

Ad Themistium Arabum

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In 1973, Dr. M. C. Lyons of the University of Cambridge published an edition entitled *An Arabic Translation of Themistius, Commentary on Aristoteles, De Anima*, Oriental Studies 2 (Thetford, Norfolk). The Arabic version, which comes from a manuscript discovered in the Qarawiyyīn Mosque in Fez, is the work of the well-known translator Ishāq ibn Ḥunain (ob. 298 A.H. = 910 A.D.). Lyons describes the quality of the Arabic as follows:

The word-for-word translation is entirely adequate . . . and, allowing for the difficulties of the original, the Arabic is surprisingly clear. Further, Ishāq's knowledge is shown to have extended well beyond technicalities. He is not baffled by a reference to the shirt of Nessus¹ and he is acquainted with the peculiarities of the Hippocentaurs and of Scylla.² Nor is his competence confined to prose, as he shows himself capable of producing a version of the cryptic hexameters of Empedocles.³ (p. xii)

Regarding the Greek text that Ishāq had at his disposal, Lyons observes that it

had a considerable chronological advantage over the oldest extant Greek manuscript. In the introduction to his text of Themistius in

¹ L(yons) 120. 13 = H(einze; see below, note 4) 73. 5.

² L 156. 2 = H 89. 12-13.

³ L 29. 11-13 = H 33. 12-14, L 31. 10 = H 34. 8, L 33. 17-18 = H 35. 13-14, L 152. 14 = H 87. 22.

the series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Heinze⁴ notes as his oldest manuscript one of the eleventh century, Parisiensis Coislinianus no. 386, which he uses extensively, together with a later representative of the same tradition. His other manuscripts he traces, in the main, to the recension of "a not unlearned Byzantine."⁵ Ishāq's original must antedate this tradition by some two hundred years or more. Its age alone, of course, is no guarantee of its accuracy and consequently there is included in this edition a list of comparative readings found in the Arabic and in Heinze's manuscripts. It must be admitted that the readings derived from the Arabic are in every case tentative, but their accumulation should present a reasonably accurate conclusion. This is that the Arabic represents no known branch of the present Greek manuscript tradition. It has a number of errors peculiar to itself, but in many places where there is a division in the Greek Mss. it follows the better reading and in a certain number of cases it seems to have preserved a better text than any to be found in Greek. (p. xiii)

Unfortunately, as I learned from Lyons, 13 years elapsed between the time when he submitted his typescript to the printer and the actual date of publication. During that period, the publisher mislaid the list of comparative readings, and consequently it is not to be found in the edition.⁶ In working through the Arabic and comparing it to Heinze's Greek text, I have accumulated a similar list of readings; from this—in the notes that follow—I choose those that show that the Arabic translator's Greek *Vorlage* is superior to the manuscripts that form the basis of Heinze's edition. The number of these passages is significantly large, and the changes introduced into the text are often of considerable impact, so that the future editor of the Greek Themistius can ill afford to overlook the Arabic version. In this article, I cite the Greek in accordance with Heinze's edition, from whose apparatus I select pertinent data. Note that I use Ar to stand for Lyons' Arabic text. Passages from Aristotle's *De anima* conform to the critical edition of P. Siwek, *Aristotelis Tractatus de anima graece et latine* (Rome 1965). I had the opportunity to discuss the Arabic text with Dr. Lyons when I was a Visiting Fellow of Clare Hall in the fall of 1984, and I am grateful to him for valuable criticism.

⁴ R. Heinze, *Themistii librorum de anima paraphrasis*, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae 5. 3 (Berlin 1899).

⁵ "A Byzantino quodam non indocto"—Heinze p. v.

⁶ In his paper "An Arabic Translation of the Commentary of Themistius," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 17 (1955), 426–35, Lyons printed a few emendations obtained by comparing the Greek and the Arabic for the beginning of Section 7 of Themistius (L 214 – 217. 7 = H 116. 24 – 118. 5).

27. 38–39 οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐλεεῖ ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τῇ μέντοι ψυχῇ. . . .

For this segment of text, Ar has an additional clause:

كذلك ليست النفس هي التي ترحم بل الإنسان إلا أن الإنسان إنما يرحم بالنفس
وليس النفس هي التي تتعلم بل الإنسان بالنفس

thus it is not the soul which feels pity, but man, although it is by the soul that man feels pity, and it is not the soul which learns, but man by the soul. . . . (18.3–5)

This suggests that the translator's *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as οὕτω καὶ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐλεεῖ ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τῇ μέντοι ψυχῇ⟨, οὐδὲ ἡ ψυχὴ μανθάνει ἀλλ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῇ ψυχῇ⟩. . . Homoioteleuton may have caused the omission in the rest of the tradition. As reconstructed, the text is quite close to the corresponding passage in Aristotle: βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ (408b13–15). Note that تعلم also renders μανθάνειν on 81. 4 (= 55. 31 of the Greek). For the use of the particle *lā* to bring out the emphasis implicit in the Greek, cf. H. J. Polotsky, *Études de syntaxe copte* (Cairo 1944), pp. 26 and 65–68 as well as my comments in “Ad Artemidorum Arabum,” *Le Muséon* 97 (1984), 208 (9. 5–6) and 209 (52. 15).

29. 3–5 ὥστε δηλονότι μάχοιτο ἂν οὐ πρὸς τὸ κινεῖσθαι προηγουμένως τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ [μὴ] κινεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ σώματος κινήσεις. (μὴ delevit Heinze)

Here Ar reads:

فيظهر من قبل ذلك أن معاندته ليست على القصد الأول لمن قال أن النفس
تتحرك لكن لمن قال أنها تتحرك حركات البدن

and so from that it is clear that his opposition is not primarily against the one who says that the soul is moved but against the one who says that it is moved in the movements of the body. (20. 9–11)

The Arabic version supports Heinze's deletion of *μὴ* and also suggests that *προηγουμένως* should be transposed: I reconstruct the *Vorlage* as ὥστε δηλονότι μάχοιτο ἂν οὐ προηγουμένως πρὸς τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ σώματος κινήσεις. Possibly *προηγουμένως* fell out because of homoiarchon with the following *πρὸς*; its subsequent insertion may have been responsible for the addition of *μὴ*.

