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## ΚΑΙ ΚΕ ΤΙΣ ΩΔ' ΕΡΕΕΙ: An Homeric Device in Greek Literature

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Nothing is more characteristic of the Homeric respect for public opinion than those speeches within speeches that project what people might say after a given turn of events. So Hector in the *Iliad* addresses his spirit as he awaits the onrush of Achilles. If he retreats now, Poulydamas will be the first to reproach him for not having ordered a withdrawal earlier. But the reproach will also be general (22.105-108):

. . . αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρωάδας ἑλκεσιπέπλους,  
μή ποτέ τις εἴπησι κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο·  
"Ἐκτωρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν."  
ὡς ἐρέουσιν . . .

In Homer this procedure of projecting future opinion is a conspicuous part of the hero's armory, and its formal characteristics are a suitable object of parody. Thus Hegemon, the fifth century epic parodist, vows never again to venture abroad in search of lucre, but will scoop up money at home in Thasos. Never again will anyone be indignant when his wife bakes a holiday loaf of meagre dimensions,

καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπη σμικρὸν τυροῦντ' ἐσιδοῦσα·  
"ὦ φίλη, ὠνήρ μὲν παρ' Ἀθηναίοισιν ἀείσας  
πεντήκοντ' ἔλαβε δραχμάς, σὺ δὲ μικρὸν ἐπέψω."

(P. Brandt, *Corpusculum poesis epicae ludibundae*, p. 44, 15-17 = Athenaeus 15.698 f.). The history of a device that is so recognizably Homeric and so linked to the values of a shame culture is of ethical as well as stylistic interest. In each case the approach to an Homeric pattern, or the deviation from it, to some extent defines the moral attitude of the speaker as well as the stylistic affinity of the writer.

Since in Homer these speeches express public opinion, as voiced by an

anonymous *tis* or "someone," they belong to the general category of what Anton Fingerle has called *tis*-Reden.<sup>1</sup> As potential *tis*-Reden (expressions of what people might say), they are to be distinguished from actual *tis*-Reden (expressions of what people actually said). Formally the difference is reflected in introductory and capping formulas. Actual *tis*-Reden are introduced in the past tense directly from the narrative, by the phrase ὡς δὲ τίς εἶπεσκε(ν),<sup>2</sup> and are capped by the phrase ὡς ἄρα τίς εἶπεσκε(ν),<sup>3</sup> ὡς ἄρ' ἔφην,<sup>4</sup> or the like.<sup>5</sup> Potential *tis*-Reden, on the other hand, in their capacity as speeches within speeches that refer to the future, have an introductory formula that is either purposive<sup>6</sup> or predictive,<sup>7</sup> and a capping formula that is invariably future.<sup>8</sup> The content of a potential *tis*-Rede is either shameful or glorious and reflects the psychology of the speaker who projects it. This is in contrast to actual *tis*-Reden, which are more often than not morally neutral.

In Homer the opinion expressed in a potential *tis*-Rede is usually negative, and the speaker projecting this negative opinion is often attempting to dissuade himself or others from a certain course of action. Hector's soliloquy before the onrush of Achilles is an example. Similarly, in the funeral games of Patroclus, Menelaus urges impartial adjudication of his dispute with Antilochus so that no Achaean can accuse him of pressure tactics. The anonymous Achaean's potential accusation is fully quoted, giving Menelaus ample cause to settle his dispute peaceably (*Il.* 23.575-578). In the *Odyssey*, Eurymachus fears the consequences to the suitors' reputation if the beggar in the palace is given a chance of joining the contest with the bow. Here, as in Hector's soliloquy, the imagined speaker

<sup>1</sup> *Typik der homerischen Reden*, unpublished dissertation, Munich, 1944, 283-294 (I wish to thank the Institut für klassische Philologie of Munich University for supplying me with a copy of these pages). See also C. Hentze, "Die Chorreden in den homerischen Epen," *Philologus* 64 (1905), 254-268.

<sup>2</sup> *Il.* 2.271; 3.297, 319; 4.81; 7.178, 201; 17.414; 22.372. *Od.* 2.324; 4.769; 8.328; 10.37; 13.167; 17.482; 18.72, 111a, 400; 20.375; 21.361, 396; 23.148.

<sup>3</sup> *Il.* 4.85; 17.423; 22.375. *Od.* 4.772; 13.170; 23.152.

<sup>4</sup> *Il.* 3.324; 7.181, 206. *Od.* 17.488; 18.75; 21.404.

<sup>5</sup> ὡς ἔφασσαν: *Od.* 10.46; 20.384. ὡς φάσαν: *Il.* 2.278. *Od.* 21.366. ὡς ἔφην: *Il.* 3.302. ὡς φάν: *Od.* 2.337.

<sup>6</sup> ὄφρα τίς ὡδ' εἶπη(σιν): *Il.* 7.300; 12.317. μή ποτέ τίς εἶπη(ν): *Il.* 22.106; 23.575. *Od.* 21.324.

<sup>7</sup> καί ποτέ τίς εἶπη(ν): *Il.* 6.459; 7.87. καί κέ τίς ὡδ' ἔρρει: *Il.* 4.176. Cf. also the wish καί ποτέ τίς εἶποι in the incomplete *tis*-Rede at *Il.* 6.479.

