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Of Nature and Eros: Deianeira in Sophocles’ *Trachiniae*

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Humanity has always measured its individual and finite experiences against nature’s endless cycle of birth, maturity and death. The descriptive analogies between human physical appearance and the natural life cycle which pervade epic and lyric poetry can also be documented in Greek tragedy, where the playwrights exploited a diction and an imagery already embedded in the spectators’ cultural consciousness and adapted them to various dramatic purposes. Some of the ways in which erotic experience is portrayed by the tragedians through the manipulation of archetypal nature images can be observed in Sophocles’ *Women of Trachis*. Conventional *topoi* of love poetry pervade the play and several passages show how those nature metaphors associated with erotic experience play a decisive rôle in the psychological characterization of the female protagonist.

Echoing Deianeira’s opening monologue about her restless and unhappy existence (1–48),¹ the chorus reflect upon the linkage between cosmic order and human life. As the movement of the cosmos is one of eternal return, so is human life in constant flux (129–36):²


But grief and joy come circling to all, like the turning paths of the Bear among the stars. The shimmering night does not stay for men, nor does calamity, nor wealth, but swiftly they are gone, and to another man it comes to know joy and its loss.  

"Sophocles' universe is an interconnected whole in which nature, man and the gods indissolubly belong together. The divine order comprises the movements of the cosmos, the actions of the gods, and the fates of mortals . . . Man is intercalated among the powers of nature, as one of their metamorphoses." Love, therefore, is neither an absolute concept nor an abstraction in the Trachiniae, but, as a manifestation of the cosmic order and a by-product of time, it undergoes change, death and renewal. Deianeira perceives and articulates an interdependence between the natural cycles, the sequences of time and the different aspects of her emotional life, the constant opposition between past and present stressing the contrast between youth and maturity, love and amatory disillusion.

Although Deianeira's fearful existence predates her marriage to Heracles, her passage from a presumably serene period to one of relentless worries is bound to her reaching nubile age when, still living in her father's house, she was wooed for the first time (6-9). As Richard Seaford admirably illustrated, the wedding constitutes one of the most fundamental transitions in the life of an individual and represents, especially for the bride, a transition marked by ambiguity. Marriage comprises negative and positive aspects: The girl's passing to a new life and a new family signifies isolation and separation from her friends and relatives, while, at the same time, tradition demands that she and her groom be praised and likened to gods during the wedding ceremony.


6 "The Tragic Wedding," JHS 107 (1987) 106-30; J. Redfield, "Notes on the Greek Wedding," Arethusa 15 (1982) 188-91 emphasizes the similarities between the wedding and the funeral, both rites of passage involving a change of residence. Also A. van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (Chicago 1960) 3: "Transitions from group to group and from one social situation to the next are looked on as implicit in the very fact of existence, so that a man's life comes to be made up of a succession of stages with similar ends and beginnings: birth, social puberty, marriage, fatherhood, advancement to a higher class, occupational specialization, and death"; cf. 123-24.
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Deianeira reveals her own awareness of the ambiguity of the transition effected by marriage when she contrasts her worrisome life as a wife and mother (148–50) with the peaceful seclusion of youth which she once enjoyed (144–47):

tο γάρ νεάζον ἐν τοιούτε κόσκεται

χόροισιν αὐτοῖ, καὶ νῦν οὐ θάλπος θεό, οὐδὲ δύμρος, οὐδὲ πενεματόν οὐδὲν κλονεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡδονάει ἀμοιχθον ἥξαίρει βίον.⁷

Deianeira implicitly compares unmarried young women to plants:⁸ They grow up in a sheltered environment of their own—the paternal household—until they are mature; upon reaching maturity they are taken away (λάβῃ 149) and made to enter an alien household.⁹ The natural setting of lines 144–47 conveys the image of a locus amoenus,¹⁰ a place


¹⁰ This phrase, now conventionally taken as the literary term referring to a specific kind of landscape description, seems to have been first introduced by E. R. Curtius in his Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter (Bern 1948) 189–200. Treatments of the locus amoenus have been recently surveyed by H. Thesleff, “Man and locus amoenus in Early Greek Poetry,” Gnomosyne: Menschliches Denken und Handeln in der früh griechischen Literatur: Festschrift W. Marg (Munich 1981) 31 n. 2; M. Davies, “Symbolism and Imagery in the Poetry of Ibycus,” Hermes 114 (1986) 400 n. 7 provides additional bibliography. Antecedents to the Trachiniae passage include the description of the Elysian fields in Odyssey 4. 566 (absence of snow, storms, rain), that of the two
traditionally well-shaded, well-watered and free from windy blasts. This bucolic setting is frequently used in archaic poetry, both epic and iambic-lyric, as conventional accompaniment to erotic situations, whether explicit or not. The presence of such symbolic imagery in the poetry of Archilochus, Sappho and Ibycus being widely acknowledged, the instances recognized in iambic and lyric poetry have in turn guided the detection of precedents in Homeric poetry. For example, in Odyssey 5. 55–74 the scenery suggests a love-nest to which Odysseus refuses to yield, and the locus amoenus depicted at the end of the same book also seems to prefigure a potential amatory situation. The secluded area where Odysseus rests upon his arrival in Phaeacia foreshadows the romantic tone of the meeting between the hero and Nausicaa (5. 475–80):

\[\textit{Trachinia}e 144–47 \text{and Odyssey} 5. 475–80 \text{both emphasize the absence of sun, rain and wind. The passages present the individual dwelling in such an environment as being apart from the achieved eroticism associated with exuberant vegetation and water sources, but at the same time about to experience it, either because of age (the maidens of Trachis and, before them, Deianeira) or due to attending circumstances (Odysseus). A place protected from direct sun, pouring rain and gusty winds, however, is not necessarily a gloomy, airless and parched wasteland; rather, the sheltered environment suggested in both passages conjures up the image of a spot untouched by the potentially destructive effect of unmitigated exposure to the elements.}^{13}\]

The concomitant reference to a secluded place, absence of scorching sun, rain and wind storms calls to mind a place where virginity could come to an end. A sense of latent fertility pervades the passage. First, \(\tau\zeta\lambda\tau\zeta\omicron\nu\ θ\omicron\omicron\nu\) both contains a literal reference to the sun and conveys a metaphorical

bushes in Od. 5. 478–80 (absence of wind, sun, rain), and that of Olympus in Od. 6. 43–44 (absence of winds, snow); Easterling (above, note 5) on 144–47.


\(^{12}\text{So Bremer (previous note) 270.}\)

\(^{13}\text{A. H. Sommerstein (per \textit{litertas}) suggests that} \textit{Trach.} 144–47 \text{rather describes the interior of a house, the expected dwelling of a} \tau\alpha\rho\beta\omicron\nu\omicron\nu, \text{as in Hes. Op.} 519–23.}\)

\(^{14}\text{See A. Motte,} \textit{Prairies et jardins de la Grèce antique} (Brussels 1973) 10, 14, 126, 206, 214, 222 (fertilizing breezes), 217–22 (water), and 10, 70–75 (sun).\)
allusion to the emotional "heat of desire."15 As the warmth of the sun helps the plant to grow and ripen, so does the passion of love transform the maiden into a potential lover, ripe for marriage and sexual life.16 Second, the presumably moderate and benevolent moisture which visits the garden of youth recalls the fertilizing power of rain on earth17 and, ultimately, the archetypal union of sky and earth.18 Third, the absence of turbulent winds does not make the presence of gentle breezes impossible, and in a passage tinged with the images of idealized virginal existence common in hymeneal poetry, πνεύματα (146) contains a likely allusion to the positive and benevolent action ascribed to breezes in similar and related contexts.19

The climatological metaphor expressed in lines 144–47 through θάλπος, κλονείν and πνεύματα20 also introduces the notion of change and


18 Moisture is a traditional component of the union of sky and earth: e.g., Hom. Il. 14. 351 (ἐπελεικ.currentTimeMillis... ἐρέματι), Aesch. Danaidæ, TrGF III fr. 44. 3 Radt (διήμαρον), Eur. Chrysisippus fr. 839. 3 N (γαρβόθλος σταγώνας νοτίας), Lucretius 2. 992–93 (liquentis / umbris guttas), and Verg. Geor. 2. 325 (pater omnipotens fecundus imbibat). J. Herington, "The Marriage of Earth and Sky in Aeschylus, Agamemnon 1388–1392," in Greek Tragedy and its Legacy (Calgary 1986) 27–33 lists nine classical passages in which this immemorially old mythical mating is described.


20 Kamerbeek (above, note 15) 59.
disease. A “universal force of desire, confusion and destruction,” love means imbalance and sickness. Indeed, the Hippocratic concept of disease is rooted in the belief in a close correlation between the meteorological world and those affecting human bodies and souls. Encompassing all aspects of the power of desire and destruction, love subjugates gods, men and animals and elicits from them hopeless reactions of resistance or obedience. Love is an external force human beings must constantly control, resist or obey, an obsessive desire driving them to the edge of madness. At this point in the play, however, the demonic violence of Deianeira’s jealousy has not been unleashed and her love for Heracles is best defined as the loyal and steadfast devotion of a wife to her husband.

The meadow of maidenhood toward which Deianeira looks back thus ambiguously combines the security of virginal innocence with the promise of sexual readiness and marriage. For Deianeira, however, the transition to


22 For the concomitant effects of heat, wind and water on human diseases, see, e.g., Hippocr. Aëtr. 26, 23, 27, 22 (ed. H. Diller) and F. Heinemann, Nomos und Physis (Basel 1945) 176–78, 183–86.


24 Both neglect of and submission to love are destructive: The Danaiads and Hippolytus are punished for neglecting erotic love and Deianeira’s destruction is owed to her commitment to love. Cf. Seaford, JHS 107 (1987) 112–19; A. P. Burnett, “Hunt and Hearth in Hippolytus,” in Greek Tragedy and its Legacy (Calgary 1986) 167–71.

25 E.g., Trach. 441–42: “Whoever offers resistance to Eros like the fist fighter with his hands is insane,” and Plato, Resp. 329c: Πός, ἕρω, ὃς Σωφόκλεως, ἔχεις πρὸς τάφροδιας; ἔτι οὗ το οἷς γυναικὶ συγγίνεσθαι; καὶ ὡς, ᾠδήμει, ἕρω, ὃ δ’ ἀθροπο- ἀμενναίταις μενεί σὺνδ ἀπόφηγνον, δεκτής ἐπεταίρας τίνα καὶ ἄγριον δεκπτῆ ἀπορφυγων. Cf. Dover (above, note 21) 125–26 and 208–12.


27 As in Catullus 62. 39–41, a poem indebted to the wedding poetry of Sappho:

Ut flos in saeptis secretus nascitur horitis,
ignotus pecori, nullo comolusar aratro,
quem mulcent aurea, firmat sol, educat imber.

married life has brought suffering, and she, therefore, confines her memories of the past to a world of chastity. Later, when she learns that Heracles is back and that she is soon to see him, she invokes Zeus with words that, again, suggest the protected—yet ambivalent—inner world of virginity (200): ὁ Ζέα, τὸν Ὡτήσαν ἀκόμον ὡς λειμῶν᾽ ἐκεῖν. The "intactness" of the uncut meadow of Oeta suggests virginity and, at the same time, creates a context where virginity could find its end. The meadow is par excellence the place where lovers meet, a place whose sanctity, isolation and luxuriance produce the setting and/or occasion for love: e.g., Sappho fr. 2. 9 L–P (λείμων), Ibycus PMG 286. 4 Page (πήγος ἀκήρατος) and Eur. Hipp. 73–74 (ἐξ ἄκηράτου / λειμάνος), the latter referring to the inviolate meadow of Artemis which Phaedra, in her erotic hallucination, transforms into a love meadow (208–11). The optimism of Deianeira's call upon the lush meadow of Oeta, however, is ironically vitiated by the outcome of her future actions: The robe which she sends to Heracles on Oeta and intends to be the symbolic instrument of a second union with her spouse will not foster renewed love and life but, rather, breed fiery torment and death.

*Trachiniae* 547–49 further illustrates Sophocles' treatment of traditional nature imagery. Now aware of Heracles' affair with Iole, Deianeira finds herself alienated from the world of love, not because she is not yet ready for it (144–47) but because she is too old for it:

> ὃσα γὰρ ἥβην τὴν μὲν ἔρπονεαν πρόκω, τὴν δὲ φθῖνονεαν· ἄν ἀφαρπάζειν φιλεῖ ὁθαλμὸς ἄνθος, τῶν δ᾽ ὑπεκτρέπει πόδα.

28 While stressing the utter alienation of lines 144–46 from their context, Dawe (above, note 7) 81 ponders: "Were the lines perhaps once part of a description of the ἀκήρατος λειμῶν of v. 200?"

29 Motte (above, note 14) 121–46 and "Le pré sacré de Pan et des nymphes dans le *Phèdre* de Platon," *AC* 32 (1963) 466–69; Segal (above, note 21) 124–25; Bremer (above, note 11) 268–79; Stügers (above, note 11) 92–95.

30 For the gradual evolution of the Oeta in the play, from peaceful to destructive, see Segal (above, note 5) 149–51 and *Tragedy and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles* (Cambridge, MA 1981) 84–85: "Zeus's meadow, though uncut, is the very antithesis of her sheltered meadow of virginity. Zeus and Oeta will bring her no joy... The meadow fantasy thus reflects that imbalance between hope and reality, innocence and maturity... Hence the meadow too, comes to reflect its opposites: shelter from heat turns into the full force of the heat of lust; protection from time in Olympian serenity becomes the total subjection to human transitoriness which Deianeira knows and fears."

31 Deianeira seemingly never had a balanced love experience: Her earliest memories of her readiness for love are tied to fear (5–17) and threat of rape (557–65). C. S. Kraus, "Ἄγος ὡς ἐκτ' ἄρχατος: Stories and Story-Telling in Sophocles' *Trachiniae*," *TAPA* 121 (1991) 87 notes that "the stasimon both brings Deianeira's marriage to a close and assimilates her to Iole (and vice-versa), both victims of bestial love."

32 ὁν δ' (548) and τῶν (549) Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (with Zippmann), while Dawe posits a lacuna in the middle of 549.
The human process is compared to the natural world, and so is vulnerable to the laws of nature—subjection to time and the transformations that time ordains and operates being the most tangible and damaging such law. Linked to the past, nature is positive and blooming (144–47); tied to the present, it signifies age and heralds desolation (547–49), for the analogy between the human process and the natural world breaks down with the finite nature of human experience. Nature’s ever-recurring cycle of birth, maturity and death describes a circular pattern which provides the mutability of human lives and affairs with partial explanation and inadequate comfort.

The flow of the individual human life is obstructed by mortality; singly, humankind has no immediate share in the benefits of a predictable and endless repetition of natural phenomena. Human self-perpetuation is collective only; no isolated human life can be repeated. The flower of youth does not bloom twice.

Deianeira speaks of herself with the words of a tired lover. Her words are those of the speaker in the “Cologne epode” of Archilochus (16–19):

\[ \text{νίεοβουλη [ν μεν οὖν]} \]
\[ \text{άλλος ἄνθρωπος αἰαῖ πέπειρα διὰ τόσης} \]
\[ \text{καὶ θαρτρήσῃ παρθενήθην} \]

Deianeira’s youth is fading (ἡ βην ... φθόνοις = πέπειρα, ἀπερρύσκει) and no longer exerts any attraction (ὑπεξτρέπει = Νεοβουλη [ν ... ἀλλος ἐχέτω]); her rival, on the contrary, is still growing towards her full bloom (ἐρπουσαν πρόσχω) and is most pleasing to behold (φιλεῖ εἴκες χάρις). Both authors employ similar imagery to contrast younger and older women.

33 For a perceptive definition of the ancient Greek feeling of kinship with the natural world: Irwin (above, note 8) 147–50.
34 Cf. van Gennep (above, note 6) 3: “Man’s life resembles nature, from which neither the individual nor the society stands independent. The universe itself is governed by a periodicity which has repercussions on human life, with stages and transitions, movements forward, and periods of relative inactivity.” For an analysis of the concept of time in Trachiniae, see de Romilly (above, note 2) 81–83; Segal (above, note 5) 106–08.
36 For other treatments of the same idea, see, e.g., Theocr. 7. 120–21 (καὶ δὴ μᾶν ἀπίοιο περίτερος, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες / 'αἰαί,' φαντὶ, 'φιλίνε, τὸ τοι καλὸν ἄνθος ἀπόρρει') and AP 12. 39. 1–3.
37 The bloom of youth is a conventional image in lyric poetry: cf. Stigers (above, note 11) 100 n. 15; Bremer et al. (above, note 19) 41–42, to which Mimn. fr. 1. 4 and 2. 3 West can be added (Kamerbeck [above, note 15], Longo [above, note 2]). Also common is the image of the flower of love: e.g., Pind. Pyth. 9. 37, 109–11; Aesch. Ag. 743; Eur. Cycl. 499; Heiden (above, note 1) 84.
38 Deianeira’s possible analogy with Neoboulæ rests upon her somewhat ambiguous attitude toward sexuality, an ambiguity suggested by the tension between her undeniable
The use of nature imagery, however, is more pervasive in Archilochus’ poem than in Sophocles’ tragedy. While the Cologne fragment presents the surrogate maiden as a καλῆ τέρεινα παρθένος (4) whose floral softness symbolizes innocence and vulnerability,39 Sophocles introduces iole by focusing on the ethical and social implications of the girl’s demeanor.40 Deianeira’s candid portrayal of Iole stresses both the maiden’s virginal appearance and her noble birth.41 Iole withstands the situation in a manner which betrays her γενναιότης and, hence, her σωφροσύνη (313).42 See 308–09:

ἀνανδρός, ἡ τεκνόωσσα;43 πρὸς μὲν γὰρ φύσιν πάντων ἀπειρος τῶνδε, γενναία δὲ τις.

Later on, however, once aware of iole’s actual relationship with Heracles, Deianeira’s feeling is greatly transformed (379):

experience and her retrospective longing for virginity. A hint at the ambivalence of her sexuality possibly occurs in the Nessos episode (Trach. 555–74) where Deianeira, still a girl (κατὰ 557) but already Heracles’ wife (ἐνίκεις 563), is almost raped by the centaur. P. Berol. 16140 (= Bacchyl. dubia fr. 64 Maehler = Pind. fr. 341 Bowra), a fragment of song in the style of Pindar and Bacchylides surely recounting Deianeira’s encounter with Nessos, suggests the same ambiguity: νήσοδο ροδοπιακόν (10) and φιόλον πόσιν ιδίες (18), γυναικῶς φοι[20]. A. P. Burnett, The Art of Bacchylides (Cambridge, MA 1985) 196 n. 27 cautious that the fragment may be the work of yet another poet, perhaps Simonides. C. Calame, Les chœurs de jeunes filles en Grèce archaïque 1 (Rome 1977) 63 observes that although κόραι, παρθένοι, νεάνιδες, νύμφαι usually designate maidens and γυναῖκες married women, the semantic content of those terms could vary according to the context. Similarly, E. M. Craik, “Two Notes on Sophocles’ Trachiniai, 257 and 750–62,” LCM 9 (1984) 24–25 points out the ambivalent and changing status of Iole, simultaneously girl and woman.


40 The concern for the social aspect of the relationship is already present in Archilochus (δωχέω δὲ μν / οἶδος ἀμωμόν ἔχειν 4–5), where it is closely bound to the nature of invective poetry. E. Degani and G. Burzacchini, Lirici greci (Florence 1977) 10 understand ἀμωμός as quae irritari et uituperari nequit, an interpretation confirmed by the fear of χάρμα emphasized later on in the epode (21–23). Cf. Hes. Op. 700–01; Semon. 7. 111–13 West.

41 On φύσις in Sophocles: Heinimann (above, note 22) 95.


43 τεκνόωσσα (Brunck): τεκνόωσσα 1.5 rec. 5: τεκνόωσα rec. L.A. Brunck’s emendation, which is based on an unattested contraction of τεκνόωσις, -σσα, -ευ, is accepted by the most recent editors: Longo (above, note 2) 131 brings Callim. fr. 431 παλινδήσσα in support of Brunck’s suggestion; Easterling (above, note 5) ad loc. adds Eur. Hipp. 733 πατρούσσα στον παλίρροια τος and parallels; Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (above, note 7) ad loc.
The captive is outstanding (λαμπρά) both because of her birth and of her good looks. Although her appearance is not described in terms of nature symbolism, the diction is clearly tinged with the imagery of archaic epic and lyric poetry. In the *Iliad*, λαμπρός refers to the gleam of weapons (e.g., 13. 265, 16. 216) and the glare of the sun (e.g., 1. 605, 8. 485); it is also used in a simile where Achilles is likened to a star (22. 26–31) and in the description of Diomedes’ starlike glittering arms (5. 5–6). The adjective thus conveys the idea of outstanding military might, a power supported by the gods and, at the same time, elevating the heroes to the rank of divine beings.

When Sappho borrows the star imagery and other images from Homer, refashions them and utilizes them in epithalamial poems, bride and groom become the unheroic warriors of the battle of love. Historically and intellectually embedded in the transitional period between myth and the emergence of philosophy, the poetry of Sappho, quite naturally, echoes the primitive understanding of the individual’s life through the reenactment of myth at crucial moments of her (or his) existence. The wedding day is one such instance: Custom demands that the couple be compared to gods.

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45 Cf. W. Schadewaldt, “Experimentelle Philologie,” *WS* 79 (1966) 77. Compare Eur. El. 36: λαμπρός γὰρ ἐσεῖς γένος γε, χρημάτων δὲ δὴ πένητες; Aeschin. Fals. leg. 51. 7–52. 1: ἐδύκει Κητισιώνῳ τὴν δὲν λαμπρὸς εἶναι. The adjective often also refers to the handsome vigor of youth (e.g., Eur. fr. 282. 10 N; Thuc. 6. 54. 2) and regularly implies social prominence and political clout (e.g., Soph. El. 685; Hdt. 6. 125. 1). On the multivalency of the word λαμπρός: F. Ellenriedt, *Lexicon Sophocleum* (Hildesheim 1958) s.v.; Seaford (above, note 6) 124 n. 182 (with further references).


47 H. S. Schibli, *Pherekydes of Syros* (Oxford 1990) 67–68 aptly captures the modes and terms in which the transition is expressed and negotiated in the work of Pherekydes (flourit 544/1 BC, the first—according to Theopompus [ap. D.L. 1. 116]—to write about nature and gods): “In sum, in the marriage of Zas and Chthonie the divine world touches upon the human world. The institutions and customs of men are traced back to the gods. In Pherekydes’ book, marriages are literally made in heaven as each marriage re-enacts the first divine marriage. In mythical thought, human acts are real because they repeat the deeds of the gods.”


49 The human institution of marriage is grounded in the world of the gods. The marriages of primeval deities such as Ouranos and Ge, Zas and Chthonie are archetypal for all subsequent unions among gods and men, and the concept of an original divine mating is
The light imagery which stands prominently in her love poems and wedding songs (frr. 16. 18, 58. 26, 96. 6–9 L–P) naturally constitutes a universal and central theme in allusions to and depictions of wedding ceremonies in contemporary and subsequent literature. Given such conventional mental representations and literary precedents, therefore, it is likely that when Sophocles uses λαμπρός he implies marriage. He grants Iole a godlike nature and presents her as the prospective victorious warrior in the coming war for Heracles’ love, while he prepares Deianeira’s withdrawal from it.

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associated with Zeus and Hera in particular: Burnett (above, note 24) 176 n. 62; J. Rudhardt, Le rôle d’Eros et d’Aphrodite dans les cosmogonies grecques (Paris 1986) esp. 25–28 and 39–40; Seafor d (above, note 6) 117 n. 17; Schibii (above, note 47) 61–69 with nn. 27–28. The sexual urge in nature and cosmos is a common theme in later wedding ceremony: Men. Rh. 401 and 408. 13–19 (nature creates marriage and unites heaven and earth), Himer. Oraii. 9. 8 (god and nature play key roles in instituting marriage), and Procl. in Tim. 3. 176. 19–30 Diehl (δεδή [i.e. the union of earth and sky] και οἵ ἔθεμοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰδότες προκείμενον οὐρανός καὶ γῆ προτελεῖν τοὺς γάμους). Cf. Seafor d (above, note 6) 117 n. 117.

50 Alcman PMG 1. 40–43 Page; Aristoph. Pax 859: τι δητε’ ἐπείδαν νυμφόν μ’ ὀρέτη λαμπρόν δόντα; and An. 1709–10 (mock-hymeneal passage in which Pithetairos is said to outshine stars and sun rays); Eur. IA 74 (Paris is said to have come to Sparta χροώς τε λαμπρός, both an allusion to his oriental princely glitter and an ironical reference to his being groom-to-be: ἔρων ἐρόσαν [75] ... λαμβόν [76], following the tendency to describe adulterous union in terms of marriage ritual [Seafor d (above, note 6) 123 n. 174]); Theoc. 16. 26–28; Ap. Rh. 1. 774–81 (Jason compared to the Evening Star, the star of marriage and fertility) and 3. 956–59 (Jason/Sirius steals Medea’s heart and mind) with R. L. Hunter, Apollonius of Rhodes. Argonautica, Book III (Cambridge 1989) ad loc.; Catullus 61. 21–22, 192–93. Light imagery is commonly applied to the gleaming beauty of the gods as well as to the power and energy which emanate from them (e.g., Apollo is Φοῖβος in Hom. II. 1. 43, Soph. OT 71, Eur. Ion 140 and Tεταύν in Oρφικ. H. 34. 3). Marriage itself is associated with brilliance in Philoxenus Cytherius PMG 828 Page: Γάμε θεῶν λαμπρότατε. W. E. Gladstone, Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age III (Oxford 1853) 492 argues that the celebrated goldenness of the gods “always belongs to light rather than color.” While brightness might radiate from the whole body (Hom. H. Demeter 188–89 with N. J. Richardson, The Homeric Hymn to Demeter [Oxford 1974] ad loc.), radiance about the head is the traditional manifestation of divine power (Onians [above, note 15] 165–66). The radiate head naturally plays a key rôle in Hellenistic iconography and political propaganda: M. Parca, Piocheia or Odysseus in Disguise at Troy (P. Köln VI 245), ASP 31 (Atlanta 1990) 41–44.

51 One might also recognize a topical dimension to λαμπρός since it echoes the parodos of the play (94–140) where Heracles and Deianeira are characterized through the opposing concepts of light and darkness (cf. T. F. Hoey, “Sun Symbolism in the Parodos of the Trachiniae,” Arēthusa 5 [1972] 133–54). Thus, by a tragic irony, Deianeira applies Heracles’ active qualities to the maiden and makes her stand by him in an harmonious relationship from which she is alienated. Segal (above, note 5) 116 relates the adjective to the fire imagery latent in the first part of the play.

52 In 205–07 the chorus sing of a marriage about to be celebrated; in 379 Deianeira praises Iole for her beauty (a traditional element in wedding ceremony); and subsequently Iole is referred to as the bride of Heracles (536, 546, 843, 857, 894; cf. Eur. Hipp. 544–45): Seafor d (above, note 6) 128–29 and (above, note 7) 50–54.

53 In Sappho fr. 16. 18 L–P Anastoria’s beloved face is ἀμφρυσμα λαμπρόν (G. Lanata, QUCC 2 [1966] 76–77), and Segal (above, note 5) 116 notes that in Trachiniae
Iole’s characterization combines heroic grandeur with lyric sensitivity and bears witness to Sophocles’ adaptation of epic and lyric precedents to his literary genre and dramatic goal. Lines 539–40 reveal a similar blend of allusion and assimilation:

καὶ νῦν δό’ οὐκαὶ μίμνουμεν μιᾶς ὑπὸ χλαίνης ὑπαγκάλιμα.

Mía χλαίνα is the symbol for a pair of lovers and its vivid contrast with δό’ οὐκαὶ suggestively sums up the situation: “So now the two of us lie under the one sheet waiting for his embrace.” The seduction narrated in the Cologne epode provides a larger literary frame for the image (29–30):

μαλθακη δὲ μιν
[χλαίνη καλύψας, αὐχέν’ ἀγκάλη<ι>c’ ἔχων.

The parallel becomes instructive when one recalls that Archilochus’ poem is itself modelled on the Dios Apate of Iliad 14, as it presents the reenactment by human beings of the sacred nuptials of Zeus and Hera. Unless the community of diction and thought shared by the three episodes (χλαίνης Trach. 540, [χλαίνη] P. Köln V 58. 30, νεφέλην ἔσσαντο Iliad 14. 350; ὑπαγκάλιμα Trach. 540, ἄγκαλη<ι>c’ P. Köln V 58. 30,

“the word (λαμπρός) has erotic connotations too, suggesting the luminosity of the love object, and hence forms part of the constellation of themes linking the fire-imagery of lust to the destructive fires of the action itself.” Thuc. 6. 54. 1–2 (το γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ Ἀρμοδίου τόλμημα δὲ ἐρωτικὴν ἕμνυσθαν ἐπεχειρήθη ... γενομένου δὲ Ἀρμοδίου ἄρα ἠλλίκας λαμπρὸς Ἀριστογείτων ἀνὴρ τῶν ἄτων, μέεσος πολιτείς, ἐφαρμὸς ὄν εἴτεν αὐτόν) provides a possible indication that the adjective λαμπρός bears erotic overtones.

Webster (above, note 1) 169 pointedly notes that Iole and Deianeira are not engaged in a conflict but rather embody two poles of the same reality, and P. E. Easterling, “Character in Sophocles,” G&R 24 (1977) 122 observes that both women are linked as victims of love.


Arrigoni (previous note) 17 observes that the cloak could also serve as cover for the κλάσην of the symposium or for the bridal couch, and interprets Deianeira’s last actions (“casting sheets [φάρην] and spreading them upon the bed of Heracles,” 915–16) before her suicide as the symbolic reenactment of her union with Heracles. “Indubbiamente il comportamento della Deianira sofoclea, dopo la morte di Eracle ... dimostra che l’identità sessuale della sposa greca nasce e finisce nel talamo, sul letto nuziale, dove gli strappà ... φάρη di Eracle, come precedentemente la chlaina indivisibile con le altre, raccolgono un altro viaggio verso l’abbandono” (51).

On human marriages as replicas of that of Zeus and Hera: Bremer (above, note 11) 272–73; Redfield (above, note 6) esp. 188; Burnett (above, note 24) 178 n. 72.
Pherecydes, however, the dramatic action invalidates the exemplary relevance of the mythical deed to lovemaking and marital harmony among mortals. The primeval divine union with which Archilochus assimilated his own erotic experience and through which he gave a literary expression to the universal aspects of human amatory encounters is now adapted to a mariage à trois in which two women are waiting for the man’s attentions under a single cloak. Spread over both his wife and his new lover the cloak of Heracles thus turns into a monstrous parody of the cover which traditionally effected the lovers’ seclusion and constituted the emblem of their indivisible intimacy.

These passages illustrate Sophocles’ adaptation of conventional images, epic and lyric, to the psychological characterization of the female protagonist. All depict Deianira as a passive character either too young or too old to share in the potential erotic environment which surrounds her. Two other episodes, however, contradict this perception by portraying

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58 Intrinsically, of course, the mythical tales themselves reflect social and human realities. Zeus’ cloud refers to the cloak with which the lover covered his girl in the actual lovemaking encounters which took place in the open. On the rôles of the nuptial cloak of the husband in the sexual initiation and matrimonial transition of the bride: Arrigoni (above, note 55) 48–56, and B. M. Fridh-Haneson, Le manteau symbolique. Etude sur les couples en terre cuite assis sous un même manteau (Stockholm 1983) 75–77 (with a note on Pherecydes fr. 7 B 2 Diels, in which Zas makes a robe which he presents to Chthonie as he declares her his wife, on which now see Schibli [above, note 47] 50–69).


61 These select passages, however, do not detract from the fact that once she has resolved to act, Deianira does so out of passionate love, under the guidance of powerful and destructive erotic urges: H. Parry, “Aphrodite and the Furies in Sophocles’ Trachiniae,” in Greek Tragedy and its Legacy (Calgary 1986) 109 n. 30 (with bibliography). Also, the Aetolian mythological tradition underlines Deianira’s Amazonian nature, physical strength and harsh character: Bacchyl. 5. 165–68; Apollod. 1. 8. 1; Σ Ap. Rh. 1. 1212; Nonnos 35. 89–91. The pre-Sophoclean character was bold-hearted and perhaps even deliberately malicious: Th. Zielinski, “Exkurse zu den Trachinierinnen,” Philologus 55 (1896) 583–85; I. Errandonea, “Deianeira vere Δημοσίευτος,” Mnemosyne 55 (1927) 147–48; F. Stoessl, Der Tod des Herakles (Zurich 1945) 29–31; March (above, note 1) 51–57.
Deianeira as a young woman instinctively—though only partially—aware of the emotional and physical demands placed upon her by the foreseeable transition from virginity to womanhood.  

Deianeira’s memories of her fear of suitors and of Acheloos’ courtship suggest the setting which generally accompanies evocations of divine marriages (9, 13–14):

μνητήρ γάρ ἦν μοι ποταμός, Ἀρχέλων λέγω,

ἐκ δὲ δακτίου γενειάδος
κρουνοὶ διερραίνοντο κρηναίου ποταμῷ.

Acheloos’ physical appearance combines the two elements inherent in most divine unions: water and vegetation. The words ποταμός, κρουνοὶ and κρηναίου ποταμός constitute an obvious reference to the first component of a setting fit for the human reenactment of the divine τερός γάμος, and an allusion to vegetation emerges from δακτίου when the adjective is granted an extended, metaphorical meaning. Such is suggested by an entry in Hesychius: δακτίον· μεγάλως σκιάζον διὰ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ δακτύλο (δ 286 Latte). The clump of Acheloos’ beard thus hints at dense bushes and shade, and elicits the image of a setting often associated with lovemaking. Acheloos was a well-known amoret in antiquity, and the associative nexus which Sophocles creates between the monster’s beard, water and vegetal growth probably reflects the belief in the association of the jaw—and hence of the beard—with procreation.

62 On the way stories are used by Deianeira and other characters in the play to organize their experience, see Kraus (above, note 31) 79–88 (“marriage stories”) and 88–95 (“poison stories”).

63 See Motte (above, note 14) 208–09.

64 “Rivers were regarded as generative powers and rivers of seed”: Onians (above, note 15) 230, who refers to the custom in various parts of the Greek world for bridegroom and bride to bathe in river water. Also Martina (above, note 1) 64 n. 47: “È stata sottolineata la presenza dell’elemento acqua e il significato che essa assume nell’ambito sessuale, anche nelle forme in cui l’Acheloos si manifesta.”

65 Ordinarily, the adjective δάκτυος qualifies ὄλη and δροκ (Longo [above, note 2] 29). G. Schiassi, Sofocle. Le Trachinie (Florence 1953) ad loc. observes, “δάκτυος δα l’idea della boscaglia ombreggiante le rive del fiume,” and Segal (above, note 5) 105 remarks, “the fine lines which describe the water pouring down the forest-like tangle of his beard... make clear at once that we have to do with a figure who is not yet fully differentiated from the forces of nature.” On the “fairy-tale uncouthness” of this and the Nessos episodes: K. Reinhardt, Sophocles, transl. by H. and D. Harvey (New York 1979) 37; Martina (above, note 1) 64 and 72–73.


67 Onians (above, note 15) 232–33.
Deianeira's second threatening erotic encounter with a hybrid creature occurred soon after her marriage to Heracles. She was being ferried across the Evenos river by Nessos when, in mid-stream, the wanton centaur attempted to rape her (557–65): 69

Some ancient critics faulted this scenario for its inherent absurdity: "Others charge that Sophocles has introduced the shooting of the arrow too soon, while they were still crossing the river, for in those circumstances, they claim, Deianeira too would have perished, since the dying Centaur would have dropped her in the river" (Dio of Prusa 60.1, transl. H. L. Crosby [Loeb]). On Sophocles' innovation: March (above, note 1) 65.

The various literary treatments of the Nessos tale (Archil. frs. 286, 288 West; Hes. Cat. fr. 25. 18–33 M–W; Bacchyl. 16; Apollod. Bibl. 2. 7. 6; Diod. 4. 36. 3) are surveyed and discussed in Ch. Dugas, "La mort du centaure Nessos," REA 45 (1943) 18–24; Easterling (above, note 5) 15–19; Burnett (above, note 38) 196; March (above, note 1) 52–58, 62–65; Heiden (above, note 1) 86.


Centaurs are traditionally hairy (e.g., Hom. Il. 2. 743; Hom. H. Hermes 224), and Longo (above, note 2) 204 cites Hes. Op. 514 as the first occurrence of δασύστερνος in reference to animals τὸν καὶ λάγην δέρμα κοτάκιον. On the popular belief that growth of hair is associated with sexual vigor: Onians (above, note 15) 232–33.

D. Gerber, "An Epithet in Bacchylides' Dithyramb 16," LCM 14 (1989) 102–03 stresses the erotic overtones of the epithet ῥόδοςες applied to Nessus' river in Bacchyl. 16. 34 as well as the dramatically significant symbolism of the adjective: "The roses on the banks of the Lycomas are an appropriate setting for Nessus' attempted rape." On the question of whether Bacchylides is indebted to Sophocles, see Easterling (above, note 5) 16; Burnett (above, note 38) 196 n. 27; March (above, note 1) 62–63 (with bibliography); Davies (above, note 3) xxxii. On the date of Trachiniae: Kraus (above, note 31) 75.

Cf. Pind. Pyth. 2. 41–48; Soph. Trach. 1096 (ὑβριστή, ἀνομο, ὑπέροχον βίαν); Eur. HF 181 (τεταρακτέλες θ' ὑβρισμα). Dumézil (above, note 70) 176–77; I.
Nessos' intentions.⁷⁴ The attack on Deianeira however fails as the centaur succumbs under Heracles' arrow-shot, and the beast employs his last gasps to devise the death of his murderer. It is with the love-charm which the lustful creature concocts from a mixture of his blood and of the Hydra's poison⁷⁵ that Deianeira will irrevocably "cure" her husband's relentless lust.⁷⁶

Achelous and Nessos belong to an elemental world of unrestrained sexual drive and physical violence and partake of an era in which the distinction between human and bestial realms is blurred. The multiformous river and the horse-man are forces of nature closely connected with meadows or, more precisely, creators of meadows.⁷⁷ In Trachiniae, they intrude in the human sphere at the moment when the female protagonist experiences the critical transition from maidenhood to marriage. The tension between the threat of their instinctive lust and the emotional and physical vulnerability of her coming of age is logically conveyed through metaphors drawn from the natural world. The following tabulation—fashioned after that which concludes J. M. Bremer's discussion of Sappho fr. 2 L–P and Ibycus PMG 286 as inescapable predecessors for the imagery of Euripides Hippolytus 73–78 ([above, note 11] 271)—seems to corroborate this interpretation:

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⁷⁵ Thus also in Ovid Met. 9. 129–33. Perhaps echoing a primitive version of the myth, the late sources (Diodorus 4. 36. 5 and Apollod. 2. 7. 6) list the centaur's sperm among the ingredients of the philter, a detail which Sophocles may have omitted as inappropriate for the dignity of tragedy (Dugas [above, note 69] 22–24). On the beguiling quality of Nessos' persuasive words on Deianeira: e.g., A. Roselli, "Livelli del conoscere nelle Trachinie di Sofocle," Materiali e discussioni per l'annalisi dei testi classici 7 (1982) 29 and Stinton (above, note 7) 424–26; Heiden (above, note 1) 87–90.


⁷⁷ Segal (above, note 5) 106 similarly links the two: "Nessus is 'shaggy-chested,' dasusternos (557), and his river is 'deep-flowing,' bathourrous (559), a detail which relates to the wild realm and the shaggy beard of Achelous in the opening scene (13–14)."
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<th><em>Trach.</em> 5–14</th>
<th><em>Trach.</em> 557–65</th>
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<td><strong>springtime (of life)</strong></td>
<td>πατρὸς μὲν ἐν δόμοισιν</td>
<td>παίς ἔτες ὀδά (557)</td>
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<td>Οἰνέως εἰς ναίοννε' ἔτε' (6–7)</td>
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<td><strong>meadows–bushes</strong></td>
<td>δακτίου (13)</td>
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<td><strong>erotic urge</strong></td>
<td>(μνηστήρ 9)</td>
<td>(Cypris 497–530 and 860–61)</td>
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Differences between the *Trachiniae* and the other passages exist. The three texts examined by J. M. Bremer emphasize the presence of flowers and the fact that the spot is un trodden, and they depict the *locus amoenus* as a natural love nest in whose seclusion erotic love can potentially be pursued. In Sophocles' play, by contrast, there are no flowers and the natural setting favorable to an erotic adventure is partly created by the males' bodies, through highly elaborate metaphors.

*Trachiniae* 13–14 and 557–65, because they bear the imprint of the conventions of the nature symbolism diction, help complete and shade Deianeira's character. While the analogies she draws between herself and the natural world at different moments of her life first implant the idea that she is not an active erotic being (144–47 and 547–49), the Achelooas and Nessos episodes modify this impression and show that, within the limits of her personality, Deianeira acknowledges an awareness of her erotic potential: Bound to the past, her active sensuality belongs to the past as well.\(^{78}\) Her psychological characterization reflects the tensions in the play, the clashes between youth and age, love and deception, birth and death, light and obscurity.

Is it valid to assume that the conventional images of love poetry motivate the metaphorical associations outlined in the *Trachiniae*? Can they be taken to be familiar to the public of tragedy to a degree that Sophocles might manipulate them freely as if they were common conventions? Only a global study of the ways tragic poets adapt archetypal, natural metaphors to the dramatic treatment of erotic and other major liminal experiences can provide an answer. In the meantime, we are left with possible links. From

\(^{78}\) “The encounters with Achelous and Nessus ... remind us that the power of female sexuality ... still lives in Deianeira” (Segal [above, note 30] 79).
the Homeric hymns to Nonnus, the meadow metaphor is the standard accompaniment of accounts of divine and mortal unions.\textsuperscript{79} A feature of the poetry of Archilochus, Sappho, Anacreon (PMG 346 frr. 1. 7–9 and 417. 5 Page), Pindar (Pyth. 9. 37, 109–10), Bacchylides (Dithyr. 16. 34) and Euripides (Cycl. 499; Hipp. 73–78, 208–11), such imagery also pervades Hellenistic poetry. This permanence suggests that instead of being “skipped” by the tragedians, the conventional topoi of love poetry lived on in their works, but encoded in words and applied in ways that satisfied the demands of an altered subjectivity, of a different literary genre, of changing cultural views, and of new philosophical questions. J. M. Bremer’s suggestion that Phaedra’s “sensual words about the meadow [Hipp. 208–11] will have been understood easily by an audience which was accustomed to poetry in which erotic activities took place on lush meadows” ([above, note 11] 278) are particularly apt and invite further investigation.

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\textsuperscript{79} Motte (above, note 14) 208–12.
2

Assenting Eternal Providence: Theodicy in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King

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On the last occasion when I had the good fortune to read E. R. Dodds’ famous essay, “On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex”,¹ I felt certain misgivings at some of his conclusions. Dodds, it will be remembered, is denouncing a view that he discovered in some undergraduate essays on the question, “In what sense, if in any, does the Oedipus Rex attempt to justify the ways of God to man?” The offending view² holds that “we get what we deserve,”³ that is, that Oedipus in some measure merits his suffering. Dodds’ position in answer to this has an ethical aspect (Oedipus has an “essential moral innocence”⁴), a religious one (Sophocles’ “gods are [not] in any human sense just”⁵) and a literary-critical one (“there is no reason at all why we should require a dramatist—even a Greek dramatist—to be for ever running about delivering banal ‘messages’⁶). Many have anticipated Dodds


² Dodds identifies and refutes two further views (that the OT is a tragedy of fate and that Sophocles, as a pure artist, does not concern himself with morality or religion at all), which, since they are mutually exclusive of the view I support, I join him in rejecting.

³ Dodds 37 = 64.

⁴ Dodds 42 = 69.

⁵ Dodds 47 = 75.

⁶ Dodds 45 = 73. Dodds holds a similar view of Aesch. Eum.; he wrote in “Morals and Politics in the Oresteia,” in The Ancient Concept of Progress (above, note 1) 47–48: “Nearly everyone agrees . . . that there is a political point here; but after a century of controversy there is still no agreement on what the point is. I believe myself that this is
in his position\(^7\) and others have followed him,\(^8\) with very few dissenting.\(^9\) This position is consonant with the emotional reaction of anyone watching or reading the play. Our sympathies are with Oedipus: We feel terror and pity at his plight and this makes us want him to be innocent and his persecutor, Apollo, to be unaccountably vicious. This emotional reaction is important, because Greek tragedy is an emotional medium.\(^{10}\)

Tragedy is also, however, an intellectual art-form and the intellectual clarification of the concepts of terror and pity is arguably as much a part of tragic catharsis as is any psychological purgation through terror and pity.\(^{11}\) As well as feeling for Oedipus, we must analyze his situation. Texts contemporary with Sophocles suggest that, while feeling about the play much as we do, many members of its original audience would have questioned Dodds' analysis. Oedipus has no essence beyond what we can infer from the deeds that he performs and, of these, Sophocles' contemporaries will have found some morally innocent and others not. Apollo's actions, meanwhile, will have seemed to them to be just in an all-too-human sense. The present article is devoted to the analysis of the roles of Oedipus and Apollo in the play along lines suggested by fifth-century thought.

I

Beyond doubt, Oedipus suffers greatly in Sophocles' play. He has been living in a state of incest and he blinds himself in order to be unable to see the children conceived in pollution (lines 1273–74, 1369–90). He is undoubtedly not responsible for his incest and the pain that he experiences is innocent suffering. The presence of this innocent suffering explains our sympathy for his actions, but should not cloud our analysis of them. If there is any additional suffering that Oedipus has merited, it must be because he has done something. He is not likely punished for a character-

\(^7\) Of these, Dodds mentions (38 = 65) especially U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Excursus zum Oedipus des Sophokles," Hermes 34 (1899) 55–80 = Kleine Schriften VI 209–33. He also (42 = 69) sees similarities between his view and those of Whitman, Waldock, Letters, Ehrenberg, Knox and Kirkwood.


flaw, because not all tragic heroes suffer a *hamartia*, which is in any case more likely an ignorance of fact than a moral flaw, and because actions and not character-traits cause things to happen in Greek tragedy.

Oedipus does only one thing on stage: He "pursue[s] the truth at whatever personal cost," and "accept[s] and endure[s] it when found." This is shown by the moment (1170) when he pauses in his course of action, having realized its implications, and chooses to follow Delphi’s command and implicate himself by pursuing the truth. This moment recalls that in Aeschylus’ *Libation Bearers* (899–903) where Orestes pauses briefly and then immediately chooses to follow Delphi’s command and kill his mother. But this very self-prosecution points backward in condemnation to an earlier act, namely Oedipus’ murder of his father Laius.

The murder of Laius might justify part of Oedipus’ suffering, since it is a deed and not a character-flaw and since it not only precedes but also paves the way for his suffering. Laius’ death makes Jocasta a widow, and so enables Oedipus to marry her and reside in Thebes; the residence of the regicide in Thebes, in turn, causes the plague (106–07) that sets in motion the plot. Still, small causes can provoke disproportionately large effects and our question remains.

The crime of parricide has two components: homicide and father-abuse. The play enforces this distinction: The quests for Laius’ killer and for Oedipus’ father remain separate for most of it, not merging until the recognition-scene (1182–85). Let us examine the crime under these two headings, beginning by considering the murder of Laius in the context of fifth-century Athenian law. This is relevant, given Greek tragedy’s tendency to anachronism, the audience’s familiarity with the Athenian judicial

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12 Dodds 38–39 = 66.
15 Dodds 48 = 76.
16 Dodds 39 = 66.
17 There are no grounds on which to assess Oedipus’ guilt or innocence in the case of his incest, for incest was not formally illegal at Athens; see A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens I: The Family and Property* (Oxford 1968) 22 n. 3, and M. Broadbent, *Studies in Greek Genealogy* (Leiden 1968) 155. This is of little moment, since incest is obviously a violation of motherhood, which the Greeks held in high esteem (see A. H. Sommerstein, *Aeschylus. Eumenides* [Cambridge 1989] ad 657–66) and apparently constituted a pollution (R. Parker, *Miasma* [Oxford 1983] 97–98).
apparatus and the probability that the play draws heavily for its structure on the process of judicial inquiry.\(^{19}\)

Classical Athenian jurisprudence recognizes three kinds of killing\(^{20}\) and different scholars have classified Laius' murder under all three. The first is the unintentional killing of an innocent victim (what we would call "manslaughter"). The hero of *Oedipus at Colonus* claims unintentionality to defend himself from the charge of parricide (273, 547–48, 988–99). Yet if Oedipus did not know that Laius was his father, he knew that he was a human being and that his act was homicide, in contrast to Deianira who could (but, interestingly, does not) plead unintentional killing, having administered a poison believing it to be a love-potion.

The second kind is justified homicide (which has no equivalent in American jurisprudence), which is the intentional killing of a criminal caught in the act. The best-known example is the killing of an adulterer apprehended *in flagrante delicto*,\(^{21}\) but another is the killing of a highwayman caught red-handed.\(^{22}\) Oedipus does not claim to have thought that Laius was a robber.\(^{23}\) Indeed, according to the admittedly none-too-factual report of Laius’ surviving slave, Laius and company suspected Oedipus of intending to rob them (122), as he does in Euripides’ version.\(^{24}\)

The third kind is intentional homicide (ordinary murder). Self-defense\(^{25}\) was a mitigating circumstance in a case of intentional homicide, rather than grounds for lawful homicide.\(^{26}\) Demosthenes (21. 71–75) tells how a certain Euæeon, who killed a man in retaliation for a single blow, was convicted by one vote. This case shows that, despite the considerable sympathy that the jury obviously felt for the killer, "the mere fact that the victim struck the first blow was not sufficient to acquit the killer."\(^{27}\) One must show that the victim intended to kill the murderer. Yet Oedipus does not argue self-defense,\(^{28}\) claiming, as he would have to do, that Laius was

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\(^{21}\) *Πάντα αὐτοφόρο, e.g. Lys. 1.

\(^{22}\) *Εν δὺῳ καθελὼν, Dem. 23. 53; cf. Aeschin. 1. 91.


\(^{24}\) Eur. *Phoen.* 44–45. Even in Euripides’ version the robbery is incidental to the murder and is not the motive for it.

\(^{25}\) *Αμυνόμενος ἀρχοντα χειρῶν ἀδίκον, Lys. 4. 11, Dem. 23. 50, 47. 7, Isoc. 20.

\(^{26}\) Gagarin (above, note 23) passim.

\(^{27}\) Gagarin (above, note 23) 117.

about to kill him, stating in fact that on this occasion Laius wanted only to drive him from the road (805). Moreover, according to Plato (Leg. 869b)—who may or may not be reflecting Attic law—parent-murder is the only crime in which self-defense is not an extenuating circumstance.

One might suppose that Oedipus' act was a third-degree murder, since he acted without malice aforethought (807), and that he was guilty of something less than premeditated homicide, but this claim would ignore fifth-century Attic law, which reserves no special category for homicide that is intentional but unpremeditated. "[T]he Athenians used [the terms] 'unpremeditated' and 'unintentional' interchangeably... [T]he practical effect of this was to narrow unintentional homicides to our category of accidental killings. This meant that all other killings were classified as intentional and were subject to the severest penalties. Sudden killings thus received no more lenient treatment than any other intentional killings unless some justification such as self-defence could be shown" (which in Oedipus' case, as we have seen, it could not).

Again, one might argue that, whatever the judgement of a hypothetical fifth-century court, the heroic society in which Oedipus is imagined as having lived would have "acquitted" him. Not so. In Homer and Hesiod a murderer faces one of three penalties. He may either be killed by the victim's family, or go into exile, or offer monetary compensation. Only two of the murders mentioned in epic are not followed by such an atonement: One is the murder of Laius; the other is Hercules' murder of Iphitus. When Sophocles recounts the latter (Trach. 38, 270–79) he supplies the penalty, exile, that is missing in Homer's account. Given Sophocles' supplement to this story, Oedipus stands alone among epic murderers in escaping human retribution. We do not know why this is so.

29 Not even in the OC does he make this claim explicitly, although he says παθὼν μὲν ἀντέκαμοι (271), which implies reciprocity. Mekler's emendation (accepted by Jebb) at 547, καὶ γὰρ ἄν, οὐς ἐφόνευσα, ἐμ' ἀπαλλάσσαν, has Laius intent on murder, but the MSS read καὶ γὰρ ἐλλαυς ἐφόνευσα κάπωλεσα, which is capable of a wide variety of reconstructions, of which Mekler's is by no means the most obvious.

30 For Laius had, of course, wanted to kill him when he exposed him years before, a point to which we shall return.

31 Δι' ὀργῆς. This is but the last occurrence of ὀργή and related words in the play, the others being at 335, 337, 339, 344, 345, 364, 405 and 524.


37 There are other murderers known to Greek myth as we find it in Apollodorus who make no compensation or purification for murder and these are listed by Parker (above, note 17) 375, sections 2 and 3.
in the epics, but Sophocles supplies an explanation: The Thebans were too distracted by the Sphinx to investigate the murder and try the killer (130-31). Although postponed by the Sphinx, punishment was as fitting for Laius’ killer as for any other. This is why the oracle orders the murderer’s exile (98) and why Oedipus pronounces this sentence upon him (236-43).

The audience's appreciation of Oedipus’ act was conditioned by the precepts of ancient Greek popular morality. For example, Laius’ murder occurred at a crossroads (716, 730, 733, 800-01), an important fact since it is a constant in the myth, while the precise location is variable. The crossroads is a place where a decision must be made, as in the story of the choice of Heracles. As in that story, the alternatives confronting Oedipus were as much moral as directional: By turning one way, he would kill four strangers; either by retreating (an option available to Oedipus, but not to Heracles) or by deviating temporarily from his chosen path, he would spare them.

Three considerations make clear the judgement that morality passes upon these alternatives. Firstly, since Laius was trying to push Oedipus from the road (804-05), which was narrow (1399), and since there was another path available, one party should step aside. According to Homer (II. 9. 69, 160-61), one should yield to the kinglier, that is, to him who commands more men, and to the elder. The old might defer to the young of higher rank, but with both age and rank on his side one would expect deference and try to exact it if not forthcoming. Laius (a king) is actually kinglier than Oedipus (a king’s son) and obviously so, travelling in a mule-car (753, 803) with a retinue, while Oedipus goes alone on foot. In the

38 I shall henceforth use the term "morality" as a shorthand for "ancient Greek popular morality."


42 E.g. Od. 2. 14, Tyrt. fr. 12. 37 West, Theogn. 935-36.

43 In addition to its usefulness for cartage, an ἀπήνη is the appropriate vehicle for conveyance on a ceremonial occasion; see H. L. Lorimer, “The Country Cart of Ancient Greece,” JHS 23 (1903) 132-51, esp. 136-37. Nor is it merely the tool of rustics: A ἀμαξα drawn by mules was not beneath Priam’s dignity (II. 24. 266-74) and the ἀπήνη
parallel incident in the *Iliad* (1. 188–92), when Achilles is provoked by Agamemnon, who is both kinglier and elder, he contemplates homicide, revealing that the course actually chosen by Oedipus is not unnatural, but then wisely abstains from violence. Laius was also clearly older than Oedipus, for his hair was "a sable silver'd" (742) and Oedipus calls him "elder" (805, 807), not necessarily an old man, but a senior figure\(^{45}\) deserving of respect. Oedipus should not have quarrelled with Laius, not because he might be his father,\(^{46}\) but because morality demanded respect for elders.\(^{47}\)

Secondly, Laius was a stranger (813), whom it is wrong to kill,\(^{48}\) for "all strangers are in the keeping of Zeus" (*Od*. 6. 207–08 = 14. 57–58) in his capacity as Zeus of Strangers.\(^{49}\) Indeed, some may even be Zeus incognito.\(^{50}\) These beliefs are grounded in social reality: The stranger lacks brotherhood, law and hearth (*Il*. 9. 63) and is very vulnerable. To limit this vulnerability and prevent a breakdown of society, the Greeks ritualized the behaviour proper toward strangers. When a stranger presents himself at one's house, he must be entertained no matter how inconvenient (cf. Eur. *Alc*. 476 ff.). Even in battle one should not attack a man of unknown identity lest he be a god.\(^{51}\) The proper behaviour of strangers meeting as wayfarers is shown in the *Iliad*, where Priam, the old man, travelling away from home with his herald encounters the unrecognized young man,\(^{52}\) his surrogate son, who is Hermes in disguise, and whom he suspects of being a brigand.\(^{52}\) In contrast to Oedipus, Hermes is a paragon of courtesy.\(^{53}\) To

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\(^{44}\) Dawe (above, note 8) ad 805.

