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CLASSICS

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Preface


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Urbana, 4 July 1975

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH, Editor
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The Nature of Homeric Composition

G. P. GOOLD

Sing, Goddess, of Friedrich son of Wolf,
Who brought countless griefs upon the Homerists,
And sent to Hades many valiant souls of professors,
When on a time there clashed together in strife
The lynx-eyed Analysts and much-enduring Unitarians.
First did one hero take up a huge, jagged hypothesis,
(Though he alone believed it quite easily),
And hurled it at foeman’s shield of six indubitable strata;
But, checked thereby, the shameless assumption glanced aside.
Next did the other lift up a much larger hypothesis,
And threw it, nor missed, at enemy’s book:
Through six editions did the missile penetrate,
But the seventh stopped it, made of the hide of a calf.
Then the two armies advanced with clamour unspeakable,
And a chorus of Babel arose before the face of heaven.
As when the South Wind sheds a mist over mountain-peaks,
A mist hated of shepherd, but to robber better than night,
Even so ascended a thick dust-cloud of uncertainty
From beneath their feet as they went.

Cf. CR 25 (1911) 63.

The Homeric Question is an apt phrase. The difficulty of any genuine attempt to determine the process by which our texts of the Iliad and the Odyssey were composed may well lead even an optimist to despair. But the greatness of the poems inspires lasting pleasure and interest in every age and I hope will permit a hearing for my claim, however deluded, to be able to progress a little nearer the heart of the matter.

Let me say in advance (though I shall do my utmost to avoid using these conclusions in argument) that I believe the poems to have been composed, more or less as we have them, by a single person in a process which I call “the progressive fixation of a text.” I deliberately use this
new-fangled expression, because I think we have to deal with a very special situation. I do not consider the composer an oral poet as defined by the scholars who employ this description, nor do I think it could be other than misleading to say without qualification that he wrote. Still, write I believe he did, and I will try to show how.

For my whole position on Homer the most crucial issue is that of single versus multiple authorship, and I do not think it can ever be insisted strongly enough that the earliest tradition about the poems attributes them to one man.

When Denys Page writes "the fact that tradition attached to both poems a single name, Homer, would be instructive if we knew what it meant," he is tendentiously expressing as doubtful what is on the contrary an uncompromising assertion. I freely grant the tradition may be a mistaken one. But it was not a tradition beset by uncertainty or ambiguity. In the classical age of Greece no one questioned the unity of the Iliad or of the Odyssey, or doubted that both were the work of one poet: Homer. Nor in the Hellenistic age, when the production of literary masterpieces ceased, and the Greeks diverted their great talents to subtle speculations and argumentation, not then were Homer's existence and title challenged. True, among these pieces of sophistry were attempts to prove that the Iliad and the Odyssey were put together by different authors; but Aristarchus called them paradoxes and wrote a tract in refutation. Seneca referred to them as an example of that Greek perversity in seeking absurd themes for argument. Lucian satirized them. And the world at large dismissed them as the whimsical fancies of professorial cranks until in 1795 F. A. Wolf produced his famous Prolegomena. This was the age of Voltaire and the French Revolution: an age of disbelief and scepticism; an age which glorified the common man and dethroned the great; an age animated by the conviction that mankind progresses and flourishes, not principally under the leadership of genius, but under the impetus of the collective efforts of the people. For Wolf, the Iliad and the Odyssey were folk-poetry, the poetic expression of the entire people, and not the creation of any single superior genius. Wolf's main reason for doubting the unity of the Homeric poems was that writing was unknown at the time the Iliad originated or was so little known that it could not be used for literary purposes; and without writing Wolf regarded it as impossible that a poem of such bulk as the Iliad should either have been composed or, granting that miracle, that it should have been preserved. His conclusions were these: the Homeric poems were originally not written at all but composed in the memory; exposed to the alterations of chance and design, they were carried abroad by rhapsodists until the technology of a
lettered age secured for them a written form. This is essentially the view of the analysts, a view held by many scholars today: the creative poets are beyond our reach; their material took centuries to attain its present form in our written *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; and the process was one of constant deterioration from artistic excellence. Naturally this view, utterly incompatible with the belief of antiquity, aroused and still arouses a good deal of spirited reaction. But although the unitarians were able to contrive some compelling arguments for adhering to ancient tradition, they must on the whole be deemed unsuccessful in their attempts to controvert, when they chose to meet, the arguments of their analytical opponents.

It often happens that progress does not occur in precisely the quarter at which effort has been directed, and in some ways Milman Parry's studies of formulae and his investigations into the nature of oral poetry have diverted attention from the real issue. For Milman Parry and his successors it is axiomatic that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have been orally composed; composed, that is to say, without the aid of writing. But this is merely to restate the problem, for by simple definition the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are written texts; and in trying to solve the riddle of authorship we are forced back to regard the Homeric question, with Wolf, as fundamentally a matter of reconciling the existence of our written *Iliad* and *Odyssey* with the features of oral composition which they allegedly display. Albert Lord's theory that the poems are "oral dictated texts" is the only one to command any measure of acceptance; and in my earlier paper on Homer I expressed my own assent. Sixteen years however have made me conscious of grave difficulties which that theory does not solve, and also of certain aspects of Homeric composition not paralleled in the Yugoslav epics, which have (otherwise quite reasonably) been taken as imposing firm criteria for speculation about the technique of formulaic composition. Consequently I now modify my earlier paper in suggesting a different method of composition whilst maintaining the view that "Homer was a collector and stitcher of lays who effected the first great literary exploitation of the alphabet by compiling and preserving in two designedly comprehensive epics the vast treasures of oral literature." If such a view of Homer were correct, we might expect to find—contrary to the doctrine of Milman Parry—indications that the text is regarded by the poet as something to be fixed. Indeed, we should be able to detect signs of the poet's procedure in composition, *fixed* passages, and the intention to *fix*. Moreover, if the poet is designedly blending and amalgamating songs, we might expect to find: (a) continuous structural problems, and (b) a continuous combination of heterogeneous and exclusive elements. Let us consider these two matters first.
It is a natural fallacy, but a fallacy nevertheless, to regard all logical inconsistencies in the Homeric poems as marks of inferior artistry or, if not that, marks betraying the conflicting intentions of different composers. If we choose to bring a microscope to the text of the Odyssey, we may with Denys Page regard the work as seriously corrupted at the beginning, seriously corrupted in the middle, and seriously corrupted at the end. Indeed, seriously corrupted everywhere. This reductio ad absurdum should give us pause. And we meet the same views when we turn to Walter Leaf, a dedicated and appreciative Homerist, whose monumental edition of the Iliad is still for us English-speakers the most learned and helpful companion to the song of the wrath of Achilles the Peleiad. Before the text of each single book Leaf gives an appreciation of the argument, quite free from polemic or conceit, and certainly sensitive to the art of the poet. Let me quote a few extracts:

**Book 1:** “The problem of the composition of the Iliad meets us in a peculiarly subtle and difficult aspect on the very threshold of the poem. The first book seems, even to a careful reader, to be a perfect and indivisible whole; yet it is here that the severest battles of the critic have been fought.”

**Book 2:** “In the first book we found a marked unity of conception and development, marred at most by a somewhat superficial contradiction in a secondary point. With this book the case is very different; hardly any portion of the Iliad has caused such trouble to the defenders of unity of composition.”

**Book 3:** “... one of the most brilliant and picturesque pieces of narrative in the Iliad. But when we come to relate the section to the rest of the poem, the question is by no means so simple. There are amply sufficient grounds to prove that this part of the Iliad had no place in the story of the Menis.”

**Book 4:** “No serious difficulty within the story itself, though its relationship to the rest of the Iliad is fraught with thorny questions.”

**Book 5:** “The structure of this part of the Iliad presents a most difficult problem.”

And so for Books 6 and 7 and 8, and for every single book to the very end. Not one is free from structural problems. Thus, while Leaf eschews the rhetorical flourish and denigratory thrust characteristic of Page, his conclusions are essentially the same: structural and organic blemishes exist from the first book to the very last; the original author of the Menis has had his work no less seriously interfered with than the unhappy minstrel of the Nostos. Not only the Doloneia has been added, but the Catalogue, most of the combats, the Embassy, the Shield, and the very ransom of Hector’s body—not to mention the Games, of which no less a dramatist than Schiller declared that no man who had read it could complain that he had lived in vain.
Now what is most significant is not that critics have claimed that serious difficulties occur here in the poem, or there; but rather that they have detected such difficulties consistently throughout the *Iliad*, at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end, just as Page (following Kirchhoff and others) did in the *Odyssey*. What we must answer is not, what is the solution of this particular difficulty, but rather, why is no single book free from structural difficulty? Even in formulating the question we discern the glimmering of an answer. The very nature of Homeric composition involves these structural difficulties: nothing is in fact so Homeric as the contradictions, interpolations, and accretions assumed without a thought as un-Homeric. Evidently they were inseparably bound up with the circumstances of composition. These structural difficulties must not—the usual mistake of the unitarian—be underestimated or argued as not existing: they are there all right. But two millennia of readers have definitively ignored them in pronouncing Homer the greatest of poets. We, who study them, must see them in the proper perspective.

And we must never forget that the great artist is not a perfectionist: no painter of genius ever confined himself to what a camera could do. You remember that illuminating discussion in Lessing's *Laocoon* where the German critic explains that visual art is best suited to description of the static, literary art to narration of the dramatic. Homer has full control of this insight. The pictures on Achilles' shield are not described as static but are quickened into action. Homer does not say "this picture shows us a city besieged," "this picture shows us a trial-scene," but without explaining or excusing his art he launches at once into narrative: we can visualize the picture in our mind's eye the better for being told what the people in the picture have done, are doing, and will do than if we were simply told who they are and where they are.

Such are the grand aims of the poet's art. But he has a price to pay: he can only secure those aims, if he conciliates the sympathies of his audience. Let him be persistently interrupted by a heckler asking how the pictures on the shield can move or simultaneously represent different moments in time, and he will become a laughing-stock. And a laughing-stock he is sometimes made to appear. In a tense scene the ghost of Ajax confronts Odysseus and turns away in silence, a silence extolled by the so-called Longinus as more sublime than any speech and by Rome's greatest poet deemed worthy of imitation. Says Denys Page: "The ghost of Ajax stood apart, silent and sullen, nursing resentment against Odysseus for the wrong it suffered at his hands in the world above. Odysseus implored it to forgive him and to join him in conversation:
'but it made no answer, and went after the other ghosts into Erebus' (563 f.). That surely was all: the unforgiving ghost of Ajax disappears without a word into the gloom. What drabness now intrudes upon the sombre beauty of the poet's thought, merely in order to make way for Minos and his vassal ghosts? 'And there nevertheless he would have spoken to me, for all his anger, or I to him; only my heart within me desired to see the ghosts of other persons dead' (565 f.). The silence of Ajax, then, was accidental, imposed by the requirements of a time-table. Given another moment he would have spoken. And Odysseus' plea, that Ajax might forgive and speak to him, was nothing but formal politeness: Ajax was about to reply, but Odysseus is in a hurry, he cannot wait for the answer; another day, perhaps, but just now time is pressing. Surely we are justified in concluding with certainty that whoever conceived the image of the silent ghost of Ajax did not at once proceed to destroy his own conception?' But that the matter is not so simple emerges from a similar situation elsewhere.

Book 7 of the Iliad contains a duel between Hector and Ajax. Says Geoffrey Kirk: 'He lays out Hector with a stone-throw, but Apollo quickly gets the Trojan on his feet again (VII.268 ff.). Now what will happen? 'Then indeed they would have smitten each other at close range with swords' (273)—if the heralds had not stopped the proceedings because of bad light. 'Night is coming on,' they say, 'it is good to obey night' (282)! Ajax says he will stop if Hector will, and so these duellers-to-the-death happily exchange pieces of equipment as souvenirs: a pretty piece of anti-climax, and almost inconceivable as untrammeled invention for a poem like the Iliad unless by a singularly mediocre poet.' "Singularly mediocre poet" is a judgment which betrays an unsympathetic auditor. What the poet is doing in these two passages, as I claim to be able to show, is to effect a juncture between two blocks of different auditor. He does not want to drop Ajax and abruptly introduce Minos, nor does he wish to kill off inexpendable heroes, but has elected to secure a transition in the one passage and a suspension in the other by means of a contrary-to-fact apodosis: from a sympathetic viewpoint no one could reasonably imagine that Ajax was willing to forgive Odysseus or that the duellers-to-the-death were really shamming.

The Iliad and the Odyssey are poems made up of many elements. This is most obvious of the Odyssey. In his enchanting book Woodhouse distinguishes as components the Deep-sea Yarns, five Popular Tales, the Saga of Odysseus, and the Quest of Telemachus (I omit what he terms the Poet's Cement). Even in these components we find that the poet has
added (and, let it be admitted, confused) themes and tales and verses and phrases from sources none now can tell. The same is true of the *Iliad*.

We must therefore be prepared for disparate elements in Homeric epic. When Page talks of "the Homeric idea of Hades," he is imputing to Homer a disinclination, indeed an inability, to take and adapt to his own ends any story about Hades which does not conform to "the Homeric idea of Hades." Consequently for him parts of the *Necyia* cannot be Homeric, nor the *Continuation*, whose poet "is very far from the Homeric conception of the geography of Hades." But "the Homeric this" or "the Homeric that" is a fallacy: there is no such thing as a Homeric norm; all is grist to the poet's mill. "It is proper to observe," says Page, "the differences between the *Catalogue* and the *Iliad.*" This is a tendentious formulation, implying that the *Catalogue* is essentially different from the rest of the *Iliad*, which this sentence of Page's implies to be a homogeneous unit. Page later tells us: "The embassy was added to an *Iliad* which neither had it nor allowed for it." This implies that Book 9 deviates from the norm of 1–8, 10–24. But of course this is not an implication which Page intends at all: he is explicit in regarding all or part of Books 10, 11, 14, 15, 21, 23, and 24 as un-Iliadic; and he will surely have to disown the *Reconciliation* (19) after what he has said about it; indeed, if pressed would probably part with more. And it is interesting to speculate whether, if compelled to apply his own criteria everywhere, he would be compelled to part with the lot.

The important point is this, that disparate and incompatible elements are not just for being such to be considered as an indication, still less as proof, of multiple authorship or widespread contamination or corruption of the poems: they are simply the material out of which the poet has constructed his poem. This heterogeneous nature of the Homeric poems finds on the linguistic side a parallel, for the curious amalgam of dialects which is the Homeric language attests a willingness to tolerate side by side exclusive forms.

It might be thought that the conception of the Homeric poems so far outlined permits of a collector or editor who did little more than stitch together the words of others. This, however, cannot be so; we are compelled to assume that the maker of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* refashioned what he collected, and in doing so exercised an originality far greater than modern scholarship seems willing to allow him.

I confine myself to one example of Homer's own creations—the hero Odysseus. I seem to sense your surprise. "Surely," I hear you saying to yourselves, "surely the crafty Odysseus and all his exploits and travels
were part of the tradition which Homer inherited?" Well, let us see. We must admit that the name Odysseus was once borne by a man of flesh and blood, who was, like Atreus, Achilleus, Tydeus, Capanes, Oeneus, Theseus, one of those old Helladic kings who, very curiously, have sons whose names, unlike their own, are Greek compounds: Telemachus, Agamemnon, Menelaus, Neoptolemus, Diomedes, Sthenelus, Meleager, Hippolytus, Demophoon. However, the historical Odysseus was a minor king of an obscure island, whose life and death left little mark upon Greek legend. He must have seemed to Homer, as did Aeneas centuries later to Virgil, the ideal person for transfiguration into a superhuman hero.

Consider first the Odyssey. The chief themes of the poem are drawn from folktale: one such is the deep-sea yarns, those marvellous adventures which take the hero and his companions from the Cicones to the cattle of the sun Hyperion; as everyone admits, the scenes with the Cyclops, Circe, Scylla, Charybdis, and the Phaeacians belong to a fairyland, as does the hero, whom we may call Sinbad or even leave unnamed. It is not fanciful to see a trace of this folktale figure even on Homer's own lips: "Tell me, O Muse, of the man of many wiles, who wandered right far, who saw the cities of many men and knew their minds; many were the sorrows which he suffered on the sea, when he tried to win his own life and the return of his companions."

Homer's dazzling success has obscured the simplicity of his art, for here at the very beginning of the Odyssey, he has not named Odysseus, nor given us the slightest word about Penelope and the suitors, let alone Telemachus: Homer's material here, you will see on reflection, must once have referred only to the deep-sea yarns. And on finding that in the deep-sea yarns, Athene, Odysseus' constant protectress, plays no such role, we may reasonably suspect that it was only in our poem (not in its sources) that she acquired that role; and seemingly here in our poem that the hero of the deep-sea yarns first acquired his present name. Another theme woven into the epic, the husband who returns in the nick of time to save his wife's honor, she having for three full years kept her suitors at bay with the ruse of the web, is incompatible with Odysseus and his twenty-year-old son. The clear conclusion to be drawn is that it is the author of the Odyssey, our Odyssey, and not his sources, who is responsible for building up the dim historical Odysseus into a full and sharply defined character; and Homer does so very cunningly by what I may call "association," associating him with Nestor and Menelaus and, in the underworld scenes, with the great Achacans who died at Troy.

Let us now turn to the Iliad. Where does Odysseus appear? Well, the fact is, he practically never appears other than in a minor role, except in
scenes and books almost universally acknowledged as late or interpolated; or, as I should put it, secondary passages designedly created by Homer for the purpose (though not necessarily the sole purpose) of giving life to the character of Odysseus; he is practically absent from Books 1; 6–8; 12–18; 20–22; 24, but is significantly prominent in controversial contexts, such as the Thersites passage, the Embassy, and the Doloneia. Take such passages away, and Odysseus is reduced to what we find him in the Catalogue, to what Homer, I believe, found him in the tradition, a minor chieftain of no special consequence. The model of oralism fabricated by Milman Parry has engendered an absurd disbelief in the poet's originality, in spite of such evidence as the fictitious accounts Odysseus gives of himself: The Doloneia, for example, unthinkable without Achilles' anger, must have been composed for the place it occupies, and can hardly have existed as an independent lay. Some ten years ago in an excellent article Willcock showed that much casual reference to mythology in Homer does not depend on centuries of oral tradition but has been invented by the poet for the particular needs of the occasion.

Much of the incompatibility between the analyst and unitarian positions will disappear if due regard is given to the length of time it would have taken a single person to create the poems. How would Homer have composed the Iliad? Not in linear fashion, beginning with Book 1, then Book 2, and so on. Clearly he built it up gradually. There will have been a time when his repertory—and thus his poem—had no Catalogue, no Embassy, no Wall, no Doloneia. They were added later, as the poem expanded. The analytical school generally assumes that this process of addition and expansion took a vast number of years and involved many composers. The latter at least is an unnecessary hypothesis. No consideration which it involves becomes more difficult if one imagines a poet, Homer in fact, who over a period of years gathered a repertory of songs about the Trojan War. At one time he sang of the gathering at Aulis; at another of the seduction of Helen. Later he fitted these songs and others to his Wrath poem. Similarly with the Odyssey. Woodhouse's Components were doubtless once separate, but it is as likely that one as it is that many welded them together; and equally likely that this was he who composed the Iliad. For antiquity inherited no legend about two great poets. So let us now see how in fact Homer put his poems together. In the ninth book of the Iliad Agamemnon sends an embassy to Achilles offering amends. The episode is not a basic element of the story, and it does not affect the forward movement of the epic as a whole. The embassy fails; Agamemnon and the Greeks are no better off at the end of Book 9 than they
notice them. But how unsatisfactory that is emerges from the reformulation: Why did the Insertor of Phoenix, if not Homer, not adapt the contradictory duals? These must have sharply confronted his attention. Clearly, the text which Homer (or whom you will) was in process of expanding was fixed. It could be altered, as was Il. 9.169 and 223 and other lines. But for some reason wholesale changes of the text were undesirable, an obstacle lay in the way, and alteration was kept to the absolute minimum.

The practice of inserting an additional scene into an already finished composition does not lack parallels in literature. Let me give a Latin example. In his 64th poem Catullus describes the wedding of Peleus and Thetis: that lines 50–266 which tell the story of Theseus and Ariadne were added later, two indications suggest, apart from the fact that, had the mss omitted the episode, its loss would defy detection: first, in those verses—as opposed to the rest of Catullus—there is a marked concentration of language showing the influence of Lucretius, as Munro insists in his commentary at 3.57; and secondly, the insertion imports a glaring anachronism: the marriage is an immediate sequel to the voyage of the Argo, the first ship, and yet the inserted passage describes as on view at the wedding the picture of Theseus sailing away from the wave-sounding shore of Dia with his speedy fleet. This illustration prompts some instructive reflections: there is of course no suggestion that not Catullus, but someone else, inserted the passage into his poem; furthermore, Catullus is dealing with emotions and actions not as particulars forming part of a historical sequence, but as universals possessing eternal validity, and he may even from the beginning have envisaged his poem as needing completion with just such a centrepiece, though without forming a detailed conception of what it should be. Applying these reflections to Iliad 9, we shall feel justified in pursuing the ideas (1) that Homer, not another, inserted the Embassy; (2) that the logical inconsistencies involved do not affect the universal validity of the action; and (3) that such insertions were characteristic of Homer’s composition on a grand scale.

Before moving on, I should like to touch briefly on what seems to me another large-scale fallacy of those who favor multiple authorship. Inconsistent stories reflect different versions; and inconsistent linguistic forms reflect different traditions. It is evidently considered legitimate to postulate an infinitude of diversity upon which Homer’s style is based. But there are limits, and that these are much narrower than most scholars realize was strikingly shown a quarter of a century ago by Manu Leumann in his brilliant Homerische Wörter. I say “brilliant,” referring to his discoveries rather than his conclusions.
Very briefly, he showed that diverse and incompatible morphological and semantic phenomena, so far from being unrelated to each other, could be—indeed must be—explained as a development which took place within our Homeric corpus. For example, ἄγγελίην in Il. 11.140 is an analogous development from ἄγγελίης in Il. 3.206. I accept (I do not think scholars are left much choice) the general lines of his relative stratification within the two poems.

Where we are poles apart is that, for him, every single development is the misunderstanding of some dactylic ignoramus (i.e., our Homeric poems were composed by a succession of philological morons) whereas, for me, every single development is the deliberate innovation of one versifier working in special conditions.

I often see Homer refashioning his own verses, where others see scores of pseudo-Homers. Take Od. 3.311. This verse tells us that Menelaus returned on the very same day that Orestes held the funeral of Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra.

αὐτήμαρ δέ οἱ ἡλθε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος

On-self-same-day to-him came Menelaus good-at-the-war-cry.

What is the point of the coincidence? Well, nothing dramatically, but the line is modelled on Il. 2.408, where Menelaus arrives at Agamemnon's banquet of his own accord:

αὐτόματος δέ οἱ ἡλθε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος

Self-invited to-him came Menelaus good-at-the-war-cry.

The real nature of Homeric composition is nowhere more plainly to be seen than in the Catalogue in Book 2, which everybody recognizes to have been adapted to the poem as a whole. Unfortunately, the true significance of the adaptation has been overshadowed by the astonishing theory, generally held in some form or other by modern scholars, "(a) that the Achaeian and Trojan Catalogues are substantially inheritances from the later Mycenaean period, orally transmitted through the Dark Ages; (b) that both Catalogues are, and so far as we can tell have always been, Orders of Battle; and that their connection with an overseas expedition must be historically true." That, like so much else Mycenaean in the Homeric poems, Mycenaean names survived the Dark Ages on the lips of men, it is reasonable to assume. But to talk of Battle-orders and historical truth provokes irreverent criticism and a comparison with the faith of those who believe that the geography of the Odyssey corresponds with reality. What was the purpose of preserving this battle-order,
notice them. But how unsatisfactory that is emerges from the reformulation: Why did the Insertor of Phoenix, if not Homer, not adapt the contradictory duals? These must have sharply confronted his attention. Clearly, the text which Homer (or whom you will) was in process of expanding was fixed. It could be altered, as was II. 9.169 and 223 and other lines. But for some reason wholesale changes of the text were undesirable, an obstacle lay in the way, and alteration was kept to the absolute minimum.

The practice of inserting an additional scene into an already finished composition does not lack parallels in literature. Let me give a Latin example. In his 64th poem Catullus describes the wedding of Peleus and Thetis: that lines 50–266 which tell the story of Theseus and Ariadne were added later, two indications suggest, apart from the fact that, had the mss omitted the episode, its loss would defy detection: first, in those verses—as opposed to the rest of Catullus—there is a marked concentration of language showing the influence of Lucretius, as Munro insists in his commentary at 3.57; and secondly, the insertion imports a glaring anachronism: the marriage is an immediate sequel to the voyage of the Argo, the first ship, and yet the inserted passage describes as on view at the wedding the picture of Theseus sailing away from the wave-sounding shore of Dia with his speedy fleet. This illustration prompts some instructive reflections: there is of course no suggestion that not Catullus, but someone else, inserted the passage into his poem; furthermore, Catullus is dealing with emotions and actions not as particulars forming part of a historical sequence, but as universals possessing eternal validity, and he may even from the beginning have envisaged his poem as needing completion with just such a centrepiece, though without forming a detailed conception of what it should be. Applying these reflections to Iliad 9, we shall feel justified in pursuing the ideas (1) that Homer, not another, inserted the Embassy, (2) that the logical inconsistencies involved do not affect the universal validity of the action; and (3) that such insertions were characteristic of Homer's composition on a grand scale.

Before moving on, I should like to touch briefly on what seems to me another large-scale fallacy of those who favor multiple authorship. Inconsistent stories reflect different versions; and inconsistent linguistic forms reflect different traditions. It is evidently considered legitimate to postulate an infinitude of diversity upon which Homer's style is based. But there are limits, and that these are much narrower than most scholars realize was strikingly shown a quarter of a century ago by Manu Lehmann in his brilliant Homerische Wörter. I say "brilliant," referring to his discoveries rather than his conclusions.
Very briefly, he showed that diverse and incompatible morphological and semantic phenomena, so far from being unrelated to each other, could be—indeed must be—explained as a development which took place within our Homeric corpus. For example, ἀγγελίνην in II. 11.140 is an analogous development from ἀγγελίς in II. 3.206. I accept (I do not think scholars are left much choice) the general lines of his relative stratification within the two poems.

Where we are poles apart is that, for him, every single development is the misunderstanding of some dactylic ignoramus (i.e., our Homeric poems were composed by a succession of philological morons) whereas, for me, every single development is the deliberate innovation of one versifier working in special conditions.

I often see Homer refashioning his own verses, where others see scores of pseudo-Homers. Take Od. 3.311. This verse tells us that Menelaus returned on the very same day that Orestes held the funeral of Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra.

αὐτῆμαρ δὲ οἱ ἤλθε βοήν ἀγαθός Μενέλαος

On-self-same-day to-him came Menelaus good-at-the-warcry.

What is the point of the coincidence? Well, nothing dramatically, but the line is modelled on II. 2.408, where Menelaus arrives at Agamemnon’s banquet of his own accord:

αὐτόματος δὲ οἱ ἤλθε βοήν ἀγαθός Μενέλαος

Self-invited to-him came Menelaus good-at-the-warcry.

The real nature of Homeric composition is nowhere more plainly to be seen than in the Catalogue in Book 2, which everybody recognizes to have been adapted to the poem as a whole. Unfortunately, the true significance of the adaptation has been overshadowed by the astonishing theory, generally held in some form or other by modern scholars, “(a) that the Achaean and Trojan Catalogues are substantially inheritances from the later Mycenaean period, orally transmitted through the Dark Ages; (b) that both Catalogues are, and so far as we can tell have always been, Orders of Battle; and that their connection with an overseas expedition must be historically true.” That, like so much else Mycenaean in the Homeric poems, Mycenaean names survived the Dark Ages on the lips of men, it is reasonable to assume. But to talk of Battle-orders and historical truth provokes irreverent criticism and a comparison with the faith of those who believe that the geography of the Odyssey corresponds with reality. What was the purpose of preserving this battle-order,
and why was it composed without reference to its cause or conclusion? Battles concern people, and the names of the leaders who lead people in the Catalogue yield small grounds for confidence in their historical reality. Protesilaus’s leadership of the Phylacians is original to the earliest stratum of the Catalogue, but he is noteworthy only as the first to fall at Troy. No connection with Nestor or his genealogy occurs in the Pylos tablets, as we should expect had a king of that name ruled over Pylos at the time of the Trojan war; not that this comes as a surprise to those who see in Homer’s elaborate introduction of him in Il. 1.247 ff. evidence that he is a comparative newcomer to the Trojan saga. Odysseus, of course, comes from folk-tale, and there rather than in the historical Ithaca he belongs. Achilles, Ajax—can we really believe that these men were enrolled in a Mycenaean Battle-order? Take away the names of the leaders, and we have left a list of presumed Mycenaean place-names. Actually it is these that have won such confidence for the Catalogue, for as far as can be checked they correspond with Mycenaean sites. Need we wonder at this? In Homer’s day remembrance of the Mycenaean age, even of places obliterated by the Dorians, must have been greater than we can now verify. The Catalogue, then, need be no less Homer’s work than the rest of the Homeric poems. Let us, for example, consider a typical entry, the 6 verses 2.511–516:

511 And they who dwelt in Aspledon and Minyan Orchomenus,
These were led by Ascalaphus and Ialmenus, sons of Ares,
Whom Astyoche bore in palace of Azetid Actor,
Honored maiden, having ascended to upper chamber,

515 To mighty Ares; for he lay with her secretly.
And with these were ranked thirty hollow ships.

The second verse is evidently formulaic, and is virtually repeated at 9.82 (that is, it was a formula in the repertory of the poet who added the Embassy); similarly Peneleos and Leitus of 494 reappear together at 13.91 f. and 17.597 f.; Arcesilaus and Clonius of 495 reappear almost together at 15.329 and 340: we need deny none of these lines to Homer. Verses 513–515 hardly go back to the Mycenaean age (they, too, contain Homeric formulae), nor 516, which apart from other considerations contains the late Ionic form of the word for “ships.” Thus, all in this entry which need be older than Homer is the two place-names in 511.

I believe that the Catalogue in an earlier form was actually written down by Homer himself, and comprised a narration of the Gathering at Aulis. Subsequently in his career, when he had conceived the plan of a grand epic, he adapted this narration so that it should become The Review at Troy. The poet had to consider two matters: (1) changes of personnel,
and (2) mention of ships. We find that both items are inorganically added, that is, the verses of the earlier version are preserved, even when some embarrassment arises, and whole verses are added. It seems that the earlier version was fixed. Let the principle be illustrated from 603 ff.

603 And they that held Arcadia beneath steep Cyllene,
By tomb of Aepytus, where men fight in close combat,
605 And they that dwelt in Pheneus . . .,
609 These were led by Ancaeus' son Agapenor,
610 With sixty ships; and on each ship many
Arcadians embarked, skilled in fighting.
For Agamemnon, king of men, had given them
Well-benched ships to cross the wine-dark sea,
Since matters of the sea were no concern to them.
615 And they that dwelt in Buprasium and goodly Elis,
Such as Hyrmne and littoral Myrsinus
And the rock of Olen and Alesium enclose within,
These had four leaders, and each one did ten
Swift ships follow, and many Epeians embarked . . .
625 And those from Dulichium and the sacred Echinae
Isles, that lie across the sea opposite Elis,
These did Meges lead, . . .
630 And with him followed forty black ships.
And Odysseus led the high-hearted Cephallenians,
Who dwelt in Ithaca and Neriton . . .
637 And with him followed twelve red-cheeked ships.
And Thoas, Andraemon's son, led the Aetolians,
Who dwelt in Pleuron and Olenus and Pylene . . .
644 And with him followed forty black ships.

Observe that the ship-verses have been added systematically, as they have been also at 509–510; 516; 524; 534–535; 545; 556; 568; 587; 602; 652; 680; 733; 737; 747; and 759. It is hard to believe that an oral refashioning of the Gathering would so consistently have maintained line-diaeresis. The few ship-entries which are not easily detachable permit of special explanations and probably all belong to the second stratum. One occurs with mention of Ajax: but it is clear that Ajax himself has been added; and this addition caused a modification elsewhere.

527 And the Locrians were led by the swift Oileid, Ajax, 
The lesser, by no means as great as Telamonian Ajax,
But far less. Short was he, with linen corselets,
530 And with spear he surpassed all Hellenes and Achaeans, . . .
534 And with him followed forty black ships.
   . . .
557 And Ajax from Salamis led twelve ships
And stationed them with the Athenian battalions.
Consider the significance. First, mention of Telamonic Ajax is added after 556; then a consequential alteration is made at 527, at an earlier verse. It follows that the poet is not expanding in a straightforward linear fashion. We cannot impute this to some post-Homeric editor: the presence of Telamonic Ajax in the Homeric Catalogue is crucial; without Ajax we have no Iliad. Nor to a post-Homeric editor can we impute any of the following, all inorganic additions to what seems to be an embarrassingly fixed text.

(a) The death of Protesilaus:

695 And they that held Phylace and flowery Pyrasus,
Sanctuary of Demeter, and Iton, mother of flocks,
And Antron by sea and grassy Pteleos,
These were led by the warlike Protesilaus,
Whilst he lived; but ere this black earth held him.

700 And in Phylace was left his wife with tearful cheeks
And house half-finished; for him a Dardan slew
Leaping forth from ship, far first of Achaeans.
Even so they lacked not a leader, though they missed him,
But Podarces, scion of Ares, marshalled them,

705 Son of Phylacid Iphicles rich in sheep,
Own brother of great-hearted Protesilaus,
Younger by birth; the other was elder and better
Man, warlike Protesilaus; so the people did not
Lack a leader, though they missed that noble man.

710 And with him followed forty black ships.

(b) The absence of Philoctetes:

716 And they that dwelt in Methone and Thaumacia
And held Meliboea and rugged Olizon,
These were led by Philoctetes the skilled archer
With seven ships; and on each fifty oarsmen

720 Embarked, skilled archers to fight amain.
But he lay on island, suffering severe pains,
On sacred Lemnos, where the Achaeans had left him
Suffering from grievous wound of deadly snake.
So there he lay pained; but soon were to remember

725 Argives by ships the prince Philoctetes.
Even so they lacked not a leader, though they missed him,
But Medon, natural son of Oileus, marshalled them,
Whom Rhene bore to Oileus, sacker of cities.

It is to be noted that 705 may have belonged to the earlier version, but the identical verses 703 and 726, which perform a formulaic function, show that the poet making the additions is either creating or drawing upon elements generally supposed to be the prerogative of the oral composer.
(c) The defection of Achilles:

681 Now them that inhabited Pelasgian Argos,
    And those that dwelt in Alus and Alope and Trachis,
    And held Phthia and Hellas, land of fair women,
    And were called Myrmidons and Hellenes and Achaeans,

685 Of fifty ships of these was Achilles captain.
    Yet they were not mindful of tearful war,
    For there was none to lead them into the ranks.
    For swift-footed goodly Achilles lay among ships,
    In anger over the fair-haired maiden Briseis,

690 Whom after much toil he had taken from Lynnessus,
    Having sacked Lynnessus and the walls of Thebes,
    And felled Mynes and Epistrophus, spear-wielding heroes,
    Sons of prince Evenus, son of Selephus,
    So for her he lay pained; but soon was to rise again.

Notice that 694 has the same pattern as 724.

Here, then, we are observing the author of the *Iliad* at work. Our earlier speculation, that amendments of the text were difficult to make, whilst there was no apparent bar on addition, seems to have held. The clues seem to indicate that Homer was writing down his text, and writing it down in such a laborious way that he preferred expansion and explanation to deletion and alteration. It is tempting to see here the psychology of those early writers, who first wrote in alphabetic script with pens. We must be very careful not to think of them endowed with our easy familiarity with writing: rather, imagine a man laboriously chiselling out the letters of the words of his verses on a stone wall of unlimited length, and one may better appreciate why Homer, when he inserted the embassy and again later when he inserted Phoenix, and when he painstakingly but guilelessly continued the Catalogue of ships, did so with a minimum of deletion and alteration. Likely enough Homer used papyrus, but for him the act of writing must have been exceedingly taxing; alteration was not something to be resorted to lightly.

That the *Iliad* was composed by a process of expansion solves many problems. The promise of Zeus to Thetis that he will aid the Trojans (Book 1) finds its natural outcome in the Trojan success (Book 11), and so the story was once told. At some time was inserted the poignant farewell of Hector and Andromache (Book 6), as, accompanied by Paris, he went out to his last fight; and perhaps we should see in the exploits of Hector and Paris in Book 11 a vestige of this older sequence. However that may be, it is clear that the Trojan success in Book 11, which secured the Greeks the sympathy of Patroclus, once led immediately to the situation at the beginning of Book 16.
Says Nestor to Patroclus:

11.656 "Why only now does Achilles pity the sons of the Achaeans? ... for the bravest

Lie at the ships smitten and wounded.

660 Smitten is Tydeus' son, mighty Diomedes,
And wounded is spear-famed Odysseus, and Agamemnon
And smitten is Eurypylus too with arrow in thigh."

The report is conveyed to Achilles (after an interval of several books):

16.21 "Achilles, son of Peleus, far mightiest of Achaeans,
Be not angered: such grief has overpowered Achaeans.
For they all who once were bravest
Lie at the ships smitten and wounded.
Smitten is Tydeus' son, mighty Diomedes,
And wounded is spear-famed Odysseus, and Agamemnon
And smitten is Eurypylus too with arrow in thigh."

These little blocks of text, repeated verbatim, occur not infrequently in both poems, but almost always at short intervals. Much of Agamemnon's speech at 9.115 ff. is repeated by Odysseus a hundred lines later, just as Zeus' speech at II. 24.144 ff. is repeated by Iris at 172 ff. (and, in abbreviated form, by Priam 22 lines later). In the first book of the Iliad the invocation of Chryses to Apollo in 37-42 is except for the last verse identical with his invocation in 451-456. The second occurrence at least cannot be an impromptu oral composition: it must be the repetition of a fixed text. Consult the mendacious accounts Odysseus gives of himself at Od. 14.258 ff. and Od. 17.427 ff., and you will find that the first fifteen lines of each are identical. Here, too, the second occurrence cannot be an impromptu creation, and must be a repetition of the first, a fixed text.

Let me refer briefly to two other passages in the Iliad which are manifest additions to a fixed text. The first addition is Book 18, and concerns the Shield of Achilles. Earlier the poet had told how Patroclus went to the assistance of the Achaeans wearing his own armour. Afterwards he conceived the fine idea of creating special arms—in particular a special shield—for Achilles. Therefore, let Achilles' arms be given to Patroclus and be lost. We can trace exactly the tell-tale additions which have been made to Books 11 and 16, those two early books which twice already have revealed the order of composition.

The second concerns the Wall and Ditch constructed by the Greeks around their ships: these fortifications are undertaken and completed on Nestor's advice at the end of Book 7, but further on we encounter some passages where the wall seems to be absent: it seems to follow that the construction of the wall is yet another addition to a fixed text.
Before turning to the fixation of certain passages in the *Odyssey* it will be well to rid our minds of the natural misconception that the *Iliad* preceeded the *Odyssey*. I hasten at once to add that the *Odyssey* did not precede the *Iliad*. Rather both poems were a long time in the making; in their final form each bears signs of re-working under the influence of the other. This view is nothing new, and was often advocated in the palmy days of German 19th century scholarship: apart from our different positions on single versus multiple authorship I can accept and appeal to practically everything on the subject written by Benedictus Niese in his *Die Entwicklung der homerischen Poesie* (1882). Indeed, it may be said once and for all that Analytical Scholarship in general, when freed from the stultifying shackles of multiple authorship, invariably projects a more satisfying and convincing picture of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* being put together than either the Unitarian or the Oralist schools. Thus Eduard Schwartz in his magnificent book on the *Odyssey* (how can one mention such a work save in terms of the highest praise?) describes down to the most trivial minutiae the processes by which the poem was enlarged until it attained its final form. Replace his several authors distorting their predecessors' compositions by a single author expanding his own, and one obscurity after another disappears: the deferred recognition by Penelope (obviously 18.281-283 are, like the duals in *Iliad* 9, the relic of an earlier version), the general localization of the hero's island from Weissnichtwo to Ithaca (was ever conjecture so wide of the mark as Dörpfeld's?), and little puzzles like the removal of the arms are now seen as inevitable, certainly understandable, consequences of painting on a large canvas, where canvas and paint signify materials effecting a tangible and visible recording, and are no mere irrelevant metaphor for the fleeting and unrecorded word.

We saw earlier that Homer inserted an *Embassy* into an incomplete version of the *Iliad*, and later expanded that *Embassy* by inserting into it the figure of Phoenix. We find precisely the same method of composition in the *Odyssey*. For example, there was at one stage no visit to the Underworld; then one was added; and yet later a further addition is made.

In the tenth Book of the *Odyssey* the hero reaches the island of Circe and narrowly escapes disaster. Towards the end of the Book the poet begins the motivation of Odysseus' next adventure; at the insistence of his comrades Odysseus approaches Circe, asks her to send him home (10.483 ff.) and is granted his request—at 12.23 ff. (over a book away). What now occupies the interval, and this means essentially *Odyssey* 11, Homer added later. Of Circe's instructions about his return home Denys Page
says: "It is quite obvious that this poet does not suppose that Odysseus is already acquainted with these matters." True: "this poet" is Homer: he had not yet composed Book 11, in which Circe's instructions are largely duplicated. When Book 11 came into being, Books 10 and 12 were already composed: they were fixed and could not be altered.

Now Odysseus, as I have mentioned earlier, is not properly a warrior at all; he is a figure of folk-tale and needs all the poet's skill to take his place beside the great heroes of saga. Telemachus' journey serves to implant a conviction of his father's association with Nestor and Menelaus and their comrades, and in devising converse of Odysseus with the dead, among whom should appear the ghosts of Agamemnon and Achilles, Homer consolidates his achievement.

The composition of the Necyia insertion is simplicity itself:

1. Asked by Odysseus to send him home, Circe now tells him he must visit Hades: 10.490-550;
2. Since it is necessary because of the fixed composition of Book 12 that Odysseus return to Circe's island, Elpenor dies under circumstances not allowing his burial: 10.551-574. The insertion proper now occurs:
3. NECYIA—Introduction: 11.1-50;
4. NECYIA—Ghosts come:
    (a) Elpenor, to motivate the return to Circe's island by asking for burial: 51-83;
    (b) Tiresias: (84)-149;
    (c) Anticleia: 150-224;
    (d) Agamemnon: 387-466;
    (e) Achilles: 467-540;
    (f) Ajax: 541-564;
5. NECYIA—Conclusion: 628-640;
6. Return to Circe's island; burial of Elpenor; Circe begins speech to proceed from 10.489: 12.1-22.

The edges of the insertion should be noted.

10.487 Thus I spoke, and forthwith the goddess answered:
    "Zeus-born son of Laertes, many-wiled Odysseus, No longer now remain in my house against your will.

490 But you must first complete another journey and go To house of Hades and dread Persephone"

... 12.20 And in our midst the bright goddess said:
    "Rash men, who alive have entered house of Hades, To die twice, whilst others die but once. But come, eat food and drink wine Here the whole day; and at break of dawn
You shall sail; and I will show way and each
Thing tell, in order that...

The pattern of the earlier join indicated occurs at 10.456 ff.

No longer now rouse lament; I know myself
Both the woes you suffered on fish-filled sea
And hurt received from foes on mainland.
But come, eat food and drink wine

At a yet later stage Homer decided to exploit the conception of Odysseus in Hades by representing him actually within the realm of the dead and observing a pageant of heroes and heroines. And foreseeing Page's charge of clumsiness in the matter of reported speech, he inserted an interlude taking us back to the court of Alcinous as a reminder of the dramatic situation.

The last stage of composition, like the second, consists of the insertion of inorganic verses in two places; and Webster is probably right in seeing a designed balance.

A Ghosts come
1) Elpenor
2) Tiresias
3) Anticleia

B Odysseus sees heroines : 225–332

X Intermezzo : 333–386

A Ghosts come
1) Agamemnon
2) Achilles
3) Ajax

B Odysseus sees heroes : 565–627

Let us observe the joins.

“(Anticleia is speaking)...
But hasten quickly to the light, and all this
Know, that hereafter you may tell your wife.”

Thus we two talked, and the women
Came, for queenly Persephone sent them,

Now when she scattered here and there the spirits
Of the women, she holy Persephone,
And there came the spirit of Atreid Agamemnon
Sorrowing; and about gathered others who

Thus I spoke, but he answered not, and went
To Erebus after the other spirits of the dead.
Then yet though wroth had he spoken to me, and I to him,
But the heart in my breast was eager
To see the spirits of others dead.
Then I saw Minos, glorious son of Zeus

"(Heracles speaking) . . ."

The dog I carried off and led from Hades;
And Hermes guided me and owl-eyed Athena."
So saying he went back into house of Hades,
But there I stayed on, if yet one might come
Of those heroes who perished in days of yore.

In 387 the word ὅτε, originally a conjunction, now has to do duty as an apodotic particle. Touching the matter of Ajax’s silence, we may now retort to Page that Homer “did not at once proceed to destroy his own conception.” He added to it later. Moreover, if the earlier version was fixed, Homer’s continuation becomes much more intelligible, for it commonly happens in his story-telling that after a pause we find some resumptive phrase or device. We need look no farther than 11.225 for example, and should bear in mind that Homer was here confronted with the negative situation “thus we did not speak.”

Perhaps the most significant example in the Odyssey of composition by expansion is the Journey of Telemachus. Like the Embassy, and for that matter like the Necyia, it does not disturb the action. Telemachus’ journey yields no results affecting the return of Odysseus and is irrelevant to the sequence of events.

No less than the Necyia insertion the addition of the Telemachy is very simply effected. The earlier version of the Odyssey began with a council of the gods, to whom Athena complained of their forgetfulness of Odysseus, detained perforce on the island of Calypso; Hermes was then sent to bring about his release. We may still see the whole sequence in our texts.

Now all the others who escaped destruction
Were home, safe from war and sea;
But him alone, longing for return and wife,
Queenly nymph detained, Calypso, bright goddess,

In hollow caves, desirous he be her husband.
But when, as seasons revolved, the year came
In which the gods decreed his return home
To Ithaca, not even there was he safe from toils
Even among his people. And all the gods pitied him

Save Poseidon; but he unceasingly raged
Against godlike Odysseus until his return.
But he had gone to the distant Ethiopians,
Who are sundered in two, most distant of men,
Some at Hyperion’s setting, some at rising,
To receive hecatomb of bulls and rams. 
There he delighted in the banquet; but the others 
Were assembled in halls of Olympian Zeus.

And to them Athena was telling many woes of Odysseus, 
For she took ill his being in house of nymph. 
"Father Zeus and you other immortal gods, 
Nevermore purposely kind and gentle let be 
Sceptred king, nor heed justice in mind, 
But ever harsh let him be and work injustice, 
Since no one remembers divine Odysseus 
Of people he ruled, and gentle was as a father. 
But he lies in island suffering grievous pains 
In halls of nymph Calypso, who him perfence 
Detains; and he cannot return to native land, 
For he has no oared ships and companions 
To send him over broad back of sea."

Such essentially was once the beginning of the Odyssey. The poet starts with Odysseus' detention by Calypso; notes the sympathy of the gods for him; and finally arouses Athena to action. At a later stage the poet decided on a large expansion. The hero's son was to be introduced, among other things in order to strengthen the connection between Odysseus and the Iliadic heroes. There was no technical difficulty: the council of the gods now hears, not a speech by Athena about the already mentioned Calypso, but a quite unmotivated reference to Orestes, son of Agamemnon. This eventually steers the discussion to Telemachus, son of Odysseus, whom Athena elects to visit. So the Telemachy is brought about, and from that point runs its course to the end of Book 4. However, the earlier version is fixed. It is now necessary to return to the council of the gods, at the point where Athena's speech was replaced by one of Zeus'. The insertion, therefore, is effected as follows:

There he delighted in the banquet; but the others 
Were assembled in halls of Olympian Zeus. 
And to them first spoke the father of gods and men, 
For he remembered in heart the peerless Aegisthus, 
Whom far-famed Orestes, Agamemnon's son, slew. 

(Telemachy)

And Dawn from couch beside proud Tithonus 
Rose, to bear light to immortals and mortals; 
And the gods were at council, and among them 
Zeus high-thundering, whose might is greatest. 
And to them Athena was telling many woes of Odysseus, 
For she took ill his being in house of nymph. 
"Father Zeus, . . ."
We are now confronted with a situation parallel with that which occurred as a consequence of the _Necyia_ insertion. Then, embarrassingly (and to the disgust of Page and the Analysts), Circe repeated to Odysseus information he had acquired from Tiresias. Now, too, _because of his earlier fixed text_, Homer is obliged at 5.3 to arrange another council of the gods, and we can see that it is perfectly reasonable for him to do so. In fact, he has no alternative. But to Denys Page and the Analysts

What actually happens is without parallel in the Greek Epic. The action is interrupted by a second Assembly of the gods in heaven, a pale and uninteresting image of the one which begins the _Odyssey_, for no visible purpose but to go over much the same ground again and to set in motion a matter for which the first Assembly had made provision enough—the sending of Hermes to the island of Calypso.

This tedious and abnormal procedure might be excused as being merely an innovation, an unsuccessful experiment; but if we turn from the structure to the contents, we may not judge so leniently.

The gods assemble at dawn, and Athene begins to address them on behalf of Odysseus. At once a most disagreeable fact obtrudes itself: Athene’s speech is not a free composition naturally designed for this place and purpose. . . .

How right, and yet how wrong! Of course, Athena’s speech was designed for the earlier version: _it was fixed, and fixed even after the insertion it remained_.

The above account, in truth, is not the whole story, but a simplification. The poet, it seems, has attempted to patch up the insertion by transferring some of the earlier version to the later version: we can still see tell-tale signs in Zeus’ reply to Athena (1.63 f. = 5.21 f.). Some of the passage 1.63–87 must originally have followed 5.20, its place being now filled by 5.21–27, an addition consequent upon the _Telemachy_ insertion. Interestingly, parallel problems occur with Circe and Elpenor; and it seems clear that the _Necyia_ insertion proper (sections 3–5, i.e., our Book 11) was composed first, and the first two sections of the insertion were adapted later (no wonder these appear “ill-conceived and ill-executed”: _they were made to a fixed text_).

We must not overlook the extent to which in inserting the _Telemachy_ the poet has indulged his imagination and demonstrated his originality. Previously his poem had taken a rather different form. Penelope had kept her wooers at bay with the excuse that she must first complete the shroud for Laertes; and she had successfully maintained this position for three full years (19.151). But then her ruse was detected, and she was forced to marry. Or rather, she would have been forced to marry, had not Odysseus returned in the nick of time and killed the suitors. So the story
of Amphimedon as told in *Od.* 24. It is revealing to observe that the three-year delay, which does not allow the child Telemachus to grow to an age when he can be used as a character, is not altered by Homer; and the passage of 9 lines, created for the earlier version, which occurs in Book 19 as well as Book 24, is, as a little fixation, repeated verbatim at the appropriate place in Book 2 of the *Telemachy* insertion.

The *Odyssey* contains other large-scale additions, of which let me mention just two. On his arrival at the court of Alcinous (let us suppose it was a Monday) Odysseus is promised convoy home on the very next day (Tuesday), but in fact it is the evening after that (on Wednesday) before he can take his departure. Few difficulties in Homer have provoked such implausible solutions. And yet the matter is simple enough, as a concise tabulation will make clear.

**Monday Evening**

7. 167 Alcinous receives Odysseus
    177 Odysseus eats and drinks
    185 Alcinous speaks
    207 Odysseus answers
    222 “Send me home tomorrow”
    308 Alcinous answers
    317 “Yes, tomorrow”

    7.188 ff. *Sends Phaeacians home*

    229 ff. *Phaeacians go home*

    334 ff. *All sleep* (Tuesday)

8. 1 Dawn rises
    . . . Games;
    Banquet . . .
    535 Alcinous speaks
    550 “Tell your story”

9. 1 Odysseus answers
    2 And tells his story . . .

13. 1 So spoke Odysseus
    17 All sleep

**Tuesday** (Wednesday)

18 Dawn rises
35 Sunset, and farewell to Phaeacia

What we have in the *Odyssey* is a fixation of a version in which Alcinous honored his promise. Later the poet inserted material chiefly occupying Book 8. And there is an insertion within the insertion. At 8.83 ff. Odysseus
weeps and Alcinous notices; and later at 8.521 ff. Odysseus weeps again and Alcinous notices again. Why the curious repetition? Likely enough the incident only happened once in the original telling, but the insertion of the Games and the song of Ares and Aphrodite was most easily achieved by a departure from and a return to the action at the same point. One may also reasonably surmise that the request for Odysseus' identity (7.238) was originally followed much more closely by compliance (9.19—now over a book's distance away).

At Book 21.291 the haughty reproof of Antinous to Odysseus shows no remembrance of the beggar Irus: and we find that nothing is known of Irus outside Book 18. At the end of Book 17 Odysseus says "Let Penelope wait" and after 50 lines of Book 19 Penelope comes forth. It seems clear that Book 18 is another major insertion.

Now some of the insertions I have been referring to, and indeed all of the large-scale ones, bear a consistent relationship to the book-divisions in our printed texts; and a closer look at these book-divisions forms the next part of my enquiry.

Orthodox scholarship regards these divisions as having been made by those Alexandrian critics who first devoted themselves to researches on the text; apportionment into books (so the prevalent theory goes) was made for convenience of reference. However, two lines of argument point to the book-divisions as having been made by the composer himself.

First, both poems contain structural units which approximate to what I may call book length: second, the beginning and end of these units are, for the most part, marked by formal and thematic features characteristic of the style and design of the poems as a whole.

Consider first the Dolomeia. Differing in their views of its authorship, all scholars assume that the unit is conterminous with Book 10. Here, to begin with, are two book-divisions which go back centuries before the Alexandrian critics. Books 23 and 24 have sometimes been denied to the Iliad but no one denies that the Funeral Games and the Ransom of Hector are the units their composer conceived. The Embassy (9) is sharply divided from what precedes and from what follows. So is the Reconciliation (19), and so are the last battles of Patroclus and Hector in Books 16 and 22 respectively. Thus, of the 15,693 lines of the Iliad the eight units identified as structural give an average of 713 lines, suggesting that the Iliad was articulated in about 22 parts. Since a fluctuation of over 200 lines on either side of the mean occurs, we cannot dogmatize about the precise number of divisions intended.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>No. of lines</th>
<th>Portion of Iliad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diomedeia (5)</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>1/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy (9)</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>1/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doloneia (10)</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>1/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of Patroclus (16)</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>1/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation (19)</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>1/37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of Hector (22)</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>1/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funeral Games (23)</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>1/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ransom of Hector (24)</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1/20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Odyssey contains 12,110 lines; and we may safely identify as structural divisions Telemachus at Pylos and at Sparta; the Cyclops episode and the Necyia (and the intervening Circe book); the Return of Telemachus; the Taunting of Odysseus; and the Stringing of the Bow. The average number of lines (568)—again we must acknowledge wide fluctuation—indicates that the Odyssey was planned in about 21 parts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>No. of lines</th>
<th>Portion of Odyssey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telemachus at Pylos (3)</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>1/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telemachus at Sparta (4)</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>1/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclops episode (9)</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>1/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circe episode (10)</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>1/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necyia (11)</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>1/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of Telemachus (15)</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>1/22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taunting of Odysseus (18)</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>1/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stringing of the Bow (21)</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>1/28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So far we have shown that there is a general probability that Iliad and Odyssey were conceived in divisions comparable and perhaps conterminous with the text book-divisions (certainly we may infer that Homer did not work in units of as much as a thousand lines). When we now examine the themes accompanying the book-divisions, we at once recognize patterns which can hardly have been imposed by anyone other than the creator of the unit. For the most part the action of a unit is brought to an end by the advent of night or sleep (book-end), and the action of the next unit begins with dawn or the initiative of a sleepless person (book-beginning): so Iliad 1/2; 7/8; 8/9; 9/10; 10/11; (18)/19; (23)/24; Odyssey 1/2; 2/3; 3/4; 4/5; 5/6; 7/8; 14/15; 16/17; 17/(18); 18/19; 19/20. The following examples will speak for themselves.
The formulaic and thematic character of these book-divisions is transparent. *Iliad* 1.606 is repeated thrice in the *Odyssey* (3.396; 7.229; 13.17; see also 1.424; 18.419) and a variation performing the same function is found at *Od.* 18.428. *Iliad* 9.713 is paralleled at 7.482, and in the *Odyssey* Book 16 ends on the same note:

16.481 κοίτων τε μνήματο και ὑπνοι δόρων ἔλοντο.

The connection between the two poems is greater than appears from the above, for the Odyssean formulaic line occurs in the *Iliad* at 1.477 and 24.788.

Naturally, the significance of these book-divisions would be seriously compromised if similar breaks were found in the middle of books. They are not. Occasionally dawn does rise in the middle of an Iliadic book (cf. 1.477; 23.109; 23.226; 24.788), but in no case is a break in the action indicated. Obviously, when dawn rises four times in the course of the Cyclops story (*Od.* 9.152; 170; 307; 437), there is no question of a partition in the text. Nor at 4.306 (in the middle of the Spartan book), 5.228 (in the middle of the Calypso book), or 10.187 (in the middle of the Circe book).

It seems, then, that all the book-divisions specified above are original to the creator of the poems. This cannot on purely formal grounds be proved for the rest, but some of the book-divisions share common features.
After all, men do other things than sleep, and Homer cannot everywhere use this thematic device for marking the end of a section. Sometimes he describes the action which he wishes to conclude as having reached a static point (the last line of the Iliad is a good example) and then, with a resumptive ὥς δ (οἱ) μέν at the beginning of the next book (this proves the composer’s intention to pause), he passes with a δὲ to the initiative of a new character. Thus we have:

(d) End of II. 8: The Trojans keep watch.
   9.1 ὥς οἱ μὲν Τρώας φιλακάς ἔχον: αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὺς . . .
End of II. 11: Patroclus heals Eurypylus.
   12.1 ὥς δὲ μὲν ἐν κλίσει Μενοίτιον ἄλκιμος νῖς ἵππος Ἐφρύπυλον βεβλημένον: οἱ δ’ ἐμάχοντο . . .
End of II. 15: Fighting at the ships.
   16.1 ὥς οἱ μὲν περὶ νῆς ἐνεκελμοῦ μάχοντο: Πάτροκλος δ’ Ἀχιλῆι . . .
End of II. 17. Fighting at the trench.
   18.1 ὥς οἱ μὲν μάραντο δέμας πυρὸς αἰθομένοι, Ἀντίλοχος δ’ Ἀχιλῆι . . .
End of II. 19: Achilles at the head of the Greeks.
   20.1 ὥς οἱ μὲν παρὰ νυκτὶ κορωνίτες θωρησσόντο ἀμφὶ σὲ, Πηλέος νικ., μάχες ἀκόρητον Ἀχαιοί, Τρώας δ’ αὐθ’ ἐτέρωθεν ἐπὶ θραυσμὸ πεδίου: Ζεὺς δὲ . . .
End of II. 21: The Trojans shut up in the city.
   22.1 ὥς οἱ μὲν κατὰ ἀκτὴν περιζότεσ ἡμῆς νεβροὶ ἱδρῶ ἀπεφύγοντο πίον τ’ ἀκέοντό τε δίφας, κεκλιμένοι καλῆς ἐπάλξεσιν: αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ τείχεος ἄκος ἰκαν, σάκε’ ὠμοὶ κλίνατες.
   “Εκτορα δὲ . . .
End of II. 22: Lamentation for Hector.
   23.1 ὥς οἱ μὲν στενάχοντο κατὰ πτόλυν: αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ . . .
End of Od. 5: Odysseus asleep
   6.1 ὥς δ’ μὲν ἐνθα καθεδὲ πολύτλας δίος Ὀδυσσεὺς ὑπὼν καὶ καμάτω ἄρημένος: αὐτὰρ Ἀθηνὴ . . .
End of Od. 6: Odysseus in prayer.
   7.1 ὥς δ’ μὲν ἐνθ’ ἥρατο πολύτλας δίος Ὀδυσσεὺς, κούρην δὲ . . .

The resumptive formula is occasionally varied:

II. 3.1 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κόσμηθεν . . .
II. 15.1 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ . . . ἐβηκαν . . .
Od. 11.1 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ . . . κατηλθομεν . . .
Od. 12.1 αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ . . . λύτεν . . .
II. 21.1 ἀλλ’ ὦτε δὴ πάρον ἦδον . . .

Sometimes we meet with a resumption not couched in formulaic terms, though the context reveals unmistakably that at this point occurs a
structural division: *Iliad*. 6.1 subtly passes from heaven to earth, *Iliad*. 13.1 from earth to heaven; *Iliad*. 7.1 and *Odyssey*. 13.1 briefly glance back at major episodes, and *Odyssey*. 9.1 briefly acknowledges Alcinous with a δέ as the hero embarks upon the Deep-sea Yarns. There are obvious transitions at *Iliad*. 5.1 and *Odyssey*. 23.1, where, however, the repetition of Παλλάς Ἀθήνη and γρηγόρευσι respectively effect a resumption.

The preceding argument enforces the general thesis: that composition of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* occurred as a progressive fixation of passages, effected not linearly, but as designed expansions of the central theme, both poems being for whatever reason articulated in lengths consonant with the traditional book-divisions and seemingly identical with them, and the close similarity of compositional technique being consistent with and seemingly confirming the traditional ascription of both poems to a single composer.

If my reasoning thus far has any validity, it seems that we shall have to abandon or at least modify seriously the hypothesis propounded by Parry that Homer was an oral poet. Of course, in a sense most poets are oral poets; certainly all the ancient poets composed for the ear rather than the eye. But we must distinguish between "impromptu" composition and "premeditated" composition. Milman Parry, like many discoverers, was quite carried away by his discovery of the formulaic systems and became obsessed with the hypothesis that even in the Homeric poems the function of the formulas must have been to prevent a break-down in impromptu composition: furthermore, he seems to have relegated anyone who repeated a fixed text to the inferior status of a rhapsode.

The technique of Homeric verse composition, like other aspects of Homer, cannot be straitjacketed in a homogeneous system. It varies. Take such a verse as τὸν δ’ ἀπομειβόμενος προερήματος Ὀδυσσείας, which occurs frequently in both poems. Surely we shall not argue that the poet worked out this verse anew on every occasion. Rather, he knew it by heart, and he repeated it, where it was appropriate, as a memorized text. Now these stock recurring lines, which contain a high proportion of the noun-epithet formulas, add up to a goodly total. Of all lines in *Iliad* 1 no less than 1/6 recur in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*.

Repeated verses in *Iliad* 1:

13–16; 22–25; 33; 37; 38; 43; 58–60; 68; 73; 84; 88; 89; 101–104; 130; 131; 141; 142; 148; 172; 177; 193; 196; 201; 206; 209; 212;
In *Odyssey* I the proportion is even greater: it is $\frac{1}{4}$. In these passages the poet is not creating sentences—he is repeating fixations. Why, some passages in Homer are manufactured, not out of formulas, but out of stock lines. They are little more than centos: almost the whole of *Iliad* 8 is composed in this fashion and so are the last 125 lines of *Odyssey* 19. Let me tabulate a sample from *Iliad* 8:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>$3.95$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>$9.69$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td><em>Od</em>. 1.44</td>
<td>$14.28$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td><em>Od</em>. 1.45</td>
<td>$8.36$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-37</td>
<td>$463$-$468$</td>
<td>$5.77$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-40</td>
<td>$22.18$-$186$</td>
<td>$11.82$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-44</td>
<td>$13.23$-$26$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the end of *Odyssey* 19:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>570</td>
<td>$11.45$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>577</td>
<td>$21.75$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>578</td>
<td>$21.76$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>579</td>
<td>$21.77$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>580</td>
<td>$21.78$</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>582</td>
<td>$164$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over these stretches of the text of Homer, the theory of a technique of improvised verse-composition cannot apply; and another consideration leads me to believe that it does not apply elsewhere, either.

I refer to words that the poet never formularizes, words of zero formularity: the premeditated word. So I shall boldly call it, to arrest your attention. To be strictly scholarly I must correct myself and say: let us turn to the hapax legomena in Homer. Like the repeated lines, they are too numerous and too evenly scattered in Homer to fit any theory of impromptu oral composition. Parry says dogmatically, of the impromptu oral composer: "He can put into verse only those ideas which are to be found in the phrases which are on his tongue . . . at no time is he seeking words for an idea which has never before found expression."

Now, given this severe limitation for the oral poet, we should not expect in the 27,000 verses of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* a unique word to occur
very often. But the fact is that a word not otherwise to be found in Homer—and I have scrupulously excluded proper names from the count—occurs at a rate of once every fifteen lines. Nor can it be argued that in these cases the poet was forced outside his basic vocabulary—in many instances it is obvious that the poet has deliberately sought to include technical and ornamental detail. Why, this is proved by the way in which hapaxes, though they occur throughout the Iliad and the Odyssey, form special clusters in speeches and descriptions and digressions and similes. They could so easily have been avoided. And they are found everywhere, even cementing together cento-passages. Let me again tabulate a little of the statistics for hapax legomena:

Iliad 1: 4, 32, 45, 75, 81, 95, 99, 113, 122, 126, 128, 128, 140, 155, 156, 166, 205, 216, 225, 231, 235, 236, 236, 237, 265, 269, 292, 335, 402, 434, 449, 518, 526, 575;  
Speech of Phoenix (II. 9): 443, 446, 454, 456, 457, 461, 470, 490, 491, 500, 503, 505, 526, 534, 539, 563, 565, 568, 579, 582, 593;  
Shield of Achilles (II. 18): 493, 500, 502, 513, 519, 521, 525, 529, 531, 536, 543, 550, 553, 555, 562, 563, 566, 570, 571, 571, 576, 576, 580, 584.  

Here are some sample clusters from the Odyssey:  
Book 4: 221, 221, 221 (Helen’s drug);  
Book 5: 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 256, 261 (Making of raft);  
Book 7: 90, 104, 106, 107, 118, 119, 121, 123, 125, 125, 126, 127 (Palace of Alcinous);  
Book 9: 383, 384, 385, 385, 387, 388, 392, 393 (Blinding of Cyclops)  

Let us speculate a little. What did Homer do when he first decided on the fixation of a long poem on the wrath of Achilles? Had he in mind the compass of 24 books? Surely not. We may even wonder whether he began with a conception of book-units. Most likely, these arose out of the convenience of book-roll and their convenience as inserts: moreover, this would account for their disparate lengths, which cannot be easily explained as the length of a recitation or as the equal division by the Alexandrians of the total mass. M. L. West puts the matter very well when he says “The absence of an audience meant that it (the Iliad) was subject to no limit of length, and it grew in the writing to a length that no oral poem had ever had or sought.”  

We are fortunate, however, in being able to detect the finishing touches. The designed balances between Iliad 1 and Iliad 24 are so precise—see particularly Myres in JHS 1932—that most scholars who are aware of
the facts admit the formal symmetry of the poem. Of course this is only possible if the poem be fixed, that is to say written. Furthermore, since I cannot think of the embryonic *Iliad* as growing in writing without *Iliad* 1, and since I cannot think of our present *Iliad* 1 as anything but a very late book, I am forced to the conclusion that our present *Iliad* 1 represents a re-writing of the earlier version. It is easy to pick out little fixations. For example, the implication that Agamemnon in person seized Briseis (cf. 1.356, 507; 2.240; 9.273; 19.89) suggests that there was an earlier *written* version in which he did. The final version, in Book 1.320 ff., in which Talthybius and Eurybates take the girl, is Homer's afterthought. And it also appears that it was Achilles himself who originally made supplication to Zeus (cf. 16.236) and not Thetis, as in our present text of Book 1. Furthermore, Odysseus' journey to Chryse provides irrefutable proof of being a late insertion:

432 cf. *Od.* 16.324
458-461 cf. *Od.* 12.359-361
460-465 cf. *Od.* 3.457-462
467-469 cf. *Od.* 16.478-480
475-477 cf. *Od.* 19.426-428
481-483 cf. *Od.* 2.427-429
485 cf. *Od.* 16.325

In the early part of *Iliad* 2 and elsewhere I seem to detect signs suggesting that an earlier written version with marginalia has been reworked, and wonder whether the theory of re-writing of earlier copy might best explain some features of the *Odyssey*. But here we must tread with care, and I will retreat to the more general consideration voiced by Gilbert Murray: "Every work of art that was ever created was intended in some way to be used. No picture was painted for blind men; no ship built where there was no water. What was to be the use of the *Iliad*? What audience would listen to the recitation of such a poem? It contains over 15,000 verses. It would occupy 20-24 hours of steady declamation. No audience could endure it, no bard could perform it, in one stretch."

All field experience with oral poets seems to show that they never, except when stimulated by the most attractive inducements, exceed an hour or two in their performances. This is how Phemius and how Demodocus performed. The cinema will provide us with a parallel to their attitude: a movie for us, like an oral song for them, is something which lasts an hour or so, no more. To explain the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as oral poems is like postulating movies 24 hours long.

That the monumental *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have their origins in the lesser scale of oral poetry there is no reason to doubt. But the difference is
fundamental. Homer is not a singer of tales, but a recorder of them; and we should compare his work with such as that of the composer of the Kalevala, Elias Lönnrot, who in the first half of the 19th century made repeated field-trips throughout Finland collecting oral poems. Believing that these lays were the disjecta membra of a once wonderful epic he stitched them together to provide a text of 12,000 lines, which after further efforts he expanded to 23,000 lines. Such a man was Homer, except that he was no folklorist scholar, but a supremely gifted artist.

We must understand that the Iliad and the Odyssey were not composed to meet an existing or even contrived need, but simply to fulfil the vision of an artist, like Wagner's Ring des Nibelungen, which cannot be completed at a single performance, and Bernard Shaw's Back to Methuselah, which exceeds the bounds of what is theatrically feasible. And once we understand that Homer's vision was built on the realization that writing allows the songs which die in the act of recital to be given life for ever, then the method of composition uncovered in this paper appears as an ambitious and indeed exciting process, and the completion by it of the Iliad and the Odyssey as a comprehensive as well as a prodigious achievement.

University College London
The Mare, the Vixen, and the Bee:  
Sophrosyne as the Virtue of Women in Antiquity

HELEN F. NORTH

When the future Emperor Julian entered the presence of Eusebeia, the wife of his predecessor, Constantius, he was so deeply impressed by the perfection of her womanly virtue that he felt as though he were beholding a statue of Sophrosyne. So, at least, he reports in his Encomium of the Empress (Or. III.123A–B). It is doubtful that Julian could actually have seen a statue of the personified virtue of Sophrosyne. No trace, no record of such a statue has survived, and it is likely that he was thinking of the Roman equivalent, Pudicitia, who was portrayed in images and portrait busts, as well as on the imperial coinage from the time of Hadrian. But what is significant is that when he sought to evoke the quintessence of feminine excellence, sophrosyne was the concept that occurred to him, as it would probably have occurred to most of his readers, whether Greek or Roman. By the time Julian composed his eulogy (ca. A.D. 355) sophrosyne had long been accepted as the principal virtus feminarum and as such was mentioned in numberless epitaphs, celebrated in rhetorical topoi concerned with feminine arete, and ascribed to various mythical exemplars, some of whom—Penelope, Arete, Evadne, Laodamia—figure in this very oration.

But sophrosyne is the most multifaceted of all the Greek virtues, and some of its aspects belong exclusively to men. What is the sophrosyne of

1 This paper is an adaptation of one that I had the privilege of reading at the University of Wisconsin in Madison on May 12, 1974, as part of a celebration in honor of Friedrich Solmsen on the occasion of his retirement. I should like to dedicate this version also to him.

2 I have tried to separate some of the threads that comprise the fabric of this complicated arete and trace them to their sources in Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca, 1966).
women? When did it emerge as their proper characteristic? And what does it tell us about the way women were regarded in antiquity? It is the purpose of this paper to suggest answers to these questions.

The earliest extant literary allusion to feminine sophrosyne occurs in the famous diatribe against women composed by Semonides of Amorgos in the latter half of the seventh century B.C. This poem is of profound significance for the history of women because, like the earlier and still more celebrated story of Pandora as told by Hesiod, it reveals the deep-seated misogyny characteristic of the archaic Greek farmer. Semonides' tirade consists mainly of a series of degrading analogies between types of women and animals. One kind of woman is compared to a sow, another to a bitch, another to a donkey, still others to a weasel, an ape, a mare, and a vixen, each type of woman being charged with the ugly, vicious, ridiculous, or otherwise undesirable traits popularly ascribed to the animal from which she is said to be descended. In one hundred and eighteen lines of pungent comment Semonides finds only one kind of woman worthy of praise, the one he compares to a bee. The excellence ascribed to the bee-woman might easily represent the ideal of feminine conduct enshrined in the hearts of men throughout Greek history. Of this woman the poet says that she makes livelihood flourish and increase; loving and beloved, she grows old with her husband, bearing children who are fair and well-spoken of; she is outstanding among all women, and charm from the gods envelops her. Moreover, she does not enjoy sitting among women when they talk about sex (frg. 7.85–91, Dichl).

After this unique commendation Semonides returns to his normal satiric strain and concludes the poem with a reminder that all other kinds of women constitute a source of woe for mankind, through the device of Zeus. For good measure, he then gives one further instance of the evil women do, deceiving their husbands and making them a laughing-stock among their malicious neighbors. In his description of the bee-woman the poet does not apply the term sophron to his paragon, although hers is precisely the kind of conduct for which the word was to be reserved in the classical period. But he does employ the related verb sophronein in his vivid little picture of the treacherous wife and the deceived husband. “Whatever woman seems especially to be a good wife—sophronein—that very one happens to be doing the greatest harm, for while her husband is gaping, the neighbors rejoice to see how he is deceived” (108–111). Clearly her outrageous conduct is sexual, for just before this Semonides says that when a man has a wife he cannot welcome strangers into his house (106–107). The poet’s statement makes sense only if there already exists a general understanding that to be sophron is to be chaste—for a
woman, that is. The word does not have a comparable application to the moral or sexual conduct of men until about two centuries later, and it never ranks very high, in this sense, in the table of masculine virtues, as the story of Hippolytus makes abundantly clear.

Before the time of Semonides words derived from the root of *sophron* have no specifically feminine application in extant literature. In the Homeric poems *saophron* and *saophsroyne* (the original, uncontracted forms) occur but rarely, and only once in connection with a woman. In Book XXIII of the *Odyssey* Penelope tells Eurycleia, the aged nurse, who has announced the return of Odysseus after twenty years, that the gods have deprived her of her wits, “the gods who can make foolish (*aphron*) even one who is exceedingly sensible (*epiphron*) and who have brought the light-minded (*chali pneumeon*) to *saophsroyne*” (11–13). The noun *saophsroyne* is still close to its etymological meaning, “soundness of mind,” as its equation with another word meaning “sensible” (*epiphron*) clearly implies. The antitheses to both terms simply mean “foolish.” There is nothing specifically masculine or feminine about either condition, and one can imagine Penelope making the same remark to the swineherd, Eumaeus.

We should note, however, a significant application of the adjective *saophsron* to Telemachus, the son of Odysseus, when he, a simple country boy from Ithaca, stands bashfully silent in the presence of Menelaus, the world-famous king of Sparta. His young friend Peisistratus apologizes for him, saying, “He is modest (*saophsron*) and feels ashamed to embark on hasty speech in your presence” (IV.158–160). This use of *saophsron* is notable because to be silent, or to speak only briefly, was to become an important facet of *sophsroyne* for women (and for young persons of either sex) throughout Greek literature.

One other use of *saophsron*, this time in the *Iliad*, also forecasts future developments. Poseidson challenges Apollo to fight, taking sides in the battle between the Greeks and the Trojans. Apollo refuses, on the ground that he would not be *saophsron*, if he, a god, engaged in combat for the sake of mortal men (XXI.462–464). This use too is significant, because the word here implies self-knowledge, especially knowing one’s own place, and although the place of Apollo is entirely different from the place of women in Greek society, *sophsroyne* as a sense of propriety has applications for them too.

In post-Homeric poetry and the society that it reflects, *sophsroyne* took on a variety of new meanings, some of them religious, some political in their implications. The concept was especially congenial to the Apolline morality with its emphasis on restraint, self-knowledge, and the acceptance
of limits, imposed in some cases by the gods, in others by the state, and in the case of women by men. The general tendency of sophrosyne to suggest inhibition of some kind made it particularly suitable (from a masculine point of view) as a summa of feminine virtue, and it is not surprising that sophron begins to replace more general terms of value, such as agathe or esthle. For example, Hesiod in the Works and Days remarks that a man gets nothing better than a good wife, nothing worse than a bad one (702–703)—doubtless a cliché even in the eighth century B.C. His word for the good wife is agathe, which becomes esthle in Semonides (fr. 6), but when Epicharmus in the fifth century echoes this bit of proverbial wisdom, agathe and esthle must have seemed insufficiently precise. He therefore substitutes sophron, saying that it is the virtue of a sophron woman not to wrong her husband (fr. 286, Kaibel). There can be little doubt that by sophron he means what Semonides meant by sophronein: to be dutiful, obedient, well-behaved. By the fifth century sophrosyne in this sense has established itself as the fundamental quality expected of women, married or unmarried. Thereafter the concept may be amplified or refined, adapted to particular circumstances, but no change in the basic meaning occurs, where women are concerned. And during the late archaic and early classical period a further development of great importance takes place: the identification and canonization of exemplars of feminine virtue and vice. Mythical heroines such as Penelope and Andromache, to whom the word sophron had never been applied in the Homeric poems, are now stereotyped as models of sophrosyne, while Clytemnestra, Helen, Sthenoeboa, and Phaedra are exemplars of undesirable conduct—licentious, self-willed, destructive. Both kinds of exemplar now become available for citation in a variety of edifying contexts, from choral odes in tragedy to mythological parallels in oratory and popular philosophy.3

It is in tragedy of the fifth century that the type of the sophron wife is first observed, fully established and represented by the principal exemplars destined to reign in later times. Andromache is preeminent among them. Two plays by Euripides include scenes in which she explains in some detail what her famous sophrosyne consists of. In The Trojan Women (645–656) it includes staying indoors and not indulging in gossip (we remember the bee-woman of Semonides). This is in fact the minimum qualification

3 Marylin B. Arthur, “Early Greece: The Origins of the Western Attitude toward Women,” Arethusa 6 (1973) 7–58, suggests reasons why the social, political, and economic organization of Greek communities from the sixth to the fourth centuries made men feel it essential to keep under strict control feminine sexuality and “tendencies towards destructiveness,” which in Homeric and other aristocratic societies had seemed less threatening to masculine security.
imposed on women at virtually all periods in Greek history. It is the essence of Telemachus’ injunction to his mother, immediately after Athena has inspired him to assume the responsibilities of an adult male (Od. I.356–358). He expresses the advent of full maturity first by rebuking the suitors, then by telling his mother to go upstairs and tend to her household tasks. In Aeschylus’ Septem Eteocles bids the distraught women of the Chorus to do two things: be quiet and stay in the house (232). We understand how it was that the tortoise became the symbol of the sophron woman, from the Ouranian Aphrodite of Phidias to the Pudicitia of Ripa.\footnote{4} The tortoise is always necessarily indoors, because it carries its house wherever it goes, and there was even a widespread belief in antiquity that the tortoise had no tongue. It therefore had to be silent!

We understand also why in the Medea the theme of “going out”—out of the house—becomes so crucial. In Medea’s first speech to the Women of Corinth (in the first line of her first speech) she says that she has come out of the house—ἐξῆλθον δόμων (214), and the rest of the play rings the changes on the symbolism implicit in that phrase.\footnote{6} And finally, we understand why when Aristotle in the Politics concedes that only aristocratic women can be expected to maintain the standards of behavior that he approves—essentially, sophron behavior—he remarks that the women of the poor “go out” (here exienai), presumably to earn their living, and therefore cannot conduct themselves in the conservative, old-fashioned way (1300a4–7).

In Euripides’ Andromache, the concept of sophrosyne as the virtue of the ideal wife is embellished by still another facet, one that modern critics have tended to find somewhat extreme. Now Andromache recalls that when she was Hector’s wife she even suckled his children by other women (224–225). That is, absence of jealousy is a facet of feminine sophrosyne, a highly desirable one from the masculine point of view. Its opposite, the refusal to brook a rival, is exemplified by Clytemnestra, Medea, and Hermione, whose lack of sophrosyne, in this respect and others, brings disaster upon their husbands’ households.

Women specifically characterized as possessing sophrosyne are not

\footnote{4} Exceptions are women like Sappho and the girl athletes celebrated in Alcman’s Maiden-song (who, we note, are compared to fillies, with no pejorative implication, fr. 1. 47–48, 58–59, Page). The Amazons are so completely opposed to the Greek concept of feminine arete that they regularly figure (like the Centaurs, the Titans, and the Giants) as symbols of hybris, in classical sculpture.

\footnote{5} For the tortoise and its significance consult W. S. Heckscher, “Aphrodite as a Nun,” Phoenix 7 (1953) 105–117.

uncommon in Euripidean tragedy, sometimes maidens, more often wives (since perpetual virginity is not a Greek ideal, except for certain goddesses, and then for special, often very complex historical reasons). In either condition, they are noted for quiet, inconspicuous behavior and obedience to father, husband, or other kyrios, as well as for chastity. They are not, for the most part, protagonists in their tragedies, since for women, as for men, to be capable of sophrosyne is to be relegated to secondary rôles—foil characters like Ismene in the Antigone or Creon in the Oedipus Tyrannus. Not only Euripides, with his Medea, Phaedra, and Electra, but Aeschylus and Sophocles as well find their tragic heroines in women who reject the feminine stereotype and show themselves to be as passionate and heroic as men. The Sophoclean Electra in a famous passage (983) even aspires to the specifically masculine arete of andreia (which Aristotle in the Poetics, Ch. 15.4, criticizes along with deinotes, cleverness, as unsuited to the feminine ethos); she has already recognized that in her situation sophrosyne is impossible (307–308). What is commendable in a man is of course dangerous, even to the point of hybris, in a woman, and the contrast between the feminine and masculine elements in such natures constitutes a special source of tragedy, almost a special kind of hamartia.

The sophron woman in Euripidean tragedy can be the heroine only in the kind of play whose climax is self-sacrifice, freely chosen, since sophrosyne in a woman normally includes self-sacrificing conduct. Hence Alcestis is the other notable Euripidean heroine of sophrosyne, and for obvious reasons the one most popular in sepulchral epigrams, which not only perpetuate traditional values, but, in Roman times especially, compare their subjects to Penelope, Andromache, or Arete, as well as to Alcestis.7

The study of ancient epitaphs tends to suggest that sophrosyne, even though established as the characteristic virtue of women in the late archaic and early classical period, found its way into inscriptions only later. The earliest epitaphs, for both men and women, are extremely severe, sometimes confined to the name of the dead person, but as early as the sixth century B.C. sophron and sophrosyne begin to appear in masculine epitaphs, particularly those from the Dipylon in Athens, in such formulae as agathos kai sophron, arete kai sophrosyne.8 Similar phrases become current on feminine stelae only in the fourth century. An example is the epitaph

7 On this subject consult Richmond Lattimore, Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs (Urbana, 1942), especially 293–300. For comparisons to mythical exemplars of sophrosyne see Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca, 277, 471, 558, 874.
8 See Paul Friedländer, Epigrammata (Berkeley, 1948) 71, 6, 31, 85.
for Glycera, from the Peiraeus, which describes her as esthle kai sophron.\(^9\) Differing implications conveyed by the same words, depending on which sex is commended, are spelled out only in later, more detailed inscriptions, usually of the Roman period. Nevertheless such a fourth-century Athenian epitaph as that of Hegilla, which praises her tropoi (character) kai sophrosyne, makes it clear that her virtues as a wife are meant, because the inscription concludes by saying that her husband knows best how to praise her.\(^10\)

In the course of centuries, as sepulchral eulogy becomes ever more lavish and specific, the praise of women for traditional domestic virtues occupies an increasingly prominent position. Lattimore cites a late, elaborate list of feminine virtues in the epitaph of Claudia Areskousa, from Patara, whose qualities begin with philandria asynkritos (incomparable love for her husband) and proceed through philoteknia anyperbletos (unsurpassable love for her children) and kallos ameimeton (matchless beauty) to reach a climax in sophrosyne adiegetos (indescribable virtue).\(^11\)

Roman epitaphs commend the departed wife and mother by such terms as pudica, casta, sobria, words that are ubiquitous also in rhetorical eulogy and the stories of the great Roman heroines of the early Republic, Lucretia and Verginia. On both Greek and Roman monuments there is a tendency to link the basic feminine virtue with wool-working. Every student of Roman epigraphy remembers the formula domum servavit, lanam fecit (she kept house, she spun wool) which concludes the epitaph for a Claudia of the Gracchan age (CE 52). The word lanificium (wool-working) finds a place in lists of virtues on tombs, as does the boast: Lana . . . e manibus numquam sine causa recessit (the wool never fell from her fingers without good reason, CE 1988, 14).

Such proofs of domesticity are somewhat more common on Roman than Greek tombstones, yet there is the famous example from Sardes in the first century B.C. of an epitaph celebrating a woman, Menophila, whose achievements were represented on the tombstone by symbols explained in the epitaph itself. This lady had held office (archa) of some kind (probably religious, rather than civic), a distinction represented on her tombstone by a garland; she was honored for her intelligence (sophia), symbolized by a bundle of papyrus scrolls, and for her “well-ordered virtue” (eutaktos arete, a substitute for sophrosyne), which is commemorated by a work-basket (talaros).\(^12\)

Epigrams in the Greek Anthology, adopting the form of genuine epitaphs

\(^9\) Kaibel 53; see also 51: agathe kai sophron.
\(^10\) Kaibel 78.
\(^12\) Ibid. p. 293.
or dedicatory inscriptions, sometimes refer to the *talaros*, the spindle, the loom-comb, or other symbols of wool-working, as well as more enigmatic emblems of feminine excellence. Since household tasks are traditionally the *erga* or *ergmata* of Athena, the apparatus of wool-working is often dedicated to this goddess, sometimes to mark the end of the weaver’s career (e.g., *A.P*. VI.247), sometimes to indicate that the dedicator, tired of honest poverty, is transferring her attention to the works of Aphrodite (e.g., *A.P*. VI.47, 48, 285).

Among the “enigmatic epigrams” which describe puzzling emblems and explain their significance (a type to which the Sardes inscription really belongs), is one by Antipater of Sidon which says, in the person of the dead woman, that the wool proclaims her to have been *philobergos*, a lover of work (*A.P*. VII.423). Another epigram by the same poet asks the dead woman, Lysidice, the meaning of the reins, the muzzle, and the cock that adorn her *stele*, emblems that do not suit sedentary women, but rather the works of the spindle and the loom. The answer comes that the cock proclaims her to have been an early riser, the reins show that she was the “charioteer” of her house, and the muzzle reveals that she was not talkative, but full of lovely *hasychia* (quietude, VII.424). One thinks of the emblem-books of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Italy, which recommend that artists depict a bridle as an emblem of *temperantia* (the usual Latin rendering of *sophrosyne*). Even earlier, Giotto portrayed the personified *Temperanza* in the Arena chapel in Padua as a woman wearing a bridle and holding the bit in her mouth.

If the primary virtue of women is thus signified on Greek and Roman epitaphs and funeral *stelae* by workbaskets and allusions to *lanificium*, if Lucretia, in Livy’s account, is found by her husband late at night spinning, if spinning or weaving symbolizes feminine virtue in New Comedy and Roman elegy,13 we are bound to consider the economic aspect of feminine excellence, the explicit identification of the good woman with the good housekeeper. Phocylides of Miletus in the sixth century B.C. sums up the kinds of women in a catalogue consisting of four types, three of them bad: the flirt, the slattern, and the shrew, compared, in the manner of Semonides, to a mare, a sow, and a bitch. The only good woman is the one he calls the *oikonomos agathe*, the good housekeeper. She is of course compared to a bee (fr. 3). Phocylides does not describe her as *sophron*, but it is appropriate to ask to what extent and at what date feminine *arete*, especially *sophrosyne*, was defined in terms of *oikonomia*.

A study of Homer yields a rich harvest of “value-terms” applied to

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13 Consult Ogilvie on Livy 1.57.9 for many apt citations.
women, although, as noted above, *sophron* itself is exceptional. Terms of praise include *pinyte, pepnymene, and *periphron*, all of which refer to some kind of practical intelligence, *echephon*, "self-restrained," and occasionally (in the *Odyssey*) *euergos*, "a good-worker." These values are determined by men, on the basis of what is advantageous, profitable, or simply pleasant for them in the context of heroic society. Within the framework of the epic poems, the terms of value are usually applied by masculine characters, talking about women—Agamemnon, the Trojan Elders, Odysseus, or the Suitors. Women are seldom quoted on the subject of other women. Exceptions are Nausicaa talking about her mother, Arete, Calypso talking about Penelope, and Penelope talking about Helen or the treacherous maidservants. Only Nausicaa is complimentary.

One of the first references to a woman in the *Iliad* is also one of the most instructive: Agamemnon’s statement in Book I of his reasons for preferring his captive, Chryseis, to his wife, Clytemnestra. He says that Chryseis is not inferior to Clytemnestra in respect to form, stature, intelligence, or accomplishments (*erga, 115*). Of the three categories—physical appearance, intelligence of some kind, and the work a woman can do—the last is of special concern to us. It is a commonplace in the Homeric poems that women are valued for their capacity to work. We need think only of the women offered by Achilles as prizes in Book XXIII, the Funeral Games for Patroclus. They are described, not in terms of beauty or desirability, but with respect to their accomplishments. The first prize in the chariot race is a woman who knows blameless works (*anymona erga*), plus a tripod (263), while the second prize in the wrestling match is a woman who understands many tasks (*polla erga*), worth four oxen (705).

Special importance is attached to one kind of *ergon*—spinning or weaving. Already in his brutal speech to Chryses early in Book I, Agamemnon has defined the *erga* that lie ahead for Chryses, until old age overtakes her in Argos, far from her native land. He pictures her as *ιπτων εποιχομενη*, going back and forth in front of the loom (31). So great is the symbolic value of this task that it is not confined to slaves and captive women. Even Helen, in the *Odyssey*, safely back from Troy, has a golden distaff ready to hand when she presides over the entertainment of her guests in Sparta. Calypso and Circe, nymph and witch respectively, go back and forth singing before the loom on their magic islands. And of course Penelope is inseparable from the notion of weaving, because her very name is derived from the word *pene*, which means thread or woof. The command of Hector to Andromache at the end of their farewell scene, bidding her go to the house and attend to her tasks, specified as the loom and spindle (*II. VI.490–491*), is doubtless already formulaic; it is in these terms that
Telemachus relegates his mother to her proper place, in the passage already mentioned (Od. I.356–357).

The reason for the prominence of spinning and weaving is obvious. To clothe her dependents is one of the primary tasks of the mistress of a household in ancient times, a task so important and time-consuming that it never becomes purely symbolic (unless perhaps in the household of the Emperor Augustus, whose insistence on wearing garments woven by Livia and Julia is related to his moral reforms). Even before the age of Homer, in still more primitive societies, the weaving of mats and screens for shelter may have been women’s work, as Erich Neumann suggests. He also calls attention to the implications of spinning and weaving for matriarchal cultures, in which the Great Mother weaves the web of life and spins the thread of fate. Thus plaiting, weaving, and knotting belong to the “fate-governing” activity of women. The crossing of threads symbolizes sexual union, the device by which the Archetypal Feminine “weaves” life. In Homer the Fates are Klothes—Spinners. How persistent this motive is may be inferred from its appearance in medieval art, where the Blessed Virgin and St. Ann are often portrayed in Annunciation scenes with spindle or distaff, as an emblem of their maternal function.

Agamemnon, in death as in life, is wont to link the kind of woman he prefers with the concept of ergon. In two key passages in the Odyssey his shade (which might be expected to set the highest value on fidelity in a wife) actually speaks as if being a good worker is the supreme feminine arete. In both scenes in Hades his ghost draws a contrast between Penelope and Clytemnestra, saying that the guilty wife will for ever bring shame on all women, even one who is euergos (XI.434, XXIV.193). Although translators usually render the word as if it meant “behaving virtuously,” it could hardly fail to convey some idea of working hard, being industrious, as well.

The implications of this word are confirmed by some of the derogatory terms applied to women in early Greek poetry. Hesiod has two words for the kind of woman he dislikes, the one who impoverishes her husband: epiklopos (thievish) and deipnoloche (dinner-stealer). The latter term is applied to the bad wife who “roasts her husband without fire and makes him old before his time” (Erga 704–705). The capacity of a wife to help

14 See Suetonius, Aug. 64.2, 73.
15 The Great Mother, translated by Ralph Manheim (New York, 1955), p. 284. See also pp. 227 ff. I am indebted to Katherine A. Geffen’s monograph, Comedy in the Pro Caelio (Leiden, 1973) for calling to my attention Neumann’s theories about the significance of these motives in literature.
or hinder her husband economically lies behind much of Semonides' invective. Thus the "mare-woman"—luxurious, scornful of household tasks, so dainty that she bathes two or even three times a day—is fit only for a king or a tyrant; no ordinary man can afford her (57–70). The "donkey-woman" eats, day in and day out, all over the house, and the work she engages in, illicitly, is the ergon aphrodision (46–49). The "bee-woman" is commended both for her lifelong fidelity to her husband and for her ability to make his life prosperous (85). Semonides observes that whoever dwells with any other kind of woman will not quickly drive hunger from his house (100–101).

The thievish nature of women is naturally combined with deceitfulness in speech. Thus Hesiod in the Works and Days describes Pandora as being endowed by Hermes with lies and crafty words and a thievish (epiklopos) nature (78). Later he warns the reader (a male reader, naturally) not to be deceived by a woman with a sweeping train (pygostolos). She will beguile a man with deceitful words, but all she is after is his barn (373–374). Grimly, he concludes, "He who puts his faith in women puts faith in deceivers" (375). Three centuries later, in Old Comedy, the thieving ways of women still constitute a commonplace, together with their reputation for sexual license. Among all the charges lodged against women by the Greek misogynists the two that are most persistent are just these: they impoverish their husbands by not being good housewives, and they betray them by not being faithful. The reverse of the coin, the good woman, as portrayed in epitaphs and encomia, is valued equally for her chastity and her domesticity. That the concept of sophrosyne embraces the first of these virtues no one doubts; it remains to consider the relation of sophrosyne to oikonomia.