<sup>8</sup> ὄφρουσι(ν): *Il.* 22.108. *Od.* 6.285; 21.329. ὡς ποτέ τίς ἔρρει: *Il.* 4.182; 6.462; 7.91. There is no capping formula at 7.302; 12.321; 23.578. The ring form of these capping formulas reflects in miniature a major structural principle of the speeches in Homer (see Dieter Lohmann, *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias*, Berlin, 1970).

is baser than they (*Od.* 21.324). Nausikaa, too, takes seriously the potential reproaches of her inferiors, should she be seen entering the town with a strange man (*Od.* 6.275–285). She admits that she herself would feel the same way about another girl in the same circumstances.<sup>9</sup> The truth is that in Homer there is no such thing as non-valid public opinion.<sup>10</sup>

But *tis*-Reden are not always negative, and their function can at times be to encourage and to persuade. For example, in the *Iliad* Sarpedon encourages Glaukos to fight in the front rank (12.317–321):

... ὄφρα τις ὦδ' εἶπη Λυκίων πύκα θωρηκτῶν  
 οὐ μὲν ἀκλέεες Λυκίην κᾶτα κοιρανέουσιν  
 ἡμέτεροι βασιλῆες, ἔδουσι τε πίονα μῆλα  
 οἶνον τ' ἕξαιτον μελιγδέα· ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ ἴσ  
 ἔσθλή, ἐπεὶ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρῶτοισι μάχονται.'

The third function of *tis*-Reden in Homer is predictive. An anonymous speech can bring fame or shame in the future without demanding an immediate response. So in a mood of fatalism Hector imagines what will be said about his wife Andromache after the fall of Troy (*Il.* 6.459–462):

καὶ ποτέ τις εἶπησιν ἰδὼν κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσιν·  
 Ἔκτορος ἦδε γυνή, ὃς ἀριστεύεσκε μάχεσθαι  
 Τρώων ἵπποδάμων, ὅτε Ἴλιον ἀμφιμάχοντο.  
 ὡς ποτέ τις ἑρέει . . .

But, he continues, may I be dead and buried by then.<sup>11</sup> More optimistic is Hector's idea of an epitaph for one of his own prospective victims (*Il.* 7.87–91):

καὶ ποτέ τις εἶπησι καὶ ὀψιγόνων ἀνθρώπων,  
 νηὶ πολυκλήϊδι πλέων ἐπὶ οἶνοπα πόντον·  
 ἀνδρὸς μὲν τόδε σῆμα πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος,  
 ὃν ποτ' ἀριστεύοντα κατέκτανε φαίδιμος Ἔκτωρ.  
 ὡς ποτέ τις ἑρέει· τὸ δ' ἐμὸν κλέος οὐ ποτ' ὀλεῖται.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Nausikaa's *tis*-Rede is the longest in Homer and serves to depict her ambiguous attitude to the local suitors. See Norman Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon*, Berkeley, 1975, 194.

<sup>10</sup> C. E. F. von Erffa, *Aidos und verwandte Begriffe* (*Philologus* Suppl. 30, Heft 2), Leipzig, 1937, 41, contrasts this with the Stoic distinction of ὀρθὸς ψόγος ([Plato] *Def.* 412 C 10 = Andronicus in J. von Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Fr.* 3.432); cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1384 a 21–33. Hesiod *Op.* 763 f. represents an intermediate position.

<sup>11</sup> Hector's despair about Andromache is matched by Andromache's own despair about Astyanax. At *Il.* 22.496–498, she imagines what more fortunate boys will say to her orphaned child (the gnomic aorist at 496 is applied in the future to Astyanax, as 499 ff. show).

<sup>12</sup> There is perhaps an element of persuasion here, in that Hector's prospective victim will become famous by association. Conversely, there is an element of dissuasion at *Il.* 4.176–182, where Agamemnon encourages Menelaus not to die.

After Homer this contemplation of posthumous fame is applied by the writer of personal poetry to his own poetic achievement. So Theognis (22 f.), enlarging the Homeric *τις* to *πᾶς τις*,<sup>13</sup> looks forward to his own fame as a poet:

ὦδε δὲ πᾶς τις ἔρει· 'Θεύγνιδός ἐστιν ἔπη  
τοῦ Μεγαρέως· πάντας δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός.'<sup>14</sup>

In the same tradition is a fragment falsely attributed to Epicharmus.<sup>15</sup>

But even in Homer not every projection of opinion is a *tis*-Rede. When, in *Iliad* 8.145 ff., Diomedes considers retreating before the thunderbolt of Zeus, he imagines not what "someone" will say but what Hector in particular will say if he draws back.<sup>16</sup> One might add that the "someone" of *tis*-Reden is usually further qualified as an Achaeon, a Trojan, a suitor, or the like. So in Semonides (7.29-31 West), who provides the earliest example of projected future opinion after Homer, it is the ignorant visitor, and not just anyone, who praises a woman whom he has only seen on one of her good days:

ἐπαινέσει μιν ξείνος ἐν δόμοις ἰδών·  
'οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη τῆσδε λωΐων γυνή  
ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισιν οὐδὲ καλλίων.'

