The second century A.D. saw a new flowering of Greco-Roman culture as the leading men of the Greek world were integrated at successively higher levels into imperial society. 1) Greek writers turned to their classical heritage as to a treasury from which they could draw gold and jewels which they could remold or reset in the new designs required to express their own thoughts. 2) No one was more successful at this reworking of ancient riches than Arrian, the historian of Alexander the Great. Calling himself the new Xenophon, he imitated the Memorabilia in his record of the Discourses of his own teacher, Epictetus, and imitated and surpassed Xenophon's Cynegeticus in his own hunts. In his Anabasis, the influence of Xenophon is strong, but he draws heavily as well in style and thought on Herodotus and Thucydides. 3) It is his imitation of these authors which explains a peculiar feature of the Anabasis, examination of which will allow us to appreciate better Arrian's creative adaptation of classical models.

The beginning of Arrian's Anabasis falls into three parts: a preface in which he states his subject and sources, a narrative of Alexander's activities from his accession in 336 B.C. to his crossing over to Asia in spring 334 (1.1.1-12), and a second preface explaining Arrian's desire to praise Alexander and his own competency to do this (12.2-5). The reader is puzzled that Arrian makes two prefatory statements so close to each other at the beginning of his book. Why did he not include all his prefatory material in one passage, rather than interrupt his narrative of the great expedition against Persia as it was just beginning? 4) The intervening narrative is also problematic, at once too brief and too detailed. Arrian is silent on a number of important points, especially the circum-
stances of Philip's death and Alexander's rapid moves to secure the throne and all the complicated intrigue which served as background in Greece to Alexander's selection as hegemon by the Hellenic league. On the other hand, the battles in Thrace and Illyria are chronicled in precise detail, far greater than their intrinsic importance to the historian would warrant. The clue to Arrian's purpose in these introductory chapters, and therefore to his selection and arrangement of material, can be found in the similar introductions of Herodotus and Thucydides.

The preface of Herodotus consists of two statements expressing the historian's opinion, the first sentence and 1.5.3-4, separated by a Persian account (with a Phoenician variant) of how the dispute between Greeks and barbarians began. In the two sections where Herodotus speaks on his own behalf, he justifies his work on the basis of purpose and method: A. Purpose: 1. The preservation of the record. 2. Praise of great _erga_. B. Method: 1. Fixing the responsibility for the wars between Greeks and barbarians. 2. Equal treatment for large and small cities, since human prosperity is unstable.

The statement of purpose is found in Herodotus' first sentence. The notion of responsibility ties together the two statements, appearing at the end of the introductory sentence and resuming at 5.3 with Herodotus' statement that he has his own opinion of who began the sequence of wrongs. The final assertion of impartiality (5.3-4) develops a notion implicit in the introductory sentence, that greatness declines, and establishes one of the major themes of the whole work, the rise and fall of states as a function of the human condition. The intervening accounts of the Persians and Phoenicians (1.1.1-5.2), which at first seem a digression, grow out of the idea of responsibility introduced in the opening sentence, but also serve to introduce the reader to a number of Herodotean themes. The most obvious general theme is that of reciprocal responsibility, that is, that the action of one party causes a reaction by the other, establishing a pattern of injury and vengeance to which no end is apparent. This is part of the larger notion of _dike_ in history, seen as balancing of transgressions on both the personal and international level. The accounts further stress the separation and opposition of Europe and Asia, culminating in the
Persian opinion that Asia belonged to them, while Europe and the Greek world were separate.

These accounts also demonstrate some aspects of Herodotus' historical method, most especially his use of sources. He has inquired of knowledgeable Persians, compared their story with the Hellenic tradition (1.3; 2.1) and the version of Phoenician informants (5.1-2), and has added clarifications of his own (1.2, on the ancient importance of Argos; 2.1, the Cretans). At the same time, however, he reserves judgment on the truth of the stories ("I will not say whether these events occurred in this way or some other"). The narrative explains by example what Herodotus had meant in the introduction by *historie* and by his reference to both Greek and barbarian *erga*.

