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"Name-Magic" and the Threat of Lying Strangers in Homer’s *Odyssey*

S. DOUGLAS OLSON

Homer’s Odysseus is a man who has literally become “Nobody” (9. 366 f.) and, as Sheila Murnaghan has shown, the *Odyssey* as a whole can be read as the story of the hero’s gradual recovery of his own identity. In an important and influential article, Norman Austin has traced the significance of the name “Odysseus” in the poem and has argued that Penelope, Telemachos and Eumaios all try to avoid using it. This is a form of “name-magic,” Austin insists, which has little or nothing to do with concrete practical concerns about household security or the like. Instead, Odysseus’ intimates “treat his name as a treasure which must be shielded from vulgar display, protecting the man by repressing the name.” So long as the fateful syllables “Odysseus” are hidden, the possibility that the hero may return remains open. Each time the name is pronounced, on the other hand, Odysseus’ chances for survival diminish. Names are important and powerful things in the *Odyssey*, and the hero guards his carefully. The reluctance of those closest to Odysseus to name him, however, is much less general than Austin suggests. It also seems to reflect not a fear of “name-magic” but a straightforward and very practical awareness of the threat posed by the seductive lies of wandering strangers. What Austin identifies as Homeric “name-magic” is thus only another example of the calculating caution the *Odyssey* recommends in all human affairs.

As Austin has pointed out, the fact that Penelope, Telemachos and Eumaios all frequently use periphrases (such as “my husband,” “my father”

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1 Thanks are due David Sansone for thoughtful comments on several previous drafts of this paper.
4 This is true both on Scheria, where Odysseus does not identify himself by name until 9. 19–21 (see Austin [previous note] 4–5), and on Ithaca, where the hero’s survival depends specifically on his active suppression of his identity until he can take his revenge. On the power of names in the *Odyssey*, see also C. S. Brown, “Odysseus and Polyphemus: The Name and the Curse,” *Comp. Lit.* 18 (1966) 193–202; B. Fenik, *Studies in the Odyssey*, Hermes Einzelschriften 30 (Wiesbaden 1974) 5–60; J. Peradotto, *Man in the Middle Voice: Name and Narration in the Odyssey* (Princeton 1990), esp. 94–170.
or “my master”) for Odysseus is in itself unremarkable and cannot be taken as evidence of a concerted effort to suppress the hero’s name.4 Austin also insists, however, that on a number of important occasions all three characters deliberately avoid naming Odysseus. Thus Telemachos does not mention him by name to “Mentes” in 1. 158–77, 214–20, 231–44; Penelope seems to try not to name him to her women in 4. 722–41 and in her conversation with the ἐςωλον of her sister in 4. 810–23, 831–34; Eumaios speaks of him only obliquely to the Stranger in 14. 122–47. In each case, Austin argues, we see an essentially magical attempt to protect and conceal the hero’s name and thus make possible his return.5

This theory of Homeric “name-magic” stumbles first of all on the fact that neither Penelope, Telemachos nor Eumaios actually shows any consistent reluctance to speak the name “Odysseus.” Penelope, for example, names her husband before the Suitors in the incident described at 2. 96, 19. 141, to the herald Medon at 4. 682, 689, to Telemachos and Theoklymenos at 17. 103, to Eumaios at 17. 538–39, and to the Suitors again at 16. 430, 18. 253 and 21. 74.6 Indeed, Ὀδυσσής is one of the final words in Penelope’s long despairing speech in Book 4, which Austin cites as a prime example of her deliberate attempts at “circumambulation around the name” (4. 741).7 Telemachos too names his father over and over again: in the presence of the Suitors at 1. 354, 396, 398; 17. 402; to the Assembly of Ithacans at 2. 59, 71; to Eurykleia at 2. 352; to Nestor and his sons at 3. 84; to Helen and Menelaos at 15. 157; to Theoklymenos at 15. 267, 522; to Eumaios at 16. 34; and to Theoklymenos and Penelope at 17. 114, 131, 136. Eumaios as well refers to his master as “Odysseus” in the presence of the Stranger at 14. 144, 364, 515; 15. 337; 17. 314, to Melanthios at 17. 240, and before Penelope and her serving women at 17. 522, 525. Others who are well-disposed to Odysseus and eager that he return to Ithaca also call

4 Austin (above, note 2) 5.
5 Austin (above, note 2) 5–9.
6 As noted above, Austin points to the large number of circumlocutions in Penelope’s conversation with the image of Iphthime (4. 810–23, 831–35) as further evidence of her eagerness to conceal Odysseus’ name. Given the brevity of these speeches, the phenomenon is not necessarily significant. If it is, the fact that the ἐςωλον as well fails to name Telemachos and Odysseus (4. 807, 826, 836) means that this is not a characteristic of Penelope’s speech in particular and that we are therefore in need of some larger, more comprehensive explanation of what is going on here.
7 Austin (above, note 2) 5–6. Austin (7–8) is equally free with the evidence in the case of Kalypso. It is true that neither Hermes nor Kalypso names Odysseus in their brief confrontation in 5. 85–148, and if this has any significance it may well be that “Hermes’ obliquity springs from the tact appropriate to his mission and to his person as the divine messenger” (Austin 7). It is simply not the case, however, that Kalypso is so deeply concerned to protect Odysseus and so aware of the power of “name-magic” that she remains “to the end . . . the Concealer,” carefully protecting the hero’s name even after she has lost control of the man himself (Austin 8). In fact, Kalypso names Odysseus to his face at 5. 203, and then not in the context of giving him up but as part of a final desperate attempt to keep him with her (5. 203–13).
him by name: Athena (1. 48, 57, 60, 83, 87; 5. 11); the men in the Assembly (2. 27, 163, 173, 234, 238); Eurykleia (2. 366; 19. 381); Nestor (3. 121, 126, 163); Menelaos (4. 107, 151); Helen (11. 143; 15. 176); Theoklymenos (17. 152); the old servant-woman grinding grain (20. 117); and Philoitios (20. 205, 209).

Pace Austin, therefore, characters in the Odyssey who are favorably disposed to the hero’s return do not routinely attempt to "protect" him by resort to name-tabus. The scattered occasions on which Odysseus' intimates do avoid using his name must accordingly be accounted for in some other way. The first of these incidents occurs in Book 1, when Athena appears at the door of the palace on Ithaca (103-05, 113). Athena is disguised as a man and completely anonymous, and is therefore greeted by her host simply as ξειε (123).8 Telemachos treats his visitor with perfect hospitality here (125-35) and opens their conversation by referring to his own personal troubles (159-68). At the same time, however, he holds back a number of crucial details: not only does he fail to name his father, but he also avoids identifying himself and does not mention his mother at all. Instead, he quickly brings the discussion around to the question of his guest’s identity (169-70) and possible connections to the house (175-76). Athena responds to the boy’s questions by identifying herself as Mentes (180-81) and explains her visit (182-84), declaring she is Telemachos’ paternal guest-friend (187-88). She supports this claim, moreover, by mentioning not only the name of Laertes (188-89) and some incidental details about him (189-93) but the name of Odysseus as well (196). In his reply, Telemachos mentions his mother for the first time (215), and Athena/Mentes responds by supplying her name as well (223). Only now does Odysseus’ son tell his visitor precisely what is going on in the household (esp. 245-51).

Telemachos thus behaves in a courteous but at the same time practical and hard-headed manner here, leavening the bread of hospitality with an obvious suspicion of his unknown visitor. As Austin has pointed out, he does conceal his father's identity. He conceals a great deal more than that, however, and he clearly does so not out of a belief that names have some sort of magical power but because he wants to know more about the

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8 Homer’s audience know this is Athena in disguise, of course, but Telemachos does not (cf. 322-23). Those listening to the poem are also already aware that Athena resembles Mentes, leader of the Taphians (105), a fact which Telemachos (who has clearly never met the real Mentes) only learns later (180-81).

Guests and strangers in the Odyssey are regularly addressed as ξειε by those who receive them (1. 123, 214, 231; 3. 43, 71; 13. 237, 248; 14. 56; 15. 80, 145, 260, 402, 536; 16. 113, 181; 17. 163, 478; 19. 104, 124, 215, 253, 309, 509, 560, 589). Once they have been accepted or identified, they sometimes graduate to ξειε φιλε (1. 158; 19. 350) or even φιλε (3. 103, 211, 375). The guests themselves, however, have a pronounced tendency to address their hosts immediately as φιλε (13. 228; 15. 260, 509; 16. 91; 17. 17, 152). Presumably the latter term indicates a stronger form of attachment, which guests are eager to assert and establish as early on as possible. Cf. the discussion of G. P. Rose, “The Swineherd and the Beggar,” Phoenix 34 (1980) 288-91.
stranger before he surrenders substantial information about himself and his household to him. When “Mentes” proves capable of naming Odysseus and other members of the family on his own, Telemachos apparently concludes he can trust him. Similar caution on the part of a host confronted by the arrival of an anonymous ξείνος can be seen in Eumaios’ behavior at the beginning of Book 14, in a scene which helps explain precisely what dangers are posed by situations of this sort.

When an impoverished wanderer (really Odysseus in disguise) arrives at Eumaios’ hut in the countryside, the swineherd takes the old man in and feeds him (14. 45–51, 72–81) and complains to him at length about his own troubles (esp. 39–42, 68–71, 81–82, 89–108). As Austin has pointed out, Odysseus’ servant is initially careful not to name his master and instead speaks only of κείνος (70, 90) and of his ἄναξ (40, 67; cf. 61–62). Attention to the subsequent course of the conversation, however, shows that Eumaios (like Telemachos in Book 1) speaks thus elliptically for a very clear and specific purpose, which has nothing to do with “name-magic.” After the Stranger has eaten and drunk his fill (109–13), he asks the name of his host’s lost master, repeating a few clues Eumaios dropped inadvertently in the course of their conversation earlier (115–17; cf. 70–71, 96–104) and intimating he may have news for him (118–20). Eumaios responds by telling the old man not to waste his time: he is obviously just another in a long line of wanderers and vagrants who have come to Ithaca and offered false tales about Odysseus in hope of getting a gift in return (122–32; cf. 378–89). Eumaios normally does his best to be a discreet and careful servant, as he shows in Book 16, when he quietly whispers the news of Telemachos’ presence in his hut to Penelope and returns straight home (338–41). So too here, therefore, he brushes off his guest’s prying questions and continues to refer to his master only obliquely (κείνον 14. 122; τοῦ 133; τὸν and στρατῷ 135; οἱ μὲν 137; cf. 139). At 144, however, caught up in his sad reminiscences and his grief (esp. 138–43), Eumaios lets the fateful name Οὖνοσήνος slip. The swineherd hastens to add that αἰδῶς normally restrains him from calling his master by name (145–47). The damage has been done, however, and Odysseus in the role of the beggar immediately picks up the vital word, uses it repeatedly in the remarks that follow (152, 159, 161) and incorporates it into the extended lies he tells a

9 Cf. the care Athena takes to furnish Odysseus with the name of the Phaeacian queen before he enters the palace on Scherta (6. 53–54; cf. 7. 146).
10 Eumaios is strongly characterized in the Odyssey as someone who takes pleasure in mulling over and describing his own troubles and in listening to those of others (esp. 14. 168–75). The autobiographical lie Odysseus manufactures for him is therefore full of troubles and disasters and thus calculated to satisfy his servant’s tastes; note Eumaios’ satisfied comment in 14. 361–62.
11 Exactly what Eumaios means here has been a matter of considerable dispute; see the discussion of Austin (above, note 2) 11–12, and the bibliography cited there (n. 11); Fenik (above, note 3) 28–30.
little later on (321, 323; cf. 470, 484, 486), all of which are intended to show he actually knew Odysseus (esp. 484–501; cf. 237–42) and has credible news of his homecoming (esp. 321–33; cf. 118–20).12 In the conversations which follow, Eumaios uses Odysseus’ name freely (364, 515; 15. 337; 17. 240, 314).

The impoverished Stranger thus does his best to learn the name of Eumaios’ long-lost master, and when he does, incorporates it into a series of elaborate (and apparently very convincing; cf. 17. 522–27) lies. The swineherd, on the other hand, who has seen this sort of thing before (14. 122–30; cf. 378–85), tries to hold his master’s name back, not out of any concern for “name-magic” but because he has no intention of allowing this old beggar to tell his beloved mistress and her son (both of whom he also initially declines to name: 14. 123, 127–28; cf. 137) a more convincing lie than might otherwise be possible.13 That Eumaios fails in this attempt to protect his household is only consistent with the characterization of the swineherd in particular, and of servile characters generally, throughout the epic. Servants in the Odyssey are expected to tell the truth, and the most their masters ever demand of them in the way of deception is therefore silence in the presence of others (2. 337–81, esp. 373–77; 19. 485–90; cf. 21. 228–41). Indeed, Eurykleia immediately confesses even a passive deception of this sort when questioned by her mistress (4. 743–49; cf. 23. 1–24).14 It is accordingly a basic feature of the plot of the poem that Odysseus’ servants, no matter how faithful they might be, are not allowed to participate actively in the planning for their master’s revenge. Instead, they are told what they need to know at the last moment and expected to act on their orders without questioning them (e.g., 21. 188–244). Eumaios himself, moreover, is consistently characterized in the Odyssey as well-meaning but somewhat bumbling. It is he, after all, who almost fails to deliver the bow to Odysseus at the crucial moment in the great hall (21. 359–67), a task he only carries out when Telemachus threatens him (21. 368–79).15 That Eumaios fails in his attempt to baffle the prying Stranger in Book 14 thus comes as no real surprise. The basic strategy the swineherd

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12 Austin fails to explain why Eumaios ultimately names Odysseus if he is, in fact, aware of the power of “name-magic” and its implications for his master’s return. The fact of the matter is that the swineherd has a much more immediate set of concerns here and simply makes a mistake (see below).

13 In the aftermath of his failure to conceal the name of Odysseus, however, Eumaios quickly surrenders those of Penelope, Telemachos and Laertes as well (14. 172–73).

14 On the one occasion on which a servant does tell an active and independent lie (Eumaios, attempting to convince the suitors he knows nothing about the arrival of the Stranger at Odysseus’ palace: 17. 380–91; cf. 275–77), in fact, he is immediately found out and embarrassed (369–79) and subsequently told by his master to be quiet (392–93).

15 It is accordingly Eumaios, unlike the cowherd Philoitos (who successfully carries out his orders: 21. 388–93; cf. 240–41) but like Telemachos (who also makes a dangerous and potentially fatal mistake: 22. 154–55), who is wounded in the fighting which follows (22. 279–80; cf. 277–78).
adopts here, however, is clear: anonymous guests should be treated graciously, but should also be kept from learning more than they need to know and thus prevented from taking advantage of the master's family.

This pattern can be detected once more, in Book 16, in a passage Austin does not discuss, when Telemachos meets the Stranger for the first time. When Odysseus' son arrives at Eumaios' hut, the swineherd rushes out into the courtyard to greet him, while the old wanderer remains inside (11–16). Telemachos names Odysseus outright when he is speaking to Eumaios alone (34). Once he enters the hut and sees the Stranger sitting there (41–45), however, he becomes more cautious, asking first who this might be (57–59) and then speaking obliquely of "my mother" and "her husband" (73–75). Only after the anonymous Eumaios has proved capable of naming Odysseus and Laertes (100, 104) does Telemachos let down his guard and use the names himself (118–19).

What Austin identifies as a concern for "name-magic" in the Odyssey can thus be more credibly explained as a concrete anxiety on the part of members of Odysseus' household about the possibility of being taken in by the lies of wandering strangers. There are many such impostors wandering the earth, Alkinoos declares in Book 11, "putting together lies from sources no-one could fathom" (363–66). The desperate desire of Odysseus' family to have any news of him (e.g., 4. 315–31) makes them particularly easy prey for men of this sort (e.g., 14. 126–30, 378–85; 19. 165–260) and they are therefore on their guard against them. The Odyssey regularly puts a premium on guile and verbal agility. It is precisely the hero's outstanding cleverness and deceptiveness, after all, which those who know him think of when they recall his exploits (esp. 4. 240–89; cf. 502–03) and which he claims as a central token of his identity when he reveals himself on Scheria (9. 19–20). It is this very ability in δόλω, in fact, Athena asserts, which both protects Odysseus and makes him her favorite (13. 291–99, 330–36; cf. 8. 519–20). "He made many lies like to the truth with his words," as the poet says later, and one measure of his greatness is that he could do so

16 A nice counter-example for this sort of caution is the Sidonian slave-woman in Eumaios' story (15. 403–84), who immediately gives her father's name when asked (423–26) and naturally receives an answer calculated to please her (430–33). Her ultimate reward, of course, is death (477–81).

17 Telemachos lets down his guard so far here, in fact, that he actually names Penelope (130), something he does nowhere else in the epic (cf., e.g., 1. 248, 415; 2. 50, 131, 133, 135, 223, 358, 373, 411; 4. 321; 15. 515, 522; 16. 33, 73, 151; 17. 6, 401; 21. 103, 110, 115; note also 4. 325, where Telemachos avoids naming his grandmother as well). If there is any "name-magic" or any sort of "name-tabu" at work in the Odyssey, that is to say, it seems to be associated with the names of women rather than of men; cf. S. D. Olson, "Women's Names and the Reception of Odysseus on Scheria," forthcoming in EM/C/CV 36 (1992). For similar phenomena in classical Athens, see D. Schaps, "The Woman Least Mentioned: Etiquette and Women's Names," CQ 27 (1977) 323–30; A. H. Sommerstein, "The Naming of Women in Greek and Roman Comedy," Quaderni di storia 11 (1980) 393–418.
without flinching (19. 203–12). Much of the particular genius of Penelope as well consists in her ability to put off the Suitors convincingly for years (esp. 2. 87–106; cf. 18. 282–83), to test those who bring her stories of her lost husband (19. 213–19) and ultimately to deceive even the great trickster himself (23. 177–206). It is precisely the fear of lying strangers, in fact, which the Ithacan queen gives as the reason for her cautious treatment of Odysseus at the beginning of Book 23: she has always been afraid of being taken in by the words of some plausible speaker, and has therefore tested even her own husband (215–17). Indeed, Penelope now goes so far as to convert the seduction of Helen into a mistake of precisely this sort (218–24).\(^\text{18}\)

Homer's *Odyssey* puts a high value on hospitality to strangers and guests, but recognizes that this relationship can be perverted and abused by either party (e.g., 2. 55–58; 15. 67–74; 22. 22–41). The poem is also marked by an acute awareness that intelligent and resourceful people tell false stories for their own profit (e.g., 13. 254–55; 14. 378–89, 457–522, esp. 507–11; 19. 395–97) and that the ability to lie effectively is, in fact, one mark of the successful free individual.\(^\text{19}\) As Austin has shown, Odysseus' friends and family do on occasion suppress his name in conversation with others. They do so, however, not out of concern for "name-magic," but for the very specific and straightforward purpose of avoiding the deceptions of lying strangers and thus protecting themselves and their household.

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Notes on *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*

DAVID KOVACS

Text and apparatus are quoted from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (Oxford 1990) except as noted.

*Antigone* 1–6

δο κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κάρα,
ἀρ’ ὀθ’ ὁ τι Ζεὺς τῶν ἄπ’ Ὅδηπον κακῶν
ὅποιον οὐχὶ νώιν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ;
οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτ’ ἀλγεινὸν οὕτ’ τάτης ἄτερτ
οὗτ’ αἰσχρὸν οὐτ’ ἀτιμὸν ἐσθ’ ὁποίον οὖ
τῶν σῶν τε κάμων οὐκ ὅποι’ ἐγὼ κακῶν.

2–5 totus locus vexatus

Text and apparatus are Dawe’s. Prominent among the vexations of 2–3 are whether Sophocles could have written both ὁ τι (or ὁτι) and ὁποίον, and if, as I believe, he could not have, which of these expressions needs to be replaced, and with what. A further question I have never seen satisfactorily answered is why Antigone remarks pointedly that Zeus is fulfilling the evils of Oedipus on Antigone and Ismene during their lifetime (νώιν ἔτι ζώσαιν), as if one would naturally expect him to do so after their death.

The discussion must begin with the dogmatic assertion that the transmitted text—where interrogative ὁ τι or the conjunction ὁτι fights for mastery with relative or interrogative ὁποίον—cannot be correct. The main lines of defense can be read in Campbell, in Jebb and (somewhat unclearly) in Kamerbeek. To me they do not seem successful, and I can appeal in confirmation only to my reader’s intuition.

On that premise, either ὁ τι or ὁποίον is corrupt, and we cannot do better than to imitate the dentist and probe the edges of what is sound until we find something that yields. As I move the probe backwards from the end of line 3, I reach the beginning of the line without encountering anything

1 See also H. Bonitz, *Beiträge zur Erklärung des Sophocles*, 2. Heft (Vienna 1857) 12–17. The most evident difficulty with Bonitz’ paraphrase ὁ γὰρ ὀθ’ ὁ τι τῶν ἄπ’ Ὅδηπον κακῶν (sc. ἐστιν), ὁποίον οὐχὶ Ζεὺς νώιν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ is, as Schütz and others point out, the position of Ζεὺς.
that is not absolutely sound, not clearly and demonstrably Sophoclean. For ὀποίον οὐχὶ we need look no further than 5. Müller’s argument that ὀποίον must be corrupt because it has a qualitative sense that is out of place here is mistaken, as there is sufficient evidence to show that Sophocles used ὀποίος in place of the simple relative: see Phil. 659, OC 561 and fr. 1130. 17, quoted below on OT 938. For ὀποίος as indirect interrogative with a noun understood, see Eur. Hel. 631. That being so, suspicion falls on ὦ τι and perhaps on a neighboring word or two.2

If ὀποίος is the word that introduces the whole clause, then we must suspect not only ὦ τι but also Ζεὺς. For once we remove ὦ τι, there is no way to fit the nominative of Zeus’ name into the line without absurdity.3 Furthermore, if the subject of the verb τελεῖ stands directly after the verb introducing indirect question but before the indirect interrogative, intuition calls for the anticipated subject of τελεῖ to be in the accusative case as the object of οἷοθα. This is the so-called “lilies of the field” construction, formally called prolepsis, whereby the subject of an indirect question is anticipated, placed before the interrogative pronoun and made into the object of the leading verb. Like Greek authors of every period, Sophocles uses it often: cf. OT 224–25, quoted below, and 302, and also Aj. 118, Tr. 2, 321 and Phil. 573, and the discussions in Kühner–Gerth II 577 ff. and A. C. Moorhouse, The Syntax of Sophocles (Leiden 1982) 47–49. If it were not that zeta always makes position, we could write ἄρ’ οἷοθα Ζῆνα, and the sense would be exactly what we require: “Do you know which of the evils stemming from Oedipus Zeus is not accomplishing for us during our lifetime?”

As it is, we must always be in doubt about what once stood there. As far as meter is concerned, we could write ἄρ’ ὀἷοθα Κρονίδην, but this patronymic, not used by Aeschylus at all, is confined by Sophocles and Euripides to lyric. No other way commends itself of fitting Zeus’ name into the line in the accusative once we remove ὦ τι.

At this point, the difficulties seem insoluble, and we might do well to turn away from them for a bit to the last of our queries: Why does Antigone say so pointedly that the ills of Oedipus are being accomplished on her and Ismene during their lifetime? Brown suggests that Antigone might have expected Zeus to spread the finite stock of Oedipus’ ills over

2 Lloyd-Jones and Wilson print ἄρ’ οἷοθα ὦ τι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ’ Οἰδίπου κακῶν — ἀ, ποῖον οὐχὶ νόιν ἐξί ζώσαν τελεῖ; But the interjection ὦ is found in tragedy only at sentence beginning, as a separate sentence for cries of pain and the like, or (in two doubtful cases) before a vocative. The self-interruption and anacolouthon, natural enough in conversation, seem decidedly stilwidrig in tragedy. This conjecture gives us the measure of the desperateness of the problem and provides part of the justification for putting forward my own somewhat drastic solution. For a different solution, see now A. L. Brown, CQ 41 (1991) 325–26.

3 No one will hesitate for a moment to reject ἄρ’ οἷοθα δῆ Ζεὺς (Meineke, cited by Schütz) with a collocation (ἄρα . . . δῆ) unknown to Denniston, or ἄρ’ οἷοθα γε Ζεὺς, where the emphasis is unwanted.
David Kovacs 11

several generations, but he gives no reason for this supposition. Müller says that in Antigone’s view the new trouble will not allow them to live any longer, but that is no reason for Antigone to say νῶιν ζώσαιν but quite the opposite. Only Dawe (Studies III 99) faces the problem squarely: He canvasses and rejects still other answers and says, “I see no solution, and write this note only to show that the difficulties of this notorious passage may be even greater than we had imagined.” He notes a further difficulty, that in τῶν ἀπ’ ἠδίπου κακῶν the preposition is surprising.

Yet these last two difficulties may perhaps lead to the solution of the earlier problems. It may be that Antigone speaks the way she does because the subject of τελεῖ is one who is normally thought to bring death to the victim, not pain and disgrace in life. If both ὁ τι and Ζεῦς are under suspicion, other subjects—other supernatural agents—become available. We could fit in δαξίμων, but not in the accusative grammar almost certainly calls for. Antigone could have said ἄπ’ ὄισθα Φοῖβο, but though the god is in the right case, in this play Apollo is nowhere mentioned as the destroyer of the Labdacid line. She might have said ἄπ’ ὄισθα πότμον or Μοῖραν, though these abstractions seem a bit feeble for the play’s openings lines and for the vigorous action they are expected to perform.4 For my money, though, the most attractive possibility is the following:

οὐκοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κάρα,
ἄπ’ οἴσθα Ἐρινὺς τῶν ἀπ’ ἠδίπου κακῶν
ὑπότοιν οὐχὶ νῶιν ἕτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ;

Here is a fitting subject for τελεῖ. There are Erinyes of murder victims, or even of beggars, and the Erinyes are often portrayed as carrying out the destructive plans of a god or gods.5 Surely, though, with τῶν ἀπ’ ἠδίπου κακῶν in the same line, the reference must be to the curse of Oedipus against his sons. The surprising fact to which Antigone alludes

4 In addition, these suggestions are open to the objection that the genitive phrase in the second half of the line, which ought to go with what follows, might all too easily be taken with πότμον or Μοῖραν. An actor, to be sure, could easily make the structure plain, but a name would be better than an abstraction.

5 The connection between gods and Erinyes is made clear in Iliad 19. 87, where Zeus is accompanied by Moira and “the Erinyes who walks in darkness”; in Aesch. Ag. 59, where some god sends an Erinyes on the transgressors; and in Ag. 461–66, where the gods are mindful of those who kill many, and the black Erinyes blot out those who prosper without justice.

It is a reasonable guess that an Erinyes had played a role in connection with the destruction of the Labdacid line often in poetry before Sophocles, as she clearly does in Aeschylus’ Septem (see 70, 574, 700, 723, 867, 887, 977, 989 and [1055]). Certainly that is the picture the second stasimon of our play paints (594 ff.), where the “last root” of the house is cut down by three agents, the last two of which (the only ones we can be sure of) are “folly of speech and the mind’s Erinyes.” The very next words, τεῦν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τὶς ἄνθρωποι ὑπερβασία χασταγοί, imply clearly that this Erinyes-wrought destruction is, in the Chorus’ view, part of the plan of Zeus to end the house of Labdacus.
here is that this curse, designed by Oedipus for the destruction of his ungrateful and unfilial sons, works on those who are still alive as well.

We can explain the corruption if we assume that as a note against line 2 someone wrote, e.g., ταύτην τὴν Ἐρινῶν ἵστεον ὅτι Ζεὺς ἔστιν ὁ πέμυσας, or ἵστεον ὅτι Ζεὺς ἄλλα' οὖκ Ἀπόλλων ἔστιν ὁ τοῦς Λαβδακίδας ἐν τούτοι τῶι δράματι ἄναιρων. Somehow ὅτι Ζεὺς stood directly above the third word in the line and was taken by a later scribe for its replacement. The theme of Ate and the Erinyes as behind the action of the play is well brought out in H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1971) 113–17.

Antigone 648–54

μὴ νόν ποτ', ὅ παϊ', τὰς φρένας γ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς γυναικὸς οὐνεκ' ἐκβάλης εἰδώς ὅτι ψυχρὸν παραγκάλισα τούτο γίγνεται, 650 γυνή κακῆ ἐξουνεον ἐν δόμοις. τί γὰρ γένοιτ' ἐν Ἑλκος μεῖζον ἃ φίλος κακός; ἀλλὰ πτύσει ὥσεὶ τε δυσμενὴ μέθες τὴν παῖδ' ἐν Ἀιδοῦ τήνδε νυμφεύειν τινί.

653 ἄλλα' ἀποπτύσας KRZe

Text and apparatus are Dawe's. There are three problems in 653–54. The τε in 653 does not connect things of like status in the sentence. We may not take the τε to be an instance of "epic τε" in view of C. J. Ruijgh's large book on that engrossing subject.6 Jebb, with Ruijgh's approval, translates, "with loathing, and as if she were thine enemy, let this girl go," but the joining of two expressions, one nominative, the other accusative, by means of τε seems difficult.

Even if we ignored this problem the translation of the couplet raises other difficulties: "But rejecting her with contempt [and] let the girl, as you would an enemy, marry some individual in the nether world." There are lots of things one does customarily and as a matter of course to enemies, but letting them marry someone in the nether world is not one of them, that being restricted to a few situations like ours. Lastly, τινί, placed where it is, ought, one feels, to be allusive and minatory: cf. Ant. 751. But there is no reference.7

We need another participle for the τε to connect. The same participle will serve to disjoin "like an enemy" from "let her marry in the nether

6 Autour de "τε épique" (Amsterdam 1971) § 811, on ὥσεὶ τε as foreign to tragedy.
7 Müller says that the pronoun has "eine verächtliche und zugleich eine ominöse Kraft." There seems no reason to be dismissive of a "somebody or other" in the nether world. And there is no reason to take τινί as itself alluding to something painful, as if the identity of her otherworldly bridegroom were somehow a further unpleasant surprise. The combination of dismissive and ominous seems, furthermore, psychologically a near impossibility.
world," which is highly desirable. Its disappearance can be accounted for if we assume the following original:

\[ \text{άλλα πτόςας ὦσεὶ τε δυσμενὴ τιθεὶς τὴν παιδ' ἐν "Αἰδοῦ τὴνδε νυμφεῦειν μέθες.} \]

Perhaps μέθες was copied both where it belonged and also at the end of the previous line, causing the disappearance of the participle that once stood there. Someone saw that there were two identical imperatives, and that one of them should go. He picked the wrong one and wrote τινὶ in its place.

Lloyd-Jones and Wilson take a different approach. Noting that K, which Wilson has established as our second-oldest witness, reads ἀλλ’ ἀποπτύσας, which reading also appears in R and Zc, they delete the ἀλλ’ with Blaydes and read ἀποπτύσας οὐν ὡστε, the last two words being Blaydes’ conjecture for ὦσεὶ τε. This attractive solution deals with the first two of the three problems cited above. But the third (the force of τινὶ) is untouched. Furthermore the corruption of οὐν ὡστε to ὦσεὶ τε seems hard to motivate. And while the authority of K must in general be rated higher now that Wilson has redated it, its reading here, ἀποπτύσας for πτύσας, represents a kind of error that is by no means uncommon, the replacement of a poetic simplex by a compound more usual in prose. See Eur. Hipp. 965, where the truth is ὀλεσεν and a large number of mss. read ἀπώλεσεν, contra metrum, as in our passage.

**Antigone 726–34**

| KP. | οἱ τηλικοῖδε καὶ διδαξόμεσθα δὴ φρονεῖν πρὸς ἄνδράς τηλικοῦδε τὴν φύσιν; |
| A1. | μηδὲν γ’ ὃ μὴ δίκαιον· εἰ δ’ ἐγὼ νέος, οὗ τὸν χρόνον χρὴ μᾶλλον ἡ τάρτα σκοπεῖν. |
| KP. | ἔργον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν; |
| A1. | οὐδ’ ἄν κελεύσαμι εὐσεβείν εἰς τοὺς κακούς. |
| KP. | οὐχ ἢδε γὰρ τοιαῖδ’ ἐπείληπται νόσωι; |
| A1. | οὐ φησὶ Θήβης τῇσδ’ ὀμόπολις λεώς. |
| KP. | πόλις γὰρ ἠμὶν ἀμὴ χρὴ τάσσειν ἑρεί; |

730 οὐδ’ οὖν τὰν Schneidewin

There are several problems calling for our attention here:

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8 A. L. Brown suggests άλλα πτόςας ὦσεὶ τε δυσμενὴ μεθεὶς / τὴν παιδ’ ἐν "Αἰδοῦ τὴνδε νυμφεῦειν <ξα>, which gives two aorist participles in the first line and a two-letter imperative whose disappearance can be accounted for by haplography: -EINEA.

9 Lloyd-Jones pointed out to me that, on p. 165 of the Anhang to Schneidewin–Nauck, Nauck proposes a somewhat bolder solution to the same problem: "Vielleicht γένοιτ’ ἄν ἐκός μείζων; ἀλλ’ ἀποπτύσας τὴν παιδ’ ἐν "Αἰδοῦ τὴνδε νυμφεῦειν μέθες."
(1) Though Schneidewin's conjecture gets rid of an οὐδὲ in 731 for which there is no apparent use,¹⁰ no commentator I have read remarks on the singularity of εὔσεβεῖν in the same line. The context seems to require the line to mean, "I would not, you know, urge anyone to honor the base," a reply of sorts to Creon's question ("Is it merit to reverence those who are unruly?") which refers to Haemon's taking of Antigone's part.¹¹ Even if it could mean this, Haemon's line is a strange reply to Creon's, as I will show below. In fact, however, εὔσεβεῖν is no synonym for σέβειν, and εὔσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς could mean nothing but "to act piously in regard to the base or the guilty." Jebb's "I could wish no one to show respect for evil-doers" is wishful thinking.

If we start from the phrase's literal meaning, we reach a different impasse. Haemon then says, "I would not, you know, urge anyone to act piously in regard to the guilty," Creon says, "Isn't that what she has done?" and Haemon must then reply, "Not according to the people of Thebes," attributing to the Thebans the view either that Polynices was no traitor or that the burial was no act of piety. Neither is a plausible attitude for Haemon to take.

(2) There are difficulties of a lesser gravity with οὐδὲ ἐν κελεύσαμι. Why, in this context, should Haemon speak of "ordering" or "urging" others to εὔσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς? Charged with committing X oneself, it is scarcely natural to reply, "I would not urge anyone to commit X," or (reflecting the force of οὐδὲ) "I would not even urge another to commit X [much less do it myself]."¹² If 731 could mean "I would not urge anyone to act piously in regard to the base" without ending up in the impasse described in the last paragraph, Haemon would be at least saying something intelligible ("I would not have urged Antigone to act as she has"), even if it is rather weasel-like to say, "I didn't authorize it beforehand," of an act you clearly approve of afterward. But it is hard to make any sense of κελεύσαμι on Jebb's interpretation of εὔσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς as "to

¹⁰ Denniston, GP 197, cites passages in Herodotus where οὐδὲ seems to mean gar nicht but (583) excludes our passage. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, Sophoclea 134, translate, following Kamerbeck, "Far from revering them, I should not even exhort another to show piety towards those who are κακοῖ." But Lloyd-Jones and Wilson give us no help in reading their translation: Do we stress exhort or show piety, and why are we being left in doubt? The first, which gives more plausible word-order, means a contrast between doing a thing and urging others to do it, but it is unclear why if one will not urge another to do a thing, it is a fortiori clear that one would not do it oneself. The second gives better sense (the kakoi are such that they do not even deserve to be treated with the decencies approved by the gods, much less shown special honor) but word-order is against it.

¹¹ "The unruly" is too mild an expression, surely, to describe Polynices, and so τοὺς ἀκορμοῦντας σέβειν must refer to Haemon's approval of Antigone's burial of her brother. Only this can be cast in Haemon's teeth as one of his ἔργα.

¹² The same objection applies to the interpretation of οὐδὲ proposed by I. Kvíčala, Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung des Sophokles (Vienna 1865) 15–18, who says it means "No, nor . . . "
honor the base.” Are we to suppose that “I would not urge (anyone? you?) to honor the base” is mere elegant variation for “I would not honor the base?” Or that, in spite of the fancy footwork at the beginning of the line, we are supposed to fix our attention on the significant substitution of τοὺς κακούς for τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας (thus Jebb)?

(3) Lastly, there is the less than perfect clarity of 732, where some maintain stoutly that the νόσος in question is κακία and others no less stoutly that it is τὸ εὔσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς. Brown’s comment sums up what many will feel: “The latter is more pointed in itself, and may be preferable, even though it makes the argument hereabout slightly less coherent.” In the last paragraph but one I dilated upon this incoherence, which I think is considerable. Yet the fact that we can be pulled in one direction by considerations of style and “point” and another by logic means that all may not be well here.

If we attack (1) by itself, there is only one reasonable approach. We must find something to replace εὔσεβεῖν or εὔσεβεῖν εἰς that is capable of meaning “to honor” and then persuade ourselves that it is close enough in look to have been mistaken for what is in our MSS. The closest I can come is οὕ τὰν κελεύσαμ’ ἐναρτησασθαι κακούς (cf. Eur. Or. 623). It would be difficult to explain the corruption, though if we felt we had settled the biggest problem, we could persuade ourselves that the other two were the phantom images of a hyper-critical mind. And since life is short and there are other things to think about besides Soph. Ant. 726–34, we might well cut our losses and pass on.

Suppose, however, that we take our courage in our hands and resolve to address all three problems at once. We would like ideally a solution that gives good sense throughout while preserving as many letters as possible of the text transmitted in our MSS. As it happens, we can get unimpeachable sense while preserving every letter of the paradox. Let us ask ourselves four questions. (a) To what action is Haemon likely to be referring by the phrase εὔσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς, and what is likely to be his moral attitude toward that action? (b) Who is it that in all probability talked about giving the order for something? (c) What must have preceded 731 for transmitted οὐδ’ to make sense? (d) What must have been said before 732 for the reference in τούτω νόσωι to be instantly and perfectly clear? The answers are these: (a) The phrase εὔσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς refers to Antigone’s burial of the traitor Polynices, an action Haemon must be describing in approving terms as “showing piety (even) with regard to the base”: εὔσεβεῖα is good almost by definition, and once a course of action is agreed to be pious, there is little that can be said against it, so that “I would not urge you to observe piety with regard to X” is not a plausible line of argument. Haemon must in some way commend piety in the case even of the guilty. (b) Creon is the most likely man to give an order. (c) Preceding the οὐδ’ in 731 we need a negative to give οὐδ’ the force of the connective “nor.” (d) Before 732, “Has she not been tainted with this
disease," we need a reference to disobeying orders that a pious person could obey so that Creon can claim (732) that Antigone is guilty of this disease, Thebes deny it (733) and then Creon ask (734) whether the city shall tell him what orders to give. The patient can be saved in all his limbs, but the operation is messy. Here is the appalling spectacle that, if I am right, the editor must put in the text:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{KP.} & \quad \text{ἐργὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμουντας σέβειν;} \\
\text{Al.} & \quad < > \varepsilonὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς. \\
\text{KP.} & \quad \text{οὐδ’ ἐν κελεύσαιμ’} < > \\
\text{Al.} & \quad < > \\
\text{KP.} & \quad \text{οὐχ ἢδε γὰρ τοῦτο ἐπειληπται νόσωι;} \\
\text{Al.} & \quad \text{οὔ φησι Θήβης τήσδ’ ὀμόπτολις λεώς.} \\
\text{KP.} & \quad \text{πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἁμὲν χρὴ τάσσειν ἔρει;}
\end{align*}
\]

Below the water-line in the app. crit., the editor will have scope for creative reconstruction of the missing portions. Provisionally I suggest the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{KP.} & \quad \text{ἐργὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμουντας σέβειν;} \\
\text{Al.} & \quad < \text{οὐδ’ ἐν κελεύσαιμ’} \text{ἐργα δράν θεοστυγή.} > \\
\text{KP.} & \quad \text{οὐδ’ αἰνέσαιμ’} < \varepsilonὐσεβεῖς συχχεῖν νόμους.> \\
\text{KP.} & \quad \text{οὐχ ἢδε γὰρ τοῦτο ἐπειληπται νόσωι;} \\
\text{Al.} & \quad \text{οὔ φησι Θήβης τήσδ’ ὀμόπτολις λεώς.} \\
\text{KP.} & \quad \text{πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἁμὲν χρὴ τάσσειν ἔρει;}
\end{align*}
\]

Others will be able to write more elegant and Sophoclean Greek. But the sense cannot, I think, be much improved. Note that Creon’s "What? Shall the city tell me what orders I must give?" now rises naturally out of its new context.

**Antigone 1277–80**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{δὲ δέσποθ’}, \; \text{ὡς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος,} \\
\text{τὰ μὲν πρὸ χειρόν τάδε φέρεις, τὰ δὲ ἐν δόμοις} \\
\text{ἐοικας ἥκειν καὶ τάχ’ ὀψεσθαι κακά.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

1280

1279 φέρεις Brunck: φέρον codd.: φέρειν Hartung 1280 ἥκειν]

ἡκὼν Brunck καὶ τάχ’ LVZf: καὶ τά γ’ AZo: καὶ τάδ’ RUY: καὶ τά τ’ S: αὐτίκ’ Blaydes

Blaydes proposed hundreds of conjectures on the texts of the tragic poets, and because their general quality is not high, there has been a tendency to ignore him in places where he is right or at least plausible. His conjecture here (adopting Brunck’s ἡκὼν and writing αὐτίκ’) is highly plausible and may well be right. The sense we require is not (paradosis), “It seems that you have come and will soon see other misfortunes in the house,” but

\[13\text{ Cf. R. D. Dawe, Repertory of Conjectures on Aeschylus (Leiden 1965) 6–7.}\]
(conjecture), “It seems that having arrived you will soon see other misfortunes in the house.” The ratio corruptelae is simple: ἔσκας governs an infinitive, and this led a scribe to turn a participle into the infinitive he looked for. Later someone noticed there were two infinitives in the line, interpolated the “and” this seemed to require, and adjusted the adverb to fit the metre. Brunck’s φέρεις, though the corruption is harder to explain, looks very attractive well.

