The interpretation of Heraclitus will always remain controversial. The main reasons are his peculiar mode of expression, the fragmentary character of the evidence, and the very way ancient authors quoted his sayings. If progress is still to be made, it is necessary to discuss the arguments given in support of one or another interpretation in order to determine in each case what is probable, what is merely possible, and what is unlikely or impossible. Such a discussion should contribute to clarify the points on which scholarly opinion is likely to differ and to eliminate poor and irrelevant arguments. The following analysis of Heraclitus’ first fragment has been prompted, among other things, by the preceding considerations. The fragments will be cited according to the numbers in the B section of chapter 22 of Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. For the sake of brevity my discussion takes its starting point from, and presupposes knowledge of, the commentaries of Kirk and of Marcovich. This explains the prominent character of my disagreements with these

1 I refer to the 6th edition, 3 vols., Berlin 1951–52. The alleged later editions are mere reprints. This work is referred to as FVS.


3 M. Marcovich, Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary (Mérida, Venezuela 1967) and Eraclito. Frammenti. Introduzione, e commento (Florence 1978). Hereafter these books are referred to as Marcovich and Marcovich, respectively.

The following publications will be cited by their authors’ names alone: E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung 1, ii (Leipzig 1920). Herausgegeben von W. Nestle; J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London 1930); K. Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn 1916); O. Gigon, Untersuchungen zu Heraklit (Leipzig 1935); R. Walzer, Eraclito. Raccolta dei frammenti e traduzione italiana (Florence 1939). Other references will be self-explanatory.
two scholars. For the reader's convenience I print the text with a short critical apparatus in which purely orthographical variants have been disregarded.

"τὸν Λόγον τοῦτον ἄντως αἰτεί ἢ ἄξιντοι γίνονται ἀνθρωποί καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἂνοικοὶ καὶ ἂνοοσσεῖτε τὸ πρῶτον γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἀπορωσίων ἀόρκασε περιφέρειοι καὶ ἐπέκου καὶ ἐργὰς τουσών ὑκόιων ἐγὼ διηγεύμαι μετὰ τούτων διαφωνικά ἔκαστον καὶ φράξων δικώς έξεις τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λαυθάνει ὑκόσα ἐγερθεῖτε ποιοῦν ἄκωσηρ ὑκόσα ἐπιλαυθάνονται.

The entire fragment is cited by Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. VII. 132) only. It is possible that the omission of τοῦ or τοῦ δὲ (see infra), of αἰτεί, and of πάντων are due neither to him nor to his source but to one or more scribes. Hippolytus (Ref. Omn. Haeres. IX. 9. 3 [pp. 241–42 Wendland]) gives the passage up to ἔχει, omitting the final comparison (τοῦς δὲ ἄλλους . . . ἐπιλαυθάνονται). Clement (Strom. V. 111. 7 [II, pp. 401–02 Stählin]) has the first sentence only, from τοῦ to πρῶτον, and Eusebius (Praeparatio Evangelica XIII. 13. 39 [II, p. 214 Mras]) himself quotes this passage of Clement's. Finally, also Aristotle (Rhet. 1407 B 16–17) cites the first sentence, but only from τοῦ to ἀνθρωποι γίνονται (in this order).

Both Aristotle and Sextus tell us that this text occurred at the beginning of Heraclitus' book. However, neither the former's ἐν ἀρχῇ αὐτῶν nor the latter's ἐναρχημένος (sc. Ἰράκλειτος) . . . τῶν περὶ φύσεως necessarily implies that those in our fragment were the very first words of Heraclitus' treatise. This topic has been usually discussed in connection with whether at the beginning of our text one should read τοῦ λόγου or τοῦ δὲ λόγου. A majority of recent scholars, including Kirk and Marcovich, has adopted the latter reading, though it is transmitted by Hippolytus only. The reason given is that advanced by Zeller long ago: it is easy to see that δὲ

1 This is the reading of the MSS. Ross and Kassel in their respective editions of Aristotle's Rhetoric, Marcovich, and others have adopted Richard's emendation αὐτῆ. To my mind the emendation is not at all necessary; but even if it is adopted, it would really not affect the point at issue here, since even ἐν ἀρχῇ αὐτῆ τοῦ συγγράμματος would leave open the possibility that some words preceded 22 B 1 in the Heraclitean original.