The narrative also confirms the statement of impartiality toward great and small cities (5.3-4), since Herodotus notes that Argos was much more important in the past than it is now (2.1).

The two personal statements of Herodotus, then, are not so much separated as joined by the intervening narrative, which develops ideas implicit or explicit in these statements and gives examples of Herodotus' historical method and of the themes which he will present in the whole work.

The format of Herodotus' preface is elaborated and extended by Thucydides. Although there has been some debate on the exact limits and nature of the preface, the following analysis, based on the work of Pohlenz and Bizer, accepts as given that it ends at 1.23.3. As with Herodotus, the preface falls into three parts, two direct statements on the purpose and method of the history (1.1.1-3 and 1.22.1-23.3), separated by an extended historical account, the investigation of the capabilities for war in preceding ages (1.2.1-21.2). The two direct statements show standard proemial themes justifying the publication of the work: A. Method (Accuracy): 1. Began when the war started (1.1). 2. Use of inference based on economic and political realities (resources, the common action of many cities: 1.1; 20.1; 21.1). 3. Testing of accounts (20.1-3; 21.1; 22.2-3). 4. Autopsy (22.1). 5. Interviews with eyewitnesses (22.1-3). B. Importance of subject: the greatest war (1.1-3; 23.1-3). C. Purpose: 1. To set forth the truth of events (22.4) 2. To be useful for the future (22.4). The major elements of
these statements are the arguments for the greatness of the war, the scientific care which the author will use in investigating events and which will ensure the accuracy of his narrative, and the purpose which requires that accuracy, to serve as a reliable record for future men.

The narrative which separates the two accounts serves most obviously to prove the greatness of the war. It functions as well as an example of historical method, as Thucydides expressly states in chapters 20 and 21, since it uses inference from several sources, including the poetic tradition (especially Homer) and tombs on Delos, and the givens of human nature to reconstruct the past. Moreover, this selection allows the reader to discover in past history the motifs and criteria which will be essential to Thucydides' presentation and interpretation of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides repeatedly emphasizes in his account here the role of factors such as monetary surpluses, settled populations, walled cities, and a navy, and of historical processes such as the state's growth in power through subjugation of weaker peoples, and the loss of that power through war or stasis. In sum, the material found between the two proemial statements is not casually chosen, but is meant to reinforce and illustrate these statements, so that the whole of chapters 1 to 23 must be seen as one unit. Both Herodotus and Thucydides use this combination of proemial statements and illustrative narrative, which I call an extended preface, to introduce their histories.

The structure of Arrian's introductory chapters so markedly reflects that of Herodotus and especially Thucydides that it is apparent that he wished to imitate this feature from them. To what extent does the later author imitate the use to which his classical models put this structure? Does the intervening narrative in Arrian, as in Herodotus and Thucydides, reinforce and illustrate the prefatory statements which frame it?

As has been noted by Schepens, Arrian set out to write the history of Alexander the Great nearly five hundred years after his death, when innumerable historians had already done so before him, and so could not "evade the question of the justification of his subject, nor the problem of the relationship of his own work to the extant literature on Alexander." Arrian
states his position in his two proemial statements, which closely associate the statement of the subject, Alexander and Alexander's deeds, with his own justification for undertaking the work. This justification is treated under three major topics: a. the choice and use of his sources (pref. 1-2). b. the suitability of the subject (1.12.2-4). c. his own capacity to write worthily about Alexander (1.12.4-5).

His historical method will naturally be very different from that of Herodotus and Thucydides, since Arrian is so far removed from the events: he cannot question men from Macedonia or Greece learned in lore of the past or interrogate eyewitnesses. He must rely on the written record, but he takes pains to explain his criteria for selection of the authors at the base of his account and how he treats disagreements existing between them and with other authors. Ptolemy and Aristobulus both were eyewitnesses to the expedition, yet wrote only after Alexander's death, when the most obvious reasons for distortion were removed. Arrian will follow these when they agree and otherwise will select stories on the basis of credibility and narrative interest. Having said this, Arrian throws down a challenge to his public: if they still wonder that he should decide to write yet another history of Alexander, "let them first read those others, and then mine, and then let them wonder." This said, he plunges at once into his history of Alexander.

