The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union

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Abstract

Among the many objections to Turkish membership in the European Union lie claims that Turkey will be a powerful actor in the future EU, with a population as large as or larger than Germany. Many also claim that this power will have negative effects on the EU. We examine such claims analytically, influenced strongly by spatial models of EU policy-making. We find that Turkey’s preferences lie sufficiently outside the EU mainstream so that it will have little influence in day-to-day policy-making under the assent, codecision, consultation, and cooperation procedures (or the common procedure in the rejected constitutional treaty). Its influence may be more evident in areas such as the CFSP or JHA, where unanimity remains the normal procedure. Still, Turkey’s veto power here is no different from that of other, much smaller countries. Furthermore, veto power can only block changes and cannot be used to pull the EU into undesirable new directions. Even this veto power can be avoided if the EU-25 establishes whatever policies they desire prior to Turkish membership, forcing Turkey to accept a fait accompli. Despite these limitations to its power, Turkey may have some influence in purely intergovernmental settings such as negotiations over new treaties that might occur some decades hence.

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Turkey has become an important political issue throughout the European Union. Opposition to Turkish membership was an important motive for the French to vote against the Draft Treaty for a Constitution in May 2005, though as Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and countless commentators have noted, the two really have nothing to do with one another. Turkish entry has also become an important electoral issue in Germany, where Angela Merkel wants to postpone, if not preclude entirely, Turkey’s entry into the Union.

As the French referendum shows, many people hold misconceptions about how Turkish membership would affect the Union. Many would be surprised to learn that Turkey has been interested in joining the European Economic Community (EEC, now EU) since it applied for associate membership in 1959. Its 1963 Association Agreement included a promise of eventual full membership. Nonetheless, Turkey has since seen the EU grow from six to twenty-five members, without itself becoming any closer to membership.

To appreciate the length of this “process,” recall that Turkey’s first interest in membership coincided with the UK’s original application, vetoed by Charles de Gaulle. Or imagine telling someone in 1959 that Estonia, then one of 15 Soviet Socialist Republics, would join the European Union before Turkey could even commence negotiations. The nature of the discussion over Turkey’s membership has changed, but there can be no doubt that Turkey has been part of political processes in the EU, broadly defined, for a very long time.

Of course, Turkish membership raises many issues not found in a post-communist Estonia. Harry Flam (2003: 7-8) argues that the most important reasons for the EU’s unwillingness to negotiate Turkish membership over the years have been the budgetary implications, the political implications as a result of Turkey’s size and likely voting weight, and
the cultural question of whether Turkey is part of Europe. Several other scholars have also raised
general concerns about Turkish voting power in an enlarged union, often using Shapley-Shubik,
Banzhaf, or other indices of voting power to reach this conclusion (i.e., Aleskerov et al. 2002;
Baldwin and Widgrén 2005). Because Turkey is different from the European mainstream on
many dimensions, many EU citizens are concerned that Turkish membership could change the
nature of the Union.

Turkey’s potential political power is a major concern. The standard refrain begins with
the observation that Turkey will soon have more people than Germany (see Müftüler-Bac and
McLaren 2003; Quaisser and Reppegather 2004 *inter alia*). These concerns have entered popular
discourse—as *The Economist*’s “Charlemagne” (2005) notes, “By 2015 it will be larger than any
other EU state by population, which has unsettling implications for its voting weight and
representation in the European Parliament.” Furthermore, this influence would supposedly
change the Union. In a widely-reported speech at Leiden University, outgoing Dutch
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (2004) joined many in saying that “the entry of a land with 68
million inhabitants—and 83 million in 2020—will also change the European Union greatly.”

Matthias Wissman, member of the Bundestag since 1976, former cabinet minister (1993-98), and
chair of the EU committee in the Bundestag (2002-), fears that the EU will become ungovernable
(cited in “CDU/CSU setzen . . .”):

> We have nothing against Turkey but we are of the opinion that the Union is at risk
> of breaking if one stretches it too far. When one makes it so big that it is no
> longer governable, can no longer be efficient. Turkey would soon be the largest

\[1\]“door toetreding van een land met 68 miljoen inwoners nu - en in 2020 83 miljoen - zal
ook de Europese Unie sterk veranderen.”
country in the Union and would completely change the architecture of the EU.\(^2\)

Similar claims were made about the entry of the ten newest members, though they did not prove to bar membership.

On both analytical and empirical grounds, we will argue here that these concerns are unwarranted. Turkey is most feared on those dimensions where it is most different, but its influence is smallest where it is the most different, \emph{precisely because} of this difference. One of the most important features of EU decision-making is the presence of many veto actors and supramajoritarian procedures, which mean that ideologically extreme proposals cannot be adopted (Hix 1999; Kreppel 2002; Tsebelis 2002: Chapter 11). Because Turkey will have preferences outside the European mainstream on many dimensions, it will have little influence over day-to-day policy-making. Preferences, and not simply voting weight, determine influence.

In making this argument, we set aside many economic and social issues in the interests of the narrowly political. The economic consequences of Turkish membership have attracted significant attention, though many of the effects of economic union are already available.\(^3\) Turkey and the EU enjoy a free movement of goods, and significant capital movement. Though the movement of labor is not free, there are already many Turkish workers in the EU. Even cultural integration has already begun, with Turkey a member of the European region in football

\(^2\)“Wir haben nicht etwas gegen die Türkei, sondern wir sind der Meinung, dass die Union kaputtzuzeigen droht, wenn man sie überdehnt. Wenn man sie so groß macht, dass sie nicht mehr regierbar ist, nicht mehr effizient sein kann. Die Türkei wäre bald das größte Land der Union und würde die Architektur der EU völlig verändern.”

\(^3\)Specific policies pose challenges, such as the working of agricultural price supports in a country with a much lower price level (see for example Quaisser and Reppegather 2004). The EU’s December 2004 decision to begin negotiations with Turkey included recognition of Cyprus as another policy issue that will need to be resolved (for review, see Foryinski 2005; Müftüler-Bac and Güney 2005).
and other sports contests, as well as being a figure in the annual Eurovision song contest.

Whatever one thinks of the economic or cultural issues, political decision-making processes will be responsible for delineating future developments in both. The bodies of the European Union can encourage, influence, or reduce the significance of these other interactions. For this reason, it is important to examine Turkey’s likely influence in the political processes of the European Union independent of its economic or cultural effects.

**History and the fears of Turkish influence**

Turkey's relationship with the European Union needs to be seen in its broader historical context, which illuminates the EU’s hesitance concerning Turkey and provides the background for Turkey’s current preferences concerning EU membership and policy matters.

Turkey’s desire to become a part of Europe has its roots in the 19th century and the Westernization movement (for a summary of Turkish elite views, see McLaren 2000). Starting with the 1839 Tanzimat Declaration, the Young Turks and other Ottoman elites equated modernization with Westernization (for a detailed account, see Ozbudun 1984; Shaw and Shah 1977; and for its economic underpinnings İslamoğlu-İnan 1987; Kasaba 1988). Following World War I, the Turkish Republic was founded on the two pillars of Kemalism: independence and modernization, with the latter referring to "development along the lines of the 'contemporary civilization' of the West" (Sezer 1981: 3). In other words, Turkey has been self-consciously converging on European practices and preferences for a long time.

