

## THE IPHIGENEIA AT AULIS: THE PROLOGUE ANAPAESTS

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This paper will examine the anapaests of the prologue of the *Iphigeneia at Aulis* more or less in isolation from the iambics. Separating the two sections is a somewhat artificial procedure since it involves not only dissecting an area which is tightly-knit, even if the unity is purely formal, but also, as Page puts it in the last sentence of *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*,<sup>1)</sup> 'reducing to fragments the structure which Euripides and he [the interpolator] had built'; nevertheless it is manifestly desirable from an academic viewpoint that any new argument for or against the authenticity of the lines should be brought forward.

My approach will be stylistic, in a broad sense. Consequently, neither the arrangement of the prologue, nor such hoary problems as the much-debated lack of consistency between lines 106-7 and 124ff. will be dwelled upon. Secondly, I shall not focus upon the unresolved and apparently unresolvable issues of, for instance, the construction  $\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\mu\theta\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$  (44) and the exceedingly uncomfortable language at 130ff. In these instances the case for the prosecution is well stated by Page, Bain and Dr. Diggle,<sup>2)</sup> and I shall confine myself to mentioning them briefly before the main discussion.

1) D.L. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1934) 216. Referred to throughout this paper by the author's name.

2) D. Bain, "The Prologues of Euripides' *Iphigeneia at Aulis*" *CQ* 27 (1977) 10-26, a very helpful survey, referred to henceforth as Bain. J. Diggle, review of G. Mellert-Hoffmann, *Untersuchungen zur Iphigenie in Aulis des Euripides*, in *CR* 21 (1971) 178-80.

Instead, I should like to concentrate upon the general *ethos* of the anapaests, which will entail studying value terminology; then I shall consider some phrases and imagery which I feel to be both ineffective and inappropriate; and finally I shall discuss the apparent lack of logical or even conceptual progression in both sections of the anapaests.

Firstly then, some introductory remarks about the transmitted order of the prologue. I am not convinced that lines 1ff. can stand at the beginning of a Euripidean play. δόμων τῶνδε παροιθεν is 'technically improper' and 'uninformative', as C.W. Willink<sup>3)</sup> admits, unless the identity of these δόμοι was clearly indicated by the *skene*, an assumption which points more to later than to classical technique.<sup>4)</sup> It is, however, a possible if uninspired opening line, in keeping with the general tone of the anapaests which is atmospheric rather than informative. Certain details suggest that the anapaests were written to open a play, for instance, the well-known ingredients of: speaker identification (πρέσβυ 1, 3 is adequate for a minor character like the Old Man); the mention of the setting quite rapidly (10, 14), and of the time of day, which is not obligatory except when the action starts during the night (e.g. Sophocles' *Electra*, the *Agamemnon* and, of course, the *Rhesus*). Such information fits most comfortably at the play's opening and is not really adequately conveyed in the somewhat irrelevant genealogy and legend in the first lines of the iambics.

I would like to be able to adopt the most favoured current critical viewpoint about the form of the prologue: that is, that two self-contained versions were written by two hands and conflated by a third. Unfortunately, however, this seems more neat than satisfactory, mainly because the information conveyed by both parts appears to be independent. My points

3) C.W. Willink, "The Prologue of the Iphigeneia at Aulis" *CQ* 21 (1971) 343-64. Referred to henceforth as Willink.

4) See P. Arnott, *Greek Scenic Conventions* (Oxford 1962) 93ff., and H.C. Baldry, *The Greek Tragic Theatre* (Chatto and Windus, London 1971) 47.

are these: 1) the anapaests initiate themes of later importance, such as Agamemnon's relationship with his brother (85, 97-8) and, more weightily, his dilemma in harmonising strong family feeling with desire for power (84-98). 2) the anapaests fulfil the indispensable function of introducing the Old Man and conveying in detail the first change of mind in the play. I admit that portions of the complete anapaests and iambics which duplicated information could easily have been excised by an editor. But 3), unless his work was done extremely hurriedly, I do not see why the linking passage at 106-14 should contain the contradiction (which cannot just be brushed under the carpet) with 124ff., nor why Tyn-dareus' oath, which is thematically non-existent later in the play, should follow the Old Man's request for information.

Without doubt, some kind of 'scissors and paste' job was performed upon the iambics and the anapaests. I do not wish to discuss this in detail, but it might be worth considering the possibility that Euripides wrote some of the iambics, which were then incorporated into an avant garde prologue, commissioned by the first producers to supply the missing dramatic links.

This hypothesis is obviously as untestable as any other, but my reasons for putting it forward are as follows. Firstly, I am tempted by the thematic considerations mentioned above, to believe that Euripides wrote from line 80 to approximately line 107; line 107 because I think that the three 'villains' of the piece, Odysseus, Calchas and Menelaus, could well do with an earlier mention, and this need is perhaps not one that an editor, rather than the author, would necessarily have perceived. Furthermore, the glaring textual corruption of 105-7 points rather to confusion over a join than to interpolation; whereas the reminiscence of the *Iphigeneia among the Taurians* at 112-3 and the derivative nature of the rest of the patchwork from the anapaests certainly indicate an interpolator at work. My reasons for making line 80 the commencement of Euripides' own writing

are that the greatest stylistic problems are in lines 49-79; and the 'story' there recounted is irrelevant. Secondly, the existence of the contradiction between 106-7 and 124ff. is more plausibly explained by the possibility that the editor(s) wished to keep as much of Euripides' own script as they could without, however, mutilating their brand-new anapaests. And thirdly, these editors may have felt that although the avant garde anapaests were splendid, they themselves ought to make a token gesture towards traditional Euripidean practice, by incorporating a genealogy (and legend) not *totally* unconnected with the topic in hand, to fill out the scanty remains from Euripides' own pen. I am aware that these last two reasons may be felt by some to be rather too 'psychological', but pure rationality was certainly not the inspiration of any persons involved in this operation.<sup>5)</sup>

So much, briefly, for the disharmony of the prologue's structure. If the play were to be performed with the prologue as we have it, which it obviously was in antiquity, I think that we would have to concede that the existing arrangement would 'work', but it seems unclassical and totally un-Euripidean.

Turning now to the internal problems of the anapaests which are generally well-known, we are faced, in the words of A.M. Dale,<sup>6)</sup> by metrical 'licences elsewhere unparalleled in drama' such as: 1) 119, a dimeter ending in ποός; 2) 123, a paroemiac of the form - - - ∪ ∪ ∪ - -, unique because the sequence - ∪ ∪ ∪ - is normally confined to the opening of a line; 3) 122, γὰρ δὴ is oddly positioned. Considerations (2) and (3) lead Dale to accept Verrall's arrangement: εἶς

5) The brevity of this introduction is mainly due to two papers devoted to the prologue and presented at the Cambridge Greek Seminar 1977-78 before my paper, by Richard Hunter (an overview) and by John Wilkins (a study of the iambs). I am greatly indebted to them, as well as to the Cambridge Greek Seminar for their comments on this paper. - Bain provides a useful summary of critical differences over the prologue.

6) A.M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1968) 50.

