Indirect Questions in Old Latin: Syntactic and Pragmatic Factors Conditioning Modal Shift

LAURENCE STEPHENS

1. Introduction

In Old Latin the original indicative of a direct question is not universally shifted into the subjunctive to form an indirect question. Sometimes modal shift occurs, e.g. Pl. Merc. 103, vosmet videte quam mihi valide placerit, and sometimes it does not, e.g. Pl. Pseud. 18, face me certum quid tibist. (cf. Cic. Fac me certiorem quando adfuturus sis). Can particular conditions be discerned that favor modal shift? Are there rules governing modal shift in Old Latin, or is it in a stage of more or less free variation? Scholars such as Bennett,1 Lindsay,2 and Woodcock3 seem to suggest the latter view when they claim that both the indicative and the subjunctive are found side by side in indirect questions depending on the same main verb. Six or seven cases are commonly cited: Pl. Amph. 17; Cist. 57; Most. 199 and 969; Pers. 515; Ter. Andr. 650; and Hecyr. 873–74. All of these cases have been disputed, notably by Becker4 and Gaffiot.5 Gaffiot’s interpretation of

1 C. E. Bennett, Syntax of Early Latin I. The Verb (Boston 1910), p. 121.
2 W. M. Lindsay, Syntax of Plautus (Oxford 1907), p. 66.
4 E. Becker, De syntaxi interrogationum obliquarum apud priscos scriptores Latinos, Studemundus Studien 1 (1873), pp. 113–314.
the indicatives at Pl. Amph. 17, Most. 969 and Pers. 515 as relative clauses seems rather forced but raises an important methodological point. Interrogative pronouns are distinct from relatives only in some cases. Any preliminary analysis of the use of the indicative must be limited to forms that are clearly interrogative. At Pl. Cist. 57 velis is most likely not an instance of modal shift, but a potential subjunctive used like velim. (Cist. 57 belongs to Class 1a discussed below in section 2.) This raises another methodological point: any preliminary analysis of modal shift must be limited to subjunctives that cannot be ascribed to independent uses in direct questions. The remaining cases of indicatives occurring alongside subjunctives have been analyzed as independent exclamations or direct questions. I agree with Bräunlich 6 that these interpretations seem rather unnatural, and I do not wish to argue that modal shift in Old Latin is governed by absolute and categorical rules and that there is no variation. Rather, we should remember that there are about two thousand potentially dependent interrogative clauses in Old Latin, and these six or seven cases should be assessed in the light of the regularities and tendencies which obtain in that large corpus.7

Wackernagel8 suggested that Old Latin modal shift was a gradient phenomenon, depending on the degree of dependency of the interrogative clause: “je dezidierter . . . das Abhängigkeitsverhältnis ist, um so eher der Konjunktive gebraucht wird.” Wackernagel, however, did not specify how the Abhängigkeitsverhältnis is to be assessed: is it syntactic, semantic, or somehow pragmatic and stylistic, or a combination of some or all of such factors? Some twenty years before Wackernagel, Delbrück9 reached exactly the opposite conclusion. Pointing to apparently contrasting pairs such as Pl. Truc. 499, vide quis loquitur tam propinqu. (an example belonging to Class 1 discussed in section 2), and Pl. Amph. 787, vide sis signi quid siet, (an example belonging to Class 2 discussed in section 2), Delbrück asked:

Wie erklärt sich diese Anwendung des Subjunktivs? Aus der Natur des Abhängigkeitsverhältnisses kann sie nicht folgen, denn bei demselben

7 From data supplied by Bennett (Syntax of Early Latin), I calculate that only 19% of the ca. 1064 clearly dependent word questions in Old Latin are unshifted. This proportion is sufficiently small to suggest that it is the retention of the indicative, and not modal shift, that is the more restricted variant.
9 B. Delbrück, Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen 3 (Strasbourg 1900).
Verhältnis zeigen sich ja auch Indikative; auch nicht aus der Natur des Modus, denn sonst würde dieselbe Anwendung sich, wohl auch, in den verwandten Sprachen finden.

Since there was, in his opinion, no synchronic regularity in Old Latin modal shift, Delbrück concluded that scholars should concentrate on the historical linguistic processes through which modal shift arose in Latin. I hope to show in this article that just the reverse research strategy is the productive one: by formulating a more adequate synchronic account we will be able to discover new aspects of the diachronic processes involved in the development of modal shift.10