\(^{45}\) As Vellacott (above, note 9) 140 argues.


\(^{50}\) *Il*. 6. 119–236. This is a special case, since Glaucus and Diomedes are connected by earlier ties of family; but then so too were Oedipus and Laius, if they had only bothered to stop and find this out.


\(^{53}\) The particular relevance of this story to my argument was pointed out to me by Emmet Robbins.
murder strangers is extreme barbarity, fit for Laestrygonians or Cyclopes, each of whom is a law to himself and cares nothing for others (Od. 9. 112–15), but unthinkable to a civilized Greek. Of potentially ironic application to Oedipus is Hesiod's observation (Op. 327–32) that whoever harms a stranger is as bad as a father-abuser.

Thirdly, Laius was accompanied by a herald (753), recognizable as such (802), presumably through his caduceus. The herald accompanied him because he was an “envoy sent to consult the oracle” (114) on official religious and state business. Oedipus at first “[forebore] to strike the sacred herald”—whom he does eventually kill—because heralds are inviolable. To violate their rights was “sacrilegious”; to kill them was to break the customs of all men. Herodotus (7. 133–37) tells how the Spartans killed Dareius’ heralds and were incited by the hero Talthybius, in life the herald of Agamemnon, to send men to Xerxes to die to expiate the crime. Xerxes refused to act illegally like the Spartans; yet, although he spared them, their sons later died, Herodotus editorializes, in requital for Talthybius’ wrath. Once, whenever Athenian youths assembled they wore mourning for the herald Copreus whom the Athenians had killed (Philosfr. VS 2. 1. 5 = 2. 59 Kayser). An Athenian herald murdered by the Megarians was buried with full honours at the Dipylon gate while his murder caused enmity between the two states.

Three arguments, all inadequate, might be raised in Oedipus’ favour. The first is that he did not choose to kill Laius because, unlike Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigeneia (Aesch. Ag. 206–17), his deliberation is not reported. Lacking on his lips is “the characteristic cry of the tragic hero,” Yet this is a feature of his character, not of his situation. The only one to hesitate in our play is Creon (91–92, 1443);

55 See C. P. Bill, “Notes on the Greek θεωρός and θεωρία,” *TAPA* 32 (1901) 196–204.
56 *Jebb* (above, note 54) ad 804–12.
58 ‘Ασεβής, Dem. 12. 4.
60 Plut. *Per.* 30. 3, Dem. 12. 4. Oedipus, who killed a man engaged in a *theoria*, will easily insult a seer (386–89; cf. his insulting of the Pythia, 964–65), since that is a relatively common form of disrespect for the gods’ servants (cf. II. 1. 106, 12. 231–50, Soph. *Ant.* 1033–38).
Oedipus is full of Sophoclean self-assurance, impatient at others’ slowness (74, 287, 1162) and always quick to jump to a suspicion (124–25, 139–40, 380–89). More quick-witted than Agamemnon, he will not laboriously deliberate before choosing the wrong course; it is his particular glory to rush “with characteristic decisiveness”63 into actions whose outcome is ruinous.

Secondly, Oedipus was provoked. Laius was rude to him and seems by nature to share his temperament as well as his looks (743), as we would expect of kings, who laid great store by heredity.64 Morality, far from counselling one to turn the other cheek, commands vengeance: Helping friends and harming enemies is the oft-cited recipe for justice.65 Still, the vengeance exacted by Oedipus exceeds the wrong done. Oedipus says, “[Laius] paid no equal penalty” (810),66 a phrase reminiscent of the herald in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (532–33), who says that the Trojans “do not boast that they wrought more than they suffered.” This reminiscence is ominous in view of the consequences that Agamemnon’s excessive vengeance had for him. Of course, in all self-defense killings the victim gets more than he gave,67 but this is only because he is less successful; in terms of intent the acts are equal, with one killing in order to avoid being killed. Yet by Oedipus’ own admission Laius only sought to remove him from the road (804–05). On this point again morality suggests that the vengeance should fit the offense, being equal to instead of greater than the crime,68 a principle enunciated by Antigone (Soph. Ant. 927–28). If equality of retribution was not an absolute standard of morality, the Greeks were at least sensitive to the problems inherent in excessive retaliation (cf. Soph. fr. 589 Radt). This is clear in the present passage where the escalating violence spirals rapidly out of control: Laius and his servant drive Oedipus away, perhaps using only words (804–05); Oedipus responds with a blow, evidently of his fist (806–07); Laius is then the first to use a weapon, coming down upon Oedipus’ head with an ox-goad (807–09); Oedipus finally kills them all with a deadlier weapon, his staff (811–13).

Why, then, mention the provocation at all? (It is not in earlier or later accounts.69) The reason is that neither here nor anywhere else did Sophocles

63 Bowra (above, note 28) 190.
64 Cf. Neoptolemus in Soph. Phil., who shares the nature of the father he has never known.
66 Οὐ μὴν ἴσον γῆτετεν. Thus Bowra (above, note 28) 164 is wrong to say, “Laius was the aggressor and got what he deserved”; by Oedipus’ own admission he got more than he deserved.
67 Gagarin (above, note 23) 118 n. 32.
68 Ἡσα πρὸς ἢσα, Hdt. 1. 2. 1.
portray an irredeemably evil man. Faced with a dilemma, he chooses a crime that he would never have gone out of his way to commit.

Thirdly, it will be argued that no one censures Oedipus for murder as murder (as distinct from regicide and parricide). On a strict application of the principle that what is not mentioned in the play does not exist (schol. Il. 5. 385d), such censure must be impossible. The answer to this lies in the play’s structure. The rapid movement of the play between two distinct questions, the public one of who killed Laius (106–07) and the private worry of Oedipus over his parents’ identity (437, 779–93, 1017), allows no time for the identity of Oedipus’ victims to be raised in its own right. If a third question arises at all it is the red herring of whether one can foreknow the future (720–22, 945–49, 981–82). Oedipus reveals to Jocasta and the audience his past, apparently for the first time, only when the play is half over (813), and in the context of the distracting search for Laius’ killer.

If Oedipus chose to kill the old man and his act was no mere accident or reflex, what was his motive? None is explicit in the text, which gives an account remarkable for its succinctness (813); we must infer one from Oedipus’ character. Oedipus, exemplary in so many respects, is led to his crime because he has the Sophoclean hero’s impulsive incapacity to yield, as when he ignores the pleas of his wife and herdsman to stop his investigation (1060–61, 1165). Read this trait as hubris or heroism; it keeps him from yielding to the old man and thence leads him to murder. “Character is destiny.”

If Oedipus is unquestionably guilty of murder, we must turn to the question of whether he is guilty of the other component of parricide, harming his father. Oedipus does harm his father and this was a grave offense, but he never would have done so knowingly, having taken elaborate, if futile, steps to avoid it. Therefore, he could defend himself by saying that he did not know that Laius was his father. One can act in ignorance and still bear some blame according to Pittacus of Mytilene. He enacted a law that one be fined double for an offense committed while

70 This seems to be the implication of 771–73 and of the phrase καὶ σοι, γύναι, τύληθες ἔξερο (800).
71 Dodds 38–41 = 66–68 ridicules the scrutiny of character, but I would argue that much of this scrutiny has been rather insufficiently focused than misdirected.
72 See Knox (above, note 18) 15–16.
73 He does yield once in the play, with great reluctance, at 669–72, when he spares Creon in response to the combined pleas of Jocasta and the chorus.
74 Some scholars such as Winnington-Ingram (above, note 8) have tried to have an Oedipus at once arrogant (183) and innocent (203).
75 Heracleitus 22 B 119 Diels–Kranz, quoted by Winnington-Ingram (above, note 8) 177.
77 As he does in Soph. OC 273, 547–48, 988–99.
drunk.\textsuperscript{78} This law was not designed to discourage drunkenness,\textsuperscript{79} or he would have outlawed wine, but rather, as Aristotle approvingly explains, because one is culpable of a crime committed in ignorance, if this ignorance arises through negligence.\textsuperscript{80} Oedipus’ abuse of his father is an extraordinary example of such a crime.

One would not have thought Oedipus negligent in harming his father. Indeed, his abandoning of his comfortable life in Corinth to embark upon the wandering that brought him to Thebes seems the opposite of negligence. Nevertheless, Oedipus was negligent in remaining ignorant of his father’s identity, having been led into this negligence again by his impulsive character. He made the trek to Delphi to learn who his parents were and upon hearing that he was destined to defile them, he immediately abandoned the object of his journey, for the oracle manifestly did not resolve it (788–89), raising instead the separate (789) issue of parricide and incest, and set off to flee Corinth. Far from distracting him from his parents’ identity as it did,\textsuperscript{81} the oracle’s response made it imperative that he pursue just this quest. As a distant second best, he might have contemplated a life of non-violence and celibacy\textsuperscript{82} rather than murdering the first people whom he met and marrying in the first city to which he came. The failure to consult the oracle further is an essential ingredient in his downfall and shifts the blame onto his own shoulders, as is shown by Sophocles’ friend (cf. Soph. fr. 5 West \textit{IEG}) Herodotus.\textsuperscript{83} Herodotus tells how Croesus, having received the oracle that if he attacked Persia, he would destroy a mighty empire, caused his own misfortune by attacking without first determining which empire was meant (Hdt. 1. 91. 4). Delphi addressed a similar rebuke in like circumstances to the children of Heracles (290 Parke–Wormell = L63 Fontenrose). While repeated consultation of an oracle might seem an improbable pestering of the god, myth records many examples of just this phenomenon.\textsuperscript{84} Like that of Croesus and the Heraclids, Oedipus’ ignorance results from his negligence in failing either to understand Apollo’s warning or to inquire further about a question that the oracle had just shown to be crucial. In this regard, Creon is an important foil, showing constant reliance upon Delphi (603, 1442–43).

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{78} Diog. Laert. 1. 76, Ar. Pol. 2. 9. 9 (= 1274b), Rhet. 2. 25. 7 (= 1402b).
\item \textsuperscript{79} Pace Diog. Laert.
\item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{Δίος ἀμέλειαν}, Arist. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 8–9 (= 1113b–14a).
\item \textsuperscript{81} He acts as though he knew that Polybus and Merope were undoubtedly his parents; cf. 826–27.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Which can only with extreme latitude be characterized as “compil[ing] a handlist of all the things he must not do” (Dodds 40 = 68, quoting Waldock); it would be a short list.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Sophocles and Herodotus shared views on many topics: e.g. Ant. 908–12 = Hdt. 3. 119. 6; \textit{El}. 417–23 = Hdt. 1. 108. 1; \textit{OC} 337–41 = Hdt. 2. 35. 2; \textit{OT} 1528–30 = Hdt. 1. 32. 5; \textit{El}. 62–64 = Hdt. 4. 95; \textit{OC} 1224–27 = Hdt. 7. 46. 3–4.
\item \textsuperscript{84} 4–5, 43–44, 94–95, 161, 216–21 Parke–Wormell = Q58A–B, Q28–29, Q146–47, Q191A–B, Q7–9 Fontenrose.
\end{itemize}
There are signs that Oedipus has not been told the truth: the scars on his feet that have always troubled him (1033) and the story of the drunk (780), which may have been widely circulated, and which Polybus and Merope do not deny outright (783–84). Oedipus, skilled at reading signs, has to his credit noted these and feels the uncertainty of his parentage as an impairment of his intellect (786); it motivates his hundred-kilometre walk on mountain roads from Corinth to Delphi and repeatedly rears its head during his quest for the regicide (437, 779–93, 1017). He elevates his ignorance into his governing principle, acknowledging that he is “the Know-Nothing Oedipus” (397).

This man, who knows of his ignorance, acts not once but repeatedly as though he were privy even to hidden facts, treating the many phantasms of his imagination (124–25, 139–40, 380–89) as though they were manifest revelations (534–35). Likewise at the crossroads he acted—knowingly and yet as though unknowingly—in ignorance, recklessly failing to yield when it was moral and convenient to do so.

In light of these observations, we see that Oedipus is guilty of parricide as well as being an innocent victim of incest. But there is still one point to make in his favour, namely that his fate was unconditionally pre-ordained. "Sophocles," writes Dodds, "has provided a conclusive answer to those who suggest that Oedipus could, and therefore should, have avoided his fate. The oracle was unconditional . . . And what an oracle predicts is bound to happen." While a conditional prediction allows for the play of free will, an unconditional prediction might be supposed to imply predestination. Even on this assumption the prediction does not exonerate Oedipus, for predestination does not, paradoxically, constitute a compulsion. Dodds knows this. His own book, The Greeks and the Irrational, made familiar the concept of overdetermination whereby according to early Greek thought an event may be "doubly determined, on the natural and on the supernatural plane." We cannot deny this overdetermined status to Oedipus' act: He killed Laius by free choice, thereby abdicating any claim to essential moral innocence. Oedipus' act is also determined on the supernatural plane by fate, and the Pythia says so (713), but fate is an impersonal force, not an

85 Depending upon the interpretation of the phrase ὑφείρπε γὰρ κολύ (786).
86 148, 149 Parke-Wormell = L17, L18 Fontenrose. Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 55 = 209, Dodds 41 = 69.
87 Dodds 41 = 69 (Dodds' italics).
88 The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley 1951) 31. In the present context he cites, after B. M. W. Knox, Oedipus at Thebes (New Haven 1957) 39, the case of Peter, who fulfilled Jesus' prediction that he would deny him (Matthew 26. 34, 74–75) but "did so by an act of free choice" (Dodds 43 = 71). H. D. F. Kitto, Sophocles: Dramatist and Philosopher (London 1958) 60 is right in saying, "there was nothing compulsory about the affair at the cross-roads."
89 Cf. [Laius'] μόριμος υἱός, Pind. Ol. 2. 38.
Olympian deity or even a lackey of the gods like the Furies, and it is as binding upon gods as upon mortals (cf. II. 16. 433–61).

Oedipus’ unsuccessful attempt to elude his fate has been attributed to hubris, but he would have invited greater condemnation either by rushing toward Corinth in homicidal and libidinous determination to fulfill the prophecy or by quietly going about his business like some Stoic avant la lettre. Moreover, Socrates is not hubristic in trying to disprove Delphi’s claim that he is the wisest of men, a less than total faith in the ineluctability of the Pythia’s predictions being neither unusual at Athens nor in itself evidence of improity.

Even apart from overdetermination, Oedipus’ fate does not absolve him of blame, since he could have fulfilled it in total innocence. Laius could have “died at the hand of his son” (713) and Oedipus become the “murderer” (793) of his father had he killed him accidentally, for example while hunting or playing javelin or discus (cf. e.g. Hdt. 1. 43, Apollod. Bibli. 1. 3. 3). One who kills by accident is readily called a “murderer” by a society that denies this name and the consequent legal proceedings neither to animals nor even to inanimate objects (Arist. Ath. Pol. 57. 4).

Furthermore, an unconditional prediction is not evidence for predestination if time for the agent making the prediction is not an abstract, inexorable forward flow. Consider this example: Suppose I videotape a group of playing children and, before playing back the tape, I state that during the play-session Mary will steal Tom’s teddy-bear. My prediction is unconditional and will be brought to pass, and yet I did not compel Mary to act in this way; I may even wish that she had not done so (it has spoiled my movie). I am, in fact, incapable of imposing my will on the children or of removing theirs from them, but I can accurately predict how they will act, because I, unlike them, do not experience time as a chronometric, impersonal medium. If Apollo has a relationship to time like that in this example, he could accurately predict events without ordaining them and he could have such a relationship to time only if Time itself is a free agent, moving forward or backward, quickly or slowly, for the benefit of those whom he would help. According to the Greek conception, such was in fact the nature of Time. In our play, Time is personified as “the All-seer” (1213). The situation in the play is more complex than in the videotape

92 J. de Romilly, Time in Greek Tragedy (Ithaca 1968) 50 writes, “Even if things are supposed to exist through all eternity and to have been decided regardless of time, it is with time and in time that they come to be. He uncovers them.” See also P. Vivante, “On Time in Pindar,” Arêthusa 5 (1972) 107–31, who cites bibliography at 130–31, to which add A. M. Komicka, “La notion du temps chez Pindare,” Eos 64 (1976) 5–15.
93 This is a title of Zeus (Aesch. Eum. 1045, Soph. OC 1085) and of Helios (Aesch. PV 91; cf. II. 3. 277).
example, because Apollo does not predict the event to a disinterested third party but to the protagonist himself, and Oedipus reacts of his own free will to the god’s prediction. Yet such is the nature of fate that any action that Oedipus might have taken in response to any prediction that Apollo might have made would have ended in the same result, albeit brought about by a different chain of intermediary events.

To sum up: By murdering the belligerent stranger, his superior and elder along with his retinue, including the sacred herald, while they were engaged upon official religious and state business, Oedipus violated the prerogatives of Zeus of Strangers, the respect due to superiors and elders, and the principle of fitting retaliation; he is therefore guilty of murder. He knew that he was acting in ignorance and yet behaved as though he did not know this; he is therefore guilty of father-abuse. He was fated to commit his crime, but it cannot be shown that he was compelled to do so, and certainly not in the way in which he did.

II

What, then, of Apollo, who manifests himself in the story of Oedipus (1329)? If Oedipus had been, as the prevailing view holds, essentially morally innocent, then Apollo would have been unjust in allowing him to suffer as he does. Now that we have found Oedipus in fact responsible in some measure for some of the suffering that he incurs, the possibility arises that Apollo’s actions may be just. There is no a priori reason to think that they are so; the gods of Greek myth lie, commit adultery, are gluttons. “Men find some things unjust, other things just; but in the eyes of God all things are beautiful and good and just.”

Nevertheless, if the actions of Sophocles’ Apollo conform to an accepted definition of justice, we should admit that he at least is in that sense a just god.

We have seen that he did not compel Oedipus to kill his father and sleep with his mother, but neither did he try to prevent him from doing so, for example by giving him a straightforward answer to his question concerning his parents. The reason that he did not do so is linked, perhaps, to the fundamental difference of power between god and man. Gods cannot reveal themselves undisguised to men without destroying them; when they appear incognito they are often recognized only at the end of the encounter and only by the extremity of their body, their feet (II. 13. 71–72, Verg. Aen. 1. 405, etc.). This disguise-principle is intensified in connection with verbal communication. Gods have their own language and their own special

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94 Heraclitus 22 B 102 Diels–Kranz, quoted by Dodds 47 = 76.
95 Zeus and Semele: Pind. Ol. 2. 25–26, Eur. Bacch. 6–12; Yahweh and Moses: Exodus 33. 18–23.
intonation. The inevitable process of translation needed to enable them to communicate with men is complex: At Delphi when "the enquirer entered, the Pythia was already under the influence of Apollo, and was in some abnormal state of trance or ecstasy ... [Her] answer would vary in its degree of coherence and intelligibility. When it had been given, the prophet would reduce it to some form, and dictate it to the enquirer." The answer given by this convoluted process was perforce oblique: "The lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks nor hides, but gives a sign" (Heraclitus 22 B 93 Diels–Kranz). It is scarcely surprising if the answer was not as straightforward as we would like.

Even so, Apollo does not lie to Oedipus. The cause of Oedipus' extraordinary ignorance of the events attendant upon his birth lies with Polybus and Merope. The drunk at the banquet accused Oedipus of being a supposititious child (780), but this is itself either a lie or an error, for Polybus was privy to the secret (1021). Even at the drunk's false charge the royal couple expresses anger, thereby effectively misleading Oedipus (783–84). Later, a quick detection of the regicide is prevented by the lone survivor's mendacious description of "many robbers" (122–23). In both cases humans, not gods, have lied.

Whether we find any justice in Apollo's actions will depend upon our definition of the term. Simonides' definition, cited by Polemarchus in Plato's Republic, is "giving back to each person what is owing...." So conceived, justice is wholly reactive. It requires one not to initiate any action, but only to respond in kind to the actions of others. It does not require one to help any person (by warning of impending disaster or by any other means) unless one has been helped first by him. True to the Greeks' anthropomorphic conception of the gods, this rule applies to human–god relationships just as to relationships between humans. In the Iliad, Apollo helps Chryses because he has rooted many temples for him (II. 1. 39). In


98 Nothing would have prevented Polybus and Merope from openly adopting a child, but, as a foundling (1026), Oedipus cannot be adopted, if Athenian laws are imagined as holding good in Corinth; hence they are forced to lie. See Harrison (above, note 17) 71.


100 Τὸ τὰ ὀφελόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀκοδιδόναι, Pl. Resp. 331e = Simonides 642 PMG.
the *Oresteia*, the gods punish Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra in response to their breaking of laws.

According to this conception of justice, Apollo is under no obligation to help Oedipus by warning him of the impending catastrophe, for Oedipus has performed no prior service for him. Yet, once Oedipus has offended the gods by his sacrilegious behaviour at the crossroads, Apollo is obliged to intervene and ensure that the fitting penalty of exile is enforced. He does this through the plague and the oracle to Creon (97); we can also see him at work in the fortuitous arrival of the Corinthian messenger (924) who, again by a striking pseudo-coincidence, is the very man who rescued the infant Oedipus in the first place (1022). Compassionate and comforting Apollo is not, but he is just in this all-too-human sense.

At this point, a further objection might be raised. Given that, from Oedipus' perspective, the murder of Laius is a crime justly punished by his subsequent suffering, is not the same act, when viewed from the perspective of Laius, merely an absurd suffering and, as such, evidence for the wanton cruelty of the gods that negates any other hint of divine justice in the play? When viewed from the perspective of Jocasta, does not the incestuous marriage, discovery of which provoked her suicide, also refute any claims of divine justice? I can meet this objection in two ways: First, Laius was not a wholly innocent bystander at the time of his murder, having actually provoked Oedipus to strike. Second, the suffering of Laius and Jocasta may be construed as punishment for an earlier crime of their own: that in which he "yoked" the feet of the infant Oedipus (718) and she gave the child to a herdsman to kill (1173–74)."101

Opinion is divided over whether newborns were commonly exposed in fifth-century Athens. Even if they were, it would be rare to treat a healthy, legitimate, first-born son like Oedipus in this way. Exposure did

101 H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1983) 121 likewise believes that Laius must deserve his suffering, yet his own solution (that the suffering is provoked by Laius' rape of Chrysis) violates Aristarchus' rule, "what is not mentioned in the play does not exist," and so is less economical than the view proposed here.


103 Health: Patterson (previous note) 113–14; legitimacy: ibid. 115–16; primogeniture: Cameron (previous note) 106 (cf. Pl. *Theat.* 161c); maleness: Golden (previous note) passim. Tyro in one of Sophocles' plays of that name exposed her twins because they were illegitimate. It would of course be rare in real life, if not unparalleled in
not constitute homicide, firstly because the newborn was not a legal person until its adoption into the family during the naming festival, which took place on about the tenth day of life\textsuperscript{104} and an unwanted child would be exposed before this time, Oedipus, for example, at three days (717–18), and secondly because the parent did not actually kill the child. Yet, while not criminal, the act was open to moral censure: Oedipus blames his parents for hurting him knowingly, while he committed his crimes in ignorance (Soph. \textit{OC} 273, 547–48, 988–99); the servant saved him out of pity (1178) and Jocasta, thinking of the exposure, calls him “wretched” (855).\textsuperscript{105} Furthermore, Oedipus’ was no ordinary exposure. Ordinary exposure is not necessarily lethal, thrusting the newborn from the family only, not necessarily from life. All children exposed in myth\textsuperscript{106} and, presumably, many in real life were saved and reared as foundlings,\textsuperscript{107} for the parents, callous enough to abandon their child, scruple actually to shed its blood. By contrast, Laius and Jocasta, intending actually to kill their son, left him on a trackless mountain (719) where the hope of rescue was slight and took the unprecedented step of maiming him, which both weakened him and made it unlikely that he would be rescued even if found. We note the symmetrical justice in the adult Oedipus’ causing the deaths in fact of the parents who tried to kill him as an infant.

III

Recognition that Oedipus’ guilt and Apollo’s justice are greater than is usually allowed for affects how we understand what—if any—is Sophocles’ message. Sophocles’ gods, like those of Aeschylus, are just in an obvious human sense. It is no longer true, on the basis of this play at least, to speak of “the incomprehensible ways of the divine will” or to hold that “one must not bring in false concepts of human morality involving good and evil.”\textsuperscript{108} These are precisely the concepts necessary to understand Apollo’s role in Oedipus’ suffering. It is even less true to say that “what causes his ruin is his own strength and courage, his loyalty to Thebes, and his loyalty

legend (cf. Paris: Apollod. \textit{Bibl.} 3. 12. 5), that a child should be prophesied to kill his father (Soph. \textit{OT} 712–13).

\textsuperscript{104} N. J. Richardson, \textit{The Homeric Hymn to Demeter} (Oxford 1974) 231–34 and Patterson (above, note 102) 105–06.

\textsuperscript{105} Golden (above, note 102) 331; cf. Pl. \textit{Theat.} 161a.


\textsuperscript{107} Θερμοτ, Patterson (above, note 102) 121–22.

to the truth."\(^{109}\) This is only "[t]he immediate cause"\(^{110}\) of his ruin and the Greeks are far more sensitive than we to ultimate causes, abounding as their myths do in nativities, inventors, aetologies and even an original sin or two.\(^{111}\) This is especially true in a legal context: For example, in Plato’s Apology (18a–b) Socrates identifies and refutes his "former accusers." Oedipus is himself an aficionado of ultimate causes, beginning with confident relish (132) the seemingly hopeless investigation into the regicide and extrapolating from Teiresias’ claim that he, Oedipus, has committed parricide and incest not only an alleged proximate cause (Teiresias has been bribed to say this) but also a putative distant cause (Creon bribed him because he wants the kingship [380–89]). We must never forget the ultimate cause of Oedipus’ ruin—the murder at the crossroads come back after all these years (613, 1213) to haunt him.

The profound differences between Aeschylus and Sophocles are not theological and it is difficult to agree with those who find in the god who tells Orestes, "you must kill your mother"\(^{112}\) a kinder, gentler Apollo than the god who tells Oedipus, "you will kill your father." What is new—and far from comforting—in Sophocles is his assessment, gloomy even by Greek standards, of the limits of human knowledge. The ignorance of Sophoclean characters runs through a broad spectrum: Oedipus mistakes his parents for strangers, homecoming for exile and hereditary kingship for unconstitutional rule; Creon in Antigone twice mistakes the priorities of the living for those of the dead;\(^{113}\) Deianira mistakes a poison for a love-potion; and Ajax mistakes a sheep for Agamemnon. In Sophocles humans deceive one another\(^{114}\) and people act with a self-confidence unwarranted by their feeble grasp of reality. Only once does a god deceive: Athena in Ajax (51–52), and her deception, motivated by retribution (762–77), prevents a crime from being committed. It is in his anthropology rather than his theology that the uncompromising quality of Sophocles’ world consists.

The function of art, according to Dodds, quoting Dr. Johnson, is "the enlargement of our sensibility."\(^{115}\) This phrase is perhaps too broad to

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\(^{109}\) Dodds 43 = 71.

\(^{110}\) Dodds 43 = 71.


\(^{113}\) Firstly at Ant. 773–80, 1068–71; secondly at 1192–1205.

\(^{114}\) Aj. 646–92, Trach. 249–90, 569–77, El. 680–763, Phil. 343–90.

\(^{115}\) Dodds 45, 49 = 74, 77. This curious doctrine of enlarged sensibility was no mere temporary aberration of Dodds’ thought, for he had enunciated it years before in Euripides. Bacchae (Oxford 1944) xliii = 2nd. ed. (1960) xlvii. Dodds does not specify the source of this quotation, but David Sansone has most plausibly suggested to me that it is an
capture the specific virtue of tragic drama. The virtue of tragedy lies elsewhere, in a region suggested by the examination question set by Dodds for his undergraduates, namely, in adding understanding to our spontaneous emotional response, in order to assert eternal providence, and justify the ways of God to men.

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inaccurate quotation from memory of Johnson's *Life of Waller* §139: "From poetry the reader justly expects, and from good poetry always obtains, the enlargement of his comprehension and elevation of his fancy."
Rethinking the History of the Literary Symposium

JOEL C. RELIHAN
and the Members of Greek Seminar 420

In the Spring of 1992 it was my pleasure and privilege to direct at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign a Greek seminar called “Plato and Later Symposiac Literature.” Four Greek texts were read in common: Plato’s Symposium, Xenophon’s Symposium, Plutarch’s Banquet of the Seven Wise Men and Lucian’s Symposium or The Lapiths; each member of the seminar was then responsible for the production of a study of a different text within the genre. These latter texts were assigned as follows: Joseph Leichter to Petronius’ Cena Trimalchionis, Stephen Trzaskoma to Plutarch’s Table Talk, Eleanor Hardin to Athenaeus’ Deipnosophists, A.L. Dollmetsh Worley to Methodius’ Banquet of the Ten Virgins, John Houlihan to the Emperor Julian’s Symposium or Saturnalia (popularly Caesars) and Jennifer MacDonald to Macrobius’ Saturnalia; I concerned myself with the Cena Cypriani and related late classical texts. Timothy Johnson, who has just finished a dissertation on Horace’s symposiac poetry, was unable to attend the seminar, but agreed to help us in our revisions with his knowledge of sympotic lyric and Homer. We present here the conclusions that we have reached about the definition of the genre, Plato’s place within its history, and the relation of later texts to earlier models; it is, as it were, a potential introduction to a volume, Collected Ancient Symposia, that has not yet found its B. P. Reardon. My students have allowed me the general supervision and construction of this essay, along with the free use of the pronoun “I” and reference to my forthcoming book, Ancient Menippean Satire; I lean on their expertise not only for the specific authors which were their particular concern but also for their general literary acumen.

NOTE: We will use as a convenient shorthand the adjective “sympotic” to refer to the actual cultural institution which is the symposion, and “symposiac” to refer to the literary genre which is the symposium.¹

¹ This corresponds roughly to the use of the terms employed in O. Murray (ed.), Sympotica (Oxford 1990) v, as borrowed from Plutarch, Table Talk 629d: Sympotica is the preferred term for talk about the symposion, and symposiaca for talk suitable for a symposion.
Some Initial Considerations

That Plato’s *Symposium* is to us *the* symposium obscures the fact that it is a very eccentric symposium, whether it is viewed in contrast to those literary symposia that follow it and take it as a model, or in contrast to those contemporary sympotic realities which form the historical background against which we may evaluate the text as a document of social history. Once this is stated, it is perhaps not so surprising; those other few Platonic dialogues which take their names not after characters within them offer strikingly anomalous examples of the things they affect to discuss: Surely the *Apology* is a strange apology, and the *Republic* a strange republic.² Plutarch, who in his *Table Talk* shows his theoretical understanding of the genre (his practice in the *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* is quite different), must constantly make excuses for Plato’s divergence in his *Symposium* from sympotic and symposiac norms.³ But what is at issue here is more than whether there are to be flute-girls, symposiarchs and rules for seating: Rather, what most accounts for the difference between the *Symposium* and a symposion is the presence of Socrates. For Socrates is practically by definition an unsympotic character. If the norm for a symposion is egalitarianism, then Plato’s hybristic Socrates is out of place;⁴ if a symposion is a social microcosm, then Socrates can no more be constrained by its boundaries than he can be by those of Athens. And it is surely the case that the topic of the *Symposium* is not Love, but the nature of Socrates himself. A Socratic literary symposium is, if not exactly a contradiction in terms, at least a kind of oxymoron; and those who follow in Plato’s footsteps must come to terms with a model whose central character violates the norms of the symposion.

What Alcibiades does to the end of Agathon’s symposion later authors do to Plato’s *Symposium* as a whole: They remove the straitjacket that was imposed in the name of philosophy, and allow dissentient voices to be heard. As this kind of multiplicity becomes the symposiac ideal, the person of Socrates undergoes some remarkable changes. The problem for the author is how to have a philosophical view endorsed without dragging the

² *Sophist* and *Statesman*, as continuations of *Theaetetus*, are dialogues that seek to define their key terms as character types (*Philosopher* was not written); *Laws* (and its *Addendum*) may be allowed to be unironic.

³ This matter will be discussed more fully below.

⁴ In a sense, this complete egalitarianism is social anarchy, or panarchy; the sympotic society is controlled by everyone and no one. It is now questioned whether equality was a sympotic reality in the Roman world of the patron–client relationship; and there are now suspicions that even in Greek sympotic gatherings some people were allowed a privileged position. J. D’Arms, “The Roman Convivium and the Idea of Equality,” in Murray (above, note 1) 308–20, argues that Roman sympotic reality may be much illumined by jettisoning the idea of equality, but also allows that literary symposia may operate along egalitarian lines. The genre, then, obeys literary conventions at some remove from social reality: There are rules of equality, and the violations of these rules are important.
owner of that opinion into the levelling fray. The hero of a symposium is neither narrator nor host: Shall the hero be one in the discussion and bruised by it, or one outside of the discussion and superior to it? Xenophon’s Socrates is much more sympotic: He participates in the rough and tumble, makes jokes and is embarrassed, and is much more interested in bodies than in souls.\(^5\) The question ultimately raised there is whether the ugly Socrates is truly kalos; the entertainers who vote say no, but Lycon, his future accuser, says yes, he is kalos kagathos. Other authors, not actually putting Socrates on stage, can be more polite in their treatment of the one with superior wisdom. In Plutarch’s Banquet, he is heard only as a voice off, in the person of the holy man Arion. But as the texts become more motley, he becomes the jester figure (already implicit in Alcibiades’ description of him), or the disruptive uninvited guest: The bald and ugly buffoon Satyrion in Lucian (Symp. 18) resembles Alcibiades’ Socrates in name as well as appearance; further, Lucian’s uninvited Cynic is a mildly Socratic version of the veridical Cynics of Athenaeus. In Julian’s Caesars, Socrates lurks behind the Silenus who insults the emperors; in Martianus’ Marriage, his drunken antics disrupt the boring speeches at the wedding feast. One may say that Plato’s Alcibiades is the other half of Socrates’ own self, and that the uninvited disrupter is himself a Socratic figure; Socrates may himself be present in a number of different guises in a single work; as we shall see, these various traditions reassemble themselves in the person of Evangelus in Macrobius’ Saturnalia, who inspires the conversations by his objections.

Rosen’s analysis of the dynamics of the Symposium reveals a Socrates on trial for and convicted of hybris; in other words, the Symposium points outside of itself, to the death of Socrates, to gain its point and to show the true value of the arguments contained within it.\(^6\) But what Rosen sees as singular about this one symposium is in fact central to the nature of the whole symposiac genre. What is crucial to a literary symposium is the anticipated death of its main character.\(^7\) Xenophon’s Symposium ends with Lycon, one of Socrates’ future accusers, calling him a good mensch; Athenaeus sets his Deipnosophists just prior to the death of the acidulous Ulpian;\(^8\) Macrobius’ Saturnalia antedates Praetextatus’ death by only a few

5 A nice point made by M. Jeanneret, A Feast of Words: Banquets and Table Talk in the Renaissance, transl. J. Whitely and E. Hughes (Chicago 1991) 142.

6 S. Rosen, Plato’s Symposium\(^2\) (New Haven and London 1987) 21–22: “Both Agathon and Alcibiades present what one may call the private, or more serious version of the public charges against Socrates recorded in the Apology: Socrates is accused and condemned of hybris.”

7 It may be best to say that in the symposium an ancient aspect of the symposium is brought to prominence; namely, that the convivial gathering is both a funeral ritual and a relief from the world of death; consider the surprised reaction of Patroclus when he discovers Nestor and Machaon swapping stories while drinking a healing potion in an impromptu symposium of wounded soldiers at Iliad 11. 618–803.

8 Athenaeus depicts his least likeable character, Ulpian, thus (385a): “nit-picky Ulpian, who reclined by himself, eating little and scrutinizing the speakers.” The aloof attitude, in itself
years. Petronius' Trimalchio, Lucian's Lapiths, Methodius' martyr-to-be Thecla and even Julian himself, about to march to his death in Persia with great foreboding, may be allowed to participate in this tradition; we shall also suggest that the extraordinary Last Supper in John's extraordinary Gospel belongs here as well.

The unsympotic Socrates and the death-centeredness of the symposium are central to the proposed definition of the genre whose history we sketch below. There are three further, related points. First, the symposiac genre must violate symtpotic norms in order to function as literature. As a cultural institution, the symposion seeks to create an atmosphere in which individual differences may be aired without fear of embarrassment or reprisal, in which no one person may be allowed an authoritative point of view or an absolute truth, and where all may vie for honor but not at another's expense. But, as a literary genre, the symposium will generate its plot from tension, conflict and the violation of rules, and will show some key participants trying to gain the upper hand in impolite ways. In this agon, death is never far away, for sympotic order is implicitly imposed on potential disorder, and violence and orgy are the all-too-real inverse of the convivial ideal.

Second, what better source of conflict than the rules of the ritual? As the Table Talk shows, the proper conduct of discussion at a symposium is in fact one of the most important topics of conversation at a symposium, and in all fictional symposia the impulse to reveal these rules which shape the action is very strong. It is crucial that Socrates does not play by the rules

anti-sympotic behavior, identifies Ulpian unpleasantly as the Socratic hero of the Deipnosophists.


Xenophon is remarkable in making all of his guests enter equally into discussion, even the Syracusan impresario; so too Lucian, whose goal is to criticize all. Plutarch's Seven are only a subset of the guests at Periander's symposion; typically, some characters remain quiet and unsympotic. These include our narrators, who can themselves be abused for their aloofness; Petronius' Encolpius is a good example, but so is Athenaeus' narrator.

Hippocleides' dancing at the betrothal feast (Hdt. 6. 128–29) is the most famous example of the fact that symposia preserved by historians are notable precisely for the violation of the sympotic rules of decorum.

R. B. Branham, Unruly Eloquence (Cambridge, MA 1989) 110, puts it succinctly: The symposium is "a tradition in which social and literary practices intersect." Plutarch, in Table Talk (1. 1), has his characters conclude that, as far as philosophical conversation goes, the tone should not be contentious, the speakers should not go on interminably, nor should the conversation get insipid. The symposium should not become a rhetorical school, a gambling house, or a theater (1. 4). It should be noted that Plutarch raises all sorts of questions about conduct that are not strictly relevant to the question of proper conversation; for example, should wine be strained, and why is it that old men get drunk faster than young men? The laws of conversation are most important for the symposiac genre, for the symposium is more interested in recording ideas as they struggle against the restraints of politeness. Most instructive in this regard is one of Varro's Menippaeans, the Nescis quid uesper serus uetal, which has a comic set of convivial laws, all of which are probably broken in the confusion at the end of the meal which the title portends. These include (cited from Astbury's 1985
of Plato's *Symposium*: Refusing to deliver an encomium, he tries to get Agathon into his elenctic clutches, and then tells his Diotima story; when drinking becomes the rule, he does not get drunk. It is a question of rhythm: Characters are to harmonize.\(^{13}\) Third, as a cultural institution, the symposium is aristocratic; sympotic social groups despised commoners, and it is not only such spectacular acts as the mutilation of the herms that make the violent and hybristic nature of such groups the object of special legislative concern.\(^{14}\) But Plato deftly reverses this. It is Socrates who is hybristic, and the Alcibiades who convicts him of this is not just another aristocrat but, as a man of wine and passion, functions as a representative of Athens at large.\(^ {15}\) The popular and democratic voice that overrides the aristocratic and philosophical discussion will live on in many comic ways—the symposium is not sympathetic to philosophers and their abstractions, but will tend to have common sense laugh at squabbling pedants. To be sure, this is a trivialization of the drama of the Platonic *Symposium*, but the elements of the comic symposium are all in place in Plato.

Plato attempts to restrain a symposium, and consequently keeps under pressure a number of centrifugal forces: the catalogue of wise opinions; the presentation of philosophers; the equality of guests; the levelling mechanisms which make discourse possible. It is the explosion of this sealed system that first gives the *Symposium* its drama, and later gives the symposium genre its shape. Parodies will emphasize orgy and violence;\(^ {16}\) imitations will stress heterogeneity rather than homogeneity; excerpters will concentrate on catalogues of wisdom, or of riddles; expanders will place increasingly large catalogues within increasingly fantastic frames; the

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Teubner text; italics identify the editorial comments of Aulus Gellius, the source for these fragments): (336) nec loquaces autem, *inquit*, conuiuus nec mutus legere oportet, quia eloquentia in foro et aput subsellia, silentium uero non in conuiuio, set in cubiculo esse debet. (337) sermo uelles in temporis habendos censest non super rebus anxiis aut tortuosis, sed iucundos atque inuitalibiles et cum quadam incebræ et volupitate uiles, ex quibus ingenium nostrum uenustius fat et amoenius. (339) dominum autem, *inquit*, in conuiuio esse oportet non tam lautom quam sine sordibus, *et* (340) in conuiuio legi non omnia debent sed ea potissimum, quae simul sint θλοφελή et delectent, potius ut id quoqueuideatur non defuisse quam superfluissæ. I discuss these fragments at some length in my forthcoming book, *Ancient Menippean Satire.*

\(^{13}\) The guests who drink too much and are quarrelsome, those who mindlessly chatter on and on and those who, pretending to some higher moral status, do not truly share in the sympotic activity, are all arrhythmic, unharmonious personalities. On the idea of arrhythmic personalities in symposia, see Ath. 445d, where Pontianus calls Ulpian an arrhythmic drinker, and Lucian Symp. 34, in which the narrator describes arrhythmic philosophers who cannot live in harmony with their own learning.

\(^{14}\) Murray (above, note 9) 268–69.

\(^{15}\) The madness of wine is seen as an inevitable popular component of symposia in *Laws* 1–2 and in need of tight control; see below, 219–20 and n. 22. As Plutarch says (*Table Talk* 1. 2), the symposium is a democratic institution. So too does Lycon function at the end of Xenophon's *Symposium*, Athens giving Socrates the back-handed compliment that he is beautiful and good, the perfect gentleman (*Symp.* 9. 1).

\(^{16}\) See Jeanneret (above, note 5) 151, on Lucian's *Lapiθs.*
irreconcilability of the many contrasting forces which the social symposion tries to harmonize will make the genre a frequent ally of Menippean satire; its fragmentation into things like riddle books, lists, etc. marks its end.

These aspects of Plato's *Symposium* allow us to draw a line from it through the symposia of late antiquity; placing Plato within the tradition which he inspires has proven a useful way to read his text. Accordingly, what we wish to do in this paper is three-fold: first, to explain from a literary viewpoint the peculiarities of Plato's dialogue *Symposium*, and describe the general processes by which they are transmuted into the symposiac genre; second, to give an accounting of the symposiac genre by defining the characteristics of the general phases of its history and development; and, third, to offer brief accounts of specific late texts, pointing out the ways in which they belong to a complete understanding of the nature of Plato's own provocative work, ending substantially with Macrobius' *Saturnalia*, but allowing some space for consideration of the genre's sparse medieval progeny. In this essay we do not take up the question of the nature of those symposia known to us only in fragments, nor do we address sympotic poetry, the *deipnon*, the sympotic letter, or *symposiac problemata* as literary forms; but the interest recently shown in the phenomenon of the classical Greek symposium, abundantly attested by Slater's *Dining in a Classical Context* and Murray's *Symptotica*, allows us to attempt a brief *Symposiaca* and make a particular sense of a nearly 800-year Greco-Roman prose tradition that was not obvious to earlier literary historians, primarily Ullrich and Martin; a sense which those who restrict their literary interest in the genre to Plato would do well to consider.17 We are inspired by, but take exception to, the fascinating assessment offered by Jeanneret in his study of Renaissance symposia. Plutarch, Athenaeus and Macrobius are not "mausoleums."18 Traditions of the Renaissance do allow for fruitful readings and rereadings of the classical texts; we hope here to construct a stronger bridge to lead from ancient to more modern literature.

**From Dialogue to Symposiac Genre**

By its simplest definition, a literary symposium is a dialogue that takes place at some time in the course of that ancient ritual of dining, drinking and conversation known as the symposion. In other words, it is by form a dialogue; and if we assert that the symposium is a separate genre of literature, we need to define how this setting so influences the dialogue in its structure, and so affects its range of characters and topics, that dialogue is

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no longer an adequate label for it. We must therefore begin with Plato and face the fact that if his Symposium had inspired no followers it would probably be classified as another of his middle dialogues, presenting well-known characters, themes and literary devices in a form which, while exceptional in his corpus, would prove no obstacle to its inclusion among the dialogues.19

Plato’s Symposium primarily aligns itself with the middle Socrates who speaks of transcendent forms, a separable soul and the philosophical contemplation of ultimate reality in terms of sexual union—philosophy as erotics.20 We note the similar literary devices: The Symposium is a dialogue reported long after the fact, as is the Theaetetus; the Phaedrus has a bad speech of Lysia’s recalled and discussed, reminding us of the bad speeches in the Symposium, particularly Eryximachus’; the Socrates who is in love in some problematic way with Alcibiades recalls the early dialogue Gorgias; and while Socrates’ story of Poros and Penia reflects a love of myth-making abundantly attested in the middle period (Er in Republic 10, the chariot of the soul in the Phaedrus), Aristophanes’ tale of the origins of the human race seems a comic anticipation of the account in the late Timaeus. It is significant that the Symposium is retrospective and prospective, for in it we see in action a number of different personae of Socrates and different views of the nature of the symposion itself. When he questions Agathon (199c3–201c9), we see an elenctic Socrates who wants to be as he was in the early dialogues;21 but this questioning is impolite (the cardinal rule of conduct in a symposion or sympotic discussion is politeness) and violates the rules of this particular symposion (at Symp. 177a1–78a1 the guests agree to deliver encomia only, a genre which Socrates affects not to master), and so Socrates is compelled to proceed more along the lines of the middle Socrates, relating his mystical instruction at the hands of Diotima. The call for sober discussion without entertainment is reminiscent of Socrates’ prescriptions for a properly educational symposion in the early Protagoras (347c–48a), in which we find both Agathon and Socrates; but the interruption of the proceedings by the drunken Alcibiades would anticipate the regulations of Laws 1–2, where

19 For example, Martin (above, note 17) 295–96 makes the reasonable observation that there are symposiac traditions prior to Plato, and only the later exaltation of Plato made him the founder of a new genre. Martin also notes that the symposion setting for this particular dialogue portrays the social life of Athens with a vividness and detail not paralleled in the other dialogues.


21 The Socrates of the early dialogues, who takes all his interlocutors as equals and argues only to show that he and they are equally unaware of the truth, is by nature truly sympotic; the middle Socrates is not. The dialogic methods of the early Socrates are implicitly held up to ridicule in Plato in this brief interview with Agathon; they are explicitly mocked in Xenophon (Symp. 4. 56–59), when all the guests agree to reply Ἴλαντο μὲν οὖν to all of Socrates’ questions.
wine and madness are deemed necessary, but in need of firm control.22 As a final point, there are here, as always in Plato, enough layers of reporting and enough biased filters intervening between the focal point of the dialogue and its actual relation to satisfy Plato’s general wary unwillingness to let any one presentation of a point of view pass for an absolute truth; Socratic wisdom must always be grasped darkly.23

What then makes the Symposium unique? This dialogue is driven by a tension between sympotic reality and Socratic desire. In dismissing the flute-girl and refusing to drink deeply, the guests attempt to deny that they are at a symposium, and try to transcend the occasion and their physical surroundings. Plato conspires with them in this by omitting details of the dining. All this is done in the name of Philosophy, of course; as Rosen points out, all of the speakers, even the unworthy ones, may be allowed to have some partial glimpse of the truth, so that Socrates’ speech stands as the summation and perfection of all that has gone before. The clear implication is that this symposium is superior to a real symposium because words and speeches stand in for food and drink. This proud attitude will have a long history; it will become commonplace for guests to arrive at a literary symposium with words and riddles and debate as their share (their symbolon) for the convivial potluck.24 As symposiac texts become increasingly encyclopedic, the images of learning as eating, of compilation as satire, of books as digestes, come increasingly to the fore.25 It will be the

23 The sequence of narration in Plato (Apollodorus tells to an unnamed friend the dialogue as he heard it from the guest Aristodemus, a version considered to be more accurate than that related to Glaucon by Phoenix, and checked in some details against Socrates himself) is laboriously followed by Methodius (Gregorion tells Eubulion, who had earlier heard an unsatisfactory version from an unnamed informant, about the banquet given by Arête as she heard it from the guest Theopatra).
24 See Aulus Gellius 7.13.2–3 on the sympotic quaestiuonculae (a trivializing diminutive for which he also gives the Greek equivalent, ἐνθυμήματα) that guests would bring to banquets at the home of the philosopher Taurus, in Athens: cum domum suam nos vocarent, ne omnino, ut dicitur, immunes et asynboli ueniremus, coniectabamus ad cenalam non cuppedias ciborum, sed argutias quaestionum. unusquisque igitur nostrum commentum paratusque ibat, quod quaereret, erat initium loquendi edundi fanis. Examples of these levelling riddles are given: Should we say that one who is dying dies while still alive or when dead? Do you stand up while seated or when already standing? The point is made that such questions stimulate the wit and the conversation; but it is not really polite for one guest to try to prove the superiority of his opinion.
25 This is abundantly illustrated in Jeanneret, A Feast of Words (above, note 5); but it is worth noting that those who explicitly claim the superiority of words over food may be mocked. In Plutarch’s Banquet (160c), when Solon delivers a rude and lengthy diatribe against the pleasures of food, in which the bowels are compared to Hell (the “pit” of the stomach), his unsymptotic fervor is not commented on by our narrator or anyone else (160c), and we get the impression that his words were received with a shocked silence. Silence as an undercutting response to an improper speech in the symposium deserves further study. See also below, note 40.
primary joke in Athenaeus, where the Cynic guests must always wonder whether the food before them will ever be eaten, or only talked about. But the point to make is that Plato’s Symposium desires to be unsympotic. Pellizer describes sympotic reality as a controlled exercise of the passions, a private agon (unlike the public one in which Agathon secured his victory) in which the public image can be put at risk in a sort of ritualized exhibitionism. 26 In Plato’s Symposium, this agon is clearly present, both in the rivalry that animates the different encomia and in the tensions that surface between speakers; but control disappears, just as the other aspects of sympotic reality make their first appearance, at the end with the arrival of Alcibiades. Now we have a symposiarch who imports a flute-girl (though she does not play), orders deep drinking and sets about embarrassing Socrates and calling into question the value of his speech on Love.

Alcibiades makes his famous claim that there is a reality to Socrates that is hidden from view, and he implies that Socrates intentionally keeps it hidden. This is Socrates’ erotic nature, and the references to the Sileni with the gods inside and to the mad-piping Marsyas do not only tell us of Socrates’ enigmatic nature, but of his attempt to conceal himself, to be unsympotic. And when Alcibiades offers himself for ridicule, telling of his own impropriety in attempting to seduce the older man Socrates and how his advances were rejected, we see not only an embarrassed Socrates but also a Socrates convicted of not proceeding, as he had been instructed to by Diotima, from the physical body to transcendental love. 27 It may be too much to say that Alcibiades’ revelations and talk of hybris give the lie to Socrates’ abstractions, but Socrates’ attempt to live in the abstract, both in philosophy and in the symposion, is disdainful of the world around him.

What distinguishes Plato’s Symposium from his other dialogues is the way in which the social order of Athens, which differs so dramatically from the dialogic world of Socrates, intrudes at the end to force a re-evaluation of the character of Socrates. This is obviously not like the Apology with its verdicts, or the Phaedo with the jailer and his poison; in these, death comes to a Socrates whose opinions are fully endorsed, while in the Symposium death waits for a Socrates whose opinions are questioned. Socrates sits here beneath no plane tree, and is not in his usual element, before two or three eager listeners. Bathed and with shoes on, he is out of character; the lengthy delay before he enters suggests his unwillingness; the concluding long and paradoxical discussion of the nature of the writing of tragedy and comedy, which puts our narrator to sleep, makes the reader wonder just what has transpired here: Is the disjunction between Socrates and his

27 Rosen (above, note 6) 276–77, summarizing a long analysis of the Diotima passage: “It is by no means self-evident that Socrates himself begins unambiguously at the level of the body.”
audience a comic or a serious thing? The learning of the speakers has been set in a frame that calls for the re-evaluation of both the learning and the speakers, and society appears impatient with the wisdom of the wise.

This, then, is our genre in its first stage of development, the symposiac "mode" of the dialogue to use Alastair Fowler's terms. The transition from Plato's Symposium to the symposiac genre is accomplished by a number of means. Creative imitation draws out selectively certain aspects of the work; recourse to actual symptic convention augments Plato's material; and appeals to other literary traditions afford an intertextual richness that goes some way toward making up for the particular philosophical profundity which is Plato's genius, never seriously rivalled within the tradition. In the eyes of later authors, the characters of Plato's Symposium are too homophonous, the speeches themselves are objectionable as too long and too serious, and there is a need of variety (poikilia). Variety is imported into the symposium partly by attention to the details of actual symptic practice: the rituals of eating and drinking; entertainment, jesters and buffoons; variety of topics discussed; riddles and puzzles. But the theoretical justification for the modification of the master's practice is, of all people, Homer. The important discussion of this is the beginning of Book 5 of Athenaeus, in which the jurist Masurius comments on the ways in which Xenophon and Plato variously approximate the Homeric ideal. Epicurus suffers most in the analysis for never having made the attempt, but Homeric symposia are superior to philosophical symposia, to the partial exception of Xenophon's Symposium, by virtue of poikilia. This is in fact a remarkable literary sleight-of-hand. Despite the laborious reference to Homer at its beginning, Plato does not draw on Homeric feasting scenes to create his own Symposium. In effect, Plato is

28 Too much attention is paid, I think, to the discussion of drama at the conclusion of the Symposium, where the best writer of tragedy is said also to be the best writer of comedy; and too much to the supposed five-act structure of the symposium, although D. Sider, "Plato's Symposium as Dionysiac Festival," QUCC 33 (1980) 41–56, has an interesting statement of the thesis. We are more impressed by the implicit equation of the guests and the chorus of drama: Socrates, as it were, steps out from the chorus to pronounce the truth, and like most of those in tragedy who say what is true, he is to pay with his life.


30 The importance of this term for Athenaeus is discussed by A. Lukinovich, "The Play of Reflections between Literary Form and the Symptic Theme in the Deipnosophistae of Athenaeus," in Murray (above, note 1) 267–68. We are not dealing merely with a stylistic matter here: As a banquet is compounded of various courses, and would be unpalatable without variety, so too does the literary symposium require what the symposion does.

31 Socrates' ponderous complaint to Aristodemus (174b3–d3) of how Homer made the lesser Menelaus go unasked to the sacrifice and feast of Agamemnon in Iliad 2 has a surprising afterlife. Masurius wrestles with this in Athenaeus, and proposes a textual emendation as well (Ath. 5. 177c–78e). In Petronius' Cena, an Agamemnon goes to attend a symposion at which a Menelaus is present; Evangelus in Macrobius bids his host fear lest he take three Menelauses into his home (Sat. 1. 7. 10): superuenire fabulis non euocatos haud equidem turpe
acknowledged to be the founder of the genre, but appeal to the earlier and more authoritative Homer justifies the modification of the Platonic model. It is also curious that the long tradition of pre-Platonic, archaic symposiac literature, expressed in epigram and drinking song and tales of the sympotic gathering of the seven archaic wise men, is generally suppressed. Of course Plutarch’s *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* is the exception; it could never have existed without this tradition. Plutarch’s narrator claims to be writing in the archaic age, making this work an interesting example of historical fiction as well as a symposium. But though the work tries to leap over Plato, as it were, to the archaic traditions, we shall show that the actual structure of the *Banquet* is Platonic, and that the prior traditions do not exist to create rival forms of the literary symposium but only superficial modifications of the Platonic model.

Even Homeric *poikilia* is not sufficient to override the Platonic pattern of the symposium. Plato’s death-centeredness is maintained, whether one speaks of the mortal heroes of the *Iliad* and the discussions found in the Embassy to Achilles, or of the feasting of the suitors on Ithaca. The *Odyssey* is in fact more important to the later symposiac tradition, just as the *Odyssey* is more important generally in the history of later prose genres (romance, Menippean satire, the picaresque). It is fascinated with violations of the rules for proper feasting (the glutony of the suitors, Polyphemus’ cannibalism, the eating of the Cattle of the Sun) and in Telemachus’ initiation into the right use of ritual conviviality (learning from Nestor, Menelaus and, ultimately, his own father). More importantly, however, Homeric realities become the counterpoint to philosophical debates. Thus, Lucian’s *Symposium or Lapiths*, which is centered on a wedding feast, ends in bloodshed as philosophers fight like Penelope’s suitors; the heavenly symposium which figures in Julian’s *Symposium*, like the wedding feast on Olympus that Philology reaches at the end of her journey in Martianus Capella’s *Marriage of Philology and Mercury*, are pointedly unworthy sources of wisdom by virtue of the associations of their Homeric fantasies.