ἄλλας γὰρ δὴ παιδός / δαίσομεν ὄρας ὑμεναίους.<sup>7)</sup> It is difficult, however, to accept that such oddities should be treated as ordinary emendable problems, especially as their existence gains indirect confirmation from the divided anapaestic *metra* at 2, 3, 16, 140, and 149.<sup>8)</sup> I am not impressed by Willink's 'exact parallel' at *Rh* 16 as a confirmation of Euripidean authorship. That argument works both ways; and *Tra* 977-8, while proving that the licence has a classical, formal parallel, is completely dissimilar in its context of hushed, tense expectation. Sophocles seems to have been innovating with a serious dramatic purpose, whereas our writer used the device (if it may be so called) without any significance that I can perceive. For instance, should we argue that the split *metra* connote haste and anxiety, as is possible at 2, 3, 140 and 149, the example at line 16 then appears to be used loosely; for Agamemnon is hardly going to rush into a general reflection after the sense pause following *στείχωμεν ἔσω* with the same haste and anxiety as when summoning the Old Man from the hut, or sending him on his mission. This is a slight criticism perhaps, but one that Euripides would not have incurred.

About individual examples of rare or so-called nontragic words there will never be agreement. For instance, Page points out that *καλονουγεῖν* is very rare, only here (2 and 838) in poetry until Antiphanes. Willink, on the other hand, remarks that it 'seems securely authentic'. Assuming that it is rare, even coined (although this cannot be proved), one might feel that, firstly, it would have been placed more prominently (as indeed at line 838, where Achilles is dumbfounded by Clytemnestra's revelation that he is supposed to be betrothed to Iphigeneia) rather than at the opening of a play, where it could have little meaningful emphasis;

7) Probably attributable rather to Herwerden (Bain, p. 22, note 62). Bain also comments that the licences may be acceptable since they occur in *lyric* anapaests.

8) An even more unusual divided paroemiac. Parallels at Willink, p. 360: *Tra* 977 and *Rh* 561. The latter is doubtful. Compare W. Ritchie, *The Authenticity of the Rhesus of Euripides* (Cambridge 1964) 292.

and secondly, that any instances of such rare diction should bear some thematic weight. It seems to me unlikely that *καὶ-νουργεῖς* at line 2 assists our reception of its recurrence at 838; but this may be a rather subjective opinion.

At line 22 the MSS present us with the unmetrical *καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον*. This is a tricky problem. As with the metrical licences, I feel that simple emendation here is not an adequate answer, although the metrical error here is glaring. Bothe's remedy of deleting the line as a gloss is, as Willink says, 'much the most plausible solution', but plausibility is not a sufficient reason for deletion. Against Nauck's *πρότιμον* there are the problems of its meaning, 'precious', and its apparent absence from the tragic genre. I would choose to keep *τὸ φιλότιμον*, preferring to read with Markland *τό τε φιλότιμον*, which although unparalleled and unpleasant, does form an anapaestic *metron*, while the MSS reading does not. It is possible that a later scribe disliked the proceleusmatic that he found and changed the reading to *καὶ τὸ...* presuming that the iota in *-τιμον* could be short. Another reason why I incline towards retaining *τὸ φιλότιμον* is because I suspect that lines 20-22 are closely related to 385-7, either as their indirect model or their copy. I shall elaborate on this contention later.

*Συννυμφοκόμον* at 48 does not seem problematic in itself, although a *hapax legomenon*. But I do not think that it suits the character of the Old Man to employ original, perhaps recognisably poetic coinages, and I cannot detect the 'irony' that Willink perceives; that is, that the audience can imagine the Old Man accompanying Iphigeneia, as he did her mother, but to a very different wedding ceremony.

Again, the charge of unnecessary employment of unusual diction can be made against *κολπώδη* and *ἀκλύσταν* at 120 and 121. Page informs us that *κολπώδης* appears only here in poetry, as does *ἀλσώδης* (141), which does not recur until Nicander. In isolation, none of these words is objectionable, but we have to ask ourselves if, clustered together in context, they are not rather 'manneristic'. Some more examples

of odd diction, 'poetic' in tone, are τροχαλοῖσιν ὄχοις (146), παραμείβεσθαι (146) and θυμέλας Κυκλώπων (152). These three usages, though obtrusive and uncomfortable, I am prepared to accept. In the first we may allow Agamemnon some licence for his vivid pictorial anticipation of the Old Man's journey. By extension ὄχοι can perhaps denote ἀρμάτων ὄχοι, especially, as Willink argues, in close proximity to ἀπήνη (47); and θυμέλας Κυκλώπων may be, in England's words, 'a picturesque synonym for Mycenae' (see note 25). Similarly we are confronted by σιγαί at 10, which England considers to be of 'poetic beauty', despite (or perhaps because of) the awkwardness of the plural, which can be matched only with Plato *Rep* 425 b 6, where it means 'instances of silence'. Such a meaning is unsuitable here. Willink attempts to support it upon the insecure prop of uncertain emendations by Hermann and Dindorf of a corrupt passage (obelised by Page in the OCT) at *Ag* 412, but this is hardly adequate.

To sum up, the diction here cannot be supported, only accepted as the work of a mannerist writer but probably not the work of Euripides. I shall return to our poet's use of language later.

Grammatically, some passages of the anapaests are highly suspect, such as κοίνωσον μῦθον ἐς ἡμᾶς (44) and the text at 130ff. As I mentioned earlier, I am not reconciled to line 44, but it does not seem to be a case for normal emendation. We may perhaps soothe our sensibilities by arguing that the strained construction was not too harsh for Greek ears; but we cannot so easily dispose of the question, 'Would Euripides have used it?' And what reason can we exercise our imaginations to produce, to account for the unique employment of κείνω in a quasi-reflexive sense at 130? There are also problems here with ἐπισημίζεῖν τιναί τιναί which can perhaps be paralleled by Plato *Laws* 771 d 1 in the sense 'to assign to'.<sup>9)</sup>

9) Page's reference. Willink 357 rewrites:

We may also experience discomfort at 151, where the emendation εἰσόρμα would give Euripides a new word, one which, besides, is found intransitively in the active voice only at *Anth. Pal.* 7.707, according to Page. κλήθρων δ' ἔξορμοις at 149 is an awkward emendation of κλήθρων ἔξορμα, raising the question once more of dissociating superficial corruption from an odd original expression.

Another verb used intransitively in the active voice appears to be πορθμεύει at line 6, in opposition to its normal, transitive Euripidean usage. If we wish to smooth out this irregularity we must change τίς to τί, put the question mark after μεσσήρης (8) and take Σεῖριος to mean, on the authority of Theon of Smyrna,<sup>10</sup> 'any bright star'. If Agamemnon is asking the unlikely question, 'What ferrying is this bright star ferrying, darting near the Pleiades?', he does not receive an answer from the Old Man. Page feels that this is intolerable. England and Willink get around the problem by ascribing all the lines to one speaker only - to Agamemnon and the Old Man respectively - and informing us that these characters are either 'musing' (England of Agamemnon), or 'garrulous' (Willink of the Old Man). This division of speakers, however, is supported neither by the transmitted text nor Ennius' translation, which admittedly is fairly free:

Ag. Quid noctis videtur in altisono  
caeli clipeo?

Sen. Temo superat... etc.<sup>11)</sup>

οὐδέ τι κείνῳ παῖδ' ἐπεφήμισα  
νυμφείους εἰς ἀγκυλῶν  
εὐνάς ἐνδώσειν λέκτροις.