The only comprehensive study of Old Latin modal shift is that of Eduard Becker.11 This work is an essential starting point for any study, and my paper is clearly much indebted to it. Becker’s work, however, is marred by a tendency to emend away examples that do not fit his arguments, and it is difficult to say to what extent he succeeded in developing an explicit, consistent, and systematic theory. For such a theory we must turn to Haiim Rosén’s recent study.12 Rosén advances the hypothesis that: “it takes a verb of inquiry (or response to an inquiry . . . ) to cause modal shift.”13 The full set of conditions disjunctively sufficient for Old Latin modal shift as proposed by Rosén can be organized into four classes and these arranged to reflect increasing generalization of the domain of modal shift, with clear diachronic implications, which, however, Rosén does not discuss: (1) the verb of the main clause expresses an inquiry, e.g. rogo at Pl. Pers. 635, die Pl. Bacch. 555, narra Ter. Eun. 562; (2) a response to an inquiry, e.g. dixi Pl. Curc. 608, scio Pl. Capt. 1007; (3) reception of a response to an inquiry, e.g. audivi Pl. Amph. 745, ex hoc . . . scio Pl. Capt. 295; (4) ignorance or uncertainty, even when no desire to know is expressed, e.g. nescire passim, interrogative verbs of knowing, e.g. Pl. Poen. 1121, verbs of knowing when dependent on an expression of causation or intent, e.g. Pl. As. 140, memorare as causative of neminisse.

However, as will emerge from my presentation of the data in section 2, Rosén’s theory is not only incapable of explaining the full range of variability in the philological record, but is also simply contradicted in

10 Bräunlich (above, note 6), xvii–xxviii, provides a useful discussion of scholarship on the question up to 1920.
11 De syntaxi interrogationium obliquarum (above, note 4).
13 Rosén, op. cit., p. 8.
a large number of cases. For a full discussion of this theory see my review of the Rosén's book.14

2. Preliminary data analysis

The work of Becker and Rosén has shown that an adequate account of the factors that condition modal shift must consider the utterance involving the question (henceforth Q-clause) and its associated verb in relation to the speech situation portrayed and to its discourse function. Of the various criteria that have been employed for classification, the following appear to be the most useful for a preliminary organization of the data: (1) In what sort of utterance is the Q-clause involved?—inquiry, exclamation, command, etc.: (2) If in an inquiry, is the speaker inquiring about the Q-clause or about its associated verb? (3) If the inquiry is about the Q-clause, does the speaker want an immediate answer? (4) If a command, what is the addressee commanded to do?—find out, inquire about, make a statement about or simply consider the Q-clause; (5) Is the topic of the Q-clause either established in the discourse or present in the speech situation? (6) What is the syntactic status of the verb associated with the Q-clause? In what follows, the major classes of verb plus Q-clause that result from these criteria are given brief labels. These labels are intended not as complete, formal definitions, but as approximate, descriptive mnemonics. Tables 1–4 provide representative examples in addition to those cited in the text. Table 1 provides examples of Q-clauses associated with verba videndi, Table 2 verba sciendi, Table 3 verba dicendi, and Table 4 verba rogandi. In any one class only a few examples can be given of often scores of similar cases.

2.1. Class 1a: simple inquiries.

The simplest type of utterance involving a Q-clause and associated verb is the class of inquiries made by the speaker concerning the Q-clause to which he wants an immediate answer and in which the topic of the Q-clause is present or established in the discourse. A good example of this class is Pl. Truc. 499, cited by Delbrück and quoted in section 1. It comes from the beginning of Act II, scene vi. Strato-phanes has just entered and given a speech. Phronesium asks the question of her maid Astaphium, who answers in the following lines. Here vide introduces a simple inquiry to which Phronesium expects an immediate answer. The topic of the question is obviously present

Table 1. *verba videndi*

**Class 1:**
- Pl. *Rud.* 948 Gr. eloqueren quid id est? Tr. vide num quispiam consequitur prope nos.
- Pl. *True.* 499–500 Ph. vide quis loquitur tam propinqu. As. miles, mea Phronesium/tibi adest Stratonenes.
- Pl. *Cas.* 377–78 tene sortem tibi/ vide quid scriptumst.

**Class 4:**
- Pl. *Miles* 536 vide sitne istae vostra intus.
- Pl. *Capt.* 292 proinde aliis ut credat vide.
- Ter. *Andr.* 385 ex ea re quid fiat vide.

**Class 7:**
- Ter. *Hec.* 78 audin quid dicam, Scirte?
- Pl. *Pseud.* 1296–97 non vides me/ut madide madeam?
- Ter. *Heaut.* 1013 non vides quantum mali ex ea re excites?

**Class 2:**
- Pl. *Most.* 309 vide tali ubi sint.
- Pl. *Amph.* 787–88 So. vide sis signi quid siet, ne posterius in me culpam conferas.

