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THE TWO FACES OF HESIOD’S MUSE

PATRICIA ANN MARQUARDT

The Muses, of all the feminine figures in Hesiod, enjoy the most positive and enthusiastic treatment. As embodiments of the highest intellectual and artistic values, they are both a delight to the gods (Th. 37, 40 and 51) and a comfort to men (Th. 98-103). Music and poetic inspiration, however important for their own sake, represent only part of the Muses' power, which extends to the very enactment of justice. It is the Muses who bestow on favored princes the gift of righteous speech and the ability to bring peace through persuasion (Th. 81-86). Such a gift is declared sacred by Hesiod (Th. 93) and links the Muses to Zeus in the poet's conception of divinely sanctioned justice since princes are said to derive from Zeus (Th. 96). So closely are the Muses linked to Zeus that they are the only other deities to whom Hesiod gives the epithet "Olympian" ('Ολυμπι-δες; Th. 25 and 52).

More immediately, the Muses are responsible for Hesiod's poetic awakening since they inspired him with "divine voice" to celebrate in song the immortal gods and events of the past and future beyond mortal vision (Th. 31-33). A striking instance appears in the Works and Days in the section on sea-faring. Hesiod admits to his limited personal experience with the sea but relies upon the insight gained through poetic inspiration (Op. 660-662). He asserts that the tutelage of the Muses has made it possible for him to relate the will of Zeus: Μοῦσαι γάρ μ’ ἑδίδαξαν ἀδέσφατον ὄμνον ἀείδειν (Op. 662). The word Hesiod uses in this context to describe his song is ἀδέσφατος, which properly means "impossible for gods to tell" or "inexpressible". It is a striking expression of the fundamental mystery and awe which often surround the poetic process.

Despite the essentially spiritual relationship of man and the Muses, the latter appear as young, attractive women, but with undertones of sensuality and wildness. The opening lines of the Theogony (3-7) describe how the Muses dance on Mt. Heli-
con and bathe in the mountain springs:

καὶ τε περὶ κρήνην λοειδέα πόσσ' ἀπαλοίην δροχεύναι καὶ βωμὸν ἑρυσθενέος Κρονίωνος.
καὶ τε λοεσάμεναι τέρενα χρῶα Περισόσοι ἢ Ἰπποῦ κρήνης ἢ Ὄλυμνοῦ ξαδέοι ἀκροτάτῳ ἔλιμων χοροὺς ἑνεπουήσαντο...

The Muses' "soft" feet (πόσσ' ἀπαλοίην; 3) and "tender" skin (τέρενα χρῶα; 5) evoke sensual images similar to those evoked by Aphrodite, whose "shapely" (ῥαδινός; Θ. 195) feet as she walks stimulate the fertility of the earth, and by the "soft-skinned" maiden (ἀπαλόχροος; Ορ. 519), still maturing sexually, who spends the cold winter indoors by the fire (Ορ. 519-521) and bathes her "tender" body (τέρενα χρῶα; 522). Further evidence that the Muses carry sensual undertones for Hesiod is their association on Mt. Olympus with the Graces and Himerus (Desire; Θ. 64), close attendants of Aphrodite. Hesiod's description makes clear that different forms of beauty, both physical and poetic, are components of the creative vitality embodied in the Muses. 3)

It is probable that the sensual quality of the Muses derives largely from their similarity to nymphs, female nature-spirits who represent the divine powers of mountains, waters, woods and trees. 4) Just as νυμφη denotes a bride or marriageable maiden, so the nymphs were traditionally envisioned as young and beautiful women, fond of music and dancing and able to inspire mortals with poetry and prophetic power. Although nymphs are usually benevolent, they can be angry and threatening. At first glance, Hesiod's encounter with the Muses on Helicon (Θ. 22-34) seems to be the meeting of nymphs and mortal caught alone in their domain. Their first words to him are harsh and somewhat threatening; they insult his lowly shepherd-status and proclaim their ability to speak, at will, both plausible falsehoods and the truth (Θ. 26-28). Only after they have declared their prerogatives, do they manifest their benevolence by presenting Hesiod with the laurel shoot as a symbol of his poetic calling and by inspiring him with the prophetic voice of poetry (Θ. 29-31). Further, there is an element of compulsion in the Muses' epiphany. The poetic charge, so suddenly thrust upon Hesiod, is not contingent upon his own acceptance or rejection, but he is "ordered" to sing
as the Muses bid (Th. 33).

That Hesiod regards the Muses as akin to divine mountain nymphs is evident from the emphasis given their mountain haunts. The *Theogony* begins in the mountainous setting of Helicon:

Μουσῶν Ἑλικωνιάδῶν ἀρχώμεθ' ἀείδειν,
α' τ' Ἑλικώνος ἔχουσιν ὅρος μέγα τε ὡδεῖν τε...

Again, it is on "highest" Helicon (7) that the Muses dance and at the foot of "numinous" (Ζάδεος; 23) Helicon that they appeared to Hesiod. It is significant that the Muses are called Heliconian only in the "first" proem to the *Theogony* (1-35). The "second" proem (36-115) maintains their association with mountain tops (42 and 62) but transfers them to Olympus without mention of Helicon. According to the second proem which emphasizes their position as Zeus' children, the Muses are born on Mt. Pieria in Thessaly (53-54) but move to Olympus (68 and 71) and permanently reside there in "Olympian homes" (63 and 114). The transfer to Olympus clearly subordinates them to Zeus and their new role appears to consist, in large part, of entertaining the gods (37, 40 and 51). It is true that the Olympian Muses possess the enormous power of granting righteous speech to favored princes, but they wield this power as Zeus' offspring and in the context of his theological system (71-80).

In the first proem the Muses function more independently. Helicon is properly their haunt and there they freely exercise their powers, as in their appearance to Hesiod. Although they bid Hesiod sing the praises of the immortal gods, they demand that their own praises be sung first and last (34). Hesiod can sing of the Muses of Pieria (e.g. Ὀρ. 1) and Olympus, but it is for the Heliconian Muses that he feels personal affection. When he won the tripod at the funeral games of Amphidamas, for example, he dedicated it on Mt. Helicon to the Muses who first inspired him with poetic song (Ὅρ. 656-659). The archaeological remains at Thespiae and in the Valley of the Muses adjacent to Ascra, scanty though they are and later than Hesiod, confirm a strong tradition of devotion to the Muses around Mt. Helicon, a tradition for which we find strong and ample evidence in Hesiod's text. The extent to which the Muses represented a personal, religious experience can be gauged from
the special care Hesiod exercises in describing their soothing effect on men, much like a drug (Th. 98-103). Even if there were no remains, we would have to assume from Hesiod's own words that the Muses were the objects of enthusiastic devotion. The close connection of the Muses with wild nature, which will be discussed fully below, makes it likely that the earliest sites of worship were not confined to temple precincts at all, but were chosen precisely for their wild and uncultivated qualities.

The Muses go back to an early stratum of Greek religion since their genealogy, despite the popularity of the Theogony, was never firmly set and one tradition even named Uranus as their father. Their original number is also unknown although the belief persisted in antiquity that they first composed a triad. Since their number is unspecified in the first proem, it is uncertain how many Muses Hesiod saw. It is not surprising that he refers to them only as a vague plurality since he is recounting a personal, religious experience and not delineating a divine hierarchy. It is in the second proem, where they are exclusively Olympian Muses, that Hesiod proceeds to define them and to fit them neatly into an ordered cosmos by setting their number, assigning them individual names (77-79) and stressing their relationship to Zeus.

It cannot be argued that Hesiod is thinking of two completely different sets of deities because at one point in describing his encounter with the Muses on Helicon he calls them Olympian and daughters of Zeus (25). The Heliconian and Olympian Muses are essentially the same to Hesiod; the difference is that the former represent the older goddesses of local cult with independent traditions which prevent them from fitting easily into the Olympian system, and the latter are largely the product of Hesiod's intellectual ordering of the world, although even these Muses may have originated as mountain nymphs and may have been central figures in Thessalian cult. For Hesiod, though, the Olympian Muses enjoy little existence apart from Zeus and are a fundamental part of his conception of Zeus-fostered justice, since they are instrumental in granting the righteous speech (Th. 81-84) which results in just acts.

The Muses of Helicon, on the other hand, are viewed in a more personal light. In their realm Hesiod had a religious
experience which deeply affected his life and which he later remembered with gratitude when he placed his victory-tripod on Mt. Helicon in the very spot where the Muses claimed him as their own (Op. 658-659). Since Hesiod's village of Ascra lay on the slopes of Mt. Helicon (Op. 639-640) and since he is the earliest poet to call the Muses Heliconian, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he was familiar with their worship, perhaps as a devotee, and that even after he aligned himself intellectually with Olympian religion, he still retained a lingering affection for the old cult and the local goddesses.

An oblique reference to such a cult may be contained in the enigmatic line: ἄλλα τίνι μοι ταῦτα περὶ δρῦν ἢ περὶ πέτρην; commonly translated as "But why all this about oak or rock?" (Th. 35). The Heliconian Muses, in a setting befitting their elemental nature, impart their inspiration to the common folk who frequent the rugged slopes of Mt. Helicon. The physical token of their appearance is a tree branch, a shoot of the laurel, which symbolizes the power inherent in the poetic calling (Th. 30).10 The Heliconian Muses, moreover, were joined in cult, at least in later times, with Thespian Eros, who continued to be represented as an unwrought stone and whose worship included circular dances by his female devotees.11 Hesiod emphasizes the Muses' dancing (e.g. 7-8) and says specifically that they dance around an altar of Zeus (περὶ... βωμῶν; 3-4). The altar of Zeus on the Heliconian mountaintop would probably have been a conveniently sized and shaped rock and little more, and therefore when Hesiod makes reference to the rock in his proverbial expression (περὶ... πέτρην; 35), it seems possible that his imagination linked the rock and the altar, and for that matter may account for his selection of precisely this transitional line. Since δρῦς originally meant tree in general, a more accurate translation of line 35 may be: "But why (do I concern myself with) those things (which happen) round tree or rock?" This interpretation is consistent with the strictly local sense of περὶ.12 By "tree" and "rock", Hesiod may be indicating the traditional sites or activities (i.e. dancing) of the Muses. Despite Hesiod's attempt to assimilate them, the Muses of Helicon remain close to their origins and retain always a wild, independent quality.

Hesiod undoubtedly knew the proverbial meaning of the phrase as it occurs in Homer, where to talk ἄνδρόδρυς... ἄνδρό πέτρης (Il. 22.26) means to talk without consequence or meaning, but note that the Homeric preposition is ἄνδρο and not περὶ.13 Hesiod probably intended that his readers
understand the phrase as expressing his eagerness to shift from local cult associations to a more transcendent, theological plane. He turns then from the Heliconian Muses with their religious and emotional associations to the Olympian Muses who, because of their intimate connection with Zeus in the poet's mind, are more fitting attendants of a poet who is setting out to delineate a Zeus-oriented universe. By using the phrase of "tree and rock" in a local sense, however, Hesiod makes the proverbial expression work for him on another level, as he bids farewell to the local goddesses.

The closeness of the Heliconian Muses to wild nature emerges sharply in the account of their dancing. Hesiod's first glimpse of the Muses sees them dancing, perhaps naked, at night on the top of Mt. Helicon around a spring and altar of Zeus (Th. 5-8):

5 Kai te lāōssāmēnai tērēna xroā Perimēsou̱to
η Ἱπποῦ κρήνης ή Ὀλμείον Καθόιον
ἀκροτάτην Ἑλικώνι χοροὺς ἑνεποιήσαντο,
καλοὔς ἵμερέντας, ἑπερρόσαντο ó̀ ἰοσάν.

Local pride may have prompted the mention of Permessus, Olmeius and Hippocrene, but their inclusion in the poem demonstrates Hesiod's familiarity with the topography of Mt. Helicon, and perhaps even with the recognized sacred haunts. The poet's description reveals that the Muses of Helicon are dancing a kind of ring-dance, one of the most ancient dances closely associated with springs, trees and altars.14) Historically the ring-dance seems to be a refinement of the primitive circle-dance which attempted through sympathetic magic to badger the sun and moon into returning in their proper courses around the earth. Sympathetic magic also lay behind the ring-dance, which was performed around springs to promote a continuous flow of water. Magical power, which the circle formation helped to contain and direct, was believed to be generated by dancing, particularly of an ecstatic kind.15) The uninhibited nature of the Muses' dancing is suggested by the words ἑπερρόσαντο ó̀ ἰοσάν, meaning "they moved vigorously (or lustily) with their feet", i.e. they plied their dance (Th. 8). This same, rather unusual verb in an uncompounded form appears in ἡ. Ven. 5.261 in reference to the dancing of mountain nymphs (καλόν χορόν ἑρωδόσαντο). It is tempting to see this verb as a vox propria which describes
the distinctive qualities of the dancing of mountain nymphs.\textsuperscript{16)\textsuperscript{\textdagger}}

Furthermore, although Hesiod is not concerned to state the details of the Muses' actions, it seems what we are to envision here is a series of ritualistic acts, involving group-bathing and nocturnal dancing. The sequence in which the acts are performed is explicit, however, and contrary to expectation, in that the vigorous dancing is said by Hesiod to follow the bathing rather than to precede it. The purpose of the bathing, then, would not be to cool the feverish dancers but, more likely, to purify them before dancing. It is noteworthy that the Muses of Helicon also dance around an altar of Zeus (4), whose presence on the mountaintop reflects his original role as weather-god.\textsuperscript{17)\textdagger} Although it is impossible to know the precise nature of the Muses' dancing, it is clear that it is related to their early role as deities of nature.

The dancing of the Olympian Muses in the second proem, as they move from Pieria to Olympus, is more structured and appears to be a procession accompanied by chanting (\textit{Th.} 68-71):

\begin{quote}
\textquotedblright\textit{οἵ τότε ἵσσαν πρός Ὀλυμπον, ἀγαλλόμενα ὑπὸ καλῆ, ἀμφορίῳ μολῆ· περὶ δ′ ἔξαε γαῖα μέλαινα 70 ὑμνεόμεις, ἔρατός δὲ ποδῶν ὑπὸ δοῦλος ὄρωρει νισσομένων πατέρες εἰς δυν· δ′ οὐρανῷ ἐμβασιλεύει.}
\end{quote}

Although grammatically ἔρατος ("lovely") describes the sound (δοῦλος; 70) of their dancing, it applies more properly to the beauty or form of their dance.\textsuperscript{18)\textdagger} There is a striking contrast between the vigorous dancing of the Heliconian Muses and the formal, orderly steps of their Olympian counterparts. In addition, their dancing is noticeably separated from the song they sing honoring Zeus and the Olympian gods (Ἐνδεν ἀπορνύμεναι..., ἐννύχιαι στείχον..., ὑμνεύοι, Δία: "Starting from there... they march at night... singing of Zeus"; \textit{Th.} 9-11), as though these are acts that could not easily be reconciled (even though the Muses are said to dance around an altar of Zeus). The sequence of activities emphasizes the primacy of their dancing. Afterwards, when they sing of Zeus, Hesiod chooses the verb στείχον, denoting orderly and measured movement, which contrasts with the ἐπερούσαντο, chosen to describe their earlier dancing. Hesiod shows no such hesitancy to unite the two actions of dancing and singing in the description of the Olympian Muses, whose dancing and singing in the passage above (68-71) are integrated harmoniously with Olympian ideals. In fact, judging from the lack of emphasis,
the dancing of the Olympian Muses (63 and 70-71) is secondary to their singing (e.g. 37, 41-42, 43-44, 48, 51, 60, 65-67 and 68-69). Finally, even the Muses' dancing-places underscore their fundamental difference. The Muses of Helicon dance in the wilds at night (10) in a setting which suggests an alignment with earth-deities and chthonic powers who thrive in darkness. In contrast, the "glistening" (λυπαρός; 63) dancing-places of the Olympian Muses near "beautiful" homes on "snowy" Olympus (62-63) further emphasize their allegiance with Zeus and the positive associations of his order.

In summary, the Heliconian Muses are sensual, feminine figures closely associated with wild nature. There is a concrete, disturbing element about them, which is evidenced by their more immediate, emotional effect on men. The Olympian Muses, on the other hand, are civilized figures, drawn into the masculine sphere, who dwell in houses on Mt. Olympus rather than in the wilds. As a specific part of the hierarchy of Zeus, they are more remote and tamer than their primitive Heliconian counterparts. There is even a social distinction. The Heliconian Muses breathe divine song into the mouths of rustics (26-32), while the Olympian Muses grant the gift of pervasive speech to princes (81-83). There is overlap, though, between the two sets of Muses, as in the passage where the Olympian Muses are conceived concretely as the bringers of forgetfulness of sorrows (Th. 98-103) and where poet and king are seen to exercise their powers from that flow of words which comes from the Muses (80-84 and 94-97). Although the beauty of the Olympian Muses is more abstract than physical, appearing primarily as a talent for song (e.g. ἔρατην... δοσαν: "lovely voice"; Th. 65; cf. 67 and 104) and inspired speech (e.g. μαλακοῦ... ἐπεσειον: "soft words"; Th. 90; cf. 83-84 and 97), it is conveyed in concrete terms which contain much of the sensuality more insistently associated with the Heliconian Muses (e.g. Th. 3, 5, and 8). Nor should we forget that the Olympian Muses dwell near the Graces and Himerus on Olympus (64) and that one is named Erato (78). The Heliconian Muses, in like manner, though not fully assimilated into the Olympian Hierarchy, are still daughters of Zeus (25 and 29) and supporters of his order (11-21 and 33). Though conceived
in strongly physical terms, they are powerful to impart the supernatural gift of poetic inspiration (31-33).

The Muses really represent two levels of religious experience and provide a striking example of the tension or ambivalence which appears in Hesiod's poetry when these two levels are interwoven. Hesiod has commingled the two sets of Muses into one Muse who faces in two directions - backward to an older level of religious experience so appealing to the poet and forward to what Hesiod sees must be the order of the new day. Hesiod listens to one Muse, but she speaks with two voices.

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NOTES


2) Traditionally the functions of poet and seer are in many ways extensive. For the poetry-prophecy complex in early song, see E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Boston 1957) 80-82.

3) Cf. the lyric fragments: "Cretan girls dancing with tender feet around a lovely altar and pressing the soft, smooth flowers of the grass" and Sappho's "Come hither, soft Graces and lovely-tressed Muses," E. Lobel and D. Page, Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta (Oxford 1955) 294 and 92. Hesiod also calls the Muses "gold-filleted" (χρυσόμυλη; Th. 916), thus associating them with other recipients of χρυσό-epithets, notably Pandora (Op. 74; Th. 578) and Aphrodite (e.g. Th. 822). Cf. Th. 17 and 136. On their simplest level responses to physical and poetic beauty are closely related. On the physical basis of poetry's effect, see E. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Oxford 1963) 145-160, esp. 153-155, and E. Kris, Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art (New York 1952) 300-302.

4) There is no scholarly consensus concerning the relationship of Muses and nymphs. On their similarity, see, for example, Mayer in RE s.v. "Musai" 16.1 (1933) cols. 692-693; Kurt Latte, "Hesioids Dichterweihe," Antike und Abendland 2 (1946) 156-158; F. Krafft, Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod (Göttingen 1963) 145 (for the permutability of their names); and West (Theogony) 154-155. Denying a similarity are Wilamowitz, Der Glaube de Hellenen (Berlin 1931) I, 184; and Karl Deichgräber, "Die Musen, Nereiden und Okeaniden in Hesioids Theogonie," AbhMainz (1965) 203, n. 1. Whatever the objective reality may have been, Hesiod's poetic vision seems to have commingled the two kinds of creatures. Support for this view is found in Athanasios Kambylis, Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik (Heidelberg 1965) 39 and 46, who speaks of an "encounter."

5) Cf. the description of the "clear-voiced" nymphs dancing at night around a mountain stream in h. Pan. (19) 19-20. Hesiod links the Muses to mountain nymphs in fr. 26 (10-12); R. Merkelbach and M. L. West, Fragmenta Hesiodea (Oxford 1967) 17:

\[\tau\alpha]l ðο ... Νυμφάων καλλιπ[λο]κάμ[ώ]ν συνοπηδο[ι]


...... ξοχο[ν Π]αρνησσο[υ] τ` ἀκορα κάρηνα

The attractive etymology of "mountain-goddess" for Muse (L. mons) is now largely obsolete: Emile Boisacq, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque (Heidelberg/Paris 1923) 647. For other suggested etymologies of Muse, see Eike Barmeyer, Die Musen (Munich 1968) 53-54.

6) There is a distinct break after line 35 when Hesiod shifts focus from the Heliconian to the Olympian Muses and repeats in a new context the opening invocation. Cf. Th. 1 ("From the Heliconian Muses let us begin to sing") and 36-37 ("Come thou, let us begin with the Muses who gladden the great spirit of their father Zeus in Olympus with their songs"). For the sake of discussion, we may speak of two proems (1-35 and 36-115), although the two passages form a unified whole and represent the same synthesis of old deities and new religious concepts which can also be seen in such figures as the Fates (Th. 217 and 904) and Styx (Th. 777-778 and 385-386). A survey of the most important scholarship on the proem is found in Peter Walcot, "The Problem of the Prooemium of Hesiod's Theogony," Symbosl 33 (1957) 37-47. Among the recent scholars who have argued for a unified proem are William W. Minton, "The Proem-Hymn of Hesiod's Theogony," TAPA 101 (1970) 357-377; and W. J. Verdenius, "Notes on the Proem of Hesiod's Theogony," Mnemosyne 25 (1972) 225-260.

7) The concreteness of the Muses' gifts suggests the effects of wine and drugs. Cf. Op. 614 and Od. 4.221. When Hesiod calls the Muses a λησμοσύνην τε κακών ἀμπαμά τε μεριμνάων (Th. 55), he uses abstractions which are absent from the rest of the Hesiodic corpus and from Homer. For the untraditional elements in Hesiod's account of the Muses, see G. S. Kirk, "The Structure and Aim of the Theogony," Hésiode et son influence (Entretiens Fondation Hardt 7; Geneva 1962) 77-78. James G. Frazer (ed.), Pausanias' Description of Greece (Cambridge 1897; Reprint New York 1965) V, 141, 147-148 and 150-152, describes in detail the archaeological remains, excavated by the French School from 1888-1891, of the Muses' temples at Thespiae and in the grove of the Muses on Helicon. Little but the foundations of these temples remain. See also Peter Levi (ed.), Pausanias: Guide to Greece (Penguin; Middlesex, England 1971), I, 364 n. 143 and 369 n. 160, who has been unable to add anything significant to what Frazer said. For the antiquity of the cult of the Muses on Helicon, see Martin Nilsson, Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung (Leipzig 1906) 440; Mayer in RE a.Ü. "Musai" 16.1 (1933) cols. 696-698; Peter Walcot, Hesiod and the Near East (Cardiff 1966) 166; and West (Theogony) 152. The antiquity of the cult of the Heliconian Muses may be reflected in the mythological tradition, related by Paus. 9.29.1-2, which credits Otus and Ephialtes and Oeocles, the son of Poseidon and the nymph Ascra, with both the founding of Ascra and the establishment of the cult of the Muses on Helicon.

8) Paus. 9.29.2, for example, gives the names of the original three Muses of Helicon as Melete (Meditation), Mneme (Memory) and Aoede (song), and it is noteworthy that the Chapel of the Holy Trinity (Hagia Triada)

9) See West (*Theogony*) 152 and 174. When Hesiod calls the Heliconian Muses "Olympian" (25), this is a device, a kind of bridge, which connects the local Muses with the Muses of the new (Olympian) order. Hesiod knew what he was doing when he drew no sharp distinctions between the Olympian and Heliconian Muses. The awkwardness in the transition, however, is proof of the difference between the Muses of the wilds and the Muses who should fit into the hierarchy of the Hesiodic scheme.

10) Helicon may be derived from the word for "willow"; see Boisacq (above, note 5) s.v. "ἐλυκη" 243. Hesiod's description of the Heliconian Muses is echoed in h. *Var. 5.257-261 in the description of the nymphs who inhabit a "great and holy" (μέγα τε ζάθεος) mountain and dance their fair (καλός) dances among the immortals. The life-span of these nymphs is mirrored in the growth and decay of their individual trees (264-272). On the connection of trees and nymphs, see Richard Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford 1896) II, 427-429. For ancient tree and stone cults in general, see Edward M. Bradley, *Theogony 35,* *SymbOlo 44* (1969) 12-14 and Martin Nilsson, *Greek Folk Religion* (New York 1940) 8-18, who discusses the relics of these cults in modern Greece. One primitive idol at Thespiae was a branch worshipped as an image of Hera (Arn. *Adv.Nat. 6.11*).

11) Plutarch (*Amat. 1*) relates that a joint festival in honor of the Muses and Eros, called the Erotidia, was celebrated every four years at Thespiae. Cf. *Paus. 9.31.3.* Eros, as an unwrought stone (*Paus. 9.27.1*), seems to have been a divinity of procreation much like Priapus. For the connection of the Muses with prostitution, see J. S. Morrison, "Pythagoras of Samos," *CQ* 50 (1956) 145. The nymphs were also associated with herms in general. A fourth century Arcadian herm dedicated to a trinity of unspecified nymphs is described by Constantine Rhomaios, "Arcadian Herms," *Archaiologike Ephemeris* (1911) 154.

12) Some simple altars of Zeus on mountain tops, as a characteristic of the aniconic stage of Greek religion, are discussed by Arthur Bernard Cook, *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* (Cambridge 1914) I, 117-121 and II.2 (1925) 898. The many interpretations of Th. 35, surveyed by West (167-169), include: to talk of ancient things (because man was born in the wild or from trees); to recite oracles (since Dodona is indicated by the oak and Delphi by the rock); to chatter like lovers among trees or rocks; to talk about simple, country matters; to talk about one's private affairs; to be distant from mankind among rocks and trees; and to relate what no one will believe. West (169) emphatically states "Anyone who attempts to explain how Hesiod's expression came to have one of these senses or some other sense, should in future take note of the fact that περι with the accusative in early epic always has a local sense; so that the phrase is not simply 'about', i.e. concerning, tree and rock, but 'round'. The original meaning of δρυς was simply 'tree', so that the species 'oak' may have no significance." Further support for the interpretation offered in this paper is given by Edward Bradley (above, note 10) 7-22, who suggests that the phrase originated in an allusion to the forms and concepts of an animistic religion (e.g. the "tree" and "rock" are Dodona and Delphi), viewed later with scepticism, and that it came to mean superstitious be-
lief in improbable divine forces; and Heinz Hofmann, "Hesiod Theogonie 35," Gymnasium 78 (1971) 90-97, who interprets the line literally as the physical characteristics of the wilderness which Hesiod must leave to practice his new calling as poet. We need not look so far afield as Delphi and Dodona to substantiate this phrase's connection with trees and rocks, however. Nor is the line only to be interpreted as a change of life-style; rather it marks a shift in religious focus from the "tree" and "rock" of Helicon's primitive cults to the enlightened theology of Olympus.

13) Hesiod's use of περί with "tree" and "rock" is significant because it appears to be unique. The Homeric preposition is ἀπό (e.g. Od. 19.163), which is also used in a number of later instances of this phrase: e.g. Pl. Apol. 34D, Resp. 8.544D, and Plut. Mor. 608C. Other appearances of this phrase, surveyed by West (167-169), are written in a variety of constructions and hold various meanings: Pl. Phdr. 275BC, Plut. Mor. 1083D, Lucr. 5.130, Cic. Acad. 2.101 and Juv. 6.12 et al.


15) Energy or power is the basis of all magic. T. C. Lethbridge, Witch-see (Secaucus, N.J., 1962) 145-147 points out the antiquity of the belief that power can be obtained by increasing the current in human bodies through wild dancing or other ecstatic activity. Oesterley (above, note 14) 89-90 suggests that dances around springs and wells may have originated in the belief that the water itself was a living organism possessing will and prophetic power. In addition to the emphasis on water in the account of the Muses' dancing and bathing, Hesiod also depicts the inspiration they impart as a flow of liquid. Cf. Th. 83-84 and 97. For the Muses as earth-goddesses: "denn das fließende Wasser hat chthonische Bedeutung", see Otto Kern, Die Religion der Griechen [1926] (Berlin 1963) 1, 208.

16) The verb ῥόωμαι and its compound ἐπιρρόωμαι (see LSJ s.v.) are words of various meanings indicating rapid movement of some sort. The verb is used of dancing with quick steps and when it is used to signify such action in the early texts, in each case it is the nymphs who perform the action. In addition to Th. 8 and h.Yen. 5.261 supra, cf. Il. 24.616 (Νυμφών, αἱ ἄμφο Ἀχέλων ἔρρωσαντο). In a late text (Anth. Pal. 9.403.3), the verb is used of Dionysus in a context that implies music and unfettered motion of the feet (λεύκωσαν πόδα γαύρον, ἐπιρρόωμαὶ δὲ χορείν). This may support the contention that the verb is used properly in contexts in which the dancing is of an unrestrained or orgiastic nature. Cf. the dancing of Pan in h.Pan. (19) 22-23.

17) The large number of weather-epithets for Zeus in Hesiod (e.g. Th. 41, 558 and 730) attests to his origins as a sky-god. For mention of the major weather-cults of Zeus, see Parnell (above, note 10) I, 42-52, esp. 50-52, and Nilsson (above, note 10) 6-8. The cults of Zeus Lycaeus in Arcadia, Laphystius in Boeotia, Acraeus in Thessaly and Panhellenius on Aegina were associated with mountain tops and are thought to have involved rain-making magic.

Aux exemples de l’expression τὸ πάν τόδε (variante de τάδε πάντα), signifiant "l’univers", que M. L. West a relevés chez Platon pour appuyer indirectement la leçon τάδε dans le fragment 79 d’Héraclite, τάδε πάντα οἶκείς κεραυνός, on devrait ajouter un de plus: Τὸ γὰρ πάν τόδε τοτε μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς συμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτε δὲ ἀνήκεν (Politique, 269 c 4).

Cet exemple a, par rapport aux autres, l’avantage de figurer dans une phrase qui rappelle en partie le fragment susdit d’Héraclite. Des deux côtés, une volonté divine conduit le monde en marche. Platon appelle de son propre nom ce qui en tient lieu chez Héraclite. Quant à l’image de la direction d’un bateau, présente nécessairement dans οἶκείς, mais non pas dans συμποδηγεῖ et συγκυκλεῖ, on doit noter que, lorsque Platon, en poursuivant la narration de son mythe, arrive au point où Dieu laisse aller le monde à sa rotation rétrograde, il se le représente comme un pilote qui lâche la barre du gouvernail: ... τότε δὴ τοῦ παντὸς ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης, οἶον πηδαλίων οἶκος ἀφέμενος, εἰς τὴν αὐτὸν περιωπήν ἀπέστη (Politique, 272 e 3). L’image du pilote et du gouvernail, accompagnée cette fois de celles de la tempête et de l’océan, revient au moment où le démiurge, craignant que le monde livré à lui-même n’aille à sa perte totale, se rassied à son gouvernail: Διὸ δὴ καὶ τότ’ ἢδη θεὸς ὁ κοσμῆσας αὐτὸν, καθορῶν ἐν ἀπορίαις δύνα, κηδόμενος ἵνα μὴ κειμασθῆ ὑπὸ ταραχῆς διαλυθῆ εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀπειρον δύνα πάντων ὅπῃ, πάλιν ἐφεδρος αὐτῷ τῶν πηδαλίων γιγνόμενος... (Politique, 273 d 4-e 1). La conception du monde qui ressort de ces images est celle d’un vaisseau, de sorte que, quand Platon parle du monde en tant que αὐτοκράτωρ
τῆς αὐτοῦ πορείας (Politique, 274 a 5), l'idée sous-jacente est celle d'un bateau qui règle sa propre course sans l'intervention d'un pilote.

Mais Dieu n'est pas seulement un capitaine cosmique dans le mythe du Politique. Il est conçu aussi, dans ce qu'on a appelé la fable sociale de ce mythe, comme pasteur du troupeau humain: θεός ἐνεμεν αὐτοὺς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν, καθάπερ νῦν ἄνθρωποι, ἦσον ὁν ἔτερον θεϊότερον, ἄλλα γένη φαυλότερα αὐτῶν νομεύονσι (Politique, 271 e 5). La section du mythe qui contient ce passage a été rapprochée de Critias, 109 b 6-c 4, où il est question de dieux qui paissent les hommes comme ceux-ci paissent les animaux: ... οἷον νομῆς ποίμνια, κτήματα καὶ θρέμματα ἑαυτῶν ἡμῶς ἔτεροι (sc. θεοί), πλήν οὐ σῶμασι σώματα βιαζόμενοι, καθαπέρ ποιμένες κτήνη πληγῇ νέμοντες, ἀλλ' ἡ μάλιστα εὐστροφον ζῷον, ἐκ πρόμνιν ἀπευθύνοντες οἷον οἰκιίς πειθοὶ, ψυχῆς ἐφαπτόμενοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν, οὕτως ἄγοντες τὸ θηντὸν πᾶν ἐκυβέρνων. Il est à remarquer qu'ici aussi s'introduit l'image du pilote; les pasteurs divins sont comparés à des pilotes qui gouvernent leur navire du haut de la poupe. Quant à l'expression κτήνη πληγῇ νέμοντες, elle a été unanimement considérée comme une référence au fragment 80 d'Héraclite: πὰν ἔρπετὸν πληγῇ νέμεται. Par ailleurs, il y a ceux qui voient dans ce fragment un corollaire du fragment 79. M. Marcovich, qui les classe ensemble, dit: 7) "I think that πληγῇ might hint at πληγῇ κεραυ- νοῦ, 'stroke of the thunderbolt.' Consequently, the saying might imply: Thunderbolt (Fire) is the Supreme Guide (Shepherd) of mankind."

Le but des rapprochements qui précèdent a été d'éclaircir l'arrière-plan des associations qui sous-tendent la phrase du Politique: τὸ γὰρ πὰν τόδε... αὐτὸς ὁ θεός συμποδηγεῖτι πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ. Reposant ainsi sur une base élargie, cette phrase a plus de chances d'être considérée comme une réplique du fragment d'Héraclite τάδε πάντα σιακίζει κεραυνός.
NOTES

1) C'est du sens de "tout ce qui est là", "tout ce qu'on peut saisir par la vue", que s'est développé celui de "tout ce qui est". C'est comme si le philosophe qui s'en sert se mettait à la place d'un observateur qui, du haut d'une élévation et en montrant ce qui est sous ses yeux, prononce les mots: "tout ce qui est là", tel le diable dans la scène de la tentation de Jésus (Mt. 4:8-9).


4) Cf. δοσιν γάρ ἢγονται τὸ πᾶν ἐλναι ἐν πορείᾳ (Cratyle, 412 d 1).

5) M. Marcovich, cité d'après l'édition de 1967, p. 424, dira à propos de περαινθος dans fr. 79: "Namely, the thunderbolt is Zeus' main weapon and, pars pro toto, recalls easily the idea of Zeus as the Supreme Divinity".

6) Cf. l'équivalent tardif αὐτοκυβερνήτης.

7) Marcovich, op. cit., p. 430.
Performance

The ode was intended to be performed at the inauguration of Aristagoras as prytanis (cf. K.P. IV, 1206.44ff.) at Tenedos. As we do not know the programme of such inaugurations (εἰσιτήρια), the time of the performance cannot be determined. There will probably have been a banquet, but the view expressed by Dionysius of Phaselis and Didynus that the song belonged to the genre of paroinia (similarly Bury, 217) seems to be a mere deduction from vv. 6-10 (cf. Puech, 141-2). That it was performed in the Prytaneum appears from the beginning of the poem.

Date

It is by no means certain that N.11 is a work of Pindar's old age, as is commonly assumed. A connection with fr. 123 cannot be established (see the commentary on 11 Ἀρκεσίλαον), and even if Aristagoras was a brother of Theoxenus, no chronological conclusion can be drawn from fr. 123: cf. Farnell, II, 325, B. A. van Groningen, Pindare au banquet (Leiden 1960), 79, de Vries, 153-4. Similarities between N.11 and other odes do not prove anything: H. A. Pohlsander, "The Dating of Pindaric Odes by Comparison", GRBS 4 (1963), 131-40, has pointed out that "Pindaric odes widely separated by time can show considerable similarities of thought or diction. Thus we must reject the comparison of parallels within Pindar not only as a means of dating N.3 and N.11 but as an approach to Pindaric chronology generally" (139; cf. also Fogelmark, 84-5).
The metre (dactyloepitrite) does not present special difficulties. It may be noted that at 5 etc. choriambi appear between epitrites, a fact which supports the view of those who accept the correspondence of these metres.

Commentary


1: ά τε. For survivals of epic τε cf. Denn., 523-4; not all his examples of a use "in general statements" in Pindar are equally convincing: here (and e.g. at 0.2, 35, 0.14, 2) the function is more likely to be emphatic with a slightly causal nuance (Denn., ibid.). See also C. J. Ruijgh, Autour de TE épique (Amsterdam 1971), 981ff., who thinks that the relative sentence is digressive and denotes a permanent fact.


1: λέλογχας. Properly 'have obtained as your portion', when the parts of the world were distributed among the gods (cf. Hom. II. 15, 190, Hes. Th. 393-6, Pind. O. 7, 55-9, A. Pr. 229-31), but the perfect often means 'to have under one's care' and is especially used of tutelary deities (e.g. O. 9, 15, H.Hom. 19, 6, Hdt. VII 53, 2, Pl. Tím. 23d 7).

2: ὑψίστον. A traditional epithet of Zeus (LSJ 2) based on the Homeric ὑπάτος, ἡμενος ὑπη, ὑψομεμέτης, ὑψίζωνος, etc. Similarly, N. 1, 60, O. 4, 1. See further Bowra, Pindar, 45, Fogelmark, 49ff., H. Schwabl, Zeus, R.E. Suppl. XV (1978), 1275.28ff.

2: ὑμοθρόνου. Although gods are represented as sitting on the same throne (e.g. Hades and Persephone), the element -θρόνος refers to rulership rather than to a concrete seat: cf. A. Ag. 43, 109, Cho. 975, S. O.R. 237, O.C. 425.

3: εὖ. Equivalent to εὐνώς (cf. LSJ I 2).

3: δέξαι. H. Meyer, Hymnische Stilelemente in der frühgriechischen Dichtung (Würzburg 1933), 64, points out that this forms the connection between the hymnic beginning and the theme of the song, just as O. 5, 3 δέξειν, O. 13, 29 δέξαι, P. 8, 5 δέκεν.

3: ἡλαμον. Not necessarily a shrine within the Prytaneum: at O. 6, 1 ἡλαμος is the whole house (cf. LSJ I 3 and the similar use of μέγαρον O. 6, 2, P. 3, 134). Miller, op. cit. (above on 1 πρυτανεία), 36, writes: "One should expect with some probability a prytaneion to have two
main rooms (the dining room and the room of the hearth)"). Farnell is more explicit: "we do not hear of separate chapels within the Town-Hall, though there may have been a barrier round the sacred fire; if so, this spot would be in a special sense her 'thalamos'". I doubt this last conclusion: δέ-ξει or obviously refers not only to the installation, but also to the tenure of office, and this was performed in the whole building (cf. schol. Εις τό πρωτανείον).


4: σκάπτω. Not of Aristagoras (Fränkel, 572), but of Hestia. Farnell suggests that this is an imaginary picture, because statues of Hestia were comparatively rare. Cf. Wilamowitz, Glaube d.Hell., I, 156: "ein Bild der Göttin neben den Herd zu stellen, der sie ist, würde widersinnig sein". But Pausanias (I 18, 3) mentions a statue of Hestia in the Prytaneeum at Athens, and if we assume the performance of the song to have taken place in the town-hall, as the invocation of Hestia seems to imply, a reference to an invisible sceptre would have been rather confusing.

5: γεραίροντες. The force of the participle (their rule is accompanied by their worship) is lost in such translations as 'They honour you and keep Tenedos upright' (Bowra), 'who guard the glory of Tenedos and often honor you' (Nisetich). In a Greek sentence the main idea is often expressed by the participle: cf. K.G. II, 98-9, Schw. II, 389, and my note on Men. Epitr. 219-20, Mnemos. IV 27 (1974), 27. This is well rendered by Lattimore: 'who honor you as they keep Tenedos upright'.

5: ὀρθάν. 'Upright', hence 'safe', 'prosperous' (LSJ III 1). Cf. N. 1, 15 Ευκελλάν πίειραν ὀρθόσειν, I. 6, 65 ὀρθώσαντες οἶκον. Lefkowitz (51) wrongly translates 'on a straight path'. Péron (119 n. 1, 283-4) thinks that ὀρθάν refers either to the direction or to the position of a ship, because φυλάττειν is sometimes used of a steersman (116 n. 7). But in connection with a town the verb most probably means 'to guard' (cf. e.g. A. Sept. 135-6 πόλιν... φυλάξειν κήδεσαι τε) and in connection with a predicate 'to maintain', 'to preserve' (cf. LSJ B 3). The predicate is used in a resultative sense: cf. O. 10, 95 τρέφοντι δ' εὖρυ κλέος, K.G. I, 276, Bruhn, §9, Schw. II, 181 (who wrongly call this use 'proleptic').

6: πολλά. Equivalent to πολλάκις (LSJ III 1a).
6: ἀγαξόμενοι. An unusual word, perhaps chosen because it sounds more subdued (or austere) than ἀγαλλόμενοι.

6: πρῶταν. Not 'the first of the gods' (Bury) or 'the first of goddesses' (Bowra), but 'before the other gods' and to be connected with ἀγαξόμενοι: cf. schol. ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἥρχοντο and Ἡ. Ἑμ. 29, 4-6 ou γὰρ ἄτερο σοῦ/ἐιλαπιναὶ ὑπητοσίν ἵν᾽ οὗ πρῶτη πυμάτη τε/Ἐστὶν ἄρχομενος σπένδει μεληθέα οἶνον (see also Allen ad loc.), S. fr. 726 πρῶτα λοιβὴς Ἐστία (and Pearson ad loc.).

7: κνίσα. Lefkowitz (51) suggests that men who worship a deity with burnt offerings are 'celebrating death and the gods' gift to them of life', but her references to Vernant (Mythe et pensée, 142) and Burkert (Homo necans, 158-9) do not prove anything.

7: λύρα. Musicality is a topos in the praise of cities and rulers: cf. O. 1, 17, O. 11, 18-9, G. van N. Viljoen, Pindaros se tiende en elfde Olympièse odes (Leiden 1955), 24-5.

7: οἵτινε. Usually taken to be a dative of interest, but more probably a dativus auctoris (βρέμεται being equivalent to 'is played'): cf. S. Ai. 970 θεοῖς τέθυμεν, K.G. I, 423, Bruhn, 547, and my note on Men. Epitr. 534, Mnemos. IV 27 (1974), 37. A possessive dative seems to me less likely in this connection, and is to be generally suspected (although it is assumed by Schw. II, 189: but see K.G. I, 429-30).

7: βρέμεται. This verb seems to be more appropriate to the sound of a stringed instrument (cf. N. 9, 8 βρομίαιν ψύμιγγα) and the aulos (cf. Cat. 64, 264 stridebat tibia) than to songs. De Vries (152) speaks of a σεγμα, but the word could apparently refer to resounding voices (cf. 'to peal'). Slater's translation 'murmur' is correct at P. 11, 30, but absurd in the present passage.

8: Ἑνίου. Hospitality is a topos in the praise of cities and rulers: cf. O. 1, 16, O. 2, 6 and 93-4, O. 3, 40, N. 5, 8, I. 2, 39, Viljoen, op. cit. (above on 7 λύρα), 23 n. 31.

8: Διός. Themis is a wife of Zeus (fr. 30, 5, Hes. Th. 901) and his paredros (O. 8, 22). In the present passage, just as at E. Med. 208 τὰν θνὸς ὥρκιαν θέμιν, their relationship is not specified, but the genitive certainly has possessive force (as in Ἴ. 6, 460 Ἑκτορος ἢκε γυνῃ) and should not be connected with τραπέζας (as is done by Sandys, who refers to Athen. IV 143f., and Bowra).

8: Θέμις. Most editors do not print this word with a capital, because ἀνικεῖται cannot mean 'is worshipped' but only 'is cultivated', 'is practised': cf. Hdt. I 96, 2 δικαίοσύνην ἢκε, LSJ II 2 (Slater's
translation 'honour' is misleading). In that case the word may be translated by 'order' or 'law'. But at O. 8, 21-2 Σώτειρα Διός Εξενίου / πάρεδρος ἀσκεῖται θέμις she is both a personal deity and an abstraction. This is considered by Farnell to be "one of the signs of a hurried composition", but he has overlooked the fact that a similar ambiguity is to be found at P. 3, 108-9 τὸν δ' ἀμφέποντι αἰεὶ φοράσιν / δαίμον' ἀσκήσω, N. 7, 4 τεάν ἀδέλφεαν ἐλάχιστον ἁγιάζων Ἡβαν, Hes.

Op. 222-4 Ἡ (Dike) δ' ἐπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ηθεά λαοῖν, / ἡέρα ἐσσαμένη, κακῶν ἀνθρώπων φέρουσα, / οί τε μιν ἐξελάσοσι καὶ οὖν ἰδείαν ἐνείμαν, 763-4 φήμη δ᾿ οὖ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυτα, ἆντινα πολλοῖ / λαοὶ φημίξωσι. θεός νῦ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτῆς, Th. 231-2 "Οροκῆν θ’, δὲ δὴ πλείστον ἐπιχθόνιους ἀνθρώπους / πημαίνει, οτὲ κέν τις ἐκὼν ἐπίσημον ὰμόσησι (similarly Hdt. VI 86 γ, 2, Aesch. Ctes. 233). The law of hospitality, just as δική, is a principle, but this principle is so fundamental that it is considered to be a divine power, and as soon as a divine power becomes operative in a striking way it is imagined as a divine person. Cf. Wilamowitz, 202: "Was lebt und wirkt, wird als persönlich gefühlt: darum ist es pervers, von Personifikation zu reden'. See also F. Dornseiff, Pindars Stil (Berlin 1921), 50ff., Farnell, II, 467ff., Duchemin, 125ff., W. Fötcher, "Das Person-Bereichdenken in der frühgriechischen Periode", WS 72 (1959), 5-25. For the association of hospitality with righteousness (i.e. giving others their due) cf. O. 2, 6 διὶ δίκαιον εξένων ('strict in his consideration of strangers'), N. 4, 12 δίκα ξεναρχεῖ."
arguments to the wish proper (Denn., 15-6). In the present case these conditions do not apply, but 9-10 forms the continuation of the wish expressed at 3-4. For progressive ἀλλὰ cf. Denn., 21-2.


9-10: τέλος... περάσατι. The translation 'reach the end' (de Vries, 151, Nisetich) is misleading, because (1) τέλος properly means 'fulfilment', hence 'performance of a task', 'office' (LSJ I 3), and (2) περάσω properly means 'to traverse' and so refers to the whole term of office (LSJ I 3 seem to me wrong in classing the present passage with S. O.R. 1530 τέρμα τοῦ βίου περάση and E. 'Andr. 101-2 τὴν τελευταίαν... περάσας ἡμέραν). Cf. schol. τὴν προτανεῖαιν.