In light of this history, successive governments have regarded the EU as part of a larger policy of seeking membership to all European institutions (Kabaalioğlu 1999: 20)–Turkey joined the OECD in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO in 1952. The country saw the
Treaty of Rome as another opportunity to this goal. Important political figures such as Adnan Menderes (Prime Minister, 1950-1960) and Ismet Inonu (Prime Minister, 1961-65) concluded that Turkey should participate not just because of the economic opportunities but its political potential.

Turkey’s application for associate membership led to an Association Agreement in 1963, with an eye toward eventual customs union. Under an Additional Protocol in 1970, a timetable called for Turkey to reduce its duties on Community industrial products gradually over twenty-two years, with the free movement of labor accomplished over twelve years. The Protocol nonetheless fell short of attaining Turkey’s principal objective of accession. Even so, this history means that some of the most controversial issues of the 2004 Enlargement have already been addressed to a substantial degree for Turkey, reducing the gap between the two sides’ interests.

The lack of further progress after 1970 was partly a result of political events in Turkey. Beginning in the 1950s, Turkey entered a period of boom and bust economic cycles, accompanied by political crises that led to disruptions in the democratic system in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The import-substitution strategy of the 1960s and the 1970s had brought along overdependence on imports and foreign borrowing. After the oil crises of 1974 and 1979, Turkish governments also faced severe foreign exchange shortages, leading to precautionary rationing of some essentials (Onis and Webb 1992).

Under such economic pressure, ideological radicalism turned into day-to-day violence. When the army intervened in politics again in 1980, in its role as "guardian of the Republic," Turkey's image abroad worsened again. Following the dissolution of the Grand National Assembly and all political parties, the European Community froze its relations with Turkey until
the resumption of democracy in 1983.

In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership. Since this application came after the recent accession of Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal (1986), the addition of another Mediterranean country seemed plausible for both Turkey and the EU. The Mediterranean enlargement also made democracy and the respect of human rights an implicit condition for membership, and this fact would become explicit conditions in the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. Turkey now faced the prospect of joining a political union, not just an economic community, and the standards of membership would be accordingly higher (see Müftüler-Bac 2003).

Despite these encouraging developments in the late 1980s, the EU put possible negotiations with Turkey on the back burner with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The prospects for Turkish membership were sufficiently weak that the 2000 Nice summit did not even provide hypothetically for the number of future Turkish votes or members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Harry Flam (2003: 2) correctly notes that this “effectively meant that the EU-15 did not plan for Turkey to become a member in the foreseeable future.”

Though less salient than relations with formerly-communist eastern Europe, the EU’s relations with Turkey did progress in these years. The long-planned customs union was phased in over 1996-2001, making trade in industrial goods free from tariffs and quotas. Turkey has also followed EU economic policy toward many third parties, granting preferential tariffs to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa and the signatories of the Lomé Convention.

Despite this progress, hurdles remain. Turkey is no longer applying to be one of seven, but one of 30. This inevitably dilutes its influence no matter how large its formal weight. At the same time, this larger union changes the political opportunities for Turkey. Instead of being

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markedly less developed economically as the rest of the Union, it can now join a coalition of newer “cohesion” members. In a major report, Wolfgang Quaisser and Andrea Reppegather (2004: 80) argue that the first eastern enlargement can be expected to have major effects on EU decision-making, and thus also change the environment for Turkey:

The importance of the cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) was relatively limited in the EU-15 even though they were overrepresented in the European Council. Because almost all enlargement countries are relatively poor compared to the EU, the importance of cohesion countries will grow significantly through the first eastern enlargement. They will encompass about 30% of the population, 36% of the votes in the European Parliament, and 42% of the votes in the Council, though they make up only about 14% of EU GDP. 4

Turkey, they suggest, will have an even greater effect. With the addition of Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, cohesion countries will make up 36% of the population, 41% of the votes in Parliament, and 43% of the votes in the Council of Ministers, while contributing only 9% of the EU’s overall GDP. Turkey will be a natural leader of this group, with 14.2% of the EU’s total population, 11.2% of the seats in Parliament, 7.8% of the votes in the Council of Ministers, but only 3.0% of GDP.

Qualified majority voting, they argue, will make this group of poorer countries especially influential. A large, rich country such as Germany will no longer be able to block budget-busting policies favoring poorer countries in agriculture and structural policy. They go on to note the likely effects on politics (Quaisser and Reppegather 2004: 80-81):

Though the cohesion countries will not have a majority in either the Council or

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4“In der EU-15 ist die Bedeutung der Kohäsionsländer (Spanien, Portugal und Griechenland) relativ gering, obzwar sie im europäischen Rat überproportional vertreten sind. Da fast alle Beitrittsländer im Vergleich zur EU relativ arm sind, wird durch die erste Osterweiterung die Bedeutung der Kohäsionsländer deutlich wachsen. Sie werden ca. 30% der Bevölkerung, jedoch 36% der Parlaments- und sogar 42% der Ratsstimmen auf sich vereinen, doch nur ca. 14% des BIP der EU erreichen.”
Along similar limes, Henry Flam (2003: 25) notes that “a coalition of poor, new member states can easily block decision-making in the EU-28.”

Such calculations are not unfounded, but they are incomplete. For example, QMV not only reduces Germany’s ability to block policies that favor poor countries, but it also reduces the ability of Turkey and other countries to block budget policies that existing members favor. Understanding the role of Turkey requires this kind of symmetrical analysis, as well as consideration of the status quo (which may introduce some further asymmetries into the analysis). In what follows we will develop an analysis of Turkey’s likely role in EU policy-making that will consider not just voting weight in the Council but the full panoply of EU decision-making procedures as well as the location of the status. Our analysis shows that the many fears concerning Turkey’s future influence are overstated.

**Concerns about Turkey’s preferences in Europe**

Turkey’s membership in the EU sparks concern in media discussion because it is distinctive on at least two dimensions (see for example, *The Economist*, “Unwelcome Guests”). First, many claim that Turkey’s membership will increase the “Muslim influence” in the EU, especially if a large, fundamentalist Islamic revival party one day governs Turkey. A pro-Turkey Danish editorial acknowledged that an Islamic revival party might pop up “like a jack-in-the-
box” (“som trolen af æsken”) but argued that even a party based on Islamic identity politics such as AKP (Justice and Development Party) could be strongly pro-European and reformist (“Et større Europa”). As it stands, Muslim influence in Europe is currently vanishingly small, consisting of a few Muslim members of parliament in Germany and the Netherlands (and still none in France). It is hard to see how Turkish membership in the EU could increase this power enough to make a difference for policy. Debates over Turkey and Islam have raised the profile of a few individuals such as (Ethiopian-born) Ayaan Hirsi Ali, but the effect on policy has been trivial.

Against these fears, some expect positive effects. Turkish membership may have a “moderating” influence on Muslims currently living in the EU who might otherwise turn to radical opposition movements. The current government of Turkey argues that greater integration between Islam and Europe will turn the issue of cultural difference into an advantage. For example, the government recently sent 700 moderate imams to Europe as part of a policy to encourage moderate forms of Islam (Salhani 2004). The AKP also sees the EU as useful for its own identity politics, hoping that entry into the Union will eliminate the headscarf issue in Turkey. Such moves highlight Turkey’s role as a “bridge” between Europe and its neighbors in North Africa and the Middle East.

