹ a statement that so enraged Baloković that he wrote to the editorial board seeking to clear his name.¹¹⁹² Baloković took proactive measures as well, resigning his honorary positions at a slew of left-leaning organizations like the American Slav Congress¹¹⁹³ or the American-Soviet Friendship Society.¹¹⁹⁴ Baloković would become much more politically circumspect in the United States, never again venturing into the rowdy realm of émigré politics. Nonetheless, Baloković continued to travel and give concerts, on occasion in Yugoslavia, where his presence would be used for propaganda by the government, encouraging its citizens to take pride in the achievements of a prominent émigré. Baloković passed away in 1965 on one such trip to Yugoslavia, where his 70th birthday was to have been feted.¹¹⁹⁵ He would be interred in Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb, a final argument that he belonged to Yugoslavia.

The new Red Scare would have deleterious effects on the major Yugoslav emigrant groups as well. In 1948, the United Committee for South Slavic Americans was labeled a “subversive organization” by the Attorney General.¹¹⁹⁶ This designation led to great difficulties for the American Council for Yugoslav Relief (ACYR), UCSSA’s sister organization that raised money from emigrants to send to Yugoslavia, although the ACYR’s financial difficulties truly began after the downing of the two American planes over Yugoslavia in the summer of ’46.

¹¹⁹² Letter from Zlatko Baloković to NYT Editorial Board, July 7, 1949, Zlatko Baloković Papers, Box 1, Folder 8, IHRCA.
¹¹⁹³ Letter from Zlatko Baloković to George Pirinsky, April 18, 1949. Zlatko Baloković Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, IHRCA.
¹¹⁹⁴ Letter from Zlatko Baloković to John Kingsbury, November 2, 1949. Zlatko Baloković Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, IHRCA.
Following this incident, ACYR took in much less money in donations than it had the previous year—being able to send $373,159 to Yugoslavia, compared to $554,990 in 1945. By November, 1948, the combined accounts of the ACYR had shrunk to $15,000. With few funds to purchase relief supplies for Yugoslavia, the board of the ACYR agreed to disband the organization, liquidate its assets, and donate whatever remained to the Red Cross. In its final meeting held the following January, the board complained of intimidation and the stigma of being designated a subversive organization, suggesting that HUAC indeed delivered the coup de grace. Even so, the ACYR’s sum contribution to Yugoslavia totaled $2.7 million, a number that suggests that Yugoslavism was hardly an insignificant force in the United States.

While the anti-communist zeitgeist sapped the energies and cohesion of the American Yugoslavist movement, it gave prestige and legitimacy to its opponents. Konstantin Fotić, now an ex-ambassador, had remained in the United States after the war’s end. Building on his wartime activities, Fotić openly assumed leadership of the Serbian National Defense, an organization covered in the previous chapter. Despite the loss of his prestigious title, Fotić effectively occupied Adamić's former position as a professional “expert on Yugoslavia.” Mirroring Adamić’s success with *The Native’s Return* in 1934, in 1948 Fotić published a book, *The War We Lost*, a pro-Mihailović memoir, receiving favorable reviews in the *New York Times*. Further attesting to his influence, Fotić would be frequently tapped by the *New York Times*.

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1197 American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Minutes for Meeting on November 14, 1946. Zlatko Baloković Papers, Box 1, Folder 11, IHRCA.
1198 American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Minutes for Meeting on November 22, 1948. Zlatko Baloković Papers, Box 1, Folder 11, IHRCA.
1199 American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Minutes for Meeting on January 25, 1949. Zlatko Baloković Papers, Box 1, Folder 11, IHRCA.
Times for commentary and quotes on Yugoslav affairs, at least until his death in 1959.\textsuperscript{1202} The same could not be said for Ruth Mitchell, who largely disappeared from the public eye after 1945. In 1953, she published her second (and last) book, My Brother Bill. A biography of her brother General Billy Mitchell, Mitchell’s new book showed that her engagement with Serbian émigré politics had largely ended. Mitchell accomplished little in the next sixteen years, dying in 1969 in a nursing home in Portugal at the age of eighty-one.\textsuperscript{1203} Bishop Dionisije, another ringleader for the Odbrana, lasted another ten years, passing away at the age of 80 in 1979. Much of Dionisije’s postwar activity centered around his feud with the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Communist Yugoslavia, which attempted to defrock Dionisije in 1963. Dionisije refused to accept this verdict, triggering a schism between the Serbian Orthodox Exarchate and the Holy Synod in Belgrade.\textsuperscript{1204} This quarrel doubtless allowed Dionisije to maintain his position at the head of the Serbian right wing, providing an endless series of small conflicts to stoke Serbian outrage and mobilize it in his defense.