10: περάσατι. For infinitives in prayers cf. P. 1, 68, K.G. II, 22-3. Some editors read περάσατι (opt.), but the subject is more likely to be the whole Council: 11 ἀνδρα marks the point where the attention is focussed on Aristogoras.

10: σὺν. Not to be altered into νῦν, for (1) the subject αὐτοῦς is easily supplied from the preceding lines, and (2) repetition of words is avoided by Pindar only in the case of proper names and important apellatives (Schmid, Gesch.d.gr.Lit., I, 610 and n. 5): cf. P. 9, 112-4 γάμον... γάμον, N. 3, 28-30 φέρειν... φέρειν, N. 8, 41-2 ἀνδρῶν... ἀνδρῶν, Schroeder, Prolegomena, 43-4. For the resultative use of σὺν cf. Hes. Op. 119 σὺν ἐσθλοῖσθαι, Theogn. 50 κέρδεα ἐνιοσώφ σὺν κακοῖ ἐρχόμενα, S. Ant. 172 ὠλοντο σὺν μιᾶσματι, LSJ A 6.

10: ἀτρώτῳ. 'Without annoy' (Fennell; similarly Puech 'dans la paix du coeur') is too weak: Τιτρώσκω originally means 'to damage' (LSJ 2, e.g. Hdt. VIII 18 αἰ ἡμίσεα ἡ εἷς νεῶν τετρωμέναι ἡσαν), and here the meaning is 'not injured by misfortunes or sharp criticisms': cf. I. 3, 18 αἴων δὲ κυλινδομέναις ἀμέραις ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἐξάλλαξεν ἀτρωτοῖ γε μᾶν παίδες θεῶν (I doubt whether Bowra, Pindar, 116, is right in concluding that "the truly noble", just as Aristogoras, "do not take injuries to heart"). It is not correct to say that ἀτρώτῳ repeats the idea of σὺν δόξα in a negative form (Mezger, followed by Fennell and Bury).

11: ἀνδρα. Equivalent to αὐτόν: cf. P. 1, 69, P. 2, 29, and my note on Pl. Prot. 309a 3 in Studia Platonica: Festschrift H. Gundert (Amsterdam 1974), 41. The word must refer to Aristogoras, as appears from the identity of 12 δέμας and 13 μορφα. The accusative is not an acc. of respect ('As for the man...'), for we can hardly supply 'as contrasted
with the goddess' (as is suggested by Mezger, who is followed by Bury and Fränkel, 572-3), but we have to assume a σχῆμα καθ’ δίλον καὶ μέρος (cf. K.G. II, 289-90, Schw. II, 81; rightly explained as a form of 'paraphrase' by B. A. van Groningen, Mnemos. III 9, 1941, 275; Lefkowitz, 52 n. 19, wrongly calls πατέρα, δέμας, and ἄτρεμιαν accusatives of respect).

For the father as μέρος cf. Wilamowitz, 431 n. 1: 'der Vatersname ist kurz für die Abstammung gesetzt, die sozusagen ein Teil des Mannes ist'.

For μακαρίζω with double accusative ἄρ. Vesp. 588 is the only exact parallel (if Reiske's emendation is accepted; Bury wrongly thinks that τοῦτο is a cognate object equivalent to τοῦτὸν τὸν μακαρισμόν). But at 30-1 μέωσομαι (which is the reverse of μακαρίζω) has the same construction. Lefkowitz (loc. cit.) compares A. Pr. 340 τὰ μὲν σι’ ἐπαινῶ, but there τὰ μὲν is adverbial ('on the one hand'). S. Al. 1381 πάντ᾽ ἔχω σι’ ἐπαινέσαι and Pl. Symp. 222a 7 ἄ ἐγὼ Σωκράτη ἐπαινῶ are no convincing parallels either, for πάντα and ἄ are more obviously accusatives of respect.

Pennell writes: "I cannot see the point of congratulating the son upon his father, who kept him from winning the Olympian and Pythonian games (v. 22)" (similarly de Vries, 152). But praise of the father is a topos in the victory ode: cf. e.g. O. 7, 17, P. 11, 43, N. 4, 13, I. 1, 34; see further Thummer, I, 49ff. Besides the father's hesitation with regard to his son's athletic chances hardly detracts from his general laudability.

11: μακαρίζω. C. de Heer, Μάκαρ - εὐδαίμων - ἀλβοσ - εὐ-
τυχής (Amsterdam 1968), 31-2, points out that μάκαρ usually implies the idea of divinity or at least of a status resembling that of the gods, and that such a suggestion is ruled out by vv. 13-6. He therefore concludes that the verb may be connected with μακάριος, a word which is less heavily loaded, as appears from P. 5, 46.

11: μέν. Not to be connected with 12 καὶ... τε (Mezger), but with 13 δέ.

11: 'Ἀρκεσίλαν. Some editors read 'Αγησίλαν (B) or (for metrical reasons) 'Αγεσίλαν, but the fact that Pindar's beloved Theoxenus of Tenedos was a son of Hagesilas (fr. 123, 15) has been used to satisfy sentimental romanticism (a handsome boy son of a handsome father, and ἔρω-
των as a personal confession: cf. Fränkel, 575: "Obwohl allgemein formuliert, klingt die Schlusswendung wie ein Ausbruch persönlichen Gefühls") rather than to build up a solid argument. Turyn rightly observes: "cum in scholiis p. 187, 8 et 187, 9 bis nomen in utroque codice BD casu accu-
sativo ἀρκεσίλαν legatur, dubium non est, quin v. 11 'Ἀρκεσίλαν (non
'Ἀγεσίλαον) sit legendum'.

12: ἰδέα. Bury (216) writes: "The island of Tenedos, noted for the beauty of its women (Athen. XIII, 609e), was perhaps a land of handsome men also" (similarly Mezger, 481). But cases of individual beauty were thought worth mentioning, and not only by Pindar (e.g. O. 8, 19, O. 9, 65): cf. the epigram from the first half of the 5th cent. quoted by Lefkowitz (52 n. 19): παίδε... κάλλιστον μὲν ἰδέιν, ἀθλεῖν δ' οὖ χείρωνα μορφής. The Greek admiration for physical beauty is strikingly illustrated by an extreme case mentioned by Herodotus (V 47, 2): a citizen from Croton was worshipped as a hero after his death at Segesta διὰ ἐωυτοῦ κάλλος. See further my note on Tyr. 6-7 D., 9, Mnemos. IV 22 (1969), 342-3. Physical beauty was considered important for a magistrate: cf. Xen. Symp. 8, 40.

12: ἀτρεμίαν. Usually translated by 'fearlessness', but 'calmness', 'composure' is more correct and better suits his function.

12: σύγγονον. For the value attached by Pindar to inherited capacities (cf. P. 10, 12, N. 6, 8 τὸ συγγενές) see below on 33 πάλαι.

13: ὅ. Lefkowitz (51) wrongly translates 'If then...': ὅ has adversative (restrictive) force and answers 11 μὲν.

13: ὄλβον. Pindar often emphasizes the importance of wealth, but adds that it should be used to realize ἄρετή: cf. Gundert, 14, 28, 86-7, P. R. Colace, "Considerazioni sul concetto di πλούτος in Pindaro", Studi in onore di A. Ardissoni, II (Rome 1978), 737-45.


13: παραμεύσεται. Doric for παραμεῖβομαι (cf. R 1, 45 and fr. 23). Not a gnomic future (cf. K.G. I, 171-2), but rather a subjunctive of the aorist: cf. O. 6, 11, O. 7, 3, P. 4, 266 and 274, K.G. II, 474. The shift to the indicative ἐπέδειξεν cannot be explained by the assumption that the poet lost sight of the relative beginning of his sentence (as at O. 7, 6 and P. 4, 268), but may imply that v. 14 indicates a more firmly established fact than v. 13. B. Breyer's emendation ἐπιδείξῃ (Analecta Pindarica, Vratislava 1880, 26-7; similarly B. L. Gildersleeve, AJP 3, 1882, 440-1) is unnecessary.

13: ἄλλων. Not to be altered into ἄλλους or ἄλλον: the genitive
is used on the analogy of διαφέρονται τινος. Similarly ὑπερβάλλειν and καὶνυσθαι with genitive (K.G. I, 393).

14: βίαν. Used in a favourable sense ('strength'). The original meaning is 'natural or vital power': cf. LSJ I 1 and F. Stoessl, Die Sprache 6 (1959), 67-74.

15: ὅντα. Pindar points out man's mortality at P. 3, 59, I. 3, 23, I. 5, 16, etc., and it cannot be maintained that the emphasis is stronger here than elsewhere. Lefkowitz (52) argues that the tone of the famous beginning of N. 6 is more optimistic than that of N. 11, 13-6, but the two passages are hardly comparable: (1) N. 6, 6-7 does not refer to death, but to the unpredictability of the outcome of any human undertaking (as has been pointed out by Fränkel, Wege u. Formen, 30 n. 2), and (2) the point of N. 11, 15-6 is closely connected with 17-8, as appears from 17 ἀεὶ (omitted in Lefkowitz's quotation of the Greek text!). The force of ἀεὶ has been either neglected (e.g. by Fränkel, 574, who calls 15-6 "einen harten Umschlag" and simply remarks: "Die neue Triade hebt von frischem mit Festesklängen an") or taken to be (a) adversative, (b) explanatory (motivating), (c) consecutive. (a) Mezger assumes a contrast between 15 μεμνά-σω and 17 λόγοις, which is inept. Nisetich translates 'yet', which he explains (287) by "But death is no reason not to celebrate when the opportunity arises" (similarly de Vries, 151, 155). This idea seems to me too flat and trivial for Pindar. (b) Thummer (1, 76) translates μεμνά-σω by 'der mag sich getrost vor Augen halten', but the intention of the Greek cannot be to ease our mind. (c) is considered by Thummer in n. 53, but he again overstates his case (the importance of praise in a poem of celebration) by suggesting that the sadness of death is outshined by the joy of future fame. The train of thought seems to me to be as follows: 'Man's physical being is doomed to perish, and therefore his achievements have to be recorded', (so that he may still obtain some degree of immortality). The idea that immortality is to be secured by fame, and most effectively by a laudatory poem, is a topos in Pindar: cf. O. 7, 11 (where ἅπαξλειτος has a causative sense), O. 10, 91-6, N. 6, 30, N. 7, 12, N. 8, 40, Duchemin, 283-4. For the consecutive force of ἀεὶ cf. Denn., 170, and my notes on O. 12, 10, Zetesis: Album Amicorum E. de Stryoker (Antwerp-Utrecht 1973), 337, and Men. Epit. 332, Mnemos. IV 27 (1974), 31. Bowra (Pindar, 319) points out that in most poems the metrical division "corresponds neither with the grammatical structure of sentences nor with the flow of the sense" (though he is wrong in taking N. 11 to be an exception).
15: περιστέλλων. In spite of Emp. B 126 σαρκῶν ἄλλογνωτι περιστέλλουσα (sc. τὰς ψυχὰς) χιτῶνι, the phrase περιστέλλων μέλη cannot mean 'sterblicher Glieder Ummüllung tragend' (Werner; similarly Nisetic 'that he wears a mortal set of limbs'). The word probably refers to his robes of office worn at the installation (Mezger) and need not imply that Aristagoras was a 'glass of fashion' as well as a 'mould of form', somewhat of an 'exquisite' perhaps in personal adornment, or studious at least to compose the folds of his tunic and mantle for displaying most becomingly the graces of his limbs" (Bury, 217). The fact that περιστέλλω "can denote decking out a corpse" (Lefkowitz, 52) is irrelevant in this connection, for there is no evidence for the assumption that the word was especially used in this sense (Lefkowitz refers to Od. 24, 293 and S. Ant. 903, Αἱ. 821, 1170, but the passages from Sophocles do not, or not exclusively, refer to dressing).

16: τέλευτάν. Usually explained as quasi-adverbial, but more naturally to be taken as an apposition to γὰν. Pindar may have had Xenophanes B 27 ἐκ γαίης γάρ πάντα καὶ εἰς γῆν πάντα τέλευτά in mind. For reminiscences of the Presocratics in his poetry cf. Gundert, 55-7, Strohm, 20-3. The apposition is put at the beginning of the sentence for the sake of emphasis: cf. Ι. 3, 7 εὐκλέων δε ἔργων ἄποινα χρή μὲν ὤμησα τὸν ἔσολον. Lefkowitz (52) creates a structural phantom by assuming a connection between 9 τέλος and 16 τέλευταν.

16: ἐπιεισόμενος. The metaphor is based on II. 3, 57 λάϊνον ἐσο-σσο χιτῶνα and is first found in Alcaeus 129, 17. See further I. Waern, Γῆς ὀστέα: The Kenning in Pre-Christian Greek Poetry (Upsala 1951), 19-22.


17: ἀγαθοῖς. No enallage (Mezger and Bury with schol. ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν), but 'favourable': cf. O. 7, 10 φάμαι ἀγαθαί, I. 1, 46 ἐπος ἀγαθόν, I. 3, 3 ἀξίως εὐλογίας ἀστῶν μεμιχθαί. Pindar probably suggests that the name Aristagoras may have been understood as 'very well spoken about'. This seems to me more likely than the etymology 'mächtig im Rath' (Pape-Benseler) adopted by Barkhuizen, 86 (who may be right, however, in taking 14 ἄριστεύων to be another allusion to the name).

17: μὲν. This or νῦν (Puech) is a plausible emendation of μὲν (defended by Bury as emphatic): δαιδαλδέντα sc. μέλη (suggested by
LSJ) cannot serve as the object of μελιζέμεν. It is true that the object has sometimes to be supplied from the context (cf. K.G. II, 561-2), but this is easier if a related word (in this case the same word, but as a subject) precedes.

17: ἐπαὐνεῖσθαι. A certain emendation of αἴνεῖσθαι: at P. 5, 107 the MSS. have the same mistake.

17: χρεών. Contains an ambiguity: fame is necessary to obtain immortality (see above on 15 θνατά), but it is also due to the victor: cf. O. 1, 103, O. 3, 7, O. 8, 74, P. 8, 33, P. 9, 104, I. 1, 43, I. 3, 8, Gundert, 43.

18: μελιγδούποσι. The original meaning of δούπος, 'thud', 'roar', 'clash' is widened into 'booming sound' (see above on 7 βρέμεται). Cf. Dith. 2, 12 ἑρίγδοποι στοναχάι. Pindar likes to characterize the beauty of songs as 'sweet': cf. μελίγαρμος, μελίκομπος, μελίφθογγος and the frequent use of γλυκύς. See also M. Kaimio, Characterization of Sound in Early Greek Literature (Helsinki 1977), 158.

18: διδαλθέντα. 'Glorified': similarly O. 1, 105, O. 5, 21 Parth. 2, 32. The word does not imply 'skilfully' (Fränkel, 572 'mit kunstvollem Gesang').

18: μελιζέμεν. Not to be altered into μελίζειν or μέλειν ἐν (Bury, Lefkowitz, 52): for the synizesis in ἀουίδατις cf. I. 3, 17 τετραοριάν, Schroeder, Proleg., 25-6, 39. There is a pun in the juxtaposition of μελιγδούποσι and μελιζέμεν: cf. P. 1, 12 μῆλα... θέλγει and Barkhuizen, 104ff.

19: ἐκ περικτιῶνων. A brachylogy for 'gained from places inhabited by π.' or 'from games organized by π.' (cf. N. 2, 19 ἐξ άδηλων νίκαις ἐκόμιζαν). Fennell wrongly connects the phrase with ἐστεφάνωσαν and translates 'on the authority of'.


20: πάτραν. 'Clan' or (more probably) 'native land': cf. O. 8, 20 ἐξένεπε κρατέων πάλα δολιχήρετων Αἰγίναν πάτραν, P. 1, 32, P. 9, 73, N. 9, 12, I. 3, 12. See further W. Keuffel, Der Vaterlandsbegriff in der frühgriechischen Dichtung (Würzburg 1942), 32ff.

20: εὐώνυμον. Probably a resultative predicate (see above on 5 ὅρδαν), for Tenedos could hardly be considered famous in itself like Athens (N. 4, 19) and Aegina (N. 7, 85). Bury and Barkhuizen (89) take the word to allude to 33 Πεισάνδρου, which name forms a good omen for Aristagoras' function as prytanis, but apart from the question whether πάτραν refers to the clan, Pindar now concentrates on Aristagoras'
athletic, not his magisterial, qualities.

21: πάλα. 'On the occasion of...'. For this use of the dative cf. O. 1, 50 τραπέζαισι. O. 10, 76 δαλίαις, P. 1, 47 μάχαις, K.G. I, 445 (who do not clearly distinguish this use from the dative denoting attendant circumstances).

21: μεγαυχεῖ. 'Glorious' (similarly A. Pers. 642). At P. 8, 15 μεγάλαυχος means 'vainglorious': αὐχέω often means 'to boast', but the original meaning is 'to declare proudly or confidently' (whether or not rightly), so that at S. O.C. 713 αὐχημα has a favourable sense.

22: ἐλπίδες. The original meaning of ἐλπίς is 'supposition' (cf. ξενομαι at Il. 9, 40; 16, 281; 18, 194), of which 'expectation' is a specialization (Plato, Leg. 644c 9 defines it as δόξα μελλόντων). See further O. Lachnit, Elpis (Tübingen 1965), 3ff.

22: ὄνυνρότερα. 'Too hesitant': for this use of the comparative cf. K.G. II, 305, Schw. II, 184-5. Lefkowitz (53) observes that "this apology for non-accomplishment of deeds never attempted is unique", but does not explain why Pindar included it. A possible answer has been suggested by Gundert, Ill n. 40: "Fragt man, warum Pindar den Fall, der zumindest für die Eltern peinlich war, überhaupt erwähnt und so weit führt, so ist ein Hauptmotiv die Aufgabe des Dichters, verkannte Aretas zur Geltung zu bringen". This is a more plausible explanation than that given in Mnemosyonon (5-6), where he maintains that "fast zwei Drittel des Festlieds gelten dem Versäumnis der Eltern" and suggests that "es ist, als ob er [Pindar] den Anlass, dass er keine grösseren Siege hatte, geradezu gesucht hätte, um den Abgrund aufzureißen zwischen der lichten Welt des Adels und der Gottverlassenheit der Menschen". E. L. Bundy, Studia Pindarica (Berkeley-Los Angeles 1962), 48ff., has rightly pointed out that past misfortunes in the family are used as dark foils for present glory (although his view that the victory ode "is dedicated to the single purpose of eulogizing men and communities", 35, is untenable).

22: βίαν. See above on 14 βίαν.

23: πειράσθαι. One might expect the addition of μὴ, but this may be omitted if the infinitive is felt as an object: cf. E. Or. 263 σχῆμω σε πηδάν, K.G. II, 214-5, Schw. II, 598 (who compares Thuc. VII 33, 3 ἐπέσχον το εὐθέως τοις Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν).

24: γάρ. Explains ὄνυνρότερα (Bury) or (rather) the unexpressed idea of 'wrongly' (Pennell 'for else'): cf. Denn., 62-3, Bruhn, §114. Another possibility is to take γάρ as emphatic (γε + ἀρα): as such it often introduces emotional questions (Denn., 82-5) and it also occurs in
exclamations, usually preceded by Ἡ (Denn., 284); in the present passage
ναλ μά may be considered equivalent to Ἡ.

Hdt. VI 86, 2, and above on θέμις.

thinks that "these are accusatives of 'extent, range, sphere', like
tο ἦμαν μέρος", Bury and K.G. I, 317, call the accusative 'adverbial',
Farnell calls it 'absolute', Sch. II, 86, suggests that it originated from
a 'prosthetic' nominative. These explanations are unsatisfactory. I am
inclined to take the phrase as an apposition to the unexpressed internal
object of the sentence: cf. O. 7, 17 αἰνέως πυγμᾶς ἀποινα, K.G. I,
284-5, Bruhn, §11, Wilamowitz on E. H.F. 59 ἐλεγχον, Barrett on E. Ηηρρ.
757 ὑνασών.

24: παρὰ Κασταλία. The phrase 'if he had participated in the con-
tests' has to be supplied from the context: cf. K.G. II, 565, Bruhn, §199.


25: μολὼν. Sc. 'tither': cf. N. 5, 45 ἀλικας ὅ ἐλθόντας οἰ-
κοι τ' ἐκράτει, S. Αί. 854 νῦν μ' ἑπίσκεψαι μολὼν, K.G. II, 87.

26: ὁρισμῶν. The active form is not to be found elsewhere in the
classical period. The participle may have concessive force: cf. Schw. II,
389. It is certainly wrong to assume that the vanquished adversaries func-
tion "nicht mehr nur als Folie, sondern zugleich als Beispiel für die κε-
νεύσομενες αἷχαι der Sterblichen", as is suggested by H. Schmitz, Hypnos
und Bios (Bern 1970), 49.

27: ἑστάν. Apposition to the internal object of κωμᾶσαις (see
above on 24 ἦμαν δόξαν).

27: Ἡρακλέος. A genitivus auctoris: cf. O. 12, 15 τιμᾶ πορῶν,
2. For Heracles as founder of the Olympic games cf. O. 3, 11ff. For Pin-
dar's special regard for him cf. Bowra, Pindar, 45ff.

27: τέθμιον. 'Established', 'organized according to fixed rules'
(cf. O. 6, 69 τεθύμοις ἀέθλων), hence 'solemn'. The translation 'nach
der Satzung des Herakles' (Mezger), 'founded by Herakles' (Bowra; similarly
Lattimore, Misetich) is misleading.

28: ἀνδρασμένος κόμαν. 'Having his hair wreathed': similarly I.
1, 28 ἀνδρασμένοι, I. 2, 16, O. 7, 15 στεφανωσάμενον, O. 12, 17, N.
6, 21. For this use of the middle cf. δίδακεσθαι 'to have oneself
instructed', K.G. I, 113, 116, Schw. II, 232 (who in I, 757 wrongly as-
sumes a passive sense in στεφανωσάμενος), and my notes on Men. Επιτρ.
44 and 205, Mnemos. IV 27 (1974), 20 and 26. The force of ἀνα- may be explained from the fact that a wreath or a head-band (Il. 22, 469 ἀνα-δέσμη) makes the hair enclosed by it appear partly to rise above it.

28: ἐν. Bury rightly observes: "The expression loses its strength if we take ἐν as merely instrumental; the victor's locks are conceived as actually in the wreath of olive leaves". Cf. Il. 5, 386 ὅσοιν κρατε-ρῷ ἐνὶ δεσμῷ, and above on 17 ἐν.

28: πορφυρόεις. Not 'bound by purple fillets' (Slater, Lefkowitz, 53, following P. von der Mühl, Kl. Schriften, 194-6), but 'glittering', 'brilliant': cf. H. Gipper, Gl. 42 (1964), 39ff., O. J. Schrier, Mnemos. IV 32 (1979), 316ff. Similarly P. 2, 6 τηλαυγέσιν... στεφάνοις. Duchemin (198ff.) rightly points out that φωνικοπέξα said of Demeter and Hecate (O. 6, 94, Pas. 2, 77) does not refer to colour but to brilliance (cf. Homeric ἄργυροπέξα). For the Greek tendency to subordinate colour to shine cf. Fogelmark, 17ff., who is wrong, however, in concluding (23) that πορφυρόεις "denotes colour in Pindar but not in Homer". His interpretation of the present passage as giving "an impression of beautiful colour" (26) is rather arbitrary. It is true that we find at O. 6, 55 ὅων ξανθαῖν καὶ παμπορφυρόεις ἀκτίσι, but the addition of ἀκτίσι is significant. Olive and laurel are called χρύσεος (O. 8, 1, O. 11, 13, P. 10, 40, N. 1, 17), but this refers to their value rather than to their visual appearance; cf. P. 3, 73 ὑγίειαν ἄγων χρυσέαν, LSJ III 1 (Duchemin, 226, thinks that "il s'agit d'un feuillage divin aux reflets lumineux, aux promesses d'immortalité"). Mezger suggests that πορφυρόεις, too, is intended "um seinen hohen Wert zu bezeichnen" (similarly Bury: "Regal 'purple' might be considered the queen of colours and used as a metaphor for supreme excellence", and Bowra, Pindar, 245-6), but there is no parallel for such a figurative use.

29: ἄλλα. Lefkowitz (53) thinks that "the reference to binding... leads into a statement of human limitations" (!). The function of ἄλλα obviously is to explain why the possibility indicated in the preceding lines was not realized: it is equivalent to ἄλλα γὰρ marking the non-fulfilment of a condition (Denn., 104).


29: αὖχατ. See above on 21 μεγαυχέει. Wilamowitz (432) writes: "ihm wird in einem Atem gesagt, dass er ihn [the victory] hätte erreichen Kön- nen, und angedeutet, es wäre wohl eher Selbstüberhebung gewesen". Similarly Lefkowitz, 53: "the contest is in the athlete's mind... the opponents are emotions, 'empty-minded boasts'... and an 'unadventurous heart'".
But 32 ὑμὸς ἀτολμὸς obviously refers to his parents' hesitations, and the first part of the sentence (τὸν μὲν...) serves as a foil to the second part (Gundert, 24 and 117 n. 95). It is well-known that the Greeks often use antithetical expressions to emphasize only one idea; cf. Fehling, Wiederholungsfiguren, 84-6, 274-9, and my notes on Semon. 7, 9, Mnemos. IV 21 (1968), 135-6, and A. Pr. 106, Miscellanea Kamerbeek (Amsterdam 1976), 453-4.

30: ἔξ ἀγαθῶν ἐβαλόν. Cf. S. Α. 808 χάριτος ἐκβεβλημένη, El. 648-9 μὲ πλούτου... ἐκβαλεῖν, Xen. An. VII 5, 6 μὴ ἐκ τῆς Σευθοῦ φιλίας ἐκβληθεῖν. The translation 'cast down from' (Fennell and others) is perhaps too strong, for βάλω may also mean 'to place' (LSJ A I 6).

30: καταμεμφθέντα. The parallelism of the two parts of the sentence suggests that the sense is active (like Ἡτ. I 77, 1 μεμφθείς, etc.). There seems to lie a difficulty in the fact that ὑμὸς refers to the parents and ἵσχυν to the son, but the parents may have regarded their son's abilities as part of their own: cf. P. 8, 44-5 ωφ... ἐν πατέρων, Gundert, 15ff.

31: ἵσχυν. For the accusative see above on 11 ἀνόρα.

31: οἴκειων. 'Within his reach' (Fennell). For the topos of τὸ παρείμενον (N. 3, 75) cf. Strohm, 72-5.

31: παρέσφαλεν. 32 ὑπίσσω shows that παρέσφαλεν cannot mean 'lässt vorbeistraucheln' (Fränkel, 573). The local force of παρά- ('to the side') has apparently been widened to the idea of 'missing' and 'falling'. For the genitive cf. LSJ σφάλλω III 2.

32: ἀτολμος. Another topos: one has to take risks (O. 6, 9-11 ἀνκίνδυνοι δ' ἄρεται οὐ... τίμιαι, P. 4, 185-7), but τόλμα should be combined with σύνεσις (N. 7, 59, I. 3-4, 63-5, fr. 231).

33: συμβαλεῖν. 'To conjecture' (cf. LSJ III 3), sc. the presence of in their son.

33: μάν. Denn. (330, 337) hesitates between an emphatic and a progressive sense, but the meaning is more likely to be adversative (Denn., 334-5, Slater, 311).

33: πάλαι. Not to be connected with ἀπὸ ἐπάρτας (Fennell, Farnell, Puech), but with αἵμα: cf. I. 2, 1 οἱ πάλαι ωτές, LSJ I 2. B. A. van Groningen, In the Grip of the Past (Leiden 1953), 50, rightly observes: "The quality of the primogenitor determines the quality of the whole lineage and every member of it shines with the reflected light of his ancestral glory". Cf. also 12, 52, 54, and Gundert, 15, Bowra, Pindar, 101-2,
34: Αμύκλαι. "Because in Pindar's opinion Amyklai had been the place where king Agamemnon was murdered on his return home from Troy... Not until Orestes had killed his mother did he set the Aeolians on their way towards Tenedos" (G. Huxley, Pindar's Vision of the Past, Belfast 1975, 34). I doubt whether Pindar alludes to the capture of Amyclae mentioned at P. 1, 65, as is suggested by Lefkowitz, 54.

35: ἀνάγαυν. 'Leading over sea': cf. Il. 9, 338 λαόν ἀνήγαγεν ἐνυδάεε, LSJ I 2. Orestes as a leader of Aeolian colonists is also mentioned by Hellanicus (PGNH 4, P. 32).

36: βοϊν. Puech reads βοϊν with MSS. and scholia, but Pindar always uses the plural βοιάι, and παρά βοϊν is obviously parallel to ἀπὸ Ἐπάρτας, so that we have mentally to supply τὸ αἷμα (as is rightly observed by Bury, who spoils the construction, however, by translating 'mingled near the stream of Ismenus with the blood of...'; similarly Werner 'an Ismenos' Fluten beigemischt'.

36 κεκραμένον. Sc. with the blood on the father's side.

37 Μέλανιπποιο. Famous opponent of the Seven against Thebes: cf. K.P. III, 1164.16ff.

37: δέ. Has explanatory (motivating) force: see above on 19 δέ.

38: ἀμφεροντι. Mezger translates 'sie bringen mit sich', but this is φέρομαι (e.g. P. 7, 21). Fennell translates 'return' (similarly Farnell 'revive', 'renew'; cf. schol. ἀποφερονται), but the comparison with cornfields shows that the meaning is 'raise up', 'give forth': cf. ἀναδίσωμι (LSJ II 1), and A. Cho. 447-8 ἀνέφερον... γόον. The capacities (ἀρεταί) inherent in the γένος are like the fertile soil from which shoot up the achievements (ἀρεταί) of the individual members as flourishing plants (I. 5, 17 θάλλοισ' ἄρετα; cf. O. 9, 16, N. 4, 88, N. 10, 42), which may be kept alive by the water of the victory ode (N. 8, 40-1). See further my note on O. 14, 15 θαλία, Mnemos. IV 32 (1979), 27-8. Although the middle ἀμφερονται is defended by Fennell by comparing P. 7, 21 φέρεσθαι, the active seems to be preferable because it is the regular form of φέρω when said of the earth or of trees: cf. 41 φέ- 

38: ἀλλασσόμεναι. Schol.: τοῦ μεταξὺ γένους ἡμαυρωμένου.


38: ἀνδρῶν. Not to be connected with σθένος (Sandys, Werner, Lefkowitz, 54), but with γενεαῖς: cf. Il. 6, 149 ὃς ἀνδρῶν γενεῇ ἢ
μέν φώει, ἢ δὲ ἀπολήγει. I do not believe that the assonance Πεισ-ἀνδρὸς (33)-ἀνδρῶν is intentional, as is suggested by Barkhuizen 147.

38: οὐδένος. May imply the idea of profusion: cf. O. 9, 51 ὁ δὲ θανατός, I. 3, 2 σ. πλούτου, Pae. 9, 14 σ. νυφετοῦ, LSJ II 2.


39: δέ. Has explanatory (motivating) force: see above on 19 δέ.

39: ὅν. Cf. Denn., 419-20: "ὁν emphasizes the duality, or plurality, of the ideas negativated". Similarly εἶτ' ὅν (Den., 418-9).

39: μέλαιναι. Bury thinks that this word "is chosen with the purpose of pointing the illustration by a play on Μελάνιππος" (similarly Barkhuizen, 147), but μέλαινα is a conventional epithet of γῆ and χθόν (e.g. Il. 2, 699, Hes. Th. 69, Alcm. 58, 3, Archil. 58 D. = 130 W., 2 Sa. 1, 10). I also doubt whether A. Kober, The Use of Colour Terms in the Greek Poets (New York 1932), 32-3, is right in suggesting that μέλαιναι ἄρουραι implies the idea of fertility: Fogelmark (30) observes that at O. 9, 50 μέλαινα χθόν "any thought of black fertile soil is out of the question, as it is merely a variation on a conventional phrase bequeathed by epic poetry".

39: ἄρουρα. The same comparison is found at N. 6, 8-11. The differences between the two passages suggested by Lefkowitz (54-5) seem to me fanciful.

40: δένδρα. Lefkowitz (54) maintains that a "natural connection is drawn between the crowning of the victor (... ἔργεσιν, rather than στε-φάνοις, 29) and the flowering of the trees". I fail to see where the connection is drawn except in the reader's imagination. For ἔργεσιν cf. N. 6, 18, I. 1, 29 and 66.

40: οὐκ ἔδέλει. Pennell rightly translates 'are not wont': cf. O. 11, 9, P. 1, 62, N. 7, 10, LSJ II 2, and my note on Pl. Meno 95b 1, Mnemos. IV 10 (1957), 297. There may be an implication of 'are unable': cf. Il. 21, 366, Od. 3, 121, Sol. 3, 27. Lefkowitz (54) thinks that "there is a special emphasis on intention" in the simile; she admits (n. 29) that ἐ-Θέλω "can denote customary behaviour", but argues that "English 'tend' does not adequately convey the verb's sense of volition". But the point is that in such cases the verb has lost its sense of volition. Nisetich (62) argues that the poem contains "repeated instances of negative volition"
and that therefore "the literal connotation, secondary from the point of view of the immediate context, is primary from the point of view of the ode as a whole". But the only evident instances of negative volition are 22-3 and 31-2, both referring to the same fact.

40: περόδοις. One may think of the fact that the trees are in flower at different times during the year, but Pindar probably wished only to avoid such prosaic expressions as κατὰ έτος.

41: πλούτῳ. For the limitative force of the dative see above on 13 μορφόν. Wilamowitz (431) wrongly takes πλούτῳ to refer to the fruits ("nicht jedes Jahr entspricht die Ernte der Blüt-enpracht"): Schroeder points out that in that case the text would have πλούτον ἁνθεί έσον. For πλούτος 'abundance' cf. LSJ I 2.

41: έσον. Mommsen's τ' έσον is unnecessary, for έσον is construed as a predicate.

42: έναμείβουντι. Some editors read έν άμείβουντι (cf. έναλλάξ), but the verb (which further occurs at Lyd. Mag. 3, 39) seems to have been modelled after έναλλάττω. Pindar might have written έπαμείβουντι (cf. Ι. 6, 339 νίκη δ' έπαμείβεται άνδρας), but έν- more strongly suggests alternation. For the plural after έθέλετι cf. Ι. 2, 135 δούρα σέθηκε νεών και σπάτα λέλυναι and K.G. I, 65-6. For a plural verb after a plural neuter in Pindar cf. Ο. 8, 12, O. 10, 85, P. 1, 13.


42: άγει. Bury thinks that this means "'drive', like wind". One might compare L. Pers. 602 τόν αύτόν αἰεὶ δαιμόν οὐριείν τύχης, but Moira is a more stable power than Tyche: cf. Strohm, 51ff., especially 52: "Sie stellt den ein für allemal festgelegten Grundriss dar". Accordingly, the meaning is 'guides', 'governs' (cf. LSJ A II 2-3, Slater, 8).

43: τό δέ. Usually connected with έκ Διός ('that which comes from Zeus'), either as an accusative of respect or as the subject of the sentence (σαράκς τέκμαρ being the predicate). This is better than to connect τό with τέκμαρ (Mezger), but it seems to me more natural to take τό δέ as 'on the other hand': cf. O. 9, 95, I. 3, 11, K.G. I, 584. Anyhow it is important not to neglect the adversative force of δέ (as is done by most translators): the course of life of human generations, just as that of fields and trees, has been fixed by Destiny, but man is unable to foresee the future. This is a topos (cf. e.g. Ο. 12, 7-8, Ν. 6, 6-7, Ι. 8, 14-5) and as such does not need a special motivation, such as is suggested by Lefkowitz, 56: "the temporary nature of the occasion itself, election to
a political office, gives special emphasis to the topics of the limits of achievement, ignorance of the future, mortality, and change". On the contrary, the comparatively short duration of the office (10 δωδεκάμηνον) implies that these topics are not especially relevant to the occasion.


43: ἔτεται. 'Falls to': cf. P. 10, 17 Ἐποικτο μοίρα, Il. 4, 415 τούτῳ κόδος ἄμ᾽ ἔφεται, LSJ ΠΙ 2.

44: τέκμαρ. Cf. P. 10, 63 τὰ δ᾽ εἰς ἄνιαυτὸν ἀτέκμαρτον προνοήσατο. This parallel shows that Pindar's outlook upon the limits of human power did not change very much in the course of his life. Cf. also O. 2, 30-3, O. 12, 8, Strohm, 64ff. For Pindar's view of the future see also C. G. Starr, Essays on Ancient History (Leiden 1979), 177-8. Bury (followed by Péron, 42 and n. 1) thinks that τέκμαρ "suggests a guiding star". He compares H. Hom. 32, 13, where the moon is called τέκμαρ βροτοῖς, but even E. Hec. 1273 κυνὸς ταλαίνης οἴμα, ναυτίλοις τέκμαρ does not warrant such a conclusion. Pindar is more likely to have had Il. I, 525-6 in mind, where Zeus calls his nod μετ᾽ ἄδανατοις μέγιστον / τέκμαρ.

44: μεγαλανορίαι. 'Self-confident ambitions': cf. P. 8, 90-1 ἐξ ἐλπίδος πέταται / ὑποπτέροις ἀνορείας, N. 3, 20 ἀνορείας ὑποπτ-τάταις ἐπέβα. The translation 'hochmütig' (Werner) is misleading, and Strohm's paraphrase "verblendetes Menschentum" (78) is certainly wrong.


45: τε. Mezger wrongly reads ἔργυ ἄτε (Mommsen). For τε introducing a participial clause Denn. (502) quotes two examples, Lys. 13, 40 ἄφικνευταί, μέλαν τε ἵματιον ἡμφιεσμένη and Pind. P. 6, 45-6 πατρών μάλιστα πρὸς στάθμαν ἔβα, / πάτρῳ τ᾽ ἐπερχόμενοι ἀγλα-ίαν ἀπάσαν. He rightly explains the first τε as equivalent to καὶ ταῦτα, but wrongly thinks that from ἔβα we have to supply βαίνων (similarly Fennell and Bury): just as ἡμφιεσμένη, ἐπερχόμενος supplies an additional information closely connected with the first part of the sentence. Similarly P. 1, 70 υἱῷ τ᾽ ἐπιτελλόμενος, N. 8, 19 ἀμπνεύων τε (cf. Slater, 489: "almost καὶ ταῦτα"). Schroeder (on P. 1, 75-80) wrongly equates these cases with O. 7, 81 and I. 2, 38, where the parti-
ciple is used instead of a finite verb ("Variation des Ausdrucks"; cf. Bowra, Pindar, 207). In the present passage the additional information has an explanatory (specifying) character: for this use of τε cf. Denn., 502 (e), and my notes on Men. Epitr. 338, Mnemos. IV 27 (1974), 31-2, A. Pr. 152, Miscellanea Kamerbeek, 455, and E. Ba. 54, Mnemos. IV 33 (1980), 13-4.

45: δέδεται. According to Fennell, "perhaps a metaphor from a slave chained to the oar", a view adopted by Bury, but rightly rejected as anachronistic by Péron, 41-2 n. 5. Strohm (78) wrongly sees a paradox in the phrase δέδεται ἐλπίδοι γυνα: the verb does not imply paralysis, as is assumed by Strohm, but only inescapable compulsion, and it may refer to a holding as well as to a moving force (as is observed by Fränkel, 575 n. 22): cf. P. 3, 54 κέρδει καὶ σοφία δέδεται, P. 4, 71 κίνδυνος... δῆσεν, and the phrase 'to be bound to'. Lefkowitz (55) thinks that the metaphor has been prepared by 15 περιστέλλεν, 16 ἐπιεσόμενος, 23 ἔσχον, 28 ἀνθοδόμενος, 39-40 οὕτ' ἔδωκαν... οὕτε ἐθέλει, and concludes that "Pindar has elaborated the traditional connotation of binding, which in Homer regularly describes the effect of death and delusion, into a characterization of mental action". Such a hunt for hidden meanings and implicit connections seems to me a serious danger to a sound development of Pindaric scholarship.

45: ἀναίδει. Not 'unconscionable' (Fennell). 'importunate' (Bury), 'insolent' (Farnell), 'wanton' (Bowra), 'shameless' (Gundert, 144 n. 393, Lattimore, Nisetich, Lefkowitz, 55), 'freck' (Werner, Fränkel, 573), 'ef-frontée' (Puech), 'insensée' (Péron, 256), but 'knowing no αἰδώς', i.e. 'shrinking from nothing': cf. O. 10, 105 ἀναιδέα θάνατον, II. 4, 521 λάας ἀναιδής, 5, 593 Κυδοιμόν ἀναιδέα, E. H.P. 165-6, where ἀναιδέα is contrasted with εὐλάβεια, and the λίθος ἀναιδείας in the Areopagus. In such contexts αἰδώς has its original meaning of keeping oneself at a respectful distance (cf. my remarks in Mnemos. III 12, 1944, 48ff. and Lampas 5, 1972, 114) and does not have a specifically moral connotation, as is suggested by Mezger ("schamlos - weil das gebührende Mass überschreitend") and is assumed by Lefkowitz (55), who defines it as "the ability to respect one's own person or another's rights". She refers to P. J. Nisetich, TAPA 107 (1977), 246-7, who more rightly, however, explains ἀναιδής at O. 10, 105 by: "What is shameless about death is that it makes no distinctions; it overtakes mortals without exception, when it pleases, with no regard to their wishes", and N. 11, 45 by: "Here it is men who are 'shameless', because their hopes will countenance anything".
It appears from these definitions that 'shameless' is not a happy translation.

46: ἐλπίδα. See above on 22 ἐλπίδες. Strohm (78) maintains that ἐλπίς is depreciated ("abgewertet") here and at P. 8, 90 more than elsewhere (P. 3, 23, N. 1, 33, N. 8, 45, I. 2, 43), and that a positive appreciation is to be found at O. 13, 103, P. 3, 111, I. 8, 15, fr. 214. Similarly Péron, 42: "l'homme, laissé par les dieux dans une ignorance complète de ce qui l'attend (v. 43), contribue aussi à son propre aveuglement, en se laissant entraîner par l'espérance, puissance d'illusion et d'égarement, à poursuivre des ambitions démesurées, sans rapport avec sa nature, par essence limitée; ἐλπίς a donc une valeur purement 'négative' (v. 46: ἄναίδει)". I have already pointed out that ἄναίδει does not imply criticism: Pindar does not blame man for cherishing far-reaching expectations, but he states the objective fact that ἐλπίς does not have a natural limit, because man does not know the future. The result is that in some cases ἐλπίς is too weak (22 ὀκνηρότερα), in other cases too strong (cf. Bury, 218: "undue diffidence and undue confidence"). The question whether there occurred a change in Pindar's appreciation of ἐλπίς is wrongly put: Pindar did not evaluate ἐλπίς as such (as is rightly observed by J. J. A. Schrijen, Elpis, Groningen 1965, 60), but he observed its failures (for its connection with τύχα cf. Nisetich, op. cit. [above on 45 ἄναίδει], 247ff.) and preached moderation (47). It can only be said that man's ignorance of the future, already signalized in his earliest work (see above on 44 τέκμαρ) is more strongly emphasized in P. 8 (93-5) and N. 11 (43-4, 46). The difference, however, is not very great: cf. B. L. Gildersleeve, Selections from the Brief Mention (Baltimore-London-Oxford 1930), 59: "For my part, I have not been able to recognize the symptoms of aging in Pindar, which Leopold Schmidt has dwelt upon in such detail. P. VIII is bitter, or, if you choose, austere, but the melancholy of the latest piece is matched by the melancholy of the earliest". Gundert (Mnemosynon, 5) and Lefkowitz (52, 56) make much of the fact that αἰγάλα διόδοςτος (P. 8, 96) does not appear in N. 11, and that there is no trace of a similarity between men and gods (N. 6, 3), but faith in divine help is implicitly expressed at 5 and 8.

I doubt whether Pindar's view of human weakness should be called 'tragic', as is done by Strohm (79): "Der Mensch kann ja wesensgemäss gar nicht anders als gegen das ebenso wesensgemäße Gesetz seiner Bedingtheit verstossen" (similarly Fränkel, 575). But 47 χρή implies that man can try to observe this law by aiming at moderation (as is implicitly admitted
by Strohm, ibid.). Foreknowledge is difficult, but possible to some extent: see below on 46 ἀπόκεινται. Consequently, Péron (130 and 257) is wrong in thinking that Ἡ. 11 is concluded by "un véritable aveu d'impuissance". That the term 'pessimism' is equally inappropriate has been pointed out by de Vries, 156-7 and Riemes. IV 10 (1957), 8-15, who rightly observes that Ἡ. 7, 37 is counterbalanced by 38, and P. 95 by 96-7. Even the phrase 'resigned pessimism' (Bury, 218) is misleading, for it may induce us to underestimate Pindar's faith in man's power to crown his life with lasting values.

46: γυία. Nisetich, op. cit. (above on 45 ἀναίδει), 247, suggests that this implies the idea of mortality, but elsewhere in Pindar the word more often refers to athletics than to death. In the present passage it seems to continue the image of 44 ἐμβαίνομεν.

46: προμάθειας. Not 'precaution' (Werner 'Vorsicht', Fränkel, 574 'sorglicher Voraussicht'), but 'foreknowledge'. Cf. O. 7, 44, where αἴδως ('restraint': see above on 45 ἀναίδει) is said to be characteristic of the προμαθής.

46: δέ. Has explanatory (motivating) force (see above on 19 δέ): ἐλπίς does not know limits, because it does not know the future. Schrijen, op. cit. (above on 46 ἐλπίδι), 56, wrongly explains the connection as adversative: "hope is shameless, but one should try to avoid shamelessness by bearing in mind that the human power of foresight is very weak".

46: ἀπόκεινται. Not 'sind verborgen' (Mezger) or 'are beyond our reach' (Puech: 'se dérobent à nous'; Péron, 257: 'être à l'écart'), but 'are far away', 'are difficult to reach'. A small degree of foreknowledge is not denied to man: cf. Ἡ. 1, 40 ὁ πονησαῖς δέ νῦν καὶ προμάθειαν φέρει.

46: βοάλ. Not 'the tides of events lie beyond our foresight' (LSJ I), but to be connected with προμάθειας. The image of streams or waves is often used of destiny (cf. Péron, 251ff.), but its connection with foreknowledge is not immediately clear. Fennell's observation that "no doubt the mariners of Tenedos were familiar with and often grateful to the strong Hellespontine current" seems to me irrelevant. Péron (256-7), who rightly rejects the translation 'sources' (Werner, Fränkel, 574), argues that the phrase "ne constitue un effet que le dernier élément d'un tableau dominé par la présence de la mer"; he compares O. 12, 5-6, but there human expectations are compared with ships, not with waves. If we translate the word by 'rivers' (Bury, Romagnoli, Wolde), we may compare Ἡ. 2, 41-2, where the Phasis and the Nile are mentioned as symbols for remote parts of the world.
Desires of gain': cf. P. 3, 54 Κέρδεων καὶ σοφία δέδεται, N. 9, 33 αἰδός γὰρ ὑπὸ βούλησις Κέρδεων κλέπτεται, LSJ I, 2. Warning against Κέρδος is a topos in Pindar: cf. P. 1, 92, P. 2, 78, P. 4, 139-40, and Péron, 210-1.

