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WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BELONG? AN ANALYSIS OF MIGRANT INTEGRATION
POLICIES IN GERMANY, SPAIN, AND HUNGARY

BY

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

The number of migrants in the European Union (EU) has grown significantly since 2015. One of the main issues to consider is how these migrants are integrated into EU Member States. Although some EU policies are created at the supranational level, when it comes to issues like migration, states are allowed to exercise a generous amount of sovereignty. Although the EU does encourage migrant integration, the degree to which migrants are able to integrate socially, economically, and culturally into their host societies varies within and between Member States. This research project examines the causes of migrant integration and determines if and how the Europeanization of migration policies plays a role.

The central questions guiding this thesis are: How does the Europeanization of migration policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? Additionally, how do national level policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? The literature on migrant integration suggests that the power of the EU is limited related to migration policy. Based on these themes of limited EU competences, I argue that national policy provisions will play a greater role in migrant integration than Europeanization.

Using case studies in Germany, Spain, and Hungary, these research questions are answered through an examination of Europeanization and migrant integration data. Transposition deficit scores, which measure how countries adapt legislation to meet the standards outlined in EU directives, are used to determine the extent of Europeanization in EU Member States. Additionally, data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is used to conclude the degree of migrant integration in several policy areas at the national level, including health, education, and labor data. These policies and national legislation from each of these three nations help determine the main cause of migrant integration.

Furthermore, this thesis project contributes to debates in the literature about European integration and migrant integration. My findings support the multi-level governance approach as supranational actors like EU institutions work with national actors like EU Member States and civil society institutions to create and implement policies at the EU and national levels. I found that while national actors do have a more important role in migrant integration, Europeanization may have a limited role in influencing common standards that Member States utilize when developing national policy provisions. Additionally, the multi-level governance approach better explains the different levels of governance that play roles in creating migration policies at the supranational, national, regional and local levels. The results of this study also show that policies developed at the national level do indeed contribute more to migrant integration than levels of Europeanization. These findings contribute to the literature on migration by supporting the argument that Member States have more control over migration policies than supranational actors.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The migration crisis dominated headlines across the world in 2015 when the Syrian civil war intensified and caused thousands of migrants to flee the country. This was the catalyst for the European migration crisis. These migrants sought refuge mainly in the neighboring countries of Syria and the Member States of the European Union (EU). Because of the accessibility of the Mediterranean Sea, a high number of migrants entered the borders of coastal states like Spain, Greece, and Italy. As a result of this migration crisis, attention became focused on migration policies within the EU.

Although the European Union does encourage migrant integration, the degree to which migrants are able to integrate socially, economically, and culturally into their host societies varies within and between Member States. Member States are given a generous amount of sovereignty in regard to migration issues. As a result, there are states like Germany, which has openly accepted a large number of refugees, and Member States like Hungary, which has openly opposed migration. The policies formed in Member States affect how migrants are integrated. This thesis examines the roles of Europeanization and national policies on migrant integration.

The central questions guiding this thesis are: How does the Europeanization of migration policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? Additionally, how do national level policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? Through three case studies in Germany, Spain, and Hungary this research question is answered. Transposition deficit scores, which measure how countries adapt legislation to meet the standards outlined in EU directives, are used to determine the extent of Europeanization in EU Member States. Additionally, data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is used to determine the degree of migrant integration in several policy areas at the national level including health,

education, and labor policies. The case studies include the transposition deficit scores, MIPEX data, and national policies from each of the countries to determine the main cause of migrant integration. Because the literature emphasizes the EU's lack of power in migration policy, I argue that national policies play a greater role in migrant integration than Europeanization.

The results of this study show that policies developed at the national level do indeed contribute more to migrant integration than levels of Europeanization. These findings contribute to the literature on migration by supporting the argument that Member States have more control over migration policies than supranational actors. While Member States must follow EU legislation, there is not specific legislation on migrant integration that must be applied in each Member State. Each nation is free to develop their own policies on migrant integration and these policies do not have to be harmonized.

This thesis also contributes to the literature on European integration theories by showing the significance of the multi-level governance approach and its relevance to Europeanization. The main debate over European integration is between intergovernmentalist scholars and multi-level governance scholars. Intergovernmentalists believe that national actors have the greatest influence over integration policies, while multi-governance scholars believe that European integration has been possible through the coordination of a variety of actors with different levels of power. I find that while national actors do have a more important role in migrant integration, Europeanization may have a limited role in influencing common standards that Member States may choose to utilize when developing national policy provisions. Additionally, the multi-level governance approach better explains the different levels of governance that create and enforce migration policies at the supranational, national, regional and local levels. Member States do fall under the governance of the European Union but develop their own governance structures in

relation to migration and migrant integration. Within states, policies that affect migrant integration may vary at the national and regional levels. Thus, this multi-tiered structure is best explained by multi-level governance rather than the intergovernmentalist approach. However, before I could fully understand the literature on Europeanization and migrant integration, I first had to understand the history and background of the EU and its migration policies.

CHAPTER 2: MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE EU

HISTORY OF MIGRATION POLICY IN THE EU

Originally, migration policy was considered to be a part of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar of European Union policies. The JHA policy area of the EU focused on four main issues: immigration, asylum, along with police and judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters. The Treaty of Maastricht created this third pillar for Justice and Home Affairs that was incorporated in 1993. The pillars ranged from a more supranational pillar for the European Communities, to Common Foreign and Security Policy, and to the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. There was initial debate over whether JHA should be a part of the first pillar as a supranational, European Community issue or if it should be an intergovernmental issue (Ucarer, 2020). With this new pillar creation, the European Commission was marginalized in the decision-making process and the key decision making for JHA went to the JHA Council.

The Amsterdam Treaty replaced the Treaty of Maastricht and changes were made to the co-decision procedures between EU institutions. Debate ensued with the development of the Amsterdam Treaty and proposals were created to give greater roles to the Commission, European Parliament (EP), and Court of Justice. Within this policy area, there was also a shift from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism as a result of these EU institutions gaining more power.

With the Amsterdam Treaty, migration was transferred to the first pillar, while police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained in the third pillar (Lavenex, 2015). This means that migration was deemed a more supranational issue that should be dealt with at both the national and supranational levels. With the movement of migration to a more supranational level, the JHA Council was given a greater role and was able to try to adopt policies to ensure the free

movement of people within the EU while also keeping external security measures in place. Through this treaty, the Council also received a more dominant position in decision making. The Commission would also gain the right to initiate policy, while the EP gained more of a voice through the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and could be consulted for the decision-making procedure. The EU Court of Justice also was allowed to make preliminary rulings in policy areas within the first pillar.

The Amsterdam Treaty reforms also left criminal matters in the third pillar, including issues like combating crime, terrorism, human, drug, and weapons trafficking, corruption and fraud (Ucarer, 2020, p. 327). However, the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009 abolished the pillar structure and extended the Ordinary Legislative Procedure so that more EU institutions like the Council have a role in decision making. The Treaty of Lisbon also established the creation of an Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) as the second goal of the EU (Lavenex, 2015). Now immigration policies fall under this AFSJ, which aims to ensure security while also promoting the protection of citizens' rights and free movement within the EU.

WHO DOES WHAT TODAY?

The roles of EU institutions and Member States have changed over time. When it comes to AFSJ and migration policy, the European Commission is still known as the executive wing of the EU. The Commission proposes and initiates legislation and implements the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The JHA Council, however, is a formation of the Council of the EU that has a hierarchical structure of policy making with four decision making layers (Lavenex, 2015). The JHA Council helps develop cooperation and common policies on different issues and is made up of ministers from each EU Member State (Council of

the EU, 2019). The Commission is specifically designated as the coordinator of policy proposals for asylum (Ucarer, 2020). Furthermore, the Commission is also responsible for managing EU policies and works with the Court of Justice to ensure that EU law is applied in the EU Member States (European Union, 2019)

The EU decision making process is a collective effort known as the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). This procedure requires that the European Parliament and the Council of the EU approve legislation that is proposed by the Commission. The OLP also applies to policies on both irregular and regular immigration (European Parliament, 2019). The European Parliament and the Council review the proposals created by the Commission and propose amendments. When it comes to migration policy, the Commission has an agenda on how to handle migration issues and properly respond (European Commission, 2018a).

Additionally, the Commission has proposed making a European Asylum Support Office, which would be a European agency with certain powers in crises and would allocate migrants among Member States based on quotas. The Commission has also created an action plan that includes a policy framework and steps to have Member States integrate migrants (European Parliament, 2019).

Within migration policy, the role of national parliaments has been strengthened and parliaments can evaluate the work of AFSJ bodies and agencies. Member States also exercise sovereignty when it comes to migration policy and can coordinate cooperation regarding the integration of migrants (Lavenex, 2015). For instance, the EU creates directives on migration that establish guidelines and standards that EU Member States must follow, but it is up to the individual Member States to develop and transpose these directives in a way that meets the standards but also fulfills the duties of each nation state. It is harder for the EU to have more

competence in this area because states are more reluctant to surrender power over their own border controls. Member States have the ability to determine how many people are admitted into their country, however the EU establishes the guidelines that allow for legal migration and legal residence. When it comes to migrant integration, the EU can provide support and incentives for Member States to provide migrant integration measures, but there is no EU law that requires complete harmonization of national laws on migrant integration (European Parliament, 2019). Despite the freedom that Member States may have in the migration policy area, Member States must still follow EU Regulations on migration policies.

Regulations are laws that are directly binding in all Member States directly and do not need to be passed into national law by the Member States. A directive is a law that binds Member States to achieve some type of objective (European Commission, 2020b). Usually, these directives must be transposed into national law to become effective. When it comes to migration policies, there is a set of legally binding common standards on how to treat migrants and asylum seekers, but no one overarching policy or Regulation for migration that much be applied equally in each Member State.

The OLP is the most common procedure for adopting EU legislation. Under this procedure, the Commission makes a proposal, which must be adopted by both the Parliament and the Council. Generally, Member States are consulted for input on legislation during the co-decision procedure. After the proposal is received, the first reading begins. During this first reading, Member States examine the legislation in detail with the Council (European Commission, 2020b). The Commission is also in constant dialogue with national parliaments and if “certain conditions are met” the Commission may review a proposal based on the national parliament’s opinions and publicly explain whether the proposal will be maintained, amended, or

withdrawn (European Commission, 2020b). The national parliaments of the Member States also have the “right to express their concerns in relation to draft legislative acts” (European Commission, 2020b).

Specifically, within the AFSJ, national parliaments have been given a new role. “National parliaments now have eight weeks in which to examine any given legislative proposal in the light of the subsidiarity principle; until that period has expired, no decision can be taken at EU level on that proposal” (European Parliament, 2018). Essentially, without feedback from national parliaments, legislative proposals regarding migration will not be passed. Additionally, “the Lisbon Treaty also made it clear that the EU shares competence in this field with the Member States, in particular as regards the number of migrants allowed to enter a Member State to seek work” (European Parliament, 2019). Ultimately, the EU institutions and national governments work together to monitor migration. The EU determines the conditions that govern entry into and legal residence in EU Member States, including circumstances for family reunification and for third country nationals. Member States have the right to determine the “volumes of admission for people coming from third countries to seek work” (European Parliament, 2019). When it comes to migration and asylum, the Commission has developed a proposal to which Member States have agreed to relocate asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other EU countries (European Commission, 2020b). Various Council directives such as Directive 2003/86 set out provisions for migrant integration and family reunification. However, it is up to the individual Member States on how to implement these directives and to decide on whether or not to allow for resident cards.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF MIGRATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The term migrant can be very confusing, especially when discussing migration into and within the European Union. The EU describes migrants as both “regular” and “irregular.”

Regular migrants are migrants who have entered the EU legally or are establishing their usual residence in the territory of an EU Member State, or have previously been a resident of another EU Member State (European Commission, 2016). An irregular migrant in the EU context is a third country national (or someone who is not an EU citizen) who does not have proper legal documentation to enter the Schengen area (European Commission, 2016c). Irregular migrants can include refugees, victims of human trafficking, and unaccompanied migrant children.

In recent years, when the term migrant is used in the media or literature, it often refers to refugees and asylum seekers who wish to enter the EU. However, after examining the descriptions of migrants in the literature, there actually seems to be four main types of migrants in the European Union: refugees/asylum seekers, economic migrants, internal migrants, and victims of human trafficking. Refugees are migrants who arrive in the EU after fleeing their own country because of violence or fear of persecution. Economic migrants are those who come to the European Union in search of a job or better economic or educational opportunities (European Commission, 2016). Internal migrants are citizens of the European Union that migrate to other EU Member States for various reasons. These internal migrants are also considered regular migrants. Victims of trafficking are often brought into Europe through organized crime networks. There are different levels of decision making and policies for each type of migrant. These policies may be under the supranational influence of the EU or may have more weight at the national level. The influence of EU institutions on policy and the nationalization of these policies are examples of the effects of Europeanization. The better that Member States are able

to implement legal frameworks created by EU institutions into their own national policies, the greater the indication of Europeanization. Because the EU does have a framework for migrant integration, countries that utilize this framework in their national policies will show how Europeanization can play a role in migrant integration.

Refugee/Asylum Procedures

Refugees are the type of migrants that are most recognized in the media around the world. The migrants that flooded into the European Union during the Syrian refugee crisis attracted much attention to the EU and its Member States' migration policies. The decision making for refugees takes place by the European Union at the supranational level because the EU makes policies to manage migrants as they come into the EU. For instance, asylum seekers are subject to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) which provides standards for asylum and placement of refugees. The CEAS tries to ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally and fairly and aims to reduce the differences between Member States "on the basis of binding legislation" (European Commission, 2016). There are three pillars that support the development of the CEAS: "bringing more harmonization to standards of protection by further aligning the EU States' asylum legislation; effective and well-supported practical cooperation; increased solidarity and sense of responsibility among EU states, and between EU and non-EU countries" (European Commission, 2016a). However, new EU rules have been created under CEAS to revise asylum directives, including the Dublin Regulation.

The Dublin Regulation is the main EU legislation on asylum and establishes which Member State is responsible for the examination of an asylum application. The Dublin Convention first came into force in 1997 and has been replaced with two Council Regulations.

The most recent Dublin Regulation (Dublin III Regulation No. 604/2013) entered into force in July 2013 and includes improvements to the Dublin procedure. The current Dublin Regulation requires migrants to apply for asylum in the first EU country in which they arrive (Murray & Longo, 2018).

