

The Four Stoic *Personae*

PHILLIP H. DE LACY

In the first book of Cicero's *De officiis* is a formulation of Stoic ethical doctrine that has not received the attention it deserves. Cicero differentiates four considerations that must be kept in mind when we ask, *quid deceat*. These four considerations he calls *personae*. Two pertain to our nature, one to our circumstances, one to our choices. The two natural *personae* are (a) the nature we share with all human beings, and (b) our individual natures. The *persona* arising from circumstances is imposed on us by chance and time, and that which pertains to our choices results from our judgment of the kind of life we wish to live (*De off.* i.107-117).

This schematic formulation of four *personae* corresponding to four determinants of ethical choices is, so far as I know, unparalleled in ancient philosophical writings, although partial parallels may of course be found. It raises some difficult questions. One set of questions pertains to the use of the term *persona* and its Greek counterpart, *πρόσωπον*, in ethical contexts. Another has to do with the doctrine's pedigree. Presumably Cicero found it, or something like it, in the treatise of the Stoic Panaetius *Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος*, on which *De officiis* I and II were based (see *De off.* iii.7, and *Ad Att.* xvi.11.4). Can we safely assume that it is authentically Panaetian, and if so, is it also consistent with the teachings of the early Stoa, or is it a Panaetian aberration? And finally, how does the doctrine reflect Stoic thought, as contrasted with the treatment of the determinants of ethical choices by other ancient philosophers, notably Plato and Aristotle? This paper will offer tentative answers to these questions.

I

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the term *persona*—*prosōpon* in ethical contexts is the way in which it combines a specification of individual differences with a suggestion of detachment. An actor playing a role remains distinct from the role he plays; the *prosōpon* is as external to him as

the mask he wears when he plays it. Similarly, the ancient rhetorical practice of *προσωποποιία* demanded of the orator an ability to speak in ways appropriate to a variety of different characters.¹ In a more generalized context, therefore, *persona*-*prosōpon* may refer to an outward show as distinct from inner reality, or to a temporary or transitory course of action, something put on or put off, as distinct from a persistent identity. This detachment is reflected also in the evaluation of an actor's competence. He may give an excellent performance of a worthless character (cf. Plutarch, *Lysander*, ch. 23 [446 D]), and he laughs or weeps not according to his own inclination but as the play requires (Plut. *Demosthenes*, ch. 22 [856 A]). Thus the externality of the role permits a distinction between the part assigned, which is not our doing, and our responsibility to play the part well.

But the term *prosōpon* came also to be used in a contrasting way, to indicate what is peculiar to the individual. The poet who composes a drama may be viewed as portraying the words and actions of certain kinds of persons, and the connection that he makes between character and action is immediate and necessary. Agamemnon as a *prosōpon* has an identity to which his acts conform. It is not possible for Agamemnon to behave like Thersites, or Thersites like Agamemnon. In this context *prosōpon* refers precisely to the distinctive features that identify the individual and separate him off from other individuals. Far from being external, it is what makes him what he is.

Both of these uses of *prosōpon* were exploited by the philosophers. Plutarch offers many examples in addition to those already cited. He uses the phrase *ἦθος καὶ πρόσωπα* with reference to moral character, whether on the stage (*De aud. poet.* 28 EF) or off it (*De invidia et odio* 537 F). He even speaks (*Quaest. conviv.* vii.8.1, 711 C) of the *êthos* of the *prosōpon*, thus suggesting that a *prosōpon* carries an *êthos* with it. Yet elsewhere Plutarch says that it is shameful for the aging statesman to exchange his political *prosōpon* for some other (*An seni respublica gerenda sit*, 785 C), and he describes the powerless Arrhidaeus as having only the name and *prosōpon* of king (*An seni* 791 E). Thus in some passages *prosōpon* is closely bound up with character, but in others it is separable, either as a role that is put on and off,² or an appearance that misrepresents the reality.³

¹ See for example Quintilian, *Inst. orat.* iii.8.49; vi.1.25-27; xi.1.39-42.

² Cf. also *Antony* 29 (928 F-929 A). Antony was a tragic actor to the Romans, a comic actor to the Egyptians. The rhetoricians also speak of putting a *persona* on or off; see for example Cicero, *De off.* iii.43 and Quint. *Inst. orat.* iii.8.50.