47: δέ. Strongly adversative (neglected in almost all translations): human aspirations and expectations tend to overstep all limits, but all the same they (κέρδεων is a specification of μενοινῶντες and ἐλπίζοντας) have to keep within bounds, for else they lead nowhere (48 ἄπροσικτων).

47: μέτρον. Cf. O. 13, 47-8 ἐπεται δ' ἐν ἐκάστω μέτρον, P. 2, 34 χρὴ δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν αἰεὶ παντὸς ὑπὸ μέτρον. Pindar more often uses καλρός: Gundert, 63, 66ff., Strohm, 67-8, M. Riemschneider, Ztschr.f.Ästh. u.allg. Kunstw. 36 (1942), 105-9. These parallels show that the end of the poem is a topos, and it is wrong to assume that this must have a special application, as is done by Farnell (234), who supposes "that the kinsmen of Aristagoras being aware of his weaknesses had suggested to Pindar to convey this to him", and by Mezger, who thinks that the warning is addressed to "den Teil der Bürgerschaft, der überstürzenden Neuerungen zugethan ist", and that the praise of Aristagoras serves the purpose "die Warnung an die Unruhestifter recht eindringlich zu machen".


48: ἄπροσικτων. Not 'ad quem accedere non licet, inexpugnabilis' (Rumpel with schol.; cf. ἀπλατος), nor 'unattainable' (Bury, LSJ, who wrongly take ἔρωτων to be 'objects of desire', Slater), nor depending on ἔρωτων (Christ), but 'not reaching their end', 'achieving nothing'. For the verbal adjective used with active force cf. Kühner-Blass, II, 289, Bruhn, §101, Wackernagel, Vorl. II. Synt. I, 136, 288, Pearson on S. fr. 534, 4, Barrett on E. Hipp. 678.

48: ἔρωτων. Used in its general sense of 'desires', but especially 'desires of gain' (cf. 47 Κέρδεων). The genitive has been explained in various ways, none of which seems to me convincing: (1) gen. of object: 'aber die Gier nach unerfüllbaren Wünschen brennt allzuheiss' (Wilamowitz, 431). But (a) according to LSJ μανία with objective genitive does not occur before Hermesianax; (b) 'allzu' apparently means that μανία always prevents the attainment of μέτρον, a conclusion which makes χρὴ a sarcastic paradox and which attributes to Pindar an unparalleled negativism.
The suggestion put forward by Gundert (Mnemosynon, 5), that the poet was "in innerem Kampf", does not solve this difficulty. (2) gen. of subject: 'schlimm ist das wahnsinnige Begehren unerreichbarer Wünsche' (Mezger), 'Unerreichbares Sehnen ist der schneidenste Wahn' (Dornseiff), 'vom unerreichbaren Begehren aber ist heftiger der Wahnsinn' (Gundert, Mnemosynon, 4), 'Unerschöpflich Begehren heisst mir der bitterste Wahn', 'Doch unerfüllbares Begehren tobt in umso heftigerem Wahn' (Fränkel, 574, explained, 575, by "Wir sollen uns bescheiden, und doch brennt kein Sehnen so heiss wie der Wahnwunsch nach dem Unerreichbaren"), 'Too sharp is the madness of unattainable desires' (Nisetic; similarly Lefkowitz, 56), 'qui se laisse aller à des ambitions irréalisibles s'expose à une démence éperdue' (Pu- ech), 'Immers, de razernij van het verlangen naar het onbereikbare schrijnt fel' (de Vries, 156). But (a) some of these translations suggest that the μέτρον is never attained (cf. Gundert's explanation, Mnemosynon, 5: "Die kurze Mahnung zum Mass geht unter in dem Schluss"): see above on 1b; (b) others (such as 'schlimm', 'der bitterste', 'too sharp', 'éperdue') may imply a condemnation of μανία: a genitive: causal connection with the preceding sentence. De Vries explicitly defends this view: he explains οξύτερα as 'extra sharp', which he takes to be equivalent to 'smarting', but although οξύς may be said of pains (e.g. II. 1, 53 οξύειας άνίασι, II. 11, 268 οξύτατό οδύνατ), I do not know instances of οξύς in itself meaning 'painful'. (3) gen. of origin: 'Sharp are the fits of madness wrought by unattainable longings' (Bury), 'From longings unachievable cometh madness passing fell' (Fennell), 'Too bitter are the pangs of madness after loves that are past attainment' (Lattimore), ' Loves beyond reach sting too sharply to madness' (Bowra), 'Unerfüllbare Gier ruft heftigeren Wahn nur hervor' (Werner). But (a) these translations, like most of the ones classed under 2, neglect οξ, so that they leave us in the dark about the question whether the connection is adversative or explanatory. If it is adversative, see on 1b, if explanatory (motivating), it may be doubted whether the prospect of increasing insanity would be a sufficient incentive to aim at moderation; (b) for Lattimore's 'too bitter' see above on 2b.

The above difficulties may be avoided by taking οξύτερα in the sense of 'too violent' (see above on 22 οκνηρότερα), and έροτων as a partic- tive genitive: 'For mad passions whose violence exceeds the measure (ad- vocated in the preceding sentence) belong to the domain of unrealizable desires'. For μανία as disregarding measure cf. Ο. 9, 38-9 το θελη- σθαι παρά καιρόν / μανίασιν ὑποκρέστη. For the genitive express-
ing the idea of 'belonging to' cf. e.g. Pl. Euthyd. 277 c 5 τῶν λαμβανόντων ἄρ' εἰσὶν οἱ μανθάνοντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἑχόντων; see further K.G. I, 372, Schw. II, 122-3. For δέ having explanatory (motivating) force see above on 19 δέ.

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NOTES

*) Editions of the text, commentaries and translations will be referred to by author's name only.

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Slater = W. J. Slater, Lexicon to Pindar (Berlin 1969).


In each of Plato's major cosmological works, the Timaeus, the Statesman myth and the Philebus, he asserts that the body of the whole universe is alive and possesses a single World-Soul which extends throughout it. I wish to offer a new interpretation of the role of the World-Soul which gives the World-Soul a special function in the economy of the Platonic cosmology and which explains why Plato would place such repeated emphasis on the existence of such an odd-sounding creature. I suggest that Plato is not viewing the World-Soul on the model of the Phaedrus and Laws X, which view soul as a self-and-other moving motion. Nor, I suggest, is Plato viewing the World-Soul on the model of soul taken as a crafting agent that initiates order. Rather I suggest that Plato views the World-Soul merely as a maintainer of order against a natural tendency of the corporeal to be chaotic.

It is important to notice that in each of these three cosmological dialogues Plato claims that the ordered World-Soul and the order of the World-Body are severally and in their synchronizations the products of the workings of a single, eternal, divine, rational Demiurge, which resides outside the universe.1) Further, in all three of these dialogues the phenomena are viewed as necessarily in flux. The erratic flux of the phenomena wholly characterizes the pre-cosmic and acosmic periods of the Timaeus and Statesman myth -- but, in addition, it remains a potent and considerable factor even within the ordered and ensouled cosmos (Timaeus 43a-b, Statesman 273c-d and add Philebus 43a, 59a-b and Cratylus 439d, which do not distinguish between cosmic and acosmic periods).2) With these observations in tow, I suggest that the World-Soul operates in the Platonic cosmology rather like a governor
on a steam engine: the governor regulates the motions of the machine in such a way that the machine's self-sustained and independently originated motions, which owing to unpredictable conditions of combustion tend to run off to excess, are none-theless uniformly maintained and do not destroy the machine itself. However, the governor neither initiates the motions it regulates nor is it itself the cause of its being synchronized with the machine. This synchronization, which enables the governor to govern, is derived from some external source. And like a machine-governor, the World-Soul is capable of maintaining order only within a certain range of natural disruptions (Statesman 273d-e).

If, as is the case, Plato believes material objects to be necessarily in a chaotic flux even in the formed and ensouled cosmos (Timaeus 43a-b, Statesman 273c-d), then it is natural that he should view one of the major functions of soul to be the maintenance of order against the natural tendency of the corporeal to be chaotic, thus saving the appearance of the continuous order which we indeed do observe in the phenomenal realm. For Plato the homeostatic conditions of the observed world cannot be explained by physical theories; rather, they have to be explained in spite of physical theories (of the sort articulated at Timaeus 58a-c).

WORLD-SOUL IN THE STATESMAN. In the Statesman myth the Demiurge is said to make the World-Soul, to make it rational (269d1) and to form the ordered World-Body (269d7-9, 273b6-7, 273e3). In the structure of the dialogue as a whole the Demiurge is functionally contrasted with the World-Soul as a shepherd is contrasted with a human statesman (275a-276b). The Demiurge is like a shepherd in that he constructs on his own every material component of the objects of his craft, whereas the World-Soul is like a human statesman just to the extent that all the necessary material preparations and organizations of the object of its activities are handed over to it from other sources than itself. Since this is held to be the case at the level of discourse of the divisions that make up the bulk of the dialogue, it is difficult to claim that the division of the Demiurge from the World-Soul is merely a literary exigency of the myth (as some people would claim is the case in the Timaeus). In the case of the World-Soul, it is the whole order of the world that is handed over to it (273a7-b2). This is dramatically represented by the withdrawal of the Demiurge from the world, which he
leaves in the care and control of the World-Soul. The World-Soul, though, unlike the human statesman, does not further organize the organization already handed over to it (305e ff.). Rather the World-Soul tries to maintain the orderly homeostatic conditions of the World-Body, as it is inherited from the Demiurge, against the necessary, erratic, even explosive (cf. Εξανθετή, 273dl), incursions of the bodily, which tend to throw the organization of the World-Body and World-Soul out of kilter (273b,d). The World-Soul performs this task not by initiating order, but merely by trying to remember and preserve the orderings given from the Demiurge(273bl-2, c6). Eventually though, the bodily incursions succeed in disrupting the World-Soul's memory and the World-Soul thereupon loses its ability to maintain order. This decay necessitates the reappearance of the Demiurge to restore order both to the World-Soul and World-Body (273d-e). It seems then that the World-Soul is not being viewed as an initiator of orderly motion either in itself or in the World-Body. For this role is reserved for the Demiurge. Neither is the World-Soul viewed as the source of the disorderly motions which are said to erupt into it.4)

If in addition to regulating motions, the World-Soul were able to initiate new motion it is not clear why it must succumb to the disruptions of the corporeal. If it were able to induce new motion, it would be able not merely to keep a lid on disruptive forces but to counteract and diffuse the cause of disruption. Further, if it had self-initiated thought and reason, items in the catalogue of self-motions in Laws X (897a-b), and did not have its rationality derived entirely from an external source, then it is not clear why, on its own, its failures of memory are irreparable and irreversible, such that it is necessary for the Demiurge to reappear to initiate new order.

It is, then, I suggest, to the homeostatic condition of living creatures, rather than to their ability to self-initiate locomotion and to move other objects, to which Plato in the Statesman myth is primarily appealing when he posits the world as a living creature (Ζῳος, 269dl). This sort of appeal should be contrasted with the doctrine of the autokinetic soul in the Phaedrus and Laws X. In each of these texts it is not to homeostatic conditions of living organisms, but rather to the motor powers of living bodies to which Plato appeals in order to identify that which is autokinetic with soul. It is because living bodies move themselves and other things that we know that that which is autokinetic is soul (Phaedrus 245e, Laws 895c).5)
WORLD-SOUL IN THE PHILEBUS. The function of the World-Soul as a maintainer of homeostatic conditions, a function which results from its vivifying effects on bodies, is also evident in the Philebus (30a), a dialogue in which, as in the Statesman and Timaeus, flux characterizes the phenomena (43a, 59a-b) and in which there is not the slightest trace of the autokinetic doctrine. As in the Statesman and Timaeus, the order of the world's body is derived from the transcendent rational Demiurge (28d). In addition, also as in the other two dialogues, the Demiurge is the cause of the presence of the World-Soul and its rationality in the ordered World-Body (30c-d). And so again there is no suggestion that the World-Soul is the efficient cause of the motion or the order of the World-Body.

Rather, the World-Soul here is viewed as standing to the order of the universe, as represented in the orderly years, seasons and months, as our souls stand to our bodily order, as represented by health (30b-c). The only actions of our soul-body complex here mentioned as being relevantly paralleled in the World-Soul = World-Body complex are physical exercise and (self-) doctoring; both of which maintain or restore from deviation the homeostatic condition of the body. Notice that nutritional and sheltering arts are significantly not on the list of parallel practices, since we may assume they both involve manipulations of the external world while the only actions relevant to the World-Soul are internally directed. (For exercise and proper doctoring dealing only with the relation of the body with itself and not with the external world, see Timaeus 89a-b.) Our souls are the cause of the maintenance of health or proper orderings of our bodies against a natural propensity towards disease, which is viewed as a sort of internal corrosion (cf. Timaeus 82a-83a). Analogously, the only actions entertained as being performed by the World-Soul are the regulations of the World-Body which maintain its order against disruption natural to it. Indeed it is to save the appearance of rational order that it is claimed that there must be a World-Soul (30c-d). Plato does call the World-Soul a cause (30a10), but it is only in the sense of maintainer that Plato is so committed.

WORLD-SOUL IN THE TIMAEUS. In the Timaeus we are told little of the nature of the functional relations between the World-Body and the World-Soul. All that we are told is that the World-Soul is the mistress and governor (δεσπότιν καὶ ἀρχομαστὶ, 34c5) of the World-Body. What form this governance is to take, we are not told. I suggest, though, that it entails no more than the sort of governance I have already mentioned, namely, the maintenance of order. There is no suggestion in the Timaeus that
the World-Soul is either autokinetic\textsuperscript{6} or is the efficient cause of either the order or the motion of the World-Body. The form and orderly motion of both the World-Soul and World-Body are derived from the Demiurge (31b-36e). In commenting on 36d-e Cornford writes: "The above sentences reiterate the emphasis already laid at 34b on the fact that the soul extends throughout the body of the world from centre to circumference, and communicates its motion to the whole" (p.93). Now it is true that the World-Soul is so extended, but there is not a word in the text about the World-Soul communicating its motion to the World-Body. Rather we have in the text a highly detailed account of parallel structures and synchronized motions (as represented in celestial dynamics) between the World-Soul and World-Body. This synchronization is derived from the Demiurge and is not of the World-Soul's making. Note that Plato is free to have said otherwise. For, when at 34c Plato admits that his narrative order was mistaken and misleading in having spoken of the World-Body being composed prior to the World-Soul, he could have taken the opportunity to claim that it was merely an exigency of his narrative order that forced him to claim that the Demiurge rather than the World-Soul composed the order of the World-Body and initiated its orderly motions, since in the mistaken narrative order the World-Soul did not even exist when the World-Body was established. But later, the mistake in narrative order having been pointed out, the cosmological claims of 34b are allowed to stand and are reiterated: the structure and motion of the World-Soul and World-Body severally and the synchronizations between them are all workings of the Demiurge (36d-e). Taken at face value, the \textit{Timaeus} strongly suggests that when Plato claims governance on behalf of the World-Soul, he does not mean that the World-Soul acts as a crafting agent or as an efficient cause of motion.

* At first inspection the World-Soul strikes us as perhaps the oddest of many odd components of Platonic cosmology in that it is highly counter-intuitive: the world just does not feel like an animal. Most of it is clearly inert and the parts of it which are animate do not seem to form a single composite whole which is one animal. Further, the World-Soul appears to be redundant or useless ontological baggage on most interpretations, which assimilate it either to the autokinetic doctrine or to the view of souls as a crafting agent. For if the World-Soul is merely one more autokinetic soul, it has no special function in the economy of Plato's cosmology. And similarly if
the World-Soul is viewed (incorrectly in my opinion) as mainly an agent that crafts external objects, then it becomes indistinguishable in function from the Demiurge. If it is understood, though, that Plato viewed order among the phenomena as the thinnest of veneers, made out of and spread over that which is inherently rotting, we then see that it is reasonable for Plato: 1) To assume the existence of a regulating agency which on the one hand is necessarily non-material but on the other hand is immanent in the corporeal world, thus explaining the persistence of what sensible order there is in the world and 2) to leave the original source of the order of both the World-Body and World-Soul outside the soul-body complex, thus unaffected by the natural corrupting influence of the corporeal.

If my interpretation of the World-Soul is correct, two additional oddities of its characterization are explained. Typically one of the functions of an ensouled rational creature is deliberation and practical reason. Second, typically for Plato souls are viewed as capable of discarnate existence. Yet neither of these characterizations holds of the World-Soul in either the Timaeus, Statesman, or Philebus: 1) Though in the Timaeus the World-Soul has true opinion and contemplative reason (37 b-c, esp. cl, 2), we never hear here or in the Philebus or Statesman of the World-Soul deliberating or making decisions, as do the Demiurge and statesmen (Statesman 305e ff.; Republic 483c-d, 500e). The World-Soul's rationality is not that of planning or producing with the aid of paradigms, as is in large part the rationality of the Demiurge and statesman. But, if as I have suggested the World-Soul's function is that of maintenance of order rather than initiating order, this is to be expected. 2) Unlike personal souls, the World-Soul is never viewed as existing in a discarnate condition. If its function is the maintenance of homeostatic conditions of material objects, it can only do this by being present in them. Insofar as the ordered world is to exist sempiternally (Timaeus 38b-c), so too must the World-Soul abide in it.

Aristotle thought that through the whole of the natural world the motions of bodies on their own were constant, uniform, and orderly enough that it made sense to describe both animate and inanimate objects as moving homeostatically, as though the
whole of nature were like someone who heals himself (Physics II, 8, 199b30-32). Plato felt that the corporeal itself was so chaotic that at best ensouled objects could maintain orderly homeostatic conditions, and even then with only limited success.

Further, though the World-Soul for Plato, in order to have its special function as a maintainer of order, is necessarily immanent in the corporeal, it is not immanent in the corporeal as the result of its ontological status or make up, which is the same as that of human souls, which are capable of discarnate existence (Timaeus 41d-e). In principle, then, the World-Soul should be capable of discarnate existence. So that though in fact the World-Soul is immanent in the material world, it is not to be confused as being merely the functioning or actualization of a body of a certain type, as is the soul for Aristotle, which as such is not capable, even in principle, of discarnate existence (De Anima II, 1, esp. 413a4). There are additional reasons to suppose the World-Soul is not the actualization of a body of a certain type. One, it is a pre-condition for any matter even being the sort of thing which might be ordered enough to be considered an organ with a function. Two, the World-Soul is not the functioning of a body, but is that which makes it possible that the functions of various bodily parts are sustained. And three, unlike Aristotelian souls, the World-Soul has no limit on what sorts of body it may vivify. There is no proper matter for the World-Soul: it is present in both flesh and brass. The World-Soul, unlike Aristotelian souls, is self-substantial independently of its material inherence. The immanent World-Soul is not a step in the direction of either Laws X or De Anima II.

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NOTES

1) Statesman 269c-270a, 272e-273e; Philebus 28d, 30a-d; Timaeus 31b-36e. I take these texts to be doctrinally homogeneous with each other.

The account of how the Demiurge makes the World-Soul (Timaeus 35a) is, I think, largely inscrutable. For a reasonable attempt at an interpretation, though, see T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology (Toronto, 1970), pp. 70-74.

2) Though I think it more likely than not that Plato means what he
says, when he says there was a chaotic pre-cosmic era, nothing in this paper hangs on whether Plato believed in an initial act of demiurgic world formation. Further, though I believe that the flux of phenomena is purely mechanical in origin, so that the Tіmαeus, Statesman, and Phιλεδιβιοus are inconsistent with the claim of the Phαεδιμυν (245c9) and Lαου X (896bl) that soul is the source and cause of all motion, again, nothing I wish to claim in this paper hangs on this issue.

3) The overwhelming tendency in Platonic scholarship has been to read the claims about the Demiurge non-literally. The Demiurge has been taken as a dooublet for the whole World-Soul (Archer-Hind), or for the rational part of it (Cornford), as a general symbol for any craftsman-like activity (Cherniss), as only a hypothetical entity serving as a literary foil to the human statesman and World-Soul (Herter) and recently as a "sublation" of the World-Soul (Stanley Rosen, "The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos," Review of Metaphysics, 33, 1 [1979], 75-76).

4) Robinson suggests that the corporeal is merely like a virus which in itself is passive and inert and is active and disruptive only when it comes in contact with a living organism (pp. 136-7). This view though does little justice to the descriptions at 273a-b of the corporeal on its own as active and even explosive in its incursions into the World-Soul.

The majority of translators and critics take the World-Soul to be the efficient cause of the reverse rotation of the universe (Skemp, Herter). This is the result of mistakenly reading the δυ of 269d1 causally rather than descriptively, and thus as asserting the World-Soul as the cause of the reverse circuit. This cannot be the case, though, for the cause of the reverse circuit is left an open question to be answered only after 269d3 (δυ τόσ', 269d2) and when this cause is forthcoming (whatever it is), it exists in spite of, not because of, the presence of the World-Soul (269d7-9).

5) Robinson (mistakenly, I think) takes several reflexive phrases in the myth as referring to autokinetic soul (pp. 134, 135, 139):

i) αυτό ἐαυτό στρέψει ἄει, 269e5 (of the Demiurge). But στρέψει cannot merely be a synecdoche for κυνείν, for so construed it does not fulfill the demands of the context. It is because the Demiurge moves constantly in one direction rather than because it is autokinetic that it is said that the Demiurge cannot cause two contrary motions. That the phrase is reflexive merely means that the Demiurge's rotation is independent and non-contingent, in contrast to the rotations of the world.

ii) τῆς αυτοῦ κυνήσεως, 269e4. The antecedent of αυτοῦ, though, is the World-Body (269d7-8), not the World-Soul, which it comes to possess (28-9, with dl). The phrase merely describes the motion of the World-Body (or World-Body=World-Soul complex) as it is moved in the train of the Demiurge's rotation. The term αυτοῦ means something like "proper to itself under the best of conditions."

iii) Finally, δι' ἐαυτοῦ after Burnet, 270a5. This expression is to be taken mechanistically (as Robinson admits it might be), for the immediately ensuing account of the world's reverse motion is described entirely on a mechanistic model (270a6-8), even if one wishes to claim Plato means something else. But in the latter case the phrase ceases to be direct evidence for autokinesis. But in any case I think δι' ἐαυτοῦ of the BT mss should be preserved, meaning "throughout itself".

6) On Timaeus 37b5, which is sometimes seen as such a suggestion, see Cornford's note ad loc., which has not been superseded by later discussions (Plato's Cosmosology [London, 1937]).
Agesilaos und Timotheos:
ZWEI STAATSMÄNNERSPORTRÄTS AUS DER MITTE DES IV. JHS.
MARIAN PLEZIA

Bald nach dem im J. 360 v.Chr. erfolgten Tode des Spartanerkönigs Agesilaos II. hat sein Freund und Bewunderer, Xenophon von Athen, einen Lobpreis auf den Verstorbenen verfasst, der uns heute unter dem Titel Agesilaos in der Sammlung der kleinen xenophontischen Schriften vorliegt. Das Werkchen wurde im Laufe der Zeit viel und eifrig gelesen, u.a. hatte es Cicero in seinem verlorenen Cato (minor) nachgeahmt, wie es seinerzeit K. Kumaniecki in der Festschrift für K. Büchner schön dargelegt hat\(^1\).

Die Ursache der Popularität des Agesilaos war wohl in erster Linie sein erbaulicher Inhalt, aber auch die echt xenophontische \emph{charis}, die ihm eigen ist. Die Hyperkritik des 19. Jh. hat zwar an seiner Echtheit zu makeln versucht, aber seit der Jahrhundertwende gelten solche Gesichtspunkte als überwunden und jeder Zweifel an der Authentizität des Agesilaos scheint heute unberechtigt zu sein. Die neuere Forschung betrachtet die Schrift meist im Zusammenhang mit dem kaum 15 Jahre früher entstandenen Euagoras des Isokrates als zwei markantesten Beispiele der einer zeitgenössischen Persönlichkeit gewidmeten prosaischen Lobrede (während die älteren poetischen und prosaischen Enkomien der Griechen mythische Gestalten zum Gegenstand gehabt hatten). Man konnte aber bei dieser Betrachtungsweise nicht übersehen, dass im Aufbau der beiden thematisch und formell so nahestehenden Schriften ein nicht unwesentlicher Unterschied spürbar wird: Isokrates feiert die heroischen Taten seines Helden, indem er sie im Grossen und Ganzen in chronologischer Abfolge schildert; die xenophontische Lobrede auf Agesilaos zerfällt dagegen ganz auffallend in zwei Hauptteile, von denen der erste (Kap.1-2) als Tatenbericht, der zweite (Kap.3-9) als Tugendkatalog bezeichnet werden kann; an die beiden schliesst sich dann eine Art Schlusswort und Zusammenfassung an (Kap.10-11), die zu den Besonderheiten der Komposition des Werkchens gehört und die Erklärer vor schwierige Probleme stellt\(^2\).

Uns braucht hier diese Spezialfrage nicht näher anzugehen, denn für unsere Betrachtung ist der Gegensatz zwischen der chronologischen Darstel-


Mehr Beifall hat Seyfferts Behauptung gefunden, dass dasselbe zweiteilige Schema, das die Komposition des Agesilaos bestimmt, auch in der Agathon-Rede im platonischen Symposium (194 E - 197 E) zu beobachten sei. Der Vergleich war verlockend, denn in den beiden Fällen handelt es sich ja um eine Lobrede, was die Anwendung der gleichen Topik wahrscheinlich machen könnte. Tatsächlich geht Agathon von der Feststellung aus, seine Vorredner hätten eher die Menschen glücklich gepräht wegen der Gaben, welche ihnen

Dasselbe zweiteilige Schema befolgt dann auch Sokrates in seinem Refe- rat der Diotima-Rede (199 C ἐπιθετεῖαι ὁποίος τίς ἐστιν ὁ Ἐρως, ὁτερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, vgl. 201 E). Da derselbe Sokrates im weite- ren Verlauf des Gesprächs die Rede des Agathon als gorgianisch bezeichnet (198 C), hat man daraus schliessen wollen, dass auch die zweiteilige Kom- position jener Reder (ὁ λόγος ὁν οὕτων αίτιος τυγχάνει) von Gorgias her- rührt und Gorgias galt manchmal für den Urheber dieses älteren Schemas des Enkomion-Aufbaus, das uns in geschlossener Form erst in Xenophons Agesilaos greifbar wird. In letzter Zeit hat Krömer, der sonst an der gorganischen Herkunft dieses Schemas zweifelt, an seiner zeitlichen Prio- nität festgehalten und betrachtete es als allein sinnvoll und logisch, denn vorerst muss man wissen, wie etwas beschaffen sei, bevor man auf sein Wirken eingeht. Xenophon habe seiner Meinung nach dieses klare und logi- sche Aufbauprinzip in Agesilaos verkehrt angewandt und Krömer muss sich dann viel Mühe geben, um seinen Lesern klarzumachen, warum der Verfasser eigentlich so ungeschickt gehandelt und trotzdem mit seiner unlogischen und sinnwidrigen Komposition doch letzten Endes treffliche künstlerische Effekte erzielt hätte 10).

Wie auch diese ganze Theorie auf den ersten Blick ansprechend erscheinen mag, gibt sie doch zu manchen Bedenken Anlass und ist im Grunde genommen ein reines Gedankengebilde, das die gegebenen Tatsachen nicht recht zu er- klären vermag. Um zuerst mit dem angeblichen gorganischen Vorbild fertig zu werden, möchten wir hervorheben, dass der platonische Sokrates, als er erklärt, ihn erinnere die Agathon-Rede an Gorgias, ihren Redeschmuck (μάλλος τῶν ὁνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων 198 B) und nicht ihre Komposition im Auge hat. Damit fällt das Argument zugunsten der Annahme ab, die Agathon- Rede sei nach einem von Gorgias aufgestellten Schema abgefasst. Soweit sind
wir mit Krömers Ansichten einig. Wenn er aber Seyfferts Auffassung billigt und zu erhärten versucht, Xenophon befolge im Agesilaos dasselbe Aufbau- 
prinzip wie Plato in den Agathon- und Sokrates-Reden im Symposium und 
stelle nur die Abfolge der beiden Glieder der Zweiteilung um, so lässt 
sich dazu bemerken, dass die Wesensbestimmung des Eros schwerlich für 
identisch mit dem Tugendkatalog eines Menschen gehalten werden kann, wäh 
rend die Aufzählung seiner Gaben mit der chronologischen Schilderung der 
grossen Taten einer historischen Persönlichkeit einfach nichts zu tun hat. 

Wenn man dazu noch in Betracht nimmt, dass die Anordnung der beiden 
Bestandteile der Zweiteilung bei Xenophon und bei Plato umgekehrt ist, 
wird man zugeben müssen, dass die vermeintliche Analogie im Aufbau der 
beiden Lobreden recht problematisch wird. Auf diesem Wege ist zu einer 
überzeugenden Interpretation der Komposition des xenophontischen Agesilaos 
icht zu gelangen. Sein Aufbauprinzip ist auf keinen Fall so unlogisch, 
wie es uns Krömer nahezulegen versucht.11) Platos Gedankengang ist ein 
deduktiver, sein Verfahren philosophisch: er sucht das Wirken des Eros 
aus seinem Wesen zu erklären. Xenophon stellt sich dagegen ein viel be 
scheideneres Ziel: er ist bemüht, im Leben und Handeln des Agesilaos ge 
wisse allgemeine Charakterzüge bloszulegen, die er Tugenden nennt. Er 
vorführt also induktiv, und die Induktion hat doch wenigstens seit Aristote 
les in der Logik auch ihren Platz. 

Auss derdom ist in einer Lobrede die strenge logische Beweisführung nicht 
zur erwarten. Xenophons Absicht war ja nicht, etwas zu beweisen, sondern 
durch die Herausstellung der Tugend seines Helden sein Gedächtnis zu ehren, 
die Nachkommen aber zu seiner Nachahmung aufzufordern. Ueberhaupt arbeitet 
Krömer in seiner Analyse zu viel mit logischen Gesichtspunkten, ungeachtet 
dessen, dass das prosaische Enkomion eine Fortsetzung des poetischen war, 
und wer würde bei Pindar oder bei Bakchylides an der Unzulänglichkeit der 
logischen Komposition ihrer Gedichte Anstoss nehmen? 

M.E. werden wir dem Nebeneinander von Tatenbericht und Tugendkatalog in 
Xenophons Agesilaos am ehesten dann gerecht, wenn wir uns vergegenwärtigen, 
dass die Entstehung dieser Schrift in die Mitte des IV. Jh. v.Chr. fällt, 
in eine Zeit, in der sich schon in den intellektuellen Kreisen ein Bedarf 
an der begrifflichen Durchbildung der ethischen Werte spürbar zu machen 
begann. Es genügte nicht mehr, wie in alten guten Zeiten, die grossen, vor 
bildhaften Taten als Offenbarung der arete in Erinnerung zu bringen. Man 
wollte wissen, um was für eine Tugend es sich in einem gegebenen Fall handel, 
da zumal in einem bestimmten historischen Vorfall mehrere verschiedene Tu 
genden zum Ausdruck kommen können. Es waren schon Jahrzehnte her, seitdem


Timotheos, der Sohn des berühmten Konon, welcher zur Wiederherstellung der athenischen Seemacht nach der Niederlage im Peloponnesischen Krieg massgebend beigetragen hatte, war mit Isokrates eng befreundet und hat seinerzeit dem Kreise seiner Schüler angehört. Er spielte in der politischen und militärischen Geschichte seiner Heimat während des zweiten Viertels des IV. Jh. eine bedeutende Rolle, erlebte Erfolge und Rückschläge, zuletzt aber wurde er nach der verlorenen Seeschlacht bei Embata (in der Nähe von

Das war die Ursache, die ihn dazu bewog, in seiner Gelegenheitsschrift, die wir Antidosis-Rede nennen, ein Bild des Timotheos zu entwerfen und auf seine Rolle im Öffentlichen Leben Athens einzugehen. Er tut das von einem gewissen geistigen Abstand, sub specie aeternitatis, nicht ohne Melancholie, die dem Bewusstsein des Missserfolgs von Timotheos' Wirken entspringt und die von ihm begangenen Fehler klar erblicken lässt - aber auch im Banne seiner grossartigen und anmutigen Persönlichkeit. Was aber für uns hier von entscheidender Bedeutung ist, ist die Tatsache, dass das Lob des Timotheos in der Antidosis-Rede nach denselben Gesichtspunkten entwickelt wird, die wir schon in Xenophons Agesilaos kennengelernt haben.


Dann drückt er das Bedauern aus, dass ihm der Mangel an Zeit es verbiete, auf den inner- und aussenpolitischen Hintergrund der genannten Vorgänge näher einzugehen (114), er meint aber, seine Zuhörer werden ihm Dank wissen, wenn er es ihnen auseinandersetze, wieso habe Timotheos bei seiner zarten Gesundheit und bei all seinen innerpolitischen Verpflichtungen so gewaltige Taten vollbringen können (115 ή γαρ οὐκ ὃς ἡδέως ἢ άνάκοσις, διὰ τι ποτὲ... τηλικαύτα διεπράξατο τὸ μέγαθος), während die bei dem Volke beliebtesten Heerführer (gemeint ist der alte Haudegen Chares) dem attischen Reich nicht einmal ein Dorf einzubringen vermochten. Die Antwort auf diese Frage, die in eine Charakteristik der militärischen und

Von dem Inhalt dieser Charakteristik werden wir im weiteren zu sprechen haben; vorläufig wollen wir ein wenig bei ihrer Komposition verweilen. Die Analogie mit dem Aufbau des xenophontischen Agesilaos springt jedem unvorgenommenen Leser in die Augen. In jedem der beiden Enkomien geht die Schilderung der Taten des Helden voran, ihr aber folgt die Analyse seiner Charaktereigenschaften. Besonders eindrucksvoll kommt in beiden Fällen die Identität des Aufbauprinzips in dem Überleitungssatz vom ersten zum zweiten Teil zum Ausdruck. Wir haben soeben den entsprechenden Passus aus der Antidosis-Rede angeführt; in Agesilaos lautet er folgendermassen: "Jetzt aber will ich die seiner Seele inne wohnenden Tugenden schildern, dank denen er dies alles vollbracht hat" (3,1 νῦν δὲ τῇ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ ὀρετῇ πειράσμοι δηλοῦν, δὲν ταῦτα ἔπραττε). Der Begriff des Vollbringens (πράττειν bzw. διαπράξασθαι) und seiner Ursache (στὶ τί) kehrt sowohl bei Xenophon als auch bei Isokrates wieder. Der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Fassungen liegt vom compositionellen Standpunkt aus gesehen darin, dass das zweite Glied der Zweiteilung in der Antidosis-Rede viel ausführlicher behandelt wird als das erste, während in Agesilaos das Umgekehrte der Fall ist.

Für die Formgeschichte des frühen prosaischen Enkomions in der griechischen Literatur13) sind die von uns hier gewonnenen Erkenntnisse von gerin- ger Bedeutung. Zwar liess sich die Ähnlichkeit im Aufbau der zwei zeitlich so naheliegenden Denkmäler der attischen Prosa einwandfrei feststellen, aber gerade wegen ihrer zeitlichen Nähe kann man diese Ähnlichkeit am einfachsten durch die Abhängigkeit des isokratischen Timotheos-Bildes von dem xenophontischen Agesilaos erklären. Mit der Möglichkeit, dass beide Schriftsteller eine gemeinsame Quelle nachahmen, die dann ein älteres Enkomion-Stadium ergeben würde, ist wohl kaum zu rechnen14).

Es ist dagegen reizvoll, zu beobachten, wie verschieden trotz aller Formähnlichkeit der Inhalt der beiden Auffassungen des grossen Staatsmanns ist. Nach der tief eingewurzelten Überzeugung der Griechen gehören zum Wesen des Staatsmanns seine grossen Taten, durch die er sich um die Polis-Gemeinschaft wohlverdient macht (Εὐεργετεῖ). Dementsprechend gehört auch in das Lob eines Staatsmanns die Aufzählung seiner Taten und jeder der beiden uns hier angehenden Autoren ist dieser selbstverständlichen Verbindlichkeit nachgekommen15). In der Aufklärung dessen, was dem Helden die Vollbringung
Dieser Taten ermöglicht hat, d.h. in der Motivierung seines Staatsmann- 
tums, gehen sie aber völlig auseinander.

Dem Tatenbericht in dem ersten Teil der xenophontischen Lobrede auf 
Agesilaos (Kap.1-2) entspricht im zweiten Teil ein Register seiner Tugend-
en, das recht reichhaltig ist. An erster Stelle wird seine Prämigkeit 
(ή εἰς τὰ θεῖα εὐσέβεια, Kap.3) hervorgehoben, dann die Gerechtig-
keit in Geldsachen (ή εἰς χρήματα δικαιοσύνη, Kap.4), die Mäßig-
keit in verschiedener Hinsicht (σωφροσύνη, Kap.5), die Tapferkeit (ἀν-
δρεία) und die Weisheit (σοφία) im Krieg (Kap.6). Das sind bekanntlie-
die vier sogenannten platonischen Tugenden, die Xenophon als guter Sokrati-
kher hier in den Vordergrund rückt. Damit ist aber die Liste von Agesilaos' 
Tugen bei weitem noch nicht erschöpft. Er liebte seine eigene Heimat 
(φιλότατος, Kap.7,1-3), war griechenfreundlich (φιλέλλην, Kap.7,4-6) und 
zugleich perserfeindlich gefasst (μισησόμαι, Kap.7,7). Trotz seiner 
hohen Stellung zeichnete er sich durch die Einfachheit und Menschenfreund-
llichkeit aus (Kap.8,1-2 u. 6-8); wenn die Lage es erforderte, wusste er 
aber auch seine Würde zu wahren (Kap.8,3-5), worin sein Verhalten zu dem 
der Perser im krassen Gegensatz stand (Kap.9).

Es ist leicht einzusehen, dass dieses ausführliche Register von Agesi-
laos' Tugen im Grunde genommen von seinen staatsmännischen Eigenschaft-
en nichts besagt. Es fehlt wohl bei Xenophon nicht an Bemerkungen solcher 
Art wie 1,37, dass es des lobenswerten Königs Ausgabe sei, unter den ver-
bündeten Städten Eintracht zu stiften, oder 7,1, dass ein guter König 
seinen Untertanen so viel wie möglich Gutes zu erweisen habe – aber davon, 
was Agesilaos zu einem Politiker grossen Stils, zu einem wahren Herrscher 
und Leiter seines Staates erhoben haben sollte, ist in seiner Charakteris-
k von Xenophons Feder kaum die Rede. Seine Tugenden sind mehr die 
oines edelgesinnten Privatsmanns in hoher politischer Stellung, eines 
καλὸς κἀγαθός, der gegebenenfalls auch bedeutende Aemter zu bekleiden ver-
mag, als eines zielbewussten und erfahrenen Staatslenkers. Selbst eine so 
angesprochene "politische" Tugend wie Gerechtigkeit wird in seinem Fall 
vom engen Gesichtspunkt der Selbstlosigkeit in Geldsachen aufgefasst.

Das ist die altertümliche Denkweise der griechischen Demokratie, nach 
der ein guter Bürger selbstverständlich auch guter Staatsmann war und die 
den Begriff des πολίτης von dem des πολιτικός nicht recht unterschied. Im 
sprachlichen Material findet diese Auffassung ihren Ausdruck noch im pla-
tonischen Gorgias, wo die Namen πολίτης und πολιτικός bisweilen vertausch-
bar gebraucht werden16). Viel später, noch bei Cicero, heisst einmal in 
De re publica der Staatslenker (rector rei publicae) einfach hic civis17).
Philosophisch durchgebildet erscheint dieselbe Auffassung in den älteren Schichten der aristotelischen Politik, wo das Ideal von ὁρθῶς καὶ ὁρθοστάτω erörtert wird. Sie war die Frucht der altertümlich-biederer Züge, als die Leitung eines Stadtstaates noch kein Fachwissen beanspruchte und jedem vertrauenswürdigen Gemeinschaftsmitglied ebensowohl übertragen werden konnte. Im konservativen Sparta hat sich diese Auffassung tief in das aufgeklärte vierte Jahrhundert gehalten und das xenophontische Bild von Agesilaos beeinflusst.

Es ist an sich merkwürdig genug, wie wenig Xenophons eigenes Führerideal, das wir aus seinen anderen Schriften, vor allem aus der Kyropädie, aus dem Oikonomikos und aus der Anabasis kennen, gerade im Agesilaos, wo wir es ganz besonders erwarten würden, zum Ausdruck und zur Sprache kommt. Dieses Ideal ist sonst weder kompliziert noch tief durchgedacht, obgleich es auch mancher feinsinnigen Beobachtungen nicht bar ist. Es basiert aber hauptsächlich auf Xenophons eigenen Erfahrungen als Soldat und Landwirt und braucht dementsprechend nur verhältnismässig einfachen Ansprachen und Problemen Rechnung zu tragen.

Ganz anders bei Isokrates. Er hatte schon im Euagoras inmitten der im Grossen und Ganzen chronologisch aufgefassten Schilderung seiner Taten einen besonderen Abschnitt (Euag., 41-46) seiner Herrschaftszeit gewidmet, die er in der Einsicht (φρόνησις) erblickte (vgl.41 Ὑγούμενος μὲν, ἐὰν καλὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ φρόνησιν παρασκευάσειν, καλὸς αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔξειν), die ihn bei seinem eigenen Handeln (41) wie bei der Beurteilung der äusseren Verhältnisse (42), in der Behandlung anderer (43) wie in seinem eigenen sittlichen Verhalten (44-46) überall das Rechte treffen liess. Es war also nach Isokrates' Ansicht seine intellektuelle Trefflichkeit, die ihm dazu befähigte, Sachen richtig zu erkennen und aufgrund dieser Erkenntnis der jeweiligen Lage Herr zu werden.

Was im Euagoras nur ganz knapp angedeutet worden war, ist im Lob des Timotheos in der Antidosis-Rede viel ausführlicher entwickelt worden. Auf die Frage nämlich, worin Timotheos alle übrigen Heerführer Athen in seiner Zeit übertraf, antwortet Isokrates (Antid.117), dass er sich durch solche Eigenschaften auszeichnete, die den wahren Feldherrn ausmachen (περὶ ταῦτα δεινὰς ἦν, περί ἀπερ χρὴ φρόνιμον εἶναι τὸν στρατηγὸν τὸν ἀγαθὸν). Er verstand es, den Krieg zugleich mit militärischen und politischen Mitteln zu führen, ihm geeignete Ziele zu stecken und zu ihrer Erreichung Verbündete zu gewinnen (117 f.). Er war Meister im zweckmässigen Aufbau seines Heeres und wusste es so zu führen, dass der Krieg sich selbst ernährte (119 f.). Er bestand darauf, gegenüber den Verbündeten Athen...

Der Gegensatz zu der xenophontischen Auffassung, die wir in Agesilaos kennengelernt haben, konnte nicht deutlicher werden. Es ist nicht die Gesamtheit der Tugenden eines Edelmanns alten Schlages, die den Timotheos über das Niveau der durchschnittlichen Söldnerführers vom Typ Chares erhoben hat, sondern einzig und allein seine intellektuellen Fähigkeiten, die es ihm ermöglichen, die politische und militärische Lage von einer höheren Warte zu überschauen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist von seiner Ge rechtigkeit und Enthaltsamkeit, ja selbst von seiner Tapferkeit keine Rede, obgleich ihm Isokrates auch diese lobenswerten Eigenschaften sicher nicht hat absprechen wollen; sie waren aber für seine Eignung zum Staatsmann und zum Feldherrn von zweitrangiger Bedeutung. Es ist die geistige Ueberlegenheit, die nach Isokrates' Urteil den waren Staatsmann kennzeichnet.

Auch die Übrigen, in dem Timotheos-Bild hervorgehobenen Charakterzüge sind uns aus der zeitgenössischen Literatur und aus den Schriften des Iso-
krates selbst wohl bekannt. Das Wohlwollen, das Timotheos für Athen bei
dessen Verbündeten zu gewinnen suchte, war in Isokrates' Augen überhaupt
ein wichtiger politischer Faktor\textsuperscript{23}). Diese Erkenntnis hängt zusammen mit
dem in dem damaligen philosophischen Schrifttum des olderen zum Ausdruck
kommenden Grundsatz, dass die Macht über die Willigen (ἐκόντων ἀρχεῖν) ein
Merkmal der legitimen Herrschaft ist, denn sonst entartet sie in die Ty-
rannis. Auch die Milde (προδοτης), welche Timotheos selbst gegenüber den Be-
siegten geübht haben sollte, ist keine sentimentale Barmherzigkeit; sie ist
auf das Gewinnen eben jenes Wohlwollens berechnet und wird oft mit der An-
wendung der Strengen zusammen erwähnt als ein untrennbares Paar. Cicero wird
es später in Nachahmung griechischer politischen Theorie in De off. 1,88
classisch ausdrücken: \textit{Et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo atque clementia,
ut adhíbeatur rei publicae causa severitas, sine qua administrari civitas
non potest}\textsuperscript{24}). Die genannten Vorzüge sind also im Grunde genommen nichts
mehr als Nebenerscheinungen jener \emph{φιλόνομος}, die darin besteht, einen Blick
dafür zu besitzen, was dem Menschen in seinem engeren und breiteren Wirk-
ungs- kreis wertvoll ist (Arist. NE a.a.O.).

Isokrates ist aber weit davon, sein Timotheos-Porträt zu einem idealen
Regentenspiegel gestalten zu wollen. Neben den Vorzügen seines Helden kennt
er auch seine Schwächen, sei es auch, wie er meint, seine einzige Schwäche,
die den erfolgreichen Politiker zuletzt zur Verurteilung und Verbannung ge-
bracht hat (Antid. 131-138). Sie bestand in seiner Unfähigkeit, um die
Gunst der Menge zu werben und an die Demagogen, die damals die öffentliche
Meinung Athens entscheidend bestimmten, Zugeständnisse zu machen. Timotheos
war ein zu großer Herr dafür, ohne sonst volksfeindlich oder hochmütig zu
sein. Er war aber Überzeugt, dass ihm seine schlagenden aussenpolitischen
Erfolge auch in der Innerpolitik den Weg ebnen dürften und laut genug für
ihn sprechen sollten. Er weigerte sich, zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, dass der
breiten Masse ein Betrüger, der ihr mit einer heiteren Miene des Menschen-
freundes naht, erwünschter ist als ein Wohltäter, der ihr mit gemessener
Würde begegnet. Isokrates gesteht, er habe dies seinem Freund und ehemaligen
Schüler des älteren dargetan, ohne doch seine unbeugsame Natur ändern zu
können. Diesem Mangel an gemeinsamer Sprache mit seinen Mitbürgern ist Timo-
theos letzten Endes zum Opfer gefallen\textsuperscript{25}).