I wish, however, to direct attention in this note to 1278, where attempts to interpret the paradox seem to me to fail on two counts. First, everyone seems to take ἔχων and κεκτημένος as if they meant respectively “having present with one” and “having in store, in one’s storeroom.” I find this frankly incredible, and I cannot believe that any Greek hearing these two verbs, plain and unmodified by any prepositional phrase, would conclude that the one refers to things at the ready and the other to things hidden away. The two verbs are synonyms, and ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος (note the connective) looks for all the world like ordinary and unremarkable pleonasm.14

Second, attempts to account for ὡς are equally unsatisfying. Most commentators or translators ignore it. Kamerbeek makes it exclamatory, most implausibly. Jebb’s translation takes it with the participles and translates “as one who,” which would cause no comment if the participles were nouns. With a participle, ὡς most commonly means “on the ground that.”

The only way I know of to deal with both of these objections simultaneously is to mark a lacuna after 1278. The lacuna will have the participle that forms a contrast to ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος, and present possession will be contrasted with something else, perhaps future acquisition. As for the ὡς with the participle, we do not want the causal participle, “on the grounds that,” which would make no contribution to the Exangoulos’ sentence, but an idiom that is thoroughly Sophoclean, the use of redundant ὡς in participial indirect statement after a verb of knowing or sense perception; see Moorhouse, Syntax of Sophocles 318. What Sophocles wrote may have looked something like this:

ὤ δέσποθ’ ὡς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος
<πένθη κάτιοθι χατερ’ αὖ σχῆσων, ἐπεὶ>
τὰ μὲν πρὸ χειρῶν τάδε φερεῖς, τὰ δὲ ἐν δόμοις
ἐοικας ἡκον αὐτικ’ δψεσθαι κακά.

14 The two verbs are used as synonyms, e.g., Thuc. 1. 73. 1 (ἔχομεν ὡς κεκτημένα); Lys. 29. 4; Isoc. Paneg. 107, Antid. 159; Dem. 7. 26, 7. 28–29, 11. 6, 14. 28, 21. 62, 45. 80; Plato, Crat. 393b, Theat. 197b–c, Polit. 259a, Symp. 201b, Resp. 382b (ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτηθάαι), 458c, Crit. 111c, Leg. 666e, 717b (ὁ κεκτηθάι καὶ ἔχει), 742b, 815e. In tragedy, see Eur. Ion 591–93, Pho. 555–56 and fr. 57. 2.
"O master, know that you have a grief and will get yet another." The contrast between present and future is then made clearer in the next two lines.

OT 223–32

υμίν προφωνῶ πάσιν Καδμείοις τάδε·

οὔτε δυνάται ἀνήδρος ἐξ ἐκ τίνος διώλητο,

τοῦτον κελεύω πάντα σημαίνειν ἐμοί·

κεί μὲν φοβεῖται τοῦπίκλημ’ ὑπεξελῶν

<

αὐτὸς κατ’ αὐτοῦ·—πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ἀστεργές οὐδὲν, γῆς δ’ ἀπεισὶν ἀβλαβής—

εἰ δ’ αὐ τις ἄλλων οἴδεν ἢ ἣ’ ἡ ἄλλης χβονὸς

τὸν αὐτόχειρα, μὴ σιωπᾶτο· τὸ γὰρ

κέρδος τελῶ 'γὼ χῇ χάρις προσκείσεται.


Editors are right to posit a lacuna here, for the transmitted text is defective, and emendation does not heal the sense. Blaydes’ καὶ μὴ φοβείσθω . . . ὑπεξελεῖν, apart from other deficiencies, means an unexpected and incomprehensible shift in address in 227 from the man who knows who the killer is to the killer himself. For it is clearly the killer, not the “knower,” the potential informant, who is assured that he will suffer nothing worse than exile. But with 224–26 preceding and τοῦτον in the line just before, no one would expect the subject of φοβείσθω to be anyone other than the informant. The same point tells against Rauchenstein’s optative of wish (we might have expected a third-person imperative anyway), whose subject must be the killer, though the change of subject is not made clear.

But the same point that tells against these conjectures tells against the placement of this lacuna in the text above. The subject of φοβεῖται in 227 ought to be the informant, the τοῦτον of the previous line. By contrast, the man who speaks αὐτὸς κατ’ αὐτοῦ, denounces himself, and thus suffers nothing worse than exile, is the killer, for the promise that he will suffer nothing worse than exile would be unnecessary to an informer while its appropriateness to the murderer is obvious: Oedipus has just learned that he must kill or exile the guilty (99–101), and he promises to do only the second in the case of someone who denounces himself. In between is a phrase, τοῦπίκλημ’ ὑπεξελῶν, whose ownership is disputed, which will belong either to the one or to the other depending on where we mark the lacuna.
We should mark the lacuna within the line—"\(\text{ὑπεξελών}\) definitely, and \(\text{τούπικλήμαν}'\) possibly, going with what follows—for several reasons. First, while \(\text{τούπικλήμαν} \) could refer either to the charge of murder against the killer or the charge of complicity against the informant doubtless mentioned in the lacuna, it is slightly more probable that the person engaged in "diminishing, reducing, doing away with by degrees" (\(\text{ὑπεξελών}\): cf. El. 1420, Eur. Hipp. 633) is the murderer himself, who by denouncing himself can reduce his punishment to exile.

More important, however, is the whole context. In 224–26 Oedipus is asking any informants to come forward. In 230–32 he is still addressing informants, this time those who may know of a foreign killer.\(^\text{15}\) It seems easiest to construe the intervening lines so that they too address possible informants and so that the killer and his penalty are mentioned only to reassure them. The sense we look for is this: "And if he fears the charge <of complicity in the murder, I assure him most solemnly that not even the murderer himself will receive the expected penalty for murder if he denounces> himself and thereby reduces <his punishment>.” (Since what the murderer reduces is not the charge but the penalty, I mark the lacuna after \(\text{τούπικλήμαν}'\). But certainty is impossible here.) The Greek for this, though longer than one would like, writes itself:

\[
\text{κεῖ \ μὲν \ φοβεῖται \ τούπικλήμαν' <δόμον κτανεῖν \ συνειδέναι τε, τούς θεούς δομνυμί \ εγώ \ μηδ' \ αν \ τὸν \ ἔρξαντ' \ οὗ \ "κτανεν \ τείσαι \ δίκην \ ἡν \ μαρτυρήσῃ, ζημίαν> \ υπεξελών, \ αὐτὸς κατ' \ αὐτοῦ. \ πεῖσται \ γὰρ \ ἄλλο \ μὲν \ κτλ.}
\]

(For the “coincident” aorist participle, describing an action contemporaneous with an aorist verb, see Barrett on Hipp. 289–92.) By contrast, attempts to reproduce the argument of the passage taking \(\text{τούπικλήμαν' \ υπεξελών}\) with the knower are considerably more awkward.\(^\text{16}\) This solution avoids the anacolouthon postulated by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson above. This is a gain, for to posit both a lacuna and a drastic change of construction seems a perilously expensive way of proceeding.

\(^{15}\) Vauvilliers’ conjecture should be rejected: “if on the other hand anyone knows someone else <or> from another land” is dubious sense. Nauck’s \(\text{ἐλθοῦν}'\) for \(\text{ἄλλον}\) gives good sense.

\(^{16}\) Only two ways of proceeding suggest themselves. (1) "If he is afraid, reducing the charge against himself <of complicity, let him come forward in the knowledge that even the murderer will not receive the expected punishment if he denounces> himself, etc.” (2) "If he is afraid, by doing away with the charge against him <in this fashion, that he will bring himself into trouble, let him be aware that the murderer himself will not receive the expected punishment if he denounces> himself, etc.” The first is longer and more awkward than the text I argue for; the second takes \(\text{τούπικλήμαν' \ υπεξελών}\) in an unsatisfyingly conative sense which requires the unnatural suppletion of “in this fashion.”
Surely 615 should be bracketed too? The argument of the passage is this: Creon wants Oedipus to conduct a proper investigation, going to Delphi to see whether his report of the oracle’s words was correct. For to deem the good man bad and the bad good are both terrible errors. The safe course for avoiding both is to take the time to investigate, for it is time alone that shows up the just man.

Line 615 (“but the wicked man you may recognize in a single day”) is not only irrelevant (as Kamerbeek admits) but positively ruinous. While it was said of Winston Churchill that while you could find out all his faults in half an hour’s conversation, it would take a lifetime to appreciate his virtues, no such reflections are relevant here. In this context δίκαιον does not mean anything more general than “law-abiding, innocent of the charge,” for the whole scene is not about Creon’s moral character in general but about whether he is guilty of conspiring to depose his king. If it is time alone that establishes innocence, it cannot at the same time be said that a single day suffices to find out guilt. I suspect that to some actor 613–14 seemed insufficiently sententious for the end of his speech.

17 Wecklein’s preemptive first strike against possible attackers of 615, Ars Sophoclis emendandii (Wurzburg 1869) 140–41, takes the passage into the realm of high morality: “Causa autem sententiae v. 615 ... in eo posita est, quod unum malum facinus malum hominis ingenium manifestat, unum bene factum bonum animum non comprobat.” But the meaning of δίκαιος (law-abiding) and κακός (guilty) is sufficiently shown by the parallel situation in Euripides’ Hippolytus, esp. 929, 942, 1024, 1031, 1075, 1081, 1299, 1307, and the references to time as establishing guilt and innocence in 1051 and 1322.
Dawe’s commentary well points out the unsatisfactory character of 938 as transmitted, where “ποίεν cuts across ὃδ’, and the question is answered almost before it is put, lit. ‘What is the double effect that it has like this?’” He rightly says that ποίεν is an attractive conjecture, well argued for by H. Reynen in Gymnasium 67 (1960) 533–36, but that it could not be used absolutely (“What sort of a thing?”) but only as ποίεν (sc. ἐποίες). I find such a “subaudition” hard here, and I cannot find any clear parallels in tragedy. I would much prefer to write τι δ’ ἐξῆθ’ ὁποῖον δύναμιν ὃδ’ ἔχει διπλῆν; comparing, for this use in place of simple relative, Ant. 5, Phil. 659, OC 561 and fr. 1130. 17 ὁν σοι λαβεῖν ἔξεστι τοῦθ’ ὁποῖον ἄν / χρῆς. 

**OT 1303–06**

21 Ἰεβῆ. ὅποιον δύναται ἄλλα ὡς ἐν ζωήν ἀνερέσθαι, πολλὰ πνεύματα, πολλὰ δὲ ἀθρήσκαι. 1305 τοῖς μετρίοις παρέξεις μοι.

Jebb: “The fate of Oedipus is a dark and dreadful mystery into which they are fain to peer (ἀνερέσθαι, πνεύμασι; cp. the questions at 1299 ff., 1327): in its visible presentment it has a fascination (ἀθρήσκει) even for those whom it fills with horror.” Kamerbeek: “In the reaction of the Chorus the clash of sentiments is evident and natural. Shrinking from the sight of the horror they feel at the same time the desire to know and to see.” Someone who fails to detect beauties other interpreters claim to see may be thought to be lacking in literary sensitivity. In spite of that risk, I must say bluntly that I think the passage as it stands is slightly incoherent and that the second metron of 1305 should be deleted. If a poet wants to make the point, however obliquely, that a sight prevents one from looking on it even though one greatly desires to behold it, no easy point to grasp, he does not muddy things up by introducing two other infinitives—whose parallelism with the infinitive “to behold” is reinforced by anadiplosis—that take one down the path of an entirely different thought, that because of the horrible appearance of Oedipus they cannot look at him though they still want to ask him many questions. For metrical reasons we cannot delete the first two infinitives. Delete the third18 and all is in order, including 1306 (following on a series of questions): “Alas, unhappy man! But I cannot even look at you, though I have much that I would ask, much that I would learn, such is the shuddering with which you fill me.” The motive for the insertion was probably some actor’s feeling that a tricolon is wanted here and that three infinitives are better than two. I suspect that something similar has

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18 Nauck thought that all of πολλ’ ἀνερέσθαι, πολλὰ πνεύματα, πολλὰ δὲ ἀθρήσκει was spurious. W. Teuffel, Neue Jahrbiicher für Philologie 97 (1868) 752, deletes the last two phrases but defends the first. F. Heimsoeth, Kritisiche Studien zu den griechischen Tragikern (Bonn 1865) 227–28, anticipates my deletion.
happened at Eur. Tro. 110–11, where I would read τί με χρη σιγᾶν; [τί δὲ μὴ σιγᾶν;] τί δὲ θρηνησαί; Cf. similar expansions of anapaestic monometers at Aesch. Pers. 6 and 145 and Cho. 1069.19

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19 For suggestions and criticisms (not always heeded) I am grateful to Andrew Brown, Roger Dawe and Hugh Lloyd-Jones.
A Neglected Stoic Argument for Human Responsibility

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On two separate occasions Origen attempted to defend the proposition that human beings are personally responsible for their actions. In his comprehensive exposition of Christian theology, On Principles, written about A.D. 220–25, he devoted an entire chapter to the subject of free will, in the first half of which he attempted to demonstrate on philosophical grounds that human beings are responsible for their behavior and that it is within their power (τὸ ἐξ' ἡμῖν) to do right and avoid sin, as God in his justice demands (De Princ. 3. 1. 1–5 = SVF 2. 988).1 A decade or so later in his treatise On Prayer Origen again defended human responsibility, this time in order to show that God does not foreordain everything that happens, thereby rendering prayer useless, but rather that human beings remain in control of and responsible for their own decisions and actions (De Orat. 6. 1–2 = SVF 2. 989).2

Origen’s two arguments have long been regarded as influenced by the Stoic literature in defense of moral responsibility, an issue that was being hotly debated in the philosophical schools in the second and third centuries A.D.3 The first of these texts especially has been pressed into service for

1 The text of On Principles has been edited by Koetschau (1913) and reedited by Görgemanns and Karpp (1976). Page and line numbers in my citations are those of Koetschau, which may also be found in the edition of Görgemanns and Karpp. On the date, see Butterworth vi-viii and Trigg 87.

2 The text of On Prayer is edited by Koetschau (1899). Page and line numbers in my citations are those of Koetschau. On the date, see Jay 72, and Trigg 156.

3 Von Arnim includes them in SVF 2. 988, 989 (all references to SVF are to fragment numbers, with page and line numbers added in square brackets when needed); and they have been used for the reconstruction of Stoic doctrine (see below, note 4). A Stoic influence on Origen’s conception of human responsibility is also acknowledged in varying degrees by Koch 280–91; Pohlenz I 426; Jackson, esp. 19–21; and Trigg 116–17; as well as by the authorities cited in note 4. The Stoic influence on Origen, in general, is surveyed by Pohlenz I 423–28, II 203–07; and recent bibliography is cited by Inwood 281 n. 186. For
the illumination that it sheds on the Stoic theory of action, as well as on the Stoic defense of human responsibility in a world governed by fate.\textsuperscript{4} Origen’s second attempt to defend responsibility, however, has received relatively little attention, either as an argument for the efficacy of prayer or as a reflection of the controversy in secular philosophy.\textsuperscript{5} It is cited mainly to fill in a few details that are absent from the discussion of On Principles.\textsuperscript{6} Yet even a superficial reading shows that though it begins in exactly the same way as the argument in On Principles, it soon turns in a noticeably different direction and eventually ranges over a series of points that are entirely absent from the account of On Principles. The difference between the two accounts raises the question why Origen did not simply repeat the argument he had used in On Principles. He cannot have forgotten what he had written earlier; the close resemblance of the first ten lines demonstrates that he was fully aware of the way he had presented the argument in On Principles. The version in On Prayer, then, must have been a deliberate revision. As such, it constitutes a distinct contribution to the discussion of the issue and needs to be analyzed and evaluated in its own right.

One can best grasp the unique approach of Origen’s argument in On Prayer by comparing it to his earlier version in On Principles. There Origen had attempted to show how rational human beings differ from other things that move by locating them in a comprehensive division of everything that moves:

Of things that move some have the cause of their motion in themselves; others are moved only from outside. So the things that are carried, like wood, stones, and every material held together only by its physical state (ε̲ξις), are moved only from outside... Plants and animals, on the other hand, and basically everything that is held together by nature (φωσις or soul (ψυχή), have the cause of moving in themselves... And of those that have the cause of moving within themselves, some, they claim, move out of themselves (ε̲ξ ε̲καυντον)

\textsuperscript{4} E.g., by Gould 22; Stough 206, 220-21; Inwood 21-26, 78-82; and Long and Sedley I 313.

\textsuperscript{5} One of the most comprehensive treatments is by Gesell 156-60, who surveys the argument and suggests a Neo-Platonic source, with only a brief allusion to the Neo-Platonic triad of Being, Life, and Thought as a parallel for the three kinds of self-motion. Typical of the treatment of the passage is Trigg 159-60 (cf. 116-17), who considers the argument in On Prayer similar to that of On Principles, basically a Middle Platonic approach. See also below, note 6.

\textsuperscript{6} Most frequently cited is Origen’s claim in On Prayer that the characteristic activities of plants, animals, and human beings (viz. growth, impulse, and reasoning) are named motion “out of themselves” (ε̲ξ ε̲καυντον), “from themselves” (απ’ ε̲καυντον), and “through themselves” (δι’ ε̲καυντον) respectively; cf., e.g., Stough 221 and n. 34; Inwood 22-24. On the terminology see below, notes 8 and 10.
and others from themselves (ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν)—out of themselves the things without soul (ἀψυνχα) [viz. plants] and from themselves the ensouled things (ἑμψυχα), for the ensouled things move when an impression (φαντασία) calls forth an impulse (ὄρμη)... The rational animal, however, in addition to the impression-producing nature also possesses reason (λόγος), which judges the impressions, rejecting some and accepting others, in order that the living thing (ζων) may be led in accord with them [viz. the approved impressions]. (De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 3–97. 11] = SVF 2. 988 [287. 33–88. 10])

After this Origen goes on in some detail regarding the acceptance or rejection of impressions and finally concludes that it is precisely by virtue of this function that rational animals may be said to be responsible for their actions (esp. De Princ. 3. 1. 3 [198. 5–11] = SVF 2. 988 [288. 17–22]).

The argument in On Prayer begins with exactly the same division:

Of things that move some have their mover outside, such as inanimate things held together by physical disposition (ἐξεις) alone. (De Orat. 6. 1 [311. 16–17] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 37–38])

But instead of continuing the division of things that move in the manner of On Principles, Origen immediately begins to shift to a different point of view, namely, an enumeration of the different kinds of motion that characterize the various categories of things that move. His point of view is signaled from the beginning by the particles μὲν . . . δὲ . . . δὲ; and the shift from a division of things that move to an enumeration of kinds of motion is further facilitated by the use of the ordinal numerals “second” and “third” in his presentation of the subsequent items. The result is that while the account begins with a division and a discussion of the first category of things that move (viz. things moved from outside [τὰ μὲν τινα τὸ κινουν ἔχει ἔξωθεν]), this discussion is presented as if it were a discussion of the first member of a tripartite series, and the division is never mentioned again.

This procedure creates a tactical problem for Origen in his presentation of the rest of the series. The original division separated off things moved from outside, but it left things that move from within as an undifferentiated generic category, including both plants and animals. Origen’s next move ought to have been to subdivide this generic category in preparation for an enumeration of its members and their motions. In his eagerness, however, to shift over to an enumeration of motions he overlooks this task and instead says:

The second class (δεύτερα δὲ) of things that move, in addition to these [externally moved objects], are the things that move by the agency of their internal nature or soul (ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνυπαρχόνσις φύσεως ἦς ψυχῆς κινούμενα), which are also said to move “out of...

7 For full discussion of this text and its relation to Stoicism see Inwood 21–26, 78–81.
them(selves)” (ἐξ αὐτῶν) by those who are more scrupulous in terminology (παρά τοῖς κυριωτέρον χρωμένοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι). (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 1–3] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 1–3])

Here he denotes the second class of things that move by the still undivided generic category (“things that move by either their internal nature or their [internal] soul”), to which he then adds a relative clause identifying their motion as “motion out of them(selves) (ἐξ αὐτῶν)—the motion that is characteristic of things that move specifically by nature and not by soul. In this way he combines the enumeration of the second member of the series of things that move (although imprecisely described) with an identification of its specific motion.

Finally, having given the proper technical name for the characteristic motion of the second class, he ceases to enumerate the classes and concentrates entirely on the motions themselves:

Third (τρίτη δὲ) is the motion in animals which is named “the motion from it(self)” (ἡ ἄντι αὐτοῦ κίνησις); and I believe (οίμας) that the motion of rational beings is [called] “motion through them(selves)” (δὲ αὐτῶν). (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 3–5] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 3–6])

8 I have retained the non-reflexive forms as found in the only extant MS of On Prayer, even though the texts of On Principles and of Simplicius In Cat. (= SVF 2. 499) use the reflexive pronouns. The apparent inconsistency has tempted editors to emend the text of On Prayer in some or all of the four instances of prepositional phrases. Koetschau eventually decided to emend all four to bring them into line with the text of On Principles (cf. Koetschau [1926] 27 n. 1). Such emendation is unnecessary and produces a grammatically inferior text in three of the four instances. In Simplicius and On Principles the prepositional phrase modifies the verb and refers back to the subject of the sentence (viz. the things that move). In On Prayer, however, in all but one case the prepositional phrase qualifies a noun (κίνησις) and the pronoun refers back to a genitive modifier; hence it cannot be reflexive. In only one instance, where Origen is attempting to combine the second class of things that move with the name of their motion, does the pronoun refer back to the subject of the clause and the sentence, and hence only this one phrase might be expected to contain a reflexive pronoun. Yet even here, if Origen had in mind a list of motions in which the pronouns were non-reflexive (in keeping with standard grammatical practice), he might have retained the non-reflexive form of his source despite a rephrasing that called for a reflexive pronoun. One small additional point in favor of retaining the non-reflexive forms of the manuscript is the fact that when Origen did use the reflexive form in On Principles (De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 11–97. 1] = SVF 2. 988 [287. 41–88. 2]), he used the uncontracted form ἐαυτῶν, removing all ambiguity even in early, unaccented uncial manuscripts. The fact that he uses the short form (αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν) in a discussion of the very same subject in On Prayer may indicate that Origen did not intend the term to be construed as a reflexive. It should be noted, moreover, that regardless of the form used in the Greek text, which is determined by the exigencies of Greek grammar, the reference of the pronoun is the same and the meaning is unaffected. Furthermore, in English the reflexive is more indicative of the required meaning than the non-reflexive, even for the nominal form, “motion out of itself.”

9 Contrast the clarity with which he distinguishes the second and third categories and their motions in On Principles 3. 1. 2 (196. 11–97. 1) = SVF 2. 988 (287. 41–88. 1).
Thus in three steps Origen shifts completely from a division of things that move to an enumeration of the motions with which they move.

This procedure is surprising and suggests that Origen did not create this argument from whole cloth, but constructed it by conflating two distinct arguments. One of these, like the argument in On Principles, required a classification of things that move on the basis of the source of their motion, i.e., whether their motion originates from outside (as in inanimate things), or from within (specifically from nature in plants, from soul in animals, and from reason in human beings). The other account required a catalog or enumeration of the kinds of motion that characterize the various classes of things that move and designated at least the motions that arise from within by different prepositions with a (reflexive) pronoun, i.e., ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, or δι’ ἑαυτοῦ. To meet these two requirements he grafted the list of motions onto the initial division of things that move. The result was a composite theoretical basis for his argument—a division of things that move into things moved from outside and things that move from within, but with the added stipulation that things that move from within may possess as many as three different types of motion: (1) motion out of themselves (presumably found in all living plants and animals), (2) motion from themselves (animal motion), and (3) motion through themselves (rational motion).

To confirm the hypothesis that Origen’s argument is really a combination of two separate arguments, we must examine how the argument actually proceeds:

If we remove from the living creature (ζωόν) motion from it selv (ἀπ’ αὑτοῦ), it can no longer be considered a living creature, but will be either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone carried (φέρεται) by someone from outside. If it [the animal] is aware of its own motion (παρακολουθή τῇ ίδιᾳ κινήσει), since it is to this that we have given the name “moving through it selv” (δι’ αὑτοῦ), this [animal] will of necessity be rational. Those people, therefore, who wish nothing to be subject to us (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) will necessarily arrive at a most absurd conclusion: first, that we are not animals, and second, that we are not rational, but we might [rather] say that what we believe we [ourselves] are doing we [really] do, as it were, by the agency of an external mover (οἷον ὑπὸ ἐξωθεν κινοῦντος), in no way ourselves doing the moving (αὑτοί ὀυδαμῶς κινοῦμενοι). (De Orat. 6. 1–2 [312. 5–14] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 6–13])

For the sake of clarity and consistency I shall use the reflexive form for both the English phrase and the corresponding Greek phrase, regardless whether the reference is to the text of On Principles, which used the reflexive form, or to On Prayer, which probably used the non-reflexive form (see above, note 8).

Unfortunately, all editions and translations begin a new paragraph in the middle at De Orat. 6. 2 (312. 11) = SVF 2. 989 (289. 10). This breaks up the argument, which runs...
Though Origen’s logic may not be immediately clear, it is obvious that he is attempting to prove that determinism leads to not one, but two absurd consequences: (1) we human beings are not living creatures (ζωάς) and (2) we human beings are not rational creatures (λογικά). Working backward from this double conclusion, we see that it is preceded by two conditional sentences. These may now be recognized as supplying the two required major premises for the pair of conclusions, the first stipulating the conditions that constitute denial of our status as animals, the second stipulating the conditions for regarding an animal as rational. Origen’s argument thus takes the shape of two parallel syllogisms. In the one, he argues that determinists by claiming that all our actions are done by the agency of an external mover satisfy the condition of the first premise and hence implicitly deny that we are living creatures. In the other, he argues that determinists by this very same claim deny the condition that constitutes rationality as specified in the second premise and therefore also deny that we are rational creatures.

We shall have to clarify these arguments further; but first we must observe that Origen’s attack on the determinists consists of two parallel arguments based on two parallel premises, and that one of these arguments depends specifically on the distinction between motion caused by an external mover and motion arising from within, whereas the other depends on a particular concept of rational motion that Origen characterizes as “motion through itself.” Hence the course of the argument shows the same pattern of conflation as did the exposition of what we may now construe as its theoretical basis, the classification of things that move and their specific motions. We may, therefore, use this pattern to disentangle the two conflated arguments for further detailed analysis:

THEORETICAL BASIS

Division of Things that Move

Catalog of Self-Motions

Of things that move some have their mover outside, such as inanimate things held together by physical disposition alone, and also things that are moved by nature and soul at times when they are not being moved as

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to De Orat. 6. 2 (312. 18) = SVF 2. 989 (288. 17), and has no doubt contributed to its misunderstanding.
such [viz. by nature or soul], but rather in the manner of things held together only by physical disposition. For stones that have been extracted from a mine and wood that has lost its capacity to grow, since these are [now] held together only by physical disposition, have their mover outside. In fact, even the bodies of animals and the foliage of plants when they are transported (μετατίθεμενα) by someone change place (μετατίθεται) not as animals and plants, but in the manner of stones and wood that has lost its capacity to grow. And again, if ever these things move by virtue of the fact that all things disintegrate (ρευστὰ εἶναι) when they perish, they have the motion that occurs during perishing as an incidental result (παρακολούθητικήν) [viz. of the perishing, and thus as an externally caused motion].

class of things that move, in addition to these [externally moved objects] are the things that move by the agency of their internal nature or soul,

which are also said to move “out of them(selves)” (ἐξ αὐτῶν) by those who are more scrupulous in terminology. Third is the motion in animals, which is named “the motion from it(self)” (ν ὁπ'' αὐτοῦ κίνησις); and I believe that the motion of rational beings is [called] “motion through them (selves)” (δι' αὐτῶν).
ARGUMENTS

Based on
Division of Things that Move

If we remove from the living creature motion from itself, it can no longer be considered a living creature, but will be either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone carried by someone from outside.

Based on
Catalog of Self-Motions

If it [the animal] is aware of its own motion (παρακολουθη
tη ἵδιξ κινήσει), since it is to this that we have given the name “moving through itself,” this [animal] will of necessity be rational.

Those people, therefore, who wish nothing to be subject to us (ἔφ’ ἡμῖν) will necessarily arrive at a most absurd conclusion:

first, that we are not animals,

and second, that we are not rational,

but we might say that what we believe we [ourselves] are doing we [really] do,

as it were, by the agency of an external mover (οὗν ὑπὸ ἐξω-
θεν κινοῦντος),

in no way ourselves doing the moving (αὐτοὶ οὐδαμῶς κι-
νοῦμενοι). Especially after examining his own experience let anyone see if he would not be shameless to [still] claim that he himself does not will, he himself does not eat, he himself does not walk, and, moreover, he himself does not assent and accept some beliefs, and he himself does not reject
We shall begin by examining the argument in the left-hand column, the
argument that we are not living creatures (ζύζω). This argument is based on
the premise:

If we remove from the living creature (ζύζων) motion from it(self) (τὴν
ἀπ’ αὑτοῦ κίνησιν), it can no longer be considered a living creature,
but will be either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone
carried by someone from outside. *(De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5–8] = SVF 2.
989 [289. 5–7]*)

Origen laid the foundation for this premise in his presentation of the
division of things that move at the very beginning. In dividing things into
those moved from outside and those moving by nature or soul from within,
he made it clear that this division does not entail that things moving from
within are never moved from outside.\(^{12}\) Among the things moved from
outside he includes things that move by nature and soul (viz. plants and
animals) at those times when they are not moving qua plants or animals,
that is, with the proper motion of plants or animals *(De Orat. 6. 1 [311.
17–24] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 37–44]). Plants, he believes, move as plants
when they grow (φύειν, De Orat. 6. 1 [311. 19–20, 24–25] = SVF 2. 989
[288. 40–41, 43–44]); animals move as animals when they move by
impulse in response to an impression *(De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 13–97. 1] =
SVF 2. 988 [288. 1–2]). However, when a plant dies and loses its ability
to grow, as in the case of wood, or when plants or animals are transported
by someone or something, they are moved from outside in exactly the same
40–44]). Thus plants and animals are subject to externally caused motion as
well as to their own proper internally caused motions.

In the actual statement of the premise Origen goes further and assumes
that the various classes of things that move by an internal source also
possess varying numbers of internally caused motions and that the number
of such motions depends on their position in the scale of things that move.
What he says is that if we take away (περιέλωμεν) the proper motion of an
animal, i.e., motion from itself, it will no longer qualify as an animal, but
will “move only by nature like a plant or be carried by someone from
outside like a stone” *(De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5–8] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 5–7]*)
This implies that an animal is capable of three kinds of motion, externally

\(^{12}\) In *On Principles* he adds the word μόνον to say: “Of things that move some have the
cause of their motion in themselves, others are moved only from outside” *(De Princ. 3. 1. 2
[196. 3–4] = SVF 2. 988 [287. 33–35]). This makes it clear that the other divisions are
moved externally as well as by one or more internal sources of motion.
caused motion and two internally caused kinds of motion, motion by nature, such as characterizes plants, and motion from itself, which is the proper motion of animals; but it is only the motion from itself that defines the animal. If this proper defining motion is removed, the animal may no longer be considered an animal. It will still, however, be left with two kinds of motion, the motion of biological growth that is the proper motion of plants, and, of course, externally caused motion, which may happen to anything at all, whether animate or inanimate. Origen’s argument, therefore, entails an analysis of things that move as an ordered series in which each member possesses its own proper motion in addition to all the motions of the prior members of the series.

This conception is built into the very structure of the division, which we may abstract from the full account of it in *On Principles*. There we find the first division defined as follows:

> Of things that move some have the cause of their motion in themselves; others are moved *only* from outside. (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 2 [196. 3–4] = SVF 2. 988 [287. 33–35])

This implies that things that have the cause of their motion in themselves are *also* capable of being moved from outside, an implication that Origen actually spelled out in *On Prayer*. Moreover, when Origen comes to the last division, he says:

> The rational animal *in addition* to the impression-producing nature *also* possesses reason. (*De Princ.* 3. 1. 3 [197. 9–10] = SVF 2. 988 [288. 7–9])

He thereby reveals that on his analysis the internal source of motion which characterizes a specific class of things that move occurs in addition to, not in place of, the source that characterized the class from which it is being differentiated. Thus the complete division may be diagrammed as follows:13

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13 I have enclosed “only” and “also” in parentheses where they do not occur in Origen’s text, but must be supplied to bring the division into line with the principle of division used for the first and fourth classes. The bracketed descriptions indicate the implied distribution of descriptions that Origen consolidates into a single generic description at the prior level and does not explicitly repeat in the subdivisions of the genus. We might note that this occurs in his attempt to differentiate plants from animals, where he prefers to use the prepositional characterization of the catalog of motions.
Division of Things That Move (On Principles 3. 1. 2–3)

Things that move

Moved only from outside; held together by physical disposition alone; viz. inanimate things

(Also) having a cause of motion in themselves; held together (also) by nature and soul; viz. plants and animals

Moving (only) out of themselves; Moving (also) from themselves when impression calls forth impulse;

[moving (only) by internal nature; held together (only) by nature]; viz. soulless [plants]

[moving (also) by internal soul; held together (also) by soul]; viz. ensouled [animals]

Moving (only) by impression-producing nature and impulse

Also possessing reason, which judges impressions

The structure of Origen’s division is, in essence, an asymmetrical dichotomy, in which each subdivision adds another source of motion and another kind of motion as the defining characteristic of that class, thereby assigning the four classes of things that move to an ordered series, each member of which possesses the motions and sources of motion of all prior members of the series in addition to its own proper motion and source of motion. Specifically, the series consists of four members: (1) inanimate things, (2) plants, (3) animals, and (4) rational creatures. The first member of the series, inanimate things, move only from outside. Plants may also be moved from outside, but their proper motion is one caused by their internal nature and called “motion out of themselves.” It is this motion that occurs when they grow and flourish as plants. Animals, too, as the third member of the series, have such motion by nature, enabling them to grow and reproduce in the manner of plants, but their proper motion is the motion from themselves (ἀφ’ ἐαυτῶν), which Origen in On Principles identifies as the motion that arises when an impression calls forth an impulse (De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [196. 13–97. 1] = SVF 2. 988 [288. 1–2]). Animals,
therefore, are susceptible of three kinds of motion: (1) externally caused, passive transportation, (2) biological growth (motion out of themselves), and (3) motion by impulse (motion from themselves). Finally, human beings conform to the same pattern. They possess these three forms of motion, as well as a fourth, their own characteristic motion of reason, which in On Prayer Origen calls “motion through themselves” (δι' ἐμφάνισις).

It is this conception that forms the logical basis for Origen’s first argument in On Prayer. Leaving aside the specific motion of rational creatures, he adopts the conception of an animal as possessing three motions, externally caused transportation, biological growth, and motion by impulse (motion from themselves). If we remove the proper motion of the animal, the motion that defines it qua animal, it can no longer be regarded as an animal. This, he asserts, is what the determinists do when they claim that all human actions, even those that we believe we do on our own initiative, are done “as it were, by the agency of something outside.” For this argument the motion of reason is not relevant; the determinist claim that all human action is caused by an external mover denies even the animal motion by impulse in response to an impression and so “removes motion from itself.” By leaving humans without the defining motion of animals, the determinist position entails the absurd consequence that we human beings are not even animals, much less rational animals.14

This analysis shows clearly the conceptual connections of the argument. Formally the argument is made on the basis of the first step in the division, viz. the division into things moved from without and things that move themselves from within. The minor premise (that determinists claim human beings are moved exclusively from outside) requires only the distinction between things moved from within and things moved from without. This distinction is fully developed in the opening lines of the argument. The major premise, however, is formulated to reflect the full range of superimposed motions to which an animal is subject:

If we remove from the living creature motion from itself, it can no longer be considered a living creature, but will be either like a plant moving only by nature or like a stone carried by someone from outside. (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5–8] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 6–8])

14 The justice of Origen’s criticism is a question that cannot be discussed here. Origen’s critique seems simply to oppose externally caused motion to motion by impulse without taking any account of the possibility that a determinist might incorporate animal motion into his determinist scheme by claiming that not only the impulse-provoking external impression, but also the internal impulse-generating mechanism was in some way affected by external causes. It may be that Origen says οἶνον ἥπαξ ἐξίσουν κινούντος, “as it were, by an external mover,” to include under this looser rubric accounts that determine the internal mechanism. If so, he would seem to be claiming that such accounts give a human being less freedom than an animal.
Though these motions are expressed in terms of the prepositional classification of the catalog, the catalog is not the theoretical ground for the conception of a living creature as possessor of the three concomitant motions. For concomitance, though not incompatible with the classification by prepositions, is neither implied by that classification nor stipulated as an additional condition in Origen’s exposition. It is, on the other hand, both a necessary, logical consequence of the asymmetrical dichotomy of the division and explicitly mentioned in the full exposition of that division in On Principles and again in the part repeated in On Prayer. Thus we can safely say that the first argument against determinism is derived conceptually from the division of things that move, such as is found fully expressed in On Principles.

Yet at the same time we have to acknowledge that the conclusion of the first argument in On Prayer is unequivocally different from that of the argument of On Principles. In On Principles Origen made no attempt to defend human responsibility on the basis of the internal origin of motion in living creatures (ζόων), but staked his entire claim of human responsibility on the capacity of the reason (λόγος) to resist the impulses provoked by impressions of the senses (De Princ. 3. 1. 3 [197. 1–98. 11] = SVF 2. 988 [288. 2–22]). That argument is now replaced in On Prayer with a new argument that even animals, and presumably some of the animal activities of humans, arise from within and so conflict with the determinist claim that all movement without exception is caused from outside. This clears the way for Origen to use the reason of rational creatures as the basis for a second argument that is not based on the division of things that move. Thus we can see that in constructing the composite argument in On Prayer, Origen has carefully introduced part, but only part, of the division on which his argument in On Principles was based, and then, on the basis of that part and its assumptions about the structured distribution of motions among the components of the universe, he has created a new argument, one which will not interfere with the completely different argument with which he intends to conflate it. Let us now turn to that second argument.

The second argument is presented in studied rhetorical antithesis to the first within a conventional literary structure, a ring composition centered around the conclusions:

15 This does not mean that Origen is necessarily attributing full responsibility to animals. In On Principles he cites spiders and bees as animals who create artistic, geometrically shaped structures without possession of reason (De Princ. 3. 1. 2 [197. 2–9] = SVF 2. 988 [288. 2–7]). The impression that calls forth such creations presumably arises from within them and not entirely from some external source. Origen could take these animals as evidence that even irrational animals are not completely dependent on external causes for all their motions. Yet, as he goes on to show in On Principles, they are not morally responsible for their actions.
Major Premise I
Major Premise II
Conclusion I
Conclusion II
Minor Premise I
Minor Premise II

Within this structure Origen expresses both arguments in the same grammatical form. The major premises are introduced in the form of a pair of conditional sentences (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5–10] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 5–9]). Then the conclusion is expressed in the middle of the discussion in a single sentence with the determinists’ consequences in numbered, coordinate indirect statements: first, that we are not living creatures, and second, that we are not rational beings (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 11–13] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 10–11]). Finally, the minor premises are added in the form of parallel phrases in an indirect discourse statement of the determinists’ allegations: “moving, as it were, by an external mover, not by ourselves” (De Orat. 6. 2 [312. 13–14] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 12–13]). The parallel grammatical forms, however, embody formally antithetical premises. Whereas the major premise of the first argument draws a negative conclusion (“it is not an animal”) from a denial of the necessary defining characteristic, the major premise of the second argument draws a positive conclusion (“it is rational”) from the affirmation of the defining characteristic of this class. In the minor premises the determinists are claimed to affirm a source of human motion incompatible with the definition of animals, while simultaneously denying the kind of motion that defines rational beings. Thus Origen claims that the determinists satisfy the condition of the major premise in the first argument and so affirm its negative conclusion, whereas they fail to satisfy the condition of the major premise in the second and so deny its positive conclusion. In the end the two antithetical syllogisms converge; the affirmation of the negative conclusion of Major Premise I and the denial of the positive conclusion of Major Premise II yield the two parallel negative conclusions: We are not animals and we are not rational. This intricate antithesis clearly reveals the care with which Origen constructed the argument, as well as the importance he attached to the conflation of the two arguments. It also indicates that the remodeling of the argument from On Principles and the addition of the second argument was not a casual variation, but a deliberate attempt to accentuate it by antithesis and to produce a climactic focus on its central concept, namely, the rational motion of human beings.

Origen’s second argument depends on the crucial claim that “being aware of” or “understanding” (παρακολουθή) one’s own motion is the proper motion or defining characteristic of rational human beings.16 This

16 Most modern translators and interpreters, including Gesell 157–60 in his detailed analysis of the passage, have missed this technical sense of παρακολουθή, which was
claim he derives explicitly from the catalog of motions. In his statement of the major premise he justifies the inference from awareness to rationality with the explanation that it was such “awareness” to which he had given the name “moving through oneself” (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 8–10] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 7–9]). He had not, of course, explicitly used the term in his catalog of self-motions; but he is obviously claiming that “awareness” is the particular motion that he had in mind when he said that the motion of rational creatures is called “motion through oneself” (De Orat. 6. 1 [312. 5] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 5–6]). Thus he intends us to see “understanding” as the motion that specifically characterizes rational beings and differentiates them from the living things (ζῶσια) that move only by impulse “from themselves” (ἀπὸ ἑαυτῶν). Origen’s argument, then, is that his definition of rationality is grounded in the order of nature and can be used as unimpeachable evidence of rationality.

