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The Editor, Illinois Classical Studies
Department of the Classics
4072 Foreign Languages Building
707 South Mathews Avenue
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PREFACE

The Department of the Classics of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and the Advisory Editorial Committee of *Illinois Classical Studies* are pleased to devote this issue and the next to the publication of Studies in Honor of Miroslav Marcovich. There are few scholars in the world today who are as deserving of such a tribute as is Professor Marcovich. This is neither the time nor the place for a detailed disquisition intended to substantiate so sweeping an assertion, an assertion, in any event, the validity of which needs no substantiation in this place and at this time. For the readers of this journal, no less than the distinguished contributors to this and the following volume, are well aware of the enormous contribution to scholarship that Professor Marcovich has made. The extent of that contribution is apparent from the pages that follow. In the first place, the very journal in which these pages appear owes its existence to the vision and the tireless energy of Professor Marcovich, who, having founded *Illinois Classical Studies* nearly twenty years ago, has been its editor for all but five years of its distinguished existence and has made it one of the foremost classics journals in the world. In the second place, there is published below (1–17) a bibliography of Professor Marcovich’s works, which supplies in abundance the evidence for this scholar’s astonishing range and versatility. (It should be pointed out that compiling a list of Professor Marcovich’s publications is rather like taking a census on a chinchilla farm, so rapidly do they multiply, and this list should be regarded as comprehensive only for the time of its compilation, November 1993.) Few scholars indeed have had so decisive an impact in such a variety of fields, from the study of archaic Greek poetry to Byzantine epigraphy, from the interpretation of Greek philosophy to the elucidation of the Church Fathers, from palaeography and textual criticism to the investigation of religious practices in the Graeco-Roman world. Finally, the contents of this volume bear ample witness to the influence, both personal and scholarly, that Professor Marcovich has exerted, and continues to exert. Three generations of scholars, who come from four continents and whose contributions represent many (but not all) of the fields in which Professor Marcovich has demonstrated his expertise, gratefully and affectionately pay honor to a scholar and educator who has himself taught on four continents and whose publications have enlightened and inspired all who are concerned with the classics in the broadest sense of that word.

The tribute that this and the following volume represent is only one—and not the last—of the many honors that Professor Marcovich will have
received in the course of his remarkable career. And it will be appropriate to mention at least some of those honors here, as they too attest the world-wide recognition that Professor Marcovich’s teaching and scholarship have so deservedly received. In Venezuela, Professor Marcovich was twice awarded the Premio Sesquicentenario Gold Medal (1962 and 1964). In Greece, he was the recipient of the Silver Cross at Mount Athos (1963). More recently, in Israel, he was named Sackler Scholar at Tel Aviv University (1991). Finally, the awards that Professor Marcovich has received here in North America are too numerous to recount, but they include fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and from the National Endowment for the Humanities and appointments as Associate Member of the Center for Advanced Study and as Senior Scholar at the University of Illinois. And, most recently, the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois have voted to confer upon Professor Marcovich the degree of Doctor of Humane Letters, *honoris causa*, to be awarded in May 1994.
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22. *Bhagavad-Gītā* (Kruševac: Bagdala 1993)
The Origin and Semantic Development of the Term *Harmony*

PETAR HR. ILIEVSKI

I

The word *harmony* (ἀρμονία), which has been accepted together with the rich cultural and lexical classical Greek heritage into all European languages, has a long history. It has often been the subject of profound studies both from a formal and a semantic point of view, including interpretations of different philosophical statements about harmony and numerous transformations of the mythical figure of Harmonia. There is, however, reason to discuss this interesting theme once again and to cast some fresh light on it.

A generally accepted definition of *harmony* is “reconciliation of opposites, a fitting together of disparate elements, whether in music, universe, the body politic, or the body of man.” This is, in fact, one of its last meanings, already formed in the classical Greek epoch. Linguistic studies, among which the Ph.D. dissertation by P. B. Meyer (above, note 1) is to be especially stressed, have laid a solid basis for the etymology and the historical development of its meanings in classical Greek literature. However, the question of how the term *harmony* was formed and from which dialectal basis it originated, cannot be answered only by means of classical Greek. Today its development can be followed since Mycenaean times.

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* I would like to thank David Sansone for his valuable improvements in my text.
1 The number of studies devoted to this subject is enormous. Here I shall mention only a few of them: P. Bonaventura Meyer, O. S. B., APMONIA: Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes von Homer bis Aristoteles (Zurich 1932); F. Jouan, “Harmonia: Mythe et personification,” *Actes du Colloque du Grand Palais*, Paris 7–8 Mai 1977 (Paris 1980) 113–21, with earlier literature.
The aim of this paper is to explain the origin of the term *harmony*, adding some further arguments concerning its stem from the Mycenaean documents written in Linear B. The development of different meanings of this word in classical Greek literary sources has been quite often scrutinized. Therefore, here it will be traced very briefly, comparing its metaphors and metonymies with the metamorphoses of the mythical figure Harmonia. Our distinguished colleague who is being celebrated with this volume, an outstanding classical scholar and polyhistor, and to whom this article is dedicated, also made a considerable contribution to this problem with his lucid explanation of *harmony* in Heraclitus’ philosophical system.

II

The exact etymology of *άρμονία* was discovered at the end of the last century. This word is derived from the IE verbal stem *ar-*, which appears in Greek *αρφίσκω*, “fit together,” “join,” “fasten,” as well as in other IE languages.4 The etymological connection between *άρμονία* and *αρφίσκω*, or rather *άρμονίζω*, is evident from the Homeric description of how Odysseus, with the permission of Calypso, built his boat (*Od. 5. 247–48; cf. also 361*):

τέτρηνεν δ' ἀρα πάντα καὶ ἦρμοσεν ἀλλήλοις
gύμφοισιν δ' ἀρα τὴν γε καὶ ἄρμονήσιν ἄρασεν.

In shipbuilding *άρμονία*, in Homer always in the plural, there are elements which serve for fastening together with γόμφοι, “bolts” (<*gombh*, Slav. *zhib*, Skt. *jambha*, “tooth”; cf. Hesych. γόμφοι· ὀδόντες), different parts of a whole. They give to the boat a form of joint unity. The verbal form ήρμοσεν is related both to ἄρμονήσιν and γύμφοισιν, which are semantically close and have the same function. The coradicate relation between ήρμοσεν (< *άρμόσσω*, -ζω < *άρμοτ-ι-ω*) “to join” and ἄρμονία, with numerous metaphoric meanings and metonymies, is indisputable.

The verb *άρμοζω* (-σω/-ττω) is denominative, derived from a noun corresponding to *άρμα*, -τας in classical Greek, in Homer usually plur. *άρματα*, with the meaning “chariot.” But this Homeric and classical Greek form cannot explain either the verb *άρμοζω* or the term *άρμονία*. The denominative verbs in -ζω (-σω/-ττω) derived from nouns in -μα (neuter) in classical Greek end in -άζω or -ατίζω, from the stem of the oblique cases: ἀσθμα – ἀσθμάζω, ἀχμα – ἀχμάζω, θυμα – θυμάζω (-τίζομαι), θύμα – θυμάζω, κόμα – κομάζω, etc. In Modern Greek, by analogy with other derivatives from neuters in -άζω, the noun *άρμασιά*, “wedding” and

The word ἀρμονία, however, remained unchanged both in Greek and in the other European languages. The question is how to explain this form, with the vowel -o- (-mo-) instead of -a- (-ma-), when it is well known that it is from a noun which in classical Greek and Homer is ἀρμα. Today this question can be answered by the aid of Mycenaean Greek.

III

On the Knossos and Pylos Linear B tablets dealing with chariots and chariot equipment, classified in S-series, the word a-mo / (h)armol instead of ἀρμα appears quite often. The word is also documented in the nom./acc. plur. a-mo-ta / (h)armota/ and dual a-mo-te / (h)armotel/; cf. also the personal name a-mo-te-u / (H)Armoteus/. Its meaning here is not “chariot,” but “wheel,” as is proved by the ideogram *143, a circle with crossed lines (= 4 spokes), which follows this word. The name for chariot in Mycenaean is i-qi-ja, ῥπης, “horse-drawn war-chariot,” from i-go /hiqqos/, ῥπης. The Homeric term ἀρματα for chariot is a synecdoche, named according to one of its parts (pars pro toto) like roof for “house.” In some other IE languages the plural or dual of the name for wheel also denotes “chariot”; cf. Skt. ratha, Lat. rota, Lith. rātas, Slav. kola, etc.

The perf. middle/pass. pple. a-ra-ro-mo-te-me-na / (h)ararmotmena/ (< ἀρμαξω) is used as an epithet for an assembled chariot. After every use of the chariot its parts, especially the wheels, were disassembled and kept separately in order to protect them from exposure to the elements (Od. 6. 57, 69, etc.). Such a practice can be seen in some parts of the Balkans even today. In addition to a-ra-ro-mo-te-me-na we have the verbal adj. a-na-mo-, plur. /anarmostoi/ (< anarmottoi: u < si), along with the ideogram *142 (ᚅ), a frame of the chariot.

These two terms are related to chariots, consisting of many parts, and wheels are especially important since without them the chariot cannot exist. The Mycenaean name for wheel, a-mo / (h)armol, from the stem *ar-, is formed with the suffix -(s)mη(t)-, the reflex of which is either -mo(t)- or -ma(t)- (cf. pe-mo /spermol and pe-ma /spermal), but a-mo is always written

5 Borrowed also in Balkan Slavic languages; cf. Maced. armasa, “to betroth,” Bulg. armas, n. “betrothal,” armasnik, armasnica, “betrothed,” “fiancé/e,” from the aorist stem of Modern Greek ἀρμάσσα < ἀρμαξω; cf. Δ. Δημητράκου, Λεξικόν τῆς Ἑλλήν. γλ., s.v.; Бълг. етим. рецънк (Sofia 1962) s.v.
7 In Op. 456 Hesiod says that the foolish man fails to realize that you need a hundred pieces of wood for an ἀμαξα; cf. N. J. Richardson and S. Piggott, “Hesiod’s Wagon: Text and Technology,” JHS 102 (1982) 226.
in this form by different scribes. This very likely means that the word *a-mo* became a technical term in Mycenaean; therefore, the scribes of different dialects used only the form with the reflex -o- (*-mo-*). The initial aspiration of ἀρμο very likely is from an s in front of the suffix -mp(t).8

In Greek there are some other names for wheel: κύκλος, which denotes circle, from *q*ēl- with reduplication *q*e-kl-, Lith. kālkas, Lat. cyclus, colo, Russ. kol'co, Serbocroat. kolo, kotač, Maced. kolce, etc., and τροχός, which contains the idea of its function from τρέχω, “run,” Slav. trkalo < trčati, točak < teči.9 In Mycenaean both κύκλος and τροχός were known,10 but in the terminology of the chariot only the word *a-mo* was used and not without reason.

The history of the wheel can now be followed from the fourth millennium B.C. From the archaeological finds one can trace its development from a monolithic block-wheel and disk-shaped wheel11 to an open and light-spoked wheel from the middle of the second millennium B.C. The felloes of the earliest spoked wheel were made from a single piece of wood, bent in a full circle by heat, as can be seen from the Egyptian chariot from Thebes (1435 B.C.).12 In a Mycenaean grave a wheel has been discovered with two apsides, naturally bent. There are also Mycenaean wheels with four felloes, as in Homer and Hesiod.13

The original meaning of *(h)armo* was “joint work,” like an arm with its most mobile joints. The arm is an organ with which one can carry, pull or push a load. The wheel is a kind of substitute for the arm. With the help of wheels a man and a horse were able to pull a load many times greater than what they could carry on their backs. A more convenient name for such a useful invention could not be imagined than *(h)armo < *ar-s-mp(t)-*, which already existed in pre-Mycenaean vocabulary with a meaning similar to the numerous nearer and further parallels in the other IE languages. The most adequate parallel is the Slavic ramo.

One of the most frequent meanings of *harmonia* in classical Greek is “joint,” a synonym of which is ἀρτός. From the stem of ἀρτός the denominative verbs ἀρτύω and ἀρτύνω are derived. Their meaning, “put in

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10 Cf. the personal names ku-ke-re-u [Kukleus] and to-ro-ki-no [Trokhinos].


order," appears in coradicals of some other IE languages, e.g. Arm. ardu, ardus, Skt. ṛtu, "order." But Lat. artus, -us, diminutive articulus, corresponds exactly to Gr. ἀρτός with the meaning "joint" of bones, and from the same semantic circle is armus, -i, Slav. ramo < *ar-śmq, with a metathesis of the liquid, Skt. ṛmāh, Avest. arma, "humerus,"14 corresponding to Myc. (h)armo. Slav. jaram, jarem, Arm. yarmar, "yoke" that unites two oxen or horses, Skt. ardas, "spoke" that connects the hub with felloe, etc. are from the same stem.

The idea of fastening the parts of a wheel and other jointed things is, in fact, an imitation of natural joints. The joint represents a perfect functional junction of two bones,15 because one is at that point concave and the other convex, strongly bound with special fastening texture. The joints are the most important factors that make it possible for living beings to move. Many of the joints are able to provide different motion, but none of them is as universal as the humerus, which permits the arm to move in all directions: upwards and downwards, forwards and backwards, as well as to rotate about a length axis. It is remarkable that the word for wheel, (h)armo, is the same as that for Slavic ramo.

On the basis of the data set out above one can conclude: First, the wheel is an extremely important invention with a profound effect on the progress of human civilization and the Mycenaean contribution to its development is great. Even if the spoked wheel was not invented by the Mycenaean Greeks, the improvement in its technology at least belongs to the Mycenaeans. Together with the technological process of this invention the technical term (h)armo was created in the Mycenaean society, and it continued to be used in the derivatives ἀρμόζω and ἀρμονία.

Second, the dialectal basis both of the noun (h)armo and the verb ἀρμόζω can be explained only by Mycenaean phonetic rules, according to which the inherited IE vocalic nasal -ṃ- developed a reflex -m-. The verb ἀρμόζω is, in fact, a technical term too, and there is no doubt that the noun ἀρμονία is derived from this verb.

IV

A. Since remote times the term ἀρμονία had begun to be used in a metaphorical sense, and to spread its meaning from the material into the intellectual sphere. Along with the concrete meaning as an instrument for joining and fastening two things together (Od. 5. 248), in Homer it was used

14 The original meaning of Slav. ramo, "joint" later changed to "shoulder." In Church-Slavic texts the Greek words ὀμος, "shoulder," νότος, "back" and μετάφρενον, "broad of the back" are translated as ramę, ramo; cf. Lexicon linguæ paleoslovenicae, ČA (Prague 1966–90) s.v.

In the physical sphere the term ἀρμονία had continued to be used with the meaning “junction” in post-Homeric times. In classical Greek numerous synonyms, coradical forms from *ar-, appear with the same meaning (“fastening,” “joint”), e.g. ἀρτύς (see above), ἀρμός in masonry for joining stones through cut channels and putting bolts in them, ἀρμογῆ, “junction,” ἀρθμός in a physical sense, “bond,” but also “friendship,” etc. It is interesting to note that this word in Mycenaean Greek a-to-mo/arthmos/ had a similar meaning, “guild of craftsmen” (especially among the smiths), which represents a product of an organized society.

B. a. The musical meaning, by which the word harmony today is usually known, was developed gradually. In Homer this meaning is unknown. Pindar’s teacher Lasus (VI cent. B.C.) first attributed a musical meaning to harmony, though not as a “chord,” but only as accent and intonation. Sappho also finds that accent and intonation are ἀρμονία. The Greek pitch, especially when it unites two or three words into one accent-whole, could, of course, be called harmony. In a full musical sense as chord and octave harmonia was first used by Pindar.

The octave was a great discovery of the Pythagoreans. They noticed and explained that a string of the same length, thickness and strain always gives a tone of the same pitch, but if we divide that string (1:2), the one half will give a tone an octave higher. The Pythagoreans, who thought that number and proportion of numbers with the mass are the basis of the whole world, discovered a wonderful regularity in the sonority of the segments of the chord: Two thirds give quinta, three quarters quarta, etc. According to them the musical harmony and octave are identical. At the same time they found such a proportion in the cosmos. In music they discovered seven tones, the heptachord; the eighth connects the octave of a lower with a higher scale. By analogy this is transferred into the planetary system, in which they found seven planets which move at different speeds in concentric circles round a spherical axis as a centre.

According to them, as according to Heraclitus, the basic factors in the cosmos are number, mass and harmony. External harmony is a result of an internal ἀφανῆς ἀρμονία which, as the soul of the world, unites the opposite elements in a whole.

On the basis of the Pythagorean definition of harmony as number and musical scale, Plato also discovered mathematical relations in the musical intervals. He found three main chords in the first four members: 2:1 octave, 3:2 quinta, 4:3 quarta. Arranging the numbers in a geometric figure, so that on the left-hand side are put even numbers, and on the right-hand

16 For different meanings of ἀρμονία in classical Greek, see Diccionario Griego-Español III (Madrid 1991) s.v. I am grateful to Professor D. Sansone for his kindness in sending me a photocopy of pages 517 and 518 of this dictionary, which we do not have in Skopje.
side odd ones, he discovered, as did the Pythagoreans, cube, which corresponds to the heptachord in music; the numbers are twice connected between themselves; the adding of the first six numbers gives the sum 27, the same as the multiplication of the numbers on the right-hand side.

b. **Harmony as cosmic force.** According to Plato (Tim. 31a–32c) the world is one and a whole (cf. also Heraclitus fr. 25 M) both in a physical and intellectual sense. This unity is conditioned by the aid of harmony. Plato says that the Demiourgos first created the Soul of the world, which is the harmony of the cosmic sphere, and the microcosmos—man—is a faint copy of the macrocosmos. The Soul of the world and harmony are synonyms, identical in their functions. It is a force which unites the opposite elements of Chaos. Consequently, there is such a soul, i.e. harmony, in everything.

This Platonic thought about the Soul of the world corresponds exactly to Heraclitus’ Logos (frs. 9, 25, 27 M) as a unity or coincidence of each pair of opposites, underlying unity of the world-order, which is an invisible fastening, ἀφανῆς ἀρμονία, much stronger than fastenings in carpentry, masonry and shipbuilding. According to Heraclitus and Plato, harmony, as an internal principle for the joining of opposite elements, is the primary basis of the world and of everything.

c. **Harmony in psychology.** The human soul is an imperfect reflection of the cosmic Soul (Plato, Tim. 47b–d; Arist., De anima 407a–b). Everything related to the cosmic Soul, as a universal principle of unity and reconciliation of opposites, also concerns every individual soul. Plato explains it by the analogy of a lyre with a body—a frame and seven strings which produce harmonic sound. The lyre and the sounds are material, but in the sounds there is soul, as in the other harmonies of the Demiourgos. This gives him reason to conclude that harmony is a kind of mixture, a joining of material and spiritual factors. Plato often repeats that harmony is σύνθετον and σύνθεςις, i.e. a composition of opposites (ἐναντίων) both in the physical and in the spiritual sense. In the framework of this conception he found harmony in ethics too.

d. **Harmony in ethics.** A righteous man, according to Plato, is a result of the harmony of three elements: wisdom, which is one of the most beautiful and greatest symphonies, and bravery united with prudence (Legg. 3. 689d, Resp. 4. 430c). As a consequence of this threefoldness in the ethical sphere three other virtues appear: righteousness, which is a harmony of joy, love and hate, φιλία in its widest sense, from conjugal love to

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17 P. Petrović Njegoš, who was also a great poet and philosopher, thought that harmony governs the whole cosmos. The order and harmony of the parts towards the whole and the constant laws keep this world for ever (Ljuta Mikrokozma).

18 M. Marcovich, Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary, editio maior (Merida 1967) 8, 28, 34, 119–29, etc.; cf. also commentary in Eraclito, Frammenti (Florence 1978) and Filozofija Heraklita Mračnog (Belgrade 1983).
highest friendship, and ἀρετή, which has numerous different meanings, and every epoch has its own ἀρετή. However, its meaning is limited by the context. For a running horse ἀρετή is speed, for one pulling, strength; for a man ἀρετή is goodness, a value in an ethical, intellectual, physical and practical sense. Such an ideal was embodied in the personality of Odysseus for the ancient Greeks.19

Until Socrates and Plato man was considered as an indivisible psychophysical whole. Rhythm and harmony unite the soul and body. Young people have a perfect rhythm and harmony (εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμόστεροι, Prot. 326b), which also represents a kind of ἀρετή.

As a synonym for harmony in the ethical sense Aristotle uses the term μεσότης, “middle,” i.e. the highest point on the line that connects the ends or poles. There is no proper horizontal line. The Greeks noticed that from the surface of the sea, with which they were surrounded on all sides. Instead of horizontal lines they used to make elliptical ones, proportional to the whole. The middle is protruded. On the ethical level the middle point is the highest between two slopes. Thus, bravery is in the middle, between foolish fearlessness and cowardly fearfulness, which are extremes; between wastefulness, which leads to poverty, and heartless niggardliness is charity.

e. Harmony as an artistic term is used in aesthetics, poetry, rhetoric and especially in music. The harmony in Plato’s aesthetics represents a full consent of the idea of the good and beautiful (καλοκαιρινός is the ideal of the ancient Greeks). The same as ἀρετή is ἀρμονία in an ethical and physical sense; thus beauty is harmony from the aesthetic and ethical point of view. These two domains were simply indivisible for the Greeks. Plato (Tim. 87c) finds that “every pretty thing is good, but the beauty must not be deprived of proportions and symmetry.” The beauty is simplicity in diversity, symmetry in co-ordination, the same as in the musical and mathematical harmony. The harmony in its etymological sense of “joints” also underlies the beauty. The best joint (δεσμὸν δὲ κάλλιστος) is that which connects two different things and makes a unity of them.

The rules concerning aesthetic harmony are relevant for poetics and rhetoric. As a term in poetry and rhetoric, the word harmony is used in Plato and Aristotle for the Greek accent (προσῳδία), in which there is melody, pitch on a certain syllable and intonation. These elements make a harmony of words which ravish a man with both contents and music (ἀρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος, Tht. 175e). Then the term is transferred to different kinds of poetry which, according to Aristotle (Poet. 1), represents imitation.

Among the synonyms with which classical Greek authors compare harmony especially significant are σύνθετον, σύνταξις and σύνθεσις in Plato and Aristotle. They are, in fact, technical terms from the field of

poetry. In the Poetics Aristotle emphasizes that the most important feature of a beautiful tragedy is composition (of the events) and proportional (i.e. harmonic) composition of its parts as the artistic work represents an organic and complete whole.

V

A. The different variants of the mythical figure of Harmonia and rites connected with her represent a very complicated body of material. In this, at first sight, mythological chaos, it is not easy to find any order. However, in a comparison between the chronological development of its meaning in different fields of the physical and intellectual life with transformations of the mythical figure of Harmonia throughout history, some coincidences are striking. This shows that, in spite of all the nebulosity of the myths, there is a reason to combine the results of linguistic studies with those from mythology.

Meyer\(^{20}\) thinks that the etymology of harmony does not help towards a better understanding of the mythical figure of Harmonia, therefore, he does not discuss this material. But a few parallels between theoretical conceptions of harmony by classical Greek authors (poets, philosophers and historians) on the one hand and popular explanations of these ideas through personifications of the mythical images on the other, will throw some light on the mythical figure of Harmonia. We must bear in mind the fact that myths have appeared among the people from whom the same poets and philosophers originated and that one and the same spirit has flowed in them. Only the form of their expression is different. While the philosophers have expounded their ideas with a logical speech, the popular masses have done the same by personifications and allegories.

B. The mythical figure of Harmonia does not appear in Homer.\(^{21}\) According to Hesiod (Theog. 933–37) Harmonia is a daughter of Ares and Aphrodite, married to the Phoenician prince Cadmus. After Cadmus had killed a dragon, the offspring of Ares, and after he had undergone a term of servitude, the Olympians, as a prize, gave him Harmonia for a wife. The wedding of Cadmus and Harmonia looks very much like that of Peleus and Thetis. Harmonia is a goddess, both of whose parents (Aphrodite and Ares) were gods, but she was married to a mortal man to whom she bore four daughters and a son. Disgraced Hephaestus, jealous because of the adultery of his wife Aphrodite, also brought wonderful presents: a cloak and a necklace. But they were fatal. Later they brought great sufferings to Thebes. Similar misfortune was caused by Iris at the wedding of Peleus and Thetis. It seems that this wedding was a transposition of the Theban one.

\(^{20}\) Meyer (above, note 1) 6.

\(^{21}\) However, in the Homeric hymn to Apollo (194–96), Harmonia appears in a procession of women singing and dancing and Phoebus welcomes them to Olympus.
which had taken place about five generations earlier. These data are very significant. Harmonia is a daughter of warlike Ares and tender Aphrodite, i.e. an offspring of two extremes, an idea also expressed by poets of more recent times (cf. Schiller’s *Das Lied von der Glocke*).

Judging from the names of Cadmus and Harmonia one can conclude that their wedding represents a union of two cultures: Mediterranean with Semitic elements and IE. The name Cadmus is from a Semitic stem qdm, Hebrew qedem, qādim, “east,” qadmēnî, “men from the east.” Cadmus brought the Greeks a script from the east (Hdt. 5. 58). *Harmony*, as we have already seen, has an IE etymology. The phenomenon that she married a mortal man denotes a connection of the Sky with the Earth. Harmonia is here, in fact, an incarnation of the principle which makes possible the junction in the cosmos, i.e. a well-ordered system (ἀρμονία τοῦ κόσμου), as Heraclitus says, and in life: accord in the family and peace in the community.

The philosophers have identified harmony with φιλία (love and friendship) and, in mythology, with Demeter, Kore, Pandora, but most frequently with Aphrodite, the goddess of love, fertility and diversion. Plutarch noted (Amat. 23. 769a) that in Delphi there was an Aphrodite “Harma,” the goddess of love. Harma is very likely a short form of Harmonia.22

Obviously there are some parallels between the theoretical statements of the term *harmony* as a principle of connection, joining, unity of opposites in one whole and transformations of the mythical figure of Harmonia as an incarnation of that principle. It is noticeable that these parallels of the abstract ideas of *harmony* chronologically correspond to the mythical personifications of Harmonia.

VI

To sum up. We saw how the Mycenaean Greek dialect provides evidence about the formation of the noun ἀρμονία from the word *a-mo* /*(h)armo/* with the meaning “wheel” made by the junction of spokes and felloes. Together with the technological progress of this important invention in Mycenaean times the noun *(h)armo* was also created as a technical term from which both the verb ἀρμὸξω and the noun ἀρμονία were derived. Since Homeric times the term ἀρμονία has been used in a metaphorical sense, and in classical Greek its use spread to all spheres of the physical and intellectual life. The gradual development of its meaning from a concrete object, *pin, peg*, to the most abstract idea of *unity* displays the cultural and spiritual development of the ancient civilization. The ancient Greeks

attributed great importance to this idea, identifying harmony with λόγος, 
ψυχή, ἀρετή, etc. Diogenes Laertius (8. 33) says that ἀρετή is ἀρμονία 
and health, and every good and god, διὸ καὶ καθ' ἀρμονίαν συνεστάναι τὰ 
ὦλα.

Health, both physical and spiritual, is a result of a balance and 
proportion, i.e. harmony, of the opposite elements, a principle which 
underlies the existence of the cosmos. If one of the elements is going to 
dominate the others, then order and harmony disappear, and this causes 
ilness in the human body, anarchy in society, disorder in the cosmos and a 
return to chaos. But even in this desperate situation one can find some 
consolation in the philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure. According to him 
life continues through the eternal change of διαφερόμενον and συμφέρεται, 
returning again to harmony and love, as it is splendidly explained by 
Professor Marcovich.

*Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts*
L'éminent historien anglais Moses I. Finley, auquel nous devons des remarquables recherches et synthèses sur l'histoire économique et sociale de la Grèce ancienne et, singulièrement, sur la place de l'esclavage dans l'économie des sociétés antiques, considérait les "esclaves-marchandises" ("chattel-slaves") comme une "sous-catégorie" du travail dépendant (ou involontaire), c'est-à-dire du travail qu'une personne accomplit pour une autre "non parce qu'elle faisait partie de sa famille, ... non parce qu'ils avaient conclu un accord volontaire et contractuel, ... mais parce qu'elle y était contrainte par quelque condition antérieure, le fait d'être née au sein d'une classe dépendante, ou des dettes, ou toute autre situation qui, par droit ou par coutume, lui enlevait automatiquement une partie de sa liberté de choix et d'action, généralement pour longtemps ou même pour la vie."1 Selon Finley, les multiples formes revêtues par le travail involontaire en Grèce ancienne formaient comme un "spectre" de positions qui se succédèrent par gradation, un continuum, aux extrémités duquel se situaient, d'une part "l'esclave conçu comme une propriété," de l'autre "l'homme parfaitement libre," deux abstractions qui n'existait en réalité nulle part.2 La métaphore du spectre apparut, à ma connaissance, pour la première fois dans un article de 1959, dans lequel Finley distinguait au moins six catégories de dépendance en Grèce: l'esclave, le "serf-like" oikeus de Crète, l'hilote/péneste, l"esclave" pour dettes, l'esclave affranchi sous certaines conditions et l'affranchi.3 Elle a été reprise par la suite dans presque tous ses travaux concernant l'esclavage en Grèce, avec des nuances qui ne

2 Finley, "Formes d'exploitation" (supra n. 1) 84 s.
3 M. I. Finley, "Was Greek Civilization Based on Slave Labour?" Historia 8 (1959) 147. Comme il s'agit du rapport de dépendance, l'homme libre n'entre pas dans cette énumération: il se trouve au-delà de la ligne qui marquait la dépendance.
changent pas la substance de l'idée. Les six catégories rarement apparaissent dans la même communauté. Dans les périodes archaïques de l'histoire grecque et romaine, ainsi que dans certaines régions du monde grec, l'esclavage représentait une quantité négligeable, les autres formes de travail étant les plus répandues.

La conception de Finley appelle deux objections: l'une a trait au rapport esclavage-dépendance, l'autre à la place de l'esclavage dans le "spectre." L'esclavage antique était-il une sous-catégorie du travail forcé? Oui et non. Oui, parce que l'esclave travaillait pour son maître et sous le contrôle de celui-ci. Non, parce que son rapport avec le maître ne saurait être réduit à un rapport de production. Ce qui caractérise l'esclavage ce n'est pas la non-proprité des moyens de production, qui est à la base de tout travail involontaire, mais le fait que l'esclave est lui-même d'abord une propriété d'autrui (il pouvait ne pas être employé comme force de travail) et puis un moyen de production, un instrument animé. Cela vaut pour tous les esclaves, quel que soit le mode de leur utilisation et le degré de leur servitude. On évoque souvent le célèbre banquier athénien Pasion comme preuve que la vie d'un esclave n'était pas toujours dure. C'est oublier que Pasion ne s'est pas enrichi comme esclave. Un esclave ne peut s'enrichir puisque tous les fruits de son travail appartiennent à son maître. Il peut tout juste faire des épargnes pour racheter sa liberté. Ce n'est qu'après avoir acquis la confiance de son maître, après être devenu esclave χωρίς οίκων, que Pasion put amasser la somme nécessaire à son affranchissement. Il put alors dépouler, en tant qu'homme libre, l'activité financière qui l'élève sur l'échelle sociale et finalement lui valut la dignité de citoyen athénien et le droit (prérrogative des citoyens) d'acquérir des biens-fonds, qui sanctionnèrent sa promotion sociale. L'exemple de Pasion fait ressortir un trait essentiel de l'esclavage antique: la condition d'esclave n'était pas irréversible. La société antique ne connaissait pas le système rigide des castes. Le fossé qui séparait les hommes libres des esclaves n'était pas

4 M. I. Finley, "The Servile Statues of Ancient Greece," RIDA 7 (1960) 186; idem, "Formes d'exploitation" (supra n. 1) 78. Dans L'économie antique (Paris 1975) 85, Finley explicite que le "spectre" ne doit pas être considéré comme un continuum mathématique, mais "comme un spectre plus métaphorique, plus discontinu, avec tantôt des trous, tantôt de plus grandes concentrations."

5 Finley, "Formes d'exploitation" (supra n. 1) 87.

6 Cf. la définition de l'esclavage formulée par Finley (supra n. 3) 145: "by slavery ... I mean roughly the status in which a man is in the eyes of the law and of public opinion and with respect to all other parties, a possession, a chattel, of another man." E. L. Kazakevitch, VDI 64 (1958) 19, insiste également sur le fait que "l'esclave est avant tout une catégorie juridique, objet de propriété, forme de richesse.

7 Cf. Ilypérie, Contre Athénag. 22: Si un esclave a bien réussi une affaire, ou créé une industrie nouvelle, tout le bénéfice est pour son maître.

infranchissable (dans les deux sens).\(^9\) De sorte que l'affranchissement se présente comme un critère objectif permettant de distinguer le statut des esclaves des autres catégories du travail dépendant. Où il y a affranchissement, il y a esclaves: on affranchit les hilotes, on n'affranchit pas les laoi! En tant que sanction de la transition d'une personne du statut servile au statut d'homme libre, l'acte d'affranchissement ne pouvait avoir lieu que dans une société qui connaissait l'esclavage. Pour l'avancement social de l'esclave, l'affranchissement était une *conditio sine qua non*, tandis que le travailleur dépendant, se trouvant en-deçà du fossé, n'en avait pas besoin pour passer de la dépendance à une situation sociale plus privilégiée. L'esclavage différait des autres types de dépendance non pas par degré mais par nature. C'était une catégorie sociale unique, présente, d'une manière ou d'une autre, dans toutes les sociétés antiques.

La formule “entre libres et esclaves,” mise en vogue ces dernières décennies par les travaux de W. L. Westermann, de D. Lotze et de M. I. Finley, masque d'une certaine manière l'antinomie fondamentale opposant l'esclave et le libre dans les sociétés antiques. Elle a été empruntée à l' *Onomasticon* de Iulius Pollux (grammaireien et sophiste de Naukratis qui enseignait à Athènes sous le règne de Commode), dans lequel une série de noms spécifiques désignant des dépendants dans diverses régions grecques—hilotes de Sparte, pénestes de Thessalie, clarôtes et mnôîtes de Crète, dòrophoroi Mariandyniens d'Héraclée Pontique, gymnètes d'Argos et korynéphoroi de Sikyon—sont séparés des mots grecs signifiant “esclave” et sont classés “entre les libres et les esclaves”: μεταξὺ ἐλευθέρων καὶ δοῦλων.\(^10\) La formule a été utilisée comme titre de trois ouvrages des auteurs susmentionnés.\(^11\) Mais, alors que Westermann et Finley admettent l'existence en Grèce ancienne de statuts qui se situaient “entre l'esclavage et la liberté,” Lotze arrive à la conclusion que les quatre premières catégories (hilotes, pénestes, clarôtes/mnôîtes et Mariandyniens, auxquelles il joint les Kylyriens de Syracuse et les *woikiatai* de la Locride Orientale) constituaient un type spécial d'esclavage pouvant être défini comme


\(^10\) Pollux 3. 83.

“esclavage collectif” (“Kollektivsklaverei”), tandis que les gymnètes et les korynephori n’étaient pas des “non-libres” (“Unfreie”), mais faisaient partie des couches inférieures de la population d’Argos et de Sikyon qui ne jouissaient pas de tous les droits des citoyens.12

Point n’est besoin d’insister sur le fait que la condition économique et sociale des libres et des esclaves variait selon les régions et les époques, qu’il y a eu des degrés de liberté et des degrés de non-liberté. La liberté absolue est une notion plutôt morale et philosophique que sociale. En tant qu’être social, l’homme ne peut l’atteindre qu’en se retirant de la société. Je ne dirais pas la même chose de l’esclavage. L’esclavage est une réalité sociale des plus dures qui ne pouvait être méconnue. Du fait que l’esclave était à l’origine un caput de guerre,13 le droit de son maître sur sa personne (et son corps) était absolu. Lui ayant fait grâce de la vie, le vainqueur s’emparaît du vaincu comme d’une part du butin qui lui appartenait. Le maître pouvait entretenir et employer son esclave comme bon lui semblait, il pouvait en faire un domestique, une main-d’œuvre ou un intendant. Le fruit de son travail lui appartenait. L’esclave pouvait être battu, enchaîné, marqué au fer rouge, soumis à la torture, vendu et même tué.14 Les droits du propriétaire d’esclaves étaient reconnus et sanctionnés par sa communauté.15 Si celle-ci imposait parfois des limites à son arbitraire, elle ne le faisait que dans son propre intérêt.16 Comme l’a souligné M. I. Finley,


13 Voir, par exemple, Hésych. δούλον ἡμαρ· σίχμαλωσιάς ἡμέρα. Les autres sources d’esclavage—rapt, piraterie, vente des enfants, vente des endettés, commerce des esclaves—présupposent la demande de la main-d’œuvre servile et sont *eo ipso* des phénomènes sociaux postérieurs. Le fameux fragment d’Héraclite (fr. 29 Marcovich = 53 Diels-Kranz) qui commence par la formule πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ peut lui aussi être cité dans ce contexte, car dans sa seconde partie τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἑλένθερους, il a une connotation sociale bien concrète.

14 Le pouvoir absolu du maître, le droit de vie et de mort qu’il a sur l’esclave, est considéré par les juristes romains comme une institution du *ius gentium*. Cf. Gai Inst. 1. 52: *In potestate itaque sunt servorum dominorum. Quare quidem potestas iuris gentium est; nam apud omnes pereaque gentes animadvertere possimus dominos in servos vitae necisque potestatem esse; et quodcumque per servum adquiritur, id domino adquiritur.*

15 Il va sans dire qu’à l’époque homérique il ne peut être question de dispositions législatives réglant les rapports des hommes, mais seulement d’un droit coutumier. En ce sens seulement on peut admettre avec P. Debold, “Esclavage mycélien, esclavage homérique,” *REA* 75 (1973) 234–35, que la non-liberté était à cette époque un état de fait et non un statut juridique, ce qui pourtant n’exclue pas l’existence d’une démarcation nette entre les libres et les non-libres et de la conscience de cette limite.

16 A Athènes, le meurtre d’un esclave non fautif était condamné comme un acte de violence gratuit qui attirait la vengeance des dieux sur toute la communauté et nécessitait une purification. A Sparte, où l’État était l’unique maître des masses hilotiques, le massacre des hilotes par des particuliers n’était permis que dans les crypties qui faisaient suite à la déclaration annuelle de la guerre aux hilotes par les éphores.
l’esclave subissait, du fait de sa condition, “non seulement une perte totale de contrôle sur son travail, mais aussi une perte totale de contrôle sur sa personne et sur sa personnalité.”\textsuperscript{17} La liberté pouvait être relative, l’esclavage ne l’était point. C’était un état dont on ne pouvait pas ne pas être conscient.

La formule “entre les hommes libres et les esclaves” figure seulement dans l’\textit{Onomasticon} de Pollux. Aucun autre texte ancien ne fait la moindre allusion à des statuts intermédiaires entre la liberté et l’esclavage. Il est bien probable, comme on l’a déjà conjecturé,\textsuperscript{18} que Pollux ait utilisé pour son lexique un ouvrage d’Aristophane de Byzance (257–180 av. n. è.).\textsuperscript{19} Mais, même si nous admettions que la formule nous vient de l’érudit hellénistique,\textsuperscript{20} n’est-il pas étrange que les théoriciens de l’époque classique s’intéressant aux structures de la société grecque, tel Platon ou Aristote, pour ne citer que les plus éminents, aient passé sous un silence complet un fait aussi important que l’existence de populations ou de personnes “ni libres ni esclaves”? Peut-on se contenter de l’allégation que “en règle générale, les écrivains grecs et romains ne se sont pas inquiétés de telles nuances”?\textsuperscript{21}

Contrairement à ce que l’on affirme parfois, la ligne de partage entre “libres” et “non-libres” dans le “spectre” des formes de travail involontaires était bien nette pendant toute l’Antiquité et dans tous les pays.\textsuperscript{22} L’esclavage est un fait primordial connu et pratiqué dans toutes les sociétés antiques, mais il n’est devenu une forme dominante du travail involontaire qu’à une époque relativement tardive et non partout. La différence entre une société esclavagiste et une société qui, tout en connaissant l’esclavage, n’était pas esclavagiste, tient au nombre des esclaves (au rapport numérique entre libres et esclaves) et au rôle que les esclaves jouaient dans la production. L’esclave était, comme nous l’avons dit, un bien dont on s’est rendu maître par la force des armes (guerre, razzia, rapt individuel) ou par


\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Schmid–Stählin (supra n. 18) II.1 (1959) 260 ss.

\textsuperscript{20} Pour Finley la conjecture devient une certitude. Cf. “The Servile Statuses of Ancient Greece” (supra n. 4) 179, et l’article cité ci-dessus (supra n. 1) 82. Dans ce même article, l’oeuvre d’Aristophane est par mégare située dans la première moitié du III\textsuperscript{e} siècle.

\textsuperscript{21} Finley, “Formes d’exploitation” (supra n. 1) 78. Les Romains, selon Finley, “se contentaient de la simple antinomie opposant l’esclave et le libre, bien qu’ils ne puissent ignorer qu’il existait entre eux certaines gradations.” Certes, il y a eu des gradations, mais celles-ci ne se situent pas “entre l’esclavage et la liberté” ; elles constituent des formes de l’un ou de l’autre statut.

\textsuperscript{22} Voir, par exemple, M. I. Finley (supra n. 8) 105, où l’auteur constate au sujet du monde homérique “l’absence, dans la réalité, des catégories sociales nettement tranchées que nous trouverons plus tard, et en particulier des deux catégories des ‘libres’ et des ‘non-libres’.” Il est vrai que la notion de liberté n’était pas encore élaborée à cette époque, mais la catégorie des esclaves y était nettement définie.
l’achat (échange) et dont on disposait à sa volonté. Ce rapport de propriété, reconnu par la communauté, définit le statut juridique de l’esclave et est valable autant pour la société homérique que pour l’Athènes classique. Naturellement, la condition des esclaves dans les *oikoi* des nobles d’Ithaque, de Sparte ou de Phéacie différerait grandement de celle des domestiques à Athènes, les structures socio-économiques respectives n’étant pas égales. Personne ne contestera non plus que la vie d’un esclave dans la société homérique pouvait être moins dure que celle d’un thèse, privé des moyens d’existence et obligé à se mettre au service d’autrui pour un salaire misérable. On pense toujours à ce propos à la bonne fortune du porcher d’Ulysse, Eumée. Il n’en reste pas moins que les esclaves se trouvent ici aussi au plus bas de l’échelle sociale. Le thèse pouvait choisir son “maître,” le destin de l’esclave était toujours incertain et ne dépendait pas de lui. Dire d’un thèse que, en s’engageant, il “renonçait volontairement à la liberté” me semble un peu fort. Travaillant pour un autre, le thèse demeurait libre et c’est ce qui compte en l’occurrence. “Ce qu’il y avait de très dur pour le thèse,” note Finley, “c’était l’absence de tout lien, sa non-appartenance.” En effet, à la différence des esclaves intégrés dans les

23 Le terme “société homérique” n’est pas précis. Comme l’a montré de façon convaincante J. A. Lencman, *L’esclavage dans la Grèce mycénienne et homérique* (Moscou 1963) 227–77 (en russe), les passages de l’*Iliade* et de l’*Odyssee* ayant trait à l’esclavage reflètent deux couches historiques: la description des travaux dont s’occupent les nombreux esclaves des palais des *basileis* remonterait, selon lui, à l’époque mycénienne; d’autres données, plus rares, dans l’*Odyssee* se rapporteraient à l’époque homérique proprement dite (IXe–VIIe s.). Selon M. I. Finley (supra n. 8) 103, le tableau des institutions sociales que nous présente l’épopée est celui des “siècles obscurs” (Xe–XIe) et pour l’essentiel de la première moitié de cette période.


25 Finley (supra n. 24) 87: “Les esclaves ... étaient le plus souvent victimes d’une mauvaise chance. En ce sens, le thèse est le plus infortuné: c’est volontairement qu’il abandonnait, en se laissant, le contrôle de son propre travail, qu’il renonçait, en d’autres termes, à sa liberté.” En termes semblables et se référant au même passage de l’*Odyssee*, A. Aymard, “Hérédité du travail et autarce individuelle dans la Grèce archaique,” dans *Études d’histoire ancienne* (Paris 1967) 328–29, traite la condition du thèse comme inférieure à celle de l’esclave (“il ... a ... aliéné sa liberté de travail et de vie, et le pire est qu’il l’a fait volontairement”).

26 Finley (supra n. 24) 68. P. Debord (supra n. 15) 232 n. 8, identifie θης à ξεινός et considère que les thèses étaient exclus du *dēmos*. Il me semble que les thèses sont appelés *xeinoi* dans la mesure où ils ne font pas partie de l’*oikos* (cf. *Od.* 14. 101–02, où le
oikoi, les thèses se trouvaient en dehors de ces cellules sociales qui garantissaient la sécurité de leurs membres. De ce fait, leur condition matérielle était assurément plus précaire. Mais on ne peut pas dire d’eux qu’ils étaient des étrangers comme les esclaves, des déracinés par rapport à la patrie et à la famille.\footnote{Même le bienheureux porcher Eumée, si attaché à son bon maître, ne peut ne pas penser à ses parents et ne pas désirer retourner à la terre natale et les revoir de ses yeux (Od. 14. 140–43).} Les thèses vivaient dans leur communauté, faisaient partie du démos, ne rompaient pas leurs liens familiaux.


dénombrément des troupeaux d’Ulysse se termine par les vers: τόσσα συν δυσόστεια, τόσ’ αἰκόλη πλατέ’ οίγνων / βόσκουσι ξείνοι τε καὶ αὐτοῦ βοτρόσες ἄνδρες).
Homère connaît le terme δουλοσώνη qui ne peut signifier rien d'autre que la condition de l'esclave avec toutes ses implications.31

Pour terminer, qu'il me soit permis de citer in extenso un passage de Marc Bloch, concernant les "halfway-statuses," hautement instructif32:

Les sociétés médiévales distinguaient deux grandes conditions humaines: il y avait des hommes libres, d'autres qui passaient pour ne l'être point. Mais la notion de liberté est de celles que chaque époque remanie à son gré. Certains historiens ont donc jugé de nos jours qu'au sens prétendument normal du mot, c'est-à-dire au leur, les non-libres du moyen-âge avaient été mal nommés. Ce n'étaient, disent-ils, que des "demi-libres." Mot inventé sans aucun appui dans les textes, cet intrus, en tout état de cause, serait encombrant. Il n'est malheureusement pas de cela. Par une conséquence à peu près inévitable, la fausse rigueur qu'il donnait au langage a paru rendre superficie toute recherche vraiment approfondie sur la frontière de la liberté et de la servitude, telle que ces civilisations en concevaient l'image: limite souvent incertaine, variable même selon les parties du moment ou du groupe, mais dont un des caractères essentiels fut, justement de n'avoir jamais souffert cette zone marginale que suggère, avec une malencontreuse insistance, le nom de demi-liberté. Une nomenclature imposée au passé aboutira toujours à la déformer. Ces étiquettes-là, il n'y a envers elles d'autre attitude raisonnable que de les éliminer.

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Gschnitzer constate que le terme δmós est employé pour désigner: 1. une propriété (= andrapodon), 2. un domestique (= oiketes) et 3. l'état d'appartenance à autrui (= doulos). Il s'emploie le plus souvent avec la signification de servantes et domestiques, ce qui plaide en faveur de l'étymologie δμός de dem- (mot gr. δύομος, lat domus). Cf. E. Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes I (Paris 1969) 305: "dmós, le serviteur, l'esclave, δμος, la servante, c'est-à-dire 'ceux qui font partie de la maison'." Cette étymologie est tenue pour probable par M. I. Finley (supra n. 24) 70, qui reconnaît également le caractère servile des δmôs. Notons aussi l'étymologie signalée par Aristopha de Byzance (Miller, 433): δμώς καὶ δμοίδες· οἱ δουλοί καὶ οἱ δουλίδες, ἀπὸ τοῦ δεδυμένου καὶ οἰονεὶ δημοτέσσαρα." 31 L'interprétation controuvéée de l'expression δουλοσώνη ανέξεσθαι avancée par W. Beringer, Athenaeum 30 (1960) 65–97, est à rejeter parce que, comme l'a souligné J. A. Lencman (supra n. 23) 235 n. 24, elle est contredite autant par la signification du mot à l'époque classique que par la signification de l'adjectif doulos dans l'épopée (le sens que Beringer attribue à cet adjectif est secondaire; il ne convient guère au passage Od. 24. 252–53, où δουλόν εἶδος καὶ μέγεθος se rapportant au vieux Laërte ne peut signifier que "servile"; cf. supra n. 30).

32 Apologie pour l'histoire ou métier d'historien3 (Paris 1959) 88.
On the Interpretation of a Poem of Anacreon

R. RENEHAN

σφαίρη δηντε με πορφυρή
βάλλων χρυσοκόμης Ἄρως
νήν ποικιλοσεμβάλω
συμπαίζειν προκαλείται.
ἡ δ', ἐστὶν γαρ ἀτε εὐτίκτου
Λέσβου, τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην,
λευκή γάρ, καταμέμφεται,
πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινα χάσκει.

(fr. 13 Page = PMG 358)

By a curious coincidence Professor Miroslav Marcovich and I both published discussions of this famous poem which not only appeared almost simultaneously¹ but which proceeded along rather similar lines of interpretation. While our ultimate conclusions do not entirely coincide, they are closely related and we share a general agreement in dismissing certain earlier interpretations of this much-discussed poem. Few there are who would not be pleased to find their own views so much in harmony with those of the distinguished scholar who is being honored in the present volume.

In 1991 Hayden Pelliccia published yet another discussion of this poem,² in which he takes as his starting point the two papers just mentioned. The problems of interpretation are of sufficient interest that I do not hesitate to reconsider the poem in the light of Pelliccia’s remarks. Unfortunately my own views as set forth in my CP article seem to have been misunderstood, and I am represented as expressing certain opinions which I did not express. Let it be stated at once that I consider Professor Pelliccia a serious scholar and I take it as certain that there was no intention on his part to misrepresent deliberately my position.³ If my English was not clear enough and the fault for any misunderstanding is mine, I sincerely regret it.

³ In fact, if my memory is correct, Professor Pelliccia had courteously sent me a typescript of his article before publication for my criticisms. Unfortunately at the time I was in poor
Pelliccia begins his piece by referring the reader to Marcovich’s paper and mine for “the refutation of previous errors” (30). He then states his own position: “The view advocated both by Marcovich and, with the qualification to be noted, by me is the well-established one that takes ἄλλην τινά in the last line to refer to another female, and thus makes an ethnic and sexual joke out of the Lesbian girl’s origins and behavior” (30). That is to say, Pelliccia agrees with Marcovich (and many others) that there is a joke in the final verse: The girl, it turns out, is both Lesbian and a lesbian and accordingly rejects Anacreon in favor of another woman. The main competing interpretation is, of course, that which supplies κόμην with ἄλλην τινά in verse 8. Not a few understand the poem in this way; readers of Pelliccia’s article are likely to include me in their number. “Renehan argued at length that the μὲν . . . δέ antithesis in lines 5–8 made it ‘all but unavoidable to supply mentally’ κόμην in line 8” (34). And again, “. . . suppose that with Renehan and others we think it possible to supply κόμην with πρός δ’ ἄλλην τινά . . . .” (32). The fullest statement of my views (30 n. 2) differs from these accounts in that some other opinions, mutually incompatible, are also attributed to me: “Renehan first argues from the μὲν . . . δέ structure of the last four lines that κόμην (referring to a younger man’s head of hair) must be supplied with πρός δ’ ἄλλην τινά; then, on the last page, he surprisingly says that ἔστιν γὰρ ἄπ’ εὐκτίτου / Λέσβου can have led the audience to understand ἄλλην τινά as referring to another girl; and he finally proposes that the ambiguity cannot be resolved and that the poet may have intended it that way” (emphases added here).

The reader may be excused if he concludes from Pelliccia’s language that I expressed different, and contradictory, views in different sections of my paper. Actually all his remarks refer to several consecutive paragraphs on the last two pages of my discussion (31–32; no page citation given by Pelliccia). On page 31, in the course of analyzing the structure of verses 5–8, I stated in part: “When one then proceeds to πρός δ’ ἄλλην τινά (no further), it is all but unavoidable to supply mentally a corresponding κόμην.” Ignoring the crucial qualification “no further,” Pelliccia misrepresents me as arguing that “κόμην . . . must be supplied with πρός δ’ ἄλλην τινά.” My actual point was that, when one then goes on to the last word of the poem, one meets an unexpected verb which makes it quite likely that ἄλλην τινά does not after all refer to κόμην, but rather to another woman. On page 32 I entertain two possibilities: 1) Verses 5–6 contain no allusion to lesbianism and κόμην is to be understood with ἄλλην τινά. On this view, as I wrote, “Anacreon’s revenge consists solely in the use of an unflattering expression (χάσκειν πρός) to describe her misdirected attentions (as he sees it). The poem is heterosexual on this reading; the sense is acceptable.” With this interpretation the verb χάσκει is still

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health (which necessitated major surgery) and my life was so disrupted that I did not read the piece until after it had appeared in print.
unexpected and delivers a παρά προσδοκίαν effect. 2) Verses 5–6 do allude to the lesbian interests of the woman. I stated, "... then ἄλλην refers to a woman and the παρά προσδοκίαν is even more pronounced" (emphasis added here). It is not apparent to me how anyone could conclude from such language that I was an advocate of the "κόμην" interpretation in explicit opposition to the "κόρην" interpretation. In other words, Marcovich and Pelliccia are among those interpreters who understand ἄλλην τινά in verse 8 as referring to some other woman. I differ from them in rejecting this interpretation—quite the contrary—but in continuing to believe that the "κόμην" interpretation is also possible, if less pointed. I thought that I had made it clear in my CP paper that I preferred the other interpretation, if an absolute choice had to be made (see below). Perhaps not. Let us come to the crux of the matter: ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ' εὐκτίτου Λέσβου.

