

Notes on *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannus*

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Text and apparatus are quoted from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (Oxford 1990) except as noted.

*Antigone* 1–6

ὃ κοινὸν ἀντάδελφον Ἰσμῆνης κάρα,  
 ἄρ' οἴθ' ὅ τι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίου κακῶν  
 ὅποιον οὐχὶ νῶϊν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ;  
 οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀλγεινὸν οὔτ' ἤττης ἄτερ†  
 οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν οὔτ' ἀτιμὸν ἔσθ' ὅποιον οὐ  
 τῶν σῶν τε κάμῶν οὐκ ὅπωπ' ἐγὼ κακῶν.

5

2–5 totus locus vexatus

Text and apparatus are Dawe's. Prominent among the vexations of 2–3 are whether Sophocles could have written both ὅ τι (or ὅτι) and ὅποιον, and if, as I believe, he could not have, which of these expressions needs to be replaced, and with what. A further question I have never seen satisfactorily answered is why Antigone remarks pointedly that Zeus is fulfilling the evils of Oedipus on Antigone and Ismene during their lifetime (νῶϊν ἔτι ζώσαιν), as if one would naturally expect him to do so after their death.

The discussion must begin with the dogmatic assertion that the transmitted text—where interrogative ὅ τι or the conjunction ὅτι fights for mastery with relative or interrogative ὅποιον—cannot be correct. The main lines of defense can be read in Campbell, in Jebb and (somewhat unclearly) in Kamerbeek.<sup>1</sup> To me they do not seem successful, and I can appeal in confirmation only to my reader's intuition.

On that premise, either ὅ τι or ὅποιον is corrupt, and we cannot do better than to imitate the dentist and probe the edges of what is sound until we find something that yields. As I move the probe backwards from the end of line 3, I reach the beginning of the line without encountering anything

<sup>1</sup> See also H. Bonitz, *Beiträge zur Erklärung des Sophocles*, 2. Heft (Vienna 1857) 12–17. The most evident difficulty with Bonitz' paraphrase ἄρ' οἴσθ' ὅ τι τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίου κακῶν (*sc.* ἔστιν), ὅποιον οὐχὶ Ζεὺς νῶϊν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ is, as Schütz and others point out, the position of Ζεύς.

that is not absolutely sound, not clearly and demonstrably Sophoclean. For ὅποιον οὐχί we need look no further than 5. Müller's argument that ὅποιον must be corrupt because it has a qualitative sense that is out of place here is mistaken, as there is sufficient evidence to show that Sophocles used ὅποιος in place of the simple relative: see *Phil.* 659, *OC* 561 and fr. 1130. 17, quoted below on *OT* 938. For ὅποιος as indirect interrogative with a noun understood, see *Eur. Hel.* 631. That being so, suspicion falls on ὅ τι and perhaps on a neighboring word or two.<sup>2</sup>

If ὅποιον is the word that introduces the whole clause, then we must suspect not only ὅ τι but also Ζεύς. For once we remove ὅ τι, there is no way to fit the nominative of Zeus' name into the line without absurdity.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, if the subject of the verb τελεῖ stands directly after the verb introducing indirect question but before the indirect interrogative, intuition calls for the anticipated subject of τελεῖ to be in the accusative case as the object of οἶσθα. This is the so-called "lilies of the field" construction, formally called prolepsis, whereby the subject of an indirect question is anticipated, placed before the interrogative pronoun and made into the object of the leading verb. Like Greek authors of every period, Sophocles uses it often: cf. *OT* 224–25, quoted below, and 302, and also *Aj.* 118, *Tr.* 2, 321 and *Phil.* 573, and the discussions in Kühner–Gerth II 577 ff. and A. C. Moorhouse, *The Syntax of Sophocles* (Leiden 1982) 47–49. If it were not that zeta always makes position, we could write ἄρ' οἶσθα Ζῆνα, and the sense would be exactly what we require: "Do you know which of the evils stemming from Oedipus Zeus is not accomplishing for us during our lifetime?"

As it is, we must always be in doubt about what once stood there. As far as meter is concerned, we could write ἄρ' οἶσθα Κρονίδην, but this patronymic, not used by Aeschylus at all, is confined by Sophocles and Euripides to lyric. No other way commends itself of fitting Zeus' name into the line in the accusative once we remove ὅ τι.

At this point, the difficulties seem insoluble, and we might do well to turn away from them for a bit to the last of our queries: Why does Antigone say so pointedly that the ills of Oedipus are being accomplished on her and Ismene during their lifetime? Brown suggests that Antigone might have expected Zeus to spread the finite stock of Oedipus' ills over

<sup>2</sup> Lloyd-Jones and Wilson print ἄρ' οἶσθ' ὅ τι Ζεύς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν — / ἄ, ποῖον οὐχί νῶν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ; But the interjection ἄ is found in tragedy only at sentence beginning, as a separate sentence for cries of pain and the like, or (in two doubtful cases) before a vocative. The self-interruption and anacolouthon, natural enough in conversation, seem decidedly *stilwidrig* in tragedy. This conjecture gives us the measure of the desperateness of the problem and provides part of the justification for putting forward my own somewhat drastic solution. For a different solution, see now A. L. Brown, *CQ* 41 (1991) 325–26.