His next step is to claim that the determinists deny that human beings possess this characteristic. This he does by spelling out the implications of the determinists’ claim that he used for his first argument, i.e., that all human action is caused by an external mover, as it were. If one follows the determinists, one ought to say “that everything we think we do, we really do, as it were, by an external cause, we ourselves in no way causing the motion” (αὐτοὶ οὐδαμῶς κινοῦμενοι, De Orat. 6. 2 [312. 13–14] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 12–13]). The argumentative significance of these last words is clarified and emphasized by the subsequent sentence:

Let anyone examine his own experience and see if he would not be shameless to continue to claim that he himself does not will (μὴ αὐτός θέλειν), he himself does not eat, he himself does not walk, and, moreover, he himself does not assent and accept some beliefs, and he himself does not reject others as false. (De Orat. 6. 2 [312. 14–18] = SVF 2. 989 [288. 13–17])

Origen wants his readers to realize that the determinists by their claim that all human actions are externally caused deny that we ourselves do any of these things. Origen had just established that the unimpeachable mark of rationality was “being aware of our own motion,” which entails being able to distinguish what is our own action from what is imposed on us from without. The determinists, he now claims, effectively deny that we can do that. They say that what we think we are doing by ourselves we are doing under compulsion, as if by an outside agent, and that we are, in fact, deceived and unable to recognize our own actions. By this claim they deny παρακολουθῆσις and hence our rationality.

current in the second and third centuries A.D., wrongly interpreting the term simply as “follows.” This interpretation makes the argument unintelligible. Inwood 22 translates correctly, but does not discuss the argument.

17 The sentence as a whole is given emphasis by the introductory words: ἄλλως τε καὶ.
Origen's argument is now formally complete. Animals that are aware of their own motions are rational. The determinists refuse to acknowledge this awareness. Therefore, they ask us to believe that we are not rational. But rhetorically Origen still holds his trump card. What the determinists refuse to acknowledge is something that can be verified by intuitive introspection. Anyone can examine his own experience and determine for himself whether his action is freely chosen or not. By conceiving the naturally ordained distinguishing feature of rational humanity as the ability to recognize and reflect on one's own actions Origen gives everyone access to irrefutable evidence of human freedom. This is no doubt why he can call what the determinists ask us to believe "something extremely foolish" (ἡλθίωτατόν τι, De Orationibus 6.2 [312. 11–12] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 101]); anyone can refute it by simple introspection.

This second argument in On Prayer is distinctly different from the argument of On Principles. Its only explicit point of contact with On Principles is the almost parenthetical remark there that the difference between soulless self-movers (plants) and ensouled self-movers (animals) is their kind of motion: The self-motion of plants is "out of themselves" (ἐν ἑαυτῶν), whereas the self-motion of animals is "from themselves" (ἀπὸ ἑαυτῶν, De Principio 3.1.2 [196. 11–97. 1] = SVF 2. 988 [287. 41–88. 2]). Thus we can hardly see the second argument as an extrapolation of the argument of On Principles. We must look elsewhere for its conceptual connections.

Our search quickly takes us back to the Stoics. Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories tells us that the Stoics differentiated as "different kinds" (διαφοράς γενόν) (1) "moving out of oneself" (ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖται), (2) "activating motion through oneself" (δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν κίνησιν), and (3) "acting from oneself" (ἀπὸ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν, SVF 2. 499). From this account the Stoic origin of the theoretical foundation of Origen's second argument can readily be established.

Moreover, the conception of rational activity on which the entire argument is based, namely, self-understanding (παρακολούθησις), was adopted by the Stoics in the second century A.D. as the essential

18 He picks up this point in his next argument, where he claims there are beliefs that one cannot accept regardless of the number of persuasive arguments given in their favor (De Orationibus 6.2 [312. 18–20] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 17–18]). If the determinists were right that all human choices are determined by external causes, any belief presented with a plausible argument would win assent. If some person can resist assent to even a single belief, that rejection eo ipso constitutes an empirical refutation of the determinist claim. Thus Origen has not only intuition, but objective empirical evidence in his support.

19 On this text and its relation to Origen see Inwood 23–24 and Long and Sedley II 310. Simplicius' characterization of the three Stoic motions, however, does not agree with what we read in Origen. This has led Inwood, followed by Long and Sedley, to suspect contamination with Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic notions; but it is also possible to explain the discrepancies as due to a misleading and selective abridgement of a longer Stoic exposition. A full analysis of this text, however, is beyond the scope of this study.
characteristic of rational human beings. Both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius used παρακολούθησις to denote the term for the capacity that differentiates a rational human being from an animal.20 As such it had a variety of connotations. In Epictetus these included understanding the meaning of words, following the course of an argument, comprehending the divine order that governs the universe and events in it, and, most relevantly, understanding how to use external impressions so as to act morally in harmony with the divine order and not merely to react mechanically as animals do.21 Thus it included not only evaluation of the impressions that call forth action, but also evaluation of the evaluative process itself and of the resulting actions in terms of their relation to the causal and moral order of the universe. It was this second-order evaluation that constituted awareness and understanding of the grounds of our own actions and that formed the basis for the use of intuitive introspection in philosophical investigation. Epictetus himself applied such introspection to the recognition of one’s own moral progress and so used it, for example, of a student of philosophy who, he believed, should have been able to “understand himself,” specifically, that in learning philosophy he was rejecting bad opinions and adopting new (scil. and better) ones, and was thereby changing his position from one in which his choices were morally indifferent to one in which he could make correct moral choices (Diss. 3. 5. 4).22

But it is not only Epictetus’ concept of παρακολούθησις as a mark of rationality that parallels Origen’s second argument; the role of intuition entailed by that concept was also explicitly used by Epictetus as the basis for his own proof of free will. Though, in general, Epictetus simply assumed that human beings are capable of freely choosing their pursuits and actions, on several occasions he offered an actual argument (Diss. 1. 17. 21–28; 4. 1. 68–72, 99–100). His argument is strikingly similar to Origen’s second argument in both form and content, here quoted from Diss. 1. 17:23


21 Understanding the meaning of words: Diss. 2. 14. 14–17; 2. 17. 6; following a speech, argument, or demonstration: Diss. 1. 5. 5; 1. 7. 11, 33; 1. 14. 11; 1. 26. 13–14; 1. 29. 26; 2. 24. 13, 19; 3. 23. 26; comprehending the divine order: 1. 9. 4; 2. 10. 3, 4; 2. 16. 33; 4. 7. 7, and specifically the will of nature (βουλήμα τῆς φύσεως), 1. 17. 14–15 (cf. 18); 3. 20. 13; comprehending events (γινόμενα): 1. 6. 13; understanding the use of impressions: 1. 6. 13, 17, 18 (cf. 21); 2. 6. 6, 8; 4. 7. 32; understanding the moral implications of actions: 1. 6. 15; 1. 28. 20; 2. 26. 3; 3. 5. 4–5 (cf. 3. 24. 110; 4. 7. 7); recognizing one’s actions as constituting resistance to the divine order: 3. 1. 29; 3. 10. 6 (cf. 3. 24. 110).

22 He also attributed to Socrates the sentiment that just as someone else derives joy from improving his farm or his horse, he himself derives joy from being aware of himself becoming better (παρακολούθων ἐμαυτῷ βελτιών γινομένῳ, 3. 5. 14).

23 Though the argument in both discourses is logically the same and verbally similar, the context is different. In Diss. 4. 1. 68–75 it occurs in a dialogue on freedom and is
Therefore, I go to this interpreter and diviner (ἐξηγητὴν... καὶ θότην) and say: “Examine the entrails for me and tell me what they signify (σημαίνεται) for me.” He takes them and spreads them out and then interprets as follows: “Oh, man, you have choice (προσερέσειν) by nature without hindrance and constraint. This is what is written here in the entrails. I will show this to you first in the area of assent. Can anyone prevent you from approving truth? Indeed, no one can! Can anyone force you to accept the false? Certainly not! Do you see that in this area you have the capacity to choose free of hindrance, necessity, and obstruction? What about the area of desire and impulse? Is that any different? What can overpower an impulse except another impulse and what can overpower desire or aversion except another desire or aversion? Someone might object: ‘If someone threatens me with death, he compels me.’ No, not the threat; the fact that it seems better to you to do that sort of thing rather than to die. So your own belief (δόγμα) has compelled you. That is, one choice has compelled the other. For if God had so constituted (κατεσκευάκει) that part which he took from himself and gave to you in such a way that it could be hindered or constrained either by himself or by someone else, he would no longer be God, nor would he be caring for us as he ought. These are the things I find in the sacrifice,” he says. “These signs are given to you. If you will (Θἐλη), you are free. If you will (Θἐλη), you will have no one to blame, no one to accuse. Everything will be in accord with what is at the same time your will (γνώμην) and also God’s.” (Diss. 1. 17. 21–28)

This argument was presented by Epictetus in an imaginative metaphorical setting within a discourse (Diss. 1. 17) devoted to the study of the reason (λόγος). In this discourse Epictetus discussed the mental faculty that is capable of undertaking such a study, its philosophical value, and finally its goal or end.24 At the very end of this discourse he depicts the

24 In Diss. 1. 17 Epictetus makes the following claims about reason, all in compressed dialogue form: (1) the reason (λόγος) studies itself (1. 17. 1–3); (2) the study of reason (λόγος), typically called “logic” (λογικό), is important because reason is the agent of understanding (ἐπισκεπτικό, δι' οὗ τὰ λαθα καταμεθανέται) and the standard of judging (διακριτικά, τὸ τῶν ἔλλων κριτήριον) everything else (1. 17. 4–12); (3) its end in general terms is to understand the will or plan of nature (νοήσαι, παρακολουθεῖν, οὔ καταμαθέν τὸ βουλήμα τῆς φύσεως, 1. 17. 13–19); finally (4) the specific result of this study is the recognition that “You have a choice that is by nature free of hindrance and
concrete result of the study of the reason in the form of an elaborate metaphor, in which the philosopher is portrayed as an interpreter and diviner (ἐξηγητὴν καὶ θύτην), reading or interpreting God’s will from the entrails (σπλάγχνα) of a sacrificial victim. The organs used by the diviner metaphorically represent the different psychological functions of the reason that the philosopher qua diviner uses as empirical evidence for his conclusions. So the philosopher looks first at the area of assent (ἐπὶ τοῦ ςυγκαθετικοῦ τόπου) and then at the area of desire and impulse (ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ καὶ ὁμητικοῦ). From these “organs” of the human mind he “shows” (δειξω) the “prophecy” (μαντείαν): “You have a choice (προαίρεσιν) that is by nature free of hindrance and constraint... If you will (θέλης), you are free. You will have no one to blame, no one to accuse.”

This is clearly an argument for human freedom and responsibility, but it is an argument that uses a metaphorical mode of presentation to lay its theoretical foundation. Epictetus’ metaphorical description of the process by which the philosopher infers human freedom is that of a diviner reading God’s plan from the sacred offerings (ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς), i.e., from the natural condition of the human intellect. By this he makes it clear that he regards the argument as drawing its conclusions directly from the divinely ordained structure of the universe in accord with which human beings are endowed with the unique capacity to choose their beliefs, desires, and impulses. Even though this metaphorical proof of freedom makes no reference to these psychic “motions” as members of a comprehensive, naturally ordered set of self-motions, as Origen did in his argument, it appeals through its imagery of divination to a divinely ordained, intellectually comprehensible natural structure as the basis for its validity.

But the similarity to Origen’s argument is found not only in its theoretical basis. What is equally significant is the close similarity of its logical structure and content. Epictetus looks for evidence of freedom first in assent (ἐπὶ τοῦ ςυγκαθετικοῦ τόπου) and in approving (ἐπινεῦσαι) the true, while not accepting (παραδεξασθαι) the false. Then he looks for evidence of freedom in desire and impulse (ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ καὶ ὁμητικοῦ). Finally, he describes both areas generically as “willing” (θέλης). Origen looks in precisely the same areas, but surveyed in reverse.
order. He begins with the generic activity of willing (θέλειν), then enumerates two examples of action resulting from impulse, scil. eating and walking, and finally looks for evidence of freedom in asenting to (συγκατατέθεοθαί) and accepting (παραδέχεσθαι) some doctrines, while disapproving (ἀνανεύειν) others as false (De Orat. 6. 2 [312. 15–18] = SVF 2. 989 [289. 14–17]). Significantly, even Origen’s vocabulary echoes the argument of Epictetus.

Finally, Epictetus finds the conclusive evidence for freedom of choice in the presumably self-evident observation or intuition that there is no one who can prevent a person from asenting to the truth or who can force him to accept the false. He makes this point dramatically through the use of rhetorical questions and emphatic answers. It also underlies his reply to the objector who claims that a threat of death is an example of external compulsion to perform some undesirable act. Epictetus’ “diviner” rebuts this objection, not by discursive argument, but by asking his opponent simply to reflect: What can overcome a desire or aversion except another desire or aversion? A threat of death is merely an occasion in which one is confronted with two aversions: an aversion to dying and an aversion to performing an undesirable act. As in any freely chosen act, action in these circumstances arises from a decision or belief (δόγμα). From this intuitive reflection on the process of asenting to beliefs and choosing actions, Epictetus concludes that human choice is completely free and not even God himself, who constituted human beings the way they are, can hinder or compel human action. The similarities between Epictetus’ argument and Origen’s are so strong as to leave little doubt that Origen derived the essential features of his second argument from the same sources as those from which Epictetus derived his own philosophy. Combined with the testimony of Simplicius regarding the Stoic origin of the three prepositional classifications of self-motion, these similarities force us to conclude that Origen’s entire argument emanates from a Stoic source.

These parallels with Stoic doctrine bring into even sharper focus the essential difference between Origen’s two arguments and suggest a plausible reason why Origen modified his lengthy and elaborate argument of On Principles for his subsequent treatise On Prayer. Though in both works Origen relies primarily on the rational capacity of human beings to justify his claims of human freedom and responsibility, his conception of the rational capacity differs significantly. In On Principles the function of the reason (λόγος) is to evaluate impressions (φαντασία) and to decide whether to assent to an impression or not. An assent results in an impulse

27 I say he relies primarily on the rational capacity because On Prayer also contains an argument (which I have discussed above as the first argument) that does not make use of the rational capacity, but links responsibility to the animal soul. In the overall strategy of the argument, however, it plays a relatively minor role and could not, in itself, have been the basis for Origen’s revision.
to action. The essential difference between an animal and a human being is the fact that animals respond automatically and invariably to whatever impression arises in accord with their particular nature. A human being, however, does not respond automatically, but may choose to reject an impression and so refrain from acting. It is in this capacity to resist an impression that a person’s moral responsibility lies. In On Prayer, in contrast, the function of the reason (here called “awareness” or “understanding” [παρακολούθη]) is to reflect on one’s action; and it is this ability to reflect on one’s actions that enables a person to examine his decisions and to recognize his independence and freedom from compulsion.

This difference in conception was, no doubt, a decisive factor in Origen’s choice of arguments for each context. When Origen defended free will in On Principles, he did so for the express purpose of justifying God’s judgment of sinners. He could not do this without defending a sinner’s moral responsibility for his actions (De Princ. 3. 1. 1 [195. 4–96. 2], not in SVF). The argument he brings in On Principles was admirably suited to that purpose. There the defining characteristic of a human being was the reason whose function is to evaluate every impression and to decide whether to approve or reject it. This approval or rejection determines whether a person will act upon an impression or not. The foundation of moral responsibility in an ability to resist the lure of an impression made an ideal basis for justifying God’s judgment of sinners, because it could be applied directly to the avoidance of sin. In fact, one of the illustrations that Origen used was that of a Christian monk confronted with an attractive woman (De Princ. 3. 1. 4 [199. 1–11] = SVF 2. 988 [288. 26–35]). The impression of the woman calls him to sinful action but, as a rational being, he is capable of resisting this temptation and hence he is responsible for the consequences of whatever decision he makes.

In On Prayer Origen was faced with a different challenge. He had to defend the value of prayer against the charge that prayer is useless on the grounds that all things happen by God’s will and nothing that God determines can be changed (De Orat. 5. 3–6). It was against this claim of comprehensive divine predestination that Origen directed his anti-determinist argument. In a defense of the value of prayer for affecting the course of events the argument used in On Principles would have been of less value. The ability to resist an impulse to inappropriate or immoral action may have been sufficient to justify moral responsibility for actions, but it possessed less efficacy for justifying a person’s ability to determine his own

28 Origen also had to defend against the charge that God’s foreknowledge makes prayer unnecessary (6. 3–5). Against this charge he argues that God does indeed foreknow the actions people will undertake by their free will, including their prayers; but he arranges the consequences to correspond to their freely chosen actions, so that prayers are, in fact, answered. The argument for free will thus serves as a foundation for his defense against this charge as well.
destiny through prayer. For that Origen needed to establish not merely moral responsibility, but causal responsibility as well, and, what is more, a causal responsibility that is not only reactive (able to block immoral influences), but capable of initiating independent action as well.

The Stoic conception of παρακολούθησις did just that. For Epictetus, it served, like the reason in Origen’s On Principles, to evaluate individual impressions that call forth action, but it also included the additional function of understanding the process as a whole, as well as the entire working out of divine providence in the universe (Diss. 1. 6. 12–22). Moreover, it included reasoning out the implications of the divine order and bringing one’s own life into harmony with it (Diss. 1. 6. 12–22; 2. 8. 1–8; 2. 10. 1–6). This ability not only differentiated humans from animals, but also set them over the irrational animals as leaders (προηγούμενοι) or masters.29 With their understanding of the divine order and with their position as masters of all the lower orders of nature, rational human beings are in a position, not merely to comply with the order of nature, but even to take positive action to promote it (cf., e.g., Diss. 2. 10. 5–6). It is not hard to imagine why such a conception of the human mind would have seemed to offer a better basis for the kind of autonomy that Origen needed to oppose rigid divine predestination and to justify the efficacy of prayer.

If, however, this broad conception of mind made a better basis for justifying the efficacy of prayer than did the narrower conception of it as a mechanism of accepting or rejecting impressions, we are still left with the question why in On Prayer Origen did not completely ignore the argument that he had used in On Principles. Why did he jeopardize the unity and clarity of his presentation by conflating an argument based on the broad conception of mind as awareness or understanding with the first phase of the division that served to ground his argument in On Principles? Once again the Stoic conception as exemplified in Epictetus suggests an explanation. The conception of mind as παρακολούθησις, which raises human beings above animals and the rest of the component parts of the universe and gives them an element of control over their destiny in the universe, puts human beings on the same level as God. In fact, in the Stoic view human beings carry a “fragment of God” (ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ) around within themselves in the guise of their minds.30 This, as we have seen, was Epictetus’ primary basis for claiming that human choice is totally free and unhindered (Diss. 1. 17. 27; cf. 1. 1. 10–12). If God had not constituted human beings with total freedom from manipulation by himself or anyone else, he would not be God or he would not be caring for us as he ought. In

29 The role as master is brought out in Epictetus’ characterization of animals as servants (ὑπηρετικά, Diss. 2. 8. 6; 2. 10. 3). He also uses the verb ὑπετέκαστο of animals to denote the correlate of προηγούμενα (Diss. 2. 8. 8).

30 E.g., Diss. 1. 1. 10–12; 1. 14. 1–10; 1. 17. 27; 2. 8. 1–14; cf. 1. 9. 1–6. On this Stoic doctrine see Bonhoeffer 76–80 and Rist 262–68.
reality, Epictetus claimed, whatever human beings choose by will, will actually occur in accord with a will that is their own and God’s will at the same time (Diss. 1. 17. 27–28). Human beings, in effect, participate with God in the governance of the universe.

Such a close connection between human beings and God could not have been unwelcome to Origen when he was attempting to justify the possibility and importance of human communication with God through prayer, but it did suggest at least one unacceptable consequence. If whatever human beings will is actually in accord with God’s will, then God is also in some sense responsible for sin and wrongdoing in human beings. Origen could not allow God to participate in human decisions to sin. One way to ensure this was to eliminate the Stoic conception of the human reason as a “fragment of God” within. This Origen could do only at the risk of leaving his argument bereft of its strongest basis for claiming human autonomy. To compensate for this loss Origen built his second argument on the ontological foundation of the first—the natural order of the universe. This he could construe as the product of God’s creative activity, thereby grounding the existence and autonomy of the human mind, without making God personally responsible for human action, specifically, human failures and sins.

An analysis of Origen’s arguments for free will shows that Origen was familiar with a variety of Stoic arguments in support of human responsibility. It also shows that he did not simply take over Stoic arguments indiscriminately, but was sensitive to the philosophical nuances of the arguments and selected from among them such as could support his


32 Whether he knew them directly from Stoic sources or received them through Middle or Neo-Platonic sources is difficult to ascertain. Origen certainly had read Chrysippus (e.g., C. Cels. 1. 64, 2. 12, 4. 48, 4. 63, 5. 57, 8. 51) and other early Stoics and knew of and admired Epictetus (e.g., C. Cels. 3. 54, 6. 2, 7. 53); see also Chadwick; Jackson 20; and Inwood 281 n. 186. The division of things that move, however, is attested only in Origen’s proof in On Principles and in a differently structured version in Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 2. 20 = SVF 2. 714). Another related division, but of things that are, rather than of things that move, is found in Philo of Alexandria (Quis rer. div. her. 137–39) and in Seneca (Ep. 58. 14). The preponderance of references to the division in Alexandrian Jewish and Christian writers could suggest transmission via Alexandrian Platonism. Similarly the fact that the prepositional classification of self-motions is otherwise attested only in the Neo-Platonist Simplicius, and that in the context of a discussion of Neo-Platonic conceptions of motion, points in the same direction; but we must also consider that neither Origen’s division nor his catalog is paralleled exactly by any other text. At the very least, we have to assume a fluid tradition in which these conceptions were transmitted; and the possibility of direct influence of Stoic texts at different stages must be kept open.
own theological objectives most effectively without importing any conceptions incompatible with his theological presuppositions. In the case of *On Prayer* this meant adapting and combining elements from two different arguments to create a rhetorically effective double argument in support of human autonomy and freedom. Origen thereby proved himself to have been a philosophically astute, creative adapter of Stoic philosophy to Christian theology.

At the same time an analysis of his adaptation of Stoic arguments discloses at least one argument, based on a prepositional classification of motions and a self-reflective conception of mind, that is distinctly different from the Stoic arguments for human responsibility attested by Cicero, Aulus Gellius, and Alexander of Aphrodisias.\textsuperscript{33} This argument sheds new light on the Stoic treatment of the issue of human responsibility. Its appearance in the repertory of Stoic arguments suggests that the Stoics did not limit themselves to the approach established by Chrysippus, but went beyond him to explore new ways of attacking the problem. If that is the case, the history of the Stoic treatment of this important philosophical topic and the role of the Stoa in the larger history of the subject may have to be reexamined.

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\textsuperscript{33} These are conveniently collected in *SVF* 2. 974–1007 and in Long and Sedley I 386–91; II 382–88. For a discussion of Chrysippus' defense of human responsibility and the general Stoic treatment of the subject see Long (1971), van Straaten, Long and Sedley I 333–55, 386–94, with further bibliography at II 505.
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Seneca and the Schools of Philosophy in Early Imperial Rome

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Seneca the Younger, as author of the philosophical Epistles, Dialogues, and the De Clementia, takes a place in treatments of the so-called “diatribe tradition”¹ which trace the path of this somewhat nebulous phenomenon from its origins in Bion.² In so much as Seneca’s philosophical works are characteristically paraenetic—favoring ethical philosophy over the other types and couched in impassioned and persuasive language—they are no doubt rightfully included therein.³ However, as scholars have pointed out, it is doubtful whether Seneca had first-hand knowledge of the fourth-century diatribists.⁴ Such knowledge as he had of them could rather have been derived from the florilegia of their sayings which were in common circulation,⁵ or through the philosophers of the Old and Middle Stoa.⁶

¹ E.g., R. Bultmann, Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments 13 (Göttingen 1910) 7; H. Weber, De Senecae philosophi dicendi genere Bioneo (diss. Marburg 1895); A. Oltramare, Les origines de la diatribe romaine (Lausanne 1926) 252 ff.
² Diatribe is defined by M. T. Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford 1976) 13, as “a popular philosophical discourse invented by Bion the Borystenite, devoted usually to a single moral theme and aimed at a wider circle than school philosophy, being loose in structure and characterized by a pointed style, vivid imagery, and colloquialisms.” The problems associated with the concept of “diatribe” as used by modern scholars are discussed by H. D. Jocelyn, “Diatribes and Sermons,” LCM 7 (1982) 3–7.
³ Cf. e.g., Oltramare (above, note 1) 13, on diatribe: “Le lecteur est sans cesse harcelé par un maître qui semble avoir pris à tâche de le persuader immédiatement et lui parle le langage le plus propre à le séduire.”
⁴ Griffin (above, note 2) 14 n. 3, takes a very conclusive stance on this: “Seneca can certainly not be said to have been influenced directly by Bion or Teles.” J. F. Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary, Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 11 (Uppsala 1976) 86 f., concludes more tentatively that “both Plutarch and Seneca had some knowledge of the actual work of Bion and that they were not drawing exclusively on a collection of extracts. This is made even more plausible by the fact that they were both widely read.”
⁵ Seneca himself complains bitterly about adults whose sole claim to the title of philosopher resides in sententiae and chreiai memorized at school (Ep. 33. 7 f.). Diogenes the Cynic often served as a source of apophthegmata for school use; cf. S. F. Bonner, Education in ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny (Berkeley 1977)
would suggest, however, that for the immediate source of the defining characteristics of Seneca’s philosophical style and interests, we need look no further than Seneca’s immediate surroundings. That is to say, the qualities of his work which attract definition as “diatribe” can be attributed more directly to the influences of contemporary philosophers at Rome.

Seneca regarded himself as a Stoic, of course, receiving instruction in his youth in that philosophy from Attalus, whose teaching he enthusiastically describes. Another teacher of his early years was Papirius Fabianus. Seneca likely heard Fabianus in his capacity as a declaimer as well as instructor in philosophy, for his involvement with the rhetorical schools and parts of his declamations have been recorded by Seneca’s father, Seneca the Elder. As a philosopher, Fabianus regarded himself as a member of the so-called “Sextian” school of philosophy, founded by Sextius a generation earlier. Seneca, however, for good reason, as I shall show, saw little to distinguish the Sextians from the Stoics. Seneca also attended the lectures of another Sextian, Sotion, who was influential in Seneca’s life, but about whom we know relatively little. Finally, Seneca was also to come into contact with Cynic philosophy in the person of Demetrius, and although this meeting occurred later in life, when Seneca was no longer an impressionable youth, he writes of Demetrius’ teachings with as much enthusiasm as he shows for those of the Stoic Attalus and the Sextian Fabianus.

From allusions in Seneca’s prose-works to the teaching of Attalus, Sextius, Fabianus, Sotion, and Demetrius we are able to form a picture of these three philosophical schools—Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic—as they were in early Imperial Rome. What emerges, I believe, is this: that the teaching

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7 *Ep.* 108. 3 ff.
8 Cf. *Contr.* 2 praeef. 1–5; 2. 1. 10–13, 25–26, 28; 2. 2. 4; 2. 3. 5, 9, 12; 2. 4. 3, 7, 10–11; 2. 5. 6–7, 18–19; 2. 6. 2, 4; *Suas.* 1. 4, 9–10.
9 Seneca the Elder, *Contr.* 2 praeef. 4; Suetonius, *Gram.* 18; Quintilian 10. 1. 124.
10 *Ep.* 64. 2: “Lectus est deinde liber Quinti Sextii patris, magni, si quid mihi credis, viri, et licet neget Stoici.”
11 There are several philosophers known by the name of Sotion; cf. *Der kleine Pauly*, s.v. Oltramare (above, note 1) 166 contests the usual view (e.g. E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, trans. S. F. Alleyne and E. Abbott [New York 1886] 286; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* [Göttingen 1970] 280; Griffin [above, note 2] 37) that this Sotion was a follower of Sextius.
style and concerns of these three schools were strikingly similar, in so far as they shared the elements of paraenesis, which, as I have said, typify Seneca's own philosophical prose-works. Chief among these elements is a predominating concern with ethical, rather than speculative, philosophy, presented in an eloquent and persuasive style. Cerebral speculation gives way to the voice of certainty in a direct exhortation to the soul, rendered vivid and meaningful to the audience by images or analogies13 drawn from everyday experience. In short, the elements of paraenesis are threefold: ethics, eloquence, and illustrative imagery.

In many passages of the prose-works, Seneca makes clear his contempt for the kind of philosophizing in which semantic casuistry takes precedence over a compelling presentation of the moral issues which face mankind.14 Such an order of priorities, he feels, is comparable to stopping to look over a game of chess when one's house is burning down or lingering to peruse notices of edicts and games on the way to summon a midwife for one's daughter (Ep. 117. 30):

Transcurramus sollertissimas nugas et ad illa quae nobis aliquam opem sunt latura properemus. nemo qui obstetricem parturienti filiae sollicitus accersit edictum et lidorum ordinem perlegit; nemo qui ad incendium domus suae currit tabulam latrunculariam prospicit ut sciat quomodo alligatus exeat calculus.

In contrast to Seneca's criticism of those who indulge in such cavillationes15 is his enthusiastic endorsement of the approach of his own teachers. Fabianus, for example, he tells us, used to say "contra affectus impetu, non subtilete pugnandum, nec minutis vulneribus sed incursu avertendum aciem; [non probat cavillationes] <vitia> enim contundi debere,

13 Henceforth I use the terms "image" and "imagery" to include all types of technically distinct figurative language, e.g., metaphor, simile, analogy.
14 E.g., Ep. 45. 4 ff., 48. 4 ff., 49. 5 ff., 71. 6, 82. 8 ff., 83. 8 ff., 85. 1 ff., 88. 42 ff., 102. 20, 108. 12, 109. 17 ff., 111, 113, 117. 25 ff.
15 Among the ranks of those who indulge in such cavillationes Seneca places Stoics of the Old and Middle Stoa: Zeno (Ep. 82. 9 ff., 83. 9 ff.), Chrysippus (Ben. 1. 3. 8 ff.), Posidonius (Ep. 83. 10 ff., 87. 31 ff.) and Antipater (Ep. 87. 38 ff.). He also reproaches with this fault Peripatetics (Ep. 87. 38), Academicians, Xenocrates and Speusippus (Ep. 85. 18), and Epicurus (ibid.). Seneca refers more than once to the "hairsplitting" style as a characteristic of Greek philosophers: Ep. 82. 8 ("ineptias Graecas"), Ben. 1. 3. 6 ("Sit aliquis usque eo Graecis emancipatus"). By "Greek" he cannot mean ethnicity alone, as Attalus, the Greek teacher whom Seneca so much admired, had a style far removed from the casuistical one Seneca despises, as had most Stoics who followed in the footsteps of Panaetius (Cicero tells us that "... tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem sententiarium nec disserendi spinas probavit ..." Fin. 4. 28. 79). Insofar as Seneca has Stoics in mind in his criticism of the dialectical approach to philosophy, he probably alludes to members of the Old Stoa who had no connection with Rome, and whose style was quite different from that of the "Roman" Stoics. Criticism of philosophers for splitting hairs is, of course, a topos in itself: cf. the σκινδολαμοί of Aristophanes (Nub. 130, Ran. 819).
non vellicari” (Brev. Vit. 10. 1). It is the absence of this aggressively protreptic approach to ethics, reflected in Fabianus’ physical and military vocabulary, which Seneca criticizes in Chrysippus, picking up ex contrario similar physical imagery when he describes him as “magnum mehercules virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur; etiam cum agere aliquid videtur, pungit, non perforat” (Ben. 1. 4. 1).

The common concern of Seneca’s teachers16 for the ethical problems facing mankind, and the similarity of the solutions they proposed, is illustrated by the sermons on the evil of luxury which Seneca attributes to each of Sextius (Ep. 108. 18), Attalus (Ep. 110. 14 ff.), and Demetrius (Ben. 7. 9. 1 ff.)17 while we have the testimony of Seneca the Elder for speeches on the topic given by Fabianus (Contr. 2. 1. 11 ff., 25; 2. 5. 7). Sextius, Seneca tells us (Ep. 108. 17), put his condemnation of luxury into practice by restricting himself to a frugal vegetarian diet; vegetarianism was also preached by Sotion, his follower, with the result that Seneca gave up eating meat for a year (Ep. 108. 22), while, owing to the influence of Attalus, Seneca ate no oysters or mushrooms and drank no wine (Ep. 108. 15 f.).18 The sermons of Attalus and Demetrius on the evil of luxury—which are presented by Seneca at considerable length—contain the topoi of criticism of luxury typical of the moralizing tradition.19 It is, perhaps, not surprising then, that we also find Fabianus in a speech remembered by Seneca the Elder, delivering the same topoi in the schools of declamation; this speech is, in turn, closely echoed by our Seneca in his prose-works.20 Cross-fertilization between the schools of rhetoric and philosophy at this period is clearly a major factor in the explanation of the homogeneity of the philosophical schools at this time.21

16 Sextius, of course, was not directly Seneca’s teacher, but, indirectly, as teacher of his teachers Fabianus and Sotion; cf. above, p. 50.

17 Billerbeck’s ([above, note 12] 19) comment on the speech placed in the mouth of Demetrius (Ben. 7. 9. 1 ff.) is well taken, and to some extent, should, perhaps, be considered in relation to all direct speech placed by Seneca in the mouth of others: “Diese von Seneca offensichtlich als ethnopoietische Oratio verfaßte Invektive wirft natürlich wiederum die grundsätzliche Frage auf, inwieweit die unter dem Namen des Demetrius aufgenommenen Ausführungen und Aussprüche authentisch sind.”

18 Seneca does not explicitly describe the Cynic Demetrius as a vegetarian, although avoidance of meat is typically advocated by the Cynics; cf. Oltramare (above, note 1) 50, theme 31d, also A. C. van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe, trans. B. L. Hijnans, Jr. (Assen 1962) 96 ff.

19 Cf. Oltramare (above, note 1) themes 35, 35c, 37, 38, 39a, 40 and van Geytenbeek (previous note) 111 ff.

20 Cf. E. Rolland, De l’influence de Sénèque le père et des rhéteurs sur Sénèque le philosophe (Ghent 1906) 40 ff., for list of parallels.

21 Note how Seneca the Elder recommends to his son the example of Fabianus, who continued to study rhetoric along with philosophy: Contr. 2 praef. 4, and Tacitus, Dial. 19. The long-standing connection between the moralists and the schools of rhetoric was especially strengthened, according to Oltramare (above, note 1) 153 ff., by Sextius.
A dialectical approach to philosophy, which, as we have seen, Seneca reproaches in Old Stoics and others, is necessarily couched in a dispassionate and uninspiring style. By contrast, it is incumbent on philosophers like Seneca, who regard themselves as “teachers of mankind,” to present their message in as persuasive a manner as possible. The persuasive power of Attalus’ eloquence is mentioned by Seneca in relation to his exhortation to ascetism, with what results I have already mentioned (Ep. 108. 14):

Cum vero commendare paupertatem coeperat et ostendere quam quidquid usum excederet pondus esset supervacuum et grave ferenti, saepe exire e schola pauperi libuit. cum coeperat voluptates nostras traducere, laudare castum corpus, sobriam mensam, puram mentem non tantum ab inlicitis voluptatibus sed etiam supervacuis, libebat circumscripte gulam ac ventrem.

The son’s testimony is supported by the father’s. Seneca the Elder describes Attalus as “magnae vir eloquentiae, ex his philosophis quos vestra aetas vidit longe et subtilissimus et facundissimus” (Suas. 2. 12). Seneca praises, in terms similar to those he uses for Attalus, the ability of Sextius and his follower Fabianus, to inspire the neophyte with a spirit of emulation, while, at the same time, not inducing in him despair of success. After a recent reading of a philosophical work of Sextius, Seneca comments (Ep. 64. 3 f.):

Quantus in illo, di boni, vigor est, quantum animi! hoc non in omnibus philosophis invenies: quorundam scripta clarum habentium nomen exanguia sunt. instituunt, disputant, cavillantur, non faciunt animum quia non habent: cum legeris Sextium, dices, “vivit, viget, liber est, supra hominem est, dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciae.” in qua positione mentis sim cum hunc fato lego fatare tibi: libet omnis casus provocare, libet exclamare, “quid cessas, fortuna? congredere: paratum vides.” illius animum induo qui quaerit ubi se experiatur, ubi virtutem suam ostendat . . .

Similarly, with reference to the eloquence of Fabianus, Seneca says “cum audirem certe illum, talia mihi videbantur, non solida sed plena, quae adulescentem indolis bonae attolerent et ad imitationem sui evocarent sine desperatione vincendi, quae mihi adhortatio videtur efficacissima” (Ep. 100. 12). The same spirit or animus and the same disregard for semantic niceties which make the Sextian style so effectively persuasive, also, Seneca tells us, characterized Demetrius’ style. Seneca describes him as a man “exactae, licet neget ipse, sapientiae firmaeque in iis, quae proposuit, constantiae, eloquentiae vero eius, quae res fortissimas debeat, non

22 See above, p. 51 and n. 15.
23 Ep. 89. 13: “. . . tamquam quidquid aliud sit sapiens quam generis humani paediagogus.”
24 On Fabianus’ eloquence, cf. also Ep. 40. 12.
concinnatae nec in verba sollicitae, sed ingenti animo, prout impetus tuit, res suas prosequentis”\(^{25}\) (Ben. 7. 8. 2).

An important aspect of the effectively persuasive style, Seneca tells us at Ep. 59. 6, is the image (imagines). Those whose prime concern is to persuade, use them “ut et dicentem et audientem in rem praesentem adducant” (ibid.). A particularly masterly exploitation of the image in philosophical writing, Seneca tells us, is to be found in Sextius. He cites Sextius’ comparison of the wise man’s preparation for adversity to a general’s readiness for attack while on the march (Ep. 59. 7).

Elsewhere in the prose-works, references made by Seneca to images used by Attalus, Fabianus, and Demetrius show us that Sextius’ follower, as well as the Stoic and Cynic, were equally aware of the persuasive power of the image in paraenesis.\(^ {26}\) Furthermore, it emerges from these references that Attalus, Fabianus, and probably Demetrius too, used, like Sextius, imagery drawn from the sphere of war. I have referred already to Fabianus’ use of the image of a military onslaught on the emotions at Brev. Vit. 10. 1.\(^ {27}\) At Ep. 67. 15 Seneca quotes Attalus as saying:

malo me fortuna in castris suis quam in delicia habet. torqueor, sed fortiter: bene est. occidor, sed fortiter: bene est.

At Prov. 3. 3 Seneca illustrates an axiom of Demetrius—“mihi videtur infelicius eo cui nihil umquam evenit adversi”—with the image of a battle with Fortuna:

Non licuit enim illi se experiri. ut ex voto illi fluxerint omnia, ut ante votum, male tamen de illo di iudicaaverunt: indignus visus est a quo vincernetur aliquando fortuna, quae ignavissimum quemque refugit, quasi dicit: “quid ergo? istum mihi adversarium adsumam? statim arma summisset; non opus est in illum tota potentia mea, levi comminazione pelletur, non potest sustinere vultum meum. alius circumspectiatur cum quo conferre possimus manum: pudet congredi cum homine vinci parato.”

That Demetrius himself used such an image to illustrate the axiom Seneca attributes to him seems highly likely.\(^ {28}\)

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\(^ {25}\) The opposition which Seneca makes here between res and verba is a constant theme, implicit or explicit, in his opposition of ethical to dialectical philosophy; cf. Ep. 52. 8, 75. 7, 83. 27, 87. 40, 88. 32, 108. 6, 38 (non est loquentum sed gubernandum), 117. 33.

\(^ {26}\) In addition to those that follow, cf. Ep. 9. 7, 63. 5 f., 72. 8, 81. 22 (Attalus); Ep. 69. 17, 91. 19, Ben. 7. 1. 4 (Demetrius); Ep. 73. 15 (Sextius).

\(^ {27}\) See above, pp. 51–52.

\(^ {28}\) A similar military scenario, in which a soldier is addressed by ‘Ανδρεία and Δειλία, is attributed by Stobaeus (3. 8. 20) to a Demetrius, whom P. Wendland, Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum\(^ {2}\) (Tübingen 1912) 85 n. 1, in agreement with O. Hense, RE s.v. “Ioannes Stobaios,” IX (1916) 2582 f., attributes to Demetrius the Cynic, Seneca’s contemporary. For more recent discussion, cf. Billerbeck (above, note 12) 57 ff.
Les comparaisons de la vie avec la guerre sont les plus fréquentes de la diatribe," says Oltramare,29 and certainly they represent one of the largest groups of imagery in Seneca's philosophical works, rivalled only by medical images in number.30 Of course the militaristic nature of Roman society meant that military imagery was part of the general currency of the language; and among philosophers its use is certainly not confined to "dias tribists"—we find it, for example, in the mouth of Plato’s Socrates.31 The fact, then, that we find this image being used by Seneca’s teachers and contemporaries among the Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic schools of philosophy in first-century Rome is not so much significant in itself, but is rather one more piece of evidence which, taken with others, confirms that there were many similarities between their teaching styles and orientations.