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*eximimatur: uterum sponte inruere in convivium alii praeparatum nec Homero sine nota uel in fratre memoratum est, et uide ne nimium arroganter tres tibi uelis Menelaos contigisse, cum illi tanto regi unus euenerit.*

32 See B. Snell’s fascinating collection, *Leben und Meinungen der Sieben Weisen* (Munich 1971); Martin (above, note 17) 291–92 does not deal with the significant difference between real model (pre-Platonic sympotic reality and symposiac production) and claimed model (Homer).

33 The significance of sympotic feasting in the *Iliad* is taken up by Murray (above, note 9) 259–62; Masurius in Atheneaus (above, note 31) also speaks explicitly of the Embassy. W. J. Slater, “*Sympotic Ethics in the Odyssey*,” in Murray (above, note 1) 213–20, speaks of Odysseus among the Phaeacians, but does not note how unsympotic such a story would be by contemporary sympotic standards. That symposia may be implicitly death-centered can be argued from Homer (above, note 7), but Plato fronts this concern in ways that cannot be extrapolated from Homer, except in the general way that epic and tragedy together assert that heroes must die.
Lucian's comic treatment of Homer's heaven helps to pave the way for this. Later symposia enjoy the relief from Plato's high sentence, allowing wrangling philosophers to be mocked for their arrogance, and exalting Odyssean piety and practical wisdom.

It is good to remember that philosophical debate is itself a violation of sympotic norms: Philosophers in their discourse are outside the pale of civilized human beings. This is a joke frequently encountered in Varro's Menippeans and throughout the Menippean tradition as well, in which the philosopher gloriōsus is the recurring butt of humor.34 This theme, and the key term poikilia, are both stressed at the very beginning of Lucian's Symposium or Lapi̇ths: Ποικίλην, ὁ Λυκίνε, διατριβήν φασά γεγενήθαι ύμιν χθές ἐν Ἀρισταίνετον παρὰ τὸ δείπνον καὶ τινὰς λόγους φιλοσόφους εἰρήθαι καὶ ἔριν οὐ συμικράν συστήναι ἐπ' αὐτοῖς . . . , "They say, Lycus, that you had a truly sympotic gathering over dinner at Aristaenetus' house the other day, that philosophical words were spoken, and that no small contention arose because of them . . ." See how clearly Platonic eros has been replaced by eris; the "philosophical words" are themselves examples of objectionable behavior.35 The discussion even takes place during dinner, and not after—no order is maintained. Wrangling eggheads have supplanted the philosophers. It is not important to Lucian that Plato's doctor Eryximachus stands out as one who cannot pass muster as a philosopher; he typifies the foolish wise man, and this theme is pounced on here with a vengeance.

The Three Phases of the Symposiac Genre

These considerations allow us to see the transition from Plato to later authors in a clearer light. To continue to use Fowler's terms, once we establish a genre out of the symposiac mode of Platonic dialogue, we can discern the three typical phases of the genre's life span. To the primary stage (primitive/simple/naive) we assign Xenophon's Symposium, which is concerned not to use Socrates to make philosophical points but to remember Socrates as a personality. Xenophon's Socrates displays a "complex irony" which is in welcome contrast to his moral didacticism in the Memorabilia.36 He is present at a symposium that is concerned with bodies much more than minds: the dancers who entertain them, the beauty of Callias and Critobulus,

35 The term reappears as the adjective ποικίλα at section 34, where too we learn of the absence of rhythm in the conduct of the philosophers; see above, note 13. Branham (above, note 12) 104–23 has a nice discussion of Lucian's use of Platonic material in the Lapi̇ths. See also Jeanneret (above, note 5) 150–52 for a brief treatment that makes the interesting point that the disiecta membra of the discussion, letters, fragments of poets, etc. suggest a text about to fly apart.
36 For complex irony, see Vlastos (above, note 20) 30–32.
the ugliness of Socrates. Philosophical issues are accordingly played out on the physical level, and it is left to Lycon to proclaim the paradox that Socrates is beautiful and good. In the person of Lycon, Socrates’ death is before us here as it was in Plato, but Socrates’ eccentricities and foibles are more sympathetically presented by Xenophon. Here we see Socrates the pander, the man who loses the beauty contest, the philosoper who is chided for not being able to educate his wife Xanthippe. His praise of the beauty and virtue of the young man Autolycus, Lycon’s son, is sufficient to win the admiration of the boy’s father; but his words and example are quickly countermanded by the Syracusan impresario, who stages a “live-sex-act” version of the myth of Dionysus and Ariadne that sends the married men galloping off to their wives, makes the unmarried men wish they were married, and leaves Socrates rather out of the picture, tagging along after the proud father and son. The central debate on the value of the characteristic on which each speaker prides himself is a series of praises of paradox, of money and of poverty. Here Socrates preens himself on his abilities as pander. What we have is genuine dialogism, a multiplicity of surprising opinions, all sanctioned by the convivial table; Socrates does and does not belong. Xenophon follows, but with an originality that should not be overlooked; he introduces a polyphonic strain of symposiac literature that pursues Plato’s ends by a very different means. Xenophon competes very creditably on Plato’s terms, achieving a pointed portrait of an exceptional wise man on the level playing field of the symposion.

Plutarch’s Banquet of the Seven Wise Men also belongs to this primary stage; in it, Periander (often called one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece but pointedly not so labelled here) presides over a banquet which will reveal the superiority of his wisdom and piety to that of the Seven; instrumental in this exaltation of Periander is his protection of Arion, whose rescue from the pirates establishes him as an anti-Socrates, a wise man not delivered up to death at the hands of the mob. The story is worth some detail.

It becomes clear that Periander’s brother Gorgus stands in the place of the uninvited guest. He has a tale to tell, the tale of Arion and the dolphin (160e–62b); it has the climactic function of the Diotima story in Plato. Gorgus had seen to it that soldiers be stationed at various landfalls to be on

37 Jeaneret (above, note 5) 142.
38 This will prove inspirational to Julian in his imperial debate, as each emperor proclaims his guiding principles and justifies himself before the gods. Socrates is present at the proceedings only as Silenus, who mocks all their pretensions.
39 Jeaneret (above, note 5) 144 speaks of Xenophon’s open-ended text as “a foretaste of the Menippean satire.”
40 Gorgus’ arrival (160d) stops the conversation. The name alludes clearly to the Gorgon; cf. Socrates in Plato (Symp. 198c), who says that the figures of Gorgias in Agathon’s speech, like a Gorgon, almost turned him to stone and prevented his speech. Xenophon’s Symposium begins with all the guests unable to speak because of the beauty of the boy Autolycus. Silence and a new beginning are used to set off important passages in a symposium.
the look-out for the pirates who had abducted Arion; and we discover that the soldiers have been successful and have just arrived at Corinth with the pirates. Periander at first does not believe it, but finally has the pirates put in prison without revealing to them Arion’s escape. So far, we have the story in Herodotus 1. 23–24, but the conclusion is missing. We never hear of what happens to the pirates; but we do know what will happen because we know Herodotus. A story whose conclusion is known is already begun; and the one who was to be unjustly murdered will receive justice and vindication.

But this Arion is more than Herodotus’ Arion. It is made more clear that he is θεοφιλής; his song is not only a hymn but a swan-song; he is a friend of Periander’s. In these details our story is just like that which begins the Corinthian Oration (Or. 37) of Plutarch’s contemporary Dio Chrysostom; Dio also makes the point that Solon was at Periander’s court at the time of the Arion affair, being exiled from Athens and Peisistratus. Peisistratus is not mentioned in Plutarch’s Symposium. But we have here further adumbrations of the untold story: Periander is a wise man in comparison to the tyrants, and we know that he will act in defense of the holy man Arion. In this light, the Seven Wise Men, who frequently have been seen as less than religious, to whom our religious narrator is something of a naive foil, and whose behavior has been less than exemplary (consider Solon’s tasteless speech on the bowels as Hell, 159b–60c, which immediately precedes the arrival of Gorgus and the tale of Arion), are to come around to a religious point of view, and their concluding stories strike the religious theme, telling other dolphin stories and tales of divine interventions. Other types of wisdom are contrasted with theirs. Periander is the practical wise man; Arion is the holy man; the seven are much more in the realm of philosopi gloriosi. We have, in other words, a frame which makes for a re-evaluation of the nature of the seven.

We are fortunate to have two parodies of this primary phase of the literary symposium in the death-centered Cena Trimalchionis and in Lucian’s bloody Lapiths. We leave the Cena for later, but the Lapiths may be dealt with briefly here. Lucian is a moralist, and the philosophers who gather for the wedding feast are shown up as hypocrites as they steal food, vie for honors, and try to seduce the groom. The Odyssean battle which

41 Near the beginning, word is brought of a monstrous birth, of a foal with a human head (149c–e). The narrator Diocles (functioning as Plutarch’s porte-parole) says it calls for purification and atonement, but Thales disagrees, and says only that the young men who keep the horses should find other work or get themselves wives. The narrator is proved right, of course; this parallels the story of the one-horned ram at Pericles 6, where Plutarch says that Anaxagoras’ clever explanation from natural science does not eliminate the possibility of a concurrent theological explanation; the one addresses cause, the other purpose.

42 There is no attempt at moderation. The narrator Lycinus, though present, tries to keep himself to himself. He observes the boorish behavior of his companions, but never steps in himself to do anything about it.
terminates the work only points the moral that wisdom is not worth acquiring if your life is going to be out of synch with it. All of the impolitenesses exhibited are part of a thoroughgoing parody of the Platonic symposium, to the significant exception of having no one person singled out for approval of any sort; while this is consonant with Lucian’s general anti-philosophical stance, it is also a very symptomatic attitude: All are certainly equal at this symposium, Epicureans and Stoics, Aristotelians and Platonists alike. It is the opposite of a symposium: There is only orgy and violence, and a failure to impose order on the different voices contained within it.43

To Fowler’s secondary phase (artificial/sophisticated/sentimental) we assign that great gallimaufry which is the Deipnosophists of Athenaeus; a symposium composed of the stuffings of many another symposium, and organized, like a menu, course by course from appetizer to dessert. It is food as philology, and not really at a great conceptual remove from Trimalchio’s banquet, where each astonishing dish must be explained, where every event is a riddle, where nothing seems to be what it really is. The ritual must be explained by mock scholars: As Trimalchio says (39. 4), oportet etiam inter cenandum philologiam nosse. It is preceded by Plutarch’s Table Talk, also an assemblage of materials from various symposia, on a variety of issues round and about the general theme of how to conduct a symposium. This is the structural equivalent of a collection of nothing but programmatic verse satires. Though it lacks a plot it anticipates that later agglutinative tendency which affects all late prose genres—the process by which systematic learning becomes the content of an imaginative work.44 We see this in Menippean satires as they increasingly follow the lead of Varro’s scholastic Menippeans, thus creating the fantastic and ironic encyclopedia of Martianus Capella; we see it also in romance, not only in the almost euphuistic use of digressions on natural history in Achilles Tatius, but also in the Clementine Recognitions, in which the romance form is largely a vehicle for sermons. We note again that imitation is creative: We are in the realm of the intellectual game of the philological satira, halfway between Xenophon’s polyphony and later fantasy.

For Fowler’s third and final phase, characterized by literary nostalgia and the elevation of various generic elements to a quasi-allegorical status, we have Methodius’ Banquet of the Ten Virgins, which sets out deliberately to emulate and rival Plato’s Symposium. Not only is the elaborate chain of sources for the relation of these carefully arranged speeches preserved, but so is the theme of transcendent love, the use of the female voice for

43 Further on Lapiiths, above, note 35.
44 G. Matino, “Strutture Retoriche e Colloquiali nelle ‘Quaestiones Conviviales’,” in G. D’Ippolito and I. Gallo (edd.), Strutture Formali dei “Moralia” di Plutarco (Naples 1991) 295–313, points out that while there is no obvious scheme of composition in the Table Talk (to the exception of Book 9, which is limited to a single symposium) the rhetorical tension between Attic and koine speech throughout the work indicates a unity of intent, and that the discussions are not just an aggregation of random observations (esp. 296).
instruction on the nature of love and the appetite for the good, and the impending martyrdom of the main speaker, Thecla, which leads us to look beyond the speeches for ultimate wisdom. Many other things conspire toward this: The symposium’s setting is a walled garden beneath a chaste-tree; the symposiarch of this sober discourse, Arete, hopes to lead the guests on to the milleniarist’s fields of immortality; a concluding dialogue between the teller of the tale and his auditor underlines the point that those who listen must do more than listen to achieve their salvation. The pagan counterpoint to this is Macrobius’ *Saturnalia*, a stately presentation of Vergilian wisdom expounded over three days in three different houses, in response to the blasphemous objections of Evangelus to Vergil’s literary authority. One wishes that the various lacunae hide some passages in which Macrobius would have asserted the value of these bookish pursuits relative to the larger world, but this is probably a vain hope; it is a book that seeks to exalt another book, not to denigrate its own efforts in doing so. It is important that the introduction speaks of the following work as a digest of learning for his son.\(^5\) It is a return to Platonic homophony and a rejection of the reinterpretations to which the Platonic model had been subjected; it is also possible that Roman rituals of dining influenced this literary decision. Macrobius is at any rate little interested in that satura which is a heady mixture of all the possibilities of the dinner table, or in humor at the expense of those who know.

We have not yet made room for Julian in this scheme, nor for the *Cena Cypriani*. To do so, we need to point out a crucial aspect of the history of the symposium genre, and this is the extent to which it intersects the history of Menippean satire. Northrop Frye takes Athenaeus and Macrobius as authors of Menippean satires, for he makes much of the encyclopedic hunger of the Menippean genre, and its desire to contain the world within a book.\(^6\) But I think that it is easy to keep these in the fold of the symposium: There is no fantasy, no narrator on a fantastic quest, little sense of the narrator’s self-parody. Menippean satire has the fantastic device of the journey to the other world in search of absolute truth, the mordant theme that truth is not to be found at the ends of the earth, and the self-parodic laugh at the authors and narrators who attempted the impossible only to come up with their hands empty. As I argue in *Ancient Menippean Satire*, its inspiration is Plato’s Myth of Er; in the hands of Varro and Petronius it becomes a parody of verse satire and its preachers. The symposium is not


\(^{46}\) Frye (above, note 34) 310–11, where the writings of Macrobius and Athenaeus are said to be “a species, or rather sub-species, of the [Menippean] form.”
in essence fantastic and does not laugh at its narrator; it speaks of the value of knowledge in the real world and not beyond it; but, like Menippean satire, it does make fun of philosophers and all who affect a specialist’s knowledge of everyday phenomena.

Because of the sympotic reality of problemata, there is a tradition of recording, without the sympotic setting, the opinions of the wise on various problems ("What is wisest, most just, most useful?"). Plutarch shows how sets of questions and answers attributed to the Seven Wise Men could be given a symposium treatment, and how these views could be denigrated in comparison to a higher truth; in his Table Talk he also shows how problems can be stripped of their setting. It is the question of how the setting affects the learning that is at issue. A work like the Placita Philosophorum can be read as if it were excerpts from a banquet of the learned; a hagiographic work like Secundus the Silent Philosopher shows such digested learning fully endorsed. The sympotic setting implies that all opinions are equally valid, but the sympionic tradition asserts that some one person has a superior truth. In Plato, this person is Socrates, and the price exacted for superior wisdom is very loudly hinted at. In other words, there may be many opinions, in the name of poikilia; but there is also one opinion, and sympionic literature finds itself much exercised about who gets to hold it, because there is little literary interest in having many opinions endorsed as equally valid, but quite a bit of interest in having all opinions (or all but one) overthrown. Consequently, both symposium and Menippean satire enjoy the use of frames that question the validity of the learning contained within them.

To make his thematic overlap between Menippean satire and symposium all the more confusing, Menippean satire, out of its general desire to parody other forms of literature, may include a symposium within itself without actually becoming a symposium. This is obviously the case with the Cena Trimalchionis; this Menippean satire contains within itself a parodied symposium; the narrator and main characters of the whole are largely quiet here, observing and then passing on. Varro is a complex case. His 150 Menippean Satires are not compelled by the overarching title to be generically identical, but there are certainly many parodied symposia contained within them. Unfortunately, we cannot tell if their point is to parody the Platonic form (as in Petronius or Lucian) or whether the symposium is itself emblematic of a place in which the seeker of truth will not find it, which is the habit later in the history of the Menippean genre. The Nescis quid uesper serus uenat, which contains a series of polite sympotic rules certainly dramatically violated as the title implies, may have worked to parody the sympsiarch/author/narrator who pronounced them and so be Menippean;\(^47\) but Lucian’s Lapiths shows that the symposium can just be parodied without any further generic complications. When we read

\(^{47}\) See above, note 12.
Martianus Capella, we see that the fantastic journey of Books 1 and 2 takes Philology to a wedding feast, the setting for the last seven books; this is a symposium contained within a Menippean satire, and the discourses of the Liberal Arts are presented as sympotic exercises that do not possess the Truth discovered earlier in the text, when Philology glimpsed the Unknown Father. This delays the marriage, and participates in the usual symposiac fun at the expense of intellectuals. Julian is the unusual case: His Menippean satire, his journey to heaven, is almost coterminous with the symposium contained within it, in which the equality of the emperors who vie for divine honors is shown to be largely an equality of error. In other words, in adapting Seneca’s *Apocolocyntosis* Julian had to find a way to have many aspirants to Olympus present themselves at once and be found wanting: The symposium is used for this reason, and because a symposium levels its guests. Julian stands outside, and it is his own impending death that gives added meaning to the distance that he keeps from his comic predecessors.

To this extent, we can assign Julian to the second phase of the history of the symposium genre. The *Cena Cypriani*, on the other hand, is of the final phase, for it attempts to relate a banquet almost entirely through the medium of riddles; specifically, cryptically expressed Biblical trivia. Isaac brings firewood and the reader must remember why it is appropriate for him to do so. This *Cena* has no conversations, and lasts for two days; but the discovery of the theft of one of the host’s cups ultimately results in the death of one of the guests, both reminding us of Lucian’s *Lapiths* and violently asserting the significance of death to the constitution of the genre and justifying its insertion here. Rather like the late *Aenigmata Symp[h]osii*, the *Cena* takes one aspect of the symposium and expands on it alone; it does this with gusto, and with a nod toward other generic requirements, but once the genre loses its ability to synthesize its constituent elements it is effectively dead.

A New View of the Late Symposia

Much of what informed the previous discussion was distilled from our reading of later texts: our understanding of their conventions and themes, our view of their interrelations and history. What we do here is present profitable ways to read these texts, to draw them into the ambit of Plato and show how they can illumine each other. We do not desire to be exhaustive, but to point a direction.

*Cena Trimalchionis*

Petronius is read as a document of first-century social history, whose literary affiliations are almost entirely to the Roman satiric tradition. For the *Cena*, the pertinent satiric theme is of course the dinners of the
nouveaux riches; Horace’s *Cena Nasidieni* (Sat. 2. 8) is the obvious parallel. But Petronius is clearly more than tastelessness, debacle and escape; Trimalchio strains the satiric straitjacket by being ultimately a likable character, at least more likable than the hypocrites who eat his food and laugh behind his back. I have discussed elsewhere the *Satyricon* as a whole as an example of Menippean satire; but this literary setting has particular pertinence for the understanding of the *Cena*. Our narrators are wandering scholars, full of book opinions and uncomprehending of what they see; in the *Cena* they walk into another book, a parody of Plato’s *Symposium*. The death of the hero could not be more clearly anticipated, from the painting of his apotheosis seen by the guests as they enter to the mock funeral which terminates the evening’s festivities. As a fictional character, Trimalchio has no life to the reader outside of the text; we do not know how his life will continue after the dinner, as we do know in the case of Socrates, and so we have to be told. Trimalchio’s inability to serve food without a lecture directly anticipates the *Deipnosophists*; the emergence of the superiority of our gauche hero from the cacophony of undirected voices is in the tradition of Xenophon.

What is most fascinating is that Trimalchio is not just a nouveau riche but another Socrates. The grotesque physical appearance is one connection; the inappropriate dancing for which Fortunata taxes him (*Sat. 52. 9–53. i*) reminds us of the laughter aroused by Xenophon’s Socrates, who claims that he wants to learn how to dance, perhaps to improve his figure (*Symp. 2. 16–20*). Just as Alcibiades tells us of the inner and the outer Socrates, so do we hear (endlessly) of the old and the new Trimalchio, and how he tries to hide his servile nature behind a show of wealth and mock-senatorial trappings. But he is paradoxically wise, in contrast to the narrator, who will go on to other adventures; Trimalchio is toying with these people. A large part of this game-playing consists of his appallingly enigmatic choice of foods, a clear anticipation of the gustatory/philological humor of Athenaeus, and an extension of the general sympotic love of riddles. The *Cena* must not be separated from the history of Plato’s *Symposium*.

**Table Talk**

Plutarch’s project here is ostensibly to relate verbatim actual conversations to his friend Sossius Senecio but, with nine books and a total of ninety-five disputations, many having been put on paper after an interval of several

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48 Xen. *Symp*. 2. 17–19; see too the contortions of Philip the jester at 2. 22. Consider also the buffoon Satyrion in Lucian (*Symp. 18*) who also resembles Socrates; he is ugly and bald, and dances in a contorted fashion.

49 C. P. Jones, “Dinner Theater,” in W. J. Slater (ed.), *Dining in a Classical Context* (Ann Arbor 1991) 185–98, discusses dinner theater and its transformation into theater-dinner, as he calls it, in terms of the Roman patron’s obligations of providing for his guests; this social explanation does not eliminate its literary resonances, particularly its relation to Athenaeus.
years (if they ever actually took place), and almost all of them filled with erudition of the most impressive sort, we are obviously dealing with a highly literary undertaking, rather like an edited collection of letters. The list of alleged exemplars which Plutarch gives in his introduction is headed by Plato; he is followed by Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epicurus and several more of the "greatest philosophers" who wrote symposia.\textsuperscript{50} The \textit{Table Talks} are particularly valuable because of their self-referential nature; what we have is a series of talks which are themselves mini-symposia, some of which are about what should happen at symposia. Plutarch blurs the line between artificially constructed symposia and actual drinking parties not only by referring to the symposia of Xenophon and Plato as if they actually happened, but by literally rendering actual entertainments.

This anticipates the elaborate construction of the \textit{Deipnosophists}, being more ethical and concerned with rules than philological and concerned with courses. But it also gives us the opportunity to check Plutarch’s view of the nature of Plato’s \textit{Symposium}. We have already seen his partial attempt to distance himself from Plato’s practice while keeping to the theme of the wise man’s impending death. It becomes clear that each discussion is so arranged that the last speech has a place of honor and commands assent; we can tell what the rules are supposed to be, and these symposia are homophonic according to the practice of Plato, and do not indulge in the dialogic complications of ambiguity. We can deduce that Plato’s \textit{Symposium} follows sympotic rules for seating according to friendliness rather than honor (1. 2); it is exempted from the rule that there ought to be music and flute-girls (7. 6) because of the extraordinary nature of the guests; it generates the rule that people may come if invited by other guests and not the host (7. 6). But the symposiarch must not be drunk (1. 4); and Plutarch is hard put to explain Alcibiades’ behavior in what must still be the model symposion/symposium. Plutarch tries sleight-of-hand: We learn that insults must be designed to increase friendship (2. 1); Alcibiades and Aristophanes are equated as good-natured, comic speakers who liven things up a bit (7. 7). In every reference to rules, where we see Alcibiades as a disruptive sympotic element, Plutarch would only see good-natured banter, inspired by his rivalry with Agathon for Socrates’ love.

Yet Plutarch, regardless of his idealization of Alcibiades, fundamentally understood what was happening in the \textit{Symposium}.\textsuperscript{51} Consider the following (1. 1 in Goodwin’s translation):

\textsuperscript{50} S.-T. Teodorsson, \textit{A Commentary on Plutarch’s Table Talks}, vols. I and II (Göteborg 1989) on this passage states that “Plut. adduces the large number of famous authors of convivial works in his first prooemium in order to warrant his project.” It is more likely that the list is intended, not to justify, but to locate Plutarch’s ambitions within the tradition.

\textsuperscript{51} I think this is borne out nicely in the \textit{Banquet}, where Thales is perfectly correct in his appraisal of seating arrangements and Alexidemus’ rudeness, but still appears a pompous fool while doing so. Cf. esp. 149f, where Thales says in a voice “louder than usual”: “Where is the place at table to which the man objected?”
You see that even Plato in his *Symposium*, where he disputes of the chief end, the chief good, and is altogether on subjects theological, doth not lay down strong and close demonstrations; he doth not prepare himself for the contest (as he is wont) like a wrestler, that he may take the faster hold of his adversary and be sure of giving him the trip; but he draws men on by more soft and pliable attacks, by pleasant fictions and pat examples.

Instead of forcing a single opinion on the reader, Plato employs several “soft and pliable attacks,” the most important of which is Alcibiades. Alcibiades undercuts Socrates and the *Symposium* as a whole. He does so, not because Plato wants the reader to think that Socrates is wrong or that the *Symposium* is trash-literature but, paradoxically, to increase Socrates’ authority without appearing to do so, by singling him out as the object of this intrusion. Plato’s *Symposium* is not an ideal symposion, despite Plutarch’s special pleading; yet Plutarch seems to be aware of the mechanics by which Plato tries to impress Socrates on his readers.

**The Deipnosophists**

Athenaeus is at some distance from his material, and this preserves the narrative frame’s illusion of sympotic objectivity. But here the symposium is seen in a different way, not as one person’s reported narrative or even a firsthand account. Athenaeus’ narrator exerts an enormous amount of control over the organization of his work. Unlike most sympotic works (Plutarch’s *Table Talk* seems to be an exception), his is not recounted in chronological sequence. Its narrative frame, the situation which sets up the narrative, seems to be—because of the lamentable state of the first two and a half books—a conversation at a dinner between Athenaeus and his young friend Timocrates, who asks to know all about the dinners held at the house of a wealthy Roman, Larensis (which is a situation comparable to that in the narrative frame of Lucian’s *Lapih*). What Athenaeus has done in order to tell his friend about these banquets is to take the conversations the 23 wise guests had at these banquets (whenever they were held), edit them, and reshape them so that the subject matter of the discussions of the wise men corresponds to the courses of a banquet—from hors d’oeuvres to sympotic wreaths and hard drinking. Practically everything they eat is discussed. Sympotic literature itself becomes a topic, as do the characters of various philosophers, prostitutes and other historical figures (not to mention sympotic activities: music, singing, riddles and the like). This creates an odd and often ridiculous aping effect: A character talks about citron, in literature or history, and the characters eat citron as if they have never tasted it before (85c); they wash their hands, and discuss washing hands (408b).

52 For example, it is mentioned at 361e that it is the Parilia (April 21st), but later on (372d–e) the banqueters think they are eating cucumbers in January.
The equation of food and learning, which aligns the later symposium genre with Menippean satire, here reaches fantastic heights as the narrator himself becomes a cook, preparing, ordering and serving various ingredients. This parallel becomes clear when the actual cook from the banquets appears in the text. On each of three separate occasions, the cook presents an inventive dish which has transformed the natural and casual into the artificial and structured: a pig roasted on one side and steamed on the other (375d ff.), the dish made of roses (403d ff.) and the myma, a dish of mashed up ingredients (685e ff.). On each occasion, the cook must enlighten the puzzled diners, who are ravenous for information. The similarity between the skills of narrator and cook can also be observed when the cook first appears with the amazing shat and his sophia (376c) as well as his techne (381f) is admired. Moreover, the cook, like the narrator, seems to have much control over the guests. Like the narrator, he is allowed to joke with them and mock them gently. He knows the riddle of the dishes he has invented; he alone knows how they were created, and only he can provide the answers. Athenaeus' narrator has been cast in the role of the chef of his work, since he has taken bits of Greek literary art, symphonic conversation and repartee and transformed them into one banquet. This is quite a departure from the narrative technique of other symposia.

*The Banquet of the Ten Virgins*

Methodius writes in the last half of the third century. We have already assigned him to the third phase of the genre's history; the later Julian seems more comfortable in the second; we give the authors chronologically here, but it is important to see just how much in flux the genre is in late antiquity. There is no ordered march toward its demise. Methodius is the only Christian author to attempt a symposium along classical lines; we shall return in the conclusion to why this is so. But what is most remarkable is how thoroughly the job of emulation of Plato has been accomplished. Not only are the distancing effects of the narrative frame expressly modeled on the *Symposium*, but so are its themes of spiritual love and transcendence. Thecla's virginity, like Socrates' homosexuality, is a means of access to the realms of higher truth; but unlike Plato, who uses Alcibiades' entrance to force a re-evaluation of the wisdom of Socrates and so draw him down to earth, Methodius concludes with a brief Platonic dialogue between the narrator of the work and his/her audience (we must be uncertain, because

53 At 6. 222a and 223d–e Athenaeus compares himself in terms of his invention (the *Banquet*) with comic poets, while the cook (or cooks), when they appear, bring as their *symbolai* the quotes from comic poets dealing with cooks. The cook also prides himself on the novelty of his work, quoting *Nubes* 961. So, too, when at the end of a book (10. 459b–c) Athenaeus makes a transition to the topic of drinking-cups, which will be the subject of Pausanias' discourse on the following morning, he justifies this transition on the basis of "novelty," by quoting Metagenes' comedy *Philotheus*. 
Eubulion, the listener, is supposed to be a woman, but the occasional masculine adjective forces us to see her as Methodius’ own voice) which forces the narrator of the symposium to admit that we who listen cannot hope to achieve transcendence by speech and by ear, but by hard work and struggle, the spiritual agon.

Methodius is not as homophonic as he seems. The Banquet accommodates exercises in many genres: sermons, exegesis, a Socratic dialogue, a hymn. The symposium setting allows ten speakers to espouse ten good opinions: Even Theophila’s Praise of Marriage (the second speech) can be incorporated into a system in which virginity is the supreme good. Yet there is an agon: What was depicted as a contest among speakers in Plato for the most fitting praise of love has been here transferred to the agon of spiritual perfection; the language of the theater has been completely replaced by Pauline language of struggle and race and contest, victory and crown. As the rich meal concludes at the end of the prelude, the hostess Arete proposes a contest of speeches in praise of virginity and promises a crown of wisdom to the winner. At the end it is Arete who crowns all the contestants, but gives a larger crown to the maryr-to-be Thecla, the Socrates-figure who outshone all the rest.

Methodius proceeds largely by inverting Plato point by point. It is a banquet of women; it holds female virginity as a universal model; its author, the auditor of the dialogue, presents himself as a woman, and takes the gender of Plato’s Diotima seriously. Socrates’ mediating Eros is here replaced by a mediating Christ. Man is halfway between mortality and

54 In her exegesis (8. 12) of the passage in the Apocalypse in which the woman clothed with the sun fights the dragon, she uses and extends Pauline battle language in encouraging her virgins:

Do not then lose heart at the deceits and the slanders of the Beast, but equip yourselves sturdily for battle, arming yourselves with the helmet of salvation, your breastplate and your greaves. For if you attack with great advantage and with stout heart you will cause him untold consternation; and when he sees you arrayed in battle against him by Him who is his superior, he will certainly not stand his ground. Straightway will the hydra-headed, many-faced Beast retreat and let you carry off the prize for the seven contests. (Musurillo’s translation, ACW 27, p. 130)

In the interlude at the end of Thecla’s speech, Eubulion characterizes her thus: “And so outstanding did she frequently show herself as she engaged in those first great contests [ενδραικε] of the martyrs, possessing a zeal equal to her generosity, and a physical strength equal to the maturity of her counsels.” We are here at a great remove from the agon in solving riddles in Plutarch’s Banquet or the beauty contest in Xenophon (Symp. 5. 7).

55 Julian has equal crowns awarded to all contestants, even though Marcus is better than all the rest, and Constantine much worse.

56 D. M. Halperin, “Why is Diotima a Woman? Platonic Eros and the Figuration of Gender,” in D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (edd.), Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World (Princeton 1990) 257–308, argues that Diotima’s teaching is a male construct of what the feminine should be; Methodius (through the female voice of Eubulion) presents a male view of what female virginity should be, but claims it as universal.
immortality; Christ is Adam’s clay recast and Christ/Adam participates in
death and resurrection. The theanthropic Christ, by his two-fold nature in
one Person, leads all from earth to heaven. As Arch virgin he leads the choir
of virgins. In the mediating time of the Millennium, of which this banquet
is a foretaste, virginity will be the only natural state. The reality of the
world to which we may aspire and which we may actually reach excels the
world described by Diotima to Socrates. What is well ordered in Methodius
is not merely a sign of dull dislike of disorder but part of a conscious
attempt to out-Plato Plato and present a superior world-view; there is no
latecomer, uninvited guest, change of plan, or interruption. But we note the
nearness of the work to allegory and fantasy; the walled garden, the chastetree, the fields of the millennium. We may deplore a lack of social reality in
a genre so intimately tied to social reality, but it is emphatic in trying to
describe an unearthly world beyond, much as Socrates labors to do.

The Caesars

The problem of generic definition of this work has already been raised. I
have discussed it elsewhere as a Menippean satire; yet symposium may still
be the better envelope for it. It may be claimed that Xenophon and Plato
use Socrates’ unusual behavior at a symposium, and the consequences of
that behavior, as a metaphor for the way he was perceived and treated by
society at large: His inner beauty was misunderstood or ignored, and his
superficial eccentricity and apparent arrogance were ridiculed and
condemned. The point to make here is that the philhellenic philosopher and
emperor Julian could not help but see himself in this Socrates, for he too
was mocked for his manner and appearance (he indulges in a bit of self-
parody on this score in the Misopogon), while his efforts to promote his
Neoplatonist philosophy met with little success: “Without luck and
unblessed he struggled against the current for a lost cause, a cause which he
himself could not avoid recognizing as lost.” Moreover, Julian was
probably writing his Symposium in December of 362, when his ill-fated
Persian expedition was only a few months away; thoughts of possible
martyrdom to the cause for which he was fighting could not have been far
from his mind, and they undoubtedly influenced what he wrote. Indeed,
Julian could hardly have written a symposium without considering the
meaning that this circumstance would give to his choice of genre.

To some extent, then, Julian’s own character can be considered the
opic of his Caesars, just as Socrates’ can be considered the topic of Plato’s
Symposium. Socrates provides one view of his habits and character in his

57 See Thalia’s speech (3. 1–8).
58 T. Mommsen, Römische Kaisergeschichte, as quoted by W. M. Calder III in
59 According to G. W. Bowersock, Julian the Apostate (Cambridge, MA 1978) 101.
of his own speech, but a rather different impression is given in the speech of Alcibiades; the penultimate speaker among the competitors in Julian’s \textit{Caesars}, Marcus Aurelius, is similarly embarrassed by Constantine, who refutes the merit of Marcus’ virtuous lifestyle by winning the same reward in spite of his own wicked ways. Now if Marcus occupies the same position in Julian’s \textit{Caesars} as Socrates does in Plato’s \textit{Symposium}, then one might assume that Marcus and his philosophy of life are its true topic. But as Marcus’ philosophy of life is presented essentially as being the same as that which was publicly professed by Julian, it can be argued that the true topic is Julian himself. A final point to consider is that Julian stands outside this heavenly symposium and watches but does not enter: In this he is not like a guest/narrator who eats but does not speak; rather, he is like the Socrates who, in Plato’s \textit{Symposium}, stands outside Agathon’s door and does not come in.

But the identification of Julian, through Marcus, with Socrates, and of Constantine’s function with that of Alcibiades, is complicated by the fact that the divine equivalents of Socrates and Alcibiades, namely Silenus and Dionysus, also play prominent roles in the \textit{Caesars}.\footnote{For Alcibiades as Dionysus, cf. the description of him as \textgamma
desφανωμένον . . . κεττοῦ τέ τινι στεφάνῳ δασεί καὶ ίων, καὶ ταυτίας έχοντα επί τῆς κεφαλῆς πάνι πολλάς (Pl. \textit{Symv}. 212d–e).} Dionysus and Constantine are clearly divine and mortal sides of the same coin, for it is Dionysus who requests that Constantine be allowed to participate in the competition as a representative of all pleasure-seekers (317d), the god himself presumably included. Silenus, moreover, merely echoes the outer Socrates, through his appearance, his flirtatiousness with Alcibiades/Dionysus, and his tendency to be a gadfly, while the inner Socrates, Socrates the philosopher, is represented by Marcus Aurelius. Marcus’ own external characteristics, such as the abstemiousness that Silenus mocks (333c–d), are reminiscent not so much of Socrates\footnote{Cf. Xen. \textit{Symv}. 2. 19: ἕ τόδε γελάτε, εἰ μείζω τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν γαστέρα ἔχων μεταφέραν βούλομαι ποιήσαι αὐτήν;} as of the emaciated Julian, and in a sense it is Julian himself who is being mocked.\footnote{The Platonic Socrates is often fragmented in later symposia—in Lucian’s \textit{Lapiths}, for example, the jester resembles the outer Socrates/Silenus in both appearance (18) and name (19); the closest thing in Lucian to the inner Socrates is probably the Platonic philosopher Ion.}
serious in tone (Οὗτος μὲν δὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως ἐσπονδαλογήθη), and to preserve the balance of the serious and the comical that is so important in symposia it is followed by the speech of the jester Philip; this too is echoed in Julian’s Caesars, where the serious speech of the ascetic Marcus is followed by the laughable effort of the sybarite Constantine.

Julian’s Caesars displays a remarkable acquaintance with the earlier Greek works, and his encyclopedic catalogue of dead emperors in divine assembly participates in the sort of energy that Athenaeus and Macrobius have. I have argued for his close acquaintance with Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis in Ancient Menippean Satire; it should be added that Julian knows the symposiac traditions as well as the Menippean ones, and is at home in the late classical traditions that use old genres as fantastic containers for ever greater amounts of learning. But his is a creative use, respecting those traditions that rejoice in cacophony and do not expect philosophy to escape unscathed from the banquet, and his symposium, like that of Methodius, deserves to be much better known.

The Saturnalia

This title Macrobius shares with Julian’s subtitle; the Saturnalia are a feast of social inversion, in which the lowly are exalted, just as Julian’s mortal emperors get to be gods for a day. Even Methodius sees that a symposium is an appropriate setting for celebrating inversion; but the same cannot be said for Macrobius. His characters are more like students home for vacation; there is nothing subversive going on; all is politeness and order; the goal is the writing of an educational work, from father to son. It is a homophonic, nostalgic return to Plato by a Platonist who does not see the irony of Plato; the frame has little to do to modify the learning contained within it. We are far from the world of Plutarch’s Banquet, or Athenaeus’, for that matter. But there is one incongruous element in all of this, and all that the symposium genre offers by way of disorder, multiplicity and impropriety is wrapped up in it: the person of Evangelus.

Evangelus, who dares to ask, “Which came first, the chicken or the egg?” to a group of philologues (Sat. 7. 16. 1), is really one of the most intriguing rogues in classical literature. He is not just a character who needs to be educated about the glories of Vergil, as the author’s son is; and he is more than the braggart scholar who haunts the pages of Aulus Gellius, from whom Macrobius gets much of his material. Braggarts let Gellius and his scholastic clan reveal the depths of their knowledge, but Gellius rebukes his braggarts in the same way that Evangelus rebukes Praetextatus and his friends.63 Praetextatus, the one who, in the main, must put down these

63 For Gellius’ braggarts and Evangelus, see T. R. Glover, Life and Letters in the Fourth Century (Cambridge 1901) 175. This sort of anonymous character serves as a foil to be put down by the likes of Fronto and Favorinus, to avoid their facing off against one another.
remains, is always the very picture of gentility and modesty (as is, say, Apollinaris in Gellius 13. 20. 3). Evangelus is never forced to say "uncle," nor does he ever leave in a huff. Obviously, this symposium needs him.

Evangelus is in fact three different characters rolled into one: As the uninvited guest, he represents the unpredictable element, the element of surprise; this follows in the footsteps of Aristodemus and Alcibiades in Plato, of Philip in Xenophon, of Gorgus in Plutarch, of Alcidamas and the letter of Hetoimocles in Lucian. But he is also a buffoon, the one who raises a laugh, or at least laughs at what goes on. In Book 2, the guests agree to tell the jests of the great men of old; Evangelus is needed to goad the reserved Servius and Disarius on to speak (2. 2. 12–14). While not a comic on the order of Plato's Aristophanes, or even Xenophon's troubled humorist Philip, Evangelus is close to Lucian's Satyrion, or Julian's Silenus, who can mock all in turn without rousing too much ill will. A third function is that of the contentious Cynic. Consider Xenophon's Antisthenes, who asks Socrates about his unmanageable wife (Symp. 2. 10). Impoliteness does not necessarily generate friction; characters often rise above the insults directed at them. Unpredictability, humor and strife are all to be seen as ineradicable elements of the literary symposium. Evangelus is in fact doing what should be done at a symposion. After all, Plutarch says that asking whether the chicken or the egg came first is a perfectly good symptic poser (Table Talk 635d), and Evangelus is satisfied with the answer he gets; what is remarkable is that our respondent, the doctor Disarius, is so caught up in his own erudition that he gives answers on both sides of the question (7. 16. 2–14).

Evangelus is Macrobius' spirit of symposium. His objections motivate the Vergilian discussion, but it is clear that the guests could talk even without his prompting. He is rude, but does not seem to suffer for it; he makes his characters think. The suspicion here is that in Evangelus we have reunited some of the various aspects of Socrates which were fragmented in Plato's Symposium, and variously reflected after it.

**Christian Symposia and the End of the Classical Genre**

Many of the forms of late classical prose literature are Platonic: Lucian's dialogues are obvious as comic developments of the master's special genre, but there are other, less obvious, reflections of Platonic practice as well. Menippean satire is inspired by Platonic myth-making, particularly the myth

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64 Aulus Gellius 6. 1.
65 Aulus Gellius 6. 17.
66 However, when Satyrion reaches Alcidamas the Cynic, the latter becomes very angry and challenges him to a fight (Luc. Symp. 18–19). The blushing reaction of Alexander and Constantine to Silenus' criticisms in Julian (328c–31b) is closer to the reactions that Satyrion generates.
of Er. Not only is the device of the fantastic story important; the Platonic insistence that words cannot convey ultimate reality is very close to the heart of this subversive genre. Utopian literature has its origins in the Timaeus, where too we find that not everyone believes that such stories can reveal the truth. Prose fiction and romance can be said to draw inspiration from Plato's deliberate fictions and then to reject Plato's cautious desire to gain the reader's conscious acceptance of fictional devices and the reader's willed complicity in the fabulous. The romance lulls the reader into taking the false as true, but we may suspect that there is enough Second Sophistic humor in the romance that we are to laugh at the incongruity of the lovers' adventures and the language which they use and which encloses them.

What becomes clear is that Plato bequeaths to literature not only a number of forms and genres but also a certain intellectual attitude concerning the function of literature. It is at an ironic distance from what is real; it is playful; it begs the question of whether fiction is true. To say this is not merely to assert the modern critical viewpoint that the meaning of literature lies in its inability to mean anything; rather, it is the acknowledgment of a Platonic point of view that transcendent reality is only approximated by words and stories, and that wise readers must appreciate the gulf between stories and the truth. Plato stands at the head of a number of traditions, all of which assert that wisdom is found outside of the propositions of the wise.

And so we would understand the symposium. Throughout its history, the Platonic symposium is taken as a medium for depicting a social microcosm and a crucial anomalous element. In Plato, this is Socrates, the unsymptotic man, whose opinions, and whose chosen form for the expression of those opinions, set him apart from his fellows, and in fact mark him for death. The fate of the main speaker is more important than his opinions; the learning exposed to public view may be grand or contemptible, but it is the inability of those who have these opinions to make their points forcibly that is to the fore. We may have to allow that Macrobius is off to one side, unable as he is to make fun of Praetextatus' guests, even though he seems to allow Socrates to come to life to some extent in the rude Evangelus. The literary symposium implies a conflict, but the resolution typically lies outside the symposium which it describes.

If we want to describe the end of classical symposia, we face a couple of facts. There are no Byzantine symposia, and only the Cena Cypriani (in its first edition of 400 and the expanded rewriting of it around 800) stands between late antiquity and Dante's Convivio. The heavenly banquet allows no classical symposia, though we can imagine how the Crucifixion could

serve to frame a discussion of different views of the nature of history, God and salvation; dialogue exists, but there is little interest in writing a dialogue in such a form as to suggest that the differing points of view must be subjected to a higher principle of interpretation; in this light we must view the boldness of Methodius as a thing we should have liked to see more often in Christian texts.

It is worth asking why Christian symposia are so rare. Here we must look to the Gospel of John, whose importance in the history of the classical genre needs to be asserted. John's Gospel, unlike the synoptic gospels, has Jesus handed over for trial and execution on the Passover. Consequently, this Last Supper (Chapters 13–17) is not a Passover meal, and Jesus does not institute the Eucharist (though he does speak of the Bread of Life at 6. 26–59 in ways that remind us of the symposiac insistence that real food is not physical food but words; or, here, the Word). Related to these is the fact that John's Last Supper comes much closer to the form of a classical symposium than does any of the other, much shorter, Last Suppers. The beloved disciple reclines languorously close to Jesus; questions are asked that betray the ignorance of the speakers; and perhaps more clearly here than anywhere else the impending sacrificial death of the main speaker gives an edge to his discourse, for he continually speaks of things that his listeners do not understand. Note too that John never has Jesus foretelling his passion and death outside of the Last Supper, though he does foretell his betrayal. We think here of Socrates and Lycon in Xenophon.

We could say that John understands that the symposium has its place in religious discourse through the example of Job: Jastrow's old theory, that the form of Job is the classical symposium, is out of favor these days, though I think it more persuasive than the more popular view that the book is a five-act drama. 68 Note how the frame of the story of Job, which makes it quite clear that Job's sufferings are due exclusively to a wager made between God and Satan, makes all of the talk of sinfulness and justification irrelevant; there is a constant undercutting in Job, a constant presentation of the limitations of both conventional wisdom and conventional piety; and even God's epiphanal speech, which shuts off any further discussion, rather pointedly refuses to tell Job of the truth of things. There is no undercutting of Jesus in John, of course; but the wisdom of the speaker is over the heads of the listeners, and death and resurrection will give a meaning that speech cannot: These are all in the ballpark of the classical symposium. We are not terribly far removed from the world of the social microcosm, the

68 M. Jastrow, The Book of Job: Its Origin, Growth and Interpretation (Philadelphia 1920) 30–38. One could similarly point to the debate among the three courtiers in the intertestamental Esdras (3–4) on "What is strongest?" to demonstrate the vitality of elements of the classical symposium in Judaeo-Christian literature. Similarly, in the Letter to Aristeas 187–294, the 72 translators of the Septuagint are described as philosophers in the court of Ptolemy, each being asked a question at a banquet lasting seven days and each having his answer approved by the king (see Murray [above, note 9] 271).
enigmatic Socrates, the levelling riddle and the impending doom. It may be that the symposium does not flourish in Christian literature out of deference to this evangelical symposium; certainly Jesus’ "open commensuality" could have inspired the creation of gatherings of people from all walks of life whose equality before God and each other is stressed. Also missing are symposia set at the heavenly banquet, or parodies of symposia in the abundant literature of the visions of Hell. It is probably no accident that gnostic writings have no time for symposiac forms, stressing rather direct revelations of truth from master to student. At any rate, Methodius remains our lone example of a thoroughgoing Christian symposium.

The Cena Cypriani represents a sort of dead end in the history of the Christianized symposium.⁶⁹ It belongs to a jumble of late classical symposiac works, of which Vespa's Ludicum coci et pistoris and the Riddles of Symposius (or Symposium) are best known. It is a remarkable attempt at Biblical parody, a symposium told entirely through enigmatic Biblical references that have the status of riddles. King Iohel invites all the famous Biblical personalities to a wedding feast at Cana: The Christian reader thinks immediately of the miracle of the wine, but the reader steeped in the symposiac tradition will expect drinking and inappropriate behavior, and will not be disappointed. It is fantastic, as late symposia often are; because all these different personalities exist at the same time and in the same place, one could say that this is in effect a heavenly banquet; but it ends in death, and nearly conjures up more of the atmosphere of the Dialogues of the Dead.

We hear of symptotic practice, but usually in a fleeting reference. All bathe in the Jordan before seating; there are latecomers who must find their own seats (Job complains that he has to sit alone on a dung heap, 893); food is brought, but rather than sharing, each takes an appropriate food (Jonah takes gourds, 875); they put on festive clothing; drinking habits and drunkenness are described (887). At one point, all change clothes and play dress-up (Jesus as a teacher, Pharaoh as a persecutor, Nimrod as a hunter,

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⁶⁹ Text edited with an introduction by K. Strecker, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Poetarum Latinorum Medii Aevi IV.2–3 (Berlin 1923) 857–900. As the text is mostly verse with the occasional prose insert, the line numbering of the text is somewhat misleading and I cite by the page number of Strecker's edition. As each page consists mostly of apparatus, with small pieces of the two versions of the text printed above each other, the page number is sufficient. For discussion, see P. Lehmann, Die Parodie im Mittelalter (Munich 1922) 25–30; Jeanneret (above, note 5) 204–05.

The work is related to a work of Zeno of Verona (1. 24, post traditum baptism) in which those who have fasted and been baptized are invited to a heavenly, not an earthy banquet, for which the Father provides the bread and wine, Christ pours the oil, Isaac carries the firewood, John the Baptist brings locusts and honey, Peter provides the fish, and Noah (the arcaurus) provides from his store whatever any guest may feel the need of. I offer only about half of Zeno's examples. The Cena could be uncharitably thought of as this sort of playfulness carried to lunatic proportions; it seems to lie along the line that leads to the playful trivia questions of the Joca Monachorum.
889). They return a second day, bearing gifts, but at this point a theft of some cups is discovered (reminiscent of the theft by which Joseph playfully frames his younger brother Benjamin in Genesis) and various suspects are tortured in an attempt to find the criminal (Jesus is crucified at this point, 893), and we are in the world of the Lapiths, as all the guests suspect each other. The thief turns out to be Achan, son of Carmi, known from Joshua as the man who stole from Jericho after it had been destroyed and declared a holocaust. After his execution in Joshua (7. 16–26) the Lord's favor is restored; Iohel hands him over to the guests for execution in the Cena Cypriani to provide another happy ending. Judas and Jesus work side by side to kill him (896, though John the Deacon rewrites this part).70 They are all ordered to bury him, and the text ends with a laugh (897):

Vendidit agrum Emmor, emit Abraham, 
monumentum fecit Nachor et aedificauit Cain, 
aromata imposuit Martha, clusit Noe, 
superscripsit Pilatus, pretium accepit Iudas. 
Quo facto 
gaudens clamat Zacharias, confunditur Helisabeth, 
stupet Maria, ridebat de facto Sarra.

It is stunning that a death actually, instead of only potentially, terminates a symposium. This is a symposium which obeys no proprieties. Iohel, as rex mensae, commands certain things; each brings appropriate food; but there is no discussion, no topics, no undercutting; the symposium is itself a set of riddles, but the guests are not set to solve riddles; all are levelled by the accusation of Iohel, though not all are tortured; the guilty party is expelled from the group as the symposium becomes a sort of fantastic detective story. While the form shows the genre at its end, its themes are exactly those of its more polyphonic predecessors. There is no respect of persons, all are subjected to ridicule, and the one who does not belong must die.

It is regrettable that this did not inspire further symposia. We leap ahead to Dante, who is important to the later history of the genre in two ways. First, as the author of La Vita Nuova, he knows of Menippean satire in its ancient form. The love story with its dream vision and constant academic reference to the poetry of the author's youth is at some remove from the medieval Aucassin et Nicolette. Second, his Convivio also reflects more of the late classical fascination with the encyclopedic potential of the symposiac genre: It is a philosophical work designed as a series of discussions and explications of fourteen of the author's own canzoni. Dante knows well the academic functions of the varieties of late classical prose and prosimetrum; but for all this his works must be set apart from either

70 The original reads: ... lapide percussit Dauid, uirga Aaron / flagello Iesus, medium operuit Iudas ... John the Deacon, who also omits Sarah's final laugh, rewrites this last line as Iudas intima diffindens in ficos supposuit. So creeps propriety into an upside-down text.
Plato or Athenaeus. But one later medieval text seems to recall an earlier, more Socratic form of the symposium. In Piers Ploughman there is an inset symposium, Passus 13 in the B-text, Passus 15 in the C-text, in which the dreamer encourages the assembly to admit Patience, who stands outside and begs bread. This hermit becomes the presiding genius of the banquet; there is also a friar, who cannot digest satisfactorily the diet of the scriptures, and the dreamer will reject the book-learning and theology of this fat man for a more experiential approach to Faith and the Active Life. We could say that here too we see the halves of a divided Socrates, both the reluctant soothsayer and the buffoon. Langland seems to understand something of the nature of the classical symposium, and this is worth further study; his commentators do not seem to discuss by what medium he acquires it.\(^{71}\)

But the problem, it seems to us, is Macrobius. He has the homophonous guests of a Platonic symposium, but all at the standard of an absolute truth; the value of Vergil seems not to be countermanded by context; the later death of Praetextatus does not seem to affect the presentation of the learning; the character of Evangelus, though he can be seen profitably as the confluence of a number of symposiac conventions, shows how tolerant his host and the other guests are. When Plato's rhetoric of ambiguity and doubt are completely written out of the genre, we may have to admit that only the shell remains, and we no longer have the spirit which animated our genre. We do not say that Macrobius is simple-minded or unsophisticated, only that his symposium seems not to insist on the subordination of scholars' views to some higher reality. Or could the cult of the sun so lovingly expressed in the first book be like Plutarch's religious framework, and could Servian commentary still be the stuff of eggheads? Could Macrobius' son learn from the predigested learning here that there are religious truths and spiritual views that transcend the bookworm's truth? It is hard here to keep wishful thinking from filling Macrobius' lacunae.

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\(^{71}\) I owe this reference to Langland to my colleague Charles Wright.
Catullus 68A remains a volatile forum for critical discussion. Two rival camps of interpretation can currently be identified, the one centring its theories around a Mallius who is considered to be seriously distressed and emotionally committed; the other around a Mallius assumed to be playful and humorous. The work of scholars such as Woodman and Ferguson\(^1\) seems to have been moving us towards a "humorous" orthodoxy, but the most recent critical study of the poem\(^2\) has taken a stance that is unequivocally "serious." Naturally the conclusions of these rival groups have resulted in quite disparate interpretations of the poem. The aim of this paper is a re-examination of the evidence through a close reading of the poem and in particular through a re-assessment of the problematic lines 27–30. We must now turn to the poem's opening (1–10):

Quod mihi fortima casuque oppressus acerbo
conscriptum hoc lacrimis mittis epistolium
nausfragum ut eiectum spumantibus aequoris undis
sublevem et a mortis limine restituam,
quam neque sancta Venus molli requiescere somno
desertum in lecto caelibe perpetitur,
nec veterum dulci scriptorum carmine Musae
oblectant, cum mens anxia pervigilat:
id gratum est mihi, me quoniam tibi dicis amicum,
muneraque et Musarum hinc petis et Veneris. 5

10

Taken at face value the language naturally indicates a disaster of some magnitude: "fortuna casuque oppressus acerbo," "conscriptum hoc lacrimis mittis epistolium," "sublevem et a mortis limine restituam." But if Mallius is genuinely upset and there is a reference to some real loss, the reader is forced to pass a rather unfavourable judgement on the nature of Catullus' response. For, as we shall see, Catullus not only declines to provide the *munera* but also expresses his refusal by reapplying to himself

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the substance and imagery of Mallius’ complaints. In this way he seeks to demonstrate the more radical nature of his own suffering. It would be unforgivable to treat in this way a friend who had suffered a genuine loss. Even if we can modify our opinion by accepting Wiseman’s suggestion that Mallius was “not one of the poet’s intimate friends,” the effect is still one of egocentric and heartless brutality, a brutality in marked contrast to Catullus’ expression of grief at his brother’s death.

Given the improbability of this scenario, a closer reading of the opening lines is required. The lines are in fact carefully constructed to move the reader from a response of sympathy to one of humorous complicity. Lines 1–3 resound with an air of tragic melancholy. Within the terms of this portentous language (and consequent to the association of shipwreck with death), Catullus is requested to perform an appropriate act of compassion: “sublevem et a mortis limine restitua” (4). The specific nature of Mallius’ discomfort remains unstated, but the reader is clearly drawn into the anticipation of an explanation suited to the gravity of the language.

In lines 5–8 the reader is introduced to Mallius’ specific grievances. Although the register of language remains at a suitably lofty level (“sancta Venus,” “veterum dulci scriptorum carmine Musae”), nevertheless the reader senses some distance between the effect of these lines and lines 1–4. Finding no pleasure (“nec ... oblectant”) in the writings of the veteres scriptores seems to be out of step with a request to be rescued “a mortis limine” (4), and “fortuna casuque oppressus acerbo” (1) is a rather overstated way of describing the condition of “desertum in lecto caelibe” (6). Mallius is in fact presented as using the conventional and exaggerated imagery of the abandoned lover but in a frivolous rather than seriously intentioned manner.