<sup>3</sup> No one will hesitate for a moment to reject ἄρ' οἶσθα δὴ Ζεύς (Meineke, cited by Schütz) with a collocation (ἄρα . . . δὴ) unknown to Denniston, or ἄρ' οἶσθά γε Ζεύς, where the emphasis is unwanted.

several generations, but he gives no reason for this supposition. Müller says that in Antigone's view the new trouble will not allow them to live any longer, but that is no reason for Antigone to say  $\nu\omega\iota\nu$  ἔτι ζῶσαιν but quite the opposite. Only Dawe (*Studies* III 99) faces the problem squarely: He canvasses and rejects still other answers and says, "I see no solution, and write this note only to show that the difficulties of this notorious passage may be even greater than we had imagined." He notes a further difficulty, that in  $\tau\omega\iota\nu$  ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν the preposition is surprising.

Yet these last two difficulties may perhaps lead to the solution of the earlier problems. It may be that Antigone speaks the way she does because the subject of  $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota$  is one who is normally thought to bring death to the victim, not pain and disgrace in life. If both ὁ τι and Ζεὺς are under suspicion, other subjects—other supernatural agents—become available. We could fit in δαίμων, but not in the accusative grammar almost certainly calls for. Antigone could have said ἄρ' οἴσθα Φοῖβον, but though the god is in the right case, in this play Apollo is nowhere mentioned as the destroyer of the Labdacid line. She might have said ἄρ' οἴσθα πότμον or Μοῖραν, though these abstractions seem a bit feeble for the play's openings lines and for the vigorous action they are expected to perform.<sup>4</sup> For my money, though, the most attractive possibility is the following:

ὃ κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμῆνης κára,  
 ἄρ' οἴσθ' Ἐρινὺν τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν  
 ὁποῖον οὐχὶ νῶιν ἔτι ζῶσαιν τελεῖ;

Here is a fitting subject for  $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota$ . There are Erinyes of murder victims, or even of beggars, and the Erinyes are often portrayed as carrying out the destructive plans of a god or gods.<sup>5</sup> Surely, though, with τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν in the same line, the reference must be to the curse of Oedipus against his sons. The surprising fact to which Antigone alludes

<sup>4</sup> In addition, these suggestions are open to the objection that the genitive phrase in the second half of the line, which ought to go with what follows, might all too easily be taken with πότμον or Μοῖραν. An actor, to be sure, could easily make the structure plain, but a name would be better than an abstraction.

<sup>5</sup> The connection between gods and Erinyes is made clear in *Iliad* 19. 87, where Zeus is accompanied by Moira and "the Erinyes who walks in darkness"; in Aesch. *Ag.* 59, where some god sends an Erinyes on the transgressors; and in *Ag.* 461–66, where the gods are mindful of those who kill many, and the black Erinyes blot out those who prosper without justice.

It is a reasonable guess that an Erinyes had played a role in connection with the destruction of the Labdacid line often in poetry before Sophocles, as she clearly does in Aeschylus' *Septem* (see 70, 574, 700, 723, 867, 887, 977, 989 and [1055]). Certainly that is the picture the second stasimon of our play paints (594 ff.), where the "last root" of the house is cut down by three agents, the last two of which (the only ones we can be sure of) are "folly of speech and the mind's Erinyes." The very next words, τεάν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι, imply clearly that this Erinyes-wrought destruction is, in the Chorus' view, part of the plan of Zeus to end the house of Labdacus.

here is that this curse, designed by Oedipus for the destruction of his ungrateful and unfilial sons, works on those who are still alive as well.

We can explain the corruption if we assume that as a note against line 2 someone wrote, e.g., ταύτην τὴν Ἐρινὺν ἰστέον ὅτι Ζεὺς ἐστὶν ὁ πέμψας, or ἰστέον ὅτι Ζεὺς ἄλλ' οὐκ Ἀπόλλων ἐστὶν ὁ τοὺς Λαβδακίδας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ δράματι ἀναιρῶν. Somehow ὅτι Ζεὺς stood directly above the third word in the line and was taken by a later scribe for its replacement. The theme of Ate and the Erinys as behind the action of the play is well brought out in H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1971) 113–17.

