

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT: UNEQUAL INTRA-EUROPEAN UNION MIGRATION DUE
TO ECONOMIC AND LINGUISTIC BARRIERS

BY

NICHOLAS ZALEWSKI

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in European Union Studies
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2021

Urbana, Illinois

Master's Committee:

Professor Zsuzsa Gille, Chair
Mr. Lucas Henry

Abstract

Freedom of movement is hailed as an accomplishment of the European Union, but it also hinders EU member states that experience significantly higher levels of emigration than immigration. While the European Union likes to believe that EU citizens can move to any member state, this is difficult without the necessary language skills to work and live in another European nation. An important question is how do language skills as opposed to economic deterrents impact EU migration to Southern and Eastern European member states? Part of the issue is that the European Union has twenty-four official languages, and citizens may choose to study only a couple of these languages to learn as it is unrealistic to learn every official language. English, German, and French are the top three spoken languages in the EU, along with being the three most studied foreign languages. These are also the official working languages in European Union Institutions. These languages also appear to be preferred due to the higher level of economic development of Northern EU member states.

I have chosen Italy and Romania as case studies for this thesis. These two countries have the lowest percentage of college graduates in the EU and would benefit if these two member states were able to attract more highly educated EU migrants. With these countries I hope to examine why these two member states are often overlooked by EU citizens looking for another member state to live and work in. I also felt it is important to look at a country from Eastern Europe and a country from Southern Europe to look at the similarities and differences in the challenges these member states face. Despite Italy's and Romania's large populations, Italian and Romanian are not popular foreign languages for citizens of other member states to study. The citizens of Romania and Italy are also less likely to know English as well as citizens in other member states. This makes it difficult to attract migrants from other EU member states. In addition, these countries are lower than the median European Union economic performance.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my mother, Kathleen M. McClory and the sacrifices she made for me to get here along with her constant words of encouragement. Additionally, I am grateful for support from my father, Daniel L. Zalewski. I would also like to thank my advising committee, Professor Zsuzsa Gille and Mr. Lucas Henry, along with the staff of the European Union Center for their support and challenging me to do my best.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review.....	1
Chapter 2: Freedom of Movement and General Trends in Intra-EU Migration.....	24
Chapter 3: Economic Background and Worker Rights in Italy and Romania.....	34
Chapter 4: Language Capabilities in Italy and Romania.....	62
Chapter 5: Conclusion.....	75
References.....	82

Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review

One of the most cherished benefits for citizens of European Union member states is the freedom of movement, one of the four freedoms of the European Single Market. The four freedoms are: free movement of people, goods, services, and capital¹. This thesis will focus on the free movement of people. The European Single Market and its four freedoms are massive achievements in recent European history. The free movement of labor via the Schengen Agreement is particularly notable, in that it allows the citizens of EU member states to freely move about the union. However, intra-EU migration has not been even among the member states, with some benefitting from emigration and immigration more than others. It is not easy to understand why some member states are chosen over others by intra-EU migrants. While many Northern and Southern member states have been successful in attracting migrants from the other Southern and Eastern member states of the European Union, this migration has remained uni-directional. This is why it is important to study why other Southern and Eastern member states have not had the same success in attracting migrants. In order to do this, I chose Italy and Romania. Italy and Romania are larger member states in Southern and Eastern Europe but are the two countries with the lowest college completion rate in the European Union (see table 1.1), arguably giving them more of a reason to try to compete for migrants from other member states. In addition, Italy has the lowest fertility rate in the European Union², and both Italy and Romania have lost a large amount of their own citizens in emigration to larger member states³. In order to balance this loss, both countries would likely attempt to attract migrants from other European Union member states. Both member states have struggled and have not been able to balance the

¹ Information about the four freedoms can be found at the European Union. <https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/single-market_en>

² Data can be found at the European Commission. <[Fertility statistics - Statistics Explained \(europa.eu\)](#)>

³ Information on emigration can be found at the European Commission. <file:///C:/Users/tubes/Downloads/KE-BQ-21-001-EN-N.pdf>

emigration with immigration. It is important to analyze whether the reasons for this are solely economic, or if the foreign language knowledge of Italians and Romanians have played a role in the lack of migrants as well.

Table 1.1: Tertiary Education Attainment in EU Member States, 30-34 Age Group⁴

Member State	Percent of citizens aged 30-34 years old citizens With Degree (2019)
Cyprus	58.8
Lithuania	57.8
Luxembourg	56.2
Ireland	55.4
Sweden	52.8
Netherlands	51.4
United Kingdom	50.0
Denmark	49.0
Belgium	47.5
France	47.5
Finland	47.3
Poland	46.6
Estonia	46.2
Latvia	45.7
Slovenia	44.9
Spain	44.7
Greece	43.1
Austria	42.4
Slovakia	40.1
Malta	38.1
Portugal	36.2
Germany	35.5
Czechia	35.1
Hungary	33.4
Croatia	33.1
Bulgaria	32.5
Italy	27.6
Romania	25.8

Thus, the main research question that will shape the arguments and research of this thesis is this: how do language skills, as opposed to economic deterrents impact intra-European Union

⁴ This data can be found at the European Commission. < <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tesem030/default/table?lang=en>>

migration to Southern and Eastern member states? While the strength of a national economy is important in order to attract migrants, there can be other factors that can impact migration as well, particularly language skills. The European Union has twenty-four official languages, along with a large number of dialects and minority languages spoken as well⁵. As it cannot be expected that European Union citizens learn all twenty-four official languages, the language skills they do possess have the potential to influence EU citizens on the member states to which they might migrate. Knowing a language that is widely spoken in a member state can help a European Union citizen integrate into the member state where they chose to work. The European Union itself has acknowledged the impact that language skills can have on the mobility of European Union citizens.⁶ It was also included in a 2008 European Council resolution as one of the major points, which urged the European Commission and member states of the European Union to “Better promote multilingualism as a factor in the European economy's competitiveness and people's mobility and employability” (Youth and Culture Council, 2008).

As the population of member states continue to age and the working-age population continues to shrink, intra-European Union migration is an important potential source of labor. Besides attracting migrants simply for labor, member states can try to attract highly educated migrants that member states can use to fill in gaps in their national labor market. Nations in the European Union can benefit from the freedom of movement of persons and rely on intra-EU migration to fill labor shortages, instead of migration from outside the bloc.

The Treaty of Rome defines the competencies that the European Union controls, competencies the EU shares with member states, and finally competencies that only the member

⁵ A list of EU official languages can be found on the European Union website. < https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-languages_en>

⁶ This can be found on the European Commission website. <<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=462&langId=en>>

states control. Title I states that exclusive areas of legislation the European Union control which include: the single market, the customs union, and the monetary policy of member states that use the euro. Title I of the Treaty of Rome also clarifies that in competencies that the European Union shares with member states, the member states are given legislative control over the part of the competence that the European Union has not specified itself (European Union, 1957a). Title IV of the treaty defines migration as a competence shared by the European Union and the member states. The European Union expects the member states to respect third-country nationals, but shares the competency to allow member states to codify the fair treatment of third-country nationals in their different legal systems (European Union, 1957b). Protocol 19 details the Schengen Area which permits the free movement of persons without border controls at national borders within the area (European Union, 2012).

My Thesis will be divided into several chapters. In Chapter 2, migration will be studied at the supranational level. Reports from the European Union about intra-European Union migration will be analyzed to look at the existing patterns in the European Union and to see how migration has changed over time in the European Union since the creation of the freedom of movement, and continues to change looking into the future. The rights of European Union citizens have been restricted overtime in order to protect the welfare systems of richer member states (Barbulescu and Favell, 2020), so it is important to see the impact this has had on intra-European Union migration.

Legislation from the European Union will be analyzed in the beginning chapter about the freedom of movement. It is important to examine how the way freedom of movement was written into law has influenced migration within the European Union. While it may seem simple at a first glance, various rules associated with the freedom of movement have had an impact on

intra-European Union migration. In order to appease older member states of the European Union, a transition period was permitted for these member states to restrict migration from member states directly after acceding (Koikkalainen, 2020). Not all details of freedom of movement have been legislated by the European Union, and various aspects have been left for the individual member states to decide these aspects. This means it can be easier or harder for a European Union citizen depending on both the rules legislated by the European Union and those that each individual member state has independently created.

In the Chapter 3, the economic strengths and weaknesses of Italy and Romania will be examined. This is in order to try to explain why Italy and Romania have not had as much success attracting intra-European Union migrants from other member states, as other member states in the European Union have been able to do. The economic characteristics that will be examined of the Italian and Romanian economies include GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, wages and how they compare with the European Union average. Italy's and Romania's economies will also be compared to nearby member states. If Italy and Romania have weaker economies than nearby member states, this can be a strong reason for intra-European Union migrants choosing to migrate to other member states instead of Italy or Romania.

Chapter 3 will additionally look at how Italy and Romania may have issues regarding the regulation of migration and protecting worker rights. If these two member states have a high burden on intra-European Union migrants, this can serve as a deterrent. If the economies of Italy and Romania are not well regulated, this increases opportunities for workers to be abused in these two member states. If Italy and Romania do not have well-regulated economies, potential causes of this will be discussed as well.

Chapter 4 will look at the language knowledge of Italy and Romania. If these two member states do not have a strong understanding of English or other widely spoken European languages, it would be hard for intra-European Union migrants to work there even if economic incentives exist to work in these member states. The history of Italian language standardization may help explain why Italy has been potentially slower to prioritize foreign language skills when compared to other EU member states. This chapter will also discuss how Italy's current foreign language policies in schools and Italy's strategy is to spread foreign language knowledge within the country still have not seen the same level of foreign language knowledge among Italian students as students in other EU nations.

The conclusion answers my original research question and summarizes my findings on how the economic performance and linguistic capabilities of Italy and Romania have impacted their ability to attract intra-EU migrants. The conclusion also includes possibilities of continuing to research intra-EU migration. This last part of the thesis also explains what these findings mean for the European Union as a whole.

Literature Review

This section reviews literature concerning the economies and language policies of Romania and Italy in an effort to contextualize data that reveals what separates Romania and Italy from other EU member states in matters of internal EU migration. It looks to examine the structure and weakness of the Italian and Romanian economies, yet also uncovers some interesting features they have. It examines the language policies these countries have had to date, and whether these policies encourage or discourage emigration of EU citizens to Italy or Romania. This review also examines how similarities between the Romanian and Italian languages have motivated Romanian migration to Italy. This will help to establish why these countries face

more difficulties than other nations in attracting EU migrants, but also explain why Italy has been able to attract the most Romanian immigrants of any member state in the European Union.

Roxana Barbulescu and Adrian Favell have argued that the freedom of movement has actually not worked as initially intended (Barbulescu and Favell, 2020). While originally viewed as an achievement for the European Union, freedom of movement has been viewed with scorn by Western member states following the Eastern Enlargement starting in 2004. The freedom of movement of persons was seen as a burden and threat for member states with generous welfare systems. Instead of working to prevent fraud, benefits were curtailed in favor of national citizens instead of equal treatment of European Union citizens as previously intended. While European Union institutions were expected to defend the freedom of movement, they appear to be in favor of supporting national welfare systems and security concerns, rather than defend the right of European Union citizens living in different nations than the one that they have national citizenship from. This was made possible by giving permission to old member states to initially restrict the migration of citizens from new member states.

Sofia Vasilopoulou and Lisa Talving discuss how national attitudes toward freedom of movement are different based on the relative wealth of a particular member state (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2019). More affluent member states have divided public opinions about freedom of movement. The opinion towards freedom of movement in affluent nations relies on the level of education of the individual. More educated respondents are likely to be supportive, while those who are less educated and have a stronger national identity are more likely to view freedom of movement as a threat. In poorer member states in the European Union, support for freedom of movement remains very high. Vasilopoulou and Talving show that the GDP per capita of a

member state is proven to be the strongest determinant on the public opinion in the member state towards freedom of movement.

According to Jon Kvist, negative opinions towards freedom of movement is nothing new in the European Union (Kvist, 2004). This existed before ten additional countries became member states of the European Union in 2004. Western member states were already fearful of a large wave of migration from these new poorer Eastern European member states. In order to prevent this large wave of migration, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain all negotiated to temporarily restrict the freedom of movement of citizens of the member states that acceded in 2004. This was done based on the presumption that there would be wide-scale migration to Western European Union member states solely because of their welfare systems. The member states that chose not to restrict migration from the countries that acceded the European Union in 2004, instead chose to make changes to their social policies in order to protect their welfare system from potential new arrivals. These restrictions were an important factor shaping migration patterns in 2004 as migrants had limited options.

Alessandro Pellegata and Francesco Visconti (2020) explore how opposition to migrants' entitlement to welfare benefits has grown in Italy, similar to other member states. Many Italian citizens, and many from other EU member states for that matter, view immigrants as outsiders. Recent increases in Euroscepticism across member states have exacerbated this issue. This sentiment was a driving factor in the 2018 election in Italy, which saw the success of Eurosceptic political parties who have anti-migration stances. On the other hand, there is strong support for economic assistance for only Italians in the country. In Italy, like in other member states, drastic changes in the European Union have resulted in winners and losers the further member states

continue to integrate and lose national sovereignty. Winners are those who are able to succeed with more integration, while losers, who see integration as competition will consider nation-states vital to protecting their socio-economic status. People who view the nation-state as vital also view welfare as something to be restricted to only those who belong to the nation-state, which can be seen in Italy (Pellegata and Visconti, 2020).

Italy's economy is divided in two. Emanuele Felice (2019) discusses how since the completion of the reunification process in 1871, the north generally has been better off economically than southern Italy. There has been limited economic convergence between the northern and southern regions, but still, the north has been doing significantly better than the south. Northern Italian regions have significantly higher GDP per capita (see Table 1.2), along with higher industrial production (see Table 1.3). In recent years, the divergence between the Southern and Northern economies in Italy has widened. Around unification, the southern regions of Sicily and Campania each had a GDP per capita around the Italian median GDP per capita. Shortly after reunification, this can be explained by the fact that Italy's economy had yet to modernize. When it did, modernization mainly happened in Northern Italy while Southern Italy was left behind. While Northern Italy's economy industrialized, Southern Italy remained heavily reliant on the agricultural sector. It is much more challenging to pinpoint why Southern Italy has fallen behind once again in the past five decades, after a period of convergence. What is clear is that geography is not to blame for Southern Italy's economic troubles. Felice argues that Campania is Italy's Southern region with the best geographic position due to its proximity to Rome, and yet it is the worse off economically.

Table 1.2: GDP per capita in Italian Regions⁷

Region of Italy	GDP per capita (in thousands of euros)
Northern Regions	
Provincia Autonoma Bolzano	48,100
Lombardia	39,700
Provincia Autonoma Trento	38,800
Valle d'Aosta	38,800
Emilia Romagna	36,700
Lazio	34,200
Veneto	33,700
Liguria	32,300
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	31,900
Toscana	31,900
Piemonte	31,700
Marche	27,700
Umbria	26,200
Southern Regions	
Abruzzo	25,100
Basilicata	23,000
Sardegna	21,300
Molise	21,100
Campania	18,900
Puglia	18,900
Sicilia	17,900
Calabria	17,300

Table 1.3: GDP contribution per worker in Industry compared to Italy (100)⁸.