"Interpretation of the poem is chiefly complicated by the statement in lines 5–6 that the girl is from Lesbos." So I wrote in my CP paper (30) and it is clear from Pelliccia's remarks in his paper that verses 5–6 continue to present difficulties. To illustrate the sentence-structure seen in verses 5–8 I had adduced a passage not hitherto cited in this connection, namely Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 37–39:

ό γὰρ ἀνήρ, ὁ φιλτάτη,
Σαλαμίνος γὰρ ἐστίν ὁ ἐξευμείνετ' ἐγώ,
τὴν νῦχθ' ἀλὴν ἠλαυνε ἀπ' εἰς τοῖς στρώμασιν.

Pelliccia will make much use of this passage, but first he observes that "Renhan does not draw any inferences from the passage but simply quotes

4 Marcovich (above, note 1) 375–76, argues that Greek idiom regularly requires that χάσκειν πρὸς refer "to an animate object" and hence κόμην is unlikely to be the object of the preposition here. I do not believe that this "rule" has any validity and Marcovich himself adduces some evidence that argues against it. Nothing either in the nature of the Greek language in general or of this word in particular favors putting χάσκειν in such a semantic straitjacket.

5 It seems to have become customary among defenders of this interpretation to contrast specifically the word κόρην with κόμην in this connection. Thus Pelliccia on p. 33 writes of "understanding κόρην in the last line." Marcovich uses similar language more than once. This should be avoided because it is both inexact and misleading. Precisely because there is a neatness to the jingle κόρη – κόμη, a reader is liable, consciously or no, to attribute the play on words to Anacreon himself, which would, of course, itself go a long way towards validating this interpretation. The "evidence" is illusory. 1) Anacreon calls the girl a νήνις, not a κόρη. 2) In Anacreon's dialect the form would be κόρη, not κόρη, and the slight extant evidence for his own usage clearly points to κόρη (PMG 390, 418), a form which hardly forms a striking jingle with κόμη. 3) If ἄλλην τινά refers (as I think it most likely does) to a woman, no substantive need be mentally supplied; the feminine termination -ην suffices. For an unambiguous example of this see Aesch. Ag. 1268 ἄλλην τιν' ἄτης ἄντι ἐμοῦ πλαυτίζετε. (Cassandra is the speaker, ἄτης is Stanley's correction of the meaningless ἄτην of the MSS.) 4) If a Greek supplied any substantive here it would most likely be γυναίκα, the natural word to contrast female with male. Theocritus 6. 25–26: ἀλλα καὶ ἀντὸς ἐγὼ κνίζον πάλλυν οὐ ποθόρημι, / ἄλλα' ἄλλαν τινά φαμί γυναίκ' ἔχεν. (Note, incidentally, ποθόρημι, a polite equivalent to the vulgar χάσκειν in Anacreon.)
it as 'an exactly parallel sentence'" (31 n. 4). This is somewhat imprecise; again I am misquoted. On pages 30–31 I discuss the elaborate *structure* of verses 5–8 and state what I take to be the purpose and effect of the several parenthetic clauses. Having done this, and only then, do I cite the Aristophanes passage as "an exactly parallel sentence-structure" (emphasis added). Pelliccia omits the crucial word "structure," which ought to have removed any doubt as to my main reason for producing the parallel. But he believes the parallel to be even more significant than I did: "The function . . . of the interposed γάρ-clause . . . ('for he is from Salamis') is perfectly clear: it provides the ethnic information that sets up and makes possible the obscene punchline . . ." (31). And again, "The first γάρ-clause in Anacreon resembles that in Aristophanes in an even more significant way: both interrupt their sentences in order to tell the ethnic origin of the subject; in Aristophanes this ethnic information serves to set up the obscene punchline that follows, and that is its only purpose. There is an obvious point to be made from all this: an interposed or anticipatory γάρ-clause demands a 'pay-off,' comic or otherwise; when the interposed clause contains ethnic information, the pay-off must present action associated with the ethnic group" (32). I have no quarrel with the basic point made here, for I was under the impression that I was making much the same point on pages 30–31 of my paper, where I conclude the section by explicitly alluding to a παρά προσδιοκόων ending (= Pelliccia's "punchline").6 Surely he could not have imagined that I failed to observe the "ethnic" adjective in the Aristophanes passage. That was precisely what made it so apt a parallel.

Our disagreement here is small, but perhaps significant. The reader will have observed that in the quotations from Pelliccia's paper just given he refers twice to "the obscene punchline" in the Aristophanes passage. The two passages from Anacreon and Aristophanes have in common 1) a parenthetic γάρ-clause and 2) an "ethnic" (perhaps better "geographic") reference in this clause. Aristophanes also has 3) an obscene ending. While Pelliccia does not quite say so in so many words, the reader naturally infers from his language that this is a third detail which the two passages must share, because such a γάρ-clause, specifically containing an ethnic or geographic reference and leading up to an *obscene* punchline, constitutes, as it were, a formal pattern: "The Aristophanes parallel adduced by Renehan . . . does prove that the formal structure common to it and Anacreon 13 was suitable for the kind of joke that the 'lesbian' interpretation creates" (33 n. 8). Parenthetic γάρ-clauses can be used for humorous effect and doubtless often were. The interesting presence in them, on occasion, of an ethnic

6 In addition to "punchline" Pelliccia uses not only "pay-off" but also introduces the contrasting pair "apparent logic" versus "joke logic" (see especially 34). All this seems to me but a roundabout way of describing the familiar παρά προσδιοκόων pattern, although Pelliccia apparently believes that his language introduces some new insight (32: "given this newly strengthened intuition").
word followed by an obscene ending does not prove that an obscene ending must always, or even usually, follow. The formal structure common to Anacreon 13 and Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 37-39 is neutral in this regard. It was of set purpose that I did not draw any further inferences along these lines.

Let me attempt to clarify the point. Yáρ-clauses with an ethnic or geographic element also occur elsewhere, both 1) where the clause is not parenthetic and thus there is no “punchline” following and 2) where there is no obscene content. Epigram 6 (Pfeiffer) of Callimachus has to do with the dedication of a nautilus shell to Arsinoë Aphrodite by Selenia, daughter of Kleinias. Verses 11-12 go thus: Κλεινίου αλλὰ θυγατρὶ δίδου χάριν· οἴδε γὰρ ἔσθλα / δέξειν καὶ Σμύρνης ἐστίν ἀπ’ Αἰολίδος. This epigram has no erotic content and these verses conclude the epigram. (That is, the “ethnic” yáρ-clause is not parenthetic.) More significant, because of its provenience, is the following passage, from the Anacreontea (14. 10-14 West), where the imitator is telling off all his “affairs” or ἔρωτες: ἔπειτα δ’ ἐκ Κορίνθου / θεῖς ὄρμαθους ἔρωτον· / Ἀχαίας γὰρ ἐστιν, / ἔτους καλαὶ γυναικεῖς. / τίθει δὲ λεσβίους [sc. ἔρωτας] μοι κτλ. The “ethnic” yáρ-clause is not parenthetic; it concludes one section. Nor is it, despite occurring in an “erotic” poem, in any way obscene. Such yáρ-clauses, it appears, show considerable structural variety.

It thus seems to me that Pelliccia attempts to prove too much from a single overworked Aristophanean passage. He states the following (32): “Now, given this newly strengthened intuition, suppose that with Renehan and others we think it possible to supply κόμην with πρὸς δ’ άλλην τινά: What kind of pay-off, then, will be the clause ‘but she gapes at another . . . head of hair?’ How does the information that ‘she is from well-built Lesbos’ set up such a climax? The answer must be, it does not; and that failure to account for the structure, especially as illuminated by the parallel from Aristophanes, constitutes a serious defect in any interpretation that supplies κόμην in line 8” (emphasis in each instance mine). These assertions are certainly couched in too confident language. After all, Marcovich (372 n. 1) had given what he correctly described as “a generous selection of scholarship (1899-1979)” on this little language. His useful, but incomplete, list contains almost forty items, representing a remarkable variety of opinions and theories.

The plain fact is that the clause ἐστίν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου, taken in the most innocent way, makes sense here. The epithet is modelled on Homeric language and is both elevated and honorific. A woman from “well-built Lesbos” can mean a woman from a sophisticated and cultured center of Greece (Sappho! Alcaeus!); she would be no rustic. A woman from Lesbos also comes from a region famous for beauty contests, which is
to say from a region associated with beautiful women.\textsuperscript{7} Such a woman might well assume a condescending air towards the old poet past his prime. She can do better. Take the poem that way and the final word χάσκει still produces a “punchline,” an unexpected and uncomplimentary jibe directed towards the young lady.\textsuperscript{8} The structure is flawless and no one has succeeded in proving beyond any doubt that such cannot be the sense of the poem.

To come to the alternative, “lesbian” interpretation of verses 5–6. In contemporary classical studies, where a cottage industry dedicated to the detection of hitherto unnoticed obscenities in Greek and Latin literature (many of them imaginary) flourishes, there is a risk of being too quick to see, and even of insisting upon, sexual innuendoes which may not have been apparent to the ancient Greek hearer or reader. Nevertheless many, including myself, have believed that an allusion to lesbianism is likely to be present in this poem. Marcovich advocates this position and Pelliccia

\textsuperscript{7} For the evidence for beauty contests on Lesbos see my CP paper (above, note 1) 30. In an extraordinary paragraph (32 n. 7) Pelliccia attempts to argue away this possibility: “The evidence for the Lesbian reputation for feminine beauty rests on II. 9. 129–30 Λεσβίδας, ὥς ὅτε Λέσβος εὐκτιμένη ἔθεν αὐτός / ἐξελόμην, αἱ κάλλες ἑνίκων φόλα γυναικῶν—where the imperfect ἑνίκων shows that the antecedent of the relative in αἱ κάλλες ἑνίκων is not Lesbian women in general, but a particular group—and on the attestations in Alcaeus fr. 130. 32–33, et al .... that beauty contests were held on the island. Do beauty contests necessarily imply singular beauty?” The attack is thus two-pronged: 1) The Homeric passage refers only to a certain few women from Lesbos and 2) beauty contests do not necessarily “imply” beautiful women. For the first argument to have any validity one would have to assume against all probability that these particular women were the only beautiful women from Lesbos. Otherwise it proves nothing contra. Surely no one would really care to defend such a position. (If one wished to pursue this line of argument seriously, merely note the language used: ἐξελόμην means “I selected, picked out for myself”—obviously from a larger group of such.) One might as well argue that, because Anacreon does not explicitly describe the young lady in his poem as beautiful, we are meant to conclude that she is ugly. Or that in Anacreonta 14. 10 ff. (see above), a passage almost certainly imitating our poem, one is to conclude that only the women from Corinth are beautiful because they are singled out as such, and not also the women from Athens, Lesbos, and elsewhere (see the whole poem). Rather, the Homeric passage is some evidence that Lesbos enjoyed a reputation for beautiful women. Surely one is also entitled to take into account the fact that in this passage, where Homer mentions beautiful women from Lesbos, he describes it as εὐκτιμένη and that Anacreon employs the corresponding epithet εὐκτιμένη. His literary allusion, if not certain, seems very probable. (Note that in Anacreonta 14. 12–13 [cited above], Ἀχαϊάς γαρ ἔστιν, ἥμας καλαὶ γυναικεῖς, there is an analogous Homeric precedent, II. 3. 75 = 258 Ἀχαϊάδα καλλιγύναικα.) The rhetorical question which forms the second prong of Pelliccia’s attack is, if anything, even more curious: “Do beauty contests necessarily imply singular beauty?” Clearly he intends the answer to be “No,” and in the schools of the logicians that might be the correct answer. In the real—or literary—world the answer is “Yes.” What sort of fool would hold a beauty contest if he or she believed that beautiful contestants could not be found? Beauty is in the eye of the beholder and the existence of such beauty contests on Lesbos tells us what the beholders there thought they were beholding.

\textsuperscript{8} For the force of χάσκω here (crude, but not obscene), see my CP paper (above, note 1) 29–30 and 31.
quotes him with approval. "Marcovich states the case well: those who believe that κόμην is to be understood in line 8 'have rightly objected that there is just no evidence for the assumption that ‘coming from Lesbos’ would imply ‘being a lesbian.’ I feel, however, that such an assumption is [certainly] possible in the time of Anacreon in view of the unmistakable homosexual inclinations of Sappho from Lesbos, as expressed in her poetry" (32–33). I agree completely with Marcovich’s position here and expressed comparable views (see my CP paper, 30 and 32). Yet directly after quoting Marcovich Pelliccia states in a footnote, "Renehan rejects this [i.e. Marcovich’s] argument as circular" (33 n. 8). I repeat verbatim my words as a cautionary tale: "It is also quite possible that Lesbos in Anacreon’s time already suggested female homosexuality. Sappho’s fame alone could adequately account for that. Unfortunately, if such were the case, this poem is the only extant evidence for it, and any formal argument as to the meaning of the poem based on the mention of Lesbos in lines 5–6 runs the risk, unavoidably, of circularity" (30). The key words here (ignored) are "any formal argument" and my statement is perfectly correct. To attempt to prove formally that verses 5–6 refer to lesbianism on the basis of verses 5–6 alone is a logical fallacy, a petitio principii. I do reject such a move. This does not mean that one cannot make an assumption about the probable meaning of verses 5–6 based on their context. What Pelliccia has done, by stating, specifically in connection with the statements of Marcovich cited above, that I "reject this argument," is to make it appear that I reject the legitimacy of assuming (as Marcovich does) that a lesbian interpretation is possible. In fact I proceed immediately to argue against those who stress the absence of contemporary evidence for a reputation among women from Lesbos for lesbianism: "That . . . is true enough, but, given the scanty remains from this period, it is hardly significant, much less decisive" (30).

Where does all this leave us? Pelliccia seems convinced that the poem must be given a "lesbian" interpretation. His arguments strike me as not fully persuasive, indeed, in places fallacious. I believe now, as I did when I wrote my earlier paper, that certainty is not attainable. The mention of Lesbos may have more to do with social standing than sexual proclivities and κόμην may be understood with ἀλλὰν τινά. This will give a satisfactory sense. I still believe, however, that the "lesbian" reading produces an "even more pronounced" παρὰ προσδοκίαν, as I wrote on page 32 (although readers of Pelliccia’s paper would never discover that). What impressed me most, however, was the fact that both the Lesbos-clause and ἀλλὰν τινά admitted of two interpretations; that is to say, the Greek seems to show not one but two ambiguities which can significantly affect our understanding of the entire poem. I considered this, if a coincidence, a "remarkable" one (32), which is to say highly improbable—and, therefore, suggested that the poet intended a deliberate ambiguity culminating in a highly effective παρὰ προσδοκίαν.
Pelliccia writes (30 n. 2): “[Renehan] proposes that the ambiguity cannot be resolved and that the poet may have intended it that way. I find the suggested ambiguity unappealing . . . and the argument that produces it self-contradictory.” The problem of conscious ambiguities is of no little importance in poetry. Some twenty years ago the great American Pindaric scholar, Elroy Bundy, wrote of “ambiguity of this sort” as “being one of the most powerful instruments of meaning in poetry.” In the case of Anacreon 13 I proposed an interpretation along such lines. The poet, by an elaborate and careful structuring of verses 5–8 (discussed on pages 30–31 of my CP paper), deliberately misleads his audience. As one goes through the sentence, ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐυκτίτου Λέσβου is first understood to refer to the girl’s illustrious homeland. (The epithet ἐυκτίτου, because of its usual associations [see above], may itself be deceptive.) Then, especially because of the emphatic “centerpiece” of the sentence, τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην, one instinctively supplies κόμην with the contrasting πρὸς δὲ ἄλλην τινὰ—until one sees the unflattering verb χάσκει, at which point one realizes that ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐυκτίτου Λέσβου can admit of a quite different (lesbian) meaning and that κόμην need not be supplied, thereby making ἄλλην τινὰ refer to a person. I find the poem so understood ingenious and elegant; I see nothing “self-contradictory” therein.

Before dismissing out of hand an interpretation of the poem along these lines one ought to be aware that conscious ambiguities are well attested in Greek literature (to go no further). Let me conclude by calling attention to but one particularly striking parallel (or so at least it seems to me), Sophocles, OT 337–38. Tiresias is the speaker; he knows the awful truth about Oedipus who, still in the dark, has just angrily rebuked the blind seer:

ὅργην ἐμέμψα αὐτήν ἐμήν, τὴν σήν δ’ ὄμοιον ναΐοὐσαν οὗ κατείδες, ἄλλ’ ἐμε ἤλεγές.

Richard Jebb (ad loc.) says: “ὁμοῖον ναϊοῦσαν while (or though) it dwells close to thee . . . the words have a second meaning: ‘thou seest not that thine own [τὴν σήν, thy kinswoman, thy mother] is dwelling with thee [as thy wife].’ The ambiguity of τὴν σήν, the choice of the phrase ὄμοῖον ναϊοῦσαν, and the choice of κατείδες, leave no doubt of this.” Long before Jebb Eustathius (ad II. 9. 342) had observed ἐνθα δοκεῖ μὲν λέγειν ὁ Τευρεσίας ὅτι τὴν σήν ὀργήν οὗ κατείδες τὴν σύμφωνον σοι, ἀληθῶς δὲ λέγει ὅτι τὴν σήν ἀλοχον σοῦ οἴδας, ἥγουν τὴν μητέρα σου, ἕς σομβιοῖς.

10 For reproducing the general effect of the poem in English one can hardly do better than David Campbell’s Loeb rendering (Greek Lyric II [1988]) with its final dash: “. . . but she—she comes from Lesbos with the fine cities—finds fault with my hair because it is white, and gapes after another—girl.” But no English version can fully recapture the ambiguity of the inflected Greek.
Note how ὀργήν ... τὴν ἐμὴν parallels τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην, how the contrasting τὴν σὴν δὲ with the inherent ambiguity of its feminine case-ending corresponds to πρὸς δὲ ἀλλὰν τινά, and how there is a second ambiguity in ὀμοῦ νοείοιον, just as we have suggested there is in ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ᾿ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου. Finally, observe the a b a pattern: ἀλλὰ ἐμὲ ψέγεις repeats ὀργήν ἐμέμψω τὴν ἐμὴν—but with a significant difference. Ὅργην ... τὴν ἐμὴν is replaced by the personal pronoun ἐμὲ, which makes it all the more likely (when one has read the sentence to the end, exactly as in Anacreon) that the ambiguous, and contrasting, τὴν σὴν is to be taken as really referring to a person, not a thing. That not everyone will accept an interpretation on such lines in either passage is only to be expected. The Greek in both places is, after all, ambiguous.

University of California, Santa Barbara
Heraclitus and the Moon:
The New Fragments in \textit{P.Oxy.} 3710

WALTER BURKERT

The editio maior of Heraclitus by Miroslav Marcovich\(^1\) will remain a model and a thesaurus of scholarship for a long time, especially since there is little hope that the amount of evidence preserved in ancient literature will substantially increase. Still, two remarkable additions have come to light from papyri in recent years, the quotation of B 94 = 52 M. and B 3 = 57 M. in the Derveni papyrus,\(^2\) which takes the attestation of these texts with one stroke back to the 5th century B.C., and especially the totally new and surprising texts contained in the learned commentary on Book 20 of the \textit{Odyssey} which was published in 1986 as Oxyrhynchos Papyrus 3710 by Michael W. Haslam, with rich and thoughtful notes.\(^3\) It was Martin West who called attention to these fragments in 1987;\(^4\) they appeared too late to be included in the new editions of Heraclitus by Diano, Conche and Robinson.\(^5\) Immediately after West, Mouraviev proposed an alternative reading and interpretation.\(^6\) It may still appear that the precious new sayings of Heraclitus are either obscure or trivial or both. Another approach to achieve a better understanding may well be tried.

The commentary on the \textit{Odyssey} preserved in Oxyrhynchos Papyrus 3710 is astonishingly rich in quotations. The passage concerned is \textit{Odyssey} 20. 156, with the mention of a “festival” which turns out to be a festival of


\(^{3}\) \textit{The Oxyrhynchos Papyri} LIII, ed. with translations and notes by M. W. Haslam (Oxford 1986). Haslam repeatedly refers to remarks and evidence adduced by Edgar Lobel.


Apollo (20. 278, 21. 258). Aristonicus, quoted in abbreviated form, identifies this festival as that of the new moon (numenia), and identifies Apollo as Helios. Aristonicus evidently was thinking of the verse τοῦ μὲν φθίνοντος μινός, τοῦ δ' ἱσταμένου, which occurs twice to indicate the return of Odysseus (14. 162, 19. 307). Incidentally, Wilamowitz had come to similar conclusions.7 The commentator goes on to state that solar eclipses occur at numenial, quoting Aristarchus of Samos, who apparently quoted Thales: ἔτη τε ὧν Ἡλίας ὅτι ἐκλείπειν τὸν ἥλιον σελήνης ἐπίπερθεν αὐτῶι γενομένης, σημειούμε[νος τοὺς ὅρους] τής ἡμέρας ἐν ἦ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐγκεισθείν ("Thales said, 'The sun has an eclipse if the moon gets in front of it, and he indicated the limits of the day in which the sun has an eclipse'.").8 This day, we are told, is called either τριῳκός or νουμήνιος. There follows, asynthetically, Ἡράκλειτος with a sentence in Ionic dialect; it is unclear whether this still comes from Aristarchus. At any rate a commentator on the Heraclitus text is introduced subsequently, a certain Diodorus,9 who goes to some length to explain the celestial phenomena at the moon’s disappearance. But the last three lines of the column are badly preserved, and 14 complete lines at least are lost from the top of the next column; it is not before the 7th line preserved that a continuous text begins to emerge again.10 Here the commentator adds another sentence of Heraclitus, stressing as it seems that "he says what is consistent."11

The two sentences of Heraclitus attested in this way, as singled out by Martin West, are:

(Π. 43–47) συνιόντων τῶν μηνῶν ἡμέρας ἐξ ὧν φαίνεται προτέρην νομήνιον δευτέρην ἄλλοτ' ἔλασσονας μεταβάλλεται, ἄλλοτε πλεῦνας.


8 For the supplement, cf. Hdt. 1. 74 οὐρὸν προθέμενος. This is a new and very important testimony for Thales. That Thales discovered the true nature of solar eclipses, through the interposition of the moon, is in fact the tradition of Theophrastus (Aet. 2. 24. 1 = Diels–Kranz 11 Α 17a) and Eudemus (fr. 145 Wehrli = Diels–Kranz 11 Α 17; cf. 11 Α 3: "prediction" has intruded into the text in Eudemus fr. 143 = 11 Α 5 and fr. 144 = 11 Α 1 §23), rivalling the more popular tradition that Thales "predicted" an eclipse (Hdt. 1. 74), which he could not possibly have done; see O. Neugebauer, The Exact Sciences in Antiquity2 (Providence 1957) 119, 142 f. Aristarchus the astronomer knows this and makes astronomical sense, tacitly correcting Herodotus, whose word οὐρὸς he recalls.

9 Probably Diodorus no. 53 Pauly–Wissowa (Lobel in Haslam), who wrote on astronomy in the 1st cent. B.C.; one Diodorus wrote Περὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρου (D.L. 8. 70); hardly to be corrected to Diadotus, who explained Heraclitus (D.L. 9. 12, 15).

10 It may be that another quotation of Heraclitus occurs in lines 54–56: μειζ ὤταν τὴν ἐκ τῶν [. . .] πρῶτος καθάτισα νόημα[ν]της ἀνθρώπου . . . ; cf. next note.

11 Πάλιν ἠλέγαν τάξιν (λεθα). In the following sentence we have μείζ as masculine (φαινομένης), but in lines 11 ff. the commentator goes on using a feminine (φαινομένη, sc. σελήνη); this clearly marks the distinction between quotation and commentary.
The word ὑπόμετρος is new, and there seems to be no further attestation of a “first” and a “second” new moon. Thus West suggested ἐξ ὅτου φαίνεται προτέρη νομηνίνῃ <ἐξ> δευτέρην, “from the appearance of one new moon to the next,” i.e., in the course of a month; Mouraviev tried ἡμέρας ἐξῆς γ’ οὖ φαίνεται, and takes προτέρην, νομηνίνῃ and δευτέρην as three successive days, “la veille (de la néoménie), à la néoménie, le lendemain.”¹³ This means introducing, against astronomical facts, a fixed number of days, while the following text clearly insists on irregularity, and postulating an improbable name for the last day of a month, “the day before (sc. the new moon)” ; no doubt προτέρη should be in opposition to δευτέρη.

It may be helpful to reflect briefly on the astronomical facts behind the philological problems. The average length of a synodic month is given as 29.53059 days by modern handbooks; normal Greek calendars, especially the Attic calendar, which we know best, used to alternate between months of 29—a “hollow month”—and of 30 days; in Athens this seems to have been the rule since Solon.¹⁴ In earlier times one probably relied on observation of the new moon. But it turns out to be very complicated to predict on which day the new moon will be visible for the first time: the 30th, the 31st, or even the 32nd or the 29th evening? It depends not only on the moon’s distance from the sun but also on the angle between ecliptic and horizon, and of course on weather conditions.¹⁵

We know practically nothing about the calendar of Ephesus at the time of Heraclitus. But encountering the terms “first” and “second noumenie” in the new text, we may suppose that this refers just to the phenomena described: The appearance of the new moon on the 30th day—corresponding to a “hollow month” in Athens—would be the “first noumenie,” and the appearance on the 31st day the “second noumenie.”¹⁶

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¹² Mouraviev prefers τρ[ίτη] in III 7; in III 9 the scribe originally wrote γίνεται and corrected to φαίνεται; Mouraviev prefers γίνεται.
¹³ Following Haslam (108). One would rather expect the word order γ’ ἐξῆς.
¹⁵ The irregularities are described by Geminus (9. 13–15). For the very complicated Babylonian methods of computation, see Neugebauer (above, note 8) §47 and A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy I (Berlin 1975) 533–40.
¹⁶ Cf. Haslam 108: “the προτέρη νομηνίνη and the δευτέρη (νομηνίνη) might be two successive days.”
This makes it possible to understand the first sentence of Heraclitus without a change—taking into consideration the Greek use of the accusative of time; 17 there is even a distinctive Heraclitean rhythm:

συνιόντων τῶν μηνῶν
ήμερας ἐξ ὄστον φαίνεται
προτέρην νουμηνίν δευτέρην
ἀλλοτ' ἐλάσσονας μεταβάλλεται,
ἀλλοτε πλέυνας.

As the months meet,
days since it (sc. the moon) makes its appearance—at the first noumenie, (or) at the second18—sometimes it changes fewer (sc. days), sometimes more.

In the second sentence, ὑπόμετρον can be understood in contrast to the well-attested ἐπίμετρον, “surplus,” “excess”; 19 it thus should mean “rest” by subtraction. 20 An appearance of the moon “on the third day” would be equivalent to the “second noumenie.”

μεὶς τριταῖος φαινόμενος
ἐκκαθεκάτη ροσέληνος φαίνεται
ἐν ἡμέραισ τεσσαρεσκάιδεκα;
ἀπολιμπάνει τὸν ὑπόμετρον
ἐν ἡμέραισ τρισκάιδεκα.

The moon, appearing on the third day,
appears as a full moon21 on the 16th,
within fourteen days;
it leaves22 the rest (to change)
in thirteen days.

The calculation seems to be that the moon needs 14 days to become full; this leads from the “second noumenie” (third day after disappearance, i.e. second day of the month) to the 16th, and this leaves 13 days (16th to 29th) for the rest. This is explained at length in the commentary.23

17 R. Kühner and B. Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache II.1 (Hannover 1898) 314 f.; cf. e.g. Hdt. 4. 181. 3 (τὸ ὕδωρ) τῶν μὲν ὃθερον γίνεται χλιαρὸν . . . , or 6. 127 τοῦτον τῶν χρόνων, or 2. 2. 2 τὴν ἀρχὴν.
18 For “expressive asyndeton,” see A. Debrunner, Griechische Grammatik II (Munich 1950) 701; typical for Heraclitus, see especially B 67 = 77 M.
20 “Le démésuré par défaut,” Mouraviev; not commented upon by West.
21 The form πασσέληνος is also attested in Arist. APo. 93a37, PA 680a32.
22 West has the tempting suggestion ἀποσιμπλάνει. But ὑπόμετρον may be especially fitted to ἀπολιμπάνον.
Trivial arithmetic? It appears surprising indeed that Heraclitus the
σκοτεινός should be concerned with counting days of the month. Nothing
“deep” and obscure, allusive and pregnant. It may still be in the tradition of
Thales, Anaximander, Xenophanes and indeed of Phocus of Samos,
Cleodratus of Tenedos and Mandrolutus of Priene, who all seem to have
written handbooks on what has been called “calendaric astronomy.”24 We
may be inclined to dissociate Heraclitus all too much from these
surroundings. Hardly a trace has been left of those Ionian books before or
at the time of Heraclitus. But we may well compare two texts on the same
subject, one considerably earlier, one later:

The following commands are issued by Marduk to the Moon at the
creation of the world in the Babylonian epic Enuma Elish: “At the
beginning of the month, to glow over the land, you shine with horns to mark
out six days; on the seventh day the crown is half. The fifteenth day shall
always be the mid-point, the half of each month. When Shamash [the Sun-
God] looks at you from the horizon,25 gradually shed your visibility and
begin to wane. Always bring the day of disappearance close to the path of
Shamash, and on the thirtieth day, the [year] is always equalized . . .”26

From the other side comes the text in Philo’s book, On the Creation
of the Universe according to Moses. Philo states that the “perfect number” 28
governs the period of the moon: “For the moon increases from its first
appearance as a crescent to a half moon in 7 days, then in another 7 days it
becomes a full moon, and again it comes back the same way, completing the
double course, from full moon to half moon in another 7 days, and from this
to crescent in the same number of days. From these the number mentioned
[i.e. 28] has become complete.”

Philo, praising the order of the universe, is in fact cheating: He simply
disregards those irregularities with which everyday calendars had been
struggling all the time. This no less than the naive description in Enuma
Elish brings out the emphasis of Heraclitus: Heraclitus insists that there is
change, irregularity, but not irregularity alone; there is number too, the
number seven evidently and its multiples that play a role—this is not at all

24 Diels-Kranz nos. 5, 6, 11 A 19.
25 I.e. the sun rises before the moon sets.
26 Enuma Elish 5. 15–22, translated in S. Dalley, Myths from Mesopotamia (Oxford 1991)
256; in the last verse quoted, the translation “year” is questionable; rather “(the position of) sun
is equalized, is repeated.” Cf. J. Bottéro, S. N. Kramer, Lorsque les dieux faisaient l’homme
(Paris 1989): “Pour qu’en trentième, derechef, Tu te trouveras en conjonction avec Shamash.”
new. What is specifically Heraclitean is that both should be in view, the change and the *logos*. This will lead directly to the famous saying on the river: *The same river, but new waters all the time; unceasing change, and still identity.* Or, in other words, there is a *logos*, but the *logos* is hidden and will only appear to him who knows how to perceive identity in difference.

Given the astronomical interests of Heraclitus as illustrated by the new text, one might have another look at further astronomical fragments of Heraclitus and be more inclined to find astronomical sense in them. There is, first, B 120 = 62 M., quoted by Strabo and hence of unquestionable authenticity: ἡ οὐκ οἷα ἐπέρας τέρματα ἡ ἀρκτος καὶ ἀντίον τῆς ἀρκτος ὀρος σιθρίου Διός (“Limits of morning and evening: the Bear, and opposite the Bear, (the) boundary of bright Zeus”). Morning and evening change from day to day, but there are “limits” which stop their drifting apart or coming together, and these are in fact the limits or “measures” of the sun’s course, one in the North, and one opposite. For, “if there were no sun, as for the other stars, it would be night.” Strabo may not have been that wrong in understanding the Bear to stand for the “arctic circle,” though it should rather be the tropics which are in view. We do not know whether Heraclitus was familiar with this concept of the tropics; he definitely chose not to use technical terminology in this sentence. What matters is that there is constant change, and there are limits to change, which are, in this case, the “measures” of Helios. One may still take notice of the fact that girdles of that kind have been marked out in Babylonian astronomy, and there is especially the section of Enlil the Storm God adjoining the equator; Enlil would equal Zeus.

Another fragment of Heraclitus should be considered afresh in the new perspective, B 126a = 118 M.; it was judged a fake by Diels and has therefore been almost completely neglected since; only Conche in his recent edition has made an attempt to vindicate the text. It comes from a learned

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27 The association of the number 7, the moon and menstruation may well be prehistorical; the ancient evidence was collected by W. H. Roscher, “Die enneadischen und hebdomadischen Fristen und Wochen der ältesten Griechen,” *Abhandlungen der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften* 21.4 (Leipzig 1903); “Die Sieben- und Neunzahl im Kultus und Mythus der Griechen,” ibid. 24.1 (Leipzig 1904).


29 Cf. also Conche (above, note 5) 195–97.

30 B 99 = 60 M.; cf. B 94 = 52 M.

31 Rather complicated in detail; see *Reallexikon der Assyriologie* II 386–88. For Zeus Aithrios, see H. Schwabl in Pauly–Wissowa X A (1972) 263.

32 Diels on 126a and Marcovich 589 f.; not treated in Kirk, Kahn, Diano–Serre, Robinson. See Conche (above, note 5) no. 54, pp. 209 f. Two Bears are mentioned here, as against one in B 120, but this hardly suffices for atheism. B 120 indicates the direction; for B 126a it is remarkable that the “sign” is found twice.
source which should be basically credible, Anatolius;\textsuperscript{33} it reads: κατὰ λόγον δὲ ὄρεων συμβάλλεται ἐβδομάς κατὰ σελήνην, διαφέρεται δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρκτοὺς, ἀθανάτου μνήμης σημεῖω. Diels read σημεῖοι and made this putative dual—which is indeed impossible by linguistic standards—one of his arguments for condemnation. The evident correction was printed by Conche.\textsuperscript{34} “Corresponding with the logos of the seasons, the number seven is put together in the (changes of) the moon, it is divided in the Bears, by a sign of undying memory.” The concept of “sign” will immediately remind us of the famous sentence about the god who does not speak nor conceal but “gives a sign,” σημαίνει (B 93 = 14 M.). And it makes sense. The constellations are not eternal for Heraclitus, nor is the moon, but there is a logos which endures,\textsuperscript{35} a logos in which the number seven seems to be important; this is indicated by the constellations of the Bears, while the seasons indicate the number four, and both we find combined in the changes of the moon. The seasons in turn are governed by Helios, who has his “measures” and “limits”: It is Helios who makes the changes of the seasons appear, as Plutarch writes with reference to Heraclitus; there may be more in his text which goes back to Heraclitus than just the words ὥραι αἱ πάντα φέρουσι.\textsuperscript{36}

The new fragments remain puzzling in their way. Some will find that such a treatment of calendaric astronomy makes Heraclitus appear more “Pythagorean” than Heraclitean. Others will come forth with other interpretations. The “Delian diver” (D.L. 9. 12) is not in danger of losing his job.

\textit{Universität Zürich}

\textsuperscript{33} On Anatolius, see also R. Kassel, \textit{Kleine Schriften} (Berlin 1991) 207–14.

\textsuperscript{34} Translated, “pour signe de l’immortelle mémoire.”

\textsuperscript{35} I must confess I prefer to take ἐόντος ἀεί together in B 1 = 1 M.; but this problem, indicated already by Aristotle (Rhet. 1407b14), cannot be discussed here.

\textsuperscript{36} B 100 = 64 M.
Sophokles über die geistige Blindheit des Menschen

HARTMUT ERBSE

Sophokles beschließt die “Trachinierinnen” mit folgenden Versen (1275–78):

\[\text{λειπον μηδε σύ, παρθέν', ἐπ'} (L 190, sch., t: ἄπ' Laz) οἴκων,
μεγάλους μὲν ἱδοῦσα νέους θανάτους,
πολλὰ δὲ πήματα <καὶ> καίνοπαθῆ,
καύδεν τούτων ὁ, τι μὴ Ζεῦς.\]


Oidipus, der klügste aller Menschen, dem es gelang, das Rätsel der Sphinx zu lösen und die Stadt Theben vor schwerem Unheil zu schützen, ist nicht in der Lage festzustellen, wer er selbst ist. Der Dichter macht seine geistige Blindheit in doppelter Hinsicht offenkundig: Oidipus versagt, wenn es gilt, den Mörder des Laios ausfindig zu machen (dieses der Inhalt der Bühnenhandlung), und er vermag die eigene Vergangenheit (die dunkle


Die Suche nach dem Schuldigen beginnt also unter Irrigen Voraussetzungen, und da Oidipus alle Indizien, die ihm zugänglich gemacht werden, nur auf seine (falsche) These bezieht, verfolgt er hartnäckig einen Gegner, den es nicht gibt. Er kommt nicht auf den Gedanken, daß er sich im 1. Episodion bei der Verrufung des Täters selbst verfluchen könnte. Er beleidigt in der nächsten Szene (316 ff.) den Seher Teiresias und weiß dessen überdeutliche Anspielungen auf den wahren Sachverhalt nur als schamlose Äußerungen des Priesters zu deuten, der mit Kreon gegen ihn im Bund sei. Im 2. Episodion (512 ff.) verhängt er ohne gerichtliche Untersuchung, nur auf seine ungeprüfte Vermutung hin, über seinen Schwager die Todesstrafe. Allein die Dazwischenkunft lokastes verhindert deren Durchführung. Im folgenden Gespräch mit der Gattin erhält Oidipus so viele Informationen, daß er bei richtiger Kombination seiner eigenen Erlebnisse mit dem, was lokaste ihm mitteilt, “den entscheidenden Schluß hinsichtlich seiner Herkunft” ziehen müßte.3

Auch das 3. Episodion bringt keine Klärung. Sobald Oidipus von dem korinthischen Boten erfahren hat, daß er nicht Sohn des Polybus und der

Merope ist, versteigt er sich zu der Behauptung (1080), er könne von Tyche abstammen, ein Glückskind sein. Er spricht diese hallose Vermutung aus, ohne von den ergreifenden Warnungen der Gattin berührt zu sein, von der die Wahrheit längst durchschaut worden ist. Erst das nächste (4.) Episodion, das peinliche Verhör des alten Hirten und Gefolgsmannes des Laios, enthält die lang erwartete Lösung und führt die Katastrophe herbei.

Lefèvre hat überzeugend dargestellt, daß die geistige Blindheit des Helden (ein rein intellektuelles Versagen) im Laufe des Spiels ethische Fehlleistungen zur Folge hat. Das braucht im Einzelnen nicht nochmals nachgewiesen zu werden. Wir stellen aber die Frage: Was beabsichtigte der Dichter mit dieser Demonstration menschlichen Versagen?


Solche Fehler werden gerade von Oidipus begangen. Als junger Mensch hört er in Korinth die Verdächtigung, er sei gar nicht Sohn des Königspaares Polybos und Merope. Auf seine Anfrage in Delphi erhält er die bekannte Antwort, er werde seinen Vater erschlagen und die Mutter heiraten. Er kommt nicht auf den Gedanken, diesen Ausspruch an dem Verdacht zu messen, den er in Korinth gehört und der ihn ja überhaupt erst zur Orakelbefragung veranlaßt hat. Er bittet den Gott auch nicht—was


Man wende nicht ein, daß der Dichter seinen gealterten Helden im zweiten Oidipus-Drama über sein Verhalten ganz anders urteilen lasse! Oidipus spricht dort über seine beiden Verfehlungen (Tötung des Vaters und Ehe mit der Mutter) in der Rede, in der er sich gegen die Anschuldigungen Kreons verteidigt (O.K. 960–1013). Kreon nennt ihn πατροκτόνος (944) und ἄναγγελος (945), wirft ihm mithin vorsätzliches Handeln vor. Oidipus aber streitet nicht die Tat ab, sondern den Vorsatz: Den tödlichen Schlag gegen Laios habe er in Notwehr geführt (Laios sei

⁴ Vgl. z.B. Hdt. 7. 141.


In diesem Drama beobachten wir also die gleiche menschliche Schwäche, die Unfähigkeit, eigene Irrtümer einzugestehen und unter Würdigung bessrerer Gründe die bisherige Stellung zu räumen. Kreon gibt übrigens nach dem erregten Gespräch mit dem Priester (Ant. 988 ff.), wenn


6 Vgl. bes. 289–303, dazu K. Reinhardt, Sophokles (Frankfurt 1947) 77 ff.

er endlich zur Umkehr bereit ist, zunächst nicht aus Einsicht in die Fehlerhaftigkeit seines bisherigen Verhaltens nach, sondern aus Furcht vor den schlimmen Folgen, die Teiresias ihm angedroht hat (vgl. Ant. 1078 f.).


πάτερ, θεώς μὲν κἂν ὁ μηδὲν ἄν ὅμοι κράτος κατακτήσαιτι· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ δίχα κεῖνων πέποιθα τούτ' ἐπισπάσαιν κλέος.

Und Athenas Angebot, ihm im Kampf beizustehen, wurde von ihm höhnisch abgewiesen (773: ἀντιφωνεῖ δεινὸν ἢρητόν τ' ἐπος). Er sagte (774–75):

ἀνασάεσα, τοῖς ἄλλοισιν Ἀργεῖων πέλας ἦστω, καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐκοτ' ἐνρήξει μάχη.


8 Vgl. dazu H. Diller, Kleine Schriften (München 1971) 260 f.


10 Hier wird die Kategorie der Sterblichen umschrieben, der Aias zugerechnet werden muß: ὀστὶς ἀνθρώπων φύσιν /βλαστῶν ἐπετη μη κατ' ἀνθρώπων φρον."


Der Dichter behandelt seinen Aias wie den Uberrest einer vergangenen (heroischen) Zeit. Man empfindet Entsetzen vor den stilten Äußerungen des Helden und vor seinen unbedachten Entschlüssen, aber man muß ihn doch bedauern, weil er—im Gegensatz zu Oidipus und Kreon—ganz naiv von Voraussetzungen ausgeht, die in einer rechten Vorzeit gegolten haben mögen, heute aber, zur Zeit des Spiels, überholt sind. Ob er überhaupt die Fähigkeit besitzt die Unzulänglichkeit seiner Anschauungen rechtzeitig zu erkennen? Der Dichter nimmt das an, wie aus dem Monolog des 2. Epeisodions (der sogenannten Trugrede) zu ersehen ist, und er läßt seinen Helden gegen die Gottheit, der er sich beugen sollte, freveln. So muß er denn zu Falle kommen, wie Oidipus und Kreon auch.

Lefèvre hat die Behandlung der "Trachinierinnen" von seiner Untersuchung ausgeschlossen. Das ist schwerlich zulässig; denn die vier ältesten der erhaltenen sophokleischen Tragödien kreisen alle um das gleiche Problem der menschlichen Blindheit gegenüber dem göttlichen Wissen, 14 und gerade das in den "Trachinierinnen" dargestellte Doppelschicksal 15 erfüllt sich deshalb in tragischen Untergängen, weil die Hauptbeteiligten nicht in der Lage sind, den Sinn ihres Daseins zu verstehen, d.h. sich selbst zu erkennen.

Dafür ist Herakles ein eindrucksvolles Beispiel. Man bezeichnet ihn als "Dulder," 16 der in unsäglichen Mühen die gesittete Welt von Übeln und

13 Wobei die Athetese der Verse 839–42 durch Wesseling vermutlich unbewegt bleiben muß.

κοῦδεις τροπαῖ· ἔστησε τῶν ἐμῶν χερῶν.

νῦν δ᾽ αδὲ ἀναρθρος καὶ κατερρακομένος
tυφλῆς ὑπ᾽ ἀτῆς ἐκπεφόρθημαι τάλας κτλ.

Sobald in Hylllos’ Aufklärungen der Name Nessos fällt (1141), denkt er nur noch an seinen eigenen Untergang; denn er erinnert sich nun eines alten Zeusorakels des Inhalts, ein Verstorbener werde ihn töten. Er vermag jetzt dieses Orakel mit dem Spruch von Dodona zu verbinden, der dem Hörer seit dem Prolog bekannt ist (vgl. 1159 ff.).

In dieser langen Rede nun, der wir die zuvor genannten Belege entnommen haben, fällt kein Wort über die Möglichkeit, daß der Sprecher selbst durch sein Betragen seine Gattin Deianeira zu ihrem Verhalten provoziert und dadurch sein Unglück herbeigeführt habe. Da er sich als Opfer einer undurchsichtigen Weiberlist betrachtet, sieht er in seiner Frau nur die vorsätzlich handelnde Mörderin, vgl. 1035–40, besonders 1062–63:

γυνὴ δὲ, θηλὸς ὡσα κἀνανδρὸς σύνιν,

μόνη μὲ δὴ καθεῖλε φασγάνου δίξα.


Der sophokleische Herakles ist ein Muster des selbstsicheren, leidend schaffenden Menschen, der es versäumt, sich selbst zu prüfen und sein Tun auf die Gegebenheiten der Wirklichkeit abzustimmen. Geistig steht dieser Herakles viel tiefer als Aias; denn Aias durchschaut das Wesen der Welt, die nicht die seine ist, und zieht sich eben deshalb aus ihr zurück, weil er sich ihr nicht anpassen kann. Herakles aber handelt ganz impulsiv, unbesorgt um Leben und Gefühle anderer. Er fühlt sich nur dort wohl, wo er notfalls zuschlagen kann, und er schlägt zu, wenn er befürchten muß, daß seine Wünsche nicht erfüllt werden. Er verachtet Recht und Sitte. Deshalb muß er scheitern.


nachdrücklichen Wunsch, Hyllos möge nach seinem Tode die Iole zu sich nehmen. Herakles denkt dabei nicht an eine formelle Eheschließung (Iole ist Kriegsbeute, also Sklavin), sondern an die Beschützung dieser Konkubine. Aber für Hyllos vermindert sich die Roheit dieses Anliegens dadurch nicht (vgl. V. 1233–36).


Die euripideische Konzeption ist eine ungemein verfeinerte und vertiefte Auffassung des im griechischen Mythos so beliebten Helden, den man sich zuvor nur als gutmütigen, mit ungeheuerlichen Körperkräften ausgestatteten Mann, bisweilen auch als polternden oder gar gewalttätigen Triebmenschen vorgestellt hat. Der euripideische Herakles hat alle diese urtümlichen, ja abstoßenden Züge der gleichnamigen sophokleischen Gestalt abgelegt. Stattdessen verfügt er über eine Seelenstärke, die jenem fast völlig fehlt. Es ist heute schwer verständlich, wie man noch vor nicht einmal 100 Jahren meinen konnte, die Tragödie des Sophokles habe erst entstehen können, als Euripides seinen Herakles zur Titelfigur eines Dramas gemacht hatte—eine Argumentation, mit der die angebliche Spätdatierung der “Trachinierinnen” gestützt werden sollte. Die Texte, so scheint mir, lehnen das Gegenteil; denn der sophokleische Herakles steht dem Urbild der Sage weitaus näher als die humanere Schöpfung des Euripides.


Blicken wir jetzt zurück! Wir gingen aus von den letzten Worten der "Trachinierinnen." Wenn Hylllos hier sagt: ... κούδεν τοῦτον ὅ,τι μὴ Ζεύς, dann hat er, so scheint es zunächst, nicht durchaus Recht. Das Spiel hat ja diesen schrecklichen Ausgang genommen, weil der Mensch, in der Darstellung des Sophokles, seine eigentliche Aufgabe nicht erfüllte; denn er erwies sich als unfähig, die göttliche Weisheit zu erfassen. Das besagt, wie wir nun schon mehrmals beobachtet haben: Er handelt nach eigenem Gutdünken, ohne seine Möglichkeiten zu prüfen, ohne seine Pflichten zu ermitteln und ohne das von den Göttern gesetzte Wesen der Welt zu erforschen, um sich ihm, wo nötig, einzufügen. Alles das aber ist im Gebot der Selbsterkenntnis enthalten.


Die Richtigkeit dieser Interpretation wird bestätigt durch die beiden inhaltlich von einander abweichenden Orakel, die am Ende ineinandergreifen und auf das gleiche Ereignis deuten, auf Herakles' Tod. Offensichtlich sind beide Weissagungen vom Dichter erfunden. Für das Gelingen des göttlichen Planes ist auch die hingehende Liebe Deianeiras unentbehrlich. Hier ist ebenfalls die Handschrift des Dichters kenntlich; denn vermutlich hat erst er die "Männermörderin" Deianeira der epischen Vorlage in die ihrem Gemahl aufrichtig zugetane Frau verwandelt, die um

Die Zuneigung ihres Mannes kämpft, aber zu spät bemerkt, daß sie ihn mit ihrem Liebeszauber zugrunde gerichtet hat.  

Den letzten Vers des Dramas verstehen wir jetzt besser als Hylllos selbst. Der Ratschluß des Zeus durchdringt das ganze Stück: "Zeus is present in everything that has happened" (so Davies p. 260 zu V. 1278; siehe auch 1022: τοιαύτα νέμει Ζεύς). Das bedeutet nun freilich nicht, daß die am Spiel beteiligten Personen ganz ohne freien Willen sind. In der Art, wie sie auf die Herausforderung des unentinnbaren Schicksals reagieren, verwirklichen sie, wenn auch teilweise unbewußt, ihr eigenes Wesen; sie vermögen dessen Beschaffenheit freilich nicht zu ändern. Deianeira erkennt—wenn auch zu spät—ihre fehlerhafte Übereilung und sühnt ihr Vergewe durch einen heldenhaften, echt sophokleischen Tod.  


Mit dieser Interpretation greifen wir auf bekannte Feststellungen der Sophoklesforschung zurück: Der in den Dramen des Dichters dargestellte Held ist von einem Schicksal göttlichen Ursprungs umschlossen. Dessen Sinn vermag er nicht zu verstehen, weil er nur Teilansichten erfaßt, von unzulänglichen Vorstellungen ausgeht oder von Leidenschaften beherrscht wird, die seinen ohnehin beengten Blick erst recht trüben. Nur im eigenen Untergang erschließt sich ihm der Sinn des Geschehens, in das er verstrickt ist.  

Im Falle des Herakles freilich ist auch das nur unvollkommen der Fall.

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Die Tatsache, daß der sophokleische Held diesen Einblick gewinnen kann, berechtigt zu der Vermutung, er habe die Wahrheit unter anderen Voraussetzungen, d.h. ohne die allzu menschlichen Hindernisse seiner Verblendung, rechtzeitig erkennen können. Das Ecce des Dichters ist zugleich ein Vorwurf—nicht als ob er andeutend von Schuld habe sprechen wollen, auch nicht als ob er annehme, seine Helden hätten das ihnen zugedachte Schicksal vermeiden können; denn ihre herbe Gesinnung und ihre eigenwillige Größe sind gleichfalls Teile der bestehenden Welt, sind sogar für ihr Ergehen verantwortlich.25 Aber diese Hauptzüge ihres Wesens, ihr Stolz, ihre Leidenschaft und ihre Unzugänglichkeit, weisen allenthalben über sich selbst hinaus auf das, was ihnen fehlt: die Selbsterkenntnis und Selbstbescheidung. Unsichtbar steht neben den Personen des Sophokles die Forderung des Gottes von Delphi: γνῶθι σαυτόν. Und dieses Gebot geht alle an, die je Zuschauer oder Leser einer sophokleischen Tragödie gewesen sind.

Anhang

Zu den Zeugnissen für die geistige Blindheit des Oidipus gehört auch der erste Teil des ersten Epeisodions (216 ff.), die Verrufung des Täters, eine Szene, die Lefèvre in seiner Erörterung fast unbeachtet gelassen hat. Ein kurzer Hinweis ist jedoch erforderlich, da der König hier die Netze auslegt, in denen er sich am Ende selbst verfängt (was die Zuschauer, denen die Sage bekannt war, gar wohl durchschaut haben werden).


ἔγῳ, μὲν οὖν τοιόσοδε τῷ τε δαιμονὶ
tῷ τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῷ θανόντι σύμμαχος πέλω.