30: 20–22 καὶ ὄλως εἰ χρῆται ὀργάνῳ ἀφανεστέρω, πῶς οὐκ εὐλογον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν αἰσθητικὴν χωριστὴν ποιεῖν τῶν ὀργάνων;

For this Ar provides a fuller text, which, unfortunately, contains a lacuna:

وبالجملة إن كان العقل يستعمل آلة وكان بهذا السبب ليس هو نوعا غير
مفارق [] يتمم آلة مكنونة فكيف لا يجب على هذا القياس
أن نجعل النفس الحاسة أيضا مفارقة للآلات

and in short, if the mind uses an organ and is for this reason itself not an inseparable category [and also if] it uses a hidden organ, then how is it not necessary, in accordance with this reasoning, that we make the sensible soul also separable from the organs? (23. 11–13)

Regarding the lacuna, Lyons notes: “haec verba desiderantur ap. H.” I venture to restore *إن أيضا* , which is incorporated in the above translation; for the phraseology cf. e.g. 7. 3. Note that the use of the 3rd pers. masc. sg. *يستعمل* after the lacuna shows that the subject is *العقل* , not *النفس* . The Greek underlying the passage as a whole may have been *καὶ ὄλως εἰ χρῆται ὄργάνῳ (μηδ' αὐτὸς ὧν ἀχώριστον εἶδος, καὶ ταῦτα ὄργάνῳ) ἀφανεστέρω, πῶς κτλ.* Assumption of homoioteleuton (*ὄργάνῳ - - ὄργάνῳ*) can explain the absence of the intervening words in the rest of the tradition. Arabic *نوع* elsewhere translates *εἶδος* (see pp. 304 and 334 of Lyons' index), and *غير مفارق* renders *ἀχώριστος* on 192. 2 (= 105. 28 of the Greek) and on 197. 18 (= 108. 30).

32. 7–9 *ἴδιον δέ, ὅτι κινούσι τὸ ζῶον ὑπ' ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Δημόκριτον ἔφαμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ τῶν σφαιρῶν.*

For the clause *ὅτι κινούσι τὸ ζῶον ὑπ' ἀριθμοῦ*, Ar reads

أنهم يقولون إن الحيوان إنما يتحرك عن عدد

the fact that they say that the living creature is moved by number (27. 5–6; literally “. . . that it is by number that the living creature is moved”: see above, on 27. 38–39).

Examination of the Arabic readily suggests that *κινούσι* should be emended to *κιν(εἶσθαι λέγ)ουσι*; cf. especially the similar phrase *τοῖς . . . κινεῖσθαι λέγουσι τὴν ψυχήν* below in line 35, rendered by Ar as

لمن قال بأن النفس تتحرك

to whoever holds that the soul is moved (28. 14–15). Cf. also below, on 87. 23–25.

33. 9 οὐ γὰρ δήπου τῶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἵππῳ τὸν ἕξω ἵππον (sc. ὀπώπαμεν: cf. 33. 7).

Here Ar shows that its *Vorlage* had a clause absent in the rest of the tradition. From the translation,

فإنه ليس يتيماً أن يقال أنا رأينا الإنسان الخارج بالإنسان الذي فينا ولا الفرس
الخارج بالفرس الذي فينا

for it is not possible for it to be said that we have seen the external man by means of the man who is within us, nor the external horse by means of the horse that is within us, (29. 7–8)

we may restore the *Vorlage* as οὐ γὰρ δήπου <τῶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν ἕξω ἄνθρωπον οὐδὲ> τῶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἵππῳ τὸν ἕξω ἵππον. The extra material could have dropped out of the manuscripts used by Heinze through homoiarchon. As now reconstructed on the basis of the Arabic, the passage reflects the man–horse typology that appears in Aristotle, *Cat.* 1b4–5 and 2a13–14: οἶον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τις ἵππος.

33. 22–25 τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰ καθόλου πῶς γνωριεῖ, ἃ διηρίθμηται ἐν κατηγορίαις, οἶον οὐσίαν, ποσὸν καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰ γένη στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλείω τῶνδε καὶ πόρρω παντάπασι τοῦ καὶ νομισθῆναι στοιχεῖα. . . .

The vigilant reader will look in vain for a correlative to the phrase ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλείω τῶνδε. The Arabic shows that the passage in question is corrupt; it reads

لكنّ الأثيياء التي من الاسطقات أكثر من عشرة والأجناس بعيدة جداً من
أن يتوهم فيها أنها اسطقات

but the things that consist of elements are more than ten, and the genera are very far from being considered to be elements. (30. 8–10)

This interpretative translation permits us to emend the text in Heinze: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλείω τῶν <δέκα, τὰ> δὲ καὶ πόρρω παντάπασι τοῦ καὶ νομισθῆναι στοιχεῖα. Themistius is of course referring to the ten categories of predication specified by Aristotle in the fourth chapter of *Categories*. Note that there is a similar reference in Themistius on 42. 17–18: πολλαχῶς δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἔν εἶναι (δεκαχῶς γάρ). Visual similarity between δέκα and δὲ καὶ was probably responsible for the loss of δέκα, τὰ in the manuscripts utilized by Heinze.

34. 22–24 κρεῖττον δὲ αἰεὶ τὸ συνέχον τοῦ σκεδαννυμένου. οἱ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τὰ στοιχεῖα ποιῶντες στοιχεῖα [τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον αἰεὶ ποιεῖ]. . . .

In his apparatus Heinze writes “στοιχεία (alt.) suspectum | τὸ - - ποιεῖ seclusi, fort. collocanda post σκεδαννυμένου.” Beginning with οἱ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται, the Arabic version is as follows:

لكن هؤلاء لا يستحيون أيضا أن يجعلوا الاسطقات أفضل من العقل
فإنّ الفاعل أبدا هو الأفضل

but these are not embarrassed either in that they make the elements better than the mind, for the maker always is better. (32. 9–10)

Ar's *Vorlage* was free of the defects that troubled Heinze; I reconstruct it as οἱ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τὰ στοιχεῖα ποιῶντες βελτίονα, τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον αἰεὶ <δ> ποιεῖ. . . . The appropriateness of reading ποιῶντες βελτίονα is also apparent from the next clause, where similar phraseology is clearly to be understood: ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου τὴν ὕλην (sc. ποιῶν βελτίονα) (34. 24–35). Ar here makes the text explicit:

ومجراهم في ذلك مجرى من يفضّل الهولي على الصانع

and in that they are like one who prefers the material to the craftsman. (32. 10–11)

34. 25–26 καίτοι γε εὐλογον τὸ βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ προγενέστατον καὶ κυριώτατον, οὐ τὰ στοιχεῖα.

This clause continues from the passage discussed in the last note. Here Ar has

على أنّ الواجب أن يكون هو الأفضل وأقدم ما ينتمى إليه والأشرف لا
الاسطقات

however, it is proper that *it* be the best and the oldest of what is related to it and the most distinguished, not the elements. (32. 11–12)

The use of the emphatic pronoun *هو* suggests that Ar's *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as καίτοι γε εὐλογον <αὐτὸν> τὸ βέλτιον εἶναι κτλ.; *αὐτὸν*, referring to *νοῦς*, seems required, in order to give οὐ τὰ στοιχεῖα something to balance, and the word could have dropped out through homoioteleuton with εὐλογον. Compare Aristotle 410b14–15 εὐλογον γὰρ τοῦτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν (without οὐ τὰ στοιχεῖα). For the structure of the sentence cf. e.g. 40. 28–29 καὶ εἰς τὸ ποσὸν συντελέσει τῷ ζῳῷ ἢ ψυχῇ, οὐκ εἰς τὸ ποιόν.

43. 18–19 πάλιν δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ὁ πρίων, ὅτε σίδηρος ἦν καὶ τὸ τοιονδὶ σχῆμα ὁμοῦ. . . .