Article seven of the third Chapter of the Dublin Regulation states the criteria for determining which Member State is responsible for asylum applications. According to this article, Member State responsibility shall be determined on the basis of the situation obtaining when the applicant first lodged his or her application for international protection with a Member State” (European Union, 2013). There are other contributing factors that determine which Member States are responsible for asylum applications. Member States must consider evidence regarding family members, relatives or any other family relations of each applicant, as long as this evidence is provided before another Member State “accepts the request to take charge or take back the person concerned...and that the previous applications for international protection of the applicant have not yet been the subject of a first decision regarding the substance” (European Union, 2013).

Member States must also make further considerations for families when processing an asylum application. For instance, when an applicant is an unaccompanied minor, the Member State responsible will be where a family member or sibling of the minor is legally present as long as it is in the best interests of the minor. Other considerations include visas and residence documents. If an applicant has a valid residence document, the Member State which issued the document shall be responsible for examining the asylum application. If an applicant “has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea, or air having come from a third

country, the Member State thus entered shall be responsible for examining the application for international protection” (European Union, 2013).

Because the current Common European Asylum System’s flaws were exposed during the recent migrant crisis, the Commission has attempted to create some revisions. The Commission is “proposing to revise and replace the current asylum instruments to better manage migration flows and offer adequate protection to those in need, in line with the approach set out in the European Agenda” (European Commission, 2016b). In May 2016, the Commission presented a draft of a proposal to make the Dublin System more transparent and effective, and also provide a mechanism to handle disproportionate pressure on Member States’ asylum systems, which would be called the Dublin IV Regulation (European Commission, 2016b).

Similarly, Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council is an international protection directive that focuses on the standards of living conditions for asylum seekers and conditions for applicants (European Parliament, 2013). This directive aims to ensure that the human rights of asylum seekers in the EU are respected (Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2013). This Directive also applies to applicants and their families for international protection. Asylum seekers should have access to housing, food, clothes, financial allowances, a decent standard of living, and medical and psychological care. Under this Directive, EU countries should also guarantee that applicants can access employment within nine months and education for those under the age of eighteen.

As seen through the Dublin Regulation, family reunification plays a large role in developing migration policies. There is an EU Directive that explicitly focuses on family reunification. The Family Reunification Directive applies to family migration sponsored by third country nationals. Directive 2004/83/EC represents EU Community legislation on free

movements and allows migration sponsored by migrants already in the EU (Block & Bonjour, 2013, p. 205). Sponsors of migrants are required to provide housing and must fulfill an income requirement. Therefore, refugees and asylum seekers and their fates are determined by both supranational EU institutional policies and Member States.

Legal Framework for Economic and Internal Migrants

Although asylum seekers may be more subject to EU policies, economic migrants from third countries are subject to the policies of individual Member States. For example, economic migrants may need to apply for a visa to work in the state in which they are trying to live. Each Member State has its own policies for economic migrants and what someone would need to do in order to work there. These policies not only vary from country to country but also vary based on the individual migrants and their background, as well as the conditions of entry into the country. For the purpose of this study, economic migrants refer to non-EU nationals who cross into the EU to work or live because of better economic or educational opportunities. These non-EU nationals will have to undergo a different process to work in different Member States and may have to apply for a specific visa or work permit. While EU law may help a migrant enter the EU, it is still up to the Member State to decide who is able to work in their country.

Visas

Certain non-EU nationals are required to have visas depending on their country of origin. An EU Regulation (2018/1806) from December 18, 2018 lists non-EU countries whose nationals must have a visa when entering the European Union and those whose nationals do not need a visa. The Regulation does allow for some EU countries to have exceptions for the visa

requirement for certain “categories of persons” such as those who hold diplomatic or service passports, civilian air and sea crews, school groups, those with local traffic permits, and exemptions for refugees and stateless persons who reside in the EU and hold a travel document from their origin country (Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2018). A few of the countries whose citizens must carry a visa include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, and Bahrain. Other countries such as Kosovo and the Palestinian Authority are not recognized as states by at least one Member State. There are also countries that have citizens that are exempt from having a visa when crossing the external borders for stays of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period. Some of these countries are North Macedonia, Andorra, the United Arab Emirates, Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Georgia, Israel, South Korea, Monaco, Moldova, Montenegro, Mexico, Serbia, San Marino, Ukraine, and the United States (Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2018). Visa policies are also legally binding through EU Regulation 2018/1806. This type of policy is considered Europeanized because it is created at the EU level and every Member State must follow it. This is an example of top down Europeanization.

Migration for Education and Research

Directive (EU) 2016/801 discusses the “entry and residence conditions for non-EU nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing” (European Union, 2016a). EU Member States themselves may decide to apply EU level rules to non-EU nationals wishing to come to the EU for one of the purposes outlined above. To be admitted to an EU Member State, applicants must

have a valid travel document for the duration of their intended stay in the EU, evidence of resources to cover subsistence and the costs of return travel, and health insurance (European Union, 2016).

These non-EU nationals are also entitled to certain rights, including the right to be treated the same as EU citizens. “This means, for example, that researchers--except in cases where EU countries can apply exceptions--are entitled to be treated on an equal footing with EU citizens” (European Union, 2016). Students and researchers have the right to stay for at least nine months after finishing their studies so that they can look for work or start a business. Additionally, family members of researchers are allowed to join them under specific conditions.

Directive 2003/109/EC focuses on the status of non-EU nationals who are long-term residents. The Directive aims to set out the terms and conditions for granting (and withdrawing) long term residence to non-EU citizens who are legally living in the EU for at least 5 years (European Union, 2016b). To obtain long-term resident status, non-EU citizens must have lived continuously and legally in an EU country for five years. These non-EU nationals must prove they have the economic resources to support themselves and their family and they must have sickness insurance. Authorities may refuse to grant resident status for public policy or public security reasons but cannot grant this status because of economic reasons. Applicants who are successful are given a residence permit that is valid for at least five years and is automatically renewable. Long-term residents may lose their status if they have acquired it by fraud, are considered a threat to public policy or security, or leave the EU for twelve consecutive months. Long-term residents enjoy equal treatment with country nationals when it comes to employment, education, social security, taxation, and freedom of association. In certain cases, EU Member States may restrict this equal treatment. This legislation does not apply to certain categories of

non-EU nationals, such as students or those who work as au pairs or seasonal workers (European Union, 2016).

Internal Migrant Procedures

For internal migrants, or EU citizens who migrate to other EU Member States to work or live, EU policies allow for citizens to move freely between Member States. The EU Commission states that “the freedom to move to another EU country to work without a work permit is a right for EU nationals” (European Union, 2019). Free movement of workers is one of the four freedoms of the EU and a fundamental right of the EU. EU citizens “are entitled to: look for a job in another EU country, work there without needing a work permit, reside there for that purpose, stay there even after employment has finished, and enjoy equal treatment with nationals in access to employment, working conditions, and all other social and tax advantages” (European Commission, 2020a). The literature shows that the main beneficiaries of the free movement are EU citizens who are actively seeking jobs (Ruhs, 2017). EU citizens also have further rights like the ability to access welfare across borders (Martinsen et al., 2019). Additionally, the “family members of EU nationals working in another EU country are entitled to reside and work in that country (regardless of their nationality) and their children have the right to be educated there” (Ruhs, 2017, p. 24). Therefore, the freedom of movement that has been made possible through the EU’s supranational authority prioritizes giving rights to internal migrants who are EU citizens.

Procedures for Victims of Human Trafficking

Decisions regarding the fight against human trafficking are made at the supranational level. Human trafficking is regarded as both a criminal and human rights issue and the EU tries to take a more holistic approach when trying to combat human trafficking. The EU Council is heavily involved with battling human trafficking. The EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (the FD) and the Council Directive on Short-term Residence Permits are two driving instruments of the fight against trafficking (Krieg, 2009). Although there are issues with implementing cooperation to combat trafficking at the Member State level and even the judicial level, human trafficking is addressed under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice through the prevention and combating of crime through judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Krieg, 2009).

The Framework Decision not only outlines that the defined acts be punished by criminal law in all Member States, but also ensures that Member States hold someone liable for the human trafficking offenses. The FD is binding upon Member States and requires Member States to take appropriate actions and enforce criminal penalties for human trafficking crimes (Krieg, 2009). Thus, there are laws against human trafficking and protocols developed at the supranational level by EU institutions that are supposed to be enforced by Member States. Consequently, human trafficking victims who are brought into the EU are therefore under the decision-making procedures of the European Union.

For this study, the term migrant will refer to non-EU nationals such as asylum seekers, refugees, and economic migrants and how they are integrated within the European Union. As human trafficking victims do not willingly enter the EU, they will not be the main focus of the study.

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Within the debate surrounding migration and integration policies, there are two main arguments. One of these perspectives is liberal intergovernmentalism, which emphasizes the importance of Member States as the main actors in making EU policies. The other main theoretical approach is multilevel governance, which considers that there are different sets of actors (local governments, national governments, supranational institutions) located within different layers of governance within the European Union.

Andrew Moravcsik is one of the most prominent liberal intergovernmentalists who is often cited in other scholars' work on intergovernmentalism. He argues that when it comes to policy, decision making agreements between national governments are more effective because bargaining is more issue specific and balances out benefits among governments. The main argument of Moravcsik's book, *The Choice for Europe* is that "European integration can be best explained by a series of rational choices made by national leaders" (1998, p. 18).

Moravcsik (1998) explains that understanding national preferences is the first step to understanding outcomes of international negotiation. He argues that the literature on European integration accounts for national preferences in two broad categories: geopolitical interests and economic interests. Geopolitical interests "reflect perceived threats to national sovereignty or territorial integrity" while economic interests reflect the imperatives induced by interdependence and show the opportunities for "profitable cross-border trade and capital movements" (p. 26). The central prediction of this geopolitical approach is that "when economic integration is perceived to generate positive geopolitical externalities, governments tend to favor integration"

(Moravcsik, 1998, p. 29). However, when integration is perceived to create negative geopolitical externalities, governments are more likely to oppose integration.

Moravcsik goes on to explain what he calls the supranational and intergovernmental bargaining theories. The supranational bargaining theory maintains that “transaction costs are high relative to the gains from agreement for all actors except supranational officials” (p. 52). The intergovernmentalist theory assumes that transaction costs are low “and therefore the pattern of state preferences and power is the decisive determinant of specific agreements” (pp. 52-53). Many studies argue that supranational leadership is necessary for integration, but they all nearly demonstrate that while supranational actors attempt to propose initiatives, mediate between governments, and mobilize social groups, they do not show that supranational actors were actually essential actors to integration processes (p. 53).

Furthermore, Moravcsik explains why he believes the intergovernmentalist approach is strongest and how intergovernmentalism played a fundamental role in the establishment of the European Community. “The intergovernmental explanation focuses not on the availability of information and the intervention of supranational entrepreneurs but on the issue-specific distribution of bargaining power, which in turn reflects the nature and intensity of state preferences” (p. 60).

Moravcsik argues that historically, European integration was a series of adaptations by national leaders that developed from an interdependent world economy, the relative power of states, and the potential for international institutions to help the credibility of interstate engagements (p. 472). He asserts that five of the most important negotiations in European Community history including the Treaty of Rome, Common Agricultural Policy, the European Monetary System, the Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty, support his argument.

Generally, governments appeared to be better informed than supranational actors when it came to integration. “Though they consistently acted as policy initiators, mediators, and mobilizers, Commission officials and Parliamentarians increased the efficiency of only one agreement, the Single European Act; they had no impact on the distribution of gains” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 479).

The prominent EU integration theorist Ben Rosamond (2000) also discusses intergovernmentalism. He explains that intergovernmentalist scholars agree that national governments and state actors are central actors to the development of the EU (p. 131). The politics *within* nation states are fundamental when trying to understand the politics *among* states (p. 135). “It follows that in order to understand the bargaining that occurs between governments at the European level, we need to attend to the domestic roots of the state preferences which are negotiated in those bargains” (Rosamond, 2000, p. 135). National leaders are fundamental actors within the EU. The European Council consists of the heads of the state or government of the EU Member States. The Council of the European Union represents the governments of the Member States. Although Member States surrender some of their sovereignty to EU institutions, these institutions are able to thrive because of the Member States and their leadership. Rosamond (2000, p. 143) further elaborates that “states benefit from and use the institutional environment of the EU for purposes of domestic legitimation and the pursuit of preferences.”

Additionally, he explains that, according to intergovernmentalists, Member States are the ones who set the boundaries within which supranational institutions operate (Rosamond, 2000, p. 143). One of the important functions of states is the role they play in intergovernmental bargaining where governments are seeking to advance their positions, secure their own preferences, and gain compliance from other governments (p. 144).

However, Rosamond also critiques elements of intergovernmentalism when examining the EU. The European Union is not a state and does not function like one. The multi-level governance position challenges intergovernmentalism and many scholars argue that intergovernmentalism is limited because it may only explain intergovernmental bargains and not how the EU functions as an entity with different layers of governing bodies (Rosamond, 2000, p. 153).

Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, the two most renowned multi-level governance scholars, argue that multi-level governance, not just the actions of individual states or supranational institutions, allow EU integration to work and create effective policies. They refer to intergovernmentalism as the state centric model, which places states and their governments as the ultimate decision makers when determining policies (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, 1996). Within this view, policies are created to reflect the best interests of Members State's executive powers and supranational institutions which exist to aid states. These policies follow the directions that states determine. "The state-centric model does not maintain that policy-making is determined by state executives in every detail, only that the overall direction of policy-making is consistent with state control" (p. 345).

With this viewpoint, these scholars hold that those who argue that integration is fueled by intergovernmentalism are wrong because "individual state sovereignty is diluted in the EU by collective decision-making among national governments and by the autonomous role of the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Court of Justice" (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996). Essentially, while nation states do have power within the European Union, they are not the sole actors, and may actually lose power to supranational institutions. In their multi-level governance model, instead of decisions being monopolized by state executives,

the decision-making capabilities are shared by different actors at different levels. (Marks, et al., 1996, p. 346). The EU supranational institutions have their own independent roles in the decision-making process that are not just reflective of their role in aiding state executives. “States are an integral and powerful part of the EU, but they no longer provide the sole interface between supranational and subnational arenas, and they share, rather than monopolize, control over many activities that take place in their respective territories” (Marks, et al., 1996, p. 347).

In their article in the *American Political Science Review*, Hooghe and Marks (2003) discuss different types of multi-level governance. They begin by arguing why multi-level governance may be more effective than more centralized policies. Centralized policies may impose one single policy that does not account for differences in the needs for regional and local political systems (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). With multi-level governance, policy variations that arise at the local and regional levels are taken into consideration and “jurisdictions can be custom designed with such variation in mind” (p. 263). Hooghe and Marks identify two types of governance: type I and type II. “One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions” (p. 233).

