

A Sophist on Omniscience, Polymathy, and Omnicompetence: Δ. Λ. 8.1–13¹

THOMAS M. ROBINSON

(1) <τῷ δ' αὐτῷ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης νομίζω κατὰ βραχὺ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ <τὰν> ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ δικάσασθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἷόν τ' ἦμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνης ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων ὡς τε ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἐγένετο, διδάσκειν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδῶς πῶς οὐ δυνασεῖται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσειν; (3) ἔτι δὲ ὁ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων εἰδῶς ἐπιστασεῖται καὶ περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς λέγειν. (4) δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται περὶ τούτων λέγειν. <περὶ> πάντων γ' ἄρ' ἐπιστασεῖται· (5) πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας ἐπίσταται, τοὶ δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐ<όντων ἐντί>. (6) δεῖ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ ὄτων καὶ λέγοι† < > καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὀρθῶς διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ τῶς κωλύειν. (7) εἰδῶς δέ γε ταῦτα εἰδήσει καὶ τὰ ἄτερα τούτων· πάντα γὰρ ἐπιστασεῖται· ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν πάντων, τῆνα δὲ ποτὶ τωῦτόν τὰ δέοντα παρέξεται, αἱ χρή. (8) κἂν μὴ ἐπιστάται αὐλὲν, αἱ δυνασεῖται αὐλὲν, αἶ κα δέη τοῦτο πράσσειν. (9) τὸν δὲ δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτω ται δίκαι. εἰδῶς δὲ τοῦτο εἰδήσει καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ <ἄλλα αὐτῷ? ἐ>τεροῖα. (10) δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶς νόμῳ ἐπίστασθαι πάντας· αἱ τοίνυν τὰ πράγματα μὴ ἐπιστασεῖται, οὐδὲ τῶς νόμῳ. (11) τὸν γὰρ ἐν μωσικῇ νόμον τίς ἐπίσταται; ὅσπερ καὶ μωσικῆν· ὅς δὲ μὴ μωσικῆν, οὐδὲ τὸν νόμον. (12) ὅς γα

¹ The following authors are referred to by name only: Dupréel = E. Dupréel, *Les Sophistes* (1948); Guthrie = W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (1962–); Levi = A. J. Levi, “On Twofold Statements,” *AJP* 61 (1940) 292–306; Sprague = R. K. Sprague, tr. of *Dissoi Logoi*, *Mind* 77 (1968) 155–167; Taylor = A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica* (1911) 92–128; Untersteiner = M. Untersteiner, *Sofisti* 3 (1954) 148–191.

For a full *apparatus criticus* the DK⁶ text should be consulted. The *apparatus criticus* here given merely indicates points of divergence from that text (O = “all manuscripts”; F₁ = Laurent. 85, 19; F₂ = Laurent. 85, 24; Y₁ = Vatic. 1338; Y₂ = Vatic. 217).

⟨μὰν⟩ τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίσταται, εὐπετῆς ὁ λόγος ὅτι πάντα ἐπίσταται. (13) ὅς δὲ <κατὰ> βραχὺ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται>, δεῖ νιν ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι περὶ πάντων· οὐκῶν δεῖ νιν πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι.

(1) <τῷ δ' αὐτῷ> scripsi: <τῷ αὐτῷ> DK δικάσασθαι F1.2 Meibom: δικάζεν ἐπίστασθαι DK (2) ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσειν O: ὀρθῶς καὶ <τὰν πόλιν διδάσκειν> DK (4) <περὶ> Rohde πάντων O: πάντ' ὧν DK γ' ἄρ' scripsi: [γάρ] DK (6) καὶ λέγει <Iac. 4-5 lin.> O pr. καὶ λέγει F1.2: κα λέγει, <τὰ πράγματα>, DK τῶς O pr. τοὺς Y1.2: τως DK (7) δέ γε scripsi: γε O: [γε] Diels: δὲ DK ταῦτα O: ταῦτὰ DK πάντων, τῆνα scripsi: πάντων τῆνα DK δὲ ποτὶ O: <ὁ> δὲ ποτὶ DK παρέξεται, αἱ χρή scripsi: πράξει, αἱ χρή DK (8) κἂν μὴ O: καὶ μὲν DK ἐπιστάται scripsi: ἐπίσταται O (9) τοῦτω A: τοῦτο DK <ἄλλα αὐτῷ?> scripsi: <τούτων> DK ἑτεροῖα Mullach: ἄτερα DK (11) τίς O pr. τίς Y2 Stephanus: ὠντὸς DK ἐπίσταται; ὅσπερ scripsi: ἐπίσταται, ὅσπερ DK μουσικάν· scripsi: μουσικάν, DK (13) ὅς O: ὡς DK <κατὰ> Blass: <καὶ κατὰ> DK βραχὺ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται>, δεῖ Blass: βραχὺ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται, αἶ κα> δέη DK.