A second concern about preferences is secular, an expectation that Turkey would tend to join the peripheral coalition of the UK, Scandinavia, and most central and eastern European countries (CEECs). These countries are less strongly integrationist than the original Six and a few other strongly pro-EU countries. Moreover, this cleavage overlaps with many policy areas, such as the role of markets or the EU’s relationship with NATO and the US, as well as style such as the use of English as opposed to French. Turkey’s effect on this debate should be a serious
We are obviously following Robert Dahl’s (1957) definition of power as the ability to get someone else to do something that they would not otherwise do. Turkey is not powerful if its votes are cast to keep the EU doing what it already does.

A concern, and here Turkey’s votes could make a real difference. Because this division already exists in Europe, however, Turkey’s entrance would not change the terms of the Union but merely contribute to the victory of one side or another in an existing debate. Examining the effects of Turkey’s influence more precisely is our task in the next sections.

The dimensionality of EU politics and Turkey’s likely preferences

Given Turkey’s distinctiveness, our analysis of Turkey’s weight in the political institutions of the EU depends both on voting rules and on preferences. We agree with those who expect that Turkey will formally have as much influence as Germany. Yet we maintain that these votes may not affect policy, that is, they may not give Turkey as much power as many fear—nor as much as Germany. We will focus on what Turkey can use its power for, and whether it is likely to be successful in using its power to make the EU do things that it would not otherwise do.  

Several different theories might help us evaluate Turkey’s influence in the future European Union. Scholars using power indices to measure influence would capture the large role of Turkey’s voting weight and assign it a large power index number (i.e., Baldwin and Widgrén 2005; Höslí 1993, 1995, 1996; Lane and Maeland 1996; Thomson and Höslí 2003). Unfortunately, these approaches do not normally consider preferences but instead treat each ordering of preferences as equally likely (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). With this inattention to preferences comes a failure to include the status quo against which policies are voted.

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The simplest way to incorporate both preferences and the status quo is an “intergovernmentalist” theory of Council decision-making (i.e., Moravcsik 1991, 1998). This approach’s central claim is that policy outcomes reflect “lowest-common-denominator” (LCD) bargaining, so the outcome will be whatever the most reluctant negotiator will accept. This implies that Turkey can serve as a brake on decisions when it is the LCD, but that it cannot pull the EU off in new directions because other, reluctant members will prevent this.

Despite some useful insights, intergovernmentalism remains limited in several respects. Intergovernmentalist theory rests primarily on the study of a few “grand bargains” in major intergovernmental conferences (Anderson 1995). While it can be criticized on empirical grounds even for such cases (i.e., Sverdrup 1998), it is analytically and empirically dubious for day-to-day decision making for three reasons. Analytically, Council decision-making typically uses qualified majority voting (QMV), which means that the LCD can be outvoted. Even decisions that apparently enjoy a consensus in the Council have been taken in the shadow of a possible QMV decision. Empirically, the theory lacks support where one would most expect it. In the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for example, policy outcomes often lie closer to median voter than to any LCD (Smith 2004).

Given these limitations of the alternatives, our approach is to examine the EU as a political system (Hix 1999), emphasizing the formal institutions of that political system and the way that each country’s politicians can pursue their interests within that system. We give special weight to the growing literature using spatial theories of politics to understand the EU (Crombez 1996, 1997; Hug and König 2002; Pahre 1997, 2001; Tsebelis 1994; Schneider and Cedermann 1993 and to some extent Schneider et al. eds. 1995; less formally, Hix 1999, Kreppel 2002). Spatial theory explicitly includes voting rules such as QMV and allows for domestic political
constraints to affect outcomes in ways beyond what intergovernmentalism allows (i.e., Crombez 1996, 1997; Hug and König 2002; Pahre 1997, 2001; Tsebelis 1994; Schneider and Cedermann 1993). It leaves open some questions, such as where preferences or policy agendas come from, but “constructivist” conceptions of these processes can help flesh the theory out when needed (see Smith 2004; Sverdrup 1998 for examples).

The major divisions in EU politics fall on the left-right dimension, the pro- or anti-integration axis, or represent particular national interests. It is also somewhat likely that another dimension, which has reflected environmental concerns, could broaden to include other dimensions of alternative politics against traditional values, as is found in Eastern Europe. (This has become known as a GAL-TAN cleavage, referring to green-alternative-left versus traditional-authoritarian-nationalist values.) Some scholars have found additional dimensions for secondary policy issues, such as a North-South cleavage over agricultural and regional policy. These policy dimensions are also related to some extent, and can be collapsed in some analyses (for recent contributions to this large literature, see Aspinwall 2002; Hix 1999, 2002; Marks et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2004; Noury 2002; Pennings 2002).

Simplifying, we can say that national interests often dominate policy-making in the Council of Ministers, while the complexities are more evident in the European Parliament. In the Council, these national interests are often organized around the question of greater or lesser integration. Even if individual ministers have preferences shaped by their position on the Left-Right dimension, it often plays better politically to defend national interests instead of taking ideological positions that tend to divide the citizenry politically. We will therefore analyze Turkey’s preferences in the Council as if it were a unitary actor pursuing a more or less coherent national interest. That national interest will often make Turkey’s preferences an outlier.
Like other large countries such as the UK and (unofficially) France, Turkey’s national interest will probably not lie in rapid integration. Unlike small countries that recognize a lack of control over the outside world, large countries tend to place a greater value on the sovereignty costs of deeper integration. Turkey is no different.

Second, and related in part to its size, nationalism remains very strong in Turkey as in some other large countries such as France, Poland, and the UK. Though lacking the imperial elements of, say, British or French nationalism, deep patriotism and a state-centered nationalism have remained an essential part of the Turkish polity since the 1930s (Ergil 2005; Heper 1985: 144). This nationalism has only grown as it was presented as an alternative to fascism in the 1930s and 1940s, to Marxism and theocracy alike in the 1970s, and in response to the terrorist attacks of the PKK. Though it has not presented itself as an obstacle to membership, this nationalism is likely to make Turkey prefer slower integration once it becomes a member.

Third, Turkey has limited capabilities to implement decisions toward rapid integration. If, like other countries, it prefers to commit only to those policies that it expects to be able to implement (Martin 2000 but Mertha and Pahre 2005), this weakness in administrative capabilities will also lead Turkey to demand a slower pace of integration, lest it be legally committed to policies that it lacks the capacity to implement fully.

Finally, Turkey’s position on the European periphery also means that it will have the kind of extra-European interests that also characterize the UK and Scandinavia. Its regional interests in the Middle East, for example, differ considerably from the EU mainstream. Because of its security concerns and approach to its own Kurdish minority, Turkey has advocated a strongly centralized constitution for Iraq, in contrast to the more federal principles that most Europeans support. Turkey also has significant interests in Central Asia and has close ties with the Turkic-
speaking countries of the region, ties not shared with other EU member states. Turkey will also share some interests with the other poorer countries of the EU on the North-South dimension, a dimension that has historically been much of secondary importance in defining EU politics.

In contrast to the national-interest and integration dimensions of the Council, the European Parliament is increasingly organized along the left-right dimension. The party groups are certainly organized that way. This left-right dimension often coincides with members’ views on greater or lesser integration. Particular national interests also play a role in the EP. In the EP, Turkey’s preferences must therefore be analyzed in terms of party groups, as we will do below.