The narrative does not pause again until Arrian has brought Alexander, at the beginning of his Persian expedition, across the Hellespont and to the tomb of Achilles at Troy. There Alexander called Achilles fortunate, in that he had found Homer as herald for his fame in time to come. This sentence, and the comments of Arrian which follow, interweave the two remaining topics, the greatness of the subject of the work, Alexander, and the skill of his historian, Arrian. Arrian moves from the obvious association of Achilles and his poet, Homer, to other men of action and the men who have guaranteed their fame: the Sicilian tyrants and the choral poets who celebrated their victories and Xenophon's march and the history describing it. Great men deserve great works of literature to establish their fame. None was so great as Alexander, yet despite all the works
written about him none had ever done him justice. "Hence, I assert that I have set out to write this history, considering myself not unworthy to publish to the world the deeds of Alexander." Arrian proudly puts himself in a class with Homer, Pindar, and Xenophon as one able to celebrate great deeds. His history will not simply be more accurate, but better than all those which have preceded it. The excellence is demanded by the subject matter, Alexander's extraordinary deeds, and by the purpose of the work, to celebrate Alexander worthily. Arrian bases his estimate of his own ability on "these writings" (οἶδα οἶ λόγοι), which have been his native land, family, and offices since his youth. Alexander's greatness is based upon his deeds, Arrian's upon his writings, and Arrian considers himself "worthy of the first rank in the Greek language, if indeed Alexander is worthy [as he is] of the first rank in arms."

Arrian's challenge at the end of the preface, and the boast in 1.12.4-5, would be empty and ridiculous unless the narrative between the two passages justified and confirmed them. When Arrian says "let him read my writings," and asserts that "these writings" are his claim to an excellence on a par with the greatest writers of classical past, he is urging the reader to read and evaluate his narrative of Alexander's European campaigns and to decide for himself whether it demonstrates the success of his method, the superiority of Alexander's accomplishments, and his own ability to present them to the world. There is no doubt that the account of the European campaigns prepares us to believe that "no other single man has manifested such great and numerous deeds, whether in number or in magnitude, among either Greeks or barbarians," as Alexander (1.12.4). Arrian's narrative vividly describes Alexander's military genius at work in diverse circumstances.

The variety of obstacles to be overcome in the campaigns of 335 and the precise detail in which they are described make the battles seem almost textbook cases in the tactical use of phalanx, cavalry, and light-armed archers and slingers. Consider what the situations represented:

1. Forcing a steep mountain pass (against the Thracians on Mt. Haemus, 1.6-13).
2. Using archers to drive an enemy from a protected position in a wooded area into the open, so that it could be attacked by
the phalanx (against the Triballians south of the Danube, 2.4-7).
3. The night crossing of a major river using local dugouts and
tents stuffed with straw (the raid across the Danube against the
Getae, 3.5-4.5).
4. Dislodging an enemy from a strong position by first confusing
and awing them with rapid and precise drill maneuvers (at Pellion,
6.1-4).
5. The rescue of a foraging mission (at Pellion, 5.9-11).
6. Crossing a river in retreat while under constant threat of
attack, using careful staging of troop movements and finally cata-
pults and archers to protect the crossing of the last contingent
(at Pellion, 5.6-8).
7. A surprise night attack on an enemy camp, using picked
troops (at Pellion, 6.9-11).
8. A forced march through mountainous terrain (from Pellion
to Thebes in fourteen days, 7.4-6).
9. The siege and capture of a major Greek city (Thebes, 7.7-8.8).

On two occasions Alexander was forced to withdraw: his attack on the
island of Peuke in the Danube was unsuccessful because of the small number
of ships available, the steepness of the island's banks, and the speed of
the river current at that spot (3.3-4), and the siege of Pellion had to
be abandoned when the surrounding hills were occupied by the troops of
Glaucias (5.5-8). In both cases Arrian gives suitable reasons for the
need to retreat, although he does not explain why Alexander decided to
attack in the first place. On each occasion Alexander compensates for
the setback by a victory. At the Danube, he crosses the river to ravage
the land of the Getae and destroy their village; at Pellion, he returns
in a few days to surprise the barbarians in their camps and force them
to abandon the city.