TRANSLATION

(1) I consider it a characteristic of the same man and of the same art to be able to converse in brief questions and answers, to know the truth of things, to plead one's cause correctly, to be able to speak in public, to have an understanding of argument-skills, and to teach people about the nature of everything—both how everything is and how it came into being. (2) First of all, will not the man who knows about the nature of everything be able also to *act* rightly in regard to everything? (3) Furthermore, the man acquainted with the skills involved in argument will also know how to speak correctly on every topic. (4) For the man who intends to speak correctly must speak on the topics of which he has knowledge; and he will, one must at any rate suppose, have knowledge of everything. (5) For he has knowledge of all argument-skills, and all arguments are about everything that is. (6) And the man who intends to speak correctly on whatever matter he speaks about must know < > and <how to> give sound advice to the city on the performance of good actions and to prevent them from performing bad ones. (7) In knowing these things he will also know the things that differ from them, since he will know everything. For these <objects of knowledge> are part of *all* <objects of knowledge>, and the exigency of the situation will, if need be, provide him with those <other objects>, so as to achieve the same end. (8) Even if he does not know how to play the flute, he will always prove able to play the flute should the situation ever call for his doing this. (9) And the man who knows how to plead his cause must have a correct understanding of what is just; for

that is what legal cases have to do with. And in knowing this he will know both that which is the contrary of it, and the <other things?> different in kind <from it?>. (10) He must also know all the laws. If, however, he is going to have no knowledge of the facts, he will have no knowledge of the laws either. (11) For who is it knows the rules (laws) of music? The man acquainted with music. Whereas the man unacquainted with music is also unacquainted with the rules that govern it. (12) At any rate, if a man knows the truth of things, the argument follows without difficulty that he knows everything. (13) As for the man who is able to converse in brief questions and answers, he must under questioning give answers on every subject. So he must have knowledge of every subject.

In this eighth chapter of the *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι* the last vestiges of discussion in terms of *λόγος* and counter-*λόγος* have gone; what we have in their place is what might be called an essay on the characteristics of the paradigmatic sophist/orator/politician. Its point of contact with most of the earlier chapters is perhaps its defense of what could be described as another identity-thesis (see 8.1, <τῷ δ' αὐτῷ> ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τέχνας κτλ.). With the whole chapter one might profitably compare Pl. *Euthyd.* 293–297 (where a similar omniscience-thesis is professed by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; cf. *Gorg.* 458e [?] and *Soph.* 232b ff. (where the said omniscience-thesis—among other things—is criticized). In the *Sophist* in particular and Δ.Λ. 8 (see Dupréel 311–312) a number of claims about the sophist's τέχνη are couched in fairly similar (though far from identical) terms: compare, e.g., *Soph.* 232d 1–2, Δ.Λ. 8.6, 8.9, 8.10; *Soph.* 232c 8–10, Δ.Λ. 8.1 (*fin.*); *Soph.* 232b 11–12, d2, e3–4, Δ.Λ. 8.1 (*init.*), 8.3 (*init.*) 8.5 (*init.*), 8.13 (*init.*)—on the assumption that Plato's references to ἀντιλογική, ἀμφισβήτησις etc. are references to what the sophist of the Δ.Λ. calls τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ διαλέγεσθαι δύνασθαι, τὸ τὰς τῶν λόγων τέχνας εἰδέναί etc.; *Soph.* 234d4 (τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας), Δ.Λ. 8.1, 8.12; *Soph.* 232c 4–5, Δ.Λ. 8.1 (περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων), 8.2. In view of the affinities, it seems a fair inference that Plato is (consciously or unconsciously) drawing upon the Δ.Λ. in writing this section of the *Sophist*; Dupréel (240) makes the further suggestion, however, that Δ.Λ. 8 and 7 (*fin.*), along with Pl. *Polit.* 305c–e, themselves have as a common sophistic source Hippias. But Hippias, so far as is known, never laid claim to omniscience (see n. ad 8.2 [περὶ πάντων]), and he can hardly be singled out among Greek writers for the belief that ἡ πολιτική was the supreme τέχνη.