This involves keeping ἐνδώσειν (paralleled in Euripides only at *Cyc* 510), which is supposed to imply 'in more crudely sexual terms' Achilles' 'hypothetical disappointment', thus creating a new meaning for ἐπιφημίζειν τινὰ τινί on the analogy of ἐπιβοᾶν τινὰ τινί: 'to him I uttered an intention of giving my daughter (to him)'; and importing another epic word, ἀγκυλῶν. As Bain remarks (p. 22, note 63), this rewriting is unconvincing.

10) περὶ ἴστρ. 16 (Martin; Page's ref.) which seems to cite this passage. By this change we also correct the astronomical error.

11) J. Vahlen, *Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae* (Leipzig 1928), *Scaenica* 215 [cf. H.D. Jocelyn ad Enn. trag. fr. XCVI. - *Ed.*]

Willink, reading τί and ignoring the astronomical problem, keeps Σείριος as the Dog Star with some highly subjective and dubious arguments from 'hunted dove imagery' and an imaginative association of Sirius, the hunter's dog, with Orion himself, whose constellation is (of course) near the Pleiades. As usual, Willink's solution, reading 6f. τί ποτ' ἄρ' ἄσπῆρ ὄδε πορθημεύει; / Σείριος ... (that is, ἄρα accent-ed with a circumflex to suit the 'Retainer's quasi-jocular attitude of wonderment and protestation') is too elaborate to carry any conviction. It is also based upon the (as yet unproven) assumption that Euripides was the author of this section of the play.

Further oddities in the anapaests should be mentioned. ἕζου plus accusative (141) may be paralleled at *And* 1265-6 according to Willink, and used on the analogy of θάσσω (Page). ἥώς (epic) juxtaposed with Ἀελίου (158) is certainly disturbing and, as Bain points out, cannot be emended to ἰώς with the facility that Willink implies at p. 359. ἐς τέλος (161) too is unusual, meaning 'up to the end'; but it may be possible to take it as 'completely/to completion' if we compare *Hec* 817, its only parallel.

None of the difficulties which I have surveyed here are new, and most continue to rest under grave suspicion. If Euripides was innovating, we owe it to his stature as a playwright to explain the dramatic function of the high proportion of curiosities in the anapaests with respect to the rest of the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*. It is very hard to do this, especially in view of the advances of modern dramatic analysis, which show clearly that the great Attic tragedians do not present audiences with pointless confusion of technical anomaly. Having very briefly mentioned the linguistic problems of the anapaests I shall now turn to their *ethos*.

The first passage I should like to examine is at 45-48. Here the Old Man, in order to convince Agamemnon that he is loyal and trustworthy, says:

πρὸς <δ'> ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν πιστόν τε φράσεις·  
 σῆ γάρ μ' ἀλόχῳ τότε Τυνδάρεως  
 πέμπει φερνήν/ συννυμφοκόμον τε δίκαιον.

This seems very strange, and I can find no parallel instance in tragedy of a slave addressing his master, or any free man, with a self-recommendation couched in these terms. Nowhere does a slave call himself an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός without batting an eyelid: if approbatory value terms are used, they are either traditional or commented upon in typical Euripidean general reflections, which, by their nature, suggest that the author is advancing a controversial opinion. Traditionally acceptable terms for social inferiors are εὖνους, εὖφρων, εὖμενής or πιστός.<sup>12)</sup> Any lack of these qualities makes a slave κακός. Compare *Helēn* 726-7:

κακός γὰρ ὅστις μὴ σέβει τὰ δεσποτῶν  
καὶ ξυγγέγηθε καὶ συνωδίνει κακοῖς.<sup>13)</sup>

When slaves wish to advise or contradict their superiors (something which occurs mainly in Euripides), they need to ask for permission to speak freely, since free speech can only take place among equals.<sup>14)</sup> There is none of the confidentiality between master and servant that we find in New Comedy, even in what would appear to be the most likely relationship, that of the Nurse to Phaedra in *Hippolytus*. It is worth mentioning that here the Nurse eventually prevails upon Phaedra by appealing to her mistress as a suppliant, thereby emphasising her inferiority, rather than addressing her in terms of an equal relationship as is the case in our passage. Of course, it could be argued that the Nurse is pushing Phaedra into a confession that she does not fully wish to make, while the Old Man is responding specifically to Agamemnon's orders; but this is quite unconvincing. It is extremely improbable that social convention (in its strong sense) could be so altered merely because the Old Man feels confident in his request. And how then do we interpret his behaviour at line 866? I shall return to this.

12) εὖνους *Hip* 698, *Hel* 481, *And* 59; εὖφρων *Ag* 263; εὖμενής *Per* 175; πιστός *Hip* 267.

13) Also *Med* 54-55, *Ion* 566, 857-8, *Ba* 1032-3.

14) We have examples of this at *Ba* 668-71, *Hip* 89, *Tra* 52-3 and in the heavily ironical speech of Hecabe to Odysseus at *Hec* 234-7.

Two examples of Euripidean reflections which endow slaves with unusual approbatory value terms are at *Helen* 728-33, which isolates γενναῖοι slaves by implication from all others, using the criterion of 'intelligence' (νοῦς) to make this distinction; and more relevant to our context, *Ion* 854-6:

ἔν γάρ τι τοῖς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει,  
τοῦνομα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων  
οὐδὲν κακίων δοῦλος, ὅστις ἐσθλός ἤ.

This clearly conveys what we expect to hear of fifth century slaves - that they have αἰσχύνη. Euripides, in a characteristic λόγος/ἔργον contrast, is presenting the controversial idea that only their *name* is αἰσχρόν. But our Old Man has no such doubts about his own slavery if he can state that he is an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός rather than, say, a δοῦλος γενναῖος/χρηστός/ἐσθλός.

My objections may be summarised by the following two questions: 1) Can the Old Man refer to himself as ἀγαθός, which has more social overtones of 'nobility' than γενναῖος, χρηστός, or even ἐσθλός, all of which are used occasionally of slaves? And 2) Can he call himself an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός in one breath and in the next (cf. line 866) φερνὴν συννυμφοκόμον, which actually emphasises his lack of freedom, hence his inferiority? I doubt that the social assumption implied by his juxtaposition, that slaves are as much 'men' as free men, could have been passed over without comment by Euripides. δίκαιον at 48 receives the force of criticism (2) even more strongly, accompanying φερνὴν συννυμφοκόμον cheek by jowl, as it does. And is 'justice' relevant here anyway? If the Old Man means that he performed his job as he should have done, is this something for a slave to boast about?

We find δίκαιος used of a servant/mistress relationship at *Tra* 410-2 when the First Messenger is conducting his bizarre cross-examination of Lichas. He snatches up Lichas' δίκαια γάρ (409), meaning approximately 'Of course', which was in answer to the question, 'So you say that this woman is your mistress?', and continues:

τί δῆτα; ποίαν ἀξιοῦς δοῦναι δίκην,  
ἦν εὐρεθῆς ἐς τήνδε μὴ δίκαιος ὢν;

to which Lichas returns in some surprise, πῶς μὴ δίκαιος; Obviously Lichas is already beginning to side-step the Messenger's anticipated accusation. But the important underlying assumption runs somewhat as follows: 'All servants should/must (χρῆ) be trustworthy, loyal, honest (δίκαιος) to their masters and mistresses.' If they are not, after all, then they lose their greatest claim to be good servants. δίκαιος at 48, we must conclude, is either redundant or making a special point. It is conceivable that this point could be ironical (this would have affinities with Willink's interpretation of συννυμφόκομον), as the Old Man later betrays his master to his mistress; but I believe such irony to be far-fetched.