### *Antigone* 648–54

μή νύν ποτ', ᾧ παῖ, τὰς φρένας γ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς  
 γυναικὸς οὐνεκ' ἐκβάλης εἰδῶς ὅτι  
 ψυχρὸν παραγκάλισμα τοῦτο γίγνεται, 650  
 γυνὴ κακῆ ξύνευνος ἐν δόμοις. τί γὰρ  
 γένοιτ' ἂν ἔλκος μείζον ἢ φίλος κακός;  
 ἀλλὰ πτύσας ὥσει τε δυσμενῆ μέθες  
 τὴν παῖδ' ἐν Ἄιδου τήνδε νυμφεύειν τινί.

653 ἀλλ' ἀποπτύσας KRZc

Text and apparatus are Dawe's. There are three problems in 653–54. The τε in 653 does not connect things of like status in the sentence. We may not take the τε to be an instance of “epic τε” in view of C. J. Ruijgh's large book on that engrossing subject.<sup>6</sup> Jebb, with Ruijgh's approval, translates, “with loathing, and as if she were thine enemy, let this girl go,” but the joining of two expressions, one nominative, the other accusative, by means of τε seems difficult.

Even if we ignored this problem the translation of the couplet raises other difficulties: “But rejecting her with contempt [and] let the girl, as you would an enemy, marry some individual in the nether world.” There are lots of things one does customarily and as a matter of course to enemies, but letting them marry someone in the nether world is not one of them, that being restricted to a few situations like ours. Lastly, τινί, placed where it is, ought, one feels, to be allusive and minatory: cf. *Ant.* 751. But there is no reference.<sup>7</sup>

We need another participle for the τε to connect. The same participle will serve to disjoin “like an enemy” from “let her marry in the nether

<sup>6</sup> *Autour de “τε épique”* (Amsterdam 1971) § 811, on ὥσειτε as foreign to tragedy.

<sup>7</sup> Müller says that the pronoun has “eine verächtliche und zugleich eine ominöse Kraft.” There seems no reason to be dismissive of a “somebody or other” in the nether world. And there is no reason to take τινί as itself alluding to something painful, as if the identity of her otherworldly bridegroom were somehow a further unpleasant surprise. The combination of dismissive and ominous seems, furthermore, psychologically a near impossibility.

world," which is highly desirable. Its disappearance can be accounted for if we assume the following original:

ἀλλὰ πτύσας ὡσεὶ τε δυσμενῆ τιθεὶς  
τὴν παῖδ' ἐν "Αἰδου τήνδε νυμφεύειν μέθες.

Perhaps μέθες was copied both where it belonged and also at the end of the previous line, causing the disappearance of the participle that once stood there. Someone saw that there were two identical imperatives, and that one of them should go.<sup>8</sup> He picked the wrong one and wrote τινί in its place.<sup>9</sup>

Lloyd-Jones and Wilson take a different approach. Noting that K, which Wilson has established as our second-oldest witness, reads ἀλλ' ἀποπτύσας, which reading also appears in R and Zc, they delete the ἀλλ' with Blaydes and read ἀποπτύσας οὖν ὥστε, the last two words being Blaydes' conjecture for ὡσεὶ τε. This attractive solution deals with the first two of the three problems cited above. But the third (the force of τινί) is untouched. Furthermore the corruption of οὖν ὥστε to ὡσεὶ τε seems hard to motivate. And while the authority of K must in general be rated higher now that Wilson has redated it, its reading here, ἀποπτύσας for πτύσας, represents a kind of error that is by no means uncommon, the replacement of a poetic simplex by a compound more usual in prose. See Eur. Hipp. 965, where the truth is ὤλεσεν and a large number of mss. read ἀπόλεσεν, *contra metrum*, as in our passage.

#### Antigone 726–34

- KP. οἱ τηλικοῖδε καὶ διδαξόμεσθα δὴ  
φρονεῖν πρὸς ἀνδρὸς τηλικοῦδε τὴν φύσιν;  
AI. μηδὲν γ' ὃ μὴ δίκαιον· εἰ δ' ἐγὼ νέος,  
οὐ τὸν χρόνον χρὴ μᾶλλον ἢ τᾶργα σκοπεῖν.  
KP. ἔργον γάρ ἐστι τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν; 730  
AI. οὐδ' ἂν κελεύσαιμ' εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοῦς.  
KP. οὐχ ἦδε γὰρ τοιαῖδ' ἐπείληπται νόσοι;  
AI. οὐ φησι Θήβης τῆσδ' ὁμόπολις λεῶς.  
KP. πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀμὲ χρὴ τάσσειν ἐρεῖ;

731 οὐδ' ἂν] οὐ τὰν Schneidewin

There are several problems calling for our attention here:

<sup>8</sup> A. L. Brown suggests ἀλλὰ πτύσας ὡσεὶ τε δυσμενῆ μεθεὶς / τὴν παῖδ' ἐν "Αἰδου τήνδε νυμφεύειν <ἔα>, which gives two aorist participles in the first line and a two-letter imperative whose disappearance can be accounted for by haplography: -EINEA.