Untersteiner (ad 8.13) sees in the “ring-composition” of this chapter the influence of Hippias. But this view turns on his belief that the *Anonymus Iamblichii* is also the work of Hippias (see Untersteiner, *Rend. Ist. Lomb.*

di Sc. e Lett. 77, f.2, 448–449), and this is a view which as far as I know he is unique in holding. On the whole question of the putative dependence of Δ.Α. 8 on Hippias see Dupréel 192–200, 240; Untersteiner *ad loc.*, with litt.

The chapter can be summarized as follows. One and the same τέχνη gives a particular person:

- (a) the ability to discourse *κατὰ βραχὺ* (see section 13)
- (b) knowledge of “the truth of things” (see section 12)
- (c) the ability to plead one’s cause in court (see sections 9–11)
- (d) the ability to speak in public (see sections 6–8)
- (e) an understanding of argument-skills (see sections 3–5)
- (f) a knowledge of the nature of everything (see section 2)

(1) *κατὰ βραχὺ*—see Hippias B6 (DK⁶), Pl. *Prot.* 329b3–4, 334d ff., *Gorg.* 449b8 ff., Th. 1.64.2; cf. Pl. *Soph.* 241e5, *κατὰ σμικρόν*. From the evidence of the first three passages referred to, a natural translation would be “briefly”; from the evidence of the latter two, “little by little.” Perhaps elements from both are intended: the man under discussion can examine a topic briefly, and also meticulously, going over each and every aspect of the problem in patient and systematic detail. *ἀλάθειαν*—books on “Truth” were written by Protagoras (B1 [DK⁶]), and Antiphon (B1 [DK⁶]). For the phrase *τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας* see Pl. *Soph.* 234c4 (cf. *Phd.* 99e7?), and compare 8.12 below. *δικάσασθαι*—“to plead one’s cause.” See below, 8.9, *δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον*. The word refers to private suits, as a rule, rather than to public prosecutions (see LSJ⁹, s.v. *δικάζω*, II i). *ὀρθῶς*—“correctly,” “appropriately”; i.e., in a way conducive to persuading the jury of the rightness of one’s cause. The significance of (and ambiguities in) the word are felt more and more as the chapter progresses. On Protagoras’ apparent commitment to *ὀρθοέπεια* see Pl. *Phdr.* 267c6 (= Protagoras A26 (p. 262.5) DK⁶). *περὶ φύσιος κτλ.*—see Pl. *Prot.* 337d 3–4 (Hippias speaking), *Soph.* 232c, *ὅσα φανερά γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ κτλ. τῶν ἀπάντων*—the phrase *τῶν ἀπάντων* suggests a reference to the world “as a whole,” and the subsequent phrases would, if this interpretation is correct, most naturally refer to the origin and present state of such a world. Such an interest in the world we can fairly guess that the sophist Hippias professed and encouraged; cf. Pl. *Hipp. Mai.* 285, *Hipp. Min.* 367e; Levi, 300–301.

(2) *περὶ πάντων*—“in regard to everything” (in the distributive sense; contrast the collective *τῶν ἀπάντων* at 8.1, 8.2). For the use of *περὶ* see LSJ⁹ s.v., A II 5.

The fallacy is, of course, the fallacy of Division; collective and distributive propositions are not such that the former necessarily entail the latter. The move is easily made in Greek, since “all” and “every” are the same word. Whether Hippias ever claimed such omniscience in practical matters seems to me in doubt (see below); and even if he did, there is no particular reason for thinking that he would found such a claim on the fallacy of Division here so neatly exhibited by the author of the Δ.Λ.

For Untersteiner, *ad loc.*, in this section of the Δ.Λ. “si esprime la correlazione necessaria fra l’universalità di physis, nelle sue molteplici qualità, e l’universalità del conoscere, cioè la scienza enciclopedica.” But omniscience (here = omnicompetence; cf. *πράσσειν*) is neither (*pace* Untersteiner) synonymous with encyclopedism nor even a logical corollary of it. So one must search elsewhere than in Hippias’ encyclopedism for proof that Δ.Λ. 8.2 and 8.12–13 are Hippias in inspiration. One such source could be Pl. *Hipp. Min.* 363d 1–4, but even here it is not clear (assuming for the moment—with Untersteiner [*Soph.* 8 (86) A 8]—that we are looking at a genuine *testimonium*) that the clause ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἂν τις ἐρωτᾷ is a claim to omniscience; the καὶ . . . καὶ could be taken to mean simply that Hippias is ready to read (or deliver from memory?) his set pieces and answer any questions concerning them that people might care to put—not any questions on any (imaginable) topic.