3 T. P. Wiseman, Cinna the Poet (Leicester 1974) 102.
4 The imagery of shipwreck and death is frequently associated with the abandoned lover:

...? heu quotiens fidem
mutatosque deos flebit et aspera
nigris aequora ventis
emirabitur insolens,
qui nunc te fruietur credulus aurae,
qui semper vacuum, semper amabilem
sperat, nescius aurae
fallacis. miserique quibus
intemptata nites. me tabula sacer
votiva paries indicat uvida
suspendisse potenti
vestimena maris deo. (Horace, C. 1. 5. 5–16)

Propertius uses the imagery of death with typical obsessiveness:

sic igitur prima moriire aetate, Properti?
Again, if Mallius had faced a serious amatory setback (such as the death of his wife or the end of a longstanding relationship) his complaint of finding no pleasure in poetry appears a trifle frivolous. Though poetry is certainly possible as a form of consolation, it surely is inadequate for an event as grave as the death of one’s wife. Mallius’ very use of “oblecant” (“delight in”) clearly indicates that he foresees the munus Musarum as providing entertainment and not consolation. Similarly his request for a munus Veneris, in a context of serious misfortune, would appear to be somewhat disreputable.

The progression, then, from the intense and tragic imagery of the opening four lines to the more mundane nature of the complaints in lines 5–8 must indicate that the former are merely an exaggerated and humorous analogy of the latter. Such humour and exaggeration are surely indicated in the apparent simplicity of the remedy that Mallius requires, “muneraque et Musarum... et Veneris.”

The nature of the gifts themselves has caused endless argument. This problem cannot be sidestepped by appeal to the poem’s epistolary form. “After all, presumably Mallius’ request itself was clear enough and Catullus would not need to report it back to him.” For this misses the point that

sed morere; interitu gaudeat illa tuo! (2. 8. 17–18)

Death as a consequence of erotic desertion is also detailed in Eclogues 2 and 10:

O crudelis, Alexis, nihil mea carmina curas?
nil nostri miserere? morti me denique cogenes. (Ecl. 2. 6–7)

Quae nemora aut qui vos saltus habuere, puellae
Naides, indigno cum Gallus amore peribat? (Ecl. 10. 9–10).

5 Cf. R. Ellis, Commentary on Catullus (Oxford 1889) 404.

6 It may also be noted that Catullus’ initial response to Mallius, “id graium est mihi” (9), is hardly a tactful or appropriate remark to describe the receipt of a letter solely concerned with the exposition of tragic circumstance.

7 F. Cairns, Tibullus: A Hellenistic Poet at Rome (Cambridge 1979) 163, similarly interprets the effect of these lines: “If these lines [1 to 4] alone had survived and the question were asked what misfortune Catullus’ addressee had suffered, the unhesitating answer would be that he had lost a loved one through death. This is implied by fortuna and casuque...acerbo (1) and by a mortis limine (4). But the next few lines dispel this illusion. Allius is said to be kept awake in an empty bed by Venus (5 f.); he gains no satisfaction from old poetry (7 f.) and he asks Catullus for new love-poetry (10). Through this anticlimax the reader realises that Allius has not lost a beloved to death but has been abandoned by a living mistress.” We should perhaps feel a little reservation about Cairns’ “unhesitating,” for the imagery of death may simply be activated by the shipwreck metaphor of line 3. It will become clear that I cannot agree with Cairns on several other substantive points.

8 Powell (above, note 2) 206.
68A is both a letter and a poem. Its publication\(^9\) presupposes that it should be intelligible both to its general audience (the reading public) and to its specific audience (Mallius). This principle must be equally applicable to the nature of the munera, for they are an integral part of the poem/letter.

The correct identification of the munera has also been hindered by a continuing desire to read “muneraque et Musarum . . . et Veneris” as a hendiadys. Though the insuperable difficulties of this approach were pointed out long ago by Prescott,\(^10\) nevertheless the idea has not been finally buried. But the idea of hendiadys is simply untenable. It ignores the formal relationship between “neque . . . nec” (5–8) and the “et . . . et” of line 10; it plainly contradicts the “utriusque” of line 39 (which informs us quite specifically that Catullus, at least, believed he had been asked for two separate items\(^11\)) and obliterates the elaborate chiastic structure of the poem.\(^12\)

That scholars are reluctant to abandon the idea of hendiadys derives from a similar reluctance to accept the obvious meaning of the munus Veneris. It is consequently necessary to state quite unequivocally that the only possible meaning is an object of sexual gratification.\(^13\) It is irresponsible of the


\(^11\) Nisbet’s emendation (“Notes to the Text of Catullus,” PCPS 204 [1978] 105), quod tibi non hucusque petenti exempla paravi, can surely only be acceptable if the idea of hendiadys is unquestionably correct.

\(^12\) For more detailed analysis, cf. Prescott (above, note 10) 478–79.

\(^13\) A position accepted by Wiseman (above, note 3) 94 (“What Manlius wanted besides poetry . . . was a girl.”) and Woodman (above, note 1) 101. T. E. Kinsey, “Some Problems in Catullus 68,” Latomus 26 (1967) 35–53, at 41–42, introduces a variant to this position: “. . . it would seem that Manlius is trying to open, or perhaps reopen, a homosexual affair with Catullus.” This interpretation is also accepted by J. Ferguson (above, note 1) 226: “His friend is making two requests: one for a poem, the other for the renewal of a homosexual affair with Catullus: there is no other explanation of munera Veneris. There is a chiasmus—empty bed : old poets :: Catullus’s poetry : Catullus in the empty bed.”

A homosexual interpretation cannot be lightly dismissed. However, though reference to the munera Veneris need not exclude a homosexual context (cf. Sappho fr. 1 etc.), there is no clear indication either that the reader should be led in this direction. “Tempore quo primum vestis mihi traxisti pura est,/ iucundum cum aetas florida ver ageret./ multa satis luisi” (15–17) evidently refers to sexual activity in general; it need not exclude homosexual involvement, but it clearly does not stress it. Likewise Kinsey’s reference to “amicum” (9) and “hospitis” (12) to support this meaning is unconvincing. In “id gratum est mihi, me quoniam tibi dicis amicum” (9) what “gratum est mihi” is that Mallius is treating Catullus
critic to shy away from this meaning through personal aesthetic and moral criteria. The evidence of both Greek and Latin literature demands this meaning and has been widely quoted. The specific meaning of the *munus Veneris* is an integral part of the poem and cannot be left undefined. For it both explains the content of lines 15–26, with their air of sexual renunciation, and points to the likelihood of an erotic reference in the critical lines 27–30.

as an “amicum” by placing confidence in him. “Hospitii officium” is also unlikely to have “an obscene sense.” It is much more likely to be a response to Mallius’ use of the shipwreck metaphor, as noted by Woodman (above, note 1) 101–02. It is also noted by Woodman (104 n. 12) that a homosexual reference loses point if the reader does not believe that the reference to *munera Musarum* is a request for poems written by Catullus: “There is some attractiveness in this thesis [that Mallius had requested Catullus as a homosexual partner] if the *munera* are taken to mean Catullus’ own poetry, for then the poet would be asked to be personally responsible for both requests. But if the request is not for Catullus’ own poetry, as I believe, the theory of homosexuality becomes in my opinion less plausible.”

14 [Hesiod] *Aspis* 46–47:

παννύχιος δ’ ἄρ’ ἔλεκτο σὺν αἰδοὶ παρακοίτι
terpmenocos δῶροις πολύχρυσον Ἀρροδίτης.

[Homer] *Hymn. Cer.* 101–02:

γηὶ παλαιγενεὶ ἐναλίγκιος ἢ τε τόκοιο
eirgetai δῶρων τε φιλοστεφάνου Ἀρροδίτης.

Catullus 61. 224–28:

claudite ostia, virgines:
lusimus satis. at boni
coniuges, bene vivite et
munere assiduo valentem
exercete iuventam.

Catullus 68. 145: sed furtiva dedit mira munuscula nocte.

These references are quoted variously by Ellis (above, note 5) 404–05; Kroll, *Catull* (Berlin 1923) 221; Prescott (above, note 10) 499. A further passage referred to by both the proponents and opponents of hendiadys is Anacreon 96 D:

οὐ φιλέω δς κρητῆρι παρὰ πλέω οἰνοποτάζων
neiketo kai polémov dakhrovneita légei,
álλ’ ὅστις Μουσέων τε καὶ ἁγλαϊ δῶρ’ Ἀρροδίτης
smúmatos érastis mnísoketai évphrosúnēs.

C. J. Tuplin, “Catullus 68,” *CQ* 31 (1981) 113–39, cites this poem to support his point that line 10, in isolation, could plausibly mean, “you ask for gifts consisting in love poetry.” Kinsey (previous note) 41 n. 6 has, however, already dealt with this argument by rightly stressing *smúmatos*, which not only indicates that the two items are separate but is also itself representative of sexual activity.

12 “I assume that the *munera Musarum* meant poetry of some sort, and that the *munera Veneris* meant something different,” Powell (above, note 2) 205–06.
It should also be noted that the very nature of the *munus Veneris* must imply humour.\(^{16}\) At this point we might consider the possibility that "epistolium" (2) should have already alerted the reader to the introduction of such humour. The diminutive is frequently used in Catullus to suggest irony and a sense of mock-seriousness. This is certainly the case in Poems 3 and 50. In the third poem the forms "miselle," "ocelli" and "turgiduli" all occur in the last three lines (3. 16–18):

\[
o \text{factum male! o } \text{miselle passer!}
\]
\[
tua \text{ nunc opera } \text{meae puellae}
\]
\[
\text{flendo } \text{turgiduli rubent ocelli.}
\]

Here the diminutives serve both to emphasise the absurdity of Lesbia’s grief over such an issue and to put in perspective Catullus’ apparently “tragic” treatment of the incident. Similarly in Poem 50 the diminutive is used to emphasise the frivolity and humour behind the apparently serious façade: “nec somnus tegeret quiete *ocellos*” (10), “at defessa labore membra postquam / semimortua lectulo iacebant” (14–15), “oramus, cave despuas, *ocelle*” (19). The loss of literary activity and intellectual stimulus is jokingly referred to in terms of love-sickness.

The use of the diminutive should alert the reader to the potential for irony and humour in “epistolium.” Parallels can be provided for “epistolium” as a term designating frivolity: This is the case in Apuleius, *Apologia* 6: “Primo igitur legerunt e ludicris meis epistolium de dentifricio versibus scriptum.” Two related examples, which also emphasise the erotic associations of “epistolium,” are found in Plutarch:

\[
\text{τὸν δ’ ἀναγνόντα Σερβιλίας τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἐπιστόλιον ἀκόλαστον}
\]
\[
\text{πρὸς τὸν Καῖσαρα γεγραμένον, ἔρωσις καὶ διεφθαρμένης ὑπ’}
\]
\[
\text{αὐτοῦ. (Plut. Cato minor 24. 3)}
\]
\[
\text{καὶ τὸν Καῖσαρος τὸ δελτάριον, ὡς εἶχε, τῷ Κάτωνι}
\]
\[
\text{προσδόντος, ἀναγνόντα Σερβιλίας τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀκόλαστον}
\]
\[
\text{ἐπιστόλιον. (Plut. Brutus 5. 4)}
\]

That it is the diminutive form which suggests frivolity in these two passages is made clear from reference to the same ἐπιστόλιον as τὸ δελτάριον, γραμματιστὶν μικρὸν and τὶ μικρὸν. When the diminutive is

\(^{16}\) This point is the basis for Woodman’s (above, note 1) 101 perception of humour in the poem: “Manlius cannot have suffered a serious crisis if he expected that a new girl would immediately solve his problems; and asking a friend to send a girl from one area of Italy to another is in itself a humorous notion and presumably not to be taken seriously.”
combined, as in our poem, with a grandiose phrase, "conscriptum hoc lacrimis," it surely can only have a humorous effect.

With the humour and frivolity of Mallius' self-description and his request for a *munus Veneris* (a woman) established, it is time to consider the nature of Catullus' response in lines 15–26. These lines have two basic objectives: first to reveal to Mallius the precise nature of Catullus' "incommoda" (11) and second to demonstrate how Catullus' current position makes him unable to comply with a request for a *munus Veneris*.

Line 15 immediately places us in an erotic context, as the "vestis . . . pura" is defined by erotic rather than political meaning; the assumption of the *toga virilis* symbolically marking the inception of sexual interest. (Line 16, "iucundum cum aetas florida ver ageret," clearly indicates that this particular stage in Catullus' life is intended to show the beginning of pleasurable rather than "serious" pursuits.) This context already establishes the probability of "multa satis lusi" as a specific reference to "love-affairs," and this inference is further confirmed by the appearance of Venus in lines 17–18, "non est dea nescia nostri/ quae dulcem curis miscet amaritiem."

Though it is tempting to see a possible literary reference in "lusi," there are nevertheless good reasons for the exclusion of such a reference. An examination of the use of *ludere* in Catullus reveals that the only place where this verb implies poetic composition is in Poem 50. But, as we have already seen, this poem humorously equates literary and erotic experience. As Wiseman notes, "the imagery is deliberately erotic," and therefore the use of *ludere* in this poem cannot be cited as support for a general meaning of the verb, "to compose poetry." Even though it may be argued that "non est dea nescia nostri/ quae dulcem curis miscet amaritiem" (17–18) need not emphasise the lover at the expense of the poet, there is nevertheless a clinching argument in the careful structuring of lines 31–33:

ignoscis igitur si, quae mihi luctus ademit,
haec tibi non tribuo munera, cum nequeo.

nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me, . . .

17 A phrase which, as Ellis (above, note 5) 403 rightly stresses, means "not tear-stained but written in tears instead of ink."

18 Thus Powell's assertion (above, note 2) 204 that non-serious interpretations of Mallius' letter must be excluded as being "too frivolous" to be consistent with the tone of "conscriptum hoc lacrimis" is quite invalid.


20 Wiseman (above, note 3) 92 n. 27.

21 So Prescott (above, note 10) 480: "Even the immediately following allusion to the goddess of bitter-sweet love with whom Catullus is not unacquainted may seem to our opponents [supporters of hendiadys] ambiguous and applicable to a composer of love-poetry as easily as to a lover."
The effect of these lines is to polarise the content of lines 15–30 (27–30 being attached to 15–26 by the consequential force of "quare" in line 27) from that of 33–36. "Igitur" (31) looks backwards to the content of 15–26; line 32, "haec tibi non tribuo munera, cum nequeo," summarizes the total effect of the whole of 15–36; and "nam" (35) looks forward to the content of 33–35, Catullus' reason for refusing to provide the munus Musarum. The precision of this structure makes the idea of any literary reference in "lusi" misplaced.

Although Catullus' emphasis on the sexual aspect of his life may appear to be leading him towards compliance with Mallius' request, this impression is simultaneously countered by the poet's specific reference to past situations that are no longer applicable. Catullus certainly would have been the right person to approach in this matter, but he is no longer. The sense is clear and concisely expressed; so "tempore quo primum" (15) signifies the beginning of a past preoccupation, "satis lusi" (17) establishes that this past is finished with, and "sed" (19) points forward to a new reality. Catullus quickly introduces the reason for this new situation: "sed totum hoc studium luctu fratema mihi mors / abstulit" (19–20). The death of his brother has removed his capacity to enjoy relations with the opposite sex, "totum hoc studium" referring back to "tempore quo primum ... multa satis lusi" (15–17).

The introduction of "death" as the basis for Catullus' position is significant. For it is by the use of this imagery that he will demonstrate to Mallius the disparity of their respective situations.22 Mallius has expressed the nature of his own insignificant erotic desertion in the terms of death imagery (dependant on "naufragum" in line 3); hence his request to be rescued "a mortis limine" (4) and his enforced stay in a "lecto caelibe" (6, where "caelibe" is potentially not only "bachelor" but also "widowed"). For Catullus, however, the imagery of death is not a form of frivolous exaggeration but an expression of harsh reality. Restatement and intensification of this imagery would be ruinously inappropriate if Mallius' complaint had been seriously expressed. But, faced with a Mallius who communicates in this humorous and exaggerated manner, this same technique becomes a necessary and effective means of both explaining his own situation and pointing out the incongruity of Mallius' request.

22 Contra Tuplin (above, note 14) 115, who argues that, "The loss of the brother is thus deliberately made to seem of the same sort as the loss that Mallius has sustained," and, "In short, Catullus is showing Mallius that his own position was exactly like Mallius'—only very much worse." But this argument seems to be based on a striking contradiction, for Catullus' situation cannot be "exactly like" and "very much worse" than Mallius'.
To this end Catullus emphasises the intensity and reality of his loss by repeated apostrophe, “o miserо frater adempte mihi./ tu mea tu moriens fregisti commodа, frater” (20–21), and by a stress on the completeness of his loss and the causal link between his brother’s death and the misery of his present situation (21–26):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tu mea tu moriens fregisti commodа,} & \text{ frater,} \\
\text{tecum una totа est nostra sepulta domus,} \\
\text{omnia tecum una perierunt gaudia nostra} \\
\text{quaе tuus in vita dulcis alebat amor.} \\
\text{cuius ego interitu totа de mente fugavi} \\
\text{haec studіa atque omnes delіciас animі.}
\end{align*}
\]

Although the reader may sense a movement away from the specifically erotic reference of “totum hoc studіum” (19) to a wider area of influence, “omnia . . . gaudіa” (23) and “haec studіa atque omnes delіciас animі,” this should not be seen as a confirmation of deliberate ambiguity in “multa satis lusi.” Such expansion is simply necessary to indicate the generality of misery that has descended on Catullus. “Haec studіa” and “omnes delіciас animі” are expressive of pleasure in general. Obviously Catullus cannot realistically limit the effect of his brother’s death simply to the removal of his love-life. It has to have a more generally depressive effect but at the same time he is forced to emphasise one particular aspect, as the one that specifically prevents him from providing a munеs Veneris. The possibility of the expansiveness of “haec studіa” and “omnes delіciас animі” having a literary, rather than an emotional, basis is further precluded by the structure of 31–33 (see above).

So certain basic parameters have been established: Mallіus’ description of his own state is deliberately exaggerated (and his request for munеra is inevitably implicated in this frivolity); Mallіus has misjudged, or is, rather, unaware of Catullus’ true situation (i.e. he knows that Catullus is in Verona but he does not know why) and consequently seeks the impossible, “a

\[23 \text{“Fregisti commodа” forms an obvious rhetorical link back to line 11, “sed тіbi ne mea sint ignota incommodа, Mallі.” This link does rather more than merely establish the dependence of Catullus’ “incommodа” upon his brother’s death. It may, in fact, be possible, given the likely proximity of lines 1–10 to the actual words of Mallіus’ letter, that Mallіus had himself used the phrase “mea incommodа” to describe the consequences of his situation and to explain his specific requests from Catullus (“munеraque et Musarum . . . et Veneris”). Catullus then initiates his refusal of Mallіus’ requests by informing him that he has in fact “incommodа” of his own. The effectiveness of “sed тіbi ne mea sint ignota incommodа, Mallі” would naturally be considerably enhanced by the reapplіcation of Mallіus’ own words. Moreover the essential difference between Mallіus’ and Catullus’ “incommodа” is more poignantly expressed by the existence of an apparent point of similarity. For the “incommodа” of both men force them into a celibate state, but their reasons for this enforced celebacy are quite disparate.}]}
misero dona beata" (14); the basis of the poem is Catullus’ attempt to
demonstrate the reality of his own distress and the extent of Mallius’ mis-
conception; and finally lines 15–26 state his inability to provide a munus
Veneris and establish the reason for his refusal, the death of his brother.

These considerations have to be borne in mind as the reader approaches
the much-debated lines 27–30:

quare, quod scribis "Veronae turpe, Catulle,
esse," quod hic quisquis de meliore nota
frigida deserto tepefactat membra cubili.
id, Malli, non est turpe, magis miserum est.24

"Quare," as shown above, indicates a close thematic link with the content of
lines 15–26. In the light of the consequential force of “quare” it is justi-
fiable to make two assumptions: first that 27–30 deal with the same subject
matter as 15–26, the munus Veneris; second that they are further designed to
display and emphasise the disparity of Catullus’ and Mallius’ respective
positions (which has been the central point of the preceding section).

Before analysing the effect of 27–30 it is necessary to establish the
correctness of the punctuated version of these lines shown above. The
problem of whether “hic” (28) refers to Catullus’ or Mallius’ current
location is of fundamental importance, for it not only defines the extent of
Mallius’ direct speech but also has a radical effect on the reader’s entire
perception of the poem. (The meaning of 27–30 must alter drastically25
according to whether “hic” is a reference to Catullus in Verona or to Mallius
in Rome.)

A detailed reading of the poem will reveal an elegant tripartite use of
“hic,” as a means of reference to Catullus in Verona, and an explicit contrast
between the use of “hic” in this sense and the use of “illic” in line 35. The
first reference is in line 10, “muneraque et Musarum hinc petis et Veneris,”
where “hinc” is an explicit reference to Catullus in Verona, from where
Mallius seeks his munera. Similarly in line 36, “huc una ex multis capsula
me sequitur,” “huc” refers to Verona, the place to which Catullus has gone.
“Hic” (28) would naturally stand within this pattern as a reference to Verona,
the place where Catullus currently is. Each of these positional references is
also accompanied by a different temporal aspect: “Hinc” (10) is defined by
the future, the place Mallius envisions his gifts will come from; “hic” is

24 The punctuation indicates what I believe is the correct reading.
25 It is surely inadvisable therefore to leave the resolution of the meaning of “hic” to
simply a matter of personal preference: “There are linguistic arguments, but not decisive
ones, on both sides . . . Accordingly, which text we adopt depends primarily on whether
we think it is at Verona, or at the place where Mallius is writing from, that all the best
people are warming their cold limbs in a deserted bed,” Powell (above, note 2) 203.
rooted in the present, referring to Catullus’ current emotional condition; and “huc” (36) is detailed by past action,26 Catullus’ initial move to Verona. “Hic” then is the pivotal point of this structure, defining both Catullus’ spatial and emotional position.

This use of “hic” stands in explicit contrast to the meaning of “illa ... illa ... illic” in lines 34–35,

hoc fit, quod Romae vivimus: illa domus,
illa mihi sedes, illic mea carpitur aetas,

where “illa ... illa ... illic” are all defined by the locative “Romae,” the place where Catullus is not. The reader is then left to conclude that the extent of Mallius’ direct speech must be limited to “Veronae turpe, Catulle, esse,” for if “hic” has to be a reference to Verona it cannot be part of Mallius’ direct speech, since Mallius, wherever he may be, is clearly not himself in Verona. Direct speech ends after “esse” (28), and “quod” (28) then introduces Mallius’ speech as reported by Catullus, “quod hic ... cubili” (28–29). The portions of direct and reported speech combine to indicate what precisely Mallius believes to be shameful, Catullus’ very presence in Verona (“Veronae turpe, Catulle, esse”), and why he thinks it is shameful (“quod hic quisquis de meliore nota / frigida deserto tepefactat membra cubili”). “Id” (30) then initiates Catullus’ judgement of Mallius’ reproach.

The basis of Catullus’ statement, “id, Malli, non est turpe, magis miserum est” (30), is plain enough: The reason his stay at Verona is not “turpe” but “miserum” is the death of his brother. This still leaves us with the problem, however, why Mallius should believe Catullus’ stay in Verona to be “turpe.” Catullus, of course has already stated Mallius’ reason in lines 28–29 (quoted above), but this has only served to further diversify critical opinion.27

26 Although Mallius made his request in the past and “petis” (10) is a present tense, nevertheless the question of whether or not Catullus will provide the munera is clearly rooted in the future. Likewise in line 36 the verb which accompanies “huc” is a present tense, “sequitur,” but must indicate a past action since Catullus is already in Verona: “Verona turpe, Catulle, esse.”

27 Ellis (above, note 5) 406–07 suggests two basic possibilities: (i) “It is disgraceful for Catullus to be at Verona, because here (i.e. at Rome, or perhaps Baiae) everyone of any fashion has been warming the limbs that lie cold on a forsaken bed,’ i.e. has consoled Lesbia for Catullus’ absence by becoming in turns her paramour.” (ii) “It is disgraceful to Catullus to be at Verona, because in Verona every man of fashion is condemned to freeze on a solitary bed,’ i.e. is unable to follow the pursuits of a man of pleasure.” Powell (above, note 2) 205 proposes a speculative rift between Lesbia and Catullus: “It is a shame for you to rush off to Verona (just because you have been deserted by Lesbia). Don’t you realise that, here, everybody who is anybody (including, of course myself) has been deserted by his lady friend, and is at this very moment trying to warm his frozen limbs in a deserted bed.” Kinsey (above, note 13) 41 opts for a homosexual explanation: “Or does ‘hic’ refer
It is helpful to approach this problem within the context of the poem's structure. The poem is built around various expositions of disparity. Mallius himself has assumed a disparity, but this is one of a "miser" Mallius and a "beatus" Catullus. This impression has to be removed, even reversed, by Catullus. He has to show himself as the one who is "miser" in a real rather than superficial way. This has already been achieved in part by the revelation of his brother's death. Catullus, however, can most effectively expose Mallius' frivolous humour as incongruous by forcing Mallius' words back upon him.

As lines 27–30 are linked (by "quare") to the content of 15–26, with their focus on the munus Veneris, "turpe" must also be explicable within this context. Mallius in Rome28 states that he is abandoned and sleeping on his own ("desertum in lecto caelibe," 6). The identification of the munus Veneris as a woman and his request for the same from Catullus must emphasise two things: first that he believes Catullus is in a position to comply with this request (i.e. he believes Catullus has no shortage of women to sleep with in Verona) and second that it is the general condition of being "desertus" that is problematic and not the loss of one specific partner. The application of "turpe" in this sense must imply that Mallius regards it as "shameful" that he is forced to sleep on his own when Catullus is not. Indeed, Mallius' request for a munus Veneris (a woman) not only assumes that Catullus is not sleeping on his own but (within the general tone of Mallius' exaggerated humour) hints at a belief that Catullus has in fact his own personal harem in Verona.

to Rome and is Manlius suggesting that Catullus should return to Rome and help him to attain the munera Veneris?" Wiseman (above, note 3) 100 prefers to see "turpe" (as defined by Mallius) as a reference to Catullus' inability to indulge himself in Verona: "Therefore (quare), his stay in a town where the élite did not sleep around with the same freedom as in Rome (or so at least he makes out for the sake of his argument), was not a disgraceful abdication of his normal way of life, as Manlius had implied, but proof of his genuine misery." Woodman (above, note 1) 101 on the other hand takes it that Mallius' "turpe" signifies that he believes Catullus is having more luck with his love-life in Verona than Mallius is in Rome: "The sense of these notoriously difficult lines seems to me to be: 'As for your writing 'How shocking it is, Catullus, <for you> to be in Verona,' the fact that here all the best people can still warm their limbs even when their beds have been deserted is, Manlius, not shocking but sad.' In other words, I take it that Manlius had employed a humorous and ironical way of saying that there was a surplus of girls in Verona."

28 In fact there is no specific evidence that Mallius is in Rome. But Catullus' emphasis on the disparity between his present situation at Verona (where he is mourning his brother's death) and his former life at Rome, "quod Romae vivimus" (where "vivimus" symbolises life's pleasures and contrasts with the oppressiveness and inactivity of Verona), suggests that Catullus may well be reversing an image that Mallius has projected, an image of himself miserable in Rome and Catullus having a good time in Verona.
When "turpe" is applied in this sense it gains a suitable sense of mock moral indignation. Mallius berates Catullus for doing precisely what he himself wants to do. This argument presupposes that the effect of "deserto" (29) is quite different from that of "desertum" in line 6. The structure of the poem makes this a valid assumption: "Desertum" (6) is Mallius' reference to his own situation whereas "deserto" is his reported reference to Catullus' situation. Given that Mallius has assumed a disparity between their respective positions, the effect of the word in each instance must be different. So far from this "clear rhetorical link" being used to emphasise the parallel nature of their suffering it rather demonstrates the extent of Mallius' misconception.

None of this argument will stand, however, if there is no possibility of an active sexual meaning in lines 28–29:

... quod hic quisquis de meliore nota
frigida deserto tepefactat membra cubili.

This possibility is vigorously denied by Powell: "If you are warming cold limbs in a deserted bed, it means that you are sleeping alone." But, as shown above, the basic theme of contrast throughout the poem (Mallius' misconception of Catullus' position and Catullus' attempt to reverse this impression) must alert the reader to the probability of a different point of reference in "deserto" (29) from "desertum" in line 6.

The hypothesis that "tepefactat" is an allusion to sexual activity may be supported by reference to Ovid, Heroides 1. 7, where Penelope complains that, if Ulysses had not departed, "non ego deserto iacuissem frigida lecto." Two things are made clear here, first that she is "frigida" precisely because Ulysses is not with her and second that she envisions her limbs being returned to a more temperate state by his return.

It may, however, be argued that a state of being "tepidus" represents a degree of heat that is warm rather than hot. But "tepidus" indicates an intermediary stage between the extremes of "frigidus" and "calidus." So

29 Cf. Powell (above, note 2) 205.
30 A possibility that Powell (above, note 2) 205, in accordance with a serious interpretation, will not allow: "Mallius is not warming his limbs with the assistance of a second party, but by wrapping the blankets around them; it is surprising that scholars should be unwilling to accept this as a legitimate way of warming the limbs." The reader may, however, note that although the warming properties of blankets cannot be denied, nevertheless, their desirability as a heating agent is surely rather circumscribed within an erotic context. Moreover, it is inherently unlikely that Mallius is complaining about the superior quality of Veronese blankets.
31 So Ellis (above, note 5) 407, on the benefits of a "celibate" reading of lines 28–29: "This has the advantage of giving tepefacere its proper meaning of slightly, as opposed to thoroughly, warming."
although it can be used to indicate a decline in erotic feeling ("Fac timeat de te, tepidamque recalface mentem")32, it may also display an intermediate stage in the ascent, a progressive state, moving from "frigidus" towards "calidus." "Frigidus" is naturally applied to two "erotic" conditions, virginity and widowhood:

\[\text{nec tenerum Lycidam mirabere, quo calet iuventus} \]
\[\text{nunc omnis et mox virgines tepebunt.}^{33} \]

"Tepebunt" is not, I believe, contrasted with "calet" to demonstrate the relative intensity of male and female sexuality. Rather, it indicates the inception of female sexual awareness that will be consequent upon Lycidas' arrival at manhood. In this sense "tepebunt" is contrasted with the already developed homosexual interest, "calet," that accompanies Lycidas' pubescent state.34 A movement away from a state of being "frigidus" is also a natural consequence of remarriage:

\[\text{ipsam iam cedere sensi} \]
\[\text{inque vicem tepuisse viro.}^{35} \]

Widowhood is a form (albeit enforced) of erotic desertion and consequently returns the sufferer to a state of being "frigidus." The reactivation of a love-life, the movement away from "frigidus," is here implicit in the infinitive "tepebisse."

Less permanent forms of desertion, such as separation or simple lack of sexual activity, will also result in "frigida membra":

\[\text{frigidus in viduo destituere toro.}^{36} \]
\[\text{frigida deserto nocte iacebis anus.}^{37} \]

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32 Ovid, Ars 2. 445, quoted by Kroll (above, note 14) 223 and restated by Wiseman (above, note 3) 100.
34 This gives point to Nisbet and Hubbard's remark (A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book 1 [Oxford 1970] 72), "tepebunt: less strong than calet" and to their explanation: "He illustrates the lapse of years by remarking that Lycidas will soon be loved by women instead of men." Stinton's objection to this point ("Horatian Echoes," Phoenix 31 [1977] 162), "But if this is the only point, why did Horace write tepebunt not caletbunt?" does not take account of the "temporal" aspect of the poem or the progressive status of "tepebunt." The verb thus represents something that presently ("mox") will begin to happen and is depicted in its initial stages so as to contrast with the fully-developed (but precarious) nature of present events.
35 Statius, Silv. 1. 2. 139–40, quoted by Nisbet and Hubbard (previous note) 72.
36 Ovid, Am. 3. 5. 42.
37 Ovid, Ars 3. 70; this and the previous example are both quoted by Powell (above, note 2) 205.
“Tepebunt,” then, in connection with “frigida . . . membra,” in a specifically erotic context, must be an indication of sexual activity. In particular it indicates sexual activity for someone who, for whatever reason, has been recently inactive in this department. The point that Mallius must be making is that, if he were in Catullus’ position (i.e. in Verona), he would have no problem in finding suitable female company; his limbs need not remain “frigida deserto . . . cubili.”

The use of the frequentative verb need not, as Wiseman says, “suggest that the warming was not very successful, and that ‘everyone of quality’ was in bed alone” (above, note 3) 100. Rather, the frequentative verb indicates that “everyone of quality”38 could successfully warm their limbs, even when deserted, anytime that they pleased. Tepefactare with its idea of repeated action thus links explicitly to the idea of “copia” (39–40)39 and its association of fruitful abundance. Mallius has suggested that there is an abundance (“copia”) of suitable girls in Verona. This must be what Mallius is alleging is “turpe”: that Catullus should be surrounded by sexual opportunity when he himself is forced to sleep “in lecto caelibe” (6).

But is this reconstruction tenable? Why should Mallius assume that women were more readily available in Verona?40 Can we possibly credit the idea that Mallius is asking Catullus to send him a girl from Verona? To be drawn into the question of Veronese morality (whether one believes “tepefactat” has a sexual point of reference or not) is to miss the point at issue.41 Verona simply represents where Catullus is and Mallius is not. Catullus’ exact location is relatively unimportant (at least to Mallius): Mallius merely wants to point out that he believes Catullus is having a

38 The approbatory nature of “quisquis de meliore nota” may in itself lead the reader to expect some positive rather than negative action taking place in “frigida deserto tepefactat membra cubili.”

39 The reference to “copia” (33, 40) makes Tuplin’s idea (above, note 14) 115, that the munus Veneris is a request “for help in getting back the girl he loves,” unlikely. (Powell is presumably alluding to Tuplin’s argument when he writes, “Perhaps Mallius asked Catullus to intervene and try to persuade his errant mistress to return.”) “Copia” in this sense would have to mean, “much influence,” which goes ill with the sense of plurality and abundance that is inherent in “copia” in lines 33 and 40 (“nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me”).

40 It is perhaps possible to see this improbable assumption as yet another attempt to establish the wretchedness of his position. He may in effect be saying, “Here I am in Rome (all alone), where you might expect it would be easy for a deserted man to find another woman and there you are, Catullus, in Verona (that provincial backwater) and still having a good time.”

41 The reference of Poem 67 to Veronese immorality (though surely not in an entirely serious or generally applicable sense) may be seen as leading the reader into the expectation of some form of sexual misconduct in lines 27–30 of 68A. However this draws us into the contentious questions of whether and by whom the Catullan collection was deliberately arranged.
good time when he himself is not. Mallius’ point would presumably have been similarly phrased wherever Catullus may have been. That Mallius’ censure is essentially humorous is stressed by the extravagance of his claim: the generality of “quisquis de meliore nota” and the exaggeration of the frequentative verb “tepefactat.” Catullus and not Verona is the target of Mallius’ humour.

Mallius’ expression, then, in 27–30 is perfectly in keeping with the frivolity of the opening ten lines. His request for a munus Veneris is in itself deliberately humorous. He cannot seriously expect Catullus to send him a woman from Verona. But such an improbable request is certainly compatible with the polarity of their respective positions that Mallius has created: a wretchedly miserable, sex-starved Mallius in Rome and a wildly fortunate Catullus, sitting amidst his harem in Verona. This use of humour and the obvious frivolity of Mallius’ tone combine to exclude the need to defend the concepts of communio amicae or the free movement of women for erotic purposes around the Roman world.42

42 These ideas are not, however, necessarily untenable. Communio amicae cannot be rejected on the grounds of “emotional involvement,” as Powell (above, note 2) 206 insists: “It is not squeamishness about the idea of such trafficking that leads one to reject the hypothesis, but the fact that it presupposes a cynical and commercial attitude which is totally at odds with the emotional involvement of both Catullus and Mallius as displayed in the poem.” This assumes a similarity between the emotional states of Mallius and Catullus that the poem clearly does not display. Similarly, Powell’s statement, “Roman convention appears to have been that such things could have been offered, but not asked for without breach of propriety,” is unconvincing. For the account of Pompey and Flora in Plutarch (Pomp. 2. 3) clearly indicates that it is not Geminus who is acting in a peculiar fashion by asking for a share in Flora’s favours but Pompey in refusing to have anything to do with her thereafter and Flora herself for being upset about this state of affairs. (Cf. Wiseman [above, note 3] 95, “the surprising fact which made the story worth telling was that one of the principals involved was not prepared to co-operate.”) The activities of another lady, Cytheris, are also interesting in this context, and in particular her movement between M. Antonius and Volumnius: “She first appears in Antony’s retinue in May 49 . . . greeted as Volumnia . . . When late in 46 Cicero saw Cytheris at the dinner-table of her patronus Volumnius . . . she may have gone back to her old lover: the ingratiating Volumnius appears later as a protégé of Antony (RE IX A, 878 f.), and presumably had lent him the lady in the first place” (R. D. Anderson, P. J. Parsons and R. G. M. Nisbet, “Elegiacs by Gallus from Qasr Ibrim,” JRS 69 [1979] 125–55, at 152–53).

Neither can the notion of a courtesan travelling from a man at point A to a man at point B be simply dismissed. This idea may be present in Eclogue 10. 22–23, in connection with Gallus, Lycoris and another: “‘Galle, quid insanis?’ inquit, ‘tua cura Lycoris / perque nives alium perque horrida castra secuta est.’” The sense of “secuta est” is unclear: “followed” or “accompanied.” Possible clarification is available in lines 46–47: “Alpinas a, dura, nives et frigora Rheni / me sine sola vides.” But again it is uncertain whether “sola” has a general (on her own) or a specific (without Gallus) point of reference. Of course none of this evidence is conclusive, but it does at least raise some interesting possibilities.
Lines 27–30 form a natural progression from the preceding section. In 15–26 Catullus deals with his brother’s death in elaborate and expressive depth. So, when he quotes and reports Mallius’ words back to him in 27–30, the ruinously inappropriate nature of his frivolous humour is readily apparent (both to Mallius and to us). Catullus need not do more than state the obvious: “id, Malli, non est turpe, magis miserum est.” The point is achieved with devastating economy.

This effect of pregnant brevity is continued in lines 31–32:

ignosces igitur si, quae mihi luctus ademit,
haec tibi non tribuo munera, cum nequeo.

“Ignosces igitur” is a piece of studied politeness, for there can now be little doubt about the propriety of Catullus’ refusal. This point is further emphasised by “quae mihi luctus ademit,” forcibly reminding the reader (again the effect is the same for us as it is for Mallius) of the emotional intensity of 19–26: “sed totum hoc studium luctu fraterna mihi mors / abstulit. o misero frater adempte mihi” (19–20).

This conciseness of expression appears to continue into Catullus’ basic excuse for the non-provision of the munus Musarum: “nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me, / hoc fit, quod Romae vivimus:

43 The emphatic repetition (34–35) of “illa domus, illa mihi sedes, illic mea carpitur aetas” appears, however, to conflict with the matter-of-fact expression of the rest of lines 33–36. This may lead the reader to suspect that its reference is not merely confined to Catullus’ shortage of books in Verona. Further examination will suggest that the intensity of its expression (especially “illa domus, illa mihi sedes, illic mea carpitur aetas”) helps to emphasise the fuller implications of “Romae vivimus.” The meaning of this phrase is expanded outside of its immediate context (lines 33–36, where it simply applies to Catullus being separated from his library in Rome), and becomes, instead, indicative of the habitual pleasures of Catullus’ life at Rome. This inevitably contrasts with the depression and misery of his current situation in Verona. This change of emphasis once more suggests to Mallius the unsuitability of his simplistic dichotomy: good times for Catullus in Verona, hard times for Mallius in Rome. The effect of “illa domus, illa mihi sedes, illic mea carpitur aetas” is however more wide-ranging. For it effectively compresses and summarises the whole content of the poem within the space of nine words. “Domus” is a reference to Catullus’ house in Rome and more specifically in this context to his library in that house. His separation from that house and his library makes the provision of a munus Musarum impossible. “illa mihi sedes” is a reactivation of the hospes-theme and provides an explanation as to why Catullus is unable to comply with either request. By not being in his normal sedes (the link between sedes and the role of hospes is demonstrated at 64. 176, “consilia in nostris requiesset sedibus hospes!”) Catullus is effectively excused from being required to perform the “hospitis officium” (12) that would normally be due to a “naupragum” (3). “Illic mea carpitur aetas” links back to line 16, “iucundum cum aetas florida ver ageret,” and its context of erotic pleasure. However, the enjoyment of these pleasures, which are a habitual part of Catullus’ life in Rome (“Romae vivimus”) is precluded from Verona by circumstance (the death of his brother) and so there is no possibility of Catullus’ providing a munus Veneris from Verona.
... / ... hoc una ex multis\textsuperscript{44} capsula me sequitur" (33–36). He lives at Rome, he hasn't brought many books\textsuperscript{45} with him and so isn't in a position to send any to Mallius.

That the munus Veneris should be dealt with so fully in lines 15–30 and the munus Musarum so briefly (33–36) is not in itself surprising. For it is the munus Veneris which affords Catullus the best opportunity to demonstrate the true nature of his own position. Conversely the act of lending a book does not suppose or depend upon any particular emotional state.

The final four lines of the poem are once more affecting in their restraint:

\begin{quote}
\textit{quod cum ita sit, nolim statuas nos mente maligna}
\textit{id facere aut animo non satis ingenuo,}
\textit{quod tibi non utriusque petenti copia posta est:}
\textit{ultro ego deferrem, copia siqua foret.}
\end{quote}

It is perfectly clear by now that Catullus' refusal can hardly be due to "mente maligna" or "animo non satis ingenuo." But, in spite of the unfortunate blunder that Mallius has made and circumstances that might dictate a rather brusque reply (or no reply at all), Catullus handles himself with remarkable composure. Mallius is informed, not rebuked.

The reference in the final line to the possibility of Catullus' complying with Mallius' requests, "ultro ego deferrem, copia siqua foret," should not be seen to invalidate the frivolous nature of the munus Veneris that has been suggested in this paper. Catullus is merely responding to Mallius within the terms of the latter's humour. It is Mallius who has suggested that a "copia" of books and a "copia" of women are concepts that are on the same level and are both something that can be transported with equal facility.

Catullus exploits Mallius' humour to the full. Mallius' request for a munus Veneris, with its attendant emotional emphasis (albeit frivolous in this instance), provides Catullus with the perfect opportunity to inform Mallius of his own situation: The harshness of Catullus' real misery is

\textsuperscript{44} Again an obvious rhetorical link exists between "una ex multis capsula" (36) and "multa satis lusi" in line 17. Both link to the idea of Catullus' usual abundance of these items in contrast to his current shortage in the present circumstances. The affirmation of a lack of books is specifically stated in line 33, "nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me," and the shortage of both commodities is covered in the final two lines of the poem, "quod tibi non utriusque petenti copia posta est: / ultro ego deferrem, copia siqua foret." The link between a shortage of reading material and the lack of someone to sleep with is of course a product of Mallius' humour. Catullus is able, however, to respond to this equation because his own radical suffering has ironically produced exactly the same circumstances (a lack of books and enforced celibacy).

\textsuperscript{45} For my belief that the munus Musarum must be a reference to books rather than poetry written by Catullus, compare these lines with Kinsey (above, note 13) 38–40 and Woodman (above, note 1) 100.
expressed all the more effectively against the backdrop of Mallius’ humorously exaggerated problems.

The whole poem, then, is built around an effective contrast between Mallius’ misfortunes, which are superficial and exaggerated for humorous effect, and the very real nature of Catullus’ distress at the death of his brother. Catullus does not treat Mallius dismissively (for his blunder is unintentional), but he nevertheless makes his situation perfectly clear and emphasises the inappropriateness of Mallius’ overstated imagery at this particular moment. This emphasis is achieved by the reapplication of Mallius’ imagery to himself (the shipwreck metaphor, the closeness to death and enforced sexual inactivity), and by quoting Mallius’ words back at him. This latter technique is especially effective after Catullus has created a context in lines 15–26 which forces Mallius into recognition of his error.

As a letter, 68A conforms to its generic parameters by conveying information that is unknown to the recipient (the death of Catullus’ brother) and by being (or at least seeming to be) specifically tailored to the nature of the addressee (a friend who through unavoidable ignorance uses humour, which at other times would have been appreciated, in a wholly inappropriate situation). As a poem, 68A does not exclude the general reader from its meaning. All the information that is needed is there and is perfectly explicable. Its success “as a poem” depends both on this accessibility to a wider audience and on its particular and personal expression reaching a more universal level. This is achieved not only by the reader’s being able to identify with the emotional intensity of bereavement and the unpredictability of life, but also, as this poem’s particular expression shows, by recognition of the inadequate and unreliable medium of human communication.

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46 One of the most regrettable aspects of Powell’s article (above, note 2) is the reintroduction of Lesbia (the King Charles’ Head of Catullan interpretation) as a basis for interpretation. The fallacy of Lesbia’s presence in this poem is perhaps one of the few major areas of agreement in the recent critical tradition. The idea is rejected explicitly or implicitly excluded by all of Kinsey, Wiseman, Tuplin and Woodman. For those who believe in the division of Catullus 68 into two quite separate poems the reintroduction of Lesbia into 68A can only be a regressive step in the analysis of the poem.

47 I should like to thank Dr. J. L. Moles and Professor A. J. Woodman of the University of Durham for their invaluable assistance in the production of this article.
Love, Lovesickness, and Melancholia

PETER TOOHEY

Love, lovesickness, and melancholia, these three terms have not always enjoyed the banal symbiosis that they do in our era. Love was not always associated with lovesickness. Yet on occasion it could be. Love’s onset, especially if unconsummated, often brought lovesickness; and once this

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1 This paper was read to the 26th Congress of the Australian Universities Language and Literature Association in Perth, February 1991, and to the staff seminar of the School of Archaeology, Classics, and Ancient History at the University of Sydney, May 1991. My gratitude to both audiences. Professor Beryl Rawson helped with bibliography and provided me copies of her pieces from Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome, ed. Beryl Rawson (Canberra and Oxford 1991). Professor Herwig Maehler kindly posted me a copy of his article, “Syptome der Liebe im Roman und in der griechischen Anthologie,” in Groningen Colloquia on the Novel, ed. Heinz Hofmann, 3 (1990) 1–12. Dr. Suzanne MacAlister assisted me with Aristotle and the novelists; Mr. Robert Baker with Propertius and the elegists. To Professor David Konstan I owe an especial debt; he has corrected and clarified my argument on many points.


pestis\textsuperscript{4} was established its frustration could easily induce a viral recurrence.\textsuperscript{5} Nor was lovesickness necessarily associated with melancholia. Yet, at least in the eyes of some, an attack of lovesickness could not easily be distinguished from an attack of depressive melancholia. The focus of this paper will be on the tenuous relationship among these three conditions, but especially on lovesickness\textsuperscript{6} and melancholy.\textsuperscript{7}

Why? It is a matter of origins and precedents. The combination of these emotions represents a powerful theme for Western literature, if not always Western experience. The theme was especially prominent in the literature of the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{8} During that period the literary theme of lovesickness, assuming the proportions almost of a textual epidemic, received considerable medical attention.\textsuperscript{9} In this paper some of the more prominent ancient examples of lovesickness will be examined. The questions repeatedly to be asked are: Do these examples, first, have any basis in ancient medical thought and, second, do they have any resemblance to medieval and modern love-melancholy?

Three tentative conclusions will be offered. First, the depressed, fretting, passive, and physically ill lover (sometimes termed the love-melancholic), though present in ancient literature, is more a cliché of medieval and modern literary experience. The dominant reaction to frustrated love in ancient literature was manic and frequently violent. Second, lovesickness, in its literary depictions, mirrors the distinctions which the ancient medical writers posited for melancholia itself: There was a depressive type and there was a manic type. Third, the depressive variety of lovesickness becomes more frequent late in antiquity, perhaps during the first century after Christ. (Thus it is coeval with the "literary discovery" of depression.)\textsuperscript{10} The form my discussion will take is as follows. After a brief outline of the prevailing ancient medical interpretations of lovesickness (Section I), illustrations will be provided of the corresponding literary

\textsuperscript{4} Virgil’s word; Dido is apostrophized at A. 1. 712 thus: praecipue infelix, pesti devota futurae. Compare Val. Fl. Arg. 7. 125. Here a feverish lap dog is being compared to lovesick Medea: aegra nova iam peste canis rabieque futura.

\textsuperscript{5} By, for example, rejection, enforced separation, jealousy, or being cuckolded.

\textsuperscript{6} There have been a number of terms used for this condition. Jackson (1986, 352) lists the following: love-melancholy (Robert Burton’s term), lovesickness, love-madness, amor hereos, amor heroicus, heroic love (“hereos,” “heroicus,” and “heroical” are corruptions of the Greek word for love, ἡρώς), the malady of hereos [sic], the lover’s malady, erotomania.

\textsuperscript{7} I take lovesickness (or love-melancholy, as it came to be known) as the product of unconsummated or perhaps unseasonably frustrated love. Thus jealousy is not here at issue. Bitinna in Herondas 5, for example, exhibits neither an unconsummated nor an unseasonably frustrated love relationship. The same point could be made of the soulful amatory frustrations of Roman elegiac poetry (thus Propertius 1. 5, 1. 9, and 1. 19, or Tibullus 2. 4 and 2. 6). More on elegy below, notes 22 and 30.

\textsuperscript{8} See, most recently, Wack 1990, and Beecher and Ciavolella 1990.

\textsuperscript{9} See Jackson 1986, and Beecher and Ciavolella 1990.

\textsuperscript{10} Toohey 1990a.
portraits (Section II). Section III will look at examples of manic lovesickness which do not correspond to the medical views. In the fourth section I will attempt to show how both forms of lovesickness match prevailing ancient notions of melancholia.

I

Ancient medicine has very little to say of lovesickness. What is said (confined to Aretaeus, Galen, Oribasius, Caelius Aurelianus, and Paul of Aegina) interprets lovesickness as a depressive illness whose symptoms, but not etiology, match those of depressive melancholia.¹¹ Aretaeus of Cappadocia (c. A.D. 150), for whom melancholy was a depressive rather than a manic illness, describes one man who “appeared to the common people to be melancholic.” In fact his trouble was merely a case of “serious dejection due to unrequited love.”¹² His doctors, like the common people, must have assumed the illness was melancholy, for their treatments were unsuccessful. The truth of Aretaeus’ diagnosis was demonstrated by the man’s cure. This took place when he declared his love to his beloved.

Aretaeus’ distinction may seem to us to be hair-splitting. He was, however, a humoralist and attributed melancholy to a superfluity of black bile (in Greek μελανία χολή). The sufferer in this instance was the victim, not of an excess of black bile but of a psychological disturbance.

Galen (c. A.D. 130–200) was also a humoralist. One finds, therefore, the same careful distinction. Galen describes lovers as sometimes “emaciated, pale, sleepless, and even feverish.”¹³ In one instance he discusses his treatment of a woman who exhibited symptoms of sleeplessness at night and restlessness during the day, taciturnity, and, when Galen consulted her, a reaction as follows: “She turned her face away, threw her clothes over her body and hid herself away completely.”¹⁴ Galen’s diagnosis? “Either she was tormented by melancholy, or she was grieving over some cause she did not want to confess.” Subsequently he discovered that love was the problem. He discovered that her pulse rate rose when mention of the stage dancer Pylades was made. Although easily confused with depressive melancholia, the real origin of the woman’s condition—and love melancholy generally—is psychological rather than physical (brought on, that is, by an excess of black bile).¹⁵ Two other writers are of

¹⁴ The passage is quoted in Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 51.
¹⁵ It is also worth pointing out that Galen seems to have felt that “excessive vehemence in loving” was a condition related to lovesickness (Jackson 1986, 353, citing P. W. Harkins [trans.] and W. Riese [intro. and interpret.], Galen. On the Passions and Errors of
significance in this matter. Oribasius (A.D. 326–403) and Paul of Aegina (fl. c. A.D. 640), in their discussions of lovesickness, present what seems to be a shared view of lovesickness. Oribasius, the physician to Julian the Apostle, treated lovesickness as a distinct illness and attributed to it symptoms such as sadness, insomnia, hollow eyes, an inability to cry; and sufferers “appeared to be filled with voluptuousness, and their eyelids, the only part of the body not weakened, were continuously blinking.”16 For Paul of Aegina the lovesick were “desponding and sleepless.” He describes them in his discussion (On Lovesick Persons) in terms very similar to those of Oribasius.17

Caelius Aurelianus (5th cent. A.D.),18 who translated the Trajanic medical writer Soranus of Ephesus, believed that lovesickness manifests many of the symptoms of depressive melancholy: “unhappiness, mental anxiety, tossing in sleep, frequent blinking of the eyes, and disturbances of the pulse . . . ‘it manifests itself now in anger, now in merriment, now in sadness or futility, and now, as some relate, in an overpowering fear of things which are quite harmless.’” Wack, whom I am quoting,19 links the preceding reference to anger with Caelius’ statements elsewhere correlating melancholia with anger. (On this topic see Section IV of this paper.) Although not humoralist,20 it may be possible that Caelius and Soranus were conscious of a tradition of manic lovesickness.

The description of lovesickness in all of these writers presents a condition that, while not technically melancholia, shows the outward signs of the illness in its depressive phase. Aretaeus and Galen are at pains to point this out. (Caelius’ comments on anger may offer the only modification.) Centuries later Avicenna (A.D. 980–1037) makes the very same point.21 The link, therefore, between lovesickness, depression, and melancholia is a vital one. Lovesickness, according to the major surviving medical view, was a condition typified by sadness, insomnia, despondency,

the Soul [Columbus, OH 1963] 48). The significance of this suggestion is something to which I will return.


19 Wack 1990, 11–12.

20 Drabkin (above, note 18) 561. Klibansky 1964, 48 quotes the text: “melancholica dicta, quod nigra fella aegrotantibus saepe per vomitum veniant . . . et non, ut plerique existimant, quod passionis causa vel generatio nigra sint fella; hoc enim est aemimentium magis quam videntium veritatem, vel potius falsum sicut in alis ostendimus.”

dejection, physical debility, and blinking. Areteaus and Galen do not seem to have thought of the condition as a specific illness (unlike melancholia), but rather as a vague psychological disturbance presumably best cured by therapeutic intercourse. Oribasius and Paul of Aegina conceived of lovesickness as an actual illness, but not one based upon an excess of the black bile.

II

Depictions of depressive lovesickness are not common in ancient literature.22 Perhaps the earliest unambiguous example is to be found in Theocritus' second idyll.23 Here Simaetha has fallen in love with Delphis. The description of her initial infatuation is remarkable. Lovesickness is like a fever and it causes Simaetha to become frenzied (εμάνην 82). Yet, as the emotion lays hold of her, she becomes ill and takes to bed (82–86). After ten days her skin has become dull and sallow, her hair has begun to fall out, and she has been reduced to skin and bone (88–90).24 The cure comes when the slave-girl Thestylis coaxes Delphis to Simaetha's home. Love-making provides the remedy. The outlines of the condition of depressive lovesickness are all present in this story: taking to bed, physical debility

22 The point needs to be stressed that the concern here is with lovesickness, not with love in general. Hence discussions or expostulations such as those of Plato in the Symposium or Phaedrus, of Sophocles, Antigone, 781 ff., of Plautus, Trinummus 223–75 and 668 ff. (where the stress is less on the subjective experience than it is on the deleterious effects of love on aristocratic young men and their families—though at 669 love is said to make men morosi) are not germane to my argument. The same point may be made concerning D. H. Garrison's useful discussion of love in the Hellenistic epigram: Mild Frenzy: A Reading of the Hellenistic Love Epigram, Hermes Einzelschriften 41 (Wiesbaden 1978). Other passages, while offering witness to lovesickness, lack detail. Such a one is provided by Horace, Odes 3. 12, a description, according to Quinn, of a lovesick Neobule. Quinn terms this a "cliché" and compares Sappho 102 L–P. Into this category should be placed such productions as Propertius 1. 5 and Ovid, Amores 1. 6 (and note Barsby's comments ad loc.). See also notes 7 and 30.