Region of Italy	GDP Per Worker in Industry
Northern Regions	
Lombardia	115
Valle D'Aosta	113
Piemonte	108
Liguria	106
Emilia-Romagna	106
Trentino-Alto-Adige	104
Lazio	100
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	99

⁷ This data can be found at ISTAT. <<https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/251960>>

⁸ This data can be found at Banca D'italia <<https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/quaderni-storia/2017-0040/QSE-40.pdf>>

(continued)

Region of Italy	GDP Per Worker In Italy
Venezia	99
Toscana	91
Umbria	85
Marche	80
Southern Regions	
Abruzzo	97
Sicilia	85
Puglia	84
Basilicata	82
Sardegna	82
Molise	81
Campania	81
Calabria	76

It is crucial to look at why Romanians migrated to Italy, as they are Italy's largest migrant population (see table 1.4) and greatly outnumber immigrants from any other European Union member state that reside in Italy. Cornel Ban explains that cooperation between the Italian and Romanian governments helped motivate Romanian migration to Italy (Ban, 2012). Romanians initially immigrated to Italy due to agreements between the two national governments shortly after the collapse of the socialist government in 1989. The lack of jobs in Romania encouraged Romanians to look for work in other countries even before the Romanian accession to the European Union. Romanians were already the largest group of foreign workers in Italy has before Romania became a member of the European Union in 2007. Migrants during this period were predominantly from Moldavia in Eastern Romania, along with several regions in the Northwestern portion of the country. Ban looks at how many Romanian migrants tended to migrate to the same areas in Italy, often seeing towns losing a majority of their population except during summer and winter holidays. In one extreme case, the town of Borsa had half of its population of 30,000 living in Milan. Before Romania became a member state, 64 percent of Romanians were work tourists, and worked in Italy for 3-9 months per year. Italy became a top

destination country due the ease with which Romanians could obtain forged documents to travel to and work in Italy.

Table 1.4: Number of Citizens from Each Member State Living in Italy⁹

European Union Member State	Number of Citizens Living in Italy
Romania	1,145,718
Poland	86,743
Bulgaria	56,645
Germany	35,316
France	29,721
United Kingdom	29,654
Spain	25,954
Croatia	16,285
The Netherlands	8,283
Slovakia	7,976
Hungary	7,927
Greece	7,627
Portugal	6,476
Austria	6,078
Belgium	5,824
Czechia	5,392
Lithuania	5,249
Sweden	3,159
Ireland	3,076
Latvia	2,886
Slovenia	2,391
Denmark	2,018
Finland	1,664
Estonia	1,245
Malta	712
Luxembourg	255
Cyprus	247

Another explanation for Romanian migrants continuing to choose Italy that Cornel Ban brings up is the fact that Italy's national government did not seem as concerned with stopping illegal immigration as other western countries were, particularly Germany (Ban, 2012).

⁹ This data can be found at ISTAT.

http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCIS_POPSTRCIT1#

Germany implemented regulations in the 1990s in an effort to put an end to illegal immigration. Even while Italy made several efforts to reform illegal immigration, rather than kicking Romanians out, the government allowed to stay within Italy (Uccellini, 2009). Romanians in Italy also found informal ways to send remittances to family members in Romania without the usage of banks or credit Unions through Italy's informal economy. Romanians could pay bus security a fee to bring cash back to Romania for their families. Romanians illegally working in Italy could not only send home money and avoid a record of their money transfers, they also got a cheaper rate sending remittances through the coach companies than banks and credit unions.

Despite negative press media concerning Eastern European immigrants in other member states, Romanians still came to Italy. This is partly due to Italian officials doing their best to make it clear Romanians were welcome to migrate to Italy. Italian Prime Minister Brodi stated that Romanians and Italians were brothers, and were bonded together through language, history, and friendship. Part of this was motivated by Italy's economic interests in Romania, where thousands of Italian firms conducted business could face potential economic fallout if Italians did not accept Romanians as legal migrants (Uccellini, 2009). What is clear, is that despite being viewed as outsiders, Italy still remained the number one country for Romanian migrants within the European Union.

Gabriela Nicolescu (2019) discusses how one of the main jobs for Romanians living in Italy is working as a *badante*, or care giver for the elderly. This work is available throughout the country, even in the poorer south partially because the National Social Security Institute helps pay for in-home care. Poorer families can receive 900 euros a month in order to take care of elderly family members. Italian families were not necessarily looking for a registered nurse, as evident by the majority having no previous health care experience. Italian families were simply

looking for care workers to look after elderly family members who needed it. Nursing homes are not very popular in Italy, and *badanti* (cheap health care workers) who live in the home and care for the family members is seen as a more acceptable solution. These Romanian migrants, mainly women, could still earn enough as *badanti* to send money home to family members in Romania.

While briefly described by Nicolescu (2019), when discussing how *badanti* do not have official contracts, Leila Talani (2019) specifically addresses how in Italy the informal economy is a major driver of migration. This includes migrants from not European Union member states and helps explain Italy's large population of migrants from non-European Union and non-European countries. It also further explains why primarily Romanians, Bulgarians, and Polish migrants have come to Italy to search for work as well. Talani clarifies that by no means migrants are culpable for Italy's informal economy, rather that they are taking advantage of employment opportunities that are available to them from the informal economy. These employment opportunities have resulted in large-scale migration to Italy, despite the difficulties of trying to obtain a regular migration status after arrival. While some experts thought the number of people working irregular jobs would decrease, the situation appears to be worsening over time. Talani also points out that while some estimates of the size of the informal economy in Italy show a decrease, this is not the case. Many of these estimates leave out illegal activities which in turn make the informal economy appear smaller than it truly is. Businesses in Italy may not register officially as a business in order to avoid paying taxes and social security obligations, or because they are engaged in illegal activities, which prevents them from legally registering as a business due to the activities they are involved in. Registered businesses will also misreport how much they produced in order to pay less taxes and social security obligations. Even registered workers and businesses may be left out from the official size of Italy's economy due to being misclassified based on size of business, wrong geographic code, or because the business

was put in the wrong category regarding its industry. Another source is statisticians making statistical errors when calculating the volume and value of products from registered businesses.

Reasons why Romanians continue to stay in Italy are discussed by Andrica Nicoleta (2020). Earlier academic literature suggests that many Romanians had the intention to return home, but Nicoleta discusses why the number of Romanians has continued to grow, and why many Romanians are choosing to remain in Italy long-term. Italy remains more economically developed economy than Romania, and all twenty regions of Italy have attracted Romanian migrants; however, most continue to live in Central or Northern Italy. Romanian men continue to work primarily in construction and agriculture, meanwhile Romanian women work primarily in various service industries and as elderly care workers. Regardless of the sector, Romanian migrants in Italy continue to earn more than Romanians who live and work in Romania. Romanian migrants continue to be primarily Romanian women; in 2010 there were 77,000 more Romanian women than men compared to 2019 when there were 180,000 more Romanian women than men. Romanians are primarily employees in Italy, but 7,000 companies are owned and operated by Romanian migrants. Romanians continue to choose to work in Italy primarily for economic reasons, as they are able to earn money to send home to family members in Romania. In 2018, 730 million euros were sent to Romania from Italy. Nicoleta also pointed out how Romanians who live and work in Italy can now benefit from Quota 100, a program launched by the Italian national government in 2019. Under Quota 100, European citizens working in Italy and contributing to the pension fund have the right to collect pension benefits.

Paul Bridgen and Traute Meyer examine how intra-European Union migrants are impacted financially if they choose to retire in the member state where they moved to work (Bridgen and Meyer, 2017). Italy does not have relatively high wage rates among EU member states that have

attracted Romanian migrants. Even though this is the case, Romanian workers have an easier time living above the poverty line following their retirement. The same holds true for Spain, but does not in Germany and the UK. While Romanians live above the poverty line in Italy and Spain after retirement, they are at greater risk of living below the poverty line in Germany and the United Kingdom. Part of this is because pensions benefits transfer from their home country to the country they migrated to, and the pension they earned in their home country is often not adequate to help support European Union intra-migrants in retirement in their destination country. While migrants from poorer member states may benefit from higher wages in Germany or the United Kingdom initially, they will struggle in retirement due to their pensions not measuring up to the standards set for German citizens. This is a result of the total of their pension benefits that the migrants earned in their home member state along with the pension benefits they earned in their destination country are lower than the poverty line in the destination country. Besides cost of living, another factor is the generosity of the pension systems of the various member states. The Spanish system has the most generous pension system meanwhile Italy has the second most generous system. The United Kingdom and Germany are less generous, and Germany is the least generous of the four countries. This makes it harder for European Union migrants from member states with lower wages to live above the poverty line with their wages. It is notable that German retirees themselves struggle to live above the poverty line. The German system is not only fiscally conservative with migrants, but German nationals as well. For migrants from significantly poorer member states, earlier migration is vital for them to receive higher pensions if they then choose to retire in their destination country. In order for future migrants to enjoy higher pensions in their destination countries, there will need to be more convergence of wages among the member states for this to occur.

Economic growth is crucial for Romania's economic convergence with other European Union member states yet as Pavel and Moldovan (2019) point out, economic growth amongst Romania's regions is not equal. Partly this is due to the fact that Romania is one of the most rural member states. As of 2017, 43.6 percent of Romanians lived in rural areas of the country. Rural areas also tended to have poorer quality of infrastructure. In 2011, only seven percent of rural roads were modernized, and only 28.2 percent of Romanian communes had sewage networks and water purification systems. While the quality of infrastructure did not impact local economic growth in rural areas of Romania in the short term, other factors do. In order for Romanian regions to see local economic development, Romanian communes need to be close to a large urban area and have direct access to the E-road network of the European Union.

Simona Bodogai and Stephen Cutler (2014) argue that because Romania has an aging population, this will have a significant financial impact on the country. It is expected that older Romanians will make up 30 percent of the population by 2050. Projections vary, but the minimum expected value is 30.9 percent estimated by Eurostat. This will be more than slightly double than Romania's older population in 2010, which was only 14.9 percent and lower than the European Union's average of 17.1 percent. As it is, due to the poorer economic performance of Romania compared to other countries, it will be more difficult to support a much larger portion of the population. The older population is much more pronounced in rural Romania, where 55.6 percent of Romanians older than 65 live, compared to 44 percent of Romania's overall population in 2012. The main factors causing Romania's population to rapidly age include a lower fertility rate, external migration to other European Union member states and other countries, and a higher life expectancy for Romanians. Besides a lower fertility rate causing an aging population, another contributor is the baby boom that occurred in Romania in the 1960s through 1980s. President Nicolae Ceaușescu banned abortions in 1966 which caused a

rapid increase in the birth rate and this generation was known as the decree babies generation. Romanians had relied almost exclusively on abortions as their primary means for family planning which led to a large increase in children being born when this was no longer an option. In 1989 abortion was made legal again after the overthrow of Ceaușescu which led to a decrease in the birthrate once again. The median age of Romania’s population was 38.3 in 2010 up from 34.4 in 2000 and is projected to reach 51.4 by 2050.

Anca Dachin discusses how part of Romania’s economic problems is partly due to the large role agriculture still plays in the economy (Dachin, 2011). Agriculture remains vulnerable due to variables that are hard to control, in particular changes in climate and the price of energy. Due to these uncontrollable variables and the large portion that agriculture makes up of Romania’s economy, this causes significant fluctuations in Romania’s Gross Domestic Product, prices, and the employment rate. Romania has continued to see significantly higher employment in the agriculture sector compared to the European Union and other member states of the European Union in Eastern Europe (see table 1.5).

Table 1.5: Percent of Workers Employed in the Agricultural Sectors of EU Member States.¹⁰

EU Member State	Percentage of Workers Employed in the Agricultural Sectors (2016)
Romania	28.7
Bulgaria	18.2
Greece	11.1
Poland	11.0
Portugal	9.4
Croatia	8.0
Lithuania	7.9
Slovenia	7.3

¹⁰ This data can be found at the European Commission

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/NAMA_10_A64_E_custom_757078/default/table?lang=en>

(continued)

EU Member State	Percentage of Workers Employed in the Agricultural Sectors (2016)
Hungary	5.3
Ireland	5.3
Latvia	5.3
Cyprus	3.8
Spain	3.6
Austria	3.6
Italy	3.4
Finland	3.4
Czech Republic	2.7
Estonia	2.7
France	2.5
Netherlands	2.5
Denmark	2.1
Slovakia	2.1
Germany	1.4
Sweden	1.3
Belgium	1.2
Malta	1.2
United Kingdom	1.1
Luxembourg	0.8

After having reviewed the literature on the economic aspects of migration, let me turn to how scholars evaluate the role of language. When it comes to Romania and Italy, an important issue when it comes to attracting intra-EU migrants is language. As neither Romanian nor Italian is widely studied in the European Union, it is important that these two member states can speak a widely spoken language. The most spoken language in the European Union is English which is why the capability of Italians and Romanians ability to speak English will be examined in depth.

Before it is possible to understand why Italians have not learned English as well as member states in the European Union, it is important to examine the history of language in Italy. As Jillian Cavanaugh (2008) demonstrates, this history can help explain why foreign language instruction has not been prioritized in Italy, in comparison to the other large member states such

as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Cavanaugh, 2008). This article adds important information on how politics in Italy have impacted the importance of standardization of the Italian dialects and then the revival of dialects. Before Italy could focus on teaching foreign languages, it had to deal with the issue of standardizing the Italian language itself. During Fascism, Mussolini sought to end the usage of dialects and replace it with standard Italian. While the Northern League has changed their original stance of Northern Italian regions breaking off from Italy and forming their own country, they still promote Northern dialects. The Northern League has even gone as far as to say that the Italian government is a colonizing force which tried to eliminate the usage of dialects in order to try to unite the peninsula. This paper examines how the Northern League has promoted the usage of the dialect Bergamesco in the city of Bergamo. While people may not agree with the more radical stances of the Northern League's political stances such as its anti-migrant stance, people do agree with the party's stance on protecting and promoting the use of dialects. It has been over one hundred years in Italy, and yet the government struggles to standardize the Italian language. Due to the popularity of the Northern League, Bergamesco has been used in more contexts than previously, including in regional politics. Even if parents tend to speak to their children less in dialect, there are still regional differences in the standard dialect.

Marcel Danesi discusses why Italian dialects are widely spoken and the impact this has on the ability of speakers of regional dialects to speak the standard Italian dialect (Danesi, 1974). In the past, speakers of Italian dialects were primarily associated with a lower social class. Starting after World War II, there is more acceptance of speaking dialects. When a lot of focus is placed on learning and speaking dialects, this can make efforts to teach the standard Italian dialect more difficult, due to various errors students may make based on the dialects they speak. A further complication is that no national standard exists, and instead there are regional standards for how

Italian should be spoken. These regional dialects can result in difficulty in communication between Italians who were educated in different regions. As a result, Italians as a whole often make varying types of grammatical errors when speaking in the standard Italian language. Southern Italian dialects often lead to confusion when conjugating verbs into a certain tense in a conditional clause. Northern Italians tend to simplify various intervocalic double consonants. An example of this is Northern Italian dialect speakers saying *bela* instead of *bella* for beautiful.

Farahnaz Faez examines several reforms Italy has made to its education system to incorporate foreign language instruction (Faez, 2011). This has resulted in a large increase in people studying foreign languages and English in particular. Italy has a centralized education system creating regulations at the national level, resisting any efforts to decentralize the education system to the regional level. Despite this, schools still have significant autonomy that enables them to shift priority away from foreign language education in secondary schools. Teachers in primary school are not always able to adequately teach English due to a proper lack of language training. Proper foreign language education typically begins in secondary school, where teachers are specifically trained to deliver instruction in these languages. Training for secondary school foreign language teachers lasts for six years in Italy, which is one of the longest in comparison to other member states.

Grosu-Rădulescu and Lucia-Mihaela review how in Romania the European Union and Bologna Process have both greatly influenced changes in foreign language education at the tertiary level. The Bologna Process is an effort to synchronize higher education in the European Union in order to ensure citizens of European countries are being educated in a similar manner and allow citizens to work in other countries more easily. The European Union and Bologna Process are dedicated to spreading the values of multilingualism which Romania has started to

consider important as well. Romania's education system had to undergo reforms to be in compliance with the Bologna Process, which aims to improve mobility for students and employees. Reforms influenced by the European Union and the Bologna Process enabled Romania to increase foreign language teaching and acquisition. Under Communism Russian prevailed as the major foreign language taught in Romania, and there was a lot of propaganda against teaching and learning Western European languages, apart from French. Knowledge of French remained high because French had been used to standardize the Romanian language in the 19th century. Grosu-Rădulescu and Lucia-Mihaela (2018) also describe the difficulties of teaching Romanian to foreigners in order to attract migration of teachers and students into Romania.