Closer to the dramatic context of Homer is the use of projected opinion by Solon in his Salamis poem. This work of about 100 lines is conceived as a messenger speech delivered to the Athenians by a herald fresh from Salamis, which the Athenians are in danger of abandoning to the Megarians. According to Diogenes Laertius, the poem reaches a climax of scorn when the herald wishes he were the citizen of the obscurest island rather than of Athens (Solon 2.3 f. West):

αἶψα γὰρ ἂν φάτις ἦδε μετ' ἀνθρώποισι γένοιτο·  
'Ἄττικὸς οὗτος ἀνήρ, τῶν Σαλαμιναφετέων.'

By projecting the scorn that will be heaped upon them, the herald attempts to dissuade the Athenians from letting go of the island.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See Rudolf Führer, *Formproblem-Untersuchungen zu den Reden in der frühgriechischen Lyrik* (*Zetemata* 44), Munich, 1967, 54.

<sup>14</sup> For this punctuation see Felix Jacoby, "Theognis," *SBBA* 1931, 115 f.

<sup>15</sup> Fr. 86.12 ff. in Colin Austin, *Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta* (= *CGFPap.*).

<sup>16</sup> At 152 ff. Nestor argues that even if Hector should call him a coward, the Trojan men and women he has widowed would disagree. The authority of their collective judgement would naturally be expressed by a *tis*-Rede, and this general judgement would outweigh any individual judgement.

<sup>17</sup> Even more interesting is Solon's projection of actual public opinion, in fr. 33 West. The vulgar crowd consider him a fool for not having abused his powers as arbitrator to

Chronologically, the next example of projected future opinion is an oracle in Herodotus, which is dated by Parke to around 494 B.C.<sup>18</sup>

ὡς ποτέ τις ἑρέει καὶ ἐπεσσομένων ἀνθρώπων·  
 'δεινὸς ὄφισ τριέλκτος ἀπώλετο δουρὶ δαμασθείς.'

(Parke–Wormell 84.4 = Hdt. 6.77). The predictive function of the *tis*-Rede follows naturally from Homer, though the author of the oracle mistakenly applies an Homeric capping formula to introduce it.

It is, however, the dramatic use of the device in Solon that points the way to Greek tragedy.<sup>19</sup> Proportionally, tragedy contains as many instances of projected opinion as Homeric epic itself. This is partly due to the inherently dramatic nature of the device, which is always thought of as a speech within a speech. In drama, though, we must distinguish between non-argumentative projections of opinion developed from Homer, and the argumentative projections of opinion known in rhetoric as *prokatalēpsis*, where an opinion is set up for the purpose of being demolished. *Prokatalēpsis* is the rule in oratory, whereas poetic examples occur for the first time in Euripides.<sup>20</sup>

In Aeschylus the power of public opinion is typically very different than in Homer. In Homer it has a quasi-objective force because every one subscribes to it. In Aeschylus there is an element of religious compulsion (*Agamemnon* 456 f.):

βαρεῖα δ' ἀστῶν φάτις σὺν κότῳ,  
 δημοκράντου δ' ἀρᾶς τίνει χρέος.

become tyrant. But elsewhere (fr. 32 West), in a hitherto unparalleled defiance of public opinion, Solon defends his own position.

<sup>18</sup> H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle*, Oxford, 1946, I, 158–161.

<sup>19</sup> For Solon as a precursor of tragedy see Gerald F. Else, *The Origin and Early Form of Greek Tragedy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, 32–50.

<sup>20</sup> For Euripidean examples see Christopher Collard's edition of Euripides' *Suppliants*, ad v. 184 (but the pre-Euripidean examples he cites are all *tis*-Reden and are not *prokatalēptic*). The earliest dated example of *prokatalēpsis* in Old Comedy is Ar. *Ach.* 540 (425 B.C.), but this is itself a parody of Eur. *Telephus* 708 N. A possibly earlier example is Pherecrates fr. 154 Edmonds = Athen. 3.122 c. For Middle Comedy cf. Philiscus in Austin, *CGFPap.*, fr. 215.1.—Usually there is no danger of confusing the two types of projection, but at *Ba.* 204 ff., where the opinion to be rejected is a shaming judgement, the first two lines by themselves could pass as an indirect *tis*-Rede:

ἔρει τις ὡς τὸ γῆρας οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι,  
 μέλλων χορεύειν κῶτα κισσώσας ἐμόν.

The very next line, however, shows that the opinion was presented for instant rebuttal (hence, as in Murray's text, one should read 204 f. with an interrogative intonation: "will someone say . . .?").

Whether their rulers listen or not, what the people say can be effective. It is perhaps the fear of a divinely backed curse that helps Pelasgus in the *Suppliants* to his decision of consulting the people before granting asylum to the Danaids (398–401):

εἶπον δὲ καὶ πρὶν, οὐκ ἄνευ δήμου τάδε  
 πράξαμι' ἄν, οὐδέ περ κρατῶν, μὴ καὶ ποτε  
 εἴπη λέως, εἴ ποῦ τι μὴ τοῖον τύχοι,  
 'ἐπήλυδας τιμῶν ἀπώλεσας πόλιν.'

