ETHICAL ENTANGLEMENTS: HUMAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS IN MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY SPAIN

BY

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DISSERTATION

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Abstract

My project explores three central questions. First, how do analyses of human-animal relationships throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century Spanish literature suggest more inclusive visions of multispecies community? Second, what can these representations of animal protagonists tell us about the ways in which authors might resist hegemonic practices of socially-sanctioned violence toward both humans and non-humans? Finally, more broadly speaking, how might the consideration of a non-Anglophone cultural context such as Spain’s inform current work in literary ecofeminism, ecocriticism, and the environmental humanities? To answer these questions, my analyses draw on theories primarily from animal studies and ecofeminist philosophy. Any ecofeminist approach recognizes all forms of marginalization and systemic violence as inextricably entangled. My analysis adopts ecofeminist Josephine Donovan’s theory that practicing literary analysis through an ethic of care can inspire a cultural change in attitude that discourages domination and promotes responsibility and respect for humans and nonhumans alike. I follow Spanish ecofeminist philosopher Alicia H. Puleo’s adaptation of this idea in the Spanish context in forming my analyses. Because much ecofeminist theory and animal studies analytical work focuses primarily on Anglophone contexts, my project seeks to expand the scope of these analytical frames as a secondary goal.

I analyze novels, short stories, and fables published throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in Spain to explore these questions. Chapter II analyzes themes of anthropomorphism, zoomorphism, metaphoric cannibalism, and gluttony in early twentieth century works by Miguel de Unamuno and Emilia Pardo Bazán. Chapter III examines forced silence and self-censorship as a form of violent repression seen in Franco-era children’s literature by Carmen Laforet, Mercè Rodoreda, and Ana María Matute. Chapter IV looks at entanglement
and exclusion as patriarchal residue in fictional attempts at alternative community building in contemporary works by Isabel Franc and Jesús Carrasco.
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Chapter I: Introduction: Representing Human-Animal Relationships

Pinín, con medio cuerpo fuera de una ventanilla, tendió los brazos a su hermana; casi se tocaron. Y Rosa pudo oír entre el estrépito de las ruedas y la gritería de los reclutas la voz distinta de su hermano, que sollozaba exclamando, como inspirado por un recuerdo de dolor lejano:
- ¡Adiós, Rosa!...¡Adiós, Cordera!
- ¡Adiós, Pinín! ¡Pinín de mio alma!...
Allá iba, como la otra, como la vaca abuela. Se lo llevaba el mundo. Carne de vaca para los glotones, para los indianos; carne de su alma, carne de cañón para las locuras del mundo, para las ambiciones ajenas.¹

from Leopoldo Alas, ¡Adiós, Cordera! (1892)

This concluding scene from Clarín’s turn-of-the-century tragedy about interspecies friendship, family, and loss encapsulates the patriarchal power structures that figuratively and literally feed off marginalized groups. As Rosa and Pinín, poor teenage siblings from rural northern Spain, shout heartfelt farewells, the two link their current, hopeless situation to that of their family cow Cordera. Shortly before this final scene, their father was forced to sell Cordera, his children’s companion and his primary means of providing for their family, in order to pay his landlord. The children bid goodbye to the unsuspecting bovine as the same train that will later transport Pinín to war whisks her to her slaughter for beef. Clarín’s prescient story thus links class, gender, geography, and species to the unrestrained capitalistic mechanisms that come to define Spain in the early twentieth century. While classism, sexism, and urbanism/ruralism have all merited important academic work in Spanish Cultural Studies, work on speciesism, the aspect of modern Western culture that places humans at the top of a hierarchy over all other creatures remains scarce.

¹ My translation: “Pinín, with half his body hanging out the window, extended his arms toward his sister, and they almost touched. And Rosa could hear, between the train’s rhythmic racket and the shouts of the other recruits, her brother’s distinct voice. He was sobbing as he exclaimed, as if inspired by a memory of distant pain: “Farewell, Rosa!...Farewell, Cordera!” “Farewell, Pinín! Pinín of my soul!...” There he went, like the other, like their grandmother-cow. The train took her world away. Flesh of cow for the gluttons, for the indianos; flesh of her soul, cannon fodder for the madness of the world, for distant ambitions.”
Speciesism, like sexism, racism, ableism, and many other -isms, names a hegemonic system that uses violence to marginalize those who are not considered part of the “dominant” group – human animals, in this case. The field of Literary Animal Studies seeks to examine how speciesism is exposed, reinforced, questioned, and (re)defined in different contexts in the hopes of better understanding how socially-sanctioned speciesist practices intertwine and inform other institutionalized forms of violence, even as those other forms come to be recognized as detrimental by a wider and wider public while speciesism does not (Donovan, *Aesthetics of Care* 1). Ecofeminist reading, therefore, “exposes and opposes intersecting forces of oppression, showing how problematic it is when these issues are considered separate from one another” (Adams and Gruen 1). Animal Studies, as a branch of ecocritical and ecofeminist theory, places non-human animals in the spotlight, as the lens through which to more closely examine individual representations of humanity and its responsibility to non-human animals, the environment, and to other humans. It is my intention to look to literary representations of human-animal relationships throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in Spain to more profoundly understand how this brand of socially-sanctioned violence has transformed through the rise of capitalism, dictatorship, and democracy, and to examine how such relationships might present opportunities to resist oppression.

Spain is, of course, not exceptional in its proclivities for systemic violence. However, there are two well-known and fairly widespread cultural practices that suggest that Spain’s cultural products might provide fruitful material for critical inquiry applying ecofeminist and animal studies lenses: bullfighting and *jamón* (cured ham). These cultural practices, bullfighting and ham eating, have long served as symbols indicative of belonging to the Spanish nation. One need only consider the imposing presence of the *toros de Osborne* on Spanish highways (Morales), or the
news outlet ABC’s 2012 report on the 57,000 emergency room visits per hour due to poor ham-cutting technique ("En España"). Historically speaking, the link between the enthusiastic consumption of pork products and Spanish cultural identity is unsurprising, given that public displays of non-adherence to Jewish and Islamic prohibition of pork consumption were common after the expulsion of Muslims and Jews from the Kingdoms of Castile and Aragón in 1492. With respect to bullfighting and its ilk, Katarzyna Beilin’s work is particularly illuminating of the privileged but not uncontroversial place of the bullfight in Spanish literary, cultural, and political history. According to her, the culturally-sanctioned violence that culminates in the bullfight seeps into every aspect of Spanish society.

In his 2017 documentary, Ed Antoja links both enthusiasm for bullfighting and a pride in a robust porcine product industry in Spain to astounding rates of companion animal abandonment. In fact, the Affinity Foundation, which explicitly studies and promotes the benefits of pet companionship in Spain, consistently finds Spain to be a leader in animal abandonment in the European Union. For Antoja, cruelty toward bulls and pigs translates to cruelty toward dogs and cats and reflects a lack of empathy for non-human life, which he sees as a direct contributor to the current climate crisis.

Critics like Beilin and filmmakers like Antoja are not alone in their concern. Spain provides a unique look into how Western politics might be impacted by social mobilization around concern for the planet and for animals in particular, as the recent years have seen the rise of the Animalist Party (Partido Animalista Contra el Maltrato Animal) in Spain’s multi-party parliamentary system. While the academic disciplines that contribute to Animal Studies and animal rights activism may have begun primarily in Anglophone contexts, Spain’s particular manifestations of violence toward animals reveal complex nuances and strategies that can both challenge and enrich
ecofeminist and Animal Studies praxes. Spain is not, of course, the only country with a unique history of violence directed toward non-human animals; however, its previous, current, and future relationships between humans and non-humans merit critical scrutiny. My project seeks to lay groundwork for tracing how non-human animals represented in literary works challenge hegemonic structures by unraveling speciesism and bringing to light the forms of interhuman, interspecies, and environmental violence to which speciesism connects both directly and indirectly. Through this process, my project also aims to examine how these challenges to patriarchal and speciesist thinking often fall short in fully confronting marginalizing structures.

Overarching Theoretical Frameworks: Literary Ecofeminism and Animal Studies

Each chapter employs more specific theoretical apparatuses from animal studies and ecofeminism, as well as from related fields like disability studies, trans* studies, and queer studies. The following concepts inform my analyses both explicitly and implicitly:

Carnism and Meat Culture: We Are What We Eat (and Wear, and Cuddle, and Ride, and Experiment on…)

Melanie Joy’s Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows: An Introduction to Carnism (2010) explains the basic tenets of the speciesist system in which the vast majority of modern human cultures operates. Joy’s term carnism, originally proposed in 1991, refers to hegemonic cultural practices, that is those that go unmarked as “normal,” that place non-human animals’ bodies at the mercy of human consumers. Although not named as such, this idea permeates Carol J. Adams’ foundational ecofeminist text The Sexual Politics of Meat, originally published in 1991. I discuss Adams’ seminal work in greater detail in Chapter 2.
In “What Is Meat Culture?,” the introductory chapter to her 2017 edited volume *Meat Culture*, to which Adams also contributed, Annie Potts employs carnism as the ideology that drives what she calls meat culture:

If carnism is the ideology, then ‘meat culture’ is all the tangible and practical forms through which the ideology [carnism] is expressed and lived. Meat culture therefore encompasses the representations and discourses, practices and behaviours, diets and tastes that generate shared beliefs about, perspectives on, and experiences of meat. Like any culture, meat culture is not one thing, nor is it static; it varies widely across and within geographical and cultural locations, as this volume will show. While there is a shared general meat culture across industrialized nations – one which maintains that meat is normal, natural, necessary and nice (known as the 4Ns) (Piazza et al 2015) – different countries, and even different places within the same country, will have their own forms of meat culture reflecting regional and social differences such as the ways in which nonhuman species (especially those categorized as killable and edible) are understood and treated. (19-20)

While several of the texts I analyze in my chapters do indeed deal with meat consumption, I do not interpret Potts’ and Joy’s terms as applicable only to meat eating contexts. Instead, I argue that the texts I analyze together help to form a picture of Spain’s particular flavor of meat culture in the twentieth century onward that looks beyond bullfighting to more everyday and more universal human-animal encounters. My analyses emphasize how carnism and meat culture are informed by and perpetuate other structures of violence stemming from patriarchy.
Anthropomorphism and Language: Animals Communicating Like Humans

With few exceptions, the human-animal relationships depicted in the works I analyze involve non-human animals with the capacity to communicate human-like thoughts and actions in human language. The implications of this fact are many – anthropomorphism is difficult in this respect. Karla Armbruster cautions that representations of non-human animal subjectivity must always be approached with a critical eye, because “the practice of speaking for others, even when undertaken with the best intentions, carries a real danger of misrepresentation and, in particular, of erasing difference, of turning the other into the same” (23). Literature, like any product of human culture, because it is written by humans, can only ever perform some degree of anthropomorphism in its representation of non-humans, regardless of the ethics or intention that might inform such an approximation. Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman explain that anthropomorphism is inescapable and deeply rooted to our relationships with animals in the sciences as well as in the humanities. For these Ecofeminist and Human-Animal Studies critics, animals are never neutral, and representations of non-humans are never without purpose. I apply the same logic to the human-animal relationships in my analyses. Thus, my project relies upon understanding and accepting anthropomorphism as an imperfect, but essential strategy for representing the non-human both collectively and individually.

The discussions offered by linguist, disability studies, and queer studies scholar Mel Y. Chen’s of animacy’s slippery nature within cognitive linguistics demonstrate that not only is language use itself is always in flux, but that as such, animacy relates directly to ideas of both representation and access (Animacies 24-30). Chen suggests that the idea of animacy operates in this way because hegemony demands language that is also racialized, ableist, minoritizing, heteronormative, or, in a word, dehumanizing. Chen insists that “queering is immanent to animate
Empathy, Ethics-of-Care, Ecofeminism: Cultivating Human to Human and Non-human to Human Relationships through Animals in Literature

Literary and Feminist Studies scholar Josephine Donovan continues to write extensively on the merits of reading literature with an ethic-of-care, what Sunaura Taylor describes as “the ways in which caring should play a vital role in conceptions of justice” (“Interdependent Animals” 109), as a means through which to improve interrelations between individuals of all species and thereby create a more compassionate place in which to live. Her 2016 book *The Aesthetics of Care: On the Literary Treatment of Animals* develops this tactic through close analyses of Anglophone and Russian fiction. The premise of Donovan’s book relates directly to philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s contention that reading certain types of novels (realist novels) cultivates a reader’s capacity for empathy (“Finely Aware” 148). Donovan’s volume extends this empathic cultivation to a readership who wants to be more responsible. Donovan’s insight directly informs my project’s overarching motivation: I want more people to actively care about the plights of non-humans and I believe that caring begins by deliberately paying attention.

Carol J. Adams and Lori Gruen’s 2014 edited volume *Ecofeminism: Feminist Intersections with Other Animals and the Earth* offers a wide array of analytical insights into various debates and categories within ecofeminist theory’s current wave. The diverse perspectives highlight the field’s intersectionality and celebrate its versatility. Their volume offers both a comprehensive
history of ecological feminism’s (ecofeminism) evolution and its applications in various fields as well as a historical timeline of related activism. While I find all of the essays profoundly eye-opening, of particular influence in my project are those by disability rights activist and artist Sunaura Taylor, philosopher Karen Emmerman, philosopher Ralph Acampora, and Carol Adams. I discuss Acampora’s and Adams’ chapters at length alongside texts in Chapter One.

In both Taylor’s contribution to Ecofeminism and her 2017 book Beasts of Burden: Animal and Disability Liberation, she offers even greater, more specific insight into the nexus of culturally-marginalizing practices that affect non-humans and disabled humans in strikingly similar and mostly devastating ways. In her 2014 chapter, she dissolves the myth of independence. For Taylor, it is important to recognize that while non-human animals, both domestic and wild, and disabled humans are more obviously dependent, “the truth is, all of us are dependent. We human beings begin life dependent on others and most of us will end life dependent on others. Yet dependence often becomes an excuse for exploitation and has extremely negative connotations – no one wants to be dependent” (112). Most egregious to Taylor and others is that the dependency argument is a fairly common justification for subjugating animals to the point of raising them cruelly in unhealthy, demoralizing conditions for mass food production. The leap from this disgraceful treatment of animals to insulting, less than dignified treatment of the physically or mentally disabled is a small one, especially in a state of unchecked capitalist patriarchy (114-115). Taylor concludes reminding us that “[v]ulnerability and dependence can be unsettling as they are states that require intimacy, empathy, and self-reflection, but they also hold the potential for new ways of being, supporting, and communication – new ways of creating meaning across differences in species and ability” (124). Taylor’s insight reaffirms the central tenet of an ethic of care: constant consideration of others beyond oneself.
Emmerman addresses the inevitability of moral relativity in all relationships, but especially in those involving differentiated power dynamics like those between humans and non-human animals. Emmerman uses a hypothetical situation and her own experience with her premature newborn son, what she calls an “ecofeminist contextualized account.” She could not nurse him and was met with the reality that there was no vegan option at the time for a formula that would allow her son to get the proper nutrition he would need to survive in his fragile state. She opted for a formula that used sheep lanolin to extract the necessary ingredient, meaning that Emmerman’s choice supported an industry that made money literally by exploiting sheep’s suffering (161-162).

Emmerman uses her examples to demonstrate two points. The first is that her ecofeminist approach to “inter-animal conflict” is not inherently based on hierarchy but is predicated on relativity. That is to say that her son’s suffering did not matter more simply because he was human, but specifically because he was her son. According to her reasoning, the sheep’s life is not less valuable because it is not human. Such a line of thinking clearly challenges the hegemonic humanist view, even if it upholds it in effect. Her second point is that “Moral life is about recognizing remainders as the norm rather than the exception. […] Lived experience tells us that, in many cases, we do not simply maximize the good, respect rational agency, or show loving attention and move on worry-free even if moral theory tells us we could. We know moral remainders are a part of moral life because we experience them” (163). Emmerman’s concept of the moral remainder, the idea that we must take from other beings at times of necessity without possibility of remuneration, is useful even if unsettling. In every text analyzed in the chapters that follow, moral remainders abound in the relationships I analyze, because, as Emmerman explains, “As a result of our choices and actions, sometimes nonhuman animals will lose, sometimes humans
we do not know will lose, and sometimes humans or nonhumans we love and cherish will lose. We have to accept that moral remainders are often a part of moral life even when we do our very best to mitigate all harms” (162). For Emmerman, while there is no escaping moral remainders, recognizing the systemic structures that force moral remainders into existence can hopefully lead to their diminution and less overall suffering.

Lori Gruen’s *Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic for Our Relationships with Animals* (2015) offers an extensive analysis of the ways in which empathy is employed socially and academically. Her major premise is that by recognizing and developing the human capacity to empathize fully with other beings, we can work to make more lives livable and more futures viable. She defines her eponymous term:

> Entangled empathy: the type of caring perception focused on attending to another’s experience of wellbeing. An experiential process involving a blend of emotion and cognition in which we recognize we are in relationships with others and are called upon to be responsive and responsible in these relationships by attending to another’s needs, interests, desires, vulnerabilities, hopes, and sensitivities. (3)

Gruen’s term informs my analyses as well as inspires my project’s title. Empathy, as a key component to both ecofeminist and animal studies work, also finds a significant place in literary studies. Specifically, Gruen’s term nuances Martha Nussbaum’s belief in literature as a vehicle for moral education. I delve deeper into Gruen’s term in Chapter IV.

Human-Animal Studies in Spanish Cultural Studies: A Review of Select References

Georgina Dopico Black’s 2010 article “The Ban and the Bull: Animal Studies, Cultural Studies, and Spain” draws attention to the dearth of animal studies work in Spanish Cultural
Studies and makes the case for taking up animal studies theories as a challenge to the humanist, anthropocentric norms that the field sustains. She broaches the topic using the recent Catalan bullfighting ban to demonstrate how easily what appear to be actions seeking to improve animal welfare can be manipulated for highly specific and exclusionary causes. In this case, the bullfighting ban was lauded as an indication of Catalan moral superiority over Spanish brutishness. However, legal protections awarded to other culturally-sanctioned forms of cruelty toward bulls came shortly after, including correbous, festival events which typically involve setting flammable material affixed to a bull’s horns on fire while human participants try to dodge the bull’s desperate thrashing in search for relief (236). Dopico Black’s article emphasizes what is at stake on a more than symbolic level when real non-human individuals’ fates are left to a system that considers their suffering secondary to human caprice. As she suggests, without critical attention to animal studies within Spanish Cultural Studies, such detrimental attitudes, both toward non-humans and other humans alike, we as scholars and humans will not develop the “sympathetic imagination” required to meet the increasingly difficult demands of living in a hostile and cruel social system (245).

Ecofeminist philosopher Alicia H. Puleo’s extensive work Ecofeminismo para otro mundo posible (2011) provides a comprehensive background of ecofeminism itself in its many previous iterations, connecting ecofeminist theory and activism to female sexualities, ecological citizenship and education, and interculturality and Spanish colonialism. Of particular importance for my project are her final two chapters. Her eighth and penultimate chapter “Los animales en la ética ecofeminista” discusses the problems in binary thinking that lead to women’s animalization and the subjugation and stigmatization of both in patriarchal societies: “Las actitudes de empatía y piedad por la vulnerabilidad del no humano han sido tradicionalmente devaluadas como debilidad
femenina” (370). Puleo teases out debates within animal ethics like that of conservation versus individual rights before turning to Spain’s bullfights and related activities. This chapter examines narratives of female bullfighters often lauded as indicators of progress in terms of gender inclusivity to counter complaints of anti-feminism and anti-modernism in both bullfighting culture and Spanish popular culture. Critiquing popular works like Almodóvar’s Hable con ella, Puleo labels such depictions, both fictionalized and real, as instances of false feminism, identifying tauromachy’s overt violence as not only anthropocentric but also androcentric in its strict maintenance of both species and gender hierarchies in its performance (390). Puleo’s final chapter calls for a radical re-imagining of society according to the feminist ethic-of-care tradition, but with a bit of a twist:

Sostenibilidad es solidaridad con el conjunto de la ciudadanía, una ciudadanía ecológica que no conoce fronteras y con la cual nos comprometemos a preservar el espacio de vida común. Es responsabilidad con las generaciones futuras. Es preocupación por las personas más vulnerables a la contaminación y a la degradación medioambiental: mujeres, niñas y niños, trabajadoras y trabajadores afectados por la industria y la agricultura tóxicas, indígenas y pueblos empobrecidos del Sur. […] sostenibilidad es también compasión y justicia para ese Otro, el animal no humano, silencioso e ignorado, pero capaz de anhelar, amar y sufrir.  

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2. My translation: “Attitudes of empathy and pity toward non-human vulnerability have traditionally been devalued as feminine weakness.”

3. My translation: “Sustainability is solidarity with the amalgam of the entire citizenry, an ecological citizenship that does not know borders and with which we commit to preserve the space of common life. It is responsibility shared with future generations. It is preoccupation for the people most vulnerable to pollution and environmental decline: women, children, workers affected by industry and agricultural toxins, indigenous peoples and poor communities of the Global South. […] sustainability is also compassion and justice for that Other, the non-human animal, silent and ignored, but capable of desiring, loving, and suffering.”
Puleo’s concluding call to action demands an ecofeminism that recognizes not just caring for others within the system that exists, but one that seeks to level it to make way for patriarchy’s compassionate replacement. Although I do not yet know what this system might look like or be called, my project is inspired by Puleo’s call in combination to those of literary ecofeminists like Josephine Donovan, discussed in the previous section, to read with compassion for animals in the hope that such readings can cultivate empathy and that a deep desire for mitigating suffering in all its forms will percolate through societies and eventually, albeit slowly, transform capitalist patriarchy into a more sustainable and more caring world system.

Next, Katarzyna Olga Beilin’s 2015 book *In Search of an Alternative Biopolitics: Anti-Bullfighting, Animality, and the Environment in Contemporary Spain* delves into late twentieth and early twenty-first century debates around ideas of nationhood, masculinity, and environmental ethics through examining cultural products surrounding the national pastime: bullfighting. Her analyses incorporate historical essays, short stories, films, public activism, lawmaking, and political campaigns into debates that resist Spanish political and cultural hegemony, like Catalan independence, rights for Great Apes, and meat-eating, peel back biopolitical, and often necropolitical, structures which strive to consistently divide and categorize through animalization. She concludes that recognizing and understanding the alternative, less-violent ways of resisting cultural hegemony reveals the interconnectedness of Spanish society’s sanctioned violences so that cruelty in all forms, from bullfighting and *correbous* to Spain’s participation in the United States’ “War on Terror,” must be addressed as having the same roots and proliferating the same damage to the environment as well as the fragile social fabric in favor of capitalist patriarchal interests.
While neither Puleo’s nor Beilin’s text is devoted solely to Spanish literature or human-animal relationships, these authors’ work is indispensable to my project. Drawing on these authors’ powerful insights into the complexities of anthropocentrism and the pervasiveness of its destructive effects, my project focuses on literary human-animal representations that occur in mundanity, in the day-to-day exchanges that humans might typically have with members of non-human species.

Abel A. Alves’ 2011 book *The Animals of Spain: An Introduction to Imperial Perceptions and Human Interaction with Other Animals, 1492-1826* traces the omnipresence of non-human animals in Iberian historical and cultural production from the beginning of Spain’s overseas empire to the early nineteenth century. While the period and scope of Alves’ study predate and exceed mine, his work is the only one I have found explicitly examining representations of human-animal relationships in Spanish literary and cultural studies. His work also explores the specific implications of Spain’s particular brand of interconnectedness with the Latin American world and thus its unique and ongoing legacy of animalization.

Katarzyna Beilin and William Viestenz’s 2016 edited volume *Ethics of Life: Contemporary Iberian Debates* brings together posthumanist cultural analyses of Iberian cultural products and practices with the intention of expanding the scope of human responsibility for lives other than human ones. Their goal is to formulate an ethics that “calls for respect for all forms of life rather than fetishizing death, for adequate representation of live organisms’ realities and needs and for the search for new political solutions, which would assure their peaceful coexistence, minimizing all forms of violence and destruction” (xii). Through these interventions, the contributors expand ideas about whose lives, and quality of life, counts and who is responsible for them.
Ed Antoja’s 2017 documentary *Empatía*, already briefly mentioned, links quantifiable research and philosophical debates to anecdotal attempts to approach life in twenty-first century Spain without relying on non-human animal suffering. His project was produced overtly at the request of, and in cooperation with, FAADA (Fundación para el Asesoramiento y la Acción en Defensa de los Animales) an activist non-profit group based in Catalunya that views anti-cruelty awareness and pedagogy as core to its mission and vision for populace empathetic toward eliminating animal suffering. The documentary explores narratives of food, family, clothing, and bullfighting, as Ed, the always-conflicted protagonist, struggles to transform his lifestyle into a vegan one. The film’s argument is that an expansion of humans’ capacity for empathy is the only way to slow our planet’s rapid deterioration and that in Spain, that should take the form of veganism. While the documentary is convincing on the whole, it does not adequately explore intersections of ability, race, class, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, or even simply being from a part of Spain that is not Barcelona, a cosmopolitan city from one of the wealthiest parts of Spain. However, the producers’ insistence on not including graphic representations of violence makes the absence of violence even more noticeable: the viewer is left to imagine the violence that the anecdotes and statistics allude to, arguably allowing for more squeamish viewers to better ingest the information presented and (hopefully) recognize the small changes that can add up to a positive difference. For my purposes, the remarkable absence of violent images and descriptions reinforces the idea that all forms of violence preclude empathy, especially those aimed at non-humans. His documentary also provides an accessible and relatable entry into the real-world impact that considering human-animal relationships can have for a general, non-academic public. I will return briefly to Antoja’s work in the concluding chapter as a further example beyond literature that demonstrates how cultural attitudes about human violence directed toward non-human animals
have changed over time. My chapters examine such shifts in literary works during the twentieth and into the twenty-first century.

Chapter II juxtaposes two short stories by Emilia Pardo Bazán and Miguel de Unamuno’s novel *Niebla* (1914) to examine representations of humans and animals entwined in metaphors of gluttony and cannibalism. In *Niebla*, the canine character Orfeo eulogizes his human’s tragic death-by-overeating, condemning human society for its hypocrisy. Pardo Bazán’s “El cerdo-hombre” (1911) explores similar themes, but this time the protagonist is bullied into eating his companion animal before taking his own life. Pardo Bazán’s “Navidad de lobos” (1918) fully inhabits non-human minds narrating a starving wolf pack’s quest for sustenance that leads them to a human village during Christmas. They find that some humans are burning the village, inadvertently creating a Christmas feast for the desperate pack. While the wolves are quick to point out that they would never hurt their brethren in such a manner, their hunger quickly turns to bloodlust. Through these striking representations, these texts condemn human greed and overconsumption as enabled by exploitation of those we dominate. Hunger, flesh, and hypocrisy link these three works, envisage unsettling dynamics and blurred boundaries between humans and non-human animals. Drawing on theories of meat consumption and metaphoric cannibalism, I analyze how zoomorphism, or animalization, and anthropomorphism work simultaneously to disrupt hegemonic ideas about species, morality, and social standing.

Chapter III analyzes three short stories written by Carmen Laforet (“El secreto de la gata” 1952), Mercè Rodoreda (“Gallines de Guinea” 1958), and Ana María Matute (“El saltamontes verde” 1960). These stories take place during the middle part of the Franco dictatorship, and each features a child protagonist with conspicuously absent parents. Laforet’s protagonist discovers a matriarchal cat commune, and her lifelong maintenance of its clandestinity questions the familial
norms strictly enforced in fascist Spain. Rodoreda’s story narrates a young boy’s brutal initiation into socially-sanctioned violence as he plays witness to a goose’s bloody transformation from an imagined companion into real-life poultry. Matute’s protagonist is a mute orphan who follows a talking grasshopper in search of his lost voice. The pair meets many unsavory humans and fearful non-humans along the way, before the grasshopper reveals to the boy that he is in fact his voice and that the protagonist needs only to kill him in order to retrieve it. Through their relationships with animal companions, these children cope with their circumstances through self-censorship. These stories explore themes of enforced silence as violent oppression. I argue that in their illustrations of biophilic fantasy, these children’s stories demonstrate the violent means through which patriarchal hierarchy is maintained, even as they envision more harmonious societal alternatives.

The fourth chapter examines Isabel Franc’s “lesbofables” (2008) and Jesús Carrasco’s *Intemperie* (2013). Franc reworks classic fables alongside original ones that together conceive of a community exclusively for female-identifying queer non-humans of any species. Her use of humor provides what is likely the only work analyzed in these chapters that can be considered light-hearted, however, the intersections of ability, species, sexuality, and gender expression that these fables broach are indeed serious matters. I juxtapose Franc’s fantastical vision of a safe-haven community for LGBTQ+ individuals with Carrasco’s much darker bildungsroman, which illustrates a very different type of precarious community. Carrasco’s novel describes a young boy’s escape into the desert wilderness, where he quickly develops a symbiotic relationship with an aging goatherd and his flock. As circumstances grow more dire, the protagonist continues to flee, his tragic story of chronic psychological, physical, and sexual abuse is slowly revealed to the reader. Although very different texts, each describes formulating a new community that protect
marginalized, vulnerable, multispecies group. While these divergent texts imagine non-human animals as a base for forming communities of liberation and protection that exist outside of patriarchal capitalism, both suggest the limitations of the literary imagination to formulate a workable community devoid of patriarchal violence. In these narratives, exclusion is revealed to be an inevitable component of creating alternative communities, and thus illuminates the current inescapability of violence as a tool in forming communities of liberation.