<sup>9</sup> Lloyd-Jones pointed out to me that, on p. 165 of the Anhang to Schneidewin-Nauck, Nauck proposes a somewhat bolder solution to the same problem: "Vielleicht γένοιτ' ἂν ἔλκος μείζον; ἀλλ' ἀποπτύσας τὴν παῖδ' ἐν "Αἰδου τήνδε νυμφεύειν μέθες."

(1) Though Schneidewin's conjecture gets rid of an οὐδέ in 731 for which there is no apparent use,<sup>10</sup> no commentator I have read remarks on the singularity of εὐσεβεῖν in the same line. The context seems to require the line to mean, "I would not, you know, urge anyone to honor the base," a reply of sorts to Creon's question ("Is it merit to reverence those who are unruly?"), which refers to Haemon's taking of Antigone's part.<sup>11</sup> Even if it could mean this, Haemon's line is a strange reply to Creon's, as I will show below. In fact, however, εὐσεβεῖν is no synonym for σέβειν, and εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς could mean nothing but "to act piously in regard to the base or the guilty." Jebb's "I could wish no one to *show respect for evil-doers*" is wishful thinking.

If we start from the phrase's literal meaning, we reach a different impasse. Haemon then says, "I would not, you know, urge anyone to act piously in regard to the guilty," Creon says, "Isn't that what she has done?" and Haemon must then reply, "Not according to the people of Thebes," attributing to the Thebans the view either that Polynices was no traitor or that the burial was no act of piety. Neither is a plausible attitude for Haemon to take.

(2) There are difficulties of a lesser gravity with οὐδ' ἂν κελεύσομαι. Why, in this context, should Haemon speak of "ordering" or "urging" others to εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς? Charged with committing X oneself, it is scarcely natural to reply, "I would not urge anyone to commit X," or (reflecting the force of οὐδέ) "I would not even *urge* another to commit X [much less do it myself]."<sup>12</sup> If 731 could mean "I would not urge anyone to act piously in regard to the base" without ending up in the impasse described in the last paragraph, Haemon would be at least saying something intelligible ("I would not have urged Antigone to act as she has"), even if it is rather weasel-like to say, "I didn't authorize it beforehand," of an act you clearly approve of afterward. But it is hard to make any sense of κελεύσομαι on Jebb's interpretation of εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς as "to

<sup>10</sup> Denniston, *GP* 197, cites passages in Herodotus where οὐδέ seems to mean *gar nicht* but (583) excludes our passage. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, *Sophoclea* 134, translate, following Kamerbeek, "Far from revering them, I should not even exhort another to show piety towards those who are κακοί." But Lloyd-Jones and Wilson give us no help in reading their translation: Do we stress *exhort* or *show piety*, and why are we being left in doubt? The first, which gives more plausible word-order, means a contrast between doing a thing and urging others to do it, but it is unclear why if one will not urge another to do a thing, it is a fortiori clear that one would not do it oneself. The second gives better sense (the *kakoi* are such that they do not even deserve to be treated with the decencies approved by the gods, much less shown special honor) but word-order is against it.

<sup>11</sup> "The unruly" is too mild an expression, surely, to describe Polynices, and so τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν must refer to Haemon's approval of Antigone's burial of her brother. Only this can be cast in Haemon's teeth as one of his ἔργα.

<sup>12</sup> The same objection applies to the interpretation of οὐδέ proposed by J. Kvíčala, *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung des Sophokles* (Vienna 1865) 15–18, who says it means "No, nor . . ."

honor the base." Are we to suppose that "I would not urge (anyone? you?) to honor the base" is mere elegant variation for "I would not honor the base?" Or that, in spite of the fancy footwork at the beginning of the line, we are supposed to fix our attention on the significant substitution of τὸς κακούς for τὸς ἀκοσμοῦντας (thus Jebb)?

(3) Lastly, there is the less than perfect clarity of 732, where some maintain stoutly that the νόσος in question is κακία and others no less stoutly that it is τὸ εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς. Brown's comment sums up what many will feel: "The latter is more pointed in itself, and may be preferable, even though it makes the argument hereabout slightly less coherent." In the last paragraph but one I dilated upon this incoherence, which I think is considerable. Yet the fact that we can be pulled in one direction by considerations of style and "point" and another by logic means that all may not be well here.

If we attack (1) by itself, there is only one reasonable approach. We must find something to replace εὐσεβεῖν or εὐσεβεῖν εἰς that is capable of meaning "to honor" and then persuade ourselves that it is close enough in look to have been mistaken for what is in our MSS. The closest I can come is οὐ τὰν κελεύσασαμ' ἐναριθμήσασθαι κακούς (cf. Eur. *Or.* 623). It would be difficult to explain the corruption, though if we felt we had settled the biggest problem, we could persuade ourselves that the other two were the phantom images of a hyper-critical mind. And since life is short and there are other things to think about besides Soph. *Ant.* 726-34, we might well cut our losses and pass on.