The projected accusation, epigrammatic in its assonance and its evenly split line, is an enhancement of Homer's (*Il.* 22.107)

"Ἐκτωρ ἦφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν.'

Note, however, that it is the people as a group, and not a generalized "someone" who speaks.

Closer both in form and feeling to an Homeric *tis*-Rede is Orestes' tribute to Athena after his acquittal in the *Eumenides*. In that play honour is a matter for the gods, whether Olympian or chthonic. Orestes, the only human being in the play other than the priestess at the beginning and the silent citizens of Athens, is preoccupied with survival. But now that for him at least the storm has cleared and he can return into society, he expresses his thanks by an imagined tribute to the Olympian triad (*Eumenides* 756–760):

καὶ τις 'Ελλήνων ἐρεῖ·  
 'Ἄργεῖος ἀνὴρ αὖθις, ἐν τε χρήμασιν  
 οἰκεῖ πατρώοις, Παλλάδος καὶ Λοξίου  
 ἕκατι καὶ τοῦ πάντα κραίνοντος τρίτου  
 Σωτήρος.'

Equally Homeric and specifically Odyssean is the passage in the *Libation Bearers* where Orestes seeks to manipulate public opinion in order to assure his admittance to the palace (567–570):

μενοῦμεν οὕτως ὥστ' ἐπεικάξειν τινὰ  
 δόμους παραστείχοντα καὶ τὰδ' ἐνέπειν·  
 'τί δὴ πύλῃσι τὸν ἰκέτην ἀπείργεται  
 Αἴγισθος, εἴπερ οἶδεν ἔνδημος παρών;'<sup>21</sup>

In fact, Orestes gains admission with ease and is at once faced with his mother—a moral, not a technical problem. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus also

<sup>21</sup> Alexander Sideras, *Aeschylus Homericus (Hypomnemata 31)*, Göttingen, 1972, 228, notes that the *nemesis* that would be aroused in such a situation is actually felt by Telemachus at *Od.* 1.119 f.

thinks of manipulating public opinion to achieve his ends. After the killing of the suitors he orders the household to engage in song and dance (23.135 f.):

... ὡς κέν τις φαίη γάμον ἔμμεναι ἐκτὸς ἀκούων,  
ἢ ἄν' ὁδὸν στείχων ἢ οἱ περιναιετάουσι.

But Odysseus' potential *tis*-Rede (given in reported speech) is soon converted into an actual *tis*-Rede (*Od.* 23.148–151), thus confirming the hero's mastery of the plot.<sup>22</sup>

In a frankly imitative context, Sophocles provides an even more direct reflection of an Homeric *tis*-Rede. Just as, in Book Six of the *Iliad*, in the final scene between Hector and Andromache, Hector imagines the words that will be spoken about Andromache after her captivity, so in *Ajax*, in the final scene between the hero and Tecmessa, Tecmessa imagines what her husband's enemies will say about her to his own discredit (505) once she gets into their power (500–504):<sup>23</sup>

καί τις πικρὸν πρόσφθεγμα δεσποτῶν ἐρεῖ  
λόγοις ἰάπτων· ἴδετε τὴν ὀμεινέτιν  
Αἴαντος, ὃς μέγιστον ἴσχυσε στρατοῦ,  
οἷας λατρείας ἀνθ' ὅσου ζήλου τρέφει.  
τοιαῦτ' ἐρεῖ τις . . .

Sophocles even imitates the ring form of the Homeric framing formulas, by repeating the verb of speaking. But the difference in speaker and intention is also important. In Sophocles the *tis*-Rede is spoken by the woman as an instrument of persuasion, while in Homer it is spoken by the man in a vision of despair.<sup>24</sup>

Characteristically, Ajax rejects Tecmessa's premiss out of hand (560 ff.). The situation she envisages simply will not arise. As for his own future, any further humiliating possibilities will be forestalled by suicide. One of the rejected possibilities is a reunion with his father Telamon. It is this same possibility that his half-brother, Teukros, envisages in detail, as he laments

<sup>22</sup> Among Aeschylean examples we should also note *Ag.* 575 ff. However we interpret 575 f., 577–579 project a boast that is recapitulated in Homeric style by *τοιαῦτα*, at 580.

<sup>23</sup> For an excellent comparison of both scenes as a whole, see Gordon M. Kirkwood, "Homer and Sophocles' *Ajax*," in J. M. Anderson, ed., *Classical Drama and Its Influence: Essays Presented to H. D. F. Kitto*, London, 1965, 53–70.

<sup>24</sup> For the exaggerated masculinity of Ajax compared to Hector see Michael Shaw, "The female intruder," *CPh* 70 (1975), 257 f.

over the hero's corpse. If Teukros returns home without Ajax he will get a grim reception indeed (1012–1018):

οὔτος τί κρύψει; ποῖον οὐκ ἔρει κακόν,  
τὸν ἐκ δорός γεγῶτα πολέμιου<sup>25</sup> νόθον,  
τὸν δειλία προδόντα καὶ κακανδρία  
σέ, φίλτατ' Αἴας, ἧ δόλοισιν, ὡς τὰ σά  
κράτη θανόντος καὶ δόμους νέμοιμι σοῦς.  
τοιαῦτ' ἀνήρ δύσοργος, ἐν γήρα βαρῦς,  
ἔρει . . .