The Second Red Scare also strengthened the more conservative and nationalistic organizations of the Croatian-American community at the expense of the moderates and liberals. In 1946, the Croatian Catholic Union, Hrvatski Kolo, the American Branch of the Croatian Peasant Party, and the CFU under the leadership of President Butković formed an umbrella organizations calling itself the “United Croats of America and Canada.”\textsuperscript{1205} Although the Croatian Fraternal Union finally ousted the conservative Butković in 1947, replacing him with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1204} Francesco Ragazzi, Governing Diasporas in International Relations: The Transnational Politics of Croatia and Former Yugoslavia (New York: Routledge, 2017), 62.
\end{itemize}
the pro-Yugoslav Mandić, in 1949 the Croatian Fraternal Union would be “exposed” as a supporter of the American Slav Congress, another organization deemed subversive by HUAC. Threatened by the anti-communist mania, the CFU reacted much like Baloković did—retreat and silence. To avoid answering questions about Yugoslavism or Tito, the CFU adopted the position that

We recognize but one Flag and but one authority and that is the Flag and the Constitution of the United States […] WE have a tender regard, too, for the homeland of our fathers, but in any test of allegiance, in any question of loyalty, we assure you all that we stand unswervingly behind this Country.

Americanism, now instead of reinforcing Yugoslavism, helped shield the Croatian Fraternal Union of charges of disloyalty. The CFU would not abandon its apolitical stance until 1967, when it became pro-Yugoslav, a stance that lasted until Tito’s death in 1980, when the CFU became pro-Croatian. The remnants of the Ustaša, however, seemed to operate in impunity. In Argentina, Ante Pavelić founded the Croatian Liberation Movement in 1956. Branches of this organization soon popped up in the United States, and parallel Ustaša organizations were founded in Spain and Germany as well. The West, it seemed, was no longer as hostile to fascism as it had been in 1945.

**Who Killed Louis Adamic?**

It would be these tense circumstances that made the loss of Adamic in 1951 such a devastating blow to the Yugoslav movement in the United States. As we have seen, many people

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1210 Ragazzi, *Governing Diasporas in International Relations*, 63.
had reason to want Adamic dead: Cominformist Yugoslavs, the USSR, along with the Serbian, Croatian, and American right wing. But who pulled the trigger—Adamic, or his many enemies?

Although Dan Shiffman’s 2003 biography of Adamic argues that Adamic’s death was probably a suicide, ¹²¹¹ John Enyeart, in a more recent biography of Adamic argues that there was foul play, specifically by Ustaša/Domobran emigres. Enyeart concludes that the KGB or its agents were unlikely to have assassinated Adamic for a variety of reasons. First, the KGB’s murder of dissidents was a common trope in the American anti-communist media during the 1950s. As a source base, they were known for exaggerating the “threat” of communist spies, agents, and sleeper cells in the United States for both ideological reasons and out of pure sensationalism—one need only look at how many mainstream sources believed McCarthy’s claim in 1950 to have a list of 205 communists’ names in the State Department. And second, Enyeart argues, Stalin would have known that ordering a hit on Adamic would have been a waste of time. After all, Adamic had already been marginalized, having lost his organization, his allies, and media platform during the Second Red Scare. The Ustaša, Enyeart believed, were motivated more by passion than logic, and could have killed Adamic as revenge for his support for Tito. ¹²¹²

However, there are several problems with this theory as well. During Adamic’s period of wartime activism, neither Adamic nor the Ustaša’s proxies in the United States, the Domobran, butted heads. While Adamic was vocally opposed to fascism, there was, simply put, no organization on the far right in the Croatian-American community with which he could spar. The Domobran, as Chapter 4 shows, had been shut down by the FBI in 1941 after years of organizational weakness and infighting had decimated their membership and financial assets. UCSSA, in turn, emerged in 1942-3. Because Adamic had little history of public enmity with the

¹²¹² John Enyeart, Death to Fascism: Louis Adamic’s Fight for Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2019)
Domobran, this makes for a weak motive for assassination. Moreover, the Domobran’s organizational weakness made them unlikely candidates to assassinate Adamic. Adamic’s murder, if it was that, was the work of a professional: the killer left no identifiable forensic traces, having wiped any fingerprints and set a blaze to cover their tracks. While it is possible that the arrival of battle-hardened Ustaša emigres from postwar Yugoslavia strengthened the remnants of the Domobran organization in the United States, most of the leading Ustaše, including Ante Pavelić, went to Argentina, not the United States.\textsuperscript{1213} In short, the Domobran lacked both the capabilities and a strong motive to assassinate Adamic.

An alternative suspect could be someone from the Serbian National Defense—the Serbian right wing, rather than the Croatian right wing. As documented in Chapter 6, the Serbian National Defense was vocally and bitterly opposed to Adamic’s activities on behalf of Tito—here, at least, there is a clear motive. Additionally, Sava Kosanović, Adamic's ally, received at least one death threat from this group. However, it is doubtful whether the Serbian National Defense was capable of murder. And if the Serbian National Defense killed Adamic, why wait until 1951 rather than kill Adamic in 1943, when it could have done the most damage to the Yugoslav movement? The professionalism of the assassination, if it was that, as well as the impending threat posed by Adamic’s upcoming pro-Tito book speaks to Stalin’s involvement, right-wing press tropes notwithstanding.