Type I governance “describes jurisdictions at a limited number of levels”, meaning that it is a hierarchical network of governance with nonintersecting power distributed at the subnational, national, and supranational levels (p. 236). These jurisdictions bundle together multiple functions that include an assortment of policy responsibilities, including a court system and representative institutions. However, in type I governance, there is “one and only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale (p. 236). Conversely, Type II governance is a mixture of polycentric authorities with different overlapping jurisdictions that work at many

different territorial levels. The ways in which these specialized jurisdictions operate varies and independent jurisdictions have different functions, “they tend to be lean and flexible—they come and go as demands for governance change” (p. 236).

Both types of multilevel governance are seen throughout the Europe. For instance, Type I multi-level governance is characterized by nonintersecting memberships. This means that membership is territorial, “as in national states, regional, and local governments, but it can also be communal” (p. 237). These jurisdictions and its memberships have boundaries and do not intersect. This principle is seen through the European Union itself, which encompasses national states. Each Member State has its own jurisdiction that does not overlap with another. However, specific EU states may have different governance structures. Type II governance is often seen at the local level where the public sector can be composed of different service industries. For issues like local public services, jurisdictions can be comprised of regional government leaders, regional parliamentary representatives, city mayors, local authorities, etc. Because the EU is comprised of many different actors at the international, national, regional, and local levels, multi-level governance is the best approach when examining European integration.

Other multilevel governance scholars make similar arguments. Nadalutti (2013) discusses the idea that those who have a multi-level understanding of governance argue that intergovernmentalists do not consider the importance of the distribution of power in the EU. This distribution of power can lead to more autonomy for both state and non-state EU actors (p. 756). In her own work, Nadalutti refers to Hooghe and Marks and their Type I and II multi-level governance models. However, she does mention that the political alliances between all of these different actors and the various types of governance described in these models still need to be studied further. Nadalutti wants to use her study to determine if EU institutions and subnational

actors are building an alliance that helps push multi-level governance through EU Regulations (Nadalutti, 2013, p. 757). The analysis for Nadalutti's study shows that sub-national actors have been able to mobilize effectively around the legislation for an EU Regulation at the supranational level through lobbying a variety of associations and bodies, ranging from the EU Committee of the Regions, the Association of European Border Regions (p. 768).

Similarly, Bisong (2019) argues that multi-level governance plays a role in migration governance. She uses the multi-level governance approach to explain how different levels of governance determine inter-institutional relationships within the EU and even have contributed to the European Union's relationship with other international agencies. More specifically, her article explores multi-level governance through power sharing between the EU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Member States of both organizations (Bisong, 2019, p. 1295). Multi-level governance "is manifested in a number of exchanges between subnational and transnational institutions, seemingly bypassing the State" (Bisong, 2019, p. 1297).

Thus, Bisong contends that other countries and regions have taken the EU's model of multilevel governance and used it to develop their own regional economic and political cooperation networks and multi-level institutions. The formal and informal interactions between the EU and ECOWAS Member States contributes to blurring levels of migration governance. However, Member States and the Commissions of both the EU and ECOWAS play various roles in maintaining this governance, thereby proving that the multi-level governance framework is important for understanding how institutions like the European Union function.

In terms of policy making in the European Union, multi-level governance scholars argue that for the intergovernmentalist argument to stand true, there should be evidence of state

executive dominance in decision making. National governments could use their voices on the European Council and the Council of Ministers to exert their influence on other EU institutions. However, if the multi-level governance model is stronger, then the European Council and Council of the EU would show that they share the decision-making authority with the supranational institutions of the EU. To explain the role that institutions play in forming the behavior of political actors in Europe, Hooghe, Marks, and Blank break down the policy making process into four phases: policy initiation, decision-making, implementation and adjudication (Marks et al., 1996).

The European Commission is the EU institution with the power to initiate and draft legislation. While the Commission solely has the power to initiate legislation, it is often influenced by other actors. The Council has used soft law to influence the Commission by ratifying opinions, resolutions, and agreements and outside interest groups have also become more involved in the decision-making process. The Commission does take the input of interest groups in the legislative process, but the Commission may have limited powers when there are internal divisions. If members cannot come to an agreement, then a policy cannot be recommended.

At one time, the Council of Ministers was said to be the main legislative body of the European Union. The Council of Ministers is made up of Member State executives. Today, those who support the intergovernmentalist approach argue that state executives maintain control in the decision-making process because they are able to maintain sovereignty and influence supranational institutions in national executives' favor. However, the legislative power of the European Parliament prevents states from having this control. Qualified majority voting helps prevent state executives from controlling decision making. Collective state control that was

exercised through the Council has dwindled because of the growing role of the European Parliament. The Maastricht Treaty helped to establish more of a balance between the Council, the Parliament and Commission during the legislative process. The Council cannot make legislative decisions without the support of at least one of the other two institutions unless it is unanimous (Marks, et al., 1996, p. 364). Thus, governance in the EU is a complex system made up of various levels and actors. This multi-level governance approach is important when determining if and how Europeanization plays a role in the development of migrant integration policies at different levels within the EU.

EUROPEANIZATION-WHAT IS IT AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

Europeanization is a term that refers to the influence of the EU on policies (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003). Historically, it has been used to describe the homogenization of policies and institutions across the EU, but also of social norms, values, behavior, and cultural beliefs. Europeanization can refer to “national changes towards European standards and compliance with a supranational entity or relates to the socio-structural foundations of European integration and its societal consequences” (Carlson et al., 2018). Furthermore, the idea of Europeanization also makes sense in the context of multi-level governance. Multi-level governance emphasizes the role of various actors within the EU and how power is transferred between them.

In more modern times, the ‘Europe’ in Europeanization has referred to mainly Western European influence. In fact, the term Europeanization has been attributed with the transition to democracy in areas like central Europe (Featherstone, 2003, p. 8). Furthermore, Europeanization “today is most often associated with domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership” (Featherstone, 2003, pp. 6–7).

Europeanization is often referenced in relation to regional integration and how it affects different actors and institutions of the EU. Europeanization is “inherently an asymmetric process” and the impact of it varies from country to country, institution to institution, and the national to the supranational (Featherstone, 2003, p. 4). Because its impact varies, it is important to examine Europeanization’s impact on national policies and how it affects how these policies are implemented among EU Member States.

There are further ways to discuss and define Europeanization. For instance, top down Europeanization refers to the way that the EU transfers policies to the Member States. Scholars like Mathieu (2016) argue that Europeanization initially was used to refer to institution building at the EU level and is now used to refer to the process through which institutions at the EU level affect Member States (p. 27). Top down Europeanization has become the most prominent conceptualization of Europeanization as scholars continually examine the effects of EU institutions and policies on Member States (Mathieu, 2016). Van Wolleghem (2019) argues that EU institutions influence the way that policies are implemented at the national level. Jordan (2003) agrees, stating that the “EU has also transformed national policy” (p. 262). The scholarship suggests that while national administration structures like departments, parliaments, and implementing agencies can resist Europeanizing pressures, national laws and policies have still been deeply Europeanized (Jordan, 2003, p. 264). The way that a policy has been Europeanized could explain why an EU directive can have different impacts in different European countries (Jordan, 2003).

While the top down approach to Europeanization is the most common conception, the bottom up Europeanization approach is also important. This approach references the manner in which different European actors transfer policy to the European Union. Because Member State

representatives have a presence and voice in institutions like the European Council, where the heads of government and state represent their own nation, these national leaders along with civil society organizations within these Member States may influence EU legislation and institutions.

Van Wolleghem (2019) discusses a different kind of Europeanization called soft Europeanization. This form of Europeanization is not often mentioned in literature but relies on the concept of soft law and the European Union's influence. Soft power refers to one's ability to use tactics such as persuasion or diplomacy to influence others rather than using hard power like violence or coercion. The EU is often stated to have soft power in the international sphere because its power does not derive from its military. The EU's power comes from its leaders, values, and economy. Soft Europeanization draws from both the bottom up and top down models of Europeanization. "In the case of soft law though, implementation of EU outputs is not driven by EU legislation but by national initiatives, carried out by national governments" (Van Wolleghem, 2019, p. 18).

Although Europeanization is used throughout the social sciences and can explain the European Union's influence, there are criticisms of the concept. Celata & Coletti (2019) explain how Europeanization has been accused of being too state centric. It may also be seen as a process of "homogenization and exclusion" (Schwell, 2016, p. 259). Euroscepticism also plays a role in the criticism of Europeanization. Critics who question the European Union and its policies examine the role that Europeanization plays in Member States.

Although the various forms of Europeanization are all important, this research project will focus on the top down version of Europeanization, as I am examining the effect of EU migration policies on individual Member State policies. The idea of Europeanization is important because it can help with understanding how policies are implemented in the European

Union at both the supranational and national level. In terms of migration policy, the EU does have established frameworks on integration and general migration Regulations and directives that Member States must follow. The way that states transpose the EU guidelines that the EU proposes is a form of Europeanization. The migration policies that are nationalized in these Member States will have levels of migrant integration that vary from state to state. Thus, the Europeanization of migration policies should be reflected at the national level.

CURRENT STATE OF MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Despite the fact that Europeanization of migration policies should emerge at the Member State level, it is not always apparent. EU scholars agree that an overall improvement in the migration policy area is necessary to prevent another potential crisis from happening.

Essentially, there needs to be more of a centralization of migration policies and more cohesion between EU Member States and institutions. Scipioni (2018) says that the “crisis came as a result of weak monitoring, lack of policy harmonization, low solidarity, and absence of central institutions” (p. 1358). Consequently, the lack of EU institutional involvement has led to policy failure in the migration and border security area.

Scipioni argues that policy failure has also come as a result of incomplete governance structures. When many EU laws are formed, incomplete contracts are created that lack many implementation details. The justification for these incomplete agreements is that contracts would take too long to arrange and cover every detail that needs to be included (Scipioni, 2018).

However, this incompleteness means that policies are essentially set up to fail, especially if there are no enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that states follow them equally. A lack of EU institutional involvement means that there is also weak monitoring of such policies. The

migration crisis has also caused states to call into question what international norms should be (Emiliani, 2017). Additionally, a divergence of state interests combined with the lack of EU involvement has also led to inequalities in the way policies are enforced.

States have expressed worries about the effectiveness of EU policies and the fact that the implementation of policies is not enforced equally. Following the creation of the Maastricht Treaty, states quickly realized that the agreements regarding asylum and migration were not effective, especially because the policies were incomplete when it came to emergency procedures (Scipioni, 2018). States expressed dissatisfaction about the manner in which the distributions for processing applications was handled even before the Syrian refugee crisis. There was an uneven distribution of applications where some countries received disproportionately more asylum seekers than others. This gap in national implementation is emphasized throughout Scipioni's article but is also seen in other literature surrounding EU border, migration, and asylum policies.

Furthermore, another common theme in the literature surrounding these issues is the idea of burden sharing. Greece and Italy were inundated with thousands of asylum seekers at the height of the refugee crisis because they are countries on the Mediterranean Sea that are very accessible to migrants. However, because of the rules in the current Common European Asylum System and the Dublin Regulation, states do not have much control over how many applicants they receive. The Dublin Regulation in place at the time of the refugee crisis required migrants to apply for asylum in the first EU country in which they arrived (Murray & Longo, 2018). This law meant that Greece and Italy were overwhelmed with both refugees and asylum applications, while other countries like Poland did not receive very many migrants or as many applications.

Borowicz (2017) discusses the consequences of the different actions of various Member States and argues that the lack of cohesiveness and solidarity between Member States may also lead to incompetency in EU policies. This lack of solidarity may have economic, social, and political consequences and may lead to lack of policy agreement. Lavenex (2018) argues that there needs to be a fairer distribution of asylum seekers to improve migration policy. This burden sharing issue indicates that there needs to be more cohesive policies among Member States that require Member States to take more refugees so that certain countries are not faced with a large burden while others are not affected at all.

Furthermore, the EU is an organization that prides itself on upholding its values like respect for human rights. However, Lavenex also indicates that when it comes to migration policy there is evidence of organized hypocrisy in the EU which affects human rights. She defines organized hypocrisy as “the concurrent reinforcement of protective claims and protectionist policies” (Lavenex, 2018, p. 1195). Because Member State approaches are different, and some states would rather close their borders to refugees than accept them, there seems to be a juxtaposition between what the EU says and how policies are actually implemented. With the current state of migration policies in the EU, there is no way to ensure that every state is implementing the policies in the same ways, especially with minimal EU institutional involvement.

This organized hypocrisy idea is present in other works, just under a different name. Murray and Longo (2018) refer to it as interests versus values but present the same central idea that while the EU promotes a values-based approach of migrant acceptance, the national policy interest differences between states does impact the outcome of policy implementation. For instance, countries like Poland and Hungary have been singled out for not taking effective policy

responses to the migration crisis and denying access to asylum seekers (Murray & Longo, 2018). This clash of interests versus values prevents migration policies from being executed equally.

Additionally, Murray and Longo also emphasize that there is a struggle for leadership and policy coherence among and within EU institutions to bring about a common and effective approach to migration policy (2018). There have been many meetings in the European Council, but they have not resulted in a common position because national interests have dominated EU values and interests. Germany acted unilaterally and opened German borders to migrants and circumvented the Dublin Regulation. This act upset other EU actors and many other states turned against Germany. Unilateral action in this case was for humanitarian causes, but if states do act independently and without consultation it further undermines the EU.

The rise in populist and nationalist movements seen across Europe also shows problems with EU leadership and governance. Populist, anti-migrant narratives can hurt the EU's legitimacy and place the EU as the enemy of the people (Murray & Longo, 2018, p. 416). If citizens do not feel as if they can trust the EU, then policies become more ineffective because state leaders and citizens will not be willing to follow them. Murray and Long also state, "EU legitimacy is primarily dependent on Member States' willingness to confer legitimacy to the collective decision making of the EU" (Murray & Longo, 2018, p. 412).

Member States are not very willing to give up sovereignty in the migration policy area. However, EU institutions may be able to influence states in non-official ways, which may help states be more willing to effectively implement policies. In Riddervold's article about EU security and defense policies, the author shows how EU institutions like the European Commission influence individual Member States. Riddervold says, "Commission officials' expert knowledge in different fields is important for understanding EU integration, including in

inter-governmental policy areas” (Riddervold, 2016, p. 357). Although the Commission may not have a direct impact on Member State decisions within the Common Security and Defense Policy, Member States may assess the Commission’s policy proposals input before they do make any common action decisions. States often seek advice from EU institutions, which means that more institutional involvement can be beneficial for Member States. The Commission may also be regarded as a “policy entrepreneur”, or someone that aims to initiate a policy change (Menz, 2013). When it comes to migration policy, the Commission has worked to create and improve the Common European Asylum System and create a foundation for a “pan-European Regulation of asylum” (Menz, 2013, p. 93).