As with Tecmessa's *tis*-Rede, this indirect projection of Telamon's opinion is capped by a return to the verb of speaking. The formality of the frame contrasts with the supple modulation into a direct address of Ajax (1015), who thus remains the centre of attention.<sup>26</sup>

It is not accidental that there are two projected speeches in *Ajax*, since the whole plot revolves around reputation, and in this respect is the most Homeric of Sophocles' plays. The only other speech of projected opinion in Sophocles is in the much later *Electra*. There the heroine evokes the glory that she and her sister will gain if (now that their brother is dead) they take it on themselves to avenge their father (975–985):

τίς γάρ ποτ' ἀστῶν ἢ ξένων<sup>27</sup> ἡμᾶς ἰδῶν  
τοιοῖσδ' ἐπαίνους οὐχὶ δεξιῶσεται  
ἴδεσθε τῶδε τῷ κασιγνήτῳ, φίλοι,  
ὦ τὸν πατρῶν οἶκον ἐξεσωσάτην,  
ὦ τοῖσιν ἐχθροῖς εὐ βεβηκόσιν ποτέ  
ψυχῆς ἀφειδήσαντε προουστήτην φόνου.  
τούτῳ φιλεῖν χρή, τῶδε χρή πάντας σέβειν·  
τῶδ' ἐν θ' ἑορταῖς ἐν τε πανδήμῳ πόλει  
τιμᾶν ἅπαντας οὐνεκ' ἀνδρείας χρεῶν.  
τοιαῦτά τοι νῶ πᾶς τις ἔξερεῖ βροτῶν,  
ζῶσαιν θανούσαιν θ' ὥστε μὴ κλιπεῖν κλέος.

But this heady vision does not sway Chrysothemis. What good is reputation if one has to face an infamous and protracted death (1005 ff.)?

Interestingly enough, the praise that *Electra* imagines is actually given to Antigone (though she never knows it). At *Antigone* 692 ff., Haemon, in the hope of swaying his father, tells Creon what the city is surreptitiously saying in praise of Antigone. But Creon is unmoved, and this report of

<sup>25</sup> To stress the alienation of Teukros, I interpret *πολέμιος* as *hostilis* (its normal sense) rather than as *bellicus*.

<sup>26</sup> Note at 1015 f. the expressively repeated pronominal forms *σέ . . . τὰ σά . . . σοῦς*.

<sup>27</sup> The polar expression here is equivalent in its inclusiveness to Theognis' *πᾶς τις*, which duly appears in the capping line (984).

actual public opinion has no effect. We may note that in Sophocles projections of future opinion are equally ineffective.<sup>28</sup>

In Euripides there are twelve examples of projected future opinion,<sup>29</sup> proportionately more than the number in Aeschylus or Sophocles. Half of these are *tis*-Reden of the Homeric type, except that in Euripides the hypothetical speaker is usually a completely generalized *tis* or "someone," and is not even a member of such a broad group as "the Greeks." The imitation of Homer produces an archaizing effect, but at the same time the extreme anonymity of the speaker gives the broadest possible currency to what he says. The remaining half dozen projections of opinion are not *tis*-Reden and show little or no Homeric influence.

The most simplistic examples of *tis*-Reden in Euripides are to be found in the two patriotic plays, the *Heracleidae* and the *Suppliants*. In the prologue to the *Heracleidae* Iolaos, the nephew of Herakles, gives his reasons for sharing in the misery and exile of the children of Herakles as follows (28–30):

... ὀκνῶν προδοῦναι, μή τις ᾧδ' εἴπη βροτῶν  
 'ἴδεσθ', ἐπειδὴ παισὶν οὐκ ἔστιν πατήρ,  
 'Ἰόλαος οὐκ ἤμυνε συγγενῆς γεγώς.'

The ostentatious rectitude of his position, somewhat old-fashioned in its Homeric dress, contrasts with the confident modernism of the Argive herald, whose system of morality is quite different.

Later in the same play, one of the children, Makaria, argues for sacrificing herself to save Athens. Part of her argument consists in envisaging what would happen should she survive the fall of the city that had offered her protection (516–519):

κοῦκ αἰσχυνοῦμαι δῆτ', ἐὰν δὴ τις λέγῃ·  
 'τί δεῦρ' ἀφίκεσθ' ἱκεσίοισι σὺν κλάδοις  
 αὐτοὶ φιλοψυχοῦντες; ἔξιτε χθονός·  
 κακοὺς γὰρ ἡμεῖς οὐ προσωφελήσομεν.'

The feeling anticipated is of shame, yet the thought behind it is practical and quite in accordance with the overall rationality of her speech. If she fails to assist her benefactor now, she can expect no help in the future.

In the *Suppliants* Theseus is shamed by his mother Aethra into helping the Argives gain permission from the Thebans to bury their dead. If he

<sup>28</sup> To the Sophoclean examples we might add *O.R.* 1496–1500, where a catalogue of family woes is transformed into a speech of projected opinion by the capping *τοιαῦτ' ὀνειδιεῖσθε* (1500, cf. 1494).