There are etymological reasons why a connection between the two concepts would come easily to the Greek mind. If sophrosyne in its radical sense means soundness of mind, that soundness can easily develop in the direction of "shrewdness" or "good sense", especially in protecting one's own advantage. Sophrosyne enables its possessor to be safe in various ways. Such an excellence soon came to be valued in the Greek polis, and sophrosyne has a long history as a civic virtue (predicated always of men, never of women). The polis of the late archaic and early classical period depends for its safety and prosperity on many excellences in its citizens—in wartime, obviously courage, in peacetime, not only restraint and moderation,

17 Aristophanes, Thesm. 419–420, 556–557, 812–813, Ecc. 14–15, Frogs 1043. The persistence of the motive connecting deceit with spinning, as typical of women, is indicated by its recurrence in the Wife of Bath's Prologue, 401–402 (Deceite, wepyng, spynnyng God hath yive/ To wommen kyndely, whil that they may lyve).
but good sense and shrewdness in managing the affairs of the city. Good management is described in Greek by such words as *eu oikein* or *dioikein*, and in the fourth century good management of both household and state is unequivocally linked with *sophrosyne* (Plato, *Meno* 73A–B; cf. *Symp.* 209A–B).

It is not surprising that Greeks who distinguished masculine from feminine forms of excellence—as most Greeks did—should sometimes do so in terms of *eu oikein* or *oikonomia*—the man directing this activity towards the affairs of the city, the woman towards her own household. Gorgias is supposed to have said something like this according to the *Meno* (71E), whose dramatic date would be late in the fifth century, but he does not relate either kind of *oikonomia* to *sophrosyne*, nor does Aristotle in the *Politics*, when he distinguishes between the tasks of men and women on the basis of two types of *oikonomia*, the one acquiring, the other preserving (1277b20–25).

Apart from the Platonic Socrates in the *Meno*, Xenophon is the first, as far as I know, to define both masculine and feminine *sophrosyne* with reference to *oikonomia*. The issue arises in the *Economics*, which reports a conversation between Socrates and a certain young land-owner, Xenophon himself thinly disguised. Part of the dialogue consists of an account by the young man of how he taught his bride her responsibilities in their new partnership. When she protests that she can do nothing to help her husband manage his estate, because her mother has taught her just one thing, *sophrosyne* (i.e., to be chaste, modest, a good wife in the narrower sense), her bridegroom responds that in fact his father has taught him the same virtue, for *sophrosyne* is proper to both sexes. It is the part of those who possess it, whether men or women, to act in such a way as to preserve what they have as well as possible and to acquire in addition as much else as they can, provided that they do not violate what is fair and just (7.14–15). The interesting thing here is not so much the definition of *sophrosyne* as guarding one’s advantage (although this is important in the history of the concept), but rather the perception that the common element unifying masculine and feminine facets of *sophrosyne* may be *oikonomia*. While Xenophon at this point sounds as though he intends to maintain the Socratic doctrine that virtue is one, whether manifested in men or women, he very shortly reverts to the traditional Greek view of specialized function, according to which God has made women suited to indoor work, including spinning and weaving. It is not surprising that he repeatedly compares the position of the wife in the *oikos* to that of a queen bee (7.17).

The “Socratic” position is, of course, maintained and developed by
Plato, who derives from it many consequences important for the position of women in the Ideal State, especially their eligibility for higher education and promotion to the rank of philosopher-ruler. Related to the general question of feminine capacities is a special theme prominent in the Republic, Statesman, and Laws—that of the dangerous polarity of the two temperaments, what Plato usually calls the sophron (gentle, moderate) and the andreion (spirited). It is a fundamental doctrine of his three principal works on statesmanship that the two natures must be combined, woven into one fabric, if the state is to be strong. The andreion temperament is of course masculine, the sophron feminine. Glenn Morrow, discussing the emphasis on this subject in the Laws, points out, "The masculine nature tends towards majesty and valor; the feminine towards orderliness and temperance. These differences are of considerable import; for the feminine qualities, it should be noted, are precisely those which in an earlier passage (628 ff.) [Plato] has said a state most needs." In both the Republic and the Laws Plato indicates in various ways his preference for the sophron temperament, but although he clearly realizes that this temperament is feminine and that the state has the greatest need of the qualities identified with it, he never puts the two propositions together and draws the conclusion that the state needs, not women who are as much like men as possible, but citizens who excel in qualities that, in Greek society, are seen most often in women.

In connection with the theme of the two temperaments we should not overlook the controlling metaphor of the Statesman, in which the ruler is explicitly compared to a weaver whose task is to combine the bold and the gentle, the andreion and the sophron, and prevent the dangerous excess of either without the other. Weaving is woman's work, and the statesman is not only blending feminine with masculine qualities to produce the strongest possible fabric in the state, but is using feminine techniques to accomplish this task. Perhaps this is really the Philosopher-Queen at work.

Whatever the sex of the Statesman, Plato had a notable predecessor in the use of the weaver-metaphor. Lysistrata, in Aristophanes' comedy, employs this very analogy when she explains to the magistrate how to restore order and justice to war-torn Greece, a task at which women are likely to be more competent than men. She describes how women untangle yarn, wash dirty wool, bring together all the necessary skeins, and ultimately weave a strong cloak for the state (567–568). This is not the only passage in Old Comedy which raises in jest an issue that philosophers

took up in all seriousness a generation or two later, and it is particularly remarkable how often fourth-century philosophy analyzed, defined, and commended as essential to the well-being of the state the virtues that were familiar in fifth-century drama as the qualities proper to women—self-restraint, cooperation, lack of aggressiveness.

Nevertheless, in spite of the willingness of Plato and, later, the Stoics to concede to women at least a theoretical capacity to achieve the same kind of arete as men, there was overwhelming pressure from ancient society to make even philosophers assume that a woman is best occupied when she has a spindle in her hand. Thus the Stoic Musonius Rufus, sometimes called the Roman Socrates, in a discourse entitled That Women Should Study Philosophy (Or. III) insists that they should, because they are endowed with the same capacities as men, but it turns out that, like most contemporary philosophers, he has lost interest in the more theoretical aspects of his discipline and defines philosophy merely as the effort to live well, i.e., in accordance with the cardinal virtues. Hence the proof that women should study philosophy amounts to little more than a series of statements about their capacity to achieve these virtues and apply them to the solution of their practical problems. According to Musonius, the first requirement is still that a woman be a good housekeeper, although he regards this as a manifestation of episteme, not sophrosyne (which now implies superiority to passion, the fundamental Stoic virtue).

How very limited Musonius is, as a champion of the liberated woman, becomes painfully clear from a passage in which he seeks to defend her. Some critics have charged that women who associate with philosophers are bold and brazen, abandoning their household tasks to go about with men, practicing speeches, behaving like sophists, and analyzing syllogisms, when they ought to be sitting at home spinning. Musonius replies that the study of philosophy is useful only if it has practical results; disputation is worthless if it does not help the soul attain virtue. He concludes with a ringing assertion that philosophy will actually instil in women modesty (aidos), sophrosyne, and oikonomia.

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Five Textual Notes

F. H. SANDBACH

I. Heraclitus fr. 126 DK, 39 Bywater, 42 Marcovich

ὁ παλαιὸς γὰρ Ἡ<ρά>κλείτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἐκαλεῖτο δεινὸς διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ σκοτεινόν τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν ψύχεται, ὅ<γρον> αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται.

This comes from a note by John Tzetzes on his Commentary on the Iliad, at present published only from an incomplete 15th-century ms. of that Commentary, belonging to the University of Leipzig’s library, by G. Hermann in Draco Stratonicensis et Tzetzes (Leipzig, 1812). The notes are mutilated; the letters in the angled brackets above were supplied by Hermann.

G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus (Cambridge, 1954), 150–151, remarks on the abruptness with which the quotation is introduced and the arbitrary change of number. L. Bachmann, Scholia in Homeri Iliadem (Leipzig, 1835), reprinted Hermann’s text with some emendations, probably conjectural, but unmarked and unexplained. Here he made all the adjectives neuter plural. That Kirk’s unease and Bachmann’s change were justified is shown by a carefully written ms. of the 14th century in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge (R.16.33). It contains Tzetzes’ notes undamaged, and reads ὁ παλαιὸς γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ἐκαλεῖτο δεινὸς διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ σκοτεινόν, λέγων ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὰ ψύχεται, ύγρὰ αὐαίνεται, καρφαλέα νοτίζεται.

This is how the fragment should be printed, with some confirmation from Epist. Heracliti 5, ύγρὰ αὐαίνεται, θερμὰ ψύχεται. But I think that Tzetzes wrote or intended to write ἐκαλεῖτο σκοτεινός, since Heraclitus

1 On this ms. see E. Maass, Hermes xix (1884) 264 ff. and RE 2 vii. col. 1967.
2 Noted in RE, loc. cit., and used by O. Masson, Parola del Passato, v (1950) 71, who found in it some new fragments of Hipponax. Unlike the Leipzig ms., it contains the whole of the commentary on Iliad A.
was notoriously nicknamed δ ἀκοτεινός, Suda s.v., Strabo xiv 25 p. 642, Cicero, Fin. ii.15, cf. Livy xxiii.39. The mistake arose from the previous sentence, δευός ἐναθῆα δ ὁ σοφὸς διὰ τὸ μεγάλα ἐναβρίνεθαι, which refers to the other Heraclitus who wrote on Homer. He, says Tzetzes, was clever and effective because he took pains to show off; (the truth of this appears from a comparison), since Heraclitus of Ephesus got the name of Obscure because of the obscurity of his writing. The word δευός stuck in the memory either of Tzetzes or of a copyist and replaced the correct ἀκοτεινός. ἀκο may have been overlooked after ἐτο.

II. PLATO, Politicus, 259 d.

At 258 e the Eleatic stranger says that one can distinguish practical and cognitive sciences. He then asks whether the statesman (πολιτικός), the king, the master of slaves, and the master of a household exercise different arts, just as they have different names. He continues as follows (I omit the assenting replies of the young Socrates):

259 a If a private citizen were competent to advise a doctor in public practice, should we not necessarily give the same name to his expertise as to that of the man he advised? Similarly if a private citizen is clever enough to give good advice to one who is king of his country, shall we not say that he possesses the science which

b the ruler should himself have had? But the science of the true king is the science of kingship; and will not the man who possesses this science, whether he be a ruler or a private citizen, be rightly called "kingly," so far at least as his expertise is concerned?*

A further point: the master of a household and the master of slaves are one and the same thing. Now you will hardly say that there is any difference between a large household and a small city with

c respect to their government. So there is a clear answer to our question: there is a single science applicable to all these fields, and whether anyone calls it the science of kingship or of statesmanship or of household management, let us not quarrel with him. But it is also clear that no king can do more than a trifle to maintain his rule by manual work or the whole sum of bodily effort compared with what mental power and strength of personality can do. So we shall agree that the king has a closer connection with cognitive science than with manual and practical science.

d Shall we then associate statesmanship and statesman and kingship and kingly men in the same class as being all a single entity? We should therefore proceed methodically if we were next to define cognitive science.
The sentence in italics runs in Greek: τὴν ἄρα πολιτικήν καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικήν καὶ βασιλικῶν εἰς ταύτων ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα συνθήσομεν; It is strange that no-one seems to have noticed that it is out of place, breaking irrelevantly into the argument about cognitive science which begins in the middle of 259 c. That irrelevance is more noticeable because the Eleatic makes it a point that he is proceeding methodically. Nor can it be defended as an absent-minded parenthesis, for the particle ἄρα marks it as a conclusion or inference, the only usage admitted by E. des Places, Etudes sur quelques particules de liaison chez Platon. On page 245 he classes this passage among those where the principal speaker sums up after the respondent has assented to his views. But this will not do. The sentence does not sum up the previous statements, and it is narrower than the conclusion already reached at the beginning of 259 c. Where it would be in place is at the earlier point in 259 b marked by an asterisk. If we transfer it there together with the phrase τὶ μὴν; which precedes it, we shall have ταύτην ἰδίᾳ κεκτημένος οὐκ, ἀντε ἥρξιν ἀντε ἰδιώτης ὡν τυγχάνῃ, πάντως κατὰ γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτῆς βασιλικὸς ὀρθῶς προσαρθήσεται;—τὶ μὴν;—τὴν ἄρα πολιτικήν καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικήν καὶ βασιλικῶν εἰς ταύτων ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα συνθήσομεν;—δίκαιον γοῦν.

An omission might have been caused by a scribe’s eye jumping from —θῆσθαι to —θήσομεν. A minor advantage of replacing the passage here is that this removes the only instance in Plato where δίκαιον γοῦν answers a question containing the word ὀρθῶς. To say anything ὀρθῶς must be δίκαιον. Once suspicions have been aroused, they tend to multiply. What follows is less well-based than what has already been said, yet I cannot resist a doubt whether the original Platonic text has been completely restored. The ms. T originally did not have καὶ before either πολιτικῶν or βασιλικῶν. This cannot have been due to deliberate omission; it may have been due to accident, although an unlikely double accident. But if it is a reading which goes back to the archetype and has received an obvious “correction” in the mss. B and W, the modern critic would prefer to bracket the words πολιτικῶν and βασιλικῶν as explanatory additions. The preceding argument has shown that πολιτικῶς is equivalent to βασιλικός; from this equivalence is deduced the equivalence of πολιτική and βασιλική.

The omission of πολιτικῶν and βασιλικῶν would make ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα a strange phrase, since it would refer merely to the pair πολιτική and βασιλική, and this may be a reason for retaining the words. But, as the late Professor R. Hackforth said when I once discussed the passage with him, the phrase is in any case disturbing, since even if four terms precede it there are in reality only two entities to be identified. He
suggested that the phrase had been wrongly repeated, as an explanation of \(\text{εἰς ταύτων συνθήσομεν}\), from 258 e, where it was in place, since there four entities are identified.

III. PLUTARCH, QC 645 F–646 A

καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν κεκλημένων ἀγόμενοι φίλων ἐπὶ τὸ δείπνον ἔθει φιλανθρώπως τυχόντων τοῦ αὐτῶν . . . εἰ δὲ τις ἄφθονοι βαδίζει, τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν θύραν κεκλείσθαι, οὕτως αἱ μὲν περὶ τὴν ἐδώδην καὶ πόσιν ἡδονὴν κεκλημέναι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ταῖς ὀρέξεσιν ἐπόμεναι τόπων ἔχοντα, ταῖς δὲ ἄλλαις ἀκλήτους καὶ σὺν οὐδεὶ λόγῳ . . . φιληδονίας ἀπῆλλακται.

The simile does not work. The contrast between the so-called ἐπίκλητοι, persons brought to a feast by invited guests, and would-be gate-crashers does not form a parallel to the contrast between invited and uninvited pleasures. Hiatus such as that in κεκλημέναι ὑπὸ is not unparalleled in Plutarch, but it is not common. Restore normality and sense by reading κεκλημέναις ὑπὸ. “The pleasures of eating and drinking follow the appetites for food and drink, which are invited by nature, and so find a place.” Nature is the host and invites the appetites for food and drink to her table; the pleasures of eating and drinking come along in their company and are welcomed also.

The last two words have been variously and unsatisfactorily emended. I suspect that they are genuine but separated from the foregoing by a lacuna.

IV. PLUTARCH, QC 646 C

οἶκοπεί δὲ ὅτι τοῖς φυμένοις καὶ βλαστάνουσι τὰ μὲν φύλλα σωτηρίας ένεκά τοῦ καρποῦ καὶ ὅπως ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τὰ δέντρα βαλτόμενα καὶ ψυχόμενα μετρίως φέρη τὰς μεταβολὰς γέγονεν, τοῦ δὲ ἄνθους ὀρέλοις οὐδὲν ἐπιμένοντος, πλὴν εἰ τι χρωμέναις ἦμιν ἐπιτερπέσ αὐθερεθαῖ καὶ ἱδεῖν ἥδι παρέχει, θαυμαστὰς μὲν σαμοὺς αἱρεῖνα, ποικιλίαν δὲ ἀμμήτους χρώμασι καὶ βαραῖς ἀνοιγόμενα.

τὰ δέντρα del. Paton, ut subjectum sit τὰ φυμένα καὶ βλαστάνουτα ἀφιέντα et ἀνοιγόμενα inter se transp. Wytenbach ἀνοίγοντα Turnebus ἀμπεχόμενα Pohlenz ποικίλα . . . ρεινόμενα Reiske.

The speaker is arguing that flowers, not leaves, should be used to make garlands. The leaves used in garlands were predominantly those of what the Greeks called δέντρα: bay, pine, myrtle, oak, vine, and ivy. Hence, although leaves are useful to all plants and not merely to “trees,” he may well have introduced δέντρα as the subject of the verb. He will very
shortly say ὅ μόνης...τῆς δάφνης τῶν φύλλων ἀπὸ πάμπων ἱέρη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀλλών φείδεσθαι δείδρων.

In the last sentence ἄφεντα and ἀνοιγόμενα are written as if τῶν ἀνθῶν had preceded, not τοῦ δὲ ἀνθῶς. This is easy, but there are other difficulties, one of which I cannot solve, the other I think I can.

What leaves me uncertain is the question whether ποικιλίαν can be governed by ἄφεντα, for which Plato, Lysis 222 B, ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς παντοδαπὰ ἡφίει χρώματα offers a weak support. If so ἀνοιγόμενα, "when they open," might be a not very happily placed participle, to be taken both with the μέν-clause and the δὲ-clause. Otherwise the final word must govern ποικιλίαν and, since ἀνοιγόμενα can hardly be transitive, it must be corrupt.

ποικιλίαν needs an epithet to balance θαυμαστὸς before ὁμοῖος. Translators attempt to supply the need by renderings such as "a variety of inimitable colours and hues," or "l'inimitable jeu de couleurs et de tons qu'elles déploient." But βαφαί does not mean "hues," and the dative of description is not a Greek construction, although ablatives of description are common in Latin. Plutarch must have written ποικιλίαν δ'ἀμίμητον χρώμασι καὶ βαφαῖς, "a variety inimitable by pigments or dyes," meaning that painters and other craftsmen, with a limited range of colours available, are unable to reproduce the variety offered by nature's flowers. Cf. Mor. 58 c, οἱ γραφεῖς ἀνθηρὰ χρώματα καὶ βάμματα μυγνύονσιν.

V

Gregory of Nazianzus, Epist. xii, addressing Nikoboulos, who had scoffed at the small stature of his wife, Alypiane, reproves him, and after enumerating her merits concludes, according to the mss., followed by editors, ὅντως οὗ μετείχαι ψυχή, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἐκτὸς ἐόντα πρὸς τὸν ἐντὸς βλέπειν άνθρωπον. There is no reason why Gregory should have used the epic form ἐόντα for ἐόντα, as seems to be assumed in the recent Budé edition, which translates the second clause "et l'extérieur doit se juger d'après l'intérieur." But by the fourth century A.D., Gregory's time, confusion of o and ω was common. What he meant was δεῖ τὸν ἐκτὸς ἐόντα πρὸς τὸν ἐντὸς βλέπειν άνθρωπον, "one ought to disregard the outer man and look to the inner." I hope that the false spelling was that of a copyist and not his own.

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It is easy to say that we know nothing of Pindar’s music; but our ignorance does not give us the right to think that we can interpret his odes correctly while taking no account of his music. His words and his metrical structure, even if understood correctly, give us only one half of his art; his rhythm and his melody are not less important because we have no direct information about them. His odes were written to be sung by a choir, and persons who heard them sung as the composer intended were surely less likely to remember their logical structure or their moral message than their musical design, the musical relation between strophe, antistrophe, and epode, the way in which words were fitted to music rather than the words by themselves, and the variation between one strophe or epode and another. They were also likely to remember the climactic points, and whether they were the same in each triad; and, if they were singers, they would remember the technical difficulties and the passages which it gave them special pleasure to sing or to hear; these may not always be the passages that readers of the mere words admire most.

We cannot give life to Pindar’s music unless we can supply more than the patterns which metricians offer us. We may not want to trust our imagination to supply details that are missing, but refusal to use our imagination does not protect us from error. It is hard for me to sympathize with anyone who thinks that, because he cannot see round the corner, there cannot be anything of interest there. I have set forth elsewhere some of my views about the rhythm of Pindar’s dactylo-epitrite odes.¹ I cannot

¹ “Catalexis and Anceps in Pindar, A Search for Rhythmical Logic,” *GRBS*, 15 (1974) 171–191. Some of the argument of that article and the main theses of the present article were first presented orally in papers to the Classical Section of the Philological Association.
expect that many readers will accept all my solutions and I shall not repeat my arguments here. I propose, instead, to begin by stating quite dogmatically that in every strophe there must be one or more places where the singer is given time to take breath without disturbing the rhythm, where he has a rest\(^2\) (the equivalent of a *longum* or a *breve*, sometimes even longer), during which the instruments will not necessarily be silent or the dancers at a standstill; and generally it is not difficult to see where these rests are\(^3\) (they need not be the same in each strophe). When, for example, a dactylic figure ends in this fashion:

\[ - \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \]

or this:

\[ - \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \]

and is followed by an epitrite figure or a further dactylic passage, the phrasing can tell us whether these are appropriate places for the singer to take breath, with the rest of a *breve* in the first instance:

\[ \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \]

and a *longum* in the second

\[ \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \quad \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \quad \overline{\texttt{-}} \overline{\texttt{\textacuted{-}}} \]

of the Pacific Coast at Gonzaga University in November 1970 and to the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, in February 1972. The present version represents a complete revision and, it is hoped, an improvement on the earlier versions.

\(^2\) One can hardly expect an entire Pindaric strophe to be sung without rest or pause for breath. Scholars who have concerned themselves with Greek lyric and with the restoration of Greek musical texts have shown themselves strangely indifferent to practical considerations of this kind. A notable example of such indifference is the musical version, in modern notation, of the First Delphic Paean, first presented by H. Weil and T. Reinach (*BCH*, 17 [1893] 569–610, 18 [1894] 345–389), and reprinted in numerous later publications, e.g., in J. U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina* (Oxford, 1925) 146–159 (for other publications in which this text is reprinted and for recent bibliography see E. Pohlmann, *Griechische Musikfragmente, Erlanger Beiträge*, 8 (Nürnberg, 1960) 80). The singer is apparently expected to continue without rest or break until he reaches the end of a long sentence. Although critics, in restoring the text, have considered difficulties of tonality (e.g. Pohlmann, *op. cit.* 60–66), they seem prepared to treat the singers as having “lungs of bronze.”

\(^3\) The measured rest was perfectly familiar to Greek musicians. Cf. e.g. the clear statement of Aristides Quintilianus 1.18 (27J, 41M): *κενὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ χρόνος ἀνέυ φθόγγου πρὸς ἀναπήρωσιν τοῦ μυθοῦ, λέιμα δὲ ἐν μυθῷ χρόνος κενὸς ἑλάχιστος, πρόσθεσις δὲ χρόνος κενὸς μακρὸς ἑλάχιστος διαπλασίω. Modern metricians seem content to ignore its existence. For example, Paul Maas, in his *Greek Metre* (English trans., Oxford, 1962), makes no distinction between a pause, denoted by the symbol \(\quad\), which is a break in the rhythm, and a rest which is not. And his index of Greek words lists neither χρόνος nor κενὸς.
And if an epitrite figure ends
\[ \text{- o - - o - o} \]
or
\[ \text{- o - - - o} \]
this will often mean
\[ \text{\textit{d} d d d | d d d d d} \]
or
\[ \text{\textit{d} d d d | d d d d} \]
In more formal and general terms, the so-called catalectic metron, whether dactylic hemiepes or epitrite dipody,
\[ \text{- oo - oo -} \quad \text{or} \quad \text{- o - - o -} \]
is an indication that a close is being reached (though handbooks on metre fail to point out that this is what the word catalectic means).\(^4\)
Sometimes also when the final syllable of a noncatalectic metron is short, this is an indication that a short rest may be taken, but unless there is word division this is clearly impossible; and there are occasions when this short syllable does not coincide with the end of a word.

It is not the purpose of this article to quarrel with current metrical theory, but to examine two of Pindar's dactylo-epitrite odes in an attempt to discover how they may have been performed, how the singers could perform them without becoming breathless, and what dynamic subtleties were called for, such as changes in tempo (accelerando-ritardando) and variation between forte and piano (crescendo-diminuendo), where the major and minor climaxes occur in each strophe and epode and what notes could or should receive stronger emphasis or accentuation than others, apart from the normal demands of the rhythm. The words must be our guide, and they will often tell us where a triumphant fortissimo is demanded and what are the climactic notes after which a diminuendo must begin.\(^5\)

The Ninth Nemean and Third Olympian have been chosen for examination, two odes which appear to offer fairly straightforward examples of dactylo-epitrite metre and contain very few metrical problems. The Ninth Nemean will be taken first. It is monostrophic, with the strophe repeated eleven times. A metrical scheme is set forth below with a line division, which is meant to show the alternation between dactylic movement (4-time, the \( \text{i} \text{os} \text{os} \ \text{l} \text{o} \text{y} \text{o} \text{s} \)) and epitrite movement (7-time, which is a


\(^5\) The musical texts discovered so far are not as helpful as one might have hoped.
regular alternation between 4-time and 3-time, between the ἰσος λόγος and the διπλάσιον λόγος).  

Str. 1 Κωμάσοµεν παρ’ Ἀπόλλωνος Σεκουνόθε, Μοῖσαι, 
τὰν νεοκτίσταν ἐς Αἴτηνα, 
ἐνθ’ ἀναπηπταµέναι ξείνων νεκίκανται θύραι, 
δύβιον ἐς Χροµίου δοµι’. 
’Αλλ’ ἐπέων γλυκοῦ ύµον πράσσετε. 
Τὸ κρατήσαπον γὰρ ἐς ἀρµ’ ἀναβαίνων 
µατέρι καὶ διδύµοις παῖς 
δεσσαν αὐδὰν µανάτει Πυθῶνος ἀπεινάς ὁµοκλάρως ἐπόπτας.  

| -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |--
Hiatus poses no problem to a singer if it occurs at a *catalexis*, where there is a rest, as at line 7 in strophes 7 and 9. But at any other place in the strophe it will require some explanation. We should not suppose that Pindar was oblivious to technical difficulties, since we are told that his singers were amateurs, not highly trained professionals.8 If a singer is to observe hiatus strictly, without any kind of crasis, as he will want to do at comma, colon, or period, he will need plenty of time to take breath—more time than if there is no hiatus; and whenever hiatus occurs, in lyric or dramatic poetry, or in oratory, one must ask whether the occasion permits him time enough to take breath or not.9 Hiatus occurs in this ode in strophes 9 and 10 before the final syllable of line 10, ἀμέρα. ιστω, γίνεται ἐγκιρνάτω, corresponding to μανέει Πυθώνος in strophe 1.10 One must ask, therefore, if there is not perhaps a rest at this point, particularly as there is word division here, at the same place, in every strophe; and in strophe 3, as well as strophes 9 and 10, it seems appropriate to punctuate with a period.

Modern editors generally try, so far as possible, to make line division correspond to word division, and it is customary to think of the line as ending with μανέει, so that the final phrase of the strophe takes the metrical form

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

This means changing the *schema* of the epitrite foot from — — — — to — — — —, a form of rhythmical *metabole* which Aristoxenus recognized,11 and finishing with a hypermetric syllable. The only objection to this is that there is no clear example of Pindar finishing a strophe or epode with this

8 In Aristot. *Prob.*, 19.15 we are told that the antistrophic odes of earlier days were performed by οἱ ἐλεύ瑟εροι αὐτοί, who could not be expected to be so proficient as the ἀγωνισταί, and therefore ἄπλοντερα ἐποίουν αὐτοίς τά μέλη. ἢ δὲ ἀντίστροφος ἄπλον. Εἰς ῥυθμός γάρ ἡτι καὶ ἐνι μετετέσται.

9 I have discussed the difficulties that hiatus creates for an orator, as well as its purposes, in “Hiatus and its purposes in Attic Oratory,” *AJP*, 96 (1975) 138–159. An orator does not as a rule take breath at hiatus, unless he is prepared to take plenty of time (as at the end of a sentence). Hiatus in the middle of a sentence makes heavy demands on a speaker’s powers of breath control—in any language, as readers can discover quickly for themselves.

10 It is possible that the choir sang ἀμέρα. ιστω, that the digamma was pronounced even though no longer written. And, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus points out (*Dem.*, 38), one way of handling hiatus is to insert a semivowel. But it may be doubted if choirmasters would permit their choirs to sing γίνεται ἐγκιρνάτω, when the period marks a clear break.

rhythmical figure, though he frequently finishes with a series of normal epitrites:

\[ \boxed{\begin{array}{c}
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\end{array}} \]

Line division as adopted by modern editors has no musical meaning. What the singer would need to know (and no arrangement of the lines in a modern text will tell him this) is how Pindar wanted the closing sequence of the strophe to be sung—in which of the following ways?

\[
\mu \alpha \nu \nu \epsilon i \quad \Pi \nu \theta \omega \nu o s \quad \alpha i \pi e i \nu \acute{o} s \quad \omicron \mu o k l \acute{a} \rho o i s \quad \acute{e} \pi \o \acute{p} \tau o i s
\]

1. \[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{| } d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \\
\end{array} \]
2. \[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{| } d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \\
\end{array} \]
3. \[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{| } d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \\
\end{array} \]
4. \[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{| } d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \quad d \\
\end{array} \]

The first version is undoubtedly the simplest rhythmically, and if we think that the author of the Problems means what he says about the simplicity of antistrophic song—\( \epsilon i s \ \rho \nu \theta \mu o s \ \gamma a r \ \lambda \varepsilon \tau i \ kai \ \acute{e} \nu i \ \mu e \tau \rho \epsilon i t a i \)—we may think we are bound to accept this version. There is indeed no serious reason for not adopting it, provided the singer can take a quick breath before \( \Pi \nu \theta \omega \nu o s \) (and the corresponding word in other strophes), even when there is hiatus, because he is surely expected to sing what follows all in one breath and quite loud.\(^{14}\)

In strophes 6 and 8 we have \( \epsilon \nu \nu o \mu o n \ \alpha i \tau \acute{e} w \) and \( \chi e \acute{m} \mu a o n \ \acute{a} \gamma \chi o \acute{d} \) corresponding to \( \mu \alpha \nu \nu \epsilon i \ \Pi \nu \theta \omega \nu o s \), that is — \text{—} instead of — \text{—} —, a

\(^{12}\) As in the strophes of \( O l. \ 3, \ O l. \ 6, \ P y. \ 9, \) and elsewhere. In some editions of Pindar the epodes of \( O l. \ 8, \ N e m. \ 5, \) and \( I s t h m. \ 1 \) are printed in such a way that the closing rhythm appears to be:

\[ \boxed{\begin{array}{c}
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\end{array}} \]

But it is easy to rearrange the lines so as to give

\[ \boxed{\begin{array}{c}
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\text{—} \quad \text{—} \\
\end{array}} \]

\(^{13}\) See note 8 above.

\(^{14}\) A singer can be expected to manage three epitrites in one breath, but when Pindar wants four to be sung without a break, he provides breathing points that will not interrupt the rhythm.

One can hardly object that breathing may be a musical notion alien to Greek music, but I have found no previous study of breathing points in Pindar’s odes. J. Irigoin, \( R e c h e r c h e s \ \text{sur les mètres de la lyrique chorale grecque} \) (Paris, 1953) has examined word division in Pindar and other lyric poets, and tried to show how they avoided word endings at certain points, preferring caesura to diaeresis, in order to maintain rhythmic continuity; and his arguments have been criticized and improved by Laetitia Parker, “Some recent researches on the versification of Pindar and Bacchylides,” \( B I C S, \ 5 \) (1958) 13–24. The statistics that they provide are not without interest, but neither of them is prepared to say when a division between words justifies a break or pause (except where it is obvious) or when it invites a singer to take breath.
tertia brevis in the epitrite. The occasional occurrence of this tertia brevis in Pindar has disturbed metricians and editors, and some effort has been made to abolish all occurrences by emendation. But in this instance a short syllable instead of a long gives the singer a rest in which to take breath—\( \text{\textbf{\textdegree} \textbf{\textdegree} \textbf{\textdegree} } \). Far from causing difficulty, the so-called irregularity makes things easier for the singer. If he is following version 1, as proposed, in other strophes it must be assumed that he cuts the long syllable slightly short in order to take breath, so that the correct modern notation would be \( \text{\textbf{\textdegree} \textbf{\textdegree} \textbf{\textdegree} } \). It may be significant that this curtailed long syllable does not bear a tonic accent except in strophe 2—a very proper exception, one might think, since \( \text{\textgamma}\text{\textomega} \) is not a word that calls for special emphasis.

The singers will take the opportunity to breathe whenever rhythm and phraseology permit, and the places will not necessarily be the same in each strophe. In strophe 1 there is an opportunity after \( \text{\textit{Moi\delta\alpha}} \) (2) or \( \text{\textit{A\^i\pi\nu\nu}} \) (3), but in strophe 2 the second alternative, after \( \text{\textit{ka\lambda\upsilon\phi\mu}} \), is better. Another breathing point in strophe 1 might be after \( \text{\textit{\varphi\alpha\beta\epsilon\beta\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota}} \) (8), but in strophe 2 a better place is after \( \text{\textit{ko\ro\nu\varphi\uomicron}} \) (7). In all these places, except the last, there is no tonic accent on the long note which is not sustained to its full length if breath is taken after it.

In strophe 2 as well as strophe 1 the final phrases declare in solemn style the intention of praise, and might acquire additional solemnity by a slight ritardando. But the choir’s jubilant enthusiasm should first show itself very strongly in two earlier phrases, in strophe 1 \( \text{\textit{\delta\beta\iota\iota\iota \varepsilon \textit{X}r\omicron\omicron\omicron \delta\omicron\iota\iota}} \) (6), and to \( \text{\textit{\kappa\rhot\eta\pi\alpha\pi\omicron\nu\nu \gamma\iota\rbar \varepsilon \textit{\alpha\rmi}}} \) (8), and in strophe 2 \( \text{\textit{\alpha\ladder \textit{\alpha\ladder \varepsilon\nu\nu \beta\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron \phi\omicron\omicron\gamma\gamma}} \), and \( \text{\textit{\i\pi\pi\iota\omicron\nu \varepsilon\thbeta\ladder \kappa\ro\nu\varphi\uomicron}} \). At the same point in each strophe the choir calls for music in praise of Chromius, recalling his victory and his horses. Each phrase comes immediately after a catalexis, and the singers should have plenty of breath to sing fortissimo. Thus in each strophe there are two climactic phrases in the middle, with a solemn formal phrase at the close. And it is worth while to notice how the tonic

\[ \Delta\lambda\omicron\upsilon \kappa\sigma\alpha\gamma\nu\gamma\eta\tau\alpha, \sigma\theta\sigma\varepsilon\nu \text{\textit{\alpha\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu}} \]
\[ \upsilon\omicron\nu\nu \text{\textit{\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \theta\epsilon\mu\nu}} \]
\[ \alpha\nu\nu\nu \text{\textit{\alpha\ladder\ladder\ladder \mu\gamma\gamma\gamma \i\pi\pi\iota\omicron\nu}} \]
\[ \text{\textit{Z\nu\nu\nu \textit{\textit{A\^i\pi\nu\nu\nu}}} \chi\rbar\rbar} \]
\[ \text{\textit{\textit{\alpha\rmi}} \text{\textit{\delta}} \text{\textit{\omicron\omicron\omicron \textit{X}r\omicron\omicron\omicron \textit{N}e\textit{m}\nu\nu \textit{\theta}}} \]

The key words \( \upsilon\omicron\nu\nu, \alpha\nu\nu, \alpha\rmi \), all come after a catalexis, and thus receive special emphasis; and in antistrophe 1 \( \text{\textit{Moi\delta\alpha}} \) corresponds to \( \upsilon\omicron\nu\nu \) and \( \text{\textit{Z\nu\nu\nu}} \) to \( \alpha\rmi \). Cf. also in the first strophe of \textit{Py. g'} \( \text{\textit{\epsilon\kappa \textit{P}a\ell\omicron\upsilon \kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron \pi\omicron\omicron\omicron \pi\omicron\omicron \omicron \textit{\lambda}a\textit{t}o\textit{\omicron}\textit{\omicron}\textit{\omicron} \upsilon \textit{\alpha\rmi}} \). There is no counterpart to \( \text{\textit{\alpha\rmi}} \) in the antistrophe, but strophe 2 has \( \text{\textit{\theta\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon}} \).

16 Very similar technique can be seen in the opening strophe of \textit{Nem. 1}, which is also in honour of Chromius:
accents fall, Χρομίων δῶμ', corresponding exactly with βρομίαν φόρμυγ', and γάρ ἐσ ἄρμ' ἀναβάινων with κορυφάν, ἡ τε Φοίβω (almost as exactly). In the final phrase, in the first strophe, the voice must rise, as the accent seems to direct, to a strong high note on Πυθώνος, and likewise on μνεθείς.17

Like the first two strophes, strophes 3 and 4 show close correspondence with one another. The myth is now being told, and both strophes begin with a narrative sentence that closes with a formal statement:

άμφανε κυδαίνων πόλιν,
ήσαν μέγιστοι <λαγέται>

(the final word is Bergk's conjecture, but some noun of this metrical shape is needed to fill the lacuna). The resemblance in style and shape to the corresponding phrases in strophes 1 and 2 is unmistakable:

ζείνων νείκανταυ θύρα,
καύχας άωδα πρόσφορος.

In all four strophes the same music would be appropriate; and on each occasion the first note is accented and the last note unaccented,18 so that the phrase ends quietly at the catalexis.

The second half of strophes 3 and 4 is full of gloom and foreboding, Adrastus' exile from Argos and the ill-omened expedition of the Seven against Thebes. There is perfect balance between καὶ δεινὰν στάσιν πατρίων οἶκων ὀπὸ τ' "Ἀργεως and ἄνδρῳν αἰσθάν οὐ κατ' ὀρνίχων ὀδόν.

The strong negative οὐ gains additional strength because it comes immediately after the rest at the catalexis, as does πατρίων οἶκων, and the fourth strophe helps the singer to see how the third should be sung, emphasizing the word πατρίων. The tonic correspondence between

17 One cannot overlook the difference between perispomenon (rise and fall) and oxys (rise), but for a singer the similarity (an initial rise) may be more important than the difference, except at a final close. Erik Wahlström, "Accentual Respiration in Greek strophic poetry," Soc. Scient. Fennica, Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, 47 (1970) 21, says: "Perispomena and long oxytona less frequently occur on corresponding syllables in poetry than they do if accents are randomly distributed," but his statistics are insufficient to support such a statement; indeed his discussion barely scratches the surface of the subject of tonic correspondence. The music of the Delphic Paean shows not only that perispomenon vowel sounds were favoured for sustained high notes, but also that the division of long vowel or diphthong into two notes in a falling cadence is possible whether perispomenon or oxys or unaccented, Φοίβων, γάναν, ταὐρίων, ταῦνδε, κλειστῖν, ἕμνοι. Cf. J. U. Powell, Collectanea Alexandrina, pp. 146-148, 154-159.

The correspondence in sound between Χρομίων δῶμ', and βρομίαν φόρμυγ' is as noteworthy as the tonic correspondence. Parallels are not difficult to find in Pindar, the most familiar being in Ol. 1, ἄρσιου μὲν ὀθρω, θεμιστέον δς (ant. 1), χάρις δ' ἀπερ (str. 2). For fuller illustrations see C. J. Brennan, "A peculiarity of choric response," CR, 20 (1906) 386-92.

18 Unless the lost word was oxytone. Note also the tonic correspondence between γλαφυροῖς and Δαναών, as compared with ἀναπεπταμένα, ἐπέων, in strophes 1 and 2.
\(\text{δρυ\&\nu})\text{ων} \text{δ\&\nu} \text{ν} \text{αικων} \delta\text{π\&\nu} \) is also striking. The solemn closing statements are not joyful, as in strophes 1 and 2, but have a warning note; and the accents on κρ\(\text{\&\nu})\text{σ\&\nu})\text{ων} \text{αικε̱ων} \) seem to be in contrast with Πυθ\(\text{\&\nu})\text{ων} \text{αικε̱ων} \) in the opening strophes.

The close correspondence between odd and even-numbered strophes does not continue. Neither breathing points nor phrases can be matched against each other in the next four strophes (5–8). The narrative ends in the middle of strophe 6, and after a brief comment that even heroes are helpless \(\text{ἐν δαμονίωσι φά\&\nu})\text{ωσ} \), the second part of the strophe is taken up with a prayer to Zeus to delay any conflict between Syracuse and the Carthaginians. The last thing that Pindar would want to suggest is any comparison of the present situation with the disaster of the Seven against Thebes, and it cannot be right to look for the kind of correspondence with strophe 5 that has been so evident in the earlier strophes.

The first catalexis in strophe 6 comes at the end of a sentence: \(\text{φε\&\nu})\text{γοντι και πα\&\nu})\text{\&\nu})\text{τε\&\nu})\text{ων} \) (as in the earlier strophes), but this is not the case in 5, 7, and 8. In strophe 5 \(\text{Ισ\&\nu})\text{μνοπ\&\nu}) \text{δέ} \text{ἐπ} \text{&o\&\nu})\text{θαι} \text{γλυκων νό\&\nu})\text{σων} \text{ερειο̱σμενου} \) the break comes after the adjective \(\text{γλυκων} \) which results in a heavy emphasis on \(\text{νό\&\nu})\text{σων} \), underlining the failure to return. The technique is like that at the second catalexis in strophe 4 \(\text{αισ\&\nu})\text{ων} \text{ου κατ} \text{δρυ\&\nu})\text{ων} \) where the break after the adjective draws attention to the noun that is to follow. In strophe 6 there is a similar break at the second catalexis between Φοιν\(\text{ικοσ\&\nu})\text{τολων} \) and \(\text{ε\&\nu})\text{χε̱ων} \), but an even better parallel is in strophe 7, where \(\text{αι\&\nu})\text{ρες} \) comes after the break at the second catalexis, following the adjectival phrase \(\text{κτε\&\nu})\text{ων} \text{ψυχ\&\nu})\text{ς} \text{ἐκ\&\nu})\text{οντες κρ\&\nu})\text{σ\&\nu})\text{ων} \).\(^{19}\)

There is no noticeable correspondence in tonic accent between strophes 5 and 6, but there are some good examples of it between 5 and 7, in the climactic \(\text{αι\&\nu})\text{ρες} \), corresponding to \(\text{νό\&\nu})\text{σων} \), and \(\text{α φε\&\nu})\text{ρει δόξαν} \text{το} \text{ἐπ} \text{τα} \text{γαρ} \text{δα\&\nu})\text{σαντο} \).\(^{20}\) And in the closing line \(\text{ἐκ\&\nu})\text{ρος} \text{ἀν} \) matches Ze\&\nu})\text{ς} \text{τω} \text{ν} \text{βα} \text{θ\&\nu}) \ldots . \)

More remarkable correspondence can be seen in the closing lines of strophes 6 and 8:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ζω̱} & \text{ι̱} \\
\text{α̱ς} \text{αναβάλλομαι ώς πόρ-} & \text{σιστα, μοιρα\&\nu} \text{ν δέ} \text{ε\&\nu})\text{ινομον} \\
\text{αιτέω σε πουιν χαρον Λιναϊων όπα̱ξε̱ιν}, & \text{οι̱κο\&\nu})\text{τοι με̱ν κλ\&\nu})\text{ος ανθή-} \\
& \text{σαω Σκαμ\&\nu})\text{μ\&\nu})\text{δρου χε\&\nu})\text{μα\&\nu} \text{α̱γ̱χ̱ο̱, βαθυκρ̱\&\nu})\text{μ̱νοι̱σι} \delta \text{αμφ} \text{ακται̱ς 'Ελιω̱ρου.}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{19}\) For this break between adjective and noun at a catalexis cf. \(\text{Νεμ. 1} \text{αδνεπι̱ς υμως (str. 1)}, \text{Ολ\&\nu})\text{μων δεπο̱τάς Ζε\&\nu}) \) (ant. 1).

\(^{20}\) One may reasonably suppose that the accents on \(\text{α} \) and \(\text{γαρ} \) are relatively unimportant.
In both these strophes the climax is reserved for the closing line, the earnest prayer for peace in strophe 6 and the brave comparison of Chromius with Hector in strophe 8. A strong note must be intended on the tonic accent at ζῶσι and Ἒκτορι, with a diminuendo down to εὐνομον and χεῦμασων, where (in contrast to earlier strophes) we have a proparoxytone word dying down to a short syllable, a tertia brevis, before the breathing point.\textsuperscript{21} Then the chorus comes back strongly in the final patriotic reference to the “men of Aetna” and the “cliffs of Helorus.” The local Sicilian names are evidently meant to match one another.

Strophes 9 and 10 emphasize the proper contrast between the efforts of the contest and the more peaceful delights of the banquet and honoured old age. Words and phrases of contrary meaning are set at corresponding places in the two strophes:

\[ \begin{align*}
\pi\lambda\lambda\alpha\ μ\acute{e}ν \ ε\acute{e}ν \ κοινα—\ 'Hσυχα δε \ φιλει
\ 'Εκ \ πόνων—μαλακακα
\ συν τε \ δικα—θαρσαλακ
\end{align*} \]

There are no strong climaxes, as though the choir was showing restraint in preparation for the final triumphant strophe.

This final strophe offers many interesting details. The opening word ἀργυρεῖσιν is surely to be delivered with greater conviction and exultation than the opening word in any other strophe, and the rhythmic and tonic echo is seen in φιάλαις in the second part of the dactylic figure. The voices will rise to βιατάν as never before at this point in the strophe, and never before have the epitrites, ἀμπέλου παιδ', ὡς ποθ' ἵππου, been so neatly set off and divided. Then after the first catalexis there follows:

\[ \begin{align*}
\Lambda\alpha\tau\sigma\theta\alpha \ στεφάνοις \ εκ
\ τας \ ιερας \ Σεκυνως. \ Ζευ πατερ,
\ ευχομαι \ ταυταν \ αρεταν \ κελαδησαν
\end{align*} \]

The divine word Λατοθά receives proper emphasis as it starts the dactylic figure, and at Ζευ πατερ before the second catalexis the break before ευχομαι seems sharper than ever before at this point in the strophe. One might think that the dancers and marchers were meant to stop as the voices were silent for a moment, a leimma and a prosthesis,\textsuperscript{22} before ευχομαι. Then in the final phrase the climactic note will be on νίκαν. The tonic accents, on νίκαν and on the final note, Μοισαν, are as in strophe 3.

The \textit{Third Olympian} yields equally interesting results if subjected to the

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. p. 57 above. \quad \textsuperscript{22} Cf. note 3 above.
same kind of analysis. The metrical scheme of the strophe may be presented as follows:

\[ \text{Τυνδαρίδας τε φιλοζέων ὁδεῖν καλλιπλοκάμῳ \textsuperscript{θ} Ἐλένης κλεινὼν Ἀκράγαντα γεροίρων εὐχομα, Θήρωνος Ὀλυμπιονίκαν ήμον ὀρθώσας, ἀκαμαντοπόδων ἵππων ἢσον. Μοῖσα δ' οὖτω ποι ταρέστα} \]

5 \( \muο \ νεοσύγαλον εὐρόντι τρόπον \)

Δωρίω φωνών ἐναρμόζαι πεδίλω

\[ \begin{array}{cccccccccc}
\text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} \\
\text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} \\
\text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} \\
\text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} \\
\text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} \\
\end{array} \] (Catalexis)

From a text with this line-division one can see how the flow of song continues unbroken until ἢσον, and there is no catalexis until τρόπον in line 5. There are, however, various places in the sentence where a singer might take breath. One might recommend that it be taken at Ἐλένης, εὐχομα, and ὀρθώσας (none of them oxytone words). This will not suit each subsequent strophe and antistrophe, because phrasing and word arrangement vary in each triad. In the second strophe and antistrophe, corresponding to εὐχομα, Θήρωνος, we find πανδόκω ἀλοει, Ἀλφεοῦ ἀλλ', with hiatus making it difficult, if not impossible, to take breath here. And although in the first strophe it would not be advisable to take breath after ἀκαμαντοπόδων, this is certainly the right place in antistrophe 1, after ἐπέων τε θέων, where there is a convenient short final syllable, a prima brevis in dactylic metre,

\[ \begin{array}{cccc}
\text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} & \text{—} \\
\end{array} \]

which seems to mean

\[ \begin{array}{cccc}
\text{_Api} | \text{ Api} | \text{ Api} | \text{ Api} | \text{ Api} \] \[23\]

In strophe and antistrophe 2 this is clearly the right place to breathe, as the punctuation shows, but not in strophe 3, where there is hiatus after

\[ \begin{array}{cccc}
\text{Api} | \text{ Api} | \text{ Api} | \text{ Api} | \text{ Api} \]

\[23\] I use the term prima brevis for a short syllable when it takes the place of a long at the start of a τετράδαμος ποίος (in practice -- instead of -- ). At a catalexis (or, as Maas would say, "at a pause," §66), it hardly calls for comment, \[ Api \] instead of \[ Api \]. Here, whatever rule one may devise to explain it, it is easy to understand if, instead of making any rhythmic difficulty, it makes things easier for the singer, giving him a chance to breathe, \[ Api \] instead \[ Api \].
τέρμα δρόμου,24 and it would be better to breathe after ἵμερος ἔσχεν, not necessarily pronouncing the final μυ.25

As in the Ninth Nemean, this long opening sentence of the first strophe calls for song in celebration of the victory and praises the horses; and there are climactic points in the middle of the strophe, Ὄλυμπιονίκαν ἔμοι, ἵππων ἄρτον. Μοῖσα, and at the end Δώρῳ φωνάν. The victory and the music that celebrates it are mentioned side by side. In the corresponding antistrophe the sentence is longer, continuing without break to the cœtalexis, with φόρμιγα τε ποικιλόγαρων corresponding to Θῆρων Ὅλυμπιονίκαν at the first climax, and Αὐναιδόμου παιδί τί ἵππων ἄρτον. Μοῖσα. The victory and the place of victory, the victor and his horses and his city, the music and the choir usually have their places in the first triad of a Pindaric ode;26 here the places of honour, at the climactic points, are held by the victory and the joyous music, the victor and his father and his horses. And at the end of strophe and antistrophe alike attention is drawn to the music and its association with Olympia in the solemn epitrite statement at the close after the cœtalexis:

Δώρῳ φωνάν ἐνθαρρύξα τεθίλω,
θεόμοροι νίσοντ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους Ἄοιδαί.

24 I cannot understand what Maas means by saying that hiatus is permited "only at a pause" (§66). He surely cannot think that there is a "pause" after δρόμου.
25 — — instead of — — at the close of a dactylic figure (the so-called brevis in longo) is very common and there is no difficulty or cause for comment if the word ends at that point and a rest is appropriate, as here,

ἔσχε δωδεκάγαμπτον, διδί! | διδί... Likewise with — — — instead of — — — at the close of an epitrite figure. In epode 1

παγάν ἑνεκεν Ἀμφιτριυσσάδας, — — — — — — — — — — the short syllable gives the singer a rest and an opportunity to breathe before Ἀμφιτριουσσάδας. And in epode 2

'Iστριαν μν' ἔθα Λατοῦς, — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — the final short syllable, at a colon, creates a needed breathing point at the end of a sustained statement.

Snell and Maehler (Teubner, ed., 1971) refuse to recognize these short syllables: "Ancipitia hoc in carmine P. admisisse non videtur, nam v. 14 ἑνεκεν et v. 26 μυν posito littera -ν effecta agnoscis postes." Their use of the verb "admisisse" betrays the metrician's attitude, as though the poet is taking advantage of a metrical licence, not seeking to write music that can be sung.

In epode 1 where the codices read μνᾶμα τῶν Ὅλυμπια — — — — — — — — they prefer to follow Bergk and Gildersleeve in reading Ὅλυμπια. There is no advantage for the singer in having a short syllable here, and a different musical explanation must be sought. Cf. GRBS, 15 (1974) pp. 187–191.
26 As denoted by words like νίκη, κράτος, ἵπποι, ἕμοι, μέλος, Ἀοίδα, Μοῖσα, κάμος. Cf., e.g., Ol. 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, Py. 2, 4, 6, 7.
The correspondence between strophe and antistrophe is further reinforced by words that match one another in metrical form, in tonic accent, and often in sound as well:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strophe</th>
<th>Antistrophe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Τνωδαρίδας</td>
<td>ἀγλαάκωμον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φιλοξείνοις</td>
<td>χαίταις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ἐλείς</td>
<td>στέφανοι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Θήρωνος</td>
<td>φάρμιγγα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἀκαμαντοπόδων</td>
<td>ἐπέων τε θέσων</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παρέστα</td>
<td>πρεπόντως</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἑναρμόξει πεδίλῳ</td>
<td>ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ἀοιδαὶ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rising note on the fourth syllable, Τνωδαρίδας, is repeated in every strophe and antistrophe except strophe 2, and even here there may be a secondary accent on δάμον Ὀπερβορέων as on ἀκαμαντοπόδων corresponding to ἐπέων τε θέσων. Corresponding to φιλοξείνοις we have πείδαις and κέινων in strophes 2 and 3; αἴτει and θάβμαυε in strophes 2 and 3 match γεραίρων in strophe 1 in sound if not precisely in tonic accent; and the accent on Θήρωνος also reappears in strophes 2 and 3. The epode closes with the same epitrite figure as the strophe, and the accent on Δωρίῳ occurs again in epode 3, as well as strophe 2 and antistrophes 2 and 3, the accent on ἑναρμόξει in epodes 1 and 2, as well as antistrophe 1 and strophe 2. And the accent on the final word πεδίλῳ reappears in strophes 2 and 3, antistrophes 2 and 3, and epodes 1 and 3, ἀέθλων, εἴην.27

The second strophe and antistrophe are much quieter than the first, as the tale of Heracles and the trees is told. The strophe tells how he asks Apollo’s people for the trees, since he has seen the need for them now that the altars to Zeus are consecrated; the antistrophe tells of the lack of trees, though the festival is already arranged, and his decision to seek them in the far North. The topics are the same in strophe and antistrophe, but taken in reverse order.

Even if the musical notes are the same as in the first triad, the dynamic subtleties may be different. Where the first strophe and antistrophe have the triumphant words ἵππων ἄωτον and Αἰνησίδάμον at mid-point, here

27 Comparison with other odes where the strophe ends in a similar epitrite figure shows a comparable rate of tonic correspondence, sometimes only in the first and second triad, after which it seems to be abandoned, as in Isth. 6, μελεθόγγοις ἀοιδαῖς, str. 1, Μοῖρας ἑστημαί ant. 1, βαρυφθόγγοι νευράς str. 2, but only once again, in ant. 3, φραῖρον παρανεῖ. In Isth. 1 the accentuation of the closing words of the strophe, ξεύξῳ τέλος, is repeated in ant. 1, str. and ant. 2, but not again till ant. 4 (the final triad). And in Py. 3 the first strophe ends with ἀλκτίμα νοῦσων, followed by μιχῳδία Φοίβῳ in ant. 1, but there is no further correspondence till str. 5.
we have only the phrases that mark the transition from one topic to the other, ἦδη γὰρ αὐτῷ, τοῦτων ἔδοξεν, and they do not demand the same kind of climactic emphasis. If the same musical phrase that was used to convey the triumph of Theron’s victory must convey the concern or distress of Heracles, a different tone will be needed. But both strophe and antistrophe lead up to a climax at the end—the moon flashing in the face of Heracles—a splendid moment and a marvellous Greek phrase—ἐσπέρας ὑφαλίμων ἀντέφλεξε Μήνα, and his determination to set forth on his journey to the Ister, with the climactic word postponed until the start of the epode: δὴ τὸτ’ ἐσ γαῖαν πορεύν θυμός ὄρμα Ἰστρίαν νῦν. We might have suspected from the first triad that there is no pause or rest between antistrophe and epode; now we know that there cannot be, neither here nor in the third triad, and here there is hiatus as though to warn the singer that he cannot take breath until after Ἰστρίαν νῦν.

Strophe corresponds to antistrophe at many points in word arrangement, most notably in

πιστὰ φρονέων Διὸς αἴτει,
θήκε ζαθέοις ἐπὶ κρημνοῖς.

And the tonic correspondences are numerous, often bearing no relation to those between first strophe and antistrophe:

ἀνθρώποις—ἐν βάσσῳς
ηδη—τοῦτων
πατρὶ—γυμνὸς
βομμῶν ἀγιοθέντων—κάποιος ἔξειας
ἐσπέρας—δὴ τὸτ’ ἐς.

In the third strophe the tone is joyous again, as Heracles reaches the Hyperborean land and stands in amazement at the trees, full of delight at the prospect of planting them where the horses will make their turn. The climax of the strophe is reached here; the close is solemn but peaceful, the presence of Heracles at the festival with the Dioscuri. There is good correspondence between strophe and antistrophe; Ὀδυμπόνδ’ ἵων matches ἰδε καὶ κεῖναν χθόνα, the return to Olympia after the journey to the North, and the song in honour of Theron’s victory is paired with the achievement of Heracles, the planting of the trees, so that the phrases which occur at mid-point—ἵππων φυτεύσαι, Ἐθήρων τ’ ἐλθεῖν κύδος—recall the corresponding triumphant words of the first triad—ἵππων ἄωτον, Λινησιδάμον παιδί. The correspondence in word-arrangement and tonic accent must be left for the reader to seek for himself; it is as noteworthy as in the preceding triads.
In the epode, unlike the strophe, there are four clear catalexis:

\[ \delta \tau \iota \iota \kappa \rho \iota \alpha \iota \nu \nu \, \varepsilon \varepsilon \varepsilon \tau \iota \mu \mu \alpha \zeta \varsigma \, 'H\rho\alpha\kappa\lambda\varepsilon\varsigma \, \pi \rho \o \tau \varepsilon \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \, \alpha \tau \rho \varepsilon \kappa \varepsilon \varsigma \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \, 'E\lambda \nu \lambda \nu \varsigma \iota \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \, \gamma \lambda \nu \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigm
This is a solemn moment in each epode. Pindar uses a similar word-arrangement in the first antistrophe, before the catalexis: ἃ τε Πίσα μὲ γεγωνεὶν τὰς ἁπο. But it has no parallel in any other strophe or antistrophe.

In each of the three epodes the development that follows this solemn moment at the third catalexis is treated in similar style, with insistence on three details:

(1) The olive, from the North—Heracles brought it—as a trophy for victors at Olympia.
(2) Eurystheus, at Zeus’ order, called for the golden hind—which Taygeta dedicated—to Artemis Orthia.
(3) Theron, by his achievements—.touches the pillars of Heracles—no man can go further—it would be folly to try.

Comparison of the wording in each epode shows how perfect the correspondence is:

(1) Ἰστρον ἀπὸ σκιαράν παγῶν ἔνεικεν
       Ἀμφίτρωπινάδας
       μνάμα τῶν Ὀλυμπίας κάλλιστον ἄθλων.
(2) χρυσόκερων ἔλαφον ὧθλειαν ἄξονθ’,
       ἰν ποτε Ταυγέτα
       ἄντιθεῖα Ὥρθωσια ἐγραψεν ἱεράν.
(3) σικοδεῖν Ἡρακλέος σταλᾶν. τὸ πόρω δ’
       ἐστὶ σοφός ἁθατον
κάσαροις. οὗ νῦν διώξω. κεινὸς εἶν.

A change comes with the closing words of the third epode, where both word division and tonic accentuation are different. Pindar returns to a statement about himself in the first person, like that which closed the first strophe. Perhaps the music was fashioned so as to recall the closing cadence of the first strophe. These three epodes are examples of Pindar’s technical artistry in its most exquisite form, and if we had his music we should understand it more completely. But as things are, οὗ νῦν διώξω. κεινὸς εἶν.

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For nearly sixty years the English-speaking world was under the spell of a phantasm, so far as the origin of tragedy is concerned. The beginning of this obsession, or delusion, can be dated to 1912 when Gilbert Murray published in Jane Harrison’s *Themis* an “Excursus on the Ritual Forms Preserved in Greek Tragedy.”

Professor Murray claimed to have discovered in Greek tragedy extensive remnants of a prehistoric ritual sequence in six parts, or acts. In it were enacted the passion, death, and resurrection of an *Eniautos-Daimon* or Year-Spirit who could also be, and indeed was, identified with Dionysos, Adonis, etc. The full sequence comprised an *Agón*, a contest of Light against Darkness, Summer against Winter; a *Pathos* of the Daimon, in which he was slain, stoned, and/or torn to pieces; a *Messenger* who reported the tragic event; a *Thrēnos* or lamentation over it; a *Recognition* or discovery of the slain Daimon, followed by his *Resurrection* or epiphany or apotheosis. With this last stage went a drastic *Peripety* or reversal of feeling from grief to joy.

This ritual has never been shown to have existed in ancient Greece or anywhere else. It is a pure construction, and it was demolished by Pickard-Cambridge nearly 50 years ago. An awareness of these facts is at last beginning to gain ground these days; but unfortunately, in fields

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1 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2nd ed. 1927.
2 It has been plausibly suggested that the real model for it was the Easter myth and ritual of Christ: Carlo del Grande, *Tragoidia: essenza e genesi della tragedia*, Naples, 1962, pp. 309–311.
3 A. W. (later Sir Arthur) Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb Tragedy and Comedy*, Oxford, 1927, pp. 185–208. It is necessary to warn the reader that T. B. L. Webster, who supervised the second edition of the work (1962), almost exactly reversed Pickard-Cambridge’s conclusion, returning to a prehistoric ritual very like Murray’s.
4 Del Grande, op. cit. 311, roundly called Murray’s theory “una costruzione intellettualistica.” Cf., as straws in the present wind, A. F. Garvie, *Aeschylus’ Supplices: Play
of study like English, comparative literature, drama, etc., where reference is often made to the origin of tragedy, everybody knows Murray while few have even heard of Pickard-Cambridge. This kind of cultural lag, one of the curses of modern scholarship, perhaps has to be borne, but it does not have to be borne gladly. It was one thing for Francis Fergusson to announce in 1949, 22 years after Pickard-Cambridge’s book was published:

The Cambridge School of Classical Anthropologists has shown in great detail that the form of Greek tragedy follows the form of a very ancient ritual, that of the Eniautos-Daimon, or seasonal god. This was one of the most influential discoveries of the last few generations . . . ,

and to proceed without hesitation to apply this “influential discovery” to the Oidipous; it is quite another thing to go on repeating Murray’s theory 60 years and more after its launching without betraying any awareness that it was exploded long ago.

Theodor H. Gaster, in his book Thespis, documented a long series of myths and rituals—Egyptian, Canaanite, Hebrew, Akkadian, Sumerian, Babylonian, Hittite—which have in common a focus on the “drama” of earth’s animal and vegetable life: the annual withering of the crops and herds in the fall and their regular renewal in the spring. Gaster expressly identified these seasonal rites as the root and source of drama: all drama (pp. 3–4):

All over the world, from time immemorial, it has been the custom to usher in years and seasons by means of public ceremonies. These, however, are neither arbitrary nor haphazard, nor are they mere diversions. On the contrary, they follow everywhere a more or less uniform and consistent pattern and serve a distinctly functional purpose. They represent the mechanism whereby, at a primitive level, Society seeks periodically to renew its vitality and thus ensure its continuance. These seasonal ceremonies form the basic nucleus of Drama, their essential structure and content persisting—albeit in disguised and attenuated fashion—throughout all of its later manifestations.


5 Gordon M. Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama, Cornell, 1958, pp. 12–16, gives a devastating appraisal of Murray’s theory and “ritual expectancy” as applied to Sophokles. His most telling point is that ritual depends on exact repetition, while the Greek plays present the stories differently each time.

6 Thespis: Ritual, Myth and Drama in the Ancient Near East, New York (Schuman), 1950. The foreword to the book was written by Gilbert Murray.
I have protested before against the ongoing, unthinking acceptance of the Murrayan hypothesis, and have no intention of treading that ground again here. Rather I want to call attention to an implication or corollary which will be of importance for our discussion of Aischylos. Gaster makes it more explicit than Murray, though with Murray’s approval: the primitive ceremonies are the means through which “Society [my italics] seeks to renew its vitality;” and again on p. 4: the seasonal program of activities is performed “under communal sanction” [G.’s italics]. In short, to state the point canonically, drama has a social, communal root; from which it follows that individuals have no place in the pattern except as socially representative persons: kings, warriors, priests, petitioners, and the like.

It is obvious that a communal origin for tragedy—to focus on it for the present—accords well with the prevailing belief that tragedy began with the chorus. But I wish to raise the issue here not as a part of the question of origins, but very precisely as a question concerning the dynamic relationship between society (as represented by the chorus) and individual, and/or between ritual and drama, in Aischyleian tragedy. And for that purpose I should like to begin with the question: what is it that makes a drama dramatic?

We are all familiar with Aristotle’s definition of tragedy as the imitation of an action, and with his dictum that the parts of the action should follow upon one another either probably or necessarily. In a complex plot, which Aristotle explicitly identifies as the best, the end may be surprising but must still be plausible. Viewed in these terms, the dramatic quality resides in the relentless, logical way in which the action marches on once it has begun, yet ends up in a new direction: a paradoxical yet compelling7 outcome. This is what Aristotle calls “peripety.”

Drama in that sense is clearly limited to complex plots, as Aristotle himself in effect says. But Aischylos did not write complex plots. (I believe that that is the main reason why Aristotle tended to ignore or depreciate him; but that is another issue.) Indeed in most of Aischylos’s plays there is hardly any action at all, much less a complex one; and little or nothing of what does happen happens on stage. In the Persians we see the Persian disaster successively anticipated, narrated, explained, and emotionally realized; but neither it nor anything else really happens during the play. In the Seven Against Thebes Eteokles calms the women, posts his defenders to the gates of the city, and rushes off himself to die at his brother’s hands; that is all. It is a commonplace that in Prometheus nothing happens

between the binding of the Titan at the beginning of the play and his
descent into Tartaros at the very end. In between, lamentation, argument,
explication, reminiscence, prophecy, but no action. Only in Choephoroi
and Eumenides is there anything like a self-contained, ongoing sequence
of events which lead from a "beginning" to an "end."

Elsewhere, and most strikingly in Agamemnon, there is a grandiose
development of what in my book on early tragedy I called "virtual
action." The sacrifice of Iphigeneia, the race of the fire-signal, the fall
of Troy, the great storm on the Aigaian—all these events, in different
senses, do and do not happen in the play. The play as an explicit action
does not contain them, but it presents them in a way that makes us feel
as we might feel if they had been enacted before our eyes. They exist for
us as virtual happenings.

If the plays of Aischylos are dramatic, then—and I think we do feel
them to be dramatic—it is not because they follow Aristotle's prescrip-
tions for plot or "action." Nor is it, in general, because they bring us
stark confrontations of human wills. In the Seven the striking feature is
precisely that the two brothers, whose competing wills we might expect
to be the mainspring of the drama, are never brought together. In the
Persians, Xerxes and the Greeks do not meet except in the Messenger's
speech, and eventually we come to see that the burden of the play is not
the confrontation between these enemies but the king's hybris, his offense
against divine law. Even in Agamemnon the meeting of husband and wife
is curiously oblique and muffled. Only in the Suppliants and—once more—in
the last two plays of the Oresteia is there a clear facing-off of adversaries:
here Orestes and his mother, Orestes and the Furies.

We have still not found the secret of the dramatic quality of Aischyleian
drama. I believe that that quality resides not in the inweaving of events
to form an action, and not primarily in the explicit confrontation of opposing
wills—although the latter also appears at times, in the Suppliants and the
Oresteia—but above all in the intensity with which certain emotions are aroused in
the persons of the drama and, through them, in us. It seems to me that that
emotional tension, all-pervasive and compelling as it tends to be, is the
primary source of the dramatic quality that we feel in the plays.9

8 The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy (Martin Classical Lectures, XX), Harvard,

9 There is nothing really new here. The essential points were made in Jacqueline de
Romilly's little book La crainte et l'angoisse dans le théâtre d'Eschyle, Paris 1958. Vickers' formu-
lation, op. cit. (n. 4 above) 3: "The plays translate the clash of will and motive into
forms which, although obeying complex literary conventions, still represent human actions,
and convey them with intensity, . . ." [my italics], is only partially true of Aischylos.
Of the two most powerful emotions that Aischylos arouses, one—fear—
belongs to the traditional Aristotelian dyad, but the other is not pity but

grief, lamentation.

A drama which operates with a complex plot—the Oidipous Tyrannos,
say—tends to bring fear into play late in the game, or at any rate not at
the beginning. Aischyleian "fear," on the contrary, tends to begin at
the very beginning and to grow steadily from that point to the climax.
Fear—or as we often call it, more tamely, foreboding—is in fact in a very
real sense the mainspring of Aischyleian drama. His masterpiece in this
line is of course the Agamemnon, where fear repeatedly breaks in and
domesticates the scene all the way up to the murder. But every other
Aischyleian play shows the same thing, in greater or less strength.

Fear is an emotional anticipation of a catastrophe that is still to come;
grief and lamentation are an emotional response to it after it has come.
The natural place for grief, therefore, is at or near the end of the play,
and three of the extant dramas—Persians, Seven Against Thebes, Agamemnon
—show it in that place. In the others, Suppliants, Choephoroi, Eumenides,
and Prometheus, the phenomena are more complicated, and I cannot deal
with all of them here.

At this point a remark on chronology is necessary. We used to think
that the Suppliants was the oldest play of the extant seven. Most scholars
tended to date it far back in Aischylos's dramatic career, even as far
back as the 490's, less than ten years after he began to produce plays. The
reason for this assumption—for it was nothing more than that—was very
simple. In Suppliants the chorus, representing the 50 daughters of Danaos,
is the protagonist of the play, and this fitted well with the universal belief
that tragedy originated in a choral performance, to which the first actor
was added only later. In 1952, however, our attention was called to a
tiny scrap of a didaskalia on papyrus, not more than two or three inches
square, which indicated that the Suppliants was produced in competition
with Sophokles, and the earliest possible year for that is 466; the most
likely is 463. If we accept this dating—and it is now more and more firmly
accepted—it follows that the Suppliants, far from being a primitive
attempt, represents Aischylos's dramaturgy not long before the Oresteia
(458). That leaves Persians as our earliest extant play (472); the Seven
comes next (467).

I should now like to propose my first major thesis: that the most potent

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10 The incomparably close and carefully argued study by Garvie, op. cit. (n. 4 above)
1–28 is now the locus classicus for this subject. It can be said that the effort to ignore or
argue away the evidence of the papyrus has now effectively ceased.
modes and forms of expression of fear and grief in the plays are derived from ritual, and involve the chorus especially.

The plays are permeated with ritual elements from one end to the other. That is the solid truth that lay behind Gilbert Murray's construction. And some of the elements are the same: he knew Greek tragedy too well not to have built them into his scheme. But there is a prime distinction to be made. Pathos, catastrophe, and thrênos, lamentation, belong to the native fabric of Aischylean tragedy, but the other elements in the scheme: the tragic agôn (the alleged ritual combat), theophany, and peri-
pety from grief to joy, were products of Murray's imagination. They do not belong to the basic ritual patterns. To establish a background for what I mean by "basic ritual patterns," let me quote Wolfgang Schadewaldt on "Grundsituationen des Menschlichen." After speaking of the significance of Botschaft: messages and messengers, he says:


Of all these "Naturformen" in Aischylean tragedy, at least the ones that are certainly of ritual origin, the thrênos is the most clearly marked, both in its place and function in the play and in its metrical character and style. 12 The Persians—our oldest extant tragedy and only extant historical play (but its constituent forms are identical with those in other plays)—ends with a full-dress thrênos in proper form, a lamentation over the myriads of Persian dead and more generally over the loss of Persian empire and glory.

Here there is a difficulty of presentation. The rhythmical and stylistic peculiarities of the thrênos, in the Persians or elsewhere, cannot be rendered, or even approximately suggested, in English; and even our Greek text is only a text of words, devoid of music, gesture, and action—danced action, mimed action. Without those accents of color, sound, and move-


12 For the following see in detail Rudolf Hölzle, Zum Aufbau der lyrischen Partien des Aischylus (Freiburg diss.), Marbach a. N. 1934, esp. pp. 12–29. It is worth noting that the study was suggested and directed by Schadewaldt during his time at Freiburg.
ment, any text is no more than bare bones; and in English translation these particular bones are so bare that they make only a ridiculous clicking and clacking. The last pages of the Persians, in English, sound like a parody of grief. It will be necessary to do some quoting in Greek.

In the course of the play we have heard about the disaster of Salamis, from a messenger, and we have heard it explained by the ghost of the old king Dareios. Now, at line 908, Xerxes enters, a shattered man, a wraith of his old imperial self. He begins with recitative anapaest—s not a rhythm of lament but of marching—perhaps to suggest how he (and a few weary men?) have dragged one foot after the other all the endless way back from Greece to Persia:

\[ \text{ιώ} \]
\[ \text{δύστηνος ἐγώ στύγεράς μοίρας...} \]

The chorus replies in kind, 918 ff., but at 922 goes over to melic anapaests:

\[ \gamma' \delta' \alphaϊάξει τάν ἐγγαίαν \]
\[ ἡβαν Ζέρξαι κταμέναν,... \]

thus signalling a first raising of the emotional level. And this first anapaestic system (918–930) ends in an unusual way: not with the customary momometer or paroemiac but with a verse the second half of which suggests dochmiac character: \( αἰνῶς \ αἰνῶς \ επὶ \ γόνι \ κέκληται. \) The hint of dochmiac signals the beginning of a further rise in emotion.\(^3\)

Xerxes' brief strophe, 931–933, begins the lamentation proper, still in anapaests but again with the savor of a dochmiac: \( κακὸν \ ζρ' \ ἐγενόμαι. \)

Five of the next 11 verses, in the chorus's response, Xerxes' antistrophe, and the next choral response, have a similarly ambivalent flavor, anapaestic/dochmiac:

\[ 936-7 \quad \text{κακοφάτιδα} \ βοάν, \ \text{κακομελετον} \ ιάν... \]
\[ 940 \quad \text{πέμψω} \ \text{πολύδακρω} \ \text{ιαχάν.} \]
\[ 943 \quad \text{μετάτροπος} \ \text{ἐπὶ} \ \text{ἔμοι.} \]
\[ 945 \quad \text{λαοπαθέα}^{14} \ \text{σέβων} \ \text{ἀλήτυπα} \ \text{τε} \ \text{βάρη...} \]
\[ 947-948 \quad \text{κλάγξω} \ \delta' \ \text{αὐ} \ \text{γόνι} \ \text{ἀριδάκρυν.} \]

\(^3\) Broadhead's metrical discussion of the exodos (The Persae of Aeschylus, ed. H. D. Broadhead, Cambridge, 1960, 294–297) is careful—and conservative. E.g., he favors anapaestic scansion of 934 and 936 because "the contexts are wholly anapaestic." But it is precisely what Aischylos does in such situations that is of interest; the exceptions, or possible exceptions, are as important as the rule. See below, pp. 79 f. and n. 17.

\(^4\) ἱασπαθέα in 945, with correct long \( α \), indicates a dochmiac rather than a resolved anapaestic metron: A. M. Dale, The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama\(^2\), Cambridge, 1968, p. 54.
Already at this early stage we can observe one of the characteristic marks of the gods or thrones: assonance of every variety, including alliteration (934, 936–937, 940), end-rhyme (934, 936–937, 940), other echoes (940 πολύδακρων, 948 ἀφιδακρων), gemination (930 αῖνως αῖνως).

Xerxes' second strophe, 950–953, introduces another modulation, a suggestion of ionics; the chorus in response introduces another, with a double dochmiac, a choriambic dimeter, two lekythia, a pair of anapaests, and a hypodochmius. The variegated rhythmic pattern continues in what follows, with dochmiacs at 973, 976, 986, 990, the last three all being 28. These new variations seem to reflect a shift, if not an increase, in emotional tension: a change of key.

At line 1002 there is a major break. So far the responsion between Xerxes and chorus has been between whole strophes and anapaestic systems. Now the tempo speeds up and there is staccato responsion between short lines, seldom longer than a dimeter. Within this restricted space the phenomena of assonance which we noticed before recur, but with greater insistence. The rhythms are mainly iambic, frequently with syncopation:

1002 Ξε. βεβάσι γὰρ τοῖσερ ἀγρέται στρατοῦ. Χο. βεβάσιν οἱ νόνιμοι. Ξε. ἵν ἵν ὑ ὑ. Χο. ὑ ὑ ὑ, ...

1008 Ξε. πεπλήγμεθ'... Χο. πεπλήγμεθ',... Ξε. νέα νέα δύα δύα.

Gemination and echoing, in various forms, now occupy a larger and larger place:

1038 Ξε. δίανε δίανε πῆμα, πρὸς δῶμος δ' ἵθ. Χο. αἰαὶ αἰαὶ δύα δύα. Ξε. βόα νν ἀντίδουντά μοι. Χο. δόσιν κακῶν κακῶν κακόῖς,

until in the final epode hardly anything is left except echoing moans: 1070–1071 ιῶ δῆ... ιῶ δῆτα, 1074–1075 ἦτ ἦτ... ἦ ἦ... In all this there is little or nothing that can be called rational, coherent speech. It is not intended to be rational or coherent. What we have here

15 See Holzle, loc. cit. (n. 12 above).
16 Cf. the accented beginning Τάω with the strongly accented ionics in 65 ff., where the themes of the play are broached. The ionic-chanting Persians have got their come-uppance from the "Ionians."
17 973, though not in strict responsion, is surely dochmiac. Throughout the passage one observes this tendency toward transcendence of anapaests into dochmiacs, ionics, etc., but with a rising fervency as the lamentation goes on.
is a series of cries, desperate, affect-laden cries, rising out of levels of feeling far below the conscious mind. The whole thing is, to use a modern term, gut-utterance, an expression of desolation and despair going away beyond what normal, self-controlled human beings say in ordinary life.

Yet this formulation is misleading, for Greek life—unlike ours—did have a place and a constituted form of expression for just this kind of gut-utterance, when human beings were faced with the loss of everyone and everything dear to them. No doubt the scene in the Persians is meant in part to characterize the Persians as Orientals, lacking in dignity and self-control. But we have good reason to think that the form of the threnos, with its responsions and echoings and urgent rhythms, was one well known to the Greek audience: that it was, in short, a native ritual form.

A proof of this, if proof is needed, is that the end (the genuine end) of Seven Against Thebes employs the same form, and this time the lamenters are not Orientals but perfectly good Greeks. Thus when Aischylos wants to portray the human reaction to death and the loss of dear ones, he has recourse to a form of lamentation that is known and familiar to his audience: the form in which, we can safely assume, they lamented their own dead. He achieves the dramatic effect he wants by borrowing a ritual form from real life.

But we must not think of this borrowing as an irruption of "real life," raw, unformed, undigested, into the domain of art. The threnos was already a highly developed, elaborate form in the bosom of real life long before Aischylos was born.\(^{18}\) It has its exarchôn or exarchontes (forechanter or -chanters), its professional or at least trained and skilled female keeners, its progression of the lament from generalities and measured cadences to staccato, incoherent cries, accompanied by the beating of breasts and heads, the ripping of clothing, and no doubt some kind of dance, if only a primitive surging to and fro in time to the music.

We have fine literary specimens of the threnos in the last book of the Iliad, in the lamentations of Hekabe, Helen, and Andromache over the body of Hektor. But the vehemence, the rapid cries, the primitive swaying and moaning have been dampened by the form under which the whole episode is subsumed; they have been transposed into the stately, long-drawn tread of the epic hexameter. (Even so, it is worth noticing that the Iliad too ends with lamentations and a funeral.) Thus the passionate movement is slowed and diverted. Of the threnos as a literary form in its own right, i.e., as a genre of choral lyric, we have only tantalizing

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\(^{18}\) On the threnos, both "real-life" and literary, as part of the background of tragedy, see M. P. Nilsson, Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum 27 (1911) 609-13, = Opuscula Selecta 1 (Lund, 1951) 61-68.
scrap from Simonides and Pindar, but enough to show that there too it was transformed: softened, quieted, made sentimental or reflective.19

Thus the old brutal, direct outpouring of grief in the thrēnos or goōs is not visible to us in the direct literary tradition. We find a remnant of its ancient form and mode of working only in tragedy, and most clearly of all in Aischylean tragedy. The same is undoubtedly true of its rhythms. Wilamowitz conjectured long ago that the iambics—especially the syncopated iambics—which are so characteristics of the movement of the thrēnos belonged to the native dirges of the Athenians;20 and surely we may add the dochmiac, that strange checked, cross-weaving rhythm which is akin to iambics and is found only in tragedy. Its function is to express grief and other strong emotions, but always in the tragic context.

Having said this much, we must add a further qualification. Although the rhythmical and stylistic traits of the primitive lament shine through in the exodos of the Persians (and of the Seven Against Thebes), it would be naive to suppose that Aischylos imported them into his dramas unmodified. The subtleties of modulation which we observed in Persians, between anapaests and dochmiacs, are at least as likely to be his doing as they are to be simple borrowings. In other words, Aischylos will have improved on “nature,” and we can hypothesize three stages in the artistic shaping of expressions of grief, with a bifurcation in the third stage:

1. Naive breaking forth of feeling
2. The goōs or thrēnos as real-life forms
3. Artistically shaped thrēoi:
   a. In the literary tradition (Homer, Simonides, Pindar)
   b. In tragedy: kommos

Tragedy was able to offer the thrēnos a true home, an artistic ambiance in which it could nevertheless unfold its real passionate nature without compromise. Tragedy was able to do this for two reasons: (1) rhythmically,

19 The few fragments of Simonides’ thrēoi collected by Page, PMG, 520–531 (only nos. 521 and 523 are explicitly cited as from thrēoi) show very markedly his meditative, pessimistic tone. On the other hand the Danae fragment (Page 543), which has sometimes been ascribed to a thrēnos, evokes a very different tone-register, romantic and/or realistic but in any case sentimental: ionische Weichtkeit.—The relatively short fragments of Pindar’s thrēoi (frg. 128a–137 Snell) are sufficient to reveal their reflective, consolatory character. Fr. 129, quoted by Plutarch, gives the famous picture of the life of the blessed in the other world; cf. Ol. 2. 58–83.

20 Commentariola metrica, originally published in the summer and winter indices lectionum at Göttingen, 1895; republished, with a few changes, in Griechische Verskunst, Berlin 1921 (repr. Darmstadt 1958); see p. 208: “eo adducor, ut legitimos hos numeros [sc. iambos] in naeniis Atheniensium fuisse credam.”
because it did not impose a change of form, to dactylic hexameters or various song-rhythms, but allowed the thrēnos to unfold at its own pace and in its own characteristic rhythms; and (2) spiritually, because it could allow the thrēnos to express real, heartbroken grief without let or hindrance. Tragedy could do these things, where the epic and the choral lyric could not, because it was drama and tragic drama. As drama its form was broad and inclusive enough to tolerate “real-life” forms; and as tragedy it was fitted to embrace real grief in its most powerful expressions.

This second point leads us back to Gilbert Murray. His “primitive ritual” included a thrēnos, but not a real one in our sense, for it ended by turning into a cry of jubilation over the theophany or apotheosis of the risen god. Murray’s true fault was to have claimed the pattern of the Dying God as the key to Greek tragedy. Tragedy and vegetation-rites have nothing to do with each other. A god is not a tragic hero or the prototype of one, for the simple reason that gods do not die. If a god “dies,” his resurrection is sure, guaranteed by the annual cycle of the seasons. The tragic hero, on the contrary, really suffers and/or dies. His passion is not redeemed by a conviction in the spectator’s heart that he will rise again. (The politically oriented salvation that appears at the end of the Oresteia is a different kind of thing altogether.)

The annual vegetation-rites are buoyed up by the tested faith that the god will live again next year as he did this year, in the same way and the same rhythm; while tragedy is haunted by the tragic awareness that we mortals, even the greatest of us, must fail and die. This tragic fear—the other partner in the Aischyleian duo of which I spoke a while ago—permeates other ritual forms in Aischyleian tragedy as grief permeated the thrēnos. But while the thrēnos tends to come late in the tragic pattern, in the nature of the case these forms of foreboding, in which the soul palpitates before the unknown future, tend naturally to come early. There are two chief species: the prayer cast in the form of a hymn, and the kommos or lyric antiphonal. The first of these is an utterance of the chorus, the second of an actor and the chorus responding to each other in lyric rather than spoken dialogue. Such utterances are everywhere in Aischyleian tragedy.

These two ritual forms—for that is what they are—cannot be described in the same direct, simple fashion as the thrēnoi at the end of Persians and Seven Against Thebes, for their modes of appearance vary considerably and they even play in and out of each other. But they are there, and although their modes are not always the same they perform the same function.
Assuming provisionally a certain sequence of parts as the normal beginning of an Aischylean tragedy, namely spoken prologue,\textsuperscript{21} parodos (entrance) of the chorus in recitative anapaests, and first ode containing or including a prayer, we find the following variations:

In the \textit{Seven}, after the prologue between Eteokles and the Scout, the chorus bursts onto the stage in too great agitation of spirit for a regular parodos. But after some thirty lines of frenzied allusion to the sights and sounds of battle from outside the walls, and agonized questions as to which gods can help them, they settle down (109 ff.) to a fervent prayer to all the \textit{theoi poliouchoi}, the protector-gods of Thebes, to deliver them from the imminent catastrophe.

In the \textit{Suppliants} there is no prologue.\textsuperscript{22} The daughters of Danaos enter at once, with a prayer to Zeus in the very first (anapaest) lines of the parodos; then they utter lyric prayers to Epaphos, Io, and Zeus, the ancestors of their race, and to the land of Argos and Artemis, ending once more with Zeus. The whole sequence vibrates with fear and foreboding, but it also makes reference (116) to göi, grief-laden laments.

\textit{Agamemnon} has the watchman as prologue, then a proper parodos in anapaests, and following that an ode of enormous length which contains as its central portion, in iambics, an intense and very unusual prayer to Zeus. The prayer and the whole ode speak of fear, allude to fear, invite fear, repeatedly.

\textit{Choephoroi} begins with a prologue (mutilated, unfortunately, in our manuscripts). The chorus enters with lyric strophes, not a regular parodos, but at line 152 it addresses an agitated prayer to its dead master, Agamemnon, as the libations are poured.

\textit{Eumenides} also has a prologue but no proper parodos. The chorus is discovered in the temple and is chased out by Apollo; only at line 321, as it is about to begin its "binding hymn," does it invoke its mother, Night.

The \textit{Persians} has no prologue, and neither its parodos nor the following ode contains a prayer to any god. But the parodos expresses fear and apprehension in ample measure: fear of what the gods may do or may have done.

Since the \textit{Prometheus} is played among gods (except for Io), there is no

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] The redating of the prologueless \textit{Suppliants} to ca. 463, together with the fact that the \textit{Seven} (467) has a prologue, helps to discredit the idea that "no prologue" = "early." Themistius, \textit{Oration} 26, p. 816d, quotes Aristotle as saying that Thespis invented the prologue. It follows that Aischylos was free to operate with or without one, according to his purpose in a particular drama.
\item[22] See previous note.
\end{footnotes}
room for a normal prayer. In its place there is an affecting and deeply emotional appeal by Prometheus to the four elements, fire, air, water and earth (line 88 ff.); he gives expression (114 ff.) to fear, and the chorus to both fear and pity (143 ff.); and at 397 ff. the chorus sings a kind of *thrēnos*, though not of the regular form, over Prometheus's sufferings.

Five of the other six plays have one thing in common, however they begin and whether or not there is a formal prayer: the chorus passionately desires something and is in terror that the opposite will happen, i.e., that its desire will be frustrated. In the *Persians* it desires that the Persian army may return safely; in the *Seven*, that the Argive threat may be averted from Thebes; in the *Suppliants*, that it itself may be granted asylum in Argos and defense against the sons of Aigyptos; in the *Agamemnon*, that the expedition and the king may come home safely; in *Choephoroi*, that the dead king may be avenged. In *Eumenides* the chorus is the source of terror rather than its victim; yet its own position causes it some moments of fear, and it explicitly affirms (517 ff.) the sanctity and necessity of fear among men.

What the chorus desires is the initial purpose of the play; whether the desire is fulfilled varies with the play and its position in the trilogy. In any case the fervent desire of the chorus is surrounded by fears and forebodings,23 and the fulfilment of its wish is felt to be doubtful in the extreme. This is certainly true in the four plays (*Seven, Suppliants, Agamemnon, Choephoroi*) where the chorus utters a regular prayer.

When people pray fervently to gods for the accomplishment of a wish, it is normally because they are in great uncertainty and apprehension whether it will be accomplished. And it is clear that one effect—one intended effect—of Aischylean tragedy is to underline this apprehension and communicate it to us.

Here, then, in the initial prayers to the gods, is a ritual element that is intended to make us share in the chorus's feelings of uncertainty, apprehension, foreboding. Francis Fergusson, talking about Sophokleian drama and taking Gilbert Murray's hypothesis as his premise, speaks of a "ritual expectancy" that attends the unfolding of the play. But whatever may be true of Sophokleian drama—and the premise does not really hold there either24—it is not true for Aischylos. "Ritual expectancy" would mean that we know the outcome and are on the alert to see it happen again. The forces of Darkness will be defeated; the sun and the light and the Daimon will emerge once more and Life will be rescued for another year, in the same way as it has been in the past.

23 See note 9 above.  
24 See note 5 above.
Aischylean drama is not based on this simple syndrome. Far from reassuring us by covert reminders, or by the very structure of the play, that everything will come out all right once more, Aischylos seeks through his use of the ritual prayer to involve us deeply in the fears and uncertainties of the chorus (and of other people of the drama, like Elektra and Orestes). All is not a foregone conclusion, or it is not felt as one. The ultimate outcome may be distantly known to us, as an idea, but even in those cases where it might be reassuring, the immediate effect of ritual prayers is not to bring it near but to make us share in the very real terrors of the dramatic persons, to whom it appears unspeakably remote and chancy. Ritual—this use of ritual—is a way of making us feel with them.

Much more could be said along the same line, about Aischylos's use of epirrhematic scenes (those in which one party, usually an actor, utters spoken verses while the other party, usually the chorus, responds with lyric utterances) and fully developed kommoi (in which, as in the thrênoi, actor and chorus engage in lyric responson). These too have every likelihood of being ritual forms, or developments from them, and they too are employed to arouse fear or grief or—what is much more dramatic—a mixture of the two. The Danaids and the King, in the Suppliants; Cassandra and the chorus, and later Klytaimestra and the chorus, in Agamemnon; the great invocation of the spirit of Agamemnon in the Choephoroi, involving Orestes, Elektra, and the chorus; the Furies and the ghost of Klytaimestra, in Eumenides—all these scenes show a masterly use of forms derived from ritual to build grief or terror or both. Until finally, in the last great scene between Athena and the Furies, in Eumenides, epirrhematic and kommatic forms are used for a new and different dramatic purpose, in the opposite direction, to accompany the miraculous change of the Furies into the Kindly Ones.

So far we have spoken only of lyrical or epirrhematic scenes, within the chorus or between chorus and actor. What about the dialogue? It is usually perceived as the center of tragedy, at least in the fifth century, with the lyrical parts as accompaniment, commentary, emotional counterpoint. That view is not wrong; but it is important to get the whole into due perspective and proportion. The hero is the focal point of Aischylean tragedy.\(^{25}\) We mistake the form, however, if we think in terms of an exclusive dichotomy between hero: dialogue and chorus: lyrics. The hero has a share in lyrics, in the responsive forms of kommos and thrênos, and

\(^{25}\) The attempt of John Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy, Oxford and New York, 1962, to banish the hero not only from the Poetics but from tragedy altogether (see pp. 12–13 and passim) is so perverse and wrong-headed it is not worth arguing with.
on the other hand the chorus, through its leader the koryphaios, can take
part in the dialogue; but the relationship between the two remains fixed
in a certain direction. Whatever the external form, lyric or dialogue, the
hero—in general—leads and acts, the chorus follows and reacts.26

A new question might then be asked: do ritual forms also underlie the
dialogue, as they underlie considerable portions of the lyrics? I suspect
such an origin for one form of dialogue at least: the so-called stichomyth,
that curiously rigid scheme in which actor and koryphaios, or actor and
actor, respond to each other line by line. It is possible that such exact
responsion, especially in question-and-answer sequences (e.g., Persians
231–245, 715–738; Suppliants 293–321), arose out of standing ritual prac-
tices in the consultation of oracles.27

Thinking of those “Naturformen der Kultur” or “Grundsituationen
des Menschlichen” distinguished by Schadewaldt,28 one may be tempted
to extend the concept of ritual to cover messenger’s speeches, prophetic
discourse (e.g., Dareios in Persians 739 ff.), speeches of exhortation
(parainesis), and other forms. At this point, however, distinctions would
seem to be in order. The ghost of Dareios may be speaking in a form
more or less fixed by oracular usage (it is framed by stichomythies; cf.
above). It is well known, on the other hand, that the messenger’s speeches
in tragedy have an epic cast: they carry its mark in their capacity to
dispense with the augment in secondary verb-forms.29 As for parainesis,
its forms and procedures also had long since been defined, and in litera-

26 For the point that the actor’s rhéis leads off (states the issue or initiates the action
that will dominate the following scene) while the chorus or koryphaios follows, see Aurelio

27 Question-and-answer seems to be the earliest species of stichomyth; see Walter
Jens, Die Stichomythie in der frühen griechischen Tragodie (Zetemata 11), München 1955,
pp. 3–7. But conflict-stichomyth has a chance of being as old: ibid. p. 7 n. 1; cf. p. 17 n. 1,
which refers to “Die beiden Urformen der Stichomythie, Frage-und-Antwort und Streit.”
My conjecture that the question-and-answer stichomyth may have had its origin in
the questioning of an oracle is, so far as I know, a leap in the dark; but the strictness of
the form suggests it. If it is correct, the two stichomythies in Persians 232–245 and 715–738
show Aischylus already well beyond the primitive stage of oracle-to-questioner. Cf. what
was said above, p. 79, about the refinement and variability of his art. Jens, p. 13, refers
to another kind, namely prayer-stichomyth, as a form of “heilige Handlung.” More
investigation is needed here.

28 See note 11 above, and add (ibid. p. 13):

Der Strom des tragischen Geschehens sucht sich nicht in beliebigen Gestaltungen seinen
Weg; er wird von den vorgeprägten Formen des Lebens in Kult, Sitte, Brauch wie
von Schalen aufgefangen und fortgeleitet.

ture rather than in cult: not only in epic but most particularly in elegy.  

What it all signifies is that no element in the web of Aischylean tragedy comes to it raw, without a process of pre-formation in life or literature or both. But it is possible to distinguish between ritual elements like thrênos or hymn, still vigorously operating in corporate fashion in the society that surrounds the drama, and elements like messenger’s speech or parainesis whose derivation is mainly literary. And “literary” means here primarily epic and elegy, the genres which glorify the individual: hero or aristocrat. In Aischylean tragedy these two differently weighted elements enter into a fruitful symbiosis: the hero is presented against a backdrop of communal thought and feeling, with forms of both kinds contributing to the total experience.