Regarding ὅτε Heinze notes: “fort. delendum,” but clearly we are

to articulate as $\delta\ \tau\epsilon$ (comparable to the structure in the clauses following: $\eta\ \tau\epsilon\ \kappa\acute{o}\rho\eta\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \eta\ \delta\psi\upsilon\varsigma$ - - $\eta\ \tau\epsilon\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\ \acute{o}\mu\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{o}\ \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$). The Arabic translator correctly understood the passage:

وأیضا كما أن هناك المنشار كان الحديد والشكل المنشار إليه معا

and also, just as there the saw was the iron and such-and-such a shape at the same time. . . . (53. 6-7).⁷

43. 28-29 οὐπω γὰρ δῆλον, εἰ καὶ οὗτος σώματός τινος ἐντελέχεια ἄρα τοιαύτη ὥστε ἀχώριστος εἶναι. . . .

The particle ἄρα is surprisingly late in its clause. From the Arabic we see that the text printed in Heinze requires emendation:

لأنه لم يبين بعد أنه استكمال لجسم ما فإن كان استكمالاً فهل هو استكمال
يجرى مجرى ما لا يفارق

because it is not yet clear whether it is a completion of some body, and if it is a completion, whether it is a completion like what is inseparable. . . . (53. 16-17)

We should alter ἄρα to ἀρα and add a short protasis: οὐπω γὰρ δῆλον εἰ καὶ οὗτος σώματός τινος ἐντελέχεια <καὶ εἰ ἐντελέχεια,> ἀρα τοιαύτη ὥστε ἀχώριστος εἶναι. . . . For the general structure cf. 45. 25-27 . . . εἰ πρότερον διακρίναιμεν πότερον ἐκάστη τούτων τῶν προειρημένων δυνάμεων ἐστι ψυχὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἢ μόνιον τι ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόνιον, πότερον οὕτως. . . . Note also that, although it lacks the equivalent of καὶ εἰ ἐντελέχεια, the Medieval Latin translation of William of Moerbeke here has *utrum*,⁸ reflecting ἀρα, which is also found in the *editio princeps* of the Greek text (see below, note 14).

47. 2-4 καὶ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς οἰκεία ὕλη ἐκάστῳ εἶδει, οἰκεία μὲν ἡδί, κοινή δὲ ἡδί, καὶ ζῶψ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὸ φυσικὸν σῶμα ὀργανικόν, τοιῶδες δὲ ζῶψ τὸ τοιῶδες ὄργανον. (ante ὀργανικόν add. καὶ ας)

Here the Greek text underlying the Arabic is somewhat different from what Heinze prints; Ar reads:

⁷ Note incidentally that in the same section (43. 19) Heinze's ὀφθαλμός should be corrected to <ὁ> ὀφθαλμός: it is parallel to ὁ πρίων (in the passage quoted in the text); Ar reads العين (53. 7) and shows that ὁ ὀφθαλμός stood in its *Vorlage*.

⁸ G. Verbeke, *Thémistius, Commentaire sur le traité de l'âme d'Aristote: Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum I* (Louvain/Paris 1957), 102. 41.

وبالجملة فلكلّ خلقه هيوولى ملائمة لها أما للبيت فكذا وأما للسرير فكذا
وأما للحى المطلق فالجسم الطبيعى الآلى وأما للحى المشار إليه فالآلة

المشار إليها

and in general to each form there is matter suitable to it: to the house, this (matter); and to the bed, this; and to the animal in general, the natural and organic body; and to such-and-such an animal, such-and-such an organ. (61. 14–16)

Ar's *Vorlage* I assume ran as follows: καὶ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς οἰκεία ὕλη ἐκάστῳ εἶδει, οἰκία μὲν ἡδί, κλίνη δὲ ἡδί, καὶ ζῶω μὲν ἀπλῶ τὸ φυσικὸν σῶμα ὀργανικόν, τοιῶδε δὲ ζῶω τὸ τοιόνδε ὀργανον. I suspect that οἰκία - - - κλίνη is what Themistius wrote: first οἰκία became οἰκεία through assimilation to the preceding οἰκεία, and κλίνη was "emended" to κοινή to provide balance with the corrupt οἰκεία; note that in 41. 28 κλίνη is rendered by سرير (49. 1), the same word employed in the present passage. The assumption that Ar's *Vorlage* had ζῶω μὲν ἀπλῶ instead of ζῶω μὲν ἀπλῶς proceeds from the use of the adjective مطلق. If the Greek had been ἀπλῶς, we might expect a prepositional phrase like على الإطلاق, which renders ἀπλῶς in 39. 33 (Ar: 45. 1). There is no way of ascertaining whether the Arabic translated a manuscript which had καὶ before ὀργανικόν (see the apparatus in the passage quoted above), but the conjunction is not needed: cf. 42. 15 σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ (rendered in Ar as لجسم طبيعى آلى 50. 13–14).

48. 30–31 καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴδὲ οὗτός γε τέλειος ἀπάσης ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ κοινότατός γε ἀπάντων τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

Heinze emended τελείως, the reading of his manuscripts, to τέλειος. Ar shows that its *Vorlage* is to be reconstructed as οὗτος <κοινός> γε τελείως:

وذلك أنه وإن لم يكن هذا الحدّ عامّاً على مثال واحد لكلّ نفس فإنه أعمّ
الحدود لهذه التي تذكر في [هذا] الوقت كلّها

for even if this definition is not common in the manner of one for each soul, it is the most common definition for all these things that are now mentioned. (65. 7–9)

Note the symmetry of the passage as now emended: <κοινός> γε - - - κοινότατός γε.

48. 36 – 49. 2 τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα ἀκριβέστερον ὀριεῖσθαι ἀποδοτέον ἰδία, τίς ἐστι λόγος ἐκάστης ψυχῆς, οἷον τῆς φυτοῦ, ὅτι ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρώτος

τροφὴν ὀργανικοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν τῆς θηρίου, ὅτι ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς τροφήν τε καὶ ὄρεξιν ὀργανικοῦ.

The Arabic that translates this passage is badly lacunose in Lyons' manuscript, but its phrase

استكمال للجسم الآلى المدّ للغذاء والنمو

a completion of the organic body intended for nurture and growth
(65. 16)

corresponds to ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς τροφήν ὀργανικοῦ and shows that in the *Vorlage* this segment should be reconstructed as ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς τροφήν <τε καὶ αὐξησης> ὀργανικοῦ, exactly balanced by the following ἐντελέχεια τοῦ πρὸς τροφήν τε καὶ ὄρεξιν ὀργανικοῦ; cf. 39. 31 τὴν - - - τροφήν τε καὶ αὐξησης, which Ar renders as النغذى والنمو "nurture and growth" (44. 13-14).

55. 34-35 ὥστε ἐκεῖ μὲν φθορὰ τῆς προϋπόσεως ποιότητος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τελείωσις μᾶλλον.