<sup>29</sup> The *tis*-Reden are *Heractl.* 28–30; 516–519; *Supp.* 314–319; *Ph.* 580–582; *Alc.* 954–960; 1000–1005. Formally distinct are *HF* 1289 f.; 1378–1381; *Tr.* 1188–1191; *IA* 462–466; 790–800; 1177–1179.

does help, he will be supporting a principle of international law, while if he doesn't (314-319):

ἔρεϊ δὲ δὴ τις ὡς ἀνανδρία χερῶν,  
 πόλει παρόν σοι στέφανον εὐκλείας λαβεῖν,  
 δείσας ἀπέστῃς, καὶ σοὺς μὲν ἀγρίου  
 ἀγῶνος ἦψω φαῦλον ἀθλήσας πόνον,  
 οὐδ' ἐς κράνος βλέψαντα καὶ λόγχης ἀκμὴν  
 χρῆν ἐκπονήσαι, δειλὸς ὢν ἐφηυρέθῃς.

Theseus only needs a mild prod to agree. He is, after all, the representative of Athens and as such he is, in all extant Greek tragedy, beyond reproach and sure to succeed.

In these morality plays Honour is unproblematic. This is very different from the tragic world of *Hippolytus*, where the two major characters, Phaedra and Hippolytus, both passionately espouse honour and the renown it brings, but are victims of their internal enemies or of circumstance. It is very different, too, from those plays, particularly in the later period, where the claims of honour, if they are made at all, are not heeded. So in the *Phoenissae* Jocasta suggests to her son Polynices that he is in a moral dilemma. If he succeeds in capturing his native city, how will he inscribe the dedicatory shields (575 f.)?

‘Θήβας πυρώσας τάσδε Πολυνείκης θεοῖς  
 ἀσπίδας ἔθηκε.’

If, on the other hand, he fails and returns to Argos (580-582):

ἔρεϊ δὲ δὴ τις· ὦ κακὰ μνηστεύματα  
 Ἄδραστε προσθείς, διὰ μιᾶς νύμφης γάμον  
 ἀπώλωμεθα.’

But her plea is not even considered, for Eteocles cuts short the debate by threatening to withdraw Polynices' safe conduct (for he is only in Thebes on sufferance). In the discussion between the brothers, as in the more desperate parts of Thucydides, Fear and Ambition are the motivations, and Honour is expendable.

*Alcestis* provides a more sophisticated use of projected opinion. In that play there is a conspiracy of silence between Admetus, Alcestis and the chorus about the seamy side of Admetus' transaction with his wife, in which he had allowed her to give him a new lease on life by dying for him. After her death, this silence is broken by Pheres, the father of Admetus, who under provocation goes so far as to call Admetus his wife's murderer. The chorus remains unaffected by this outburst, and does not really comment on it. After the funeral, though, Admetus does change his attitude, but this is only because he realizes that the bargain he had made with

death was not such a good one after all, and that Alcestis in death is actually better off than he is in life. For Alcestis had a noble death and is now free of pain, while life without her, as he has just discovered, is no pleasure, and on top of that his reputation has suffered. What Pheres has already said to Admetus reappears as the projection of what his enemies will soon be saying (954–960):

ἔρεϊ δέ μ' ὅστις ἐχθρὸς ὦν κυρεῖ τάδε·  
 'ἰδοῦ τὸν αἰσχρῶς ζῶνθ', ὅς οὐκ ἔτλη θανεῖν,  
 ἀλλ' ἦν ἔγημεν ἀντιδοῦς ἀψυχία  
 πέφευγεν Ἄιδην· εἴτ' ἀνὴρ εἶναι δοκεῖ;  
 στογεί δέ τοὺς τεκόντας, αὐτὸς οὐ θέλων  
 θανεῖν.' τοιάνδε πρὸς κακοῖσι κληδόνα  
 ἕξω.

But in imagining what people will say, Admetus by no means subscribes to their views. The key difference from the Homeric model is that it is not just any one who will speak out against him, but rather his enemies, his *echthroi*, whose opinion can be at least partially discounted. His public image may be damaged (a regrettable occurrence), but his self image is relatively unscathed.<sup>30</sup>

In the chorus that follows this episode, the bad reputation of Admetus is implicitly contrasted with the good reputation of Alcestis. Impromptu tributes at the tomb are already familiar from Homer, and just as in the *Iliad* Hector imagines what will be said at the tomb of one of his prospective victims, so the chorus imagine a visit to the tomb of Alcestis (1000–1005):

καί τις δοχμίαν κέλευθον  
 ἐκβαίνων τὸδ' ἔρεϊ·  
 'αὔτα ποτὲ προύθαν' ἀνδρός,  
 νῦν δ' ἔστι μάκαιρα δαίμων·  
 χαῖρ', ὦ πότνι', εὐ δὲ δοίης.' τοιαῖ νιν προσερούσι φῆμαι.

As in Sophocles, the tribute to Alcestis follows the Homeric pattern down to the ring form repetition of the verb of speaking. But though the chorus is supposed to be consolatory, the projected speech of praise for the wife, coming on the heels of a projected speech of blame for the husband, has an ironic effect.