**Class 5a:**
- Pl. *Epid.* 81–82 quo in loco haec sit vides/Epidice:
- Ter. *Heaut.* 555 quae sit ei(u)s aetas vides;
- Pl. *Rud.* 573 at vides me ornatus ut sim vestimentis uvidus:

**Class 8a:**
- Pl. *Most.* 887 vide ut fastidit simia!
- Ter. *Eun.* 919 vide ut otiosus it!

**Class 8b:**
- Pl. *Stich.* 410 videte, quaeso, quid postest pecunia:
- Ter. *Phorm.* 358 vide avaritia quid facit!

**Class 3:**
- Pl. *Most.* 681 videndumst primum utrum eae velintne an non velint.

**Class 6:**
- Pl. *Miles* 1045 viden tu ignavom ut sese infert?
- Ter. *Eun.* 1037 audin tu, hic quid ait?

**Class 9:**
- Pl. *Merc.* 103 vosmet videte quam mihi valide placuerit:
- Ter. *Andr.* 825 vide quam iniquo' sis prae studio:
Table 2. *verba sciendi*

**Class 1a:**
Pl. *Curc.* 543 scire volo quo reddi-disti.
Pl. *Pseud.* 696 me quid vis facere, fac sciam.

**Class 1b:**
Pl. *Cas.* 184 amo te, atque istuc ex-peto scire quid sit.
Pl. *Trin.* 88 sed istuc negoti cupio scire quid siet.

**Class 3:**
Pl. *Miles* 345–46 volo scire utrum egon id quod vidi viderim/an illic faciat,
Ter. *Ad.* 555 scire equidem volo quot mihi sint domini:

**Class 5a:**
Pl. *Curc.* 435 iam scis ut convenerit:
Pl. *Aul.* pr. 29 is scit adulescens quae sit quam compresserit,
Pl. *Men.* 764a verum propemodum iam scio quid siet rei.

**Class 5b:**
Pl. *St.* 112 scio ut oportet esse:
Pl. *Miles* 36 scio iam quid vis dicere.
Pl. *Bacch.* 78 et Pol ego scio quid metuo.

cf. Pl. *Epid.* 577 scio quid erres:
Pl. *Copt.* 1007 attat, scio qure te patrem adsimules esse et me fi-lium:

**Class 6:**
Pl. *Rud.* 773 scin quid tecum oro, senex?
Pl. *Men.* 425 sed scin quid te amabo ut facias?
Pl. *Poem.* 1318–19 ANTA. nam te cinea-dum esse arbitror magi quam virum./AG. scin quam cineaedus sum?
Pl. *Pseud.* 538 at enim scin quid mihi in mentem venit?

**Class 7:**
Pl. *Trin.* 373 scin tu illum quo genere natus sit?
Ter. *Eun.* 1035 scis me in quibu’ simil gaudis?
Pl. *Merc.* 732 non tu scis quae sit illa?
Table 3. *verba dicendi*

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<tr>
<th>Class 1a</th>
<th>Class 1b</th>
<th>Class 1c</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ter. <em>Andr.</em> 389 <em>cedo quid iurgabit tecum hic?</em></td>
<td>Pl. <em>As.</em> 27–28 <em>proinde actutum istuc quid sit quod scire expetis/elo- quere:</em></td>
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<td>Pl. <em>Pers.</em> 215–16 hoc mi expedi./quou agis?</td>
<td><strong>Class 1c:</strong></td>
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**Class 1d:**

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<th>Class 1e:</th>
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<td>Pl. <em>Rud.</em> 635–36 <em>at ego te per crura et talos tergumque optestor tuum,</em>/ut tibi ulneam uberem esse speres virgidemiam</td>
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<th>Class 2:</th>
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<th>Class 5a:</th>
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<td>Pl. <em>Rud.</em> 478 nam haec litteratast, eapse cantat quoia sit.</td>
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<td>Pl. <em>Merc.</em> 940 <em>dico quid eo adven- erim,</em></td>
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<td>Pl. <em>Cist.</em> 549–51 <em>dico ei quo pacto eam ab hippodromo viderim/erilem nostram filiam sustollere. extimuit tum ille.</em></td>
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<th>Class 10:</th>
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<td>Pl. <em>Most.</em> 1150 <em>dicit is quo pacto tuo’ te servos ludificaverit:</em></td>
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<td>Pl. <em>Most.</em> 1136 <em>loquere nunc quid fecerim:</em></td>
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<td>Ter. <em>Eun.</em> 970 <em>tu isti narra om- ne[m] ordine[m] ut factum siet.</em></td>
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<td>Class 1a:</td>
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<td>Class 3:</td>
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<td>Pl. <em>Amph.</em> 1015–16 nunc domum ibo atque ex uxorae hanc rem pergam exquirere/quis fuerit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pl. <em>Capt.</em> 951–52 interibi ego ex hac statua verberea volo/erogitare meo minore quid sit factum filio.</td>
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<td>Pl. <em>Bacch.</em> 189 rogabis me ubi sit:</td>
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<td>Pl. <em>Truc.</em> 650–51 interrogo/quit eum velit</td>
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at hand to the speakers. In all cases of imperative forms of *videre* used in this way, even when the literal meaning of seeing is not involved, as at *Rud.* 1002 in Table 1, modal shift regularly does not occur in the Q-clause. As Tables 2–4 show, imperative verbs of saying, first person present tense verbs of asking, and expressions such as *scire* *volo* and *fac sciam* are also used to introduce such simple inquiries. This fact proves that the distinction between *verba videndi, sciendi, dicendi*, and *rogandi* is not relevant to the conditioning of modal shift.