23 Polyphemus is also lovesick for Galatea in Idyll 11 (a model for Corydon in Virgil's Eclogue 2). Theocritus, however, does not detail the physiology of his condition. At lines 10–11 he is said to love "not with apples, or roses, or ringlets, but with downright frenzy (ἄρπαικς μανίκαις)." That sounds hardly depressive. Nor do lines 15–16, where he has "deep beneath his breast an angry wound which the shaft of the mighty Cyprian goddess had planted in his heart" (translation Gow). The only hint of a Simaetha-like passivity is suggested in lines 14–15, where he is described thus: He "alone on the wrack-strewn shore, would waste away with love as he sang of Galatea." "Wasting" (here the verbal form is κατεξάετο) is typical of the depressive lovesick. (In Ovid's depiction of the lovesick Cyclops his emotion seems to be a violent one, see Met. 13. 867–69.) There may be a hint of a Simaetha-like lovesickness in the case of Gryllus, the admirer of Threissa in Herondas 1. 49–60. Unfortunately the picture here too is very sketchy.

24 W. V. Clausen, Virgil's "Aeneid" and the Tradition of Hellenistic Poetry (Berkeley 1987) 101, points out that the baldness is a symptom of a "morbidly excited condition" and compares Hesiod, Catalogue fr. 133. 4–5 M–W and Virgil, Ecl. 6. 51.
leading to emaciation and, potentially, death, and a dramatically altered complexion. The cure is sexual congress.

It is noteworthy that this Alexandrian tradition does not take firm root within the literary tradition (as it survives) until the first century of our era.\textsuperscript{25} That tradition is inaugurated by Valerius Maximus (5. 7 ext. 1), who recounts the famous ancient example of Antiochus, the son of King Seleucus, who fell in love with his young stepmother Stratonice. Antiochus, either unwilling or unable to reveal his passion, fell ill, took to his bed, and began to waste away.\textsuperscript{26} The physician Erasistratus, called to attend Antiochus, noticed how, when Stratonice entered the room, his pulse and breathing quickened, and how he flushed. Erasistratus realized that the cause of Antiochus’ troubles was frustrated love. King Seleucus so loved his son that, on hearing Erasistratus’ diagnosis, he passed on his wife Stratonice to Antiochus. That selfless action afforded the cure.

There are many variations of this story, within and without medical literature.\textsuperscript{27} Plutarch’s variant version is undoubtedly the most influential (Demetrius 37. 2–3). In Plutarch’s account Antiochus takes to bed and begins deliberately to starve himself as a means of controlling his passion. But whatever Antiochus’ motives, the symptoms he displayed were those of a depressive melancholic: physical debility, emaciation, a pallid complexion alternating with one flushed, laboured breathing, and a disturbed pulse rate. Love, lovesickness, and melancholy are inextricably intertwined.

Such lovesickness is not confined to the popular Antiochus and Stratonice story. A narrative clone may be found in the Vandal poem, the miniature epic, Aegritudo Perdicae.\textsuperscript{28} This story concerns a young man, Perdica, who was studying in Athens. Just before leaving for home he

\textsuperscript{25} The most famous example of lovesickness is Sappho’s phainetai moi ode (31 Campbell), which seems to aim to describe thwarted sexual desire. (Catullus’ adaptation, C. 51, ought to be compared.) The symptoms of the speaker’s lovesickness are speechlessness (9), a burning sensation on the skin (9–10), loss of vision (11), ringing in the ears (11–12), cold sweat (13), trembling (13–14), pallor (14–15), and a near-death experience (15–16). Many of these symptoms will be seen in later descriptions (e.g. Theocritus 2. 106 ff.). Whether this experience was depressive or manic, however, cannot be known: The last stanza of the poem is incomplete; nor does Sappho tell us what followed this experience. Worth comparing are Ibycus 286 and 287 Campbell, where the onset of love seems especially violent (in 286. 10–11 the word mania is used, significantly associated with darkness, ἐπιμνῄσκοντα 10). In 287 Ibycus trembles at love’s coming. The onset of love in Archilochus is equally prepossessing. Compare 112 and 118 Campbell.

\textsuperscript{26} Plutarch, in his version, attributes the story to a Greek physician, Erasistratus, who lived in the first half of the first century B.C. I see no reason why we ought to believe Plutarch’s attribution. The story has the ring of the literature of the Roman empire.

\textsuperscript{27} Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 48–51 provide references to a number of these. See also Wack 1990, 17 ff.

neglected to sacrifice to Venus and Cupid. He was rewarded with a dream-image with which he fell in love. The image was of his mother. Lovesickness not only caused him to reject food, but also produced insomnia, fearfulness, and physical debility. His mother called a doctor, Hippocrates, who, by feeling for Perdica’s pulse, discovered that it increased when his mother entered the room. Realizing the cause of the illness he resigned the case. Despite his mother’s ministrations Perdica become more and more sick: He became pallid, emaciated, his nose, the tendons in his arms, and his ribs became protuberant. In the end he decided to hang himself. Once again lovesickness manifests itself in a depressive manner, and one that is easily confused with melancholia.²⁹

A lovesickness which may be confused with depressive melancholy figures in Ovid’s story of Echo and Narcissus (Metamorphoses 3. 339–510).³⁰ The nymph Echo had fallen in love with the handsome young Narcissus. He fastidiously rejected her love. Echo’s reaction to the rejection may be compared to that of Perdica. She became grief-stricken (395), anxious and insomniac (396), was unwilling or unable to eat (397),

²⁹ A possible contemporary parallel comes from the Vandal poet Reposianus, who, in his miniature epic, The Intrigue of Mars with Venus (text and translation: J. W. Duff and A. M. Duff [eds. and trans.], Minor Latin Poets [repr. London 1961] 524–39), depicts a lovesickness (here effected by jealousy) which is depressive, but also manic. The poem describes the famous affair of Venus with Mars and their punishment by Vulcan. It is the love of Vulcan for Venus which is frustrated. When he discovers his wife’s infidelity his reaction is a bizarre mixture of depression (160: “and now half benumbed”—iam quasi torpescens) and mania (161–62: “he growls aloud, and groaning mournfully strikes his sides to their very depth and wrathfully heaves sigh on sigh unceasing”—Duff and Duff adapted; the Latin is: or e re m n t maest oque modo gemi ultima pulsans i ilia et indignans suspira pressa fatigat). But anger quickly wins the day (160: vix sufficit ira dolori).

³⁰ Discussion in Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 53–54. It is sometimes suggested of Narcissus’ pining away that “the topos is the familiar one of the lover who wastes away with passion.” Knox (Ovid’s “Metamorphoses” and the Traditions of Augustan Poetry, Cambridge Philological Society, Suppl. 11 [Cambridge 1986] 22), who makes this claim, cites in support Ovid, Ars 1. 735; cf. Am. 1. 6. 5, 2. 9. 14; Propertius 1. 5. 21–22; Theocritus 2. 88 ff. Knox’s parallels raise an important problem: To what extent is lovesickness to be seen in Roman elegy? Narcissus, I believe, has a real parallel in Sinaetha (Theocritus 2), but does he in Gallus (Propertius 1. 5)? In Gallus’ case, we ought to point out, wasting does not indicate un consummated or unseasonably frustrated love (so 1. 5. 13–21; see above, note 7). Nor, in its detail (we should include 1. 5. 13–21), is its description as specific and as ample as, say, that of Theocritus. There is also the problem of “sincerity.” Elegy is such a deliberately unrealistic, literary (Gallus’ situation is an ironic reversal of Phaedria’s at Terence, Eunuch 46–49), and hence ironic, genre, that it is very difficult to take Gallus seriously (thus I follow P. Veyne, Roman Erotic Poetry: Love, Poetry, and the West, trans. D. Pellauer [Chicago 1988], e.g. 31 ff. or 132 ff.). Compare Propertius 1. 1. 21–22 (en agedum domiae mentem convertite nostrae,/ at facite illa meo palleat ore magis). Baker (Propertius I [Armidale 1990]), for example, seems to take this as an example of the pallor brought on by wasting and lovesickness (thus another instance of Knox’s topos), and cites Plautus and Aretaeus in support. But lines 33–34 of the same poem seem to identify such pallor as the result of too much love-making. It is that very sort of complication which makes elegy such an unreliable and ironic witness.
and, like Perdica, her bones became protuberant (though in a slightly different manner). Narcissus was punished (406) for his heartless behaviour. He caught sight of his own reflection in a pool and fell in love with it (407 ff.). Like Echo he became weak (469, 488–90), unable to eat (437), and gradually starved to death.\(^\text{31}\) He was transformed into the flower bearing his name.\(^\text{32}\)

Depressive lovesickness figures large in the following, rather different illustration. This one comes from the life of Marcus Aurelius (ruled A.D. 161–80) in the Historia Augusta (Marcus Antoninus 19. 12) and repeats an alarming story concerning the conception of the brutal emperor Commodus (ruled A.D. 177–92).\(^\text{33}\) It runs as follows:\(^\text{34}\)

Some say, and it seems plausible, that Commodus Antoninus, his son and successor, was not begotten by him, but in adultery; and they embroider this assertion, moreover, with a story current among the people. On a certain occasion, it was said, Faustina, the daughter of Pius and wife of Marcus, saw some gladiators pass by, and was inflamed with love for one of them; and afterwards, when suffering from a long illness [aegriuto], she confessed the passion to her husband. And when Marcus reported this to the Chaldaeans, it was their advice that the gladiator should be killed and that Faustina should bathe in his blood and in this state lie with her husband. When this had been done the passion was indeed allayed, but their son Commodus was born a gladiator, and not really a princeps.

If it is not wholly clear in this version whence Faustina’s illness derived, my preceding discussion ought make this plain. Like Antiochus or Perdica, Faustina was so love-struck by the gladiator that she fell ill and took to her bed. Frustrated love has produced a state of physical enfeeblement. We cannot be sure that this was depressive, but the mention of a “long illness” (longa aegriuto—the noun often means “lovesickness”) points to this. The cure may seem remarkable. Yet a little thought will indicate that it offers a

\(^{31}\) The novelty of this description may be underscored by comparing it with another case of frustrated love in the Metamorphoses. Byblis fell in love with her brother (9. 454–665). Declaration of love to him was followed by rejection. Her reaction was not Antiochean pining, but violent and unrestrained madness—she became a Bacchante (9. 635 ff.). The exertion of her Bacchic travels eventually caused her to die. She metamorphosed into a fountain.

\(^{32}\) In Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe 3. 23, Daphnis tells Chloe a variant version of the legend. Here Echo repulsed Pan’s advances. In an excess of frustrated love he caused the local shepherds and goatherds to go into a frenzy (mania) and rip her limb from limb. Earth buried these limbs in a variety of places where, henceforth, echoes became possible. Pan’s reaction is one of manic lovesickness, which variety I will discuss in the next section. On the history of the Narcissus legend see L. Vinge, The Narcissus Theme in Western European Literature up to the Early 19th Century (Lund 1967).

\(^{33}\) The tale is repeated by Aurelius Victor, Caes. 16. 2.

\(^{34}\) Translation (but here slightly adapted) and Latin text: D. Magie (ed. and trans.), The Scriptores Historiae Augustae, 3 vols. (repr. London 1953).
variation on a standard method of curing lovesickness, sexual congress with the beloved. In this instance it is therapeutic intercourse by proxy. Faustina, coated with the blood of the unfortunate gladiator, undergoes with him a type of sexual union through the proxy of the ineffectual Marcus Aurelius.35

Perhaps the most striking examples of lovesickness seeming to ape melancholy are to be found in the ancient novel.36 Chariton (writing maybe in the middle of the first century A.D.), Xenophon of Ephesus (writing in the second century), and Heliodorus (third or fourth century) provide descriptions of frustrated young lovers which, in their similarities, seem to indicate that love melancholy had become a literary topos.37

Let me take Chariton first. The hero and heroine of this novel, Chaereas and Callirhoe, spot one another at a public festival of Aphrodite and fall in love at once. The effect of love on Chaereas was dreadful: He was too weak to stand, and began to waste away; he looked set to die (1. 1). The effect on Callirhoe was worse, because, unlike Chaereas, she would not admit her condition to her parents: She lay on her bed, head covered, crying, and when marriage (not, she thought, to Chaereas) was proposed, she became speechless, sightless, and almost expired (1. 1). Chaereas and Callirhoe were saved from death in the nick of time. They married.

Xenophon’s description of the love of Habrocomes and Anthia in his Ephesian Tale is more detailed. The youngsters fall in love at a festival of Artemis. Habrocomes in love (1. 5) was worn out, insomniac, weary-eyed, of altered complexion; he was moaning, weeping, and praying pitifully; eventually his body wasted away and his mind gave in. Things were no better for Anthia (1. 5), whose beauty was quickly fading. Had their parents not consulted the Delphic oracle and settled on marriage (1. 6) Habrocomes

35 A comparably macabre example may be found in Quintus Smyrnaeus’ Posthomerica when Achilles develops a necrophilic lovesickness for Penthesileia. After he has killed the Amazon warrior (1. 654 ff.), he gazes on her corpse and is smitten (716–21, cf. 666–68) by love (719, cf. 671–74) and by grief (“deadly grief [anai] devoured his heart”—720). His reaction was not violent, but passive, at least until provoked by Thersites (722 ff.).

36 Maehler (above, note 1) is very useful on this topic.

37 Less striking instances may be found in Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe, after Chloe has been abducted by the Methymnaeans (2. 20), when Daphnis, in the despair of frustrated love, casts himself onto the ground, languishing and waiting for death (ἐνταφθα περιμενον κειμενον ... θανατον 2. 22). This is not quite melancholy, yet the passive desire for death resembles the despair of Antiochus or Perdica. Melancholy is more evident in Book 3. Here Daphnis and Chloe are kept from the pastures and their meetings by the harsh weather of winter. Their reaction: “They had long and sleepless nights, now they had sad and pensive days, and desired nothing so much as a quick return of the spring, to begin their regeneration and return from death” (3. 4, Edmonds’ translation). Similar reactions take place in Book 4: Chloe, thinking Daphnis has forgotten her, weeps, complains, and thinks only of death (4. 27); Daphnis, after Chloe has subsequently been spirited away by Lampis, sinks into a similar state of despair (4. 28).
and Anthia, who lay ill and in critical condition, would certainly have died (1. 5).

Xenophon's portrait has an approximate parallel in an interesting passage to be found in his near contemporary Apuleius. In his Metamorphoses Lucius relates a tale which he had heard of a beautiful young stepmother who had fallen in love with her handsome stepson. Hippolytus-like he virtuously rejected her overtures. Frustrated love changed to hate, and the stepmother responded by fabricating a charge of fratricide which almost succeeded. But what matters here is the description provided by Apuleius of the young woman's feigned or real love-wracked condition (10. 2):

> her countenance was pale, her eyes sorrowful, her knees weak, her rest disturbed, and she would sigh deeply because of the slowness of her torment; there was no comfort in her, but continual weeping and sobbing; you would have thought that she had some fever, except that she wept unreasonably...

This could as well be the description of the far more appetizing Habrocomes or Anthia.

Only one of the lovers in Heliodorus' Aethiopica shows full-blown signs of depressive lovesickness. This is the fair-skinned Ethiopian Charicleia.38 Charicleia had seen the young Thessalian Theagenes (3. 5) in the procession of atonement to Neoptolemus at Delphi. She was at once love-struck (3. 5). Calasiris, her subsequent guide, took her languishing in bed, her moist eyes, and her headache (3. 7) for the effects of the evil eye (3. 7–9) and promised to help cure it. But her condition continued to deteriorate (3. 19): "The bloom was fleeing her cheeks, and it was as if the fire in her glance was being extinguished by the water of her tears." Theagenes and Charicleia saw one another a second time when Theagenes ran in the Pythian games (4. 3–4). The effect was catastrophic. Charicleia became still worse and her whole household was reduced to tears (4. 5). Calasiris unsuccessfully attempted to cure her with incantations, incense, and laurel (4. 5). Charicleia was subsequently examined by a doctor (4. 7). Arcesinus the physician discovered at once that the root of the problem was love:

> Can you not see her condition [pathos] is of the soul and the illness [nosos] is clearly love? Can you not see the dark rings under her eyes, how restless is her gaze, and how pale is her face—although she does not complain of internal pain? Can you not see that her concentration wanders, that she says the first thing that comes into her head, that she

38 Theagenes suffers too, though not so badly. At the banquet for Neoptolemus (3. 10) he is distracted and gloomy and, later, he confesses to Calasiris that he is near to death. Calasiris describes his condition at the beginning of 3. 11 in terms redolent of medical depression—he is full of χάσμα ἀδημονοῦσα (presumably "troubled depression" or perhaps "troubled ennui") and he is also suffering from a humoral imbalance (he is ἄνωμαλος).
is suffering from an unaccountable insomnia, and has suddenly lost her self-confidence? Charicles, you must search for the man to cure her, the only one, the man she loves.

Charicleia’s nosos is finally cured by union with her beloved, Theagenes.

What especially interests in Heliodorus’ description of the effects of lovesickness are the indications that Arcesinus the physician initially took her problem to be a superfluity of the black bile. He tells Charicles (4. 7) that he has discovered no excess of humours (οὐ γὰρ χυμῶν τις περιττεύει). The humour in question can only have been black bile, μέλανα χολή. Further indication that Charicleia’s lovesickness could be confused with depressive melancholy is suggested by Arcesinus’ testing her pulse (4. 7). That seemed to give the game away.39 Arcesinus’ pulse test seems to mirror that applied by Galen and that which we have seen in the stories of Antiochus and Stratonice, and Perdica.40

Depressive lovesickness, as I hope my brief survey has demonstrated, is not at all common in the literature of the classical world. One of the earliest unambiguous examples comes from Theocritus. The majority of ancient examples, however, are to be drawn from the first century of our era and later. Their appearance coincides approximately with the earliest medical discussions of the condition. While Theocritus may demonstrate that depressive lovesickness was a condition from which people must always have suffered, the remaining instances suggest that, as a sociological phenomenon to be taken seriously, depressive lovesickness is “discovered” in the early imperial era.

III

Although the doctors may have thought lovesickness a depressive condition, that is not the way it is depicted in the majority of ancient literary descriptions. Lovesickness, displayed in a violent or manic fashion, receives descriptions in almost all of the periods of ancient literature. It is a dominant amatory cliche. One of the best representations of the experience may be found in Apollonius Rhodius’ depiction of the love of Medea for Jason. The symptomatology of Apollonius’ portrait is explicit and consistent. The initial attack of love produces a violent physical reaction. Subsequent frustrations recapitulate, though in a more pronounced manner,

40 Another example of this type of lovesickness is alluded to by T. Hägg, The Novel in Antiquity (Oxford 1983). It is the story of Paul and Thecla in the apocryphal acts (see E. Hennecke, New Testament Apocrypha II [London 1965] 353–64). Hägg points out (160) that “Thecla’s first reaction when she hears Paul preaching in the neighboring house—she does not touch her food or drink, she worries her family by her distracted behaviour—is reminiscent of the purely physical manifestations of awakening love in, for instance, the Ephesiaca.”
this emotional reaction. The descriptions, as we will see in the next section, match those used of melancholy but, of course, lack the precision of humoral diagnosis.

Medea’s infection is precipitated by Hera.\(^{41}\) Wishing to help Jason succeed in gaining the fleece from King Aietes, she persuades Aphrodite to have Eros make Medea fall in love with Jason (Argonautica 3. 36–110). When Eros wounds Medea (3. 284–98) the subjection to love is sudden and complete:

He [Eros] shot at Medea. Speechlessness (\(\acute{\alpha}μφασι\eta\)) overcame her. And he sped back from the high-roofed hall laughing, and the shaft burnt in the girl, deep below her breast, like fire (\(\phiλογι\ \acute{\epsilon}ι\κε\lambda\nu\)). Continuously she cast bright glances at the son of Aeson. In the turmoil her clever wits left her breast. She had lost her memory. Her heart was flooded with this sweet agony (\(\acute{\alpha}νι\eta\)). As a working woman, who spins for a living, piles brushwood on a smouldering log to spread light through her home in the dark, while she works nearby, and, as the great blaze, kindled from a little brand, reduces the twigs to ashes, so, enfolded within her breast, did woeful love (\(\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}ρ\omega\varsigma\)) stealthily smoulder. Her soft cheeks turned from white to red in the whirl of her mind (\(\acute{\alpha}κηδε\ι\eta\varsigma\ \nu\acute{\omega}ι\omega\)).

The description of Medea’s reaction, though incomplete, gives a fair idea of the violence of her response. The imagery bears this out: Eros’ shaft is “like fire,” Medea’s heart is full of “agony,” the shaft causes, furthermore, forgetfulness, mental turmoil (\(\acute{\alpha}κηδε\iota\eta\)), and pallor alternating with rose-coloured flushing.\(^{42}\)

Once Medea’s condition has been established it is not allowed to run its course. Her love is frustrated in two ways. First, loyalty to and fear of her father Aietes initially restrain her from succumbing to the emotion. Second, Jason’s own fecklessness threatens to prevent her love reaching its obvious conclusion. In response to both, Medea’s reaction is violent. Argonautica 3. 444–71 shows how she is affected by loyalty and fear. She is wracked by contradictory emotions: She cannot remove Jason’s image from her imagination (453–58); she fears for his safety (459–60), but mourns him as if he were already dead (460–61); she hopes he will escape unharmed (464–68) but, if he does perish, that he will know of her sympathy (468–70). These contradictions seem to be the result of the illicit nature of Medea’s passion: Love impels her to hope for Jason’s success, but this, she knows, will be at the expense of her father Aietes. Medea’s “lovesickness” results in part from a conflict between \(\alpha\tilde{i}\delta\omega\varsigma\) and \(\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\rho\varsigma\) (3. 653). The former dictates loyalty, the latter that she follow her longing for Jason. This ambivalence is especially evident in the dream-sequence at 3.

\(^{41}\) On love in Apollonius see G. Zanker, “The Love Theme in Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica,” WS 13 (1979) 52–75.

\(^{42}\) This latter description may be compared to those of Antiochus.
616–32\textsuperscript{43} and in her actions (645–68) after the first monologue (636–44). She hesitates to leave her room, but hangs on its exit. She casts herself writhing onto her bed. She weeps. Finally, Chalciope hurries to her (670 ff.). She manages to disguise her willingness to assist Jason as concern for Chalciope’s sons, who are now in the company of the Argonauts (681 ff.). There follows the description of another bout of anguish. The symptoms of her condition are becoming more and more explicit (755–65):\textsuperscript{44}

Her heart throbbed quickly within her breast . . . a tear of pity ran from her eyes, and within her unceasingly agony wore her away as it burnt through her skin along her nerve endings right up to the muscles of the neck beneath the head, where pain is the most severe whenever tireless love (ἀκάματος ἔρωτες) casts pain into one’s mind (πραπίδες).

Despite this physical anguish Medea does not, like Antiochus or Faustina, take to bed. She makes her decision. Ἐρρέτω αἰθῶς (“let shame perish” 3. 785), she states. She will betray her parents. Medea herself gives a name to the condition: It is ἀτη, violent delusion.

In Argonautica 4 there is no longer a conflict between αἰθῶς and ἰμέρος. Medea has abandoned Colchis.\textsuperscript{45} Her passion is frustrated now by the fecklessness of Jason, who seems likely to give in to the threats of the pursuing Colchians. Near the beginning of this book Medea’s lovesickness is described with real precision: Her eyes are filled with fire, her ears ring, she clutches at her throat, she pulls at her hair, groans, is suicidal (16–23). These physical woes seem partly the product of frustrated love, partly fear.\textsuperscript{46} Later, when the Colchians manage to cut off the Argo’s party (303–38), Jason, sensing that their situation is hopeless, strikes a deal (συνθεσίη) with the Colchians. They will keep the fleece, but leave Medea on a nearby island with its priests of Artemis. Judges can later arbitrate her future (339–49). Medea’s reaction to this treachery is not to swoon, nor to take to bed, nor to begin a wasting illness, nor even to contemplate suicide, rather it is to threaten violence. She wrathfully argues that Jason is under oath to protect her (358–59, 388). If abandoned she threatens she will curse him.

\textsuperscript{43} She dreams that Jason had taken on the contest, not to gain the fleece, but to win her. Medea even dreams that she fought Aietes’ bulls in his stead (R. L. Hunter, Apollonius of Rhodes. Argonautica, Book III [Cambridge 1989] 164 notes the sexual symbolism of fighting the bulls). In the dream Medea must decide, her father dictates, whether to award the stranger the fleece. Aietes would not, for Jason had not fought. Against his wishes she awards Jason the fleece.

\textsuperscript{44} The translation follows the line order of Hunter’s commentary (previous note).

\textsuperscript{45} At the beginning of the book (4–5) Medea flies from the palace to join Jason: The poet asks whether her action is the result of ἀτης πῆμα δυσφίμερον (“ill-desired wave resulting from ἀτη”) or a φοῖκαν ἀεικελίην (“unseemly panic”).

\textsuperscript{46} Fear is her motive according to A. R. Dyck, “On the Way from Colchis to Corinth: Medea in Book 4 of the Argonautica,” Hermes 112 (1989) 455–70, and Zanker (above, note 41) 64.
Jason at once backtracks and hatches a plan to murder the leader of the Colchians, Medea’s brother Apsyrtus (395–420). There follows a most extraordinary personal intrusion into the narrative (445–51):47

Wretched Love, great woe and great object of hatred for humans, from you destructive strife, groaning, and wailing, and countless other pains pierce us. Rise against the sons of our enemies, god, in the way that you cast hateful madness (στυγερη ἕτη) into Medea’s heart. For how then with awful death did she overcome Apsyrtus? My song’s task next is to tell that.

Medea’s lovesickness then reaches its apogee of violence. The bloody murder of Apsyrtus follows. In the thrill of passion Medea, it seems, will go to any length.

I have dwelt at such length on this version of the Medea story because it provides such a detailed (and moving) instance of the violent power of passion. Medea’s lovesickness—and there can be no other word for it (she is still a virgin, and a young one at that)—leads her to remarkable acts of violence. In Apollonius’ reading of the emotion of lovesickness, the onset of love and, later, its frustration can lead to violent physical and emotional disorders. It can lead, furthermore, to acts of violence, even murder. Not only does Apollonius graphically illustrate its effects but he also editorializes on its dangers.

Love in Apollonius’ version of the story of Medea is a typical, if extreme instance of what seems to have been the prevailing ancient view of the dangers of lovesickness. Let me give a few other examples to illustrate and to bolster this contention. Dido suffers like Medea. Her love, like that of Medea, has been thrust upon her by divine scheming (Aeneid 1. 657 ff.).48 Dido’s infection is likened to a wound (Aeneid 4. 1–2, 67) and it burns like fire (2, 66). Like any love-melancholic Dido becomes insomniac (5) and anxiety-ridden (9 ff.). But, like Medea, she sees giving in to her passion as a form of betrayal (27; cf. 172)—and giving way to the passion results in exactly this (86–89, 193–94). Also like Medea she is betrayed, in her case by Aeneas. The “betrayal” comes after Jupiter sends Mercury to Aeneas (237–78): Aeneas must remember his mission and cease from Carthaginian affairs. But before Dido meets Aeneas she senses that treachery is afoot. Her reaction is not depressive, but manic. (Her reactions, though not strictly relevant to a discussion of frustrated, unconsummated love, are so much of a kind with those of Medea, that they deserve to be detailed.) Dido rages through the city like a bacchant (300–03) to meet Aeneas. (This was the action of Ovid’s Byblis and Valerius

47 Val. Fl. Arg. 6. 469 ff. (not quite the same point in his narrative) moralizes on the destructiveness of love. Here Valerius is describing the girdle Venus lends to Juno. With this she causes Medea to fall in love with Jason.

48 Venus’ intention powerfully uses the imagery of fire: donisque furentem / incendat reginam atque ossibus implicit ignem 1. 659–60; note also 1. 712–22.
Flaccus' Medea.) Dido, her love frustrated and after an unsuccessful attempt at persuading Aeneas to delay sailing (416–49), again reacts violently: She sets about planning her own death (450–552). Notice that Virgil compares her to those embodiments of violent anger, Pentheus and the manic melancholic Orestes (469–73), and, elsewhere, stresses her anger (531–32; note that it is linked with love [resurgens / saevit amor]—this is not just a matter of insulted pride or broken covenants). Dido's soliloquy, delivered as she watches the Aeneadae sail away, shows no relaxation of anger (590–629): She summons the sun, the gods, and the Furies to avenge her, on Aeneas first, then on all of his descendants. Soon afterwards she suicides.

Of Virgil's other love-blighted, if not lovesick, protagonists such as Corydon (Eclogue 2), Cornelius Gallus (Eclogue 10), or Orpheus (Georgics 4), it is only Orpheus who gives signs of real depressive melancholy. Yet even he meets a most violent end (Georgics 4. 523–27). Perhaps Virgil's amatory reservations are based on Epicureanism. Lucretius' famous descriptions and rejection of love and its effects (De rerum natura 4. 1037–1287) seem in line with Virgil's view of lovesickness as a dangerous, violent pestis. For the Epicurean Lucretius love is "a disease of the soul that slowly pervades the entire body, just like madness, and that must be eradicated before it completely upsets the physiopsychological balance of the man." Most important for the present discussion is Lucretius' opinion that the onset and effects of love do not produce a state of depressive enfeeblement, but madness. Lucretius is to the point: Love is a madness (rabies 1083) and a dangerous one at that (1079–83). His contemporary Cicero does not tell us of lovesickness, but he has his suspicions of love. In the Tusculan Disputations 4. 75 he notes of love that "of all disturbances of the soul there is assuredly none more violent ... the disorder of the mind in love is in itself abominable." Horace's Satire 1. 2, another Epicurean diatribe against love (which might as well be

49 The comparison is important. Orestes is singled out in the canonical discussion of manic melancholia, the pseudo-Aristotelian Problema 30. See Toohey 1990a. In Val. Fl. Arg. 7. 144–52 Medea, initially inflamed by the love of Jason, is compared to Orestes furens.


51 Nor are the characters of Eclogue 8 passive, depressive figures.

52 Scylla, in the Ciris, is not Virgilian (see R. O. A. M. Lyne, Ciris: A Poem Attributed to Virgil [Cambridge 1978]). But she is very like Apollonius' Medea in her total surrender to love (scapeo) and her swift betrayal of her father Nisus to her beloved, King Minos.

53 The lineaments of the pattern may be found in Virgil's allusion to depressive, metamorphic love at Aeneid 10. 189–93 (the transformation of Cycnus). The allusion is perhaps too brief for proper discussion.

54 For a discussion see Beecher and Ciavolella 1990, 52–53.

designed as advice for Corydon in Eclogue 2), reproduces the same vision of love, if not lovesickness, as a type of dangerous mania.56

There exist in ancient literature many other examples of manic lovesickness.57 Here I will confine myself to a final pair of illustrations which test this conclusion. These concern the lovesickness of Phaedra as it is depicted by Euripides (Hippolytus) and by Seneca (Phaedra).58

Euripides’ heroine (sometimes compared to Dido) is certainly lovesick.59 She has fallen unexpectedly in love with her stepson Hippolytus. The infatuation has been caused by Aphrodite, who, angered at Hippolytus’ insulting behaviour (Hippolytus 12 ff.), intends to use Phaedra’s love to bring him down. Phaedra’s love is, of course, frustrated, for the object of her desire is the son of her still living husband Theseus. What are the symptoms of her lovesickness? Initial impressions suggest a condition which might easily be confused with depressive melancholia. Like Simaetha, Antiochus, and Perdica, Phaedra has become bedridden (131–34), debilitated (198–202), seems to be unable to take food (135–38), she is pallid (174–75), and inconsistent in her wants (176 ff.). If her symptoms continue she will die (138–40). But it emerges as the drama continues that these symptoms are feigned (391 ff., 400–01, 419 ff.). Phaedra, mindful of αἰδώς (385), of τιμή (329), of σωφροσύνη (399), and of τὰ ἔσθλὰ (331), has determined, like Plutarch’s Antiochus, to preserve her honour and to disguise the ἔρως by starving herself to death. It seems, however, that the real symptom of lovesickness, if it is allowed to manifest itself, is mania.

56 A few random examples: Sallustius insanit over freedwomen at 1. 2. 48–49. Amatory frustration is alluded to in a colourful manner at 1. 2. 71 (mea cum conferbuit ira) and at 1. 2. 118 (malis tentigine rumpi).

57 Ariadne, love-blighted and frustrated in Catullus 64, eventually works herself into a frenzy and, like Dido or Valerius’ Medea, is furens (124 and 54) and is compared to a bacchant (61). Ariadne, of course, has presumably consummated her love and, therefore, does not quite fit within the parameters of this paper—see above, note 7. Scylla in the pseudo-Virgilian Ciris will go to any length to consummate her love for Minos. Medea in Ovid’s Heroides 12 is frenzied rather than depressed. Much, much later the Roman emperor Caracalla fell in love with his stepmother Julia, who, “as if through carelessness, had uncovered the greater part of her body” (HA, Caracalla 10). He was encouraged by her complacency: “His disordered madness was given strength to carry out the crime and he contracted the marriage which . . . he alone should have prohibited.” The description and language used of Caracalla’s emotions might be compared to those used of a mad (furiosus) slave who is said to have attacked Hadrian (Hadrian 12).

58 Ovid, Heroides 4 provides us with an ironic letter from Phaedra to Hippolytus. But here we have a portrait of a loose-living Roman matrona whose love or lust, though apparent, hardly exhibits the symptoms of real lovesickness. H. Jacobson, Ovid’s Heroides (Princeton 1974) 142–58 is helpful.

59 Her condition is sometimes linked with hysteria; see M. R. Lefkowitz, “The Wandering Womb,” in Heroines and Hysteries (London 1981) 12–25, at 19 ff. But whether ancient hysteria ought to be considered a manic or depressive disease (in the same way as lovesickness or melancholy) I am not sure. By the time of Galen, at any rate, some descriptions are of the depressive order; see I. Veith, Hysteria: The History of a Disease (Chicago 1965) 31 ff.
Thus at 188–238 Phaedra seems to be caught off guard by the nurse and reacts in a manic fashion (206, and note 241 ἐμάνην). She admits as much to the chorus at 243–48. And, after the nurse indicates Phaedra’s love to Hippolytus (601 ff.), her reaction to the nurse—she does not meet Hippolytus—is angry and violent abuse (682 ff.). Her off-stage suicide follows soon after, and soon after that Theseus returns to discover the body and, with it, the note which mendaciously dooms Hippolytus to a most violent death. It is significant that the contents of the letter seem to declare themselves in a most vehement manner (877–80). From these indications, therefore, it appears that the real nature of Phaedra’s lovesickness is manic. What are we then to make of the early, seemingly depressive symptoms? I suspect that here an audience saw Phaedra’s illness not as the direct result of lovesickness but merely as indicating a means of attempting a suicide which would guard her honour against the onset of desire. The modus moriendi here is the common ancient tactic of inedia—starvation.60

Seneca’s Phaedra also exhibits a form of lovesickness which is best described as manic, rather than depressive. Seneca’s depiction of Phaedra’s condition, however, is not as carefully constructed as that of Euripides. Seneca is at times more rational: Phaedra’s passion, for example, can be explained away as resulting from the neglect (Phaedra 91 ff.) of an adulterous husband (97–98); nor does Phaedra make much of an effort to hide her passion from the nurse: At times it seems that it is all that she can talk about (218–21, 225, 241). Yet Seneca does skimp logically. Phaedra’s decision to look after her good name (her fama; Euripides’ Phaedra was concerned with τιμή, but also αἰδός and σωφροσύνη) seems rather an afterthought (250–54, 258–60).

What are the symptoms of Phaedra’s lovesickness? In the early parts of the play it is a violent madness (a furor; see 184–85, 186–87, 268, and especially 339 ff.). Later, after she has determined to guard her fama, she begins to suffer a wasting illness (360–86), which seems in its symptoms to match those of Antiochus and Perdica. Yet it is unclear in Seneca’s version whether these symptoms are feigned or whether they are simply the result of a prolonged starvation aimed at suicide. At any rate, the wasting illness does provide her with a chance to be alone with Hippolytus and to declare her love. That she may have been feigning the illness is confirmed by her reaction to Hippolytus’ rejection. Once spurned she becomes angry (824–28) and guilefully dooms Hippolytus by claiming (868 ff.) that he had raped her. Furor overcomes her in the end as well. After Hippolytus’ death

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60 A. J. L. van Hooff, From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-Killing in Classical Antiquity (London 1990) 45–46 argues: “inedia is the ancient method for attracting attention for grief, open or hidden. Phaidra could not reveal her unbecoming love for her stepson Hippolytus. ‘I abstain from food’ (asiteo); such will be ‘the renouncing of life (apostasis tou biou)’ ... Frustration in love leading up to voluntary starvation is a theme in the ancient novel: on one occasion Chaireas is convinced that Kallirhoe is in love with Dionysios. He decides to abstain from food ...”
is reported she comes on stage mad (1156) and suicides. Thus, the Senecan portrait of Phaedra’s lovesickness is persistently, if not unequivocally, manic.

Lovesickness, as I hope these admittedly random examples may have demonstrated, was capable of producing a manic rather than a depressive reaction. Space precludes a demonstration of the following point, yet my own reading of the literature of the classical periods indicates that this type of lovesickness, in most ancient contexts, is the dominant form.

IV

While ancient medical theory seems in practice to recognize only one form of lovesickness, I hope to have demonstrated that in the literary sources there were two distinct forms, the medically recognized depressive form, but also the more widespread manic form. I would like to focus now on the relationship of this manic lovesickness with ancient concepts of melancholia.

Ancient medical theory focused on two forms of melancholia. There was, of course, a depressive form, but the more prevalent type was violent and manic. The information on this matter has been examined elsewhere. Perhaps it will suffice here to point to the evidence of the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata 30.1. The author of the Problemata maintains that melancholia is the product of a superfluity of black bile. Black bile is a mixture of cold and hot. Melancholics, accordingly, fall into two broad groups, those in whom the black bile becomes very hot and those in whom the black bile becomes very cold. Where the black bile is hot, one would expect what we term the manic phase of this condition; where the black bile is cold, one would expect the depressed phase. Subsequent theorists, whether humoralists or not, associate the illness with one, the other, or both of the two poles, mania and depression. So Celsus, Soranus of Ephesus, and Caelius Aurelianus all associate the disease with depression. Aretaeus of Cappadocia and Galen, on the other hand, allow the bipolarity of the Problemata.

How does this information relate to ancient concepts of lovesickness? The two types of melancholia mentioned in the Problemata and depicted later in various medical contexts seem to match the two types of lovesickness I have been attempting to describe. Just as melancholia could be manic or depressive, so could lovesickness be manic or depressive. The congruence is remarkable and perhaps tells us something of the popular perceptions of melancholia and lovesickness. This curious congruence, however, may provide an explanation for two other features of ancient

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61 Toohey 1990a (with bibliography) outlines the evidence epitomized here.
62 A reproduction of the Greek text with translation and comments may be found in Klibansky 1964, 18–29.
lovesickness, namely the paucity of descriptions of the depressive form of lovesickness and, second, the relatively late appearance within literary texts of this condition.

It has been argued elsewhere that the depiction of melancholia as a depressive illness rather than as a manic illness is not common in ancient literature and, furthermore, that what occurrences there are appear late in the tradition. They seem to begin seriously in both popular literatures at about the time of Seneca. The same tendencies seem to be observable in the ancient descriptions of lovesickness. Medical discussions of lovesickness, as we have seen, are all relatively late and describe the condition as depressive and as not unlike melancholia—also treated as a depressive illness. Of the literary descriptions of lovesickness provided here, the examples of manic lovesickness are distributed throughout most periods. The descriptions of depressive lovesickness, however, begin in earnest with Valerius Maximus, who wrote under the Roman emperor Tiberius (ruled A.D. 14–39) and continue sporadically over subsequent centuries. Descriptions of melancholia as a depressive disease seem to begin seriously at approximately the same time as do descriptions of depressive lovesickness. The parallel between melancholia and lovesickness, therefore, allows us to be more precise in categorizing and dating the phases of the ancient perceptions of lovesickness and perhaps love itself.

V

After Florentino Ariza saw her for the first time, his mother knew before he told her because he lost his voice and his appetite and spent the entire night tossing and turning in his bed. But when he began to wait for the answer to his first letter, his anguish was complicated by diarrhea and green vomit, he became disorientated and suffered from sudden fainting spells, and his mother was terrified because his condition did not resemble the turmoil of love so much as the devastation of cholera. Florentino Ariza's godfather, an old homeopathic practitioner who had been Tránsito Ariza's confidant ever since her days as a secret mistress, was also alarmed at first by the patient's condition, because he had a weak pulse, the hoarse breathing, and the pale perspiration of a dying man. But his examination revealed that he had no fever, no pain anywhere, and that his only concrete feeling was an urgent desire to die.

Toohey 1990a. I stress popular, for the medical perception predates the literary expression. Celsus, for example, was conscious of the depressive nature of melancholia. Perhaps the perception of the real force of depression dates to the third century, during which period, Pigeaud 1987 has argued, there was a soul–body split in medical thought. Toohey 1988 also dates the earliest descriptions of boredom to this period.
This passage comes from Gabriel García Márquez's *Love in the Time of Cholera*.\(^65\) I have reproduced it to illustrate a simple point. This description of a depressed, fretting, passive, physically ill lover—almost a cliché of modern literature\(^66\)—might as easily be of an ancient depressive melancholic as of a victim of cholera or lovesickness. The dominant ancient concept, as I hope to have shown, was a violent one. Thus, we see the origins or the “discovery” of Florentino Ariza’s hackneyed condition above all in the literature of the early empire. It has its best parallels in the Greek novel.

A second observation concerns the passivity of the *inamorati* of the first and second centuries of our era. Is this really passivity or is it in fact the result of a literature that interests itself in the young and inexperienced and in love-relationships that violate societal taboo? The depressed lovers of the Greek novel are usually young and inexperienced. One might easily blame their sense of powerlessness on their age and social station. Had they been older, more experienced, and more capable of attaining their own ends, then might their frustration have manifested itself as anger, rather than melancholy? Is the “discovery” of depressive lovesickness merely the product of a literature that takes more of an interest in the emotions of a more vulnerable class? There are, in the texts mentioned above, several instances that vitiate such a supposition. Chariton’s Dionysius, Callirhoe’s first suitor after her abduction by the pirates, offers one example. He is a man full grown. Recently widowed, wealthy, friend of kings, and the father of two children, he might have been expected to react to frustration in anger, rather than in the depressed manner he does (*Chaereas and Callirhoe* 2. 4). Similarly Theocritus’ Simaetha. She seems to be the victim of neither age nor inexperience. Anger, therefore, might be expected to be the reaction to her infatuation with Delphis. It was not. Medea, on the other hand, offers an example, especially in Valerius, of an angry reaction to frustrated love. Like Callirhoe or Anthia or Charicleia, she is young and inexperienced. The likelihood of her being able to marry the foreigner Jason is remote. Her response, therefore, might be expected to be one of depression. It was not. Youth and inexperience act as an inaccurate means of predicting the reaction to love’s onset and initial frustration. The same point might be made of a love that violates societal taboo. Here I am thinking of Marcus Aurelius’ wife Faustina, or Perdica, or Phaedra, or Ovid’s Byblis (especially *Metamorphoses* 9. 635–40). It could be argued that, were their affections expressed openly, they might run the risk of detection and punishment. Hence their depressive inversions. But let us compare Medea. The taboo against a relationship with Jason is every bit as strong as that, say, against

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Marcus Aurelius’ wife (who could, after all, have had a clandestine affair). Love for Medea meant betrayal of her father and her family. She knew this from the beginning. Yet her reaction was not one of powerlessness, but, especially in Valerius’ version, of strong anger. What is noteworthy in the stress on passivity in love is, I contend, not its being confined to the young or to taboo-breakers, but its efflorescence in the first and second centuries of our era.

A third observation deserves to be made. It is curious that love-melancholy begins to gain real currency at the same time, approximately, as descriptions of depressive melancholy become current. It is equally curious that it is the same period which begins to show descriptions of “boredom” in the modern sense of the term. These peculiar congruences may tell us something about the prehistory and even archaeology of affective states. They show also how closely allied were the emotions of anger, depression, boredom, and love. Perhaps of more interest is that they suggest that there took place in the first or second century of our era a shift in the perception of the symptoms of such affective states as love, lovesickness, and melancholia. This has, I suggest, some bearing on the notion of the “discovery” of depressive love-melancholy.

Finally, there is Paul Veyne. In a brilliant article in 1978 he argued that such an affective shift, at least as far as love is concerned, is evident in the early empire. He believes that, with the weakening of the extended, aristocratic Roman family system, romantic love rather than family compulsion became the means for securing marital obesiance from women. It would be easy to interpret love-melancholy as another aspect of the new stress on romantic love (which seems above all a passive condition; as love itself became romantic, so did lovesickness become depressive). The active, frequently violent emotions of the lovesick are slowly, but never wholly, replaced by the passivity of Antiochus, or of Habrocomes, or of Florentino Ariza.68

Veyne’s explanation for the affective shift has been, and probably rightly, rejected.69 Most, however, accept the existence of such a shift.


68 The remarkable condition of acedia, at least in its fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-century manifestations, bears a very close resemblance to depression and lovesickness. It is curious that lovesickness receives one of its best descriptions in the Aegritudo Perdicæ in Vandal North Africa at approximately the same time monks and lay folk were being ravaged by the morbus of acedia. There can be no easy explanation for this coincidence except perhaps to remark that the first and fifth centuries of our era were most dangerous and demoralized periods. Perhaps in such periods that sense of passivity which seems a congener of these conditions is especially prevalent and encourages these pests? On this phenomenon see Toohey 1990b.

69 Veyne has been corrected, notably by R. P. Saller and R. D. Shaw, “Tombstones and Roman Family Relations in the Principate: Civilians, Soldiers, and Slaves,” JRS 74
What was its cause? Space precludes consideration of the issue here. But it does not preclude the observation that the interrelation of lovesickness with melancholia, depression, and boredom seems sufficiently strong to demand an explanation which provides a cause not just for the affective shift in the perception of frustrated love, but also for depression and boredom. Veyne's exhilarating thesis may tell us something about the “discovery” of romantic love and even of lovesickness, but it tells us nothing of the interrelated “discoveries” of its congeners, depression and boredom.⁷⁰

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⁷⁰ P. Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (London 1988) 16 n. 51 states that, although Saller and Shaw correct Veyne “on important points,” his is “an exceptionally thought-provoking study.”
Notes on Statius’ *Thebaid* Books 5 and 6

J. B. HALL

This is the third in a projected series of six papers presenting conjectures in the text of Statius’ *Thebaid*. The first two of these papers appeared in *ICS* 14 (1989) 227–41 and 17 (1992) 57–77; the rest will follow at intervals. As before, I take my lemmata from D. E. Hill’s edition (Leiden 1983), and have regularly consulted the editions by Gevartius (1616 and 1618), Cruceus (1618), Veenhusen (1671), O. Müller (1870), Garrod (1906), Klotz (1908; revised by Klinnert, 1973) and Mozley (1928).

5. 13–16

*illeae clangore fugaci,*
*umbra fretis aruisque, volant, sonat auius aether.*
*iam Borean imbresque pati, iam nare solutis*
*amnibus et nudo iuuat aestiuare sub Haemo.*

The cranes are flying, and flying northwards from Egypt to their summer quarters in Thrace, their precise destination being Mt Haemus. “Soon it will be their delight . . . to spend the summer days on naked Haemus,” says Mozley, but I must confess that I am at a loss to see how “naked” Haemus could be an attraction to the birds, or indeed what the relevance of its being “naked” might be here. Lactantius’ comment at this point only increases my incomprehension: “sine honore siluarum. Haemus est autem mons Thraciae. et bene nudo. uestiuntur enim arboribus . . .”; to which mystifying, not to say contradictory, sequence of observations he adds a reference to Sall. *lug.* 48. 3, where a tree-clad eminence is described. And surely, in our present context, *nudo* is exactly the opposite of what is required. As apt as any word here would be *uiridi*, emphasising the attraction to the migrating cranes of Haemus’ tree-clad slopes.

5. 17–24

*hic rursus simili procerum uallante corona*
*dux Talaionides, antiqua ut forte sub orno*
*statab et admoti nixus Polynicis in hastam:*
“*at tamen, o quaecumque es*” ait “*cui gloria tanta,*
*uenimus innumerae fatum debere cohortes,*
quem non ipse deum sator aspernatur honorem,
dic age, quando tuis alacres absistimus undis,
quae domus aut tellus, animam quibus hauseris astris..."

Saved from death by dehydration, the Argive army takes time off from its march to hear the story of Hypsipyle, their saviour. The request that she should tell her tale comes from Adrastus (dux Talaionides), here depicted as standing under an ash tree, leaning on Polynices' spear. Not his own spear? Why not his own spear? Is this normal military practice, for one man to lean on another's weapon? Is not his own strong enough? Surely to goodness, if anyone is at ease and leaning on a spear, it must be the man who owns it? If so, should we not expect:

stabat, et admotam Polynices nixus in hastam?

Adrastus, then, is standing under the ash, while Polynices rests on his spear hard by.

Lines 20 and 21 harbour two corruptions, I believe, of which the first, at for tu, was corrected by Markland, while the second, not yet corrected, lies concealed in the words fatum debere. That fatum debere might mean the same as uitam debere, as Lactantius opined, is about as credible—or incredible—as the equation of "to owe one's fate" with "to owe one's life"; and Barthius at all events had the common sense to suggest altering fatum to uitam here. But more is needed than that, for, as Mozley notes, "uenimus debere' is doubtful Latin," and, on any analysis, it is hardly true to say that the army's purpose in coming was to owe its life to Hypsipyle. One variant reading, however, fato for fatum, though worse in isolation even than fatum, as Mozley's solecistic conformation of text makes clear, does nevertheless point the way to a credible solution, and a very easy one, namely:

"tu tamen, o quaecumque es" ait "cui gloria tanta
uenimus innumeræ fato debente cohortes, . . ."

Now all is in order: the coming of the army was owed by fate, and it brought great glory to Hypsipyle.

One final difficulty is presented by line 21, where the question animam quibus hauseris astris seems to invite Hypsipyle to state her geniture, the disposition of the celestial bodies at the time of her birth—as if it could make the slightest difference to her questioner whether she was born on 1 April or the day in which the sun first entered Leo or whatever day it actually was in the Lemnian calendar. But no: Adrastus did not want to know her birthday, but rather

animam quibus hauseris oris,

the second half of 21 being no more than a variation on the first.
5. 61–64

illa Paphon ueterem centumque altaria linquens,
neu uultu nec crine prior, soluisse iugalem
ceston et Idalias procul ablegasse uoluces
fertur.

This note is no more than a cry for help. The words *neu uultu nec crine prior* are rendered “with altered looks and tresses” by Mozley, and something like that must be the sense intended by Statius, but *prior* seems to me totally inadequate to represent that sense; nor am I in the slightest degree impressed by the gloss “id est non apparens in uultu neque in cultu qualis prius” which Hill cites from “Schol. Dres. a.” For *prior* I can do no better at the moment than *eadem or ut erat* (and heaven alone knows how the corruption could have come about), but something better still must occur to someone.

5. 64–67

erant certe media quae noctis in umbra
diam alios ignes maioraque tela gerentem
Tartareas inter thalamis uolitasse sorores
uulgarent, . . .

“. . . the goddess, armed with other torches and deadlier weapons, . . .” is what Mozley has to offer us for line 65, but since when did *maiora* mean “deadlier”? The presence in this line of *alios* might perhaps suggest the idea of replacing *maioraque* with *atque altera*, but more economical, and not inferior, would be either *grauioraque* (cf. 585) or, perhaps more to the point, *peioraque* (cf. e contra 138 melioraque).

5. 70–72

protinus a Lemno teneri fugistis Amores:
mutos Hymenuersaeque faces et frigida iusti
cura tori.

*Cura* is less than adequate here: it was not that their “care” for their lawful spouses had grown cold, it had vanished altogether. So what was now *frigida?* Surely their *flamma?* The word *cura* is an intruder from 75.

5. 102–06

stricto mox ene silentia iussit
hortatrix scelerum et medio sic ausa profari:
“rem summam instinctu superum meritiqne doloris,
o uiduae (firmate animos et pellite sexum!)
Lemniades, sancire paro; . . ."
The aged Polyxo works on the emotions of the Lemnian women, urging them to murder. Such a "desperate deed" (rem summam, so translated by Mozley) is, she claims, prompted by the gods above and by the meritus dolor which they themselves feel. Now dolor is by no means a precise word, and here could mean either "pain" or "anger"; the fact that it could mean just "pain" is enough in itself to disqualify meritus as an appropriate adjective for Polyxo to use here. What she must appeal to is the inmeritus dolor of the women.

5. 120–22

quodsi proprioribus actis
est opus, ecce animos doceat Rhodopeia coniunx,
ulta manu thalamos pariterque epulata marito.

The dreadful story of Procne is set before the Lemnian women as an example, but 122 as it stands in our manuscripts does not tell us anything about the nature of the feast she set before Tereus. I feel quite certain that pariterque conceals an original partumque, which would make all the difference in the world to Polyxo's counsel.

5. 152–55

tunc uiridi luco (lucus iuga celsa Mineruae
propter opacat humum niger ipse, sed insuper ingens
mons premit et gemina perunt caligine soles),
hic sanxere fidem, tu Martia testis Enyo . . .

Hic in 155 is unsatisfactory, since uiridi luco has preceded. Perhaps hanc?

5. 278–79

accelerate fugam, tuque, o mea digna propago,
hac rege, virgo, patrem, . . .

Surely o me digna propago?

5. 281–83

stat funesta Venus ferroque accincta furentes
adiuuat (unde manus, unde haec Mauortia diuae
pectora?).

"Whence hath the goddess this violence, this heart of Mars?" is how Mozley translates the end of this utterance, but where is "this violence" (surely the sentiment required here) to be found in the Latin of the manuscripts? Perhaps replace manus with haec uis?
Hypsipyle is now going away from the shore, so how is *prospectem* to the point? Is not *respectem* what is needed (as conversely, let me suggest, *prospexit* for *respexit* at 5. 421)? Then there is the phrase *surgentia caelo flamina*, which can hardly serve as the object of any verb of seeing. It may be that *lumina* for *flamina* is all that is required here, but *ponto* for *caelo* might additionally be worth a moment's consideration.

Since the direct speech which follows in 491–92 is in turn followed by the words *talibus examinis dictis*, it is evident that *occulta* gives exactly the opposite sense to that which is needed here. *Quin nec iam occulta* . . . therefore.

The semi-personification imported by *miserae* strikes me as out of place here. A more significant, and appropriate, epithet would be *sacrae*.

Capaneus' fatal spear enters the gaping maw of the great serpent and "cleaves the rough fastenings of the triple tongue" (so Mozley), but "rough" is not a normal meaning of *ferus*, which indeed strikes me as fearfully weak at this juncture. *Tria* or *sua* would be better than *fera*, I fancy.
Exsibilat for adsibilat?

5. 617–18

sic equidem luctus solabar et ubera paruo
iam materna dabam, . . .

"Eurydice, wife of Lycurgus, was the mother of the babe Opheltes, whom Hypsipyle had been nursing," observes Mozley in a note on line 632, and his observation highlights the factual error of *iam materna*. Perhaps the easiest solution is *non materna*, but *ceu materna* might be worth a moment’s consideration.

5. 633–35

hocne ferens onus inlaetabile matris
transfundam gremio? quae—me prius ima sub umbras
mergat humus?

Such is Hill’s punctuation, following Brinkgreve, who first postulated an aposiopesis after *quae*. Needless to say, no previous editor had suggested so improbable a change of linguistic direction. Nevertheless, *quae* is a problem, though no previous editor had suggested as much. The problem would disappear, and rhetoric be better served, if we read

*quin me prius ima sub umbras*

mergat humus!

5. 667–69

quos inter Adrastus
mitius et sociae ueritus commercia uittae
Amphiaraus ait, "ne, quae! absistite ferro, . . ."

Lycurgus, seeing the corpse of his son, makes to strike Hypsipyle, but is intercepted by Tydeus and other leaders of the Argive host. They in turn are threatened by Lycurgus’ men, and a general conflict seems imminent. Adrastus and Amphiaraus accordingly interpose themselves in the interests of peace. In line 668 *mitior* would be appreciably better than *mitius*, and for *commercia*, which is senseless in this context, we could do much worse than write *conuicia*. It is pertinent that Mozley translates, “Amphiaraus, fearing the strife of kindred fillets”; pertinent also that Markland had jibbed, not at *commercia*, but at *ueritus*, for which he proposed *meritus*, perceiving indeed that there was a target here for the emendator, but missing it by one word.

5. 719–22

sed Lemnos ad aures
ut primum dictusque Thoas, per tela manusque
inruerant, matremque auidis complexibus ambo
diripiunt flentes alternaque pectora mutant.

Three small corrections may improve the expression here: latusque for
dictusque; inruerunt for inruerant; and adripiunt for diripiunt.

6. 10-13
mox circum tristes seruata Palaemonis aras
nigra superstition, quotiens animosa resumit
Leucothea gemitus et amica ad litora festa
tempestate uenit.