My project does not intend to be exhaustive in either the analyses of the works presented nor in the works selected themselves. Instead, I hope to provide a springboard for other likeminded scholars interested in how the value of our personal relationships with our non-human companions manifests itself in literature and beyond in ways many of us have yet to comprehend. From companion animal adoption (Unamuno, Carrasco) and training (Pardo Bazán, Matute), entertainment (Pardo Bazán, Franc), eating (Unamuno, Pardo Bazán, Rodoreda, Carrasco), hunting (Pardo Bazán, Carrasco), playing (Laforet, Rodoreda, Matute), self-preservation (Laforet, Carrasco, Franc), and self-determination (Unamuno, Matute, Franc), these works upend the traditional patriarchal and anthropocentric expectations that readers might anticipate. I argue that paying critical attention to the human-animal relationships depicted in each of these texts sheds light on the ways violence toward non-human animals reflects contemporary social dynamics and concerns during different periods in modern Spain. Such an analytical lens further reveals the ways in which oppressive circumstances and structures might be questioned or even contested in Spanish literature.
Chapter II: Aristocratic Appetites: Gluttony, Cannibalism, and Zoomorphic Narratives in the Early Twentieth Century

*El animal llega hasta cierto punto; pero pasado de ahí empiezan una limitación y una pasividad que infunden ganas de rehabilitar las teorías de los filósofos al considerarle máquina animada.*

4. from Emilia Pardo Bazán “El cerdo-hombre” (1911)

– *No lo he comprado, Domingo; este perro no es esclavo, sino que es libre; lo he encontrado.*
- *Vamos, sí, es expósito.*
- *Todos somos expósitos, Domingo. Trae leche.*

5. (134) from Miguel de Unamuno *Niebla* (1914)

The turn of the twentieth century in Spain was a period marked by profound uncertainty. The loss of the last overseas colonies to the United States in the conclusion to the Spanish-American War was known to the Spaniards as the “Desastre de 98”. Although Unamuno has always been considered a principal figure of the *Generación del 98*, critics such as José Manuel González Herrán make a compelling case for Pardo Bazán’s inclusion in this group, arguing that she, too, expressed similar preoccupations with Spanish national identity upon the losses of Spain’s final ultramarine colonies in Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean (139-140). Whether or not literary history ultimately chooses to group the writers together, their works, both fiction and not, largely demonstrate the anxieties associated with the time period: loss of/weakness of national identity, concern for Spain’s political and economic future, and remedying the moral failings to which this group of writers and intellectuals attributed Spain’s imperial decay. Furthermore, Pilar Faus, among others, have documented their mutual admiration, and Unamuno himself declared, upon Pardo Bazán’s passing in 1921, that “Era doña Emilia una formidable discutidora; se perecía por

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4. “The animal only goes so far. Beyond that point there begin a limitation and a passivity that inspire the impulse to rehabilitate philosophers’ theories upon considering the animal an animate machine” (My translation).

5. Fite translation: “No, I didn’t buy him, Domingo. This dog is not a slave; he’s free-born. I found him.”

“Ah, yes! he’s a foundling.”

“We are all foundlings, Domingo. Bring some milk” (60).
discutir de todo y con todos. Y decía que yo era uno de los que más le movían a contradicción”6 (“Recuerdos”). In other words, their juxtaposition in this chapter is not merely for temporal reasons, but also because their professional relationship of admiration and debate makes the similarities in their representations of non-human animals as society’s moral judges even more noteworthy. While I do not suggest that either had particular concerns for non-humans or for Spain’s treatment of them, the analyses I offer here reveal an exasperation with humanity as a whole that, as I read them, forces consideration beyond human moral endeavors.

Emilia Pardo Bazán, perhaps more widely associated with early Spanish feminism and for her role in developing Naturalism in Spanish literature in the nineteenth century than for her “noventayochismo,” often includes non-human animals in her texts; for example, “Piña” (1890) in which themes of gender difference, childhood, imperialism, class, and as I would add, speciesism, all materialize in the eponymous monkey’s tragic plight. This chapter examines two of her lesser known short stories from the early 20th century in which similar themes manifest themselves in more complex ways and in settings notably displaced from the Spanish mainland. The third text I study is Niebla (1914), a canonical novel by philosopher and author Miguel de Unamuno, a central figure of the Generación del 98. While analyses of this early modernist novel, or nivola as it is described in the work itself, mention the canine character Orfeo, they do not discuss the implications of this character’s subjectivity. For instance, Noël Valis reads Orfeo’s soliloquy as parody and “a cliché, a verbal cursilería” (45). To take Orfeo the puppy seriously, as I suggest, transforms the protagonist Augusto Pérez into a human who behaves like a lost and helpless canine, and thus opens the novel to new interpretations and to questions about

6. My translation: “Doña Emilia was a formidable debater; she would die to discuss everything with everyone. And she would say I was one of the ones who most moved her to contradiction.”
consciousness, domination, and kinship. As my analyses will demonstrate, all three of these narratives upend, to strikingly uncomfortable effect, the traditional animacy hierarchy on which many Western human languages and thereby societies operate.

In my estimation, key to each of these narratives is that the non-human characters’ subjectivities, albeit presented to varying degrees, effectively thwart traditional human domination over the non-human. Mel Y. Chen’s critical engagement of the animacy hierarchy in cognitive linguistics illuminates how this thwarting works:

I read this hierarchy, treated by linguists as an avowedly conceptual organization of worldly and abstract things with grammatical consequence, as naturally also an ontology of affect: for animacy hierarchies are precisely about which things can or cannot affect – or be affected by – which other things within a specific scheme of possible action (with the added delimitation within linguistics that the hierarchy is, with reference to a culturally shared order of things, a field of reference whose shared usage facilitates communicating). […] Above all, I claim that animacy is political, shaped by what or who counts as human, and what or who does not. (Animacies 30, italics and parentheses in original)

Using Chen’s idea of animacy as a defining characteristic of human-created social hierarchy, I examine how these three narratives use anthropomorphized animal subjectivity and human-animal relationships to question the cultural status quo. Furthermore, in addition to anthropomorphizing the non-human characters in each text, each story also performs a degree of zoomorphism or animalization on its human characters, as my analyses demonstrate. I argue that each of these instances of zoomorphism designates that particular human character to be morally inferior to other humans in some respect.
Hungry for More: Augusto Pérez as Metaphysical and Material Dog-Man in *Niebla* (1907, 1914)

Miguel de Unamuno’s *Niebla* (*Mist*) is considered a canonical work of the beginning of the twentieth century during which time the Spanish nation-state was struggling to redefine itself after the loss of its last overseas provinces (colonies) in 1898, effectively ending its centuries’ old status as a world empire. As Gerard Brown explains, this period was characterized by a seemingly universal pessimism as the Spanish nation struggled to define itself in new terms in the new century (15). Augusto Pérez, the novel’s protagonist, can be read as a metaphysical exploration of this national anxiety. Pérez is a bourgeois intellectual, pampered by his mother, absent a father, whose philosophizing dominates his life and impedes his ability to connect with his own body and to relate to others. As such, while not overtly offending anybody, Augusto somewhat haphazardly wanders through his young adulthood without forming meaningful connections with anybody with one exception – his dog. One day, while literally following his paramour (unbeknownst to her) he stumbles upon a tiny, apparently abandoned pup who he takes home and christens Orfeo (*Orpheus*). From this point on, Orfeo becomes the “interlocutor” with whom Augusto has many a philosophical debate, albeit largely one-sided. Orfeo always listens intently to his “master” who interprets his full, attentive eyes to be in perpetual agreement with whichever line of thinking or philosophical questioning Augusto is pursuing at the moment. In other words, despite the dog’s presence and interaction with him, Augusto is really only talking to himself.

Or so the reader might think until reaching the epilogue. Up to this point, Unamuno has already challenged his reader by having Augusto learn that he is but a work of fiction, confront his

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7. Although the English version’s title is *Mist*, fog is another possible translation which I believe better conveys the confusion in which the protagonist frequently finds himself. A reading of Augusto as having a cognitive and/or mental disability might relate this idea of fog to Mel Chen’s “Brain Fog” (2014). In this article, Chen argues for more acceptance of neurodiverse or neurotypical analyses in academia. Michael Bérubé’s *The Secret Life of Stories* (2016) explores the ways in which literary analyses of canonical characters might change by understanding neurodiversity.
author, a character named Unamuno after the novel’s real-life author, and attempt to defy Unamuno-the-character by committing suicide by quite literally eating until he dies. Of course, there is no way for the reader to know definitively whether or not Augusto’s “rebellion” was successful because the author-character claims that he orchestrated his protagonist’s death. Regardless of the interpretation of these metaliterary events, the structure forces the reader to question the boundaries and limitations of perception, perspective, and existence itself. Furthermore, Augusto’s endearing ineptitude in the human world renders his attempts to undermine the structural authority that controls his destiny comical and even ridiculous, despite the gravity that surrounds his death, be it attributed to authorial homicide or the protagonist’s vindicating suicide. Such dark humor tinges the reader’s experience with narrative irony that certainly calls into question the value of philosophical pursuit.

The epilogue further muddles this metaphysical mess. The narrator, himself a character with whom the protagonist interacts in his daily life, explains that as custom dictates, there needs to be an epilogue, but in this case the only character whose fate is worth mentioning is that of little Orfeo because he is the one who most profoundly felt his master’s absence (296-297). What follows appears to be an interior monologue during which time the dog both laments his master’s passing and criticizes both him and humanity in general as a hypocritical species who contaminates those around them. Orfeo alternates between sad, impassioned comments questioning what has happened to his poor master (297-300) and critical judgments of Man’s allegedly superior position terming him “el animal hipócrita por excelencia” (298) and accusing humankind of subjugating dogs, “perverting” them and making them “dog-like” (“perruno”), and transforming their qualities into insults (298-299). Orfeo then claims his own role in feeding Augusto’s penchant for philosophizing through his constant and loyal companionship. Upon finishing his “funeral
oration,” Orfeo dies at his master’s feet and the novel ends with Augusto’s servant attributing Orfeo’s death to his grief. Orfeo’s eulogy, although not delivered publicly to other characters in the novel, nonetheless equates Augusto’s speaking to barking and blames Man’s hypocrisy through language for making dogs supposedly inferior. It seems likely that it was Augusto’s inability to connect with the physical, material reality of his existence, that led to his demise, and that he is only redeemed through his dog whom he takes in and cares for, thus constituting the only act in life that could be deemed a contribution to society’s well-being. Moreover, through Orfeo’s turning the blame for animalizing the animal kingdom through his subjugating hypocrisy, the novel’s interrogation of existence and human consciousness extends to all definitions of consciousness. Through Augusto, the novel asks about the origin of consciousness; I argue that through Orfeo the novel disregards the seemingly intuitive privileging of human consciousness to ask what grants that privilege to one type of lived consciousness over another. It is this idea of privileged consciousness, or a consciousness hierarchy, around which my reading of the novel centers. For Chen, the animacy hierarchy unilaterally assigns value to forms of sentience recognizable to humans in order to rank and thereby Other them. Chen’s powerful insight applies directly to the questions which I argue Orfeo’s epilogue inspires.

Orfeo’s anguish challenges the Cartesian idea of animals as automata without a consciousness, an idea which Augusto himself regularly refers to and also distorts. For instance, in the chapter immediately following his troubling encounter with Unamuno-the-character, Augusto understandably begins a rapid downward spiral into what will ultimately be a fatal existential crisis. He asks his housekeeper Liduvina in vain if he exists; she sees no reason to answer him. He then resorts to his habitual inner monologue, this time citing Descartes: <<Pienso, luego soy – se decía Augusto, añadiéndose -: Todo lo que piensa es y todo lo que es piensa. Sí,
todo lo que es piensa. Soy, luego pienso.>> (287). In his clarifying footnote, editor Mario J. Valdés interprets Augusto’s inversion of the famous Cartesian declaration as one that “privileges existence over essence” (287, my translation). In this respect, Augusto’s desperate musings serve to affirm his own autonomy in the face of external threat, that of Unamuno the character (also the omniscient narrator) proclaiming Augusto’s non-existence. At the same time, the privileging of existence over essence that Valdés reads also grants existence and thereby thought in Cartesian terms to the protagonist’s eulogizing pup.

Yet, such a bestowal of the capacity of cognition and, by extension, suffering in Cartesian terms directly contradicts Descartes’ understanding of non-human animals as beings who live without thinking, without consciousness, and therefore without the capacity to suffer. Through Orfeo’s heartfelt lamentation, however, the novel characterizes Orfeo’s capacity for suffering as one steeped in his own mortality and therefore in his materiality. While Augusto is wholly devoted to the idea of existence, it is the physicality of the body which confounds him. It is not until he encounters a threat to his physical existence that he confronts his material body and attempts to exert control over it by attempting suicide. His death can be understood to mark his materiality as a part of his being to which he should not be granted access. Like his master, when Orfeo transgresses his socially assumed role of silent observer and speaks, he too dies. Thus, the connection between Augusto and his canine companion resembles an idealized Western human-dog relationship, as Erica Fudge describes (37).

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8. Fite translation: “I think, therefore I am,” said Augusto to himself; and then he added: “Everything that thinks is, and everything that is thinks. Yes, everything that is thinks. I am, therefore I think.” (309). Interestingly, pienso is also the Spanish word for kibble, which to me suggests further that Augusto can be read as dog-like, especially in Spanish.

9. See Luc Ferry for a brief but thorough discussion and rebuttal of Cartesian humanism and how it enables the objectification of animals as unique objects of human bloodlust.
Fudge’s analysis of pets’ silence explains the potential gravity of Orfeo’s perceived transgression:

Humanist humanity is undone when the animal mind is contemplated, either because the animal mind is revealed to be just like the human mind, thus destroying notions of human superiority; or because the animal mind is recognized as being always beyond our understanding, thus revealing how limited that understanding actually is. Whichever way you approach the issues, what is revealed are the frailties of the human. (...) We like our pets’ silence because it allows us to write their words for them, and what they say - and what we write – reminds us of our power” (52).

Understood in this way, a central theme emerges in the novel around the relationship between body and mind: mentality rules over materiality or physicality. However, as Fudge’s insight illuminates it, the novel’s ultimate revelation of Orfeo’s mind concedes that Augusto himself has been mistaken all along. Augusto’s insistence upon his mind being the only determining factor in his existence, according to his Cartesian understanding of human superiority over non-human animals, collapses upon his death and is overturned in Orfeo’s eulogy.

The connection between Orfeo and his human companion ventures into heretofore unexplored territory when considering Augusto in zoomorphic terms. As Wendy Doniger explains, zoomorphism, or animalization, tends to work in more subtle, complex ways than does anthropomorphism, because unlike anthropomorphism, zoomorphism is never taken for granted (17). While Doniger’s analysis revolves around the use of language specifically, like humanity and animality, zoomorphism is not predicated on one feature alone. As described earlier, one of Orfeo’s chief complaints about human language is that it has rendered Man a hypocrite who in turn made
Dog dog-like, *perruno*, and rendered those whom the adjective is used to describe as inferior. Ironically, the narrative structure of the novel lends itself to this reading of Augusto himself as dog-like in relation to his mother.

Augusto’s penchant for following women and becoming easily distracted during conversations certainly support this reading, as Robin Fiddian has convincingly argued (1757). However, Fiddian’s analysis misses Orfeo’s materiality; while he is of course a symbolic dog, as any fictional representation of anything is, within the storyworld of *Niebla*, Orfeo also is an actual puppy with a puppy’s body, a puppy’s needs, and, as Jill Morstad reminds us, is therefore charged with a puppy’s both real and symbolic load (194). While Fiddian’s reading of Orfeo as a symbol of Augusto’s child-like character is compelling, I propose that Orfeo’s arrival portrays Augusto himself as *perruno*. The dog’s introduction in juxtaposition with Augusto’s traumatic memory of losing his father and becoming an orphan upon his beloved mother’s passing, along with Orfeo’s departure upon his person’s death, suggest a reading of Augusto not only as child-like, but also as a canine-like human. In this respect, Orfeo’s symbolic role finds grounding in material questions of what it means to be a dog and what it means to be a human with dog-like characteristics – both questions to which Orfeo himself returns the reader in his epilogue.

In chapter five, Augusto sits in a park which inspires his recollection of a tragic scene from his childhood. Although he cannot make sense of it at the time, an unsuspecting young Augusto is clearly traumatized after finding his father dying and bloody. He remembers his mother rushing to him in her despair and holding him close: “Poco después, su madre, temblorosa de congoja, le apezugaba a su seno, y con una letanía de ¡hijo mío!, ¡hijo mío!, ¡hijo mío!, le bautizaba en
lágrimas de fuego” (131). From here, Augusto recounts a happy childhood in which his mother proclaimed herself to “live only for his sake”, a successful adolescence and university education, and his mother’s graceful death in old age while holding her adult son’s hand:

Y vino la muerte, aquella muerte lenta, grave y dulce, indolorosa, que entró de puntillas y sin ruido, como un ave peregrina, y se la llevó a vuelo lento, en una tarde de otoño. Murió con su mano en la mano de su hijo, con sus ojos en el ojos de él. Sintió Augusto que la mano se enfriaba, sintió que los ojos se inmovilizaban. Soltó la mano después de haber dejado en su frialdad un beso cálido y cerró los ojos. Se arrodilló junto al lecho y pasó sobre él la historia de aquellos años iguales.11 (133)

These two flashbacks find parallels with scenes involving Augusto and Orfeo, the first occurring mere paragraphs after his Proustian12 romp through his life with his mother. Immediately after thinking to himself that his mother would be able to help him out of his current predicament in courting Eugenia, the beautiful piano instructor who repeatedly snubs his proposals, Orfeo appears almost as though he were Augusto’s mother’s reply to his thought-prayer:

Unos débiles quejidos, como de un pobre animal, interrumpieron su soliloquio.

Escudriñó con los ojos y acabó por descubrir, entre la verdura de un matorral, un

10. Fite translation: “A little later his mother, trembling with grief, pressed him to her bosom, and with a litany of “My son! My son! My son!” baptized him with tears of fire” (55).
11. Fite translation: “And then came death, that gentle composed, and unhurried death, without pain, which came in noiselessly, on tiptoe, like a bird of passage, and carried her away in a slow flight one autumn afternoon. She died with her hand in the hand of her son, her eyes fixed upon his eyes. Augusto felt her hand growing cold, and he saw that her eyes had ceased to move. He let her hand go after leaving upon its coldness a warm kiss, and he closed her eyes. He knelt beside the bed and the whole story of those uneventful years passed in review before him and above him” (58).
12. Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu (1913-1927) is somewhat contemporaneous with Niebla, although the reference I make here is anachronistically descriptive. I do not intend to imply that Unamuno’s structuring of this chapter was in any way directly influenced by or mimetic of Proust’s now famous madeleine scene or vice versa. I am simply referring to the similarities between the thought processes that bring both Proust’s and Unamuno’s characters to a significant childhood memory that the narrative extends to describe the characters’ strong ties to their respective mothers.
pobre cachorrillo de perro que parecía buscar camino en tierra. <<¡Pobrecillo! – se dijo - . Lo han dejado recién nacido a que muera; les faltó valor para matarlo.>> Y lo recojió.

El animalito buscaba el pecho de la madre. (…) Y Orfeo fue en adelante el confidente de sus soliloquios, el que recibió los secretos de su amor a Eugenia. <<Mira, Orfeo – le decía silenciosamente –, tenemos que luchar. ¿Qué me aconsejas que haga? Si te hubiese conocido mi madre… (…) Y ahora, ¿qué vamos a hacer, Orfeo?>>

In this internal exchange, Orfeo comes to replace Augusto’s mother as life companion, even if Augusto does not recognize either as such, as his steadfast determination to marry Eugenia suggests. While this connection between Orfeo and Augusto certainly is established as one between parent and child, as Robin Fiddian has argued, the fact that Orfeo is an orphaned dog and not an orphaned creature - or any other type of orphaned creature - cannot be overlooked.

Fiddian interprets this same juxtaposition in chapter five as one painting Orfeo as Augusto’s substitute for a human child, as he also reads character-narrator Víctor Goti’s acquisition of a dog and Unamuno-the-character’s’ novel/nivola (1751). I agree with Fiddian’s claims. However, considering the lengths to which the narrative voice/Unamuno-the-character

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13. Fite translation: “A faint moaning, as if from some poor animal, interrupted his soliloquy. He searched about and finally, in the midst of a thicket, he discovered a poor puppy which seemed to be trying to find a way out. “Poor little beggar,” he said to himself. “He is just newly born, and they have left him out to die. They hadn’t the courage to kill him.” And he picked him up.

The little animal was seeking the breast of his mother. (…) Thenceforth Orfeo was the confidant of his soliloquies and the recipient of the secret of his love for Eugenia.

“Listen, Orfeo,” he said to him quietly, “we have to fight. What do you advise me to do? If only my mother had known you – (…) And now, what are we going to do, Orfeo?” ” (59-60).

14. I must point out that in his analysis, Fiddian does not make any explicit distinction between Unamuno the author of *Niebla* and Unamuno the character-narrator within *Niebla*.
goes to depict Augusto as dog-like himself, it is worth considering Augusto as a zoomorphized character. Fiddian himself concedes that Augusto’s own actions even portray him as canine in character: “Pronto podremos ver cómo la imagen del perro se corresponde precisamente con el carácter de Augusto”15 (1757). As pointed out earlier, Fiddian’s emphasis on metaphor elides Orfeo’s materiality: while certainly symbolic, he is a dog for a reason. Considering Augusto’s “dogness” in terms of zoomorphism encourages an interpretation of specific types of people in relation to specific types of non-human animals, as Wendy Doniger explains:

[Although this time [in cases of zoomorphism as opposed to those of anthropomorphism], a human being is the explicit object, the bestial qualities imbued to the human usually reveal an observation of animals more detailed (if no more accurate) than that of anthropomorphism, and the text teaches us simultaneously what sort of person it thinks that animal is like and what sort of animal it thinks that sort of person is like. (17)

If understood as an example of zoomorphism, Augusto and Orfeo become grounded in both symbolic and material terms within the text, because Man and Animal can no longer be relegated to generic terms. Along with being considered generalized types representatives of their respective species, each must also be understood as nuanced individuals: one man named Augusto and one dog named Orfeo, each with a unique combination of biology and lived experience.

Augusto’s zoomorphism is concretized at the novel’s end after Orfeo delivers his funeral oration in which he explicitly accuses humanity of subjugating dogs and in effect making them

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15. “We will quickly see how the image of the dog corresponds precisely with Augusto’s temperament/character” (my translation). In this “Me Too” moment during which I write this analysis, Augusto’s dog-like qualities is also quite “dawg”-like; he is objectively a creep toward the women he encounters, and in particular toward women of lesser economic means.
perruno in humanity’s own, subordinating terms. He promptly dies of heartbreak in a scene that parallels that of Augusto’s memory of his mother’s death in chapter five, just before he meets Orfeo the puppy:

<<Siento que mi espíritu se purifica al contacto de esta muerte, de esta purificación de mi amo, y que aspira hacia la niebla en que él al fin se deshizo, a la niebla de que brotó y a que revirtió – Orfeo siente venir la niebla tenebrosa… Y va hacia su amo saltando y agitando el rabo - ¡Amo mío! ¡Amo mío! ¡Pobre hombre! >>

Domingo y Liduvina recojieron luego al pobre perro muerto a los pies de su amo depurado como éste y como él envuelto en la nube tenebrosa. Y el pobre Domingo, al ver aquello, se enterneció y lloró, no se sabe bien si por la muerte de su amo o por la del perro, aunque lo más creíble es que lloró al ver aquel maravilloso ejemplo de lealtad y fidelidad. Y dijo: - ¡Y luego dirán que no matan las penas!16 (300)

This closing exclamation from Augusto’s loyal servant returns us to the text’s challenge of the Cartesian understanding of animals. For Descartes, the question of animal suffering was foreclosed by the assumption that animals could not suffer or feel real physical pain because he believed their reactions to be merely mechanical or biological ones rather than reasoned responses. Jacques Derrida, among other philosophers, questioned if there is even a worthwhile distinction between the two terms, but proposes that once we decenter the human in our understanding of language and

16. Fite translation: ““I feel my own soul becoming purified by this contact with death, with this purification of my master. I feel it mounting upward towards the mist into which he at last was dissolved, the mist from which he sprang and to which he returned. Orfeo feels the dark mist coming. And he runs to his master, jumping and wagging his tail. Dear Master! Dear Master! Poor man!”

A little later Domingo and Liduvina picked up the poor dog lying dead at the feet of his master, like him purified, and enveloped like him in the dark cloud. And when poor Domingo saw that, he was deeply affected and he wept. Whether for the death of his master or for the death of the dog, it might be hard to say. But it is most likely that he wept at the sight of that marvelous example of faithfulness and loyalty. And he exclaimed:

“And yet they say that grief never kills!”” (331-332).
communication, speech becomes one mere element of what is really a material and corporeal act of meaning-making (“Animal Responded?” 127). Chen takes this analysis further to suggest that in order to decenter the human with regard to language we must also decenter language itself as the leading measure of sentience (Animacies 92-3). For Chen, although not an unproblematic venture, to expand the measures of sentience beyond language would naturally disrupt the anthropocentric animacy hierarchies which govern most societies’ social structures.

With this expanded understanding of language, non-human animals are now fully encompassed in this realm, as Niebla’s ending suggests. Erica Fudge explains that “recognizing the existence of animal language reveals, once again, humans’ ability to interpret animals to be limited; we cannot fully know all that they are saying. [...] , human language itself is revealed to be limited in that it cannot represent the many beings with which it shares the world. Either way, human power is undercut when the animal is believed to respond” (63). Niebla’s ending does not leave room for doubt regarding Orfeo: he very clearly is capable of responding to the situation unfolding before him. In this respect, as Augusto is revealed to be a character in a novel (within the novel/nivola), he strives unsuccessfullly to affirm that he is indeed not an automaton of his author’s creation, thus disproving the original Cartesian motto and placing him precisely where his dog theoretically should be in the Cartesian humanist hierarchy.

However, his inversion of Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum, rendering it as “Soy, luego pienso”, creates space for his canine companion to surpass him into the realm of beings who can fully engage with their material environment on emotional terms. The narrative voice/Unamuno the character presents this zoomorphic inversion at Augusto’s deathbed: where his corpse replaces that of his late mother and Orfeo, at his feet, occupies the physical and symbolic space where Augusto kneeled at his mother’s bedside. As Fiddian interprets it psychoanalytically, Augusto names Orfeo,
the mythical Orpheus who loses his beloved Eurydice and devotes his life to recovering her from the land of the dead, because of his unconscious desire to be reunited with his mother (1758). Augusto’s search ends as his quest is now complete as is Orfeo’s metamorphosis into an anthropocanine. As Fiddian puts it, when Orfeo functions as “un mecanismo por el cual la novela se muerde la cola”, because the reappearance of Orfeo at the end cleverly echoes the beginning when Augusto waits for a dog to appear to determine which direction he should walk (1757). Therefore, a zoomorphic reading of Augusto Pérez leads us to conclude that humans who are too dog-like in spirit and dogs who are too human-like in demeanor must be eliminated from society through authorial (read: authoritative) intervention. For both Orfeo and Augusto, this authority of course means Unamuno the real-life, extradiegetic author and his fellow Generación del 98 writers, who, as Brown argues, believed themselves to be the ones who could point Spanish society in the proper direction (18-19). Such an authorial act actually supports Orfeo’s indictment of humanity as hypocritical, once again disturbing the traditional animacy hierarchy, but this time, in the material world. The recursivity that Fiddian’s reading of Orfeo’s in Augusto’s death scene perhaps alludes to the futility of such an endeavor: Man will never renounce his language, his dominance, nor his hypocrisy.

Gluttons for Punishment: Cannibalism and Class in “El cerdo-hombre” (1911)

Over-eating and zoomorphism are themes in the two Emilia Pardo Bazán short stories I discuss in this chapter that come together more overtly than in Unamuno’s Niebla. The nexus of these two concepts takes the metaphoric form of cannibalism: each story describes the premature

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17. My translation: “a mechanism through which the novel bites its own tail.”
death of a human and attributes it to human overconsumption, and each features gluttonous flesh-eating as the text’s principal action. Further connecting these two stories is the fact that each takes place not only outside of Spain but in Northeastern Europe, perhaps suggesting that the messages about social conflict in each story may have been too blunt for Spanish audiences to thoughtfully accept as critiques of Spanish society itself. As in Niebla, the characters who indulge in the gluttonous act do so in complete ignorance of or indifference to the effects such a privilege implies. The act is inherently violent, as each of the three narratives depict it, but the violence is more overt in Pardo Bazán’s short stories.

Emilia Pardo Bazán’s short story “El cerdo-hombre” (1911) delivers the gutwrenching tale of a man who loses his companion pig to upper class appetites. While many of Pardo Bazán’s works explore gender dynamics through narrating perspectives of female characters, this short story instead examines morality through class dynamics and contrasting undesirable visions of masculinity. The story begins by highlighting the protagonist Durof’s financial woes. He is described as the now-impoverished progeny of a long line of Russian nobles and aristocrats, thus opening the story with class as a core theme. The narrator emphasizes Durof’s unique talent for training animals, a gift that he has indeed perfected. The narrative voice takes time here to emphasize that while many make the case for animals being just shy of human levels of intelligence, that “el animal llega hasta cierto punto; pero pasado de ahí empiezan una limitación y una pasividad que infunden ganas de rehabilitar las teorías de los filósofos al considerarle máquina animada.”18 However, given the story’s dramatic turn, it is difficult to read this assertion

18. “The animal only goes so far. Beyond that point there begin a limitation and a passivity that inspire the impulse to rehabilitate philosophers’ theories upon considering the animal an animate machine” (My translation). This statement describes the essence of Cartesian philosophy regarding animals, as discussed in the previous section.
without irony; descriptors like “limitation” and “passivity” typically apply to women in contrast with men. I will return to this feminization later.