Ultimately, resolution of the mystery of Adamic’s death will have to await the declassification of specific documents from the FBI inquiry, which found several suspects. One informant described being recruited to shoot Adamic by a woman, name redacted, with reddish-brown hair and dark-rimmed glasses who worked on behalf of the American communist party.

\textsuperscript{1213} Michael Phayer, \textit{Pius XII, the Holocaust, and the Cold War} (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008), 220-230; Francesco Ragazzi, \textit{Governing Diasporas in International Relations} (New York: Routledge, 2017), 59-69.
The FBI was skeptical, however, noting that the informant in question was a “drifter” and a heavy drinker. Nonetheless, if true, this would suggest that Adamic’s death was ordered by Moscow. Details about the four other suspects, however, are sparse—the FBI’s conclusions are swathes of black ink. Given that this material was last reviewed for release in 1990 and that thirty years have elapsed since then, we may hope that future Freedom of Information Act requests will prove more fruitful.

Regardless, Adamic’s death speaks to a basic truth about diaspora politics. Adamic was caught between much larger forces: Rogers Brubaker characterizes diaspora politics as conditioned by the tug-of-war between host country and sending country. Although our approach has also factored in the role of transnational organizations, the fact remains that diasporas are weak compared to states. Their ability to affect geopolitics is quite limited—one needs only look at the disappointment of the Yugoslav Committee during WWI when their efforts failed to create a federal Yugoslav republic or the disappointment of UCSSA when their lobbying failed to do the same thing. Moreover, it takes the right confluence of circumstances in the host country, sending country, and the milieu of transnational political parties for a diaspora lobby to have any effect at all. During the interwar period, Adamic’s vision of Yugoslavism was supported or tolerated by the United States, the KPJ, and the Yugoslav Fraction of the CPUSA. Moreover, it fed off resentment toward an autocratic and conservative ‘old country.’ That ‘old country,’ moreover, lacked both the money and geopolitical heft needed

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1217 Ivan Čizmić, *Jugoslavenski iseljenički Pokret u SAD i stvaranje jugoslavenske države 1918* (Zagreb, Liber, 1974).
to curb this growing overseas dissident movement. Everything changed in the postwar era. Yugoslavia had become a communist state, the CPUSA sided with the Cominform against Tito, and the US launched a witch hunt against the left. These factors made diaspora politics a dangerous and demoralizing experience, especially for a person of principle like Adamic. Unwilling to change his political sails when faced by headwinds from the host country, sending country, and international organizations like the Cominform, Adamic paid the ultimate price. Regardless of who pulled the trigger, it was this quadratic nexus that killed Louis Adamic.

**The Fragility of Diaspora**

With the death of Adamic and the marginalization of Kosanović and Baloković, the Yugoslav movement in the United States had lost several key unifying figures. With Tito’s rise to power, the Yugoslav movement in the United States had lost its raison d’etre, a liberal, democratic Yugoslavia. And with the end of UCSSA and the ACYR during the Second Red Scare, the Yugoslavist movement had lost its unifying organizations. As such, 1951 is a good place to conclude this narrative. After all, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the “Yugoslav diaspora”, (defined, once again, as a transnational network of emigrant organizations large enough to plausibly speak on behalf of an imagined emigrant Yugoslav community) had come unraveled.

During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, successive waves of anti-communist and nationalist political emigrants from Yugoslavia came to the United States, tilting the balance even further to the right. Some groups, like the Croatian Križari (Crusaders) or the Serbian Otadžbina movements, even carried out terrorist attacks on Yugoslavia or its diplomatic representatives abroad.\(^\text{1218}\) Communist Yugoslavia, meanwhile, continued to learn little from its

\(^{1218}\) Ragazzi, *Governing Diasporas in International Relations*, 62-8; Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 269-270.
successor, and had categorized emigrants into the so-called “old emigration,” emigrants from the old Yugoslavia or Austria-Hungary, and the new “enemy Yugoslav migration” or “hostile emigration” composed of anti-Communist exiles who were threats to Yugoslavia’s security and ideological purity.\footnote{1219} This attitude was also strongly reminiscent of the old Yugoslavia, which had securitized discourse around “separatist,” republican, and communist groups.

Even so, support for Yugoslavia faded only gradually. The Croatian Fraternal Union, for instance, maintained close ties with Communist Yugoslavia and the Croatian Matica, continuing to organize group trips to Yugoslavia and accepting funding for cultural activities.\footnote{1220} Still, by the 1980s, overseas Yugoslavism was largely moribund as a political movement. When the nationalist politician Franjo Tudjmann went to Canada in search of friends and funds, he met little organized opposition, despite lacking the support of several major self-help groups like the Croatian Fraternal Union.\footnote{1221} Raising millions of dollars from wealthy anti-communist emigres in North America, Tudjmann’s newly founded party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) was able to win control of the Croatian parliament on an explicitly secessionist platform.\footnote{1222} It would be the HDZ’s success that kicked off the brutal civil war that led to Yugoslavia’s dissolution, even if Milošević’s leadership and economic stagnation made such a conflict inevitable.