For Dupréel (199) Socrates has Hippias’ claim to omniscience in mind when at Pl. *Hipp. Min.* 372b he says, “I obviously know nothing” (φαίνομαι οὐδὲν εἰδώς). But this again does not necessarily follow: Socrates’ remark is just as understandable if Hippias proposed encyclopedism, or for that matter any degree of knowledge.

ὀρθῶς]—“rightly,” in the sense of “correctly,” “fittingly,” “appropriately.” See n. on 8.1 (ὀρθῶς). ὀρθῶς καὶ πράσσειν: for the idiosyncratic position of the καὶ see 6.11 εὐφυῆς καὶ γενόμενος, and *ibid.* ἔστι δέ τις καὶ φύσις. The textual change proposed by DK (in the light of 8.6) seems unnecessary; the purely intellectualist ethics that is apparently being proposed is no more surprising than that which is frequently attributed to Socrates.

However, the sequence knowledge—action is made without any attempt at explanation of the basis for it. Perhaps the author is assuming that knowledge “how” (to act rightly) is one of τὰ ἅπαντα that are known.

(3) τέχνας τῶν λόγων]—“argument-skills” (?). The phrase is a loose one, and could tolerate a number of interpretations, like “linguistic skills,” “logical skills,” “rhetorical skills,” “reasoning skills,” and the like. Sprague’s “the art of rhetoric” is perhaps a little too restricted, since there

is no evidence in 8.3–5 that it is *public* speaking that is involved. Rather, 8.6–8 seems to deal with such public speaking (*δαμαγορεῖν*) and 8.9–11 with the ability to plead one's cause in court. So I tentatively opt for a translation which underscores the sophist's dialectical ability in argument with his peers, be this in the public glare of a *πανηγυρίς* or the semi-public forum of a law-court or the privacy of a home.

ὀρθῶς λέγειν—given the ambiguities of the adverb *ὀρθῶς* (see above, n. on 8.1 [*ὀρθῶς*]), the author is able to make his case here because he has at his disposal a word covering both “nonfallaciously” and “soundly” and the combination of the two. All that his argument in fact leads to is a claim that the sophist's reasoning-skills will enable him to produce *valid* arguments on every topic—though not necessarily *sound* ones; but, given the ambiguity of *ὀρθῶς*, the argument would perhaps appear to some to have proved that on every topic a man knowing the *τέχνας τῶν λόγων* will produce arguments that are both valid *and* sound (i.e., truth-delivering)—and it is undoubtedly this latter effect that the sophist is out to produce, as the subsequent sections make clear.

(4) *περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται*—a defense of the startling phrase *περὶ πάντων* used in the preceding sentence. Knowledge of the particular subject-matter involved is, along with understanding of the *τέχναι τῶν λόγων*, in any given instance a *sine qua non* of *τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγειν* (for the ambiguities of the phrase see n. above). And we know, says the author (see 8.2) that the *σοφιστής* in question has knowledge of *everything* (see n. on 8.2 [*περὶ πάντων*]). For a clarification of the latter claim see below, 8.7 (with n. on 8.7 [*ἐπιστασεῖται*]), 8.8.

As Taylor sees (124), *δεῖ—λέγειν* is unexceptionable *Socratic* doctrine; Dupréel (194) suggests that 8.4–5 is aimed at the rhetoric of Gorgias, with its stress on form at the expense of content, but this seems to be an aspect of the rhetorical art that is hardly uniquely Gorgian.

γ' ἄρ'—see J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1954) 43. The reference is back to the statement of 8.2 (*fin.*): “and he will, one must at any rate suppose (*γ' ἄρ'*), <as we have seen; see above 8.2 (*fin.*); and see also 8.5> have knowledge of *everything*.” But at 8.2 (*fin.*) all that was claimed was universal *practical* knowledge (*εἰδῶς . . . περὶ πάντων . . . πράσσειν*); there was no suggestion that omniscience was anything more than *omni-competence*.