The irony surrounding the assertion that the “animal can only go so far” is further evidenced in the narrator’s description of the pig during his performances:

Aquel cerdo maravilloso hacía más monerías que ningún niño. El número del cerdo sabio, del cerdo-hombre, llenaba el circo todas las noches; la multitud, encantada de sus habilidades, le echaba a la pista hasta cajas de bombones de chocolate, como si se tratase de un chiquillo genial y sublime, a quien era preciso mimar.\(^{19}\)

(Emphasis added)

The direct comparison in this paragraph transforms the companion pig not only into a human but into Durof’s child. This idea of the pig-as-child is confirmed in the following paragraph describing his act as that of a student learning both elementary academics and etiquette. However, in a description of a later part of the act, the pig comes to play the part of a woman desperate to save herself from coerced sex and to save her lover from death:

Y todos miraron curiosamente a Durof, que, en aquel mismo instante, con ligera varita en la mano, dirigía el trabajo artístico de su alumno, haciéndole berrear un aria, el "<<Vissi d’arte, de Tosca>>, cómicamente remedado. […] Y al terminar, más pronto que otras veces, el trabajo "<<la despedida del cerdo-hombre>>", según rezaba el cartel, y mientras el público reclamaba "<<bis>>", se vio al tonto, que, acercándose a su discípulo, le abrazó con cariño. Aumentó la algazara, porque

\(^{19}\) “That marvelous pig performed more antics than any child. The wise pig’s number, the pig-man’s, used to fill the circus every night; the crowd, enchanted by his abilities, even threw him boxes of chocolate bonbons, as if they were dealing with a little boy, jolly and sublime, who it was necessary to fawn over” (My translation).
In this part of the routine, the pig mocks a famous opera aria to the audience’s great amusement. This particular aria, “Vissi d’arte” from Puccini’s Tosca (1900), is performed by the female lead, Flavia Tosca, in her tragic lament: she cannot understand why God seems to have abandoned her to a cruel fate in which she must either condemn her lover to death or succumb to a brutal sexual encounter with her lover’s would-be murderer (Green). This foreshadowing scene is set immediately after the show’s intermission, during which time Stroganoff convinces Durof to sell him his pig for fifty thousand rubles. Casting the pig in such a role transforms el cerdo-hombre into a desperate woman for the audience’s metaphorical consumption as entertainment. He is doubly transformed into metaphorical woman and later into actual meat for consumption for Durof, and the unfortunate pig is consumed as literal entertainment and meat for Stroganoff and his well-to-do lackeys.

As Carol Adams discusses in The Sexual Politics of Meat, her 1990 landmark study of the intersections of meat-eating and misogyny, such a depiction of woman as consumable flesh is nothing new. In her 2014 essay “Why a Pig?”, Adams delves deeply into the pig/woman analogy specifically, Adams makes use of a photograph displayed in the magazine Playboar (evoking Playboy) of a pig reclining in women’s underwear to discuss the intertwining of racism, sexism,
and animalization in the figure of the reclining nude throughout history. She classifies this portrait as “anthropornography”, a term also highly applicable to the pig as tragic operatic heroine in “El cerdo-hombre”:

Anthropornography is a neologism coined by Amie Hamlin and introduced in The Pornography of Meat22 to identify the specific sexualizing and feminizing of animals, especially domesticated animals consumed as food. Animals in bondage, particularly farmed animals, are shown “free,” free in a way that “beautiful” women have been depicted as “free” – posed as sexually available as though their only desire is for the viewer to want their bodies. (Especially when that freedom was a lie.) They become the “not-free free.” (221)

Thus, through this anthropornographic anthropomorphosis the cerdo-hombre also undergoes a blatant feminization akin to that which occurs to Durof himself. In the paragraph describing the audience, the narrative voice explains that the effect Durof’s pig had on his public was much greater than he could have anticipated because in the audience were some familiar faces, or, at least, faces of men who found Durof’s familiar:

Durof había presentado al admirable tocino en una tournée por Italia, España, Francia y Turquía. Al contratarse para el circo de San Petersburgo, Durof descontaba, naturalmente, el efecto que su alumno había de producir. Fue, sin embargo, mayor de lo que él mismo pensaba. El cochinillo se tragó a los demás artistas, así iracionales como racionales. […] ¿No era aquél el propio Sergio Orlik, pariente de los Dolgoruki? Sergio en persona…Pero ¿qué cerdito, qué asombro!

Realmente no se comprendía que un animal…Y recordaron: ya antaño, en el colegio, Sergio domesticaba arañas, atraía moscas…El gorrino realmente rayaba en fenómeno: daban ganas de preguntar si tenía dentro un hombre, si era autómata, una mecánica admirable…

Fue entonces cuando el príncipe Vladimiro Strogonof, no el más linajudo, pero acaso el más rico de aquellos señores colmados de todos los goces de la existencia, murmuró:

-Eso, pronto lo vamos a saber.

- Sí, hay que averiguarlo… Es preciso que Sergio nos haga tragar conocimiento con el cerdo-hombre.

- ¡Bah! – exclamó Vladimiro -. Hay un medio más sencillo, y voy a ponerlo en práctica. Ese cerdo me lo como yo asado, y os convido a vosotros al festín…23

(Emphasis added)

The language used in the aristocrats’ scheming is not only clever but deeply troubling; *gorrino* in peninsular Spanish can refer to either a young pig or a person with a disheveled appearance. The double meaning here serves both as anthropomorphism and zoomorphism as well as to set up the

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23. “Durof had presented the admirable bacon on a tour of Italy, Spain, France, and Turkey. Upon being hired for the St. Petersburg circus, Durof underestimated, as one does, the effect his student would produce. It was, nonetheless, greater than he had planned. The piglet outshone all the other artists, rational and irrational alike. […] Wasn’t that the very Sergio Orlik, relative of the Dolgorukis? Sergio in person…But, what a piggy, what a wonder! It really didn’t make sense that it was an animal…And they remembered: before, in school, Sergio used to train spiders, trap flies…the little pig truly bordered on phenomenon: they wanted to ask if there was a man inside, if it was a robot, an admirable machine…” (My translation).

It was then that Prince Strogonof, not the most blue-blooded but perhaps the wealthiest of those men saturated with all the joys of existence, murmured:

“That we will find out shortly.”

“Yes, we have to verify it…Sergio must make us privy to the secret of the pig-man.”

“Bah!” exclaimed Vladimiro. “There is a simpler way, and I am going to put it to the test. I am going to eat that pig roasted, and you’re all invited to the party…” ” (My translation).
impending flesh feast as cannibalistic for all human parties involved, because the phrasing leaves it unclear whether or not Stroganoff employs the term to refer to Durof or to the cerdo-hombre.

Therefore, during this moment of recognition, Prince Vladimiro Strogonof reveals himself to be sadistic in his indulgences, as the narrator quickly attributes as a “signo de raza.” His interest in verifying the cerdo-hombre’s secret goes beyond mere curiosity into the realm of cruelty towards his one-time counterpart. Raza can translate to either “race” or “breed.” I prefer the latter option for raza as it coincides with the earlier description of Strogonof as “not the most blue-blooded” because it negatively animalizes Strogonof’s character as part and parcel of his social class and marked classism. Furthermore, translating raza as “race” would merely draw attention to Russian aristocrats as sadistic and cannibalistic whereas “breeding” simultaneously refers to upbringing and heredity. Thus, “breed” complicates a naturalist reading of this work in ways that “race,” in the context of the story, cannot. Thus, the language play in this scene zoomorphizes both Stroganof and Durof: Stroganoff is cast as uncontrollable in his desire to consume and dominate while Durof is cast as wholly pitiable. Neither is a flattering stereotype for a human or a non-human.

Furthermore, understood as an instance of anthropornography, Strogonof’s desire for the pig’s flesh cannot be separated from his desire to dominate both the pig and Durof himself, nor from his desire to consume the man himself, whether in pig form, as his “test” aims to prove, or otherwise. The story’s conclusion confirms this reading. Adams reminds us that anthropornography relies on the act of (usually) symbolic consumption by the male gaze:

[Anthropornography] is not only complicit in this oppressive approach to representing women, it simultaneously hides and celebrates its complicity, simultaneously makes fun of itself and never truly resists the configuration –
consumption, it seems to say, is consumption and the “carnivorous virility” (Derrida) that constitutes the Western subject is okay by them. (“Why a Pig?”, 223)

Consumption is key. It is not enough for Stroganoff to witness the humiliated state of someone formerly like him, but he renders Durof himself consumable by purchasing his pig, because the pig is both Durof’s companion and means of income. In other words, in addition to the zoomorphic language that Stroganoff uses to conflate the two performers, Stroganoff’s purchase reveals Durof’s vulnerability and submission. Durof’s subsequent death-by-suicide completes the parallelism between human performer and his pig companion as consumables for Stroganoff’s caprice, as I will discuss. Tellingly, within the story, the pig’s consumability is never called into question except when his flesh is served to Durof and he is peer-pressed into eating him. Only then is the meal considered “sacrilegious,” but only with respect to Durof. However, Durof’s subjugation to his wealthier counterparts is never called into question.

When considering that Stroganoff’s proposition only occurs as a means to test whether or not the cerdo-hombre is a man in disguise, the act of gluttony which he proposes transforms into the taboo act of cannibalism, especially given the double entendre terms used to describe both the pig and Durof, the way each is feminized, and the narrative’s careful rendering of the pig as Durof’s kin. The narrative voice also depicts Durof as “one of them,” or one of the overindulgent Russian aristocrats watching the performance, further complicating the metaphorical concepts of kinship. In his discussion of meat eating in relation to speciesism and the idea of contextual moral vegetarianism/veganism, Ralph Acampora explains that “eating is literally a case of consumption, of using up some-body – such that there is no remainder whom one could any longer respect or care for/about” (150, emphases in original). While the cerdo-hombre is consumed literally and Durof, who commits suicide, is consumed figuratively, each are consumed through the
cannibalistic nature of unbridled privilege. Durof, of course, eats his own companion animal under duress; although the narrative does not explain why Durof attends Stroganoff’s morbid feast, it is clear that eating was not his choice: “Cuando sirvieron el asado del cerdo-hombre (a la salsa picante), el bobo rehusó; pero aquellos insensatos, entre carcajadas, le forzaron a comer.”24

Albeit in extreme terms, Durof’s actions reaffirm the idea of the human-pet relationship as a particularly one-sided and coercive one:

Because they are unable to talk, pet animals are also unable to judge or criticize their owners, lie to them, or betray their trust. […] Instead of enjoying the company of animals for its own sake, we may ultimately find ourselves sharing our lives with an assortment of hybrid monsters: no longer animals so much as little people in disguise. (Serpell 127, 132)

As James Serpell interprets them, human-pet relationships are never of mutual but different advantage, as thinkers like Fudge and Donna Haraway insist. In this particular case, the pig might be understood as a “flexible person,” or an animal whose exchange value might opportunistically transform his classification within a household from companion to commodity (Kirksey 134-135). For Serpell, such interspecies relationships are always and inevitably ruled by a logic of domination, as is any relationship in which one being is consumed literally or metaphorically by another. Interestingly, Serpell’s description of pets as “little people” applies doubly to the cerdo-hombre: in Pardo Bazán’s story, the pig is portrayed first as Durof’s child and student, then as a

24. My translation: When they served the roast cerdo-hombre (with spicy sauce), the fool refused; but those degenerates, between guffaws, forced him to eat.”
tragic heroine faced with an impossible decision, then as equivalent to Durof himself before finally being betrayed by his person and eaten. Like the cerdo-hombre himself, if actual human cannibalism does not occur within the narrative, it is difficult to imagine coming any closer to the real thing without actually crossing that blurred border.

It is along these blurred lines between human, non-human, food, and family that Analía Villagra attempts to make a case for embracing the idea of the cannibal as inherent to human nature. She points out that:

>Cannibalism is viewed as the most abhorrent of transgressions. Accusations of cannibalism have been levied against numerous groups of people as a means with which to construct them as most fantastically other, as less than human. What could be more barbaric than consuming one’s kin? […] Before we comfortably accept animals as kin we must confront the problem of the animals’ edibility. Either we consume our kin and make cannibals of ourselves or we deny their kinship at the moment of consumption. (46, 50)

It is this identification with the cerdo-hombre as kin that prompts the narrator to describe Durof’s meal as “impious,” “brutal,” and “sacrilegious.” These uncomfortable feelings lead to his suicide the morning after ingesting his companion. However, it seems that such an identification means little to Strogonof, despite his caprice having only been predicated on his prior acquaintance with Durof a.k.a. Sergio Orlik. He smiles delightedly upon hearing that Durof has hanged himself from one of the mullions of the circus theatre. He clearly has no qualms about his cannibalistic cruelty or the devastating consequences it might entail.

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26. Acampora critically points out that Villagra only ever discusses ideas of extended kinship to other species (monkeys and apes in particular) and never argues for actual anthropophagy on the part of other humans.
A reader, however, might also be struck by the protagonist’s suicide in its similarity to that of Puccini’s heroine. Upon discovering her lover’s death and that she was betrayed by the man with whom she compromised her body in order to save his life, she jumps off the castle to avoid arrest (Green). Thus, Durof’s feminization-animalization is complete: like his pig companion, he has been recast as La Tosca\textsuperscript{27} in order to be doomed to ridicule, desperation, and violent death. His act of cannibalism becomes autophagic in that Durof has not only destroyed his livelihood and his family, but he has effectively consumed himself. Villagra concludes her essay encouraging us to “confront the idea that as the kin of other animals, when we consume them we may become the cannibals we have so feared” (52). Ultimately, Pardo Bazán’s “El cerdo-hombre” serves as a cautionary tale against the destructive power of unchecked stupidity (Durof) and the greed of an amoral elite operating without any imperative of temperance or moderation.

Gluttony and metaphoric cannibalism thus complement each other in this narrative, just as their separation distinguishes Durof from Stroganoff morally as well as in terms of economic class. The terms’ convergence in Durof’s guilty conscience renders his own lack of moderation and greed doubly tragic, while the contrast between his suicide and Stroganoff’s amusement upon learning of Durof’s demise reflects different consequences, a different morality, and effectively a different reality for those with privilege. Despite its setting well outside of Spain, for a nation still rather obsessed with porcine foodstuffs and as the literary product of an author well-versed in the cultural significance of cooking,\textsuperscript{28} the leap to applying the warning in “El cerdo-hombre” to a nation attempting to rebuild its now precarious identity is a short one.

\textsuperscript{27} While in Italian, \textit{tosca} translates roughly to “woman from Tuscany”, in Spanish it refers to a person derogatorily to mean that they are uncivilized or disgusting. This meaning would not have been lost on a Spanish readership, especially since Pardo Bazán specifically names the aria \textit{and} the character who sings it in describing the pig’s act.

\textsuperscript{28} See Rebecca Ingram for a discussion of gendered culture and class in Pardo Bazán’s cookbooks.
Hungry Like the Wolf: Species and Morality in *Navidad de lobos* (1918)

Emilia Pardo Bazán’s December 1918 short story “Navidad de lobos” or “Wolves’ Christmas” takes place in the Polish-Prussian city of Ostrow. This lesser-known story is protagonized by a starving pack of wolves who come together out of desperation to enact a plan to feed themselves in the dead of winter. On Christmas Day, they turn to an elder wolf named El Cano, which roughly translates to “The Gray One”, who articulates the plan: They will immediately leave the forest in as large a group as wolfly possible, find a nearby human village, and pick off their livestock and even stray children. Upon following the suggestion to target Ostrow made by another wolf, who claims to have successfully hunted a one-year old there, the “black horde/army” (“negro ejército”) advances toward the village, amassing more lupine members as they move. Once they find the town, however, it is engulfed in flames. They watch a drunken group of men lighting the town’s mansions on fire, an act that the wolves find morally deplorable but which they recognize as advantageous for their purposes. The wolves scavenge and feast amidst the flames until a fleeing woman’s gunshots refocus their efforts first upon those with rifles to lessen the humans’ possibilities for resistance. The remaining humans, left to suffer death either by flame or wolf, commit themselves to prayer and lamentation. The story concludes with the triumphant Cano correcting the humans’ cries for redemption from their tragic fates: “¡Triste para vosotros! ¡Para los lobos, alegre!” 29 Through the representation of wolves as cooperative in their desperation, in contrast to the destructive humans, “Navidad de lobos” characterizes wolves as morally superior to humans. Effectively, this renders the wolves more human than the human

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29. My translation: “Sad for *you* all! For us wolves, joyous!”
characters in upholding their communal values, even when the wolves behave as ferociously as people might expect actual wolves to behave.

Throughout this unsettling tale, the narrative voice strives to establish the wolves as morally superior to the human characters. Narration begins by explaining the wolves’ desperation, first by casting the scene as a frozen winterscape both “sinister” and “tragic,” before describing the startling condition of the wolves themselves:

En el fondo del bosque, los lobos, guiados por sus propios famélicos aullidos, iban reuniéndose. Salían de todas partes, semejantes a manchas obscuras, movedizas, que iluminaban dos encendidos carbones. Era el hambre la que los agrupaba, haciendo lúgubres sus gañidos quejumbrosos. Flacos, escuálidos, fosforescente la pupila, parecían preguntarse unos a los otros cómo harían para conquistar algo que comer. Era preciso que lo lograsen a toda costa, porque ya sentían el hálito febril de la rabia, que contraía su garganta y crispaba sus nervios hasta la locura.  

In this passage, the wolves come together almost magnetically in an attempt to alleviate their common suffering. Animal behavioral scientist Temple Grandin’s insight into the misconceptions about wolf and dog pack structures marks the wolves’ gathering as anomaly:

_in the wild, wolves don’t live in wolf packs, and they don’t have an alpha male who fights the other wolves to maintain his dominance._ Our whole image of wolf packs and alphas is completely wrong. Instead, wolves live the way people do: in families

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30. My translation: “In the deep of the forest, the wolves gathered, guided by their own famished howls. They came from everywhere, restless like dark stains illuminated by two lit coals. It was hunger that summoned them, rendering mournful their whining yelps. Skinny and squalid, pupils phosphorescent, they seemed to ask one another how they were going to scrounge up something to eat. It was imperative that they do so at any cost, because they already felt the rabid fever contracting their throats and fraying their nerves to the point of insanity.”
made up of a mom, a dad, and their children. Sometimes an unrelated wolf can be adopted into a pack, or one of the mom’s or dad’s relatives is part of the pack, or a mom or dad who has died could be replaced by a new wolf. But mostly wolf packs are just a mom, a dad, and their pups. (Grandin and Johnson, 26; emphasis in original)

Under the auspices of complete necessity, Pardo Bazán’s fictional pack coheres around the elder El Cano, also the only character in the story with (something like) a name. The wolves’ mutual, family-like support and cooperation in the face of adversity allows them to resolve their hunger crisis without resorting to intra-pack violence or competition. In this respect, the wolves exemplify an ecofeminist ethic-of-care; that is, of course, if we ignore their unscrupulous quest for flesh, and only consider their cooperation within the context of the wolves’ survival needs. However, Pardo Bazán’s Wolf pack, while not scientifically accurate, does reflect common beliefs about how wolves operate and confirms why humans should fear them.

Her depiction of their behavior in “Navidad de lobos” works to portray why humans should also fear becoming like them. While the condition of the human community is not presented in nearly as much detail as that of the wolves,’ we do know that the wolves themselves recognize and reject the humans’ intraspecies conflict: “¿Veis esto? -preguntó el Lobo Cano a los demás-. Son los hombres, que queman las mansiones de los hombres. Nosotros no cometeríamos tal insensatez. No nos mordemos los unos a los otros.”31 The wolves’ portrayal of the humans’ actions as an immoral logic finds confirmation through a brief instance of free indirect discourse near the story’s conclusion. Like the wolves, humans are collectively represented by a single character

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31. My translation: “Do all of you see this? the Gray Wolf asked the rest. It is men who burn the mansions of other men. We would not commit such senselessness. We do not bite one another.”
distinguished from the other humans in the tale. The narrator temporarily inhabits the inner thoughts of a young blonde woman in the moments before her dramatic escape:

Uno de los incendiarios tenía sujeta por las trenzas a una moza rubia, su parte de botín. La muchacha gemía, se retorcía las manos, porque acababa, no hacía una hora, de ver arder su casa y caer bajo los golpes de los feroces asesinos a su padre, viejecito, y a un hermanillo de doce años. Y en su cabeza danzaba una confusión de horrores, entre los cuales sobresalía el horror de no comprender. ¿Por qué los mataban, por qué hacían ceniza sus viviendas? No era el extranjero quien así procedía: eran sus propios hermanos, los que se decían salvadores del pueblo, y a quienes en nada habían ofendido.32

The underlying association between brotherhood and revolution is particularly poignant, because the town of Ostrow, the story’s village setting, was an actual site of nationalist protest in Prussia during the latter part of the 1910s. These events, part of the Greater Poland Uprising in 1918-1919, were a manifestation of the Polish nation’s desire to officially re-establish an independent state (Biskupski 55-73). Although I read this internal monologue from a daughter of a villager as a condemnation of intra-state conflict, it is also worth noting that it is also she, a female victim of violence who narrowly escapes her would-be violator, who describes the perpetrators of the violence she experiences and witnesses as kin. Although she ultimately frees herself, she does so through the same violence she claims not to understand: she manages to grab her assailant’s

32. My translation: “One of the arsonists had taken a blonde adolescent by the braids as his share of the loot. The girl trembled and twisted her hands, because, not an hour ago, she had watched her house burn and fall, under siege by the ferocious assassins who murdered her father, a small and elderly man, and her little brother, only twelve years old. And in her head danced a confusion of horrors, among them those which surpassed even horror into incomprehension. Why did they kill them? Why did they burn their houses to the ground? It was not a foreigner who proceeded in this manner: they were their own brothers, those who fashioned themselves the village saviors, and to those who had in no way offended them.”
revolver, shoot him without hesitation, and ride away from both the wolves and the flames without glancing back. The young blonde thus embodies both nationalist conflict and gendered violence while making explicit the larger connection to war as a uniquely human sign of crisis. While she perceives the assassins and arsonists as only perpetrators and her family as only victims, her instinctive response to save her own life reveals a deeper understanding of how extreme desperation can lead to brutal violence even against those classified as “family.”

In juxtaposing the two communities in crisis through the lens of family, “Navidad de lobos” interrogates interhuman violence itself. Against the backdrop of the wolves’ hunger to the point of starvation and their continued rejection of turning on or “biting” one another as taboo, the blonde woman’s initial conception of the revolutionaries’ violent crimes as also taboo suggests that violent conflict itself is cannibalistic. Although less overt in its accusations of upper-class fault, the free indirect discourse through which the reader gains access to the adolescent female’s confusion and panic in effect bridges the gap between her attackers and her own butchered family members. Thus, while the wolves actively distance themselves from their human prey, the nameless blonde mentally unites herself to her human abductors by naming them as kin, even as she flees her village.

These kinship ties return us to Villagra’s discussion of metaphoric human cannibalism: “The blurry boundary between human and nonhuman animal does not begin and end with the actual consumption of flesh” (51). For Villagra, the interspecies bonds which she believes justifies an acceptance of cannibalism-as-metaphor can only come to exist if the heretofore unchallenged human-on-top hierarchy can itself be toppled, at least in theory: “Kinship cannot be constructed if

33. To me, the facts that the blonde’s home is described as a “mansión” and that villagers were burning it suggest undertones of class conflict as well as nationalist conflict or mere violent caprice, but there is no other evidence to suggest a specific motivation behind the arsonists’ choices.
the human being possesses an untouchable dominance, a position of privilege that we cannot even begin to question” (52). While the blonde in “Navidad de lobos” does not strive to establish kinship with beings other than humans, the narrative itself zoomorphizes the humans involved while anthropomorphizing the wolves as morally superior even in the midst of their starvation crisis. Through this double performance of zoomorphism and anthropomorphism, the humans and wolves come to resemble each other despite the differences the narrative highlights. Instead, as in cannibalism itself, lines are both blurred and solidified simultaneously. According to Merit Anglin, [T]he recognition of kin or kin-like qualities in the animal-other denaturalizes the species-line by blurring the categories of “humanity” and “animality.” At the same time, species kinship is a cultural discourse or signifying practice that presupposes difference and thus consolidates the divide. […] [I]n identifying kin qualities in other animals and extending its protection and partnership, the human species unwittingly creates a space for and protects the unknown and humanly unknowable. (142-3)

Applying such an idea to Pardo Bazán’s text requires anachronistic extrapolation, but it allows for a reading of the text as one that seeks to expand definitions of human kinship through morality rather than reduce them. It is also important to note the backdrop of Catholicism in this Christmas text; the entire Roman Catholic tradition is predicated on an act of mystical cannibalism: transubstantiation. Although in the catechism it is the adult Jesus who commands his followers to

34. Curiously, and as a testament to Pardo Bazán’s impressive attention to detail, wolves are an ideal social animal for comparing human society in order to critique it, because “both humans and wolves have remarkably similar hierarchical social organization, which revolves around the family and effective communication” (Fagan 29). While I suspect Pardo Bazán’s critique was more of the “brutality” of social protesters than the socioeconomic structure which placed aristocrats like her on top, in choosing a shy, opportunistic scavenger carnivore as the non-human counterweight to all of humankind, “Navidad de lobos” interrogates the oppressive human social hierarchy rather than working-class upheaval, even if inadvertently. I have no evidence to suggest that a reader or the author herself would have understood wolves as anything other than scary and lethal carnivores.

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eat of his flesh and drink of his blood in commemoration of his sacrifice for humanity, the story’s Christmas setting evokes images of baby Jesus among the fiery carnage from which the ravenous, albeit non-cannibalistic wolves feast. Thus, El Cano’s blunt reminder that humans consume each other and wolves who do not is subtextualized by the naturalized but discomfiting requirement of this ritual sanctioned by the Church itself. Thus, the mundane moral integrity of humans is called even more directly into question.

Specifically with regard to the dual roles that anthropomorphism and zoomorphism play in reading cannibalism in “Navidad de lobos,” it is helpful to remember Jill Morstad’s insight that language itself, typically thought of as a traditional measure by which to distinguish the human from non-human animals, that anthropomorphism through human language draws attention to (human) cultural insufficiencies or uncertainties rather than morphological (anatomical) insufficiencies on the part of the non-human animals in question: “Externalizing language requires that we consider how cognition, emotion, motivation, perception, imagination, and memory are themselves, and directly, social affairs” (201). In other words, even if inevitably anthropocentric in its practice, intentions, and result, anthropomorphism demands the acknowledgment of animacy à la Chen, if not agency on the part of the anthropomorphizer, because it is a relational act. However one-sided or unequal the relationship itself might be, anthropomorphism always requires imagining a non-human or not-fully-human Other whose subjectivity can be tangibly affected by human intervention. In this way, the anthropomorphism, in tandem with zoomorphism, in “Navidad de lobos” questions the sustainability of a social hierarchy in which one group of powerful people continues unfettered in its violent domination over other community members in order to maintain their status quo. A similar theme can be read in both Niebla and “El cerdo-hombre”, although the negative potential consequences for all of humanity are most salient in
“Navidad de lobos” because of its location in a working-class village as opposed to an aristocratic environment.

However, this story, like “El cerdo-hombre”, was written by Emilia Pardo Bazán, and so the plight of the oppressed female is of course present. As is also the case with the cerdo-hombre in drag as the tragic La Tosca, the reader is only presented a limited glimpse of a female human. However, as I read in each of these Pardo Bazán narratives, it is this brief but calculated connection between human female and non-human animal suffering in particular that also encourages an ecofeminist reading. For instance, in granting access only to the inner thoughts of one human in “Navidad de lobos”, the story privileges the wolves’ community of care and solidarity over human intraspecies competition, just as the narration privileges the wolves’ subjectivity. Such a literary technique can be interpreted today as ecofeminist in consequence, even if it could not initially be intended as such. As feminist literary critic Josephine Donovan explains,

Applying care/standpoint theory to animal ethics, […], means listening therefore to the “voice” of animals, hearing their standpoint vis-à-vis a system that oppresses them. As the silenced voice of women is inherently subversive of patriarchy, so is the silenced voice of animals necessarily subversive to the current speciesist regime of industrialized agriculture and abattoirs, as well as to other institutions abusive and exploitative of animals. (The Aesthetics of Care, 98)

Thus, as Donovan’s insight suggests, an ecofeminist reading of this Pardo Bazán short story reveals it to be doubly subversive in its privileging of female voices over male ones and non-human ones over human ones. Ultimately, “Navidad de lobos” seems to suggest a karmic rebalancing: the wolves are rewarded with newfound abundance of their solidarity while Ostrow is devoured by flame and wolf, seemingly for its moral failing.
Conclusion: It’s a People Eat People World

In conclusion, each of my analyses has demonstrated how the respective narratives work to animalize or zoomorphize central human characters as a means by which to mark them as morally deficient. Such a realization draws attention to the damage such unchecked hierarchizations can do to vulnerable individuals and communities. In *Niebla*, Augusto Pérez is depicted as dog-like and therefore incapable of connecting to humans on human terms. In “El cerdo-hombre” The protagonist Durof is reduced to tragically-consumed entertainment like his companion pig, and his patron-bullies are characterized as insensitive and unrestrained, as “signos de raza.” Meanwhile, the violent human mob in “Navidad de lobos” is directly described as more bestial than wolves who seek to eat babies. In each instance, this animalization is heavily predicated on unbridled consumption of food to effectively destroy human bodies: Augusto’s suicide-by-gluttony; Durof’s suicide-after-cannibalistic gluttony; the wolves’ opportunistic gluttony. In the Pardo Bazán stories, this zoomorphism is embodied in the literal and metaphoric consumption of human flesh. Wendy Doniger reminds us of the close relationship between these two literary techniques:

Anthropomorphism and zoomorphism are two different attempts to reduce the otherness between humans and animals, to see the sameness beneath the difference.

But sameness, just like difference, may lead to the inhuman treatment of both humans and nonhumans. (34)

Essentially, as Doniger explains, anthropomorphism requires some degree of zoomorphism and vice versa, and this correlation produces the categorical confusion that can perpetuate Othering and its consequential suffering. Paradoxically, the relationship between anthropomorphism and zoomorphism both acknowledges and denies the similarities between humans and non-humans in
such instances. However, I argue that as long as narratives like the novel and short stories discussed in this chapter rely on such an inconclusive paradigm, they create space for exploration of new visions of human-animal relationships.