If the Yugoslav diaspora ultimate proved ephemeral, what is the point of studying it? The rise and fall of the “Yugoslav” diaspora underscores an important point, namely, that diasporas are artificial—they can be made, and they can be unmade just as easily. The formation of the “Yugoslav diaspora,” defined as a transnational network between Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations large enough to plausibly represent an imagined diasporic community, was a

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{1219} Ragazzi, Governing Diasporas in International Relations, 38-9.
  \item \footnote{1220} Brunnbauer, Globalizing Southeastern Europe, 276.
  \item \footnote{1221} Ragazzi, Governing Diasporas in International Relations, 82-105, 88.
  \item \footnote{1222} Ibid, 91
\end{itemize}}
gradual process. During the 1920s, the newly-formed government of Yugoslavia sought to build ties with what it saw as “its” emigration, even though their time and port of departure linked most migrants with Austria-Hungary, not Yugoslavia. From the beginning, Yugoslav policymaking was shaped by an instrumentalist view of the diaspora, seeking to use it as a source of money and political legitimacy. At the same time, Serb, Croat, and Slovene diaspora organizations began to consolidate, driven by the demographic pressure imposed by American laws that choked off the flow of new migrants from the Western Balkans. These new societies, such as the Croatian Fraternal Union or the Serbian National Federation, often found their resources equal to or greater than those that the government of Yugoslavia was willing to allocate to support emigrant cultural institutions—ultimately, Yugoslavia wanted to extract more from its “diaspora” than it invested.

The increasingly adversarial relationship between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and “its” emigration provides a useful case study for theoreticians of “diaspora” like Gabriel Sheffer, who was interested in the sort of tensions that emerge as a result of homelands who take diaspora political and economic activity on its behalf for granted. In this Yugoslav case this discrepancy created a sense of bitterness, but also taught independence, both financial and ideological. It strengthened the diaspora network and created an opening for cultural and political syncretism with the host country. Even going back to the 1920s, Yugoslav emigrants often drew on the democratic, liberal, and federal organization of the United States in formulating their views on what Yugoslavia should be like. This confirms Nina Glick-Schiller and Peggy Levitt’s assertion that acculturation to the host country and the construction of transnational ties are not

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1223 Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, 250-256.
mutually exclusive, especially when the values of the host country resonate with the complaints of a politically unsatisfied diaspora. Moreover, the adversarial relationship between fraternal unions and the government of Yugoslavia was strengthened during the 1930s, when agents of the royal dictatorship sought to import Yugoslav political repression to overseas communities. Grievances against Belgrade were further popularized by travelers to Yugoslavia, among them Louis Adamic, who raised awareness of Yugoslavia and its political problems. At the same time, this period was characterized by the intensification of national activity by fraternal unions, often on a Yugoslav basis, but largely funded independently of the government of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav rooms, gardens, and radio stations all emerged during the 1930s, reinforcing the habits of cooperation between Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups. Conscious of their strength and disillusioned with the government of Yugoslavia, the ground was laid for mobilization during the Second World War against the government of Yugoslavia but for Yugoslavia’s reconstruction on a liberal, federal basis.

One of the Yugoslav diaspora’s vulnerabilities was that the political horizons of diasporas are often delineated by the host country, as Nadejda Marinova argues. The host country government, for instance, can decide which emigrant groups are taken seriously by the press or called in to testify before Congress. To take a modern-day example, the Iraqi National Congress led by Ahmed Chalabi, a relatively minor organization in the “Iraqi diaspora,” became important because their testimony was useful to hawks in the White House seeking to legitimize the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. In return for (false) testimony and a public relations campaign averring that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, the INC received millions of dollars in

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funding from the CIA and privileged treatment by the mainstream media, including the *New York Times, Washington Post,* and *Atlantic*. Moreover, the INC’s newfound status positioned it at the center of a new network of Iraqi émigré organizations, where it acted as an intermediary between them and the Bush administration. Conversely, the uselessness of UCSSA to the United States after 1945, in light of its leftist tendencies, rendered it vulnerable. From the beginning, American Yugoslavism was imbued in the spirit of American liberalism and progressivism, particularly during the New Deal years. The dream of a federal, democratic Yugoslavia was inspired by the American model. When that discourse changed during the outbreak of the cold war, and it became more important to be against Communism than to be for democracy, the Yugoslav-American diaspora disintegrated. Adamic, who once, similar to Chalabi, had the ear of the president and contacts in the OSS, the predecessor of the CIA, found himself politically isolated and powerless, affecting his ability to maintain the networks of donors and fraternal organizations that sustained the “Yugoslav diaspora.”