³ Cf. also Lucretius iii.58, where *persona* is a mask that conceals the truth; and Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* v.73, where it is said of Epicurus that *tantum modo induit personam philo-*

These examples, a few out of many,⁴ approximate at least two of the four Ciceronian *personae*: the second, which ties our *persona* to our individual nature, and the fourth, which makes our *persona* a matter of voluntary choice. Cicero's third *persona*, the role assigned to us by chance or time, would include Arrhidaeus' kingship, since in Plutarch's view he was king by chance, not from virtue (cf. *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, 337 DE). A more explicit parallel, however, to Cicero's third *persona* is found in the Cynic tradition. Teles (third century B.C.), in his work *On Self-sufficiency*, gives Bion as his authority for the statement that *τύχη*, like a poetess, assigns at one time the *prosōpon* of *πρωτολόγος*, at another of *δευτερολόγος*, at one time the *prosōpon* of king, at another of wanderer (*ἀλήτης*); and Teles remarks that just as the good actor must play well whatever role the poet gives him, so the good man must play whatever role fortune has given him.⁵ Even earlier Demades, the sharp-tongued Athenian orator, is reported to have said to Philip of Macedon (fr. 48 De Falco² = Diodorus Siculus xvi.87): βασιλεῦ, τῆς τύχης σοι περιθείσης πρόσωπον Ἀγαμέμνονος, αὐτὸς οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ πράττων ἔργα Θερσίτου; "O King, when fortune has clothed you in the role of Agamemnon, aren't you ashamed to perform the acts of Thersites?"

It is only the first of Cicero's four *personae*, then, for which a parallel seems to be lacking; and indeed it is a surprising usage. All the other *personae* are to some extent individuating, whereas the first is common to all human beings. The stage analogy breaks down, unless the aim is to differentiate the role of a human being from that of a lower animal or a god. This may in fact be Cicero's intention, since the passage in which he introduces the first *persona* (*De off.* i.107) follows closely on a discussion of the difference between men and animals (i.105). Cicero's extended use of the term is therefore not altogether unreasonable.⁶

sophi et sibi hoc nomen inscripsit. The actor's mask provides an appropriate metaphor for both the putting on and off of roles, and the concealment of one's true self.

⁴ The examples taken from Quintilian and Plutarch are of course post-Ciceronian and could not have provided models for Panaetius. But they are convenient illustrations of the ways in which *prosōpon* can be used. For further material on Plutarch's use of dramatic terms and concepts see E. O'Donnell, *The Transferred Use of Theater Terms as a Feature of Plutarch's Style*. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1975.

⁵ *Teletis Reliquiae*², p. 3 Hense = Stobaeus, Vol. III, pp. 37-38 Wachsmuth-Hense. Cf. also Teles, *On Circumstances* (p. 52 Hense = Stobaeus, Vol. V, p. 984 Wachsmuth-Hense), where fortune is again compared to a dramatic poetess.

⁶ See also G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, s.v. *πρόσωπον*, X, D, p. 1188, col. 2, where one finds "le *prosōpon* de la divinité et celui de l'humanité" in a citation from Nestorius' *Liber Heraclidis* (Nau's French translation from Syriac).

II

Historians of Stoicism generally accept the four Ciceronian *personae* as authentic Panaetian doctrine. They tend to see in them a characteristically Panaetian concern with real people in real situations, rather than with the idealized sage.⁷ An exception is A. Schmekel, who regarded the third and fourth *personae* as Cicero's own addition, on the grounds that they do not combine with the first two to form a coherent scheme.⁸

The well attested fragments of Panaetius are of no real help here, since they contain no reference to any of the four *personae*. When one looks in other ancient Stoic texts for a comparable analysis of the determinants of moral conduct, most of the material comes from authors subsequent to Cicero. A major source is Epictetus. In *Diss.* ii. 10, Epictetus begins with the exhortation, *σκέψαι τίς εἶ* "Examine who you are." The examination that follows takes the form of a list of names, each contributing something to the process of self-identification: you are a human being, a citizen of the universe and a part of it, a son, a brother (ii. 10. 1-9). Epictetus then shifts to a conditional form of expression: if you are a member of the council of some city, if you are young, if you are old,⁹ if you are a father, if you are a smith (ii. 10. 10-13). Each name of this kind, he says, when it comes into consideration, always indicates the acts (*ἔργα*) appropriate to it (ii. 10. 11).