Because no one in modern times has bothered to collate the Rochester
manuscript (Royal 15 C X) in its entirety (see my note in ICS 14 [1989]
227 n. 1), its variant igr a for nigra has passed unnoticed; likewise its
accompanying gloss nocens. Not indeed that there is anything particularly
objectionable in nigra, but then neither would there be anything particularly
objectionable in aegra, to which the Rochester manuscript seems to be
pointing us.

6. 74-83
namque illi et pharetras breuioraque tela dicarat
festinus uoti pater insontesque sagittas;
iam tunc et nota stabuli de gente probatos
in nomen pascebat equos cinctusque sonantes
armaque maiores expectatura lacertos.
[spes auidi quas, non in nomen credula, uestes
urguebat studio cultusque insignia regni
purpureos sceptrumque minus, cuncta ignibus atri
damnat atrox suaque ipse parens gestamina ferri,
si damnis rabidum quae exaturare dolorem.]

The passage is notoriously difficult, and I am not sure that what I have to
say about it satisfies even my own qualms; but since diagnosis may aid to a
cure, I will say it all the same. Lines 79 to 83 are omitted by the Puteaneus
and other manuscripts; and because P omits them, they were bound sooner
or later to fall under suspicion. Accordingly, they were condemned by
Müller, and are bracketed as spurious by Hill. Wrongly, in my view, since
their expression is (barring corruption) entirely Statian, and one can see how
they might have come to be omitted if one contemplates the jump from ex-
atura in 78 to exatura- in 83. As far as 78 there is, so far as I can see, no
problem; but 79, here printed by Hill in Gronovius’ version, is a mess; and
it is in that line, and that line alone, I suspect, that the key to the whole of
this passage will be found. Quite how Gronovius arrived at auid(i), for which
the manuscripts universally offer auid(a)e, I do not know; nor do I know
how his version is to be construed or interpreted. The words *credula uestes urguebat studio* must, however, refer to the contribution of Archemorus’ mother Eurydice, made to complement that of his father, and a specific reference to Eurydice, at present lacking in 79, would help greatly to clarify what is going on in 79–81. One might add, moreover, that *studio* would benefit from an adjective, while *in nomen* in 79 looks suspiciously like a scribal iteration from 77. All of which brings me to the proposal I wish to advance for the restoration of line 79, and that is:

Eurydice quas non materno credula uestes
urgebat studio . . .

Should this proposal fail to satisfy discerning critics, my hope is that it may urge one of them on to the definitive solution.

6. 109–10

*non grassante Noto citius nocturna peregit*
*flamma nemus.*

At Amphiaraus’ bidding the army fells vast swathes of forest to make a funeral pyre for Archemorus; and they do the job in double quick time, as quickly indeed as a forest fire sweeps through a grove, fanned by the south wind. Very well, but why should the flame be a “nocturnal” one? Why not rather, or as easily, a “diurnal” one? I suspect that *nocitura* lurks here.

6. 175–76

*occumbam pariter, dum uulnere iusto*
*exaturata oculos unumque impeller in ignem.*

What wondrous syntax! *Occumbam . . . exaturata . . . impellanur*—the sequence of first person singular verb, nominative singular participle, and first person plural verb, all supposedly referring to one and the same person, constitutes an egregious solecism. Write:

*exaturata oculos unumque impellar in ignem.*

6. 217–19

*ter curuos egere sinus, inlisaque telis*
*tela sonant, quater horrendum pepulere fragorem*
*arma, quater mollem famularum bracchia planctum.*

The Greek kings ride around the funeral pyre, clashing their arms as they go, and the handmaids respond by beating their breasts. The very strange arithmetic (*ter . . . quater . . . quater*) appears not to have bothered anyone except Mozley, who comments: “It is not clear why, if they clashed arms thrice, the noise was heard four times.” Quite so; and surely the number
ought to be the same on all three occasions. In 217 *ter* is guaranteed by metre, so let us make necessary changes in 218 and 219, as follows:

*tela sonant, terque horrendum pepulere fragorem
arma, ter et mollem famularum bracchia planctum.*

Once *terque* had become *quater* (via *que-ter*), it was inevitable that *ter et* would follow suit.

6. 223–24

*dextri gyro et uibrantibus hastis
hac redeunt, . . .*

If Gronovius had wanted to spend his time profitably on these lines, he should have spared himself the trouble of defending *dextri* (which does not need defence) and concentrated rather on the jarring inelegance of *gyro et . . . armis* and the inscrutability of *hac* (translated by Mozley as though it were *sic*). I suggest that what Statius left behind him was:

*dextri gyrant uibrantibus hastis
ac redeunt, . . .*

6. 358–59

*nam saepe Iouem Phlegramque suique
anguis opus fratumque pius cantarat honores.*

Often had Phoebus sung of Jove’s victory at Phlegra and “his own victory o’er the serpent” (so Mozley translates), and that sentiment seems to me to call for *suumque*.

6. 563–66

*nota parens cursu; quis Maenaliae Atalantes
nesciat egregium decus et uestigia cunctis
independra procis? onerat celeberrima natum
tater, . . .*

If Parthenopaeus fell short of his mother Atalanta as a runner, it would be perfectly appropriate to say that her glory was a burden to him (*onerat*), but he himself is *procul fama iam notus*, and her fame, accordingly, can be no burden to him. What it can be is an adornment, and Statius here, I fancy, wrote *ornat*.

6. 661–63

*uix unus Phlegyas acerque Menestheus
(hos etiam pudor et magni tenuere parentes)
promisere manum.*
Hippomedon’s strength in handling the discus is so great that all the competitors bar Phlegyas and Menestheus opt out of the competition, and it is only a sense of shame and a consciousness of great ancestry that prevent them from following suit. Etiam here seems to suggest that these two considerations were additional to other constraints, when in fact they were the only ones. Etenim therefore?

6. 695–96

excitit ante pedes elapsum pondus et ictus
destituit frustraque manum demisit inanem.

Phlegyas is in mid-throw when the discus slips from his grasp. For the action of throwing a discus I should have said that the right word was not ictus but actus, and for the effect of losing the discus I should have said that the variant reading dimisit was preferable to demisit: relieved of the weight indeed, the hand is, if anything, more likely to fly up than down.

6. 751–52

tuto procul ora recessu
armorum in speculis, aditusque ad uulnera clausi.

We move on now to the boxing match between Capaneus and Alcidamas. Both stand on tiptoe, with their guard up, their eyes on their opponent. “Safe withdrawn are their faces on their shoulders, ever watching, and closed is the approach to wounds,” says Mosley, by some sort of double vision, it should seem, perceiving scapulis alongside speculis! Tuto . . . recessu armorum, “safe within the recess of their weapons”—since the boxers’ gloves are reinforced with lumps of lead (732), armorum is perhaps just tolerable, but the expression is strained, I should say, even for Statius, and I am much drawn to the idea of replacing armorum with ulnarum, a word very well suited to represent the cradling effect of the fighters’ uplifted and extended arms.

6. 765–66

doctor hic differt animum metuensque futuri
cunctatus uires dispensat.

Capaneus, being more experienced, husbands his strength at the outset of the fight. Most manuscripts give cunctatus, but the Putaneus offers cunctatur, from which Bachrens elicited cunctator, thus generalising about Capaneus’ style of fighting. If, however, a particular tactic was here in Statius’ mind, he might well have chosen to write cunctanter.
leuat ecce diuque minatur
in latus inque oculos; illum rigida arma cauentem
auocat ac manibus necopinum interserit ictum . . .

“Leuat sc. manus (uel rigida arma . . .)” is Hill’s comment on 779, but the ellipse is exceedingly harsh, and the picture of what is happening is consequently difficult to visualise. I feel pretty certain that leuat conceals an original l(a)eua (sc. manu), and that Statius left behind him the following form of words:

læua ecce diuque minatus
in latus inque oculos, illum rigida arma cauentem
auocat ac dextra necopinum interserit ictum . . .

No one who has ever watched a boxing match can fail to recognise this picture: the fighter first jabs with his left so as to distract his opponent's attention, and then comes in suddenly with his right in the hope of a knock-out.

6. 802–05

ece iterum inmodice uenientem eludit et exit
sponte ruens mersusque umeris: effunditur ille
in caput, adsurgentem alio puer improbus ictu
perculit euentuque impalluit ipse secundo.

Alcidamas, the subject of the first section, eludes Capaneus’ charge by dropping down (ruens: not rushing, as Mozley imagines) with his head tucked into his shoulders; Capaneus goes right over the top of him, falling head first, and as he gets up, is felled alio . . . ictu. Not at all surprisingly, Mozley was troubled by alio ictu, which he tried vainly to defend (“The word 'alio,'” l. 804, seems to imply Capaneus’ fall as being the first blow”) when he would have done much better to resort to one of the easiest of all emendations, alto for alio. Finally, perhaps expalluit for impalluit?

6. 813–15

nec mora, prorumpit Tydeus, nec iussa recusat
Hippomedon; tunc uix ambo conatibus ambas
restringunt cohibentque manus ac plurima suadent.

The ignominy of his fall infuriates Capaneus, and Adrastus can see that he will not stop now until he has murdered the young Laconian. Tydeus and Hippomedon, accordingly, jump forward to restrain Capaneus. In line 814 tunc strikes me as an idle stopgap, and I suspect that it has taken the place of an original tamen, which followed ambo, thus:
Hippomedon; uix ambo tamen conatibus ambas restringunt cohibentque manus ac plurima suadent.

6. 819–22

uociferans: "liceat! non has ego puluere crasso atque cruore genas, meruit quibus iste fauorem semiuiri, foedem, mittamque informe sepulcro corpus et Oebalio donem lugere magistro?"

Capaneus' vociferation, as regularly now printed, changes tack with an abruptness difficult to register on the inner ear, shifting with one word from entreaty to blustering threat. I find myself wondering whether Statius did not settle for an easier run of words and couch the whole of Capaneus' outburst in the form of an entreaty:

"liceat nunc has ego puluere crasso . . . 819
corpus et Oebalio donem lugere magistro!" 822

6. 840–43

sed non ille rigor patriumque in corpore robur:
luxuriant artus, effusaque sanguine laxo
membra natant; unde haec audax fiducia tantum
Oenidae superare parem.

Agylleus has vast bulk, but he is flabby and sluggish, and his poor condition encourages Tydeus (Oenides) to hope for victory. That, surely, is the general sense intended, but particular problems of text prevent that sense from being intelligibly conveyed. Quite what the meaning of sanguine laxo may be, I am at a loss to tell; nor do I see what the force is of effusa sanguine. For effusa some manuscripts give effeta, and this may possibly be right, unless it in fact is an early conjecture. I myself incline to suffusa, with lasso in place of laxo. Finally, in 842, I fancy that Statius wrote, not haec, but hunc.

6. 864–69

non sic ductores gemini gregis horrida tauri
bella mouent; medio coniunx stat candida prato
uictorem expectans, rumpunt obnixa furentes
pectora, subdit amor stimulos et uulnera sanat:
fulmineo sic dente sues, sic hispida turpes
proelia uiliosis ineunt complexibus ursi.

Two matters need attention here, of which the first is the more important. That the concentration of each and every reader of a text is fitful is well known; but I can only say that I am amazed that no reader of this text has
spotted the idiocy of *non sic* in line 864: how could anybody assert that two bulls make war “less fiercely” than Tydeus and Agylleus? What, after all, would such an assertion mean? And how precisely did the bulls fight, if not with all the ferocity at their disposal? The idiocy, moreover, is made still more blatant by the absence of *non* from line 868, which must imply, as the text of this passage stands at present, that boars and bears have more ferocity than bulls when it comes to a fight. The word that offends here is *non, and for non sic* I would suggest the easy expedient *sic sibi*. The second matter concerns the noun *pectora* in line 867, where the participle *obnixa* tells rather for *cornua*, or for *tempora*, the beast’s head, not its chest, serving it as a battering ram with which to attack its opponent.

6. 872–74

contra non integer ille
flatibus alternis aegroque effetus hiatu
exuit ingestas fluio sudoris harenas . . .

The out-of-condition Agylleus is now in a bad way, breathing heavily and sweating profusely. His sweat indeed is now so profuse that it washes off the caked sand—and for that sense to be obtained, what we need is *eluit*, not *exuit*.

6. 906–10

“quid si non sanguinis huius
partem haud exiguam (scitis) Dirceus haberet
campus, ubi hae nuper Thebarum foedera plagae?”
haec simul ostentans quaesitaque praemia laudem
dat sociis, sequitur neglectus Agyllea thorax. 910

The phrasing of line 909 would be appreciably improved, I think, if we read *has simul ostentat* . . .

6. 921–23

tum generum, ne laudis egens, iubet ardua necti
tempora Thebarumque ingenti uoce citari
uictorem: dirae retinebant omina Parcae.

The syntax of *ne laudis egens*, where a finite verb form is to seek, is rather strange. Did Statius perhaps write *ne laude egeat*?

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Statius Silvae 4. 9: Libertas Decembris?

CYNTHIA DAMON

The last poem of Statius’ 4th book of Silvae is generally taken to be a Saturnalia-inspired reproach directed at a well-connected patronus by a poet who has come off rather the worse in an exchange of gifts. The connections with Catullus’ 14th poem—a poem in which Catullus commemorates a Saturnalia gift-book—and with Martial’s complaints about meagre gifts from patrons have been noted. It has even been argued that in Silvae 4. 9 Statius makes use of the license of the season to produce a poem in which “he accuses his addressee of a lack of literary taste.” A closer examination of the “parallels” in Martial, together with a glance at Statius’ other poems in hendecasyllables (Silvae 1. 6, 2. 7, 4. 3), will reveal some of the problems which arise if one reads the poem this way. By defining the tone of Silvae 4. 9 in terms of the distance between it and the poems in which Catullus chaffs his literarily inclined friends one can get a better sense of the délicatesse that Statius applies in managing his relations with Plotius Grypus.

The epigrams in which Martial expresses a sense of injury at having received a gift of little market value, parallel to 4. 9 as they appear at first glance, are in fact all addressed to fictitious donors and celebrate the poet’s ingenuity, not the receipt of real, if paltry, gifts. On the disappointing half-pound of pepper sent by the “Sextus” who had sent a pound of silver the


2 K. M. Coleman, “Silvae 4. 9: A Statian Name-Game,” PACA 14 (1978) 9-10. She continues: “in addressing his accusation to a Grypus, Statius uses the associations of ‘nasutus’ to draw attention to sensibilities which are noticeably lacking in Plotius.” In her more recent commentary (previous note) she is less precise about who the target of the poem, which she calls “a satire on poor literary taste and the absence of social graces,” is. Her final remark on the tone of the poem, that “in all, the teasing note, familiar from Catullus (and also Cicero and Horace), is not meant to be taken seriously,” is too much ex cathedra; it is my aim to show how Statius’ teasing differs from that of Catullus.
year before, for example, he quips *tanti non emo*, *Sexte, piper* (10. 57. 2). And the long tirade in 11. 18 on the insufficiency of a rural property given the poet by “Lupus” only prepares for the joke at the end (25–27):

Errasti, Lupe, littera sed una:

nam quo tempore praedium dedisti,
mallem tu mihi prandium dedisses.4

On the other hand, the thank-you notes that Martial addresses to real people are always grateful, not to say effusive, in tone. Hyperbolic gratitude is perhaps to be expected in an epigram acknowledging the gift of a toga from the imperial freedman Parthenius (8. 28), but the toga from M. Antonius Primus is warmly received as well (10. 73):

Littera facundi gratum mihi pignus amici
pertulit, Ausoniae dona severa5 togae,
qua non Fabriicius, sed vellet Apicius uti,
vellet Maecenas Caesarianus eques.
vilior haec nobis alio mittente fuisset;
non quacumque manu victima caesa latat:
a te missa venit: possem nisi munus amare,
Marce, tuuum, poteram nomen amare meum.6

3 For more abuse of “Sextus” see 2. 3, 13, 44, 55, 3. 11, 38, 4. 68, 7. 86, 8. 17. The Sextus who is praised in 5. 5 is carefully differentiated from these disgraceful Sexti in the first line of his epigram: *Sexte, Palatinae cultor facunde Minervae.*

4 On the fictionality of this “Lupus” see P. White, “The Friends of Martial, Statius and Pliny and the Dispersal of Patronage,” *HSCP* 79 (1975) 265–300, esp. 271 n. 14, and N. M. Kay, *Martial Book XI: A Commentary* (London 1985) 249. Other abusive thank-you notes are addressed to “Galla” (5. 84, she sent nothing), “Umber” (7. 53, he sent along a variety of gifts, totaling only 30 *nummi* in value, however; cf. 12. 81, where despite his newly wealthy state he sends *alica*—barley water—when before he sent a cape—*alicina*) and “Postumianus” (8. 71, over the years his gifts have been shrinking in value). “Paulus,” to whom the wry thanks of 8. 33 and the outright abuse of 2. 20, 4. 17, 5. 4, 22, 6. 12, 9. 85, 10. 10 and 12. 69 are addressed, may also be the addressee of the flattering poem 7. 72, or there may be more than one Paulus addressed in the collection (cf. 9. 31 for a poem seeking the favor of Velius [Paulus]). Among the more than 400 satirical epigrams in the *Greek Anthology* (Book 11) there are plenty of abusive poems, but none directed at givers of gifts and only a very small number directed at less-than-hospitable hosts (11. 14, 313, 314, possibly also 135 and 137).


6 This couplet is misleadingly mistranslated in the Loeb edition of W. C. A. Ker (Cambridge, MA 1920): “if I could not love your gift, I could love at least my own name.” An exactly parallel construction is to be found at 10. 89. 4–5 (*Junonem, Polyclitum, swam nisi frater amaret/ Junonem poterat frater amare tuam*), where Ker translates, correctly: “Did not her brother love his own Juno, Polyclitus, that brother might well have loved this Juno of thine.” In 10. 73 the imperfect *possem* does duty in a past contrary-to-fact protasis, and the indicative *poteram* stands in the apodosis because the possibility of enjoyment of the *nomen* is in no way conditional (cf. the pluperfect subjunctive in 8. 30—the topic is the Scaevola-like fortitude of a criminal in the amphitheatre: *quod nisi rapta foret noli mei poena, parbat/ saevior in lassos ire sinistra focos 7–8*). The translation of the couplet should read: “had I not been able to love your gift [which of course I was], I was
Statins' valuable gifts acknowledged: Some of the gifts mentioned by Martial are more valuable than the volume of Brutus' oscillationes that Statius received: an ornate cup from Instantius Rufus (8. 50), a carriage from Aelianus (12. 24), an estate from Marcella (12. 31), but the difference in tone between Martial's complaining epigrams and his grateful ones is, I think, due more to the value of the addressee than to the value of the gift.

If Martial's recipe for these thank-you notes calls for a large measure of gratitude with wit admixed to taste (more wit for Instantius Rufus, the addressee of 8. 50 and a number of other high-quality epigrams, less for Aelianus and Marcella, each appearing twice only), how is it that we find Statius, whose attitude towards his patrons in the Silvae is consistently more reverent than that of the epigrammatist, sending young Plotius Grypus a poem in which he draws attention "to sensibilities which are noticeably lacking in Plotius"? Statius' thank-you, despite the dues of flattery paid with the résumé of Grypus' public career (lines 14–19), would seem to push at the boundaries of acceptable libertas Decembris, and that too in a poem not for Grypus' ears only, but one included in a liber intended for a broader public (hunc tamen librum tu, Marcellae, defendes 4 pr. 34). Can this reading of the poem's tone be right? Would Grypus have read it thus?

able to love my own name." On the meaning of the latter phrase, see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, CP 73 (1978) 287.

7 Primus is also the addressee of 9. 99, 10. 23, 32.


9 Epigram 9. 72 might seem to constitute a counter-example: The boxer Liber, who is thanked for no more than a dinner, ought (Martial hints) to have paid heed to the suggestion inherent in his name and sent wine, too (5–6). The suggestion that the giver might make perfect his gift by supplementing it is used in epigrams prompted by more valuable gifts, too. Among the 21 epigrams addressed to Arruntius Stella is a poem acknowledging a gift of roof tiles: plurima, quae posset subitos effundere nimbos, l muneribus venit tegula missa tuis (7. 36. 3–4). The epigram is capped by the couplet horridus, ecce, sonat Boreae stridore December! Stella, legis villam, non legis agricolam (5–6), hinting that a winter garment would not have come amiss. I wonder, however, whether these "hints" were anything more than a convenient closing device, whether Martial really thought the supplemental gift might be forthcoming if only he made bold to ask. He uses the same tactic to conclude the thank-you note to Parthenius, an unlikely target, one would think, for carping ingratitude: O quantos risus pariter spectata movebit l cum Palatina nostra lacerna togal! (8. 28. 21–22), where the humor at his own expense is at least as emphatic as the "hint."

10 The other poem addressed to Marcella (12. 21) is even more unctuous than the thank-you note. Aelianus receives only a passing reference in 11. 40.

11 See above, note 2.
One way to approach such questions is to examine generic precedents. The three other hendecasyllable poems in the *Silvae* provide a sense of what an ancient reader’s expectations in approaching 4. 9 are likely to have been.

*Silvae* 1. 6 is perhaps the closest comparandum, being, like 4. 9, a Saturnalia poem (it has the *titulus* “Kalendae Decembres,” and is addressed to Domitian). In this poem, too, Statius foregrounds the license of the season, seeking inspiration at the outset not from Apollo and company, but from *Saturnus, ridens locus* and *Sales protervi* (1. 6. 1–8; cf. 45 libertas). But it turns out that * locos licentes* (93) are among the features of the festival that surpass verbal expression (*quis canat . . .? iamiam deficio* 94–95). As such, they are reproduced nowhere in the poem, which remains thoroughly panegyric. Statius has another hendecasyllable poem addressed to Domitian, *Silvae* 4. 3, on the recently completed Via Domitiana from Sinuessa to Puteoli, and as the description that Statius provides for this poem in the epistle prefatory to Book 4 suggests—*tertio viam Domitianam miratus sum* (4 pr. 7)—its content, too, is praise and its tone lofty. His choice of the hendecasyllable meter for *Silvae* 2. 7, the *genethliacon Lucani ad Pollam*, was, Statius tells us, a gesture of respect for the dead (hexameter) poet: *laudes eius dicturus hexametros meos timui* (2 pr. 25–26). The poem is no less respectful towards its subject (cf. *reverentiam* 2 pr. 25) than are 1. 6 and 4. 3. My point, really, is that the meter of 4. 9 in and of itself ought not to create the expectation of Catullan or Saturnalian irreverence.

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12 The phrase *locos licentes* which stands in the first impression of Courtney’s OCT is a typographical error for *locos licentes*.

13 During the imperial period praising the emperor was not so much an expression of approval as it was a public declaration (which might be true or false) that one was not subversive. The warmth of the praise necessary to make this declaration persuasive varied under different emperors—warmer under Nero, for example, and cooler under Trajan. In pronouncing *Silvae* 1. 6 panegyric I simply mean to say that Statius is taking a non-confrontational stance, and I leave open the possibility that he may have reserved for himself and perhaps a circle of friends a private laugh at the absurdities of contemporary panegyric and imperial posing. I would not go as far as F. M. Ahl does (in “The Rider and the Horse: Politics and Power in Roman Poetry from Horace to Statius,” in ANRW II.32.1, ed. by W. Haase [Berlin 1984] 40–110) and say that Statius’ purpose in flattering Domitian is “to hold the emperor up for the ridicule of later generations” (91), nor as far as J. Garthwaite does (in the analysis of *Silvae* 3. 4 which is appended to Ahl’s article, pp. 111–24), when he suggests that there are elements of “satire against Domitian” in the *Silvae* and the *Thebaid*, and that Statius had to leave Rome in consequence (124).

14 Cf. Coleman (above, note 1) ad loc. on the high tone of the extended anaphora of lines 9–26, and note the lengthy speeches by divinities in 72–94, 124–64.

Of course Statius himself proclaims that both will be forthcoming (hendecasyllabos quos Saturnalibus una risimus 4 pr. 23–24), but forewarned by the example of 1. 6—that is to say by the overwhelming presence of panegyric in a poem which claimed to offer libertas—[17]—we can perhaps reach a more satisfactory understanding of the Catullan and Saturnalian components of Silvae 4. 9.

The wit that Statius makes such a memorable characteristic of the addressee of 4. 9 is of a particularly Catullan variety (quo soles lepore 54; cf. est sane iocus iste),[18] and while the poem’s verbal debt to Catullus has been examined by Vollmer, Colton and Coleman, more can be said about its situational debt to the polystrema. The Catullan poems most strongly evoked by 4. 9 are 14, 44 and 50, with less prominent echoes of 22 and 38. The selection is significant. These are all poems in which Catullus’ friendships and the closely connected topic of literary aesthetics occupy center stage. A number of Catullus’ actions are mirrored by those which Statius ascribes to Grypus. Like the Catullus of Poem 22, Grypus is the recipient of a lavishly produced volume (cartae regiae, novi libri, novi umbilici, lora rubra membranae, directa plumbo et pumice omnia aequata 6–8; cf. 4. 9. 7–9), and like the Catullus of 14, who promises to requite the favor of a dull gift-book with the worst things he can find in the booksellers’ cases (nam, si luxerit, ad librariorum / curram scriinia, Caesios, Aquinos, / Suffenum, omnia colligam venena 14. 17–20), Grypus enforces himself on Statius by sending Bruti senis oscillationes, de capsa miseri libellionis, emptum plus minus asse Gaiano (4. 9. 20–22). The Calvus who is to be punished in Poem 14 is the same man as the Licinius with whom Catullus enjoyed the poetical field-day so warmly recalled at the beginning of Poem 50 (Hesterno, Licini, die otiosi / multum lusimus in meis tabellis, / . . . / reddens mutua per iocum atque vinum 50. 1–6), a scene evoked not only by the iocus with which Statius begins his poem, but also by the words with which he presents the poem to the dedicatee of Book 4: Plotio Grypo, maioris gradus iuueni, dignius opusculum reddam, sed interim hendecasyllabos quos Saturnalibus una risimus huic volumini inserui (4 pr. 22–24).[19] Catullus’ Poem 50 is a hendecasyllabic working-off of the effects of that poetic colloquium, and Statius ends his poem in mock

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17 The two are also combined in the verses of Martial to which Pliny took such a fancy (adloquitur Musam, mandat ut domum meam Esquilis quaerat, adeat reverenter: “sed ne tempore non tuo disertam / pulses ebria ianuam, videto . . . ,” Ep. 3. 21. 5).
18 If Coleman is correct in seeing in “Grypus,” i.e. γρυπός, a calque on nasutus, it may reinforce the quality referred to here, not undercut it (see above, note 2).
19 A generation before Statius a Greek poet, Lucillius, took Catullus 50 as the starting point for one of his satirical epigrams (AP 11. 134), but the difficulty of identifying its addressee Heliodorus (cf. 11. 137) and even of determining whether he is real or fictional make one wary of using it to justify a satirical reading of Silvae 4. 9. (For an attempt to identify Heliodorus and the arguments against the idea see J. Geffcken, s.v. “Lukillios,” RE XIII [1927] 1777.28–78.10.)
apprehension lest Grypus be similarly aroused: *irascor tibi, Grype. sed valebis;/ tantum ne mihi, quo soles lepore/ et nunc hendecasyllabos remittas* (53–55). If the likelihood of his making a metrical retort aligns Grypus with Catullus, his *lepos* (54) and his oratorical prowess (14–16) are the virtues of Catullus’ friend Calvus (salaputium disertum 53.5, *tuo lepore* 50.7). And not only does Grypus possess qualities which pass for virtues in the Catullan world, but he is also honored for his freedom from failings obnoxious to Catullus. By refraining from sending his own speeches for the delectation of his sometime dinner companion, for example, Grypus shows himself very unlike Sestius, the perusal of whose *oratio in Antium petitorem* caused such physical distress to Catullus (44.13).

There is still more to be learned from the Catullan poems evoked by Statius’ *hendecasyllabi iocosii*, however. For while Statius describes Grypus in terms which Catullus would have used to praise someone of whom he approved, he does not arrogate to himself equal standing in that world. Where the Catullus of 44 seeks to turn the effect that Sestius’ *malus liber* had on him back onto its author (44.18–20), Statius professes to regret the fact that Grypus did not send his own writings (4.9.14–16). And where Catullus admits the motivating effect that Sestius’ *sumptuosae ceneae* had had on him (44.9; cf. [Sestius] *tunc vocat me, cum malum librum legi* 21), the banquets with which Grypus has gratified Statius are kept entirely separate from the exchange of reading material (line 51). A similar restraint is observable in the way Statius adopts words that Catullus had used in a fond reproach to his friend Comificius (*irascor tibi* 38.6): Statius omits the note of intimacy which so pleases one in Catullus’ protest, *sic meos amores?*, moving directly to his farewell: *irascor tibi, Grype, sed valebis* (4.9.53).

Statius, then, does not quite credit himself with the behavior worthy of Catullus that he ascribes to Grypus. Nor does he lay claim to the refined literary sensibilities of Catullus’ world. Catullus begins Poem 14 by asking what he had done to deserve this horrible book (*quid feci ego quidue sum locutus;/ cur me tot male perderes poeta?* 4–5), but Statius begins 4.9 with the answer—he sent a volume of his writings to Grypus. His fancy book is thereby implicated with the awful poems forwarded to Catullus by Calvus (*di magni, horribilem et sacrum libellum* 14.12; cf. *saecli*

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20 Catullus’ use of hendecasyllables as a weapon of attack is well documented in the collection: *aut hendecasyllabos trecentos/ exspecta aut mihi linteum remitte* (12.10; cf. *adeste hendecasyllabi* 42.1; Poems 14, 16, 21, 23, 24, 28, 29 and 33 are attacks in hendecasyllables).

21 There is a parallel for his drawing of Grypus as a contemporary Catullus or Calvus in the fifth poem of this book (Statius’ only surviving experiment with Horace’s Alcaics), where he conjures up a modern-day Horace in Septimius Severus: *sed memor interim/ nostri verecundo latentem/ barbiton ingemina sub antro* (4.5.58–60; cf. *Odes* 1.1.34, 1.32.4, 3.26.4, the only previous appearances of *barbitos* in Latin, unless one counts the probably spurious poem [Ov.] *Her.* 15.8).
incommoda, pessimi poetae 23), and, given the details of the description, with Suffenus’ dreadful (but nice-looking) collection.22 Statius’ reaction to the speeches of Brutus which Grypus selected for him may have a similarly modest point.23 According to Coleman, the choice of these dull works reveals Grypus’ poor literary taste,24 yet it is surely not coincidental that in roughly contemporary discussions of oratory Brutus and Catullus’ friend Calvus were repeatedly paired as the stylistic opposition to Cicero (Quintilian 12. 1. 24, 10. 12; Tac. Dial. 18. 4–5; cf. Cic. Brut. 280–84).25

22 On the physical resemblance of Statius’ volume and Suffenus’, see the discussions of Colton and Coleman (above, note 1). And yet, I wonder just how fancy Statius’ offering really was. Coleman thinks that the 10-as production-cost indicates “very costly materials,” but her examples do not bear her out (esp. the 5-denarius, i.e. 80-as, edition of Martial’s Book 1 [1. 117. 17]). Vollmer, on the other hand, sees the cost as a “niedrigen, aber auch so in der Scherz passenden Preis.”

23 The other Brutus who has been cumbered with the authorship of these oscitationes is the Gracchan-era jurist M. Junius Brutus. H. Mattingly (“Nomentanus,” PCPhS 181 [1950–51] 12–14), for example, sees a nest of references to the age of the Gracchi in Statius’ poem: Brutus is the jurist, as Gaianus is a reference to C. Gracchus’ revaluation of coinage (16 asses to the denarius, instead of 10) and decussis to the 10-as piece which went out of use after this devaluation. However, the shift from a 10- to a 16-as denarius seems to have preceded Gracchus’ tribunate by more than a decade (M. H. Crawford, Coinage and Money under the Republic: Italy and the Mediterranean Economy [Berkeley 1985] 59–61) and is never elsewhere connected with the tribune. The 10-as piece, the decussis, was in fact rarely minted (10 asses being the equivalent of the silver denarius piece before the devaluation and an awkward denomination—2.5 sesterces or .625 denarius—after it). The only bronze coins with multiple-as values that were at all common were the dupondius (2 asses) and the tricessis (3 asses). And yet there are words, Varro tells us, for 4 asses, 5 asses and so on up to 9 asses, and also for 20 asses and 100 (De ling. lat. 5. 169–70, 9. 81–83; cf. Priscian, GL III 415.17 Keil). These words must refer not to coins, but to sums of money. This is easy enough to see in Festus’ discussion of peculatus, for example: ut bos centussibus, ovis decussibus aestimaretur (237 M; cf. 54 M: centussibus ... id est centum assibus, qui erant breves nummi ex aere), or when Horace’s miser Opimius begrudges the eight asses his doctor spent on some soup for him (octussibus, Sat. 2. 3. 156). Lucilius seems to have created a metaphorical hundred-as piece, the centussis misellus of Fannius, the author of sumptuary legislation limiting expenditure on feast days to 100 asses (1173 M; cf. Gell. 2. 24. 3–6 for the context). Lucilius’ centussis, in all likelihood, gave rise to that of Varro (Men. 404) and to the clipped hundred-as piece of Persius (curto centusse 5. 191).

24 Coleman (above, note 1) 221. I would myself say that the rhetorical point of the two long lists which show that Silvae 4. 9 was written in the world which produced Martial rather than that which produced Catullus (lines 10–14, 23–45) is not to give vent to Statius’ chagrin at the measly value of the gift he received, but to show how modestly low he puts the value of his own offering: sed certa velut aequa in sitateria / nil mutas, sed idem mihi rependis (46–47).

25 Vitiarius Marcellus, the dedicatee of Book 4, ought to have understood the reference, at any rate, for he is also the dedicatee of Quintilian’s Institutio. Interest in the matter seems to have inspired the composition of some spurious letters to Cicero from Calvus and Brutus, “ex quibus facile est reprehendere Calvum quidem Ciceroni visum exsanguem et aridum, Brutum autem otiosum atque diuinctum; rurasque Ciceronem a Calvo quidem male audisse tamquam solutum et enervem, a Bruto autem, ut ipsius verbis utar, fractum atque elumbem” (Tac. Dial. 18. 5). Ovid’s phrase, doctus et in promptu scrinia Brutus habet (Ex
Perhaps Statius means to point up Grypus’ pure standards of taste, and simultaneously display his own lack of refinement—he professes to have found them boring, after all. He can afford such gentle self-deprecation in this, the most pleasant and lively of the *Silvae*.

For all its wit, however, the poem illustrates well some of the real differences between Catullus’ world and Statius’. The Saturnalia festival must in fact have posed a tricky problem of etiquette for someone in Statius’ position. The festival itself condoned, even invited a certain degree of impudence, and the literary tradition offered *exempla* of perhaps exaggerated license, but what sensible dependent would fail to take thought for the day after the festival? The fictional Davus’ forthrightness had to be checked by a threat (*octius hinc te / ni rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino*, Hor. *Sat.* 2. 7. 117–18), but Statius was not so heedless. Lest even this carefully unpresuming, subtly flattering Saturnalia-address seem too bold (at least to eyes not acquainted with both parties), he prefaced it with a disclaimer: *Plotio Grypo, maioris gradus iuueni, dignius opusculum reddam, sed interim hendecasyllabos quos Saturnalibus una risimus huic volumini inserui* (4 pr. 22–24). Statius never lost sight of the realities of his position.

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*Ponto* 1. 1. 24), can be read as further evidence of the esteem accorded Brutus’ works with the aid of Martial 14. 37 (*selectos nisi das mihi libellos / admitam tineas trucesque blattas*, spoken by a *scrinium*): The *scrinia* served to protect valued rolls from damage.
"Thus Nature Ordains": Juvenal’s Fourteenth Satire

ALAN M. CORN

Satire 14 has long been neglected and misunderstood. At first glance, it seems to be merely a catalog of immoral and avaricious activities in Roman society. Most critics have readily apprehended the surface meaning, but they have rarely understood the ironic and satiric subtext. In an effort to clarify its meaning, I will examine the ironic undertones and structural unities of Satire 14.

Juvenal presents a series of rhetorical examples which focus on the father-son relationship, avarice, and the ordering of nature. The excesses enumerated progress from the exempla domestica of a simple Roman father to the crimes of the father of the entire Roman people, namely Claudius (330–31). As in Satire 13, Juvenal stands apart from the comic spectacle he describes. Not relying upon indignatio as in the earlier satires, he chooses subtle irony and deflation to make his point. Juvenal takes on the role of a pseudo-moralist whose opinions and arguments are suspect from beginning to end. In this way Juvenal exposes the bankruptcy of the Roman moral tradition.


2 J. Ferguson, Juvenal. The Satires (New York 1979) 315–16, believes that Satire 14 is a unified attack on the family and its headlong search for the acquisition of wealth. The alternative to extreme avarice is a life of simplicity and moderation.

3 S. C. Fredericks, “Calvinus in Juvenal’s Thirteenth Satire,” Arethusa 4 (1971) 227, believes that Juvenal is aloof from avaritia and regards the pursuit of money as a comic spectacle.


5 S. H. Braund, Beyond Anger: A Study of Juvenal’s Third Book of Satires (Cambridge 1988) 111, recognizes the moralizing speaker in Satires 8 and 14. She states: “The presence of this philosophical or moralising material has tended to obscure the ironic element in Juvenal’s so-called moralist, not least because of the links or overlaps often
Satire 14 is divided into four basic parts.\(^6\) Section one (1–106) gives multiple examples of the proposition, sic natura iubet, and shows how it controls the parent–child relationship in man as well as animal. The elements of "nature" and "ordering" run consistently throughout the satire. In the second section (107–255) Juvenal shows how avarice causes the undermining of the parent–child relationship, and as a result destroys the fabric of Roman society. The movement in the first two parts is from a general presentation of how parents teach their children all kinds of vices (1–106) to a specific examination of how parents by example teach their children avariciousness (107–255). However, the overriding principle in these first two sections remains sic natura iubet.

In the third section (256–316), in order to engage in a short digression on his satiric philosophy, Juvenal momentarily moves away from the parent–child motif. Finally, the epilogue (316–31) combines his statements on the ordering of nature, the absurdity of avarice, and his concern for the father–son relationship in Roman society. The image of the father as philosopher and king is central to this final passage. The mention of Epicurus, Socrates, Croesus, and Claudius points this out. Narcissus symbolically takes on the role of the evil son by willingly carrying out the orders of his emperor, the symbolic father of the entire Roman world. Through his mention of Epicurus, who turned his back on avarice, Socrates, who searched for the truth, Croesus and the Persian kingdoms, which are examples of extreme wealth, and Claudius, who ordered his freedman Narcissus to kill Messalina, Juvenal reinforces the unity of Satire 14 by intertwining and linking all the major themes: (1) father–son, (2) avarice, and (3) sic natura iubet. Thus, Juvenal moves from an exposition of the specific evils of Roman society to a general philosophical comment about the nature of man which is a common structure in Satires 11–15.\(^7\)

perceived between satirists and moralists. But, Juvenal's so-called moralist is, in effect a parody of a moralist.”

\(^6\) For comments on the structure of Satire 14 see J. D. Duff (ed.), D. Iunii Juvenalis Saturae XIV, rev. M. Coffey (Cambridge 1970) 413, who saw only a slight connection between the two major parts (1–106 and 107–331); M. Coffey, Roman Satire (London 1976) 134, who believed that the theme of bad parental examples gave a unity of structure until the sensational description of the merchants at sea (265–302); O'Neil (above, note 1) 252, who divided the satire into three parts (1–106, 107–316, and 316–331); Ferguson (above, note 2) 305 broadly follows O'Neil's account of the structure; E. C. Courtney, A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal (London 1980) 561–89, also follows O'Neil's structure; Hight (above, note 1) 283–84 n. 4 was happy with a four-part structure (1–106, 107–255, 256–316, and 316–31). The arrangement chosen in this article borrows and alters structures from O'Neil and Hight in order to achieve a logical flow and movement to the satire.

\(^7\) Satires 11–15 consistently end on philosophic generalizations that pose some ironic problem for the critic. If we look at them all together, we can find a satirist who offers his audience a moderate way of living. But it is not simply moderation which must be our guide. Juvenal suggests that we must live a life tempered by sapientia. For further study of this comparison of Satires 11–15, see K. Weisinger, “Irony and Moderation in Juvenal
Satire 14 begins by recalling an idea that Juvenal set forth in Satire 1 (147–49): Posttery can add nothing further to our traditions (nostris moribus), the grandchildren will do the same things that their parents did; and vice is a recurring evil afflicting generation after generation. Satire 14 contains a similar theme (1–3): Parents demonstrate (monstrani) and hand down (tradunt) to their sons many things worthy of notoriety.

The examples which follow (4–30) show the perversion of the parent–child relationship and indicate how that relationship can be used to teach the vices of gambling, gluttony, cruelty, and promiscuity. First, Juvenal parodies epic as he details the consequences of a father who gambles (4–6). His son cannot help but brandish the “arms” (movet arma) his father uses. The tools of gambling are sarcastically referred to as weapons. The dinners which follow (6–14) to illustrate gluttony are a standard Juvenalian motif showing the degeneration of society.

Next, the cruelty of Rutilus is revealed (15–24). These lines contain a wealth of philosophical and epic allusion, and hint at a humane view of slavery. Rutilus does not teach his son to have a gentle mind, or to offer fair treatment for slight faults (15). Juvenal presents Rutilus as a total rejection of rational philosophy. He is motivated by anger and vengeance, just as Calvinus is in Satire 13. Rutilus also rejects Lucretian philosophy, for he does not think that the minds and bodies of his slaves are made of the same elements as his own (16). Like Calvinus, he enjoys feeding his baser emotions and is happy (18 gaudet, 21 felix, and 23 laetus) only when he can brand someone with a burning iron for stealing a towel or two (21–22).

Rutilus is the very embodiment of cruelty and is compared to such epic villains as Antiphates and Polyphemus. By this shocking comparison of mythological to contemporary characters, a horribly stark and bold image is created.

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9 Duff (above, note 6) 126 n. 91; Ferguson (above, note 2) 306 n. 5; and Courtney (above, note 6) 563 n. 4.

10 Cf. 5. 114–19, 146–55, and 11. 1–23.

11 Cf. 6. 474–96; Sen. Ep. 47.

12 Fredericks (above, note 3) 219–31; Morford (above, note 4) 26–36.

13 Ferguson (above, note 2) 306 n. 17.

The effect of a sinful mother upon her daughter is illustrated next (25–30). Juvenal wonders how else than bad is a young girl to turn out who is unable to name the lovers of her mother without taking a breath at least thirty times? The prolific ability of Larga is contained in the obvious pun of her name, which means “generous.” Both girls and boys are subject to the wanton example of their parents.

Juvenal now briefly summarizes (31–37) the first thirty lines. The path of old blame pointed out by parents (monstrata veteris orbita culpae 37) brackets Juvenal’s opening statement in which he also used a form of the word monstro (3). The parents are teaching and demonstrating, but it is a perverted example. The idea of monstrata is significant and occurs again later in the satire. While the premise of sic natura iubet seems straightforward, the examples Juvenal uses to make his point undercut the argument through the grotesque and ludicrous images of parents such as Rutilus and Larga. Epic parody, learned philosophical allusions, mythological asides, and rampant promiscuity control the opening lines (1–37). All of this indicates that Juvenal does not want us to accept the literal complaints of his persona. The solemn sic natura iubet juxtaposed to such obvious humor is all the more compelling. The ordering of nature which occurs throughout the satire (31, 108, 212, 306, and 331) supports the notion that nature does order children to follow the example of their parents, but Juvenal deflates this solemn maxim by portraying it as being ridiculous.

Juvenal continues his exempla (38–106) and sets up guidelines for moral reform. The satirist says that it is easy to find a Catiline, an evil individual, in any society. The force of this statement is undercut by the repetition of quocumque. It would appear that it is a hopeless situation, since the presence of Catilinarian evil exists everywhere (quocumque in populo vides, quocumque sub axe 42). The satirist, at this point, grossly overstates his point. Both the repetition and the vague sense of quocumque serve to undercut this statement. The satirist contrasts two examples of Republican virtue (Brutus and Cato the Younger, 41–43) with Catiline, who tried to destroy the Republic. Not only are these examples so hackneyed and overused as to be meaningless, but they are confusing, for Brutus carries a double meaning: the Elder, who began the Republic, and the Younger, who assassinated Caesar, ending all semblance of a Republic. In this way, Juvenal suggests that the old models of traditional Roman morality can no longer be accepted unthinkingly.

Function of Epic in Juvenal’s Satires,” Latomus 206 (1989) 415, demonstrates that Juvenal is the “inheritor of the epic–vatic tradition.”

15 Winkler (above, note 8) 47 states: “By Juvenal’s time the old, stern mores appear shallow and hollow; they have become meaningless and finally absurd and ridiculous. What significance could the faded picture of an ancestor of hundreds of years ago, of a Brutus, Cato, Scaevola, or anybody else among those mentioned, possibly convey to anyone living in Juvenal’s days?”
The satirist continues: Do not allow foul words or sights to come into a house where there is a father (44). Keep all bad influences away. The use of procul, a procul (45) is particularly apt, since it was a proclamation that occurred before a sacrifice or on other religious occasions in order to keep away unholy persons and evil spirits.\(^6\) The sanctity of a child is surrounded with a religious aura. If a man has an evil deed in mind, Juvenal advises him to let the thought of his infant son stand in the way of the crime’s commission.

As an elaboration of this idea, Juvenal examines parents’ misplaced emphasis on the external appearance of a Roman household (59–73). The household, as far as the master is concerned, is only important with respect to its physical appearance. The master trembles lest his guest may see dog dung in his halls (64–65), yet he does nothing to insure that his son grows up in a house free from vice (sine labe 71) and without fault (carentem vitio 71). Juvenal catches our attention with the phrase ne stercore foeda canino / atria displiceant oculis venientis amici (64–65). We are shocked by the image of the “dog’s dung” befouling the hall. “Dog’s dung” is more important than the moral well-being of the son.

The master of the household overlooks the spiritual and moral meaning of domus. Appearance is king. This is a Juvenalian theme which also occurs in Satire 7, where it does not matter what a man says or does, but only what he wears (105–49). The appearance of a man is glorified, and the man of real integrity, although shabbily dressed, is overlooked. Satire 14 contains a similar theme (59–69): Roman society has reached the height of moral turpitude when the appearance of a man’s house is more important than the condition of his family.

Juvenal next presents another aspect of Roman morality which one generation was always passing on to the next (70–72):

gratum est quod patriae civem populoque dedisti,

si facis ut patriae sit idoneus, utilis agris

utilis et bellorum et pacis rebus agendis.\(^17\)

The overwhelming use of sibilants makes these lines both sinister and comic. This idea, which is the stance of the traditional moralist, dates back to the time of the Elder Cato and before.\(^18\) It harks back to a time before

\(^6\) Cf. V. Aen. 6. 258; Hor. Odes 3. 1. 1. A. Richlin, *The Garden of Priapus* (New Haven 1983) 8–9, comments on how Ovid uses this clearly religious expression in a complete reversal of its original intention. She states: “Here the warning is applied in reverse, to the emblems of chastity themselves . . . .” Juvenal too uses this religious expression to indicate irony, for the vice-ridden Roman father is not capable of keeping evil far away from his son.

\(^17\) This was a common sentiment in Roman times. See J. E. B. Mayor (ed.), *Thirteen Satires of Juvenal* (London 1881) 299, who suggests that we look at Cic. Ver. 3. 161 and Sen. Suas. 2. 21 for the worthiness of giving a citizen to the fatherland.

the Punic Wars, and is advice that was so common and so nebulous as to be meaningless. When Cato the Elder denounced the ills of Roman society around 150 B.C. and offered his conservative view of education, people listened, but when Juvenal’s satiric speaker does the same thing in the 2nd century A.D. it is banal. He makes this point about the Roman family and state trite, so that we may turn away from the glorification of the distant past and deal with the Roman present. The subversion of this idea appears later in the satire (161–72), where Juvenal contrasts the greed of the miser with the gratitude of ancient Romans who received very little for their services in the Pyrrhic and Punic wars. Through the juxtaposition of the pristine virtues of the early Romans with the blatant avariciousness of present-day Rome, Juvenal highlights corruption and decadence. It is a common Juvenalian technique to glorify the past and belittle the present. However, this contrast is drawn to show that the past was not so glorious, but only a fantasy which exists in the Roman mind. Turbam (167) is a word which points to Juvenal’s real intent. The ancients’ life was one of hardship, crowded and uncomfortable, where the standard fare was generally pulitus (171), which was used at sacrifices and as food for the sacred chickens. Juvenal wants his audience to concentrate on the present.

Next, Juvenal compares humans to birds (73–85). The placement of moribus instituas (74), beside the description of how the stork, the vulture, and eagle care for their young, is a signpost to satire. The very picture of the vulture teaching his offspring to eat dead cattle, dogs, and human beings that have been crucified is grotesque (77–78). But it is even more shocking and ironic when we consider that a few lines before the satirist was exhorting a parent to make sure that he provides a citizen for the Roman state who is both useful in war and peace (70–72). The placement of such supposedly important thoughts next to vultures eating carrion is laughable. This image should shock us into the realization that the entire bird analogy is ironic. The portrayal of the noble eagles (generosae ... aves 81–82) should make us understand that Juvenal’s satirist uses a double standard. It seems normal for birds to follow the example of their parents, but when human children follow the example of their parents it is reprehensible. This

19 Anderson (previous note) 79 remarks that Juvenal exploits several standard moral antitheses which became popular with rhetoricians long before his time, especially the opposition of present to past.

20 Cf. 6. 286–300; Sallust, Hist. frag. 11. 12. Cat. 10. 11, lug. 41. 1. Sallust points to a period before the Second Punic War when the early Romans were more virtuous than the Romans who followed.

21 J. De Decker, Juvenalis Declamans (Ghent 1913) 34–35, gives further examples of this common Juvenalian technique; see Winkler (above, note 8) 23–58 for further discussion of this common Juvenalian motif.

22 Weisinger (above, note 7) 235 says, “when describing the virtue of the early Romans, Juvenal stretches his point until this rustic virtue becomes almost a parody of austerity.”
comparison is certainly ludicrous, for animals function instinctively, repeating their daily patterns, while man through reason may alter his customs and habits.

Next, Juvenal portrays a human parallel (86–95) of his bird story. Not only do children follow the example of their parents, but the sins of the father are increased by the sins of the son. Caetronius’ son improves on his father’s excesses (86–95). The son in his mad rush (amens 94) to outdo his father foreshadows the madness of avarice (136, 284) which Juvenal expounds in the next two major sections. Through the juxtaposition of these two sections (73–85, 86–95) the satirist compares the willingness of a son to ape his father with a bird’s natural instinct to follow his parents’ example.

The last part (96–106) of the first section repeats this argument by illustrating that the son not only follows in his father’s footsteps, but improves on his father’s performance. However, these lines are ironic, for what would seem to be acts of a dutiful son are condemned by the satirist. Words and phrases such as ediscunt et servat ac metuunt ius (101), tradidit (102), and monstrare (103), are praised later in the satire (176–78) as very strong positive moral traits. But when they are juxtaposed with Jewish religious customs, they are condemned as anathema by the satirist. Juvenal is debunking Roman moral tradition, which cannot accept the mores unless they appear only in a Roman setting. Juvenal purposely gives the Jewish son praiseworthy Roman characteristics to highlight the inconsistency of his persona. Why, if the satirist can praise birds for following parental example, can he not praise the Jewish son? Is it all right for a bird to do what a bird does, but not a Jew? This is ludicrous and absurd. Again the ordering of nature is being ridiculed.

Thus, in the first section (1–106) Juvenal shows that the excesses of Roman life should be avoided. He seems to balance what nature should ordain with what nature really does ordain in the grotesqueness of life. Nature should offer una potens ratio (39) and reverentia (47). Instead, we get Catiline and Brutus, a man worried about the appearance of his house, vultures eating cadavers, Caetronius’ son, and the Jew who follows Jewish law better than any Roman follows Roman law.

In the second section (107–255) the emphasis changes from a general discussion of all vices to the specific examination of avaritia (108). The argument of the first section is focused and intensified. Avarice is particularly insidious because it seems to have the appearance of virtue (109). The inversion of the moral order, which we experienced earlier (59–

23 Cf. Hor. Sat. 1. 1. 41–42, who also uses a similar shift in emphasis in order to focus on avarice.
Juvenal draws attention to the conflict between virtue’s appearance and reality: *specie* (appearance) and *umbra* (semblance) 109; and *habitu* (attire) and *vultu* (countenance) 110. He reveals this tension through the *exemplum* of the miser. Some people praise the miser for his thrift; others praise him because he is skilled in the art of money-making. He guards his fortune more tenaciously than if it were watched by the dragon of the Hesperides (112–14). The father copies the miser and urges his sons to do the same (119–23).25 He starves his slaves in the name of thrift and causes himself to go hungry (124–28). A meal is described which would turn any man’s stomach (129–33). Not even a beggar would accept an invitation to such a meal (134). This reinforced imagery of poverty proves that the frugal man is the poorest man.

Juvenal expands on this theme with examples of the outrages the miser commits to gain more property (138–51). His love of gain grows in direct proportion to the money he has. The more he accumulates, the more he wants. Even the ugly head of rumor does not deter him (152–55). He is unconcerned about what people think of him, if only he is able to keep his farm and land for himself. Juvenal, sarcastically (*scilicet* 152), states that the greedy man will live a happy life, if only he is the sole possessor of as many acres of land as the Roman people tilled in the days of Tatius (156–60).26 The land of the entire Roman nation would not be enough for the greedy man. The only alternative would be moderation.

Juvenal continues to explain the causes of evil (173) and shows that the lust for money results in perverse deeds (173–209). The conflict between excess and right living is presented through Juvenal’s technique of overstatement. Two alternatives are offered: on the one side, excess (175–76), wickedness (188), sacrilege (188), and on the other, reverence (177), fear (178), and shame (178). These two alternatives are offered so that moderation will seem plausible. This contrast recalls lines 101–02 where the satirist earlier condemned the fear and shame which led a young Jew to practice the rituals learned from his father. The inconsistency of the present praise with the earlier condemnation points strongly to the ironic nature of this passage (173–209).

Continuing to develop this irony, Juvenal’s satirist again uses the tension between ancient Roman simplicity and present-day turpitude to

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24 Cf. 12. 111–20, where the legacy-hunter goes to the limits of morality in order to become the rich man’s heir. He will even sacrifice his own daughter, for he is mad with greed. As in *Satire* 14, the moral order is upside down. No crime is too unthinkable.

25 Clausen follows Housman’s deletion of 119, but this line seems to make sense as it stands.

26 Juvenal obviously wants us to recall Horace’s *Satire* 1. 1 to closely associate himself with the Roman satiric tradition, but also to demonstrate that he wants the same things that Horace sought; see Hor. *Sat.* 1. 1. 92, 125, and 179; Winkler (above, note 8) 44 also finds this passage replete with irony. He focuses on the satirist’s theme of old-time *parvitas*. 

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show the need for moderation. In days of old, fathers gave solid advice to their sons: “Live content with these cottages and hills. Let us seek bread with the plough, which is enough for our table . . .” (176–82). “The man who is not ashamed to protect himself against the cold and wind with the skins of animals will not be likely to commit a crime. It is the desire for purple raiment (purpura 188) that leads a man to crime and wickedness” (185–88). This is completely ludicrous, since this purpura is unknown to the senex. Martin Winkler supports the ironic nature of these lines when he states: “The fact that the old man warns against something which he has never even laid eyes on divests him of all credibility and reduces him to a state of utter idiocy. A mortal blow has been struck at this point at the stereotypical figures of the maiores.”

The mention of the Marsian, Hernican, and Vestinusian fathers who once fought bravely against the Romans only to lose also points out the misdirection of this entire passage. If these lines were serious, Juvenal would hardly mention the elders of three tribes who rose up against Rome only to be defeated. Juvenal does not want us to look for simple answers in the past, but wishes us to borrow some earthy philosophy of contentment (vivite contenti) and apply it to the present. But even this simple philosophy is questioned by the undercutting alliteration of contenti casulis et collibus.

Juvenal next addresses fathers in general and predicts what will happen to them and their sons in the future (210–55). These lines are a further elaboration of Satire 1. 148: eadem facient cupientque minores. As Juvenal proves his earlier prophecy of Satire 1, he builds a progression of deeds that ends in the destruction of the father. Juvenal warns fathers that the morality of money is a short-sighted rule (211–14). Iubet (212) recalls iubentur (108) and sic natura iubet (31), and foreshadows iussus (331). Juvenal is linking the beginning, middle, and end of his satire through the use of this verb. In this way Juvenal recalls the original motif of lines 1–37. But, whereas Ajax and Achilles surpassed their fathers in heroic deeds, the modern-day son outdoes his father in deeds of wickedness.