These findings suggest that the role of ritual in Aischylean tragedy, though very important, is secondary rather than primary: that it is drawn upon to express forebodings of the hero’s downfall and lamentations over it afterward—the emotional response to his action and pathos—rather than to shape the action and the pathos themselves. These represent, rather, the free part of the total action, while the ritual elements represent the bound part, conditioned by and responsive to the other. Which is to say that Aischylus has shaped the action of his plays by a relatively free use of his poetic and literary imagination, but has shaped the emotional pattern of reaction to it by drawing heavily on cult- and ritual-bound forms from the life around him.

(Having said this, one has to add that in the later plays Aischylus uses ritual elements in increasingly free and dramatic ways. In three at least—Suppiants, Choephoroi, Eumenides—they do not merely follow and react to the action, but on occasion initiate it. This is especially true of the great kommos in the Choephoroi.)

There is no time here to explore the other part of Aischylus’s drama-turgy, the “free” part, in full. I will permit myself just one or two remarks. First, as to the word “free.” Aischylus did not invent plots and characters out of the blue; no serious Greek poet did, at least before the close of the fifth century (Agathon; comedy is another matter). But the freedom of the tragedians in handling their inherited stories is or ought to be a


31 See my remarks in Origin and Early Form (above, n. 8), pp. 76–77; also del Grande, op. cit. (above, n. 2) 274.
commonplace of criticism; and Aischylos is every bit as free, in his own way, as the others.

Second, the heart of every Aischyleian play is a heroic pathos: a killing or other deed of tragic weight and bearing which brings suffering in its train. But this pathos, unlike the one excogitated by Gilbert Murray, has no kinship with the march of the seasons. The march of the seasons is a majestic, compelling spectacle; it is also dependable, mindless, stupid. It does not suffer. The pathos of the tragic hero—Xerxes, Eteokles, Agamemnon, Orestes—has nothing in common with it, or with the suffering of the Dying God. It is human suffering and real suffering; it attaches to the hero as an individual; it is fundamentally and essentially un-ritualistic.

The concept of the hero's suffering came to Aischylos from Homer: specifically, from the Iliad. It is embodied above all in the hero's set speeches, rhēseis. The rhēsis too is a form, and it dominates the dialogue portions of Aischyleian tragedy. But as we have said, it is not a ritual form; it comes from another quarter of life. A man's pathos is his own individual affair; no other man can help him avert it or endure it.

Yet in Aischylos's vision (as in Homer's and Shakespeare's) no man is an island. The suffering of kings involves the lesser men who depend upon them. Quicquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi. So the tragic chorus is drawn into the orbit of the pathos; and through its suffering over the pathos, both in anticipation (prayer) and retrospect (lamentation), we, the audience, are drawn into that orbit in turn. It is there, in that sector of the total tragic happening, that ritual and ritual expectancies have their part to play. In Athenian tragedy the heroic individual is surrounded by two collectivities: that of his own time and place, represented by the chorus, and the larger one which is not represented but actually constituted by the Athenian people assembled in the theatre. Ritual forms provide a sort of pre-tested resonance system through which the first collectivity can arouse, focus, and amplify the feelings of the second. Only through this link do the hero's sufferings generate a really common experience in the members of the audience.

Just in proportion as these ritual-bound forms were sure to achieve their intended effect with Aischylos's own audiences, they are bound to have a less direct effect upon us. We emancipated twentieth-century Americans, especially those with Protestant evangelical or low-church backgrounds, have very little organ or training for these Aischyleian and Athenian modes of feeling. Protestant America for a long time tended to regard religious ritual as Popery and frippery. And now that urbanization and fragmentation have broken the crust of custom still further, we are still further removed from the possibility of full emotional participation in a
drama like that of Aischylus. Its personages are great individuals: kings, queens, heroes; but the emotional fabric of the drama that surrounds them and responds to them is woven in good part out of ritual, i.e., communal, public elements. We can confidently assume that the Athenian citizen of 472 or 458 B.C. took that emotional fabric into his heart and vitals with full, immediate comprehension—no, not just comprehension, but participation. The foreboding of the tragedy to come, in prayers, epirrhematic scenes, and kommoi, the final outflow of feeling into kommos or thrênos, embodied in ritual forms that he had known and taken part in all his life, as son, husband, father, and citizen, made him a participant in tragic drama in a way that no modern spectator or reader can hope to be. Yet, although that ritual web was not the source or the main raison d'être of Aischyleian tragedy, it accounts for much of the compelling force which it still exerts, even on us today.

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Synaesthesia in Sophocles*

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I

The combination of two (or more) different senses into a single metaphor is a recurrent feature of Greek poetic diction at its most brilliant. The poetry of Sophocles is no exception. The purpose of this paper is to call attention to some neglected aspects of Sophocles’ “synaesthetic” or “intersensal” imagery, as W. B. Stanford calls it, and thereby to remind us once again of the subtlety and sophistication of Sophocles’ art not only as a dramatist, but also as a poet.

The poetic and dramatic effects of synaesthetic imagery work closely together in the Oedipus Tyrannus. The mixture of senses vividly expresses the recurrent concern with the reliability of human knowledge and the problem of man’s comprehension of “reality.” What man takes to be reality may be in fact a fearful illusion of security in a most insecure world.

The most powerful and perhaps the most important case of synaesthesia in Sophocles occurs in Oedipus’ line in the midst of his quarrel with Teiresias (O. T. 371): τυφλὸς τὰ τ’ ὄτα τὸν τε νοῦν τὰ τ’ ὄμματ’ εἶ. Like the other synaesthetic passages which we shall discuss later, this verse combines sight and hearing, but it adds to them the general perceptual field implied in nous. The synaesthetic figure adds to the effect of violent passion which Oedipus feels, but there is also a powerful dramatic irony at work, for his taunt, as Teiresias points out at once, applies to Oedipus himself (372–373):

σο̂υ δ’ ἀθλιός γε ταῦτ’ ὑνειδίζων, οὐ σοι
οὐδεὶς ὅσ σοφι τῶνδ’ ὑνειδίει τάχα.

* I would like to thank the American Council of Learned Societies for a fellowship for 1974–1975, in the course of which this paper was written.

1 For the figure and examples see W. B. Stanford, Greek Metaphor, Studies in Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1936; reprint 1972) 47–62.
The full degree of irony involved here appears later when Oedipus explains to Jocasta that he fled Corinth in order that he “might not see (μὴ ποτε ὄψωμην) brought to fulfilment the insults (ὁνείδη) of evil oracles” (796 f.). It is, however, just this exchange of “insults” (ὁνείδιζεν, 372–373) which makes Oedipus “blind” to the truth which Teiresias is here uttering. The theme of vision and nonvision are kept alive in this scene by the emphasis on seeing in Oedipus’ reply to Teiresias’ words about the “insults” which will soon apply to him (374–375): “You are nurtured by one continual night so that you could harm neither me nor any other who sees the light (ὅστις φῶς ὤρᾳ).”

Three synaesthetic images in the play’s first two choral odes prepare for and then expand the significance of the synaesthetic figure. In their lamentation over the disasters afflicting the city the chorus in the parode sings of the groan of suppliants and the cry of the united voice of the people as the paean “flashes forth” (186–189):

\[\text{παῖαν δὲ λάμ-}\\ \text{πει στονόσσα τε γήρυς ὀμαλός-}\]
\[\text{δὲν υπὲρ, ὦ χρυσά πηγατερ Δίως,}\]
\[\text{εὔπτα πέμψον ἀλκάν.}\]

The figure, Stanford says, “combines the idea of a flashing beacon fire with the resounding paean.” 2 The image of “flashing,” however, works in a close and complex way with the allusions to destructive fire immediately before and after these lines. In 174–178 the souls of those who have died of the plague are compared, as they flutter off to Hades, to birds fleeing before a terrible fire (175–178):

\[\ldots ἄπερ εὔπτερον ὀρνιν\]
\[κρείσσον ἀμαμακέτου πυρός ὀρμον\]
\[ἀκτὰν πρὸς ἐσπέρου θεοῦ.\]

In the following antistrophe, immediately before the synaesthetic lines of the paean’s “flashing,” there is another suggestion of light and sound, fire and cry, working together as the women “groan” (ἐπιστενάχουσιν, 185; cf. στονόσσα, 187) around the altars, to be thought of as kindled with offerings in this crisis for the city. The unusual phrase which describes these altars, ἀκτὰν παρὰ βάμιον (184), recalls the souls’ flight “to the shore of the western god,” i.e. to Hades, in 176. The combination of sound and fire stresses the ritual aspect of the scene, the impression of voices and flame (188) before the altars of supplication. Thus it underlines the

2 Ibid. 56. See also J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles, IV, The Oedipus Tyrannus* (Leiden, 1967) ad OT 186.

3 See Kamerbeek (preceding note) ad OT 174–176 and 176.
desperation of the people and the pressure to find the murder of Laius. The synaesthetic effect of 186–188 gives the whole scene an eerie, supernatural mood appropriate to the emergence of supernatural forces in the background.

In the next strophe fire, once more in close association with sound, recurs as the chorus utters prayers to avert "Ares the blazingly destructive who ... attended by shouts (of battle) burns me ..." (190–192):

"Ἀρεά τε τὸν μαλερόν, ὅς ...  
φλέγει μὲ περιβόατος ἀντιάξων.

The "irresistible fire" in the simile of 175–177 has prepared us for this mysterious and destructive divine fire, and the combination of Ares' ominous "blazing" (φλέγει) and "shout" (περιβόατος) in 192 are a grim answer to the "flashing" of the paean in 186. Ares himself has a fiery quality in his destructive violence since μαλερός is always an epithet of fire in Homer and is associated with fire in the tragic poets too.4

Turning away from these destructive visions, the chorus invokes more benign deities, gods who have associations with light, brilliance, flashes of fire: Zeus "who wields the power of the fire-bearing lightning" (200–201); "the fire-bearing brilliance of Artemis" (206–207); "shining-visaged, blazing" Dionysus (214). But the earlier sections of the ode have given us little encouragement to think that this divine fire is benign (cf. 176, 192), and the ode ends with a kind of oxymoron which suggests the ambiguous nature of divine power, Ares as τὸν ἀπότιμον ἐν θεοῖς θεόν (215).5

The next ode, the first stasimon, closely echoes the synaesthetic imagery of the parode (473–476):

ἔλαμψε γὰρ τοῦ νυφόν- 
τος ἄρτιώς φανείσα  
φάμα Παρνασσοῦ τὸν ἄδη- 
λον ἀνδρα πάντ' ἱχνεύειν.

Since φάμα also has a prominent place in the previous ode (158), the two synaesthetic figures are probably to be connected. The dim oracle and obscure report are gradually illuminated by the light of truth, which, however, comes at least in part as violent, destructive fire. In the latter passage, the first stasimon, the synaesthesia is reinforced by the word-play, φανείσα φάμα (474–475), and by the contrast between the whiteness of "snowy" Parnassus and the "obscure" criminal (ἀδηλοῦ, 475; cf. 497).6

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5 See the scholion ad 215, ad fin.: θεῶν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ εὐεργετεῖν τοὺς ἄνθρωπους, δὲ φθείρει καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.
6 Kamerbeck (above, note 2) comments ad OT 473–475, "It is as if the oracle is also conveyed by the far visible glitter of snow-capped Parnassus."
In both the first and the second odes the synaesthesia emphasizes the element of vision, which is, of course, a major theme in the play. In the second ode the “flashing” of the oracle’s report not only sets off the emergence of the “hidden” or “obscure” truth out of the darkness of the seeing/blind Oedipus (cf. 371–375, supra), but also leads into the theme of the ambiguity of human knowledge and the unreliability of perception in this ode’s closing antistrophe (498–511). Here another synaesthetic image reinforces the point. Beginning with the divine knowledge of Zeus and Apollo (497–499) and the question of prophetic skill (499–503), the chorus reflects on their dilemma in choosing between Teiresias and Oedipus. They conclude, “I would never agree with those who blame (Oedipus) until I should see a straight word (ἰδοὺ· ὀρθὸν ἔπος, 505). The visual theme is stressed by the description, immediately after, of the Sphinx as it came into Oedipus’ vision (cf. φανερά, 507), an encounter in which he “was seen as wise” (σοφὸς ὕφθη, 509), although, of course, the contest with this “singer” (36, 391, 1199) was one of words, not sight (cf. 392–394).

II

Stanford mentions two other passages in Sophocles where, he argues, synaesthesia has little vividness. He agrees with Lobeck that in these passages the synaesthetic metaphors are to be explained “as catachrestic uses of verbs meaning ‘to see’ or ‘to hear’ for the general sensuous term ‘to perceive’.” The passages in question are Trachiniae 693 and Philoctetes 202. I believe that Stanford has underestimated the significance of the figure. A brief reexamination of the contexts will show that the synaesthetic imagery is both poetically alive and thematically relevant.

Trachiniae 693. Deianeira has just described how the tuft of wool with which she anointed Heracles’ robe flared up and disintegrated in the light. Before going on with the details, she says (693–694):

εἶσιν δ’ ἀποστείχουσα δέρκομαι φῶς
ἀφραστον, ἀξύμβλητον ἀνθρώπῳ μαθεῖν.

The synaesthetic figure is as striking as those cited above from the Oedipus Tyrannus. It is of a piece with the rich poetical language characteristic of this play and particularly of this speech (cf. 675–678, 683, 695–704). The synaesthesia has two effects. First it emphasizes the eerie quality of the events now unfolding. The monstrous Centaur and Hydra in the background become more insistent presences. Second, it forms part of an

7 Stanford (above, note 1) 51.
inversion of light and darkness which runs throughout the play and is especially prominent here. The drug is kept locked up in the recesses of the house (δόμοις . . . ἐγκεκλημένου καλῶς, 578-579; ἐν μυκοῖς, 686). It must be kept away from the light (ἀλαμμές ἥλιον, 691; cf. 685 f.). When revealed to the “sun’s beam” (ἀκτίνι ἐς ἥλιοντι, 697), it shows its destructive force. Later, at the peripety, Kypris, the goddess behind the disaster, is “revealed,” “made clearly visible” as the “soundless agent” (Ἀναυάδος φανερὰ τῶν’ ἑφών πράκτωρ, 862-863). This destructiveness of light and sun is a leitmotiv in the play (e.g. 94 ff., 379, 607, 608, 1086, 1104, 1144); and the attention drawn to sight and light by the synaesthesia of 693 both derives strength from and contributes to its effectiveness.

Philoctetes 201. Neoptolemus and the chorus are waiting for Philoctetes to return to his cave in order to put into operation the ruse agreed upon between Odysseus and Neoptolemus in the prologue. The chorus warns their leader to be silent since “a sound has appeared” (201-202):

προνοφάνη κτύπος,
φωτός σύντροφος ἄς τειρομένου <του>...

The juxtaposition of the sound’s “appearance” with φωτός in the next line (albeit in the meaning “person”) reinforces the synaesthetic effect.

More important, however, the synaesthesia is not an isolated phenomenon in this passage. We may note ἀχῶ τηλεφάνης as the chorus describes Philoctetes’ pitiful cries in 188-189 and the similar βοᾷ τηλωπίν ἵων in 216 f. Less vivid, but probably also involving some mixture of senses is διάσημα θροεῖ in 209. Here too the synaesthesia calls attention to the special or unusual context of this sound. On desolate Lemnos there is sound, but no communication. Philoctetes had cried out, but there is no answer, for he is alone on his island. The “far-seen echo” of 189 and the similar expression in 216 stress the quality of desolation. A sound is heard, but nothing is seen.

Sound is a major theme throughout this section of the play. Odysseus’ warnings about Philoctetes and his deadly bow (45-47, 104-107) have made Neoptolemus and his men alert to the castaway’s approach. All their senses are strained, sight as well as hearing. But what sets the dramatic tension underway is partly that the sounds which they hear are such as to awaken compassion rather than fear.

Though Philoctetes lives in the wild like a shepherd, he plays no


9 E. Wunder and N. Wecklein, Sophoclis Tragoediae, I.i (Leipzig, 1875) note ad Phil. 187 the parallel construction in 187, 202, 216 and remark on τηλεφάνης, “... nam sensuum vocabula permutat poetarum acumen, ut mox 202 . . ., 216 . . .”
pastoral tunes on a flute (213 ff.): his only music is the “terrible shouting” of his pain (προβοκά ... δεινόν, 218; cf. also 188–190, 206, 216). His first desire is to hear a human voice: φωνής δ' ἀκούσαυ βουλομαι (225); φωνήσατ', εὑπερ ὃς φιλός προσήκετε (229); οὐ φίλτατον φώνημα· φεῖ τὸ καὶ λαβεῖν | πρόσφθεγμα τοιοῦτ' ἀνήρος ... (234 ff.). When the promise of friendship held by this renewal of human speech is disappointed, he turns back to the silent rocks and the inarticulate beasts of his deserted island (935 ff., 1146 ff.; cf. 182–185).  

III

Besides these passages there are three instances of ἵδον, ἤδε used of sounds where Stanford thinks that all visual implication is lost: Ajax 870, Electra 1410, Oedipus at Colonus 1463. “In all these,” Stanford remarks, “I think most people will agree that the poets expect no imaginative force to be felt in their words . . .”  

These passages stand on a different level from those discussed above, where the synaesthetic imagery is worked into a rich poetical diction. In the three passages which we are now considering the synaesthetic figure is unquestionably weaker; yet it is not entirely insignificant. It recalls us to the visual aspect of the performance or what Aristotle called ὑφις, the spectacle unfolding on the stage. The combination of hearing and sight in Ajax 870–871, as in the Philoctetes passage above, emphasizes the straining of all the senses to locate the hero, sight in 876 and 890, hearing in 886 and 891.  

Tecmessa cries out when she finds the body, and the chorus “sees” her (894), but not Ajax. The scene, she says, is one deserving of lamentation (αἰδέξειν, 904), one of the play’s grim puns on the name of the hero. She briefly conveys the visual effect of the sword fixed in the body (906 ff.). The chorus blames itself for being “deaf” and “ignorant” (911 ff.): ἑγὼ δ' ὁ πάντω κωφός, ἦ πάντ' ἄιδρισ where there is perhaps an implication of sight in the root of ἄιδρισ (ἰδεῖν). The body is presumably wheeled out on the ekkyklema, but Tecmessa’s first words are, “Ἡε is not to be seen” (οὖν θεατός, 915) as she covers the corpse with her cloak. The discovery of


11 Stanford (above, note 1) 51. See also D. Tarant, “Greek Metaphors of Light,” CQ n.s. 10 (1960) 184: “While in some instances (e.g. Aesch. Pers. 395) the combination gives great vividness of effect, in most the general sense of perception appears to superseding the proper meaning of the words of sight.”

Ajax is a kind of synaesthesis, balancing the positive synaesthesis of 870–871 (ἰδὼν ἢδον,' δοῦναν αδ κλῶν τινά). There is a doleful blocking of the senses in the silence of the great corpse and the cloak which conceals it from view. We may compare the effect at the very end of the play where sound and sight are grimly conjoined in the silent playing of the "pipes" of the dead hero whose "blowing" produces the visual, not audial, impression of the "black" blood (1411–1413):

ēτι γὰρ θερμαί
σύριγγες ἀνω φυσώσι μέλαν
μένοι.

Electra 1410. The long-awaited deed of matricide is being performed. Orestes and Pylades are inside the palace. Electra strains every sense to ascertain what is happening there. Finally she hears a shout within and asks the chorus to "listen" (ἀκούστε, 1406). They reply that they have heard "something not to be heard" that makes them shudder (ἥκουσαν ἀνήκουστα... ἀστε φρίζαι 1407–1408). Then we hear Clytaemnestra's desperate offstage cry for help (1409), to which Electra says in 1410, "Look, someone is crying out," ἰδοὺ μαλλὰ' ἀδ Θροεὶ τίς. The combination of sound and sight in this line stresses the tension contained in the crucial action whose effects we can hear, but not see. The combination of senses conveys also something of Electra's intense desire to perceive as fully and concretely as she can the action which has been the main goal and the driving force of her life, killing her mother.13

The next scene enacts the uncovering of the hidden object, the result of the unseen action whose sound so stirs Electra.14 Aegisthus asks about news of Orestes' death; and Electra, in deliberately ambiguous language, plays on the fusion of speech and sight (1453): οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καταδείξας οὐ λόγῳ μόνον. Aegisthus would behold the evidence in its visual clarity (ὁστε κάμραν μαθεῖν, 1454). But as the hearing of this deed was something "not to be heard," so the sight of it is equally ambiguous: "an unenviable sight" is Electra's reply (μαλλ' ἄξηλος θέα, 1455). The visual effect is


14 On this scene and its themes of vision and concealment see my remarks (preceding note) 527.
underlined by Aegisthus' hypocritical words as he is about to lift the veil (1466-1467):

ω Ζεῦ, δεδορκά φάσμ' ἀνευ φθόνου μὲν οὐ πεπτυκός· εἰ δ' ἔπεστι νέμεσι οὐ λέγω

But when he sees what is beneath he cries, οἴμοι, τί λεύσω; (1475). The sound/sight mixture of 1410 reinforces this grim horror of what is finally seen, the result of a terrible act which was only heard.

Oedipus at Colonus 1463. Thunder is heard: έκτυπεν αὐθήρ (1456). Oedipus asks that Theseus be called (1456 f.). He explains that this “winged lightning of Zeus will bring me at once to Hades” (1460-1461). The chorus then sings (1463 f.):

ιδὲ μὰλα μέγας ἐρείπηται
κτύπος ἀφατος οὐ διόβδολος.

The effect of the synaesthesia here may be compared with that in Trachiniae 693, above. It stresses the strange, supernatural quality of events on and off the stage. Here, of course, that supernatural quality moves in a direction quite the opposite to that of the Trachiniae: it is the will of Olympian Zeus becoming manifest, not the workings of archaic, phantasmagoric monsters.

The phrase Διὸς πτερωτὸς βροντῆ in 1460-1461 already stresses the interaction of sound and sight. βροντῆ denotes the primarily audial effect of the divine sign (cf. βρέμω, "roar"), whereas πτερωτὸς suggests the visual appearance of the flash in the sky. The visual aspect of the god’s call is again stressed immediately after (1466-1467): οὐράνια γὰρ ἀστραπὰ φλέγει πάλιν. The synaesthesia of 1463-1464, ιδὲ ... κτύπος, brings the two senses together with the power of vivid condensation. The oxymoron κτύπος ἀφατος in 1464 is surrounded by words which may denote the visual, as well as the audial, aspect of the thunder-and-lightning as it moves across the sky, viz. ἐρείπηται (1463) and διόβδολος (1464).

Here again, as in the other passages which we have examined, the synaesthetic figure is developed in the surrounding context. There is a second flash of lightning, and the chorus cries (1477-1479):

ἐὰ ἐα, ἵδον μὰλ' ἀὖθις ἀμφιστάται διαπρύσιος ὁτοβος.

Here, as in 1463 f., a sound is “seen” (ἵδον, 1477; cf. ἵδε, 1463). The almost tangible quality of this sound is stressed by the metaphor of its “standing around” the spectators.15 The next lines then focus on vision

15 See R. C. Jebb, Sophocles, The Plays and Fragments, II. The Oedipus Coloneus (Cambridge, 1900) at 1477.
again with the mysterious light/no light (cf. ἀφεγγές, 1481) of the god’s message. The mysterious light recurs near the end of Oedipus’ last speech some seventy lines later (1549–1550):

   ὄ φῶς ἀφεγγές, πρόσθε ποὺ ποτ’ ἴθι ζύο, 
   νῦν δ’ ἔσχατόν σου τοῦμόν ἀπετει ἔδμας.

The paradoxical darkness-in-light is appropriate to the ἀφανής θεός whom the chorus invokes in their next lines (1556). It suits too the mixture of chthonic and Olympian deities in this call to Oedipus (compare 1462–1471 with 1556–1578 and cf. also 1463 f. and 1606). The blind man who once “saw by his voice” (φωνή γὰρ ὅρῳ, 138) now guides the seeing (1520 ff.); vision becomes unearthly as the inward sight, given by the gods, replaces the blind eyes.

Theseus’ first words, as he arrives from the hasty summons, continue the mixture of sound and sight (1500 ff.):

   τὸς ἀδ' παρ’ ὑμῶν κοινὸς ἥχειται κτύπος, 
   σαφῆς μὲν ἁστών, ἐμφανῆς δὲ τοῦ ξένου;

The total effect of these synaesthetic expressions throughout the great finale of this play is to convey the overpowering impression of the numinous atmosphere as it grips and dominates the entire sensory field of the spectators.

To conclude, Sophocles uses synaesthetic imagery, more restrainedly and sparingly than Aeschylus or Pindar, to be sure, but with a fine sense of both verbal and dramatic effectiveness. It is especially important to note how closely the synaesthesia is related to its context. It is not an isolated piece of ornament or verbal coruscation, but forms part of a coherent, self-conscious pattern. It often helps express the recurrent Sophoclean themes of loneliness and the absence of communication, the deceptiveness of language, the mysterious remoteness of the gods, and the uncertainties of human knowledge in a world where reality is often hidden and distorted by appearances.

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Air-Imprints or Eidola:
Democritus' Aetiology of Vision

WALTER BURKERT

Democritus' explanation of vision, known to us mainly, if not solely, through the critical account of Theophrastus, De sensu 50–55, has been subject to severe criticism ever since. Theophrastus wrote: “Democritus wants to make some points in an original manner, but he raises still more problems,” a judgment which becomes much more negative in the translations of Stratton and Guthrie: “In trying to say something original he has left the problem even farther from solution,” as if raising problems were a setback. There have been recently penetrating and illuminating studies of this complex of Democritean problems by Kurt von Fritz and Peter Bicknell. Still the interpretation and even the reading of the basic text may need further discussion in some places, and there are some general, disquieting perspectives involved as to the consistency of Democritus' system and the reliability of the doxographical tradition as a whole.


2 Guthrie 443; “even farther from solution” also Stratton 115.
Democritus, according to Theophrastus, starts from a simple observation, the "appearance in the eye," ἐμφάσις; flow, "in" the pupil of the eye of man or animal a small picture of the world, and of the observer himself, "appears." This, of course, was generally known, as Theophrastus in another place condescendingly remarks: "As to the appearance in the eye, this is rather a general opinion; for nearly everyone thinks that seeing comes about in this way, by the appearance produced in the eyes"; in particular he mentions Anaxagoras for this assumption. This image in the eye seems to be the important link in the process of transmission from the world outside to the seeing individual. For Democritus, this evidently implies two questions: (1) How is this "appearance" produced, and (2) What happens to it after it has entered the eye? In trying to answer these questions, he has to rely on his atomistic premises, that there is nothing but atoms, different in form and size, moving through the void, hitting each other or getting fixed together in varying arrangements.

Democritus' main effort is devoted to answering the first of these questions. He distinguishes three factors in bringing about the "appearance": there must be (a) a medium between object and eye, (b) some modification of the medium by the object, and (c) some means of transport from the object to the eye.

As a medium, "air" is introduced. Air, for Democritus, is a swarm of atoms, not of any specific shape—as in Plato's Timaeus—but with a certain limit of size; bigger atoms constitute water, still bigger ones earth. Thus air is the finest of all possible media, it is suited best for receiving imprints, as fine sand in contrast to gravel; Theophrastus' polemical suggestion, that on Democritus' principles we ought to see better in water than in air (51, p. 514, 2 Dox.), misses this point.

Indeed Democritus, as Theophrastus expressly attests, used the picture of seal-imprints on wax to account for the modification of the medium by the object, thus creating a comparison which has loomed large in ancient and in modern epistemology. Still it is difficult to see how imprints on air could be produced. Democritus has to presuppose an interplay of three activities: an "efflux" (ἀπορροή) of the object, some action of the eye, and an impulse coming from the sun or any other light. This third

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3 One should not translate "reflexion" (Guthrie 442), cf. v. Fritz 612; 614.
4 36, p. 509, 17 Dox.; 27, p. 507, 7 Dox. = Anaxagoras A 92. Theophrastus raises the objection that the image in the eye is distorted, 36, p. 509, 19 Dox., and that mirrors do not see (below, n. 49).
5 Arist. cael. 303 a 14 = 67 A 15 and Simpl. cael. 610, 24; 625, 1 = 275 Luria.
6 Plat. Tht. 191cd, 194c, Phil. 39ab; Arist. an. 424 a 17 fl., 425 b 23, 434 a 29; the Stoics, SVF II nr. 53, 55, 56, etc.; E. Hoffmann, Sokrates 47, 1921, 56–58; P. Friedlaender, Platon III2, 1960, 456 n. 60.
factor is easiest to explain: fire-atoms, being smallest and swiftest, are constantly emitted by every source of light; hitting the air, they produce a "condensation"7 as children playing in sand "condense" it by tapping or pressing it; if the wax is too soft, it will not keep any imprint.

The thesis that "there is always some efflux from every thing" (50, p. 513, 20 Dox.) is taken over from Empedocles, nearly as a verbatim quotation.8 Empedocles had used the "effluxes" to explain magnetism, odours, sounds, and even seeing, and at the same time he had considered them a sign of constant decay under the realm of Neikos. Democritus seems to have come close to this pessimistic view, judging by a fragment published recently from Arabic tradition:9 everything is constantly disintegrating.

The third factor, some activity of "that which sees," has seemed to be suspiciously close to Plato's theory of the active eye; some tried to eliminate it by altering the text.10 But the alternative of receptiveness or activity of the eye is not treated by the Presocratics as strictly exclusive; Aristotle already blamed Empedocles for using "effluxes" of the objects and still comparing the eye to a lantern;11 and in his account of the mirror Empedocles spoke of "fire being separated off from the mirror," "condensing" and "pushing back" the effluxes.12 There are still more important testimonies as to Democritus' opinion: a certain Heracleides who wrote an "Introduction to Music" answers the problem, why lightning is perceived prior to thunder, with the thesis that our vision is sent out to meet the light, whereas hearing waits to receive the sound, and he cites Democritus at least for the second part of this explanation.13 And Democritus explained the fact that owls see at night by the "fire" in their eyes, which, being "sharp and cutting," "takes apart" (the eye or the dark air?) and "brings vision into contact" (with the object?).14

The result of this cooperation is a specific process expressed by the

8 Empedocles B 89 = 554 Bollack γνώις δτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροκαὶ ὅσοι ἔγενουτο, vgl. A 57; 86; 88; 89; 90; 92; B 109 a; on 553 Bollack, see Gnomon 44, 1972, 436.
10 (στελλόμενον) κατὰ τοῦ ὀρῶντο "in direction to the seeing (eye)" Diels, Beare, Bicknell, instead of καὶ (sc. ὑπὸ) τοῦ ὀρῶντος.
11 Arist. sens. 437 b 23 on Empedocles B 84, cf. L 90.
12 Empedocles A 88 = 334 Bollack.
13 Democritus A 126 a = 489 Luria; on Heracleides, W. Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, 1972, 380 f.
14 A 157 = 550 Luria διαφέρει καὶ ἀναμιάγνυ τὴν ὀρᾶν. Luria's translation of ἀναμιάγνυ as "bringing chaos," "confusing" cannot be right.
verb συντελλόμενον. This was translated “being compressed” by Stratton, followed by Guthrie, whereas Luria takes it to mean “being produced”;

15 Diels tried to alter the text altogether (n. 10). Still if we look at the vocabulary of Theophrastus and Aristotle, we find συντελλεσθαί in opposition to αὐξάνεσθαι, meaning “to shrink,” “to get smaller.” There have been repeated discussions in modern literature of the problem, how the atomistic theories of vision could account for big “imprints” or “images” passing through the pupil; 16 Democritus has answered it by the concept of συντελλεσθαί. We know that Democritus dealt with problems of perspective, 17 and gave some explanations of how we can “see” magnitudes and distances correctly, though Theophrastus did not deign to describe it (54, p. 514 f. Dox.). He must have assumed that the size of the imprint is proportionally reduced according to the distance from the eye. In this process of “shrinking,” “that which sees” plays some role. Democritus apparently supposed that, as in the case of the owl’s eye, though with less force, fire-atoms constantly emanate from the eye, like the “cone of visual rays” of later optics. 18 Later on, the Stoics speak of a state of “tension,” αναντασίς, of the air produced by the cone of visual rays. 19 The fire-atoms of the eye somehow cut a path through the air along which, then, the “imprint” is transported, shrinking all the time in the cone.

But how, finally, are the imprints transported? This too is expressly stated in the text of Theophrastus, although ever since the editio princeps this indication has been eliminated by conjecture: “perhaps it is the sun that produces the appearance and the light, bringing it, as it were, right up to the eyes (literally ‘to vision’).” 20 This makes perfect sense; there is a slight irregularity of syntax, a masculine participle ἐπιφέρων being

16 Bailey 412; Guthrie 442; Bicknell, Eranos 1968, 11.
17 199 Luria = Anaxagoras A 39; the title Ἀκτιογραφία in the catalogue Diog. Laert. 9, 48, B 15 b (Tetralogy IX 4).
18 It may be a coincidence that Democritus dealt with the geometrical problems of the cone, B 155 = 126 Luria.
20 54, p. 514, 24 Dox. ἄλλη ἵστως τὴν ἐμφάσιν ὃ ἠλλος ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ φῶς, ὃσπερ ἐπιφέρων ἐτὶ δύναντας καὶ was deleted in Camots Aldina edition 1552 and in the Codex Vossianus, as in Stratton and Luria; Diels indicated a corruptula in Doxographi and suggested ὃσπερ <ἀκτίνα> ἐπιφέρων in “Fragmente der Vorsokratiker” II 115, 26.
attached to ὁ ἡλιος . . . καὶ τὸ φῶς, but this is not unprecedented and does not call for emendation. The phrase “and the light” is an afterthought; sun is not the only source of light, but its action dominates the sentence. Light consists of an emission of fire-atoms, which hit all objects, jump back, and thus produce a movement leading away from the objects which are exposed to light. So light has a double function in Democritus’ theory: it condenses the air so that it can receive the imprint, and it transports the imprint along the narrowing cone produced by the seeing eye. That the imprint appears to be colored is not difficult to explain in principle, since the impression of color is produced by a special arrangement of atoms.21

Understandably, Democritus has much less to say on the second main question, what happens to the “appearance” when it has come to be in the eye. Evidently it does not stay there, but is transmitted to the “rest of the body.”22 Soul, for Democritus, is not concentrated in any “leading” organ. Democritus goes into detail about the physiology of the eye: the outward membrane must be thin and transparent,23 the water in the eye spongy, without flesh or fat liquid, and the “veins” leading from the eye to the brain must somehow be accommodated to the imprints.24 Of course Democritus had no idea of what we call processing of information, and we need not blame him for that.

On the whole, Democritus’ explanation of vision is rather consistent and detailed. Among the special objections raised by Theophrastus, the argument that an imprint must be inverted right-left (52, p. 514, 7 Dox.) is acute, but irrelevant—the retinal picture is even upside down; the other argument, that the imprints cannot help clashing in the air, if two persons are looking at one another,25 is rather fatal to any theory of vision.

21 ἀλλόχρων 50, p. 513, 21 Dox. recalling Anaxagoras (A 92) ibid. 27, p. 507, 11 Dox.; τροπή γὰρ χρωματίζονται Arist. gen. corr. 316 a 2 = 337 Luria.
22 54, p. 514, 30 Dox.; cf. Bicknell (above, n. 1).
23 50, p. 513, 23 Dox. εἴ δὲ μὲν ἔξω χείτων ὡς λεπτότατος καὶ πυκνότατος εἶτη can hardly be right; cf. Anaxagoras ibid. 37, p. 509, 31 τοὺς ὑμένας τῶν ὀμμάτων λεπτοῖς εἶναι καὶ λαιμοῦς; Democritus (A 135) ibid. 73, p. 521, 2 καὶ εἰδὴτροπα καὶ διαγη ὅλα λαμπρὰ εἶναι; Alcmeon (A5) ibid. 26, p. 507, 1 Dox. ὅραν δὲ τῶι στάθμοι καὶ τῶι διαφάνει; 77, p. 522, 12 τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ διαφάνες. I would suggest στιλπνότατος for πυκνότατος.
24 The text in 50, p. 513, 26 is quite uncertain; the codices have καὶ μὴ εὐσχημονεῖν, corrected to ὡς ὀμοσχημονεῖν by Diels Dox.; ὀμοσχημονεῖν in “Fragmente der Vorsokratiker” II 115, 2 seems to be a mere slip, which got into the first edition, was taken over by Stratton, and has made its way into LSJ.
25 53, p. 514, 20 πολλὰ ἐπαλλάττετες should be emended to ἐπαλλάττετει: the imprints do not get “one in the place of the other,” but “one on the other,” cf. ἐπαλάττετει 80, p. 523, 13/15; A 146 = 546 Luria; ἐπαλάττετες Simpl. cael. 295, 15, A 37 = 293 Luria; on ἐπαλάττεις J. B. McDiarmid, Hermes 86, 1958, 294 f.
starting from the simple mechanics of blow and impact; again, we can hardly blame Democritus for not having invented wave theory.

It is true that he has to accept some strange ad hoc hypotheses as to the mechanics of air-atoms being compressed, imprinted, and transported; but he has done as much as could be done on his own principles. To this extent the theory is to be judged quite satisfactory.  

Much greater problems are raised by the contradictions which exist between the account of Theophrastus and some other testimonies. Aristotle, setting out his own theory of vision in De anima, pleads for the assumption that air is necessarily the medium (μεταξύ) and criticizes Democritus for holding an opposite view: “For Democritus is wrong in saying that, if the space between were void, one could even see clearly an ant on the vault of the sky” (an. 419 a 15 = 68 A 122 = 468 Luria). So Democritus is credited with the view that “air” is an obstacle to sight, whereas in Theophrastus’ account air is the necessary medium exactly as in Aristotle. How to reconcile both reports has been a vexed question for a long time. Zeller took the “ant” to be a contrafactual example, which was to support the theory described by Theophrastus: we do not see such an ant, therefore the process of vision must be totally different. Guthrie tried to belittle the discrepancy by taking “void” not in an absolute sense, but “void of anything nontransparent to obstruct the view” but atoms hardly are transparent. Kurt von Fritz stated that the disquieting “ant” presupposes a different theory of vision, and one cannot but agree: if Democritus said what Aristotle reports, he did not, at that moment, think of the explanation of vision which is in the text of Theophrastus.

But there is more: Theophrastus himself, in some later chapters of De sensu, gives an account of Democritus’ explanation of colors (73–82). Following Empedocles again, Democritus states that there are four basic colors, white, black, red, and green, and he tries to assign special arrangements of atoms to each of them. We cannot go into all the details of this rather involved passage. It is in the explanation of “black” that “effluxes” turn up, emanating from the “black” object; they are “slow” and “confused,” getting such qualification “on account of the air contained in

27 1127, 1, followed by Beare 27.
28 444; followed by Bicknell, Eranos 1968, 12, 15.
29 Grundprobleme 614, 50.
them” (*De sens*. 74, p. 521, 13 Dox.); “black” is produced by “the thickness of the air and of the efflux coming in and the confusion of the eye” (81, p. 524, 5 Dox.). Democritus is very difficult to understand on this point, Theophrastus says; but his repeated statement leaves no doubt that Democritus spoke of “air” as a determining factor in the special case of “black”, and of “effuxes” entering the eye directly, without all that mechanism of condensation, imprints, and moving light. The connection of “air” and darkness is old and popular; indeed it is the basic meaning of ἀπὸ. This meaning is present here and in Aristotle’s remark; it is incompatible with Theophrastus’ earlier report.

Finally, there is the famous theory of “eidola,” which has its place in every handbook as the theory of vision of atomism, ever since Lucretius.31 “External objects are constantly giving off films of atoms which retain the approximate form of their surfaces and so constitute ‘images’ of them. These actually enter the eye…”32 Doxography ascribes this theory to “Leucippus and Democritus”33; we have the title of a book of Democritus, Περὶ εἰδώλων ἤ περὶ προορῆς (68 B 10a = 578 Luria), and of a polemical work of Heraclides Ponticus, Περὶ εἰδώλων πρὸς Δημόκριτον.34 In fact Theophrastus, in the main text discussed above, refers to this theory: “On the whole, if one assumes an efflux from the form, as in the book Περὶ τῶν εἰδών, why should one bring in the imprinting process? For the images, by themselves, appear in the eye.” It is generally agreed that Theophrastus, in the parenthesis, is referring to some special book of Democritus, and that there was no book Περὶ τῶν εἰδών of Democritus. There are two possible solutions to this dilemma: J. G. Schneider, who edited Theophrastus in 1821, suggested Περὶ τῶν εἰδώλων; whereas Diels thought that the reference was to Περὶ Ἰδεῶν and that Theophrastus had written Περὶ εἰδών instead according to his own usage. The latter explanation, which avoids any alteration of the transmitted text, has won almost general acceptance.35

Still Diels’ arguments are clearly wrong. It is true that Democritus called the atoms “Ἰδέα,” and if the title Περὶ Ἰδεῶν is absent from the catalogue of Thrasyllus, it may have been an alternative title for one of

32 Guthrie 442.
33 Aet. 4, 13, 1 = 67 A 29 = 469 Luria; Aet. 4, 14, 2 = 67 A 31 = 479 Luria; cf. Aet. 4, 8, 10 = 67 A 30 = 469 Luria.
34 Fr. 36/37 and Fr. 123 Wehrli; Wehrli thinks these are two different titles. There was also a book of Theophrastus Περὶ τῶν εἰδώλων, Diog. Laert. 5, 43.
35 Luria p. 521 on nr. 478, 8; Steckel, RE Suppl. XII, 1970, 218; περὶ εἰδώλων was preferred by V. E. Alfieri, Gli Atomisti, 1936, 144.
the books listed there. But since Theophrastus, like Aristotle, uses both έιδος and ἰδέα in his own works indiscriminately, even within the same sentence, he had neither conscious nor unconscious reasons to change a title Περὶ έιδεῶν to Περὶ έιδῶν, as if this were "translation into Attic dialect," as Luria believes. On the contrary, there is not a single instance in either Aristotle or Theophrastus where atoms are called έιδη. The one passage adduced by Diels (DK II 115, 7), Arist. phys. 184 b 21, is corrupt in the wording, but the sense is clear: if there are infinitely many principles, these can be one in essence, though different in shape, like the atoms of Democritus; or they can be different in character, or even opposites. Here έιδεῖ διαφεροῦσα belongs to the alternative to Democritus' view and is not a description of the atoms.

So Schneider's emendation Περὶ τῶν έιδῶ&laquo;n comes up again, as έιδωλα are mentioned in the context; the title appears in the catalogue of Thrasyllus. The change of the manuscript tradition involved is minimal; in fact the same kind of corruption occurred or was about to occur in the transmission of the catalogue in Diogenes Laertius: the Laurentianus F writes έιδωλ with a small λ above the line; a抄ist would easily tend to write έιδoν; the other manuscripts, BP, have έιδωλον, probably the transcription of a similar abbreviation.

Thus Theophrastus turns to a special book Democritus wrote on έιδωλα in order to combat Democritus' explanation of vision: these are two conflicting theories which should not be conflated into one. Confirmation comes from Epicurus, who still keeps both apart: he rejects the concept of "imprints" and generalizes the theory of "images": "for the external objects could not 'imprint' their own nature as to color and shape through the air between them and us."

This passage of Epicurus makes it probable that he knew the theory reported by Theophrastus, to which Aristotle too alludes. So there is

36 As suggested by Brandis and Diels, B 51. It is quoted by Sextus Adv. math. 7, 137, B 6 = 48 Luria.
37 plant. 1, 12, 1; 7, 15, 3; cf. 6, 2, 7; 7, 7, 2; 8, 5, 1; De od. 1; ign. 5.
39 Diog. Laert. 9, 47, B 10 a; as all the testimonies of Aristotle, Plutarch, Sextus (n. 57) have ειδωλα in the plural, Diels' emendation Περὶ ειδώλων is convincing.
40 Epist. 1, 49: οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἐναποσφραγίσωτο τὰ έξον τῆς ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὸ τε χρώματος καὶ τῆς μορφῆς διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ μεταξοῦ ἡμῶν τε κάκεινων; reference to Democritus in G. Arrighetti, Epicuro, Opere, 1960 ad loc.; H. von Staden notes that it could also be aimed at Zeno (ἐναποσφραγίζεσθαι, SVF I n. 59, etc.).
41 ἐμφασις sens. 438 a 6, see n. 47.
no question about the authenticity of Theophrastus’ account, which Bailey was prone to discount as otherwise “unsupported.” 42 We can indeed trace the influence of Democritus’ explanation of vision for three more generations: After Aristotle, whose own theory of light and vision owes much to Democritus in contrast to the Academy, 43 Theophrastus himself seems to have accepted, at least provisionally, a process of “imprinting in the air”; 44 Strato, diverging from Aristotle, came still closer to atomism; he said that colors “move away from the bodies, coloring the air between.” Instead of Aristotle’s qualitative change ( ἀλλοίωσις) he reintroduced motion through the medium of air; and if the comparison with the electric blows dealt by the torpedo fish goes back to him, he came surprisingly close to modern physics. A pupil of Strato was Aristarchus of Samos, the famous astronomer; he taught that vision occurs through certain “shapes forming the air by themselves,” and that color is “the light falling on the objects,” which must be modified somehow in the process. 45

This seems to be the latest echo of Democritus’ air-imprints. In the later period even the doxographers—represented by Aetius and Diogenes Laertius—seem to have forgotten about them. Aetius mentions exclusively the εἰδωλα; as the atomistic theory of vision he ascribes it to “Leucippus and Democritus” and adds Epicurus in the same lemma; this combination clearly comes from a late Hellenistic source. Diogenes Laertius gives the same theory to Democritus, Calcidius to atomists in general. 46 Very interesting is the case of Alexander of Aphrodisias. 47 Commenting on a passing remark of Aristotle about the “appearance in the eye” according to Democritus—which we can easily understand thanks to Theophrastus—he gives a close paraphrase and a correct explanation of the word ἐμφασις, then goes on to report on the εἰδωλα-theory of “Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus,” though this adds nothing to the point.

42 Bailey 167.
43 Light is ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς, color is κανητικών of this, an. 418 b 9, 419 a 11, sens. 438 b 5, 440 a 15-18, 446 b 27; this has in common with Democritus the hypothesis of a medium and of modification of the medium by light. Cf. n. 51.
44 Theophrastus, as quoted by Priscianus Lydus 1, 33 p. 15 Bywater: φαμέν γὰρ δὴ καὶ τῆς μορφῆς ὀσπερ ἀποτύπωσι καὶ τῶν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἀμφοτέρων γίνεται.
46 Aetius, see n. 33; Diog. Laert. 9, 44; Calc. 236.
47 In de sens., CAG III 1 p. 24, 14 (cf. 56, 12) = 477 Luria, on Arist. sens. 438 a 5.
Evidently he did not use the book of Theophrastus, but some handbook of the Aetius-type, and there he could find nothing about Democritus' authentic views. This is rather a disquieting fact about the surviving doxography. Though it ultimately goes back to Theophrastus, as far as the Presocratics are concerned, in its present form it has undergone heavy remodelling in late Hellenistic times, and in more than one case the authentic tradition has been ousted by Hellenistic views and perspectives. Just as in the doxography for Pythagoras Academic reconstructions prevail against Aristotle's indications, in the atomistic theory of vision Epicurus has got the better of Democritus.

In his decision to generalize the eidola-theory and to give up the complicated air-imprints, Epicurus has chosen a doctrine which is simple and easy to remember, and this ensured his success in all the handbooks. Still there was some scientific reason, too, why Democritus' explanation should seem to be outdated: it relied on the observed fact of the "appearance in the eye." On this point Aristotle had remarked disdainfully: "This comes to pass because the eye is smooth, and the picture is not in the eye but in the observer; what happens, is reflexion. But generally, as it seems, nothing was yet known about mirror-images and reflexion." Geometrical optics appears to have started with Philip of Opus. The explanation of mirror-images by the law of reflexion was a great achievement of mathematical physics, but at the same time this new branch of mathematics seemed to entail the theory of visual rays. Hence Democritus' earlier attempts were reduced to shambles. There happened here, on a smaller scale, the same phenomenon as in astronomy and cosmology as a whole: the speculations of the Presocratics about the physics of the universe were superseded by precise mathematical science, which seemed however to preclude any simple materialistic physics. Homocentric spheres or epicycles as well as visual rays combined with quinta essentia and soul-substance put a halt to physical theory for nearly two millenia.

48 Burkert (see n. 13) 53-83; see also W. Rösler, "Lukrez und die Vorsokratiker," Hermes 101, 1973, 48-64.

49 sens. 438 a 7 = A 121 = 477 Luria, cf. meteor. 370 a 16 f., Theophrastus sens. 36.

50 The earliest surviving treatise is the "Optika" in the Corpus of Euclid, cf. A. Lejeune, Euclide et Ptolémée, Deux stades de l'optique géométrique grecque, 1948. Plato seems to know nothing about geometrical optics, but in the works of Philip of Opus there are ὀπτικά and ἐνοπτηρικά (Suda s.v. φιλόσοφος), parallel to the later distinction of ὀπτικά and κατοπτρικά.

We are left with two disconnected theories in Democritus, the explanation of vision by the air-imprints and the assumption of emanating eidola. Theophrastus clearly indicates how to deal with the contradiction: The conflicting doctrines come from two different books. As \( \text{P} \text{e} \text{r} \text{i \ e} \text{id} \text{o} \text{l} \text{w} \text{o} \text{n} \) is brought in for the sake of polemics, the main report must refer to another book of Democritus, the title of which is easy to guess. In his chapter on Democritus, Theophrastus treats vision and hearing, makes a passing remark on "the other senses" (57, p. 515, 22 Dox.) and continues \( \text{P} \text{e} \text{r} \text{i \ t} \text{o} \text{o \ f} \text{r} \text{o} \text{n} \text{e} \text{i} \text{w} \) (58). In the catalogue of Thrasyllus, there are two consecutive titles, "On Nous" and "On senses,"\(^{52}\) with the note "some editors combine these two under the title On the soul." Later on in Theophrastus' book there is an account of "taste" (64–72) and of "colors" in Democritus (73–82), and there are separate titles "On tastes" and "On colors" in the catalogue.\(^{53}\) Thus the contradiction between the role of "air" in the explanation of "black" and of vision in general, too, is reduced to conflicting statements in different books. There is still a passage in Theophrastus on "light and heavy" (62–64) which is not directly attributable to a Thrasyllus title; the sentence \( \text{t} \text{o \ s} \text{x} \text{h} \text{m} \text{a \ m} \text{e} \text{t} \text{a} \text{p} \text{i} \text{t} \text{t} \text{o} \text{n \ e} \text{r} \text{g} \text{n} \text{a} \text{z} \text{e} \text{s} \text{t} \text{h} \text{a} \text{i} \text{k} \text{i} \text{t} \text{h} \text{n \ h} \text{e} \text{m} \text{e} \text{t} \text{e} \text{r} \text{a} \text{n} \text{a} \text{l} \text{l} \text{o} \text{i} \text{w} \text{a} \text{w} \) (p. 517, 11) could suggest \( \text{P} \text{e} \text{r} \text{i \ a} \text{m} \text{e} \text{i} \text{f} \text{i} \text{r} \text{i} \text{s} \text{m} \text{i} \text{o} \text{w} \)\(^{54}\) but Theophrastus also made use of "other" books (61 f., p. 516, 28 f. Dox.).

Of course the fact that different books of Democritus contained different views is not very satisfying to historians of philosophy. Some tried to assume an evolution of doctrines: Democritus first took over the "simple" theory of eidola from Leucippus and later tried to give a more detailed explanation along the lines described by Theophrastus.\(^{55}\) But the latter view is so directly dependent on Anaxagoras and Empedocles (as can be shown in many details: see nn. 4; 8; 21; 30), that it is difficult to fit another atomistic theory in between. We are drawn to the more radical thesis that there was no eidola-theory of Leucippus nor, as regards the general explanation of vision, of Democritus himself.

In fact Democritus did speak of \( \text{e} \text{i} \text{d} \text{o} \text{a} \text{l} \text{a} \) or \( \text{d} \text{e} \text{i} \text{k} \text{e} \text{l} \text{a} \) (B 123 = 467 Luria).

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52 Diog. Laert. 9, 46, Tetralogy IV 3/4.

53 Tetralogy V 1/2. It is important to note that Theophrastus confirms the authority of Thrasyllus' catalogue; the possibility of which a sceptic might think, that titles could be forged or "reconstructed" on the sole basis of Theophrastus, is minimal, considering that this treatise of Theophrastus was not widely known, not even to Alexander.

54 Tetralogy V 4.

55 Bailey 166; Guthrie 442 f. One testimony of Clement seems to say that the eidola-theory was an innovation of Democritus as against Leucippus, Protr. 66, 2, (not in DK and Luria), but Diels, Dox. 130 showed this to be a result of compilation by Clement himself.
But the only reference to them in the Corpus Aristotelicum\textsuperscript{56} as well as in the well informed reports of Plutarch\textsuperscript{57} and Sextus (B 166 = 472 a Luria) clearly show that these “images” are not supposed to account for normal vision, but for “parapsychology”:\textsuperscript{58} apparitions of demons, dreams predicting the future, sudden ideas which involuntarily strike us; the “images” do not even enter through the eye, but through “pores” in the body; dreams come when the eyes are closed. The word \textit{eid\omicron\omega\omicron\nu} itself is suggestive of deceptive apparitions and ghosts of the dead. In Thrasyllus’ catalogue, the book Περὶ \textit{eid\omicron\omega\omicron\nu} has a second title, Περὶ πρωνοίησ; this suggests a discussion of soothsaying spirits and a polemic against Anaxagorais’ doctrine of a Nous who “knows everything that was, is or shall be” (B 12). This has little to do with vision in the clear light of day. But Theophrastus could play off one doctrine against the other, and Epicurus could generalize the eidola theory at the cost of Democritus’ original doctrine.

Plutarch, one of the rare people who still read original works of Democritus in imperial times, remarks that, like Aristotle or Chrysippus, Democritus “gave up some of his earlier doctrines without ado or irritation, even gladly” (A 35 a). Some historians will hardly be satisfied with this. Consistency of thought is the only virtue left when the factual problems and solutions of the early “physiologists” are hopelessly outdated. Democritus could not share this perspective. For him, there is a set of ontological premises guaranteed by reasoning, and there is a wide range of observable facts which, though subject to due criticism, are indicative of reality: ὁμοιοῦ ἀναλω 

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{De divinatione per somnium} 464 a 5 = 472 Luria, not in DK.

\textsuperscript{57} Besides Α 77 = 476 Luria, there is an important passage in \textit{Aem. Paul.} 1, 4 (parallel to, but more detailed than B 166); this was quoted by Zeller 1160, 1, but disregarded by subsequent scholars including Luria. See also Diogenes of Oinoanda, New fragment 1 in \textit{AJA} 74, 1970, 57.

\textsuperscript{58} See Bicknell, n. 1.

\textsuperscript{59} This verbatim quotation—on the importance of which see J. Klowski, “Der historische Ursprung des Kausalprinzips,” \textit{AGP} 48, 1966, 225-266—in Stob. 1, 4, 7 = Aet. 1, 25, 4 appears as Leucippus B 2 (= 22 Luria). But the parallel passage in Theodoretus, \textit{graece. aff. cur.} 6, 13 = 22 Luria—omitted in \textit{Doxographi}—gives the name of Democritus in this context. The Aetius lemmata on Pythagoras, Parmenides, and atomists seem to be variously conflated by Ps.-Plutarch, Stobaeus, and Theodoretus in this passage (1, 25). The original must have had “Leucippus and Democritus” for the atomists; and since \textit{περὶ νοῦ} occurs in Thrasyllus’ catalogue (Tetralogy IV 3) and is nowhere else brought into connection with Leucippus, the quotation must be from Democritus.
about such a reason may "lie in the depths" (B 117 = 51 Luria). Democritus again and again tries to find such reasons; hence his many books on "causes," αἰτία;\textsuperscript{60} he said "he would rather find one causal explanation than become king of Persia'' (B 118 = 29 Luria). He was sure there was progress in knowledge by more and more "findings," but he left it to his critics to see whether all the explanations suggested were mutually compatible; it was an easy triumph to show that they were not.

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\textsuperscript{60} No less than 8 books, listed under the rubric 'Ἀετίακατα, in the catalogue (Diog. Laert. 9, 47). Aelian in A 150a–155 evidently gives excerpts from Αἰτία περὶ ζῷων.
Notes on the Electra of Euripides

JAMES DIGGLE

"Go to my aged tutor of a dear father." This lopsided sentence admits of two easy corrections, between which editors have found that the choice is not easy. In Victorius' τροφὸν ἐμὸν φίλου πατρός either ἐμὸν or φίλου is otiose. HF 1281–1282 ou tv' ἐμὰς φίλας/ Θῆβας ἐνοικεῖν ὅσιν lends no support, for in Heracles' complaint that "it is not lawful for me to live in my beloved Thebes" each epithet adds its separate stab of pain; nor is any more support afforded by the words imputed to the dying Agamemnon at 1151–1152 below, φονεύσεις φίλας/ πατρίδα... ἐλθόντ' ἐμὰν; In Camper's τροφὸν ἐμὸν φίλου πατρός the word-order (noun A, adj. B, adj. A, noun B) is not unexampled; 489 πρόσβασιν τῶν' (τῆν' Musgrave, perhaps rightly) ὄρηναν οἴκων, Hes. 44 ἄδελφήν τῶν' ἐμήν ἐν ἥματι (v.l. τὴν ἐμήν τῆν' ἥμεραι), Tr. 498–499 γάμον μιᾶς ἴνα/ γυναικός, Hel. 571 γυναικῶν... εἰς δυοῖν... πόσις, S. Ai. 859 γῆς ἱερὸν οἰκεῖας πέδουν, El. 730 ναυγάθων Κρεαίδων ἱππικῶν πέδουν, OT 52 ὁρνθὶ... τὴν τὸτ' αἰείως τύχῃ, 109 ἵνας παλαιὰς δυστέκμαρτον αἰτίας, Tr. 613 θυτήρα κανών κανῶν ἐν πεπλάματι, and from lyrics Tr. 151–152 πλαγαῖς Φρυγίους (Wilamowitz, -iae codd.) εὐκόμποις... θεοῦς, IT 408 ῥοθίως εἰλατίναις δικρότους κώπας (Reiske, ῥ- ἐλατίναις δ- κώπαις L), S. Ai. 357 γένος ναίας ἄρωγὸν τέχνας, Tr. 994–995 ἱερῶν οἰων οἰων... χάριν. But while it would be fair to say that in these passages the word-order was positively stylish, it would be fair to say that, in comparison with these, the style of τροφὸν ἐμὸν φίλου πατρός, where "the interlaced hyperbaton... throws a great deal of weight on two not very weighty adjectives" (Denniston), is positively graceless. The style of the phrase is not enhanced by the prior attachment to τροφὸν of the adjective παλαιῶν.

There is a further complication: the Old Man was Agamemnon's τροφεύς, not his τροφός. When Amphitryon at HF 45 describes himself as
τροφών τέκνων οίκουρον, it is unnecessary for Elmsley\(^2\) to re-name him τροφέα, because, as Wilamowitz says, “hier zeigt die Verbindung mit οίκουρον, dass der Ausdruck mit Absicht gewählt ist, weil Amph. nicht mehr ἐν ἄνδράσιν ist, denn auch das οίκουρεῖν ist spezifisch Webersache.” But in our passage Elmsley’s τροφέα is indispensable; and it opens the way for a further change which removes all difficulties: ἐδώ ὡς παλαιὸν τροφέα μοι φίλων πατρός, “do me the favour of going. . . .” The role of the dative may be illustrated by Su. 36–37 οἴχεται δὲ μοι κῆρυξ τρός ἂττυ and S. OC 1475–1476 ὡς τάξιστα μοι μολὼν/ ἀνακτα χώρας τής τε τις πορευκάτω: see also Kühner-Gerth i.423. A parallel, if one is needed, for the dative’s position between noun and dependent genitive is provided by A. Ch. 193–194 εἶναι τόδ’ ἀγλάσωμα μοι τοῦ φιλτάτου/ βροτῶν Ὀρέστου.

432–436  Χο. κλειναί νάες, αἱ ποτ’ ἔβατε Τροίαν
tοῖς ἀμετρήτοις ἑρετμοῖς
πέμπτοισαι χοροῦς μετὰ Νηρήδων,
κ’ ὁ φίλαυλος ἑπάλλε δέλ-
φίς . . .

“Famous ships, which went to Troy with oars beyond number, escorting the dances with the Nereids, where the flute-loving dolphin gambolled. . . .” If the words which I have translated “escorting the dances with the Nereids” could mean, as Paley would have it, “escorting the Nereids in their dances,” then all would be well. But they cannot. He translates πέμπτοισαι χοροῦς Νηρήδων and ignores μετὰ. This preposition indicates that someone is dancing with the Nereids. “Probably Euripides thought of ship, Nereids, and dolphins as all dancing in concert,” says Denniston, citing Hel. 1451–1455 Φοίνικα Σιδωνιάς ὃ ταχεία κύστα. . . χοραγε τῶν καλλιχόρων δελφίνων and S. OC 716–719 ὃ δ’ εὐθρετμος . . . πλάτα θρόικει, τῶν ἑκατομπόδων Νηρήδων ἀκόλουθος. Weil is more expansive: “Avec leurs rames innombrables, qui sont comme autant de pieds, les vaisseaux dansent sur les flots, et les flots, agités par le mouvement des rames, bondissent autour des vaisseaux, semblent s’associer à leur danse. Traduissez ces faits en langage poétique et mythologique, vous verrez les choeurs des Néréides accompagner la danse des vaisseaux.”


2 Qu. Rev. 14 (1812), 447. He compares the corruption of τροφέας to τροφέες in some manuscripts at S. Ph. 344.
But even if we could countenance those dancing vessels of Weil, using their innumerable oars for feet, like a convoy of waltzing centipedes, how are we to reconcile the expression πέμπουσαι χορούς with the preposition μετά? It is no help to compare, as Keene and Denniston do, the phrase πομπήν πέμπειν. Because this means “take part in a procession,” it does not follow that πέμπειν χορούς means “take part in a dance.” The words πέμπουσαι χορούς ought to mean not that the ships participate in the dance but that they accompany or escort the dancers on their way: like the pair of eagles which Χαίανιν δίθρονον κράτος . . . πέμπει ξίνω δορί καί χερὶ πράκτορι . . . Τευκρίδζ επ’ αἰθαν (A. Ag. 190–113), or like the sons of Hephaestus who escorted Apollo to Delphi (πέμπουσαι Α. Ευμ. 12), or like Nessus who ferried Deianeira across the Evenus (S. Tr. 570–571 ὄνησι τῶν ἕμων . . . πορθμῶν, ὀδούνεξ υπότητι ε’ ἐπεμψ’ ἐγώ).

In short we do not want the preposition μετά. Without it we have an expression (χοροῦς Νήρηδων) which is found at Andr. 1267 (sing. χορός), Tr. 2, IT 274 (χορός), 428. And so perhaps Euripides wrote not χοροῦς μετά but χορεύματα, a noun of which he is fond: 875, HF 891, Ion 1474, Ph. 655, Ba. 132, Erechtheus fr. 65.80 Austin; also A. P.Oxy 2245.I.iii.3, Pratinas, PMG 708.1 (= Snell, TGF i, p. 82), Ar. Av. 746.

479–486

τοιῶνδ᾽ ἄνακτα δοριπότοσνων
480/1 ἔκανεν ἄνδρων, Τυνδαρί,  
481/2 κὰ λέξεα, κακόφρον κόρα. 
τοιγάρ εὲ ποτ’ οὐρανίδαι  
πέμψονει τανάτους καὶ

485 ἔτ’ ἔτι φόνων ὑπὸ δέρας  
όψομαι αἴμα χοθὲν εἰδάρων.

481 Τυνδαρί, κὰ λέξεα Seider, τυνδαρίς ἅλεξα L 482 κακόφρον Radermacher,  
-φρον L κόρα Dindorf, κούρα L 485 ἔτ’ ἔτι Seider, ἔτι ἔτι L δέρας Wecklein,  
-αν L 486 ὀψομαι Erfurdt, ὀψομ’ L

For the moment let us accept πέμψονεις τανάτους εἰς, which all editors print, and ignore καί, which they emend in different ways. “Such were the spearmens whose leader was killed by your adulterous bed, daughter of Tyndareus, malignant woman.” Therefore the gods will send you to

3 I have preferred Seider’s Τυνδαρί, with brevis in longo, to Murray’s Τυνδαρίς. Nominate is occasionally used for vocative in tragedy (for a recent discussion see V. Schmidt, Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Herodas [Berlin, 1968], pp. 89–95), but seldom is καί absent. When it is absent, in passages like Med. 1133 μη ἐπερχοῦσα, φίλος, and Ph. 629 καί τί σοι, πόλεις, γένηται, a preceding second-person form precludes the confusion which is present in El. 480, where a third-person verb ἔκανεν precedes. On the infringement of Porson’s law in this line see L. P. E. Parker, CQ n.s. 16 (1966), 16.
your death. Soon I shall see beneath your neck the bloody gore shed by steel."

"The gods will send you to your death": Clytemnestra may be sent to her death in English, but may she in Greek? And why the plural βανάτωις? Is it any more possible in Greek than in English to send a person to his deaths?

"For the dative," says Denniston, "cf. IT 159 Αἴδαι πέμψας, and Hom. Il. 1.3 "Αἰδή προίασθεν." But Hades is a place, death is not. Camper compares Pl. Ol. 2.82 Κύκνοι τε βανάτωι πότεν. But πότεν is not ἐπεμβεν: Pindar has reversed the normal construction of this verb (Pyth. 4.297 μήτ’ ὅν τινι πῆμα πορών) by analogy with the alternative construction of δίδωμι (Pyth. 5.60—61 ἐδωκ’ Ἀπόλλων θήρας αἰνώι φόβωι).

Now consider the plural. "Pluralem βανατοΐ saepius noster usurpat, ubi de violenta, sive, quod fere eodem redit, de praematura morte, sermo est," says Seidler; and Wecklein agrees—"Plural von gewaltsamen Tode." Maybe; but what we need to know is whether the plural is used of the death, violent or not, of a single person. "Some of the cases," says Denniston, "where βάνατοι appears to be used of the death of an individual are illusory... But cf. A. Ch. 53, S. El. 206 (Jebb), Tr. 1276, OT 497."

I transcribe the passages: A. Ch. 51—53 ἀνήλιοι βροτοτυγεῖς/ δύνατοι καλύπτουσι δόμου/ δευτέρα τινας μετακόμη, S. El. 206 βανάτοις αἰκεῖς διδύμων χειρῶν, Tr. 1276—1277 μεγάλους μὲν ἱδοῦσα νέους βανάτους:/ πολλὰ δὲ πῆματα <καὶ> κανοπαγή, OT 496—497 Λαβδακίδαις/ ἐπίκουρος ἁθήλων βανατῶν. These passages have two features in common. First, the word for death is not the only plural in the sentence. In two of the passages the victim is also named in the plural. In the other two passages plurals of a different kind are linked to βανατοί: in El. 206 βανάτους αἰκεῖς διδύμων χειρῶν means "attempts on his life by two pairs of hands"; in Tr. 1276, even if the "great new deaths" refer only to the death of Deianeira and not also (which I think more probable) to the imminent death of Heracles, the allusive generalizing plural matches the following generalized reference to πολλὰ πῆματα.

Second, these deaths are the deaths of persons much lamented. The plural is apt, for the reason given by "Longinus" 23.3: χυθεῖς εἰς τὰ πληθυντικὰ ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἰσεπλῆθυς καὶ τὰς ἀτυχιας, as he remarks after quoting S. OT 1403 εἰς γάμοι γάμοι, ἐφύσαθ’ ἣμας καὶ φυτεύσαντες πάλιν/ ἀνείτε ταῦταν επέρμα κατεδέξατε/ πατέρας ἀδελφοὺς παιδᾶς κτλ. He adds a caution: οὐ μέντοι δέι ποιεῖν αὐτὸ ἐπ’ ἄλλων, εἰ μὴ ἑξ’ ὅν δέχετα τὰ ὑποκείμενα αὐξήσεις ἢ πληθύνῃ ἢ ὑπερβολήν ἢ πάθος, ἐν τι τούτων ἢ πλείονα, ἔτει τοὶ τὸ πανταχοῦ κόσμων ἐξήφθαι λέων σοφιστικῶν. I see no justification for
referring to the death of Clytemnestra, who will be lamented by nobody, in the honorific plural.  

But even if the words τοιγάρ cē σοτ' οὐρανίδαι πέμψουσινθανάτωσι(ι) were acceptable, there would still remain the difficulty of what to do with καν. And what editors do with καν is far from satisfying. Murray, following Weil and Keene, prints K. Schenkl’s θανάτωσι: ἦς καν. The chief merit of this conjecture is its palaeographical simplicity (HC ~ IK), since ἦ (“Affirmative, mostly with adjectives and adverbs,” Denniston, Greek Particles, p. 280) is not especially appropriate here, and the sentence would begin much better with ἦρ’ ἐπι. No more attractive are Nauck’s θανάτωσι: ἦ μᾶν or L. Dindorf’s θανάτωσι: καν δ'. Parmentier’s defence of καν I pass over in silence.

Murray proposed σοτ’...θανάτωσι κικαν, δικαν, which he appears to have interpreted as “the gods will send you an equivalent punishment for (his) death.” The dative θανάτωσι, now referring to Agamemnon, is unsatisfactory. Grammatically it is sound enough: compare 148–149 χέρα τε κράτ’ ἐπι κοῦρμοιν/ τιθέμενα θανάτω σώι (“beating my shaven head for your death”), Med. 1286–1287 πίντει δ’ α τάλων’ ἐκ ἀλμαν φόνων / τέκναι δισεβεί, A. Ch. 53 (quoted above). Nor would it be right to object to the superfluity of such an explanatory dative after the explanatory τοιγάρ (“therefore [because of his death] the gods will send you punishment for his death”), for this is an idiomatic superfluity: Su. 191–192 οδ χρείαν πόλεις/ πολλ’ διώλοντ’ ἐνδεείς στρατηλάτου, Wilamowitz on HF 842. What disqualifies θανάτωσι is its plural number. The plural, unaided by any other plural noun in the context, fails one of the tests which I have prescribed for the plural of this noun.

Nevertheless, Murray’s approach is a profitable one. The words σοτ’....πέμψουσι...δικαν would give good sense, if the troublesome plural θανάτωσι(ι) could be disposed of. I suggest that we accept Murray’s σοτ’, elicit δικαν from the letters -cι καν, and alter θανάτως to θανάτου:

τοιγάρ σοτ’ οὐρανίδαι πέμψουν θανάτου δίκαν.

4 Denniston quotes three further passages where other plurals are used to denote death: 137 αἰμάτων (‘bloodshed’, a regular use of this plural), S. Ant. 1313 μέρων (irrelevant, since two deaths are referred to), and more pertinentily S. El. 779 φόνους πατρίων (the murder of Agamemnon). For the “honorific” plural, in general, see Kühner-Gerth i.18.

5 Metre offers no guidance, since the passage is not in responsion. For analysis of the metre see Denniston, p. 220.

6 ZS C 25 (1874), 90–91.

7 If Wecklein’s βέρας (1906 ed.) is accepted, as it almost certainly should be, we shall have to read ἦς κακ (see Denniston, who also suggests θανάτωσι· κακ).

8 This is the interpretation implied by his verse-translation: “Therefore the tribes of Heaven one day/ for these thy dead shall send on thee/ an iron death.”
“Therefore the gods will send you punishment for his death.” The expression ἄνέμψης may be compared with 977 φόνον...δίκαιον, ΙΤ 339 δίκαιον...ειδος, Or. 500 αἴματος δικήν. The metre is choriambic dimeron and glyconic. For the verb πέμπτω used of the dealings of gods with men compare Ἀντιφρος 97 Page θεοῦ πέμπταν τοια βούλεται, fr. 916.6–7 Διόσθεν/θανάτων πεμφθείσα τελευτή. For δίκην as the object compare S. Ph. 1265–1266 μών τί μοι μέγαν πάρεστε πρὸς κακοῖς πέμπτοντες κακῶν; Even closer, if the text is sound, will be A. Εὐμ. 203 ἔχρησα ποινάς τοῦ πατρὸς πέμφαι (“impose punishment for his father’s murder”): see R. D. Dawe, The collation and investigation of manuscripts of Aeschylus (Cambridge, 1964), p. 100. Also comparable is 1169 νέμει τοι δίκαιον θεὸς.

503-506

Ἡλ. τί δ’, ὥ γεραις, διάβροχον τόδ’ ὅμι’ ἔχεις; 
μών τάμα διὰ χρόνου ε’ ἄνεμψης κακά; 

505 

ὥς τάς Ὀρέστου τλήμονας φυγάς στένεις 
καὶ πατέρα τὸν ἐμὸν...;

These are Electra’s first words to the Old Man. “Why are you weeping? Have they reminded you of my troubles after so long a time?” The plural ἄνεμψης is indefensible, since no plural subject is available. “The subject can only be οἱ ξένοι, supplied from 500,” writes Denniston. “... But 500 is somewhat far away, and it is not very natural to say that the strangers have ‘reminded’ the Old Man of anything.” No, it is not at all natural.

Denniston, together with Paley, Keene, Wecklein, and Parmentier, accepts Dobree’s ἄνεμψης. “Can it be that my present misfortunes have reminded you after so long a time?” is Paley’s translation. Reminded of what? Of “domus nostrae mala,” Dobree; “of past events, the murder of Agamemnon, etc.,” Paley; “δακρώνων, suggested by διαβροχον in the preceding line,” Keene; “le souvenir des tiens [maux],” Parmentier. It appears that we are free to supplement the sense in whatever way we wish, since the sense refuses to disclose what supplement is wanted. Denniston has a different approach. “The verb is used absolutely, ‘stirred your recollection.’” But there is no satisfactory parallel for such a use, as Denniston himself admits. Weil alone has rejected these subterfuges. His conjectures, an unhappy pair, are ε’ ἔκινης α’ κακά and ε’ ἄνεκινης διὰ χρόνου κακά.

Sense and Euripidean usage are restored by accepting ἄνεμψης and changing κακά to the genitive: μών τάμα διὰ χρόνου ε’ ἄνεμψης κακῶν; “has the sight of my condition after so long reminded you of your troubles?” For the construction see Αἰξ. 1045 μη μ’ ἄνεμψης (LP, μη με μμήςες vel μμήςσες cett.) κακῶν, Ιον 284 ὥς μ’ ἄνεμψης ες τινος. Also comparable, both for κακῶν and for the sentiment, is Or. 1032 ες
δάκρυα πορθμεύουσ' ὑπομνήσει (Musgrave, -μης codd.) κακῶν ("bringing me to tears by reminding me of our troubles"). No qualification is needed by κακῶν in any of these passages, since the context makes its reference clear. The Old Man, cast out of the city by Aegisthus, has his own share of the troubles of Agamemnon's household, and Electra asks whether it is these that the sight of her has awakened, or whether he weeps rather for the exiled Orestes and the murdered Agamemnon.

567–568 Πρ. βλέψον νυν ἐκ τοῦθ', ὁ τέκνον, τὸν φιλτατον.
’Ηλ. πάλαι δέδορκα, μη εὖ γ' οὐκέτ' εὖ φρονής.

Everyone used to accept Victorius' δέδοικα, which removes the solecism of δέδορκα μη φρονής—a solecism because, as Jackson says simply, "δέδορκα is no synonym of σκοπω." 9 But recently four attempts have been made to reinstate δέδορκα. I do not think that any of these attempts succeeds, although I believe that δέδορκα is indeed correct. The fault in δέδοικα is twofold. First, "the child's reply . . . is . . . an impertinence," Jackson. Second, "in stichomythia we pass from point to point, and here the command βλέψον cannot be overlooked: I have been looking for some time," H. D. Broadhead. 10

Denniston saw in δέδορκα a play on words: "I have long been looking—to see whether you have gone mad.' Electra means the Old Man to take δέδορκα in the physical sense at first, answering his βλέψον, until she rounds on him with μη εὖ γ' οὐκέτ' εὖ φρονής." The equivocation is frigid and hardly removes the solecism.

Jackson changed φρονής to φρονεῖς and punctuated πάλαι δέδορκα.—μη εὖ γ'- οὐκέτ' εὖ φρονεῖς. "As the old man makes a motion to lead her to her brother, she ejaculates, like a well-brought-up young woman, 'Don't! Have you gone out of your senses?" But, as Broadhead says, "the assumption of the by-play is quite gratuitous and unsupported by anything in the context. What makes Electra think the old man may be 'out of his senses' is clearly his reference to the stranger as τὸν φιλτατον."

The former objection was also made by P. T. Stevens, 11 who proposed to print a colon after δέδορκα and to take μη . . . φρονής as an independent clause. This is unappealing, for a reason which he himself gives: "There is perhaps no exact parallel in Euripides to this use of μη with the present subjunctive to indicate that something may prove to be true, i.e., to make a cautious statement about the present."

11 CR 60 (1946), 101–102.
Broadhead accepted Jackson's φρονεῖς and proposed the further change of AMH to ΑΛΛΗ: πάλαι δέδορκα· ἀλλ' ἢ εὖ γ' οὐκέτ' εὖ φρονεῖς. He compared S. El. 879 ἀλλ' ἢ μέμηναι; The sense is satisfactory,12 but the further change was needless, since the adversative conjunction is not, as he insists, "indispensable." The same sense is given by πάλαι δέδορκα· μὴ εὖ γ' οὐκέτ' εὖ φρονεῖς; "I have been looking for a long time. Have you gone mad?" For μή introducing a question see Hi. 799, Tr. 178, IA 1536, A. Pe. 344, Su. 295, Ag. 683, PV 247, 959, S. Tr. 316, OC 1502.13 Such a question does not demand a negative answer: see Fraenkel on Ag. 683.

Now L has been collated many times, but it can still yield novelties in unexpected places. And here is a place where it has been reported wrongly. It is clear to me, from Spranger's facsimile, that L originally had φρονεῖς, which has been corrected (very neatly) to φρονής. The form of η is clearly visible. But the decisive evidence is the circumflex accent. The circumflex is a continuation of the right vertical of η (ε), and it rises in a loop to the right of that vertical. This is the almost invariable way in which the scribe of L adds the circumflex to ε. He never represents the circumflex on η in this way. P has φρονής, so that the alteration was made either by the original scribe of L or by Triclinius during his first stage of correction.

According to A. Olivieri, RFIC 24 (1896), 471, φρονεῖς was also written by the scribe of Riccardianus 77. This manuscript is a very careless copy of L, made at the end of the fifteenth century: see A. Tury, The Byzantine manuscript tradition of the tragedies of Euripides (Urbana, 1957), pp. 366–367.

893–896 (’Όρ.) ἦκω γὰρ οὐ λόγοις ἀλλ’ ἔργοις κτανῶν
Ἀτύκνος· ώς δὲ τῶι σάρ’ εἰδέναι τάδε
προεθώμεν, αὐτόν τὸν θανόντα σει φέρων,
ὡν εἶτε χρήσεις θηρεῖν ἀρπαγήν πράθεις . . .

"I come as Aegisthus’ murderer not in word but in deed." What follows I give in Paley’s paraphrase: "but, that I may add this ocular proof (τάδε τεκμήρια) to the certain knowledge you already have from my words, I bring you this head of Aegisthus." Denniston accepts this interpretation, though he toys with Heath’s τάδε for τάδε. But the sense is preposterous. What poet, when he could make Orestes say "I have killed Aegisthus—here is his head to prove it," would allow him to say, in effect, "I assure you that I have killed Aegisthus—I know that you

12 But the stop after the second foot is very uncommon in Euripides: see Denniston, CQ 30 (1936), 77–78.
13 Murray creates another instance at Ion 1523; wrongly, as the commentators will explain.
are quite certain that I have killed him, but here is his head too”? As Bothe puts it, “incerta confermanda sunt, non certa” (in allusion to Heath’s translation “ut vero ad certam huius rei scientiam confermam aliquid addamus”). Denniston’s “But one can ‘make assurance double sure,’” is hardly to the point.

From the time of Barnes to the time of Paley and even beyond, the ineptitude of the transmitted text was recognized, and in its place was printed Barnes’s conjecture ὡς δὲ τῶι ... προθῶμεν, translated by Barnes as “ut autem cuivis clare haec proponamus, i.e., ut haec certo scias.” The fatal objection to this was made by Paley: “Euripides would hardly have said, ‘that one may know it, I bring you the dead body.’” A second objection of his must be discounted: “προθες is rather awkwardly repeated in a somewhat different sense in the very next verse.” The repetition is no more objectionable than such instances as 44–45 ἰςχύους (“dishonour”) ... αἰσχύνομαι (“am ashamed”), S. Ph. 1300–1301 μῇ ... μεθής βέλος/—μέθες με ... χείρα.14

I suggest that we read as follows:

\[ \tilde{\eta}κω γάρ οὐ λόγοις ἀλλ’ ἐργοις κτανόν \]

Αἶχμαλὼν [ὡς δὲ τῶι σάφ’ εἴδεναι τάδε
προθῶμεν] αὐτῶν τῶν θανότας σοι φέρω ... 

The asyndeton is vigorous and was itself the cause of interpolation. Furthermore, the phrase οὐ λόγοις ἀλλ’ ἐργοις finds a new resonance. According to Denniston, “it comes to nothing more than ‘in very truth.’” And, indeed, with the transmitted text, that is all it can come to. In the less charitable opinion of Herwerden,15 the expression “non inutile tantum sed ridiculum est verborum pondus.” That goes too far, as Ion 1298 ὁπλοῖν αὐτῇ οὐ λόγος ἐρρύσατο (cited by Denniston) shows. But see how well the words are adapted to their new sequel: “I come not in word but in deed as the murderer of Aegisthus—I bring you his body.” His word he has already given; his deed is confirmed by the bringing of the corpse.

For the interpolation not of a single complete line but of parts of two consecutive lines see Alc. 795b–796a (del. Herwerden), Hel. 9b–10a (del. Nauck), 388b–389a (del. Nauck), and possibly Su. 842b–843a (del. Hermann; see M. D. Reeve, GRBS 14 [1973], 149).

14 See also the references in my note on Phaethon 56 (Cambridge, 1970), to which may be added Page, Actors’ interpolations in Greek tragedy (Oxford, 1934), pp. 123–124, and Verdenius, Mnemosyne, ser. iv 11 (1958), 203. Anyone who is intent on accepting Barnes’s conjecture and avoiding the repetition may write προθες (Herwerden, RPh 2 [1878], 29). But προθες is supported by H. II. 24.499 and S. El. 1487.

15 Mnemosyne 28 (1899), 232.
Denniston writes: “Intransitive ἐκβάλλω has several well-defined physical senses: among others, ‘invade,’ of an army (metaphorical at Pl. Tht. 165D), ‘flow into a sea or lake,’ of a river (e.g., Pl. Phd. 113C), ‘lay on with oars.’ None of these are suitable here.” He proposes ἐκβάλλομεν: “ἐκβάλλω is used at Pl. Phd. 113A of a river branching off, and Thucydides (1.97.2) uses ἐκβολή λόγον for ‘digression.’” The parallels are insufficiently exact. And the tragedians do not use ἐκβάλλει intransitively—for at 96 Denniston himself rightly accepts Dobree’s ἐκβάλω πόδα for ἐκβάλω (ἐμ- Lyρ) ποδί. Indeed, he has forgotten what he wrote on 96: “The intransitive use of ἐκβάλλει cannot be justified by ἐκβάλλει of rivers, intransitive ἐκβάλλει, βάλλη ἐκ κόρακας, and Verrall’s defence of βαλώ at A. Ag. 1172.”

The compound of βάλλω which Euripides does use intransitively (in the sense “enter”), and whose noun is used in precisely the connection exhibited by 962, is ἐκβάλλω. For the verb see Hi. 1198 χώρον ἐκεβάλλομεν, Cyc1. 99, Andr. 968, Ba. 1045, Phaethon 168 (= fr. 779.1), for the noun (“entering upon a thing, beginning,” LSJ) see Su. 92 κανὰς ἐκβολᾶς...λόγων, Ion 677 στεναγμάτων (Musgrave, στεναγμών L) τ’ ἐκβολᾶς, Ar. Ran. 1104 ἐκβολαῖ...σοφιμάτων.

1013-1017 (Κλ.) λέεις δὲ· καίτοι δόξ’ ὅταν λάβῃς κακή γυναίκα, γλώσση πικρότης ἐνεκτὶ τις· ὡς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς· τὸ πράγμα δὲ μαθόντας, ἦν μὲν ἀξίως μισεῖν ἔχη, εὐγεύειν δίκαιον εἰ δὲ μὴ, τί δέ εὐγεύειν;

1016 μαθόντας Reiske, -.scripta c’ L ἔχη Seidler, ἔχη L

“Hunc locum nemo intellexit,” said Seidler. “Alii aliter vertunt, sed inepte omnes.” His complaint still holds good. First, here is the conventional translation.18 “I shall explain.—And yet, when a woman gets a bad reputation, there is a certain bitterness in her tongue. In my opinion, not fairly. But when people have learned the facts, if these facts justify hatred, then it is right to hate; if not, why hate?”

16 See Fraenkel on this passage for a demolition of the alleged instances of the intransitive use of βάλλω and some of its compounds.

17 In these passages a simple accusative is used after the verb; but εἰκ is commonly added by other writers when the verb is used intransitively (see LSJ s.v. Π, who actually cite ἐκβάλλει εἰ λόγον from Olympiodorus), and it is added by Euripides when he uses the verb transitively at 79 βοῦς εἰκ ἀροφάς ἐκβάλων.

18 The reasons for accepting Reiske’s and Seidler’s emendations in 1016, and a defence of the anomalous prosody γνωικὰ γλώσσης, are given by Denniston.
The words ώς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν, οὐ καλῶς, “in my opinion, not fairly,” do not fit their surroundings. Clytemnestra is excusing the sharpness of her tongue. She says that women whose reputations have been wronged may be expected to adopt a bitter tone. She is just such a woman. But if she says that such women are acting οὐ καλῶς, she is condemned out of her own mouth. Denniston remarks that “the sequence of thought, though not expressed with formal exactitude, is perfectly intelligible.” His paraphrase runs: “I will tell you what I think of Agamemnon. But a maligned woman has a sharp edge to her tongue. In my opinion such bitterness is to be deplored. But she should not be condemned out of hand on account of it: she should be judged on the facts alone.” This paraphrase misses the direction in which the reader is pointed by the μὲν and δὲ of 1015. These particles suggest that two opinions or attitudes are to be balanced. “My opinion is that such bitterness is to be deplored. Others, when they have learned the facts, but not before then, are entitled to their own opinion.” This, so far, is unexceptionable. But we do not now expect “and they may find that their hatred is justified,” which is to imply “and they may come to the same opinion as me.” The structure of the sentence demands “and, after learning the facts, they are entitled to come to a different opinion—but not before then.” Furthermore, this is a most unexpected concession which Denniston imputes to Clytemnestra. It is as if she were saying “I am going to speak sharply. It is wrong to do so. Please ignore my asperity and judge the facts alone.” This is no way to ingratiate yourself or win over your opponent.19

Denniston betrayed his own uneasiness over this interpretation when he considered an alternative rendering, first proposed by Seidler,20 of the words γλῶσσῃ πικρότης ἔνεστι τις: “orationi eius invisi quid inest (i.e., eius orationem inviti audient, neque acqua lance pendunt) . . . πικρότης igitur est idem quod πικρόν τι, invisi, molesti quid.” As Denniston puts it, “Dislike, invidia, attaches to her words, which are πικρός, ‘repellent,’ to the hearer.” “This,” he says with truth, “gives a smoother connection.” With equal truth he adds “But ἔνεστι strongly suggests that πικρότης is a quality residing in the tongue.” This is not so much strongly suggested as certain.21

19 Weil comes to the same conclusion: “Clytemnestre ne doit pas faire une telle restriction.” He condemns ώς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν as corrupt.

20 And adopted by Paley, Wilamowitz (Hermes 18 [1883], 223), Wecklein (1906 ed.), and Parmentier. Paley and Parmentier go on to mistranslate ώς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν as “in my case,” What these words mean is shown by Med. 763, Held. 881, Ba. 401, S. Tr. 589. Wilamowitz proposed γαρ for δὲ in 1015.

21 And for that reason Matthiae took γλῶσσα to be the tongue of the woman’s detractor, which is impossible.
Wecklein\textsuperscript{22} and later K. Schenkl\textsuperscript{23} proposed ύμιν for ἡμῖν. “In your opinion, such bitterness is unjustifiable. But first examine the facts.” This is only a specious improvement. Clytemnestra has said “When women are maligned, they speak bitterly.” She can hardly continue with “You do not think that they should do so.” Electra might very well think that maligned women in general (for Clytemnestra is speaking in general terms) have a right to speak bitterly, and to preempt Electra’s opinion on the matter does nothing to help Clytemnestra’s case.\textsuperscript{24}

Clytemnestra must not weaken her case by admitting that her bitterness is unjustified. She ought to say that, in her view, such bitterness is reasonable, and that, although others may hold a different opinion, they should not reach that opinion until they have learned the facts. The phrase ὅπως καλῶς is the opposite of what we want: what we want is ὅπως κακῶς. “When a woman gets a bad reputation, there is a certain bitterness in her tongue: in my opinion, not improperly, ὃς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν, ὅπως κακῶς. But people should learn the facts before deciding. If the facts justify hatred, then it is right to hate; otherwise, why hate?” For the sense of κακῶς (“wrongly, improperly”) compare Su. 297–298 οὕτωι εἰσωτῶς εἶτα μέμψομαι ποτε τὴν νῦν εἰσώτην ὅς ἐγίγνηθ' κακῶς, fr. 199 τὸ δ' ἄθενες μου καί τὸ θῆλυ εὐματος/ κακῶς ἐμέμφησε.

1041–1046 (Κλ.) εἰ δ' ἐκ δόμων ἡρπατῶ Μενέλασ λάβραι, κταέιν μ' ὑφέτῃν χρήν, κασιγνήτης πόσιν Μενέλαον ὡς εὐσεβίμ; κόσα δὲ πάπι πατήρ ἡνέμεθ' ἂν ταῦτ; εἶτα τὸν μὲν ὧδ' θανεῖν κειὼντα χρήν ταύτ', ἔμε δὲ πρὸς κεῖνον παθεῖν; ἔκτεν', ἐτέρειθην ἠπέρ ἦν πορεύσιμον ...  

1046 ἠπέρ Boissonade\textsuperscript{25}, ἠπέρ L

“If it had been Menelaus (and not Helen) who was abducted, ought I to have killed Orestes in order to save Menelaus, my sister’s husband? How would your father have tolerated that? Then ought not he to have died for killing my child and I to have suffered at his hands? I killed him . . .”

The absolute use of παθεῖν, in the sense of τι παθεῖν or θανεῖν, is open

\textsuperscript{22} Ars Sophoelis emendandi (Würzburg, 1869), p. 185.
\textsuperscript{23} Z6G 25 (1874), 95.
\textsuperscript{24} Further discussion of this passage may be found in A. Schmidt, Rh.Mus. 31 (1876), 565–566, S. Mekler, Euripidea (Vienna, 1879), p. 50, E. Holzner, Studien zu Eur. (Vienna, 1895), p. 111, G. Ammendola, RFIC 48 (1920), 393–394.
\textsuperscript{25} Attributed to Boissonade by Wecklein (1906 ed.), also conjectured by Page \textit{opud} Denniston.
to the gravest doubt, as Denniston and Jackson\textsuperscript{26} have shown. Denniston’s \textit{θανεῖν} for \textit{παθεῖν} is not appealing. It gives, as he himself says, a “flat repetition,” and the change would have to be imputed, as Jackson says, to “a reflective—and therefore improbable—copyist.” Jackson’s \textit{πόθεν}; (\textit{ἐίτα} τὸν \textit{μὲν} οὐ \textit{θανεῖν}/ \textit{κτείνουτα} \textit{χρῆν} \textit{τάμ’}, \textit{ἐμὲ} \textit{δὲ} πρὸς \textit{κεῖνον} \textit{πόθεν}; “ought he to have escaped death and I to have died? Certainly not”) is quite out of court. Jackson has fallen into the trap into which Denniston and others have fallen (and this is fatal in his case, though in Denniston’s it was not) of supposing that \textit{οὐ} negatives \textit{θανεῖν} and that the meaning is “ought he not-to-die (i.e., to live) and I to die?” Not \textit{θανεῖν} but \textit{χρῆν} is negated by \textit{οὐ}. If the infinitive alone is to be negated, \textit{μὴ} is needed: \textit{Held}, 969 \textit{χρῆν} \textit{τόνδε} \textit{μὴ} \textit{ζήν}, and for both types of negation Ion 1314–1318 \textit{οὐκ} \textit{ἔζειν} \textit{ἐχρῆν}/ \textit{ἀλλ’} \textit{ἐξελάουσεν} . . . \textit{καὶ} \textit{μὴ} ‘\textit{π’} \textit{ταυτὸ} \textit{τοῦτ’} \textit{λύντ’} \textit{ἔξειν} \textit{ίκον}, “he ought not to sit but (one ought) to drive him away . . . and (he ought) not-to-have.”\textsuperscript{27} The question \textit{οὐ} \textit{θανεῖν} \textit{χρῆν}; means “ought not he to have died?” (equivalent to a statement “he ought to have died”). A similar question is \textit{Rh.} 643 \textit{οὐκ} \textit{ἔγειρεσθαί} \textit{εἰ} \textit{χρῆν}; (“ought you not to be awake?”), and another instance of an infinitive separating \textit{οὐ} from the verb it negatives is \textit{IT} 659 \textit{οὐκ} \textit{λέγειν} \textit{ἐχοντά} \textit{μὲ}.

There is a further objection to the transmitted text: an essential part of the antithesis is missing. Euripidean antitheses do not, as a rule, require us to piece out their imperfections with our thoughts; contrasts are fully and precisely expressed. Here is a supplement which provides an object for \textit{παθεῖν}, adds the missing thought in its entirety, and sets a trap for the scribe:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ἐίτα} \text{τὸν} \text{μὲν} \text{οὐ} \text{θανεῖν} \\
\text{κτείνουτα} \text{χρῆν} \text{τάμ’}, \text{ἐμὲ} \text{δὲ} \text{πρὸς} \text{κεῖνον} \text{παθεῖν}, \\
\langle \text{κτείνουσαν} \text{αὐτὸ} \text{παῖδας}, \text{οὐκ} \text{ἔλάσσονα}; \\
\text{ἐκτεῦ}’ \ldots \\
\end{align*}
\]

“Then ought not he to have died for killing my child and I to have suffered no less at his hands for killing his child?” In other words, \textit{εἰ} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{δίκαια} \textit{τάδε}, \textit{καὶ} \textit{ἐκεῖνα} \textit{ἐνδικα} (see 1096). I have taken the language from A. Pe. 813–814 \textit{κακῶς} \textit{δράςαντες} \textit{οὐκ} \textit{ἔλάσσονα}/ \textit{πάσχουσι}.