Subclass 1b: simple inquiries with prolepsis.

Subclass 1b is identical to 1a simple inquiries, except that the sentences in 1b all show prolepsis (or *anticipatio*). The subject of the Q-clause has been removed from the Q-clause and turned into an accusative dependent on the associated verb. Modal shift regularly applies in subclass 1b irrespective of the type of associated verb.

Subclass 1c: double inquiries.

In subclass 1c the speaker is still making an inquiry about the Q-clause to which he wants an immediate answer, but he is also asking whether his addressee will answer the question simultaneously being asked. Modal shift regularly occurs in subclass 1c.

Subclass 1d: conjoined inquiries.

In subclass 1d the imperative verb of saying is syntactically connected by a conjunction with another imperative which is not a verb of saying. Modal shift regularly applies in subclass 1d. But for future reference note 1d' in Table 3 where two verbs of saying are coordinated and there is no modal shift in the Q-clause.

Subclass 1e: subordinated inquiries.

In subclass 1e the verb of saying continues to introduce a question the speaker wishes to be answered, but the verb is part of a final clause. Modal shift regularly occurs in subclass 1e.

2.2. Class 2: inquiries about Q-clauses with topics not present.

Class 2 differs from class 1a simple inquiries in that the topic of the Q-clause is not immediately present, so that the person questioned cannot give an immediate response. This is obvious when there are two imperatives “go and see” as at *Ter.* *Heaut.* 871 in Table 1, but it is also the case when only *vide* occurs, as at *Pl.* *Most.* 309, where Philematium tells the slave to get dice, which, of course, are not on stage. *Pl.* *Amph.* 787, cited by Delbrück, belongs to this class. Imperative verbs of asking can also be used this way, and a related usage is found when the speaker intends to turn the attention of the addressee to the question he is about to ask, as at *Rud.* 1148 with the future
imperative, in Table 3. Note that Daemones actually calls for an answer from Palaestra four lines later at 1153: loquere nunciam, puella. Volo scire is used exactly the same way at Pl. Truc. 779 in Table 2; Callicles only commands a response nine lines later: loquere tu. Modal shift regularly applies in class 2.

2.3. Class 3: question descriptions.

In class 3 the speaker is not addressing the Q-clause to a second person in order to obtain an answer; rather he is describing a question he has already asked or one that he will ask or find out about at a later time. With the second person indicative verbs of asking, the speaker is describing or presenting his addressee as asking a question. Class 3 regularly has modal shift.

2.4. Class 4: commands to inquire or find out.

In class 4 the speaker is not asking a question to obtain an answer at all, but is directing a second person to find out or to consider something for the second person’s sake. This is particularly clear in the whole interchange between Periplectomenus and Sceledrus at Pl. Mil. 535–37:

Pe. vin scire plane? Sc. cupio. Pe. abi intro ad vos domum. continuo, vide sitne istaec vostra intus. Sc. licet, pulchre admonuisti.

Modal shift regularly occurs in class 4.

2.5. Class 5: statements.

Subclass 5a consists of simple declarative statements: no question is being asked, no command given. Modal shift regularly occurs in class 5a.15

Subclass 5b consists entirely of the first person singular, present indicative scio immediately preceding the Q-clause. In these sentences scio is neither syntactically coordinated nor subordinated; it is never qualified or intensified, nor is it used in contrast with nescio or other verbs of ignorance and doubting. So far as the discourse function of subclass 5b utterances is concerned, it differs from 5a in that they are all anticipations of a second person’s words, sometimes forestalling an objection as at Aul. 174. Additional examples with the indicative are: Pl. Bacch. 78 and Mil. 36. Modal shift usually does not occur in subclass 5b in Plautus, but note Epid. 577 in Table 2 with modal shift. In Terence and later authors, however, subclass 5b seems always to have modal shift, and thus is merged with 5a.

15 See the apparatus criticus at Ter. Ad. 996.
2.6. Class 6: exclamations about present topics introduced by interrogative forms.

In class 6 we have the interrogative forms *viden* and *scin*, but here it is not used in an inquiry, i.e. the speaker is not asking whether a second person actually does see or know what the topic of the Q-clause refers to. In fact with *viden* the topic of the Q-clause is present at hand in the action on stage. Furthermore the Q-clause functions as an exclamation. This is particularly clear in Palinurus’s exclamation at Pl. *Curc.* 186–88 in Table 1. (He completes his exclamation with the sentence *nequeunt complecti satis.*) Modal shift does not occur in class 6.

2.7. Class 7: inquiries about the associated verb.

Class 7 differs from class 6 in that the speaker is actually inquiring whether a second person sees or knows. There are apparently no cases with the form *viden*, but *non vides* is common, as is *scin*. We can compare the similar use of *audin* as at Ter. *Hec.* 78 in Table 1: Scirtus is not on stage, but in the house, and Parmeno is genuinely inquiring if Scirtus has heard what he ordered him to do. Modal shift regularly occurs in class 7.