Reslow (2017) proposes that the EU should utilize external cooperation and work with non-EU actors more to help better migrant conditions and manage migrant flows. However, Reslow also says that external cooperation policy needs to be evaluated more before official policies can be created. There is not enough focus on external cooperation policies in EU literature (Reslow, 2017). Thus, there are some thoughts about possible policy solutions, but nothing concrete. There are definitely serious problems with current EU migration policies, however, there is not a clear path to make these policies more cohesive.

INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS

The lens of multi-level governance also helps to understand policies of migrant integration because it shows how supranational actors and EU Member States work together to implement common standards in regard to migration and migrant integration. Member States must ensure that they are upholding EU standards such as respect for human rights. However, Member States may take different measures for migrant integration. For migrants that are non-

EU citizens, these measures can range from complete cultural assimilation to multiculturalism where different cultures live simultaneously, but separately (Van Wolleghem, 2019, pp. 5–8). Integration ability varies from Member State to Member State, but the degree of integration a migrant is able to achieve affects the everyday lives of migrants. Additionally, the impact that migrants will have on a society depends on their ability to adapt to a host country (Kagan, 2019).

Because the EU does not have a unified, binding integration policy, it is up to each Member State to create its own policies that allow migrants to integrate into societies (Gregurović & Župarić-Iljić, 2018). Supranational institutions and Member States must work together so that migrants receive the proper aid and support to which they are entitled as a basic human right. Van Wolleghem (2019) states, “it is evident, therefore, that the interaction between the EU and its Member States is the driver of policy development at the EU level” (p. 11). Van Wolleghem also argues that in order for this interaction to take place, migrants first must be integrated at the national level.

There are also different types of integration of migrants within the European Union. Migrants can be integrated politically, legally, and socially. For instance, a migrant may acquire a job in the EU and be integrated through labor, but not feel as if he/she fit into the culture of his/her host country. A migrant may not know the language or customs of his/her new nation and may not feel as if they are socially integrated or ever will be. A migrant may be eligible for healthcare benefits but may not be able to understand physicians and not receive a translator. Essentially, giving a migrant civil and social rights helps the individual to integrate into a physical community, but that does not necessarily integrate them into the political community, which is “political rights, to the right to participate in the collective definition of the future of a society” (Van Wolleghem, 2019, p. 11). Because migration is a central part of European society

through the flow of goods and humans across borders, Member States need to adopt effective integration policies. If a Member State does not create a successful integration policy, there may be ramifications for European labor markets and economies as well as for security issues (Van Wolleghem, 2019).

One of the most extreme forms of integration is assimilation. While integration means that migrants have the opportunity to engage in the social sphere of their new society, assimilation requires migrants to completely conform to the new culture around them. Essentially, assimilation means that migrants adapt their “lifestyle to the social class to which they aspire to belong” (Jackson, 2011, p. 19). This assimilation can be through religion, language, and way of dress. Some scholars argue that migrants should not be required to assimilate and should be allowed to practice their own culture or religion (Jackson, 2011). Some migrants do choose to assimilate so that they can feel as if they belong to their new culture.

There are states that use language testing “as a tool for the Regulation of migration processes and official citizenship” (Augustyniak & Higham, 2019, p. 514). Learning the language of the state to which one has migrated is one form of integration and can be a factor in the feeling of cultural ‘belongingness’ (Augustyniak & Higham, 2019, p. 514).

There is also a version of integration that is not as absolute as assimilation. While some migrants do completely assimilate, some migrants also prefer non-assimilation integration which means they base their identity in their country of origin and adapt some of the lifestyles of the new culture in which they now live. There is some mixing of cultures like a hybrid culture of their origin country and new society (Jackson, 2011, p. 19).

Some scholars propose that there needs to be more inclusive models of integration and a conception of citizenship. A new conception of nationalism and multinational citizenship would

include different cultural backgrounds for migrants who wish to become citizens of the countries to which they immigrate (Augustyniak & Higham, 2019).

In contrast, some migrants choose to keep their culture completely separate from that of their new society and do not integrate any part of their new culture. These migrants may not wish to culturally integrate because they do not feel a sense of cultural belonging. There are various reasons a migrant may or may not culturally integrate into the new society. Some may not integrate because of personal preference, while others may be restricted because of Member State policies. Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Petrantuono's (2017) study discovered that naturalization may actually help the social integration of immigrants. Their article discusses a scholarly debate over whether naturalization is a crown or a catalyst. Naturalization can be a motivator for migrants to integrate (a catalyst) or may be an excuse for migrants to not fully integrate (a crown).

Additionally, Hainmueller et al. emphasize that social integration is very important for migrants. They define social integration as the removal of barriers so that migrants can fully participate in society (p. 257). This type of integration allows for economic mobility, civic engagement, and political participation. This allowance can improve migrants' lives and gives them the ability to better contribute to their host country. There are concerns that the growing number of migrants may lead to issues with social capital and thus the lack of acceptance of the institutions and norms of the host country. Contrarily, the social integration of migrants would help maintain social cohesion.

The study done by Hainmueller et al. showed that naturalization helped improve the long-term social integration of immigrants. However, the naturalization effect does vary depending on the group of migrants. More marginalized groups such as migrants from Turkey had a larger

concentration of positive effects as compared to groups born in Switzerland, where the study took place. They also found that “integration returns are larger when immigrants naturalize earlier...in their residency” (Hainmueller et al., 2017, p. 257). Their findings suggest that it may be more effective for countries to have less strict and shorter residency requirements for longer stays. These slightly more lenient naturalization requirements may help migrants more fully integrate and contribute more to their new societies.

Besides social and cultural integration methods, migrants may also be able to integrate more quickly through labor markets. The EU does not have a common set of EU labor migration policies. Scholars argue that there needs to be a reformation of the EU labor policies to accommodate for the evolving market as the separate Member State labor markets slowly merge into one large market. International migrant workers should be able to access EU labor markets, especially as more skilled workers are needed. Migrants should be integrated into the EU market whether they are entering the EU for employment opportunities or even for family, asylum, education, or other reasons (Martín & Venturini, 2015).

There are also now different forms of labor migration in the European Union. For instance, migrant workers may enter for seasonal work, temporarily as high and low skilled workers, and even to answer temporary job postings. The variety of opportunities available and the influx of migrants into the EU also means that there is an increasing risk and vulnerability of migrant workers’ rights (Verschueren, 2016). These directives help with protection of social security rights of migrants, but “they need to be complemented by other instruments such as multilateral or bilateral agreements with third countries, or even human rights instruments” (Verschueren, 2018, p. 100). Member States are reluctant to surrender sovereignty over the admissions criteria that are used to admit migrants to their own labor markets (Verschueren,

2016, p. 101). Nations may want to develop labor policies that enable them to compete against each other and further their own markets, which may not always work in migrants' favor.

Verschueren goes on to explain some of the directives that have been developed to facilitate labor migration. Directive 2009/50/EC was adopted to help facilitate the admission of qualified workers and their family members. This Directive is called the "Blue Card Directive" and it is designed to attract as many talented/skilled workers as possible. Through this Directive, migrant workers will receive a large range of rights. For instance, these workers receive the right to be treated equally with the nationals of EU Member States that have issued the EU Blue Card (Verschueren, 2016, p. 104). Under this equal treatment, skilled migrant workers have the ability to join workers' organizations and social security. These workers would also receive state pensions that Member States must pay to these former blue card holders when they move to a third country just as they would pay pensions to their own nationals. These types of labor market directives could be considered a form of bottom up Europeanization as Member States have exercised their influence on the labor market and flexed their sovereignty to obtain policies that have been created at the EU level.

EUROPEANIZATION OF MIGRATION POLICIES IN THE EU

There is not much literature on the Europeanization of migration policies in the EU. However, the existing literature does suggest that treaties such as the Treaty of Amsterdam and Treaty of Lisbon have caused migration policies to become more and more Europeanized as they are more centralized in EU institutions.

Governance plays a large role in Europeanization and how these concepts are connected at the national and supranational levels. There are different levels of governance, including hard

and soft governance. Governance is an important part of how the EU is facilitated and understanding both hard and soft governance can help understand EU influence on policies and the power relations within the European Union (Dudek & Pestano, 2019). Hard governance refers to coercion or required legal mechanisms, while soft governance refers to the cooperation of other actors or EU influence. Some scholars argue that the EU's soft governance plays a role in the Europeanization of migration policies.

One example of hard governance is the Schengen Agreement, which is legally binding between the participating European countries. The Schengen Agreement is bound by law through the Treaty of Amsterdam. This Treaty also gives the EU more authority in terms of migration even though national governments have primarily been the controllers of migration in the past. The Schengen Agreement makes migration control a more multi-level EU issue and the EU's supranational institutions play a larger role in migration, visa, and asylum policies (Dudek & Pestano, 2019).

Europeanization may also be connected to issues of identity and what it means to be European. Members of the European Union are bonded by a set of core values. "EU members and particularly those of the Schengen area partaking in the 'Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice' not only subscribe to common action plans and interests but also to norms and values that are perceived as binding for all participants" (Schwell, 2016, p. 262).

The requirements to be an EU Member State may also be a great example of Europeanization. For a nation to become an EU Member State, it must demonstrate that it is willing to follow and promote the democratic values of the EU. The first step for accession is that a state must fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, which are a set of rules that determine the eligibility of a state to apply for EU membership. Countries who wish to apply must ensure their

institutions must guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for minorities, and a functioning market economy with the ability to implement the obligations of EU membership, including the political, economic, and monetary union (European Commission, 2016). Member States that wish to demonstrate they follow EU values may show this through their national policies on migration by making sure their policies meet EU guidelines. This means that there is a possibility that Europeanization may play a larger role in migrant integration than national policies.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In this study, I seek to understand whether it is policy decisions at the EU level or decisions at the national level that have the most impact on the successful integration of migrants into European societies. Specifically, I ask two questions: A) How does the Europeanization of migration policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? B) How do national level policies affect the integration of migrants in EU Member States? In order to find answers to these questions, I plan to test empirically four separate hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: The degree of migrant integration in an EU Member State correlates positively with the level of Europeanization of that Member State's migration policy.

Hypothesis 2: The degree of migrant integration in an EU Member State correlates positively with national labor integration policy provisions for migrants.

Hypothesis 3: The degree of migrant integration in an EU Member State correlates positively with national education policy provisions for migrants.

Hypothesis 4: The degree of migrant integration in an EU Member State correlates positively with national healthcare policy provisions for migrants.

MEASURING MIGRANT INTEGRATION

The Migration Policy Institute defines integration as “the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups” (Penninx, 2003). While this is a vague definition, the ability of migrants to integrate varies from country to country. There are many variables that may contribute to migrant integration in host societies. Migrants may be

given the opportunity to integrate through access to resources such as healthcare, education, and political participation.

While there is more than one way to measure integration, the most complete overview of integration policies comes from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Gregurović & Župarić-Iljić, 2018). The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is a tool that measures migrant integration policies in all of the EU Member States as well as Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. This tool uses 167 policy indicators that cover eight policy areas. The data from the MIPEX project is used by policy makers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), researchers, European and international institutions to help compare integration policies at the national level and to improve them (Huddleston et al., 2015). MIPEX can also serve as a tool to help evaluate and compare integration policies and may even serve as a tool for Member States to create a legal framework to help migrants integrate by receiving the same access to employment, education, and healthcare, free from discrimination, and have equal opportunity for community engagement (Gregurović & Župarić-Iljić, 2018, p. 110). MIPEX data will serve this study by determining integration levels in Germany, Spain, and Hungary.

Additionally, part of the methodology used for gathering the data and determining the score criteria involves aspects of Europeanization, which makes the MIPEX data even more important to this study. The authors state, “MIPEX identifies the highest European and international standards aimed at achieving equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for all residents” (Huddleston et al., 2015). These standards are used to formulate the questionnaires and scores used for the MIPEX study. Furthermore, the authors list several EU directives, including the EC Directive on the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents,

2003/109 and EC Directive on the right of citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States as sources of MIPEX equality standards. They also state that “MIPEX does not monitor transposition itself, but rather the implementation of the highest standards sometimes found within relevant Directives on migration” (Huddleston et al., 2015). The usage of EU directives and policies for the MIPEX methodology means that measures of Europeanization were used to indicate to what degree the MIPEX nations actually implemented the goals set out in these directives.

In essence, MIPEX is a composite index, which consists of over a hundred indicators that fall under policy areas such as education, healthcare, labor market mobility, political participation, and more. To calculate the scores for each policy area, there are policy indicator questions relating to specific policy components of each of the policy areas. There are three options for each answer to these questions. Three points is awarded as a maximum when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment. The indicator scores are averaged together to give one out of four dimension scores which examine the same aspect of each policy. The four dimension scores are then averaged together to get the policy area score for the different policy areas. After being averaged one more time, each overall score is calculated for each country. For the rankings and comparisons, this initial one, two, three scale is converted into a 0, 50, 100 scale for the dimensions and policy areas, with 100% as the top score (Huddleston et al., 2015).

One way to measure migrant integration is to examine these indicators for any inequalities migrants may face. The literature identifies education as a key factor of migrant integration. Education can be a key component to migrant integration by helping migrants adapt to new countries faster (Kagan, 2019). Several of the indicators used to measure the education

policy area for the MIPEx data were migrants' abilities to access education, rating if education programs targeted migrants' specific needs, and rating if the curriculum encouraged intercultural education and diversity (Huddleston et al., 2015).

Access to a labor market can also be another way to measure migrant policies. From an economic perspective, "the impact of immigrants depends on their economic performance and how well they adapt to their host country" (Kagan, 2019, p. 33). The greater accessibility migrants have to labor markets may indicate that the integration policies for their host country are more Europeanized. For the MIPEx study, the labor market mobility score was calculated by using indicators such as the degree of access migrants have to the Member States' markets, including access to the public and private sectors, access to support like training or validation of skills, and the receipt of workers' rights.