6 Kirk, pp. 33 and 36; Marcovich, p. 2 = Marcovich, p. 4.

was omitted by our other sources because for their purposes it was superfluous and stylistically disturbing, whereas it is difficult to explain why any one should have added it if it was not present in his source. Yet the matter is not so easily disposed of. For one thing, such connectives are sometimes added for no reason at all. Moreover, in this case, the variant may be due to a scribal mistake. For it is possible that the first τοῦδε in ΤΟΤΔΕΔΟΓΟΤΤΟΤΔΕΟΝΤΟΣ was caused by dittography. On the other hand, δε is omitted both by Aristotle and by Clement, who does not depend on Aristotle,8 and there is no reason to think that they both purposely omitted this word. Such an omission would more probably be due to scribes. Consequently, it seems to be just as likely that Heraclitus wrote τοῦ δε λόγου as that he wrote τοῦ λόγου. If I have printed the latter reading, it is only to call attention to the fact that the prevailing opinion is not as certainly right as its proponents believe it to be. And hereafter whenever I cite τοῦ λόγου as the reading at the beginning of our text, it is with the understanding that Heraclitus may well have written τοῦ δε λόγου.

If τοῦ δε λόγου is the correct reading, then δε is either connective or inceptive. The latter possibility is that preferred by most recent scholars.9 However, even now there are some who believe that δε is connective and that in what preceded frag 1 Heraclitus must have given a hint as to what he meant by this Logos.10 This last contention seems to me more than doubtful,11 and even if the δε is connective, it is likely, given the statements of Aristotle and of Sextus cited above, that not much preceded our text.12 On the other hand, if Heraclitus wrote τοῦ λόγου, it is likely that those words came at the very beginning of his treatise, and the same is true if δε is the right reading and is inceptive.13

8 This ought to be obvious, since Clement’s citation is longer than Aristotle’s.
9 Cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 1, Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), pp. 274–75; Kirk, p. 36.
11 West (cf. note 10 supra) cites with approval Diels’ suggestion that something like Ηράκλετος Ἐφέσιος τάδε λέγει preceded frag 1. But he does so on the assumption, shared by others (cf. e.g. Burnet, p. 133 with n. 1), that δ λόγος δει refers to Heraclitus’ own discourse. Yet it was because of this that Reinhardt, p. 217, n. 1 rejected the δε, for there are strong reasons for thinking that in frag 1 Logos cannot primarily mean Heraclitus’ discourse or doctrine (cf. the concluding remarks of this paper). However, Reinhardt did not consider the possibility that the δε may be merely inceptive.
12 It is hardly likely that either Aristotle or Sextus’ source, who knew the relative collocations of the present fragments 1 and 2 (cf. note 37 infra), would have said that what they cite of frag 1 came at the beginning of Heraclitus’ book if a long and/or important statement had preceded.
13 For inceptive δε cf. Ion of Chios 36 B 1 ἀρχή δε μοι τοῦ λόγου and Kirk, p. 36.
A more fundamental question is the construction of αιεῖ. Aristotle cited the first words of our fragment precisely to illustrate his point that it is difficult to "punctuate" (διαστήσεις) the text of Heraclitus, since it is unclear (παράλογον) whether αιεῖ goes with what precedes or with what follows it. 14 Modern scholars are not agreed on this: some take αιεῖ with ἐντος, while others attach it to ἀξίωσεν. Prominent among the latter are Reinhardt, Snell, Kranz, Kirk, and Marcovich. 15 Their main argument is (i) that αιεῖ leading up to καί ... καί is an archaic figure typical of Heraclitus' style. To this Marcovich has added two arguments: (ii) In αιεῖ ἀξίωσεν γίνονται ἀνθρώποι—in contrast to the rhythmical unit τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐντος—there is an intentional alliteration a-a-g-a; (iii) The construction of αιεῖ with ἐντος is a lectio facilior prompted by the influence of the epic formula αἰεῖν ἐντοτες (Homer, Il. 1. 290, etc.). Now the second argument may be dismissed with the remark that it begs the question, since it simply assumes that Heraclitus meant αιεῖ to go with ἀξίωσε. Moreover, the alliteration alleged by Marcovich is of no significance as it is vowel alliteration only. The third argument implies a misuse of the notion of lectio facilior, but I postpone its discussion for later. As for the first argument, it is anything but decisive. αιεῖ followed and taken up by καί ... καί is a normal construction in archaic and in later Greek, but so is also the use of καί ... καί in the sense "both ... and," even without a preceding αιεῖ. The essential point that must still be established is whether here Heraclitus intended αιεῖ to be taken up by καί ... καί. I submit that there are strong reasons for thinking that he did not.