Die beiden Versgruppen 246–48 und 249–51 sind deren Anwendung auf den Sprecher selbst, der, ohne es zu wissen, sich schon jetzt verflucht und verdammt. Die Tatsache, daß die inkriminierten Verse im Laufe des Spiels dreimal regelrecht zitiert werden, bestätigt m.E. die Richtigkeit

28 Die von Bruhn gesammelten Stellen werden auch am Ende des soeben ausgeschriebenen Zitats aus Holford-Strevens genannt, aber als Belege für die Alltäglichkeit des Ausdrucks—was schwerlich überzeugen kann.
29 Vgl. Lloyd-Jones und Wilson a.O. (ob. Anm. 1) 86: "... the vagueness of 251 is another sign of the interpolator's incompetence."
unserer Exegese. Am eindeutigsten sind die Worte des zweiten Boten (des Exangelos), der über den bereits blinden König berichtet (1290–91):

\[ \text{ὡς ἐκ χθονὸς ἔπιστον, οὐδ' ἔτι μενὸν δόμοις ἁραίος ὡς ἥρασατο.} \]


*Universität Bonn*

30 Der Rückgriff auf V. 249–51 ist richtig erkannt und gebührend hervorgehoben von Kamerbeck z. St. (Komment. S. 240).
Orestes’ Mania: Euripides’, Mee’s and Bogart’s Apocalyptic Vision

MARIANNE MCDONALD

In the Phaedrus, Plato shows that mania can be destructive, but also that it can be creative. It can lead to egocentric isolation or social integration. Plato, through his persona Socrates, talks about the mania of love both negatively and positively. The jealous drive for possession can easily crush the love object, or it can lead to the perception of the good and the beautiful, which he claims is the ultimate end of life (Phaedrus 244a ff.). There is a human madness, which is mostly harmful, and a divine madness, which is fourfold (265a ff.) and beneficial: first, the mania of Apollo, i.e., of a prophet; second, the mania of Dionysus, a cult mania, that of the mystic that in traditional depictions of Orestes ultimately leads to the expiation of his guilt and thus purification (244e); third, the mania of the artist, or the creator, which is associated with the Muses; and, fourth, the ultimate mania, the love of what is everlasting, the love of truth and beauty: The ultimate lover is the philosopher, and this lover is subject to Eros and Aphrodite. The praise of this last mania continues in Plato’s Symposium, where the end is also beauty/good (τὸ καλὸν). Plato takes traditional myths and concepts of mania and links them to his philosophy. Plato’s conception of mania helps us understand Euripides’ work by contrast: Orestes shows how mania unhooked from the gods and from idealism can create the ultimate nightmare. It is human, all too human.

Euripides’ play was written during the final years of the Peloponnesian War, and the violence of the period was well described by Thucydides in his account of the war: “A man thought more of avenging an injury than of having no injury to avenge” (3. 82). Madness became a way of life. Euripides in his Orestes shows a breakdown of the values that Plato’s Socrates praised. Modern scholars like M. L. West may count the exciting action as more important than the ethical issues, but perhaps one should be conscious of just such issues.¹ For instance, the Gulf War was seen as an

¹ Euripides. Orestes, ed. with trans. and comm. by M. L. West, in The Plays of Euripides, ed. by C. Collard (Warminster 1987). West claims that Euripides “was writing for a theatre audience whose emotions he had enlisted on Orestes’ side. What does the academic critic think that Orestes and Electra ought to have done? Taken their medicine like sportsmen...
exciting video event in which we sanitized our “hits” to illustrate our technological prowess, but the victims remained unseen.

Euripides’ brilliant play, which is a living nightmare, defines the first instance (395–96) of conscience as a disease of the mind (neurosis?):

Menelaus: What ails you? What disease assails you?
Orestes: My conscience (σώνεσις). That I know (σώνοιδα) what terrible things I have done.

This is mania without the divine component, the Eumenides of the mind. At least this Orestes is aware that he has done wrong, but it sounds somewhat like the whining of a spoiled child. By the end of the play he seems to have forgotten even that, or at least by then it does not matter.

“It’s a nightmare, really.” Characters intone this phrase several times during Chuck Mee’s reenactment of Euripides’ Orestes. Mee’s version illustrates the chaos of modern times by way of the ancient Greek myth. Anne Bogart’s brilliant direction of Chuck Mee’s play in Saratoga, Fall 1992, breaks the barriers between stage and audience: Actors and actresses freely walk in the audience area. Past violence mingles with present violence and the stage shows us victims of the Persian Gulf War in a hospital set in front of the White House. Orestes is one of the victims, and we see how suffering brutalizes. He victimizes others by the end of the play, and we see that such role-reversals are merely based on opportunity. Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia and Los Angeles come to mind, and the generalizations of Greek tragedy are often more revealing than the particulars from the six o’clock news.

Chuck Mee vividly replicates the chaos of the ancient world by drawing parallels with the modern world. He also speaks in brutally explicit language, the language of Godfather and Terminator rather than media-speak. He has made Euripides into Seneca, a drama which shocks, criticizes, rehearse trauma in a cathartic way, and keeps one riveted to the seat while delivering savage and yet satisfying blows. The nightmare is made flesh.

His drama has had two stagings before Bogart’s, one by Tina Landau and another by Robert Woodruff, both early in 1992. Woodruff replicated the chaos manifested by the words and the audience had to follow multiple actions at once. The rain scene from Götz Friedrich’s production of Richard Strauss’ Elektra, in which Elektra danced herself to death, was seen at the back of the stage while other actions were going on in at least four different places on stage. The violently explicit text was expanded by the visual to

But what a lame play that would have made . . .” (37). For a mixed view of Orestes and his actions, see C. W. Willink, Euripides. Orestes (Oxford 1986). D. Sansone in his review of both West’s and Willink’s editions of the Orestes quotes them to illustrate how they “avoid profound literary reflection” (Willink: “Orestes is a play to be enjoyed,” West: “it is first-rate theatre, a rattling good play”), CP 85 (1990) 67.
include an anal violation of Pylades by Electra wearing a dildo. The whole work concluded with Apollo talking from multiple TV screens. People enter and leave and then repeat their actions, and loud noises punctuate the action. This production was a symphony of chaos, comparable to Schoenberg’s twelve-tone system playing itself out and repeating itself. No eighteenth-century harmony here. The audience was assaulted by images and sound; nothing resembled a linear plot or even Mee’s play. By eliminating most of the text, Woodruff achieved the nearly impossible: He made violence boring.

Anne Bogart’s production is very different. It allows chaos to appear in a more controlled setting and performance, which makes it even more terrifying by implicating the audience in the brutal message. The audience is rarely required to sort out multiple texts, except in the trial scene, which because of its rigid formalism shows the failure of the legal process to produce justice. The suggestion seems to be that he who shouts loudest carries the day. At Orestes 696–703, we find one of the first instances of comparing the mob’s rage to fire. This was what probably happened during meetings in the Athens of Euripides’ time. The democratic restoration, following the oligarchic takeover in 411 B.C., was filled with abuses. Orestes also represents the nobility, so there is a fitting parallel in that it is a man of the people who secures his condemnation. Orestes in the play shows that mob violence can be practiced on the aristocratic scale: All he needed was a few friends to wreak havoc. References to the William Kennedy Smith trial are clear. We hear about Orestes’ careless brutalities and rapes, and a modern context is suggested. Another modern parallel during the trial scene is reference to the Clarence Thomas–Anita Hill proceedings: “Well, somebody put pubic hair on my coke can.”2 This absurdity is an apt illustration of modern insanities, how the private intrudes on the public sphere.

The set in the Saratoga production (Fall 1992) is simple, suggesting a hospital, with a long diagonal pipe set against a rather dismal green wall. Beds are swung around the stage, and props are provided as necessary (e.g., large pan to bathe Orestes, long table for the trial scene, table for the nurses as they play cards). The items on the set seem as disposable as the human beings.

Chuck Mee has brought the ancient myth into modern times, against a backdrop of war and its idiocies. The characters are seen as patients, interacting with a staff of nurses. Some characters are added and we are jarred by their modern names. A general comes and goes (Menelaus); we are told he is seeking a political position (to rule in Sparta) which he will hardly compromise by defending his unpopular nephew. We also see Electra, Helen and a literal doll of a Hermione. Electra and Helen are

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dressed in Armani and Chanel, and Helen speaks of her cosmetic preparations for the day. Pylades joins this yuppie crowd in dress and morality. He is definitely upwardly mobile, willing to do anything, including murder, to get what he wants. These characters are seen as the nasty business that other scholars have noted as characterizing the Euripidean original.³ Mee allows for the possibility that all the characters coming and going are hallucinations.

In the Euripidean original Pylades comes up with the idea of murdering Helen (just for the fun of vengeance) and, when Electra suggests taking Hermione hostage, she is complimented for “thinking like a man” (Or. 1204), an ominous compliment since her mother was also said to have “a heart which thinks like a man” (ἀνδρόβουλος κέαρ, Aesch. Ag. 11); Electra certainly carried on the murderous tradition and is continuing to plot, now attacking the innocent (Hermione). Mee has Pylades, instead of Electra, come up with the suggestion of taking Hermione hostage. Euripides gives a simple twist to the basic story of Electra and Orestes killing their mother in retribution for Clytemnestra’s killing her husband and their father; now he shows Orestes, Electra and Pylades prepared to kill gratuitously, simply so that Menelaus will suffer the way they are suffering. After they have decided to act, they become hyped by the realization that they have reached the point of no return; like Thelma and Louise, or Michael Douglas’ character in Falling Down, they relish their extraordinary power and freedom even more because they cannot retreat.

Orestes, in a wonderful perversion of the notion that friendship might be based on ethics, greets Pylades’ suggestion of the murder of Helen with the comment that “nothing is greater than a true friend, neither wealth nor power” (Or. 1155–56). The Aristotle of the Nicomachean Ethics would shudder. The best friendship there is the friendship based on the good (over friendship for pleasure or utility) and just as Plato’s view of beneficial mania is perverted in this play, so is beneficial friendship. Friendship here is just an alliance of thugs, comparable both to the nobles that Athens saw in

³ West (above, note 1) 32 cites one of the earliest (“an ancient critic in one of the Hypotheses prefixed to the text”): “The play is one of those that enjoy success on the stage, but its ethics are dreadful: apart from Pylades everyone is bad.” One wonders how this critic could exempt Pylades, who suggests murdering Helen. Does adultery merit capital punishment? Obviously this critic did not take Helen’s defense in Euripides’ Trojan Women seriously, nor other apologies, such as those put forward by the sophist Gorgias in his encomium of Helen in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker II (Zurich 1969) 288–94. See also W. Burkert, “Die Absurdität der Gewalt und das Ende der Tragödie: Euripides’ Orestes,” Antike und Abendland 20 (1974) 97–109, and W. Arrowsmith’s introduction in Euripides IV, ed. by D. Grene and R. Lattimore (Chicago 1958) 110: “The resolution . . . is so designed as to be merely an apparent resolution . . . The nightmare survives the magic.” See also E. Rawson, who characterizes the play as “primarily an ironic and deeply unheroic commentary on the story of Orestes,” who shows symptoms “of folie à trois which he shares with his two allies,” “Aspects of Euripides’ Orestes,” Arethusa 5 (1972) 155–56.
power in 411 and to the Cleophons that succeeded them. One thinks again of Thucydides: "Even kinship became less close than comradeship because of the latter's greater readiness for daring without justification" (3. 82). Euripides' Orestes advises one to get friends, not only relatives, and quotes a proverb: "Better than ten thousand relatives is a friend who has melded himself to you by his ways" (Or. 804–06). Euripides shows these friends practicing the popular Hellenic idea, "Help your friends, harm your enemies," which beginning with Homer was finally corrected by Plato in the Republic.  

This is a myth for our time, showing us the mania of violence. Mee adds various characters to the play. John and William are both war victims who are haunted by the violence of their past, and Nod is one who still revels in it. There is a man whose mouth is taped, but untaped at intervals. He goes into the history of violence, beginning with Homer, ending with the messages of war written into the bodies of moderns. This character is eliminated: killed on stage, typically by Nod. He functions rather like Tiresias, a prophet who not only tells of the disasters of the future, but who shows their intimate connection with the past. He has the only poetic and hopeful lines in the text, reflecting the beneficial poetic mania discussed earlier: "The imagination is less a separate faculty than a quality of all our mental faculties... It generalizes our ideas by tracing a penumbra of remembered or intimated possibility around present or past settlements... By all these means it undermines the identification of the actual with the possible."  

He speaks of a way of making a better future, an ethical revolution. He must be silenced.

Orestes and Pylades are clear yuppies. Orestes' vulnerability is conveyed not only through the ancient text, which showed him as a haunted neurotic, too willing to follow his criminal friends, but it is also conveyed by costuming and actions. Orestes is bathed on stage, which can remind one of rituals to prepare a victim. Then his hospital gown is exchanged for a suit (Agnes B. conservative), which functions as a double type of costume (in the play we are watching, and for Orestes as he goes to the "play" of his trial). When he hears the verdict he urinates on the stage, flooding it with his fear. Bogart has him assume a fetal position and suck his thumb. His hallucinations range from killing a date to killing his mother.

Electra's only saving grace is her loyalty to Orestes; she also discourses on the advantages of euthanasia, prostitution and terrorism with a frightening detachment. Her social ideology is typical of the armchair liberal. Although one might agree with her arguments, we have to see her comments in the context of her final actions (attempted murder, arson, kidnapping, etc.). Helen is the vain and silly creature she was in Euripides,

4 See a summary and discussion of this maxim's use in M. W. Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics (Cambridge 1989).
5 Mee (above, note 2) 45.
without a clue. Hermione in this production is even without life (she first appears as a doll on a tricycle).

Tyndareus is the legalistic pedant as in Euripides. He discourses further on language, so the letter of the law is seen as merely letter in this drama. We agree with what Tyndareus says: “And yet, one can commit murder and find the words to justify it. This is your sort of civilization, then, it speaks nicely and behaves barbarously.”6 It is a telling commentary on our times. Tyndareus is another prophet who comes and goes and effects nothing. The guilty verdict merely coincides with his wishes; it is not based on the points he made. This is now a world of chance and Tyndareus is an anachronism (The Oresteia has become Orestes, the general becomes all too particular). In Suzuki’s Clytemnestra, Tyndareus appeared dressed in Meiji costume, in contrast to Orestes and Electra clad in modern shorts.

The Phrygian slave is still here, to allow Orestes a moment of brutal mental torture such as he displayed in the original. Now, as then, Orestes is the imperialist master, taunting the slave with the servility which is a means for the slave’s survival. Athens’ own prosperity was based on a society of slaves; Euripides’ conscience routinely endorsed the underdog, whether woman, child, or slave, and this hardly won him prizes in Athens (only four compared with twenty-four and thirteen for Sophocles and Aeschylus, respectively).

In addition to the other characters who have been added, there is Farley the astrologer, the nurses, a radio voice (that announces the arrival of Menelaus) and a doctor who begins the play with a recitation of facts from an autopsy on a murdered woman. Clytemnestra has been reduced to a body with “no abdominal abnormalities or complications of the genito-urinary system.”7

Nurses, dressed in black, are benign furies. They discuss their love-life as Orestes’ trial is going on. The personal is played against the public and neither is given priority. This seems to be a world without values and a world with no emotion. Bogart was influenced by Ken Kesey’s depiction of Nurse Ratched, the Big Nurse in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. Bogart duplicates the underlying current of sadism in the actions of the nurses. In both the novel and this play the nurses’ reaction to minor infractions of their rules is to administer a sedative. Control is more important than cure, something our society learned early on.

The other stand-ins for the furies are Orestes’ companions in the hospital:

Nod: Sluts.
Menelaus: What’s this?
John: The sluts!

6 Mee (above, note 2) 24.
7 Mee (above, note 2) 2.
Menelaus: Who are these people?
Orestes: These are my fellows. You may speak in front of them just as you would speak to me in private.
Menelaus: So these Furies pursue you.\(^8\)

These furies have their own nightmares from the tortures they have inflicted, and the tortures they have suffered. There is not only the public pain they have inflicted and suffered in the context of war and politics, but also the personal ones from madness and vengeance. John killed his sister, her husband and his nephew. Orestes killed his date. Nod tells us of the serial murderer who collected various female parts, including peeled skin that he could wear. We are back in modern times with memories of Jeffrey Dahmer and *Silence of the Lambs*, another topical drama of modern violence.

From the horror of pain, we fly into the narcotic illusion of the gods: the television talk show. Apollo comes on with a microphone like a game-show host to sort out who wins what. The prizes are as hollow and ephemeral as his own appearance. Bogart shows him as an electric robot whose batteries run down. He is carried off stage. Mee gives the following stage instructions: "Apollo’s voice continues to be miked so that he can speak very quietly, Reagan-like, and his voice still fills the theatre."\(^9\) The artifice that controls our life is revealed to be as hollow as the blustering *Wizard of Oz*. Only that nightmare ended, ours does not.

We see we are still in the hospital and what we have just seen was merely an interlude. Perhaps the whole play was a TV sit-com by Euripides. Bogart has done comparable framings, such as *On the Town* being staged as a diversion for sailors on an aircraft carrier, to allay their fears as they sail to war, or *South Pacific* staged in a rehabilitation clinic.

The play ends with William musing, "Every man must shout: ‘There’s a great destructive work to be done. We’re doing it.’" The brutalized has learned the lesson: "What we need now are some strong, straightforward actions that you’d have to be a fool not to learn the wrong lessons from it.” This is nightmare and criminal *mania* urged as sane practice. The nurse urges sleep, claiming, "We’re finished.” William says, "Thank you.”\(^10\) This is the sleep of death, and at this point we can be thankful for death, if life is really like what we have just seen. Euripides ended this play with a prayer to Nike, victory, an ostensible plea for his play to win a prize. Yet his victory is as ironic as William’s sleep. It anticipates the hollow victory of the Peloponnesian War, and all the victories that Euripides had witnessed, victories which are generally indictments of the victors.

Euripides has been called the greatest anti-war playwright, just as Aristotle called him the most tragic of the poets (τραγικότατος, *Poetics*

\(^8\) Mee (above, note 2) 21.
\(^9\) Mee (above, note 2) 62.
\(^10\) Mee (above, note 2) 65.
1453a). In play after play he has taught the lesson of the sufferer turning into the one who inflicts suffering (Medea, Hecuba, even Dionysus in the Bacchae). And Orestes shows three criminals gratuitously committing crimes just to make someone else suffer along with themselves. This is brutalizing suffering carried to the stage of absurdity. This is suffering carried into modern times. Perverted ἄλης seems to be at the basis of the political world Euripides saw and which he portrayed in this play.

All of Chuck Mee’s plays speak of pain and suffering. This play seems to make a fetish of violence, both mental and physical. It speaks of the violence that has engraved its message on the mind. We feel brutalized after seeing this and being assaulted by the language. But how can we be less assaulted by the daily news? The exponential damage our technology can effect in modern times is translated into this drama of modern victims turning victimizers.

Mee has taken the domestic violence of Greek myth and tragedy and put it in a context of collective, political atrocities, so that matricide, which traditionally has shocked us, seems tame by comparison. This shows us how far we have come.

Just as mania was rated and classified in Plato’s Phaedrus, as we have mentioned, so also violence can be classified in this drama. There is divinely ordained violence, which we can attribute to Aeschylus and Sophocles, and which Euripides plays against. In having Orestes doubt the existence of Apollo, and thinking that this violence could have been a demon of his own brain (Or. 1168–69), Euripides takes a giant step away from the other playwrights with his making the idea of neurosis explicit. The squalor of domestic crime is another category. Then there are the mass murders and political crimes that various characters represent. The final category is murder for the sake of murder, on both the individual and mass basis. Our categories proceed from the particular to the general, and from ethical to random killings. Perhaps we can see ethical killing as divinely inspired mania, and random killing as all too human. Or perhaps we can see ethical killing as an oxymoron. I think this is Mee’s intent. He shows that institutionalized violence such as the Persian Gulf War and the torture of political prisoners worldwide is also not to be explained away with a simple, “My superiors made me do it.” Does man like to torture, maim and rape? Recent events in Waco, Texas, illustrate the mad violence which has become a daily occurrence in our modern world. Mee confronts us and urges us to raise questions.

11 Orestes uses the word ἁλῆς, which one could argue had an objective existence as a family curse, but the words δείμω and δοξαμι (1668–69) bring this clearly into the psychological world that has colored this play. Apollo has been made into a neurosis, as conscience was called a disease of the mind (Or. 395–96); Electra also says, “you are not sick but you imagine (δοξας ἄρης) yourself sick ... a curse and weakness for men” (314–15).
The parallel between our modern "authorized" gangsters (soldiers) and Orestes is made problematic; both have committed crimes on orders, and both will be rehabilitated. We cannot share the enthusiasm of those commentators on Euripides who say that our sympathy is with Orestes, and that the dramatic action is what engages our approval. Our sympathy is for us, who live in a world that sanctions these crimes. I claim that Euripides and Mee are showing us a nightmare that will haunt us, not an action-packed thriller to entertain us for a moment and to be forgotten tomorrow.

Anne Bogart's inspired rendering of both the ancient and the modern text directly implicates us, the audience. She trains her actors and actresses with a rigorous physical program that makes them acutely aware of space, the movement of their bodies and their relation to each other and the audience. As the characters wander in and out of our space we see ourselves as victims like them. The mania of ancient times has seeped into the present and we feel that we are in a hospital in front of the White House, listening to our nurses gossip. Have Plato and Aristotle had their mouths bandaged? Perverted mania can only be hospitalized, and it is only a matter of time until the inmates burn the hospital, as Orestes burned Menelaus' palace. Perhaps soon we shall be burned in the fires we now watch.12

University of California, San Diego

12 Thanks for suggestions from Thomas MacCary, Bridget McDonald and Thomas Rosenmeyer, besides the careful editing of David Sansone.
Phaedo’s Enslavement and Liberation

SLOBODAN DUŠANIĆ

Little is known of Phaedo the Elean’s life and writings. The evidence is not only meagre and, in some points, contradictory; it is also complicated by textual uncertainties. A reexamination of two sets of controversial testimonies on Phaedo will not be, I hope, out of place in a volume dedicated to the great scholar who has done so much for our understanding of ancient philosophy and its creators.

I

According to the tradition best represented by Diogenes Laertius and the Suda article (Φ 154), Phaedo came to Athens as a slave. He met Socrates there, was ransomed through Socrates’ help, and became a philosopher.

Diog. Laert. 2. 105 (cf. 2. 31): Φαίδων Ἡλείος, τῶν εὐπατρίδων, συνεάλω τῇ πατρίδι καὶ ἡναγκάσθη στήναι ἐπὶ οἰκήματος· ἀλλὰ τῷ θόρυμον προστίθεις μετέχει Σωκράτους, ἦς αὐτὸν λυτρώσασθαί τούς περὶ Ἀλκιβίαδὴν ἢ Κρίτωνα προύτρεψε· καὶ τούτων οὖν ἐλευθερίως ἐφιλοσόφει.

Ἡλείος] Μήλιος Grote

Suda s.v. Φαίδων: ... τούτων συνεβή πρῶτον αἰχμάλωτον ὕπο Ἰνδόν ληφθήναι, εἶτα πραθεὶς παρνακοσκόβιν προεστή ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἐταίρισιν ἐν Ἀθηναῖς. ἐντυχὼν δὲ Σωκράτει ἐξηγομένῳ ἡράσθη τῶν


2 For the rest of the evidence, see Giannantoni (previous note) I 148–50.

3 The brothel element of the story is best rejected as a moralistic embroidery: McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 14–17.

4 Here, as well as in section II below, I reproduce only those items of the apparatus criticus for Diog. Laert. 2. 105 and the Suda Φ 154 which are indispensable to the argument of the present article.
If we are to believe Plato’s *Phaedo* (cf. 89b), the eponym of the dialogue, though adult, was still young at the time of the death of Socrates.\(^5\) This in turn well accords with the notes just quoted from Diogenes and the *Suda* implying that the event which cost Phaedo his liberty formed part of an inter-state war (συνάλω τῇ πατρίδι; αἰχμάλωτον ὑπὸ εθνικὴ ληφθήναι); namely, the Spartan–Elean hostilities of 402–400 B.C.\(^6\) offer, chronologically, quite a likely context for Phaedo’s misfortune.\(^7\) The attempts of a number of modern students of Phaedo to attribute his enslavement to the Athenian operations in the territory of Elis in 431 B.C. (Thuc. 2. 25. 3–5),\(^8\) or the Athenian conquest of Melos in 416 B.C. (this latter combination, in a wholly improbable manner, also makes Phaedo a Melian instead of an Elean),\(^9\) may be dismissed as presupposing a birth-date for him which would be too early to be reconciled with Plato’s indications, obviously trustworthy here. What is more, within the whole period of Socrates’ activity—and all our sources credit Socrates with the conversion of Phaedo into a philosopher—there was no episode in the history of Elis (exterior and interior alike) as dramatic as the 402–400 war. Having defeated the Eleans at that time, Sparta overthrew their ancestral democracy and introduced some other measures deeply resented by the Elean patriots;\(^10\) those measures alone could justify Diogenes’ use of the strong expression, “Phaedo . . . was captured together with his fatherland.” It seems that the confiscation of the anti-Laconian families’ goods went together with the violent discontinuity in the Elean politico-constitutional situation in 400

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\(^5\) The point is disputed—see e.g. H. Dörrie, *Kleine Pauly* IV (1972) 691 f.; Rossetti (above, note 1) 122 f.; Giannantoni (above, note 1) III 105, 107—but certain, practically speaking. Von Fritz (above, note 1) 1538; McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 2 n. 7, 14 n. 65.


\(^7\) Thus, e.g., L. Preller, *Rh. Mus.* 4 (1846) 391–95 (with some hesitation); Zeller (above, note 1) 275 n. 2; von Fritz (above, note 1) 1538; J. Humbert, *Socrate et les petits Socratiques* (Paris 1967) 278; McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 13–18.

\(^8\) Rossetti (above, note 1) 125 f. Cf. Preller (previous note) 393.


B.C.\textsuperscript{11} If Phaedo’s origin (τῶν ἐνπατριδῶν) was among the nobles who wanted an Elis independent of Sparta—many indications recommend that conjecture\textsuperscript{12}—he too must have been a victim of such a confiscation, which would provide a plausible explanation of the fact that the financial support of Socrates’ friends and/or acquaintances was needed for his ransom.\textsuperscript{13}

On the other hand, recent scholarship is inclined to broaden its scepticism as to the value of the tradition analyzed in the first section of the present paper. Disagreements concerning the date and circumstances of Phaedo’s enslavement tend to be replaced by suggestions that his “slave story” should be discarded \textit{in toto}. It has been regarded as a fabrication conforming with something that has been described as a \textit{locus communis} of the philosophers’ \textit{Lives} (the servitude of Plato, Diogenes the Cynic, and some others).\textsuperscript{14} Two details have been insisted upon in this connection: The fall of Elis itself in 400 B.C. does not seem to have been accompanied by any enslavement of its citizens,\textsuperscript{15} and (in G. Giannantoni’s opinion) the entire account of Phaedo’s losing his freedom “è chiaramente romanesco, come prova anche la variante che leggiamo in Suida, e cioè che Fedone fu catturato ὑπὸ ἵλνδῶν . . .”\textsuperscript{16} In an able study, though, E. I. McQueen and C. J. Rowe have shown that, on general grounds, the war aspect of Phaedo’s biography in Diogenes and the lexicographer is “likely to contain a core of fact.”\textsuperscript{17} It may be added that, at least in the case of Plato, the evidence of the philosopher’s temporary \textit{status servilis}—though smacking of a topos and eventually adapted to the fictional framework of a topos—does repose on historical truth.\textsuperscript{18} As to the modalities and whereabouts of Phaedo’s


\textsuperscript{12} Dušanić (above, note 10) 84 and n. 30; Dušanić (previous note) 327 f.

\textsuperscript{13} For a different explanation of that fact, McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 14 and 16 n. 79. Let us note, in support of what is said on Phaedo’s origin in the \textit{Suda}, that he had more than one aristocratic friend in Athens—Simmias and Cebes, for instance (regarding their social background, see, e.g., Xen. \textit{Mem.} 1. 2. 48).

\textsuperscript{14} Giannantoni (above, note 1) III 107–09, with refs. to the works by W. Croenerg, F. Wehrli, and J. Humbert; cf. also Dorrle (above, note 5). The (lost) essay of Hermippus, \textit{Περὶ τῶν διαστρεφόντων ἐν παιδεία δούλων}, is usually mentioned to illustrate the popularity of the topos.

\textsuperscript{15} Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3. 2. 30 f.; Diod. 14. 34. Cf. Grote and Montuori (above, note 9); McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 13 n. 60.

\textsuperscript{16} Giannantoni (above, note 1) III 107 f.

\textsuperscript{17} McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 17 f., with the following comment: “Given the existence of the Spartan–Elean war [of 402–400 B.C.] . . ., Athens’ involvement in that war, and the fact that Phaedo the Elean was well-known as a follower of the Athenian Socrates, it is entirely credible, first, that Phaedo originally came to Athens as a prisoner-of-war; secondly, that Socrates was somehow responsible for his regaining his freedom; and thirdly that it was also because of Socrates that he turned to philosophy. If these things are indeed true, then we have an attractive explanation of Plato’s choice of Phaedo as his narrator for the dialogue; if none of them is true, then no such explanation is available.”

capture, McQueen and Rowe have persuasively reaffirmed the possibility that the future Socratic was caught by the invading army somewhere in the outlying parts of the Elean territory, in the course of fights preceding (not necessarily immediately) the capitulation of the city in 400 B.C. Phaedo would have been on garrison duty at the place and moment of his imprisonment, which would mean that he was some 18–20 years old. Plato’s indications in the Phaedo concerning the eponym’s age in 399 B.C. would square with such a reconstruction of events and their chronology.

The problem of the ἵππος Ἰνδῶν has remained unsolved, however. Despite modern contentions to the contrary, that variant cannot be defended as based upon a romantic literary invention. For the attentive reader of a developed romance (a short lexicographical note presents of course a different case; cf. below, notes 47–48) the “Indians” would have been difficult—impossible indeed—to insert logically into the context of an episode recounting Phaedo’s troubles in a war or quasi-war situation. To judge from the whole of the biographical tradition on Phaedo, that context must have been narrow, in both time (the future Socratic was liberated when still a young man) and space (the scene of his complete career was between the Peloponnese and Athens). An episode confronting him with the “Indian” captors (not thinkers!) would have appeared bizarre to the point of spoiling the artistic effects of the entire story. If the simple invention, not the correction, of a corrupt ethnic were in question, even the writer of a piece of very naive fictional literature, and ready at that to transform the transmitted war details (ἀρχομαλωτον . . . ληθηναι) into something tolerably similar but more picturesque, would have invoked (Mediterranean) pirates rather than the “Indians.” Pirates figure in the analogous anecdotes about Plato and Diogenes the Cynic, which fact has possibly inspired the conjecture ληστῶν in the editio Porti. The phrase ἵππος Ἰνδῶν must consequently reflect an original corruption, as the authors of emendations quoted in the apparatus have already supposed. But neither Portus’ proposal nor those of the other editors and commentators appear attractive.

19 With good reason, McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 14 with n. 66 have pointed out the warfare of 401 (summer) in this connection. We are informed that Athenian soldiers accompanied the Spartan army then (Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 25, of Agis’ expedition); on the other hand, the Athenian participation in the campaigns of 402 and 400 B.C. is not attested. See also below, notes 29 and 35.

20 Agis’ operations of 401 resulted in massive enslavements: Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 26.

21 McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 14 n. 65. Cf. Zeller (above, note 1) 275 n. 2 and von Fritz (above, note 1) 1538.

22 Hellenistic and later authors make Greek philosophers and lawgivers travel to India and meet various sages there. No need to say that such cases are far from constituting parallels for Phaedo’s enslavement, though, paradoxically, they seem to have indirectly inspired the controversial reading in the Suda Φ 154 (below, text and note 47).


24 Also von Fritz (above, note 1) 1538, and some others.
enough from the palaeographer’s point of view; 25 A. von Gutschmid’s ὑπὸ Ἀρκάδων also has the disadvantage of not giving the ὑπὸ in the elided form. Little wonder then that Hesychius reproduces ὑπὸ Ἰνδῶν and that the main editors of the Suda retain it without obelizing it.

The controversial reading in the Suda should be corrected, I think, to ὑπὸ Ὠπουντίων. The error seems to have come into being in two phases. First, through scribal haplography, one of the two successive ΠΟ of the ΥΠΟΠΟΥΝΤΙΩΝ has been eliminated. Second, a copyist has tried to emend the unintelligible 26 ΥΠΟΠΟΥΝΤΙΩΝ by making two interconnected assumptions, faulty but pardonable: (a) that the omicron (formerly the ethnic’s initial) belonged to the preposition and (b) that the following Y stood for I, and NT 27 for ΝΔ; both the “ultraclassical” spellings are common in later Greek. 28 The first phase probably presupposes the use, on the part of the scribe responsible for the haplography, of an early manuscript (the scriptura continua; ? the absence of the accent in ὑπὸ and the breathing in Ὠπ.;) the date of the second phase would have been comparatively late, to judge from the confusion of NT and ΝΔ that it implies.

Now, it is easy enough to imagine “Opuntians” as Phaedo’s captors in the war of 402—400 B.C.—to be exact, at the time of the expedition led by the Spartan king Pausanias into the eastern part of the Elean territory (warm season, 401?). 29 Pausanias’ army advanced through Acroreia, the land of

25 Palaeographically, Wasseling’s emendation Σινδῶν seems less difficult than those proposed by Portus, Menagiou, Preller, or Gutschmid but, geographically and historically, the Sindians (subjects of the Bosporan kings) had nothing to do with Elis and its neighbourhood. Wasseling’s tentative explanation of his proposal, quoted in Bernhardy’s apparatus, is not convincing: “... Indorum importuna mentio, neque commoda Sindorum, nisi si iuvenis ab hostibus captus in horum dein piratarum rapaces malo fato incidit.” Note that our sources (K. Kretschmer, RE III A [1927] 226–28) know nothing about the Sindians’ piracy.

26 The “Opuntians” were a solution hard to find, though cases similar to the haplography postulated here must have been frequent enough (cf. e.g. Syll. 47 [Meiggs–Lewin, GHI 20], line 11 [of the Lorician Opus]: ΛΟΠΟΥΝΣΙΟΝ = ὕπον Ὠπουντίων). Namely, Opus Acrioria was scarcely known in antiquity; on the other hand, the copyist had little reason to associate the Lorician Opuntians, unlike the Indians (below, notes 47–48), with the context.

27 The disappearance of the following iota may have been the result of either a phonetic (a synizesis of -ιον?) or a graphic (the copyist had before his eyes the abbreviation ΥΠΟΥΝΤΙ?) phenomenon.


29 The problem of the relationship between (Xenophon’s account of) the second campaign of Agis and (Diodorus’ of) the campaign attributed to Pausanias may be solved in one of three ways (cf. McQueen and Rowe [above, note 1] 5 n. 22): The historians describe two different events from two different years (according to that hypothesis, Pausanias’ expedition should be put in 402 B.C.), or two different but approximately contemporaneous events, or only one event (i.e. Agis’ expedition related by Diodorus with an important variation concerning the name of the king and the direction of his attack). For several reasons, I prefer to follow J. Hatzfeld, REA 35 (1933) 401, 406 f., and opt for the second solution: Sparta launched two
Elis' *perioeci* near the Arcadian frontier. Among the little poleis of that region there was one by the name of Opus (the ethnic: *Ὀπούντιοι*), which, like all or almost all of Acroreia, was brought over to the invader's side. To demonstrate their loyalty to their new ally Lacedaemon, the inhabitants of Opus Acroriae would have been able to capture Phaedo while serving—according to the supposition cited above (text and notes 19–21)—as a *peripolos*, to quote an Attic term, in the vicinity of their city or, rather, in the city itself. Such an action by the Opuntians would appear all the more natural if Phaedo's family was already known for its anti-Laconian attitude. The simplest explanation of Phaedo's further fate would be that the Acroreian Opuntians delivered him to Pausanias; after the king's dividing up the booty he fell to the share of the Athenians whose contingent(s) strengthened the Spartan troops in 401. This opened the way for Phaedo's coming to Athens and, eventually, his acquaintance with Socrates. What is known about, or might be plausibly deduced from, the

expeditions against Elis in the warm season of 401, Agis' from the south (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 25 ff.) and Pausanias' from the east (Diod. 14. 17. 6 ff.).


31 Ernst Meyer, *RE* XVII (1939) 818 f. (the site of Gartsiko?). The ethnic: Strab. 9. 4. 2 and Steph. Byz. s.v. *Ὀπούεις'/Ὀπούς*.

32 Diod. 14. 17. 8 (transl. C. H. Oldfather, LCL): "Pausanias, then, entered Elis by way of Arcadia and straightway took the outpost of Lasion at the first assault; then, leading his army through Acroreia, he won to his side the four cities of Thraestus, Halium, Eupagium, and Opus." "Eupagium" has been frequently emended to "Epitalium," but that emendation should not be retained.

33 It is probable that the Opuntians, like the majority of Elis' *perioeci* in general, had found the leadership of Elis hard to bear (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 23, 25, 30); at any event, the Spartans gave Acroreia a sort of independence in 401 and it preserved that status till 371 B.C. (Siewert [above, note 30]). But the Opuntians' changing sides in 401 may have been partly inspired by their wish to escape from the punishment which normally befell a city resisting the besieger. Even the enslavement of Phaedo may have been instrumental to the same or similar purpose; to cite a number of parallels close in time, see Diod. 14. 14–15 (on Dionysius I and the betrayals, well rewarded, in Sicilian cities) and the accounts of the surrender of the Byzantines in 409 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 3. 14–22, Diod. 13. 66–67, Plut. *Alc.* 31).

34 The site of Gartsiko (above, note 31) has considerable remains of a fortification.

35 It was normal practice to divide booty, slaves included, among the contingents of an allied army that came from various states (cf. e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 27). In 401, Agis' army certainly included some Athenians (above, note 19) and Pausanias' very probably did (Diod. 14. 17. 7 [Oldfather's transl.]: "[Pausanias] was accompanied by many soldiers also from practically all the allies except the Boeotians and Corinthians"; Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 25 suggests that "from practically all the allies" includes the Athenians too). Phaedo may have been immediately sold to an (Athenian) slave merchant—such merchants used to follow their compatriots in war expeditions (P. Ducrey, *Le traitement des prisoniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique* [Paris 1968] 237).
history of Acroreia during Socrates’ lifetime excludes, practically speaking, any other occasion for Phaedo’s capture ὑπ’ Ὄπουντίων.

The reconstruction of events leading to Phaedo’s enslavement as delineated above has the advantage of corresponding to an emendation of the Suda’s ὑπὸ Ἰνδῶν which—aside from the problem of the possible influence of the Zopyrus on the birth of that corrupt reading (below, notes 47–48)—does not seem to contradict the basic demands of textual criticism. That reconstruction is also in harmony with historical evidence. Two points deserve to be underlined here. If captured as early as the summer (autumn) of 401, Phaedo had enough time to get closely acquainted with Socrates and Socrates’ circle before the fatal trial of spring 399; everything that is recorded about the Elean’s life proves that he was intimately connected with them. If, according to the new emendation of the Suda text, the capture occurred in a garrison of Acroreia which included the peripoloi, a series of particulars which are otherwise difficult to explain combines to produce a verisimilar picture of Phaedo’s rôle in the military developments of 401. Certainly, an additional point of interest of the present note is found in the support it gives to the conjecture that Phaedo’s (eupatrid) family did not approve of Sparta’s domination over Elis and, it might be imagined, the Peloponnese as a whole.

II

The politico-chronological enigma of Phaedo’s enslavement has one more facet; it concerns the person or persons who, at Socrates’ instigation, helped Phaedo regain his liberty. Of them, Diogenes mentions (at 2. 105) τοῦς περὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην ἦ Κρῖτωνα and (at 2. 31) Crito alone; the Suda Ἀλκιβιάδην; Gellius, Cebes the Socratic. If the Suda is followed, Phaedo could not have been liberated as late as the end of the century, for Alcibiades was already dead in 404 B.C. (Crito, Cebes, and some of Alcibiades’ friends, however, outlived Socrates for certain). Actually, the testimony of the Suda ([Socrates] πείθει Ἀλκιβιάδην πρίασοθα αὐτόν [i.e. Phaedo]) would have suggested that a probable terminus post quem non for Phaedo’s ransom should be put in 407 B.C., when Alcibiades left Athens.

36 The scholars who are inclined to put the beginning of the Spartan–Elean war after 402 B.C. or, in any case, to date Phaedo’s enslavement to 400/399 B.C. or a later year are unable to explain the evidence of Phaedo’s close friendship with Socrates. Cf. Humbert (above, note 7) 277 f.; Rossetti (above, note 1) 123 f.
37 Cf. above, text and notes 19–21, 33–35.
38 Gell. NA 2. 18. 4: “Ευμ (sc. Phaedonem) Cebes Socraticus hortante Socrate emisse dicitur habuisseque in philosophiae disciplinis.”
39 McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 17 n. 82 are undoubtedly right in excluding the possibility that the Suda refers here to Alcibiades’ son of the same name.
never to return. 40 On the other hand, if the whole story of Phaedo’s servitude is viewed as pure invention, the liberators’ names cited in our sources must reflect an effort of the forger’s (or forgers’) imagination too. To understand the whole problem better, it may prove useful to consult the two extant catalogues of Phaedo’s writings:

Diog. Laert. 2. 105: ... διαλόγους δὲ συνέγραψε (sc. Phaedo) γνησίους μὲν Ζώπυρον, Σίμωνα, καὶ δισταξόμενον Νικίαν, Μήδιον, ὃν φασὶ τινες Αἰσχίνου, οἱ δὲ Πολυαινοῦ: Ἀντίμαχον ἡ Πρεσβύτας· καὶ οὗτος διστάζεται: σκυτικοὺς λόγους· καὶ τούτους τινές Αἰσχίνου φασίν.


Suda s.v. Φαίδον: ... διάλογοι δὲ αὐτοῦ Ζώπυρος, Μήδιος, Σίμων, Ἀντίμαχος ἡ Πρεσβύτης, Νικίας, Σιμίας, Ἀλκιβιάδης, Κριτόλαξος.

Μήδιος] Μήδειος Preller

The longer of the two, the Suda’s list, also seems the more instructive. It may be inferred from it that Phaedo had a special interest in the personages of Alcibiades and Simmias. As is well known, the latter was an intimate friend of Cebes. Crito, on the other hand, was remembered in Socratic tradition for his readiness to succour the Master, as well as the other members of the circle, with money whenever there was need. 41 If accepted as reliable, these facts would tend to corroborate the evidence about the liberation of Phaedo through the financial aid of Crito, Cebes, and Alcibiades or a group of Alcibiades’ partisans (to adopt Diogenes’ τοὺς περὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην ἡ Κρίτωνα as the better variant—one compatible with the dating of Phaedo’s capture in 401 B.C.—than the Suda’s Ἀλκιβιάδην). The circumstance that, according to our sources, three or more men were believed to have participated in Phaedo’s liberation has nothing suspect in it. All of them were close to Socrates and a conciliatory approach to the diverging evidence would have been in order: For obvious material reasons, several people were able to unite in contributing the means for Phaedo’s ransom. 42

40 Giannantoni (above, note 1) III 106; cf. Grote (above, note 9); Rossetti (above, note 1) 126.

41 Diog. Laert. 2. 20 f., 121, Plat. Apol. 38b and Phaedo 115d, Xen. Mem. 2. 9, etc.

42 With McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 14 f., I translate Diogenes’ testimony, “(Socrates) impelled Alcibiades’ associates or Crito to ransom him” (it can be deduced from Diog. Laert. 2. 31 that τοὺς περὶ [there is no good reason to assume here a periphrastic tum meaning Alcibiades himself] does not refer to Κρίτωνα in addition to Ἀλκιβιάδην; after all, a group of “Crito’s associates” would have been socially improbable). To my mind, Diogenes’ “or” implies that he combines here two traditions from two different sources: One (citing “Alcibiades’ associates”) was common to Diogenes himself and the source of Suda Φ 154; the other (citing Crito) went back to a biography of Crito and is recorded at 2. 31 and 105 (besides the first-mentioned tradition). Gellius’ reference to Cebes as Phaedo’s liberator (deriving in
A number of uncertainties remain, however. Diogenes—otherwise critical in judging the authenticity of dialogues ascribed to Phaedo—does not cite the *Alcibiades* or the *Simmias*. Are the corresponding entries in the *Suda* trustworthy or, perhaps, have they been fabricated with regard to the names, just mentioned, of two of Phaedo’s liberators (Clinias’ son, Cebes)? Conversely, there is a possibility that our sources’ references to Alcibiades, Crito, and Cebes as the financiers of Phaedo’s liberation derive, in the final analysis, from the forger’s illegitimate extension of the genuine data about the literary and social history of Socrates’ school—in other words, from the facts that Phaedo composed the dialogues *Alcibiades* and *Simmias* (works under such titles were also written by some Socrates who had never been slaves) and that Crito’s real behaviour gave rise to various anecdotes on his willingness to help. In that case, too, we should have been denied independent support of the liberation story. Furthermore, are we to suppose that an ancient or medieval reader with sufficient knowledge of Phaedo’s times was able to “correct” the already invented πείθει Ἀλκιβιάδην to a (προντρέψει) τοὺς περὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην to spare himself the chronological contradiction (Alcibiades died in 404 B.C.; Phaedo lost his freedom some three years later)? This would make the version in the *Suda* older than the version in Diogenes, though both would reflect a historically irrelevant reinterpretation of the indications provided by the title (and content?) of an essay of Phaedo’s.

In my opinion, there is no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of either side of the Phaedo tradition examined in these pages. Alcibiades was very probably spoken of in the *Zopyrus*, the *Nicias*, and the *Simon* (three works cited by both the lists) within dialogue contexts much earlier than the end of the fifth century. It is difficult, therefore, to question the historicity of Phaedo’s *Alcibiades*—one of many essays of that name written by Socrates’ pupils—still more to see in it a fabrication reflecting only the aftermath of the Elean–Spartan war. Diogenes’ omission of the *Alcibiades* from his catalogue of Phaedo’s literary legacy is best put down to the ultracritical attitude of Diogenes’ source, an attitude which was obviously influenced by the parallel existence of several Socrates’ writings bearing the same title. A defence along analogous lines holds true for the

the last analysis from a biography of the Theban?) would be comparable to the reference to Crito of the latter branch.

43 On the *Zopyrus* and the *Simon*, see Rossetti (above, note 1) 136–53, Giannantoni (above, note 1) III 110–16. With good reason, the latter scholar rejects R. Hirzel’s conjecture that the *Nicias* attributed to Phaedo must have been, in reality, a work of Pasiphon.

44 The majority of the Socratic dialogues (now lost) whose names are cited in Diogenes and the *Suda* should not be taken for complete fabrications; cf. Rossetti (above, note 1) 80 f. Their titles as well as their (rare) fragments attest to their authors’ intimate knowledge of the historical themes discussed in the fourth century B.C. (cf. e.g. Phaedo’s *Medius* or *Antimachus*); so they were either genuine products of the decades following 399 B.C. or preserved some elements of the originals. For a somewhat different view, C. W. Müller, *Die Kurzdialege der Appendix Platonica* (Munich 1975) 18 f. n. 4, 320 ff.
Simnias too,\textsuperscript{45} and we should insist upon the value of the conciliatory approach mentioned above. The names of Phaedo’s liberators and the titles of his dialogues do not depend upon each other for their authority; rather, both should be studied as products of the same historical reality.

From that point of view, Diogenes’ “(Socrates) impelled Alcibiades’ associates or Crito to ransom him (sc. Phaedo)”\textsuperscript{46} must be preferred to the Suda’s “(Socrates) persuaded Alcibiades to ransom him (sc. Phaedo),” and not only because of considerations of chronology. The Suda article Φ 154 reveals certain disquieting signs of the redactor’s, or his source’s, tendency to simplify, modernize, and improve upon the transmitted evidence. The article omits the caveats (adduced by Diogenes) concerning the genuineness of some of Phaedo’s dialogues. It offers what is evidently a lectio facilior for the subtitle of the Antimachus. If I am not wrong in reconstructing the way the variant υπὸ Ἰνδὸν came into being, the redactor or his source did not hesitate to propose bold emendations of the text which had become hard to understand. The “(Socrates) persuaded Alcibiades” seems to belong to the same group of secondary changes in peius. As a corollary to the emendation υπὸ Ἰνδὸν itself, it has eliminated both the name of Crito and the turn τοῦς περὶ from the developed phrase in the original—or, if the original did not refer to Crito, it has eliminated this latter element only. To be exact, the emendation of ΥΠΟΥΝΤΙΩΝ to υπὸ Ἰνδὸν and the simplification of the developed τοῦς περὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην (+ ἡ Κρίτωνα;) formula we know from Diogenes will have gone together as parts of the same (superficial) attempt at interpretation. For we are entitled to suppose that, in the redactor’s picture of Phaedo’s fate, these “Indians” were expected to be (indirectly) approached by Alcibiades without any help from Alcibiades’ Athenian friends. That impression of a special link existing between the “Indians” and the son of Clinias was presumably formed from Phaedo’s dialogue Zopyrus, whose eponym, an Oriental—an Indian, according to a later version of the dialogue story\textsuperscript{47}—was Alcibiades’

\textsuperscript{45} Aeschines Socraticus was also credited with a dialogue named after a Pythagorean (the Telauges; cf. H. Dittric, Aischines von Sphetos: Studien zur Litteraturgeschichte der Sokratiker [Berlin 1912] 213–44). His Phaedo (Suda s.v.) resembles Phaedo’s Simnias as a work dedicated, to judge from its title, to a fellow-member of the Socratic circle. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2. 108 for Euclides’ Aeschines and Crito.

\textsuperscript{46} Cf. above, note 42.

\textsuperscript{47} Probably in reference to Phaedo’s dialogue of that name (cf. Giannantoni [above, note 1] III 114 f.), Aristotle (fr. 27 R\textsuperscript{3} ap. Diog. Laert. 2. 45) speaks, without citing his name, of a “magus from Syria” who came to Athens to converse with Socrates (and Alcibiades; cf. Cic. De fato 10). After Alexander the Great, the tradition about a “magus from Syria” was likely to be transformed into the tradition about a “sage from India” (cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 9. 61 and 63, and the articles on Apollonius of Tyana, Democritus, and Calanus in the Suda; on the traffic between India and Syria in Hellenistic times, W. W. Tam, The Greeks in Bactria and India [Cambridge 1951] 361 ff. et passim). Actually, the anonymous Indian whom Aristoxenus (ap. Euseb. PE 11. 3) has met Socrates in Athens seems to have been Zopyrus himself, an alter ego of the man from Syria mentioned by Aristotle. That identification follows from a number of common points linking Aristoxenus’ and Aristotle’s notes, as well as these two with the rest
interlocutor, perhaps even former pedagogue. In the reasoning which we are inclined to attribute to our encyclopaedist or his source, the mysterious Indians who caught Phaedo were likely to have been spoken to by another Indian, Zopyrus, and this latter by his associate Alcibiades; Crito or Alcibiades’ political friends were superfluous in the whole matter.

If this explanation of the relationship between the corresponding notes in Diogenes and the Suda is accepted, we have two independent testimonies (for the Suda Φ 154, which otherwise contains some good evidence that is not in the Phaedo chapter of Diogenes, should be understood, loco retractato, Σωκράτης πείθει <ποιός περί> Ἀλκibiάδην πρίασθαι [φαιδώναι]) on the rôle of Alcibiades’ followers in the ransom of the young Elean. Equally important, the political history and prosopographical indications concur in supporting these testimonies.

Earlier scholarship, though, was sceptical about the possibility that Phaedo had been bought by men describable as “Alcibiades’ group.” McQueen and Rowe have justly remarked that “it is doubtful whether such a group would have been identifiable so long after [Alcibiades’] death.” True, the author of a recent study on Athens after the Peloponnesian War has expressed (without citing Suda Φ 154) a somewhat different opinion: “Although dead by 403, Alcibiades had made associations that continued to influence politics afterwards” (he is thinking of Axiochus, Adeimantus, and Thrasybulus of Steiria in particular). But that influence, in the purely Athenian framework, could not have borne the label of membership in a (formerly) Alcibiadean faction, even if Alcibiades were a less controversial figure. Party memories did not last long in Athens; Alcibiades was absent from his city after 415 (save for a brief interval in 408/7), and the process of his virtual disappearance (in the sense of a party leader) from the local Realpolitik must have begun much earlier than his death in 404 B.C. It seems significant, in the Socratic context, that the voluminous fourth-century literature dealing with the trial of 399 B.C. never introduces the...
problem of “Alcibiades’ group” in the complex of Socrates’ political responsibilities; both the accusations and apologies concentrate on Alcibiades and Critias as individuals.