Another important factor in migrants' ability to integrate is healthcare. The World Health Organization (WHO) emphasizes that access to healthcare is a basic right that everyone should have. The WHO has also created a report for a global action plan to promote the health of refugees and migrants. For the MIPEx study, some of the indicators used to determine the levels of integration in terms of healthcare were if migrants were allowed healthcare coverage, if migrants and asylum seekers received administrative discretion and documentation, if they had access to qualified interpreters, and if diversity was encouraged in healthcare workplaces (Huddleston et al., 2015). While education, labor market mobility, and healthcare are not the only variables that play a role in migrant integration, the literature seems to indicate that they may play the most important roles in migrant integration. For this thesis, the MIPEx data will be used for these different policy areas as these indicators will vary at the national level and reflect different levels of integration and Europeanization.

In addition to MIPEX, another way of measuring integration is using data found in the Eurobarometer surveys. Funded by the European Commission, the Standard Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion surveys consisting of about 1,000 face-to-face interviews per country. The results of these surveys are made into reports that are published at least twice yearly. There are also Special Eurobarometer reports that are based off of thematic studies that are done for the European Commission or other EU institutions. These reports vary in topic and are integrated in the Standard Eurobarometer's polling waves. A third type of Eurobarometer, called the Flash Eurobarometer, is done on request for different services of the Commission. The Flash Eurobarometer is an ad hoc thematic telephone interview. These flash surveys allow the Commission to obtain results quickly and focus on specific target groups. All of these Eurobarometer studies help "investigate in-depth the motivations, feelings and reactions of selected social groups towards a given subject or concept, by listening to and analysing their way of expressing themselves in discussion groups or with non-directive interviews" (European Commission, 2019a).

EUROPEANIZATION AND MIGRANT INTEGRATION

The degree to which Member States adopt legislation related to EU directives is Europeanization, the degree of which I want to assess, in order to estimate its effect on migrant integration. Scholten and Penninx (2016) state that migrant integration "has largely been a purview of the nation state, as ideas about how to integrate migrants are often strongly correlated with ideas about national identity" (p. 92). Free movement of EU citizens is at the center of European integration. "It is a key supranational element of the Europeanization of immigration policies and has had a clear binding effect on Member States" (Scholten & Penninx, 2016, p. 95).

Europeanization of policies on immigration and border security is exemplified through policies like the Schengen Agreement, which stopped border controls and adopted joint immigration policy measures (Scholten & Penninx, 2016). The Treaty of Amsterdam, The Lisbon Treaty, the Dublin Convention, and asylum and migration becoming a part of the first pillar are all examples of the Europeanization of migration policies. These are the first steps taken to try to create a Common EU policy. The Lisbon Treaty further normalized migration policy as a central EU issue and strengthened the role of EU institutions like the European Parliament and European Court of Justice, especially when it comes to issues like migration (Scholten & Penninx, 2016, p. 95). Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx (2016) explain that integration policies have become more Europeanized instead of just a process between the migrants and their host nations. In 2003, the European Commission created a more comprehensive view on integration policies and “integration was conceived as a balance of rights and obligations, and policies took a holistic approach targeting all dimensions of integration (including economic, social, and political rights; cultural and religious diversity; and citizenship and participation)” (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016, p. 2).

The following year, the Council of the EU agreed on the Common Basic Principles (CBPs) for integration as a step towards a shared European framework to migrant integration and a reference point for the implementation and evaluation of future integration policies. In the process of evolving this framework and getting Member State cooperation, the definition of what it means to have full migrant integration has changed. The Commission states that stakeholders at all levels need to be involved at all levels for successful integration policies (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016, p. 2). EU institutions, Member States, human rights

organizations, and civil society organizations need to work together to promote full migrant integration that is outlined in this EU framework.

MEASURING EUROPEANIZATION

Although there are various definitions of Europeanization, for the purposes of this study the conceptualization provided by Van Wolleghem (2019) will be used. Van Wolleghem emphasizes the idea that the way that policies are implemented at the national level is influenced by the EU institutions. This means that the way that migration policies are implemented at the national level is an impact of Europeanization.

There are many different ways of measuring Europeanization. Typically, it is measured using qualitative analysis such as the analysis of policy or legislation. There are not many cases of quantitative analysis of Europeanization, but some scholars have tried to use quantitative analysis to measure Europeanization's effect on issues like education or migration policies. For instance, Töller (2010) argues that qualitative analysis on issues of Europeanization is not effective or conclusive enough, and there should be more quantitative studies done with Europeanization. She uses quantitative analysis to measure the Europeanization of national legislation and assess others' research, along with her own, to measure Europeanization in the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, and Germany. She explains how the development of an analytical tool would be the most effective way to measure the scope and extent of Europeanization of national public policies across different disciplines and countries (Töller, 2010).

Töller also explains that Europeanization can be measured by looking at the influence of European law on national law. One can measure the share of legal acts that transposed a

European directive into national law. Töller also states, “Europeanized laws are laws that either ratify international treaties, transpose European directives or agreements between Member States or judicial decisions by the European Court of Justice” (p. 423). To have a more quantifiable study of Europeanization one has to identify the ratio between national and Europeanized laws. The European side must have directives and Regulations and the national side has to have primary and secondary law. To make this simpler, there needs to be a database that has all national legislation and organizes legislation with the Eur-Lex (European Union) classification (Töller, 2010).

Nanou, Zapryanova, and Toth (2017) examine the micro-variation in integration patterns in the periods between treaties and compares the impact of secondary legislation to that of the treaties to create a comprehensive index. This index is a new resource, “encompassing 1957 to 2014, on the distribution of authority between the European Union and Member States across policy fields”, and the content of both primary and secondary legislation (Nanou et al., 2017). To complete this study, the authors used expert surveys and mainly surveyed Jean Monnet Chairs on what they thought about different directives, who they thought were the main agenda setters, and Europeanization of policy levels in different Member States. The study found that Germany was the leader in levels of Europeanization and agenda setting influence.

Another way to measure Europeanization is to look at the transposition of European policies to national law. Transposition “is the process of incorporating EU directives into the national laws of EU countries. The directives then have to become law in the EU countries by a specific deadline” (European Union, 2018). The EU Commission has a Single Market Scoreboard that measures the performances of Member States to determine if they “completely and correctly” transpose the legal measures of the Single Market Directives by the deadlines set

out in these directives. The Single Market Directives are legal measures that have impact on the Single Market. “This includes the four freedoms (freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital across borders within the EU), and supporting policies that have a direct impact on the Single Market” like taxation, employment, culture, education, public health, and energy. (European Commission, 2019b).

After directives are created, each Member State must adopt its own legislation that implements the policies outlined in the directives. While each Member State is allowed to adopt these directives in a way that is specific to its own national practices and needs, they must correctly meet the guidelines of each directive. After developing its legislation, each Member State notifies the Commission by sending a text of their legislation. To determine if these policies in the directives are correctly transposed, the Commission examines this text that EU countries send of their national implementation. The Commission ensures that the text meets the objective of the directive and that the law is implemented and meets any deadlines (European Union, 2018).

The Commission also uses several different indicators to measure the overall transposition of policies of EU Member States. The indicators that are used to determine the overall performance score of each country are the transposition deficit (% of all directives not transposed), change over the last six months (change in the number of non-transposed directives), long-overdue directives (two years or more), total transposition delay (in months) for overdue directives, and conformity deficit (% of all directives transposed incorrectly). Member States often fail to comply with these transposition deadlines (König & Luetgert, 2009).

Because transposition scores reflect the degree to which countries adapt legislation to meet the standards outlined in EU directives, the transposition deficit scores will be used to

measure Europeanization for each of the EU Member States for this thesis project. According to the European Commission, “the transposition deficit shows the percentage of Single Market directives not yet completely notified to the Commission in relation to the total number of directives that should have been notified by the deadline” (European Commission, 2019b). The data used in this report uses all the transposition notifications made by December 10, 2018 for directives with a transposition deadline on or before November 30, 2018.

To calculate the deficit, the Commission includes the directives for which no transposition measures have been communicated, the directives that are considered to be partially transposed by a Member State after it notified some transposition measures, and directives that are considered to be completely transposed by a Member State. The Commission can also open an infringement proceeding for non-communication if a Member State has not notified new transposition measures (European Commission, 2019b). Therefore, states with the lowest transposition have correctly and completely transposed EU directives into their national legislation. The EU Member States with the lowest transposition deficit scores would therefore have the highest levels of Europeanization. Additionally, data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index will be used to compare migrant integration policies in EU Member States. Table 1 below shows the MIPEX overall scores alongside variables like labor market mobility, education, and healthcare. The final column shows the transposition deficit score for each country that received MIPEX data.

OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR MIGRANT INTEGRATION

Healthcare Policies

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights deems healthcare a human right to which everyone is entitled. In fact, “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services...” (United Nations, 1948). Within the European Union, European frameworks work in combination with international frameworks to create a path for health equality. However, it is up to nation states to create legislation and policies that “comply with international and European standards that set parameters for the respect of human rights, including health” (Mikaba, 2018).

It is difficult to discuss migrant health because in the majority of EU Member States, collection of data on ethnicity and migrant status is legally prohibited (Mikaba, 2018). At the end of 2017, Austria, Croatia, Germany, and Portugal were the only Member States to have defined indicators to measure migrant integration in the healthcare field (Mikaba, 2018). Migrants have a diverse set of healthcare needs and may face issues when receiving healthcare because of these differences in healthcare needs, as well as languages, traditions, and previous levels of care, which all vary on migrants’ origin countries (Ledoux et al., 2018). Migrants and ethnic minority groups generally have a lower socio-economic status than nationals, which is the main explanation for health inequalities. Migrants may have difficulty accessing healthcare services due to language barriers, costs, location, information, and possibly due to the lack of entitlement to receive healthcare (Ledoux et al., 2018). If countries do not have healthcare benefits applicable to migrants, then migrants may need to pay out of pocket for healthcare, which may always not be financially possible. To combat these inequalities, some scholars like Flegar

propose that a human rights-based approach to health laws and policies can help “refine and concretize the individual rights and state obligations for the preventive health care of undocumented migrants” (Flegar et al., 2016, p. 1). Obviously, health is extremely important for any person and the inequalities that migrants face may prevent them from receiving the basic right to health to which all humans are entitled.

Education Policies

Themes in the literature suggest that education plays a large role in migrant integration. In fact, some scholars argue that “education is widely perceived as the main channel through which migrant families could economically catch up over generations with the native population” (Krause et al., 2015, p. 758). Access to education can provide migrants of all ages with the means to learn more about the language and culture of their host country, receive vocational training for better job access, and even provide migrants with the opportunity to feel as if they share something in common with native Europeans. Carlson et al. (2018) say, “Europeanized education or a type of Europeanized policy initiative will provide a “‘common ground’ for all members of the European population, be it in terms of language skills, shared values, mutual understanding, or a shared sense of the past” (p. 396).

Efforts to increase Europeanized education have been made across the EU. The creation of a common European Higher Education Area (EHEA), a European Research Area (ERA), and the introduction of mobility programs like Erasmus for students are some examples of initiatives taken to create a more “European” education. Additionally, the European Council has emphasized the role of education in bringing Europeans together (Carlson et al., 2018, p. 396). “As these examples indicate, education is seen as a means not only of increasing economic

competitiveness, but also of fostering a shared sense of belonging or ‘European identity’” (Carlson et al., 2018, p. 396). The Europeanization of education is perceived as a vital part of European social integration (Carlson et al., 2018). If education is a vital source of integration for Europeans, it must also be a gateway for migrants to integrate into European societies.

In many EU Member States, migrants are able to use education to their advantage for both social integration and through gaining economic opportunities. “From our point of view there are vital aspects of the migrants’ successful social integration; we have to integrate the migrants who are coming to our country and plan to stay for a longer time to the field of education and the labor market (Kórnives & Dajnoki, 2016, p. 363). Migrants with higher levels of education will be better able to obtain a job as the competition for jobs increases. Lower-skilled, less educated social groups may fall behind and will not be able to get these same opportunities (Kagan, 2019). While there is much emphasis on migrant children receiving education, especially because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and EU directive 2013/33 make elementary education compulsory for refugee children, higher education is still important for migrants and can be the key to their integration.

Kagan also argues that the Europeanization of education makes it easier for migrants to integrate. “Europeanization processes...have led to increased emphasis on inclusion and to the introduction of shorter degree courses that allow students to enter the labor market more rapidly” (Kagan, 2019). However, migrants do face some inequalities in education as an individual’s socioeconomic background is a significant factor in one’s access to education. People with a migrant background are often identified as an under-represented group in higher education because they face educational inequalities (Kagan, 2019). “Typically identified as a less advantaged social group the increased participation of immigrants and their descendants in HE

[higher education] is vital for their integration and social inclusiveness” (Kagan, 2019, p. 36).

Therefore, education opens doors for migrants to integrate into society by not only providing language and communication skills, but also by giving migrants an opportunity to enter the labor market.

Labor Market Policies

Much of the literature on migrant integration emphasizes how access to labor markets is central for migrant integration. “Socioeconomic mobility for migrants, measured in terms of education achievement and medium to high-income occupations, is linked to successful integration and higher access to valuable opportunities and resources” (Ron-Balsera, 2015, p. 149). Once migrants enter the workforce of a nation, they are able to fully integrate into society. In fact, the MIPLEX data shows that labor market mobility is one of the highest policy indicators for many EU Member States. Scholars agree that entering the labor market is the first step for migrant integration. Cseh Papp, Bilan, and Dajnoki (2019) state “labor market integration is a starting point and a precondition for social integration of immigrants” (p. 183). Similarly, Kórmíves and Dajnoki believe that “the social integration of migrants in a country is closely linked to employment, to the integration into the labour market...” (2016, p. 363).

However, migrants may face difficulties when trying to enter labor markets in EU Member States. Immigrants may face discrimination or people who have misconceptions about migrants, such as the idea that migrants displace domestic labor and cause unemployment. Migrants entering labor markets can actually boost economies. Negative attitudes and prejudices towards migrants will prevent them from fully integrating. Integration of migrants means that multilateral relationships are established between migrants and the society to which they are

trying to integrate. The success or failure of this integration depends on the openness and levels of prejudice of the receiving society (Cseh Papp et al., 2019).

Specific country policies may also prevent migrants from labor market integration. Many European countries impose employment bans that prevent asylum seekers from immediately entering the labor market once arriving in their host country (Marbach et al., 2018). There is variation in the wait times for migrants to enter the labor market in each EU Member State. Generally, most of these wait times fall between six and twelve months. Marbach's study showed that these longer employment bans can considerably slow down migrants' economic integration and reduce their motivation to integrate soon after their arrival to their host countries (2018, p. 1). These employment bans are actually detrimental to economies. Marbach also found that the employment ban costs German taxpayers about forty million euros per year "in terms of welfare expenditures and foregone tax revenues from unemployed refugees" (2018, p. 1). Therefore, labor market mobility is very effective for migrant integration, and also helps maintain the labor force productivity in EU Member States

WHY GERMANY, SPAIN, AND HUNGARY?