However, before we go into this question, it is convenient to determine what would be the likely meaning of τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐντος, if αιεῖ goes with ἀξίωσεν. For, given Aristotle's statement mentioned above, one must acknowledge that the construction of αιεῖ with what follows it must be possible, and hence that the construction τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐντος must also be so. Of those who take αιεῖ with what follows, Kranz, Kirk, and others 16 take τοῦδ’ as predicative: "The Logos being this." But in that case one would have expected τοῦνδ’ instead of τοῦδ’, or, at the very least, the τοῦδ’ to come after and not before ἐντος. Kirk argues that the fact that in the next sentence τὸνδε is not predicative in κατὰ τὸν λόγου τὸνδε "does not tell against its predicative

use earlier.” 17 But the question is whether any reader who was not defending an interpretation would detach τοῦδ’ from the rest of the phrase in τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’. Moreover, the passage from ὁ λόγος ὁ δὲ in the next sentence would at least be unnecessary. The probability then is that τοῦδ’ is attributive, and it is so interpreted by Marcovich and others. 18 In that case, one must take ἐόντος existentially and probably having concessive force: “This Logos, existent, or real though it is.” 19 This meaning gives a reasonable sense, but it considerably weakens the force of the whole first sentence of the fragment, especially when it is compared to the sense yielded by that sentence when αἰεὶ is construed with ἐόντος.

One of the main objections against taking αἰεὶ with ἀξίωμα is that the former word, prominently emphatic here, and important for Heraclitus, as frag. B 30 shows (ἣν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται), 20 would be almost otiose. Its omission would not at all affect what he is saying, since καὶ πρῶσθεν ἡ ἀκούσας καὶ ἀκούσας τὸ πρῶτον would suffice to convey the notion that men fail to understand the Logos both before and after they have heard it. There would be only slightly more emphasis if αἰεὶ were taken up by καὶ . . . καὶ. Kirk himself unwittingly betrays the weakness of taking αἰεὶ with what follows when he states that αἰεὶ with ἐόντος makes sense “and expresses something that Heraclitus believed” but that “it is to be rejected only on the ground that αἰεὶ goes rather with ἀξίωμα.” 21 Moreover, since Heraclitus says that men are comprehending both before they have heard the Logos and after they have heard it, it makes better sense to take αἰεὶ with ἐόντος. For, unless the assertion is made that this Logos exists always, that it is always present in the universe, that is, also before men have heard it 22 from Heraclitus, it would be pointless to reproach

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17 Kirk, p. 35.
19 The meanings “existent” and “real” are frequently connected with each other and with the meaning “true.” In the present case the last mentioned meaning is also possible, if by “true” we understand what is the case in the sense of what is real; but the meaning “true” as the opposite of “false” is, I believe, impossible. Cf. Busse (above, note 15), pp. 205–06.
20 In 22 B 30 one must punctuate with a colon after ἔσται, cf. Kirk, p. 310 with references.
21 Kirk, p. 35.
22 This to my mind is a decisive reason for rejecting those interpretations which, like West’s (op. cit. in note 10 supra, pp. 115 and 116), take ὁ λόγος ὁ δὲ to mean “This discourse of mine.” If that were Heraclitus’ meaning, then he would be blaming men only for not understanding the Logos after they have heard it. But the fragment as
them for not knowing it even before they had so heard it.\textsuperscript{23} Finally, with έωντος αἰεί Heraclitus in all probability meant his readers and/or hearers to recall the epic formula αἰὲν έωντος used of the traditional gods,\textsuperscript{24} and the similar use of αἰεί by Pherecydes (7 B 1 Ζας μὲν καὶ Χρόνος ἱσταν αἰεί καὶ Χθονί) and perhaps by other authors of cosmogonies. Marcovich contends that (in Heraclitus) to take αἰεί with έωντος is a lectio facillior,\textsuperscript{25} but this is really a misapplication of a valid principle of textual criticism. There a variant reading is considered to be a lectio facillior when it can be explained as an intentional change from a reading that is more difficult to understand. In the present case, however, it is most improbable that Heraclitus placed αἰεί next to έωντος without intending his readers and/or hearers to recall the formula of immortality applied to the gods of traditional Greek mythology.\textsuperscript{26} And if he intended to allude to this formula, it was in order to suggest that it is the impersonal Logos, in accordance with which all things happen in the universe, that is eternal and not the traditional, anthropomorphic gods. And there is other evidence of Heraclitus' hostility to anthropomorphism and to traditional Greek mythological thought.\textsuperscript{27}

The preceding are, I submit, valid reasons for thinking that Heraclitus meant αἰεί to go with έωντος. If this is so, it is surely noteworthy that, with the exception of Aristotle, the extant ancient authors who in citing or alluding to this part of the fragment make it clear how they construe αἰεί, all took this word with έωντος. They are Clement, Amelius, Hippolytus, and perhaps Cleanthes.\textsuperscript{28} It must

\footnotesize a whole and other relevant evidence (cf. e.g. 22 B 2, 17, 34, 50, etc.) show that Heraclitus supposed that men could understand the universe by themselves, since he blames them for not doing so.

\textsuperscript{23} This second argument has been rightly emphasized by Gigon, p. 6; Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), p. 279; H. Cherniss, Selected Papers (Leiden, 1977), p. 16, n. 13.