2.8. Class 8: exclamations about present topics introduced by imperative forms.

In class 8 we have imperative rather than interrogative verb forms. As in class 6 the Q-clause may be an exclamation regarding something on stage (8a) or a topic already described in discourse (8b). A good example of 8b is Pl. *Stich.* 410 in Table 1, where Epignomus had just described how his financial success had got him back in the good graces of his father-in-law Antipho. Modal shift does not occur in class 8.

2.9. Class 9: presentations of new topics.

In class 9 the topic of the Q-clause is not already established in discourse. For example, at Ter. *Andr.* 825 in Table 1 Chremes spells out what he means by *quam iniquo’ sis* in his following remarks to Simo. Modal shift regularly occurs in class 9.

2.10. Class 10: commands to make statements.

Finally in class 10 the speaker commands a second person to tell something to a third person or persons. Modal shift regularly occurs in class 10.

3. Preliminary Generalizations

To summarize the results of section 2, modal shift regularly does not apply to class 1a simple inquiries, class 5b *scio* anticipations, class 6 exclamations about present topics introduced by interrogative forms.
and class 8 exclamations about present topics introduced by imperative forms. In all the other classes modal shift regularly applies. A number of preliminary generalizations concerning regularities in modal shift emerge from the foregoing classificatory scheme: (1) Modal shift always applies to Q-clauses associated with third person and non-interrogative second person indicative verb forms; (2) When the topic of the Q-clause is not present or already introduced into the discourse, modal shift regularly applies, regardless of the associated verb form; and (3) When the associated verb is involved in certain syntactic relations, for example subordinated in a final clause, coordinated with imperatives of verbs other than verba dicendi, or governing a proleptic object, modal shift regularly applies to the Q-clause, regardless of the status of the utterance or other criteria. These generalizations and the very fact that the cases with modal shift could be separated from the cases without it on the bases of externally defined criteria show that there must be some coherent and substantive principles at work. It remains to determine what is directly relevant and what is redundant and how factors of syntactic structure may interact with function in discourse to condition modal shift.

4. Considerations of Speech Act Theory

Since it has been established that Old Latin modal shift is conditioned by speech situation and discourse function (i.e. conditioned by pragmatic factors) as well as by syntactic factors, it is reasonable to investigate the relevance of the theory of speech acts as developed by J. L. Austin and popularized by J. R. Searle.16 It is obvious that in actual discourse a speaker does far more than merely make statements: he can promise, cajole, advise, warn, introduce new topics, order, request, exclaim, ask questions, and so on. In fact, the sort of acts just indicated are varieties of one of three simultaneous acts involved in speaking. Austin distinguished “locutionary acts,” the making of an utterance, from “illocutionary acts,” the acts performed simply by making an utterance (asking, promising, exclaiming, etc.), and both of these from “perlocutionary acts,” the results intended by

16 The literature on speech acts has become enormous since J. L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (Oxford 1962), and especially since J. R. Searle’s Speech Acts (Cambridge 1969). An admirable presentation is given by John Lyons (Semantics 2 [Cambridge 1977], pp. 725–86). See also S. C. Levinson, Pragmatics (Cambridge 1983), pp. 226–83. My arguments do not depend on any specific version of speech act theory and will remain valid on an approach which seeks to subsume speech act theory under more general pragmatic theories of utterance function and intent.
making an utterance, such as obtaining an answer. I shall argue that it is the illocutionary status of the verb associated with the Q-clause that is crucially involved in determining whether modal shift takes place.

There is a distinction to be drawn between linguistic form and structure on the one hand and the use of that structure in discourse on the other. As noted in the descriptions of class 6 exclamations introduced by interrogative forms and class 7 inquiries about the associated verb (in which that verb is, of course, also interrogative in form), not every use of an interrogative form such as scin or audin involves the illocutionary act of questioning. In English, if we say at the dinner table “Could you pass me the salt?” we are making a request, not asking a question. From the perlocutionary point of view, we intend to get the person to pass the salt, not to answer yes or no. The actual illocutionary force is that of a request; the grammatical form determines only the incidental illocutionary force. Such indirect speech acts are, of course, associated with considerations of politeness and the tone that the speaker wishes to adopt.17 Similarly in an utterance such as rogo, quid est, rogo does not make a statement; it is part of the illocutionary act of asking the question; it is a performative verb. Performative verbs can serve to make the illocutionary force or an utterance explicit. When they do, they are always first person, primary tense (and, interestingly, in English never progressive in aspect). Performative verbs need not be overtly present. Quid est? also has the illocutionary force of a question. Quid est? is a primary performative; rogo quid est an explicit performative. If primary and explicit performatives are not completely identical in meaning, they are nevertheless very similar. In fact performative verbs resemble in a number of ways what are called parenthetical verbs used in making statements. In the utterance “John will be here at eight o’clock, I think” the words “I think” are, as Urmson says, “Used to modify or weaken the claim to truth implied by a simple assertion.”18 They do not serve to describe the speaker’s act of cognition. Similarly in the utterance “I ask you, what would you have done?” the performative verb “ask” makes explicit the illocutionary force—perhaps indicating

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17 In general an indirect speech act can be performed by stating or questioning one of the felicity conditions on an explicit speech act: see D. Gordon and G. Lakoff, “Conversational postulates,” Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (Chicago 1971), 63–84. This principle seems to be a language (culture) universal; see P. Brown and S. Levinson, “Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena,” in E. Goody, Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction (Cambridge 1978), 56–311.