Of the six remaining examples of projected opinion in Euripides, three occur in *Iphigenia in Aulis*, two in *Herakles*, and one in the *Trojan Women*. At *I.A.* 462–464, Agamemnon contributes to his dilemma by imagining

<sup>30</sup> By contrast, in Homer even an enemy's opinion is fully respected (as Diomedes respects Hector's opinion at *Il.* 8.147–150).

the speech of supplication that his daughter will make. At *I.A.* 1177–1179, Clytemnestra tries to influence Agamemnon by projecting what she will keep on saying to herself back in Argos, if Iphigeneia is killed. At *I.A.* 790–800, the chorus imagine what the Trojan women will say at the prospect of slavery. At *Troades* 1189 ff., as a variation on what people will say, Hekabe imagines what a poet will write on the tomb of Astyanax.<sup>31</sup>

More remarkable is the sequence in *Herakles*. In the pathetic aftermath to his madness, during which he has killed his wife and his children, the hero at first resolves to kill himself too. Like Makaria in the *Heracleidae*, he wonders how he could honourably survive as an exile. He will be bitterly goaded as follows (1289 f.):

‘οὐχ οὗτος ὁ Διός, ὃς τέκν’ ἔκτεινέν ποτε  
δάμαρτά τ’; οὐ γῆς τῆσδ’ ἀποφθαρῆσεται;’

What distinguishes this from conventional projections of shame (apart from the lack of a formal introduction), is the horrible gravity of the charge. If the charge is true, as it incontrovertibly is, the shame before others is almost forgotten before the horror of the fact itself. That Herakles is not just thinking of what people will say, is shown by the succeeding lines (immediately succeeding, if we follow Wilamowitz). The very elements, so he imagines, will reject him (*Herakles* 1295–1298):

φωνὴν γὰρ ἦσει χθῶν ἀπεννέπουσά με  
μὴ θιγγάνειν γῆς καὶ θάλασσα μὴ περᾶν  
πηγαί τε ποταμῶν, καὶ τὸν ἀρματήλατον  
Ἴξίον’ ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἐκμμησομαι.

And yet this blend of shame and guilt is not intellectually assented to, for, as he says at the end of this very speech, it is the goddess Hera and not himself who is to blame.

In the end, under the influence of Theseus, Herakles decides to steel himself to live rather than to die, perhaps in part as a testimony of innocence. In tears he laments his shattered past, and as he prepares to leave the scene of the killings he hesitates to take up his weapons (1378–1381):

ἀμηχανῶ γὰρ πότερ’ ἔχω τάδ’ ἢ μεθῶ,  
ἃ πλευρὰ τὰμὰ προσπίτνοντ’ ἐρεῖ τάδε·  
‘ἡμῶν τέκν’ εἶλες καὶ δάμαρθ’· ἡμᾶς ἔχεις  
παιδοκτόνους σούς.’

<sup>31</sup> For shameful writing, as opposed to shameful speech, cf. *E. Ph.* 573 f.

The surreal picture fits his fevered condition. Here a device that properly expresses the values of a shame culture is adapted to express feelings of guilt, by having the weapons rather than the public speak.<sup>32</sup>

These last passages from *Herakles* boldly realize such hypotheses as that of the watchman in the prologue of *Agamemnon*, who imagines what the house would say "if it could give voice."<sup>33</sup> Yet another possibility is to imagine what the dead would say if *they* could give voice. So in *Orestes* (408 B.C.), the hero asks his uncle Menelaus to imagine that his dead father Agamemnon is speaking through him (674–677).<sup>34</sup> Nine years later we find a similar conceit in Andocides (1.148), and thereafter it becomes a commonplace.

In rhetorical theory, the non-real projection of opinion from the past is a form of *prosopepoieia*, which in principle could also include projections of future opinion such as the Homeric *tis*-Reden. But, as we have noticed, in Greek oratory projections of future opinion are usually argumentative and procataleptic in nature. The one exception is a passage in Hyperides' *Defence of the sons of Lycurgus* (ca. 324 B.C.): *τίνα φήσουσιν οἱ παριόντες αὐτοῦ τὸν τάφον; 'οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως, ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὖρε πόρους, ὠκοδόμησε τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ὠδεῖον, τὰ νεώρια, τριήρεις ἐποίησατο, λιμένας· τοῦτον ἢ πόλις ἡμῶν ἠτίμωσε καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἔδησεν αὐτοῦ.'* (Hyperides fr. 118 Kenyon). The passerby at the tomb in Hyperides' projection of opinion harks back to Hector's *tis*-Rede for his prospective victim in the *Iliad*, and the chorus' *tis*-Rede for the heroine in *Alcestis*. The projection of an epitaph as a shaming device is paralleled by Hekabe's epitaph for Astyanax in the *Trojan Women*.

The passage from Hyperides is unusual in other ways. Down to the end of the Hellenistic period, there are only two other instances of a moralizing use of projected future opinion.<sup>35</sup> One occurs in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica*, in a passage where Medea considers the possibility of first aiding Jason and then killing herself.<sup>36</sup> She is dissuaded by the reflection that even suicide would not help her posthumous reputation. Even after death

<sup>32</sup> Reproachful weapons also speak in an epitaph by Antipater of Sidon for the tomb of Ajax (Page 7 = *A.P.* 7.146):

τεύχεα δ' ἂν λέξειεν Ἀχιλλεύς· ἄρσενος ἀλκᾶς,  
οὐ σκολιῶν μύθων ἄμμες ἐφιέμεθα.'