<*περὶ*> *πάντων—ἐπιστασεῖται*—for a similar claim (based upon a series of arguments purporting to prove that a knowledge of anything implies a knowledge of everything) see Pl. *Euthyd.* 293b ff. Compare *Euthyd.* 295b ff. for the same claim, this time based on the argument that because we

have a faculty (the *ψυχή*) with which we “know everything we know” therefore we know everything. At Pl. *Soph.* 233c it is suggested that sophists πάντα . . . σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται because δοκοῦσι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν . . . πρὸς ἅπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν and δρῶσι . . . τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα (cf. *Rep.* 598c 7 ff.). Whether one can infer from this, however, that any sophist ever made a *serious* claim to such omniscience (now, apparently, from the evidence of 8.5, understood in an all-embracing sense) is doubtful; at best it might have been put forward as a paradoxical debating point, or as a (pseudo-) synonym for encyclopedism, on the safe assumption that intelligent observers at any rate (not least other sophists) would spot (or at least sense) the fallacies in the reasoning. Plato, one must assume, had such a philosophically educational intention in composing the *Euthydemus*.

(5) This section is ostensibly a reason (*γάρ*) for the final claim of 8.4, <περὶ> πάντων—ἐπιστασεῖται. The first part is simply a repetition of earlier claims (8.1, 8.3), except that the universality there implicit is now made explicit; the second part is new. Literally, “All arguments are about everything that is,” it could *prima facie* be interpreted in terms of argument-form: i.e., there is nothing [=, one must assume, no event, action, or state of affairs] that falls outside of the purview of all argument-forms. A more likely interpretation, however (if the section is to succeed in its ostensible purpose of explaining the final claim of 8.4, in which πάντων appears to be used distributively; cf. 8.2 *fin.*), is in terms of argument-content: i.e., the sum total of argument-content (actual and possible?) covers the sum total of what is (actually and potentially?) real/the case. On the first interpretation the sense of πάντες is clearly distributive (“every argument”), on the second it is collective (“all arguments”). Either way, one is now far beyond the omniscience claim of 8.2 (περὶ πάντων . . . πρᾶσσειν).

(6) δὲ]—the topic now under discussion would appear to be, following the general inverse-sequence of the chapter, δαμαγορεῖν (8.1, *fin.*), and the reference to διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν κτλ. seems to confirm this.

δεῖ—κωλύειν]—as in previous instances, any *prima facie* plausibility the proposition has stems from an exploitation of ambiguities: in this instance in the use of δεῖ and ὀρθῶς. In the case of δεῖ the natural interpretation is in terms of duty: “the μέλλων ὀρθῶς λέγειν has a duty to know . . .” etc.; the interpretation the author wishes the reader to place upon it, however, is, “the μέλλων ὀρθῶς λέγειν cannot help knowing . . .” etc. For the same ambiguity (and the same intent) see below, 8.9, 8.10. In the case of ὀρθῶς, the first instance exploits the same ambiguities as were found in

its use at 8.3 and 8.4 (see nn. *ad loc.*); the second is less problematic, and seems to mean simply “sound,” or something similar (compare 8.9 below, ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς). For a similar stress on τὸ ὀρθόν see [Pl.] *Minos* 317c.

(7) The sentence is one of the most difficult in the treatise, and emendation and interpretation is more than usually speculative. If my interpretation is correct, the author is suggesting that, should a *δημηγορῶν* possess the knowledge requisite to giving the πόλις sound advice, he can be sure that Necessity, the mother of invention (see 8.8, δέη, and on the general topic Guthrie 2.473), will provide him with all other (less important?) knowledge. The possession of *actual* knowledge of what it takes to be a good *δημηγορῶν* is *eo ipso* the possession of *potential* knowledge of everything else (see 8.8, δυνασεῖται). In attempting to make these contentions plausible, the author appears to confine himself to instances of knowledge “how”; at any rate no instances of other forms of knowledge are mentioned.

