This paper will examine the anapaests of the prologue of the *Iphigenia at Aulis* more or less in isolation from the iambics. Separating the two sections is a somewhat artificial procedure since it involves not only dissecting an area which is tightly-knit, even if the unity is purely formal, but also, as Page puts it in the last sentence of *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*,¹ 'reducing to fragments the structure which Euripides and he [the interpolator] had built'; nevertheless it is manifestly desirable from an academic viewpoint that any new argument for or against the authenticity of the lines should be brought forward.

My approach will be stylistic, in a broad sense. Consequently, neither the arrangement of the prologue, nor such hoary problems as the much-debated lack of consistency between lines 106-7 and 124ff. will be dwelled upon. Secondly, I shall not focus upon the unresolved and apparently unsolvable issues of, for instance, the construction κοίνωνον μοδον ες ημαι (44) and the exceedingly uncomfortable language at 130ff. In these instances the case for the prosecution is well stated by Page, Bain and Dr. Diggle,² and I shall confine myself to mentioning them briefly before the main discussion.

¹) D.L. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1934) 216. Referred to throughout this paper by the author's name.

Instead, I should like to concentrate upon the general ethos of the anapaests, which will entail studying value terminology; then I shall consider some phrases and imagery which I feel to be both ineffective and inappropriate; and finally I shall discuss the apparent lack of logical or even conceptual progression in both sections of the anapaests.

Firstly then, some introductory remarks about the transmitted order of the prologue. I am not convinced that lines 1ff. can stand at the beginning of a Euripidean play. δόμων τῶν δὲ πάροικῶν is 'technically improper' and 'uninformative', as C.W. Willink\(^3\) admits, unless the identity of these δόμων was clearly indicated by the skene, an assumption which points more to later than to classical technique.\(^4\) It is, however, a possible if uninspired opening line, in keeping with the general tone of the anapaests which is atmospheric rather than informative. Certain details suggest that the anapaests were written to open a play, for instance, the well-known ingredients of: speaker identification (ἰπποθέτῳ 1, 3 is adequate for a minor character like the Old Man); the mention of the setting quite rapidly (10, 14), and of the time of day, which is not obligatory except when the action starts during the night (e.g. Sophocles' Electra, the Agamemnon and, of course, the Rhesus). Such information fits most comfortably at the play's opening and is not really adequately conveyed in the somewhat irrelevant genealogy and legend in the first lines of the iambics.

I would like to be able to adopt the most favoured current critical viewpoint about the form of the prologue: that is, that two self-contained versions were written by two hands and conflated by a third. Unfortunately, however, this seems more neat than satisfactory, mainly because the information conveyed by both parts appears to be independent. My points

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are these: 1) the anapaests initiate themes of later importance, such as Agamemnon's relationship with his brother (85, 97-8) and, more weightily, his dilemma in harmonising strong family feeling with desire for power (84-98). 2) the anapaests fulfil the indispensable function of introducing the Old Man and conveying in detail the first change of mind in the play. I admit that portions of the complete anapaests and iambics which duplicated information could easily have been excised by an editor. But 3), unless his work was done extremely hurriedly, I do not see why the linking passage at 106-14 should contain the contradiction (which cannot just be brushed under the carpet) with 124ff., nor why Tyndareus' oath, which is thematically non-existent later in the play, should follow the Old Man's request for information.

Without doubt, some kind of 'scissors and paste' job was performed upon the iambics and the anapaests. I do not wish to discuss this in detail, but it might be worth considering the possibility that Euripides wrote some of the iambics, which were then incorporated into an avant garde prologue, commissioned by the first producers to supply the missing dramatic links.

This hypothesis is obviously as untestable as any other, but my reasons for putting it forward are as follows. Firstly, I am tempted by the thematic considerations mentioned above, to believe that Euripides wrote from line 80 to approximately line 107; line 107 because I think that the three 'villains' of the piece, Odysseus, Calchas and Menelaus, could well do with an earlier mention, and this need is perhaps not one that an editor, rather than the author, would necessarily have perceived. Furthermore, the glaring textual corruption of 105-7 points rather to confusion over a join than to interpolation; whereas the reminiscence of the Iphigeneia among the Taurians at 112-3 and the derivative nature of the rest of the patchwork from the anapaests certainly indicate an interpolator at work. My reasons for making line 80 the commencement of Euripides' own writing
are that the greatest stylistic problems are in lines 49-79; and the 'story' there recounted is irrelevant. Secondly, the existence of the contradiction between 106-7 and 124ff. is more plausibly explained by the possibility that the editor(s) wished to keep as much of Euripides' own script as they could without, however, mutilating their brand-new anapaests. And thirdly, these editors may have felt that although the avant garde anapaests were splendid, they themselves ought to make a token gesture towards traditional Euripidean practice, by incorporating a genealogy (and legend) not totally unconnected with the topic in hand, to fill out the scanty remains from Euripides' own pen. I am aware that these last two reasons may be felt by some to be rather too 'psychological', but pure rationality was certainly not the inspiration of any persons involved in this operation. 5)

So much, briefly, for the disharmony of the prologue's structure. If the play were to be performed with the prologue as we have it, which it obviously was in antiquity, I think that we would have to concede that the existing arrangement would 'work', but it seems unclassical and totally un-Euripidean.

Turning now to the internal problems of the anapaests which are generally well-known, we are faced, in the words of A.M. Dale, 6) by metrical 'licences elsewhere unparalleled in drama' such as: 1) 119, a dimeter ending in πρός; 2) 123, a paroemiac of the form — — — — — —, unique because the sequence — — — — — — — is normally confined to the opening of a line; 3) 122, γάρ δὴ is oddly positioned. Considerations (2) and (3) lead Dale to accept Verrall's arrangement: εἴς

5) The brevity of this introduction is mainly due to two papers devoted to the prologue and presented at the Cambridge Greek Seminar 1977-78 before my paper, by Richard Hunter (an overview) and by John Wilkins (a study of the iambics). I am greatly indebted to them, as well as to the Cambridge Greek Seminar for their comments on this paper. - Bain provides a useful summary of critical differences over the prologue.

It is difficult, however, to accept that such oddities should be treated as ordinary emendable problems, especially as their existence gains indirect confirmation from the divided ana-
phaestic *metra* at 2, 3, 16, 140, and 149.*

I am not impressed by Willink's 'exact parallel' at *Rh* 16 as a confirmation of Euripidean authorship. That argument works both ways; and *Tra* 977-8, while proving that the licence has a classical, formal parallel, is completely dissimilar in its context of hushed, tense expectation. Sophocles seems to have been innovating with a serious dramatic purpose, where-
as our writer used the device (if it may be so called) without any significance that I can perceive. For instance, should we argue that the *split metra* connote haste and anxi-
ety, as is possible at 2, 3, 140 and 149, the example at line 16 then appears to be used loosely; for Agamemnon is hardly going to rush into a general reflection after the sense pause following στειχώμεν ἔως with the same haste and anxie-
ty as when summoning the Old Man from the hut, or sending him on his mission. This is a slight criticism perhaps, but one that Euripides would not have incurred.