Thus, zoomorphic consumption and instances of symbolic cannibalism in these texts function as a gruesome but powerful indicator of the far-reaching consequences of human hypocrisy as exercised in particular by members of the upper class (Niebla, “El cerdo-hombre”) or by those in conflicting positions of power (“Navidad de lobos”) toward both those human and non-human who occupy lower positions in the social and animacy hierarchies. The violence exercised by those in power in this chapter takes a different form in Chapter III, as social authority makes way for governmental authority in totalitarianism, and my analyses turn to the ways silence and secrecy work to perpetuate and resist internalized socially-sanctioned violence during the Francoist period.
Chapter III: Challenging Childhood Innocence: Literary Animals and Child Protagonists as Witnesses to and Victims of Francoist Violence

_I thought I already knew about animals and food. Animals were our dogs Clyde and Mischief and our cat Sybil. They were the lizards and toads that live outside but would sometimes come inside. They were Curious George and Winnie-the-Pooh. How could they possibly be in the same category as apples and sandwiches and birthday cake?_ (4)

from Sunaura Taylor, _Beasts of Burden_ (2017)

While the previous chapter explored the difficulty of forming communities of care in times of uncertainty, as in Unamuno’s _nivola_, and desperation, as in the Pardo Bazán stories, this chapter engages the difficulty of articulating that same need under an oppressive regime that demands compliance and adherence to traditional ideals of patriarchy. Because of this ubiquitous oppression, violence in these stories often takes more covert forms than the very obvious ones discussed in Chapter One. In 1936, General Francisco Franco’s forces attempted to overthrow the democratically-elected Republic, thus triggering a violent conflict which they eventually won in 1939. The end of the Spanish Civil War ushered in over forty years of strict Catholic fascist conservatism in which national political and religious identity were officially consolidated and gender roles were expressly defined, reverting women’s political and social progress back to nineteenth century restrictions. In other words, dissenting voices of any gender, creed, and even linguistic identity were actively and often violently repressed. Historians Mary Nash and Martha Ackelsburg chronicle the drastic change such a regime change marked for Spanish women. In particular, women who had previously taken very active roles in resistance movements such as Mujeres Libres (Free Women) during the 1920s and 30s now found themselves either exiled, persecuted, or relegated to domestic silence. In literature, censorship was the new norm, either through the state or through self-policing.
Through close readings, this chapter calls into question the fairly common practice of reading narratives that feature human-animal relationships as told from a child’s perspective as exclusively aimed at a child readership and to draw critical attention to the social commentary and insight that such stories might therefore provide. As Martha Nussbaum argues, realist literature itself often serves as a means through which to cultivate morality without risk to the reader (“Literature and the Moral Imagination”). As Josephine Donovan explains, the subjectivity of other (nonhuman) beings can only fully take shape and substance through active participation in emotional dialogue with them, whatever form that may take (“Participatory Epistemology”). It is with these ideas in mind that I read Carmen Laforet’s “El secreto de la gata” (1952), Mercè Rodoreda’s “Gallines de Guinea” (1958), and Ana María Matute’s “El saltamontes verde” (1960) as signaling the more insidious ways that patriarchal violence disrupts cooperation and therefore communities.

All published during the 1950s, these three stories have quite a lot in common: they feature children as protagonists, they are written by female authors with strong connections to Barcelona, and they all use human-animal relationships to explore themes of fantasy, absent parents, and silence. Although this period, often referred to as segundo franquismo, is generally considered one of renewed prosperity after the desperation and hunger that characterized the post-war period, it was still a period of uncertainty and repression. Furthermore, these three stories have been read as children’s literature, despite the fact that only Matute was known for children’s stories in addition to her numerous other works. All three of these authors have been established as strong proponents of female voices who write against traditional patriarchy in ways that obfuscate the critiques of hegemony. I argue that in each of these three stories, the relationships between the child
protagonists and their non-human companions subvert the Francoist ideal of the moral patriarchal family through the representation of covert and socially-sanctioned violence.

Clandestine Cats and Communal Motherhood: Carmen Laforet’s “El secreto de la gata” (1952)

A bit of a conundrum during this period is author Carmen Laforet. She was a teenager during the Civil War and only twenty-three when she published her now canonical first novel Nada in 1945. The novel follows the day-to-day life of narrator-protagonist Andrea throughout her time in Barcelona to study at the university, where her home life is depicted as an overcrowded hell and her awkward social life frustrates her in a different manner. The novel concludes with her “escape” to the nation’s center, to Madrid, frequently read as reinforcing the official narrative that the centralized national vision is far preferable to that of the linguistic and geographic periphery. At least that was how the work was interpreted at the time. Laforet’s debut novel won the very first Nadal Prize for unpublished manuscripts in 1944, marking her for literary stardom and her novel itself as a bildungsroman whose ending reinforces the Franco regime’s values and the prescribed place for women in Spanish society.

Laforet herself had five children and took a very active part in the Sección Femenina, the branch of the Fascist government that focused on promoting women’s roles as mothers, homemakers, and nuns. She even experienced a religious conversion in her early thirties, drawing her closer to Catholic doctrine, and she often questioned parts of the religious and political society that surrounded her. Her writing suggests as much. Critics such as Barry Jordan and Roberta Johnson problematize the traditional reading of Nada, emphasizing the ending’s ambiguity and Andrea’s constant struggle to fit herself into the molds her family and friends modeled, despite her conspicuous status as outsider. Carmen Martín Gaite’s seminal essay “La chica rara” (1987)
cemented both Andrea as a protagonist and Nada as a narrative that surreptitiously undermine Francoist feminine ideals and repression instead of supporting them, even if they appear to do so on the surface. Despite the fact that after Nada Laforet published robustly, as two of her biographers put it, her first novel “cast an excessive shadow” over her later works and even over the author herself (Caballé and Rolón 21, my translation).

I argue that questioning the status quo is even more obviously present in her later works and in her short stories in particular. Many of her works focus on children and several include young protagonists, such as Nada’s Andrea, who is an adolescent, and Cristina in “En la edad del pato” from the short story collection La muerta originally published in 1952. Critics typically read these narratives as stories directed toward adult audiences that explore the lessons learned in childhood and adolescence. A notable exception is “El secreto de la gata” (1952). This short story is not well-known, and Roberta Johnson has even classified it as Laforet’s only children’s story (117). In fact, it was published in Bazar, a propagandistic journal aimed at young girls and published by the Sección Femenina, with the express purpose of re-indoctrinating Spanish girls into the cult of domesticity that Franco’s Spain demanded (Martínez Cuesta and Alfonso Sánchez 234-240). In this complex storyworld, animals and children interact with sophisticated mutual comprehension, which suggests a cultural value beyond mere children’s entertainment or social instruction.

In “El secreto de la gata,” Carmen Laforet presents a world in which children and animals regularly converse in human language. Her protagonist is a pre-adolescent girl named Carmen.

35. Laforet’s second daughter’s name. Naming her characters after family members was common practice for Laforet.
36. Or at the very least it is in verbal human language that the story is conveyed to the reader. Furthermore, because all other nonverbal communication is marked as such and interpreted for the reader, I believe it a safe assumption to categorize the protagonist’s verbal conversation with her cat as “human language”.
who, feeling distanced from her brothers, decides to prove her bravery by indulging her curiosity about the mysterious house next door. Covered in overgrowth, it is apparently abandoned, and no one seems to be allowed to enter. The narrator explains that her father even punished one of Carmen’s brothers severely for simply crossing into the yard to take some plants to feed his pet lamb. The neighborhood felines, however, seem to be an exception. Carmen decides to ask her cat Pachota to tell her what goes on in the house. To her delight, Pachota agrees, revealing that she is actually the Queen of the Cats, and that she intends to bring her into the house and let her - and her alone - in on the cats’ communal secret. Under cover of night and with Pachota’s guidance, Carmen enters the house, where she is immediately recognized and quietly welcomed as Pachota’s person. She sees first-hand how the cats live: each bringing supplies for the benefit and use of all of the others to care for the unwanted kittens the cats rescue from the well in which their people discarded them. Thus, from its introduction, the cat community is governed by an ethic-of-care seemingly in contrast to that of the human community in which Carmen participates on the margin.

Carmen is anxious to engage with Pachota and the others, but she is a respectful guest and merely listens and observes. She is soon lulled to sleep by the cats’ rhythmic purring in sync with the peacefully monotonous piano music that fills the house, played by the cat queen herself. Carmen awakens in her own bed in her own house, with Pachota watching her curled up at her feet. Questions again surge through Carmen’s mind, but, upon Pachota’s non-verbal prompting, she instead silently relishes the privileged knowledge she now and forever shares with Pachota, a knowledge to which no one else will ever have access. The story concludes with the narrator’s revelation that Carmen never even disclosed her secret to her own children.

According to Roberta Johnson, despite the fact that many of Laforet’s short stories feature child protagonists, “El secreto de la gata” is the only one with children as her intended audience.
Critic and biographer Agustín Cerezales concurs, and both critics emphasize the autobiographic qualities the story itself bears, namely that the protagonist and her siblings share the same names and birth order as Laforet and her older brothers. Although the narrator does not directly claim to be a mature version of the story’s protagonist, Johnson concludes that this is likely the case. Johnson further laments that Laforet did not produce more stories like this one: “From this one fine example of Laforet’s ability to transform child psychology, mild sibling rivalry, into imaginative literature, one can only wish that she had employed her skill in other stories and books for children” (118). While I agree that this short story captures in compelling detail the thought processes of a younger sister, I expand upon Johnson’s initial insight in order to draw attention to this creative and complex narrative as worthy of rich analysis for an adult audience. I propose recasting the story through an ecofeminist lens, reimagining this work as deceptively transgressive in its vision of a family and community structure with the potential to displace the hegemonic structures prescribed in Francoism. I argue that Laforet’s story undermines traditional Western expectations through narrative relationships and character identifications that invert traditional Western hierarchies in which humans dominate over animals, males lead females, and adults know better than children.

The narration begins by describing the protagonist’s family in terms of the non-human animals who cohabit their home, including a number of boisterous hens and a turkey named Míster Whisky, “el animal más tonto que se pueda imaginar” (176), who would blush with embarrassment and insult the hens right back when they made fun of him from their coop. The children themselves are not described in detail, but in brief and generalized terms in comparison

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37. Cerezales is also Laforet’s youngest child.
38. My translation: “the silliest animal one could imagine.”
to their respective companion animals. Eduardo, the eldest child, is introduced through his relationship to his dog Numa:

En la casa había también una perra simpatíquísima, una perra de guarda que se llamaba Numa. Numa era de lo más sonriente que se pueda uno imaginar. No le gustaba cumplir con sus obligaciones, […] Corría grandes aventuras, conocía a todos los perros del barrio que eran sus amigos y sabía cuáles eran los más valientes y los que tenían las narices más frías. Esto en los perros es muy importante. […] Sólo el niño mayor, que se llamaba Eduardo, sabía sus aventuras, y Eduardo no la traicionaba nunca. (176)

The language the narrative voice employs to describe Eduardo’s loyalty to Numa is strikingly similar to the language used later to describe the central interaction between Carmen and her cat Pachota. Moreover, and continuing to upset traditional hierarchies, the story’s conclusion reveals that it is the human, Carmen, who “never betrays” Pachota the cat’s secret, supposedly until the moment her reader encounters those very words. Like her oldest brother, the protagonist is presented in very minimal terms: “El tercer niño de la casa…era una niña y se llamaba Carmen. Puedo decir que los niños eran algo más valientes que ella” (176). Carmen’s rank in the household suggests not only that there exists a hierarchy in terms of age, but also of significance, as determined through perceived bravery. Carmen’s curiosity and action clearly mark the narrator’s comment as coded according to a gender-specific and sexist definition of bravery. Such

39. My translation: “In the house there was also a very friendly dog, a guard dog named Numa. Numa was one of the smiliest that one could imagine. She did not like to fulfill her obligations, […] She went on great adventures, she was friends with all of the neighborhood dogs, and she knew which ones were most valiant and which ones had the coldest noses. This is very important in dogs. […] Only the oldest child, who was named Eduardo, knew of her adventures and Eduardo never betrayed her.”

40. My translation: “The third child of the house…was a girl and she was called Carmen. I can say that the boys were somewhat braver than she.”
a ranking system alludes to the rigid pack hierarchical organization that characterizes many non-human animal societal structures and parallels the ideal family and nation structures that Francoist patriarchy imposed. Interestingly, cat colonies are largely matriarchal, forming a striking exception.

When Carmen’s building curiosity about the abandoned red house prompts her to ask her cat what goes on there, she in effect questions the neighborhood’s norms of leaving the house alone, especially given the fact that her middle brother Juan, who only went to the house to collect treats for his animal companion, is beaten by his father when he catches him in the act. Furthermore, the narrator explains, he tells his siblings that when he would approach the house, he would hear strange sounds and that once he even heard eerie piano music playing, despite the well-known fact that no one lived there. Well-attuned readers would be mindful of two issues regarding the house: its color and its conspicuous long-term vacancy. Although only mentioned twice, the house is red, suggestive not only of blood or violence, but the color of Republican and Socialist opposition to the Franco regime. This powerful symbol coupled with Carmen’s father’s overreaction to her brother’s coming into contact with the house’s surroundings suggests a sinister fate for the house’s former human occupants: they were likely either forced into exile or, if they were less lucky, into prison or worse. Thus, paradoxically, the cat commune is rendered necessary by human cruelty and dependent upon the prolonged effects of interhuman violence, both physical and psychological. Yet Carmen, likely oblivious to her previous neighbors’ fates,\textsuperscript{41} is drawn to the house’s mystery. The narrator distinguishes her from her brothers in this respect, explaining that although she is not as brave as they are in general, she, unlike them, was not afraid of the

\textsuperscript{41} Or, perhaps she is hyperaware, and her fantasy serves as a means to escape a knowledge of violence she finds overwhelming, like Almodóvar’s protagonist in \textit{El laberinto del fauno} (\textit{Pan’s Labyrinth}).
supernatural. Instead, she asks Pachota to let her in on the secret, effectively toppling the established ranking system between the siblings, even if only in Carmen’s mind.

Little Carmen’s clandestine transgression takes on another layer when Pachota brings her into the cats’ abode. First, following Pachota’s lead, Carmen scales the wall that she watched her brothers struggle to climb so many times. Upon doing so, “Carmen se sentó entre ellos, procurando ser tan elegante en sus posturas como los felinos, y sin lograrlo, como es natural. Pero no se rieron de ella. Sólo la miraron para que no hiciese nada de ruido” (179)\(^42\). This personal realization, focalized through Carmen herself, begins to dismantle Carmen’s acceptance of the established hierarchy in her family’s household. Here, she starts to see herself as just as brave and adventurous as her brothers, and therefore just as valuable. Once Carmen opens herself to new possibilities, she is eager to impress the “gatos principales” (“main cats”) and strives to mimic their behavior: “Carmen se sentó entre ellos, procurando ser tan elegante en sus posturas como los felinos, y sin lograrlo, como es natural. Pero no se rieron de ella. Sólo la miraron para que no hiciese nada de ruido” (179)\(^43\). Despite her unsuccessful attempt to force her human countenance into feline elegance, the cats notably do not laugh at her as her brothers do to Míster Whisky. Instead, they extend to her the same acceptance that they gave the unwanted kittens: non-judgmental acceptance of those that do not quite fit.

When Carmen awakes the next day, one look from Pachota cues her to withhold any questions she might have about the previous night’s experience. Whether her evening amongst the cats was dreamt or actually took place, Carmen enthusiastically, even proudly, guards her

\(^{42}\) My translation: “She discovered that it wasn’t as difficult as it seemed when she would watch her brothers do it.”

\(^{43}\) My translation: “Carmen sat between them, trying to be as elegant in her postures as the felines, but without achieving it, as is natural. But they did not laugh at her. They only watched her to make sure she didn’t make any noise” (179, my translation).
privileged knowledge of the cat commune. Pachota’s secret is so precious to her that, as the narrator describes, she remembers it well into old age, not even revealing it to her own children. Carmen’s lifelong determination to not betray the cats’ secret suggests a profound respect for her relationship with Pachota in particular. As the story’s title suggests, this interspecies relationship seems to be one more prized than Carmen shares with any of the human characters in her world, including her own progeny. Given that the narrator’s identity is deliberately ambiguous, this final detail supports Johnson’s reading of the narrator as the grown-up protagonist, because if Carmen has truly not revealed her secret to anyone until now, this must include an outside narrator. Curiously, the story itself makes the reader privy to that secret, thereby transforming the entire narrative into an invitation to witness and even become complicit in the cats’ community of mutual care.

Moreover, Carmen’s preference for feline relationships also signals a mistrust of the patriarchal system within which she lives, regardless of whether or not she recognizes it as such. Her reluctance to disclose Pachota’s secret takes on new significance when considering her gender in conjunction with her association with cats. As Marjorie Garber explains in her book Dog Love, it is traditionally in the dog that humanity finds its ideal companion: “Readers and writers, adults as well as children, anthropomorphize in order to regain their sense of a collective human experience. Paradoxically, the quintessence of the “human” is often found in the dog” (34). Quite purposefully then, Carmen the protagonist’s analogue is a female cat who introduces her to a more egalitarian communal society in which an ethic of care is the ruling principle. This commune thus serves as an alternative model to that of the traditional patriarchal home structure that, as Garber skillfully reminds us, is that in which the dog unconditionally and loyally adheres to his

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44. For extended discussions on ethics of care in ecofeminist theory, see Donovan and Puleo.
master’s regime (37). In her analysis of the iconic 1993 American film *Homeward Bound*, Garber points out the significance of the fact that the family’s children are associated with their respective pets according to gender: each of the dogs (both males) correspond to the boys while the female cat corresponds to the only daughter (68). Garber’s analysis further suggests that in stereotypical, hegemonic terms, dogs and cats are as opposite and complementary as male and female. Extending this line of analysis to Laforet’s short story, “El secreto de la gata” becomes a forward-looking social critique proposing an alternative model for community that could not have been outwardly presented in 1950s Spain. Furthermore, the cat commune itself contradicts stereotypical beliefs of cats as distant loners. Read in this manner, what on the surface might look like a children’s story is revealed to be a complex tale about an imaginative young girl, and a critique of the deeply ingrained social forces that move her toward secrecy and silence.

Notwithstanding its original context, this short story serves as a literary example of the new lines of thinking and environmental sensitivity that ecofeminist philosophy encourages. Alicia Puleo explains that:

Hemos de pensar en la continuidad del mundo natural y en la cercanía de los otros seres vivos, en nuestro parentesco y similitud. Para ello, es necesario favorecer el desarrollo conjunto de la razón y la emoción y abandonar lo que el ecofeminismo ha llamado <lógica del dominio>.45 (17)

Recognizing her closeness to the cats is precisely what Carmen does, and the effect is that she abandons the logic of domination that pervades her home life, at least to the extent possible given

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45. My translation: “We must think of the continuity of the natural world and of the closeness of other living beings, of our likeness and similitude. To do so, it is necessary to favor the joint development of reason and emotion and to abandon what ecofeminism has called “the logic of domination.”
her material circumstances. Puleo refers specifically to the binary concept of Nature versus Culture as extended to Woman and Man in her 2011 book *Ecofeminismo: Para otro mundo posible* (*Ecofeminism: For Another Possible World*), where she argues that humanity has reached the point in history where a new model of interacting with the other beings on the planet has become necessary. For Puleo and to a greater extent for other critics like Josephine Donovan and David Herman, this new model begins to take shape by examining and interrogating the current and historical representations of animals in literary and cultural products.

Furthermore, and with specific concern for cats, Donna Haraway’s analysis and principal complaint about Jacques Derrida’s philosophical contemplation of his companion’s gaze upon him is that such a line of thinking, one in which the cat remains secondary to its contemplator despite Derrida’s best intentions, while commendable in its recognition of not only nonhuman animal presence but agency, does not explore the possibility of the cat’s unique world view or other-worlding: “But with his cat, Derrida failed a simple obligation of companion species; he did not become curious about what the cat might actually be doing, feeling, thinking or perhaps making available to him in looking back at him that morning” (20). In “El secreto de la gata,” unlike Derrida, Carmen accepts Pachota’s invitation into her world, and, as I argue, by extension so does the reader. In this manner, works involving animal protagonists, whether anthropomorphized to such a high degree as in this case or not, invite their readerships to imagine themselves into the material realities of beings unlike themselves as closely as possible. For Haraway, “species reeks of race and sex; and where species meet, that heritage must be untied and better knots of companion species attempted within and across differences” (18), implying that relationships with animals are

46 Thomas Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1979), Cary Wolfe’s “Thinking Other-Wise” (2008), and David Herman’s “Storyworlds/Umwelt” (2011) all discuss the limits of human imagination to fully understand another being’s reality. It is because of this inherent limitation that the cultivation of empathy and ideas of justice through literature is vital to the ecofeminist ethic of care that Puleo and Josephine Donovan, among others, propagate.
so integral to the human experience that in order to create a more just world for humans of all races, genders, classes, and creeds, it is necessary to recognize and take very seriously our responsibility to other creatures on this planet.

As Martha Nussbaum explains, “Our choices affect the lives of nonhuman species every day, and often cause them enormous suffering. Animals are not simply part of the furniture of the world; they are active beings trying to live their lives; and we often stand in their way” (Frontiers of Justice 22). If literature is capable of serving as a vehicle for moral didacticism, as Nussbaum argues in Love’s Knowledge, perhaps it is time to go beyond literary animals as coded stand-ins for human issues – which they certainly and inevitably are – and to consider their perspectives, their curiosity as well as their suffering. Furthermore, close reading of works like this one inspires further interrogation of the literary trope of animals and children in special relationships by pointing out that the effects of these relationships, as well as the relationships themselves, last long into adulthood and have the potential to shape the world in which we all live. Yet, the question remains as to how to bridge understandings gained through thoughtful reading into everyday physical and emotional practice, a challenge to which the mention of the adult narrator-protagonist’s continued repression strongly alludes.

For human-animal studies scholar and anthrozoologist Margo De Mello, animals are seldom permitted to be animals in literature (326); instead, they are employed as archetypal stand-ins used to teach human morality, especially in the case of children’s literature:

Ultimately, animals are useful vehicles for educating and entertaining children because of their ability to be like us and yet not like us. The make-believe world in which fantasy creatures live and animals talk to each other (and to humans) is the
ideal world in which to include lessons on friendship, morality, kindness, bravery, or perseverance. (330-331)

Although my argument is indeed that Laforet’s short story should not be read as a tale uniquely meant for children, De Mello’s characterization of animals in children’s literature can be directly applied to “El secreto de la gata.” More specifically, applying De Mello’s assertion that child fantasies or dreams are ideal vehicles for such didactic intentions to Carmen’s night in the cats’ commune supports the reading that her experience is indeed an imaginary one. However, her dreamworld still deconstructs the hierarchized world in which she lives her real life and builds an appealing case in favor of a female-led societal model in which an ethic-of-care, as Josephine Donovan might describe it, is the governing principle, constituting quite literally an inexpressible desire that Carmen harbors in secret apparently for the rest of her life. Essentially, Laforet employs the Western literary trope of using biophilia, children’s tendency to seek identification with non-human animals, in order to interrogate the monolithic ideals of the gendered, state-sponsored family and community hierarchical model, and to propose an alternative mode hinging on cooperation and care. This questioning opens the possibility of the existence of other clandestine worlds, both real and imagined, that characterized the reality of silence and self-censorship for women under dictatorship.

From Pets to Poultry: Mercé Rodoreda’s “Gallines de Guinea” (1958)

In the Catalan context, censorship was typically an even trickier process to navigate given that languages other than Castilian were prohibited in large public gatherings and of course in publication. Mercé Rodoreda, perhaps today’s most widely read Catalan author, ceased publication for decades after the outbreak of the Civil War. She initially sidestepped linguistic and thematic
censorship by publishing in Catalan journals outside of Spain while in exile in France and Switzerland (Bergmann 323). Like Laforet, Rodoreda is more famous for her novels than her short stories, and her 1962 novel _La plaça del diamant_ is today a canonical work of both Spanish and Catalan literatures. Unlike Laforet’s short story, however, the animals in “Gallines de Guinea” (“Guinea Fowls”) are not anthropomorphized but are instead depicted as undergoing very real and recognizable suffering. Nonetheless, the use of a child protagonist with a vivid imagination and an affinity for animals has led critics to classify it a _conte infantil_, a children’s story, in much the same way as Laforet’s. DeMello again offers useful insight into why narratives that feature animals as key characters are frequently pigeonholed as narratives directed toward a child audience despite their expert handling of complex themes. Again, biophilia is the answer:

Animals may also play such an important role in children’s literature because children seem to naturally love animals. Children of all cultures are drawn to animals from a very young age, forming attachments to them and making them central in their lives. […] Children relate to animals, and, since at least the Victorian age, adults have understood that they could use the natural affinity between children and animals to teach valuable social skills. Through reading about animals, children learn empathy, relationship skills, kindness, and compassion. (330)

De Mello further specifies that non-human animals in actual children’s narratives are often so anthropomorphized to the point that the interpretation of their presence can be no more than symbolic. In other words, the material circumstances of both the child and the nonhuman animal in question cannot be taken at face value.

In this respect, if understood as a tale for children, Mercé Rodoreda’s 1958 short story “Gallines de Guinea,” part of the collection _Vinti-dos contes (Twenty-two Stories)_ , is a grim
exception. In this narrative, a young boy abruptly and unwittingly comes to understand exactly how animals become food. The fictional animals portrayed in this story, fowls in particular, behave as real-life birds might. The boy’s imagination certainly projects other characteristics and understandings onto them, but the materiality of both the boy and the soon-to-be poultry are presented with detailed verisimilitude, thereby opening both up to a reader’s empathy, especially when the narrative describes the exceedingly uncomfortable events. For feminist philosopher-activist Carol J. Adams, the relationship between meat eating and oppression has been obscured in language because of our natural discomfort with animal slaughter: “We do not see our meat eating as contact with animals because it has been renamed as contact with food. […] Meat becomes a symbol for what is not seen but is always there – patriarchal control of animals and language” (48). I argue that in Rodoreda’s short story, the reader confronts the disconcerting and undeniable use of violence in everyday life through carefully cultivated narrative empathy.

“Gallines de Guinea” illustrates a brief but agonizing episode in the otherwise mundane life of a boy named Quimet. Having recently moved to a new neighborhood of an unnamed city that is likely Barcelona, the youngster sets out into the plaza one afternoon to play, upon his mother’s insistence. He does not seem to know anyone yet but entertains himself by inventing stories about what he observes. He finds himself particularly drawn to a goose as he watches it being transported to the local market. Entranced, Quimet unthinkingly follows the bird inside. In contrast to the stunning beauty on display in the forms of colorful fruits, flowers, and vegetables, Quimet follows the bird to the poultry section to find a macabre scene of animal cadavers hanging in varying states of butchery. He then watches the store attendant strangle the same birds he followed into the market, one by one, until finally it is his goose’s turn to die. The omniscient narrator details a variety of reactions: To the adult passers-by, the public, violent, and systematic
slaughter of these creatures is unsettling; to young Quimet, it is paralyzing. He turns waxen, breaking into a cold sweat. He is stunned, only coming to when the attendant demands he help her retrieve the bird corpses when they fall off the counter. He complies, but his physiological distress only increases, until he finally flees for home where he can no longer hold back his tears.

It seems for Quimet that during this quick sojourn to the market his entire understanding of the world is shaken to its core. His shock apparently stems from the stark contrast between his imagined idealized relationships with the animals he sees and the brutal reality of their life circumstances that, ironically, bring them into his fantasy world in the first place. Once Quimet leaves his new house, the narrative voice immerses the reader fully in Quimet’s internal experience. Through this focalization we learn two things about him: that he is determined to eat his chocolate on its own in direct defiance of his mother and, more importantly, that his natural inclination toward animals is one of curiosity and affiliation. As he observes the adults going about their busy day, Quimet imagines being able to interact with someone else’s rabbit:

Passà una vella tota decidida, amb una berruga a la punta de la barba. Duia un cabàs ple de provisions i gairebé l’hi fregà pel nas. D’una banda del cabàs sortia el cap d’un conill. Quedà embadalit. Oh, aquelles orelles tan llargues i el morret desficiós i rosat, amb els bigotis llargs per a estirar…

Although the context surrounding the rabbit might suggest that the rabbit forms part of the “provisions” the woman is carrying, Quimet does not make this connection. Instead, he focuses only on the possibility of the rabbit as a pet from whose physical presence he can derive comfort and joy. It is not insignificant, however, that the rabbit is already visually fragmented, as only its

47. My translation: “An old woman passed, very focused, with a verruca on the point of her chin. She was carrying a shopping basket with two handles so full of provisions that it just grazed her nose. On one side of the basket emerged a rabbit’s head. Quimet was amused. Oh, those long, long ears and that rosy nosey, with its long whiskers for tugging…”
head is visible among the other foods in the old woman’s bag. Such presentation strongly foreshadows the impending scene in the market.

Quimet’s imagination goes even further when he sees a man transporting chickens and other poultry fowls in crates. His attention immediately turns to a goose whose gaze draws him to it:

De la banda oposada a la vella venia un home, vestit de blau, que empenyia un carretó curull de caixes d'aviram. Per entre els barrots de fusta les gallines i els pollastres treien el cap. A la caixa del cim, barrejada amb gallines, una oca blanca, oriental, amb el bec d'un groc esclatant i els ulls negres com agulles de picar, estirava un coll llarguíssim.

Si fos meva, pensà Quimet, li lligaria un cordill a la pota i la trauria a passejar. Li diria "Avellaneta".

S'aixecà i seguí l'home del carretó. L'home es va aturar davant la porta del mercat i començà a descarregar caixes.

Plantat al seu davant, Quimet no el perdia de vista. L'home agafà una caixa i entrà al mercat. Quimet, d'esma, el seguí. Li semblava que l'oca s'havia adonat d'ell i que aquells ullets inexpressius el miraven.48

48. My translation: “From the opposite side of the old lady came a man, dressed in blue, who was pushing a cart overloaded with poultry in cages. In between the wooden bars the hens and the roosters poked out their heads. In the cage on top, mixed with the hens, an oriental white goose, with a shocking yellow beak and beady black eyes, stretched its very long neck.

If she were mine, thought Quimet, I would tie a rope to her foot, and I would stroll around with her. I would call her “Avellaneta”.

He stood up and followed the man with the cart. The man stopped in front of the door to the market and began unloading cages.

Rooted in front of him, Quimet didn’t let him out of his sight. The man grabbed a cage and entered the market. Quimet, mesmerized, followed him. It seemed that the goose had noticed him and that those inexpressive eyes were watching him.”
This time, only moments after seeing the rabbit, Quimet fantasizes about being able to name the animal in question and keeping her as a companion. Once he names her, the goose fully becomes a being to him, thus rendering the ensuing interaction, that of Quimet witnessing her slaughter, particularly traumatizing to both Quimet and Rodoreda’s empathetic reader.