An overriding concern with ethics, couched in a persuasive style and illustrated by imagery, was, then, common to the Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic schools with which Seneca came into contact in Rome. That Seneca’s own philosophical works mirror these characteristics needs little demonstration. The points of speculative philosophy that he treats are few, and then almost always in a tone of deprecation.32 The entire thrust of his message is an insistently ethical one, as Seneca conceives of himself as a guide to lost travellers (Ep. 8. 3), a doctor (Cons. Marc. 1. 8; Cons. Helv. 1. 2, 2. 1 f.), or, more modestly, as a fellow-patient passing on the remedies learnt during convalescence (Ep. 27. 7). “Volo luxuriam obiurgari, libidinem traduci, inpotentiam frangi," Seneca tells us in a characterization, attributed to Lucilius, of the ideal philosophical homily (Ep. 100. 10). Such a program is rigorously pursued by Seneca. To convey his message as persuasively as possible he notoriously spares neither words nor rhetorical devices. Figuring prominently among the latter are very many images of the kind that, as we have seen, he had heard and admired in the Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic schools of Rome.33 In particular, like Sextius, Fabianus, Attalus, and Demetrius, Seneca often uses military imagery characterizing the Stoic sage as a soldier of God, and the morally flawed as those who fight timidly or turn in flight.34

Fourth-century Cynic philosophers such as Bion, as preachers for the "man in the street," undoubtedly concerned themselves with ethical

29 Oltramare (above, note 1) 56. Cf. also O. Halbauer, De diatribis Epicteti (diss. Leipzig 1911) 32 and n. 1 and R. Bultmann (above, note 1) 36.
30 Cf. my thesis (above, note 6) 176 ff., 194 ff.
32 In Ep. 65, e.g., which discusses the “first cause," Seneca preempts criticism from Lucilius with: “Quid te inquis "delectat tempus inter ista conterere, quae tibi nullum adfectum eripuunt, nullam cupiditatem abiguunt?” (65. 15). Cf. note 14.
33 For a full treatment of the images used by Seneca, cf. my thesis (above, note 6).
34 Cf. ibid., s.v. M. 1, pp. 194 ff., and M. 2, pp. 198 ff.
exhortation, which they rendered more comprehensible to the crowd by means of images drawn from everyday life. Certain of these, as well as certain stock themes, are shared by generations of moralizing literature including that of Seneca and his philosophical contemporaries. In this sense it is meaningful to place much of Seneca's extant prose in a "diatribe" tradition. An immediate explanation, however, of the paraenetic characteristics of Seneca's philosophical prose-works lies close at hand in the schools of philosophy—Stoic, Sextian, and Cynic—that Seneca attended at Rome. In each and all of these he could have heard ethical exhortation couched in impassioned and oratorical language, illustrated by images drawn from a common stock.

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Notes on Statius’ Thebaid Books 3 and 4

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This is the second in a projected series of six papers presenting conjectures in the text of Statius’ Thebaid. The first of these papers appeared in ICS 14 (1989) 227–41; the rest will follow at intervals. As before, I take my lemmata from D. E. Hill’s edition (Leiden 1983), and have regularly consulted the editions by Gevartius (1616 and 1618), Cruceus (1618), Veenhusen (1671), O. Müller (1870), Garrod (1906), Klotz (1908; revised by Klinnert, 1973) and Mozley (1928). There is a commentary on Book 3 by H. Snijder (Amsterdam 1968).

3. 6–12

“ei mihi” clamat,
“unde morae?” (nam prona ratus facilemque tot armis
Tydea, nec numero uirtutem animumque rependit)
“num regio diuersa uiae? num missus ab Argis
subsidio globus? an sceleris data fama per urbes
finitimas? paucosne, pater Gradiue, manue
legimus indecores? . . . ”

Through the long night the evil tyrant Eteocles broods deeply on the tardiness of his cut-throats’ return. Three reasons for the delay suggest themselves to him: his men lost their way; or they met with reinforcements from Argos; or (and here we come to the problem) something involving the neighbouring cities impeded them. As Mozley renders the Latin, an sceleris data fama per urbes / finitimas means, “Or has news of the deed spread round the neighbouring cities?”, and his rendering is faithful to the Latin. Lactantius comments first on the word sceleris, which he interprets to mean violatae legationis sanctimonia (but surely sanctimoniae is required?), uel quod religiosum officium legati peteretur insidiis; he then adds words which make explicit what is by no means implicit in the Latin as transmitted: dicit quippe a finitimis ciuitatibus Tydeo aduersus insidiantes esse subuentum. Quite so, that is what Eteocles must be wondering; but that is not the same thing as saying that “the neighbours have heard of his crime”: we need to be told that they not only heard about it, but did something about it. A further point is that in line 4
the poet had referred to Eteocles' action as a *scelus*, and as an observer of the action he was creating he was, of course, entitled to his comment: but would Eteocles himself refer to his planned ambush as a *scelus*? A bloodthirsty butcher like him? Of course not! The *scelus* Eteocles has in mind here is an armed insurrection against himself and for Tydeus on the part of the neighbouring cities. One trifling alteration to the paradosis will give us what we need:

\[
an \text{ sceleris data flamma per urbes finitimas?}
\]

For the combination of *dare* with *flammam*/*s* see Ov. *Met.* 2. 811 and Sil. 5. 572.

3. 22

iam pudet incepi, iam paenitet . . .

Lactantius, dimly aware of the problem, drew a fanciful and false distinction between *pudet*, which is not appropriate here, and *piget*, which is: *nam pudet ad praeteritum spectat, piget ad futurum*. That Eteocles should be “ashamed” of his undertaking is unthinkable: that he should “loathe” it or “bitterly regret” it is very much what he might do. Statius of course had in mind Verg. A. 5. 678.

3. 103–07

\[
\text{quo satis ore tuis famam uirtutibus addam,}
\text{augur amate deis? non te caelestia frustra}
\text{edocuit laurueque sua dignatus Apollo est,}
\text{et nemorum Dodona parens Cirrhaeaque uirgo}
\text{audebit tacito populos suspendere Phoebo.}
\]

It was Jortin who postulated the lacuna after 105; “*alioqui et (106) uix intelligi potest,*” declares Hill. If *et*, however, were corrupt, there might be no need for Jortin’s drastic expedient; and such indeed is the case. In 107 Markland had proposed *gaudebit*, which Hill pronounces “*parum aptum*”: on the contrary, it fails only in its choice of tense. This, I am sure, is what Statius wrote:

\[
\text{non te caelestia frustra}
\text{edocuit laurueque sua dignatus Apollo est,}
\text{nec nemorum Dodona parens Cirrhaeaque uirgo}
\text{gaudebat tacito populos suspendere Phoebo.}
\]

There was no satisfaction for Dodona or Delphi in keeping folks in suspense when Phoebus was silent, since Maeon could issue prophecies instead. One final, perhaps rather dubious point concerns the aptness of *Phoebo*, who had
nothing whatever to do with the cult-site at Dodona. His father and he would, however, both be happily accommodated by the common noun diuo.

3. 108–09

nunc quoque Tartareo multum diuisus Auerno
Elysius, i, carpe plagas . . .

What is the point of quoque? Maeon has not been to Hell before now. I would much prefer i nunc Tartareo . . .

3. 125–26

stat sanguineo discissus amictu
Luctus atrox caesoque inuitat pectore matres.

"Incites" is how Mozley renders inuitat, but his rendering rather invites inritat, altogether the more effective verb.

3. 127–28

scrutantur galeas frigentum inuentaque monstrant
corpora, prociduae super externosque suosque.

That the mothers should "scrutinize" the helmets of the dead warriors (in order to identify them, if possible) is altogether natural, but what would be the point of their "showing" the bodies they had found, when no distinction is here drawn between friend and foe (externosque suosque) and there were presumably bodies for the "showing" to be found all over the field? I suggest lustrant, continuing the idea of attempted identification.

3. 133–36

at uaga per dumos uacuique in puluere campi
magna parens iuuenum, gemini nunc funeris, Ide
squalentem sublata comam liuentiaque ora
ungue premens . . .

Ide appears only here in the whole of the Thebaid, and, unless time has denied us knowledge of a well-known story, the epithet magna must surely have been as mystifying to Statius' audiences as it is to me now. An effective alternative to so cryptic an adjective would be ante, contrasting with nunc. In the next line, would somebody tell me what on earth is the point of the participle sublata, "uplifted" (hardly reiecta terrore, which was how Wakefield interpreted it)? Ide will hardly get far looking for her sons unless she keeps her head down. Mozley translates as though the text read diffusa, and that indeed is one out of a considerable number of participles which would at least give us some sense here.
3. 160–64

sed nec bellorum in luce patenti
conspicui fatis aeternaque gentibus ausi
quaesistis miserae uulnus memorabile matri,
sed mortem obscuram †numerosaque funera passi,†
heu quantus furto crur et sine laude iacet!

To obelize the whole of the second half of 163, as Hill does, is to evince an unwarranted defeatism: it is only in the word *numerosaque* (or its alternative *numerandaque*) that the fault lies; unless, that is, one can stomach Mozley’s defence of *numeranda* as meaning “suffering deaths which were (only) for the counting ... they were only two more in the list of dead.” Equally silly is Lactantius’ gloss: *quia inter paucos nec in magno proelio concidistis*: neither of these considerations necessarily implies an obscure death. Try *reuenendaque*, which is very nearly an anagram of *nuerandaque*.

3. 165–68

quin ego non dextras miseris complexibus ausim
diuidere et tanti consortia rumpere leti:
ite diu fratres indiscretique supremis
ignibus et caros urna confundite manes!

*Tanti ... leti* is translated “so noble a death” by Mozley, but such a sense is gainsaid by the preceding context, which emphasises the obscurity of the young men’s death. Some point would be introduced if *tanti* concealed an original *iuncti*. Nor is there any point in saying *ite diu fratres*, since, in death as in life, they will always be brothers. Perhaps *piti*?

3. 183–88

sed nec ueteris cum regia Cadmi
fulmineum in cinerem monitis lunonis inuque
consedit, neque funerea cum laude potitus
infelix Athamas trepidio de monte ueniret,
semianinem heu laeto referens clamore Learchum,
hic gemitus Thebis ...

Does not *consedit* in 185 call for a corresponding *reuenit* in 186?

3. 229–35

“*talis mihi, nate, per Argos,*
talis abi, sic ense madens, hac nubilus ira.
exturbent resides frenos et cuncta perosi
te cupiant, tibi praecipites animasque manusque
deuoueant; rape cunctantes et foedera turba,
cui dedimus; tibi fas ipsos incendere bello
caelicolas pacemque meam ...”
I have three suggestions to make in this passage. For *exturbent* (cf. 233 *turba*) perhaps *excultant*; for *cuncta*, and as an alternative to *uincla*, proposed by Bentley, perhaps *pacta*; and for *cui*, which makes a sort of sense only if taken with *tibi*, and no sense at all with Hill’s punctuation, perhaps *quae*: *foedera...quae dedimus* will then correspond to *pacem...meam*, just as *cunctantes* corresponds to *ipsos*.

3. 241–43

*sic Fata mihi nigraeque Sororum*

*iurauere colus: manet haec ab origine mundi*

*fixa dies bello, populique in proelia nati.*

How can distaffs “swear”? Could Statius conceivably have written *ius neuere*? It was in such terms (*sic*) that the Fates spun Jove’s authority (*ius*). *Iam neuere* or *sic neuere* would, I feel, be less forceful.

3. 293–94

*(haud mora) desiluit currui clipeoque receptam*

*laedit in amplexu dictisque ita mulcet amicis.*

Various critics, including Peyraredus, Barthius and O. Müller, have taken exception to *laedit* and advanced conjectures designed to eliminate it. I agree with them that the idea of “harming” is out of place here (even if we contemplate a picture of a clumsy giant not knowing his own strength), and suggest *claudit*: Venus is swept snugly within Mars’ shield.

3. 320–23

*uolat ignea moles*

*saeua dei mandata ferens, caelumque trisulca*

*territat omne coma iamdudum aut ditibus agris*

*signa dare aut ponto miseros inuoluere nautas.*

If anyone can believe, with Mozley, that *territat* means *terrore cogit, μακαρίζω*. But in any case, what a pathetic thought! “The thunder-bolt compels the sky in terror to give signs to the fields.” How, precisely, does a thunderbolt make the sky do anything? And are “signs” all that will be given to the fields? How much more sense there would be in

*caelumque trisulca*

*territat omne coma, minitata aut ditibus agris*

*damna dare aut ponto miseros inuoluere nautas!*

3. 330–32

*sic nota in pascua taurus*

*bellator reedit, adverso cui colla suoque*

*sanguine proscissisque natant palaeabirb armi.*
Perhaps adversi?

3. 333–35

tunc quoque lassa tumet uirtus multumque superbit
pectore despecto; uacca iacet hostis harena
turpe gemens crudosque uetat sentire dolores.

Garrod and Snijder both objected to pectore despecto (which is indeed a silly thing to say, whether despecto be taken to mean "looked down on" or "despised"), but their conjectures are nugatory. Hill's comment, "lassus taurus despiciens . . . uulnera a fronte passa uidet et superbit," might have given him a clue but did not. Write uulnere despecto.

3. 358–60

nocte doloque uiri nudum ignarumque locorum
nequiquam clausere; iacent in sanguine mixti
ante urbem uacuam.

To say that Thebes was an "empty" city would be a lie, and a transparent one: everybody knows that Tydeus has not killed the women, children and old men. There is regular confusion on the part of scribes between uacuus and uiduus (which are not synonyms), and it is the latter epithet which we require here.

3. 360–62

nunc o nunc tempus in hostes,
dum trepidi exanguesque metu, dum funera portant,
nunc, socer, haec dum non manus excidit; . . .

Nunc socer haec dum non is what the Puteaneus (alone) offers; the other manuscripts give dum capulo nondum. Mozley, strangely, thinks that haec dum non manus excidit has to be completed by the ablative memoria, notionally supplied; but could he, or anyone who accepts the reading of the Puteaneus, explain why the Argives would be likely to have short memories of Tydeus' achievements, nay, why they might be likely to forget here and now, on the spot? Capulo, on the other hand, joins with excidit to give admirable sense; and Garrod's dum capulo nondum haec misses the mark by no more than a hair's breadth. Write dum capulo haec nondum manus excidit.

3. 403–04

... ubi maximus illi

sudor . . .
Amongst other details of the fight, Tydeus relates *ubi maximus . . . sudor.* The sweat of course is his own, not another’s; O. Müller surely cannot have been the only editor of Statius to recall *Th. 2. 275 f. sed plurimus ipse / sudor;* and I cannot but marvel that nobody has thought of introducing *ipse* into the present passage.

3. 460

*mons erat audaci seductus in aethera dorso*

Not *seductus,* surely, but *subductus?*

3. 516–20

‘equidem uarii, pater, omina Phoebi
saepe tuli: iam tum, prima cum pube uirentem
semideos inter pinus me Thessala reges
duceret, hic casus terraeque marisque canentem
obstipuere duces, . . . ’ 520

*Hic* in 519 is anything but clear, and the variant *hi,* offered by at least one manuscript (*apud* O. Müller), is useless. Perhaps *hinc* (cf. 516–17), meaning “from this source,” namely, from Phoebus.

3. 573

(te pudor et curae retinent per rura, Melampu)

Amphiaraus returns to Thebes, but Melampus stays in the country. Why? Because of “shame and cares,” say the manuscripts. Cares, they are understandable enough; but why on earth should Melampus be ashamed? All that he and Amphiaraus had done was, at Adrastus’ behest, to explore the will of heaven; and if heaven’s will was adverse, as indeed it was, that was nothing to cause him shame. *Pavor,* on the other hand, would be very much to the point.

3. 575–77

*et iam suprema Tonantis*
*iussa fremunt agrosque uiris annosaque uastant oppida*

*Premunt,* not *fremunt?*

3. 602

*diu tuto superum contemptor*

For *tuto* Cassellanus 164 gives *tutos;* and there might be something to be said for *tutus,* to avoid adverbs in juxtaposition.
3. 697–98

aspice res humiles, atque hanc, pater, aspice prolem exulis; huic olim generis pudor.

Argia pleads with her father for war, and, as an argument in its favour, urges that he leave no legacy of shame to his grandson Thessandrus. Surely that argument would be properly presented if in 698 we read

huic olim generis pudor?

3. 704–05

nescis, pater optime, nescis,
quantus amor castae misero nupsisse marito.

"Thou knowest not, good father, thou knowest not what deep affection a husband's misery implants in a loyal bride" is how Mozley renders these lines; but I see no sense in this sentiment, even if syntax permitted it: are we seriously to believe that the wives of the disadvantaged love them more than other women love husbands for whom all is going well? Surely it all depends on the individual? Let me hazard the guess that 705 originally ran

quam sit onus castae misero nupsisse marito.

That would be a true enough sentiment.

3. 718–20

tu solare uirum, neu sint dispendia iustae
dura morae: magnos cunctamur, nata, paratus.
proficitur bello.

The final parataxis here makes for a weak close to Adrastus' comforting speech. Perhaps

magnos cunctanti, nata, paratus
proficitur bello,

with a general statement about strategy by way of conclusion?

4. 38–42

rex tristis et aeger
pondere curarum propiorque abeuntibus annis
inter adhortantes uix sponte incedit Adrastus,
contentus ferro cingi latus; arma manipli
pone ferunt; ...

It is a sad fact, but true, that all our years pass away, and so perhaps somebody can tell me how the words propior . . . abeuntibus annis
(literally, "nearer to the passing years") convey the notion that Adrastus is now not far from death? He is moreover dreadfully unhappy about embarking on the war and, after tristis, aeger pondere curatum and uix sponte incedit, it is hard to see how he could be "content" with anything to do with the business, be it wearing his sword or (so E. H. Alton in CQ 17 [1923] 175) surrounding himself with a bodyguard. I suggest non laetus ferro cingi latus. One final observation on this passage: manipli may be the reading of all the manuscripts, but it is still a ludicrous reading, since the arma are those of the king himself, and not even one platoon, let alone several (manipli), would be needed to carry them. The certain correction ministri was advanced by Markland in his note on Silu. 5. 2. 154, and printed by O. Müller in his edition of 1870. Garrod and Klotz then concurred in forgetting about it altogether, and, not perhaps surprisingly, it failed to reemerge in Hill’s edition of 1983. I may note, by way of confirming Markland’s conjecture, that Par. lat. 13046 glosses manipli with armigeri.

4. 74–76

proxima longaeuo profert Dircaeus Adrasto
signa gener, cui bella fauent, cui commodat iras
cuncta cohors: . . .

It would be premature to say of a warrior going into uncertain battle that bella fauent (and of Polynices it would, of course, be ultimately untrue), and in any case the anaphoric cui requires that both clauses have to do with the cohors: hence Bentley’s gerit, and Damsté’s fouent, to which I will now add the small adjustment fouet. That the whole cohort gave full support to its leader may pass unquestioned, but it is not the unanimity of the cohort which is in point here, as the sequel shows, but the nature of its composition: the succeeding lines tell us in some detail that the cohors was made up partly of Theban exiles, and partly of Peloponnesian troops: a mixed company, therefore, and mixta cohors is needed to introduce what follows.

4. 93–95

ecce inter medios patriae ciet agmina gentis
fulmineus Tydeus, iam laetus et integer artus,
ut primae strepue re tubae: . . .

It would be something of a medical miracle for a wounded man to recover at the first sound of the trumpet’s blast, but here there is no miracle: as lines 398 ff. of the previous book make clear, Idmon of Epidaurus had already attended to the wounds Tydeus had sustained. At Ov. Ep. 3. 86 all the manuscripts give impiger but the correct reading is integer, conjecturally retrieved by Hooefftt: in the present passage the process of corruption has travelled in the opposite direction.
4. 105–06

Ionii et fluctibus hospita portu

Chalcis

Various cities heard the tidings of war, among them Chalcis, "welcome haven from Ionian billows" (as Mozley puts it). This sense, surely the one intended by Statius, would be better expressed if the text read

Ioniiisque e fluctibus.

4. 110–11

omnia aeratae propugnant pectora crates,
pilaque saeua manu; patrius stat casside Mauors.

Saeua is, quite frankly, pitiful, just about the last adjective that a master composer would think of. Better by far would be sueta, after which patrius . . . Mauors will figure now as an elegant complementation.

4. 121–24

quos celer ambit
Asterion Dryopumque trahens Erasinus aristas,
et qui rura domant Epidauria (dexter Iaccho
collis at Hennaeae Cereri negat); . . .

The Dorian contingent assembles, amongst its number being those who dwell by the rivers Asterion and Erasinus. The picture of "Erasinus sweeping on his flood Dryopian harvests" bodes no good at all for the locals: if he carries away their crops on a regular basis, perhaps they should contemplate emigration! But no: what the river drags along are the harenas of Dryopia. The inhabitants of Epidaurus, on the other hand, live in hilly terrain, whereas rura are quintessentially Cerealia (Ov. Fast. 1. 683). Perhaps saxa, or possibly lustra?

4. 131–32

umeros ac pectora late
flammeus orbis habet

Habet is distinctly dull and inexplicit. Try obit.

4. 152–54

dat tamen haec iuuenum tercentum pectora, uulgus
innumerum bello, quibus haud ammenta nec enes-
triste micant.
Lactantius’ silly comment on *innumerum bello* should make everyone chuckle; everyone, that is, except those who edit the *Thebaid*. Hear what he says: “INNVMERVM BELLO expositio, quid sit ter centum pectora, uulgus innumerum: quia tam fortos erant, ut multorum facta fortia sua uirtute pensarent.” First we have three hundred represented as “countless” when Adrastus’ own Argive contingent alone had amounted to three thousand (4. 63); then we have the suggestion that The Magnificent Three Hundred could counterbalance “the brave deeds of many,” for all that (as the succeeding context states) they were not armed with javelins or swords, but only with pine-wood staffs and arrows (a second-class military accoutrement, in other words)! The mistake made by Lactantius, and indeed by all editors of the *Thebaid*, stems from failure to see that Statius intended *in numerum*, “to make up the number,” and, not least because everybody appears to have made that same mistake, I am inclined to think that Statius separated *in from numerum*. Either therefore *in numerum bello*, or, as I should myself prefer, *in belli numerum*. The lads from Tiryns, to be blunt, are no more than a make-weight in the host from the Peloponnese.

4. 154–56

*flauae capiti tergoque leonum*

*exuuiae, gentilis honos; et pineus armat*

*stipes, inexhaustis artantur tela pharetris.*

Perhaps *inexhaustisque*?

4. 168–71

*squalet triplici ramosa corona*

*Hydra recens obitu: pars anguibus aspera uiuis*

*argento caelata micat, pars arte reperta*

*conditur et fuluo mortiens nigrescit in auro.*

In his apparatus criticus to 170 Hill argues that the transmitted form of words *arte reperta* may without any difficulty be retained if one understands *arte* to refer, not to the maker of the shield, but to Hercules and Iolaus who used a stratagem to kill the Hydra. By the same token, presumably, these two then embalm the Hydra in gold, as they also engrave it in silver? How very singular! As the thinking student of the *Thebaid* has for centuries observed, however, there is a fault in *reperta*, and conjectures proliferate like the suckers of the Hydra (*torre repressa, arte reposta, retorta, repressa, aere perempta, altera reptans*, etc.). “Part by a cunning device is sunken” translates Mozley, noting that “reperta must be corrupt, but no emendation seems convincing.” He and the others have missed the obvious: *arte perita*, which is almost invited by Mozley’s own translation.
4. 173–75

at laterum tractus spaciosaque pectora seruat
nexilis innumero Chalybum subtemine thorax,
horrendum, non matris opus.

I am sure we should all be relieved to hear that it was not Capaneus’ mother who knitted his corselet; but then wrought-ironwork is not to many women’s taste as an evening occupation. Strange that no one, not even Barthius (who expostulated on this “stulta lectio”), spotted horrendum Mauortis opus.

4. 182–86

hic fretus doctas anteire canendo
Aonidas mutos Thamyris damnatus in annos
ore simul citharaque (quis obuia numina temnat?)
conticuit praeceps, qui non certamina Phoebi
nosset et inlustres Satyro pendente Celaenas.

I find a difficulty here in conticuit praeceps, and the lack of any obvious or necessary connexion with the qui-clause which follows. “Fell on the instant mute . . . for that he knew not what it was to strive with Phoebus . . .” is how Mozley translates, but his translation signifies naught to me: is there any sense in saying (in almost so many words) that, because he was no Marsyas, Thamyris fell silent? I feel pretty certain that Statius did not write praeceps here, but what he did write for the moment eludes me. The kind of sentiment that seems to be called for is

conticuit, felix qui non certamina Phoebi
nosset et inlustres Satyro pendente Celaenas.

To be rendered mute is good luck by comparison with being hung up and flayed.

4. 196–99

illa libens (nam regum animos et pondera belli
hac nutare uidet, pariter si proudus heros
militet) ipsa sacros gremio Polynicis amati
exuerat cultus haud maesta atque insuper addit: . . .

I have to say that I do not follow Hill’s defence of si against the alternative reading ni(si) in 197: “alii bellare recusabunt si Amphiaraus pariter . . . militabit, i.e. contradicet”: Argia (illa 196) wants war for the sake of her husband Polynices, and she sees that the war effort will fail if . . . if what? Amphiaraus, the proudus heros, has already been compelled to war by Fate (189 f. Atropos had thrust arms into his reluctant hand), and Eriphyle’s treachery has merely clinched his doom. Surely in this context, with Argia
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determined to bring on the war and Amphiaraus already committed to it against his will, there is no point in canvassing the possibility that he might not in fact take part in the action to come. _Ni_ or _ nisi_, therefore, is required here. In line 198 the feminine pronoun _ipsa_ is quite superfluous: of course no one else is going to remove Argia's necklace. _Militet ipse_, on the other hand, would add welcome emphasis to Amphiaraus' hoped-for involvement. Here, therefore, _ipsa_ should be changed to _ipse_, just as, conversely, _ipse_ was changed to _ipsa_ in line 193 by Sandstroem, with the justified approbation of subsequent editors. Finally, in line 199 I should say that there is much to be said for reading _exuerat nexus_, in other words taking the verb from the Puteaneus and the noun from the other manuscripts.

4. 204–05

cum tu claudare minanti
casside ferratusque sones

Perhaps _ferratumque_?

4. 214–17

_Taenariis hic celsus equis, quam dispar coetu_
_Cyllarum ignario generat Castore prolem,_
quassat humum;

_Taenariis_ begins a new paragraph in modern editions, and the reader's attention is now turned back from Argia and Eriphyle to the doomed prophet. In this context _hinc_ would be better than _hic_.

4. 282–84

_hi lucis stupuisse uices noctisque feruntur_
_nubila et occiduum longe Titana seuti_
desperasse diem.

The primitive Arcadians were terrified by eclipses is what Statius is saying here, but the expression as given by the manuscripts is awkward, with _lucis_ . . . _uices_ an ambivalent phrase as well able to signify the return of light as its departure, and _nubila_ lacking point as a qualification of _noctis_. Clearer by far, and not, I venture to suggest, appreciably less attractive, would be _fugam for uices and solis for noctis_.

4. 292–94

_uenit et Idaeis ululatibus aemulus Azan_
Parrhasiique duces, et quae risistis, Amores,_
grata pharetrato Nonacria rura Tonanti._
I do not understand *risistis* here. Contingents come from many regions to aid Parthenopaeus, and among them is Nonacris, a region "pleasing to the Thunderer" because it was there that he seduced Callisto. Very well, but why should the Loves smile or laugh at the countryside itself? If Jove had had an affair in Golders Green or Pratts Bottom, would the Loves smile or laugh at Golders Green or Pratts Bottom? The idea is idiotic. The verb needed here is *quaesistis*.

4. 299–303

Arcades hi, gens una uiris, sed dissona cultu
scinditur: hi Paphias myrtos a stirpe recuruant
et pastorali meditantur proelia trunco,
his arcus, his tela sudes, his cassida crines
integit, ...

*Hi* in 299 strikes me as an inept anticipation of the string of demonstratives which peppers 300 to 303, and the jump from *Arcades* to *uiris* is distinctly inelegant. A smoother, and a clearer, run would be provided by *Arcadibus*.

4. 360–62

... tamen et Boeotis urbibus utrix
adspirat ferri rabies, nec regis iniqui
subsido quantum socia pro gente mouentur.

In 356 we were told that the people of Thebes itself were anything but eager for the war (*bellator nulli caluit deus*), so what is the point of *et* in 360? Surely that must imply that the Thebans too were in the grip of *ferri rabies*, and that, as the preceding lines make abundantly clear, is just not the case. Perhaps *tantum Boeotis urbibus*: only the cities of Boetia were eager for war, and then not so much on behalf of the king as on behalf of their kinsfolk.

4. 387–88

aut tumidum Gangen aut claustra nouissima Rubrae
Tethyos Eoasque domos flagrante triumpho
perfuris, ...

In 387 I fancy the second *aut* should be *et*.

4. 403–04

a miser i morum! bellastis sanguine tanto
et saltum dux alter habet.

Thus ends the prophetic ranting of the leader of the Bacchanals. The two bulls fight to the death, and another lords it over the mountain pastures, the
clause in 404 referring, as Lactantius informs us, to Creon, who took over after the death of Eteocles and Polynices. Of preceding scholars, only Baehrens, so far as I can discover, was troubled by *morum*, but his *quorum* is plainly wrong. "Miserable and wicked" is Mozley's translation, and a very free one it is too! Furthermore, it is not the character of the two brothers that needs emphasis at this point, but the sad outcome of their fighting. *Mortis*, I suppose, is a possibility, but *sortis*, or even *euentus*, would accord better with the sequel.

4. 409–18

ille deos non larga caede iuuencum,  
non alacri penna aut uerum salientibus extis,  
nec tripod Implicito numerisque sequentibus astra,  
turea nec supra volitante altaria fumo  
tam penitus, durae quam Mortis limite manes  
elicitos, patuissse reft; Lethaeaque sacra  
et merum Ismeni subter confinia ponto  
410  
miscens parat ante ducem, circumque bidentum  
uiseribus laceris et odori sulphuris aura  
graminibusque nouis et longo murmure purgat.

W. S. Watt, in *Eranos* 85 (1987) 50, proposes to read *uiuum* for *uerum* in 410, and this seems to me right; but other difficulties remain, I believe, and they concern the word *elicitos* in 414 and the words *parat ante* in 416. Consider first the overall syntactical structure of 409 to 414: *ille* (sc. Tiresias) *refert deos non tam penitus caede iuuencum patuisse quam manes elicitos* fails because *manes elicitos* does not properly answer to the sequence of ablatives introduced by *caede iuuencum*: indeed, it breaks the structure completely. What is required is not *elicitos* but rather *si cieat*, which leads the thought naturally and easily to the calling up of Laius (414–18). "'Parat' must be taken both with 'Lethaeaque sacra,' and with 'ducem,' *i.e.*, Laius," says Mozley in his note on these lines, but *parat ducem* strikes me as an exceedingly odd expression. I suggest that what Statius wrote was not *parat ante ducem* but *petit arte ducem*, with *arte* replacing the gratuitous *ante* as an introduction to the rituals described in 416 to 418.

4. 434–42

extra inmane patent, tellus Mauortia, campi;  
fetus ager Cadmo, durus qui uomere primo  
post consanguineas acies sulcosque nocentes  
ausus humum uersare et putria sanguine prata  
erit; ingentes infelix terra tumultus  
lucis adhuc medio solaque in nocte per umbras  
435  
expirat, nigri cum uana in proelia surgunt  
terrigenae; fugit incepto tremibundus ab aruo  
agricola insanique domum rediere iuueni.
Hill makes much of his heavier punctuation after *campi* in 434, but makes nothing of his lighter punctuation after *Cadmo* in 435, when the former is just wrong, but the latter disastrous. If a comma only follows *Cadmo*, then Cadmus becomes the subject of the relative clause which follows, and we are confronted with an extraordinary inversion of events, whereby Cadmus’ ploughing of this patch of earth comes after, not before, the war between Eteocles and Polynices, and, what is yet more remarkable, after his own sowing of the Spartoi! At the very least, a full stop is required after *Cadmo* (as was proposed first by Barthius); but that, I believe, is not enough. To save time and space, let me come straight to what I think is needed in 434–35, and that is:

extra inmane patet tellus Mauortia Cadmi,

fetus ager bello.

*Patet* indeed is given by a number of manuscripts, but *tellus, campi and ager* is too much of one thing, and *fetus* calls out for an ablative indicating the bloody crop produced by the *ager*. The subject of the relative clause now becomes, as become it must, the *agricola* of 442. One further correction is needed, and that is *eruere for eruit* in 438.

4. 455–57

trunca dehinc nemora aduolunt, maestusque sacerdos
tres Hecatae totidemque satis Acheronte nefasto
uirginibus iubet esse focus.

*Maestus* is disquietingly pointless: Tiresias is here merely doing his job, and emotion will not be a help at this juncture, only a hindrance. I think Statius wrote *ternaeque or triplicique*.

4. 473–79

‘Tartareae sedes et formidabile regnum
Mortis inexpletae, tuque, o saeuissime fratum, ... 474

solute pulsanti loca muta et inane severae
Persephonae uulgusque caua sub nocce repostum
elicite, et plena redeat Styga portitor alno.

Two comments on 479. First, let me commend the tentative suggestion made by Rubenbauer in *ThLL*, s.v. “elicio,” that Statius might have written *eicite*; and I commend it the more warmly since it was with *eicite* already in mind as a possibility that I made my way to his article in search of evidence (which I did not find) that *elicere* might be used, not of calling out, but of casting out. Then there is *redeat*, defended against conjecture by Klotz (“*quasi redire Styga non latinum esset*”—well, is it?) and by Hill, who adduces the Virgilian *redire uiam* and its Statian imitation, together with
Hor. Sat. 1. 6. 94, where the verb is not *redire* but *remeare*. Apropos of which, it was a pity that no one told Garrod that the third person singular of the present subjunctive of *remeare* is not *remeat*.

4. 514–15

scimus enim et quidquid dici noscique timetis
et turbare Hecaten . . .

Perhaps *poscique* for *noscique*? After all, if something is said, it may be presumed to be known.

4. 614–15

iacet ille in funere longo,
quem fremis, et iunctae sentit confinia mortis.

*Longo* seems a strangely pointless adjective in this context: of course death is long, but how is that fact relevant to the still living Oedipus? Much more to the point would be *uiuo*.

4. 664–66

isque ubi puluerea Nemeen efferuere nube
conspicit et solem radiis ignescere ferri,
necdum compositas belli in certamina Thebas, . . .

Madvig, Koestlin, Baehrens, Slater and Garrod had all taken offence at the phrase *solem radiis ignescere ferri*, but all of them, according to Klotz, “diminish the poetic force of the passage,” and Hill is evidently of the same opinion as Klotz. It is thus “poetical,” in their view, to say that “the sun grows hot with the rays of the iron”; others, however, might say that it was not so much “poetical” as “lunatic.” The various conjectures so far propounded may be found in the apparatus criticus of Klotz’s edition (for Hill has time only for Madvig’s suggestion, and then, one suspects, simply because it is also found as a reading in a manuscript). To them let me add one more: for *et solem* read *atque solum*.

4. 686–87

Argolicos paulum mihi fontibus amnes
stagnaque et errantes obducite puluere riuos.

*Fontibus* is absolutely pointless. What is needed is a word which will correspond to *puluere*, and that is *sordibus*.

4. 691–92

uim coeptis indulgent astra, meaeque
aestifer Erigones spumat canis.
Sirius is indeed represented in Latin literature as suffering from hydrophobia (see OLD s.v.), but any suggestion here of a liquid secretion in the form of saliva would be at odds with Bacchus’ insistence that the stars also are helping to dry Argos up completely. The conjecture I propose is one of the easiest in the book: read spirat for spumat.

4. 723–24

    una tamen tacitas, sed iussu numinis, undas,
    haec quoque, secreta nutrit Langia sub umbra.

I do not see the force of haec quoque, and note that Mozley, revealingly, takes no account of it; sed, moreover, is not the word we want in 723, as Mozley’s “and she” makes clear. I suggest that we read:

    una tamen tacitas ut iussu numinis undas
    sic quoque secreta nutrit Langia sub umbra:

although her waters are silenced by Bacchus’ command, even so Langia keeps them flowing on in secret.

4. 725–27

    nondum illi raptus dederat lacrimabile nomen
    Archemorus, nec fama deae; tamen auia seruat
    et nemus et fluuium; manet ingens gloria nympham.

*Tantum for tamen?* The fact that Langia is not yet famous is no impediment to her preserving her grove and her river; but preserving her grove and her river is all that she can do at present.

4. 753–56

    “diua potens nemorum (nam te uultusque pudorque
    mortali de stirpe negant), quae laeta sub isto
    igne poli non quaeris aquas, succurre propinquis
    gentibus; . . . ”

And so mortals are denied the feelings of modesty (*pudor*), are they? What a very novel twist to the traditional view, of Jove, for example, and Venus, those paragons of immodesty! Of course it was not Hypsipyle’s modesty that seemed to deny her mortality, but her *decor*. And it is her *decor*, as expressed in the adjective *pulchro* (747) which leads us to the second problem in this passage, for Hypsipyle is not cheerful (*laeta*) but sad (*pulchro in maerore*). Appreciably more appropriate to this context than *laeta* would be *sola*.

4. 772–73

    dixit, et orantis media inter anhelitus ardens
uerba rapit, cursuque animae labat arida lingua.

Where is the object of *rapit*? It cannot be *uerba*, for that forms part of the phrase *media inter . . . uerba* and cannot be coerced into performing a second function. Why not *orantem*, therefore? Then there is the question of the aptness of *rapit*, apt enough indeed as long as *uerba* was imagined to be its object, but not if the object is *orantem*. *Capit*, on the other hand, would suit well enough.

4. 779–80

at nostris an quis sinus, uberaque ulla,
scit deus;

I cannot remember ever coming across *an quis* as an alternative to *numquis* or (though less credibly in this passage) *ecquis* in subordinate clauses, and Kühner–Stegmann, *Lat. Gramm.* I 634 offers only the slightest attestation, and that in the comic writers, for the use of *an quis* in primary clauses. I am inclined to think that Statius here wrote *numquis*.

4. 805–06

pars cingunt, pars arta plebe sequuntur
praecelerantque ducem.

I cannot imagine why nobody, apparently, has proposed *praecelerantue*.

4. 816–20

incubuere uadis passim discrimine nullo
turma simul primique, nequit secemere mixtos
aqua sitis, frenata suis in curribus intrant
armenta, et pleni dominis armisque feruntur
quadripedes;

For *frenata suis in curribus . . . armenta* Mozley gives “bridled horses with their chariots,” and the question at once arises why Statius should have preferred *in to cum*; to which question the answer is that *in* was not Statius’ preference but came in as a scribal aberration. Then, there is the matter of the quadrupeds described as “full” of riders and armour: did anyone ever consciously so describe a mounted charger? The right word here is *proni*, not *pleni*.

4. 820–24

hos turbo rapax, hos lubrica fallunt
saxa, nec implicitos fluuio reuerentia reges
proterere aut mersisse uado clamantis amici
ora. fremunt undae, longusque a fontibus amnis
diripitur;
Fremunt undae—what is this to the business? No statement about this river could be less relevant at a time when men and beasts are hurling themselves into the water all along the length of the river, right back to its source, and the noise of the river must have been drowned by the noise of men, beasts and clanking metal. Perhaps ferunt undas, or premunt undas?

* * *

Let me end by listing a number of unpublished conjectures by Gilbert Wakefield (1756–1801) and Jeremiah Markland (1693–1776). Those by Wakefield in Books 1 and 2 I presented in my previous paper (231 n. 7); I now add those in Books 3 to 12. The conjectures by Markland, which I now give for all twelve books, may be found in a British Library copy of Gronovius, shelfmark 1067. a. 17.

First then, Wakefield’s contributions: 3. 109 amnis; 207 lumina; 257 fruges; 375 nuptis; 379 blanditusque; 505 pacabile ('?); 531 fuluos; 644 uictos; 4. 55 toto; 217 intermicat; 224 euitata; 254 deas; 255 intulit; 308 his; 314 corrupta; 327 albis; 366 turgida; 434 campis; 464 sangue (= P); 550 quo legit et; 608 albumue; 731 arida (= Schrader apud Haupt); 734 et caecis; 5. 45 ulua; 95 trementem; 100 it Pallados; 161 coniectis (= Schrader); 329 et tutum; 489 accensa 'sr; 497 iacentem (= Peyraredus); 586 fronti; 708 calenti; 727 nume; 731 prior (= δ); 732 arrexerat; 6. 26 pollentis; 97 trementes; 196 tenera ora; 208 exundat; 303 tenero; 678 arida; 7. 69 in tegmine; 202 terras . . . impetat; 311 feruent ingentia; 453 parantum; 471 rubet; 565 coeli quondam; 595 illi; 626 uexat uel uersat; 634 fassa manum uel missa manu; 650 ueritus . . . et mansisse; 8. 70 alerni . . . leti; 398 clipei clipeis; 575 raptat; 689 iam saevior; 712 permixtis; 9. 72 torta; 114 corpus agir; 215 sic saltam; 350 flamina; 419 iaraque (?); 621 lacrimisque; 873 aspera; 10. 308 cola reducta; 523 mirantur agri; 735 alta; 762 at uos o! superi; 823 saeuit; 833 acta Iouem; 11. 165 gerentiem; 285 primitiae; 562 peractus; 12. 69 sortis (= Niδ Schrader); 232 rumpit iter; 361 qui uacat.