For alternative interpretations, see Untersteiner *ad loc.*, with litt. ταῦτα]—i.e., the contents of 8.6 above. ἐπιστασεῖται]—sc. “at least potentially,” as the rest of the section, and 8.8 below, make clear. The bald claim of 8.4 (*fin.*) has been clarified. ἔστι γὰρ κτλ.]—“are part of.” See LSJ⁹ s.v. εἰμί, C II. τῶν πάντων]—“all [objects of knowledge]” in the sense of “the totality of [objects of knowledge]” (see n. on 8.5 above, *fin.*). τῆνα]—i.e., τὰ ἕτερα above (like, e.g., knowledge of flute-playing; see 8.8 below). τῶν πάντων]—i.e., the possession of knowledge of everything. τὰ δέοντα]—see Thuc. 1.22.1 *et alibi*; cf. Isocr. 3.25, οὐδὲν τῶν δέοντων πράττοντες. (Unique to the Δ.Λ., however, if my emendation παρέξεται is correct, would be τὰ δέοντα in the subject-position.) παρέξεται]—for παρέχεσθαι in much the same sense as παρέχειν see LSJ⁹ s.v. παρέχω, παρέχομαι.

(8) μῆ]—with all the MSS (from which DK unaccountably diverge without signalling the fact). ἐπιστᾶται]—Doric subjunctive. The author is, of course, on the interpretation here suggested, discussing “actual” knowledge only. δέη]—i.e., “whenever the situation calls for doing this”; see above, 8.7, τὰ δέοντα. For the distinction between “actual” and “potential” knowledge see n. on 8.7, and n. on 8.7 (ἐπιστασεῖται).

(9) δεῖ]—see n. on 8.6 (δεῖ) above. τὸ δίκαιον]—simply, “that which is just.” Taylor (126, n. 2), recalling how Plato (Socrates) uses the term αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα at *Phaedo* 66e 1–2 of the Forms, takes τὸ δίκαιον here and τὰ πράγματα at 8.10 and 8.12 to refer to the Platonic (Socratic) “objective reality” that is αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι δικαιοσύνη. But τὰ πράγματα, as I suggest below, is surely best taken as simply “the facts,” and τὸ δίκαιον as a hint

that the proponent of the views of Δ.Λ. 8 is in an essentialist tradition. That he should have adhered to the further, Platonic doctrine of *transcendental* essentialism seems most unlikely—though the doctrine of the “presence” of τὸ ψεῦδος to a (false) λόγος (Δ.Λ. 4.5) undoubtedly has a Platonic ring to it. εἰδήσει καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον]—i.e., τὸ ἄδικον.

τὰ <ἄλλα αὐτῶ? ἐ>τεροῖα]—for a similar usage see *Ans. Med.* 9, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κακὰ ἕτεροῖα τῶν ἀπὸ πληρώσιος. If this reconstruction is correct in essence, the author is clearly acquainted with the notion of concept-clusters; i.e., with the notion that a concept of a particular sort (e.g., τὸ δίκαιον) can only be said to be completely perspicuous in the context of a knowledge of its contrary (in this case τὸ ἄδικον) and of those related concepts which, in (actually or apparently) differing from it, shed light upon it (in the case of τὸ δίκαιον such a related concept would perhaps be ἡ ἰσονομία).

(10) δεῖ]—see n. on 8.6 (δεῖ). The required sense here is “cannot help but.” αὐτὸν]—sc. τὸν δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον (8.9). τὰ πράγματα]—“the facts,” “what goes on.” See below, 8.12, τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων. The term is much used by the author, and is of very large extension. See, e.g., 5.11.

The sense of the section is, apparently, as follows:

The δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενος cannot help but know all the νόμοι.

But knowledge of the laws is itself contingent upon knowledge of τὰ πράγματα.

Ergo the δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενος has knowledge of τὰ πράγματα. In an earlier argument, the author had glossed his own phrase “the skills involved in argument” (τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων 8.3) as in fact a reference to the skills involved in *all* arguments [i.e., all forms of argument] (πάντων τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας 8.5). In the present instance, too, one senses a similar desire to gloss τὰ πράγματα (i.e., all the facts relevant to law-making, law-implementation, etc.) as <πάντα> τὰ πράγματα (i.e., all facts), so as to lead to the desired conclusion that certain people can justifiably claim to know “everything” (8.12). But the cautious γὰρ <μὰν> of 8.12 indicates perhaps that he feels that the fallacy would this time be *too* transparent, and the move is not in fact made; an ambiguity in the phrase τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων (8.12) does the job instead. For Taylor (126, n. 2; cf. Levi 301) τὰ πράγματα (here and at 8.12) is the equivalent of the Platonic (for Taylor the Socratic) αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη. See, however, n. on 8.9 above (τὸ δίκαιον).