Alcibiades’ ties with foreign states and politicians were another matter—especially in the Peloponnese. His anti-Laconian line after c. 420 B.C. made him very popular in Argos, Mantinea, and Elis itself.51 Part of that popularity was bound to outlast him. His allies and relatives inherited it, according to a well-known pattern of Greek nepotism. (One example of such a widespread practice will suffice: Thucydides records that, in 428 B.C., “the Athenians ... sent out ... a fleet of thirty ships round the Peloponnese. This fleet was under the command of Phormio’s son Asopius, the Acarnanians having requested that the commander sent out to them should be either a son or a relation of Phormio.”52 Thanks to his victories in and around Acarnania in 432 and the following years, Phormio had become so respected in the country that “a son or a relation of his” was needed to replace him, after his death in 429/8 B.C., as the leader of the Attico-Acarnanian joint actions; and the memory of Phormio’s excellent admiralship was not lost in the Acarnania of the fourth century.)53 It was natural then that Socrates should ask certain former friends of Alcibiades to help Phaedo; a group of “Alcibiades’ associates” must have preserved its operative identity precisely with regard to the Attico-Elean collaboration. If we assume that Alcibiades was really in contact with Phaedo’s family—which the Elean’s aristocratic background and presumably anti-Laconian orientation make probable—the complementary conjecture becomes inevitable: Both the political interest (Elis was a rich and influential polis) and moral obligations of these “Alcibiades’ associates” demanded that they ransom Phaedo.

We might perhaps identify some of these people. According to the rules of the Athenian party stage,54 their connections with Alcibiades did not necessarily imply that they were on good, or even neutral, terms with each other.

First, Thrasybulus of Steiria. An opponent of oligarchy, especially its radical forms, Thrasybulus attached himself to Alcibiades in 411 B.C. to support him “tenaciously and loyally until [Alcibiades’] death.”55 In 404/3, Thrasybulus received, through Lysias’ agency,56 two talents from

52 Thuc. 3. 7 (transl. R. Warner, Penguin Classics).
53 PA 14958. In an Atticophile family of Acamania, the admiral’s name appears in at least two generations (Phormio senior fl. c. 400 B.C.; his grandson fl. c. 338/7 B.C.), IG II 2 237, lines 15 ff.; cf. M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens III–IV (Brussels 1983) 44.
54 Strauss (above, note 50) 15 ff.
55 Strauss (above, note 50) 92 f. et passim.
Thrasydaeus, the champion of Elis' independence.\(^5^7\) The purpose of the gift was to help the men of Phyle overthrow the regime of the Thirty; all four notables involved—Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, Thrasydaeus, Lysias—were enemies, as well as victims, of the Lysandrean Sparta and its allies. We are entitled to surmise that Lysias, the guest-friend of Thrasydaeus, was in a position to inform the Elean democrats not only of the political schemes of Thrasybulus but also of the sincerity of Thrasybulus' friendship for Alcibiades.

Second, Andocides the rhetor. There is no explicit evidence regarding his personal relations with Alcibiades, but a number of indications suggest that they were politically close in the second phase of the Peloponnesian War.\(^5^8\) If the \textit{De reeditu} is dated at the time of Alcibiades' return to Athens (408/7 B.C.), these indications would gain considerable strength. Andocides spent some years in Elis before 404/3; "when Thrasybulus and his band returned, he also returned to the city."\(^5^9\) His political option (antioligarchical after 411), his choice of his post-407 place of exile (an Elis hostile to Sparta), and the timing of his last reappearance in Athens—all that reminds us of the contact between Thrasydaeus and Thrasybulus referred to by the \textit{Vita Lysiae} of pseudo-Plutarch.

Third, Conon of Rhamnus. The so-called Chreocopidae forgery attests to the newly-formed alliance of Alcibiades, Conon, and Callias of Alopece\(^6^0\)—an important fact which tends to be neglected by modern historians of the domestic affairs of post-Periclean Athens.\(^6^1\) The alliance is datable to 408/7; in the Peloponnesse, it pursued a policy which, though not anti-Laconian, tried to reconcile Sparta with the democratic regimes in Argos, Elis, and elsewhere.\(^6^2\) Conon with his son Timotheus and his political partisans continued the same line, if increasingly firm to Sparta; the events of the Corinthian War and its aftermath are illustrative.\(^6^3\) A point of similarity between Andocides and Conon deserves to be underlined here.

\(^{57}\) On his rôle in the war of 402–400, Xen. \textit{Hell}. 3. 2. 27 ff.

\(^{58}\) Notably, both of them had sided with the fleet at Samos and pursued an antiextremist line (against the radical oligarchs and the radical democrats alike) after that. Alcibiades, Andocides and Andocides' relative Critias (who was, as is well known, Alcibiades' supporter and distant cousin) in the Hermocopidae affair: And. 1. 13, 15, 47 et passim.

\(^{59}\) Ps.-Plut. \textit{Mor}. 835a (transl. H. N. Fowler, LCL); cf. ps.-Lys. 6. 6 ("in the Peloponnesse"). The evidence on Andocides' stay in Elis has been questioned by some students of the orator, e.g. G. Dalmeyda (in the Budé edition of Andocides [Paris 1930] 134, \textit{ad} ps.-Plut. loc. cit.), without adequate reasons.

\(^{60}\) Plut. \textit{Sol}. 15. 7; cf. J. K. Davies, \textit{Athenian Propertied Families}, 600–300 B.C. (Oxford 1971) 12, 255, and 506. All three men were relatives, though distant; see Davies' Table I and IG II\(^2\) 3769 (+ 3688, and Davies' comments, p. 512). Cf. also the \textit{syngeneia} linking Conon's son Timotheus to Plato (\textit{FrGrHist} 328 F 223), another member of the old nobility.

\(^{61}\) Who are therefore inclined to see in Conon a rival, and/or in Callias a constant enemy, of Alcibiades (e.g. Strauss [above, note 50] passim).


\(^{63}\) Dušanić (above, note 10) 82–85.
Fear of Sparta and the Athenian oligarchs made Andocides combine the Cyprian Salamis and Elis as the places of refuge. We are tempted to surmise that Evagoras' influence was considerable in Elis, and that Conon—himself a famous guest of the king in the period after 405 B.C.—was instrumental in reinforcing the Elean-Cypriote connections. True, absent from Athens at the (putative) moment of Phaedo's liberation c. 400 B.C., he could not have been, in person, a member of the group defined as οἱ περὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην by Diogenes Laertius. But his own brother was there, doubtless benevolent to the appeal of Socrates.

If the foregoing observations on two points in Phaedo's biography are not off the mark, they could help us analyze the little that has remained of Phaedo's philosophical production. The fragments of the Zopyrus and the Simon, as well as some of the titles of Phaedo's works which are completely lost now (Nicias, Alcibiades, Medius, Antimachus), seem to betray his interest in the politico-historical and/or politico-prosopographical aspects of ethical issues. With his own experience in mind (the 402-400 hostilities were largely a matter of plunder, he himself was sold into slavery?), he would have condemned every Greek war of the V-IV centuries as a manifestation of the instincts of gain (e.g. in the Antimachus). The policy of Lacedaemon, both greedy and over-militant in the years 404-371, must have been judged by him with special severity. A reflection of those messages of Phaedo is attributable to Plato's dialogue of the same name. Let us signal, in conclusion, two details only. The setting of the Phaedo indirectly criticizes the aggressive attitude of Sparta towards Phlius at the end of the 380s. The statement of Socrates, "all wars are undertaken for

64 Before and after 411 B.C. he spent several years in Cyprus (ps.-Lys. 6. 6 f. and 26-28, And. 1. 4, ps.-Plut. Mor. 834e-f; cf. Dalmeida [above, note 59] x with n. 2). Significantly, his stay at Evagoras' court (discontinued owing to a personal conflict) belonged for the most part to 411-408 B.C. (ps.-Lys. 6. 28), i.e. the period which immediately preceded his coming to Elis (if we put aside the short interval of his return to Athens in 408/7). Both in Salamis and in Elis, Andocides probably had influential philoi and xenoi (cf. 1. 145).
65 Cf. e.g. Isocr. 9. 52 ff.; D. M. Lewis and R. S. Stroud, Hesperia 48 (1979) 190 f.
66 Davies (above, note 60) 507. That (anonymous) son of Timotheus (I) was on good terms with Conon, to judge from the fact that his own son served as Conon's quartermaster-general in Cyprus c. 389 B.C. (Lys. 19. 40).
68 Cf. Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 26 f.
69 For a previous "attempt to understand the reason or reasons (if any) why Plato chose to cast Phaedo of Elis as narrator for the dialogue which goes by his name," see McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 1-4, 17 f. (above, note 17).
70 No doubt, the problem of the Lacedaemonians' aggressiveness towards the Greek world presented a unity from the point of view of Plato, Phaedo, and many other Socratics, though manifested in various forms and various events. Of the latter, a dialogue by Phaedo will have concentrated on the Elean–Spartan war of 402-400 B.C.; Plato's Symposium and Phaedo dealt with the misfortunes of Mantinea and Phlius, respectively (the 380s). McQueen and Rowe (above, note 1) 2 and 3 n. 12 came near to this point.
the acquisition of wealth" (66c), clearly has topical facets that allude to Phaedo’s fate.\footnote{I intend to discuss this in the forthcoming book referred to above, note 67.}
The World as Art-Object: Science and the Real in Plato’s *Timaeus*

T. M. ROBINSON

Given the controversy that has swirled around the interpretation of the *Timaeus* from just about the time of its appearance, I make no apologies for beginning any fresh attempt to assess its purported claims that the world is an art-object with some brief remarks on my method of interpretation of the dialogue as a whole.

First, my general source of interpretation will be hints that appear to emerge from the text itself, rather than (though not to the exclusion of) a broad range of commentary over the ages, ranging from the view that the description of a supposed temporal beginning to the universe was elaborated by Plato the way it was simply as a pedagogical device\(^1\) to the view that the dialogue does not set out to expound Plato’s views at all.\(^2\) Xenocrates’ view—that any talk by Timaeus of the world as a supposed object of creation is for pedagogical purposes only—has for some time now enjoyed large-scale, though not universal acceptance, leading a significant number of scholars to write off the Demiurge—the supposed fashioner of such a world—as symbolic rather than real.\(^3\) I myself take it as a sound principle of interpretation that Timaeus is to be understood literally except on those occasions (such as 34b–c) when he explicitly indicates that he is *not* to be so taken, on the simple grounds that it makes no sense on Plato’s part to have...

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\(^1\) The view is attributed by Aristotle to Xenocrates (De Caelo 279b32–80a1 = Xenocrates fr. 54 Heinze), and may also have been held by Speusippus and left open as a possibility by Theophrastus; for estimates of the evidence see A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus* (Oxford 1928) 66–70; H. Chemiss, *Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy I* (Baltimore 1944) 423 n. 356; G. Vlastos, “The Disorderly Motion in the *Timaeus* (1939),” in *Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics*, ed. by R. E. Allen (London 1965) 383 ff.; and L. Tarán, “The Creation Myth in Plato’s Timaeus,” in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, ed. by J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (Albany, NY 1971) 404 nn. 140–43 (he adds Crantor to the list and possibly Heraclides Ponticus).

\(^2\) The view espoused by Taylor (previous note).

gone out of his way so to indicate had he intended the whole work to be understood in some (unspecified) non-literal way. The resulting interpretation of the dialogue in general and its apparent claim that the world is a fashioned art-object in particular seem to me of at least as much philosophical interest as a number of prevalent non-literal interpretations. As part of such an interpretation I shall be attempting on this occasion to show the following: 1) that for Timaeus—whom I understand to represent Plato at the time of the dialogue’s composition—the world is understood as an object, not simply a concept; 2) that it is thought of as fashioned (or on another, biological analogy conceived) at a point in time which is in fact the beginning-point of time, in accord with a praeter-cosmic paradigm by a praeter-cosmic artificer (or, on the other analogy, father); 3) that the precosmic matter (or better, pre-matter) used for the formation of this world as art-object is in eternal, unpredictable Heisenbergian motion, a motion still residually present in the formed cosmos; 4) that the formed cosmos is an art-object that is actually itself alive—a view current at the time and in our own time resuscitated as the Gaia hypothesis; 5) that the same cosmos-as-dynamic-art-object (as we may now describe it) is in epistemological terms the object of at best justified true opinion, a state of consciousness denied by Plato to be knowledge.

Turning to the dialogue, we can begin as Plato himself does with a crucial metaphysical and epistemological distinction. “We must, then,” he says, “in my judgment, first make this distinction: What is that which is always real and has no beginning of existence, and what is that which comes into existence and is never real?” (27d5–28a1). The translation of the sentence is crucial. If at 27d6–28a1 the correct reading is τί τὸ γενόμενον μὲν ἄξιον (“what is that which is forever coming into existence?”), we apparently have, “at the top of the show” so to speak, a broad hint on Plato’s part that his interest in the subsequent discussion will be in an eternal world of Forms—those perfect paradigmatic particulars that serve as the cornerstone of the metaphysics of so many of the dialogues, including this one—and a co-eternal universe over and against them, whatever the “temporal” drift of his own narrative. As it happens, however, and as Whittaker pointed out many years ago in a much-overlooked article, ἄξιον almost certainly did not appear in Plato’s argument: He was instead simply setting the stage for the discussion, in the immediately subsequent lines, not of the ontological status of the eternal world of Forms and the eternal world of genesis, but of the ontological status of any Form and any sense-object and the implications thereof for that greatest of all sense-objects (as he saw it), the universe itself.

The point is reinforced immediately by Plato in the very next sentence, where a sense-object is described as something that “comes into being and goes out of being”; no manuscript carries a trace of any lost adverb ἀκέi. Which is not, of course, to suggest that in the Timaeus Plato has given up on the Republic’s doctrine that our world is a world of genesis2 (= “process”), merely that in the present context what he is describing is simply genesis1 (= “beginning”).

The stage for the argument is set in two rapid moves. First, with the epistemological assertion, familiar to all readers of the Republic, that one of the two objects—i.e., the Form—is “apprehensible by insight, along with a rational account” (i.e., is in Plato’s strictest sense “knowable”), the other—i.e., the sense-object—being “the object of opinion, in conjunction with unreasoning sensation” (28a1–4). Second, with the assertions a) that anything that comes into existence must do so thanks to some causal agent; b) that that agent uses a model to serve as his paradigm in the fashioning process; c) that the only two types of model possible are ones described respectively as “everlastingly and unchangingly real” (i.e., Forms) and ones that have “come into existence” (i.e., sense-objects); and d) that anything produced in accordance with the former class of model will be on that very account kalos (“an object of beauty”), anything in accordance with the latter class not so (28a4–b2).

With this as his basis (none of it new to readers of the Republic) Plato can now construct an argument concerning the universe. Having just divided the real into everlasting objects and objects that have a beginning of existence, he classifies the universe without further ado as belonging to the latter class—i.e., as having had a beginning of existence—on the grounds that “it can be seen and touched and has body, and all such things are objects of sense” (28b2–8).

Satisfied on the above grounds that the universe can be reasonably described as a sense-object and hence something that came into existence, Plato then has no trouble positing a causal agent to account for its coming into existence, an agent he calls its “craftsman and father,” a craftsman he immediately admits it is hard to “discover” and impossible to “declare” (= “satisfactorily describe”? ) to every person (28b8–c5).

A few final moves complete the argument. Like any other causal agent, the world’s craftsman too must have used one of two available models, and Plato declares that it must have been the one of an “everlasting” nature, on the grounds a) that the universe is not only kalos but in fact “the most kalos of things that have come into existence” and b) that its craftsman is the

5 For further instances in which what would have been an analogous ἀκέi is conspicuous by its absence, see 28a1, 37b2–3, 48e6–49a1.

6 The terms are not ones that Timaeus confines rigidly to efficient causes. At 50c he will compare Space to a mother, the eternal Form to a father, and the universe they form between them to offspring.
"best of causal agents"; the contrary supposition—i.e., that the Demiurge is not *agathos* and the universe not *kalos*—is "something one cannot even mention without blasphemy" (28c5–29a6).

The Demiurge's first actions are described by Plato as follows (tr. Cornford, with some changes):

1. "Since he wished all things to be good (*agatha*), and, as far as possible, no thing to be imperfect, the god took all that was visible—not at rest but moving in discordant and unordered fashion—and made efforts to reduce it from disorder to order, considering the latter to be in all ways better than the former."

2. "Now it neither was nor is acceptable that he who is the most good should bring about anything other than <what is itself> the most *kalos*. Weighing the matter, then, he kept finding that, among things by nature visible, no product devoid of intelligence will ever be more *kalos* than one possessing intelligence, when each is taken as a whole, and what is more that intelligence cannot possibly come to be present in anything without <the prior presence of> soul. In view of this reasoning, he who put together the universe made efforts, in doing so, to fashion intelligence within soul and soul within body, so as to prove to have fashioned a product as *kalos* and as excellent as it could by nature be. This . . . is how we must say, according to the likely account, that this world came into existence, by the god's providence, in very truth a living creature with soul and reason."

As Cornford points out (34), "the dialogue yields no more information about the Demiurge" than is conveyed by the above short account. We should therefore pause a while at this juncture and make a preliminary assessment of what we at any rate appear to have been told. It can be described in summary form as follows:

1. The world, like any of its constituent parts or contents, is a sense-object, since it is seeable, touchable and possesses bulk, and is hence contingent for its existence upon a causal agent other than itself.
2. Like all sense-objects, it had a beginning of existence and a maker/father.
3. The model to which this maker/father looked is an eternal one, guaranteeing that the world itself will be good; and the indisputable

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7 The word will again come as no surprise to readers of the *Republic*, though it raises immediate questions as to the role, if any, played by the Form of the Good in the scheme of the *Timaeus*, and its possible relationship to the Demiurge and his activities.

8 The tense is significant. Cornford characteristically translates "is visible" (my italics), in line with his understanding of Plato's intentions.

9 The tense is not aorist, but imperfect, underlining the difficulties faced by the Demiurge in his task.

10 The reference (immediately above) to all things being desired by the Demiurge to be good (*agathos*) suggests that by *kalos* Plato means something nearer to that notion than to that of simple physical beauty, so I leave it in transliteration.

11 Literally, "apart from soul."
goodness of the world itself is an argument for the eternal nature of its model.

4. The Demiurge is not only good but the "best of causal agents," and the world he fashioned not only good but the "best of things (worlds?) that have come into existence."

5. Over and against the Demiurge, apparently *ab aeterno*, are not just the Forms but moving, unordered matter of some sort, which at a certain point the Demiurge made successful efforts to reduce to some type of order, producing the cosmos we know.

6. On the principle that no product that does not possess intelligence is ever better than one that does, and that the exercise of intelligence is contingent upon the <prior> existence of soul, he made the world a living, intelligent creature, possessed of soul, intellect and body.

Taking these points in turn:

1. As Taylor (69–70), picking up on a point emphasized in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, indicated long ago, Timaeus’ argument is greatly weakened by the assumption that the world is a sense-object in the way, apparently, that its parts or contents are sense-objects. One can go further, in fact, and wonder whether any argument of the sort could be valid if it assumes that the world is *any* type of “object” at all, rather than a general concept indicating the finite or infinite sum of what exists/is the case. As so often, Plato’s realism assumes the referential nature of general terms and goes off in vain search of the putative referent.

2. Given the basic philosophical weakness of the notion of the world as sense-object, Plato’s further contention that it is, like all sense-objects, contingent—and apparently *temporally* contingent—upon a causal agent other than itself is a fortiori shaky. But it has the great value, in interpretational terms, of indicating clearly to the reader that reductionist attempts to equate the Demiurge with the world, or with the world’s soul, or with the world’s intellect, could never have met with his approval. If the world, its soul and its intellect are all understood as contingent, as they are indeed apparently understood, they will always, according to Platonic doctrine, be dependent on some prior principle to account for their existence, whether the Demiurge is explained away or not, and whether the world is eternal or not. If this is the case, reductionists must find a reductee that is, as a minimum requirement, unequivocally understood as non-

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12 Throughout this paper I shall be using the terms "contingent" and "non-contingent" in their time-honoured cosmological rather their current logical sense. I shall also be using them in their weaker rather than in their stronger sense, i.e., to express a relationship of dependency, but without invocation of a supposedly necessary being as explanation of a chain of existents. The basic data of the real as described by Timaeus—the Demiurge, Forms and Space—are just that, apparently, data; no further claims in terms of their supposedly absolute—as distinct from hypothetical—necessity are proffered.

13 See above, note 3. E. Ostenfeld, *Forms, Matter and Minds: Three Strands In Plato’s Metaphysics* (The Hague 1982) 246, suggests that the Demiurge is to be equated with the Circle of the Same in the world’s soul.
contingent. The only such candidate that has been brought forward, to my knowledge, is the everlastingly self-activating soul described in the Phaedrus and Laws 10. This point will be discussed later.

3. The model—the Eternal Living Creature—used by the Demiurge in forming the universe is a clearly recognisable Form, though one unmentioned in previous dialogues, where its relevance would not in any case have been clear. And like all Platonic Forms (excepting the Form of the Good) its role and status are purely paradigmatic. It is also eternal, as the Demiurge is presumably eternal, and neither one is described as contingent for existence upon the other. So further reductionist attempts to equate the Demiurge with this (or any other) Form, except perhaps the Form of the Good—on which later—can have little chance of catching Plato’s intentions.

The analogue of Plato’s vision is rather, as so often, to be found in the Republic, where the philosopher-ruler sets out to form a good society on the pattern of the Form of the Good. But it is not an exact analogue, since the Form of the Good is there credited with what appear to be powers of efficient, not simply paradigmatic causality, and to that degree the philosopher can indeed be said to be contingent—if only at several removes—for existence upon a Form. On the other hand, in the same dialogue the Demiurge too is credited with efficient causality, leaving Plato with a problem that could only be solved by a ruthless exercise of Ockham’s razor. That exercise is, it seems, performed in the Timaeus, where the Demiurge is left as the sole efficient cause of the world’s formation, and the Form of the Good, if it is to be found at all, is reduced to the paradigmatic status of all other Forms.

What of Plato’s argument concerning the world and its paradigm? There are, it seems to me, two major problems with it:

a) It is unclear why the everlastingly unchanging status of the Form “Eternal Living Creature” should guarantee the world’s goodness rather than its status as a (contingent) living creature. What is more, Timaeus has also apparently opted to endow the Demiurge with the twin attributes of efficient and paradigmatic causality previously enjoyed by the Form of the Good (“he wanted everything to come into being <with attributes> as close as possible to <those possessed by> himself”).

Matters are complicated further by the apparent continuance in existence, in the Timaeus, of the Form of the Good, at least as a standard (paradigmatic) Form, and at the level of what now seems a mere cosmic whisper. In a much-overlooked phrase at 46c7–d1 Timaeus says, “Now all these things are among the accessory causes which the god uses as subservient in bringing to completion (ὕποτελεῖν), as far as possible, the form of the best.” For no good reason that I can see Taylor, followed by Cornford (“in achieving the best result that is possible”), discounts the clear possibility, seen by Archer-Hind, that we have here an echo of the notion of
the Form of the Good, but now playing the role of paradigm rather than efficient cause.\textsuperscript{14}

b) Statements at 28a and 29a suggest that Timaeus has either caught himself in the coils of a circular argument or perhaps unwittingly affirmed the consequent. At 28a the (hypothetical) argument runs:

If a craftsman looks to an everlastingly unchanging model, the product will be one that is \textit{kalos}; if to one that has come into existence, it will not be so.

So structured, the argument, had Timaeus completed it, would—to be a valid (though not necessarily sound) one—have concluded as follows:

The model the Demiurge uses is in fact everlastingly unchanging.

Therefore the world he produces is \textit{kalos}.

In fact we have to wait till 29a for Timaeus to return to the matter, but this time he argues from the self-evident \textit{kallos} of the world and goodness of its Demiurge (contrary thoughts being deemed blasphemy) to the everlasting nature of the model! Spelled out, the argument runs as follows:

If the world is \textit{kalos} and its Demiurge \textit{agathos}, the model used will be everlasting; if the world is \textit{aischros} and its Demiurge \textit{kakos}, it will not be so.

The world is \textit{kalos} and its Demiurge \textit{agathos}.

Therefore the model is everlasting.

But this of course will not do. The argument at 28a was never completed, and the second antecedent of the argument at 29a is based not on argument or observation but the fear of being caught in blasphemy. Even were the \textit{first} antecedent soundly based, however, the \textit{consequent} (i.e., that the model used will be everlasting) would still be far from obvious, unless the reader were already convinced of the validity of the \textit{previous} argument begun but not finished at 28a. But this argument never affirmed, let alone attempted to prove, the critical antecedent that the world’s model is everlasting. So the reader is left with the uncomfortable choice of accusing Timaeus of planning (but not completing) the argument of 28a along the lines suggested above—and hence of being caught in an egregious piece of circular reasoning, arguing first from the everlastingness of the model to the \textit{kallos} of the world and then from the \textit{kallos} of the world to the

\textsuperscript{14} A minor problem attaching to this scenario is the fact that, were it the case, Plato would appear to finish up with \textit{three} paradigms for the world’s goodness, the Form of the Good, the Eternal Living Creature and the Demiurge himself. To which Plato might have replied, had the question been put, that the significant quality of the Demiurge, in the matter of world-making, is his causally efficient status; whether the goodness of the world that was made had as its paradigm the goodness exemplified by the Form of the Good or by the Form “Eternal Living Creature” or by the Demiurge or by all three is of lesser moment.
everlastiness of the model—or of planning to complete the argument (fallaciously, unfortunately) as follows:

The world produced by the Demiurge is in fact kalos.
Therefore the model is everlastingly unchanging.

and so perhaps avoiding the charge of circular reasoning in the combined arguments, but committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent instead.

All this, of course, has to do with the validity of Timaeus’ arguments, not their soundness. Even were the former granted, argumenti causa, the notion that the world is self-evidently (to nonblasphemous people) kalos would remain something of an unclear philosophical foundation.

4. In view of the problems raised by the above, Timaeus faces, it seems, even bigger hurdles with his further claim that “the world is the most kalos of things that have come into existence” and the Demiurge “the best of causal agents.” The latter claim could of course simply be true by definition, the Demiurge playing the part of first and best among the gods in the way Zeus is first and best among the Olympians. And the former claim could have been based on the assumption that the totality of kala is quite clearly more kalos than any of its constituents. But the sceptic would still press Timaeus to explain a) why and in what precise sense the world is kalos rather than aischros (and the Demiurge by the same token agathos rather than aischros) and b) why the notion of the world as a sense-object on an ontological and epistemological par with its own constituents is not the untenable outcome of a fallacy of composition.

5. Over and against the Demiurge lies a realm described by Timaeus as “all that was visible—not at rest but moving in discordant and unordered fashion.” This is presented as a cosmological datum, like the Demiurge and the Forms, and is like them presumably to be understood as non-contingent; every other item in the cosmology is described in terms of contingency. Since there were no physical spectators of this supposed pre-cosmos, the word “visible” is perhaps surprising, but ultimately of little import; as early as the Phaedo (79a6 ff.) Plato was apparently using the word as a synonym for “physical.” We shall return to the whole question of the role and status of the pre-cosmos and its components in Timaeus’ scheme of things. Suffice it for the moment to notice in passing that at this introductory stage the stuff (for want of a better word) of which the cosmos will eventually be formed is described as being—and as presumably always having been—in chaotic motion; and there is no hint of any alterum quid that might be understood as the initial or ongoing source of that motion. Nor is any reason offered at this stage why Demiurgic intervention to reduce chaos to some sort of order took place at one moment rather than another.
6. As a paradigm himself apparently possessed of soul and reason15 the Demiurge naturally imparts the same qualities to his ordered universe, though Timaeus as it happens offers as the reason the (far from obvious) supposition that no thing not possessed of reason can ever be better (and the best possible product is of course the Demiurge’s objective) than one that is; and taking it as self-evident that only living things can reason, he sees the presence of soul, the life-principle, as an indispensable condition for the operation of reason, and in that sense logically if not temporally prior to it. These claims are worth careful study in themselves; for the moment we can simply note that both soul and reason are described here in terms clearly suggesting contingency, being as they are direct objects of Demiurgic production. The same, it might be added, must be said of the planetary, solar and lunar gods and the goddess Earth; all are unequivocally described as being direct Demiurgic productions.16

A central argument in favour of a non-literal interpretation of the dialogue’s creation account, including the role and status of the supposed Demiurge, is the claim that, despite the apparent contingency of the world’s

15 A notion rightly defended by Vlastos, “Creation in the Timaeus: Is it a Fiction?” in Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, ed. by R. E. Allen (London 1965) 407, following Chemiss (above, note 1) Appendix XI. For a restatement of the Chemiss position see Tarán (above, note 1) 395 n. 34. Hackforth, by contrast (“Plato’s Theism,” CQ 30 [1936] 4–9 = Allen, Studies 439–47), followed by Mohr (above, note 3) 178–83, has argued that the most that can be asserted is that the Demiurge is nous, not ensouled nous. But this is hard to square with the statement at 29e3 that the Demiurge “desired that all things should come as near as possible to being like himself.” While in this precise context Plato has nothing further to say about the implications of anything’s being characterised by desire, when he returns to the topic in Laws 10 (897a1–3) he makes it clear that it is still in fact for him one of a number of features that characterise psyche as such, as he had indicated in detail for all three μέρη of soul in the Republic. The same can be said of the pleasure (cf. Laws 897a2) felt by the Demiurge in the world of his formation (Tim. 37c7). It is only when there is talk of soul’s “conducting all things to a right and happy conclusion” (or the opposite) that she is characterised as νόμον προσλάβοντος ο άνοιξις συγκενοµένη (Laws 897b2–4); pleasure and desire are two of several features apparently characteristic of soul tout court, without reference to the quality of what soul might “bring about” (ὑπεργολέται 897b4).

16 Despite this description, it has been suggested by Cornford (280) that the ease with which in the final part of the dialogue (69a ff.) Timaeus blurs the distinction between the Demiurge and the gods of his formation is further evidence of the mythical character of the formative powers attributed to both. A less drastic and surely more likely explanation is that Timaeus, on the assumption that the said gods, ever heedful of and obedient to their father’s commands (42e6–7), were at all times implementing the wishes of the Demiurge, felt free to talk indifferently of their or the Demiurge’s activity, the crucial conceptual and real difference between them having been made with clarity earlier on. In the same way Timaeus, when the spirit moves him, will use a vivid present tense in the midst of a standard set of descriptive aorists (e.g., at 37d6 πονεῖ, e3 µηχανεῖται); or will indeed on one occasion (53c–66d) dispense with all talk of divine construction when faced with the task of covering a large mass of complex terrain in a manageable amount of space and where a constant adversion to detailed activity on the part of the gods would probably slow down the accomplishment of a more important objective—the detailed description of such things as the actual figures of the primary bodies, the nature of motion and rest, and the like.
soul upon Demiuric production, there is one major statement in the dialogue of the Phaedrus' doctrine that all soul is self-activating activity, or self-moving motion. To many this has suggested that Timaeus’ real view is that all soul is in fact non-contingent, whatever the apparent thrust of the rest of his account, and that as a result the Demiurge is a superfluous entity, all of his productive activities being easily ascribable to the world's soul, or perhaps to its rational aspect. But this conclusion should, it seems to me, be resisted, on a number of grounds:

1. It is far from obvious that the Phaedrus was written prior to the Timaeus, as I have argued elsewhere. And if it was indeed written later, it is methodologically risky to import its doctrine of soul into an interpretation of the earlier dialogue, unless the Timaeus itself has a clear statement on the matter.

2. As far as the latter point is concerned, the crucial evidence is found at 37b5, where Timaeus talks of discourse being carried on "within the thing that is self-moving." Cornford correctly elucidates this as a reference to "the Heaven as a whole," but then adds, "which, as a living creature, is moved by its own self-moving soul." In some non-technical sense, this may be thought to be self-evident; Plato, like Aristotle after him, thought that a distinguishing feature of animals was that, unlike plants, they moved themselves (see, e.g., Tim. 77c4–5). Such self-movement is however merely contingent self-movement; one needs an explicit argument to show that the soul which lies at the source of such movement is itself self-moving in a manner that is non-contingent. And no such doctrine is found with clarity in Plato's works before the Phaedrus.

As far as the present passage is concerned, nothing can be inferred from the fact that Timaeus uses, to describe the world, the phrase "moved by itself" in a way not dissimilar to the use of a phrase to describe soul in the Phaedrus, for he goes on to clarify himself immediately afterwards by talking of the world as "set in motion (κινηθέν) and alive"; the passive voice is unequivocal, and sure evidence that the world's self-motion is in Timaeus' view contingent. Nothing has been said, or even hinted at,

17 Phdr. 245c ff., Tim. 37b5.
18 See above, note 3.
19 For Chemiss, "The Sources of Evil According to Plato," PAPS 98 (1954) 26 n. 24, the reference is to self-moving soul, and he cites as evidence 37c3–5, especially the words ἀλλό πλην ψυχῆν. But this is far from clear. The passage would appear rather to be about the universe, which has a soul (cf. the words αὐτοῦ τῆν ψυχῆν 37b7), followed by a description of a pair of prominent features of that soul (37c5–7).
20 Chemiss (above, note 1) 428 has argued that the following passages in the Timaeus presuppose a doctrine of psychic self-motion: 37b5, 77c4–5 and 89a1–5. But all of these passages can be explained without difficulty as references to a contingent form of self-movement; there is no hint of the presence, even at the level of assumption, of the more drastic and all-embracing Phaedrus-doctrine of non-contingent self-movement.
concerning the soul of the world—whether it is itself self-moving and whether, if so, its self-motion is of the contingent or non-contingent variety.

The fact is that all Timaeus needs for his argument to go through at this point is a notion of soul as possibly self-moving—but if so merely in the commonplace sense that animals are said to be self-moving—but in any case merely contingently so, and this is of course exactly in line with his earlier description of the world’s soul as being of direct Demiurgic construction. In a later dialogue Plato will come back to the question of soul, and will attribute to all (rational) soul the quality of non-contingent self-motion which in the Timaeus would appear to characterise merely the soul of the Demiurge.

If this interpretation of the Timaeus stands up to scrutiny, we have I think a cosmological schema of much greater modernity than has been customarily ascribed to it:

1. Substitute the Big Bang theory for demiurgic intervention and we have something very close to Plato’s distinction between the eternal duration of the pre-matter that eventually comes to form the world we know and the (as he sees it) temporally everlasting duration of such a formed world. The similarity holds even with the oscillation version of the theory;

21 The phrase used by Cornford (95 n. 2) to describe soul—τὸ ἐαυτὸ κινοῦν—is of course taken from the Phaedrus, and is nowhere to be found in the Timaeus, with or without the world’s soul as its ostensible referent. On the two single occasions when the world-soul’s motion is referred to in the dialogue, at 37a6–7 and 37c6, the voice is passive, not middle, as Comford’s own translations concede: “whenever [the world’s soul] is in contact with anything that has dispersed existence or with anything whose existence is indivisible, she is set in motion all through herself...”; and “when the father who had begotten it saw it set in motion and alive...” (my italics).

22 The attribution seems to be confined to one dialogue, the Phaedrus only, however. Noticing perhaps a number of unacceptable implications for his other cosmological and theological beliefs were he to make all (rational) soul non-contingent, Plato reverts to views analogous to his earlier ones in the Politicus and Philebus and even (from the evidence of 967d4–7) the Laws, despite the claim, earlier in the same dialogue (896a1–2; cf. 896a6–b1), that soul is, as the Phaedrus had enunciated, “the movement which is able to move itself.” For details see Hackforth (above, note 15) 441–42 and Robinson (above, note 3) chapters 6, 8, 9 and 10.

23 As Hermias saw, the argument at Phdr. 245c refers to rational soul only. It is also significant that it refers to the totality of such rational soul, whereas the Timaeus does no such thing; the soul possessed by the Demiurge cannot be argued, as it is argued by Tarán (above, note 1) 394 n. 30, to possess of necessity the same constituents as the world’s soul and hence to be clearly one and the same as it. (The argument is based on an assumption that the Platonic doctrine of soul is a uniform one, but this is of course the very question in dispute.) The whole point of the description of the world’s soul is to demonstrate its contingent self-motion and its “intermediate” metaphysical and epistemological status; the Demiurge, by contrast, is a non-contingent datum of the real, and no more “intermediate” than those other non-contingent data, Space and the Forms. What Timaeus would have said about the composition of his psyche we do not know, but it seems hard to doubt that, had he wished to spell out the details of the activity of that psyche, he would have described it in terms that we would recognise as clearly non-contingent self-movement.
everlastingness is easily tailored to denote time-measured duration to the end of a given oscillation.

2. The stuff composing the real is in beginningless motion, its basic components, dubbed by Timaeus the “traces” of what will eventually come to be the four elements earth, air, fire and water, being subject as a whole to the laws of centrifugal and centripetal force but the path of movement of any particular quantum of it being forever beyond prediction. It comes therefore as no surprise to find that Heisenberg read the _Timaeus_ in detail during his school-years; for all his criticisms of many parts of it one cannot fail to notice what he has also—perhaps unconsciously—taken from it.

3. The notion of the world-as-alive is once again currently fashionable as the Gaia hypothesis. And now as then the notion is subject to the criticism that it commits a compositional fallacy. From the proposition “A is full of living things” one can no more infer “A is itself a living thing” than from the proposition “This book is full of errors” can one infer “This book is itself an error.”

4. That the world of sense is the object of at best justified true belief is a commonplace of contemporary epistemological thinking as well as a view propounded in detail by Plato and never in fact abandoned by him. As an insight it retains its force despite Plato’s own invention of a second universe to solve a problem that he thought his theory generated.

5. That the world is not just alive but a living _art-object_ is a notion very much around at the level of popular if not scientific belief. Plato’s version of the theory is peculiar in that, as a believer in a mimetic theory of art, he needs a paradigm as well as an artificer to account for this as for any other art-object, and the paradigm he chooses (what he calls the Form “Eternal Living Creature”) is, like the rest of the Forms, in the final analysis itself more problematic than the original problem it purports to solve. The theory does not, as it happens, need a mimetic theory of art to support it, as Plato himself seems to have seen in the _Laws_, and is often put forward as an appendage to one or another version of the cosmological argument. But it remains fatally flawed by circularity, in whatever version, Platonic or contemporary.

What all this means in effect is that there is a good deal more Platonism around, at the level of both popular belief and contemporary epistemological and scientific theory, than is commonly supposed. This was probably realized with more clarity in the past, when the contents of the _Timaeus_ in particular were more widely known and when the Xenocratean—read “figurative”—interpretation of that dialogue had not robbed it of most of its more interesting cosmological claims. A more straightforward interpretation allows us to see with greater clarity the
Platonic origin of some of our best and worst ideas on the universe and how we perceive it, and to react in any way deemed appropriate to the enlightenment.

University of Toronto


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\(^1\) *Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften* (1899) 105-35.


\(^3\) *Österreichische Jahreshefte* 7 (1904) 105-26 (Abhandlungen und Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde* 1, 197-218).
angehörten, sondern nahezu alle—ein Ergebnis, das sofort von Wunsch akzeptiert wurde.\textsuperscript{4} Es war dann wieder Ziebarth, der 1934 eine größere Anzahl neuer attischer Fluchtafeln veröffentlichte, darunter eine besonders lange aus der Zeit um 323 v. Chr., die als das "Staatsstück" dieser Gattung gelten kann.\textsuperscript{5} Weitere Exemplare wurden von Werner Peck 1941 und 1956 bekanntgemacht,\textsuperscript{6} um von Einzelstücken, die von Zeit zu Zeit publiziert wurden, zu schweigen. Einen höchstdienstlichen Katalog aller seit den Corpora von Wunsch und Audollent veröffentlichten Fluchtafeln, nicht nur der attischen, hat David Jordan vor wenigen Jahren gegeben.\textsuperscript{7} Er enthält auch die 1980 zuerst bekanntgewordene Tafel aus dem Kerameikos mit den Namen des Diadochen Kassander, seines Bruders Pleistarchos, seines Generals Euplemos und des Demetrios von Phaleron, der von 317 bis 307 v. Chr. als Exponent Kassanders die Geschichte Athen bestimmte.\textsuperscript{8} Und soeben hat Franz Willemsen neue attische Fluchtafeln vom Kerameikos vorgelegt. In einer derselben erscheinen ebenfalls zwei ganz prominente Persönlichkeiten des politischen Lebens, Lykurg und Hypereides.\textsuperscript{9} Sie soll zunächst etwas eingehender betrachtet, danach zu zwei anderen, die etwa aus der gleichen Zeit stammen, in Beziehung gesetzt werden.


\textsuperscript{4} W. Rabehl, \textit{De sermone defixionum atticarum} (Diss. Berlin 1906) bes. S. 40; R. Wünsch, \textit{Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift} (1907) 1575–76.

\textsuperscript{5} "Neue Verfluchungstaflern aus Attika, Boiotien und Euboia," \textit{SBB} (1934) 1022–50. Die Fluchtafel vom Ende der 20er Jahre ist Ziebarths Nr. 1. In ihr waren einst mehr als einhundert Personen aufgeführt, darunter einige Frauen. 77 Namen sind noch lesbar, in der großen Mehrzahl Bürger, denen das Demotikon beigegeben ist.

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Kerameikos} III (1941) 89–100, Nr. 1–9; \textit{Attische Grabinschriften} II (Abh. Deutsche Akad. 1956, Nr. 3) 59–61, Nr. 205–07.

\textsuperscript{7} "A Survey of Greek Defixiones not included in the Special Corpora," \textit{GRBS} 26 (1985) 151–97; für Attika 155–66, Nr. 1–55.


Es ist im Licht dieser Namen dann auch recht wahrscheinlich, daß der auf der neuen Tafel genannte Kallisthenes wirklich, wie Willemsen annimmt, der Politiker ist, dessen Auslieferung Alexander der Große im Jahre 335, zusammen mit der von anderen athenischen Bürgern, gefordert hatte.19 Zwei weitere Namen der neuen Tafel sind zwar in Athen seltene Namen, Meixias und Aristomedes, und doch trifft es sich, daß gerade für die Zeit des neuen Dokuments, ca 330 bis 324 v. Chr., in beiden Fällen mehr als ein Kandidat für die Identifizierung bereit steht. Willemsen identifiziert Meixias mit Meixias, Sohn des Hegesias, aus Gargettos, Ratsherr im Jahre 341/0.20 Möglich ist aber auch Meixias aus Myrrhinus.21 In Aristomedes sieht Willemsen den im Jahre 330/29 bezeugten Diaiäteten aus

10 Wünsch, Rhm 55 (1900) 62 ff., Nr. 6 (Ziebarth [Anm. 1] Nr. 6; Audollent, Defixionum Tabellae Nr. 60). Audollents Zweifel an der von Wünsch und Wilhelm akzeptierten Identifizierung des Demosthenes und Lykurg sind gegenstandslos geworden.
11 Anm. 5, Nr. 1, B 2.
13 Oben, Anm. 8.
15 PA 8157 und 8129; APF 277–82; Hansen 170. Die Fluchtafel: SBB (1934) 1027, Nr. 2.
17 PA 11925 und 11934 und 11950; Hansen 175. Die Fluchtafel: SBB (1934) 1023, Nr. 1, A 56.
18 PA 15076; APF 559–60; Hansen 178. Die Fluchtafel ist Wünschs Nr. 24, mit dem Kommentar Wilhelms (Anm. 3) 117.
19 Plutarch, Demosthenes 23. 4; PA 8090; Hansen 170. Aber auch andere zeitgenössische Träger des Namens könnten gemeint sein, z. B. Kallisthenes von Trinemeia, Ratsherr und Antragsteller eines Beschlusses von 328/7, Agora XV 49, 41.
20 Agora XV 38, 13; derselbe, IG II² 2388, 15.
Kollytos.\textsuperscript{22} Möglich, allerdings weniger wahrscheinlich, ist indessen auch Aristomedes, Sohn des Aristophon, aus Azenia, Ratsherr der Hippothontis in einem Jahr zwischen 360 und 340 v. Chr.\textsuperscript{23}

Für Lysanias und Eubulides, in Athen geläufige Namen, ist keine einigermaßen sichere Identifizierung möglich.\textsuperscript{24} Es bleibt Parpakides. Willemsen hält den Namen für neu bzw. "überhaupt neu." Er ist jedoch in einer Liste von Bürgern der Kekrops, IG II\textsuperscript{2} 2385, schon enthalten, denn in ihr findet sich in Zeile 77 unter den Δαίδαλοι Παρπακίδης[ς Μ]ενεκράτου, gefolgt von 'Αρίστων Μενεκράτου, vielleicht seinem Bruder. Kirchner datiert den Text "med. s. IV a.," doch ist er zweifellos etwas jünger, am ehesten aus einem der Jahre zwischen 335 und 320, denn von den darin Genannten ist einer im Jahre 335/4 bezeugt,\textsuperscript{25} ein anderer 329/8,\textsuperscript{26} ein dritter 324/3,\textsuperscript{27} ein vierter 323/2,\textsuperscript{28} sowie der Bruder eines fünften 324/3.\textsuperscript{29} Da schon Willemsen die Zeit der Fluchtafel aus dem Kerameikos auf "um 330" und spätestens 325/4 bestimmt hat, ist deutlich, daß die beiden Zeugnisse für den sonst nicht bekannten Namen Parpakides gleichzeitig sind und mithin ein- und denselben Bürger meinen.\textsuperscript{30}


\textsuperscript{22} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1924, 9–10; APF 66. Unmittelbar nach ihm ist in der gleichen Liste Hypereides genannt, worin Willemsen mit Recht eine Stütze seiner Ansicht sieht.

\textsuperscript{23} Agora XV 20, 27; APF 65–66.


\textsuperscript{25} Χαιρήτος Χαιριμένους Πιθέως (Zeile 104); Agora XV 43, 167–68.

\textsuperscript{26} Κλεόνυμπος Κλεομήνου. 'Επεικίδης (Zeile 81); IG II\textsuperscript{2} 2837, 1.

\textsuperscript{27} Λεσίππος Λυσίου 'Αθμονέως (Zeile 61); IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1203, 12.

\textsuperscript{28} Σύμων Θεοδώρου 'Αθμονέως (Zeile 11); IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1631, 662.

\textsuperscript{29} 'Αντιφων 'Αριστομαξίου 'Αθμονέως in IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1203, 11, der Bruder des ['Αριστ]είδης 'Αριστομάξιου 'Αθμονέως von IG II\textsuperscript{2} 2385, 17.

Es ist zweitens die von Ziebarth veröffentlichte Tafel, die einmal mehr als einhundert Namen enthielt. Unter den Genannten sind viele prominente Politiker: Demosthenes und Demeas (der Sohn des Demades)31 von Paania, Xenokles und Polyeuktos von Sphettos, Demophilos und Lysikles aus Acharnai, Strombichos und Strombichides aus Euonymon.32 Da die Zahl der Verfluchten für einen Prozeß zu groß ist, andererseits viele der Genannten als nationalistische Politiker bekannt sind, die in aktiver Opposition zu Makedonien standen, dürfte Ziebarth mit der Vermutung Recht haben, daß es sich um politische Gegner des Autors handelt, dieser mithin zu den Kreisen zählen dürfte, denen es um eine friedliche Koexistenz mit Makedonien zu tun war, d. h. zu denen, die nach Alexanders Tod 323 v. Chr. den Frieden zu bewahren suchten, wie Diodor mitteilt.33 Die Tafel ist diesem Zeitpunkt nicht fern; sie ist entweder kurz vor Demosthenes’ Verbannung (Frühjahr 323) aufgeschrieben worden oder in seinem letzten Lebensjahr, zwischen Herbst 323 und Herbst 322.34

Es ist endlich die jetzt von Willemsen bekanntgemachte Fluchtafel aus dem Kerameikos, nicht später als 324, aber höchstens wenige Jahre älter. Die herausragenden Namen sind Lykurg und Hypereides. Es läßt sich in diesem Falle nicht sagen, ob ein politischer Gegensatz oder ein Prozeß oder was etwa sonst den Anlaß zu dieser Verfluchung gebildet hat.


31 Dieser, der vor 322 politisch aktiv war, ist wahrscheinlich gemeint (APF 102).
33 18. 10. 1: ο δὲ δῆμος τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τῶν μὲν κτηματικῶν συμβουλευόντων τὴν ἰσχύαν ἀγείν, τῶν δὲ δημοκρότων ἀνασείστων τὰ πλῆθη καὶ παρακαλοῦντων ἐρρομένως ἐξευθεία τοῦ πολέμου, πολύ τὸς πλῆθεσιν ὑπερείχων οἱ τῶν πόλεμον αἰρόμενοι.
die die Solidarität der Bürger im Kampf gegen Fremdherrschaft und Willkürregiment preisen.35

The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

35 [Korrekturzusatz: Nach Abschluß des Manuskripts wird mir John G. Gagers Buch *Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World* (Oxford 1992) zugänglich. Dort sind u. a. folgende Fluchtafeln besprochen: S. 125, Nr. 38 = Wünschs Nr. 103; S. 145, Nr. 56 = Ziebarths Nr. 1 (Anm. 5); S. 147, Nr. 57 = die Tafel mit Kassanders Namen (Anm. 8). Gager merkt auf Grund einer persönlichen Mitteilung an, daß D. R. Jordan in dem Demosthenes von Ziebarths Tafel Nr. 1B einen anderen als den berühmten Redner zu erkennen meint.]
Notes on the Temple of Onias at Leontopolis

ABRAHAM WASSERSTEIN

Rabbinic literature written in Hebrew and Aramaic is a largely untapped source for the history of the ancient world. Here and there it has been used with some measure of success for the critical reconstruction of literary, legal and—to some extent—social history of ancient Jewry in Babylonia, Palestine and some adjoining regions by, e.g., Gedalya Alon, Saul Lieberman and, more recently, Martin Goodman. But, on the whole, the difficulties inherent in the sources seem to have deterred ancient historians from systematically examining and exploiting for their purposes what is one of the largest bodies of literature surviving from antiquity. The reasons for that are varied: There are superstitious fears about linguistic difficulties and superstitious delusions no less unjustified and deceptive about the allegedly narrow range of rabbinic literature. One glance at the works of learned scholars like Paul de Lagarde and Eduard Schwartz suffices to make one aware of the loss of opportunities due not only to prejudice, animosity and, occasionally, wilful and hence invincible ignorance, but to a general lack of awareness of the breadth and depth of the materials to be found in the records of ancient rabbinic Jewry. In this paper I shall confine myself to examining a problem of no more than minuscule, local, toponomastic interest in early Byzantine Egypt. I shall argue that even what is obviously a mistake in a rabbinic source may, in one way or another, contribute to our knowledge.

Few things are as certain about Jewish attitudes to liturgical arrangements in the late biblical period and in proto-rabbinic Judaism as the exclusive attachment to the Temple in Jerusalem. The Temple was not only the primary centre of divine worship but the one place in which sacrifices could be offered. It was strictly and strenuously distinguished from pagan and sectarian cult locations, the more so if the latter pretended to be authentically Jewish like, for instance, the Samaritan temple on Mount Gerizim.¹ Pagan gods, even though they might have a special connexion

¹ This was destroyed, according to Josephus, by John Hyrcanus, apparently in 129/8 B.C. See Josephus, AJ 13. 254 ff.; cf. Megillat Ta'anit, cap. IX sub 21 Kislev. See also E. Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi I (4th ed., Leipzig 1901) 264 (Engl. tr.: G. Vermes and F. Millar [edd.], The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus
with a particular, perhaps pre-eminent, shrine or place, would have temples and altars in many places. Not so the God of Israel: it was in Jerusalem that He had promised to dwell with His people forever, in Zion that there would be the habitation of His honour and the seat of His throne. And as God was jealous of other gods, so was He also jealous for Jerusalem, the abode He had chosen in which to set His name. No other place was worthy to be His dwelling.  

For the Persian period, we have, of course, the well-known papyrological sources concerning a temple at Elephantine near Syene (Assuan) in Upper Egypt. Of this temple we have no archaeological remains and it has left no traces in ancient literature. Our evidence indicates that it was used by the small military colony of Aramaic-speaking Jews and their families; but it cannot have had any more than local significance.

In the Hellenistic period the evidence for Jewish shrines outside Jerusalem is meagre. Apart from the Samaritan temple on Mount Gerizim mentioned above and the temple of Onias in Egypt, the location of which is the subject of this paper, recent work enables us to conclude that substantial literary or archaeological information about Jewish shrines outside Jerusalem is practically non-existent.

Two sites are principally concerned, at Lachish and at 'Araq el-Emir. The so-called Solar Temple at Lachish, which Aharoni had thought was a Hellenistic structure used for Jewish cult purposes, probably was, in the Hellenistic period, not a Jewish sanctuary at all; it therefore need not detain us here any further.

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2 See, e.g., Jer. 3. 17, 17. 12, Ez. 43. 7–9, Joel 4. 17, 4. 21, Zach. 2. 14–15, 8. 3, Ps. 26. 8, 74. 2, 132. 13–14, 135. 21, Neh. 1. 9, 1 Chr. 23. 25, II Chr. 6. 6 ff. For the general tendency in the Hebrew Bible to confine the sacrificial cult to one place, cf. Dt. 12. 5 ff., 11–14, 18, Jos. 22. 10 to end of chapter. And see Philo, Spec. leg. 1. 67, Josephus, Ap. 2. 193 (see on this especially the note ad loc. by J. G. Müller, Des Flavius Josephus Schrift gegen den Apion [Basel 1877; repr. Hildesheim–New York 1969] 314) and AJ 4. 200–01.