Esther Laso y León explains that children tend to be portrayed as eager to establish connections with animals across many literary traditions, especially if children are considered the primary audience. She notes that several critics trace this tendency to Rousseau, “in the belief that children, instinctive beings in “becoming,” are more inclined toward understanding nature and to enter into contact with it.”

Whether or not the story is intended for children, however, it is certainly not the case that Quimet understands the non-human world nor that he completely identifies with the animals’ inferior social rank. In both his fantasized relationships with the goose and the rabbit he does not envision a relationship of equality or even of care, but instead imposes a dominance that borders violence upon each of the potential pets. He derives joy from the prospect of pulling on the rabbit’s whiskers, and though he names Avellaneta, his fantasy involves physically roping her to his person. In neither case does he consider the animal’s material or psychological reality – not that a child of his age necessarily could or should. Although Quimet is a child and as such his understanding is of course limited, the level of narrative detail given while experiencing Quimet’s dismay at the meat stand allows for the reader’s empathy to extend beyond Quimet and to the

49. My translation: “in the belief that children, instinctive beings in “becoming,” are more inclined toward understanding nature and to enter into contact with it.”

50. My translation: “another explanation for the abundant presence of animals in stories for children would be that, in terms of social hierarchy, children and animals have occupied a similar rank for a long time.”
scared, defeated bird who is well aware of the cruel death she is about to experience. Considered in this manner, the story acquires a level of sophistication in the social critique it delivers that can easily extend to an audience keenly aware of the systemic violence in Catalunya under the shadow of Francoism.

Although not speaking particularly of Spain’s fascist dictatorship, Adams passionately links rigid, patriarchal cultures to violence through meat consumption:

Meat eating is to animals what white racism is to people of color, anti-Semitism is to Jewish people, homophobia is to gay men and lesbians, and woman hating is to women. All are oppressed by a culture that does not want to assimilate them fully on their grounds with their rights. Yet, an enormous void separates these forms of oppression of people from the form in which we oppress the other animals. We do not consume people. We do consume the other animals. Meat eating is the most oppressive and extensive institutionalized violence against animals. In addition, meat eating offers the grounds for subjugating animals: if we can kill, butcher, and consume them – in other words, completely annihilate them – we may, as well, experiment upon them, trap them and hunt them, exploit them, and raise them in environments that imprison them (...). (52)

Adams does not mince words. For her and ecofeminists like her, animals deserve precisely the same consideration and freedom from torment as any human. While I have no reason to believe that Rodoreda herself might have shared such a point of view, Adams’ broader point is that all exploitation and suffering is related directly to and perpetuated in similar manners as all other exploitation and suffering. When applied to “Gallines de Guinea”, the graphic descriptions of how the widowed butcher so brutally strangles the birds despite their agonizing screams and later
justifies her actions (she claims they taste better with all the blood still inside them) negates Quimet’s initial identification. Once the butcher renders Avellaneta a mere object, she is transformed from a potential pet into consumable flesh and usable feathers: things. Quimet’s visible and inarticulate reaction reflects the shattered illusion of both his own control over the narratives he invents and his innocence about the ubiquity and normality of violence around him:

La vendedora li donà una poma. Sortí a fora, travessà el carrer, pujà l'escala de pressa i entrà al pis panteixant. A la cuina trobà la seva mare i se li abraçà a les faldilles.

- Què tens? Encara no has tastat la xocolata?

Quimet esclatà en sanglots violents. Plorava sorollosament amb la boca oberta i amb els ulls plens d'arrugues de tan tancats.

- Però què tens? T'han pegat? Què et passa?

Ell feia que no amb el cap a cada pregunta i no parava de plorar. Abocava tota la pena, tot el dolor emmagatzemat. Un cop la crisi apaivagada, amb el pit encara sotragat per les deixalles dels plors, digué, com si tot d'una s'hagués fet més gran.

- Estic més trist...  

51. There is no clear indication in the text of Avellanita’s real-life sex other than the use of the word “oca”. It appears to be Quimet who genders her female of his own imagination and not based on any specific knowledge of goose biology.

52. My translation: The vendor gave him an apple. He fled, crossed the street, climbed the staircase as fast as he could, and entered the apartment panting. He found his mother in the kitchen and he embraced her skirts.

“What’s wrong? You still haven’t had your chocolate?”

Quimet burst into violent sobs. He cried loudly with his mouth open and his eyes completely scrunched up from being so tightly shut.

“But what’s wrong? Did someone hit you? What’s happened to you?”

He shook his head no to every one of her questions and did not stop crying. All of his anguish poured out, all the bottled-up pain. Once the crisis was appeased, with his chest still jolted from the remaining cries, he said, as though he had just aged.

“I’m so sad...”
In this closing scene, poor Quimet cannot quite make sense of the meaning of what he just witnessed; such a task is left to the reader. However, the fact that Quimet reacts most intensely to the encounter is telling – the other adults voice their concerns and discomfort, but none actually turns away from the violence before him or her, thus suggesting that all violence is sustained through societal norms. Like the widowed butcher, who we can only guess might have lost her husband – and her compassion – to overt human violence, the adults present are conditioned to the brutality of war and desensitized to and even dependent on everyday, socially-sanctioned violence.

Therefore, Quimet’s incapacity to verbalize what he has just experienced reflects the anxiety of the bird he watched struggle for life, and both creatures’ reactions echo the unspeakable despair most Catalans and Spaniards in general felt under the oppressive regime. According to Adams: “Children, fresh observers of the dominant culture, raise issues about meat eating using a literal viewpoint. One part of the socialization process to the dominant culture is the encouragement of children to view the death of animals for food as acceptable: to do so, they must think symbolically rather than literally” (57). So, too, must Rodoreda’s readers think about their own likely visceral reaction to Avellaneta’s fate. In symbolic terms, the leaps from societally-sanctioned violence against animals for the consumption of their bodies to that of soldiers to the military, women to domesticity, or the worker to capitalist structures are small, a theme recalling Clarín’s “¡Adiós, Cordera!”, another supposed children’s story from 1892, and quoted in the introductory chapter. Although critics such as Lluís Serrasolsas Domènech consider “Gallines de Guinea” to be a conte infantil, such a symbolic interpretation, that is one that carefully examines the emotional processes that occur during the traumatic episode in both Quimet and the fowls, alludes to an audience with a much more complex understanding of society than a child reader might command.
Ultimately, this episode of Quimet’s childhood completes his entrance into the violent patriarchal structures that characterize Catalan society under the Franco regime well into his adulthood. The challenge to his innocent view of the world, to his desire to make all animals his friends in some capacity, is simply too much for him to process calmly. The child protagonist’s initiation into normalized, sanctioned human violence leaves him visibly traumatized, unlike the adult witnesses already seemingly conditioned to such scenes and practices, effectively provoking similar discomfort in the reader. Like any other trauma, this grisly encounter is likely to affect him for the rest of his life. The use of a child protagonist in such a way calls into question the very mundanity of the practice itself, giving us pause as readers alongside Quimet. This strain of narrative empathy marks the commonness of public and brutal animal slaughter.

Considering Carol J. Adams’ interpretation of all acts surrounding meat eating, Quimet’s reaction draws attention to both the material and symbolic significance with which Rodoreda’s short story is charged. In its employment of a child protagonist as a witness traumatized by a quotidian act, Rodoreda’s “Gallines de Guinea” interrogates the violence inherent in everyday life and thereby attests to the pervasive power of patriarchal authority and lays bare its destructive nature through the physical suffering and psychological anguish of those most vulnerable to its domination. Margo DeMello notes that “Many children’s books, while emphasizing the closeness between child and animal, end with the child growing up and, sometimes, the animal’s death” (331). While this is what happens in “Gallines de Guinea,” in this case, Quimet’s growing up does not imply a happy ending for him, for his country, and certainly not for the guinea fowls.53

53. This is an especially foreboding ending if one entertains the possibility of Quimet “maturing” into the unstable and physically and psychologically abusive first husband to Rodoreda’s most famous protagonist from La Plaça del Diamant, published about four years later. Not only does this diabolic character share a name with young Quimet, but it is he who renames Natalia “Colometa,” or dove.
Ana María Matute’s short story “El saltamontes verde” resembles Laforet’s “El secreto de la gata” in its fantastic elements and aligns with Rodoreda’s “Gallines de Guinea” in its complex treatment of human loss. This combination of the fantastic and the real draws the reader into the child protagonist’s unique set of circumstances. “El saltamontes verde” follows Yungo, an orphan, as he in turn follows his grasshopper guide in search of his quite literally lost voice. The grasshopper joins him enthusiastically after Yungo rescues him from two young bullies about to drown the poor creature. The grasshopper’s stare startles Yungo into action. In gratitude, the grasshopper offers to help Yungo find the “Hermoso País” (“Beautiful Land”), a place Yungo invents to give his quest to find his voice a named destination. After several stops on their way ranging from sad to beautiful to frightening encounters with travelers, the grasshopper finally reveals to Yungo that he is in fact Yungo’s lost voice and that all he needs to do reclaim it for himself is to smash the grasshopper under his foot. The grasshopper pleads for Yungo to recognize the good the grasshopper always did for those who crossed their path and insists that Yungo emulate his good works once Yungo kills him and regains his voice. While the boy contemplates his options and mourns his shattered illusion, the wind carries off his map to the Hermoso País and in its pursuit, it takes Yungo too. The grasshopper is left bidding him farewell, knowing that Yungo is finally on his way to the Hermoso País where no voices are needed, because “all words have already been said” (34, my translation).

“El saltamontes verde” is largely a text about verbal expression as embodied in an interspecies relationship in which verbal and non-verbal communication are inverted from their natural and expected representations. First, the tragic hero’s quest for his voice concretizes around
his ostracization as a mute orphan. Next, the catalyst for the quest is his encounter with a talking grasshopper who volunteers to play a Vergil-type guide in Yungo’s journey to the Hermoso País.54 Throughout their time together, the grasshopper attempts to convince Yungo that there are other valuable ways of perceiving and communicating, but Yungo consistently rejects them all in favor of one day recuperating his spoken voice. Finally, when the grasshopper reveals that he is actually Yungo’s voice, the protagonist refuses to kill him to recover his ability to speak, he is denied any opportunity to accept or adjust to his new understanding of reality as he is carried off over the ocean to the Hermoso País, or afterlife. Ultimately, Yungo’s internalization of an immutable and unattainable ideal of oral communication renders him capable of social belonging until he confronts the untenability of regaining speech and promptly dies. Thus, as the story’s nexus of silence and fantasy, Yungo’s demise represents totalitarian patriarchy’s rejection of any non-conforming human element.

Because he is bullied by his peers and underestimated by adults, Yungo spends a lot of time before meeting the grasshopper alone, leading to a life of isolation in which he develops a strong affinity for all elements of nature, including non-human animals of many varieties. His empathy for bullied creatures like himself leads him to intercede for the grasshopper:

Yungo se acercó. Extendió las dos manos para decir a los muchachos que se alejaran y abandonaran al saltamontes. De todos los muchachos de la granja Yungo era el que amaba más a los animales, a las flores e incluso al viento cuando soplaba en la negra chimenea.

- ¡Vete de ahí, atontao! – dijo el mayor de los chicos, empujándole.

54. The comparison to Jiminy Cricket (Pepe Grillo) would perhaps be a more likely one for Rodoreda’s reader. Disney’s Pinocho came out in Madrid in early 1944 (“Pinocchio”).
Tiraron del hilo para meter al pobre animal en la charca y ahogarlo. Y, en aquel momento, Yungo notó la mirada del saltamontes. Era una mirada extraña. Dos ojos diminutos que se clavaban en él, como dos finísimas y largas agujas de oro. Ningún animal le había mirado de aquel modo. Y entonces ocurrió algo extraordinario. Una voz llegó hasta él:

-¡Sálvame, Yungo! (10)

It is at this point in the story when the boy, who is accustomed to having his gestures misinterpreted or willfully ignored, first begins to communicate using verbalized human language. Upon exchanging a “strange gaze” with the grasshopper, a Freudian scene of uncanny recognition, the grasshopper appeals to Yungo for help using his own name. From here onward, the grasshopper assumes the role of interlocutor and intermediary for Yungo, specifically because he can use human language in ways that Yungo cannot. Such isolation is unsurprising given the tendency to both infantilize and animalize those who communicate through gesture, as animal rights and disability rights activist and scholar Sunaura Taylor reminds us:

The supposed lack of sophistication of sign language, which was used to justify oralism at the turn of the century, is an example of the ways categories of race, disability, and animality have been entangled in and co-constitutive of one another. […] Deaf people who could not sign or speak were also animalized, seen as lacking

55. My translation: “Yungo drew closer. He extended his two hands to tell the boys to step away and leave the grasshopper alone. Of all the boys on the farm, Yungo was the one who loved animals the most. He loved flowers too and even the wind when it would blow in the sooty chimney. “Get out of here, stupid!” said the older of the boys as he pushed Yungo. They yanked on the thread to submerge the poor animal in the pond and drown him. And, in that very moment, the grasshopper’s gaze caught Yungo. It was a strange look. Two diminutive eyes that had fixated on him, like two very fine and long golden needles. No animal had ever looked at him in such a way. And then something extraordinary happened. A voice called out to him: “Save me, Yungo!”
language and thus as living in a state of brutishness or mere animal existence. Others argued that gestural language could no more be called a language than expressive animal movements like the wag of a dog’s tail. (*Beasts of Burden* 50-51)

While Yungo is not deaf, his inability to speak gives the people around him an excuse to ostracize him further. The bullies readily dismiss his thoughts and desires and ridicule him because to him, he is not much above the hapless grasshopper. His abilities to comprehend complex human language and emotion and to communicate through sound (music), gesture, and written language do not matter until he is united with the grasshopper, the physical manifestation of his voice. Mel Y. Chen rightly asserts that “language users use animacy hierarchies to manipulate, affirm, and shift the ontologies that matter the world” (42). Yungo seems to have internalized such a hierarchization of oralism in communication, ultimately to his own detriment.

However, it is the grasshopper’s particular use of spoken language to ingratiate himself with the protagonist that brings the nuances of human language to Yungo’s and the reader’s attention. Yungo reacts with awe and wonder to hearing his named pronounced by a stranger in need, and this utterance inspires him to heroic action, something of which he never presumed himself capable:

Yungo conocía el lenguaje de las flores, de los pájaros y del viento; un lenguaje mudo, sin voz, como el suyo propio. Pero aquel pequeño saltamontes verde, parecido a una de aquellas resplandecientes ramas del fondo de la charca, le miraba y le hablaba con lenguaje humano, como nunca le mirara ni hablara nadie. Al escuchar la voz de aquella pequeña e insignificante criatura de la tierra, se dio cuenta de que todos los hombres, mujeres y niños le hablaban a él con impaciencia,
o con desvío o con tristeza. Nunca le había pedido nadie nada, hasta aquel momento. Una gran indignación se le despertó viendo lo que iban a hacer los chicos del granjero Nicolás, y se lanzó contra ellos. Levantó los puños y los descargó con fuerza contra las dos cabezas, que estaban muy juntas e inclinadas. Las dos cabezas chocaron, y sonaron como cocos huecos.56 (10-11)

Although he had always felt lonely, in this passage Yungo finally realizes the capacity of language to connect and thereby evoke strong emotions. Befriending the grasshopper in this way gives Yungo’s quest focus because the grasshopper offers his support, a completely novel experience to the young protagonist. Thus, the grasshopper doubly reinforces Yungo’s internalized desire for normalized, oral communication. The grasshopper’s willingness to serve as his companion and guide allows Yungo’s singular wish to grow into an obsessive desire, because his companion’s affirmation concretizes the Hermoso País, a space that until that point had been a fantasy confined to Yungo’s interior world.

Despite having fed Yungo’s desire for his voice, the grasshopper consistently encourages Yungo to appreciate the other nuances of communication of which he is extraordinarily capable. The grasshopper urges Yungo to pay attention to the words people speak, an action he can only just now appreciate after witnessing the kindness and compassion that words can inspire. Yungo

56. My translation: “Yungo knew the language of the flowers, of the birds, and of the wind. A mute language, voiceless, like his own. But that tiny green grasshopper, similar to those resplendent branches at the bottom of the pond, was looking at him and speaking to him with human language, like no one had never looked or spoken to him before. Upon hearing the voice of the small, insignificant creature of the earth, he realized that all the men, women, and children spoke to him with impatience, or with inattention, or with sadness. No one had never asked him for anything until that moment. A great sense of indignation awoke a storm inside him knowing what Farmer Nicolás’s boys were going to do, and he launched himself at them. He raised his fists and discharged them with force against the two heads, which happened to be very close together and tilted. The two heads crashed and they sounded like empty coconuts.”
comes to understand the revelatory power of language that only he can perceive upon the grasshopper’s instruction:

- ¡Fíjate en sus palabras!

Yungo vio que de la boca del traficante salían pompas de jabón que subían hacia las nubes. Los pájaros las picoteaban furiosos. Las pompas se deshacían enseguida, por más hermosas, brillantes y redondas que aparecieran.

- Ya ves qué vanas son sus palabras – dijo el saltamontes.

Luego, de la gran boca llena de oro del ganadero, Yungo vio caer piedras negras como carbones. En vez de elevarse en el aire como las palabras del traficante, caían al suelo, pesadas, siniestras.

Y el saltamontes añadió:

- ¡Ya ves qué falsas y malvadas son ésas!

La conversación duraba mucho, y más pompas de jabón subían en el aire y más negros carbones caían al suelo. Todo resultaba tan desagradable de ver, que Yungo sintió un pesar muy grande.

- ¿Aún deseas encontrar tu voz? – dijo el saltamontes, esperanzado -. ¡Ya ves que no son gran cosa las palabras de los hombres!
Pero Yungo movió afirmativamente la cabeza, y el saltamontes leyó su pensamiento: <<Sí, deseo encontrar mi voz, sobre todas las cosas de la tierra.>>

(15-16)

Yungo understands his unique ability akin to that of the birds within the storyworld to perceive not only the words orally communicated around him, but also their speakers’ underlying intentions. Without the grasshopper’s mediation, Yungo would never have come to understand the dark side of linguistic ability. However, instead of convincing him of the hypocrisy that language allows, this ability only hardens his resolve. The protagonist’s obsession remains unshaken and he persists in his unrelenting pursuit to secure speech for himself.

Soon after, the grasshopper encourages Yungo to adopt a new form of nonverbal expression by purchasing a guitar from another needy boy. Upon first playing his guitar before an audience, even without ever being instructed musically, Yungo attracts more positive attention than he ever imagined possible:

El saltamontes volvió al hombro de Yungo, y juntos cruzaron el río. Llegaron a una plazuela donde había árboles y bancos de piedra. Yungo se sentó, extendiendo al sol sus desnudos pies, y pulsó las cuerdas de la guitarra. Realmente, el muchacho.

57. My translation: “Focus on his words!” Yungo saw that from the trader’s mouth came soap bubbles that rose to the clouds. The birds pecked at them furiously. The bubbles burst immediately, as brilliant, beautiful, and round as they might have been. “You can see how vain his words are” said the grasshopper. Then, from the cowherd’s great, gold-filled mouth Yungo saw black rocks fall like charcoal. Instead of floating in the air like the trader’s, these words fell to the ground, heavy and sinister. The grasshopper added: “See how false and wicked his are!” The conversation lasted a long while, and more bubbles floated, and more coals fell. It was all so displeasing to watch that Yungo felt a heavy burden settle on him. “Do you still want to find your voice?” asked the grasshopper hopefully. “You can see that the words of men are not a great thing!” But Yungo nodded his head and the grasshopper read his thoughts: “Yes, I want to find my voice, more than anything else on this earth.”

58. In this respect, this narrative complements Orfeo’s epilogue in Niebla as discussed in the previous chapter. Both Orfeo and the grasshopper accuse humanity’s language, often cited by philosophers as the main difference between humans and nonhuman animals, as its greatest mechanism of betrayal. Thus, language use becomes a marker of immorality and its nonuse an indicator of innocence or purity of heart.
no había mentido, pues enseguida llegaron cuatro perros hambrientos y famélicos, pájaros, y un torpe y tímido sapo. Hasta la charca donde habitaban, entre las malas hierbas del descampado, habían llegado aquellas notas. Todos levantaban la cabeza hacia Yungo, y le miraban con ojos llenos de amor y agradecimiento.

También los árboles mecieron sus ramas, y el más anciano dijo:

-Nunca nos alegró nadie con palabras como éstas.

Al oír esto, Yungo miró sorprendido al saltamontes. Y el saltamontes leyó en sus ojos: <<¿Es posible que crean oír mi voz?>>

In this passage, Yungo realizes the ability he wields to gratify and calm nature and nonhuman animals through his music. He also begins to suspect his unique connection to the natural world, a fact that the narrative voice has made explicit throughout. While he is impressed by his newfound capacity, Yungo remains steadfast in his pursuit. The grasshopper faithfully continues on with Yungo, and after each of their various encounters with humans of various types, asks Yungo to reconsider his quest for a voice.

The relationship between the grasshopper and Yungo unfolds following this similar pattern where the grasshopper speaks and interprets Yungo’s thoughts while Yungo witnesses the positive effect of the grasshopper’s words on others and the overwhelming peace his own guitar music brings to all those who listen. The relationship depicts an inversion of the traditional human-animal

59. My translation: “The grasshopper returned to Yungo’s shoulder, and together they crossed the river. They arrived at a small plaza with trees and stone benches. Yungo sat down, extended his bare feet in the sunshine, and plucked the guitar strings. Truly, the boy hadn’t lied to him, because four hungry, malnourished dogs came, as well as birds, and an awkward and timid frog. His chords had reached all the way to the pond where they all lived, among the weeds in the wasteland. They all raised their heads toward Yungo, and they looked at him, their eyes filled with love and gratitude. The trees’ branches swayed too and the oldest said “No one has ever made us this joyful with words like these.” Upon hearing that, Yungo looked at the grasshopper with surprise. And the grasshopper read in his eyes: “Is it possible that they believe they can hear my voice?” ”

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relationship; it is generally the humans who do the talking and the interpreting of animal gestures and looks while non-human animals elicit human reaction to their nonverbal utterances. I read this inversion between the protagonist and his companion-guide as an indication of their fusion as the same being within the story. Furthermore, the narrative voice makes it clear at various points that Yungo is saddened when humans cannot call him by his name because he cannot tell them what it is, but the grasshopper has always called him Yungo from the moment he first called out to him for help. The grasshopper also reads Yungo’s thoughts through the boy’s expressions with great accuracy. Clearly, the connection runs deeper than mere companionship.

The grasshopper’s revelation that he is actually the embodiment of Yungo’s voice strengthens this reading:

El saltamontes dijo:

-Estoy llorando, Yungo, porque no puedo resistir más. ¿De verdad, de verdad deseas recuperar tu perdida voz?  

Yungo asintió.

-Bien. – dijo el saltamontes -. Entonces, déjame en el suelo y aplástame bajo tu pie. Yo soy tu voz.  

Yungo se quedó tan sorprendido que apenas podía creer lo que el animal decía.

-Cuando naciste, yo fui encargado de robar tu voz. De este modo debía andar por el mundo y deslizar en los oídos de los desgraciados un poco de esperanza. Ya has visto cómo lo hice siempre: con el caballito bayo, con el muchacho de la guitarra, con los perros hambrientos y el sapo, con los titiriteros, con el hombre del...
guiñol…y hasta contigo mismo. De este modo he podido hacer el bien por la tierra. Creí que lo comprenderías, pues yo tampoco sé dónde está el Hermoso País, aunque sé que algún día me llevará allí…¡Pero eres un chico muy tozudo, Yungo! No tengo más remedio que morir. Si me matas, tu voz volverá a ti. Sólo te pido una cosa: procura hacer con ella el mismo bien que hice yo.60 (32-33)

Nonetheless, Yungo does not kill the grasshopper to recuperate his voice. Upon deciding not to kill his friend, Yungo is literally carried away by the wind to the Hermoso País. Yungo’s death suggests that his decision to remain voiceless ultimately condemns him.

The grasshopper’s survival instead of Yungo’s demonstrates a preference within the storyworld for human oral expression that anyone without speech cannot circumvent, because even though the mute human is excised from society through death, the arbiter of human language – the grasshopper – is also left abandoned without his intermediary and the source of his voice. While these events subvert traditional anthropocentric hierarchies in terms of physical bodies, the ending reaffirms speciesist and ableist paradigms regarding communication. As Chen explains, “this is indeed one of the ironies of the general use of language to dehumanize: while (human) language is being used to impute a nonhuman animality to a human, it is also already viewed as a unique quality of humans” (Animacies 51). Although the grasshopper might still be able to evoke hope in those whom he encounters, Yungo’s presence provided him access to humans that he would not.

My translation: “The grasshopper said: “I’m crying, Yungo, because I can’t stand it anymore. Do you really, REALLY want your voice back?” Yungo nodded. “Well,” said the grasshopper, “In that case, put me on the ground and smash me under your foot. I am your voice.” Yungo was so stunned that he could hardly believe what the animal was saying. “When you were born, I was charged with the task of stealing your voice. That way, I could wander the earth and slip a little hope into the ears of the wretched. You have already seen how I’ve always done it: with the cream-colored horse, with the boy with the guitar, with the starving dogs and the frog, with the puppeteers, with the theater man…and even with you. This is how I have been able to do good for the earth. I thought you would understand, but I don’t know where the Hermoso País is either, even if I do know that one day I’ll be taken there…But you are a very stubborn boy, Yungo! There’s nothing else I can do but die. If you kill me, your voice will return to you. I only ask you one thing: use it for the same good that I have.” ”
otherwise enjoy. Thus, as a result of Yungo’s human death, as Yungo’s voice, the grasshopper can no longer propagate the good the orphan boy might have done in the world. His excision from humanity, or dehumanization, is only partial until his death, thus silencing Yungo’s would-be perspective as an alternative narrative to the dominant forms of expression and familial and community ties that characterize totalitarian patriarchy. In this narrative, language is the perpetrator of all that is evil and only some of what is considered good or valuable, and those who do the most damage demonstrate the most adept use of language, with the exception of the grasshopper. However, the grasshopper’s survival without Yungo does not seem likely, because, in fantasy or otherwise, history tells us that animals who act like humans are never allowed full access to humanity – just ask Durof Durof’s cerdito from the previous chapter.

The clear need for interdependence between Yungo and his grasshopper companion for social survival encourages reading “El saltamontes verde” as a multispecies disability narrative. Sunaura Taylor argues compellingly against the fallacy of independence:

Dependency is real – but the point is that we all exist along its spectrum. The challenge is to understand dependency not simply as negative and certainly not as unnatural, but rather as an integral part of being alive. […] Dependency is a reasoning that has been used to justify slavery, patriarchy, colonization, and disability oppression. The language of dependency is a brilliant rhetorical tool, as it is a way for those who use it to sound concerned, compassionate, and caring while continuing to exploit those who they are supposedly concerned about. (“Interdependent Animals” 113-114)

Although she is particularly concerned with animal slaughter and experimentation, Taylor’s broader point, that interdependence is universal even for the most privileged and able-bodied
humans, allows us to read Matute’s narrative as an attempt at an interspecies relationship of care whose success is prematurely foreclosed without explanation. Given the context of censorship and the violent patriarchal hierarchies the story’s ending restores, an ending in which both Yungo the musical orphan survives alongside his talking grasshopper-shaped moral compass was likely an impossibility. Yet, taking Taylor’s insight into account establishes a clear link between the three short stories this chapter has explored (this is also true to an extent among all the works analyzed in each chapter). While the fantasy of a community of care ultimately dissolves by the end of each tale, and the storyworld returns to one ruled by patriarchal violence, the will for a less cruel, more accepting reality gains some material ground in the recognition of interspecies interdependence:

Care and needing care are sites that rather than trying to avoid, we need to be radically attentive to. For better or for worse, our co-evolution with domesticated species has created animals whom we are deeply entangled with, both ecologically and emotionally. These animals remind us that we ourselves are a part of “nature,” that we cannot just cut ourselves free from other animals. But they also remind us that we are capable of deep coercion and exploitation – that we have too often dominated those whom we deem dependent and vulnerable. Vulnerability and dependence can be unsettling as they are states that require intimacy, empathy, and self-reflection, but they also hold the potential for new ways of being, supporting, and communicating – new ways of creating meaning across differences in species and ability. (Taylor, “Interdependent Animals” 124)
Conclusion: Biophilia’s Failure in the Long Shadow of Francoism

Laforet’s “El secreto de la gata” is the least upsetting of the three stories compared in this chapter, because no one dies and there is no overt depiction of violence. The protagonist Carmen’s parents are mentioned but are conspicuously absent in the narrative world. While the story itself employs magical realism throughout in the communication between the children and non-human animals, fantasy moves the narrative action as the story’s ending leaves the main question regarding the cats unresolved: it is unclear whether or not Carmen actually experienced an evening learning about the secret cat community or merely dreamed it. What is clear is that Carmen did not ever feel she could safely disclose that experience until well into adulthood.

Rodoreda’s “Gallines de guinea” is certainly the most realist of the three, possibly because the author did not feel the need to couch any event that might displease censors in child-like fantasy. As in Laforet’s story, the protagonist Quimet has a mother who appears in the narrative, but she does not play a major role in the events that unfold. His father is only mentioned in passing as the former owner of the hand-me-downs in which Quimet is dressed, suggesting the likelihood that he has been lost to either war or Fascism. Later, it is Quimet’s imagination that fantasizes one of the geese to be a companion named Avellaneta. Once this possibility is utterly and violently obliterated before his eyes, Quimet can only express profound sadness through word and action. His trauma remains verbally undisclosed at the story’s ending.

Matute’s “El saltamontes verde” is easily the most removed from realist representations, a quality unsurprising in a story specifically written to be published for children (Gazarian-Gautier 99). In this narrative, the protagonist’s parents are absent from the beginning: the narrative voice explains how Yungo’s parents drowned and how his adoptive mother, a farmer, has little time or understanding for him because of his disability. Fantasy abounds in this narrative in Yungo’s deep
connection with a highly anthropomorphized natural world, Yungo’s supernatural abilities, and his self-delusion of the Hermoso País. Even his death is fantastical. Silence also an overt theme in “El saltamontes verde” both in Yungo’s muteness and in his final excision from society. Disclosure of any sort of trauma is thus foreclosed throughout Yungo’s short life.