Of two of the names on the list, son and brother, Epictetus uses the phrase, *τοῦτο τὸ πρόσωπον*, thus hinting, but not actually saying, that the other names also correspond to *prosōpa*. The Stoic Hierocles (second century A.D.) also uses the term *prosōpon* with reference to the relation of brother to brother, master to servant, parent to child. He says that each member of such a pair will see more clearly how to behave toward the other if he supposes himself to be the other—a supposition, he says, especially easy for brothers, because they have from nature the same *prosōpon*.¹⁰

⁷ Examples are M. Van Straaten, *Panētius* (Amsterdam, 1946), p. 266; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. I (Göttingen, 1948), pp. 201-202; J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge [England], 1969), pp. 186-188; F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London, 1975), pp. 125-127.

⁸ A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1892), pp. 39-41.

⁹ Cicero does not include age differences (young, old) in his account of the four *personae*, but he mentions them soon thereafter (*De off.* i. 122). P. Milton Valente, *L'Éthique stoïcienne chez Cicéron* (Paris and Porto Alegre, 1956), p. 249, places them under the third *persona*. Cicero himself, however, is not so specific; cf. i. 125: *Ita fere officia reperientur cum quaeretur quid deceat et quid aptum sit personis, temporibus, aetatibus.*

¹⁰ Page 59 Von Arnim = Stobaeus, Vol. IV, pp. 660-661 Wachsmuth-Hense. Hierocles also uses the term with reference to family relations on page 62 Von Arnim = Stobaeus, Vol. IV, pp. 672-673 Wachsmuth-Hense.

In *Diss.* i.2 Epictetus introduces quite a different *prosōpon*, which results from one's *paraskuehē*. In this discourse (i.2.7) he lists two determinants of what is reasonable (*eulogon*) in any particular situation: one's *prosōpon*, and the value (*axia*) one places on external things (*ta ektos*). Different persons have different *prosōpa*, the difference lying, apparently, in the extent to which they have the strength to live the truly good Stoic life. Not all horses are swift, and not all men can live the life of Socrates. Our preparation (*paraskueē*) varies with our natural ability and our training. *Ti ouden; epeidh aphēs eimi, apostō tēs epimeleias toutou eneka*; "What then? Since I am without natural ability, shall I therefore stop taking care?" No; I shall make the most of what I have (i.2.34-37). Here the differentiation of persons is in terms of their position on an ascending scale that terminates in the sage. Those who differ from the sage are his inferiors. This same relation of superior to inferior appears in the discourse on the Cynic ideal (iii.22). The Cynic preserves *to tou kalou kai agathou prosōpon* (iii.22.69). His way of life requires a special *paraskueē* which is beyond the reach of most men (cf. iii.22.23, 107-109).

A. Bonhöffer, whose studies of Epictetus established that Epictetus' affinities were with the early Stoa rather than the Stoa of Panaetius and Posidonius, pointed out the differences between Epictetus' *prosōpa* and the *personae* of the *De officiis* and concluded, quite rightly, I think, that Epictetus was not following Panaetius here.¹¹ Yet the possibility remains that Epictetus and other late Stoics reflect a pre-Panaetian stage in the development of the Stoic doctrine of *prosōpon*, and that the Ciceronian scheme is Panaetius' reaction to existing Stoic teaching. If we may believe Seneca, there was already in the early Stoa a dispute about the usefulness of that part of philosophy quae dat propria cuique personae praecepta nec in universum componit hominem; and Seneca gives as examples the precepts telling the husband how to behave toward his wife, the father how to raise his children, the master how to govern his slaves (*Epp. mor.* 94.1). Seneca reports that the Stoic Ariston was opposed to such detailed precepts, and that Cleanthes considered them weak if not derived from fundamental philosophical doctrines (*ibid.* 94.2 and 4). The opposition here described is one that could easily lead to the two kinds of *prosōpa* seen in Epictetus, on the one side the wise man, whose conduct serves as a standard for all, and on the other an indefinitely long list of names designating personal and family relations, age differences, trades and professions, external circumstances, all of them calling for certain specified kinds of conduct.