Ar's wording reflects a slightly different text; it reads:

فتكون حال ذاك حال مبيد للكيفية المتقدمة فيه وحال هذا حال مكمل

للطبيعة التي هي فيه

and so the condition of that is a condition of destruction for the quality that precedes in its case, and the condition of this is a condition of completion for the nature that is in it. (81. 7-8)

I believe that the *Vorlage* ran as follows: ὥστε ἐκεῖ μὲν φθορὰ τῆς προϋπόσεως ποιότητος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τελείωσις <τῆς ἐνούσης φύσεως>. In the course of transmission, we may assume that τῆς ἐνούσης φύσεως dropped out through homoioteleuton (τελείωσις - - - φύσεως) and that μᾶλλον was added to obtain at least a semblance of balance to the preceding φθορὰ τῆς προϋπόσεως ποιότητος. For the phrase τελείωσις τῆς - - - φύσεως cf. 56. 12 τὴν τῆς φύσεως τελειότητα, rendered in Ar as كمال الطبع "the completion of the nature" (82. 6).

58. 5-11 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητὰ ἂ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητὰ, τῷ δὲ συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς ἀπλῶς αἰσθητοῖς: αἰσθητὸς γὰρ ὁ Διάρους υἱὸς ἢ ὁ Διάρης οὐχ ἢ Διάρης, ἀλλ' ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ Διάρει καὶ λευκῷ εἶναι. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητὰ οὕτως ἐρμηνεύει: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, διότι τῷ λευκῷ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν οὐ αἰσθάνεται, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λέγοι ὅτι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦ Διάρους αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε Διάρει εἶναι.

In his apparatus to *τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν οὐ αἰσθάνεται*, Heinze notes: "scripsi ex Arist.: οὐ αἰσθάνεται⁹ τοῦτο συμβ." For the passage in question, the Arabic version is based on a text that deviates from Heinze's emendation and from the reading of his manuscripts; it reads:

¹⁰ من قبل أنه عرض للابيض الذي يحسه أن كان هذا

because it has befallen the white which he senses that it be this. (87. 5-6)

Ar's *Vorlage* may be reconstructed as *διότι τῷ λευκῷ οὐ αἰσθάνεται τούτῳ <εἶναι> συμβέβηκεν*. The replacement of *τούτῳ εἶναι* by *τοῦτο* may have arisen through a desire to bring the text closer to that of Aristotle, which, as Heinze notes, here reads *ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο οὐ αἰσθάνεται* (418a22-23¹¹); with Heinze's reading, the passage is brought still nearer to Aristotle's, but, as the Arabic suggests, it is probably not what Themistius wrote. In order to show the appropriateness of the proposed *διότι τῷ λευκῷ οὐ αἰσθάνεται τούτῳ <εἶναι> συμβέβηκεν*, I have quoted the entire context at the beginning of this section. Note in particular the balancing effect of *καὶ λευκῷ εἶναι* - - - *τούτῳ <εἶναι>* - - - *Διάρει εἶναι*.

63. 25 *εὐθρυπτος γὰρ* (sc. *ὁ ἀήρ ἐστι*) *καὶ εὐόλισθος*. . . .

Here Ar reads

وذلك أنه سريع التشتت والترب والتفتت

for it is quick in dispersion and dissolution and slipping away. (100. 6-7)

Since this translation does not characteristically use two Arabic words to render a single word in Greek, Themistius may have written *εὐθρυπτος γὰρ <καὶ εὐδιάχυτος> καὶ εὐόλισθος*, and the second term could have dropped out through a combination of homoiarchon and homoioteleuton. For the triadic structure cf. e.g. 64. 23-24 *εὐθρυπτος καὶ εὐδιαίρετος καὶ εὐεκτος*, which Ar translates as

⁹ Note that *αἰσθάνεται* in Heinze's apparatus, both in the lemma and in the citation, is a misprint.

¹⁰ هذا is added by the scribe in his capacity as reviser (see Lyons' introduction, pp. viii and xviii).

¹¹ In his critical edition, *Aristotelis Tractatus de anima graece et latine* (Rome 1965), P. Siwek lists some variant readings for the passage: *τῷ λευκῷ*] *τὸ λευκὸν, οὐ*] *ὄ, αἰσθάνεται*] *αἰσθάνεσθαι* (see his apparatus for details).

سريع التثبّت والتفرّق سهل الانخزال

quick in dispersion and scattering and easy to curtail. (102. 13-14)

Themistius does not elsewhere employ the adjective *εὐδιάχυτος* (for which see LSJ),¹² but of similar formation to *εὐθρυπτος* - - - *εὐδιάχυτος* is the phrase *θρύπτεσθαι καὶ διαχεῖσθαι* in 64. 24, rendered in Ar as

التثبّت والانتشار

dispersion and diffusion, (102. 14)

as well as 65. 12 *θρύπτεσθαι* - - - *καὶ διαχεῖσθαι*, which Ar turns as *يتسرب ويتشر* "being dissolved and diffused" (104. 4). It is on the basis of these doublets that I propose *εὐθρυπτος γὰρ* <*καὶ εὐδιάχυτος*>, but it is also possible that the text should be restored as *εὐθρυπτος γὰρ* <*καὶ εὐδιαίρετος*>, as in 64. 23-24 quoted above.

63. 26-27 . . . *εἰ καὶ τύπανον τυμπάνῳ ἡρέμα προσάγοις, οὐ ποιήσεις ψόφον.*

For this Ar offers the following translation:

إن قريت ما يضرب به الطبل من الطبل برفق لم يحدث من ذلك صوت

if you gently bring that with which you strike a drum close to a drum, as a result of that it will not produce a sound. (100. 8-9)

I suspect that Ar's *Vorlage* read *εἰ δι' οὗ τύπτεις τύπανον τυμπάνῳ ἡρέμα προσάγοις κτλ.* After *τύπτεις* dropped out (through homoiarchon), *δι' οὗ*, no longer construable, was altered to *καί*. The reconstruction provides a more reasonable text than Heinze's (since one does not characteristically bang two drums together) and may approximate what Themistius wrote. For *τύπτειν* cf. 63. 30-31 *τόν* (sc. *λόγον*) *τε τοῦ τυπτομένου σώματος καὶ τὸν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ τύπτεται*, rendered in Ar as

معنى الجسم المضروب ومعنى الجسم الذى فيه يقع الضرب

the sense of the body that is struck and the sense of the body on which falls the blow. (100. 12-13)

¹² Note especially the collocation *ἀέρα εὐδιάχυτον ὄντα* in *Placita philosophorum* (ed. H. Diels, *Doxographi graeci* [Berlin 1879], 404), 4. 13. 11.

For β rendering $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ + gen. cf. e.g. 122. 5 (Gr. 74. 3).

63. 36 ἀνακλᾶται μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ πληγεῖς εἰς ἀήρ. . . .

Here Ar has

وذلك أنّ الهواء المقروع ينعكس أبدا

for the air that is struck is always reflected (100. 18)

and shows that we should emend the Greek to ὁ πληγεῖς {εἰς} ἀήρ (dittography); cf. also 64. 7 ὁ πληγεῖς ἀήρ, which Ar likewise translates as الهواء المقروع "the air that is struck" (101. 11).