In addition to these three common themes of absent parents, reliance on fantasy, and repressive silence, each of these stories presents a pivotal scene in which the protagonist and would-be companion animal share a profound and meaningful gaze which draws them together:

Laforet: Se despertó en su camita, con la gata a los pies, mirándola con sus grandes, misteriosos, ojos verdes.

Tuvo intenciones de preguntarle algo. Cómo había llegado hasta allí, por ejemplo, pero Pachota le indicó con la mirada que eso no era conveniente.61 (“El secreto de la gata” 180)

Rodoreda: Plantat al seu davant, Quimet no el perdia de vista. L’home agafà una caixa i entrà al mercat. Quimet, d’esma, el seguí. Li semblava que l’oca s’havia adonat d’ell i que aquells ullets inexpressius el miraven.62 (“Gallines de guinea”)

Matute: Y, en aquel momento, Yungo notó la mirada del saltamontes. Era una mirada extraña. Dos ojos diminutos que se clavaba en él, como dos finísimas y

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61. My translation: “She awoke in her bed, with the cat at her feet, watching her with her big, mysterious green eyes. She wanted to ask her something. How she had gotten there, for example, but Pachota signaled to her with a look that would not be prudent.”

62. My translation: “Rooted in front of him, Quimet didn’t let him out of his sight. The man grabbed a cage and entered the market. Quimet, mesmerized, followed him. It seemed that the goose had noticed him and that those inexpressive eyes were watching him.”
largas agujas de oro. Ningún animal le había mirado de aquel modo.\(^{63}\) (“El saltamontes verde” 10)

Each of these nonverbal communicative moments leads the child protagonist toward a deeper connection with their respective nonhuman animal companions. For Donna Haraway, interactions such as the gazes exchanged between each of the child protagonists and their nonhuman companion animals mark the relationships between them as one of mutual responsibility:

> Touch, regard, looking back, becoming with – all these make us responsible in unpredictable ways for which worlds take shape. In touch and regard, partners willy nilly are in the miscegenous mud that infuses our bodies with all that brought that contact into being. Touch and regard have consequences. (...) Caring means becoming subject to the unsettling obligation of curiosity, which requires knowing more at the end of the day than at the beginning. (...) Curiosity gets one into thick mud, but I believe that is the kind of “looking back” and “becoming-with-companions” that might matter in making autre-mondialisations more possible. (36-38)

Applying Haraway’s insight leads to analyzing the consequences these children face after entering into these relationships of curiosity alongside their nonhuman companions as ecofeminist commentaries on the shortcomings of Francoist ideals of family and morality. Violence, both overt and covert, still haunts the would-be alternative communities and relationships these narratives describe. While these stories attest to the powerful implications of empathizing with the natural

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63. My translation: “And, in that very moment, the grasshopper’s gaze caught Yungo. It was a strange look. Two diminutive eyes that had fixated on him, like two very fine and long golden needles. No animal had ever looked at him in such a way.”
world as children, none goes so far as to imagine a successful alternative to traditional patriarchy. Such explorations are left for later authors, as explored in twenty-first century narratives by Isabel Franc and Jesús Carrasco in the following chapter.
Chapter IV: Rebellion of the Marginalized: Anti-Patriarchal Community Formation and The Limits of Ecofeminist Visions

Durante los meses siguientes, no se volvió a ver a la zorra de seguridad por La Madriguera Dancing Club y, como era el único bar de ambiente que había en el bosque, vete a saber dónde iría la pobre. (137)


Recognizing that every course of action carries attendant exclusions is important, therefore, in complicating notions about what modes of ethics are necessary in responding to entangled worlds. At the same time, it is necessary to move beyond simply acknowledging the inevitable role of exclusion, as this could prove as paralyzing for questions of action and intervention as recognizing that everything is entangled. Exclusions, I argue, do not just need to be acknowledged but politicized. In order to open space for more political questions to be asked, however, it is necessary to negotiate the exclusions that – perhaps paradoxically – constitute relationality itself. (176)

from Eva Haifa Giraud, What Comes After Entanglement? Activism, Anthropocentrism, and an Ethics of Exclusion (2019)

The early twenty-first century in Spain was initially marked by newfound liberty, a broadening of civil rights, and relative prosperity. After decades of political uncertainty following the end of the Franco dictatorship in late 1975, Spain had finally begun to solidify democratic rights and processes and to experience neoliberal economic openness. The country experienced a new wave of immigration, and tourism flourished. Robust independence movements reemerged, especially violently in the Basque Country and vocally in Catalunya. Like the rest of the world, however, Spain was profoundly negatively affected by the economic collapse of 2008-2009 and suffered staggering unemployment rates. Real estate foreclosures and evictions reached historic rates. Thus, as a result of incorporating fully into the global neoliberal social order, Spain experienced impressive gain and overwhelming loss in a relatively short amount of time. Spain’s subsequent indebtedness triggered tumultuous austerity and protest.
With this backdrop in mind, this chapter explores very different literary relationships between humans and non-human animals than what we have seen so far. Unlike the works examined in previous chapters, these two works are set in hyper-fictionalized spaces and times, yet the Franc texts could not have been written without broadened civil rights that solidified along with the return of democracy nor could Carrasco’s novel have taken such shape without the atmosphere of precarity and scarcity resulting from the financial and housing crisis. Franc’s fables take place on farms run exclusively by lesbians and in a multispecies garden in which non-humans of species from very different geographies and climates coexist and seemingly only clash in highly anthropomorphized ways. That is to say that Franc’s non-humans only interact in recognizably human ways, although the stories’ wordplay and use of animal-centered idiomatic expressions demonstrate narratorial awareness of the characters’ non-humanness. Conversations around copulation, for instance, are always about pleasure and the value of procreation is readily questioned. Diets, meanwhile, whether carnivorous, herbivorous, or omnivorous simply never come up at all, even though predators and prey all regularly come into close contact. In her fables, the setting itself is only described in vague terms, instead focusing on the interactions between the various protagonists that the queer-friendly spaces enable and privilege.

In contrast, Carrasco’s hyper-realist descriptions rely on detailed descriptions of sights, sounds, smells, and internal sensations that effectively convey the immensity of the openness of both the landscape itself and the human characters who interact within it and because of it. His bleak landscape and intense psychological narratives create a vivid account of survival despite scarcity – of resources, of experience, of safety, and of morality. Non-human animal perspectives are not represented in this novel, and only male characters populate its pages. However, the animals are still consequential; their physical presence and needs allow the central relationship to develop,
and in both Franc’s fables and Carrasco’s novel, the types of non-humans represented reflect popular understandings of these specific creatures’ places within human society. Importantly, despite their differences in tone, style, theme, and genre, both authors depict anonymous rather than concretely identified individuals with respect to human and non-human characters alike. As my analyses suggest, such treatment reveals the interconnectedness of humanity and animality and of human and non-humans in conceiving of community.

In this chapter, I apply Roberto Esposito’s *communitas* in conjunction with ecofeminist philosopher Lori Gruen’s “entangled empathy” to illustrate how each of these works advocates for the destruction of assumed societal bonds in favor of forging voluntary ones in the creation of multispecies communities of care and protection that respond to twenty-first century issues of queer identity and patriarchal sexual exploitation. Donna Haraway’s idea of kin-making in opposition to biological family ties further links these two seemingly disparate works in my analyses. I argue that interpreting these works through such an ecofeminist lens and in conjunction with one another serves to highlight the limitations of ecofeminist re-imagination of multispecies cultural configurations. Finally, Eva Haifa Giraud’s response to theories that emphasize entanglement suggest that these limitations might at least be predicted by anticipating the possible relationships that are excluded by such entanglements and the consequences foreclosing those relationships. As Giraud rightly posits, these inevitable exclusions seem to be as critically productive as they are unavoidable in practice.

Isabel Franc’s “lesbofables” (2008) and Jesús Carrasco’s debut novel *Intemperie* (2013) both conceive communities in defiance of various forms of patriarchal violence that characterize traditional community structures. Franc describes her approach to storytelling as one without any agenda other than to entertain those she cares about (*Cuentos y fábulas* 12-13), while Carrasco’s
work demonstrates a careful consideration of landscape and human desperation. Nonetheless, each
narrative responds to sexual violence directed toward a particular marginalized group: queer
feminists in Franc’s fables and children in rural poverty in Carrasco’s novel. Paradoxically, while
each work responds to patriarchal violence by creating a community of support, liberation, and
ultimately protection, both resort to depictions of violent acts that effectively establish an
alternative social order in which the once marginalized figure transforms into a central figure of
power.

These two texts feature very different narrative approaches, which in turn reflect differently
on the potential and implications of the multispecies communities portrayed. Franc uses humor
and absurd, inconsistent metaphor to advance a specific type of queer empowerment, even if at
times the themes are essentialist and even transphobic. Meanwhile, Carrasco’s very brutal,
masculinist novel takes a very different tack. By employing little spoken dialogue and relying on
flashback and an overabundance of sensory description, Carrasco’s narrative voice creates an
atmosphere of desolation, distress, and suspense. Yet, Franc’s fables and Carrasco’s novel
resemble each other in their explorations of the function of violence in creating highly exclusive
societies of protection that seek to resist patriarchy. As in the works discussed in the previous two
chapters, violence is revealed to be unavoidable in community formation and maintenance, even
when it is the desire to escape from forms of patriarchal violence that necessitates community-
building in the first place. In his analysis of multispecies families, environmental humanities
scholar Eben Kirksey defines multispecies connections as beneficial through both inclusivity and
exclusivity, entanglement and disengagement:

Multispecies families are spaces where social persons experience torque as their
modes of being are twisted, with other kinds of agents pulling at them and making
demands across the species interface. When social expectations are aligned, and
demands are quickly met, the torque or stress, evaporates. Some members of
multispecies families enjoy happiness, where lively encounters bring “the hap of
what happens” into “the gap between the impressions we have of others and the
impressions we make on others.” For others, happiness emerges only with the
possibility of escaping uncomfortable familial entanglements. (136)

In the juxtaposition of these works, we witness a gamut of entanglements and reactions to them,
all of which, if taken together, suggest that entanglement and exclusion are linked through
violence, as Giraud’s arguments indicate. Furthermore, the metaphoric use of animals in Franc’s
lesbofables and Carrasco’s novel’s intense focus on interhuman relationships essentialize the non-
human characters in each, despite their apparent specificity and indispensability to each of the
narratives.

“Pueden venir otras especies, pero es solo para hembras”: Lesbian Liberation and Exclusion in

Isabel Franc’s Fabulario Les (2008)

Isabel Franc is known for privileging lesbian identity and community in her fiction
(Aramburu, Norandi). She is perhaps best known for her erotic fiction like Entre todas las mujeres
(1992) and her queer trilogy written under the pseudonym Lola Van Guardia (Con Pedigree from
1997, Plumas de doble filo from 1999, and La mansión de las triédoras from 2002). Her more
recent graphic novels Alicia en un mundo real (2010) and Sansamba (2014) engage lesbian identity
in relation to disability, aging, ethnicity, race, and privilege. Diana Aramburu describes her
detective novels as part of a project to make lesbianism visible in the public sphere as well as in
popular fiction. For Aramburu, this trilogy of novels constructs a space in which women themselves must serve as protectors and promoters of their own liberation by remaking what is a traditionally masculine genre, the detective novel, into one of queer feminist cooperation (52).

For Elina Norandi, these novels celebrate an array of possibilities for empowered queer females in Spain, that nonetheless stick to humor as a mechanism to avoid serious political engagement (124). Given the presence of Lola Van Guardia’s name in the title of the volume in which these “lesbofables” appear, it seems safe to assume that these narratives also follow the same precepts. These fifteen “lesbofables” form the second-to-last section of her 2008 collection Cuentos y fábulas de Lola Van Guardia (Short Stories and Fables of Lola Van Guardia). On the surface these fables imagine a world away from heteronormativity, machismo, and speciesism in which all queer females can peacefully support one another. However, in order to build such a world, these narratives rely on the same exclusionary mechanisms that patriarchy often employs to enforce compliance to community norms.

Franc’s “lesbofables” are Aesopian or animal fables, as Thomas Noel broadly defines the genre:

[T]he short didactic narrative, commonly employing animal characters […] This definition of “fable” is probably the one most commonly accepted by the average person in the twentieth century. […] Everyone knows the formula – pithy narrative using animals to act out human foibles and consequent moral, either explicit or implicit – and most people remain familiar with a handful of traditional fables, even though that familiarity might be hidden away in the dim recesses of the mind along with other pre-puberty remembrances. (1)
Although Franc’s versions use humor to seemingly undo any moral value that her fables might on the surface appear to be imbued with, I argue that it is through her humorous wordplay that her fables acquire moral relevance for a receptive readership because of her careful attention to animality in the language used to (re)claim queer feminist identity.

Articulated ten years after Noel, H. J. Blackham defines a fable more amply:

A fable is a story invented to tell the truth, not a true story. A common definition used to be: a short story in which the action is natural and the agents imaginary. It could as well be the other way round. Enough to say at the outset that the fable is a metaphorical statement of its own kind, worth discriminating from its near literary kindred for its special uses. (Preface)

For Blackham, distinguishing a fable from other similar genres like parables, fairy tales, and allegories is a tricky process. One of the main characteristics he identifies that can readily apply to interpreting Franc’s fables is that “the medium is the message. The message is not delivered – certainly not in the ‘morals’ tagged to the Aesopian fables: it is embodied. It is in this sense that fable is a conceptual artefact, which remains to be used. Interplay continues between the thought provoked and the representation that provokes and aids it” (xviii-xix). The idea of the fable and its interpretations as dynamically changeable bodies is a particularly apt one given Franc’s discussions of human standards of female beauty and gender expression/presentation in many of the “lesbofables” and in particular given her reworking of the Aesopian fable itself. With respect to non-human animal bodies in fables, Blackham explains:

The animals of Aesop are not animals in nature. They are conventional, fictional characters with stereotyped reputations. It is as such, neither as animals nor as
humans, that they serve their purpose in putting examples of human behavior before the mind’s eye in ways that add their own meaning. […] Ethology, enlarging the view of identity and difference through detailed perceptions, helps to make reflection on human behavior systematically more general; whereas animals as symbols or as agents in actions related in fables dramatize particular reflections on human behaviour or particular forms of human behaviour; the latter a mode of reflection, the former an act of expression. (203, 205)

Reading Franc’s fables as in the Aesopian tradition then, Blackham’s insight into how non-human animals work in such texts coincides with Mel Y. Chen’s understanding of animals in representation, as opposed to material animals, as occupying a liminal place that bears a significant symbolic burden specifically when used in representations of marginalized groups:

As existing scholarship tells us from many different disciplinary sites and, indeed, as everyday language practices also confirm, vivid links, whether live or long-standing, continue to be drawn between immigrants, people of color, laborers and working-class subjects, colonial subjects, women, queer subjects, disabled people, and animals, meaning, not the class of creatures that includes humans but quite the converse, the class against which the (often rational) human with inviolate and full subjectivity is defined. This latter characterization exposes why animals have been so useful as figures, since they stand in for the intermediary zone between human and nonhuman status, and for the field of debate about the appropriateness of humane and inhumane treatment. (95)

Therefore, as both Blackham and Chen concede, representations of non-human animals are seldom interested in the animals themselves but are instead wholly invested in and reliant upon the
cultural stereotypes that particular animals evoke. As such, while some of my analyses of Franc’s fables reference actual animals in Spain, I do not hold any illusions that Franc might actually be writing about real animals on the Iberian Peninsula. However, the nexus between stereotype and language comes to the forefront in her hyper-anthropomorphized animals because of the real-life consequences, or as Blackham might put it, truths to which Franc’s untrue stories unabashedly allude.

In Spain, the fable first entered through translations of Aesop and Phaedrus, and later through Lafontaine’s French versions. The latter half of the eighteenth century saw Félix María de Samaniego’s *Fábulas en verso castellano* from 1781 and 1784, which featured both original and rhymed adaptations of fables from the three sources mentioned above, although mostly from Aesop, with the purpose of creating “el primer pasto con que se debe nutrir el espíritu de los niños, las máximas morales, disfrazadas con el agradable artificio de la fábula (Samaniego 3).” Samaniego’s neoclassical fables form the basis from which the fable is mostly studied in the Spanish literary context. As Noel noted already in 1975, across Europe the fable was usually seen as an outdated mode of didactic literature (156). However, as Isabel Franc’s collection of fifteen *lesbofábulas* from 2008 prove, this genre, at least in Spain, remains wide open to reimaginings to whatever purpose an author might see fit. In Franc’s case, that appears to be to make space for marginalized sexual identities and gender expressions.

Because fables almost always feature animal characters exclusively, their critical analysis naturally demands a discussion of the powers and limits of anthropomorphism, beyond what I

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64. My translation: “the first pasture from which children’s spirits should be nourished, the moral maxims, disguised with the pleasant artifice of the fable.”

65. Other authors known for their fables include Tomás de Iriarte (1750-1791), Concepción Arenal (1820-1893), and Vicente Blasco Ibáñez (1827-1928).
presented in the introductory chapter. For Lorraine Daston and Gregg Mitman, anthropomorphism is a double-edged sword: Especially in Animal Studies circles and related fields, anthropomorphism is often seen as either lazy academic work or as ethically irresponsible. Because anthropomorphism itself always requires speaking for others, and it therefore runs the immanent risk of appropriating the voice in question for interests not in line with those being represented, any serious undertaking of anthropomorphism requires careful consideration of the socially established significance of the individual, fictional non-human animals themselves in representing the types of non-humans involved. This concern is ever-present. However, critics like Karla Armbruster argue that while it will always inevitably be a technique wrought with moral incertitude, anthropomorphism in literature can always at the very least serve to remind readers of the material realities of Othered existences, so long as such an approach is handled with the intention of critically interrogating those representations and assumptions and the privilege with which any anthropomorphic act is inexorably charged. Furthermore, according to Daston and Mitman, literary non-human animals are never arbitrarily chosen, and therefore never act in ways that might undercut the message delivered to the anticipated audience (12).

With respect to a fable, while specific animals are not usually the focus of the text, they are hyperhumanized, presenting caricatures of the real animals whose form they mimic in the reader’s imagination. Yet, Daston and Mitman argue, this is always done with purpose: “Animals simplify the narrative to a point that would be found flat or at least allegorical if the same tales were recounted about humans” (9). Gillian Beer reinforces a similar point, explaining that because the animals are always stereotyped and one-dimensional in fables, “the interest is certainly not in ‘the whole animal’ but in the animal as pointer to or satire on human behavior” (311). Therefore, in the case of the fable, Armbruster’s premise that drawing attention to the plights of the animals
represented, both human and not, relies on the capacity of the storyteller to understand exactly how an audience will interpret the societally-codified significance of the non-human animals selected as protagonists. Ultimately, in all narratives representing non-human subjectivity, but even more noticeably so in a fable, anthropomorphism remains a highly useful tool for critiquing human morality. Even if imperfect, it is often the best we can do to represent interests in literature that would otherwise remain unvoiceable. As Katya Beilin writes:

> While the habitual way of seeing nonhuman life envisions it as so different from human that it is often not treated as life at all, anthropomorphism proves to be a very useful strategy to challenge these perceptions of animals, showing that the similarities between humans and animals are often not just metaphorical, but real. They were made invisible by the discourses that shape modern culture, which conceive of animals as livestock or beasts or represent them as machines. Anthropomorphism appears in this sense as an efficient deconstructive strategy that returns life and personalities to animals. While it can be viewed as not so different from the “anthropological machine” in that it assimilates the environment to the subjective perspective of humans, stripping them of their otherness and equipping nonhuman life with human properties, it may be just a first, imperfect step in a complex process of building a new conceptual framework for a more humane administration of life. (158)

While Franc’s fables can be considered an extreme example of anthropomorphism, and if read as only direct metaphors for humans and/or the non-human animals that represent them, it is difficult to make the case to recognize similarities rather than differences. However, if we consider the power and craft behind Franc’s wordplay in relation to her larger project of making female
queerness visible, her “lesbofables” can be understood to repurpose the genre as well as unravel the language long used to marginalize queerness and women through animalization.

In the author’s introduction to the volume, Franc describes these stories briefly, describing her intention as that to entertain her friends through “absurd humor” (12). Objectively, these stories are very funny. Her clever word play combines idioms and queer slang to create puns that create not only the sardonic humor which makes these fables so enjoyable, but which also linguistically gesture toward the non-human animal characters’ physical beings. Through these fables, Franc employs non-human animal protagonists to create a narrative universe in which non-human animals of various species find a community of solidarity in support and celebration of queer sexuality. However, despite the apparent inclusiveness of such a framework, the requirements for access are without exception: one must be female, lesbian (or at least bi- or pansexual), and demonstrate unwavering loyalty and kindness toward the other community members. For some characters, inclusion is not easily achieved. For others it is achieved unexpectedly, and for the least fortunate, it never occurs.

The collection’s assigned structure is relatively circular, meaning we begin in the same physical place that we end, although there are several other ways in which the stories could be classified other than order of appearance. Themes like beauty standards or trans*ness would group certain stories together, or stories might also usefully be categorized according to the types of animals they feature. For instance, there are stories throughout that could be taxonomically classified according to class as mammalian, gastropodan, reptilian, amphibian, insectan, and avian, and I examine the stories using both frameworks as appropriate. In considering the Fabulario Les holistically, however, I find it helpful to examine them in order of appearance which give the collection its overall structure of outside-inside-outside, as I will explain. The first two and last
two stories, also avian stories, are the only ones that include actual humans. These four stories could easily form a set apart from the rest of the fables because they take place on neighboring farms and deal with sexuality-based discrimination and queer feminist solidarity. However, their placement as bookends at the beginning and the ending of the collection suggests that the stories that directly involve human society belong as far as possible from the stories I classify as “insider stories,” or stories that describe life inside the queer feminist multispecies community. I read these stories in contrast to the “outsider stories,” which take place either entirely apart from or on the outskirts of the garden, at the center of which is the lesbian bar and community center called La Madriguera Dancing Club.

I will first focus on the methods through which the exclusive queer feminist community comes to protect itself from would-be detractors as seen in the “insider stories.” These middle stories take place entirely inside the queer feminist garden and describe the community chronologically from the inception of the La Madriguera Dancing Club to the expulsion of one of the club’s bouncers because of her apparent infidelity to the group. The majority of these stories describe commonplace situations ranging from familial frustration to romantic rejection and identity confusion. The first “insider” story and the last, however, describe acts of overt violence which serve to solidify the community itself and cement the behavioral codes which allow membership.

In “Las conejitas y la reina de la selva”, the first insider story and the collection’s fifth, a group of lesbian rabbits seeks permits and funding from the Queen of the Jungle, a lioness, for their new venture: a lesbian bar which will serve as a central gathering point for establishing a queer female community. The Queen initially rejects their plan, claiming that “lesbians don’t sell”, but they eventually convince her to support their plan, although she remains skeptical of their
business’s likelihood for success. One night, shortly after La Madriguera opens, the Queen is struggling to evade a horde of insistent lions when one of the bunnies spots her and guides her to the rabbits’ bar. The bouncers refuse entry to the lions because all males are prohibited. The Queen can finally relax and let loose knowing that, amongst the bunnies, she is safe from male harassment and quite possibly rape, and she even hooks up with a tigress.

In “Las ardillas bolleras y la zorra de seguridad”, the last insider story and the collection’s ninth, a group of butch squirrels are practicing *sevillanas* in the forest when a security vixen responds to the marmot’s noise complaint. Upon hearing that they are going to be cited for “public scandal,” they protest even more ardently, outing the security vixen as a lesbian who does not take care of her fellow La Madriguera members. She adamantly denies that sexual identification and ignores their accusations of hypocrisy. Sadly, however, she never goes back to La Madriguera, the only lesbian-friendly bar in the garden. Thus, in the course of performing her day job, the vixen makes a decision which costs her her only tie to a community that would accept her sexuality in order to maintain her professional integrity, as the narrator laments at the story’s conclusion. This fable is most illustrative of the direct demand for solidarity and honesty under all circumstances in order to continue enjoying access to the protections and pleasures of partaking in the queer feminist community.

In each of the stories, the community comes together to protect its own members seemingly at the peril of those who do not conform. In the first, the lioness queen escapes male harassers and would-be rapists, while in the last, the squirrels effectively exile the vixen. The stories further resemble each other in the makeup of their protagonists: each features a group of determined rodents (rabbits and squirrels respectively) who insist on their point of view against a sole, but powerful, predator (a lion and a fox) and get their way. The primary difference in the two plots
lies in the way the predator uses her respective power. While both the lioness and the vixen are undeniably physically stronger and more imposing than their opposers, each is also in a position of socially-sanctioned authority. While the lioness doubts the rabbits’ business plan, proclaiming that “Lo lesbico no vende” (128), she eventually concedes to approve and subsidize La Madriguera Dancing Club. Although the lioness initially scoffs at the idea that they could ever help her personally, her subsequent actions support the burgeoning lesbian community. In contrast, the security vixen denies her ties to the lesbian community at La Madriguera in her attempt to simply do her job. Because her own use of power acts against the community’s principle of uncompromising solidarity, she winds up expelled from the lesbian community, essentially cut off from all further personal exploration of any social or sexual life because of her perceived disloyalty.

Yet, her transgressions fall far short of the insults the Queen of the Jungle hurled at the conejitas. Ultimately, such differential treatment seems to be due to the patriarchal capitalist undertones that characterize the political and economic hierarchies within the fables, and thereby reveals the privilege the Queen enjoys that the zorra does not. Thus, while La Madriguera and its community members profess diversity except in terms of gender identification, financial capital appears to carry more significance than the physical labor of protecting the space, therefore highlighting the class hierarchies that also reign. The only support its members value is financial, and therefore class-based discrimination is also apparent. Consequently, the diversity for which the community apparently stands is strikingly exclusive.

Such exclusivity is even more apparent in the stories which take place outside of the garden in which La Madriguera community forms. These stories frame the insider stories, cushioning them from each of the sets of avian farm stories within the collection. The first two, third and
fourth respectively in the collection, feature multispecies casts of characters and touch on trans*-related themes. In “La murciélaga transgender” (“The Trans* She-bat”), a solitary she-bat sleeps peacefully while a variety of animals pass her by, judging her form using different words, but all marking her physical morphology as illegible and grotesque. She awakes at night, goes about her evening routine, and returns to her eave to sleep once again, singing herself to sleep with a pop anthem of self-acceptance. Notably, this is also the only fable with a musical moral: the iconic refrain from Alaska y Dinarama’s 1986 hit “A quién le importa”. However, although the bat does not seem to be affected by the other female animals’ negative reactions to her appearance, she also does not enjoy any sort of social relationship, which is surprising given that most European bat species dwell and roost in colonies or smaller groups of closely related individuals (Baruva and Streit 9-12). If “La murciélaga transgender” is a fable about self-acceptance, the fable that follows is its opposite.

The next fable, “La rana lesbiana que quería ser vaca heterosexual” (“The Lesbian Frog Who Wanted to Be a Hetero Cow”), a lesbian frog observes a straight cow drinking at the pond and develops an obsession with becoming that cow. She convinces herself that her desire stems from the cow’s exceptional beauty and not from an internalized perceived need to suppress her homosexuality. She undergoes both extensive plastic surgery and hormone therapy to transform her into a bovine. Unfortunately, her efforts result in her literally swelling until she explodes. Essentially, because she denies her lesbianism by attempting to drastically alter her physical appearance, the frog cannot survive. The story’s placement just before the first insider story, “Las conejitas”, begs the reader to question what the frog’s fate might have been had she had access to a supportive female community, thereby further illustrating the quite literal life-and-death need for
such a gathering point. On the surface, the lesbian frog and trans* bat fables make a compelling case for a new community exclusive to female-identifying queer non-humans of any species.

The two stories that separate the final pair of avian stories and the insider stories are also stories entirely about insect societies and their complacency. While the insider stories include an ant, a cicada, and a slug, these societies of insects, bees and praying mantises, do not demonstrate the queer feminist solidarity necessary for inclusion in La Madriguera. The twelfth fable of the collection, “La disgregación de la colmena desigual” (“The Disintegration of the Unequal Hive”), details the collapse of the diverse hive of the previous fable (“La colmena desigual”/ “The Unequal Hive”). The fable is structured similarly to the famous poem “First They Came” about Nazi persecution by Martin Niemöller. This fable traces the forced disappearance of each of the members of the diverse hive community without any other member coming to their defense. This systematic elimination occurs until the “abnormal” bees are the only ones left, and there is no one left to protect them. This is the only fable without a concrete moral, rendering its implicit moral perhaps the most poignant, because the reader must determine it for herself.66

Immediately following is the collection’s thirteenth fable “El Consejo General de las mantis religiosas” (“The General Council of Praying Mantises”). The fable’s plot involves a female praying mantis explaining to the Mantis Council that she is tired of hooking up with only male mantises and being obligated to eat them afterward; they give her indigestion. In response, the General Mantis Council charges her with endangering the species’ future. She delivers an angry speech defending her desire to hook up with females of other species’ instead, as well as in favor of alternative family models to the traditional patriarchal nuclear one. She concludes by accusing

66. I consciously use the feminine as generic here, as Franc does in both the introduction to Cuentos y fábulas, and as Elina Norandi reminds us is par for the course in Franc’s fiction (117-118).
the mantises of being exceedingly antiquated in their reliance upon prayer rather than action. The only Council members who applaud her queer resistance to mantis society’s homophobic brand of militant feminism are the males. Thus, she challenges what could be considered a matriarchal but still heteronormative and ethnocentric society in favor of exploring her own sexual appetites. The language itself also interrogates the value of following a religious or any sort of doctrine without question.