About individual examples of rare or so-called nontragic words there will never be agreement. For instance, Page points out that *καυνουργεῖν* is very rare, only here (2 and 838) in poetry until Antiphanes. Willink, on the other hand, remarks that it 'seems securely authentic'. Assuming that it is rare, even coined (although this cannot be proved), one might feel that, firstly, it would have been placed more prominently (as indeed at line 838, where Achilles is dumbfounded by Clytemnestra's revelation that he is supposed to be betrothed to Iphigeneia) rather than at the opening of a play, where it could have little meaningful emphasis;

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7) Probably attributable rather to Herwerden (Bain, p. 22, note 62). Bain also comments that the licences may be acceptable since they occur in *lyric* anaepaests.

and secondly, that any instances of such rare diction should bear some thematic weight. It seems to me unlikely that κωλνοργείς at line 2 assists our reception of its recurrence at 838; but this may be a rather subjective opinion.

At line 22 the MSS present us with the unmetrical καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον. This is a tricky problem. As with the metrical licences, I feel that simple emendation here is not an adequate answer, although the metrical error here is glaring. Bothe's remedy of deleting the line as a gloss is, as Wilink says, 'much the most plausible solution', but plausibility is not a sufficient reason for deletion. Against Nauck's πρὸτιμον there are the problems of its meaning, 'precious', and its apparent absence from the tragic genre. I would choose to keep τὸ φιλότιμον, preferring to read with Markland τὸ τε φιλότιμον, which although unparalleled and unpleasant, does form an anapaestic metron, while the MSS reading does not. It is possible that a later scribe disliked the proceleusmatic that he found and changed the reading to καὶ τὸ... presuming that the iota in -τιμον could be short. Another reason why I incline towards retaining τὸ φιλότιμον is because I suspect that lines 20-22 are closely related to 385-7, either as their indirect model or their copy. I shall elaborate on this contention later.

Συννυμφοκόμον at 48 does not seem problematic in itself, although a hapax legomenon. But I do not think that it suits the character of the Old Man to employ original, perhaps recognisably poetic coinages, and I cannot detect the 'irony' that Willink perceives; that is, that the audience can imagine the Old Man accompanying Iphigeneia, as he did her mother, but to a very different wedding ceremony.

Again, the charge of unnecessary employment of unusual diction can be made against κολπόδη and ἀκλύσταν at 120 and 121. Page informs us that κολπόδης appears only here in poetry, as does ἀλσώδης (141), which does not recur until Nicander. In isolation, none of these words is objectionable, but we have to ask ourselves if, clustered together in context, they are not rather 'manneristic'. Some more examples
of odd diction, 'poetic' in tone, are τροχαλοῖσιν δχοῖς (146), παραμείβεσθαι (146) and θυμέλας κυκλώπων (152). These three usages, though obtrusive and uncomfortable, I am prepared to accept. In the first we may allow Agamemnon some licence for his vivid pictorial anticipation of the Old Man's journey. By extension δχοι can perhaps denote ἄρματων δχοι, especially, as Willink argues, in close proximity to ἄπηνη (47); and θυμέλας κυκλώπων may be, in England's words, 'a picturesque synonym for Mycenae' (see note 25). Similarly we are confronted by σιγαί at 10, which England considers to be of 'poetic beauty', despite (or perhaps because of) the awkwardness of the plural, which can be matched only with Plato Rep 425 b 6, where it means 'instances of silence'. Such a meaning is unsuitable here. Willink attempts to support it upon the insecure prop of uncertain emendations by Hermann and Dindorf of a corrupt passage (obelised by Page in the OCT) at Ἀγ 412, but this is hardly adequate.

To sum up, the diction here cannot be supported, only accepted as the work of a mannerist writer but probably not the work of Euripides. I shall return to our poet's use of language later.

Grammatically, some passages of the anapaests are highly suspect, such as κοίνωσον μοῦδον ἐς ἡμᾶς (44) and the text at 130ff. As I mentioned earlier, I am not reconciled to line 44, but it does not seem to be a case for normal emendation. We may perhaps soothe our sensibilities by arguing that the strained construction was not too harsh for Greek ears; but we cannot so easily dispose of the question, 'Would Euripides have used it?' And what reason can we exercise our imaginations to produce, to account for the unique employment of κείνω in a quasi-reflexive sense at 130? There are also problems here with ἐπιφημίζειν τινὰ τινί which can perhaps be paralleled by Plato Laws 771 d 1 in the sense 'to assign to'.

9) Page's reference. Willink 357 rewrites:
We may also experience discomfort at 151, where the emendation εἰσόρμα would give Euripides a new word, one which, besides, is found intransitively in the active voice only at Anth. Pal. 7.707, according to Page. κλῆθρον δ' εξόρ-μοις at 149 is an awkward emendation of κλῆθρων εξόρμα, raising the question once more of dissociating superficial corruption from an odd original expression.

Another verb used intransitively in the active voice appears to be πορθμεῖν at line 6, in opposition to its normal, transitive Euripidean usage. If we wish to smooth out this irregularity we must change τίς το τί, put the question mark after μεσοήρης (8) and take Σείρμοις to mean, on the authority of Theon of Smyrna,10) 'any bright star'. If Agamemnon is asking the unlikely question, 'What ferrying is this bright star ferrying, darting near the Pleiades?', he does not receive an answer from the Old Man. Page feels that this is intolerable. England and Willink get around the problem by ascribing all the lines to one speaker only - to Agamemnon and the Old Man respectively - and informing us that these characters are either 'musing' (England of Agamemnon), or 'garrulous' (Willink of the Old Man). This division of speakers, however, is supported neither by the transmitted text nor Ennius' translation, which admittedly is fairly free:

Ag. Quid noctis videtur in altisono caeli clipeo?

Sen. Temo superat... etc.11)

οδεί τι κείνῳ παείδ' ἐπεφήμισα
νυμφεῖος εἰς ἄγκουνᾶν
εὐνόης ἐνδύσεων ἕκτενος.

This involves keeping ἐνδύσεων (paralleled in Euripides only at Cyc 510), which is supposed to imply 'in more crudely sexual terms' Achilles' 'hypothetical disappointment', thus creating a new meaning for ἐπιφή-μίζετον τινὰ τινὶ on the analogy of ἐνδύτων τινὰ τινὶ: 'to him I uttered an intention of giving my daughter (to him)'; and importing another epic word, ἄγκουνᾶν. As Bain remarks (p. 22, note 63), this rewriting is unconvincing.

10) περὶ ἄστρ. 16 (Martin; Page's ref.) which seems to cite this passage. By this change we also correct the astronomical error.