Moreover, the “Yugoslav diaspora” was fragile because no fraternal union was successfully organized on a Yugoslav basis. The Yugoslav Fraternal Federation, an attempt in the early 1930s to merge the major Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions in the United States, failed in the face of opposition by the nationalist wing of the CFU. Had a single Yugoslav fraternal organization been created, it would have integrated Yugoslavism into the day-to-day life of migrants, sustaining a sort of “banal nationalism” that could be easily mobilized in times of crisis. Instead, Yugoslavism remained an ad-hoc organizing principle for one-off projects like the Yugoslav room in the Pittsburgh Cathedral of Learning, the Yugoslav Garden in

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Cleveland, or Yugoslav radio. While these projects created the habits of cooperation that tied together Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations and paved the way for political cooperation during the Second World War, this was a weak integrating force compared to a formal organization with bylaws, a charter, its own newspaper, and so forth. Institutions have more inertia. Instead, the organization tying South Slavs together would be UCSSA, which was based around a specific political cause that could be delegitimized.

The Importance of Travel

Still, a Yugoslav diaspora did emerge and it is useful to evaluate which of the techniques deployed to promote national consciousness—musicians, parades, language schools, newspaper propaganda, exchange programs, etc.—had the greatest effect. Somewhat surprisingly, travel and travelers seem to have had the most potent impact on diasporic politics. Of course, all migrants are, by definition, travelers. However, in this case, what matters is travel back to the home country, rather than migrants’ first trip overseas. It is worth recalling, for instance, that Louis Adamic only became a Yugoslav nationalist and a famous public intellectual after he traveled to Yugoslavia in 1932. Besides Adamic, however, a number of other important individuals in the Yugoslav diasporic network either returned to Yugoslavia as tourists or came from Yugoslavia as politicians: Ivan Mladineo, Vincent Cainkar, Nikola “Uncle Sam” Kovačević, Mirko Marković, Petar Radić, and Stojan Pribićević, among others. This also holds true for the anti-Yugoslav opposition. Look, for instance, at Ruth Mitchell and Branko Pekić of the Serbian National Defense, or Branimir Jelić, all of whom parlayed their experience as travelers to or from Yugoslavia into political influence within a diasporic community. Not only does travel make nationalists, it also gives them the symbolic capital within a diasporic context.
One could also point to the success of izlet type excursions during the 1930s as another example of travel’s effect on national consciousness. There are also a contemporary parallel for this phenomenon: Israel’s “Taglit Birthright” program. In 1999, Israel began to sponsor free travel to Israel for young, nationally-suggestible adults. Like the Izlet, Birthright was a response to fears that Jews in the United States were getting a bit too assimilated.1227 Also reminiscent of the izlet, Birthright tourists are guided through major cities in Israel, partaking in banquets and a generous helping of propaganda in the form of speeches, lectures, and meetings with members of the Israeli Defense Forces. The Israel Prime Minister at the time of writing, Benjamin Netanyahu, routinely addresses Birthright travelers. Although Netanyahu’s politics have proven polarizing to some young American Jews, his engagement with the Birthright program nonetheless attests to its importance to the Israeli government.1228 Recent studies of Birthright’s effect on the Jewish diaspora universally show its dramatic effects on national consciousness. Going to Israel, travelers find themselves to be more confident in their national identity. The homeland becomes something “concrete,” a new “homeland” alongside the country of their birth. Moreover, they become more aware of the geopolitical “insecurity” of their “Old Country” (which, like Yugoslavia, is also relatively new). In this way, the narrative of persecution that partially underwrites a Jewish diasporic network is reinforced.1229 Yugoslavia probably benefited even more from this sense of peril; Germany and Italy during the interwar period were much greater threats than contemporary Palestine or Iran, and Yugoslavia, unlike

Israel, lacked a nuclear deterrent. Nor is the effect of Birthright trips limited to the travelers themselves. The parents, friends, and social networks of participants also experience a greater sense of connection to Israel. As a result, travelers become hubs within a broader diasporic network. Although Lord Acton memorably commented that “exile is the nursery of nationality,” it appears that the journey was more important than the destination.

**Why the United States?**

Even though the Yugoslav diaspora was fragile, it nonetheless existed. But why did an organization that could plausibly claim to speak for Serb, Croat, and Slovene migrants only emerge in the United States? What about the United States during the interwar period made it such fertile soil for Yugoslavism? While acknowledging that my American background might interfere with my objectivity, I would nonetheless propose a three-part explanation.