\textsuperscript{26} Marg. scena. 170–172. Denniston might have made it clearer that the use of \textit{πάσχω}, without object, in the sense “be the sufferer,” “be on the receiving end” (often, but not always, in direct antithesis to a verb expressing action), is not uncommon (e.g., \textit{Ba.} 801 \textit{οὐκ} \textit{πάσχον} \textit{οὐχ} \textit{δράω}), and this is the justification for \textit{Rh.} 640. We may also be justified in dispensing with Wilamowitz’s \textit{<τ>} (favored by Jackson) at \textit{Lys.} 20.30; compare 12.100 \textit{ἀκηκόατε} \textit{ἐφόρακατε} \textit{πεπόνθατε} \textit{ἐχερε}’ \textit{δικάζετε}. This use does not justify the equation \textit{παθεῖν} = \textit{θανεῖν}.

\textsuperscript{27} I have discussed the difficulties of this passage in \textit{PCPS} n.s. 20 (1974), 30–31.
1150–1154  (Xo.) ιάχηε δε στέγα λάνω
    τε θριγκοί δόμων, τάδ’ ενέποντος· ὦΩ
    σχέπλα, τί με, γύναι, φονεύςεις φίλαιν
    πατρίδα δεκέτεσιν
corporācīν ἐλθόντ’ ἐμάν;

1150–1153 dochmiacs, 1154 syncopated iambics. But in 1152 the initial
anceps of the dochmiac σχέπλα τί με γύναι is resolved. Barrett has shown
that of the alleged instances of resolved initial ancesps in tragic dochmiacs
only this instance and one other have resisted convincing emendation.28
Two emendations are offered: ὦ σχέπλα Seidler ("highly doubtful
Greek," Denniston) and σχέπλους, ἦ Weil ("possible, for σχέπλους has two
terminations at IT 651," Denniston). But why not simply σχέπλε;? For
the corruption see IT 858 and S. Ai. 358, cited in n. 28 above. Further
examples of Euripides’ use of three-termination adjectives with two
terminations are given by Kühner–Blass i.535–537, Wackernagel, Vorl.
über Syntax ii.49–50, Dodds on Ba. 991–996, Kannicht on Hel. 335, and
W. Kastner, Die griechischen Adjektive zweier Endungen auf –ΟΣ (Heidelberg,
1967). For the separation of noun and adjective in the vocative case
(σχέπλε ... γύναι) see Hi. 840–841 πόθεν θανάσιμοι τဉαχα,γύναι, εάν
ἐβα, τάλανα, καρδία, Tr. 165–166 μέλεα, μόχθων ἑπακούωμενα, Τρωιάδες,
ἐξορμίζεθ’ (Headlam, ἐξω κοιμίζεθ’ codd.) ὀϊκων. Similar is 167 Ἀγα-
μέμνονος ὦ κόρα, ἦλυθον, Ἡλέκτρα.

1177–1182  Ὡρ. ἵω Γᾶ καὶ Ζεῦ πανδερκέτα
    βροτῶν, ὑδετε τάδ’ ἐργα φόνι-
1179 a    α μυσάρα, δίγονα σώματ’ ἐν
b    †χθονὶ κείμενα πλαγαῖα†
1180 a    ἄρχοδ ὅπ’ ἐμάς, ἀποι’ ἐμῶν
b    πτημάτων ...

1179b χθονὶ κείμενα πλαγαὶ is in response with the iambic dimeter 1193
λόχε’ (Weil, λέχε’ L) ἀπὸ γᾶς (l, γᾶς τὰς L) Ἐλλανίδος (iambus + dochmiac
if γᾶς τὰς is retained). The only conjecture worth mentioning29 is Wal-
berg’s χθονὶ <τάδε> πλαγαὶ κείμενα, and this is made unattractive by word-

28 Hippolytos, p. 434. See also N. C. Conomis, Hermes 92 (1964), 35–38. The three other
“possible instances” mentioned by Barrett are certainly to be rejected: HF 878 μανίσκειν
λόθας (μανίσκεω λόθας: see PCPS n.s. 20 [1974], 11), IT 858 δόλων κα’ ἀγόμαν (δόλων,
but also delete the unwanted δα’ with Hartung), S. Ai. 358 ἀλλαν (ἀλλαν) δε ἐπέβας. It
remains unclear whether P.Oxy. 2396 justifies the attempts which have been made to
restore a further instance at Hel. 670. See G. Zuntz, An inquiry into the transmission of the

29 Wecklein’s list may be supplemented by W. Headlam, CR 16 (1902), 251, K. Busche,
end after the long ancesps in the second metron and by neglect of synapheia. I suggest χθονι κεχυμένα πλαγαί <διπλά>, with the verb used as in Held. 75–76 ἰδετε τὸν γέροντ’ ἀμαλὸν (γέροντα μᾶλλον L) \(^{31}\) ἐπὶ πέδωι/χύμενον (perfect part. at HF 1052, Ba. 456), H. Od. 22.386–389 ο’ δέ τε πάντες (sc. ἤιθυκες…) ἐπὶ ψαμάθοις κέχυντα… ὥς τότ’ ἄρα μνηστήρες ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοις κέχυντο, the phrase πλαγαί διπλαί as at S. El. 1415 παίσον… διπλήν, and the iteration δίγονα… διπλάι much like Or. 633 διπλῆς μερίμνης διπτύχους ἴων ὀδοὺς, Λ. ScT 849 διπλά μερίμνων διδύμων ὀράν κακά (Tucker, διπλάν… διδύμ’ ἀνορέα fere codd.), Pi. N. 1.44–45 δικαίας δοιούς… μάρφας… ἵπερν ἐαίς δόμις.

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\(^{30}\) See L. P. E. Parker, CQ n.s. 16 (1966), 14–16, 18 (1968), 247. But 480 provides a parallel (n. 3 above).

\(^{31}\) Editors attribute the restoration of ἀμαλὸν to Hemsterhuys (in Hesychius, ed. Alberti, i [1746], s.v. ἀμαλὸν), but priority belongs to P. Wesseling, Probabilia (1731), p. 38. For a recent discussion of this passage see R. Renehan, Greek textual criticism: a reader (Harvard, 1969), pp. 113–114.
A Sophist on Omniscience, Polymathy, and Omnicompetence: Δ. Λ. 8.1–13

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(1) <τῶ δ᾿ αὐτῷ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχὺ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ <τῶν> ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ δικάσσαθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἷον τῇ ἃμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων ὡς τε ἔξει καὶ ὡς ἐγένετο, διδάσκειν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδὼς πῶς οὐ δυνασθεῖται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσει, (3) ἐτή δὲ ὁ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων εἰδώς ἐπιστασθεῖται καὶ περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς λέγει. (4) δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ ὧν ἐπιστασθαι περὶ τούτων λέγειν. <περὶ> πάντων γ᾿ ἀρχὴ ἐπιστασθεῖται. (5) πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστασθαι, τοι δὲ λόγου πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐ<ὀντων ἐντί>. (6) δεὶ δὲ ἐπιστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ ὧν καὶ λέγοι † <τῶν> καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὀρθῶς διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν πράσσειν, τα δὲ κακὰ τῶς κωλύειν. (7) εἰδὼς δὲ γε ταῦτα εἰδότης καὶ τὰ ἄτερα τούτων πάντα γὰρ ἐπιστασθεῖται ἑστὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν πάντων, τίνα δὲ ποτὶ τούτων τὰ δέοντα παρέχεται, αἱ χρή. (8) κἂν μὴ ἐπιστασθαί αὐλεῖν, οὐ δυνασθεῖται αὐλεῖν, αἱ καὶ δέχετο τούτο πράσσειν. (9) τὸν δὲ δικάξεσθαι ἐπιστασθεῖν δεῖ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπιστασθαι ὀρθῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων τοῖς δίκαιοι εἰδώς δὲ τούτῳ εἰδότης καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ <ἄλλα αὐτῷ> ἐπεροία. (10) δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶς νόμως ἐπιστασθαι πάντας· αἱ τούν τὰ πράγματα μὴ ἐπιστασθεῖται, οὐδὲ τῶς νόμως. (11) τὸν γὰρ ἐν μωσαικὴν νόμον τὸ ἐπισταται; δασφεὶ καὶ μωσαικάν· δὲ μὴ μωσαικάν, οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων. (12) ὡς γα


For a full apparatus criticus the DK text should be consulted. The apparatus criticus here given merely indicates points of divergence from that text (O = “all manuscripts”; F1 = Laurent. 85, 19; F2 = Laurent. 85, 24; Y1 = Vatic. 1338; Y2 = Vatic. 217).
<μᾶν> τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίσταται, εὑπτητής ὁ λόγος ὅτι πάντα ἐπίσταται. (13) δὲ δὲ <κατὰ> βραχῦ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται>, δεῖ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι περὶ πάντων. οὐκών δεὶ νῦν πάντ᾽ ἐπίστασθαι.


Translation

(1) I consider it a characteristic of the same man and of the same art to be able to converse in brief questions and answers, to know the truth of things, to plead one's cause correctly, to be able to speak in public, to have an understanding of argument-skills, and to teach people about the nature of everything—both how everything is and how it came into being. (2) First of all, will not the man who knows about the nature of everything be able also to act rightly in regard to everything? (3) Furthermore, the man acquainted with the skills involved in argument will also know how to speak correctly on every topic. (4) For the man who intends to speak correctly must speak on the topics of which he has knowledge; and he will, one must at any rate suppose, have knowledge of everything. (5) For he has knowledge of all argument-skills, and all arguments are about everything that is. (6) And the man who intends to speak correctly on whatever matter he speaks about must know < > and <how to> give sound advice to the city on the performance of good actions and to prevent them from performing bad ones. (7) In knowing these things he will also know the things that differ from them, since he will know everything. For these <objects of knowledge> are part of all <objects of knowledge>, and the exigency of the situation will, if need be, provide him with those <other objects>, so as to achieve the same end. (8) Even if he does not know how to play the flute, he will always prove able to play the flute should the situation ever call for his doing this. (9) And the man who knows how to plead his cause must have a correct understanding of what is just; for
that is what legal cases have to do with. And in knowing this he will know both that which is the contrary of it, and the <other things?> different in kind <from it?>. (10) He must also know all the laws. If, however, he is going to have no knowledge of the facts, he will have no knowledge of the laws either. (11) For who is it knows the rules (laws) of music? The man acquainted with music. Whereas the man unacquainted with music is also unacquainted with the rules that govern it. (12) At any rate, if a man knows the truth of things, the argument follows without difficulty that he knows everything. (13) As for the man who is able to converse in brief questions and answers, he must under questioning give answers on every subject. So he must have knowledge of every subject.

In this eighth chapter of the Δισσοι Λόγοι the last vestiges of discussion in terms of λόγος and counter-λόγος have gone; what we have in their place is what might be called an essay on the characteristics of the paradigmatic sophist/orator/politician. Its point of contact with most of the earlier chapters is perhaps its defense of what could be described as another identity-thesis (see 8.1, <τῶ 8' αὐτῶ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς τέχνας κτλ.). With the whole chapter one might profitably compare Pl. Euthyd. 293–297 (where a similar omniscience-thesis is professed by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; cf. Gorg. 458c [?] and Soph. 232b ff. (where the said omniscience-thesis—among other things—is criticized). In the Sophist in particular and Δ.Λ. 8 (see Dupréel 311–312) a number of claims about the sophist’s τέχνη are couched in fairly similar (though far from identical) terms: compare, e.g., Soph. 232d 1–2, Δ.Λ. 8.6, 8.9, 8.10; Soph. 232c 8–10, Δ.Λ. 8.1 (fin.); Soph. 232b 11–12, d2, e3–4, Δ.Λ. 8.1 (init.), 8.3 (init.) 8.5 (init.), 8.13 (init.)—on the assumption that Plato’s references to ἀντιλογική, ἀμφίτυπης etc. are references to what the sophist of the Δ.Λ. calls τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι δύνασθαι, τὸ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας εἰδέναι etc.; Soph. 234d4 (τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας), Δ.Λ. 8.1, 8.12; Soph. 232c 4–5, Δ.Λ. 8.1 (περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων), 8.2. In view of the affinities, it seems a fair inference that Plato is (consciously or unconsciously) drawing upon the Δ.Λ. in writing this section of the Sophist; Dupréel (240) makes the further suggestion, however, that Δ.Λ. 8 and 7 (fin.), along with Pl. Polit. 305c–e, themselves have as a common sophistic source Hippias. But Hippias, so far as is known, never laid claim to omniscience (see n. ad 8.2 [περὶ πάντων]), and he can hardly be singled out among Greek writers for the belief that ἡ πολιτικὴ was the supreme τέχνη.

Untersteiner (ad 8.13) sees in the “ring-composition” of this chapter the influence of Hippias. But this view turns on his belief that the Anonymus Iamblichus is also the work of Hippias (see Untersteiner, Rend. Ist. Lomb.
di Sc. e Lett. 77, f.2, 448–449), and this is a view which as far as I know he is unique in holding. On the whole question of the putative dependence of Δ.Λ. 8 on Hippias see Dupréel 192–200, 240; Untersteiner ad loc., with litt.

The chapter can be summarized as follows. One and the same τέχνη gives a particular person:

(a) the ability to discourse κατὰ βραχύ (see section 13)
(b) knowledge of “the truth of things” (see section 12)
(c) the ability to plead one’s cause in court (see sections 9–11)
(d) the ability to speak in public (see sections 6–8)
(e) an understanding of argument-skills (see sections 3–5)
(f) a knowledge of the nature of everything (see section 2)

(1) κατὰ βραχύ[—see Hippias B6 (DK6), Pl. Prot. 329b3–4, 334d ff., Gorg. 449b8 ff., Th. 1.64.2; cf. Pl. Soph. 241c5, κατὰ σμικρῶν. From the evidence of the first three passages referred to, a natural translation would be “briefly”; from the evidence of the latter two, “little by little.” Perhaps elements from both are intended: the man under discussion can examine a topic briefly, and also meticulously, going over each and every aspect of the problem in patient and systematic detail. ἀλάθειαν[—books on “Truth” were written by Protagoras (B1 [DK6]), and Antiphon (B1 [DK6]). For the phrase τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀλήθειας see Pl. Soph. 234c4 (cf. Phd. 99c7?), and compare 8.12 below. δικάσωσθαι]—“to plead one’s cause.” See below, 8.9, δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον. The word refers to private suits, as a rule, rather than to public prosecutions (see LSJ⁹, s.v. δικάζω, Π I i). ὀρθῶς[—“correctly,” “appropriately”; i.e., in a way conducive to persuading the jury of the rightness of one’s cause. The significance of (and ambiguities in) the word are felt more and more as the chapter progresses. On Protagoras’ apparent commitment to ὀρθοεπεια see Pl. Phdr. 267c6 (= Protagoras A26 (p. 262.5) DK⁶). περὶ φύσιος κτλ.[—see Pl. Prot. 337d 3–4 (Hippias speaking), Soph. 232c, ὅσα ἑαυτὲ ἡγεῖ τε καὶ ὀφειλεῖ τινὰς τῶν ἀπάντων]—the phrase τῶν ἀπάντων suggests a reference to the world “as a whole,” and the subsequent phrases would, if this interpretation is correct, most naturally refer to the origin and present state of such a world. Such an interest in the world we can fairly guess that the sophist Hippias professed and encouraged; cf. Pl. Hipp. Mai. 285, Hipp. Min. 367e; Levi, 300–301.

(2) περὶ πάντων]—“in regard to everything” (in the distributive sense; contrast the collective τῶν ἀπάντων at 8.1, 8.2). For the use of περὶ see LSJ⁹ s.v., A Π 5.
The fallacy is, of course, the fallacy of Division; collective and distributive propositions are not such that the former necessarily entail the latter. The move is easily made in Greek, since “all” and “every” are the same word. Whether Hippias ever claimed such omniscience in practical matters seems to me in doubt (see below); and even if he did, there is no particular reason for thinking that he would found such a claim on the fallacy of Division here so neatly exhibited by the author of the Δ.Λ.

For Untersteiner, ad loc., in this section of the Δ.Λ. “si esprime la corre-
lazione necessaria fra l’universalità di physis, nelle sue molteplici qualità, e l’universalità del conoscere, cioè la scienza enciclopedica.” But omni-
sience (here = omnicompetence; cf. πράσασεν) is neither (pace Unter-
steiner) synonymous with encyclopedism nor even a logical corollary of it. So one must search elsewhere than in Hippias’ encyclopedism for proof that Δ.Λ. 8.2 and 8.12–13 are Hippian in inspiration. One such source could be Pl. Hipp. Min. 363d 1–4, but even here it is not clear (assuming for the moment—with Untersteiner [Soph. 8 (86) A 8]—that we are looking at a genuine testimonium) that the clause ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν tis ἐρωτᾶ is a claim to omniscience; the καὶ . . . καὶ could be taken to mean simply that Hippias is ready to read (or deliver from memory?) his set pieces and answer any questions concerning them that people might care to put—not any questions on any (imaginable) topic.

For Dupréel (199) Socrates has Hippias’ claim to omniscience in mind when at Pl. Hipp. Min. 372b he says, “I obviously know nothing” (φαίνομαι οὐδὲν εἰδὼς). But this again does not necessarily follow: Socrates’ remark is just as understandable if Hippias proposed encyclopedism, or for that matter any degree of knowledge.

ὁρθῶς—“rightly,” in the sense of “correctly,” “fittingly,” “appropri-
ately.” See n. on 8.1 (ὁρθῶς). ὁρθῶς καὶ πράσασεν: for the idiosyncratic position of the καὶ see 6.11 εὑρήκῃ καὶ γενόμενος, and ibid. ἐστὶ δὲ τις καὶ φύσις. The textual change proposed by DK (in the light of 8.6) seems unnecessary; the purely intellectualist ethics that is apparently being proposed is no more surprising than that which is frequently attributed to Socrates.

However, the sequence knowledge—action is made without any attempt at explanation of the basis for it. Perhaps the author is assuming that knowledge “how” (to act rightly) is one of τὰ ἀπαντα that are known.

(3) τέχνα τῶν λόγων—“argument-skills” (?). The phrase is a loose one, and could tolerate a number of interpretations, like “linguistic skills,” “logical skills,” “rhetorical skills,” “reasoning skills,” and the like. Sprague’s “the art of rhetoric” is perhaps a little too restricted, since there
is no evidence in 8.3–5 that it is public speaking that is involved. Rather, 8.6–8 seems to deal with such public speaking (δημαγορεῖν) and 8.9–11 with the ability to plead one’s case in court. So I tentatively opt for a translation which underscores the sophist’s dialectical ability in argument with his peers, be this in the public glare of a πανηγυρίς or the semi-public forum of a law-court or the privacy of a home.

ορθῶς λέγει—given the ambiguities of the adverb ορθῶς (see above, n. on 8.1 [ορθῶς]), the author is able to make his case here because he has at his disposal a word covering both “nonfallaciously” and “soundly” and the combination of the two. All that his argument in fact leads to is a claim that the sophist’s reasoning-skills will enable him to produce valid arguments on every topic—though not necessarily sound ones; but, given the ambiguity of ορθῶς, the argument would perhaps appear to some to have proved that on every topic a man knowing the τεχνα τῶν λόγων will produce arguments that are both valid and sound (i.e., truth-delivering)—and it is undoubtedly this latter effect that the sophist is out to produce, as the subsequent sections make clear.

(4) περὶ ὧν ἐπιστατεῖαι—a defense of the startling phrase περὶ πάντων used in the preceding sentence. Knowledge of the particular subject-matter involved is, along with understanding of the τεχνα τῶν λόγων, in any given instance a sine qua non of τὸ ορθῶς λέγει (for the ambiguities of the phrase see n. above). And we know, says the author (see 8.2) that the σοφιστῆς in question has knowledge of everything (see n. on 8.2 [περὶ πάντων]). For a clarification of the latter claim see below, 8.7 (with n. on 8.7 [ἐπιστασεῖται]), 8.8.

As Taylor sees (124), δεῖ—λέγει is unexceptionable Socratic doctrine; Dupréel (194) suggests that 8.4–5 is aimed at the rhetoric of Gorgias, with its stress on form at the expense of content, but this seems to be an aspect of the rhetorical art that is hardly uniquely Gorgian.

γ’ ἀφ’]—see J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford, 1954) 43. The reference is back to the statement of 8.2 (fin.): “and he will, one must at any rate suppose (γ’ ἀφ’), <as we have seen; see above 8.2 (fin.); and see also 8.5> have knowledge of everything.” But at 8.2 (fin.) all that was claimed was universal practical knowledge (εἴδος . . . περὶ πάντων . . . πράσσειν); there was no suggestion that omniscience was anything more than omni-competence.

<περὶ πάντων—ἐπιστασεῖται]—for a similar claim (based upon a series of arguments purporting to prove that a knowledge of anything implies a knowledge of everything) see Pl. Euthyd. 293b ff. Compare Euthyd. 295b ff. for the same claim, this time based on the argument that because we
have a faculty (the ψυχή) with which we “know everything we know” therefore we know everything. At Pl. Soph. 233c it is suggested that sophists πάντα . . . σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται because δικοῦσι πρὸς τά ἐπιστημώνως ἔχειν . . . πρὸς ἀπερ ἀντιλέγουσαν toδο πρὸς ἀπαντα (cf. Rep. 598c 7 ff.). Whether one can infer from this, however, that any sophist ever made a serious claim to such omniscience (now, apparently, from the evidence of 8.5, understood in an all-embracing sense) is doubtful; at best it might have been put forward as a paradoxical debating point, or as a (pseudo-) synonym for encyclopedism, on the safe assumption that intelligent observers at any rate (not least other sophists) would spot (or at least sense) the fallacies in the reasoning. Plato, one must assume, had such a philosophically educational intention in composing the Euthydemus.

(5) This section is ostensibly a reason (γὰρ) for the final claim of 8.4, <peri> πάντων—ἐπιστασείται. The first part is simply a repetition of earlier claims (8.1, 8.3), except that the universality there implicit is now made explicit; the second part is new. Literally, “All arguments are about everything that is,” it could prima facie be interpreted in terms of argument-form: i.e., there is nothing [=, one must assume, no event, action, or state of affairs] that falls outside of the purview of all argument-forms. A more likely interpretation, however (if the section is to succeed in its ostensible purpose of explaining the final claim of 8.4, in which πάντων appears to be used distributively; cf. 8.2 fin.), is in terms of argument-content: i.e., the sum total of argument-content (actual and possible?) covers the sum total of what is (actually and potentially?) real/the case. On the first interpretation the sense of πάντες is clearly distributive (“every argument”), on the second it is collective (“all arguments”). Either way, one is now far beyond the omnicompetence claim of 8.2 (peri πάντων . . . πράσσειν).

(6) δὲ]—the topic now under discussion would appear to be, following the general inverse-sequence of the chapter, δεμαγορεῖν (8.1, fin.), and the reference to διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν κτλ. seems to confirm this.

δὲ—κωλύειν]—as in previous instances, any prima facie plausibility the proposition has stems from an exploitation of ambiguities: in this instance in the use of δὲ and ὁρθῶς. In the case of δὲ the natural interpretation is in terms of duty: “the μέλλων ὁρθῶς λέγειν has a duty to know . . .” etc.; the interpretation the author wishes the reader to place upon it, however, is, “the μέλλων ὁρθῶς λέγειν cannot help knowing . . .” etc. For the same ambiguity (and the same intent) see below, 8.9, 8.10. In the case of ὁρθῶς, the first instance exploits the same ambiguities as were found in
its use at 8.3 and 8.4 (see nn. ad loc.); the second is less problematic, and seems to mean simply "sound," or something similar (compare 8.9 below, ἐπιστασθαί ὑβῆς). For a similar stress on τὸ ὑβῆ οἶδε [Pl.] Minos 317c.

(7) The sentence is one of the most difficult in the treatise, and emendation and interpretation is more than usually speculative. If my interpretation is correct, the author is suggesting that, should a δημιουργὸς possess the knowledge requisite to giving the πόλις sound advice, he can be sure that Necessity, the mother of invention (see 8.8, δέη, and on the general topic Guthrie 2.473), will provide him with all other (less important?) knowledge. The possession of actual knowledge of what it takes to be a good δημιουργὸς is εἰς ἑαυτό the possession of potential knowledge of everything else (see 8.8, δυνασείται). In attempting to make these contentions plausible, the author appears to confine himself to instances of knowledge "how"; at any rate no instances of other forms of knowledge are mentioned.

For alternative interpretations, see Untersteiner ad loc., with litt. ταῦτα]—i.e., the contents of 8.6 above. ἐπιστασείται]—sc. "at least potentially," as the rest of the section, and 8.8 below, make clear. The bald claim of 8.4 (fin.) has been clarified. ἔστι γὰρ κτλ.]—"are part of." See LSJ⁹ s.v. εἰμί, C II. τῶν πάντων]—"all [objects of knowledge]" in the sense of "the totality of [objects of knowledge]" (see n. on 8.5 above, fin.). τῆς]—i.e., τὰ ἔτερα above (like, e.g., knowledge of flute-playing; see 8.8 below). τῶν τῶν]—i.e., the possession of knowledge of everything. τὰ δέοντα]—see Thuc. 1.22.1 et alibi; cf. Isocr. 3.25, οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων πρᾶττοντες. (Unique to the Δ.Λ., however, if my emendation παρέξεται is correct, would be τὰ δέοντα in the subject-position.) παρέξεται]—for παρέχεσθαι in much the same sense as παρέχειν see LSJ⁹ s.v. παρέχω, παρέχομαι.

(8) μῆ]—with all the MSS (from which DK unaccountably diverge without signalling the fact). ἐπιστᾶται]—Doric subjunctive. The author is, of course, on the interpretation here suggested, discussing "actual" knowledge only. δέη]—i.e., "whenever the situation calls for doing this"; see above, 8.7, τὰ δέοντα. For the distinction between "actual" and "potential" knowledge see n. on 8.7, and n. on 8.7 (ἐπιστασείται).

(9) δεῖ]—see n. on 8.6 (δεῖ) above. τὸ δίκαιον]—simply, "that which is just." Taylor (126, n. 2), recalling how Plato (Socrates) uses the term αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα at Phaedo 66e 1–2 of the Forms, takes τὸ δίκαιον here and τὰ πράγματα at 8.10 and 8.12 to refer to the Platonics (Socratic) "objective reality" that is αὐτὸ δ ἔστι δικαιοσύνη. But τὰ πράγματα, as I suggest below, is surely best taken as simply "the facts," and τὸ δίκαιον as a hint
that the proponent of the views of Δ.Λ. 8 is in an essentialist tradition. That he should have adhered to the further, Platonic doctrine of trans-
cendental essentialism seems most unlikely—though the doctrine of the
“presence” of τὸ ψεῦδος to a (false) λόγος (Δ.Λ. 4.5) undoubtedly has a
Platonic ring to it. εἴδησε καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον—i.e., τὸ ἄδικον.

τὰ ἄλλα αὐτῶ? ἕστεροῖα—for a similar usage see Anc. Med. 9, πολλὰ δὲ
καὶ ἄλλα κακά ἕστεροι τῶν ἀπὸ πληρώσιος. If this reconstruction is correct
in essence, the author is clearly acquainted with the notion of concept-
clusters; i.e., with the notion that a concept of a particular sort (e.g., τὸ
δίκαιον) can only be said to be completely perspicuous in the context of
a knowledge of its contrary (in this case τὸ ἄδικον) and of those related
concepts which, in (actually or apparently) differing from it, shed light
upon it (in the case of τὸ δίκαιον such a related concept would perhaps
be ἡ ἱσονομία).

(10) δεῖ—see n. on 8.6 (δεῖ). The required sense here is “cannot
help but.” αὐτῶν—sc. τὸν δικαίεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον (8.9). τὰ πράγματα—
“the facts,” “what goes on.” See below, 8.12, τῶν ἀλαθειῶν τῶν πραγμάτων.
The term is much used by the author, and is of very large extension. See,
e.g., 5.11.

The sense of the section is, apparently, as follows:
The δικαίεσθαι ἐπιστάμενος cannot help but know all the νόμοι.

But knowledge of the laws is itself contingent upon knowledge of τὰ
πράγματα.

Ergo the δικαίεσθαι ἐπιστάμενος has knowledge of τὰ πράγματα. In an
earlier argument, the author had glossed his own phrase “the skills in-
volved in argument” (τὰς τέχνες τῶν λόγων 8.3) as in fact a reference to
the skills involved in all arguments [i.e., all forms of argument] (πάντων
tῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνες 8.5). In the present instance, too, one senses a similar
desire to gloss τὰ πράγματα (i.e., all the facts relevant to law-making, law-
implementation, etc.) as 〈πάντα〉 τὰ πράγματα (i.e., all facts), so as to lead
to the desired conclusion that certain people can justifiably claim to know
“everything” (8.12). But the cautious γὰρ 〈μάν〉 of 8.12 indicates perhaps
that he feels that the fallacy would this time be too transparent, and the
move is not in fact made; an ambiguity in the phrase τῶν ἀλαθειῶν τῶν
πραγμάτων (8.12) does the job instead. For Taylor (126, n. 2; cf. Levi 301)
tὰ πράγματα (here and at 8.12) is the equivalent of the Platonic (for
Taylor the Socratic) αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστι δικαιοσύνη. See, however, n. on 8.9 above
(τὸ δίκαιον).

(11) νόμον]—the author understandably assumes a close analogy be-
tween law and the “rules” of μοισικά, since a single Greek word, νόμος,
covers both. But the νόμοι of 8.10 relate to a body of facts (τὰ πράγματα), while the νόμος of 8.11 relates to a τέχνη (ἀ μοσικά). However, in context it seems possible that the term μοσικά refers to the “field of music” as an object of “acquaintance” knowledge, rather than to skill in playing or composing μοσικά, thus lending the analogy some measure of support. For a similar use of the term μοσική see Pl. Tht. 206b (φθόγγοι are the στοιχεῖα μοσικῆς—a piece of “book” knowledge in no way contingent upon one’s having mastered any instrument).

(12) γὰρ <μᾶν>—an indication that in the author’s eyes 8.10 and 8.11 have in themselves been insufficient to demonstrate the truth of the thesis of 8.4 (fin.).

τῶν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων—see 8.10 (πράγματα) and n. on 8.1 (ἀλάθειαν). The author clearly feels that this is the proposition most likely to win general acceptance, and one sufficiently strong to “prove” the thesis of 8.4 (fin.), even if others are rejected. The reason for his assumption seems to be his confidence that the average reader will instinctively unpack the phrase τῶν πραγμάτων in a generic sense—i.e., as <πάντων> τῶν πραγμάτων (see final n. on 8.10 above). Plato also uses the phrase (Soph. 234c)—a ἀπαξ in his writings—in what seems to be such an all-embracing sense, and given the context (a discussion of sophistic practices) a clear possibility emerges that τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ ἀλήθεια was a favorite sophistic catch-phrase (and perhaps even a specifically Protagorean one; see Diog. Laert. 9.51, Eurip. fr. 189 Nauck2), to which an allusion was in the context not inappropriate. For his more normal phrasing see Phd. 99e (τῶν ὀντῶν τῶν ἀλήθειαν), Men. 86b.

(13) <κατὰ> βραχὺ—given the apparently inverse structure of the rest of the chapter, it seems natural to expect at this point a reference back to 8.1; so I follow Blass and DK in inserting <κατὰ>. δεῖ . . . δεῖ—for the ambiguity see n. on 8.6 (δεῖ). The first instance involves duty (self-imposed or otherwise), the second one hypothetical necessity.

If I have understood him correctly, the sophist has constructed a series of arguments in which it is claimed that there exist certain people who are, not simply polymaths and encyclopedists (like, say, Hippias), but also persons endowed with omnicompetence and omniscience. Just why the (apparently one-sided) arguments are included in a work that at any rate begins with a set of antithetical λόγοι (Δ.Λ. 1–4) is not immediately clear,2 but one might suggest that basic and interesting ambiguities (if

not direct antitheses) are to be found in a number of key words, giving the chapter a dialectical tension it does not at first sight possess: πᾶς, for example, can be used collectively or distributively; δὲ can be used of duty or hypothetical necessity; ὁθὸς can mean "nonfallaciously" or "soundly" or both. With such terms at his disposal, the sophist can construct an amazing phantasmagoria of non-sequiturs, an object of bewilderment and perhaps irritation to the uninitiated among his hearers, to others however probably just another routine (like the Euthydemus?) for the exercise and toning of philosophical muscles. How much of this was the conscious purpose of the author we cannot of course know with certainty. If he was the "talentlose Verfasser" of whom Diels (ad Δ.Λ. 1.1) spoke, we can only assume that he was largely if not wholly insensitive to the ambiguities just mentioned, had as a consequence no such philosophically reputable purpose in mind as the one I have just alluded to, and almost certainly did not himself profit philosophically from the treatise he had just composed. While this is possible, it seems to me much more likely, given the care with which the chapter is composed, that we are looking at a sophist endowed with skills at least as sharp as those demonstrated by the sophists in Plato's Euthydemus (where no one believes for a moment that they were fooled by the ambiguities in their own arguments). The difference perhaps is that the sophists of the Euthydemus seem to be merely clever; if they have any honest propaedeutical purpose in mind, it does not appear from the dialogue (Plato's own purposes are, of course, something different). The author of the Δ.Λ., by contrast, in this chapter seems to me both clever and serious, and for that reason alone the possibility of a reputable propaedeutic purpose on his part should not, I think, be discounted.

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Ancient Interpolation in Aristophanes

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To be considered for inclusion in the category of ancient interpolations in Aristophanes a word, phrase or passage must satisfy two conditions: first, there must be grounds for thinking that Aristophanes did not write it, or at least not with the intention that it should stand where it now stands in the text; and secondly, there must be grounds for thinking that it was present in at least one copy of the text earlier than the dark age which separates late antiquity from the Photian renaissance. This second condition is satisfied by words which are observably present in an ancient fragment of the text or are discussed or implied by the scholia vetera. It is also satisfied *prima facie* by words which are present both in R (Ravennas 137.4a) and V (Marcianus 474: not available for Ach., Lys., Thesm., Eccl.) and also in all or most of the Paleologan manuscripts (none of which, however, contains Thesm.); the qualification "*prima facie*" is necessary, since early dissemination of an interpolation first made in the ninth or tenth century is always a possibility to be reckoned with. An interpolation which first appears in the Paleologan era could be ancient in origin, but the presumption must be the contrary, given the span of time available to interpolators since the Photian renaissance and the propensity of Paleologan scholars to interpolate for the purpose of restoring metrical correctness and lyric responsion.

I distinguish between five types of interpolation, of which type I may...
properly be described as "accidental": that is, the copyist's insertion (normally repetition) of words which he would at once have recognized as erroneous and would have deleted if his attention had been drawn to the bare fact of his having inserted them (often, indeed, a copyist perceives the error himself and deletes the insertion).

Two types are, equally certainly, "deliberate," in the sense that the interpolator knows very well what he is putting into the text was not written by the author. One of them (type IV) is the modification of a text by inserting words to make it serve as a means to an end not identical with the author's end. In this type I include the passages interpolated in tragedy in order to adjust it to the needs and tastes of audiences after the author's lifetime; interpolations in any technical, philosophical or historical work whose users might attach greater importance to completeness of information or clarity of exposition than to homogeneity of style or the integrity of the literary form designed by the original author; interpolations in passages selected, for any reason, for inclusion in anthologies or for quotation in support of an argument; and modifications of texts treated in later centuries as models for imitation (here I am thinking especially of Demosthenes). We should not expect to find that interpolation of this type has played a part in the transmission of the text of Aristophanes. We lack evidence that any Aristophanic play was performed after its author's lifetime, and I shall be surprised if evidence to that effect ever presents itself; comedy, unlike tragedy, continued to evolve throughout the fourth century until it was transformed into something strikingly unlike Aristophanes. The close relationship between a play of Aristophanes and the circumstances of its original production ensured that he was read and studied by lovers of the past, but it combined with his obscenity, inconsequentiality and sometimes childlike fantasy to keep him off the stage. Aspects of his language were a model for Atticists, but his style and dramaturgy were not models imitated by writers in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. He had no claim to be considered a systematic purveyor of information or an expositor of rational argument, even though some of the things said or done in his plays were treated as factually true by historians and biographers who should have known better.

into the text (my type II) into this category, and distinguishes it from interpolation which is bewusst, by which he means my types IV–V. I shall argue that this bald distinction is unhelpful, and that even if it is adopted Jachmann's generalization is not true of Aristophanes.

3 Cf. M. L. West, Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique (Stuttgart, 1973) 16 f.
He was not regarded by anthologists as a good source of inspiring moral sentiments, though a stanza from *Frogs* (454 ff., "for on us alone shines the sun," etc.) was inscribed by a Dionysiac association at Rhodes which wished to proclaim the comfort to be drawn from initiation.5

The other type (type V) of unquestionably deliberate interpolation is a species of forgery. The interpolator has something to say, and he wishes future readers to believe that what he says was in fact said by the original author. Thucydides iii 84 is a case in point: an addition to Thucydides’ characterization of stasis, parodying Thucydidean language and covering afresh some of the ground already covered, but introducing the theme of economic greed as a motive for stasis.6 I would put in the same category the forged laws and decrees in Demosthenes’ *De Corona* and some other speeches. This is the type of interpolation which offers the strongest resistance to the systematic application of a critical principle to which I attach importance, the principle that no passage in a Greek text should be classified as an interpolation unless one can offer a historically plausible explanation of how it came to be there. Textual criticism is, after all, a branch of history, in which aesthetic evaluation operates in the service of historical hypotheses. Words exist only in so far as they have been spoken or written by determinate persons at points in space and time, and there cannot be a question in textual criticism which is not a question about what somebody did, said, thought, intended or felt at a certain time and place. It is conceivable that any given interpolation was the work of someone so mad, eccentric, perverse or devious that the criteria of probability on which historical hypotheses necessarily rely are inapplicable. There is no reason to suppose that people of this kind were more numerous in antiquity than today, but there are degrees of idiosyncrasy which lie well this side of such extreme conditions and yet may resist interpretation because we have no direct acquaintance with the interpolator as an individual and cannot claim to understand as well as we might wish motivations characteristic of late Greek culture as a whole.

There remain two types of interpolation in regard to which the simple dichotomy of "accidental" and "deliberate" may be misleading or inadequate. One of these (type III) is deliberate in the sense that the interpolator goes beyond simple transcription, supplementing it by conjecture, but he does so in the belief that the text before him is defective and that he has some chance of restoring what the author wrote. An example of this type is *Wealth* ii 170, where all the manuscripts have

5 G. Pugliese-Carratelli, *Dioniso* viii (1940/1) 118–123.
It is possible that μοι originated in a supralinear amplification of δοκής (medieval glossators, at any rate, were notoriously fond of inserting direct and indirect pronominal objects), but in the light of 1153 ff. μοι is not the appropriate amplification, and there is a high probability that it was interpolated by someone who believed that the second syllable of διακονικός is short. The same misapprehension is responsible for αύτῷ γε διακονεῖται in Parisinus Regius 2715 at Ach. 1017 (responding to 1046 φωνῇ τοιαῦτα λάσκων). We may compare Ach. 928, where the whole medieval tradition offers us

\[\dddot{\text{ώσπερ κέραμον, ἴνα μὴ καταγῇ ἡφαρώμενος}}\]

as an iambic trimeter. Elmsley’s conjecture φερόμενος, founded on his correct scansion of the second syllable of καταγῇ as long is vindicated by a fragment from the fifth century A.D., \textit{BKT} v 2. no. 231.

Type II of interpolation, which in the transmission of Aristophanes outweighs in importance (though not always in interest) the other four types put together, is the insertion of words which the copyist for one reason or another, and at varying levels of consciousness, believes to be part of the author’s text. Such a belief entails mistaken a variant, gloss, paraphrase, stage-direction or comment for an element of the text accidentally omitted by the copyist of one’s exemplar and subsequently replaced by him above or beside the text. Errors of this kind would not have occurred if ancient copyists had invariably observed the simple rule that rectification of omissions should be made above the line and comment, of whatsoever kind, in the margin; or, failing that, if they had invariably introduced words other than the words of the text itself with one or other of the formulae available to them (γραφεῖαι) for variants, ἀντὶ τοῦ for glosses, ὁλον or ὥσει ἔλεγε [e.g. \textit{CGF} 83.1 (s. I a.C.)] for paraphrases, etc.); or again, if they had been both conscientious and consistent in employment of the critical signs invented by Hellenistic scholars. These condi-

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7 Cf. Holzinger’s commentary \textit{ad loc}.

8 -τά- is guaranteed by 944 καταγεῖ η ποτ’ in response with ψοφεῖ λάλων τι. Porson deleted 928; anyone who yields easily to the temptation to delete lines (ignoring the warning of D. L. Page, \textit{Actors’ Interpolations in Greek Tragedy}, Oxford, 1934, 149) will probably see here an example of \textit{Binneninterpolation} (Jachmann, \textit{loc. cit.} [n. 2] 123–144, 185–215) and turn 927 f. into one line, δός μοι φορτύν, ἴνα μὴ καταγῇ φερόμενος, since it is, after all, the Theban, not Dikaiopolis, who will \textit{φέρεω} the packaged informer.

tions, however, were not met. A clear and simple medieval example of the consequences is provided by V at Frogs 625:

\[ \text{μη δητ' ἐμοι} \text{ ὁδηγω} \text{ ἀνευ τιμῆς ἕπασανίζ} \text{ ἀπαγαγόν} \]

οὐτω δὲ Ῥ: τοῦτον δὲ cett. ἀνευ τιμῆς recte om. Ῥ cett. \( \Sigma \text{v}: \) ὁδηγ' ἀνευ τιμῆς. οὐδὲν θέλω ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.

The text of V here combines one tradition in which οὐτω, "unconditionally," was explained in a scholion as ἀνευ τιμῆς, "without compensation," and another in which ἀνευ τιμῆς was written above οὐτω as a gloss and was then mistaken for the rectification of an omission.\(^{10}\)

In a papyrus of the fifth century A.D. (POxy 1371), which preserves parts of the opening scene of Clouds, the words \textit{ρυπαρος} and \textit{τλ[η]θων}, standing at a good distance from the column opposite lines 44 and 45, are clearly glosses on \textit{εὔρωτιὼν} (or \textit{ἀκόρητος}) and \textit{βρῶν} respectively. But in a Theocritus papyrus of the same date (POxy 1618) the gloss \textit{ἐν ἀκαλήρας} standing over \textit{ἐν κυδασι} in 7.110, equally a gloss (cf. \( \Sigma \text{κ} \) κυδη \textit{βρ'} ἡμών ἀκαλήρη \textit{ἐν ὑπ' Ἀττικάω}), could formally be taken for a rectification of an omission. This ambiguity is exemplified far earlier in the London papyrus of Bacchylides (PLond 733). At 15.55 \textit{αγνας} | \textit{εὐνομιακηπτιντακεμτος}, the word \textit{ακολουθου} is written over \textit{κατων}; it is required by the sense, "attendant on . . .," and supported by responso with 48, and is thus rectification (by the second corrector) of a抄ist's omission. Yet at 3.47, \textit{ταπροσθε[ν]δ[εθ]θραφιδαθανευγγικτον}, the word \textit{ννω}, also written in the second corrector's hand over \textit{αφω}, is intended as a clarification ("what was hateful before is now welcome") and cannot be part of Bacchylides' text, for twelvefold responso guarantees the sequence \(x-\omega x \infty \omega -\ldots\). The same absence of discrimination between the functions of superscript words is apparent in a papyrus (POxy 1617) of Aristophanes' \textit{Wealth}. At 55

\[ \text{ηπη[. . .]} \text{στο[η]} \]

i.e. \textit{πυθομεθ' ἀν τὸν χρησμὸν ἥμων ὅτι νοεῖ}. \( \ddot{\text{η}} \text{μών} \) is superscript only because it was accidentally omitted,\(^{11}\) but at line 39

\[ \text{εἰσεν} \]

\[ \text{ιβροέλακεν ἐκ τῶν στεμμάτων} \]

i.e. \( \text{τ' δήτα} \text{ Φοίβος ἑλακεν ἐκ τῶν στεμμάτων;} \)

\(^{10}\) At Frogs 437 R is the offender, V innocent. Cf. Leidensis Vossianus gr. Q4A at Aesch. Prom. 214 (Dawe, op. cit. [n. 1] 206).

\(^{11}\) Cf. CGF 92.34 (Eupolis), POxy 852 (Eur. \textit{Hypsipyle}) fr. 20/21.7. Ibid. fr. 1 iv 2 the clause \( τὼν πόσις ἔκτα, \) rectification of an omission, is formally identical with a supra-linear comment.
etpev is probably a gloss on ἐλακεν, conceivably a variant, but certainly not the rectification of an omission. In the light of these examples, it is not surprising if editors hesitate over the interpretation—gloss or variant?—of Men. Dysk. 284 in POxy 2467

or Herodas 1.34 in PLitLond 96

Nor is it surprising that after more than a millennium of sporadic editorial and transcriptional negligence we find at Frogs 202

(in R) οὐ μὴ φιλαρήσεις ἔχων, ἀλλ' ἀντιβάς

or at Frogs 275

(in R) ὅ Ἡρακλῆς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιόρκους οὐς ἐλεγεν ἡμῖν: οὐ δ' οὐ

καὶ ταύτα μὲν δὴ σμικρὰ: but the ambiguity of intention inherent in word and phrases written above or beside the line extends also to longer units. For example, in PLond 733 at Bacchylides 11.100 ff. the words τοῦ δ' ἐκλυ' ἄριστοπάτρα actually constitute line 106, but were accidentally omitted and replaced by the corrector in the space at the top of the column. There is nothing formally to distinguish a rectification of this kind from a marginal comment from which the introductory formula or sign which would make its nature apparent has been dropped; and therefore, since if A resembles B, B resembles A, nothing to distinguish (formally speaking) a marginal comment minus its introductory formula from the rectification of an omission. Obviously, form is not all; error can usually be avoided by a copyist who attends to the sense of what he is writing, and in any case many texts are consistent in distinguishing

12 In POxy 2258 (ss. VI/VII p.C.) at Callim. H. 2.6 πυλάων is written over θυράων; the medieval text has πυλάων, the quotation by Σκ Theocr. 11.12 θυράων.

13 For conversion of glosses into variants in the medieval text of Aeschylus cf. Dawe, op. cit. (n. 1) 102 f.

14 The likelihood of misapprehension is fortuitously increased when (as has happened in PBodmer IV at Men. Dys. 944–946) a marginal gloss or comment is misplaced.
between the functions of adscript and superscript, or entirely devoid of marginal comment; but consistency was a likely casualty in late antiquity, when the total amount of comment of all kinds imposed upon a text increased.\(^{15}\)

One of the most spectacular interpolations in the medieval transmission of Greek poetry occurs at Aeschylus, Persae 253, where in some Palaeologan manuscripts the messenger’s line
\[\omega\rho\mu\omicron\iota,\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\omicron\ \mu\epsilon\nu\ \pi\rho\omicron\\omega\tau\omicron\nu\ \alpha\gamma\gamma\ell\ell\epsilon\nu\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\]
is followed by Soph. Ant. 277
\[\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\ \gamma\alpha\rho\ \iota\delta\delta\epsilon\iota\ \alpha\gamma\gamma\epsilon\ell\nu\ \kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\ \epsilon\pi\omicron\iota\nu.\]
In the early medieval Medicean manuscript (Laurentianus 32.9) the Sophoclean line is written in the margin as an apt comment on the messenger’s utterance, but without any indication of its source, and evidently later copyists took this to be the rectification of an omission.\(^{16}\)

One can only be surprised that such misinterpretation was not commoner; at Prometheus 378, for example, the Medicean adds in the margin a sententious distich which says much the same thing at greater length, and \(\Sigma\) II. xv 393 attributes this distich to Menander (fr. 782 Körte-Thierfelder), but in the Medicean there is no such attribution.\(^{17}\)

Birds 190–193 is a passage of Aristophanes in which there is reason to believe that a verse has been interpolated because it was taken for the rectification of an omission. All the manuscripts have:

\[\omega\omicron\\upsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\\varsigma\omicron\sigma\omicron,\ \delta\tau\omicron\ \theta\upsilon\sigma\omega\sigma\varsigma\nu\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omicron\varphi\omicron\omega\pi\omicron\omicron\ \tau\omicron\\omicron\omicron\ \theta\omicron\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma\omicron\iota\omicron\sigma\omicron\iota\varsigma,\]
\[\gamma\nu\ \mu\nu\ \phi\omicron\omicron\omicron\ \phi\epsilon\rho\omicron\varphi\omicron\omega\nu\ \upsilon\mu\nu\ \iota\omicron\omicron\ \theta\omicron\omicron\iota\omicron,\ \\delta\iota\ \tau\omicron\\upsilon\sigma\omicron\ \pi\omicron\\omicron\\epsilon\omicron\varsigma\omicron\ \tau\omicron\\omicron\omicron\ \alpha\\lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\\omicron\varsigma\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\\omicron\omicron\ \mu\nu\\rho\omicron\\omicron\ \tau\omicron\ \kappa\nu\upsilon\sigma\omicron\ \upsilon\ \delta\iota\alpha\rho\omicron\varsigma\sigma\omicron\dot{e}\omicron\sigma\epsilon\omicron.\]

192 (=1218) del. Beck

Peisetairos is addressing the Hoopoe: “So, when men sacrifice to the gods, if the gods don’t bring you tribute through the city which is not theirs and through the void you will not let through the savour of the thighs.” I have deliberately omitted punctuation in the English translation. If we punctuate after καὶ τοῦ χάος, the sense is wrong, for the gods will have to bring tribute to the city of the birds, not through it; in 1218, on the other hand, the sense is right, for Iris is flying to mankind on earth (1230) through the city of the birds (1173). If we punctuate after of theol, the layout of the sentence is defensible (cf. Ach. 277 l. ἓν μὲθ’ ἡμῶν ἐμπιθής,

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\(^{15}\) POxy 2258 (cf. n. 12 above) is a striking example of abundant marginal and supra-linear comment in combination.

\(^{16}\) Cf. Dawe, op. cit. (n. 1) 308.

\(^{17}\) Cf. the absence of attribution when lines are cited in \(\Sigma\) Birds 266, 1620, 1647.
ἐκ κραυγάλης ... ῥοφήσεις τρύβλων) but the sense is again wrong,18 for ἀλλοτρίας will then characterize a city which belongs to the subject of the verb of the clause in which reference to the city is made. This could have been expressed by διὰ τῆς πόλεως τῆς ὑμετέρας,19 precisely as in 556 f., “and forbid the gods to go to and fro, with penis erect, through your territory (διὰ τῆς χώρας τῆς ὑμετέρας).” I have little doubt that 192 is interpolated, and that the cause of the interpolation was a marginal forward reference to 1218 for the purpose of clarifying διαφήσετε. It is not uncommon for scholia to quote one passage of a play while commenting on another passage of the same play (e.g., on Birds 11, 168, Frogs 153, 1262),20 and Wealth 280–282 exhibits the intrusion of such a quotation into the text of one branch of the medieval tradition:

φράσαι δ' οὖν τέτληκας ἡμῖν
ὀστον χάριν μ' ὁ δεσπότης ὁ σὸς κέκληκε δεύρο
οἶ πολλὰ μοχθήσαντες κτλ.

281 recte om. RV

μ' sits ill between ἡμῖν and the plurals of the following relative clause, even when allowance is made for the oscillation between first person singular and first person plural which is so common in Greek drama, and it seems that 281 originated as marginal quotation of 259 (where it is preceded by οὖ δ' ἄξιοις ἰσως με θείν, πρὶν ταῦτα καὶ φράσαι μοι) in order to amplify φράσαι (an unnecessary amplification, as we see from Aristophanes’ usage in 62, 65, 268).

The examples of type II interpolation so far considered might be called “pure,” in so far as the incorporation of words from the margin entails no modification of them, but we have also to consider a sub-type (which we might call “IIa” or “II/III”) in which conjectural modification plays a part. Consider, for example, what has happened in R at Clouds 906 f.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δικ. αἰβοὶ· τωτί καὶ δή</td>
<td>Δικ. αἰβοὶ· τωτί καὶ δή</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>χωρεί τὸ κακὸν· δότε μοι λεκάννη·</td>
<td>χωρεί τὸ κακὸν· δότε μοι λεκάννη·</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὡς ναυτων ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου ψύχρας</td>
<td>ὡς ναυτων ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου ψύχρας</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἢ ἵνα ἐμέσως χολὴ γάρ μοι ἐπιπλέει</td>
<td>ἢ ἵνα ἐμέσως χολὴ γάρ μοι ἐπιπλέει</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>διὰ τὰ αὐτῶν ῥήματα.</td>
<td>διὰ τὰ αὐτῶν ῥήματα.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΛΔΙΚ. τυφογέρων εἰ κάναρμοστος.</td>
<td>ΛΔΙΚ. τυφογέρων εἰ κάναρμοστος.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 V. Coulon, Essai sur la méthode de la critique conjecturale appliquée au texte d'Aristophane (Paris, 1933) 180 f., denies this, translating, “votre cité qui leur (c.à.d. aux dieux) est étrangère.”

19 As suggested by Dindorf and Lenting.

The scholion explains why Right, disgusted, calls for basin; in R the scholion has been treated as part of Right’s own utterance. This seems at first sight a simple case of the phenomenon to which Galen (CMG v 10.2.1 l00.11 ff.) refers, the mistaken treatment of marginal comment ὡς αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγραφέως. Perhaps one should not make too much of the fact that the interpolated scholion is ordered in lines resembling the layout of the anapaestic verses which precede and follow it, for a straight incorporation of a marginal scholion is likely to yield lines of roughly that size; but the coincidence of line-end and phrase-end contrasts strikingly with the layout of the scholion in V, and it should be remarked that the quotation of the passage in EiMagnum 337.1 (s.v. ἐμῶ) and Zonaras 711 runs δότε μοι λεκάνην ἵνα ἔξεμέσω, which looks rather like an incompetent attempt at anapaestic versification.21

A simpler example of modification occurs in RV at Clouds 922–924:

Τῆλεφος εἶναι Μυσός φάσκων δύστροπος ἐκ πηριδίου
dystropes
γνώμας τρώγων Πανδελετίουs
dystropes recte om. cett. -teious Triclinius: -tias V

The text of RV here is a conflation of one tradition in which δυστρόπος was a gloss on Πανδελετίουs and another in which that gloss had been mistaken for part of line 922 and deliberately altered to a nominative singular in order to fit the syntax of that line. It cannot be accommodated metrically, since the passage is anapaestic and δυστρόπος constitutes only half an anapaestic metron.

Something more complicated is implied by Clouds 1230 f. in R, where we find

νῦν δὲ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἐξαρνος εἶναι διανοεῖ;

Δα καὶ μὴν ἀποδώσεις ὡ μέλε’ ἀ πρώην περ ἐλαβε. ζήτ

Στ’ τί γὰρ ἄν ἀπολαύσαιμι τοῦ μαθήματος;

The Creditor asks, “And now, because of that, are you intending to deny (sc. the loan)?” and Strepsiades replies “Why, how else would I get any advantage from (sc. my son’s) instruction?”22 The copyist left a space between the two lines, and the corrector (adding ζήτ(ει) to the right of the space) filled in an atrociously versified clarification which (as it stands) means, “Assuredly you will pay back, my friend, what you

21 Suda λ 232 has καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης δότε μοι λεκάνην. ἴδον, χωρεῖ τὸ κακὸν δότε μοι λεκάνην, ὡς ναυτίων κτλ., but with ψυχρολογίας instead of ψύχρας; cod. V of the Suda omits ἴδον . . . λεκάνην, and between τὸ κακὸν and δότε codd. GM have ὁ αὐτός.

22 The copyist omitted the siglum Δα. at 1230. R and V both omit ἀλλ’ before ἄν in 1231.
received the other day." Unless the copyist had known of this line, he
would not have left a space; clearly he meant the decision on its ex-
clusion or inclusion to be taken later by someone else, and if the cor-
rector’s decision had gone against inclusion, any future copyist using R
as his exemplar would have been confronted with a διάλειμμα of one line
between 1230 and 1231, but also, presumably, with καὶ μὴν κτλ. in the
margin, in which case he in his turn would have to take a decision. The
interpolated line is already glossed (superscript μωι) and already corrupt
(ἄ μὲλε' for ὁ μέλ', and, I think, καὶ μὴν ἀπο- for καὶ μὴν 'πο-, "... and are
you not going to pay back . . .?"). The original versification could well
be ancient; πρῶν, “some time before,” “formerly,” is attested in Pro-
copius (the notion that the creditor, whose patience is at last exhausted,
is claiming money left “the other day” would be a striking misunder-
standing of the situation), and the presence of περ shows that the versifier
rejected the option ἀ πρῶν.
At Birds 1343–1345 all manuscripts have

οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν τῷ πέτεσθαί γλυκύτερον. 1343a
ἔρω δ’ ἐγὼ τι τῶν ἐν ὀρνισιν νόμων. 1343b
ἀρνιθομανίω γὰρ καὶ πέτομαι καὶ βούλομαι
οἰκεῖν μεθ’ ὑμών κατιθυμῶ τῶν νόμων

1343b del. Dobree ἐγὼ τι] ἐγωγε ΠΕ

The πατραδοῖας has arrived in Cloud-cuckoo-land, full of enthusiasm.
“There’s really nothing more delightful than flying! And I have a
passion for the rules of bird society. For I am crazy about birds, and I
fly, and I want to live among you, and I have a desire for your rules.”
ΣV on 1343 says: “After this (sc. line) some have a gap (διάλειμμα) of one
line, and Ἀριστοφάνειον[ους?] πλήρωμα οὕτως”; then 1343b is quoted. It looks
prima facie as if Aristophanes of Byzantion in the third century B.C. was
acquainted with a text in which one line-space was left between 1343a
and 1344 and either found in another text, or himself composed, 24 1343b.
There is indeed no reason why a Hellenistic edition of Birds should not
have contained a vacant line. It appears from ΣV on Wasps 1272 that
texts of Wasps in the Roman period had a space of several lines after 1283,
in some cases partially occupied by unintelligible fragments of words; 25

23 I do not know at what date the modern Greek μὴν = μὴ is first attested, but an
isolated μὲν = μὴ is recorded from the second century b.c. by E. Mayser, Grammatik
der griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit, i 1 (ed. 2, revised by H. Schmoll, Berlin, 1970)
172.
25 Cf. J. W. White, The Verse of Greek Comedy (London, 1912) 410 f., and D. Holwerda,
Mnemosyne IV xvii (1964) 261 f.
and a commentary of the second century A.D. on Aristophanes’ *Anagyrus* (POxy 2737, CGF i 56) remarks (10 ff.) that the second half of one verse is missing. The word πλήρωμα is not attested elsewhere in the meaning “conjectural supplement”—πλήρης and its cognates are used of writing without elision (Sext. Emp. Math. i 161, τὸ πλήρες and ἐκπλήρωσις), syntactical completion of an elliptical utterance (CFG i 63.63, Σ Pi. O. 7.10a, 11.13c, ὁ πλήρης λόγος and πληροῦν, P. 6.13d)—but there is no reason why it should not mean “supplement”; in the *Anagyrus* commentary (15) πε[πλήρωμ[έν]ο[σ (Lobel, ed. pr.) or (ἐκ)πληρώμ[ατ]ο[σ (tent. Luppe) occurs in a sentence of which the sense must be something like “the meaning would be clear if the line were complete.” Yet it is not easy to imagine that Aristophanes of Byzantion seriously manufactured, for insertion between 1343a and 1344, a line which creates a lame tautology with 1345, and a preferable hypothesis is as follows. In the fourth century B.C. there were texts of *Birds* which contained 1343a, 1344 and 1345, but there also came into existence texts from which 1344 was accidentally omitted; we should note that as the second of three successive lines beginning with the same letter it is the most vulnerable line in the context. A copyist, collating a text in which 1344 was present with one from which it was absent, deferred decision (like the copyist of R at *Clouds* 1230) on whether to include 1344, and instead left a blank. He thus generated one of the texts known to Aristophanes of Byzantion, whose πλήρωμα was not an invention, but 1344 itself, known to him from other texts. 1343b ἔρω ... τῶν ἐν ὄρνισι νόμοιν is in origin a paraphrase of the word ὀρνιθομανόν in 1344, and our scholion is the result of compressing a comment which began with Aristophanes of Byzantion’s observation and ended with a paraphrase. The profoundly misleading results of compression in scholia are well-known, not least from the R-scholia on Aristophanes, e.g., on *Wasps* 1326, which ΣB describes simply as “from Euripides’ *Troades,*” whereas ΣV, while pointing out the similarity to *Tro. 308,* rules out on chronological grounds the possibility that *Troades* can be parodied in *Wasps.*

The strongest reason for thinking ἔρω κτλ. an explanation of ὀρνιθομανόν is Σ 1281, where ἔλακκονομάων, “they were crazy about Sparta” is explained as τῆς τῶν Λακώνων ἤρων πολυτείας: cf. also *Knights* 61, where σιβυλλαῖ, “he’s sibyl-struck,” is explained in the scholia as χρησιμῶν ἔρα καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ or simply χρησιμῶν ἔρα. The paraphrase constitutes an iambic trimeter: by accident or by design? δ’ is no problem, for at *Birds* 10 ἐντευθεὶ τὴν πατρίδ’ ἄν ἐξεύροις σύ που; we find in ΣRV the paraphrase

The dancing-girl sat on the policeman’s lap to take her sandals off (1182 f.), and he took the opportunity to feel her breasts (1185). Now she is practising her dance again, and he admires her buttocks. As one might expect, his phallos responds vigorously, and he tells it threateningly to “stay inside.” Since he is a Scythian, he could be wearing trousers, and would certainly be wearing them if they allowed of comic exploitation, as I think they did; I suggest that he pulls his trousers halfway down his thighs, giving room and air to the vertical object which he has been wearing concealed under his clothes since he came on stage, καλὴ τὸ σκῆμα being a joke against barbarian manners and taste. Since he inflects his verbs haphazardly, the verbs ἀνακύπττῃ (i.e. -τι) and παρακύπττι could as well be second person as third—a question addressed to his phallos, “Popping up, are you, and peeping out, with your foreskin back?,” or information confided to the audience, “It’s popping up . . .” The difficulty, of course, is stylistic. A simple ἀνακύπττι; would suit the Scythian’s staccato style very well, but no one can feel quite easy about the continuation καὶ παρακύπττι, and the good Attic word ἀπεψωλημένος (cf. Ach.

27 τά ἐν ὀρνσι νόμμα in 1337 may be influenced by 1343b.
28 J. van Leeuwen, Prolegomena ad Aristophanem (Leiden, 1908) 338 f., in deleting 1343b, supposes that Aristophanes wrote δὲ, not γάρ, in 1344; Coulon, op. cit. (n. 18) 176 f., while leaving γάρ intact, supposes that it caused some difficulty to ancient commentators and facilitated the interpolation of 1343b. But I would be surprised if an ancient commentator found any difficulty in understanding the kind of γάρ discussed by J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford, ed. 2, 1954) 60–62. 29 Cf. Page, op. cit. (n. 8) 112–115.
161, 592, Lys. 1168) is too good; we would have expected the stem ψωλ to figure in a comically ungrammatical observation. So far as the content of the line goes, it would be hard to reject the possibility that it is a versified stage-direction; cf. Σ Peace 879 f., "Touching her buttocks and admiring them and showing her private parts to the audience" and "A member of the audience takes Theoria by the hips and feels her, drawing a line round with his finger" (some ancient commentator on Aristophanes had a fondness for bringing "extras" on stage, cf. Σ Frogs 297, 308). Nor indeed is the language of scholia always euphemistic; Σ Thesm. 1187a in fact describes the Scythian as speaking πρὸς τὸ πέος. I would, however, like to keep open the possibility that ἀνακύπτει is addressed by the Scythian to his phallos and the rest of the line an attempt to repair a breach occasioned by the omission of something which had become unintelligible. Cf. above on gaps of this kind; and the omission of Frogs 1294 τὸ εὐγκλινές τῷ ἐπ' Αἴαντι by some ancient texts (according to Timachidas in Σ ad loc.) may have been due to the fact that it is so inconsequential an utterance as to be unintelligible to those who expect a little too much of parody.

A crude example of an artistically unexacting πλήρωμα seems to be presented by BKT ν no. 231 (s. V p.C.) at Ach. 780, where the Megarian's daughters, obeying their father's command to squeak like piglets, say κότ often enough to make up a kind of iambic trimeter (the right-hand part of the line is preserved in the papyrus, but not the left-hand part), whereas in the medieval manuscripts (including the citation in the Suda) they say κότ only twice, which should not surprise us in the case of noises and exclamations. Later in this same passage occurs what seemed at one time to be an open-and-shut case of interpolation, 801–804:

Text of RAG

801 κότ bis R 803 om. Suda: del. Bentley σῦκα A

30 Moreover, ἀπεψωλημένος is applied elsewhere to persons, not to penises (Coulon, op. cit. [n. 18] 174).
31 Rutherford, Scholia Aristophanica II (London, 1896) ad loc. emended θεκτῶν to οἰκτῶν; but I think that the commentator was influenced by 877 f., 887, 905 f.
32 J. Jackson, Marginalia Scaxnica (Oxford, 1955) 104–107 emends ἀνακύπτει to ἀνασύρει "he pulls up her dress," and envisages an actio quite different from what I have suggested.
33 But the identity of 1295 with 1293 may have caused accidental omission of 1294 f.
34 Apparently an eightfold κότ, with the second syllable short (despite the evidence of 801 f.), and therefore ending a trimeter ς ς ς ς.
In 801 Dikaiopolis asks one of the girls (τρόγγος ἄν codd., τρόγγοιτ' ἄν Blaydes) if she would eat chick-peas, and in 802 (there is no reason why the question should not be addressed to the same girl) dried figs. Given the accentuation σύκα in RΓ and the idiom τί δαί σὺ; (e.g. Birds 136, Lys. 136, Frogs 1454; cf. Blaydes ad loc.), it looks as if Dikaiopolis is asking the second girl, "What about you? Would you eat (sc. dried figs)?", τί δαί σὺ; τρόγγος ἄν;—to which she replies (as in 801) with a triple κοί (so Elmsley). σύκα is not a synonym of ἱσχάδες, and though it appears as a Paleologan gloss on ἱσχάδες (at Knights 755, Wealth 877, 1122) it is not a likely gloss in the scholia vetera, which in fact use the word ἱσχάδες themselves (e.g. Σ Peace 634, Lys. 647; cf. reflexes of ἱσχάδιον in many modern Greek dialects). The humour of the passage lies in its sexual reference; ἐρεβῶνος can mean "penis" (as it does in Frogs 545) and it is not hard to see why ἱσχάς too could have this meaning35 (σύκον in Peace 1349 f. is applied to the external genitals of both sexes).36 Ancient commentators on Theocritus interpreted the "foxes... which pick Mikon's grapes" and the "beetles which eat away the figs of Philondas" in Theocr. 5.112–115 as an allusion to people who have homosexual intercourse with Mikon and Philondas respectively, and if this idiom existed in Aristophanes' time Ach. 801–804 could be spoken and acted (by-play with the artificial phallos, and increasingly excited reactions from the girls) very effectively. Since 802 and 803 begin and end alike, it is exceedingly probable that there existed at any given period texts from which 803 had been accidentally omitted, and its absence from the Suda's quotation of the passage does not, therefore, tell significantly against the authenticity of the line. But the inexplicable residue left by this hypothesis is the presence of the word αὐτός, and I cannot offer a plausible explanation of it as a corruption of something else.37 There is much to be said38 for keeping αὐτός, adjusting the word order as in Parisinus 2715, and interpreting 803 as a coarse joke, τί δαί σὺ; τρόγγος αὐτός ἄν; addressed to the Megarian himself (more by-play with the comic phallos), suggesting that he is ready to prostitute himself to avoid starvation, and eliciting a falsetto κοί κοί. For the layout, verb + x + ἄν (abnormal,

35 Because of its resemblance to the glans covered by the foreskin.
36 Appropriate to the vulva, which is "sweet" to the penis as the fig is sweet to the mouth, and also perhaps because a sliced or bitten fig could remind one of a vulva with the labiae parted; and appropriate to the penis for the same reason as ἱσχάς.
37 Coulon, op. cit. (n. 18) 171 f. suggests that τρόγγοις ἄν originated as an explanation of the verbless object in 802 and so generated a bad verse; but would not the versifier have written αὐτή, given that there are two girls and 801 is addressed to only one of them? Or did he envisage what I (following Parker) have suggested?
38 So Douglass Parker in his translation (Ann Arbor, 1961).
as against verb + ἀν + x or x + ἀν + verb or x + verb + ἀν), cf. Wealth 135 f. καὶ βαδίως πάντας, εἰ βούλοντο, ταῦτ’ ἄν, Frogs 96 f. γόνυμον δὲ ποιήτην ἄν οὐχ εὐροῖς ἐτι ζητῶν ἄν.

One of the singular features of many putative interpolations in tragedy is that they do not clarify the contexts in which they occur but either restate some part of the context or make a point in conflict with it, so that the text containing the interpolation presents in series what would rationally be presented as alternatives in parallel.39 To say this is, of course, to risk a charge of begging the question, since the reason for suspecting a passage as interpolated may be precisely the fact of its tautology or inconcinnity. But it happens from time to time that having spontaneously conceived a suspicion of a passage because it simply does not seem to fit, to the best of our understanding of how the tragic poets set about their business, we subsequently find that the passage was indeed absent from some ancient texts. A well-known example occurs in the opening speech of Euripides’ Andromache, where 5 f., “enviable in former times, νῦν δ’ ε’ τις ἄλλῃ δυστυχεστάτη γυνῇ” is followed in our manuscripts by (7) ἐμοῦ πέφυκεν ἡ γενήσεαι ποτε, which would make sense only if we had νῦν δή τις ἄλλῃ in 6 and took δυστυχεστάτη as comparative. According to the scholion, 6 was modified, and 7 added, by actors; and 7 is absent from POxy 449.40 Compare Eur. Hρ. 871 ff. (and Barrett ad loc.), Ph. 1075 and Su. 902–906 (the citation of 901–908 by Johannes Damascenus omits 902–906, thus freeing the passage from tautological conceits and bearing out the speaker’s announcement ἐπαυνον ἐν βραχεί θήσω μέγαν).

In Aristophanes one of the most remarkable examples of alternatives presented in series by our manuscripts is Frogs 1431a–1432.

οὐ χρῆ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν.
μάλιστα μὲν λέοντα μὴ ’ν πόλει τρέφειν.

ἔν δ’ ἐκτραφῇ τις, τοῖς τρόποις ὑπηρετεῖν.

1431a om. Plu. Alc. 16.3 1431b om. VA

The scholia recognize only a text in which all three lines are present, and they discuss whether all are spoken by the ghost of Aeschylus or divided between speakers. The omission of 1431b by some manuscripts is unimportant, since when two successive lines end with the same word the accidental omission of the second line is a widespread phenomenon. I

40 Cf. R. Renehan, Greek Textual Criticism: a Reader (Cambridge, Mass., 1969) 34.
hope I may be allowed to take it as certain that Aristophanes did not intend 1431a and 1431b to be uttered one after the other.41

The second passage is Frogs 1251–1261.

1251 Xo. τί ποτε πράγμα γενήσεται;
1252 φροντίσειν γάρ ἔγωγ' ἔχω
1253 τίν' ἅρα μέμιν ἐποίσει
1254 ἀνδρὶ τῷ πόλο ν πλείστα δῆ
1255 καὶ κάλλιστα μέλη ποίη-
1256 σαντι τῶν μέχρι νυν.

1260 καὶ δέοιχ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ.

1261 Eu. πάνυ γε μέλη θαυμαστά: δείξει δῆ τάξα.

Here there is no useful or interesting comment in the scholia. The alternatives differ somewhat in tone, the former expressing a certain degree of intellectual excitement, the latter apprehensiveness about the audacity of Euripides. The former exhibits a completely normal pattern of glyconics and pherocrateans, the latter an unusual pattern, one glyconic followed by three pherocrateans, for which the only parallels are the wedding-song at the end of Peace (1341 ff., 1346 ff., two telesilleans plus three reiziana, but two of the reiziana are the cry 'Τημήν Τημέναι' ὥ) and the end of the epode of Pindar's second paean (glyconic plus four reiziana, but here again three of the reiziana are a refrain ἵνε Παιάν, ἵνε Παιάν δὲ μὴποτε λείποι), to which one might add Aesch. Pers. 554 ff. ~ 564 ff., (two lekythia plus two pherocrateans).42 The second of the two alternative versions is also remarkable (whenever it was written, and in whatever circumstances) in giving Aeschylus the title τὸν Βακχείον ἀνακτα, which one would not expect to find given to anyone but Dionysus. Euripides' first words, πάνυ γε μέλη θαυμαστά, seem to pick up the words of the first alternative, κάλλιστα μέλη, and are inappropriate to the second alternative, since at first hearing it seems to pick up the chorus's emphatic θαυμάζω but in fact has quite a different point. This doublet presents a problem to which I shall return. Much simpler is Clouds 652–654,

Στ. κατὰ δάκτυλον; νη τὸν Δ', ἀλλ' οἴδ'. Σω. εἰπε δή.
Στ. τίς ἄλλος ἄντι τούτου τοῦ δακτύλου;
πρὸ τοῦ μέν, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ παιδὸς δύντος, οὐτοσί.

41 But perhaps not everyone will allow me (cf. Coulon, op. cit. [n. 8], 175 f.) to treat it as self-evident, if both lines were written by Aristophanes, that he regarded 1431a as better than 1431b, or that if only one of them is his, that one is 1431a. The objection that Alcibiades' father did not merit the high praise "lion" surprises me; how many of us, in reading λέωντος σκυμών, "lion cub," have given even a passing thought to Alcibiades' father?

If there were room for an adversative conjunction in 654, I would not regard 652 and 653 as alternatives; but there is not.

How did conflation of alternatives arise? It is easy to imagine that a copyist of Euripidean tragedy, confronted with two exemplars, of which one contained a histrionic alternative to what stood in the other, either took the responsibility of conflating the two himself or wrote one version in the text of his copy and the other in the margin—in which case the conflation which we find in the medieval tradition was the work of a subsequent copyist. The operative forces were reluctance to discard anything which might possibly be authentic and negligence or inconsistency in the use of critical formulae and signs. The phenomenon of alternatives in series was certainly familiar to ancient critics. Aristophanes of Byzantion marked with sigma and antisigma the two lines Od. v 247 f. (Odysseus building his raft) because "he considered the content of both to be the same," τὸ αὐτὸ ὄρκον περιέχειν ἄμφω. A similar point is made, though with a difference of technique, by ΣΑ II. viii 535 ff.: "Either these three lines, which are marked with antisigma, should stay in the text, or the following three lines, which are marked with dots (στιγμαί), for they express the same thing (εἰς γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν γεγραμμένοι εἰς διάνοιαν)." ΣΑ II. ii 192 also refers to the conjunction of antisigma against one line and dots against a nearby passage, but this time with reference to a possible disturbance of order. The only place in the scholia on Aristophanic comedy at which we encounter sigma and antisigma is Frogs 151–153.

ἡ Μορσίμου τίς ῥήσαν ἐξεγράφατο.

Δι. νη τοὺς θεοὺς ἔχον γε πρὸς τούτοις κεί
tὴν πυρρίχην τίς ἔμαθε τὴν Κινθαίου.

ΣΨ says: "Some do not write the line νη τοὺς θεοὺς, but leave it out and write the next line as ἡ πυρρίχην κτλ. For this reason Aristophanes (sc. of Byzantion) puts in the margin the antisigma and sigma." No one could claim that 152 and 153 say the same thing; it is rather that 152 + 153 constituted an alternative to a slightly modified 153. Nor is there anything in the language and style of 152 + 153 to justify a suspicion on internal grounds that anything has been conflated with anything else,

43 Cf. the practice of ancient editors of Homer, and the survival of the words γιάλεως ἀλή Μοίσας in Pl. O.2. 27a despite Aristophanes of Byzantion's observation that they violated responson (ΣΑ8, 48f Drachmann).

44 The difficulty of interpreting antisigma consistently in CGF 61.21, 24. 85.323 f., 248.1, is instructive. Cf. n. 9 above. At II. ii 192 ΣΑ made things harder for any subsequent copyist by misplacing the scholion (to 188) and writing antisigma with a dot instead of plain antisigma; see Erbse ad loc.
as there is in Hom. H.Ap. 136–139, where some of those medieval manuscripts which contain all four lines have preserved some marginal anti-
sig mata.45

The uncertainties which could be produced by editorial ambiguity and inconsistency and by negligence in summarizing editorial judgments can be appreciated if we consider the implications of modern scholarly pub-
lication. In Act III of Mozart’s Idomeneo there are four extant versions of
the oracular utterance. Mozart himself refers to two of them explicitly, and a third implicitly, in writing (18 Jan. 1781), “The oracular utterance
also is still much too long. I have abbreviated it. Varesco is not to know
anything about that, for everything will be printed as he wrote it.” In
the Neue Mozart-Ausgabe (ii 5.11 1972) two versions are given at the appro-
priate place in the score, clearly labelled “28a” and “28b,” and the re-
main ing two, “28c” and “28d” in the appendix. What would the fate of
that text be in a culture which could transmit it only by manual copying?

On the assumption that we cannot expect to find in Aristophanic
comedy histrionic interpolations of the kind we find in tragedy, we have
to consider the hypothesis that alternatives originate with the author
himself.46 Galen once more (CMG v 10.1 43.23 ff.) is helpful, telling us
how he sometimes composed two alternative versions of a passage, one
in the column of text and the other in the margin, postponing decision
between them; but the text, he says, was copied before he made up his
mind, and the copyist incorporated the marginal alternative in the column.
In the case of Aristophanes, the hypothesis that he himself composed both
the alternative versions of a passage has received support from the state-
ment of Dicaearchus that Frogs was performed a second time, from the
certainty that the Clouds we possess is a partially revised version of the
Clouds performed in 423, and from the fact that the comic poets, including
Aristophanes, occasionally put on plays bearing the same titles as plays
which they had put on previously. But although there is reason to
believe (Galen CMG v 9.1 120.8 ff.) that the second Autolycus of Eupolis
was a revised version of the first Autolycus, the available evidence does

45 Unless, perhaps, it seemed to Aristophanes of Byzantion (I think this is what Bou-
дреaux, op. cit. [n. 24] 27 means) that it was stylistically wrong for Herakles to end with a
joke against Morsimos instead of leaving jokes about the arts to Dionysos. On this prin-
ciple F. Ritschl, Opusula Philologica v (Leipzig, 1879) 272 f., followed by Coulon, op. cit.
(n. 18) 138–140, arranged the lines in the order 152, 153, 151. Since, however, one joke
(148) has already been included in Herakles’ otherwise portentous list of sinners, I see no
real objection to his ending with another (151), even if it is not quite of the same kind.

not suggest that Aristophanes’ two plays which shared the title *Thesmophoriazusae* had much else in common, and I would suspect that the same could be said of *Peace* and *Wealth*. The commentators from whose work the scholia on *Wealth* are derived believed that they were commenting not, as they were, on the play of that name produced in 388, but on the homonymous play of 408; accordingly, confronted in *Wealth* 173 with an apparent reference to the Corinthian War, they favoured the speculation that the passage had been transferred from the later *Wealth* to the earlier. But clearly they were not in a position to compare the two plays, and their explanation is disturbingly facile—rather like the idea, popular in antiquity (cf. Σ ad loc.), that the apparently hazy reference to Aeschylus’s *Persae* in Frogs 1028 is actually a reference to another, lost *Persae* which described the battle of Plataea and contained the death of Xerxes and was performed at Syracuse. Moreover, the traditional association of conflated passages with known pairs of homonymous comedies has recently been dislocated by a papyrus\(^47\) in which *Lysistrata* 187 is followed by 197, 199, 198 and then 188 (after which the fragment breaks off). The passage beginning with 197 (δρόσωμεν κτλ.) and that beginning with 188 (εἰς ἀστίας κτλ.) can both hitch comfortably on to 187 (τίν’ ὅρκον ὄρκῳ σεις ποθ’ ἡμᾶς;—οὖνα;) and since 197 also hitches on to 196 (μηλοσαφεῖσας κτλ.) the possibility has to be considered that 188–196 and 197 ff. were originally alternatives—a possibility first brought home to us by their being conflated in the papyrus in the order which (unlike that of the medieval text) makes no sense.

The issue of author’s variants is apt to arouse emotion, and one can see why. If an editor, confronted by variants of which one is sense and the other nonsense, attributes the former to the author’s mature reflection and the latter to that same author’s hasty drafting,\(^48\) he implies that the transmission of texts down to the sixth century a.d. was exempt from the processes of corruption which we can see at work, step by step, before our very eyes, in many manuscript traditions from the ninth century onwards. This implication is not consonant with the evidence. If the editor’s rule of procedure is rooted in an emotional commitment to defending the integrity of transmitted readings at all costs, he is vulnerable to the further charge, as serious in historical studies as in ordinary life, that he cares more *what* the truth is than he cares *that* the truth, whatever it is,

\(^{47}\) PColon. inv. 3, edited by A. Henrichs and L. Koenen, ΖPE i (1967) 117–120; I follow the essentials of their interpretation, but hesitate to refer to *histrionic* modification of an Aristophanic text.

should be found. Yet the contrary rule, that we should never consider attributing textual variation to the original author in default of positive external evidence that he revised his text, is no less open to criticism. Rules, after all, govern relations between adversaries, especially in games, where part of their purpose is to ensure that the game is not over too soon. In historical study we have no adversary and no occasion to be just or unjust, fair or unfair. Instead of rules, we have hypotheses which are consonant or dissonant with the available evidence and procedures which promote or impede the establishment of results.

Jachmann, a vigorous critic of thoughtless recourse to authors' variants as an interpretative procedure, cites spectacular examples of the through-going alteration of a text by people other than its author, and no doubt many more could be cited. Yet an infinity of such examples cannot annihilate the independent fact that authors do sometimes rewrite their own texts. To take a contemporary example, Dürenmatt's play Romulus der Grosse first appeared in print in 1958 in a form differing in many details from the version first performed in 1949, and the playwright revised it again for republication in 1964, altering not merely tenses and connecting particles but also the sequence and scale of the dialogue in certain scenes. Or, a slightly less recent example: the number and extent of the revisions to which Hardy subjected The Mayor of Casterbridge between April 1885, the moment at which he could fairly say that he had completed the novel, and its appearance in Macmillan's Wessex edition in 1912.

Ancient scholars were willing to assume that revision of this kind had occurred. On Ar. Frogs 1206 ff. Αἴγνυτος, ὡς ὁ πλείστος ἐσπαρτάν λόγος, κτλ. ΣV says: "According to some, this is the opening of Archelaus. They are wrong, for no such speech of Euripides is now extant. For, says Aristarchus, it does not belong to Archelaus, unless (sc. the poet) himself altered it (μετέθηκεν) later and Aristophanes has given the original text". So too on Frogs 1400 βέβληκ' Ἀχιλλεύς δύο κύβω καὶ τέταρα, ΣRV says: "Aristarchus says that this is cited as anonymous (ἀδεσπότως), since Euripides represented men playing dice in Telephus and (sc. later) removed them. It may therefore be from that play."

I am not in a position to assert that Aristarchus was right or wrong on these matters, but experience suggests to me that many authors rewrite their works as long as they are given the opportunity to do so. The

49 Loc. cit. (n. 4), 368 f.
50 Page, op. cit. (n. 8) rejects as spurious Eur. fr. 228, given as the opening of Archelaus in [Plu.] Vit. X Or. 837ε, on the grounds that Aristophanes must have got it right.
modern processes of printing and publishing, and in particular the cold reception given by publishers to the good ideas which come into one's mind while correcting page-proofs, reduce the opportunities. Before the invention of printing, they were far greater. The title of Emonds' book, *Zweite Auflage im Altertum*, has perhaps done harm by encouraging us to think of ancient authors as revising their works in discrete editions, when we should be thinking of indefinitely prolonged and extremely irregular processes of revision. I recall that the late Professor Douglas Young altered some lines in his Scots translation of *Frogs* during the dress rehearsal. The actor concerned noted the changes and got them right in the performance twenty-four hours later. Others made no such note. When the play was printed, it naturally had the revised lines; but before printing, revised and unrevised typescripts coexisted. If anyone says that I should not tell such a story without adding *si parua licet componere magnis*, so that he may at once cry *non licet*, I can only proclaim the contrary conviction that in the behavior of writers and artists there are structural constants behind the cultural variables.

I am inclined to treat *Frogs* 1252–1256 and 1257–1260 as author's variants, though without invoking the story of the repeat performance of the play as evidence; and if I have to say which of the two passages was replaced by the other, I will say that 1257–1260 was replaced by 1252–1256. On this hypothesis, Aristophanes will have ventured on the expression τὸν Βάκχειον ἀνακτὰ and then repented of it; and I suspect that not only the form, but the associations of a divine title predisposed him to a refrain-like sequence of pherecrateans. Whether the first version ended at καὶ δέοιξιν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, I doubt; it makes a surprisingly short stanza, compared with any other choral stanzas which mark the transition from one section to another in an Aristophanic scene; the idea that the chorus fears for Euripides needs some amplification, and it is possible that Euripides' opening words in 1261 cohered as well with what followed 1260 in that first version as they now seem to do with 1255 f. But in thus classifying *Frogs* 1257–1260 as a type II interpolation rather than as a type V I am chiefly influenced by inability to point to any passage in Aristophanes which can be assigned to type V on grounds which carry real conviction.

The strongest contender is undoubtedly the latter part of the messenger's speech in *Ach*. 1174–1189.

51 Cf. Radermacher's commentary *ad loc.*

52 Coulon, *op. cit.* (n. 18) 177 f. suggests that an unknown admirer of Aeschylus paraphrased 1252–1256, bringing out in θαυμάζω and δέοικα the ingredients of φροντίζω.
Kenneth J. Dover

\[\text{άνηρ τέρτωται χάρακι διαπηδών τάφρον, καὶ τό σφυρὸν παλίνωρρον ἑξεκόκκισεν, καὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέαγε περὶ λίθοι πεσῶν, καὶ Γοργόν' ἐξηγειρέν ἐκ τῆς ἀσπίδος: πτέλον δὲ τὸ μέγα κομπολακύθου πεσόν πρὸς ταῖς πέτραις δεινῶν ἑξημίδα μέλος: "ὦ κλεινὸν ὁμμα νῦν πανύστατόν σ' ὕδων λείπω φάος γε τούμον, ὠκέτ' εἰρ. ἐγώ."}

\[\text{1180}

\[\text{tosαύτα λέξεις εἰς ὕδρορρόαν πεσόν ἀνισταταὶ τε καὶ ξυναντὰ δραπέτως ληστὰς ἐλαίνων καὶ κατασφέρχων δορί.}

\[\text{1181 del. Dobree 1185 γε om. R}

1181, since it repeats 574 (but with καὶ for τίς), has long attracted suspicion (though the context does not provide a motive for marginal quotation, such as we find in the context of \textit{Birds} 192 or \textit{Wealth} 280); κομπολακύθου in 1182 harks back to an offensive joke made by Dikaiopolis against Lamachus in 589, and may therefore be thought inappropriate in the lips of this distraught and portentous messenger; if the text of 1182–1185 is sound, it seems that the feather δεινὸν ἑξημίδα μέλος; if the utterance (hardly a μέλος) is addressed to Lamachus (and to whom else could it be addressed?) it creates a relationship between a feather and its wearer to which an audience, ancient or modern, may find it hard to adjust, and the opening words of 1185 are hardly intelligible; and in 1186 we pass, apparently, to Lamachus himself, falling down again (~1178–1180) and recovering in order to conduct activities which are hard to reconcile with each other. Blaydes condemned 1181–1188 as interpolated, Wilamowitz 1181–1187, and more recently Page concluded, after severely adverse judgments on the sense—as comedy—of successive items in 1181–1188, that there is no alternative “except to recognize wholesale interpolation by a very inferior writer,” “specially composed to fill a known gap” after loss of part of the original messenger’s speech.\(^{53}\) The authenticity of the passage has however been defended in detail.\(^{54}\) Without rehearsing these details (which are numerous and complicated) I want to raise afresh the essential question: in what circumstances and for what purposes will a Greek capable of writing respectable iambic trimeters (and of quoting from \textit{Telephus} in line 1188) have interpolated in a play of Aristophanes a passage of obscure drivel uncharacteristic of messengers’ narratives in comedy? We are entitled to reply, “We cannot imagine, but that does

\[\text{53 Wilamowitz, Hermes liv (1919) 57 f. ( = Kl. Schr. iv 295 f.); Page, WSt lxi}x (1956) 125–127.}

not matter," only if we are satisfied that the kind and degree of nonsense which we find in Ach. 1181 ff. are beyond doubt distinguishable from other Aristophanic nonsense. I stress "beyond doubt," because to reject any passage in any author on the grounds that it is the most x passage in that author's work automatically promotes the second most x to first place, and away we go on a rampage of deletion. The impossibility of quantifying nonsense precisely and the consequent necessity of recourse to subjective judgment should not deter us from tackling the problem of Ach. 1181 ff.; the questions which most insistently demand an answer are commonly unquantifiable. It seems to me that Fraenkel\textsuperscript{55} was right to adduce the lyric parodies in Frogs, but wrong in referring to the parody of Euripidean monody (1331–1363), which is actually a coherent passage, rather than to the parodies of choral lyrics (1264–1277, 1284–1295 and 1309–1322), which are incoherent in syntax, sense and imagery. In that section of Frogs Aristophanes wrote colourful drivel as a means of characterizing the object of parody as colourful drivel, and the reasonable inference from this is that the messenger's speech in Ach. parodies something specific. We need not be abashed if we are not in a position to identify the original and compare the parody with it.

The problem of a passage stylistically unlike anything else in the author's work is raised by the wedding-song (1329–1359) at the end of Peace. I have omitted indications of speaker, as irrelevant to the particular problem which concerns me here.\textsuperscript{56} The song is divisible into eight sections, which I have marked A–H. S\textsuperscript{V} offers a metrical analysis, which we may ascribe (in keeping with the subscriptio) to Heliodorus,\textsuperscript{57} and that is where our troubles begin, for (a) in S 1329 the expected noun preceding μονοστροφικ(ν) is missing, (b) the description given in S 1329 is simply not true of the text we have, (c) the scholion which begins opposite line 1334 and ends opposite 1346 seems to belong to 1337, and (d) the scholion which is keyed by a sign to line 1346 seems to belong to 1351. Section A could be made to fit the analysis by repeating 'Τιμην Τιμεων' α; since this refrain is in fact repeated in 1335 f., 1344 f., 1349 f. and 1355 f., it is a reasonable presumption that Heliodorus's text contained a line 1332b

\textsuperscript{55} Op. cit. (n. 54) 41.

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. especially H.-J. Newiger, Wege der Forschung cclxv (Darmstadt, 1975) 238–254, and D. Holwerda, loc. cit. (n. 25) 133, 270–272 (Holwerda suggests transposition of section C to follow section F).

\textsuperscript{57} Newiger, loc. cit. (n. 56) 248 points out that "Heliodorus" is sometimes a term of convenience for the metrical analyses preserved in the scholia vetera on Aristophanes; it is noteworthy that the analysis of telesileans and reiziana in S Knights 1111 is fundamentally different from what we have in S Peace 1329. Cf. Boudreaux, op. cit. (n. 24) 36.
Peace 1329-1359

A 1329 δεῦρ' ὃ γένοι εἰς ὁγρόν

1330 χώπως μετ' ἐμοῦ καλῇ
1331 καλῶς κατακείσει.
1332 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.

B 1333 ὦ τρισμάκαρ ύς δικαί-
1334 ὁς τάγαθα νῦν ἐκεῖς.
1335 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.
1336 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.

C 1337 τί δράσομεν αὐτήν;
1338 τί δράσομεν αὐτήν;
1339 τρυγήσομεν αὐτήν.
1340 τρυγήσομεν αὐτήν.

D 1341 ἀλλ' ἄραμενοι φέρω-
1342 μέν οἱ προτεσταγμένοι
1343 τὸν νυμφρόν, ὄνδρεσ.
1344 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.
1345 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.

E 1346 οἰκήσασε γοῦν καλῶς
1347 οὐ πράγματ' ἐξοντε ἀλ-
1348 λα συκολογοῦσε.
1349 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.
1350 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.

F 1351 τοῦ μὲν μέγα καὶ παχύ,
1352 τῆς δ' ἦδο τὸ σύκον.

G 1353 φύσεις γ' οἶτων ἐρθῆς
1354 οὗτον τε πίθα λόζων.
1355 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.
1356 Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ.

H 1357 ω χαίρετε χαίρετ' ἐν-
1358 δρες' κἀν ἐννέθησθε μοι,
1359 πλακοῦντας ἐδεσθέ.

1332 bis Vat. Pal. 67
1342 pro- Bentley: proo- codd.

POxy 1373

δευρω[ γναειεςγρυν]
δευρωγυαεισγρυν
χωπωντευνουκαλη
κα[ ἠτακει ] 
ν[ ] εναει

Κάρανδικια
μφε[ ] ειαρ

Scholia in V

1329 διπλη καὶ εν ἑπεισθεσι < > μονοστροφικὴν τοῖς πεντα-
καλῶν ἰωνικῶν διμέτρων, δύο καταληκτικῶν τριῶν δὲ βραχυ-
καταληκτῶν.

1333 εἰτα εν ἑπεισθεσι τοῦ χορ(ο)ῦ τὸ ἱσον.

1334 τοῦτοις φέρονται κατὰ τῶν
παράγραφοι ἕνα ὁ χορός ἀνὰ 
μέρος αὐτά λέγη καὶ τάλιν τὰ ἐ 
τοῦ αὐτόν μέτρον τοῦ χοροῦ.

1337 ἐν τισὶν ὁ φέρεται διὰ τὰ μέτρα.

1346 ἐντεθεὶς ἐν τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις οὐ 
φέρεται ἐν τοὺς πεντάκολα ἀκολού-
θως: ὡς φέρεται καὶ ἑνταῦθα 
ἐστιν.

1359 ύφ' ὁ κορώνις τοῦ δράματος.
sub fin. Υμὴν Ὃμεναι ὁ' οὔτως 
'Ηλιοδώρους' κεκώλυστα πρὸς τὰ 
'Ηλιοδόστρον.'