Willink, reading τί and ignoring the astronomical problem, keeps Σείριος as the Dog Star with some highly subjective and dubious arguments from 'hunted dove imagery' and an imaginative association of Sirius, the hunter's dog, with Orion himself, whose constellation is (of course) near the Pleiades. As usual, Willink's solution, reading ἔφ. τί οὐτ' ἄρ' ἄστήρ οὖσ' πορθέμενει; / Σείριος ... (that is, ἄρα accentuated with a circumflex to suit the 'Retainer's quasi-jocular attitude of wonderment and protestation') is too elaborate to carry any conviction. It is also based upon the (as yet unproven) assumption that Euripides was the author of this section of the play.

Further oddities in the anapaests should be mentioned. ζου plus accusative (141) may be paralleled at And 1265-6 according to Willink, and used on the analogy of Ὅσσω (Page). ἥς (epic) juxtaposed with Ἀελίου (158) is certainly disturbing and, as Bain points out, cannot be emended to ἄως with the facility that Willink implies at p. 359. ἐς τέλος (161) too is unusual, meaning 'up to the end'; but it may be possible to take it as 'completely/to completion' if we compare Ἑκ 817, its only parallel.

None of the difficulties which I have surveyed here are new, and most continue to rest under grave suspicion. If Euripides was innovating, we owe it to his stature as a playwright to explain the dramatic function of the high proportion of curiosities in the anapaests with respect to the rest of the Iphigenia at Aulis. It is very hard to do this, especially in view of the advances of modern dramatic analysis, which show clearly that the great Attic tragedians do not present audiences with pointless confusion of technical anomaly. Having very briefly mentioned the linguistic problems of the anapaests I shall now turn to their ethos.

The first passage I should like to examine is at 45-48. Here the Old Man, in order to convince Agamemnon that he is loyal and trustworthy, says:

πρὸς ἔδ' ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν πιστῶν τε φράσεις.
σῇ γὰρ μ' ἀλόχω ὀτές Τυνάδρεως
πέμπει φερνὴν/ συννυμφοκόμον τε δίκαιον.
This seems very strange, and I can find no parallel instance in tragedy of a slave addressing his master, or any free man, with a self-recommendation couched in these terms. Nowhere does a slave call himself an ἄνηρ ἄγαθός without batting an eyelid: if approbatory value terms are used, they are either traditional or commented upon in typical Euripidean general reflections, which, by their nature, suggest that the author is advancing a controversial opinion. Traditionally acceptable terms for social inferiors are εὖνος, ἐὔφρων, εὔμενὴς or πιστός.\(^{12}\) Any lack of these qualities makes a slave κακός. Compare Helen 726-7:

κακός γὰρ δόσις μὴ σέβει τὰ δεσποτῶν
καὶ ξυγγέγηθε καὶ συνωδίνει κακοῖς.\(^{13}\)

When slaves wish to advise or contradict their superiors (something which occurs mainly in Euripides), they need to ask for permission to speak freely, since free speech can only take place among equals.\(^{14}\) There is none of the confidentiality between master and servant that we find in New Comedy, even in what would appear to be the most likely relationship, that of the Nurse to Phaedra in Hippolytus. It is worth mentioning that here the Nurse eventually prevails upon Phaedra by appealing to her mistress as a suppliant, thereby emphasising her inferiority, rather than addressing her in terms of an equal relationship as is the case in our passage. Of course, it could be argued that the Nurse is pushing Phaedra into a confession that she does not fully wish to make, while the Old Man is responding specifically to Agamemnon's orders; but this is quite unconvincing. It is extremely improbable that social convention (in its strong sense) could be so altered merely because the Old Man feels confident in his request. And how then do we interpret his behaviour at line 866? I shall return to this.

12) εὖνος Hip 698, Hel 481, And 59; ἐὔφρων Ag 263; εὔμενὴς Per 175; πιστός Hip 267.
13) Also Med 54-55, Ion 566, 857-8, Ba 1032-3.
14) We have examples of this at Ba 668-71, Hip 89, Tra 52-3 and in the heavily ironical speech of Hecabe to Odysseus at Hec 234-7.
Two examples of Euripidean reflections which endow slaves with unusual approbatory value terms are at Helen 728-33, which isolates γενναίοι slaves by implication from all others, using the criterion of 'intelligence' (νοῦς) to make this distinction; and more relevant to our context, Ion 854-6:

ἐν γάρ τι τοῖς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει, τοῦνομα· τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων οὐδὲν κακίων δούλος, δότις ἐσθλός ἦ.

This clearly conveys what we expect to hear of fifth century slaves - that they have αἰσχύνη. Euripides, in a characteristic λόγος/ἔργον contrast, is presenting the controversial idea that only their name is αἰσχρόν. But our Old Man has no such doubts about his own slavery if he can state that he is an ἀνήρ ἁγαθός rather than, say, a δοῦλος γενναῖος/χρηστός/ἐσθλός.

My objections may be summarised by the following two questions: 1) Can the Old Man refer to himself as ἁγαθός, which has more social overtones of 'nobility' than γενναῖος, χρηστός, or even ἐσθλός, all of which are used occasionally of slaves? And 2) Can he call himself an ἀνήρ ἁγαθός in one breath and in the next (cf. line 866) φερνῆν συννυμφοκόμον, which actually emphasises his lack of freedom, hence his inferiority? I doubt that the social assumption implied by his juxtaposition, that slaves are as much 'men' as free men, could have been passed over without comment by Euripides. δίκαιον at 48 receives the force of criticism (2) even more strongly, accompanying φερνῆν συννυμφοκόμον cheek by jowl, as it does. And is 'justice' relevant here anyway? If the Old Man means that he performed his job as he should have done, is this something for a slave to boast about?

We find δίκαιος used of a servant/mistress relationship at Ῥα 410-2 when the First Messenger is conducting his bizarre cross-examination of Lichas. He snatches up Lichas' δῖκαια γάρ (409), meaning approximately 'Of course', which was in answer to the question, 'So you say that this woman is your mistress?', and continues:
τί δῆτα; ποίαν ἄξιοις δοῦναι δίκην,
ην εὐρεθής ἐς τήνδε μὴ δίκαιος ὡν;
to which Lichas returns in some surprise, πῶς μὴ δίκαιος;
Obviously Lichas is already beginning to side-step the Mes-
senger's anticipated accusation. But the important under-
lying assumption runs somewhat as follows: 'All servants
should/must (χρή) be trustworthy, loyal, honest (δίκαιος)
to their masters and mistresses.' If they are not, after
all, then they lose their greatest claim to be good servants.
δίκαιος at 48, we must conclude, is either redundant or mak-
ing a special point. It is conceivable that this point could
be ironical (this would have affinities with Willink's in-
terpretation of συνωμοσίαμον), as the Old Man later betrays
his master to his mistress; but I believe such irony to be
far-fetched.