First, the political and economic situation of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the United States acted as a centripetal force on their organizations, pushing them toward cooperation on Yugoslav lines. American Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were concentrated in the major cities of the American Midwest and to a lesser extent California. Living together in the same cities, it is not surprising that Serb, Croat, and Slovene organizations, even at the beginning of the 1920s, were generally aware of one another’s activities. Working-class activism, especially in the communist party, brought Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, along with their organizations, into dialogue. This was unlike the situation in South America, where migrants were dispersed over the countryside, or in Belgium, where the migration was so new that large fraternal unions had not yet developed organically. In short, in the United States there was the potential for a diasporic network; all they needed was an impetus to cooperate. That impetus arrived with the

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1230 Janet Aronson, “‘I Wish They Had Birthright For Adults’: The Effect of Birthright Israel on Jewish Parents Interest in Visiting Israel,” *Contemporary Jewry* 37, no. 3 (2017): 405-431.
1924 quota law, which cut off almost all South-Slavic migration from Europe. Suddenly, Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal organizations needed to merge, consolidate, and cooperate to compensate for the lack of new members coming in from Europe (see table 2 in the appendix). Indeed, over the course of the 1930s the top Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions either lost members or remained stagnant (see table 6). This demographic pressure drove the Serbian and Croatian fraternal unions to consolidate on ethnic lines. The SNPJ took matters a step further, creating an umbrella organization as a steppingstone to a Yugoslav Fraternal Union. While this ultimately proved a failure, Serb, Croat, and Slovene fraternal unions increasingly made saw the benefit of pooling resources. The children of immigrants needed to be taught patriotism as well—again, to make up for the absence of new migrants from Yugoslavia. In the 1930s, the new language schools, foreign exchange programs, and initiatives like the Yugoslav Room or Yugoslav Radio were supported by fraternal organizations to fight assimilation and ensure their organizational longevity. The legacy of this was a habit of cooperation on Yugoslav lines, independent of whether migrants saw themselves as “Yugoslavs,” a habit that manifested in political Yugoslavism during the Second World War.

The second reason the United States developed a Yugoslav movement was that Yugoslav politicians, seeing that most of the “tenth banovina” lived in the United States, concentrated their efforts there. Emigrants in the United States bore the brunt of the Yugoslav state’s efforts to censor their speech and deport their dissidents. Yugoslavia went from being something irrelevant and far away to an immediate threat against which migrants needed to mobilize. Moreover, the lure of diaspora dollars attracted opposition politicians from the Demokratska Stranka, the Croatian Peasant Party, and the Communists, all of whom also had an incentive to cooperate against Belgrade and the strain of Croatian ultranationalism represented by the Ustaša, especially
during the era of Popular Front politics. As was emphasized in the previous section, travel and travelers have powerful effects on diasporic nationalism. Coming to the United States, making speeches, and raising money, these transnational politicians mobilized more emigrants, causing them to take a greater interest in old country affairs. Moreover, their parties inserted themselves into the politics of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene self-help societies, strengthening the network of relationships between Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups and pushing them to work together to defeat fascism.

The third part of this explanation is that American prejudice against East-Europeans pushed migrants toward Yugoslavism as a way of demonstrating their American-ness. In early twentieth century America, South Slavs were “Bohunks,” second-class citizens in an Anglo-Saxon sea. The pressure to conform, to “Americanize,” created a backlash, with emigrants like Ivan Mladineo seeking to prove that they had a place in America, that their history and achievements in their new homeland were equal to, if not greater than, those of other migrant groups. In crafting this narrative, nationalists like Mladineo or Adamic realized that combining the achievements of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would create the most impressive portfolio—better to have Tesla, Bishop Baraga, and Columbus’s Croatian sailors in a single pantheon than kept separate. Moreover, this narrative was also based on the contributions of the South Slavic industrial working class, the thousands of anonymous miners, metal-workers, and construction workers, all occupations where Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes worked together rather than apart. This narrative also resonated with the United States’ cultural pluralist movement in the 1930s. Mladineo, after all, was a member of the Foreign Language Information Service, just as Adamic was a founding member of the Common Council for American Unity. Celebrating the
achievement of all of America’s ethnic groups, in turn, boosted the liberal, multicultural version of Yugoslavism that emigrants were articulating.

These three factors—closed borders, the attention of Yugoslav politicians, and a backlash against the idea of America as a “melting pot”—strengthened the network of interlocking relationships connecting Serb, Croat, and Slovene groups and gave them a common symbolic vocabulary. It was due to these circumstances, rather than any inherent virtue of the United States, that a Yugoslav diaspora formed in interwar America.

**The Tenth Banovina and the Other Nine**

Although examining the “Yugoslav diaspora” expands our understanding of diaspora and nationalism, it also leads us to a transnational interpretation of Yugoslav history. Understanding Yugoslav politics during the 1930s is difficult without looking abroad. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s attempt to create Yugoslavs involved mutually-reinforcing initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic. The patriotism of the “tenth banovina” was supposed to be a model for the other nine, and vice versa. Yugoslav legislation, like prohibitions on political dissent or the introduction of new holidays, in turn, found themselves being enforced overseas. The activities of other diasporas in the United States, like the 1930s craze for trans-Atlantic tourism, inspired Yugoslav migrants to return to their old country, which, in turn, sought to use these trips as propaganda stunts for the benefits of its own citizens. By creating Yugoslavs abroad, Yugoslavia’s government was also creating them at home.