3 E. Sachau, Aramäische Papyrus und Ostraka in einer jüdischen Militärkolonie zu Elephantine (Leipzig 1911); A. E. Cowley, Jewish Documents of the Time of Ezra (London 1919); idem, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (Oxford 1923); E. G. H. Kraeling, The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri (New Haven 1953); B. Porten, Archives from Elephantine: The Life of an Ancient Jewish Military Colony (Berkeley 1968); for a fuller bibliography see EJ VI 610.


5 See for this Campbell (previous note) 166.
Excavations at 'Arâq el-Emîr in Jordan have uncovered what some scholars\(^6\) have thought to be the remains of an unfinished temple built by one of the Tobiads, Hyrcanus the son of Joseph, in the second century B.C. The arguments adduced do not seem to be convincing; but in any case, even if we accepted the dating and the identification of the structure as a temple we should still have to ponder the relationship of this building to one that is mentioned by Josephus (\textit{AJ} 12. 230; see Campbell 162–63) as having been built by that same Hyrcanus and called a “fortress,” βασιλεία Ἱερουσαλήμ. It was pointed out long ago by Arnaldo Mommiglano that the Tobiads had, even in the Persian period, been hostile to Jerusalem; that the βασιλεία had been in existence as early as the third century; and that its construction should be attributed not to Hyrcanus in the second century but to another Tobiad, a contemporary of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (regn. 285–46).\(^7\) The unreliability of Josephus or his source\(^8\) in this matter, combined with the weakness of the archaeological evidence, allows us to discount, in any inquiry on Jewish shrines outside Jerusalem in the period of the Second Commonwealth, the case made for the existence of a Jewish temple at ‘Arâq el-Emîr.\(^9\) There is no need to conclude (with Campbell 163) from the evidence that “the building must have been used by Jews if a Tobiad built it, and furthermore it probably had more than purely local significance.” It is indeed interesting that Campbell refers (ibid.) to the likelihood that “vestiges of the old Tobiad-Samaritan association persisted.” But it is not clear why Campbell is so certain that in this region “there must have been a large number of Jews increasingly disenchanted with the Jerusalem temple and politically opposed to the Jerusalem alignments, for whom the ‘Arâq temple would have become the religious center.” We have nothing here that could strengthen an argument purporting to show that there were in the Hellenistic period any significant Jewish shrines in the Palestinian region outside Jerusalem.

We come now to the Samaritan temple on Mount Gerizim. From the point of view of mainstream Judaism the building of that temple must have signalled the separation of the Samaritans from the people of God. This judgment is supported both by explicit rabbinic statements and by historical

\(^6\) See Campbell (above, note 4) 162–64 for details and literature; for other, earlier, scholars who have identified the structure on the site as a temple, see Mommiglano, \textit{Quinto contributo} (next note) 605 with notes.


\(^9\) Even were one to assume that at some time in the early Hellenistic epoch there existed a “Jewish” temple on the site of ‘Arâq el-Emîr, there can be no doubt that it would have been a dissident temple; see Mommiglano, \textit{Quinto contributo} (above, note 7) 606.
parallels. We are told in Massekhet Kuttim, cap. II, ad fin., that it is by giving up their attachment to Mount Gerizim that the Samaritans can gain re-admission to the fold,\textsuperscript{10} and we are, I submit, entitled to compare Samaritan separatism (as exemplified in the building of their own temple) to the hostility of the Qumran sectarians towards the Temple in Jerusalem. It was this, rather than their idiosyncratic messianic and apocalyptic doctrines, that marked the latter off as sectarians who would in the end sever themselves from the community of the House of Israel.\textsuperscript{11} The temple on Mount Gerizim was the clearest possible monument to the separation of the Samaritans from the body of the Jewish people.

In view of the strong evidence for the concentration of the sacrificial cult in Jerusalem it is all the more noteworthy that at the very time of the religious and national re-awakening associated with the resistance to Seleucid rule in Palestine there existed a Jewish temple in Egypt established by a member of the high-priestly family descended from Simon Justus. This temple was founded, in the second century B.C., under Ptolemy VI Philometor (c. 186–45; regn. 180–45) by a son of the High Priest Onias III. This man is conventionally referred to as Onias IV, although he did not, in fact, serve as High Priest in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{12} He had fled to Egypt (c. 162–60) for reasons which are not wholly clear. Josephus reports fear of the Seleucid ruler Antiochus IV Epiphanes.\textsuperscript{13} Tcherikover suggests the enmity towards Onias of Jewish hellenizers in Jerusalem as motivating his flight.\textsuperscript{14} According to rabbinic accounts, his flight was occasioned by an intra-family feud about the succession to Onias III.\textsuperscript{15} In Egypt Onias was hospitably

\textsuperscript{10} Мы не должны быть обмануты романтизмом, археологически-напитанным ностальгией и энтузиазмом, возникающими из находок в пустыне Иудеи, думать, что сектанты были действительно иудеями. У них были сильные иудейские корни, как у смиритов и христиан; и как пишут о втором поколении в Средневековье, они усугубляли вражду к нормальной традиции иудаизма. Поскольку мы не утеряли эти находки, это придает нашему знанию прошлое доли того же рода, каким иудаизмом были написаны в античной литературе. Мы, в то же время, наше необдуманное, чтобы принять этих сектантов как иудеев, и забыть, что они были иерархами и врагами иудаизма в Иерусалиме.

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\textsuperscript{13} Josephus, \textit{BJ} 1. 33, 7. 423, \textit{AJ} 12. 387. Antiochus IV had died in 164/3. In the BJ, though not in the AJ, Josephus may have been thinking of Onias III; see Tcherikover (previous note) 276.

\textsuperscript{14} See Tcherikover, \textit{CPJ} I (1957) 2, who, however (ibid., note 12] 44), points out that Onias IV may himself have been a hellenizer in spite of his opposition to the hellenistic party in Jerusalem.

\textsuperscript{15} PT Yoma 43d and BT Menahot 109b ff.
received by Ptolemy and Cleopatra, who granted him some land in the nome of Heliopolis. There he founded a military colony for Jewish settlers and a temple for their use. These settlers may have come with him from Palestine or he may have raised a Jewish military force after his arrival in Egypt; indeed he may have founded the colony and the temple as late as 145 B.C., shortly before Ptolemy's death.16 There is no foundation for the suggestion that Ptolemy Philometer intended to found a cultic centre for the Jews in the Delta to counterbalance the importance and attraction of the temple in Jerusalem,17 and there is no evidence whatsoever that the temple of Onias had at any time more than merely local significance.18 The temple at Leontopolis existed until after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem; it was demolished on the orders of Vespasian in A.D. 73.19

Apart from the rabbinic references (see below), our main source for the history of Onias and his temple is Josephus.20 The temple is never mentioned by Alexandrian writers and it seems that Egyptian Jewry was not much interested in this Palestinian immigrant foundation.21

We have a number of rabbinic reports referring to the shrine of Onias.22 These regularly describe the temple of Onias as בֵּית חוֹלֵיוֹן. The word תְּרוֹם, though it does not univocally = temple, naturally is capable of being used in a phrase referring to a temple; cf., e.g., בֵּית אלּוֹרָהוֹן, בֵּית הוֹיָא.

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16 See Tcherikover (above, note 12) 279 f.
17 H. Kees, "Οφίον," RE XVIII.1 (Stuttgart 1939) 477-79.
18 This should be weighed in any consideration of the argument put forward by A. Momigliano (Aegyptus 12 [1932] 161-72, and esp. 170-71) that there existed or that there may have existed a Greek translation of the Old Testament in the Temple of Leontopolis different from the Septuagint; that this version ("accolta o curata dai sacerdoti leontopolitanì") was circulating in Egypt in competition with the LXX; and that the legend of the Greek translation of the Bible propagated by the author of the Letter of Aristaeas had a polemical purpose directed against the Leontopolitan temple. I know of no evidence that would support any part of this argument. In any case, it is to be noted that Momigliano relies not only on a fairly late date for the work of Ps.-Aristaeas but, more seriously, on what seems to me a vastly inflated estimate of the importance of the Leontopolis temple; we cannot even say that the population for whom this temple was built was Greek-speaking rather than Aramaic-speaking; for all we know they spoke Egyptian. Though there is evidence that the Greek Bible was read in the countryside in the second century B.C., it seems clear on the whole that the Jews living in the chora were assimilating fast to their Egyptian-speaking neighbours. See Tcherikover, CPJ I (1957) 43-46.
19 BJ 1, 7, 421.
21 We may disregard Sibylline Oracles 5. 501, 507, where some scholars have seen an allusion to the temple of Onias; see Tcherikover (above, note 12) 499 n. 28 and, more generally, idem in CPJ I (1957) 20 f. and 44 ff., with notes (and literature cited in his n. 117) and idem, Jews and Greeks in the Hellenistic Period (Tel Aviv 1963) 220 ff. and nn. (Hebrew). Cf. P. M. Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria (Oxford 1972) I 83 with nn. 301 ff. (in vol. II, pp. 162 f.).
22 Mishna Menahot 13. 10, PT Yoma 43d, BT Menahot 109a ff., BT Megilla 10a, BT AZ 52b.
Interestingly, where the actual construction of the temple is reported, the word ἱερόν = altar is used, thus making it quite unmistakable that the reference is to a foundation meant to be used for the performance of sacrifices.24 Similarly, Josephus speaks of the temple as a ναός or ναώς and ιερόν; and in the same context he refers to Isaiah 19. 19 f. as predicting the κατασκευὴ τοῦ ιεροῦ. Isaiah actually has there בירוב הזרוק ליהו וושׁת. It is interesting that this same passage is quoted also in both Talmudim, in the same context.26 The LXX translates תַּהְabilidade correctly as θυσιαστήριον, and Josephus, too, knows that text: ἐσται θυσιαστήριον ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Κυρίῳ τῷ θεῷ (AJ 13. 68). A few paragraphs earlier (AJ 13. 64) Isaiah is said to have foretold that a ναός would be built in Egypt. Occasionally Josephus mentions a βωμός.27

There can be no doubt that both the rabbinic sources and Josephus are speaking about a temple, i.e. a cult place in which sacrifices were performed, not merely a meeting house for prayer and study, i.e. a synagogue.28

The temple of Onias is known to us as having been located at Leontopolis. Josephus mentions Leontopolis (in the name of Heliopolis), by that name, only in AJ 13. 65, in Onias’ petition addressed to Ptolemy VI Philometor and Cleopatra, and in 13. 70, in the sovereigns’ reply. The other passages in the works of Josephus refer only to the name of Heliopolis without further specification of the place. The repetition of the phrase containing the place-name in the royal reply to the petition simply conforms to what is a natural feature of chancery style, namely to repeat the formulations contained in the original petition. We are thus left with what is, in effect, a single occurrence of the name Leontopolis.29 Now, it is

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23 Cf., e.g., PT Yoma 43d.
24 PT Yoma 43d and BT Menahot 109b.
25 E.g. BJ 7. 424, 431 and 432.
26 Above, note 24.
28 Fraser’s repeated references to a “synagogue” at Leontopolis–Tell el-Yahoudiyah ([above, note 21] I 83, II 162–63 nn. 302 and 306) must be due to a lapsus calami; the point is that a synagogue is not a temple: The two serve different functions and have always had a different status from each other. This confusion is found also in the index (but not in the text or in the English original) of the French translation of E. R. Bevan’s Histoire des Lagides (Paris 1934) 438. In rabbinic literature I know of only one passage in which it appears that the writer has conflated a synagogue with a temple: In the late ספרת עצה וילניק (version II), published by A. Jellinek in Bet ha-Midrasch (3rd ed., repr. Jerusalem 1967) V 113–16 (see 115 and also [version I] IV 135), the language used is unmistakably conflated with that of the famous description of the great Alexandrian synagogue in Tosefta Sukka 4. 6 et alibi (see below, note 31); the author mentions an altar (in Alexandria) and speaks of sacrifices being performed there.
29 The correspondence quoted by Josephus is generally regarded as a Hellenistic forgery; see Tcherikover (above, note 12) 499 n. 30, who, though for a different purpose and in a different context, rightly notes that even a forged document may contain some kernel of
interesting that those rabinic sources that do name the location of the Onias temple speak of it as having been located in Alexandria. The Rabbis are certainly not confusing the temple of Onias with the Alexandrian Synagogue which is mentioned elsewhere in talmudic literature; on the contrary, in a number of passages they make it quite clear that they understand that the Onias foundation was a temple, a cult place in which sacrifices were performed, and we even find the opinion expressed that, whatever the status of that temple may have been, it was not an idolatrous temple, and some of the sacrificial acts performed there were, under certain circumstances, to be regarded as valid. It is thus inconceivable that the Rabbis might have confused the temple with the Alexandrian Synagogue.

On the other hand, though the possibility of a simple mistake concerning the location of the temple arising from guesswork or ignorance cannot be discounted, it is certainly possible that the Rabbis drew on their own contemporary knowledge that Leontopolis was in the early Byzantine age an alternative designation for Alexandria. The equation Leontopolis = Alexandria lends itself to confusion in both directions.

We are told by Stephanus of Byzantium (fl. probably c. 528–35) that “Alexandria was called Rhakotis, and Pharos, and Leontopolis ...” Similarly, Eustathius of Thessalonike (12th century) reports that Leontopolis was one of a number of alternative names for Alexandria.

Historical truth; thus, the name Leontopolis may well be correct. In any case, there seems to be no doubt about the reliability of the references to the location of the temple in the Hellenistic name, and it is generally accepted that the Onias temple was in fact located in the countryside, quite possibly at a place to be identified with the modern Tell el-Yehudiyyeh, at a distance of ca. 30 miles NE of Memphis. See R. Marcus on Josephus, AJ 13. 65 (LCL VII 258–59), with the literature there quoted, esp. Schürer (above, note 1) 3rd ed., III (1898) 97 ff. with note 25 (Engl. tr.: III. 1 145 f., esp. n. 33).

30 PT Yoma 43d, BT Menahot 109b.
31 Tosefta Sukka 4. 6, BT Sukka 51b, PT Sukka 5. 1 = 55 a–b; cf. S. Krauss, Synagogale Albertiümer (Berlin–Vienna 1922) 261 ff., 336.
32 See, e.g., Mishna Menahot 13. 10, BT Menahot 109a–b, BT AZ 52b, BT Megilla 10a.
33 RE s. v. “Leontopolis 10” and A. Calderini, Dizionario dei nomi geografici e toponomi dell’Egitto greco-romano I (Cairo 1935) 58.
34 Stephani Byzantii Ethnicorum quae supersunt ex recensione Augusti Meinekii I (Berlin 1849; repr. 1958) 70: ‘Αλεξάνδρεια πόλεις οκτώκαιδεκα. πρώτη ἡ Αἰγυπτία ἤτοι Λίβυςσα, ὅς οἱ πολλοί, ἀπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Φιλίππου. ἤσσων δὲ ὁ τὸν βίον τῆς Ἐλλάδος γράφας ἐν δ’ βιβλίῳ φησὶ “τὸν μὲν οὖν τόπον τῆς πόλεως ἵνα ἔξηγημοδοτήθη οὕτως
νήσος ἐπείτι τῆς ἐστὶ πολυκλύστερ ἐνί πόντῳ
Ἀγαπτόν προπάραθε, Φάρον δὲ ἐκ κυκλήσκουσιν.
(Homer, Od. 4. 354 f.)

Εἴληευες δὲ διαγράφειν τὸ σχῆμα τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονῶν· οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ λευκὴν τῆς ἀλοίπους διεγράφων, ὄρνθες δὲ καταπάντες τὰ ἀλκία αἰγίνης διηρροεῖν. ταράχθεις οὖν Ἀλεξάνδρος (sic) οἱ μᾶντες βαρθεῖν ἔλεγον πάντων γὰρ τὴν πόλιν τροφὴν γενήσεθαι. “
ταῦτα καὶ Ἀριστοκράτους· ἐκλήθη δὲ Ὀλυμπίας καὶ Φάρος καὶ Δεούττοποις δίᾳ τὸ τὴν τῆς Ὀλυμπίαδος γαστέρα ἐσφραγίσθαι λέοντος εἰκόνι. Cf. Appian, Anab. 3. 1–2, Plut. Alex. 2.
Eustathius clearly draws, directly or indirectly, on Stephanus of Byzantium (or his source?). It is thus evident that we have here not two testimonia but what is in fact one. Such papyrological evidence as we have consists of the single letter lambda in a fourth-century papyrus, where we read εις την 'Αλεξάνδρειαν ἶτοι Λεοντόπολιν. It is manifest that this reading of the papyrus, so far from establishing or confirming the identification of Alexandria with Leontopolis, is itself based on that identification.

The evidence for the alternative name of the great city is thus seen to be extremely meagre; but if the Rabbis indeed confused Alexandria with Leontopolis this very confusion, though leading them into error, would paradoxically enable us to see in it a further piece of evidence, both for the use of Leontopolis as an alternative name for Alexandria and for the placing of the Oniad temple in Leontopolis (the latter, as we have seen, attested otherwise only by Josephus, AJ 13. 65–70). Since our Greek evidence is so poor on both these points any additional evidence from rabbinic sources is to be welcomed, more especially as our talmudic texts are completely independent of the Byzantine tradition. We must, of course, remember that neither the Jerusalem Temple nor that of Onias at Leontopolis existed any longer at the time the Rabbis discussed the sacrifices performed there. Their discussions are thus purely academic, and though they will have been nourished by plentiful and zealously preserved information about the activities of the Jerusalem priesthood, they cannot have drawn on more than scattered memories of the Oniad foundation. Hence, since in their period Leontopolis was known to be an alternative name for Alexandria, the great city with its vastly numerous Jewish population, any fleeting memory of the name Leontopolis in connexion with the temple of Onias, or any mention in

4–5. My colleague Dr. Deborah Gera has reminded me of Herodotus 6. 131, where a somewhat similar motif occurs in a story concerning the mother of Peneles; cf. Plut. Per. 3. 2.

Eustathius (C. Müller [ed.], Geographi Graeci Minores II [Paris 1882] 261) writes on the words Μακεδόνιον πτολεμαίον (which appear in the text of Dionysius Periegetes, line 254 = Geographi Graeci Minores II 116): δ’ ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ Μακεδονος Αλεξάνδρου ομόνυμος πόλις, εν ἦ και ἐπάφη ... ἀριθμοῦνται δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις Αλεξάνδρεια υπὲρ τὰς δεκακοτώ τούτων μίας καὶ αὐτῆς, πόλις Λίβυσσα ἤτοι Λιγυπτία. τούτων δὲ καὶ ἄλλως μὲν ὅνομας διαφόροις κληθήναι φασι ποτε, ὀνομασθήναι δὲ καὶ Λεοντόπολιν διὰ τὸν τῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος καὶ τούτῳ Αλεξάνδρου (?), ἤς ἡ γαττὴρ ἐφραγμένη λέοντος εἰκόνα λέγεται, κ.τ.λ. For the possible sources of Stephanus, for the question why the great city was called Leontopolis, and for related matters, see C. Müller (ed.), Pseudo-Callisthenes (Paris 1865) xix f., with notes; also C. Müller (ed.), Scripores Alexandri Magni (Paris 1865) 160 (Iason Argivus, fr. 2).

35 We have only an epitome, dating from between the sixth and the tenth centuries, of the Ethnica; it has been suggested (J. F. Lockwood in OCD s.v. "Eustathius") that Eustathius may in fact draw in his commentary on the complete text of Stephanus. R. Browning in the same work (2nd ed., p. 1012) suggests that Eustathius used the surviving epitome of the Ethnica.


37 The reading Λεοντόπολιν, though attractive and quite possibly right, does not by necessity impose itself and is not universally accepted: see P. J. Sijpesteijn, "Notes on Two Papyri," ZPE 87 (1991) 257–58, who suggests εις την 'Αλεξάνδρειαν ἶτοι Αιμένα μέγαν τοῦ Εὐνόστου].
some recondite source of the location of that temple in that place, could easily explain the confusion—but only if the temple was really located in Leontopolis.

There are further facts to be considered: Leontopolis was located in the Heliopolitan nome. By a curious and in itself unremarkable coincidence the city of Heliopolis (in Hebrew called יְרוֹם) bore the Egyptian name yw nw. It is manifest that to the eyes and ears of users of Aramaic or Hebrew this would constitute an irresistible invitation to confuse the Egyptian name with the Semitic name for “Greek” or “Greece,” ywn, which itself was sometimes confused with Alexandria: See the passages cited below from Tosefta Nidda 4. 17 and BT Nidda 30b.

The Hebrew/Jewish Aramaic/Syriac (ד)אֶלֶּה בֵּית נִדָּתָא, like the Greek Ἀλεξάνδρεια and the Latin Alexandria (-ia), can refer to towns other than the great city: Thus, e.g., an Egyptian city called Ρ,', mentioned a number of times in the Hebrew Bible, is generally identified by the Septuagint translators with Diospolis (Thebes in Upper Egypt). Some rabbinic sources

38 Gen. 41. 45, 41. 50, 46. 20. Cf. also Ez. 30. 17, where the vocalization is different, but see Symmachus and Theodotion for the Greek transcription אָיו. (The Septuagint has "Heliopolis.")

39 Jer. 46. 25: Hebr. קָנָד; for LXX, see Jer. 26. 25; Syr. קָנָד(ר). It may be of interest that in Ez. 30. 17 קָנָד the LXX has ναονίσκου Ἰάκου πόλεως. The vocalization of קָנָד need not detain us here; but it is noteworthy that the Peshitta translates קָנָד כָּנָד בֵּית נִדָּת. My colleague Professor Jonas Greenfield has pointed out to me that the Peshitta reading קָנָד in Ez. 30. 17 may be due to a misreading of the Hebrew מֵיסָד, the last word in the preceding verse (left untranslated there). Ez. 30. 14: Hebr. קָנָד(ב); LXX Διόσπουλος; Syr. דֶּבֶר(ב). Ez. 30. 15: Hebr. קָנָד LXX Μέμψεις; Syr. מְדָר(ר). Ez. 30. 16: Hebr. קָנָד(ר); LXX Διόσπουλος; Syr. מְדָר(ר). Nah. 3. 8: Hebr. קָנָד(ד); LXX Αμών; Syr. מְדָר(ד). See also the citations in R. Payne Smith, Thesaurus Syriacus 1 (Oxford 1879) s.v. קָנָד, coll. 1579–80 (from medieval Syriac-Arabic lexicographers): e.g., מְדָר קָנָד. The reference is clearly to our passage in Nah. 3. 8. For other identifications with Alexandria, see ibid. מֶמֶסֶיס in Ez. 30. 15 seems to be based on the reading מִזְּרִיא (instead of the masoretic מַזָּר), borrowed from 30. 13 (Hebr. קָנָד Syr. סַמְר מַנָד), which is translated there by מֶמֶסֶיס (LXX). The LXX translation in Nah. 3. 8 is, of course, no more than a transcription of the second part of the double name in the Hebrew Vorlage. It is to be noted that rabbinic sources understand the reference in Nah. 3. 8 too to be to Alexandria (see Pesikta Rabbati 156b, cited below). Note also that extra-septuagintal Greek translators did not hesitate to transcribe the Hebrew name קָנָד in one way or another rather than to give a Greek equivalent for it: Nó (Symmachus in Ez. 30. 14, 15), Nóς (Theodotion, ibid.), Nóα (Aquila in Ez. 30. 15); compare also Aquila: בְּאָשָׁו for הָאָשָׁו in Ez. 30. 14. (The place-name מֶמֶסֶיס stands variously for מַזָּר, קָנָד or מְדָר in the Septuagint; for examples see Supplement to Hatch and Redpath, Concordance to the Septuagint 112b, s.v. מֶמֶסֶיס.)
on the other hand identify רָחַב as anachronistically with Alexandria: אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי.

Both the Greek and the Syriac traditions have preserved the memory of the multiplicity of places called Alexandria: Stephanus of Byzantium (above, note 34): 'Ἀλεξάνδρεια πόλεις ὀκτώκαθέσσα (cf. Eustathius of Thessalonike [above, note 34]: ... ἀριθμοῦνται δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις Ἀλεξάνδρεια ὑπὲρ τὰς δεκακότων). For Syriac, see Payne Smith, col. 209, s.v. אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי for two towns called Alexandria: אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי = the city in Egypt and אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי = Alexandretta (Iskenderun).

It is also the case that, occasionally, Alexandria, in Greek, Hebrew and Aramaic (both Jewish and Christian), may refer to the whole land of Egypt, or, rather, may stand for it, pars pro toto. Thus, Payne Smith (ibid.) also cites the use in Syriac of the name Alexandria pro tota Aegypto. Similarly, in Lamentations Rabba 1. 5. 246 (p. 65 Buber) it seems easy to understand דַּרְבּוֹת אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי as referring to the commander of the troops from Egypt as a whole and not only of those from Alexandria. So also, one may want to read in Tosetta Nidda 4. 17 בָּנְפֶסְטָר מְלֶבֶת אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי (= הַלְּבָסְנֶדְרֵי) instead of אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי of the older editions, or instead of הַלְּבָסְנֶדְרֵי in the parallel passages (both in BT Nidda 30b: הַלְּבָסְנֶדְרֵי and, on the same page, אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי); or instead of הַלְּבָסְנֶדְרֵי as read by Zuckermandel (p. 645).

Note also that Rashi on BT AZ 8b (בָּנְפֶסְטָר מְלֶבֶת אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי) writes, citing the passage in BT Nidda 30b, בַּלְּבָסְנֶדְרֵי בַּלְּבָסְנֶדְרֵי. This suggests either the ease with which the place-name Alexandria insinuates itself into such a context or the possibility that Rashi read a text different from that in our printed editions.

But all this does not, in the end, affect our problem: One is not surprised that Alexandria may, as is so often the case elsewhere, stand for the country of which it is the chief city; nor that its name may be applied confusedly and thus wrongly, because of the great number of places that bear the same name. What is argued here is simply that the confusion that we are dealing with is of a peculiar kind, namely that occasionally the name Alexandria, in our rabbinic sources, comes in place of another name which

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40 See Pesikta 63b, with Buber’s note ad loc., Pesikta Rabbati, cap. 17, p. 87a and see also p. 156b (Friedmann—[Ish Shalom]), Gen. R. 1. 1 (p. 1 Theodor/Albeck), Targum to Ezekiel 30. 14–16, Targum to Jeremiah 46. 25, Targum to Nahum 3. 8.

41 RE has twenty-one entries for places called Alexandria.

42 Such confusions are easy in our sources: Thus in Seder Olam Rabba some editions are said (see Krauss, Lehnnabter 1 55, s.v. אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי) to have in chapter 30 the spelling אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי for the proper name אֲלָבָסְנֶדְרֵי.

43 Cf., in Arabic, مِصْر for Egypt and also for its capital; similarly al-Shām for Syria and its capital. See also Syriac מִשְׁרָא, which is used both for the whole of Egypt and for any city which may at any given time be its capital, e.g. Fustāt (Old Cairo) or Alexandria.
is itself, in the early Byzantine age, an alternative name of the Ptolemaic capital.

Considered by themselves the points made here are small and perhaps insignificant. Nonetheless, if I am right in suggesting that the confusion of the Rabbis arose out of the fact that Alexandria was also called, in their time, Leontopolis, this would make it unnecessary to suspect the Rabbis of completely uninformed guesswork. This alone would be a conclusion of some value. But there is more: If the suggestion made here is indeed acceptable, then this would add strength to the confidence with which we expect to find in the recesses of rabbinic literature a good deal more such material. Handled with discretion and discrimination, this is likely to provide confirmation and corroboration of what we learn otherwise only through remarks dispersed here and there over pagan and Christian writings of antiquity and the early Byzantine age.

The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

JOHN GLUCKER

éan mên ouân ës eîpou ekáteron láxh tìmphâs aiòsthêsîs te kai noûs, ánâghke tôn kekhpîmêon årkhphérios émê eûerphetêiôsai; éan de pórrw tôn lógou àpò noû kai aiôsthêsou apagagôn patéra mên tôn genhînanta < tôn> kósmon, múterâ de tîn sofian, di' ës åpetelêshê to pâv, tîmphâs âziôshâs, aútôs ev peîsh; ñeitai gár ouðènôs oui te ël phrêh phs Òó te ëkra kai panteîhs epîstêmê, ëste tôn thêrpesiûkô

tûtpou mî touc thêrpesiûmous ouc anvndêeis ëntas álîl. ësauton mâlîsta òphelên.â éipikê mên gár kai skulakuetikê, epîstêmê thêrpesiûs ëh mên òppou ëh de skulakôn ouûsa, b póriêti tôcês ëzôi tâ òphêlima, c dò ôn êkeîna deîtai d mh póriçouso de òmpleîn án dokoin. tîn de eûsbêeian thêou thêrpesiûn ëpârchousan g ou tëmis xoristikê eipein tûn òphelhsonînton tâ thêion. h òphelêtai gár ëpô ouðênôs, i âte mhìte ënôdeis ëvn j mhìte tinôs tê en ëpâsin aútou kriîtîn perûkîtôs ñnhshiai, touvnantôn de tê sômpana suvekhôs kai ápavûtous òphelên. k ëste ëtan tê eûsbêeian lêgoumen eînai thêou thêrpesiûn, b ñpîresiûn tîvâl toiaûtun fâmên, ëpôiûan dôuloi depsotaiîs tê kelenômenon årkônus poineî ëngwôkôtês ñpîrêtoûs. m dîoiêi de pâlîn, ëtti oî mên depsotai ñpîresiûs ënôdeis, ë de ëthês ou xhrêios. n dòste êkeînous mên tâ òphelhsonûa aútouc ñpîrêtoûai, tô dé ouðên êzô fylodespôtoû gnavôi parêzouj; bëlêtôiwai mên gár ouðên evrûsousai, o tôv ðespotikôn pàntwv éz årkhês ënton arîstow, mëgalâ dé aútouc ënhwousi gnowriotñhêi thê phromboûmenoi. (Philo, *Quod Deterius* 54–56)

a. 14e1–2: òvn êkeînou tughanounvsin deûmenoi par' ëmewn. 14e2–4: ou gár tekhnikon ëv' ën eî ñwpôrphorein didônta to tauta òvn ouðèn deîtai.

b. 12e5: tô peri thên tôv thêð'n thêrpesiûn kte. 

c. 13b8–9: ëp' ågath dînì estî kai ôpheliá tou thêrpesiûmouns.

I have followed the Philonian text with parts of the relevant pages of Plato's *Euthyphro*, where verbal similarities are close enough. To the best of my knowledge, Professor John Dillon is the only one so far who has noted the similarities. His context is that of “the canon of two virtues,” and he only notes briefly: “That Philo had the *Euthyphro* well in mind is shown by the echoes of *Euth*. 13A ff. in *Det*. 55–6.”¹

This, however, is only the beginning of our story. When Philo is echoing a source—even Plato—what matters is what he does, in each case, with his Platonic materials. Even on a cursory reading, it should be clear that these pages of Plato have passed through a serious transformation. *Euthyphro* is an aporetic dialogue, where questions and refutations are the order of the day, and where answers, in the few cases where they are given, are not answers to the central questions, but usually part of the refutation. Philo provides us, within the space of one page or less, with more answers (and no questions whatsoever) than the whole of Plato’s dialogue. This, as well as Philo’s own context and theological framework, would account for the many differences between his passage and its “source.” Let us point out some.

1. Philo says clearly and repeatedly that God lacks nothing. Plato’s Euthyphro would take it for granted that one cannot make the gods better

(e.g. 13c6–10); but he does initially accept that one can offer them ὄφελία (13c4–5)—and, indeed, that there are things which the gods require from us (14e1–5), with the consequence that ὄσιός is εἰμπορικὴ τέχνη (14e1–5), however grudgingly he admits that. It is only under more pressure from Socrates that he realizes that the gods cannot obtain any ὄφελία from us (15a5–6).

2. Philo takes it for granted that εὐσέβεια is θεοῦ θεραπεία. This definition (of εὐσεβές καὶ ὄσιον—whereas ὄσιον and its cognates are entirely absent from our passage of Philo), offered by Euthyphro at 12d5–8, is the one refuted by Socrates from that point in Plato’s dialogue until the crisis of 14a11.

3. In the course of that refutation, by Socrates, of Euthyphro’s ἡ τῶν θεῶν θεραπεία, Euthyphro offers ἡμπερ...οί δοῦλοι τούς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν as an explanation of this particular θεραπεία. This is not so much refuted as brushed aside by Socrates, who, almost with a sleight of hand, concentrating on ύπηρετική, moves on to another example. Philo takes it for granted that εὐσέβεια is θεραπεία θεοῦ in this sense: ὀποίαν δοῦλοι δεσπότας τὸ κελευόμενον ἀόκνως ποιεῖν ἐγνωκότες ὑπηρετοῦσιν.

4. Philo’s idea that those who serve God properly do so only for their own improvement and benefit would be incomprehensible to the Euthyphro of Plato’s dialogue—and, on this point, Euthyphro would not be eccentric, or different from the average Athenian or pagan in general.  

Yet, perhaps surprisingly at first sight, some of those points, made so positively and decisively by Philo, are points which may well emerge (other things, between Plato and Philo, being unequal) out of reading between the lines of Plato’s dialogue.  

The idea that the gods lack nothing and require nothing of us is, of course, alien to Euthyphro’s whole attitude to life. He is suing his father because he is afraid of μισομα (4b7 ff.). For him, τὰ ὄσια (14a11 ff.—forgetting yet again that Socrates had asked him at 5c–d for the one ὄσιον, always τοῦτον...ἐν πάσῃ πράξει...αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, and that, at 6d10, he had reminded him that he does not want τὰ πολλὰ ὄσια, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδος) consist in the correct knowledge of acts which please the gods and, therefore, save individuals and cities, while their opposites destroy them. Yet even Euthyphro, under pressure from Socrates (and with the help of the socially unpleasant ἐμπορικὴ τέχνη) asks at last: ἀλλ’ οὔτε, ὃ

2 But Philo’s point would have been perfectly intelligible to some Palestinian Sages. Antigonus of Socho used to say: “Be not like the servants who serve the master in the expectation of receiving a reward,” etc. (Mishna Aboth 1. 3). This is not to say that Philo knew this saying, or Hebrew—problems which should not concern us here—merely that such an idea was probably current in Jewish pious circles at the time.

3 In what follows, I shall draw heavily on a book in preparation on Plato’s Euthyphro by Mr. Ivor Ludlam and myself, and I hope to be more precise and detailed there.
Sókrates, tóus theous ópheléithai áπò toútwn ò par’ ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; (15a4–6). In response to Socrates’ further question he explains that we only give them τιμή kai γέρα.

Socrates’ refutation, from now on, is based on the distinction, accepted by Euthyphro, that any “gifts” we give to the gods are either ὀφέλμοι or φίλα. Since ὀφέλμοι is out, φίλον remains. But we have already refuted the definition of τὸ ὀσιον as τὸ θεοφιλές, in various stages and senses (6e10–11b8). Thus, the dialogue ends in ἀπορία.

But hold. Have we really, from Euthyphro’s outburst at 14a11–b7, been discussing τὸ ὀσιον, or was it rather τὸ εὐσεβῆς? Plato’s Socrates is, in some measure, responsible for this confusion. At 5c8 he starts his request for a definition with ποίον τι τὸ εὐσεβῆς φῆς ἐνναὶ καὶ τὸ ἁσεβῆς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων;—and then passes, almost imperceptibly, to τὸ ὀσιον alone, whereas τὸ εὐσεβῆς is not mentioned again until 12e. There, the combined εὐσεβῆς τε καὶ ὀσιον is employed by Euthyphro in his definition, but not before Socrates had asked, τὸ ποίον μέρος τοῦ δίκαιον ὀσιον ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἁσεβείας γράφεσθαι. Euthyphro falls into the trap, since he, unlike Socrates, makes no distinction between acts like prosecuting a suspected murderer and sacrificing. For him, both are equally done for the sake of divine reward and for eschewing divine punishment.

Plato, however, has no intention of confusing his perceptive reader (and he writes for none else). Such a reader has noticed that even Euthyphro (4b9) has conditioned ὀσιον in his particular case on εἴτε ἐν δίκη ἐκστεινεν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μῆ, thus paving the way, even at that early stage, to Socrates’ suggestion (11e4 ff.) that ὀσιον is part of δίκαιον. This had been brought out by Socrates’ argument (7b2 ff.) that if the gods quarrel among themselves, it is about τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν (7d1–2), a widespread contemporary expression for what we, after Aristotle, would call ethical problems4—but an expression which contains τὸ δίκαιον. At 8b6 ff. Euthyphro is certain of the gods’ agreement that a murderer should be brought to justice, and Socrates convinces him that all men agree as well. It is, I think, because of this close connection between ὀσιον and δίκαιον that Euthyphro agrees (10e1–2) ὦτι . . . τὸ . . . ὀσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλείσθαι [ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν] ὦτι ὀσιον ἐστιν—and not the opposite. This would make no sense if applied to prayers, sacrifices and εὐσεβεία in general, whose whole existence would be meaningless without the gods as recipients.

Yet from 14a11 to the end of the dialogue, the discussion had been turned by Euthyphro (as Socrates hints at 14b8–c6) from acts of justice with religious overtones to acts of pure worship—that is, from ὀσιον to εὐσεβῆς. This would imply that the final refutation, relying as it does on Euthyphro’s

4 On this and related issues, see my forthcoming article, “Τὰ ὀνόματα τῆς ἠθικῆς πρὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους,” to be published (with a brief English summary) in the Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Greek Philosophy, Samos, August 1990.
admission at 10e1–2, is not valid if applied to acts of ritual like prayers and sacrifices. Even here, one could claim that if such things are τοῖς θεοῖς φίλα, the gods need them in some way and are somehow made βελτίων for them. But if we take 14e10–15a10 to imply that, since the gods give us all the good things we have, they deserve honor and respect from us even though they need, and get, nothing out of them, we would be getting near enough to Philo’s position—without, of course, Philo’s transcendental one God, and without Philo’s idea, so central to his thought, that worshiping God is a step in a man’s progress towards his aim in life, knowledge of God.

Would all this imply that Philo had unravelled so much of the dramatic and dialectic side of this aporetic dialogue? That, for example, he saw the distinction between εὐσέβεις and ὁσιον; understood that the final ἀπορία applied only to the latter and did not refute the former; that it was the former which needed refuting in the last part of the discussion—or even the “small detail,” that the example of slaves serving their masters has not been really refuted? I doubt it. Even a brief glimpse at Leisegang’s indices will remind us that, for Philo, εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης are one and the same virtue. From examples which can be brought by the bushel I cite only one clear one. At Spec. Legg. 4. 135 we have περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἡγεμονίδος τῶν ἀρετῶν, εὐσεβείας καὶ ὁσιότητος. It is, I suspect, precisely because Philo makes no distinction between εὐσέβεια and ὁσιότης, and because he does not read the dialogue as drama—how many did in his age?—that he can take for granted what Euthyphro admits only under pressure, that God cannot benefit from anything we do; that he can accept (and extend in his own language) Euthyphro’s description of θεραπεία as the one given by slaves to masters—indeed, that he can retain θεραπεία θεοῦ (for Plato’s θεοῦ, of course) as the definition of . . . but of what? Of εὐσέβεια, what else? This may not be very far from sentiments expressed by Plato’s Socrates elsewhere; see especially Phaedo 62b1–8. But once again, within Philo’s general framework of man’s progress from worship of God to a different life consisting of contemplating God, this acquires a new dimension.

Philo has prepared the ground. From 46 on, the argument has been that the virtuous man, symbolized by Abel, cannot be killed in any sense by the earthly “sophist” Cain—and was not killed even on a plain ῥῆτη ἐρμηνεία (47). At 49 we are told that the wise man lives an incorruptible life by dying to the corruptible life. That is, the wise man does himself good by living the life of striving after God. The argument from ποιῶν and πᾶσχον in 49 may already echo Euthyphro 10a–d, but I doubt it. There, only πᾶσχον is mentioned at c3–4. It is more likely to be of Aristotelian or Stoic provenance.5 Certainly, the distinction between διεστηκότα and ἦνωμένα at 50 is Stoic.6 But once we have shown that the soul is one unit, where τὸ

5 See, e.g., SVF II 161. 30 and context.
6 See the translators’ note in the Loeb edition of Philo, II 494, on 49.
ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον are one and the same, what better example than the greatest of virtues, ἐνσέβεια?

For some of Plato’s dialogues we have ample ancient evidence: quotations, references, verbal reminiscences and paraphrases, beginning sometimes with Aristotle and Xenocrates and including papyri, Cicero, Plutarch, Church Fathers and other authors. One need only look at the “apparatus of citations” in the text of Dodds’ great edition of Gorgias for such a catalogue. Other dialogues are less fortunate. For Euthyphro our only pieces of ancient evidence—apart from its inclusion in the lists of Aristophanes and Thrasyllus—have so far been Plutarch, De Genio Socratis 10 (Moralia 580d), Diogenes Laertius 2. 29 and Numenius ap. Euseb. PE 13. 5 (fr. 30 Leemans = 23 des Places). This scarcity of ancient evidence was one of the grounds—when this was the fashion around the middle of the last century—used by those who wished to athetize the dialogue. Chief among those athetizers was the—then young—Friedrich Ueberweg, who took the scantiness of ancient testimony as his starting-point, and went on to suggest, on “internal grounds,” that Euthyphro was a forgery—an early one, since it was already Platonic to Aristophanes—and to offer the obscure Pasipho of Eretria as the likely culprit. The fact—I hope we have shown it is a fact—that another ancient author, a contemporary of Thrasyllus and earlier than Plutarch, Numenius and Diogenes, has also made use of this dialogue, would make no difference to an athetizer, if one is still around. Philo does not mention Plato—he may have read it as someone else’s work. In any case, a Pasipho, a Simon the Shoemaker, or any other Socratic whose name is known to us, would do for an early forger. But I still find it almost aesthetically satisfying to discover another reader of this dialogue.

How does Philo make use of these pages of Euthyphro? Not, I believe, with Plato’s (or Pasipho’s) text before him. Not just because he does not follow, in his reminiscences, the order of Plato’s text; he is under no obligation to do so in what is not expressly a paraphrase. Nor is it because

7 See M. Croiset (ed.), Platon, Oeuvres Complètes I (Paris 1946) 179.
8 For a comprehensive bibliography (for its time) on this and other issues related to Euthyphro, see E. Wagner, “Über Platons Euthyphron, zur Frage seiner Echtheit und zu seiner Erklärung,” in Festschrift Ludwig Friedlaender (Leipzig 1895) 438–55, esp. 438–39. On the whole of that fashion of athetizing dialogues and the methods and criteria employed, one of the best summaries is still that of S. Ribbing, Genetische Darstellung der platonischen Ideenlehre II: Untersuchungen ubber die Echtheit und die Reihenfolge platonischen Schriften (Leipzig 1864) 3–78. The book is a translation of the Swedish original of 1858, and therefore has no account of Ueberweg (see next note). For what is still one of the clearest and best argued rejections of this fashion, see G. Grote, Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates, 2nd ed. (London 1867) I 132–211.
9 F. Ueberweg, Untersuchungen ubber die Echtheit und Zeitfolge platonischen Schriften (Vienna 1861) 250–51; see also 201. I had the good fortune to read this book in London University Library in George Grote’s own copy, with his copious annotations in pencil. Very often, Grote underlines, and then copies in the margin, the expression “innere Gruende.” See his sardonic remarks on this issue in his Plato (previous note) 189–90, 198, 206.
he rewrites much of what is in Plato in his own words; Philo does that even
to Biblical passages he is expressly commenting on. The more pedestrian
and “external” clues are always better, and I think one exists here: Philo’s
and Plato’s dogs and their breeders. In Euthyphro 13a1–c10 Plato has only
κώνες and κυνηγητική. In our passage of Philo it is only σκύλακες and
σκυλακευτική.¹⁰ Now, σκύλας and σκυλάκιον and cognates exist in
Plato,¹¹ but only six times, as against the far more frequent κών and
cognates—and Plato knows only of κυνηγητική. Philo, according to
Mayer’s index, has κών sixteen times, κυνηγός and cognates seven times
(and never κυνηγητική), while he has σκύλας and cognates seven times
(and our σκυλακευτική). This is just what one would expect. In today’s
Greek, σκυλί(ον) and σκυλάκι(ον) are the normal words for “dog”; only
the most persistent purist would use κών. The “demotic” use of σκύλας—
originally meaning “puppy” or “puppy dog”—to mean simply “dog” started
probably in Plato’s time, or somewhat earlier. Like a few other “demotic”
words, it occasionally finds its way to Plato’s texts. Philo has already a few
more instances of σκύλας as against κών, most probably since, in his
time, he was already using more regularly the more “demotic” form. Yet
κών is more frequent even in his works—probably whenever he
remembers that this is the “good Attic” word. Had Philo the Platonic text
before him, he would have used the more δόξιμον καὶ Ἀττικόν word and
its cognates, since they were, in that case, in his text.¹²

What, then, did he have? The verbal reminiscences, sometimes almost
exact, suggest that he is not quoting from memory. The scarcity of ancient
testimonies to Euthyphro makes it unlikely that this dialogue was frequently
read and studied even by Platonists; after all, the same issues are dealt with
in a simple exposition, without the irritation of a dramatic and aporetic
dialogue, in Book 10 of the Laws. The same consideration would also
preclude a piece of a Middle Platonist handbook as Philo’s source. If I may
be bold, I would like to suggest that what Philo had before him were notes
he had taken—with his own interpretations and conclusions—some time
before he wrote this work, of the last pages of Plato’s Euthyphro. I do not
exactly remember now whether the suggestion that Philo may be using
notes de lecture from time to time when he seems to follow his sources has
been made, and I have not checked my von Armin, Bousset and Heinemann
for such a suggestion. That such notes were used by writers in late antiquity
is now commonly acknowledged. Scrolls were far too hard to roll and
unroll for every reference and reminiscence.

¹⁰ According to our dictionaries a hapax eiremenon in the whole of Greek literature.
¹¹ Rep. 2. 375a2, 7. 537a17, 539b6, 5. 451d7, Parm. 128c1.
¹² It is a pity that Phrynichus has no entry like κών δόξιμον· σκύλας ἀδόξιμον. The fact
that Plato has the “wrong” word—and in central dialogues like Republic and Parmenides—
may have deterred him.
In a famous passage of a famous book, the greatest Philonian scholar of the last generation wrote:

Nous considérons donc que la recherche de parallèles philosophiques grecs est pour l'historien de Philon une tâche à coup sûr extrêmement importante et, tant qu'elle est maintenue dans ses limites raisonnables, tout à fait fructueuse. Mais les contradictions mêmes qui la divisent montrent sans ambiguïté que pour une quête de Philon elle ne saurait venir qu'en deuxième ligne, à la façon d'une discipline auxiliaire.¹³

Yet even the most dedicated Philonian scholar today would hardly maintain that he or she can accept Philo's allegorical interpretation of Scripture as proper exegesis.¹⁴ Besides, not every reader of Philo reads him *sui ipsius causa*, or merely so. Many of us read Philo—with all our admiration for his personality and our sympathy for his dedication to a righteous way of life—also as one of our main sources for the works and opinions of Greek philosophers existing and available in his age—an age for which our philosophical sources, at least the contemporary ones, are not abundant. This is just the way in which most of us would read, say, many of the Church Fathers, with all their importance as evidence for the spirit of their age and their own community, also as sources of evidence for Hellenistic-Roman philosophy—and for the Pre-Socratics.

All of us have learned many things from the numerous works published by Miroslav Marcovich in the course of an astonishing career which is still at its zenith. One thing he has taught us is that fragments and testimonia have not been born equal. Even what passes, or is passed, for a fragment may be an exact quotation, a paraphrase, or what Marcovich has labelled "Respitit": a close, or not so close, verbal reminiscence. In comparison with work of this kind done by Marcovich himself, I would be happy if the present note is considered as "Respitit."

Tel-Aviv University


¹⁴ See Leopold Cohn's words in his general introduction to the great German translation (above, note 1) 4: "Die Methode seiner Ausgleichsbestrebungen war verfehlt, aber die Reinheit und Lauterkeit seines Charakters leuchtet aus seinen Schriften hell hervor."
Without Chrysippus there would have been no Stoa (D.L. 7. 183). Similar assessments of Chrysippus’ importance have been made in modern times, most notably by Hans von Arnim, who claimed that Chrysippus’ teachings influenced Stoicism for centuries, and that the Roman Stoa was mainly dependent on Chrysippus.¹ Von Arnim’s views were later supported by Max Pohlenz, who wrote, “die spätere Zeit kennt das stoische Lehrsystem nur in der Form, die Chrysipp ihm gegeben hat.”² Such evaluations of Chrysippus’ influence seem exaggerated, but they emphasize that, among Roman Stoics such as Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, Chrysippus had a position of prominence.³ Musonius Rufus, Epictetus’ famous teacher, seems an exception to the previous observation: In the fragments of his works, preserved largely by Stobaeus, there is no mention of Chrysippus.⁴ There are at least two ways of explaining this situation: First, Musonius’ works are fragmentary, and Chrysippus may well have been mentioned in what is now lost; and second, Chrysippus’ influence on the first and subsequent centuries A.D. was certainly not eclipsed by that of his predecessors, Zeno and Cleanthes, who are mentioned by Musonius. Indeed, since Epictetus himself mentions Chrysippus some fourteen times, it would be most odd if his teacher Rufus had not known Chrysippus’ doctrines.

This study’s scope is not, however, Chrysippus’ influence on later Stoics in general, but on Epictetus in particular. There are several reasons for focussing on Epictetus. First, reports of his teachings by Arrian are fairly extensive.⁵ Second, unlike Seneca or Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus was

² M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung I (Göttingen 1948) 32.
³ See Gould (above, note 1) 10–14 for a brief survey of Chrysippus’ importance for the Roman Stoa.
⁴ See the indices to C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae, ed. O. Hense (Leipzig 1905) 144–48.
⁵ Arrian’s role in recording Epictetus’ teachings has been much discussed. Perhaps the best conclusion is that of P. Stader, who believes that truth lies somewhere between K. Hartmann’s view that the Discourses are verbatim transcripts and that of T. Wirth, who believes that they are Arrian’s literary reworkings, so that one must not speak of Epictetus’ Discourses, but of
a full-time teacher of Stoicism, devoted to living and propagating his philosophy within a circle of students and visitors to Nicopolis. Moreover, Epictetus’ teachings, as reported by Arrian, provide a relatively coherent and limited scope for study, unlike the many and diverse writings of Seneca, or the introspective, personal musings of Marcus Aurelius. To be sure, Epictetus was not exactly a systematic thinker, and if Arrian’s transcripts can be trusted, much of his teaching seems ad hoc, devoted to individuals and to specific situations and topics. Still there are problems, not least of which is the fragmentary state of Chrysippus’ own voluminous works. Moreover, the methodological principle which affects Posidonian studies also affects Chrysippean, that is, whether to consider anything by Chrysippus if not explicitly assigned to him by an ancient source. In what follows, this principle will be observed, but there seems to be enough known about Chrysippus’ views to conjecture that some of Epictetus’ beliefs were probably influenced by him even if he is not explicitly mentioned. Indeed, as Adolf Bonhöffer argued, Epictetus’ doctrines were primarily those of the early or ancient Stoa, not those of later Stoics. But in his very admirable and learned studies Bonhöffer seldom discussed Chrysippus’ influence on Epictetus at length, and doctrines of Chrysippus are often treated together with those of Zeno, Cleanthes and other early Stoics. Bonhöffer’s works thus need careful reading, but even then no clear conception of Chrysippus’ influence on Epictetus emerges. Josiah Gould’s The Philosophy of Chrysippus has a brief account of Chrysippus’ influence on Epictetus, usually relying on Ludwig Edelstein’s methodological principle first applied to Posidonius, that is, only to elucidate teachings explicitly attributed to him. Except for Bonhöffer’s often brief and sporadic remarks, and some paragraphs in Gould’s book, there has been no comprehensive account of Chrysippus’ influence on Epictetus.

The most obvious feature of Chrysippus’ influence on Epictetus is that his works were read and discussed in Epictetus’ school at Nicopolis. At 1. 4. 14, in a diatribe on moral improvement or progress (προκόπη), Epictetus refers to On Impulse (Περὶ ὁμηρίζ), the title of a work by Chrysippus known only from this passage. Again, at 2. 17. 34, there is reference to Chrysippus’ On the Liar (Περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου), a subject on which he is

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7 The works of Bonhöffer referred to are: Epictet und die Stoa (Stuttgart 1890) and Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet (Stuttgart 1894). His Epiket und das Neue Testament (Giessen 1911) is not used in this study.
reported to have written six books addressed to Aristocreon, his nephew (D.L. 7. 196). Several other books were composed by Chrysippus on the Mentiens Argument (ibid.), and at 3. 9. 21 Epictetus mentions the syllogism called “The Liar,” most likely with Chrysippus in mind. ⁸ (There is also mention of “The Denier,” an argument whose formulation is unknown, though Chrysippus wrote two works on “Denial” [D.L. 7. 197].) In addition to references to these treatises, there are other passages which suggest that Chrysippus was read in Epictetus’ school: At 1. 4. 5 Epictetus remarks that making progress in virtue, and achieving serenity (εὐρωπέα), do not consist in reading many treatises of Chrysippus, or having knowledge of his thought; in order to be a philosopher one must do more than read Chrysippus (2. 16. 34), and “we shall never even come near to making progress, even if we go through all the introductions and treatises of Chrysippus, with those of Antipater and Archedemus thrown in” (2. 17. 40). It is especially important to value one’s moral purpose (προαίρεσις), and not to be concerned about making good impressions by having read Chrysippus or Antipater (3. 2. 13). It is also important to assimilate the principles learned, to show change in one’s own governing principle (τὸ ἱγεμονικόν), and not to worry about lecturing on Chrysippus’ doctrines “as no one else can” (3. 21. 7). Still another passage in the Encheiridion (49) suggests that not only were Epictetus’ students reading Chrysippus, but they boasted about comprehending him: “When someone gives himself airs because he can understand and interpret Chrysippus’ books, say to yourself, ‘If Chrysippus had not written obscurely (ἀσωφήως), this man would have no reason to give himself airs’.” As will be seen, if Arrian’s notes can be trusted, Epictetus himself may not always have understood Chrysippus.