¹¹ A. Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart, 1894), pp. iii-iv, 10-11.

If such a controversy did indeed exist in the early Stoa, then the Ciceronian scheme represents an attempt to resolve it, not simply by deriving the more detailed precepts from the more general principles, but by analyzing the components common to all *personae*. At this level of analysis Epictetus' *prosōpa* do not fall into one or another of Cicero's categories, but all have a part in all. The conduct of the smith, no less than that of the sage, is determined by his being a man, having certain natural abilities, acting under such-and-such circumstances, and aiming at a certain way of life. The fourfold scheme thus provides a theoretical basis for analyzing conduct at all levels, and to this extent it deemphasizes the sage. And inasmuch as it recognizes the variables in human life, it prepares the way for practical advice on how to deal with these variables.

In a way the third *persona*, that imposed by chance and time, is the crucial one. As noted above (p. 165), a close parallel to this *persona* appears in the Cynics Bion and Teles. Their position is very close to that of Ariston; like them, Ariston compared the wise man to a good actor who, whether he takes the role (*prosōpon*) of Thersites or Agamemnon, plays either one in the appropriate way.¹² One misses here a reference to fortune as poetess. Yet fortune is important only as the source of the circumstances under which we act and over which we have no control. *On Circumstances* (Περὶ περιστάσεων) was the title of one of the works in which Teles called *τύχη* ἡ ποιήτρια (see note 5). Ariston too attached great importance to circumstances (περιστάσεις); they have as much to do with a wise man's choices as the word to be written has to do with a grammarian's choice of letters (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* xi.64-67 = *SVF* I, frag. 361).

This concern with circumstances persisted in Stoicism. It is evident in the importance attached to the timeliness (εὐκαιρία) of right actions, since circumstances change with time.¹³ One of Posidonius' works included a section περὶ τοῦ κατὰ περίστασιν καθήκοντος *On Circumstantial Duty*.¹⁴ Still later, Epictetus saw in circumstances the material (ὑλη) for moral actions.

¹² Diog. Laer. vii.160 = *SVF* I, frag. 351. Thersites and Agamemnon were the examples used by Demades. Bion and Teles had spoken more generically of king and wanderer, famous and obscure, and the like. Thersites and Agamemnon reappear in Epictetus (*Diss.* iii.22.28; iv.2.10), but Epictetus is interested in the qualitative differences in their ways of life rather than the quality of the actor's performance.

¹³ Cf. *De off.* i.115: Regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores, divitiae, opes, eaque quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita temporibus gubernantur. On εὐκαιρία (Cicero's *opportunitas*) see also *SVF* III, frag. 502 (p. 136.29), frag. 630 (p. 161.3); Cic. *De fin.* iii.45-46, 61; Epict. *Diss.* ii.13.21; D. Tsekourakis, *Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics* (Hermes Einzelschriften, 32 [Wiesbaden, 1974]), pp. 56-57; J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 81.

¹⁴ Frag. 41a Edelstein-Kidd = Cicero, *Ad Att.* xvi.11.4.

They include the hardships sent by Zeus to test us and train our powers.¹⁵ That the source of these circumstances is Zeus rather than fortune is not a crucial difference, since the terms fortune, providence, and fate all refer, in the Stoic view, to the cosmic order established by divine reason, or Zeus.

There is nothing in this Stoic background that identifies Panaetius as the author of the Ciceronian fourfold scheme. The only reason for assigning it to him remains Cicero's statement that he was following Panaetius in *De officiis* I and II. But the alternatives are limited. Since the scheme uses Stoic concepts to solve a Stoic problem, there is every reason to believe that the author was a member of the school. To be sure, it is in a sense Platonic; it establishes a finite plurality between the one (the ideal represented by the sage) and the many (the endless diversity of actual human lives). Cicero would have welcomed this aspect of the theory and indeed might have let his Platonic sympathies influence his presentation of it.¹⁶ But Panaetius too was an admirer of Plato, and he could have had the precepts of the *Philebus* in mind when he formulated the fourfold scheme.