These three countries were selected based on general current events, available literature, and their overall MIPEX scores. During the height of the migration crisis, Germany made headlines by declaring that it would openly accept one million refugees (Karnitschnig, 2015). Because of the willingness of the German government to accept a high number of refugees, the German MIPEX score in comparison with other EU countries, and themes in the literature, Germany was chosen because I thought it would have a high degree of migrant integration. Similarly, Spain has also taken in an inordinate number of migrants. Spain's location makes it

an accessible point of entry for migrants who cross the Mediterranean and is also a popular destination for migrants from northern Africa. In the summer of 2018, Spain became the main entry point for migrants and received twice as many migrants as Greece and six times as many times as Italy (Benavides, 2018). Therefore, Spain was chosen as a case study to determine if the large amounts of migrants that have entered have been able to integrate into society. Hungary was chosen because its government has shown a much different attitude than Germany and Spain. The Hungarian government has openly taken an anti-EU and anti-migration stance. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) says that everyone has the “right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state” and “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (United Nations, 1948, Article 13.1, Article 14.1). Despite the rights outlined in the UDHR, Péter Szijjarto, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, said that the ability to be a refugee and apply for asylum is “is not a human right” and that being a refugee violates border security (Al Jazeera, 2018). These views of the Hungarian government indicate that there may be a lower level of migrant integration in Hungary.

CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES

GERMANY

According to the data provided from the Migrant Integration Policy Index, Germany has a higher integration score than many other European Union Member States; Germany's national policies may play a significant factor in the ability of migrants to integrate. First and foremost, the German Basic Law outlined in the German constitution describes a fundamental right to asylum (German Federal Government, 2020). The German government has also articulated its goals to help integrate migrants and emphasizes creating measures to help migrants more efficiently and effectively into the German labor market.

Transposition

Although Germany was expected to have a higher degree of Europeanization of policy, Germany's transposition deficit score is 1.1%. The European Union's proposed and ideal score was 0.5% and the target was 1%. Ultimately, the goal was to stay as close to the target as possible. However, as shown in Figure 1, Germany (Deutschland, or DE) is in the red, meaning that it did not meet the target and actually has one of the highest transposition deficit percentages. [See Figure 1 below for a comparison of all the transposition deficit scores.] Hypothesis one stated that the degree of migrant integration in a Member State would correlate positively with its level of Europeanization. However, although Germany has higher migrant integration scores than Spain, Hungary, and many other Member States, it has one of the worse levels of Europeanization. Therefore, with this case study, hypothesis one is rejected.

Migrant Healthcare in Germany

Out of the three policy areas, Germany's overall healthcare MIPEX score of 43 is its weakest. The literature indicates that migrants in Germany face difficulties and discrimination when trying to obtain proper healthcare. "There are inequalities in health care utilization between migrants and natives in Germany. These disparities vary in terms of health care sector, indicator of health care utilization and migrant population" (Klein & von dem Knesebeck, 2018). It is difficult for migrants to get healthcare for various reasons ranging from socioeconomic factors, language barriers, and legal issues. The large majority of the German population has private or statutory health insurance, and thus has a health insurance card. Patients without those cards have difficulties accessing health care unless they can directly pay for it themselves (Müllerschön et al., 2019, p. 2). As migrants typically have a lower socioeconomic status compared to native citizens, paying for healthcare out of pocket is not always possible. Additionally, migrants without a residence permit risk deportation if they cannot afford to pay for medical care (Müllerschön et al., 2019, p. 2). Furthermore, the healthcare system of Germany is a social insurance-based public-private system. Public insurance companies must accept any person regardless of their health status. This would include any German citizen or foreigner with a residence permit. However, undocumented migrants are not mentioned and have no right to public health insurance (Flegar et al., 2016, p. 6).

With that being said, "the German Asylum Law regulates access to healthcare for asylum seekers and undocumented migrants" (Müllerschön et al., 2019, p. 2). The asylum seekers who are eligible for this medical care have access to care for mainly acute diseases and obstetric conditions, "but not for preventive medical check-ups. In many German federal states, asylum seekers have to obtain a medical treatment voucher (MTV) from social welfare offices each time

they want to seek medical care, thus decisions about whether the treatment is necessary are not made by professional medical staff” (Müllerschön et al., 2019, p. 2). The German Asylum law also allows migrants in Germany to have the right to access the regular health care system after staying for 15 months. Although these asylum seekers may have limited access to healthcare resources, they are not given the option of full coverage healthcare and may face obstacles when trying to obtain it.

Migrant Education in Germany

Directive 2013/33/EU states that minor children should receive access to education systems of each Member State (Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2013). While Germany does provide some education to migrants and migrant children, migrants do not always receive equal opportunities for education. This inequality may be the reason that Germany has a low score of 47 out of 100 for education. Krause et al. (2015) argue that socioeconomic background plays a large role in education outcomes. However, migrants often are at a socioeconomic disadvantage because of language barriers and difficulties accessing labor markets. If migrants have not been exposed to the native language of their host country, they may be less likely to fully access education opportunities or may fall behind in school.

Tidwell (2019) also discusses education for undocumented migrants in Germany. Public education in Germany is regulated by states without much federal intervention. There is not a federal law that requires all children to have a right to a public education. Without a federal directive, state administrators have the authority to implement policies that prevent undocumented children and their parents from getting the right to an education. German legislation says that education is for all citizens, but this does not necessarily include

undocumented migrants. Because the responsibility of public education in Germany is up to the sixteen German states, migrants in the various states of Germany may not receive equal educational opportunities (Tidwell, 2018).

Tjaden (2017) states that “education is seen as the main vehicle for a successful long-term integration into society” (p. 108). In Germany, migrant education can be supported through connection to the labor market. This is illustrated by Germany’s Vocational Education and Training (VET) sector which helps integrate students with migrant backgrounds (Tjaden, 2017). Although Germany has a high labor market mobility score, foreign students and migrants are still less likely to enter VET compared to native Germans (Tjaden, 2017). This may be because of the language barrier and socioeconomic disadvantages. Therefore, while migrants legally are supposed to have access to German education, their access is limited or may be almost non-existent in practice, depending on the region of Germany.

Labor Market Mobility in Germany

Labor market mobility was Germany’s highest scoring policy area, with a high score of 86. Germany has developed several acts to help migrants that come into Germany looking for asylum or work. In June of 2019, the German government passed a series of bills that changed migration policies in Germany. For example, the New Skilled Workers Immigration Act makes it easier for people from non-EU states to come to Germany. The Employment Toleration Act establishes legal certainty for individuals already living in Germany. Conversely, individuals now applying for asylum now must provide information verbally or in writing, present a passport or other form of travel documentation, skill certificates and accept mandatory security measures.

The Orderly Return Law also facilitates the deportation of failed asylum seekers and gives more power to police and immigration authorities. The goal of this new law is to increase the proportion of successful deportations. However, this package also includes policies to improve the German labor market for skilled workers. Migrants who do not have asylum status that arrived before last summer will be able to stay if they have a job and are able to speak German (Mischke, 2019). This change in legislation led to controversy and debate within the German parliament, showing that divisions over migration occur in almost every EU Member State.

Eurobarometer data from the Special Eurobarometer 469 survey conducted in 2017 on the integration of immigration in the European Union shows that the majority of Germans have favorable opinions towards migration as compared to the data from the other EU Member States. For instance, when asked if they agreed or disagreed with the idea that immigrants “take jobs away from workers in [our country],” only 21% of Germans surveyed agreed. Similarly, 73% of Germans agreed that immigrants “help to fill jobs for which it’s hard to find workers” (European Commission, 2018b). These numbers indicate that migrants are generally welcome in the German labor market.

Overall, Germany has one of the top ten migrant integration scores out of all of the MIPEX countries. Although Germany did not have a strong score or policies for migrant health and education, it excelled in the labor market mobility policy area. This shows that national policy provisions for labor play a large role in the ability of migrants to integrate into Germany. A similar trend with the levels of Europeanization and migrant integration is seen in Spain.

SPAIN

Spain scores between Germany and Hungary on the MIPEX scale. Spain scores high in certain policy areas like labor market mobility and lower in areas like migrant education. While there is not an official integration law in Spain, Spanish policymakers have set up two main integration strategies for migrants. There have been two sets of these plans called the First Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECI). The first set, named PECI I, covered the period from 2007-2010. Its goal was to adapt public policies in education, employment, social services, health and housing to meet the needs of the migrant population. In 2011, an update called PECI II was created that identified six specific areas of action. Additionally, in 2011, a comprehensive strategy was developed to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and intolerance. PECI II covered the period from 2011-2015. “The inclusion of migrants in the workplace, non-discrimination principles and cultural diversity nevertheless continues to be the main pillars of the Spanish integration policy” (European Commission, 2019c). Although the Spanish government has created these migrant integration plans, it seems as if they are not applied in all policy areas.

According to the Spanish Constitution, Organic Laws are related to fundamental rights and public liberties. In 2000, Spain introduced the Organic Law 4/2000, which is the foundation of the country’s current legal framework on migration. This law provides migrants (regardless of legal status) with access to healthcare, housing, legal aid, and other services Spanish nationals receive, as long as these migrants register with their local municipality (Hooper, 2019; Spanish Government, 2000). The Organic Law 2/2009 is an act that describes the rights and duties of migrants in Spain. This act is referred to as the Spanish Aliens Act and is also known as the law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration. This act creates the

framework for the treatment of irregular migrants and establishes principles to help promote legal immigration and limit the number of “irregular” migrants (Dudek & Pestano, 2019). “Thus, although one could argue that Schengen has placed parameters on Spain’s immigration policy, the Aliens Act is a law the Spanish state put into place to establish Spanish rules and norms of immigration beyond the general framework of Schengen” (Dudek & Pestano, 2019). Since the migrant crisis, the Organic Law 2/2009 has been particularly important for policy implementation and migrant integration. While Spain has always welcomed migrants, since the migration crisis of 2015, the amount of migrants entering Spain has steadily increased (Benavides, 2018).

Transposition as a Measure of Europeanization

Spain (España or ES in Figure 1) has the highest transposition deficit score of 1.5%. This score means that Spain has the highest deficiency and did not correctly transpose the policies by the date given by the European Commission. This outcome was not expected because Spain falls between Germany and Hungary with its overall MIPEX score. If Europeanization does play a significant role in migrant integration, then it would be logical for Spain to have a Europeanization score that also reflects how it scores for integration. [See Figure 1 below for a comparison of all the transposition deficit scores.] Like in the first case study, hypothesis one is also rejected for Spain. Spain’s integration scores are relatively high, but it has the worst transposition deficit score, and thus the worst level of Europeanization. Therefore, the degree of migrant integration in Spain correlates negatively with the Europeanization of migration policies in Spain and hypothesis one is rejected for this case study.

Migrant Healthcare in Spain

There are two different kinds of health policies: legislative policies and health system responses that make healthcare accessible to migrants. These health policies can target either users or providers. To target users means to improve health literacy and make information easier to understand for migrants. Targeting providers means training staff members to have new and improved knowledge that is culturally adaptable (Ledoux et al., 2018). The Spanish government has an integration plan for migrants with two main objectives of “guaranteeing the right to health for foreigners and improving the diversity management capacity of health centers” (Ledoux et al., 2018, p. 4).

Spain has a national health system called the Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS) which is governed by the Ministry of Health and the Departments of Health of Spain’s seventeen autonomous communities. This national system is based on coverage of health care through tax based rather than social insurance-based funding (Flegar et al., 2016). Each autonomous region also has its own health service besides the national one. Although there are differences in the organization of provision of services management, these national and regional health systems have the same basic features (Ledoux et al., 2018).

Although the migrant integration plan in Spain does have some provisions for migrant health, it is difficult to determine who is actually benefitting from these integration policies because Spanish policies use the words migrants and immigrants without actually defining who is included in these terms. In Chapter two of this thesis, I define four main types of migrants that are present in the European Union: asylum seekers/refugees, economic migrants, internal migrants, and victims of human trafficking. If policies do not explicitly define what specific types of migrants that the legislation is targeting, all migrants will not receive equal treatment or

health resources. Because Spain has a MIPEx health score of 53 and does not have clearly stated policies that explain how their migrant integration plans are being enforced, this shows that the policy provisions do align with migrant integration.

The healthcare inequalities in Spain may also be due to a law revision that took place in 2012. This change caused the Spanish national healthcare system to go from being universal to only covering people who are insured under the social security system or who have a dependency tie to such an insured person. Undocumented migrants would not have regular access to this type of healthcare system. However, while undocumented migrants do not have access to preventive health care, there are some exceptions for emergency care, health care to children under the age of eighteen, and pre/post-natal care. Undocumented migrants can still access the complete health care package if they can afford being insured with the national health system. Some autonomous communities have expanded their healthcare provisions to include undocumented migrants and other people who would otherwise not be covered by SNS (Flegar et al., 2016, pp. 13–14). However, depending on income and regional policies, all migrants do not receive equal access to healthcare resources in Spain.

Migrant Education in Spain

Spain has a low MIPEx score of 37 for education. Like Germany, this score shows that education is one of Spain's weakest policy areas for migrant integration. However, According to Article 9 of the Organic Law, foreigners under the age of sixteen have the right to an education including access to basic, free, and compulsory education. Foreigners under the age of eighteen are also entitled to post-compulsory education. This includes obtaining the corresponding academic degree and access to the public system of scholarships and grants. Resident foreigners

over the age of eighteen have the right to access post-compulsory educational stages to obtain the corresponding qualifications, and to apply to the public scholarship system under the same conditions as Spanish citizens (Spanish Government, 2000). Like with health policies, the word foreigners does not specify what types of migrants are entitled to education, and there does not seem to be an indication of how exactly migrants are supposed to access this education to which they are entitled.