Let us now consider the scene between the Old Man, Clytemnestra and Achilles with reference to the preceding discussion. When the Old Man introduces himself in answer to the question (basically), 'Who are you?', does he reply: 'I am an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός/πιστός/δίκαιος'? No, he modestly admits (858):

δοῦλος, οὐχ ἀβρύνομαι τῷδ'. ἡ τύχη γὰρ οὐκ ἐᾷ.

If τύχη means the chance which has made him a captive,<sup>15)</sup> how do we account for his reversion to a traditional estimation of slavery after his earlier, liberated attitude?<sup>16)</sup> In addition to this, he evidently tries to supplicate Clytemnestra by seizing her hand (866) and he assures her of his goodwill in the most acceptable possible terms; he is εὖνους (867 and 871) especially to Clytemnestra, rather than her husband, because of his longer association with her side of the family (868, 870).<sup>17)</sup>

I do not believe that these passages can possibly be

15) Cf. *Aj* 485-6.

16) This passage rules out the objection to my argument, that the Old Man is more intimate with Agamemnon than with Clytemnestra (or Achilles) and hence that his behaviour towards his mistress is more formal.

17) Compare *Ion* 811-2.

written by one author and, as 865ff. are so clearly Euripidean in tone, I do not see how 45-48 can be attributed to him.

The next relevant passage for this discussion is at 16-23. I am extremely dissatisfied with ἀκίνδυνον, ἀγνώως, ἀκλε-  
 ής and the *ethos* which this usage implies, while τὸ καλὸν γ' ἐνταῦθα βίου and τὸ φιλότιμον (if this should be read) enhance my suspicions. To begin with ἀκλεής: Aeschylus and Sophocles do not employ the word but we do have two examples in Euripides: *Her* 623 and *Hip* 1028. In the latter, Hippolytus swears a long, extremely powerful oath, declaring the penalty he would wish to incur for having committed incest, of which he has been accused. The context could hardly be more serious, so we may presume that the usage is representative of standard, not innovatory, fifth century thought. He says:

ἦ τάρ' ὀλοίμην ἀκλεής ἀνώουμος,  
 ἄπολις ἄοικος, φυγὰς ἀλητεύων χθόνα,  
 καὶ μήτε πόντος μήτε γῆ δέξαιτό μου  
 σάρκας θανόντος, εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ.

Can Agamemnon then be using ἀκλεής similarly, and ἀγνώως as a synonym for ἀνώουμος? Surely not, for in Hippolytus' oath it is clear that ἀκλεής ἀνώουμος, 'moral' terms, are equal in weight to ἄπολις ἄοικος; and if you are without a city or a home, it is an unequivocal κακόν. To be without fame or reputation is also, therefore, an unequivocal κακόν.<sup>18)</sup> Is Agamemnon really implying that he envies a man in possession of κακά? This would indeed merit the Old Man's charge of madness at 42! Such extrapolation may, perhaps, be going too far beyond the texts.

If we consider the second Euripidean occurrence of ἀκλεής, at *Her* 623, it comes in the familiar double-negative construction οὐδ' ἀκλεής, and refers to Macaria's heroic sacrifice. It is possible that οὐδ' ἀκλεής here means 'not without fame', but this construction often indicates understatement.

18) Cf. S. *El* 1082-4: οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ζῶν / κακῶς εὐκλειαν ἀτοχῶ-  
 ναι θέλει / νῶουμος for a more traditional configuration of the relevant value terms.

ments: 'not without fair-fame'; that is, 'very famous'. A parallel, conveniently using ἀγνώς, the other disquieting term, can be found at Pindar *I.* 1.12, οὐκ ἀγνώς. Further examples of ἀκλεής, in the form of the adverb ἀκλεῶς, are to be found at *Or* 786 (ἄνανδρον ἀκλεῶς κατθανεῖν) and *Rh* 752, 761. The *Orestes* instance clearly matches the moral loading of ἄνανδρον with that of ἀκλεῶς, and I can see no way of escaping the conclusion that ἀκλεής is treated by Euripides not merely as the *privative* of εὐκλεής, but as its *moral opposite*. The same arguments can be extended to ἀγνώς and ἀκίνδυνον βίον. The idea of the dangerous life bringing greatest glory has its literary origins in Achilles' choice and occurs frequently in Pindar,<sup>19)</sup> and although ἀγνώς in tragedy perhaps tends to be morally neutral, meaning 'unknown',<sup>20)</sup> it can hardly fail to attract the moral loading of the other two terms here.

Perhaps it might be said that these lines characterize vividly Agamemnon's disturbed state of mind in the prologue: he is so anxious to save his daughter that he defies moral norms of living καλῶς. Two counter arguments can be adduced: firstly, Agamemnon's character throughout the play which, although indecisive, is consistent in being pulled between family ties and ambition. For example, I see no reason to regard as untruthful Menelaus' account of his brother's rise to leadership at 337-48, which hinges on the family loyalty/power conflict, nor 357. After all, Agamemnon's defence does not deny Menelaus' charges, although it does tell us that his brother's self-righteous stand is as unwholesome as his own position of power. Furthermore, when Agamemnon hears from the First Messenger that Iphigeneia has arrived he reacts, after his initial outburst at 442-5, in the customary style of contradicting an accepted norm. His reflection begins (446):

ἡ δυσγένεια δ' ὡς ἔχει τι χρήσιμον

19) E.g. *O.* 1.81, 5.16-18, 6.9-11.

20) E.g. *Ion* 14, the only other Euripidean instance, *Phil* 1008, *Ant* 1001, *OT* 681, *Cho* 677, *A. Sup* 993.

balancing *δυσγένεια* against *τι χρήσιμον*; in other words, he is not asserting that *δυσγένεια* is *entirely* *χρήσιμος*. He then goes on to elucidate his contention, a common Euripidean pattern.<sup>21)</sup> There is no suggestion that Agamemnon envies his social inferiors in anything more major than the freedom to lament at will.

The second argument follows from the last. When Euripides wishes to question values he does so deliberately and clearly. Compare, for instance, the climax of Iphigeneia's appeal to Agamemnon, *κακῶς ζῆν κρεῖσσον ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν* (1252). This has been prepared for as far back as 1218-9, which is picked up at 1250. In addition, it is worth noting that the traditional values prevail upon Iphigeneia in the end (1375-6).

The *ethos* of lines 16-19 was obviously quite acceptable in later antiquity. Stobaeus quotes them, as does Alexander Aphrodisiensis.<sup>22)</sup> Their approval need not necessarily have stemmed from a Christian bias towards an unworldly, spiritual life; but I am convinced that the lines are totally anomalous in Euripides.

While on the subject of lines 16-19, I should like to comment upon their extraordinary construction. I cannot find another tragic parallel for the expression, 'I envy you more than I envy me', apart from line 677 of this play, much less for the formula that we have here: 'I envy you (that is 'the inglorious') and/but I envy those in honor (that is 'me') less'. Stobaeus' reading, *ἥσσον ἐπαινῶ*, may not merely be a characteristic misquotation therefore, but an effort to make the sentiment more lucid, unless by chance he preserved the correct reading.<sup>23)</sup> But this is doubtful. Turning to 677,

21) Cf. *Med* 579-83, 1089-1104, *Hip* 186-8, 424-5, 664-6, *Sup* 1101-3, *Her* 299-301, etc. On the contradicting of maxims as a rhetorical device, see Arist. *Rhet* 1395 a-b.