The hallmarks of Alexander's activity in these campaigns are speed
and flexibility of response. His ability to move his army and deploy his
forces rapidly is indicated by the frequent references to the time required
for a march \(^{10}\) and especially to the surprise and confusion of the enemy:
the Getae, when they find Alexander on the north bank of the Danube (4.3),
the Illyrians encamped at Pellion, victims of a night attack when they
thought that Alexander had been forced to withdraw, and the Theban patri-
ots, when it was announced that Alexander had entered Boeotia. Tactical
flexibility is apparent in each engagement of these campaigns, for every
situation which confronted Alexander was particular and required a differ-
ent response. Alexander's principal decisions in each case are precisely
explained by Arrian. \(^{11}\) In these actions we note especially Alexander's
imaginative use of missiles, whether arrows, slingshots, or catapult bolts,
to protect the advance of the phalanx (1.11-12), to drive the enemy from
cover (2.4), to protect a river crossing (6.6-8), and to defend the army
against skirmishers (7.8-9). Arrian follows carefully the movements of other units as well. For instance, his narrative of the raid across the Danube specifies the handling of the cavalry according to the situation: first behind the phalanx, as the army marches through the grain fields, then on the right wing as the army prepares to meet the enemy, and finally in the lead as the phalanx marches rapidly to the Cetic village (4.1-4). Each unit (archers, phalanx, cavalry, Agrianes and hypaspists) has its special functions, which are integrated in new combinations according to the requirements of the situation.

The splendid discipline of Alexander's army is implied throughout the narrative: it could not have been easy to get soldiers to float across the Danube on stuffed tents, to endure the long forced marches, or to remain calm when making the retreat across the river from Pellion. The most impressive evidence for the discipline is in Alexander's handling of the threat of the Thracian wagons at the Haemus pass. Arrian presents matter-of-factly what seems almost incredible, that the phalanx could keep its order while dividing to allow the Thracian wagons to pass, or even falling flat to allow them to go over their locked shields. But in any case, Arrian's narrative gives a strong impression of the soldiers' discipline and Alexander's hold over his men. The drill exercise at Pellion gives us an indication of the training which had brought Alexander's army to this condition.

As in the rest of his history, Arrian in the narrative of 1.1.1-12.1 shapes his narrative so as to put Alexander's actions in the most favorable light. Therefore he records the devotion which Alexander was able to inspire in men such as Langaros, the king of the Agrianes (5.1-4), insists that Alexander showed great patience in handling the Theban revolt (7.7-11), and notes his moderation toward the anti-Macedonians at Athens (10.4-6). The destruction of Thebes, the action which especially contributed to his bad reputation in the Greek world, is described as the terrible catastrophe it was, but Arrian absolves Alexander of much of the responsibility, attributing the decision rather to the enemies of Thebes among the Greeks. Conscious literary artifice is evident in Arrian's reflection on the destruction of Thebes (1.9). The impact upon the Greeks of the fall of the ancient city is developed first by an extended comparison (a standard means of rhetorical auxesis) with similar disasters recorded by Thucydides and
Xenophon. Arrian recalls the Athenian defeat at Syracuse, the collapse of Athens after Aegospotami, the Spartan losses at Leuctra and Mantinea, and finally the destruction and enslavement of Plataea, Melos, and Skione. The long, elaborately constructed sentences enhance the dignity of the thought, as does the repetition of key words: ἐκπλήτω, πάθος, παράλογος.\textsuperscript{13)\textsuperscript{13)\textsuperscript{13)}}

Arrian imitates Thucydides here in the frequent use of abstract nouns (especially in -ος) as substantives, as well as specific borrowings (e.g. the noun ὁ παράλογος at 9.1, 4, 5).\textsuperscript{14)\textsuperscript{14)\textsuperscript{14)}}