Finally, it is worth noting that the EU does not currently have either a “Christian” or “Muslim” policy dimension in decision-making. One might argue that it does have a “Christian Socialist” dimension behind its concern for social solidarity and subsidiarity, and certainly Christian Socialism has played an important role historically in the European Union. Interestingly, the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament has recently admitted the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as an observer, despite the fact that several EPP parties opposed opening negotiations with Turkey. The decision was reportedly an easy one, as "a vast majority of group's members agreed that the AK Party is very similar to most of the Christian democratic parties in Europe and it is important for the group to have a strong partner in Turkey," according to Robert Fitzhenry, spokesman of the EPP party group (cited in Kubosova 2005). This position represents a remarkable reversal since the EPP’s declaration of 4 March 1997 that “The European Union is a civilisation project and within this civilisation project, Turkey has no place.” (cited in Müftüler and McClaren 2003: 23).

Some have expressed fears that a Muslim member would change policy dimensionality. It is hard to imagine exactly how this would work, however. What EU issues, exactly, would be
affected by the fact that most Turks are Muslims? On some of the most visible issues involving
civil rights, such as women’s head scarves, Turkey’s secularist tradition turns out to be very
similar to France and different from more integrationist countries such as the UK or Netherlands.
It is hard to see how these kinds of JHA affairs might be organized into a policy dimension other
than the existing Left-Right dimension.

In summary, Turkey will likely want slower integration, less social policy, less
environmentalism, and more agricultural and regional policy. Indeed, it has already sought
exemptions in some of these areas, including agriculture, environment, taxation, competition
policy, and transportation (“Turkey to ask EU for exemptions . . .”). Agricultural policy will
pose particular challenges, in part because of the serious regional differences in Turkish
agricultural development (Demir 2005; Quaisser and Reppegather 2004). Its overall position on
the left-right dimension is somewhat harder to predict in light of the collapse of the Republican
party and the current dominance of AKP. However, AKP’s likely entry into the EPP helps
cement its preferences within the European mainstream.

As we will show, having a position closer to the status quo than the EU core on all issues
than the North-South dimension implies that Turkey may serve as a partial brake on integration.
However, it will not play a role in leading the EU into new and possibly undesirable directions.

**Turkey and the Council**

We begin our institutional analysis with the European Council, which remains the most
important decision-making organ for many purposes (Thomson and Hösli 2003). It has the right
of initiative in a few issue areas such as enlargement. With a sufficient supermajority, it can
always amend Commission proposals, and its approval (also usually by supermajority) is

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necessary for almost all forms of legislation. We will analyze Council decision-making under both unanimity and QMV rules.

The oldest decision rule, unanimity remains particularly important in treaty negotiations, such as those at Maastricht, Amsterdam, or Nice. In these settings, the veto held by a country with outlier preferences can shape the result in important ways. Even so, this veto power is highly constrained. It can only block actions and not take new actions. Worries that Turkish membership will lead to major new spending programs redistributing income southeastward are therefore unreasonable.

In addition, the EU-25 can take actions today in issue areas where they anticipate a Turkish veto in the future. For example, the EU norm against capital punishment would have been impossible to create with Turkey as a member, given unanimity requirements in JHA. Recognizing this, the EU-15 established the norm before beginning Turkish membership negotiations, avoiding any Turkish veto in the future.

Now let us consider Turkey’s influence under a stylized form of QMV. The QMV procedure requires a majority of about 5/7 of the weighted votes, which we will model with only seven states. Treating Turkey as one of those seven overstates its likely vote weight (29 votes out of about 375, or 7.7%, which is a little more than half of one-seventh), and therefore exaggerates its influence. We will examine politics on a single policy dimension, which reflects the stronger germaneness constraint of EU policy-making in comparison with the United States. This restriction does not model well those cases in which trade-offs across policy are important, such as IGCs.
Figure 1 shows this model, with the ideal points of seven EU member states shown on a single dimension. Before Turkey joins the EU, policy will lie in the “core,” which is the range of policy from 3’s ideal point to 5's ideal point. Any policy to the left of 3’s ideal point would attract a QMV majority (3 through 7) to move it to the right, while any policy to the right of 5's ideal point would attract a similar majority to move it to the left. Between 3 and 5, three or more players would block any move in either direction.

We will now add Turkey to this abstract model. To do so, we will allow Turkey to have any preferences at all, so that we analyze all the possibilities, whether likely or not. These
preferences will likely be different from one issue to the next, so this approach abstracts from any particular issue area. We consider five possible locations for Turkey’s ideal point (labeled T1-T5), exhausting the logical possibilities of types of effects in this model. Because the line representing policy space is symmetric, particular illustrations of Turkey’s location should not be interpreted as implying that Turkey is on either the “Left” or “Right.”

As we have stressed throughout this paper, Turkey’s influence is shaped by two factors: its ideal point, and the weighting that its votes receive. Adding an eighth player means that a 5/7 majority requires six votes of eight. This case is illustrated in the bottom diagram, treating Turkey as a “normal” country. Alternatively, we might suppose that Turkey’s large weighted vote means that a majority of five (of eight) countries can pass any proposal if that five includes Turkey, while six countries are necessary if Turkey opposes the proposal. In this way, we capture Turkey’s relatively large share of votes in a simple way. This situation is shown in Figure 1 as “powerful Turkey.” Obviously this procedure overstates Turkey’s real votes but the distinction between the two scenarios is useful, and much easier to see when exaggerated.

This procedure works tolerably well for all foreseeable decision-making processes. The EU Constitution, if it had been ratified, would have used a “double majority” vote requiring a majority of 55% of member states representing 65% of the Union population, with a blocking coalition also required to consist of at least four states. If Turkey were to join the EU today, it would have 70 million of the EU’s population of 550 million (including Bulgaria and Romania), or about one-eighth of the total. This would have an effect similar to the “powerful Turkey” scenario discussed in the text, although reducing Turkey’s blocking power a bit because of the four-state minimum requirement for any measure to pass.

Adding Turkey defines a new core—the set of policies that, once adopted, cannot be
changed. These cores are shown as C1-C5 for each of the five possible locations of Turkey’s preferences. The pre-Turkey situation also defined a core. When those cores are identical, adding Turkey has no effect, for whatever policy was in effect before Turkey will remain after Turkey. If the post-Turkey core is a superset of the pre-Turkey core, Turkey will again have no effect, since every policy previously in effect would continue to be in the core and would therefore not be subject to change (by definition).

When Turkey is a “normal” state, it can expand the core slightly when it has extreme preferences. We see this in the cores C1, C2 and C5 (C5, we should note, is the mirror image of C2 but is included to show effects in both directions). When Turkey’s preferences lie only slightly outside the existing core, as is true of T2 and T5, it expands the win-set slightly to include its own ideal point. In contrast, when Turkey has extreme preference on a policy dimension, it will always be outvoted. However, outvoting Turkey requires that the policy coalition add some other state to the winning QMV coalition. This other country’s preferences may help shape the win-set. As we see in Figure 1, state 2 will help define the win-set in these cases.