22) Stobaeus 4.16.4 (Hense); Alex. Aphr. see Murray's app. crit.

23) Parallels for *ἐπαινεῖν*: *And* 456, 866, *Al* 553-4. None of these is adequate, since only the first can conceivably mean *ζηλοῦν*, and none is a contrast between two individuals. The last two and *Hip* 264 contain contrasts between types of behaviour, rather than between people. *Hip* 264 is the only example which approaches the generality of our passage. None mix generality with particularity as does *IA* 16-19.

See Hense in *RE* 9. 2575ff. for Stobaeus' access to reliable sources.

we find:

ζηλῶ σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ 'μὲ τοῦ μηδὲν φρονεῖν.

Unusual certainly, but not, I think, uncomfortable in *ethos* or formulation. Could the avant garde poet of the anapaests have been inspired to emulate 677 in a misguided attempt to improve upon the idea there?

As I remarked earlier, the suspicions aroused by lines 16-19 are heightened by τὸ καλόν and τὸ φιλότιμον. τὸ καλόν is purely Euripidean; never found in the other two tragedians. When it occurs it is always in a well defined context, even at *Sup* 300 (its most difficult instance), where it refers to the moral status that Aithra would lose by not protecting the Suppliants. The employment at 300 is prepared for by the more normal εἶπω τι... σοί τε καὶ πόλει καλόν at 293. In general, τὸ καλόν tends to be clarified in antithesis with τὸ μὴ καλόν, or implied equivalent.<sup>24</sup>) It is never used in its full abstract sense of 'all that is good, beautiful and noble' without careful preparation, as at *Hec* 600-2:

ἔχει γε μέντοι καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς  
 δίδαξιν ἐσθλοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἦν τις εὖ μάθη,  
 οἷδεν τό γ' αἰσχρόν, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθῶν.

καλῶς and ἐσθλοῦ prepare for τὸ καλόν at 602; and this general sentiment is itself the climax of a long reflection upon φύσις and νόμος which is brimming over with value terms under consideration: ἐσθλός twice, χρηστός twice, κακός, κακή three times, and πονηρός once, all in seven lines (592-8).

In contrast, τὸ καλόν at *IA* 20 is sprung upon us suddenly. As with δίκαιον, we must conclude that it has either a special point or is used carelessly and ineffectively. τοῦτο δὲ γ' ἐστὶν τὸ καλόν σφαλερόν at line 21 immediately tells us that the latter is true, for the passage may be paraphrased as follows: *Old Man*. All that is good, noble and beautiful is there in life (!) *Ag*. But this noble thing at least, is unstable... The two usages of καλόν are dissimilar and no point

24) *Sup* 300 again, *Hec* 602, *Or* 417, *Hip* 382 (pleasure/virtue contrast) and, most interestingly, *IA* 387.

is made by their juxtaposition (unless it could be Agamemnon's lack of moral awareness).

The loose employment of τὸ καλόν at line 20 is underlined by the phrase ἔνταῦθα βίου, which is very awkward. I fail to see how τὸ καλόν can be limited by an idea less abstract, such as βίος (this would be construing τὸ καλόν with βίου); yet presumably the Old Man is not implying that τὸ καλόν can be acquired somewhere *beyond* life (this is taking βίου closely with ἔνταῦθα). The superfluity of the second rendering and the inappropriateness of the first give further indication that the writer of the anapaests was either incompetent, or did not belong to the classical era.

Τὸ φιλότιμον appears to be thematic in the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, as it occurs twice (385, 520) and φιλοτιμία once (527), while its only other occurrences in Euripides are at *Pho* 567 and *Sup* 907 (if the latter is genuine). England<sup>25)</sup> remarks that in Euripides it means 'ambitious', 'ambition' and is pejorative; but that it later comes to signify 'distinguished', 'distinction'. It certainly is the simplest solution to *Sup* 907 to regard it as interpolated; and in our passage at 22, it enhances our doubt about the lines' *ethos*.

I shall now examine lines 385-7 with close reference to 20-22. Like Page, I cannot feel that 385-7 are spurious on Wecklein's<sup>26)</sup> grounds that τὸ λελογισμένον is too similar a formulation to τὸ χρῆζον (1017), τὸ κείνου βουλόμενον (1270) and τὸ τῆς θεοῦ φίλον (747), all in suspicious circumstances. Besides Page's point that λελογισμένοι (922), λελογισμένως (1021) and ἐξελογίσω (1409) appear in innocent surroundings and so balance out Wecklein's objections to the article-phrases, the context seems to me to require 385-7 for continuity of thought.<sup>27)</sup> To my mind, however, the most inter-

25) E.B. England, *The Iphigeneia at Aulis of Euripides* (Macmillan, London 1891). Referred to throughout by the author's name.

26) N. Wecklein, *Iphigenie in Aulis* (Leipzig/Berlin 1914). Referred to henceforth by the author's name.

27) Other reasons for supporting the lines: 1) the topical Euripidean pleasure/virtue contrast (cf. *Hip* 380ff.); 2) the lines form a customary gnomic climax, a feature of rhetoric, especially in tragedy; 3) rationality and ambition versus love is an important thematic tension.

esting feature here is the juxtaposition of τὸ καλόν and τὸ φιλότιμον, which is highly significant, since these two expressions occur only here and at 20-22 in the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, while τὸ φιλότιμον itself is confined to our passages within the entire Euripidean corpus. Both τὸ καλόν and τὸ φιλότιμον are characteristically elucidated (not left as bare abstractions) by the pleasure/virtue contrast at 386-7 and τοῦμόν at 385. As has been mentioned, however, in the case of τὸ καλόν at 20 - and which can be extended to include τὸ φιλότιμον at 22<sup>28)</sup> - elucidation is lacking. In addition, καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον or τό τε φιλότιμον is superfluous, as Bothe felt.

Drawing a few threads together from this discussion, there appears to be heavy dependence at 16-23 on sound passages later in the play: 1) for the original idea of 'I envy you more than me', compare 677; 2) for Agamemnon's discontent with his social status, compare 446-9; 3) for the juxtaposition of τὸ καλόν and τὸ φιλότιμον, compare 385-7; and it may be worth noting that a later writer need not necessarily have read τὸ φιλότιμον as 'ambition' at 385, but indeed as 'distinction', which is its meaning at 22. Even if the idea seems far-fetched that one man, having read and digested Euripides' unfinished work, should then have composed the anapaests, including lines 16-23, incorporating reminiscences of different passages of the original text, it seems still more implausible that Euripides botched potentially valuable material so badly.

Several larger but equally disturbing questions arise out of the general *ethos* of the anapaests. The first has been touched upon already: can a master (and a great king) hold this type of intimate conversation with a servant or slave? Secondly, how suitable to the tragic genre is Agamemnon's almost neurotic state?<sup>29)</sup> Has he the dignity that is neces-

28) Although we perhaps do not require elucidation, since it doubles for τοῦτο τὸ καλόν.