Suppose, however, that we take our courage in our hands and resolve to address all three problems at once. We would like ideally a solution that gives good sense throughout while preserving as many letters as possible of the text transmitted in our MSS. As it happens, we can get unimpeachable sense while preserving every letter of the paradosis. Let us ask ourselves four questions. (a) To what action is Haemon likely to be referring by the phrase εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς, and what is likely to be his moral attitude toward that action? (b) Who is it that in all probability talked about giving the order for something? (c) What must have preceded 731 for transmitted οὐδ' to make sense? (d) What must have been said before 732 for the reference in τοιαῦδε νόσωι to be instantly and perfectly clear? The answers are these: (a) The phrase εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακούς refers to Antigone's burial of the traitor Polynices, an action Haemon must be describing in *approving* terms as "showing piety (even) with regard to the base": εὐσέβεια is good almost by definition, and once a course of action is agreed to be pious, there is little that can be said against it, so that "I would not urge you to observe piety with regard to X" is not a plausible line of argument. Haemon must in some way commend piety in the case even of the guilty. (b) Creon is the most likely man to give an order. (c) Preceding the οὐδ' in 731 we need a negative to give οὐδ' the force of the connective "nor." (d) Before 732, "Has she not been tainted with this

disease," we need a reference to disobeying orders that a pious person could obey so that Creon can claim (732) that Antigone is guilty of this disease, Thebes deny it (733) and then Creon ask (734) whether the city shall tell him what orders to give. The patient can be saved in all his limbs, but the operation is messy. Here is the appalling spectacle that, if I am right, the editor must put in the text:

KP. ἔργον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν;  
 AI. < > εὐσεβεῖν εἰς τοὺς κακοὺς.  
 KP. οὐδ' ἂν κελεύσαιμ' < >  
 AI. < >  
 KP. οὐχ ἦδε γὰρ τοιαῖδ' ἐπέιληπται νόσωι;  
 AI. οὐ φησι Θήβης τῆσδ' ὁμόπολις λεῶς.  
 KP. πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀμὲ χρὴ τάσσειν ἐρεῖ;

Below the water-line in the app. crit., the editor will have scope for creative reconstruction of the missing portions. Provisionally I suggest the following:

KP. ἔργον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν;  
 AI. <οὐκ ἔστ' ἄκοσμον> εὐσεβεῖν εἰς (στὸν κάκ) τοὺς κακοὺς.  
 KP. οὐδ' ἂν κελεύσαιμ' <ἔργα δρᾶν θεοστουγῆ.>  
 AI. <οὐδ' αἰνέσαιμ' ἂν εὐσεβεῖς συγγεῖν νόμους.>  
 KP. οὐχ ἦδε γὰρ τοιαῖδ' ἐπέιληπται νόσωι;  
 AI. οὐ φησι Θήβης τῆσδ' ὁμόπολις λεῶς.  
 KP. πόλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀμὲ χρὴ τάσσειν ἐρεῖ;

Others will be able to write more elegant and Sophoclean Greek. But the sense cannot, I think, be much improved. Note that Creon's "What? Shall the city tell me what orders I must give?" now rises naturally out of its new context.

### *Antigone* 1277–80

ὦ δέσποθ', ὡς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος,  
 τὰ μὲν πρὸ χειρῶν τάδε φέρεις, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις  
 ἔοικας ἤκειν καὶ τάχ' ὄψεσθαι κακά. 1280

1279 φέρεις Brunck: φέρων codd.: φέρειν Hartung 1280 ἤκειν]  
 ἤκων Brunck καὶ τάχ' LVZf: καὶ τὰ γ' AZo: καὶ τὰδ' RUY: καὶ  
 τὰ τ' S: αὐτίκ' Blaydes

Blaydes proposed hundreds of conjectures on the texts of the tragic poets, and because their general quality is not high, there has been a tendency to ignore him in places where he is right or at least plausible.<sup>13</sup> His conjecture here (adopting Brunck's ἤκων and writing αὐτίκ') is highly plausible and may well be right. The sense we require is not (paradosis), "It seems that you have come and will soon see other misfortunes in the house," but

<sup>13</sup> Cf. R. D. Dawe, *Repertory of Conjectures on Aeschylus* (Leiden 1965) 6–7.

(conjecture), “It seems that having arrived you will soon see other misfortunes in the house.” The *ratio corruptelae* is simple: ἔοικας governs an infinitive, and this led a scribe to turn a participle into the infinitive he looked for. Later someone noticed there were two infinitives in the line, interpolated the “and” this seemed to require, and adjusted the adverb to fit the metre. Brunck’s φέρεις, though the corruption is harder to explain, looks very attractive as well.