For the moment, it is clear that the previous passages are evidence for the availability of Chrysippus’ works to Epictetus and to his students. He clearly knew some of Chrysippus’ writings at first hand⁹ and any assessment of Chrysippus’ influence on Epictetus needs to acknowledge this fact. But beside passages where Epictetus refers to Chrysippus’ treatises, there is other evidence for Chrysippus’ influence on Epictetus: For example, Aulus Gellius refers to Epictetus’ Discourses “arranged by Arrianus, and no doubt in agreement with writings of Zeno and Chrysippus” (quas ab Arriano

⁸ Recently, in “Προαίρεσις in Epictetus,” Ancient Philosophy 11 (1991) 111–35, R. Dobbin rightly remarked that Epictetus is one of the “best sources” for this argument, “which figured in the debate on fate and responsibility” (126).

⁹ The impression given by ancient authors of an impoverished Epictetus, e.g. Simplicius, who reports that “even his dwelling in Rome needed no bolt for the door since there was nothing within except for a straw mattress and rush mat” (In Epict. 9), merits some doubt. Since Arrian has Epictetus quoting from, or referring to, works of Chrysippus and other ancient authors, e.g. Xenophon and Plato, sometimes verbatim, it seems that either he or his students owned books, or had ready access to them. Indeed, his remarks at 4. 10. 26 suggest that he had a library, though he may simply put himself in the place of a prosperous inquirer. See Hijmans (above, note 6) 3.
digestas congreure scriptis Zenonis et Chrysippi non dubium est, 19. 1. 14–21). Whatever the faults of Gellius, he was learned, and his report seems in keeping with the general contents of Epictetus’ diatribes. A second passage, from Epictetus himself (1. 17. 16), is probably more important, but not as laudatory of Chrysippus as is sometimes suggested: Epictetus (or someone else) turned to Chrysippus as a guide to or interpreter of nature (ἐξηγητὴς τῆς φύσεως), but discovered that his views also needed interpretation.10 As Oldfather noted, Epictetus perhaps puts himself in place of a Roman pupil who would understand Chrysippus more easily if he had written in Latin.11 So far, Epictetus appears to be critical of Chrysippus: He wrote obscurely, and needs interpretation. Such a negative assessment of Chrysippus, however, may not be that of Epictetus himself, and is at variance with other passages where Chrysippus is mentioned. For example, in a somewhat obscure passage (1. 10. 8 ff.), Epictetus suggests that he read and reflected on certain texts before meeting his students, and so learned from Chrysippus about the administration or arrangement of the cosmos (ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις), and the place of rational beings in it. In a previously cited passage (1. 17. 17 f.), Chrysippus (or any Stoic thinker) is said to interpret nature (φύσις), but if the philosopher does not “follow” (ἀκολουθεῖ) it, he does not deserve praise. This and other remarks in his diatribes show Epictetus’ concern not only for right thinking, but also for right conduct.

Earlier it was suggested that Epictetus may not always have understood Chrysippus. Gould, for example, refers to “the bewildered Epictetus’ remark” at 2. 17. 34: “I wish to know what Chrysippus means in his treatise on The Liar.”12 But, as Oldfather correctly translated the passage, the remark is not Epictetus’, but that of an inquirer.13 That Gould took it as Epictetus’ own probably results from reliance on von Arnim’s quotation in SVF (II 280, cited by Gould) which gives no context, only the quotation itself, and so creates not only an impression that Epictetus misunderstood Chrysippus, but was not well versed in logic. Logic was, of course, Chrysippus’ specialty (more than a third of his writings, or some 311 volumes listed by Diogenes Laertius, dealt with logic), and he systematically promoted its study. Owing to the loss of his works it is thus often hard to know if complaints about Chrysippus’ obscurity or inconsistency arise because of the complexities of his logical studies, or because of his “inelegant,” or sometimes incorrect, Greek style. Moreover, there is not much evidence in Epictetus’ diatribes as to how logic was taught

10 See Gould (above, note 1) 13 and Bonhöffer, Epictet und die Stoa (above, note 7) 16 on this passage.
11 Oldfather (above, note 5) I 117 n. 3.
12 Gould (above, note 1) 88.
13 See Oldfather (above, note 5) I 346 for the old sophism: “If a person says, ‘I am lying,’ does he lie or tell the truth? If he is lying, he is telling the truth; if he is telling the truth, he is lying.”
in his school (perhaps by handbooks, as Benson Mates suggested\(^\text{14}\)), and, most important, the diatribes sometimes give an impression that Epictetus himself was not very interested in logic. 2. 19 suggests, for example, indifference to the subject: Sections 1–4 are an exposition of the “Master Argument,” of which only two of its three propositions can be held at the same time. Asked which pair he himself maintains, Epictetus replies: “I don’t know.” Pressed further, he replies: “I don’t know, and I was not made for this purpose—to test my own external impression (φαντασία) upon the subject...” But the belief that Epictetus disliked or was indifferent to logic is false. Indeed, in his own probably original three-fold division of philosophy (3. 2. 1 ff.), Epictetus includes logic under “avoidance of error and rashness of judgment, and, in general, about cases of assent.” There is little evidence to show that Epictetus neglected the study of logic; it was a vital part of his teaching, with difficult or much-discussed problems reserved for more advanced students. Indeed, the diatribes often presuppose knowledge of logic, e.g. at 4. 1. 61: “That is why we even worship those persons [e.g. Caesar] as gods; for we consider that what has power to confer the greatest advantage is divine. And then we lay down the wrong minor premiss: ‘This man has power to confer the greatest advantage.’ It needs must be that the conclusion from these premisses is wrong too.”

On the whole, Epictetus’ diatribes reveal no aversion or indifference to logic as pursued by Chrysippus, but a very “practical” interest in it. After all, logic was for Chrysippus and other Stoics the science of correct reasoning and speech, and was essential to proper human conduct. Finally, it is important to remember Phillip De Lacy’s thesis that the dominant principle of the organization of the diatribes is that ethics is subject to logical analysis, and that Epictetus remained faithful to Chrysippus.\(^\text{15}\) 1. 5–8, which deal, for example, with hypothetical arguments and the reasoning faculties, are an application of logic to ethics. But whether it can be concluded from these diatribes and other passages that all were arranged according to Stoic principles of logic, or that Arrian “veiled” the “logical structure of Epictetus’ ethics” under the diatribe form,\(^\text{16}\) seems unconvincing. Suffice it to note that Arrian (or Epictetus) did not omit consideration of logic because it was very much a prerequisite for understanding Stoic ethics and physics with their emphasis on rationality.

Thus far, it is clear that Epictetus knew Chrysippus’ works at first hand and that he was influenced by Chrysippus’ devotion to logic. But it is

\(^\text{14}\) See B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley 1961) 8, who notes that not long after Chrysippus handbooks commonly entitled “Introduction to Logic” (εἰσαγωγή διάλεκτική) had wide circulation.


\(^\text{16}\) De Lacy (previous note) 113
difficult to go further in assessing the impact of Chrysippus’ thought on Epictetus. Here Bonhöffer and Gould have made interesting, though not always persuasive, suggestions. According to Gould, for example, the distinction between “things in our power” (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) and “things not in our power” (τὰ οὐχ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) had a “pivotal position” in Epictetus’ thinking, and this is certainly correct (see, for example, the very beginning of the Encheiridion).17 If the report in Epiphanius Adv. haeres. 3. 2. 9 (3. 36) Diels p. 592 (= SVF I 177, p. 45) can be trusted, the distinction goes back to Zeno. Chrysippus also employed a similar distinction in his effort to reconcile human choice and fate. Indeed, Aulus Gellius quotes Cicero’s fragmentary De fato at Noct. Att. 7. 2. 15 (= SVF II 977): Chrysippus aesiuans laboransque, quonam <pacto> explicet et fato omnia fieri et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo. And Nemesius in De nat. hom. 35 (= SVF II 991) ascribes to Chrysippus a similar distinction between “what is in our power” (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν; cf. Cicero’s aliquid in nobis) and what happens according to fate (τὸ καθ’ εἰμαρμένην; cf. Cicero’s fato omnia fieri). Given Cicero’s report in Aulus Gellius, it seems certain that neither Gellius nor Nemesius was influenced by his knowledge of Epictetus in reporting Chrysippus’ distinction and, in fact, there are two passages in the diatribes which suggest that Epictetus was influenced by Chrysippus in making his famous distinction: At 3. 24. 81, in a diatribe directed against yearning for things not in our control (οὐχ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), he refers to philosophical principles (ἀπορήματα) presumably learned by his students, and asks: “How has Chrysippus wronged you that you should prove by your own conduct his labors to be useless?” It is tempting to think that what was learned involved the ἐφ’ ἡμῖν principle. In another diatribe, 2. 6, on indifference (ἀδιαφορία), Epictetus quotes Chrysippus at section 9 (= SVF II 191). What purport to be Chrysippus’ words are introduced by Epictetus’ remark that “if you always bear in mind what is your own and what is another’s, you will never be disturbed.” Then follows the Chrysippus quotation:

As long as the consequences are not clear to me, I cleave ever to what is better adapted to secure those things that are in accordance with nature; for God himself has created me with the faculty of choosing things. But if I really knew that it was ordained for me to be ill at this present moment, I would even seek illness; for the foot also, if it had a mind, would seek to be covered with mud.

It seems that underlying Epictetus’ initial remark and the supporting quotation of Chrysippus is really the more basic distinction between what one can control (“what is your own”) and what one cannot control (“what

17 See Gould (above, note 1) 142 ff. The distinction may ultimately have been a “general principle” of Hellenistic philosophy. See the excellent introduction by M. Hossenfelder to Die Philosophie der Antike III, ed. W. Röd: Stoa, Epikureismus, und Skepsis (Munich 1985) 11–41. Among the Grundzüge of Hellenistic philosophy may be Epictetus’ famous ἐφ’ ἡμῖν distinction.
belongs to another”). Certainly the Chrysippus quotation involves a
distinction between what is fated (and thus not in our power) and what is
chosen (and so presumably in our power). But, without going into
Chrysippus’ attempts to deal with fate and human choice, it seems that he
anticipated Epictetus’ later famous distinction between “what is in our
power” and what is not.

Yet another instance where Chrysippus’ “very doctrine” may inform
Epictetus is the latter’s belief that “of beings whose constitutions
(κατασκευασί) are different, the works and the ends (τέλη) are different” (1.
6. 16–17). Underlying this belief is possibly Chrysippus’ view (SVF III
20) that for each kind (genus) of living being there is a faculty peculiar to it,
and whose development (and functioning) constitutes the excellence or
virtue of the individuals in that kind (in eo genere). In the case of human
beings, this excellence or virtue consists in living in accord with reason
(SVF III 16). In fact, expressions such as “life according to reason” are
equivalent to “life in accord with nature,” “to live a morally good life,” etc.
Some of this is Aristotelian, and one cannot be sure whether it was the
Stagirite or Chrysippus who influenced Epictetus in this passage. After all,
Aristotelian influence on Epictetus’ doctrine of moral choice (προσχρήσεως)
seems almost certain. In any case, this is one of several passages in
Epictetus where “Chryssiepean” influence may exist although Chrysippus
himself is not mentioned. And at this point we reach an area where
sometimes only speculation is possible, and this concerns the problems of
assessing one thinker’s influence on another when there is little direct
evidence. It is a problem to which Epictetus would most likely have given
little attention because he was convinced that he was simply an heir to and
propagator of the teachings of ancient Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus,
who especially furnished books that provide harmony with nature and
subsequent tranquility (1. 4. 28 ff.). This passage, almost a hymn of praise
to Chrysippus, underscores his importance for Epictetus: He “brought to
light and imparted to all human beings the truth which deals, not with mere
life, but with a good life—who among you has for that set up an altar in his
honor, or dedicated a temple or a statue, or bows down to God in gratitude
for him?” One is perhaps reminded of Lucretius’ similar adulation of
Epicurus. Yet there is little justification for some of Bonhöffer’s remarks,
e.g. that Chrysippus’ works “bilden für seinen [Epictets] Unterricht und
seine Homileen [sic] in ähnlichen Weise die Grundlage für die christliche
Predigt.” More persuasive are Bonhöffer’s comments on Epictetus’

18 Gould (above, note 1) 117 seems a bit too confident.
19 See Dobbin’s essay (above, note 8), which rightly emphasizes Aristotle’s influence on
Stoicism. F. H. Sandbach’s The Stoics (London 1975) seems odd in leaving Aristotle “almost
entirely out of account.” Προσχρήσεως was an important concept for Aristotle, as any reader of
the Nicomachean Ethics knows.
20 Bonhöffer, Die Ethik (above, note 7) 2.
teachings when, for example, he suggests that Epictetus was a true disciple (Anhänger) of Chrysippus in refuting Posidonius, and using lines from Euripides' Medea to illustrate that every passion is an error (Verirrung) of reason (Vernunft). Bonhöffer shows here possible connections between the philosophies of Chrysippus and of Epictetus. At the same time, Bonhöffer's very learned comments, with sometimes scanty evidence to support them, are not always convincing. In making this observation, however, there is no intent to disregard Bonhöffer's valuable studies, but to draw attention to them and to the possibility of further investigation of Chrysippus' influence on Epictetus.

In conclusion, insofar as Epictetus' teachings conform to those of the ancient Stoa, he was certainly influenced by Chrysippus. He knew works by Chrysippus at first hand. These were read and commented on in his school, and evidence of Chrysippus' influence can be seen in those passages where Epictetus deals with formal logic; contrary to the impression sometimes given, logic was for Epictetus, like Chrysippus before him, an extremely important discipline. Epictetus' admiration for Chrysippus is clear, and some teachings, such as his famous distinction between "what is in our power" and "what is not," may well derive from Chrysippus. The fragmentary state of the works of the Stoics, Chrysippus included, does, however, create problems for tracing specific teachings of Epictetus to Chrysippus. Indeed, singling out the doctrines of Chrysippus from those of Zeno, for example, is not always an easy matter. There may thus be far more of an influence of Chrysippus on Epictetus than has been shown in this and other studies.

University of Minnesota

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21 Bonhöffer, Die Ethik (above, note 7) 4. See 1. 28. 6 ff. Neither Posidonius nor Chrysippus is mentioned here by Epictetus. In fact, Posidonius is nowhere mentioned by him. Oldfather was inclined to see 1. 9. 4–6 as a quotation from Posidonius, yet noted that similar beliefs were ascribed to various Stoics and especially to Chrysippus. The "quotation" concerns the κοινωνία of God and human beings by means of reason (λόγος). Here is another of those possible influences of Chrysippus on Epictetus.

22 A version of this study was presented in German at the Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin in November 1991, before its "Abwicklung." I wish to thank Reimar Müller for some helpful comments.
A Gleaming Ray: 
Blessed Afterlife in the Mysteries 

FREDERICK E. BRENK

Recently, looking at the "mysteries" with eschatological spectacles has come in for something of a beating. Rather, stress has been on the cults' concern to satisfy the less romantic and spectacular needs of mundane life. The devil's advocate will now attempt to demonstrate that behind apparently innocent iconography may lie preoccupations about a blessed afterlife.

The Egyptians anticipated Plato in arriving at the true purpose of eros, the vision of the Form of the Beautiful. At least that appears to be Plutarch's opinion in his Erotikos, the dialogue on love. Fine, faint effluvia (ἀπορροαῖ) of the truth lie scattered about in Egyptian mythology, but it takes a keen nose to track them down (762a). The Egyptians have three Eros's, Pandemos (earthly), Ouranios (Heavenly), and a third Eros which is the Sun (Helios). As the solar radiance gives nourishment, light, and growth to all things, so the gleaming ray and warmth of love nourish and enlighten the soul (764c). Plutarch apparently is speaking of the archaic Egyptian religion and not of the Hellenistic and Roman mysteries of Isis. Still, it is difficult to believe that, like a recent scholar, he did not keep glancing over his shoulder at more contemporary religion.¹

The reference in the Erotikos to Egyptian mythology might be Plutarch's blowing his own horn for On Isis and Osiris. The treatise was intended to serve the needs of a friend, Klea, a devotee of the Isiac mysteries, who supposedly wanted "background information." Thespiai and the nearby Valley of the Muses, the setting for the Erotikos, had a long tradition of Isism, dating apparently from the refoundation of the festival of the Muses (Mouseia) by Ptolemaios IV Philopator and Arsinoe III.²


Moreover, Thespiai had a close relationship with the "Roman colony" of Corinth, where Isis was very strong. In Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, at Kenchreai, the southern port of Corinth, Isis liberates the hero, Lucius, from his asinine shape and un-Platonic comportment.\(^3\)

At any rate, in the passage referred to from the *Erotikos*, Egyptian mythology alludes to the Platonic similes of the cave and of the sun as the phenomenal counterpart to the Good of the intelligible world. The goal (*telos*) of the soul is the "beatific" or blessed vision of the Forms, and above all, of the Form of the Beautiful (and Good). Plutarch might have startled the shade of the sleeping, or, hopefully, contemplating, master, with his next outplatonizing twist. The sun, in the *Erotikos*, diverts our vision to the sensible world, away from the intelligible, which is our destiny. But his next thought is quite Middle-Platonic: In this world we see only beautiful mirror images of beautiful realities (ɛσοπτρα καλῶν καλά 765b).\(^4\) It may be surprising to learn that Egyptian religion coincided so nicely with the thought of the Middle Academy. But *On Isis and Osiris* reveals how all these mysterious, and at first sight barbarous, myths, rites, and symbols conform to the principal tenets of Plutarch’s Middle Platonism.\(^5\)

Though quite clear about the soul’s destiny in Platonism, Plutarch’s treatise remains rather murky about a person’s ultimate fate in “Egyptian mythology.” He might have used sources in which Osiris and his devotees eventually receive a blessed solar immortality. Such an eschatology would coincide with Plutarch’s own description of the sun as the visible symbol of a God identified with Being and the Good, which is found at the conclusion.

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\(^4\) M. Marcovich, “The Isis with Seven Robes,” *ZPE* 64 (1986) 295–96, relates the seven robes to the seven heavens or planetary orbits. Apuleius describes his initiation rite at Rome (*per omnia uectus elementa renaeae* 11. 23 [285]) as a trip through the "elements," viewing the sun and the "lower and higher gods"; see J. Gwyn Griffiths, *Apuleius of Madauros: The Isis-Book (Metamorphoses, Book XI)*, EPPO 39 (Leiden 1975) 301–08. Graeco-Roman readers would probably be influenced by Platonic eschatological voyages.


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of The E at Delphi. This identification might create problems, too, since Osiris, like the mythological Apollo, or the visible sun, could only in a remote way resemble the supreme god. But forcing Plato on Isis in a Procrustean bed is not limited to Plutarch alone. The Platonic allegorization of Egyptian religion may have begun in the Hellenistic period, possibly among native priests. In Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, also, the trials of Lucius and his ultimate release through Isis probably is a Platonic allegory of the soul’s entrapment in the world we love, its release through appreciation of the intelligible realities, and its expectation, in the next life, of the blessed vision of the Form.6

Recently the eschatological importance of the mysteries has been seriously challenged.7 Cumont-like excess merits scepticism. But were the mysteries largely concerned with the mundane cares of this life rather than the more horrendous possibilities of the next? The newer methodology is strongly archaeological, sociological, and minimalist, far removed from Cumont’s detection of afterlife symbolism everywhere and the use of later sources to interpret earlier phenomena.8 But not even a metempsychosisist dedicates an ex-voto for salvation received in the next life. Moreover, should our civilization collapse, leaving little or no literature, one dreads what interpretation future scholars would give the bare, ruined choirs of Christianity and tumbled-down synagogues of Judaism.9

The “secularist” approach tends to put Isis in the shadows. But Early Imperial people had sharper eyes than we. Effortlessly they recognized astrological and eschatological allegory in famous authors, in architecture, and in sculpture, where we remain unperceptive or perplexed. Third-century Neoplatonists clearly had no difficulty in unearthing eschatological allegory in Homer. However, evidence does exist for an earlier period. For Plutarch—if the attribution of a certain fragment is correct—Kirke’s bewitching of Odysseus’ companions into swine signifies metempsychosis into this world; his swimming to land at Phaiakia, the soul’s struggle toward its otherworldly telos.10 More questionable is whether Vergil’s gates of ivory and horn at the end of the sixth book of the Aeneid might allude to

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8 Burkert (previous note) is somewhat inconsistent, minimizing eschatology at times, e.g. at 13–16, 23–24 (“the pagan evidence for resurrection symbolism is uncompelling at best” [23]), but underscoring it in the Eleusinian and Dionysiac mysteries at 21–22. On Egypt and mysteries see 40–41.


10 So P. R. Hardie, “Plutarch and the Interpretation of Myth,” in ANRW II.33.6 (1992) 4743–87 (4774).
astrological—eschatological lore on souls entering and exiting this world through the signs of Cancer and Capricorn. As already noted, Apuleius, though in the second century, could easily metamorphose a depressing Greek novel into a magnificent allegory of the soul’s escape from our worldly prison and our bodily tomb.

In the realm of sculpture, two of the great Augustan monuments in the Campus Martius, the Solarium and Ara Pacis, apparently underscored the astrological implications of Augustus’ conception under the sign of Capricorn. Possibly, here, too, Capricorn functions as a soul “gate.” Recently the statuary of the Aedes Concordiae, another Augustan monument, has been convincingly interpreted as an astrological expression of cosmic harmony. The decoration of Augustus’ own mausoleum, the obelisk of the Solarium, and—at least for later beholders—its proximity to the Isen Campense suggest the ascent to the divine in Hellenistic Egypt. Motifs associated with the pharaohs and, in particular, their assimilations to Horos and Osiris, appear in the cella of the Mausoleum (atef crown with uraei—symbol of the kingdoms of Upper and Lower Egypt—and a cornice with motifs similar to that below the funeral bed of Osiris in the Temple of Dendera and in Ptolemaic friezes). Such motifs suggest that Octavian’s mausoleum was intended to do more than underscore a special relationship with Egypt. Especially in a mausoleum they evoke eschatological aspirations. In a new allegorical interpretation of the Tazza Farneese, the figures interpreted as Isis, Horos, a sphinx, and the Nile are an expression of creation according to the Hermetic tractate, Poimandres. The scene symbolizes the soul’s return to the sidereal realm and union with God. In


12 See, for example, Edwards (above, note 6).


15 See M. de Vos, L’egittomania in pitture e mosaici romano-campani della prima età imperiale, EPRO 84 (Leiden 1980) 74; frontispiece, tav. XLI.

another interpretation, the cup represents an astrological allegory of the Augustan age.17

Thus, symbolism neither entirely nor exclusively religious could prepare the way for Isis.18 Nero’s Golden House, too, seems to be a complex and magnificent symbol of cosmic and eschatological realities.19 Once again the tracks lead to Egypt, the land of living death, but also of luxuriousness struggling against temporality. They lead to Antonius and Kleopatra, to the divine Alexandros, and to the pharaohs—haunting spectres, if not gods blazing light. The octagon room of the Domus Aurea was perfectly illuminated at the equinoxes, with the unique orientation for Rome of an east–west axis. Not only was Nero’s great-grandfather, Cnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, a friend of Antonius and Kleopatra, but Nero himself was directly descended from the triumvir, as was his relative Caligula, also not lacking in solar brilliance. The Egyptophilia of Nero’s grandfather, Germanicus, led him not only to Alexandria, in A.D. 19, but far up the Nile to Elephantine.

Nero’s own Egyptophilia, or Egyptomania as Seneca suspected, would certainly have benefitted the practice of Isis among Roman upper society. The Alexandrian Chairemon, a member of the Mouseion of Alexandria who understood hieroglyphics and Egyptian religion, had been in the circle of the young Nero. Ptolemaios, another Alexandrian, was the astrologer of Nero’s wife Poppaea, whose family had erected an Isiac sacellum at Pompeii. Though Nero supposedly disliked cults, he apparently venerated the memory of his ancestor, Marcus Antonius.20 Antonius almost certainly must have portrayed himself as Osiris, since his queen, Kleopatra, had so seriously assimilated herself to Isis. The sources present her own death as an obsessively planned and passionately enacted assimilation to the goddess. Unforgettably she passed to a better life from within the very precinct of Isis, leaving upon her breast the marks of an attribute and form of the divinity, the uraeus.21

20 Voisin (previous note) 522–30; Hemsoll (previous note) 26–33.
The Flavian Emperors, too, assisted the diffusion of Egyptian religious symbolism. Domitian attempted to immortalize himself in the Egyptian manner, though his divinization was linked with the exaltation of the dynasty. The obelisk chosen for this purpose was erected next to the Iseum Campense and the Serapeum, which he had added to the Iseum. He also erected two obelisks before the tomb of Augustus, and allowed a local citizen to erect two others within the precinct of Isis at Beneventum. The inscriptions radiate Egyptian soteriology, on side II (6): "... the greatness of his name reaches the height of the celestial vault and his glory extends to the rays of the sun"; on side III (1–3) we learn that the soul of the divinized Titus has flown off to heaven. Throughout, the names Horos, Re-Horakhty, and Isis appear.

The close link between public ideology and private devotion to Egyptian religion appears in a slightly later period, when the beloved, and now divinized Antinoos, was honored by Hadrian with the "Serapeum" at the Villa Hadriana near Tivoli. Here, too, are powerful intimations of Egyptian immortality. Like the Iseum Campense, which suggests to some the Serapeion at Memphis, the Serapeum at Tivoli evokes the religious atmosphere of Hellenistic Egypt. The Serapeum not only sheltered eight "colossal" statues of Antinoos, portrayed as Osiris, but also a colossal bust of Isis–Sothis and in the center of the "bridge" the double bust of Osiris–Apis (Sarapis) resting on a lotus base. The motif of "the god on the flower" evoked the birth and awakening of the sun—thus symbolizing the power of rebirth of the god as recipient of the cyclic energy of both Osiris and Apis. There were also two colossal "Telemons" of Osirantinoos, probably in the interior corners of the pavilions. Over the tomb of Antinoos—now considered to have been located elsewhere, in Rome—Hadrian erected an

159–82; and "Plutarch’s Life 'Markos Antonios': A Literary and Cultural Study," in ANRW II.33.6 (1992) 4347–4469 and 4895–4915.


25 The Memphitic connection of the Iseum Campense is suggested by A. Roullet, The Egyptian and Egyptianizing Monuments of Imperial Rome, EPRO 20 (Leiden 1972) 24–25, 27–30, pl. XII, figs. 18–19; figs. 347–52. On the Serapeion (sic) at Memphis, see Thompson (above, note 5) 22–23, 212–65. However, Professor Grenier is sceptical of this connection.

26 Following Grenier's reconstruction (above, note 24) 941, 955, fig. 6; 963, fig. 7; 970, fig. 8; 974, fig. 9; pls. XV–XVIII, XXVII, XI; cf. pls. XIX, XXIX–XXXVI.
obelisk, undoubtedly intended, by association with Osiris, to allude to eternity and immortality.  

Neither was Mithraism so occupied with bull-slaying as to be unconcerned with soteriology. Some recent scholars see the religion at a very early period concerned with “salvation” in the next life. In this interpretation the tauroctony itself depicts the soul’s triumph over space and time. In the later Empire, the Emperor Julian the Apostate claimed that the scope of “this holiness” “is the ascent of the soul.” Kelsos (Celsus), in the mouth of Origen, speaks of the soul’s flight “through the spheres of the fixed stars and the planets.” In this view, the Neoplatonist interpretation of Mithraism is to be taken at face value. Thus, the ladder of the Mithraeum of Felicissimus at Ostia is suggestive. So too is the solar ray which in some tauroctonies appears in the path of apogenesis (rebirth), while Cancer and Capricorn are the gates of the soul’s entry and exit to and from this world. An example is the solar ray in the Barberini fresco, which emanates from Sol, passes through Capricorn (the place of the soul’s ascent and return) and through Cautes’ torch—who should be associated with the soul’s ascent from this world—to Mithras.

Behind the Platonic allegories and the allusions of eternity and divinization in religious-political architecture, however, is a whole strain of Egyptian religion in which Osiris and those assimilated to him receive immortality, in particular, celestial immortality. Already in the Fifth and

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29 Origen, Against Kelsos 6. 22; cf. Beck, Planetary Gods (previous note) x.

30 See F. Cumont, Recherches sur le symbolisme funéraire des Romains (Paris 1942) 35–42, figs. 2, 3.


Sixth Dynasties (ca. 2500[or 2300]–2300[or 2100] B.C.), Osiris had solar associations. Though nothing in the earlier myth of Osiris should put him in orbit, he inherited the celestial hereafter and became associated with Orion. In traditional Egyptian theology the gods must be renewed each day to retain their eternal youth. In many passages such rejuvenation or resuscitation is the true meaning of a blessed death (Pyramid Text 1975): “O Osiris, the King, you have gone, but you will return, you have slept [but you will awake], you have died, but you will live.” The soul as Ba, represented as a small bird with the head and arms of the deceased, can follow the Sun-God. But as a mummy it must await the Sun’s return, and call out his name, until the body is resuscitated. This cyclical concept reflects the unending process of the body’s life in death as though in sleep. As Osiris is revived in sleep, so is the king, in this denial of death (Pyramid Text 134): “O King, you have not departed dead, you have departed alive; sit upon the throne of Osiris, your sceptre in your hand, that you may give orders to the living ...” But there are different conceptions from this “corporeal” one. There is also transformation into another form, including that of a star. Undoubtedly, Greeks and Romans would associate Egyptian catasterism with more familiar types of the soul’s divinization and immortality. A compulsive tendency seems to have existed to sublimate into a higher, Platonic form the traditional salvation of an Egyptian eschatology threatened with chaos.

Like Greek and Roman religion, Egyptian beliefs were not exempt from creeping democratization. In the Coffin Texts and The Book of the Dead, Osiris secures triumph over death for all, kings and commoners, who identify themselves with him. Osiris became a savior-god. His fate, which led to final triumph after suffering and death, is a pattern which human believers can achieve. Osiris, though, could even take a very active role as a savior-god. The Oath of the Mystes powerfully expresses the initiate’s hopes for overcoming mortality:

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33 Griffiths (above, note 23) 13, 65.


35 Faulkner (previous note) 40; Griffiths (above, note 23) 67.

36 Griffiths, “Osiris” (above, note 32) 629, without Pap. BM 10507.

... and day from night
and sunrise from sunset, and [life
from] death, and birth from [corruption].

... καὶ ἡμέραν ἐκ νυ[κτος]
[καὶ α]νταλήν ἀπὸ δύσεως καὶ [ζωήν]
[ἀπὸ] θανάτου καὶ γένεσιν ἀπ[ὸ φθοράς]. (12-14)38

For Augustus and early Roman emperors Egyptian religion and
soteriology was literally and figuratively bathed in sunlight. Many Isis–
Osiris texts reflect the rays of the solar god, for example a line in the
Bremner–Rhind papyrus (312–11 B.C.):

To thee belongs sunlight, O thou who art equipped with rays. Thou
shinest at the left hand of Atum. Thou art seen in the place of Re. (10.
6)39

In The Hymn of Isidoros (at the latest first century B.C.), Isis mounts “the
chariot of the swift-driving Sun” (III 25).40 The Isis of the Kyme Aretalogy
is not more modest: “I am she who rises in the Dog Star (9), . . . laid out the
paths of the stars, . . . set the course for Sun and Moon (13–14), . . . I am in
the rays of the sun.” (44)41

More closely linking salvation and resurrection with the sun are Pap.
BM 10507:

I will live again when I have looked upon your face, Osiris, foremost in
the West . . . (II 20); you will enter the darkness; it will become light for
you (XII 8); Osiris . . . He will cause you to be rejuvenated eternally.
[They will favour you forever. They will cause you to be rejuvenated
eternally, Isis and Nephthys] (XII 21–22).42

Plutarch’s On Isis and Osiris is faithful to the solar or stellar aspects of
Osiris, Isis, and other Egyptian deities, without in these passages

38 Totti (above, note 3) 19.
39 Col. 5. 10. See R. O. Faulkner, “The Bremner–Rhind Papyrus, I,” Journal of Egyptian
Archaeology 22 (1936) 121–40 (125), with other references to Re, the Solar Disk, and the
nocturnal sun (cols. 10. 6; 10. 20; 16. 14–16, 27) 125, 128, 130–31. Similar, too, is Pap. BM
10507 I 11, while Osiris’ power is stressed in X 15, X 19; cf. Smith (above, note 37) 35, 49,
60, 117–18.
40 V. F. Vanderlip, The Four Greek Hymns of Isidorus and the Cult of Isis (Toronto 1972)
50–51, 57.
41 Totti (above, note 3) 5–10 (Andros Hymn), 79–80 (III Hymn of Isidoros). The solar and
Sothis–Seirios aspects of Isis were represented on the façade of the Iseum Campense (solar
disk, Isis on Dog Star): Roulet (above, note 25) 31–32, fig. 22; Turcan, Culles (above, note 28)
110, pl. IXa.
42 Smith (above, note 37) 37, 51–52; comment, 71–72, 125–26, 129 (double brackets
indicate Pap. Harkness parallels). In the Bremner–Rhind Papyrus: “Lie with thy sister Isis” (5.
25); “Raise thee up, O Osiris” (17. 1) (Faulkner [above, note 39] 125, 132). In Pap. BM
10507, cf. II 22, IV 7, V 6, VIII 2, VIII 7, IX 7 (Smith [above, note 37] 38–40, 45, 47;
comment, 87–88, 102–03).
communicating the soteriological tone of the Egyptian texts. At birth (355e) "the Lord of all advances into the light." Osiris is sprung from the Sun (355f), while Isis is Sothis (the Dog Star) (359d, 375f-376a); again, Horos (Osiris) is Orion (359e). Or, the logoi of the gods reside in the heaven and the stars (375b). Not exactly a savior figure, Osiris becomes, rather, the Platonic form of the Good—whose visible image in Platonic philosophy, and elsewhere in Plutarch, is the sun (372c, 374d).

On Isis and Osiris incorporates aspects from the traditional Greek mysteries, such as the Eleusinian and the Dionysiac, through allusions to the "Orphic" myth. Such additions to traditional Egyptian religion suggest the eschatological bent of Greeks who propagated the Hellenistic and Roman worship of Isis. The phenomenon also appears in other cults, such as that of the Ephesian Artemis. A torch on coins in the years 48–27 B.C. suggests the introduction of nocturnal mystery rites. In the Salutaris procession (A.D. 104), even the golden Artemis carries a torch. Heroic and divine cult of humans in the first century B.C.—shortly to be followed by the Imperial—had encroached upon devotion to the goddess. One wonders whether aspirations implicitly associated with heroization and divinization did not cry out for fulfillment even in the ancient cult of Artemis.

43 Plutarch says "Horos," but according to Heliopolitan theology, Osiris; so J. Gwyn Griffiths, Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride (Swansea 1970) 353 n. 6 and 371–72.

48 See, for example, Rogers (previous note) 113; Oster (above, note 18) 1728.
The relation between the soteriological aspects of Isis and women dressed as the goddess is not clear. But women's desire to be frozen forever in marble assimilation to the goddess, especially in funerary monuments, is impressive.\(^{49}\) As the shades of death drew nigh, Kleopatra, with obsessive passion, gradually transformed herself into Isis. Destiny, or the goddess, admirably obliged. She was not alone. Numerous inscriptions suggest the desire for Isis' protection in death as in life (\textit{dis manibus Hortensiae sacerdocii Isidi}) or even demand a fine to Isis (or Serapis) if the tomb is broken into (\textit{habebit sacra Isidis illius quieta irata or habebit Isidem iratam}).\(^{50}\)

The Temple of Isis at Pompeii reveals the deceptiveness of "first sight."\(^{51}\) Here we can possibly reconstruct how worshippers were successively drawn deeper and deeper into the profundities of Egyptian religion and thus transformed. "Foreign" religions have an uncanny knack of entering in sheep's clothing. Or do the wolves become sheep? The temple precinct was not as suggestive of Egypt as was the Iseum at Rome, where a long "dromos" and hemicycle Serapeum might recall the \textit{Serapieion} at Memphis.\(^{52}\) However, the temple itself resembles other Hellenistic temples of Isis, including that at Alexandria and the temple of the Iseum Campense.\(^{53}\) Like temples for other "oriental" cults, the Iseum at Pompeii had a number of exotic rooms.\(^{54}\) Thus, the external architecture, at first sight entirely Graeco-Roman, contains a number of "mystery"


\(^{50}\) Vidman, \textit{Sylloge} (above, note 3) nos. 473; 52, 346 (to Serapis), 464–65.


\(^{52}\) Two reliefs depicting striking Egyptian and pseudo-Egyptian sculptures may represent the Iseum façade (Turcan \textit{Cultes} [above, note 28] 110, pl. VII; Roulet [above, note 25] pl. XIII, figs. 20–21). However, see note 25 above, with Grenier's reservations.

\(^{53}\) Following the pattern of Greek funerary temples of the necropolis of Hermopolis Magna; Roulet (above, note 25) 30–31, figs. 23, 24.

\(^{54}\) Little seems to be known about the Isieion (so spelled at Memphis); Thompson (above, note 5) 22–23, 31, 168, 192.
features. These are a so-called Megaron or Purgatorium with an underground space—in the form of a highly decorated aediculum—a Sacrarium (a kind of sacristy, or initiation hall), and the largest room, the Telesterion, Curia Isiaca, School, or Ekklesiasterion (according to different theories)—for presenting the initiates, sacred representations, ritual meals, and meetings—and the Pastophorion (rooms possibly for the residence of the priests, and of the laity during the fasting period before initiation). The use of the Purgatorium (or Megaron) and its underground room is very uncertain. Possibly it stored “Nile water” and was used for ablutions, or, according to another theory, was a kind of incubation oracle for receiving prophecies.

The painting, like the architecture, innocently Graeco-Roman in appearance, becomes more dangerously religious as one “zooms in” on a world continually more mysterious and Egyptian in imagery and theme. The Porticus—like the Ekklesiasterion, in the Pompeian Fourth Style—first attracts the viewer into the religious Isism of Hellenistic Egypt. In the Porticus a kind of aediculum was decorated with a large painting (95 × 107 cm) depicting Harpocrates. The Praxitelean statue of the youthful god incongruously receives worship from an Egyptian priest holding forth two candelabra. A beautiful painted acanthus frieze forms the upper portion of the panels. Here, fantastically woven into the tendrils, seed pods, and flowers—along with various animals—are a jackal, cobra, bull, cow, hippopotamus, and even a baby Harpocrates on a lotus.

The numerous sacro-idyllic scenes, with their frequent funerary monuments or shrines in either quadretti (small rectangle) or emblemata (small inserts against the red decorated panels), begin to entice the viewer deeper into the exotic piety of Hellenistic Egypt. Alternating emblemata supposedly represent the solemn procession of the Pompa Isidis. But in fact the statuary poses of the isolated personalities, depicted against a simulated stone backdrop, suggest, rather, figures from a monument. They are strikingly Egyptian in dress, with two exceptions. The zakoros and the hiergrammateus, with ostrich feathers attached by a band to his head, spondophoros, and hierodoulos are all sufficiently sympathetic. Only

55 Actually the architecture is quite revolutionary. It includes a false arch in the pediment, Eastern elements, and Isiac or Egyptian motifs—untypical of contemporary Roman style; cf. Lyttleton (above, note 51) 199–200.
56 Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) 34; Elia (above, note 51) 5.
57 Catalogue 1.5 (40–41, 116); Elia (above, note 51) 7–8, fig. 7; Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) 135, pl. V.
58 Catalogue 1.31 (48, tav. VIII), 1.37 (50, tav. VIII), 1.42 (50–51, 119), 1.49 (52–53), 1.54 (52–53), 1.55 (52, 54); other animals (some more than once) are lioness, female goat, goose (?), wolf, galloping horse, lion, gazelle, leopard—besides a pygmy. This type of frieze, frequently religious, was studied by J. M. C. Toynbee and J. B. Ward Perkins, “Peopled Scrolls: A Hellenistic Motif in Imperial Art,” PBSR 18 (1950) 1–43, esp. 2, 8–9, 10 and pl. VI.1, 3 (Iseum); they omit the Harpokrates in VI.1 and uraeus in VI.2.
Anubis gives one pause. Despite the artist's manful struggle, even this congenial jackal resists syncretism's imperfect fits.59

As one entered the Sacrarium a large painting evoked a familiar Graeco-Roman lararium. Isis sat enthroned, with Osiris—Serapis—Horos beside her, reclining on a rock.60 Benign and approachable, they wear lotus flowers on their heads, while "Osiris" is pictorially framed by two uraei, also wearing the lotus headpiece. The majestic and self-confident poses offer reassurance of the ultimate triumph of good over evil. The vision is a comforting one of gods to be encountered, where evil exists no more and every tear is dried. Scattered about the Sacrarium, as though to be innocuous, are more disturbing smaller representations of Egyptian gods. Re's symbol—the dung beetle or scarab, Khe-pre—crawled around Isis and Osiris enthroned. Other inhabitants lurking in the room were the enthroned dwarf god Bes, the Apis bull, a baboon (the symbol of Thot, god of magic and wisdom), Anubis as jackal, Khnum, the god of the cataracts, as a ram, a vulture (symbol of Nekhbet, primordial god of Upper Egypt), an ichneumon crouching toward the right (the symbol of Horos), and a cat (symbol of Bast, the goddess of Bubastis in the Delta). Elsewhere were Toth as the ibis, and Sakhmet represented as a coiled uraeus (the sacred serpent) crowned with the lotus (symbol of Wadjet, the goddess of the Delta).61

The Hellenistic sfumatura of another fresco in the Sacrarium, the "Inuentio Osiridis," only scantily veils its radically Egyptian theme. Isis stands erect in a barque, between two huge hoary heads dripping water, which undoubtedly are personifications of the upper and lower Nile.62 Behind her she tows yet another barque, the prow of which terminates in a male head. Upon the barque rests the square coffin of Osiris, decorated with the falcon.63 In the lower register, a kind of lararium, two huge snakes writhing protectively around a cista mystica frame the mystic basket.64 Above, Isis returns upon the barque Sothis, accompanied by the cadaver of Osiris, which she found through her arduous searching and reassembled

59 Catalogue 1.36 (49), tav. VII; Elia (above, note 51) 5–20; figs. 9–15, 161–21b, tav. V.1–2; Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) 136, pls. II–V.
60 Catalogue 1.71 (59); Elia (above, note 51) 20–21; fig. 25. Only the Serapis part survives; Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) 145, pl. VIII.1 (167 x 176.8 cm).
61 In general, the descriptions of the catalogue—sometimes contradicting earlier authors—have been followed here: 1.71–79, 1.84 (58–60, 62). Cf. Elia (above, note 51) 22; Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) pls. VII, IX.2; Turcan, Cultes (above, note 28) 109.
62 V. Sampaolo, "La decarazione pittorica" (catalogue 60 n. 1), treats the distinguishing crowns.
63 Catalogue 1.74 (59–60, engraving, 85); Elia (above, note 51) 22, fig. 26; Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) 37, pl. X.1. Cf. Plutarch, On Isis 357f–58b (Griffiths [above, note 43] 339–40).
64 Cf. Apul. Met. 11. 11: cista secretorum . . . cels operia magnificae religionis.
with her own hands. The scene probably recalled the procession of the sacred water, symbol of the regenerated Osiris in the Isiac ceremonies.

The unfamiliar scene is somewhat unfamiliarly portrayed. Isis’ protection, so it intimates, extends beyond the ordinary concerns of this life to the unexperienced voyage hereafter. The enormous serpents evoke Isis’ own uraeus form, in her special role as goddess of the dead. One might recall a striking room at Pompeii. At the time of the restoration of the Villa of the Mysteries in the early Augustan period, the tablinum next to the room of Dionysiac scenes was redecorated with Egyptian motifs. These included a pteroform Isis as protectress of the dead, with the uraeus—as depicted in pharaonic crowns and decorations—and with Seth. The juxtaposition of Dionysiac and Isiac scenes may not be coincidental. Nor, possibly, is it by chance alone that precisely in this period Dionysos and his train apparently retreat before the exotic Egyptian gods.

In the Ekklesiasterion most of all one begins to communicate with the mysterious world of Hellenistic and Egyptian Isism. This time, the “otherness” of foreign ideas and iconography does not rear an ugly head, but rather the painting dazzles with the incredible beauty and mystery of Hellenistic Egypt. Two large paintings, “Io, Argos, and Hermes” and “Io at Kanopos,” in spite of snake, sistrum, and situla in the latter, reflect the early Greek statuary style of painting. The double occurrence in the temple precinct of the Io-theme, quite rare in Graeco-Roman painting, is striking, particularly since the Io at Kanopos occupies a commanding position in the Ekklesiasterion. One picture suggests Hermes’ freeing of Io from torment and persecution by killing the spy, Argos. The second, through the horns

65 The falcon painted on the box, according to Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) 65 n. 4, represents Osiris, who as a falcon flew from the barque Sekket to heaven; so T. G. H. Allen, The Egyptian Book of the Dead (Chicago 1960) ch. 77.

66 So V. Sampaolo, “La decorazione pittorica” (catalogue 60).

67 At the same time possibly meant to allude to the Ploia phesia (Nauigium), the opening of the sailing season, and success on the sea. See M. Malaise, Inventaire préliminaire des documents égyptiens découverts en Italie, EPRO 81 (Leiden 1972) 279–80, no. 47, pl. 44; Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) 99–100, pl. X.1; P. Bruneau, “Isis Pélagia à Délos, (Compléments),” BCII 87 (1963) 301–08 (esp. 307); R. Brilliant, Pompeii AD 79: The Treasure of Rediscovery (New York 1979) 95 (warships in the Iseum). Naumachiai appear frequently in the Porticus (catalogue 1.20, 1.23, 1.25, 1.29, 1.39, 1.41, 1.44, 1.47 [44, tav. V]). Undoubtedly Isis sailed with the Ptolemaic fleet.


69 De Vos (above, note 15) 12, pls. III–VII.

still remaining on Io, depicts the very moment at which Isis releases the heroine from her beastly shape. The iconography thus foreshadows the transformation in Apuleius’ Isis-book, in which Lucius, through the intervention of Isis, is restored from ass form back to human shape. Platonic allegorical interpreters would not be stretched to find a true meaning: The devotee, through the mercy of the all-powerful Isis, will be liberated from immersion in the phenomena of this world and from the necessity of perpetual metempsychosis in the next, and will view forever, in the intelligible sphere, the perfect Good and Beautiful.

How different the sacro-idyllic scenes! In the Ekklesiasterion six or seven very large tableaux exude a delicate, haunting, and mystical Hellenistic style.71 These paintings contrast strikingly with the Egyptian representations of Isis and other divinities in the Villa Farnesina Romana. Though the Farnesina frescoes are beautifully executed and mysteriously serious, they are also playful and decorative, undermining the religious tone.72 In the emblemata of the Ekklesiasterion the landscape was arranged around a sacred edifice such as a funerary monument, temple, or “sacred portal” and usually set upon a rocky islet shaded by trees and surrounded by water. Mountains and deep valleys faintly appear in a background sprinkled with sparse vegetation and enhanced with the rare appearance of an isolated animal or human being. The emblemata, as indicated by their modern names, reflect the cult of Isis: “Sacred Portal of Neith,” “Funerary Monument of Isis–Hathor,” “Tholos Temple of Hathor,” “Funerary Monument of Osiris,” “syncretist cult of Osiris–Adonis–Nile” (which was celebrated at Kanopos).73 The Nile seems to flow through the Heptanomide of Upper Egypt, north of the Thebaid, coursing from mountain passes to glide silently among numerous small sanctuaries.74 Viewed with religious awe, the magnificent sacral architecture and breathtaking nature of these

71 Between 125 x 120 and 210 x 122 cm in size; e.g., catalogue 1.62 (tav. IX), 1.66–68 (tav. XI–XIII), 1.70 (tav. XV). Possibly the seated divinity in 1.66 and 1.67 is Isis (Sampaolo, catalogue 56, 57).
72 See I. Bragantini and M. de Vos, Le decorazioni della villa romana della Farnesina, Museo Nazionale Romano: Le pitture II.1 (Rome 1982). The painted Isis candelabra of the Villa (Bragantini, tav. 37–38, 45, 50, 95; esp. 50) contrast with the simplicity, more religious pose, and characteristic Isis knot of their Pompeian sisters (catalogue 1.57–60 [54–55, tav. III]: Elia (above, note 51) 23, fig. 27).
73 Catalogue 7.16 (82, 85); Elia (above, note 51) 12–13; tav. 1; Croisille (above, note 51) 124–43 (127).
frescoes intimate that the mysteries of life and of the goddess are ultimately indistinguishable.  

The most astonishing scene again is a piece of initial deception. Through the transparent veil of romantic Hellenism, suddenly an Egyptian theme strikingly and irresistibly evokes death and a blessed afterlife. This relatively large painting, "The Adoration of the Mummy of Osiris" or "The Tomb (σώρος) of Osiris," in its own way is more strikingly Egyptian than "The Finding of Osiris." Like two colossal stelai, anthropomoid mummy cases form a sacred portal at the composition's center. Three steep steps approaching them, typical of Egyptian sanctuaries, reach to the middle of the "portal." Beneath the gate, a coffin—or mummy case—appears, erect. Upon it a phoenix perches, the bird of the Sun par excellence, sacred to Osiris, and the symbol of rebirth. Below the case, a hierogrammateus, whose head is decorated with ostrich plumes, extends a tray of offerings. Beyond this unusual "sacellum," an ithyphallic god, either Min or Ptah, is saucily propped up against a "ceppus." Ribbons are tied tightly around the stelai, while those around the "coffin" seem already loosened as though about to fly asunder. The central scene, bathed and highlighted with sunshine, stands out against the misty background of the distant mountains.

75 K. Schefold, La peinture pompéienne: Essai sur l'évolution de sa signification (Brussels 1972) (= Pompejanische Malerei: Sinn und Ideengeschichte [Basel 1952], with some revisions) offered a strong eschatological interpretation: "above all, Isis promises eternal life" (87); F. Le Corsu, "Un oratoire pompéien consacré à Dionysos–Osiris," RA (1967) 239–54, sees prominent symbols of death and resurrection, and Isis linked with Dionysos (254). Other scholars are more reserved.

76 Catalogue 1.68 (111.5 x 188.8 cm [56–57, tav. XIII]); cf. Elia (above, note 51) 33–34, tav. C; Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) pl. X.1.


The exact nature of the crown in the impressionistic "Adoration" fresco is difficult to determine. Lunar crescent and sun disk, uraeus, hemhem crown, or simply some generic fantasy? E. Vassilika, Ptolemaic Philae (Louvain 1989) 293–325, reproduces the huge assortment found at Philai. The crowns closest to the "Adoration" bird's are the rush and hemhem crowns (301–04; cf. 84–95). Roman attitudes toward Egyptian crowns are discussed by L. Kákosy, "Die Kronen im spätägyptischen Totenglauben," in G. Grimm et al. (eds.), Das römisch-byzantinische Ägypten, Aegyptica Treverensia 2 (Mainz 1983) 57–60, esp. 57–58 (Taf. 1, 3; 2, 2–3; 3, 4), 59. Somewhat similar is the tiny crown on Arsinoe II in coins; see O. Morkholm et al., Early Hellenistic Coinage (Cambridge 1991) pl. XVIII, 294–95. Something similar appears in some iconography of Isis; cf. Tran Tam Tinh, "Isis," in LIMC V.1 (1990) 761–96 and V.2 (1990) 501–26 (Isis 61, 96, 252b; on Isis in the "Inventio Osiridis" at Pompeii, 77). Also on a minister in the cult, see Dunand (above, note 68) III pl. X1.2.

Elia (above, note 51) 34, unconvincingly, saw Isis as a "sparrow-hawk" about to resuscitate Osiris. Pace Tran Tam Tinh and Sampaolo, the outer mummy case is surely closed (tied with a yellow ribbon), not open. Its generic rather than Egyptian look may be significant.