29) Cf. ἄϊσω 12; his ludicrous behaviour over the writing tablets, as described by the Old Man at 34-42.

sary for us to sympathise with his dilemma; the dignity that all kings in tragedy possess, unless they are unambiguously villainous, like Lycus in the *Heracles* or Polymestor in *Hecuba*?<sup>30)</sup> Furthermore, does he behave with this lack of restraint later in the play? And thirdly, following closely from the last issue raised: how suitable is an anapaestic dialogue, which even incorporates the highly emotional lyric *metra* that we find (for example) in Phaedra's feverish dialogue in the *Hippolytus*, for two *men*, especially when one is a king and the action has yet to commence? Is this possible in fifth century tragedy?

Taking the second question - Agamemnon's lack of dignity - to begin with, I should like to turn to 136-7 which provides a convenient illustration. In response to the Old Man's criticism of his actions, Agamemnon cries:

οἴμοι, γνώμας ἐξέεσταν,  
αἰαῦ, πῖπτω δ' εἰς ἄταν.

Willink seems to think that this reaction is 'characteristic' and compares 1132-6. I fail to see the resemblance, since 1132-6 displays the restraint and hints of disaster that are the hallmark of the highly original and effective scene between the king and his daughter. At 136-7 the οἴμοι, followed a line later by αἰαῦ, the extravagance of the ideas of 'standing out of one's mind' and 'falling into ἄτη', and the cumulative effect of the parallel constructions, seem to me to be more appropriate to an antiphonal dirge (such as at the close of the *Persae*, performed with the Chorus) than to the situation here, which is not completely lost.

There are other objections against these two lines. Consider ἄτη, for example, which does not recur during the *Iphigenia at Aulis* as we have it. This in itself could hardly be called suspicious. Six other Euripidean plays contain only a single instance: *El* 1307, *Hcl* 607, *Al* 91, *Hec* 688, *And* 103 and *Ion* 1240. Of these, *Hec* 688, *Ion* 1240 and *Al* 91 refer to

30) It might be argued that Polymestor gains some stature at the end of the play, but this is totally dissimilar and fully consonant with Euripides' dramatic technique.

especially momentous deaths.<sup>31)</sup> *El* 1307 and *And* 103 are traditional usages: ἄτη πατέρων of the House of Atreus (cf. also *S. El* 215), and the equation of Helen to ἄταν τινά; while *Hcld* 607 meaning 'disaster' refers also to specific deaths, those of all the Heracleidae with Iolaus and Alc-mene (combined with defeat for the Athenians) weighed in the scale against Macaria's own self-sacrifice. It is hardly conceivable that ἄτη at *IA* 137 is used with reference to the curse of the House of Atreus, a theme which seems to have no importance in the play (this is taking ἄτη as a traditional usage), and even less likely that Agamemnon is saying 'I am falling to death' (specific usage).<sup>32)</sup> Once again, the charge of loose writing is inescapable; a strongly suggestive word is employed without sensitivity for its full potential. And Agamemnon is thus presented uttering an almost meaningless lament.

Perhaps despite all this, he retains enough dignity in his reflections at 16ff. and 161ff., and in his orders to the Old Man at 139ff., to convince the audience of his regal status and to be consistent with his character later in the play. Alas, no. In his orders, at least, he is unnecessarily loquacious, a trait totally inconsistent with his later speeches, which are invariably shorter than those of his opponents;<sup>33)</sup> and, in my opinion, his reflections are either

31) *Hec* 688 to Polymestor's; *Ion* 1240 to death by stoning after the attempt on Ion's life; *Al* 91 to Alcestis' voluntary sacrifice.

32) I do not object to the expression πίπτω εἰς ἄταν in other circumstances. *Hip* 241 (e.g.): ἔπεσον δαίμονος ἄτη is perfectly acceptable, contributing to the theme of Phaedra's divinely inspired passion. (Other instances in *Hip* are 276, 1149, 1289.) *Troades* uses ἄτη frequently within a thematic network of the destruction of Troy. But when ἄτη occurs only once in a Euripidean play, it has a traditional or specific reference-point, which is lacking in the *IA*. Note also the ἄτη chain in *Medea* (129, 279, 979, 988), which focusses upon the ruin of the 'royal family', reaching a climax with the metrically prominent 979, 988. From this angle, 129 and 279 may be seen as referring both to Medea and to Creon's household. 279, in particular, gains a tremendously sinister impact from this ambiguity.

33) Note the preferences for brevity and silence which he expresses at 378, 400, 683 and 1144.

anomalous and disturbing, or, as Bain puts it, 'incredibly trite'.<sup>34)</sup>

Proceeding from the idea that the presentation of Agamemnon in the anapaests is inconsistent with his later character, and inappropriate for a king in fifth century tragedy, I come now to my third question, 'How suitable are anapaests, before the action has commenced, for a dialogue between two men, especially when one is a king?' Social values and norms are again of relevance. Agamemnon himself tells us that his birth prevents him from being able *δακρῦσαι ῥαδίως...* / ἅπαντα τ' εἰπεῖν (447-8), and Sophocles' *Electra*, plus the λόγος/ἔργον contrast ubiquitous in tragedy, press the point home that men were supposed to *act*, not talk. If we consider this further, from the angle of form and content - how the significance of any passage is reinforced by its form - the most reasonable conclusion is the most disturbing; that by composing the opening dialogue in anapaests which may even be melic, the poet has actually emphasised Agamemnon's unmanly inability to act, by using a poetic form removed from the iambs of conventional tragic discourse.<sup>35)</sup> Are other dramatists (and Euripides) aware of this nicety? Let us glance at some instances of anapaests and lyrics, in the mouths of male characters.

In Aeschylus, we have Xerxes' lyric lament with the Chorus. He has been destroyed by his rash war, and his dignity is minimal;<sup>36)</sup> he is no longer in a position to act. Prometheus uses anapaests on three occasions (93ff., 136ff., 1040ff.), on the second of which his calmer anapaests contrast with the Chorus' lyrics. Because he is bound, he is prevented from physical action. Physical incapacity is also important in the *Trachiniae*, *Oedipus at Colonus* and *Philoctetes*,

34) 'Anomalous and disturbing', 16-23 (see above); and 24-27, which I shall come to later. 'Incredibly trite', Bain, p. 123, on lines 161-3.

35) This argument assumes that, as the 'words' are 'action', especially in Greek drama, any departure from normal 'words' (i.e. iambic trimeter) towards lyric metre conveys a shift away from 'action'.

36) Compare the tattered clothes symbol.

where Heracles, Oedipus and Philoctetes participate in anapaestic and/or lyric interchanges. In Sophocles' *Electra*, Orestes, the man of action *par excellence*, never departs from iambs even when his sister greets him lyrically at 1232ff. Other examples of men participating in lyrics and anapaests are to be found regularly at moments of despair, when the hero is crushed;<sup>37)</sup> and lyrics of a 'religious' nature are sung by Orestes in the *Choephoroi* and by Ion. None of these examples can adequately support the use of anapaestic dialogue in the opening scene of the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*. And none, in my opinion, raises the question of dramatic and character consistency that arise from the form employed here.

Thus, to recapitulate, the anapaests must be considered highly problematic on the grounds of *ethos*; and they betray themselves in the use of value terms and their underlying social assumptions, and in their dissociation of form from content, as being composed by a lesser, later writer than Euripides.