Now the sins of the fathers are visited upon the sons and finally return to destroy the father (215–55). Care and reverence are necessary, for as soon as a boy begins to grow a beard, he will swear falsely (216–18); the son will kill his wife for her dowry (220–21); the wealth which a father thinks should be found over land and sea a son will acquire by a shorter road (222–23). The son has become worse than his father, fulfilling the earlier prophecy of lines 211–14. The father will deny that he has taught his son to lie and cheat to gain wealth (224–25). And while this may be true, Juvenal insists that the father is the cause of his son’s evil mind, for the

27 Winkler (above, note 8) 46.
28 Courtney (above, note 6) 577 n. 179.
29 Winkler (above, note 8) 46.
father who teaches his son the love of wealth turns him into a greedy individual (226–27).

Lines 235–55 summarize what has occurred in the preceding section (210–34). The momentum that has been building comes to its horrible conclusion: The son will challenge the authority of his father and consider patricide (246–51). The father must protect himself from being poisoned, just as Mithridates protected himself (252–55). The progression is now complete. The mention of the pater et rex (255) foreshadows the appearance of Claudius at the end of the satire, and the attempt at poisoning Mithridates reminds us of the death of Claudius by poisoning at the hands of Agrippina.

Thus, in the second section (107–255), Juvenal shows how the parent–child relationship can result in the murder of the parent. At this point in Satire 14 the crimes of society have reached their lowest point, for what could be worse than the murder of a father by a son?

In the third and fourth sections (256–316, 316–31) Juvenal tries to move away from this nadir and suggest some alternatives to the total avarice he has described. He makes a philosophical comment about the nature of his satire (256–67), and then he examines the nature of man’s folly (268–316). He takes on the role of a parent/father with the word monstr (256), but what he teaches is not normal school curriculum. He teaches the folly of man with a touch of voluptatem egregiam (256). This is apparently a sarcastic statement, but there is an element of truth, for it represents the inherent ambivalence of Juvenalian satire. Juvenal deals with a love–hate relationship that is unique in satire. He castigates mankind severely, but cannot help laughing, loving, and enjoying its human foolishness. We can see this ambivalence in Satire 15: 71: ergo deus, quicumque aspexit, ridet et odi. The god who sees the follies of mankind both laughs and hates them. In the same way, Satire 14 reveals a similar ironic pleasure which

30 Cf. 12. 111–20 for this typically Juvenalian progression. Just as the father will sacrifice the daughter for gain, so will the son kill the father. While the situation in Satire 12 is a little different, the common denominator is the grotesqueness of it.

31 W. C. Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago 1974) 190, makes an interesting comment which relates directly to Juvenalian satire: “Where then do we stop in our search for ironic pleasures? Where the work ‘tells’ us to, wherever it offers us other riches that might be destroyed by irony. It takes a clever reader to detect all the ironies in a Fielding or a Forster. But it takes something beyond cleverness to resist going too far: the measured tempo of the experienced reader, eager for quick reversals and exhilarating turns, but always aware of the demands both of the partner and of the disciplined forms of the dance.” The reader as well as the author walks a tightrope between what is ironic and what is not. In order to understand Juvenal we have to walk this fine line. This is where the meaning of Juvenalian satire lies. This is Juvenal’s point in 14. 256–68. A. B. Kerman, The Plot of Satire (New Haven 1965) 83, asks a very important question: “Why is irony, which is what changes the serious to the ridiculous in satire, witty and amusing?” Again I would point out that lines 256–68 are both witty and amusing, and tinged with ironic delight.

32 Richlin (above, note 16) 209 states: “... it seems he [Juvenal’s persona] also thought that God was to man what the satirist was to his victim (15. 69–71)." She goes on
Juvenal gets from observing the strange and magnificent excesses of Roman society. No theatre, no stage of a lavish praetor can compare to the games of life wherein men risk their lives to increase their fortunes (256–62). Real-life situations are far more delightful than the stage curtains of Flora, Ceres, and Cybele (262–64). In Satire 1. 22–80 the satirist also takes ironic delight in observing the foibles of Roman society: “Is it not pleasing to fill up spacious notebooks at the crossroads” when we see corruption and depravity all around (63–64)? Juvenal asks a similar question in Satire 14 (265–67): “Is there more pleasure to be gotten from watching men being hurried from a springboard, or walking down a tightrope, than from yourself?” The parallels between 1. 63–64 and 14. 265 are clear. Libet (1. 63) and oblectant (14. 265) have the same general meaning. They both introduce questions of an ironic nature which indicate some form of entertainment. The same desire that caused Juvenal to complain about always having to be only a listener to the rantings of others has impelled him to fill up notebooks at the crossroads, watch the folly of uncontrolled acquisition, and state that god must simultaneously laugh and hate the misdeeds of mankind. It is an irony which is tinged with a perverse delight.

This irony continues as he suggests that the love of gain is a form of madness. Madness as a cause of folly was already mentioned in conjunction with the accumulation of wealth (136). Now it takes shape in the minds of men who wish to become rich by means of sea trade. Madness (furor) is another standard Juvenalian technique, which appears in Satire 1 (simplexne furor 92), in Satire 13, where madness is a product of this depraved generation (28), and again in Satire 15, where a whole nation is driven to the point of cannibalism. Madness takes various forms. One man is terrified of the Furies, even as Orestes was after the murder of Clytemnestra. Another man strikes down an ox believing it to be Agamemnon or Ulysses, even as Ajax slew a flock of sheep. But the man

to suggest that this is perfectly consistent with Juvenal’s satire. I would take it one step further. I believe it is basic to an understanding of how Juvenal operates; Braund (above, note 5) 192 declares: “The invitation to laugh at the follies of mankind at 256–264—tanto maiores humana negotia ludi (264)—recalls the picture in Satire 10 of Democritus laughing at the crowd instead of watching the spectacles.” Juvenal is laughing at both the crowd and the spectacles.

33 Richlin (above, note 16) 200 observes that “Juvenal [in Satire 1] closely unites a second-person address of the audience and/or an imaginary protagonist (agnitus accipies, line 99) with a depiction of himself as present at the scene (nobiscum, line 101). He has brought himself and his addressee physically into the poem together.” This is similar to what he does in Satire 14 at lines 256–68.

34 Cf. 1. 111–16, where the worship of the goddess Money is so strong that the other Roman virtues are neglected. Although not specifically defined as such, this is a precursor of the mad rush for gain.

35 Cf. 8. 215–21, where Juvenal shows that the modern day Nero committed more heinous crimes than Ajax and Orestes.
who is in need of a keeper is the merchant who loads his ship to the gunwales in the mad search for money. The untiring efforts of the merchant symbolize the full range of irrelevance and destruction that avaritia imposes on one’s life. To import raisin wine from Crete in jars of local pottery, to travel far, to risk one’s life and one’s property, all with the hope of gain, is the height of folly. His spes lucri (278) will ultimately leave the mercator destitute in a shipwreck or lead to paranoia if he becomes wealthy.36

The madness of the search for profit is similar to Ajax’s insanity, but Juvenal shows that the merchant’s lunacy is greater. If only he could have been satisfied with what he had, the tragedy of his shipwreck would never have occurred. Suffecerat (298) and sufficient (300) prepare us for the anticlimax that is about to occur in the epilogue (suffecit 319). This progression will be played out again in the conclusion of Satire 14.

Lines 303–16 comment on the misery that accompanies the acquisition of great wealth. The millionaire Licinus orders (iubet 306) a troop of slaves to stand guard in his house with buckets of water in case of a fire, because he is worried about all his valuable possessions.37 Again, iubet recalls the earlier uses of this verb, and prefigures what is about to occur (331). This ordering, as we have already seen, is used to achieve some wicked end. It is not what nature intends, but it seems to be the way humankind employs it.

Licinus is compared to the nude Cynic Diogenes (308–14), who does not fear that the fire will consume his tub. The satirist observes that when Alexander the Great saw Diogenes in his tub he realized how much happier a man was who had very little. Juvenal’s concluding comment of this section sums up his point. “Had we but commonsense wisdom (prudentia), you would have no divinity, O Fortune; it is we who make you into a goddess” (315–16).38 Juvenal’s persona uses the exact same words at the end of Satire 10 (365–66). By recalling Satire 10 Juvenal is trying to end the satire on a positive note, but an ironic twist occurs at the end of Satire 14.

A similar point is made in Satire 13 (19–20): “Great indeed is wisdom, the conqueror of Fortune, who gives precepts in her sacred books.” Juvenal is recommending a form of wisdom (sapientia or prudentia) against the powers of Fortune and madness (furor). He suggests that if man could be

36 Stein (above, note 1) 36.
37 Cf. Hor. Sat. 1. 1. 76–78, where Horace shows how the anxiety of wealth and money is really not worth the trouble.
38 See 7. 190–98 and 10. 51–58 for Fortune’s effect upon the lives of men; Duff (above, note 6) 437 believed that these lines were decidedly irrelevant. Yet there is really no reason to think that these lines do not make good sense. They recall Seneca, Ep. 85. 2: “The man who is prudent is also temperate. The man who is temperate is also constant and calm. The man who is calm is without sadness. The man who is without sadness is happy; therefore, the prudent man is happy and prudence is enough for a happy life.” Juvenal follows this line of reasoning in the conclusion of 14. 316–31, when he asks, “How much is enough?”
wise and sensible, then the troubles portrayed in his satires would cease; but he knows that is not possible. At the close of Satire 14 Juvenal offers his last bit of advice.

In this final section (316–31) he moves from generalization of the problem to a summation of the advice that has been inserted as the poem progressed. Juvenal suggests that moderation is the key to living, and attempts to define moderation by showing that the measure of wealth which is sufficient for man is "as much as thirst and hunger and cold demand, as much as sustained Epicurus in his little garden, as much as the followers of Socrates had in their homes" (318–20). Both Nature and Wisdom (sapientia) agree upon the course of action one's life should take (321). Juvenal now addressed those people who are not satisfied with what he has just offered them: "Do I seem to enclose you within limits?" (322). The interjection of the first person, much as at line 256 (monstro), should be our guide to understanding the appearance of the author at this point. He lays down the mask of his persona and speaks directly to his audience. This refrain is similar to advice which Horace gave in Satire 1: 1: est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines / quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum (106–07). Horace states it simply and does not cloud the issue with extended examples.

If Juvenal confines his reader too greatly, he suggests mixing in something from our own Roman customs (nostri moribus 323) and making up a sum as big as that worthy of an equestes, i.e. 400,000 sesterces. The phrase nostri moribus recalls 1. 147 (moribus addat) and 14. 74 (moribus instituas). Juvenal is still concerned with Roman mores and is still trying to teach by example. But, if we cannot learn from a good example, he then offers, facetiously, a bad example (327–31):

If I have not yet filled up your lap, if it is open further, neither the fortune of Croesus, nor the Persian kingdoms, nor the riches of Narcissus will ever be enough for you. This is the Narcissus whom Claudius Caesar greatly indulged, the one who killed the emperor's wife, bidden to slay her by imperial command.

Through the comparison of Croesus and Narcissus, the scope of satire is expanded and the importance of what is being said about Roman society and its vices is enlarged. While the reference to Narcissus is actually anticlimactic, especially in relation to Croesus, it is significant by itself, for it points to the ultimate corruption of the Roman state, when a Greek can rise to such power and wealth. And it is doubly ironic, because Juvenal has just glorified the Greek moderation of Epicurus and Socrates. Juvenal inverts the order of society by having his satire end with the act of uxoricide committed by a Greek who was formerly a slave.

With this ironic and anticlimactic conclusion Juvenal draws Satire 14 to a close. He has rolled all the motifs of his satire into one clever finale. Yet, this epilogue (316–31) is entirely consistent with the themes of Satire
14. It completes and solidifies the unity by mention of the father (Claudius), the symbolic son (Narcissus), nature (321), and the need for moderation in the face of avarice which ultimately leads to murder by poisoning (317–31). Juvenal has examined Roman society and, as always, has found it wanting; but, in the process, he has shocked, entertained, and delighted his audience. We are amazed at his satiric virtuosity. Indeed, he treads the satiric tightrope more gracefully and subtly than any author before or since.

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Notes on Justin Martyr’s Apologies

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The works of Justin Martyr are preserved virtually in a single and relatively late manuscript—the precious Parisinus gr. 450 (= A), dated 11 September 1364 (f. 461v bottom). The Parisinus is copyed in an easy, neat and readable hand (probably by the monk Joasaph), but it is plagued with textual gaps, corruptions, scribal errors and intrusive marginal glosses. Back in 1883, Adolf Harnack estimated that A contained some 200–300 scribal errors in the text of the Apologies alone, as compared to a tenth-century manuscript (such as is the Arethas codex, Parisinus gr. 451, copied in A.D. 914). But, apparently, no subsequent editor heeded Harnack’s warning. The result is that we still do not have a critical edition of Justin. I present here a few remarks on the text and probable sources of the Apologies. 

Apologia Maior

1: Already the Address is typical of the textual problems involved (comprising inversion, omission and interpolation). It reads: Αὐτοκράτορι Τίτῳ Αἰλίῳ Ἀδριανῷ Ἀντωνίνῳ Εὐσεβεί, Σεβαστῷ Καίσαρι, καὶ Οὐχρισσίῳ υἱῷ πολιορκῷ, καὶ Λουκίῳ πολιορκῷ, Καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσιόντα, ἑραστῇ παιδείᾳ, ἵνα τε συγκλήτῳ καὶ δήμῳ παντὶ Ῥωμαίων, υπὲρ τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων

1 Cod. Claromontanus 82 (later belonging to the collection of Sir Thomas Phillipps [1792–1872], now in the British Museum, Loan Nr. 36), dated 2 April 1541, is an apograph of A (hence called by me “a”). It is of no value for the establishment of Justin’s text.


3 Here are the principal editions of Justin’s Apologies: R. Stephanus (Paris 1551); F. Sylburg (Heidelberg 1593); J. E. Grabe (I Apology, Oxford 1700) and H. Hutchin (II Apology, Oxford 1703); S. Thirlby (London 1723); P. Maran (Paris 1742 = PG VI [Paris 1857 = 1884]); C. Ashton (Cambridge 1767); J. W. J. Braun (Bonn 1830); J. C. Th. von Otto (Jena 1842; 2nd ed. 1847; 3rd ed. 1876); G. Krüger (Freiburg i. B. 1891; 4th ed. Tübingen 1915); L. Pautigny (Paris 1904); A. W. F. Blunt (Cambridge 1911); J. M. Pfättisch (Münster 1912); E. J. Goodspeed (Göttingen 1914); S. Frasca (Turin 1938); A. Wartelle (Paris 1987). None of them is critical. I quote Wartelle’s text as being the most recent.
dürkwos μισομένων καὶ ἐπηρεαζομένων, Ἰουστίνος Πρίσκου τοῦ Βασιλείου, τῶν ἀπὸ Φλαουίας Νέας πόλεως τῆς Συρίας Παλαιστίνης, εἰς αὐτῶν, τὴν προσφώνησιν καὶ ἐνέτεινεν πεποίημαι.

First, the title Καίσαρι belongs to Marcus Aurelius, not to Antoninus Pius; consequently, read Σεβαστῷ, καὶ Καίσαρι Οὐρασίσσῳ υἱῷ φιλοσόφῳ (as Sylburg had conjectured). Second, the words καὶ Δουκίῳ φιλοσόφῳ, Καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσποιητῷ, ἐραστὴ παιδείας are a later interpolation, introduced by a pedant interested in historical exactness (as Gustav Volkmar in 1855 had seen, only to be disregarded). For (a) the expression ἐραστῇ παιδείας is redundant in view of 2. 2 ἐρασταὶ παιδείας (which is the source of inspiration for the interpolator). (b) Neither Lucius Verus nor his father, the Caesar Lucius Aelius Verus, was a philosopher. (c) The explanation, Καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσποιητῷ, is tedious and out of place in an address. Finally, (d) the introduction of Lucius Verus destroys the entire thematic unity of both Apologies. They deal only with Εὐσέβεια, embodied in the person of Antoninus the Pious, and Φιλοσοφία, manifested in Marcus Aurelius the Philosopher—from I Apology I and 2. 1–2 down to II Apology 2. 16 and 15. 5.4

Third, the expression οἱ ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἄνθρωποι means in Justin either “the human race” (as in Dial. 95. 2 and 134. 5) or “the gentiles” (as in I Apol. 25. 1, 32. 4, 40. 7). Certainly, Justin is not speaking on behalf of either of them, but on behalf of the Christians. The most common synonym for “Christians” is οἱ θεοσεβεῖς.5 Consequently, read ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἄνθρωπων θεοσεβεῖων, ἐδικὼς μισομένων καὶ ἐπηρεαζομένων. Justin is speaking on behalf of the God-worshipping people coming from every nation, which is being unjustly hated and mistreated. The supplement is confirmed by Justin himself; compare Dial. 52. 4 οἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔθνων ἀπάντων . . . θεοσεβεῖς . . ., (ἡμεῖς) γενόμενοι, 91. 3 οἱ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἔθνων . . . εἰς τὴν θεοσεβείαν ἐπέρρησαν, 131. 5 ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἄνθρωπων θεοσεβεῖς . . . δείκνυσθαι εἴναι τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύοντας τα ποιεῖν. Finally, at the end of the sentence read εἰς αὐτῶν <ὅν> (with Eusebius HE 4. 12 cod. A, and with Grabe).

5. 3 (The evil demons arranged through wicked men that even Socrates be killed for telling the truth): . . . καὶ αὐτὸν οἱ δαίμονες διὰ τῶν χαριοῦντων τῇ κακίᾳ ἄνθρώπων ἐνήργησαν ὡς άθεον καὶ άσεβῆ ἀποκτείνεσθαι. Ἁποκτείνεσθαι is Otto’s emendation of the transmitted


5 Compare Melito ap. Eus. HE 4. 26. 5 νῦν διάκυκτα το τῶν θεοσεβῶν γένος; Ep. ad Diogn. 6. 2 and 9; Iren. Adv. haer. 3. 11. 8; Clem. Strom. 6. 167. 3; Tertull. Apolog. 37. 4 et al.
TO.eXivixav. ocbl^iaxa). context Thus developed judge heaven.): Showing fo-ovov ETiovo^d^ovoiv <o>)Cfiv. suffisante," e.g., machinations would agissements vertu." Socrates[XTtoKTeivai. men.): oTiEp^a mal dvEXiiXuGEvai 21. 9. 7. Obviously, that is a lacuna before éxouvsin. Reading by the fact that at the beginning of c. 5 Justin was speaking of the need for men to judge with reason the schemes of the evil demons (5. 2 τοὺς οἱ λόγοι τὰς γινομένας πράξεις ὀψις ἐκρίνον), I would expect the lacuna to contain, e.g., τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας <λόγω κρίνειν παρ>éxouvsin. The evil demons would not allow even the men longing for virtue to judge similar machinations with reason.

7. 5: Οὐ γὰρ τοὺς κατηγοροῦντας κολάζειν ὑμᾶς ἀξιώσομεν· ἀρκοῦνται γὰρ τῇ προσοψῇ πονηρία καὶ τῇ τῶν καλῶν ἁγνοία. I shall not demand that you punish the false accusers of the Christians. For, "le mal qui les habite et leur ignorance du bien leur sont une sanction suffisante," translates Warrette. I would doubt, however, that this construction can yield such a sense. Read instead ἀρκοῦν γὰρ τὸ (for ἀρκοῦνται γὰρ) τῇ προσοψῇ πονηρία καὶ τῇ τῶν καλῶν ἁγνοίᾳ <συζήν>. Justin is imitating Plato (compare, e.g., Hippias Maior 296a5, Republic 3. 411e1 ἐν ἁμαθίᾳ ... ζῆν).

9. 2 (We do not worship the lifeless statues of gods, permissible works of men.): ... καὶ ἐξ ἀτίμων πολλάκις σκευῶν διὰ τέχνης τὸ σχῆμα μόνον ἀλλάξαντες καὶ μορφοποιήσαντες θεοὺς ἐπονομάζουσιν [sc. οἱ τεχνῖται]. Obviously, the text is lacunose (as already Henri Estienne in 1592 had noticed). Read σκευῶν, διὰ τέχνης τὸ σχῆμα μόνον ἀλλάξαντες καὶ μορφοποιήσαντες, <ἀνδριάντας ποιήσαντες> θεοὺς ἐπονομάζουσιν and compare Isaiah 44. 13.

19. 2 (It is hard to believe that a full-grown human body could have developed from a little drop of the human seed, and yet it is true.): Ἐξ τίς υμῖν μὴ οὐσί τοιούτοις [sc. full-grown men] μηδ’ ἐκ τοιούτων ἔλεγε, τὸ σπέρμα τὸ ἀνθρώπουν δεικνύσι καὶ εἰκόνα γρατῆν, ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου οὐδὲ τε γενέσθαι διαβεβαιούμενος, πρὶν ἰδεῖν γενόμενον ἐπιστεύσατε; Showing us a picture of what? Of a full-grown human body, of course. Thus read δεικνύσι καὶ <σώματος> εἰκόνα γρατῆν and compare the context (19. 1 εἰ ἐν σώματι μὴ υπήρχομεν and 19. 4 τὰ ἀνθρώπεια σώματα).

21. 2 (Bellerophon too, a mortal man, reportedly ascended into heaven): καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐφ’ ὦπνοι Πηγάσου Βελλεροφόντην [sc. ἀνεληλυθέναι εἰς οὐρανόν]. Read instead καὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων δὴ
31. (The Jewish kings carefully kept the books of the prophecies by the prophets of God): τάς προφητείας ... τῇ ἵδιᾳ αὐτῶν 'Ἑβραίδι φωνῇ ἐν βιβλίοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν προφητῶν συντεταγμένας κτῶμενοι περείποιον. The prophets composed the books of prophecies, not the prophecies themselves. Thus read συντεταγμένα and compare 31. 3 τάς βιβλίους ... τῇ προειρημένῃ 'Ἑβραίδι αὐτῶν φωνῇ γεγραμμένας.

33. 7: τὸ δὲ Ἰσσοῦς, ὄνομα τῇ 'Ἑβραίδι φωνῇ, σωτὴρ τῇ Ἑλληνίδι διαλέκτῳ δηλοῖ. "Jesus est un nom hébreu, qui signifie en grec Sauveur," translates Wartelle. Obviously, the text is lacunose. Read τὸ δὲ Ἰσσοῦς ὄνομα <ἀνθρώπος> τῇ 'Ἑβραίδι φωνῇ, σωτὴρ τῇ Ἑλληνίδι διαλέκτῳ δηλοῖ. "The proper name Jesus means in Hebrew Man, in Greek Savior." This is confirmed by II Apology 6. 4 Ἰσσοῦς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώποι καὶ σωτήρος ὄνομα καὶ σημαίαν ἔχει. Justin derived the name Jesus from Hebrew 'ish ("man") and from Greek Ἰάσων = Σωτήρ. Compare the inscriptions in the catacombs of Rome and II Apology 6. 6 πολλοὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀνθρώπων ... κατὰ τὸν ὄνοματος Ἰσσοῦ Χριστοῦ ... ἱάσαντο καὶ ἐτί νῦν ἱάνταν, 13. 4 ἀνθρώπως γέγονεν [sc. Christ], ὡς ... ἱασιν ποιήσηται; Clem. Paed. 3. 98. 3 ὁ ἱάμενος Ἰημὼν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν ... Ἰσσοῦς; Eus. Dem. ev. 4. 10. 19 καὶ Ἰσσοῦς ὄνομα Χέσεχε, παρὶ δοσὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχῶν ἱάσεως τε καὶ θεραπείας χάριν τὴν πάροδον εἰς ἴμας ἐποιεῖτο; Cyril. Hierosol. Catech. 10. 4 Ἰσσοῦς καλείται φερονύμως, ἐκ τῆς σωτηρίας καὶ ἱάσεως ἔχων τὴν προσηγορίαν, 10. 13 Ἰσσοῦς τοῖνυν ἐστὶ τοῖνυν ἐστὶ τῇ Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν τὸ ἱάμενος, ἐπειδὴ ἱατρὸς ἐστὶν ψυχῶν καὶ σωμάτων καὶ θεραπευτῆς πνευμάτων; Epiph. Ancor. 108. 7 Ἰσσοῦς ... ἱατρὸς ἔμφυτες καὶ σωτῆρ; Panar. 29. 4. 9 Ἰσσοῦς γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ἑβραϊκὴν διάλεκτον θεραπευτῆς καλεῖται ἰτοί ἱατρὸς καὶ σωτῆρ.

35. 1 (It has been predicted by the prophets that Christ shall be ignored by the Jews): Ὁς δὲ καὶ λίσειν ἐμέλλει τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους γεννηθεὶς ὁ Χριστὸς ἀχρις ἀνθρώπη, ὅπερ καὶ γέγονεν, ἀκούσατε τῶν προειρημένων εἰς τούτο. Delete ἀχρὶς ἀνθρώπη as a gloss. For Christ was never recognized as Messiah by the Jews, as is confirmed by 35. 6 Ἰσσοῦς δὲ Χριστὸς ἐξετάθη τὰς χεῖρας, σταυρωθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἀντιλεγόντων αὐτῷ καὶ φασικόντων μὴ εἶναι αὐτῶν Χριστῶν.

6 Compare G. Kittel, Th. Wb. zum NT III (1938) 287 n. 24.
35. 5: Καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις δι' ἐτέρου προφήτου λέγει (there follows Ps. 21 [22]. 17c + 19b). Says who? The Holy Ghost, as throughout the treatise. Thus read δι' ἐτέρου προφήτου <τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα> λέγει.

36. 2 (One and the same divine Logos speaks in different persons—sometimes as a prophet, sometimes as in the person of God, or Christ, or the Jewish people.): ὅποιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρ' ὕμῖν συγγραφέων ἰδεῖν ἔστιν, ένα μὲν τὸν τὰ πάντα συγγράφοντα οὖντα, πρόσωπα δὲ τὰ διαλεγόμενα παραφέροντα. Read próσωπα δὲ τὰ διαλεγόμενα <πλείω> παραφέροντα.

37. 7: Κἂν φέρητε σεμίδαλιν, θυμίαμα, βδέλυγμα μοί ἐστί. "Que vous m'apportiez fleur de farine ou encens, c'est pour moi une abomination," translates Wartelle. Read instead Κἂν φέρητε σεμίδαλιν, <μάταιον-> θυμίαμα βδέλυγμα μοί ἐστι = LXX Isaiah 1. 13.

39. 5 (oath of allegiance to the emperor by the Roman soldiers): ... ύμῖν μὲν τοὺς συντιθεμένους καὶ καταλεγομένους στρατιώτας καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἐαυτῶν ζωῆς καὶ γονέων καὶ πατρίδος καὶ πάντων τῶν οἰκείων τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀσπάζομαι ὁμολογῶ ... Wartelle translates: "... les soldats que vous enôlez et dont vous exigez un serment sacrifier à l'engagement qu'ils ont pris à votre égard leur propre vie, leurs parents, leur patrie et tous leurs intérêts ..." But Roman oaths of allegiance did not require the soldiers to place an emperor above the fatherland. Consequently, delete καὶ πατρίδος as a gloss and understand τῶν οἰκείων to mean "and the soldiers' relatives." Compare, e.g., Suet. Calig. 15. 3 ... ut omnibus sacramentis adicerentur: "Neque me liberosque meos cariores habebo quam Gaium habeo et sorores eius"; Tertull. De corona 11 Credimusne humanum sacramentum divino superduci licere et in alium dominum respondere post Christum et eierare patrem et matrem et omnem proximum, quos et lex honorari et post deum diligi præcepit ...?

41. 3–4: Λάβετε χάριν καὶ εἰσέλθετε κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ καὶ προσκυνήσατε ἐν αὐλαῖς ἁγίας αὐτοῦ ... Ἐὐφρανθῆτωσαν ἐν τοῖς έθεσιν. 'Ὁ κύριος ἐβοσίλευσεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου. Read καὶ προσκυνήσατε <τῷ κυρίῳ> ἐν αὐλαῖς καὶ Ἐὐφρανθῆτωσαν <καὶ εἰπάτωσαν> ἐν τοῖς έθεσιν, which is confirmed by LXX 1 Chron. 16. 29 and 31; Ps. 95 (96). 8b + 9a + 11a + 10a and by Justin’s Dial. 73. 4.

43. 2 (We agree with the prophecies about the punishments and rewards after death.): Τὰς τιμωρίας καὶ τὰς κολάσεις καὶ τὰς ἁγαθὰς ἁμοιματικὰς κατ’ ἐξίαν τῶν πράξεων ἐκάστου ἀποδίδοσθαι διὰ τῶν προφητῶν μαθόντες καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαίνομεθα. Read μαθόντες <δίκαιον> καὶ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαίνομεθα and compare 12. 11 (δίκαια τε
καὶ ἀληθὴς ἡξιοῦμεν) and 43. 6. Incidentally, read ἐκάστῳ (with Thirlby and Ashton) for the transmitted ἐκάστου.

44. 8 (Plato borrowed wisdom from Moses.): "Ὡστε καὶ Πλάτων ἐηπών. "Αἰτία ἐλομένου, θεὸς δ’ ἀναιτίος," 7 παρὰ Μωσέως τοῦ προφήτου λαβῶν εἰπε: πρεσβύτερος γὰρ Μωσῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν Ἑλλησ συγγραφέων. 8 Read πρεσβύτερος γὰρ Μωσῆς (= A) <καὶ Πλάτωνος> καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν Ἑλλησ συγγραφέων.

48. 2 (the miracles of Christ): Τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ ... τυφλοὶ ἀναβλέψουσι καὶ λεπτοὶ καθαρισθήσονται καὶ νεκροὶ ἀναστήσονται καὶ περιπτάσονται. Read καὶ νεκροὶ ἀναστήσονται καὶ χωλοί περιπατήσουσιν = Matthew 11. 5.

54. 6 (The evil demons imitated Moses’ prophecies about Christ in their myth about Dionysus.): Τούτων οὖν τῶν προφητικῶν λόγων ἀκούσαντες οἱ δαίμονες Διόνυσον μὲν ἔρασαν γεγονέναι ύλὸν τοῦ Δίος, ... καὶ διασπαραχθέντα αὐτόν9 ἀνέληλυθεν εἰς οὐρανόν ἐδιδαξαν. The important allusion to the resurrection of Christ is missing in the text. Thus read καὶ διασπαραχθέντα αὐτόν <ἀναστήσαντα καὶ> ἀνέληλυθεν εἰς οὐρανόν ... This is confirmed by Justin’s Dial. 69. 2 Ὡταν γὰρ Διόνυσον μὲν ύλὸν τοῦ Δίος ... γεγενήθαι λέγωσι ... καὶ διασπαραχθέντα καὶ ἀποθανόντα ἀναστήσανται, εἰς οὐρανόν τε ἀνέληλυθεν ἑτορώσι ... .

60. 5 (Plato misunderstood Moses’ “sign of the cross” at Numbers 21. 6–9 and wrote in Timaeus that the first God placed Christ in the universe in the shape of the letter Χ [36b7–8 and 34b3].): "<A> ἀναγγείλως Πλάτων καὶ μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάμενος, μηδὲ νοθάς τίπον εἶναι σταυρῷ ἀλλὰ χάσμα νοθάς, τὴν μετὰ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν δύναμιν κεχίσαθαι ἐν τῷ παντὶ εἰπε. Read μηδὲ νοθάς ... , ἀλλὰ χάσμα νομίσας, ...

61. 4–5: Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Χριστὸς ἔπει. ""Ἀν μὴ ἀναγεννηθήτη, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν" (= John 3. 5 + Matthew 18. 3). "Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰς μίτρας τῶν τεκνουσών τοὺς ἀπὰς γεννομένους ἐμβῆναι, φανερῶν πάσιν ἑστι. The main purpose of baptism is regeneration, and it is missing in the second sentence. In

8 The source is Aristobulus the Jew ap. Clem. Strom. 1. 150. 1–3; ap. Eus. Praep. ev. 11. 9. 4–5, 13. 12. 3–4 et al. Compare Philo De spec. legg. 4. 61; Leg. alleg. 1. 108; Quis rerum div. heres 214; Quod omnis probus liber 51; Quaest. in Gen. 3. 5 s.f., 5. 152; Ps.-Justin Cohort. 14. 2; Min. Fel. Oct. 34. 5 et al.
9 Compare Aristid. Apol. 10. 8; Clem. Protr. 17. 2; Orig. C. Cels. 3. 23; Acta Apollonii 22; Amob. Adv. nat. 1. 41, 5, 19; Ps.-Nonnus Hist. Gregorii in Iulian.: ad Greg. Orat. II c. Iul. 35 (PG XXXVI 1053C); Alcestis Barcinon. 62 ed. Marcovich.
addition, editors have not recognized that it is a free quotation of John 3.4. Consequently, read “Oti de kai “αὐδύνατον εἰς τὰς μῆτρας τῶν τεκουσῶν τους ἀπὰς γεννωμένους ἐμβηναι καὶ ἀναγεννῆθηναι;” faverōn pāsīn ēstī. John 3.4 reads: Πῶς δύναται ἀνθρώπος γεννηθῆναι γέρων ἢν, Μὴ δύναται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ δεύτερον εἰσελθεῖν καὶ γεννηθῆναι;

63. 10 (the Logos Incarnate): ... νῦν δὲ διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους ἀνθρώπως γενόμενος [sc. Λόγος] ὑπέμεινε καὶ παθεῖν ὅσα αὐτὸν ἐνήργησαν οἱ δαίμονες διατεθῆναι υπὸ τῶν ἀνοίητων Ἰουδαίων. The word καὶ attests to a lacuna after ὑπέμεινε. This is confirmed by 63. 16 ... νῦν δὲ ... διὰ παρθένου ἀνθρώπου γενόμενος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς βουλὴν ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας τῶν πιστευόντων αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξουθενηθῆναι καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέμεινεν ... 

65. 3 (the Eucharist following a baptism): “Ἐπειτα προσφέρεται τῷ προσετώτι τῶν ἁδελφῶν ἁρτος καὶ ποτήριον ὡδατος καὶ κράματος ... Since τὸ κράμα usually means “wine mixed with water,” Ashton deleted the word ὡδατος, while Hamack followed Ottobonianus gr. 274, which omits καὶ κράματος, strangely believing that the early Eucharist consisted of bread and water alone.10 The simplest solution is to read ποτήρια for ποτήριον. A deacon brings bread and two chalices, one with wine, the other with water. The word κράμα means here ὡδος, as is confirmed by 65. 5 μεταλαβεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐχαριστηθέντος ἁρτον καὶ ὡδον καὶ ὡδατος and 67. 5 ἁρτος προσφέρεται καὶ ὡδος καὶ ὡδαιρ.

As for the equation κράμα = ὡδος, compare Song of Solomon 7.2 (3); Plut. Praec. coniug. 20 (140f) τὸ κράμα, καὶ τὸ ὡδατος μετέχον πλείονος, ὡδον καλοῦμεν; Theodoret. Eran. 1 (PG LXXXIII 56A) σῶμα τὸν ἁρτον ἐκάλεσε, καὶ ὡδο καὶ τὸ κράμα; Modern Greek κρασί = ὡδος. For the use of “wine mixed with water” in the early Eucharist compare Iren. Adv. haer. 1. 13. 2 ποτηρίω τῶν ὡδων κεκαρμένον (versio Lat. et Hippol.): ποτήρια ὡδον κεκαρμένα (Epiphan.—the same error is in our text), 4. 33. 2 καὶ τὸ κράμα τοῦ ποτηρίου ὡδον αἰμα διεβεβαιωτο [sc. ὡδον]; Clem. Paed. 2. 2. 3 τὸ κεκαρμένον ποτηριων; Cyprian Ep. 63. 13 Sic autem in sanctificando calice Domini offerri aqua sola non potest, quomodo nec vinum solum potest ...; Constit. apost. 8. 12. 37 Ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ποτηρίων κεράσας εξ ὡδον καὶ ὡδατος ... 

10 A. Hamack, T.U. VII.2 (1891) 117–44, esp. 130. But Ottobonianus is an unreliable manuscript. For example, at 67, 8 it omits one whole line of its exemplar. The fact that the initiates of Mithra offered to their god bread and water (CIL VI 3722a; compare M. Claus, Mithras: Kult und Mysterien [Munich 1990] 117–22) proves nothing. Two out of three elements common to the Christians and Mithra were a sufficient reason for Justin to proclaim that Mithra was a copy of Christ (I Apology 66. 4).
Apologia Minor

1. 1 (Willy-nilly you Romans are our brothers): ... ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ὦμοιοπαθῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀδελφῶν, κἂν ἀγνοῆτε καὶ μὴ θέλητε ... Read καὶ <εἴναι> μὴ θέλητε.

1. 2 (We Christians are being exterminated by incorrigible criminals, instigated by the evil demons): Παντοχοῦ γὰρ, ὃς δὲ σωφρονίζηται ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἡ γείτονος ἡ τέκνου ἡ φίλου ἡ ἀδελφοῦ ἡ ἄνδρος ἡ γυναῖκος κατ' ἠλλειψιν, ... καὶ οἱ φαύλοι δαίμονες, ... φονεύειν ἡμᾶς παρασκευάζουσιν. Wartelle translates: “Partout, en effet, les gens qui devraient apprendre ce qui leur manque de sagesse auprès d’un père, d’un fils, d’un ami, d’un frère, d’un mari, d’une épouse ...” But σωφρονίζῃσθαι means here “to be corrected (castigated),” as it does at 2. 2 (a sinful woman ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδάσκατα ἔγνω, αὐτή <ἐπεὶ> ἐσωφρονίσθη ...). Consequently, read ὅς <κλῆς> (Ashton) ἄν <μὴ> σωφρονίζῃσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς ..., i.e., any incorrigible sinner becomes a servant of the evil demons.

3 (8). 6 (Crescens the Cynic and Socrates): ... διὰ τούτων ἀκούοντας δὲ οὐ τολμᾶ ἠλείην, ὦμοιος Σωκράτει ... ὃς γε μηδὲ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ἀξιέραστον ὅν τιμᾶ. “Ἀλλὰ σὺν γε πρὸ τῆς ἀλήθειάς της ἄντρο.” Read καὶ ὄμοιος Σωκράτει. Unlike Socrates, Crescens is too afraid to tell the truth (about Christ), disregarding Socrates’ admirable words: “No man should be put above the truth” (Plato Rep. 10. 595c2–3).

6 (5). 3 (another etymology of the name Christ): Χριστὸς μὲν κατὰ τὸ κεχρίσθαι καὶ κοσμῆσαι τὰ πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸν θεὸν λέγεται. Wartelle translates: “il est appelé Christ, parce qu’il a reçu l’oction et que Dieu a mis l’ordre dans l’univers par lui.” The etymology, Christ or Messiah, the anointed One, is out of place here. Κεχρίσθαι is medial here and means “to caulk.” Christ is called so because through Him God “caulked” and arranged all things. Compare Theophilus Ad Autol. 1. 12 Ποῦν γὰρ πλοῖον δύναται εὐχρηστὸν εἶναι καὶ σώζεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον χρισθῇ; “Ἡ ποίες πῦργος ἡ οἰκία εὐμορφος καὶ εὐχρηστός ἔστω, ἐπὶ οὐ κέχρισται; ... Ποῦν δὲ ἔργων ἡ κόσμον δύναται εὐμορφίαν ἔχειν, ἐὰν μὴ χρισθῇ καὶ στιλβωθῇ; (Of course, εὐχρηστὸς alludes to Χριστός.)

7 (6). 1 (It is for the Christians’ sake that God delays the end of the world): Ὠθεν καὶ ἐπιμένει ὁ θεὸς τὴν σύγχυσιν καὶ κατάλυσιν τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου μὴ ποιήσαι ... , διὰ τὸ σπέρμα τῶν Χριστιανῶν, ὁ γινώσκει ἐν τῇ φύσει ὅτι αἰτίον ἔστιν. “De là vient que Dieu retarde la réalisation du bouleversement et de la destruction du monde entier ... , en
vertu de la famille des chrétiens qu’il reconnaît dans la nature pour être la cause de ce délai,” translates Wartelle. The words èn tῇ φύσει speak against the interpretation αἴτιον τῆς ἐπιμονῆς. Read instead ὅ γινόσκει ἐν τῇ φύσει ὅτι <τοῦ ζήν> αἴτιον ἐστίν and compare Justin’s source, Aristid. Apol. 16. 1 and 6, “wegen des Flehens der Christen die Welt besteht” (Geffcken 92 f. and 94).

8 (7). 1 (Thanks to the seed of the Logos, implanted in all mankind, the philosophers were able to grasp a part of the truth. And that is why the evil demons hated them so much.): Καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δὲ δογμάτων ... διὰ τὸ ἐμφυτὸν παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ Λόγου, μεμισήθαι καὶ πεφουνεθὰν οἴδαμεν. Ἡράκλειτον μὲν ... καὶ Μουσάνιον δὲ ἐν τοῖς καθ ἡμᾶς καὶ ἄλλους οἴδαμεν. Heraclitus and Musonius may have been hated, but they were not killed. Thus delete the words και πεφουνεθασι as a gloss inspired by the death of Socrates. The subsequent text speaks only of μισείσθαι (8. 2 and 3). Incidentally, delete the second οἴδαμεν as a dittography.

11. 4 (Heracles at the crossroads): Καὶ τὴν μὲν Κακίαν, ἀβραμιον ἐσθητι καὶ ἐρωτοπεποιημένω καὶ ἀνθοῦντι ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων προσώπω ... , εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν Ἡρακλέα ... Read ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων <χρωμάτων> προσώπῳ and compare Prodicus (fr. 2 D–K) ap. Xenoph. Memorab. 2. 1. 21–28.11

11. 8 (Death is inevitable for any born man.): ὅ καὶ περὶ Χριστιανῶν ... ὑπολαβεῖν δὲὶ πάντα <ν>οὐνεχὴ,12 ἐκ τοῦ καὶ τοῦ φειδτοῦ καταφρονέων ἡμᾶς θανάτου λογισμὸν ἐλκοντα. “... tout esprit sensé doit le concevoir en tirant argument du mépris que nous manifestons pour la mort que, justement, tout le monde fuit,” translates Wartelle. But Justin’s argument is this: “Every man who is born must die: Death is an inevitable debt for everyone, and we Christians pay it with gratitude.” Consequently, read ἐκ τοῦ τοῦ μή φειδτοῦ καταφρονέων ἡμᾶς θανάτου λογισμὸν ἐλκοντα and compare 11. 1 ... εἰ μή πάντως παντὶ γεννομένῳ καὶ θανάων ὀφείλετο ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ὀφλήμα ἀποδιδόντες εὐχαριστοῦμεν.13

12. 4 (Our enemies impute to us the crimes they themselves commit.): Φονεύοντες γὰρ αὐτοὶ τίνας ἐπὶ συκοφαντία τῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ εἰς βασιλόν εἶλκοσον οἰκέτας τῶν ἥμετέρων ἢ παίδας ἢ γυναία, καὶ

11 Also in Philo De sacrif. Abel. 20–34; Max. Tyr. Or. 14. 1a–d; Clem. Paed. 2. 110. 1;Themist. Or. 22. 280a; Cic. De officiis 1. 18 et al.
12 νουνεχὴ Thirlby: οὖν ἔτει Α.
13 At I Apology 11. 2 Justin alludes to Eurip. Alc. 419, 782 (βροτοῖς ἀπασί καταθενέων ὀφείλεται), Androm. 1271 f., as does Philo De aet. mundi 27.
δι’ αἰκισμῶν φοβερῶν ἐξαναγκάζουσι κατειπεῖν ταῦτα τὰ μυθολογούμενα, ἂν αὐτοὶ φανερῶς πράττουσιν. Read instead Φονεύ<σ>−αντες γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῖνας ἐπὶ συκοφαντίᾳ τῇ εἰς ἡμᾶς, <συνέλαβον> καὶ εἰς βασάνους ἐιλικρινὰς οἰκετὰς τῶν ἡμετέρων . . . , καὶ δι’ αἰκισμῶν φοβερῶν ἐξαναγκάζουσι κατειπεῖν <ἡμῶν> ταῦτα . . . , and compare Eus. HE 5. 1. 14 συνελαμβάνοντε de καὶ ἑθνικῷ τίνες οἰκεταὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων . . . οἱ . . . φοβηθέντες τὰς βασάνους . . . κατεψεύσαντο ἡμῶν Θεόστεια δείπνα καὶ Οἰδυποδείους μίξεις . . .

14. 2 (By punishing us for the crimes they themselves commit our enemies only condemn themselves.): ἐκ τοῦ [καὶ δελεί] ἡμῖν, ὡς τοιαῦτα πράττουσι, θάνατον ἡ δεσμὰ ἡ ἄλλο τι τοιούτῳ προστιμῶν [Thirlby: πρόστιμον Α] εαυτοὺς κατακρίνειν . . . Read ἡ ἄλλο τι τοιούτῳ πρόστιμον <κρίνειν> εαυτοὺς κατακρίνειν.

15. 3 (Our doctrine is far away from the works of Sotades, Philaenis, Archestratus or Epicurus; and yet you persecute us while allowing everyone to read their works.): . . . εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν Σωταδείοις καὶ Φιλαινιδείοις καὶ Ἀρχεστρατείοις καὶ Ἐπικουρείοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτωι ποιητικοῖς διδάγμασιν σὺν ὤμοια [sc. ημῶν τὰ διδάγματα], οἷς ἐνυγχάνειν πάσι . . . συγκεχώρηται. E. Leutsch emended the transmitted ὀρχηστικοίς το Ἀρχεστρατείος.14 Fr. Buecheler defended ὀρχηστικοῖς15 but I think it is defenseless in view of the fact that the group Archestratus, Philaenis and Epicurus appears together in Athenaeus 3. 104b, 8. 335b, 10. 457d–e. His source is Chrysippus, which may suggest that Justin is using a Stoic source here.

Appendix:
Marcus Aurelius to the Senate: A Christian Legend (A f. 240r–41r)

In Germany Marcus Aurelius is besieged by 77,000 Quads and Sarmats:

Wartelle (p. 222.2–11):
Φανερὰ ύμῖν ἐποίησα τὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ σκοποῦ μεγέθη, ὅποίᾳ ἐν τῇ Γερμανίᾳ ἐκ περιστάσεως διὰ περιβολῆς ἐπακολουθήματα ἐποίησα ἐν τῇ μεθορίᾳ καμῶν καὶ

Read:
Φανερὰ ύμῖν ποιήσω τὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ σκοποῦ μεγέθη, <δείξας> ὅποίᾳ ἐν τῇ Γερμανίᾳ ἐκ περιστάσεως διὰ περιβολῆς ἐπακολουθήματα [5] ἐποίησε, ἐν τῇ μεθορίᾳ

14 Philol. 20 (1863) 465.
We learn from Lucian (Hist. conscrib. 29) that “dragon” is a military unit consisting of 1,000 men (χιλίους γάρ οἴμαι ὁ δράκων ἁγεί). Consequently, in lines 8–9 we should read “seven” for the transmitted
"four," and in line 21 ἐναντίον for the transmitted ἐννακοσίων. The total number of Quads and Sarmats facing Marcus is 77 dragons = 77,000 men.

The text of lines 16–19 means, “and I had with me the armies of the legions First and Tenth-Gemina, in addition to a limited detachment of the legion Fretense.”19

Abandoned by the Roman gods, Marcus appeals to his Christian soldiers:

Wartelle (p. 222.14–19):

... παρεκάλεσα τοὺς παρ’ ἡμῖν λεγομένους Χριστιανοὺς καὶ ἐπερωτήσας εὑρόν πλήθος καὶ μέγεθος αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐμβριμησάμενος εἰς αὐτοὺς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔπρεπε διὰ τὸ ὑστερον ἐπεγνωκέναι με τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν. "Ὅθεν ἀρξάμενοι οὐ βελῶν παράρτησιν οὔτε ὅπλων οὔτε σαλπίγγων, διὰ τὸ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸν Θεόν, δέν φοροῦσί κατὰ συνείδησιν.

Read:

... παρεκάλεσα τοὺς παρ’ ἡμῖν λεγομένους Χριστιανούς, καὶ ἐπερωτήσας εὑρόν πλήθος παμ-μέγεθες αὐτῶν, καὶ <ἐβδόμον> ἐμ- [5]βριμησάμενος εἰς αὐτούς (ὅπερ οὐκ ἔπρεπε διὰ τὸ ὑστερον ἐπεγνωκέναι με τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν).

"Ὅθεν <οὖν ὅρμαν> ἀρξαμένοι<> οὐ βελῶν παράρτυσις οὔτε [10] ὅπλων οὔτε σαλπίγγων διὰ τὸ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτο αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸν Θεόν, δέν φοροῦσι κατὰ συνείδησιν.

3–4 παμμέγεθες Η. Ο. Hirschfeld: καὶ μέγεθος A Il 4 ἐβδόμον supplevi Il 8 οὖν ὅρμαν supplevi Il 8–9 ἀρξα-μένοι<> scripsi: ἀρξαμένοι A Il 9 παράρτυσις scripsi (παράρτυσιν iam Geffcken): παράρτησιν A Il 10 post σαλπίγγων lacunam statuit Harnack

There are two lacunae in the text, ἐβδόμον in line 4 and οὖν ὅρμαν in line 8. The closest parallel seems to be Gregory of Nyssa Or. Ib in XL martyres, p. 146. 22 Lendle (= PG XLVI 760): τότε καταλιπόντες οἱ γενναίοι [sc. οἱ Χριστιανοί] τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων βοήθειαν ἐγνώσαν τὴν ἁμαχον καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστον ἐν τοῖς φοβεροῖς συμμαχίαι.

The Christians pray to God for rain:

19 Compare E. Ritterling, RE XII (1925) 1686.
Wartelle (pp. 222.20–224.26):

"Ρίψαντες γὰρ ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν οὖχ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ μόνον ἑδείθησαν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παρόντος στρατεύματος, παρῆγορον γενέσθαι δίψης καὶ λιμοῦ τῆς παρούσης. Πεμπταῖοι γὰρ ὤδωρ οὐκ εἰλήφειμεν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι· ἦμεν γὰρ ἐν τῷ μεσομόφαλῳ τῆς Γερμανίας καὶ τοῖς ὁροῖς αὐτῶν. "Αμα δὲ τῷ τούτους ῥίψαι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ εὔχεσθαι Θεῷ, ζ ἐγὼ ἡγόνουν, εὐθέως ὤδωρ ἥκολούθει οὐρανόθεν . . .

Read:

"Ρίψαντες γοῦν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν οὖχ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ μόνον ἑδείθησαν <Θεοὺ>, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς στρατεύματος, παρῆγορον γενέσθαι δίψης καὶ λιμοῦ τῆς παρούσης. Πεμπταῖοι γὰρ ὤδωρ οὐκ εἰλήφειμεν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι· ἦμεν γὰρ ἐν τῷ μεσομόφαλῳ τῆς Γερμανίας καὶ τοῖς ὁροῖς αὐτῶν. "Αμα δὲ τῷ τούτους ῥίψαι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ εὔχεσθαι Θεῷ, ζ ἐγὼ ἡγόνουν, εὐθέως ὤδωρ ἥκολούθει οὐρανόθεν . . .


The words καὶ λιμοῦ are a gloss: The Roman army suffered from thirst alone. Compare Iul. Capitol. M. Anton. 24. 4 (suis pluvia imperatra, cum sibi laborarent); Apollinaris ap. Eus. HE 5. 51–56 ( . . . δυμβρὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν τὸ θεῖον παρακεκληκτῶν στρατιάν <ἀναρραγέντα supplevi>, πάσαν αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ δίψους μέλλουσαν ὅσον οὖπω διαφθείρεσθαι, ἀνακτώμενον); Tertull. Apolog. 5. 6 (illam Germanicam sitim); Xiphilinus (Dio Cass. 71. 8. 1–10. 5 = III 259–61 Boissevain); Orac. Sibyll. 12. 194–200 et al.

University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff on Wilhelm Dilthey:
His Letters to Georg Misch (1914–1928)

WILLIAM M. CALDER III and SVEN RUGULLIS

I. Introduction

The Hamburg Ordinarius for Philosophy, Klaus Oehler, has written of Wilamowitz’ letters and Erinnerungen, “Wo in seinen Briefen und in seinen ‘Erinnerungen’ der Name Dilthey Erwähnung findet, ist Karl Dilthey,¹ der Archäologe, gemeint. Von Wilhelm Dilthey und dessen Gedanken findet sich bei Wilamowitz keine Spur.”² In principle it is bold to rule on what lies in a man’s letters when only some five percent of the letters are published and many still in private collections. With Goethe or Nietzsche it would be different. In fact Wilamowitz in his published works easily available to Oehler mentions Wilhelm Dilthey.³ And the letters of Wilhelm Dilthey to Wilamowitz survive.⁴ In general Oehler is right. Wilamowitz had no time for philosophical speculation. Werner Jaeger, his student and successor, acutely observed:⁵ “Dem Geiste von Wilamowitz lag das


³ See U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Kleine Schriften VI, ed. by W. Buchwald (Berlin 1972) 141: “Die Biographie, wie sie Justi und Dilthey uns geschenkt haben, leistet viel.” Cf. ibid. 120.

⁴ Publication by W. M. Calder III and S. Rugullis is underway.

eigentlich Philosophische fern. Insbesondere hatte er kein intimes Verhältnis zu denjenigen Autoren, die wie Aristoteles und die Männer der exakten Wissenschaft oder die griechischen Väter seit Origenes ein vieljähriges systematisches Eindringen und völliges Vertrautsein erfordern.”

In a revealing Latin intellectual autobiography written 6 March 1928 Wilamowitz writes:6 “Philosophorum recentiorum tantum Spinozam eatenus legi, adolescents, ut ipse suspicere possem. Kantium ariditatem et rationalismo deterritus celeriter abieci. Γονεῖς, Schopenhauer et sequaces, ne tantum quidem valueræ, ut odissem, sensi statim rationis debilitatem. sensi ‘ils ne sont pas sérieux.’” This view is anticipated in a letter written by him in mid-October 1905 to Anton Thomsen (1877–1915), Professor of Philosophy at Copenhagen and husband of the editrix of Suidas, Ada Adler. Thomsen had sent him a copy of a book on Hegel. Wilamowitz politely replies:7 “Dabei sehe ich, dass die Betrachtungen, die Sie über Hegel anstellen, mich wohl reizen würden; ich stamme aus einer Generation, die sich mit dieser speculativen Philosophie gar nicht abgab, und mein Bedürfnis nach dieser Seite ist durch die Griechen reichlich befriedigt worden. Aber der geschichtliche Zusammenhang mit der Goetheschen Bewegung des modernen Denkens müsste mich stark interessiren.” Plato was different. Wilamowitz believed Plato.8

The letters here are of interest because they provide the rare occasion where Wilamowitz writes about philosopi recentiores, in particular his Berlin colleague, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911).9 But for these letters and the three preserved of Dilthey to Wilamowitz we are almost uninformed of their acquaintance. Wilamowitz’ unpleasant experience with Wilhelm’s brother Karl would not have made matters easier. That Wilhelm Dilthey had married the sister of Hermann Usener (1834–1905) need not have brought them close. Wilamowitz’ view of Hermann Usener was not uncritical.10 On the other hand at Basel Dilthey was befriended by Adolf Kießling, Wilamowitz’ friend and collega proximus at Greifswald and, when a student

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7 Studies (previous note) 155 n. 43.
8 See Wilamowitz apud E. Norden, Kleine Schriften zum klassischen Altertum, ed. by B. Kytzler (Berlin 1966) 668: “Fidem profiteor Platonicam.”
at Berlin, had heard the lectures of Wilamowitz’ father-in-law, Theodor Mommsen. They were also united in an admiration for things Greek. Dilthey had noticed in May 1897 with approval Wilamowitz’ arrival in Berlin: “Wilamowitz noch nicht gesehen. Diels sagt daß seine Gesundheit schwerlich Berlin aushalten werde. Seine öffentliche Vorlesung über das griechische Drama hat durch die anthropologische Grundlegung über Drama der Naturvölker usw.[?] große Begeisterung der Studenten erregt. Er nimmt mit Diels die Position einer ganz modernen Psychologie ein.” This is praise indeed.