Some scholars address how education in Spain may not actually be accessible for all migrants, although education is an important aspect of integration. In fact, Rodríguez-Izquierdo and Darmody (2019) explain that in Spain, there is not a general legislative framework specifically for migrant education and the legislation can vary between the seventeen autonomous communities and cities. Since 2000, all the autonomous communities and cities have developed their own educational programs for migrant students (Rodríguez-Izquierdo & Darmody, 2019, p. 47). Because the educational system is so decentralized, migrants may not receive adequate education in all of these regions, which is reflected in Spain's poor MIPEx score for education. There is also a different degree of autonomy given to schools in each of the autonomous communities. For example, in the region of La Rioja, each educational center has to follow organizational guidelines. However, in the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, the process of migrant integration is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, which also regulates the measures needed to assist migrant students (Rodríguez-Izquierdo & Darmody, 2019, p. 47). Another difference between the communities' administrations is the possibility of another official language besides Castilian Spanish (Catalan in the Balearic Islands, Valencia and Catalonia, Galician in Galicia, and Basque or Euskera in the Basque Country and Navarre). If migrants are not familiar with these official languages, they may not be able to take full

advantage of these educational opportunities and may be at a significant disadvantage for integration.

In fact, the main obstacle that migrants may face is limited proficiency in the language of instruction. This lack of language proficiency can lead to issues with social and academic engagement. “Low proficiency in the language of the host country may result in social exclusion and limited post-school pathways as well as difficulties in interaction with different communities” (Rodríguez-Izquierdo & Darmody, 2019, p. 49). If migrants are not given the same opportunities as native citizens of their host country, they may not be given the same opportunities for social, economic, and political and integration. “School is one of the most important institutions for socialization” (Ron-Balsera, 2015, p. 148). School provides the communication and interpersonal skills to function in society. However, the Spanish education system may not provide the same educational opportunities for migrants as native Spaniards. Ron-Balsera argues that the Spanish education system reinforces social inequalities because students with a lower social class that are not Spanish natives tend to have higher levels of school failure (Ron-Balsera, 2015, p. 168). Latin American migrants make up a large portion of migrants in Spain. Many of them are Ecuadorian, and these students of Ecuadorian background achieve lower education levels than native Spanish students (Ron-Balsera, 2015, p. 149). Therefore, the education policy area does not give equal opportunities for migrant integration in Spain.

Labor Market Mobility in Spain

Spain has a MIPLEX score of 72 in the general labor market mobility category. For immediate access to the labor market, Spain scored a 100. To score a 100 for the immediate

access to market indicator, foreign residents in all categories (permanent residents, residents on temporary work permits within a period of one year or greater, and residents on family reunion permits) all have to be able to immediately access the labor market (Huddleston et al., 2015).

In the EU, high skilled migrants often receive better opportunities for work and are able to get a Blue Card. However, low and middle skilled migrants may not receive the same economic opportunities and may not be able to seek work right away once entering a host country. In Spain, there are two pathways to admit low and middle skilled migrants. One is the General Regime, which allows employers to sponsor migrants for a specific job. The other is the Collective Management of Hiring in Countries of Origin, or the Collective Management System, “which allows employers to recruit groups of workers from countries with which Spain has signed a bilateral agreement” (Hooper, 2019). Employer sponsorship is a big part of the labor migration system in Spain (Hooper, 2019). “In 2018, one-third of Spain’s foreign-born population came from four countries: Morocco (13%), Romania (9%), Ecuador (6%), and Colombia (6%)” (Hooper, 2019, p. 6). Employers must go through the General Regime which requires the local public employment office to do a labor market check that verifies the fact that no Spanish or EU national could first fill the post. Ultimately, in this policy area, Spain had similar results to Germany. Spain’s weaker policy and migrant integration areas were migrant health and education, while its labor market policies gave migrants greater opportunity for integration. However, unlike Spain and Germany, Hungary provides weak policy provisions for migrants in all three policy areas.

HUNGARY

Migrant integration in Hungary is quite different than in both Germany and Spain. One of the main reasons for this is due to the strict migration policies that are practiced in Hungary. Within the past two years, the Hungarian Parliament tried to pass a law that prevented anyone from coming to the aid of migrants. Under the terms of this new law, anyone who helps migrants, whether it be distributing information about the asylum process, or providing migrants with financial assistance, could get twelve months in jail (Kingsley, 2018). The government has even created walls at each of its borders to prevent migrants from entering Hungary after going through other EU Member States. Those migrants that are able to cross borders are often held at migrant detention centers. As a result, there has been a huge decline in asylum applications for Hungary (International Organization for Migration, 2018).

Hungary's policies directly clash with EU directives and core European Union values. Fidesz, the governing party of Hungary led by Viktor Orban, is extremely critical of the EU and migration. Part of this Eurosceptic platform has led Hungary to publicly state its position against refugees and migrants. These physical walls that Hungary has created combined with laws aimed at reducing the number of migrants attempting to enter Hungary has led to much criticism. The European Parliament stated that the Hungarian government has breached EU core principles including human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The EU has accused the Hungarian government of violating these core principles through its allowance of government corruption, the passage of anti-refugee laws, and controlling the media (Al Jazeera, 2018). Hungary has even been admonished by the European Court of Human Rights. "The court ruled that the detention of migrants in transit zones qualified as a violation of

the right to liberty and challenged the legality of the detention centers policies” (International Organization for Migration, 2018).

The Hungarian Foreign Minister, Péter Szijjarto, has responded to the criticism and defended Hungary’s stance on refugees. In a statement to Al Jazeera, Szijjarto states that Hungary is not violating EU values and argues that the right to asylum is “not a human right.” He also says, “My question is how you can be a refugee and violate the borders of five or six safe countries” (Al Jazeera, 2018). These sentiments are not just limited to the Hungarian government. Hungarian citizens have grown to have similar opinions on immigration because of government influence. Eurobarometer data indicates that 81% of Hungarians surveyed stated that they felt negatively towards immigration from outside of the European Union and 94% of people said that they would like more measures for irregular migration (International Organization for Migration, 2018).

Transposition as a Measure of Europeanization

Hungary met the transposition guidelines outlined by the European Commission. Hungary is placed at 9 (HU) on the chart shown in Figure 1 below and has a transposition deficit score of 0.9%. This means that Hungary correctly transposed the EU Regulations by the proposed timeline. This result was unexpected because of Hungary’s anti-EU stance and low migrant integration scores. [See Figure 1 below for a comparison of all the transposition scores.] Because Hungary has a better transposition score than both Germany and Spain, but some of the worst migrant integration scores in the EU, hypothesis one is rejected. This shows that there is a negative correlation between migrant integration and levels of Europeanization.

Migrant Healthcare in Hungary

For migrants trying to enter Hungary today, not being able to access healthcare is a common reality. Hungary's health score is 40, indicating that migrants do not have much access to health resources. According to Chapter 2, Articles 5 and 11 of Directive 2013/33/EU, migrants who have applied for asylum, or are even in detention, should be provided with healthcare resources. However, the Hungarian government disagrees. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó, discussed migrant healthcare at a plenary session on universal healthcare coverage at the UN General Assembly of 2019. He said, "Hungary will under no circumstances recognise the migration-related parts of the UN declaration on universal healthcare services, according to which UN Member States would have to provide the same level of services to illegal migrants as to their tax paying citizens (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019). Szijjártó also stated that the Hungarian government "is also unable to accept the fact that illegal migrants should in any way receive the same level of services as Hungarian tax paying citizens, and refuses to negatively discriminate against its own citizens" (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019). These statements directly oppose international and European Union standards for human rights.

Language barriers also play a huge role in migrants not receiving proper health care in Hungary. Only thirteen Member States provide interpreters for free to patients with inadequate proficiency in the host country's language. In Hungary, patients must pay for the costs of interpreters. The impact of not having this service, or not being able to afford it, can be detrimental. "This does not only disadvantage the patient, but it also creates a burden for the care providers, as doctors are legally obligated to inform the patient about their rights, diagnosis and treatment in order to obtain informed consent" (Mikaba, 2018).

Marek et al. (2019) conducted a questionnaire survey among migrants from the largest Hungarian refugee center to determine their health knowledge and access to healthcare in Hungary (p. e36). The results showed that 52% of participants had no information about healthcare provisions and 61% had not participated in any medical assessment since arriving to this healthcare center. Medical screening for certain infectious diseases is mandatory in Hungary and is performed a few days after arrival at reception centers; however, more than 90% of migrants leave these reception centers before the medical screening is completed and an asylum status decision is made (Marek et al., 2019). The MIPEX data used in this study shows that the Hungarian health system provides even less information to migrant patients than health systems of most of the EU countries.

The Hungarian public health care system is also positioned to favor those who are economically prosperous. This system is horizontally accessible for third country nationals that are economically active. People that have paid employment or those that are self-employed who are paying social insurance contributions are entitled to the health care system. Access to third country nationals who are not economic migrants is subject to the registration of residence and possession of a permanent residence permit (Illés & Gellér-Lukács, 2016). This means that asylum seekers, along with other migrants, in Hungary do not have equal footing with nationals in terms of healthcare.

Migrant Education in Hungary

The Hungarian government has complete control over the education system. Since gaining power in 2010, Viktor Orban has engaged in educational reforms, which includes supplying textbooks that portray nationalism (CNN, 2019). EU Directive 2013/33, Article 14

discusses that minor children of asylum applicants and applicants that are minors should receive access to education. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released a publication in 2019 that reviews the access to education for refugee and migrant children in Europe. This publication showed that migrant children in Hungary are often excluded from receiving education (UNHCR, 2019).

Despite Hungary's open anti-migration stance, Hungary is known for accepting migrants that are EU-nationals. The StepTogether Programme is one of the practices that is used to prevent students from leaving school early in Hungary. The main goal is to improve the language competence of migrant pupils and decrease school dropout rates to support pupils in their transition from primary to secondary school. This program helps to integrate migrant children who are non-native speakers. Historically, these students have been migrants and migrant children from neighboring countries (Rostás & Kecskés, 2016). Non-EU nationals do not receive the same treatment and that is indicated through Hungary's anti-immigration policies and its MIPEX education score of 15.

Labor Market Mobility in Hungary

Hungary has an overall labor market mobility score of 40, but a 0 for immediate access to labor markets. The literature clearly indicates that labor market integration is a vital aspect of effective migrant integration. However, discrimination is one of the barriers to migrants being fully integrated. In Hungary, ethnicity is second on the list of most serious discrimination factors (Kőmíves & Dajnoki, 2016, p. 363). The European Commission has examined forms of discrimination in the workplace. The authors highlight a study from the Commission that states that in Hungary the discrimination factors are age (over 55 years), disability, gender, and

ethnicity. Hungary demonstrates more of these discrimination factors than other EU Member States (Kórmíves & Dajnoki, 2016, p. 368). According to data from Special Eurobarometer 469, less than half of Hungarian citizens (32%) would feel comfortable with having a migrant as a work colleague (European Commission, 2018b). Out of those polled, only 27% of Hungarians believe that immigrants have a positive effect on the economy of the respondent's country (European Commission, 2018b).

Despite these negative sentiments, a pattern of increasing numbers of foreign employees in Hungary is apparent; there is an influx of workers coming from neighboring countries like Serbia and Ukraine. The Hungarian legal system categorizes migrants into categories of citizens of the European Economic Area and citizens of third countries. Members of the European Economic Area are able to work in Hungary without permission and do not need a work permit; members just have a duty to register (Cseh Papp et al., 2019). Thus, the Hungarian labor market also seems to not discriminate against migrants from other European nations but is more against migrants from countries outside of Europe.

In a study done by Botrić (2016), a comparative analysis approach is taken to analyze migration in Croatia by comparing it to Hungary and Slovenia using data from the European Social Survey, Labor Force Survey, and Migrant Integration Policy Index. This article highlighted that the “studies on European economies usually find that immigrants have lower labor force participation, higher rates of unemployment, and are frequently clustered in lower-paid jobs” (Botrić, 2016, p. 10). Compared to Slovenia and Croatia, Hungary is less open towards immigrants of a different race or ethnic group. The literature shows that migrants, especially those who have migrated for humanitarian reasons, are less likely to participate in local labor markets (Botrić, 2016, p. 18). Hungary discriminates against migrants that are non-

EU nationals, but prioritizes integrating migrants that are from European nations, especially nearby nations like Serbia. Overall, the Hungarian national policy provisions reflect its MIPEX scores, just like the policies of Germany and Spain also reflected their scores.

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

Hypothesis one focused on the correlation between migrant integration and Europeanization. The transposition deficit scores provided by the European Commission were used as a measure for Europeanization. The European Commission's goal for the transposition scores was for states to achieve a score between 0.5% and 1%. Out of the three chosen Member States, Hungary had the lowest deficit percentage at 0.9%, despite having one of the lowest MIPEX integration scores. Conversely, Germany and Spain are within the top ten scorers on the MIPEX scale, but Germany received a transposition deficit score of 1.1% and Spain received the worst score of all at 1.5%. Therefore, hypothesis one was rejected. For each case study, there was a negative correlation between the degree of migrant integration in the Member States and their levels of Europeanization. Despite the fact that Hungary has a better transposition score than Germany and Spain, it still has more restrictive migration policies and has a government that is very unwilling to accept migrants. These results indicate that Europeanization does not play a significant factor in migrant integration. [See Figure 1 below for the transposition deficit scores for each EU Member State.]

Hypothesis two focused on the correlation between national healthcare policies and migrant integration. [See Table 5 below for the MIPEX health scores sorted from lowest to highest.] None of the three countries had a particularly high MIPEX score in the healthcare policy area and the national policy provisions for each country reflected these scores. In both Germany and Spain, migrants may face difficulties attempting to get healthcare because of a lack of laws that protect undocumented migrants. The laws that are in place in both of these countries do not give migrants access to preventive care. The Hungarian government is directly against giving migrants any of the services citizens would receive, including healthcare. For this policy

area, the degree of migrant integration did correlate positively with national healthcare policy provisions. Thus, hypothesis two was confirmed.

Furthermore, hypothesis three focused on the relationship between national education policies and migrant integration. None of the case studies had high MIPEX scores in this policy area either. Germany and Spain have decentralized education systems and lack legislative frameworks for migrant education. The legislation for education can vary from region to region in both of these countries. In Hungary, the government has total control over the education system and uses education to promote nationalism, which means that migrant children are often excluded from receiving education. Thus, the policy provisions provided in these Member States correlated with their migrant integration scores and hypothesis three was also confirmed. [See Table 4 for the MIPEX education scores sorted from lowest to highest.]

Finally, hypothesis four was also confirmed through a positive correlation between national labor policies and migrant integration. [See Table 3 for the MIPEX labor market mobility scores sorted from lowest to highest.] All three countries had their highest scores in labor market mobility. Within the past two years, Germany has created new policies aimed at helping migrants that are looking for work to enter the labor markets in Germany more easily. Spain allows employers to sponsor migrants and allows migrants to immediately access the markets upon arrival. Hungary allows migrants from other EU Member States to work without a permit but does not allow the same labor privileges to non-EU nationals. The fact that labor market mobility was the highest scoring policy area for the case studies means that migrants generally have better opportunities to integrate through labor markets than other policy areas.