At several points in the anapaests we come across strained imagery which seems very mannered and akin to the ineffective usages of rare words and odd constructions. The first of these occurs at lines 4-5:

μάλα τοι γῆρας τοῦμόν ἀυπνον  
καὶ ἐπ' ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄξύ πάρεστιν.

Willink comments on lines 1-5 that 'the exchange is already strikingly Euripidean, especially in the characterisation and elegant idiom of 4-5'. He does not, however, explain this viewpoint, and paraphrases the lines: 'My old age is sleepless, and my eyes are keen'. This avoids the difficulty of ὄξύς, which, applied to 'old age', gives an exceptionally curious metaphor: 'My old age is very wakeful and is present sharp (or sharply) upon my eyes'.<sup>38)</sup> All other instances of

37) E.g., Ajax's first appearance, where the Chorus and Tecmessa, interestingly, respond in iambs; compare the end of Euripides' *Electra*.

38) The other rendering of the lines, with ὄξύ as subject of πάρεστιν is even more bizarre. There is an adverbial usage of ὄξύ in Collard's *Supplement* (see note 53), but this is not a parallel.

όξύς in Euripides<sup>39)</sup> mean, as is normal, either 'sharp' or 'shrill', with the possible exception of *Hclld* 290 (μάλα δ' όξύς "Αρης ό Μυκηναίωv), where, however, the notion of sharp blades lies close to the surface.

To make matters worse, old age in tragedy is a theme with stock characteristics: bad temper, intelligence and its lack, weakness, stubbornness; it is almost always considered hard to bear. For some reason or other, the three great tragedians do not depart from these stock traits in the extant plays;<sup>40)</sup> and I very much doubt if they would have introduced the novel idea of keen-sighted old age without a well defined dramatic reason. There is no reason in the *Iphigeneia at Aulis* that can even be imagined, let alone well defined. And, lastly, when γήρας is accompanied by a concrete adjective (such as όξύς) in Euripides, that adjective invariably enunciates a stock characteristic: πικρόν at fr 282, βαρύ at *Al* 672, λυγρόν (and φθονερόν<sup>41)</sup>) at *Her* 649; and δυσπάλαιστον at *Sup* 1108.

The second strained metaphor appears in the reflection at 24-27, which is perhaps alien to Euripidean thought in any case, in its antithesis of 'gods' and 'γνώμαι', both wrecking the prosperity of great men from time to time. διακναίω is not a common word, and we can have no reason to imagine that it was a 'dead' metaphor. It occurs absolutely in the passive voice in both Aeschylus and Euripides (*Al* 109, *Med* 164, *Ag* 65) and with a dative agent at *Prom* 94 and 540.<sup>42)</sup> In the active voice, it is unique to Euripides - at *El* 1307 and *Hclld* 296. The example at *Hclld* 296 is used much as though it were passive: the Chorus, speculating on what report the Herald will bring to Eurystheus, imagine that he

39) *Hclld* 290, *Cyc* 401, *IT* 785 (= *IA* 1566), *Or* 1530.

40) Old age: bad temper, *Ba* 1251-2, *And* 727-8, *Or* 490; intelligence (contradicting the 'norm' of stupidity), *Pho* 528-30, *And* 645-6, *Ant* 280-1, *OC* 930-1; intelligence and weakness, *Ion* 742, *And* 756, *Phil* 96-99, *Ag* 584; weakness and stupidity, *Ag* 75-82, 584, *Eum* 38, *Her* 111-2, 229, *And* 687, 745-6, *Ba* 251-2, *Pho* 1722, *OC* 1235-8.

41) φθονερόν being Wilamowitz's conjecture for φόνιον.

42) αἰκείαις and μυρίοις μόχοις, respectively.

will have been badly treated and παρὰ μικρὸν / ψυχὴν ἤλθεν διακναῖσαι. The expression διακναῖσαι ψυχὴν clearly connotes physical violence, as the Chorus fear the worst that the Herald could relate - the violation of his diplomatic immunity. The instance at *Electra* 1307, however, is more abstract. There, the Dioscuri announce that μία... ἄτη πατέρων has destroyed (διέκναισεν) both Orestes and Electra. The metaphor is aided by the personification latent in ἄτη; there seems to be no awkwardness here.

But what of γνῶμαι πολλὰ / καὶ δυσάρεστοι 'scraping away' or 'shattering into pieces' the lives of great men (*IA* 26-27)? I can find only one example of γνῶμαι as the subject of a concrete verb, within a metaphor, and that is *Philoctetes* 432:

ἀλλὰ χαί σοφαί / γνῶμαι ... ἐμποδίζονται θαμὰ.

Perhaps this is sufficient to parallel our passage; but I feel that the importance in the action of plans failing, and the comparative ease of the idea of complex plans 'tripping themselves up', differentiate the *Philoctetes* instance completely from *IA* 24-27. For here, plans do not merely destroy themselves, but 'scrape away' or 'shatter' someone's life, and their importance in the action is minimal.

I mentioned Agamemnon's flowery letter earlier in connection with rare diction such as κολπώδης and ἀκλύστην (120-1). I shall now adduce other diverse criticisms of its language. To begin with a *caveat*: I do not think that we are in a position to argue that anapaests are an unsuitable vehicle for conveying the contents of a letter (although I personally find this uncomfortable, especially when the anapaests are lyric), since data is lacking. We can, however, argue that some of the wording is unsuitable, in particular ὤ Λήδας ἔρνος (116) and τὰν σὰν Ἴνιν (119). Both ἔρνος and Ἴνις are highly poetical words, unlike (e.g.) παῖς. Out of ten usages of ἔρνος in Euripides, six are literal, meaning 'shoots', and one is found in a simile of ivy clinging to laurel shoots, where poetic mileage is made out of the

metaphorical meaning.<sup>43)</sup> Seven out of ten occur in lyrics. When the metaphorical use falls in iambs (twice: *Tro* 766 and *Ba* 1306), there appear to be convincing reasons. At *Tro* 766, Andromache calls Helen ὦ Τυνδάρειον ἔρνος (οὔποτ' εἶ Διός) in an emotional apostrophe, while at *Ba* 1306, Cadmus is referring to his grandson, Pentheus, in dialogue with the newly-sane Agaue: τῆς σῆς τόδ' ἔρνος, ὦ τάλαινα, νηδύος.<sup>44)</sup> As for ἱνις, it has five occurrences in Euripides, all of which have lyric contexts, apart from *Tro* 571 (anapaests).<sup>45)</sup> Its usage suggests that it constitutes a very dignified form of address, since three out of five cases refer to Heracles. Of the other two dramatists, only Aeschylus employs it,<sup>46)</sup> thus reinforcing our belief that it is highly poetical. In Agamemnon's letter, ἔρνος and ἱνις follow each other within the space of four words; while in the text, even after the Old Man's interruption, they are still remarkably close together. Once more our poet seems to be striving for purely superficial effect.

I should also like to raise a slight objection to the address, Ἀήδας ἔρνος. Of course, this is not an isolated example of an offspring being called its mother's, but it is interesting to note that, among numerous Euripidean examples of the phrase παῖς τινοῦ, only two (in the *Bacchae*, both referring to Pentheus as Agaue's son<sup>47)</sup>) refer to the child by use of the mother's name. In Sophocles this happens three times (*El* 1395, *Tra* 19, 98) for excellent dramatic reasons;<sup>48)</sup> while in Aeschylus the children mentioned spring from elemental personifications, except at *Ag* 1040 and *Sup*

43) At *Med* 1213, describing how Creon is unable to tear himself from his daughter's poisoned robe.