\textsuperscript{24} Cf. Homer, II. I. 290, 494, XXIV. 99; Odyssey I. 263; Hesiod, Theog. 21, 33; Op. 718.

\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Marcovich\textsuperscript{1}, p. 9 = Marcovich\textsuperscript{2}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{26} The notion that αὐα can go both with έωντος and with αξένωτος (cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 2) must be rejected. Such an ἅτο κοινων construction is impossible here, since in reading the text we would have to make a pause either after έωντος or after αὐα. This is precisely the point Aristotle makes when he cites the first few words of our fragment. His testimony is incompatible with Gigon's suggestion.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. 22 B 5, 15, 30, 40, 42, 53, 56, 57, 62, 67, 104, etc.

\textsuperscript{28} That Clement took αὐα with έωντος is clear from the way he cites the fragment (Strom. V. 111, 7 [II, pp. 401–02 Stählin]): ἐντικρρ ὅ ὅ μὲν Ἰράκλατσ "τοῦ λόγου τοῦθέν έωντος αὐα, 1 ήφων, "αξένωτα κτλ." Hippolytus for his part precedes the citation of B 1 with the words (Ref. IX. 9. 3 [p. 241, Wendland]) ἦτο δὲ λόγος ἵστων αὐα τὸ πάν καὶ διὰ παντός ζω, ὀντός λέγει. Amelius, cited by Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica XI. 19. 1 (II,
also be said that, contrary to what is sometimes asserted, Aristotle does not state, nor necessarily imply, either, that the ambiguity of *aiei* is incurable. For Aristotle was not concerned with analyzing the part of Heraclitus’ statement he quotes. He was merely trying to find an example of ambiguity in “punctuation” in connection with the general rule “that a written composition should be easy to read and therefore easy to deliver; for it is the same thing.” But this rule is violated when there are many connectives, “or where the punctuation is difficult, as in the writings of Heraclitus.” He claims, after citing the beginning of Heraclitus’ first fragment, that it is unclear (ἀδηλον) whether *aiei* goes with what precedes or with what follows it. Hence for Aristotle the very fact that two constructions of *aiei* are possible suffices to make the construction ἀδηλον and therefore difficult to read and to deliver, for we would have to stop and think and give arguments in favor or against one or the other construction. However, that something is ἀδηλον means simply that it is not self-evident or obvious; it does not necessarily follow that Aristotle himself, if that had been his purpose, would not have been able to decide in favor of one of the two possibilities he mentions. In other words, Aristotle is recommending that we write in such a way as to avoid all possible ambiguity, a rule he himself not infrequently violated.

The next point is to decide how the initial genitive should be construed. Those who take *aiei* with what follows, however they construe the words τοῦθ’ ἐόντος, take τοῦ λόγου as an objective genitive depending on ἀξιώτατοι. Even some of those who take *aiei* with ἐόντος also take the initial genitive to depend upon ἀξιώτατοι, while taking ἐόντος *aiei* as modifying τοῦ λόγου τοῦθ’. However, if one takes *aiei* with ἐόντος, there are good reasons for taking τοῦ λόγου τοῦθ’ ἐόντος.

p. 45 [Mras], says: καὶ ὅντος ἀρα ἢν ὁ λόγος καθ’ ἢν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχεῖ καὶ ἀναγεννησαν ἐγένετο, ὡς ἢν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιώσας κτλ. As for Ceanthes, if in line 21 of his Hymn to Zeus we read ὡςθ’ ἐνα γίγνεσαν πάντων λόγων αἰεὶ ἐόντα (cf. G. Zuntz, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 [1958], p. 303), it is likely that he there had Heraclitus in mind and that he read αἰεὶ with ἐόντος in 22 B 1.

29 Cf. e.g. Calogero, Gior. Crit. della Filos. Ital. 17 (1936), 196.
28 Given the context, with διαστίζα Aristotel seems to mean some sort of dot or stop to be made at appropriate places of a text in order to facilitate the reading of it. Cf. also note 26 supra.
31 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 11–12.
32 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 12–14. It is noteworthy that Aristotle says, not that it is impossible to punctuate Heraclitus’ written statements, but that it is difficult to do so: τὰ γὰρ Ἡράκλειτος διαστίζα ἐργον κτλ.
33 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 17–18.
34 Cf. notes 26 and 30 supra.
35 Cf. e.g. West, op. cit. (note 10 supra), p. 117.
aiếι as a genitive absolute, having concessive force: "Though this Logos exists always men are uncomprehending both before they have heard it and once they have heard it." In the first place, the assertion of the perpetual existence of the Logos acquires emphasis from the beginning, and greater prominence is given to the state of ignorance in which men live. Secondly, the word ἀξιωταί, which for Heraclitus, as Kirk himself says,\(^{36}\) has a positive meaning and which he employs in another fragment (B 34) in a similar way ("ignoramuses"), would be used here too in an absolute, derogatory, and not merely negative sense.