(11) νόμον]—the author understandably assumes a close analogy between law and the “rules” of μουσικά, since a single Greek word, νόμος,

covers both. But the νόμοι of 8.10 relate to a body of facts (τὰ πράγματα), while the νόμος of 8.11 relates to a τέχνη (ἡ μουσικά). However, in context it seems possible that the term μουσικά refers to the “field of music” as an object of “acquaintance” knowledge, rather than to skill in playing or composing μουσικά, thus lending the analogy some measure of support. For a similar use of the term μουσική see Pl. *Thl.* 206b (φθόγγοι are the στοιχεῖα μουσικῆς—a piece of “book” knowledge in no way contingent upon one’s having mastered any instrument).

(12) γὰ <μὲν >]—an indication that in the author’s eyes 8.10 and 8.11 have in themselves been insufficient to demonstrate the truth of the thesis of 8.4 (*fin.*).

τῶν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων]—see 8.10 (πράγματα) and n. on 8.1 (ἀλάθειαν). The author clearly feels that this is the proposition most likely to win general acceptance, and one sufficiently strong to “prove” the thesis of 8.4 (*fin.*), even if others are rejected. The reason for his assumption seems to be his confidence that the average reader will instinctively unpack the phrase τῶν πραγμάτων in a generic sense—i.e., as <πάντων > τῶν πραγμάτων (see final n. on 8.10 above). Plato also uses the phrase (*Soph.* 234c)—α ἄπαξι in his writings—in what seems to be such an all-embracing sense, and given the context (a discussion of sophistic practices) a clear possibility emerges that τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ ἀλήθεια was a favorite sophistic catch-phrase (and perhaps even a specifically Protagorean one; see Diog. Laert. 9.51, Eurip. fr. 189 Nauck²), to which an allusion was in the context not inappropriate. For his more normal phrasing see *Phd.* 99c (τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν), *Men.* 86b.

(13) <κατὰ > βραχὺ]—given the apparently inverse structure of the rest of the chapter, it seems natural to expect at this point a reference back to 8.1; so I follow Blass and DK in inserting <κατὰ >. δεῖ . . . δεῖ]—for the ambiguity see n. on 8.6 (δεῖ). The first instance involves duty (self-imposed or otherwise), the second one hypothetical necessity.

If I have understood him correctly, the sophist has constructed a series of arguments in which it is claimed that there exist certain people who are, not simply polymaths and encyclopedists (like, say, Hippias), but also persons endowed with omniscience and omniscience. Just why the (apparently one-sided) arguments are included in a work that at any rate begins with a set of *antithetical λόγοι* (Δ.Λ. 1–4) is not immediately clear,² but one might suggest that basic and interesting ambiguities (if

² See, however, W. Kranz, “Vorsokratisches IV: Die sogenannten Δισσοὶ Λόγοι,” *Hermes* 72 (1937) 226.

not direct antitheses) are to be found in a number of key words, giving the chapter a dialectical tension it does not at first sight possess: $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, for example, can be used collectively or distributively; $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ can be used of duty or hypothetical necessity; $\acute{\omicron}\rho\theta\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ can mean “nonfallaciously” or “soundly” or both. With such terms at his disposal, the sophist can construct an amazing phantasmagoria of *non-sequiturs*, an object of bewilderment and perhaps irritation to the uninitiated among his hearers, to others however probably just another routine (like the *Euthydemus*?) for the exercise and toning of philosophical muscles. How much of this was the conscious purpose of the author we cannot of course know with certainty. If he was the “talentlose Verfasser” of whom Diels (*ad* $\Delta.\Lambda.$ 1.1) spoke, we can only assume that he was largely if not wholly insensitive to the ambiguities just mentioned, had as a consequence no such philosophically reputable purpose in mind as the one I have just alluded to, and almost certainly did not himself profit philosophically from the treatise he had just composed. While this is possible, it seems to me much more likely, given the care with which the chapter is composed, that we are looking at a sophist endowed with skills at least as sharp as those demonstrated by the sophists in Plato’s *Euthydemus* (where no one believes for a moment that they were fooled by the ambiguities in their own arguments). The difference perhaps is that the sophists of the *Euthydemus* seem to be *merely* clever; if they have any honest propaedeutical purpose in mind, it does not appear from the dialogue (Plato’s own purposes are, of course, something different). The author of the $\Delta.\Lambda.$, by contrast, in this chapter seems to me both clever *and* serious, and for that reason alone the possibility of a reputable propaedeutic purpose on his part should not, I think, be discounted.

University of Toronto