These two fables call into question the safety and preferences of the individual versus the overall welfare of the community at large. Violence and power also link these stories overtly through the general reticence to defend others’ individual freedoms and an overall resistance to change even damaging norms. Notwithstanding, much like the bat and frog fables in juxtaposition, the bee fable and the mantis fable present opposing cases that reinforce the need for a lesbian refuge apart from traditional heteronormative patriarchy. At the same time, these fables further demonstrate the need for strict exclusivity in such an alternative community. In the bee fable, the bees do not defend one another, in diametric opposition to the events which define solidarity and mutual defense as benefits of and requirements for participation in the La Madriguera community, as in both the opening insider fable “Las conejitas” and the closing one “Las ardillas bolleras”. In the mantis fable, however, the heteronormative matriarchy which maintains its control through ritualized execution and forced heterosexuality and reproduction proves itself to be just as oppressive as the patriarchy against which La Madriguera protects females of all species. Thus, the fable argues that enforcing female sexual liberation is the only way to allow for individual freedom, regardless of the prevailing social power structure, because speaking up for or defending oneself is not enough. The effort must be communal, consistent, and codified, even if such codification is only understood mutually rather than sanctioned legally. Thus, in this instance, as
in that illustrated in Carrasco’s novel, community also requires sacrifice to others and obligation to the larger group and therefore does not necessarily mean the full and unfettered support of each individual’s full range of personal needs and identifications on the part of the others in the group. Furthermore, this is yet another “lesbofable” that indirectly opposes the traditional heteronormative imperative that all women must become mothers; underlying the male mantis’ enthusiastic support is the reality that female mantises behead and consume their mates after copulation. For the males, it means death. For the women forced to bear baby mantises, it means single motherhood.

Finally, Franc’s avian stories bookend the collection, not only because they both involve actual human characters, as previously stated, but perhaps also because of their recognizability for her queer readership. On her blog, Franc proclaims herself “Una cómica de la pluma,” referencing both her literary expression and her visibility as a lesbian. These four stories can form their own set, like the Madriguera stories, because of the chronological continuity of place but also because they share a cast of characters, namely the lesbian farmer and the lesbian hens. When reunited with the concluding avian stories, they also form a microcosm of the collection as a whole, echoing the same call for a community apart from heteronormativity, as the tale of “La oca poco agraciada” (“The Graceless Goose”) illustrates.

In the first avian story, Gallina hetero en corral Les (“Hetero Hen in a Les Coop”), a straight hen arrives in a lesbian chicken coop and sets up beauty services which she pressures the other hens into using. Before her arrival, they did not deplume or make themselves up and they refused to lay eggs. The hetero hen’s makeovers make her, the rooster, and their farmer happy, but

67. Other fables that question, either directly or indirectly, compulsory motherhood in the collection include “La rebelión de las gallinas Les,” “Hormiga con familia y cigarra independiente,” and “El desenlace justo y merecido de la oca poco agraciada.”
the rest of the hens feel insecure, stressed, and enslaved to their image. The collection’s second story, “La rebelión de las gallinas Les (Continuación de la lesbofábula anterior)” (“Lesbian Hen Farm (Continuation of the Previous Lesbofable)”), brings harmony to the disrupted coop as the same lesbian hens from the previous fable grow so depressed about their new forced femininity and submission that the hetero hen decides to take action. They accept her advice to focus on egg laying, but to no avail. They decide to confront the hetero hen in her salon and deliver an ultimatum: try things their way now. She at first declines flatly, but after they make the case that they earnestly tried everything she suggested, she agrees to extend them the same courtesy, admitting to herself that she felt lonely and hated mating with the beastly rooster. She engages in lesbian sex, finds she enjoys it, and considers herself a “liberated hen.” These stories set the stage for more identity struggles, each leading up to the foundation of La Madriguera Dancing Club.

The last two stories, adapted versions of “The Ugly Duckling,” take place on the farm neighboring that of the lesbian chicken coop. This group of geese, however, ostracizes an awkward-looking goose for her sexual orientation: they are afraid that they will catch her lesbianism. The farmer, outraged at their backward understanding of sexuality, leaves the goose pen frustrated by their irrational discrimination. The final fable, *El desenlace justo y merecido para la oca poco agraciada* (“The Just and Deserved Ending for the Graceless Goose”), sees the awkward oca incorporated into a community that not only tolerates her difference but celebrates it. Because circumstances in the goose gaggle did not change after the farmer chided them, and the lone lesbian goose’s mental and physical health continue to deteriorate, the farmer decides to rehome the lesbian goose. She brings her to her adoptive home – the neighbor’s lesbian hen coop. The hens are so taken with the prospect of “pluma fresca” that she quickly adjusts to her new life, full of sexual attention and social acceptance. Apart from lesbian identity, these stories align
lesbian desire with masculine heterosexual desire while also undoing it through their wordplay: *pluma* refers to queer desire while women in general, like chickens, have been and are reduced to their sexualized, consumable body parts like breasts. In this way, lesbian desire is privileged in the stories, but it is only apparently different from heterosexual desire in its object’s gender presentation. Furthermore, while the ending is a happy one for the goose, thereby reifying the critical view of traditional feminine beauty standards as seen in other fables like the first two avian ones, “La murciélaga transgender,” and “La rana lesbiana que quería ser vaca heterosexual,” it does not actually portend overall change for the better on the backward-thinking goose farm.

In her discussion linking patriarchal violence against women to that against non-human animals, Carol J. Adams describes each as an “absent referent” or a representation of an Other whose subjectivity is nullified through linguistic acts of objectification. Adams clearly connects sexual violence against females to violence against animals through the language of patriarchal dominance and, specifically, consumption of flesh:

> [F]eminists among others, appropriate the metaphor of butchering without acknowledging the originating oppression of animals that generates the power of the metaphor. Through the function of the absent referent, Western culture constantly renders the material reality of violence into controlled and controllable metaphors. (*Sexual Politics of Meat* 22)

For Adams, it is language which denies both women and non-human animals the privileges of human masculine subjectivity that initially transforms them into objects and thereby makes them consumable both metaphorically and often literally.
Adams’ thought-provoking analysis lies more firmly in the category of manifesto than of philosophical analysis. The Spanish philosopher Alicia Puleo provides greater nuance to the ideas expressed by Adams, by drawing attention to the deeply ingrained associations of female animals and feminine sexual depravity and guile:

La relación de las mujeres con los animales en nuestra cultura occidental tiene una doble vertiente. La heterodesignación de las mujeres como Naturaleza se ha manifestado y aún se manifiesta en un lenguaje insultante que asimila <<la Mujer>> a <<la hembra>>, reduciéndola a funciones sexuales y reproductoras. Pensemos en el significado de los términos <<zorra>>, <<perra>>, <<chienne>>, o <<bitch>>. Numerosas feministas denunciaron este mecanismo patriarcal y reaccionaron con justificada ira, rechazando la inclusión en ese Otro denostado. Pero, en general, lo han hecho sin advertir que esa manifestación de sexismo se apoyaba, a su vez, en un fuerte especismo, es decir, en un prejuicio de especie por el que el Otro diferente era concebido como inferior y objeto de legítima posesión y desprecio.68 (366)

Here, Puleo refers directly to Adams’ work in *The Sexual Politics of Meat* to recognize the intertwining of patriarchal oppressions that dominate both women and non-human animals. Puleo continues, explaining how animalization has served to objectify and marginalize within patriarchal social hierarchies:

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68. My translation: “The relationship between women and animals in our Western culture has a double aspect. The hetero-designation of women as Nature has manifested and still manifests itself in an insulting language that equates “Woman” to “female,” reducing her to sexual and reproductive functions. We can think of the meaning of terms like “vixen,” “bitch,” or “chienne.” Numerous feminists denounce this patriarchal mechanism and reacted with justified ire, rejecting being included in that reviled Other. But, in general, they have done so without indicating that this instance of sexism rests, in its own way, in a strong speciesism. That is to say, it rests upon a species prejudice through which the different Other is conceived as inferior and as an object of legitimated possession and devaluation.”
La animalización se ha cernido siempre como una amenaza y una condena sobre mujeres, pueblos sometidos, extranjeros, clases desfavorecidas, indígenas y minorías sexuales. Con respecto a estas últimas, observemos que, en los debates suscitados por los proyectos de ley de matrimonio homosexual en diversos países, por lo general siempre hay alguien que compara públicamente la relación sexual entre personas del mismo sexo con la zoofilia.69 (367)

Thus, as Puleo points out, animalization and queer sexuality have historically been linked in Western cultural imaginaries to the apparent detriment of all those who claim those identities and those onto whom those identities have been thrust. Franc’s “lesbofables” seem to embrace those negative associations and turn them on their heads.

As Mel Y. Chen argues:

While it would be false to equate the two, relations between the two epistemological regions of queer and animal abound. The animal has long been an analogical source of understanding for human sexuality […] I do not imagine queer or queerness to merely indicate embodied sexual contact among subjects identified as gay and lesbian, as occurs via naïve translations of queer as the simple chronological continuation or epistemological condensation of a gay and lesbian identitarian project. Rather, I think more in terms of the social and cultural formations of “improper affiliation,” so that queerness might well describe an array of subjectivities, intimacies, beings, and spaces located outside of the

69. My translation: “Animalization has always loomed as a threat and condemnation over women, suppressed peoples, foreigners, unfavored classes, indigenous groups, and sexual minorities. With respect to this last group, we can see in the debates ignited by gay marriage legalization pushes in different countries that, generally speaking, someone always publicly likens same-sex sexual relationships with zoophilia.”
heteronormative. Similarly, I consider animality not a matter of the creatures that we “know” to be nonhuman (for instance, the accepted logics of pets or agricultural livestock and our stewardship of them), so much as a flexible rubric that collides with and undoes any rigid understanding of animacy. (104-5, italics, quotation marks, and parentheses in original)

With this understanding in mind, while Franc is certainly talking metaphorically about real queer human females and not metaphorically about real non-human animals, her use of anthropomorphized animals effectively queers the traditional Spanish fable and reclaims the pejorative language used to deride women in general and queer-identifying females specifically. In this way, Franc’s wordplay with feather imagery and terms like conejita, zorra, and bollera, simultaneously undoes the patriarchal work of marginalizing queer females through objectification by reclaiming agency over those terms and draws attention to the entanglement between all types of patriarchal oppression as they overlap in metaphors of queer females and non-human animals, even if the latter effect is only inadvertent. In queering the fable as well, Franc reinforces Samaniego’s original goal of educating a general readership in social mores but with a twenty-first century twist that celebrates the new identities available in a democratic (and capitalist) Spain.

“No era el hijo pródigo”: Displacing the Biological Family in Jesús Carrasco’s Intemperie (2013)

Intemperie is a bildungsroman in which the child protagonist flees his family and village in search of relief from prolonged sexual, physical, and psychological abuse. For Jesse Barker, it is an “ecological dystopia” in which “exposure to the elements and to a dependence on others also

70. Rough translations: “bunny,” a sexualized woman, but in Spain this carries a specifically lesbian connotation; “vixen” literally, but more often used like “slut,” “whore,” or “bitch”; “butch.”
constitutes the novel’s glimmer of hope” (196-7). For John Margenot, the novel describes an increasingly desperate hellscape where “Carrasco’s narrative world constitutes a narrative wasteland where entropy reigns supreme” (226). The novel opens as the main character hides from a search party. He is clearly terrified and lies still for hours waiting for the coast to clear while his own urine dries and sticks to his petrified body. Once he finally emerges, he wanders north in search of safety in a less desperate landscape. Still fearful, traumatized, and growing increasingly weaker in the dry and sun-baked wilderness, the young boy happens upon an old man and his small herd of goats, a donkey, and a friendly dog who take him in without question. The relationship between the two humans develops slowly as the boy comes to trust the goatherd and then to rely on him for survival while the old man begins to entrust the boy with more physically demanding tasks.

Eventually the boy’s pursuers, local law enforcement officers, catch up with them and the goatherd tells him to hide. The boy takes refuge in the only nearby structure and the sheriff’s assistant literally attempts to smoke him out. The boy nearly suffocates, but he survives. However, he does not feel secure enough to emerge until hours later. He finds the goatherd in grave condition: the sheriff has whipped and beat him to within an inch of his life. The lawmen have also slaughtered most of the goats and absconded with the dog and the male goat. After tending as best he can to his guardian’s wounds, he goes for water only to discover the nearby well contaminated – the lawmen have slaughtered the male goat and deposited his remains in it. Now, in order to retrieve potable water, the boy must travel without the goatherd for hours to a ghost town. There the boy encounters a disabled71 man who offers him food. With seemingly no better option in sight,
the boy reluctantly trusts this stranger, who cuffs him inside his kitchen after the boy passes out. Upon waking, and several excruciating attempts to get free, the protagonist manages a painful escape and confronts the disabled man as the latter attempts to steal the donkey in the boy’s charge. After a brief struggle, the boy flees with the donkey and returns to the goatherd. Begrudgingly, the old man makes all of them return to the village to save the disabled man from dying of his wounds. However, once they get there, he is nowhere to be found.

The boy enters the disabled man’s tavern to retrieve provisions, but he lets his guard down once he smells the cured meats and begins eating. He stops when he notices someone apparently hiding behind a curtain. He carefully and fearfully pushes the curtain aside to reveal the naked corpse of the disabled man. Then the sheriff and his crony, the one who attempted to burn him to death earlier, enter and the boy loses all hope. The sheriff sends his assistant away and intimidates the boy in preparation to resume his now-ritualized pederastic abuse. The goatherd rescues the boy in the nick of time and shoots the sheriff. The old man’s energy is spent, so he instructs the protagonist to retrieve the assistant’s body from where the old man left him so that all three corpses can be properly buried. The boy realizes quickly that he will neither have the physical strength nor the mental wherewithal to properly bury his violators, so he decides to burn all three instead. Once the bodies are safely burning in the abandoned tavern, the goatherd, boy, remaining goats, donkey, and newly-returned dog set off for new pastures and safety. The old man dies while still in the donkey’s saddle. After burying him, the boy briefly contemplates his options and decides to continue his original journey north, as far from his tormented past as possible. The novel closes with the first rain of the story, signaling a new beginning for the herd, and at the very least, a short

the world, but I read it also as an indication of the boy’s deeply internalized fear of authority and lack of understanding of men who do not visibly wield power over him.
reprieve from the torture that has so far constituted the entirety of the adolescent protagonist’s short life.

The novel relies on the redirection of violent power to correct the abundance of injustice that the child protagonist experiences. This violence begins in the boy’s domestic sphere, as he often thinks of his family during his most desperate moments. The protagonist initially interprets his escape as he imagines his family might, as a betrayal of his family before his greater community:

Se preguntó si buscarían a su hermano del mismo modo, si él sería capaz de convocar a tantos hombres en su búsqueda. Ante el coro de voces, sintió que quizá había desempolvado algún tipo de lazo comunitario y por un momento su rencor se replegó hacía algún lugar de su estómago. Había reunido en torno a él los hombres del pueblo, a todos los brazos curtidos y poderosos que hundían los arados en la tierra y llenaban los doblados de grano. Había provocado un acontecimiento. Pensó que quizá la necesidad de reunir a aquella partida habría obligado a remangarse, codo con codo, a viejos enemigos. (11)

While in hiding, the boy contemplates the horde of townspeople searching for him. He recognizes each by voice, suggesting a tight-knit town complicit in his abuse to varying degrees. Yet, while

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72. This textual reference is only one of two to the protagonist’s sibling. The second occurs in chapter 3 when the narrator explains that the boy had envisioned his life in the wilderness while he slept next to his brother (52). There is no indication of whether or not his brother is younger or slightly older, but the circumstances under which the protagonist suffers raises the ethical question of his brother’s fate. Perhaps the boy’s psychological distancing from his family as a result of domestic abuse extends even to detachment from his sibling.

73. Jull Costa translation: “He wondered if they would put such effort into finding his brother. Would he have attracted such a large search party? Hearing that chorus of voices, he felt that he had perhaps revived some kind of community spirit, and for a moment, his bitterness withdrew into one small corner of his stomach. He had gathered around him all the men of the village, all the strong, weatherworn arms that tilled the fields and sowed the furrows with grain. He had caused an incident. Perhaps the need to come together had forced old enemies to roll up their sleeves and work alongside one another” (3-4).
the boy allows his fear to drive his escape plot, he is not yet capable of fully recognizing his family’s central role in his trauma. Instead, he sees his escape as a unifying call to action in which those who normally hold grudges against one another choose to overlook them to save a lost child in crisis. If the community at large knows the real reason for the boy’s flight, it is a collective secret. Psychologically, the boy is still focused on what the community thinks of him rather than what he thinks of the insular community’s complicity as they once again facilitate his long-term suffering.

Still at the novel’s beginning, after hours of physical discomfort, the protagonist is tempted to reveal his hiding place. However, his imagination plays out the likely course of events, ultimately revealing his father to be the genesis of his fear:

Consideró la opción de terminar aquello de manera inmediata y resolver así su incomodidad. […] A punto estuvo de mover las ramas que tapaban el agujero para llamar la atención de los hombres más cercanos. […] Después, vuelta al pueblo en una parihuela entre cantos de labranza y botas de vino caliente, con la áspera mano del padre sobre su pecho pequeño y moreno. Exordio gozoso de un drama que habría de llevarlos a todos a la taberna y más tarde, a cada uno a su casa. Al final, los gruesos muros de piedra que sustentaban el tejado y enfriaban las estancias como únicos testigos. Un preludio comunal para el cinturón gastado del padre. Hebilla cobriza rajando el aire podrido de la cocina, tan veloz como incapaz de devolver destellas. El cuadro de su afectada postración al fondo del hoyo, vuelto en su contra.74 (13-14)

74. Jull Costa translation: “He considered bringing the whole situation and his discomfort to an end. […] He was on the point of moving the twigs covering the hole in order to attract the attention of the men nearest him. […] Then,
The boy’s imagination flows from a display of public jubilation upon his return to “safety” to a descent into the private realm of his home where a beating awaits him. The focus on the domestic location of his abuse and in particular on the “rotten air of the kitchen” arises again at the novel’s denouement when the full nature of his paralyzing fear of the sheriff comes to light. The close association of the protagonist’s two most prevalent sensations throughout the novel, fear and hunger, effectively collapse in this domestic space both during this opening hypothetical and at the end during the boy’s final confrontation with his sexual abuser. The link is made clear in the boy’s determination to remain hidden despite extreme physical discomfort and uncertainty: “Ni las horas bajo tierra, ni la orina del maestro empastándole el pelo, ni el hambre, que por primera vez le espoleaba, le resultaron suficientes para decaer en su empeño porque aún le mordía el estómago la flor negra de la familia” 75(14). His family’s toxic decadence is apparent to the reader through the narrative voice and to the protagonist through his body’s involuntary reactions to the scenes that unfold before him both literally and hypothetically. It is not until later in the narrative that the boy comes to consciously displace blame and shame from himself onto his family and onto his father specifically.

Tellingly, the boy seldom thinks of his mother, 76 who does not seem inclined to defend him from either of the boy’s abusers. However, once free of the immediate danger of discovery to the accompaniment of songs and warm wine, he would be carried to the village on a stretcher with his father’s rough hand resting on his small, brown chest. A joyful exordium to a drama that would propel them all to the village bar and, later, to their respective houses. Afterward, the only witnesses would be the thick stone walls that supported the roof and kept the rooms cool. A communal prelude to his father’s worn leather belt. The swift copper-colored buckle slashing dully through the fetid kitchen air. His earlier feigned state of unconsciousness getting its unjust deserts” (5-6).

75. Jull Costa translation: “Nothing, not even the hours spend underground or the teacher’s urine still sticky in his hair or the beating which was, for the first time, pricking him hard, nothing was enough now to weaken his resolve, because the black flower of his family’s betrayal still gnawed at his stomach” (7).
76. Mentions of the boy’s mother are scarce, but she is the only female presence in the novel, save for the milk-producing female goats. In this respect, the novel’s storyworld is markedly masculine. This exclusionary narrative
and in the long contemplative silences as the herd migrates, the narrator focalizes a flashback which establishes his somewhat absent mother as a battered woman completely at the mercy of his father’s capricious cruelty:

Recordó la tarde en que el padre irrumpió en donde estaban y se llevó a la madre, apretándole el codo. La puso frente al tonel y, zarandeándola, sacó su navaja. La madre abrió la boca y luego la escondió entre los pliegues de su pañuelo negro. El padre clavó la punta de acero en el interior de la cuba, rasgó hasta que la hendidura fue lo suficientemente profunda y se marchó. Entonces, la madre, sola, se apoyó en la barriga del tonel y se dejó caer. Una mancha de virutas y serrín quedó flotando en la lámina de agua negra. […] La dominación estaba grabada en el interior de la barrica como una herida abierta sobre la madera en la que se enganchaban mechones mucosos. Una marca oculta o un código cerrado. Una hendidura que era como una daga que asomaba de las entrañas del tonel sólo para la garganta de la madre.77 (43-44)

This flashback reveals the rest of the boy’s family to be victims of his father’s unchecked violence. It is small wonder that no one in the village would dare protect him after witnessing this behavior. However, the boy’s family dynamic mimics that of the town itself. In particular, the town’s tyrannous sheriff benefits from an arrangement with the boy’s father that allows him to indulge in

strategy places greater emphasis on the types of male characters represented as well as on the patriarchal mechanisms at work in each interhuman relationship.

77. Jull Costa translation: “He still remembered the afternoon when his father had burst into the room where they were sitting, grabbed his wife by the elbow and dragged her outside. He had stood her in front of the water butt, shaking her, before taking out his knife. […] With the point of his knife, his father had made a deep incision in the inside wall of the butt, then stormed off. Left alone, his mother had then slumped against the body of the barrel and slide to the ground. […] He had inscribed his domination of his wife on the inside of the wooden barrel, like an open wound to which slimy bits of algae attached themselves. A hidden mark or a secret code. A gash that was like a dagger held to his mother’s throat” (40-41).
his own sexual appetites, as will be discussed. As the boy reviews such memories throughout his journey with the goatherd, his understanding of events slowly shifts from internal shame to the outward recognition that his domestic circumstances are irredeemable. Yet, this particular flashback portrays his father as less subject to the sheriff’s coercion than a willing accomplice in his son’s sexual abuse. As such, the boy comes to acknowledge his father’s role as primary perpetrator in his suffering.

This acknowledgment grows more salient in another moment of painful desperation. Upon entering the abandoned town in search of potable water after the sheriff and his henchmen butcher the male goat and poison the other well with his remains, the famished boy reticently follows the disabled stranger into his home for a meal. After eating and drinking some wine that was likely drugged, the boy wakes up chained by the wrist to a column in the disabled man’s kitchen. In evaluating his current options and their future consequences, the boy considers his captor’s possible motives, then thinks of the goatherd and then his own family in quick succession:

Pensó en el cabrero. Lo imaginó tirado al pie de la muralla a punto de dejar de respirar. Lo cuervos quietos sobre la cabeza del Cristo o apostados en el matacán a la espera de su momento. Las cabras enloquecidas por la falta de agua. Entendió que él podría correr la misma suerte si no lograba escapar. Moriría de hambre o de sed atado a aquella columna. Pensó en su familia tratando de hallar algún consuelo, pero no lo encontró porque había sido ella la que le había empujado hasta aquel lugar.78 (146-147)

78. Jull Costa translation: “He thought of the goatherd. He imagined him lying at the foot of the castle wall, about to breathe his last. The crows perched on the head of the Christ figure or on one of the corbels, awaiting their moment. The goats maddened by the lack of water. He realized that if he didn’t escape, he might well meet the same fate. He would die of hunger and thirst, chained to that pillar. Seeking consolation, he thought of his family, but his family was the reason he was there” (148).
For the first time, in this passage, the protagonist finally assigns blame outright to his family for his precarious life until this point. Furthermore, the passage marks a turning point in the boy’s perception of his community ties, because he first considers his “herd” before attempting to find comfort in his biological family. At this point in the narrative, the boy’s remaining sense of connection to his family in the village dissolves in favor of the familial bond he has been forming slowly with the goatherd. Family, thus, ceases to be a biological obligation requiring his fidelity and compliance and becomes a thoughtful and deliberate relationship of mutual necessity.

Throughout the length of the novel, the protagonist’s sense of obligation to his family dissolves as he bonds with the goatherd and begins to take responsibility for the non-human animals in their care. While the protagonist flees without expecting to need anybody, he quickly becomes dependent on the goatherd’s unconditional generosity. After initial silent observation and grateful acceptance of whatever provisions the goatherd offers him, the boy slowly begins to interact with him, awkwardly feeling out a new type of relationship with an adult in which his own comfort and needs are respected and his active contribution desired. However, the transition from an oppressive and obligatory familial relationship to one of voluntary, mutual care and contribution is slow:

Mientras rebañaba su cuenco, pensó que era la primera vez que tomaba algo caliente desde que había salido de su casa dos noches atrás y que también era la primera vez en su vida que comía en compañía de un desconocido. […] En sus cálculos tampoco entraba la idea de tener que pedir ayuda a alguien, y, mucho menos, hacerlo tan pronto. […] En todo caso confiaba en sus conocimientos para abrirse paso con mayor soltura. Al fin y al cabo, era él tan hijo de aquella tierra como las perdices y los olivos. […] Parecía como si, de nuevo, hubiera entrado en
una casa cargada de normas y necesitar algún tipo de permiso o de orden para poder irse a acostar. […] Pensó que a la Altura a la que la copa de la palmera crecía, corría un aire más puro que el que circulaba a ras de suelo y que algo habría hecho la palmera para merecer ese aire balsámico. […] Algo habría hecho él para merecer sus quemaduras, su hambre y a su familia. <<Algo malo>>, le recordaba el padre a cada instante.⁷⁹ (51-54)

In the above passage, the protagonist vacillates between appreciation and fear as discourse of the family is presented in three distinct iterations. The first is that of the protagonist’s biological family, the second is the burgeoning voluntary family with the herd, and the third links human to non-human partridges, olive trees, and the earth. The recursive structure of this section encapsulates the boy’s struggle to free himself from his past torment and embrace his current, albeit somewhat improved comparatively, precarity.

Ultimately, the boy finds the closest thing resembling a father figure and a non-dysfunctional familial relationship in the goatherd. Without necessarily searching for it or even realizing it as it happens, the boy comes to crave the old man’s approval and later to depend on his company and guidance. After freeing himself from the disabled man’s kitchen, he returns to where he left the goatherd to find him missing, and immediately sinks into a deep, hopeless despair:

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⁷⁹. Jull Costa translation: “While he was wiping the bowl clean with his bread, he realized that this was the first time he’d eaten anything hot since leaving home two nights before, and that it was the second time in only a few hours that he had eaten in the company of a stranger. […] He had left no room in his calculations for perhaps having to ask for help, far less at such an early stage in his journey. […] He had merely trusted in his knowledge and skills to help him on his way. After all, he was as much a child of that place as were the partridges or the olive trees. […] It was as if he had once again entered a house full of rules and was waiting for someone to issue an order or give him permission before he could go to bed. […] Up there, he thought, the air would be purer than the air near the ground, and he thought, too, that the palm tree must have done something to deserve that balmy air. […] He must have done something to deserve his burns, his hunger and his family. “Something bad,” as his father never tired of telling him” (48-51).
Se sentó al lado del lecho del viejo y, con los codos sobre las rodillas, se tapó la cara y comenzó a llorar. La escapada infantil, el sol abrasador, el llano incapaz de inclinarse a su favor. Sintió la inmutabilidad de lo que le rodeaba, la misma calidad inerte en todo cuanto podía tocar o ver y, por primera vez desde que inició su huida, tuvo miedo de morir. Le estremecía la posibilidad de seguir su camino solo y, como un fogonazo rojizo, se le aparecieron las siluetas de su casa, al borde de la vía del tren, y del silo. Regresar por decisión propia. Abandonar su desesperante lucha contra la naturaleza y los hombres y regresar a casa. No al hogar, sino al simple cobijo. Volver en peores condiciones de las que tenía antes de partir. No era el hijo pródigo. Era él quien había repudiado a su familia y quien debía enfrentarse a su veredicto. 80 (159)

Upon witnessing his future with his newfound family disintegrate in an instant so soon after having fought so hard to try to save it, the protagonist breaks down and plunges into a downward spiral toward an increasingly dim abyss in which he envisions himself entering a hellscape inside himself in order to avoid the very real one before him. He is only rescued from this rapid descent by the sound of the goatherd’s voice, provoking a visceral reaction of joy:

La voz del cabrero, fofa y picuda, y su mano huesuda sobre el hombro. El niño se incorporó como un muelle y, sin mirar siquiera al pastor, abrazó su cuerpo enclenque. Se hundió entre sus jirones para fundirse con él, para penetrar en la

80. Jull Costa translation: “He sat down beside the blanket and, resting his elbows on his knees, covered his face with his hands and wept. His childish flight, the searing sun, the bleak, indifferent plain. He sensed the immutability of his surroundings, the same inertness in everything he could touch or see, and for the first time since he had run away, he felt afraid of dying. The idea of carrying on alone terrified him, and the image flashed into his mind of his house beside the railway track and the silo. He could decide to go back. He could abandon his desperate struggle against nature and against men and return home. Well, if not home exactly, at least to some kind of shelter. He would return in a far worse state than when he left. He wasn’t the prodigal son” (161).
estancia serena que sus manos acababan de negarle. Era la primera vez que se encontraba tan cerca de alguien sin estar peleando. La primera vez que enfrentaba sus poros con los de otra piel y dejaba fluir por ellos los humores y sustancias que lo conformaban. El pastor le recibió sin decir palabra, como quien acoge a un peregrino o a un exiliado. El chico se abrazó al torso hasta hacer bufar al pastor, molesto. "Las costillas," dijo, y automáticamente se deshizo el nudo y se separaron. Lo que vino a continuación no fue vergüenza. Acaso una distancia más acorde con las leyes de esa tierra y de ese tiempo. La semilla, en todo caso, estaba echada.81 (160)

This point marks the beginning of a more familiar, less-awkward relationship between the protagonist and the goatherd. While not as close a relationship as might be expected or desired between parent and child, perhaps because it is entered into voluntarily and is characterized by mutual need and responsibility, it is one of care and respect that the protagonist has never known until this point.