Das erinnert uns an Thukydides und seine Charakteristik von Perikles
2,60,5 (vgl. 2,65,5-13), wo er ihm in erster Linie zwei hervorragende Eigen-
schaften zuerkennt, die seine einzigmalige politische Grösse bestimmen.
Die erste bestand in der Fähigkeit, vorauszusehen, wie sich die Lage gestalten wird und auf Grund dieser Erkenntnis entsprechende Massnahmen zu ergreifen (γνῶμαι τὰ δόξοντα). Die zweite ermöglichte ihm das Erkannte seinen Mitbürgern darzulegen und ihre Zustimmung zu seiner eigenen Handlungsweise zu gewinnen (ἐρµηνεύομαι ταῦτα)\(^{26}\). Der erste dieser Vorzüge war auch dem Timotheos in hohem Masse eigen, an dem zweiten dagegen mangelte es ihm weitgehend. Diese Beobachtung will nicht besagen, dass Isokrates seinen Timotheos mit den thukydidischen Massstäben gemessen hat, obgleich es an sich ganz gut wahrscheinlich sein kann, dass er das historische Werk seines grossen Landsmanns gekannt und gelesen hat. Er konnte aber auch infolge richtiger Einschätzung der geschichtlichen Tatsachen im Fall Timotheos' selbstständig zu demselben Ergebnis gekommen sein. Für unsere Betrachtung ist wichtiger, dass ein attischer politischer Denker noch vor Isokrates erkannt hat, worin das Wesen eines wahren Staatsmanns liegt und dass er diese Eigenschaft als politische Voraussicht bezeichnet hat\(^{27}\).


Academia Scientiarum Polona, Cracoviae

ANMERKUNGEN


3) Seyffert a.a.O. 26 f. 4) Breitenbach a.a.O. 1702.
5) Vgl. Anm.2. 6) A.a.O. 31.

10) Krömer a.a.O. 128 ff., vgl. den Schlussurteil 151: "Xenophon hat mit etwas fragwürdigen Mitteln ein eindringliches Bild des Agesilaos geschaffen".

14) So meint auch Bucheit a.a.O. 34.
15) Xenophon. Ages.: πράξεις 1,10. 38; διαμαρξάονθαι 1,6. 12. 17. 37; 2,26. 27; εὐφρενία 7,1: basilewós ἀγαθοῦ τούτο ἑργον ἐνόμιζε, τὸ τούς ἀρχομένους ὡς πλείστα ἁγαθά ποιεῖν. Isocr. Antid.: πράξεις 111, 114, 119, 132, 134, 137; εὐφρενία 111 (= πράξεις), 133 (τοὺς ἐν πολούντας), 135 (πλείστων ἁγαθῶν αἰτίως).
16) Gorg.515 C 7; D 10; 517 C 2; 518 B 1; vgl. Dodds im Kommentar (Plato, Gorgias. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1959), 356, vgl.361.
17) De rep. 6,1.
23) J. de Romilly, Eunoia in Isocrates or the political importance of creating good will, Journal of Hellenic Studies 78 (1958) 92-101, bes. 95 (über Antid. 122).
27) So auch Cicero, De rep. 6,1: totum igitur expectas prudentiam huius rerum, quae ipsum nomen hoc nacta est a providendo. Cf. De legg. 1,60: nam cum animus... examinerit ullam ut omum sit ingenii aciem ad bona soligenda et reicienda contraria, quae virtus ex providendo est appellata prudentia.
О ХАРАКТЕРЕ КОНФЛИКТА В КОМЕДИЯХ МЕНАНДРА

В. ЯРХО

Общим местом истории античной литературы является противопоставление новой и древней комедии как бытовой и политической. Верное в принципе, это представление о новой комедии подкрепляется, с одной стороны, целым арсеналом типов, заимствованных ею из реального афинского быта конца IV в. (воины, паразиты, гетеры, врачи и т. д.), с другой, - несомненным мастерством психологической характеристики, которым столь успешно владел Менандр 1). Не последнюю роль в оценке его персонажей играет известное высказывание Аристофана Византийского: ὁ Μένανδρος καὶ βίς, πότερος δὴ ύψον πότερον ἀπεικόμεθα; Отсюда нередкие в научной литературе отзывы о комедиях Менандра как "зеркала жизни", отражающем ее в редкой достоверности 2).

Вместе с тем, в последнее время все чаще раздаются голоса исследователей, ищущих более близкие точки соприкосновения между Менандром и Аристофаном. Начало этому направлению было положено в 1936 г. работой Ф. Берли 3), которому приходилось еще в значительной мере опираться на материал паллади. С открытием "Диксола" необычный для Менандра финал этой комедии заставил задуматься над его близостью к тем эпизодам из комедий Аристофана, в которых побежденный антагонист (или целая их вереница) становится объектом сатирической αἰσχρολογία. В этой связи не без оснований напоминают о том, что комедия Менандра, несмотря на всю ее психологическую достоверность, являлась все же частью праздника Диониса 4). Справедливо указывают на заведомую условность сюжетной схемы пьес Менандра: если принимать содержание его комедий за непосредственное отражение действительности, то надо признать, что в каждом втором афинском доме девушка на выданье подвергалась совращению со стороны юноша насильника и что подкупление детей и их последующее опознание составляло едва ли не главное занятие афинян в IV в. 5). Наконец была сделана попытка применить к анализу комедии Менандра мотив...
аграрного ритуала, стимулирующего плодородие 6). Таким образом, и в отношении Менандра намечается тенденция к выявлению в его комедийном творчестве тех черт, которые восходят к традициям фольклорной схемы. Менее замеченным остается, однако, переосмысление данной схемы, и я попытаюсь сосредоточить внимание именно на этой стороне вопроса, рассмотрев его в связи с характером конфликта в комедии Менандра.

Начать придется несколько издалека. Существенным элементом древней аттической комедии является мотив "перевернутых отношений", объединяющий сюжеты комедий Аристофана с "логикой" сатуралий. Этот мотив, являющийся очень устойчивым компонентом фольклорных представлений о достижении "рая на земле", был в свое время прослежен в различных ареалах древней средиземноморской культуры советским историком и филологом С.Я. Лурье в его статье "Die Ersten werden die Letzten sein" 7). В современном советском литературоведении мотиву "перевернутых отношений" уделяется большое внимание в связи с исследованием проблем комического, природы карнавала и других проявлений "смеховой" культуры (работы М.М. Бахтина, Д.С. Лихачева и др.) 8). Возвращаясь к Аристофану, мы легко обнаружим логику "перевернутых отношений", когда "последние становятся первыми", "верхнее - нижним", едва ли не в каждой из его комедий, с чем связано и ярко выраженным фантастическое, утопическое разрешение конфликта. Важно, однако, что к этому финалу ведет весьма напряженная борьба, в которой сталкиваются защитники и противники общественно значительных концепций: вести войну или заключить мир? кому и как следует управлять государством? в каком духе воспитывать граждан? Наредко остается в борьбе по названным вопросам ведет к тому, что средства фольклорного "срамления", направленного ранее на стимулирование производительных сил природы, теперь используются в целях политической сатиры, т.е. в конечном счете гротескно укрупняют объект критики.

Столь же гротескно укрепляются и результаты одержанной победы: почти обязательная для аристофановской комедии финальная свадьба (или заменяющая ее процедура) вместе с финальным обжорством восходит к тому же ритуалу плодородия и призвана с наибольшей мерой наглядности подтвердить преимущество нового порядка вещей, наступившего в результате победы протагониста над противником. (Именно в этой сфере терпит поражение потре-
бительский идеал Праксагоры, который модернизаторами античности совершенно неправомерно отождествлялся с коммунистическим устройством общества) 9).

В комедии Менандра мы находим переосмысление всех прежних стилевых координат. Ритуальное "посрамление", служившее стилевой основой для беспощадных аристофановских обличений δυναστεί и не вполне исчезнувшее в средней комедии (вспомним перечень лиц, замешанных в пропаже денег Гарпала, в комедии Тимокла "Делос" 10), сводится у Менандра до минимума. В первой его комедии "Гнев" упоминался Ктесипп, который ради удовлетворения своих прихотей продает камни от памятника, воздвигнутого на государственный счет его отцу Хабрию; упоминался также известный паразит Хэрреонт, который из боязни опоздать на обед явился в гости, едва рассвело (фр. 303, 304). Того же Хэрреонта встречаем в "Самиянке" (603 сл.) 11 и еще в нескольких фрагментах (51, 245, 265), как, впрочем, и у других авторов средней и новой комедии 12. Ясно, что это - не столько персональное обличение, сколько привычная дань публике.

Ближе к традиционному "посрамлению" - но не реальному, а вымышленного персонажа - ругательные эпитеты, которыми Менандр наделяет в "Щите" Смикрина: пουνερος (140, 316, 369), μαρφότατος (313) - последнее напоминает одну из любимых негативных характеристик у Аристофана (μαρφός - 36 случаев; сравн. степень - 1, превосходная - 23) 13. Наиболее же развернутую форму такого посрамления представляет, конечно, уже упоминавшийся финал "Дискола". Заметим, однако, что и здесь мучители Кнемона не ругают и не бьют его, как это делали, например, со сводником в папириусном фрагменте периода средней комедии 14 или будут делать в финале "Парса", заимствованного Плавтом тоже из средней комедии. Гета и Сикон оглушительно колотят в двери дома Кнемона, требуют выдать им несметное количество посуды, утвари и т.д., т.е. направляют свои удары на самые чувствительные места в нравственном облике нелюдимого старика, который на этот раз лишен возможности отдать от дому несносных просителей. Таким образом, в этом фарсовом завершении комедии заметно ско- рее стремление к психологической характеристике "посрамляемого" который в том же, в конце концов, отдает себя на волю победителей.
Те́рзает свое́ первона́чальное назна́чение заклю́чительное пирше́ство и ве́дя стихи́я обжорства с непременны́м осме́нием недопу́щенных к столу, столь отчётливо предста́вленные еще во вто́рой половине "Плутона", не говоря уже о заключительных сце́нах "Мира" и "Птицы". В этой сце́ни показательна эволюция, которую прерпева́ют от средней комедии к Менандру два типажа: повар и па́расит.

Повар средней и отчасти новой комедии - прямой наследник той стихии обжорства, риту́альный смысл которой, однако, уже утрачён. В "Эниклиза́усах" Аристофана перечень чутли не 20 компонентов, составляющих иннови́нное блю́до (ст. 1169-1175), служит еще сигналом для приобщения к праздничной еде всех гражда́н. В комедии IV-III вв. монологи повара, возводящего свое искусство в ранг высокой науки, доступной только посвященны́м, или негодующего, что он не может найти в доме ничего необходи́мого, не имеют никакого отношения к коллекти́вному празднеству, хотя претензии повара по-прежнему должны быть вызы́вать смех своим несоотве́тствием действительности, а его буду́ча - хе́ставством15).

У Менандра единственный повар, сохраняющий свою традициона́льную богаты́стость, представлен в "Самиянке" (ст. 283-295): по замеча́нию ра́ба Пэ́рменона, повар сим забы́л способен изрубить собе́ственный на мелкие кусочки. При этом, однако, повар не щеголяет сво́им искусством, а всего лишь интересуется тем, на сколько персон накрывать стол. И хотя́ повар принимал участие еще в не́скольких комедиях16), единственный пьесой, в которой ему отве́дена довольно значи́тельная роль, остается ранний "Дисклон", но и здесь́ эта роль не вполне укладывается в рамки традициона́льного амплуа: не сумев ничего получить от Кне́мона, Сикон элорадует по поводу случивше́гося со ста́риком нечастье́, а затем прина́имает уча́ствие в его́ финальном осме́нении17). Таким обра́зом, традициона́льный а́лаков, каким полагалось бы́ть повару, выступает не в ка́честве посрамляемого, а сам посрамляет другого - оче́видная "пера́вернутость" по отноше́нию к традици́и древне́й комедии. Вершиной полеми́ческого переосми́щения маски повара является фина́л 3-го акта "Ненавистного": здесь повар не более, чем "немое лицо", и хозя́ин только да́ет ему краткие указания о числе госте́й (ст. 270-275).

Отходи́т на задний план и па́расит. У Менандра нет ничего, хоть отдаленно напомина́ющего горды́е профе́ссион de foi па́расита, за-
свидетельственными у других авторов 18), и сам паразит в "чистом виде" представлен среди имеющихся текстов, вероятно, только в "Льстце" (ст. 27-70); образ его в "Сиконце" не вполне ясен.

В функции паразита выступает также Харей, приятель Сострата, в "Дисколе", но здесь он в очень умеренной форме гордится своим дипломатическим искусством (ст. 57-70) и вскоре ретируется при виде приближающегося Кнемона. Вечно голодные паразиты Плавта, всякые Куркулионы, Артотроги, Пеникулы и пр., принадлежат типологически более древней фольклорной традиции, получившей отражение в уже упомянутых фигурах неудачливых претендентов на угощение из театра Аристофана. К Менандру они никакого отношения не имеют.

Свои ритуальные функции теряет еще более существенный элемент сюжета древней комедии - заключительное бракосочетание. Прежде всего, в целом ряде комедий действие начинается после того, как юридически оформленное или фактически совершенное соединение молодых людей уже имело место 19). Однозначно возводит сюжет этих комедий к обрядовой игре, стимулирующей производительные силы природы, столь же неправомерно, как и замечать, что в тех случаях, когда целью интриги является "добывание невесты" 20), главное внимание Менандра привлекают не столько внешние усилия, направленные к этой цели, и уж во всяком случае не описание чувственных радостей, обычное в палайд 21), сколько гармония, возникающая в результате благополучного преодоления всех трудностей. В этом смысле интересно поведение менандровских героев, добивающихся соединения с любимой девушкой.

В "Дисколе" Сострат, помогая Горгую тешить из колодца Кнемона, оказывается один-на-один с его красавицей-дочкой и не может ее налюбоваться. Любовь другой молодой человек у Плавта или Аристофана, конечно, не упустит бы случая обнять и расселовать девушку. Между тем Сострат преодолевает это желание и выходит из дома Кнемона, сознательно отказываясь воспользоваться благоприятной обстановкой и беззащитностью своей любимой (ст. 666-690). Такая же деликатность проявляет в "Щите" Харей, живущий под одной крышей с девушкой, которую ему прочат в невесты (ст. 286-297) 22).

Если Сострат имеет дело со свободной, то Стратофан в "Сиконце" и Фрасонид в "Ненавистном" испытывают нежные чувства к собственной рабыне, и ни один человек в реальном мире, окружен-
шек Менандра, не усомнился бы в том, что юная невольница явля- ется наложницей своего господина23). Тем более благодарный мате- риал давала эта ситуация для комедии с ее древней традицией фаллического празднества. У Менандра владелец девушки не только не сожительствует с ней, но принимает все меры к тому, чтобы разыскать ее родных и получить от них разрешение на законный брак ("Сикионец"), либо всячески старается заслужить ее любовь своим благородным и диллакатным отношением, - так в "Ненавистном", о котором мы еще скажем подробнее.


Название слово "гармония", мы получаем доступ к тому, как пере- осмысливается в комедии Менандра самый важный стилевый элемент древней комедии - принцип "перевернутых отношений". В комедиях Аристофана, в конечном счете, тоже достигается своеобразная гармония - между крестьянином, добывшим мир для себя одного, и его окружением; между женщинами, выступающими за прекращение войны, и мужчинами, которые сначала им противостоят, а затем примираются с ними и т. д. Эта утопическая "гармония" наступает, однако, в результате ожесточенной борьбы между противниками, которая часто принимает физические формы потасовки с балаганным обливанием водой, погоней за "преступником" и т. п. трюками, свойственными клоунаде.
В комедии Менандра нет, в сущности, противоборствующих сил, нет персонажей нападающих или обороняющихся. Если влюбленный молодой человек подозревает существование соперника, то это либо плод недоразумения, либо предполагаемый соперник оказывается братом девушки\(^{27}\) или братом влюбленного\(^{28}\). Всем людям, вместе взятым, противостоят один, общий для всех враг и друг: случай, создатель всякого рода путаницы и взаимного непонимания, которые вследствие игры того же случая обычно разъясняются. Так, только по недоразумению Поленон подозревает Глинеру в измене, Харисий - Памфилу в доброй связи, Демея - Мосхиона в сожительстве с Хрисидой, Кратия - Фрасонида в убийстве ее брата. Вместе с тем, для развязки, приносимой игрой случая, уже подготовлена благоприятная почва в характере людей, запутавшихся в отношениях друг с другом. Поэтому разрешение конфликта наступает у Менандра не в результате столкновения и противоборства антагонистов, а вследствие их готовности к взаимопомощи и взаимопониманию. Извечные для комедии конфликтные ситуации, известные нам по до-мениандровскому периоду и по римским переделкам, переосмысляются таким образом, что конфликт из внешнего столкновения антагонистов превращается в конфликт внутренний, развивающийся в душе индивида. Традиционные ситуации обращаются в свою противоположность в важнейших типах комедийных конфликтов. Прослежим это на нескольких примерах.

Мотив "борьбы отца с сыном" за женщину представлен в зачаточной форме в одном эпизоде аристофановских "Ос", где Филоклеон уводит с пирушки, устроенной для него сыном, флейтистку\(^{29}\) и обещает ей выкупить ее, как только вступит в права наследования (ст. 1341-1359). Спор между отцом и сыном за ласки соблазнительницы разыгрывался, судя по кратким фрагментам, у Ферекрата в "Корианно"\(^{30}\). В современной Менандру комедии этот мотив был разработан гораздо обстоятельнее в "Ευπορος у Филомена и в Кληρονμενος у Дифил, насколько можно судить по Mercator и Casina Плавта\(^{31}\). У Менандра потенциальный конфликт отца с сыном за обладание женщиной заложен в сюжете "Самияники": из неправильного понятий слав старой нянки Демея делает вывод о том, что Мосхион вступил в связь с отцовской сожительницей Хрисидой, которая родила ему сына (ст. 231-279). Оскорбленное чувство отца, несомненно, могло бы послужить причиной для острого столкновения между Демеей и Мосхионом. Между тем, мениандровский Демея
в своей брак с беспроблемностью и без особого труда убедить его выдать собственную дочь - богатую невесту - за бедняка Горгия, ибо тот - честный работник (ст. 784-820). Таким образом, интрига, затейная "против" Кнемона, оказывается избыточной, а улаживание двух законных браков, являющихся явным мезальянсом, обходится и вовсе без интриги.

В "Щите" интрига направлена не столько на добывание невесты, сколько на ее "взволнение", поскольку скудой старик Смикрин, пользуясь родственным правом, хочет жениться на сестре Клеострата, давно обещанной молодому человеку Хэре. Впрочем, и здесь интрига является избыточной: мнимая смерть богатого Хэрестрата, подставной врач, - все это становится излишним с появлением самого Клеострата, так как в качестве хорос своей сестры он может выдать ее замуж за того, кого сам сошлет для этого подходящим. "Добывание невесты", сопряженное в римской комедии с массой трудностей, с необходимостью одуречить скудого отца и выудить у него деньги, в двух упомянутых комедиях не только совершенно отсутствует, но и те элементы "добычания", которые использовались Менандром, либо находятся вне интриги ("Дисколе"),

сам находит доводы, оправдывающие Мосхиона и, не подавая ни о чем вида, продолжает готовить его свадьбу с дочерью соседа. Только невпопад сказанное Мосхионом слова доводят дело до взрыва, который тут же гаснет, поскольку обстоятельства подтверждают полную невиновность молодого человека.32)

Едва ли не самый распространенный мотив новой комедии, унаследованный также римской паллиатой, - "добывание возлюбленной" для жених путем интриги, цель которой обмануть отца или сводника (или, еще лучше, обоих). Нечто подобное имело место, очевидно, и в Дис 6Иαπατόν Менандра, послужившим основой для "Бакхид" Плавта. Часто, однако, в сохранившихся комедиях Менандра мы сталкиваемся с прямо противоположной ситуацией.

Сострату в "Дисколе" приходится добывать себе невесту собственным трудом в поле; нарядившись бедным землевладельцем, он отправляется орудовать тяжелой мотой, чтобы завязать разговор с нелюдимым Кнемоном и просить у него руку дочери (ст. 366-392). Правда, маскарад этот не достигает прямой цели, но Сострат захищает таким путем доверие и благосклонность Горгия, которому Кнемон поручает распоряжаться судьбой сводной сестры. Больше того, Сострату удается легко заполучить согласие отца на свой брак с бесприданницей и без особого труда убедить его выдать собственную дочь - богатую невесту - за бедняка Горгия, ибо тот - честный работник (ст. 784-820). Таким образом, интрига, затейная "против" Кнемона, оказывается избыточной, а улаживание двух законных браков, являющихся явным мезальянсом, обходится и вовсе без интриги.
либо вовсе не направлены против отца молодого человека и не носят меркантильного характера.

Без применения всякой, и тем более сознательно направляемой интриги происходит "добытие невесты" в "Остриженной", "Ненавистном" и "Сикионце". Герои этих комедий, особенно двух первых, добиваются взаимности исключительно благодаря своим нравственным качествам: Полемон - своим чистосердечным рассказам, Фрасонид - редким душевым благородством. Конечно, определенную роль играет во всех случаях спасительное узнавание, которое делает Стратофана полноправным афинским гражданином, а Гликеру и Кратию - дочерьми свободных родителей, но важно подчеркнуть, что решающее слово принадлежит именно женщинам, а не их отцам, - ситуация, совершенно невероятная в афинской жизни и не частая на афинской сцене 33).

В связи с женскими образами Менандра заслуживает упоминания полное переосмысление образа гетеры, наиболее очевидное в "Третейском суде" и "Самиянке". Комедийный стереотип давал, как правило, образ алчной жрицы любви, не выпускающей из своих хищных лап попавшего в них юношу 34), - так обстояло дело, в частности, в пластиках "Вакхихад" (в какой мере достоверно они именно в этой части воспроизводят менандровский оригинал, сказать трудно). Правда, уже в средней комедии и в современной Менандру новой наряду с гетерой-хищницей появляется гетера поневоле, добрая и сердечная девушка, оправдывающая свое название "подруги" 35). Такая переоценка, возможно, была связана с тем, что афинские поэты и их зрители знали, сколько семей оказалось в IV в. разбросанными в результате бесконечных военных операций и сколько осиротевших девушек осталось без средств к жизни. Как бы то ни было, менандровские Габротон и Хрисида представляют собой полный отказ от типажа алчной гетеры-разлучницы.

Первая из них, вместе того, чтобы шантажировать Хрисию с помощью его перстия и вымогать деньги для своего выкупа на волю, берет на себя главную роль в поисках отца и матери подкинутого ребенка. Хрисида в "Самиянке" с самого начала готова сделать все от нее зависящее, чтобы на время прикрыть связь Мозхиона с Планго, а затем, став жертвой непонятного ей гнева Демея, по-прежнему самоотверженно защищает доверенного ей ребенка. Таким образом, обе женщины оказываются своего рода добрыми гениями для мужчин, которые вошли в их жизнь.
Особого рассмотрения заслуживает целиком переосмысленный в комедии Менандра образ воина. Мы привыкли судить об изображении воина в новой комедии по плавтовскому Пирополику, между тем как попытка возвести *Miles gloriosus* непосредственно к Менандру остается в достаточной степени спорной 36. В театре Менандра единственной, надежно засвидетельствованной фигурой хвастлившего воина является Биант в *Кóлаи*, которому, однако, противостоят и чистосердечный Полемон, и благородный Стратофан, и, особенно, трогательно несчастный Фразонид 37. Влюбившись в купленную им рабыню Кратию, Фразонид тяжело страдает от того, что девушка отвергает все его подарки и мольбы, так как подозревает в воине убийцу ее брата. Естественно, что девушка не хочет связывать свою судьбу с таким человеком; менее естественно, что Фразонид, не зная причины ее отказа, выказывает такую душевную чуткость по отношению к своей рабыне, которую едва ли можно было заподозрить в рядовых афинянах: для всякого было ясно, что молодая и красивая невольница должна стать наложницей хозяина. Тем не менее Фразонид ведет себя совсем иначе, и чуткость, проявленная им по отношению к Кратии, сто лет спустя дала основание Хрисиппу воспользоваться примером нашего воина, чтобы показать истинную сущность любви: она стремится μὴ εἶναι συνουσίας, ἀλλὰ φιλίας 38. Употребляемое Хрисиппом понятие φιλία, составляющей основу супружеского союза, возвращает нас самым прямым путем к учению о дружбе, разработанному примени- тельно к семейным вопросам Аристотелем в "Никомаховой этике": в основе союза мужчины и женщины должно находиться не одно лишь стремление к деторождению, присущее всем живым существам, а дружба, являющаяся одним из видов ὀρέτη. Ставить вопрос о том, как должен муж жить с женой, все равно, что рассуждать о том, как надо блюсти законы справедливости 39.

Здесь мы оказываешься перед многократно обсуждавшимся вопросом об отношении комедии Менандра к философии перипатетиков 40; однако я хотел бы коснуться его не совсем с той стороны, с которой до сих пор подходили исследователи. Обычно спор идет о том, является ли нит поведение персонажей Менандра или их отдельные высказывания прямым откликом на положения Аристотеля или Феофраста. В нашем же случае соотношение между философией и комедией Менандра представляется не столь важным в деталях, сколько в их принципиальном жизнеотношении, и здесь, на мой взгляд, очевидна значительная близость в мировоззренческом плане.
В самом деле, весь жанр новой комедии возникает, в сущности, на пересечении двух противоположных тенденций: с одной стороны, вполне объясненный в эпоху падения гражданской активности инте-
рес к индивидуальному миру рядового человека, находящегося в
повседневных, обыденных отношениях со своим окружением; с
другой, - порожденная общественной неустойчивостью этого же
времени неизбежность иллюзорного разрешения жизненного кон-
фликта, которая создает определенный стереотип драматургического
мышлении, отдаляющий комедию от реальных проблем действитель-
ности. К числу таких элементов, подготовливающих иллюзорное
разрешение конфликта, следует отнести:

Непременное опознание в подброшенных некогда младенцах
детей достаточно обеспеченных родителей, которых без вся-
кого затруднения устраивают их дальнейшую жизнь (исключи-
ение - Филумена в "Сикиноце", но здесь богатый Стратофан
нисколько не заинтересован в приданом);

Опознание в гетере свободнорожденной из состоятельной
семьи; к тому же девушка, хоть и встала на опасный путь,
еще не успела пойти по рукам и придерживается одного лю-
бовника, который берет её в жены (Συναρφίωσα - плавов-
ская Cistellaria; Rudens -по Дифилу);

Готовность богатых молодых людей и их отцов взять в жены
бедную девушку, поскольку добрый нрав дороге денег. Так по-
ступают в "Самиянке" Демея, в "Щите" Харестрат, в "Дисколе"
Каллипид; в "Земледельце" состоятельный Клеонет готов же-
ниться на бедной девушке, сестре Горгия.

В результате получается, что финалы мена́ндровской комедии
оказываются не менее утопичными, чем у Аристофана; только там
утопия охватывала общество в целом, здесь она распространяется
на узкий круг лиц, ограниченный пределами одной-двух семей.
Тот же разрыв между действительностью и идеалом характеризует
в последние десятилетия IV в. теоретические построения филосо-
фов и возможность их практического применения.

Аристотель, обследовавший государственное устройство более
чем 150 греческих полисов и давший детальную классификацию раз-
личных свойств человеческого характера, пришел к выводу о не-
obходимости отдать предпочтение - в общественной и индивидуаль-
ных сферах - цєсότης; между олигархией и охлократией, между
богатством и бедностью, между крайними проявлениями человечес-
кой природы. Так, посередине между страхом и дерзновением на-
ходится мужество; благоразумие является серединой по отноше-
нию к наслаждениям; те, кто предаются избытку гнева, искажают сущ-
ность этого справедливого чувства 41). Ровесник Менандра Деметрия Фалерский, прошедший вместе с ним школу Феофраста, пытался применить теоретические положения перипатетиков о "среднем строе" к действительности 42) и после 10 лет правления должен был спасаться бегством из Афин, а воздвигнутые в его честь 300 или 360 статуи свергли в течение одной ночи 43). Реальные классовые противоречия в Афинах опрокидывали идеальные построения философов.

В комедии Менандра такому решительному разрешению конфликтов, присущих реальной жизни, противопоставляется иллюзорная гармония, возникающая не без помощи удачного стечения обстоятельств, но коренящаяся, в конечном счете, в той же логике "перевернутых отношений". Два обстоятельства предопределяют благополучное завершение комедий Менандра: традиция жанра, восходящего к фольклорно-ритуальному действу, с одной стороны, и поиски упокоения от треволнений времени в кругу идеализированных семейных отношений, - с другой. В древней аттической комедии, где исходной точкой сюжета с самого начала были фантастические иди и планы, утопическое разрешение конфликта не находилось в противоречии с требованиями жанра. В новой комедии, которую принято считать комедией бытовой, иллюзорное решение конфликта свидетельствует о несовместимости общественного и нравственного идеала с реальными жизненными условиями. Советливый молодой человек, охотно берущий на себя последствия насилия над девушкой; отец, обеспокоенный тем, чтобы только скрыть от людей оскорбление, нанесенное ему приемным сыном; суровый воин, готовый скорее покончить с собой, чем принудить к сожительству собственную рабыню; гетера, отказывающаяся от возможности обогащения ради счастья ее прежнего возлюбленного, - все это персонажи, которым вдва ли можно было найти широкое соответствие в реальной жизни афинян. Типы Менандра при всей их близости к бытовой повседневности несомненно идеализированы. Несмотря на внешнее правдоподобие менандровской комедии, не выходящей за пределы двух-трех соседних домов, в ней создаются достаточно условные, в сущности, утопические предпосылки для постановки нравственного конфликта, и его решение ведет к не менее иллюзорной в своем роде развязке. Традиционные для древней комедии "перевернутые отношения" снова "переворачиваются", но результатом этой операции становится не простое возвращение к повседневной действи-
тельности, а установление иллюзорной гармонии⁴⁴), соответствую- 
ующей аристотелевскому представлению об идеале как середине 
между двумя крайностями.

Москва

NOTES

1) Quint. Inst. or. X.1.69; Plut. Compar. Aristoph. et Men. epitome 853.2; 
Hermog. Περί Ιδεϊ του ΙΙ.36 (Text.38.41.44 Крате).

2) Most frequently quoted is M. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, Oxford, 1941, 166. Cf. also G. Méautis, Le crê-
puscula d’Athènes et Ménandre, Paris, 1954. A more differentiated approach 
to this problem is found in Cl. Préaux, 'Ménandre et la société 
athénienne,' Chronique d’Egypte 32 (1957) 84-100; M. Treu in Menander 
Dyskolos, Munich, 1960, 97-100; S. Perlman, 'Menander, Dyskolos 13-20...,' 
RFIC 93 (1965) 271-277; W.G. Arnott, 'Menander, qui vitae ostendit vitam,' 
G&R 15 (1968) 1-17.


4) L.A. Post, AJP 80 (1959) 407 f.; И.М. Тронский, 'Новоантичная коме-
dия Менандра "Угрюмец'', ЕДИ 1960, 70; W. Kraus, AAW 26 (1973) 38.

5) Compare (as early as in 1911) W.Sc. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens, 
273 (same as in the 1st ed., 1927); Kulturgeschichte der Antike: 1. Gri-
sehenland, Berlin (Akademie-Verlag), 1976, 459. The "plausibility" of the 
New Comedy is argued from the aesthetical point of view by W. Görler, 
'Ueber die Illusion in der antiken Komödie,' AA 18 (1972) 41-57.

6) T.B.L. Webster, 'Woman hates soldier: structural approach to New 
Comedy,' ORBS 14 (1973) 287-299. Compare earlier G. Murray in New Chapters 
in the History of Greek Literature, II. Series, 1929, 15 f.; 'Ritual ele-
ments in the New Comedy,' CQ 37 (1943) 46-54.

7) Klio 22, No.4 (1929) 405-431. Compare H. Kenner, Das Phänomen der 
verkehrten Welt in der griechisch-römischen Antike, Klagenfurt, 1970, 
est. 65-94.

8) М. Бахтин, Творчество Франсуа Рабле и народная культура средневековья 
и Ренессанса, Москва, 1965, ос. 8-20; А.А. Белян, Русские скоморохи, 
Москва, 1975, 95-97, 129-132, 137-38, 155-58; Д.С. Лихачев, А.М. Панчанко, 
"Смеховой мир" Древней Руси, Ленинград, 1976, 15-26, 57-68.

9) В.Н.Ярхо, Социальная утопия в комедиях Аристофана, Москва,1947,17-43.

10) Fr.4 Edm. (FAC II 604). Cf. T.B.L. Webster, Studies in Later Greek 

11) Text of Menander is given throughout according to the edition of 

12) Antiph. fr.199; Alexid. fr.210; 257; Timoth. fr.1; Timocl. fr.9; 


14) Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta, ed. Colin Austin, 
Berlin, 1973, No.239.
15) E.g., Sosip. fr.1; Diphilos. fr.17, 43; Dionys. fr.2; Strato fr.1; Alexid. fr.174 (FAC III 280, 104, 114; II 534 s., 582, 460). For detail see A. Giannini, 'La figura del cuoco nella commedia greca,' Aome 13 (1960) 135-216; H. Doehm, Mageiros, Munich, 1964.

16) Asp.216-233; Col. fr.1; Phasma 73 s.; Epitr. fr.1-5.


18) E.g., Diodor. fr.2; Antiph. fr.195 (FAC III 220; II 262).


21) Compare the brief message of Davus (Peric.305) against the detailed orders of Trygaeus (Pax 842-44; 868-70; 886-904). Similarly, the impartiality of Polemon is expressed in a single sentence (Peric. 997 f.), in contrast to an entire scene dedicated in Dyskolos to the love-sufferings of Cinesias. Compare also Chaerea's reticence in his dialogue with Antiphos, in Terence's Eunuchus 604-06, going back to Menander.

22) Cf. Asp.290 and Her.41 s.: neither Davus nor Chaerea seek secret intimacy with the beloved girl.

23) Cf. Mism. 307 ὁμο ἐναλλ. 24) As, e.g., in Rudene.

25) Sam.726 s.; Dysc.842-44; Peric.1031 s.; Mism.444 s.; Fab. inc.29 s.

26) Sam.50-54; Georg.15-21; Cithar.96-101.

27) Peric.819-27; 985 s.

28) Sicyon. 309 s.


30) Frr.71-74 (FAC I 234).


33) Cf. Pap. Didot I 34 s.: The woman defending before her father the right to remain with her husband nevertheless admits that the choice of her future husband is her father's responsibility.

34) E.g., Anaxil. fr.22; Alexid. fr.98 (FAC II 340, 416-418). Webster, Studies (note 10), 22 f.; 63 f.


37) For more detail see V. Įarho, "Новиника Менандра "Ненавистный"," ВДИ 1979, No.2, 24-41 (there the earlier bibliography).

38) Diog. Laert.VII.130.


ON THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN THE COMEDIES OF MENANDER

V. N. IARKHO

The traditional theme of "the reversed social order" (in which the last become the first), involving an illusory, utopian solution of the play's plot, is present in almost every Aristophanic comedy. But the dénouement of the Menandrian comedy proves to be equally illusory and utopian, with the only significant difference that in Aristophanes the utopia extends to the entire society, while in Menander it is limited to the interests of two or three families.

Now, in Aristophanes utopian solutions may have been encouraged by the nature of the traditional literary genre itself. But in Menander such an "illusory harmony" only attests to the incompatibility between the fresh -- mostly peripatetic -- social and ethical ideals, and the surrounding reality. In brief, Menander's characters are not real Athenians but rather idealized models. The poet consistently re-examines the traditional characters in an effort to transform them into more humane, conscientious, noble-minded, self-denying, ideal human beings. Such is the case with the hetaera and with the professional soldier, while the traditional abuse of the parasite and the cook is reduced to a minimum. Accordingly, the traditional theme of "the acquisition of the bride" is also re-evaluated, usually ending in a legitimate matrimony.

Finally, there are no real antagonistic forces in action in a Menandrian comedy: Chance is everybody's fiend or friend. She creates misunderstanding, confusion and conflict, and she usually brings them to a happy solution.

The author substantiates these remarks with many examples from Menander.

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(Abstract by the Editor)
Literary histories tend to present Lucretius as an isolated figure, his poem as something of an anachronism. Unlike the work of Catullus or the Augustans, whose variety and contemporaneity stimulate the study of influence, development and interrelationship, the *De Rerum Natura* has seemed to stand apart from its historical and literary context. This impression is encouraged by the poet himself, when he preaches withdrawal from the follies of contemporary public life (e.g., in the proem to Book 2) and elevates the poem's practical aim above its merely aesthetic value (1.931f.). Nevertheless, this isolation has been much exaggerated. Firstly, both the Epicurean subject matter and the poetic genre of the *De Rerum Natura* mirror contemporary tastes. Epicureanism, which had been known at Rome since at least 154 B.C., or maybe 173 B.C.,\(^1\) reached a height of popularity in the late Republic,\(^2\) partly in response to a growing disillusionment with the public scene which Lucretius depicts with such abhorrence (e.g., 3.59f.), much like Sallust in the next generation. Prose authors catered to this interest\(^3\) and Epicurean doctrine is conspicuous in Cicero's philosophical oeuvre. The idea of expounding such technical material in verse was an original stroke but by no means anachronistic, for indications exist that the didactic genre, revived in the Hellenistic era, was beginning to enjoy a vogue in Lucretius's day.\(^4\) Apart from Cicero's translation of Aratus, known to Lucretius,\(^5\) one might mention the *De Rerum Natura* of Egnatius (Frs 1-2 Morel), the *Empedoclea* of Sallustius (Cic. *ad Quint. 2.10.3) and certain didactically flavoured fragments of Valerius Soranus (Fr. 4 M) and Q. Cicero (p. 79 M); in the next
generation came the *Chorographia* and *Epimenis* (?) of Varro Atacinus (Frs 14-22 M).

Another area of exaggeration concerns the poet's alleged neglect by his own and subsequent ages. Yet he is mentioned with praise by Cicero in a celebrated letter (*ad Quint.* 2.10.3) and there are many parallels to suggest that Cicero drew upon him also in his philosophical works (despite the often accepted view to the contrary). 6) Catullus too introduced clear Lucretian reminiscences into his most ambitious poem 7) and probably shared with him the patronage of Gaius Memmius. In later literature there are specific references to Lucretius in Nepos (*Att.* 12.4), Vitruvius (9, praef. 17), Ovid (*Am.* 1.15.23, *Trist.* 2.425), Velleius (2.36.2), Seneca (*Tranq. Anim.* 2.14, *Ep.* 58.12 etc.), Pliny the Elder (*N.H.*, index lib. 10) and Younger (*Ep.* 4.18.1), Statius (*Silv.* 2.7.76), Quintilian (1.4.4, 10.1.87 etc.), Tacitus (*Dial.* 23.2), Fronto (*Ep. ad Marc. Caes.* 4.3.2, p. 62 N etc.) and many later authors; 8) more significantly, he left an indelible print upon most subsequent poets, especially Virgil. 9)

These data suggest that Lucretius wrote about a relevant topic, employed a fashionable genre and was read by contemporaries and posterity. But there remains a final argument of those who have stressed Lucretian isolation, which represents him as an arch-conservative clinging to the antique style and ethos of Ennius in opposition to innovative trends variously styled Neotericism, New Poetry or Alexandrianism. 10) This old-fashioned Lucretius, immune to the influence of Hellenistic poetry and lacking contact with the Catullan circle, used to be a familiar figure, 11) but has happily disappeared from most modern criticism. No doubt those critics of Ennius whom Cicero characterized (some years after Lucretius's death) as *novi poetae* and *cantores Euphorionis* (*Orat.* 161, *Tusc.* 3.45) disapproved of Lucretian archaism; no doubt the experimental poetry of Catullus evinces a disassociation from poems so long and so deeply rooted in early Latin as the *De Rerum Natura*. But this hardly amounts to a rigid polarization of attitudes and styles. The absence of any other successful model made imitation of Ennius prudent and inescapable, once Lucretius had decided upon a large hexameter poem. However, this fact
should not be allowed to obscure his independence and modernity. Suffice it to observe here that Lucretian veneration for Ennius is tinged with criticism of his philosophy and competitive emulation of his poetic achievement. Moreover, a mechanical list of Lucretius's numerous archaisms does little justice to the quite un-Ennian range of sophisticated effects for which he employs them.

Another way of qualifying too narrow a view of the literary influences which molded Lucretius is to demonstrate the multiplicity of his Greek models. Traces of Homer, Hesiod, Sappho, Aeschylus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Euripides, Thucydides and Plato, not to mention Epicurus, testify to the broad reading and culture of the poet. Furthermore, it is becoming clear that, despite previous statements to the contrary, Lucretius was acquainted with the Hellenistic poetry which inspired young contemporaries like Catullus. Scattered parallels have been noted since Lambinus, but the first serious discussion came in L. Ferrero's overstated but unjustly neglected book on Lucretius and New Poetry, which stresses the common literary climate of Lucretius and Catullus. In recent years several other authors, especially E. J. Kenney, have made useful contributions to this aspect of Lucretian background. The intention of the present article is to explore further the extent and significance of Lucretius's debt to the most important of the Hellenistic poets, Callimachus. Not that Callimachus was a late Republican discovery, for Ennius almost certainly knew his work and he was translated by Q. Lutatius Catulus (Fr. 1 M). But since he played a key role in inspiring the fresh impetus of Alexandrianism which we observe in Catullus and his friends, any contacts with Lucretius become doubly interesting.

Roman poets were intrigued by the poet-critic combination in Callimachus and eagerly adopted his canons of style and subject matter in their programmatic poems. This kind of Callimacheanism is familiar to us from Catullus and the Augustans; there has been less discussion of the series of programmatic passages in Lucretius, many of which bear unmistakable traces of Callimachus, both in their general self-consciousness and also their specific images and slogans. Let
us begin with the famous digression in Book 1 (1.921-50), where we will be chiefly concerned with the first half proclaiming the poem's originality (921-34).

The remarkable richness and variety of imagery which pervades these lines should warn us from the outset against seeking a single source of influence: clearly this is an original synthesis of motifs, relating not only to external models, but also to the proem of Book 1 and the surrounding context. Nevertheless, some of the threads composing this closely woven texture can be unravelled by reference to Lucretius's predecessors. For instance, in the opening lines he has drawn upon two conventional Greek concepts of the poet, those of the divinely possessed devotee (thyrso, 923) and the Muses' friend (amorem/Musarum, 924-5). Here he may have recalled the eloquent account of poetic inspiration in Plato's Ion 534a, where the idea of divine possession is followed by a comparison of poets with honeybees, according to which they are said to derive their songs from honeyed fountains in the gardens of the Muses (compare the sequence of ideas in Lucretius). It is noteworthy, however, that Lucretius has converted these originally religious motifs into personal symbols of ambition and ecstasy, stripping away the reference to external inspiration which was conventional in a 'Dichterweihe' of the Hesiodic kind.

Having established a tone of exultant pride and individualism, Lucretius now describes his originality through a series of three metaphors - untrodden path, untouched springs, fresh flowers for a garland (926f.). Much here is reminiscent of the beginning of the Theogony (the Muses, their gift to the poet, the natural setting and, later, the sweetness of song), but Lucretius probably had Ennius mainly in mind. The reconstruction of the proem to the Annales is highly controversial, but an excellent case can be made for supposing that Ennius, in imitation of Callimachus's dream in the Aetia, traversed the realm of the Muses, drank from an inspiring spring and won a garland, just as Lucretius does in metaphorical terms. By repeating these motifs and simultaneously stressing newness (avia, nullius ante..., integros, novos, unde prius nulli...), Lucretius manages to convey both indebtedness and originality.
However, it is going too far to state that these lines are 'no more than an elaboration in the imagery of Ennius', for the terms in which Lucretius expresses his originality are irresistibly reminiscent of Callimachus. Lines 926-7, as Pfeiffer recognized, recall the road imagery of *Aet. Fr.* 1.25-8;

\[\text{πρός δὲ σε} θαλὸν ἄνωγα, τὰ μη πατέουσιν ἄμαξα τὰ στείβε, εἰν, ἐτέρων ἵχνια μὴ καθ’ ὁμά}
\[\text{διφρόν ἐλῃξον μηδ’ οἶμον ἀνὰ πλατὺν, ἄλλα κελεύον ἀτρίπτος, εἰ καὶ στείβε, ἵγοτέρην ἔλασεν.‘}

Indeed, if the supplement ἀτρίπτους is correct, the parallel extends to verbal detail (*loca nullius ante/trita solo*). Moreover, the role of springs as a source of poetic inspiration (927), an unclassical idea which Callimachus's dream in the *Aetia* may have popularized, reminds one here by its emphasis on freshness of the *Hymn to Apollo*, where Apollo is said to approve a καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἄχράντος... ὀλίγη λυβάς (*Hymn* 2.1.11-2). Despite his general debt to Callimachus's dream, there is no evidence that Ennius formulated his claim to be the first real Roman poet with such specifically Callimachean emphasis on novelty of theme; indeed, had he done so, Lucretius would surely have avoided a repetition both weak and subversive of his own claim. A more plausible explanation is that Callimachean influence on Ennius's proem was restricted to the dream passage, while Lucretius has borrowed from elsewhere in Callimachus (including the later preface, which can hardly have been congenial to the Roman epicist) in order to underline his own independence from Ennius.

These reminiscences raise two important questions, which must be answered if we are to assess their significance correctly. Firstly, even if they were not derived from Ennius, is it possible that they were channelled from Callimachus to Lucretius by an intermediary source, or that they had attained the status of commonplaces by his time? The evidence tells against the latter, inasmuch as the images of unworn path and pure spring are uncommon in Hellenistic poetry and, to judge from later imitations (e.g., Virg. *Georg.* 3.291f., Hor. *Carm.* 1.26.6), received from Lucretius their first definitive statement in Latin. The former possibility, that Lucretius took his cue from an imitation of Callimachus, is more serious, since the unworn path appears in an epigram by Antipater, *A.P.* 7.409.5-6 (*εἰ τὰν ἀτριπτὸν καὶ ἀνέμβατον ἀτριπόν ἀλλοις/μαίεαι*), which Lucretius is likely to have known on the basis of other parallels.
and pure springs are used in another epigram by Alcaeus of Messene, A.F. 7:55.5-6 (Ἐννέα Μουσέων ἢ πρέσβες καθαρῶν γευσάμενος λιβάδων), to describe the inspiration of Hesiod. Whether or not Lucretius knew the Callimachean originals directly must therefore remain a matter of judgment, although it seems to me highly probable in view of other echoes of Callimachus which I hope to establish later.

Secondly, do these reminiscences - direct or indirect - imply any adherence to Callimachean stylistic canons, above and beyond their primary function of expressing Lucretius's originality? Kenney suggests that the emphasis Lucretius lays upon clarity (e.g., 1.136-45, 921-2, 933-4) may go beyond an Epicurean concern for σαφήνεια (D. L. 10.13) and share something with Callimachus's repeated insistence upon fine-drawn art. One could add that the notion of poetic sweetness (936-50, esp. 945-7) is prominent not only in the opening of the Theogony (39-40, 69, 83-4, 97) but also in the Aetia preface (Pr. 1.11, 16) and the epigram praising Aratus (Ep. 27.2); moreover, Lucretius repeats the cliche in a strikingly Callimachean statement at 4.180 and 909 (suavidae potius quam multis versibus edam), which I suspect to have been inspired by an epigram of Asclepiades (A.F. 7.11) that describes Erinna's tiny output as γλυκοῦ... πόνος, οὐχὶ πολύς μέν... ἄλλη, ἔτερων πολλῶν δυνατάτερος. However, very little can be made of such vague parallels, based as they are upon ideas which were prevalent not only in Callimachus but Hellenistic literature in general and even earlier Greek poetry. To return to the question posed above, we must answer that Lucretius assertions of thematic novelty (926-30) and lucid style (933-4) do not amount to a statement of allegiance to Callimachean poetics in the narrow sense of Catullus 95 or the Augustan recitationes. This clearly emerges from a contrast between Lucretius's expansive handling of the path and spring images and the ironic, allusive treatment of Callimachus. Callimachus was revitalizing an old and jaded art by his insistence on refined exclusivity; Lucretius was exploring the potential of a relatively new one and conveys the exhilaration of a poetic pioneer and missionary.