When Turkey is “powerful” in the sense defined above, it will not surprisingly have greater influence. Turkey’s influence in moving policy in a favorable direction works in exactly the same way as a “normal” Turkey. In these cases, Turkey’s votes can expand the core in the direction that it favors; equivalently, it can keep the core from reaching too far away from its preferences.

The more interesting effect happens on the opposite end of the policy dimension. Turkey’s weighted votes do not help much in pulling policy toward its ideal point but are very useful when putting together a blocking coalition against policy changes unfavorable to Turkey.
A coalition of five states that includes Turkey can ignore the most distant *three* member states, labeled 5-7 in our figure. This pulls in the right-hand bound of the core, either to 4's ideal point or to Turkey’s own ideal point. This effect is visible in C2, for example.

Even in these cases, Turkey’s influence is limited to *new* policy initiatives. Any well-established policy will already be located in the pre-Turkey core, that is, between the ideal points of states 3 and 5. Analyzing this requires a new concept, the “win-set.” The win-set is the set of policies that the Council prefers to a particular status quo. This differs from the core, which does not consider the status quo at all (or, phrased differently, considers all possible status quos, and takes the union of all the resulting win-sets).

Any policy that is chosen before Turkey joins will still be a rational outcome and therefore not subject to change. The CAP is probably a good example, which is very difficult to change whether or not Turkey joins the EU. We need only conduct a win-set analysis, then, when the pre-Turkey core is not a subset of the post-Turkey core. To see the maximum extent of its possible influence, we will consider only the case of a “powerful” Turkey. Figure 2 begins with the assumption that the pre-Turkey policy is in that set of the core that does not lie in the post-Turkey core (T5, which is the mirror image of T1, is not shown). Below the pre-Turkey core, we show this set of “changeable” policies, that is, policies that are no longer in the post-Turkey core. The policies in this set provide the possible locations of the status quo.
To see the maximum change, suppose that the player farthest away can propose a new policy—this means T1 or state 1 for policy changes to the left, state 7 for policy changes to the right. Any proposal needs to attract five votes if the coalition includes a “powerful” Turkey (as in all the cases here). For policy moves to the left, this means that the fifth actor from the left must be no worse off under the new policy; for policy moves to the right, the fifth actor from the right must be no worse off under the new policy. The minimum change is infinitesimally small. Because the set of changeable policies is an open set defined by the boundary of the “unchangeable” core, a closed set, policy could change by epsilon, bringing into that core. The
In all such cases, the new policy will remain within the old core, as all the win-sets are subsets of that core. The constraints imposed by the need to satisfy existing members limits policy change considerably. Turkey’s power helps determine the new outcome, but so does existing members’ choice of status quo. Indeed, the existing members can forestall any change after Turkey’s membership by choosing the pre-Turkey status quo accordingly.

We would expect, then, that the potential for Turkish membership of the EU will shape policy choices today. This will be particularly likely in areas that are subject to unanimity today but will be subject to QMV in the future. This characterizes a variety of policies in the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs). Turkey will not pull the EU in new directions after joining, but its future influence will help existing members select particular solutions to problems in advance of Turkey’s membership. This is a much more narrow form of influence than seen in most of the fearful accounts discussed above.

**Further considerations in the Council**

In addition to these vote calculations, let us consider two confounding factors. First, Stefanie Bailer (2004) has recently argued that differences in national bargaining “skill” also affect outcomes in the Council. For example, participants view the UK as very skillful negotiators because of the high levels of information gathered through the excellent network of British EU civil servants.

At this point, Turkey will not join the UK among the ranks of the “highly skilled.” It is interesting that Turkish administrators have noticed the issue, however. Turkey's former Secretary-General for European Union Affairs, Ambassador Murat Sungar, has noted that he
lacks sufficient numbers of expert officers in the core committee that will conduct full membership negotiations with the EU (Kurt 2005). This lack of skilled personnel remained a problem for Sungar and, with the renewed challenges of the Cyprus issue, ongoing administrative problems were a cause of his resignation in August 2005 (Boland, Kuser and Minder 2005). Turkey will doubtless fare poorly on the “skill” dimension until it has been an EU member for some years and its professional diplomatic staff has had an opportunity to develop appropriate expertise and networks.

Second, some scholars emphasize the importance of the unanimity norm in the Council, which would make vote-counting exercises such as ours irrelevant (i.e., Mattila and Lane 2001). There is some tendency in such work to explain outcomes in terms of voting weights because of vote-trading processes even under unanimity (i.e., Rodden 2002). Unfortunately, we are not aware of any studies that control for the status quo and the nature of QMV majorities while simultaneously examining the role of voting weights, which is what spatial theory would have us do (see Pahre 2005 for the general critique). Some results are suggestive, however. Harry Flam (2003: 26), for example, finds that per capita GNP, Cohesion Fund status, and voting weight explain variation in per capita contributions among the EU-15. However, voting weight has the smallest substantive effect and is of marginal statistical importance. This is consistent with the theory here, which would predict that controlling for the status quo and the QMV coalitions would increase the measurable effect of voting weight.

We should also consider the likely effect of Turkey’s first Council Presidency. The theoretical literature on the institution of the presidency is still thin, but it seems that the holders of this office does have some ability to affect policy outcomes in their favor (Huelshoff 2002; Kollman 2003; Tallberg 2004). Both experience in EU policy-making, and thorough preparation
for the presidency play an important role in determining just how much influence the chair can have. Skill in brokering deals also helps shape the scope for a country to achieve its own goals as part of the package. There is no reason to believe that Turkey will be any more effective than other states in pursuing its own national goals while Council President, and in its first Presidency a lack of infrastructure and experience will likely make it somewhat less effective.

Looking even further ahead, we should also consider how the Council might change in response to Turkish membership. Carubba and Volden (2001) have suggested that the EU will make greater use of smaller supermajorities as the number of members increases. This implies a greater use of QMV where unanimity now applies. Despite rejection of the Constitution in 2006, its “common procedure” may prove to be a desirable reform in future treaties. Under this procedure, most Council decisions would be made by double majority (55% of the countries representing at least 65% of the EU population). These kinds of procedural innovations increase Turkey’s ability to influence new policies but reduce its ability to help block changes to existing policies.

In light of our analysis of the Council as a whole, it is hard to see how Turkey could have systematic and major effects on EU policy. It can at best pull new policies in a favorable direction, and can make some existing policies unsustainable by weakening some blocking coalitions. In both cases, existing members are hardly powerless. By establishing a status quo strategically, existing members can reduce even further Turkey’s likely influence. This is exactly how members have dealt with previous major expansions, by establishing the Common Fisheries Policy before the 1973 enlargement, or by changing decision-making procedures before the 2004 enlargement. We should expect the same behavior before Turkey becomes a member.
Turkey and the Commission

The Commission is probably the EU’s second-most influential body after the Council. Like the Council, it has a voice on every issue, though Commission powers are slowly being whittled away. Each Commissioner has important agenda-setting powers in his or her policy domain. A Commission can also influence important policy decisions across issues by voting in the Commission, though traditions of deference and consensus dilute this influence.

In this setting, Turkey’s first Commissioner will certainly be an influential figure in Europe. As a large country, Turkey will expect that its Commissioner will be given an important portfolio. Countries clearly choose their commissioner candidates carefully so that they will be qualified for an important post. Austria has chosen particularly well for a small country, winning first Agriculture and then External Relations in successive Commissions (1999-2004, 2004-2009), thanks to the European-wide reputations of their nominees (Franz Fischler and Benita Ferrero-Waldner). Poland has also played this game well, winning the important post of Regional Policy for Danuta Hübner, an academic-turned-politician who has had positions at universities in Berkeley, Madrid, and Sussex.