Σ 1329 εν ἑπεισθεσι Θιεμάνν: ἑπ-
τελεῖ Σ ἄκτας White: ἑπ-
τάς Holwerda περίοδων
White: περίοδος Σ βραχυ-
καταληκτών Dindorf: βραχέων 
καταληκτών Σ

Σ 1333 παράγραφοι Θιεμάνν: παρα-
γραφαί Σ χοροῦ Dindorf: κό-
ρου Σ

Σ 1337 διὰ τὰ μέτρα] τὰ δ' μέτρα 
Dobree: τὰ δ' δίμετρα Thie-
mann: τὰ διὰ μέσου tent. Hol-
werda

Σ 1346 Σοῦ] τὰ Θιεμάνν: γ Holwerda
in which case his characterization of the stanzas of the song in general as "five ionic dimeters, two of them catalectic and three brachycatalectic" (what we would call "two telesillean and three reiziana") applies at any rate to the first stanza. Section B will fit the analysis only if we posit a lost reizianum, 1334b, before the double refrain. Section C, consisting of a repeated question and repeated answer, all reiziana, will not fit, and ΣV here informs us that this section (or does it mean part of this section?) was absent from some texts "because of the metres." If the words διὰ τὰ μέτρα are sound, the scholiast is ascribing the absence of those four verses to deliberate omission for the purpose of making the text conform to the metrical analysis; and even if his explanation is wrong, his presupposition throws an interesting light on editorial procedures in the Roman period. For what it is worth, there is some reason to think that the fifth century codex of which POxy 1373 (PPrinceton AM 9056) is a fragment contained 1337–1340, since the copyist repeated line 1329 (which was subsequently deleted by scoring through). Why did he do this? Clearly we cannot always expect to explain why transcribers repeat lines—whether we are speaking of our own daily experience or of ancient抄写者—and we may be dealing here with a pure coincidence, but it is tempting to suggest that someone (a) wished to make section A conform to the metrical analysis, (b) lacked understanding of the distinction between "catalectic" and "brachycatalectic," (c) instead of taking the obvious step and repeating the refrain, was influenced by the repetition in section C and wished to imitate it.

That is, of course, highly speculative; it is less speculative, taking Σ 1337 as applying to section C and also as true, to say: there did exist texts from which section C was absent. When the late Maurice Platnauer was preparing his edition of Peace, I found it impossible to persuade him at least to print section C in his text and express his doubt of its authenticity in the apparatus criticus; it was the only occasion on which his characteristic patience and courtesy in discussion of disagreements failed him, and he simply could not take seriously the notion that Aristophanes wrote those four crude, childish lines. Now, the form of question and answer, with assonance and partial repetition, seems to be a constant in

58 That is to say, to the analysis in Σ 1329; but Newiger, loc. cit. (n. 56) 251 remarks that if (as seems probable) καὶ πόλυ κτλ. in 1334 refers to 1341 ff., it implies not a continuation of the same metrical form as precedes 1341 but a return to an earlier form (cf. ΣE Ach. 204; White, op. cit. [n. 25] 397).
59 This is implied by Newiger, loc. cit. (n. 56) 251.
60 This seems to have been the view of Grenfell and Hunt in their introduction to POxy 1373.
Greek wedding-songs, from Sappho (fr. 115 Lobel-Page), "To what, dear bridegroom, am I most to liken you? To a slender sapling I most liken you," to the modern Sarakatsani,^"Whose is the flag, fine and red? The bridegroom's is the flag, fine and red!" The tone of jocular obscenity in section C accords well with that of section F and with ancient practice at weddings; and it should be noted that sections C and F have a formal feature in common, in that each follows a pair of stanzas which end with the Hymen-refrain. I do not see why Aristophanes should not have decided to integrate his own sophisticated poetry in this wedding-song with ingredients taken directly from rustic usage, which serve as a thumping coda to sections A + B and D + E respectively. C and F (I would prefer to think of them together, as far as possible) may have been present in one of the author's versions of the song and absent from another; if so, \( \Sigma V \) 1337 is explained and the problems of the metrical analysis are in part resolved. But I must confess that I am still not quite happy about the repetition within section C, and I would not absolutely rule out the possibility that it has its origin in pure error. If Aristophanes wrote one question and one answer, beginning with the same letter and ending with the same ten letters, the chance that the answer would be accidentally omitted in transmission was very high. This could set in motion a process which can be set out diagrammatically:

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For deletion of a line as incoherent cf. *Frogs* 1294 (p. 148); and for marginal addition of something already there, cf. R at *Wealth* 1128–1131, where 1129 f., accidentally omitted in the text, were written by the copyist in the margin and again (in the same hand, but a different ink) at the top of the page. It will be objected that the process indicated in the right-hand side of the diagram is not likely to have occurred unless transmitters of the text were familiar with repetition as a feature of actual wedding-songs. Perhaps indeed they were; so, then, was Aristophanes, and the repetition ceases to require explanation, whether sections C and F belong to a revised or to an unrevised version of the exodos of *Peace*. Whichever of the alternative hypotheses considered may be judged the more probable, *Peace* 1337–1340 has no better claim than *Frogs* 1257–1260 or *Ach.* 1181(2)–1187(8) to be classified as a type V interpolation in Aristophanes.

In this article I have tried to found discussion of difficult and disputed cases on what is simple, observable and undisputed elsewhere. Even if my hypotheses commend themselves as far as they go, they will require re-examination when the editing and indexing of the *scholia vetera* on Aristophanes has been completed and (in conjunction with the publication of more ancient fragments of commentaries) has increased our understanding of the ways in which ancient editors and commentators operated.\(^6^2\) It will be easier then also to distinguish between the methods, interests and predilections of different individual commentators, or at least different periods and traditions.\(^6^3\)

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\(^6^3\) Boudreaux, *op. cit.* (n. 24) took some important steps in this direction. The commentators from whom the *scholia vetera* on *Birds* and *Frogs* were derived like to cite individual scholars by name (later commentators are more prominent in *Birds*, earlier in *Frogs*), while names are almost entirely suppressed in the scholia on *Wealth* and *Clouds*, and those on *Wasps* occupy an intermediate position (cf. W. G. Rutherford, *A Chapter in the History of Annotation* [London, 1905] 417–434). There are very full metrical analyses in the scholia on *Ach.*, *Knights* and *Peace*, some on *Clouds* and *Wasps*, and none on the extant plays which would come later in any edition of the plays arranged not in alphabetic but in chronological order. These data alone give rise to interesting but inconclusive reflection.
11

The Four Stoic Personae

PHILLIP H. DE LACY

In the first book of Cicero’s De officiis is a formulation of Stoic ethical doctrine that has not received the attention it deserves. Cicero differentiates four considerations that must be kept in mind when we ask, quid decent. These four considerations he calls personae. Two pertain to our nature, one to our circumstances, one to our choices. The two natural personae are (a) the nature we share with all human beings, and (b) our individual natures. The persona arising from circumstances is imposed on us by chance and time, and that which pertains to our choices results from our judgment of the kind of life we wish to live (De off. i.107–117).

This schematic formulation of four personae corresponding to four determinants of ethical choices is, so far as I know, unparalleled in ancient philosophical writings, although partial parallels may of course be found. It raises some difficult questions. One set of questions pertains to the use of the term persona and its Greek counterpart, πρόσωπον, in ethical contexts. Another has to do with the doctrine’s pedigree. Presumably Cicero found it, or something like it, in the treatise of the Stoic Panaetius Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος, on which De officiis I and II were based (see De off. iii.7, and Ad Att. xvi.11.4). Can we safely assume that it is authentically Panaetian, and if so, is it also consistent with the teachings of the early Stoa, or is it a Panaetian aberration? And finally, how does the doctrine reflect Stoic thought, as contrasted with the treatment of the determinants of ethical choices by other ancient philosophers, notably Plato and Aristotle? This paper will offer tentative answers to these questions.

I

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the term persona—πρόσωπον in ethical contexts is the way in which it combines a specification of individual differences with a suggestion of detachment. An actor playing a role remains distinct from the role he plays; the prosōpon is as external to him as
the mask he wears when he plays it. Similarly, the ancient rhetorical practice of προσωποποιεῖν demanded of the orator an ability to speak in ways appropriate to a variety of different characters. In a more generalized context, therefore, persona–prosopon may refer to an outward show as distinct from inner reality, or to a temporary or transitory course of action, something put on or put off, as distinct from a persistent identity. This detachment is reflected also in the evaluation of an actor’s competence. He may give an excellent performance of a worthless character (cf. Plutarch, Lysander, ch. 23 [446 D]), and he laughs or weeps not according to his own inclination but as the play requires (Plut. Demosthenes, ch. 22 [856 A]). Thus the externality of the role permits a distinction between the part assigned, which is not our doing, and our responsibility to play the part well.

But the term prosopon came also to be used in a contrasting way, to indicate what is peculiar to the individual. The poet who composes a drama may be viewed as portraying the words and actions of certain kinds of persons, and the connection that he makes between character and action is immediate and necessary. Agamemnon as a prosopon has an identity to which his acts conform. It is not possible for Agamemnon to behave like Thersites, or Thersites like Agamemnon. In this context prosopon refers precisely to the distinctive features that identify the individual and separate him off from other individuals. Far from being external, it is what makes him what he is.

Both of these uses of prosopon were exploited by the philosophers. Plutarch offers many examples in addition to those already cited. He uses the phrase ἡθος καὶ πρόσωπα with reference to moral character, whether on the stage (De aud. poet. 28 EF) or off it (De invidia et odio 537 F). He even speaks (Quaest. conviv. vii.8.1, 711 C) of the ethos of the prosopon, thus suggesting that a prosopon carries an ethos with it. Yet elsewhere Plutarch says that it is shameful for the aging statesman to exchange his political prosopon for some other (An seni respublica gerenda sit, 785 C), and he describes the powerless Arrhidaeus as having only the name and prosopon of king (An seni 791 E). Thus in some passages prosopon is closely bound up with character, but in others it is separable, either as a role that is put on and off, or an appearance that misrepresents the reality.

1 See for example Quintilian, Inst. orat. iii.8.49; vi.1.25–27; xi.1.39–42.
2 Cf. also Antony 29 (928 F-929 A). Antony was a tragic actor to the Romans, a comic actor to the Egyptians. The rhetoricians also speak of putting a persona on or off; see for example Cicero, De off. iii.43 and Quint. Inst. orat. iii.8.50.
3 Cf. also Lucretius iii.58, where persona is a mask that conceals the truth; and Cicero, Tusc. disp. v.73, where it is said of Epicurus that tatum modo induit personam philo-
These examples, a few out of many, approximate at least two of the four Ciceronian persona: the second, which ties our persona to our individual nature, and the fourth, which makes our persona a matter of voluntary choice. Cicero’s third persona, the role assigned to us by chance or time, would include Arrhidaeus’ kingship, since in Plutarch’s view he was king by chance, not from virtue (cf. De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute, 337 DE). A more explicit parallel, however, to Cicero’s third persona is found in the Cynic tradition. Teles (third century B.C.), in his work On Self-sufficiency, gives Bion as his authority for the statement that τύχη, like a poetess, assigns at one time the prosōpon of πρωτολόγος, at another of δευτερολόγος, at one time the prosōpon of king, at another of wanderer (ἀλήτης); and Teles remarks that just as the good actor must play well whatever role the poet gives him, so the good man must play whatever role fortune has given him. Even earlier Demades, the sharp-tongued Athenian orator, is reported to have said to Philip of Macedon (fr. 48 De Falco = Diodorus Siculus xvi.87): βασιλεύ, τής τύχης σου περιθείσης πρόσωπον Ἀγαμέμνωνος, αὐτὸς οὐκ αἰσχύνη πράττων ἔργα Θεραΐτου; “O King, when fortune has clothed you in the role of Agamemnon, aren’t you ashamed to perform the acts of Thersites?”

It is only the first of Cicero’s four personae, then, for which a parallel seems to be lacking; and indeed it is a surprising usage. All the other personae are to some extent individuating, whereas the first is common to all human beings. The stage analogy breaks down, unless the aim is to differentiate the role of a human being from that of a lower animal or a god. This may in fact be Cicero’s intention, since the passage in which he introduces the first persona (De off. i.107) follows closely on a discussion of the difference between men and animals (i.105). Cicero’s extended use of the term is therefore not altogether unreasonable.

sophi et sibi hoc nomen inscrispit. The actor’s mask provides an appropriate metaphor for both the putting on and off of roles, and the concealment of one’s true self.

4 The examples taken from Quintilian and Plutarch are of course post-Ciceronian and could not have provided models for Panaetius. But they are convenient illustrations of the ways in which prosōpon can be used. For further material on Plutarch’s use of dramatic terms and concepts see E. O’Donnell, The Transferred Use of Theater Terms as a Feature of Plutarch’s Style. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1975.


6 See also G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, s.v. πρόσωπον, X, D, p. 1188, col. 2, where one finds “le prosōpon de la divinité et celui de l’humanité” in a citation from Nestorius’ Liber Heraclidis (Nau’s French translation from Syriac).
Historians of Stoicism generally accept the four Ciceronian *persona*:s as authentic Panaetian doctrine. They tend to see in them a characteristically Panaetian concern with real people in real situations, rather than with the idealized sage. An exception is A. Schmekel, who regarded the third and fourth *persona*:s as Cicero's own addition, on the grounds that they do not combine with the first two to form a coherent scheme.

The well attested fragments of Panaetius are of no real help here, since they contain no reference to any of the four *persona*:s. When one looks in other ancient Stoic texts for a comparable analysis of the determinants of moral conduct, most of the material comes from authors subsequent to Cicero. A major source is Epictetus. In *Diss. ii.10*, Epictetus begins with the exhortation, σκέψεις τίς εἴ “Examine who you are.” The examination that follows takes the form of a list of names, each contributing something to the process of self-identification: you are a human being, a citizen of the universe and a part of it, a son, a brother (ii.10.1–9). Epictetus then shifts to a conditional form of expression: if you are a member of the council of some city, if you are young, if you are old, if you are a father, if you are a smith (ii.10.10–13). Each name of this kind, he says, when it comes into consideration, always indicates the acts (ἐργα) appropriate to it (ii.10.11).

Of two of the names on the list, son and brother, Epictetus uses the phrase, τοῦτο τὸ πρόσωπον, thus hinting, but not actually saying, that the other names also correspond to prosōpa. The Stoic Hierocles (second century A.D.) also uses the term prosōpon with reference to the relation of brother to brother, master to servant, parent to child. He says that each member of such a pair will see more clearly how to behave toward the other if he supposes himself to be the other—a supposition, he says, especially easy for brothers, because they have from nature the same prosōpon. 


9 Cicero does not include age differences (young, old) in his account of the four *persona*:s, but he mentions them soon thereafter (De off. i.122). P. Milton Valente, *L'Éthique stoïcienne chez Ciceron* (Paris and Porto Alegre, 1956), p. 249, places them under the third *persona*. Cicero himself, however, is not so specific; cf. i. 125: *ita fere officia reperientur cum quaeretur quid deecet et quid aptum sit personis, temporibus, actuibus.

In Diss. i.2 Epictetus introduces quite a different prosōpon, which results from one's παρασκευή. In this discourse (i.2.7) he lists two determinants of what is reasonable (ἐβλογοῦν) in any particular situation: one’s prosōpon, and the value (ἀξία) one places on external things (τὰ ἐκτός). Different persons have different prosōpa, the difference lying, apparently, in the extent to which they have the strength to live the truly good Stoic life. Not all horses are swift, and not all men can live the life of Socrates. Our preparation (paraskeue) varies with our natural ability and our training. Τί οὖν; ἐπειδή ἀφυῆς εἰμί, ἀποστῶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τούτου ἐνέκα; “What then? Since I am without natural ability, shall I therefore stop taking care?” No; I shall make the most of what I have (i.2.34-37). Here the differentiation of persons is in terms of their position on an ascending scale that terminates in the sage. Those who differ from the sage are his inferiors. This same relation of superior to inferior appears in the discourse on the Cynic ideal (iii.22). The Cynic preserves τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν πρόαστόν (iii.22.69). His way of life requires a special paraskeue which is beyond the reach of most men (cf. iii.22.23, 107-109).

A. Bonhöffer, whose studies of Epictetus established that Epictetus’ affinities were with the early Stoas rather than the Stoas of Panaetius and Posidonius, pointed out the differences between Epictetus’ prosōpa and the personae of the De officiis and concluded, quite rightly, I think, that Epictetus was not following Panaetius here. Yet the possibility remains that Epictetus and other late Stoics reflect a pre-Panaetian stage in the development of the Stoic doctrine of prosōpon, and that the Ciceronian scheme is Panaetius’ reaction to existing Stoic teaching. If we may believe Seneca, there was already in the early Stoas a dispute about the usefulness of that part of philosophy quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta nec in universum componit hominem; and Seneca gives as examples the precepts telling the husband how to behave toward his wife, the father how to raise his children, the master how to govern his slaves (Epp. mor. 94.1). Seneca reports that the Stoic Ariston was opposed to such detailed precepts, and that Cleanthes considered them weak if not derived from fundamental philosophical doctrines (ibid. 94.2 and 4). The opposition here described is one that could easily lead to the two kinds of prosōpa seen in Epictetus, on the one side the wise man, whose conduct serves as a standard for all, and on the other an indefinitely long list of names designating personal and family relations, age differences, trades and professions, external circumstances, all of them calling for certain specified kinds of conduct.

11 A. Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoiker Epictet (Stuttgart, 1894), pp. iii–iv, 10–11.
If such a controversy did indeed exist in the early Stoa, then the Ciceronian scheme represents an attempt to resolve it, not simply by deriving the more detailed precepts from the more general principles, but by analyzing the components common to all *persona*es. At this level of analysis Epictetus' *prosōpa* do not fall into one or another of Cicero's categories, but all have a part in all. The conduct of the smith, no less than that of the sage, is determined by his being a man, having certain natural abilities, acting under such-and-such circumstances, and aiming at a certain way of life. The fourfold scheme thus provides a theoretical basis for analyzing conduct at all levels, and to this extent it deemphasizes the sage. And inasmuch as it recognizes the variables in human life, it prepares the way for practical advice on how to deal with these variables.

In a way the third *persona*, that imposed by chance and time, is the crucial one. As noted above (p. 165), a close parallel to this *persona* appears in the Cynics Bion and Teles. Their position is very close to that of Ariston; like them, Ariston compared the wise man to a good actor who, whether he takes the role (*prosōpon*) of Thersites or Agamemnon, plays either one in the appropriate way. One misses here a reference to fortune as poetess. Yet fortune is important only as the source of the circumstances under which we act and over which we have no control. *On Circumstances* (Περὶ περιστάσεων) was the title of one of the works in which Teles called τῶν γενίτρων (see note 5). Ariston too attached great importance to circumstances (*περιστάσεις*); they have as much to do with a wise man's choices as the word to be written has to do with a grammarian's choice of letters (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* xi.64–67 = *SVF* I, frag. 361).

This concern with circumstances persisted in Stoicism. It is evident in the importance attached to the timeliness (*eîkαρπεία*) of right actions, since circumstances change with time. One of Posidonius' works included a section περὶ τοῦ κατὰ περίστασιν καθήκοντος *On Circumstantial Duty*. Still later, Epictetus saw in circumstances the material (*ἐλην*) for moral actions.

12 Diog. Laer. vii.160 = *SVF* I, frag. 351. Thersites and Agamemnon were the examples used by Demades. Bion and Teles had spoken more generically of king and wanderer, famous and obscure, and the like. Thersites and Agamemnon reappear in Epictetus (*Diss.* iii.22.28; iv.2.10), but Epictetus is interested in the qualitative differences in their ways of life rather than the quality of the actor's performance.


They include the hardships sent by Zeus to test us and train our powers.\textsuperscript{15} That the source of these circumstances is Zeus rather than fortune is not a crucial difference, since the terms fortune, providence, and fate all refer, in the Stoic view, to the cosmic order established by divine reason, or Zeus.

There is nothing in this Stoic background that identifies Panaetius as the author of the Ciceronian fourfold scheme. The only reason for assigning it to him remains Cicero’s statement that he was following Panaetius in \textit{De officiis} I and II. But the alternatives are limited. Since the scheme uses Stoic concepts to solve a Stoic problem, there is every reason to believe that the author was a member of the school. To be sure, it is in a sense Platonic; it establishes a finite plurality between the one (the ideal represented by the sage) and the many (the endless diversity of actual human lives). Cicero would have welcomed this aspect of the theory and indeed might have let his Platonic sympathies influence his presentation of it.\textsuperscript{16} But Panaetius too was an admirer of Plato, and he could have had the precepts of the \textit{Philebus} in mind when he formulated the fourfold scheme.

It is of course possible that Panaetius did not originate the scheme but took it over from some earlier Stoic. It is simply the lack of evidence that prevents us from pushing it back to an earlier period. There are indeed two very tenuous bits of evidence, neither of them persuasive. One is a list in Epictetus of five determinants of things that are done: τῶν πραττομένων τὰ μὲν προηγομένως πράττεται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ περίστασιν, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ οἰκονομίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμπεριφοράν, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἔνστασιν “Of things that are done, some are done as primary ends, some in conformity with circumstance, some with management of a household, some with sociability, some with resistance.”\textsuperscript{17} The first two items bear some resemblance to the fourth and third \textit{personaee}, and it is conceivable that Epictetus was following some early Stoic text. But the list as a whole is so unlike the fourfold scheme that even if it is early it cannot be regarded as an anticipation of that scheme.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Diss.} i.6.33–37; i.24.1–2. The terms \textit{περίστασις} and \textit{δῆ} are closely joined in i. 6.34 and i.26.2.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Diss.} iii.14.7. This sentence stands in isolation, without explanation or illustration. The relation of \textit{προηγομένως} to \textit{κατὰ περίστασιν} is clarified by Hierocles, \textit{On Marriage} (p. 52 Von Arnim = Stobaeus, Vol. IV, p. 502 Wachsmuth–Hense): married life is \textit{προηγομένως} for the wise man, life without a wife is \textit{κατὰ περίστασιν}. That is, some \textit{περίστασις} may prevent the attainment of the \textit{προηγομένως}. 
The second bit of evidence is more perplexing. There is in the *Magna Moralia* an account of actions that covers very nearly the same ground as the four *personae*. In i.11 and 14–15 (1187 b 4–30, 1188 a 38-b 24) the author characterizes human beings as capable of generating actions and identifies the ἄρχη of action as πρωιέρεις καὶ βούλησις καὶ τὸ κατὰ λόγον πᾶν "choice and wish and all that is in conformity with reason." Actions, however, are subject to the limitations of one's nature (ch. 11) and of force (βία, ch. 14) and necessity (ἀνάγκη, ch. 15). Force is an external cause of action contrary to nature or to wish. Necessity also has to do with externals; for example, a person who suffers a lesser harm in order to escape a greater one is acting under the necessity imposed by things.

The obvious differences between this account and the four *personae* are so great that a direct connection seems most unlikely. One of the obvious differences is that in the *Magna Moralia* one's individual nature and the external situation are regarded as restraints on one's choices and wishes, whereas in the Ciceronian scheme they are co-determinants. It is just possible that some Stoic found in this Peripatetic analysis a useful formulation of the obstacles to be overcome by the wise man,18 and that Panaetius converted the obstacles into roles that demand from us appropriate action. Uncertainty about the date of the *Magna Moralia* makes the whole question of its relation to Stoicism very uncertain indeed. It is sometimes held that the *Magna Moralia* postdates the founding of the Stoic school and reflects Stoic influence.19 This may well be so; but to postulate an otherwise unknown Stoic source for the chapters cited above would surely be to multiply entities beyond necessity.

III

The purpose of the doctrine of four *personae* was to provide a formula for discovering for any given person in any given situation the appropriate act, *quid debeat*. The four considerations that determine the correctness of the action are thought of as imposing on the agent four different roles which he must bring into harmony in order to make the right choice. This pluralization of roles would seem to destroy the individuality of the moral agent; he is not one person but four, playing four roles

18 As already noted, both the limitations of one's natural ability and the hazards of fortune appear in Epictetus as obstacles to be overcome by the wise man. See above, pp. 167 ff.
that somehow result in a common act appropriate to them all. Where is the unity of the moral agent to be found?

The answer, I suggest, must be given in terms of basic Stoic doctrine. The Stoics do not explain individualization in terms of some unique essence or substance, but rather in terms of a unique set of relations. The four personae express these relations so far as they pertain to moral action, and collectively they identify the individual agent.

Here again Epictetus is helpful. He speaks of our σχέσεις, our relations to other persons and to the deity. Some of these σχέσεις are natural, others are acquired. Examples are pious, son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbor, companion, ruler, ruled. The good man is true to his σχέσεις, and his duties (καθήκοντα) are measured (παραμετρεῖται) by them. The moral agent is thus characterized by his collection of relations.20

The identity of the Stoic cosmic deity presents a similar unity in plurality. He has many names, Zeus, Athena, Hera, Hephæstus, Poseidon, Demeter, and the rest, corresponding to his many powers.21 A unity corresponding to the four personae, therefore, lies well within traditional Stoic modes of thought, even if it was devised by Panaetius as a means of promulgating his own version of Stoic ethics.22

The distinctive features of the scheme, however, and specifically the formulation in terms of personae, remain Panaetius’ own. What attraction did this formulation have for him? One may conjecture that he viewed it as a clarification, not an alteration, of Stoic teaching. For one thing, it clearly broadens the base of human action to include more than one’s nature. This broadening may have been a reaction to Plato and Aristotle, both of whom emphasize the relation of a person’s ergon, his distinctive activity, in the performance of which his virtue and happiness lie, to his nature; and they place the highest good in the performance of the ergon that is most distinctively human.23

20 Relevant passages include Diss. ii.14.8; iii.2.4; iv.4.16; iv.8.20; iv.12.16; Ench. 30. See P. De Lacy, “The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles,” TAPA 76 (1945), pp. 257, 260.


To the Stoics, apparently, such a scheme was too narrow. They accepted the correlation of *erga* with natures, virtues, and arts.\(^{24}\) But man's highest activity, his exercise of reason, is no more attached to one virtuous *ergon* than to another. Nor is the exercise of reason peculiarly human; it is also divine, and the gods, presumably, are better at it than we are. Our highest good is therefore not tightly bound to our own natures.

Here the doctrine of four *personaes* has two further attractions. First, since our *personaes* determine our *ergon*, the two *personaes* that represent our nature (individual and common) determine it only in part. The rest is determined by the place assigned to us in the cosmic order and by our own exercise of reason in making choices for ourselves. Second, the element of detachment implicit in the notion of a role helps to remind us that we are not discrete entities. We are parts of a far greater unity to which we are related in a variety of ways, and moreover in ways that change with time. To identify ourselves with any one of our roles, to the exclusion of the others, would lead us into error.

Thus on this interpretation at least the doctrine of the four *personaes* is Panaetius' attempt to analyze and explain how the multiple relations of the individual to the Stoic universe are to be taken into account in the actions of everyday life.

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\(^{24}\) See for example Diog. Laer. vii.100 = *SVF* III, fr. 83, p. 20.26–27; Plut. *De Stoicorum repugn.* 1038 F = *SVF* III, fr. 211, p. 50.33–34; Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* xi.200 = *SVF* III, fr. 516, p. 139.10–12. There are also many references to *erga* in Epicetus. He speaks for example of the *erga* of the different names we have (*Diss. ii.10.2*), the *erga* of the artisans (*ii.9.10*), of the philosopher (*i.20.7*), of the soul (*iv.11.6*); and he ties the excellence of animals and men to their distinctive *erga* (*iii.14.13–14*).
A New Manuscript of Babrius: Fact or Fable?¹

JOHN VAIO

In 1857 the British Museum purchased from Minoides Mynas the Athoan codex of Babrius and a second manuscript (L).² The later, Mynas claimed, was a copy of a codex discovered by himself on Mt. Athos. It contained a prologue and 94 fables written in what was intended as choliambic verse—about half the lines actually scan. Mynas' copy bore the title 'Ἐκ τῶν τοῦ Βαβρίου χωλιάμβων' and was published as such by G. L. Lewis.³ The latter admitted that the text was badly corrupt, but still believed that many genuine verses and phrases of Babrius, not extant elsewhere, had been preserved.

The integrity of this new collection and of its vendor was soon attacked. Cobet and Dübner began with general and sweeping indictments of forgery,⁴ which were then substantiated by Conington’s detailed and devastating critique.⁵ Most scholars accepted these charges as proved, and “Babrius, Part II” was dismissed as a patent forgery. Sauppe and

¹ A preliminary version of this paper was presented to the Oxford Philological Society on 13 June 1975.
⁴ Cobet, Mnemosyne 8 (1859) 339 f., 9 (1860) 278–287. Dübner’s views were reported in Revue de l'instruction publique en Belgique n.s. 3 (1860) 83–86.
Bergk, however, rejected the majority’s opinion, but in spite of their spirited resistance the views of Cobet and Conington emerged as orthodoxy, especially after the adherence of Crusius in his masterly edition of Babrius.

But the final chapter on “Part II” had not yet been written. For in 1953 at the Ninth International Congress of Byzantine Studies, A. Dain revealed the existence of a manuscript which appeared to preserve a Byzantine recension of Babrius. This manuscript is Paris. suppl. gr. 1245 (Mq), which consists of two parts. The original folia contain the prologue and 61 of the 94 fables found in L. The text of Mq differs markedly from that of L, but interleaved with the original folia of Mq are additional pages, where Mynas has written alternate verses, many of which recur in L. Mq’s principal text is a “copie figurée,” that is, a copy that imitates (or pretends to imitate) the style of writing of its original. The cataloguers of the Bibliothèque Nationale assign Mq’s script to the twelfth century. But Mr. Nigel Wilson, who has generously inspected rather outsize photographs of Mq at my request, suggests an Italian hand of the Renaissance as the original or model of this manuscript.

Dain’s claims for Mq are two. (1) It is a copy of a genuine Byzantine collection of fables imitative of Babrius. (2) In five fables preserved elsewhere in choliambic form Mq represents an independent tradition offering superior readings in some passages. It is the second of these assertions that is the subject of this paper.

Dain adduces three examples, which turn out to weaken rather than support his case. The fable in question is 29 Mq corresponding to Babrius 124. (It does not appear in L.) This is one of twelve fables preserved only by the Vatican codex (V) of Babrius. Lacunae occurring at lines 7, 10 and 20 in V’s text are not found in Mq, which thus supplies the missing words, according to Dain.

6 Sauppe, *NAK* (1860) 249–253; Bergk, *AnthLyr* pp. XXXII–XLI (cf. supra n. 3); *Philologus* n.f. 1 (1889) 387–397.
9 The ms., if genuine, belongs in the class of Chambrý’s *codices mixti* (Ma, Mb, etc.): cf. *Aesopi fabulae* ed. A. Chambrý I (Paris, 1925) pp. 19 ff.; C. E. Finch, *TAPA* 103 (1972) 127 ff. Reports of Mq are based on autopsy.
10 Cf. Dain, *Babrius* 107 f.
12 A date after 1300 is indicated by fable 47 Mq, which is based on Planudes’ life of Aesop.
13 *Babrius* 110 f.
But let us look further. The first gap is at line 7, where V offers τὸ λοιπὸν δικτυῶ τί ποιήσεις. Either x - is missing in elements 1–2, or - x in 4–5. Mq supplies οὖν τῷ (= τῷ) in the latter position. This yields a line without caesura and violates a rule of Babrian meter established on the basis of the attested fables. If admitted, Mq’s supplement would be the only exception of its type. Thus the metrical anomaly in a matter so important as caesura suggests that οὖν τῷ is the work of a later “editor” and not of Babrius.

Mq’s second supplement in line 10 involves only the obvious addition of a missing article and is of little value as evidence for the superiority of the new manuscript. The third case, however, is more complex and damning. Crusius’ text of line 20 reads ὧμως δὲ δεὶ σχέιν <τὸν ψιλὸν> τὶ δειπνήσει; (= V with K. E. C. Schneider’s supplement). Here Dain declares, “... au vers 20, au lieu de τὸν ψιλὸν ..., on écrira τὸν ξένον, tiré de notre manuscrit.” Mq, however, reads quite differently: ὧμως δὲ δεὶ σχέιν δειπνίας τὰ [sic] τὸν ξένον. Thus Mq does not supply a cretic in elements 6–8 but completes the line with an antibacchius in 10–12. This entails rewriting and transposing V’s text, and results in awkward word order and inferior prosody, since a trochaic properispomenon is far less common at the end of Babrius’ trimeter than a spondaic paroxytone. Again Mq’s variant is more likely a later alteration than the original reading, and the supplement in v. 20 like that in v. 7 is probably an invention of Mq rather than Babrius’ phrase.

Moreover, the assumption that Mq’s supplements in vv. 7, 10 and 20 are later additions is strengthened by the evidence of v. 1 (not reported by Dain). Here V reads αὐρήνης for ἐξαυρήνης. Mq supplies ὧψ αὐρήνης, whose awkwardness betrays post-Babrian invention.

Thus in vv. 1, 7, 10 and 20 evidence of style, meter and prosody confirm the view that Mq is based either on V itself or on a text marred by the same lacunae, and that Mq’s supplements are to be regarded as conjectures and not as independent readings. In these passages Dain’s claim for the new manuscript fails.

14 Reports of V are based on autopsy. Photographs of V’s texts of Babrius 126–129 (discussed below) may be found at Merkelbach–van Thiel, Griechisches Leseheft (Göttingen, 1965) pl. 19 (pp. 63 ff.).
16 Contrast two examples of caesura after two prepositions in elements 4–5: Babrius 6.4, 33.8 (cf. Maas, op. cit. 86).
17 Babrius 111.
18 The reading attributed by Dain to Mq is in fact a conjecture of Mynas appearing on one of the interleaves. It had also been proposed by J. G. Schneider in 1812.
19 V omits the prefix in order to turn Babrius’ trimeter into a dodecasyllabus: cf. Vaio, CPh 64 (1969) 156 with n. 32.
Apart from minor orthographica there are other variants in Mq, which Dain does not consider. These may be grouped as follows. I. Correction or minor errors in V, which does not indicate an independent tradition, given the evidence for editorial tampering established above. The instances are ἡμερώσας (5), ἐβουλήθη (12) and ὀφράματιν (15). οἶδας (19) corrects the sense but distorts the meter. II. Inferior variants in Mq: θύμβρην (2), γενητήρα (11). III. A variant which could be an arbitrary alteration of V's unexceptionable reading in line 5: εἶχεν εἰς V, εἶχε πρὸς Mq. IV. Interpolations in Mq: line 2 is repeated after 3 with the addition of un-Babrian hiatus and Byzantine prosody (σέλυα ἐσθίειν); line 14 attested by both V and the Suda is omitted, a new verse being substituted (πῶς ἃν με θύσαις (ἀν μεθ. cod.) ωφελοῦντά σε πλεῖστον). V. Shared error: δὲ V Mq (4). VI. In line 13 Mq sides with the Suda against V, but given the evidence for editorial activity in Mq, we may assume contamination rather than a separate tradition.

There is no decisive support here for Dain, and we may conclude that in Babrius 124 Mq offers no significant variant of independent value, superior to the readings of V.

Furthermore, if we examine the other fables that Mq shares with V, Dain's case becomes even weaker. For example, fable 9 Mq corresponds to Babrius 127. The first four verses of this fable have been wretchedly contracted and corrupted by V, and the version of the Bodleian paraphrase of Babrius (Ba) offers no real help in restoring the original. Mq's version of the opening lines follows:

'Ἐν ὀφταλμίῳ γράφοντα τὰς ἀμαρτάδας
ὁ Ζεὺς τὸν Ἐρμήν κέλλετ' ἐν κινωτίῳ
ἐγγὺς θ' ἑαυτοῦ βέντα σωφρεύειν ταῦτας
ὅπως ἐκαστὸν τὰς δίκαια ἀναπράσην.

Here is a passage where Mq might prove its excellence, if based (as Dain supposed) on an independent and superior tradition. Instead these new verses offer nothing that could not be spun out of V and Ba.21 Moreover, they exhibit five violations of ancient prosody and Babrian meter: brevia scanned as long in element 11 of vv. 1 and 2; longa in element 9 of vv. 2 and 3, which violates the meter of the attested fables of Babrius, as does -ας in element 12 of v. 1.22 Note also that Mq omits ἐρευνήσας attested by V and (as Lachmann saw) probably the end of a Babrian

20 Fab. 51 Lewis has been radically revised by Mynas drawing on suggestions of Lachmann. It is found in Mq on one of the pages added at the beginning of the ms. (3v). Mq's own version appears on f. 16v. In line 2 one might suggest κέλλετ' for κέλλετ'.

21 The texts of V and Ba are conveniently cited by Perry in his apparatus ad loc. (op. cit. [supra n. 8] p. 164). "Ba" = Perry's "B".

22 On Babrius' practice cf. Crusius, op. cit. (supra n. 7) pp. XL–XLII.
choliambus. We are thus entitled to infer that Mq’s opening verses are un-Babrian concoctions based on the defective versions of V and Ba.

And what of the lines preserved almost intact by the other witnesses (vv. 6–10)? They read as follows in Mq:

\[ \text{τών δ’ οστράκων συγκεκριμένων ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις} \quad 5 \ (= \text{6 Crusius}) \\
\text{τὸ μὲν βράδιον τὸ δὲ τάχιον ἐμπίπτει} \\
\text{εἰς χεῖρα Δίως, εἰ ποτ’ εὐθύνει δόξοι.} \quad 23 \\
\text{τῶν δὴ ποιητῶν οὐ προσήκε θαυμάζειν} \quad 10 \\
\text{εἰ βάσσον ἀδικών τις ὅψε κακῶς πράξει.} \]

The wretchedly corrupt state of these lines requires little comment. The lack of caesura in v. 5 (6) results from misguided adoption of Ba’s prose variant. But the perverse distortions of vv. 7 (8) and 9 (10) must be assigned to the miserable invention of the editor, whose work was observed in the fable previously discussed. Thus Mq’s plausible variants (ἐκαστον 4, τῶν δὴ 8 [9]) may be regarded as of no independent value.

Fable 9 Mq then is a text corrupt far beyond even the defective witnesses on which Babrius 127 Crusius is based. And whereas we find no definitive index of an independent tradition in Mq, there are strong indications of close dependence on those witnesses. The same is true of fable 26 Mq, which corresponds to Babrius 126. Mq’s version was reproduced with extensive changes by Mynas in L (= fab. 52 Lewis). Again V has contracted and contorted Babrius’ opening verses, which cannot be restored even with the evidence of Ba.24 And again Mq offers verses whose defects of meter and prosody, poverty of style and general vacuousness reveal them as the product of Mq’s fancy feeding on the remains of Babrius available in V and Ba (vv. 1–8 Mq correspond to 126.1–4 Crusius):25

\[ \text{’Οδοιπορῶν ἀνθρωπος εἰς ἐρημαίνη} \\
\text{μόνην ἐστώσαν εὗρεν ἐν κατσφείῃ} \\
\text{σεμνήν γυναίκ’ ἀλ’ οὐ δοκοῦσαν εὐ πράττεν.} \\
\text{καὶ θησιν αὐτή \text{‘τι πέπονθας ἁρίστῃ;}} \\
\text{καὶ τίς ἐν εἴση; τοῦ γάρ μένεις ἀδεί;’} \\
\text{’ἐγώ, ἀνερ,’ εἶπεν \text{‘εἰμί σοι γ’ ‘Ἀλήθει’}.} \\
\text{πρὸς ταῦτ’ ἑθαίμασι’ οδοιπόρος κέπηρωτα:} \\
\text{’τι οὖν πόλις ἀφείσα τὴν ἐρημίν παλείς.’} \]

Nor does the rest of Mq’s version offer any firm indication of a tradition independent of V and Ba. Lines 9, 12 and 13 (= 5, 9–10 Crusius) reproduce V including the unmetrical word order in 13 (10), although

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23 Mq reads εὐθύνει δόξοι.
24 Cf. Crusius’ apparatus ad loc.
25 Apart from line 6 the text has been corrected only by the addition of missing accents and breathings.
26 εὐγένερ cod.
27 Mynas has erased the first two words of this verse and added epsilon-iota over the iota of πόλις.
one negligible variant occurs in 9 (5)—ράδ' V, ταῦτ' Mq. The same is true of the end of v. 11 (7)—ἐλήλυθε ψεῦδος Mq V. And in v. 10 (6) V's concluding phrase is altered only slightly in Mq: παρ' ὀλίγουσα τὰ ψεῦδη (corrected from ψεῦδος). The only major variants in Mq are found at the beginnings of v. 10 (6)—οτι ποτὲ V, ἐν τοῖς πάλαι γὰρ Mq—and of v. 11 (7)—νῦν εἰς πάντας βροτοὺς V, νῦν δ' εἰς βρ. ἀπαντάς Mq. But given the scope of editorial activity in Mq, these may be regarded as conjectures, the former probably based on Ba's ὀτι τοῖς πάλαι καιροῖς.

There remain two fables of Mq that require detailed discussion. Both are found in V, which alone preserves (at least in part) the choliambic original. In the case of one of these dependence on V can be demonstrated. The fable in question is 28 Mq reproduced with major changes as 54 Lewis and corresponding to Babrius 129. We are concerned with two passages, line 7 (= 8 Mq) and lines 18-20 (= 19-21 Mq). We begin with the latter.

Lines 19–20 are defective in V, which reads as follows: ἐσχάτον δὲ κυνίδων (18) θεράποντες ἐν μέσους ὡς εἶδον (19) ἐσάωσαν (20). Mq adds αὐτὸν before ὡς in 19 and completes 20 thus: θρέξαντες εὐθὺς δεσπότην ἐσάωσαν. But ἐσάωσαν is possible only in elements 1–3 (or perhaps 3–5) of the Babrian choliambus. And Mq’s placement offends not only against ancient prosody （-)αὶ- in element 10) but also against Babrius’ most characteristic metrical practice, namely, the localization of the accent in element 11 of the trimeter. Thus Mq’s supplement in line 20 must be regarded as conjectural restoration of V (or a text exactly like V), and the same is probably true of αὐτὸν in 19.

We next consider v. 4, which is presented as follows: (1) V’s text, (2) V as restored by the editors of Babrius, (3) Mq’s text.

(1) κυνίδιον δὲ χάριν δὲν εὐρύθμους παιζον
(2) τὸ κυνίδιον δ' ἐξανρε παιζον εὐρύθμους
(3) τὸ κυνίδιον δ' ἡθυρε χαριν δον παιζον.

Style commends the phrase ending (2) as strongly as it condemns its equivalent in (3). Moreover, the prosody of εὐρύθμους is characteristically Babrian, whereas properisponena ending in δον occur only rarely in elements 11–12. Thus ἡθυρε, which fills the gap left by the omission of εὐρύθμους in Mq, may be regarded as interpolated. Again, χαριν δον, a singularly awkward phrase in its context, may most easily be explained as a pitiful attempt to remedy V’s corruption.28

28 It is worth noting that this conjecture is the same as that of Furia, who first published V’s text of Babrius 124, 126–129: cf. Fabulae Aesopicae ed. F. de Furia, vol. II (Florence, 1809) p. 208 (henceforth: Furia). Other agreements of Mq with Furia against V are noted in nn. 29, 30, 32, 33, 35. The implications of this will be considered below.
That Mq derives from V is further indicated by the following conjunctive errors. Lines 2–3 appear in the same order in V and Mq. At line 6 Mq = V, except in omitting δ'. At line 15 (16 Mq) Mq = V, except in the spelling of θλάσσεν. At line 17 (18 Mq) Mq = V. Moreover, line 6 (7) corrupted by V is even further distorted by Mq, which reads ὃνος δ" ὁ τλήμων τὴν μὲν ἀλέθων [!] νύκτα. 29 And line 24 (25) unexceptionable in V (apart from a minor orthographical error) is marred in Mq by a metrical anomaly (anapaest in elements 7–8), the confusion of ὅρος and ὅρεις, and a more serious lapse in orthography: τί γὰρ παθῶν ἐν οὐρεοῖν οὐκ ἐπωλείμην (παθῶν is clearly interpolated). 30

Other variants, whether better or worse, may be attributed to conjecture, arbitrary change or brute ignorance. They are listed below. 31

1. ὃνος τις εἶχε σὺν κυνδίῳ ψέβος (note the Byzantine prosody in element 8)
2. ὅ μὲν ἦν (καὶ ἦν V)
3. χιλίῳ (χόρτον V)
8 (9). ἡμέρην (ὡς V, -ης edd.)
9 (10). ψέβων ἀφ' (ὑπεν ἐφ' V) 32
11 (12). ἀβρόπητη δ' ἐν πάση
12 (13). δεσμοὺς καὶ κάλως
21 (22). κρανός (κρανάς V, -ής edd.)
22 (23). ἐκπεινόν (ἐθεινόν V). 33

Finally, after line 6 Mq inserts the following verse, condemned by its own prosody: ἔσωζεν ἄθυμην ἦδον παραμυθείς.

Interpolation also plagues Mq's text of Babrius 128 (= fab. 27 Mq repeated with major changes by Mnas in L [= 53 Lewis]). A choliambic version attributed to Babrius is found in V and probably derives from Xen. Mem. 2.17.13. We begin with Mq's expansion of lines 5–6 V (= lines 6–9 Mq):

πλέον γὰρ ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φορβήν
πάσαν φέρει σοι γῆ τιθηνίς ἀπάντων.
καὶ τοῖς οὐρεοῖς εὐθαλεῖ τι γενναί σοι
ἀραίη βοτάνη καὶ ὅροις γεμισθεῖσα.

29 τὴν μὲν νύκτα ἀλήθων Furia, τὴν μὲν νύκταλατρεῖων V (ἀλτρεῖων ci. Rutherford).
30 Cf. παρ' οὐρεοῖν Furia, παρ' οὐρήσει V. Mq, V and Furia all read ὡς δὲ in line 22 (23Mq).
31 The reader is spared the epimythium of two verses added by Mq (meter and prosody are Byzantine and non-Babrian).
32 Mq agrees with Furia in reading ἀφ'.
33 Mq agrees with Furia against V.
Interpolation is proved by the accent at the end of line 6 and by the prosody of line 7 (element 10). That V is the basis of Mq’s invention is indicated by the conjunctive error in line 9 (7 V): ὅμη ἑραί ( amat V) βοτάνη Mq V, β. 〈γ’〉 ἑραί edd. Lines 6, 8–9 follow V fairly closely; line 7 is spun out of two words in V (sc. γῆς πάσαν). The verses just quoted are framed by two lines not found in V. Style, repetitiousness and context justify their condemnation.

5 οὗ δ’ οὖν ὅμη ἑραί πρὸς μόνον νομὴν ἡμᾶς
10 ψέκασμα διὸν ὕποθεν πεπωκυία.

Next, the following verse is inserted after line 10 V (= 13 Mq), its spuriousness revealed by lack of caesura and by false prosody:

14 ὦ οὗ γε βληχάξουσι ἀσυμβολὸν βάξιν.

Finally, a verse damned by illogic and otiosity precedes line 13 V (= 18 Mq):

17 κἂν ἢτε θῶμα θηρίουσι παντρώκτας.

So much for interpolation. The dependence of Mq on V noted above is further indicated by three important conjunctive errors: τοιάδε at the end of line 1,37 V’s unmetrical line 8 (= 11 Mq) repeated almost exactly by Mq (only one accent is changed), and πάντοθεν in line 13 V (= 18 Mq). As for Mq’s variants (listed below), they do not necessarily indicate anything beyond conjectural change or correction of V’s text:

1. ποτ’ / νομὴν
3. ἀμέλγοντ’ ἐστιν εἰ
10 (= 13 Mq). παροῦσα δ’ ἡκουστ’ ἢ κύων κατημελήθῃ (the longum in element 9 is un-Babrian)
11(15). μέσος ἐπωλούμην

34 By a combination of erasure and rewriting Mynas has succeeded in changing Mq’s original reading to αὕρας νοτίας. The conjecture recurs with orthographic changes on an interleaf (30v) and with a more important change for the worse (νοτιῆς) at fab. 53.10 Lewis. Bergk restored αὕρας τε νοτῖς against Babrian meter and declared the new reading part of a versum Babrio dignissimum (op. cit. [supra n. 3] p. XXXVI). The evidence of Mq un_masks Mynas’ conjecture and reveals the danger of such pronouncements, based as they are on purely subjective criteria.

35 Again note the agreement of Mq with Furia against V at the end of line 8 (= 6 V): γεννῆσαι Μq Furia, γεννήσει V.

36 An epimythium of two verses is added by Mq. One of these lacks caesura and contains a split anapaest in elements 7–8 (a major offense against Babrian meter).

37 Apart from minor variants noted below this verse is essentially the same in both Mq and V. In Mq Mynas has erased the three words following δἰς, altered the case of νομὴ (sc. -ῆς), and added the monstrous compound προσεξηνοῦσα after τοιάδε (cf. fab. 53.1 Lewis).
We have so far considered five fables common to Mq and V (sc. Babrius 124, 126, 127, 128, 129), and may now summarize the results of our inquiry. In these fables Mq derives principally from V with some contamination from Ba and the Suda. It does not represent an independent tradition, and its few plausible variants are to be attributed to conjectural activity on the part of the "editor" responsible for the massive and demonstrable interpolations noted above.

Seven other fables in Mq correspond to extant fables of Babrius. They are listed below together with the corresponding numbers of the fables repeated in L and published by Lewis (cf. n. 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mq</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>Babrius</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>141</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>134</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>138</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>142 Perry (cf. 143 Crusius)</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>143 Perry (cf. 147 Crusius)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In the case of all these fables, except for lines cited by the Suda and other indirect witnesses, there is nothing in Mq that could not have been manufactured on the basis of known versions, which preserve little or nothing of Babrius' original. Nor is there anything to indicate with certainty or even probability that Mq had access to a source preserving more Babrius than the witnesses available to us.

A detailed examination of each fable is not required, since the reader can easily verify the statement made above by comparing the versions published by Lewis (which will do for the purpose despite Mynas' alterations) with Babrius. One example will suffice—fab. 46 Mq, which does not recur in L. 38

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38 Conington's strictures on fab. 13 Lewis (= 5 Mq) are equally valid for Mq's version: op. cit. (supra n. 5) pp. 364–366 (= pp. 464 f. of the reprint). The problem raised by Mq's agreement with Lachmann's conjecture in line 4 (cf. 13.4 Lewis, 141.4 Crusius) will be considered in a later paper.

39 M's epimythium is omitted. It is based on the paraphrasts (cf. infra n. 41) and consists of two verses, one of which lacks caesura. The text of lines 1–7 is reported exactly as it appears in the ms. except for the addition of two missing accents and a breathing. Two marginal variants keyed to the text are found in the original writing. They are αὐτᾶι (for ὑπείς 5) and σκόιν [sic] (for εἰς [corrected from ἐχεις by the first hand] 7). Variants added by Mynas in his own hand are not reported.
Babrius’ version is preserved by a single witness (G) and the Suda, which cites two verses attributing them to Babrius. Mq takes lines 6–7 from the Suda (with minor variations) and creates five verses on the basis of two branches of the paraphrastic tradition. The new verses are a miserable hodgepodge of faulty usage, syntax, style, meter and prosody. G’s version, though marred by corruptions curable and incurable, is incomparably superior.

Thus Mq, even if a product of the late Byzantine age, is a witness of no independent value for the text of Babrius. The new manuscript draws upon the known sources of Babrius’ Mythiambi as well as other Aesopica to vary and expand the authentic fables with its own invention and to recreate the others anew in a pseudo-imitative style, whose ineptitudes boggle the mind. Dain’s belief in the importance of his discovery is thus revealed as premature, overoptimistic and utterly unfounded, as far as Babrius is concerned.

And what of Dain’s assumption that Mq is a copy of an authentic Byzantine codex? The proof that this new manuscript is a forgery concocted by Mynas requires examination of all Mq’s fables and their relationship to those published by Furia and Koraës in their editions of Aesop, and will not be undertaken here. We may conclude, however, by noting a strong index of forgery occurring in the fables discussed above. Of the thirty Babrian fables preserved by V all but six were published by Furia in 1809. V was rediscovered and re-examined by Knöll in 1878, who noted that certain readings in Furia differed from the actual lections of the manuscript. Mq agrees with Furia against V in five important


41 The *Suda’s* entry is Σ 1030 (4.427.27 f. Adler). For the paraphrastic versions cf. Chambry, *op. cit.* (supra n. 9) 1.197 f. (fab. 99a–b). The texts in question are also reported by Crusius, *op. cit.* (supra n. 7) p. 135.

42 Furia, *op. cit.* (supra n. 28); A. Koraës, Μύθων Αισοφείων συναγωγή (Paris, 1810). Note, for example, the fable just quoted. Dain’s Byzantine pseudo-Babrius would have had to combine two paraphrases in addition to exploring the *Suda* in order to create 46 Mq. Mynas had merely to turn from p. 230 to p. 407 in Koraës!

variants. Given the editorial activity observable in Mq, any one of these agreements could be mere coincidence. But their cumulative force is considerable and strongly supports the view that Mq is a forgery.

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44 Cf. supra nn. 28, 29, 30, 33, 35. On the other hand, Mq's agreements with V against Furia are relatively minor (readings in parenthesis are Furia's): 126.5 εἰδὸ (εὐ); 128.8 φέρβοις (είς); 129.13 ἡλθ' (ἡλθε), 16 ἡλόης (ἡλόησε), 22 καυτός (καί αὐτός), ἐκπνέων V -είων Mq (ἐκπνευ). 45 But is Mynas' the original hand of Mq? At Babrios 108 Dain suggests tentatively that this is the case. But at Mnas 119 f. he abandons this view. His evidence is a statement of Mynas found in an unpublished essay on Babrius (Paris, suppl. gr. 748 f. 9r): "Avant de faire une dissertation sur les 62 autres fables inédites de Babrius [presumably the fables of Mq], dont je viens de recevoir une copie presque fac-similé..." But Mynas is a notorious liar in such matters, as Dain himself shows (Mynas 117 f.), and this statement proves nothing. Who else but Mynas had the motive and incentive to forge such a document as Mq? For an instructive example of Mynas' forgery of Babrius on a much smaller (but far more successful) scale, cf. Rutherford, loc. cit. (supra n. 7).
On 9 December A.D. 348, Aurelius Ammon, a scholasticus from Pana-
opolis, drew up a petition addressed to the catholicus of Egypt, Flavius
Sisinnius. This petition is preserved on a papyrus from the collection of
the University of Cologne (inv. 4533). It is here published for the first time,
to serve as a basis for the discussion which follows.

Köln inv. 4533  
30.5 x 26.5 cm.  9 Dec. 348

Φλαυώ Σίσις[νυ]ῶιν  
tῶι διασημοτάτωι καθολικῶι
παρὰ Αὐρηλίον[ν Ἀμμων]ος Πεταρβεσχύν[ος σχολαστικῶι ἀπὸ Πανοῦσ
πόλεως
τῆς Θηβαίδος[ς έπειδῆ Εὐγένειος Μεμ[.,] ἦν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν Ἀμμων, φίλων με-
tαξον νημῶν γενομένων ἐπὶ τῆς Πανος[ολ]τῶιν πόλεως Παλῆς[ον ἀπὸ
dικουριάτου
5 καὶ Ἀπολλώνιον[ς πιστοῦ καὶ ἄλλον Ὁρίωνον[ς, ὁ]μολογίαν ἔγγραφον
κοινῇ πέτοιη ἑμὲνε
μεθα περὶ ἄνδραπόδων ἐν Ἀλεξάνδρειαῖ νὸν ὄντων [τ]ῇ λαμπρῇ ταύτη
πόλει
ὑπὸ Ἀρποκρατίων[ν]ος καταλεῖ[εί]μεμένων τοῦ ἐδελφοῦ τοῦ [ε]μοῦ ἐν
dιοσ[η]ῇ ὑμολογ[η]ίᾳ
tαύτῃ, οὐκ αἰ[δρ]ὰ ἄνθρωπος ἐπείδη ημεῖς προθεσμοῖν ἑαυτῶν ἐλεητικῇ
καταδεξασθαί
ὡςτε εἰσὶ ημεῖς[ν]ομολογοῦν εἰκοσὶ ἀπὸ ἐβδόμης καὶ ε[ί]κόδος Ἀθύρ[αν]
παρελθόντος[ν]ος μηνὸς εἰς
10 τῆν Ἀλεξάνδρ[εία]ν με παραγενέσθαι, ὅπως[ς] πέρας ἐπιτεθῆ τῷ πρῶτῳ [μ]ο-
τὶ ἀλλ᾿ ἑπεξ
νὸν ἑνταῦθα π[ρ]ὸ ἄλλων διὸ ἠμερῶν τῷ [ι] προειρημένωι Εὐγενείωι οὐ
συνήλθον
To Flavius Sisinnius the most illustrious catholicus from Aurelius Ammon son of Petearbeschinis, scholasticus from Panopolis of the Thebaid. Whereas Eugenius son of Mem ... and I, Ammon (in the presence of some friends of ours in Panopolis: Paniscus from the juridicus,1 Apollo the poet, and another, Horion), have established in common a written contract concerning slaves who are now in Alexandria, this glorious city, and who have been left by Harpocration my brother in this contract in duplicate, I was issued a summons to accept, I know not why, a fixed period of such a sort that within twenty days, starting from the twenty-seventh of the preceding month Hathyr, I was to go to Alexandria, so that an end might be put to the affair. But since, as it is, I did not meet the aforesaid Eugenius here two days ago and have not been able to find him, for this reason I publicly attest today, the thirteenth of Choiak, four days before the fixed period expires, that I have arrived. And I ask that this attestation of mine be securely deposited until Eugenius arrives, in order that he may not be permitted to offer a pretext against my notifica-


1 The Greek δικαιοδοτύς is the technical translation of the Latin iuridicus; see H. J. Mason, Greek Terms for Roman Institutions, Am. Stud. Pap. XIII (Toronto, 1974) s.v.
tion, and I ask that the matter be referred to your greatness, my lord, through the public notary today.

The consulship of Flavius Philippus, the most glorious prefect of the Sacred Praetorium, and Flavius Salia, the most glorious master of the horse, Chioiak 13.

I, Aurelius Ammon, have submitted this petition, as is aforesaid.

This text is addressed to the hitherto-unattested catholicus, Flavius Sisinnius. At this period, the two departments of the treasury in Egypt, the fiscus and the res private, were each under a καθολικός, the Greek translation of the Latin rationalis. It is not immediately obvious how the present petition could be of interest to the financial administration. The fact that slaves are involved may be important. Though human, they were technically classified with landed property, and the catholicus was concerned with the proper maintenance of the landed property of Egypt. On the other hand, the catholicus here may be simply the prefect's delegate, as he is elsewhere.

Ammon informs the catholicus that he and a certain Eugenius have drawn up a contract concerning slaves of Harpocration, Ammon's brother, but the petition does not reveal the nature of this document. After the contract had been drafted, Ammon received a summons to appear in Alexandria within twenty days of 27 Hathyr (23 November), "so that an end might be put to the affair" (line 10). Upon arrival, Ammon could not find Eugenius, and fearful of treachery, he composed the present petition, in which he states that he reached Alexandria four days before the expiration of the twenty-day period. He asks that his petition be kept safe until Eugenius' arrival.

The information in the Cologne papyrus is tantalizingly vague. We look in vain for a description of the contract between Ammon and Eugenius. We also wonder about the precise role of Eugenius in the affair. Ammon himself says: "I was issued a summons to accept, I know not why, a fixed period of such a sort that within twenty days . . . I was

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3 See, e.g., R. Taubenschlag, "Das Sklavenrecht im Recht der Papyri," Opera Minora (Warsaw, 1959) II 249, who shows that slaves were included in property declarations (κατ' οίκιαν ἐποιγαραφαί) and were on record in the registry of real property (the βιβλιοθηκή ἐγκτῆσεων).

4 Lallemand (above, n. 2) 85 and n. 1.

5 Ibid. 145, a discussion of P.Oxy. IX 1204, where the catholicus appears to replace the prefect in a legal case.
to go to Alexandria” (lines 8–10). There is much that puzzles Ammon, but there is also much, one feels, that he has left unsaid.

Furthermore, in terms of style and drafting, the text leaves something to be desired. Ammon writes with a practiced and skilled hand, as befits a scholasticus, and his style is generally what one would expect from a person of his position. But he has lapses. Note the awkward phrase ἐν δι[ασφήν] ὕμλο[γη] αῖ ταύτη in lines 7–8; presumably it goes with what precedes, and I have so translated it: “concerning slaves who are now in Alexandria . . . and have been left by Harpocrat in this contract in duplicate.” But there has been no mention of this contract before, and therefore we do not expect ταύτη. Possibly Ammon wanted to reiterate the διμολογίαν ἔγγραφον of line 5, but, if so, he chose an ambiguous means of achieving his goal. Faulty drafting is also noticeably in evidence in line 17, where the phrase κατὰ τὴν σήμερον ἡμέραν is carelessly repeated.

It is not only we who are dissatisfied with the petition; Ammon too presumably found it below standard. Instead of sending it to the cathedral, he tried his hand at a considerably expanded version, in which he went into much greater detail. He first used the entire verso of the same sheet and then, finding this to be insufficient, he crowded more of his revision in the margins on the recto. Ammon’s additional remarks in this revised version will concern us later, for they prove to be of more than usual interest.

Before dealing with these additions, we should note that the Cologne papyrus, fortunately, is not an isolated text. It belongs to a small archive of papers which reach back to the third century of our era, and which provide much information about Ammon and his family. The texts of this archive are divided between the University of Cologne and Duke University, and the publication of all of them is planned for the near future.

The archive falls into two groups. The first deals with Ammon’s father, Aurelius Petearbeschinis and the latter’s wife, Aurelia Senpasis. It comprises three texts: a declaration submitted by Senpasis in the year 289 for property she had purchased, and two copies of a contract documenting the ownership of this property.

6 The scholastici were “advocates so called as a result of their activity as jurisconsults of rather high educational attainment . . . [they] were as a rule assigned to duty in the courts of provincial governors”—J. G. Keenan, ZPE 11 (1973) 60. The most recent detailed study is that of A. Claus, Ο Σχολαστικός (Dissertation Cologne, 1965).

7 The edition is being prepared by G. M. Browne, L. Koenen, J. F. Oates, and W. H. Willis.

8 The property declaration is preserved in P.Köln inv.4531 + P. Duke inv. G 185, and the two copies of the contract appear in P.Köln inv. 4535 and 4539.
The second group of documents centers around Petearbeschinis’ two sons, Ammon and Harpocration. Six in number, they are all written in Ammon’s hand, and they all concern the slaves of Harpocration. One text is the original petition transcribed above, four others represent various attempts at revising this petition, and the sixth is a contract in which Ammon asks a certain Faustinus to act on his behalf in Alexandria.9

These texts all come from Panopolis, the modern Achmim, in Upper Egypt. Until recently, papyri from Panopolis used to be scarce,10 and this scarcity occasions surprise, since the city was the capital of its nome and the intellectual center of Upper Egypt. But now we have quite a few papyri from Panopolis, many of them from archives of the early Byzantine period. Some of these texts are documentary: one thinks immediately of the two lengthy rolls containing correspondence of the strategus of the Panopolite nome, dated respectively to A.D. 298 and A.D. 300 and published a little over a decade ago by T. C. Skeat.11 Professor and Mrs. H. C. Youtie and Dr. D. Hagedorn have just edited another group of Panopolitan texts.12 These papyri, 31 in number, extend from A.D. 298 to A.D. 346. Some of them, a series of tax receipts, come from the versos of the rolls which Skeat published; the remainder are lodged in the Cologne collection. Rather than constituting a homogeneous group, these texts are probably remnants of the papers of several families.13

It is not only documents which have come to light from Panopolis. Professor E. G. Turner has made a strong case for Panopolitan origin of the Bodmer codex containing Menander’s Aspis, Dyscolus, and Samia, and he points to evidence which, though ambiguous, at least suggests a similar provenance for the Comedia Florentina (PSI II 126) of Menander.14 The roll of Hyperides’ in Athenogenem, as well as fragments from Demosthenes, Euripides’ Rhesus, Hesiod, the Anthologia Palatina, and the Acta Alexandrinorum, are also said to come from Panopolis.15

9 The petition in its original form appears on P.Köl n inv. 4533, a papyrus which also contains one attempted revision; the other revisions are to be found in P.Köl n inv. 4532 verso + P.Duke inv. G 19 verso, and P.Duke inv. G 18 recto and verso. The contract involving Faustinus is preserved in P.Köl n inv. 4532 recto + P.Duke inv. G 19 recto. Passages from these papyri will be quoted in the course of this paper.
13 Hagedorn (above, n. 10) 208.
15 Ibid. 51–52.
As I indicated above, much of this new material from Panopolis is from the early Byzantine period, and much of it appears in archives. In other words, it was found intact, perhaps carefully buried, and not scattered piecemeal—as are so many of our papyrus finds—over a rubbish dump.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that Panopolis is not the only site in Upper Egypt which has yielded archival material. Across the Nile lies the White Monastery, established in the middle of the fourth century by the monk Pkio1, and raised to a position of national importance by his celebrated successor, Shenoute. The library of this monastery was destined to become the largest single source of Coptic manuscripts. And, not far from Panopolis is situated the modern town of Nag Hammadi, near which the well-known Coptic Gnostic library came to light in the late 40's.

This brief survey of other archives and libraries from Panopolis and its surroundings serves to demonstrate that the papers of Ammon and his family are by no means unique finds. Their preservation as an intact group finds numerous parallels from the same time and locality.

In one respect, however, this new collection of texts is unique: it contains information which carries us far beyond Panopolis and even beyond Egypt. And, though documentary in content, the papers of Ammon give us a view of the literary activity of the Empire in the early Byzantine period.

I mentioned above the attempts on Ammon's part to revise his petition. These are scribbled on many of the papyri of his archive, but the most extensive revision appears on the verso and part of the recto of the sheet containing the original version of the petition. Unfortunately, the papyrus is badly damaged and has suffered extensive abrasion, and many of the details of the text remain obscure. But one passage is reasonably well preserved, and it is on this section that I should like to concentrate.

Harpocratian, according to Ammon's account, leaves his slaves in Alexandria and prepares to travel abroad. His journey Ammon describes in some detail, and I here quote his words in full (P. Köln inv. 4533v 23–27):

\[ \ldots \ \varepsilon \nu \ \gamma \pi \tau \mu \ \vartheta \ \alpha \pi \delta \varphi \xi \mu \iota \ \alpha \varsigma \epsilon \tau \mu \iota \varsigma \nu \varsigma \ \varsigma \chi \iota \mu \upomicron \sigma \varsigma \varsigma \ \kappa \alpha \iota \ \alpha \rho \omicron \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \ \iota \delta \varphi \varsigma \nu \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma \varsigma 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[text content]
which Constans defeated and put to death his rival Constantine II at Aquileia, then it is probable that Harpocration’s eulogies referred to Constans and Constantius as the sole successors to Constantine the Great. It would have been unwise to do otherwise, and, as a parallel, we can adduce Libanius’ Oration 59, βασιλικὸς εἰς Κωνστάντιον καὶ Κωνστάντα. Throughout this speech, only the Emperors mentioned in the title appear as the heirs of Constantine I.24

The reference to τὰς νίκας may not have been intended to be taken seriously; it would be difficult to compose a panegyric without mentioning some victories, however trivial and unimportant. But if Harpocration touched upon substantial military accomplishments in his laudatory speeches, we may see in τὰς νίκας an allusion to the countless battles which the Imperial House waged with the Persians, in a continuation of the war inherited from Constantine the Great.25 If Harpocration’s tour of the Mediterranean world took place after 340, he certainly would have enthusiastically praised Constans’ total victory over Constantine II in that year. Unfortunately, our sources for the period in question are neither numerous nor detailed, but they inform us of Constans’ defeat of the Franci in 342. Harpocration may have had occasion to insert a reference to that defeat in his panegyrics. The summer of 348 saw the important, though indecisive, battle between the Romans and the Persians at Singara, and in his Oration 59, Libanius fulsomely praises the alleged victory of Constantius.26 Ammon’s petition was not drawn up until December of 348, and therefore τὰς νίκας could have included the battle of Singara as well.

Ammon is not overly interested in giving a detailed catalogue of his brother’s activities, and consequently his report contributes little to our knowledge of the political and military history of the period. What he does say is, nonetheless, of considerable importance and interest for the history of ancient literature. His remarks show clearly that Harpocration belonged to a class of literati to whom, until recently, the scholarly world has paid little attention. In the early Byzantine period, Egypt became highly influential in the areas of poetry and other forms of literature, and it produced numerous men of letters. Claudian and Nonnus at once come to mind as well-known poets whose native country was Egypt, but whose influence extended far beyond. These men are not

24 See the remarks of H. F. Clinton, Fasti Romani (Oxford, 1845) I 415.
25 For the wars and battles recorded in this paragraph, see Clinton (preceding note) I 396–414.
26 For the date of the battle, see R. Foerster, Libanii opera IV (Leipzig, 1908) 201 n. 2.
isolated exceptions; they belong to a large group of Egyptian writers whom Alan Cameron has rescued from oblivion in his highly successful article, “Wandering Poets: A Literary Movement in Byzantine Egypt,” *Historia* 14 (1965) 470–509. Like Harpocration, most of these men, though born in Egypt, spent much time in travelling from one city of the Roman Empire to another, delivering panegyrics on the Imperial House and on influential men in the State. If successful, these panegyrists often secured the benefits of high public office.

Ammon came from Panopolis, and it is likely that this is also the *origo* of his brother Harpocration. The city was a center of Hellenic culture during this period, and it produced such literary figures as Cyrus, Nonnus, Pamprepius and Triphiodorus. From the neighborhood of Panopolis we have other writers: Andronicus of Hermopolis, Christodorus of Coptos, Horapollon of Phenebith (a village in the Panopolite nome), and Olympiodorus of Thebes.

Being a center of Hellenic culture, Panopolis was also the focal point of pagan intellectual reaction against Christianity. This reaction was doubtless intensified by the proximity of the White Monastery. The Coptic *Life of Pachomius* gives an account of debates between Panopolitan philosophers and Christian exeges from the surrounding territory, and it provides eloquent testimony of the tension naturally arising from the immediate contiguity of Pagan and Christian. Ammon and Harpocration were both doubtless pagans, as were most of the intelligentsia of Panopolis, including, in all probability, Nonnus and Triphiodorus. We need feel no surprise that pagans should compose eulogies on behalf of Emperors who, since Constantine the Great, had been ardent Christians. We have similar effusive compositions by Libanius and Themistius—two of the staunchest defenders of paganism of their time. Nor should we forget that Julian, when Caesar, wrote two encomia on Constantius II.

In line 5 of the petition which I presented at the beginning of this paper, Ammon numbers amongst his friends the otherwise-unattested poet Apollo, and in one of his revisions of this petition, Ammon adds that Apollo was his nephew, known for his rhetorical skill by the catholicus in Alexandria: φίλους γὰρ ἀξιώσας μεταξὺ γενέσθαι Πάνασκον τὸν ἀπὸ δικ[αίους] καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα τὸν [ποιη]τὴν τὸν ἀδελφοῦν τὸν ἐμὸν ὑπὸ καὶ ἡ σῆ, ὁ δὲσποτα, περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄρε[τή]..., “for, thinking it right that friends should be present, namely Panicus from the office of the juridicus, and Apollo the

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27 Cameron’s presentation serves as a point d’appui for the following discussion.
28 See L. Th. Lefort, *S. Pachomii vita bohairice scripta*, CSCO Copt. ser. 3.7 (1925) 52–54.
29 See Cameron 476.
30 See above, n. 1.
poet, my nephew, whom your skill in rhetoric, my lord . . .” 31 Earlier on
in the same text, Ammon tries to secure the good will of the catholicus by
emphasizing that it was only under duress that he had had recourse to
litigation; in normal circumstances, he would have preferred the quiet life
of a scholar: ἥσυχιαν τοῖς ἅπαντια τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ λόγοις ἀντιμείνους
πρέσεως καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστάματος (ευς), “since I myself know that a quiet life free
from intrigue befits those educated in philosophy and rhetoric.” 32 Clearly,
Harpocration was not the only writer from the family: Ammon’s nephew
was known for his skill in poetry by the catholicus, and Ammon, as one
would expect from a scholasticus, 33 does not hesitate to include himself
in the class of persons “educated in philosophy and rhetoric.”

In Ammon’s account of his brother’s travels, we learn that the latter
visited Rome. Perhaps, like Claudian of Alexandria, Harpocration com-
posed and delivered panegyrics in Latin. Cameron suggests that Eusebius,
another Egyptian residing in Rome at the same period, may have written
laudatory speeches in Latin. 34 Where literary evidence is lacking we
cannot of course be certain. But after Diocletian’s reforms, the study of
Latin increased greatly in Egypt and in the other Eastern provinces of
the Empire; 35 therefore nothing excludes the possibility that Harpo-
cration was sufficiently familiar with Latin to be able to draft eulogies
both in that language as well as in Greek.

As I noted above, panegyristst at this period were often successful at
obtaining the rewards of high public office. If we limit ourselves to men
of letters from Panopolis, we have the example of the poet Cyrus, who,
through his literary talents, insinuated himself into the good graces of
the empress-poet Eudocia and thereby secured posts of distinction: “the
city prefecture in 435 and again in 439, when he was praetorian prefect
as well (the first man ever to hold both offices simultaneously), and
eventually the consulship in 441”. 36 We should also note that Pampr-
pius had sufficient rhetorical skill to be successful at flattering the military
dictator Illus; as a result, in 479 he reached the position of quaestor of
the Sacred Palace and became honorary consul. 37

31 The verb, of which ἴμ . . . ἄρτης is the subject, has been lost in the following lacuna:
e.g. περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσας. The quote comes from P.Köln inv. 4533 r 56–57.
32 P.Köln inv. 4533 v 9–10. For the phrase τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ λόγοις ἀντιμείνους, cf.
A. D. Nock, Sallustius (Cambridge, 1926) xxvi.
33 See above, n. 6.
34 Cameron 496; the Eusebius in question is mentioned by Eunapius, Vit. Soph. 493
(Cameron 486 n. 92).
35 Cameron 494–496; cf. also H. Zilliacus, Zum Kampf der Weltsprachen im Ostrimischen
Reich (Helsingfors, 1935) 126–129.
36 Cameron 498. 37 Ibid. 499.
Harpocration, however, does not appear to have been so fortunate. If the words ἐπίτρ(οπεῦν) καὶ λογισ(τεῦν) are correctly resolved in line 26 of the draft petition quoted above, we see that, in the course of his so-journ abroad, Harpocration held reasonably high public offices: he became a procurator (ἐπίτροπος)—probably a financial official, not an imperial procurator—and he discharged the duties of the curator civilis (λογιστής), also involved in the financial administration. But the beginning of line 26 can no longer be read, and we thus lack the connecting link between Harpocration’s career as panegyrist and his tenure as public official. All we have is the vague [γ]δρ, and that not securely read: hardly enough to justify the assumption that, in this case, eulogies led to high position in the government. Furthermore, nothing indicates that the offices in question were honorary; on the contrary, at this period they seem to have been liturgies, burdensome duties to be avoided. All we can safely say is that Harpocration delivered panegyrics, and that he held fairly high civil positions. If these two activities have any internal cohesiveness, it is lost irrevocably in the beginning of line 26.

There is a strong temptation to identify our Harpocration with his namesake whom Libanius mentions several times in his correspondence. This Harpocration is also an Egyptian rhetorician and poet, and he is known to have resided for a time in Constantinople, where he taught. But alas, the identification cannot be sustained. The Harpocration appearing in Libanius was still alive in 358 to 363, the period when the correspondence was written, but, unless Ammon was seriously mistaken or was guilty of lying, his brother died sometime before 9 December 348, the date of the original version of the petition. This is a matter of some importance, and it deserves close attention. It is true that Ammon makes no mention of Harpocration’s demise in that text, but in another document

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38 The words ἐπίτροπος and ἐπίτροπεῦω designate the various types of procurator, while λογιστής and λογιστεῦω refer to the office of the curator civilis; see Mason (above, n. 1) s. v. Lallemand (above, n. 2) 90–92 discusses ἐπίτροπος with fiscal duties; for her treatment of the curator civilis, see 107–114. For the juxtaposition ἐπίτρ(οπεῦν) καὶ λογισ(τεῦν), cf. Cod. Theod. 12.1.20: nullus decurionum ad procurationes vel curas civitatum accedat nisi omnibus muneribus satisfecerit patriae . . .

39 For the curator civilis as a liturgist, see Lallemand (above, n. 2) 113 and n. 3. The juxtaposition of procuraciones and curas civitatum in Cod. Theod. 12.1.20 (preceding note) suggests that the position of procurator was also a liturgy. For the process of filling public offices at this period, see especially A. K. Bowman, The Town Councils of Roman Egypt, Am. Stud. Pap. XI (Toronto, 1971) passim.

40 Epistulae 364, 368, 818; see A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, J. Morris, The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire I (Cambridge, 1971) 408. Epp. 816 and 817 may also allude to the same person; cf. O. Seecck, RE VII 2 Col. 2410.
from the same archive, Ammon refers to an attempt on the part of Eugenius to seize Harpocration’s slaves, “on the grounds that they are now without a master and he has died without heirs” (ὡς ὁντα νῦν ἀδέσποτα καὶ ὃς μὴ ἐπὶ κληρονόμοις ἐκεῖν[ο]υ τελευτήσαντος). This statement is ambiguous; the use of ὡς may imply that we are dealing with a mere allegation; for all we know to the contrary, Harpocration could still be alive, and Eugenius is lying. This was the extent of our knowledge as long as we had only the Cologne papyri. The end of this text has recently surfaced in the collection of Duke University, and we now have strong evidence that Harpocration has in fact died. After the passage quoted above, the papyrus continues as follows:

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ἐντέλλαμα

οἶν οὐ τὸν κύριόν μου τὸν δ[ι]ασήματον ἑπαρχὸν τῆς
Ἀγάπτου Φλάνουν Νεστόρ[ιο]ν περὶ τοῦτοῦ διδάχει ὡς ἀδελφός
ὑ[πάρχει] τοῦ ἀπελθόντος ἐκ[ε]ί[νος Ἀρσικρατίων ὀμοπάτρι-]
ός τε καὶ ἀμοιβήριος, νόμιμος ἐκείνον κληρονόμος, ”Αμμων
τοῦ νομα.
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“Accordingly, I enjoin you to inform my lord, the most illustrious prefect of Egypt, Flavius Nestorius, to the effect that there exists a brother on both the father’s and the mother’s side of the departed Harpocration, his legal heir, Ammon by name.”

The participle ἀπελθόντος in this passage is perhaps as ambiguous as the English “depart”, but Ammon would hardly emphasize the fact that he is Harpocration’s legal heir, unless the latter were deceased. Therefore, however disappointing it may be to do so, we must abandon the attempt to connect Ammon’s brother with the Harpocration in Libanius. The name, which evokes the god Horus, is of course extremely common in Egypt, and we have no evidence to permit an identification with any of the numerous other Harpocrations known to us.

Our panegyrist from Panopolis cannot be further identified, and many problems concerning him, his brother Ammon, and the villain of the story, Eugenius, will probably never be solved. But despite all the obscurity and uncertainty, one fact emerges with clarity: we see that Harpocration is one of the typical literary figures of his time; an Egyptian writer, “wandering from city to city throughout the Empire in search of fame and fortune”, he affords us a unique opportunity of catching a glimpse, through first-hand documentation, of an important literary movement

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41 P.Koln inv. 4532 r 12-13.
43 For a list of other Harpocrations, see RE VII 2 Cols. 2411-2417.
44 Cameron 471.
of the Late Roman Empire. Scholars have often complained of the irrelevance of the vast majority of papyrus documents to the study of the Classics. These texts from the Cologne and Duke collections stand out as conspicuous exceptions: they allow us to bridge the gap between literary history and documentary papyrology.

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Euclio, Cnemon, and the Peripatos

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I. Euclio and the Peripatos

In Plautus’ *Aulularia* II.4, Megadorus’ slave Pythodicus (see Appendix I) presents a catalogue of typical incidents from daily life in order to describe, *more Theophrasteo*, the character of a super-miser, the *senex Euclio*. These incidents are supposed to prove Pythodicus’ conclusion, put at the head of the catalogue (v. 297): “It is easier to squeeze water out of a pumice stone than money out of that old skin-flint” (*pumex non aequae est ardus atque hic est senex*).

The beginning of the catalogue is lost; the rest (lines 300–320) consists of the following eight motifs (a through h):

300  *Pythodicus*. Quin divom atque hominum clamat continuo fidem,
     De suo tigillo fumus si qua exit foras (a).
     Quin, cum it dormitum, follem obstringit ob gulum.
  *Anthrax.* Cur?
  *Pyth.* Ne quid animae forte amittat dormiens (b).
  *Anth.* Etiamne obturat inferiorem gutturem,

305  *Pyth.* ne quid animae forte amittat dormiens (c)?
  *Anth.* Haec mihi te ut tibi med aequum est, credo, credere.
  *Pyth.* At scin etiam quomodo?
  *Anth.* Censen talentum magnum exorari pote

310  *Pyth.* Aquam hercle plorat, cum lavat, profundere (d).
  *Anth.* Ab istoc sene, ut det qui fiamus liberi (e)?
  *Pyth.* Famem hercle utendam si roges, numquam dabit (f).
  *Anth.* Quin ipsi pridem tonsor unguis dempserat:
  *Collegit,omnia abstulit praesegmina (g).*

315  *Pyth.* Edepol mortalem parce parcum praedicas.
  *Anth.* Censen vero adeo esse parcum et miserum vivere?

320  *Pyth.* Pulmentum pridem † ei eripuit † milvus.
     Homo ad praetorem plurabundus devenit:
     Infic ibi postulare plorans, eiulans,
     Ut sibi liceret milvum vadari (h).
  *Anth.* Sescenta sunt quae memorem, si sit otium.
(1) Scholars who have paid special attention to this passage, notably Günther Jachmann,\(^1\) Friedrich Klingner,\(^2\) Erich Burck,\(^3\) Walther Ludwig,\(^4\) Hans Dohm,\(^5\) Giuseppe Torresin,\(^6\) have failed to point out that motifs \((b)\) and \((g)\) simply do not do the job: they do not fit into the image of a miser but belong to the character of a Deisidaimon.

Motif \((b)\). It is a superstitious man, not a miser, who puts a bag over his mouth when he goes to bed, in order to prevent his living breath or soul from leaving the body during the night. When Gunthram, king of the Franks, once fell asleep, his soul left the body in the shape of a small reptile coming out of his mouth, according to Paulus Diaconus \((\text{Hist. Langob. III.34}).^7\)

Motif \((g)\). Again it is a superstitious man, not a miser, who carefully collects the parings of his nails in the barber shop and takes them home \(\text{(to burn them or to bury them)}\). They are part of a man’s body and must not come into the possession of his potential enemy. Pythagorean \textit{symbola} prescribe: ‘\(\text{Απονυχίσμασι καὶ κουραίς μη ἐπουρεύειν μηδὲ ἐφίστασθαι} (\text{DioG. Laërt. VIII.17}); ‘\(\text{Αποκαρμάτων σῶν καὶ ἀπονυχισμάτων κατάπτυε}. \text{Παρὰ θυαία μὴ ὁνυχίζου} (\text{Jamblichus, Protept. 21, λβ’ and κζ’}).\) Throwing away nail trimmings is a tabu among many peoples.\(^8\) Giving your nail clippings to the devil means making a treaty with him.\(^9\) From thrown-away nail parings small devils make little caps for themselves,\(^10\) or the devil king makes his chair out of them.\(^11\) It is dangerous to cut finger nails on Friday and Sunday \(\text{(at least in the United States:)}\) it brings bad luck, or “\text{der Teufel sammelt alle Abfälle, und hat er davon einen Sack voll ...”}^12\)

(2) In 1878 J. L. Ussing\(^13\) found a probable source of Plautus’ motif \((a)\): “\text{Miser starts calling heaven and earth to witness \(\text{(that he is bankrupt)}, \text{the moment some smoke goes out of his chimney}”}\); he referred

\(^1\) \textit{Plautinisches und Attisches} \(\text{(Problemata, 3, Berlin, 1931 = Studia Philologica, 11, Rome, 1966), 130 ff.}\)


\(^3\) "\text{Zur Aulularia des Plautus (Vs. 280–370)}," \textit{Wiener Studien} 69 (1956), 265 ff.


\(^5\) \textit{Magieiros, Die Rolle des Kochs in der griechisch-römischen Komödie} \(\text{(Zetemata, 32, Munich, 1964)}, 243–259.\)


\(^8\) Stith Thompson, \textit{Motif-Index of Folk-Literature}, C726.1.

\(^9\) Bächtold-Stäubli, II, 1503 ff.

\(^10\) Thompson, G303.25.5.1.

\(^11\) G303.25.5.

\(^12\) B.-S., II, 1500.

\(^13\) \textit{Plauti comœdiae} \(\text{(Copenhagen, 1878), II, p. 587 (Addenda).}\)
to the rhetor Choricius 32.73 (p. 360 Foerster and Richtsteig): ἦ καὶ τῶν Μενάνδρων πεποιημένων προσώπων Μοσχίων μὲν ἡμᾶς παρεσκευάζει παρθένους βαίζεσθαι, Χαρέστρατος δὲ παιδρίας ἔρων, Κυνήμων δὲ δυσκόλως ἐποίησαν εἶναι, Σμυκρών ἐς φιλαργύρους, ὁ δεδώς μὴ τι τῶν ἐνδον ὁ καπνὸς οἶχοιτο φέρων. To be sure, there is a difference between Menander and Plautus here (pointed out already by Ussing: “Quamquam similia haec potius quam eadem sunt”). The miser Smireres hates smoke because he fears that smoke, like a thief, may take away with it some of his house property, while the miser Euclio cries for the smoke being wasted (cf. motif d: “Crying for the water being thrown away after taking a bath”). Nevertheless, the similarity is so close that a single motif about smoke going out of the miser’s chimney may be assumed, and the difference explained by Plautus’ usual simplification.14

(3) While motif (a) is commonly assumed to belong to the Greek original of the Aulularia (Jachmann 128; Klingner 158 f.; Burck 270; Ludwig 253 f.), motifs (c), (e), and (h) are considered as Plautine expansion.

Motif (e). P. Langen15 pointed out that the cooks Anthrax and Congrio are not slaves but free men hired by Megadorus to cook (cf. Aul. 448 Congrio: Nummo sum conductus. 457 f. Coctum ego, non vapulatum, dudum conductus fui./ Euclio: Lege agito mecum, “Very well, take me to court”). Accordingly, lines 309 f. (Censen talentum magnum exorari pote/ Ab istoc sene, ut det qui famus liberi?) stand in absolute contradiction with this fact and must be considered as a Plautine addition.

Motif (c) also seems to be a facile Plautine expansion of motif (b), devised to increase the comic effect (sales Plautinae), as August Krieger once pointed out.16 One immediately recalls the dilemma of Claudius’ soul: which way to leave the body, through superiorem or through inferiorem gutturem (Apocoloc. 3.1: Claudius animam agere coepit nec invenire exitum poterat; 4.3: cum maiorem sonitum emisisset illa parte, qua facilius loquebatur).

As for motif (h), “taking a stealing kite to court,” Krieger thought it may well be a Plautine joke, as did Jachmann (57 n. 1; 130), Klingner 165, Dohm 151, and others. But this is not necessarily the case. Plautus may well have replaced a word like ἱππαξ by his familiar word milvus (cf. Menaechmi 212; Poenulus 1292; Pseudolus 851 f.), taking over the rest of the Greek motif. If Euclio is able to believe that the cooks would make a deal with the house cock (Aul. 470 f.: Credo edepol ego illi mercedem gallo pollicitos coquos,/ Si id palam fecisset), or that one can tell compliments

15 Plautinische Studien (Berliner Studien, V.1, Berlin, 1886), 108.
16 De Aululariae Plautinae exemplari Graeco (Diss. Giessen, 1914), 24 n. 2.
to a raven (671 f.: ut ego illic aliquid boni/Dictam), he may just as well be willing to sue a stealing bird of prey. In short, this fabulistic personification of birds may well go back to the Greek original of the play.

(4) One may now ask: who had introduced the inappropriate Deisidamon-motifs (b) and (g) into the catalogue describing a miser: Menander or Plautus? My answer is: Plautus, who took t...cm from another Greek play (e.g., from Menander’s Δεισιδαίμων).

(5) Euclio is a combination of two characters: (a) Miser (φιλάργυρος) and (b) Mistrustful man (ἄπιστος).\(^{17}\) As a φιλάργυρος Euclio shows the Aristotelian “deficiency in giving money” (Ἑλέως τῆς δόνεως, EN Δ1, p. 1121 b 18), but not an “excess in taking money” (ὑπερβολὴ τῆς λήψεως). Hence he is not an αἰσχροκερδής, a kind of Skylock or Harpagon, sordidly greedy of gain, but only a φειδωλός, γλίσχρος, κύριβεξ, κυμνοπρίστης (EN, p. 1121 b 22 and 27), a miser, niggardly, stingy, close-fisted, skin-flint, cheese-parer, etc. In short, Euclio combines the traits of Theophrastus’ Characters, X: Μικρολόγος,\(^{18}\) and XXII: Ἀνελεύθερος, with those of Characters, XVIII: ἄπιστος (the characters XXX: Αἰσχροκερδής, and XVI: Δεισιδαίμων, being excluded).\(^{19}\)

(6) There was a time when scholars (partly misled by the fact that Euclio is not an αἰσχροκερδής) denied to him even the trait of a miser, taking him only for an ἄπιστος: Euclio becomes a mistrustful man only after the discovery of the pot of gold. This trend started in 1873 with

\(^{17}\) I do not find convincing either the attempt by Ludwig 253 f. to see the original of the Aulularia in a play of Menander called Φιλάργυρος (no such play is known), or that by T. B. L. Webster (Studies in Menander, Manchester U.P., 1950; 2nd ed. 1960, p. 121) and by Konrad Gaiser (Wiener Studien 79, 1966, 191–194) to see such an original in Menander’s ἄπιστος (Fr. 58 Körete–Thierfelder; Nos. 104 and perhaps 240 Austin).

\(^{18}\) To judge by the testimony of Choricius 32.73, the name of Euclio in the Greek play was Smicrines, evidently linked with σμικρόλογος (cf. Schol. in Ὀδύσσεια VII.225: κομιδὴ γὰρ σμικρόλογος φαίνεται...), ὁς παρὰ Μενανθέρῳ Σμικρίνης ἐν Ἐπιτρέπουσιν.

Note also as a paradigm of greed both Smicrines in the Aspis (cf. vv. 123; 149; 351 Austin) and possibly Smicrines in the Sicyonius (cf. vv. 156 and 162–166 Kassel). I would side (though with great reserve) with W. Thomas MacCary (“Menander’s Old Men,” TAP.1 102, 1971, 306–313) against A. W. Gomme and F. H. Sandbach (Menander: A Commentary, Oxford, 1973, 648): “it would indeed seem an unsuitable trait [sc. being close-fisted] in the man who will be discovered to be the hero’s long-lost father.” Gomme–Sandbach then suggest Smicrion or Smicrias for Smicrines.

Finally, see Julian, The Caesars 311 A (where Vespasian is called ὁ σμικρίνης οὗτος); Themistius Orat. 34.17, and R. A. Pack, Class. Philol. 30 (1935), 151.

\(^{19}\) Alciphron (IV.19.6: ἰδεὶν Μένανθον καὶ ἄπιστον φιλαργύρων καὶ ἤρων καὶ δεισιδάιμόνων καὶ ἄπιστων) is speaking of four different characters.
W. Klingelhöffer (Progr. Gymn. Darmstadt, p. 8 f.) and is best represented by the following scholars: Wilamowitz (1899), 20 M. Bonnet, 21 Fr. Leo, 22 A. Krieger (o.c., 86 f.), and more recently by T. B. L. Webster (o.c., 121), W. Beare ("Euclio... is perhaps at bottom just a poor old fellow, crazed by the sudden acquisition of wealth; he is not a Shylock or a Harpagon..."). 23 G. E. Duckworth ("Euclio is a poor man who has carried thrift to the point of meanness... But Euclio is not really a miser... ") 24 K. Abel, 25 and others. Accordingly, the passage under consideration (Aul. 288–320) was interpreted as a Plautine addition taken from another play (Bonnet, Leo), and as a "comic exaggeration" without functional significance in the play (Ph. E. Legrand, 26 P. J. Enk, 27 Duckworth, o.c., 143).

Enk (o.c., 281–290) was right in establishing the traits of a μικρολόγος or ϕείδωλος (parce parcus) for Euclio, but he failed to realize that a μικρολόγος too belongs to the Aristotelian class of φιλοχρήσιμος or ἀνελευθέρος, i.e. φιλάργυρος or miser (EN, p. 1121 b 15 ff.; EE, p. 1232 a 10 ff.), and that both epithets of Euclio, avidus (Aul. 9) and aridus (297) belong to the type of a senex miser (cf. Terence Heaut. 526: Sed habeat patrem quendam avidum, miserum atque aridum; Plautus Persa 266 f.: Nam id demum lepidumst, triparcos homines, vetulos, avidos, ardos/Bene admordere). 28

(7) It is the merit of Jachmann, Klingner, Burck and Ludwig to have reached the following conclusions: (a) Aulularia 288–320, describing Euclio as a miser, is an integral part of the play, and not a comic addition. According to Klingner (165 ff.), Aul. II.4 (280–349) makes one dramatic unity, in which the smarter cook Anthrax gets the richer kitchen (that of Megadorus), while the obedient cook Congrio must go into the empty kitchen of the miser Euclio (Burck then extended this dramatic unity to II.4–6: 280–370). In addition, line 335 (Huccine detrusti me ad semn parciissim) presupposes line 297 of the passage under consideration (Jachmann).

(b) Euclio is indeed a hopeless, inborn, hereditary miser. His grandfather was so greedy that he chose to die without revealing the existence

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20 Newe Jahrh. 3 (1899), 517 ff. (= Kleine Schriften, 1, 229 ff.); Menander, Das Schiedsgericht (Epitrepones), Berlin, 1925, 135 f.
22 Geschichte der röm. Lit. (1, Berlin, 1913), 119 and n. 3.
26 Davos (Lyons-Paris, 1910), 219.
27 Mnemosyne, Tertia series, 3 (1935), 290.
28 Referred to by Burck 270.
of the hoard of gold to his only son, thereby leaving him in poverty 
\textit{(Aul. 9–12)}:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Is quoniam moritur (ita avido ingenio fuit),
  \item Numquam indicare id filio voluit suo,
  \item Inopemque optavit potius eum reliinquere
\end{itemize}

Quam eum thesaurum commonstraret filio.