Furthermore, this study found that labor market mobility and migrant education are more connected than they initially seemed. If migrants are provided with access to education, then

they may be able to receive training that prepares them to join labor markets more effectively and efficiently. For example, programs like VET in Germany allow migrants to receive proper education and training to enter the labor market successfully. However, like the labor market policies, in all three countries the better the policy provisions for health and education, the higher the degree of migrant integration. Therefore, migrant integration is caused by the national policy provisions provided by each Member State in every policy area.

FINAL THOUGHTS

I argued that national policy provisions would play a greater role in migrant integration than Europeanization. This study showed that this theory was correct, and Europeanization did not play a significant role in migrant integration. Instead, national legislation and policies in EU Member States provide migrants with opportunities to integrate. Although national policy provisions are the direct cause for migrant integration, that does not mean that Europeanization does not play a limited role. As mentioned previously, Europeanization is a term that can refer to the spread of norms and values created at the supranational level. Although each Member State creates its own policies for migrant integration, Member States may create these policies with European Union values and directives in mind. For instance, EU Directive 2013/33 sets standards for Member States on what to do for migrants that have applied for asylum. If Member States are considering European standards when forming national policy provisions, then that is a form of Europeanization. However, if this is the only role that Europeanization plays in migrant integration, then policies created at the national level *are* the true cause of migrant integration.

The literature showed that factors such as migrant healthcare, education, and labor market mobility are policy areas that would best allow for migrant integration. The results of this study showed that out of these three policy areas, labor market mobility gives migrants the best opportunities for integration. Education also has a closer relationship to labor than anticipated. Migrants that receive education and specific vocational training are more likely to successfully enter the labor market. While this outcome was not expected, it does make sense. For someone to feel as if they are part of a society, one must have a role in it. Labor market mobility gives migrants this role and provides them with the means for both social and economic integration. Education gives migrants greater opportunity for social integration through providing resources for language and cultural assimilation. Vocational training or educational programs that are directly linked to job training help give migrants the means to enter the workforce. Someone who is integrated into the labor market will also have the means to acquire healthcare. These policy areas are all connected, and help migrants receive better equality and thus, give them more opportunities for integration.

Furthermore, this thesis contributed to the literature on Europeanization and migrant integration by solidifying the argument that the European Union does not play a large role in migration. Despite the importance of Member States in the field of migration policy, as a researcher, I still argue that multi-level governance is the best approach to discuss European integration. The EU and its nations are only able to function because of the interconnection of state and non-state actors at the supranational, national, and regional levels. Many Member States have national policies in addition to more specific policies that may differ at regional and local levels. The way that Member States are able to function would not be possible without this multi-tiered governance.

The concept of Europeanization may not just be restricted to the European region. Values like human rights and the ability to gain asylum are central values of the European Union, but also are values that many other nations like the United States also support. The extent to which these values are upheld all over the world will also impact how migrants are integrated into any society. Migrant integration is not something that just impacts Europe but is an issue that impacts nations all over the world.

To make effective migration policies, states must focus on international and regional human rights frameworks that ensure that migrants are protected. Creating effective migration policies goes beyond just forming legislation. Measures have to be enacted to ensure that these policies are actually being enforced and that they apply to all types of migrants. Additionally, for full integration, migration policies must include national policy provisions that allow migrants to enter labor forces. To allow for migrants to fully integrate into these labor markets, additional policy measures may need to be taken including providing vocational training or specialized education programs that allow for full language immersion. This would help migrants to communicate effectively in their host societies and be better equipped to acquire a job. If these measures are taken, and effective, enforceable legislation on migration and migrant integration is created, then migrants, not just in the European Union, but across the world will be able to integrate and receive basic human rights and resources.

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
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APPENDIX: MIPEX AND EUROPEANIZATION DATA VISUALIZATION

Figure 1: EU Member State Transposition Scores¹



¹ European Commission. (2019). *Single Market Scoreboard – Transposition*. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/transposition/index_en.htm

Table 1: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization
(in alphabetical order by country)

Country	MIPEX Overall Integration Score ²	Labor Market Mobility ³	Education ⁴	Health ⁵	Transposition Deficit (%) ⁶
Australia	66	58	76	67	0
Austria	48	64	47	63	1.2
Belgium	70	64	61	53	1.3
Bulgaria	44	50	3	28	0.7
Canada	70	81	65	49	0
Croatia	44	54	15	20	0.3
Cyprus	36	34	27	31	1.4
Czechia	45	52	38	44	0.7
Denmark	59	79	49	53	0.7
Estonia	49	73	58	27	0.3
Finland	71	80	60	53	0.5
France	54	54	36	50	0.5
Germany	63	86	47	43	1.1
Greece	46	55	36	27	0.5
Hungary	46	40	15	40	0.9
Iceland	46	51	23	40	0
Ireland	51	38	30	58	0.9
Italy	58	66	34	65	0.8
Japan	43	65	21	51	0
Latvia	34	46	17	17	0.8
Lithuania	38	40	17	26	0.6
Luxembourg	60	42	48	43	1.1
Malta	39	45	19	45	0.3
Netherlands	61	73	50	55	0.3
New Zealand	70	67	66	75	0
Norway	69	90	65	67	0
Poland	43	38	20	26	1
Portugal	80	91	62	43	0.4

² Huddleston, T., Bilgili, O., Joki, A.-L., & Vankova, Z. (2015). *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015*. Retrieved from <http://mipex.eu/>

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ European Commission. (2019). *Single Market Scoreboard – Transposition*. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/transposition/index_en.htm

Romania	45	57	20	45	1.1
Slovakia	38	21	24	31	0.2
Slovenia	48	38	26	18	0.7
South Korea	55	71	57	36	0
Spain	61	72	37	53	1.5
Sweden	80	98	77	62	0.1
Switzerland	46	59	42	70	0
Turkey	24	15	5	32	0
United Kingdom	56	67	57	64	0
United States	62	56	60	69	0

Table 1 (cont.)

Table 2: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization
(Sorted lowest to highest for overall scores)

Country	MIPEX Overall Integration Score	Labor Market Mobility	Education	Health	Transposition Deficit (%)
Turkey	24	15	5	32	0
Latvia	34	46	17	17	0.8
Cyprus	36	34	27	31	1.4
Lithuania	38	40	17	26	0.6
Slovakia	38	21	24	31	0.2
Malta	39	45	19	45	0.3
Japan	43	65	21	51	0
Poland	43	38	20	26	1
Bulgaria	44	50	3	28	0.7
Croatia	44	54	15	20	0.3
Czechia	45	52	38	44	0.7
Romania	45	57	20	45	1.1
Greece	46	55	36	27	0.5
Hungary	46	40	15	40	0.9
Iceland	46	51	23	40	0
Switzerland	46	59	42	70	0
Austria	48	64	47	63	1.2
Slovenia	48	38	26	18	0.7
Estonia	49	73	58	27	0.3
Ireland	51	38	30	58	0.9
France	54	54	36	50	0.5
South Korea	55	71	57	36	0
United Kingdom	56	67	57	64	0
Italy	58	66	34	65	0.8
Denmark	59	79	49	53	0.7
Luxembourg	60	42	48	43	1.1
Netherlands	61	73	50	55	0.3
Spain	61	72	37	53	1.5
United States	62	56	60	69	0
Germany	63	86	47	43	1.1
Australia	66	58	76	67	0
Norway	69	90	65	67	0
Belgium	70	64	61	53	1.3
Canada	70	81	65	49	0
New Zealand	70	67	66	75	0
Finland	71	80	60	53	0.5
Portugal	80	91	62	43	0.4
Sweden	80	98	77	62	0.1

Table 3: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization
(Sorted lowest to highest for labor market mobility)

Country	MIPEX Overall Integration Score	Labor Market Mobility	Education	Health	Transposition Deficit (%)
Turkey	24	15	5	32	0
Slovakia	38	21	24	31	0.2
Cyprus	36	34	27	31	1.4
Ireland	51	38	30	58	0.9
Poland	43	38	20	26	1
Slovenia	48	38	26	18	0.7
Hungary	46	40	15	40	0.9
Lithuania	38	40	17	26	0.6
Luxembourg	60	42	48	43	1.1
Malta	39	45	19	45	0.3
Latvia	34	46	17	17	0.8
Bulgaria	44	50	3	28	0.7
Iceland	46	51	23	40	0
Czechia	45	52	38	44	0.7
Croatia	44	54	15	20	0.3
France	54	54	36	50	0.5
Greece	46	55	36	27	0.5
United States	62	56	60	69	0
Romania	45	57	20	45	1.1
Australia	66	58	76	67	0
Switzerland	46	59	42	70	0
Austria	48	64	47	63	1.2
Belgium	70	64	61	53	1.3
Japan	43	65	21	51	0
Italy	58	66	34	65	0.8
New Zealand	70	67	66	75	0
United Kingdom	56	67	57	64	0
South Korea	55	71	57	36	0
Spain	61	72	37	53	1.5
Estonia	49	73	58	27	0.3
Netherlands	61	73	50	55	0.3
Denmark	59	79	49	53	0.7
Finland	71	80	60	53	0.5
Canada	70	81	65	49	0
Germany	63	86	47	43	1.1
Norway	69	90	65	67	0
Portugal	80	91	62	43	0.4
Sweden	80	98	77	62	0.1

Table 4: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization
(Sorted lowest to highest for education)

Country	MIPEX Overall Integration Score	Labor Market Mobility	Education	Health	Transposition Deficit (%)
Bulgaria	44	50	3	28	0.7
Turkey	24	15	5	32	0
Croatia	44	54	15	20	0.3
Hungary	46	40	15	40	0.9
Latvia	34	46	17	17	0.8
Lithuania	38	40	17	26	0.6
Malta	39	45	19	45	0.3
Poland	43	38	20	26	1
Romania	45	57	20	45	1.1
Japan	43	65	21	51	0
Iceland	46	51	23	40	0
Slovakia	38	21	24	31	0.2
Slovenia	48	38	26	18	0.7
Cyprus	36	34	27	31	1.4
Ireland	51	38	30	58	0.9
Italy	58	66	34	65	0.8
France	54	54	36	50	0.5
Greece	46	55	36	27	0.5
Spain	61	72	37	53	1.5
Czechia	45	52	38	44	0.7
Switzerland	46	59	42	70	0
Austria	48	64	47	63	1.2
Germany	63	86	47	43	1.1
Luxembourg	60	42	48	43	1.1
Denmark	59	79	49	53	0.7
Netherlands	61	73	50	55	0.3
South Korea	55	71	57	36	0
United Kingdom	56	67	57	64	0
Estonia	49	73	58	27	0.3
Finland	71	80	60	53	0.5
United States	62	56	60	69	0
Belgium	70	64	61	53	1.3
Portugal	80	91	62	43	0.4
Canada	70	81	65	49	0
Norway	69	90	65	67	0
New Zealand	70	67	66	75	0
Australia	66	58	76	67	0
Sweden	80	98	77	62	0.1

Table 5: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization
(Sorted lowest to highest for health)

Country	MIPEX Overall Integration Score	Labor Market Mobility	Education	Health	Transposition Deficit (%)
Latvia	34	46	17	17	0.8
Slovenia	48	38	26	18	0.7
Croatia	44	54	15	20	0.3
Lithuania	38	40	17	26	0.6
Poland	43	38	20	26	1
Estonia	49	73	58	27	0.3
Greece	46	55	36	27	0.5
Bulgaria	44	50	3	28	0.7
Cyprus	36	34	27	31	1.4
Slovakia	38	21	24	31	0.2
Turkey	24	15	5	32	0
South Korea	55	71	57	36	0
Hungary	46	40	15	40	0.9
Iceland	46	51	23	40	0
Germany	63	86	47	43	1.1
Luxembourg	60	42	48	43	1.1
Portugal	80	91	62	43	0.4
Czechia	45	52	38	44	0.7
Malta	39	45	19	45	0.3
Romania	45	57	20	45	1.1
Canada	70	81	65	49	0
France	54	54	36	50	0.5
Japan	43	65	21	51	0
Belgium	70	64	61	53	1.3
Denmark	59	79	49	53	0.7
Finland	71	80	60	53	0.5
Spain	61	72	37	53	1.5
Netherlands	61	73	50	55	0.3
Ireland	51	38	30	58	0.9
Sweden	80	98	77	62	0.1
Austria	48	64	47	63	1.2
United Kingdom	56	67	57	64	0
Italy	58	66	34	65	0.8
Australia	66	58	76	67	0
Norway	69	90	65	67	0
United States	62	56	60	69	0
Switzerland	46	59	42	70	0
New Zealand	70	67	66	75	0

Table 6: A Comparison of MIPEX Nations for Migrant Integration and Europeanization
(Sorted lowest to highest for transposition deficit scores)

Country	MIPEX Overall Integration Score	Labor Market Mobility	Education	Health	Transposition Deficit (%)
Australia	66	58	76	67	0
Canada	70	81	65	49	0
Iceland	46	51	23	40	0
Japan	43	65	21	51	0
New Zealand	70	67	66	75	0
Norway	69	90	65	67	0
South Korea	55	71	57	36	0
Switzerland	46	59	42	70	0
Turkey	24	15	5	32	0
United Kingdom	56	67	57	64	0
United States	62	56	60	69	0
Sweden	80	98	77	62	0.1
Slovakia	38	21	24	31	0.2
Croatia	44	54	15	20	0.3
Estonia	49	73	58	27	0.3
Malta	39	45	19	45	0.3
Netherlands	61	73	50	55	0.3
Portugal	80	91	62	43	0.4
Finland	71	80	60	53	0.5
France	54	54	36	50	0.5
Greece	46	55	36	27	0.5
Lithuania	38	40	17	26	0.6
Bulgaria	44	50	3	28	0.7
Czechia	45	52	38	44	0.7
Denmark	59	79	49	53	0.7
Slovenia	48	38	26	18	0.7
Italy	58	66	34	65	0.8
Latvia	34	46	17	17	0.8
Hungary	46	40	15	40	0.9
Ireland	51	38	30	58	0.9
Poland	43	38	20	26	1
Germany	63	86	47	43	1.1
Luxembourg	60	42	48	43	1.1
Romania	45	57	20	45	1.1
Austria	48	64	47	63	1.2
Belgium	70	64	61	53	1.3
Cyprus	36	34	27	31	1.4
Spain	61	72	37	53	1.5