Norica-Felicia Bucur and Oana-Rica Popa (2013) write about how after the fall of communism in Romania, English became the predominate second language taught in Romania and Russian classes are now almost nonexistent in the country. English became more popular due to it being perceived as a more important global language that can help Romanians access more job opportunities, particularly after Romania became a member state of the European Union. This has partially helped Romania achieve a high level of English skills. Classes are also available to Romanian students from a younger age due to reforms starting in the 2012/2013 academic school year. Adopting a national policy has helped regulate how English is taught in Romania. All foreign languages taught in Romanian schools are regulated by the Romanian Education Ministry. This progress has primarily been motivated by Romania working to abide by guidelines set by the European Union.

Eleonora Bălănescu (2019) examines how Eastern Europe as a region saw foreign language skills decrease after the fall of the Soviet Union, except for Romania. As Russian was no longer

a compulsory language to learn, people stopped using and learning the language in these former Eastern European countries. Many of these countries were slow to replace Russian with other foreign languages. Romania was one of the few countries to not see a decrease. This is due to Russian being quickly replaced with other foreign languages including English and French. Gradually Eastern European countries saw students studying one foreign language on average. Romania was an outlier as students studied two foreign languages on average. This would put Romania in line with the European Union's policy of European Union citizens speaking two foreign languages in addition to their native language. The rest of Eastern European countries however have appeared to develop their own policy, which is learning English in addition to their native language.

Chapter 2: Freedom of Movement and General Trends in Intra-EU Migration

Freedom of movement is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the Single Market, alongside the free movement of capital, goods, and services. As such, these freedoms are protected by the *aquis communautaire*. At the same time, intra-European Union migration remains lower in comparison to migration into the European Union and migration from the European Union to the United States (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2019). While European Union citizens can enjoy many opportunities offered by freedom of movement, there are still restrictions that must be discussed. Member states are able to restrict freedom of movement on the basis of public security, public policy, public health grounds and employment in the public sector. Member states can prevent entrance or expel a European Union citizen for any of the previously mentioned reasons. For stays under three months, European Union citizens are only required to carry a valid document or passport to prove their identity. For stays longer than this, European Union citizens must be able to prove they have sufficient funds and do not become a burden on the social services on the member state they are in. They must also register for a resident permit from the member state they are in for any duration over 90 days (Marzocchi, 2020).

An example of member states restricting freedom of movement on the basis of public health grounds would be during the Covid-19 pandemic. Since the beginning of the outbreak in Europe, member states and the European Union have been discouraging non-essential travel within the European Union. This saw the European Commission publishing guidelines¹¹ on who could be restricted from traveling to and from various member states. If a European Union citizen is traveling from a high-risk area, the member state they are traveling to can require them

¹¹ Guidelines are available at the European Commission <[Travel during the coronavirus pandemic | European Commission \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/europa.eu)>

to take a Covid-19 test and quarantine upon arrival. The European Union has tried not to restrict the movement of workers and has established a protocol for testing based on the risk of various types of workers. For workers who frequently have to cross borders related to work, they are not required to quarantine every time they cross a national border within the European Union ("European Commission.", 2021a).

Another important consideration of free movement of people is that it is not limited to membership in the EU. Despite being external nations, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein are part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and are part of the Schengen Area agreement. These countries also have agreements to permit Citizens of the European Union to move to them, which can impact the number of migrants that member states of the European Union receive. In particular, Switzerland has a large amount of European Union citizens living in the country. In 2019, 1.02 million European Union Citizens were living in Switzerland (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021). Also, all three of these external countries have a higher median income than the European Union median. This enables these countries to attract migrants that might have gone to member states in the European Union if the European Union did not have agreements to allow migrants to work.

There are two possible ways of examining member states and ranking them based on the number of intra-European Union migrants they attract. You can examine intra-EU migration by how many European Union migrants there are in a country as a percentage of the total population, or you can study intra-EU migration by the overall number of migrants from another member state reside in another country. Depending on the method used, this impacts which member states are ranked highest as a destination country for intra-European Union migration.

Recently, Elena Fries-Tersch, Matthew Jones, and Linus Siöland released a study that contains data that supports this trend. In 2019, 17.9 million European Union citizens lived in a different member state from their birth, and of the 17.9 million, 13 million are of working age (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021). Most European Union migrants continue to have jobs that require low education, but an increasing number of European Union migrants have jobs that require tertiary education. The main European Union member states that attract European Union migrants with tertiary education are Germany, Spain, France, Belgium, and Austria, meanwhile the main member states these migrants came from were Poland, Romania, Italy, Bulgaria, and Portugal. Slightly over a third of these highly educated migrants have a job that does not require their education level (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).

Luxemburg has the highest percentage of European Union migrants as a percentage of its total population; 44 percent of all people living in Luxembourg are from another member state. The countries that follow Luxembourg are Cyprus (17 percent), Malta (12 percent), Ireland (12 percent), and Austria with 10 percent of its population. In 2019, the six member states from where most EU migrants originated from were Portugal, Poland, Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria; these five states have also had the most emigration and have been the five states with the most emigration in the European Union for the past several years, accounting for 58 percent. Almost half of all migrants live in Germany or the United Kingdom (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).

Looking at intra-European Union migration on an annual basis, the past several years migration has been on a downward trend. In 2019, the total number of intra-European Union migrants increased by only 1.2 percent. This is largely due to migration to the United Kingdom falling significantly. If United Kingdom is excluded from the data, then the total number intra-European Union migrants increased by three percent in comparison to the previous year. This

means that the pace of migration growth in 2019 was the same as the previous five years, from 2014 to 2018. Portugal, Cyprus, France, Spain, and the Netherlands saw their number of migrants increase significantly in 2019 compared to 2018 (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).

While the United Kingdom was a member state, it also had a diverse group of intra-EU migrants. Italy also has a significantly higher percentage of EU migrants who are employed in the homes of nationals of the destination country, primarily as nurses. In particular, 19 percent of all EU migrants who work in households work in Italy. In Germany, the percentage is close to only a small fraction of one percent, and also only 7 percent in France and Spain. As less European Union migrants continue to work in households each year, which has the potential to hurt Italy's ability to attract migrants. In addition, the percentage of European Union migrants employed in professional, scientific, and technical activities is significantly lower than that of other countries, with only 2 percent employed in this sector in Italy. In the European Union, the median for migrants employed in this sector is 6 percent (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021). If more migrants continue to have a higher level of education, this can also impact Italy's ability to attract migrants in the future, unless there are more jobs which require advanced skills.

Italy may be able to change this trend, however, as Italy has numerous professions which require a migrant to pass a national exam. These examines certify that a person is able to practice the profession related to their university degree before they can become employed in Italy. This is not the case in other Western European countries, which hurts Italy when it comes to its ability to attract migrants as these migrants do not have to deal with this barrier in other member states that they can migrate to instead of Italy.

Italy is also fourth in the European Union for total number of migrants, but below the European Union average based on migrants as a percentage of its total population. In 2019, there

were 1.5 million European Union migrants living in Italy. When looking at intra-European Union migration to Italy as a percentage of the total population of Italy, only three percent of Italy's population were migrants from other member states. Italy's rank in terms of total number of migrants also equals its rank for total population in the European Union. However, examining the migration sources exposes interesting results. While other countries in the European Union have been able to attract migrants from many different member states, Italy relies very heavily on Romania as the main source of its migrants. This is an issue because Romania is also the member state with the highest rate of return migration. This creates a problem for another member state whose economic development heavily depends on labor from intra-EU migrants. While smaller countries were typically ranked higher than larger countries base on migrants as a percentage of the population, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom still had a higher percentage than Italy. Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and France are peer countries for Italy, and it is important to examine these countries together. Not only were these the five largest countries in the European Union in 2019, they are also Western European nations, ignoring the North/South divide. When comparing the number of European Union migrants to their respective population in this peer group, Italy is doing worse.

When looking at intra-EU migration, the European Union classifies new movers as migrants who have moved to another member state within the past two years. Besides relying heavily on migrants from Romania, the employment rate of new movers in Italy is concerning as well. In 2019, migrants considered new movers by the EU only have an employment rate of 38 percent in Italy, in comparison to an employment rate of 66 percent for EU migrants who have lived in Italy longer than two years. New movers are defined by the European Union as migrants who have moved to another member state within the past two years. If Italy cannot address this high unemployment rate, it is possible that Italy will lag even further behind when it comes to

attracting EU migrants. EU migrants who emigrated to Italy in the past enjoyed an employment rate higher than the national employment average of 58 percent (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021). This can explain why Romanian migration to Italy has slowed, and the majority of Romanians migrated to Italy in 2007 or before. Another factor to take into consideration is that there is not a breakdown of those employed in Italy’s informal economy based on nationality. As time has gone on, it is possible a lot more Romanians are employed in Italy’s informal economy without a formal contract.

In 2018, Italy was 17th among EU and EFTA member states for the number of Intra-EU migrants per 1,000 inhabitants. Italy had just over 25 intra-EU migrants per 1,000 inhabitants (see table 2.1). These statistics are based on migrants regardless if they are from other European Union member states or from outside the European Union. This is possibly due to statistics related specifically to European Union migrants in 2018 is unavailable for many member states. For the member states that do disclose this data, it is clear that Italy is behind other member states that can be considered as part of Western Europe.

Table 2.1: Intra-EU Migrants in EU/EFTA Member States as of January 1st, 2020¹²

EU/ EFTA Member State	Intra-EU Migrants per 1,000 inhabitants	Population of Intra-EU Migrants	Population of Member State
Luxembourg	396	247,878	626,108
Cyprus	133.78	118,801	888,005
Lichtenstein	180.79	7,005	38,747
Switzerland	166.19	1,430,197	8,606,033
Iceland	114.32	41,626	364,134
Malta	102.54	52,761	514,564
Ireland	93.30	463,166	4,964,440
Austria	86.34	768,597	8,901,064

¹² This table was created with data from Eurostat. < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_pop1ctz/default/table?lang=en> and < <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00001/default/table?lang=en>>

(continued)

EU/EFTA Member State	Intra-EU Migrants per 1,000 inhabitants	Population of Intra-EU Migrants	Population of Member State
Belgium	81.57	939,965	11,522,440
Norway	69.45	372,796	5,367,580
United Kingdom	54.93	3,681,859	66,647,112
Germany	53.56	4,454,418	83,166,711
Spain	42.67	2,019,487	47,332,614
Denmark	39.57	230,445	5,822,763
Netherlands	35.42	616,632	17,407,585
Sweden	31.21	322,324	10,327,589
Italy	25.23	1,504,521	59,641,488
France	23.63	1,599,411	67,320,216
Czechia	22.91	245,000	10,693,939
Finland	18.29	101,072	5,525,292
Portugal	17.94	184,717	10,295,909
Greece	17.83	191,118	10,718,565
Estonia	15.71	20,883	1,328,976
Slovakia	11.05	60,311	5,457,873
Slovenia	10.27	21,523	2,095,861
Hungary	8.29	81,060	9,769,526
Croatia	4.78	19,417	4,058,165
Latvia	3.45	6,590	1,907,675
Romania	3.29	63,591	19,328,838
Lithuania	3.02	8,426	2,794,090
Bulgaria	2.06	14,342	6,951,440
Poland	0.96	36,598	37,958,138

The trend of other western member states attracting more migrants than Italy has continued. Spain, Belgium, Austria, France, and the Netherlands all had more migrants from the European Union than Italy did in 2018 (see table 2.2). While France has a higher number of intra-European Union immigrants is only about 12,000 more than those who moved to Italy, this can be explained a larger economy and a larger population in France to absorb more migrants. However, these two reasons together cannot explain the higher number of Intra-EU migrants arriving in 2019 in the other member states. Spain has a smaller population, smaller economy, and lower GDP per capita than Italy. Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium all have populations

and economies smaller than those of Italy, but each of these member states has a higher GDP per capita.

Table 2.2: Number of Intra-EU Migrants in Specific Western European Nations¹³

Member state	Number of Migrants that arrived in 2019
Spain	121,000
Netherlands	73,500
France	69,300
Austria	64,200
Belgium	62,100
Italy	55,000

While not all member states have information showing whether or not these immigrants are from other member states, they do have information on how many immigrants are expatriates returning home. Italy ranks as one of the member states with the lowest percentage of nationals returning as part of the total immigration. Only six member states have nationals as a lower percentage of their immigration; Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Luxembourg, Malta, and Spain (European Commission, 2021d). Of these member states that see very few nationals moving back as a percentage of the migration, none of them ever saw a large emigration like Italy had. This would explain why very few of their nationals are coming back. Italy on the other hand has been one of the largest sources of intra-European Union migration for several years. While it is not clear from what member states they left, it is estimated that 1.3 million Romanians have returned to Romania during the pandemic. This is more than a quarter of the migrants who moved abroad in the European Union initially. The main motivation for some Romanians

¹³ This data can be found at Eurostat <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics>

moving back was losing their jobs in the informal economy and not having a safety net to fall back on to remain within Italy (Mantu, 2020).

Even though it is not clear how many Romanians have left Italy specifically, Italy has already noticed the consequences. Italy, along with many other EU member states, has had issues with not having enough agricultural labor. Jobs in this sector do not pay well enough to interest nationals of Western or Southern European countries, including Italy and many of these nations rely on migrant labor from Eastern Europe to fill positions. Many Romanians have taken these jobs as they pay more than agricultural positions in their home country. Romania has now raised the minimum wage for agriculture workers to 3,000 Romanian Lei a month (\$690) to try to persuade Romanians to remain (Mutler, 2020). If raising the minimum wage in the agriculture industry and convinces a large number of Romanians to stay, this may impact Italian agriculture with a shortage of workers.

Before the pandemic, a survey showed 30 percent of Romanians wanted to return to Romania in 2018. Only 21 percent stated that they want to remain in Italy indefinitely. This is because many Romanian migrants living in Italy have maintained close relations with family back in Romania which may motivate many to move back to Romania if possible. 31 percent have stated that their goal is to construct a home in Romania (Santoro, 2018). This is surprising as these close bonds helped support Romanians in establishing themselves upon arrival in Italy. The strong desires of Romanians to return shows the urgency of this situation for Italy.

Even though Italy has struggled to attract intra-European Union migrants, Romania's situation is markedly worse. While Romania has a higher number of migrants than many Eastern European Union member states, this does not necessarily mean Romania attracts more migrants from other European Union member states. Many of these migrants are Romanian but had

acquired citizenship from their new country. Like all other Eastern European member states, the number of intra-European Union migrants is very low compared to its total population.

Romania essentially has very few migrants from other European Union member states, and the majority of citizens of other member states that move to Romania are Romanians. Some Romanians returning from France and Italy are counted as migrants if they have citizenship from one of these member states. It is important to see why Romania has failed to attract migration from European Union citizens who are citizens from other member states, yet the country has been seeing an increasing number of Romanians returning to the country, even before the pandemic (European Commission, 2021d).

It appears that the majority of Romanians currently want to work abroad again, but it is not clear if they will return to the member states they worked in before or look to work in other member states. According to a poll sixty-six percent of Romanians who returned to Romania during the pandemic want to work abroad once the situation eases up. While this is the majority, one in three Romanians wanting to remain in Romania could have a serious impact on Italy if a large amount left Italy. Romanians not only make up the majority of European Union migrants in Italy, but all foreigners in the country. Romanians are 23 percent of the foreign population within Italy which can lead to severe labor shortages (ISTAT, 2020b).