Let us now consider the scene between the Old Man, Cly-
temnestra and Achilles with reference to the preceding dis-
cussion. When the Old Man introduces himself in answer to
the question (basically), 'Who are you?', does he reply: 'I
am an ἄνήρ ἀγαθός/πιστός/δίκαιος'? No, he modestly admits
(858):

δοῦλος, οὐχ ἀβρόνοιμαι τῶδ'. ἡ τύχη γὰρ οὐκ ἐδ.
If τύχη means the chance which has made him a captive,15)
how do we account for his reversion to a traditional estima-
tion of slavery after his earlier, liberated attitude?16)
In addition to this, he evidently tries to supplicate Cly-
temnestra by seizing her hand (866) and he assures her of
his goodwill in the most acceptable possible terms; he is
εὐνοῦς (867 and 871) especially to Clytemnestra, rather than
her husband, because of his longer association with her side
of the family (868, 870).17)

I do not believe that these passages can possibly be

16) This passage rules out the objection to my argument, that the
Old Man is more intimate with Agamemnon than with Clytemnestra (or Achil-
les) and hence that his behaviour towards his mistress is more formal.
written by one author and, as 865ff. are so clearly Euripidean in tone, I do not see how 45-48 can be attributed to him.

The next relevant passage for this discussion is at 16-23. I am extremely dissatisfied with ἀκίνδυνον, ἀγνός, ἀκλε-ής and the ethos which this usage implies, while τὸ καλὸν γ’ ἐνταῦθα βίου and τὸ φιλότιμον (if this should be read) enhance my suspicions. To begin with ἀκλεής: Aeschylus and Sophocles do not employ the word but we do have two examples in Euripides: Her 623 and Hip 1028. In the latter, Hippolytus swears a long, extremely powerful oath, declaring the penalty he would wish to incur for having committed incest, of which he has been accused. The context could hardly be more serious, so we may presume that the usage is representative of standard, not innovatory, fifth century thought. He says:

η τάρ’ ὀλοίμην ἀκλεής ἀνώνυμος,
ἀπολις ἄοικος, φυγὰς ἀλτεύων χθόνα,
καὶ μητέ πόντος μητε γη δέξατό μου
σάρκας θανόντος, εἰ κακός πέφυκ' ἄνηρ.

Can Agamemnon then be using ἀκλεής similarly, and ἀγνός as a synonym for ἀνώνυμος? Surely not, for in Hippolytus' oath it is clear that ἀκλεής ἀνώνυμος, 'moral' terms, are equal in weight to ἀπολις ἄοικος; and if you are without a city or a home, it is an unequivocal κακόν. To be without fame or reputation is also, therefore, an unequivocal κα-κόν.18) Is Agamemnon really implying that he envies a man in possession of κακός? This would indeed merit the Old Man's charge of madness at 42! Such extrapolation may, perhaps, be going too far beyond the texts.

If we consider the second Euripidean occurrence of ἀκλεής, at Her 623, it comes in the familiar double-negative con-struction οὸδ’ ἀκλεής, and refers to Macaria's heroic sacri-fice. It is possible that οὸδ’ ἀκλεής here means 'not without fame', but this construction often indicates understate-

18) Cf. S. El 1082-4: οὐδείς τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ / κακός εὐκλείμων αἰσχον-
 ναὶ θέλει / νόμυμος for a more traditional configuration of the relevant value terms.
ments: 'not without fair-fame'; that is, 'very famous'. A parallel, conveniently using ἀγνῶς, the other disquieting term, can be found at Pindar i. 1.12, όνω ἀγνῶς. Further examples of ἠκλεής, in the form of the adverb ἠκλεῶς, are to be found at Or 786 (ἀνανδόρον ἠκλεῶς καταθανείν) and Rh 752, 761. The Orestes instance clearly matches the moral loading of ἀνανδόρον with that of ἠκλεῶς, and I can see no way of escaping the conclusion that ἠκλεής is treated by Euripides not merely as the privative of εὐκλεής, but as its moral opposite. The same arguments can be extended to ἀγνῶς and ἀκίνδυνον βίον. The idea of the dangerous life bringing greatest glory has its literary origins in Achilles' choice and occurs frequently in Pindar, 19) and although ἀγνῶς in tragedy perhaps tends to be morally neutral, meaning 'unknown', 20) it can hardly fail to attract the moral loading of the other two terms here.

Perhaps it might be said that these lines characterize vividly Agamemnon's disturbed state of mind in the prologue: he is so anxious to save his daughter that he defies moral norms of living καλῶς. Two counter arguments can be adduced: firstly, Agamemnon's character throughout the play which, although indecisive, is consistent in being pulled between family ties and ambition. For example, I see no reason to regard as untruthful Menelaus' account of his brother's rise to leadership at 337-48, which hinges on the family loyalty/power conflict, nor 357. After all, Agamemnon's defence does not deny Menelaus' charges, although it does tell us that his brother's self-righteous stand is as unwholesome as his own position of power. Furthermore, when Agamemnon hears from the First Messenger that Iphigeneia has arrived he acts, after his initial outburst at 442-5, in the customary style of contradicting an accepted norm. His reflection begins (446):

19) E.g. 0.1.81, 5.16-18, 6.9-11.
20) E.g. Ion 14, the only other Euripidean instance, Phil 1008, Ant 1001, OT 681, Cho 677, A. Sup 993.
balancing δυσγένεια against τι χρήσιμον; in other words, he is not asserting that δυσγένεια is entirely χρήσιμος. He then goes on to elucidate his contention, a common Euripidean pattern.21 There is no suggestion that Agamemnon envies his social inferiors in anything more major than the freedom to lament at will.

The second argument follows from the last. When Euripides wishes to question values he does so deliberately and clearly. Compare, for instance, the climax of Iphigeneia's appeal to Agamemnon, καλῶς ζῆν κρείσσον ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν (1252). This has been prepared for as far back as 1218-9, which is picked up at 1250. In addition, it is worth noting that the traditional values prevail upon Iphigeneia in the end (1375-6).

The ethos of lines 16-19 was obviously quite acceptable in later antiquity. Stobaeus quotes them, as does Alexander Aphrodisiensis.22 Their approval need not necessarily have stemmed from a Christian bias towards an worldly, spiritual life; but I am convinced that the lines are totally anomalous in Euripides.

While on the subject of lines 16-19, I should like to comment upon their extraordinary construction. I cannot find another tragic parallel for the expression, 'I envy you more than I envy me', apart from line 677 of this play, much less for the formula that we have here: 'I envy you (that is 'the inglorious') and/but I envy those in honor (that is 'me') less'. Stobaeus' reading, ἂοσον ἐπαυνῶ, may not merely be a characteristic misquotation therefore, but an effort to make the sentiment more lucid, unless by chance he preserved the correct reading.23 But this is doubtful. Turning to 677,

21) Cf. Med 579-83, 1089-1104, Hip 186-8, 424-5, 664-6, Sup 1101-3, Her 299-301, etc. On the contradicting of maxims as a rhetorical device, see Arist. Rhet 1395 a-b.

22) Stobaeus 4.16.4 (Hense); Alex. Aphr. see Murray's app. crit.