And Euclio is a man of the same mould: pariter moratus, ut pater avusque 
huus fuit (22). Although he possesses a four-pound pot full of gold (809: 
quadrilibri aulam, auro onustam), he pretends to be a \textit{homo pauperum 
pauperem} (227) and refuses to give a dowry to his only daughter: Meam 
pauperciam conqueror./ Virginem habeo grandem, dote cassam atque 
incolabilem;/ Neque eam quo locare cuiquam (190–192); At nihil est 
dotis quod dem (238; 255 f.; 257 f.). In acting this way he is breaking a 
socially established law: a girl is expected to bring a dowry to her hus-
band, especially a poor girl who is going to be married to a man of higher 
social rank (as is Megadorus). Otherwise she may well be considered as 
a concubine, not as a wedded wife. Cf. \textit{Trinummus} 689–691:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Sed ut inops infamis ne sim, ne mi hanc famam differant,
  \item Me germanam meam sororem in concubinatum tibi,
  \item Si sine dote <dem>, deditae magi’ quam in matrimonium\textsuperscript{29}
\end{itemize}

This was well pointed out by both Abel 43 and Ludwig 48; 58.

\textbf{(8)} In short, to be an \textit{inborn miser} is Euclio’s very \textit{χαρακτήρ} (Menander 
Fr.66 K.-Th.), \textit{ingenium} (Terence \textit{Heaut. 384}; cf. \textit{Aul. 9:} ita avido ingenio 
fuit),\textsuperscript{30} or \textit{τρόπος}, and this inborn character he cannot change. Although 
we do not have the conclusion of the \textit{Aulularia}, we can be quite certain 
that at the end of the fifth act Euclio remains a miser. \textit{(a)} Euclio’s Greek 
brother, the old miser Smicines in Menander’s \textit{Aspis} 143–146, eventually 
“returns to his previous state” without changing his greedy character:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{μάτην δὲ πράγμαθ’ αὐτῷ καὶ πόνος}
  \item \text{πολλοὺς παρασχὼν γνωριμώτερόν τε τοῖς}
  \item \text{πᾶσιν ποήσας αὐτὸν οἶδ’ ἀνήρ}
  \item \text{ἐπάνειοιν ἐπὶ τάρχαια.}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{(b)} According to Aristotle, EN \textit{Δ} 1, p. 1121 b 12, miserliness is both 
\textit{incurable} and more innate in men (than prodigality). It is incurable 
because of the \textit{old age} and possible disability of a miser: ‘\text{Ἡ δὲ ἀνελευθερο}" 

\textsuperscript{29} Cf. G. F. Schoemann and G. F. Lipsius, \textit{Attisches Recht und Rechtsverfahren} (Leipzig, 
1905), 472, and W. Erdmann, \textit{Die Ehe im alten Griechenland} (Munich, 1934), 303; W. K. 

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Χαρακτήρ} = “die angeborene Eigenart . . . , die dem Menschen das individuelle 
Gepräge verleiht,” A. Körte, \textit{Hermes} 64 (1929), 79 and 85.
203

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καὶ ῥάδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν.

32 "Da geht ihm [Euclio] auf, es gibt doch noch-anderes in der Welt als arm und reich und ihren Gegensatz, vor allem gibt es die Liebe der Menschen untereinander als ihre schönste und tiefste Beziehung. Diese Erkenntnis drängt ihm mit erwärmender Kraft zum Herzen und löst die eisige Erstarrung, in die seine Seele gefallen war" (138).

33 "Wir dürfen vermuten, dass er [Euclio] sowohl durch den Schock des plötzlichen Verlustes als auch besonders durch die humane Rückgabe des Lyconides zu einer Einsicht gelangte, die ihn seinen Geiz überwinden liess: Gold ist ein Geschenk der Tyche, die es ebenso nehmen wie geben kann. Man soll es deshalb nicht nutzlos hüten, sondern auf edle Art verwenden und anderen davon mitteilen" (59 f.).

(9) As for the second characteristic of Euclio, the mistrustfulness (ἀμαρτία), it seems to be no more than an illness (a), and a curable one (b). (a) The ἀμαρτία as an illness of Euclio: Aul. 67 f. quid ego ero dicam meo/ Malae rei evenisse quamve insaniam; 71 Nescio pol quae illunc hominem intemperiae tenent; 105 Discrucior animi (Euclio); 642 Larvae hunc atque intemperiae insaniaeque agitant senem; 653 Insanis. (b) Euclio cured from his ἀμαρτία: Aul. Fr.IV Nec noctu nec diu quietus umquam eram: nunc dormiam.

We can only guess about the exact cause of Euclio’s cure and about what moved him to give the pot of gold (or at least one half of it) to Lyconides as the dowry of his daughter (Argumentum I.15: Laetusque natum conlocat Lyconidi. Arg. II.9: Ab eo [sc. Euclione] donatur auro, uxore et filio [sc. Lyconides]). The most natural reason seems to me to be the simple fact that Lyconides had returned the gold to Euclio. The latter was ready, at any rate, to give one half of the gold to Lyconides upon its return (767: I, refer: dimidiam tecum potius partem dividam). Since the recovery of the gold through Lyconides (Arg. II.8: illic Euclioni rem refert) and Phaedria’s betrothal to the latter coincide in time, the most likely assumption seems to be that Euclio now realizes his obligation to give a dowry to his daughter and, at the same time, to fulfil his promise to Lyconides (767) by rewarding him. And he acts accordingly. After all, God’s will had to be fulfilled (25–57: Eius [sc. filiae] honoris gratia/ Feci thesaurum ut hic reperiret Euclio,/ Quo illam facilius nuptum, si vellet, daret).

Jachmann’s explanation sounds too romantic to be appropriate to an inborn miser;32 Ludwig’s suggestion involving the goddess Tyche strikes me as too vague.33 The most we can say is that it was Lyconides’ honesty
which moved Euclio to give up the gold and thus get rid of the ἀπιστία which was tormenting him, in the same way in which Gorgias’ self-abnegation caused Cnemon’s partial change to the better in the Dyscolus (713–717 and 722–726). Whatever may have been its cause, Euclio’s change was only partial. His essential character of a miser remains unchanged, as both Ludwig and Gaiser had suggested.

II. Cnemon and the Peripatos

(1) Like Plautus’ Euclio, Menander’s Cnemon in the Dyscolus is a combination of two characters: (a) Misanthrope (cf. Dyso. 6 f.: Κυίμων, ἀπανθρωπός τις ἀνθρωπος σφόδρα, καὶ δυσκόλος πρὸς ἀπαντας), whose prototype is undoubtedly Timon (cf. Pherocrates’ Μονότροπος; Aristophanes Lysistrata 805 ff.; Antiphanes’ Timon and Miosopónt̂uros; Mnesimachus’ Δύσκολος; again Monótrōpos by Ophelion and Anaxilas, etc.), and (b) Αθάνατς, or better ‘Τηρήφανος (Görler 281).
Cnemon’s stubbornness and arrogance (cf. Theophrastus’ Characters XV and XXIV) are apparent in his disdain for everyone except himself (cf. Char. XXIV.1: “Εστι δὲ ἡ ὑπερήφανία καταφρονησίς τις πλὴν αὐτὸ τῶν ἀλλών) and in his conceit. Therefore he neither accepts a help when offered nor is he ready to give it. Görler rightly referred to Ariston of Ceos, p. 53.2 Wehrli (ap. Philodemus Peri kaiwv X, col. XIV.7 Jensen): ὃ γὰρ ὑπέρήφανος οὔτε συναρπαλητικὸς ἑτέρων, ὃμα μὲν ὑπ’ οἴησεως, ὃμα δὲ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖν....

(2) But Cnemon is not a miser. True, like the miser Euclio (Aul. 95–97; cf. Rudens 133–135 and Libanius Declam. 31.34), or a μικρολόγος (Theophr. Char. X.13) and an ἀπιστος (Char. XVIII.7), Cnemon will lend nothing from his household:

35 “Eine sparsame Grundhaltung braucht Euclio deshalb nicht zu verlieren” (60).
38 Bertram 64; Schmid 171 n. 47; Th. Williams, Untersuchungen zu Menander (Diss. Vienna, 1960, typescript, p. 119); P. Steinmetz, “Menander und Theophrast,” Rhein. Mus. 103 (1960), 185 f.
39 Cf. Aristotle, EN A 7, p. 1097 b 8: Τὸ δ’ ἀντίκες λέγωμεν οὐκ οὐτὸ μόνον, τῷ ξύνῳ βλαν μονάτην, ἅλλα καὶ γονέας καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναῖκι καὶ δοὺς τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐσειδὴ φόσει πολιτικῶν ὁ ἀνθρωπος.
But the reasons for the same behavior on the part of Euclio and Cnemon are different. Cnemon lends nothing from his household not because he is close-fisted or mistrustful, but because of his misanthropic philosophy: "Leave me alone." This was well pointed out by Görler 280 ("Nicht darüber ärger sich Knemon, dass er etwas von seinem Hausrat herausgeben soll, sondern darüber, dass er gestört wird, dass man an seine Tür klopft und ihn anspricht"), contra W. Schmid (168; 171 n. 47) and P. Steinmetz (186).

Moreover, Cnemon's daughter (195 f.) and her servant Getas (587 f.) are afraid that the old man may beat Simiche to death for losing the well-bucket (κάδος, 190; 576; 582; 626) and mattock (579; 582; 626). This does not mean, however, that Cnemon is a miser, but only a severe and strict householder (cf. 205 f.: the daughter will get a beating if the father catches her outside the house). The fact that such late authors like Alciphron (III.7.3) and Julian (Misopogen 349 C) call their dyscolus Smicrines, not Cnemon (Smicrines being linked with σμικρολόγος), proves nothing, as does not the fact that Lucian (Dial. mort. 8 = 18 MacLeod) calls his greedy will-hunter Cnemon, not Smicrines: theirs are late and free imitations of Menander.

Similarly, the fact that both Euclio (Aul. 385 f.) and Cnemon (Dysc. 449–451) limit their offerings to gods to some incense, meal cake or garlands does not make Cnemon a miser. For, again, their motives are different. The miser Euclio wants to save at all costs (cf. Aul. 371–384; Theophr. Char. X.12; Libanius Declam. 32.25 s.f.). But Cnemon desires to be a religious reformer: sacrifices are made to please only men, not gods; the latter are happy with a small offering:
Finally, Cnemon cannot be a miser: he categorically rejects any kind of gain (τὸ κερδαίνειν, 719 ff.).

(3) If Cnemon is not a miser, then Blake’s restoration of line 597 of the Dyscolus must be wrong (quite apart from its palaeographical improbability):  

595 Κνήμων. Δᾶνον καλεῖς ἀνόσι', ἀνηρκυια [με;] 
οὐ σοι λέγω; θᾶττον βαδίσ', εἰσο. [τάλας] 
ἐγὼ, τάλας τῆς ζή η μι ἂ τ σ τῆς νῦν [ἐγὼ], 
ὡς οὔδε ἐλις.

595 μὲ Ε. Α. Barber 596 τάλας R. P. Winnington-Ingram 597 ξημίας

Blake: ἐρημιασ Π  ἐγὼ2 Blake

“Good Lord! I’ve never seen such luck! The things I’ve lost today,” translates Blake (line 597). But Cnemon is not much concerned about material loss (bucket and mattock). What bothers him is the loss of his beloved isolation, ἐρημία. Cf. 169 (Cnemon): ἐρημίας οὐκ ἐστιν οὐδεμίου τυχεῖν; 222 and 694; Libanius Declam. 27.26 εἰ ἕδη καὶ κακόν, ὡς σὺ ϕης, ἡ ἐρημία... “Ἐρημία is a key word in relation to Knemon,” states Handley correctly.  

How then shall we read line 597? I suggest the following emendation:

[τάλας] 
ἐγὼ, τάλας, <νῦν> τῆς ἐρημίας {τῆς νῦν} [στερείς]
ὡς οὔδε ἐλις.

The transmitted τῆς νῦν is a dittography of the correct <νῦν> τῆς (νῦν could have been easily dropped, as in line 695 Eym. Genuin. = Fr.686a K.-Th.). II is full of similar transpositions (Sandbach’s text): 105 (φιλανθρωπίς τις);

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41 As for the part of Cnemon as a “social reformer,” cf. Dyscolus 743-745, in addition to the already cited passage 449-453. Compare also Megadorus’ “social philosophy” at Aulularia 478 ff.


The reading of Walther Kraus: 44 ἐγώ, τάλας τῆς ἐρημία οὗτος ἔως νῦν [ἐρώ] seems to me stylistically weak (οὗτος τῆς). On the other hand, scholars who read either τῆς νῦν ἐρημίας (G. P. Shipp; Hugh Lloyd-Jones, OCT 1960; F. H. Sandbach, OCT 1972) or ἐρημίας τῆς νῦν (Handley) have difficulty with explaining the meaning of the phrase ἔως νῦν ἐρημία, “the present isolation.” J. M. Jacques’ reading ([τάλας] ἐγώ, τάλας τῆς νῦν ἐρημίας [ἐρώ]) 45 and interpretation (“Knemon loves the isolation he now enjoys, opposing it in thought to the human contact that would arise if he were to ask Daos for help”) may make τῆς νῦν intelligible, but the words τάλας ἐγώ, τάλας are then unintelligible (contra Gomme–Sandbach 227). Finally, to assume that ἐρημία here would mean something different from “isolation” seems to me unlikely in view of the fact that ἐρημία is a “philosophical” key-word in the play (169; 222; 694): contra Stoessl 152 (the word should mean here “Verlassenheit, Hilflosigkeit”), and contra Gomme–Sandbach 226 f. (“... can it be that the present ἐρημία is the absence of his mattock?”).

(4) As an αὐθάδης or an ὀπερήφανος, Cnemon rejects any help coming from his fellow-citizens, while overestimating his own strength and despising the rest of the world (cf. Ariston of Ceos, above, II.1, and Theophrastus Char. XV.5): Dysc. 595; 599–601. For this character defect he will be punished by falling into the well and being almost drowned (626–628; 666–669; 695). His rejected stepson Gorgias and Sostratus, a complete stranger to him, will save his life (670 f.; 679–685; 722–726; 753).

Cnemon learned his lesson: τὰ κακὰ παιδεύειν μόνα| ἐπίστασθ' ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικε (699 f.; i.e. πάθει μάθοι). He is now cured of his antisocial αὐθάδεως:

> ἐν δ̣' ἱσως ἱμαρτον, ὡς τῶν ἀπάντων ὄμην
> αὐτὸς ἀυτάρκης τις εἶναι καὶ δεήσειθ' οὐδενὸς.

715 νῦν δ̣' ἱδον ὁμείαν ὡς ἄκοπον τὸ τοῦ βίου
> τῷ τελευτῆν, εἰρον οὐκ εὖ τοῦτο γυνώσκων τότε.
> δὲι γὰρ εἶναι—καὶ παρεῖναι—τὸν ἐπικουρήσομεν' ἀεί.

(713–717; cf. 692–694; 724 ff.; 747 and Görler 283).

(5) A second fault of Cnemon as an αὐθάδης consists in his stubborn refusal to take part in the all-night symposium in the shrine of Pan and the Nymphs: the first stage of the wedding celebrations for both his daughter

44 Menanders Dyskolos (Vienna, 1960), 51 and 100.
and his stepson (Dyso. 852–855; 867–870; 874–878; cf. Theophrastus Char. XV.10: καὶ οὕτως οὖτε ῥήμα τείχει οὔτε ὅρχυσαθα οὖτ εἴθελήσει). This impiety of Cnemon goes well with the ungodliness of an αὐθάδης, as Steinmetz 186 well pointed out. Compare Characters XV.11 (δεινὸς δὲ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς μὴ ἐπευχεσθαι) with Cnemon’s reluctance to greet even the god Pan (10–13).

Of this fault too Cnemon will have to be cured through suffering in the near future, as his old servant woman Simiche well puts it (875–878):

875 τάλας σὺ τοῦ τρόπου.
πρὸς τὸν θεόν σε βουλομένων [τούτων ἄγειν]
ἀντείτας. ἐσταὶ μέγα κακόν πάλιν [τὶ σοι,]
νῇ τῷ θεῷ, <καὶ> μεἶζον ἢ νῦν εὐ πά[νυ].

Cnemon will be brought to join the part by force: φέρετε. κρεῖττου/ ἵσως ὑπομένειν ἐστὶ τάκει (957 f.). This is the cure, as applied to Cnemon by the servant Getas and the cook Sicon. Cf. 885 (Getas): τοῦτον δὲ θεραπεύσω τέως ἐγώ; 902 f. τὸ δ’ ὅλον ἐστὶν ἤμιν/ ἀνθρωπος ἡμερωτέος (cf. 122 ἀνήμερον τι πράγμα τελέως); 932 f. (Sicon): οὐκ ἐὰς κομίζειεν/ εἰς ταῦτο τοῖς θύουσι σαυτοῦ πάντα ταύτ’ ἄνεξει; 945 (Getas): μαλακὸς ἀνήρ, and finally, triumphantly (958): κρατοῦ[μεν].

Another hint at Cnemon’s punishment for not accepting an established religious custom (this time the sacrifices: cf. above, II.2 and note 40) can be found in 639–641:

οὐ δίδως
640 λεβήτιον θύουσιν, ἱερόσυλε σὺ,
ἀλλὰ βοινεῖς

(the reference is to 447; 472–475; 505–508) and in 662–664:

οὗτω γίνεται
ἀλυπότατος γὰρ τάδε γείτων τῷ θεῷ
καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ θύουσιν.

(6) Euclio’s ἀπιστία was envisaged as an illness, a mental disturbance (Aul. 67 f.: quid ego ero dicam meo/ Malae rei evenisse quamve insaniam). In the same way, Cnemon’s ἀσθάδεια is regarded as a “possession by an evil spirit” (88 κακοδαμός τοῦ γών), a “mental disturbance” (89 μελαγχολῶν; cf. Schol. in Aristophanes Plutus 372 κακοδαμόνας: μαψη, and Gomme–Sandbach 149), or simply “sheer madness” (82 μαίνεθ’ ὁ διώκων, μαίνεται; 116 f. μαίνεμενον λέγεις/ τελέως γεωργῶν; 150 οὗχ ύγιαίνει μοι δοκεῖ, “he must be mad,” Handley 157; cf. Plato Lysis 205 a 7 οὗχ ύγιαίνει . . ., ἀλλὰ ληρεῖ
(7) Cnemon’s antisocial αὐθάδεια, αὐτάρκεια or ὑπερηφανία can be cured; his δυσκολία cannot, no more than can Euclio’s innate miserliness. I think that there can be little doubt about the fact that Cnemon remains an incurable δύσκολος.

(a) Cnemon’s stepson Gorgias states (250–252; the text is lacunose, but the sense is clear): There is not a chance for making him (Cnemon) change his wretched way of life, either by force or by good advice. For (253 f.):

... ἀλλ’ ἐμποδῶν τῷ μὲν βιώσασθαί τὸν νόμον ἔχει μεθ’ αὐτοῦ, τῷ δὲ πείσαι τὸν τ ρ ὀ π ὁ ν.

(b) At the beginning of his apologia pro vita sua Cnemon himself states (711–714):

... οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς δύναστο με τοῦτο μεταπέσαι τις ὑμών, ἀλλὰ συγχωρήσετε. ἐν δ’ ἵσως ἡμαρτόν, ὡστε τῶν ἁπάντων ῥώμην αὐτῶς αὐτάρκης τις εἶναι καὶ δεήσασθ’ οὔδενος.

“Not one of you could possibly make me change my mind, but you will have to let me have my way. Probably, in one thing only was I wrong: I thought that I alone was a self-sufficient individual, in no need of anybody’s help.”

(c) Finally, Cnemon concludes (735): ἀλλ’ ἐμὲ μὲν, ἀν ἔσως ἡμ. Ζυτζζς, ἔκεν ἑαθ’ ὡς βούλομαι, “let me live the way I want,” i.e. as a hard-hearted δύσκολος.

But we have proof that Cnemon does not change his basic behavior “leave me alone”: he will lend nothing from his household after his partial μεταβολή in 715–717, just as he did not lend anything before his “conversion.” In this respect his behavior in 917 (οὐδέν ἐστιν); 923; 924 f. and 930 remains the same as it was in 473–475; 481–485 and 505–508 (οὐκ ἔχω κτλ.).

Gomme and Sandbach are right in assuming that Cnemon does not change his basic character as δύσκολος. But I think they are wrong to deny a definite partial μεταβολή to Cnemon: cf. 713 ἡμαρτόν and 717 δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι —καὶ παρεῖναι—τὸν ἐπικουρήσωντ’ ἔσθ). After all, Cnemon was taught his lesson: τὰ κακὰ π α ἰ δ ἐ ὑ ἐ ὑ ὑ ὑ ὑ ὑ —ἐπίσταται ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἐοικε (699 f.).

and Sandbach, however, write: “But Menander does not say that he [Cnemon] was reformed, nor even suggest that he could be reformed. The old man’s last words regard the good fellowship of the party as something to be ‘put up with.’ He goes there under duress, and there is nothing to indicate that he will not fall back into his self-chosen spiritual isolation as soon as he can, just as he did after he had in the previous act accepted the necessity of material help from Gorgias. That help was not to involve co-operation. He handed over everything to his adopted son, farm and daughter, and asked only to be left in peace” (p. 268).

Consequently, the author of the hypothesis to the Dyscolus (wrongly attributed to Aristophanes of Byzantium) was wrong to conclude (v. 12) that Cnemon eventually had changed his character, “becoming sweet-tempered” (πράσις γενόμενος).

(8) We have seen (above, I.8) that Euclio could not change his ἡθικὸς χαρακτήρ of being a miser either because it was his inborn nature (Aul. 22) or because he was a senex, and, according to Aristotle, ἀνελευθερία άνιατός and δοκεῖ . . . τὸ γῆρας . . . ἀνελευθέρων ποιεῖν. What about Cnemon? Why could he not change his τρόπος of being a δύσκολος? I think the same Aristotelian theory holds good for him too. He could not change his character through additional education (252 οὔτ’ ἂν μεταπείσαι νουθετῶν; 254 τῷ δὲ πείσαι; 712 μεταπείσαια): he is too old for that; he is a γέρων (30; 123; 247; 530; 575; 628; 661; 747; 852; 966).

According to Theophrastus, a παιδεία leading to a right way of life is possible only in a man’s young age. In his old age, however, any change in life becomes difficult, even impossible. Steinmetz rightly refers to Theophrastus’ fragment Περὶ παιδείας (ap. Stobaeus II.31.124 = II, p. 240.18–25 Wachsmuth): Καὶ μὴν καὶ πολλῷ γ’ ἐπισφαλέστερα τῆς διαφέσεως ἡ ἐκτροπή τῷ μὴ τὴν ὀρθὰν βαδίζοντι καὶ γὰρ βλάβαι μεγάλαι καὶ ἡ ἀναστροφή χαλεπῆ, μάλλον δὲ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατος. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ χρόνος διδῶσιν ἐξουσίαν μεταθέσεως, οὔθ’ ἡ φύσις δύναται μεταμανθάνειν τὸ βέλτιον, ὅταν ἐντραφῇ τοῖς χείροισιν, ἀλλὰ προαιρεῖται μὲν καὶ ἐτέρα γε προκρίνει βελτίω, καταζῇ δ’ ὅμως ἐν τοῖς εἰσωθόσιν.48


(9) A. Schäfer\textsuperscript{49} believed that he had found another parallel between Theophrastus' fragment and Menander in “the taming of the human soul” (τῷ ἡμερῷ). Cf. Theophrastus Περὶ παιδείας, Π. p. 240.1–3 W.: Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ παιδεία, καὶ τούτῳ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι, ἡμερῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀφαρωδέα τὸ θηριώδες καὶ ἄγνωμον, οἷον καὶ τὰ ήθη κοινότερα καὶ διγράτερα γίνεται, and Dyssolus 902 f. τὸ δ’ ὀλὸν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν/ ἄνθρωπος ἡμερωτέος (Kassel: ημερωτέος Π).\textsuperscript{50} Gaiser 35 adopts Schäfer's suggestion.

I do not think, however, that the latter coincidence is conclusive, in view of the popularity, since Plato, of the verb ἡμερῶν, meaning “to tame, civilize, humanize.” Cf., e.g., Plato Law 11, 666 e 6 παιδεύει ψήχων τε καὶ ἡμερῶν; XI, 935 a 4 διὸν ὑπὸ παιδείας ἡμερόθη ποτέ, πάλιν ἐξαγριωτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ τοιοῦτον; Republic VII, 554 d 2 ὃν πειθῶν... ὃν ἡμερῶν λόγῳ; Law 11, 720 d 8; X, 890 c 8.

**Conclusion**

(I.1–9) Euclio's ᾿χαρακτήρ is that of a miser (μικρολόγος, ᾿ανελευθερός, though not ᾿αἰσχροκερδής). In addition, he shows characteristics of an ἀπιστος. The latter may have been envisaged, however, only as a mental disturbance. Now, through a personal accident (loss of his pot of gold) Euclio happens to be cured of the ἀπιστία (τὰ κακὰ παιδεύειν μόνα/ ἔπισταβ' ἡμᾶς, ὡς οὖν, Dyssolus 699 f.). His miserliness, however, remains incurable. Why? Either it is his inborn χαρακτήρ-ingenium (Αὐλ. 22), or because he is a γέρων, and, according to Aristotle, EN, p. 1121 b 12, ἡ δ’ ᾿ανελευθερία ἀνίατος and δοκεῖ... τὸ γήρας... ᾿ανελευθέρους ποιεῖν.

(Π.1–9) Similarly, Cnemon's τρόπος is that of a δύσκολος. In addition, he shows characteristics of an αὐθάδης, αὐτάρκης or ὑπερήφανος. These latter characteristics seem to be thought of, however, only as manifestations of a mental disturbance. Now, through a personal accident (falling into the well) and, in addition, by being subject to physical harassment, Cnemon happens to be cured of his antisocial ὑπερήφανια and αὐθάδεια. His basic δυσκολία, however, remains unchanged. Why? Probably because he is a γέρων, and, according to Theophrastus (Περὶ παιδείας), re-education in old age is almost impossible (ἤ ἀναστροφή χαλεπή, μᾶλλον δὲ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατος).

In believing that an old man cannot change his character, Menander

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\textsuperscript{49} Above, note 36, pp. 71–74.

\textsuperscript{50} Cf. Aelian Epist. rust. 15 (Καλλιπιδῆς Κρήμων) δεῖ δὲ σε ὄμως καὶ μὴ βουλήμενον ἢ μὲ ρ ο ν ἡμῶν γενεάθαι... σὺ δὲ καὶ ἐμπόω καὶ κοινωνίας σπονδάων ἐστὶ τι καὶ πραώτερος, and Menander, Sententiae 50 Jaekel: "Ἀπαντᾷ ἡ παιδεύονς ἡμέρους τελεί."
(and few people would doubt today Menandrean origin of the *Aulularia*) seems to have been influenced by the *Peripatos*. The Peripatetic influences upon Menander are *a priori* probable, but are difficult to pinpoint. Gaiser’s recent comprehensive study “Menander und der *Peripatos*” (with full bibliography),\(^{51}\) as opposed to A. Barigazzi’s somewhat over-optimistic approach,\(^{52}\) remains inconclusive in several points.\(^{53}\) The reinterpretation of the characters of Euclio and Cnemon, suggested in this article, may help to clarify matters.

**APPENDIX I: PYTHODICUS AND STROBILUS**

(1) Megadorus’ slave Strobilus I (mentioned in *Aulularia* 264; 334; 351; 354, and in the scene-inscriptions preceding lines 280; 327; 350) cannot be the same person as Lyconides’ slave Strobilus II (mentioned in lines 697; 804; [812 del. J. Brix], and in the scene-inscriptions preceding lines 608; 628; 661; 667; 701; 808, and possibly 587 as well). The existence of two slaves in the play was noticed for the first time in the *editio Aldina* (of 1522), where the former slave is called Strobilus, the latter (against the meter) *Strophilus*. In the modern era, G. G. S. Köpke seems to be the first scholar to realize the difference between both slaves (in the introduction to his German translation of the *Aulularia*, Berlin, 1809, p. 7).

The decisive proof for the two-slave theory is to be found in 603 f. (Strobilus II speaking):

Nam erus meus amat filiam huius Euclionis pauperis:
Eam ero nunc renuntiatum est nuptum huic Megadoro dari.

The speaker is standing in the middle of the stage. While pronouncing the words *huius Euclionis* he points with the finger to the door on the left side of the stage (as the audience sees it), and while pronouncing *huic Megadoro* he points to the door on the right. After reciting three more lines (605–607) he will sit down on the altar in stage center, in order to “spy” upon both houses (*et huc et illuc*).

From lines 603 f. it becomes clear: (a) That the person speaking cannot be a slave of Megadorus. He came to the stage from the right-wing entrance (not from the right door). He lives with his master Lyconides somewhere in Athens, and he clearly opposes *erus meus* to *hic Megadorus*. (b) That the person speaking cannot possibly be Strobilus I. For if

\(^{51}\) Antike und Abendland 13 (1967), 8–40.
\(^{52}\) La formazione spirituale di Menandro (Turin, 1965).
Strobilus I and Strobilus II were one and the same person, we would expect in 604 renuntiavi, not renuntiatum est.\(^{54}\) It is Strobilus I who is now arranging the wedding-banquet for his master Megadorus (280–362), and it is Strobilus II who claims to be a guardian angel of his young master Lyconides (597 servum ratem esse amanti ero aequum censeo).\(^{55}\) It is then highly unlikely that he would conceal from Lyconides the fact that his beloved girl was going to marry his own uncle; rather, he would be the first to tell him this important news, as Köpke, Wagner, G. Goetz,\(^{56}\) K. Dziatzko,\(^{57}\) A. Krieger,\(^{58}\) and others had pointed out.

Finally, I think that the phrasing eam ero nunc renuntiatum est nuptiam huic Megadore dari precludes the interpretation Megadorus ero nunc renuntiavit. Thus, it is not likely that Lyconides had heard the news from his uncle meeting him, e.g., in the agora.

Consequently, it is beside the point to refer to examples from Plautus, Terence and Menander of one single slave serving two masters, as do Davus in the Andria, Parmeno in the Eunuchus, Geta in the Phormio, Epidicus in the Epidicus, Parmeno in the Samia, Davus in the Periciromene: contra Dziatzko 262 f.; Krieger 28 and 123; Webster, Studies in Menander, 123.

(2) Now, the name of the slave Strobilus II fits his role. Στρόβιλος means "cyclone, whirlwind," and the thief Strobilus II has to be quicker than Euclio if he wants to snatch the pot of gold. Cf. 705 f.: Nam ut dudum hinc abii, multo illo adveni prior, / Multoque prius me conlocavi in arborem.\(^{59}\) Apparently, speed is also characteristic of Strobilus of the play in Adespota novae comediae, Fr.244 Austin\(^{60}\) (lines 86; 146; 355 f.). For in 348 f. we read: τρέχειν ὁ ὄλυμπιος/ ἐὰν διαφύγῃς ἀνθρώπος ἐλ. Cf. also Menander Samia 555 f. στρόβιλος ᾗ/ σκηπτός ἀνθρώπος τις ἐστι, "turbo aeris aut procella est homo" (Austin).\(^{61}\)


\(^{55}\) I keep lines 592–598 (against J. Brixt) but transpose them after 602, as did W. Wagner, De Plauti Aulularia (Diss. Bonn, 1864), 27–29, and J. L. Ussing, above, note 13, p. 340.


\(^{58}\) Above, note 16, pp. 25–41.

\(^{59}\) Similarly already Ussing, 273: "huic autem [sc. Lyconidis servo] turbinis nomen optime convenit propert volubilem agilatatem, qua Euclionem sequitur et evitat."

\(^{60}\) Comiconorum Graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta, ed. Colinus Austin (Berlin, 1973).

\(^{61}\) Cf. the name Dromo (Δρόμων) in Aulularia 398; Asinaria 441, and K. Schmidt, Hermes 37 (1902), 290 f.
Consequently, the name of Strobilus II should be considered as sound and kept in the text; contra Goetz (Acta Soc. Philol. Lips.); W. M. Lindsay (the OCT Plautus, 1904); K. Gatzert;62 W. Ludwig.63

(3) Therefore the name Strobilus I must go. As Goetz (in his edition of the Aulularia, Teubner, 1881, p. VIII f.) and Dziatzko 267 had suggested, the original name of Megadorus’ slave was Pythodicus (Georgius Merula, Venice, 1472, and cod.F: Fitodicus RJV), preserved in the inscription to II.6 (v. 363). Some post-Plautine retractator replaced Pythodicus64 by Strobilus I in the seven places quoted above (1), but he forgot to do so in the last, eighth place as well (before line 363). To me this is the most likely explanation, and it is shared by A. Tartara,65 Fr. Leo,66 G. Jachmann,67 P. J. Enk,68 E. Burck,69 and others.

(4) We can only guess why a retractator wanted to replace Pythodicus by Strobilus.70 The simplest explanation seems to be that he took it for granted that Megadorus and Lyconides lived in the same house and therefore should have a single slave, Strobilus. And he deduced one common house for Megadorus and Lyconides by combining lines 330 and 334 (Megadorus’ slave speaking): Vos ceteri ite hoc ad nos and Huc intro abi ad nos (i.e., to Megadorus’ house) with line 727 (Lyconides speaking): ante aedis nostras. It was not difficult for a retractator to reach such a conclusion, since many modern scholars, from C. M. Francken in 187771 to T. B. L. Webster in 1960, have shared the same view: “Lyconides is the nephew (and perhaps the adopted son) of Megadorus, lives in his house, and uses his slave Strobilus. That Eunomia lives in the same house is not certain” (Webster 123).

But this view is certainly wrong. The widow Eunomia (cf. 779) and her son Lyconides live in their own house somewhere in Athens off the stage. For, (a): From Eunomia’s words to Megadorus: te id monitum advento (145) and from the fact that they say “Good-by” to each other (175 f.: Vale./ Et tu, frater), it becomes clear that Eunomia does not live in her brother’s house but only came to pay a visit to him (so, correctly, Dziatzko 264;

62 De nova comedia quaestiones onomatologicae (Diss. Giessen, 1913), 64 ff. (reading Strabelus for Strobilus II). 63 Above, note 4, p. 257.
64 As for the name, cf. Pliny NH 34.85 and K. Schmidt (above, note 61), p. 204.
65 RFIC 27 (1889), 193 ff. 66 Plauti comediae, I (Berlin, 1895), ad. v. 280.
67 B. Ph. W. 35 (1915), 1012. 68 Mnemosyne, N.S. 47 (1919), 89.
69 Wien. St. 69 (1963), 265.
70 Cf. A. Thierfelder, De rationibus interpolationum Plautinarum (Diss. Leipzig, 1929), 128 n. 1. 71 In his edition of the Aulularia (Groningen, 1877), p. XIV f.
P. Langen;72 Enk 91; Ludwig 259). (b): I think that Tartara 198 and Ludwig 262 are right in taking Lyconides’ reference to his uncle’s house in 727 (ante aedis nostras) to mean “the house of my uncle, a member of our family,” in the same way in which in Terence’s Adelphoe 910 Demea refers to the house of his brother Micio (912), in which he does not live, as to “our house” (ad nos).

(5) Scholars who do not accept the two-slave theory have difficulty with explaining the presence of Fitodicus in P at II.6. Certainly this is not a ghost-name created by scribal corruption, as is the case with Geta for the correct Cyame (Schoell) in Truculentus 577 (Geta being a corruption of CHIA me, cf. 583 Chiam BCD),73 or with the famous Stalitio (hence Stalino) of P in Casina 960 (from sta ilico); 347 (from licio), hence in the scene-inscriptions (II.3 before line 217a, etc.).

Therefore, attempts at emendation of Fitodicus must be discarded as ludicrous. Here belong: Francken’s conjecture Puteodicus (sc. Euclio),74 Krieger’s restoration Fit odious servus (for the transmitted Fitodici servus, p. 37), and Ludwig’s recent unfortunate transformation of Fitodicus into Strobilus.75

Finally, against the doubts expressed by A. Ernout about the authenticity of II.6 (“Est-ce une interpolation?”),76 one may say that lines 363–370 reveal genuine Plautine style, and that the motif of a gluttonous cook can be paralleled in Diphilus Fr. 43.41.77

(6) One should not be afraid to accept as genuine names preserved in scene-inscriptions only. In the Casina the name of Lysidamas appears nowhere in the text, only in the inscriptions of the Ambrosian palimpsest,78 and nevertheless it is accepted by everybody. Or, again in the Casina, A preserves the name even of a cook with a part of no more than six words: Citrio (fol. 213v),79 i.e. Chytrio (Xvpíov), as Leo had seen (in his edition of the Casina, III.6).

72 Above, note 15, p. 106 f.
74 Mnemosyne, N.S. 19 (1891), 341 ff.
78 Six times: III.3 (v.563); III.4 (591); III.5 (621); III.6 (720). IV.2 (780); IV.3 (798). Cf. W. Studemund, in Index lect. Gryphsw. 1871–1872.
79 Cf. Studemund’s Apographum of A (Berlin, 1888).
(7) Finally, a retractator of Plautus’ text seems to be at work in the Stichus as well. (a) Pamphila,80 the name of the younger sister, attested only in A (inscr. ad I.1), may be the creation of a retractator who noted that her husband’s name is Pamphilus (390), in addition to Pamphilippus (IV.1 and 2). (b) Panegyris is the name of the older sister (247; 331).81 Contradicting himself, the scribe of A introduces as her name Philumena in the inscription to I.1, though he has the correct name Panegyris in 247; 331, and in inscr. ad II.3 (326a). Why? The name Panegyris is rare (H. Petersmann).82 Some retractator felt that πανήγυρας could not possibly be a woman’s name (as it is not in Philemon’s Πανήγυρας, cf. Πανηγυρισταί by Diodorus and Baton); so he replaced it by Philumena, known to him from Terence’s Hecyra and Andria (cf. Menander Fr.489 K.-Th. Φιλομένη; Crobylus Fr.5 Kock).83

APPENDIX II: AULULARIA 388–392 AND 640–641

388 Euclio. Sed quid ego apertas aedis nostras conspicor?  
            Et strepitust intus. Numnam ego compilor miser?

390 Congrio. Aulam maiorem, si pote, ex vicinia  
            Pete: haec est parva, capere non quit.

Euclio. Ei mihi,  
Perii hercle: aurum rapitur, aula quaeritur.

Each time Euclio leaves the house he makes certain that the door is closed and locked (104; 274). To his dismay, however, this time when returning home from the agora (273) he finds his door wide open and hears the noise of several people in the house. One thought only crosses his obsessed mind: “Burglars!” When he now hears the voice of the “chief-burglar” ordering “This pot is too small: it won’t hold it all. Go and see if you can borrow a bigger one in the neighborhood [i.e., from the household of Megadorus],” Euclio finds his worst fears confirmed: “My God! It is true: fures thesaurarii (395)! Wretched me, I am lost! They are taking my gold, for they are looking for a pot.”

This is the only possible way to interpret the words aula quaeritur (392), as did, e.g., A. Ernout (“On emporte mon or, on cherche une marmite”).

80 Her name Pinacium in P is a blunder (maybe deriving from line 284, cf. Lindsay), for it is the name of the young servant of Panegyris (cf. Mostellaria).
81 Contra Fr. Ritschl, Plauti Stichus (Bonn, 1851).
82 In his critical edition of the Stichus (Heidelberg, 1973), 85.
The text does not allow us to let Euclio imagine any other situation than this: The *fures thesaurii* have found the pot of gold buried somewhere in the house (7; 437 f.; 467). They are not wasting their time unearthing it, but are taking out the gold with their hands, putting it in another pot which was nearby. This, however, proves to be too small for all the gold, smaller than Euclio’s pot, “a four-pound pot” (809: *Quadrilibrem aulam auro onustam*). That is why the “chief-burglar” orders one of his men to go and fetch a bigger pot in the neighborhood. It is to this bigger pot that Euclio refers with *aula quaeritur*.

Consequently, the words *aula quaeritur* cannot yield the sense: “They’re after *my* pot!,” as, e.g., Paul Nixon has it. Nor is G. Torresin’s recent interpretation any better; he assumes illogical behavior of Euclio under pressure: “se dunque il solo nome di *aula* deve far pensare ad una pentola per trasportare un tesoro, tanto vale dire che il solo nome di *aula* è sufficiente a suscitare l’idea di pentola dove sta il tesoro. ‘Cercano la mia pentola’ dunque. Certo è che quell’—*aula quaeritur* nè si riferisce all’ *aulam maiorem* da prender in prestito dai vicini, nè a quella che *capere non quit*, della quale non si può dire che *quaeritur* perchè i ladri ce l’hanno in mano. Che cosa insomma Euclione immagini stia in concreto succedendo dentro casa non è chiaro da quella frase, ma tale è la costante natura dei suoi sospetti senza logica . . .”

I think that scholars were mistaken in assuming that the word *aula* in this passage must denote Euclio’s pot of gold. Euclio is, however, referring here to his own pot with the words *aurum rapitum*, in the same way in which he used the word *aurum* for his pot of gold at *Aul.* 63; 65; 110; 185; 188; 194; 201; 216; 265. By the words *aula quaeritur*, which serve as a proof that the gold is being taken, he refers only to *aulam maiorem*: *aulam pete = aula quaeritur*. The word *aula*, then, designating Euclio’s pot of gold, occurs at 580 f. for the first time:

580 Edepol ne tu, *aula*, multos inimicos habes
Atque istuc *aurum* quod tibi concreditum est.

But the audience has already had opportunity to see Euclio’s pot (449; 464; 467; 471).

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84 W. Kraus, *Serta Philologica Aenipontana* (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwiss., 7–8, Innsbruck, 1962), 189, prefers the explanation that the thieves had broken Euclio’s pot of gold while digging it out.

85 In the Loeb *Plautus*, I (1916), 275.

86 Above, note 6, p. 177.
640  *Strobilus.* Non hércle equidem quicquam sumpsi nec tetti.

_Euclio._

640  *Strobilus.* Em tibi, ostendi: eccas.

_Euclio._

Ostende huc manus.  Video. Age, ostende etiam tertiam.

The implication is clear: Euclio accuses Strobilus of being a super-thief, *non fur, sed trifur* (633). But the idea of a thief with *three* hands cannot be paralleled. Ussing (II, p. 345) remarks simply: "Ridicule." Euclio’s exaggeration, however, can be explained by *Aulularia* 554. Here Euclio complains that Megadorus has filled his house not with cooks but with thieves (551 f.: *qui mihi omnis angulos/ Furum inplevisti in aedibus misero mihi*). A cook as a thief is a commonplace in comedy (*Aul.* 325 f.; 365; 445: *Laverna*; *Pseudolus* 790 f.; 850 ff.). Each cook-thief has *six* hands, like Geryon the ἕξαχεῖρ (Lucian *Toxaris* 62; *Hermotimus* 74): *Cum senis manibus, genere Geryonaceo* (554).

Therefore, when Euclio in 641 asks Strobilus to show him also his *third* hand, to make certain it is empty, he is actually implying that Strobilus, as a real *trifur*, must have more than two *furticae manus* (*Pseudolus* 887), three, maybe even six. Lines 554 and 641 were brought together by Bonnell Thornton (1724–1768), in his English translation of the *Aulularia* (London, 1767).

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87 Cf. Dohm (above, note 5), pp. 129–133; 142 and 258.

Ariadne’s Leave-taking: Catullus 64.116-20

WENDELL CLAUSEN

sed quid ego a primo digressus carmine plura
commemorem, ut linquens genitoris filia uultum,
ut consanguineae complexum, ut denique matris,
quae misera in gnata deperdita †leta
omnibus his Thesei dulcem praepartit amorem? 120

Here, after elaborating as much of the story of Theseus and Ariadne as suited him—Ariadne’s fearful emotions as she watches Theseus struggling with her brute half-brother, the simile of the storm-felled tree; in both of which passages Catullus is indebted to Apollonius’ Argonautica1—Catullus breaks off in the manner of Apollonius, Arg. 1.648–649:

\[ \alpha\lambda\lambda\varepsilon \tau'i \mu\eta\theta\upsilon\upsilon\ Αἰδηλίδεω χρεία με διηνεκέως ἐγορεθεὶν; \]

Catullus’ purpose is twofold: to underline his sophisticated allusion to the labyrinth,2 and to prepare for the entrance of Ariadne and her great speech (lines 132–201). His description of her leave-taking is brief and apparently simple; and yet misunderstood.

**Line 117**

Ariadne shall see her father’s face no more: how is this to be understood? Comment is unsatisfactory: “carum os genitoris debet semper uelle uidere filia” Baehrens (1885), quoting Stat. Theb. 10.693 (cur) ad patrios non stant tua lumina uultus? and Sen. Herc. fur. 1173–1174 cur meos

1 Though not without reference to Callimachus’ Hecale and the other bull Theseus killed; see R. Pfeiffer, Callimachus I (1949) fr. 732.

2 A minor Hellenistic lusus poeticus: Callim. Hymn 4.311; Virg. Aen. 5.588–591; 6.27. See E. Norden, Aeneis VI (19162) 129, 427 n. 3.
Theseus fugit/ paterque uultus?; “genitoris filia: the juxtaposition emphasizes the unnaturalness of her act: Kroll quotes Cic. Deiot. 2 qui nepos auum in capitis discriminem adduxerit” Fordyce (1961); “her father (it is implied) shows by his look that he is unapproachable” Quinn (1970). The juxtaposition emphasizes not the unnaturalness but the naturalness of the relationship, and its pathos. Compare Virg. Aen. 1.589–590 namque ipsa decoram/ caesariem nato genetrix, of which R. G. Austin remarks: “the juxtaposition nato genetrix has an intimacy that English cannot reproduce”1; 10.466 tum genitor natum dictis adfatur amicis; 10.800 dum genitor nati parma protectus abiret; Ov. Met. 5.438 interea pauidae nequiquam filia matri. Ariadne embraces her sister and her wildly grieving mother; the king her father, as becomes his dignity, stands silently by—premit altum corde dolorem: while the actors are Greek, the scene Catullus imagines is essentially Roman.

No commentator on Catullus (or Apollonius) notices that Catullus is following Apollonius’ singular version of the story: Jason, sorely in need of magical aid, tells Medea how Ariadne saved Theseus in his hour of peril and then happily sailed away with him, Arg. 3.997–1001:

δὴ ποτε καὶ θησαμή κακῶν ὑπελύσατ’ ἀεθλων
παρθενικὴ Μινώις ἑυφρονέουσα Ἁριάδνη,
ἡν ὅ δ’ Πασιφάη κούρη τέκνη ’Ηνείοιο.
ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν καὶ νησό, ἐπεὶ χόλον εὔνασε Μίνως, 1000
σὺν τῷ ἐφεξομενήν πάτρην λίπε.

A seductive paradigm, with a significant adjustment: the wrath of Minos remained vigilant and unsleeping. The standard version was Homer’s, Od. 11.321–324:

Φαίδρην τε Πρόκριν τε ἢδον καλὴν τ’ Ἁριάδνην,
κούρην Μινώως ὀλοφρόνως, ἤν ποτε Θησεὺς
ἐκ Κρήτης ἐς γοινὸν Αθηναῖων ἵππασεν
ἡγε μὲν, οὐδ’ ἀπόνυτο.

Apollonius’ version (or perversion) is a poet’s: the Hellene is shown glozing the foreign girl with his sweet speech. Apollonius had a clear dramatic purpose, Catullus did not; thus he seems inconsistent in lines 180–181:

3 Aeneis I (1971) ad loc.
4 Noticed by the scholiast on Apollonius (C. Wendel, Scholia in Apoll. Rhod. Vetera (1935) ad loc.): ὅτι ἐκ οὔτε Μίνως συνεχόμεν τὸν γὺμον Ἁριάδνης...Ομηρός φησι ῥήτως; and implied by Apollonius’ “correction”: ἐπεὶ χόλον εὔνασε Μίνως. See A. Ardizzoni, Le Argonautiche III (1958) ad loc.
5 And in line 150 et potius germanum amittere creui. In Apollonius, Jason slaughters Apsyrtus like a huge strong-horn bull, Arg. 4.468 ὥστε μέγαν κεραλέκα ταῦρον.
an patris auxilium sperem? quemne ipsa reliqui respersum iuuenem fraterna caede secuta?
as if he were thinking rather of Medea’s brother than of the Minotaur.

Line 119

Lachmann published his conjecture doubtfully—“fortasse laetabatur”—in the apparatus criticus of his edition (1829); Haupt, his devoted admirer and successor, placed it in the text (1853); and there, for the most part, it has remained. Rossbach (1863), Schwabe (1866, 1886), Mueller (1870), Riese (1884), Postgate (1889), Benoist (1890), Merrill (1893), Friedrich (1908), Lenchantin de Gubernatis (1927), Kroll (1929), Schuster (1949), Mynors (1958), Fordyce (1961), and Quinn (1970) all accept it; Schuster, Mynors, and Fordyce without even mentioning Conington or Buecheler. Only Robinson Ellis refused to accept it, steadfastly preferring Conington’s lamentata est: in his enormous critical edition (1867, 1878), in his commentary (1876, 1889), though describing it as “slightly weak” (he wanted to propose a conjecture of his own), and, finally, in his Oxford Classical Text (1904).

It would appear that laetabatur is now settled in the text for good; in 1962, however, Eduard Fraenkel, in a masterly review of Fordyce, remarked: “Zu 64, 119 schweigt F. völlig über laeta(batur), das sein Text bietet. Ich vermag nicht daran zu glauben und halte Coningtons lamentata est für evident.” Nor can I; and I agree with Fraenkel, although his explanation of the corruption is unlikely. Fraenkel assumed that the end of the line had been damaged so that only the letters la could be read in the archetype, and then laeta was an easy guess. But his two examples are not well chosen, nor is corruption of this sort common in the MS tradition of Catullus. There is a likelier explanation: haplography, a type of error that may occur in any script at any time. An example lies conveniently to hand, in line 139 at non haec quondam blanda promissa dedisti: blanda O; nobis X, incongruous with mihi in the next line. The scribe, his eye passing from quondâ to blanda, omitted blanda altogether; thereupon

6 Communicated to Ellis by Conington in 1861, as Ellis states in his edition of 1878, presumably to establish its priority over Buecheler’s lamentatur, published in Jahrb. f. Phil. 93 (1866) 610 = Kl. Schr. I (1913) 624–625; in his edition of 1867 Ellis identifies lamentata est as Conington’s but gives no date. Obviously, Buecheler could not have known of Conington’s conjecture.

7 Gnomon 34 (1962) 256.

8 Mynor’s sigla. Examples no less strange can be found in L. Havet, Manuel de critique verbale (1911) 130–132.
nobis was interpolated to secure meter and momentary sense. Similarly in the case of lamentata est, the scribe’s eye passed from the first a to the second, or rather from LA to TA, the result being lata est or lataë; and this (under the influence of misera?) became laeta or leta.

A palaeographical demonstration is never sufficient of itself. laetabatur is wrong for two reasons: psychologically wrong, and wrong because it involves a forced interpretation of misera. To begin with the latter: who is miserable, mother or daughter? Kroll, echoed by Quinn, is characteristically direct: “misera gehört zu gnata.” Fordyce is prudently silent; Lenchantin de Gubernatis somewhat hesitant: “misera è più probabilmente abl. concordante con gnata che non nominativo”; Merrill merely amusing: “misera: contrasting the present wretched condition of Ariadne, betrayed by a false love, with the affection formerly lavished upon her by her family.” Why should Ariadne be miserable? She has made her peace with her father and is about to sail away with her lover. But if misera refers to Pasiphae, as, surely, it must, then what of laetabatur? On an occasion like this an Italian mother does not smile bravely through her tears, she wails uncontrollably; laetabatur makes no emotional sense in the context. Compare Cic. De orat. 3.214 quo me miser conferam? quo wortam? in Capitoliumne? at fratris sanguine madet. an domum? matremne ut miseram lamentantem uideam et abiectam?;12 and Pro Mur. 88 an ad matrem quae misera modo consulem osculata filium suum nunc cruciatur . . . ?

There is, finally, evidence far older than the Verona MS indicating that Catullus wrote lamentata est—two words, the cadence of a verse in the Argonautae of Varro of Atax: expedita lamentatur.13

Varro may be described as a belated neoteric; his literary career is both curious and important, how important can only be guessed at from

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10 “Misera, au nominatif plutôt qu’à l’ablatif comme le veut Ellis” Benoist. Ellis, surprisingly, translates: “her hapless daughter,” but seems to have felt a qualm: “misera . . . perhaps spoken from the mother’s point of view.” F. W. Cornish (Loeb 1913) translates: “her mother last, who lamented, lost in grief for her daughter,” but keeps †leta in the text.

11 I once assisted at such a scene: a happy Italian girl being married to an American, a “straniero”—“e la madre pianse disperatamente.”

12 C. Gracchus' anguished utterance, that moved even his enemies to tears; see Fraenkel, op. cit. 261 (on line 177).

13 Fr. 7 Morel, whence Buecheler’s conjecture. Was this fragment known to Conington? Ellis does not cite it, nor indeed does any editor of Catullus, not even those who mention Buecheler’s conjecture. The tense of lamentatur is objectionable, as Riese noted; lamentata est resembles aspernata est in line 301.
the very meager remains. Born in Transalpine Gaul in 82 B.C., he wrote a *Bellum Sequanicum*, an epic poem in Ennian style, with, it may be supposed, a double object: to celebrate Caesar's victorious campaign of 58 B.C., and, even closer to home, to attract favorable attention to himself. In this respect at least, his poem appears to have been successful; he made his way to Rome—what Latin poet did not?—and there discovered the New Poetry. Jerome reports a tantalizing fact about him, that he learned Greek when he was thirty-five years old, an eager opismath: *qui postea XXXV annum agens Graecas litteras cum summo studio didicit.*

A "translation" of Apollonius' *Argonautica*, the Alexandrian equivalent of an epic poem, ensued; the inspiration for which and, to some extent, model was probably Catullus 64. Varro must have observed, with peculiar pleasure, how much Catullus owes for the beginning of his poem to Ennius' *Medea exul*. His imitation of line 119 is after the new style: not an inert repetition, rather an exquisite yet recognizable variation that attends to a feature of the original: *experdita* is unique, but *deperdita* (for *perdita*) is rare and first occurs here.

After Varro had finished with Jason and Medea, he turned to love poetry; here, too, some dependence on Catullus is suggested, in Prop. 2.34.85–88:

> haec quoque perfecto ludebat Iasone Varro,  
> Varro Leucadieae maxima flamma suae;  
> haec quoque lasciui cantarunt scripta Catulli,  
> Lesbia quis ipsa notior est Helena.

Leucadia, whose poetry has perished, and Lesbia, Sapphic names both: their relationship seems to be easy and unembarrassed.

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14 Virgil admired him, for he paid him the absolute compliment of stealing one of his verses entire, *Georg.* 1.377 *aut arguta lacus circumvolitutus hirundo* = fr. 22.4 Morel; see T. E. V. Pearce, *C.Q.* 16 (1966) 301–302.


16 The fantastic opinion of J. Bernays, that Varro may have been inspired by Caesar's crossing of the English channel, is preserved in Schanz–Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.* I.1 (1927) 312.


The Grievance of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus

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In early August of 50 B.C. M. Caelius Rufus began a letter to Cicero, Proconsul in Cilicia at the time, as follows (Fam. VIII.14):

Tanti non fuit Arsacen capere et Seleuceam expugnare ut earum rerum quae hic gestae sunt spectaculo careres; numquam tibi oculi doluissent, si in repulsa Domiti vultum vidisses. magna illa comitia fuerunt, et plane studia ex partium sensu apparuerunt; perpauci necessitudinem secuti officium praestiterunt. itaque mihi est Domitius inimicissimus, ut ne familiarem quidem suum quemquam tam odirit quam me, atque eo magis quod per injuriam sibi putat ereptum <auguratum> cuius ego auctor fuerim. nunc furit tam gavisos homines suum dolorem unumque m<e Curi>onem studiosiorem Antoni.

On the reading in the last sentence, where the Mediceus, here our sole authority, has unumque move, see Philol. 105 (1961), p. 88. In Phil. II.4 Cicero represents Curio as the mainstay of Antony's campaign.

A subject for ereptum has to be supplied, and auguratum (Gronovius) is the vulgate. But Cicero did not have to be told at this stage what the election was for; he is assumed to know. In Philol. 1.c. I proposed putat <hoc> ereptum. That, or something similar (as sibi <id> putat), avoids the awkward juxtaposition of cuius with a substantive which is not its antecedent.

Since then I have come to doubt the natural and hitherto universal assumption that the words quod . . . fuerim refer to the augural election. If they do, what is to be made of them? Commentators from Manutius on explain on the lines "that it was an insult to prefer Antony, a young man who had only held the Quaestorship, to Domitius, who had been Consul" (How). E. S. Gruen puts it more colourfully: "The haughty nobilis and ex-consul did not take defeat by a rank newcomer lightly" (The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, p. 355).
Per iniuriam implies an iniquity aggravating the defeat (cf. Quinct. 95 miserum est exturbari fortunis omnibus, miserius est iniuria). With cuius ego auctor fuerim it would naturally point to a specific proceeding (not just an aspect of the defeat) for which Domitius held Caelius responsible. But if the vulgate, or an equivalent, is sound, Manutius’ explanation has to be accepted, for otherwise the iniuria would have been particularized.

According to Caelius, support for either candidate in this election went on party lines, apart from a very small minority who, like himself, were motivated by personal friendship. Antony’s victory was in effect Caesar’s, and the candidates’ relative status and prestige did not count as they ordinarily would have done. But were Domitius’ qualifications really so superior? Antony was no rank newcomer, but, like Domitius, a plebeian nobilis. Cicero lays stress on the nobility of the Antonii (summo loco natos . . . dignum maioribus suis) in a letter written a few months earlier (Fam. II.18). True, he was some fifteen years younger than Domitius and correspondingly low on the official ladder, though he may already have been elected Tribune for 50–49. But election of young noblemen to priestly dignities was nothing unusual, and sometimes they prevailed against their seniors. A year previously Caelius had reported the surprise victory of young Dolabella, whose first recorded office is his Tribunate in 47, over Lentulus Crus, Praetor in 58 and Consul in 49, in a contest for the Quindecimvirate (Fam. VIII.4.1). Gruen himself recalls that the current Pontifex Maximus, Caesar, had been elected over the venerable Catulus when himself only aedilicus, or perhaps Praetor-Designate. As a candidate for the Augurate in 53(?) Cicero competed, successfully it is true, against a Tribune or tribunicius who was not even a nobilis; and Antony could take credit for waiving his own candidature in Cicero’s favour (Phil. II.4). Furthermore, Antony had an advantage, noted by Broughton (Historia, 2 (1953), pp. 209 f.), which in normal conditions might have been expected to tell heavily in his favour: his grandfather, the orator, had been an Augur. The information comes to us quite accidentally, from a scholiast on Lucan (Schol. Bern. on II.121), and since these things ran in families, it is not unlikely that his father, M. Antonius Creticus, may also have been so distinguished. The Domitii, on the other hand, had been Pontiffs for at least three generations before the Consul of 54, whose father was Pontifex Maximus; and therefore not Augurs.

This introduces a remarkable feature of Domitius’ candidacy, which gets only passing notice from commentators and historians. He is usually supposed to have been already Pontiff before he stood for the Augurate; so L. R. Taylor (Am. J. Phil. 63 (1942), p. 405): “His election should be placed before the year 50 . . . Otherwise Caelius, who writes to Cicero
of the contest for the augurate (ad Fam. VIII.14.1), would surely have mentioned the pontificate.” Similarly Broughton, *Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, II, p. 254: “M. Antonius will therefore have ruined his attempt to attain both the pontificate and the augurate.” As is well known, combination of these two dignities in the same individual is unheard of for well over a century before 49, no matter how prominent or powerful. Marius, Sulla, Pompey, L. Lucullus, and Hortensius were Augurs. Scaurus,\(^1\) the younger Catulus, M. Lucullus, and Metellus Scipio were Pontiffs. Caesar became Pontiff about 73 and Pontifex Maximus in 63. He did eventually become Augur, but only after Pharsalia under a senatorial decree granting him membership of all four of the principal priestly Colleges. In making his own appointments Caesar stuck to the rule of one man, one College (Dio, XLII.51.4). So did the early emperors, except in the case of members of the imperial family; cf. M. W. H. Lewis, *The Official Priests of Rome under the Julio-Claudians* (1955), p. 157.

If Domitius was really guilty of such exorbitance, he asked for defeat and the usual interpretation of *per iniuriam* becomes still harder to sustain. But that is not proved. He was Pontiff when he died in 48 (Nic. Damasc. Vit. Aug. 4) and the *terminus a quo* for his election is 57 (Har. Resp. 12). It could have been later in 50, after the failure in August. A vacancy may have arisen by the death of Metellus Creticus (see below). As for Taylor’s argument that Caelius would have mentioned the Pontificate, it is the purpose of this paper to suggest that Caelius did mention a Pontificate; but Metellus’ death may have occurred after he wrote. But if Domitius’ candidature for the Augurate was not a defiance of established custom, it was at least a breach of family tradition, all the stranger because, as it seems, he might have stood for a Pontificate in the previous year. In an article already quoted L. R. Taylor pointed to three (or possibly four) pontifical vacancies occurring in 54–50: Metellus Creticus died sometime during that period (Planc. 27; Vell. II.48.6), the elder Curio died in 53 (Fam. II.2), M. Scaurus was exiled in 52. M. Crassus the “Triumvir” also perished in 53, but the Pontifex M. Crassus in Har. Resp. 12 may have been his son. Assuming then that Metellus died in 50 and was replaced by Domitius, we have two certain vacancies; also two successors, one certain, the other probable. Curio the younger became Pontiff between his father’s death and early 50 (Dio, XL.62.1), and M. Brutus was Pontiff in 50 (cf. Broughton, op. cit., II, p. 254).

Normally patricians were succeeded by patricians and plebeians by plebeians (Mommsen, *Römische Forschungen*, I, 80 ff.). Brutus, a patrician

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by adoption, is therefore likely to have been Scaurus's successor. It appears to follow that Curio succeeded his father, but there is a difficulty. In a letter to him of ca. 19 December 51 (Fam. II.7.3) Cicero writes: *de sacerdotio tuo quantam curam adhibuerim quamque difficili in re atque causa, cognoscès ex iis litteris quas Thrasoni, liberto tuo, dedi.* "Since the letter implies that Cicero had been concerned with the question recently, the election may have taken place in 51, though Curio's candidature is not mentioned in Caelius' letter Ad Fam., VIII, 4, in which the priestly comitia and Curio's candidacy for the tribunate are referred to" (Taylor, l.c., p. 405, n. 65).

It looks hardly possible that the priesthood in question could have been other than the Pontificate or that Cicero was not writing about the recent past. But why was the elder Curio's place left unfilled so long?

The puzzle is annoying, but hardly affects what is here to be contended: that the *iniuria* to which Caelius refers had to do, not with the Augural election in 50, but with an earlier disappointment sustained by Domitian in connection with the Pontificate. It is certain that there had been a plebeian vacancy in the College of Pontiffs not very long previously and that the younger Curio had filled it. Domitian's family record made him an obvious candidate. Had he in fact stood, unsuccessfully? If so, we may be sure that Caelius supported his bosom friend Curio as vigorously as he later supported Antony. But for two reasons I prefer a different theory. First, our sources might have been expected to preserve some record of such a contest, especially if it took place after the flow of Cicero's correspondence recommences in the spring of 51. Second, Cicero's language to Curio about his concern on the latter's behalf and the difficulties in which he had found himself involved does not suggest open support in an electoral fight so much as activity behind the scenes. Before standing for election to any one of the four chief priestly Colleges a prospective candidate had to be nominated by one member or two members (cf. *Phil*. II.4) of that College (Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*3, II, pp. 29 f.). The intrigues and bargainings, involving not only members of the College but possible candidates and their influential friends, can be imagined. The inference waiting to be drawn is that at this preliminary stage Domitian was persuaded not to stand or somehow jockeyed out of the nomination. If he felt he had been cheated out of the Pontificate, his augural candidature is explained, and so is his additional rancour against a person whom he blamed for both discomfits—*ex hypothesi* Caelius.

Cicero's involvement in the former (he did not love Domitian) can be deduced from his letter to Curio, and Caelius' close relations with both might naturally bring him into the picture.

If so, the missing word in *Fam*. VIII.14.1 is not *auguratum* but *pontificatum*:
atque eo magis quod per iniuriam sibi <pontificatum> putat ereptum cuius ego auctor fuerim. The mechanical reason for its disappearance is obvious.

The following sentence also benefits, nunc, hitherto pointless, contrasts the present disappointment with the previous one. Also the reading unumque me Curionem gains in plausibility. Curio and Caelius again! Domitius might well fume.

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"The first book of Epistles is, after all, the consummation of Horace's poetical development." So A. Y. Campbell;\(^1\) and so, more recently, Carl Becker: "Erst in den Briefen und in der späten Lyrik vollendet sich das, was in seinen früheren Dichtungen angebahnt ist; diese Gebilde sind die Krönung des horazischen Werkes".\(^2\) Yet the volume of critical and scholarly literature on the first book of the Epistles is modest in comparison with that on the Odes or the Satires,\(^3\) and in this reticence of the interpreters may perhaps be discerned a warning. With all their charm and superficial lucidity the Epistles are curiously elusive compositions: "ces textes . . . continuent de résister aux tentatives modernes de définition".\(^4\) I do not know that the problem has been better posed than by Professor Rudd: "The trouble is that once the naively literal approach is abandoned it becomes very difficult to define the nature of the Epistles in a way which will give due weight to both art and life".\(^5\) For whereas the assessment of the balance of Wahrheit and Dichtung in the Odes may be, to some extent at least, assisted by considerations of genre and precedent, no such guidance is available to the critic of the Epistles. For these poems


3 As was remarked many years ago by Richard Heinze in his preface to the 3rd edition (1908) of his revision of Kiesling's commentary; a glance at *L'année philologique* will show that things have not changed.\(^4\) Préaux (n. 1) 1.

4 Préaux (n. 1) 1.

5 N. Rudd, reviewing McGann (below, n. 9), *C.R. n.s.* 21 (1971) 56.
there is no real precedent and they cannot be assigned to a genre; whatever partial antecedents we may trace for this or that feature, as a whole they are, as Fraenkel has said, a unique literary creation: "nothing comparable . . . had ever existed in Greek or Roman literature".6

The epithet chosen by Fraenkel to characterize Epistles I is interesting: he calls the collection "the most harmonious of Horace's books".7 It is, I believe, the mot juste; but before simply acquiescing in it we should ponder its implications. "Harmony" implies a good deal: that the content of the letters harmonizes with the form, that the personal and autobiographical elements harmonize with the didactic and doctrinal, that the individual letters harmonize with each other to combine into a rounded whole: to give, in Horace's own words, a libellus that is totus teres atque rotundus. Horace clearly went to some pains to contrive a formally symmetrical structure for the book;8 and recent work on the relationships of the individual letters with each other has shown, in spite of differences of emphasis between the critics, that this static symmetry is complemented by a dynamic "plot" which entails that each letter should be read in the light of those that precede and follow it.9

Such, briefly, are the considerations—the elusiveness of Horace in these poems and the principle Epistulas ex Epistulis interpretari—that we shall do well to bear in mind in investigating the problem of lines 6 to 9 of the fourteenth Epistle.

II

me quamuis Lamiae pietas et cura moratur
fratrem maerentis, rapto de fratre dolentis
insolabiliter, tamen istuc mens animusque
fert et auet spatiiis obstantia rumpere claustra.

9 auet Bentley: amat codd.

This passage has become something of a cardinal text in the discussion about whether, or to what extent, the Epistles are "real" or "genuine" letters. Fraenkel argued strongly that it "clearly shows that this is not a 'sermon' hung up on some arbitrarily chosen peg, but a true letter, spontaneously written in circumstances which are still recognizable . . .

6 E. Fraenkel, Horace (1957) 309 and n. 1. 7 Ibid. 8 See Appendix.
9 See G. Maurach, "Der Grundriss von Horazens erstem Epistelbuch," Acta classica 11 (1968) 73-124; M. J. McGann, Studies in Horace's First Book of Epistles (Coll. Latomus 100, 1969). Maurach takes the notion of a "plot" very much further than McGann is prepared to do, but both agree independently, for instance, on the need to read Ep. 11 as in some sense correcting 10 (Maurach 104, McGann 60).
These lines [6–9] bear the stamp of reality. Horace’s sympathy for Lamia has prevented him for the time being from returning to his Sabine farm. Otherwise he would not have written this letter but would have talked things over with the bailiff.”10 How literally Fraenkel meant the last sentence of this to be taken we have no means of knowing; possibly he really did intend to suggest that the very existence of this artfully written piece is due to the (presumably untimely) demise of Lamia’s unfortunate brother, who thus all unwittingly played the part of a sort of anti-Person from Porlock. Be that particular point as it may, Fraenkel’s argument has not carried much weight with subsequent interpreters of the poem. Williams allows that “the occasion which keeps him in Rome is certainly genuine; the very mention of it is a compliment to Lamia . . . and a consolation.” However, he also contends, citing in support Catullus cc. 65 and 68, that “this fact does not in the least prevent the lines also being an artistic device intended to mark the composition formally as a letter.”11 This too is how the question is viewed by McGann: “Yet the passage can equally well be regarded as an indication of Horace’s skill in giving the impression that he is writing a real letter.”12 Becker on the one hand rejects the notion that Horace can have invented his excuse—this is ruled out by the evident sincerity and warmth of the verses; on the other hand he finds it difficult to accept that the poem sprang from the (regarded from a purely literary point of view) fortunate conjunction of Lamia’s bereavement and the bailiff’s discontent. Having posed this dilemma he evades it by declaring it to be irrelevant: “der Brief will nicht in eine bestimmte Lage eingreifen.”13 This, substantially, is also the position of Hiltbrunner, who concludes that our understanding of the poem does not depend on a solution of this problem.14

I cite these recent discussions in some detail because it seems to me that they illustrate the way in which consideration of the passage and of the problem which it poses—which I believe to be a real and important one—has gradually drifted away from the essential point which engaged the attention of at least some of the older interpreters. With Becker and Hiltbrunner, indeed, we are perilously close to what Stephen Potter called “the ‘for God’s sake’ branch of the ‘After all’ section of writership.”15 With a careful writer like Horace it is simply not good enough to resort to such a pis aller, at least until alternative possibilities have been adequately

10 Fraenkel (n. 6) 310–311.  
11 G. Williams, Tradition and originality in Roman poetry (1968) 13.  
12 McGann (n. 9) 90.  
13 Becker (n. 2) 21–23.  
15 S. Potter, Some notes on Lifemanship (1950) 75.
explored. Whether or not Horace really had a bailiff who was the exact antitype of the ideal Catonian *vilicus* is, we may agree with Williams, irrelevant.\(^{16}\) For the purpose of this Epistle the bailiff, if he did not exist, had to be invented; none of Horace’s contemporary readers would have been disconcerted to discover on enquiry that the real man was actually a frugal and sturdy hind in whom there well appeared the constant service of the antique world—and no more should we. The case of Lamia and his brother is different. To justify his staying in Rome Horace could have made any excuse that he chose, so long as it appeared dramatically plausible. Why did he choose this one? Mention of an actual contemporary in an Epistle might be simply complimentary and honorific; but was the occasion in this case tactfully chosen? It is a matter of taste and propriety.

This seems to be what lies behind Wickham’s note: “The feeling of this reference to Lamia’s sorrow and Horace’s sympathy, though it would be rather incongruous in a letter actually intended for the ‘vilicus,’ is natural and appropriate if we look on the Epistle as intended rather for the eyes of the poet’s friends.”\(^{17}\) But Wickham’s conclusion will not really do, for the letter is after all addressed to the bailiff, and even if the choice of addressee is no more than a convenient literary device (as was held, for instance, by Morris),\(^{18}\) yet a competent literary craftsman may surely be expected to preserve and enhance the epistolary illusion that he has created rather than to go out of his way to undermine it. In general Horace went to some trouble in the Epistles to do just that,\(^{19}\) and the discussion that has centered on our passage now and again betrays an uneasy feeling that the illusion has here somehow been impaired. Argument on such a point is bound to be partly, if not very largely, subjective, but questions of taste by definition are subjective; that is no reason for banishing them from critical argument. When McGann criticizes Morris’s arguments about the “reality” of *Ep.* 1.5 as resting “on an *a priori* idea of what is not admissible in a real letter written in verse by a poet,” he does not thereby disable them.\(^{20}\) In matters of literary decorum *a priori* arguments are sometimes the only ones available, and they are not to be despised.

We come back, then, to the question broached but sidestepped by Wickham: what is the effect in this particular Epistle of a reference such as we here encounter to a friend’s bereavement? The tone of the poem

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\(^{16}\) Williams (n. 11) 12.

\(^{17}\) E. C. Wickham, *Quinti Horatii Flacci Opera omnia . . .* II (1891) 278.


\(^{20}\) McGann (n. 9) 90.
as a whole is light: Horace resurrects his former self, the spruce boulevardier and squire of dames, in language that recalls the Odes:

quem tenues decuere togae nitidique capilli,
quem scis immunem Cinarae placuisse rapaci,
quem bibulum liquidi media de luce Falerni,
cena breuis iuuat et prope riuum somnis in herba. (32-5)

These are the genteel counterparts of the bailiff’s coarser diversions (24–26); the revocation of an (agreeably) misspent youth is in Horace’s best ironical vein. Could Lamia really have been pleased to find his heartfelt grief figuring in such a context? And if Horace was really Lamia’s friend, would he even implicitly have admitted to wanting to be anywhere but at his side at such a time? The possibility that a reader of the Epistle might imagine that his attendance on Lamia was one of the inuisa negotia (17) that were all too apt to detain him in Rome was categorically denied by Kiessling, 21 but I do not see what his denial was based on, and other interpreters such as Préaux and Stégen are prepared to admit it. 22 If that difference of opinion connotes a real ambiguity, can Horace be acquitted of a charge of careless writing? Would he, of all poets, have exposed himself and a friend to such an uncharitable misconstruction?

The time has come to look at the passage more closely and see what Horace in fact says in it. However, the answer to that question turns in large measure on a close examination of the language used. It is emphatic, more than a little solemn, and, as the commentators have not failed to point out, heavily tinged with Lucretian influence.

7 The anaphoric phrases fraterm maerentis . . . de fratre dolentis are managed (chiasmus avoided) so as to throw great weight on the word fraterm, which occupies the first foot. The line has as a result a slightly archaic “feel.”

8 insolabiliter is ἁπαξ εἰρημένων and seems to be a Horatian coinage on the model of Lucretius’ insatiabiliter (3.907). mens animusque is of course a Lucretian tag. Rhythmically the line is, by Augustan standards, stiff and archaic.

9 It would beg the question to plead in evidence Bentley’s correction auet, which is founded on an appeal to D.R.N. 2.265. 23 But leaving that

21 “negotia, also Geldgeschäfte u. dgl.: keine officia.” How can he have known that?
22 Préaux (n. 1) 147; G. Stégen, L’unité et la clarté des Épitres d’Horace. Étude sur sept pièces du premier livre (4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 16) (1963) 75.
23 Cf. Fraenkel (n. 6) 311 n. 1. The arguments of Préaux (n. 1) 145 and Stégen (n. 22) 73 n. 6 in favour of the transmitted amat do not carry conviction. In the context amat is intolerably feeble and spoils the tonal unity of the verses.
word aside, both image and language are Lucretian: Horace seems to have had in mind, not only the race-course image of *D.R.N.* 2.263–265 but also, and perhaps predominantly, the *arta naturae clastra* through which the mind of Epicurus yearned to burst. So, rightly, Stégen: "Son amitié pour Lamia n'empêche pas que cette ville où il s'attarde soit pour lui une prison." This gives a more natural sense to *clastra*, which is not a usual equivalent for *carceres*; in fact no example of this sense appears to be attested before Horace. There is enjambment between all verses, especially strong between 6–7 and 8–9; the movement of the passage contributes to its urgency and in particular imparts emphasis to the concluding verse: Horace's longing for the country is so intense that it can only be conveyed in words that recall the daemonic urge that sent Epicurus on his mental voyage of discovery round the cosmos.

Might Lamia and his friends perhaps have felt that this was laying it on a bit thick? Can the language of these verses have been intended to be taken seriously? If the race-course metaphor is present, what is its propriety in the context? Of if, as seems more probable, the lines are meant to remind the reader of Lucretius, and the *spatia* are the distance that separates Horace from his country retreat, is not the implied equation of Epicurus' immense voyage with the road from Rome to the *Sabinum* somewhat overdone—if it is seriously intended? That the third book of the *De Rerum Natura* was in Horace's mind when he wrote this Epistle is indicated by vv. 12–13, which condense in a nutshell the thought of *D.R.N.* 3.1053–1075. And vv. 7–8 inevitably recall another passage from the same book:

*insatiabiliter defleuimus aeternumque
nulla dies nobis maerorem e pectore demet.* (907–908)

Lucretius' tone in that passage is mordant and sarcastic; unless Horace had totally misunderstood him, which I am reluctant to believe, it was hardly tactful to recall it at this juncture if vv. 6–9 were meant to appear as a serious reflection of Lamia's grief. And, to come back to our first question: was it appropriate to represent that grief in such high-flown language when the objective at the other end of the intervening *spatia* turns out to be nothing more urgent or uplifting than a comfortable little dinner with a snooze by the brook to follow,

cena breuis ... et prope riium somnus in herba?

24 Stégen (n. 22) 75.
25 Two only in *T.L.L.* III 1321.8–9: Manil. 5.76, Sidon. Carm. 23.331.
26 Cf. especially 1058–1059 quaeere semper/ commutare locum; 1068–1070 hoc se quisque modo fugit, at quem scilicet, ut fit; effugere haud potis est, ingratis haeret et odit/ propterea, morbi quia causam non tenet aeger. 27 Cf. my note ad loc.
That is all that Horace's restoration to himself (1), in this Epistle, seems to amount to.

III

Had Lamia's brother really died, or was Lamia merely carrying on as if he had? Horace only says that he was raptus; by death, say the commentators, quoting parallels, but not such as prove the point. We may, however, compare C. 4.2.21-22 flebili sponsae iuuenemque raptum/ plorat; but there the context is unambiguous, which is not the case here. A person may be ravished by other agencies than death, and maeror may be due to other causes than bereavement. Not the least powerful of the forces that may sweep a man away is love: Prop. 2.25.44 utraque forma raptit, Ov. Am. 2.19.19 rapuisti . . . ocellos, al.; cf. A.R. 3.1018-1019 ῥῆς δ' ἀμαρνῆς/ ὀφθαλμῶν ἦρποζεν. Is it possible that Lamia's brother had got himself entangled with just such another as the rapax Cinara that Horace himself remembered from his own young days, and that Lamia was, shall we say, slightly over-reacting? In that case there would be an obvious point in the use of the inflated language borrowed from Lucretius as conveying a strong hint of the essential triviality of the iniuisa negotia that kept the poet from his comfortable villeggiatura. On this interpretation the ambiguity of rapto is part of the playful effect; for this a parallel is at hand in Horace himself, at C. 2.9.9-12:

\[
\text{tu semper urges flebilibus modis}
\text{Mysten ademptum nec tibi uespero}
\text{surgente decedunt amores}
\text{nec rapidum fugiente solem.}
\]

Professor Quinn is surely right to suggest on this passage "that Mystes, unlike Antilochus and Troilus, had been 'snatched away' (ademptum leaves the issue very open), not by death, but by our old friend the rich admirer—diues amator".28

That interpretation is recommended, as Quinn rightly argues, by the tone of the rest of the Ode. So with our Epistle. This is not a solemn composition: "the mood is the product of the desire to escape from entanglement, viewed half-lightly."29 Horace is not seriously concerned to straighten out his bailiff so much as to use him as a foil for an aspect of that most perennially fascinating of all topics, himself.30 At the end of

the Epistle the man is in effect told pretty brusquely to grin and bear his lot—"halt's Maul und weiter dienen." There is no real attempt to reason him out of his belief that city life is the life for him. Horace has been reasoned out of his own affection for Rome by the passage of the years: since he no longer wants to dress sharply, chat up girls, and get drunk, these things have lost their virtue for him. It is not that he is ashamed of having sown wild oats, but enough is enough (39). In spite of the efforts of interpreters to invest the Epistle, if not with profundity, with significance, there is precious little here that deserves to be called serious argument. One well-worn commonplace from the diatribe provides what doctrinal basis the poem may boast. To say that is not to criticize it adversely or to belittle Horace’s art: it is greatly to his credit that he has written so pleasing a piece on this slender foundation. But what we have here is a soufflé, not an argumentative pièce de résistance. That indeed I believe to be the whole point: the insubstantial character of the argument is meant to suggest the insecurity of Horace’s philosophical position.

If then the Epistle is very largely a joke at Horace’s own expense, a reference to a real bereavement, even by way of literary compliment to the bereaved, must in terms of the taste of any age be accounted a lapse of propriety. A jocular reference to the amours of a friend’s brother, however, would be quite another thing. Once upon a time Horace himself had played the fool with the Cinaras of this world and had taken an interest in the similar affairs of his intimates, had pressed for details and had been lyrically sympathetic to the ensuing revelations—

$$a, \text{ miser},$$

$$\text{quanta laborabas Charybdii,}^{31}$$

$$\text{digne puere meliore flamma. (C. I. 27. 18–20)}$$

Sed haec prius fuere: nowadays to have to stay in Rome to help Lamia to prise his silly young brother loose from one of the tribe—especially with Lamia carrying on as if the boy had come to an untimely end—was simply a monumental bore. He does not say so in so many words, but the ironical echo of Lucretius strongly suggests that this was what he felt. This is not the only passage in the Epistles where Horace twists a Lucretian allusion to his own purposes.\(^{32}\) If the tone of vv. 6–8 implies that Lamia is making an excessive fuss, equally the tone of vv. 8–9 may imply that Horace himself is at fault for equating a retreat to the country with

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31 On Charybdis as a symbol of rapacity in the orators and poets see Nisbet–Hubbard ad loc. For the role of the confidant cf. Epod. 1.25–26.

escape: for if it is true that a man can never escape himself (13), then—as indeed the Stoics held—place is neither here nor there, and Horace's rural idyll was to a large extent a confession of weakness and self-indulgence. Not entirely so, perhaps; other things being equal a man was no doubt better employed looking after his farm than wasting time in Rome. But the Lucretian language and ideas of vv. 8–9, 12–13 expose the lack of a real philosophical basis for the argument. If Lamia's brother is in some sense Horace's old self, his tribulations to be viewed with a certain detachment, if not impatience, Horace's new self is, philosophically speaking, a bit of a fraud. He may be consistent (16) and to that extent a better man than his bailiff, but he is still as yet some way from a solution to his problems.

IV

We may now look outside the Epistle itself and consider its place in the general scheme or what I have called the "plot" of the book as a whole. It will in fact be enough to take into account only Epp. 10–14, which form a group (the function of Ep. 13 being mainly that of what may be called punctuation)33 in which the chief emphasis lies on the connexion, or lack of it, between happiness and place. In Ep. 10, as in 14, Horace contrasts his love of the country with his correspondent's attachment to Rome. As often in the Epistles, the argument is not easy to follow when one attempts to get to grips with it, but the end of the letter finds Horace apparently in no doubt about where, for him, contentment is to be sought: the last word of the text is laetus. In the following letter this position is by implication subjected to a fresh examination and, if not rejected, at least somewhat qualified, for at the end of it Horace reasserts the standard philosophical precept that the true sapiens can achieve contentment anywhere. In Ep. 11, as between town and country, he is neutral: happiness is in the mind. Ep. 12 is addressed, like 14, to a steward, though one of superior class to the vilicus, one Iccius, a figure whom we have already encountered in the Odes. Again the theme is contentment (2 si recte frueris e.q.s.), though the idea of place, in so far as it is present, is given a different turn: Iccius, it is suggested with unmistakable irony (15), would be more likely to find contentment with his lot if he came down to earth and attended to what is going on around him. Irony, "l'arme des gens du monde,"34 would be wasted on Horace's own steward, who, as we have seen, is put in his place in Ep. 14 without any of the

33 See Appendix.
34 E. Courbaud, Horace, sa vie et sa pensée à l'époque des Épîtres (1914) 151.
ceremony deemed tactful for Iccius. But one of the underlying implications of both letters, as of *Epp.* 10 and 11, is the same: in all of them Horace presents himself, in contrast with the addressees, as having attained to some measure of equanimity, as having to some degree succeeded in coming to terms with himself and his surroundings. *μεμψιμορία,* it is rather smugly implied, is something other people suffer from, and Horace has earned the right to offer advice from a point of relative vantage. It is true that in *Ep.* 14 he stops short of the extreme position that he seems to commend at the end of *Ep.* 11, that true equanimity and place are unconnected, but at least he can claim that he knows what is best for him and that his behaviour is consistent. His preference for a quiet and frugal life in the country may not be based on fundamental philosophical considerations, but at any rate his experience has taught him what best suits his case. To that extent contentment has not only been secured but is seen to be allied to self-knowledge.

The impression cumulatively built up in *Epp.* 10–14 is blown to the winds by the opening sentence of *Ep.* 15. A monster indirect question, inflated by parentheses, of twenty-five verses shows Horace as a fussy valetudinarian, intensely preoccupied with the choice of a suitable spa for his cure, with the right kind of wine for seaside drinking, and with the availability of game and seafood—so much for the *cena breuis!* For, as he archly tells us at the end of the letter, his self-denial can resist anything but temptation (42–46). Several features of *Ep.* 15 distinguish it from all the other poems in the book and suggest an affinity with the Satires. Whether Horace deliberately wrote it in this style for this place between *Epp.* 14 and 1635 or whether it was an earlier piece that he still had by him36 and which luckily came pat, makes no difference to its effect in its context—one of robust deflation. The general impression of Horace as, if not *sapiens,* at least *proficiens,* that had seemed to emerge from *Ep.* 10 onwards is abruptly and rudely dissipated.

Whatever reservations one may have on the score of technique about this sudden reversion to the manner of the Satires, the intention is clear: Horace has humorously destroyed the self-portrait that he has been engaged in painting. Yet hints that the portrait was not to be taken with entire seriousness can be detected, as has already been argued, in *Ep.* 14—indeed the motto of that poem might have been *satis inter uilia fortis* (15.43). It is because the pursuit of Cinara and what is associated with it are now *uilia* to Horace that he can afford to renounce them so cheerfully. The bailiff still hankers after such things, but that is his bad luck;

35 For the suggestion that it provides an effective foil to the serious and noble *Ep.* 16 see McGann (n. 9) 73. 36 So Courbaud (n. 34) 195.
he has no choice but to fall in with Horace's wishes, not because Horace is a better philosopher than he, as the beginning of the Epistle appears to suggest will emerge from the discussion (4-5), but because he is the master. In this light-hearted and humorously self-critical atmosphere the theme of grief for a dead brother is intrusive. It strikes a quite inopportune note of solemnity, which is at odds, not only with Ep. 14 itself but with the whole tone and tenor of the group of Epistles of which it forms part. If I am wrong about this and Horace did mean to refer seriously to a serious subject, he seems to me to have been guilty of a bad error of literary and social taste. I prefer myself to believe him incapable of such a solecism; I suspect, however, that most of his admirers will not after all these years readily countenance the demotion of the lachrymose Lamia from a figure of tragedy to one of high comedy, and I look forward to reading more than one impassioned defence of Horace's warm humanity and compassion for his grief-stricken friend.

Appendix

The "static" schema, as I have called it, of Epistles Book I is simple:

1  To Maecenas
   2–6
7  To Maecenas
   8–12
13 To (Augustus)
   14–18
19 To Maecenas

The separate status of Ep. 20 (analogous to but more sharply defined than that of Eclogue 10) is reinforced by the double responson of the addressees of 1 and 19 (Maecenas), 2 and 18 (Lollius). Ep. 13, ostensibly to Vinnius Valens, is really to the address of Augustus. Its status in the architecture of the book is seen more clearly if it refers, not as has usually been held to Odes I–III, but as Professor M. L. Clarke has convincingly argued,37 to Epistles I itself. The above analysis, which I formulated independently, is in basic agreement with that of Préaux;38 his further elaborations strike me as in some respects questionable.

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38 Préaux (n. 1) 6.
Propertius 3.22: Tullus’ Return

MICHAEL C. J. PUTNAM

Propertius' friend Tullus is the recipient of five poems, four from the Monobiblos, which tell us as much about the poet as about his interlocutor. The first poem, initiating the collection, announces the taut suffering of Propertius' affair with Cynthia, and the envoi of the book expands self-scrutiny into the wider scope of a land maimed by civic hostility. Two intervening elegies, 6 and 14, look to specific differences between poet and acquaintance. Tullus is richer and loveless, Propertius caught in passion's toils (and Tullus should be wary!). Tullus also is a servant of the state, and is associated with Ionia and Lydia, with the Pactolus as well as the Tiber. Engrossed by his allegiance to armata patria (1.6.22), to his fatherland under arms, he has no time for love or marriage.

Finally, with one book of poems and presumably some time intervening, Propertius imagines Tullus' reorientation toward Rome and amor in the extraordinary twenty-second poem of book 3. Thought of this literal return to the mother city from Cyzicus, where Tullus has apparently been stationed on the Propontis, sparks a meditation not only on what this means for Tullus' life but also on differing concepts of public and private ethics, of heroism and individual dignity, and the landscape backgrounds which embody their continuity. There can be little doubt that Propertius measured his thoughts against Virgil's famous laudes Italiae of georgic 2, and the challenging moral dilemmas of the


It is surely no accident that 3.22 bears the same number in its book as the last preceding apostrophe to Tullus, 1.22 (on which see M. C. J. Putnam, “Propertius 1.22: A Poet's Self-definition” forthcoming in Quaderni Urbinati).
Aeneid may also have been his concern. In each instance comparison instructs us in Propertian intellectual modes.

The poem divides neatly in half, its central focus resting on a concise but tonally ambiguous definition of contemporary Roman political ideology (21–22):

nam quantum ferro tantum pictate potentes
stamus: victrices temperat ira manus.

Immediately to either side of this fulcrum of abstraction we find (preceding it) four lines on the omni-productive quality of Romana terra, and, following, four verses on Rome-centered rivers, lakes and a spring. Working chiastically from this core, Propertius devotes twelve lines to detailing Tullus’ putative travels in the Mediterranean basin (5–16) and a counter-balancing, equal number to monsters and monstrous doings on the part of human and divine culled primarily from Greek myth. Framing these segments, and thus also the poem, are two pairs of couplets devoted to Tullus, the one outlining his situation in chill Cyzicus, the other cataloguing the duties and rewards that should await a Tullus newly returned to accept a citizen’s allegiance toward Rome as land and city, and an individual’s responsibility to gens and married life (39–42). The journey toward Rome leads from frigida Cyzicus to amor, from present to future, from visual excitement to a deeper stability based on deeper commitments. This future destiny, paradoxically, would seem to renounce a teleology of empire for more intimate, yet more universal cycles of human regeneration. Rome and her servant suffer a critical evolution as the mythic pretensions of Augustan Rome diminish before more realistic ends.

The initial segments define Tullus principally as sightseer, following out the exploits of errant Greek warriors. His own domain features a famous isthmus built by Alexander the Great, which strangely “flows” like the water it intersects, and a statue of Cybele with Argonautic associations, made from a vine stalk. It also contains one of the “ways” which carried the horses of Dis during the rape of Persephone. This is an excitable, poetically energized landscape, lively with event and doubly studded with the effects of human artisanship and divine amatory exploit. This vitality carries over into Propertius’ musings on Tullus’ vicarious adventuring which divides itself between east and west, between the

more individualistic hazards of Theseus and Hercules and the communal heroism of the Argonauts whose leader is not named.

Here too there are hints first at metamorphosis, then of the hero as craftsman. Tullus might behold Atlas, once giant, now a mountain. He might see the head of Medusa (with the power to alter man to stone) which Propertius treats metaphorically as if Perseus’ brave act were one of careful facial sculpting, not violent decapitation (secta . . . Persea Phorcidos ora manu). Other labors of Hercules are defined not by deed but by nominal remnant—stabula, signa, choros, marks of event but statuary as well, choral dances but also dancing floors, former deeds frozen into present artifact to be contemplated by a spectator. Propertius chooses to see Tullus’ emulation of the Argonauts in more physical terms. He must urge on the river Phasis itself, and not merely his boat, toward its Colchian mouth. The Argo furnishes elaborate evidence of the object crafted as the poet turns from synecdoche to accomplished fact, from the poetic part (trabs) to the reality of the ship’s construction (in faciem prorae pinus adacta novae). The formative act, the moulding of the first boat’s features, appears a violence offered to nature, a pine forced to take novel shape.

Propertius had begun his catalogue of Tullus’ foreign doings with allusion to Sestos and Abydos, the cities of Helle, daughter of Athamas (another piece of Argonautica). He concludes by reference to the Cayster mouth, with Ortygie its neighboring grove, and to the spreading Nile delta. On an immediate level the list supplements previous references to the Mediterranean’s impressive tributaries, Propontic waters or the Phasis. An ancient reader would also have foreseen these estuaries as marks for the famous temple to Diana at Ephesus or the pyramids, magnets on the grand tour but also striking natural settings, the ultimate in tangible reminders of vainglorious man’s achievements as monumental artist. As such they would typify another, still more political aspect of the hero as artisan, and serve as climax to a list which began with the Argonauts’ manufacture of Cybele’s statue and extended to the strange creation of the Argo itself.

It is an effective moment at which to face Rome (17–20):

omnia Romanae cedent miracula terrae:
    natura hic posuit, quidquid ubique fuit.
arma apta magis tellus quam commoda noxae:
    Famam, Roma, tuae non pudet historiae.

4 On propello, re. Tränkle op. cit. 84 f.
5 M. E. Hubbard (“Propertiana,” CQ 18 [1968], 319), unwilling to see a visit to Egypt possible for Tullus, would change septenae to serpentes and see the Meander, not the Nile, as the river in question.
We have seen many *miracula*, much grandeur in landscape and human-kind, but all are surpassed, so the poet hyperbolically claims, by a land whose chief accomplishment (we are no longer dealing with things tangible) is the combination of mental and physical prowess to pattern a world under sway, force of arms at the service of consequential abstractions: "for we stand mighty as much from weaponry as from piety; our anger restrains its conquering hands."6 This apothegm first appears a precis of that particular Roman humanistic heroism, displayed in her surpassing organizational talent, with force applied to create and maintain peace and order. Nevertheless there are ambiguities to the sentiment already adumbrated in the preceding couplets. Propertius uses the future, not the present tense, to predict, not preserve, the Roman miracle. If nature placed here whatever existed anywhere, nature created thereby a motley product embracing all levels of the moral spectrum. This is a land more fitting for arms than suitable to fault, but the situation, as Propertius phrases it, is relative. There is more emphasis on war than criminality but the latter is not totally absent. When Rome is addressed it is only to give assurance that *Fama* will not be ashamed of her history. This is an equivocal utterance at best. Propertius could simply have claimed that the Roman past was reputable. But he complicates his statement by adding the dubious figure of *Fama* who can dispense propagandistic report as well as an honest renown. This convoluted phraseology, with the challenge of sensing *pudor* arrogated to such a creature, raises doubts about the poet's tone which are sustained in the next and culminating couplet.