However, the fact that programmatic Callimachean ideas influenced a segment of Lucretius's most personal statement remains significant in itself, and receives confirmation from echoes in other self-conscious passages of the poem. Perhaps next in importance as a personal utterance stand the lines on the difficulty of rendering obscure Greek discoveries in Latin (1.136-45), where, as in 1.921-34, the contrast of light and
dark acts as a frame for reflections on the nature of the poem. Here Lucretius states that the hope of friendship persuades him *quemvis efferre laborem* (141) and *noctes vigilare serenas* (142). The second phrase obviously reproduces a proverbial idea of working late into the night, with which one can compare the use of the verb *luoubrare* and our own saying 'to burn the midnight oil'. However, I doubt whether it is coincidental that Lucretius's formulation of the idea in terms of staying awake (*vigilare*) puts one in mind of the sleeplessness which Callimachus ascribes to Aratus, as a token of his astronomical research and perfectionist artistry (Ep. 27.3-4):

\[ \chiαίρετε λεπταί \]

That this epigram was familiar to the Catullan circle may be inferred from the dedicatory poem attached to a gift by C. Helvius Cinna (Fr. 11 M):

\[ \text{haec tibi Arateis multum invigilata lucernis carmina, quis ignis novimus aetherios.} \]

As a didactic poet following in the tradition of Aratus, Lucretius may have felt a particular affinity to the epigram; one may even sense a hint of Aratus's star-studded sky in the epithet *serenas*, apart from its important psychological significance. In harmony with this interpretation, of Lucretius's sleeplessness, the poet's *laborem* (141) can be compared with the Alexandrian ideal of painstaking craft, for here (and in the oxymoron *duloi... labore*, 2.730, 3.419) the word seems to refer less to the effort of Epicurean research than to that of committing it to verse. A concern for careful artistry also emerges from his use of the verb *pango* (1.933) and the revealing statement about *politis/versibus* (6.82-3). Again, however, the similarities to Callimachus must not be overstressed. Most importantly, the sleeplessness, labour and polish of Lucretius have a practical end, and by emphasizing them he wishes to engage our attention, not to praise art for art's sake.

Another programmatic statement occurs in 4.909-11, where Lucretius promises to explain sleep *suavidiois potius quam multis versibus* (a line already mentioned earlier), and favourably compares the *parvus... canor* of swans to the diffuse *clamor* of cranes. Lines 910-11 are a close adaptation of an epigram
by Antipater (A.P. 7.713.7-8). Line 909 can hardly be called an imitation of Callimachus (I compared it before with Asclepiades, A.P. 7.11), but certainly derives ultimately from his celebrated rejection of ἐν δέισινα διηνυμές...ἐν πολλαῖς... χιλιάδοιν (Aet. Fr. 1.3-4 and passim; cf. Frs 465, 398, Hymn 2.105f., Ep. 28.1). In the light of this flagrantly Alexandrian sentiment (even the compressed incongruity sounds authentically Callimachean), it may be legitimate to suppose that pedagogical claims of brevitas elsewhere in Lucretius (1.499, 2.143, 4.115, 723, 6.1083) also contain an artistic motivation.

Furthermore, it is interesting that Lucretius substitutes cranes for Antipater's jackdaws in his adaptation. To be sure, gruum is a more tractable word than graculorum, but in such a self-conscious and literary passage he is unlikely to have hit upon the replacement by accident. Pfeiffer originally conjectured that both poets worked independently from a common source in the Aetia preface, but the recovery of lines 15-16 disproved a close imitation by Lucretius. Rather, he modelled his passage primarily upon Antipater but returned to the Aetia preface for the illustration of cranes, which there represent tedious epic, by contrast with the 'little nightingales' preferred by Callimachus. If this analysis is correct, we have concrete evidence here for the coalescence of two separate Hellenistic poems in Lucretius's creative imagination. Once again, however, we should note that ideas which Callimachus used to clarify his aesthetic standards are appropriated by Lucretius for the different role of alluring his audience (912-15).

Together, these echoes testify to the contemporary pull exerted by Callimachean poetics, although it is sometimes difficult to tell whether Lucretius was responding directly to Callimachus or his Hellenistic imitators. I turn now to a few miscellaneous resemblances which permit a more confident decision in favour of direct inspiration. The first example has gone unnoticed hitherto and occurs within Lucretius's praise of Empedocles (1.716f.). This powerful passage pays homage to the Sicilian's achievements as philosopher and poet through a vividly imaginative description of his island's natural wonders, implicitly linking the ruggedness and grandeur of Sicily with the philosopher's majestic verse. Two areas of the encomium are verbally indebted to Callimachus's
Hymn to Delos (4), which in a similar fashion approaches the tale of Apollo's birth with praise of his island birthplace. The first of these is the beautiful description of Sicily's seaboard in 718-19:

quam fluitans circum magnis anfractibus aequor
Ionium glaucis aspargit virus ab undis,

These lines are an adaptation of the picture sketched by Callimachus of the sea around Delos (Hymn 4.13-14):

ο δ' ἄμφι ε ποιοῦς ἐλλοσων
´Ικαρίου πολλήν ἀπομάσσεται ὦβατος ἄχνην.\(^\text{47}\)

To press the point, quam fluitans circum magnis anfractibus answers roughly to ἄμφι ε ποιοῦς ἐλλοσων,\(^\text{48}\) aequor/Ionium to ἴκαρίου... ὦβατος aspargit virus to ἀπομάσσεται... ἄχνην; in addition to verbal correspondence, Ionium and aspargit stand at the identical point in the line.\(^\text{49}\) Of course, Lucretius has also transformed the original, both in detail, e.g., the substitution of 'brine' for 'foam' and the addition of the ornamental detail glaucis, and in tone, which is rather more elevated than in Callimachus, thanks largely to the resounding periphrasis in 718.

A second echo of the same hymn occurs a little later, where Lucretius praises the revelations of Empedocles above those of the Delphic oracle (738-9):

sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam
Pythia quae tripodi a Phoebi lauroque profatur,\(^\text{50}\)

The commentators offer parallels for the expression 'from the tripod and laurel of Phoebus' (e.g., Eur. Or. 329, I.T. 976, Arist. Plut. 39), refer to the proverbial notion, contradicted by Lucretius, of speaking as truthfully as Apollo's oracle\(^\text{51}\) and mention an epigram by Athenaeus (not Epicurus, as Bailey says) which praises Epicurus as having learnt a certain fact from the Muses or the Delphic tripod (D. L. 10.12). Only Munro has recognized that the clever idea of speaking more accurately than the Delphic oracle derives from the humorous-prophetic words of the unborn Apollo in Callim. Hymn 4.90-94, esp. 94:\(^\text{52}\)

οὐπω μοι Πυθόνι μέλει τριποδήλως ἔδρη,
oùδε τι πω τέθηκεν φιλις μέγας, ἀλλ' ἔτει κεῖνo
θηρίων αἰνογένειον ἀπὸ πλειστοῖο καθέτοιν
Παρνησόν νιφήντα περιστέφει ἐννέα κύκλους.
ἀλλ' ἕμπης ἔρεω τι τομώτερον ἢ ἀπὸ δάμνης.
A comparison with the Lucretian lines will show that Callimachus's reference to the Pythian tripod (90) has been conflated with the joke about speaking more clearly than 'from the laurel' (94), in order to create a single, cogent idea. Significantly, Lucretius has turned the thought against Apollo and foreknowledge in general,\(^53\) whereas Apollo's words in Callimachus are unprejudicial to the veracity of his future oracle (he simply implies that firsthand prophecy is better than secondhand).

It seems reasonable to conclude on the basis of these echoes that Lucretius had read the whole hymn with some care. Perhaps this reading supplied him with some of the inspiration to praise Empedocles through the medium of his island birthplace and in terms of a latter-day god,\(^54\) (although the poetic statements of Empedocles himself are likely to have provided the chief impetus).\(^55\) This larger claim may be insupportable, but it helps towards a clearer appreciation of the plan and purpose of this striking digression, which can be seen as a demythologized hymn, removing true superhumanity from the realm of superstition to that of ratio and scientific discovery. As such, the passage may be compared with the 'hymns' to Epicurus (3.lf., 5.lf.), in which hymnic formulæ of praise are applied to the enemy of superstition, partly for polemical reasons, partly to turn around ingrained religious attitudes and divert them into constructive channels.\(^56\)

Another imitation of Callimachus is found in the virtuoso and complex digression on Cybele (2.600-660). Here, at the climax of the ritual procession he is describing, Lucretius paints a lively picture of the dancing attendants named Curetes, who recall the Dictaean Curetes who drowned Jupiter's infant cries. After an ironic gesture to tradition (\textit{feruntur, 634})\(^57\) Lucretius reports the story of the latters' dance in 635-9:

\begin{quote}
\textit{own pueri círçum puerum permioe chorea}
\textit{armati in numerum pulsarent aeribus aera,}
\textit{ne Saturnus eum malis mandaret adeptus}
\textit{aeternumque daret matri sub pectore vulnus.}
\end{quote}

The first half of this tableau seems to echo Callimachus's treatment of the same story in the \textit{Hymn to Zeus} (1.52-4):\(^58\)

\begin{quote}
\textit{οδη δε Κουφητες σε περι πρύλιν ὕρχηςαντο}
\textit{τεῦχεα πεπληγοντες, ἵνα Κρόνος οδαειν ἥχην}
\textit{ἀσπίδος εἰσαθι καὶ μή σε κουριζοντος.}
\end{quote}
Aside from rough correspondences of verbal detail (circum/περί, perrnic chorea/οὐλά 59) ... ωφήμοντο, armati/πρόλιν, 60) pulsarent... aera/τεύχεα πεπλήγοντες, ne Saturnus/Ἰνα Κρόνος... μή 61), Lucretius has imitated the etymological play upon words in Callimachus: he, of course, connects Κούρητες and κουρίζοντος ('crying like a boy'), while Lucretius more subtly suggests the derivation of Κούρητες from κωῦροι by emphasizing the words pueri ... puerum (635); 62) yet another pun appears in 643 (parent... parentibus). As usual, he has also made substantial changes to suit his anti-mythological purpose, particularly through an exaggerated use of alliteration and the ironically mock-epic development of 638-9, where he parts company entirely with Callimachus.

A small item of supporting evidence for direct imitation of the Hymn to Zeus here may be supplied by the first verse of the digression on Cybele (hanc veteres Graium docti cecinere poetae, 600). One would dearly like to know what poets Lucretius has in mind 63) and how they relate to his subsequent account of Cybele worship. 64) But, leaving aside these difficult problems, it is reasonable to suppose that Lucretius disapproved of the way in which these poets personalized the insentient earth (albeit allegorically), thus opening the door for superstition. That the tone of 600 is sarcastic may be confirmed by the similar references in 5.405 (sallicos ut veteres Graium cecinere poetae), where he dismisses the legend of Phaethon, and 6.754 (Graium ut cecinere poetae), where the myth about crows being banished from the Acropolis is ridiculed. This being so, it seems possible that the allusion to 'old poets' was inspired by Callimachus's rejection of an unbelievable story in the Hymn to Zeus, only a few lines after the description of the Curetes (1.60):

δηναλοὶ δ᾽ οὗ πάμπαν ἄληθες ἦσαν ἄοιδοι.

Of course, Pindar contradicts his predecessors in a similar way (Ol. 1.36), 66) but a closer analogy exists between Callimachus's phrase δηναλοὶ 67) ... σαυρός and veteres... cecinere poetae; as for the charge of falsehood, one could compare the sweeping rejection of the whole Cybele cult which Lucretius makes later in 644f. Nevertheless, a ready contrast between the two authors is again available, in that Callimachus is rejecting a particular myth told by ancient poets, while Lucretius is hostile to the mythologizing tendency of poetry in general.

The next passage for consideration is similar, for it once again involves the invocation and rebuttal of a Greek poetic source. In the
course of Book 6 Lucretius discusses Averna... loca (738), i.e., pestilential areas which were observed to poison overflying birds. After mentioning the famous place near Cumae (747-8), he turns to the location on the Athenian Acropolis which was traditionally believed to be shunned by birds, particularly the crow (749-55): 68)

750 est et Athenaeis in moenibus, arcis in ipso vertice, Palladis ad templum Tritonidis alae, quo numquam pennis appellunt corpora raui^ae cornusses, non even funrant altaria donis. usque adeo fugitant non iras Palladis arcis pervigili caea, Graium ut eceinere poetae, sed natura loci opus efficit ipsa suapte.

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Not content with a reference to the simple fact, Lucretius mockingly alludes to the legendary explanation of how a crow had reported to Athene the disobedience of the daughters of Cecrops in opening the chest containing the infant Erichthonius which had been entrusted to their care by the goddess, who angrily banished the crow from the Acropolis in return for its unwelcome interference. 69)

As in the Cybele passage (2.600), Lucretius refers here to a poetic tradition (Graium ut eceinere poetae, 754), and again one would like to know of whom he is thinking. No doubt the story was well-established in folklore long before Callimachus, but it is interesting to note that the sole known pre-Lucretian treatment in poetry comes in the influential short epic Hecale, where it is narrated by an old crow (Fr. 260.17f.). If, as appears likely, Lucretius has Callimachus primarily in mind when he mentions poetae, 70) it may also be possible to identify a verbal reminiscence in the mannered phrase iras Palladis aoris (753), which echoes recognizably the words of the old crow in Hec. Fr. 260.41 (βαρύς χόλος ... Ἀθηνῆς). 71) A less obvious allusion to the Callimachean source may possibly be detected in the epithet Tritonis (750), which in Greek first occurs in Callimachus (Iamb. 12, Fr. 202.28) and Apollonius (1.109, 3.1183), 72) in Latin first in Lucretius (later in, e.g., Virg. Aen. 2.226, Ov. Met. 3.127). 73) One of the commonest interpretations of Athene's title Τριτογενής explains it by reference to the Libyan lake Triton (or Tritonis) near which she was said to have been born; 74) this will naturally have commended itself to Callimachus, the native of Cyrene, for whom the name Tritonis may have had a special meaning and attraction. 75)

Perhaps, then, Lucretius borrowed a recherche title from Callimachus (the context of the Hecale under discussion?) in order to sharpen his sarcastic mention of the legend. For, like the description of the Curetes, this passage offers a fine example of his ability to denigrate a mythical
tradition. Note how the sentence ascends from the epic formula est... (749) by an elegant tricolon to the impressive cult-title of the goddess (750), only for the elevated tone to be deflated methodically in the following lines (751-5).

If Lucretius remembered the legend of the crow from the Hecale, maybe he recalled elsewhere the story of the raven who was turned from milky white to pitch black for telling Apollo about the adultery of Coronis, as briefly told by Callimachus soon after the passage on the crow (Fr. 260. 55-61). For, during his series of proofs that atoms lack colour, Lucretius uses an illustration involving white ravens as a reductio ad absurdum (2.822-5):

conveniabat enim corvos quoque sape volantis
ex albis album pinnis iactare colorum
et nigros fieri nigro de semine agnos
aut alio quivis uno varioque colore.

This whimsical notion may easily have been drawn from the poet's own imagination or proverbial expressions, but it is not unlikely that the myth was at the back of his mind, and, if so, it is worth pointing out that the version in the Hecale is our first source for the detail about a change of colour.

Lucretius's probable use of the poem to Aratus, which was discussed earlier, encourages the search for other connections with the epigrams of Callimachus. The general influence of Hellenistic erotic epigrams upon the end of Book 4 has been fruitfully explored by Kenney and there is no need to repeat his findings. Suffice it to say that the love epigrams of Callimachus share with countless others the favourite images of wound/sickness (Ep. 43, 46), fire (Ep. 43, 44) and hunting (Ep. 31) which Lucretius selected for satirical exploitation. In addition, three possible instances of specific imitation may be suggested. Firstly, in the arresting phrase vulgivaga... Venere (4.1071), which commentators wrongly attempt to elucidate by the title Πάνωμος Ἀφοοδίτη, for Venus here is simply a metonymy for sex. If a Greek model is necessary, the adjective is more likely to have been inspired by the word Περὶφολτος, used by Callimachus in his rejection of the promiscuous beloved (Ep. 28.3, cf. 38.2). If so, Lucretius has managed a piquant reversal, for promiscuity is precisely what he recommends. Secondly, the euphemism Chariton mia (4.1162), which is absent from the models in Plato (Rep. 474d-e) and Theocritus (10.24f.), may derive from Callimachus's flattering conceit of adding Berenice to the number of the Graces (Ep. 51.1-2), though it could have reached Lucretius through one of the later imitations. Thirdly,
the tableau of the *exclusus amator* (4.1177f.), a composite picture indebted to Hellenistic epigram, introduces a detail which lies outside the general run of serenade literature when it mentions the kissing of the doorposts (1179). Observation from life cannot be ruled out as the inspiration, but the literary parallel in Callimachus's paraclausithyron epigram (Ep. 42.5-6) is surely significant.

This concludes the examination of Callimachus's miscellaneous poetic influences on Lucretius (though other incidental resemblances can be found). But we should remember that he was also the scholar who produced a famous catalogue of the Alexandrian library and wrote many works on subjects such as winds, rivers and birds. Among these was an encyclopaedia of marvellous natural phenomena (Frs 407-11), comprising information drawn from a multitude of previous writers (e.g., Aristotle, Theopompos and Theophrastus). This work laid the foundation for the popular genre of paradoxography taken up by such authors as Antigonus of Carystus.

The influence of such writings can be seen in Book 6 of Lucretius, particularly in the sections on *Averna loca* (738-839) and extraordinary springs (840-905). Naturally, it is difficult to decide whether he used Callimachus directly or a later doxography partly based upon Callimachus (such as that of Antigonus, to whom we owe the main fragment of the former's work); additionally, Lucretius may have drawn some information from original sources (like Aristotle) or Epicurean studies. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that noxious areas like the *Averna loca* of Lucretius were recorded by Callimachus (Pr. 407, xxiv, xxxi, xxxii), with emphasis duly placed upon the death of birds as in Lucretius (6.740f., 818f.). As for springs, Callimachus also records fresh water bubbling up in the ocean (*ibid.* i, cf. Lucr. 6.890f.), the ignition of objects placed above water (*ibid.* xx, cf. Lucr. 6.879f.) and puzzling phenomena of hot and cold water (*ibid.* v, xxxi, cf. Lucr. 6.840f.), including the famous spring of Hammon which was cold at day and warm by night (*ibid.* xvi, cf. Lucr. 6.848f.).

To conclude, I hope to have demonstrated that Lucretius shows the direct or indirect influence of several Callimachean works. In particular, Callimachean motifs appear in certain programmatic statements of his poetic aims and attitudes, just as they do in those of Catullus (albeit with much more depth and significance). Furthermore, we have seen how various other details in Callimachus inspired Lucretian
reminiscence by their verbal dexterity or pictorial charm. These echoes are not extensive or especially dramatic, but they help to dissipate further the myth of Lucretius's literary isolation and to indicate the necessity for more study of his poetic art, which is less divorced from Catullus than is generally recognized. Lucretius was not Callimachean in the sense of being an aggressively modernistic poet, but he was sensitive to the invigorating winds of change which were effecting a transformation of the contemporary literary climate.

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NOTES

1) Depending upon which consulship is referred to by Athenaeus (xii, 547a): P. Boyancé, Lucrece et l'Epicurisme (Paris 1963) 7-8.


3) Amafinius (Cic. Fam. 15.19.2, Acad. Post. 1.5-6, Tusc. 4.6-7), Catius (Fam. 15.16.1-2, 19.1-2), Rabirius (Acad. Post. 1.5): Boyancé, op. cit. 8f., Mantero, op. cit. 41f.


5) Munro on Lucre. 5.619, K. Büchner, RE 7A (1939) 1242f.


7) For Lucretius and Cat. 64 see Munro on Lucre. 3.57.


9) For Lucretius's 'Fortleben' see Schanz-Hosius, op. cit. 280-84, Boy- ancé, op. cit. 316-27, Dalzell, loc. cit. 101f., L. Alfonsi in "Lucrece",
Fondation Hardt etc. (n. 2) 271-315. Against the idea of Augustan suppression see A. Traina, "Lucrezio e la 'coniugia del silenzio'", Dignam die (a Giampaolo Valloti) (Venice 1972) 159-68.

10) The first two expressions are based upon Cicero's notorious remarks (Att. 7.2.1, Orat. 161) and are unlikely to have a very broad significance: see N. B. Crowther, CQ N.S. 20 (1970) 322-27; on 'Alexandrianism' see J. K. Newman, Augustan and the New Poetry (Collection Latomus LXXXVIII [Brussels-Berchem 1967]) 31-60. For a recent attempt to define neoteric poetry see R. O. A. M. Lyne, CQ N.S. 28 (1978) 167-87.


12) Esp. 1.117f., where the sincere praise of Ennius is followed by implicit criticism of his inconsistency (et si præterea... 120), and perhaps of the whole idea of supernatural revelation, as E. J. Kenney argues in his article "Doctus Lucretius", Mnemosyne Series IV, 23 (1970) 373-80. Maybe the Iphigenia passage, drawing possibly on Ennius as well as Greek models (L. Rychlew ska, "De Enni Iphigenia", Eos 49 [1957-8] 71-81), is an indirect foretaste of criticism; but Ennius influence is denied by Grimal in "Lucrece", Fondation Hardt etc. (n. 2) 195.

13) Esp. 1.921f., which, as will be discussed later, probably contains Ennian motifs, and 6.95, where Lucretius's hope for a garland recalls the garland won by Ennius (1.118).

14) Poetica nova in Lucretio (Florence 1949).


16) That Callimachus's dream in the Aetia influenced the proem of the Annales is controversial, but very likely: see O. Skutsch, Studia En niana (London 1968) 7-9, J. H. Waszink, "The proem of the Annales of Ennius", Mnemosyne Series IV. 3 (1950) 215-40; for further bibliography see "Ennius", Fondation Hardt et al l'étude de l'antiquité classique, Entretiens, Tome 17 (Geneva 1972) 120 n. 2. Lucilius, and maybe Ennius, knew the Iambi: M. Puelma Piwonka, Lucilius und Callimachos (Frankfurt am Main 1949). Late Republican interest in Callimachus may have been stimulated by Parthenius: W. Clausen, "Callimachus and Latin Poetry", GRSB 5 (1964) 181-96.


20) For a general account of the relationship see Kroll, op. cit. 26f. By stressing his own love rather than that of the Muses Lucretius seems to
invert the usual emphasis.

21) Grilli, op. cit. 96-7. Lucretius compares himself with honeybees in 3.11f., and his allusion in 6.910f. to a magnetized chain of rings provides further evidence that he knew the Platonic passage (cf. Ion. 533d-e).

22) For a convenient list of the conventional elements, see M. L. West's commentary (Oxford 1966) on Hes. Theog. 22-34.

23) Waszink, loc. cit. passim. For the Muses' realm cf. Enn. Ann. 215, together with later evidence for an experience on Helicon (Lucr. 1.117f., Prop. 3.3.1f.) and/or Parnassus (schol. Pers. prol. 2); for the draught from a spring (doubtless Hippocrene) cf. Prop. 3.3.6, in combination with Lucil. 1008 M and Enn. Ann. 217, where the object of reserve may have been fonts (Waszink, loc. cit. 225-6, comparing Virg. Georg. 2.175); for the garland, presumably parallel to the laurel branch received by Hesiod (Theog. 30-31), cf. Lucr. 1.118, Prop. 4.1.61, and, in addition to Waszink, loc. cit. 232-3, see W. Suerbaum, "Untersuchungen zur Selbstdarstellung älterer römischer Dichter", Studium 19 (1968) 310-11, Kenney, loc. cit. 371 (with n. 2). I am unconvinced that Lucretius was chiefly inspired here by the garland which Hippolytus brings to Artemis from an inviolate meadow (Eur. Hipp. 73-87), as is claimed by G. Berns in "Time and Nature in Lucretius' De Rerum Natura", Hermes 104 (1976) 490-91, though it cannot be ruled out that he knew the passage. The notion of a poetic garland is Hellenistic (e.g., Antipater, A.F. 7.14.4) and the association of flowers with poetry is an old one: A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page, The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams 2 (Cambridge 1965) 593-4, A. A. R. Henderson, Latomus 29 (1970) 742.


26) For which see Wimmel, op. cit. 103-11, esp. 106; cf. also Callim. Ep. 28.1-2, adduced in connection with Lucretius by E. Fraenkel in Das Problem des Klassischen und die Antike, ed. W. Jaeger (Leipzig and Berlin 1931) 63, also O. Regenbogen, "Luukrez. Seine Gestalt in seinem Gedicht", Neue Wege zur Antike 2.1 (Leipzig and Berlin 1932) 24. For the possible origin of the image in a Pythagorean saying, see Pfeiffer on Aet. Fr. 1.25f., and cf. also Parm. B 1.27 DK.

27) Kroll, op. cit. 28-30 (suspecting, as others have done, the precedence of Philetas), E. Reitzenstein, in Festschrift Richard Reitzenstein (Leipzig and Berlin 1931) 54f, Waszink, loc. cit. (n. 16) 216f., 239, A. Kambylis, Die Dichterwette und ihre Symbolik (Heidelberg 1965) 98-102, 110f.; Pfeiffer is cautious about assuming the presence of the motif in the Aetia (op. cit. 11).

28) Fraenkel, loc. cit. 63, Ferrero, op. cit. 22 n. 2, 44, Kenney, loc. cit. 370. Callimachus' rejection of a public spring in Ep. 28.3-4 is also comparable.
29) For the 'primus-Motiv' in relation to Ennius see Suerbaum, op. cit. 269f. Lucretius repeats his claim to novelty in 5.335f.

30) The unworn path parallel is mentioned by Munro, ad loc.; for the other reminiscences (3.1037-38, 4.912) see Grilli, op. cit. 102-3, 118.

31) Loc. cit. 371; cf. Mantero, op. cit. 103-4. It is tempting to speculate whether Lucretian and Catullan insistence on lépos (Lucr. 1.28, 934, Cat. 1.11, 6.17, 16.7, 50.7), remarked upon by, e.g., Ferrero, op. cit. 38f. and Newman, loc. cit. 102, has anything to do with the Callimachean catchword λεπτός (Aet. Fr. 1.11, 24, Ep. 27.3, and see Peitzenstein, loc. cit. 25-40, on the history of the word). Several points discourage the idea - e.g., translation of λεπτός by teneris elsewhere (Lucr. 4.42 etc., Cat. 51.9), contemporary use of lépos in literary criticism (e.g., Rhet. Herenn. 4.32, Cic. de Orat. 1.213, 3.206), differences in sense - but ears so attuned to etymological connections as were those of the Romans might well have discerned an association; cf. S. Commager, The Odes of Horace (New Haven and London 1962) 39 n. 85, V. Buchheit, "Sal et lépos versiculorum (Catull. c.16)", Hermes 104 (1976) 338 n. 41.

32) For instance the thyrus image (923) lends a sense of Bacchic abandon to the whole passage; moreover, there is a significant difference between Callimachus's narrow path (Aet. Fr. 1.27-8) and the remote haunts of Lucretius (926); also between the trickling Callimachean spring (Hymn 2.111-12) and the more robust-sounding fontes of Lucretius (927: cf. the mention of largos haustus e fontibus magnis in 1.412, which seems notably un-Callimachean, pace Ferrero, op. cit. 22).

33) Cf., e.g., Cic. Parad. 5, Varr. L.L. 5.9, Men. 219, O.L.D. s.v.

34) Ferrero, op. cit. 21 n. 2, Cazzaniga, op. cit. 25f., Grilli, op. cit. 123-4 (suggesting an Epicurean provenance also, on the basis of Epict. Disq. 2.20.9 and Him. Or. 3.17), Tarditi, loc. cit. 88; see also Kroll, op. cit. 38 (with n. 34), R. O. A. M. Lyne's commentary (Cambridge 1978) on Ciris 46.

35) Apparently a conflation of the idea of sleeplessness with the metaphor lucubreare (n. 33), as in Auson. 19.1.5-6 Peiper (damnume... musae,/ iacturam somni quae parit atque olei). With Arateis... Lucernis compare Juv. 1.51 (Venusina... lucerna).

36) 'Seems merely a poetical epithet' (Munro). D. West, in The Imagery and Poetry of Lucretius (Edinburgh 1969) 81, remarks that 'noctes vigilare serenas is the phrase of a man who enjoyed the solitude and serenity of working at night, and who couldn't keep away from the window'.


38) Cf. Philetas's description of the poet as πολλά μαγήσας (Fr. 10.3), Call. Ep. 6.1, Asclepiades, A.P. 7.11.1, Leonidas, A.P. 9.25.5, Theoc. 7.51, with Gow's note, Kroll, op. cit. 38, Piwonka, op. cit. 125f., 139 n. 2.

39) See Lyne's note on Ciris 99, adding Hor. Epist. 2.1.224, A.P. 291.

40) For the metaphor cf., e.g., Cic. Opt. Gen. 12, Brut. 326, Ov. Pont. 1.5.61; its Alexandrian quality is illustrated by Cat. 1.2, where expoli- tum is more than literal. The Lucretian passage continues with a self-conscious use of canere (6.84), which Newman believes was a catchword for neoteric poets (loc. cit. 98f., esp. 101-2), though he is opposed by C. Griffiths in PVS 9 (1969-70) 7f.

41) Identical to 4.180-82, but with extra verses integrally attached (912-15).
42) As Lambinus noticed. I have discussed the imitation in my D. Phil. thesis, A Commentary on Selected Passages of Lucretius IV (Oxford 1977) 194f.

43) Ferrero, op. cit. 23, Tarditi, loc. cit. 89.

44) Cf. Ferrero, op. cit. 17ff., but it is hard to see how the De Rerum Natura could escape the charge of being ἐν δείσμα διηνεκές.


46) Bignone, op. cit. 200, L. MacKay, Latinitas 3 (1955) 210; a similar technique of encomium is applied to Epicurus in 6.1f.: cf. F. Giancotti, Il preludio di Lucrezio (Messina and Florence 1959) 79.

47) Cf. Hom. Il. 4.426, Wilamowitz, op. cit. (n. 11) 2.64 n. 2.

48) anfractibus refers to the wheeling sweep of the sea around the twisting coastline of Sicily (cf. its use in 5.683), not to the coastline itself as Bailey's note seems to imply.

49) It is interesting to observe that line 14 of the Hymn is a pure Golden Line. Unfortunately, the Lucretian line can only be construed as such by taking Ionium with virus instead of aequor, which is unnatural. Nevertheless, Lucretius has preserved something of the interlocking arrangement by the separation of glaucis... undis (matching ΠΟΛΛΗΝ... ἄχνην).

50) = 5.111-12, in reference to himself. Epicureans appear to have sometimes affected an oracular pose for polemical purposes: cf. Epic. S.V. 29, Lucr. 3.14f., 6.6, and see Pease's note on Cic. N.D. 1.66.

51) A. Otto, Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer (Leipzig 1890) 30.

52) The Lucretian parallel was first noted by O. Schneider, in Callimachia 1 (Leipzig 1870) 277. Munro's reference was picked up by Merrill.


54) The title Aerogantinus (716), the association with a wonderful environment and the climactic praise of his inspired discoveries all sound vaguely hymnic. However, further echoes of Callimachus are lacking, apart from certain similarities which are no doubt coincidental: e.g., between the statement that Sicily 'bore' Empedocles (gœsît, 717) and the pervasive notion that Delos was Apollo's nurse (2.5-6, 10, 51, 264-5, 275-6); triquris (717) could be compared with τριγυλωκιν, which is applied to Sicily in Aet. Fr. 1.36 and Poseidon's trident in Hymn 4.31, but the idea is fairly conventional (cf., e.g., Thuc. 6.2.2, Polyb. 1.42.3, Hor. Sat. 2.6.55. Sil. 5.489, Quint. 1.6.30); the uncommon lengthening of the first vowel of Italicae (721, if correct) is found in Call. Hymn 3.58 (cf. Norden on Virg. Aen. 6.61, Austin on Aen. 1.2, Fordyce on Cat. 1.5); the alliteration and polyptoton of 726f. are a little like Hymn 4.266f., though it would be unwise to postulate a model for such a common Lucretian feature.

55) Cf. his self-apotheosis in B 112.4 DK.

56) See further P. H. Schrijvers, Horror ac Divina Voluptas (Amsterdam 1970) 308f.

57) A typically Alexandrian feature (see Nisbet and Hubbard's note on
Hor. Carm. 1.7.23), though Lucretius's irony is authentically Epicurean (cf., e.g., Us. 228-29 on the master's contempt for mythological poetry).

58 The parallel was noted by Lambinus; cf. Munro on 2.635, Ferrero, op. cit. 131 n. 1.

59 This and πρύλις were obscure words: E. Cahen, Les hymnes de Calli-maque (Paris 1930) 28; maybe Lucretius received elucidation from an annotated text.

60 For this armed dance see W. H. Roscher, Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie 2.1 (Leipzig 1890-94) 1611-12.

61 Cf. Ov. Fast. 4.208 (tutus ut infantis vagi at ore puer).

62 Roscher, op. cit. 1591, West, op. cit. 108.

63 Bailey argues for an allegorical account, which seems an unlikely subject for verse. Perhaps Lucretius has foisted an allegorical interpretation upon straightforward poetic descriptions, drawing from the same source as Varro (Aug. Civ. Dei 7.24) and Ovid (Fast. 4.215f.), which Boy-ancé thinks was Stoic (op. cit. 123). Since none of the extant descriptions of the goddess in classical Greek poetry fit Lucretius's reference, it is worth mentioning that Cybele, Attis and the Galli were a favourite Hellenistic and late Republical theme (cf., e.g., Call. Fr. 761, with Pfeiffer's note, Nic. Alex. 7-8, 217-20, Hermes. Fr. 8 Powell, A.P. 6.51, 217-20, 281, 9.340, Cat. 35, 63). The verbal play docti... docentes (600-602) suggests a learned version of the Alexandrian type, which is the assumption of W. Kranz in Philologus 96 (1944) 68.

64 The poetae seem to be in the foreground until 610, where Lucretius turns to the universal acceptance of Cybele's cult.

65 Ferrero, op. cit. 90 n. 2, hints at a reminiscence. Cf. also Ov. Am. 3.6.17 (veterum mendaciam vatwm).

66 Contrast the more respectful attitude in Nem. 3.52, and, later, Apollonius 1.18, Arat. Phaen. 637.

67 ἔννοιοι is another word of difficult meaning: Wilamowitz, op. cit. 2.9 n. 1.


69 For a full account of the myth see Ov. Met. 2.552f.

70 Schneider, op. cit. 2 (Leipzig 1873) 98 (arguing for the presence of the story in the Aetia, before the Hecele passage was discovered), Munro on 6.754 (4th ed.), I. Kapp, Callimachi Heceleae Fragmenta (Diss. Berlin 1915) 47, W. Lück, Die Quellenfrage im 5. und 6. Buch des Lukrez (Diss. Breslau 1932) 142 (repeating Schneider's error), Newman, loc. cit. 100, Tarditi, loc. cit. 92.

71 Pfeiffer, ad loc.; cf. Ov. Met. 2.568.

72 Cf. also Antipater, A.P. 6.159.3, Alcaeus, A.Fl. 8.3, and see C. F. H. Bruchmann, Epitheta Deorum, quae apud poetas Graecos leguntur (Leipzig 1893) 15-16.

73 C. F. H. Bruchmann, Epitheta Deorum, quae apud poetas Latinos leguntur (Leipzig 1902) 71.

74 Cf., e.g., Hdt. 4.180.5, Eur. Ion 872.

75 The lake is mentioned in Aet. Fr. 37.1, and cf. Fr. 584.
76) Ravens are proverbial for blackness (Otto, op. cit. 95, Bömer on Ov. Met. 2.535), swans for whiteness (Otto, op. cit. 104, Bömer on Ov. Met. 2.539). The contrast of raven and swan is present, to a varying degree, in Callimachus (Fr. 260.56), Lucretius and Ovid (Met. 2.539); cf., also, Mart. 1.53.8, 3.43.2, Otto, op. cit. 104.

77) Bömer on Ov. Met. 2.535.

78) Loc. cit. 380f.

79) Gow and Page, op. cit. 156.

80) Esp. Meleager, A.P. 5.149.2.

81) Gow and Page, op. cit. 163. In Theoc. 23.18 it may be a gesture of farewell rather than of sentimental adoration (see Gow's note).

82) For the sake of completeness, some of these are listed here, though direct influence is very implausible: Lucr. 1.40, cf. Call. Hymn 6.137 (but the prayer is an obvious one; cf., e.g., Euphorion, in the Loeb Library volume Select Papyri, 3 ed. D. L. Page [London and Cambridge, repr. 1970] 496 line 19, Hermocles, Fr. 1.21 Powell), Lucr. 1.125, 920, cf. Call. Hec. Fr. 313 ('salt tears' is probably an Ennian phrase and can be paralleled by Acc. Tr. Frs 420, 578 Ribbeck), Lucr. 2.196 etc., cf. Call. Hymn 2.4 (but also Hom. Il. 7.448, Arat. Phaen. 733), Lucr. 3.957, cf. Call. Ep. 31.5-6 (a proverbial idea: see Kenney ad loc. and Gow on Theoc. 11.75), Lucr. 5.1f., cf. Call. Hymn 1.92-3 (Enn. Ann. 174 is closer), Lucr. 5.256, cf. Call. Ep. 44.4 (Hor. Carm. 1.31.8 is a much more likely imitation).


84) Lück, op. cit. 140-41, Pfeiffer, op. cit. (n. 83) 134-5; for a history of the genre see RE 18.3 (1949) 1137f.


86) For instance, Lucretius makes artistic use of several so-called 'Alexandrian' features, such as epanalepsis, spondaic fifth foot and interlocking word order, though not of course to the same extent as Catullus. It is noteworthy that Nepos, the dedicatee of the Catullian libellus, pairs Lucretius with Catullus as the best poets of their age and implies that both were elegantes (Att. 12.4); see further Alfonsi, loc. cit. (n. 9) 276-77, and compare Cicero's well-known appraisal of Lucretius in terms of ars as well as ingenium (ad Quint. 2.10.3).
CATULLUS 64 AND THE HEROIC AGE: A REPLY

JAMES H. DEE

One of the prominent trends in recent criticism of Catullus 64 is the insistence of many interpreters that Catullus is taking a moral stand, not only against the immoralities of his own day, as indicated in the epilogue (384-408), but also against the vices and brutalities of the Heroic Age. In this paper I shall attempt to show that Catullus does not express any especially strong disapproval of the tales he elaborates in poem 64 and also that it is far from certain that the epilogue is as serious an attack on late Republican more as many have thought it to be. In this demonstration I shall concentrate on what I consider some weaknesses and errors of this moralizing type of interpretation, in particular as it is applied to the section on Achilles, the Heroic and Golden Ages, the role of Jupiter and divine justice, and the epilogue. In a few parts of this essay I am inevitably following Giuseppe Giangrande, whose challenging article on this poem deserves wider recognition.¹)

In certain works of the last two decades a virtual consensus appears to have emerged on the section of poem 64 concerning Achilles (323-381). For example, Michael Putnam states that the Song of the Fates, which "should be designed to elaborate the future happiness of Peleus and Thetis," instead identifies Achilles with the "bloody brutality of war."²) Leo Curran raises a possible objection to this approach, only to set it aside; he states that the magnitude of Achilles' slaughter in lines 348-360 was an accepted, indeed glorified, part of the heroic code. But even if Homer or his heroes could accept such a simple view of life (and in fact they did not), after Euripides and after the Alexandrians no poet, least of all a sophisticated and urbane poet like Catullus, could describe such conduct from an uncritical point of view. We can be confident that Catullus regarded Achilles' brutality as we would.³)

This is very near to asserting an identity of Catullus' attitudes with the critic's and it therefore invites our skepticism. Curran's idea that
Euripides and the Alexandrians exhibit a new revulsion against battlefield bloodshed and brutality needs demonstration. Further, one may wonder where to seek the "heroic code" if Homer and his heroes have already outgrown it and whether "sophistication" and "urbanity," as they would have been understood in the ancient world, have any necessary relation to high moral standards or to humane and compassionate sensibilities of the sort that Curran requires. Finally, J. C. Bramble, in what is often called the best recent discussion, says that certain details of the Fates' Song, namely blood, impiety, and destruction, "derogue from the initial atmosphere of heroism;" he describes the sacrifice of Polyxena as "an act of unwarranted barbarity," and says of the prophecy in general, "blood and slaughter are the keynotes, not heroism and virtue." But the ethical connotations of "heroism" and "virtue" are misplaced here. Blood and destruction are quite characteristic of those figures called hêrôes in Greek, and so is a fair amount of impiety. And it has not been demonstrated that Catullus in particular regarded "blood and slaughter" as inherently reprehensible or that his concept of virtus involved an ethical sense - Werner Eisenhut has after all argued that virtus in Catullus is entirely traditional, i.e. non-ethical, in meaning.

A reply to this apparent consensus is in order. We might note first that these writers often use "loaded terms" to help guide our responses; "bloody brutality," "unwarranted barbarity" and the like express the critic's feelings without providing evidence that Catullus felt the same way. How indeed can we know that Catullus would, for example, automatically have condemned the deeds of some mythical warrior, simply because they brought misery to the victims' mothers or because of the bloodshed involved? The sensibilities revealed in the remainder of the Catullan corpus do not seem to have been very delicate in such matters. Kinsey (925, note 3) faces this problem briefly: he says that Catullus "does not elsewhere admire soldiers," referring to poem 11, where in his opinion the mention of Caesaris... monimenta magni is not serious, and to poem 68.89-90 and 99, where Troy is reproached for causing so many deaths. But these passages have nothing to do with views on soldiers or "the military." Catullus' apparent dislike of Caesar has no direct relationship to his being a "man of the military," and even the intensity of language in poem 68 may have been prompted as much by the fact that Catullus' brother happened to die near there as by any outrage at the slaughters of the Trojan War. Interpretation of poem 68 is notoriously difficult, but it may be suggested that Catullus is more concerned to emphasize the pathos of the
loss of so many good men (virum et virtutum... einis, 90) than to criticize those warriors for killing each other.

Let us now consider the matter of Achilles and Polyxena in greater detail, for there are specific grounds for doubting these critics' evaluation of this episode. They assume that the sacrifice must be taken as a perverted marriage or as an example of the rapacious brutality of warriors, and so must lead the reader, ancient or modern, to condemn the code of behavior that demanded or permitted such an act. This seems to me a simplification of the complexity of the sources on Polyxena and of the ancient attitudes toward the heroes.

The surviving evidence does not force any single interpretation of the Polyxena story upon us; rather, the assignment of motive and responsibility is as varied as our knowledge of other Greek myths would lead us to expect. A brief survey of these sources, based on Ernst Wüst's treatment, may help. 6) Among the earliest known literary accounts, the Cypria, the Iliupersis, Stesichorus, Ibycus, and Simonides are all aware of Polyxena's death. In the Cypria (frag. XXVI OCT), she was wounded by Odysseus and Diomedes during the city's capture, died, and was buried by Neoptolemus. Proclus' summary of the Iliupersis (OCT p. 108) says that the Greeks sacrificed her (sphagiazousin) at Achilles' tomb; this clearly brings Achilles and Polyxena together but leaves the motive unspecified. Achilles' ghost appeared in the Ilias parva and in the Nostoi, but without any connection to the sacrifice. The ghost also appeared in Sophocles' Polyxena (480 N^2=523 Pearson & Radt) and this time the sacrifice was clearly at issue. Euripides' Hecuba is the first unambiguous literary source for the ghost's express demand (line 40), yet the same play has other accounts. The chorus mentions Achilles' staying of the fleet and his complaint that his tomb was ageraston, and Neoptolemus invites the ghost to come and drink Polyxena's blood (lines 111-15 and 536-37). A few late sources bring in the quasi-romantic theme of a love relationship and a possible marriage; in the first three, Achilles was killed from ambush when he came to negotiate for Polyxena's hand, so the motive for the sacrifice could have been love or revenge. 7) Thus the posthumous marriage, sometimes taken for granted and interpreted in mal. part., is quite rare in our texts. The vase paintings listed by Wüst confirm the early appearance of the sacrifice, without providing evidence for the motive or for the audience's attitudes.

There are then as many as four possible reasons for Polyxena's death: (1) she was offered as a geras to Achilles, with or without a demand from
the ghost; (2) she was used to appease the ghost and end the staying of
the fleet; (3) Achilles loved her and demanded a marriage in death; (4)
he required her death as punishment for her involvement in his murder.
One's judgment of Achilles might vary with the version chosen, so we must
observe that Catullus is content to label Polyxena a praeda and a testis
to Achilles' virtutes, which implies the first motive, and that he does
not attempt to specify whose decision it was that Polyxena be sacrificed.

There is also a general consideration which may illuminate the prob-
lem from a different angle. Simply put, the question is this: what is
the origin of the story of Polyxena? Few would argue that the sacrifice
really occurred as described, although some commentators speak of it as if
it were as verifiable as some modern atrocity. Ernst Wüst sees in the
name Polyxena a faded chthonic goddess of death and concludes that in the
original form of the tale Apollo and Polyxena must have combined to kill
Achilles. This might be thought to explain Achilles' "hostility" toward
Polyxena, but it seems to me unnecessarily clever. It raises more ques-
tions than it answers and there is inevitably no literary or artistic
evidence to support it. Instead of regarding the tale as a distorted re-
fection of a much older conception, we may be closer to the truth if we
take it as a development which is typical of the post-Homeric Epic Cycle.
The differences between Homer and the Cycle have been well explored by
Jasper Griffin, who notes especially the element of perverse romanticism
in the tales of Iphigenia, Penthesilea, Polyxena, and Helen: "The concep-
tion of the hero in the Iliad is... more heroic - the warrior does not war
on women.... In the Cycle both heroism and realism are rejected in favour
of an over-heated taste for sadistically coloured scenes."3 This argu-
ment may lead to a curious conclusion. If we accept Griffin's restriction
of the term "heroic" to the Iliad and Odyssey, a restriction I am not sure
the ancients would have recognized, then the "heroic code" and the "war-
rrior ethos" are not responsible for Polyxena's death. Rather, the "blame"
for her demise should be laid at the doors of those poets who concocted
such scenes, following their own or their audiences' tastes for the strik-
ingly melodramatic. This pleasant paradox, that the poets, not the sol-
diers, were the "brutal" ones, is perhaps forced; but it draws attention
to the central question: how did the ancients (and how should we) regard
the acts attributed to the hêrôes in the Greek mythological tradition?
The exponents of the moralizing approach do not mince words in their con-
demnation of Achilles and the "heroic code" in connection with the sacri-
fice. At the other end of the spectrum is Giuseppe Giangrande (142-43),
who offers a vigorous defense of the "rights" of a "true hero of the Homeric type" to have his quasi-divine status honored and his need for a wife fulfilled. But Giangrande's main authority is Quintus Smyrnaeus, who is surely amalgamating the old tradition of the geras-offering with the idea that Achilles was a theos among the gods after death, an idea quite foreign to the severe outlook of Odyssey 11. Similarly, Giangrande oversimplifies considerably in his belief that Achilles, in being ameiliktos toward Polyxena, was merely displaying that laudable lack of sentimentality which is typical of Homeric heroes. After all, Erbarmungslosigkeit is treated in Homer as blameworthy, not laudable.9) The truth, for Catullus and for us, probably lies between these extremes. The ancient legends concerning the héroes were full of spectacular misdeeds, and it does not appear that ancient authors felt compelled to treat them all as factual and to take a moral stand for or against. Catullus' own attitude is not easily estimated, but one might observe that Greek myth is in fact surprisingly rare in his surviving works. Only poems 34, 63, 64, and 68 have extended borrowings, and fewer than 20 other allusions, most not very recondite, are found elsewhere. Such comparative indifference, a contrast to his oft-noted Alexandrianism, suggests that Catullus did not ponder deeply on the subject. More specifically, the tone of the passage on Polyxena in poem 64 does not seem to me to hint at serious outrage; Esme Beyers' remarks (89) on the meaning of the word-arrangements in these lines confuse an attempt to create pathos with an intent to express condemnation. This confusion, as I call it, will recur in our examination of recent discussions of the Theseus episode.