44) In addition to the strength of the context, fertility is an important theme in the play.

45) *And* 797, *Her* 1182, 354, *Ba* 1174, *Tro* 571.

46) *Ag* 717, *Eum* 324, *Sup* 44, 251.

47) *Ba* 517, 1309; and we should add *Ba* 1306 mentioned above. Note also *E. El* 933-5 in this context.

48) The measure of Zeus' involvement is intentionally unstressed.

171, where the father is, as in the Sophoclean instances, Zeus.<sup>49)</sup> My objection, however, cannot be pressed too far, as Leda seems to be a special case in Euripides. She is frequently named in connection with Helen, and three times as the mother of Clytemnestra.<sup>50)</sup> Perhaps this address is another echo of the *Agamemnon* (914, Aeschylus' only mention of Leda - Sophocles has none)? But surely Euripides would not have undercut the actual quotation of *Ag* 914 in the effectively reworked scene of the meeting of husband and wife (686), by using a half-baked recollection here.

While on the subject of addressing people, I should like to sidestep (legitimately, I hope) to the Old Man's irritating habit of tagging 'Αγάμεμνον ἄναξ / βασιλεῦ on to the end of his sentences (lines 3, 13, 43, 140), or at line endings (133), or both (140, 43, and 13 - a whole anapaestic *metron*); something which happens too frequently for comfort also in the first messenger speech.<sup>51)</sup> It is hard to escape the inference that the writer (or writers) of these passages used the device as a convenient line-filler, especially since the *Iphigeneia at Aulis* contains eight cases of the phrase 'Αγάμεμνον ἄναξ<sup>52)</sup> in contrast with its nearest two rivals (*Troades* and *IT*), which have only two; and since the invaluable Concordance<sup>53)</sup> shows that Euripides uses this form of address no more than four times in any other play.

To sum up the discussion so far, it seems clear from these examples that the writer of the anapaests indulges in

49) *Ag* 1040, *Sup* 171, 305, 901, *Prom* 18, *Eum* 16, 1033.

50) Addresses to Helen: *Hel* 616, 1680 and in apostrophe at *Or* 1386; to Clyt.: *IA* 686, 1106, 1344. In *IA* 827, 856 and *IT* 210, Clyt. is referred to, but not addressed as the daughter of Leda. Note that 1106, again in suspicious circumstances, reuses Aeschylus' memorable Ἀΐδας γένεθλον.

51) Lines 414, 431, 436. Note especially 414, which constitutes the highly irregular mid-line entry.

52) Note particularly the instances at 1547, 1573, 1619, extremely dubious passages; and also in the speech of Achilles, which may be interpolated at some points, 950, 961. Other references which seem reasonably secure: 828, 869. Admittedly, Agamemnon appears only in the *IA*.

53) J.T. Allen, G. Italic, *A Concordance to Euripides* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1954) with *Suppl.* by C. Collard (Groningen 1971).

much looser composition than Euripides. This criticism can also be extended from his use of language to his inability to create logical or conceptual progress within the passage.

I have already mentioned the superabundance of inconsequential detail which is not later utilised in the play; for instance, the astronomy at 6ff. and, particularly, the Old Man's projected journey at 141ff., which is crammed with unrealised, vivid pictorial information. At three points this conceptual redundancy is emphasised by lack of logical continuity. The first occasion is at 28ff. England objected to the lack of continuity in  $\sigma\upsilon\ \delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  at line 34. This example is symptomatic. I paraphrase as follows: 'You shouldn't complain about your situation like this, Agamemnon. The gods, whether you like it or not, have decreed that you must be happy as well as sad. But you have spread light around, and are writing...' At 'but you', we expect to hear how Agamemnon is contravening the gods' decree of the mutability of joy and sorrow; that is, we should now hear that he is incessantly sorrowful or (less likely in context), constantly joyful.  $\sigma\upsilon\ \delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  is a standard formula for focussing a general reflection upon a particular case, especially when a norm is contradicted,<sup>54)</sup> or for directing attention from one person to another.<sup>55)</sup> At *IA* 34, the pronoun plus  $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  performs neither of these offices unless, conceivably, we are meant to understand 'But you are constantly sorrowful' from the extraordinary and verbose description of Agamemnon changing his mind over the writing tablets. This is just within the bounds of possibility, but is puzzlingly unclear for a device which is used normally to articulate logical thought progression.

The second passage which I find particularly inconsequential is at 124-37. The Old Man asks Agamemnon how Achilles will react to losing his bride. Agamemnon replies in exceed-

54) Cf. *Hip* 459, *And* 186, *Tra* 4; and H. Friis Johansen's remarks in *General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis* (Copenhagen 1959), p. 110, note 28, and p. 146.

55) E.g., *And* 209, s. *El* 282.

ingly strange language, that Achilles is in the dark about the whole affair. Given the importance of Achilles' offence at his name being used without his permission later in the play, we might reasonably expect the author to drop a hint at this point by making the Old Man respond, 'You were certainly taking a dangerous liberty in using Achilles' name without his consent', or 'in doing this behind Achilles' back'. But no, the Old Man has forgotten Achilles' anger (124) completely, and is now more interested in the deception practised upon Iphigeneia. Again, it is possible to argue these objections away, by expanding the Old Man's words to convey: 'You dared a dreadful deed by using Achilles' name in order to sacrifice your daughter for the Greeks'; but that is not what he says. And what is the ἄτη into which Agamemnon thinks he is falling? Incurring Achilles' wrath? Incurring the wrath of the gods as the slayer of his child? This is not clear either, although I hope that I showed earlier that Euripides does not employ ἄτη without a specific reference point.

The last lines with which I shall take issue are 161ff., which previous scholars have criticised on the grounds of banality. The maxim here is indeed 'trite',<sup>56)</sup> but that in itself is an insufficient objection; some gnomic clichés (such as S. *El* 1171-3) are 'extraordinarily effective. What is more disturbing is that it appears to have no immediate connection with the preceding lines. Agamemnon has not gradually reached a resigned stance, but suddenly he acquires one at line 161; up to 160 he is as agitated as ever. Nor can the thought arise with propriety from σὺλλαβε μόχθων (although these four lines would form an internally consistent quotation), for it is ludicrous if Agamemnon should apply his *gnome* to the Old Man's forthcoming journey. Lines 161-3 dangle insecurely at the end of the anapaests, connected by the tenuous thread of some kind of ring composition (as far as I can see) with the sentiment at 28-32. And if this is, in fact, the case, Agamemnon has been converted

56) Bain, p. 123.

to the Old Man's view at 28-32 without displaying the slightest sign to the audience that he is not as discontented as before. It looks strongly as though the writer was motivated by line 160 to add an impressive-sounding generalisation to round off his work, with only the most superficial regard for consistency.<sup>57)</sup>

Many of the points that I have mentioned in this discussion of the general style, tone and *ethos* of the anapaests only scratch the surface of such problems in this extremely dubious passage. I hope, however, that they validly extend the already weighty and diverse case for the prosecution against the few, idiosyncratic pleas of the defenders. It is to this end that my paper is devoted.

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57) It is almost certain that we have a similar case (on a larger scale) at the close of the *OT*. See R.D. Dawe's acute observations in *Studies on the Text of Sophocles I* (Leiden 1973) 268-73.