A proper balance between *ferrum* and *pietas*, supplementing and correcting the previous distinction between *armis* and *nox*, is at the core of the Augustan ideology—piety toward state and family based on restrained martial strength. Augustus' self-control had at an earlier time elicited one of the poet's rare moments of apparent praise (2.16.41-42):

Caesaris haec virtus et gloria Caesaris haec est:
illa, qua vicit, condidit arma manu.

But the present utterance is less straightforward. Anger and temperance provoke antagonistic not cumulative reactions. A victor who relies on wrath for moderation bases his actions on a moral paradox.

We may survey this friction between *temperat* and *ira*, toward which *armis, noxa, ferro* and *pietate* aim, expanded still more generously in the

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6 The different contexts in which *manus* and *temperat* have already been used (8 and 16) point up this change from literal to ideological in its several guises.
ethical world of the Aeneid and its hero. Virgil’s song deals with the interrelationship between arma virumque, between arms and a man who is, we soon learn, insignem pietate (Aen. 1.10) and the victim of a goddess’ anger (iram, 1.4). The end of the epic finds him, fierce in his arms (acer in armis, 12.938), watching the beaten Turnus and for a moment restraining his hand (dextram repressit, 939). The sight of Pallas’ belt provokes an outburst of anger (he is ira terribilis, 946–947) during which he kills the suppliant (ferrum adverso sub pectore condit, 950).

I have quoted the Latin in detail to show the similarity in Virgil’s treatment of his hero’s final deed to the tensions in the Roman programme as defined by Propertius. Momentary restraint yields to a furious anger. Each characteristic of Aeneas, his temperantia and his ira, can be defended as an act of pietas, either toward his father, who had urged clemency for the prideful subdued, or toward Pallas and Evander, his protege and befriender. But Anchises’ famous words—parcere subiectis et debellare superbos—should also be weighty. Their continued vitality is illustrated in Horace’s near-contemporary portrait of Augustus in a poem where he is specifically given the pedigree of Aeneas, scion of Anchises and Venus:

... bellante prior, iacentem
lenis in hostem. (c.s. 51–52)

Here battling comes first, moderation afterwards, a clear reversal of Aeneas’ procedure. Virgil regularly pits the intimate cycles of human suffering or the grander swirls of civilization in history against the linear vision of Rome’s imperial apocalypse. Propertius, without direct allusion, sensed the conflict between the morality of a model Roman, living out his ideal role as a gentle conqueror, and the dictates of human emotion which rely more on passion than control. This is a dilemma at the core

7 That Propertius knew the gist, if not the scope, of the Aeneid as early as 25 is clear from the grandiloquent, perhaps condescending, maybe even depreciatory reference to the epic in 2.34.66 (nescio quid maius nascitur Iliade). Since the third book was published after the death of Marcellus in 23 or 22, presumably some further time elapsed before the writing of 3.22 during which his knowledge of the epic would have expanded. For the death of Marcellus in the chronology of Virgil’s readings from the Aeneid, see vita Donati 32 (Hardie).

of the Augustan dream with manifest bearing on Tullus or anyone in service to an *armata patria*, who must support pietistic allegiance through force of arms.

It is reasonable that the center, though not the climax, of a poem luring Tullus back to Rome should scrutinize Rome's unquestioned devotion to the state, in all its guises, over self and family. In Cicero, for example, the importance of fidelity to republic instead of individual can be seen in his strictures to the hedonistic Caelius who changed his ways after a period of pleasure: "revocet se aliquando ad curam rei domesticae, rei forensis reique publicae..." (*pro Cael. 42*). But this last needs to be qualified by a more elaborate breakdown in *de Officiis* (1.74): "Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res belicas maiores esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio... vere autem si volumus iudicare, multae res exstiterunt urbanei maiores clarioresque quam belicae."

In suggesting to Tullus a similar reordering of priorities, Propertius suitably enough begins with one sempiternal aspect of what "nature" gave the Roman earth, namely the landscape background of these multifarious patterns of organization (23–26):

**hic Anio Tiburne fluis, Clitumnus ab Umbro**

**tramite, et aeternum Marcii umor opus,**

**Albanus lacus et socia Nemorensis ab unda,**

**potaque Pollucis nympha salubris equo.**

By contrast to the exotic waters now Tullus' wandering lot Propertius sets his vision on Rome andcatalogues first rivers, then lakes that decorate her setting. The reader's eye is always directed on the city. It first follows the Anio, then the Clitumnus from its Umbrian course, each tributaries to Rome's great river. And the *aqua Marcia*, splendid example of man's technology used for civic benefit, coursed in the only aqueduct that led directly to the Capitolium. The same orientation holds for the stationary waters, the lakes of Albanus and Nemorensis and the *fons Juturnae*. The first are in the distant hills (and fed from an allied further source, *socia ab unda*). The last takes us directly to the Roman forum and to a moment in history long past when the Dioscuri were said to refresh their horses at the spring of Juturna after the battle of Lake Regillus. This spot is a far cry, literally and figuratively, from the path which Tullus at present admires where the steeds of Dis carried off Persephone. It might serve as a positive reminder to him not only of Rome's essence but

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8 Quoted by S. Commager in his excellent survey of Propertius' "anti-political legacy" (*A Prolegomenon to Propertius* [Cincinnati, 1974], 37 ff.).

9 Re. Front. *de Aquaeductu* 7.4–5. A union of *aeternum opus*, the Capitoline, and Roman imperial continuity was a congenial subject of speculation for Horace and Virgil as well.
of a former moment when battling in the hills near Rome was over and horses were watered at peace in the midst of res urbane.\textsuperscript{10}

With landscape established, Propertius turns back to Greece to show by contrast with Italy first what natural enormities, then, more expansively, what human oddities fail to exist on Italian soil. These lines (27–38) serve as counterpoise to the earlier outline of Tullus’ supposed itineraries and the aspects of vivid heroism they conveyed. We relinquish the public for the private sphere of action, exchanging emphasis on physical prowess, craftsmanship or mere visual persistence for scrutiny of myths involving the ethics of individual human conduct. These emphasize heavily but not exclusively the perversion of pietas between parents and offspring, the burden of guilt resting largely with the former. We begin with Andromeda who suffered for her mother’s pride and with an allusion to the banquet of Thyestes, engorging his own children. The first part of the list concludes with reference to another mother, Althea, who killed her son Meleager by burning a log on whose preservation his life depended.

Mention of Pentheus, torn apart by his mother Agave and her sisters, introduces a new variable (33–36):

\begin{quote}

Penthea non saevae venantur in arbore Bacchae,  
\quad nec solvit Danaas subdita cerva ratis;  
cornua nec valuit curvare in paelice Iuno  
\quad aut faciem turpi dedecorare bove; . . .
\end{quote}

Not only does parent do violence to child but the poet treats Pentheus, seen by his mother, as prey, herself as predator. The same notion of human envisioned as beast, reflecting metaphorically back on the protagonist’s behavior, is extended in the next episode to Agamemnon who would have sacrificed his daughter had not an animal been substituted in her place. The point becomes most explicit in the episode of Juno and Io. We move from a level of parental misdeeds to divine mistreatment of human in an action which at once makes a mockery of pietas and eliminates human dignity by forcing the victim to suffer direct metamorphosis into an animal. In a parallel passage earlier in the poem Propertius planned the construction of the Argo as in part a forced twisting of the natural into the unnatural (\textit{in faciem prorae pinus adacta novae, 14}), a novel monster that would not rage, we assume, in Italian waters (\textit{Itala portentis nec furit unda novis, 28}). We now watch deus withdrawn from a human being by a similarly degrading alteration, this time

\textsuperscript{10} The Greek mythic-heroic world thus finds a creative resolution in Roman civic peace.
totally within the realm of the animate and of supposedly rational beings.

Sinis, Sciron and Procrustes figure with enigmatic briskness in the final couplet of perversities (37–38):

\[
\text{arboreasque cruces Sinis, et non hospita Grais}
\]
\[
\text{saxa, et curvatas in sua fata trabes.}^{11}
\]

Abuse here extends from human to inanimate. Not only do these three uncivilized denizens of the Saronic coast destroy the traditionally sacred relationship between host and guest, they corrupt nature and landscape in the process. Trees are transformed into instruments of torture, timbers are curved against their own instinct for the undoing of others. The verb *curvare* is deliberately repeated from line 35: Juno’s disfigurement of her rival is only varied in a robber’s misuse of land for the destruction of mankind. It remained for Theseus to remove these hybrid menaces from the path of those travelling toward Athens. The two basic subjects called to Tullus’ attention, aspects of public heroism and personal morality, thus converge at the end. And while Theseus recalls Athens, Tullus, and Propertius’ readers would think of Rome by analogy.

It is surely no accident that Propertius urges Italy on her errant son by a pejorative register of what she does not possess in tangible monuments to former heroic prowess or in unenviable standards of personal conduct. He singles out for praise neither specific deeds in the Roman past nor personalities embodying virtues of consequence. Italy could be said to gain by comparison with the Hellenic past, yet the poet’s avoidance of open praise, save in his treatment of landscape setting, strengthens its negative opposite. Tullus, though his potential change of heart is treated positively, is the only Roman named, whether public or private ethics, imperial or civic virtue is Propertius’ concern.

Certainly the new relationship between Tullus and the metropolis to which Propertius devotes his final, climactic lines, appears the more productive by comparison with what has gone before (39–42):

\[
\text{haec, tibi, Tulle, parens, haec est pulcherrima sedes,}
\]
\[
\text{hic tibi pro digna gente petendus honos,}
\]
\[
\text{hic tibi ad eloquium cives, hic ampla nepotum}
\]
\[
\text{spes et venturae coniugis aptus amor.}
\]

\(^{11}\text{Though absence of a verb has led most critics to postulate a lacuna before line 37, the exacting symmetry of the poem tells against such a view (such a syntactic disjunction is by no means unique in Propertius). More troublesome is the distribution of arboreas cruces, saxa and trabes among Sinis, Sciron and Procrustes. My own view is that Propertius, for his own purposes, has exchanged Sinis and Procrustes. See the detailed discussion of both problems by Camps, op. cit., ad loc.}\)
Suddenly the complexities of the Propertian style disappear, and therewith much of the problems the poem had posed to highlight this very moment. Nurturing landscape and the intense beauty of a stable spot affirm an important reformation of Tullus' values, a turning away from heroism based on strength or itinerant hedonism, from propagandistic representations of Roman imperialism combining virtue and force, from ethical values corrupting family life and personal dignitas. Their replacements, which take eternal abstractions and posit them in Tullus' putative future, conjoin the urban and the familial. To lure Tullus out of distant service to arms Propertius formulates a union of devotion to one's immediate household, to tribe and to state that assumes a continuous responsibility. Art lies in the use of words, not deeds, not in reinforcing Roman rule over Asian allies but in rhetoric before citizens (it is not long since our inner eye has rested on the forum's grace). Embarking on the cursus honorum will reassert the quality of gens. Above all nepotes and amor will assure not only domestic happiness but family continuity as well.

I will return to the intimations of immortality that children bring by assuring endurance of nomen, and to an inherent contrast with Propertius' own grasping at eternity. Suffice it to point out here the wide difference between this ending and Virgil's thoughts on Roman spiritual objectives, first because they conclude where Propertius has only reached midpoint, second because of an added pessimism constantly tempering Virgil's projection of future Roman glory.

Throughout his speeches in Aeneid 6, Anchises makes clear the tight interdependence of "name" and nepotes. Yet the latter word recurs emphatically in his final obituary of Marcellus whose human mortality obliterates genetic future and makes meaningless the combination of pietas with invicta bello dextra that links him with the Augustan credo as detailed by Virgil and summarized by Propertius. Virgil undermines this

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12 These lines seem particularly inept to G. Williams who speaks of "empty and unconvincing talk of magisterial office, eloquence, hope of descendants" (Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry [Oxford, 1968], 425). His complaints have been in part answered by R. J. Baker "Duplices Tabellae: Propertius 3.23 and Ovid Amores 1.12," CP 68 (1973), 109-113, esp. 110.

13 Aen. 6.876-879. Virgil's gloom in forecasting continued reputation in historical time after death takes many guises. In one form we ponder Priam truncus (Aen. 2.557) and Aeneas himself inhumatus (Aen. 4.620). Lesser characters like Palinurus, Misenus or Caieta, give their names to features of topography, a dubious distinction Virgil makes clear in the case of the last (si qua est ea gloria, Aen. 7.4). The reputation of Nisus and Euryalus will endure as long as the house of Aeneas dwells on the Capitoline (Aen. 9.448-449), but the fallibility inherent in such a prediction is magnified in Virgil's irony at the greed of their blood-thirsty progress.
ideology most succinctly at the end of his epic, allowing his hero to be victimized by an aspect of that furor which had guided his opponents and challenged his own goals. Propertius strides forward in a direction Anchises might have considered mediocre. Alii . . . orabunt causas melius Aeneas’ father had said just before his famous dictum on sparing suppliants and warring down the prideful. In spite of a Cicero in Rome’s future, others will be better rhetors. For Propertius, however, such prowess is an essential part of civic duty, of the res urbane that, as a good elegist, he urges for antidote to the martial activism of Rome found incorporated most expansively in the paradoxes of Virgilian epic.

Virgil also forces us, again by internal means, to question the tone of his laudes Italae from the second georgic, the single strongest influence on Propertius’ ideas in 3.22 and their ordering (geo. 2.136–176). Here too the elegist, with his own special difficulties of modulation, has proposed an alternative to Virgil’s didactic awareness of nature’s combined violence and productivity, and of man the warrior, Italy’s strangest crop. In pieces of virtually the same length (the Virgilian excerpt measures forty-one lines), each poet deals with the land as parens, though Virgil’s concluding apostrophe is more fulsome (173–174):

    salve, magna parens frugum, Saturnia tellus,
    magna virum: . . .

Allusion to a once golden age, Saturnia tellus, becomes for Propertius acknowledgement of actual Rome’s universality, first through Romana terra, to which a generously ambiguous nature gave everything that had been created, then by the more directly worrisome armis apta tellus.

Propertius has little concern with nature’s beneficence and Virgil leaves reference to her constant spring and double creativity to only a few lines. Even the products of a presumably Saturnian age, when the land flowed with silver, bronze, and gold, contemporary man, artificer of competition, has hardened for his destructive ends, Virgil tells us elsewhere in the same book. But the poets overlap in dealing with the realms

of landscape and of myth. Virgil singles out large bodies of water, the
northern lakes Larius and Benacus, and the Lucrine harbor constructed
by Agrippa, and comments primarily on their energy—Benacus rising
with the roar of the sea, the Lucrine chafing with loud thunderings
against its man-made barriers. Propertius, as we have seen, has none of
this, offering instead a catalogue of specifically Roman waters remarkable
for its simplicity and restraint, to enhance his turning of Tullus away
from arms, distant or near, to Roman civilities, from *armis apta tellus* to
*aptus amor*, from *noxa* to a *nympha salubris*. Unlike Agrippa’s forced con-
tr ol of nature for military purposes, Propertius’ *aqua Marcia* orders
nature for civic ends.

The one topographical spot both poets share illustrates graphically
their divergence. For Propertius mention of the Clitumnus merely draws
the eye along its stream from his native Umbria (*ab Umbro tramite*) toward
the Tiber and Rome. For Virgil it serves the same purpose but with an
additional fillip (146–148):

hinc albi, Clitumne, greges et maxima taurus
victima, saecp tuo perfusi flumine sacro,
Romanos ad tempa deum duxere triumphos.

The eye again leaps to Rome but only to see Clitumnus’ white bulls
partaking in Roman ceremonies of triumph and then immolated, the
final amalgamation of military glory and Rome.

The poets’ use of myth also provides an object lesson in their dif-
ferences. Propertius analogizes through myth what Tullus now is and
what his Rome should not be. Tullus, in his patriotic journeying, is
viewed as a Herculean or Argonautic wanderer, not necessarily fully
committed to the Roman heroic fusion of *pietas* and *ferrum*, the “here”
of Rome’s miraculous, volatile, abstractions. This “here,” as we have
noted, is also scrutinized by Propertius for its private ethics, this time
using Hellenic tales to mirror what Italy is not. In watching Greek
models for the relationships of parents and children, gods and mortals,
hosts and strangers, we substituted torture, annihilation, de-personal-
ation, even the rending apart of the human body, for sustained affection
and respect for personal integrity. In finally embracing as his goals civic
*honos* and familial *amor*, Tullus would suffer dual metamorphosis away
from his chill Cyzicus, not only from Greek heroics and Roman arms
guided by piety instead of evil, but also from the private improprieties
of Hellenic legend. In the process Propertius’ Rome would seem to
change for the better as well.

Virgil by contrast treats myth with a more pervasive irony. His one
bow to the Greek past comes at the start of his aretology and also is meant to urge contemplation of what Italy does not offer (140–142):

haec loca non tauri spirantes naribus ignem
invertere satis immanis dentibus hydri,
nec galeis densisque virum seges horruit hastis; . . .

Virgil also disclaims any Argonautic influence on Italy's growth. Literally there are no fire-breathing bulls, no dragon's teeth to sow, no crops of men armed with helmets and spears, springing from Italian soil. By the end of his hymn, however, Virgil has enticed his reader to perceive the symbolic aptness of the same tale of Jason. The developing "myth" of an historical Rome, that uses bulls for sacrifice at triumphs and encloses a seaside bay as an arena for naval maneuvers, is in fact engendered by its crop of armed men, the genus acre virum that Italy has borne. This harvest begins with general reference to peninsular tribes—Marsi and Volsci equipped with darts—extends to pluralities of Republican Roman notables—Decii, Camilli, sons of Scipio hard in war—and culminates in a unique Caesar, mightiest of them all upon whom Virgil casts a particularly detached glance. This apex of the Italian martial heritage is off in the farthest reaches of Asia, making war against the unwarlike Indi, preserving the fortresses of Rome from her onslaughts. It is no wonder that the art of Virgil's praises is based on Hesiod's Asraeum carmen, for both have full, if idiosyncratic, awareness of the many levels of labor in human existence.

Virgil, treating landscape and people in one ontological expression, thrusts against his formal thesis from within by imaginative means.15 Propertius, while he unfolds a linear development of heroism and of Rome itself as backdrop for Tullus' own growth, senses alternatives both in the literal placement and in the spiritual outlook of his protagonist. Virgil offers no relieving modification. There was, to be sure, a time past (the second georgic concludes) when families were stable and man's competitiveness found easy release in gaming at festival time. The present, by contrast, finds Saturn yielding to Jupiter as men banquet on cattle they have slaughtered and forge swords. The contemporary stance which Propertius and Tullus share (stamus) objectifies much the same ethical pattern.16 But the elegist's personal involvement ultimately directs itself toward a future for which Rome is centripetal. This future moment of Tullus' return would fulfill the poet's desire. It would also

16 The ideological significance of statio is discussed by G. Binder Aeneas und Augustus (Meisenheim, 1972), 15 f. and n. 37 for further bibliography.
assure Tullus of a continued existence based on his progeny. The final emotion is *amor* but the operative virtue is *spes*. Each challenges war's destructive feuding in a Rome which can now promise a setting for the peaceful execution of civil and familial trust.

Propertius' meaning is often sharpened by friction with adjacent poems, and 3.22, as recent critics have well noted, is no exception. The preceding poem outlines a trip to Athens and its intellectual attractions as a *remedium amoris*. Where Tullus at Cyzicus had avoided love and city through Roman adventuring, Propertius urges on his boat toward a different isthmus, away from Rome and the bitterness of an unresponsive Cynthia. The elegy that succeeds 3.22 finds Propertius again in Rome but now with his *tabellae* lost. This is thought, with some reason, to define a lack of inspiration or productivity concomitant with the cooling of the Cynthia affair. The last two poems of the book, bitter leave-takings, are climax and conclusion of the series. It is natural that the linear directness of this grouping should find its balance in the opening five elegies which have long been recognized to coalesce around the theme of a poet's response to his craft and to its relationship with present Roman society.

There is elaborate poetic interaction between the two segments. If this parallelism is viewed chiastically, the fourth and the twenty-second poems are complements. In each the poet is at Rome, voicing his concern for the attitudes of those in power. The first word *arma* sets the tone for an appraisal more rich with irony than the exhortation to Tullus. Roman *historia* (the word appears prominently in each poem) at the moment could be seen as idealistically based on the piety of revenge (*Crassos clademque piate!*). The immediate results of this plea, however, are victories and booty, not moral uplift. The arms godlike Caesar is pondering are against the wealthy Indi as he prepares to cleave a gem-rich sea. A great reward, the poet exclaims, to achieve a triumph from the farthest land (and from a people Virgil called unwarlike). But Propertius expresses his final disdain by surveying the procession pass by from the lap of his girl. The aloof elegist observes, and that is all, the celebration of background facts for an epic he could never write.

17 The relationship between 3.22 and 3.23 is treated in detail by R. J. Baker “Propertius' lost *Bona*,” *AJP* 90 (1969), 333-337.

18 The linear interrelationship of the last poems is discussed by R. J. Baker “*Miles annosus*: the Military Motif in Propertius,” *Latomus* 27 (1968), 322-349, esp. 339 f.; J. A. Barsby “The Composition and Publication of the first three books of Propertius,” *G&R* 21 (1974), 128-137, esp. 135 ff. Cf. the words of W. A. Camps, *op. cit.* 154, in his introduction to 3.22: “His [Tullus'] reappearance here may be significant, for the neighboring Elegies xxi, xxiv and xxv suggest that a new phase is about to begin for the poet.”
Juxtaposition again sharpens intellectual design since the subsequent poem reviews similar arguments. Propertius is a poet of peace and needs no rich crystal from which to slake his thirst nor bronzes from the sack of Corinth. What good reliance on externals since death, the great equalizer, mixes conquered and conqueror, poor and rich. In his life of the mind, when old age interrupts elegiac powers, he will turn to larger realms of nature, to didactic physiology, certainly not to the epic of those who care for arms and for vengeance over the standards of Crassus.

The number of such correlations in Propertius’ third book argues for a pattern of organization extending beyond the linear stretches of the beginning and the end. These correlations rely as much on alternation as on unity of theme for their potential. Divergence between what might be called public and private topics becomes a frequent principle of fusion. Taking up after poem 5 we have a poem on the depth of Cynthia’s affection next to an indictment of the avarice that drove Paetus to his maritime death. Praise for the advantages of lovers’ squabbles (8) neighbors one of Propertius’ two addresses to Maecenas; his restraint in matters of politics should serve as warning against any generic overreaching on the poet’s part (9). The tenth poem is a birthday hymn to Cynthia while the eleventh, announcing the dictatorial power of woman, ends pointedly with praises of Caesar for extricating Rome from Cleopatra’s threatening coils. But the ring of this laudation is immediately dulled with a poem that shows the devastating results of public intrusion on the private sphere (3.12.1–2):

Postume, ploran tem potuisti linquere Gallam,  
miles et Augusti fortia signa sequi?

Postumus and Augustus, warring, journeying and greed are on one side, Galla and Rome, stability and fidelity remain on the other.

But whether one traces patterns of sequence or alternation or their combination, there are certain topics that permeate the book as a whole.\(^1\)

The chief of these, which in some way marks each poem, is the idea of time and the artist’s desperate postures between death and life. We contemplate this struggle in the most intimate as well as the most expansive poems. In poem 16, for instance, as he faces the danger of a

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nocturnal venture to his mistress in Tibur, Propertius concludes with a meditation on the proper status of a poet’s tomb. Cynthia’s genethliacon prays for frozen time: may her beauty (forma) be everlasting (perennis), her reign over the poet eternal and these rituals annual. But forma, as the last duet of poems proves, is a highly evanescent endowment. Its disappearance should strike fear into Cynthia as it does final scorn in the poet (3.25.17-18):

has tibi fatalis cecinit mea pagina diras:
   eventum formae discie timere tuae!

The road to immortality, that ultimate illusion of genius, lies through poetry for his material and for its creator (3.1.23–24):

omnia post obitum fingt maiora vetustas:
   maius ab exsequis nomen in ora venit.

Propertius’ page is from the muses, whatever its contents, and as a vatis he can predict its endurance as well as Rome’s moral breakdown or Cynthia’s withering age (3.1.35–36):

meque inter seros laudabit Roma nepotes:
   illum post cineres auguror ipse diem.²⁰

The defiance time’s variousness presents human goals is a theme that unifies Propertius and Tullus, each in his different sphere. For Tullus, return to Rome betokens espousal on the ethical level of what Propertius lays claim to on the aesthetic. The autonomous purposes of history and poetry, fact and imagination for once supplement each other. Propertius’ renunciation of epic to maintain his stand as an elegist of breadth parallels Tullus’ foregoing of an imperial Rome bolstered by dogmatic arms to accept the urban civilities of political and familial life. Each will have his nepotes—those who in a later time will sing the praises of Propertius’ poetic accomplishment or those more literal creatures who will carry on Tullus’ name into the future. Tullus is more fortunate than Augustus who loses his Marcellus (genealogy, the poet matter-of-factly observes in elegy 18, gave him little help in the face of death). He is more felicitous still in that, like Cynthia, he was befriended by a poet. In spite of Propertius’ yearning for the one and seeming repulsion of the other, it is the strange excellence of his verse that has earned for them both, as well as for himself, their fragile yet continued triumph over mortality.

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²⁰ R. J. Baker, among others, has discussed in detail Propertius’ grasping at eternity in “Propertius III, i, 1–6 again. Intimations of Immortality?” Mnemosyne 21 (1968), 35–39. See also Nethercut, op. cit. passim.
Studies on the Naples Ms. IV F 3 of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*

WILLIAM S. ANDERSON

For just over 85 years now, since Alexander Riese published his collation of the ms., scholars have recognized the fundamental importance of the Naples ms. IV F 3 for the constitution of the text of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.\(^1\) A few years earlier, Riese had produced a competent edition of Ovid's poem, relying on the standard mss. used in that period. A trip to Naples led to careful study of IV F 3 and recognition of its significance, and so he brought out a second edition of his text in 1889, providing a full collation of IV F 3 (henceforth called N by scholars) and cogently arguing for its value. Hugo Magnus, the most diligent student of the text of the *Met.* since Riese, rapidly applied the materials supplied by Riese. Already planning his own major edition of the *Met.*, Magnus began publishing in 1891 a series of studies on the early fragments and basic mss. which would provide the foundation for his own text. In 1894 he issued two studies, one in which he cogently presented the data for assuming a common source (which he christened O) for N and the hitherto *codex optimus*, Laurentianus Marcianus Florentinus 225 (regularly called M); the other demonstrated that N could not be a direct copy of M, but must be regarded as an independent derivative of O which could provide both confirmatory readings for M and correct readings where M was corrupt.\(^2\) In 1901 Magnus himself visited Naples to check N in numerous places.\(^3\)

\(^{*}\) I wish to express my special gratitude to my colleague Professor Charles Murgia for his helpful criticisms.


3 So stated by Magnus, p. XIV of his edition (Berlin, 1914).
Thus, the massive edition of the *Met.* which he published in 1914 improved on Riese's report and above all laid out in the apparatus the evidence for the relation of M and N. Since then, no new work has appeared on N. Slater's valuable apparatus criticus to the *Met.*, conceived in antagonism to Magnus, ignores his rival and borrows the data on N from the collation of Riese. However, because he could not match Heinsius' data on variant readings with Riese's report, Slater garbled the data on the correcting hands in N: he cannot be trusted anywhere where he assigns a reading to N[^2].[^5]

In preparing a new edition of the *Met.*, I have compiled some corrected and some new information on N. The purpose of this paper is to assemble this information in one place for other scholars, in the hope that the data can be used even more searchingly than I myself have done. I shall begin with a description of certain features of N which have been incorrectly reported or need fresh discussion. Then, I shall discuss a ms. which I have found to be a copy of N, the first and only one so far discovered. Finally, I shall consider the possible connections between N and the ms. that Slater rediscovered and named U, Vaticanus Urbinas latinus 341.

### I. Stages in the Development of N

Of over four hundred known mss. of the *Met.*, only two were copied in Southern Italy at a time when the Beneventan script prevailed: N and U. When Riese rediscovered N, the script, then known as Lombard (*literae longobardicae*), had not yet received thorough study. Using the criteria then available, Riese dated N in the 11th century; and he was followed by Magnus and he in turn by Ehwald. However, in 1905 E. A. Loew published his definitive *Beneventan Script*, in which he assembled a dated catalogue of all examples of the script known to him. Loew dated N in the 12th century, and his authority has been accepted by subsequent scholars such as Slater and Bruère. In the past two years, Loew's dating has been challenged by two Italian specialists, who would like to put N back in the last quarter of the 11th century.


[^5]: "superest ut moneam diversas quae in eo (N) plurimae serventur lectiones plenius esse ab Heinsio quam ab aliis citatas. has cum aliter distinguere non vacaverit, *plures a manu recentiori* esse scito; quas commemorare ab re esse visum est, ne aliunde citari debeant; modo appareat talia fonte alio derivata in margines Neapolitani confluxisse." (p. 24).

Loew distinguished a special regional kind of Beneventan script which, after the largest city with which it was associated, he called the Bari-type. At the beginning, the Bari-type could be considered a direct offshoot of what was developing around Monte Cassino, and so Loew reasonably postulated a time lag between Monte Cassino and Bari, roughly 25 years. One challenge to Loew comes from a scholar who believes that that lag of 25 years did not continue to exist in the late 11th century, because by then Bari would have developed an independent scriptorium or rather scriptoria. Another challenge comes from Bertelli, who has been doing his research into the marginal illustrations of N, the first known illustrations in any ms. of the Met. Bertelli believes that the data he has assembled on these illustrations permit a date in the latter part of the 11th century. If the date of N is brought back into the 11th century, that will make it a close contemporary of M, as many would prefer. But whether N was written in the 11th century or the early 12th, since it preserves eight more lines of Book 14 than M (written in the mid-11th century), it is clear that it is independent of M.

We do not know where N was or who used it for about 400 years after its original writing in the neighborhood of Bari. However, since it next shows up in Naples, it is reasonable to assume that it had remained in Southern Italy throughout this period. From a dedication in the ms., we learn that Giano Anisio, who lived until nearly the middle of the 16th century, gave it as a present to his friend Antonio Seripando. Seripando also acquired two other mss. of the Met. by the will of another friend. A century later, all three were in the possession of the Library of S. Giovanni a Carbonara, and there Heinsius made his collation of N. Riese re-discovered N in the Biblioteca Nazionale another two centuries later. It has recently been cared for by the Center for Restoration at Grottaferrata, but is now readily accessible, as it was for me in 1974.

The original scribe of N made a good many errors. One of the most frequent was the omission of a line or lines. Fortunately, he himself often caught the error and added the missing line or lines either between the lines in the proper sequence or in the margin. In some cases, later

8 C. Bertelli, "L'illustrazione di testi classici nell'area beneventana," ibid.
9 Heinsius worked on N in May 1647. I have not been able to identify Antonio Seripando, but I suspect that he may be a close relative of, if not identical with Gerolamo (later Troiano) Seripando (1493-1563) who founded the Library of S. Giovanni a Carbonara in 1551. When Charles of Bourbon took over Naples in 1734, he added that Library to the Farnese and Palatine Libraries to form the Royal Library, the nucleus of what is now the National Library at Naples.
hands have made the correction, which escaped the original scribe. Two correctors are quite identifiable, who have worked their way through the 14 books which N preserves from its source. The older corrector also used the Beneventan script and made his changes in N some time before the mid-12th century, I would assume. His characteristic practice was to erase or overmark the original writing, and, since he was working from an inferior ms., his "corrections" are not always improvements. Thanks to the existence of M and the known relationship between M and N, it is often possible to rectify the damage done by N² and restore to N a reading found in M. I shall discuss N² in greater detail when I consider the possible lines of relationship between N and U. The third principal hand, that is the later corrector, may readily be distinguished from the others by his obvious Italian style, which places him in the 13th century. His characteristic practice was not to tamper with the original, but to write above it alternative readings which he presumably copied from another ms. As one might suspect, the alternatives rarely improve on N, except in the case of manifest error; most of the superscripta of N³ reveal that the ms. which was being used was considerably inferior to N. Any scribal hand later than N³ I have labeled N⁴.

Riese stated in his description of N that ff. 82v.–90v. (= 7.4–488) had been written by another hand. He did not mean a later hand, but a different contemporary hand. Magnus was the first to question this distinction, and Munari still regards the matter as unsettled. Plate 3 shows f. 86v. (7.242–271); its writing may be compared with Plates 5 and 7, which illustrate the standard scribal hand in portions of Book 9. Although there is a general similarity in forms of individual letters, the total impression of the hand in 7.242 ff. is different from that of Book 9, because it is more open. That impression may be documented by measuring the lines. According to my calculations, the average line in Book 9 is under 7 cm. long; some lines are less than 6 cm. and the average is roughly 7.5 cm.; the longest line extends 9 cm., compared to a maximum of 8 cm. in the principal scribal hand. On the basis of these data, I believe that Riese was justified in positing a different (though contemporary) hand.

Riese also noted that f. 103 (= 8.340–402) was the work of another hand. Whether he meant it or not, he implied that the same hand produced ff. 82v.–90v. and 103. That cannot be accepted. The scribe of 103, as can be seen from the letter forms, is clearly distinguishable from the scribe of 82v.–90v. Moreover, he writes 29 lines per page instead of the 31 of the adjoining ms., 82–90; and much of the remainder of N has 30 lines per page. Then, too, the functions of the scribes differ. Since 82r
is written by the first hand of N, and 82v.–90v. continue in the same style
with the same kind of text, it is evident that the second scribe was simply
continuing for a brief space the work of the main scribe until he was ready
to resume his task on 91r. By contrast, f. 103 is a leaf crudely added to N
to supply in part a lacuna in O: 8.340–402, lines missing in both M and N.
In N, the evidence is unmistakable: reaching 8.339 in the middle off. 104r.,
the original scribe continued without pause on 8.403 ff. Thus, the inserted
leaf interrupts the sequence at the bottom of f. 102v., and the scribe of
f. 103 has had to mark the point where we should start reading the new
leaf, before going on to 8.403 at the middle of f. 104r.10

The same Beneventan hand inserted ff. 161–162 after 13.138 to remedy
other omissions in O, the archetype of both M and N. On 161r. he first
added the 5 lines 8.398–402 which he could not crowd into the earlier
f. 103. Then, leaving the space of one line, he copied 8.597–608. Since
there was still room on 161r., he started with 13.276 and continued on
161v. and 162r. with the passage through 343. He left 162v. blank.

Riese also correctly noted the facts about the ending of Book 14. Since
these facts have unfortunately been badly garbled by misinformation
that Magnus published in 1894 and that his prestige made acceptable to
all later scholars including Slater and Munari in his catalogue, I think
it important to restate them and document them with a photograph.
Riese stated that the original hand of N ceased at the bottom of f. 188v.
(= 14.838), that the remainder of Book 14, namely the thirteen lines
839–851 were continued on f. 189r. in another Beneventan hand.11 He went on
to point out that, after an interval of considerable time—it would be at
least a century—another scribe started to copy Book 15 on the bottom
half of f. 189r. and that several hands can be distinguished at work, all
late, in Book 15 of our ms. A glance at Plate 9 will prove Riese correct.
The top half of the page clearly contains Beneventan script, whereas
the bottom half was the product of a later Italian hand.

In 1894 Magnus published the first of his important studies on N.12
Seeking to define as fully as possible the nature of the common archetype
O of M and N, he listed the major common errors of M and N. As is
well known, M stops with 14.830 at the bottom of f. 119r. and leaves 119v.
blank: the fact suggests that the ms. copied by M’s scribe was also incom-
plete after that point. When Magnus read Riese’s description, he suspected

10 In fact, since O’s leaf contained more lines than the average leaf of N, the scribe
of f. 103 managed to write only 8.340–397, and he finished the other 5 lines of the passage
at the start of inserted f. 161 (as I note below). A later hand has then added the missing
5 lines at the bottom of f. 103v.
11 Riese, p. xxx. 12 Magnus, “Die Familie O” (above, n. 2).
a connection between the incomplete M and N, and he asked a friend of his, O. Schroeder, to check the Neapolitan ms. on f. 18gr. Schroeder did so, or said he did, and wrote Magnus that Riese had erred, that the same later hand produced the entire set of lines on 18gr., both the last thirteen lines of Book 14 and the first lines of Book 15 (as well as the additional lines on 189v.). On the basis of Schroeder’s misinformation, which Magnus failed to check in 1901 even when he was in Naples to study N firsthand, Magnus worked out a theory about O that, in modified forms, has continued to fascinate scholars ever since. The unexamined assumption is, that the ms. N copied absolutely broke off at 14.838 and that such was the condition of O. By the time that the parent of M copied O, eight more lines had been lost from the presumably worn and mutilated final leaf, and consequently the parent of M preserved Book 14 only through line 830. Now that Riese’s original information has been proved accurate, not only must all descriptions of f. 18gr. and the end of Book 14 in N—see Magnus, Ehwald, Slater, Munari—be correspondingly altered, but also scholars must carefully study the Beneventan writing of f. 18gr. and reconsider the whole problem of the likely extent of Book 14 in N’s parent and thence of the putative condition of O when copied.

There is no doubt, I think, that a different Beneventan hand produced 14.839–851 from the hand at work earlier in Book 14: the letter-forms are quite distinct from those of 188v. The new hand is not the same as that isolated by Riese in 7.4–488, nor does it even remotely resemble the hand that supplied ff. 103 and 161–162. It is however, in my opinion, closer in style and time to the scribes of 7.4–488 and the principal scribe of N, and we are obliged, I suggest, to ask ourselves whether the new scribe on f. 18gr. was merely taking over from the tired principal scribe and continuing to copy the same quite legible ms. through the end of Book 14 or whether, as Magnus supposed (though from different data), the parent of N absolutely ended at 14.838, and the new scribe on f. 18gr. used another ms. to complete the book. Two additional facts need to be weighed in the conclusion. First, f. 189 seems to have been ruled by the original Beneventan scribes or designed carefully to fit their regular system of 31 lines per page. All folia that can be shown otherwise to have been added later have a different number of lines. Secondly, no corrections or glosses from N² are discernible on 189r. (The last Beneventan gloss occurs at 824 above Iliaden.) This might mean that N² has finished Book 14 or that the scribe of 14.839–851 performed his task shortly after N² went through the ms. In the latter case, the value of 14.839–851 in the

13 P. 197, n. 3.
Neapolitan ms. would be approximately the same as that of the Beneventan corrections in earlier portions of N; it definitely must be differentiated from the much later text of Book 15, which is of negligible value. In the former case, the hypothesis about the end of O must be modified. It seems to me more likely that a leaf containing 14.831–851 was lost in O—if that is the explanation to be adopted—than that eight lines were somehow removed by a convenient rip, before M's parent copied O.

So far, I have discussed the leaves where a Beneventan hand other than the principal scribe of N has been at work. I now come to two leaves where a late hand supplied a defect in N due apparently to the poor condition of the ms. itself and the consequent loss of leaves near the beginning. There is no corresponding difficulty in M, and hence we may assume the integrity of O at these two points. Two different scribes have supplied the missing leaves: f. 7 (= 1.198–255), and f. 19 (= 2.121–181). I believe that the original leaves were lost after the 13th century and that we have a means of recovering with some confidence their readings. I base this belief on my recent discovery of an unsuspected copy of N, to which I now turn my attention.

II. Laurentianus 36.5 and N

When Slater began to use the collations of Nicolaas Heinsius which had been found in the Bodleian Library at the end of the 19th century, he recognized the importance of three mss., Heinsius' primus Palatinus, Urbinas, and Berneggerianus; and he was able to locate the first two in the Vatican collections, the third in Paris. He added the collations of these three to the usual report of Ovid's mss. and considerably improved the accuracy of data on which one could assess the ms. tradition and select the most likely reading. As he sifted through other collations left by Heinsius, Slater was particularly impressed by what Heinsius called Vaticanus primus (later identified by Slater as Vaticanus latinus 1593) and Mediceus quintus. The latter he could not identify, but he strongly urged future scholars, if they could locate it, to collate it carefully. The process of identifying Heinsius' mss. has been long, but not without results. In the case of Mediceus quintus, there have been a number of

14 The lines contained in these two missing leaves approximate the usual average of 60 per leaf that we find in N, not the longer lineage of O that we can reconstruct from the losses in Books 8 and 13. Plate 1 shows f. 19r. of N (2.121–150).

15 Slater, p. 16, n. 1: "Vaticanus 1593 et Mediceus Quintus si inveniatur, passim, nisi fallor, conferendi."

obstacles. Heinsius left his collation of the ms. in Bodl. Auct. S. V. 8, describing the ms. as follows: “R. codex optimus; quintus Mediceus DC annorum: multa tamen recentiori manu scripta ab initio lib. XI, Eurydiceque suam” (= 11.66). The index of collations in Auct. S. V. 8 is not, however, accurate in its ordinal numbers, for it lists two mss. as “quartus” before introducing Mediceus quintus. The ms. to which Heinsius referred in that index may confidently be identified with Laur. 36.5, for Heinsius wrote on 36.5: “Contuli N.H. R Sextus R.” And indeed one 13th century hand wrote 1.1–11.66, and the remainder of the poem was completed by a totally different second hand (using a different source of clearly inferior value). To complicate matters still more, Heinsius evaluated all his Medicean mss. before preparing his printed edition, and he decided that R (or Laur. 36.5) was better than all but the considerably older Laur. 36.12. Hence, Mediceus sextus, erroneously named quintus in Auct. S. V. 8, became secundus Mediceus in the printed edition. 17 Thus, the first half of Slater’s recommendation was fulfilled: Mediceus quintus was identified. It has remained for someone to collate Laur. 36.5, and that I have done. 18

My collation has established that Laur. 36.5 deserved to be called “codex optimus” only because it was a direct copy of the excellent ms. N. Let me demonstrate this conclusion very rapidly by a partial list of the common errors of the two mss. Book 1.77 posit 138 per 178 ille 193 monticule 275 auxiliantibus 284 Infremuit 302 in 325 videt 326 in marg. 363 possem formare 397 nocebat 404 si 454 victa 481 in marg. 492 densis abolentur 519 licet 521 opifexque 528 int. lin. 537 compressus et ipse 558 habebit 602 speciem 636 in marg. 641 sessae extrerrita 646 patriis dat et oscula 655 erat 677 veit 710 consilium 733 loqui 747 niligera 748 Hinc Book 2.69 ferat pavere 114 Defuguint 214 loquer 238 sparsis 256 vacant 262 siccae quoque 318 laceri late 326 satum 366 spectanda 398 trementes 402 Inquirens ne 456 rivus versabat harenas 465 decedere 470 avertit 526 sumat 584 Tangere 587 alta 620 suppositis 632 considere 640 fatidicos 655 respirat 658 praevertitur 682 et septem 703 erant et erant 764 habundet 774 deae ad 783 brevibus 790 adopertaque et nubibus 827 venit 836 Set vocat Book 3.15 longe 26 ministris 72 Tunc 88 sedebat 134 natos natasque 142 quid enim 162 distinctus 175 int. lin. 242 latratibus 247 videri 284 quantusve 299 vultumque 358 prior 384 que 388 silvis 418 at stupet 428 nisus 443 et om. 445 longum . . . in aevum 448 nec me 504 Tunc 545 frondibus 667 velatas . . . hastas 672 corpore deprenso Book 4.34

17 I am combining the partial results achieved by Munari and Lenz.
18 I studied Laur. 36.5 at the Laurentian Library in April 1974; subsequently, I have used a microfilm to check details.

¹⁹ It appears that the scribe has tried to make sense of N by changing qui to quod.

²⁰ Laur. 36.5 here shows the original reading, I believe, of N¹, also given by F. (See below p. 268) Burman reported the reading of a Medicean ms. (perhaps wrongly 36.5) as parantem.
203 possunt 207 gemiti 214 tremet 243 voluntas 291 horror adit 301 in marg. 318 corpus levare 359 facti 369 foliis quod adhuc licet 414 A Iove 427 Turvida [Plates 7 and 8] 432 non armis 482-485 in marg. 493 tecum sortita 531 pudet ad te credere 552 Fas sit ut 578 quod si 584 secto 604quam nostrae cera tabellae 611 Apte non adit 635 cum tota byblida 636 tenero de pectore 646 undam 647 iugum 681 mandavit 718 aetas formaque fuit 724 desperet 749 amantem 784 crepuit resonabile Book 10.18 creatur 34 est haec 43 cerpsere 56 in marg. 65 portare 83 popul0 158 terre 193 sustentant 252 urit 264 gemmas longoque monilia 309 panchaica 318 myrra tibi dum 327 iniit 349 metuis sacro 386 sciditque 393 roganti 396 mea non est 403 iniit 459 constrinxerat 557 pressitque gramen 591 planctis 653 libet arenam 693 vota sacerdos 697 An stigias sontes dubitavit mergere in undas 706 Quae... praebent Book 11.7 astam 16 inflato 26 Ut 37 minaces 39 et in illo 46 silvae dimissis 57 et sparso 66 tutus.

I shall not burden the argument with a list of readings where Laur. 36.5 has the correct reading in key passages along with N. The reader need only examine Plates 3-8 to determine how faithfully the scribe of Laur. 36.5 has performed his task with the Beneventan original. This extensive total agreement in errors (and similar agreement in significant correct readings, which I spare the reader) proves the close relationship of N1 and Laur. 36.5. The special marks of disorder in Laur. 36.5 at 8.339 ff. show that it adapted the clumsy addition by N2 of f. 103. Study of the Plates 3 through 8 will further demonstrate that Laur. 36.5 has copied the Beneventan changes and glosses of N3 (about which I shall have more to say below). This agreement not only with N1 but also with N2 and N3 means that Laur. 36.5 is a virtual diplomatic copy of the full condition of N as it existed in the 13th century. Both Slater and Heinsius might have suspected the relationship between the two mss., except that their collations were apparently incomplete.21 Heinsius cited secundus Medicus in his edition seven times in Book 1, of which five were in association with N. Of the other two instances, rerum in 1.225 is a curiosity, for which the scribe offers the correct reading veri above; and what Heinsius read in 1.703 as illa is actually illam, the prevalent reading. Slater, using

21 I have not been able to study S. V. 8 personally, but have been warned by M. Reeve, who has labored over it, and by a photograph of one difficult page, that study can only be successful if one uses the original. Heinsius differentiated the mss. he collated by using different inks, and these cannot be distinguished from a microfilm or photograph. Heinsius had collated N in 1647; he worked on Laur. 36.5 in 1653, and it is easy to imagine how he might not have been able to check the earlier collation at the time he was in Florence.
Heinsius’ collation, cited Mediceus quintus twelve times for Book 1, of which ten agreed with N. The exceptions are 1.206, where Heinsius apparently construed the gloss over murmura as an alternate reading and then reversed its order with the verb so as to produce a metrical phrase, compressit fremitus; the other is a simple error, montes 1.285, for which no known ms. offers support. In any case, it is no longer important to cite secundus Mediceus or Mediceus quintus, because the readings of Laur. 36.5 are derived from the excellent N which we still have. However, collation of Laur. 36.5 can be the means, now that we know its parent, of correcting erroneous collation of N. For example, Slater reported correctly that Mediceus quintus had vitalisque in 2.828; it should be no surprise to discover that N, which elsewhere favors the -is form of the acc. pl. in the 3rd declension, exhibits the same reading. Other readings that I have recovered from N after collating Laur. 36.5 are: 1.132 neque 2.779 Nec 3.72 Tunc 7.362 mera 461 iungit et hinc 8.61 reseret 8.463 pugnat 504 primo 643 perducit 870 habiit 883 potui 9.529 correptis 713 fieret 24 10.239 qua 613 petere. 622 nollet 673 dea muneris.

When Heinsius realized that Laur. 36.15 was a direct copy of M, he quite rightly collated nothing but Book 15, because M lacks Book 15, and so 36.15 offered independent evidence for that part only of the poem. We might follow the same methodology with Laur. 36.5, and assert that, being a partial copy of N, it has no independent authority until the second hand and second source takes over at 11.67. That would be proper procedure except for two things: 1) Laur. 36.5 might be contaminated with another useful tradition; 2) Laur. 36.5 might help us to recover readings in N which were erased or lost after this 13th century copy was made. I shall state immediately that I have not found contamination in Laur. 36.5. On the other hand, I wish to suggest that collation of this ms. does help us to recover readings of N which have been lost, I believe, after the scribe of our ms. made his copy from N, and others which were more legible than now.

Let me give examples drawn from Book 1 of how Laur. 36.5 may profitably be employed to enhance our accuracy on N. In 1.667, Laur. 36.5 reads inde. No reader of N has apparently noticed, but it should be recorded

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22 N has been erased and then corrected.

23 I have found a good many errors in Heinsius’ collation of Laur. 36.5. Anyone using it should assume that it gives in the text the reading it could decipher in N, that its superscripta follow N3. Where Heinsius reports something else, one should be suspicious.

24 Now that N has been found to have in 9.529 and 713 the same readings as M and other mss., we must accept these as the readings of the archetype of both main traditions and presume, unless we have good evidence to the contrary, that Ovid wrote them.
that N has (u ex i)nde. In 1.623 Magnus reports that N has furtis; in fact, it has furti(s? in ras). The hand that wrote the erased s can not be ascertained nor can the chronology of the erasure. Laur. 36.5 reads furti, which it emphasizes by the same word in the margin. In 1.510. Laur. 36.5 has quo, and qua above; careful study of N indicates that it has quo which was changed to qua. Laur. 36.5 exhibits in 1.230 Quod (Quos ssr.). Although the leaf in N which contains 1.230 replaces the original Beneventan leaf, it might have been replaced before Laur. 36.5 was copied, because the replacement reads Quo(s in ras.; fuit d). Finally, in 1.190, Laur. 36.5 has vulnus (corpus ssr.). N has been erased, and a late hand has written in vulnus, copying, I believe, the marginal note that recommends vulnus.25 It is just possible that corpus was originally in N, as it was, we know, in M, and that Laur. 36.5 derived its alternative reading from N.

Although not every example above is as cogent as those of 1.510 and 667, it is important to attempt to recover the original state of N as accurately as possible. Therefore, I have assembled below in two parallel lists the readings of Laur. 36.5 and N which I consider significantly related in this manner.

Laur. 36.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Laur. 36.5</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.101</td>
<td>dubites</td>
<td>dubit(a² ex -es)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>284</td>
<td>fumum (tantum ssr.) volitant</td>
<td>fumum volitant³/// in ras. (tantum ssr.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288</td>
<td>Quid</td>
<td>Q(uod in ras.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>378</td>
<td>Tradit et</td>
<td>Tradit (ut² in ras.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>771</td>
<td>pigra (-e ssr.)</td>
<td>pigr (-e ex -a?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>790</td>
<td>-que et nubibus</td>
<td>(-que eras.) et nubibus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>819</td>
<td>illi (illa ssr.)</td>
<td>ill(a² ex i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 29</td>
<td>ac culmine (vimine ssr.)</td>
<td>a(c²) (-eras.)u(i ex l)mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>341</td>
<td>fide</td>
<td>fide¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>557</td>
<td>absistite</td>
<td>a(s ex b)sistite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>594</td>
<td>fluviale</td>
<td>(p in ras.)luviale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>693</td>
<td>ut ira magis v. ab(con- ssr.).-sumere</td>
<td>(et in ras.)ira m(ora² in ras.?)s eras.) v. a(b ex s, con-³ ssr.)sumere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>731</td>
<td>direpta</td>
<td>di(sc⁴ in ras.)e(∽ssr.)pta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 61</td>
<td>quos (quod ssr.)</td>
<td>quo(d in ras.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>venires (-re ssr.)</td>
<td>venire (-res³ ssr.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>premit</td>
<td>(fre⁴)mit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323</td>
<td>mater (nihil ssr.)</td>
<td>mater (If ssr.⁴)²⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426</td>
<td>flere (nihil ssr.)</td>
<td>flere (ferre⁴ ssr.)²⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>435</td>
<td>illu(a ssr.)c</td>
<td>ill(u² ex a)c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>482</td>
<td>rubentem (madent- ssr.)</td>
<td>rub(mad-³ ssr.)entem²⁶</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 I shall later show that the superscripts in Laur. 36.5 have copied N³.
26 Slater attributes this loosely to N² and thus confuses the picture.
Laur. 36.5

4. 504 mixta (nihil ssr.)
527 riget
567 nihil ssr.
598 terrentur
610 putat
623 aequore
692 iustior (-ius ssr.)
709/10 tortum (-o ssr.) . . . plumbum (-o ssr.)
710 mediī
746 Con(peror- ssr.) cepitque . . . ri(vi- ssr.) gorem
749 ut erant (quod erant ssr.)
762 Sed (se ssr.)
790 Ante spectatum
796 neque (nec ssr.)

5. 15 servatae
21 luctuque letabere
113 canendo (-bas ssr.)
132 missum
301 Hauxerunt
334 vacat
347 mollibus
478 parilique irata
667 nobis
6.114 Amne mosinen
117 Amnis in aolida
212 recidat
338 suos (-o ssr.) . . . sinus
(-u ssr.)
506 Utque fidei
664 immersa (semes sa ssr.) que
707 clamans (sonans vel adamans ssr.)

7. 89 Utque
213 rudem (-brum ssr.)
232 auras (aras ssr.)
264 receptas
341 Ulla
444 chirone
616 Isse sub amplexu saspidos
642 Ponere et

N

mixta (tincta 4 ssr.)
riget ("add.3")
erratibus ssr.4
terre(n eras.) tur
put(e 2 in ras.) t
ae(thes 2 ex quo) re
justi(us 3 in ras.) 27

medio

idem, ssr.3

ut erant1 (quod erant3 ssr.) 27
Sed (se3 ssr.)
Ante (ex4 spectatum
ne(c in ras.)

servat(a in ras.; e fuit?) (add. m)
luctu// le(t2 ex v) abere
cane(bas2 ex ndo)
missum (mersum 4 ssr.)
Hau(s ex x) erunt
vac(at2 in ras.) 27
mol (1 eras.) ibus
pari(ter, fuit li) que (et- fuit ir) at (e ex a)

(v4 ex n) obis

Am(ne eras. ut vid.) mosynen
Amnis in aolida(n add.4)
(dec- ex recce-) idat
idem, ssr.3

Ut(que eras.) fidei(i add.3)

idem ssr.3
(cl- add.3) am(a ex e) ns (vel adamans, sonans ssr.)

Ut(que eras.)

idem, ssr.3

a(u eras.) ras (aras ssr.3)
rec(s ssr.4) ep(c ssr.4) tas

(Plates 3 and 4)

(U ex U ut vid.) Ulla (illa ssr.3)
(s- add.4) chirone

Isse sub amplexu (sa- eras.) sopidos

Ponere (7 2 = et) 27

27 Here, I disagree with the report of Magnus.
Laur. 36.5

7.765 Ruriculae
786 morsus (cursus *sccr.*
813 ne- (ve- *sscr.* nias
824 sa i *sscr.* cti
8.19 bellum (o *sscr.*
160 In se ponit
889 Corporibus
9.119 parentem (im *sscr.*
145 Quae quoniam veniat
151 iugulata
495 defient atque
413 petet
537 causa
553 Conveniensque V. e. annis
623 deo sed
629 vota
668 mutato
733 foronque
791 eras . . . es
10.47 oranti
55 affuerant
113 gemina (dessa *sscr.*
460 propior
473 inlato
611 hunc formosis (juvenem *sscr.*
\[male*di*xi*]
699 unguem -es *sscr.*
11.48 obscuraque

N

Ruri (colae in ras.) 28
mor (i2 ex rs) us (vel cursus vel morsus *sscr.*) 27
idem, *sscr.*
f (i ex a) cti
bellum (o *sscr.*) 3
(Im se ut vid, eras.) ponit
Corporis (o3 in ras. ex -bus)
par (a4 ex e) ntem (im *sscr.*) 3
Quae quoniam (ad- eras.) veni (at in ras.) 27
iugulai (n *sscr.*) d ex t a
's lent atque (defiebunt *sscr.*)
pet (e2 ex a) t 27
causa (-m add. 4)
Conveniens V. e. rebus (annis in marg.)
d (eo set in ras.)
vot o ex a
mutat (a2 ex o)
f (a ex o) ronque
eras (in ras., fuit s . . . es (t add. 4)
oranti s eras.
a b in ras. fuerant
gem m ex in2 (a-ta add. 2)(dessa *sscr.*) 3
prop (i in ras.) or
in4 in ras. lato
h. (juvenem in ras.) 4 male*di*xi*
ungue (s ex m)
obs c2 ex tr u r2 ex s a aque

I have described above the leaves which have been inserted in N either to supply a defect inherited from O or to replace losses in N itself some time after it had been copied. The insertions in Books 8 and 13 were the work of the same Beneventan hand, and we should expect that, since they predate Laur. 36.5, they would be incorporated in it. This expectation is justified by the disorder of Laur. 36.5 after 8.339 and by the fact that its text of 8.340–402 agrees with the Beneventan insert. The comparable portion of Book 13 has not survived in Laur. 36.5 from the hand of the original scribe, so we cannot be sure how that portion would have been treated. However, I believe that the text of 8.396–402 and 597–602, which the later Beneventan hand supplied on f. 161v in N after 13.138, but the 28 A Beneventan hand, but not N2, has written *colae* in the erasure; I also believe that the o was changed from an original u at some point.
scribe of Laur. 36.5 copied in normal order, may well indicate use of that second insert of N.\textsuperscript{29} A more interesting problem is the relation between the lost text of N at ff. 7 and 16, that of Laur. 36.5, and that of the late replacement in N.

Would it be possible to restore the text of N from either or both of these known versions, on the assumption that N still possessed the page when the scribe of Laur. 36.5 copied and also that the late replacement might have been a copy of the ruined leaf that kept falling out? Because we do possess M for both these sections of the \textit{Met.}, we do have some control over the situation. Below, I give lists of readings for comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laur. 36.5</th>
<th>N\textsuperscript{4}</th>
<th>M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.198 notus</td>
<td>motus</td>
<td>notus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199 studiisque</td>
<td>-que \textit{sscr.}</td>
<td>studiisque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202 attonitum</td>
<td>attonitum</td>
<td>attonitum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204 tuorum est</td>
<td>est \textit{om.}</td>
<td>tuorum est</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209 solvet (\textit{-it sscr.})\textsuperscript{30}</td>
<td>solvit</td>
<td>solvit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210 admissum est</td>
<td>admissum</td>
<td>admissum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218 arcadas hinc\textsuperscript{30}</td>
<td>archadas hinc</td>
<td>arcadas hic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222 certo (aperto \textit{sscr.})</td>
<td>certo</td>
<td>aperto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225 rerum (veri \textit{sscr.})\textsuperscript{30}</td>
<td>veri</td>
<td>veri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230 quod</td>
<td>quo(\textit{s ex d})</td>
<td>quod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231 dignosque\textsuperscript{30}</td>
<td>dignos</td>
<td>dignos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232 ipso</td>
<td>ipso</td>
<td>illo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235 vertitur</td>
<td>utitur</td>
<td>utitur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textit{(ur- aut utitur \textit{sscr.})}</td>
<td>\textit{herinis (in ras.)}</td>
<td>\textit{erinis}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241 erinis</td>
<td>ferisne</td>
<td>ferisne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249 piasne (feris \textit{sscr.})</td>
<td>longusque</td>
<td>longusque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255 longusque</td>
<td>\textit{(totusque \textit{sscr.})}</td>
<td>\textit{quadru- (Plate 1)}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.121 quadrupides</td>
<td>tum</td>
<td>tum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122 tune\textsuperscript{30}</td>
<td>volantes</td>
<td>volantes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128 vola (e \textit{sscr.})ntes</td>
<td>effugit</td>
<td>effugit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132 effuge (\textit{-git \textit{sscr.}})\textsuperscript{31}</td>
<td>ingressus</td>
<td>ingressus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136 egressus</td>
<td>oram</td>
<td>aram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139 aram (Plate 2)</td>
<td>consulet</td>
<td>consulet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141 consulat</td>
<td>\textit{con}</td>
<td>\textit{consul}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{29} There are two other possibilities: 1) Laur. 36.5 copied 8.398-402 from the 5 lines added to the Beneventan replacement after it was inserted. This can be rejected, because the writing of those 5 lines is later than that of Laur. 36.5. 2) Laur. 36.5 copied the text of a second ms. it was using. But we have no evidence that it in fact was using another ms., since, as we see below, its superscripta come from N\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{30} I believe that reconstruction of N may also be helped by the readings of U, a somewhat more distant relative than M. U gives the following useful readings: 1.209 solvet 218 arcadas hinc 225 rer/ (= rerum?) 231 dignosque 2.122 tun\textsuperscript{c} 143 Humida 152 ille 165 aera 167 runique.

\textsuperscript{31} L also has \textit{effuge}. 
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Laur. 36.5

2.143 Humida
tetigit

N⁴
umida
tangit
(tetigit in marg.)

151 leves
datas (in ras.)

152 ille³⁰ (inde ssr.)
ille

154 Quartus equi
philegon solis

156 thetis
tethis

157 caeli
caeli

159 levati
levati(-s eras.)

160 isdem
hisdem

165 insueto vacuos(-us
ssr.)
(aer vacuos (-us ssr.)

166 Discutiturque
Succutiturque
aer ær(a ex e)

167 ruuntque³⁰
ruunt

168 quadruges
-iuges

170 Ne(c ssr.)scit
Ne(c scit in ras.)

172 tinguí
t(a ex i)ngi

176 bootes
boetes

179 patentes
iacentès

181 obortae
abortae¹

M
Humida
tetigit

leves (datas ssr.)
inde³²

Solis e. q. ph.

Solis equi quartusque

philegon

thetis

caeli

levatis

hisdem

as(in ssr.)suetó

vacuos (-us ssr.)
aer

Succ.

ruunt

-iugi

Nee scit

ting(i ex ui)

bootes

patentes

abortae¹

It is evident that the crucial section 1.198–255 does not have so many problems as 2.121–181. However, the best that can be said for f. 7 in N is that it is a very clumsy copy. It is obviously wrong at 1.198 and 199; its spelling is irregular at 202; its elimination of est at 204 is not supported by any of the older mss. It disagrees with M and the correct text at 218 and 222, offers a wrong alternative at 255, and preserves the correct reading with most mss. against M at 232. In 218, 222, and 232, Laur. 36.5 also shares its readings; and indeed only with certo at 222 does N⁴ offer an infrequent reading. But whereas Laur. 36.5 had a more careful scribe, it is difficult to claim that its variants from M must be assigned to N. It is correct in 232, and we may assume that its reading was in N, O, and Ovid's first ms. It seems to be wrong with its additional est in 210; that could have been in N, but I suspect that the error is later. It is also wrong in its additional -que in 231, but that was an early attempt to deal with the universal error in the archetype created by dominum; it is shared by such close contemporaries as ELU, so may have been in N. Similarly, the reading arcadas hinc may have been in N¹. For the five instances where Laur. 36.5 offers variants, I assume that they are the work of N² or N³. I am satisfied that certo is a gloss that has entered Laur. 36.5 and N⁴ from

³² Magnus’ report is incorrect here.
separate sources, but should not be allowed to oust the lectio difficilior. Similarly, vertitur at 235 is unlikely to have been in N; it arose in a period of non-Beneventan writing when a single line over utitur could make it vertitur and the careless expectation of the verb in situations of metathesis encouraged N^3 to adopt the error. Both solvet 209 and rerum 225, though rare errors, are found in N's close Beneventan contemporary U. As we shall see, an arguable link exists between N and U. I therefore tentatively suggest that these readings were found by the scribe of Laur. 36.5 in N, the work of either N^1 or N^2; the scribe then wrote as superscripta the correct text which N^3 had added above. I do not know what to do with unique piasne of 249. Accordingly, I do not think that the scribe of f. 7, that is, N^4, had access to a poor leaf of N, which he was to copy and replace; the text of f. 7 offers special errors and nothing of significance. But I suggest that we may be able to postulate that the original leaf in N existed at the time when Laur. 36.5 was copied. On that assumption, by using M and U as controls, I partially reconstruct the 13th century text of N in 1.198–255 as follows: 198 notus 199 studiisque 204 tuorum est 209 solv(et in ras.\(^2\)) (solvit\(^3\) ssr.) 210 admissum 218 arcadas hinc 222 aperto (certo ssr.\(^3\)) 225 (r- in ras.\(^2\)) er(um in ras.\(^2\)) 230 quod 231 dignosque 232 ipso 235 utitur (vertitur ssr.\(^3\)) 241 erinis 255 longusque.

The text of 2.121–181 produces more variants than 1.198–255, but here too the insert in N, by a different hand from that in insert i, can be branded as late and negligible. It is wrong at 136, 139, 141, 143, 151 (an erroneous “correction”), 176, 179, and 181; and only datas in 151 and abortae in 181 have a claim as 11th century readings. As against Laur. 36.5 it preserves the correct reading alone in 156—probably a scholarly correction of a longstanding error in the archetype, the more familiar name Thetis for rarer Tethys—and agrees with M and other mss. at 122, 132, 154, 165, 166, and 167. However, N elsewhere gives tunc where tum is the accepted reading (cf. 3.72 and 504), and U also had tunc; therefore, I propose to regard Laur. 36.5’s reading at 122 as a true reading of N^1. Although L also has effuge in 132, I prefer to believe that N^1 agreed with M and most mss. and that the error crept into Laur. 36.5 from N^2 or N^3. At 154 the error is obvious, but possibly so obvious that it existed in N (cf. Quartus equi phil. en): I feel no confidence in reconstructing N here. At 159, 165, and the spelling of 160, Laur. 36.5 could well point to the work of the correcting hand in N. The error in 166 is unique, possibly the text of N or a blunder of the scribe of Laur. 36.5. The error

\(^{33}\) L and e have vertitur; the change, therefore, could be pre-Beneventan in N’s parent. For the reversal of N’s text and superscriptum by the scribe of Laur. 36.5, note 4.435 and 7.259.
in 167 is shared with U, but is such an affront to meter and sense that I would not want to attribute it to N and hesitate even assigning it to N². On other readings, I assume that Laur. 36.5 faithfully preserves N at 143—aspiration is common in O (cf. 160)—, in the variant at 152, in 172, 176, 179, and, as elsewhere with this word, in obortae at 181. Thus, I would use Laur. 36.5 to reconstruct N (controlling it somewhat with M and U) as follows: 2.122 tunc 128 volantes 132 effugit 136 egressus 139 aram 141 consulat 143 Humida tetigit 151 leves 152 inde 154 ?? 156 thetis 157 caeli 159 levati(-s eras.) 160 hisdem 165 (in- ex as²)sueto vacuus (es sscr.) aer(a ex e) 166 ?? 167 ruunt 168 ?? 170 Nec scit 172 tingui 176 bootes 179 patentes 181 obortae.

Finally, I come to the superscripta in Laur. 36.5 and their relevance to N³. As I pointed out above, two consistent correcting hands worked over N, first a Beneventan which we may call N², then a century later an Italian which I propose to call N³. In fact, further tampering occurred in N, and I have vaguely named any scribe subsequent to N³, both the scribes of the replaced ff. 7 and 19 as well as later correctors of the text, as N⁴. I have pointed out that Slater vitiates his report of the correcting hands by refusing to follow the lead of Riese or Magnus and so failing to distinguish the 12th century, 13th or 14th century hands: in the list of useful readings supplied by Laur. 36.5 to throw light on the actual state of N at time of copying in the 13th century, my note 26 indicates some of the problems caused by Slater’s vagueness. Indeed, now that we know that Laur. 36.5 is a direct copy of N, a comparison of alternative readings and glosses in both mss. can be very useful.

Plates 3 and 4 exhibit parallel readings for 7.242–265. N shows Beneventan corrections at 246 liquidi and 249 coniuge; Laur. 36.5 predictably agrees. Most non-Beneventan corrections in N may be assigned to N³ because Laur. 36.5 adopts them: 245 Conicit 247 Altera (sscr.) 252 aras (sscr.) 255 iubet (possibly N²) 257 sparsis 258 flagrantes 259 atri (Laur. 36.5 has reversed text and superscriptum) 262 calido. To N⁴ must be given the dubious credit of forcing superscript aras into the text: he erased the u of the correct reading auras, which Laur. 36.5 exhibits unmarred. And N⁴ corrected receptas (264), which the scribe of Laur. 36.5 had faithfully copied from N. Most glosses in N are the work of N³, non-Beneventan notes which 36.5 has accurately copied. Once, in the marginal comment at 263, Laur. 36.5 has corrected N³. In five lines, where the special writing might otherwise make us suspicious, Laur. 36.5 shows no note. These should be the work of a later scribe: the extra gloss in 244 over cultrosque,

34 On the correct spelling of obortae in N, cf. 1.350, 2.656, 7.689, 10.67 and 419.
246 bachi, 255 the marginal note, 260 two superscripta, 262 the marginal gloss.

Plates 5 and 6 give the partially overlapping texts of 9.127 ff. in N and Laur. 36.5; Plates 7 and 8 do the same for 9.399 ff. Since N wrote 31 lines per page and Laur. 36.5 only 29, it is impossible to secure full correspondence. The corresponding lines here are 9.147–155 and 9.417–429.35 We may note first that the text of N has been corrected in 9.127 ff. three times by a non-Beneventan hand, and Laur. 36.5 exhibits the new text: 9.148 ac ex an; 9.151 pel(eras.)līce; 9.150 pos(c ex s)īt. But (151) where another hand has erroneously changed N to iugula(ōd in ras.)a, Laur. 36.5 retains what is correct and what it presumably found in N: iugulata. Both mss. show almost identical superscripta; the slight differences help us distinguish the hands. The two hands abbreviate in an occasionally distinct way, and this fact plus the distinguishable form of the taller letters (d, l, s) enables us to state that different scribes, as we might expect, produced the superscripta in the two mss. However, one exception is noticeable; in the right hand margin of both mss. at 9.151, the same hand, I believe, has produced the same gloss: "ostendo illum dolorem tantum." The style of the d and l is sufficiently identifiable so that we can say that the hand responsible for the superscripta elsewhere in Laur. 36.5 has also worked on N here.

In 9.417–429, we can quickly see three places where the text of N has been altered. In 417 Laur. 36.5 preserves the original praecipiet; which dates the changed reading percipiet of N later. In 423, the different ink of the added -que suggests that it is the work of N3; Laur. 36.5 incorporates the addition with the original word. Thirdly, since Laur. 36.5 reads turvida with N4 in 427, the correction in N must be by N4. As for the superscripta and marginalia, we can readily distinguish three hands in N which have written notes above the line and of course another Beneventan hand that has produced the "Lactantian" fabulae, here occupying almost the entire right margin of N. A Beneventan hand has glossed Pallantias in 421; not surprisingly, that gloss has been taken over in Laur. 36.5. The same 13th century hand which worked over 9.147 ff. has also copiously annotated almost every line of 417 ff., and these notes appear verbatim in Laur. 36.5. But the glosses in N over dixit in 418, Anchisae in 425, and in the right margin at 424 were written later and hence could not be copied by the scribe of Laur. 36.5.

All the evidence can best be explained, I think by assuming that N3

35 To help the reader, I note that 9.147 begins at the top of N, but about two-thirds of the way down in Laur. 36.5; that 9.417 begins at the top of Laur. 36.5, but about two-thirds of the way down in N, just above the large capital.
had worked over N, altering the text here and there, writing alternative readings and glosses, before Laur. 36.5 was copied from N. The scribe of Laur. 36.5 performed a very faithful job, regularly copying N exactly as he read it. However, here and there, he chose to invert the order of original and *superscripta*; and occasionally he corrected obvious places in N, such as *omnipudens* for *omnipotens*, when referring to Jupiter.\(^\text{36}\) Thus, the presence of material copied from N\(^3\) in Laur. 36.5 gives us a terminal date for N\(^3\), and the absence of corrections and glosses which, because of differences in the writing, can be assigned to N\(^4\) means that N\(^4\) worked on N after the scribe of Laur. 36.5 did his job. Apart, then, from the sporadic evidence Laur. 36.5 gives us on the state of N in the 13th century where N has suffered subsequent corruption or loss of leaves, the main use of Laur. 36.5 is to help us fill in some of the stages of change experienced by N after the first Beneventan hand finished his task.

### III. N and U

Slater’s most significant manuscript discovery was to locate *codex Urbinas* which Heinsius had studied in Urbino in the mid-17th century. Subsequently, the Library of the Dukes of Urbino was appropriated by the Pope and transferred to the Vatican. The special ms. of the *Met.* remained unused until Slater reported his discovery of Vat. Urb. lat. 341. The importance of U is threefold: it is the oldest ms. of the *Met.* to have been found in the 20th century; it is the only ms. beside N now surviving in Beneventan script; it shows important, unique agreement with N and the combined family of M and N that is called O.

Slater was able to use the scholarly data assembled by Loew in *Beneventan Script* to date U at the end of the 11th or possibly beginning of the 12th century, and he also linked it with other products of the Bari region. Consequently, U is perhaps a quarter century older than N. Since they were both copied in the same general area of Southern Italy and are separated by such a brief interval, we might be tempted to look for a definite relationship between N and U. For example, did N copy U? Or did N copy the parent of U? Or might N have been corrected from U; that is, can N\(^2\) be derived from U? Let me say right now that the evidence does not permit a simple solution along the lines of any of these hopeful questions. In the Bari area at the end of the 11th century, there apparently existed at least *two* mss. of the *Met.*, from one of which N was copied, from the other U. The two parent mss. had some interesting correspon-

\(^{36}\) N has this unique *omnipudens* at 1.154, 2.401 and 505.
dences, but U, while preserving modest traces of the O-tradition, is our fullest early example of the contaminated tradition that we find exemplified also in the Florentine mss. F and L and in E, the primus Palatinus that Slater re-discovered.\textsuperscript{37}

Slater made a brief presentation of data pointing to the connection between N and U.\textsuperscript{38} He produced an extensive list of common errors in Books 1 and 2, then select instances in other books. Removing 1.384 and 447 (because the first involves N\textsuperscript{2} and the second U\textsuperscript{2}) and adding other agreements in error, we have the following examples in Books 1 and 2: 1.119 tunc 163 vidit summa 302 in altis 363 formare 397 nocebat 481 om. (also M) 484 suffuderat (also M) 492 densis 519 licet 558 habebit 575 in hoc 646 patriis dat et oscula 733 loqui 747 niligera (also M) 747 Hinc 2.69 pavere 101 Ne dubites 119 dei 201 sumnum ... tergum 227 Tunc 238 sparsis 262 siccae quoque 318 lacera late 335/6 sinus prima mox ossa requirens ... artus totum percensuit orbem U (N\textsuperscript{1} has been erased and corrected by N\textsuperscript{3} in the final hemistichs) 398 trementis 465 decedere 529 in caelo\textsuperscript{39} 566 nequiquam 640 fatidicos 727 balearia 790 adoperta et 827 versat. It should be remembered that the opportunity for agreement is reduced by the fact that N\textsuperscript{1} lacks, as we noted, 1.198–255 and 2.121–181, and U\textsuperscript{1} lacks 1.1–75 and 413–470, a total of roughly 250 lines in the two mss.\textsuperscript{40}

In the same two books, U disagrees with N\textsuperscript{1} and generally follows the contaminated tradition in errors as follows: 1.165 cenae 190 vulnus\textsuperscript{41} 258 moles operosa 269 et 317 superatque 323 reverentior 363 possem 370 Et set 384 rupitque 390 Inde 445 posset 573 Influit 599 inducta latas\textsuperscript{39} 617 abdicere 618 illud 637 Conatoque 647 et\textsuperscript{39} 720 in tot lumina\textsuperscript{39} 722 hos\textsuperscript{41} 739 de 764 sibi om. 2.44/5 et ... feres 47 petit ille 62 habetur 66 Fit ... trepidat 116 Tum pater 269 undis 295 violaverit 340 flatus 378 Credit\textsuperscript{39} 392 ignipedum 393 rexerat 506 et celeri\textsuperscript{39} 518 Est vero cur quis\textsuperscript{39} 525 expulsa 583 fixerat 584 Plangere\textsuperscript{39} 687 natus 710 Despiciebat 716 milvius\textsuperscript{41} 720 agilis 736 et tersis 747 viae est 757 Lemniacam\textsuperscript{41} 765 bello 855 posses 863 vix ha vix. The list is appreciably longer (48 as against 32) in this second instance. Thus, whereas U shows a greater affinity with N than does any independent ms. except M, it has even more affinity with the tradition of generally less reliable mss.

\textsuperscript{37} I date U as slightly older than F and L, neither of which, in any case, is as complete as U. \textsuperscript{38} Slater pp. 26–27. See also Bruère (above, n. 6) p. 112.

\textsuperscript{39} Here, it can be argued that the reading should be accepted.

\textsuperscript{40} Using M and U above, I have tried to reconstruct N on 1.198–255 and 2.121–181, on the assumption that Laur. 36.5 did copy its text as it looked in the 13th century after the corrections of N\textsuperscript{2} and N\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{41} So N\textsuperscript{2} in ras.
There are a number of cases above where N¹ has been obliterated, and N² (the second Beneventan hand, it will be recalled) has produced the same reading as U and other mss. against M: in 1.190 and 722, 2.716 and 757. "Correction" in N by this second Beneventan hand is far more evident in Books 11–14. According to my count, N² has changed N¹, either by erasure and over-writing or by superscripts, frequently also by inserting a line absent from both M and N, and thus regularized N in the direction of the more contaminated (but frequently correct) tradition, as follows: in 41 lines of Book 11, 40 lines of Book 12, 59 lines of Book 13, and 90 lines of Book 14. In all the above cases, although N² gives the same reading as U, that reading is shared with other mss. except in a mere 18 lines. U alone of the major early mss. agrees with N² in the following readings:

11. 234 edita bacis 377 ad arma 478 non eminus 518 ascendere 717 post- quam maris appulit 784 Se dedit 12.158 multifidi 165 visum est 184 neque quae 319 obscene 341 in monte 574 gentis 13.406 urbes 733 ora ferens 14.13 dignus amore 497 paro 601 aequore 660 Suscipiens. Tempted by this agreement, I devised a working hypothesis which I fondly hoped to prove in the interest of economy and neatness, namely, that the two neighboring Bari-type mss. had been brought into contact in the later 12th century and corrections made by N² on the basis of what he found in U. Unfortunately, the neat hypothesis in ms. studies turns out more often to be wrong than right, and so it happens in this instance of N² and U. In Book 13 and 14 alone, the change in N² disagrees with the reading of U at least 24 times.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U</th>
<th>N²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. 29</td>
<td>in causam MN¹U</td>
<td>in causa EFN²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>in MN¹U</td>
<td>ad EFN²P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>hostem MN¹U</td>
<td>hostes EFN²P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>pectore MN¹UP</td>
<td>corpore EN²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>rapta MU</td>
<td>capta EFN²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>illa MU</td>
<td>arma EFN²P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>Audeat E¹MU</td>
<td>Audet ut E²N²P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>Sic tamen E¹MN¹U</td>
<td>Sic tamen N² Vat. Lat. 1593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>382</td>
<td>possit N¹U</td>
<td>posset A 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>780</td>
<td>Hunc N¹U</td>
<td>Huc A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>902</td>
<td>seductaque A</td>
<td>seductos hN²P¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>905</td>
<td>vestris ... silvis MU</td>
<td>membris ... versis hN² (in ras.) Vat. Lat. 1593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 8</td>
<td>vectus A</td>
<td>lapsus E²NP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>iam nunc A</td>
<td>iam non FN²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>illis E¹(N¹) U</td>
<td>illum E²FN²P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>369</td>
<td>densatur E²P²U</td>
<td>densetur E¹FN¹(P¹) 43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 A is the conventional symbol devised by Slater to represent the agreement of most mss. 43 desertum M(N¹)
Especially significant among the above instances are those where N² has altered a reading on which N¹ and U have originally agreed, e.g., 13.29, 77, 78, and most notably 382, 780, and 14.579; further, where the tradition has split into three strands and O had one reading, but the other mss. divided, N² copying some other ms. than U, e.g., 14.369, 377, 795, and 798. Finally, we might note that in the 13 lines which a Beneventan hand has added to N after 14.838 the sole instance where U gives a reading of interest—846 ubi—the emender in N goes with the prevailing ibi. The conclusion seems inescapable against my hopeful hypothesis: N² did not work from U either to correct the extant portion of his ms. or to complete the final lines of Book 14. There was, therefore, at least one (no doubt many) more ms. of the Metamorphoses available to readers of N in the later 12th century.

Conclusions

The following conclusions, it seems to me, can be restated or drawn from this study of N and its relatives and applied to fill the history of the ms. and to refine our methodology in reporting its readings:

44 reliquit M(N¹)h 45 non FM 46 prærupta M
47 pronusque MN¹
48 I do not claim that the supplier of 14.839-851 is the same as N², but I believe that he can safely be distinguished from U.
49 Slater p. 26 has a tantalizing sentence: "notat ad finem poematis (sc. in U) librarius 'tres Metamorphoseon codices', duo vero integros unum autem mutilum, inesse 'Bibliothecae'." Slater and H. M. Bannister, who supplied him with much of his firsthand information about U, both believed that this note might bear significantly on the origin and relationship of N and U. I can find no such note in U. And since the original scribe of U did not have his final comments preserved because of the loss of the final leaves (which were replaced much later), there is no reason to expect that any later colophon by U³ or U⁴ would give any significant information about relationships among N and U and N². In fact, I now suspect that Slater was misled by what someone was reporting about the Library of Urbino. There are 3 Metamorphoses in the Vat. Urb. collection: 341 (which is U); 342 (a small fragment somewhat earlier than U, not in Beneventan); and 347 of the 15th century.
1. N was written in the Bari-type Beneventan script in the early 12th century (possibly 25 years earlier).

2. N's original scribe stopped at the bottom of f. 188v. at 14.838. Another Beneventan scribe, who was not far removed in time from N1, completed Book 14 on 189r. It is not certain what was the condition of N's parent at the end of 14. Therefore, the analogy with M, which breaks off at 14.830 at the bottom of the recto of its leaf, may be invalid and must be used cautiously to postulate the condition of O.

3. Still another Beneventan scribe replaced two leaves which had been lost from O before the parents of M and N were copied. These losses were not observed by N1, and therefore the insertions of 8.340–420 and 13.276–343 are noticeably out of place and disagree with the lineage of N1.

4. Still another Beneventan scribe (= N2) went over the text and proceeded to correct it from another ms. that belonged to the more contaminated tradition, from which he supplied missing lines, wrote over some words, erased and re-wrote other words, and more frequently in the later books used superscripta. In the latter case, N1 and N2 can easily be read and reported; in the others, it is difficult, if not impossible to recover N1.

5. We know that Vat. Urb. lat. 341 (= U) was also produced in the Bari-type Beneventan, shortly before N. It exhibits unique agreements with N which indicate a close relationship between one of its ancestors and N's. However, its primary affiliation is with the more contaminated tradition represented for us by EFL. Thus, N did not copy U.

6. It can further be shown that N2 did not work from U. Hence, we can infer that the separate origins of N and U and N2 point to the existence of three or more different mss. of the Metamorphoses in the region where they were produced in the late 11th and 12th centuries.

7. In the 13th century, another corrector (= N3) worked over N once more, mostly in the form of superscripta, which were written in a clear Italian hand.

8. Shortly afterwards, a copy of N was made. By that time, N may already have moved to Naples, but we cannot definitely establish its whereabouts until the 16th century. The copy, which has survived but is now defective, breaks off after 11.66 at the end of 138v, and hence it lacks a colophon which might have indicated where, when, and by whom it was copied and for whom. That copy eventually made its way to Florence, and Heinsius found and collated it in
1653 (without recognizing it as a direct copy of N) during his work at the Laurentian Library. He originally called it *Mediceus sextus*, miscalled it *Mediceus quintus* in *Bodl. Auct. S. V. 8* (the index for that collation), then as the result of his evaluation of its age and merit named it *secundus Mediceus* in his edition of Ovid. It is now Laur. Med. 36.5.

9. Laur. Med. 36.5, a careful copy of both N¹ (or the overwritten erasures that are the work of N²) and the superscript readings of N³, enables us to distinguish any correcting or damage (= N⁴) suffered by N after this copy was made. It also encourages us here and there to check certain readings where N¹ has never been correctly noted or where N¹ or N² is difficult to decipher.

10. Erasures or crude overwriting by N⁴ can be controlled and remedied by the text of Laur. 36.5.

11. The two original leaves, ff. 7 and 19, now replaced in N by a 14th century hand, were in all likelihood still intact in N at the time when Laur. 36.5 was copied. Its text for 1.198–255 and 2.121–181, controlled by M and U, can be used to recover to some extent the hypothetical text of N¹, N², and N³.

12. From the 16th century at latest, N has been and remained in Naples. It passed from private hands into the Library of S. Giovanni a Carbonara, probably at its founding in 1551. There, Heinsius collated it in 1647. In the 18th century, after the library of S. Giovanni was broken up, N was acquired by the Bourbons. As part of the Royal Library, which now is the National Library, N lay unused, unrecognized until Alexander Riese rediscovered it during the 1880’s.

*University of California, Berkeley*
Plate 1. No 2.121-150
Plate 2. Laur. 36.5 2.137-165
Plate 4. Laur. 36.5 7.237-265
Plate 5. N 9.147-177
Plate 6. Laur. 36.5 9.127-155
Plate 8. Laur. 36.5 9.417-445
Expletur hic qui

Verum iterum: solum ponderis melius

Sylvarum, tuncque quidem succedere regis.
Did Tacitus Finish the *Annales*?

REVILÓ P. OLIVER

Since Tacitus completed and made public his *Historiae* before he finished, and presumably before he began, the *Ab excessu divi Augusti*, the two works must have circulated separately.¹ At some time in antiquity, however, probably when they were transferred from rolls to codices and perhaps in 275, when the Emperor Tacitus undertook to preserve and disseminate the work of the great historian whom he claimed as an ancestor,² the two

¹ In *Ann.* XI.11.1 he refers to the later books of the *Historiae* ("quibus res imperatoris Domitiani composui") as presumably well known to his readers. Tertullian in or after 197 referred to *Hist.* V by book-number (Apol. 16.2).—I need not remark that everyone who now studies the works of Tacitus will owe more to Ronald Syme’s *Tacitus* (Oxford, 1958) and Erich Koestermann’s commentary on the *Annales* (Heidelberg, 1963–1968) than he can acknowledge in footnotes. For the rest, I limit myself to citing modern studies that seem to me fundamental and directly relevant to my inquiry, and I intend my references to include what they in turn cite; to mention and debate everything that touches, directly or indirectly, on my subject would be to convert this article into a long book, for which I see no need.

² Vopiscus, *Tac.* 10.3, which Syme (p. 687), with reference to an earlier article of mine, rejects as "a fable." One does not lightly disagree with Syme, but I remain unrepentant. The *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* are patently the work of a vulgar mind or minds, and no one would claim for the author or authors a concern for veracity greater than that of a modern journalist or "publicist," but, as Syme has repeatedly said, they are our only source for much of the period they cover, and our task is to determine, on the basis of our pitifully scanty information from other sources and inherent plausibility, what statements are probably historical. Since no one, so far as I know, has yet gone so far as to deny the existence of an emperor named Claudius Tacitus, and since it is highly unlikely that the greatest of the Roman historians had been utterly forgotten in the Third Century, nothing is more likely than that the emperor, whether or not he was a "military man," would have had the wit to profit from the coincidence of cognomina and bestow on himself the lustre of a probably supposititious (though not impossible) descent from the historian, thus acquiring a dignity and prestige that might increase his slight chance of dying a natural death. There could have been no better way of advertising the protective eminence he thus acquired than by promulgating official commands for the dissemination of the works of his adopted ancestor. The story is therefore inherently plausible.
histories were combined to form a single sequence of thirty (or more) books in chronological order, possibly under the collective title, *Historia Augusta.*

It appears that only portions of one ancient codex, sadly mutilated and dismembered, survived the Dark Ages to become the ancestor of the manuscript that preserves for us (with lacunae) *Annales* I–VI and of the manuscripts that preserve (with lacunae) *Annales* XI–XVI and *Historiae* I–V, presenting them as a single and untitled work with books numbered from XI to XXI. Our problem arises from the fact that the preserved portion of Book XVI takes us only to about the middle of the year 66 and it is inconceivable that the lost part of that book could have continued the narrative to January 69, where Book XVII ( = Hist. I) begins.

It has been seriously argued that Tacitus, presumably after completing the sentence that is incomplete in our text, was suddenly smitten with fatigue and consequently decided just to “hit the high spots” thereafter to dispose of Nero in the rest of Book XVI, and not even to mention the events of the last six months of 68 because they had been adequately described by another historian, perhaps Fabius Rusticus! *Haec igitur

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The passion for disbelieving as much as possible of what the Scriptores say may lead to excess; for a salutary lesson, see the article by James H. Oliver, *A.J.P.*, LXXXIX (1968), pp. 345–347.

3 Hieron. *Com. ad Zach.* 3.14: “Cornelius Tacitus, qui post Augustum usque ad mortem Domitian naturae Caesarum triginta voluminibus exaravit.” The use of *volumen* as a synonym of *liber* is common in Cicero and later writers, so Jerome’s statement cannot be taken to imply that the thirty books were still in the form of rolls rather than codices. To this may be added, for what it is worth, Vopiscus’s reference to the historical works of Tacitus as a *liber*, i.e., a single *opus*, almost certainly in the form of a codex or codices, as was first pointed out by Cicero Poghir, *Studii Clasici*, VI (1964), 149–154.

4 Vopiscus, *loc. cit.*: “Cornelium Tacitum, scriptorem Historiae Augustae.” Such a title would also explain Jerome’s description (“vitae Caesarum”) of a work that he may not have read, although he probably glanced through it for propaganda purposes.

5 In *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXII (1951), pp. 232–261, I assembled evidence to show that the First Medicean MS. was derived from a very ancient codex of the combined edition. There is nothing to indicate that the Second Medicean and its congeners did not stem from another part of the same dismembered codex. The fundamental work of Rudolf Hanslik and his pupils indicates that there was a line of descent from that MS. that was independent of the Second Medicean, although there are difficulties, which I discussed briefly in *Illinois Classical Studies*, I (1976), pp. 216–225. The source of the preposterous title that appears, with slight variations, in subscriptions of the Genevan family of manuscripts, “Actorum diurnalium Augustae historiae libri,” must remain mysterious; it is hard to believe that any part of it came from the archetype.

addent qui volent collectaneis de incredibilibus philologorum. Not only is it inconceivable that the historian exhibited such shameless levy, but it is obvious that, as Bretschneider pointed out years ago, Tacitus "producere voluit Annales usque ad Nymphidii exitum, id est ad initium Historiarum, et iam, ut ipsius utar verbis, narrationem dispositum intra se ipsum et ordinavit, cum XV 72 scriberet." Bretschneider believed that one more book might have sufficed, but we cannot disregard the calculations of Philippe Fabia in an article confidently entitled "Sur une page perdue et sur les livres XVI, XVII, XVIII des Annales de Tacite". Tacitus could scarcely have reached the death of Nero before the end of a Book XVIII, and if he continued to the beginning of the Historiae, at least one more book would have been necessary. We need not, however, review these calculations: whatever the requisite number of books, we must conclude that either (a) Tacitus did not write them, or (b) they have been lost at some stage in the transmission of his text.

We must mention here two considerations that are relevant, though inconclusive.

(a) We are virtually certain that Tacitus did not complete the historical study that he had undertaken. We must believe that he intended to keep the promise that he made in Ann. III.24.3 to treat the Age of Augustus, "si effectis in quae tetendi plures ad curas vitam produxero." When he resolved to begin his study with the end of the Republic, we do not know: that could have been part of his original plan, announced in Agr. 3.3: "non... pigebit... memoriam prioris servitutis... composuisse." But whether he had planned an Ab exitu liberae reipublicae from the first or only later came to see that the crux of his problem was the institution and nature of the principate, he never wrote the projected work—unless it was lost before his histories were consolidated in a series that began, as Jerome says, post Augustum.

(b) It would help, if we knew how many books the Historiae comprised, and much ingenuity has been expended to determine whether there were twelve, as required by the mystic doctrine of hexads, or fourteen, to make with I–XVI the total of thirty mentioned by Jerome. We shall not ponder that question, first, because the reading triginta in Jerome is not

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7 The phrase is Mommsen's, in his edition of the palimpsest of Livy, III–IV, Berolini, 1868, p. 208.
8 Carolus Bretschneider, Quo ordine ediderit Tacitus singulas Annalium partes, Argentorati, 1905, p. 74.
10 Fabia believes that such a book was not written, because he is sure that Tacitus would have preferred to stay within the sacred limits of hexads.
certain, and second, because any attempt at accurate computation would quickly lose itself in tenuous speculations. Tacitus was not writing one of our comprehensive textbooks, which seek to “cover” all of a given period and to allot to each event space proportional to its “over-all” importance, as so many moderns believe. A first reading should make it obvious that his subject is the principate, and that he writes with a full awareness that all the events he mentions were within the compass of other and well-known histories. If Tacitus and Mommsen met in the shadowy realm of Dis, the “most unmilitary of historians” laughed at the solemn critic and told him to assuage his curiosity about the exact position and movements of the armies at Bedriacum by reading Pompeius Planta, and to learn the military geography of Armenia from the Commentarii of Corbulo. Tacitus’ concern is to correct and explain, and he allots space accordingly. Even so acute a scholar as Goodyear complains that disproportionate attention is given to the mutinies on the German frontier in the year 14, and imagines that the reason is rhetorical, a desire to present “vivid and exciting scenes” with stylistic elaboration.

11 No variant is shown in the apparatus of the new critical edition of Jerome’s In Zachariam by M. Adriaen (“Corpus Christianorum,” Series Latina LXXVI-A, Turnholti, 1970), but the apparatus is obviously very selective, and even if the manuscripts collated all have triginta or XXX, it would remain possible that Jerome wrote XXXV or XXXX, the former being particularly exposed to corruption before voluminibus, or tres et triginta, etc.