Chapter 3: Economic Background and Worker Rights in Italy and Romania

Italy has the third-largest economy in the Eurozone, and the third-largest economy in the European Union after Great Britain left in December of 2020. Despite its large size, Italy's economy has several issues, as Italy trails other member states on several important economic metrics. Italy is ranked third to last in the European Union when it comes to the unemployment rate, only behind Spain and Greece. Italy also has a significantly lower GDP per capita than the richer member states in the European Union, along with a GDP per capita lower than the median of all European Union member states. Part of the negative economic outlook is the severity of economic problems in Southern Italian regions. Along with having some of the lowest GDP per capita among Southern or Western European Union member states, several of the regions in Southern Italy have some of the lowest employment rates in the European Union. These regions significantly pull-down averages of several metrics in Italy, and much closer to the average scores of these metrics for the average of member states in the European Union. Despite several Northern and Central Italian regions being above the European Union average on these metrics, it is not enough to make up for the weaknesses of the southern regions.

Romania currently has the 12th largest economy in the European Union but is ranked 26th out of 27 member states for GDP per capita. Romania is slowly converging economically with other member states and consistently has one of the higher annual economic growth rates of any member state. This growth rate was the highest of any member state during the fourth quarter of 2020, with a growth rate of 5.3 percent. Unlike other member states Romania was able to avoid a recession for the year. The construction sector struggled, but IT had strong growth (Timu, 2021).

In this chapter I will examine the gross domestic products, employment statistics, wage-earning rates, and national regulations of both Italy and Romania to further explore the impact of economic conditions in relation to migration rates between EU member states.

Gross Domestic Product

While the Italian economy may outwardly appear to be troubled, its regional economies tell a different story. The northern and central regions of Italy are significantly better off economically than the southern regions of Italy. This trend remains true across all the major economic metrics and includes GDP per capita, unemployment rate, employment rate, and median wage. As previously mentioned by Felice (2019), the northern and central regions of Italy rank above the European Union's median GDP per capita. Regional inequality can be seen in numerous other member states as well that attracted a large amount of intra-European Union migration.

This is a larger issue for Italy than other member states, due to how of how much lower the GDP per capita and employment rates are in the poorer regions of Italy. This brings down the national average GDP per capita and increases the national unemployment rate in Italy. Regional inequalities in member states in Western Europe are not as large as the regional inequalities observed in Italy, impacting their national averages less. This is an issue for Italy as while several regions are close or above the European Union on several economic metrics, this gets hidden as member states are often examined on the national, not regional level.

Looking at Romania, it is important to note that the country has the highest economic regional disparity among European Union member states that have more than one region in their country (City Compass Media, 2020). The GDP per capita of Bucharest, the region has the highest GDP per capita that is 3.6 times higher than Nord-Est Romania which has the lowest

GDP per capita in Romania. In Nord-Est Romania, employment is still heavily reliant on agriculture and has a lower employment rate than all other regions in Romania. 30.6 percent of those employed in the Nord-Est region were employed in agriculture, fishing, and forestry. Only 58.5 percent are employed in the Nord-Est region, significantly lower than the 69.5 percent employment rate in Romania. Bucharest- Ilov, the richest region in Romania, has an employment rate of 90 percent. In this region only 1.9 percent of those employed work in agriculture, fishing, and forestry. In Bucharest-Ilov 72.9 percent of those employed work in the service sector. In Nord-Est, only 42.8 percent are employed in the service industry (Institutul Național De Statistică, 2020).

Employment

Italy

Numerous Italian regions suffer from high unemployment rates, and the first seven regions with the highest unemployment rates are all in Southern Italy (see table 3.1). Besides Southern Italian regions having higher unemployment rates within Italy, several of these regions also rank among the worse in the European Union (see table 3.2). Upon further examination of the regions with the highest unemployment rates in the European Union, it becomes apparent that overseas territories are included in the ranking that do not reflect the unemployment rate in their respective governing nations. Removing these overseas territories, Calabria has the fifth-highest unemployment rate, and Campania and Sicilia are ranked seventh. Another concern is the high percentage of long-term unemployment rates and youth unemployment rates in these Southern Italian regions as well (see table 3.3).

Table 3.1: Unemployment Rate in Italian Regions, 15-64 Years Old¹⁴

Italian Region	Unemployment Rate (2020)
Calabria	20.1
Campania	17.9
Sicilia	17.9
Puglia	14.0
Sardegna	13.3
Molise	9.5
Abruzzo	9.3
Lazio	9.1
Basilicata	8.6
Liguria	8.3
Umbria	8.2
Piemonte	7.5
Marche	7.4
Toscana	6.6
Valle D'Aosta	5.8
Veneto	5.8
Emilia-Romagna	5.7
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	5.6
Lombardia	5.0
Trentino-Alto-Adige	4.5

Table 3.2: Unemployment in EU Member States¹⁵

Member State	Unemployment Rate (2019)
Greece	17.3
Spain	14.1
Italy	10
France	8.5
Cyprus	7.1
Sweden	6.8
Finland	6.7
Croatia	6.6
Portugal	6.5
Latvia	6.3
Lithuania	6.3
Slovakia	5.8
Luxembourg	5.6
Belgium	5.4
Denmark	5.0

¹⁴ This data can be found at ISTAT. <http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCCV_TAXOCCU1>

¹⁵ This data can be found at Eurostat <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tipsun20/default/table?lang=en>

(continued)

Member State	Unemployment Rate (2019)
Ireland	5.0
Austria	5.4
Slovenia	4.5
Estonia	4.4
Bulgaria	4.2
Romania	3.9
Malta	3.6
Hungary	3.4
Netherlands	3.4
Poland	3.3
Germany	3.1
Czechia	2.0

Table 3.3: Regions with Highest Unemployment Rate in European Union (15-74 Years Old)¹⁶

Region	Unemployment Rate (2019)
Mayotte (FR)	30.1
Melilla (ES)	27.0
Ceuta (ES)	25.8
West Macedonia (EL)	24.6
Western Greece (EL)	24.1
Extremadura (ES)	21.6
Reunion (FR)	21.4
Andalusia (ES)	21.2
Calabria (IT)	21.0
Guadeloupe (FR)	20.6
Canary Islands (ES)	20.5
Campania (IT)	20.0
Sicilia (IT)	20.0

The European Union defines long-term unemployment as unemployment that lasts longer than 12 months. The European Union has prioritized long-term unemployment as an issue that needs to be dealt with since it is a cause of persistent poverty, particularly in regions with a high rate of long-term unemployment (Long-term unemployment: Council Recommendation–

¹⁶ Data can be found at the European Commission <[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Regions with lowest and highest unemployment rates in 2019. %25.png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Regions_with_lowest_and_highest_unemployment_rates_in_2019_%25.png)>

frequently asked questions, 2016). Italy’s long-term unemployment in 2019 was 56 percent and is the third highest in the European Union (see table 3.4). This puts it 15.6 percent higher than the long-term unemployment for the European Union. Similar to other metrics, there is a significant gap among the regions and areas of Italy. Overall, Southern Italy’s long-term unemployment is significantly higher than northeastern regions. (Cascioli, 2020). 18 regions of Italy need to see an improvement to be at the European Union’s long-term unemployment average of 40.2 percent.

Table 3.4: Long-term Unemployment Rate in the EU in 2019¹⁷

Member State	Long-term Unemployment Rate
Greece	70.1
Slovakia	58.2
Italy	56.0
Bulgaria	56.6
Belgium	43.5
Slovenia	43.0
Portugal	42.6
Romania	42.4
European Union Average	40.2
France	40.2
Latvia	38.1
Germany	37.8
Spain	37.8
Croatia	35.8
Ireland	32.1
Hungary	31.9
Cyprus	29.1
Austria	25.1
Malta	25.1
Lithuania	30.6
Netherlands	30.3
Czechia	30.0
United Kingdom	25.0
Luxembourg	22.8
Poland	21.6

¹⁷ Data can be found at Eurostat <<https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>>

(continued)

Member State	Long-term Unemployment Rate
Estonia	20.0
Finland	17.6
Denmark	16.4
Sweden	13.7

Long-term unemployment is an issue as it serves as a deterrence to migrants from other member states. Since migrants from other member states need to support themselves, having a higher long-term unemployment rate than the EU average will encourage these migrants to migrate elsewhere. Migrants can only legally reside in another member state for 90 days before showing they can support themselves (Marzocchi, 2020). This can be difficult to do in Italy if over half of unemployed Italians have been unemployed for over twelve months. Due to the time limit and the potential difficulty to find a job in Italy as half of unemployed Italians have been unemployed for over twelve months, intra-European Union migrants may decide to migrate elsewhere.

All across the European Union, youth unemployment which looks at unemployment for those between the ages of 15-24 years old was higher than the total unemployment rate. Similar to the total unemployment rate, Italy had a higher youth unemployment rate as well. An encouraging aspect of this was a three percent decrease in unemployment compared to the previous year. Exactly like the total unemployment rate, only Spain and Greece had higher rates. Northeastern Italy had the lowest youth unemployment, meanwhile, the Islands had the highest youth unemployment rate. Only the provinces of Trentino-Alto-Adige have a lower youth unemployment rate than the European Union average (see table 3.5). Sicilia and Calabria are among the regions with the highest youth unemployment rates in the European Union, not including regions that are not overseas territories (see table 3.6), Sicilia and Calabria are ranked second and third for youth unemployment in the European Union.

Table 3.5: Youth Unemployment Rate in Italian Regions, 15-24 Years Old¹⁸

Italian Region	Unemployment Rate (2020)
Calabria	49.2
Campania	48.3
Sicilia	47.9
Sardegna	40.9
Molise	39.1
Puglia	34.5
Lazio	32.2
Liguria	30.9
Basilicata	30.0
Abruzzo	29.3
Marche	29.2
Umbria	27.2
Toscana	26.2
Piemonte	24.6
Valle D'Aosta	24.3
Veneto	21.9
Emilia-Romagna	21.3
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	19.2
Lombardia	16.0
Trentino-Alto-Adige	11.3

Table 3.6: Regions with the Highest Youth Unemployment in the EU¹⁹

EU Region	Youth Unemployment Rate
Melilla (ES)	64.0
Mayotte (FR)	54.1
West Macedonia (EL)	53.5
Ceuta (ES)	52.7
Guadeloupe (FR)	52.7
Sicily (IT)	51.1
Calabria (IT)	48.6
Martinique (FR)	48.0

Youth unemployment is a crucial metric as intra-European Union migrants are most likely to be younger. For Bulgaria and Romania, the majority of intra-European Union migrants fall into

¹⁸ This data can be found at ISTAT. < http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCCV_TAXOCCU1>

¹⁹ This data can be found at the European Commission < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics_at_regional_level#Regional_variations_in_youth_unemployment>

the 20-29 years age range. For Italy, Spain, Poland, and Germany, most intra-European Union migrants fall into the 30-39 age range, but the 20-29 age range is a very close second for all four member states (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021). As Italy has one of the highest youth unemployment rates, this can discourage these young intra-European Union migrants from moving to Italy. Instead, they will move to member states with a lower youth unemployment rate. Even though Italy has higher wages than the Eastern European member states these young migrants are leaving, this does not matter if they are unable to find a job once arriving in Italy. This is particularly true as several of these member states have higher wages than Italy as well.

Besides dealing with a high youth unemployment rate, Italy is also dealing with a high inactivity rate among young and all Italians. Inactivity is defined as those who are not in school, are unemployed, and not actively looking for employment. Overall, the rate of inactivity in Italy for those between the ages of 15-64 is 34.4 percent, meanwhile, among those aged 15-35 years old percent the rate is 36.6 percent (Cascioli, 2020). This is an important metric to examine as it shows the unemployment rate for younger Italians could be significantly higher if these young Italians were actively looking for work and included in the youth unemployment rate⁷.

The European Union had a goal to have a 70 percent employment rate in all member states by 2020, but only 3 out of 109 Italian provinces had achieved this in 2019: Bolzano, Bologna, and Belluno. These provinces are pointed out due to none of Italy's twenty regions having a 70 percent employment rate (European Commission, 2021f). Notably, all of these provinces are in Northeastern Italy, which is considered to be the area of Italy with the stronger economy. While the pandemic had an impact on the ability of European Citizens being able to work, no Italian region was on track of reaching this target the European Union set before the pandemic started.

A bright spot is that the employment rate is significantly higher for young Italians who have a high school or university degree, at 56.5 percent. This puts it at a similar rate to Italy's overall employment rate, but significantly lower than the 81.5 percent employment rate in the European Union for those with a high school or university degree. Looking at the overall rate for those 25-64 years old, Italian university graduates have an employment rate of 28.6 percent higher than those with a high school diploma. This is just slightly lower than the European Union's average of a 29 percent difference between those with a university degree, and those with a high school diploma (Cascioli, 2020). While the employment rate for Italians with a degree is significantly higher, a problem for this member state is the percentage of Italians who have a degree. This also raises the question of whether the Italian economy would be able to absorb more Italians with degrees, or if the unemployment rate would increase. If the unemployment rate would increase, then it would be harder to attract intra-European Union migrants with degrees.

Romania

In contrast to Italy, Romania's unemployment rate is much lower. Nationally, Romania's unemployment rate has been steadily decreasing since 2013, but slightly spiked back up in December 2020 to 5.2 percent (European Commission, 2021e). This is still lower than the average European Union unemployment. This increase in unemployment may have been for two reasons. The first may have been due to the Covid-19 pandemic which had the potential to cause some people to lose their jobs, the second is the large number of Romanians who lost their jobs and then moved back home. While this looks like a good sign, it is important to keep in mind that the population of labor force age in Romania has been decreasing rapidly as well. In 2013, 13,997,000 Romanians were of working age meanwhile in 2019 only 12,198,000 were of working age. During this time, the number of employed Romanians slightly decreased. In 2013,

the employed population in Romania was 8,530,000 and dropped to 8,492,000 in 2019 (Institutul Național De Statistică, 2020). More Romanians are not becoming employed, but the labor force of the country continues to shrink. This suggests rather than job creation, Romania's unemployment rate is low possibly because Romanians continue to emigrate to other member states to look for work. This would make it difficult to attract migrants from other European Union member states as there does not seem to be a higher number of jobs available to help entice migrants from other member states. Another potential factor causing the decrease in size of the labor force like Bodogai (2014) points out is the aging population of Romania and 30 percent of Romanians will no longer be of working age in Romania by 2050. Having a median age of 51.4 by 2050 will have a severe impact on Romania, particularly in rural areas which depend heavily on agriculture and where 55 percent of those who are older than 65 already live (Bodogai, 2014). It will be interesting to see if an aging population in Romania continues to be a driving factor in the low unemployment rate in Romania.

Over reliance on agriculture is an issue for the Romanian economy and employment. As Dachin pointed out, agriculture can experience significant fluctuations in climate and energy costs that are hard for small farms to control (Dachin, 2011). This is particularly relevant to Romania, given the small size of Romanian farms. Dachin interprets the small size of Romanian farms an issue particularly when combined with the low output of these farms. This limits the amount of income that Romanian farmers can earn. Romanian farms are the second smallest in Europe, only slightly larger than farms in Malta. Malta's farm size is related in part due to the country being a small island in the Mediterranean Sea. On average, farms in Romania are only 2 hectares in size. This is one-fifth of the size of the average European Union farm, which are 10 hectares (European Commission, 2020a). Other Eastern European countries tend to have smaller farms as well, and their size can be seen in the table below. Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia,

Croatia, and Poland all have smaller sizes than the average in the European Union. Romania has the largest number of farms in Europe, and accounts for over 34 percent of all farms with 3.4 million farms. This large number of farms and large dependence of Romanians on farming for employment helps explain the difference in size between farms in Romania and other member states. This may change with less young people working in farming in Romania. Similar to other European Union member states, Romania has a very small percentage of younger people acting as farm managers.

Given the large percentage of Romanian farms being family owned and very small, it is plausible that these farms are labeled as family-owned farms. In reality this is not a job, but how some Romanians survive. Dachin (2009) explains that many Romanian farmers work in subsistence farming, meaning they only produce enough for their family and not enough to sell commercially. This could explain why Romania has the highest percentage of employment in agriculture, yet some of the smallest farms in the European Union. Romanian farms are also less efficient in output than other farms, which would make it harder to produce enough for both their families to eat and to sell at market for income.