The contributions by Markland are as follows: 1. 65 explicui; 130 socii- . . . regni; 202 omnia nutu; 226 Aoniae . . . Thebes; 298 hic Tyrio; 517 comantes; 2. 325 longum; 347 difficilemque suis; 412 inertes; 520 damnatisque; 573 confessus (= Dδ); 609 minitantem uana; 3. 250 uergam; 329 torquet . . . sitis; 365 extant; 654 et aram (?); 4. 114 animis (?); 353 praemisere; 522 liuentesque; 746 ferebat; 5. 20 tu tamen; 554 adiaceat; 612 uersantem; 616 et blanda; 668 meritus; 6. 150 uigemus; 513 qui mortis; 829 cara labores; 847 perfusa; 7. 13 propra; 8. 40 superis quin; 46 pandam mea regna; 217 obreperae; 392 regementum; 654 in uulnera; 9. 159 is functis; 319 Isonide cretus; 370 nunc ponto submersa; 385 heu (= various manuscripts); 415 riuos; 419 simulque; 514 Mycere; 780 miserors (= Niδ); 824 mersum tacito; 897 it sonus; 10. 46 balatque repens; 129 iura (= various manuscripts); 167 it furor; 470 qui tremor elisa; 522 inque
immane; 671 i prior; 819 reflexos (?); 824 omnis, eunt; 907 superum chorus; 11. 667 confessus tacuit; 12. 249 magnae strident; 587 rogantes.

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Ten Notes on Statius’ *Silvae*

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The following editions are referred to: J. Markland (1728); E. Baehrens (1876); F. Vollmer (1898); A. Klotz (2nd ed., 1911); J. H. Mozley (Loeb ed., 1928); H. Frère and H. J. Izaac (Budé ed., 1944); E. Courtney (OCT, 1990); H. J. van Dam (Book 2, 1984); K. M. Coleman (Book 4, 1988).

1. 4. 22–25

    ipse ueni uiresque nouas animumque ministra
    qui caneris; *docto* nec enim sine numine *tantus*
    Ausoniae decora ampla togae centumque dedisti
    iudicium mentemque uiris.

Statius asks Rutilius Gallicus, the subject of his poem, to be his inspiration, for he brings distinction to the Roman courts.

    Both *docto* and *tantus* have aroused suspicion. The former was emended by Markland to *dextro* (he compared, among other passages, 66 below, *dextro sine numine cretam*), an emendation which does not deserve the oblivion which has recently befallen it. *Tantus* (“als ein so gewaltiger Redner,” Vollmer), is difficult to accept, but the conjectures listed by Klotz and by Courtney are scarcely more convincing. I suggest *natus*, which would correspond closely to *cretam* in 66.

2. 6. 10–12

    sed famulum gemis, Vrse, pium, sed amore fideque
    has meritum lacrimas, cui maior stemmate *iuncto*
    libertas ex mente fuit.

Flavius Ursus mourns the death of a favourite slave “whose spirit knew a freedom that no line of ancestry could give” (Mozley).

    If *iuncto* refers to the lines joining the *imagines* of the family-tree, then, as van Dam says, “a *stemma non iunctum* does not exist.” Hence Courtney adopts the old conjecture *cuncto*. For the singular *cunctus* in the sense of *quisque*, ThLL IV 1398. 7 ff. quotes only three instances from pre-Apuleian literature, all three from Statius, but in our passage *cuncto* would have to mean not “every single one” but “any,” presumably on the analogy
of the singular of omnis. How possible this is I do not know, but I should consider changing one letter to produce iusto (OLD sense 8); I note that cunctis and iustis are variants at Theb. 9. 633.

2. 6. 93–95

quid terga dolori,
Vrsæ, damus? quid damna foues et pectore inequou
uulnus amas? ubi nota reis facundia raptis?

Statius urges Ursus to cease mourning for his slave. I have discussed this passage in WJA 14 (1988) 165. Since raptis is not convincing either in the sense of “dragged into court” or in that of “rescued from court” (i.e. acquitted), I suggested <f>ractis, “crushed,” i.e. either “condemned” or “dejected.” Another possibility might be <g>ratis, “grateful” for their acquittal. The opposite corruption may have occurred at Silius 13. 335, where Heinsius’ ræpta (for grata) is very attractive.

3. 5. 48–49

questa est Aegiale, questæ est Melibœa reliquir, et quam quam saeui fecerunt maenada planctus.

Wives who complained about being left behind by their husbands, Aegiale, Melibœa and Laodamia.

It has been usual to read quam saeui as a parenthetic exclamation, but the double quam remains objectionable. Courtney adopts the old emendation tam saeui, but the demonstrative is no great improvement. I suggest atque ea quam saeui.

4. 1. 27–32

quid tale, precor, prior annus habebat?
dic age, Roma potens, et mecum, longa Vetustas,
dinumera fastos, nec parua exempla recense
sed quae sola meus dignetur uincere Caesar.

ter Latio deciesque tuit labentibus annis Augustus fasces...

This poem celebrates the seventeenth consulship of Domitian in A.D. 95.

“Prior annus . . . is usually understood ‘the year just passed’ but the question then has no point. It must mean ‘any former year.’ No one . . . had been consul XVII before” (D. R. Shackleton Bailey, HSCP 91 [1987] 278). By searching Rome’s annals the speaker (Janus) confirms that no previous year, not even that in which Augustus had been consul XIII, could show anything like (quid tale) a seventeenth consulship. Although quid makes good sense, I suspect that Statius wrote quis, which has been assimilated to the gender of tale.
Statius celebrates a banquet given by Domitian to which he had been invited.

*Consurgere mensa* can only mean “rise from table” at the end of the banquet, whereas what is required at this point in the poem is a word meaning “sit down at table” for the beginning of the banquet. Baehrens emended *consurgere* to *concumbere*, but it is more than doubtful whether that verb could have the required sense; see *ThLL IV* 102. 23 ff. The obvious word is *discumbere*, which is not ruled out by its occurrence in line 10; rather, I think, the repetition emphasizes the parallelism between *domina discumbere mensa* and *mediis discumbere in astra*, between the table of the emperor and the table of the gods. The corruption of *discumbere* to *consurgere* is not inconceivable in view of the ending of line 4, *consumpsit Vlixem*.

Markland’s emendation of *consurgere* to *non surgere*, adopted by Courtney, is rightly ruled out by Coleman as anticipating the climax in line 17, *non adsurgere fas est?*

4. 9. 48–50

*Inlatam salutem* presumably means “the greeting which I have brought to your home.” Despite Vollmer’s claim that *inlatam* is confirmed by the following *domi*, the word is quite otiose. I suspect that editors tolerate it merely because they are not satisfied with the available conjectures (of which five are listed by Klotz and by Coleman). Better than any of these, I suggest, would be *inratam*.

5. 1. 4–6

Abascantus deserves to have a first-class likeness of his late wife, either a portrait painted by Apelles or a statue executed by Phidias.
For *uata* editors read *nata* (a correction already found in M), but this cannot mean "given life" or "given fresh birth," as it is usually translated. One looks for a word which can correspond to *signata colore* (= *picta*), and the obvious partner for *picta* is *ficta*; for the confusion of *f* and *u* cf. 1. 1. 65, *uincit* > *fingit*.

5. 2. 164–67

sed uenies *melior* (uatum non irnita currunt
omnia), quiue aquilas tibi nunc et castra recludet
idem omnes perferre gradus cingique superbis
fascibus et patrias dabit insedisse curules.

165 recludet Courtney: *recludit* M

Statius prophesies that, on his return from military service, Crispinus will be promoted by the emperor to the highest offices of state.

"Mais tu reviendra plus grand" (Frère–Izaac). But "plus grand" is *maior* rather than *melior*; the two words are frequently confused.

5. 3. 262–64

quos ego tunc gemitus (comitum manus anxia uidit,
uidit et exemplum genital *gauisaque nouit*),
quae lamenta tuli!

Statius wept so much for his father that his friends were afraid of his committing suicide; his mother marked the precedent he was setting (an indication of what he would do for her when the time came).

Although line 263 can be construed (*uidit manus anxia et uidit
genetrix*), it would be improved by the omission of the *-que* which follows *gauisa*. I suggest *gauisa notauit*. Statius is fond of *notare*; I would in particular compare 2. 6. 21, *uidi ipse habitusque notauit*, where it reinforces *uidere* in the same way as in our passage.

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The Dedicatory Presentation in Late Antiquity:
The Example of Ausonius

HAGITH SIVAN

In a well-known analysis of the function of dedicatory pieces in Martial and Statius (whose title is here deliberately echoed), Peter White showed that the Roman concept of dedication was flexible in the extreme and well suited to a variety of purposes. Some of his conclusions are borne out by the work of the fourth-century poet Ausonius, who was greatly influenced by these two predecessors. Indeed, an examination of Ausonius' poems offers an ideal point of departure for an exploration of the topic of the dedicatory presentation in the literature of late antiquity. For example, one of the questions raised addresses the nature of the relationship between the dedication and the text to which it was attached: What can be deduced from the inclusion or omission of a dedicatory preface concerning the poet's working methods, his intended audience(s), the circulation and publication of his works? What sort of information is provided by the dedication about the chronological stages of the composition? Were dedications intended to function as proper prefaces as well as dedicatory addresses? Where multiple dedications were used, how do they relate to one another?

Several points can be made at the very start. Ausonius' surviving dedicatory work ranges from single to multiple dedications. This sort of variety follows obvious precedents, not the least Martial's four dedications in the first book of his Epigrams. The dedicatees include specific addressees, general readership and, on one occasion, even the poem's dead subjects (Professores, Poeta). Where Ausonius appended an "epilogue," it often


3 For a recent general survey of Ausonius' works, R. Herzog and P. L. Schmidt (edd.), Handbuch der lateinischen Literatur der Antike V (Munich 1989) 268–308, with vast bibliography.

serves, in conjunction with the prefatory pieces, as a frame to enclose the text. Still in the manner of Martial, the dedications of Ausonius are written in both prose and verse, and they all precede poetic works. These multiple dedications correspond to each other either by complementing or by simple overlapping. They also touch on a question of aesthetics, essentially the inner proportions of the whole, and the literary intention of this amalgam. In what follows I divide the dedications, for convenience’s sake, according to their number, from “floating” compositions, unattached to a surviving poem or corpus, to multiple dedications. Of course, other divisions could also be used, from contents to form, or through types of dedicatees.

A word of caution first. The difficulties of dealing with the process of the publication of Ausonius’ poems cannot be overstated. To date, no single edition has commanded universal consensus, and “the edition to end all editions” is still awaited. In the meantime, one has to contend with a different order of works and a different numbering system in every edition. The debate concerning the number of editions issued in Ausonius’ lifetime and the affiliation of each of the families of manuscripts with these putative editions has been a long and wearisome affair. In addition, we are now in possession of a list which gives the titles of several lost works, from a versified version of a lost history by Eusebius (of Nantes) to a *libellus* on the names of the months of the Hebrew and Athenian calendars. It is not my intention here to deal with any of the problems raised by the transmission of the Ausonian corpus, but merely to point out the useful information contained in the dedications, particularly with regard to the chronological sequence and stages of composition.


7 The standard modern editions include: Schenkl (*MGH AA* V.2, 1883); Peiper (Teubner 1886); Pastorino (Torino 1971); Prete (Teubner 1978); Green (Oxford 1991). Unless otherwise stated, all references and quotations are from the edition of Schenkl.


Dedications Without Texts

Several verse dedications have been transmitted without an attached text. One was prompted by an imperial letter, preserved in a collection of dedicatory prefaces, sent by the emperor Theodosius I (379–95).\textsuperscript{10} In it the emperor asked the poet to send him his works, and more specifically, two types of works: those which had already been “published,” and others which “rumor” had added to the corpus (\textit{postulans . . . ne fraudari me scriptorum tuorum lectione pateris. quae olim mihi cognita et iam per tempus oblitia rursum desidero, non solum ut, quae sunt nota, recolantur, sed etiam ut ea, quae fama celebri adiecta memorantur, accipiam}). The words \textit{scripta, cognita} and \textit{nota} seem to indicate some kind of published edition of collected works, while those designated as \textit{adiecta} may have been more recent additions, not yet officially presented to the public. Until the emperor’s request sent the poet to rummage through his drawers the latter had been stored away.\textsuperscript{11} The date of the imperial letter cannot be ascertained, but it may have been written between 389 and 392, during Theodosius’ longest stay in the west. By then Ausonius was living in leisurely retirement on his Aquitanian estates.\textsuperscript{12}

That Theodosius knew of these poems need not come as a surprise. Ausonius, like his predecessors, regularly sent copies to friends, some of whom he also expected to come forth with suggestions for revisions. One of these, Pacatus, to whom several poems are dedicated, was a fellow rhetor of Ausonius from Bordeaux.\textsuperscript{13} Pacatus travelled to Italy in 389 to deliver a panegyric in honor of Theodosius. In Italy, acquaintances of Ausonius, like Symmachus, with access to the imperial court, were also well informed and able to report on the state of Ausonius’ poetic productivity.\textsuperscript{14}

The choice of the words \textit{fama celebri} to mark the emperor’s source of information merits attention. We know that, in addition to poems circulating informally with the author’s permission, there were also unauthorised copies which, in spite of the poet’s wish, somehow reached an unintended audience. One such poem was the \textit{Griphus}, ninety contrived verses on the number three. Before its formal dedication to the Italian senator Symmachus in the form of a long prose letter (below), the \textit{Griphus}

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Epistula Theodosi Augusti} (Sch. I).
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Quae tu de promptuario scriniorum tuorum . . . libens inperties} (ibid.).
\textsuperscript{12} See L. A. A. Jouai, \textit{De magistraat Ausonius} (Nijmegen 1938) for a detailed biography; R. Etienne, “Ausone ou les ambitions d’un notable aquitain,” in \textit{Ausone, humaniste aquilain} (Bordeaux 1986) 1–90.
\textsuperscript{13} C. E. V. Nixon, \textit{Pacatus. Panegyric to the Emperor Theodosius} (Liverpool 1987).
had been for a long time in “secret” or informal circulation.\(^\text{15}\) What irritated Ausonius above all was that as a result of his lack of control, the poem underwent several changes of which he disapproved. These unexpected alterations may be attributed to overzealous admirers eager to share in the poetic fame of Ausonius even before the poems were formally presented to the public. To reconstruct the process: A private copy is sent to a friend with a request for perusal and suggestions for revisions; the poem is then copied by friends of the original dedicatee, but the copiers reproduce not the “original” but the “corrected” poem. As a result, the work acquires a slightly different form owing to these unauthorised revisions. When accused of such a practice, Symmachus replied that once a poem was complete and left the author’s desk it became public property.\(^\text{16}\)

Complying with Theodosius’ request, Ausonius prefaced the poetic corpus sent to the emperor with a personal dedication in which he expressed his “relief” at having thus been “forced” to part with his work.\(^\text{17}\) The imperial command, asserted the poet, came just in time to put an end to a long series of ever-worsening revisions (18–20: \textit{quis nolit Caesaris esse liber, ne ferat indignum valem centumque lituras, mutandas semper deteriore nota?}) If these words are to be taken seriously, they point to the introduction of revisions, Ausonius’ own or other people’s alterations of his work, either as a matter of course, in the process of re-writing, or when asked to publish an “official” version. In either case the final version of each work would have differed from previous drafts. There is also an element of the apologetic cliché in these words, as well as echoes of Martial’s address to his book (1. 3) and of Horace’s views on the process of poetic creativity (\textit{Ars Poetica} 289–94, 438–41).

Both the emperor’s letter to Ausonius and Ausonius’ dedication to Theodosius have been transmitted by one family of manuscripts (P).\(^\text{18}\) It is unclear whether the imperial request was attached to a corpus dedicated to the emperor, in addition to the dedication itself. Authors often referred in their dedicatory preface to the prompting of the addressee.\(^\text{19}\) If indeed the letter in its original form did head a collection of Ausonius’ poems, the gesture appears to constitute a novelty. While a later editorial hand may not be altogether excluded, Ausonius was vain enough to breach stylistic rules, if such a transgression contributed to his poetic reputation. There is no indication, however, in the verse dedication to the emperor of the scope and

15 Griphus (Sch. XXVI. 1), \textit{Ausonius Symmacho: igitur iste nugator libellus, iam diu secreta quidem, sed vulgi lectione laceratus, perveniet tandem in manus tuas} (8–9).

16 \textit{Cum semel a te profectum carmen est, ius onne posuiasti, Ep.1 Peiper = I. 31. 2 Callu (Symmaque. Lettres [Budé 1972]).}

17 \textit{Domino meo et omnium Theodosio augusto Ausonius tuus} (Sch. II). Note the “timely coincidence” of \textit{non iussa parant erumpere dudum carmina} (17–18).

18 The latter also in V.

contents of the “imperial corpus.” The correspondence between Theodosius and Ausonius seems to have extended to at least one other item. A list of contents of Ausonius’ works names a prose letter, now lost, sent to the emperor.\(^20\) One wonders whether this letter was also appended to this corpus or to another collection, perhaps an earlier one.\(^21\)

Among other “detached” prefaces, there is one addressed to “the reader” in which the author called upon his audience to act as patrons for his poems.\(^22\) This is, of course, a topos, as is, to an extent, the autobiographical sketch which constitutes the bulk of the dedication. Horace and Ovid often inserted autobiographical details into their poems, the latter minutely following an established pattern based on a description of home, descent and education.\(^23\) Nor can one deny that the age of Ausonius saw the beginning of Christian self-revelation and self-examination, which culminated in Augustine’s *Confessions*. Ausonian influence, for example, can be detected in the works of Prudentius, whose *praefatio*, a general proemium to his collected works, is cast in the form of a biography detailing his career and his spiritual progress towards “poetic conversion.”\(^24\) But there is hardly a doubt that in the hands of Ausonius the poet’s self-presentation attained considerable proportions. Not only are his home, parents and career described at great length, but the subject matter was amplified in a series of poems devoted to family members, in another, describing his school colleagues, and in several other works (*Parentalia; Professores; Epicedion; Liber Protrepticus*).

This sort of personal introduction, in the form of a dedication to the general public, left little doubt of the poet’s social status.\(^25\) Unlike his earlier models, Ausonius did not have to live from the sale of his books, nor

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\(^{20}\) Reeve (above, note 9) 116, no. 4: *item epistolás prosaicas ad Theodosium imperatore . . .*, not, I think, to be confused with the existing verse dedicatory preface.

\(^{21}\) The relations between Ausonius and Theodosius are far from clear. Having been labelled as a supporter of T. in the late 370s (Matthews [above, note 14]), Ausonius is strangely silent about the eastern emperor during the early 380s. Even in an obvious place such as the *Gratiarum actio* there is no mention of Theodosius or his connection with Gratian. The correspondence with Theodosius must, therefore, belong to the late 380s, when Ausonius, no longer in a position of power at the court, may have tried to court imperial favor.

\(^{22}\) *Ausonius lectori salutem*, Sch. III. 39–40: *tu ne temne, quod ultro / patronum nostris te paro carminibus.*


was he in need of the type of literary patronage sought by earlier poets.\(^{26}\)

Any doubt to the contrary was immediately dispelled upon reading of the dedications. Not that the system of patronage ceased to function in later antiquity, but Ausonius had far-reaching ambitions, well beyond a solid literary repute and a comfortable living. As soon as he gained access to the imperial court in Trier (A.D. 366/7), he set about to employ his poetic talents in extolling the imperial house (Mosella 420–31; Cento, praef.). When given the opportunity, he courted the favors of the most powerful aristocrat of the day, Sextus Petronius Probus (Ep. 16). As a result, even by the standards of an age which set an inordinately high premium on literacy, Ausonius did exceptionally well. Already under Valentinian I he became the quaestor in charge of imperial legislation (A.D. 375) and during the reign of his pupil Gratian, Ausonius, his family and his protégés regularly occupied the highest civil offices.\(^{27}\)

Like the dedication to Theodosius, the one to the reader does not provide a clue regarding the contents of the works to which it was attached. Perhaps it comprised one of the prefatory pieces which preceded the above-mentioned collection sent to the emperor, in addition to the emperor’s letter and the verse dedication. This hypothetical juxtaposition would have served the purpose of introducing the author as well as highlighting his unique poetic status. What came afterwards may have been of lesser importance by comparison. This sort of personal introduction also served to bring poet and audience into a direct and immediate contact. In addition to the customary captatio benevolentiae, the information provided in the prefatory dedication would surely have raised great interest and expectations.

Two other verse dedications, one transmitted among the prefatory pieces together with the dedication to Theodosius and the reader, the other transmitted with Ausonius’ epigrams, were addressed to two political associates of Ausonius, Syagrius and Proculus.\(^{28}\) No surviving texts can be attached to them. The one to Proculus bears two titles: ad libellum suum (Sch. Epig. 35) and prosopopoia in chartam (Peiper Epig. 1). Ausonius playfully debates there whether to consign his verses to the worms or to send them to Proculus. Not surprisingly he opts for the latter course, which he describes as a sweet revenge on a fellow-poet who refuses to part with his own poems (11–12: prompta est ultio vati./ qui sua non edit carmina, nostra legat). Proculus himself, then, was a poet, but an unpublished one by his own choice. He is to be identified with the Prefect of the Gauls in 382 and a consular candidate for 384. It is not clear which poems were sent to him;


\(^{27}\) See Etienne (above, note 12) for the details.

\(^{28}\) PLRE I 404 (G 9), Proculus Gregorius; PLRE I 862 (S 2 or S 3) for Afranius Syagrius, presumably the one here.
the work is described as *charta*, a *libellus* (3) and *carmina* (12). One wonders if this was a collection of epigrams. Be that as it may, Proculus was expected to give his approval, presumably with a view to publication (13–14: *huius in arbitrio est, seu te iuvenescere cedero, seu iubeat duris vermibus esse cibum*). The request is a topos, and a form of literary courtesy in the period. The point here is that the importance of the addressee as well as his literary judgement are given due prominence (9–10: *irascor Proculo, cuius facundia tanta est / quantus honos*).

Like Proculus Gregorius, Syagrius was a notable Gallic politician and a protégé of Ausonius. He is the addressee of four lines which mention a *liber* sent to him. Perhaps he received a number of poems, although the scope of the presentation cannot be determined (3–4: *nostro praefatus habebere libro, differat ut nihilo, sit tuus anne meus*). The case is interesting. Syagrius is not asked to come up with revisions or editorial suggestions, an omission which implies several possibilities: (a) The work sent to Syagrius may have been a final presentation copy rather than an informal one. This does not mean that everyone who was ever sent a "pre-publication copy" was asked to criticise it, but that such a request depended on the identity of the recipient. Literary men were natural candidates for such requests, whether made in earnest or in jest. (b) Ausonius sent Syagrius what he initially considered a final version, as a token of *amicitia*, but subsequently decided to revise and "re-publish" it in another form. This, in turn, implies that the verses to Syagrius merely accompanied the act of the dispatch and cannot be regarded as a dedicatory preface in the full sense of the word.

Among the epigrams of Ausonius, one other seems to have functioned as a dedication although it has reached us without an attached text (*commendatio codicis*, Sch. 2; Peiper 25). It is cast as a general address to "the reader," and explains the nature of his poetry, which Ausonius terms a mixture of the grave and the light. The message is clear: Ausonius had written verses for all occasions, a versatility to be commended (3–4: *non unus vitae color est nec carminis unus / lector*), nor has he forgotten, even in lighter moments, the good old manners (*veteres mores*). There is nothing unusual or novel in these words. A word of "warning" regarding the nature of one's poetry had accompanied a good number of works in antiquity, including another Ausonian work (*Bissula*, below). What is interesting is the choice of modern editors who, like Schenkl, placed this poem, together with another (Sch. *Epig. 1*), at the head of the entire collection of epigrams,

29 Ausonius’ Syagrius is identified by Evelyn White (Loeb I 7) as Apanius (*sic*) Syagrius, cos. 382. It is virtually impossible to determine which of the two eminent Syagrii of the late fourth century is the man. On the problems involved, Martindale in *Historia* 16 (1967) 254–56; Demandt, *BZ* 64 (1971) 38–45; and more recently, R. Bagnall et alii, *Consuls of the Later Roman Empire* (Atlanta 1987) 649–50.

or, like Peiper, before the so-called "imperial" epigrams which Ausonius devoted to Valentinian I and Gratian (nos. 26–31). Perhaps this brief "recommendatio" headed a published collection of several poems, or collections of poems, including at least some that were of an erotic or frivolous nature. So far this is the only detached dedicatory preface which refers to the nature of Ausonius' poetry.

Finally, the untitled epigram with which Schenkl chose to head his edited collection of Ausonian epigrams is addressed to one Augustus, presumably Gratian (Peiper 26). Evelyn White regards it as the dedicatory poem of the first "edition" of Ausonius' works. The verses hardly read as a dedication but rather as a mini-panegyric of an emperor who, in spite of wars, found time to exercise his pen. "Rejoice, thou son of Aeacus! Thou art sung once more by a lofty bard and thou art blessed with a Roman Homer." Such words were better suited to preface a poem by the emperor than a collected edition of poems by his former tutor. Perhaps it was an epigram sent to Gratian.

To sum up, the "detached" dedications that survived in the Ausonian corpus conform, to an extent, to classical patterns while also displaying some divergent traits. None of them discloses the contents of the works which they accompanied, in the manner of Statius, for example. All the prefaces exhibit the poet's self-importance either through autobiographical details or by the emphasis given to the personality of the dedicatee. In this way it appears that poetic successors like Prudentius almost deliberately revelled in display of humility and contempt for worldly achievements. Ausonius' dedications also reveal something of his working methods; these included several stages of composition, revisions, informal and formal circulation. One can envisage drafts of all sorts sent to literary friends for their comments, with a dedicatory note requesting this service in the name of amicitia. At some point a collection would be made, whether of older poems or more recent pieces, with a "final" address, either to a specific individual like the emperor, and or to the general reader. In such cases, it is necessary to distinguish between the date of the prefatory pieces and that of the work itself.

So important did the dedicatory preface appear to have become that an editorial decision, possibly later than Ausonius', deemed them worthy of separate publication. In other words, by a process which remains obscure, these short poems were detached from the text(s) which they were intended to accompany. Thus, the literary unity of the two, which ancient writers

31 Loeb I xxxvi; II 168.
33 Its date can be indicated by references to the Goths, Huns and Sarmatians (7–9), which place its composition in 379, when the Precatio consulis designati of the same year mentions the same tribes (36–37).
were careful to insist on, was no longer important. In this respect, there is need to draw a clear distinction between a preface proper and a dedicatory one.

**Texts Without Specific Dedications**

In his dedications Ausonius used a variety of terms to characterise his work: *opusculum* and *libellus* (Parentalia; Epitaphs; Tech.; Griflus; Cento; Ecl. 1); *liber, charta* (Prof. 25); and *carmen* (Prof. 26). *Libellus* is by far the most common. If, as White has suggested, *libelli* refer primarily to private and informal copies, to be distinguished from the formal published text, then the majority of Ausonius’ poems which have come down to us do not necessarily represent a “final” version. That this is feasible can be gathered from a brief examination of Ausonius’ most famous poem, the *Moselle.*

As it stands, the *Moselle* lacks a personal dedication. Such a dedication, as far as I can see, was never composed, since the poem was first recited orally at the court in Trier. We have, however, a letter written by a contemporary which attests to the poem’s fame and wide circulation (Symmachus, *Ep.* 1. 14). The appearance of this letter in the corpus of Ausonius’ work raises a question concerning the circumstances in which it became attached to the *Moselle.* We may assume that either Ausonius arbitrarily added it at some point, even though the *Moselle* was not dedicated to Symmachus, or, more likely, it was added by a later editor who recognised the literary-historical connection, in itself rather plainly stated in the letter. In this letter, the Italian senator and litterateur Symmachus complains about Ausonius’ failure to send him a personal copy of the *Moselle.* He is particularly chagrined since the *Moselle* had apparently reached many other hands in Italy before he was able to read it. Most significantly, Symmachus praises two parts of the poem: the famed fish-catalogue, presently occupying 66 lines (85–150), and, more surprisingly, a section on the source of the Moselle, which seems to be altogether missing from the version that has come down to us. One must conclude, then, that between the time of its first oral presentation at the court at about A.D. 368 and the poem’s “publication,” the *Moselle* had been revised. A gap of about ten years can be postulated between the two events, the first taking place during the early campaigns of Valentinian I against the Alamanni, and

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34 White (above, note 1) 44–45.
36 Symmachus 1. 14. 3–4, esp. *nequaquam tibi crederem de Mosellae ortu ac meatu multa narranti.* The phrase is difficult. The most recent commentator on Symmachus conceded a single line (470–71) on the topic of *ortus ac meatus* (Callu [Budé] 78 n. 3). On the other hand, these words could be taken to belong naturally together, and as such either would apply to virtually the entire poem.
the latter, around 378, when Ausonius’ political eminence at the court ensured instant popularity for his work. The question remains whether one is here dealing with two editions or with a lacuna in the text. At present, I have no answer.

Although lacking a personal dedication, the Moselle is prefaced by a brief description of the physical and poetic journey which led to its composition (1–22). The reader is thus informed of the source of inspiration before the praises of the river commence. More significantly the Moselle concludes with a lengthy epilogue (438–83) which is divided into an autobiographical component (438–68) and a section consisting of a poetic farewell (469–83). The latter connects with the preface to form a ring-composition that frames the whole piece. These sections follow well-known paths and act as an exposition of the subject, its importance and its raison d’être. Within this tightly constructed progression the rather lengthy autobiography seems somewhat misplaced. It holds two further promises, one of future success for the poet himself, the other of future poems. The former was possibly made on the eve of his consulship, the latter never fulfilled.37 Both were composed for the formal publication and circulation of the Moselle.

Ausonius’ most personal poems, the Parentalia and the Professores, have been transmitted without a specific personal dedication. They have, however, formal prefaxes (and epilogues) which serve a variety of functions. The Parentalia, a collection of brief poems commemorating dead relatives, is preceded by two prefaxes, one in prose and one in verse, each explaining the nature of the poems. Both were obviously intended for the general reader who, so Ausonius piously hoped, would be spared the sorrow which had motivated the Parentalia. The prose preface warns the reader of the solemn and sober tone of the work, indicates its contents and explains the somewhat unusual title of the collection.38 In the verse preface, although the title could not be scanned in dactylic verse, Ausonius expands on the meaning of the act of commemoration, and prepares the reader for the scale of the poetic undertaking which embraces near as well as remote kin.

In spite of some repetition, the two prefaxes complement each other. It remains to clarify whether they were written on separate occasions or conceived of as an entity. The thirty poems of the Parentalia, each devoted to one or two relatives, cover a period of over forty years.39 Even if

37 Upon reflection, I wonder if the correct reading of vs. 450 (Augustus, pater et nati, Sch.; Peiper) is not that of the ms. (pater et natus), referring not to Valentinian I and Gratian (plus/minus Valentinian II), but to Gratian and a hypothetical son, the much longed-for dynastic heir. Comp. Claudian envisaging the pregnancy of Maria, Epithalamium 340–41 and Cons. Stil. 2. 236 f., 341 f.
38 Comp. the Epicidon’s prose preface, surprisingly, in view of the long tradition of Latin epicedia.
39 Very few events in the Parentalia can be dated. One is the death of Ausonius’ maternal uncle in 337; Sivan, “A Forerunner of Ausonius: Notes on Aemilius Magnus
Ausonius kept family records, the composition made little sense as a leisurely exercise well over fifty years after the death of some of the persons included. More logically, it must be viewed in conjunction with his career. I would propose at least two stages of assembling and “publishing” the Parentalia: one, upon that momentous turning point with Ausonius’ departure from Bordeaux to Trier in 366/7, the other, as part of his consular propaganda.40 Already in his Gratiarum actio for his consulship in 379 Ausonius briefly refers to his family and his city, topics which he duly enlarges upon in the Parentalia and the Professores.41

Similarly, a traditional type of praefatio in verse heads the Professores, a collection of poems commemorating dead colleagues at the schools of Bordeaux. It is addressed to the dead subjects of the poems, but is meant to explain the rationale which dictated the selection of some teachers and the exclusion of others.42 Like the verse preface to the Parentalia, this one also ends with the poet’s pious hope that one day he would also be commemorated by a colleague. In addition, the poem ends with two concluding verse portions, one (Coronis), addressed to the general reader, the other (Poeta), a farewell to those commemorated.43 In the Coronis Ausonius recapitulates the main points of what precedes while justifying possible stylistic faults on the grounds of sentiment. The Poeta (no. 26, Peiper), is cast as a personal farewell from a kindred spirit soon to join those whom he had so piously commemorated. Both epilogues connect thematically with the preface; the Coronis is also composed in the same metre. A period of at least fifty years, from the 310s to the 360s, is covered by the careers recorded in the Professores.44 Its initial presentation, I would

Arborius, Ausonius’ Uncle,” Ancient History Bulletin 2.6 (1988) 145–49. Another is the death of Ausonius’ father in 377/8. The subject of Parentalia 32, Pomponia Urbica, has been identified as a supporter of Priscillian and a victim of mob agitation in Bordeaux in 385; R. H. P. Green, “Prosopographical Notes on the Family and Friends of Ausonius,” BICS 25 (1978) 22, on the basis of Prosper, Chron. s.a. This is attractive but hypothetical. Nothing in Ausonius’ words (discretion allowed) about her death implies either violent or untimely death, least of all a connection with an heretic. The one secure last date is Ausonius’ own consulship in 379 (6. 32).

40 J. F. Matthews, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court (Oxford 1975) 51 f. for career sequence.

41 Gratiarum actio 8. 36: non possum fide causa ostendere imagines maiorum meorum . . . non deductum ab heroibus genus vel adeo deorum stemma replicare . . . sed . . .
dicere . . . patriam non obscuram, familia non paenitendum.

42 Commemoratio Professorum Burdigalensum, praef. 1–3: vos etiam, quos nulla mihi cognatio inxiit, sed fama et carae religio partiae et studium in libris et sedula cura docentii (not strictly adhered to in the poem itself).

43 R. P. H. Green, “The Text of Ausonius: Fifty Emendations and Twelve,” Rh. Mus. 125 (1982) 350, regards the Poeta as the second half of the Coronis, and the whole as a bipartite address to the reader and to the dead.

suggest, belongs to the end of Ausonius' teaching career at Bordeaux and serves the dual purpose of paying homage to his city and colleagues as well as commemorating his own departure for greener pastures. It was then appropriately concluded with the Coronis. Years later, perhaps during his retirement in Aquitania, when the prospect of his own death was not far off, Ausonius updated and possibly revised the poem. At that point, the Poeta, strongly reminiscent of contemporary funerary epitaphs, was added.

Lack of specific dedicatory preambles deprived the poet of an opportunity to throw around famous names and to indulge in self-glorification. These particular functions were discharged, in the case of the Moselle, through an epilogue and the addition of Symmachus' letter. The Parentalia and the Professores in themselves served as self-advertisement. That these personal poems were never dedicated, or at least transmitted without a specific dedication, is hardly surprising in view of their nature. They would have been inappropriate subjects of dedication unless addressed to a close family member. Other aspects of a dedication, such as an apology about the style and an explanation of the poem's topic and circumstances were incorporated in the prefaces proper or the epilogues. In Ausonius' hands, then, the prefaces per se and the prefatory dedication became indistinguishable, each appended as it suited the poet's fancy rather than the dictates of the text.

Poems With Specific Dedications

To comply with Symmachus' desire to receive a work specially dedicated to him, Ausonius sent him the Griphus, a short poem on the number three, composed long before Symmachus' request and prefaced, upon dispatch, by a long prose letter. The dedication is important, as it throws light on the question of the circulation of "official" and unofficial copies. Ausonius

Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley 1988) 459, for grammarians only.

45 Prof. 6. 35–39 provides, rather obliquely, the last datable reference, which mentions the execution of Delphidius' wife, a supporter of Priscillian, in 385: Sulpicius Severus, Chron. 2. 48; Dial. 3. 11.


47 By comparison, one may observe the Ordo Urbium Nobilium, a catalogue of well-known cities, likewise transmitted without a dedication. There are indications that the Ordo had been originally conceived as a work rather limited in scope and only expanded later on. In one manuscript (T) only eleven cities are included, while two others (VP) include a much fuller list which all modern editors prefer. Ausonius himself stated that the city of Aquileia had been added as an afterthought (non erat iste locus, merito tamen aucta recenti 64). Perhaps he never found an occasion to dedicate such an eclectic work and it has remained, as it now stands, without a dedication or a preface.
explains the genesis of the *Gríphus*, a work which he had composed on a festive evening during a military campaign of the emperor Valentinian I in 367/8. Before the *Gríphus* was formally sent with a dedication to Symmachus it had been in wide circulation for some time, although without the author’s permission. In the course of this process various hands introduced into the text revisions of which Ausonius apparently disapproved. The lengthy preface also enabled Ausonius to display his erudition by referring to examples which he deliberately forbore to include in the poem itself. Most significantly, perhaps, a dedication of the *Gríphus* type enabled the poet to bridge the gap between the time of composition and the dispatch of the poem.

On occasions of informal circulation some chosen addressees were expected to react with words of encouragement and admiration, as well as with suggestions for revision. Even when a poem had been in public hands for some time, like the *Gríphus*, Ausonius still included the classic request which referred to the judgement of his dedicatee. Whether or not the recipients exercised the authority invested so trustingly in them remains a matter of speculation. Although requests of this sort have generally acquired the force of a cliché, some addressees may have taken them seriously. At any rate, Ausonius’ prefatory letter to Symmachus implies that the *Gríphus* was finally about to be “formally” launched.

Latinus Drepanius Pacatus, a rhetor from the schools of Bordeaux and the author of the last speech in the collection known as the Latin Panegyrics, is Ausonius’ most frequent addressee in the dedicatory prefaces. A collection of poems, the *Eclogues*, had been sent to him with a verse dedication headed by a quotation from Catullus’ well-known dedication to Cornelius. This act of *imitatio* placed Ausonius within a long and venerable tradition of dedicatory prefaces, and enabled him at the same time to produce an apology for any defects in the text (*cui dono lepidum novum

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48 *Gríphus* 1: *in expeditione, quod tempus, ut scis, licentiae militaris est, super mensam meam facta est invitatio . . .

49 See above, pp. 85–86.

50 *Gríphus* 1: *iste nugator libellus . . . quem tu aut ut Aesculapius redintegrabis ad vitam aut ut Plato iuwante Vulcanò liberabis infamia, si pervenire non debet ad famam.

51 Schenkl and Peiper differ markedly in their reconstruction of the *Eclogues*. Peiper assembled twenty-six poems under the title of *Eclogarum liber*, of which twenty deal with the calendar (nos. VII. 8–23, 25–26 = Schenkl V. 1–18). In addition, there are three “philosophical” poems (Peiper VII. 2–4 = Sch. XXVIII–XXXI), one based on Hesiod (Peiper VII. 5 = Sch. XXXII), one on weights (P. VII. 6 = Sch. XXX), one on the toils of Heracles (P. VII. 24 = Sch. XXXIII) and one on childbirth (P. VII. 7 = Sch. XXXV). What Peiper and Evelyn White regard as the dedicatory poem of the *Eclogues*, P. VII. 1, Schenkl edited as a separate poem, namely a dedication without an attached text, Sch. XXIII. While it is true that the poem to Pacatus does not disclose the nature of the text originally attached to it, I would tend in this case to support Peiper and Evelyn White in regarding all these poems as parts of one collection, as does Pastorino. This is not to exclude the possibility that some poems did circulate at some point separately, as the content list of the lost Veronensis seems to imply (Reeve [above, note 9] 117, nos. 8, 12–14).
libellum? ... at nos inlepidum, rudem libellum 1, 4). In the address to Pacatus, Ausonius asked his trusted friend to “cover up” the poem’s shortcomings. The request for revisions was probably not an idle one or a “polite farce.” Pacatus was surely in a position to appreciate and improve on the drafts sent to him. Be that as it may, Ausonius did not feel the need to supply the text with a proper preface and the dedication hints at neither the contents nor the form of what was to follow.

Yet the need to include both a proper preface and a dedicatory one did arise with the *Ludus Septem Sapientium*. Pacatus, the dedicatee, is consulted about the issue of “publish or perish,” but the request is couched in so many puns that its seriousness is undermined. Not that Pacatus was unable to offer just such criticism. He had been a colleague and a friend of many years and would have performed the task with discretion and efficiency. No indication of the date of dispatch is given in the dedication, aside from its title which points to a terminus post quem of 389, after Pacatus’ proconsulship of Africa. But the poem itself may have been the product of the years of teaching in Bordeaux, and hence composed long before it was sent to Pacatus. Indeed, the *Ludus* has a verse preface of its own which follows the basic guidelines of presenting the subject matter of the text with a brief erudite digression on the ancient theatre. This seems necessary if indeed the *Ludus* had originated as a school material, for the Greek theatre was obviously unfamiliar to students in late Roman Gaul. The dedication to Pacatus, then, forges a link between author and public and between the time of the poem’s composition and its first “public” presentation. The preface, on the other hand, fills the gap of information regarding the form and contents of the poem.