I wish, however, to direct attention in this note to 1278, where attempts to interpret the paradosis seem to me to fail on two counts. First, everyone seems to take ἔχων and κεκτημένος as if they meant respectively “having present with one” and “having in store, in one’s storeroom.” I find this frankly incredible, and I cannot believe that any Greek hearing these two verbs, plain and unmodified by any prepositional phrase, would conclude that the one refers to things at the ready and the other to things hidden away. The two verbs are synonyms, and ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος (note the connective) looks for all the world like ordinary and unremarkable pleonasm.<sup>14</sup>

Second, attempts to account for ὡς are equally unsatisfying. Most commentators or translators ignore it. Kamerbeek makes it exclamatory, most implausibly. Jebb’s translation takes it with the participles and translates “as one who,” which would cause no comment if the participles were nouns. With a participle, ὡς most commonly means “on the ground that.”

The only way I know of to deal with both of these objections simultaneously is to mark a lacuna after 1278. The lacuna will have the participle that forms a contrast to ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος, and present possession will be contrasted with something else, perhaps future acquisition. As for the ὡς with the participle, we do not want the causal participle, “on the grounds that,” which would make no contribution to the Exangelos’ sentence, but an idiom that is thoroughly Sophoclean, the use of redundant ὡς in participial indirect statement after a verb of knowing or sense perception; see Moorhouse, *Syntax of Sophocles* 318. What Sophocles wrote may have looked something like this:

ὦ δέσποθ', ὡς ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος  
 <πένθη κάτισθι χᾶτερ' αὐ σήσων, ἐπεὶ>  
 τὰ μὲν πρὸ χειρῶν τάδε φέρεις, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις  
 ἔοικας ἥκων αὐτίκ' ὄψεσθαι κακά.

<sup>14</sup> The two verbs are used as synonyms, e.g., Thuc. 1. 73. 1 (ἔχομεν ἃ κεκτήμεθα); Lys. 29. 4; Isoc. *Paneg.* 107, *Antid.* 159; Dem. 7. 26, 7. 28–29, 11. 6, 14. 28, 21. 62, 45. 80; Plato, *Crat.* 393b, *Theat.* 197b–c, *Polit.* 259a, *Symp.* 201b, *Resp.* 382b (ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτήσθαι), 458c, *Crüi.* 111c, *Leg.* 666e, 717b (ἃ κέκτηται καὶ ἔχει), 742b, 815e. In tragedy, see Eur. *Ion* 591–93, *Pho.* 555–56 and fr. 57. 2.

"O master, know that you have a grief and will get yet another." The contrast between present and future is then made clearer in the next two lines.

OT 223–32

ὑμῖν προφωνῶ πᾶσι Καδμείοις τάδε·  
 ὅστις ποθ' ὑμῶν Λάιον τὸν Λαβδάκου  
 κάτοιδεν ἀνδρὸς ἐκ τίνος διώλετο, 225  
 τοῦτον κελεύω πάντα σημαίνειν ἐμοί·  
 κεί μὲν φοβεῖται τοῦπικλημ' ὑπεξελῶν

< αὐτὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ.—πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο >  
 ἄστεργές οὐδέν, γῆς δ' ἄπεισιν ἀβλαβής—  
 εἰ δ' αὖ τις ἄλλον οἶδεν ἢ 'ξ ἄλλης χθονὸς 230  
 τὸν αὐτόχειρα, μὴ σιωπάτω· τὸ γὰρ  
 κέρδος τελῶ 'γὼ χῆ χάρις προσκίσεται.

227 κεί μὲν φοβεῖται] καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθω Blaydes et Heimsoeth  
 ὑπεξελεῶν] -ελεῖν Blaydes et Halm: -έλοι Rauchenstein post hunc  
 v. lacunam statuit P. Groeneboom: possis ex. gr. <πόλεως (vel  
 ἄλλων) ἐπισπᾶν θανασίμουσ φόνου δίκας> 230 ἢ 'ξ Vauvilliers:  
 ἐξ codd.

Editors are right to posit a lacuna here, for the transmitted text is defective, and emendation does not heal the sense. Blaydes' καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθω . . . ὑπεξελεῖν, apart from other deficiencies, means an unexpected and incomprehensible shift in address in 227 from the man who knows who the killer is to the killer himself. For it is clearly the killer, not the "knower," the potential informant, who is assured that he will suffer nothing worse than exile. But with 224–26 preceding and τοῦτον in the line just before, no one would expect the subject of φοβεῖσθω to be anyone other than the informant. The same point tells against Rauchenstein's optative of wish (we might have expected a third-person imperative anyway), whose subject must be the killer, though the change of subject is not made clear.

But the same point that tells against these conjectures tells against the placement of this lacuna in the text above. The subject of φοβεῖται in 227 ought to be the informant, the τοῦτον of the previous line. By contrast, the man who speaks αὐτὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ, denounces himself, and thus suffers nothing worse than exile, is the killer, for the promise that he will suffer nothing worse than exile would be unnecessary to an informer while its appropriateness to the murderer is obvious: Oedipus has just learned that he must kill or exile the guilty (99–101), and he promises to do only the second in the case of someone who denounces himself. In between is a phrase, τοῦπικλημ' ὑπεξελεῶν, whose ownership is disputed, which will belong either to the one or to the other depending on where we mark the lacuna.