According to the testimony of Sextus, the second fragment of Heraclitus in Diels' edition came soon after the first.\(^{37}\) If in the latter aiếι was meant to be taken with ἔντος, and if the whole initial genitive is absolute, then there is a striking parallel between τοῦ λόγου τοῦτον ἔντος aiếι and τοῦ λόγου δ' ἔντος ἐνοῷ in 22 B 2, which is certainly a genitive absolute.\(^{38}\) It is in fact possible, perhaps even likely, that the first part of Heraclitus' book contained a series of predicates of the Logos, in the genitive absolute, followed by contrasting statements in which men's failure to understand was emphasized.\(^{39}\)

Two additional questions concerning the first sentence are the meaning of the present γίνονται and of τὸ πρῶτον. To begin with the latter, in all probability here it means "once" rather than "for the first time."\(^{40}\) For it is Heraclitus' point that men are uncomprehending both before they have heard the Logos and also after they have heard it, not merely that they fail to understand it when they hear it for the first time. This latter meaning would leave open the possibility of men's understanding the Logos when they hear it for the second or third time, etc., and such a meaning is precluded by the rest of this fragment as well as by the rest of the related evidence.\(^{41}\)

As for γίνονται, it is taken by Verdenius, who in this is followed by Kirk,\(^{42}\) as implying result: "men's coming across the Logos results in incomprehension." This meaning is possible but not necessary, and I doubt that it was here intended by Heraclitus. He thought that all

\(^{36}\) Cf. Kirk, p. 34.


\(^{38}\) I should like to emphasize that I do not base my interpretation of B 1 on the parallelism between B 1 and B 2, as some scholars do (cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 3).

\(^{39}\) Cf. 22 B 2.

\(^{40}\) Cf. Kirk, p. 34 with his reference to LSJ, s.v. IIe.

\(^{41}\) Both in this fragment and elsewhere (cf. e.g. 22 B 2, 17, 34, etc.) Heraclitus speaks of men's failure to understand as characteristic of the human condition.

\(^{42}\) Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), pp. 279–80; Kirk, p. 40.
men live in a common world, but that they fail to see the common law and system of the universe (cf. 22 B 1 14, 2, 30, 89\textsuperscript{43}); that is, they fail to see how things are related to one another and, hence, do not apprehend the Logos. Therefore, I think it preferable to take ἀξίωντος γίνονται to denote the state of ignorance in which men live despite the fact that the Logos is always there and that Heraclitus explains it to them. Like the above mentioned scholars, I see no contrast between εἴναι and γίγνεσθαι implied in this fragment, as Gigon thinks there is.\textsuperscript{44}

The purpose of the fragment’s second sentence is not so much to explain the state of ignorance in which men live as to justify Heraclitus’ assertion to that effect. It begins with a concessive genitive absolute, which tells us that “though all things happen according to this Logos,” men are like people of no experience (ἀπείροσιν), i.e. they are ignorant. I believe the next participle, πείρωμενοι, is temporal-concessive rather than purely concessive,\textsuperscript{45} and not frequentative, as Diels and Marcovich, among others, take it.\textsuperscript{46} It is not the case that men are like the inexperienced each time they experience words and deeds such as Heraclitus explains. Rather, though all things happen according to this Logos, men are like the inexperienced even when they experience (i.e. are acquainted with) words and deeds such as Heraclitus explains. In other words, that men are ignorant before they have heard the discourse of Heraclitus is bad enough; but it is much worse that they continue to live in ignorance and fail to understand even when they become acquainted with Heraclitus’ doctrine, for in this last case they had the opportunity to compare Heraclitus’ statements with the facts, as all things happen according to this Logos.

The word-play ἀπείροσιν–πείρωμενοι is most probably intentional, as are the similar ones in 22 B 2, 28, 48, 114, etc. According to Kirk, “in the present case it is simply a stylistic trick and can imply no underlying connexion of sense between the similar word-forms, for the connexion is quite obvious.”\textsuperscript{47} Yet it is difficult to agree that because a connection is quite obvious the word-play must be simply a stylistic trick and nothing more than that. The word-play here does convey the implication that men, though acquainted not only with

\textsuperscript{43} In B 89, at least the first part is, pace Kirk, authentic, cf. Vlastos, American Journal of Philology 76 (1955), 344 ff.

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Kirk, pp. 40–41 against Gigon, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. also Kirk, pp. 33 and 41.