Georg Misch (1878–1965), a Berliner, had married the daughter and biographer of Dilthey. He took the doctorate in philosophy at Berlin in 1900 under Dilthey. His chief contribution to ancient studies is the first volume of his monumental history of autobiography, reviewed by Wilamowitz and in the English version by Werner Jaeger. He was deeply influenced in this by Wilamowitz’ friend and earlier Göttingen colleague, Friedrich Leo (1851–1914), whose Griechisch-römische Biographie appeared in 1905, two years before Misch’s first volume. His indebtedness to Leo did not go unnoticed by Wilamowitz. In his last preserved letter to Friedrich Althoff, dated 1 August 1908, Wilamowitz alludes to “mein hochgeschätzter College Misch.” Misch, then aged thirty, was Privatdozent for Philosophy at Berlin. Wilamowitz did not apply such epithets in such places casually. The five documents that follow are evidence for their friendship.

The originals are in the possession of Professor Dr. W. Rüegg (Institut für Soziologie, Universität Bern). We are greatly indebted to him for generously providing copies of the letters and owner’s permission for

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11 See A. Bork, Dilthey’s Auffassung des griechischen Geistes (Berlin 1944). He had been deeply influenced, not least through his father, by August Boeckh (Bork 72 ff.).
14 Wilamowitz (above, note 3) 120–27.
15 W. Jaeger, Scripta Minora II (Rome 1960) 455–62. Note especially (455): “Its characteristic feature is the combination of the author’s philological thoroughness with his searching philosophical mind.”
16 See Jaeger (previous note) 456 after Wilamowitz (above, note 3) 123, who notes Ivor Bruns as Misch’s other great predecessor. Jaeger’s statement that Misch “taught for many years in Göttingen” with Leo is untrue. Leo died in 1914. Misch became Extraordinarius at Göttingen in 1916, Ordinarius in 1919. They never taught together.
publication (per litt. 4 December 1981 to Prof. Dr. Jaap Mansfeld). We are further indebted to Prof. Dr. Jaap Mansfeld (Utrecht) for first transcriptions and selected exegetical notes as well as permission to publish the documents that had first been entrusted to him. The late Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald, the greatest modern expert on Wilamowitz’ handwriting, during the Wilamowitz Conference at Bad Homburg in September 1981 controlled the transcriptions and first deciphered a number of difficult passages. We are grateful to all three of these distinguished scholars.

II. The New Texts

1. 10 January 1914

U. von WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF
WESTEND–CHARLOTTENBURG
EICHENALLÉE 12
10 I 14

Hochgeehrter Herr College


Für mich, der ich das auf mein Reich beziehe, ist doch bedeutsam, daß der vage Begriff Römische Stoa, auch wohl Stoa und Akademie, nun schon ganz klar sich fassen läßt; die Macht des Poseidonios23 über die ganze Zeit,

20 Additions to Dilthey’s published works taken from his manuscript notes; see Dilthey (previous note) ix–xi, 493 ff.
21 Volume I of the collected works of Wilhelm Dilthey was edited by Bernhard Groethuysen and appeared first in 1922.
sei es durch Cicero de nat[ura] deo[rum] und Seneca, sei es durch die Kirchenväter praevallirt. Aber daneben das Rationelle, das viel mehr Hellenische durch Cic[ero] de offic[iis] und de leg[ibus]: das ist Panaitios\textsuperscript{24}: und das sind zwei im Grunde entgegengesetzte Weltanschauungen, obgleich das Etikett gleichermaßen Stoa lautet. Und im Ganzen ist das echtene Hellenische doch, was sich als ganz neu fühlen darf: die exacte Forschung, Galilei würde wohl allein in Platons Akademie anerkannt sein.\textsuperscript{25} Doch das führt ins Unendliche—Die Editionsarbeit wird ihnen [sic] gewiß Freude und Dank bringen; aber sie darf Sie nicht vom Eignen ganz fernhalten. Im übrigen geniessen Sie hoffentlich mit Ihrer verehrten Frau Gemalin [sic]\textsuperscript{26} die Ländlichkeit und die Landschaft.

Mit unseren\textsuperscript{27} schönsten Grüßen und Wünschen
Ihr dankbar ergebener
UWilamowitz

2. 18 May 1924

Charlottenburg 18 V 24

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Es ist mehr als ich verdiente, daß Sie mir etwas schicken, von dem Sie wissen, daß ich es nur sehr zum Teil verstehe;\textsuperscript{28} aber die Arbeit, die Sie daran gewandt haben, kann ich wohl schätzen, und auch daß sie wohl Selbstverleugnung forderte, denn der Ort gestattete nicht, was solche Entwicklungsgeschichte so nötig hat wie die Suppe das Salz, die Kritik, zwar nicht die absolute, aber wohl die viel interessantere, wie ein Plan immer den andern gekreuzt hat. “die Windeln auf die Leine,” sagte Merck.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{24} For a similar sentiment see Wilamowitz (previous note) 143; for the fragments, see M. van Straaten, \textit{Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta} (Leiden 1952).

\textsuperscript{25} Presumably a reference to the inscription on Plato’s door: see Elias, \textit{in Cat.} 118. 18 and compare Phlp. \textit{in de An.} 117. 29. Nietzsche failed math at Pforta, a fact recalled by Wilamowitz at \textit{Erinnerungen 1848–1914} \textsuperscript{2} (Leipzig 1929) 129, earlier and less subtly at \textit{Zukunftsfphilologie! Eine Erwidrung} (Berlin 1872) 13.

\textsuperscript{26} Georg Misch was married to Wilhelm Dilthey’s daughter Clara, author of the fundamental \textit{Der junge Dilthey: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebüchern 1852–1870} \textsuperscript{2} (Stuttgart/Göttingen 1960).\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} An unusual close. Marie Mommsen is included.

\textsuperscript{28} G. Misch, “Die Autobiographie der französischen Aristokratie des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts,” \textit{Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte} 1 (1923) 172 ff.; see further his \textit{Geschichte der Autobiographie} IV.2 (Frankfurt a./M. 1969) 739 ff.

\textsuperscript{29} Johann Heinrich Merck (1741–1791), writer and critic.
Mir hat von Dilthey der Beitrag zur Kultur der Gegenwart sehr imponiert, und hier finde ich sehr schön und tief, befriedigend, das er S. LXXV über die Metaphysik sagt.31 Sonst ging und geht mich an, was er zu dem getan hat, was er Anthropologie nennt,32 und natürlich zur Poetik. Beides wirkt ja sehr stark, aber die Halbwisser verderbens. Bei den gotischen und Renaissance- und romantischen etc. Menschen, die jetzt herumgezeigt werden, wird mir übel. Und das „Erlebnis“33 (wie mich dünkt, kein glücklicher Singular) stiftet auch Verwirrung. Ich glaube nicht, daß ein wirklicher Dramatiker das Erlebnis in irgend einer Bedeutung nötig hat. Er belebt aus sich einen Stoff, aber in dem muß er das latente Leben erwecken, oder besser eins, denn die Erfahrung lehrt, daß in manchen mehrere Leben gefunden werden können. Und es gibt auch Poesie genug, unverächtliehe, an der nicht mehr Dichtererlebnis ist als an einem Geschmeide, das ein wirklicher Künstler fertigt.

Dilthey hat das Große erkannt, daß und wie Geistesgeschichte im weitesten Umfang erforscht und geschrieben werden muß. Darin wird, wenn die Wissenschaft ernsthaft weiter getrieben wird, noch das Wichtigste getan und erzielt werden. Ich geschehe aber, je älter ich werde, desto weniger befriedigt mich dies Allgemeine, das ich doch als junger Mensch mit Leidenschaft trieb und mir viel darauf zu Gute tat, denn meine Fachgenossen ahnten so was nicht. Aber immer mehr engt sichs ein, einen Menschen, ein Kunstwerk, oder auch eins, das kaum so heißen darf, und einen Menschen, der auch ein Esel sein darf, wirklich zu verstehen ist mir das Liebste—und Schwerste.

generalia et facilia et levia.
So habe ich doch etwas reagiert, um meine Dankbarkeit zu zeigen.

30 W. Dilthey, „Das Wesen der Philosophie,” in Kultur der Gegenwart I.6 (Leipzig/Berlin 1907) and Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften V, ed. by G. Misch (Leipzig/Berlin 1924) 339–416. For Paul Hinneberg and the Kultur der Gegenwart, a project encouraged by Friedrich Althoff and to which Wilamowitz was a leading contributor, see L. Goldhammer, Paul Hinneberg und die Deutsche Literaturzeitung 1880 bis 1900: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Deutschland (diss. Humboldt-Univ. Berlin 1966) 63 ff. We owe the reference to Prof. Dr. Bernhard vom Brocke. The first volume appeared in 1905.


33 Misch sent to Wilamowitz: W. Dilthey, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung (Leipzig/Berlin 1924).34

34 See Wilamowitz’ letter to the philosopher, Julius Stenzel, of 26 February 1931 at Antiqua 23 (Naples 1983) 278: „Wenn das Historismus ist, daß man die Menschen als Individuen in ihrer Zeit fassen will, so bekennen ich mich zu der angeltlich victa causa.” We have been unable to identify the Latin that follows. It is not attested in the TLL.
Empfehlen Sie mich Ihrer Gattin und freuen Sie sich in Göttingen, nicht in Berlin zu sein.\textsuperscript{35}

In alter Ergebenheit
Ihr
UWilamowitz

3. 4 July 1926

Charlottenburg 9 4 VII 26

Hochgeehrter Herr College

Sie sind so freundlich gewesen, mir zuzutrauen, daß ich Ihr Buch\textsuperscript{36} verstehen könnte, und ich wollte, Sie hätten Recht. Denn die Neigung dazu ist stark, ich habe auch vielerlei gelesen, so weit die durch viele Arbeit und Geschäfte zerrißene Zeit es gestattete, aber ich muß gestehen, daß ich in das Ganze noch nicht eingedrungen bin, also in den Aufbau, die Gliederung der verschiedenen Ansätze zum Stellen der philosophischen Probleme und ihrer Lösung auf noch nicht wirklich wissenschaftlichem Wege. Ob man Demokrit noch mitrechnen darf, ist mir fraglich, aber vielleicht haben Sie ihn auch nur noch hierherstellen müssen, weil er sich neben Sokrates nicht gut ausnimmt. Daß Sie den Demokrates aussondern und so die philologische Analyse inhaltlich bestätigen, war mir besonders erfreulich.\textsuperscript{37} Die Entdeckung war mir geradezu befriedigend. Das Indische lese ich mit starkem Anteil, freilich nur des Verstandes, abgesehen von Buddha, aber mit Ihren Chinesen kann ich noch nichts anfangen.

Die Übersetzungen von Diels haben Sie mit vollem Rechte bei Seite gelassen.\textsuperscript{38} Ich fürchte, sie richten viel Unheil an, wenn sie statt des Originals genommen werden. Ich bin aber auch oft mit seinem Verständnis der archaischen Sprache nicht einverstanden. Darüber ließe sich viel reden.\textsuperscript{39} So wünsche ich Ihnen viele Leser, die philosophisch weiter und tiefer sehen als ich, aber ein fleissiger und dankbarer Leser bin ich auch und bleibe Ihr ganz ergebener
UWilamowitz

\textsuperscript{35} For Wilamowitz' despair at leaving Göttingen for Berlin, see Erinnerungen\textsuperscript{2} 239.

\textsuperscript{36} G. Misch, Der Weg in die Philosophie: Eine philosophische Fibel (Leipzig/Berlin 1926); a second, considerably expanded edition appeared in 1950 in Bern.

\textsuperscript{37} Misch (previous note) 407.


\textsuperscript{39} Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald notes: "z.B. im Hermes 61 (1926) 278 f. (= Kl. Schriften IV 405 f.); übrigens vom selben Jahre wie dieser Brief."
Hochgeehrter Herr College


Nun lehren Sie so tiefe Untergründe und dabei ganz einleuchtende Querverbindungen kennen, daß man sich am liebsten an das Werk machte—wozu doch das Alter von einem, der sein Haus bestellen muß, doch nicht die Musse gibt. Mein Lebtag habe ich nie so wenig Zeit gehabt. Aber Ihre Abhandlung habe ich mit voller Aufmerksamkeit gelesen. Erst hatte ich Angst, fragte, was hat das mit Autobiographie zu tun. Dann ward ich erleichtert; aber Sie haben zwar mit Recht Ihre Aufgabe erweitert, und zu sehen, wie die Menschen es dazu bringen, eine innere Entwicklung zu beobachten oder im Geiste schaffend zu verfolgen, das ist freilich etwas Höheres, und von da wird erst klar, daß es so gar spät dazu kommt.

Ob ich Ihr Geschenk verdienste, ist hiernach gar nicht sicher, aber daß es mich sehr gefreut hat, werden Sie heraushören. Eigentlich ist es jene Philologie, von der ich glaube, daß sie am sichersten zum Ziele führt.

Mit herzlichem Danke in der Ergebenheit
Ihr
UW Ilamowitz

42 He learned it at Pforta from August Koberstein (1797–1870); see Erinnerungen 77 and for his reading at Bonn (“Gottfried von Straßburg und die kleinen Erzählungen in v.d. Hagens Gesamtabenteuern, die ich mir gekauft hatte”) ibid. 85. By 4 December 1869 he had lost interest in Germanistik in order to devote himself wholly to Greek; see GRBS 11 (1970) 146–47 = Antiqua 23 (1983) 36–37.
43 Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald compares Wilamowitz’ citation of Varro, de re rustica 1. 1. 1 in his letter of 8 January 1928 to Stenzel (Antiqua 23 [1983] 275): “Ich stecke so tief in der Arbeit und bin gezwungen für die letzte Reise sarcinas colligere.”
44 In the end Misch omitted this article from his Geschichte der Autobiographie.
Hochgeehrter Herr College


Ihre Aufgabe hat sich dazu erweitert, daß Sie durch alle Zeiten verfolgen, wie die Menschen in einzelnen seltenen Vertretern zum Bewusstsein und zum Ausdrucke der Eigenpersönlichkeit kommen. Da müsste eigentlich noch herangezogen werden, wie sie sich im Spiegelbilde der Poesie verborgen äussern. Und zum andern wie die Fähigkeit hervortritt, einen individuellen bestimmten Menschen in der bildenden Kunst darzustellen, so darzustellen, daß seine Seele sich offenbart.

Sie ziehen Parallelen, zu Archilochos zumal. Da habe ich diese Fragen mir öfter gestellt und bin weiter, als ich es wohl früher dargestellt habe. Aber das ist zu viel für einen Brief, zumal ich zur Zeit recht müde bin.

Nur meinen Dank wollte ich aussprechen und meine Freude an Ihrem Werke auch

in alter voller Ergebenheit

UWilamowitz

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

45 Misch’s Die Geschichte der Autobiographie appeared between 1907 and 1969 in four volumes, of which the fourth appeared posthumously.
46 For Wilamowitz’ friend and Charlottenburg neighbor, the Germanist Gustav Roethe (1859–1926), see Berufungspolitik (above, note 17) 79 n. 340.
47 Wilamowitz may be thinking of the early history of Indo-European meter and his correspondence in 1921 with the Altgermanist, Andreas Heusler.
48 The name is uncertain: Ohnke, Glinke and Ehmke have been suggested. Professor Marianne Kalinke suggests Axel Olrik, but the name does not fit the traces.
50 G. Misch, “Egil Skallagrimsson” (previous note) 199 ff., esp. 211 f., 216 and 228.
51 Dr. Wolfgang Buchwald cites Wilamowitz, Sappho und Simonides (Berlin 1913) 9 f.
The Political Use of Antiquity in the Literature of the German Democratic Republic

BERND SEIDENSTICKER

For W. M. Calder III on his 60th birthday

Peter Huchel:

Der Garten des Theophrast

Wenn mittags das weiße Feuer
Der Verse über den Urnen tanzt,
Gedenke, mein Sohn. Gedenke derer,
Die einst Gespräche wie Bäume gepflanzt.
Tot ist der Garten, mein Atem wird schwerer,
Bewahre die Stunde, hier ging Theophrast,
Mit Eichenlohe zu düngen den Boden,
Die wunde Rinde zu binden mit Bast.
Ein Ölbaum spaltet das mürbe Gemäuer
Und ist noch Stimme im heißen Staub.
Sie gaben Befehl, die Wurzel zu roden.
Es sinkt dein Licht, schutzloses Laub.

1 A slightly shorter version of this paper was read at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, McMaster University, the University of Toronto, the University of California at Berkeley and Harvard University; the original lecture-format is preserved; notes are kept to the minimum. I am grateful to James Porter for correcting my English.


The Garden of Theophrastus

When at noon the white fire of verses
Where are we? In Athens, as the garden of Theophrastus and the olive tree seem to suggest? Or in the Berlin of 1962, where the poem was written, first published and read? And what is the meaning of the twelve lines? I will come back to Huchel’s poem at the end of my paper, in the hope that the interpretation of a number of other texts may help us to better understand his enigmatic memento.

For centuries the imaginative reception and creative transformation of Greek and Roman antiquity has played a significant role in German literature (as of course in other European literatures too). It is widely known that this tradition of “Antikerezeption” has lived on well into the 20th century. Authors such as Hofmannsthal, Rilke and George, Benn or Brecht, Hermann Broch, Gerhart Hauptmann or Thomas Mann attest to its continuous importance. What is much less well known, however, is the fact that the adaptation of classical material—whether it comes from myth or literature, history or art—still is a major source of inspiration and a much-used form of expression for contemporary German writers. It was not until the extraordinary success of Christa Wolf’s *Kassandra* and Christoph Ransmayr’s poststructuralist novel about Ovid, *Die letzte Welt,* that a broader literary public became aware of this interesting aspect of modern German literature. In the last decade great strides have been made in the scholarly work on the subject, but much is still to be done—and relevant new texts come out every year.

Flickering dances over the ums,
Remember, my son. Remember the vanished
Who planted their conversations like trees.
The garden is dead, more heavy my breathing,
Preserve the hour, here Theophrastus walked,
With oak bark to feed the soil and enrich it,
To bandage with fibre the wounded bole.
An olive tree splits the brickwork grown brittle
And still has a voice in the mote-laden heat.
Their order was to fell and uproot it,
Your light is fading, defenceless leaves.

3 Since there seems to be no convenient short English term for the phenomenon I will, throughout the paper, use the German term “Antikerezeption” to avoid clumsy English paraphrases.


5 Christoph Ransmayr, *Die letzte Welt* (Nördlingen 1988).


7 I have recently started to build up a computer-based archive for the reception of classical antiquity in contemporary German literature, where we try to collect and analyze all relevant texts by German, Austrian and Swiss authors, and I hope that it will soon be possible to answer inquiries about e.g. Herakles or Orpheus, Sappho, Augustus or the Parthenon in contemporary German literature.
In an article published less than a year ago I tried to give a brief comparative survey about Antikerezeption in East and West German literature, a summary of which may serve as an introduction to the one specific aspect of the phenomenon which I want to address in this paper. Perhaps the most surprising result of the survey was the clear difference between the two German literatures: The extent, variety and socio-cultural impact of Antikerezeption in the West, i.e. in the Federal Republic of Germany, is comparatively limited. Theoretical statements by poets or critics are rare; and a general theory (or, rather, ideology) about the importance of classical antiquity does not exist. Besides Walter Jens, classicist and professor of rhetoric at the University of Tübingen, as well as critic, essayist and poet, for a long time there has been no author for whom classical antiquity proves to be of central importance, if only for certain parts of his work or for a certain phase in his creative life. Only recently have there been significant indications of a change in attitude. I mentioned Christoph Ransmayr’s novel about the Metamorphoses of Ovid, and I could add Peter Handke and Botho Strauss, two of the most important contemporary German authors, both of whom in the eighties began to experiment with ancient material (Strauss) and to confront ancient texts, ideas and ideals (Handke).

On the other hand, the importance of Antikerezeption for the literature produced and consumed on the other side of the Elbe River is astounding. There is hardly anyone among the major figures of East German literature who has not (intensely and in some cases quite extensively) worked with classical material. This is true for the dramatists Heiner Müller and Peter Hacks, for the poets Peter Huchel and Johannes Bobrowski, Volker Braun and Günter Kunert, and for the prose writers Franz Fühmann and Christa Wolf, to mention only the best-known authors.

Whereas in the West classical antiquity enjoyed continuous political support, the regime in the East drastically reduced classical education, first at the high school and then at the university. In view of this fact, the


10 Cf. e.g. “Park” (Trojan War); “Die Zeit und das Zimmer” (Medea); “Die Fremdenführerin” (Atridae et al.).

11 Cf. also Peter Weiss, Ästhetik des Widerstands I–III (Frankfurt a.M. 1975–81) and H. Fichte, Geschichte der Empfindlichkeit (Frankfurt a.M. 1987–): “Mein Freund Herodot” (I 381–407); “Wer war Agrippina” (I 477–82); “Ein neuer Martial” (II 61–74); “Männerlust und Frauenlob: Anmerkungen zur Sapphorezeption und zum Orgasmusproblem” (II 75–105); “Patroklos und Achilles: Anmerkungen zur Ilias” (II 143–81) and minutaie in the novels (cf. e.g. XV 32 ff.).

12 For other authors and texts, cf. the literature cited above, note 6.
difference between East and West German literature may appear paradoxical and demands an explanation:

A first reason, I believe, can be found in the person and work of Bertolt Brecht, the great father-figure for most authors of the German Democratic Republic. Brecht, throughout his life, worked critically and creatively with ancient history, literature and art.13 There is not a single area of his rich literary production, from lyric poetry to drama and literary and theoretical prose, that does not show the impact of his study of the ancient world. If one does not forget that besides Brecht other influential authors of the early German Democratic Republic—e.g. Johannes R. Becher and Georg Maurer,14 Anna Seghers15 or Erich Arendt16—have repeatedly used ancient material to express their experiences and views, it is perhaps no wonder that the next generations of authors would follow in the footsteps of this established and successful tradition of socialist literature.

A second, complementary explanation for the astonishing importance of Antikerezeption in the literature of the GDR may be derived from the core of the official cultural (or rather ideological) policy of the regime which was based on Lenin’s fourth thesis about proletarian culture, according to which “Marxism has won its historic significance as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat because, far from rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture.”17

The program that is outlined in this thesis was taken up by the leading cultural ideologists of the GDR and developed into the official concept called “Kulturelles Erbe” or “Erworbene Tradition.” At the ninth meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (SED) Walter Ulbricht, then president of the GDR, proclaimed “that in view of the decadence of late capitalism it is necessary that we diligently preserve the great tradition of our humanistic heritage for the benefit of our people.”18

Ulbricht and his followers in the Ministry of Culture were, of course, talking about the affirmative socialist interpretation and utilization of the literary and artistic achievements of the great periods of our European past,

13 P. Witzmann, Antike Tradition im Werk Bertolt Brechts (Berlin 1964); H. Mayer, Bertolt Brecht und die Tradition (Pfullingen 1961); W. Mittenzwei, Brechts Verhältnis zur Tradition (Berlin 1972).
15 Anna Seghers, Ges. Werke in Einzelausgaben (Berlin 1961–): “Sagen von Artemis” (IX 231–58); “Der Baum des Odysseus” (IX 275 f.); “Das Argonautenschiff” (X 126–43).
17 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow 1966) XXI 317.
but it is obvious that under the wide umbrella of this ideology and further protected by the Brechtian paradigm authors could put the hallowed classical tradition to quite different uses. It is here that I feel we may find some of the deeper reasons for the unexpected importance of Antikerezeption in the literature of the GDR. First, Antikerezeption allowed authors (and artists) to evade the aesthetic constraints of “Socialist realism,” the official artistic concept of the regime; second, the creative use of ancient material opened up interesting political possibilities: It could be used as a vehicle of more or less open criticism aimed against political or cultural developments; socialistic utopias could be sketched as a contrast with a much shabbier reality of the contemporary GDR; the history or the present state of the Communist Party could be discussed; one’s own position and situation as an intellectual within the regime could be defined. It is this political aspect of the Antikerezeption in the GDR that I will try to illustrate in my paper.

Brecht, as is well known, made extensive use of antiquity for political statements. He critically analyzed ancient literature and history, a technique he called “durchrationalisieren” and “entmythologisieren” and which usually consisted in looking at antiquity from a materialistic Marxist point of view and adding the ignored or suppressed proletarian perspective, as e.g. in his famous poem, “Fragen eines lesenden Arbeiters”:

Wer baute das siebentorige Theben?
In den Büchern stehen die Namen von Königen.
Haben die Könige die Felsbrocken herbeigeschleppt?
Und das mehrmals zerstörte Babylon
Wer baute es so viele Male auf? In welchen Häusern
Des goldstrahlenden Lima wohnten die Bauleute?
Wohin gingen an dem Abend, wo die chinesische Mauer fertig war
Die Maurer? Das große Rom
Ist voll von Triumphbögen. Wer errichtete sie? . . .

Over and over again, Brecht used mythological, literary and historical figures, stories, or processes as paradigms for modern personalities, events

19 Bertolt Brecht, Poems, ed. J. Willett and R. Manheim (London 1979), transl. by N. Replansky:

Questions from a worker who reads

Who built Thebes of the seven gates?
In the books you will find the names of kings.
Did the kings haul up the lumps of rock?
And Babylon, many times demolished
Who raised it up so many times? In what houses
Of gold-glittering Lima the builders lived?
Where, the evening that the wall of China was finished
Did the masons go? Great Rome
Is full of triumphal arches. Who erected them? . . .
and developments, as e.g. in his unfinished novel, Die Geschafte des Herrn Julius Cäsar, an attack on ancient and contemporary capitalism. Two short examples of the political use of Roman history may serve as a reminder of this important aspect of Brecht's work.

After the Reichstag fire in 1934 Brecht sarcastically drew a parallel between Hitler and Nero:

Der römische Kaiser Nero, der ebenfalls
Als großer Künstler gelten wollte, soll angesichts
Des auf sein Geheß brennenden Rom auf einem Turm
Die Harfe geschlagen haben. Bei einer ähnlichen Gelegenheit
Zog der Führer angesichts eines brennenden hohen Hauses
Den Bleistift und zeichnete
Den schwungvollen Grundriß
Eines neuen Prachtbaus. So in der Art ihrer Kunst
Unterschieden sich die beiden.20

And during the heated debate about the rearmament of West Germany in the fifties he issued the crisp warning: "Das große Carthago führte drei Kriege. Es war noch mächtig nach dem ersten, noch bewohnbar nach dem zweiten. Es war nicht mehr auffindbar nach dem dritten."21 The main targets of Brecht's political Antikerezeption were fascism and capitalism. But, of course, this poetic technique of indirect critical comment could be (and was) used not only against external enemies but could equally well be turned inward against events or processes within the GDR. An instructive example is Christa Wolf's Kassandra. The author presents the Trojan war as paradigm for the East-West conflict, and although the main part of her criticism is directed against the Greeks (i.e. the West), she at the same time criticizes certain developments in Troy (i.e. in the East). The book, first published in West Germany, could not be published in the East without major cuts.

Another more personal example is Volker Braun's poem "Die Treulose":

20 Bertolt Brecht, Werkausgabe Suhrkamp (1967) IX 525 (my transl.):

The Roman emperor Nero, who also
wanted to pass for a great artist, is said
to have played the harp on a tower
looking down on Rome as it burned at his command.
On a similar occasion
the Führer watching a high house burn
took out his pencil and briskly drew a
plan for a splendid new building. So—in the manner of their art—
the two differed.

21 Bertolt Brecht, "Offener Brief an die deutschen Künstler und Schriftsteller," in Schriften zur Literatur und Kunst (Berlin-Weimar 1966) II 294: "Great Carthage waged three wars. It was still powerful after the first, still habitable after the second. It was not to be found after the third."
Was denn, Valerius, laß nicht den Kopf hängen.
So haltbar sind die Sätze zweitausend Jahre
Und mein Gefühl noch wiegt sich in den Versmaßen
Das wie Laub abfällt und ich lebe kahl weiter.
Immer wieder der Zorn die Scham Nachdichtung
Aus einer schlechten Gesellschaft in die andre.
Ich liebte sie, wie keine wird geliebt werden!
Da war das Leben heiter etc

Laß die laufen
Nach ihrem Planziel, Volker, jetzt heißt hart bleiben.
Wer wird noch zu ihr gehn, für den sie schön aussieht?
Wen wird sie lieben, wessen Liebste sich nennen?
Soll sie sehen, wo sie bleibt, mit ihren Fortschritten
Fort fort. Sie wird mir nicht mehr die Lippen wundbeißen.
Dank für den Zuspruch, Römer aus dem Weltreiche
Oder wovon sprachst du. Jetzt mußt du durchhalten
Bis sie sich bessert die Treulose:
Sag ich, meine sei schlechter? Ich bin es auch nicht
Ich bleibe hart bis zum letzten Hinkiambus.22

Braun plays with one of Catullus’ most famous poems23:

Miser Catulle, desinas ineptire
et quod vides perire, perditum ducas ...

The poem is Catullus’ desperate attempt to free himself from the destructive and degrading love of a woman who does not deserve his love. Braun, who directly addresses Catullus and calls his use of Catullus 8 “an adaptation from one bad society into the other,” uses the poem, parts of which he integrates into the text,24 to make a bitter renunciation of his allegiance to the socialist society he had believed in for a long time.

In the following I want to focus on Heiner Müller, the most prominent dramatist of East Germany. Müller, born in 1923, began his career with realistic plays about social and economic problems in the early GDR. After difficulties with political censorship that increasingly hampered or prevented the production of his plays and forced him into extensive rewriting25 he turned to antiquity which, ever since, has been a major source of inspiration for his work.

Müller first produced translations of Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and Aeschylus’ Prometheus and then wrote “Philoktet” based on Sophocles’ Philoctetes, followed by a satyr-play-like farce about Heracles’ cleaning of


23 Catullus 8.

24 As metre Braun uses a free adaptation of the Catullan choliambus.

the stables of Augias, “Herkles 5,” and a short didactic play in the Brechtian tradition called “Horatier,” which I will introduce shortly.\(^{26}\)

A closer look at Müller’s Antikerezeption\(^{27}\) can show that in turning to a different subject-matter he did not change his political convictions or

\(^{26}\) The acme of Müller’s Antikerezeption was in the sixties; but he has continued to work with classical material; cf. e.g. “Zement” (1972), “Verkommenes Ufer Medeiamaterial Landschaft mit Argonauten” (1982), “Anatomie Titus Fall of Rome” (1984).

intentions. He just adapted a different, and perhaps safer, mode of expression for his critical analysis and assessment both of the world in general and of the particular society in which he lived.

Three quite different examples will demonstrate Müller’s political use of classical material. Let me begin with a quite unusual form of political Antikerezeption, an almost literal translation of a famous Latin text:

Horaz, Satiren II 1

Horaz, Trebatius

H. Ich hör da welche sagen (laut, Trebatius!) Ich wär zu scharf in der Satire, frech Über die Schranken setzend, die gesetzt sind. Anderen gilt, was ich zusammenfüg Entnervt. Die reden so: derlei Verse Macht einer tausend auch an einem Tag. Rat mir, Trebatius, Freund. Was soll ich machen?

T. Schweig.

H. Das heißt: keinen Vers mehr künftig.

T. Keinen.


T. Besing den Fürsten selber, den Allzeit gerechten, wie Lucilius Besang den Scipio, damals.

H. Gern, Freund, gern Wenn sich ein Anlass bietet. Nicht allzeit Hat Cäsar für Horaz ein offnes Ohr. Wird er verkehrt gestreichelt, schlägt er aus.28

Borrowing the voice of Horace for a personal political statement, Müller translates the first 20 lines of the programmatic poem with which Horace opened the second book of his satires. Müller—without adding any

28 Heiner Müller, “Horaz Satiren II 1,” in Die Umsiedlerin, oder Das Leben auf dem Lande (Berlin 1975) 113 f.
comments or explanations—counts on his readers to grasp the paradigmatic quality of the conversation between Horace and his legal adviser Trebatius and to understand that the ancient verses about poetry, criticism and power have preserved their validity over two thousand years. Pointedly, Müller ends his translation at line 20 with the acknowledgment that the powerful when stroked in the wrong way will lash out. What at first sight could appear as a mere exercise in translation by Müller turns out to be a poignant programmatic statement about his poetry and a topical comment on the relation of art and power.

In the second example Müller uses a well-known passage from the *Iliad* for a personal statement:

**Geschichten von Homer**

1
Häufig redeten und ausgiebig mit dem Homer die Schüler, deutend sein Werk, ihn fragend um richtige Deutung.
Denn es liebte der Alte immer sich neu zu entdecken
Und gepriesen gezieht er nicht mit Wein und Gebraten.
Kam die Rede, beim Gastmahl, Fleisch und Wein auf Thersites
Den Geschnähten, den Schwätzer, der aufstand in der Versammlung
Nutzte klug der Großen Streit um das größere Beutestück
Sprach: Schet an den Völkerhirten, der seine Schafe
Schert und hinzogt wie immer ein Hirt, und zeigte die blutigen
Leeren Hände der Söldner als leer und blutig den Söldnern.
Da nun fragten die Schüler: Wie ist das mit diesem Thersites
Meister? Du gibst ihm die richtigen Worte, dann gibst du mit eignen
Worten ihm unrecht. Schwierig scheint das uns zu begreifen.
Fragten die Schüler: Wozu das? Der Alte: Aus Hunger. Nach Lorbeer?
Auch. Doch schätz er den gleich hoch wie auf dem Scheitel im Fleischtopf.

2
Unter den Schülern, heißt es, sei aber einer gewesen
Klug, ein großer Frager. Jede Antwort befragt er
Noch, zu finden die nicht mehr fragliche. Dieser nun fragte
Sitzend am Flüß mit dem Alten, noch einmal die Frage der andern.
Prüfend ansah den Jungen der Alte und sagte, ihn ansehend
Heiter: Ein Pfeil ist die Wahrheit, giftig dem eiligen Schützen!
Schon den Bogen spannen ist viel. Der Pfeil bleibt ein Pfeil ja
Und der Bogen stirbt nicht mit dem Schützen. Sprach der und erhob sich.

29 Müller’s text is a free translation which, however, stays fairly close to Horace’s text.
30 Homer, *Iliad* 2. 222 ff.
In the first part of Müller's hexametric poem Homer is asked by his pupils why he puts the bitter truth about the Trojan war into the mouth of Thersites and then discredits this truth by having Thersites criticized, whalloped and derided; and Homer answers: "to be liked by the princes" and "from hunger"; i.e. the poet cannot write as he pleases, at least if he wants to publish and to eat. Political circumstances and power-structure can prevent the open advocacy of the political truth.

Already here the topicality is obvious, but Müller in the second part of the poem goes one step further: The most intelligent of Homer's disciples is not satisfied by the answers of his master and repeats the question when the two are alone. And now Homer/Müller gives a second and more profound justification for his attitude: It is not only that the truth leaves pot and pan empty and that it does not provide any laurel; the truth is dangerous, and just to bend the bow in order to shoot the arrow of truth is an accomplishment. Even if the author hides the truth among his lies, as the truth of Thersites is hidden among the lies of the context, it still remains a potentially deadly weapon that can be understood and used by others. Müller thus, practicing the lesson of his fable in his poem, gives an eminently political comment on the situation of poets, or intellectuals in general, who live and work under a totalitarian regime.

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**Tales of Homer**

1

Often and in abundance his pupils were talking with Homer
Elucidating his work and demanding correct explanation.
Because the old poet loved to discover himself afresh
And when extolled wasn't stingy with wine and a roast.
During a feast, the meat and the wine, the talk once turned to
Thersites, the much despised one, the gossip, who rose in assembly
Cleverly using the war lords' quarrel for the size of their spoils
Said he: Look at the people's shepherd who is shearing and killing
Like any shepherd does with his sheep, and he showed the bloody
Empty hands of the soldiers to the soldiers as empty and bloody.
And then the pupils asked: How is that with this Thersites
Master? You let him say the right words but then with your own words
You prove him wrong. This seems to be difficult to understand.
Why did you do it? Said the old man: To be liked by the princes.
Asked his pupils: Why that? The old man: From hunger. For laurel?
Too. But he liked it as much in his fleshpot as on his head.

2

One of the pupils, however, they say was uniquely bright
A great one for questions. He always questioned each answer he got
In his search for the one, the definite answer. He asked
Sitting at the riverside with the old man the question again
As once the others. The old man looked at the youngster and said
Calmly: Truth is an arrow, poisoned to all hasty archers!
Even bending the bow is much. The arrow will still be an
Arrow if found among rushes. Truth dressed as a lie is still truth.
And the bow won't die with the archer. Said it and rose.
After the two poems I want now, for my third example, to turn to a
dramatic text. In the sixties and seventies especially the dramatists of the
GDR made extensive use of Antikerezeption. Peter Hacks, the most
important East German dramatist beside Müller, wrote no fewer than six
plays in which he worked with ancient history or literature: “Amphitrion,”
“Numa,” “Omphale,” “Prexaspes,” “Rosie träumt” and “Senecas Tod,” to
which must be added his highly successful adaptation of Aristophanes’
Peace.32 Beside Müller and Hacks, the two most important dramatists of
the former GDR, there is the interesting Antikerezeption of younger
dramatists like Hartmut Lange33 and Stefan Schütz,34 both of whom were
strongly influenced by Müller and both of whom left the GDR (Lange
already in 1968; Schütz in 1981) after encountering serious problems with
the cultural bureaucracy.

Müller wrote “The Horatian” in 1968.35 As subject-matter he chose the
famous story from Rome’s mythical past, told by Livy in Book 1, chapters
22–26, and already used by Brecht for his play “Die Horatier und die
Kuriatier.” Müller turned Livy’s story into a short epic–dramatic text in the
tradition of the Brechtian “Lehrstück.” The narrative form (the story is told
in the third person and in the past tense) creates epic distance; the rhythmical
language, the detailed description of gestures and movements of the
characters, the composition by scenes and the ample use of direct speech
give the text a distinct dramatic quality. Syntax, word-order and rhetoric are
obviously adapted to the ancient subject-matter.

Livy opens his narrative with a detailed report of the cause of the
conflict between Rome and Alba (chapter 22); he then describes the
preparations for war on both sides (chapter 23) and the formal agreement to
decide the issue not by battle but by single combat between three brothers
from each side (chapter 24). In chapter 25 he gives a full description of the
fight between the three Horatians and the three Curiatians, anxiously
watched by both armies and ending with the victory of the last of the three
Horatians, the sole survivor. In chapter 26 follow the triumphant
homecoming of the victor, the slaying of his sister, who had been engaged

32 For Hacks, cf. H. Laube, Peter Hacks (Hannover 1972); P. Schütze, Peter Hacks: Ein
Beitrag zur Ästhetik des Dramas, Antike und Mythenaneignung (Kronberg 1976); J. R.
Scheid, Enfant Terrible of Contemporary East German Literature: Peter Hacks and his Role
as Adaptor and Innovator (Bonn 1977); Ch. Trilse, Peter Hacks: Leben und Werk (Berlin
1980); R. Heitz, Peter Hacks: Théâtre et Socialisme (Berlin–Frankfurt–New York 1984); A.
Jäger, Der Dramatiker Peter Hacks: Von Produktionsstücken zum Klassikerzitat, Marburger
Studien zur Literatur 2 (Marburg 1986); cf. further notes 6 and 27 above.
33 Hartmut Lange, “Herakles,” “Die Ermordung des Aias oder Ein Exkurs über das
Holzhacken,” “Staschek oder Das Leben des Ovid,” in Vom Werden der Vernunft und
andere Stücke fürs Theater (Zürich 1988).
34 Stefan Schütz, “Laokoon,” “Odysseus Heimkehr,” “Antiope und Theseus” (“Die
Amazonen”) and his prose-trilogy “Medusa” (Hamburg 1986).
35 Heiner Müller, “Horatier,” in Mauser, Rotbuch 184 (Berlin 1978) 45–54; cf. the
literature cited in note 27 above, esp. Fehervary; Klotz; Maltzan 90–96; Profilich (1981);
to one of the Curiatians and now laments his death, his trial, first before the duumviri, then before the people who, finally, after an emotional plea by his old father, acquit the Horatian.

Whereas Brecht in his “Lehrstück” about revolutionary cunning (“Die Horatier und die Kuriatier”) accentuates the fight between the three Horatians and the three Curiatians, Müller concentrates on the aftermath. He condenses the first four chapters of Livy’s report—from the beginning of the war to the victory of the Horatian—into a short exposition which, while preserving the gist of Livy’s narrative, comprises only about a tenth of the text. In the second scene, of about equal length, the killing of the Curiatian is immediately followed by the killing of the sister. Müller here also takes over the most important details from his ancient source: The homecoming of the victor with the mantle of the Curiatian draped over his shoulder, which is immediately recognized by his sister as the “work of her hands,” the lamentations of the girl, the anger of the Horatian, his reprimands and the murder of the sister and its rationale are almost literally taken from Livy.

Müller stresses the close parallelism between the two deeds of the one doer no fewer than three times; it is the same thrust, the same sword, the same death:

Und der Horatier, im Arm noch den Schwertschwung
Mit dem er getötet hatte den Kuriatier
Um den seine Schwester weinte jetzt
Stieß das Schwert, auf dem das Blut des Beweinten
Noch nicht getrocknet war
In die Brust der Weinenden
Daß das Blut auf die Erde fiel.36

With the next lines Müller prepares for the ensuing controversy: When the Horatian raises the twice-bloodied sword the crowd falls silent. The father covers his daughter’s body with the mantle of her dead fiancé and embraces the victor; but his attempt to reduce his son’s two deeds to one, to his victory for Rome, instead of covering up the inseparability of the two deeds, exposes it:

Und der Vater des Horatiers
Sah das zweimal blutige Schwert an und sagte:
Du hast gesiegt. Rom
Herrscht über Alba.

36 And the Horatian—his arm still felt the sword’s thrust
He had killed the Curiatian with in combat,
The man he saw his sister weeping for now—
Thrust the sword—the blood of the man she wept for
Wasn’t yet dry on it—
Into the breast of the weeping girl
So that her blood dropped to the earth.
Er beweinte die Tochter, verdeckten Gesichts
Breitete auf ihre Wunde das Schlachtkleid
Werk ihrer Hände, blutig vom gleichen Schwert
Und umarmte den Sieger.37

The little scene has no counterpart in Livy, who confines the role of the father to the great defense-speech before the assembly. The scene thus serves as a signal for the deviation from Livy which begins here. Müller uses Livy's narrative primarily to constitute the problem which in the following he discusses in much greater depth and which comes to a quite different solution. In Müller's presentation of the story the murder is also followed by a trial of the "doer of two different deeds," which is to say with the debate over whether "the Horatian should be honored as a conqueror or as a murderer tried," but the execution, the result, and the function of the trial have little in common with the ancient source.

Before the assembly the trial is opened with the question as to whether, despite the threat that the Etruscans could attack Rome at any moment,38 the legal debate within should be continued. The answer is yes. The argument to put the common good, in view of the danger, above the right of the individual and the proposal to postpone the trial because it would only divide the people and thus weaken Rome are both rejected.

In the first part of the proceedings the insoluble antithesis of merit and guilt leads to a deadlock:

Und das Volk blickte auf den unteilbaren einen
Täter der verschiedenen Taten und schwieg.39

But then the people decide with one voice to divide the identity of conqueror and murderer and to give "to each one his own: to the conqueror the laurel, to the murderer the sword." Thus the Horatian is first honored for his victory over Alba and then punished for the murder of his sister.

In the second part of the trial the assembly faces the question of how to treat the corpse of the victor/murderer. Here too the Romans vote "with one voice" to preserve the double truth. The corpse of the victor is laid in state on the shields of the army and all Romans honor him:

37 And the Horatian's father
   Looked at the twice bloodied sword and said:
   You have conquered. Rome
   is ruling Alba.
   He wept for his daughter, hiding his face,
   Covered her wound with the warrior's mantle
   Work of her hands, bloodied by the same sword
   And embraced the conqueror.
38 Müller has strengthened this motif of Livy's story considerably.
39 And the people looked at the one undivided
   Doer of two different deeds and were silent.
Then, however, the corpse of the murderer, despite the intercession of the old father, is thrown to the dogs:

Damit sie ihn zerreißen
Also daß nichts bleibt von ihm
Der einen Menschen getötet hat
Ohne Notwendigkeit.

In the answer to the father’s supplication not to punish his son beyond death Müller for the first time stresses the paradigmatic character of the event:

Länger als Rom über Alba herrschen wird
Wird nicht zu vergessen sein Rom und das Beispiel
Das es gegeben oder nicht gegeben
Abwägend mit der Waage des Händlers gegeneinander
Oder reinlich scheidend Schuld und Verdienst
Des unteilbaren Täters verschiedener Taten
Fürchtend die unreine Wahrheit oder nicht fürchtend
Und das halbe Beispiel ist kein Beispiel
Was nicht getan wird ganz bis zum wirklichen Ende
Kehrt ins Nichts am Zügel der Zeit im Krebsgang.

Whereas Müller here stresses the idea that only the radical analysis and documentation of the historical truth can set an example, the short last part of the text develops the question (only alluded to here) of the preservation of the event for posterity. When one of the Romans asks, “What shall we call

Out that nothing was to harm the corpse
Of the Horatian who had conquered for Rome
Neither rain nor time, neither snow nor oblivion
And they covered their faces and mourned him.

That they shall tear him to shreds
And nothing will remain of him
Who has killed a human being
Without necessity.

Longer than Rome will rule Alba
Rome won’t be forgotten and the example
That it once set or didn’t set
Measuring with the merchant’s balance
Or neatly sifting guilt and merit
Of the indivisible doer of different deeds
Afraid of the impure truth or not afraid
And half an example is no example
What isn’t done fully to its true ending
Returns to nothing at the leash of time in a crab’s walk.
the Horatian for those after us?" the people answer, for the third time with one voice:

Er soll genannt werden der Sieger über Alba
Er soll genannt werden der Mörder seiner Schwester
Mit einem Atem sein Verdienst und seine Schuld.\textsuperscript{43}

And the reasoning added in support of the decision shows that Müller is aiming at the preservation of historical truth in words, whether this be through literature, historiography, or journalism:

Nämlich die Worte müssen rein bleiben. Denn
Ein Schwert kann zerbrochen werden und ein Mann
Kann auch zerbrochen werden, aber die Worte
Fallen in das Getriebe der Welt uneinholbar
Kenntlich machend die Dinge oder unkenntlich.
Tödlich dem Menschen ist das Unkenntliche.\textsuperscript{44}

The epilogue is given to the actors who have narrated and enacted the events and now add the closing commentary:

So stellten sie auf, nicht fürchtend die unreine Wahrheit
In Erwartung des Feinds ein vorläufiges Beispiel
Reinlicher Scheidung, nicht verbergend den Rest
Der nicht aufging im unaufhaltbaren Wandel.\textsuperscript{45}

This conclusion once again underlines the thesis of Müller’s paradoxical paradigm. The solution propagated by Müller’s Romans is paradigmatic because by the clear distinction of merit and guilt they do not cover up, but uncover the "impure truth,” i.e. the ambivalent truth of political reality in which positive and negative, necessary and unnecessary violence are indivisibly intertwined, both in individuals and in historical processes. The irritating solution of the problem not only stresses its provisional character but at the same time points to the need to change the very conditions of its existence.

The topicality of the text is obvious; and since—as Brecht in the introduction to his “Antigone” puts it—“philological interests are not to be

\textsuperscript{43} He shall be called the conqueror of Alba
He shall be called the murderer of his sister
Within one breath his merit and his guilt.

\textsuperscript{44} Since the words must be kept pure. Because
A sword may be broken and also a man
May be broken, but words
They fall into the wheels of the world, irretrievably
Making things known to us or unknown.
Deadly to humans is what they can’t understand.

\textsuperscript{45} Thus, expecting their foe, they set—not afraid
Of the impure truth—a provisional example
Of neat distinction, and didn’t hide the rest
That wasn’t resolved in the unceasing change of things.
served," the question arises why Müller used Livy to present his thesis about historical truth. A number of answers suggest themselves: First, the use of a story of Rome’s mythological past serves to produce what Brecht called “alienation”; the historical distance allows for a rational and unprejudiced reception. Second, it is important (and this also is part of Brecht’s dramatic theory) that the relative simplicity of ancient social structures provides for simple models that can be much more easily understood than the complexity of modern reality. Third, the ancient story serves as a foil against which the new version and its intentions can be seen more clearly. All these common aesthetic and didactic functions of Antikerezeption are evident here. But there is more to Müller’s choice of the ancient story. As discussed and practiced in “Tales of Homer,” Müller is using Antikerezeption to express something in an indirect way that could not be expressed as easily in the direct form. He talked openly about this technique in an interview as early as 1982: “In the early sixties one could not write a play about Stalinism; one had to use a kind of model, if one wanted to ask the real questions. The people here understand that quite quickly.” Müller is talking about his “Philoktet” here, but many critics have felt that the moral of “The Horatian,” to bear and preserve the impure truth of the inseparable mingling of merit and guilt, is yet another contribution by Müller to the Stalin-debate of the sixties. I agree; but, as a recent statement by Müller shows, there was a more specific political impulse behind the conception of this text. In his autobiography published this summer Müller reveals: “The text was my reaction to Prague. ‘The Horatian’ could not be staged. There was an attempt by the Berlin Ensemble to put it on stage, but it was prohibited by the political secretary in charge. The argument was that the text reflected the Prague-position, the claim to give the power to the intellectuals.” In this sense the insidious adjective “vorläufig” (provisional), used by Müller to limit the validity of the example the Romans tried to set, unveils its true meaning. The text is a presentation of the Czechoslovak “provisional” attempt to set an example; at the same time it is Müller’s appeal not to suppress the truth about the events in Prague in the necessary debate about the merits and guilt of communist socialism.

The insidious adjective “vorläufig” bears yet another hidden sense: Critics have pointed to a number of barbed hooks in the text that prepare the audience for Müller’s final assessment of the Roman example as provisional. There is e.g. the wild ideological fervor with which the Horatian kills the Curiatian, who is already overcome and asks for mercy;

47 Heiner Müller, in Rotwelsch (Berlin 1982) 77.
48 Heiner Müller, Krieg ohne Schlacht (Köln 1992).
49 Müller (previous note) 258 f.
there is the inner link between the one deed of the Horatian that is necessary for the society and the other deed that is "without necessity," a close inner link suggested by Müller's formulation when the Horatian kills his sister: "in his arm still the thrust he had killed the Curiatian with in combat"; there is also the fact that the Horatian does not only appear as the agent but also as the victim of his ideological education, and finally there is the paradoxical solution adopted by the Romans, a solution that is bound to create irritation. Thus "provisional" points not only to the defectiveness of the example but also to the defectiveness of the social conditions in which even the best possible solution of the problem can only be considered provisional.

But what Müller has stressed with regard to the action of his "Philoctetes" appears to be valid for "The Horatian" also: "What happens is necessary only if the whole system is not called into question." The provisionality of the example points to the necessity to do just this, and this imperative to criticism is, of course, directed not against the imperfect Roman past but against the imperfect socialistic present that it stands for.

A number of further texts of Müller and numerous texts from other poets could be added. Here I want to conclude with a poem by Günter Kunert,\textsuperscript{51} which shows how Antikerezeption in the GDR was used not only for the critical analysis and assessment of political events and processes of general importance but also for more personal political statements:

\textbf{Märkischer Konstantin}

\begin{quote}
Lautlosigkeit plus Reglosigkeit  
Der morgendliche Garten im August  
Frühe Hitze des Tages  
nördlich Berlin der verhoffte Süden  
Zarte Rauchvertikale vom Nachbarhaus:  
der Vesuv  
Tau leckt die nackten Füße  
grüne Zungen von Sklaven  
Dein Imperium umfaßt  
1470 Quadratmeter  
Barbaren klingeln schon am Gartentor:  
Hier  
bist du nicht mehr sicher. Wechsle  
den Glauben und errichte
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{51} There are more than 150 poems and a number of short prose-texts in which Kunert works with classical material.
In a monologue with himself the lyrical persona envisages himself far away in time and place. In the early heat of a summer day, the smoke rising from the neighbor’s chimney becomes the smoke-trail of Mount Vesuvius and the medium-sized garden north of Berlin turns into the imperium Romanum.

Up to this point the poem could be read as an ironical comment on the unfulfilled travel-dreams of many East German citizens (“north of Berlin the long hoped-for South”). But suddenly the poem takes on a new existential dimension. The small imperium in the Mark Brandenburg is, like the imperium Romanum, threatened by barbarians. The ringing at the garden gate evokes political control and the threat of arrest. The green empire does not provide security any longer. The last lines of the poem finally unveil the real point of the title. Like Constantine the Great our East German poet at a critical moment in his life considers changing his creed. The poem was written in 1975. One year later Wolf Biermann was expatriated and Kunert’s protests made his own situation even more difficult, so that he finally decided to take the advice of his own poem and to change his creed: In 1978 he left the GDR and founded his empire elsewhere.

On the basis of the various forms of biographical and political use of Antikerezeption we have encountered, the enigmatic poem of Peter Huchel which I used as motto for my paper will, at least partially, release its hidden


Constantine in the Mark Brandenburg (my transl.)

Silence and stillness:
the morning garden in August

early heat of the day:
north of Berlin the hoped-for South

a delicate vertical line of smoke from the neighbor’s house:
Mount Vesuvius

dew licks the naked feet
green tongues of slaves

Your empire consists of
1470 square meters
barbarians ring at the garden door
here

you are no longer safe, change
your creed and found
your empire elsewhere.
meaning. As Robert Lüdtke and Peter Hutchinson have pointed out, it is a personal political statement with a specific historical context.

Peter Huchel was not only one of the most distinguished German lyric poets after the second world war. For fourteen years (1949–1962) he was also the highly respected editor of Sinn und Form, undoubtedly the best literary journal in both Germanies, distinguished by its liberal editorial policy and practice, which brought together the best authors and critics, philosophers and political thinkers of East and West. As a result of the mounting tensions of the cold-war fifties Huchel met with increasing pressure to streamline the journal according to the official politics and ideology of the GDR, and after serious problems with the party he finally had to retire in 1962. "The Garden of Theophrastus" was published as the first of six poems in the last fascicle of the journal edited by Huchel.

Theophrastus, pupil, collaborator and successor of Aristotle, researched, lectured and wrote extensively on a wide variety of subjects, among which botany played a prominent role. Diogenes Laertius tells us that, although he was not an Athenian citizen, Theophrastus was able to acquire a garden for the Peripatetic school, which he in his preserved will dedicated "to such of his friends as may wish to study literature and philosophy there in common, so that they might hold it like a temple in joint possession." Against this political and philological background the garden of Theophrastus and the threatened olive tree unveil their specific biographical and political connotations: By choosing Theophrastus as mask, as persona, Huchel likens his editorial policy and its intended effects to a gardener, who tries to enrich the soil and to heal the fractures and wounds of the trees (as prescribed in Theophrastus' De historia plantarum) and this, as Lüdtke was the first to recognize, is a metaphorical but rather precise description of the role which Peter Huchel and his journal have played in the GDR. The olive tree that "splits the brickwork" is an image that evokes wisdom and peace; very probably, then, it refers to the periodical which, indeed, tried to split the spiritual and (since 1961) physical walls between the two Germanies. The author knows that his days as editor and gardener are numbered. They—his unidentified, but now easily identifiable critics—have already given the order to totally destroy the tree. At this moment the poet, in a memento that reads like a last will, tells his son not to forget what he and others tried to achieve "planting conversations like trees."


\[54\] P. Hutchinson, "Der Garten des Theophrast—An Epitaph for Peter Huchel," German Life and Letters (1971) 125–35 (repr. in German in Über Peter Huchel, ed. H. Mayer [Frankfurt 1973]).

In 1902 in his essay “What is to be done” Lenin wrote: “In a country ruled by an autocracy, in which the press is completely shackled, and in a period of intense political reaction in which even the tiniest outgrowth of political discontent and protest is suppressed, the theory of revolutionary Marxism suddenly forces its way into the censored literature, written in Aesopian language but understood by the ‘interested’.”56 And in his study “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism” he justifies his own use of “Aesopian language” in 1916: “I had to speak in a ‘Slavish’ tongue... In order to show with what cynicism they screen the annexations of their capitalists, I was forced to quote as an example—Japan! The careful reader will easily substitute Russia for Japan, and Finland, Poland, Courland, the Ukraine, Khiva, Bokhara, Estonia or other regions peopled by non-Great Russians, for Korea.”57 It is the paradoxical irony of history that fifty years later many authors in the GDR resorted to Lenin’s tactical concept of Aesopian language, and turned it not only against the traditional capitalist enemy, but also against their own socialist society.

In conclusion I would like to point out that the political aspect of Antikerezeption I have singled out here is by no means the only one that is important for understanding the phenomenon, but it seems to me that it is particularly significant, and it will be interesting to see what is going to happen to Antikerezeption in the work of East German writers after the fall of the communist regime which has been so instrumental for the political use of antiquity in the literature of the German Democratic Republic.

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56 Lenin Reader, ed. S. T. Possony (Chicago 1966) 466.
57 Lenin (previous note) 468.
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