When countries fail to select wisely, the Commission President now feels sufficiently strong to relegate such a weak candidate to a secondary post. The recent precedent was Jacques Chirac’s choice of Jacques Barrot in 2004, despite his legal problems and involvement in scandal. Commission President Barroso assigned Barrot to Transportation instead of Competition or a other influential economic post as France had sought.

Knowing this, Turkey will be highly constrained to choose a safe pair of hands. Given the uncertainties surrounding Turkey’s first commissioner, any future Commission President will certainly not appoint the Turkish Commissioner to a post such as External Relations where
significant discretion is essential to the job. Nor will the President want to offend Turkey with a
minor post such as Information Society. It would likely be very difficult to appoint a Turkish
commissioner to a post where Turkey’s preferences are significantly different from the European
mainstream, such as regional policy, culture, or perhaps agriculture.

Given this, it seems likely that some significant economic post would be a likely
destination for Turkey’s first commissioner. Knowing this, Turkey would be wise to nominate a
commissioner with significant international economic expertise, such as past experience with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), or similar body. This
background would imply that this commissioner would have preferences that lie within the
mainstream economic policy approaches found in the industrialized democracies. If this decision
were made today, the set of likely candidates would include as Kemal Unakitan (Minister of
Finance), Ali Babacan (Minister of State), Abdullah Gul (Minister of Foreign Affairs) or Sureyya
Serdengecti (Governor of the Central Bank). Each would pose a different set of political choices
if the government were making this decision. Unakitan is an older member of AKP and is closer
to its traditionalists. Babacan and Gul are younger and more moderate. Serdengecti is a popular
figure because of his successful management of the Central Bank, and he has good relations with
the IMF. All these figures have degrees in economics, and Gul is an Associate Professor in
International Economics. Another popular name would be Kemal Derviş, the former Minister of
State in Ecevit's cabinet, a former IMF official, and now head of the UN Development Program
(UNDP) though he is probably too much associated with the Left. For a non-economic
candidate, Turkey might follow the lead of several accession countries and choose a diplomat
closely associated with the accession negotiations, such as former negotiator Murat Sungar or
current negotiator Ali Babacan. However, this strategy seems to be more popular with the
smallest countries in the EU such as Latvia (Andris Piebalgs), Lithuania (Dalia Grybauskaitė), Malta (Joe Borg), Slovakia (Ján Figel) and Slovenia (Janez Potočnik), none of whom ended up with a major portfolio. Of course, the set of candidates will be different when Turkey becomes a member some ten years hence, but the kinds of issues here will be largely unchanged.

An economic commissioner is also likely because these posts are both important and constrained. Any new regulations would have to go through both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. This limits the discretion available to Turkey’s first commissioner, though he or she would still retain the important agenda-setting powers of the Commission. Finally, the constraints under which Turkey will choose a commissioner practically guarantees someone with mainstream views. If Turkey selects poorly, its candidate will presumably suffer Barrot’s fate.

**Turkey and the European Parliament**

The final major political body of the EU for us to consider is the Parliament. We will set aside the European Court of Justice, despite its importance, because the secrecy around its votes make it extremely difficult to forecast the role of a Turkish justice.

The first question is the number of seats that Turkey will receive. In the past, the EU has assigned voting weights to countries in a rank-order fashion, and not proportional to population. Small countries are overrepresented, and there is a norm for large countries to be treated similarly. For example, Germany has as many votes as does Britain, France and Italy in QMV decisions in the Council of Ministers, despite being significantly larger in GDP and population. After reunification, Germany did obtain more seats in the European Parliament, though the other large states have identical numbers of seats despite varying populations.
Given this background, it is likely that Turkey would receive the same number of seats in the European Parliament as either France-Italy-UK or Germany. Which of these two possibilities occurs will depend on the realized growth rate of Turkey’s population and economy, and the exact date of Turkish entry. Either weighting is likely to persist even if Turkey’s population were to become substantially larger than Germany’s, especially since Germany’s economy will remain several times larger. As a “worst case scenario” for Turkey’s alleged power, we will analyze Turkey’s future influence under the assumption that it will have the same number of seats as does Germany.

Despite this formal equality, Turkey will likely remain much less influential than Germany. Germany is clearly the most influential country in the European Parliament today, but this does not simply reflect the size of its delegation. More important, the political systems of Germany and the EU interact in a way that increases Germany’s influence.

Politics in the EP is dominated by the party groups (Hix 1999; Hix and Lord 1997; Kreppel 2002). The most important of these are the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People’s Party (EPP), which represent mainstream social democracy and Christian democracy (conservatism), respectively. Because many EP decisions require an absolute majority of all MEPs, and not just a majority of those MEPs present for a given vote, mobilizing these two party groups often suffices to guarantee passage of any measure.

Within these party groups, national delegations provide a key organizing principle. Positions are normally worked out in each national delegation, after which each party group develops a common position. In addition, European party groups have no way to keep national delegations in line, though national delegations can keep their members in line in various ways.

Herein lies the German advantage. Germany’s two largest parties are the SPD and the
CDU/CSU. The SPD sits in the PES, the CDU/CSU in the EPP. Their size in Germany guarantees that at least one of them will always be in government, and thus represented in the Council. Their size in the EP means that they are typically the largest national delegation in each of the two largest party groups. The key advantage that Germany has, then, is the existence of two dominant parties in the domestic political system that occupy political positions at the heart of the two largest party groups in the European Parliament.

Although Turkish politics now operates as a two-party system, Turkey is not likely to enjoy such an advantage. On the Center-Left, the high degree of fractionalization will make it unlikely for Turkey to have much influence within the PES. On the Center-Right, the increasing rivalry between AKP and DYP (True Path Party) will likely divide AKP’s votes in the next elections. These divisions will make Turkey’s EP delegation look more like France’s or Italy’s that Germany’s or the UK’s. This will reduce its influence considerably.

To see the importance of this particular combination of features, consider the other large countries. The governing party in Italy, Forza Italia, formerly sat in the Union for Europe group though it has since joined the EPP. The UE is a mid-sized political group toward the right end of the political spectrum, consisting of a heterogeneous collection of parties, including Poland’s Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice), Ireland’s Fianna Fáil, and French Gaullists. This group’s support is not necessary for passing most legislation in the EP. Its modest size makes policy leadership more difficult, and its heterogeneity makes it hard to unite around any measure. Being in such a group made Forza Italia marginal despite its significance in Italian politics. This structural weakness was the most important reason for Forza Italia to join the EPP instead.

Though they may come together in domestic presidential races, parties of the French left and right are also divided. Left parties are found in both the PES and GUE, right parties in EPP
and UEN. These divisions make the French delegation in each group relatively small for a large-country delegation. They do not help shape the caucus agenda to the same degree as the German parties.