78 Plutarch, On Isis 360e–f; Elia (above, note 51) 33–34; Malaise (above, note 67) 271, 280–81, no. 45, and pl. 45; Tran Tam Tinh (above, note 51) 65–66, pl. X.2.
In such an unreal atmosphere, a sudden, unexpected, and supernatural transition from death to life seems to await Osiris and all who follow his mysteries.\(^{79}\)

The temple, then, fits a pattern of religious imagery in the early Imperial period. Seemingly innocent and innocuous iconography, veiled in familiar garb, only gradually begins to reveal its deeper meaning. Isis, the mystagogue attentive not to shock, gingerly guides the initiate into her mysteries.\(^{80}\)

Statuary and sacro-idyllic painting in Hellenistic form establish a comforting distance between the viewer and the real Egypt, yet tease with an exotic touch. In fact, they have much in common with the Serapieion in Egypt: Apis bull, Bes, Anubis, Dionysos with panther, Aphrodite, peacocks, lions, Isis, Ptah, satyrs, marine lions and horses, uraei, sphinxes, and lotus flowers.\(^{81}\) To establish even closer ties with ancient and Ptolemaic Egypt the temple displayed an Egyptianized Dionysos, a hieroglyphic plaque, an ushabti, a squatting male deity, and it put an ankh into the hand of Isis.\(^{82}\)

Little by little, then, the architecture and painting of the temple unfold an “Egyptian” experience in which existence transcends ordinary life and ultimately death itself. In a sudden illumination, conditioned perhaps by Greek philosophy and public ideology, one might realize that good will ultimately triumph over evil, that the...

\(^{79}\) Except for last clause, Elia (above, note 51) 33–34: “a striking expression of the deepest and most consoling meaning of the Isis religion... resurrection, redemption, and survival after death in a better world.”


\(^{81}\) See catalogue 77, and numbers 1.1, 1.12–13, 1.16–19, 1.32, 1.36, 1.51, 1.56, 1.62, 1.64, 1.68, 1.72, 1.77–79, 1.81, 1.84, 5.2, 5.4, 6.1, 6.3. Missing are a Kerberos, falcon with head of a bearded man, mermaid, and a lion ridden by Dionysos. 3.4–6, portrait busts, apparently of women members of the imperial family, correspond with the Ptolemaic statues and busts in the Serapieion. Cf. Thompson (above, note 5) esp. 212–13.

\(^{82}\) Dionysos, 3.9 (D. D’Errico, “Materiali di produzione egiziana,” catalogue 77–79 [70]); plaque, beginning of Ptolemaic period, probably from Herakleopolis, vindicating the rights of the local god Herishef, and his native clergy (6.1 [78]) from last phase of pharaonic Egypt. The ushabtii of Paef-heri-hesu (mummiform figure, dating to 664–525 B.C.) (6.3 [79]), contains the formula (ch. 6 of The Book of the Dead), “May Osiris shine forth, Known to Re, Heard by (?) Ammon,” and mentions Paef-heri-hesu, “justified” for the afterlife. The male deity (6.2 [10.3 x 14.2 x 14.2 cm], 79, tav. XVII) in blue faience wears the useth necklace. The Isis (3.2 [105 x 85 x 42 cm], 65, 68) contains Greek archaizing and Egyptian features. Among the latter are: imitation of the useth necklace, right foot rigidly pushed forward, lotus or Hathor crown on head (so S. A. Muscettola, “La decorazione architettonica e l’arredo,” catalogue 63–76 [68]). Note, too, the lotus cup candelabra (5.4, 74).

devotion paid to these strange, yet comforting gods, could bring eternal salvation and blessedness. 83

Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome

83 Professors Roger Beck of Erindale College, University of Toronto, Mariette de Vos of the Università di Trento, and Jean-Claude Grenier of the Université Paul Valéry, Montpellier III generously read the manuscript and offered indispensable information, corrections, and suggestions. Thanks are due as well to Mary Hopkins of Milwaukee for many improvements with the text.
The Suppliant’s Voice and Gesture in Vergil and Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*

WILLIAM S. ANDERSON

The Greeks and Romans believed that the emotions behind prayer and supplication resulted in universally recognizable gestures, which appear in Homeric poetry, then in Greek art and tragedy, and continue on into Roman art and literature.¹ Because the gods were imagined to be above, human beings lifted up their hands and arms to the sky or heaven or Olympus when they appealed for divine help.² In later times, when the gods were represented by physical images, acted on stage, or depicted in poetry and picture as anthropomorphic figures, there was little distinction between the positions of the two, and so the person praying would simply hold the hands out to the deity. Similarly, when one human being implored another human being for help or mercy or pity, the two were normally on the same physical level, and the supplicant extended his or her hands out to the other.

In the prose writers of Vergil’s youth, Cicero and Caesar, the language for representing prayer-gestures was already routine: One phrase, *manus tendere*, served all occasions, whether in fact the supplicant was holding out hands to the gods in heaven or to some military victor on earth.³ Although Catullus had ample opportunities to depict this gesture, notably in the desperate moments when Attis awoke from his frenzy in Poem 63 and Ariadne from her blissful sleep on Naxos in Poem 64, he had other concerns. And Lucretius had no need or desire to describe prayer when he was combating the very irrationality that he believed lay behind most


² Sittl (previous note) 187 cites ps.-Aristotle *De Mundo* 6, 400a16 as the earliest comment on the universal prayer-gesture.

³ Caesar *BG* 7. 40. 6 and 7. 48. 3, *BC* 2. 5. 3 and 2. 11. 4; Cicero *Cat.* 4. 18.
religious activity. However, even if we now lack evidence for the Latin poetic repertoire that rendered the movement of the hands in prayer before Vergil, we may reasonably expect that it was somewhat more versatile than simple manus tendere.

I. Gesture and Prayer in the Aeneid

In the Aeneid Vergil continues the preferential use of the verb tendere, regardless of whether the speaker appeals to the gods in heaven (ad caelum or dative caelo) and among the stars (ad sidera) or to other human beings. Twice the poet uses the perfect form of tollere, but he does not seem to aim at any particular effect other than variation in fixing on the "lifting" hands. In the final scene of the poem, to which I shall return, Turnus' gesture of appeal gets the compound verb protendens, and that, we may suspect, has a special nuance.

Whereas the verb in the Vergilian gesture remains quite uniform, the description of the hands is freer. The standard phrase of prose, manus tendere, occurs often, but its utility is of course limited by its adaptability to the hexameter. Since the first syllable of manus is short, it must be preceded by a word whose final syllable is short; the noun cannot be the initial or the final word of any line. In practice, Vergil dealt with this matter smoothly: He would begin a new clause with the preceding word and attach to its ending the connective -que or he would expand the phrase to cum voce manus, thus satisfying the meter and also introducing the words of the prayer along with the gesture. Nevertheless, he preferred to use a synonym that consisted of two long syllables and allowed him more flexibility, namely, palmas. The palms, being more specific, were also more poetically expressive and more vivid to the imagination than ordinary hands. In the final appeal of Turnus in Book 12, before using his preferred tendere palmas (936), Vergil tries the unusual and therefore more affecting dextramque precantem/protendens (930–31).

It remains to add that Vergil also sometimes attached an adjective to the hands (cf. above, 12. 930 precantem) or to the person performing the gesture and speaking the words of a supplicant. In making his or her appeal, the person praying extends both hands, and the poet notes that fact by using the adjectives duplicis or utrasque, the choice depending on the meter. Fixing on the hands more precisely, Vergil may note that they are

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4 At 5. 1200–01 Lucretius does reluctantly and disapprovingly describe the prayer-gesture, with alliterative language that may well reflect the poet at work: pandere palmas ante deum delabra.

5 F. A. Sullivan, "Tendere manus: Gestures in the Aeneid," CJ 63 (1967–68) 358–62, has collected much of this material and discussed some of the passages briefly, reaching different conclusions from mine in most cases.

6 For duplicis, Aen. 1. 93, 9. 16, 10. 667; for utrasque, 5. 233, 6. 685.
supinas, with palms up and the backs turned to the ground. He can
generate pathos by calling the hands helpless (inertes 10. 596) or by
attaching an adjective like infelix to the person in prayer. Finally, he may
emphasize the supplicant posture by adding the word supplex (3. 592, 12.
930).

Vergil regularly uses the prayer-gesture as introduction to a prayerful
speech, to the gods, to another human being present who is asked to help in
some way, and sometimes to absent people, dead or alive, or abstract
powers, who are apostrophized. From this fairly stereotyped basis, the
skillful poet can move out in different experimental directions, to achieve
special effects. It is these unusual effects that I shall briefly review. The
first instance of gesture and speech occurs in 1. 92–96:

extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra;
ingemit et duplicis tendens ad sidera palmas
talia voce refert: “o terque quaterque beati,
quis ante ora patrum Troiae sub moenibus altis
contigit oppetere! . . .”

Although the gesture is virtually identical with that of Turnus in 9. 16,
which introduces a genuine prayer, Aeneas, who is here being dramatically
presented to us for the first time, is in a state of total despair, unable to
appeal to the gods, capable only of calling out to the Trojans who, as he
implies, had the good luck to die and be buried in their native land. This is
not pius Aeneas; he will have to earn that identity as we watch. In the
storm of Book 1 he is helpless and must be rescued, without any action on
his part, by benevolent Neptune. Later, on the other hand, in Book 5, when
Juno again acts to persuade the Trojan women to fire the ships in Sicily,
Aeneas does not indulge his despair, but immediately prays to Jupiter for
help; and Vergil assigns him his rightful epithet (5. 685–87):

tum pius Aeneas umeris abscindere vestem
auxilioque vocare deos et tendere palmas:
“Juppiter omnipotens . . .”

And Jupiter immediately responds with assistance, a rainstorm that puts out
the fire.

In Book 2 Vergil describes the way Sinon works on the gullible
Trojans. In the first two parts of his clever speech, the villain wins the pity
of his captors, who release him from his chains and ply him with questions
about the Horse (as he had planned). As he prepares to tell his ruinous lies,
Sinon, a consummate actor, plays the role of the truly pious (and therefore
trustworthy) man (152–57):

7 Tendoque supinas / ad caelum cum voce manus 3. 177.
8 Tendebat inertes / infelix palmas 10. 596–97.
9 Servius auctus somewhat dully complains about Aeneas’ irreverence in failing to pray as
the gesture requires.
ille dolis instructus et arte Pelasga
sustulit exutas vinculis ad sidera palmas:
"vos aeterni ignes, et non violabile vestrum
testor numen," ait, "vos aerae enesse nefandi,
quos fugi, vittaeque deum, quas hostia gessi:
fas mihi Graiorum sacra resolvere iura . . ."

Here, Vergil calls attention to the hands that have just been freed, for Sinon pretends to be grateful and tricks the Trojans by his seeming gratitude and pious words. An impious man is at work here, abusing both the words and actions of normal piety.

When, thanks to Sinon, the Horse is taken into Troy and its warriors emerge to bring about the city's fall and capture, Vergil achieves a very special and famous scene with an altered prayer-gesture. He narrates how Cassandra is treated, dragged from the temple where she has been priestess, her hair wildly disarrayed (2. 405–06):

/ad caelum tendens ardentia lumina frustra,
lumina, nam teneras arcebant vincula palmas./

In her role as both priestess and victim, Cassandra might naturally resort to fervent prayer for help. By contrast with slimy Sinon, however, she is bound, and so her hand-gesture is frustrated, and Vergil symbolically also silences the words of her prayer. The innocent remains bound and unable to reach the gods, while the guilty, freed of his bonds, exults in his impious lies. By commenting expressly in the nam-clause of 406 on the anomaly of the woman's futile look at the sky, Vergil reminds his audience of the usual gesture-language, ad caelum tendens palmas, and he lays the groundwork for the many abortive gestures which Ovid will develop in his Metamorphoses.

In Book 10, after Pallas falls beneath Turnus' spear, Aeneas goes wild with vengeful anger. He spurns the appeal of Magus for mercy; he barbarously butchers the priest of Apollo and Diana—and Vergil emphasizes the paradoxical behavior by the verb that should go with priestly sacrifice, immolat (10. 541); and he takes on two overconfident brothers, Lucagus and Liger. Aeneas' spear downs Lucagus, and Vergil, calling him pius Aeneas (591), has the Trojan taunt the dying man. Then, it is the turn of Liger, who has been serving as the unarmed charioteer (595–98):

frater tendebat inertis
infelix palmas curru delapsus eodem:
"per te, per qui te talem genuere parentes,
vir Troiane, sine hanc animam et miserere precantis."

10 Servius auctus dutifully comments on the normal gesture.
Not content with the objective adjective *inertis*, which represents accurately the helplessness of a charioteer, Vergil also includes in the scene his subjective *inflex*, which almost inevitably engages our sympathies with Aeneas’ victim. So when Aeneas spurns the gesture and the verbal appeal and, as the poet puts it, after a second taunt, opens up the man’s chest with his sword, his famous *pietas* comes seriously under question.

Aeneas emerges as superior to Turnus in the treatment of a young and brave foe: Turnus’ disrespect for Pallas’ body and armor differs sharply from Aeneas’ sympathetic tenderness for Lausus’ self-sacrifice and for his corpse (cf. 10. 821 ff.). Aeneas also differs strikingly from the father of Lausus, Mezentius the scorn of the gods. Mezentius expresses his blasphemy as he responds sardonically to a dying enemy (10. 743–44) and as he prepares to encounter Aeneas and addresses his own right arm and spear as gods, whose presence he “prays for” (773–74). But at the moment when he learns of Lausus’ death and bitterly condemns himself, his gesture of despair might be misinterpreted (844–45):

\[
\begin{align*}
canit\text{iem} & \quad \text{multo deformat pulvere et ambas} \\
ad\text{ caelum} & \quad \text{tendit palmas et corpore inhaeret.}
\end{align*}
\]

Mezentius’ hand-gesture closely resembles the abortive moves of Cassandra and a definite scene of gesture and prayer by Aeneas in 3. 177 ff. And it has been interpreted as a sign of his tragic defeat, of his return to prayer. However, in the words that the Etruscan now speaks, Vergil makes it obvious that he does not pray: He apostrophizes his dead son in the corpse and expresses despair, but no reverence for any god. Lausus is the only person who means anything to him. Though he has lost him and is desolate, he does not abandon his contempt for the gods. Far from defining his conversion, then, the gesture, much like the first gesture of Aeneas to the stars in 1. 93, reminds us of Mezentius’ godless loneliness and identity with the dead.

The final scene between Aeneas and Turnus includes a special description of the prayer-gesture that precedes the very special appeal of Turnus to his conqueror (12. 930–32, 938–39):

\[
\begin{align*}
ille & \quad \text{humilis supplexque oculos dextramque precanem} \\
protendens & \quad \text{“equidem merui nec deprecor” inquit;} \\
“ute & \quad \text{ere sorte tua . . .”} \\
\text{stetit} & \quad \text{acer in armis} \\
Aeneas & \quad \text{volvens oculos dextramque repressit.}
\end{align*}
\]

When Turnus describes his own gesture at 936, he declares that he has extended both hands and that everybody could see it: *victum tendere palmas / Ausonii videre*. Why, since the meter allowed it, did Vergil not use

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11 Sullivan (above, note 5) rejects Servius’ interpretation: *increpans deos, quasi sacrilegus*. I would, too, without adopting Sullivan’s conclusions.
*palmasque precantes* in 930? This is the only instance in the poem where he so alters both terms of the customary phrase. It seems obvious that the compound form of *tendere* is more expressive. The emphasis on the right hand serves at least two purposes in addition to denoting prayer. First, that pleading right hand has dropped its sword and dramatizes the total helplessness of the once-proud warrior, now crippled and defenseless. Second, as the description of Aeneas, which I cited, suggests, the swordless right hand of Turnus and his humble prayer evoke an immediate response from the right hand of Aeneas, which he has poised for the killing stroke. He checks his hand, pulls it back, sincerely affected by that extended hand of Turnus. Vergil has placed *dextramque* each time in the same metrical position, with a verb following and *oculos* preceding.

The stress on Turnus’ eyes adds to the power of this scene. In the usual prayer-vocabulary of the poem, Vergil has ignored the eyes, although we can easily imagine a pleading look that would accompany the hand-gesture and verbal entreaty. Only where Cassandra was bound and prevented from using her hands has the poet ostentatiously substituted the eyes and still used, in a daring manner, the verb *tendere* (cf. 2. 405–06). That precedent allows us to explain the grammar of *oculos* in 930 as an instance of *zeugma* with the verb *protendens*, though we could also suggest that *oculos* functions with *supplex* as accusative of specification. The pleading look of Turnus, then, elicits from Aeneas’ eyes a rolling motion that betrays his hesitation. Unfortunately for Turnus, Aeneas’ sympathetic reaction to Turnus’ appeal is his first response; his second is triggered by the sight of Pallas’ baldric on Turnus, at which he erupts in a short angry speech, stabbing his enemy in the chest while speaking.

These passages from Vergil indicate that he established prayer and prayer-gestures as a significant and serious form of communication between human beings and gods and among human beings. Prayers for help and for mercy merit hearing and evoke in Vergil’s audience a sympathetic response. The misuse of prayer by Sinon awakens antipathy. Refusal by a human being of another’s appeal, even of an enemy’s, as Aeneas, in different ways, rejects the pleas of helpless Liger and fallen Turnus, stirs mixed feelings in us, most particularly, of course, at the end of the epic, when the first inclination to mercy proves abortive and is replaced by savage killing. Using the stereotyped language for prayer-gestures, the poet gains emphasis by fixing on anomalies: on the failure of Aeneas to pray at his first opportunity; on Mezentius’ dreadful remorse that still proudly refuses to invoke the despised gods; on Cassandra’s frustrated gesture and silenced

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12 So R. D. Williams, *The Aeneid of Virgil* (London 1973), in his note on these lines.


14 That is the obvious implication of *hoc vulnere* (948) and of the present participle, *hoc dicens* (950).
appeal with the eyes; and on the combined entreaty, of hand and eyes, by Turnus that does earn a first humane response from Aeneas of eyes and hand.

II. Abortive Gesture and Prayer in Ovid’s Metamorphoses

If pietas and the impassioned needs of prayer are the standards in the Aeneid, from which the hero and the poet move only in exceptional circumstances that serve to reinforce the accepted value of prayer and the importance of the divine realm over human beings, in the Metamorphoses Ovid makes a theme of the way human expectations from prayer suffer regular violation, most notably from the gods themselves. Prayer-contexts form a very common scenario in Ovid’s poem, and he enriches the Vergilian language for the situation. He uses the epithet supplex to emphasize the situation of supplication, focusing like Vergil on the one who prays as subject. But he often also turns the entreatee into the object and collects a series of accusative participial clauses around him or her before revealing the violent verb that cruelly destroys all. Consider little Learchus and Itys (4. 516–19 and 6. 639–41):

\begin{quote}
deque sinu matris ridentem et parva Learchum 
bracchia tendentem rapit . . . 
... rotat . . . 
discutiit ora . . .

tendentemque manus et iam sua fata videntem 
et “mater, mater” clamantem et colla petentem 
ense ferit Procne.
\end{quote}

Ovid brings out the grim irony in the first passage, that Learchus does not anticipate what is going to happen and happily holds out his arms to his father, just asking to be picked up and cherished. The crazed Athamas does snatch him up, but only to smash his brains out. In the case of Itys, the boy senses what his mother intends and uses every means at his command to break through her madness and make her respond as mother. But all four participles are negated by the one verb of stabbing. Thus, Ovid does not use so much the single pathetic adjective, but rather forces on his audience by these fuller descriptive details and by his new grammatical presentation a much more insistent response.

Vergil had limited himself to two words for the hands in the prayer-gesture, which could serve as metrical alternatives, the iambic manus and the spondaic palmas. And he contented himself with the simple verb tendere. Ovid uses both manus and palmas, but, probably because he seeks to expand the dactylic range of his hexameter, he prefers the dactylic

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15 E.g. Callisto: tendebat brachia supplex 2. 477.
bracchia. He is the first Latin writer, in prose or poetry, to make elaborate use of the arms in his prayer-descriptions.\(^{16}\) The two passages which I have just cited show Ovid employing the two words, "arms" and "hands," without apparent distinction (other than meter and order) in virtually identical situations. The poet continues to use *tendere* as the principal verb for the gesture, but he also often chooses the metrically equal but denotatively different *tollerere*, especially when the prayer goes to a god in heaven, not one present on earth.\(^{17}\) I find one instance of *dextram* in a prayer context. Since it comes in the form *dextramque precantis*, at the end of a hexameter, I suspect that Ovid echoes the scene of Turnus at *Aeneid* 12. 930, and it will repay us to compare the way the two poets worked out their situations of desperate appeal. Ovid describes the bloody end of Pentheus (3. 719–25):

```
saucius ille tamen "fer opem, matertera" dixit
"Autonoe! moveant animos Actaeonis umbrael!"
illa, quis Actaeon, nescit dextramque precantis
abstulit, Inoo lacerata est altera raptu.
non habet infelix, quae matri bracchia tendat,
trunca sed ostendes deiectis vulnera membris
"adspice, mater!" ait. 725
```

Vergil isolated the actions of Turnus’ appeal in a separate sentence, so he gave the “praying right hand” its own special verb, *protendens*. Then he showed Aeneas starting to answer it humanely in gesture and look, also in a separate sentence. Here, Ovid works quite differently. The wounded Pentheus addresses what in Ovid’s poem is a formulaic prayer for help, *fer opem*, to his aunt, reminding her of her own recently dead son Actaeon. She is too crazed to recognize the name of her own son, let alone the humanity of Pentheus. Now, we hear of the prayer-gesture (721) and immediately, after the run-on, the verb changes the focused Vergilian viewpoint and turns Pentheus into the typical Ovidian victim, violated as he prays. The very right hand with which he pleads becomes a bloody stump as we watch: With superhuman maenad strength, Autonoe has wrenched it off. Ino does the same with the left. He had been holding both arms out in prayer (cf. 723); his family rejects him grotesquely and wordlessly, with no such poignant motivation as Vergil assigns to Aeneas in *Aeneid* 12. Ovid goes on to elaborate the frustration of the appeal of handless Pentheus to his mother. Deaf to him, as Procne to Iys, she tears off his head. That is the final answer to his anguished prayers. What in Vergil was a special, understandable, but regrettable violation of human entreaty, to capture the great issues of the epic in supreme starkness, has become for Ovid an all too regular theme. Human beings behave inhumanly toward each other, crazed

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\(^{16}\) I find no instances in Vergil, Caesar, Cicero, or Livy.

\(^{17}\) Cf. 2. 487, 3. 404, 9. 175, 10. 580.
by their passions or possessed by the terrible hatred of the Ovidian gods. As he describes their rejection of prayer, Ovid epitomizes their inhumanity.

In the death of Pentheus, the agents are human beings, the female members of his family, whose superhuman strength comes from their religious frenzy. They do not know what they are doing. Ovid does not say or imply, in contrast to the themes of Euripides in the Bacchae, that they are carrying out the vengeful will of their god Bacchus. From the way he lets his narrator join in the hymn to the god shortly after this (4. 17 ff.), we may well infer that he exempts Bacchus from the charge of cruelty. Pentheus has not remorsefully prayed to the god, and we cannot assert that Ovid has shown the god spurning prayer. Earlier in the poem, however, that had been precisely the Ovidian theme: that the gods abort and pervert human prayer in the most appalling and grotesque manner.

The first instance of this perversion involves Io. Unlike Calvus before him, who anthropomorphized the cow that Io had become and addressed it with a variety of pathetic fallacies, Ovid makes the important innovation of presenting human beings who have suffered metamorphosis and retain, when they become animals, their human consciousness inside the animal form, and thus are fully aware of the poignant frustrations which the poet delineates. Io inside the bovine form knows that she has been raped, that in her innocence she has been turned into a cow by guilty Jupiter, and that, further to conceal his guilt, Jupiter has delivered her over to the savagery of suspicious Juno. Three times in the narrative Io’s human instincts impel her toward prayer that she cannot consummate. Ovid uses those scenes as marks against Jupiter above all, to suggest that, in raping and changing Io, he has bestialized her and himself, ending the proper Vergilian communication between almighty god and needy human beings (1. 635–38):

illa etiam suppex Argo cum brachia vellet
   tendere, non habuit, quae brachia tenderet Argo,
   et conata queri mugitus edidit ore
   pertimuitque sonos propriaque exterrita voce est.

This first description in Ovid’s poem of prayer proves to be one of total frustration. In a line (636) that anticipates the grotesque scene of Pentheus’ handless stumps, Io fails to make the routine gesture because she has hooves and cannot extend them like human hands or arms. What should follow the prayer-gesture, of course, would be the words of appeal, but her miserable sounds emerge as somewhat comic mooing, sounds which, being so entirely unnatural to Io, terrify her. Io’s frustration, which will eventually end in release, can be dismissed as merely comic by some readers, but it points

18 Calvus, fr. 9 M, a virgo infelix, herbis pasceris amaris; to which we can compare Ovid's objective description (1. 632) of the human feelings inside the cow.

19 Bömer ad 635 offers us the choice of grotesque, highly comic, or tasteless.
for Ovid to the later ugliness of the miseries and ends of Callisto, Actaeon and Pentheus.

Unable to communicate with her guardian Argus, Io is driven and wanders until she comes to the river bank where her father Inachus stands. Here again frustration in communicating with a beloved family member anticipates such tragic scenes as those of Leuctus and Itys. Inachus sees only a tame cow and offers it grass (not at all what she likes; 646–50):

illa manus lambit patrisque dat oscula palmis
nee retinet lacrimas, et, si modo verba sequantur,
oret opem nomenque suum casusque loquatur;
littera pro verbis, quam pes in pulvere duxit,
corpus pro verbis, quam pes in pulvere duxit,

She tries to give human kisses and shed human tears, but we can easily imagine how Inachus greeted them, and Ovid permits us to smile at Io (since we know the happy outcome of her temporary suffering). She would like to ask for help and tell her story at length, but again the animal form denies verbal communication. Then, in a moment of human ingenuity that overcomes the animal limitations, she turns her hooves (which still cannot achieve the prayer-gesture) into writing instruments, and she manages to trace on the ground the two simple letter-forms that spell her name Io. Inachus at least can then voice his sorrow, until Argus forcibly separates father and cow-daughter.

At the end of her endurance, still pursued by Juno even after Mercury has released her from Argus (by murder), Io slumps on the banks of the Nile (729–33):

quem simulac tetigit, positisque in margine ripae
procubuit genibus resupinoque ardua collo,
quos potuit solos, tollens ad sidera vultus
et gemitu et laetum et longitude mugitu

Again, Ovid develops the material of the abortive prayer. Io is kneeling as best she can; she is trying to lift her eyes to heaven. In 731 the poet avails himself of Vergil’s inventiveness in the Cassandra-scene, but the pathos of this cow hampered by its non-human hooves is not supposed to match that of manacled Cassandra, any more than the myth agrees emotionally with the realistic scene of warfare at Troy. The abortive gesture leads to what seems abortive, surely comic prayer. The three nouns of 732 all give detail connected with the voicing of an entreaty, and the first two ambivalently refer to both human and animal behavior. The third, set with a unique Ovidian compound into a striking double spondee ending, makes for a wonderful anticlimax. All that promise resulted in mournful mooring. But then Ovid doubles the surprise. The cow seemed to communicate with
Jupiter; in fact, she did reach him and at last move him, so that she soon turns back into a woman (cf. 738 ff.).

Jupiter won over Juno to allow him to rescue Io by promising that he would never get involved with Io again. True to his words in his own way, he does not amuse himself with Io any more, but he soon has another target and consciously ignores his duty to Juno (that had clearly been established by the crisis over Io). 20 He disguises himself impiously as the revered goddess Diana and rapes her devoted attendant Callisto. Having suffered this divine abuse, Callisto encounters a series of others. Her own patroness Diana spurns her without consideration of her innocence and drives her away. When her baby is born, Juno swoops down and proceeds to harry her (2. 476–84):

\[ \text{dixit [sc. Juno] et adversa prensis a fronte capillis} \]
\[ \text{stravit humi pronam; tendebat bracchia supplex:} \]
\[ \text{bracchia coeperunt nigris horrescere villis} \]
\[ \text{curvarique manus et adunco crescre in ungues} \]
\[ \text{officioque pedum fungi laudataque quondam} \]
\[ \text{ora Iovi lato fieri deformia rictu;} \]
\[ \text{neve preces animos et verba precantia flectant} \]
\[ \text{posse loqui eripitur: vox iracunda minaxque} \]
\[ \text{plenaque terroris rauo de gutture fertur.} \]

Juno has appeared on the same level with the girl, who holds out her arms in appeal to the goddess. The answer is savage: Those pleading arms become the first target of metamorphosis (478), 21 and soon the hands have turned into paws ending in claws, and both limbs serve as the forefeet of a bear. Worse still, Juno aborts the very words of prayer that Callisto tried to utter. She destroys the possibility of human communication (483), so that the human voice turns into a sound that bears no relationship with the bruised feelings of the girl.

From this point, Callisto suffers from her inability to communicate with the gods and with other human beings, a victim of Juno’s continuing hatred. She endures frustration when she wants to protest to Jupiter (487–88):

\[ \text{quaesecumque manus ad caelum et sidera tollit} \]
\[ \text{ingratumque Iovem, nequeat cum dicere, sentit.} \]

When she encounters her own son Arcas hunting in the woods, she appears (to the narrator) to recognize the young man: She stares fixedly at him and starts to move toward him. But Arcas of course only sees a bear menacing him with a fatal hug. As he prepares to defend himself with his spear and

\[ 20 \text{Cf. his soliloquy at 2. 423 ff. before approaching Callisto.} \]
\[ 21 \text{In the next tale, Ovid lets a girl tell her story in almost the same words, as she is rescued from rape by being turned into a crow by Minerva, a change which she far from welcomes at the time; cf. 2. 580–81.} \]
probably to kill his mother, Jupiter intervenes, with an unsatisfactory awkwardness that Ovid captures in zeugma (505–07):

arcuit omnipotens pariterque ipsosque nefasque
sustulit et pariter raptos per inania vento
inposuit caelo vicinaque sidera fecit.

The Almighty, who has caused all the original trouble (cf. 401) by his sly rape of Callisto, removes the possibility of kin-crime by totally removing the two animate beings from existence on earth. Although Juno may complain that the girl has been honored by being turned into a star, we can see that she has become lifeless. Unlike Io, she has not been restored to humanity or to her son, and she certainly has not been deified.

The next main step on the way to Pentheus' killing by his aunts and mother, who cannot recognize him as a human being or respond to his prayers and handless gestures, is taken by Ovid in his story of Actaeon. Angry Diana turns him into a deer, with a taunt over the frustration that she will cause him (3. 192–93):

“nunc tibi me posito visam velamine narres,
si poteris narrare, licet.”

As if her main purpose were to silence his talkative voice and thus save herself embarrassment, she deprives him of human speech. Certainly, as a deer he is harmless. When he discovers in water's reflection that he has become an animal, he tries to voice his human despair in words, but achieves only an animal groan (200 ff.). Then follows the true horror of frustrated communication. As his own dogs pursue the deer that masks him, he desperately wants to identify himself but cannot (229–31). They pounce on him and start tearing him apart, with the eager approval of his friends. Ovid captures the scene in terms of abortive prayer for human sympathy (by this human being inside a deer form that others perceive as only an ordinary deer; 237–41):

iam loca vulneribus desunt, gemit ille sonumque,
etsi non hominis, quem non tamen edere possit
cervus, habet maestisque replet iuga nota querellis
et genibus pronis supplex similisque roganti
circumfert tacitos tamquam sua bracchia vultus.

Ovid has never implied, except through Diana's cruel distortion, that Actaeon wanted to talk about the nude goddess. Here, he is vainly trying to save his life by speech, which is almost human, according to the narrator, but not recognized as such by the dogs and hunters. Failing that, Actaeon-Deer attempts to mime the prayer-gesture. His hands have become forefeet

22 Ovid probably remembers and possibly alludes to Vergil's famous description of the almost human pet deer of Silvia in Aen. 7. 500 ff. Actaeon is no pet deer.
(cf. Callisto), so he kneels, like Io on the Nile bank, and tries to act like the stereotype supplex, using his anguished looks in place of the expected human arms. Io did move Jupiter, but Actaeon remains unrecognized by his friends and gleefully ignored by Diana. His death leads to the uglier death of Pentheus.

Ovid portrays a world where there is much prayer, but only rare success in the appeal, whether to a god or another human being. All too often, piety attracts destruction or metamorphosis. The prevailing effect that the poet aims at and achieves is of piety abused and of prayer aborted by the very gods and goddesses to whom prayer is addressed, of human entreaty unrecognized by the crazed or impassioned human beings to whom victims hold out their hands and appeal in words or in mute pantomime. What he does with the frustrated gesture of Vergil’s Cassandra and with the pleading hand of Turnus, which he perverts into the bleeding stump of Pentheus, epitomizes the grim inefficacy of prayer in the *Metamorphoses*.

*University of California, Berkeley*
Nero’s Final Hours

DAVID SANSONE

Suetonius’ account of Nero’s last hours (*Nero* 47–49) has been admired for its vividness of description and for its readability. Gavin Townend has characterized this passage as “perhaps the most successful piece of continuous narrative in the *Caesars*,” and others have agreed. But Townend also notes that the success of the account as narrative is secured at the cost of historical accuracy, and he points out (95) a number of unanswered questions that the narrative poses for historians who seek to uncover the truth that lies behind Suetonius’ description. Townend explains this state of affairs in terms of what he calls (84) the “law of biographical relevance,” whereby the details of the narrative are presented as though from Nero’s perspective. The problems and inconsistencies in the narrative can thus be accounted for by the fact that Nero was not himself aware of the totality of the situation. Implicit in an explanation of this sort is the assumption that there existed a truthful and accurate account of Nero’s final hours, and that Suetonius, in accordance with the dictates of his chosen genre, has omitted those elements that, while they are of great importance for the modern historian, do not interest the biographer. But the difficulty with this explanation is that many of the features that characterize Suetonius’ account are also to be found in Cassius Dio, who was not a biographer at all, but a historian. I should like to suggest another


2 Townend (previous note) 95 says, “the whole course of events smells of treachery.” Bradley (previous note) 274 quotes these words of Townend, apparently with approval; cf. also B. H. Warmington, *Suetonius. Nero* (Bristol 1977) 115, Lounsbury (previous note) 71.

3 Dio 63. 26–29. This would mean that there existed a truthful and accurate account that was used by the author who was the common source of Suetonius and Dio, and who was
explanation for these awkward details in Suetonius' (and Dio's) account, namely that the source that lies behind both Suetonius and Dio contained a substantial admixture of fiction.

We should be alerted to the possibility of the presence of fiction by the very circumstantiality of Suetonius' narrative. For example, if the detail that Nero tore his cloak on some brambles (48. 4) as he entered Phaon's villa is historically accurate, we will have to assume that an eye-witness thought this particular worthy of recounting, and that it was faithfully transmitted to Suetonius' source. And we will have to make the same assumptions also about the other details that enliven Suetonius' account. But these are just the sort of details that we expect to encounter, not in a work of history or even of biography, but of fiction. One of the valuable features of Rhys Carpenter's very curious book, Folk Tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics, is the reminder that the more detailed and verisimilar a narrative is the more likely it is to be fictional. Of Homer Carpenter says (31–32), "since it is fiction which imparts verisimilitude to his scenes, we may say without fear of paradox that the more real they seem the more fictional they are." But this is true not only of the songs of the oral poet but, I think, of the works of the historian and the biographer as well. If we are to acknowledge the presence of fabrication anywhere in the Caesars of Suetonius, we should acknowledge it here.

While the circumstantial character of Suetonius' account may raise our suspicions, it cannot of itself prove that the account, or any part of the account, is fictional. As it happens, not only are certain of the details individually suspicious but, as we shall see, they form a pattern suggesting that the entire narrative of Nero's last hours was created by a moralizing writer whose model was the myth of Er, which concludes Plato's Republic. There are, it is true, only a few such details, but they call attention to themselves by their specificity and their apparent irrelevancy and, indeed, they are an embarrassment to anyone who tries to deal with this narrative as

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4 According to Suetonius (48. 1; cf. Joseph. BJ 4. 493) only four men accompanied Nero. These will have been (Aur. Vict. Epit. 5. 7) the freedmen Phaon, Epaphroditus, Nephtyus and Sporus; see W. Jakob-Sonnabend, Untersuchungen zum Nero-Bild der Späantike (Hildesheim 1990) 36–37.

5 Berkeley 1946.

6 Another possible indication of the presence of fiction is the fact that there are a number of similarities of detail and even of verbal expression in Suetonius' accounts of the deaths of Nero and Otho; see B. Mouchová, Studie zu Kaiserbiographien Suetons, Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Philosophica et Historica Monographia 22 (Prague 1968) 55–57. It is difficult to believe that these similarities are the result of historical coincidence, so the likelihood is that they are fabrications either here or in the Life of Otho (in the case of Otho, these details are found also in Tacitus' account; see Mouchová), if not both.
an historical document. Keith Bradley, for example, in commenting on sections 47. 3–49. 4, says:

the piece ... has details which contribute little or nothing to elucidating the last hours of Nero's life. It is impossible to comment on such items as s. 47. 3, direptis etiam stragulis, s. 48. 3, inter fruticeta ac vepres, s. 48. 2 tremore terrae et fulgure aduerso. These items have a telling effect in a noveletish sense, but this is all.7

But I do not think this is all. In fact, of the three details on which, it is alleged, comment is impossible, two can be shown to be of considerable interest.8

Let us consider first the thicket and the brambles. At 48. 3 Suetonius recounts of Nero and his party, "ut ad deverticum ventum est, dimissis equis inter fruticeta ac vepres per harundineti semitam ... ad aversum villae parietem evasit." Dio does not include the brambles, but he does mention the reeds and the fact that Nero turned off the main road (63. 28. 1): ἐκ τῆς ὀδοῦ ἀπετράπη καὶ ἐς καλαμώδη τόπον τινα κατεκρύφθη. Clearly the common source described Nero as leaving the road and walking toward Phaon's villa along a path that led through a reedy area. Did the source also include the brambles? It seems likely that it did, and that they were simply ignored by Dio (or his excerptor). But in any case, the brambles are surely a fabrication, whether on the part of Suetonius himself or his source. The reason for their invention is immediately clear from what follows; they exist for the purpose of tearing the imperial cloak (48. 4 "divolsa sentibus paenula traiectos surculos rasit"). It is, of course, possible that Nero's cloak did in fact catch on brambles as he made his way into Phaon's villa and that this detail was accurately reported and transmitted. But it is also possible that this is all a fiction intended to remind the reader of the fate of the fictitious Ardiaeus, who is, according to Plato's account in the myth of Er, punished for his sins by being carded on brambles. Ardiaeus, it will be remembered, was, like Nero, a tyrant and a parricide, having murdered his father and his brother (Rep. 615c–d), just as Nero had murdered his own mother and his brother by adoption, Britannicus. The condign punishment meted out to Ardiaeus (Rep. 616a) consists of being dragged over brambles that lie alongside the road outside the entrance to the upper world: παρὰ τὴν

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7 Bradley (above, note 1) 273.
8 In the light of what is suggested below, it may be that some comment is possible even concerning direptis etiam stragulis as well. At 47. 3 Nero, having left his bedroom at midnight to look for his friends and finding no one, returns to his room only to find that even his guards have run off and that his bed-clothes (stragula) and container of poison have been taken. Nero then looks for Spiculus the gladiator or anyone else who can put him out of his misery, but he cannot even find someone to serve as his executioner. In other words, Nero is portrayed as being in an awkward in-between stage, as neither dead nor alive. In view of this, one wonders if the other meaning of stragula, "burial garments," is not hinted at here; for this meaning, cf. Nero 50, Petr. Sat. 42. 6 and (fem. sing.) 78. 1. Nero is cut off from the living, but he cannot attain the peace of death and burial.
όδὸς ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ ἀσπαλάθων κνάπτοντες. 9 We may assume, therefore, that Nero’s detour, 10 the delay outside the villa and the annoyance of the brambles were all fictions designed to give an impression of Nero not merely on the way to his death but, in a sense, as already in the underworld.

There are other indications that this is the case. As we have just seen, the source on which Suetonius and Dio rely described the area through which Nero’s path lay as “reedy,” and reeds are a conventional element of ancient descriptions of the underworld. 11 In this way Nero is represented as neither dead nor alive, as existing, while still alive, in the world of the dead. And this liminal status of Nero is hinted at in Suetonius’ text and may have been explicit in Suetonius’ source as well: While Nero was waiting, in a sort of limbo, until a secret entry-way into the villa could be prepared, Phaon encouraged him to hide in a pit that had been excavated in the sand (48. 3 in specum egestae harenæ) and Nero joked that he was not about to go underground while he was still alive. This pit seems also to be referred to in Dio’s account, although there is some inconsistency involved. In Suetonius Nero refuses to enter, whereas in Dio he goes into what is called the cave” (63. 28. 5 μετηάθεν ἐς τὸ ἄντρον). Unfortunately, no cave has previously been mentioned in what survives of Dio’s account, but there seems to be no question that Suetonius’ specus and Dio’s ἄντρον are identical. For there follows immediately in both narratives the same anecdote concerning Nero’s drink of water: 12 Taking some water (with his hand, according to Suetonius) from a nearby ditch, the emperor exclaimed, “This is Nero’s special drink.” 13 The special drink was in reality, as we learn from Pliny, 14 an invention of Nero’s: The emperor would boil water, which was then placed in a glass container and chilled in snow. The water was first boiled because this removed impurities and enabled the water to

9 Compare Croesus’ torture of one of his enemies (Hdt. 1. 92. 4): ἐπὶ καναρίην ἐλκὸν διέβρησε.
10 Compare παρὰ τὴν ὀδὸν in Plato with ἐκ τῆς ὀδοῦ in Dio and de verticulum in Suetonius.
11 E.g. Hersesianax 7. 6, Virg. Geor. 4. 478, Prop. 2. 27. 13, Paus. 10. 28. 1.
12 In Dio Nero also eats some bread at this point, whereas, according to Suetonius (48. 4), it was only later that he was offered some bread (which he refused). It is curious that twelve Dio represents Nero as doing something (eating bread, entering the cave) that, according to Suetonius, he refused to do. It is difficult to believe that the common source was unclear on these matters, particularly in the case of the cave, if, as seems likely, Nero’s mot about not going underground while he was still alive appeared in the source. We should perhaps assume that, in the source, Nero first refused the bread and then ate some, that he first refused to enter the cave and then went in. In other words, the source presented Nero as being even more indecisive than he appears in Suetonius’ account. For Suetonius’ portrait of Nero’s indecisiveness, see W. Steidle, Sueton und die antike Biographie 2, Zetemata 1 (Munich 1963) 93, J. Gascou, Suetone historien, BEFAR 225 (Paris 1984) 796–97.
13 “Aquam ex subjecta lacuna poturus manu hausit et ’haec est,’ inquit, ‘Neronis deo cota’” (Suet. Nero 48. 3); ἐπὶ δύσης ὁδὸς ὅπου ὁδεποιοῦσε ἐπετάκει, ἐφ’ ὁ δυσανασκεπτὰς ἐπί, τοῦτο ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ποτόν τὸ ἐμὸν τὸ ἄντρον (Dio 63. 28. 5).
14 NH 31. 40; cf. Mart. 2. 85. 1, 14. 116, 117, Juv. 5. 50.
become even colder (!) and more refreshing when chilled. This special quality of Nero’s decoction is reminiscent of the outstanding feature of the waters of the underworld: The water of the river Styx is said to be so cold as to be lethal, and no ordinary vessel can contain it. Likewise, in Plato’s myth of Er, the water of the River of Forgetfulness can be contained by no vessel. And all of the dead—but not Er, who is to return to the land of the living—must drink of this water before they can continue their journey. And so Nero drinks (but not from any vessel) while he is waiting to enter Phaon’s villa, where he is to die.

But there is something curious about the topography of this place to which Nero has come. Because of the wealth of detail in Suetonius’ and Dio’s accounts, we seem to have a vivid picture of the surroundings in which the drama of Nero’s last hours was played out. But we must be careful not to equate vividness with truth; indeed, as Rhys Carpenter has reminded us, it is one of the distinguishing features of fiction. Let us take inventory of the features of this landscape: In the immediate vicinity of Phaon’s villa are to be found thickets, brambles, reeds, a sand-pit and a ditch filled with water. But these are items that are not likely to exist in close proximity to one another. Reeds grow in wet, marshy places that are inhospitable to brambles. Nor does one excavate sand from wet, marshy places. According to Suetonius, the ditch (or pool) filled with water was adjacent to the sand-pit (ex subiecta lacuna); one wonders how the water came to fill the ditch but not the adjacent pit. It is, of course, possible that some of these details are historically accurate; I am merely suggesting that they cannot all be so. On the other hand, they could all be fictitious, in which case, as has been suggested, their origin is easily accounted for: The brambles and the source of water come directly from the myth of Er, while the reeds and the pit (or cave) have obvious associations with the underworld.

We turn next to the earthquake and the lightning-flash, concerning which Bradley found comment impossible. If one’s concern is to extract

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16 Rep. 621a τὸν ἀμέλητα ποταμόν, οὗ τὸ ὄδωρ ἀγγείον οὐδὲν στέγειν.

17 For the likely location of Phaon’s estate, see T. Ashby, *The Roman Campagna in Classical Times* (London 1927) 84–85.


19 If nothing else, it might at least have been appropriate to note the connection between these and the other portents associated with Nero’s downfall. For the frequency of reports of such portents, see J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion* (Oxford 1979) 155–66.
from Suetonius' narrative fragments of historical truth, it is difficult indeed to know what to say about the biographer's statement that Nero was "tremore terrae et fulgere adverso pavefactus" (48. 2). But the obvious comment to make is that the combination of earthquake and lightning-flash is a conventional element of narratives, particularly Greek narratives, in which the underworld is, or is about to be, revealed, either literally, as in Iliad 20. 56-65 and in various apocalyptic accounts, or metaphorically, by foretelling, threatening or describing the punishment of sinners. In Herodotus, for instance, the Athenians who impiously attempted to remove from Aegina the statues of Damia and Auxesia were greeted with thunder and an earthquake, and immediately came to a violent end (5. 85. 2, 86. 4). Josephus explicitly attributes to the agency of God the earthquake, thunder and lightning that occurred before the Philistines were put to flight. According to Pausanias (9. 36. 3), the god destroyed the Phlegyans κεραμονοίς συνεχεσι καὶ ισχυροίς εσιμοίς, because they had attacked the sanctuary in Delphi with the intention of plundering it. In the Septuagint we find thunder and an earthquake in the vision of Mordecai (Est. 1. 1d) and in Isaiah's prediction of the "visitation" that will come upon those who warred against Jerusalem (Is. 29. 6). And thunder, lightning and earthquakes figure prominently in the New Testament book of Revelation: after the seventh seal has been broken (8. 5), after the seventh angel has blown his trumpet (11. 19) and after the seventh angel has poured out his bowl (16. 18). But of greatest interest for our purposes is the fact that thunder and earthquake

20 Or thunder. In the surviving portion of his history Dio mentions (63. 28. 1) the earthquake but not the lightning. A thunderbolt, however, seems originally to have appeared in Dio's account; so K. Heinz, Das Bild Kaiser Nero bei Seneca, Tacitus, Sueton und Cassius Dio (diss. Bern 1946) 64 n. 2, who refers to John of Antioch, fr. 91 Müller: φωνεῖν ἐκ ἐπεχείρησι, πρῶτον κεραμωθείσης αὐτοῦ τῆς τραπέζης. This last looks like a confusion of two separate incidents, one, recorded by Suetonius at Nero 47. 1 (and by Plutarch at Galba 5. 3, but not in the surviving portion of Dio), according to which Nero, receiving the news while he was dining that his remaining troops had defected, overturned the table, and the other, found at Tac. Ann. 14. 22. 2, Dio 61. 16. 5 and Philostr. VA 4. 43, according to which Nero's table was struck by lightning (fulgur, σκηπτός) while he was dining. The former is connected with Nero's last day; the latter, however, belongs to the time shortly after the murder of Agrippina. The confusion may already have been present in the source of these various accounts, for Philostratus claims that the lightning also struck Nero's cup, which may be connected with the cups that broke when Nero overturned the table (Suet. Nero 47. 1). At any rate, it seems likely that the source of Suetonius and Dio contained, in addition to the earthquake, reference either to thunder or to lightning.

21 AJ 6. 27. The earthquake is Josephus' own addition to his Biblical model (1 Sam. 7. 10).

22 An interesting feature of the two passages from the LXX and the three from the NT is that all mention, in addition, φωνὴ (φωνῆς μεγάλῆς at Is. 29. 6). With this we may compare the φθέγμα in the myth of Er (Rep. 615e), which bellows to signal the punishment of Ardiaeus and the other sinners. Nothing, according to Plato, surpasses the fear of hearing this voice (φόβων ... γεγονότων τοῦτον ὑπερβλέπτων, μὴ γένοιτο ἑκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα 616a). Just so Nero, in Dio's account (but not in Suetonius'), waits in the reedy spot "trembling at every voice" (πάντως δὲ φωνῆν ... ὑποστέμων 63. 28. 2).
occur also in the myth of Er.\textsuperscript{23} In fact, immediately before Plato mentions these phenomena he tells us that Er and the waiting souls went to sleep and were awakened at midnight (ἐπειδή δὲ κοιμήθηναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι). And so Nero, on the last night of his life, went to sleep and was awakened around midnight ("ad medium fere noctem excitatus," Suet. Nero 47. 3).

We see, then, that there appears to have existed a moralizing account of Nero’s death that included a number of fictional elements, that presented Nero as in a sort of transitional state between the world of the living and the world of the dead and that originated between the time of Nero’s death in 68 and the time at which Suetonius composed his Life of the emperor, probably under Hadrian. There is yet another reason we should feel encouraged to believe in the existence of such an account. During this same period Plutarch published his essay, De sera numinis vindicta,\textsuperscript{24} which concludes (563b ff.) with an eschatological myth that is patently modeled upon Plato’s myth of Er. Just as Plato’s Er (Rep. 614b) dies and comes back to life, recounting his vision of the afterlife, so Plutarch’s Aridaeus\textsuperscript{25} reports what he saw after dying and coming back to life (De sera num. vind. 563d). Among Plutarch’s startling innovations is that his visitor to the underworld sees the shade of Nero. Indeed, Nero is the only named person whose soul Aridaeus sees. Now, one might be tempted to expect that Nero’s fate is about to be singled out as an example of the punishment of the tyrannical man.\textsuperscript{26} And this expectation appears to be on the point of being fulfilled when Plutarch tells us that preparations were being made to have Nero’s soul implanted in a viper, so that in his new incarnation he might re-enact his matricide. But all of a sudden, Plutarch tells us, a great light shone forth and from the light came a voice which commanded that, in view of his beneficence toward the Greeks, Nero be reborn as a gentler creature, as a melodious animal that haunts marshes and lakes.\textsuperscript{27} It is, of course, possible that Plutarch was the first to portray Nero in the underworld. But, given

\textsuperscript{23} Rep. 621b βροντήν τε καὶ σεισμὸν γενέσθαι. The combination of thunder (and/or lightning) and earthquake is found also in the Sibylline Oracles: 2. 6–7, 4. 113, 12. 157–58, 13. 10, 14. 234.

\textsuperscript{24} For the date (between 81 and 107), see C. P. Jones, JRS 56 (1966) 71.

\textsuperscript{25} Clearly Plato’s Ἀρδαῖος was the model for Plutarch’s Ἀρδαῖος (564c), regardless of whether we follow Wyttenbach in emending Plutarch’s spelling to conform to Plato’s. See F. E. Brenk, In Mist Appareled: Religious Themes in Plutarch’s Moralia and Lives, Mnemosyne Suppl. 48 (Leiden 1977) 136–37.

\textsuperscript{26} For Plutarch’s view of Nero as tyrant, see C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford 1971) 19.