It is of course possible that Panaetius did not originate the scheme but took it over from some earlier Stoic. It is simply the lack of evidence that prevents us from pushing it back to an earlier period. There are indeed two very tenuous bits of evidence, neither of them persuasive. One is a list in Epictetus of five determinants of things that are done: τῶν πραττομένων τὰ μὲν προηγουμένως πράττεται, τὰ δὲ κατὰ περίστασιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' οἰκονομίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμπεριφοράν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἔνστασιν "Of things that are done, some are done as primary ends, some in conformity with circumstance, some with management of a household, some with sociability, some with resistance."¹⁷ The first two items bear some resemblance to the fourth and third *personae*, and it is conceivable that Epictetus was following some early Stoic text. But the list as a whole is so unlike the fourfold scheme that even if it is early it cannot be regarded as an anticipation of that scheme.

¹⁵ *Diss.* i.6.33-37; i.24.1-2. The terms *περίστασις* and *ἕλη* are closely joined in i. 6.34 and i.26.2.

¹⁶ On Cicero's references to this Platonic procedure see P. De Lacy, "Plato and the Method of the Arts," *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan* (Ithaca, 1966), pp. 129-130.

¹⁷ *Diss.* iii.14.7. This sentence stands in isolation, without explanation or illustration. The relation of *προηγουμένως* to *κατὰ περίστασιν* is clarified by Hierocles, *On Marriage* (p. 52 Von Arnim = Stobaeus, Vol. IV, p. 502 Wachsmuth-Hense): married life is *προηγούμενος* for the wise man, life without a wife is *κατὰ περίστασιν*. That is, some *περίστασις* may prevent the attainment of the *προηγούμενον*.

The second bit of evidence is more perplexing. There is in the *Magna Moralia* an account of actions that covers very nearly the same ground as the four *personae*. In i.11 and 14-15 (1187 b 4-30, 1188 a 38-b 24) the author characterizes human beings as capable of generating actions and identifies the ἀρχή of action as προαίρεσις καὶ βούλησις καὶ τὸ κατὰ λόγον πᾶν "choice and wish and all that is in conformity with reason." Actions, however, are subject to the limitations of one's nature (ch. 11) and of force (βία, ch. 14) and necessity (ἀνάγκη, ch. 15). Force is an external cause of action contrary to nature or to wish. Necessity also has to do with externals; for example, a person who suffers a lesser harm in order to escape a greater one is acting under the necessity imposed by things.

The obvious differences between this account and the four *personae* are so great that a direct connection seems most unlikely. One of the obvious differences is that in the *Magna Moralia* one's individual nature and the external situation are regarded as restraints on one's choices and wishes, whereas in the Ciceronian scheme they are co-determinants. It is just possible that some Stoic found in this Peripatetic analysis a useful formulation of the obstacles to be overcome by the wise man,¹⁸ and that Panaetius converted the obstacles into roles that demand from us appropriate action. Uncertainty about the date of the *Magna Moralia* makes the whole question of its relation to Stoicism very uncertain indeed. It is sometimes held that the *Magna Moralia* postdates the founding of the Stoic school and reflects Stoic influence.¹⁹ This may well be so; but to postulate an otherwise unknown Stoic source for the chapters cited above would surely be to multiply entities beyond necessity.

III

The purpose of the doctrine of four *personae* was to provide a formula for discovering for any given person in any given situation the appropriate act, *quid deceat*. The four considerations that determine the correctness of the action are thought of as imposing on the agent four different roles which he must bring into harmony in order to make the right choice. This pluralization of roles would seem to destroy the individuality of the moral agent; he is not one person but four, playing four roles

¹⁸ As already noted, both the limitations of one's natural ability and the hazards of fortune appear in Epictetus as obstacles to be overcome by the wise man. See above, pp. 167 ff.

¹⁹ See for example A. A. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*, 15 (1968), p. 83.

that somehow result in a common act appropriate to them all. Where is the unity of the moral agent to be found?

The answer, I suggest, must be given in terms of basic Stoic doctrine. The Stoics do not explain individualization in terms of some unique essence or substance, but rather in terms of a unique set of relations. The four *personae* express these relations so far as they pertain to moral action, and collectively they identify the individual agent.