I am asking a real question, not just posing a rhetorical one. Such performative verbs can be characterized as modulations of the illocutionary force of the utterance in which they appear. The important point is that verbs can be illocutionary modulations only when they partake of at least the same general illocutionary force as the rest of the utterance would in their absence. We can see this very clearly when we contrast an utterance like “I asked you what you would have done.” This is a report, a description of the speech act of questioning; it is not itself a question, and “asked” is not an illocutionary modulation of the Q-clause. For future reference it is interesting to note that Lyons has suggested that “it is . . . possible that the surface structure status of a performative main verb should be accounted for by a grammatical rule which operates on two juxtaposed, or paratactically associated, clauses, neither of which is subordinate to the other.”

It will be remembered that the failure of modal shift was restricted to just the following classes: 1a (simple inquiries), 5b (scio anticipations), 6 (exclamations about present topics introduced by interrogative forms), and 8 (exclamations introduced by imperative forms). All of these classes share a common characteristic. The verb associated with the Q-clause partakes of the same illocutionary force as the Q-clause could have by itself. This status of the associated verb is most obvious for the first person, present tense indicative verbs of asking of class 1a. Interrogo at Pl. Amph. 438 and rogo at Pseud. 971 in Table 4 are (in spite of Lindsay’s punctuation) typical first person, present tense forms used as direct performative verbs in explicit performative utterances. The relevance of the illocutionary status of the associated verb is established by the minimal contrast provided by the morphologically identical forms interrogo and rogo as used in class 3 question descriptions, where modal shift occurs. At Pl. Cap. 509 and Truc. 650 neither rogo nor interrogo can be performatives, for both are historical presents used to narrate previous acts of questioning. The illocutionary force of these utterances is constative, i.e. they are statements, not questions. Consequently rogo and interrogo cannot here be illocutionary modulations of the Q-clause (or its unshifted form). Unlike rogo and interrogo, the verbs of saying, seeing, and knowing of class 1a are not simple, direct performatives. They are all imperative forms (or involving volo, expeto and the like), but their illocutionary force is not that of a command or request to do anything more than what is implicit already in the act of asking a question. This fact enables us to

19 Lyons (above, note 16), p. 782.
explain why the questions of class 1a simple inquiries are all restricted to topics that are immediately present. A genuine question cannot be felicitously asked of a person who could not reasonably be assumed to know the answer. If the topic were not present or known to the addressee, this condition of felicity would not be met, and, as a result, the imperatives would not introduce questions, but necessarily be actual commands to see or observe. Such, of course, is precisely the status of the imperatives in class 2 inquiries about topics not present where modal shift regularly applies. Thus class 2 provides another minimal contrast with class 1a that confirms the hypothesis that it is the status of the associated verb as an illocutionary modulation that blocks modal shift.

Class 6 (exclamations about present topics introduced by interrogative forms) and class 8 (similar exclamations introduced by imperative forms) show a parallel relationship between their verbs and the associated Q-clauses. In these utterances, unlike those of class 1a (simple inquiries), the Q-clause does not partake of the illocutionary force of questioning; rather these utterances are exclamations or presentations of discourse topics. We have already seen that the interrogatives in class 6 are used indirectly and that they are equivalent in illocutionary force to the imperatives of class 8. Now the act of making an exclamation or presenting a topic in discourse necessarily involves bringing the topic to the attention of the addressee. There is no additional illocutionary force to *vider* and *vide* in classes 6 and 8; they are not autonomous commands or questions. This fact allows us to explain why, just as in class 1a simple inquiries, the topic of the Q-clauses in classes 6 and 8 concerns matters present on stage or established in discourse. One of the conditions for the felicity of a simple exclamation is that the addressee can reasonably be assumed to know what it is that is being exclaimed about. This condition is not met in class 9, and, consequently, the imperatives in 9 have the illocutionary force of a command to pay attention or consider something new. Thus a minimal contrast parallel to that between class 1a simple inquiries about present topics and class 2 inquiries about absent topics obtains between classes 6 and 8 on the one hand and class 9 on the other.