\textsuperscript{46} Cf. Diels in earlier versions of FVS, an interpretation adopted also by Kranz in the 6th edition. Marcovich\textsuperscript{1}, p. 9 = Marcovich\textsuperscript{2}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{47} Kirk, p. 41.
the facts but also with Heraclitus’ doctrine, nevertheless are like the inexperienced in that they fail to understand. Other fragments, too, stress men’s characteristic inability to understand; 48 but here, in 22 B 1, the point is made that if one fails to understand the Logos, then one cannot really possess any true experience, which among other things requires repetition and memory, memory of the connection between the things that constitute a single experience. 49 Similarly, men may become acquainted (πειρώμενοι) with Heraclitus’ doctrine more than once but they still fail to understand, and so are like the inexperienced. To my mind this is the reason why in this context the word ἄπειρος was used for “ignorant.” In fact, this fragment, not mentioned by Liddell–Scott–Jones, s.v. ἄπειρος (A), is evidence of the connection between the literal meaning “without trial or experience” and the absolute sense “inexperienced,” “ignorant.”

The words ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων were probably meant to recall the epic formula ἐπος καὶ ἔργον. Kirk says that in Heraclitus “the words are the means of explanation, the deeds or events are the things which are explained.” 50 This is true, but only up to a point. For there is here an implication that men could see the Logos in language itself even apart from their hearing it from Heraclitus. Now Heraclitus believes that his doctrine is instantiated in human speech (cf. for example the connection made between βίος and βίος in 22 B 48 and that between ἔνν νόῳ and ἔννός in B 114), and so I suggest that he meant that men by themselves could see the Logos there as well as in the facts of experience. If this is so, then it is likely that he used ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων as a polar expression for “the whole of human experience,” as Reinhardt and others have thought. 51

The verb διηγεῖμαι has received little attention on the part of interpreters, even though there has been a lot of discussion as to whether Heraclitus’ book was a collection of aphorisms or a continuous exposition. 52 I agree with Walzer (p. 42, note 7) that διηγεῖσθαι indicates, not a collection of aphorisms but rather a descriptive writing, i.e. a treatise. The first fragment of Heraclitus supports such an interpretation and so do, among others, 22 B 114, 30, etc. It is

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48 Cf. note 41 supra.
50 Kirk, p. 41.
therefore likely that the aphoristic character of other fragments is
due to the way they have been transmitted to us and not to Heraclitus
himself. But even if some of Heraclitus' utterances were aphorisms,
it is unlikely that the whole book was merely a collection of such
utterances. It is noteworthy that ὁκόιον ἐγὼ διηγεύμαι κατὰ φύσιν
diaireóν ἐκαστὸν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει must refer to the whole or to
most of Heraclitus' treatise and not merely to its first part.

The two participial phrases, (διηγεύμαι) κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἐκαστὸν
καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει, have given rise to several different interpreta-
tions. First of all one must decide what is here meant by διαιρέων.
Marcovich takes it in the literal meaning "to divide," in the sense of
"taking apart." As examples he gives the bow in 22 B 51 (it consists
of two arms and of the unifying string) and the analysis of a word,
as in 22 B 48 ("the name and the function are the two constituent
parts of every given thing"). However, even apart from the fact
that his interpretation of B 51 is questionable and that the implication
he sees in B 48 is too far-reaching, it is doubtful, in the light of
our evidence, that Heraclitus devoted the essential part of his treatise
to the type of analysis Marcovich describes. But I think Marcovich
is right in his attempt to relate the two participial phrases to the rest
of Heraclitus' statements. However, if we are to take διαιρέων ἐκαστὸν
in the sense "to divide each thing," I believe that Heraclitus was
thinking of his predecessors' procedure of dividing their main "mate-
rial substances" into contraries. Thus, for example, Anaximenes
asserted (using the mechanism of condensation and rarefaction) that
all was air and then proceeded to divide this body into contraries:
hot and cold, humid and dry, etc. It is this procedure on the part
of his predecessors that Parmenides illustrates when he describes the
opinions of mortals. If this is what Heraclitus meant by διαιρέων
ἐκαστὸν, then we must think of his doctrine of identity-in-difference,
of the unity of contraries, etc., which presupposes not only some sort
of classification of things into contraries but also contrariety in the