Looking at the jobs available in Bucharest, it would be difficult for these to be available in more rural areas of Romania. When looking at European Union countries, the capital city typically serves as the primate city²⁰ of the country for both habitation and high-salary jobs. In the Bucharest-Ilov region, there are just over 100,000 jobs in the financial sector (Institutul Național De Statistică, 2020). It may not be practical to have these types of jobs in more rural

²⁰ A primate city is the largest city in a country and the most economically important. Primate cities have double the population of the next largest city. This definition can be found at Sage Publications. <[45](http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/geography/n927.xml#:~:text=Primate%20Cities,-By%3A%20Giok%2DLing&text=A%20primate%20city%20is%20the,the%20importance%20of%20their%20economies.></p></div><div data-bbox=)

regions, but there needs to be a solution. Part of Romania's problem is it has no national policy in regard to Research, Development, and Innovation, which has a negative impact on more rural regions. Nord-Est in addition has no regional policy in regard to Research, Development, and Innovation. Despite the Nord-Est region having the highest population of all regions with Romania, it only attracts a small percentage of foreign direct investment²¹. A very low percentage of foreign development risks prolonging rural Romania's economic dependence on agriculture, which impacts Romania's national economy due to 43 percent of Romanians still living in rural areas. The Nord-Est region has several clusters in textiles, medical imaging, biotechnologies and agro-food technology, and needs to continue to build off of these (European Commission, 2020c).

Compared to other member states, Romania's agriculture sector makes up a significantly larger portion of Romania's economy. Agriculture also accounts for 57 percent of land use in Romania and 23 percent of Romanian employment. This comes with its own risks, as agriculture is dependent on factors often outside the control of the farmers themselves. There are additional concerns that Romanians unable to find jobs are hidden in official unemployment statistics due to being labeled as self-employed in the farming sector. Similar to other member states, the overwhelming majority of family-run Romanian farms mainly employ only family members. Out of the 3,422,000 family-owned farms in Romania, 3,395,000 have a labor force entirely made up of only family members. This large number of family-owned shows Romania's continued economic dependence on agriculture and can help prove experts right who believe that employment in agriculture is hiding subsistence farming. This trend is seen in every region of

²¹ North-East Romania only received 2.0 percent of the Romania's total FDI in 2019. This data can be found at the European Commission <<https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regional-innovation-monitor/base-profile/north-east-0>>

Europe, and the only member state to have a large number of non-family run yet family-owned farms is Spain, where almost 1 out of every 4 European Union farms not family-owned and run is located. 13 percent of farms are family-owned in Spain but the majority of employees are not part of the family meanwhile, this percentage is well under less than 10 percent in all other member states. Overall, 54 percent of all Romanian farm employees only family workers. This puts it 1.5 percent above the European Union average. In Eastern Europe farms are less likely to have family workers with less than half of the member states, apart from Poland (European Commission, 2020a).

While overall unemployment was low in 2019, youth unemployment is another story in Romania. In October of 2020, youth unemployment in Romania was very high, at 18 percent for anyone under the age of 25. This puts Romania slightly higher than the European Union youth unemployment average, which during the same month was 16.9 percent (European Commission, 2021e). Similar to the reasons stated for overall unemployment, the increase in youth unenrollment may have been caused by job loss related to the pandemic and a large number of Romanians who moved back to Romania during the pandemic. As Romania's youth unemployment is much closer to the European Union youth unemployment rate than Italy there is less cause for concern for Romania.

Wages

Italy

The median gross hourly wage in Italy was 12.61 euros in Italy in 2018. This puts Italy's median wage slightly below that of the European Union, including or excluding the United Kingdom (see table 3.7). Italy's gross salary was lower than all the member states in Western Europe apart from Spain and Portugal, but significantly higher than the gross hourly wage of

member states in Eastern Europe. In total, Italy has a higher median gross hourly wage than 16 of the 27 current member states (European Commission, 2021g). This helps explain why migration is typically from Eastern to Western member states in the European Union, and while Italy's median wage is nowhere near that of Denmark, the highest of any member state, it still has a competitive wage compared to how low the wages are in member states in Eastern Europe.

Table 3.7: Median Gross Hourly Wage in EU Member States²²

Member State	Median Gross Hourly Wage 2018 (in euros)
Denmark	27.24
Luxembourg	19.59
Sweden	18.17
Belgium	17.97
Ireland	17.97
Finland	17.49
Germany	17.23
Netherlands	16.56
France	15.34
United Kingdom	15.20
Austria	15.27
EU 28	13.57
EU 27	13.18
Italy	12.61
Spain	10.05
Malta	9.96
Cyprus	8.39
Slovenia	8.04
Greece	7.00
Estonia	6.52
Czechia	6.17
Slovakia	5.64
Croatia	5.37
Portugal	5.37
Poland	4.98
Latvia	4.92
Lithuania	4.41

²² Data can be found at the European Commission
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/earn_ses_pub2s/default/table?lang=en

(continued)

Member State	Median Gross Hourly Wage 2018 (in euros)
Hungary	4.37
Romania	3.74
Bulgaria	2.40

When discussing wages, it is important to look at geography since geographic proximity seems to be a factor in intra-European Union migration. As intra-European Union migrants tend to be to move to member states, this is an issue since many nearby member states to the member states who have the largest number of emigrants have higher wages than Italy. Looking at the member states near Italy, France and Austria have higher gross median hourly wages. French and Austrian citizens would not work in Italy unless the specific job pays more. Italy also borders Switzerland and Slovenia. While Switzerland is not in the European Union, it has higher wages than in Italy. Slovenia's gross median hourly wage is lower than Italy's; while this would seem like a motive for Slovenians to work in Italy, an issue with this logic is that Austria is just to the north of Slovenia and enables Slovenians to make more than in Italy (European Commission, 2021g).

Besides Slovenia bordering Austria, Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia all border Austria as well and can get a higher wage there than in Italy. Croatia borders Italy by sea, yet its citizens can go to Austria as well. While some Polish citizens have migrated to Italy, more have migrated to Germany. More migration to Germany can be easily explained as Germany borders Poland and has a median gross hourly wage that is almost 3.5 times higher than Poland's. Italy's geography also does not encourage European Union citizens to work across the border in Italy as the majority of Italy borders the Tyrrhenian, Ionic, and Adriatic seas. Italy only directly borders

Austria, France, Switzerland, and Slovenia, but only Slovenian workers would benefit from working in Italy.

The member states in the European Union that have a median grossly hourly wage equal to less than 75 percent than the median gross hourly wage of the European Union but do not border a member state with a median gross hourly wage above 75 percent of the European Union's median are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania (European Commission, 2021g). The problem for Italy is migrants from Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia would reach Germany or Austria before reaching Italy and can work there instead. Their languages are significantly different as well, not giving Italy an advantage over Austria, Germany, or any other member state with a higher wage. Cyprus and Bulgaria are also isolated from richer member states. This can help explain why Bulgaria is among the top three member states that have citizens living and working in Italy, particularly since there is no language benefit for Bulgarians to move to another member state. The only country where there is a language benefit of these member states is Romania, the only significantly poorer member state in the European Union that speaks a Romance language.

As it is a peninsula, Italy does not have a lot of land borders as other member states do to encourage working across the border. This is a benefit that member states centrally located see in particular, and not member states on the periphery of the European Union, like much of Italy. Slovakia has the highest share of its work force taking advantage of working across borders. In 2015, 6.1 percent of the Slovak work force living in Slovak worked daily across national borders, mainly in Austria, the Czech Republic, and Germany. France and Germany have the largest number of workers who commute daily across national borders, with 438,000 and 286,000 respectively. (Eurostat, 2018). Migrants would be traveling through member states with higher

wages before arriving in Italy. Until there is a convergence between Italy and richer member states of the European Union, lower wages will serve as a deterrent from migrating to Italy despite having higher wages in Italy than the member states that the European Union citizens are emigrating from.

While Italy has a lower median gross hourly wage than other member states, Italy may still be able to attract some migrants as Italy has the fourth-smallest percentage of workers who can be classified as low-wage workers²³. According to the European Union, the standard to consider a worker as low-wage, these workers earn two-thirds or less of the median gross wage. Only ahead of Italy is Sweden, Portugal, and Finland. Based on Italy's gross hourly wage in 2018 of 12.61 euros, a low-wage earner would be earning 8.32 euros an hour. This wage is still over or almost twice that of the median gross hourly wage in other member states. Considering there is a larger percentage of Eastern Europeans who earn 66 percent or less of their already significantly lower national gross median hourly wage, this makes Italy an attractive member state to immigrate to (European Commission, 2021g). Looking at Romania, even if a Romanian earned 8.32 euros an hour in Italy, this is still 2.22 times the gross median hourly wage of Romania. This is also 3.36 times or more the gross median hourly wage of a Romanian low-wage worker, as they earn 2.47 euros or less an hour. As 20 percent of workers in Romania are low wage earners, this would make migrating to another member state more attractive (European Commission, 2021g).

While this statistic seems promising, it is unclear whether this includes workers in Italy who work in the informal economy. A large share of Italy's low-wage workers may be hidden in the informal economy. As a large number of Romanians work in the Italian informal economy, their

²³ Only 8.5 percent of workers in Italy are classified as low-wage earners. This information can be found at the European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Wages_and_labour_costs>

pay can be expected to be lower than Italy's median gross hourly wage (European Commission, 2021g). It does not seem that there are many accurate predictions of what pay is like in the informal economy as the majority of the focus is on trying to pinpoint the size of the informal economy and how to decrease its size. For one estimate that does exist, it claims that on average regular businesses pay about 16 euros an hour compared to businesses in the informal economy which pay 8.1 euros an hour. This would apply to Romanians and other European Union immigrants working in agriculture, in the home of Italians as caretakers, or any other job without a formal contract. However, as pointed out earlier, this lower wage is still significantly higher than the wage they can earn in Italy. As many Romanians immigrating to Italy come from poorer eastern regions of Romania, it is plausible that many of these migrants would fall into the low-wage worker category of Romanian workers. Another potential reason for Italy having such a low percentage of low-wage workers is due to workers rather being unemployed than taking low-paying jobs if they feel they are worth more.

Romania

The issues that regions in Eastern Romania face have triggered the mass migration to other European Union member states. Faced with low wages and a lack of investments has led to Romanians wanting to move elsewhere instead. The cycle of emigration from Eastern Europe is difficult to break and has an impact on the infrastructure in various villages. The young who remain and have not emigrated feel it is too risky to have children due to the risk of schools potentially closing in the future due to the present lack of children. This mass exodus has also left no one left to do labor within Romania. Romanians go abroad to work in the vineyards of other European Union member states while vineyards in Romania are left unmaintained. Rural Romania has also seen a lack of doctors as mainly have left for higher wages in other countries

as well. This is increasingly making life in rural Romania difficult and may cause these small towns and villages to be abandoned forever. Wages in rural Romania are too low to compete with even seasonal jobs abroad (Paun, 2020).

Low wages make it difficult to operate businesses in Romania if no one is willing to work for a wage that the owner can afford to pay. Romania has the second-lowest median gross wage per hour in the European Union, only ahead of Bulgaria. This is significantly lower than the European Union's median gross hourly wage (European Commission, 2021g). While there is the possibility to argue about the cost of living and the potential to live better in Romania than other member states, the problem is if migrants would want to return home. Apart from migrants in Bulgaria, all other member states have a higher gross median wage per hour putting these migrants at a disadvantage if they wanted to move back home. This logic operates with the expectation that migrants will move to a member state where they can earn a higher salary and not less money. which would be the case for any migrants from within the European Union besides Bulgarians who move to Romania.

As Romanian wages are still too low to compete for migrants with almost all member states (apart from Bulgaria), Romania will need to try to take advantage of the 1.3 million Romanians that have returned due to the pandemic. Romania may be able to consider a significant portion to stay, as a third of Romanians that have returned already stated want to try to stay in Romania permanently once polled. It is difficult to predict whether these Romanians who have returned will be satisfied with the salaries they will find in Romania. While they have increased since the majority of migrants initially left, they still remain lower than the member states these Romanians were working in. It will also be interesting to see if Romanians who moved abroad are able to cope living in a rural area again. While a portion of Romanians worked abroad in

rural areas in agriculture, many moved to cities as well across Europe. It might be difficult to readjust to living in rural Romania which cannot offer the same standard of living found in cities in other European Countries or even cities within Romania. Several regions still depend heavily on agriculture which is still significantly unpaid in Romania compared to other member states. Romania raised the monthly minimum wage in agriculture to 3,000 Romanian Lei (\$690) but this is still less than in other member states. Minimum wage is also lower in Romania than the wages that Romanian migrant workers can get elsewhere. A key example would be Romanians working in low paying jobs in Germany can earn \$1650 a month, compared to \$477 a month in Romania (Mutler, 2020). As many Romanian migrants have maintained strong connections with their family members, this may be a motive to remain in Romania even if wages are not as high. These Romanians had to leave family members and friends behind before, and time will tell if these Romanians are able to leave their friends and family a second time after the pandemic subsides.

National Regulation of Migration and Worker Rights in Italy and Romania

While visa requirements drove migration to Italy before Romania became a member state, there is no longer a visa required for European Union citizens who desire to live and work in either nation. If European Union citizens desire to stay for longer than 90 days, they simply need to register for a residence permit of that member state and show proof that they can financially support themselves without government assistance. While this is the case, both member states both have problems related to the treatment of workers which can serve as a deterrent (Marzocchi, 2020).

Italy

Italy's large migrant population may be partially caused by Italy having lifted restrictions on freedom of movement of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens two years before nine other member states did. These nine member states were Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Austria, and France. Even though there may have been economic motives such as higher wages in these nine member states and less of a language barrier than in Italy that would have encouraged Romanians and Bulgarians to move elsewhere, a further two years of restrictions may have encouraged these migrants to choose Italy instead of wait another two years (Tolbaru, 2012).

In Italy, regulation of migration has remained very weak when it has come to its ability to regulate illegal immigration and the informal economy. This has contributed to the attraction of Romanians to serve as *badanti* to support Italians when they are older. Many of these Romanians are hired with no previous health care experience. While they are not paid a high wage, it is still beneficial for a lot of Romanians to work as *badanti* if they do not have the education to find higher-paid jobs in Romania, Italy, or other European Union member states. Due to government support for Italian families who need to hire a caretaker, Romanians have been able to find work throughout the peninsula and not just in the richer northern regions. This can also help explain the geographic origin of where many Romanian migrants originally emigrate from within Romania. Most migrants come from eastern regions in Romania, which have a lower employment rate in Romania and a higher reliance on agriculture than the median region in Romania as well. Based on a lack of opportunities in these regions in Romania, it makes it worth working as a *badante* in Italy, even in the poorer regions in southern Italy (ISTAT, 2020b).

Talani (2019) hints at it, but these Romanian *badanti* are a part of Italy's informal economy as previously discussed. The most recent data about how many workers are thought to work in the informal economy is from 2016. Five years ago, it was estimated over 3.7 million people work in Italy's informal economy. The overwhelming majority of workers work in the service sector, accounting for just over 77 percent of the 3.7 workers in the informal economy. *Badanti* can be classified as part of the service sector of the Italian economy. The unobserved economy's value that in 2016 was 210 billion euros, equal to 12.4 percent of the official gross domestic product that year. Italy's informal economy dwarves that of other Western European nations. The two larger economies in the European Union currently, Germany and France, had informal economies with estimated sizes of 6.8 percent and 8.9 percent in 2017. In 2017, Italy's informal economy was 12.9 percent of the official gross domestic product (Tortuga, 2019). However, as Talani pointed out, the estimate from this article only gave the size estimate for the unobserved economy, and not the part of the informal economy consisting of illegal activities.