65. 1-2 καὶ τοῦτο ἡ φύσις εὐλαβουμένη ἐν τῷ διὰ τῶν ὠτων πόρω τὰς ἑλικὰς ἐμηχανήσατο. . . .

This Ar renders as follows:

وهذا هو الذي حذرته الطبيعة فلطفت لأن جعلت ثقبى الأذنين لوليين

and this is that of which nature was wary, and so it became delicate because it made the holes of the ears spiral. . . . (103. 12-13)

The Arabic is rather free here, but it suggests that its *Vorlage* had a clause absent in Heinze's text: καὶ τοῦτο ἡ φύσις εὐλαβουμένη <καὶ λεπτὴ γινομένη> ἐν τῷ διὰ τῶν ὠτων πόρω τὰς ἑλικὰς ἐμηχανήσατο. Cf. 60. 24 λεπτότερον, which Ar renders with الطّف "more delicate" (92. 15). Assumption of homoioteleuton can explain the disappearance of καὶ λεπτὴ γινομένη in the manuscripts available to Heinze.

75. 10-14 μέσον μὲν οὖν τι εἶναι θετέον καὶ ταύτης τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ μὴ κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ τῆς γέυσεως πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐκείνο μάλλον ὅτι ἐπ' ἐκείνων μὲν οὐ τὸ μέσον αὐτὸ ἀλλοιοῦται ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ αἰσθητήριον (τὸ δὲ ὅπως ἀκουστέον τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι προείρηται).

The entire context has been quoted, so that the pertinence of the final parenthetical remark may be clear. In his apparatus, Heinze notes: "τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι suspectum." The Arabic translation shows that we must correct to τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι:

وقد تقدم قولنا كيف ينبغي أن تفهم معنى¹³ الاستحالة

¹³ To be read instead of the manuscript's عا; see 83. 9 cited below.

and we have already said how one must understand the meaning of "changing." (125. 13-14)

For similar patterns of expressions, cf. 56. 30-31 τὸ δὲ δυνάμει ὄπως ἀκουστέον προείρηται, which Ar turns as

وقد تقدّم قولنا كيف ينبغي أن تفهم معنى بالقوة

and we have previously said how one must understand the meaning of "in potential," (83. 8-9)

and also 56. 34 πῶς δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ πάσχειν ἀκουστέον . . . προείρηται, rendered as

وقد تقدم قولنا كيف [ينبغي] أن تفهم فيه قولنا [اتفعل]

and we have previously said how one must understand concerning it our statement "he was affected." (83. 13)

Note further that the Latin version of William of Moerbeke also supports the reading τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: *hoc autem alterari qualiter sit intelligendum, praedictum est* (ed. Verbeke [see above, note 8] 172.99-00).

76. 5-10 ὥσπερ πλείους αἰσθήσεις ὄψις καὶ ἀκοή, δι' ἑνὸς δὲ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἐνεργοῦσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει πλείους μὲν εἶναι αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν λεγομένων ἀπτῶν ἐναντιώσεων, ἐνὶ δὲ χρῆσθαι τῷ μεταξὺ, λέγω δὲ τῇ σαρκί. περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον οἶον τὴν γλῶτταν καὶ γεῦσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀφή, καὶ ὅμως πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις: οὐδὲν οὖν κωλύει καὶ περὶ πᾶσαν τὴν σάρκα ταῦτόν συμβαίνειν. . . . (ὅμως Q¹: ὁμοίως PQ(?)C)

Ar translates the sentence beginning περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον as follows:

وكما أنّ في عضو واحد بعينه ومثال ذلك اللسان الذوق واللمس وعلى

هذا المثال الحواس في أكثر من واحدة فليس يمنع مانع من أن يكون

قد عرض ذلك بعينه في اللحم كله أيضا

and just as in the case of one and the same part, like the tongue, there are taste and touch, and in a similar way the senses involving it are more than one, nothing prevents that very thing from happening in the case of all flesh too. . . . (127. 9-11)

The Arabic suggests that its *Vorlage* read καὶ ὥσπερ before περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον and—along with some of Heinze's manuscripts (see the apparatus quoted above)—ὁμοίως instead of ὅμως. I believe that Themistius probably wrote καὶ ὥσπερ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον κτλ.: proximity of -περ and περ- could have caused the omission in the manuscripts

available to Heinze; after *καὶ ὥσπερ* dropped out, an *οὖν* was inserted between *οὐδὲν* and *κωλύει* in order to establish some logical relation between the two clauses.

77. 17–20 ἄλλως οὖν μεσότης ἢ ἀφή καὶ ἄλλως αἰ ἄλλαι, ἐκείναι μὲν τῷ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὦν δέχονται, αὕτη δὲ τῷ ἔχειν ἤδη τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ.

Beginning with *αὕτη δὲ*, Ar offers the following translation:

وهذا توسط من جهة أن في الأمر المتوسط بين الحار والبارد وبين الرطب واليابس وبين الصلب واللين حاصل

and this is an intermediary because in it exists the intermediary between hot and cold, and between wet and dry, and between hard and soft. (130. 12–13)

Its *Vorlage* can be reconstructed as *αὕτη δὲ τῷ ἔχειν ἤδη τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ <τοῦ> ψυχροῦ <καὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ> καὶ τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ*. For the triplet of opposites, each opposite having the article, cf. 72. 30–31 *οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακόν, καὶ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον*, and for the sequence hot-cold and wet-dry cf. 76. 34–35 *τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων θερμότης ψυχρότης, ὑγρότης ξηρότης*, rendered in Ar as

حرارة الاسطقات الأولى وبرودتها ورطوبتها ويوبتها

the heat of the first elements and their coldness, and their wetness and their dryness. (129. 2–3)

78. 12 ὁ λόγος μέντοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ λόγον κρίνει. . . .

For this segment of text, Ar translates

فأما المعنى فإنه يميز سائر الأشياء غير المعنى ويميز المعنى

now as for the concept, it distinguishes the rest of the things without concept, and it distinguishes the concept. (132. 9–10)

This readily suggests that Ar's *Vorlage* read as follows: *ὁ λόγος μέντοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα <ἄλογα> καὶ λόγον κρίνει. . . .* For a similar expression (though with *ἄλογος* in a different sense) cf. 67. 10 *τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων*, which Ar turns as

الحيوان غير الناطق

of the animals without the faculty of speech. (108. 12)

80. 25–27 . . . τῶν μὲν ἀπλῶν αἰσθητηρίων οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐλλείποι· ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ πλειόνων.