This sleight of hand, however, depended on state control over the various channels of information—news media, travelers, and word of mouth—to preserve the illusion. Neither emigrants nor Yugoslav citizens could know that their compatriots across the Atlantic resisted the dictatorship. This, in turn, was predicated on the assumption that the diaspora was an
organic part of the nation, and as such could be subjected to the apparatus of state control that existed in the homeland. This was Yugoslavia’s primary mistake in handling “its” diaspora. As Chapter Three and Chapter Four show, enforcing this information quarantine was beyond the capabilities of a small and poor state like Yugoslavia. It may be beyond the capabilities of any contemporary state, especially in a world where the technologies of travel and telecommunications are far more advanced than in the interwar period. Even in an era without air travel or internet, banned émigré newspapers were nonetheless smuggled into Yugoslavia, just as news about brutal repression in Yugoslavia made their way through the emigrant grapevine, ending up on the pages of Zajedničar or The Native's Return. Another metaphorical hole that could not be plugged was travelers, especially opposition politicians from Yugoslavia. Look, for instance, at the examples of Svetozar Pribićević or August Košutić, whose embrace of federalism can be partially attributed to their desire to please their constituencies in North America. And during the Second World War, the Yugoslav government-in-exile was unable to maintain its monopoly on information coming out of Yugoslavia past mid-1942, despite the wartime conditions imposing an information blackout. Diasporic networks, despite their weakness vis-a-vis states, nonetheless resist state control. And by failing to take this into account, interwar Yugoslavia provoked a backlash that intensified resistance still further.

Political instability in interwar Yugoslavia also had overseas roots. As Chapter Four shows, Croatian workers in South America and Belgium were recruited overseas by Ustaša activists, and sometimes returned to Yugoslavia to carry out terrorist attacks. Those Croatian migrant workers who joined the Ustaša only became ultranationalists overseas and mainly for pragmatic reasons—the lure of unemployment insurance and the threat of violence. Since the Ustaša were most successful where emigrant civil society was weakly developed, we can see
how the Yugoslav foreign ministry’s neglect of newer migrant communities in favor of focusing on the United States had catastrophic blowback. Moreover, looking through the prism of overseas politics reveals how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia went from a marginal political party with a few thousand members in the 1930s to a political hegemon in 1945. It also explains why the HSS and the DS were willing to work with the KPJ during the transition-period after 1945. Far from being a sudden shift in fortunes brought about by the volatile situation in WWII-era Yugoslavia, we can see how the Communist Party of Yugoslavia gradually lost its pariah status in the field of émigré politics over the preceding decade. Opposition political parties like the Democratic Party or the Croatian Peasant Party found the Communist Party a willing collaborator with a coherent ideological program that could appeal to a migrant constituency that was overwhelmingly working class and was, thanks to discourses in Yugoslavia about the “emigration question,” imbued with great symbolic capital.

More generally, studying Yugoslav émigré politics suggests that political Yugoslavism was not the total failure that historians of Yugoslavia typically present it as. The conventional wisdom on interwar Yugoslavia, as presented by Dejan Djokić and Pieter Troch, argues that Alexander’s repressive and corrupt dictatorship and the regency that followed discredited the Yugoslav idea.¹²³¹ Similarly, Sabrina Ramet, based on a study of the other nine banovine, concludes that interwar Yugoslavia built neither a legitimate political system nor a sense of community linking Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The core problem was that “Serbs and Croats inhabited two different worlds.”¹²³² Part of this was geography, of course, but Serbs, Croats, (and

Slovenes) lived within separate symbolic and political worlds as well. Political life in interwar Yugoslavia was organized around ethnic parties, aligning political disagreement with ethnic cleavages. Similarly, there was no common vocabulary of national symbols to which political leaders could appeal. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes lacked a common alphabet, a common religion, a common flag, a common pantheon of famous people, and a common history.\textsuperscript{1233}

Within émigré circles in the United States, however, as I have tried to show, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes increasingly lived in the same world. They lived in the same cities. Their fraternal organizations worked together to build common Yugoslav spaces, like the Yugoslav room, Yugoslav schools, or Yugoslav radio, that also functioned as unifying symbols. A common historical imaginary emerged, based on the historical contributions of Yugoslav migrants to the United States, as well as contemporary resistance to Belgrade. Overseas, opposition to the monarchy did not weaken Yugoslavism—it strengthened it. Eventually, this manifested in a common South Slavic political lobby. While there were those that opposed Yugoslavism, such as the Serbian National Defense or the Domobran, these organizations were a definite minority. Moreover, this Yugoslav diaspora did not crumble in the face of the ethnic bloodletting within Yugoslavia during the Second World War, but disintegrated due to purely exogenous factors, namely the Second Red Scare. In short, Yugoslavism was not entirely a “failed idea,” as Dejan Djokić memorably characterized it\textsuperscript{1234}—all it needed was the right context, the “tenth banovina.” In short, it was not Yugoslavism that failed, but Yugoslavia, the other nine banovine.