Despite an economic incentive for Romanian women to work as *badanti* in Italy, the poor working conditions have caused some Romanian women to migrate back to Romania. After moving back to Romania, a growing number of these women have been diagnosed with Italy Syndrome. Eastern European doctors diagnose women with Italy Syndrome who seem to be suffering from mental health issues due to their time working in Italy. Some of the *badanti* may feel isolated if they emigrated from Romania without families and feel separated from their support network. Some *badanti* also struggle to integrate into the community where they work in Italy. Some examples of symptoms include insomnia, anxiety, and a feeling of isolation (Mihali and Vinci, 2019). The authors also suppose that even more Romanian women may also possibly struggle to cope with their working conditions in Italy. In that case, this may trigger

more Romanian women to move back to Romania or potentially search for work in other EU member states.

There is a clear difference between Northern and Southern Italy and the percentage of the total number of workers employed in Italy's informal economy. Workers in the informal economy in Campania made up 21 percent of those employed in the region in 2016, the most of any Italian region. Both of these regions are converging with their regional groups, Campania with the South and Trentino-Alto-Adige with the north. While this is good as it is a decrease in the percentage of workers in Campania that work in the informal economy, it has been gradually increasing in Trentino-Alto-Adige, Italy's richest region. Campania's percentage of workers in the informal economy as a percentage of the total employed decreased from 26 to 20 percent from 2000 to 2016. During the same time, Trentino-Alto-Adige's percentage increased from 7 percent to just over 10 percent matching the average of all Northern Italian regions (Tortuga, 2019). In general, it appears that regions with higher unemployment rates have a higher percentage of workers that are employed in the informal economy.

Sanctions may be necessary in order to decrease the size of Italy's informal economy. For activities unreported or underreported for the reasons of tax and social security obligations, these would be civil sanctions. For the part of the informal economy consisting of criminal activities, those involved would be punished through the criminal system (Lanari, 2018). While these may be effective in fighting factors that cause Italy's informal economy, these sanctions do not take into consideration the 3.7 million workers in Italy in 2016 that depend on the informal economy for employment. As Italy has one of the lowest employment rates in the European Union, it is vital to ensure this would not simply worsen the quality of life of Italians and migrants employed in the informal economy. The national government of Italy would benefit from more taxes being

paid, but there is no estimate of how these sanctions would impact the number of people employed. It may also cause a lot of European Union migrants to go back home since many migrants work in the informal economy. Italy needs to figure out how to incorporate migrants into the formal economy along with Italians that work in the informal economy.

It is not surprising a majority of irregular workers are in the service industry, as they can be hired to work in the homes of Italians and are harder for the Italian government to catch. While this originally benefits Romanians looking for higher-paying work outside of Romania but are not educated, it hurts them in retirement. While there is some discussion of where Romanians are better off retiring in the European Union and Italy is one of those countries, this is irrelevant if these Romanians are not regular employees. Irregular workers have no contracts and do not have social security benefits paid for them (Fonte et al., 2018). This puts Romanian migrants and any other employees in a vulnerable spot in what is supposed to be their golden years. As (Bridgen and Traute, 2017) proves in their research, Romanians would be able to retire and have a pension just above the poverty line in Italy. The problem with this is it assumes these Romanians working in Italy had an official contract and were working toward a pension in Italy. Without an official contract, this is not the case and their pension would be lower than expected. The pension would only consist of the benefits that the workers earned from back in Romania along with anywhere else they worked before working in the informal economy in Italy.

Part of the issue with Italy not regulating migration is related to populist politicians that have gained a voice within the country. In 2018 while Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini angered Romanians when he made the claim that Romania and Bulgaria exported slaves to Italy. As Romania and Bulgaria rightfully pointed out, the responsibility to regulate labor falls on Italy (Luca, 2018). Although Romanian and Bulgarian government officials did not state this, the

treatment of Romanians and Bulgarians as slaves was a problem for Matteo Salvini to handle when he was Minister of the Interior. One of the five departments of the ministry of the Interior is Immigration and Civil Liberties. As Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini was responsible for all five departments.

While Matteo Salvini was responsible for the treatment of Romanian and Bulgarian migrant workers, he may have tried to argue he is not because a lot of the slavery accusations in Italy are in the agriculture industry. In this industry, abuse of migrants frequently occurs in Southern Italy at the hands of known as *corporals*, who are the bosses of seasonal agriculture workers (often Eastern Europeans). What is notable about the corporals is they are often of Romanian, Bulgarian, or Albanian descent and linked to criminal organizations in their respective nations (Luca, 2018). However, their citizenship does not matter as this poor and illegal treatment of workers is happening within Italy and was part of Matteo Salvini's job to protect the rights of these workers in Southern Italy, rather than blame Bulgaria and Romania for exporting slaves to Italy. Statements made publicly like this are not only read by government officials but seen by Romanians and Bulgarians themselves. Even though citizens from both of these member states have had a long history of migrating to Italy in the past, this may dissuade them from doing so. It is evident citizens of Romania read news articles related to this topic, as the Romanian government has already been accused of inaction over reports of slavery in 2017, even before Salvini made his comment a year later. Romanian politicians including Andreea Pastirnac, the Minister for Romanians Abroad, went to Southern Italy after these accusations were made (Touma, 2017). While the Minister for Romanians Abroad can advocate for the protection of Romanian citizens in other member states, the Italian government is still ultimately responsible, in particular the Minister of the Interior to protect the rights of these migrant workers. This

relates to a common misunderstanding of the European Union. While some sovereignty was taken by the European Union, a lot of responsibilities still remain at the national level.

Romania

Romania has not experienced wide-scale migration to the European Union, but it has had to introduce new regulations in order to comply with European Union laws and enable Romanian citizens to take advantage of freedom of movement. In 2018, immigrants to Romania regardless of citizenship are entitled to the minimum wage of Romania. Romania's government also had to simplify procedures in order for foreigners to apply for a permit to study or work in Romania. The goal of simplifying procedures is to enable Romania to address labor shortages it faces, which is important for a member state with over 4 million citizens living in other European Union member states. While it has not yet attracted a large amount of European Union migrants, Romania's foreign-born population has increased by 278 percent since 2009 (OECD, 2020).

Similar to Italy, Romania suffers from a large informal economy. In 2016, Romania's informal economy was estimated to be equivalent to 24.4 percent of Romania's official GDP, or 38 billion euros. Compared to Italy, only 0.3 percent is estimated to be from illegal activity. 22.1 percent comes from unregistered companies, unrecorded employees, and underreported production (City Compass Media, 2017). The size of Romania's informal economy is a dire issue as Romania can use tax revenue in order to improve infrastructure and invest in regional growth in order to converge with the other member states in the European Union. Romania's tax base already shrunk with 4 million Romanians living in other member states. These citizens do not pay taxes in Romania, only in the member state where they work.

While Romanian government officials may have been angered by Matteo Salvini's comments about Romanian slaves in Italy, the Romanian government also needs to improve conditions

within the country. Romania was ranked as the worst EU member state in the Modern Slave Index of 2017 (Verisk Maplecroft, 2017). It is the only member state in the European Union to be considered high risk for modern slavery. Romania is ranked as the worst member state due to the lack of enforcement of laws meant to protect the rights of workers (Touma and Chereseva, 2018). Besides having the second-lowest wages in the European Union, it is difficult to attract intra-European Union migrants to Romania if the rights of workers are not protected. Even if the Romanian government sets a minimum wage for a certain industry such as Multer (2020) points out one was set for agriculture, the ability of Romania's government to enforce this minimum wage is called into question by the Modern Slavery Index. This can also impact the decisions of Romanians on whether or not they will remain in Romania or move back abroad when the pandemic ends. As Romanian migrants who moved back during the Covid-19 pandemic which makes up the majority of Intra-European Union migration that Romania has seen.

Chapter 4: Language Capabilities in Italy and Romania

Widespread knowledge of additional languages is an important factor in movement of citizens around the European Union. Skills in less-commonly-spoken languages, or lack thereof, can be either a boon or a barrier for EU migrants looking to move from one EU member state to another. As neither Italian nor Romanian are widely spoken in the European Union outside Italy or Romania, it is important that these two respective countries fill the gaps with either migrants from nations that have closely-related language groups, or with migrants who use more widely spoken languages in the EU.

Italy

In 2018, only 3.4 percent of European Union students in general upper secondary education were studying Italian. The three member states with the highest percentage of students in general upper secondary education studying Italian were Malta, Croatia, and Austria. All three countries are geographically near Italy and are some of the smaller member states in the European Union. In Austria, citizens on average earn higher wages²⁴ than Italians and the country also has a lower unemployment rate than Italy²⁵. Austria also has a lower unemployment rate than Italy. Over a quarter of Austrians that have migrated to Italy reside in the region of Trentino-Alto-Adige (ISTAT, 2020b). In this particular Italian region, a majority of residents speak German, the native language of Austria. Trentino-Alto-Adige used to be part of Austria, and a majority still speak German as their primary language.

²⁴ Data regarding wages can be found at Eurostat
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/earn_ses_pub2s/default/table?lang=en>

²⁵ In 2019 percent only 4.5 of Austrians were unemployed compared to 10 percent of Italians. This data can be found at the European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics#Unemployment_in_the_EU_and_the_euro_area.>

The English Proficiency Index tests the English proficiency of countries around the world. When Looking at the English Proficiency Index, it is obvious that Italy is significantly behind the other member states in the European Union. Italy is ranked second to last among all member states, and only ranks ahead of Spain. Italians are categorized as moderately proficient in English. This score puts the average Italian who took the exam at a B2 level. This means Italians can comprehend television shows, make presentations at their work, and read a newspaper. This score also means that Italy is behind all other Southern European Union member states, except for Spain. While Italy currently is ranked as the second worst member state, Italy was the member state that saw the most improvement from the previous year. Italy increased its overall position in the world from 36 in 2019, to 30 in 2020. This brought Italy ahead of Spain, as Italy only improved from 35th to 34th worldwide. The English Proficiency Index points out that for Italy and Spain, the lower scores are of particular concern for these two countries due to their high unemployment rates. This index feels English skills are vital in order to create economic opportunities. From 2011, Italy has improved, as it was rated at low proficiency in the first edition of the English Proficiency Index (EF English First, 2020). Unfortunately, the index changed its scoring system for countries between the 2019 and 2020 editions, so it is not possible to see how Italy's score changed from the first year to the tenth year.

Upon examination of the number of citizens who reported skills in more than one language, Italians ranked 20th out of 28th when compared to other member states in 2020. 66 percent of Italians aged 25-64 years old stated that they could speak one or more languages (see table 4.1). It is important to know that in Italy there is a significant difference between the various age groups and their foreign language knowledge. More younger Italians reported that they knew one or more languages compared to older Italians. Despite significantly more younger Italians

reporting that they speak one or more languages, they still are in 20th place when looking at only those aged 25-34, as citizens aged 25-34 in other member states reported that they could speak one more foreign languages at a higher percentage than older people in these member states (European Commission, 2021c). It is difficult to say how reliable this is since this is self-reported. A potential problem is that respondents in one member state are more optimistic than those in another member state. This is why it is important to have data from standardized exams such as the English Proficiency Index, as long as the exam is taken by students throughout the country and not only students considered to have a higher level of English take the exam.

Table 4.1: Knowledge of One or More Foreign Languages by Age Group²⁶

Member state	Percent of Age Group			
	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64
Finland	98.3	96.4	92.0	92.2
Latvia	97.7	95.2	96.3	93.9
Denmark	97.4	96.8	95.3	94.1
Sweden	96.6	96.9	96.8	95.1
Estonia	96.4	92.1	91.2	85.4
Austria	96.0	91.0	84.6	73.1
Malta	94.8	92.8	91.1	87.7
Luxembourg	94.6	94.6	94.7	93.8
Lithuania	94.2	96.9	96.5	94.5
Cyprus	93.3	94.4	91.2	77.6
Slovakia	91.7	88.8	85.9	86.0
Slovenia	91.6	87.9	80.2	77.3
Netherlands	90.1	89.6	86.3	79.9
Czechia	89.7	82.2	75.5	66.3
Croatia	89.6	80.8	70.2	56.6
Greece	86.6	81.6	61.0	40.5
Belgium	85.7	80.8	76.4	71.5
Germany	84.9	82.3	88.4	70.1
Portugal	84.7	77.5	65.9	49.8
Italy	82.4	73.4	59.0	53.8

²⁶ This data can be found at Eurostat.

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_aes_122/default/table?lang=en.

(continued)

Member State	Percent of Age Group			
	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64
Poland	81.8	70.3	59.2	54.6
France	66.1	65.4	57.7	51.5
Spain	66.0	60.7	50.9	38.9
Hungary	59.6	49.8	34.9	25.4
Bulgaria	58.3	51.9	47.6	60.2
Ireland	58.3	43.8	46.4	42.9
Romania	55.7	40.9	38.8	17.1
United Kingdom	34.6	38.0	32.8	33.1

It is also important to look at the level that respondents are claiming to speak the foreign language at. While 66 percent of Italians reported they can speak one or more foreign languages, a much higher percentage report it at a basic level rather than an advanced level (see table 4.2). In comparison to other member states, Italy has the least amount of people reporting speaking their first foreign language at a proficient level and the most respondents that report speaking their first language at a basic level (European Commission, 2021c).

Table 4.2: Level of Foreign Language Proficiency in EU Member States²⁷

Member State	Level of Foreign Language Proficiency (2016)		
	Proficient	Good	Basic
Luxembourg	65.5	21.7	11.9
Sweden	59.7	26.4	13.6
Malta	50.9	27.8	21.3
Slovenia	48.5	38.1	13.4
Lithuania	45.2	29.2	25.6
Denmark	41.1	34.5	24.1
Latvia	41.0	32.2	24.6
Netherlands	36.7	42.1	20.9
Austria	35.8	31.4	32.8
Cyprus	34.5	38.1	27.4
Estonia	34.4	25.1	40.4
Finland	34.2	40.4	25.2
Slovakia	33.1	37.2	29.7

²⁷ This data can be found at Eurostat.

<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_aes_131/default/table?lang=en>

(continued)

Member State	Level of Foreign Language Proficiency (2016)		
	Proficient	Good	Basic
Ireland	31.9	22.2	45.6
Greece	30.5	35.6	33.6
Spain	29.8	30.8	38.4
Belgium	28.7	38.7	31.9
Germany	27.5	32.7	39.4
Croatia	26.9	35.3	37.8
Hungary	25.4	26.4	46.2
Bulgaria	25.0	35.8	39.0
United Kingdom	22.0	24.9	52.8
Portugal	21.3	29.2	49.5
France	19.9	29.0	51.1
Poland	14.8	26.1	59.0
Romania	14.7	31.1	54.2
Czechia	11.8	25.4	62.8
Italy	10.8	25.5	63.7

Only a handful of member states had more than 50 percent of respondents speaking foreign languages at a basic level. Of the larger member states, the United Kingdom and France both have percentages over 50 percent of those speaking their first foreign language at a basic level, followed by Germany and Spain at around 40 percent reporting their knowledge of their first foreign language at a basic level (European Commission, 2021c). One problem for Italy is that English and French are widely studied throughout the European Union, which hinders other member states in attracting intra-European Union migrants. As previously discussed in Chapter 3, economic conditions already make Italy a less attractive destination for migrants, so therefore at the very least Italy should prioritize second-language training that enables Italians to work and communicate with European Union citizens from other member states.

Italians may be slowly improving their English skills, as the Italian government has lowered the age that Italians start learning English as a foreign language. In 1984, the Italian government set the age at 11 to start learning English in school; in 2007, the age was lowered to six. English

in Italy has become an obligatory foreign language for students to study, but simply classifying English in this manner does not mean Italian students are becoming fluent in the language. A big issue for Italian students is the way English has been taught. English courses are not interactive enough for students such as practicing real-life situations and practicing dialogue that they can use in situations (Faez, 2011). The amount of time students spend in English courses is also considered insufficient. However, this is questionable. Italians spend more time in English courses than several other European countries, yet still have a poorer grasp of the language.