The status of the associated verb as an actual command and not an illocutionary modulation of the Q-clause is obvious also in class 10 (commands to make statements). Here the imperatives of the verbs of saying are genuine commands to tell or describe something to a third person. The imperatives of verbs of asking of class 4 (commands to inquire or find out) are exactly parallel.
The relation of the imperatives of verbs of asking in class 2 (inquiries about topics not present) to those same forms in class 4 is instructive. In class 2 the addressee is ordered to ask a question of a third party with the perlocutionary intent that he inform the speaker; in class 4 the speaker has no such perlocutionary object in mind. Since modal shift is obligatory in both classes, it is clear that perlocutionary differences are not relevant to modal shift. This fact permits us to unite the interrogative verbs of saying of class 1c, where the speaker actually wants an answer to the question implicit in the Q-clause, with the interrogative forms of verbs of seeing of class 7, where there is no inquiry implicit in the utterance. The illocutionary force of the associated verb in both classes is interrogative, but in respect to the second person action of the verb, not only that of the Q-clause. Thus these interrogatives cannot be illocutionary modulations.

Of the ten major classes, only class 5 (statements) remains to be discussed. In class 5a the associated verb has constative illocutionary force, i.e. it is making a statement. Consequently, these verbs cannot be modulations, since making a statement cannot be done by asking a question. Furthermore, we can unite class 3 question descriptions with class 5a statements all as constative utterances.

Class 5b (scio anticipations) requires some discussion. This class constitutes a special sort of speech act. The illocutionary force of scio is not constative as in 5a. The speaker is not really asserting his knowledge; rather, he is anticipating the second person’s next remarks or forestalling objections. This distinction emerges in the contrast between Pl. Men. 764a, which is clearly a class 5a constative utterance, and Pl. Aul. 174 or Stich. 112. The same anticipatory force of scio is also found when the verb is not associated with a Q-clause, as at Pl. Merc. 164 ff., where Charinus interrupts Acanthio. Note that scio is followed by oratio recta.

Ac. immo es—Ch. scio iam, miserum dices tu. Ac. dixi ego tacens.

Thus in class 5b, scio is also a modulation of the utterance’s illocutionary force. The relationship between scio and its associated Q-clause in class 5b is parallel to that between scin and its associated Q-clause in class 6. This parallelism is particularly clear in the case of echo-retorts such as Pl. Poen. 1318. Consequently the two classes may be united, at least for Plautus. It is important, however, to point out that class 5b does not exist in Terence as a block to modal shift. At Ter. Heaut. 626 ff. Chremes is clearly anticipating what his wife Sostrata is about to say concerning her child, yet the interruption shows modal shift:
So. Meministin me ess(e) gravidam et mihi te maxumo opere edicere, si puellam parerem, nolle tolli? Cn. scio quid feceris: sustulisti.

In fact, already in Plautus there is probably variation in modal shift in these anticipatory utterances, since Pl. Epid. 577 in Table 2, which has modal shift, seems fairly certainly to belong to class 5b. Thus in class 5b we have evidence for syntactic change in progress in Plautus that is already complete in Terence.

To summarize: in all cases where modal shift fails to apply, the verb associated with the Q-clause is a modulation of the illocutionary force that the Q-clause would have if used independently. This rule allows us to explain why failure of modal shift is found only in association with primary tense verb forms in the first person and the imperative or interrogative form having indirect illocutionary force; it is only in these forms that verbs can be used as illocutionary modulations of a Q-clause.

5. Grammatical Conditioning of Modal Shift

We must now consider whether there is any purely grammatical conditioning of modal shift in addition to the conditioning determined by the illocutionary status of the associated verb. The subclasses 1b (inquiries with prolepsis), 1c (double inquiries), 1d (conjoined inquiries), and 1e (subordinated inquiries) were initially grouped together with 1a (simple inquiries) on the basis of shared perlocutionary force and distinguished in syntactic terms. We have seen, however, that perlocutionary force is irrelevant to modal shift, and further that class 1c modal shift can be explained by the actual illocutionary force of the associated verb. Furthermore, the contrast of Pl. Pers. 664 at 1d’ in Table 3 (without modal shift) shows that the syntactic structure of coordinated imperatives is not sufficient by itself to entail modal shift. Rather, in 1d’ the two imperatives eloquere actutum atque indica are pleonastic; both of them have the same illocutionary force and are equally modulations. Thus 1d’ can be united with class 1a (simple inquiries). In subclass 1d itself, however, the imperative verb of saying is coordinated with an imperative that expresses a genuine command, for example reduc uxorem. Thus these imperative verbs of saying also express actual commands to speak. As a result subclass 1d can be united with class 2 (inquiries about topics not present), where the imperatives also have the illocutionary force of actual commands. We come closer to genuine syntactic conditioning in subclass 1e, but only in the sense that a verb subordinated in a final clause cannot have
the sort of illocutionary force required if it is to be a modulation of the utterance as a whole.