Ar shows that its *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as τῶν μὲν ἀπλῶν αἰσθητηρίων <καὶ τῶν συνθέτων> οὐδὲν κτλ.:

ليس يتقصنا شيء من الحواس البسيطة والمركبة

we do not lack any of the simple sense organs and the compound ones.
(138. 1–2)

Examination of the context makes it plausible that καὶ τῶν συνθέτων goes back to the author's autograph: μὲν with τῶν . . . ἀπλῶν αἰσθητηρίων implies a contrast, and καὶ preceding τὸ σύνθετον ἐκ πλειόνων, which Ar renders as

أيضا ما هو مركب من أكثر من واحدة

also what is compounded of more than one, (138. 2–3)

suggests a previous mention of the compound sense organs. Cf. also 80. 17 ἐκ τῶν ἀπλῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν συνθέτων (sc. σωμάτων), translated by Ar as

من الأجسام البسيطة ومن المركبة

from the simple bodies and from the compound ones. (137. 8)

83. 7–8 ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν χρῶμα τὸ ἄχρουν (sc. ἐστίν), πρὸς δὲ ψόφος τὸ ἄψοφον.

The Greek has a needless lack of balance: χρῶμα . . . ψόφος. The Arabic translation shows that its *Vorlage* had the harmonious χρώματα . . . ψόφος, corrupted in the manuscripts available to Heinze:

لكن بالقياس إلى الألوان ما لا لون له وبالقياس إلى الأصوات ما لا صوت له

but in relation to colors there is that which has no color, and in relation to sounds there is that which has no sound. (143. 10–11)

83. 22 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

This sentence is modelled on the following in Aristotle: φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἐν τῷ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι (425b20). The Arabic translator's *Vorlage* also had τῷ ὄψει, which seems necessary for the sense of the passage:

فَنَقُولُ اِنْ مِنْ الْبَيِّنِ اَنْ اِلْحَاسَ بِالْبَصْرِ لَيْسَ يُقَالُ عَلٰى طَرِيقِ الْاِطْلَاقِ

and so we say that it is clear that perception by sight is not spoken of in an unrestricted way. (144. 7–8)

83. 22–23 *καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν. . . .*

This duplicates a sentence in Aristotle (425b20–21), but the Arabic version has an extra clause:

وذلك أنا قد نحكم بالبصر ولا نبصر فضلا عنا ونحن نبصر

for we judge by sight when we do not see, to say nothing of when we do see. (144. 8–9)

I believe that Ar's *Vorlage* should be restored as *καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν* (<*καὶ ὅταν ὁρῶμεν*>), *τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν*.

85. 8–10 *προϊῶν γὰρ ὁ λόγος εὐρήσει μὴ περὶ τὴν σάρκα τοῦτο μόνον συμβεβηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ λοιπὰ αἰσθητήρια, οἷον λέγω τὴν κόρη καὶ τοὺς διὰ τῶν ὠτων πόρους.*

For the clause beginning with *οἷον*, Ar provides the following translation:

أعنى في الناظر مثلا وفي ثقبى المنخرين وفي ثقبى الأذنين

I mean in the case of the eye, for example, and the passages of the nostrils and the passages of the ears. (147. 23 – 148. 1)

The underlying Greek is to be reconstructed as *οἷον λέγω τὴν κόρη* (<*καὶ τοὺς διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων πόρους*>) *καὶ τοὺς διὰ τῶν ὠτων πόρους*. Cf. 62. 23–24 *οἷον τῷ πόρῳ τῶν ὠτων ἢ τῷ πόρῳ τῶν μυκτήρων*, which Ar turns as

مجرى الأذنين أو مجرى المنخرين

the passage of the ears or the passage of the nostrils, (97. 14)

and 75. 23–24 *τῷ πόρῳ τῷ διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων*, translated as

مجرى المنخرين

the passage of the nostrils. (126. 5–6)

In both places Ar renders *πόρος* by *مجرى*, while in 147. 18 it translates the plural *πόροι* by the construct dual *ثقبى*.

87. 23-25 καὶ Ὅμηρος δὲ συντρέπεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ὑπολαμβάνων καὶ συναλλοιούσθαι τῷ περιέχοντι σωματικὴν οἶεται τὴν φύσιν τοῦ λόγου. . .

The words τῷ περιέχοντι seem strangely unspecific. Thanks to Ar we can see that the passage is corrupt in the manuscripts utilized by Heinze:

وأميرش أيضا في ظنه أنّ العقل يتبدل ويستحيل مع البدن المحيط به
وأنّ طبيعة النطق تتحرك

and Homer too is of the opinion that the mind is changed and altered with the body that encompasses it, and that the nature of the rational faculty is moved. (152. 16-17)

We should emend the Greek to the following: Ὅμηρος δὲ συντρέπεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ὑπολαμβάνων καὶ συναλλοιούσθαι τῷ περιέχοντι σώματι, κιν(είσθαι) οἶεται τὴν φύσιν τοῦ λόγου. . . Cf. above, on 32. 7-9.

90. 5-8 ἔπειτα αἰσθησις μὲν πάσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζώοις, φαντασία δὲ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δὲ οὐ, μύρμηκι μὲν ἴσως καὶ μελίττη καὶ πολλῶ μάλλον κυνὶ καὶ ἴππῳ καὶ ὅσα μετέχει αἰσθήσεως, σκώληκι δὲ οὐ.

Regarding αἰσθήσεως Heinze sagely notes "falsum." Ar renders the clause in question as

كلّ ما يقال انّ له شركة في التمييز

everything that is said to have a share in discernment. (158. 1-2)

Elsewhere Ar uses تمييز "discernment" to translate διάνοια (see Lyons 298), and presumably its *Vorlage* here read διανοίας instead of αἰσθήσεως.

90. 28-29 φανερόν οὖν ὅτι οὔτε δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὔτε συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἢ φαντασία. (οὖν] δὲ Qs)

For this segment of text, Ar provides the following translation:

ومن البين أنّ التخيل ليس هو أيضا ظنا مع حسّ كما يقول فلاطن ولا ظنّ
بحسّ ولا تركيب ظنّ وحسّ

and it is clear that imagination is not itself also opinion together with sensation, as Plato says, nor opinion by means of sensation, nor a composition of opinion and sensation. (159. 1-2)

Ar's *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as φανερόν δὲ (cf. app.) ὅτι οὔτε δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, (ὡς λέγει Πλάτων, οὔτε δόξα δι' αἰσθήσεως,) οὔτε συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἢ φαντασία. As now restored, Themistius' text faithfully adheres to the Aristotelian original: φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι

οὐδὲ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη (428a24–26). The restored clause was lost through homoioteleuton in the manuscripts available to Heinze.

98. 4 . . . ὥστε εἰκότως νοεῖται μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, νοεῖ δὲ οὐ.

Here again the Arabic version reveals additional material:

فتكون بالواجب هذه الأشياء تعقل ولا تعقل وكل واحد منها معقول وليس
كل واحد منها عقلا

and so obligatorily these things are thought, but they do not think; and each one of them is an object of thought, but each one of them is not mind. (167. 13–14)

After *νοεῖ δὲ οὐ*, I suggest that Ar's *Vorlage* had the following clause: *καὶ νοητὸν μὲν ἕκαστον, νοῦς δὲ οὐ*. The loss of this material in the manuscripts used by Heinze is due to homoioteleuton (*δὲ οὐ . . . δὲ οὐ*); the content is similar to what Themistius writes a few lines later: *οὗτος ἀεὶ καὶ νοῦς ἅμα καὶ νοητός* (98. 8–9), rendered in Ar as

ذلك هو دائما عقل ومعقول معا

that is continually mind and an object of thought at the same time. (168. 2)

99. 13–15 οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν τῆς ὕλης ἢ τέχνη, ὥσπερ χαλκευτικὴ τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ τεκτονικὴ τοῦ ξύλου, ἀλλ' ἐνδύεται ὄλω τῷ δυνάμει νῦ ὁ ποιητικός. . .