We should mark the lacuna within the line—*ὑπεξελών* definitely, and *τούπικλημ'* possibly, going with what follows—for several reasons. First, while *τούπικλημα* could refer either to the charge of murder against the killer or the charge of complicity against the informant doubtless mentioned in the lacuna, it is slightly more probable that the person engaged in “diminishing, reducing, doing away with by degrees” (*ὑπεξελών*: cf. *El.* 1420, *Eur. Hipp.* 633) is the murderer himself, who by denouncing himself can reduce his punishment to exile.

More important, however, is the whole context. In 224–26 Oedipus is asking any informants to come forward. In 230–32 he is still addressing informants, this time those who may know of a foreign killer.<sup>15</sup> It seems easiest to construe the intervening lines so that they too address possible informants and so that the killer and his penalty are mentioned only to reassure *them*. The sense we look for is this: “And if he fears the charge <of complicity in the murder, I assure him most solemnly that not even the murderer himself will receive the expected penalty for murder if he denounces> himself and thereby reduces <his punishment>.” (Since what the murderer reduces is not the charge but the penalty, I mark the lacuna after *τούπικλημ'*. But certainty is impossible here.) The Greek for this, though longer than one would like, writes itself:

κεί μὲν φοβεῖται τούπικλημ' <ομοῦ κτανεῖν  
 συνειδέειν τε, τοὺς θεοὺς ὄμνυμ' ἐγὼ  
 μηδ' ἂν τὸν ἔρξαντ' οὐ κτανεν τεῖσαι δίκην  
 ἦν μαρτυρήσει, ζημίαν> ὑπεξελών,  
 αὐτὸς κατ' αὐτοῦ. πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν κτλ.

(For the “coincident” aorist participle, describing an action contemporaneous with an aorist verb, see Barrett on *Hipp.* 289–92.) By contrast, attempts to reproduce the argument of the passage taking *τούπικλημ' ὑπεξελών* with the knower are considerably more awkward.<sup>16</sup> This solution avoids the anacolouthon postulated by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson above. This is a gain, for to posit both a lacuna and a drastic change of construction seems a perilously expensive way of proceeding.

<sup>15</sup> Vauvilliers' conjecture should be rejected: “if on the other hand anyone knows *someone else* <or> *from another land*” is dubious sense. Nauck's *ἐλθόντ'* for *ἄλλον* gives good sense.

<sup>16</sup> Only two ways of proceeding suggest themselves. (1) “If he is afraid, reducing the charge against himself <of complicity, let him come forward in the knowledge that even the murderer will not receive the expected punishment if he denounces> himself, etc.” (2) “If he is afraid, by doing away with the charge against him <in this fashion, that he will bring himself into trouble, let him be aware that the murderer himself will not receive the expected punishment if he denounces> himself, etc.” The first is longer and more awkward than the text I argue for; the second takes *τούπικλημ' ὑπεξελών* in an unsatisfyingly conative sense which requires the unnatural suppletion of “in this fashion.”

## OT 609–15

οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον οὔτε τοὺς κακοὺς μάτην  
 χρηστοὺς νομίζειν οὔτε τοὺς χρηστοὺς κακοὺς. 610  
 [φίλον γὰρ ἐσθλὸν ἐκβαλεῖν ἴσον λέγω  
 καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτῷ βίοντον, ὃν πλεῖστον φιλεῖ.]  
 ἀλλ' ἐν χρόνῳ γνώσῃ τάδ' ἀσφαλῶς, ἐπεὶ  
 χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος.  
 κακὸν δὲ κἄν ἐν ἡμέραι γνοίης μιᾷ. 615

611–12 *delevimus* (611–15 *del. iam van Deventer*)

Surely 615 should be bracketed too? The argument of the passage is this: Creon wants Oedipus to conduct a proper investigation, going to Delphi to see whether his report of the oracle's words was correct. For to deem the good man bad and the bad good are both terrible errors. The safe course for avoiding both is to take the time to investigate, for it is time alone that shows up the just man.

Line 615 (“but the wicked man you may recognize in a single day”) is not only irrelevant (as Kamerbeek admits) but positively ruinous. While it was said of Winston Churchill that while you could find out all his faults in half an hour's conversation, it would take a lifetime to appreciate his virtues, no such reflections are relevant here.<sup>17</sup> In this context δίκαιον does not mean anything more general than “law-abiding, innocent of the charge,” for the whole scene is not about Creon's moral character in general but about whether he is guilty of conspiring to depose his king. If it is time alone that establishes innocence, it cannot at the same time be said that a single day suffices to find out guilt. I suspect that to some actor 613–14 seemed insufficiently sententious for the end of his speech.