<sup>33</sup> Aesch. *Ag.* 37; cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 418; *Andr.* 924.

<sup>34</sup> Compare also the virtuosity of Menelaus at *Hel.* 962 ff., where he attempts to influence Theonoe by invoking her dead father.

<sup>35</sup> Post-Euripidean tragedy, had it survived, might have provided further examples.

<sup>36</sup> This is the only example of projected opinion in Apollonius Rhodius. His epic, however, contains several actual *tis*-Reden, e.g., at 2.144–154; 4.1457–1461.

she will be mocked and become the talk of the town (3.793-797):

καί κέν με διὰ στόματος φορέουσαι  
 Κολχίδες ἄλλυδις ἄλλαι ἀεικέα μωμήσονται·  
 ἥτις κηδομένη τόσον ἀνέρος ἄλλοδαποῖο  
 κάθαιεν, ἥτις δῶμα καὶ οὐς ἤσχυνε τοκῆας,  
 μαργοσύνη εἴξασα.—τί δ' οὐκ ἐμὸν ἔσσειται αἰσχος;

The other occurs in an anonymous papyrus fragment attributable to Cercidas. A modest and virtuous existence is preferable to excessive meddling, which can expose one to shipwreck and to the gibes of one's enemies (Powell, *Coll. Alex.*, p. 218, 37-40):

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Πάρνε, βουλοίμην εἶναι  
 τάρκευντ' ἐμαντῶ καὶ νομίζεσθαι χρηστός,  
 ἢ πολλὰ πρήσσειν, καὶ ποτ' εἰπεῖν τοὺς ἐχθρούς·  
 ἄλῶν δὲ φόρτος ἐνθεν ἦλθεν ἐνθ' ἦλθεν.

The remaining instances of projected opinion in Hellenistic literature are confined to predictions of or wishes for praise. Wishes find their Homeric exemplar in Hector's hopes for Astyanax (*Il.* 6.479 f.):

καί ποτέ τις εἴποι 'πατρός γ' ὅδε πολλὸν ἀμείνων'  
 ἐκ πολέμου ἀνιόντα.

So Hegemon wishes that the passerby of the tomb of the Spartans at Thermopylae will praise them (Hegemon 1 page = *A.P.* 7.436):<sup>37</sup>

Εὔποι τις παρὰ τύμβον ἰὼν ἀγέλαστος ὀδίτας  
 τοῦτ' ἔπος· ὀδῶκοντ' ἐνθάδε μυριάδας  
 Σπάρτας χίλιοι ἄνδρες †ἐπέσχον αἶμα τὸ† Περσῶν  
 καὶ θάνον ἀστρεπτεῖ· Δῶριος ἄ μελέτα.'

Similarly, Eratosthenes wishes that people will respond to his dedication at the temple of Ptolemy (fr. 35, 17 f. Powell):

... λέγοι δέ τις ἄνθεμα λεύσσων  
 'τοῦ Κυρηναίου τοῦτ' Ἐρατοσθέneos.'

Also a wish, though different in form, is Theocritus 12.10-16. But the other examples of projected opinion in Theocritus are flat predictions. So, at 15.126 f., the sources of wool for the blankets of Adonis will proclaim themselves:

ἂ Μίλατος ἐρεῖ χῶ τὰν Σαμίαν καταβόσκων,  
 ἔστρωται κλίνα τῶδῶνιδι τῶ καλῶ ἄμμιν.'

<sup>37</sup> Because of the parallel with Homer, Gow-Page are probably wrong to interpret the optative here as potential. Their reference to the speeches of legendary characters introduced by the lemma *τί ἂν λέγοι*; or *τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους*; (as at *A.P.* 9. 449-480), is misleading. Aside from the fact that the lemma is not part of the poem, the speaker is a particular "historical" character, not a generalized *tis*, and he speaks on a particular historical occasion in the past, not some hypothetical occasion in the future.

More decidedly Homeric is the conclusion of the idyll to the distaff (28.24 f.), where the introductory formula is modelled on *Il.* 6.459, and the comment on a gift is perhaps suggested by the *tis*-Rede at *Il.* 7.299 ff.:

κῆνο γάρ τις ἔρει τῶπος ἴδων σ'· ἧ μεγάλα χάρις  
δώρω σὺν δλίγῳ· πάντα δὲ τίματα τὰ παρ φίλων.'

From the examples I have been able to collect we can draw the following conclusions. In the literary tradition, the most durable of the Homeric *tis*-Reden are those that predict praise. On the other hand, persuasive and dissuasive *tis*-Reden are not found beyond the fifth century. Later projections of opinion with these functions are rare and are non-Homeric in form. Even in tragedy, where projections of opinion are as frequent as in Homer, dissuasive or persuasive *tis*-Reden of the Homeric type are: associated with Homeric situations (*A. Ch.* 567–570; *S. Ajax* 500–504), are romanticizing (*S. El.* 975 ff.), or are deliberately archaic (*Eur.*, *passim*). This progressive restriction in the scope of an Homeric device is most probably due to the development of a private ethic that rejects the appeal to a generalized *tis*.

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