Ar shows that its *Vorlage* contained a clause lost in Heinze's manuscripts:

بأنّ العقل الفعّال ليس هو خارجا عن العقل بالقوة كما أنّ الصناعة
خارجة عن الهيولى مثال ذلك أنّ صناعة الصّفارين خارجة عن الصفر
والتجارة خارجة عن الخشب بل العقل الفعّال يداخل العقل بالقوة بأسره

because the active mind is not outside of the mind in potential, as art is outside of matter, as, for example, the smith's art is outside of brass and carpentry is outside of wood, but the active mind penetrates the mind in potential entirely. . . (179. 11–14)

This suggests the following reconstruction for the Greek: *οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν* <τοῦ δυνάμει νοῦ ὁ ποιητικός, ὥσπερ ἔξωθεν> τῆς ὕλης ἢ τέχνη κτλ.

99. 34–35 καὶ οὕτως ὁ νοῦς, ὅπερ ἦδη καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγῆς. . .

The clause ὅπερ ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται refers to 98. 30–31: καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστός τε καὶ ἀπαθῆς καὶ ἀμιγῆς, and accordingly we should emend οὕτως ὁ νοῦς to οὗτος ὁ νοῦς. Themistius is contrasting two types of νοῦς: one in potential (δυνάμει), the other in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), and οὗτος ὁ νοῦς refers to the latter. Ar's *Vorlage* had the correct reading:

وهذا العقل كما قلنا آتفا مفارق غير منفعل وغير مخالط

and this mind, as we said before, is separate, unaffected and unmixed.
(180. 17 – 181. 1)

107. 12–15 διόπερ οὐ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῶοις ἀλλ' ἡδονὴ μόνη καὶ λύπη ἐπὶ παροῦσι τοῖς ἡδέσιον ἢ λυπηροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα παντάπασιν ἀνεπαίσθητα λόγου καὶ νοῦ· ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ οὕτως ἄρα καὶ τὰ πάθη μέτοχα λόγου. . . .

For the last clause Ar has

وليس الأمر في الناس كذلك لكنّ عوارض النفس منهم أيضا مشاركة للنطق

and the matter is not thus in the case of men, but the affects of their soul too share in reason. . . . (194. 20 – 195. 1)

The Arabic version suggests that its *Vorlage* should be reconstructed as ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ <οὐχ> οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πάθη μέτοχα λόγου. This suits the context better than what Heinze prints and may be what Themistius wrote.

107. 31–35 ὁ δὲ νοῦς πῶς ποτε ἐξωθεν ὦν καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπίθετος ὁμῶς συμφυῆς; καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν εἶναι κατ' ἐνεργείαν, δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ληπτέον ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτός (ἐριστικὸν γάρ) ἀλλ' ὡς ὑποκειμένην τινὰ δύναμιν καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν.

This is part of a quotation from Theophrastus which Themistius introduces into his discussion of the mind. Concerning the words ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτός Heinze writes: "scil. ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔλαβεν." This is possible though somewhat strained: the context suggests that αὐτός refers to νοῦς, not to Aristotle. Here the Arabic can be of help; for the passage beginning with οὐ γὰρ οὕτως it provides the following translation:

فإنه ليس ينبغي أن نعتقد فيه أنه في نفسه ليس بشيء أصلا فإنّ هذا
مكابرة

for it is not necessary for us to believe about it that in itself it is nothing at all (for this is contentious). . . . (196. 1-2)

Instead of *ὡς οὐδὲ αὐτός*, Ar's *Vorlage* appears to have offered *ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτός*, a clause which clearly refers to the preceding *τὸ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν εἶναι* and is much more appropriate to the argument than is the reading of Heinze's manuscripts.

108. 25-27 *εἰ μὲν οὖν σύμφυτος ὁ κινῶν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐχρῆν καὶ αἰεὶ· εἰ δὲ ὕστερον, μετὰ τίνος καὶ πῶς ἢ γένεσις; ἔοικε δ' οὖν ὡς ἀγέννητος, εἶπερ καὶ ἀφθαρτος. ἐνυπάρχων δ' οὖν διὰ τί οὐκ αἰεὶ;*

According to Heinze's apparatus, the *editio princeps*, followed by Spengel,¹⁴ emended *δ' οὖν ὡς* to *οὖν καὶ*, presumably to allow the argument to proceed more smoothly than it does with the sequence *δ' οὖν . . . δ' οὖν*. Another approach to removing the textual difficulties emerges from study of the Arabic, which translates the sentence beginning with *ἔοικε* as follows:

ويشبه أن يكون جوهرًا غير متكوّن إن كان غير فاسد

and it seems to be substance without genesis, if it is imperishable. (197. 14-15)

The presence of *جوهر* "substance" suggests that Ar's *Vorlage* read *ἔοικε δ' οὐσία ἀγέννητος*, which was corrupted to *ἔοικε δ' οὖν ὡς ἀγέννητος* in the rest of the tradition. Our Arabic translator regularly employs *جوهر* to render *οὐσία* (see Lyons' index, pp. 242 and 363), and the correspondence is well established in other Arabic versions of philosophical Greek: see G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus: Zwanzig Abschnitte aus der Institutio Theologica in arabischer Übersetzung* (Beirut 1973), 78, 89 and 262 n. 1.

112. 30-32 *οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἐπιβολὴ [οὐδὲ] ἡ τοῦ τὴν ἔξιν ἔχοντος ἤδη, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος ἡ περὶ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἐπιβολὴ οὐ κίνησις ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια. . . .*

Heinze deletes *οὐδέ*, but Ar shows that more drastic surgery is in order:

كذلك وقوع العقل على المعقولات فإنه ليس فعل من [قد] حصلت له الملكة

كأنك قلت العالم في المعلومات وقوعه عليها ليس حركة بل فعل

so the mind's encounter with thoughts is not the activity of one to

¹⁴ V. Trincavellus, *Omnia Themistii opera, hoc est paraphrases et orationes; Alexandri Aphrodisiensis libri duo de anima et de fato unus* (Venice [Aldine] 1534), 64-95; L. Spengel, *Themistii paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supersunt* (Leipzig [Teubner] 1866), 2. 1-231.

whom accrues the natural disposition, as you would say the scholar's encounter with data is not movement but activity. (205. 16-18)

The Arabic text is not free of corruption, for Lyons has had to add ليس before حركة, but it allows us to get closer to the original reading, which I reconstruct as follows: οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ ἐπιβολὴ οὐχ ἡ τοῦ τὴν ἔξιν ἔχοντος ἤδη <ἐνέργεια>, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος ἡ περὶ τὰ ἐπιστητὰ {ἐνέργεια καὶ} ἐπιβολὴ οὐ κίνησις ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια. If this reconstruction is correct, it would seem that for some reason or other ἐνέργεια had been inadvertently transposed at an early stage of transmission, and that this transposition led to the somewhat garbled rewriting of the passage that Heinze's manuscripts display.