* * *

There are several other points, raised by certain critics, which call for consideration here. They involve alleged "flaws" in the Heroic Age, the relation of the Heroic and Golden Ages, and the portrayal of Jupiter in the Theseus - Ariadne episode. Since the poem deals with two tales from what we usually label the Heroic Age, quite a few scholars have concluded that Catullus must have meant to "say something" about that age. In general, they believe that he meant to demonstrate the immoral and unedifying features of that supposedly glorious period, so that the poem does not simply play upon the contrast of the better past and the degeneracy decried in the epilogue but subtly reveals that a similar corruption was already inherent in the very standards of the Heroic Age itself. A few examples must suffice. Bramble (38) declares that when the reader discovers that there is "a flaw in the Age of Heroes,... he then realises
that even the time at which Peleus and Thetis first met was not free from ambivalence." Harmon (318 and 320 - emphasis his) says that Catullus "makes a statement about the nature of the heroic ideal... through the characterization of Theseus" and concludes from Theseus' "preference" for his patria over Ariadne that "the heroic code, as it is presented in 64, actually encourages extreme cruelty." In reply, I would observe that we are not obliged to assume that every recorded act of a herōs must exemplify or be in accord with some undefined "heroic code" or even with generally acceptable moral standards. If all the herōes had been as modest and virtuous as Peleus and Philemon, many of the tales in Greek myth would never have come into being. If this view is correct, then to seek for revelation of a "flaw" in the Heroic Age or in heroic virtus is misguided. The common opinion, held throughout antiquity, that the Heroic Age was a wonderful period, better than our own, and also full of undeniable atrocities, may seem odd to some, but the ancients were quite willing to entertain such apparent inconsistencies. Similar problems arise concerning the "heroic code," which we have seen both excoriated and exonerated in the case of Polyxena. As Jasper Griffin's paper makes clear, we need a full study of what is properly "heroic" in Homer and the epic tradition - and we should remember that Greek has no exact equivalents for our "hero" group of words.

The second point to be discussed is a tendency of several critics to speak of the Heroic Age as if it were a golden age, even The Golden Age. Bramble (38 - emphasis mine) describes lines 38-42 as "in some ways, reminiscent of treatments of the Golden Age," and he argues that since Catullus "cheats the reader of the expected description of nature's automatic beneficence toward man," he must intend to show that "the evil potential of civilisation has already started to manifest itself." He adds that line 42, squalida desertis rubigo infertur aratris, "suggests wholesale dereliction" of the land and that Catullus is intimating that "at the time of the wedding man was being seduced by luxury and opulence away from his hardy agricultural existence." But what are the "seduced" Thessalians to be imagined as doing after they leave the palace (lines 267-68 and 276-77), if not going back to their toil in the fields? And in any case, a reader who knew his mythology would not feel cheated if a description of the Golden Age did not follow lines 38-42, for the wedding of Peleus and Thetis in most accounts assures Zeus's eternal rule on Olympus - and Zeus rules over all ages except the Golden. That Catullus knew this story is clear from his treatment of Prometheus in lines 294-97. Less cautiously,
Phyllis Forsyth speaks of "that supposedly Golden Heroic Age" and declares that Catullus means that "man has not altered his character; even the traditionally golden age of the heroes had its flaws and failures." But an examination of the sources on the Golden and Heroic Ages shows that the qualities predicated of men in the Golden Age have nothing in common with those of the men of the Heroic Age: the purity and simplicity of life regularly attributed to the Golden Age can hardly square with the memorable crimes and punishments which dominate the Heroic Age.

The third point is the matter of Jupiter's role and divine justice. Here again, the search for a moralizing interpretation runs into difficulties. Kinsey (919-22) effectively paints himself into a corner in his discussion of Jupiter's behavior. He observes that, by agreeing to Ariadne's prayer for vengeance, Jupiter becomes "responsible" for Theseus' forgetfulness, and he finds it "unsatisfactory" that Aegaeus, an innocent victim, should be punished by death, not through a fault in Theseus' character, but through Jupiter's intervention. He concludes that the "apparently inept decision of Jupiter" may be merely ironic, and he refers us to other supposedly humorous treatments of Jupiter in Catullus, namely the phrase Iovi aestuosi (7.5) and the "disrespectful" mention of his amores in 68.138-40. In his recent riposte to Giangrande, T. P. Wiseman (LCM 3, 1978, 22) approaches the problem differently. He says of Ariadne, "her insistence that her complaint is a just one (64.190 and 198) is not enough in itself to make us accept her version, but the matter is put beyond question when Jupiter grants her prayer.... The point is that for Catullus in this poem the gods are characterized by justifica mens (64.406)." There is quite a distance between these two views, but they agree in assuming that uniform moral sense ought to emerge from the story, either in itself or through Catullus' deliberate retelling. Yet the striking thing about many Greek myths is an irreducible element of amorality; they frequently do not yield a simple moral calculus because their tellers, in Ben Edwin Perry's phrase, "viewed things separately" and saw no need to make their tales into theodicies. After all, what sense does it make to reward a mortal with immortality and a divine marriage simply because of her brief aid (or her "fidelity") to Theseus, or to punish an innocent father with death for his son's transgression against that most unserious of oaths, the lover's sworn promise? Is that the justifica mens of the gods?

Such questions make clear the difficulty facing interpreters, that Catullus' version proves to be not very edifying if we must insist upon
working out its moral implications to the end. Kinsey's approach has the merit of recognizing the virtual incoherence of Catullus' narrative in this respect, but he errs in retreating to the explanation that Catullus was being ironic. It is simpler to say that Catullus was primarily interested in literary and emotional effectiveness in each part of his poem, without worrying whether the gods were just or whether Theseus and Ariadne "got what they deserved," whatever that might be. Scholars sometimes forget that audiences, and even well educated readers, can enjoy a fine story without trying to puzzle out the ultimate moral meaning of it all - and that this is frequently the tacit assumption of both author and audience in the ancient world. 

* 

We turn now to the epilogue, which many have regarded as a serious and perhaps autobiographical piece. L. P. Wilkinson has said that it was the product of a "mature, more reflective, Catullus," who was "depressed by the decadence of the contemporary world."

Kenneth Quinn agrees that Catullus took his moralizing seriously, though he denies him much maturity: "As moral statement it is clumsy.... Like many young men, Catullus has little talent for moral analysis." The major difficulty here is that, except for the word nobis in 406, there is no indication that Catullus means us to think particularly of his own time in the epilogue - and even nobis seems in context more likely to be general in meaning ("from all of us mortals") than specific ("from me and my contemporaries"). Although the examples of the crimes that drove Justice from the world may reveal a Catullan trait in their emphasis on family-centered outrages, scholars have found it hard to cite instances from the Roman Republic, or even from Greek myth, in which those specific crimes are attributed to humans. In other words, a Roman reader would not necessarily take Catullus' text as referring to his own time.

Another approach has been offered. Giangrande's article attempts to prove that Catullus was directly influenced by such Hellenistic poets as Rhianus, who, reacting against Apollonius' removal of the heroic element from epic, continued unhesitantly to celebrate the martial glory of warriors. His final paragraph seeks to clinch the argument that Rhianus in particular was Catullus' model by pointing to a similarity between the epilogue of 64 and Rhianus, fragment 1 Powell. The pessimistic condemnation of present-day morals in Catullus could not come, he says (146), from a court poet like Callimachus, so Rhianus, "in his splendid isolation, safely away from Alexandria," is the most likely candidate. This is
appealing, but doubts persist. The passage from Rhianus is in fact not really parallel to Catullus' epilogue. In the fragment, Rhianus says, "We humans are all _hamartinoi_ and we bear the gods' gifts _aphrades kradîê_." As examples, he contrasts the man who, lacking a livelihood, complains against the gods and the man who, receiving prosperity and power, cannot control himself and tries to be an equal of the gods. _Atê_ pursues the latter and eventually makes him pay the price, thereby serving Zeus and Justice. This summary of the 21 lines should suffice to show how different the passages are: Rhianus is not describing a drastic change in human morals but uttering familiar commonplaces about man's innate folly (for which, cf. _Odyssey_ 18.130-42). Further, the references to Justice and the punishment of the arrogant do not sound "pessimistic." And since most of the remarks in the fragment are commonplaces, we are not required to regard them as political polemic against the "new royal courts," although some eminent scholars have said that they are.21) The example in line 14, the courting of Athena, may indeed be an allusion to the megalomania of the Thracian Cotys, but it is stated in general terms and is little more than a commonplace itself, as the parallels in Alcman (1 PMG) and Cercidas (17.38 Powell) show. In fact, the text of Athenaeus (12.531 F) which preserves Theopompus' narrative about Cotys marrying Athena (_FGrHist_ 115 F 31) seems to me to share only the name of Athena with the text of Rhianus. These reservations about the fragment should keep us from using it as evidence that Rhianus could not have lived in Alexandria; as W. Aly observed long ago, _pae_ Jacoby, the surviving material does not permit a clear decision on that question.22) In sum, Rhianus can be, at present, no more than a hypothetical source for the epilogue.

In view of the weaknesses of the foregoing explanations, a new proposal may be ventured, which will attempt to account for one important feature of Catullus' epilogue. It is possible that it presents an ingenious combination of two previously independent mythical motifs. From Homer, _Odyssey_ 3.419-20 and 7.199-206 and Hesiod, fragment 1 M-W, there was a tradition that the gods had once walked among mortals and attended the banquets of certain _hêrôes_. The wedding of Peleus and Thetis illustrates the motif, as do the banquets of Tantalus and Lycaon and the gathering at Mecone. Alongside this tradition, apparently unrelated to it, was another, that at some point in human history the gods had departed the earth because of the wanton criminality of humans, Justice
or a similar goddess being the last to leave. This tradition occurs in Hesiod (Works and Days 197-201), Theognis (1135-50), and Aratus (Phaenomena 129-34), where Aïdôs/Nemesis, Elpis and Dikê respectively are involved. This second theme is a familiar moralizing refrain, taken with varying degrees of seriousness. I suggest, then, that in the epilogue Catullus (or his Hellenistic source\textsuperscript{23}) joined an element from the moralizing tradition about human degeneracy to the non-moralizing theme of the Peleus - Thetis marriage. That is, to the folk-motif, "The gods once appeared among men," there is added a sort of continuation, "They no longer do because (quare, 407) human vice drove them from the earth." The insertion of the causal connection is the novelty.

To sum up, I have tried to show that the emerging consensus in recent writings on Catullus 64 is in error in several important respects. I hope to have made clear the difficulties attendant upon any attempt to derive a consistent and serious morality from the surface of Catullus' narrative. If my view is correct, that Catullus, like other ancient authors, felt free to develop episodes from the myths without judging them, then a certain quantity of commentary on the poem is well meant but over-subtle. The differences of opinion in this paper reflect fundamentally divergent assumptions about the nature of literature in antiquity. The view for which I have argued here accepts the possibility of a form of "detachment" of an author's personal moral judgment from the subject matter of his writings. Such a detachment seems to me an essential part of the experience and appreciation of many types of literature, for, almost paradoxically, it makes possible the emotional effects that so many ancient poets sought. This view, in my opinion, accounts for what we find in poem 64 and allows us to understand the work in the way Catullus would have expected.

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NOTES

1) "Das Epyllion Catulli im Lichte der hellenistischen Epik," AntClass 41 (1972), 123-47 - hereafter Giangrande. For a spirited controversy on
the subject, cf. T. P. Wiseman, LCM 2 (1977), 177-80; Giangrande, ibid., 229-31; and Wiseman, ibid., 3 (1978), 21-22. My disagreements with Giangrande will be evident from the discussion.


3) "Catullus 64 and the Heroic Age," YCS 21 (1969), 171-92, esp. 191. Giangrande (138-39) takes issue with this remark, but his method of refutation differs from mine.


5) Virtus Romana (Munich, 1973), 43-44.


7) Alloi in Schol. Eur. Hec. 41, ali in Serv. Aen. 3.322, Hygin. Fab. 110, Quint. Smyrn. 14.254, a papyrus "epyllion" of Nonnian date (Pack1 = Pack2 = Pack1 = Pack2 1803), and Mythogr. Vatic. 1.140 and 2.205. Giangrande, Eratos 60 (1962), 154, note 4, observes that there must have been an Alexandrian model for the papyrus epyllion; if so, it would be the earliest source for the romance theme.


10) Comparable expressions in Kinsey (916) and Konstan (46), who says that Theseus' oblivio "marks the breakdown in the traditional concept of virtus."


12) An example from a different field may illustrate the problem. Gilbert Lawall, YCS 19 (1966), 158, states, concerning Jason's cloak at Argonautica 1.721-67, "charm is recommended rather than strength, and treachery is recommended and justified.... The scenes teach success and survival—distinguish unheroic goals." But charm, in its various manifestations, is certainly not considered worthless in a speaker in the Homeric poems, and only to a modern, schooled in the ethical sense of "heroic," could success and survival be classed as unheroic. Arthur Adkins, in his various writings, can hardly be altogether wrong to assert that there is an important connection between success and aretē in Homer.

13) Similarly, S. E. Knopp, CP 71 (1976), 211, states that these lines "suggest a society which abandons duty to indulge passion" and quotes line 42 as if it demonstrated this proposition.

14) This consideration disposes of two Hesiodic fragments (1 and 204 M-W) which might appear to have a different version. Of the latter, Martin
West once observed, CQ N.S. 11 (1961), 133, that the Catalogues had no place for the metals scheme of the Erôs and that "the heroic age is not distinguis-
shed from the golden age of the Erôs." He is more circumspect in his commen-
tary (above, n.11), saying only that "the heroes' world resembles that of
Hesiod's Golden men (fr.1.6-13)." But since Zeus is presumed to be the king
of the gods in both fragments, it cannot be the epit Kronos bios. The same
point should check the tendency to see portrayed in Catullus' epilogue a
"decline from a primitive Golden Age" (Fordyce on 384-407).

15) "Catullus 64: The Descent of Man," Antiochthon 9 (1975), 41-51, esp.
44 and 51 - hereafter Forsyth.

16) The major text is Bodo Gatz, Weltalter, goldene Zeit und sinnver-
wändte Vorstellungen (Hildesheim, 1967), esp.216-32, which contain a con-
spectus auctorvm with over 480 fonts and a conspectus locorum with most
of the topoi on the subject.

17) On the complexity of Greek ideas of divine justice, cf. K.J. Dover,
Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Berkeley/Oxford,
Monumentum Chilonense. Studien zur augstenglichen Zeit, ed. E. Lefèvre
(Amsterdam, 1975), 400-18. On p.414, Skiadas discusses Hesiod, fr.124 M-W,
in which the proverbial impunity of an aphrodisios horkos, in that case
sworn by Zeus himself, is already well established. Furthermore, the view
that Theseus could be guilty of "criminal Treulosigkeit" (conceded by Gian-
grande, LCM 2, 1977, 230) or of impietas (Forsyth, 43) cannot stand. No law
in antiquity covered a broken promise to élopie, and the relationship be-
tween Theseus and Ariadne was not one of those embraced in the usual de-
finitions of pietas (for which see Fordyce ad 76.2).

18) L'influence grecque sur la poésie latine de Catulle à Ovide (Vand-
ouvrés-Genève, 1956), 54.

19) Catullus: An Interpretation (New York, 1973), 263. Less plausibly,
Forsyth (47) suggests that Catullus deliberately contradicts himself in
the epilogue in order to force the reader to rethink the entire poem.

20) There is one parallel which seems to have been overlooked. The story
of a mother deliberately having intercourse with her son (403f.) is found
also in Parthenius, Evôïka pathêmatâ,17; the subject is the Corinthian
tyrant Periander and the tale serves to explain his insanity.

21) Cf.F. Jacoby, FOrhist III a,Comm.,p.199; Giangrande, AntClass 39

22) "Rhianos," RE I A 1 (1914), 782. Jacoby (above, n.21) declares the
idea impossible, basing most of his argument on this frg. Wilamowitz, Die
hellenistische Dichtung, I (Berlin, 1924), 225, takes the same approach;
but we should note that Gow and Page, The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic
Epigrams, II (Cambridge, 1965), 503, ignoring the controversy, say simply,
"his Homeric criticism [suggests] that he had worked within range of a
library and other scholars, presumably at Alexandria." Jacoby's somewhat
romanticized portrait of Rhianus escaping the power of the courts and re-
viving the old type of wandering rhapsode deserves a cautious reception.

23) Giangrande (140, n.93) provides a learned argument to prove that Ca-
tullus' putrida pectora (v.351) must be an allusion to Ilíad 18.121-25, with
bathykolpos (v.122) taken to mean, as in Hesychius, archaia, palaia, koîle,
and thus that Catullus was indeed translating a Hellenistic poem. But (1)
the allusion to the Ilíad is possible, not certain, for the details of the
two passages are quite different, and (2) putrida may simply be a native
Latin expression, as in Horace's mammæ putres (Epod. 8.7); cf. also pu-
tidus, "old, withered," at Plaut. Bacch. 1163; Cat. 42.11-12; Hor. Epod.8.1.
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF HORACE, ODES 1.17

PETER G. TOOHEY

I. Odes 1.17, like many other Horatian odes, may be examined from four different standpoints.1) These are: 1. What is the concrete scene, occasion, or excuse for the ode? 2. What are its "philosophical" ramifications? 3. What significance does the ode have within the poetical or aesthetic conceptions of the Odes? 4. What significance does the position of the ode entail? In the following pages I propose to demonstrate how Horace "answers" these questions.

First a few words in general. It is stating nothing new to maintain that a poem can mean more than one thing. That Horace could have embodied "answers" to these four questions in a single ode is not a priori improbable. Most of Horace's odes are based on a concrete scene or occasion; this needs no stressing. Few would deny that this can be consistent with either questions two, three or four. That "answers" to questions two and three can on occasion be found in the one poem has been recognized by critics such as Mette and Cody:2) Horace's Epicurean preference for simplicity fits well with a Callimachean aesthetic theory opting for the restraint and, often, simplicity of the genos leptaleon, the genus tenue. To link the fourth point with the second, or third is perhaps more difficult. An example of a particularly fecund attempt at linking points three and four (albeit without recognizing my categorization) can be found in C. P. Jones' discussion of Odes 3.26.3) Here, he suggests, Horace attempts, by the union of martial and amatory imagery, to extend "notions of the lyric poet to embrace all (Horace's) lyric oeuvre." And at the same time 3.26 may be intended to recall 1.5 thus suggesting that the collection of Books 1-3 is coming to an end.
How does 1.17 fit this schema? The answer to the first question may be stated briefly. The ostensible reason for the poem is to invite Tyndaris to Horace's Sabine farm. It is an Einladungsgedicht. This calls for little amplification. The "answers" for points two, three, and four are less obvious. It is with these that the bulk of this paper will be taken up.

II. Before examining the second, third, and fourth propositions, we must deal with a small textual crux in Odes 1.17.14. Whether one reads hic or hinc in this verse is of considerable importance for an interpretation of the ode. The problem is, I realize, a tedious one. Hopefully the remainder of this paper will demonstrate its significance and excuse my travelling over such well-worn ground. The majority of modern editors and commentators support hic: amongst others we find Page, Wickham, Wickham-Garrod, Klingner, Villeneuve, Tescari, Syndikus, Kiessling-Heinze, Nisbet and Hubbard. The intrepid scholars who support hinc can be counted on one's fingers. The few I know of are Keller-Holder, Gow, Plessis, Lenchantin de Gubernatis-Bo.

A glance at Klingner's apparatus criticus will show that the ancient commentators, Porphyrio and the author of one MS of Pseudo-Acro, plus the majority of manuscripts support hinc. The authority of hic rests entirely on D and π. The best manuscript family for the Odes is Ε; Υ is the next best; the third is ζ, a mixed family, whose derivation appears to be Ε and Υ. The manuscript D, unfortunately destroyed in the nineteenth century, falls into ζ, the least respectable family; π falls into the second best family Υ, but has been contaminated from Ε. Thus hic lacks the support of almost all the manuscripts. What it does have comes from two inferior, contaminated manuscripts.

The most common justification for hic is that the scribal abbreviations for hic and hinc are easily confused. This may be true, but it presupposes that the "error" was made at a stage in the manuscript tradition prior to the postulated archetypes Ε and Υ. This is surely an assumption of unnecessary complexity. The major reasons for accepting hic are three: i. hinc...hic...hic disrupts an otherwise neat chain of anaphora. ii. the three clauses beginning hinc/hic...hic...hic form a tricolon structure whose movement is disrupted by the asymmetrical hinc. iii. hinc would mean something in order of ob mean pietatem; thus the connection of the first clause is with what precedes, not with what follows; therefore the ode's symmetry is destroyed.

Reasonable objections, however, can be made against each of these
points: i. Technically speaking hino...hio...hio destroys the anaphora.\textsuperscript{8})

But aurally, at least, it seems to partake of the qualities of anaphora.

The sound of hino will associate it with the two following hio's. The usage is not without parallels - see, for example Horace Odes 1.34.14 and 16 (hino...hio) and Virgil, Georgics 2.145-6-9 (hino...hio...hio).

ii. Tricolon is not necessarily disrupted; there is an aural link between hino and hio. But what perhaps vitiates the tricolon theory is that the first element here is abstract or general. More expected would have been a concrete first element leading towards a summarizing abstract. To this reader the transition from the generality of the first clause to the concreteness of the two following is harsh.

iii. Perhaps the most telling objection is that hino must refer to what precedes. (Bentley suggested that it would mean \textit{ob meam pietatem}).\textsuperscript{9})

Not that hino in this sense is unparalleled (compare Odes 3.6.5-7: \textit{dis te minorem quod geris, imperas;/ hino omne princiipium, huc refer exitum}), rather it necessitates taking v.14b-16 with v.13-14a instead of v.17-28. Critics and editors have preferred this progressive orientation of v.14b-16 because a/ they feel that hino, syntactically speaking, is awkward, while hio b/ creates the tricolon and anaphora, and c/ allows the poem to fall into two neat halves, v.1-14a and v.14b-28.

Bentley as stated, felt that hino would mean \textit{ob meam pietatem}. But why must one be so specific? Surely hino will embrace 1/ the gods' protection, 2/ Horace's \textit{pietas}, and 3/ Horace's \textit{Musa}. I will attempt to outline below that hino, read thus, makes perfectly reasonable sense in the overall logic of the poem. That hino disturbs the anaphora and tricolon is, as we have seen, not vital. That it will not allow a bipartite symmetry is unfortunate, but not, as I hope to show, irredeemably so. It is fair to say, therefore, that the conservative position - the acceptance of the best manuscript reading - is the most justifiable one. In v.14 we ought to read hino.

Hino does negate the view which sees Odes 1.17 as composed of two approximately fourteen verse sections. However an equally symmetrical arrangement replaces it. Stanzas 1-3, with their "Golden Age" peace, form the first sense-block. Stanza 4, with its generalities, will form a second, stanzas 5-7, a mix of pastoral and erotic themes, form a third. The resulting tripartite structure with three followed by one followed again by three stanzas is not unattractive. This pattern, of a centrally placed stanza surrounded by two equal, longer ones, is reasonably common in Horace. It will be recalled that Williams in his commentary to Book 3 of the
Odes took pains to emphasize it. Some possible parallels are 3.10 (2+1+2); 2.14 (3+1+3); 3.8 (3+1+3); 3.14 (3+1+3); 3.11 (4+1+4 provided v.25-8 are genuine); 4.9 (6+1+6). The symmetry in Odes 1.17 may extend further. The two three stanza sense-blocks are both arranged into a pattern of 1+2 stanzas where, to some extent, the single stanza summarizes what the second and third stanzas make more explicit.

There are certain elements which reinforce this symmetry: aestatem (v.3) in the first sense-block picks up aestus (v.18) in the second sense-block; impune, v.5, picks up innocentis, v.21; there are also metuunt, v.8, and metues, v.24, fistula v.10, and fide, v.18. Among the repetitions which, while not occurring in a responsive position, none the less link the two sections, there are defendit, v.3, and vitabis, v.18; Martialis, v.9, and Marte, v.23; nec, v.9 and nec, v.22 and 24.

III. Let us now return to the main argument. The "philosophical" significance of Odes 1.17, if I may put it baldly, is an oblique product of its rejection of elegy, particularly the elegiac poetry of Albius Tibullus. I will not attempt to demonstrate an Horatian antipathy to elegy here. This has been convincingly done elsewhere. Suffice it to say that I believe that Horace took his Lucretius, particularly the concluding sections of the DRN 4, quite seriously. In rejecting the elegiac conception of love, Horace is demonstrating his Epicurean orthodoxy. This is the poem's "philosophical" significance. But first of all elegy. Where are the references to it? Nisbet and Hubbard have demonstrated the pastoral background of Odes 1.17. The hyperbolic claim to a visit from Faunus, for example, seems an established topos in pastoral poetry. Similarly the cornucopia. The more realistic locus amoenus of stanzas 5 to 7 again seems indebted to the pastoral. Into this pastoral world however, intrudes an erotic element of a type perhaps more readily seen in an urban environment. This erotic intrusion is perhaps the most telling indication that elegy is being referred to. The best parallels for this blend of erotic and pastoral are to be found in elegy: Nisbet and Hubbard compare Propertius 2.5.21, Tibullus 1.10.6lf., and Ovid, Amores 1.7.47. It is most probable, as Nisbet and Hubbard recognize, that the blending of pastoral and erotic themes is a direct reference to elegy. It is perhaps more contentious to maintain that Tibullus
may be being singled out in Odes 1.17. There are, however, certain indications which make this view probable. I would emphasize, primarily, two points 1) the blend of pastoral and erotic themes, a hallmark of Tibullan style, and 2) resemblances between 1.17 and 1.33, the latter in all likelihood addressed to Albius Tibullus. A third more contentious point is the use of *pietas* in v.13. But I will reserve discussion of this until the next section of my paper.

Consider the rejection of erotic violence in Horace's "pastoral" landscape. Or the rejection of elegiac behaviour from Horace's "pastoral" poetry. What is Horace up to? Is it possible that the rejection of erotic themes may constitute a reference to the work of Horace's friend Albius Tibullus? And further that the rejection of erotic violence may constitute a gentle criticism of Tibullus' work?

To some critics Tibullus' poetry is an unholy alliance of pastoral and elegiac (amatory) themes. Elder has maintained that "the key to pastoral poetry lies in the implied or suggested contrast between the created Arcadian world of goodness and our own actual world of virtues and vices. Tibullus does not create Arcadia, but he does form an idealized portrait of the country. Where, to follow Elder, we might find a contrast between Arcadia (the ideal) and the present (reality), we have a contrast between the country (the ideal - the pastoral element) and the city (reality - the "normal" milieu of the elegist). This contrast is at the core of many of Tibullus' poems: 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.10, 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5. Tibullus exploits this dichotomy in amatory contexts. For lovers the city is a place which breeds discord. Conversely, the country is a place which breeds concord.

A brief example. In Tibullus, 1.5.19-40 the poet had imagined a *felia vita* for himself in the country with his sweetheart Delia. She would help with the running of the farm (v.21ff.) and would entertain Tibullus' friends (v.31). But something went wrong. His plans were frustrated (v.35-6) and now he finds himself the *exclusus amator* (v.39). The contrast is obvious: the country was the ideal but unreal locale for Tibullus' love; instead he finds himself in the city and
unloved.

The rural vision of Tibullus is an ideal which does not exist in reality. Contrast the position in *Odes* 1.17. A peaceful and secure life is, Horace vaunts, quite possible in the country. He banishes the possibility of tangled, urban amours. Horace's vision, though intimately related to Tibullus', though utilizing the same contrasts as Tibullus', seems to entail a negation, a rejection of Tibullus' amatory conceptions. Where Tibullus grudgingly admits the impossibility of idealized rural love, Horace rejects its urban counterpart and unreservedly commends the efficacy of the country.

At this point we ought to compare *Odes* 1.33 which is addressed to an Albius generally taken to be Albius Tibullus. It is usually accepted that Horace is parodying Tibullus' poetry here. Three aspects of this ode deserve attention: although emphasizing the *ronde de l'amour*, the fickleness of love, the stress is on triangular relationships; 2) the name Cyrus appears; 3) the *adunaton* of wolves mixing peacefully with goats occurs. These three elements may also appear in *Odes* 1.17. Horace's invitation to Tyndaris is surely to be taken in the amatory sense; if this is accepted, then the violent urban paramour of Tyndaris, Cyrus, is a rival; thus we have an amatory triangle. The name Cyrus appears four times in Horace. In *Odes* 2.2.17 and 3.29.27 it is used of the Persian King; its other appearances are in *Odes* 1.17 and 1.33. This strongly suggests a parallel between the two poems. The *adunaton* of 1.33.7-8 suggests, to some extent, 1.17.9. What are we to make of these parallels? I do not think that Horace is concerned to have us read 1.17 and 1.33 as a pair. Rather they suggest that we are not wrong to see Tibullus in *Odes* 1.17. The philosophical justification for Horace's rejection of the Tibullan position and, certainly, elegy, deserves reiterating. Horace's Epicureanism precluded any real sympathy for the elegiac mode.

IV. The third approach to 1.17 was in terms of poetry: what significance does the ode have within the poetical conceptions of Horace in the *Odes*? The foregoing sections, which attempted to demonstrate an Horatian rejection of Tibullan elegy and elegiac love, will go part of the way towards
answering this question. We can, however, approach the question from another angle.

In v.14 of *Odes* 1.17 I have argued that we should read *hinc* rather than the more generally accepted *hic*. This reading, as I have indicated, considerably alters the meaning of stanza 4. If we were to paraphrase stanza 4 accordingly, it would run like this: the gods protect me; my piety and poetry are dear to them; because of this, Tyndarids, you will see "plenty" lavishing fertility. Whatever else this stanza may imply, therefore, at base it is a vaunt praising the powers Horace's own poetry, one comparable to the vaunts of odes such as 1.1, 2.20, and 3.30.

Here, perhaps, we should pause briefly to consider the significance of the word *pietas*. It seems, in other contexts, to have had a technical literary meaning. The lyric poet was *pius* by virtue of his devotion to the Muses; in elegy he is *pius* by his devotion to Venus and Amor. Use of both of these senses can be seen in Horace. In *Odes* 3.4.6 the metaphorical landscape of poetic inspiration is described as *pios luces*. (Indeed all of the second stanza of 3.4 is of relevance to 1.17.) The use of *pius* here is clearly technical. In *Odes* 1.22 the word *pius* is not actually mentioned. The conceit of the ode, however, functions about an implied *pius* or *pietas*. Stanzas 1 and 2 of 1.22 describe how the *pius* man has the protection of the gods; in stanzas 3 and 5 the conceit is exploited: the *pietas* is not the result of religious devotion, but of the amatory poet's devotion to Venus and Amor.

*Pietas* in v.13 of 1.17 is quite possibly used in this technical sense. That *hinc* turns Stanza 4 into a vaunt praising Horace's own poetry makes this even more likely. (We should note in passing that Horace may be pulling Tibullus' leg here. The concept of the *pius* amator may be a Tibullan invention.) It is probable, moreover, that the *di* of v.13, while of course including Faunus, may also include those other *plebes superum*, the Musae. (The protection of the Muses, it will be recalled, is demonstrated in *Odes* 3.4.9-24.) *Pietas*, then, is a double-entendre - it explains the visit of Faunus as a result of Horace's religious "piety" and his poetic "piety." Interpreted thus, it renders the likelihood of stanza 4 functioning as an instance of Selbstlob even more convincing.

But let us return to the main concern. Two dominant motifs in *Odes* 1.17 are the transformation of Greek into Roman, and juxtaposition of fantasy and reality. If we examine the
deployment of these themes in Odes 1.17, I think that the sign-
ificance of the poem within Horace's poetical conceptions
will become more apparent.

The transformation of Greek into Roman is one of the bet-
ter known self-advertisements of Horace (see Odes 3.30, 13-14:
princeps Aeolium carmen ad Italos/ deduxisse modos). I think that we
can see this emphasized in 1.17 through the theme of the
transformation of Greek into Roman. Consider these examples:
Pan leaves the Arcadian Mt. Lycaon and, becoming Faunus, lo-
cates himself in an Italian locale - the countryside about
Horace's Sabine farm. The addressee of the ode is possessed
of a Greek name, Tyndaris. Instead of simply singing on the
lyre, she sings on an Anacreontic (Teia v.18) lyre. The wine
drunk is not the more normal Italian, such as Caecuban or
Alban, but the more expensive Lesbian (which, appearing after
Teia Lyra, must inevitably set Sappho and Alcaeus in the read-
er's mind). 26) Bacchus and his mother are not designated by
their more comprehensible Latin forms, but in their solemn
Greek metronymics, Semeleius and Thyoneus. The bothersome
paramour of Tyndaris is given a Greek name, Cyrus. But all
of this in the Sabine countryside.

This theme, as stated, is of importance throughout the Odes.
However, consider the poems surrounding 1.17.

1.12 Begins with a quote from Pindar (O. 2.1ff.)
1.13 Seems to be modelled on Sappho 31 LP
1.14 Based on Alcaeus' "ship of state", e.g. 326 LP
1.15 Based on a lost ode of Bacchylides
1.16 Based on Stesichorus' palinode 192 PMG
1.18 Begins with a quote from Alcaeus 342 LP

Although many other odes have direct Greek models, 1.12 to
1.18 is perhaps the most clear-cut series based recognizably
on Greek forebears. It seems to me, at any rate, startling
and significant, that an ode, so manifestly concerned with
poetry, should emphasize this aspect of Horace's art at so
obviously relevant a time.

The blend of fantasy and reality in 1.17 is in some ways too obvious
to need mentioning. Contrast Faunus' visit with the smelly goats; Mt.
Lycaon with Mt. Lucretilis; the cornucopia with the more realistic setting
in reducta vale; the reducta vallis with Tyndaris' urban affairs. What
is the purpose of this blend? the answer is straight-forward - humour.
But why humour? This question may be answered without recourse to other odes, but it is worthwhile and instructive to make the comparison.

In *Odes* 1.1, at the close of a long selection priamel, we find the stately effect of the vaunt of Horace's role as lyric poet undercut by these lines (35f.):

\[ \text{quodsi me lyricis vatibus inseres,} \\
\text{sublimi feriam sidera vetvtiae.} \]

In 3.30, after the hyperbolic vaunt of v.1-9, we find (10-12):

\[ \text{dicar, qua violens obstrepit Aufidus} \\
\text{et qua pauper aquae Daunus agrestium regnavit populorum...} \]

Eternal fame in Horace's natal Apulia is hardly a stunning claim. Similarly the transformation of the poet into a swan in *Odes* 2.20 has been labelled, if not grotesque, at least tongue-in-check. In each of these cases the extravagance of the vaunt is undercut (but in fact undiminished). The humour resulting from the blend of fantasy and reality in 1.17 must perform the same function. It undercuts the pomposity of Horace's poetic vaunt.

Does *Odes* 1.17 have any significance in respect of Horace's conceptions of poetry? We have already interpreted stanza 4 as a vaunt praising Horace's own poetic abilities. What relation do the other stanzas have? The blend of fantasy and reality, particularly within the first three stanzas, is so pronounced as to rule out literal interpretation. It is improbable that Horace's proprietorial pride was such as to allow him this hyperbolic description. Two aspects are of paramount importance: the first, the literary (i.e. pastoral) nature of the "visit" of Faunus; the second, the consistent juxtaposition of Greek and Roman. The conclusion seems inescapable, stanzas 1-3 are a symbolic description of, as Com-mager put it, "the world of art." Not of anybody's art, but, as the transformation of Greek into Roman intimates, of the art of Horace. Stanza 4, thus, following as a vaunt in praise of Horace's own poetic abilities assumes a much greater importance.

What of stanzas 5-7? I have already mentioned their relation to the standardized *locus amoenus*. Is it possible that we have a reference to the *gelidum nemus Nympharum*? The emphasis on the valley's being withdrawn (compare Virgil, *Aeneid* 8, 609) and on its shade may hint at this - compare *Odes* 1.1.30-31,
Virgil, Aeneid 1.154ff., Horace, Epistles 2.2.77 (scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbern) and the description of the grove of the Muses in Tacitus, dialogus de oratoribus 9.6. But above all compare Odes 3.4.5-8 where pios lucos are the metaphorical landscape of poetic creation. There is ultimately no proof of this contention. The parallels are suggestive, however, of the relation stanzas 5-7 may have to the traditional depiction of poetic creativity.

V. The fourth question was: what is the significance of the position of the ode? Among the functions which I have attributed to 1.17 is a programmatic "description", for want of a better term, of one side of what Horace considered as his poetic mode in the Odes. It seems eminently possible that Odes 1.16 can be fitted into the same schema. It can be linked to 1.17 by several internal and external similarities.

First of all, is it likely that Horace would have allowed this type of pairing? The answer must be yes. In Book 1 of the Odes one might compare 1.1 and 1.38, 1.2 and 1.37, 1.3 and 1.36. Within the collection some argue that pairs exist in 1.26 and 1.27, 1.32 and 1.33, 1.34 and 1.35.

Perhaps the two most important external similarities between Odes 1.16 and 1.17 are metre and length. Consider the metres by which they are surrounded: 1.13 Third Asclepiad, 1.14 Fifth Asclepiad, 1.15 Fourth Asclepiad, 1.16 Alcaics, 1.17 Alcaics, 1.18 Second Asclepiad, 1.19 Fourth Asclepiad. The lesser frequency of the Asclepiadic metres within Odes, Books 1-4 must throw the more common Alcaic metres into prominence and, at the same time, perhaps artificially link them. The length of both odes, seven stanzas, is equally significant. Other examples of clear-cut tetrametric odes of the same length are: 1.24 and 1.25 (4th Asclepiad, Sapphic), 1.32, 1.33, 1.34 (Sapphic, 4th Asclepiad, Alcaic), 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 (Sapphic, Alcaic, Sapphic), 2.8, 9, 10, 11 (Sapphic, Alcaic, Sapphic Alcaic), 3.17, 3.18 (Alcaic, Sapphic), 4.12, 4.13 (4th Asclepiad, 5th Asclepiad). It will be noted, therefore, that 1.16 and 1.17 are the only two contiguous poems of the same length and same metre in the Odes. It would be an act of hybris to ignore this fact.

Further, the structure of both odes is similar. 1.16 is
arranged in sense-blocks of 3+1+3 stanzas. In the first sense-block there is a movement from the personal (stanza 1) to the general (stanzas 2-3); stanza 4, the second sense-block, is best taken as a parenthesis. (The continuity between stanzas 3 and 4 is indicated by the anaphora of iare v.9 and iare v.17.) In the final sense-block, stanzas 5-7, there is a movement from the general to the personal.

Perhaps the most startling internal parallel between the two odes is the looming spectre of Helen of Troy. The ancient commentators inform us that 1.16 is based on Stesichorus' palinode. Nisbet and Hubbard suggest that 1.16.1 is taken from Stesichorus' poem (we have no corresponding fragment) and that the verb recantare, v.27, may have been coined by Horace as a Latin equivalent of the Greek palinodein to indicate the parentage of the ode. Certainly 1.16 is an apt description of Helen.

However, to maintain, as do Nisbet and Hubbard, that the name Tyndaris in 1.17 "may strike a pastoral note" is to dissemble. Although the name may have been common in pastoral its primary referent must be Helen of Troy. The word is used of Helen in Lucretius, DRN 1.464, 473; Virgil, Aeneid, 2.601, 569; Propertius, 3.30.31, 4.7.30; Ovid, Ars Am. 1.746. If one attempts to suggest that Tyndaris does not imply Helen in 1.17 then the onus is on that critic to show why, in the face of this evidence, not. Clear reference to Helen of Troy, therefore, appears in both odes. We may accept this as another decisive link between 1.16 and 1.17.

It is not my intention to conjure up hoary old ghosts by maintaining as, for example, do the scholiasts that the pulchra filia of 1.16 is the eadem meretrix, Tyndaris that is, of 1.17. Stern comments from Fraenkel have laid this wraith to rest. Rather it seems possible that one level of meaning in 1.16 is poetry itself. Examine v.22-26:

me quoque pectoris
tentavit in dulci iuventa
fervor et in celeres iambos
misit furentem; nunc ego mitibus
mutare quaero tristia...

We have already noted the multilayered texture of 1.17. This is a constant feature of the Horatian ode. Granted, as Nisbet
and Hubbard maintain, that 1.16 may be a dissuasio against anger, 38) granted even that it may have been the pulchra filia whose iambs are committed to the elements in stanza 1. 39) No interpretation of stanzas 1-5, however, should distract us from the fact that v.22-26 are referring to an iambic, epodic poetry which the author of Odes 1.16 had utilized but has now abandoned. 40) Horace, it seems thoroughly probable, is referring to his own adoption and abandoning of the epodic genre.

Thus Odes 1.16 is a recantatio, a palinode, but only in the most general sense. It need not refer to an actual biographical event which gave rise to poems of either Horace or the addressee. It refers, rather, to the epodic œuvre. Seen as a deliberate reference to the now abandoned epodic style 1.16 fits very neatly with 1.17. In the latter we have, on one level, a programmatic description of Horace's new themes, in the former a reference (though hardly a programmatic one) to the now abandoned style. Odes 1.16 complements and expands the relevance of 1.17. Such a reading of 1.16, I hasten to add, will explain almost all of the problematic parallels between the two odes. It will also explain why 1.17 appears where it does.

VI. One might observe, by way of a conclusion, how closely intertwined the "answers" to questions two, three, and four are. All are related to poetry. Horace obliquely affirms an Epicurean philosophy of love by rejecting the poetry of a most unepicurean poet. He provides us with a programmatic "description" of one side of his poetic mode in the Odes. And finally, by pairing 1.16 with 1.17, he contrasts symbolically his new style of the Odes with the now abandoned epodic style. These "answers" make up what some would term the "poetological" significance of Odes 1.17.

But one ought not be too procrustean. Much more emphasis may be placed on the "answer" to point one. The amatory nature of the poem could be stressed - either, as Pucci maintains, 41) it depicts a triangular love relationship where Horace sees himself as threatened by Cyrus, or, as Quinn more convincingly maintains, 42) it is an urbane and ironic invitation for Tyndaris to leave Cyrus and to come and "spend the
weekend" with Horace. Neither of these readings, however, need vitiate nor be incompatible with mine. If one thing is true of Horace it is that his odes can have more than one meaning.

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NOTES

1) My thanks for help in the composing of this paper to Prof. K. H. Lee, Mr. A. Treloar, and, above all, to Prof. K. F. Quinn who has read and commented on it at more than one stage. My views should in no way be held to be a reflection of theirs.


3) C. P. Jones, "Tange Chloen semel arrogantem," HSCP, 75 (1971), 81-3. Note, however, that this interpretation depends on what one makes of 3.27. If one follows Quinn, Latin Explorations (London, 1963), 253-66, then 3.27 is the last amatory ode of Books 1-3; thus the neat parallel between 1.5 and 3.26 will not stand.

4) Note, however, my remarks in Section VI of the text.


6) Suggested to me by Quinn whose views should receive amplification in his forthcoming commentary on the Odes. Some possible examples of anaphora in tricolon:

| 1.2.33-(35)-41 | sive - (sive) - sive |
| 2.13.1-5-8 | ille et - ille et - ille |
| 2.16.1-5-6 | otium - otium - (otium) |
| 3.21.13-17-21 | tu - tu - te |
| 4.2.(10)-13-17 | seu - seu - sive |
| 4.9.5-9-13 | non - nec - non |

Perfect symmetry, of course, is not vital. Compare Odes 1.29.5, 8, 10, or 1.8.5, 8, 13 where the change to quid from cur signals modulation. One would expect, however, the variant element to appear last.

7) See, for example, Nisbet and Hubbard, op. cit. in note 5, 222.


9) Quoted by Nisbet and Hubbard, op. cit. in note 5, 222.


12) A useful discussion of Horace's attitude to elegy may be found in Quinn, *op. cit.* in note 3, 154-162.

13) Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 4.1058ff.

14) See notes 15, 16, 17, and 18 below.


16) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 222f., for parallels.


18) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 216, stress this point.

19) F. Solmsen, "Tibullus as an Augustan Poet," *Hermes*, 90 (1962), 295-325, 302ff., cautions against viewing Tibullus as a pastoral poet. However, one would have to wear blinkers not to recognise and admit the presence of many pastoral ideas in his poetry. For example, J. P. Elder, "Tibullus: *Terces atque Elegans, Horatio's Essays on Roman Literature*, ed. J. P. Sullivan (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 65-105, and G. Lawall, "The Green Cabinet and the Pastoral Design: Theocritus, Euripides, and Tibullus," *Ramus*, 4 (1975), 87-100, have both allowed the presence of pastoral elements in his poetry.

20) Elder, *op. cit.* in note 19, 79.

21) Lucretius, *DRN* 2.20-33 ought to be compared. Horace, an Epicurean, may have inherited much of his rural vision from Lucretius. His clear belief in the efficacy of the country is something quite alien to the rural ideal of Tibullus.


23) So Pucci, *op. cit.* in note 29, and Quinn: see note 42.


29) P. Pucci, "Horace's Banquet in *Odes* 1.17," *TAPA*, 105 (1975), 259-281, 260-261, feels that this indicates a preference for the Callimachean *genos leptaleon*. Note the objections to this type of approach made by Brink in *Gnomon*, 51 (1979), 60-62, 61.


32) E. A. Fredericksmeyer, "Horace, C. 1.34. The Conversion." *TAPA*, 106 (1967), 155-176, suggests that *Odes* 1.34 acts as a preparatory poem to 1.35.


34) Helen also appears in 1.15. This need in no way, however, weaken the link between 1.16 and 1.17.

35) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 204.

36) L. A. MacKay, "*Odes* 1.16 and 1.17: O matre pulchra... Velox amoe-num...," *AJP*, 83 (1962), 298-300.