55 Marcovich, p. 10 = Marcovich, pp. 10–11.
54 Even in B 48 itself I cannot see that Heraclitus implies that the name and the
function of the bow are its two constituent parts.
55 Heraclitus seems to place more emphasis on the bringing of things together
rather than on "taking them apart." The unity of things, i.e. of contraries, seems to
be what he claims as his most original contribution. Cf. 22 b 2, 10, 30, 41, 51, 54,
57, etc.
56 By this expression I mean to refer simply to the most widely distributed bodies
in the universe mentioned by the Presocratics, e.g. water, fire, etc.
57 Cf. Anaximenes 13 A 1, A 4, A 5, A 7, B 1, B 2, etc.
225.
things themselves. This procedure could be illustrated by fragments such as B 12 ποταμοῦσιν τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἔτερα καὶ ἔτερα ὑδάτα ἐπὶρρεῖ, B 36 ψυχήσιν θάνατος ὑδωρ γενέσθαι, ὑδατὶ δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, B 48 τῷ τῷ ὄνομα βίος, ἐργον δὲ θάνατος, B 61 θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρώτατον καὶ μικρώτατον, ἵχθυς μὲν πτόιυμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἀπόφων καὶ ὀλέθριον, etc. However, it is also possible that we must take διαίρειν here in the more general sense “to distinguish,” as Kirk59 among others does, for Heraclitus may have meant merely to say that each thing60 is described by him κατὰ φύσιν. But I cannot agree with Kirk that διαίρειν here is (merely) the process of analysis that leads up to a judgment. It seems to be rather the process by which a thing is described and thereby is differentiated from anything else, though of course in Heraclitus that very differentiation will show it to be related to everything else. As for κατὰ φύσιν, I should prefer to take it not as “according to each thing’s origin,” nor as “according to each thing’s nature,” nor as “according to each thing’s real constitution,” but in its true adverbial meaning “properly,” “as it ought to be (sc. described).”61 One objection common to the rejected interpretations is that at this stage in his book it is not likely that Heraclitus would have written κατὰ φύσιν διαίρειν if he had meant to ascribe to φύσις a technical meaning. I agree with Verdenius and Kirk62 that ἐκὼς ἔχει is not a different process from κατὰ φύσιν διαίρειν, but that the two are related. Heraclitus proposes to describe each thing correctly and so to be able to state how it is.

In the third and final part of the fragment, Heraclitus proceeds to describe the kind of life the rest of men (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους) lead because of their ignorance of the Logos, in strong contrast with Heraclitus’ own condition (ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι κτλ.). Kirk and Marcovich, among others, take the final part of the fragment to mean that the rest of men fail to understand what they do once they are awake (taking ἐγερθέντες as an ingressive aorist participle), just as they forget what they do when they are asleep: “But the rest of men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do when asleep” (Kirk’s translation). Before discussing this interpretation it may be well to indicate a point of agreement: ποιοῦσιν, which must also be supplied with the second clause, should not be interpreted too literally. ποιεῖν here refers not only to what men actually do but

59 Kirk, pp. 33 and 41-42.
60 In any interpretation of the words in question ἐκαστὸν is a rhetorical exaggeration.
also to their mental and emotional life. Moreover, the second clause refers to our dreams when we are asleep; it certainly does not refer primarily to the motions or gesticulations we may perform while we are asleep.\(^{63}\)

The difficulties of the interpretation they have adopted have not escaped Kirk and Marcovich themselves, and are indeed formidable. If we take \(\varepsilon\pi\lambda\alpha\theta\acute{a}v\delta\acute{a}n\nu\tau\alpha\iota\) to mean “they forget,” then Heraclitus would be saying that men once they are awake fail to recognize, to see the ever-present truth just as they, on waking, forget what they did in sleep, that is, they forget their dreams. However, in the first place, it is not the case that men always forget their dreams; quite frequently they do not forget them. And so we would have a first important inconsistency. Heraclitus would be comparing the perpetual failure of ignorant men to understand the truth with something that happens to men sometimes only. And there is evidence in Heraclitus himself that he did not think that we always forget our dreams.\(^{64}\)

Secondly, and even more important, even if men did forget their dreams, it is hard to see the propriety of comparing men’s customary failure to know the truth with the fact that once they are awake they forget their dreams. This difficulty should not be dismissed with Kirk’s remark that “slight inconsistencies in complex images are not uncommon in the archaic style.”\(^{65}\) The comparison would not be slightly inconsistent but rather a non sequitur. Marcovich for his part betrays the weakness of the interpretation to which he subscribes when he states that “the sentence would be complete in itself even without \(\varepsilon\pi\lambda\alpha\theta\acute{a}v\delta\acute{a}n\nu\tau\alpha\iota\), (which cannot mean the same as \(\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\acute{a}v\iota\): possibly Heraclitus added this word for the sake of balance or of the word-play.”\(^{66}\) For we would have to suppose that for the sake of balance or of word-play Heraclitus added a word, \(\varepsilon\pi\lambda\alpha\theta\acute{a}v\delta\acute{a}n\nu\tau\alpha\iota\), and ruined the whole point of the comparison, as without it the statement would yield a good sense: “But it escapes the rest of men what they do once they are awake, just as it escapes them what they do while they are asleep.” I agree with Marcovich that \(\varepsilon\pi\lambda\alpha\theta\acute{a}v\delta\acute{a}n\nu\tau\alpha\iota\) does not mean the same as the preceding \(\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\acute{a}v\iota\), but to decide what Heraclitus had in mind it is necessary to see first what he meant by the comparison in general.