As Faez (2011) points out, secondary schools do not have to prioritize foreign languages due to the autonomy Italian secondary schools enjoy despite being regulated at the national level. This hurts Italian students as the lack of prioritization of foreign language classes does not take advantage of the six years foreign language teachers spend training to teach foreign language classes. It would be more beneficial for Italian schools to focus more on foreign language courses in secondary school in comparison to primary school when teachers are not trained as in-depth how to teach foreign languages. The issue for Italy is it seems to be that Italy needs to focus on quality over quantity. Despite lengthening the period of time Italian students study foreign languages, their language skills still lag behind the majority of other member states in the European Union. Italy is also lagging behind the goal in the European Union to study two languages. In 2018, only a little over a third of students studying two or more foreign languages in upper secondary school in Italy in 2018 (see Table 4.3). This put Italy behind 16 other member states.

Table 4.3: Students in Upper Secondary School Studying Two or More Foreign Languages²⁸

Member State	Percentage of Students Studying Two or More Foreign Languages (2018)
Romania	97.7
Finland	94.4
Luxembourg	81.6
France	78.3
Poland	72.9
Latvia	69.6
Estonia	67.1
Belgium	66.7
Bulgaria	57.8
Slovakia	57.2
Sweden	56.0
Czechia	52.2
Croatia	50.4
Slovenia	48.7
Malta	47.9
Hungary	38.5
Austria	36.0
Italy	35.6
Cyprus	35.0
Netherlands	34.5
Germany	33.6
Lithuania	31.1
Denmark	31.0
Spain	20.7
Ireland	6.1 (2013)
Portugal	6.1
Greece	0.9

It is also not a question of whether Italian students are getting enough hours of foreign language education. A total of 891 hours is dedicated to foreign language classes in primary and lower secondary school in Italy, which is one of the highest for any of the member states (Faez, 2011). Looking at the more updated statistics, Italy has a higher percentage of students studying English than most other member states with 99 percent of Italian pupils studying English. Less

²⁸ Data can be found at Eurostat. < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/EDUC_UOE_LANG02__custom_822996/default/table?lang=en>

than five percent study German or French, which is in line with most member states²⁹ (European Commission, 2021c). However, this is perhaps due in part to the prevalence of heritage French and German speakers in Valle D'Aosta and Trentino-Alto-Adige, respectively; French and German are official minority languages in these regions. This puts Italian students at a disadvantage as well if either of these languages takes on a larger role in the European Union since the United Kingdom left in late 2020. While there seem to be clear issues about how English is taught in Italy, Italy needs to work on making other foreign languages more available besides also worrying about the quality in them as well.

Motivation is an important aspect in order to learn a language, but Italian students do not appear to be lacking in this aspect either. When polled, educators believed that over two-thirds of students in secondary schools in Italy were motivated to learn English. A British professor of English that Faez (2011) interviewed claimed that this is because Italians only want to learn English for superficial reasons such as understanding English in popular culture including music and movies and with the intention to travel rather than truly learn the language. He also stated that Italians can be successful enough to not have to learn English and that the Italian culture is strong and acts as a barrier.

While politicians continue to fight about the role of Italian dialects in politics, the larger role of English in Italian universities is angering some Italians. In 2012, the Politecnico di Milano announced that all graduate courses would be taught and assessments completed in English, while no courses would be taught in Italian. The main argument for making the change was that completing coursework in English will make students more employable more employable,

²⁹ Only seven member states have more than ten percent of primary school students studying French or German, including Luxembourg where German and French are official languages. This data can be found at Eurostat. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign_language_learning_statistics>

because English has become a common language in higher education. While this was a decision that shocked people, he predicted in five to ten years that more Italian universities would follow the example set by the Politecnico di Milano. He points out that Italian can be a barrier in attracting students from other countries. On the other hand, additional scholars have pointed out that instruction in other languages than Italian have the potential to weaken the Italian culture if more textbooks are written in English and not in local languages. While switching to English is beneficial to attract more international students, it works against Italians who do not speak English at all, or at a level that is advanced enough tertiary education (Coughlin, 2012).

While attracting international talent, Italy needs to make sure it is not excluding Italians from higher education. This is a possibility since Italians have one of the lowest levels of English proficiency in the European Union, but also have the second-lowest rate of college graduation. If Italian students are unable to study in Italian in higher education in Italy, then they may forgo attending university. This would do nothing to improve Italy's college graduation rate, which as mentioned earlier, is already the second lowest in the European Union.

Four years later in 2018, there were efforts to stop universities from developing solely coursework in English. A Council of State ruled that English-only degree programs marginalize Italian in academia and restrict access to courses from Italian students and professors who do not speak English. The constitutional court also ruled against universities having English-only degree programs. The Vice-Chancellor of the Politecnico of Milano disagrees with this and feels it is an economic burden to require Italian universities to have courses available in both languages. The problem is, many Italian universities already have courses available in both languages, which goes against the stance of the Politecnico of Milano. This ruling comes following an effort by professors to appeal the decision to switch to only English in post-

graduate courses at the university. The professors made it clear they have no issues with teaching courses in English, or with the English language itself; they simply do not want to see the Italian language vanish from higher education.

The Constitutional Court also pointed out in the ruling that instead of learning various languages when studying abroad through the Erasmus program, many European Union students simply learn English regardless of what country they go to (Civinini, 2018). Many students want to study in English programs, but the cost of studying in the UK is very high; many European students instead choose nations such as Poland because there are English courses, but the cost is much lower. Many of the courses offered to Erasmus students are also offered in English making it harder to learn the host language (Matthews, 2019). Professors and the Vice-Chancellor from the Politecnico di Milano seem to be angered by the ruling and have taken the ruling out of context out of context. The ruling does not ban English completely from Italian universities, but instead attempts to strike a balance between languages so as not to exclude Italians who do not have an advanced level of English yet from studying in courses.

As most member states have a higher graduation rate (Italy ranks 26th out of 27), this is a strong possibility for Italy (European Commission, 2020b). Just as university leadership is considered about the ability of foreign students to study in Italy, they need to ensure English is not a barrier to Italian students and ensure Italian students are learning enough English in order to enter English-only programs. Italy might be able to expand the number of programs offered in English when the level of English for Italian students improves. This will also depend on how major of a role English continues to play in the European Union. As the United Kingdom has left, the population in the European Union that speaks English as its native language has dropped significantly. English will no doubt remain an international language, but Italian universities

might also offer courses with a language of instruction as French or German if they have more of a role within the European Union in the future.

Romania

Romanians have one of the highest percentages of students studying two or more foreign languages. In 2018, 99 percent of Romanian students study two or more foreign languages in school; this means that Romania is on track to meet the goal of the European Union to have all citizens speak two additional languages besides their native language. The goal to speak two additional languages was set by the Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport Council. The rationale behind setting this goal was to improve the mobility, employability, and strengthen the intercultural exchange among member states (Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport Council, 2014)

Upon examining Romania's efforts to teach foreign languages, it is evident it is behind in comparison to other European Union member states when it comes to the results of these efforts. Romania looks successful when compared to other European Union member states based on the number of foreign languages that students learn, but this does not mean that these students successfully learn the language. When looking at the statistics published by the European Union, Romania ranks as one of the member states with the lowest percentage of citizens fluent in foreign languages. In 2016, only 13.7 percent of Romanians aged 25-64 spoke their first foreign language proficiently (European Commission, 2021c). This puts Romania as the third member state with the smallest percentage of citizens speaking their first foreign language proficiently. At the same time, Romania has the fourth highest percentage of citizens who speak their foreign language at a basic level. As the amount of European Union citizens that speak Romanian is below one percent of the population, it is crucial that Romanians learn one of the top foreign

languages in the European Union to make up for this. Throughout the European Union and particularly in Eastern Europe, English is already the most studied foreign language (European Commission, 2021c). While it is important that Romanians have the opportunity to study foreign languages in school, if the quality of the classes are not high enough for Romanian students able to speak the foreign languages they study after completing the classes. The quality of foreign language instruction is questionable due to the poor performance of Romania compared to other member states in the statistics published by the European Union.

The EF English Proficiency Index is more optimistic. Since first ranked by the index in 2014, Romania has always been ranked in the high proficiency category. In this year, Romania was ranked 12th in the European Union and 13th in 2020 which puts Romania in the top half of member states both years. Ranking in the high proficiency category means the average Romanian tested at a B2 level on the CEFR exam. While Romania's position may have moved up or down a position over the various years, Romania has always been ranked in the high proficiency category. Romania's score decreased a little from the previous year, but it is impossible to quantify it, as the index changed how it reports results between the 2019 and 2020 editions. Based on the Index, Romanians are ranked highly proficient and can comprehend television shows, make presentations at their work, and read a newspaper. The Romania is ranked 4th in Eastern Europe, after Croatia, Hungary, and Poland (EF Education First, 2020). Romania ranks 13th out of the 26 European Union member states that were ranked. The United Kingdom and Ireland are not ranked, most likely as English is the national language in each of these countries.

The English Proficiency Index focuses mainly on younger people and their language skills in English. When looking at a wider range of Romanians again, Romania is ranked as one of the

last member states for how the number of citizens that knew one or more foreign languages. Considering that Romania ranks in the top half for European Union member states in the English Proficiency Index, it may be a case that a lot of younger people know a foreign language, but the number of older people who do not is dragging down Romania compared to other member states (EF Education First, 2020). A potential issue that may skew the results of the EF English Proficiency Index for Romania's ranking is the number of students who take it. The number of students who take the exam for each country is not listed. However, some member states may have more reliable statistics than others. In the case of Romania, the EF English Proficiency Index stated that 70 percent of Romanians had internet access, but the exam the Index uses is only online (EF Education First, 2020). This leads to a potentially large group of students who cannot take the exam, but also lack the ability to expose themselves to opportunities to learn and practice English online.

When looking at statistics for Romania, this is true. Younger Romanians tend to have significantly higher foreign language knowledge and higher mobility than older Romanians. Romania is one of the member states that sees a higher difference when comparing various age groups. Despite a significantly larger percentage speaking one or more language, Romanians aged 25-34 are still second to last ranking only better than the United Kingdom (European Commission, 2021c). Besides a generational gap, it might also be that in other member states that do not rank as high as Romanians on the English Proficiency Index, they may be doing better in learning other languages.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The Freedom of Movement of people is a massive achievement for the European Union, but it is crucial to understand why migration remains uneven among member states. Member states in Northern and Western Europe have benefited from migrants coming from Southern and Eastern European nations in the European Union. It is important to understand what has caused this migration, which remains largely uni-directional, and why Eastern and some Southern European Union nations have not been able to attract intra-EU migrants. In particular, Romania and Italy are two of the larger member states yet do not have the same success as other countries in the European Union.

To answer my research concerning the impact of language skills as opposed to economic deterrents on intra-European Union migration to and from Southern and Eastern European member states, this thesis ultimately argues that it is a combination of both when applied to Romania and Italy. Some economic deterrents are stronger in Romania, such as lower wages. Meanwhile, the total, youth, and long-term unemployment rates are more significant issues in Italy. Romanians have a higher proficiency in English than Italians. Yet, both member states need to continue to improve their foreign language skills since Romanian and Italian are not commonly studied languages in the European Union. Ultimately, the economic aspects are more important than language proficiency. Earning higher wages seems to be the most critical factor to attract intra-European Union migrants. Foreign language proficiency can contribute to a country's ability to attract migrants from other member states, but not without high wages. If a member state has higher foreign language proficiency but lower wages, this may increase the number of citizens from that country emigrating to other nations with higher wages.

Italy has higher wages than many other EU countries, but still below the European Union average and has lower wages than some of the other large member states. While wages in Italy are not the lowest, other economic metrics are significantly worse in Italy than almost all other member states. The high total, youth, and long-term unemployment may deter intra-EU migration to Italy as migrants need to support themselves if they stay in another member state for longer than 90 days. Instead, intra-EU migrants can migrate elsewhere, particularly when most nations in the European Union have significantly lower unemployment rates. To attract more intra-EU migrants, wages in Italy would need to converge with higher-paying member states and a significant decrease in the unemployment rates.

In addition, the Italian government needs to improve the foreign language skills of Italian citizens significantly. While many Italians are studying English, the level of English Italians speak is still considerably lower than in other member states. Rather than just the quantity of classes, the Italian government must focus on the quality of foreign language courses. As Italian is not a commonly studied language in the European Union, Italy's government must work to strengthen the language skills of Italians in the languages that are the most studied in the bloc. Italy cannot expect that many European Union citizens will start learning Italian to work in Italy due to the economic deterrents, especially as French, German, and English represent the national languages of the highest-performing European economies.

That being said, Italy has experienced immigration from other EU member states, but the vast majority of the migrants have come from Romania, making up three-quarters of all intra-EU migrants living in the nation. The predominance of one group of intra-EU migrants in Italy is an exceptional phenomenon, which is not the case of other member states. Other member states that have attracted the most migrants in the EU have a large population from several member

states and do not have a majority from only one country. This risk would be more significant for Italy than other member states, especially if anything motivated most Romanian migrants to leave. An exodus of Romanian migrants from Italy may leave labor gaps in the Italian economy. There is a valid concern that this may happen due to Romanian women who have already left the country and have been diagnosed with Italy Syndrome, partially due to poor work conditions they faced while working as *badanti* in Italy.

In Romania, a low total unemployment and youth unemployment rate is not enough to attract intra-EU migrants when wages are lower than all other member states besides Bulgaria. Besides Bulgarians, citizens of any nation in the European Union would see their salary decrease if they worked in Romania. The efforts of the Romanian government to increase English fluency are not enough on their own without a more robust economy. Romania must see more economic convergence, particularly convergence in wages with the other European Union member states, to attract intra-EU migrants.

Romania's education system has improved and has made numerous changes to educate students in foreign languages, which will ultimately benefit the mobility of young Romanians within the European Union as a whole. While younger Romanians have made a lot of progress in speaking English, this is not enough to attract migrants from other nations in the European Union if citizens in all but one member state can make more money in their home country than Romania. For Romania to benefit from the improvements the population has made in speaking English, it will have to see significantly more economic convergence with other European Union nations.

Both member states must also continue to work towards protecting the rights of workers within Italy and Romania. It is unlikely that intra-EU migrants would choose to move to either

member state, which both rank as some of the worse in the bloc for the risk of modern slavery, according to the Modern Slavery Index. Economics and linguistic skills are essential, but these two aspects do not outweigh the importance of respecting intra-EU workers along with their citizens.

One avenue for future research is the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Romanian migration. Because the pandemic has not yet ended, the effect of the pandemic is still challenging to study, and it may be years before this can be effectively measured. It is clear that many expatriate Romanians returned to Romania during the pandemic, it is neither clear what member states the Romanians left, nor the number that left each country. As many Romanian women work as *badanti* in Italy, and many Romanians work in the informal economy; it would be surprising if the pandemic did not impact the number of Romanians working in Italy. While Romanians can earn higher wages in Italy than in Romania, Italian economic factors may push migrants to other member states. Italy has both a higher unemployment and youth unemployment than most other member states in the European Union, along with lower wages than the majority of countries in Western Europe. When examining Romanian migration in the European Union, economic factors alone cannot explain why Italy has the most Romanian migrants of European Union member states. Instead, these economic factors help explain why most other nations part of the bloc in Western Europe have more intra-EU migrants than Italy per 1,000 residents.

Since a significant portion of intra-EU migrants in Romania are Romanians who gained citizenship in other member states, it would be helpful to evaluate what is causing Romanians to move back since wages still remain lower than in most other member states. Based on what

caused these Romanians to move back, the Romanian government could attempt to attract other Romanian workers to move back.

Another factor that would be interesting to examine is Brexit's effect on Romanians and other intra-EU migrants currently living in the United Kingdom. Intra-EU migration to the United Kingdom will be an important issue to study as the nation has the second-largest number of intra-EU migrants only after Germany. It will be interesting to see whether these migrants will attempt to continue living in the United Kingdom, move back to their home country, or move to other member states with higher wages than their home country. There is a lot of confusion about what Brexit means for the ability of European Union citizens to continue living in the United Kingdom.