Alexander's arrival at the Danube provokes a shorter rhetorical presentation of the greatness of the river through the listing of the nations through which it flows, and ending with Herodotean echoes in the reference to the five mouths of the Danube and in the Ionic form ἐκδόσει.\textsuperscript{15)\textsuperscript{15)\textsuperscript{15)}}

The selection and omission of incidents is an essential part of the historian's skill. We have noted already that Arrian has chosen and presented incidents in such a way that they interpret and enhance Alexander's victories in the North and West and the drama of the destruction of Thebes. Equally important is his treatment of the first and last sections of the introductory narrative, the events of 336 (1.1-3) and those of winter 335 and spring 334 (11.1-12.1). Like the accounts of the campaigns of 335, these are seen as preparatory to the Persian expedition which will be the great showcase of Alexander's genius. In the first section Alexander is chosen leader of the united Hellenic expedition against Persia, the two middle sections show him ensuring quiet in Europe, and the last begins the expedition proper with the crossing into Asia. Arrian stays aloof from any discussion of the death of Philip or Alexander's steps to ensure his hold on the Macedonian throne, apparently because he is not ready yet to talk about Alexander's attitude toward power or his relations with the Macedonian nobles. Those questions will come in their own time, in Book IV, when he will narrate the deaths of Cleitus and Callisthenes. His refusal to give more than the briefest possible account of the opposition to Alexander in Greece and of the political and military factors behind his choice as leader permitted him to move at once into his narrative of these military campaigns where his genius was most apparent. The famous
scene of Alexander's encounter with Diogenes, so well evoked by Plutarch in his life of Alexander, rates not a word in Arrian: or rather, not here, for he makes good use of it at the beginning of Book VII, when he is considering Alexander's ambitions (7.2.1.). While Plutarch prefers to reveal Alexander's character through anecdote, Arrian rushes through the events of 335 so that he can present as soon as possible the evidence of military genius which justifies the work.

In chapters 11 and 12, on the other hand, Arrian adds anecdotes to the basic narrative, using stories taken from other writers to supplement Ptolemy and Aristobulus and place the invasion of Asia in the context of heroic endeavor. The festival in honor of the Muses and the omen of the sweating Orpheus introduce the concept of the close relation between the hero and the writer which is one of the major topics of the second proem. Thereafter, various stories connected with the crossing of the Hellespont and Alexander's visit to Troy recall the other great intercontinental expeditions: the Trojan War sung by Homer and the Persian Wars epically described by Herodotus. The figure of Protesilaus, whose fate Herodotus also recalled and connected with the defeat of Persia by the Greeks, is another reminder that Alexander's action fits in a long tradition of deeds celebrated in both epic and history. In focusing upon the heroic aspects of the invasion of Asia, Arrian finds no reason or occasion to mention that Parmenio and Attalus had already been sent to Asia by Philip in 336, had fought there, and were responsible for the bridgehead which permitted Alexander's army to cross without opposition.  

The shaping of the narrative by inclusion and exclusion of incidents related by different authors on the basis of "credibility and narrative interest" is a fundamental principle of Arrian's technique. Certainly it was his choice of Ptolemy and Aristobulus that allowed him to include as many specifics as he did in the description of the European campaigns. His two citations of Ptolemy in this section each establish details which were probably not available elsewhere, the precise figure for the casualties suffered by the Macedonians and the Tribalians (2.7) and the fact that Perdicas, not Alexander, was responsible for initiating the attack on Thebes (8.1). Yet
Arrian even in using the authors he most trusts, Aristobulus and Ptolemy, exercises an independent judgment, as can be documented in two cases. Plutarch twice tells the story of Timocleia, the Theban woman who killed one of Alexander's men after the Macedonian victory. When brought before Alexander she bravely asserted her right to defend her virtue, and so won Alexander's admiration and protection. The biographer ascribes the story to Aristobulus, and cites it as an example of a particularly delightful story: "who would not rather read the story of Timocleia... than sleep with the most beautiful woman in the world?" Yet Arrian suppresses it, whether because he found it incredible or more likely because it did not fit his own treatment of the fall of Thebes which focused on the enormous impression made by the disaster, which was greater than any previously experienced by a Greek city. 18)