37) Fraenkel, *op. cit.* in note 11, 208f.

38) Nisbet and Hubbard, *op. cit.* in note 5, 203.


40) Compare *Epodes* 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 12.

41) See *op. cit.* in note 29.

42) This position will be further clarified in his forthcoming commentary (cf. note 6 above). Prof. Quinn kindly communicated this view to me in private correspondence.
Too many critics argue that Seneca wrote his tragedies to expound his philosophic doctrines. They postulate - what has ever been in some quarters suspected - that the plays by the Stoic Philosopher are fundamentally Stoical. One critic has gone so far as to propose that these "philosophical propaganda-plays" constitute in fact a single "set" of tragedies which should be studied in the sequence and order they occupy in the Codex Etruscus, beginning and concluding with a Hercules play. Thus the plays must be read altogether, *en masse*, as a single "Stoic treatise" which may be designated "as a sort of glorified Essay on Man." There are, she believes, unrelieved horrors and gloom, uncontrolled passions, and an evil fate operative throughout the series - until the reader comes at last to the final play, the Oetaeus, where Stoic virtue is finally rewarded.

This critic's overall hypothesis has been largely discounted for a number of very good reasons. We have absolutely no evidence nor inkling that Seneca himself "arranged" the ordering of his plays; indeed, we have no information about their original "publication" whatsoever. Again, we have not one iota of evidence that would lend credence to the suggestion that the ordering of the Codex Etruscus is to be preferred to the ordering...
of A or any other recensions. In addition, the *Phoenissae* is admittedly an incomplete fragment, and many critics question the authorship of the *Hercules Oetaeus.* Finally, until the era of Proust, no one had encountered the ennealogical structure; a Greek audience had enough to do to sustain its attention-span when faced with the performance of a trilogy (together with a satyr-play); a nine-headed monster would have overwhelmed it. Whatever one might say to the contrary, it was never Seneca's practice to keep his readers suspended for some five hundred pages before granting them respite - and enlightenment. As Jonathan Swift once remarked, "Going too long is a Cause of Abortion as effectual, tho' not so frequent, as Going too short...." If Seneca were as eager to inculcate philosophical doctrine as this critic appears to believe, his astonishingly outstretched sequence of plays would contribute mightily to the loss of instruction entirely. No; such a critic's conjectures simply have not been able to pass muster because they are so free-wheeling and insubstantial. C. D. N. Costa, for example, finds such a theory "most unlikely;" "it needs a good deal of special pleading to infer Stoic teaching from all the plays...."

Although such a conjectural thesis has been, in large measure, shunted aside, it is important to come to terms with a beguiling and rather widely-held opinion concerning the presence of overt Stoicism in the Philosopher's drama and with the popularly received notion that there is or ought to be explicit didacticism and moral teaching in works of literature, particularly the drama. We are told, for example, that Seneca's plays constitute "a piece of neo-Stoic propaganda," and are primarily dedicated to "the teaching of philosophy;" hence, this critic believes that the Senecan plays are "pseudotragedies," utilizing dramatic form as deceptive "sugar-coating." Accordingly, "from a purely aesthetic point of view much in [these plays] deserves the most severe strictures." Needless to say, the very term "pseudotragedy" is pejorative, suggesting the synthetic, the counterfeit, and the second rate. Such a critic's emphasis upon Stoicism stems from the "effort to determine Seneca's object in writing the plays..." we might suggest that such criticism is guilty of "The Intentional Fallacy." For we can never predicate an author's intentions with certainty, and when we then proceed to locate the effects of that postulated intention in his writings, our argument becomes hopelessly circular; such criticism, as Wimsatt observes, "... begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from the psychological causes of the poem and ends in biography and relativism."
It is also interesting to note that so many modern critics endorse a kind of unwritten "law of literary specialization:" a philosopher cannot write plays, etc. Rigidly applied, this criterion would prevent a Caesar from writing memoirs or plays, a Plato from writing poetry, any poet from writing criticism, any doctor, lawyer, or priest from writing fiction.

Indeed, for many a critic, it is the philosophical content in Senecan drama that counts and that saves his plays from total condemnation. Hopefully, the reader at this point will be seriously dismayed to observe how congenially such criticism sacrifices "mere aesthetic" in works of art in favor of solid moral teaching. Certainly, as in all great literature, Seneca's plays abound in deep thought and in psychological understanding of human nature but one can hardly argue that he employed the tragic genre primarily to impart philosophic concepts.

To be sure, the whole question of literature's "utility" and "moral purpose" has been a recurrent and vexing problem in literary criticism for two thousand years. The exertions and requirements of moralizers never diminish, and many a theorist becomes frankly ambivalent. Thus W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. insists that he tends to side with those who would separate art from morality; yet later he admits that, for him, the greatest poetry will not be immoral or indifferent, but "morally right."\(^{13}\) Perhaps such ambivalence cannot ever be eliminated.

Both art and morality have an ideal... but the ideals are not the same... Morality aims at eradicating and abolishing evil..., whereas the aesthetic contemplation of life recognizes [evil] as an element necessary to vivid and full interest... I do not think that this opposition can be altogether overcome.\(^{14}\)

Elder Olson, the neo-Aristotelian critic, draws a distinct line between works of aesthetic beauty and works of rhetoric and didacticism - the work of Homer as opposed to the work of Dante, "one... concerned with beauty of form, and the other with the inculcation of doctrine."\(^{15}\) Already, the liberal reader should be uncomfortably wincing: are we to concede, willy-nilly, that there is no "philosophy" in the pages of Homer? no "aesthetic beauty" in the cantos of Dante? Somehow, such twin Procrustean beds of art and ethics threaten ruthlessly to cleave, to curtail, and to savage the writings of two of the world's major literary figures.

And indeed, the problem is more extensive and compromising even than it first appears. For these are two age-old categories, distinguishing works that strive to persuade an audience, seeking to influence its thought or its action, juxtaposed with works that "nothing affirm,"
imitations that strive to create a complete poetic whole, "a perfect pattern." 16) Such a distinction indicates, in effect, that rhetoric is a "useful" art, while poetics or poesis is a "fine" art.

Useful art, employing nature's own machinery, aids her in her effort to realize the ideal in the world around us, so far as man's practical needs are served by furthering this purpose. Fine art sets practical needs aside; it does not seek to affect the real world, to modify the actual. By mere imagery it reveals the ideal form at which nature aims in the highest sphere of organic existence. - in the region, namely, of human life... 17)

Or, according to the distinction more recently enlarged upon by Susanne Langer, rhetoric is discursive; poetry, presentational. 18) For rhetoric is a means to creating "action" in the real world; whereas poetry is an end in itself, the creating of a complete and imitative "action" - not in the real world, but - in the world of art.

And yet, these two categories have been difficult to maintain in rigorous isolation. As Aristotle himself concedes, all men - artists among them - employ rhetoric at all times:

... all men in some way partake of both [rhetoric and dialectic]; for all men to some degree attempt to examine and to support an argument and to speak in defense of it and to speak against it. 19)

In addition, boundaries between the two kinds - useful and fine art - have continually been broken down, allowing and even encouraging the two to become confused. It would prove foolhardy to insist that an artist in his work overtly propound moral precepts or, at the opposite extreme, scrupulously expunge every moral quality whatsoever from his work. The artist, frankly, can satisfy neither of these immoderate ends. Typically, for instance, Mark Twain, like many a first-rate author, perceived very clearly the paradox that morality must never predominate in art, although such morality must never be entirely absent: "Humor must not professedly teach, and it must not professedly preach," he writes, "but it must do both if it would live forever." 20)

Moreover, we should note that literary drama - even Senecan drama - is by its very nature mimetic; yet many periods in history simply make no distinction between the mimetic and the didactic. Regardless of genre, all eighteenth-century works of art, it has been pointed out, were to some degree consciously directed to an audience: "... the poet's task, like the orator's, was to arouse in his audience certain emotions about the subject of his poem." 21)
Indeed, conscious of the censures of Plato in the *Republic*, all literary criticism for some twenty-two hundred years tended to defend art by proposing that it was *always* didactic. Horace in the *Ars Poetica* affirms that all poetry desires "aut prodesse... aut delectare," to teach or to delight. Scaliger, in his *Poetice* (1561), agrees "that the poet teaches moral habits through actions. 'Action is therefore a mode of teaching; and the moral habit is what we are taught to apply.'" Similarly, Sir Philip Sidney's *Apologie for Poetrie* (1583) claims that poetry's end is "to teach and delight," and that "Poetry ever setteth virtue... out in her best colours."

Furthermore, by a quirk of history, the analysis of poetry was cast primarily into the hands of rhetoricians for some two millenia. It was authors like Longinus and Cicero and Quintilian and their commentators who influenced medieval and Renaissance thought. Only in the 1940's and '50's did the vogue of the New Criticism, focusing its attention upon the literary work itself, commence to distinguish once again, as Aristotle had done, between works of didacticism and of aesthetic. But it has been by no means a prevailing tradition.

What in our time has been labelled "the didactic heresy" was the basic theory of literature for some twenty-two centuries. Renaissance critics and poets have little to say about self-expression or the agonies of creation, but they are never weary of insisting that literature is philosophy teaching by examples, that it moves men to the love and practice of virtue and the abhorrence of vice. Thus the aim of literature is identical with the aim of education, virtuous action.

In general, then, over the centuries moralism and didacticism in literary criticism has tended to prevail. We might well answer critics' "discovery" that Seneca is philosophizing and moralizing in his dramas by reminding them that Sophoclean or Aeschylean or Euripidean drama is all too frequently comprehended in precisely the same instructional light.

Indeed, most dramatists in some sense employ ideas in their plays, and this is particularly true of the ancient Greek playwrights. William Arrowsmith, for example, has argued that both Aeschylus and Sophocles use their contemporary cultural situation "as framing dramatic ideas" in their plays, and he goes on to urge that Euripides especially was the experimentalist who literally creates a theater of ideas. There was something of a hue and cry when Eric Bentley's *The Playwright as Thinker* first appeared in 1946, but Bentley has stood by his general thesis: that the major dramatists of the modern era (Wagner, Ibsen, Strindberg, Shaw) have fostered
ideas in their dramas.

Yet the difficulties with a predominant didacticism should become apparent. Far too frequently, for instance, in such a climate, the literary work is yanked and pulled and distorted by *allegorizing*, in order to force it to yield up its acceptable modicum of lesson and message. At its most silly, such message-mongering leads a critic like Thomas Rymer to discern two "morals" in Shakespeare's *Othello*:

... a caution to maidens of quality how, without their parents' consent, they run away with black-amoors... [and] a warning to all good wives that they look well to their linen.

Still more importantly, a regnant moral didacticism is tempted to become "militant," demanding that religious and philosophical instruction in the literary work be made pikestaff clear and overt. At its worst, such criticism is recurrently moved to advocate censorship (necessitating just as repeatedly that authors counter with their *Arepagitiocas*). Such rigid moralizing criticism commences by doubting whether good poetry can ever be written by "bad" men. Where it cannot censure, it attempts to prescribe what sort of literature is "acceptable." Over the years, for example, this practice led to the development of the concept of "poetic justice" in the drama of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - that doctrine which called overtly (as at the tacked-on conclusion of the Book of Job) for the on-stage punishment of vice and the remuneration of rectitude (and may be perceived in the curious pabulum of Richard Steele's sentimental plays or in Richardson's novel, *Pamela* or *Virtue Rewarded* [1740]). By such a standard, only a limited number of "cheerful" plots would be admissible. Tragedy would be virtually ham-strung (unless the protagonist be vicious); satire would prove unruly (refusing in tone, word, and deed to "suffer fools gladly"); and comedy would only be permitted to trifle and jest at the expense of the morally reprehensible. Lest these reflections seem extreme and at any rate unnecessary in our own enlightened era, let us remind the reader of the frequency with which Tennessee Williams has been chastized for dwelling so frequently in his dramas upon the unsavory and the depressing, and recollect as well Kenneth Tynan's strictures of Eugene Ionesco's plays for failing to be "affirmative." Such ethical vigilantes are ever upon the alert. Furthermore, it has become commonplace in recent years for the occasional moralist to raise his voice against our own period's literature for celebrating decadence, violence, pornography, obscenity, and vice - the most recent instance being Mr. John Gardner's *On Moral Fiction* (1978).
The truth of the matter is that we cannot, even if we wanted to, pre-
scribe what we will accept as suitable to world literature. In the epic,
in the novel, in much poetry, and especially in the drama - in all of these
fictional modes the author simply is not present in propria persona. Nor
will normative literary conventions allow him to break in upon the scene.
It is indeed true that readers of a particular cast of mind wish fully to
"know" what an author "means" by a certain character or a certain event.
(We constantly hope to learn to "know" as much about the perplexities and
incidents of life.) Yet it is virtually impossible for fictional genres
to satisfy this obsession fully to know. Given such a frustration, too
many readers (who after all do not wish to read fictions, but yearn in-
stead for lectures, editorials, and cablegrams) are tempted to discover
the author hidden beneath the mantle of one or another character within
the creative work, as if fictional portrayal were merely a game of hide-
and-seek. After such experiences, the bewildered author often has to
deliver, outside his fiction, something of a disclaimer: characters and
scenes, he might feel constrained to inform us, in his book are wholly
fictional, and any resemblance to actual places or persons - living or
dead - is strictly coincidental. Milton was once moved to explain him-
self in just this vein:

One is not to regard what the poet says, but what
person in the play speaks, and what that person says;
for different persons are introduced, sometimes good,
sometimes bad; sometimes wise men, sometimes fools;
and such words are put into their mouths, as it is
most proper for them to speak; not such as the poet
would speak, if he were to speak in his own person.35)

One need not be a demon to create the figure of Satan, a madman to devise
a Quixote, a fool to generate a Falstaff, a chatterbox or cynic to con-
ceive a Thersites - although many a reader has faltered in comprehending
that this is so. In opposition to such a view, which he designates "the
personal heresy," C. S. Lewis urges that such critics act as if all poetry
"must be the expression of [the poet's] personality," that such poetry "is
about the poet's state of mind." Critics, Lewis notes, are guilty of this
fallacy even when dealing with the drama, for their major premiss [is]
that the cynicism and disillusionment put into the mouths of some Shakes-
pearian characters are Shakespeare's."36) It is in this light that many
a critic comprehends Senecan drama - as exclusively the expression of
Seneca's own personality, of Seneca's own ideas.

In short, an author can never be assessed ethically by the numbers of
good or evil characters he invents; on the contrary, if the artist's
vision of good and of evil is overwhelming, that is merely a testimonial to his creative force, and not at all an indicator of the level of his immaculateness or the certification of his creed. Yet the characters an author creates can hardly be judged without taking morality into account. In Aristotle's words, for instance,

... tragedy is... an imitation of... action, of life, of happiness and unhappiness... and the end is a certain action, not a quality; men are what they are as a result of their character, they are happy or unhappy as a result of their actions.\(^\text{37}\)

Whenever a fictional creation makes a choice of speech or action, he reveals (as do people in life) his moral character. He cannot help it; his actions bespeak his morality - and any behavior is in some sense moral. Henry James once entirely dismissed a critical squabble that sought to distinguish two literary kinds: novels of character and novels of incident.

There is an old-fashioned distinction between the novel of character and the novel of incident... It appears to me... little to the point... There are bad novels and good novels, as there are bad pictures and good pictures; but that is the only distinction in which I see any meaning, and I can as little imagine speaking of a novel of character as I can imagine speaking of a picture of character. When one says picture, one says character, when one says novel, one says incident, and the terms may be transposed at will. What is character but the determination of incident? What is either a picture or a novel that is not of character? What else do we seek in it and find in it? It is an incident for a woman to stand up with her hand resting on a table and look out at you in a certain way; or if it be not an incident I think it will be hard to say what it is. At the same time it is an expression of character.\(^\text{38}\)

Hence, an author may well brilliantly express action and character in literary works of art, but he cannot express himself; he cannot express his morality or his philosophy. We obtain only a hint of these latter by the breadth, the particularity, the assurance, and the intensity of his creativity. We cannot be certain of the discursive meaning of Seneca's plays (we cannot be certain of such meaning of any plays - and debates over interpretations of Hamlet and the Oedipus Tyrannos are relevant here), but we can indeed be certain of the force and intensity of much of Seneca's achievement - the gloomy atmosphere of the Oedipus, the furious ragings of a Medea, an Atreus, or a Juno, the witty asperity of a Megara's rejoinders to the tyrant Lycur, the frustrated clairvoyance of a Cassandra,
the desperate sufferings of the mother Andromache, the poisoned physical torments of a Hercules, the insane loves of a Phaedra. We cannot in all honesty label these works "pseudotragedies" or thank our stars that they are without aesthetic interest - lest with the art we toss out the artifact, and there be nothing left!

If we set aside hypotheses about instruction and philosophizing for a time and examine squarely into Seneca's plays, we ought to discern those features that lend them psychic power and dramatic force. For one thing, his plays are austere etchings and rich mood-pieces, as Herington has observed. Herington stresses in Seneca a tone of "almost religious fervor" and a "terrible moral sensitivity" realized by the playwright's "concrete, pictorial imagination" and brilliant painter's eye for "fantasy." Prescient choruses keen and brood, and grotesque images recur with a fatal insistence. Such features lend an intensity to scenes of suffering, as Regenbogen has particularly remarked and astutely explored. Further, of course, such settings and distorting scenes suggest the nightmarish, almost hallucinatory visions that bespeak a lurid and perceptive psychological presentation enhanced by his characters' soliloquies, dramatic laments, and "self-apostrophes."

To add to this psychiatric milieu, characters speak with stichomythic and almost shot-gun tenseness and unreal clarity, as violent emotions build. Moreover, scenes tend to be isolated, blocked off, separate - even disjunct. Jo-Ann Shelton speaks of temporal repetitions in the Hercules Furens and the Thyestes and of the playwright's presentation of "simultaneous events linearly;" but what is achieved is a staccato-effect in the dreamlike tracing not of clock but of psychic time. For example, in the Thyestes when Tantalus curses the House of Atreus, characters in the play are already infected, and subsequently edged and jarred and caromed onward into a mainstream of emotional fever pitch and taut melodramtic posturing and performance. Needless to say, such a psychological theater of extremity and cruelty was particularly attractive to Elizabethans and Jacobians. As Michael Higgins notes,

... the Stoic revival of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a symptom of a general dis-
solution of established beliefs and institutions. This atmosphere of chaos, of moral and intellectual disintegration, is reflected in the tragedies of the Jacobean era.  

Seneca's theater clearly reflected crises of a mass urban society and of the rising dictatorships of first-century Rome. The Neronian world of chaos, foreboding, fantasy, and the grotesque are perhaps best exemplified in his Oedipus. Moreover, such characteristics are again in the twentieth century a particularly relevant dramatic form of art.

Seneca's influential, psychologically charged, and violently emotional theater is hardly tragic or cathartic in the traditional Aristotelian sense - characters in his plays are too frenzied and furious in their violence and obsessions; and a suppurring flux of evil prevails. As the Chorus in the Phaedra (978-82) gloomily intones:

Fortune in disarray governs human affairs
and blindly scatters her gifts,
favoring the foul;
dreadful lust conquers blameless men,
and fraud in the lofty palace prevails.

Nor is Fortuna even so innocently blind; for spirits like Tantalus and deities like Juno actually intrude in behalf of savagery and mayhem. But, most importantly, despite all of the fury and destruction, Senecan drama is pervaded by a large and persistent irony. Vice triumphs - but is never gratified. Phaedra's revenge, after all, includes her own destruction and the slaughter of her beloved Hippolytus. Medea's righting of the balance betwixt herself and Jason includes the murder of her own children; her final claim that she has been restored to chastity and innocence is perceived as being outrageously and pathetically deluded.

Atreus, for all of his towering fury, continues frustrated and insecure even at the moment of his most horrible victory over Thyestes: his jealousy, suspicion, and ire are pitched at such an extremity that they can never be satisfied or allayed. Similarly, in a broad historical sense, Clytemnestra's and Aegisthus' vengeance upon Agamemnon is but the helpless accomplishment of recompense to Cassandra and the dead of Troy; and, to be sure, the play concludes with no resolution or pause in the train of crimes and reprisals, and the mad Cassandra has the last prophetic word
with Agamemnon's assassins: "veniet et vobis furor" (1012) - upon the destroyers shall mad destruction be yet to descend. Even beyond the human realm, the spirits of Thyestes and Achilles, the shade of Tantalus, cry for cruelty and vengeance. Even the deity Juno is rabidly incensed. Whether among humans, among spirits, or among the gods themselves, Senecan theater merely presents a brutal ethos of continual slaughter. His pervasive, secular irony merely attests to the ignobility of gods and heroes alike that borders upon - nay, that topples over into - insanity. Ultimately, such characters stand revealed as puppets in the universe, for their freedom and self-realization and self-expression has been totally lost to mania and passion.

It is erroneous to argue that Seneca composed such intense, original, and powerful dramatic visions merely to inculcate philosophic thought. Yet, to be sure, such thought abounds in his plays. Needless to say, all major literary works that have been presumably admired are replete with intellectual content. A true classic is remembered for its distinction in content as well as in form. It is virtually impossible to insist that Seneca wrote these tragedies merely to formulate a syllogism or a maxim. He is rather endowing us with a poetic, creative, new tragic invention - one that envisions a livid, ruinous world where evil characters rant and rave, perpetrating the destruction of themselves and of others. His brilliantly darkened world-picture can hardly be reduced or construed as torts and orts of instruction for little Marcus-es and Julii-ses. Rather he has created for us an unreasoning universe, a second world closely set beside our own, a nightmare neighborhood where passion and frenzy are forever in fullest flower. If he touches us profoundly, it is because his neighborhood, after all, is dangerously near to our own. Such is his gift to us of a genuine literature.

"What?" we might question: "Seneca a maker of 'literature'?" It is quite true that Seneca, in his philosophical writings, appears to give pure literature a second-row seat. The Stoics naturally placed philosophy above the other "arts"; thus Seneca claims philosophy is the only art that investigates good and evil and contributes to the perfection of the soul.47) Yet we know of his impressive familiarity with Ovid, Homer,
and Vergil from the great number of times he mentions or quotes from them. As he makes clear in one passage, it is not so much that he ignores literature, as that he approaches it - not as the philologist or the grammarian - but as the philosopher; his chief concern is how to live and how to die, how to obtain strength to practice virtue, to strive for intellectual perfections, and to be borne, as it were, aloft toward the gods. Seneca knew that outstanding literary achievement, whatever its genre, guaranteed for the writer immortal glory. At one point he quotes from Vergil: Optima quaque dies miseris mortalibus aevi/ prima fugit. (For wretched mortals, the best days of life are the first to flee). Overcome with emotion and response to the poet's painful insight, Seneca observes: Clamat ecce maximus vates et velut divino cre instinatus salutare carmen canit. (Behold the greatest bard exclaims and as if inspired with divine words sings a salutary song.) In his studies, Seneca regularly honors the great minds of every genre, the grand geniuses of every age: ... sed cum optimo quoque sum; ad illos, in quoque loco, in quoque saeculo fuerunt, animum meum mitto. (... but I am with all the best; to them, in whatever place, in whatever century they have been, I send my own soul.) And he, like them, escaped the oblivion of time, not only through his philosophic Letters and Dialogues but through his Tragedies as well.

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NOTES

*) The authors wish to make grateful acknowledgment to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton for inviting them to spend the Summer of 1979 in residence, where the present paper was completed.

1) Berthe Marti, "Seneca's Tragedies. A New Interpretation," TAPA 76 (1945), 216-45. She has been especially influential (although he has reservations) upon Norman T. Pratt, Jr. See his "The Stoic Base of Senecan Drama," TAPA 79 (1948), 1-11; Pratt does not analyze image-patterns in the Senecan plays but "massive systems of words expressing abstract ideas" and believes this peculiar usage to stem from the playwright's "fusion of rhetoric and Stoicism" in the plays ("Major Systems of Figurative Language in Senecan Melodrama," TAPA 94 [1963], 199-234).

2) Hercules Furens, Troades, Phoenissae, Medea, Phaedra, Oedipus, Agamemnon, Thyestes, Hercules Oetaeus.

3) Marti (above, note 1), pp. 222-223.

4) Some of this scholarship on the authenticity of the plays is summarized in Virginia Iorio, "L'autenticità della tragedia 'Hercules Oetaeus'


6) Much the same may be said for the hypothecations in Marti's "The Prototypes of Seneca's Tragedies," CP 42 (1947), 1-16, that suggest Seneca's indebtedness to a tradition of "philosophical" or "pseudo-" tragedy that includes such authors as Diogenes and Varro. It is probably true that Antisthenes developed the Socratic "dialogue" even before Plato, and that a number of Cynics and Stoics - Diogenes, Crates, Persaeus, Herillus of Carthage, Timon of Phlius - wrote dramas of a sort, not to mention the mock-dramatic Bionian and Menippean diatribes of the kind found in the work of Lucian. But these "plays" are not extant, and it is impossible for us to determine how much they are like or unlike the dramas of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, or of Seneca. It can even be said that there is virtually no question but that upon Seneca there was some influence exerted; we simply cannot in the least posit what sort of influence it happened to be.

7) "The Tragedies," in Seneca, ed. C. D. N. Costa (London, 1974), pp. 108-109. Some critics go too far in either direction. There are those like F. Egermann ("Seneca als Dichterphilosoph," Nbb. 3, [1940], 18-36) who perceive the primary function of the plays to be the teaching of Stoic philosophy. On the other hand, there are those like Joachim Dingel (Seneca und die Dichtung [Heidelberg, 1974]) who see the plays as lacking in philosophical meaning and even running counter to Stoic philosophy.


9) Marti (above, note 1), pp. 221, 219, 216. Elsewhere, Dr. Marti is explicit about what she means by Senecan "pseudo-drama." Devoted, as such a form is, she believes, "to expound[ing] his own brand of Stoicism, it is "Totally lacking in anything dramatic... It can hardly be said to have a plot but consists rather in a series of monologues and duologues which tell a pathetic story and proceed to moralize it. All is told, nothing acted. The only clash of personalities is a cold and argumentative debate... All is static exposition, without progress, growth, or crisis." Such works are "deliberately composed... as the imitation of drama" ("Seneca's Apocolocyntosis and Octavia: A Diptych," AJP, 73 [1952], 28-29).


11) W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, The Verbal Icon: Studies


19) Rhetoric I.1 (our translation).


22) Ars Poetica, line 333; see also 343, "omne tuit punctum qui mis-cuit utile dulci."


27) The allegorical interpretation of major literary works was commonplace in the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance worlds. On such a tradition, consult Joshua McClennen, "On the Meaning and Function of Allegory in the English Renaissance," The University of Michigan Contributions in Modern Philology, no. 6 (April 1947), 1-38, and Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance (New York, 1922), pp. 139-61. If anything, the Renaissance's and Reformation's new emphasis upon the individual threatened enormously to proliferate private allegorizing; see Abraham Bezanker, "An Introduction to the Problem of Allegory in Literary Criticism,"


29) Albert Guérard observes that in the "[Neo-] classical age" "It was a commonplace of criticism that no bad man could be a good writer," and he refers particularly to passages in Milton and Boileau (Art for Art's Sake [Boston & New York, 1936] p. 161). The question has been raised about profligates like Petronius and Byron, and, in our century, about the racist Roy Campbell and the deranged fascist Ezra Pound.

30) As an example of enlightened aspiration, Eliseo Vivas sets out to harmonize and reintegrate the disparate views that separate a formalistic and aesthetic comprehension of art from the moralizing and instructive conception that perceives art as "knowledge". But, amusingly enough, his schemes for reunification break down and his moralism prevails; for, after considering Louis-Ferdinand Céline's novel, Voyage au bout de la nuit (1932), he finds its "presuppositions" stemming from "hatred" and the book itself the product of a "perverted mind," and consequently providing an art and a knowledge that is "objectionable" and "open to condemnation": ("Literature and Knowledge," Essays in Criticism and Aesthetics [New York, 1955], pp. 115-116).


33) Vid. The (London) Observer, June 22 and 29, July 6 and 13, 1958, which include Ionesco's replies. It is quite common for critics of Tynan's ilk to search in literature for "the power of positive thinking." We have often heard the layman inquire why authors have to write tragedies: isn't there enough misery and depression, they inquire, in everyday life? Why give us any additional pessimism at all?

34) For other recent examples, see Duncan Williams, Trousered Apes: Sick Literature in a Sick Society (London, 1971); George P. Elliott, Conversions: Literature and the Modernist Devotion (New York, 1971); Robert M. Adams, Bad Mouth: Fugitive Papers on the Dark Side (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1977).


37) Poetics, VI.12 [our translation].

38) "The Art of Fiction," Partial Portraits (London, 1911), pp. 392-93. Nor can the artist avoid presenting moral actions; as James observes elsewhere: "Then it is a question of an artistic process, we must always mistrust very sharp distinctions. ... It is as difficult to describe an action without glancing at its motive, its moral history, as it is to describe a motive without glancing at its practical consequence. Our history and our fiction are what we do..." ("Guy de Maupassant," The Future of the Novel: Essays on the Art of Fiction, ed. Leon Edel [New York, 1956], p. 203).


40) Otto Regenbogen, Schmerz und Tod in den Tragödien Seneos (above, note 8).


44) Consult Anna Lydia Motto and John R. Clark, Violenta Fata: The Tenor of Seneca's Ifigenia, CB 50 (1974), 81-87, and "There's Something Wrong with the Sun": Seneca's Ifigenia and the Modern Grotesque," CB 54 (1978), 41-44.


46) For extended discussion of this play, consult A. L. Motto and J. R. Clark, "Seneca's Thyestes as Melodrama," RSC 26 (1978), 363-78. Too frequently, the term "melodrama" is automatically used as a term of disapprobation; but see Clark & Motto, "Gasps, Guffaws, & Tears: A Modest Defense of Sentimentality, Bathos, and Melodrama," Thalia 1 (1978), 61-70.

47) Ep. 85.28; see also Ep. 85.32, 90.26, 95.8-9.

48) Concerning Seneca's special devotion to Vergil, the poet, see A. L. Motto and J. R. Clark, "Philosophy and Poetry: Seneca and Vergil," CO 56 (1978), 3-5.


51) De Brev. Vit. IX.2; Seneca likes these lines about time's winged chariot well enough to quote them again in Ep. 108.24.

52) Ep. 62.2.
In Plutarch's Lyaxier, Nicias, and especially his Pericles, a fair amount is found on the life and teachings of Anaxagoras. There is also biographical and doxographical material in the Moralia, including two fragments, B18 and B21b, cited only by Plutarch. 1) In contrast with Aristotle or Simplicius, Plutarch is not a major source for Anaxagoras. Yet what he preserves has value not only for understanding more fully the tradition about Anaxagoras, but also for understanding Plutarch's own philosophical beliefs and working methods. These will be explored in this study which will examine the ways in which Plutarch's own Platonic convictions helped to select and to shape the Anaxagorean material preserved by him. Attention will also be given to Plutarch's sources, and to his overall interpretation of Anaxagoras' thought. In short, it is hoped that a comprehensive account of Plutarch on Anaxagoras will emerge.

Now a notable example of Plutarch's use of biographical material on Anaxagoras to express his own convictions is found in Pericles (ch. 6) where Plutarch recounts the story of a one-horned ram brought to Pericles from his country place. The oddity is first explained by Lampon, the seer (μάντις), who regards it as a sign (σημαίνει) that the mastery of Athens would finally pass to Pericles, and not to Thucydides, son of Melaetias. Anaxagoras, however, performed an autopsy on the ram's head, and explained the phenomenon scientifically. 2) The story is told after Plutarch's unfavorable contrast between superstition (σεβασμός τοῦ θεοῦ) and natural philosophy (φυσικός λόγος), in which superstition's ignorance of causes (αἴτη) is criticized. After the story's narration, however, Plutarch claims that both the φυσικός (Anaxagoras) and μάντις (Lampon) may have been right: the former correctly discerned the cause (αἴτη) and the
latter, the purpose (τέλος). Both "natural" and teleological explanations are justified; indeed, the significance or meaning of any phenomenon deserves as much attention as the immediate cause.

There seems little doubt that ch. 6 of Pericles contains Plutarch's "eigene Gedanken," and readers of his De superstitione will recognize them. Yet Plato's influence is also apparent, for at Phaedo 97Bff. (DK, A 47), Socrates expresses disappointment that Anaxagoras made no use of Nous in the ordering of things, but simply accounted "mists and air and water and many other strange things causes" (98C). Certainly Socrates' distinction between "teleological" and "mechanistic" explanation seems to underlie Plutarch's remarks in Pericles 6, and whether the incident was historical or not, it shows Plutarch's own interest in both kinds of explanation. Moreover, Pericles' association with Anaxagoras, and the latter's influence on the Athenian, are first found in the Phaedrus 269E (DK, A 15).

Probably the story of the one-horned ram should be connected with two other passages in Plutarch's Lives dealing with the theme of superstition. One is also found in Pericles (ch. 35) where Plutarch recounts Pericles' success in overcoming his crew's superstitious fears by explaining an eclipse of the sun. The story was apparently known in philosophical circles (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς λέγεται τῶν φιλοσόφων), and though Anaxagoras is not mentioned, his influence on Pericles can be presumed.

In Nicias (ch. 23), the theme of superstition is again introduced when Plutarch tells of the terror Nicias and his army experienced at an eclipse of the moon. Though solar eclipses were somewhat understood, those of the moon were not: "men thought it uncanny - a sign sent from God in advance of divers great calamities." Plutarch then interrupts his narrative somewhat abruptly with an excursus on Anaxagoras' contributions to the study of the moon: he was the first to "put in writing the clearest and boldest of all doctrines about the changing phases of the moon" (περὶ σελήνης καταγγασμῶν καὶ σκιῶν), literally, its "shinings" or "illuminations," and "shadow" (or "eclipse"). But since he was not an ancient or highly regarded authority, his views won only slow and cautious acceptance; in fact, his theory was kept secret (ἀπόρρητος), and was known only to a few. For natural philosophers were then regarded with suspicion and considered "star gazers" (μετεωρολόχας); (cf. Per. 5 where Pericles is filled with μετεωρολογίας καὶ μεταρολογευχίας as a result of his association with Anaxagoras). Protagoras
was exiled, and Anaxagoras rescued from prison by Pericles. The excursus culminates with praise of Plato who subordinated (ὑπέταξε) physical necessities (τὰς φυσικὰς ἀνάγκας) to divine and more important or sovereign principles (ταῖς θείαις καὶ κυριωτέραις ἀρχαῖς). This seems to correspond closely to Plato's critique of Anaxagoras at *Phaedo* 97Bff. cited above.

Plutarch's admiration for Plato is here obvious. That much of his interest in and criticism of Anaxagoras, at least in *Nicias* and *Pericles*,\(^\text{11}\) stem from his own Platonic convictions is well illustrated by *De def. orac.* 435F-436 where Plutarch discusses his own beliefs about the divine. With remarks reminiscent of both *Per.* 6 and *Nic.* 23, he writes:

I shall defend myself by citing Plato as my witness and advocate in one (μισθωρα καὶ σύνεκρον ὁμοῦ). That philosopher found fault with Anaxagoras, the one of early times, because he was too much wrapped up in the physical causes (φυσικὰς αἰτίας), and was always following up and pursuing the law of necessity as it was worked out in the behaviour of bodies, and left out of account the purpose and the agent (τὸ ὁδ ἔνεκα καὶ ὕφοδ), which are better causes and origins. Plato himself was the first of the philosophers, or the one most prominently engaged in prosecuting investigations of both sorts, to assign to God, on the one hand, the origin of all things that are in keeping with reason, and on the other hand, not to divest matter of the causes necessary for whatever comes into being... (Babbitt's translation)

Plutarch's Platonism, as will be seen, further explains much of his interest in details of Anaxagoras' life. For the moment, however, since the report in *Nicias* is important for understanding Anaxagoras' astronomical contributions, what value can be placed on it? Is it historically correct to maintain, as Plutarch does, that Anaxagoras was the first to explain the moon's changing phases, including eclipses? The question has recently been revived by H. Görtemanns and D. O'Brien, and merits discussion.\(^\text{12}\) The *Nicias* passage should probably be considered in conjunction with Plutarch's report on Anaxagoras at *De fac. orb. lun.* 929B, according to which Anaxagoras believed that: ἡλιος ἐντίθεσι τῇ σελήνῃ τὸ λαμπρόν (B 18, one of the two fragments preserved by Plutarch).\(^\text{13}\) Now behind both 929B and *Nicias* 23 is probably a remark of Socrates in *Cratylus* (409A) according to whom Anaxagoras recently (νεώστι) maintained the moon's illumination by the sun.
Certainly the *Crat.* passage was known to Plutarch as is clear from *De E* 391A-B, though here Plutarch apparently understood Socrates to mean recent and first.\(^{14}\) And at *De fac. orb. lun.* 929B the moon's illumination by the sun is referred to as the "very proposition" of Anaxagoras (τοῦτο δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρευον).

A major problem with the *Nic.* report, however, is that there is evidence attributing theories about the moon's illumination by the sun, and presumably lunar eclipses, to thinkers before Anaxagoras, e.g. Anaximenes, Parmenides, and Empedocles (?). Even Plutarch himself in *De fac. orb. lun.* refers to Anaxagoras' theory that the moon derives its light from the sun, right after attributing what would seem to be the same theory of Parmenides.\(^{15}\) In view of such evidence, Görgemanns has maintained that Plutarch's report can be accepted only with "Einschränkungen" and that Plutarch tried to reconcile the inconsistencies ("die überlieferte Priorität des Anaxagoras mit den konkurrierenden Ansprüchen") by adding that Anaxagoras' doctrine was initially kept secret (ἀπόρρητος).\(^{16}\) This may be correct, though it should also be noted that in *Nic.* 23 Plutarch claims only that Anaxagoras was the first to put his views *in writing* (ἐπὶ γραφὴν καταθέλειν), and in his zeal to prove Anaxagoras' "temporal" priority over Empedocles, O'Brien dismisses the remark perhaps too quickly.\(^{17}\)

All things considered, however, Plutarch does not seem especially well informed about Anaxagoras' views on the moon, despite his assertions in *Nicias* and *De fac. orb. lun.* For example, he seems to know nothing of Anaxagoras' belief that the moon was made of earth ("es scheint fast als hätte er nicht davon gewußt"),\(^{18}\) and though Plutarch reports at *De fac. orb. lun.* 932B that the moon is, according to Anaxagoras, the size of the Peloponnesus, he says nothing about the latter's reasons for the belief.\(^{19}\) A report such as this was probably taken from secondary sources, and there seems to be no good reason for thinking that Plutarch had first-hand knowledge of Anaxagoras' beliefs either about the moon's size or about its nature other than its illumination by the sun.\(^{20}\)

At *Lysander* 12 there is also a digression on Anaxagoras' views similar to *Nicias* 23.\(^{21}\) When remarking on Lysander's defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotamoi (404 B.C.), Plutarch notes that some say the fall of a stone
from the sky was a "sign" (σημείον) of this event, and:

Anaxagoras is said to have predicted\(^\text{22}\) that if the bodies fastened in the sky (τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐνδεδεμένων σωμάτων) should be loosened by some slip or shake (ὁλισθήματος ἢ σάλου), one of them might be torn away and might plunge and fall to earth; none of the stars is in its natural place, for since they are heavy and stony, they shine by the resistance and twisting round (ἀντερείσει καὶ περικλάσει) of the aither. They are dragged about by force, being tightly held by the whirl and tension (δύνη καὶ τόνω) of the revolution, just as at the beginning, they were prevented from falling on earth when cold and heavy things were being separated from the whole (τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ βαρών ἀποκρινομένων τοῦ παντοῦ).

Guthrie believes that by this report, Plutarch "usefully fills a gap in our knowledge of Anaxagoras' theory," and that τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐνδεδεμένων σωμάτων is even reminiscent of Anaximenes.\(^\text{23}\) Lanza, however, is suspicious of Plutarch's information, especially since the expression τῶν... ἐνδεδεμένων σωμάτων belongs to the Aristotelian theory of the "fixed stars" (cf. De cael. 289b 33), and in Anaxagoras' cosmology there seems to be no such conception (see DK, Λ 42). Lanza thus thinks it possible that Plutarch's report goes back to an intermediate source, probably Peripatetic.\(^\text{24}\)

Now some of Plutarch's report certainly seems to be couched in Anaxagoras' language (e.g. τῶν ψυχρῶν... ἀποκρινομένων, the latter term being quite characteristic; cf. B2, B4, and B6), but because of the expression "Anaxagoras is said" (λέγεται) by which Plutarch introduces his report, it can be inferred that it is based certainly not on Anaxagoras' own writings, but on secondary sources. The story of the fall of the stone at Aegospotamoi was well known in antiquity (see Pliny, Nat. hist. II, 149f. (DK, A 11) and Diog. Laert. 2, 10);\(^\text{25}\) also Anaxagoras' theory that the whole sky was made of stars, the rapidity of their rotation causing them to stay in place (συνεστάναι), seems to have been general knowledge in antiquity (see Diog. Laert. 2, 12 who quotes the 3rd cent. B.C. historian Silenus as his source). In Lysander, however, Plutarch never mentions his sources for Anaxagoras' astronomical doctrines. After presenting them, he later (also in ch. 12) refers to Daimachus' books on piety (τῷ δ’ Ἀναξ-αγόρα ματρυσχ... ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεσβείας), but in view of the reference's context, it seems unlikely that Plutarch took Anaxagoras' views from Daimachus.\(^\text{26}\)

Now from Pericles, Nicias, and Lysander, it is clear that Plutarch was interested in Anaxagoras' astronomical doctrines,
if only because he considered the latter an enemy of "superstition." For at De superst. 169E, in querying why superstition is no less impious than atheism, Plutarch reports that Anaxagoras was brought to trial for impiety (ἀδεβεῖα) because he said the sun is a stone (λίθος). The Cimmerians, however, are not called "impious" because they do not believe at all in the sun's existence. Indeed, superstitious beliefs about the gods, e.g. that they are fickle, vengeful, and cruel, are worse than "atheism." Again, Platonic influence on Plutarch's critique of superstition, seems clear (see Rep. 367Eff.), and a propos the remark on Anaxagoras' trial, Babbitt noted that Plutarch "probably drew from the well-known passage in Plato's Apology, p. 26D." 27 Plutarch, however, accepts Anaxagoras' position, as we have seen, in explaining natural causes. But he considers it a one-sided, perhaps even impious view, insofar as the teleological side remains neglected. For Anaxagoras did not really employ the concept of Nous in explaining the natural world, and thus in Plutarch's (and Plato's) eyes, he failed to provide teleological insights. 28

Yet Anaxagoras, the natural philosopher, was for Plutarch not only an astronomer, but also a geometrician. At De exil. 607F, when illustrating his own contention that no place can remove either well-being (εὖδαιμονιαν), virtue or understanding (ουδενεφε άρετην ουδενεφε φρονησιν), Plutarch cites Anaxagoras and his devotion to geometry as an example: while in prison he was "busied with squaring the circle" (τὸν τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸν έγραψε). The report has caused a fair amount of discussion about its meaning and historical value, 29 but again, the influence of Platonic tradition on Plutarch is likely, for that the report was known in Platonic circles is suggested by Proclus (Euh. 65. 21. A9) who says that Anaxagoras "applied himself to many geometrical problems."

For Plutarch, not only was Anaxagoras a student of astronomy, but also of the earth's natural phenomena. Several of Plutarch's references to Anaxagoras show interest in his beliefs about terrestrial happenings. One at Quaest. nat. 911D (DK, A 116) is quite brief. In a discussion of why sea water does not nourish trees, Plutarch asks whether it may not be for the same reason that it provides none for animals "seeing that Plato, Anaxagoras, and Democritus think that a plant is an animal fixed in the earth" (ζύον γαρ έγγαλον το φυτον είναι). 30 In itself, the report is of little value, but the mention of Anaxagoras (also Democritus)
together with Plato, suggests Plutarch's esteem for Anaxagoras as a student of the natural world. At \textit{Quaest. conv.} 722Afr., Plutarch and his Platonistic teacher, Ammonius,\textsuperscript{31} when discussing why sounds carry better at night than during the day, seem well informed about Anaxagoras' belief that sounds are muffled in day time by the hissing of air in the sunshine.\textsuperscript{32} Plutarch here cites Anaxagoras as claiming that:

> the air is moved by the sun with a quivering, vibrating motion, as is clear from the little bits and fragments always dancing in the air, which some call motes (τιλάγ). Anaxagoras says that these, hissing and buzzing in the heat, by their noise make other sounds hard to hear in the daytime, but that at night their dancing and their noise abate.

(Minar's translation)

In DK, A 74, the report is given with (Aristot.) \textit{Probl.} XI 33, 903a 7, but Lanza noted that the testimonies are not wholly identical, and that the movement of bodies dancing in the air "which some call motes," is reminiscent of Democritus (cf. Lucr. II, 116-120). Thus, according to Lanza, Plutarch's testimony is inserted in an Epicurean context ("il contesto in cui la testimonianza plutarchea è inserita è epicureo").\textsuperscript{33} But whatever its source, the report shows that Anaxagoras' views on sound were of interest to Plutarch and to his teacher Ammonius, and thus to Platonists of the 1st cent. A.D.\textsuperscript{34} 

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Thus far, these scattered reports on Anaxagoras may not add up to much. Anaxagoras is the astronomer, the geometer, the student of nature. He is also the teacher of Pericles. Was there any connection in Plutarch's mind between these facets of Anaxagoras' activity, or was his interest wholly doxographical? In my opinion, there is a connection by Plutarch's emphasis on associating Anaxagoras with Pericles: it lies in Plutarch's Platonic conviction that philosophers have the responsibility of entering political life, for at 777A of \textit{Maxim. cum princip.}, Plutarch maintains that a philosopher's influence is expanded and perpetuated, not by his effect on private persons, but on rulers and statesmen:

> but if these teachings (those of philosophy) take possession of a ruler, a statesman, and a man of action and fill him with love of honour, through one he benefits many, as Anaxagoras did by association with Pericles, Plato with Dion, and Pythagoras with the chief men of the Italiote Greeks.

(Fowler's translation)
Plato's involvement with Dion is, of course, well known from the VIIth Epistle, and underlying this involvement is the famous conviction that unless "philosophers" become kings, or kings "philosophers," there can be no cure for the ills of society (Rep. 472E). Now Plutarch's familiarity with both the VIIth Epistle and the Republic, is clear from his own Life of Dion and passages throughout the Moralia. And it is at Rep. 521Cff. that Plato outlines his education program for the guardians of society. Within this program, γεωμετρία and δοτροπομία have a place of prominence. Thus, in view of the anecdotes about and doctrines of Anaxagoras reported by Plutarch, it seems likely he considered Anaxagoras a precursor of the Platonic ideal: though not himself a "king" or ruler, Anaxagoras was able to influence Pericles by his life and teachings, a life devoted to astronomy, geometry, and exploration of the nature of things. But despite this influence, there really remains a basic difference between the life of a philosopher and that of a statesman.