113. 14-16 τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν φαντάσματα πρόκειται ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ αἰσθήματα τῇ αἰσθήσει, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὥσπερ ἐκείνη τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν.

The clause running from τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν to the end of the quotation is defective: something must balance ἐκείνη. Themistius may have written τῇ δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὥσπερ ἐκείνη τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν, which can also be postulated as the reading of Ar's *Vorlage*: here Ar reads

والخير والشر لتلك كما لهذا اللذيد والمؤذى

and the good and the evil are to that as the sweet and the painful are to this. (207. 2)

115. 6-7 ὃς γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη χωρίζων τῆς ὕλης νοεῖ, δηλονότι πέφυκε μᾶλλον τὰ κεχωρισμένα νοεῖν. . . .

Here Ar reads:

فكما يعقل الصور المخالطة للهيولى بأن [يفرقها] من الهيولى فمن البين أنه

أحرى بأن يكون من شأنه أن يعقل الأشياء المفارقة

for, just as it thinks of the forms involved in matter by its separating them from matter, it is clearly more apt to be its inclination to think of the things that are separate. (210. 6-8)

Instead of ὃς, contextually hard to justify, Ar's *Vorlage* read ὡς, which suits the logic of the passage and is surely what Themistius intended.

118. 8-11 ἐπεὶ γὰρ διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ τῶν πρακτῶν οὐδὲ περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ ὀρεκτοῦ διανοεῖται, ἡ κίνησις δὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον ἢ φεύγοντος ἢ διώκοντος· ὁ δὲ πρακτικὸς νοεῖ μὲν τι περὶ τούτων, κύριος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τῆς κινήσεως.

For this section Ar reads

فإنّ العقل ضربان أحدهما نظريّ والآخر علىّ فأما النظرىّ فليس ينظر في
المعولات ولا يميّز شيئاً من أمر المهروب منه والمطلوب

for the mind is of two sorts, of which one is contemplative and the other practical; now as for the contemplative, it does not contemplate practical things nor does it distinguish anything that is avoided and pursued. . . . (217. 10–12)

Ar's *Vorlage* had a segment of text missing in the rest of the tradition: *ἐπεὶ γὰρ διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς (ὁ δὲ πρακτικὸς, ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς) οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ τῶν πρακτικῶν κτλ.*

120. 17–21 . . . ὥστε καὶ ποιητὴν εἰπὼν τοῦ χρόνου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ ἐξηγητὴς Ἀλέξανδρος οὐκ οἶται φαύλως εἰρηκέναι, ἀντικρυς ἐπίνοιαν ἡμετέραν ποιῶν τὸν χρόνον, ὑπόστασιν δὲ οἰκείαν αὐτῷ μὴ διδούς· οὐκ ὀρθῶς οὐδὲ ἐπομένως Ἀριστοτέλει, εἶπερ τι δεῖ προσέχειν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει.

Here is Ar's translation:

حتى أنّ المفسّر الاسكندر قال انّ الإنسان هو الفاعل للزمان أيضا فلم
ينظنّ أنّه بئس ما قال فإنّه بتصيره صراحا الزمان تخّرصا من عقولنا وتركه
أن يجعل له قواما ما يخصّه لم يصب في ذلك ولم يلزم مذهب ارسطوطاليس
[إن كان] قد ينبغي أن يصفى إلى ما قاله [فيه] في السماع الطبيعيّ

so that the commentator Alexander said that man is the maker of time as well, and what he said does not seem to be wrong, but in his making time to be purely a fabrication of our minds and in his neglecting to give it a state that characterizes it, in that he was not right, nor did he follow the school of Aristotle, if it is necessary to pay attention to what he said about it in the lecture on Physics. (221. 19 – 222. 4)

Ar's archetype did not have the asyndeton evidenced in Heinze's text (. . . διδούς· οὐκ ὀρθῶς . . .) but instead should be reconstructed as follows: . . . οὐκ οἶται φαύλως εἰρηκέναι, <ἀλλ'> ἀντικρυς ἐπίνοιαν ἡμετέραν ποιῶν τὸν χρόνον, ὑπόστασιν δὲ οἰκείαν αὐτῷ μὴ διδούς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οὐδὲ ἐπομένως Ἀριστοτέλει κτλ. For ف rendering ἀλλά cf. e.g. 85. 17 ἀλλὰ . . . δεῖ, which Ar turns as فقد يجب "but it is necessary . . ." (148. 8).

120. 24–26 ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδει τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ἔν δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ὅπερ ἤδη κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι.

Ar translates the first clause, ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδει τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, as follows:

قد ينبغي أن يكون المشوق واحدا بالصورة

and so it is necessary that the desired be one in form. (222. 7–8)

The *Vorlage* should probably be reconstructed as ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδει (εἶναι δεῖ) τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. The words εἶναι δεῖ, which could have been lost through homoioteleuton in the manuscripts available to Heinze, may go back to Themistius himself, for they clearly reflect the modal ἄν εἶη in the Aristotelian original: εἶδει μὲν ἔν ἄν εἶη τὸ κινεῖν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν (433b10–11). For قد ينبغي corresponding to δεῖ cf. e.g. 222. 3–4 = Greek 120. 21; both passages are quoted above, in the note to 120. 17–21.

123. 5–7 οὐ γὰρ ἐγγύθεν ἔχει (sc. τὰ ζῶα τὰ πορευτικά καὶ γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ) τὴν τροφήν ἐπιρρέουσιν οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἐν οἷς ἐσπάρη καὶ ἐφυτεύθη, ἀλλὰ δεῖ πορίζεσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μετιέναι.

It is disquieting to read that self-propelled animals are associated with elements ἐν οἷς ἐσπάρη καὶ ἐφυτεύθη, and we suspect that something may have dropped out of the text. Ar here confirms our suspicions; it translates the sentence thus:

وذلك أنه ليس شيء من هذه للغذاء جاذبا من قرب ولا من الاسطقات
كما يجذبه النبات من قرب ومن الاسطقات التي فيها بذر وغرس بل
يحتاج إلى التماسه والسعي إليه

for none of these attracts nutriment from nearby or from the elements, as plants attract it from nearby and from the elements in which they are sowed and planted, but they need to proceed and move to it. (227. 10–12)

Ar's *Vorlage* can be reconstructed thus: οὐ γὰρ ἐγγύθεν ἔχει τὴν τροφήν ἐπιρρέουσιν οὐδὲ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, (ὥσπερ τὰ φυτὰ ἐγγύθεν ἔχει καὶ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων) ἐν οἷς ἐσπάρη καὶ ἐφυτεύθη κτλ. Homoioteleuton occasioned the omission in the manuscripts that Heinze used.

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