One must note two points. First, that to the man who knows the Logos, specifically Heraclitus himself (\(\varepsilon\gamma\omega\)), the nescience of the rest

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\(^{63}\) Contrast West, \textit{op. cit.} (note 10 supra), p. 116, who thinks that the reference is to bodily movements which men make while asleep.

\(^{64}\) Cf. 22 B 21 with B 26; B 75; B 89.

\(^{65}\) Kirk, p. 44.

\(^{66}\) Marcovich\(^1\), p. 10 = Marcovich\(^2\), p. 11.
of humanity in wakefulness is strongly contrasted. Secondly, Heraclitus must have meant to compare men’s failure to apprehend the Logos when they are awake with what happens to them when they are asleep and dreaming. In other words, he is comparing two states, and we must keep in mind that to sleep and dream is for Heraclitus, as Kirk himself says, “a real if diminished form of activity.” Now ἔπιλαυθάνομαι literally means “to let something which one previously knew escape one’s notice”; here, used of what happens to men while they are dreaming, it must refer to this: the successive images we see in our dreams escape our notice in such a way that we do not understand—because we are not conscious of—the nature of what we do in our sleep. This is in fact the way in which some interpreters have understood ἔπιλαυθάνονται in this fragment. To Kirk’s and Marcovich’s objection that there is no parallel to such a meaning, one must answer that it is the context that is crucial for deciding what a word means. Moreover, the middle ἔπιλαυθάνομαι or ἐπιλήθομαι frequently bears the meaning “to forget” in the sense of “not being conscious of.” Thus, for example, when at the beginning of Plato’s Apology (17 A 2–3) Socrates says ἔγω δὲ οὖν καὶ αὐτῆς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὀλίγον ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, he surely means to say that the effect of his accusers’ speeches was such that he almost “forgot himself” in the sense of “not being conscious of who he really was.” If this interpretation is right, then the comparison makes sense: “(in contrast to Heraclitus who knows the Logos) it escapes the rest of men what they do once they are awake, just as when they are asleep they are unconscious of (i.e. do not understand) what they do.” Heraclitus does not mean to say that the rest of men when awake have no knowledge at all of what they do but only that the true significance of it escapes them. For example, they see day and they see night, but they do not understand that night and day are a single thing (cf. 22 B 57). The interpretation of the final comparison given here makes better sense of ἐγερθέντες as an ingressive aorist than that of Kirk and Marcovich does. In their interpretation the comparison would be between two things that happen when men are awake: they fail to understand the Logos just as they forget their dreams. In my interpretation, men, once they are awake, fail to understand the Logos just as when they were asleep they did not understand their

67 Kirk, p. 44.
68 Kirk, p. 44.
69 Cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 6; Kranz FV5 I, p. 150; Walzer, p. 41; H. Fränkel, American Journal of Philology 59 (1938), 318 with n. 18.
dreams. The implication is that the waking life of the ignorant majority has a dreamlike quality.

This fragment, then, implies the geometrical proportion-pattern "the man who knows the Logos is to men awake who fail to understand it as the latter are to those who are asleep and dreaming." The pattern A:B::B:C was used by Heraclitus in other connections also, and the specific one implied in the first fragment is also to be reconstructed with good probability from other texts.

This is not the place to discuss the meaning of Logos in Heraclitus, since several other fragments would have to be taken into account. Nevertheless, something can be gathered even from this fragment itself, and belongs to the present discussion because it affects the interpretation of our text. The main point is that the Logos cannot be simply Heraclitus' discourse, nor can it even refer principally to it. For it is clearly implied here that men could have known the Logos even before they heard it from Heraclitus. All things happen according to the Logos, yet men are like the inexperienced even when they experience such words and deeds as Heraclitus describes; it follows that the Logos is always there but men fail to understand it because they fail to see the connection that exists between all the facts with which they are acquainted. In short, the Logos must be a formula or pattern in accordance with which all things happen in the universe. The discourse of Heraclitus expounds and explains this Logos, but the Logos' existence is independent of it. The discourse of Heraclitus "is" the Logos only in the sense that it describes the formula according to which all things happen in the universe; but the two are not identical, and they are clearly differentiated in frag. B 50: οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας κτλ.

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70 I do not mean to say that this geometrical pattern was the main purpose of this part of the fragment, but that it is implied there.
71 Cf. especially H. Fränkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," American Journal of Philology 59 (1938), 309–37, though there is no need to follow him in all his interpretations of individual fragments.
72 Cf. 22 B 89 with B 72 and Cherniss, Selected Papers, p. 39 with n. 13.
73 As e.g. West, op. cit. (note 10 supra), pp. 115 and 117 would have it.
74 As Burnet, p. 133 and n. 1, suggests.
75 Cf. note 22 supra.