On the other side of the coin, we can document to some extent how Arrian retold a story which he found in Ptolemy. Strabo attributes to that author, in fact, an account of Alexander's meeting with the Celts which parallels Arrian 1.4.6-8:

Anabasis 1.4.6-8

'Ενταῦθα ἄφικνον πορέσεις ὡς Ἀλεξάνδρου παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δοὺς αὐτόνομα ἔθνη προσοικεῖται τῷ Ἀιστρῷ καὶ παρὰ Ἐσμύου τοῦ Τριβαλλῆς· καὶ παρὰ Κελτῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ ψηλαμμένον ἦκον· μεγάλοι οἱ Κελτοὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ μέγα ἐπὶ σφῖς ψηλαμμέντες· πάντες δὲ υἱῶν τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐνείμενοι ἦκεν ἐφασαν· καὶ πάσιν ἐδώκε πότες Ἀλεξάνδρος καὶ ἔλαβε· τοὺς Κελτοὺς δὲ καὶ ἤρετο, δι τὸ μάλλῳ διεκτεῖται αὐτοῦς τῶν ἀνδρωπί· νων, ἔπισας ὅτι μέγα δύναμὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐς Κελτοὺς καὶ ἐτί προσωπεῖ ἢκει καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸν μάλλον πάντων δεδιέναι φόβους· τῷ δὲ πατρὶ ἐλπίδα ξυνῆθη τῶν Κελτῶν ἡ ἀπόκρισις· οὐ μόνον τοὺς φιλοσεμένοι Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ χωρία δύσ· πορα οἰκονύμενε καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐς ἄλλα τὴν δρμήν ὁρῶν· τε ἐφασαν δεδιέναι μήποτε

Strabo 7.3.8 (FGrHist 138 F 2)

Φησὶ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Δάγων κατὰ τούτην τὴν στρατεύματα αὐτῆς την Ἀλεξάνδρον κελτοὺς τους προκειμένους ἤκτην ἐγενήθη, νομίζοντα αὐτόν ἔρειν· αὐτοὺς δὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐδένα, πλὴν εἰ ἄρα μὴ ὁ οὐρανὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπιπέσοι, φιλιὰν γε μὴν ἀνδρὸς τοιούτου περὶ παντὸς τίθεσθαι.
Strabo introduces this story as an example of the simplicity and sincerity of the barbarians of northern Europe. The emphasis is on the Celts' lack of fear and their desire for the friendship of a great man. Arrian's version of the anecdote is more elaborate, more artfully expressed and more subtle. The Celts' reply in both accounts is the same, but in Arrian the setting and final comment by Alexander give the whole a moralistic and ironic tone not present in Strabo. Examination reveals that the two elements in Arrian which make the anecdote especially memorable have no parallel in Strabo: the characterization of the Celts as big physically and thinking big of themselves and Alexander's vain expectation that "his great name had arrived as far as the Celts and even farther." The adjectives μεγάλοι and μέγα applied to the Celts (emphasized by asyndeton and paronomasia) are in turn associated with Alexander, who is proud of his μέγα ονόμα. The anecdote thus is made to turn not on the simplicity of the Celts but on the vanity shared by the Celts and Alexander. The king's final comment, that the Celts were braggarts, leads the reader to the point of the story, that Alexander himself hungered for fame. Arrian in this way suggests an irony not apparent to Alexander. By adding a few words characterizing the Celts and explaining the thinking of Alexander and the Celts about each other, Arrian has transformed the simple anecdote recorded by Strabo, with its emphasis on the quaint phrase of the Celts ("they feared only lest the sky should fall") to a revealing example of Alexander's preoccupation with his own glory, one of the major themes of the Anabasis. It is of course Arrian's purpose in his history to give Alexander the glory he deserves, so that his name would be known (1.12.4). Alexander's name will be famous, but is not yet.
In comparing these two versions of the same story, we may note also minor stylistic changes which effect the whole. The common Greek φοβοῦμαι has been changed to the Attic δεδίττομαι; ἀγαμαί has been used in the Attic sense (especially common in Xenophon) of "admire," and Thucydidean expressions such as τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, παρ’ ἑλπίδα and ὅτε δέει ὁτε κατ’ ὁφέλειαν have appeared. Nevertheless, many words are exactly the same, so that we can be sure that Arrian had Ptolemy before him, but reshaped the story stylistically and thematically to fit his own narrative.