In juxtaposition with the previously discussed passage from Chapter Three which describes the boy’s first meal with the goatherd, the protagonist’s line of thinking assumes a strikingly similar structure: 1) think about the goatherd, 2) question his plans/ decision to leave, 3) think about how he betrayed his biological family, 4) sink into guilt believing he somehow deserved his

81. Jull Costa translation: “The goatherd’s quavering voice and his bony hand on his shoulder. The boy sprang to his feet, and without even looking at the goatherd, he flung his arms about his frail body. He pressed his face into the old man’s rags so as to become one with him, to enter the tranquil room his own hands had denied him. It was the first time he had been so close to someone without trying to fight him off. The first time he had been skin to skin with someone and allowed all the humors and substances of his being to flow forth from his pores. The goatherd welcomed him without a word, as if her were welcoming a pilgrim or an exile. The boy embraced him so tightly that the goatherd cried out: “Mind my ribs,” and immediately the knot dissolved and they separated. There was no embarrassment, just the discreet distance required by the laws of that land and that time. The seed, however, had been sown” (162-163).
suffering. In this instance, however, the narrative voice immediately mediates the boy’s thinking for the reader, insisting that the boy is so affected by his recent brushes with death and violence that he is simply not thinking clearly, as one might expect of a chronically traumatized adolescent:

Pensaba así porque el llano le había erosionado de una manera que ni tan siquiera concebía cuando vivía bajo techo. Le agotaba el desamparo y, en momentos como aquél, hubiera cambiado lo más preciado de su ser por un rato de calma o por satisfacer sus necesidades más básicas de una forma tranquila y natural. Protegerse del sol, arrancarle a la tierra cada gota de agua, autolesionarse, deshacer su propio cautiverio, decidir la vida de otros. Cosas todas ellas impropias de su cerebro todavía plástico, de sus huesos por estirar, de sus músculos hipnóticos, de sus formas a las puertas de un molde mayor y más anguloso. Imaginó el cuerpo exánime del viejo siendo arrastrado por la moto del alguacil. Los ayudantes riendo en sus caballos.\textsuperscript{82} (159)

Once again, this passage ends recursively, that is, where it began: the protagonist envisioning the goatherd’s current state. Yet unlike the meal passage from the novel’s third chapter, the narrative voice carefully informs the reader that the boy is not inclined to this type of pathological thinking, but that it is instead his extraordinarily brutal circumstances and his still-developing mind that paint the bleak and terrifying portrait of his future.

\textsuperscript{82.} Jull Costa translation: “He was thinking these thoughts because the plain had worn him down in a way he could never have imagined while living safe beneath a roof. He found this state of utter helplessness exhausting and, at such moments, would gladly have exchanged even the most precious part of his being to enjoy a little peace or simply to be able to satisfy his most basic needs quietly and naturally. These other things – protecting himself from the sun, wringing from the earth every last drop of water, inflicting pain on himself, liberating himself from slavery, deciding on other people’s lives – none of these things were appropriate to his still-expanding brain, his supple limbs, his physical frame on the verge of becoming something larger and more angular. He imagined the goatherd’s lifeless body being dragged along behind the bailiff’s motorbike and the bailiff’s deputies on horseback, laughing” (161-162).
In this way, the boy’s biological family dissolves in favor of a multispecies community of care to replace it, and the protagonist subsequently comes to see himself in different terms. Thus, overcoming the trauma of prolonged abuse through voluntarily receiving and giving care can be understood as a central theme of the text. However, despite the care the boy and the old man display to each other and to the non-humans in their charge, they are by no means pacifists. Each one resorts to destructive physical violence not only in self-defense, but also in revenge. While the boy does not witness exactly how the goatherd disarms the sheriff’s henchman, the reader is made privy to the gruesome scene and its justification (206). The boy himself expresses a desire for revenge throughout that seems to dissipate when the goatherd insists he treat the corpses of his torturers with respect. When it comes to the goatherd’s death, the boy is truly heartbroken: he has lost the only true caregiver and friend he has ever had. However, once the protagonist burns their corpses, the fire seems to quench his thirst for revenge. Thus, when he assumes his role as the herd’s new caretaker, the boy foregoes the opportunity to return to his village and punish the others like his father who were complicit or directly responsible for his suffering. Instead, he continues on his route north thus abandoning any future hope for human companionship let alone prosperity for himself. In this abandonment, I read a tenuous blueprint a new and voluntary familial structure to replace the obligations of blood ties and species loyalty that patriarchy demands with an ethic of care, responsibility, and respect.

Conclusion: Non-normative Communities through Normative Means, or The Limits of Entanglement in the Face of Exclusion

Franc’s fables and Carrasco’s novel effectively demonstrate the need for communities of mutual care, liberation, and above all protection. Yet neither case allows for ambiguity: Franc’s
fables punish or eliminate those who do not adhere faithfully to the tenets of queer feminist solidarity and Carrasco’s abusive dystopia obliterates the traditional heteronormative family structure. Both cases call for the dissolution, albeit by differing means, of hegemonic societal hierarchies in favor of multispecies ones. In this way, each work advocates for an ecofeminist re-imagining of human relationships with other humans and with non-humans according to an ethic of care. Lori Gruen’s idea of “entangled empathy” is particularly useful in understanding this interpretation. In her 2015 book Entangled Empathy, she defines it explicitly:

Entangled empathy: a type of caring perception focused on attending to another’s experience of wellbeing. An experiential process involving a blend of emotion and cognition in which we recognize we are in relationships with others and are called upon to be responsive and responsible in these relationships by attending to another’s needs, interest, desires, vulnerabilities, hopes, and sensitivities. (3)

At the core of this particular iteration of empathy is the giving care to others. This is precisely the relationship that develops between the goatherd and the boy in Intemperie, but this reciprocating care characterizes only the relationship between the two main humans and not necessarily their non-human charges in the novel, thus recreating an anthropocentric hierarchy. Similarly, it is this entangled empathy that binds at least some of the hyperhumanized characters in Franc’s “lesbofables,” despite ultimately relying on exclusivity rather than inclusive cooperation.

Gruen specifies:

Our relationships with human and animal others co-constitute who we are and how we configure our identities and agency, even our thoughts and desires. We can’t make sense of living without others, and that includes other animals. […] Given
that we are always, inevitably, in relationships, it makes sense to work to make them more meaningful and more mutually satisfying. […] This is the entanglement of entangled empathy. We are not just in relationships as selves with others, but our very selves are constituted by these relations. (63-64)

It is this idea of co-constitution that relates such an understanding of the traditional self/other dichotomy to Roberto Esposito’s definition of community as a relationship based on obligation arising out of need rather than connection. I find this interpretation to be particularly useful for interpreting representations of interspecies relationships through an ecofeminist lens, because it allows for a discrepancy in mutuality:

[Community] isn’t having, but on the contrary, is a debt, a pledge, a gift that is to be given, and that therefore will establish a lack. […] Therefore the community cannot be thought of as a body, as a corporation in which individuals are founded in a larger individual. Neither is community to be interpreted as a mutual, intersubjective “recognition” in which individuals are reflected in each other so as to confirm their initial identity; as a collective bond that comes at a certain point to connect individuals that before were separate. The community isn’t a mode of being, much less a “making” of the individual subject. It isn’t the subject’s expansion or multiplication but its exposure to what interrupts the closing and turns it inside out: a dizziness, a syncope, a spasm in the continuity of the subject. The common “rose” of its being “no subject.” (6-7)

Carrasco’s protagonists come together out of necessity in the way Esposito describes community formation. However, it is Gruen’s entangled empathy that describes why the herd is sustained even
after the goatherd’s passing. In the novel, it is because of the boy’s empathetic entanglements to both the goatherd and the herd’s non-humans that he severs his relationship completely with his family and the village, a clear example of the destructive nature of community formation through *immunitas* (Esposito 13).

Likewise, in the world of Franc’s “lesbofables,” the need for a safe, stable locale to exclusively promote and protect queer females of all “species” leads to the establishment of the La Madriguera Dancing Club community. While it is true that a common sexual identity unifies this group, the sacrifice to that identity above all others, as depicted most clearly in “Las ardillas bolleras y la zorra de seguridad,” that such membership at times demands, undermines the call for entangled empathy that can be read in many other stories like “Las conejitas y la reina de la selva”, “El escarabajo pelotero y la gusanita solidaria,”83 and “La disgregación de la colmena desigual.”

In both Carrasco’s novel and Franc’s “lesbofables,” however, violence in one form or another seems to be necessary in order to establish who can benefit from membership in these newly-formed communities. While the boy’s situation is markedly more desperate than those of the patrons of La Madriguera, the reasoning and effects of such violent exclusion are quite similar: hierarchy still prevails and vulnerable beings like the *zorra de seguridad* and the protagonist’s mother and brother are left to fend for themselves. In other words, some problems are resolved for some, while the structures that created those problems remain fully in place. As such, despite the theoretical power of entangled empathy to affect change, would-be re-imaginings of communities created through empathy still fall short of embodying meaningful change in social thought.

83. “The Ball-making Beetle and the Sympathetic Silk Worm” (my translation. Although I do not analyze this story in this chapter, it provides a clever critique of pink capitalism, the incorporation of certain queer individuals into capitalist logics and systems as determined by their other privileged social categories (i.e. white, male, wealthy). When the silk worm’s thoughtful act of solidarity in support of a fellow queer, an entrepreneurial dung beetle, goes unacknowledged and unreciprocated, she seeks refuge and belonging within the La Madriguera group.
Ultimately, the type of empathy for which ecofeminist philosophers like Gruen, Donovan, and Puleo advocate is one that shuns competition in favor of cooperation, and Carrasco’s novel and Franc’s fables illustrate well how easily such thought experiments are constrained by deeply-ingrained hegemonic insistence on always putting self-interest, inevitably anthropocentric in nature, above the well-being of the other.

Of course, as Eva Haifa Giraud argues, exclusion is an inevitable by-product of entanglement, because in any sort of linkage, other possible links are made impossible. For Giraud, this foreclosure of possible relationships is also worthy of critical attention. With this in mind, she cautions against weighing entanglement too heavily over the exclusions that ensue:

The problem is that, as argued above, practices that have often proved valuable in practice for fostering responsibility are often inadvertently foreclosed by relational, more-than-human approaches. […] ethical and epistemological responsibility is not found solely in the moment of encounter itself. Indeed, valorizing these moments and relations can obscure rather than open up responsibility. It is instead important to constantly ask who or what is being excluded when certain realities are materialized at the expense of others, to find ways of taking responsibility for these exclusions and in some instances to contest them. (180)

Responsibility, therefore, emerges as the primary reason for examining foreclosures alongside entanglements. In Carrasco’s novel, the foreclosures are fairly straightforward: in choosing to pursue a nomadic life, the protagonist eschews his kinship ties with his biological family and with any sort of human community. In Franc’s “lesbofables,” the exclusions can have more significant consequences for those excluded, as seen in the examples of the zorra de seguridad, the rana lesbiana, or the colmena desigual. However, these stories also paint exclusion as a productive and
beneficial circumstance, as seen with the murciélaga transgender or the oca poca agraciada. In each of these examples, inclusion and exclusion are highly contextualized. Giraud explains that context is always a necessary factor in determining the ethical viability of an action and that it is normativization that should be suspect (181). Franc’s “lesbofables” offer ample varied responses to acts of exclusion, and although problematic in their violence, there are certainly a few cases that reveal new possibilities that were otherwise foreclosed while those characters were still entangled in other relationships. As Giraud asserts, “Exclusion does not necessarily just come after, work around, or give birth to relations; sometimes its ethical potential is precisely in the purposeful way it destroys particular entanglements in order to create space for alternatives” (181). Reading for the exclusions as well as the inclusions, both Franc’s Fabulario Les and Carrasco’s Intemperie present anti-patriarchal visions that reinscribe patriarchal structures, a practice against which Giraud and ecofeminists in general warn. Thus, questions of uneven responsibility and risk emerge alongside questions of futurity and sustainability.

Due to their complexities, I see these non-biological communities as versions of what Donna Haraway sees as a crucial step in broadening the idea of kinship in the interest of living more meaningful lives in the present and in making life possible and secure for future generations. Haraway writes:

*Kin* is a wild category that all sorts of people do their best to domesticate. Making kin as oddkin rather than, or at least in addition to, godkin and genealogical and biogenetic family troubles important matters, like to whom one is actually responsible. Who lives and who dies, and how, in this kinship rather than in that one? What shape is this kinship, where and whom do its lines connect and disconnect, and so what? What must be cut and what must be tied if multispecies
flourishing on earth, including human and other-than-human beings in kinship, are to have a chance? […] Staying with the trouble requires making oddkin; that is, we require each other in unexpected collaborations and combinations, in hot compost piles. We become-with each other or not at all. (Staying with the Trouble 3-4)

Haraway’s “oddkin” very accurately describe the communities of care and protection that both Franc’s and Carrasco’s characters form for liberation. Haraway goes on to argue in favor of displacing biological and nuclear families to both make room for and take responsibility for the planet’s non-humans:

I think that the stretch and recomposition of kin are allowed by the fact that all earthlings are kin in the deepest sense, and it is past time to practice better care of kinds-as-assemblages (not species one at a time). Kin is an assembling sort of word. All critters share a common “flesh,” laterally, semiotically, and genealogically. Ancestors turn out to be very interesting strangers; kin are unfamiliar (outside what we thought was family or gens), uncanny, haunting, active. (Staying with the Trouble 103)

While Haraway argues for the incorporation of death into the conceptions that make life possible, her ideas upend the bio- and necropolitical schemata that bolster capitalism, patriarchy, and anthropocentrism. In this way, despite their reliance upon violence, Franc’s “lesbofables” and Carrasco’s novel demonstrate such anti-patriarchal goals. If we conceive of these works as thought-experiments in a time of global environmental crisis, applying Haraway’s theories to them, as idealistic as they may be, suggests that for individuals in imminent danger, communities of care enacted by Gruen’s entangled empathies enable short-term well-being, even if they are
socially and biologically unsustainable in the long-term, and even if they come at the expense of other possibilities.
Chapter V: Conclusion: The Significance of Human-Animal Relationships in the Age of Climate Crisis

*Han sido suficientes cinco lustros para demostrar lo contrario, esto es, que el verdadero progresismo no estriba en un desarrollo ilimitado y competitivo, ni en fabricar cada día más cosas, ni en inventar necesidades al hombre, ni en destruir la Naturaleza, ni en sostener a un tercio de la Humanidad en el delirio del despilfarro mientras los otros tercios se mueren de hambre, sino en racionalizar la utilización de la técnica, facilitar el acceso de toda la comunidad a lo necesario, revitalizar los valores humanos, hoy en crisis, y establecer las relaciones Hombre-Naturaleza en un plano de concordia.*

from Miguel Delibes, *Un mundo que agoniza* (1979)

*Sostenibilidad es solidaridad con el conjunto de la ciudadanía, una ciudadanía ecológica que no conoce fronteras y con la cual no comprometemos a preservar el espacio de vida común. (…) sostenibilidad es también compasión y justicia para ese Otro, el animal no humano, silencioso e ignorado, pero capaz de anhelar, amar y sufrir.*

*Libertad, igualdad y sostenibilidad puede ser un buen lema para guiar en el incierto siglo que vivimos. Tenemos una larga lucha por delante porque el ecofeminismo es razón y pasión para que otro mundo sea posible.*

from Alicia Puleo, *Ecofeminismo para otro mundo posible* (2011)

The above quotes illustrate long-term, intergenerational distress about Spanish culture’s anthropocentrism and concern for the social and environmental destruction such a deeply ingrained worldview perpetuates. Miguel Delibes, a prolific author who wrote novels, short stories, and essays throughout the middle of the twentieth century, describes his own literary mission as one...
that challenges what we understand today to be the neoliberal view of progress: that Nature, like all of aspects of society, is a resource to be exploited for the benefit of Mankind, and only to benefit a select group within that category. Delibes explains that his novels advocate for a return to a balance between Mankind and Nature, accusing Western society of destroying the planet and bringing humanity closer to the brink of its own destruction through unbridled solipsistic greed.

Around forty years later, ecofeminist philosopher Alicia Puleo writes a much longer, denser work calling out similar societal tendencies; the situation seems to only have gotten worse since Delibes’ manifesto, published near the beginning of the democratic transition period. Puleo’s book gives a long and in-depth analysis of global ecofeminism and how such a line of thinking can give specific insight into Spanish practices like bullfighting and cultural products predicated on those practices. In revisiting Puleo’s concluding remarks and juxtaposing them with Delibes’ observation, the similarity in language used to describe these concerns is striking. Specifically, both discuss balance between Humanity and Nature as only achievable through compassion for the non-human world. Delibes makes clear that he viewed literature as a means through which to cultivate this compassion, and Alicia Puleo has expressed the same view in earlier writings, viewing literature and other creative works as essential means through which to nurture an “ecological education,” a certain cultivated consciousness which she views as essential to changing human values and thereby behavior (“Dualismos opresivos”). For both Delibes and Puleo, science and progress must be mediated by affect, and both recognize literary representation as a method through which to do so for a mainstream audience.

Through my analyses, I have aimed to demonstrate how literary representations of human-animal relationships have taken shape in different periods over the twentieth and into the twenty-first century in Spain. I do not claim that any of the texts I study might be consciously ecological.
or ecofeminist in intent. However, I do assert that reading with these qualities in mind opens up productive interpretational possibilities for canonical works such as Unamuno’s *Niebla*, reclaims critical value for works originally dismissed as children’s literature, and can bring lesser-known works into sharper critical focus. In other words, deliberately paying attention to how non-human animals have been represented in narrative encourages the ecological consciousness for which critics like Delibes and Puleo call.

In the second chapter of this dissertation, I have argued that zoomorphism works in tandem with anthropomorphism to call out human hypocrisy. With respect to *Niebla* (1914), I contended that paying attention to Orfeo as a serious character within the *nivola’s* storyworld acknowledges his own anthropomorphosis while also revealing the human protagonist Augusto’s zoomorphosis: although seemingly an adult human man who struggles to fit in, my analysis draws attention to his canine-like personality quirks and behaviors. Orfeo the puppy’s eulogistic lamentation takes on a more serious tone if read as an attempt to redeem his master’s life by claiming Augusto to be a victim of Man’s hypocrisy rather than an inept participant within it. Essentially, if Orfeo and Augusto can both be understood as dog-like characters, then *Niebla* can be read as a recognition of Man’s philosophical failings because Orfeo’s and Augusto’s companionship defies the dominant Cartesian logic governing non-human animals. This defiance is of course one more layer upon the novel/nivola’s hierarchy-toppling pattern as the perpetrator of the protagonist’s death-by-gluttony is deliberately left ambiguous. Thus, in addition to the God/Man and Author/Character dyads, the Man/Animal hierarchical dichotomy is also upended.

Cartesian theories of animality also come into play in Emilia Pardo Bazán’s “El cerdo-hombre” (1911). The action revolves around the antagonist’s scheme to test a hypothesis: Stroganoff must know definitively whether the pig who performs humanity so well is actually a
pig or is simply a man disguised as one. As in *Niebla*, a somewhat inept man is challenged by greedy forces outside of his control. However, unlike the other characters who form the love triangle in which Augusto unwittingly finds himself, Durof’s antagonist is not treated with any sort of narrative empathy. Instead, it is made clear throughout the short narrative that Stroganoff is a wholly unsavory man whose cruelty and caprice know no bounds, enabled by his class status and wealth. Meanwhile, although also of a noble lineage, the protagonist is restricted by his lack of wealth, and it is this vulnerability that Stroganoff exploits for his own amusement. I argue that the narrative voice effectively zoomorphizes both Durof and Stroganoff while also anthropomorphizing and feminizing the *cerdo-hombre*, and thereby rendering the feast at the end of the story a scene of anthropophagic gluttony. Similar to *Niebla*, a disgraced man’s purposeful overeating culminates in his tragic death.

Finally, Pardo Bazán’s “Navidad de lobos” (1918) tells a story of desperation-turned-triumph for a pack of ravenous wolves. In their efforts to avoid mass starvation, the wolves galvanize to scavenge weaker humans during the Christmas holiday. To their delight, they discover a village already attacking itself – for the wolves this means an easy feast rather than a hard-fought meal. The wolves are appalled at the humans’ actions, however, despite the happy consequences for them. The de facto leader of the pack even condemns the humans’ betrayal declaring it beyond the pale of wolf morality. The single human perspective presented, that of an adolescent girl, performs a similar act, linking the destruction of her village and her attempted rape to acts perpetrated by “brothers.” These intraspecies and interfamilial taboos resonate even more pronouncedly as sins against the backdrop of the Christmas holiday, reminding the reader of the supposed sacredness of the time and the sacrilege of both gluttony and cannibalistic betrayal. The central act of Catholic faith, the Eucharist, is also of course an infringement of the same taboo.
against consuming flesh of the same species. As in *Niebla*, human society is revealed to be hypocritical to tragic effect. I argued that this story defines humans as uncooperative and needlessly violent during times of crisis, thereby elevating wolf morality over that actually practiced in human society. In both of these Pardo Bazán stories, cooperation is rewarded over competition, even if in gruesome ways. Linking these three texts, *Niebla*, “El cerdo-hombre,” and “Navidad de lobos,” together are ideas of social stratification and in particular elitism, over-consumption, and questions of how to ethically treat other beings both human and not. In each of these narratives and especially in reading them alongside one another, humans take shape as unfit arbiters of morality. The works discussed in Chapter II may foreshadow a common search for moral realignment through sources beyond the human in the spirit of *noventayochismo* in other works of the same period.

Next, in Chapter III, child protagonists offer narratives of fantasy and escapism against the backdrop of an austere and oppressive society. Studied chronologically, these three stories by female writers of the post-war period each portray silence as a form of violence and show suffering as differing in degree but never absent. In Carmen Laforet’s “El secreto de la gata” (1952), young Carmen’s curiosity leads to the adventure of a lifetime. She discovers that her companion cat Pachota is the Queen of the Cats and revels in the company of the cat commune for a magical evening before waking up in her bed. Upon interpreting Pachota’s gaze as urging silence, she never discusses the events of that evening before revealing it to the reader. Although published in a propagandistic journal aimed at young girls, I have interpreted this story as one of self-censorship in service of a narrative counter to patriarchal, heteronormative, and, in this case, speciesist dominance hierarchies. In this text, self-censorship is treated ambiguously, allowing for positive and negative interpretations of women’s voluntary self-restraint in fascist Spain with regard to
relationships with other beings, and with non-human animals in particular, outside of those deemed appropriate for women and girls.

Mercè Rodoreda’s more realist short story “Gallines de Guinea” (1958) displays overt violence in the form of animal slaughter. Little Quimet, new to the neighborhood, ventures out to play one afternoon and finds himself captivated by a caged swan. He imagines himself as her owner, names her, and fantasizes about walking her around on a lead. His fantasy is quickly dashed, however, when he follows her into the market to the butcher kiosk. Horrified, he watches as she and other birds are killed in rapid succession right before his eyes. When one of the freshly-minted corpses falls, he does as the butcherwoman instructs him to do and returns the body to the counter. He is clearly traumatized: he flees upon depositing the bird’s lifeless body and returns to the safety of his mother. He struggles to explain his anguish to her, but he also cannot repress it. I argued that this story juxtaposes socially-sanctioned violence in stark contrast with the natural biophilia upon which many didactic children’s narratives rely. This contradiction, akin to the pattern of human hypocrisy seen in the previous chapter, links directly to the traumatic violence of repression as intertwined with patriarchal dominance. Inarticulation in this narrative is affectively more charged than in Laforet’s cat tale, but the effect is the same: personal tendencies for connection and cooperation must be suppressed in order to maintain the hierarchical status quo. Animals are not to be regarded as more than objects, at least not publicly.

This middle chapter concludes by analyzing Ana María Matute’s “El saltamontes verde” (1960) as a fantastical tale in which society, even on its fringes, demands normative modes of communication and self-expression. Yungo, a lonely and desperate mute orphan, is moved by an intense moment of empathy to save a grasshopper from his would-be murderers. In gratitude, the grasshopper offers to guide Yungo in his quest to find his lost voice, serving as companion,
shepherd, and interpreter. Despite consistent demonstrations that human language is deceptive and proof that his other modes of expression – music and physical empathy – allow him to connect well to others both human and not, Yungo’s desire to recuperate his voice remains unfettered. Nevertheless, once the grasshopper reveals that he is Yungo’s voice and that all the boy needs to do to regain it is kill him, Yungo’s agency is wholly stripped from him; before he can even react, the wind carries him to his death. In this narrative, even the possibility of a non-conventional, non-linguistic existence is entirely foreclosed. That is to say that Yungo’s excision-through-death reinstates anthropocentric physical, communicative, and conceptual dominance, because the grasshopper can no longer interact without the boy to serve as cover and the boy can no longer interact with the world without a human voice to mediate. As in both Laforet’s and Rodoreda’s stories, silence and speech are not real choices here, and there is little leeway for non-hegemonic fantasies. I have demonstrated that what becomes clear in these narratives is an acknowledgment of hierarchy and domination as problematic at best (Laforet) and wholly destructive at worst (Matute). This observation, however, is only somewhat open to critique if done so through the same models of anthropo- and androcentric violence and family structures. Thus, in these narratives, the same biophilia that allows for the problematization of patriarchal dominance, hierarchy, and violence must either be repressed (Laforet), corrected (Rodoreda), or eliminated (Matute).

Finally, the penultimate chapter examines two works in the contemporary period as examples of human-animal relationships: at opposite ends of the anthropomorphism spectrum: Isabel Franc’s hyper-humanized creatures in her Fabulario Les (2008) and Jesús Carrasco’s highly descriptive and realist dystopian novel Intemperie (2013). Franc’s queer feminist reimaginings of traditional children’s fables, adaptations of modern cautionary tales turned into fables, and completely original inventions, critique social division according to sexual preference and gender,
placing premiums on entrepreneurship and solidarity. Her works are clever and humorous in their delivery, but often rely on violence to delineate the bounds of the multispecies lesbian community. In particular, those members who either internalize patriarchal ideals of beauty and female sexuality or who appear to waiver in their loyalty suffer death or expulsion. These punishments, however, do not apply equally, thereby revealing class and species biases, despite pretenses of inclusion and safety.

Carrasco’s novel follows an adolescent boy in his desperate escape from an abusive home life and sexual abuse at the hands of corrupt local law enforcement. A nomadic goatherd and his non-human companions take him in. The two humans learn to work together and to trust one another as the pederast sheriff and his violent henchmen close in on them, maiming the goatherd and slaughtering many of their flock in their search. After the final confrontation, there are no winners, but only survivors. Once his human companion succumbs to his injuries, the boy decides to abandon humanity altogether in favor of a nomadic life like that which the goatherd modeled. Despite the fact that his sexual abuser and his cruel enforcers have been eliminated, the boy forsakes the possibility of returning to his biological family and village, suggesting that he sees no future in the traditional family or patriarchal structure – no meaningful structural change occurred. In both Franc’s collection of lesbofables and Carrasco’s novel, entanglement and exclusion are both destructive and productive: one begets the other. In each of these visions of community and kinship outside of traditional patriarchy, I have shown that community members find refuge and protection but still rely on patriarchal forms of violence like killing, expulsion, and abandonment to establish and maintain such enclaves. In other words, possibilities for new identities and kinships might indeed be opened up through voluntary bonds of community and solidarity, but
these new inclusions and interdependencies still depend on imbalanced power dynamics and exclusionary practices.

Throughout these chapters, I have laid groundwork for further exploration into the representations of human-animal relationships throughout modern and contemporary Spanish literature. In this current period of global climate crisis, a period to which Delibes appears to have been pointing since at least the middle of last century, awareness of such representations can reveal insight into Spain’s particular entanglements with non-human animals. Moreover, as Puleo and others have argued, patriarchal hierarchies of dominance can only be challenged through accepting our non-exceptionalism as a species.

Such sensibilities can be seen beyond the texts I have analyzed here, as Beilin’s analyses of anti-bullfighting activism and Ed Antoja’s documentary linking empathy and consumption practices demonstrate. However, as my analyses have indicated, reading specifically through an ecofeminist lens, sensitive to how non-humans are represented and the cultural constructs such representations reflect and perpetuate, is the first step toward cultivating the type of non-anthropocentric sense of responsibility for the repercussions for both human and non-human actors that such representations might either facilitate or foreclose. Through paying critical attention to non-human animals in narrative, I hope to have shown that we can gain important insight into what a given society values, devalues, and struggles with during a given historical period with greater fullness. While every sort of representation is undoubtedly political in some way, but representations of non-human animals are a special case because there is never a risk of inciting discord, distrust, or rebellion among those non-human animals represented.

While my concern lies primarily with individual human-animal companionship and interspecies interaction, I recognize that most do not share this idealized view; for many people,
non-human animals will always be inferior in specific ways and therefore merely instrumental, in both real and metaphoric contexts. However, I argue that one need not seek a close relationship with a non-human animal to recognize the value of studying how they are represented, because as Daston and Mitman remind us with regard to anthropomorphism:

Animals are not just one symbol system out of many, one of the innumerable possibilities to externalize and dramatize what humans think. They are privileged, and they are performative. They do not just stand for something, as a word stands for a thing or a rhetorical trope figures something else; they do something. Even in cases of complete ventriloquism, in which thinking with animals is reduced to blatant projection of human thoughts, feelings, and fantasies, there is some added value in the fact that the blank screen for these projections is an animal. [...] They are symbols with a life of their own. We use them to perform our thoughts, feelings, and fantasies because, alone of our myriad symbols, they can perform; they can do what is to be done. We may orchestrate their performance, but complete mastery is illusion. Eyes peer through the human mask to reveal another life, mysterious – like us or unlike us? Their animated gaze moves us to think. (12-13)

That is to say that even the most contrived, extremely anthropomorphized animal representation comes from a cultural entanglement with non-humans specific to both time and place, if not also to individual and community. Their presence, as Daston and Mitman put it, “moves us to think.” I have argued that their presence reveals the physical and philosophical limitations of the human and thereby calls into question anthropocentrism and all of its inter-related patriarchal tenets: carnism, sexism, ethnocentrism, classism, racism, to name just a few. I have attempted to show that through ecofeminist approaches to literature and to life, we can care more fully and respond
more ethically to the needs of others. Such expanded empathy is needed now more than ever in the age of climate crisis, and I hope my analyses prove a fruitful beginning to this intellectual work within Spanish Literary and Cultural Studies.
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