23) Parallels for ἐπαυνῶ: And 456, 866, Al 553-4. None of these is adequate, since only the first can conceivably mean ζηλοῦν, and none is a contrast between two individuals. The last two and Hip 264 contain contrasts between types of behaviour, rather than between people. Hip 264 is the only example which approaches the generality of our passage. None mix generality with particularity as does IA 16-19.

See Hense in RE 9. 2575ff. for Stobaeus' access to reliable sources.
we find:

ζηλῷστὰμᾶλλονἡμὲντοὶμηδὲνφονεῖν.

Unusual certainly, but not, I think, uncomfortable in *ethos* or formulation. Could the avant garde poet of the anapaests have been inspired to emulate 677 in a misguided attempt to improve upon the idea there?

As I remarked earlier, the suspicions aroused by lines 16-19 are heightened by τὸκαλὸνκαὶτὸφιλότιμον. τὸκαλὸν is purely Euripidean; never found in the other two tragedians. When it occurs it is always in a well defined context, even at *Sup* 300 (its most difficult instance), where it refers to the moral status that Aithra would lose by not protecting the Suppliants. The employment at 300 is prepared for by the more normal ἐίπωτὶ...σοὶτεκαὶπόλεικαλὸνat 293. In general, τὸκαλὸνtends to be clarified in antithesis with τὸμῆκαλὸν, or implied equivalent.24) It is never used in its full abstract sense of 'all that is good, beautiful and noble' without careful preparation, as at *Hec* 600-2:

έχειγεμέντοικαὶτὸδρεσθήναικαλῶς
δίδαξινἐσθλοῦ.τοῦτοδ’ἡντὶςἐκμάθη,
οἴδεντὸγ’αἴσχρόν,κανὸντὸκαλὸνμαθῶν.

καλῶςandἐσθλοῦprepareforτὸκαλὸνat 602; and this general sentiment is itself the climax of a long reflection upon φύσιςandνόμοςwhich is brimming over with value terms under consideration: ἐσθλὸςtwice,χρηστὸςtwice,κακὸς,κακὴthreetimes,andonηνοῦςonce,allinsevenlines(592-8).

In contrast, τὸκαλὸνat *IA* 20 is sprung upon us suddenly. As with δίκαιον, we must conclude that it has either a special point or is used carelessly and ineffectively. τοῦτοδὲγ’ἔστὶντὸκαλὸνσφαλερόνat line 21 immediately tells us that the latter is true, for the passage may be paraphrased as follows: *Old Man*. All that is good, noble and beautiful is there in life (!) *Ag*. But this noble thing at least, is unstable... The two usages of καλὸνare dissimilar and no point

is made by their juxtaposition (unless it could be Agamemnon's lack of moral awareness).

The loose employment of τὸ μαλὸν at line 20 is underlined by the phrase ἐνταῦθα βίου, which is very awkward. I fail to see how τὸ μαλὸν can be limited by an idea less abstract, such as βίος (this would be construing τὸ μαλὸν with βίου); yet presumably the Old Man is not implying that τὸ μαλὸν can be acquired somewhere beyond life (this is taking βίου closely with ἐνταῦθα). The superfluity of the second rendering and the inappropriateness of the first give further indication that the writer of the anapaest was either incompetent, or did not belong to the classical era.

Τὸ φιλότιμον appears to be thematic in the Iphigeneia at Aulis, as it occurs twice (385, 520) and φιλοτιμία once (527), while its only other occurrences in Euripides are at Pho 567 and Sup 907 (if the latter is genuine). England remarks that in Euripides it means 'ambitious', 'ambition' and is pejorative; but that it later comes to signify 'distinguished', 'distinction'. It certainly is the simplest solution to Sup 907 to regard it as interpolated; and in our passage at 22, it enhances our doubt about the lines' ethos.

I shall now examine lines 385-7 with close reference to 20-22. Like Page, I cannot feel that 385-7 are spurious on Wecklein's grounds that τὸ λελογισμένον is too similar a formulation to τὸ χρησον (1017), τὸ κείνου βουλόμενον (1270) and τὸ τῆς θεοῦ φίλον (747), all in suspicious circumstances. Besides Page's point that λελογισμένοι (922), λελογισμένως (1021) and ἐξελογίσω (1409) appear in innocent surroundings and so balance out Wecklein's objections to the article-phrases, the context seems to me to require 385-7 for continuity of thought. To my mind, however, the most inter-


26) N. Wecklein, Iphigenie in Aulis (Leipzig/Berlin 1914). Referred to henceforth by the author's name.

27) Other reasons for supporting the lines: 1) the topical Euripidean pleasure/virtue contrast (cf. Hip 380ff.); 2) the lines form a customary gnomic climax, a feature of rhetoric, especially in tragedy; 3) rationality and ambition versus love is an important thematic tension.
esting feature here is the juxtaposition of τὸ καλὸν and τὸ φιλότιμον, which is highly significant, since these two expressions occur only here and at 20-22 in the Iphigeneia at Aulis, while τὸ φιλότιμον itself is confined to our passages within the entire Euripidean corpus. Both τὸ καλὸν and τὸ φιλότιμον are characteristically elucidated (not left as bare abstractions) by the pleasure/virtue contrast at 386-7 and τοῦμόν at 385. As has been mentioned, however, in the case of τὸ καλὸν at 20 - and which can be extended to include τὸ φιλότιμον at 2228) - elucidation is lacking. In addition, καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον or τὸ τὲ φιλότιμον is superfluous, as Bothe felt.

Drawing a few threads together from this discussion, there appears to be heavy dependence at 16-23 on sound passages later in the play: 1) for the original idea of 'I envy you more than me', compare 677; 2) for Agamemnon's discontent with his social status, compare 446-9; 3) for the juxtaposition of τὸ καλὸν and τὸ φιλότιμον, compare 385-7; and it may be worth noting that a later writer need not necessarily have read τὸ φιλότιμον as 'ambition' at 385, but indeed as 'distinction', which is its meaning at 22. Even if the idea seems far-fetched that one man, having read and digested Euripides' unfinished work, should then have composed the anapaests, including lines 16-23, incorporating reminiscences of different passages of the original text, it seems still more implausible that Euripides botched potentially valuable material so badly.

Several larger but equally disturbing questions arise out of the general ethos of the anapaests. The first has been touched upon already: can a master (and a great king) hold this type of intimate conversation with a servant or slave? Secondly, how suitable to the tragic genre is Agamemnon's almost neurotic state?29) Has he the dignity that is neces-

28) Although we perhaps do not require elucidation, since it doubles for τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν.

29) Cf. δίοσῳ 12; his ludicrous behaviour over the writing tablets, as described by the Old Man at 34-42.
sary for us to sympathise with his dilemma; the dignity that all kings in tragedy possess, unless they are unambiguously villainous, like Lycus in the *Hercules* or Polymestor in *Hecuba*? Furthermore, does he behave with this lack of restraint later in the play? And thirdly, following closely from the last issue raised: how suitable is an anapaestic dialogue, which even incorporates the highly emotional lyric *metra* that we find (for example) in Phaedra's feverish dialogue in the *Hippolytus*, for two men, especially when one is a king and the action has yet to commence? Is this possible in fifth century tragedy?