Britain’s two largest parties now share the same potential advantages of the German parties in that Labour sits in the PES and the Conservatives sit in the EPP (they historically sat in the European Democratic group). During most of the time since UK membership, however, both parties have had outlier preferences within these party groups, largely as a result of their internal divisions over Europe. Consolidation of the Blair wing of the Labour Party has made it much more a part of the PES mainstream, increasing its influence accordingly. However, the Tories have moved in the opposite direction and become more strongly Euroskeptic. This has had the effect of marginalizing them in the EPP on many issues, since the EPP and ELDR represent the political traditions that have historically been the most supportive of the EU.

MEPs respond rationally to their opportunities for influence in the EP. One interesting measure is the number of MEPs who choose to stay in Brussels for a second term. Though only about 30% of all MEPs plan a second term in the EP (or a move to another EU institution), almost 58% of British MEPs, and 43% of German MEPs plan to remain, in contrast to only 28% and 23% of Italian and French MEPs, respectively (Scarrow 1997). These data tend to confirm our claims that Germany and the UK are much more influential in the EP than France and Italy.

In light of this analysis, the key question is, then, where will Turkey’s MEPs sit in the European Parliament? On the Right, the governing Islamicist party (AK) was recently given observer status in the EPP, despite the EPP’s traditional foundation in Christian Democracy. Prime Minister Erdogan has sought to join the EPP partly because the EPP’s conservative agenda seems suitable for the party program of AKP. The EPP has also been strongly pro-European, as
is AKP—uniquely, for a religious party in Turkey. Perhaps more important, Erdogan also sees strategic advantages in this move. The EPP has been one of the strongest opponents of Turkish entry into the EU. Erdogan aims to neutralize this opposition, since joining the EPP would make it difficult for the Christian Democrats to reject Turkey's membership. Recognizing this, the members of the EPP are cautious about making any comments about the future of AKP's position in the organization. The chairman of the German CDU/CSU in the European Parliament, Hartmut Nassauer, has emphasized the reluctance of the EPP to accept AKP's request and implied that AKP's position is not an urgent matter, considering the long road ahead that lies in front of Turkey (O’Rourke 2003). AKP's recently acquired observer status, despite this opposition, shows that the EPP group would like to see AKP on their side in the Parliament especially because of the accession negotiations that will start in 2005.

The opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party) is a member of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PES) and the Socialist International. Although leftist parties were previously skeptical about the EU membership—mainly because of the Kemalist principle of sovereignty—in the last decade they accepted membership in light of the intergovernmental structure of the Union. As a result, they have accepted entry into the Union as one of the major foreign policy goals. In particular, CHP's supportive position depends on its long-term relationship with the PES and the hope that integration with Europe will strengthen secularism in Turkey (Hale and Avci 2001). In fact, Deniz Baykal, leader of the CHP, asked for PES support on Turkish membership, and assured the members of the group about the Turkish government by emphasizing that AKP is a conservative party, not a radical one ("Baykal asks PES's support").

We can expect interesting changes to accompany Turkey’s accession process. There is some tendency for parties from an “unconventional” party system to assimilate to the more
standard EU system as they work within party caucuses and develop joint programs with them.

For example, Slovakia used to be characterized by a party system consisting of conventional left-right parties and unconventional, “alternative” parties. Around the turn of the century, one of these alternative parties, Smer, found itself as the only significant party proposing any traditional “leftist” policies. As it joined the Party of European Socialists (PES) in anticipation of taking seats in the European Parliament after EU membership, it began to assimilate to PES policies on various issues. It now approaches the model of a conventional social-democratic party. In this process it gave up other policies, including some of a somewhat authoritarian bent, to gain acceptance in the EU (Učeň 2004: 63-66). The same assimilation has happened to other parties in Central and Eastern Europe, and we can expect that at least some parties in Turkey will undergo an analogous evolution.

The relative strength of these parties will also reflect the electoral system that Turkey uses to choose MEPs. The EU rules for electing MEPs require that each country use a proportional system of some kind even if they use first-past-the-post (FPTP) in national elections, as does the UK. Most countries use a system of proportional representation (PR). This requirement of proportionality is quite flexible, and encompasses transferable-vote systems in Ireland and Malta that work in some ways like FPTP, and like PR in other respects.

Turkey uses closed list PR system. The candidates are elected from 81 multi-seat provinces with a party-list proportional representation system using the d'Hondt method, with restricted options and a double barrier (at the local and national level). In addition, parties must have broad national support and cross an electoral threshold. A candidate can only be elected if the party (a) is fully organized in at least half of the provinces and one-third of the districts within these provinces; (b) has nominated two candidates for each parliamentary seat in at least
half of the provinces; (c) has obtained at least 10% of the valid votes cast nationwide; and (d) has received, in the constituency in question, valid votes at least equal to the applicable simple electoral quotient (EPIC Project). Except the 10 percent threshold, Turkey will most probably choose a similar system for EP elections. In that case, candidates from minority groups (e.g., Kurdish parties) might win seats in the Parliament. On the other hand, since the Left has never received more than 40 percent of the votes in Turkish history, leftist opposition parties such as the CHP would most probably win seats only from their traditional strongholds (e.g., Izmir).

While Turkish parties will tend to receive votes in line with their national-level support, it is important not to view EP elections isolated from national elections. Voters view EP elections as "second-order" elections in which many of them punish the incumbents, or vote Euroskeptic, rather than voting their normal party loyalty (Reiff and Schmidt 1988). In this case, opposition parties would benefit from the electorate's psyche. In the Turkish context, we would expect opposition parties on the Right to gain more than the leftist parties because of the above-mentioned political structure. Although AKP is claiming a center-Right position, it is a hybrid of several Right-wing factions including more traditional Islamist ones. Hence, another center-Right party like DYP or a nationalist party like MHP (National Action Party) might more easily attract the reactionary votes in the EP elections. In sum, we would expect center-Right parties including AKP to have more votes than CHP, and the CHP to win seats from its traditional strongholds in the PR system. This fragmentation on an otherwise-dominant Right may end up resembling the pattern in France, whose EP delegation is relatively weak.

Our analysis so far suggests that Turkey’s influence will be particularly small in the European Parliament. This implies that Turkish MEPs will not play a major amendment role, nor will they be key players in the budget procedure.
We should also consider more informal forms of influence in the EP, such as lobbying of MEPs by industry, labor, and other groups. Because the EP is a parliament with low party discipline, similar in many respects to the US Congress, lobbying has played a rapidly increasing role as EP powers have increased since Maastricht.

We are not aware of any studies that look at how national differences affect lobbying, nor do we know any studies claiming that certain nations’ interests are better achieved through the lobbying process than others. The literature does emphasize that both national and European associations play key roles (Bouwen 2004). Peak associations of labor and capital, and similar economic associations, seem especially important. Several recent studies, following developments in the theory of lobbies in the US Congress, emphasize the powers of groups that can provide important information to the EU (i.e., Broscheid and Coen 2003; Crombez 2002).

Turkey has several peak associations in which labor and business interests are organized. Among these associations, TUSIAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) and TUGIAD (Türkiye Genç İşadamları Derneği, Young Businessmen Association of Turkey) have been more active in lobbying for the accession of Turkey. TUSIAD's lobbying group has visited major European capitals before the decision about Turkish membership in 2004. They mostly made contacts with ministers, heads of state and peer organizations (e.g., French Entrepreneur's Movement, MEDEF). TUGIAD, on the other hand, followed a slightly different path by joining the subcommittee meetings of YES (Confederation of Young European Businessmen Associations), and following the matters regarding the European Union and YES in Brussels. MUSIAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), a Muslim and faith-based association, does not actively lobby in Europe because of its members' skepticism about the
possibility of membership. It represents small and medium-sized firms in Anatolia, which naturally tend to fear competition from European firms.