When Arrian wrote the opening chapters of the Anabasis, then, he conceived the whole segment from the preface to 1.12.5 as an extended preface in the Herodotean and Thucydidean manner and used the narrative separating the two proemial statements to illustrate and reinforce those statements. The topics of the proemial statements, Alexander's greatness, Arrian's skill as writer, and his selection and use of sources are exemplified in the narrative. The narrative serves to justify the composition of the Anabasis and to confirm Arrian's decision to write. In this as in so much else, Arrian demonstrated his capacity to imitate creatively the masters of classical historiography.

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NOTES

1) It is a pleasure to offer this small piece illustrating one aspect of the continuity of the classical tradition to Professor Turyn, who has done so much to clarify the history of that tradition from archaic to Byzantine times.

2) See, for example, B.P. Reardon, Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècle après J.C. (Paris 1971), G. Bowersock, Greek Sophists of the Roman Empire (Oxford 1969), and E.L. Bowie, "Greeks and Their Past in the Second Sophistic," Past & Present 46 (1970) 3-41, reprinted with some additional material in Studies in Ancient Society, ed. M.I. Finley (London and Boston 1974), 166-209. Studies of individual authors have also been fruitful, such as C.P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge, Mass., and London 1978).

4) Herodotus' internal preface at the beginning of Xerxes' expedition against Greece (7.20-21) serves a different purpose, being far removed from the initial preface.

5) On the preface of Herodotus much has been written. In my analysis I follow especially H.R. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in Herodotus (Cleveland 1966) 80 f. I do not agree with those, such as T. Krischer, Hermes 93 (1965) 159-67, and H. Erbse, Festschrift Bruno Snell (Munich 1956), 209-22, who attempt to limit the proem to the first sentence. See also Immerwahr, "Aspects of Historical Causation in Herodotus," TAPA 87 (1957) 241-60, esp. 247-51, with bibliography.

6) On the implications of Herodotus' statement on large and small cities, see Immerwahr, "Causation," 250.


10) At Anab. 1.1.5; 3.1; 4.5; 7.5; 7.7, and 11.5.

11) Arrian regularly describes engagements in four stages: (a) Alexander is confronted by a situation, the tactical difficulties of which are set forth; (b) he forms a plan to cope with the difficulties and gives precise orders to his troops, frequently containing instructions for contingencies potential in the situation; (c) the engagement takes place, and all occurs as he had envisioned; (d) the success is marked by the flight of the enemy, often after tremendous casualties. A typical case is the first engagement in Arrian's narrative, the encounter with the autonomous Thracians on Mt. Haemus: see the analysis in Stadter, Arrian, pp. 91 f., and L. Pearson, The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great (n. p., 1960) 205. Many see this technique as a feature taken over by Arrian from Ptolemy: see H. Strasburger, Ptolemaios und Alexander (Leipzig 1934) 16-23, G. Wirth, RE s.v. "Ptolemaios I als Schriftsteller und Historiker," XXIII. 2 (1959) at 2469-74; Pearson, Lost Histories, pp. 198-206.

12) See my treatment of this point in Arrian, 89-114.

13) Note especially the sentence at 9.2-4 (three sentences, 28.5 lines) and 9.6-7 (one sentence, 18 lines).


17) The words "it is said" or similar expression remind us that the incidents in 11.1-12.1 almost certainly were not found in Arrian's twin authorities, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, but form part of the *Legomena* added for their narrative interest mentioned in the preface. Cf. Stadter, *Arrian*, pp.74-76. The stories connected with Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont are examined by H.U. Instinsky, *Alexander der Grosse am Hellespont* (Godesberg 1949).


19) Strabo may have gotten this story through Posidonius rather than directly: see Jacoby, *FGrHist*, Commentary to 138, pp. 499; 501.