Such a summary of Plutarch's attitude to Anaxagoras, also helps to explain many of the other anecdotal or biographical incidents preserved by him. For example, at Pericles 16 Plutarch reports that the statesman's parsimony in economic matters (the doing of Pericles' servant, Evangelus) was not in accord with Anaxagoras' οοφία since "that philosopher actually abandoned his house and left his land to lie fallow for sheep-grazing, owing to the lofty thoughts with which he was inspired. But the life of a speculative philosopher (Θεωρητικό φιλοσόφου) is not the same thing, I think, as that of a statesman (πολιτικο)." Diels speculated that the anecdote was taken from the historian Ion, but Meinhardt correctly noted that there is no evidence that Ion mentioned Anaxagoras' relationship with Pericles. Moreover, the same story is found in De vit. aer. al. (831F) right after Plutarch mentions the Cynic Crates. That Plutarch's report had a Cynic source is likely, though a number of anecdotes circulated in antiquity (e.g. Diogenes Laertius, Valerius Maximus, Clement of Alexandria) showing that Anaxagoras had become a symbol of the "theoretical life" (βίος Θεωρητικός). Also in Pericles 16, another incident is mentioned about Anaxagoras starving himself to death, and Plutarch introduces it with "they say" (λέγουσιν). The subject of λέγουσιν cannot be determined, but it is not amiss to speculate that this as well as the previous anecdotes, formed part of a tradition on the theoretical
life which ultimately went back to Plato. 38)

Since Anaxagoras' life as a philosopher was closely connected with Pericles' own political fortunes, it is not surprising that Plutarch gives a fair amount of attention to Anaxagoras' trial. One of the reports at De superstit. 169E, as noted earlier in this study, probably goes back to Plato's Apol. 26D. The Apology is, of course, the earliest extant source for Anaxagoras' trial, and though Socrates' remarks in his own defense leave some doubt as to whether Anaxagoras was actually tried, 39) the ancient tradition is unanimous that such a trial took place. Problems arise, however, concerning the historical details, e.g. when it occurred and the names of the accusers. Most studies begin with the report in Diog. Laert. 2, 12 that different accounts of Anaxagoras' trial are given (περὶ δὲ τῆς δίκης αὐτοῦ διάφορα λέγεται), 40) and Plutarch's version in Per. 32 deserves attention:

Diogeithes brought in a bill providing for the public impeachment of such as did not believe in the gods (τὰ δεῖτα), or who taught doctrines regarding the heavens, directing suspicion against Pericles by means of Anaxagoras.

(Perrin's translation)

According to Plutarch, however, Anaxagoras' trial presumably did not take place, for Pericles fearing for Anaxagoras, sent him from the city (ἐξ ἐπέμψεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως).

Now there seems to be scholarly agreement about Plutarch's sources for Per. 32: a) the psephism of Diogeithes (for which Plutarch is the only ancient authority) was probably taken from Craterus' ψηφισμάτων συν-αγωγῇ; 41) and b) Ephorus perhaps provided the basic schema for Plutarch's report, namely, that Anaxagoras' accusation was only a pretext to attack Pericles who, fearful of his own position, helped to create the Peloponnesian War. 42) Aside from reconciling Per. 32 with other ancient versions, however, there is also the problem of reconciling it with Plutarch's references to Anaxagoras' persecution elsewhere. At De superstit. 169F, for example, Anaxagoras is said to be a defendant in a trial for impiety (δίκην ἐφυγεν ἁσεβείας). Other reports at De prof. in virt. 84F (ἐγραμμὸν Ἀναξαγόρου), De exil. 607F (ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ), and Nicias 23 (ἐκραίνετα) place Anaxagoras in prison, though according to the last version, Pericles rescued Anaxagoras with difficulty (μόλις). To return briefly to Diogenes Laertius, it is clear that different versions of Anaxagoras' trial circulated in antiquity. According to Sotion (D. L. 2, 12), for example, Pericles defended Anaxagoras who was fined five talents and banished (φυγαδευθήναι; cf. ἐξ ἐπέμψεν in Per. 32); Hermippus
of Smyrna reports that Anaxagoras was in prison (καθελοχθη ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ) awaiting execution, but Pericles convinced the Athenian people to release Anaxagoras. Hermippus' work was known to Plutarch and it is possible that his accounts of Anaxagoras' imprisonment were taken from him. Speculation about Plutarch's sources for Anaxagoras' trial and imprisonment, however, remains an uncertain endeavor owing to the confusion of his own and other ancient sources.

Some of Plutarch's sources for Anaxagoras seem, of course, to have been of a "traditional" nature, e.g. the λέγεται of Lysander 12 (cf. Per. 35, ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς λέγεται τῶν φιλοσόφων), or the λέγουσιν of Per. 16, 7. At Consol. ad Apoll. 118D, assuming the work is by Plutarch, the incident of Anaxagoras' son's death along with the philosopher's remark, ἥδειν δὴ δυνήτων ἔγέννησα, is reported as a "traditional" story (παρειλήφαμεν). In reference to the same story, Plutarch cites a specific source, and that is at De coh. ira 463D where he writes that Panaetius mentions somewhere (ὡς πού) that we should make use of (χρησθαι) Anaxagoras' saying on the occasion of his son's death. It would seem rash, however, to conclude that Panaetius was Plutarch's only source, for if the reference proves anything, it is that the story was known among Stoic, and possibly other philosophical circles.

Aside from such anecdotal material, the source(s) of which one can only conjecture, a major question is: did Plutarch have access to Anaxagoras' book? Though some scholars maintain that copies of it did not exist after the 3rd cent. B.C., there is evidence that they were available at least until the 2nd cent. A.D., and that one was in the imperial "Schatzkammer" at Rome. It is also possible that Simplicius, who wrote in the 6th cent. A.D., made use of a copy at Athens. Assuming, then, that Anaxagoras' work was extant at Rome and Athens, Plutarch would have had opportunity to make use of it. Unfortunately, however, though Plutarch is informed about Anaxagoras' life, and even some of his doctrines, there is little to prove first-hand knowledge of Anaxagoras' book. Plutarch in referring to Anaxagoras seems to remain in the topics of the Academic-Stoic tradition.

But according to the Diels-Kranz edition, two fragments of Anaxagoras are preserved only by Plutarch. B 18 at De fac. orb. lun. 929B concerning the moon's illumination by the sun, was considered previously in this study. The other, B 21b
at De fort. 98F, is as follows:

... in all these matters we are less fortunate than beasts; yet we use experience and memory and intelligence (σοφία) and skill (τέχνη) which according to Anaxagoras are our very own, and we take honey, and draw milk, and having gathered them together we lead and drive them, so that in this there is nothing of chance, but wholly prudence and forethought (τῆς εὖβουλίας καὶ τῆς προνοίας).

The citation appears in ch. 3 where Plutarch argues that the human senses, e.g. sight and hearing, are not the result of chance (τῆς τύχης), but of reason (λογισμός); it is because of reason that humanity is superior to animals who are otherwise better equipped physically. Many animals are, for example, swifter and stronger than humans, yet mankind remains the master of all things. According to Ziegler, many conceptions in De fort. are "zweifellos stoisch," even though it is impossible to find a specific source for the treatise. In the chapter, however, in which Anaxagoras is mentioned, there are two specific references to Plato, Tim. 67B at 98B, and Prot. 321C at 98D. There are also quotations of Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Greek dramatists. Thus, in view of the number of quotations, it would not be amiss to speculate that Plutarch is drawing from his own hypomnēmata, though the ultimate source for his quotation of Anaxagoras cannot be determined. That it came from Anaxagoras' book is possible, but unlikely.

The purposive activity of nature (φύσις) is also stressed by Plutarch at De frat. amor. 478Df. (cf. De fort. 98B-C) where Anaxagoras' views are again mentioned. In a discussion of how nature has made many bodily parts double, e.g. hands, feet, eyes, for mutual support and preservation (à propos the treatise's theme of the nature and benefits of brotherly affection), Plutarch cites Anaxagoras as believing that the reason for man's intellectual skill is the possession of hands (τὴν αἰτίαν τίθεσθαι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας καὶ συνέσεως). But, according to Plutarch, the opposite seems true: "it is not because man acquired hands that he is the wisest of animals; it is because by nature he was endowed with reason and skill (φύσει λογικὸν ἣν καὶ τεχνικὸν) that he acquired instruments of a nature adapted to these powers." That this passage
should be understood in conjunction with Arist. *Part. an.* 687a 7, seems clear. 51) Aristotle writes:

Anaxagoras says that man is the wisest of animals because he has hands, but it is reasonable to suppose that he received hands because he is the wisest. The hand is a tool, and nature like a wise man allots each tool to the one who is able to use it.

That this passage was Plutarch's source is possible, but more important, it shows in conjunction with *De frat. amor.* 478D, that whatever Plutarch's source was, one of his main criticisms of Anaxagoras was the latter's lack of teleological explanation. That this critique ultimately derives from Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo,* was argued earlier in this study.

On the whole, there is no conclusive evidence that Plutarch's knowledge (and criticism) of Anaxagoras was based on primary sources. Neither the quotation at *De fort.* 98F (B 21b) nor the passage at *De frat. amor.* 478D, reveals first-hand acquaintance with Anaxagoras' work. But perhaps the clearest proof that Plutarch made use of secondary sources is found at *Pericles* 4. The passage is worth quoting in extenso:

but the man who most consorted with Pericles... was Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, whom men of that day used to call "Nous," either because they admired that comprehension of his, which proved of such surpassing greatness in the investigation of nature; or because he was the first to enthrone in the universe, not Chance (*τύχη*), nor yet Necessity (*ἀνάγκη*), as the source of its orderly arrangement, but Mind (*Nous*) pure and simple, which distinguishes and sets apart, in the midst of an otherwise chaotic mass, the substances which have like elements (*τὰς ὁμοιομερείας*).

(Perrin's translation)

At first glance, the report seems based on fragments of Anaxagoras' work, e.g. *Nous* is pure (*καθαρὸς*), and mixed with nothing (see B 12, for example), but the term *ὁμοιομερεία* suggests strongly that Plutarch is drawing from a Peripatetic summary of Anaxagoras' thought, for it was Aristotle who apparently first attributed the doctrine of *homoiomerē* to Anaxagoras. 52) Since Theophrastus was certainly a source for Plutarch's *Pericles,* it would not be amiss to conclude that a passage such as this was based partly on Theophrastus' *φυσικόν δόξαν.* 53) In the absence, however, of reference to Theophrastus, a specific source for Plutarch's report cannot be determined.
In conclusion, there is little or no evidence that Plutarch had direct access to Anaxagoras' book, and whatever his sources (secondary) were, cannot easily be determined. A fairly consistent impression arises, however, that much of Plutarch's interest in and knowledge of Anaxagoras was probably based on a Platonic-Aristotelian-Stoic tradition. For example, Plutarch's interest in details of Anaxagoras' life is explainable because of the Clazomenian's association with Pericles, an association which seems to have anticipated Plato's own relationship with Dion, and, of course, Plato's conception of the philosopher king. The biographical anecdotes preserved by Plutarch show Anaxagoras as one interested primarily in the intellectual life, a life devoted to the study of celestial and terrestrial phenomena. Because of Plutarch's own personal interest in the workings of nature, it is not surprising that he has regard for Anaxagoras' views as is clear, for example, from Quaest. conviv. and De fac. orb. lun. where he preserves some valuable information on Anaxagoras. In Plutarch's eyes, Anaxagoras was also a precursor of his own fight against superstitious explanations of the world's happenings. But however sympathetic Plutarch may have been to Anaxagoras' beliefs, the latter's views did not really explain the purposive activity of nature, a doctrine dear to both Plutarch and to his master Plato. 54)

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NOTES


2) On the incident, see W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy II (Cambridge, England 1965) 287 who refers in n. 2 also to D. L. 2, 7. The incident, however, is not mentioned by Diogenes; it is reported only by Plutarch. For further discussion, see E. Meinhardt, Perikles bei Plutarch (Frankfurt 1957) who believes Pericles' relation with Lampon "findet durch Aristot. Rhet. 1419a 2... eine Bestätigung und dürfte somit ebenfalls zum Philosophen-Überlieferungsgut gehören, das bis zu Plutarch manche Variationen erfahren haben mag." For bibliography on Lampon, see E. Derenne.
"Les Procès d'impitie intentés aux philosophes à Athènes au Vme et au IVme siècles avant J.-C.," Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liége, XLV (1930), 16 n. 2.


5) See, for example, D. Lanza, Anassagora: testimonianze e frammenti, Biblioteca di studi superiori, LII (Florence 1966) 28 n. on A 16: "Non si può stabilire con sicurezza la veridicità della notizia..." See also Derenne, Les Procès d'impitie, 21-22: "l'histoire du bélière unicorne, si elle n'est pas historique, est du moins née du souvenir de l'opposition très réelle qui ne pouvait que se manifester entre le naturaliste et le devin." Or J. A. Davison, "Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras," CQ 47 (1953) 42: "if we believe the story of the one-horned ram, Anaxagoras had returned to Athens before the ostracism of Thucydides (probably in the spring of 443)."

6) Flacelière, Vies, III, 55 n. 1 remarks that "Plutarque, d'ailleurs, ne se porte nullement garant de l'authenticité de cette anecdote, 'racontée dans les écoles des philosophes'."

7) See also De superst., 169a, where without reference to Anaxagoras Plutarch reports the Nicias incident: "it would perhaps have been the best thing in the world for Nicias... to have got rid of his superstition... rather than to be affrighted at the shadow on the wall in eclipse and sit inactive while the enemy's wall was being built around him..." (Babbitt's translation). Plutarch then explains eclipses of the moon as an "obstruction of light caused by the earth's coming between sun and moon..." On the incident in Nicias, see R. Flacelière and E. Chambry, Plutarque Vies: Cimon-Lucullus - Nicias-Crassus, VII (Paris 1972) 136 and 298 (n. on p. 177). See also Guthrie, History, II, 308.

8) B. Perrin's translation, Plutarch's Lives III in The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. repr. 1958). Here and elsewhere the translation of Plutarch, unless they are mine, are from the LCL, and the translators' names are placed in brackets behind the quotations.

9) D. O'Brien, "The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles," JHS 88 (1968) 107 writes: "in the context περὶ σελήνης καταγγειλαν καὶ ὁμιλὰς clearly meant to include the correct explanation of the moon's "eclipse."

10) Plutarch's reference to Anaxagoras as οὐτ' αὐτὸς ἢν παλαιός at Nic. 23 seems inconsistent with De def, orac. 435P and De frat. amor. 478E where Anaxagoras is referred to as παλαιός. The "inconsistency" is explained probably by Plutarch's historical awareness: at the time of Nicias' campaign in 413 B.C. Anaxagoras was not yet "ancient"; by Plutarch's time (ca. 100 A.D.) he was.

11) The Platonic influence on Plutarch in the Periakes is great; e.g. in chaps. 1-2, inspired by Plato, he develops a moral theory of imitation or mimesis, and several times he refers to the "divine" Plato, e.g. 7, 8; 15, 2; and 24, 7. See also Flacelière and Chambry, Plutarque Vies, III, 6 and 11 for further references and discussion. Except for ch. 23, however, Plato's influence on Plutarch in the Nicias is much less obvious.

But face with parallel, Lysandre-Sylla, possible Lysander (see Lanza, Anassagoras, 240, n. on B 18).

Though the Crat. passage is cited as A 76 in DK, no reference is given to Plutarch's De E 391A-B. For the interpretation of Plutarch's meaning given in the text, see O'Brien, JHS 88 (1968) 107.

O'Brien, ibid., 107, argues that Empedocles wrote later than Anaxagoras. See also ibid. 118, where he notes that "there is nonetheless a variety of evidence that attributes derived light for the moon to a number of thinkers before Anaxagoras."

Görgemanns, Untersuchungen 35, n. 67.

O'Brien seems to overlook recent studies, e.g. E. Havelock's Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass. 1963) or J. Hershbell, "Empedocles' Oral Style," CJ 63 (1968) 351-57, which give reasons for believing that Presocratics prior to or roughly contemporary with Anaxagoras, composed their works orally. Plutarch's report provides evidence for an oral tradition, and Anaxagoras' written book may well have been a novelty among the "philosophical" works of the fifth century B.C.

Görgemanns, Untersuchungen, 35.

In the Loeb Classical Library, XII of Plutarch's Moralia (Cambridge, Mass. repr. 1968) H. Cherniss observes on p. 121, n. c that Plutarch's "statement here concerning the moon is missing from Diels-Kranz." The "traditional" report is that the sun, not the moon is larger than the Peloponnesus according to Anaxagoras. Thus, Görgemanns writes, Untersuchungen, 135, "bekannt ist, dass Anaxagoras die Sonne fur grosser erklarte als die Peloponnes: 59Al, 8.42, 8.72 D.-K. All these Zeugnisse gehen auf Theophrast zuruck (s. die Zusammenstellung bei Diels, Dox. S. 138)."

At 932C-D Plutarch reports that the moon is kept from falling because of its motion, a view similar to that of Anaxagoras mentioned in Lysander 12 (see Cherniss, Plutarch's Moralia, XII, 59 n. d). But this possible reference to Anaxagoras as well as the report at 932B and the fragment at 929B, are not enough to prove Plutarch's direct acquaintance with Anaxagorait's work.

In R. Placecliere and E. Chambry, Plutarque Vies: Pyrrhos-Marius - Lysandre-Sylla, VI (Paris 1971) it is observed, 170, n. 2, that this discussion at Lys. 12 "qui a trait a des questions de sciences physiques peut etre rapprochee notamment de celle qui, dans la Vie de Paul-Emile, 14, concerne l'origine et la formation des eaux souterraines." A closer parallel, however, is with the Nicias passage where Anaxagoras' astronomical views are also discussed. The Lysander passage bears, moreover, similarity to Per. 6 where, although the subjects are different, both chapters end with almost the same remark: in Per. 6 - ταυτα μεν ουδεν ηυση ετερας έστι πραγματειας; in Lys. 12 - ταυτα μεν ουδεν ετερας γενε γραφης διακριβωτων.

The word predicted (προεξηπειν) has caused discussion. O. Gilbert, Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums (Leipzig 1907) 689, n. 1, remarked: "wenn Plut. Lys. 12 und Diog. L. 2, 10, berichtet wird, Anaxagoras habe den Fall vorhergesagt, so heisst das nur, dass
der Fall die Bestätigung der Lehre des Anaxagoras von der Natur der Meteoriten sei." Gilbert's view has been adopted by Guthrie, History II, 304, who writes "the belief that Anaxagoras had actually foretold the fall of the meteorite is fairly obviously a particularization, easy in a credulous age, of his general statement that the sun and stars were heavy bodies held aloft by force, so that it was natural to expect that occasionally something of them would fall."

23) Ibid., 303 n. 1: "here again the language is reminiscent of Anaximenes. See vol. I, 135."

24) Lanza, Anassagora, n. on A 12, 22-23.

25) For a discussion of the sources, see Placélière-Chambry, Plutarque Vies, VI, 170-71. See also Gilbert, Meteorologie, 642 and n. 1.

26) For bibliography on Daimachus, see Placélière-Chambry, Plutarque Vies, VI, 320, n. on p. 188.


28) On Plutarch's teleology and belief in a providential ordering of the world, see, for example, P. Geigenmüller, "Plutarchs Stellung zur Religion und Philosophie seiner Zeit." Neue Jahrbiicher für das klassische Altertum 47 (1921) 251-70, esp. 258ff. See also E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, III, 2 (Leipzig 1881) 178ff.

29) For a summary of previous discussion, see Guthrie, History, II, 270. See also Lanza, Anassagora, 43-44, n. on A 38, who referring to Luria, concludes it is probable that Plutarch "intende ἔγραφεν come imperfecto di conato: 'zu konstruieren versuchte' (γράφειν = konstruieren è derivato da E. Sachs, Die fünf platon. Körper, Berlin 1917, 77)."

30) On this passage, see Guthrie, History, II, 316, n. 2. It is likely that Plato's view at Tim. 772A-B that a plant is a ζῷον, and thus akin to human nature (φύσις), underlies Plutarch's report.

31) On Ammonius, see Ziegler, Plutarchos, 15-17.

32) O'Brien, JHS 88 (1968) 109, considers this report evidence of "a knowledge of the detail of Anaxagoras' system."

33) Lanza, Anassagora, 133, n. on A 74.

34) Ammonius further remarks that night has, in and of itself, nothing to cause movement in the air, but day has one important thing: the sun, as Anaxagoras himself said (τὸν Ἑλίου, ὡσπερ αὐτός ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας ἐτρηκεν).

35) For a listing of Plutarch's numerous references to Plato's letters, see Helmhold and O'Neil, Plutarch's Quotations 57; references to the Republic are on 60-1.

36) See DK, A 13, and Meinhardt, Perikles, 47.

37) See Lanza, Anassagora, 24-25, n. on A 13.

38) Meinhardt, Perikles, 47, refers only to a "philosophische Überlieferung" without mentioning Plato. Yet as Gauthier and others have noted, "c'est Platon qui a le premier élaboré l'idéal d'une sagesse non plus seulement théorique, mais contemplative..." and "Anaxagore était pour l'Académie le type de la vie contemplative"; see R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, L'Ethique à Nicomaque, II (Paris 1959) 487 and 885. Certainly the anecdotes in Plutarch about Anaxagoras should be compared with those in Aristotle (see DK, A 30), and they remind one of Plato's story about
Thales at Theaet. 174A.

39) See, D. E. Gershenson and D. E. Greenberg, Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics (New York 1964) 348, who believe that Socrates' question at his trial as reported by Plato, "Do you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus?," was taken "as an allusion to a historical event, rather than as an outraged protest at the absurdity of accusing him of corrupting the youth through doctrines everyone knew to be Anaxagoras' and not his."

40) The bibliography on Anaxagoras' trial is fairly extensive, and consists mainly of attempts to reconcile the ancient reports. According to Diogenes L. (2, 12-13), the versions are: Sotion reports Anaxagoras was indicted by Cleon on a charge of impiety, defended by Pericles, fined five talents and banished; Satyrus says Anaxagoras was prosecuted by Thucydides, son of Melesias, on charges of Medism and impiety, and sentenced to death by default. Thus J. A. Davison, "Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras," CQ 47 (1953) 39ff., followed by R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 435ff., tried to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent reports by arguing for two trials of Anaxagoras (ca. 456 by Thucydides and ca. 433 by Cleon). For other assessments of the evidence, see A. E. Taylor, "On the Date of the Trial of Anaxagoras," CQ 11 (1917) 81-7, who argues in favor of Satyrus' testimony and Derenne, "Procès d'impiété," 11-41 who claims that Anaxagoras was accused by both Thucydides and Cleon.

41) On Craterus as a source for Plutarch, see Meinhardt, Perikles, 61 and n. 195; also Derenne, "Procès d'impiété," 22 and n. 2.

42) According to Meinhardt, Perikles, 60, "Ephoros (bei Diod. 12, 39, 2)" is Plutarch's "Gewährsmann." M. Casevitz, Diodore de Sicile, XII (Paris 1972) xiii, however, observes that "Ephore n'est nommé, comme source pour les causes de la guerre du Péloponnèse, qu'en 41 et, dans ce récit, il semble que tout ne soit d'Ephore."

43) There are several references to Hermippus Smyrnaeus in the Lives; see Helmbold and O'Neil, Plutarch's Quotations, 34.

44) J. Hani, Plutarque Consolation à Apollonius (Paris 1972) esp. 27-43, has argued extensively for Plutarch's authorship of this treatise.

45) There is no mention of Plutarch at DK, A 33; only Galen is quoted who also refers to the story as παρειλήσειν. Hani, Plutarque, 189 n. 3, remarks that "l'exemple d'Anaxagore était particulièrement utilisé dans les écoles de philosophie: Val. Max. 5, 10, 3 (le ch. 10 de V. M. est entièrement consacré à ce sujet); Tusc. 3, 14; apprécié de Chrysippe (ap. Galien, voir ch. 21, comm. du fragment de Thésée d'Euripide); de même par Panaitios (Plut., de coh. in. 16-463D), qui en étendait l'usage à la répression de la colère; Epict., Entr. 3, 24; D. Chr., Or. 37 (464D); Sen., ad Pol. 30."

46) See Gershenson and Greenberg, Anaxagoras, 370 who doubt the authenticity of the fragments in Simplicius. According to them, Anaxagoras' book was "most probably" lost before the end of the third cent. B.C., and so Simplicius did not have a copy. Contrary to such a claim, D. Sider in a paper read before the Society for Ancient Philosophy, U.S.A., "Anaxagoras on the Composition of Matter" (p. 6 of mimeographed copy) maintains that Anaxagoras' book was extant until at least the 2nd cent. A.D.: "Ibn abi Usabia (8th century) records, in a work that has been translated into German ("Uyunu l'anb" fī tabaqātī l'atibbā, ed. A. Müller (Cairo 1882) vol. I, pp. 84. 31-85.2) that Galen 'sagte in seinem Buch (Π. ἀλήθειας, not extant), daß in der grossen königlichen Schatzkammer der Stadt Rom zahlreiche Bücher und Wertgegenstände verbrannt seien. Einige der verbrannten Exemplare waren von der Hand (αὐτόγραφα for ἀντίγραφα?) des Aristoteles,
des Anaxagoras, und des Andromachus. If this report is correct, Plutarch because of his visits and official duties in Rome, would have had every opportunity to see Anaxagoras' book. On Plutarch's connections with Rome, see C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford 1971), especially 13ff.

47) See Guthrie, History II, 269, who says simply "a copy was still available to Simplicius in the sixth century A.D."

48) Ibid., 316 n. 3: "The passage of Plutarch (De fort. 98ff) given by DK as fr. 21b can hardly be said to add anything to Anaxagoras' opinions about human superiority to the beasts in mental faculties, owing to the difficulty of deciding how much is to be referred to Anaxagoras." For a similar view, see Lanza, Anassagora, 248 n. on B 21b who believes "il frammento è conservato da Plutarco e probabilmente è stato tratto da una somma dossografica o gnomologica; perciò è assai difficile stabilire i limiti della citazione, vuoi di Plutarco rispetto al dossografo, vuoi di questo (o della sua fonte) rispetto al testo originale."

49) Ziegler, Plutarchos, 88.

50) On Plutarch's use of hypomnēmatata, see H. Martin, Jr., "Plutarch's Citation of Empedocles at Amatorius 756D," GRBS 10 (1969) 69-70.

51) Guthrie, History II, 316, quotes this passage of Aristotle and refers (n. 3) to De fort. 98f.

52) See, for example, ibid., 282.

53) On Theophrastus as a source, see Meinhardt, Perikles, 10 and 12. For references to Theophrastus in the other Lives, see Helmbold and O'Neil, Plutarch's Quotations, 70.

54) I thank the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung for helping to make this research possible. I am further indebted to Prof. Dr. Ernst Vogt and Dr. Gerhart Schneeweiß, University of Munich, for their helpful criticisms. I bear the responsibility for the remaining faults.
In his now classic article, on "The Reconstruction of Proto-Romance," Robert A. Hall, Jr. remarked that "it is incumbent on Romance scholars to analyze and interpret their exceptionally full stock of linguistic material, using all methods of study at their disposal, working both backward and forward in time. Only thus will Romance linguistics be enabled to do what others expect of it; to serve not only as an end in itself but as a model and training-ground for workers in all fields of historical linguistics." What the researcher in the history of the Romance languages is faced with is, on the one hand, the schemes of reconstruction (based on the principles of the historical comparative method) and the often puzzling testimonies of reality. Put in other terms, he has the choice of working with an abstract system represented by astericized Latin forms that do not belong to any real language, or the reality of the mass of mainly post-classical written records that have come down to us to be analyzed and sifted through with a view to discovering evidences of trends toward Romance in phonology, morpho-syntax, and vocabulary; and while there are no doubt materials whose meaning in terms of future evolution of the Romance languages is difficult, if not impossible to discover, there is an abundance of those that prelude the future. It is the attention to the future that, I believe, can give reality and life to the large number of forms collected from inscriptions, late writers, and other sources of "Vulgar", that is non-literary or non-classical Latin.

A little more than a hundred years ago, Hugo Schuchardt published the third volume of his Vokalismus des Vulgärlateins which he had begun in 1866. This epoch-making event marked the beginning of documentary research in the field of Romance Philology, the first concerted attempt at sifting out Romance features from non-literary written sources, inscriptions, manuscripts, glossaries, and remarks by grammarians. The novelty of the Vokalismus, however, did not merely consist of the linguistic
analysis of the direct sources of this non-literary - call it popular, spoken, colloquial Latin (what the Germans call Umgangssprache, as opposed to Schriftlatein, and the French call langue courante), or by the now consecrated term "Vulgar Latin", or le latin tout court to use Ferdinand Lot's expression ("le latin en usage dans toutes les classes de la société, en haut comme au bas de l'échelle") (quoted in Reichenkron Historische Latein-altromanische Grammatik (1965) p. 58) but also in Schuchardt's a priori belief that the sermo plebeius he was dealing with must have been locally differentiated from the earliest times on, though he himself had to admit, albeit reluctantly, that this rustic Latin appeared on all monuments of all regions as essentially the same. 2) Indeed, the axiom of a locally differentiated Latin, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the testimony of post-classical texts that seem to show a unified language with no appreciable local variations is one of the fundamental problems that has dominated Romance studies ever since.

The question, in other words, is this: do linguistic features that differentiate Romance languages and dialects correspond to dialectal differences already in existence in Latin? 3) A landmark attempt to show the existence of dialectal variants in colloquial Latin on the basis of evidence garnered from Late Latin authors and some inscriptional material was undertaken by Karl Sittl in his 1882 study on local differences of Latin, with special reference to African Latin. 4) In this work, which at the time had aroused quite a stir, Sittl tried to show that linguistic, particularly syntactic peculiarities in some Late Latin authors like Fronto, Apuleius, Tertullian were due to their Africitas, their African origin, and that these should be interpreted as good evidence for African dialectal variants of spoken Latin. Sittl's critics were quick to point out, however, that the alleged local differences and, specifically, his thesis of an Africitas were little more than a figment of his imagination and that which Sittl had characterized as "African," "Gaulish," and "Hispanic" Latin were, in reality, post-classical syntactic peculiarities not delimited regionally. It is not generally known that in a subsequent research report on Vulgar and Late Latin Sittl retracted his thesis and admitted that even a close scrutiny of literary texts did not reveal local speech differences, but he predicted that once the inscriptional materials from all areas of the Roman Empire would be made available through the monumental Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum - which had barely begun publication in his days - these differences would become quite apparent. 5) For, had not the founder of the Corpus himself, the great
German historian Mommsen, said that the language of inscriptions was more closely connected with that of ordinary life than with that of literature.\(^7\)

And is it not axiomatic that the language of daily life, the living language of the people is locally and socially differentiated?

Sütl's importance for those of us who scrutinize Late Latin documents with a view to picking up every scrap of information that would help to deduce linguistic reality from their often baffling inconsistencies resides in the fact that he set the tone for a research program that has occupied Romance scholars for the past century.

The question of local speech variations in Latin of the imperial and both pre- and post-imperial periods and the treatment of Latin as a real language rather than an abstract system of relationships has given rise to a great deal of discussion and theorizing. It is not my purpose to review the history of the debate. For this, I can refer to Silva Neto's study *Historia do latim vulgar* (Rio de Janeiro, 1957), Antonio Tovar's "Research Report on Vulgar Latin and its local variations," (*Kratylos*, IX [2] 1964, 113-134), or G. Reichenkron's concise summary in his *Historische Latein-altromanische Grammatik* (Wiesbaden, 1965, p. 70). Suffice it to say that ever since W. Meyer-Lübke modified his rigid neo-grammarian stance around the turn of the century by substituting a chronologically, socially, and regionally differentiated *Volkslatein* (the term he preferred to *Vulgärlatein*) for a homogeneous, unitary Vulgar Latin language existing separately from and independently of literary Latin\(^8\) the thesis of a vertically (socially) and horizontally (geographically) differentiated Latin has become generally accepted by Romanists, who have thus come to regard Vulgar Latin as a real language, an authentic *historisches Volkslatein* rather than a reconstructed Romance Latin (*romanisches Konstruktionalatein* - as Meyer-Lübke's critics referred to his earlier conception of Vulgar Latin). It is the degree of regional differences which, in the present state of our knowledge, is still and, presumably, will continue to be a matter of controversy, for there remains the vexing problem of reconciling linguistic differentiation of a living Latin spread over the vast area of the Roman Empire with the evidence of the available written monuments that reveal an essentially uniform Latin, giving little or no clear indication of local variations.

Let me then turn to the purpose of my paper and attempt to show in what way we can utilize inscriptive material as a source of spoken Latin and evidence of its regional differentiation. Be it said at the outset that there is no, there
cannot exist such a thing as a text written in the *sermo vul- garis*, i.e., a text in so-called Vulgar Latin. The best we can hope for is to find hints, to catch an occasional glimpse as to the true nature of the spoken language through inadvertences and unconscious mistakes of the writer, since, as Palmer has pointed out, "the chisel of the stonemason, the pen of the loquacious nun, and the chalk that scribbles on the wall, disregard the tongue and move self-willed in traditional patterns," and Einar Löfstedt reminds us that "even the most uneducated person, as soon as he begins to write, if it be only a letter or a few words on a plastered wall, is directly or indirectly influenced by innumerable literary precedents or reminiscences."

It is generally admitted that private, that is, non-official inscriptions, particularly prose inscriptions of the funerary type, constitute a valuable source of spoken Latin because they very frequently deviate from the orthographic and grammatical norms of literary Latin and that many of these deviations are not fortuitous but, indeed, are prompted by spoken language habits that find eventual expression in one or the other Romance language. The validity of Veikko Väänänen's claim, for instance, that the 5,000 Pompeian graffiti "constituent un monument unique de la vie ordinaire" has been proven by the general endorsement of his monograph originally published in 1937, now in its third edition. And once the influence of the spoken language is acknowledged, there is no reason to assume that such an influence should be limited to phenomena that are common to all of Romania, to the exclusion of special features that are characteristic of a particular region.

"Inscriptions are a most important source of attestations of the changes that have occurred in early Vulgar Latin," said Gerhardt Rohlfs, one of the most distinguished and thoughtful Romanists of our time. Seeing that they are localized and, in many instances, even datable with some accuracy, inscriptions yield information that can only exceptionally be gleaned from literary sources during the early post-classical stages of Latin. To illustrate his point, Rohlfs adduces the following example: in inscriptions from southern Italy and Rome (CIL vols IX and VI) one occasionally comes across the term *tata* in the meaning of 'father'. This term has survived to this day as the more usual one to designate this
member of the family, particularly when speaking of one's own father; thus, in the Calabrian dialect *tata oje non vene* corresponds to a Latin *tata hodie non venit*. The form *tata* also attested on inscriptions from the Danubian Provinces has replaced Lat. *pater* in Rumanian.\(^{13}\)

No one will quarrel with Rohlfs as far as localizing lexical items is concerned. The problem arises when one wants to investigate dialectal differences as they may be reflected in the language in which inscriptions are couched. As Tovar pointed out "there are irregularities in the materials whose meaning in connection with the future evolution of Romance languages is impossible to discover; there are others in which the future announces itself. Attention to the future is what can vivify the swarm of forms collected from inscriptions, late writers, and the rest of the sources for "Vulgar Latin."\(^{14}\) If, indeed, misspellings can show important trends toward later Romance development, as Tovar claims, then we must ask ourselves just how much value we may attach to "mistakes" due to the negligence or ignorance of the stonecutter so as not to read into them more than we are entitled to. More specifically, to what extent are we authorized to draw conclusions based on an isolated occurrence or even a group of geographically delimited inscriptions, such as the Pompeian graffiti?

Take the oft-quoted example of *imudavit* found on an inscription from Mérida in the Baetica that Hübner, the editor of volume II of the Corpus (devoted to Hispania) had interpreted as a "misspelling" for *immudavit*. The inscription, which includes an entreaty to Proserpina to avenge the theft of various objects, reads, in part: *Proserpina per tuam majestatem te rogo oro obsequro uti vindices quot mihi furti factum est; quisquis mini imudavit, involavit, minusve fecit...*\(^{15}\) Some scholars proposed to interpret the controversial *imudavit* as standing for *immundavit* (from a Lat. *immundare* "to make unclean"), a likely interpretation phonetically but semantically rather doubtful in the given context; more recently, Väänänen advanced the hypothesis of an *emundavit* with the slangy meaning of "cleaned out".\(^{16}\) Under the impetus mainly of Carnoy's study on the language of inscriptions from Spain,\(^{17}\) Hübner's interpretation has been perpetuated by some Romanists and considered by many to be evidence of an early sonorization of intervocalic voiceless stops. Even Carnoy's dating of this form as the second century A.D. has found its way into standard manuals.\(^{18}\) No less a scholar than von Wartburg used this example for his
demonstration of the early rift of Romania into an eastern and a western portion. Not until quite recently has it been shown that there is no real evidence to push back the date of the inscription on which *imudavit* is found to the second century of our era (the only *terminus ad quem* being that it is a pagan epitaph and, hence, probably composed before the fifth century) and that Carnoy's interpretation rests on a misreading of the editor's comment. Also, if Väänänen's proposed reading of *imudavit emu(n)davit* is correct, the question of sonorization remains moot.

From a philological point of view inscriptions have not escaped the critic's eye and limitations placed on their value have been pointed out more than once. For one thing, the variety of language is quite restricted and, except for metric inscriptions which are influenced to a large extent by literary and poetic traditions, they very often are made up of little more than traditional formulae, proper names, abbreviation, etc. Yet, even the severest critics admit that with a sufficient body of material it is often possible to cull some interesting information as to the state of the spoken language. Be it said in passing that critics of inscriptional material as valid evidence of the state of the Latin language at a given time, as well as being a source of information concerning specifically local features, have not spurned citing isolated inscriptional examples to support their theories.

Another limitation placed upon the value of inscriptional material - which, incidentally, it shares with other documentary evidence - is that certain spellings may not at all represent actual pronunciation but may rather be due to stereotyped orthography, much the way French *eau* represents the phoneme /o/ in the modern language, while reflecting a former stage of the language.

Lastly, we must be on our guard concerning inscriptions found in one locality but actually composed in another, seeing that some stonecutters may have got around in the world. This is particularly true of verse inscriptions and those of a more learned nature. Vives, editor of Christian inscriptions of Roman and Visigothic Spain, mentions the fact that the epitaph for a certain abbot Victoriano of the monastery of Asan, Huesca, was written by Venantius Fortunatus of Gaul.
In this case, of course, the linguistic phenomenon would not be characteristic of the locality where the inscription was found; but these are exceptional cases.

All things considered and granted the shortcomings, limitations and caveats, scholars generally agree that inscriptions, particularly Christian prose inscriptions, are a valid source of spoken Latin, provided we do not draw hasty conclusions about phonological and morphological phenomena from single occurrences of a "misspelling" (though even a single occurrence of a given phenomenon may be significant) but conclusions based on the frequency of occurrence of certain "mistakes" within the context of classical Latin standards. Since linguistic inquiries into particular regions, such as those of Pirson on the language of Gaul\textsuperscript{25} and Carnoy already alluded to and the more recent study by Mihăescu on the language of the Danubian Provinces\textsuperscript{26} have yielded little if anything in terms of regional characteristics, it would seem that if we really want to learn something about local variations in spoken Latin we can only do so by means of a comparative \textit{étude d'ensemble} on the language of Roman Italy and its Provinces, such as the one advocated by Sittl about 80 years ago.

My first study involving inscriptions material which saw the light exactly ten years ago is an attempt at just such an \textit{étude d'ensemble}. For this investigation I chose Diehl's edition of Christian Inscriptions\textsuperscript{27} as well as the Vives collection as a supplement to Diehl. The advantage of working with Christian epitaphs, excepting official and verse inscriptions for reasons already stated, is that they are generally written by more or less literate people, that they are localized and that many of them are dated with some measure of accuracy. With a corpus of about 4,000 items from the Western Roman Empire, I divided my material into four main regions following the topographical classification of the \textit{Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum}, namely (a) the Iberian Peninsula (subdivided further into Baetica, Lusitania, and Tarraconensis); (b) Gaul (divided into Narbonensis and Lugdunensis); (c) Italy (subdivided into Northern, Central, and Southern Italy); and (d) Rome. The separate treatment of the capital of the Roman world seemed to be justified by the abundance of material. In addition, because of the high percentage of dated material (better than 80% in Iberia; ca. 46% in Gaul; over 40% in Italy; and 42% in Rome) I was also able to establish chronological divisions into, roughly, the fourth,
fifth, and sixth centuries.

In accordance with my belief that significant data could be obtained only by determining the frequency of occurrence of deviations in one region as against another, I made a count of vowels and diphthongs in both stressed and unstressed positions according to classical Latin standards and deviations thereof. For the sake of chronology, the numerical analysis is based only on dated material, but examples of deviations also include non-dated inscriptions both to illustrate further a particular phenomenon observed in dated material and to supplement it. On the basis of comparative percentage figures given wherever the number of examples seemed to justify this procedure, I was able to show that despite the strongly formulaic nature of inscriptive material and the fact that deviations from the classical Latin norm appear to be more or less identical in all areas of the former Empire, it is possible to detect certain features that occur more frequently in one area with respect to another, thus pointing to regional differentiations during the period of latinity covered by the monuments investigated.

Here are a few examples taken at random:

1. Stressed Vowels: a. Latin /ē/ and /ī/ are frequently represented by i and e, respectively, in all areas; however, a statistical analysis seems to show that by the fifth century this phenomenon is particularly pronounced in Gaul, with a better than 15% differential over most of the Italian and Iberian areas.

b. The u and o spelling for cl. Latin /ō/ and /ū/, respectively, is much less frequent and, in any case, not significant before the sixth century, except for the Central Italian area, suggesting that in the latter the back vowels may have merged at an earlier time than in the other areas.

c. A comparative statistical analysis of the relationship between cl. Latin /ē/ and /ū/ and /ē/ and /ī/ suggests that the front vowels did not universally merge before the back vowels in the areas under investigation, as has generally been suggested by Romance scholars.

2. Unstressed Vowels: a. While Latin vowels in the initial syllable appear to be quite stable, Latin /ē/ in the area of Rome is frequently spelled with i.
b. In the intertonic and penult positions the e and o spelling for cl. Latin /ɪ/ and /ʊ/, respectively, appears most frequently in Gaul and No. Italy, and to some extent also in the Iberian area, probably reflecting a weakening of these vowels into a schwa as a first step towards total disappearance by syncope and preluding, at the same time, an important phonological rift within the so-called Western Romance languages, namely the pro-paroxytonic versus paroxytonic word structures.

Among phenomena with important morphological implications, let me mention the following:

1. The extension of the plural accusative -is ending of i-stem nouns and adjectives to the nominative plural in the Italian area, supporting the hypothesis advanced by some scholars to the effect that the /i/ plural ending of the third declension in modern Italian may indeed be the continuator of the classical Latin plural accusative -is ending. (I developed this hypothesis in an earlier study.)

The extension of the -is ending to the nominative of third declension nouns and adjectives is also quite evident in the Lugdunensis area of Gaul, while Narbonensis hangs on to the accusative in -es (and even changes -is of i-stems to -es), much like the Iberian area where there is a trend to a generalized -es ending, reflecting subsequent developments.

2. The frequent -as ending for the Latin first declension feminine plural -ae also in the Italian area, and particularly in Rome, suggesting also that modern Italian feminine -e plural may derive from a popular -as ending rather than the classical -ae. The -as nominative plural ending is not attested in inscriptions from Iberia or Gaul, but studies on later Latin documents from these regions suggest that this sigmatic nominative reached them also, this morphological innovation (a reflex of the Oscan substratum?) having spread from south to north and west.

Here is another example that, I believe, will show what careful inscrptional reading may reveal. This particular example has interesting etymological implications: I have recorded forms like lunis, mercuris, (used with dies or die) from inscriptions from Spain and Italy, contradicting those scholars who would derive the corresponding Spanish and Italian forms from the Cl. Latin lunae and mercurii, adding an analogical -es ending in the case of Spanish, as for example, Menéndez Pidal who derives Sp. lunas from a hypothetical Lunae-s. Elcock states that the Latin basis of It. lunedī is Lunae-diem. García Diego, while proposing
a Lat. *lunis* etymon for Sp. *lunes*, claims that the Latin form is not attested. 34) (He just did not look long enough!) I did not find any attestation of either *luna* or *lunis* in the area of Gaul, but I suggest that if I had, chances are it would have been *lunis* also, seeing that OFr. *lunadi* can only derive from a sigmatic form. 35)

Väänänen has once defined Vulgar Latin as "l'ensemble de certaines tendances du latin que les monuments écrits nous révèlent sur tout le long de l'évolution de la langue." 36) I hope I may have convincingly pointed to such trends on both the phonological and morpho-syntactic levels, suggesting certain regional characteristics. The material that is available for catching further glimpses of these "tendances" is far from exhausted but to sift through all the records in search for the real living Latin requires painstaking research that is, at best, very time-consuming. The choice between tracking down evidence of the unre corded speech of our Latin speaking ancestors through these records or to reconstruct from existing Romance forms starred Latin forms that belong to an abstract system rather than any real language is a matter of taste and point of view. Of course, we have no idea how the Romans spoke, except by inference, 37) but whatever scrap of information we are able to cull from linguistic monuments that have come down to us, particularly those written by the man-in-the-street is, to my mind, worth every ounce of effort.

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NOTES


2) *Vokalismus*, I, Leipzig, 1866, p. 77.


6) "Jahresbericht über Vulgär-und Spätlatein 1884-1890," *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 67 (1892),
7) Quoted in the preface to C. M. Kaufmann's *Handbuch der altchristlichen Epigraphik*, Freiburg in Breisgau, 1917.


10) Late Latin, Oslo, 1959, p. 15.


13) Rum. *tata*. In the languages that extend between southern Italy and Rumania the word for 'father' derived from Lat. *tata* is also attested, e.g., Old Dalm. *tata*, *teta*, Vegliote *tuota*, and Alb. *tate*. Rohlfs, *loc. cit.*, cf. also *REW* #8596 (1935).


20) Hübner's comment on this particular inscription reads, in part:
21) Cf. H. Weinrich, "Sonorisierung in der Kaiserzeit," ZRPh, 76 (1960), pp. 205-216, in which he refutes examples of sonorization found in inscriptions and other sources dating back to the time of the Empire, i.e., before the early fifth century. "Wir müssen feststellen, dass es bisher im ganzen Corpus Inscriptioinum Latinarum und in anderen Quellensammlungen keinen gesicherten Beleg für eine Sonorisierung in der Kaiserzeit gibt" (p. 218).

22) Thus, for example, W. Kroll, art. cit., p. 573.

23) "Die Schreiber und Steinmetzen mochten viel in der Welt herumkommen" (Schuchardt, op. cit., p. 92).


28) The pattern of orthographic for Lat. /ð/ in this position with respect to other Italian and Western Romance areas is so consistent that Rome may well be considered as the focal point of this phenomenon. For the /l/ outcome in modern Italian, cf. M. Pei, The Italian Language, New York, 1954, p. 36.


31) Ibid., p. 51.


34) V. García de Diego Gramática histórica española, Madrid, 1951, p. 204. Let us also add Entwistle (op. cit.) to this list who claims that Sp. lunes and miércoles derive from Lat. luna and mercurii plus -es (p. 69) and that they are analogical formations. Analogical in Spanish or in Latin already? He does not say.

35) Cf. REW #5164.