Taking the second question - Agamemnon's lack of dignity - to begin with, I should like to turn to 136-7 which provides a convenient illustration. In response to the Old Man's criticism of his actions, Agamemnon cries:

οἰμοι, γνώμας ἔξέσταν,
ἀίαὶ, πίπτω δ' εἰς ἄταν.

Willink seems to think that this reaction is 'characteristic' and compares 1132-6. I fail to see the resemblance, since 1132-6 displays the restraint and hints of disaster that are the hallmark of the highly original and effective scene between the king and his daughter. At 136-7 the οἰμοι, followed a line later by ἀία, the extravagance of the ideas of 'standing out of one's mind' and 'falling into ἄτη', and the cumulative effect of the parallel constructions, seem to me to be more appropriate to an antiphonal dirge (such as at the close of the *Persae*, performed with the Chorus) than to the situation here, which is not completely lost.

There are other objections against these two lines. Consider ἄτη, for example, which does not recur during the *Iphigenia at Aulis* as we have it. This in itself could hardly be called suspicious. Six other Euripidean plays contain only a single instance: *El* 1307, *Hcld* 607, *Al* 91, *Hec* 688, *And* 103 and *Ion* 1240. Of these, *Hec* 688, *Ion* 1240 and *Al* 91 refer to

30) It might be argued that Polymestor gains some stature at the end of the play, but this is totally dissimilar and fully consonant with Euripides' dramatic technique.
especially momentous deaths.\textsuperscript{31} \textsc{El} 1307 and \textit{And} 103 are traditional usages: δτη πατέρων of the House of Atreus (cf. also \textsc{S. El} 215), and the equation of Helen to δταν τινά; while \textit{Hcld} 607 meaning 'disaster' refers also to specific deaths, those of all the Heracleidae with Iolaus and Alcmeone (combined with defeat for the Athenians) weighed in the scale against Macaria's own self-sacrifice. It is hardly conceivable that δτη at \textsc{IA} 137 is used with reference to the curse of the House of Atreus, a theme which seems to have no importance in the play (this is taking δτη as a traditional usage), and even less likely that Agamemnon is saying 'I am falling to death' (specific usage).\textsuperscript{32} Once again, the charge of loose writing is inescapable; a strongly suggestive word is employed without sensitivity for its full potential. And Agamemnon is thus presented uttering an almost meaningless lament.

Perhaps despite all this, he retains enough dignity in his reflections at 16ff. and 161ff., and in his orders to the Old Man at 139ff., to convince the audience of his regal status and to be consistent with his character later in the play. Alas, no. In his orders, at least, he is unnecessarily loquacious, a trait totally inconsistent with his later speeches, which are invariably shorter than those of his opponents;\textsuperscript{33} and, in my opinion, his reflections are either

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Hec} 688 to Polymestor's; \textit{Ion} 1240 to death by stoning after the attempt on Ion's life; \textsc{Al} 91 to Alcestis' voluntary sacrifice.

\textsuperscript{32} I do not object to the expression πίπτω εἰς δταν in other circumstances. \textit{Hip} 241 (e.g.): έπεσον δαίμονος δτη is perfectly acceptable, contributing to the theme of Phaedra's divinely inspired passion. (Other instances in \textit{Hip} are 276, 1149, 1289.) \textit{Troades} uses δτη frequently within a thematic network of the destruction of Troy. But when δτη occurs only once in a Euripidean play, it has a traditional or specific reference-point, which is lacking in the \textit{IA}. Note also the δτη chain in \textit{Medea} (129, 279, 979, 988), which focusses upon the ruin of the 'royal family', reaching a climax with the metrically prominent 979, 988. From this angle, 129 and 279 may be seen as referring both to Medea and to Creon's household. 279, in particular, gains a tremendously sinister impact from this ambiguity.

\textsuperscript{33} Note the preferences for brevity and silence which he expresses at 378, 400, 683 and 1144.
anomalous and disturbing, or, as Bain puts it, 'incredibly trite'. 34)

Proceeding from the idea that the presentation of Agamemnon in the anapaests is inconsistent with his later character, and inappropriate for a king in fifth century tragedy, I come now to my third question, 'How suitable are anapaests, before the action has commenced, for a dialogue between two men, especially when one is a king?' Social values and norms are again of relevance. Agamemnon himself tells us that his birth prevents him from being able δακρούσαν δαδίως... / ἡμαντὰ τ’ εἰπεῖν (447-8), and Sophocles' Electra, plus the λόγος/ἐργον contrast ubiquitous in tragedy, press the point home that men were supposed to act, not talk. If we consider this further, from the angle of form and content - how the significance of any passage is reinforced by its form - the most reasonable conclusion is the most disturbing; that by composing the opening dialogue in anapaests which may even be melic, the poet has actually emphasised Agamemnon's unmanly inability to act, by using a poetic form removed from the iambics of conventional tragic discourse. 35) Are other dramatists (and Euripides) aware of this nicety? Let us glance at some instances of anapaests and lyrics, in the mouths of male characters.

In Aeschylus, we have Xerxes' lyric lament with the Chorus. He has been destroyed by his rash war, and his dignity is minimal; 36) he is no longer in a position to act. Prometheus uses anapaests on three occasions (93ff., 136ff., 1040ff.), on the second of which his calmer anapaests contrast with the Chorus' lyrics. Because he is bound, he is prevented from physical action. Physical incapacity is also important in the Trachiniae, Oedipus at Colonus and Philoctetes,

34) 'Anomalous and disturbing', 16-23 (see above); and 24-27, which I shall come to later. 'Incredibly trite', Bain, p. 123, on lines 161-3.

35) This argument assumes that, as the 'words' are 'action', especially in Greek drama, any departure from normal 'words' (i.e. iambic trimeter) towards lyric metre conveys a shift away from 'action'.

36) Compare the tattered clothes symbol.
where Heracles, Oedipus and Philoctetes participate in ana-
paestic and/or lyric interchanges. In Sophocles' *Electra*,
Orestes, the man of action *par excellence*, never departs from
iambics even when his sister greets him lyrically at 1232ff. 
Other examples of men participating in lyrics and anapaests
are to be found regularly at moments of despair, when the
hero is crushed; \(^{37}\) and lyrics of a 'religious' nature are
sung by Orestes in the *Choephoroi* and by Ion. None of these
examples can adequately support the use of anapaestic dia-
logue in the opening scene of the *Iphigenia at Aulis*. And
none, in my opinion, raises the question of dramatic and
character consistency that arise from the form employed
here.