Major labor unions in Turkey such as TURK-IS (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions), HAK-IS (Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions), KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions), and DISK (Devrimçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey) are members of the European Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC). The ETUC unanimously adopted a resolution calling for Turkey's accession to the EU in October 2004 (www.etuc.org). This organizational unity on EU matters stands in contrast to their differences at the national level, which include ideology, religion, and public versus private sector membership bases. TURK-IS, the largest federation, is also the most skeptic of EU membership, while the religiously-oriented HAK-IS and leftist DISK both see the EU as a way to improve social justice in Turkey. Yet, the question of to what extent this support is a result of Turkish labor unions' lobbying efforts remains.

Given the lack of scholarship on national variation in lobbying success, it is hard to know what these facts imply. Certainly Turkey has an infrastructure of peak associations that can play a role in the usual forms of interest representation in Brussels. The relative fragmentation of these associations will tend to make them weaker than those from countries that retain a unified peak association structure. Beyond that, it is hard to tell.

In summary, it is hard to see how Turkey might “punch above its weight” in the European Parliament. The reverse seems more likely, with Turkey’s MEPs and interest groups being somewhat less influential than their numbers would imply.
Dealing with Turkey’s accession: prior changes in policy and decision-making

Whatever Turkey’s likely influence over policy in the future EU, current members can reduce it by taking some decisions before Turkish entry. The EU has a long tradition of changing its rules before enlargement. This custom locks in some policy choice or decision-making procedures that the new member or members would dislike. For example, the EU-6 laid out the Common Fisheries Policy before the expected entry of four countries with significant fishing fleets (Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the UK). The connection was made remarkably clear when the Six reached an agreement in principle on 30 June 1970, the day before the accession negotiations began. As a result, the CFP became part of *acquis communautaire* that the new members would have to accept, though this agreement did not become finalized for some months thereafter (Franchino and Rahming 2003).

The Nice treaty reflected similar intentions in that it changed policy before the Eastern enlargement. Despite its ostensible goal of streamlining decision-making in a Union of 25, it did not introduce majority voting in taxation, social policy, immigration, or structural spending, where existing members would want to have vetoes against changes reflecting the interests of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). Structural policy will be subject to QMV in 2007 but only on condition that the next seven-year budget framework has already been agreed, thereby shifting the effective use of QMV in structural policy to 2014, well beyond current decision-makers’ time horizons (Heinemann 2002).

Changes in decision-making procedures provide another example. Though the Czech Republic is more populous than Belgium, it received fewer seats in the EP (20 against 22), and the same pattern characterizes Hungary and Portugal. Nice also introduced rules for enhanced cooperation by eight or more members. This keeps the new CEEC members from blocking
deeper cooperation whenever the EU15 wants it (Heinemann 2002). These provisions will have similar effects on Turkey, preventing it from using its potential weight in a way that would harm existing members.

The accession negotiations can also lock in policies on certain issues. For example, several areas in which Turkish jurisprudence differs from general EU practice have already been made part of the entry package. These include abolition of the death penalty, and minority rights for Kurds, a \textit{de facto} prohibition on the introduction of laws on adultery. The EU-25 and EU-27 can, and doubtless will, add other requirements as they wish. We analyzed the logic of this above, showing that this is an effective way to minimize Turkey’s post-accession influence, albeit by anticipating that influence a bit before membership.

As Munchau (2004) has argued, the real question is not whether Turkey will join the EU but what kind of Europe Turkey will join. The EU’s current members have every interest in making that Europe serve their interests, even at the expense of Turkey’s.

Conclusion

We have argued that Turkey’s room for influencing the EU is surprisingly narrow, despite the many worries to the contrary. In retrospect, this should not be too surprising. The many veto players in EU decision-making make it difficult to change policy. The mere fact that normal legislation requires approval of the Commission, Council, and Parliament prevents too much legislation from passing. This tricameral structure gives disproportionate weight to the status quo, a status quo that Turkey did not help shape. Moreover, the existing members can make last-minute changes to that status quo before Turkey joins, diluting its potential influence further.

We should emphasize that our analysis here is partial. For example, our analysis of
decision-making procedures gives little attention to intergovernmental decisions that require unanimity for the simple reason that Turkey does not raise any unique issues under unanimity rules. In an IGC, Turkey will have the same veto as any other member state, and one might as well fear France’s continued membership in the EU as Turkey’s future membership.

In an environment emphasizing consensus, such as the Council of Europe or IGCs, compromise is at a premium. In this setting, Turkey may be able to trade its goals in some area where they are outliers to obtain goals in some other issue area. For example, it is possible that some day the EU may decide to take a much more active role in some high-spending area such as defense, education, or welfare. Clearly, this would require a major new constitutional agreement. Turkey would likely have outlier preferences on these issues and demand much larger transfers, and it would be in a relatively good position to obtain them.

As this suggests, like any other country, Turkey’s accession may present trade-offs between widening and deepening the European Union. Former Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (2004) put such concerns in strong terms in a speech at the University of Leiden in September 2004. He discussed the difficulties of integrating a large number of ethnicities and nationalities into a single political system—choosing the provocative analogy of the Habsburg empire’s attempts to build a multinational state in southeastern Europe after beating the Ottomans back from the gates of Vienna in 1683:

The Turks were continually driven back and the Central European empire grew steadily larger . . . The territory of the Danube monarchy now lies spread across fifteen different countries. The empire expanded but the capacity to absorb the new peoples declined. At a certain moment the Danube monarchy reached the limit of the number of peoples that it could hold together.⁷ (Bolkestein 2004:3)

⁷“De Turken werden steeds verder teruggedrongen en het Midden-Europese keizerrijk werd steeds groter . . . Het territorium van de Donaumonarchie ligt nu verspreid over bijna
Habsburg history, according to Bolkestein, illustrates a “consolidation problem”
(‘consolidatieprobleem’) analogous to Brussels’ problems now, torn between unity and diversity,
centralism and decentralization, absolutism [!] and democratization. He reminds us that the
Habsburgs ended up giving Europe the first world war, and asks of the EU, “How can one export
stability and prevent worse instability from being imported?” He concludes that the EU must
learn from Austria-Hungary, a comparison with which we are not inherently unsympathetic (see
Pahre 2001).

It is easy to talk about abstract problems of “consolidation” or “widening versus
deepening,” and we remain skeptical of the alleged causal relationships (see Pahre 1995). A
closer review of decision-making institutions, Turkey’s preferences, and the status quo suggests
that the pessimists reach too far. Like any other member state, Turkey will retain some scope for
influence. However, its influence will likely be surprisingly small, despite the size of its
population.

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vijftien verschillende staten. Het keizerrijk breidde zich uit maar de capaciteit om de nieuwe
volken te absorberen nam af. Op een zeker moment stuitte de Donaumonarchie op de grens van
het aantal volken die zij bijeen kon houden.”

8“Hoe kan men stabilité exporteren en voorkomen dat slechts instabiliteit wordt
geëxporteerd?”
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