12 Including the last years of Domitian, if Tacitus did not “publish” the relevant books until 107 or later, as is universally believed and seems quite probable. He was certainly not the only man who felt an urge to write on that subject as soon as the tension and periclitation of Nerva’s rule had been resolved by the adoption of Trajan; there must have been many contemporaries who were eager to explain what they had done or failed to do during the Terror, and others who wanted to exhibit their opinions. One such historian is mentioned as quidam by Pliny, Ep. IX.27.1, a letter which will suggest one possible reason for the long interval between Tacitus’s decision to write and the publication of his work: he deemed it kind or prudent to await the death of certain persons whose actions he would have to explain, especially, perhaps, in connection with the conspiracy that procured the assassination of Domitian. We could also imagine that he waited to see what facts would be disclosed by other writers.

13 Of whom we know only from a scholium on Juvenal, II.99, for which see Wessner’s edition. It is unfortunate that Peter in his Historicorum Romanorum fragmenta quoted the scholium in the form given it by Georgius Valla, who probably merely inferred that Planta wrote after Tacitus from the earlier form of the scholium, in which the authors are probably named in order of dignity. There is a good chance that this Planta is the man whose death Pliny announces in Ep. IX.1, c.: 07 or earlier.

Those mutinies were the first occasion on which Roman armies in the field tried to influence succession to the principate, and while it is true that the mutinies had no great "historical effect" at the time, a little more ineptitude in dealing with them or sheer bad luck might have resulted in a premature divulgation of the *arcanum imperii*. Tacitus's interest is in studying the first manifestation of a tendency that was to have such dire manifestations in later history to his own time and such calamitous consequences thereafter, of which he may have in part apprehended the danger. To calculate how long the *Historiae* were, we should first have to know to what incidents Tacitus would see fit to devote two-fifths of a book. The task is hopeless.

Although the numbering of the books in our manuscripts has been imputed to that handy scape-goat, the Mediaeval scribe, the extreme improbability that anyone in the Middle Ages would think to combine two distinct works or to alter the book-numbers shown in the colophons of an exemplar, and the attested existence of a consolidated edition in antiquity, make it only reasonable to suppose that our book-numbers come from the surviving portion of a dismembered ancient codex. It is on this basis that Walter Allen, Jr., believes that very substantial parts of Tacitus's work, including the end of the *Annales*, were lost "when the text was in the form of a volumen for each book and when each volumen confronted its own destiny". Only one tattered and incomplete set of rolls remained when the works of Tacitus were first transcribed into a codex around the middle of the Fifth Century. That this is possible, we cannot deny. Tacitus was never a popular author: he demands in his readers concentrated attention, a very high degree of intellectual power, and, what is even rarer, the fortitude to face a world of unpleasant realities instead of comforting oneself with hallucinogenic fairy tales or drugs. Symmachus, who did so much to preserve civilization, never mentions him. In his darkling day, Tacitus might have given cold shivers of foreboding to anyone who understood him, so we cannot argue that Tacitus would have been preserved together with Livy. If we are not to rest content with ignorance, we must try to weigh the relative probability of the alternative explanation, that Tacitus completed no more than sixteen books of *Annales*.

15 Fabia (*op. cit.*, p. 151) thinks that the last books of the *Annales* were lost before the two works were combined, and that the first book of the *Historiae* was numbered XVII because "le copiste de notre manuscrit [the Second Medicean!] ou d'un archétype ... a considéré le seizième livre incomplet des *Annales* comme le dernier."

16 *T.A.P.A.*, Cl (1970), p. 9. Jerome's reference (see note 3 *supra*) could, of course, have been to a collection of rolls rather than a codex.
We are first of all handicapped because we know nothing about his methods of working. We do not know when he first resolved to write history,¹⁷ nor do we know the compass of the work he then planned. We do not know how many administrative positions he held besides a pro-
consulship,¹⁸ how much of his time and energy was in various years absorbed by official duties, political activities, social responsibilities, and domestic cares, or what facilities or obstacles aided or hindered research and composition when he was away from home—or, for that matter, when he was at home. And worst of all, we do not know whether he assembled and digested material for one segment of his work at a time and remained with it until he produced a final draft of his text before starting on the next segment, or whether he prepared his material for an entire work, organized his treatment of it, and decided what he would say on each subject before he began to write a literally polished and final text of any part.

When Tacitus wrote the Agricola, in or near January, 98, he had planned at least the Historiae. If modern scholars are correct in refusing to believe the younger Pliny’s assertion that his letters were not arranged in chronological order, Tacitus in 106 or 107 asked Pliny for some information about the death of his uncle in 79. If eight years of labor had brought him only to that year, he was certainly a slow worker, but, so far as we know, his energies may have been engrossed by official duties in the provinces or other activities until 105 or 106; or, on the other hand, his request may have been an afterthought while revising a final draft of books otherwise completed—or it may have been a mere courtesy to a colleague eager to “help.” About a year later, Pliny supplies information about his own conduct in 93, thus providing proof that the Historiae or the part of them that dealt with that year had not yet been made public.¹⁹

We do not know how Tacitus “published.” Historians recited in his

¹⁷ Gaston Bossier, in his Tacite, Paris, s.a. [1903], pp. 50 f., thinks it likely that Tacitus prepared to write history as early as 93.

¹⁸ Of which we know only through the chance discovery of an inscription in Caria; for the date of Tacitus’s term as Proconsul of Asia, see A. I. Suskin, A.J.A., XL (1936), pp. 71 f., and Syme’s Appendix 23.

¹⁹ The proof, however, is subject to two obvious questions: (a) Pliny’s letter is supposed to be more or less contemporary with datable letters in the same book, but would Pliny have “published” his letter before the part of the Historiae in which he hoped to be commended was available to his readers? (b) Since it is unlikely that Tacitus devoted the equivalent of a full Teubner page to Pliny’s daring remark in the senate, could not Pliny have put his letter into circulation to give his readers a fuller account of the incident than they had found in Tacitus’s already published work?
day, but Pliny's silence may indicate that Tacitus was above such vanity.\textsuperscript{20} Ingenuity has been lavished on efforts to prove that he "published" in triads or hexads; one is reminded of Sherwin-White's comment anent similar efforts with Pliny's letters: "The triad is a fantasy born of scholarly hankering after system where system is improbable."\textsuperscript{21} There are fairly numerous allusions to contemporary events in almost every book of the letters, but very few in the whole of Tacitus. There is no reason to suppose that he would have followed the example of Vergil or of Propertius or of Ovid,\textsuperscript{22} and while we certainly cannot deny that he may have "published" in triads or hexads or decades or dodecades, the internal evidence that can be elicited by a microscopic search for discrepancies is both so exiguous and so tenuous that we may be excused from affirming that he followed any system.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20} Pliny had the good sense to be especially proud of his acquaintance with Tacitus. What better way of advertising that relationship and paying his greater contemporary fulsome compliments than a letter, perhaps to a third person, commenting on a recitation by Tacitus, if such there had been?


\textsuperscript{22} As is well known, Ovid composed his long and intricate Metamorphoses and completed them (except for a few finishing touches) without "publishing" a single hexad, pentad, triad, or book, and was able to pretend that he believed his own personal copy, which he burned before going into exile, was the only copy in existence (\textit{Trist.} I.7.15-25). For that procedure there can have been only one motive: he wanted his readers to have the completed work in its entirety at one time. He doubtless felt that piecemeal "publication" would gravely detract from the effect of the whole, which attains a quasi-epic sweep in the last book, and his artistic sense was certainly correct. If Ovid could master what appears to have been a common Roman urge to rush before the public as soon as a book or two was ready, Tacitus could have had equal self-control. Too much has been made of the obvious fact that the peripeties of history are by their very nature dramatic and often tragic, but Tacitus, who combined a profound historical sense with the highest literary art, could well have thought of the \textit{Historiae} as what they probably were, a continuous narrative rising from somber beginnings to a terrible climax and a catastrophe in which blood-stained daggers, like a \textit{deus ex machina}, suddenly resolved what had appeared to be both unalterable and intolerable. If he did, he may have refused to destroy that unity and blunt the emotional effect by giving out his work in pieces.

\textsuperscript{23} If there were hexads, then, obviously, the only place where a division would occur in our extant text is after Book XII, where, to be sure, some indications have been found, of which the most significant is the mention of Locusta in XIII.15.3 as though she had not already been identified in XII.62.3. In his commentary on I.54.1, however, Goodyear points out a discrepancy between that passage and II.95.1 that is fully as noteworthy as any that "has been cited as evidence for lack of revision in the later books," and justly remarks that the comparison "encourages scepticism about the value of such evidence." In fact, a common interpretation of the passage mentioned in note 29 \textit{infra} could be used to prove either that II.60 was published before II.61 or that Tacitus never revised Book II.
When it was believed that the *Dialogus de oratoribus* was a youthful work, it was imagined that the author's style grew more "Tacitean" as steadily as a tree grows year by year, until it reached full growth in the last book of the *Annales*, so that intervals of time could be measured by a process analogous to counting the rings in a tree's trunk. Fortunately, we now need do no more than refer to two statistically precise and trenchant articles, the one by Goodyear, who has shown that "stylistic change is part of Tacitus' nature" and is neither uniform nor chronologically measurable, and the other, which is virtually a corroborative sequel, by J. N. Adams, who shows how many factors, conscious and subconscious, may have contributed to the observed variations.  

If Tacitus finished the *Historiae* in 109, as Syme suggests, and there certainly is no reason to suggest a later date—he had about six years in which to work on the *Ab excessu divi Augusti* before he completed the final draft of Book II, and although he spent one of those years as Proconsul of Asia (a position of high dignity but not necessarily one of onerous duties), there is no known reason why that space of time should not have sufficed him for the composition of all sixteen (or more) books of that work, particularly if, as is possible and even likely, he had assembled material for it even earlier. Livy wrote at the rate of at least three to four books every year; Cicero produced something like thirty books in a year, aided, to be sure, by Greek treatises and his own recollections of the studies of his youth, but apparently without materials previously collected and digested in preparation for those writings. We do not know how laborious was the brilliance and concision of Tacitus's Latin, but even if his style required the most careful elaboration and reworking, composition of a final version from fully prepared materials would certainly have been possible within a year, and the same space of time would be more than ample for all variations of stylistic habits found between Book I and Book XVI. Let us accordingly consider the internal evidence without fitting it to a Procrustean bed of preconceptions about how Tacitus "must" have "published" or how his style "must" have "evolved."

There is one secure and certain indication of a fairly precise date: the

26 112–113; see note 18 supra.
27 This makes the speed of composition somewhat less amazing. Cicero drew on his early studies and subsequent thinking about philosophical questions as much as on the Greek treatises, as was shown by Martin van den Bruwaene (*La théologie de Ciceron*, Louvain, 1937), who, however, ventures too far in trying to identify "early" passages in our texts.
reference in II.61.2 to the *Romanum imperium*, "quod nunc Rubrum ad Mare patescit". Despite a phenomenal expenditure of perverse ingenuity in numerous attempts to explain away that passage, which in turn fixes the scope of the more general reference to expansion of empire in IV.4.3, the *Rubrum Mare* here is necessarily the *Rubrum Mare* of XIV.25.2, and Tacitus patently refers to an epochal enlargement of the empire, not a trivial rectification of frontiers. And since *nunc* means "now," Tacitus wrote that passage after hearing the first news of Trajan's conquest of Mesopotamia in 115 and before that territory was abandoned by Hadrian soon after the death of Trajan in August, 117. If we knew whether or not the passage was a late addition to a substantially complete book, and if we knew what method Tacitus followed in composing, we could venture further deductions, but as matters stand, we must be content with the limits 115–117, or, if Hadrian successfully disembled his intention for a time, 118.

28 All that needs to be said on this subject is said by Koestermann, *ad loc.*, and by Syme, Appendix 71, with a postscript in his *Ten Studies in Tacitus*, Oxford, 1970, pp. 129, 144 f.

29 As Syme points out, the passage is the effective conclusion of a digression on Oriental empires; he could have added that it seems to have a close rhetorical relationship to II.60.4, which has been the favorite datum of those who argue against the obvious meaning of *Mare Rubrum*, and has also been taken to show that the reference to Trajan's conquests was a kind of "stop-press" addition to a completed text. I think the passage may be fairly paraphrased in its essentials as follows: In 772/19 the senior Egyptian priest at Thebes translated for Germanicus hieroglyphic inscriptions which, he said, proved that Rhameses had (1) conquered (a) Libya, now a Roman province, (b) the large territory south of Egypt known as Aethiopia, which the Romans never seriously attempted to occupy, and (c) the vast territories east of Asia Minor, Media, Persia, Bactria, and Scythia, which even Alexander the Great had never completely subdued and into which no Roman had ever led an army; (2) ruled all of Asia Minor, including the territories that Trajan added to the Empire in 113-115; and (3) exacted from the lands subjected to him a revenue equal to that which those lands now, in the year 869/116, pay to their present masters, who are either the Parthians or the Romans. There is nothing in that passage that need conflict with what is said a little later about the *Rubrum Mare*, for while Trajan captured the capital, Ctesiphon, and annexed the western fringe of Parthian territory, he never claimed to have taken Susa or Ecbatana, or to have penetrated into the Parthian heartland, Persis and Media, which therefore was still subject to Parthian rule, i.e., to Osroēs, who, we may be sure, did not forget to collect taxes. It seems to me, therefore, that *nunc* in the two passages may refer to the same date and without the slightest inconsistency. The extension of Roman rule to the Persian Gulf by occupation of Mesopotamia did not at all imply that the whole of Parthia had been annihilated or subjugated, and, despite some odd assumptions by modern scholars, no one in Tacitus's day would have supposed that it did.

30 So Syme believes, but Hadrian's intentions would doubtless have become known to well-informed Romans before they were carried into effect, and the date of the formal abolition of the new provinces is conjectural, as is the guess that Hadrian may have entered into some sort of "face-saving" treaty with the Parthians.
In what is preserved of the remaining books of the *Annales*, there is no definite allusion to a later event,\(^31\) and therefore nothing to invalidate Mendell's conclusion that the whole of that work was made public by Tacitus in 116. We can a little simplify our inquiry by strictly limiting it to the date at which the extant text was written, since we really know nothing about the circumstances of its publication.\(^32\) Lacking positive information, we are reduced to the ever parlous expedient of seeking negative evidence.

With no author are arguments *ex silentio* more precarious than with Tacitus; and that is not merely because so much of his history has been lost. He wrote with such restraint and subtlety that he thoroughly confused Von Pöhlmann,\(^33\) and he always disconcerts readers who have not reached the intellectual maturity that Renan attained when he wrote, "je me résignai à un état de la création où beaucoup de mal sert de condition à un peu de bien."\(^34\) We are often tempted to assume that so powerful a mind must have foreseen—and foreseen as inevitable—the disintegration of the empire and the barbarian invasions; it requires constant vigilance to keep our understanding of him untainted by the endemic superstitions and epidemic delusions of our darkling age. There is, even now, incessant argument about his opinions on every subject. *Il nous faut trancher les discussions.* I can address only those who will agree that his primary concern was preservation of the *Imperium Romanum*; that he believed that the empire, *urgentibus fatis,*\(^35\) was under the neces-

\(^{31}\) Syme suggests (especially pp. 517–519) that experience of the early years of Hadrian's rule may have colored Tacitus's portraits of Nero and perhaps even Tiberius. Koestermann, *Athenaeum*, XLIII (1965), pp. 206 ff., believes that the description of the judicial murder of Thrasea Paetus was colored by Hadrian's assassinations. Such conjectures are insubstantial; history repeats itself, and thoughtful men disapprove in the past what they would resent in the present. One could argue that *Hist.* IV.41.1 reflects Hadrian's belated oath to the Senate that he would not have senators murdered informally!

\(^{32}\) Koestermann, in his commentary, Vol. IV, p. 10, says of the later books, "Dabei bliebe die Frage offen, wann diese Bücher überhaupt aus seinem Nachlaß ediert worden sind." For aught that we know to the contrary, that could have been true of the *Annales* as a whole. We have no evidence that they did not, like the historical work of Seneca's father (though perhaps for a different reason), remain 'unpublished' for years after the author's death.

\(^{33}\) Die Weltanschauung des Tacitus, München, 1913, leaves one with the conclusion that Tacitus either had no settled opinions or did not see that some of his opinions were incompatible with others!

\(^{34}\) In the preface to the publication in 1890 of his juvenile *L'Avenir de la science.*

\(^{35}\) The controversy over the meaning of this phrase is simply phenomenal. If one has an irresistible urge to make Tacitus prophesy the coming of Alaric, Wölflin's emenda-
sity—perhaps a fatal necessity—of expanding its dominion by subduing the barbarians on its borders, and that the worst princeps was one who was *incuriousus proferendi imperii*; and that, furthermore, as Iiro Kajanto has reminded us in an excellent article that he could have carried farther, Tacitus believed that war was itself a moral purgative indispensable to the empire. When Rome was little more than a city, L. Quinctius (as reported by Livy, III.19.12), with the Roman capacity for facing facts, had observed, "Nescio quo fato magis bellantes quam pacati propitios habemus deos." Under the empire, as experience had repeatedly proved, there was a further consideration: the standing armies that were necessary for defence of the frontiers were, under competent commanders, an irresistible offensive force, but when they, like the aristocracy, became *longa pace desides*, the result was sedition and civil war. The army, like fire, was an indispensable servant but a fearful master, and the way to keep it under control was to employ it on the tasks for which it had been created. However painful so horrid a thought may be to tender souls, Tacitus was certain that the *saeculum* inaugurated by Trajan would be *beatissimum* because, *inter alia*, the bungling defensive policies of the past would be replaced by the offensive operations which alone can succeed against a persistent enemy.

*Revilo P. Oliver*

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36 *Latomus*, XXIX (1970), pp. 699–718. On the politically and socially demoralizing influence of peace, cf. Oswald Spengler, *Jahre der Entscheidung*, München, 1933, p. 10: "Einen langen Krieg ertragen wenige, ohne seelisch zu verderben; einen langen Frieden erträgt niemand." Aristotle's theory (*Pol.* 1334a) that the deleterious effects of peace could be obviated by wise legislation (assuming that the nomothete had the power to impose his wisdom on the populace) was applicable only to city-states; in the Roman Empire, such legislation was no longer possible, and peace within the empire could be broken only by the far greater evil of civil war, but the vigor and virility of the ruling class could be maintained by the wars along the frontiers that were in any case necessary to preserve and augment the Empire and to maintain the discipline and efficiency of the standing armies. Tacitus, no doubt, thought primarily in terms of the historical imperative inherent in the very fact of empire, and we should not forget that his belief that Agricola should have been permitted to complete the conquest of Britain and then go on to annex Ireland was confirmed by subsequent history: after the futility of Hadrian's Chinese Wall had been repeatedly and expensively demonstrated, Septimus Severus had to make a belated effort to carry out Agricola's plan.
When he wrote II.61.2, Tacitus believed that Mesopotamia had become a province like Libya, and while the Parthians had not been subdued, he doubtless thought that their power had been permanently broken by the loss of their capital city, and that their kingdom would slowly disintegrate by internal convulsions aided by further Roman thrusts at opportune moments. He may even have hoped, as did Trajan in the full tide of victory, that the legions would one day march in India. Given his conception of imperial destiny, and his belief that the Parthians were a menace comparable to the Germans, we can imagine the disappointment and distress that he would have felt at news of the reverses Trajan suffered before he started home in August, 117, and what would have been his anger—and perhaps despair—over a shameful and cowardly retreat and a contraction of the territory within which, ominously, it would thenceforth be angustius imperitatum. Now in Books XI to XV Tacitus has often to mention the affairs of Armenia and Parthia, and he devotes considerable space to them, especially to the career of Domitius Corbulo, and in all of this there is no allusion to the abandonment of Trajan’s conquest, nor even a turn of phrase that would suggest such knowledge. Had he known of the failure, could he have refrained from at least some allusive phrase, such as pervicaces Romanorum hostes or numquam diu domiti or sempiterno imperio nostro periculo nati? I can discover nothing in those books inconsistent with an hypothesis that Tacitus regarded the Parthian problem as satisfactorily on its way to a definitive solution, and I note that the words he puts into the mouths of recreants in XV.13.2, “<neque> eandem vim Samnitibus . . . ac Parthis, Romani imperii aemulis,” would be exquisitely ironical, if the rivals of the great empire were going the way of the rivals of the early city-state.

If a second and equally tenuous inference ex silentio is valid, we can lower the limit ante quem. The date of the simultaneous outbreak of the Jews in many parts of the empire is variously reported. Jerome says that it began in 115, but it is inconceivable that Trajan, no matter how

37 He admits, Germ. 37, “regno Arsacis acrior est Germanorum libertas,” but he lists the Parthians after the Samnites, the Carthaginians, the Celtiberians, and the Gauls—all problems that the Romans had successfully solved, with the implication that a solution of the Parthian problem was long overdue. If Tacitus perceived at all what later history makes so obvious to us, the danger of including in Roman territory an ever increasing number of unassimilable barbarians, he must have assumed either that they could be kept in permanent subjection or that the risk was less than that of permitting them to remain under arms and uncontrolled outside the frontiers. We may wish that we had the eloquent chapter that he must have devoted to Domitian’s shameful peace with the Dacians.

38 In Fotheringham’s edition of the Chronici canones, Londinii, 1923, p. 278. The beginning of the outbreak is accordingly placed in 115 by R. P. Longden (Cambridge
intent on Oriental conquests he may have been, would have ignored for two years the devastation and effective loss to the empire of whole provinces, including Egypt with its indispensable granaries. Our best source, Cassius Dio, places the beginning of the great insurrection in the spring of 117.\footnote{Ancient History, Vol. XI, p. 250} That date for what amounted to a frenzied attempt to destroy the Roman Empire and forced Trajan to detach part of his army

\textit{infra}, p. 39. That the outbreak occurred simultaneously in several provinces is attested by all our sources, and is only reasonable, whether we suppose it to have spread by contagious enthusiasm or to have been prearranged and concerted according to an ‘over-all’ strategic plan. The eminent Jewish historian, Heinrich Graetz, in his \textit{Geschichte der Juden}, 4. Auflage bearbeitet von S. Horovitz, Leipzig, 1908, Vol. IV, p. 113, says that the Jews, after inciting and leading the revolts in Mesopotamia, "verbreiteten den Aufstand über einen großen Teil des römischen Reiches. . . . Eine solche Einmütigkeit setzt einen wohlberechneten Plan und kräftigen Führer voraus." Miss Motta (p. 487, n. 1) cites an article by A. Friedmann (to which I do not have access) in which it is concluded that the outbreaks in the Roman Empire were engineered from Palestine; I suppose that the chief of the race (\textit{Nasi}, ‘ethnarch’) is meant. Offhand, one could conjecture that if there was a world-wide strategy, the direction came from the Prince (\textit{Resch Golah}, ‘exilarch’), who, according to Graetz (p. 112) had authority over all the Jews in the empire, and who normally resided in Babylon; no one seems to know whether he feigned submission to the Roman occupation of that city or fled into Parthian territory. Graetz points out that Roman control of Mesopotamia would have gravely impaired the commercial ascendancy of the Jews, and one can only say that if the coordination of the revolt in Mesopotamia with wide-spread insurrection within the empire to take Trajan \textit{a tergo} was planned, it was masterly strategy and successful. Alexander Fuks (\textit{infra}, n. 40) believes that the coordinated outbreaks in Cyprus, Cyrenaica, and Egypt, at least, had no ‘tangible, rational cause’ and were merely ‘rooted in the messianic yearnings of the Jews.’ We are, of course, here interested only in the chronology (cf. \textit{infra}, n. 40).

\footnote{Strictly speaking, what Dio implies (LXVIII.32.1) is that the news of the overthrow of Roman government in Cyrenaica, Egypt, and Cyprus reached Trajan while he was engaged in the siege of Hatra. (One could conjecture that his anger and alarm caused the tactical blunder of which Syme, p. 495, very plausibly accuses him.) On the chronology, see the study by Lelia Motta, \textit{Aegyptus}, XXXII (1952), pp. 474–490, whose lucid and critical analysis of all the evidence (except certain papyri adduced by Fuks; see my next note) leads her to place the beginning of the sudden outbreak in the Roman provinces in the ‘prima metà del 117 d.C.’ We may add that although Trajan despatched Marcilius Turbo with adequate forces to Egypt and doubtless sent other commanders and troops to other regions, the insurrection was not suppressed at the time of his death, which may, indeed, have contributed to the subsequent pacification. He left Mesopotamia after arranging a temporary cessation of hostilities, and intended to return (\textit{Dio}, LXVIII.33.1: \textit{παρασκευάζειτο μὲν αὖθις ἐς Μεσοποταμίαν στρατεύσαι}, doubtless after he had restored Roman rule, begun reconstruction of the demolished cities, and taken precautions to avert similar outbreaks in the future. This supports Miss Motta’s conclusion, for a much earlier date would mean either that Trajan simply ignored a vast and terrible insurrection for a year or more, or that it took legionary troops an improbably long time to break resistance in territory in which there were no mountain fastnesses to be stormed or starved.}
in Mesopotamia, as distinct from relatively minor and local disturbances that may have occurred earlier, must be approximately correct. The ferocity of the zealots, the atrocity of the tortures they inflicted on their victims, the gruesome mutilation of corpses, the extermination of Romans, Greeks, and even natives in prosperous and populous regions of the empire, the slaughter of Roman officials, and the levelling of great cities to the ground, made that outbreak surpass in horror any of Rome’s civil wars, and the horror as well as the menace to the very existence

40 Alexander Fuks, in his excellent article, *J.R.S.*, LI (1961), pp. 98–104, which complements his detailed study of the papyrological evidence in *Aegyptus*, XXXIII (1953), pp. 131–158, returns to the date of 115 on the basis of one crucial piece of evidence (since the other, the *Acta Pauli et Antonini*, is now securely dated to the reign of Hadrian: Musurillo, *Acts*, p. 181), a mutilated papyrus containing the proclamation of a nameless Prefect of Alexandria in the nineteenth year of somebody’s reign. One could question Fuks’ equation of that nineteenth year with 115, but if we accept it, I submit that a careful reading of the text (most recently edited by Fuks, *Corpus papyrorum Judaicarum*, Jerusalem, 1957, #435) will show that it cannot refer to the great outbreak that alone concerns us. Enough of the text remains to show clearly that, as Fuks himself says, the Prefect, writing on 13 October, regards the troubles as over and thinks only of reestablishing domestic peace in the city, which he evidently hopes that a stern admonition to trouble-makers will suffice to produce. It is utterly unbelievable that any Roman prefect could have written in such complacent terms after the Jews in Cyrenaica had, according to Fuks, devoted themselves to “annihilation of the pagans” with such efficiency that they left only “scorched earth behind” when they invaded Egypt to join the insurrectionists there. If the date is 115, then the Prefect wrote after one of the usual *staseis* in Alexandria had been put down and before the great insurrection in Egypt and elsewhere, of which he knows nothing. The only objection is that such a local and separate outbreak does not fit the theory of a strategically planned and coordinated insurrection to support a revolt in Mesopotamia (*supra*, n. 38), but that obviously is not insuperable. If the Prefect’s proclamation is evidence of an outbreak in Alexandria in the summer or early autumn of 115, which had to be suppressed by the available Roman troops in what he calls a *μάχη*, that explains the date in Jerome, for Eusebius could have regarded the event as a harbinger or preliminary of the great outbreak in Egypt and other provinces. Alexandria was a city in which riots approaching the fury of a civil war (Claudius calls one of them a *πόλεμος* in *P. Lond. 1912, l. 74*) occurred naturally and with monotonous regularity, and the *tumultus* mentioned in the papyrus would have been regarded as merely normal by Trajan (and Tacitus).

41 Appian, who was evidently a minor official in the bureaucracy in Egypt, escaped the Jews, as he tells us (frag. 19 Vierck & Roos), by extraordinary good luck, but many other officials in the Roman administration, perhaps including procurators, cannot have been so fortunate.

42 In Cyrene, for example, the destruction of the city was virtually total; see the inscriptions collected by S. Applebaum, *J.R.S.*, XL (1950), pp. 87–90, and the accompanying article. This substantiates reports of total devastation elsewhere. On the “scorched earth” policy, see the articles by Fuks cited above.
of the empire, of which a fatal weakness was thus disclosed, must have made a profound impression on all contemporaries, and especially on Tacitus, who could scarcely have refrained from alluding to it, had it occurred before he wrote. Unfortunately for our purposes, however, his text has been lost at the points at which such an allusion would most naturally have occurred: the riots in Alexandria in 38, the violence and agitation of 41 that occasioned Claudius's letter and edict of warning, the sedition of Theudas, c. 46, and especially the outbreak in Rome *impulsore Chresto*. We are left with the uncertain evidence of the famous passage in XV.44.3 concerning the *Chrestiani*, who, as Koestermann has shown, must have been followers of the revolutionary agitator, Chrestus, and who formed a religious sect that Tacitus identifies with the sect that makes its first appearance in history in Pliny's famous letter of

43 At the time that Hadrian seized power, according to Spartianus (5.2), in addition to yet unsubdued insurrections in the territories in which we know the Jews to have been active, "Mauri lacessebant [i.e., in Mauretania; cf. 5.8], Sarmatae bellum inferebant [in Dacia, thus providing Hadrian with a pretext for his reported wish to abandon that province also?], Britanni teneri sub Romana dicione non poterant." We may believe that there were serious troubles in the regions named, but we must allow for the possibility that the source is Hadrian's autobiography, in which he would certainly have exaggerated their gravity to the very limit of credibility. If we follow Graetz and others in thinking of a carefully planned and coordinated effort to shatter the Roman Empire, the uprisings in these (and probably other) regions could have been the work of the large Jewish colonies in cities throughout the empire, who would naturally have instigated and used the natives wherever possible; if, on the other hand, they were spontaneous native movements, their leaders must have been inspired, and emboldened by reports of the Jews' successes in Egypt, Cyrenaica, Cyprus, and perhaps elsewhere. What those successes proved was that Roman rule was not proof against a sudden and furious revolt by a segment of the population in a time of apparent tranquillity, and the example thus set may have influenced later revolts within the empire to an extent we cannot estimate.

44 The date of the riots mentioned by Suetonius (Claud. 25.4) is uncertain. It seems unlikely that Tacitus would have ignored an outbreak *in Rome* of such magnitude that it called for rather drastic action by Claudius (no doubt accompanied by a pedantic discourse or other characteristic conduct), and he could have mentioned the riots without naming Chrestos or even have named the agitator without tracing the origin of the seditious sect to an earlier revolutionary of the same or similar name and thus anticipating what he says here. Our extant text begins near the middle of Book XI and after the early months of 47; there is no indication of a considerable lacuna in Book XII; and it is unlikely that Tacitus would have mentioned in the lost part of XI or a preceding book a noteworthy incident that occurred two or more years later. Given the possibility that Tacitus did mention the riots of which Chrestus was the instigator, the date 49, commonly assigned to them on very tenuous evidence, must be regarded as doubtful.

45 *Historia*, XVI (1967), pp. 456–469; cf. his commentary *ad loc*. 
c. 112. Whatever the basis for the identification, Tacitus clearly thinks of the *exitabilis supersticio* as a sect of Jewish nihilists, a pestilence that began in Judaea and spread to Jewish colonies throughout the western world, especially the numerous colony at Rome, and his "etiam per Vrbem" sounds like an allusion to the outbreak instigated by Chrestus. Had he known of the enormously more deadly and devastating eruption of Messianic aspirations in 117, would he have contented himself with an allusion to a relatively minor outbreak at Rome that the government had quickly brought under control? I think it unlikely that he would. Without pretending to know what he said in the lost books, I think the most probable of the several possible explanations of his silence at this point is that he wrote before the insurrection began. That would place the composition of Book XV, and presumably of XVI also, in 115–116.

Tacitus was sixty or past sixty in 116. He had reached the point in life at which every man, if not thoughtless, must say to himself, with Lucilius, "iam, qua tempestate vivo, chresin ad me recipio." All the ills that flesh is heir to begin to accumulate by a physiological necessity

46 In *La Parola del Passato*, XXIII (1968), pp. 368–370, Robert Renehan (who had not seen Koestermann's article) argues that *Chrestiani* should be read not only in Tacitus but also in Pliny; he does not consider Suetonius, *Nero*, 16.2, or make clear his view of the quotation from Sulpicius Severus that is now printed as Frag. 2 of the *Historiae*, although the mention of *Christianii*, if not the entire passage, is more probably to be attributed to the Fifth-Century Christian writer than to Tacitus. Léon Herrmann, *Latomus*, XIII (1954), pp. 343–353, contends that Pliny's letter has been grossly, though very cleverly, interpolated; if he is right, then the sectaries whom Pliny found in Bithynia need not have been persons whom the Christians of later centuries would have been willing to accept as spiritual progenitors. It would be irrelevant to consider here questions that have been endlessly debated with much emotion and little objectivity, and it will suffice to remark that (1) it is psychologically improbable that the appalling malice manifest in the Apocalypse and innumerable similar compositions could have been satisfied by dreams of universal catastrophe and suffering that it made no attempt to realize, and (2) nothing is more preposterous than the notion that the eminently practical Romans, long accustomed to tolerate the most outlandish sects and the weirdest superstitions, attributed *odium generis humani* to an innocuous flock of innocent lambs that were uniquely engaged in loving one another.

47 Or what he may have planned to say when he came to the Jewish revolt in 66, where, as Syme suggests (p. 469, n. 2), his probably numerous earlier mentions of Jewish seditions could have been brought to an artistically perfect climax, which, we may add, need not have involved much repetition of what he had said in Hist. V.2–8. I recognize that the possibility he might have deferred to that point the allusion that I desiderate in XV.44 seriously weakens an argument *ex silentio* on which I should otherwise insist more strongly, but it is also possible that in the chapter now lost (if ever written) Tacitus maintained the attitude he took in the *Historiae*, where he speaks of the Jews of Judaea without reference to the Jews dispersed throughout the Roman Empire, where their status was, of course, entirely different.
against which consolatory essays de senectute are powerless, and although a few men who are by heredity μακρόβιοι wither slowly, no one is astonished when men of that age cease to live. Tacitus may have died in the course of nature after he completed (or even before he completed) Book XVI; his great German expositor suggests, "Vielleicht hat ihm der Tod (wie Petrarca) den Griffel aus der Hand genommen." Koestermann was thinking of a later date, but I see no reason why Tacitus may not have died before he heard of the Jewish outbreak or suspected that the empire had passed the noon of all its greatness—died with an unshaken faith in Rome, felix opportunitate mortis.

There are, however, two alternatives (aside from the obvious one, a physical collapse) that are worth mentioning. I shall do no more than sketch possibilities that no amount of argument could convert into certainties.

Tacitus was undoubtedly a man of considerable, and conceivably great, influence in the politics of Rome and the Roman Empire. From an inscription discovered by chance in 1889 we have learned that he held the proconsulship that was the highest honor to which a loyal senator could aspire, but we do not know how prominent a part he took in the business of the senate nor to what extent he was an intimate friend of the princeps; we do not even know whether he was a member of the consilium that Trajan appears to have scrupulously consulted. He had some part in the rise of Trajan to the principate; how great a part is conjectural. In the Agricola (44.5) he says of his father-in-law: "ei <non licuit> durare in hanc beatissimi saeculi lucem ac principem Traianum videre, quod augurio votisque apud nostras aures ominabatur." Now this is generally taken to be merely a rhetorical device, a "happy artifice," and to mean no more than that Agricola hoped for better times. But an augurium should be more specific, and ominari means more than to wish or hope. When Agricola confided in his son-in-law (necessarily before 89, when Tacitus left Italy), Flavius Clemens was still alive and his sons were the officially designated heirs, and while anyone could have hoped that pupils of Quintilian would be imbued with humanitas, there was no assurance that Quintilian was a better teacher than Seneca. What is more, if we take Tacitus literally, Agricola predicted the accession of Trajan, who, to be sure, was a man of some distinction, son of a military man who had been transformed into a patrician; he had been a praetor,

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49 It is not impossible that we may someday learn from newly discovered fragments of the Fasti that he held a second consulship.
50 Syme, p. 29.
had commanded a legion in Spain, and had given proof of military competence in handling troops, but it would have required praeterhuman prescience to foresee that he would have a chance to become princeps. It is by no means impossible, however, that Agricola, one of the very few men of extraordinary ability whom Tacitus judged capax imperii, had, with a few of his peers, selected Trajan as Domitian's successor. Prudent men would not plan a futile revolt, such as that of Saturninus, nor yet an assassination when there were no special circumstances to make it feasible, but men capable of keeping their own counsel patiently could have made discreet preparations to take advantage of the opportunity that would present itself when the fortunately childless Domitian was removed from the scene. If that was what Agricola confided to the ears of his son-in-law and heir, ominabatur has a real meaning—and Tacitus was his successor in the conspiracy.  

It is generally agreed that Cocceius Nerva was probably a participant in the conspiracy that delivered Rome from Domitian, although he was in the end unable to protect the actual assassins from the Praetorians. At all events, the accession of so aged and feeble a man was merely a stop-gap; as Syme puts it, "it meant that the struggle for the succession could begin at once." If a small group of prudent men had already resolved that Trajan was to be the successor, they probably were not members of the conspiracy that disposed of Domitian, but they seized an opportunity that presented itself, perhaps unexpectedly, and it is quite likely that, as Syme suggests, the adoption of Trajan was forced on Nerva, which means that it was likewise forced on the senators and

51 As we all know, great political mutations, when not the result of war, are normally brought about by conspiracies, although it is customary to use euphemisms when speaking of successful conspiracies of which one approves, and prudence may require further circumlocution when the prevailing mythology attributes such changes to supernatural beings or "spontaneous" action by a populace or proletariat.

52 Dietmar Kienast, Historia, XVII (1968), pp. 51-71, has pointed out that Pliny in his Panegyricus speaks of Nerva in terms that are less than flattering, as surely Pliny would not and could not have done, had Trajan felt any real gratitude, much less pietas, toward his adoptive father. Pliny doubtless had good opportunities to learn after the event how the transfer of power was effected, and Kienast would have done well to explore the basis of Pliny's thrice-repeated certainty that Trajan was a man quem constat imperaturumuisse, etiamsi a Nerva non esset adoptatus. Pliny, speaking in public, naturally speaks of the need to save the empire and implies that Trajan came to power divinitus, but Pliny had had some little experience of human affairs, and unless he was indulging in empty rhetoric or had the temerity to suggest that Trajan would have followed the example of Vitellius, he must have known that Trajan and his champions at Rome had made their preparations with such sagacity and thoroughness that they were in a position to impose their will on Nerva and the opposing factions.
other men of influence who favored other candidates. Now, whether or not there was a group already resolved and prepared to act for Trajan, as we have conjectured, Tacitus was undoubtedly a member of the group that procured Trajan’s succession.\footnote{As Syme has pointed out, it is quite possible that Tacitus held the consulship when Nerva finally adopted Trajan. This has been denied by Harold B. Mattingly in a boldly prosopographical article (Rivista storica dell’Antichità, II (1972), pp. 169–185) that raises questions that I hope to discuss elsewhere. Whatever the date of the consulship, Ogilvie is surely right in saying (in his and Richmond’s edition of the Agricola, p. 9) that Tacitus “must have participated, whether as consul or ex-consul, in the political crisis that resulted in the adoption of Trajan.”} Trajan was therefore to some extent politically indebted to Tacitus, and Tacitus was wholly committed to Trajan, not only politically but from an inner conviction that must have been based on a knowledge of Trajan’s character such as could have come only from a long acquaintance or friendship.\footnote{The crowd is naturally eager to endow with imaginary virtues new rulers of whom it knows nothing, but Tacitus must early have acquired the unusual ability or fortitude to observe human nature objectively, and we cannot suppose that his confidence in Trajan’s will and ability to inaugurate a new era was based on mere gossip or a nodding acquaintance. Whether he was well acquainted with Plotina (who was younger, and may have been very much younger, than her husband) is, of course, quite another question.}

That Tacitus was disappointed in Trajan’s rule goes without saying; every man who anticipates a beatissimum saeculum must necessarily discover that, no matter how hard he tried to be coolly rational, his imagination got the better of his judgement, leading him to expect from a political mutation impossible results. Even if he has kept his mind unclouded by the normal illusion that a change in régime will transform human nature, he will find that his conceptions of what is desirable and feasible conflict with the calculations of other influential men, that decisions must be made in terms of events and pressures that he did not foresee, and that, in short, “between the idea and the reality falls the Shadow.” The only question will be how far he is willing to compromise.

We cannot catalogue Tacitus’s disappointments. We may be sure that he disapproved strongly of Plotina’s ingenuity in political affairs, at least after she, like Messalina, presumed to sit in the consilium principis,\footnote{Attested by P. Oxy. 1242 (= Acta Hermaisci in the Acta Alexandrinorum), where her presence would have been specifically protested, had it not been usual and taken for granted. The unknown author doubtless colored his narrative to further his purposes, but he would have been at pains to avoid obvious blunders in describing the setting. The doubts about his accuracy expressed by H. A. Musurillo in his commentary (The Acts of the Pagan Martyrs, Oxford, 1954, p. 176) depend on the assumption that the author used συγκλητικοῖ in the special sense of “Roman senators” rather than in the general and normal meaning of the word, which simply designates the members of any group} and he
may have been dismayed when she finally obtained from her indulgent husband the title and rank of Augusta, as Agrippina had done. He must have bitterly resented the presence and offices of her favorite, Aelius Hadrianus, a sleek young man of dubious antecedents and of morals that probably left no room for doubt, a Graeculus, master of all arts of which he had obtained a smattering, and actually a master of the art by which ambitious young men generally acquire influence over older men who have sexually unsatisfied wives.  

Although Tacitus cannot have foreseen what would eventually happen, for there are limits to the powers of the coniectura consequentium, non multum a divinatione differens, he was doubtless worried when Plotina contrived a marriage between her favorite and Iulia Sabina, her husband’s grand-niece. It is possible, though improbable, that he resented the influence of Jews in Trajan’s court. We cannot even guess whether Tacitus approved of the alimentary institutions as a means of preserving the native stock or regarded them and other expensive benefactions as a waste of money. Philostratus obviously catered to the credulity of his wonder-loving age when he described Trajan’s affection and admiration for Dio Chrysostom, but it seems that Trajan did show some favor to the house-broken Cynic, and he may have been really interested in Chrysostom’s scheme for resettling urban proletariats in agrarian countrysides. Tacitus may have been sceptical of the plan and almost certainly disapproved of its promoter.

that has been called together to deliberate or give advice, and is thus applicable to the consilium principis, which, as Musurillo says, probably included influential equites as well as senators.

Victorians were sure that Plotina, to whom some nice sayings are attributed, was a lady, and that ladies are incapable of marital divagations. Our contemporaries, who take for granted Pope’s dictum that “every woman is at heart a rake”, will be especially moved by the report (Dio, LXVIII.7, says that Trajan peri meiridika epoivdakei) that poor Plotina needed what is now called “an outlet.”

In Amm. XV.27.3 he identifies Tib. Iulius Alexander as an “illustris eques Romanus,” obviously regarding him as a Roman by “assimilation,” and it is likely that he took the same attitude toward many or all of the Jews in positions of prominence and power in Rome, who must necessarily have exhibited all the essentials of Graeco-Roman culture. Syme’s note (p. 468, n. 2) is therefore misleading: it is Josephus, not Tacitus, who identifies as Jews several persons mentioned in the Historiae and Annales.

Vit. soph. 1.7.4; cf. G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire, Oxford, 1969, p. 47, and Donald R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, London, 1937, p. 154, who (following J. von Arnim) remarks that there were “good reasons why . . . Trajan should have found Dio highly useful.”

Or. VII (Εὔβοικός = 13 in von Arnim’s edition) § 107; αὐγκακαθήσασθα ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τῷ λόγῳ τούς κομφοίς πέντεστα, ἵνα παρέχωμεν τῷ ὄντι καθ’ Ὄμηρον τὰς πόλεις εὔ ναυεταιόσας, κ.τ.λ. Dudley (op. cit., pp. 157 f.) takes this to be a serious proposal for social reform, and so do I, although it is hard to feel certain that any passage in the vast verbiage
We could multiply instances of policies that Tacitus is unlikely to have endorsed, and it would be possible to imagine that he was gradually alienated from Trajan, but the real question is whether all of Trajan’s shortcomings, multiply them as we will, would have outweighed in Tacitus’s estimation Trajan’s success in overawing the Germans, conquering Dacia, and extending Roman dominion to the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf—all this while preserving, at least in the part of society that Tacitus thought important, the felicitas temporum “ubi sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet.” Intelligent men understand that politics is the art of the possible, and Tacitus knew that nations that have won empire invariably find themselves riding a tiger from which it would be suicide to dismount. He need not have thought Trajan an optimus princeps, so long as he thought him optimus principium. And unless we imagine him as having gone into a disgruntled or despondent retirement, as he and Trajan grew old together, he must have been increasingly concerned with the problem of how power was again to be transmitted to worthy hands. And if he did survive Trajan,

of the “Second Sophistic” is not merely epideictic. Dio professes a practical political purpose (§ 127: έι δέ πολλά τῶν εἰρήμενων καθόλου κρήσιμά ἐστι πρὸς πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ.), but that, of course, could be part of the show. Dudley credits him with important additional proposals that have been lost in the transmission of the text.

60 Alain Michel, in his Tacite et le destin de l’Empire (Paris, 1966), a discursive book addressed to readers ignorant of the Classics but well worth reading, depicts Tacitus as progressively alienated from Trajan’s government and reaching a kind of spiritual and intellectual isolation in his later years. One could also base inferences on the modern view that Trajan in his last years became a “megalomaniac” who “overstrained the resources of the empire” in a “fantastic” scheme of conquest; the only evidence for this is the assumption that Hadrian consulted the interests of the nation rather than his personal convenience or advantage. To be sure, there was a limit to expansion eastward—our mind boggles at the idea of Rome with a boundary on the China Sea—but Tacitus evidently did not believe that the limit had been reached, nor, for that matter, did the authors of the tradition that came down to Eutropius, who is so certain that the retreat was unnecessary that he gives a naïve explanation of Hadrian’s motive (“Traiani gloriae invidens”).

61 It would be vain to discuss ancient rumors about whom Trajan would have nominated as his successor, or to speculate about why the nomination was deferred so long. It would have been expedient to defer the nomination until Trajan was ready to admit that he was old, and the announcement should, of course, have been made in Rome, where he could have delivered an appropriate oration and shown proper deference to the senate, where the few men who had shared his secret would lead the applause. For that matter, it is not impossible that Trajan, when he was partly paralyzed and knew that he was dying, did make a nomination that the precious three who surrounded him revised in the interests of Hadrian, who was at Antioch and doubtless preparing himself to be surprised by news of his “adoption.”
he cannot have heard the news from Cilicia without horror and despair. Gibbon's generalization about the period "during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous" has cast a glamor over Hadrian's reign. Our contemporaries, born into a catastrophic age of world wars and pathetically\(\text{medie\v{e}tes }\sigma\tau\gamma\v{e}ρ\v{e}ο\v{u}\text{=posteros eorum praestitit securos.}\)\] naturally venerate a man who contrived, by whatever means, to maintain for almost twenty-one years a peace, both foreign and domestic, that was broken only by the Jewish revolt of 132. And growing economic stringency makes it easy to see a nimbus about the head of a ruler whose propagandists could claim that he, by cancelling unpaid taxes, non praesentes tantum cives suos sed et posteros eorum praestitit securos.\] Our concern here, however, is neither to aver that peace is wonderful nor to criticize Trajan's budgets, but only to adumbrate, if we can, the sentiments of Tacitus, if he was still alive, when he heard the tidings that a dying or dead princeps had secretly, in the presence only of his intriguing wife, her lover's mother-in-law, that woman's paramour, and a young man who was cremated immediately thereafter, given an empire (that was not his to bestow) to a Graeculus who had married into the family against his will, whom he, despite pressure from his artful wife, had advanced only so far as the conventions of Roman society required to avoid scandal, and whom he had left in charge of an inactive Syrian army while the four great marshals on whose loyalty and generalship he was accustomed to rely were busy elsewhere.\] Such was the story, and Tacitus was not a man who could say credo quia absurdum est. Had the tale been credible, Tacitus would not have been less offended by the private transfer of supreme power to a person whose character, however cunningly

\[\text{\textsuperscript{62}C.I.L. VI, 967. No one seems to have remarked that the major beneficiaries were probably wealthy speculators and financiers who had access to "inside" information.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{63}To this must be added the fact that, while it is entirely possible that Trajan contracted typhoid fever at Hatra or succumbed to some other malady, he himself believed that he was poisoned, and his belief was certainly known in Rome, where Agrippina's pharmaceutical skill had not been forgotten. (Some wit may have remarked that Claudius and Trajan were both sixty-four when they ascended to Heaven.) Other suspicions or damning circumstances surrounding the demise of Trajan, unknown to us, probably flitted per ora virum in Roman society: the custom of transmitting news and rumors by correspondence did not end with Cicero. It is surely otiose to remark that we are here interested, not in establishing demonstrable historical truth, but in summarizing, on the basis of our available sources, what was probably said and believed in influential circles in Rome at the time, and that for our purposes it does not matter how much of the story is rejected by modern writers who have tender feelings toward Hadrian and Plotina. The basic work is still Wilhelm Weber's Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Hadrianus, Leipzig, 1907, which is much more detailed than the chapter he contributed to the Cambridge History and examines the sources systematically.}\]
dissembled, must have been at least suspected, and whom no man, if not delirious, could have fancied another Trajan. Plotina's *coup de Jarnac* must have taken Rome by surprise, and we can only imagine the consternation of the eminent men (perhaps including Tacitus, if he was still alive) who must have had settled plans (probably endorsed by Trajan) for determining the succession to the *imperium*, certainly with the concurrence and possibly with the ostensible primacy of the honest part of the senate. Neither Plotina's forged letter nor Hadrian's hypocritical apology can have deceived any one of them.

As Weber seems to have been the first to see, the astounding news must have been quickly followed by the arrival in Rome of P. Acilius Attianus, the Praetorian Praefect, charged with the mission of converting the *coup de Jarnac*, in which he had been one of the three participants and may have been the prime mover, into a completed *coup d'état* by means for which so talented a dissemler as Hadrian could disavow responsibility. He arrested and ejected Baebius Macer, whom Trajan had left in charge of the city; he handed out an extravagant double donative to the troops to inspire affection for Hadrian; and he must have proceeded to buy or intimidate the opposition. We do not know

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64 They must surely have learned from the probably acute crisis that preceded the accession of Trajan, just as the men who engineered that succession had obviously profited from the lesson given by what happened after the assassination of Caligula.

65 So described by Cassius Dio (LXIX.1) on the basis of the researches of his father, M. Cassius Appronianus, who had been governor of Cilicia and seems to have been twice consul. We may wonder what evidence of the forgery Appronianus could have found in Cilicia long after Trajan died there, but his son assures us that πάντα τά κατ' αὐτόν [= 'Αδριανόν] ἐμεμαθήκει σαφῶς, and that implies something much more than collecting gossip.

66 *Op. cit.*, p. 44. I try to exercise care to credit such perceptions, as one credits emendations, to the first authors, and I hope I have not been guilty of an oversight here.

67 Hadrian's former tutor, reputed to have been the paramour of Matidia, had presumably been appointed to command of Trajan's guards at some time before Trajan's death. We do not know how many Praetorians had been left in Rome, presumably under the command of the other Praefect, who, so far as I can learn, may or may not have been Sulpicius Similis at that time. Like all men engaged in conspiratorial *coup s d'état*, Attianus forgot the rule that tools are discarded when no longer useful.

68 Not a man of strong character or loyalty, it seems, for it was deemed unnecessary to murder him (Spart. Vit. Had., 5.5), and he became a prime example of the *elementia* of which Hadrian boasted in an autobiography in which he doubtless applied all the perfumes of Arabia to his spotted hands.

69 Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 44: "Ohne ernstliche Bedenken für die Sicherheit des neuen Regiments sind Attians radikale Vorschläge nicht verständlich. In allen Teilen des Reichs haben sich die Großen gegen die Nachfolge Hadrians gestaubt"—and one would expect the greatest opposition to have come from the best members of the senatorial
the details; we do not even know to what extent he may have used the
troops to demonstrate the legitimacy of Hadrian’s succession. What is
clear is that he in some way extorted from the senate decrees that gave
some cover of legality to the murder of a number of eminent men whom Hadrian feared or against whom he bore grudges. In some cases
at least, the pretext was that they were conspiring against the new master,
which may have been true in the sense that they remained loyal to what
they believed or knew Trajan’s intentions to have been, and may have
pondered means of displacing the usurper; they appear to have been
without troops when their official assassins overtook them, some of them
en route homeward.

We need not ask whether at this date men knew or suspected that
Hadrian intended to surrender all of Trajan’s conquests: four Roman

aristocracy in Rome. That no effective opposition is recorded is in itself highly significant.
As Weber, commenting on Attianus’s Wirksamkeit in Rome, says, “Man kann dies nicht stark genug betonen.” It is entirely possible that a strong conspiratorial organization had been formed during the last years of Trajan’s life to put Hadrian in power, and that its Roman chapter was ready to strike, openly or secretly, as soon as the glad tidings came from Cilicia; if not, Attianus’s achievement is so much more remarkable that one must credit him with a kind of genius. A vital question that we cannot answer is to what extent the various armies in the field were under the control of Hadrian’s partisans. One notes that Trajan’s trusted general, the polyonymous Q. Marcius Turbo etc. (on whom see Syme, J.R.S., LII (1962), pp. 87 ff.), was, exceptionally, a commander on whom Hadrian felt that he could rely from the first (Spart. Vit. Had. 5.8). A. Iulius Quadratus, whom Hadrian sent to Dacia when Nigrinus was removed and destined for assassination, may have been of less certain allegiance; he died soon thereafter.

70 The number of prominent victims is uncertain. Dio (LXIX.4), after naming A. Cornelius Palma, L. Publilius Celsus, C. Avidius Nigrinus, and Lusius Quietus, whom Hadrian killed on a pretext of conspiracy against him, adds, evidently among those killed at the very first, oi δὲ, ἐφ’ ἐτέρως δὴ τινι ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷα μεγάλα δυνάμενοι καὶ πλούστου καὶ δόξης εὐ ᾑκοντες. We do not know who those wealthy and illustrious men were, nor can we be sure of the chronology of the purge. Dio says that it was carried out ἐν τῇ ἐρχύῃ, and Spartanus says (7.3) that the four consuls were killed uno tempore, and that Lusius Quietus was killed in itinere, presumably on his way home to Mauretania. For what it is worth, I note an indication that I do not remember having seen in the historians who have recently treated this period. Graetz, op. cit., p. 126 (cf. pp. 406 ff.), reports a Jewish tradition that two insurgents in Judaea were on the point of being executed when their request for divine intervention was promptly answered by the arrival of the news that Hadrian had discharged Lusius Quietus: “Der Tag der Befreiung . . . am zwölften Addar (im Februar 118?), wurde als ein denkwürdig-freudiges Ereignis verewigt; das Synhedrion setzte ihn . . . in den Kalendar . . . unter dem Namen Trajanstag (Jom Tirjamus) ein.” The name of the holiday, however, indicates rejoicing over the death of Trajan, and one cannot believe that the news of that happy event took six months to reach a people desperately interested in it.
provinces, Mesopotamia, Assyria, Armenia, and even Dacia.\textsuperscript{71} When Hadrian began to appease the Parthians,\textsuperscript{72} thus foreshadowing the craven policy of subsidizing, instead of defeating, the enemy,\textsuperscript{73} is not important. It is unnecessary to conjecture to what extent contemporaries could have apprehended that the new master, \textit{varius, multiplex, multiformis},\textsuperscript{74} would begin the process by which the Roman Empire would cease to be Roman in its culture, its mentality, and its ruling class, so that, as Eduard Fraenkel observed,\textsuperscript{75} we see in Tacitus the last expositor of the indomitable spirit and lucid mind that created the Empire: he was the \textit{ultimus Romanorum}.

We need only ask ourselves what the coming of Acilius Attianus would have meant to Tacitus, if he lived to witness it.

If Tacitus was a man whom Hadrian or his confederates had cause to remember as devoted to the policies of which Trajan had been the avatar, and if he had or was believed to have noteworthy influence, he may have been marked for an informal and unostentatious liquidation. That, of course, is an entirely gratuitous conjecture, possible only because we cannot name a source that would certainly preserve for us a notice of his death.

Let us consider the only alternative. Tacitus, a distinguished member of the senate, would almost necessarily attend the sessions at which that body performs under the direction of the newcome ringmaster and authorizes the assassination of the men who had been great under Trajan. Even if he did not attend those sessions, Tacitus was a senator, and it is a moral certainty that he would have remembered one of the most eloquent passages in all literature: "\textit{Nostrae duxere Helvidium in carcerem manus . . . nos innocentii sanguine Senecio perfudit.}" Domitian had returned.

It was not merely that a man past sixty could scarcely hope to live to a future in which it might conceivably be possible to say again, "\textit{etiam nostri superstites sumus.}" The great effort that put Trajan in power, the high and audacious resolve to amalgamate "\textit{res olim dissociabiles, principatum ac libertatem,}" the last Titanic thrust of the Roman will-to-power—all had failed. \textit{Nunc demum abit animus!} To my mind, it is

\textsuperscript{71} I see no reason to doubt the intention reported by Eutropius, VII.6. Dacia presented some administrative problems, as shown by the immediate reorganization of its government, and Hadrian would not have cared about the \textit{multi cives Romani} whom Trajan had settled there. \textsuperscript{72}Spart. 5-4.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Epit. de Caesaribus}, 14.10. With this goes the "Chinese wall" in England and a resort to purely defensive measures, which never succeed against a persistent enemy.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 14.6. \textsuperscript{75} \textit{Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft}, 1932, pp. 218–233.
inconceivable that if Tacitus lived to see that bitter day of dissolution, he would have had the heart to write another line.\textsuperscript{76} He was, furthermore, a prudent man, not given to vainglorious displays of futile courage \textit{ambitiosa morte}, and he may have had progeny or others dear to him whose inheritance and whose future, such as it might be in the new age, he would not willingly compromise; perceiving that the time \textit{ubi quae sentias dicere licet} had passed away, he may well have consigned the pages of his unfinished \textit{Ab excessu divi Augusti} to a \textit{scrinium}, there to await, as had the histories of the elder Seneca almost a century before, a day when truth, grown obsolete, might be told without peril.

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\textsuperscript{76} Or many lines, if, as Koestermann believes (\textit{supra}, n. 31), the last twenty chapters of our extant text were written under emotion excited by Hadrian’s bloody inaugural. That is possible, but the rather numerous points in the early books at which Syme sees oblique allusions to Hadrian, which may prove no more than that history repeats itself and that human crimes are sadly lacking in variety, are certainly parallels that delators or even Hadrian himself could have noticed; to have published them after the \textit{coup d’etat} would have been to take a risk gratuitously and with no possible hope that the books could serve either to reform or to displace the new boss.
Ulrich von Wilamowit-Moellendorff
to James Loeb: Two Unpublished Letters

WILLIAM MUSGRAVE CALDER III

I. Introduction

John Williams White (1848–1917) is remembered by philologists for three books of abiding value and by archaeologists as the imaginative and powerful first chairman (1881–1887) of the Managing Committee of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. He deserves gratitude for another feat. His teaching together with that of Charles Eliot Norton (1827–1908) instilled an abiding love of the classics in a Harvard undergraduate of the class of 1888, James Loeb (6 August 1867–27 May 1933). White happily survived to see the seed he sowed bear fruit rich beyond the teacher’s dreams.

American classicists have paid scant attention to their greatest benefactor. His death passed unnoticed in the classical press; his centennial was forgotten. His published biographies fill several pages. Surviving

1 The Verse of Greek Comedy (London, 1912); The Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes (Boston/London, 1914); and Index Aristophaneus (Cambridge, 1932), completed by O. J. Todd, who neglected to put White’s name on the title page. Loeb had engaged White to do the Loeb Aristophanes. He died before completing it.


3 For White as teacher see the brief note of H. W. Smyth, E. Capps, and J. C. Rolfe, TAPA 48 (1917) ix.


5 His death is falsely reported as 29 May 1933 at Who Was Who 1929–1940 (London/New York, 1941) 822, the date of publication of the New York Times obituary. The error is perpetuated at Lord, 245.

6 See The National Cyclopedia of American Biography 100 (New York, 1930), 73–74 with portrait; New York Times May 29 1933 with portrait; and Who Was Who (loc. cit., n. 4
facts are these. James Loeb was born at 37 East 38th Street, New York City, second son of Solomon and Betty (née Gallenberg) Loeb. His father had emigrated to Cincinnati with its large German population from Worms in 1849 to work in the textile establishment of Abraham Kuhn, whose sister became his first wife. The flourishing porkpacking industry made Cincinnati, which Betty called “Porkopolis,” repugnant to many Jews; and in 1865 Solomon removed to New York. In 1867, with four relatives as partners and a starting capital of $500,000, the year of James’ birth, Solomon founded the investment banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb, and Co. at 31 Nassau Street. After vigorous private tutoring, James was educated at Dr Julius Sachs’ Collegiate Institute on West Fifty-ninth Street, a rigorous private school for Jewish boys, founded after the model of a German humanistic gymnasium in 1871. Classics were the center of the curriculum; and James was well prepared to enter Harvard College in 1884, just as his brother Morris, the eccentric chemist, had earlier done. James graduated magna cum laude in 1888. On the condition of graduate study in Egyptology at Paris and London, a curatorship in Egyptology at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, was assured with the venia legendi at Harvard. A professional career in classics was unthinkable for an American Jew of the time. Loeb became benefactor and “Privatgelehrter,” living in self-imposed exile in Bavaria. Another New Yorker and Columbia graduate, Charles Waldstein (later Sir Charles Walston) (1856–1927), emigrated to England, became a British sub-


7 “Herr Doktor Sachs was a stern, Old World schoolmaster whose uniformed boys, in smart black suits and starched stand-up collars, were seldom spared the rod. He emphasized the classics, languages (including German), and Teutonic discipline.” (Our Crowd, 160). Sachs was a man of remarkable learning if I may judge from those volumes of his library now in my own: Charles Graux, Notices Bibliographiques et Autres Articles (Paris, 1884) and Gottfried Kinkel and Ernst Böckel, Arminii Koechly Opuscula Philologica, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1881–1882).

8 See Theodore W. Richards, The Scientific Work of Morris Loeb (Cambridge, 1913) xv–xxiii for a brief life. He graduated from Harvard in 1883, took a Ph.D. in physical chemistry under August Wilhelm von Hoffmann at Berlin in 1887, was Professor of Chemistry at New York University (1891–1906). He grew increasingly eccentric (Our Crowd, 299–300) and retired, much like James, to his estate at Sea Bright, New Jersey.

9 Our Crowd, 301. Cf. infra, n.64.

10 See Who Was Who... 1916–1928 (London, 1929) 1088. At age 53 Waldstein married Florence Einstein Seligman, the widow of Theodore Seligman. For his association with the American School see Lord, 415–416 s.n. On 4 January 1891 Waldstein
ject, and pursued a glorious career and knighthood (1912) at Cambridge on the Cam, not Charles. Milman Parry took his own life. Only the refugees of the 1930’s opened tenured posts in classics to American Jews. Munich, which granted Loeb an honorary doctorate, and Cambridge, which granted him an honorary LL.D. in 1925, must have provided a remarkable contrast to Harvard with its numerus clausus and required chapel. Harvard never granted him an honorary degree.

Solomon Loeb desired that his second son enter the family firm. Several months after graduation James reluctantly became a banker and in 1891 mirabile dictu a partner. He never found the work congenial; and his brilliant, ambitious brother-in-law, Jacob Schiff, did not seek to make it so. Exclusion of James would leave Schiff’s son, Mortimer, the heir apparent. In 1901 James dutifully retired. The career of philanthropy and scholarship began, an American parallel to Englishmen like George Grote and Walter Leaf. A cellist of extraordinary virtuosity, he founded and endowed in 1904 the Institute of Musical Art in New York for the education of professional musicians, teachers, and amateurs. It was later absorbed by the Juilliard Musical Foundation in 1926 and incorporated into the Juilliard School of Music. Between 1901 and 1905 he fell in love with a Christian woman whom he wished to marry. “But the religious barrier... was insurmountable, and the union was considered out of the question.” A collapse ensued and in 1905 Loeb left New York for Vienna, and Professor Freud. If so, briefly; for on 5 November 1905 Loeb is in Jena, at whose famous psychiatric clinic Nietzsche had earlier been treated. His interest in the causes of mental disease, increased by the illness of Morris and Guta Loeb Seligman, his

delivered a Greek address at the grave of another distinguished American archaeologist, Heinrich Schliemann: see Heinrich Alexander Stoll, Abenteuer meines Lebens (Leipzig, 1938) 373. Waldstein deserves a fullscale biography.

11 See my “Die Geschichte der klassischen Philologie in den Vereinigten Staaten,” Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien 11 (1966) 236, Das Altertum 14 (1968) 52–53, and Colin Eisler opud The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960, edd. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, 1969) 621–622. Eisler’s contention (622) that “Charles Waldstein’s career in classics in the late nineteenth century is an exception that seems to prove Calder’s ‘rule’.”, is misleading for Waldstein was never able to hold a post within the U.S.A. For his controversial career at the School see Lord, 49–58.

12 Ibid., 301. Cf. infra, n. 64.

13 Ibid., where Birmingham is following the private memoirs of Loeb’s niece, Frieda Schiff Warburg. The detail that Loeb “lived in Freud’s house” if true proves that Loeb visited Freud as a friend and not a patient. But Birmingham’s historiography is cheerfully Suetonian and one often regrets the lack of other sources. Loeb was 53 when he married on 22 May 1921 in St Moritz, Switzerland, Marie Antonie Hambuchen née Schmidt, a Coburg banker’s daughter, who predeceased him: see Cyclopedia, 74.
brother and sister, led to his being "largely responsible" for the founding and maintaining of the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Psychiatrie in Munich, where he soon moved. But his chief concern after retirement to his remote estate Hochried on the Staffelsee at Murnau in Bavaria, was, apart from his own collections of rare books and antiquities, to encourage scholarly and popular interest in the literature and archaeology especially of Greece and also of Rome. He was Trustee of the American School 1909 to 1930 and contributed generously to that institution. He established the Charles Eliot Norton Fellowship at Harvard for study at the School and he endowed the Charles Eliot Norton Lectureship for the Archaeological Institute of America. At his death he left half a million dollars to the Trustees of the School to be used in conducting excavations in Greece. In 1927 on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday his "archaeological friends in Germany and America" presented him with a sumptuous Festschrift, devoted in part to the publication of objects in his own collection and demotic papyri purchased for the University of Munich at his cost. His American friends included George H. Chase, Harold North Fowler (an early contributor to the Loeb Library), Hetty Goldman, Stephen B. Luce (a former Norton Fellow and assistant Director of the School under Rhys Carpenter), and Gisella M. A. Richter. The first contributor was another amateur and collector, Paul Arndt. The *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* produced a quatrain in his honor:

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Post quinquaginta complere decem dedit annos
   Cultori fautrix diva Minerva suo:
   Aetatem vegetam producat prospera promens
   Illi, qui rebus favit adeoque suis.
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16 *Festschrift für James Loeb zum sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet von seinen archäologischen Freunden in Deutschland und Amerika* (München 1930).
17 Published at *CR* 41 (1927) 113, with the remark: "We, too, rejoice that Mr. Loeb lives and thrives, and that his services to scholarship have found a German poet."
York, 1973), again with a magisterial introduction by White (xi–xvii), who had revised Loeb’s translation and encouraged him throughout his task (v). In 1917 he published his translation of Ph. E. Legrand, *The New Greek Comedy* (London/New York, 1917) with “the delightful and scholarly Introduction” (viii) by White (ix–xvi). Loeb (viii) thanks Edward Capps (1886–1950) for “supervising the compilation of the Index.” Capps in 1914 had done detailed indexes for White’s *Scholia on the Aves*. In the same year, presumably through White’s suggestion to Loeb, Capps became an American editor of the Loeb Library. In 1918 he became Chairman of the Managing Committee of the School of which Loeb had been a Trustee since 1909. *Per indices ad astra*. Loeb’s last translation was Auguste Couat, *Alexandrian Poetry under the First Three Ptolemies 324–222 B.C.* with a supplementary chapter by Emile Cahen (London/New York, 1931). White was long dead and Loeb’s adviser was the English schoolmaster, whom he had made editor-in-chief of his Loeb Classical Library, Dr T. E. Page, who wrote an encouraging letter with a plug for the Library (viii).

In 1912 James Loeb established what his necrologer called “probably his greatest work and the achievement for which he will be longest remembered.” A brief life written during his lifetime and to a degree under his supervision describes his reasons:

Mr. Loeb has since lived abroad devoting his time, energy and means to a cause he made his own—a wider cultivation of the humanities, which are suffering neglect in the stress of modern life. His aim in seeking to revive the waning interest in the classical literature of Greece and Rome was to stimulate a new growth of idealism in men’s minds in face of the inroads of commercialism that are either smothering or killing the older conceptions of culture. With this purpose he founded in 1912 the Loeb Classical Library...20

In his Library Loeb found an occasion to unite two passions, White’s classical humanism and Norton’s democratic liberalism. There is no need here to rehearse the history of the Loeb Library. The great were scornful. Gildersleeve and Housman ignored it. With a few exceptions (e.g., Sir James G. Frazer, Sir John Sandys, H. Weir Smyth) distinguished

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19 *New York Times* (supra, n. 5).  
20 *National Cyclopedia*, 73–74.  
21 Frazer’s biographer, Robert Ackerman, kindly informs me that in a letter of 15 October 1910 to Macmillan (MS BM) Frazer reveals that Loeb has offered him the directorship of the Library at £600 per annum. Frazer would only take the post if an efficient assistant could be found and the one he wants is W. H. D. Rouse, a local schoolmaster and favorite of Lady Frazer, who indeed became a member of the editorial board.
scholars did not contribute. A. D. Nock once called it “good for the bad authors.” There was emphasis on elegant rendition; and if H. R. Fairclough was typical, candidates were carefully screened and contributors were conscientious. The Library’s popularity proved its usefulness. In 1925 Cambridge granted Loeb an L.L.D. because of it. By 1930 there were 230 titles. By the end of 1974 there were 465, apart from untold reprints and revisions. Profits have poured into the Harvard Classics Department and in recent years Loeb Lectures and Loeb Monographs have been supported by the sales of the Library. There are still more titles to come. The establishment of the Library entailed the investment of considerable capital. Loeb was a banker and a banker’s son. One would expect that he sought advice from those most competent to provide it. Loeb lived in Munich; the greatest Hellenist in the world in Berlin.

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1848–1931) was a prodigious correspondent. For over sixty years he wrote some five letters and postcards a day. Many have already been published. Many are still to be edited and indeed discovered. Through the kind help of Professor John P. Barron my attention was drawn to the sale of two Wilamowitz letters and a postcard in a sale at Sotheby’s on 29 October 1974. The description in the catalogue read: “one (possibly all) to Professor Stenzel.” The post card (see Appendix I) is to Stenzel. The addressee of the two letters is not stated. He is not an academician or Wilamowitz would have addressed him Herr College. The references to my scholarship rather than our scholarship in the second letter confirms this. The content of the second letter proves that the addressee is James Loeb; especially the references to “what you have attained for scholarship through the Loeb

But by 9 November 1910 he writes that only pecuniary difficulties would allow him seriously to consider Loeb’s offer. He finally declined but throughout his life received every Loeb volume gratis. Macmillan refused to publish the Library and this was a crucial factor in Frazer’s decision.


24 G. N. Knauer first saw this.
Collection” and to “your” wanting to revive Couat’s book. Loeb had sent Wilamowitz a copy of his translation. That Loeb is addressee of the second letter implies that he may be of the first as well. Wilamowitz is writing a gentleman who has solicited his opinion about starting a large collection of Greek and Latin texts with facing English translations. In 1910, two years before the founding of the Library, who else but James Loeb, who like his brother Morris read and wrote German fluently, would write the great German scholar? Surely not the insular English schoolmaster, T. E. Page, a Latinist, whom Loeb had not yet chosen editor-in-chief. After Loeb’s death in 1933, his stepson, Dr. J. W. Hamburg, was able to get his library to England.25 I do not know its later fate. Loeb, like many bibliophiles, may have inserted authors’ letters into his copies of their books. The letters might inadvertently have been sold with the books (I have acquired a number of scholarly letters that way) and years later found their way to the auction block.

II. The First Letter26

Westend-Berlin
Eichenallee 12 19 IX 10

Sehr geehrter Herr

ich muss um Entschuldigung bitten, dass ich Ihren Brief bisher nicht beantwortet habe; aber ich bin erst wenige Tage von einem Erholungsurlaub zurück und fand dringende Arbeit vor, die ich nun bei seite lege.


25 Our Crowd, 432.

26 G. N. and E. R. Knauer (University of Pennsylvania) kindly transcribed the three difficult texts for me. Without their generous aid my edition would be much the poorer. I have retained the punctuation of the original. R. P. Becker has kindly controlled my translations.

27 Ironic I should think; compare Wilamowitz, Greek Historical Writing and Apollo (Oxford, 1908) 27: “How the great public in England conceives of Apollo, I will not venture to surmise.” (Translated by Gilbert Murray.)

28 Jacques Paul Migne (1800–1875), a Catholic priest, who published 217 volumes of the Patrologia Latina (1844–1855) and 162 volumes of the Patrologia Graeca with Latin translation (1857–1866). The editions are uncritical and filled with printers’ errors.
sich der Leser ein, er verstünde den Originaltext, obwohl er von dem nebenstehenden hypnotisiert ist.29


Sollte nicht erst mal eine Beschränkung auf die Historiker angezeigt sein? Das ist in der Tat durchführbar und nützlich.

Aber auch da ist wissenschaftliche Arbeit nötig: man muss erfahren, was das taugt, wo das her ist, was man liest. Einleitungen, oft auch Randbemerkungen, Verweise auf die Originalautoren, Parallelen, etc. sind nötig. Es geht nun mal nicht mehr ohne Wissenschaft, und grade in England ist man in Sachen der Quellenkunde35 noch sehr rückständig; da könnte das wirklich viel helfen.

Auch Plutarchs Moralia36 sind ohne solche Beigabe nur halb so viel wert.

Ich glaube ohne sehr genaue Überlegung, Vertiefung der Anforder-

29 An odd objection for Wilamowitz, who thought a translation to be an indispensable part of a commentary: see GRBS 11 (1970) 157–158 with n. 64. The model was Karl Otfried Müller’s Eumeniden (Göttingen, 1833).
30 Loeb’s early plan included the Church Fathers.
31 Wilamowitz never found Quintilian stirring reading: see KS 3.241. H. E. Butler edited Inst. for Loeb in four volumes (1921–1922). The Declamationes were never included in the Library (see RE 6, 1862.15 ff.)
33 See Wilamowitz, op. cit., 251: “Wenn uns die eine Handschrift seines Werkes nicht durch eine Gunst des Zufalles erhalten wäre, könnten wir eigentlich gar keine Literaturgeschichte, wenigstens der hellenistischen Zeit, unternehmen.” Wilamowitz had worked closely with Georg Kaibel, who dedicated his edition of Athenaeus to him.
34 Neither Macrobius nor Photius were preserved in the “Loeb Canon.”
Dear Sir:

I have to excuse myself that I have not yet answered your letter; but I am just a few days back from a restorative holiday and met with urgent work which I now am laying aside.

About the requirements and receptiveness of the English-reading public I have no opinion; a number of texts will certainly be gladly read. Only I consider any inclusion of the ancient text pernicious: 1) doubled price; 2) it ruins the market for scholarly editions, as the disgraceful Migne reprints have done; 3) the reader prides himself on understanding the ancient text, although he is hypnotized by the one across the page.

But I am quite sure that the plan has an utopian side. The sermons alone would fill some ten bookcases. And what are they to the public? Moreover, a very great part of the preserved literature considered on its own merits is trash. Whom can one expect to read the declamations of Quintilian or of Libanius? (whose speeches are very valuable). Athenaeus is a goldmine—but to read him? to translate him? Same with Macrobius. I also consider Photius’ Library translated something monstrous.

Ought not first of all confinement to the historians be considered advisable? That in fact is practicable and useful.

But there too scholarly work is necessary: one must learn what one’s reading is worth, its source. Introductions, often marginal notes too, references to the ancient authors, parallels, etc. are necessary. One can’t do it anymore without scholarship, and in England particularly in the matter of sources people are still very backward; in this respect that could really help a lot.

Plutarch’s Moralia too without such supplementary matter are only half so valuable.

I believe that without very careful reflection, stiffening of the demands, and limiting of its range, the undertaking can scarcely be realized, and can with difficulty be of permanent value.

Sincerely yours,

U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff
Wilamowitz’ criticism must have discouraged Loeb. We do not know if he replied. No Loeb letters are preserved in the Nachlass. Translation, “twenty-five centuries of authors,” and a minimum of scholarly apparatus were fundamental to Loeb’s plan. But Wilamowitz had recently been to England (1908), visited Oxford which from Magdalen Tower he called a “Lustgarten” and thought of English scholarship much as Gildersleeve did, a hobby of well-intentioned, poorly educated amateurs. His collaboration with Gilbert Murray on the OCT Euripides only confirmed what prejudices he had.\(^{37}\) On the other hand, Loeb, the cultivated non-professional, evaluated the needs of his class more realistically than Wilamowitz ever could. Prophetically he foresaw a decline of classical education so disastrous that Wilamowitz could not even conceive of it. In fifty years matters were to reach the point that if Libanius were not available in English, he could not be read by many of those professionally required to read him. Loeb translations became standard texts and errors perpetuated themselves.\(^{38}\) Modern translations came to be not new translations of the ancient text but the Loeb translation in modern dress often with errors added.\(^{39}\)

Wilamowitz was right that text and translation increased the price. But the increase was worth it; and the series was subsidized. Surely Loeb editions cut down the purchase of Teubners by American buyers considerably, although often the Loeb text was simply a reprint of the Teubner text stripped of its *apparatus criticus*. He was surely right that the convenient translation caused a hypnotized reader to fit English into the ancient text rather than extract meaning from the Greek or Latin. The Library has contributed to the loss of linguistic expertise among its readers but it has also saved many ancient authors, even those of the calibre of Pausanias, Plutarch, and Polybius from near oblivion. A good deal of valuable lectures and articles have been based on Loeb translations and not only by archaeologists and ancient historians. Oddly recent editions (e.g., Herodotus and Thucydides), still directed by Loeb and his early editors. The suggestion to stress the historians at the start was to a degree followed. The under-


\(^{38}\) For well-chosen examples see Mary R. Lefkowitz, “Cultural Conventions and the Persistence of Mistranslation,” *CJ* 68 (1972), 31–38.

taking—in part because Wilamowitz' strictures were heeded—was largely realized and has become of permanent value.

III. The Second Letter

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff
Charlottenburg 9
Eichen Allee 12
Hochgeehrter Herr

Für eine grosse Liebenswürdigkeit habe ich persönlich zu danken, und ich benutze gern die Gelegenheit diesen Dank zu verallgemeinern40 denn was Sie durch die Loeb-collection für die Wissenschaft erreicht haben, empfinde ich, wie jede Förderung meiner Wissenschaft41 als etwas das mich persönlich zu Danke verpflichtet.

Couats Buch habe ich einst, als es erschien42 mit Genuss an der geschickten Form und Freude an der französischen Grazie des Urteils gelesen. Positiv gefördert habe ich mich nicht43 gefühlt. Da war überall in der Detailarbeitet [sic] noch zu viel zu tun.44 Jetzt ist von dieser nicht wenig, aber lange nicht genug getan, und die Entdeckungen auf allen Gebieten haben den ganzen Stand unseres Wissens geändert. Historisch sehen wir die Zeit sehr viel klarer, für die Dichter ist von entscheidender

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40 This is consistent with a view that Wilamowitz had not corresponded with Loeb since the first letter of 1910.
41 "meiner Wissenschaft" is revealing. The idea is not so much "my field" as "the big business of scholarship" ("Der Grossbetrieb der Wissenschaft"); see Geschichte der Philologie4 (Leipzig, 1959) 71 and KS 6.72. The whole conception of classical scholarship as an international cartel with Mommsen and Wilamowitz among its directors follows the analogy of capitalism.
42 Paris, 1882.
43 I have deleted a second gefördert after nicht. Wilamowitz is eighty-two years old. There are several slips.
44 Compare E. A. Barber, CR 46 (1932) 164: "Since 1882 the papyri have vastly increased our knowledge of Alexandrian poetry. Hence many of Couat's detailed judgments require serious modification, while portions of his work—e.g., that dealing with the chronology—are antiquated, but his criticism as a whole still holds good." The view of Wilamowitz' greatest Hellenistic student, Rudolf Pfeiffer, may reflect the teacher's; see R. Pfeiffer, Ausgewählte Schriften: Aufsätze und Vorträge zur griechischen Dichtung und zum Humanismus, ed. Winfried Bühler (Munich, 1960) 151: "Retaining the old description 'Alexandrian', he tried hard to bring that poetry to life again, not as a dry philologist, but as he claims as un ami des lettres anciennes. The reward for his labours was unique; his book, which was out of date shortly after its appearance, had fifty years afterwards, in 1931, the great privilege of being translated into English by Dr. James Loeb, the Ἰρως ἑτώνυμος of the Loeb library and once an honorary member of my university [Munich]."

Da war ich zuerst verwundert, dass Sie das Buch erneuern wollten. Aber bei längerer Überlegung glaube ich es doch zu verstehen. Es ist nicht zu leugnen, dass England und Amerika für diese ganze Periode der Dichtung, von der die Römer sehr stark abhängen, ausser etwa Apollonios kein Interesse zeigt [sic], während die hellenistische Ge-

45 To 9 July 270 B.C.: see Wilamowitz, Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos I (Berlin, 1924) 193 and R. Pfeiffer, Kallimachosstudien (Munich, 1922) 8. R. Bagnall kindly adds per litt.: "The year and month come from the Mendes Stele, a hieroglyphic document of which the standard edition seems to be K. Sethe, Urkunden des ägyptischen Altertums Abt. II, Hieroglyphische Urkunden der griechisch-römischen Zeit II (Leipzig, 1904) 40. The stele indicates that Arsinoe joined the gods in Pachons, year 15, i.e., June–July 270. The day is provided by the indication that it was the full moon; the source for this is the passage of Callimachus, Apoth. of Arsinoe, discussed by Wilamowitz." Cahen, opud Couat-Loeb, 567–568, says nothing of the date.

47 Frag. 1 Pf. The chief evidence for a second edition is the revision of the Coma (frag. 112.9 Pf.) for inclusion in Aitia IV and frag. 110 Pf.

48 For a comparison of Callim. Epigr. 10 with Alexandrian funerary inscriptions see Wilamowitz, HellDich I.176 with n. 3 and more generally HellDich I.123 ff.

49 Compare Wilamowitz, HellDich I.2: "Allein es genügt nicht, drei Jahrhunderte unter dem Namen des Hellenismus zusammenzufassen, wir müssen innerhalb desselben Perioden unterscheiden."; and Pfeiffer, Schriften, 152: "there was no such unity in the poetical production of the age... Scholars like Wilamowitz... attacked and even ridiculed the current opinion and championed a much more realistic view showing the variety, the individualism and formalism, the modernity, and sometimes even the originality and progressiveness of the epoch."

50 Now almost half a century old (1882–1931).

51 Pfeiffer, Schriften, 152 had a different explanation for the success of Loeb's translation: "So it was not only its elegant Form [Wilamowitz' word!] which made Couat's book attractive, but still more its uniform conception which, as 'romantic', appealed to the modern mind. Nobody after Couat produced anything similar; that explains its surprising revival in our own time. Hellenistic poetry, rejected by classicism, seemed to be justified by late romanticism." More generally see H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The Romantic Movement and the Study of History," The John Coffin Memorial Lecture 1969 (London, 1969).

52 Edward Fitch, later professor at Hamilton College, Clinton, New York (d. 15 April 1946), Wilamowitz' American doctoral student, wrote his dissertation on the theme De Argonautarum reeditu quaestiones selectae (Diss. Göttingen, 1896); cf. his able "The
I have to thank you personally for a great kindness, and I gladly use the opportunity for general thanks; for what you have attained for scholarship...
through the Loeb Collection, I feel, as with every encouragement of my scholarship, as something which commits me personally to thanks.

Couat's book I read once when it appeared with pleasure in its clever form and delight in its French elegance of appraisal. I never felt myself actually improved. Everywhere there was still too much to be done in the details. Now of this there is not little done but by far not enough; and discoveries in all fields have changed the entire state of our knowledge. Historically we see the period a good deal more clearly; for the poets it is of decisive importance that Arsinoe's death is dated, her cult exactly fixed. Kallimachos, only through the poem on her death and the prologue of the second edition of the Aitia, has become a real personality. What can a treatment of the epigram without those preserved on stone teach us now? Quite apart from the facts that now a number of individuals have been distinguished and because differences of localities and their styles have resulted, here, as everywhere, the once current generalisation of "Alexandrian poetry" has been given up.

I first wondered, therefore, that you wanted to revive the book. But with longer consideration I think I do understand it. One cannot deny that for this whole period of poetry, on which the Romans very strongly depend, England and America—except perhaps for Apollonios—show no interest, while Hellenistic History has most excellent scholars in Ferguson, Tarn, and others. Thus, a tasteful presentation, even if superseded by scholarship, can provide stimulation; the supplement by Cahen shows at least how much has been added, though only as far as the increase of material goes

Because I myself have worked my life long in this field and am familiar with the whole, I could not avoid saying this. My personal gratitude is not diminished; and I am delighted to be able to express my long cherished admiration for your encouragement of my scholarship.

With greatest esteem,
Sincerely yours,
Ulrich v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff

This letter is the last of substance preserved. A brief personal letter of 7 July 1931 to A. B. Drachmann and a postcard of 20 May 1931 to F. Solmsen are the only later two known to me. Some days before 9 June 1931 Wilamowitz collapsed in the Berlin heat, and was confined, often bedridden, to his home with what he calls in his letter to Drachmann "Nierenkolik." I doubt if many letters were written after 19 June. "The stage extorts a speedy end. Life is crueler. It goes on after the fifth act."56

56 Wilamowitz, Platon 12 (Berlin, 1920) 653, a passage written with autobiographical intensity.
In certain cases his surviving son, Hermann, wrote for him. The last summer until his death on 25 September 1931 was devoted desperately to *Glaube der Hellenen*. No strength could be lost for personal correspondence.

On the other hand, Wilamowitz always carefully read and acknowledged the flood of offprints and books mailed him by scholars greedy for his praise throughout the world. After 1918 he was especially sensitive to relations with foreign scholars, and felt acutely and personally the disdain with which Germans were often treated abroad. Fitch had remained loyal. The kindness of his Danish friends, especially Drachmann, was a joy of his later years. Their warm correspondence has largely survived. Gilbert Murray was not forgiven for breaking off contact. Wilamowitz had inflamed his fellow Berliners by citing a silly play of Murray's (*Carlyon Sahib*), presented Wilamowitz in cheerier days, in speeches in the townhall at Charlottenburg. The militant pacifist was unforgiving.

James Loeb would have been a remarkable case. An American manophile, married to a German woman, at considerable peril to himself, had survived in Bavaria throughout the war and the revolution, reconstruction, and inflation that followed. He deserved a polite reply. But Wilamowitz was ever candid. He could be brutally so. And he despised the French; hence the truth about Couat. Yet Wilamowitz is able to evaluate the book in terms of the readers for which it is intended and compliments Loeb for his decision to revive it. He tactfully chooses two scholars for mention. Tarn, like Loeb, is a wealthy gentleman-scholar, of Loeb's age, working on his estate with a great private library and unattached to a university. Ferguson is professor at Loeb's beloved *alma mater*. Gratitude twice expressed for the Loeb Library is a kind of apology for the negative reply of 1910. Wilamowitz had not been altogether right. There was something more. With their different origins and careers the two old men were profoundly alike. Wilamowitz, embittered and lonely, who signed his letters *depontanus*, had become an anachronism, an expatriate in a country no longer his. He wrote that he lived in a Platonic kingdom of eternal forms which he served with his scholarship.

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60 See Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Reden aus der Kriegszeit* (Berlin, 1915) 33–34. In Murray's play an English governor in the Himalayas poisons a tribe's water supply to provoke a revolt and then crush them. Wilamowitz cites the passage to illustrate English official morality. 61 *Platon* I², vi. For *depontanus* see *GRBS* 16 (1975) 455.
"Into its pure ether the spectres of putrefaction do not penetrate. Hate and Envy are said too to remain outside its divine pale." Hochried was Loeb's Platonic kingdom with its books and terracottas, its doctors, nurses, and depressions. Its prisoner was neither banker nor scholar, a childless recluse and widower, exiled from his country and family, to some a traitor. In two years he would die and be buried in Bavaria. Wilamowitz did not merely write to thank him.

APPENDIX I

Included with the two Loeb letters was a postcard dated by its cancellation Berlin-Charlottenburg, 3 April 1927, and addressed to Herrn Professor Dr. Stenzel, Kiel, Feldstr. 80. The card acknowledges Stenzel's Wissenschaft und Standesgesinnung bei Platon (Kiel, 1927), pp. 16; see A. E. Taylor, CR 41 (1927) 182-184. The text follows.

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Mit freudig klopfendem Herzen habe ich Ihre schöne Rede gelesen: was Sie der unwissenschaftlichen Wissenschaft der Gegenwart aus dem 7. Briefe vorhalten, ist ein Spiegel, der sie zur Besinnung führen sollte; aber sie werden nicht hineinsehen.


Wie immer in herzlicher Dankbarkeit
Ihr ganz ergebener
UvWilamowitz

The Platonist Julius Stenzel (9 February 1883-26 November 1935) took a Homeric doctorate at Breslau in 1908 under Wendland and Jacoby. He taught at the famous Johannes Gymnasium there and soon became Dozent at the university. He was professor for philosophy at Kiel (1925-1933) and at Halle (1933-1935). He died at age 53 at the height of his powers. His son, Professor Joachim Stenzel of San José State University in California kindly informs me per litt. (11 March 1975):

62 The transcription in the Sotheby catalogue "diesen kohlen Kopf" is wrong. For Wilamowitz' negative view of Xenophon see especially Platon I.2.94: "Xenophon war ein redlicher, aber herzlich beschränkter Mensch." and "Die griechische Literatur des Altertums," Die Kultur der Gegenwart I.83 (Leipzig/Berlin, 1912) 131-133.

63 See Platon I.2.94: "In der Masse seiner übringen sokratischen Schriften, die Xenophon erst ganz spät (nach 370, zum Teil noch viel später) verfasst hat..." and KS III.181.
"He had been a professor at Kiel from 1925 until April 1933 when he was one of eight (ultimately twenty-one) professors, including inter alios Felix Jacoby, who were placed in emeritus status. My father's restoration to a professorship in October 1933, though not at his own university, was the result of petitions of protest to the Prussian Kultusministerium by students and a few colleagues—the latter mostly from outside Germany."

Concerning Stenzel and Wilamowitz Professor Joachim Stenzel remarks:

My father's relationship to Wilamowitz was as close as that of many others who looked upon Wilamowitz as the exemplar of classical scholarship. I have some books from my father's library, and they include most of Wilamowitz' major works from Herakles to Glaube der Hellenen. . . . He was in correspondence with Wilamowitz for many years, beginning in 1913 when he began to publish and to exchange offprints with prominent colleagues. He made it a point to call on Professor Wilamowitz whenever he passed through Berlin.

For a thoughtful summary of Stenzel's scholarly achievement by a competent judge see Werner Jaeger at Gnomon 12 (1936) 108–112. It is sobering to observe that the same page that carries the end of this memoir announces the "release from duties" of Paul Friedländer, Ernst Hoffmann, and Richard Laqueur beside the promotions of Albin Lesky and Erich Burck.64

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64 I am grateful for several addenda. F. K. Lorenz, Reference Librarian of Hamilton and Kirkland Colleges, has discovered that the Wilamowitz-Fitch letters are no longer traceable. Fitch (see n. 52 supra) was born 27 May 1864 at Walton, New York, where he died. There is a brief necrology at Hamilton Alumni Record 11.4 (1946) 179–180. At Hamilton Literary Monthly 29 (1894) 106 we learn that Fitch "went fully equipped with German, but alas! to enter the classical seminary he has to write and speak Latin. So he spent most of his summer vacation with a German friend of his who talks Latin 'like a book,' and prepared himself for this seminary. German students seem to harbor the extraordinary idea that it is a privilege to be admitted to such a circle, which means nothing but 'grind' and midnight oil." I owe both references to Mr Lorenz.

After my enquiry Mr Thomas E. Dewey of Kuhn-Loeb has discovered a forgotten and important autobiographical document: James Loeb, Our Father (Hochried, 1929) pp. 27 with portrait. James printed this work privately to honor his Father's 100th birthday. I draw attention to the following. Solomon (7) made his Cincinnati fortune of over $600,000 by filling "government orders for uniforms and blankets" during our Civil War. James' maternal grandfather, Simon Gallenberg, was first violinist at the Mannheim Opera (7). In 1877 Solomon took his family to Italy (16). The fourteen month trip surely encouraged James' classical interests. Solomon gave James, while a student at Harvard College, "an unlimited credit at Kuhn Loeb & Co's" (21). The most revealing passage is at p. 20: "... his son James, while still at Harvard, had received a tempting
offer, through the good offices of his teacher and friend Charles Eliot Norton—an offer which meant a number of years of study in Egyptology in Paris and London, opportunity to excavate in Egypt itself, with a fair assurance of a curatorship at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts and a teacher’s post at Harvard. Though it is natural to suppose that father had a secret hope that his second son would ultimately enter the firm he had founded, he by no word or sign placed an obstacle in the way of his choosing the career for which he had a decided preference. When after a long inward struggle the decision to become a banker was finally reached, father silently smiled his approval.” Dr A. R. L. Dewey has obtained for me a copy of Frieda Schiff Warburg, Reminiscences of a Long Life (New York, 1956) 19–20, the source of most of Birmingham on James (see n. 13 supra). She writes (19): “Of all my grandparents’ children, my Uncle Jim was the most vivid, brilliant personality. As handsome as a Greek god, he charmed everyone, was an excellent scholar, a fine musician and an esthete in the best sense of the word. . . . At Harvard, he made many friends—among whom were Lloyd Garrison, the son of the Abolitionist, William Lloyd Garrison, and Professor Charles Eliot Norton. . . . Jim felt it was his duty to enter the family firm and become a partner of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, where he served for fifteen years. During this period, he took part in political reform, collected early Greek figures, played his favorite cello as well as the piano and organ—and had several love affairs. . . . But life in New York began to press in on him, and he went abroad to consult a noted neurologist, and settled in Munich.” She mentions neither a Christian inamorata nor Dr Freud. I should like at the end to thank for help Professors Sterling Dow and Zeph Stewart of Harvard and Professor T. A. Suits of the University of Connecticut. An earlier version of this paper was read at Harvard University on 4 August 1975.