All these functions were performed through the composition of a single prose dedication to a poem entitled *Cipudo Cruciatus*. A letter to Proculus Gregorius, a consular candidate in 383, describes the circumstances of the poem’s composition, its source of poetic inspiration, and even its genre, an eclogue. In spite of the usual protestation of modesty (*mihi praeter lemma nihil placet*), Ausonius clearly expected the praises of his addressee (*certus sum, quodcumque meum scieris, amabis: quod magis spero quam ut laudes*). Gregorius may not have possessed the literary qualification necessary for the type of constructive (and flattering) criticism which Ausonius usually sought. Needless to say, after this dedication, the story of

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52 *Ausonius Drepanio filio, Sch. XXIII. 17–18: ignoscenda teget, probata tradet. Post hunc iudicium timete nulla*, noting the playful tone throughout.
53 Pace Evelyn White, Loeb I xxxv.
54 1–4: *ignoscenda istae an cognoscenda rerais | adteno, Drepani, perlege iudicio. Aequanimus iam te iudice, sive legenda, sive tegenda putes carmina, quae dedimus; 15: correcta magis quam condemnata vocabo; 18: optabo, ut placeam, si minus, ut lateam.*
55 The letter even describes the stages of poetical inspiration and composition: (1) A. sees the picture; (2) A. translates visual impressions into verbal forms; (3) A. sends copies to friends.
the punishment of Cupid starts without further ado. Like the first lines of the *Moselle*, the words of the dedication create an atmosphere in which poet and reader could share in the initial visual experience which had set in motion the process of verbal creativity. In this respect, the dedication and the text complement each other, the one leading into the other.

Specific addressees, as one may surmise, were the recipients of both informal and formal/final copies of Ausonius’ poems. One of their functions was to offer criticism with a view to revisions before publication; another was simply to afford the poet an opportunity to preface his works with either an explanation of its genesis or its vicissitudes. Literary patronage, such as that sought by Martial and Statius, was hardly ever an issue, for by the time Ausonius came to circulate his poems, either privately or publicly, his political, social and economic position guaranteed his work a kindly reception. The dedication rather indicates the spread of a literary network in which the sending, dedicating and the exchange of works acted as an instrument of maintaining *amicitia*.

**Multiple Dedications**

When the *Cento Nuptialis* was sent to Paulus, Ausonius decided to frame it with a lengthy prose dedication at the beginning and a conclusion in which verse and prose sections alternate. This somewhat curious imbalance echoes the work itself in which the pastiche of Virgilian verses is “relieved” by a brief prose interlude preceding the most erotic section of the poem. The *Cento*, as the dedicatory epistle indicates, has an interesting history: It was composed in one day as a response to a challenge by no less a person than the emperor Valentinian I. When the *Cento* was first presented, in the form of an oral recitation, it was suitably headed by a verse dedication to the emperor and his son Gratian. When it was finally dedicated to a fellow poet (Paulus), the *Cento* was preceded by a long exposition on the meaning and the history of the genre, both of which seem quite superfluous as far as Paulus, himself a poet, was concerned. But there was considerable interest among contemporaries in the *Cento* and its possible adaptations to a variety of purposes.56

The lengthy dedication to Paulus enabled its author to explain the circumstances of the poem’s initial presentation when it had been dedicated to the two reigning Augusti. This was surely the prime motivation of the long dedication, written years after the events described. The poem itself may have been written as early as 367/8, at a time when the type of flattery in the preface was particularly useful to poet and addressees alike. In August 367, after a brief illness, Valentinian I promoted his eight-year old son to

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the rank of an Augustus, a constitutional novelty as Ammianus Marcellinus remarked.\textsuperscript{57} In view of the availability of older and much more experienced candidates, and the lack of decisive military victories over the enemies of the empire, the dynasty just established needed all the support it could get. Ausonius' preface to the \textit{Cento} served therefore as propaganda for the Augusti, and as advertisement for a poet who could exercise both talent and discretion. The dedication, composed when circumstances changed, and possibly after the death of Valentinian I in 375 and during the reign of Gratian (375–383), allowed the vain author to name-drop in a "humble" and socially accepted manner, and illustrated his own position and poetic reputation.

By way of apology for trivialising Virgil, Ausonius concluded the \textit{Cento} by citing all the poets who, like himself, mixed the serious with the frivolous. He craved the indulgence of his potential readers by offering Martial's well-known apology of blameless life in spite of blameworthy erotic verses (1. 48). With this ending Ausonius included an autobiographical element which further reinforces the image fostered in the dedication while imbedding in the reader's mind the \textit{jeu d'esprit} in which, after all, the poem had been conceived.

Perhaps the most spectacular example of the use of multiple prefatory pieces is the \textit{Bissula}. The three short poems, and a fragment of a fourth, which at present constitute the whole of the \textit{Bissula}, are prefaced by no less than three dedications, two to the same person (one in prose and one in verse) and one to the general reader. The first is a letter explaining the act of dispatch and offering an apology for stylistic faults, two matters which Ausonius briefly repeats in his verse \textit{praefatio} addressed, like the prose letter, to Paulus. Luckily for Ausonius, the name of his Germanic mistress scans, as does that of her tribe (the Suebi), facts which enabled the poet to introduce her twice, once in each of the dedications. The relatively long prose letter, somewhat out of proportion to the length of the poems enclosed, also introduces Paulus as one initiated into the "mysteries" of Ausonius' poetic sanctuary. Owing to these terms of intimacy Paulus had access to the most private compositions of his "mentor," one of which was now dedicated to him.\textsuperscript{58}

If this was not enough to alert potential readers to the nature of the \textit{Bissula}, Ausonius appended a third dedication, \textit{ad lectorem huic libelli}, in which the public is enjoined to read these verses in the spirit in which they had been written, and preferably after a cup or two of some suitable drink. Under the combined influence of alcohol and light words, even the most sober of readers would be happily plunged into a sleep from which the

\textsuperscript{57} Amm. 27. 6. 16.

\textsuperscript{58} Bissula 1, Ausonius Paulo: poematia, quae in alunnam meam luseram, rudia et incohata ad domesticae solaciun cantilenae, cum sine metu et arcana securitate fruerentur, proferri ad lucem caligantia coegistī.
experience would emerge as a bygone dream. One wonders if this triple dedication had been conceived as a parody on the process of initiation into a *mysterium*, and a series of formal warnings aimed at different levels of *profani*. In the poems themselves, however, there is no trace of parody although it may appear idle to deny that the whole may well have been written tongue in cheek. Be the intent serious or light, the dedications to Paulus reflect the close relationship between author and addressee, particularly in view of the private nature of the verses enclosed. It seems hardly surprising that the *Bissula* and the *Cento*, both the most “erotic” of Ausonius’ poems, were eventually dedicated to Paulus. They would have been ill suited to any of the “political” addressees, when the act of dedication was a calculated move to gain prestige rather than a gesture of friendship.

The collection of poems on various school topics known as the *Technopaegnion* presents a complication. It was dedicated at least twice, once to Pacatus (V) and once to Paulinus (Z), a pupil and friend, and later bishop of Nola, both in prose (XXVII. 1 and 2). This last is now followed by a short poem (3) whose verses start and end with a monosyllable, and by another poem (4), variously entitled *versus monosyllabici terminati exordio libero praefatio* (Sch. XXVII. 4) or *praefatio monosyllabarum tantum in fine positarum* (Peiper XII. 4) and composed in both prose and verse.59 In fact, this is a second dedication to Pacatus who is once more addressed at the very end of the collection, on a final note of polite apology.60

Through the confusion it seems possible to discern several stages of composition and circulation: (a) A poem composed of verses starting and ending with the same syllable (3) was sent with a dedication to a beloved pupil (Paulinus), perhaps when Ausonius was teaching him at Bordeaux, before 366/7.61 The dedication is a model of its sort, organised along the best guidelines of the classical rhetorical preface, stating the title of the work enclosed, its contents, the difficulties involved in the composition, an apology for imperfections, and an invitation to imitate this type of literary effort: indeed, just what one might expect from a teacher to a student. (b) A dedicatory preface (4), not dissimilar in contents and form, was composed in honor of Pacatus, and preceded a collection of poems ending with a monosyllable. Since, however, Pacatus was a colleague and not a pupil, the act of dispatch was anticipating a similar gesture on the part of the dedicatee. The concluding verses of this dedication serve as a sample of what was to

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59 Following Schenkl’s arrangement (XXVII. 4) rather than Peiper’s division of the dedication into two distinct sections, XII. 4 + 5.

60 Sch. XXVII. 13 *(Grammaticomastix)* 21–22: *indulge, Pacate, bonus, doctus, facilis vir,totum opus hoc sparsum, crinis velut Antiphila, pax* (reading of V: Pauline Z). For Evelyn White, Loeb I xi, these are indications of a “deliberate revision.”

61 The phrase *inertis mei inutile opusculum* *(Tech. 3)* does not refer to the years of leisurely retirement in the 380s and early 390s, as is usually assumed. To judge by Ausonius’ usual facility of composition, he would have needed no more than one peaceful weekend to put together sixteen verses.
follow. Both dedications, then, conform to school-book rules and precedents, each discharging the functions usually associated with a rhetorical preface. (c) Years later, the poem sent to Paulinus was combined with those sent to Pacatus to form the present *Technopaegnion*, which was headed by a second prefatory dedication to Pacatus. Why this was necessary remains unclear since, like its predecessors, this epistolary preface comments on the nature of the text enclosed and specifies the title of the entire collection, now extended from a single poem to several poems. If the title of this third dedication (*Ausonius Pacato Proconsuli*) is original and contemporary with the time of composition, the *Technopaegnion* could not have been sent to Pacatus before 389, the date of Pacatus’ African proconsulship. On the whole, the amount of repetition in all three is remarkable, particularly as each is conceived as a smooth and direct transition into the main body of the work.

Just how flexible and virtually autonomous the vehicle of personal dedication or dedicatory preface has become in late antiquity is borne out by the example of Ausonius. For him, the composition and dispatch of a dedication offered an opportunity to “tell the world” about the author, to vaunt his highly-placed contacts, and to impress the readers with poetic versatility if not with context—so much so that many of the dedications can be read on their own, independently of the text to which they were attached. In this respect, it seems useful, if not essential, to draw a clear distinction between the time of the dedicatory presentation and that of the text’s composition. And this is not as self-evident as may at first appear. Editors of Ausonius have traditionally adopted a system of dating which invariably relies on the last datable reference either in the dedications, prefaces, or the texts themselves. Yet, such a method does not take into account all the factors involved in the process of composition, dedication, publication and dissemination.

By way of a brief conclusion, contemporary prefaces by two authors influenced by Ausonius can offer some useful correlations and a point of departure for further study. Prudentius’ preface has already been mentioned. Cast as an autobiography, it fails (deliberately) to refer to the author’s own name, his home and his family. It does contain, albeit in a vague manner, a list of his “earthy” achievements as well as a reference to his written works, such as the *Cathemerion*. Poetry, in the hands of Prudentius, is regarded not as a tool for displaying one’s own status or talent, but as a religious vocation. Nor, obviously, is the preface dedicated to a mortal but to God alone. It is as though Ausonian prefaces were recast as anti-heroic compositions with the author submerging his personality and even individuality in a sea of humility and modesty.

Ausonius’ own grandson, perhaps the dedicatee of the *Protrepticon*, Paulinus of Pella, combined in his prose preface elements found in the prefaces of both Ausonius and Prudentius. The *Eucharisticon*, moulded as a confession and profession of faith, is dedicated to the public, or general
reader, and attempts to explain the reasons behind its composition. As Paulinus explains in the preface, the *Eucharisticon* is an autobiography of an essentially unworthy subject, with no claim to fame in any sense of the word. But the true source of inspiration was God’s unmistakable presence throughout the vicissitudes of his life and in this alone lies the justification of the act of writing. For, in spite of wasted years, this act has in itself the redeeming virtue of reconciling poetry with piety.

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Cyranidea: Some Improvements

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There is much of value in George Panayiotou’s (henceforth P.) recent lexical study of the *Cyranides*. However, a good deal requires correction or deserves supplement. And some of P.’s philological history may be vitiated by his cavalier acceptance of a 1st- or 2nd-century A.D. date for the work. P. seems altogether unaware of the detailed and cogent study by Klaus Alpers which assigns the *Cyranides* to the late 4th century, a fair amount of the book being a redaction of the work of Harpocration, an iatrosothist of the period. On this reckoning, the vocabulary of the *Cyranides* will often follow where P. has it lead. Alpers’ dating is strongly enhanced by Martin West’s disclosure of acrostic references in the *Cyranides* to Magnus and Marcellinus, also unknown to P. Magnus is now generally and plausibly taken to be the celebrated 4th-century doctor Magnus of Nisibis; Marcellinus may or may not be the historian Ammianus Marcellinus. Finally, P. nowhere acknowledges the serious shortcomings of the edition of the *Cyranides* by Dimitris Kaimakis (Meisenheim am Glan 1976) which he uses.

2 In his own words, P. simply takes the date from LSJ and the cognate *Canon of Greek Authors and Works* (New York 1986) designed for the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* by L. Berkowitz and K. A. Squier.
6 Bain and West are tempted by the identification; Bowersock finds it implausible.
7 Trenchantly exposed by Bain 298–99.
ἀγνόστως: This adverb is far commoner in patristic Greek than P. implies, and is there used in senses very close to that of “unawares” or “unknowingly” which P. claims to be unique to the Cyranides (henceforth Cyran).

ἀγριολάχανον: P. ignores a probable occurrence of this rare noun in Palladius, Hist. Laus. 26; true, there is a variant reading, but Lampe accepts our word.

ἀειθαλῆς βοτάνη: P. may well be right in taking these words to signify a particular plant (the houseleek) rather than any kind of green vegetable. But he is perhaps too dogmatic on the matter; also, one should consider such locutions as τῆς ἀειθαλοῦς ἀκάνθης, applied by Clement (Paed. 2. 8) to Christ’s crown of thorns.

ἀερόθεν: According to P., “Cyran. antedates by some centuries the authors cited for this word in the lexica.” Perhaps so. But it ought to be made clear that this adverb is hardly in the lexica; LSJ and Stephanus adduce only Eustathius, and it is not in Lampe, Sophocles, or Du Cange.

ἀμέθυσος: It can be added that this word occurs as a feminine noun in Michael Psellus, De lapidum virtutibus (p. 72, line 20, ed. P. Galigani [Florence 1980]).

ἀπειθέω: P. claims that the construction of this verb with the infinitive in the sense of “to refuse to obey an order to” is unattested in the lexica. But cf. Lampe s.v. 3 and 4 for close parallels in Hom. Clem. and Cyril of Alexandria.

ἀράχνιος: This may not be a new word, as P. maintains, since it is a variant reading at Basil, Hex. 6. 6. It can also be observed that in one form or another the epithet is something of a favourite with Gregory Nazianzenus.

ἀρμενίζω: Even if Cyran. does belong to the 1st or 2nd century, P. is not justified in saying that this word is in “much later” Christian sources: It occurs in Test. Neph. 6. 2 in the Testamenta XII Patriarchum, the Greek version of which is tentatively dated by Lampe (xl) to c. A.D. 50.

ἀρρενοτόκος: P. translates “associated with the birth of male children,” calling it a new meaning, but in point of fact this does not much differ from the sense comported by the epithet in the passages from Aristotle and Christian writers adduced by LSJ and Lampe.

ἀρσενόθηλον: P. censures LSJ for restricting the meaning of this compound to “hermaphrodite,” but overlooks patristic examples (on parade in Lampe) of the requisite sense of considering male and female together.
όχειμαστός: P. correctly observes that this adverbial form is not in the lexica, but might have noted the cognate ὀχειμαστή from Methodius, Symp. 11. 3.

βαμβάκινος: All that P. says about this word is correct. In view of the recorded allotropes and sketchiness of the entries in, say, Stephanus and Du Cange mentioned by P., it is worth subjoining the word’s survival into modern Greek, also the Albanian equivalent, pamuk.

βολβός: P. complains that, of the lexica, only Stephanus records the sense of “eye-ball,” although it is the first meaning given in Lampe’s entry for the word, taken from a work wrongly attributed to John Damascene.

γαλλικόν: P. says that only Sophocles of modern lexicographers records this word, but the same passage from Theophanes the chronicler is adduced by Lampe.

δενδροκολάτης: For completeness’ sake, add the equally rare cognate δενδροκόλας on show once in the late (perhaps 9th-century) writer Meletius, Nat. Hom. 27.

διακλύζομαι: What P. says about the novelty of this verb’s passive use of a lotion used for washing out the mouth seems correct, but one should note the relative frequency in medical writers of the cognate ἄνω διάκλύσιμα for a mouth-wash, also the term διάκλυσις, not in LSJ, apparently unique to Theodore Stud., Epp. 2. 219.

διοκτικόν: P. regards this substantive use in the sense of an apotropaic amulet as new. The claim is not wrong, but the novelty may be tempered by the occurrence of the adjectival form meaning “able to drive away” in the Const. App. 8. 29. 3, a document of the 4th century.

ἐνθδόνως: It should be added to P.’s otherwise adequate account that this adverb occurs at least three times in Johannes Climacus (Scal. 15, 22, 30), clearly something of a personal favourite with this author. Lampe records no other user; the cognate adjective is also infrequent, but has a wider distribution over pagan and Christian writers.

ἐπτάπολος: P. appears correct in calling this a new word. One may detect something of a Christian and/or late Greek influence, given the large number of compounds with this prefix to be found in patristic authors but missing from LSJ.

ἐυστομαχία: It is worth noting that Isidore of Pelusium (Epp. 4. 49) has the cognate adjective in the sense of “having a good digestion”; this slightly tempers the novelty claimed by P. for Cyran.’s use of the noun.
ζωογονέω: P.'s claim that the transitive use of this verb in the sense of "resuscitate" is new is amply refuted by a glance at Lampe's many entries for the word.

ηδύλαλος: P. classifies this proparoxytone adjective as a new word, bearing a passive sense in contrast with the active meaning of the paroxytone form which is equally rare, being reported by LSJ only from an inscription at Amorgos. However, Lampe registers (it is his only example) the proparoxytone in an active sense from Ephraem the Syrian.

καστόριος: For the Latin equivalent of this Greek term for the testicles of a beaver (used for magic and medicine), P. reproduces from Stephanus a passage from Pliny, NH 32. 26. One may add from the same author NH 8. 109: easdem partes sibi ipsi Pontici amputant fibri periculo urgente, ob hoc se peti gnari: castoreum id vocant medicī.

κογγύλη: P.'s information is in order, though the presence of the word in the requisite sense in such vernacular authors as John Malalas and the Paschal Chronicle suggests it was commoner than his notice implies.

κροτῶν: P. finds the unparalleled meaning of "young dog" in this word, since both lemma and entry in this passage (2. 20) of Cyran. have to do with puppies. But he confesses to "serious doubts" about the soundness of the reading. In my opinion, the word (if correct) comports its primary sense of "tick" and the author will be talking about the delousing of dogs. If P. is on the right lines, one might invoke the Albanian word kone for "puppy" to justify a Greek equivalent.

λόσις: P. claims novelty for employment of this noun in the sense of a magical or medicinal antidote, but it is in fact very similar to one of its patristic meanings of a remedy for trouble or difficulties.

μοιρικός: It is not true that this term in the sense of "ordained by destiny" is unique to Cyran.; Lampe gives an example from John Malalas.

μονανδρία: Not a new word, as P. says, since it occurs in John Chrysostom, Ad Vit. Jun. 2 tit. Notice also the cognate verb and adjective, featuring in both pagan and Christian Greek. In addition to the passages jointly adduced by LSJ and Lampe, the adjective can be seen in AP 15. 33. 9 (Arethas).

ὄνειριάξω: P. might have noted the patristic verb ὄνειριάξομαι (not in LSJ) in this connection.

πατέω: The sexual sense of this verb (of roosters mounting hens), apparently unique to Cyran., is independently pointed out by Bain (above, note 4), who also surmises that the usage must have been common and this lonely example only a freak of circumstance.
πελεκάνος: P.’s argument that at least one bird of this name must have been a species with a large beak could have been enhanced by the patristic use of this word (recorded by Lampe) in the figurative sense of an aggressive person.

σπεκλάριον: A propos this word’s sense of “window” in Cyran., P. might have noted the same meaning in patristic Greek of the cognate σπέκλον.

συντυχία: P. says that the meaning of “chance encounter” is a new one for this noun, an odd claim since this is the very first usage recorded in Lampe’s entry, and it is very common in related meanings in patristic Greek.

τεκνοσπορέω: The uniqueness of this verb is probably a statistical freak in view of the existence of cognate noun and adjective.

τριχοποιέω: P.’s documentation of this verb can be strengthened by the lone occurrence of the cognate adjective, in the requisite sense of “hair-producing,” in Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. Opif. 30. 27.

χαριτήσιος: For epigraphic and papyrological examples of this adjective, claimed as a new word by P., see L. R. Palmer, A Grammar of the Post-Ptolemaic Papyri (London 1945) 31, 33.

University of Calgary
Die Aldina der Rhetores Graeci (1508–1509) und ihre handschriftlichen Vorlagen

MARTIN SICHERL

Dem Andenken an Alexander Turyn zu seinem 90. Geburtstage


3 Legrand 85–88.


5 Zu diesem vgl. Legrand 1, S. CXXXI–CLXII; B. Knös, Un ambassadeur de l'hellénisme: Janus Lascaris et la tradition greco-byzantine dans l'humanisme français (Upsala–Paris 1945); Prosopographisches Lexikon der Paläologenzeit 6, 14536.


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7 Geanakoplos 111–66; er war seit 1503 Vertreter des griechischen Lehrstuhls der Universität Padua, von 1505 bis gegen Mitte 1509, als die Universität geschlossen wurde, dessen Inhaber.
weiten Auffangbecken die Ströme der Rhetorik gesammelt hätten, "haben wir, mein lieber Musuros, mit viel Arbeit und Mühe an Hand der Abschriften, auf die wir gestoßen sind, für die Philologen emendiert."


Von den Handschriften, die der Herausgeber der Aldina zugrunde gelegt hat, haben sich vier in der Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris gefunden, darunter die, die Ianos Laskaris dem Aldus Manutius als Druckvorlage übergeben hatte; die vierte freilich ist nur der Rest eines umfassenderen Manuskripts, aus dem der größere Teil für den Druck herausgelöst wurde und dann verloren ging. Aber auch von den fehlenden kann der Ort in der Überlieferung noch

8 Vgl. H. Rabe, Aphantonii Progymnasmata, Rhetores Graeci 10 (Lipsiae 1926) S. IX.

I. Der erste Band der Aldina (1508)

1. Aphthonios und Hermogenes


¹¹ Wendel 2230.
¹³ Rabe 333.
¹⁵ S. unten S. 134 mit A. 91.
2. Die Rhetorik und Poetik des Aristoteles
und die Alexander-Rhetorik


18 Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles (München 1960) 191 ff.

Randnoten sind nach Repertorium (nächste Anm.) 2, Nr. 197 nicht, wie Lobel und Gudeman meinten, von Ianos Laskaris.


28 Handschriftliche Vorlagen 24 ff.
Manutius, der diesem nach eigenem Bekunden die Handschrift für die Aristoteles-Ausgabe zur Verfügung gestellt hatte.\(^{29}\)


\(^{32}\) Handschriftliche Vorlagen 31 f.
aufgelöst worden und deshalb anders als die Druckvorlagen des Aristoteles, des Euripides und anderer vollständig erhalten geblieben.33


3. Sopatros und Kyros


Dieser Papiercodex (320 × 215 mm, scr. 205 × 130 mm, ll. 30) setzt sich aus zwei Teilen zusammen, die von zwei verschiedenen Schreibern stammen, der erste (ff. 1–143) von Kaisar Strategos,37 der f. 142v subskriibierte (Majuskeln in Gold): θεοῦ τὸ δόρον ἤδε Καίσαρος πόνος, der zweite (ff. 144–240) von Bartolomeo Zanetti.38 Hier interessiert nur der erste. Er besteht aus vierzehn Quinionen (αον-ιδον), deren erstem das letzte Blatt fehlt (ff. 1–139); die ff. 140–43 waren ursprünglich gewiß ein Binio. Die Blätter sind im Falz durch Papierstreifen verstärkt. Am unteren Rand rechts ist er von späterer Hand nach Lagen und Blättern von A–A 8, B–B 8 usw. bis S 7 (= f. 139) foliiert. Das erste Blatt des ersten Quaternio fehlte also bereits, als diese Folierung vorgenommen wurde. Sie ist

34 So bei den meisten Druckvorlagen der Aristoteles-Ausgabe (vgl. Handschriftliche Vorlagen 33, 39 f., 44, 52) und der Aristophanes-Ausgabe (vgl. „Die Editio princeps des Aristophanes“ 212 f.).
37 Repertorium 2, Nr. 292.
38 Repertorium 2, Nr. 45.
kennzeichnend für die Handschriften aus dem Besitz des Gianfrancesco Asolano,39 dessen Exlibris A me Io. Francisco Asulano auf f. 1r unten zu lesen ist. Durch die Wasserzeichen wird die Entstehung des Codex in die Zeit um 1500 verwiesen: 1. ff. 1–109, 140–43 Kreis mit Stern; am nächsten kommt Briquet 3057 (30 × 42r. Regensburg 1496; Venedig 1493); 2. ff. 110–39 (3 Quinionen) Ochsenkopf ähnlich Briquet 15376 (33 × 44. Ratenberg 1498), aber mit Kontermarke M in der Blattecke. Der Text ist von Kaiser Strategos wie üblich sorgfältig geschrieben, mit breiten Rändern, Zierleisten (f. 1r, 142r), Titel, Zwischen- und Initialen in Gold. Keine manus correctrix.

Dieser Teil des Codex erweist sich als Druckvorlage nicht nur durch die üblichen Umbruchvermerke und Fingerabdrücke mit Druckerschwärze, sondern auch durch Anweisungen an den Setzer. Die Seitenumbrücke, die den ganzen Text des Sopatros und Kyros durchziehen, haben die Form von gebrochenen Linien (Alineas) quer durch den ganzen Schriftspiegel, die Seiten sind mit Griffel und Tinte notiert. Auch hier gibt es Verschiebungen,40 so bei t 10 und t 12; die Aldina stimmt dann mit der Verschiebung überein. Interessanter sind die Anweisungen für den Setzer, alle auf italienisch (vermutlich weil er Latein nicht verstand). Sie beziehen sich auf die äußere Gestaltung des Schriftbildes und Auszeichnung durch Majuskeln. Letztere wird angewiesen durch Einrahmung der betreffenden Wörter und beigeschriebenes Maius(cole), Mai oder einfach M (ff. 1r, 4r, 5r). Bei der Initiale auf f. 1r steht principio, im Druck der in den Aldinen freie Raum, darin α als Initiale. Auf f. 86r ist der goldene Titel (in der Zeile) in der üblichen Weise eingerahmt und am Rand mit dem Vermerk una riga da per si versehen; entsprechend bildet er in der Aldina in Majuskeln eine Zeile für sich, ebenso f. 102r, ähnlich f. 136r (Randtitel). Auf f. 89r ist bei dem eingerahmten goldenen Titel auf dem Rand vermerkt: Con quadrantini; in der Aldina steht der Titel in Majuskeln in einer Zeile für sich. Auf f. 17r ist bei dem eingerahmten und mit M versehenen εμπίπτον στοχασιός auf dem Rand ebenfalls Quadrantini zu lesen, beides ist aber durchgestrichen, in der Aldina steht es aber doch in Majuskeln; ebenso ist f. 18r verfahren. Auf f. 139r ist τέλος τῶν τῶν σω(πάτρου) eingerahmt, auf dem Rand steht Una c(od)a, in der Aldina das Ganze in Majuskeln; ebenso ist es auf f. 142r, nur ist hier bei der letzten Zeile des Kyrotextes auf dem Rand Coda und darunter vom Anweiser selbst τέλος Κύρου περί διαφοράς στάσεως geschrieben und eingerahmt. Diese Anweisungen stammen offenbar von Demetrios Dukas wie in Paris, gr. 2921.

Eine Probekollation von ff. 1r–2r (ἐκφυγε τὴν ἀθηναίων) ergab außer κατορθώμασι cod. κατορθώμασιν Ald. keine Abweichungen des Druckes

40 S. oben S. 115 mit Anm. 31.
von der Handschrift. Es sind also auch im stehenden Satz keine Korrekturen
nach einem anderen Textzeugen vorgenommen worden.

Schon Stephan Glöckner hatte gesehen,41 daß der von Ianos Laskaris
von seiner zweiten Reise nach Griechenland, zu der er im Frühjahr 1491
aufgebrochen war, mitgebrachte Sopatros im heutigen Laur. 58, 21
enthalten ist. Er bildet darin den zweiten, ursprünglich selbständigen Teil
Schreibern stammende Papierhandschrift des 14., vielleicht auch noch des
36 bzw. 37 ist in einer Weise beschädigt, wie sie bei ungebundenen
Manuskripten zu beobachten ist. Die Auffindung dieser Handschrift hatte
Laskaris schon im Juli 1491 dem Inhaber des griechischen Lehrstuhls am
Gymnasium von Florenz brieflich angezeigt; in der Aufzählung der Bücher,
auf die er auf dieser Reise gestoßen ist, wird er so beschrieben: Σωπάτρος
διαίρεσις τῶν ζητημάτων, βιβλίων ἀξιολογοτάτον καὶ ἀναγκαίων
εἴπερ τι ρητορευμένων, und hinzugefügt: καὶ τούτων τὸν μὲν
Σωπάτρον ἐμὲν ἑωθημένοι, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἀντίγραφα λαβεῖν οὐκ
ημελήσαμεν.42 Im Reisetagebuch des Ianos Laskaris, vat. gr. 1412, ist er
auf f. 67v im πίναξ τῶν βιβλίων τοῦ Λασκάρου ἀπερ ἔχει παρ’
ἐαυτῷ αἱ Σοπάρτου διαίρεσις ζητημάτων verzeichnet.43 Aus dieser
Handschrift stammt der Paris. gr. 2976, eine Papierhandschrift aus dem Ende
des 15. Jh. mit der Subskription (f. 321r) τέλος εἰληφέν ἐν φλωρεντία,
und einem Adler, sehr ähnlich Harlinger Aigle 29 (aus dem Jahre 1489), als
Wasserzeichen. Der Schreiber ist nicht, wie Omont und danach Glöckner
meinen, Ianos Laskaris, sondern nach dem Urteil von E. Gamillscheg sein
Schüler Markos Musuros;44 Laskaris war nur sein Besitzer, wie sein
Vermerk auf dem Recto des ersten Papiervorsatzblattes zeigt: Λτ. No XI
Χα,45 und auch gewiß der Auftraggeber. Anscheinend zu diesem Zweck hatte
Laskaris das Antigraphon aus der Mediceischen Bibliothek ausgeliehen, in
deren Leihregister am 25. August 1492 vermerkt ist: hebi io Joanni Lascari
ad impressi li infrascripti libri, darunter unter Nr. 91 Sopatrum.46 Von
diesem Parisinus stammen alle übrigen Renaissance-Handschriften ab,
darunter unser Paris. gr. 2924, den Kaisar Strategos gewiß ebenfalls in
Florenz geschrieben hat.47 Mit etwa 80 weiteren Handschriften aus dem

41 Das Folgende gibt im wesentlichen die Ausführungen von Glöckner S. 15–17 wieder;
sie werden aber, wo nötig, berichtigt oder ergänzt.
42 Legrand 2, 323 f.
43 K. K. Müller, "Neue Mitteilungen über Ianos Lascaris und die Mediceische
Bibliothek," Centralbl. f. Bibliothekswesen 1 (1884) 408.
44 Repertorium 2, Nr. 359.
45 Nicht identifiziert von N. Παπατριαντασφύλλου-Θεοδωρίδη (oben A. 22), S.
129, Nr. 75.
46 Archivio Storico Italiano ser. III, 21 (1875) 289.
literature and palaeography in honor of Alexander Turyn (Urbana, Ill. 1974) 596 f.
Besiitz des Gianfrancesco Asolano, darunter den noch zu behandelnden Druckvorlagen der Kommentare zu Hermogenes, Paris. gr. 2921 und 2960, wurde er 1542 durch Guillaume Péllicier, den Botschafter Franz’ I. von Frankreich in Venedig (1539–1542), für die Bibliothèque du Roi erworben;48 unter Heinrich II. (1547–1559) erhielt er seinen heutigen Einband.49

4. Die übrigen Schriften des ersten Bandes

Den letzten Teil des ersten Bandes der Aldina nehmen 17 meist kleinere rhetorische Schriften verschiedener Verfasser, zumeist Spezialschriften zu Teilgebieten der Rhetorik, ein:


3. Dionysios von Halikarnassos, Περὶ συνθέσεως ὑνομάτων (pp. 507–44), edd. H. Usener und L. Radermacher, Opuscula 2 (Lipsiae 1904) 1–143.


5. Des Alexandros (Numeniu) Schrift Περὶ τῶν τῆς διανοίας σχημάτων καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς λέξεως σχημάτων (pp. 574–88), ed. Walz 8, 421–86; Spengel, Rhetores Graeci 3 (Lipsiae 1856) 7–40.


48 H. Omont, Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes 46 (1885) 624; Catalogues des manuscrits de Fontainebleau sous François I et Henri II (Paris 1889) VI, XXIV; S. 161, Nr. 483; L. Delisle, Le Cabinet des manuscrits 1 (Paris 1868) 158.
49 Vgl. J. Guigard, Nouvel armorial du bibliophile 1 (Paris 1890) 96.


\(^{52}\) Rhein. Mus. 72 (1917/18) 121; Ausgabe S. VIII f.

\(^{53}\) Repertorium 1, Nr. 73.

\(^{54}\) S. oben S. 114.


II. Der zweite Band der Aldina (1509)


56 Repertorium 1, Nr. 156.
57 S. unten S. 134 mit A. 91.
1. Die Prolegomena zu Aphthonios


60 Vgl. Walz 2, S. III f.
61 S. unten S. 130 ff.
62 S. oben S. 112.
63 Auf diese Weise sind uns nur Bruchstücke der Druckvorlagen der Ausgaben des Aristoteles und Theophrast (1495–1498), des Aristophanes (1498), des Euripides (1503), und auch sie nur durch einen besonderen Umstand erhalten geblieben, vgl. dazu die in Anm. 31 aufgeführten Arbeiten.
64 Ungenau sagt Walz (2, S. III): Primo loco posui eum [commentarium], quem Aldus secundo Rhetorum Graecorum voluminis tredicim foliis pagina destituit praefixit, und numeriert in seiner Ausgabe diese 13 Blätter durchlaufend, das Recto jeweils mit A, das Verso mit B.

2. Die Scholien zu den Prolegomena des Hermogenes und der 'Dreimänner-Kommentar'

Auf die Prolegomena zu Aphthonios folgt die *Iσαγωγὴ σχολίων ἐκ διαφόρων τεχνογράφων εἰς τὰ προλεγόμενα τῆς Ἐρμογένους ῥητορικῆς* (pp. 1–16), ed. Walz 4, 1–38; H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge (Rhetores Graeci 14)* (Lipsiae 1931) 258–96; daran schließt sich *Syrinæus καὶ Σωπάτρου καὶ Μαρκελλίνου εἰς στάσεις τοῦ Ἐρμογένους* (pp. 16–351), des. mutilum 351, 4 διαφέρει. ὃτι ἐν, ed. Walz 4, 39–846.


67 Walz 4, S. VI; Rabe, *Rhein. Mus.* 64 (1909) 584 ff.; *Prolegomenon Sylloge (Rhetores Graeci 14)* (Lipsiae 1931) S. LXXVIII f.


68 H. Rabe, Rhein. Mus. 64 (1909) 584; Prolegomenon Sylloge S. LXXVII ff.; Analyse der Eisagoge bei Rabe 578–84.
70 Es war die № 3 de la Xma; nicht identifiziert von N. Паппаприанакафюллου–Θεοδωρίδη (oben A. 22) S. 130, Nr. 131. Im Пίνακ τῶν βυβλίων τοῦ Δασκάρεος, ἀπερ ἔχει παρ’ ἑαυτῷ (K. K. Müller, Centralbl. f. Bibliothekswesen 1 [1884] 407), ist er der 5. Titel: Συριανός, Ὀσιατρός, Μαρκελλίνος εἰς τὰς στάσεις, περ<γαμηνύν>); vgl. Rabe, Rhein. Mus. 64 (1909) 585; Prolegomenon Sylloge S. LXXVI.
72 Vgl. meine Abhandlung Die griechischen Erstausgaben des Vettore Trincavelli (im Druck).


Daß der Codex als Druckvorlage gedient hat, zeigen außer den Anweisungen für den Setzer dessen übliche Umbruchvermerke und zahlreiche leichtere und größere Fingerabdrucke durch Druckerschwärze, die über Strecken, besonders im Anfang, auch fehlen. Die Vermerke sind schonender vorgenommen als beim Sopatros- und Kyros-Text im Paris. gr. 2924 und scheinen teilweise zu fehlen. Der Setzer bediente sich dazu eines Griffels, mit dem er im Text den Seitenumbruch durch das Zeichen Γ markiert und auf dem Rand mit arabischen Ziffern die Seiten der einzelnen Lagen vermerkt. Nur bei der ersten Seite der neuen Lage gibt er auch die Lagenzahl, so auf f. 16v p+ b = prima (pagina) der zweiten Lage. Wie hier so stimmt auch sonst meist der Vermerk mit dem Seitenumbruch der Aldina überein, aber der älteren ist der Umbruch auch verschoben worden, so bei (a)5, bei (a)16, wo er zwei Zeilen zu früh steht; bei (b)10 ist er um sechs Zeilen verschoben.

73 Vgl. Omont, Catalogue des manuscrits de Fontainebleau (oben A. 48), S. 68, Nr. 195.
Im Druck weggelassen sind außer den roten Argumenta auf dem Rand des Codex auch jeweils jene Scholien, die wie schon im Paris. gr. 2923 in kleinerer Schrift auf den Rändern stehen, aus dem sie Walz im Apparat abgedruckt hat, vgl. Walz 4, S. VII und 72 f., A. 6, 8, 9; 79, A. 40; 85, A. 8; 90, A. 10; 95, A. 7; 126, A. 1; 152, A. 5; 159, A. 1; 171, A. 1; 173, A. 2 (omissio kakaóplastov); 213, A. 9; 215, A. 11. Es folgen bis 709, A. 35 noch weitere acht Stellen. Hingegen wurden die roten Verfassernamen (συριστον, σωπότρου, μορκελλίνου, meist abgekürzt) in den Text gemäß der Anweisung des Editors in Majuskeln inkorporiert.

Der Herausgeber, Demetrios Dukas, hat das Manuskript für den Druck textkritisch bearbeitet. Schon vor mehr als hundert Jahren hat Max Treu eines der Druckmanuskripte der Moralia Plutarchs, das der gleiche Demetrios Dukas für die Aldina von 1509, also um dieselbe Zeit wie die Rhetores Graeci, bearbeitet hat, entdeckt, den Ambros. C 195 sup. Zu einigen der darin enthaltenen Schriften habe er nach Treu Korrekturen gehabt, er habe aber den Text an vielen Stellen auch konjektural zu emendieren versucht. Seine Kritik sei sehr ungleich; oft sorgfältig, oft flüchtig; manche offenkundigen Schreibfehler habe er einfach stehen gelassen. Eine ähnliche Verfahrensweise läßt sich im Paris. gr. 2921 feststellen. Seine Eingriffe in den Text erscheinen, von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, erst mit dem Kapitel Διαλέξεως τῶν στάσεων (s. 81* = 203, 19 Walz; S. 36, 6 Rabe). Bis dahin ist die Aldina ein einfacher Abdruck der Vorlage samt allen ihren Fehlern (einschließlich von Itazismen), denen sie neue hinzufügt; von S. 1–20, 21 W. habe ich deren mehr als ein Dutzend gezählt. Die dann einsetzenden und sich bis zum Ende des Codex durchziehenden Eingriffe finden sich in Text und auf den Rändern, sowohl in den Hermogenes-Abschnitten wie im Kommentar. Die einfachsten sind neben Streichungen von Dittographien die Auflösungen der paläographischen Sigel für μάρτυρες (325, 5, 12; 326, 16, 21, 27), für ὁ ἄνδρες ἄνθρωποι (205, 20; 206, 2; 421, 24; 524, 17; 539, 8; 736, 13; 752, 3 f.; 752, 18 f.); für ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί (517, 16); für κεφαλαίοις (737, 18).

Die Varianten sind nicht selten mit Zusätzen versehen, die sie als Konjekturen erscheinen lassen; solche Zusätze finden sich ausschließlich bei Textvarianten zum Kommentar, nicht zu den Hermogenes-Abschnitten.

75 Vgl. das Vorwort des Dukas bei Botfield 281 f.; Legrand 1, 92 f.; darin heißt es: Τοιούτους μὲν οὖν ἡξιώθησε δωρεὰς (der Ausgabe der Moralia) "Ἀλλὰ χρησιμοτυπώς, ἢμον τε διορθοῦντων.