The structures of foreign language courses in each member state are also important to examine. A comparison of foreign language courses may explain why EU citizens in some member states are more proficient in foreign languages than other nations. The member states with a higher proficiency in foreign languages may utilize different teaching methods that have proven to be effective. Some member states may give students more time to practice their language skills in class in a full immersion environment. It is not enough for member states to simply offer foreign language courses; the quality of the courses is vital for students to gain proficiency in the foreign languages they chose to study.

As Italy's economy has grown slower than other member states, this may impact Italy's ability to continue to attract intra-EU migrants following the COVID-19 pandemic. Besides having lower wages than many other member states in Western Europe, it is uncertain how long it will take for the Italian economy to recover from the pandemic. The economic deterrents may convince current Intra-EU migrants working in Italy to work elsewhere. Delayed economic

recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic may also potentially deter intra-EU migrants from moving to Italy in the future due to the economic deterrents and lack of foreign language skills when compared to other member states.

As previously stated, intra-EU migration will continue to remain uneven among EU member states until there is convergence in both the national economies and language skills of the nations and regions of Europe. Some member states are more competitive due to higher wages and a higher knowledge of English among their population. Economic factors act as a pull factor for intra-EU migrants, but common language skills allow a migrant to find a job. Simultaneously, without a strong economy, strong language skills enable citizens of a member state to migrate themselves rather than attract migrants from other member states. Member states must have strong economies that can offer competitive wages and a multilingual workforce to attract intra-EU migrants. As the most commonly spoken language is English, it appears this is the most important foreign language in the European Union, particularly for member states who do not have a widely studied national language such as French or German.

A difficulty with economic convergence in the European Union is the inability of the bloc to pass a minimum wage. Several European Union nations do not have a minimum wage, and instead, labor unions negotiate the salaries of employees. The European Union has left the competency of setting a national standard for wages to the member states. The EU might face challenges if it were to set a standard since member states can perceive the bloc as encroaching on a policy area left initially to the nations. Member states may feel threatened and accuse the European Union of stealing sovereignty from the national level. The lack of a minimum wage in the European Union may prolong the time it takes to achieve economic convergence within the bloc.

As the European Union and the Single Market continue to more deeply integrate and expand its four freedoms of movement—people, goods, services, and capital—unequal patterns of migration are likely to continue unless leadership is taken at the member state level. Evidenced by the Eastern European expansion in 2004, 2007 and 2012, newer member states generally have lower wages and language skills. Due to lower wages and lower proficiency of foreign languages, it is harder for new member states to attract intra-European Union migrants. Both aspects lead to uni-directional migration from these member states to wealthier nations in the bloc. This pattern shows why new member states must focus on foreign language proficiency among their citizens, and the EU must further emphasize and encourage economic convergence within the Eurozone and throughout the European Union as a whole.

References

- Bălănescu, Eleonora Olivia. "The Fall of Communism and Its Impact on English Teaching and Learning." *Revista de Stiinte Politice* 61 (2019).
- Ban, Cornel. "Economic transnationalism and its ambiguities: The case of Romanian migration to Italy." *International Migration* 50, no. 6 (2012): 129-149.
- Barbulescu, Roxana, and Adrian Favell. "Commentary: A citizenship without social rights? EU freedom of movement and changing access to welfare rights." *International Migration* 58, no. 1 (2020): 151-165
- Bodogai, S. I., & Cutler, S. J. (2014). Aging in Romania: Research and public policy. *The Gerontologist*, 54(2), 147-152.
- Bridgen, Paul, and Traute Meyer. "Divided citizenship: how retirement in the host country affects the financial status of intra-EU migrants." *Ageing & Society* (2017).
- Bucur, Norica-Felicia, and Oana-Rica Popa. "Teaching English as a foreign language in Romanian primary education." *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences* 78 (2013): 31-35.
- Cascioli, Raffaella. *LIVELLI DI ISTRUZIONE E RITORNI OCCUPAZIONALI | ANNO 2019*. PDF. Istituto Nazionale Di Statistica, July 22, 2020.
- Cavanaugh, Jillian R. "A modern questione della lingua: the incomplete standardization of italian in a northern italian town." *Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Europe* 8, no. 1 (2008): 18-31.
- City Compass Media 2020 "Romania Has Widest Regional Economic Disparity among EU States." *Romania Insider*. March 06, 2020. <https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-regional-economic-disparity#:~:text=Romania has widest regional economic disparity among EU states,-06 March 2020&text=Romania showed the highest regional,the European statistics office Eurostat>.
- City Compass Media 2017 "Romania's Underground Economy Reaches EUR 38 Billion in 2016." *Romania Insider*. June 08, 2017. Accessed March 18, 2021. <https://www.romania-insider.com/romanias-underground-economy-2016>.

Civinini, Claudia. "Italian Ruling on English-taught Courses "out of Touch with Reality"." The Pie News News and Business Analysis for Professionals In International Education. February 8, 2018. <https://thepienews.com/news/italian-ruling-on-english-taught-courses-out-of-touch-with-reality/#:~:text=The%20last%20chapter%20in%20a,features%20of%20the%20discipline%20taught.>

Coughlan, Sean. "Italian University Switches to English." BBC News. May 16, 2012.

Dachin, Anca. "Contributions of Agriculture to Economic Fluctuations in Romania." *Theoretical & Applied Economics* 18, no. 1 (2011).

Danesi, Marcel. "Teaching standard Italian to dialect speakers: A pedagogical perspective of linguistic systems in contact." *Italica* 51, no. 3 (1974): 295-304.

Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport Council. "Conclusions on Multilingualism and the Development of Language Competences ." Council of the European Union, 20 May 2014.

EF Education First. "EF EPI EF English Proficiency Index A Ranking of 100 Countries and Regions by English Skills 2020." EF Education First, 2020 https://www.ef.com/assets/cdn/WIBIwq6RdJvcD9bc8RMd/legacy/_/~/media/centrafefcom/epi/downloads/full-reports/v10/ef-epi-2020-english.pdf

European Commission 2020a "Agriculture Statistics - Family Farming in the EU." Agriculture Statistics - Family Farming in the EU - Statistics Explained. January 23, 2020.

European Commission 2020b "Educational Attainment Statistics." Educational Attainment Statistics - Statistics Explained. October 06, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Educational_attainment_statistics.

European Commission. "Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion." European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=462&langId=en.>

European Commission 2021a "Exemptions To Coronavirus Travel Restrictions." European Commission - European Commission. March 03, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/travel-during-coronavirus-pandemic/exemptions-coronavirus-travel-restrictions_en.

European Commission 2021b "Fertility Statistics." Fertility Statistics - Statistics Explained. March 22, 2021. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility_statistics.

- European Commission 2021c "Foreign Language Learning Statistics" Eurostat Statistics Explained. February 22, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign_language_learning_statistics.
- European Commission 2021d "Migration and Migrant Population Statistics." Eurostat Statistics Explained. February 26, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics
- European Commission 2020c "North-East." North-East - Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship And Smes - European Commission. 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regional-innovation-monitor/base-profile/north-east-0>.
- European Commission 2021e "Unemployment Statistics." Eurostat Statistics Explained. March 04, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics#Unemployment_in_the_EU_and_the_euro_area.
- European Commission 2021f "Unemployment Statistics At Regional Level." Eurostat Statistics Explained. February 08, 2021. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics_at_regional_level#:~:text=Across EU regions for which,East Finland \(14.2 %\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics_at_regional_level#:~:text=Across EU regions for which,East Finland (14.2 %)).
- European Commission 2021g "Wages and Labour Costs." Eurostat Statistics Explained. March 11, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Wages_and_labour_costs
- European Union, *Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version)*, Rome Treaty, 25 March 1957, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39c0.html>
- European Union. "Single Market." European Union. March 13, 2019. https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/single-market_en.
- European Union. "EU Languages." European Union. July 28, 2020. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-languages_en.
- Eurostat 2018 *Statistics On Commuting Patterns At Regional Level*. PDF. Eurostat, September 14, 2018.
- Faez, Farahnaz. "English education in Italy: Perceptions of teachers and professors of English." *Comparative and International Education* 40, no. 3 (2011).

- Felice, Emanuele. "The roots of a dual equilibrium: GDP, productivity, and structural change in the Italian regions in the long run (1871–2011)." *European Review of Economic History* 23, no. 4 (2019): 499-528.
- Fonte, Giuseppe, Angelo Amante, and George Georgiopoulos. "Amid Europe's Lockdowns, No Safety Net for Millions in Black Economy." Reuters. April 01, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-blackeconomy/amid-europes-lockdowns-no-safety-net-for-millions-in-black-economy-idUSKBN21J4LS>.
- Fries-Tersch, Elena, Matthew Jones, and Linus Siöland. Annual Report On Intra-EU Labor Mobility 2020. PDF. Publications Office of the European Union, 2021.
- Grosu-Rădulescu, Lucia-Mihaela, ed. Foreign Language Teaching in Romanian Higher Education: Teaching Methods, Learning Outcomes. Vol. 27. Springer, 2018.
- Institutul Național De Statistică. "Balanța Forței De Muncă La 1 Ianuarie 2020." <https://insse.ro/cms/ro/tags/balanta-forței-de-munca>. July 2020. https://insse.ro/cms/sites/default/files/field/publicatii/balanta_forței_de_munca_la_1_ianuarie_2020.pdf
- ISTAT 2020a *Conti Economici Territoriali | ANNI 2017-2019*. PDF. ISTAT, December 22, 2020. <https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/251960>
- ISTAT 2020b "Stranieri Residenti Al 1° Gennaio - Cittadinanza." March 20, 2020. http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCIS_POPSTRCIT1#.
- Koikkalainen, Saara. "Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present." Migrationpolicy.org. August 27, 2020. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-europe-past-and-present>
- Kuiken, Folkert, and Elisabeth van der Linden. "Language policy and language education in the Netherlands and Romania." *Dutch journal of applied linguistics* 2, no. 2 (2013): 205-223.
- Kvist, Jon. "Does EU enlargement start a race to the bottom? Strategic interaction among EU member states in social policy." *Journal of European Social Policy* 14, no. 3 (2004): 301-318.
- Lanari, Chiara. "Lavoro Nero Alle Stelle E Stipendi Miseri: Quanto Guadagnano Gli Irregolari E Le Regioni Peggiori." *Investireoggi Quotidiano Economico Finanziario*. January 31, 2018. <https://www.investireoggi.it/economia/lavoro-nero-alle-stelle-stipendi-miseri-quanto-guadagnano-gli-irregolari-le-regioni-peggiori/>.

- Luca, Ana Maria. "Romanians Angered by Italian Allegations of Exporting 'Slaves'." *Balkan Insight*. October 12, 2018. <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/08/10/italy-s-salvini-angers-romanians-with-slavery-comment-08-09-2018/>.
- Matthews, David. "Erasmus Students Only Learn English on Year Abroad." *Times Higher Education (THE)*. January 01, 2019. <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/erasmus-students-only-learn-english-year-abroad>
- Mantu, Sandra. "EU Citizenship, Free Movement, and Covid-19 in Romania." *Frontiers In Human Dynamics*. December 09, 2020. <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fhumd.2020.594987/full>.
- Marzocchi, Ottavio. "Free Movement of Persons: Fact Sheets on the European Union: European Parliament." *Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament*. December 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/147/free-movement-of-persons>.
- Mihala, Lorelei, and Romina Vinci. "Why Romanian Migrant Women Suffer from 'Italy Syndrome'." *Al Jazeera*. February 12, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/2/12/why-romanian-migrant-women-suffer-from-italy-syndrome>.
- Mutler, Alison. "Romanian Migrants Get COVID-19 As Pandemic Exposes Bad Conditions For East European Workers." *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*. May 30, 2020. <https://www.rferl.org/a/romanian-migrants-get-covid-19-as-pandemic-exposes-bad-conditions-for-east-european-workers/30643195.html>.
- Nicolescu, Gabriela. "Keeping the elderly alive: Global entanglements and embodied practices in long-term care in southeast Italy." *Anthropology & Aging* 40, no. 1 (2019): 77-93
- Nicoleta, Andrica, Giurgiu, Adriana, and Fora Andreea-Florina. "ITALY-THE COUNTRY WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER OF ROMANIAN EMIGRANTS." *Annals of the University of Oradea, Economic Science Series* 29 (2020).
- OECD "Romania: International Migration Outlook 2020: OECD ILibrary." *OECD ILibrary*. 2020. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/89085e47-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/89085e47-en>.
- Ooi, Giok-Ling. "SAGE Reference - Encyclopedia of Geography." *SAGE Knowledge*. 2010. <http://sk.sagepub.com/reference/geography/n927.xml#:~:text=Primate Cities,-By: Giok-Ling&text=A primate city is the,the importance of their economies>.
- Parenti, Angela, and Cristina Tealdi. "Cross-Border Labour Mobility in Europe: Migration Versus Commuting." In *The Economic Geography of Cross-Border Migration*, pp. 185-215. Springer, Cham, 2021.

- Paun, Carmen. "A Romanian Village Feels the Country's Emigration Pain." POLITICO. August 28, 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/intorsura-romania-village-migration-feels-the-countrys-emigration-pain/>.
- Pavel, Alexandru, and Octavian Moldovan. "Determining local economic development in the rural areas of Romania. Exploring the role of exogenous factors." *Sustainability* 11, no. 1 (2019): 282.
- Pellegata, Alessandro, and Francesco Visconti. "Transnationalism and Welfare Chauvinism in Italy: Evidence from the 2018 Election Campaign." *South European Society and Politics* (2020): 1-28.
- Presadă, Diana, and Mihaela Badea. "A Brief History of Language Teaching within the Educational System in Romania." *Buletinul Universității Petrol-Gaze din Ploiești, Seria Filologie* 62, no. 4 (2010): 133-140.
- Santoro, Gennaro. "Romeni D'Italia, Uno Su Tre Pensa Al Rimpatrio, Metropoli." *Antigone*. January 01, 2018. <https://www.antigone.it/76-archivio/1726-romeni-ditalia-uno-su-tre-pensa-al-rimpatrio-metropoli-180108>.
- Simona Talani, Leila. "Assessing the relation between the underground economy and irregular migration in Italy." *The International Spectator* 54, no. 2 (2019): 102-122.
- Timu, Andra. "Romania's Economy Outshines Rest Of EU After Shunning Lockdown." *Bloomberg.com*. February 16, 2021. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/romania-s-economy-outshines-rest-of-eu-after-shunning-lockdown>.
- Tolbaru, Ana-Maria. "Italy Opens up to Romanian, Bulgarian Workers." *EURACTIV*. January 04, 2012. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/news/italy-opens-up-to-romanian-bulgarian-workers/>.
- Tortuga. "Blog: Economia Sommersa E Lavoro Nero: Conoscerli per Sconfiggerli." *Econopoly*. July 08, 2019.
- Touma, Ana Maria. "Romania Accused of Inaction Over 'Slavery' in Italy." *Balkan Insight*. March 23, 2017. <https://balkaninsight.com/2017/03/23/romania-accused-of-inaction-over-slavery-in-italy-03-22-2017/>.
- Touma, Ana Maria, and Maria Chereseva. "Modern Slavery Risk Highlighted in Bulgaria, Romania." *Balkan Insight*. July 20, 2018. <https://balkaninsight.com/2017/08/17/romania-bulgarians-at-great-risk-of-modern-slavery-experts-warn-08-16-2017/>.

Uccellini, Cara Margaret. "Outsiders after accession: The case of Romanian migrants in Italy, 1989–2009." *Political perspectives* 4, no. 2 (2010): 70-85.

Vasilopoulou, Sofia, and Lisa Talving. "Opportunity or threat? Public attitudes towards EU freedom of movement." *Journal of European Public Policy* 26, no. 6 (2019): 805-823

Verisk Maplecroft. "20 EU Countries See Rise In Modern Slavery Risks." Verisk Maplecroft. Accessed August 09, 2017. <https://www.maplecroft.com/insights/analysis/20-eu-countries-see-rise-in-modern-slavery-risks/>.

Youth and Culture Council 2008 *2905th Education, Youth and Culture Council meeting*, Brussels, 20 November 2008