Thus, to recapitulate, the anapaests must be considered
highly problematic on the grounds of *ethos*; and they betray
themselves in the use of value terms and their underlying
social assumptions, and in their dissociation of form from
content, as being composed by a lesser, later writer than
Euripides.

At several points in the anapaests we come across
strained imagery which seems very mannered and akin to the
ineffective usages of rare words and odd constructions. The
first of these occurs at lines 4-5:

\[
\text{μάλα τοι γῆρας τούμην ἀυπνον}
\text{καὶ ἐπ' ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄξον πάρεστιν.}
\]

Willink comments on lines 1-5 that 'the exchange is already
strikingly Euripidean, especially in the characterisation
and elegant idiom of 4-5'. He does not, however, explain
this viewpoint, and paraphrases the lines: 'My old age is
sleepless, and my eyes are keen'. This avoids the difficulty
of ὄξος, which, applied to 'old age', gives an exceptionally
curious metaphor: 'My old age is very wakeful and is present
sharp (or sharply) upon my eyes'. \(^{38}\) All other instances of

\(^{37}\) E.g., Ajax's first appearance, where the Chorus and Tecmessa,
interestingly, respond in iambics; compare the end of Euripides' *Electra*.

\(^{38}\) The other rendering of the lines, with ὄξον as subject of πάρεστιν
is even more bizarre. There is an adverbial usage of ὄξον in Collard's
*Supplement* (see note 53), but this is not a parallel.
δέξως in Euripides mean, as is normal, either 'sharp' or 'shrill', with the possible exception of Hcld 290 (μᾶλα δ' δέξως Ἀρης ὀ Μυηναί(ων)), where, however, the notion of sharp blades lies close to the surface.

To make matters worse, old age in tragedy is a theme with stock characteristics: bad temper, intelligence and its lack, weakness, stubbornness; it is almost always considered hard to bear. For some reason or other, the three great tragedians do not depart from these stock traits in the extant plays; and I very much doubt if they would have introduced the novel idea of keen-sighted old age without a well defined dramatic reason. There is no reason in the Iphigeneia at Aulis that can even be imagined, let alone well defined. And, lastly, when γήρας is accompanied by a concrete adjective (such as δέξως) in Euripides, that adjective invariably enunciates a stock characteristic: πυρὸν at fr 282, βαρύ at Al 672, λυγρόν (and φθονερόν) at Her 649; and δυσπάλαιστον at Sup 1108.

The second strained metaphor appears in the reflection at 24-27, which is perhaps alien to Euripidean thought in any case, in its antithesis of 'gods' and 'γνωμαί', both wrecking the prosperity of great men from time to time. διακναίω is not a common word, and we can have no reason to imagine that it was a 'dead' metaphor. It occurs absolutely in the passive voice in both Aeschylus and Euripides (Al 109, Med 164, Ag 65) and with a dative agent at Prom 94 and 540. In the active voice, it is unique to Euripides - at El 1307 and Hcld 296. The example at Hcld 296 is used much as though it were passive: the Chorus, speculating on what report the Herald will bring to Eurystheus, imagine that he

39) Hcld 290, Cyc 401, IT 785 (= IA 1566), Or 1530.
40) Old age: bad temper, Ba 1251-2, And 727-8, Or 490; intelligence (contradicting the 'norm' of stupidity), Pho 528-30, And 645-6, Ant 280-1, OC 930-1; intelligence and weakness, Ion 742, And 756, Phil 96-99, Ag 584; weakness and stupidity, Ag 75-82, 584, Eum 38, Her 111-2, 229, And 687, 745-6, Ba 251-2, Pho 1722, OC 1235-8.
41) φθονερόν being Wilamowitz's conjecture for φόνερον.
42) αθανασίς and μυρίος μόρχθους, respectively.
will have been badly treated and παρά μικρόν / ψυχήν ἢλθεν διακαίσας. The expression διακαίσας ψυχήν clearly connotes physical violence, as the Chorus fear the worst that the Herald could relate - the violation of his diplomatic immunity. The instance at Electra 1307, however, is more abstract. There, the Dioscuri announce that μία... ἀτη πατέ-ρων has destroyed (διέκαλσεν) both Orestes and Electra. The metaphor is aided by the personification latent in ἀτη; there seems to be no awkwardness here.

But what of γνῶμαι πολλαὶ / καὶ δυσάρεστοι 'scraping away' or 'shattering into pieces' the lives of great men (Ἀ 26-27)? I can find only one example of γνῶμαι as the subject of a concrete verb, within a metaphor, and that is Philoctetes 432:

アルバム καὶ σοφαὶ / γνῶμαι ... ἐμποδίζονται θαμᾶ.

Perhaps this is sufficient to parallel our passage; but I feel that the importance in the action of plans failing, and the comparative ease of the idea of complex plans 'tripping themselves up', differentiate the Philoctetes instance completely from Ἀ 24-27. For here, plans do not merely destroy themselves, but 'scrape away' or 'shatter' someone's life, and their importance in the action is minimal.

I mentioned Agamemnon's flowery letter earlier in connection with rare diction such as κολπώδης and ἄκλυσταν (120-1). I shall now adduce other diverse criticisms of its language. To begin with a caveat: I do not think that we are in a position to argue that anapaests are an unsuitable vehicle for conveying the contents of a letter (although I personally find this uncomfortable, especially when the anapaests are lyric), since data is lacking. We can, however, argue that some of the wording is unsuitable, in particular Ἄ Λήδας ἦρνος (116) and τάν σάν ἴνιν (119). Both ἦρνος and ἴνις are highly poetical words, unlike (e.g.) παῖς. Out of ten usages of ἦρνος in Euripides, six are literal, meaning 'shoots', and one is found in a simile of ivy clinging to laurel shoots, where poetic mileage is made out of the
metaphorical meaning. 43) Seven out of ten occur in lyrics. When the metaphorical use falls in iambics (twice: Tro 766 and Ba 1306), there appear to be convincing reasons. At Tro 766, Andromache calls Helen Ὄν τον δόξειν ἔφυος (οὕποι' ἐλ ἀτος) in an emotional apostrophe, while at Ba 1306, Cadmus is referring to his grandson, Pentheus, in dialogue with the newly-sane Agaue: τῇς σῆς τόδ' ἔφυος, ὧ τάλανα, νη- δύνς. 44) As for ἧνος, it has five occurrences in Euripides, all of which have lyric contexts, apart from Tro 571 (anapaests). 45) Its usage suggests that it constitutes a very dignified form of address, since three out of five cases refer to Heracles. Of the other two dramatists, only Aeschylus employs it, 46) thus reinforcing our belief that it is highly poetical. In Agamemnon's letter, ἔφυος and ἧνος follow each other within the space of four words; while in the text, even after the Old Man's interruption, they are still remarkably close together. Once more our poet seems to be striving for purely superficial effect.