Here again Epictetus is helpful. He speaks of our *σχέσεις*, our relations to other persons and to the deity. Some of these *σχέσεις* are natural, others are acquired. Examples are pious, son, father, brother, citizen, husband, wife, neighbor, companion, ruler, ruled. The good man is true to his *σχέσεις*, and his duties (*καθήκοντα*) are measured (*παραμετρεῖται*) by them. The moral agent is thus characterized by his collection of relations.²⁰

The identity of the Stoic cosmic deity presents a similar unity in plurality. He has many names, Zeus, Athena, Hera, Hephaestus, Poseidon, Demeter, and the rest, corresponding to his many powers.²¹ A unity corresponding to the four *personae*, therefore, lies well within traditional Stoic modes of thought, even if it was devised by Panaetius as a means of promulgating his own version of Stoic ethics.²²

The distinctive features of the scheme, however, and specifically the formulation in terms of *personae*, remain Panaetius' own. What attraction did this formulation have for him? One may conjecture that he viewed it as a clarification, not an alteration, of Stoic teaching. For one thing, it clearly broadens the base of human action to include more than one's nature. This broadening may have been a reaction to Plato and Aristotle, both of whom emphasize the relation of a person's *ergon*, his distinctive activity, in the performance of which his virtue and happiness lie, to his nature; and they place the highest good in the performance of the *ergon* that is most distinctively human.²³

²⁰ Relevant passages include *Diss.* ii.14.8; iii.2.4; iv.4.16; iv.8.20; iv.12.16; *Ench.* 30. See P. De Lacy, "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles," *TAPA* 76 (1945), pp. 257, 260.

²¹ Cf. Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*, line 1: *πολυώνυμε*, and Diogenes of Babylon, frag. 33 (*SVF* III, p. 217); Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii.71; Diog. Laer. vii.147 (= *SVF* II, frag. 1021, p. 305). See also A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, Vol. II, *Le Dieu Cosmique* (Paris, 1949), pp. 515-516.

²² For a concise statement of novel features in Panaetius' ethics see F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics*, pp. 126-127.

²³ E.g. Plato, *Rep.* I, 352 d-354 a; Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* i.7 (1097 b 24-28, 1098 a 7-18). For Plato see also the relation established between *φύσις* and *ἔργον* or *ἐπιτήδευμα* in *Rep.* V, 453 b-456 b.

To the Stoics, apparently, such a scheme was too narrow. They accepted the correlation of *erga* with natures, virtues, and arts.²⁴ But man's highest activity, his exercise of reason, is no more attached to one virtuous *ergon* than to another. Nor is the exercise of reason peculiarly human; it is also divine, and the gods, presumably, are better at it than we are. Our highest good is therefore not tightly bound to our own natures.

Here the doctrine of four *personae* has two further attractions. First, since our *personae* determine our *ergon*, the two *personae* that represent our nature (individual and common) determine it only in part. The rest is determined by the place assigned to us in the cosmic order and by our own exercise of reason in making choices for ourselves. Second, the element of detachment implicit in the notion of a role helps to remind us that we are not discrete entities. We are parts of a far greater unity to which we are related in a variety of ways, and moreover in ways that change with time. To identify ourselves with any one of our roles, to the exclusion of the others, would lead us into error.

Thus on this interpretation at least the doctrine of the four *personae* is Panaetius' attempt to analyze and explain how the multiple relations of the individual to the Stoic universe are to be taken into account in the actions of everyday life.

University of Pennsylvania

²⁴ See for example Diog. Laer. vii.100 = SVF III, fr. 83, p. 20.26-27; Plut. *De Stoicorum repugn.* 1038 F = SVF III, fr. 211, p. 50.33-34; Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* xi.200 = SVF III, fr. 516, p. 139.10-12. There are also many references to *erga* in Epicetetus. He speaks for example of the *erga* of the different names we have (*Diss.* ii.10.2), the *erga* of the artisans (ii.9.10), of the philosopher (i.20.7), of the soul (iv.11.6); and he ties the excellence of animals and men to their distinctive *erga* (iii.14.13-14).