## OT 932–38

ἀλλὰ φράζ' ὅτου  
 χρήζων ἀφίξει χῶτι σημήναι θέλων.  
 ΑΓ. ἀγαθὰ δόμοις τε καὶ πόσει τῷ σῶι, γύναι.  
 ΙΟ. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; πρὸς τίνος δ' ἀφιγμένος; 935  
 ΑΓ. ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου. τὸ δ' ἔπος οὐξερῶ—τάχα,  
 ἦδοιο μὲν, πῶς δ' οὐκ ἄν; ἀσχάλλοις δ' ἴσως.  
 ΙΟ. τί δ' ἔστι; ποῖαν δύναμιν ᾧδ' ἔχει διπλῆν;

<sup>17</sup> Wecklein's preemptive first strike against possible attackers of 615, *Ars Sophoclis emendandi* (Wurzburg 1869) 140–41, takes the passage into the realm of high morality: “Causa autem sententiae v. 615 . . . in eo posita est, quod unum malum facinus malum hominis ingenium manifestat, unum bene factum bonum animum non comprobat.” But the meaning of δίκαιος (law-abiding) and κακός (guilty) is sufficiently shown by the parallel situation in Euripides' *Hippolytus*, esp. 929, 942, 1024, 1031, 1075, 1081, 1299, 1307, and the references to time as establishing guilt and innocence in 1051 and 1322.

Dawe's commentary well points out the unsatisfactory character of 938 as transmitted, where "ποῖαν cuts across ᾧδ", and the question is answered almost before it is put, lit. 'What is the double effect that it has like this?'" He rightly says that ποῖον is an attractive conjecture, well argued for by H. Reynen in *Gymnasium* 67 (1960) 533–36, but that it could not be used absolutely ("What sort of a thing?") but only as ποῖον (*sc.* ἔπος). I find such a "subaudition" hard here, and I cannot find any clear parallels in tragedy. I would much prefer to write τί δ' ἔσθ' ὁποῖον δύνάμιν ᾧδ' ἔχει διπλῆν; comparing, for this use in place of simple relative, *Ant.* 5, *Phil.* 659, *OC* 561 and fr. 1130. 17 ὦν σοι λαβεῖν ἔξεστι τοῦθ' ὁποῖον ἂν / χρήζης.

### OT 1303–06

φεῦ φεῦ, δύστην· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐσιδεῖν  
 δύναμαί σ', ἐθέλων πόλλ' ἀνερέσθαι,  
 πολλὰ πυθέσθαι, πολλὰ δ' ἀθρήσαι.  
 τοῖαν φρίκην παρέχεις μοι.

1305

Jebb: "The fate of Oedipus is a dark and dreadful mystery into which they are fain to peer (ἀνερέσθαι, πυθέσθαι: *cp.* the questions at 1299 ff., 1327): in its visible presentment it has a fascination (ἀθρήσαι) even for those whom it fills with horror." Kamerbeek: "In the reaction of the Chorus the clash of sentiments is evident and natural. Shrinking from the sight of the horror they feel at the same time the desire to know and to see." Someone who fails to detect beauties other interpreters claim to see may be thought to be lacking in literary sensitivity. In spite of that risk, I must say bluntly that I think the passage as it stands is slightly incoherent and that the second metron of 1305 should be deleted. If a poet wants to make the point, however obliquely, that a sight prevents one from looking on it even though one greatly desires to behold it, no easy point to grasp, he does not muddy things up by introducing two other infinitives—whose parallelism with the infinitive "to behold" is reinforced by anadiplosis—that take one down the path of an entirely different thought, that because of the horrible appearance of Oedipus they cannot *look* at him though they still want to ask him many *questions*. For metrical reasons we cannot delete the first two infinitives. Delete the third<sup>18</sup> and all is in order, including 1306 (following on a series of questions): "Alas, unhappy man! But I cannot even look at you, though I have much that I would ask, much that I would learn, such is the shuddering with which you fill me." The motive for the insertion was probably some actor's feeling that a tricolon is wanted here and that three infinitives are better than two. I suspect that something similar has

<sup>18</sup> Nauck thought that all of πόλλ' ἀνερέσθαι, πολλὰ πυθέσθαι, πολλὰ δ' ἀθρήσαι was spurious. W. Teuffel, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie* 97 (1868) 752, deletes the last two phrases but defends the first. F. Heimsöth, *Kritische Studien zu den griechischen Tragikern* (Bonn 1865) 227–28, anticipates my deletion.

happened at Eur. *Tro.* 110–11, where I would read τί με χρὴ σιγᾶν; [τί δὲ μὴ σιγᾶν;] τί δὲ θρηνηῆσαι; Cf. similar expansions of anapaestic monometers at Aesch. *Pers.* 6 and 145 and *Cho.* 1069.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> For suggestions and criticisms (not always heeded) I am grateful to Andrew Brown, Roger Dawe and Hugh Lloyd-Jones.