77 So f. 85' (214, 18–22) τὸ μὲν γὰρ — ἄδιδον ὁ ἔλεγχος mit dem Vermerk idem bis postium est; f. 91' (227, 23) ἄλλα φαίμεν — ξέτησις; f. 191' (288, 26) τὸ πρόγμα γὰρ μεταλαμβάνοντες u. a. Interessant ist bei der erstgenannten die Genese der Dittographie durch das wiederholte ἔλεγχος des Textes. Der Schreiber sprang von 214, 24 ἄλλο ἔλεγχος zurück auf 18 ἔλεγχος und fuhr fort mit τὸ μὲν γὰρ bis 22 ἄδιδον ὁ ἔλεγχος; von hier sprang er auf 24 ἔλεγχος und fuhr dementsprechend fort mit ὁ μὲν ἔλεγχος.
Besonders häufig ist m(ich) ν(ide)tu, gelegentlich ausgeschrieben, meist aber abgekürzt: 206, 10 οὐκ ἑλάττων; ωὐκ ἑλάττω; 228, 24 γένηται: 

gegenwärtig; 283, 5 ἦττον (fehlte im Codex); 307, 8 ἔχουση; ἔχουσαν; 328, 14 ἐξασθενεῖ: ἐξασθενεῖσθαι; 427, 30 ἐπίγειοι; ἐπιγέιοι; 443, 31 skεψαςθεῖ: skέψασθε; 447, 13 τοιοῦτω: τοιοῦτον; 452, 14 αὐτὸν: αὐτόν; 466, 11 ταῦτα: ταύτης; 519, 18 παραλλομένον: παρα- 

βαλλόμενον; dann sic ν(ide)tu: 228, 26 ἢρεισαν ἐναι ἀποκτεῖναι: vel ὦσαν ἀποκτεῖναι, vel ἐναι καὶ, ἀπο--; 737, 14 εἰλύσως; sic icious: 286, 1 ἑ λέγετε λέγει γὰρ ἐχει; sic est opus leg(ere): 273, 13 σωμβαλῶν: συλλαβῶν; 222, 25 ist das erste οὐ gestrichen, und auf dem 

Rand ist vermerkt: m(ich) ν(ide)tu: sine negatione rectius legi; ferner forsitian: 558, 28 δεινοῦς: δεινός; 592, 15 οἰωδήποτε: τοιοῦτε ποτε; 592, 25 ἀλλ' ἐξίσον ἢν: ἀλλ' ἐξίν; 598, 27 ἢ ῥήτωρ σωμάν; fortasis: 507, 10 βλέπαι (Minuskelverlesung): κλέψαι. Auch den sachlichen Fehler des Kommentars 752, 13—14 δευτέρῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθισκῶν kann Dukas von sich aus richtiggestellt haben: πρώτῳ 

kata Φιλίππου.

Auch die übrigen Korrekturen im Kommentar konnte Dukas selber finden. Sie sind im übrigen nicht sehr zahlreich; ich habe von f. 211, 20— 

355, 12 etwa 20 gezählt, und größenteils sind es ganz leichte Eingriffe wie 

Orthographica oder kleine Ergänzungen wie 212, 15 θάπτων θάπτουνος; 

226, 26 εἰ δὴ: εἰ δεῖ; 230, 15 βουλοῦνται: βουλεύονται; 232, 5/6 ὁ 

dικαιοσύνη: ὁ δικαιοσύνης; 249, 26 ἢ τὸν: εἰ τὸν; 250, 10 αἰτή: αἰτεῖν (αἰτή 

Walz); 256, 28 ἀνάγνωσ: ἀνάγνωσι (nach dem Hermogenes-Abschnitt 256, 5— 

7 und dem Kommentar ebd. 14, 17, 18, 20); 261, 15 ἀπολαβὲν: 

ἀποβαλεῖν; 261, 31 χρῆται: χρῆσαί; 267, 16 τῆ μῆρ: τῆς μητρός; 283, 14 ἔχροι: ἔχθροι; 285, 11 δίκας suppl.: 290, 11 μοῦσα: μοῦσα (nach Z. 

7); 318, 1 ἢ τὸν: θατοῦν; 322, 9 τις post συκοφαντῶν suppl.: 331, 31 πρωῖν: προῖν; 333, 12/13 οἷον μωμένον τινὶ κόρην del. (om. Ald., habet Walz e cod. 2923); 351, 5 τοῦ προσώπου τὰ κεφάλαια post 

οἰκειότερὸν ἔστι (cf. 351, 10 del.); 355, 12 ἔχρι suppl. (nach dem 

Hermogenes-Abschnitt 354, 12, 17, 19, 26). Daß Dukas aufs Konjizieren angewiesen war, ergibt sich schon aus der geringen Zahl von Kopien des 

dicken Wältzers; er hatte offenbar kein Korrektiv zur Verfügung. Gelegentlich freilich schlug er auch ein Zitat nach; so, wenn er 206, 6 ἀναγκαῖον ἣν μοι durch ἀνάγκη κάμοι (Dem. 18, 34; vgl. Syrianus ed. 

Rabe 52, 21/2) ersetzt.

Der Herausgeber hat jeweils angezeigt, wo die Namen der 

Kommentatoren, die im Codex in Rot auf dem Rande stehen, in den Text 

gesetzt werden sollten. Er hat aber auch nicht selten diese Namen in 

Schwarz ergänzt; sie fehlen dann regelmäßig schon im Archetyp, dem Paris.
Ihr konjunkturaler Ursprung erhielt aber auch aus ähnlichen Zusätzen, wie wir sie bei den Textvarianten gefunden haben: 590, 21 si ν(idetu)r συριανός; 591, 10 συριανός si ν(idetu)r; 594, 31 σωπάτρου si ν(idetu)r; 542, 14 σωπάτρου και μαρκελλίνου si ν(idetu)r; 531, 24 quod videtur ponendum...ui alibi συριανός, σωπάτρου και μαρκελλίνου; 430, 23 hic deficit sive Sopatri sive Marcellini; 444, 6 hic vel Sopatri vel Syriani; 466, 30 hic Syriani sive Sopatri. Eine andere Hand, wohl die des Aldus Manutius selbst,\(^{78}\) schrieb auf f. 16\(^{v}\) (39, 1–3) in den Zwischenraum zwischen der Eisagoge und dem Kommentar zu den "Ermojévous, ebenso auf f. 107\(^{v}\) (259, 11) συριανός και σωπάτρου.


\(^{78}\) Vgl. damit die Seiten- und Buchtitel in den Vorlagen der Editio princeps des Aristoteles, Handschriftliche Vorlagen A. 79 zu S. 31.


Neben diesen Zeichen gibt es des öfteren auch schriftliche Anweisungen für den Setzer von derselben Hand wie im Paris, gr. 2924 (oben S. 117) und die an den Lücken unseres Codex (oben S. 125). Neben der Überschrift unter einer Zierleiste f. 277v (647, 10), 323v (766, 19), 342v (813, 15) und 354v (843, 5) steht am Rand *Capitulo*. Im Druck ist dann der Anfangsbuchstabe des ersten Wortes ausgerückt. Des öfteren wird mit *riga da per si* (f. 296v = 691, 5 f. zweimal; 297v = 696, 1; 298r = 698, 14; 298v = 699, 13) angezeigt, daß sie eine Zeile für sich bilden soll. Wiederholt werden Hermogenes-Abschnitte oder -Zitate neben den üblichen Anführungs-

79 Rhein. Mus. 64 (1909) 587.
80 S. oben S. 112.
81 Dazu unten S. 134.
zeichnen mit testo gekennzeichnet, so 223, 3; 224, 5 f., 18, 20 f.; 309, 7; 482, 27; 486, 23; 217, 29 ist oūδὲ μίαν unterstrichen, daneben steht non est in testo.

3. Der Hermogenes-Kommentar des Maximos Planudes


Der Codex setzt sich aus heterogenen Teilen zusammen, die alle aus dem Besitz des Gianfrancesco Asolano kommen, wie sein üblicher Besitzvermerk A me Francisco Asulano auf f. 1v, 40f., 66v und 94r, anzeichnet.

83 Vgl. Walz 4, S. IX f.
84 Vgl. dazu Walz 5, S. 231, A. 1.

Um mehrere Jahrzehnte früher ist der Rest des Codex geschrieben, der die rhetorischen Schriften enthält und hier in erster Linie interessiert. Die einstige Selbständigkeit dieses Teils, der die ff. 94–170 (+ 170a, leer und unnumeriiert) umfaßt (scr. 225 × ca. 120, II. 32), erhielt auch aus einer alten Folierung, die wie im Paris. gr. 29211 in der äußersten Ecke rechts oben steht, aber größtenteils dem Messer des Buchbinders zum Opfer gefallen ist. Er setzt sich aus Lagen wechselnden Umfangs zusammen, die außer der erwähnten Zählung noch Reste von griechischen Kustoden des Schreibers mit Blattzahlen aufweisen; ff. 94–103 (P 1) Quinio; 104–15 (Q 1; β) Senio, vielleicht mit unregelmäßiger Zusammensetzung; 116–25 (R 1; γ, γ III) Quinio; 126–35 (S 1; δ, δ II, δ III) Quinio; 136–43 (T 1; ε) Quaternio; 144–55 (V 1, c, c VI) Senio; 156–65 (X 1, X 2, X 10; ζ, ζ II, ζ III, ζ IIII, ζ V) Quinio; 166–[170a] (Y 1; κζ, κζ II, κζ III) Ternio. Das Wasserzeichen ist ein schwach sichtbarer, aber einwandfrei identifizierbarer Vogel = Briquet 12135 (34,5 × 47r. Verona 1491. Var. ident. Verona 1492–1502) = Harlfinger, Oiseau 13, nur auf f. 165 ein Vogel = 12190 (44 × 59r.


87 Omont, Catalogue des mss. grecs de Fontainebleau (oben A. 48) Nr. 173 (S. 61).
Verona 1499). Geschrieben ist der ganze Teil vom selben Kopisten, wenn auch wohl nicht in einem Zuge; die ff. 94–164, also der Kommentar zu den στάσεις, mit hellerer, der Rest mit dunklerer Tinte. Es ist nach SubskRIPTION auf f. 170r Franciscus Bernardus (aus Brescia), der seine Kopie im August 1491 in Verona beendet. 88


Daß dieser Teil des Codex in der Druckerei gewesen ist, ergibt sich aus einer Umbruchanzeige auf f. 159r und Fingerabdrücken mit Druckerschwärze auf den ff. 157r, 163v, 164r, 164v und vielleicht schon 133v. Der Umbruchvermerk besteht in einem waagrechten Strich unter der neunten Zeile, der nach ιεροῖς μοιχεία τὰς ἰδιωτικὰς οἰκίας κατὰ (Walz 4, 796, 18) über die Zeile springt und dabei κατάλαπτοντες durchschneidet; am Rand steht X/10. Der Schnitt entspricht genau dem Umbruch pp. 329/30 der Aldina (im Druck sind die Seiten 328 und 329 irrtümlich mit 228 und 229 bezeichnet). Aber schon nach der vierten Zeile finden sich links und rechts ein Querstrich und auf dem Rand X 10 mit Bleistift oder besser Griffel. Der Umbruch ist also, wie oft in den Vorlagen der Aldinen zu beobachten, 90 verschoben worden. Das Textstück, in dem der Umbruch vermerkt ist, ist das Scholion zum Abschnitt 81, 1–82, 3 Rabe und steht


90 S. oben S. 115 mit A. 31.


scheint ebenso verloren zu sein wie jenes Doppelblatt, auf dem das 'anonyme' Scholion Walz 4, 626, 5–628, 19 stand; es ist jedenfalls nicht mit den Handschriften des Gianfrancesco d'Asola nach Paris gekommen.


Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster

91 Vgl. Handschriftliche Vorlagen 68 ff.
92 S. oben A. 33.
93 Zur Bibliothek des Aldus Manutius, die besonders reich an griechischen Büchern war, vgl. Geanskoplos (oben A. 2) 263.
An Archaeologist on the Schliemann Controversy*

WOLFGANG SCHINDLER

I

Heinrich Schliemann (1822–1890) was a product of the nineteenth century who remains unforgotten today. It is remarkable that until the early 1970s he was admired in precisely the way which he had sought in his own lifetime. For decades, for almost a century, his accomplishments were repeatedly praised. He had risen from the most modest origins to become a man of great wealth and the companion of kings, queens, an emperor and the Prime Minister of England. And, as the excavator of Troy and Mycenae, he became the founder of a new scholarly discipline, modern archaeology, that is field-archaeology. Along with Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–1768), the founder of archaeology as art history, a permanent place of honor has been reserved for him in the history of scholarship.1

I wish to state at the start that this place of honor will never be denied him, not even by those who, since the 150th birthday of Schliemann, began to interpret critically his autobiographical writings. The new impetus thus given to Schliemann research, its discoveries and the resulting controversies, which the American archaeologist Machteld Mellinck in 1985 termed “psychological warfare against Schliemann,”2 will be the center of my address.

For my part I do not speak as an uncommitted observer. I am involved in these controversies. The disagreements aroused by them have by no means subsided. The best proofs of this assertion are the two international conferences, one held at Bad Homburg in December 1989 and the other at Athens during Easter 1990, in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of

*An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign as the second Oldfather Lecture on 7 September 1990.

1 This place in the history of his discipline was not disputed by his first critic: see W. M. Calder III, "Schliemann on Schliemann: A Study in the Use of Sources," *GRBS* 13 (1972) 335–53.

Schliemann’s death. I shall evaluate the results of the first two conferences here.

II

To better understand the two conferences it will be useful to sketch briefly the progress of Schliemann research during the 70s and 80s. Before the early 70s, when attention was directed to the life and work of this man, it meant admiration for his accomplishments and trust in his writings. For the brilliant impulse to a new evaluation of the man which the famous Jewish biographer Emil Ludwig had presented in his Schliemann life of 1932 had been forgotten. The whitewashing of the hero demanded by Nazi ideologists, and carried out by the Mecklenburg schoolmaster Ernst Meyer, had destroyed the opportunity for an historical view of Schliemann for more than forty years. How very much this process was influenced by Meyer’s biography and his editions of selected letters (that is, the sources) was made clear by W. M. Calder in his Bad Homburg paper. No defender of Meyer in this regard has yet emerged, if one ignores the swarm of uncritical Schliemann defenders who preserve the picture of Meyer’s hero that has now become canonical and deny every critical attack against it.

A decisive new impetus for a realistic conception of the context in which Schliemann constructed his understanding of himself began with the now legendary midnight lecture in the pastor’s house in Neubukow on 6 January 1972, the 150th birthday of Heinrich Schliemann. It was given by


4 Proof of this continued admiration for Schliemann and his accomplishments among much else is H. A. Stoll, Der Traum von Troja: Lebensroman Heinrich Schliemanns (Leipzig 1956).


7 E. Meyer, Briefe von Heinrich Schliemann (Berlin–Leipzig 1936) and Heinrich Schliemann, Briefwechsel I (Berlin 1953); II (Berlin 1958).


Professor W. M. Calder III, a leading pioneer of the new Schliemann research. The lecture was delivered by Calder after Heinrich Alexander Stoll (the Schliemann biographer) had earlier on the same evening in the Markt gaststätte presented the official anniversary address.

What was exciting and new was that Calder under the title "Schliemann on Schliemann" first checked critically what Schliemann wrote about himself. First he looked at what Schliemann said and then sought to control it by adding independent contemporary sources. What emerged was exciting. The historicity of "The Dream of Troy" was put in doubt. Schliemann maintained that already in his childhood in Ankershagen, where he lived from the age of two until nine, he had sharpened his pick and spade to dig out Troy. Already in these youthful years he had formed the plan later to excavate Troy and his whole life long had pursued this dream. Suddenly this was no longer the truth. On February 2nd of the same year in Berlin voices were raised that doubted the historicity of the Dream of Troy during a colloquium held at the Academy there.

To this youthful romance belonged the tale of his love for Minna Meincke, his young playmate, whose role Schliemann later exaggerated. What was most striking was the fact that in Rostock there existed no dissertation written in ancient Greek with which in 1869 Schliemann could have earned his doctorate. There was only a vita of about eight pages written in Greek, Latin and French. The latter was part of his book about Ithaca, the Peloponnesus and Troy. This publication served as the dissertation and secured the degree.

With these fancies were found others. Calder proved that the granting of Schliemann’s U.S. citizenship did not occur in 1850 but in 1869. Further, the visit to President Fillmore at the White House 21 February 1851 in fact never took place but was made up by Schliemann and inserted into his diary. Apparently his visit with the Governor of Panama was similarly an invention.

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10 The address, first delivered in German, was published in English; see above, note 1.
11 At the request of the audience H. A. Stoll read aloud selections from his book Der Traum von Troja.
12 See above, note 1.
13 Calder (above, note 1) 343 f.
14 The views advanced by J. Herrmann at this colloquium were incorporated into his book, Heinrich Schliemann: Wegbereiter einer neuen Wissenschaft (Berlin 1974) 9.
15 Calder (above, note 1) 344 f.
16 Calder (above, note 1) 336 f.
18 Calder (above, note 1) 337 f.
19 Calder (above, note 1) 338 ff.
20 Calder (above, note 1) 342.
Calder had very quickly carried his discoveries to the point that he called Schliemann "a pathological liar." Only he meant a man who lied by nature, who could not distinguish between true and false. This conclusion enraged the defenders of Schliemann, who soon entered the discussion. One has the impression that not all of them were really clear as to what the expression, "pathological liar," meant. Because Calder had bestowed this title on the hero Schliemann, the controversy burst forth in all its virulence.

I am rather inclined to an historical explanation for what Schliemann had done rather than a psychological one, in part probably because I am a European and not an American. I sought to explain the fabrications and distortions of fact in Schliemann's narrative as a symptom of his *Sitz im Leben*. At first I was convinced that one must see Schliemann's great efforts and persistence to excavate Hisarlik as a part of this creative fantasy-world. But I saw later that, along with his archaeological energy, his businessman's insistence quickly to reach his goal also played a decisive role. As far as the identification of Hisarlik with Troy goes, we know now that he owes this entirely to Frank Calvert, an Englishman who served as American Consul in the Dardanelles and had purchased part of Hisarlik with the intention of excavating it. But at the end it was Schliemann who dug through the various levels and began the excavation on a scale which Calvert simply could not have managed.

Calder's discoveries were to be carried further. Professor David A. Traill of the University of California at Davis succeeded in proving that Schliemann's alleged eyewitness account of the burning of San Francisco on the night of 3–4 June 1851 was a fiction based on a Sacramento newspaper account. He further showed that his allegation that he had to leave Sacramento suddenly because of illness in March 1852 was untrue. In fact he had been shortweighing his partner's gold and was found out. Traill later confirmed from contemporary sources that Schliemann's American

21 Calder (above, note 1) 352.
26 See previous note.
citizenship and Indianapolis divorce in 1869 were gained through bribery, misrepresentation and perjury.²⁷

In this way the outlines of the picture began to take on a clearer form. All these inventions of Schliemann fit beautifully the image of the self-made man. He presented himself to his audience as the perfect social climber, the romantic parvenu, at the same time as the successful businessman and fortunate adventurer. In his anger Traill brought the verdict of moral condemnation against Schliemann. In his contribution to the Colorado volume on "Schliemann's Helios Metope and Psychopathic Tendencies" he applied to Schliemann's life the symptoms of psychopathy derived from the Encyclopedia of Human Behavior and explained all his peculiarities in terms of mental illness.²⁸ Unfortunately, this paper has damaged the critical investigation of Schliemann. In spite of Traill's invaluable contributions to our understanding of the historical Schliemann, one simply must admit this. The reaction of the press confirms my assertion.²⁹ This medical diagnosis of Schliemann as far as scholarship goes has reached a dead end. Nonetheless, now as before, as one could see in both the Homburg and Athens conferences, the Schliemann phenomenon has remained a favorite wrestling arena for psychologists and psychoanalysts.³⁰

III

Meanwhile, there has been continued progress in the understanding of the cultural milieu of Schliemann's life, of the period during which he made his business career and began his excavations. The Homburg Symposium has added a great deal to our knowledge here. German enthusiasm for Homer in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been carefully investigated. Professor Wohlleben spoke on the subject at Bad Homburg and at the University of Illinois.³¹ One must understand Schliemann's love for

Homer as part of this tradition, although Schliemann himself had no interest in the aesthetic appreciation of Homer. For him Homer was poetry with a kernel of real history which he believed one could discover archaeologically.

The reception of ancient history in Europe at this time played a decisive role. History was seen to be a medium for self-description. The quest for historical reality was practiced on a wide scale, not least in the matter of archaeological confirmation. This was articulated at Homburg up to the point of explaining the history of archaeology as "Myth and Sensation." With his search for Troy Schliemann is a typical example, also in regard to the historical coloring of his own existence. Think only of his domestic life in the Iliou Melathron, his residence at Athens, where he lived with his children Agamemnon and Andromache.

Schliemann’s approach to ancient history in his formative decades was also elucidated at Bad Homburg from the side of art history. Realistic historical description to the point of creating a model for self-identification in place of the earlier classicistic and romantic conceptions was stressed. This agrees with the contemporary patterns of historical description. We find an allegorical variant on this in the painted putti of the Iliou Melathron, who are portrayed engaged in the very pursuits of Schliemann and Sophua.

Nineteenth-century jewelry and the harmless imitation of ancient pieces were carefully discussed at Bad Homburg. Schliemann’s intention to have an exact copy of his Trojan treasures made in Paris (this is attested by his letter to Beaurain in Paris) fit easily into such a context, but they are not proof that an object such as the so-called Mask of Agamemnon is a forgery buried by Schliemann at Mycenae. Unfortunately Calder and Traill were a bit too bold in this regard. The two requests to have scientific tests of the mask made were both refused. Greek national pride here understandably played a role.


35 See C. Gere and G. C. Munn, Artists' Jewellery, Pre-Raphaelite to Arts and Crafts (Woodbridge 1989) and G. C. Munn, "The Archaeologist, the Collector and the Jeweller, 1820–1900," in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 326–34. One may add now that in September 1879 Schliemann ordered from Carlo Giuliano in London "einen Halschmuck und ein Armband" as gifts for Virchow’s daughter: see J. Herrmann and E. Maaß (edd.), Die Korrespondenz zwischen Heinrich Schliemann und Rudolf Virchow 1876–90 (Berlin 1990) 142, where for "Ginliano" read "Giuliano."

A further important point to come out of the Homburg Conference was the idea of a "collective biography" of the middle class between 1850 and 1870. The economic success and scholarly and cultural interests of this class were stressed. These factors were not only inherent in Schliemann's life, but they colored above anything else the repeated claims found in his autobiography, which became a mirror of these inclinations. Hans-Werner Hahn, a specialist in nineteenth-century intellectual history, observed:

The fact is that numerous aspects of this biography are to be brought into close contact with the general development of the bourgeoisie. That goes for the economic rise of the "self-made man" as well as for the early joining of business activity and scholarly and cultural interests, the meaning of bourgeois work ethic and efficiency, the mixing of progressive optimism with the fear of crisis, the reforming of one's own life-goals as a result of economic crisis and the reversion to the past that was connected with this.

Along with the historical examination of autobiography, an attempt was made to understand from the point of view of the history of literature Schliemann's autobiographical assertions. The interesting observation was made that two genres of autobiography must be distinguished. There is biographical information presented after the life was lived. There is also the autobiography that is programmatically conceived, written as motivation for what has not yet been realized. This was so in the case of Schliemann.

IV

In this context lie too those earliest revelations of Schliemann in which he sought to work through his early years. The great document for this is his still not fully published monster-letter of 1842 to his sisters. It is in the Gennadeion Library of the American School in Athens and is over sixty pages in length. In his edition of the selected correspondence Ernst Meyer published much of the letter. But its usefulness suffered from his censorship. We are not certain that Schliemann ever sent it.

I sought with very few exceptions to edit those parts of the letter omitted by Meyer and with this new information to determine the parallels between the letter and the topoi of contemporary literature, particularly

39 Contribution to the discussion by J. Wohlleben after the paper of H. Scheuer (above, note 37).
40 E. Meyer, Briefwechsel I (above, note 7) 9-33.
trivial-literature.\textsuperscript{41} For example, the topos of the portrayal of women: Schliemann portrays them on the one hand as romantic fairytale figures, but on the other hand with crassest realism. One need only cite the description of Sophie Schwartz, the Ankershagen housemaid and lover of his father who brought so much misfortune to his early life. He describes her in a way that stresses the vulgarity of this poor wretch.\textsuperscript{42} Alleging that he met her in Hamburg, he gives her a defense speech in which one finds a lofty level of moral and philosophical argument of a sort she never could have used.\textsuperscript{43} This is a further topos that can be paralleled in contemporary literature and sermons.

Further it is noteworthy—I have sought to show that in his description of the shipwreck off Texel—that Schliemann, in spite of all his attention to detail, a trait of the successful businessman, nonetheless is able to vary the report of what he experienced. In this regard one should compare the version of his letter to his sisters in 1842\textsuperscript{44} with the version of the shipwreck in his autobiography of 1880 in \textit{Ilios}.\textsuperscript{45} There are considerable discrepancies of such magnitude that one thinks of a dramatic composition rather than the reporting of what really happened.\textsuperscript{46}

Comparable was the critical analysis of the editing of the book about China and Japan which he submitted as part of material for his doctorate in Rostock in 1869. When one compares the text of the diary of 1865 with the published version, there are similar discrepancies, omissions and changes.\textsuperscript{47} Unfortunately the guide books used by Schliemann could not be compared with his narrative and so we do not know how much he owed to them.

In another case such a comparison was revealing. In \textit{BSA} 1989 David Turner compared the Ithaca book with which Schliemann received his doctorate with the diary and with Murray’s guidebook.\textsuperscript{48} It turned out that Schliemann combined what he had recorded in his diary with what he read in

\textsuperscript{41} W. Schindler in Calder and Cobet (above, note 8) 161 f.
\textsuperscript{42} W. Schindler (previous note) 157 f.
\textsuperscript{43} W. Schindler (above, note 41) 160.
\textsuperscript{44} E. Meyer, \textit{Briefwechsel I} (above, note 7) 22–24.
\textsuperscript{45} Heinrich Schliemann, \textit{Ilios: Stadt und Land der Trojaner} (Leipzig 1881) 9 f. There exists an external confirmation for the shipwreck from the Dutch side: see \textit{The Americanization of Edward Bok: The Autobiography of a Dutch Boy Fifty Years After} (New York 1922) xxii–xxii. Bok relates how a relative of his had rescued the boy Schliemann on the beach at Texel.
\textsuperscript{46} W. Schindler (above, note 41) 162–64.
the guidebook to create a third version. Heinrich Alexander Stoll, the Schliemann biographer, in the year 1973 wrote to Calder:49

The Ithaca-book expresses more the Wunschbild than what Schliemann really experienced . . . Please look at the names borne by the citizens of Ithaca, who enter into Schliemann’s narrative . . . The whole book is not a diary about Ithaca. It is a novel. One might easily say the same about La Chine et le Japon.

Let Stoll have the last word until further research determines the relation of his early publications with the diary entries and guidebooks.

V

Calder in 1972 in his pioneer article, “Schliemann on Schliemann,” already asked the question, “How did his psychopathy affect his archaeology?”50 This opened a new field for investigation. Traill followed the suggestion and pointed his finger to a weak point of central importance, namely to the various archaeological reports by Schliemann concerning the Treasure of Priam.51 With this treasure he had crowned his first Trojan campaign (1871–73). The first suspicious discrepancy which Traill found was Schliemann’s allegation that Sophia was at Troy and shared in the discovery of the treasure. It can be proven (Schliemann later admitted it) that at this time she had already returned to Athens.52 With the exposure of this fiction in Schliemann, the Treasure itself fell under suspicion. Sophia had been inserted as an eyewitness for what she never saw. Comparison of the report of the find in the Trojan diary with the letter to his publisher Brockhaus and the published version of the excavations revealed that first only in Athens after the completion of the campaign did he write up the description of the whole Treasure. Traill hastened to present Schliemann in the light of a forger.53 The excavator of Troy had possibly purchased new pieces or even had them made. The “warfare” against Schliemann had been carried so far that his scholarly reputation was now in jeopardy.

Finally at this point the defenders of Schliemann entered the arena. They were determined not only to contain the vilifications of Schliemann but to refute them.54 Now these tendencies too have reached inflationary

49 See W. M. Calder III (above, note 8) 374 f.
50 Calder (above, note 1) 349.
54 See especially D. Easton, “Schliemann’s Discovery” (above, note 29); “Schliemann’s Mendacity” (above, note 29); and “Priam’s Treasure,” Anat. St. 34 (1984) 141–69.
level. Instead of providing a catalogue of all these excesses, exaggerations, unjustified allegations and accusations, matters which particularly in the last years of our century provide unwelcome evidence for the hysteria of so-called objective scholarship, instead of adding to this, I should like to report a debate from the recent Homburg Conference. Its results serve to clarify the ambivalence of the arguments pro and contra Heinrich Schliemann.

It is a matter here of the rencontre between David Traill and the Cambridge defender of Schliemann, Donald Easton. Traill had accused Schliemann of unscrupulously planting together pieces from the 1872 and 1878 excavations. This seemed to him to be a further example of Schliemann’s deceit. Easton put his finger again on this passage and could show that Schliemann had put together objects from different excavations in Troy without maintaining that he had excavated them at the same time. The duel between the two scholars ended fairly and exemplified English fair play. The indictment was unsuccessful and the trial ended with the Scots’ verdict “not proven.”

This discussion once again showed how careful one must be when interpreting what Schliemann says in order to avoid repeated and unprovable accusations. Some critics and defenders of Schliemann have extended the “psychological warfare” pro and contra Schliemann to a similar campaign against one another. It would be beneficial for everyone if as part of the 100th anniversary of Schliemann’s death all these exaggerations, which have their positive side, could be reduced to a justifiable dimension. The first steps toward a reduction took place at the Schliemann Congress in Athens during Easter 1990 in which I participated. I shall return to these results later.

VI

I want to add a further example intended to illustrate how careful we must be in Schliemann research. The example brings us back to his autobiography. It is concerned with the dissertation written in ancient Greek with which he supposedly gained his doctorate at the University of Rostock in 1869.

55 See especially the writings of Bloedow (above, note 9).
Calder searched for this Greek dissertation and concluded that it had never existed. What he found were two more or less eight-page autobiographies composed in Latin and Greek. In fact they were translations of the original French life in the Ithaca book that earned him the doctorate. Calder seemed to be right with his exciting discovery that the "dissertation written in ancient Greek" was a fiction.\(^58\)

If one investigates the matter more carefully, one finds that the myth of the Greek dissertation arose gradually. In the first autobiography of 1880 that begins \textit{Ilios}, Schliemann writes of the Ithaca book:\(^59\)

One copy of this work along with a dissertation written in ancient Greek I sent in to the University of Rostock and was rewarded by being granted the degree of doctor of philosophy of that university.

That at this time by the word dissertation Schliemann meant, rather than the actual thesis with which he gained his degree, a kind of written proof of his knowledge of Greek, one sees in his letter to the American Philological Association, written from Indianapolis on 29 May 1869. There he discusses the correct way to learn a foreign language. He writes:\(^60\)

[It is necessary] to read much aloud, never to make translations, to write always dissertations on subjects that interest us.

In the same letter he speaks of a sixth-form boy who masters classical Greek in twelve months. The boy has

\begin{quote}
to write fluently a tolerably good dissertation and to translate—unprepared—any one of the classical Greek authors . . .
\end{quote}

Clearly "dissertation" here means a written proof of linguistic competence. One must obviously ask why Schliemann did not speak of the dissertation written in Latin as well as the one in Greek. With use of the word "dissertation" he must have known that in German-speaking countries there would be a misunderstanding. Readers would naturally assume that the thesis itself was written in ancient Greek. Carl Schuchhardt, in his famous book, translated into English, on Schliemann's excavations, still in 1890 distinguishes the Ithaca book from "a treatise written in ancient Greek."\(^61\)


\(^{58}\) Calder (above, note 1) 336 f.

\(^{59}\) Schliemann, \textit{Ilios} (above, note 45) 24 f.

\(^{60}\) E. Meyer, \textit{Briefwechsel 1} (above, note 7) 154 and 155.

Emil Ludwig in 1932 first spoke of "a biography written in ancient Greek."  

Professor Bachmann, instructed by the Dean Hermann Karsten to evaluate the Ithaca book, wrote as well about the Greek autobiography which he tore to pieces (the Latin vita he approved). He wrote of the Ithaca book:  

\[\ldots\] the efforts of Mr. Schliemann on archaeological and topographical matters, by which he worthily continues his learned predecessors, apart from several criticisms of details, are so noteworthy that I have no hesitation to vote for the awarding of the doctoral degree.

It is a half truth if one allows Schliemann to gain his doctorate on the basis of a dissertation written in ancient Greek. Calder's criticism must be corrected in that Schliemann used the word dissertation to mean a linguistic exercise rather than a thesis. If this exercise had in fact been his thesis, he would have failed miserably. He did not quite lie but he wrote ambiguously.

VII

With this problem, which may serve as a further example to warn against too quick a criticism of Schliemann, we find ourselves again in the midst of the biographical quarrels for and against Schliemann. At Bad Homburg Calder critically examined the efforts of the three leading Schliemann biographers: the already mentioned life by Emil Ludwig (1932), next that of Ernst Meyer (1969) and finally the biographical novel by Heinrich Alexander Stoll (1956).  

Calder expressed the highest admiration for the pioneer, critical work of Emil Ludwig, who was the founder of our modern understanding of the Lebensproblematik of Schliemann. He sought on the one hand to clarify the enormous influence of Ludwig on the historical biographical literature of his time. He explained his success through the discarding of historicism because of his conception of cultural history. That is a breakthrough which Calder had already detected in the distancing between Wilamowitz and his great pupils, especially Paul Friedländer and Werner Jaeger. Emil Ludwig similarly belonged to the generation after historicism, who, although they made use of that movement, advanced to new horizons of cultural history by seeking a deeper understanding of their subject.

62 Ludwig (above, note 5) 124: "In der Tat dürfte der Indigohändler als erster, ohne doch Alphiholologe zu sein, auf dieser Universität mit einem altgriechisch geschriebenen Lebenslauf promoviert worden sein."


64 E. Ludwig (above, note 5); E. Meyer (above, note 8), H. A. Stoll (above, note 4).
On the other hand Calder discovered a sharing of deep similarities between Ludwig and Schliemann that went so far that he described Ludwig's Schliemann biography as an *apologia pro vita sua.* The amateur Ludwig, attacked by the professors of history, saw in Schliemann, attacked by the German professors of his time, an anticipation of his own predicament. Not everyone will accept this suggestion. What seems to me more important is the stressing of the brutal realism in Ludwig's biography. He had scratched the heroic portrait of the founder of modern archaeology. The reaction of the archaeologists was immediate. Theodor Wiegand wrote to Wilhelm Dörpfeld on 17 May 1932:

> I have read the Schliemann-book of Ludwig and find it disgusting. Was it necessary to stress so many little unattractive traits in the life of the man? And on the other hand he is supposed to be a hero ... I absolutely cannot understand Mrs. Schliemann. She certainly has served poorly the memory of her husband. Quite the opposite.

Calder remarks about this: "The scholar Wiegand prefers myth to truth!" Such an opinion reveals the similarity between the way Calder and Ludwig approach their hero. Certainly Ludwig's biography had breached the fortress of Schliemann's admirers. The reason Ludwig's results had such little influence on subsequent research lay in the problem of Germany in the 1930s. After the establishment of National Socialism in Germany in 1933, the work of the Jew Emil Ludwig, born Cohn, was ignored and disparaged and the need arose to whitewash the damaged image of the hero Schliemann.

The biographer that was needed was quickly discovered. He was Dr. Ernst Meyer, since 1919 a teacher at a boys' school in Neustrelitz-Mecklenburg. He was relieved of his teaching duties in 1937 and given the task of freeing Schliemann from the slanders of the Jew Ludwig. Meyer worked for some time in Athens and had access to the Schliemann papers (by then in the Gennadeion there). This is why he knows the sources so well and in some ways this aided further research. Take for example Meyer's, admittedly problematic, editions of selected letters. We can read about him in a Mecklenburg newspaper of 31 May 1937:

> The schoolteacher Dr. Ernst Meyer of Mecklenburg has been in Athens for some time, commissioned by the Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter, Friedrich Hildebrandt, to set in order the papers of the famous archaeologist and Trojan expert Heinrich Schliemann ...

> From the whole Nachlaß there can be gained a reliable and thoroughly documented portrait of Schliemann that is free from the misrepresentations which are found for example in the biography of

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65 Calder (above, note 8) 365.
66 Calder (above, note 8) 368; cf. E. Meyer, *Schliemann* (above, note 6) 426 n. 98.
67 Calder (above, note 8) 368.
68 Calder (above, note 8) 370, citing *Landeszeitung für Mecklenburg Beilage zu Nr. 123* (31 May 1937).
Emil Ludwig Cohn, entitled *The Goldseeker*, and based on capitalistic conceptions.

The critical insights into Schliemann’s life, begun by Ludwig, were blocked by the whitewashing of Ernst Meyer. The quarrel about the “Goldseeker Schliemann” was never the turning point that it ought to have been. Meyer fully discarded this approach to the man, and writes that he misses wholly in Ludwig the organ for the German in Schliemann, particularly for his romantic idealism. Ludwig lacks entirely (one need only look at the humorous introductory sentences of his biography) the feeling for the unique values of the people of Mecklenburg and of the Low German landscape.

These aims of Ernst Meyer which may also be traced in his appendix to the new editions of Schliemann’s autobiography, are perhaps too strongly stressed by Calder. But at Bad Homburg his views were not attacked. And who would dare to defend Meyer in this context?

In contrast Calder places the writer Heinrich Alexander Stoll on a higher level. This admiration of Stoll lies partly in the fact that for years the two communicated both orally and in letters. I myself was a witness of this and can only confirm it. Calder for the first time presented to the public at Bad Homburg the letter, cited earlier, to him of 8 October 1973. This letter attests clearly the distance gained in the 1970s by Stoll from the romantic elaborations of Schliemann’s life. In his notes to his *Dream of Troy*, certainly by the tenth edition of 1974, he writes clearly:

> The earliest autobiography of Schliemann, the foreword to *Ithaka, der Peloponnes und Troja*, 1869, is more spontaneous than the one in *Ilios* and not yet written from the summit of his greatness and as proof that all experienced and attained had been anticipated from the beginning.

From this need, many of the romantic elaborations certainly resulted.

The critical attitude of Stoll regarding Schliemann’s descriptions crystalized in the 1970s, years that were decisive for Schliemann research. In the introduction which Stoll wrote to Schliemann’s Ithaca-book in 1974 we find the following critical formulation:

> The modern reader too ... will be inclined to add critical question marks and surprised exclamation points in the margins. In a number of places he will have serious doubts whether a real diary has been published or a romanticized reworking by an otherwise sober businessman which allows him to see and hear things belonging more

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70 Calder (above, note 8) 374 f. The Calder–Stoll correspondence is now in the archives of the Heinrich Schliemann Museum at Ankershagen.


to his imagination and wish-fulfilment than to the sober reality of Ithacan daily life.

David Turner's critical analysis of the Ithaca book, published in the Annual of the British School at Athens of 1989, is the best proof of Stoll's suspicions. One can, therefore, only agree with Calder's high estimation of Stoll's service in investigating Schliemann's writings and hope that these first critical steps will be permanently acknowledged especially in the balancing of research in this anniversary year.

The first steps in this direction have already been made by Wilfried Bölke, the Director of the Schliemann Museum in Ankershagen-Mecklenburg. But that was not the theme of his contribution to the Homburg Colloquium. He spoke there rather of new sources that can clarify the years of Schliemann's childhood and apprenticeship. They especially concern the role of Schliemann's father in Ankershagen and their effect on the early education of his son. With the interpretation of these new sources we have gained a fresh insight into Schliemann's conception of his father. That allows us to grasp more profoundly the childhood pattern and the motivation for his restless energy.

VIII

If we seek to survey the work on Schliemann from the seventies until the anniversary year 1990, we can distinguish the following currents.

Further critical attention to the autobiographical assertions continues unabated. New sources are always becoming available. The hasty critical attacks have become milder and more careful. Out of the allegedly notorious deceiver the self-made man of the Gründerzeit has emerged. His businessman's cleverness and brilliant gift for public relations have been understood in the light of his historical and cultural context. Not to speak of his pioneer effort for scholarship, all the more admirable because attained by a professional outsider and obsessed dilettante.

We come now to the question of what he did for scholarship. He was not the very first field archaeologist. But because of his organizational gifts, his ability to pay for his excavations and his growing improvement in excavation techniques, he became the real founder of field archaeology. Donald Easton of Cambridge sought to compare and synthesize the results of the excavations of Schliemann, Dörpfeld and Blegen at Troy. He

73 See above, note 48.
74 W. Bölke, Mitteilungen aus dem Heinrich-Schliemann-Museum Ankershagen
(Ankershagen 1988).
showed that they fit. That is splendid proof that Schliemann’s records are in large part trustworthy.

Regarding Mycenae: Since Traill’s publication of Schliemann’s Mycenaean diary there remains uncertainty. The authenticity of the Mask of Agamemnon is still in question. Stylistic considerations prove that the mask is not like the others found at Mycenae but are not sufficient to deny authenticity. Schliemann’s letter to his Parisian colleague Beaurain with the request to ask a discreet goldsmith to make exact copies of the Treasure of Priam is not an argument of sufficient cogency to question the authenticity of the mask. A testing of the gold might decide the problem but the request to do so has twice been refused by the Greek Archaeological Service.

A further aspect of recent research concerns Schliemann’s aims in editing his early travel diaries. I have already discussed the Ithaca book, the travels in China and Japan and the monster-letter of 1842 to his sisters. We should not underestimate Schliemann’s ability to embroider experience. Just how far this tendency infected his scholarly publications must be more carefully investigated. One thing seems certain: his reports about his life and travels are always subject to exaggeration. Because of this Goethe’s formulation, Dichtung und Wahrheit (Poetry and Truth), has long been applied to Schliemann’s efforts. In the introduction to Goethe’s autobiography we already find the integration of the author’s development as an individual with the history and culture of his age. There is already the need to color experience with poetic elaboration. We must allow Schliemann this if we are just to him. In the post-Goethean period the tendencies we observe in Goethe’s autobiography are exaggerated so that provable falsehoods may be detected not only in Schliemann but in Richard Wagner’s or Bismarck’s autobiographies as well. They are not always historical in the precise sense. They contain romantic elaborations of truth. But to impose modern ideas of historical veracity upon them would be anachronistic.

At the Athens Congress I tried to establish this precisely in the cases of Wagner and Bismarck. I added the case of the railroad tycoon Henry Bethel Strousberg, whose career of business swindles often reminds us of Schliemann.