I should also like to raise a slight objection to the address, Λήδας ἔφυος. Of course, this is not an isolated example of an offspring being called its mother's, but it is interesting to note that, among numerous Euripidean examples of the phrase μας τίνος, only two (in the Bacchae, both referring to Pentheus as Agaue's son 47) refer to the child by use of the mother's name. In Sophocles this happens three times (El 1395, Tra 19, 98) for excellent dramatic reasons; 48) while in Aeschylus the children mentioned spring from elemental personifications, except at Ag 1040 and Sup

43) At Med 1213, describing how Creon is unable to tear himself from his daughter's poisoned robe.
44) In addition to the strength of the context, fertility is an important theme in the play.
45) And 797, Her 1182, 354, Ba 1174, Tro 571.
46) Ag 717, Eum 324, Sup 44, 251.
47) Ba 517, 1309; and we should add Ba 1306 mentioned above. Note also E. El 933-5 in this context.
48) The measure of Zeus' involvement is intentionally unstressed.
171, where the father is, as in the Sophoclean instances, Zeus. My objection, however, cannot be pressed too far, as Leda seems to be a special case in Euripides. She is frequently named in connection with Helen, and three times as the mother of Clytemnestra. Perhaps this address is another echo of the Agamemnon (914, Aeschylus' only mention of Leda - Sophocles has none)? But surely Euripides would not have undercut the actual quotation of Ag 914 in the effectively reworked scene of the meeting of husband and wife (686), by using a half-baked recollection here.

While on the subject of addressing people, I should like to sidestep (legitimately, I hope) to the Old Man's irritating habit of tagging 'Αγάμεμλον αναξ / βασιλεῖ on to the end of his sentences (lines 3, 13, 43, 140), or at line endings (133), or both (140, 43, and 13 - a whole anapaestic metron); something which happens too frequently for comfort also in the first messenger speech. It is hard to escape the inference that the writer (or writers) of these passages used the device as a convenient line-filler, especially since the Iphigeneia at Aulis contains eight cases of the phrase 'Αγάμεμλον αναξ in contrast with its nearest two rivals (Troades and IT), which have only two; and since the invaluable Concordance shows that Euripides uses this form of address no more than four times in any other play.

To sum up the discussion so far, it seems clear from these examples that the writer of the anapaests indulges in

49) Ag 1040, Sup 171, 305, 901, Prom 18, Eum 16, 1033.

50) Addresses to Helen: Hel 616, 1680 and in apostrophe at Or 1386; to Clyt.: IA 686, 1106, 1344. In IA 827, 856 and IT 210, Clyt. is referred to, but not addressed as the daughter of Leda. Note that 1106, again in suspicious circumstances, reuses Aeschylus' memorable Μήρας γένεθλον.

51) Lines 414, 431, 436. Note especially 414, which constitutes the highly irregular mid-line entry.

52) Note particularly the instances at 1547, 1573, 1619, extremely dubious passages; and also in the speech of Achilles, which may be interpolated at some points, 950, 961. Other references which seem reasonably secure: 828, 869. Admittedly, Agamemnon appears only in the IA.

much looser composition than Euripides. This criticism can also be extended from his use of language to his inability to create logical or conceptual progress within the passage.

I have already mentioned the superabundance of inconsequential detail which is not later utilised in the play; for instance, the astronomy at 6ff. and, particularly, the Old Man's projected journey at 141ff., which is crammed with unrealised, vivid pictorial information. At three points this conceptual redundancy is emphasised by lack of logical continuity. The first occasion is at 28ff. England objected to the lack of continuity in σοῦ δὲ at line 34. This example is symptomatic. I paraphrase as follows: 'You shouldn't complain about your situation like this, Agamemnon. The gods, whether you like it or not, have decreed that you must be happy as well as sad. But you have spread light around, and are writing...' At 'but you', we expect to hear how Agamemnon is contravening the gods' decree of the mutability of joy and sorrow; that is, we should now hear that he is incessantly sorrowful or (less likely in context), constantly joyful. σοῦ δὲ is a standard formula for focusing a general reflection upon a particular case, especially when a norm is contradicted,54) or for directing attention from one person to another.55) At ἸΑ 34, the pronoun plus δὲ performs neither of these offices unless, conceivably, we are meant to understand 'But you are constantly sorrowful' from the extraordinary and verbose description of Agamemnon changing his mind over the writing tablets. This is just within the bounds of possibility, but is puzzlingly unclear for a device which is used normally to articulate logical thought progression.

The second passage which I find particularly inconsequential is at 124-37. The Old Man asks Agamemnon how Achilles will react to losing his bride. Agamemnon replies in exceed-
ingly strange language, that Achilles is in the dark about the whole affair. Given the importance of Achilles' offence at his name being used without his permission later in the play, we might reasonably expect the author to drop a hint at this point by making the Old Man respond, 'You were certainly taking a dangerous liberty in using Achilles' name without his consent', or 'in doing this behind Achilles' back'. But no, the Old Man has forgotten Achilles' anger (124) completely, and is now more interested in the deception practised upon Iphigeneia. Again, it is possible to argue these objections away, by expanding the Old Man's words to convey: 'You dared a dreadful deed by using Achilles' name in order to sacrifice your daughter for the Greeks'; but that is not what he says. And what is the ἄτη into which Agamemnon thinks he is falling? Incurring Achilles' wrath? Incurring the wrath of the gods as the slayer of his child? This is not clear either, although I hope that I showed earlier that Euripides does not employ ἄτη without a specific reference point.

The last lines with which I shall take issue are 161ff., which previous scholars have criticised on the grounds of banality. The maxim here is indeed 'trite',56) but that in itself is an insufficient objection; some gnomic clichés (such as S. El 1171-3) are extraordinarily effective. What is more disturbing is that it appears to have no immediate connection with the preceding lines. Agamemnon has not gradually reached a resigned stance, but suddenly he acquires one at line 161; up to 160 he is as agitated as ever. Nor can the thought arise with propriety from οὐλλαβε μόχθων (although these four lines would form an internally consistent quotation), for it is ludicrous if Agamemnon should apply his gnome to the Old Man's forthcoming journey. Lines 161-3 dangle insecurely at the end of the anapaests, connected by the tenuous thread of some kind of ring composition (as far as I can see) with the sentiment at 28-32. And if this is, in fact, the case, Agamemnon has been converted

56) Bain, p. 123.
to the Old Man's view at 28-32 without displaying the slightest sign to the audience that he is not as discontented as before. It looks strongly as though the writer was motivated by line 160 to add an impressive-sounding generalisation to round off his work, with only the most superficial regard for consistency. 57)

Many of the points that I have mentioned in this discussion of the general style, tone and ethos of the anapaests only scratch the surface of such problems in this extremely dubious passage. I hope, however, that they validly extend the already weighty and diverse case for the prosecution against the few, idiosyncratic pleas of the defenders. It is to this end that my paper is devoted.

Churchill College,
Cambridge University

57) It is almost certain that we have a similar case (on a larger scale) at the close of the OT. See R.D. Dawe's acute observations in Studies on the Text of Sophocles I (Leiden 1973) 268-73.