\textsuperscript{1233} Ibid, 36-37
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Fond 14: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
Fond 38: Central Pressbureau of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
Fond 83: Sava Kosanović Papers
Fond 371: Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the United States—Washington D.C.
Fond 385: Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Argentina—Buenos Aires
Fond 392: Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Belgium—Brussels
Fond 414: General Consulate of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Chicago
Fond 449: General Consulate of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in New York
Fond 724: Yugoslav Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War
Fond 790: Central Party Archive of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

Croatian State Archives (HDA)

Fond 967: Savez Organizacija Iseljenika (SORIS)
Fond 1071: Emigration Commissariat
Fond 1355: Emigration Reports
Fond 1356: Repatriation Reports
Fond 1619: Emigration Museum
Fond 1990: August Košutić Papers

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Lupis-Vukić Papers
Zlatko Baloković Papers

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APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF YUGOSLAVS IN THE UNITED STATES

Note: Prior to 1900, the United States counted arrivals by citizenship, such that a Croat from Austria-Hungary would be “Austrian” rather than “Croatian.” In 1908, the United States began classifying arrivals by nationality (sort of): Serbs, Bulgarians, and Montenegrins were one category, Croats and Slovenians a second, and Dalmatians, Bosnians, and Herzegovinians a third. Ivan Mladineo’s dataset here is a compilation of these three statistics. However, it should be noted that, consequently, Bulgarians (who are not distinguished from Macedonians) are included in this count of “Yugoslavs.” Mladineo estimates the number of “Bulgarians” in the United States to be 12,000. Moreover, these statistics also do not count the children of Yugoslav migrants, who may or may not see themselves as the same nationality of their parents. Lastly, these statistics are included to provide a sense of scale, not to make a political statement (as Mladineo originally intended them).
### South Slavic Migration to the United States 1900-1930

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Source: Ivan Mladineo and Berislav Angjelinović, *Jugoslovenski Almanak* (New York: 1931)
South Slavic Migration to the United States 1900-1930, Visualized

Source: Ivan Mladineo and Berislav Angjelinović, *Jugoslovenski Almanak* (New York: 1931)
South Slavic Population by State, 1930

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Source: Ivan Mladineo and Berislav Angjelinović, Jugoslovenski Almanak (New York: 1931)
South Slavic Population by State, 1930, Mapped

Source: Ivan Mladineo and Berislav Angjelinović, Jugoslovenski Almanak (New York: 1931)
### Top 14 South Slavic Mutual Benefit Organizations in the United States, 1931

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**Key:**

- **HBZ** – *Hrvatska Bratska Zajednica* (Croatian Fraternal Union)
- **SNPJ** – *Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota* (Slovene National Benefit Society)
- **KSKJ** – *Kransko-Slovenska Katoliška Jednota* (Carniolan Slovene Catholic Union)
- **SNS** – *Srpski Narodni Savez* (Serbian National Union)
- **JSKJ** – *Jugoslovanska Katoliška Jednota* (Yugoslav Catholic Union)
- **SSPZ** – *Slovenska Svobodomislena Podporna Jednota* (Slovene Freethinker Benefit Society)
- **SDZ** – *Slovenska Dobrodelna Zveza* (Slovene Charitable Society)
- **HKZ** – *Hrvatska Katoliška Zajednica* (Croatian Catholic Union)
- **ZSZ** – *Zapadna Slovanska Zveza* (Western Slavic Society)
- **JPSZ** – *Jugoslovanska Podporna Zveza “Sloga”* (Yugoslav Benefit Union “Unity”)
- **DSD** – *Družba Svete Družine* (Society of the Holy Family)
- **SHZ** – *Slovensko Hrvatska Zveza* (Slovene Croatian Union)
- **HSP** – *Hrvatska Sveza na Pacifi* (Croatian Union on the Pacific)
- **SPSJ** – *Srpski Potporni Savez “Jedinstvo”* (Serbian Benefit Society “Unity”)

**Source:** Ivan Mladineo and Berislav Angjelinović, *Jugoslovenski Almanak* (New York: 1931)
## Top 14 South Slavic Mutual Benefit Societies in the United States, 1937

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Acronym</th>
<th>Total Lodges</th>
<th>Adult Members</th>
<th>Youth Members</th>
<th>Total Members</th>
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**Key:** All acronyms are the same. Green indicates a positive change since 1931, red indicates a decline, black indicates no substantial shift.

**Source:** Ivan Mladineo, ed. *Narodni Adresar Hrvata-Slovenaca-Srba* (New York: 1937)