78 See Traill (above, note 36).
79 See D. A. Traill in Calder and Traill (above, note 28) 140 n. 47.
IX

In my summary I have only touched upon selected points of the new Schliemann research. Another question is the effect of Schliemann's pioneer work within archaeology. This was discussed at great length at the recent Athens conference in regard to the continuing excavations at Troy, Mycenae and Tiryns. They were examined in the contexts of geological, topographical and other scientific points of view. In comparison with these contributions, to which may be added discussions of the dispersion of Schliemann's finds, little time was left for Schliemann the man of his time or for his publications.

The Berlin Academy of Science has planned a final Schliemann Congress for December of 1990 which will also concentrate on "The Foundations and Results of Modern Archaeology." But the proposed program allows us to hope that along with the focus which is shared with Athens, the other aspects of Schliemann research, which I have discussed here, will receive their due. I find it a good omen that the pioneers of the modern critical research on Schliemann will all participate in the Berlin Conference. It guarantees that the effort to make Schliemann more historical will go forward.

Winckelmann-Institute der Humboldt-Universität, Berlin

83 At the Athens conference three days were devoted to "The Excavations of Heinrich Schliemann." Only half a day was given to "Philological Observations." The remaining contributions were put into the last day and a half. See the program for details: International Congress: Archaeology and Heinrich Schliemann (Athens 1990).


85 I wish to express my thanks to Professor William M. Calder III for translating my original into English and to Professor Miroslav Marcovich for publishing the paper in Illinois Classical Studies.

[The editors note with sorrow the death of Wolfgang Schindler in Berlin on 9 December 1991.]
The Refugee Classical Scholars in the USA: An Evaluation of their Contribution

WILLIAM M. CALDER III

Because the best American classical scholarship has never shed its German origins and because American classical scholarship has never outdistanced parallel German effort in the sense that American medicine and natural sciences have, it provides a particularly revealing, albeit neglected, specimen of cross-cultural influence, well documented, often productive, and with a lifespan of some 150 years. For purposes of historical presentation I suggest four periods in the history of German influence on American classics. Because the third period, that of the refugee scholars of the 1930s, is understandable only within the context of the other three, I shall, therefore, discuss the whole with obvious emphasis on the third period. The four periods briefly are:

1. Teutonomania: 1853 (B. L. Gildersleeve’s Göttingen doctorate) to 1914 (outbreak of European War);
2. The Reaction against Germany: 7 May 1915 (sinking of the Lusitania) to 15 September 1935 (the Nuremberg Laws for “the protection of German blood and honor”);

3. Adolf Hitler and American Classics: 1935 to 1968 (the so-called "Reform" of the West German Universities);


My exposition will proceed within the framework of these four periods. The subject is much in flux. All sorts of archival material is coming to light almost weekly. Interest in the subject is burgeoning. For the first time there is attention from the German side. I think especially of the work of Volker Losemann and Bernhard vom Brocke.\(^2\) Let us turn to the formative period 1853–1914.

The two general studies on the rise of graduate education in the United States in the nineteenth century, Storr (1953) and Diehl (1978), a prematurely published Yale doctoral dissertation, suffer fatally from the fact that neither knows Greek or Latin and so both miss the crucial role of German-educated classical scholars in establishing American graduate schools. The three great formative figures are: Basil L. Gildersleeve (1831–1924), Paul Shorey (1857–1934) and William Abbott Oldfather (1880–1945). This is not the place to discuss their publications. Oldfather alone wrote over 500 articles for Pauly–Wissowa, proof of his colossal industry and breadth. Why did they go to Germany?\(^3\)

First, it was impossible to study at the doctoral level in the United States. There were no research libraries. Only the later purchase of German private libraries made such study feasible. Oldfather arranged that Illinois buy the libraries of Johannes Vahlen and Wilhelm Dittenberger. The rather silly but well-intentioned Ernst Sihler, whose autobiography From Maumee to Thames and Tiber: The Life-Story of an American Classical Scholar (New York 1930) preserves facts, arranged that New York University buy that of his teacher Emil Hübner. Paul de Lagarde’s library ended up there


too. Hermann Sauppe, Wilamowitz’ predecessor at Göttingen, left his library to Columbia because the king who founded Columbia had earlier been the elector who had founded the Georgia Augusta. Some of it ended in Bryn Mawr. More recently the Center for Hellenic Studies purchased Werner Jaeger’s library from his widow. McMaster has purchased Karl Barwick’s (Jena), Tulane Margarete Bieber’s and some American college Walter Marg’s.

There were no libraries. There were no scholars. The best source for the anti-intellectualism of American colleges before the Hopkins and Chicago is Henry Seidel Canby, *Alma Mater* (New York 1936; repr. 1975). The outlook is that of an English public school. In starkest contrast to the Pforte of Wilamowitz’ day, the hero is the athlete. Neither scholarship nor even the intellectual life exists. Dr. Thomas Arnold, the Headmaster of Rugby and apostle of muscular Christianity, would thoroughly have approved.

The first American doctorate in classics was earned nonetheless at Yale in 1861 by James Morris Whiton, with a six page handwritten dissertation, entitled *Brevis Vita, Ars Longa*, the sort of essay Nietzsche and Wilamowitz wrote in an afternoon at Schulpforte. But why Germany and not England? The ancient universities were provincial finishing schools for the sons of clergy and the ruling class. Compare Mark Pattison’s reminiscences of undergraduate Oxford with Gibbon’s. No change. They remind us of Gildersleeve on Princeton. Or E. F. Benson, *As We Were* for Cambridge ca. 1890. Theodor Mommsen acknowledged only one scholar in England, Henry Bradshaw. Or indeed Eduard Fraenkel’s despair at Oxford preserved in Jaeger’s letter to Lietzmann of 29 November 1936. But it was not only the lack of scholarship at Oxford and Cambridge. Hatred of the English sent young Americans into the arms of the Germans. Gildersleeve’s candor here is invaluable (*AJP* 37 [1916] 496):

In the fifties an American Anglomaniac was a rarity and the German attitude towards English scholars gave no offence to the patriotic American neophyte, for I was brought up on the memories of my revolutionary ancestors. I bore a deep-seated hereditary grudge against those whose forbears were responsible for the expulsion of the Acadians, the sufferings of Valley Forge, the burning of Norwalk, the

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insolent behavior of British officers during the occupation of Charleston, and I was quite ready to be impressed by the judgments of my German masters.

These young men sat at the feet of titans, men like August Boeckh, Jacob Bernays, Friedrich Ritschl, Johannes Vahlen, Otto Crusius, Wilhelm Christ. A later one, Edward Fitch, at Göttingen heard Friedrich Leo and wrote his dissertation on Apollonius Rhodius under Wilamowitz, whom later at Berlin Grace Macurdy and William Scott Ferguson heard.

The number of American students studying at German universities in the second half of the nineteenth century steadily rose. Until the middle of the nineties they formed the largest foreign group, followed by the Russians. Whole parts of the American educational system were remodeled after the German, from kindergarten to graduate school. By 1900 whole faculties at American universities were made up largely of professors with German doctorates. The theologian Francis G. Peabody at Harvard, the first American exchange-professor in Germany on 30 October 1905 in his Antrittsvorlesung in the presence of the Kaiser revealed that 22 Harvard professors had taken a German doctorate. These men returned to their country. Many formed graduate faculties after the German model (with teaching by lectures and seminars and division into departments) and produced streams of doctoral students. Gildersleeve directed 67 dissertations, Shorey 57, and Oldfather 47. That means 171 scholars, the last of whom, Revilo P. Oliver (Urbana), still lives in retirement. For some 100 years 171 American scholars trained by German-trained men filled key positions in the United States in classics. Long German hegemony over American classical studies gave them an enduring seriousness and exactitude that until very recently was in stark contrast to insular British dilettantism. Contrast Gilbert Murray and Gildersleeve, Sir John Sheppard and Oldfather, Henry Jackson and Paul Shorey. Two general points deserve notice regarding the formative German period.

1. Most unfortunately, with the notable exception of Gildersleeve, who still heard Boeckh, a narrow post-Humboldtian university, well on the way to overspecialization and pedantry, influenced the creators of American graduate schools and in the case of philology the undistinguished generation between Boeckh–Hermann–K. O. Müller and Wilamowitz. Dissertations like H. W. Smyth, later Eliot Professor of Greek at Harvard, Der Diphthong EI im Griechischen (Diss. Göttingen 1884) (he missed Wilamowitz by one semester!) and Alfredus Gudemann, De Heroidum Ovidii codice Planudeo (Diss. Berlin 1888) under Vahlen, whose example later inspired his own commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, were not just the norm but the best. Some were the kernel of later work on a large scale, Shorey on Plato’s Laws or Oldfather on Locris, which later became the great Pauly–Wissowa article.

7 See vom Brocke (above, note 2) 137.
8 See P. R. Sweet, Wilhelm von Humboldt. A Biography II (Columbus, OH 1980) 70.
These exceptions cannot alleviate the incalculable damage bequeathed to American classical scholarship because of the chronology of its origins. We missed both Wilhelm von Humboldt and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.

2. There is an important difference between English and American attraction to German Wissenschaft in the second half of the nineteenth century. The repressive burden of religious orthodoxy turned young English liberals, like Jowett, who introduced Hegel to Oxford, and especially the Scot, William Robertson Smith, whose heresy trials (1877–81) stemming from his post-Mosaic dating of Deuteronomy in the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, “Bible,” won international notoriety, to German higher criticism of the Bible. Smith’s friendship with Albrecht Ritschl and Julius Wellhausen is famous. At Balliol in the fifties it became an affectation of liberals to employ German for what could just as well have been said in English. English intellectuals adored Germany until the proclamation of the Second Reich in 1871. Prussia suddenly had become a rival. Contrarily young American conservatives, many of the best Southerners, were attracted still to Prussia.

Notice should be taken of the professorial exchange between Prussia and the USA beginning in 1905 largely through the initiative of Friedrich Althoff and encouraged by Theodore Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm II (both liked hunting). Benjamin I. Wheeler was Theodore Roosevelt Professor at Berlin in 1909–10, although he lectured on “Kulturgeschichte der USA” and not classics, and Paul Shorey with unfortunate consequences in 1913–14. Under this program Eduard Meyer was guest-professor at Harvard in 1909–10, when he began his famous book on the origin of the Mormons. Recall also that at this time Chicago was the third largest German-speaking city in the world. German visiting lecturers had begun earlier: Wilhelm Dörpfeld in 1909. He needed money to install central heating in his Ithaca home.

I have not seen discussed a neglected phenomenon, the anti-Germanism of American academics before World War I. Part was due to vestigial Puritanism, the shock and rage that greeted Eduard Meyer’s lectures on cheerful, beer-drinking German students. Part grew from pride. American scholarship is old enough to stand alone and not remain a step-child of the German. One finds traces of this in Gildersleeve but the locus classicus is Shorey’s essay in The Nation of 1911:

Our task is to redefine and so far as may be to harmonize the aims of culture and scholarship without undue concessions to the gushing dilettante, and to emancipate ourselves from slavish subservience to German influence without losing the lessons or forgetting the debt of gratitude that we owe to Germany.

That I find moderate, sensible, indeed expected. But at Harvard there was trouble brewing and its name was Charles Eliot Norton (1827–1908). This is not the place to praise his known services to classics, founder of the American Institute of Archaeology, one of the founders of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. With John Williams White he secured for American classics their greatest benefactor, James Loeb. A liberal, he allowed his politics to pervert his scholarship. I recall only his interpretation of the Cathedral of Orvieto as a monument to liberalism. His biographer, Kermit Vanderbilt, candidly remarks:10

The academic reputation of his books, in fact, is hard to describe accurately since his own friends usually wrote the reviews.

Norton was a rabid and influential anglophile, friend of Charles Dickens, close friend and literary executor of John Ruskin, literary executor of Thomas Carlyle, honorary doctor of Oxford and Cambridge. He had the patronizing love of Italians that has characterized many later American classicists. But he was a Germanophobe. He never learned the language well enough to speak it. He never studied at a German university. He never earned a doctorate. He was in Italy during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) and shared English disapproval of the German initiative. In autumn 1871 he settled in Dresden (a natural choice for an art-historian). He did not like the Germans, who rightly thought him a dilettante. He writes from Dresden 17 November 1871 to George Curtis:11

In Italy one feels as if one had had experience... had learnt to know something, if but very little, and could at least enjoy much. Here, on the contrary, one is convicted of inexperience and ignorance at every turn, everybody is hard at work learning and knows already a vast deal, and you are forced to begin to go to school again with the sense of having much lost time to make up for, and of the impropriety of enjoyment unless the pleasure is united with instruction.

Norton detests the Germans because they demand that he know something and work hard. Later in the same letter:

The German has been surfeited with metaphysics and ontology till he has taken a disgust to them. Nothing that has not material value pleases him. Ideas he despises; facts are his treasure.

This after some six weeks in a country whose language he cannot speak. Things were made worse by the death of his wife after the birth of their sixth child in Dresden in February. The German experience for Norton was unpleasant and painful. Until the year of his death he retained the view that

Germans are stupid pedants who avoid the important and soil the beautiful. In December 1901 he writes of American graduate students returning from Germany (Vanderbilt, p. 182): “Germanized pedants ... ill-taught in Germany by the masters of the art of useless learning.” In May 1907 after Gilbert Murray’s and S. H. Butcher’s Harvard lectures he writes to James Loeb (Letters II 376):

These two Englishmen have illustrated the worth of good English scholarship, exhibiting not merely thorough learning, but an admirable sense of the true ends to which learning should be devoted. It is a great pity that so many of our American scholars, old and young, have preferred the methods which lead only to the acquisition of facts often of no importance, to those which lead to the nobler cultivation of the intelligence and of the taste, and to the appreciation of the true ends of the study of language and of literature ...

Ruskin would have approved. The facts, not unimportant, are that Murray’s and Butcher’s lectures are deservedly forgotten today and that Norton had never read through a first-rate book of German classical scholarship. Norton’s ignorant praise of dilettantism and aperçu at the expense of hard work and facts gave pseudo-respectability to a poison that until today has befouled the waters of American classical scholarship. One might investigate the influence of Norton on T. S. Eliot and the Norton–Eliot Vorbild on the Harvard Hellenist, J. H. Finley, friend of C. M. Bowra and vehement critic of Eduard Fraenkel, who taught Dante from Norton’s translation and in many ways saw himself as Norton’s successor. In short, academic anti-Germanism had begun in this country before World War I. We now turn to the second period, the Reaction against Germany, 7 May 1915 (sinking of the Lusitania) until 15 September 1935 (the Nuremberg Laws).

Paul Shorey’s hysterical racist harangue of 1919 opens the new era, the Jubilee Address of the American Philological Association held at their meeting in Pittsburgh on 30 December 1919, six months after the Treaty of Versailles, where Woodrow Wilson set the stage for National Socialism. John Adams Scott was in the President’s chair. Gildersleeve was in the audience. Shorey stated publicly (TAPA 50 [1919] 39):

I would be willing to maintain against any comer the paradox that Wilamowitz’ recent edition of the Agamemnon is no improvement on the little Harper text of Paley that I used to carry in my pocket.

Or (58):

In what may be called the virtuosity of scholarship Jebb is easily first ... of all European scholars since the Renaissance.

Or finally—and how this must have embarrassed Gildersleeve (59):

If [Gildersleeve's] scattered and too often overlooked work could be
collected and systematized the tomes of Wilamowitz would not outweigh it in any judicious scales.

I am more ashamed of Shorey than of Norton. Norton was vain, ignorant and superficial. Shorey was too learned and intelligent not to have known that he was lying, that he put politics, hate and revenge before truth.

Sides were quickly drawn up: the octogenarian Gildersleeve, almost a *Denkmal der Wissenschaft*, the loyal and not entirely ineffective Edward Fitch, Wilamowitz’ only American doctoral student, and Oldfather, powerful and a fighter, against Shorey, Scott and their followers. Oldfather believed that the *res publica litterarum* transcended national boundaries and political conflicts. This was itself a German idea rather than an English or French one. The French expelled Wilamowitz from their Academy after the outbreak of hostilities. Wilamowitz as Rector signed his diplomas (Erinnerungen 316): *plerarumque in hoc orbe academiarum socius, e Parisina honoris causa ejectus*. Just so King George V struck Wilhelm II from the Order of the Garter and removed his banners from the Chapel at Windsor with those of five other Prussian royals. Wilhelm stripped no hostile sovereign of orders. The Prussian Academy expelled no member on political grounds. The politicization of the Academy under the Nazis was different and petit bourgeois. An international, aristocratic ruling class was gone.

Only with difficulty today can one imagine the criticism that Oldfather met. In 1917 in the midst of war hysteria he was informally but publicly charged with pro-German sentiments and disloyalty to the United States. He demanded and received a public hearing where he proved that the accusations were baseless. As late as 1920 he was rebuked by Wallace Lindsay for seeking international collaboration in order to save the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, a German enterprise. My own teacher, the New Testament scholar and Quaker historian, Henry Joel Cadbury (1883–1974), was fired in 1919 from the Quaker college Haverford for advocating mercy toward the defeated adversary. But irreparable damage had been done. American entry into World War I had brought overnight abolishment of German in schools. Spanish filled the vacuum. The endowment and growing prestige of the Rhodes Scholarships with what E. C. Kopff has called their “steady production of college presidents, presidents, politicians, and bureaucrats” allowed an anti-German narrow-minded Oxford to replace Berlin. German books in classics (unlike those in theology) were not regularly translated


into English as they are into Italian. More and more German scholars became known to American students as Celsus had become known to Christians, through their American detractors. Wilamowitz’ fate at the hands of the Scott–Shorey–Cherniss axis is only the most famous example. In archaeology the wave of anti-Germanism turned the discipline from *Kunstgeschichte* to what may be euphemistically called cultural anthropology, rooftiles, dowel clamps, mouldings, drainage systems. Americans adored William Bell Dinsmoor, the American Dörpfeld, and never read Ernst Buschor. Sterling Dow called Rhys Carpenter the only American art historian (that is during the anti-German period). Obviously there were exceptions. Oldfather did not die until 1945. The rise of scientific epigraphy and papyrology, the fields in which most historians of classical scholarship have seen the most permanent contributions of American scholars, are unthinkable without fundamental German preparation. On the other hand Theodor Mommsen often said “Dumm wie ein Epigraphiker.” His son-in-law Wilamowitz “Dumm wie Hiller” (his son-in-law, the epigraphist Hiller von Gaertringen). Epigraphy was a valuable but lower discipline, something between archaeology and *Wortphilologie* that prepared the way for others.

One should recall that for classics in America this period was one of loss and discouragement. The Latin requirement for the B.A. in American colleges was almost uniformly dropped. This caused immediately a drop in Latin teaching in the schools. Greek had always been marginal. Latin survived in Catholic schools and the better private schools. The world-wide depression had affected hiring in the universities. With drops in enrollment classical positions were especially vulnerable. American classicists themselves seemed unable to better the situation. In short the profession needed help and change.14

Help and change came in an unexpected and external form. In 1966 and Volker Losemann in 1978 in his book *Nationalsozialismus und Antike* have sought to document the influence on American classics of the so-called *Säuberungswelle*, that is legalized firing on racist and political grounds of scholars and teachers. Fleming and Bailyn’s comprehensive work on the Intellectual Migration revealingly has no chapter on classics. They must have thought the field too marginal to include. Some twenty immigrants, often gaining posts at prestigious American universities in a depression when few posts were available for the natives, wrought considerable change. These immigrants were either Jews, husbands of Jews, or Kurt von Fritz. That they existed at all proves a difference between classics in Germany and

14 Typical for the time is: A. F. West (ed.), *Value of the Classics* (Princeton 1917), a collection of testimonia by influential Americans. One is struck today by the paucity of Jews and women among those giving testimonies. Out of 298 testimonials two derive from women (Lucy Martin Donnelly and Virginia C. Gildersleeve) and two certainly from Jews (James Loeb and Mortimer Schiff, his brother-in-law). Classics, as in England and unlike Prussia, remained a bastion of the male WASP Establishment.
classics in the United States. There was in Germany a tradition of Jewish classical scholars. In Prussia antisemitism was legalized and therefore less lethal. To be an Ordinarius a Jew had to be baptized. This produced the so-called Taufjuden. Most famous are the brothers Jacob and Michael Bernays. Jacob remained orthodox and a librarian until his death; Michael was baptized and won the Munich Ordinariat. Selbstbahß often characterized these Taufjuden. Friedrich Leo belonged to the Kränzchen of Paul de Lagarde and opposed the orthodox student Heinemann, who had to turn to the blond and blue-eyed Prussian Wilamowitz-Moellendorff for help.\(^\text{15}\) The antisemitism of Beloch, Jacoby and Norden is attested. But there were also Eduard Hiller and Karl Lehrs.\(^\text{16}\) Among Wilamowitz’ great Jewish students were Eduard Fraenkel, Paul Friedländer, Felix Jacoby and Paul Maas. I do not know that Gildersleeve, Oldfather or Shorey had a Jewish doctoral student. We shall see how much more effective American antisemitism was.

Without the Nazi racist laws this great win for American classics would not have been possible. Before 1935 no German classical scholar had emigrated to the United States with one exception. Because of a quarrel with Noack that impeded his hope for advancement, the archaeologist, then a professor at Berlin, Valentin Müller (1889–1945), in 1931 accepted an associate professorship at Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania, where he taught until his death.\(^\text{17}\) There had been earlier guest professorships. Eduard Meyer at Harvard in 1909–10 was the most famous. Wilamowitz was invited to Chicago, but declined with a laugh. There had been visiting lecturers, Wilhelm Dörpfeld lectured in the United States in order to pay for central heating in his Ithaca home. The fact remains that if not compelled these scholars would never have emigrated.

The influence of this band of immigrants may best be discerned under five headings.

I. The Revival of the German Tradition in American Classical Studies

This meant first an emphasis on Greek rather than Latin studies. Gildersleeve, Oldfather and Shorey, as well as the lesser men, Goodwin, Seymour and Smyth, had all been Hellenists. Of the immigrants in


\(^{16}\) J. Glucker, “Juden in der deutschen klassischen Philologie,” Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche Geschichte, Beihet 10 (Tel-Aviv 1986) 95–111. There are a number of errors and omissions.

\(^{17}\) For Valentin Müller see T. R. S. Broughton, Archäologenbildnisse: Porträts und Kurzbiographien von Klassischen Archäologen deutscher Sprache, ed. R. Lullies and W. Schiering (Mainz 1988) 244–45, where no reason for his exile is given. Professor Broughton informs me per coll. that Müller would never reveal the reason for his emigration and that at his death the name of no relation was known. For the quarrel with Noack see F. Matz, Archäologische Erinnerungen aus sechs Jahrzehnten (1910–70) (Bochum 1975) 29–30. In his Gnomon obituary Matz had given no reason.
philology only Lenz was a Latinist. He ended in far off Texas, exerted little influence and had few if any doctoral students. The influential men were Hellenists, Jaeger, von Fritz, Friedländer, Raubitschek, Solmsen and Turyn. Until this day there is a scarcity of Latinists in the United States. Of the Latinists we do produce, the most are notoriously in poetry, not prose. This certainly reflects the influence of Wilamowitz on Leo and Norden, whom he caused to prefer Latin poetry as he did Greek poetry.

The immigrants in their publications and lectures and seminars cited German secondary literature. American doctoral programs in classics had preserved a German requirement, usually a three-hour translation examination before the doctorate could be awarded. But a requirement is not the best way to encourage interest. The immigrants made us want to read German because the books and articles were made to sound so intelligent and stimulating. I came to Wilamowitz entirely because of Werner Jaeger, not because of any of my American professors at Harvard, who cited German—when they did cite German—with a sigh. Look at the notes in Jaeger’s Paideia and in Friedländer’s Plato to take only two famous and widely-read books by the immigrants that were translated into English.

Sir Kenneth Dover has remarked that what was most memorable for him about Eduard Fraenkel was the great seriousness with which Fraenkel took the calling of scholar. This was precisely my experience with Werner Jaeger at Harvard (1952–56). He remarked to me when I was 19 years old: “The trouble with American classical scholars is that they are only classicists from 9:00 am until 5:00 pm five days a week. One must always be a scholar, every moment of one’s life.” Our American teachers were dilettantes. Like Gildersleeve and his contemporaries, we learned seriousness from the Germans. The importance of this legacy cannot be overemphasized. It is the quintessence of the difference between the English and the German traditions. Scholarship, that is both research and teaching, was something central and of extraordinary importance. It was not, as it was to Jowett, useless or, as to Housman, higher crossword.

In college and university education at the better institutions the German method, lectures and seminars, had long since replaced English tutorials. On the other hand personal continuity had been broken. None of my teachers had studied in Germany. Several had in Greece and in England. None of their teachers had taken the German doctorate, although their teachers’ teachers had (Smyth and Goodwin). Jaeger’s graduate seminars certainly formed the pedagogical model for seminars later taught throughout the USA by his students. Normally he took an important text of difficulty and offered it as subject of the annual graduate seminar. I shared in the

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18 A revealing document for the extraordinary impact of German professors on a young American student is James Morgan Hart, German Universities: A Narrative of Personal Experience (New York 1874) (Göttingen, Berlin and Leipzig in the 1850s). He is struck especially by the seriousness of the professorial calling.
seminars on Aeschylus’ Supplices, Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea and Pseudo-Longinus’ De sublimitate. He used in these seminars what he called “the Berlin method.” That was the intensive study of texts difficult for reasons of palaeography, language or content. The emphasis was always on thorough understanding rather than speed. In a semester-long seminar on Aeschylus’ Supplices we read only through the first 233 verses. What we learned was the enormous difficulty of the task. Jaeger, in the Wilamowitzian tradition, occasionally offered a seminar or lectures on a subject rather than on an author as the Americans and English did. The seminar was the mixed constitution. The approach was philological, the careful study of chosen texts from Tyrtaeus to the American Constitution. The lectures concerned “the transition from Hellenism to Christianity,” again based on texts from the Septuagint Apocrypha to Clemens Alexandrinus. Both of these were histories of ideas but taught by the historical philological method. What Jaeger meant by a seminar is best illustrated by his answer to my question, “What do you think of Fraenkel’s Agamemnon?” He answered: “It is not a book. It is a seminar.”

Two corollaries must be added here. I emphasize Jaeger because Jaeger was so inspiring a teacher. In the hands of lesser men the Berlin method became a bore, pedantry for its own sake and a scrupulous avoidance of ideas. Herbert Bloch was a Witzfigur even among undergraduates. I took Juvenal with him and whenever a town or hill was mentioned by the poet, he would pass an elderly postcard around the room, assuming wrongly that this would make the text alive. His graduate seminar on Greek historiography consisted in the monotonous recital of old lecture notes. I sometimes corrected him because I had read more recent secondary literature. This angered him and he invited me to dinner one evening at the Harvard Faculty Club to ask me why I hated him. I recalled this years later when Douglas Young remarked, “the best students are the students that disagree.”

Paradoxically Jaeger had very few doctoral students. The few that he had were regularly women or Jesuits. Of course there were occasional exceptions. What distinguished women and Jesuits was that they did not need jobs. Most women married and Jesuits had already secured their future. Young men at Harvard who needed positions flocked to Sterling Dow. It was still very much the old boy system. Dow regularly attended the annual philological and archaeological conventions and was active in the Classical Association of New England as well as founder of the Classical Teachers of New England. He introduced his boys to prominent people and firmly believed that it was the duty of the dissertation director to place his student in his first job. Jaeger always remained a Fremdling in his new Heimat and simply could not compete. One should recall that even in Berlin he never had the influence with Becker that Wilamowitz had earlier had with Althoff.
II. The Introduction of Kunstgeschichte in Place of Dreckarchäologie

James Loeb, who could not get an academic post in America because he was a Jew, when he died in 1931 left to the American School of Classical Studies in Athens the money with which they bought the Agora. The Agora dig became the American dig par excellence. Generations of students have been taught there and later at Corinth and elsewhere. The emphasis was on dirt archaeology, details of stratigraphy, potsherds, roof tiles, drainage systems and architectural remains. There had been a Trivialisierung of the subject. Epigraphy with wars over three- or four-bar sigmas flourished while no one spoke about sculpture or even vase painting. Museologists made catalogues but they had no students. That is until the Germans arrived. Margarete Bieber at Columbia, Otto J. Brendel at Indiana and then Columbia, G. M. A. Hanfmann at Harvard, Valentin Müller at Bryn Mawr and, after the war, Peter von Blanckenhagen at Chicago and then the Institute for Fine Arts in New York. Dietrich von Bothmer, because he was always a museologist, concerned, under the influence of the Englishman Sir John Beazley, with details of vase painting never had comparable influence. American art historians like Evelyn Byrd Harrison, the student of Bieber, and Jerome Pollitt, the great student of Brendel, were unthinkable before 1935.

III. Popularization of the Legacy of Greece and Rome

Before 1915 there had been no need to popularize. Latin and occasionally Greek requirements, in schools and at the leading universities, provided captive hordes of students and teaching positions for all who wanted them. By 1935 this was no longer the case. The immigrants were hampered by lack of English from becoming fluent lecturers overnight. On the other hand they had been taught by great lecturers and were accustomed to lecturing to large classes. Jaeger was as in so much else the exception. His Third Humanism sought to revive the ideas of Greek antiquity so that Weimar Germany could learn directly from them. It ended in failure for a number of reasons. But oddly it took on a second life in the United States; for Jaeger gained two influential apostles. His Harvard colleague J. H. Finley presented Greek texts to hundreds of first-year students as documents from which they could learn something that was of lasting importance in their lives. Gilbert Highet reached a wider audience than Harvard freshmen. He translated three volumes of Paideia and by popular publications and weekly radio talks he presented the legacy of Greece and Rome to the American middle class. He came as near to doing for America what Jaeger had done for Germany.19 Like Jaeger in the end he failed. American

19 For Highet’s achievement see my necrology at Gnomon 50 (1978) 430–32 and T. A. Suits, “Gilbert Highet,” in Briggs and Calder (above, note 3) 183–91. For Jaeger, see now
Banausentum was not going to be civilized by classical humanism. At the end of his life Jaeger wrote:

"Ohne die dauernde Geltung der antiken Idee des Menschen in der menschlichen Kultur schwelt die klassische Altertumswissenschaft in der Luft. Wer dies nicht sieht, der sollte nach Amerika kommen und sich vom Gang der Entwicklung der klassichen Studien dort belehren lassen."

IV. The Opening up of Classical Posts to American Jews

Eduard Meyer shrewdly observed the hypocrisy of American egalitarianism during the WASP ascendency:

"Wenn ein Jude erwähnt wird, wird einem zugerflüstert: ein gescheiter und gewandter Mann, but an awful Hebrew, you know; in the Sommerfrischen in New Hampshire und den Nachbargebieten wird kein Jude als Unsiedler zugelassen, und wenn er noch so viel dafür zahlen will, und es ist mir begegnet, daß man sich bei mir entschuldigt hat, daß man zu einem intimeren Zusammensein auch einen Juden aufgefordert habe, das habe sich leider aus bestimmten Gründen nicht vermeiden lassen. So gibt es denn Fälle, wo judische Gelehrte, weil ihnen in Amerika jede Aussicht zum Vorwärtskommen versperrt war, eine Stellung in Deutschland angenommen haben; denn hier denkt und handelt man, trotz alles Geredes, in diesen Dingen viel liberaler als drüben."

Antisemitism in American was illegal. Freedom of Religion was guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. But the American Gentlemen’s Agreement was far more effective in excluding Jews from the academy than Prussian antisemitic legislation had ever been. Disciplines also differed.

22 That is, American antisemitism was British rather than German; see B. Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939–1945 (Oxford and New York 1988). There had long been a numerus clausus of about 6% for admission of Jewish students to the good universities. This has now been treated honestly for the first time; see D. A. Oren, Joining the Club: A History of Jews at Yale (New Haven and London 1985). A similar problem has arisen recently with disclosure of a secret numerus clausus for Asian students. A further irritant for Jewish students, even when they were thoroughly secularized, was the persistence of required chapel services in some cases as late as 1960. By then non-Jewish students at Princeton signed up for the Jewish service which was on Friday as that would release them from returning to the university on Sunday morning. The requirement, that is, ended a self-parody and was dropped. Such a numerus clausus for Jewish students began in Germany only with the Nazis and before 1933 was furiously resisted; for contemporary newspaper accounts see D. L. Niewyk, Socialist, Anti-Semitism, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism 1918–1933 (Baton Rouge 1971)
Anthropology from the start was liberal, Jewish (Boas) and open to women. Classics was conservative. Women were confined to girls' colleges. Margarete Bieber was never more than associate professor at Columbia and upon retiring was denied the title of emeritus. With one exception on the West Coast (Monroe Deutsch) no American Jew received a tenured post in classics in America before a European Jew had. European Jews broke this prejudice for a simple reason. If a Jew were present at the meeting, no American would dare bring up the Jewish objection. Let us look at two American scholars whom Meyer presumably had in mind and two others who stayed.

1. James Loeb was the greatest benefactor American classics ever had. He endowed the Loeb Classical Library. He endowed the Charles Eliot Norton Lectureship for the American Institute of Archaeology. He endowed the Norton Fellowship for the American School. He left the American School the money with which to purchase the Athenian Agora. He could not achieve an American career in classics because he was a Jew. His teacher Norton advised him to go to France. In fact he chose exile near Munich. He received honorary degrees from Cambridge, Oxford and Munich but never one from Harvard. The income from the Loeb Library is funneled today directly into the Harvard Classics Department and contributes to making it one of the richest in the world.

2. Alfred Gudeman, editor of Tacitus, Dialogus de oratoribus and Aristotle, Poetica and author of a brief history of classical scholarship, was denied tenure at Pennsylvania and sought refuge in Germany, where he secured a post at the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae. He lived and worked there until old age. He died in Theresienstadt.

3. Moses Hadas, one of the most influential classicists of his generation in the U.S., was kept instructor for 15 years at Columbia at a salary so low that he was forced to write books that sold. He only gained tenure after the European Jews had broken the barrier. He became very much a Leo-Norden type, embarrassed by orthodoxy and integrated into Anglo-Saxon society but with the "religion of Hellenism" and never Christianity.

159 ff. S. Klingenstein, Jews in the American Academy 1900–1940 (New Haven 1991) is superficial and uninformed.

23 For Monroe Deutsch (1879–1955) see J. Fontenrose, Classics at Berkeley: The First Century, 1869–1970 (Berkeley 1982) 37. Fontenrose typically conceals the fact that he was Jewish. He received his associate professorship in 1919 but three years later went into administration. This could not have happened on the East Coast until almost 50 years later.


4. Harry Caplan of Cornell, editor of the Loeb Auctor ad Herennium, was an early example of an American Jew in classics. The case is of interest because a letter has survived dated "Ithaca, March 27, 1919" to Caplan, aged 23, signed by four non-Jewish colleagues in which they assure him of their friendship and that they are not anti-semites and advise that he go into school-teaching because, as a Jew in America, he has no future at the university level.27

5. The case of Paul Shorey, who is on the other side of the fence, is revealing. Benedict Einarson, his successor in the Chicago chair, informed me in 1958 that Shorey "always gave Jewish students more difficult qualifying examinations." This was common American practice with blacks in other subjects until 25 years ago.

V

There is another effect that the immigrants had, one that has not yet been noted. The immigrants (I do not mean those who came to the U.S. as boys, e.g., T. G. Rosenmeyer and Martin Ostwald) remained Germans living in the United States, with German wives in German homes. They never became pseudo-Americans. A few, Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, like Rudolph Pfeiffer and Felix Jacoby in England, returned to Germany permanently after the war. Some, like Hermann Franke and A. E. Raubitschek, enjoyed guest professorships and others, like G. M. A. Hanfmann and Friedrich Solmsen, accepted honorary degrees bestowed by repentant West German universities. Margarete Bieber became honorary senator of the University of Giessen. I do not know any, other than Lehmann, that remained embittered. Margarete Bieber told me that she sent CARE packages in 1945–47 to German colleagues, some of whom had denounced her or refused to communicate with her in the Nazi period. W. H. Auden in 1940 taught at the New School for Social Research in New York, where there were a number of European exiles. He remarked perceptively: 28 "Quite a good place but O so German of 1925—and they seem to have learned nothing since." That holds true of the classical scholars. They were between two worlds, no longer Germans, but never Americans, isolated more from their colleagues and children than from their students.


27 See the publication of the document at Cornell Alumni News 84 (July 1981) 7 and B. vom Brocke, Wilamowits nach 50 Jahren (above, note 3) 680 n. 43, who republishes the letter with valuable comment and bibliography.

For us, the students, they were exotic and, therefore, more interesting than just another American teacher. There was also a less creditable reason why the refugees attracted students. They marked easily. Jaeger was famous during doctoral orals for asking long questions and then answering them himself. It never occurred to him that the American student would know the answer. This attitude of good-natured contempt was more dangerous when applied to colleagues. I asked him once why he had supported, against Sterling Dow, Cedric H. Whitman for tenure at Harvard. He replied, "What does it matter? They are all the same." Kapp at Columbia never learned English but he did learn that if he gave every student an A no student would complain about his teacher’s lack of English. The refugees made some thirty years of students familiar with German professors. This in turn prepared the way for the wave of German immigration ca. 1970–90.

VI. The Second Emigration: 1970 to the Present

Students became professors. For me to have a German colleague was not so strange as it had been for my American teachers. This familiarity has been aided by the rise of Humboldt Stipendia and the frequency of German visitors whether as guest professors, guest lecturers, or research fellows of various sorts. But the refugee scholars had prepared the way. Within the field of classics a second wave of German immigrants occurred beginning about 1970. There were two reasons for this.

First the so-called Studentenunruh and University Reform in Western Germany claimed its victims, usually men who had painted themselves into corners and could no longer survive in the intense political atmosphere of the time. Winfried Bühl er and Walther Ludwig briefly held posts in the United States but never took American citizenship. They returned to their country when matters settled down, albeit not to the universities which they had left. G. N. Knauer, a leader of the opposition to reform at the Freie Universität in West Berlin, fled to the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, where he published nothing, taught reluctantly and took early retirement.

Secondly, the seventies and eighties saw a decline in classical philology in the Federal Republic, both in schools and universities. Such a decline does not occur abruptly and young academics were caught unawares by the change. This meant that highly educated young men of ability could not obtain posts in their own country. Among the emigrants of this last period are Karl Galinsky (Texas), Albert Henrichs (Harvard), Ludwig Koenen (Michigan), Eckard Schüttrumpf (Colorado) and the German Swiss Kurt Raaffaub (Brown). These men uniformly have been successful in America in marked contrast to the English immigrants. The reason is not only the old one. The American university system with its lectures and seminars is fundamentally German rather than English. There is another more sinister reason.
The last twenty years have seen the rise in American universities of an administrative class. These administrators emerging on the analogy of Big Business see the universities as factories with themselves as management and the professors as labor. American professors are no longer allowed to elect their presidents, vice presidents and deans. They often do not set their own salaries. Only with the approval of an administrator are they allowed a new appointment and regularly an administrator not a colleague writes the letter of appointment. The salaries of administrators are regularly two to five times that of a professor of equal age. European colleagues often ask me why academics "in the land of the free and the home of the brave" are such cowards. The reason is that they have grown accustomed since their student days to consider themselves the inferiors of their administrators, who are usually failed scholars (who expectedly detest scholars) or ruthless businessmen. Our system is far closer to the former East German system where the party rules the faculty. The West German immigrants come from a different tradition, where the title professor is the highest the university can bestow. They speak up to deans in a way that Americans no longer dare. It is an open secret in America that the way to save a threatened department is to hire a German chairman.

A final change in American classics deserves notice. It was not caused directly by the refugee scholars but as their American exile was caused by National Socialism so was this change. I mean the introduction of lecture courses on classics in English translation. The fact that American classics has not become an Orchideenfach is due entirely to these courses. In 1945–46 with the disarmament hundreds of thousands of young men returned to the United States. Under the G.I. Bill of Rights they were entitled to a college education. Their fathers had never been to the university. They had not attended elite schools. They were without Greek or Latin. Several farsighted American classicists, men like Moses Hadas, Gilbert Highet and J. H. Finley, often against the wishes of their senior colleagues, who called them betrayers of their subject, introduced courses like Greek tragedy in English translation or the Classical Tradition. More recently we find Women in Antiquity or the Sexual life of the Ancients. Such courses had never been taught before in the United States and they were unknown in England. But Wilamowitz had lectured to 600 in the Aula of the Berlin University on Greek literature in translation and so had Jaeger. Again we successfully imitated the Germans.

Sometimes good things happen for bad reasons. Neither King George III nor Adolf Hitler did what he did with the intent of benefiting American classics but in fact these two men caused American classics to become a professional, productive German discipline rather than to remain shallow English upperclass dilettantism. This fact reveals another unexpected fact. So other-worldly and in the American sense "academic" (that is useless and unnecessary) a discipline as American classics is entirely dependent upon a Weltpolitik which most of its practitioners prefer to denigrate and ignore.
Appendix

The following is an alphabetical list of eighteen leading refugee scholars of the thirties in the field of classical studies with their dates and the American institutions where they taught. References are given to the authoritative biographical material. Those who arrived in the United States young enough to be educated there (e.g., Martin Ostwald and T. G. Rosenmeyer) are not included. Heinrich Gomperz and his pupil Philip Merlan were philosophers rather than philologists and, therefore, are excluded. For the appalling exploitation of the helpless Heinrich Gomperz by the University of Southern California see Wallace Nethery, Dr. Flewelling and the Hoose Library: Life and Letters of a Man and an Institution (Los Angeles 1976) 76 ff.


Memphis; Illinois College; Kansas-Wesleyan University; Marquette University).  

29 Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the University of Cologne and the City University of New York.
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