This leaves us with subclass 1b (inquiries with prolepsis of the subject of the Q-clause). The utterances in class 1b do not seem to differ from those of 1a from the point of view of speech act theory: they all involve acts of questioning. This is quite clear when we compare Pistoclerus’s question to Mnesilochus at Pl. Bacch. 555, *dic modo hominem qui sit*, with his question at Bacch. 553 also addressed to Mnesilochus, and having exactly the same force, *opsecro hercle loquere, quis is est?* The only difference between these sentences is that the one at Bacch. 555 shows prolepsis, or *anticipatio*; the subject of the Q-clause, *homo*, has been moved out of the Q-clause and made the object of the associated verb. At Bacch. 553, on the other hand, the pronoun *is* remains within the Q-clause as its subject. Prolepsis is described in modern generative grammar as the transformation called Raising to Object. In analyzing the syntactic conditions on modal shift we must be careful to distinguish similar surface syntactic structures which do not result from Raising to Object. For example at Pl. Pseud. 261 *nosce saltem hunc quis est* cannot be a case of prolepsis, since *nosce re* is not used absolutely by Plautus, and consequently there is no modal shift. It is not entirely certain that modal shift is obligatory with prolepsis in the sense of Raising to Object, cf. Pl. Pseud. 1184 *chlamydem hanc commemorare quanti conductas. Commeniorare*, however, differs from *dicere* in the senses in which it can take a direct object, so that it would be possible to argue that Pl. Pseud. 1184 is not a genuine case of prolepsis. A categorical distinction should probably not be insisted on, and variation in modal shift might be expected in cases where either syntactic analysis is possible.

While prolepsis (in the sense of Raising to Object) appears to be a purely syntactic factor that conditions modal shift in Old Latin, the association between these two syntactic processes may have been pragmatic in origin. Prolepsis is typically a topicalizing transformation, i.e. it is typically used to highlight the noun phrase topic of discourse by moving it to an earlier, more exposed position. This function can be seen quite clearly at Pl. Trin. 871 ff. The Sycophanta has been knocking on the door of the *senex* Charmides. Charmides steps out and asks him

*quid, adulescens, quaeris? quid vis? quid istas pultas?*

and the Sycophanta finally answers with the sentence

*Lesbonicum hic adulescentem quaero in his regionibus ubi habitet.*
The prolepsis of *Lesbonicum* immediately introduces the topic of the inquiry. The Sycophanta’s utterance can be regarded as a complex speech act: a statement in answer to Charmides’ question, the introduction of a topic (obviously unknown) to Charmides, and finally a question about that topic. Such an utterance satisfies, on several counts, the conditions we have already established as sufficient to cause modal shift. Since a large number of utterances showing prolepsis would be involved in topic introduction and would, therefore, already require modal shift, the characteristic conditions for analogical extension would be established: modal shift could be readily generalized to other utterances showing prolepsis, probably along a scale of discourse saliency, leading to modal shift in cases such as Pl. *Bacch.* 555. Pl. *Pseud.* 1184, just discussed, could be taken as evidence for this hypothesis of a hierarchy of saliency. At Pl. *Pseud.* 1184 the topic is present in the discourse situation—*chlamydem hanc*—so that this utterance meets the illocutionary criteria sufficient to block modal shift.

Having formulated the hypothesis that modal shift is blocked by the status of the associated verb as an illocutionary modulation, we can see that where modal shift fails to apply we do not have in fact indirect questions in the sense of *oratio obliqua* at all, but rather genuine speech acts of questioning, exclaiming, and so on. On the other hand, where the associated verb is not an illocutionary modulation of the Q-clause, the clause really is an indirect question, exclamation, etc. Accordingly we can formulate a rule that brings Old Latin closer to Classical Latin than has been previously appreciated: in Old Latin modal shift is obligatory in all indirect questions. On this approach Old and Classical Latin differ not in the syntax of indirect questions, but in the definition of what constitutes indirect questions. In Old Latin indirect question status is defined pragmatically in terms of the illocutionary status of the associated verb; in Classical Latin it is generally defined in terms of the surface syntactic structure.

We can see that more was involved in the evolution of the syntax of indirect questions out of paratactic structures than a purely syntactic process of generalization from deliberative questions. The evolution was conditioned by pragmatic, speech act factors, and already by the time of Plautus we see the beginnings of the stage that will lead to the situation in Classical Latin. In Old Latin a substantial number of all Q-clauses associated with verbs were already subject to modal shift, whether for reasons of illocutionary status or for the syntactic reason of prolepsis. A re-analysis of the conditioning factors as syntactic was the next step. We have seen evidence of two areas in which this re-
analysis began. Regular modal shift in subclass 1b inquiries with prolepsis introduced a purely syntactic condition. Modal shift was then generalized proceeding through similar syntactic structures such as those produced by Equi-NP Deletion. The second area is the restricted class of *scio* plus Q-clause anticipations of class 5b. This subclass was open to interpretation as declarative sentences like 5a and the extension of modal shift further encouraged by the overwhelming frequency of modal shift in Q-clauses associated with all other occurrences of forms of *scire*.

*University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*