\textsuperscript{27} 567f φάγακον τι ... περὶ ἤλῃ καὶ λίμνης ζῶν. K. Ziegler, RE XXI.1 (1951) 849 suggests that the animal is a swan, but good reasons have been given for believing that it is rather a frog: R. M. Frazer, “Nero the Singing Animal,” Arethusa 4 (1971) 215–18. Frog had already been suggested by M. P. Nilsson, Geschichte der griechischen Religion II (Munich 1950) 529, and Nero had already been connected with frogs (or toads) without reference to this passage by A. Lesky, “Neroniana I,” Annaire de l’Inst. de Philol. et d’Hist. Orient. et Slav. 9 (1949) 385–96 (= Gesammelte Schriften [Bern 1966] 335–43).
what we have seen in Suetonius, it seems far more likely that there already existed some account that represented, or suggested, Nero’s punishment in the afterlife, against which Plutarch was reacting. Nor is there anything implausible about the existence of such an account. The Apocolocyntosis, written at the very beginning of Nero’s reign, provides a parallel for the depiction, by an ill-disposed author, of an emperor in the afterlife. And, at a later time, Nero himself puts in a (very brief) appearance at Romulus’ banquet in Julian’s Caesares (310c) before he is unceremoniously whisked away by Cocytus. This is not enough to enable us to speak of a “tradition” of representing the emperor (or, specifically, Nero) in the underworld. But the evidence presented here, in combination with the existence of frequent rumors of “false Neros,” indicates that even in the first century there was felt to be something terribly ambiguous about the report of Nero’s death. Indeed, the very fact that the account (which appears to have been the only one in circulation) was so obviously lacking in historical plausibility may have encouraged the spread of rumors that the emperor was still alive.28

Two questions yet remain, to which we can give only partial and unsatisfactory answers, namely why such an account arose and who was responsible for it. As to the origin of the account, the most likely possibility is that Nero himself provided, while on his tour of Greece, the inspiration for those who wished to chronicle his journey to the underworld. For, in a report of which Pausanias is our only witness, Nero is said to have attempted (unsuccessfully) to measure the depth of the Aleyonian Lake, near Lerna, which was the route by which Dionysus descended into the underworld to retrieve Semele.29 This report may well be historically correct, and Michael Grant regards it as evidence of the enthusiasm for scientific exploration that was inspired in Nero by his tutor Seneca.30 In any event, the image of the emperor, in the year before his death,31 exploring one of the entrances to the underworld is likely to have suggested the outline and some, at least, of the details of the picture of Nero’s final hours. In particular, the topography of Lerna is suspiciously reminiscent of that of Phaon’s estate, as we can see from Frazer’s description:

The ground is swampy, abounding in springs, and overgrown with rank vegetation. Along the shore there is a strip of firm gravel, but between this and the foot of the hills the traveller is reminded by ditches full of stagnant

28 Tac. Hist. 2. 8; cf. M. T. Griffin, Nero: The End of a Dynasty (London 1984) 214–15. E. K. Chambers, Arthur of Britain (London 1927) 231 mentions (in addition to Arthur) Harold, Frederick Barbarossa, Don Sebastian, Charlemagne and Lord Kitchener as instances in which “the death of a great leader has been hardly accepted by those who had put their trust in him.” To these illustrious names we may now add those of Elvis Presley and Haile Selassie.
29 Paus. 2. 37. 5.
water... that he is crossing the Lernaeian Marsh. At the foot of the hill
... is a still, deep lake, or rather pool, some hundred paces in
circumference, fringed by a luxuriant growth of reeds, rushes, yellow
irises, and aquatic plants of many sorts. This is the Alecyonian Lake...32

The only elements that are missing are the brambles, which, as we have
seen, have come from the myth of Er, and the pit or cave. But, since the
function of the pit is to symbolize entrance into the land of the dead, we
may say that that element is present as well, in the form of the lake itself. In
the account of Nero's final hours, however, the lake whose bottom Nero
failed to reach was replaced, in the hopes of making the story more
plausible, by a pit or cave that Nero refused to enter.

Finally, one cannot help raising the question of the likely source of
Suetonius' (and Dio's) account of Nero's final hours. Needless to say, the
issue of the sources of Suetonius (and Tacitus and Dio) is an extremely
contentious one and, although a great deal has been written, there is little
consensus among scholars.33 What is presented here concerns only the
account of Nero's death, nor can certainty be attained even concerning this
one incident. Nevertheless, if what has been said above regarding the
character of Suetonius' source is correct, we may be able to make a more
convincing suggestion concerning the identity of that source. Perhaps the
most likely candidate, on the surface at least, is the elder Pliny, whose lost
Historiae continued the work of Aufidius Bassus. Both Pliny and Suetonius
were equites; Pliny's work was very detailed, which we have seen to be
characteristic of Suetonius' source for this incident; in his surviving
Naturalis Historia Pliny frequently criticizes Nero on moral grounds.34 In
addition, there may be one or two correspondences between Suetonius and
passages in the Naturalis Historia, passages that, we may assume, were
repeated in the lost Historiae. We have seen (above, page 182) that the brief
reference in 48. 3 to Nero's "special drink" is elucidated by a passage in
Pliny's Naturalis Historia, and we may be tempted to assume that Pliny is
Suetonius' source for the reference here. Pliny tells us (NII 2. 199 and 232)
that in his account of Nero's reign he described the portents that preceded
the emperor's downfall and, although we do not know whether these
portents are identical with those recounted by Suetonius at Nero 46, it seems
likely that Suetonius has drawn on Pliny's account.35 And there is clearly a

32 Frazer (above, note 15) III 302.
33 See most recently D. Wardle, "Cluvius Rufus and Suetonius," Hermes 120 (1992) 466-82, with bibliography.
34 J. Isager, Pliny on Art and Society: The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art
35 Dio's list of portents (63. 26. 5) is different from that of Suetonius, although they have in
common the spontaneous opening of the doors of the Mausoleum Augusti (for this, see O.
Weinreich, "Gebet und Wunder," in Genethliakon Wilhelm Schmid, Tübingen Beiträge zur
relationship between Suetonius’ “mensam subvertit, duos scyphos gratissimi usus, quos Homeriou a caelatura carminum Homeri vocabat, solo
inlisit” (Nero 47. 1) and Pliny’s “Nero amissarum rerum nuntio accepto
duos calices crystallinos in suprema ired fugit inlisos” (NH 37. 29). 36 But
the nature of Nero’s “special drink” seems to have been common
knowledge, 37 and the breaking of the cups and the portents belong to the
“public” section of the account of Nero’s downfall, before he took flight
with his four freedmen, and there is no need to assume that the source for
the “public” section (if, indeed, that source can even be identified as Pliny)
was the same as the source for the flight to Phaon’s villa. In fact, as it
happens, there is good reason for believing that Pliny’s Histories cannot
have been Suetonius’ source for the details of Nero’s death. For Pliny’s
Histories were not published until after the author’s death on 24 August
79. 38 But it is clear thatJosephus, in a work whose date of publication
antedates the death of Vespasian on 23 June 79, 39 gives evidence of
knowing the account that appeared in Suetonius’ source, for he refers to
Nero’s abandonment by his guards and his flight to the suburbs with four
freedmen. 40

We can thus eliminate Pliny as a potential candidate for Suetonius’
source. The most promising candidates that remain are Fabius Rusticus and

different selections from Pliny’s more extensive list. (Pliny himself mentions [NH 2. 232]
rivers flowing backwards, which was included in neither Dio’s nor Suetonius’ list, although the
former records rivers of blood and the sea retreating from Egypt.)

36 Lest it be thought that “caelatura” and “crystallinos” cannot refer to the same vessels, note
that Pliny, in discussing defects in rock-crystal, says, “hoc artifices caelatura occultant” (NH
37. 28). It is interesting to note that Suetonius’ phrase, “solo inlisit,” recurs in the younger
Pliny’s Panegyric (52. 4).

37 See the passages from Martial and Juvenal cited above (note 14).

38 Pliny had completed his Histories by the time he published his Naturalis Historia in 77,
but he tells us (NH praef. 20) that he intends to allow his nephew to publish it after his death.
It is usually assumed (e.g. by W. Kroll, RE XXI.1 [1951] 289) that this intention was indeed
carried out.

39 The attempt by S. J. D. Cohen, Josephus in Galilee and Rome (Leiden 1979) 84–86, to
show that Books 1–6 of BJ were completed under Titus is not convincing. See the reservations
(1937–1980) (Berlin 1984) 379, also T. Rajak, Josephus: The Historian and his Society
(London 1983) 195, with n. 23. Vitr. 361 and Ap. 1. 50–51 are most naturally taken to mean
that Josephus presented BJ to Titus and Vespasian as joint-rulers, i.e. between 71 and 79 (see
to BJ is no more evidence of post-Vespasianic publication than is the similar emphasis on Titus
in the preface to Pliny’s NH, published in 77.

40 Joseph. BJ 4. 493. Compare κατελειτήθη ... ύπο τῶν φυλάκων ἀπάντων with Suet.
Nero 47. 3 custodes diffugerant and σὺν τέτρατε τῶν πιστῶν ἀπελευθέρων with 48. 1 quattuor solis comitantibus. These look as though they are derived from a common written
source. We must beware of the suggestion that Josephus is dependent here upon oral
testimony from Nero’s freedman Epaphroditus. For this man was put to death in 94 (R. Syme,
Chiron 13 [1983] 134 = Roman Papers IV [Oxford 1988] 266), and cannot therefore be
identified with Josephus’ patron of the same name, to whom the Vita and the Contra Apionem
were dedicated.
Cluvius Rufus. It is, of course, possible that Suetonius is here relying, not on an extended historical work, but on a specialized monograph,\textsuperscript{41} but there are enough similarities between Suetonius’ account of the death of Nero and Josephus’ account of the death of Caligula\textsuperscript{42} to make it a more economical hypothesis that both accounts derive from the same source, a historical narrative of a moralizing tendency that covered (at least) the period from the accession of Claudius to the death of Nero. And that source, if what has been suggested above is correct, is most likely to have been Cluvius Rufus. For we have seen that Plutarch, in the myth in his \textit{De sera numinis vindicta}, seems to be reacting against the account that appeared in Suetonius’ source, and there is evidence that Plutarch knew the work of Cluvius Rufus,\textsuperscript{43} but none that he knew the work of either Fabius Rusticus or the elder Pliny. And, finally, we have seen that the account in Suetonius’ source may have been prompted by witnessing Nero’s attempt to measure the depth of the Alecyon Lake, and we know from Dio that Cluvius Rufus accompanied Nero on his trip to Greece, where he served as the emperor’s herald.\textsuperscript{44}

\textit{University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign}

\textsuperscript{41}See Bradley (above, note 1) 18, who refers to “the popular \textit{exitus} literature of the day.”
\textsuperscript{42}Both accounts are very detailed; both include Homeric quotations (AJ 19. 92, \textit{Nero} 49. 3); both report conversations that can have been heard by, at most, only a handful of individuals (AJ 19. 91, \textit{Nero} 48. 1–2); both emphasize the theatrical aspects of the situation (AJ 19. 90 and 94, \textit{Nero} 49. 1). For the theatrical aspects, see the following two notes. As to the Homeric quotations, G. B. Townend (“The Sources of the Greek in Suetonius,” \textit{Hermes} 88 [1960] 98–120) has argued that the quotation of Greek is frequently an indication of Suetonius’ use of Cluvius Rufus as a source; Townend’s argument has, however, recently been criticized by Wardle (above, note 33).
\textsuperscript{43}See Jones (above, note 26) 77, with n. 31. Plutarch quotes Cluvius at \textit{Otho} 3. 2 and \textit{Quaest. Rom.} 289c–d. It is interesting to observe (see previous note) that the latter quotation concerns the origin of the word \textit{histrio}.
\textsuperscript{44}Dio 63. 14. 3. We are also told by Suetonius (\textit{Nero} 21. 2) that Cluvius Rufus performed this service for Nero (apparently) at Rome as well, where he announced a dramatic performance by the emperor. This provides further evidence (see previous note) for Cluvius’ interest in the theater.
Jason, Pallas and Domitian in Valerius Flaccus’ Argonautica

PETER TOOHEY

Jason’s Tutelary Goddess?

Minerva is at the very heart of things in Valerius’ epic. As far as we can tell this was deliberate; Apollonius’ earlier version of the same legend, by contrast, consistently foregrounds Apollo. Minerva’s appearances, however, change as Valerius’ epic unfolds. The goddess is particularly prominent in the second half of the poem. I will argue that this is the result of the influence of the enthusiasm of the emperor Domitian for this Olympian divinity. Minerva’s role changes in other, more subtle, ways. Initially protector of Jason she comes to withdraw her approval from the hero—markedly so in Books 7-8. This no doubt is one result of a myth in which Jason seldom fares well. But more still is involved. Valerius, by appealing to the Argonautic legend, seeks a mythic, heroic prototype for the Roman emperor and his empire (much as Virgil does with the Aeneas legend). Valerius’ optimistic equation was ill chosen, for Jason was too ambiguous a hero for such an analogic function. Minerva’s growing disapproval registers this. Myth, therefore, unexpectedly undermines the imperial paradigm. But so did real life. Can any optimistic rendering of Roman history be sustained during Domitian’s principate?

Minerva in Two Argonautic Versions

In Valerius Flaccus’ version Minerva is given a very prominent role.1 When one compares the two adaptations, it is as if, in Valerius, Minerva has

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replaced Apollo as a tutelary deity of the Argonautic expedition.\(^2\) The applications of Minerva within the Roman rewriting are varied. Pallas, a force for "good" and for social order,\(^3\) is a figure easily to be assimilated with Venus of the \textit{Aeneid}: so 5. 651 ff. (reminiscent of Venus and Jupiter in \textit{Aeneid} 1) and 5. 617 ff. (as Virgil's Juno complains to Jupiter of Venus, so Mars complains to Jupiter of Pallas). She is frequently designated as builder (with Argus) of the Argo and is often associated with the ship itself (1. 92–95, 126, 457, 4. 542–43, 5. 206, 294–95, 8. 292); on occasion she acts as the tutelary deity of the Argo (1. 215, 2. 49 ff., 8. 203; compare the function of the Dodonan oak at 1. 302 ff. and 5. 65 f.). At times she can be seen in company with Juno, usually trying to protect Jason, the Argo, or the Argonauts as a group (1. 73–74, 87–88, 530, 642–44; cf. 3. 88, 489, 4. 542–43, 554–55, 670 ff., 5. 183, 280 ff.). At other times she will exercise this protective role on her own.\(^4\) It comes as little surprise, therefore, that Minerva and Jason sometimes develop an almost symbiotic relationship,\(^5\) an association which is extended, no doubt ironically, even to Medea (7. 482, 8. 203, 462). Such is Minerva's intimacy with Jason and his companions that she, as \textit{Pallas invita}, is even allowed to register disapproval of her favourite's actions (so 8. 203 and 224 [cf. 8. 243 and 247]; compare 3. 88, discussed below; I have omitted one example from this catalogue which appears at 6. 740 ff., where Pallas protects Perses from fear of Jupiter).

By comparison the applications of Pallas Athena within Apollonius' version are not as varied.\(^6\) Pallas predictably is designated as builder of the Argo (with Argus) and as patron of the expedition (so 1. 19, 109–11, 226, 551, 2. 613, 1187, 3. 340, 4. 583). She also acts as protector of the Argo and the Argonauts throughout the Clashing Rocks episode (see 2. 537, 598, 602, 612). As in Valerius she is a protector and patron of Jason, either with Hera (thus the beginning of Book 3, where Athena, Hera, then Aphrodite plot Medea's passion, or Book 4, where Hera and Athena anxiously watch the progress of the Argo through the Wandering Rocks: 4. 959), or alone (thus 1. 300, 721, 768) and, once in the epic, seems to be curiously


\(^3\) Thus 4. 238 (she helps Jupiter against Typhœus) and 7. 622–24 (note that Jason is also associated with Hercules here). Worth mentioning here are those occasions on which Pallas is pictured with the aegis (thus associating her with Jupiter): 3. 87–89, 4. 670 ff., 5. 287, 652, 6. 173–76, 396–98.

\(^4\) So 6. 173 (cf. 175) and throughout the battle with the Sarmatians, 6. 609 (goddess and hero are almost symbiotic: \textit{nee sua Crethiden latuit dea}), 7. 482 (the \textit{virgo} could be Medea or Pallas), 8. 203.

\(^5\) 6. 609 (\textit{nee sua Crethiden latuit dea}), 7. 622–24 (Jason is compared to Hercules who is, with Pallas, fighting the Lernaean Hydra; contrast 7. 467–68 and 509–10); cf. 8. 230.

\(^6\) Three instances where her role seems conventional are 1. 629 (patron of women's domestic duties), 3. 1183–84 (she provides the serpent's teeth to Aetees and to Cadmus), 4. 1309–11 (the nymphs of the Tritonian Lake cared for Athena after her birth).
assimilated with the hero (so the temple of Jasonian Athena, alluded to at 1. 960). Pallas, as should be evident, exhibits none of the moral significance occasionally evident in Valerius, nor does she exhibit the same vacillation of attitude towards Jason.

Minerva’s Appearances

As Valerius’ narrative unfolds (particularly from Book 5 onwards), not only does Pallas enter the epic with more frequency, but her appearances are more varied, more complex and more riddling. Valerius seems to take much more notice of this goddess and to accord her a more privileged role in the second half of his *Argonautica*. Furthermore, the intimate relationship between Minerva and Jason begins to change. As the goddess becomes more prominent she displays more and more reservations towards her favourite. It is as if Minerva becomes a moral barometer for the worth of Valerius’ Jason.

Let us look first at the frequency with which Minerva appears in the *Argonautica*. In Book 1 I notice eight references to Minerva (73–74, 87–88, 92–95, 126, 215, 457, 530, 642–44), two in Book 2 (49, 53), two in Book 3 (88, 489), five in Book 4 (238, 542–43, 554–55, 670 ff., 682 ff.), seven in Book 5 (183, 206, 280 ff., 293–95, 344–45, 618 ff., 651 ff.), in Book 6 Minerva is to be understood as present in the thick of the action throughout most of its battle (she is named at 6. 173 ff., 396–98, 408, 609, 740), in Book 7 there are two, possibly three, references (442, 482 [virgo in this line refers to Medea, but it could also apply to Minerva], 624), while in Book 8 there are four (203, 224, 292, 462). Closer examination of the occurrences indicates that the first extended appearance of Minerva within the poem comes late in Book 4, at 4. 670 ff. This is an unavoidable episode. Here Pallas helps the Argo through the Clashing Rocks and on into the Black Sea (Apollonius 2. 537 ff. also acknowledges Pallas’ help). We could stress this point. All but one of the previous nominations of Athena refer to her obliquely, and in that one exception (1. 530, this is the concilium deorum at the end of Book 1), although Pallas is on stage, it is Juno who does the talking. After the Clashing Rocks we see and hear more of Minerva. In Book 5 (280 ff.) we watch Pallas and Juno conversing; we hear her speak again in the concilium deorum at the end of this book. In Book 6 she receives what is perhaps her most vigorous depiction. Here she is physically present throughout much of the battle with Perses. She even intervenes to save him. Minerva fades somewhat in Book 7, but this is perhaps the result of the authorial absorption in the tryst with Medea. But, in the abbreviated Book 8, her presence begins again to dominate.
Frequency may be offset by the variety and complexity of the types of reference. In the first four books the appearances of Minerva are moderately straightforward. She is usually the builder of the Argo (1. 126, 457, 4. 542–43), its protector (1. 215, 2. 49 ff.), or the protector and patron of Jason (1. 73–74, 87–88, 530, 642–44, 3. 489, 4. 542–43, 554–55, 670 ff.). I notice only two references which are in any way out of the ordinary. The first of these is at 3. 88. The confused Minyae are cutting a swathe through the unfortunate forces of Cyzicus. The Argonauts are so powerful that not even the aegis-bearing Pallas could resist them (3. 87–89: horrens / stat manus, aegisono quam nec fera pectore virgo / dispulerit). Do these lines suggest an understandable disapproval of the Argonauts on Pallas’ part? The second reference comes at 4. 238. Here Minerva (compared to Pollux boxing the villain Amycus) represents a force which will vindicate the “moral” and social order—she is imagined fighting the rebel Typhoeus.

The timbre of the allusions to Minerva becomes more complex in Books 5–6. Most notable is the appearance of Minerva at the end of Book 5. Here, within the concilium deorum, she vigorously defends against Mars the position of the Argonauts to her father Jupiter. The scene of course picks up that ending Book 1, but, more importantly, it inevitably echoes that scene of Aeneid 1 where Venus argues Aeneas’ case and that of the Aeneadae to Jupiter. That comparison emphasizes the connection of Jason with Aeneas and of Venus with Minerva. As Aeneas was an imperial prototype, so too must Jason be. Whether this is for Vespasian, Titus, or Domitian does not matter terribly at this point. We witness in Jason a generic imperial prototype.

The vividness and the complexity of this allusion to Minerva is amply matched in Book 6. I have already stressed how prominent a role she plays here—she participates vigorously in the battle between the forces of Aeetes and Perses. At one point her identification with Jason seems to extend beyond her role as protector almost to the point of near symbiosis (6. 609: nec sua Crethiden latuit dea).

Pallas invita: Minerva in Books 7–8

There remain Books 7 and 8. In Book 7 the frequency of Minerva’s appearances is diminished. But their type does seem to differ from those of Books 1–6. Though still Jason’s protector (7. 442) she also represents, like

7 J. Adamietz, Zur Komposition der “Argonautica” des Valerius Flaccus, Zeitschripta 67 (Munich 1976) 80, notes the parallel with Book 1 but, following Schetter (Philol. 103 [1959] 308), believes that the divine gathering here is based on Aeneid 10. 1–117.
Hercules *alexikakos*, the moral order (7. 624). There is also a most peculiar identification between Medea and Pallas. At 7. 482 Medea sarcastically remarks *servatum pudeat nec virginis arte?* The virgo to whom she refers is herself. But, in light of later lines such as 8. 462–63 (where Medea is another Pallas: *interque ingenitia Graium / nomina Palladia virgo stet altera prora*) it is difficult not to understand the virgo as Jason’s usual protector, Pallas. What is the force of this strange identification? The portrait of Jason in this book is beginning to show cracks. The more he becomes involved with the malevolent Medea the more Valerius seems uncertain of his moral worth. Jason can be the upright Herculean hero of 7. 622–24. But he can also be the hero who at 7. 467–68 accepts from Medea the helmet of Discordia, who at 7. 498 ff. can forswear himself and who at 7. 509–10 can earn the enmity of the Fury for his *periuria: audiit atque simul meritis periuriam poenis / despondet questus semper Furor ultus amantis*. The ambiguity of Valerius towards Jason is reflected in the ambiguity of the portrait of Pallas.

Minerva’s depiction in Book 8 is comparable to that of Book 7. She is, at 8. 292, the builder of the Argo and, at 8. 203, its tutelary deity. But several of the references to her in this book partake of an equivocality which is wholly out of spirit with the sentiment behind lines such as 6. 609 (nec sua Crethiden latuit dea). Medea is, as we have already seen, curiously, even ironically, associated with Minerva at 8. 462–63. To these lines we might add 8. 202–03 (*puppe procul summa vigilis post terga magistrum / haeserat auratae genibus Medea Minervae*). Minerva’s enthusiasm for Medea as wife of her favourite Jason is made quite clear at 8. 224–25 (*ipse autem invitae iam Pallados erigere aras / incipit Idaliae numen nec spernere divae*). Pallas is *invita* because of her disapproval of the marriage. She knows, as does the Furor (compare 7. 509–10), what the outcome of this marriage will be. Her disapproval is made even more plain when the marriage is celebrated. The omen from Pallas’ altar is a bad one (8. 247–49: *sed neque se pingues tum candida flamma per auras / explicuit nec tura videt concordia Mopsus / promissam nec stare fidem, breve tempus amorum*). It is within the context of Pallas’ unwillingness that we ought to read again lines 8. 202–03 (quoted above). Here Medea clings weeping to a gilded image of Minerva, longing for surety and security. The lines are poignant in their ambivalence. The golden image suggests at once the golden fleece and Jason (identified so often with Medea and now with the fleece). Medea clings, as it were, to both in the hope of a salvation which we know will be false: Jason and his fleece will betray her. But she is also literally clinging to Minerva who, as we know, disapproves utterly of her.

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8 Here are the lines (7. 622–24) in question (Jason is fighting the earth-born warriors): *nec magis aut illis aut illis milibus ultra / sufficit, ad dirae quam cum Tirynthius Hydrae / agmina Palladis defessus respicit ignes*. Jason, like Hercules, is an *alexikakos* (8. 230) who in his turn relies on Minerva’s suggestion of fire to counter the Lernaean hydra.
No doubt Valerius, like Minerva, does strongly disapprove of Medea (see, amongst other passages, 4. 13–14, 5. 219–20, 329–99). But, I suggest, the vision presented in 8. 203 is at odds with this ideology. It is impossible, I suggest, not to sympathize with Medea in 8. 203. And with sympathy comes insidiously a disapproval of the hero who has placed her in this state. As I stated above, in Books 7 and 8 the cracks begin to show in the Valerian ideology which Jason embodies. And it is the representation of Minerva—to return to the main point of this paragraph—which highlights this change.

Domitian’s Enthusiasm for Minerva

Why does Minerva become more prominent in the second half of Valerius’ epic? I take the increasing prominence of Minerva in the final books of the *Argonautica* to reflect an enthusiastic real-life association between Domitian—under whose reign these books were written—and Minerva. That Domitian was an ardent devotee of this goddess is well known. That this homage is reflected in contemporary poetry is also well known. It is my suggestion that this respect is visible in the increasingly important role the goddess plays in the second half of Valerius’ poem.

Domitian’s regard for and identification with Minerva has been often documented (Girard 1981, Jones 1992: 99–100). I will rehearse here only a few of the better-known links between emperor and goddess. As the Julio-Claudians linked themselves with Venus, so did Domitian link himself and his Sabine Flavian dynasty (in the Sabine region the cult had considerable history) with Minerva. Philostratus tells us (VA 7. 24) that Domitian claimed to have been a son of Minerva. Perhaps that is why he kept a shrine to her in his bedroom (Suet. Dom. 15. 2). Domitian linked the goddess with a number of public buildings—in the Forum Nervae or Forum Transitorium he established a temple to Minerva’s honour; there seems also to have been one in Augustus’ Forum; there was a temple to Minerva Chalcidicia in the Campus Martius; and, perhaps, an Atrium Minervae in the Curia (Girard 1981). There are a number of reliefs depicting Minerva with Domitian, such as that from the Palazzo della Cancelleria (reproduced as fig. 3 by Girard 1981). Minerva featured regularly on his coins (Jones 1992: 100). This emperor also celebrated an annual festival for the goddess at his Alban villa and seems to have founded a college of priests for her worship (Suet. Dom. 4. 3–4). She even appeared to him just before his death (Suet. Dom. 15. 2).

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Domitian’s devotion to Minerva is reflected in contemporary poetry (e.g. Statius, Silv. 1. 1. 37–38), particularly that of Martial.\textsuperscript{11} Martial often adverts to the closeness between the emperor and his votive goddess. For example, in Poem 8. 1. 4 Minerva is termed Pallas Caesariana and in 9. 3. 10 she is said to act for Domitian (Pallada praetereo? res agit illa tuas). In 6. 10 the identification is almost too familiar. Here Martial is attempting to cadge money. Pallas responds for Domitian (also confused with Jupiter): sic ego: sic breviter posita mihi Gorgone Pallas: / “quae nondum data sunt, stulte, negata putas?” (6. 10. 11–12). This close identification is also expressed in three poems to which I will return. Poems 7. 1, 7. 2 and 14. 179 all refer to Domitian’s cuirass, on which was depicted Minerva holding the Gorgon’s head.

Minerva was traditionally associated with wisdom and often with poetry. So, it seems, was the emperor Domitian (see Pitcher 1990). Poetry, Minerva and Domitian are blended in 5. 5, where one Sextus, perhaps librarian on the Palatine, is addressed as a devotee of Minerva (5. 5. 1: Sexte, Palatinae cultor facunde Minervae) and as one who has inside knowledge of the presumably poetic abilities of the emperor (5. 5. 2: ingenio frueris qui propiore dei). The association between poetry, Minerva and the emperor is notably evident in the instance of the Alban festival. In 4. 1. 5 (hic colat Albano Tritonida multus in auro) and at 5. 1. 1 (hoc tibi, Palladiae seu collibus uteris Albae) Martial refers to the poetic contests for Minerva which were held annually at his Alban villa. Poem 9. 23 specifically celebrates one Carus, a victor at the Alban contest (9. 23. 1–2: O cui virgineo flavescere contigit auro, / dic, ubi Palladium sit tibi, Care, decus). Carus had been so successful that Domitian—Martial says Minerva—also awarded him a bust of himself (9. 24. 5–6). Poetry contests for Minerva were not confined to the Alban festival. They were also held at the quinquennial Capitoline games. Martial refers to these in the same context as the Alban festival at 4. 1. 6: perque manus tantas plurima quercus eat.

Poetry could be confused with politics. The reference in 5. 2. 8, a dedication poem for the fifth book, states that Domitian (here Germanicus) and the chaste Minerva (Cecropia puella) could read his verse without embarrassment (5. 2. 5–8: lascivos lege quattuor libellos: / quintus cum domino liber iocatur; / quem Germanicus ore non rubenti / coram Cecropia legat puella). Minerva, like Diana, was well known for her chastity.

\textsuperscript{11} Citations of Minerva within Martial which I have located (not all of them) are: as Minerva she appears at 1. 39. 3, 76. 5, 102. 2, 4. 23. 7, 5. 5. 1, 40. 1, 6. 64. 16, 7. 1. 1, 32. 3, 10. 20. 14, 14. 179. 1; as Pallas at 6. 10. 11, 7. 28. 3, 8. 1. 4, 9. 24. 5, 12. 98. 3, 9. 3. 10 (Pallada); as virgo 6. 10. 9, 14. 179; as puella at 5. 2. 8; forms of the adjective palladius are used at 5. 1. 2, 8. 50. 14, 9. 23. 2; as Tritonia at 4. 1. 5.
Domitian, if not personally chaste, made some attempt to reform his countrymen through moral legislation (again, see Pitcher 1990). That in part is the force of 5. 2. 5–8. It also helps us understand 8. 1. 3–4: nuda recede Venus; non est tuus iste libellus: / tu mihi, tu Pallas Caesariana, veni. In this poem the Julio-Claudian Venus, a symbol for sexual wantonness, has been cast out from the more pure state of this Minerva-worshipping Flavian emperor. Such ideological humbug is also at the root of 5. 40 (pinxisti Venerem, colis, Artemidore, Minervam: / et miraris, opus displicuisse tuum?; cf. 1. 102). Here one Artemidorus, erstwhile devotee of Minerva, is perplexed that his depiction of Venus has not gained the favour presumably of the emperor and his circles.

Valerius, Martial, Minerva and Domitian

Where does all of this leave us with Valerius and his Jason and his Minerva? Passages such as these certainly hint at an ideological underpinning of the presence of Minerva in Valerius’ Argonautica. They certainly make more comprehensible the displacement of Apollo, who had occupied Minerva’s role in Apollonius’ Argonautica. But it is possible that the link between Martial’s and Valerius’ Pallas may be made more explicit. There exists one striking passage within Martial which, in its association of Minerva and Domitian, may well have a direct parallel within the Valerian epic. The poem to which I am referring is 7. 1. It runs as follows:

Accipe belligerae crudum thorace Minervae,  
ipsa Medusaeae quem timet ira comae.  
Dum vacat, haec, Caesar, poterit lorica vocari:  
pectore cum sacro sederit, aegis erit.

This little poem, introducing Martial’s seventh book (dated by Friedländer to December 92 C.E.), addresses Domitian (the Caesar of line 3) and refers to a cuirass used by him during his campaign of that year against the Sarmatians. It progresses in two stages. In the first (1–2) it is suggested that Domitian is a figure of such martial capability that he could terrify the Medusa depicted on the cuirass itself. In the second stage (3–4) the cuirass is identified with Zeus’ aegis, which was often worn by and associated with Minerva. Martial states that this cuirass, when not in use, is merely a lorica (a leather cuirass). When in use (when it has been placed on Domitian’s sacrum pectus) it becomes the aegis of Minerva. Domitian himself, that is to say, becomes the very embodiment of Minerva. The impenetrability of this cuirass is referred to again in poems 7. 2 and 14. 179. In the latter Minerva’s association with Domitian is made even more plain (Dic mihi, virgo ferox, cum sit tibi cassis et hasta, / quare non habeas aegida. “Caesar habet.”).

What connection does Martial’s Poem 7. 1 have with Valerius? Minerva, as we have already seen, plays a very prominent role within the
sixth book of the *Argonautica*. She appears in this book, furthermore, armed with the aegis: *at circa Aesoniden Danaum manus ipsaque Pallas / aegide terrifica, quam nec dea lassat habendo / nec pater horrentem colubris vultuque tremendam / Gorgoneo* (6. 173–76; see 3. 87–89, 4. 670 ff., 5. 287, 652, 6. 396–98). Presumably she remains so armed throughout this book, in which she is ranged, alongside the Argonauts and the forces of Aeetes, against, amongst others, the Sarmatians. Now it is well known that Domitian campaigned against the Sarmatians in 88 and/or in 92 C.E. Martian’s Poem 7. 1 and its strong, suggestive parallel to *Argonautica* 6 may suggest a shared occasion. Let me repeat the parallel. Here we witness a goddess known to be linked with Domitian and a goddess, at that, armed with a weapon which, in another contemporary poetic context, had also been linked with Domitian and his campaign of 92 C.E. That *Argonautica* 6 contains a scarcely veiled reference to Domitian’s campaigns of 92 C.E. against the Sarmatians is a hard claim to dismiss.

The case for identifying the events of *Argonautica* 6 with Domitian’s campaign against the Sarmatians of 92 C.E. has often been made. It has been questioned (Strand 1972: 23–35). The grounds are the connection of Book 6 with the proem of Book 1. Syme felt that Book 6 offered evidence that this proem was written for Domitian. Recent authorities insist that it is addressed to Vespasian (Feeney 1991: 334 and Strand 1972: 23–35). Book 6, therefore, is better directed towards the addressee of the proem of Book 1. But to force the connection between the proem and Book 6 is unnecessary. While the proem to Book 1 may well refer to Vespasian, there is no reason why Domitian and his devotion for Minerva could not have coloured Book 6. (Revision and internal cohesion of referents in an incomplete poem is not at issue.) Martial offers particularly strong evidence as to why this may be the case.

Why then does Minerva become more prominent in the second half of Valerius’ epic? Books 5–8, I contend, were composed during the reign of Domitian. The increased prominence and the greater complexity of reference to Minerva is dictated by imperial enthusiasm. If it is correct to see Vespasian behind the proem to Book 1, then we are to imagine that the first four books were composed at a more leisurely rate during his reign (69–79 C.E.), that of Titus (79–81) and the early years of Domitian (81–96). Valerius was dead, at the latest, by 95. He may, therefore, have composed the final three and a half books of the *Argonautica* at haste (by his standards) in the final four or five years of his life.

**Domitian as Jason and Minerva**

Thus the displacement in Valerius of Apollonius’ Apollo. There are, however, other conclusions which must be teased out from my argument.

These concern the encomiastic and ideological basis of the *Argonautica*. Once we allow the parallel between Martial’s Poem 7.1 and *Argonautica* 6 two other crucial points become clear. The first is that a connection is to be drawn between Domitian’s expeditionary forces and those of the Argonauts (conceivable assimilation of Argonauts and followers to Romans occurs at 3.465[?], 6.402, 420, 7.573). This connection may be extended one step further. Just as Jason leads the Argonauts, so does Domitian lead the Romans. The emperor, therefore, is to be conflated not just, as we have seen, with the goddess Minerva, but also with the goddess’ favourite, Jason. Could any contemporary audience have missed the ideological ring of *Argonautica* 6.609: *nec sua Crethiden latuit dea?*

How is this double identification possible? Jason should be thought of not as being the prototype for a specific emperor, but as a generic imperial prototype (Toohey 1992: 196–203). He is, as we see him in Book 1, the prototype for Vespasian, or for Titus, or for Domitian. It follows, therefore, that Jason may take on attributes or qualities of more than one emperor within this poem. Thus, I suggest, he may be associated in the earlier books with Vespasian. But, in *Argonautica* 6, his particular association may be directed towards Domitian. The aims of the *Argonautica*, therefore, extend beyond the merely encomiastic. Valerius, as is sometimes noted, is attempting to provide an ideological, mythological basis for the principate (contrast Davis 1989). His mode, as will be obvious, owes much to Virgil.

**Valerius’ Narrative Impasse**

We cannot leave the argument here. There remain important interpretative and ideological conclusions which must influence one’s reading of the *Argonautica*. I have suggested that Minerva’s reactions to Jason act as a barometer for our estimation of his worth. I have also suggested that, particularly in Books 7 and 8, the depiction of Jason becomes increasingly unflattering and that, in direct proportion, Minerva seems to register her disapproval. There is, of course, a stark contradiction in this position. Domitian, as we have seen, comes to be identified with both goddess and hero. All is well while Minerva and Jason see eye to eye. But when they seem at odds, when Jason, one half of the imperial paradigm, begins in Books 7–8 to present an image of his real-life analogue which is hardly flattering, it is inevitable that we come to question the ideology on which the poem is built. Valerius, therefore, has inadvertently backed himself into an impossible corner—precisely in proportion to the analogical confusion and contradiction between Jason and Minerva.

Valerius’ ideological signifiers have slipped off their mythological referents. Myth itself is responsible for this slippage. (The poem, therefore, unintentionally comes to challenge the very ideology which it ostensibly purports to validate.) This impasse is most evident in the incomplete conclusion. To be sure, Valerius may have died before he was able to
complete his epic—a very likely possibility given the haste, by his standards, with which he seems to have composed it. Yet the prospect of Domitian’s analogue committing the inevitable murder of Absyrtus (not to mention all of his later, dubious exploits in Iolcus and Corinth) and of his falling foul of the emperor’s votive goddess Minerva may have been too much. It was one thing for Aeneas to kill Turnus—we have been prepared to accept his death by our foreknowledge of Jupiter’s disapproval. No such preparation has been offered for Absyrtus’ slaughter. To witness our imperial prototype committing such a murder would be to place too great a strain on the ideological substrate of the Argonautica. The ideology would implode. I wonder, therefore, if Valerius did not sense this, that myth and real life had subverted his intended design? I wonder if Valerius did not find premature silence a preferable means for ending his poem?

University of New England, Armidale

13 Schetter, Philol. 103 (1959) 297–308 and Davis 1989: 72 wonder if the ending was completed but “lost to us in the vicissitudes of transmission.”
Stoïciens et Stoïcisme dans les Dialogues Pythiques de Plutarque

DANIEL BABUT

Les Stoïciens tiennent à première vue une place plutôt réduite parmi les personnages mis en scène dans les Dialogues pythiques: sur un total de seize participants,1 dont trois sont présents dans deux dialogues,2 on n’en compte que deux qui puissent être sûrement ou vraisemblablement considérés comme des adeptes de la philosophie du Portique.

Le premier est appelé simplement Philippe, sans que soit précisée son origine, et qualifié de συγγραφεύς (De defectu oraculorum 418a3). On admet généralement son identification avec Philippe de Prousias (Φιλίππος ὁ Προυσίες3), hôte de Plutarque à Chéronée dans deux scènes des Propos de table (7, 7 et 8), où il est expressément classé comme stoïcien.4 En faveur de cette identification, on invoque habituellement la phrase du De defectu dans laquelle Philippe se donne pour le “concitoyen” (πολίτης) d’un certain Épithersès, qui a été aussi son “professeur de lettres” (διδάσκαλος γραμματικός), et qui était par ailleurs le père d’un rhéteur du nom d’Émilien, lui-même ancien maître de plusieurs de ceux qui assistent à la discussion (419b1–3 et c1–2). Or, il se trouve que Stéphane de Byzance5

1 Ou dix-sept, si l’on compte l’anonyme qui intervient dans le De E apud Delphos 386a7–b5 (la référence, comme toutes celles qui suivront, renvoie à l’édition des Dialogues pythiques procurée par R. Placélière dans la Collection des Universités de France [Paris 1974]). Les autres sont: Ammonios (De E, De defectu oraculorum), Lamprias (De E, De defectu), Nicandre (De E), Théon (De E, De Pythiae oraculis), Eustrophe, Plutarque (De E), Basiloclès, Philinos, Diogénianos, Sarapion, Boéthos (De Pyth. orac.), Démétrios, Cléombre, Héracléon, Didyme-Planétable et Philippe (De defectu).

2 Il n’y a pas lieu de distinguer entre le Théon du De E et celui du De Pyth. orac., même si le second est le porte-parole de l’auteur; cf. Puech, 4886.

3 Et non Προυσίες (cf. par exemple Dion Chrysostome, 43. 12, p. 66, 27, von Amim); il est donc erroné de parler de “Philippe de Pruse,” comme je l’ai fait (cf. Plutarque et le stoïcisme, 254 sq.) après d’autres. Voir Puech, 4869, qui indique (n. 144), d’après L. Robert, que “la patrie de Plutarque est Prousias de l’Hypios, non Prousias-sur-Mer qui avait repris, dès l’époque de Claude, son nom traditionnel de Kios.”

4 Cf. 710b3 sq. (Sandbach), où, juste après avoir mentionné un βαθυπόγωνα σωφρίστην ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡσίως, Plutarque ajoute: καίτω ἄρων ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτής παλαιότατας Φίλιππος ὁ Προυσίες κτλ.

5 S.v. Νίκαια, p. 475, 3–5 (Meineke).
mentionne un Éphithersès de Nicée, en Bithynie, auteur d’un traité Περὶ λέξεων Άττικῶν καὶ κομικῶν καὶ τραγικῶν, ce qui conviendrait bien à un διδασκαλος γραμματικόν, et Sénèque le Père, de son côté, parle d’un rhéteur Émilien,⁶ qu’il est tentant d’identifier avec un poète contemporain du même nom, lui aussi originaire de Nicée.⁷ Si cet Émilien était le fils du maître de Philippe, cela rendrait probable l’identification de ce maître avec Éphithersès de Nicée, et permettrait peut-être de comprendre que Philippe l’ait considéré comme son concitoyen, tous deux étant originaires ou citoyens de deux cités voisines, en Bithynie.⁸ Toutefois, l’argument ne peut revendiquer qu’une certaine plausibilité, et ne saurait, à lui seul, établir l’identité du personnage du De defectu et du Stoïcien de Prousias mis en scène dans les Propos de table.⁹

D’autres indices, en revanche, incitent à penser que le personnage du De defectu et celui des Propos de table pourraient n’être qu’une seule et même personne. Dans le dialogue, en effet, la manière dont Philippe est présenté,¹⁰ et ce que nous entrevoyons de ses relations avec l’entourage de Plutarque,¹¹ ne permet pas de douter qu’il faisait partie des familiers de ce dernier, avec lequel il entretenait assurément des relations étoffées et régulières. Or tel était bien également le cas du Stoïcien de Prousias qui apparaît dans les Propos de table. Invité à un dîner offert en l’honneur de Diogénianos de Pergame, personnage dont l’amitié honorait visiblement Plutarque et qu’il a tenu à son tour à honorer en le faisant intervenir plusieurs fois dans ses Propos de table,¹² Philippe nous est dépeint en effet comme un habitué de la société qui fréquentait la maison de l’auteur à Chéronée. Quand il prend la parole, il se range implicitement parmi les participants réguliers de ces réunions, par opposition à des hôtes plus

⁶ Controversiae 10. 5. 25: Aemilianus quidam rhetor graecus . . .
⁷ Cf. Puech, 4832–33.
⁸ Cf. Ziegler, 46, 20–23. Puech, 4846, préfère supposer que le rhéteur, originaire, comme Philippe, de Prousias, s’était établi à Nicée et en avait acquis la citoyenneté.
⁹ Le seul emploi de πολίτης que l’on puisse comparer, chez Plutarque, à celui de 419b3 se trouve dans Quaest. conv. 692b3, où Νύγρος ὁ πολίτης ἡμῶν, dans la bouche de Plutarque, s’applique sans doute à un ressortissant de Chéronée; cf. De tuenda sanit. praec. 131a4–5 (Klaerr), Νύγρος ὁ ἡμέτερος.
¹⁰ Cf. 418a3–4 θαυμάζοντος δὲ τοῦ Φιλίππου (παρῆν <γάρ> ὁ συγγραφεύς) . . ., à rapprocher notamment de De E 386d11–12, De Pyth. orac. 395c4, De defectu 410f2, et voir Plutarque et le stoïcisme, 259, avec notes 4 et 5.
¹¹ Cf. 419b1–2, 435c5–6 et 8–9, qui montrent que Philippe connaît bien les participants du dialogue, 434f4–6 et 438d9–10, d’où il ressort qu’il est proche d’Ammonios comme de Lamprias.
¹² Cf. Ziegler, 37, 5–33.
occasionnels; il est lié avec Diogénianos, dont il connaît bien les goûts littéraires; surtout, il se sent si proche du groupe des amis de Plutarque qu’il s’empresse de se désolidariser d’un Stoïcien anonyme, auteur de propos jugés incongrus, pour aider ses amis à neutraliser un personnage dont il se sent aussi éloigné qu’eux. Ajoutons enfin que les opinions exprimées par le Philippe du De defectu ne sont pas incompatibles avec celles que l’on peut attendre d’un adepte du stoïcisme, et coïncident même parfois avec des dogmes stoïciens.

Si donc l’identité de Philippe “l’historien” et de Philippe de Prousias peut être tenue pour vraisemblable, il faudrait en inférer que le De defectu nous présente un personnage d’obédience stoïcienne qui avait des relations assez étroites avec Plutarque et le cercle d’amis gravitant autour de lui, sans pour autant que ce personnage, d’assez loin l’ainé de Plutarque et de la plupart de ses amis, semble avoir bénéficié, d’après les indications du dialogue, d’un prestige intellectuel comparable à celui de ceux qui y tiennent les premiers rôles, Ammonios, Lamprias, et même Cléombrote.

13 Cf. 710d9–10 (Sandbach) ὅμις δὲ μεμιμημένοι πολιτικοίς καὶ ἄγοραίοις ἀνθρώποις, πόλεως δ’, ὧν πάνω τύχες, ἱδιώταις καὶ ὑπαγοροποιητέοις . . . Voir également 712ε2, où Philippe parle de son camarade de “palestre” (voir ci-dessus note 4) comme d’un “étranger” (ce qui ne peut s’entendre au sens géographique, puisque Philippe lui-même est un étranger pour ses hôtes chéronéens).

14 Cf. 711d12 τῷ φίλῳ Διογενισιν.

15 Cf. 712d9–12.

16 Cf. 711d9–10.


18 Philippe, qui a été l’élève d’Épithersés (419b3), dit tenir de ce dernier le récit qu’il fait au chapitre 17 sur la mort du grand Pan. Comme l’événement qui fait l’objet de ce récit a eu lieu sous le principal de Tibère (cf. 419d8 sq.), son terminus ante quem se situe en l’an 37 de notre ère. Par ailleurs, nous apprenons en 419e1–2 que le récit de Philippe est confirmé par “quelques-uns des assistants qui l’avaient entendu raconter par Émilien dans sa vieillesse” (Ἀμιλιανοῦ τοῦ γέροντος ἄριστοτάξας). Il en résulte que Philippe, ancien élève du père de cet Émilien, devait être considérablement plus âgé que la plupart des assistants, y compris Lamprias, frère aîné de Plutarque, et qu’il appartenait plutôt à la génération d’Ammonios (voire à une génération plus ancienne) qu’à celle de ses disciples, Lamprias et Plutarque (en 434f4–5, il est indiqué que Philippe et Ammonios “étaient assis l’un près de l’autre”—comme si leur âge les réunissait, face aux autres participants de la discussion). Contre l’interprétation de Bowersock, qui identifie Épithersés avec le méteur Émilien mentionné par Sénèque le Père, et traduit Ἀμιλιανοῦ τοῦ γέροντος par “Émilien l’Ancien,” voir Puech, 4833, n. 1. Pour l’emploi de γέρον en 419e2, comparer De soll. an. 974a4–5 (Heimbold) δ ἀντρών Ὄμιλανικοῦ.

19 Voir ci-dessous, p. 225.

En allait-il de même pour l’Athénien Sarapion, qui est l’un des interlocuteurs du *De Pyth. orac.* L’affiliation stoïcienne de celui-ci ne laisse du moins pas de place, cette fois, au moindre doute, puisque Philinos, l’un de ses partenaires, l’accuse de chercher à “imposer” les théories de son école et l’invite à laisser de côté les fictions imaginées par les Stoïciens. Le dialogue nous apprend par ailleurs que Sarapion était poète, et que sa poésie se signalait par sa tendance philosophique et par la gravité austère de son message moral.

D’autres sources nous font connaître également ce personnage. Dans les *Propos de table* (628a), il est indiqué que Plutarque a assisté, en qualité de citoyen d’honneur de la tribu Léontis, à une fête célébrant la victoire de Sarapion comme instructeur de chœur de cette tribu, lors d’un concours organisé et présidé par le prince syrien Philopappos de Comagène. Le poète stoïcien était donc citoyen athénien, de la tribu Léontis, et très probablement du dème des Cholliédès, qui était sans doute aussi celui d’Ammonios, le maître de Plutarque. Il est mentionné d’autre part par Stéphane de Byzance et par Stobée, et surtout une inscription provenant d’un trépied chorélique consacré dans l’Asclépieion d’Athènes nous a restitué quelques bribes de sa poésie: un poème en hexamètres traitant des devoirs du médecin, et quelques menus fragments d’un pean en l’honneur d’Asclépios. Cette inscription a pour nous l’intérêt majeur de confirmer les indications données par Plutarque sur la personnalité de Sarapion dans l’unique dialogue où il lui a donné un rôle.

II s’agit, à n’en pas douter, d’un ami très proche de l’auteur, tout autant que l’était Philippe, comme on l’a vu. Ni dans le *De Pyth. orac.*, ni dans les *Propos de table*, Plutarque n’a en effet jugé nécessaire de le présenter ou d’indiquer son patronyme ou son origine, pas plus qu’il ne le fait pour Philippe, pour Théon, ou pour d’autres personnalités bien connues du public.

21 *De E* 384c8–9 et *De Pyth. orac.* 396d6 ne prouvent pas que Sarapion ait été Athénien de naissance, mais seulement qu’il résidait à Athènes, dont par ailleurs, comme on le verra ci-dessous, il était citoyen. Selon Jones 1978, 229, il serait le Stoicien originaire de Héliopolis, en Syrie, mentionné par Stéphane de Byzance; cf. ci-dessous, note 26.

22 Cf. 400b1–2 et c2. Voir ci-dessous, p. 211, avec note 54.

23 396d5–6, f4–5, 402f2–4.

24 Flacélière 1951, 325, a supposé que Plutarque devait la citoyenneté d’honneur qui lui fut conférée par la tribu Léontis à l’intervention de Sarapion; voir également Fuhrmann, 167, n. 5 de la p. 49.


26 Stéphane de Byzance, pp. 327–28 (Meineke), Stobée 3. 10. 2, p. 408, 8 (Hense) = *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* 1 185ff, p. 315 (Snell).

27 Voir Flacélière 1951.


29 Cf. 628a4 ‘νε δὲ τοῖς Σαραπιῶνοις ἐπινικίοις ...’, 396d5–6 Παρών ὃν Ἀθήνηθεν ὁ ποιητὴς Σαραπιῶν.
auquel ses œuvres étaient d’abord destinées.30 Un ou deux détails
confirment par ailleurs que Sarapion était une figure familière pour ses
interlocuteurs du De Pyth. orac.31

Il faut même ajouter qu’il semble avoir été intellectuellement plus
proche de l’auteur que d’autres personnages des dialogues, y compris
Philippe. On peut l’inférer d’abord de l’importance du rôle qui lui a été
réservé dans le De Pyth. orac. Car avant l’intervention finale de Théon, qui
s’étend à partir du chapitre 17 jusqu’à la fin et occupe plus du tiers de
l’œuvre, Sarapion n’intervient pas moins de dix fois.32 Parmi les
interlocuteurs de Théon, protagoniste du dialogue et à coup sûr principal
porte-parole de l’auteur, c’est donc lui qui détient, au moins
quantitativement, la première place.33

Mais cette proximité intellectuelle de Sarapion et de Plutarque ressort
surtout de la dédicace adressée au poète stoïcien au début du De E (384d1-
e10). S’appuyant sur deux vers d’une tragédie perdue attribuée à Euripide,
l’auteur y développe en effet avec une certaine emphase une longue
comparaison entre les dons matériels et ceux qui ressortissent à l’esprit ou
au savoir; si, s’agissant des premiers, un pauvre ne peut en offrir à un riche
sans s’exposer au soupçon d’avoir des intentions intéressées, au contraire,
pour ce qui est des seconds, “il est beau de les faire, et beau, quand on les
fait, d’en réclamer de semblables à ceux qui les reçoivent. Ainsi moi,”
poursuit Plutarque, “si je t’envoie, en manière de prémices, à toi et, par ton
intermédiaire, à nos amis de là-bas, quelques-uns de mes propos pythiques,
c’est dans l’espoir, je l’avoue, d’en recevoir de vous d’autres, supérieurs, en
quantité et en qualité, compte tenu du fait que vous profitez des avantages
d’une grande cité et que vous avez plus de facilités pour l’étude grâce à
l’abondance des livres et des échanges de toute sorte.”

De cette dédicace, dont il n’y a pas de raison de suspecter la sincérité, il
ressort que Plutarque entretenait des rapports étroits avec Sarapion et
d’autres amis athéniens, qu’il traitait comme des égaux, envisageant même
que, grâce en particulier à l’avantage culturel que leur procurait leur
résidence dans une grande ville,34 ils puissent apporter une contribution

30 Voir ci-dessus, p. 204, avec note 10.
31 Cf. 397b5–8: “Sur ces paroles de Sarapion, Théon dit avec un sourire: ‘Sarapion, en ce
qui le concerne, a montré sa tourure d’esprit habituelle’ (τὸ εἰσόδου ἑποδέδωκε τῷ ἐπόσῳ
[voir ci-dessous, p. 214, avec note 65]), en profitant de l’occasion qui se présentait pour parler
du Plaisir et de l’Aveuglement . . . ” 400b1–3 (Philinos): “Sur quoi, je me mis à rire et lui dis:
‘Comment viens-tu encore, mon brave, imposer ici le Portique (ποὺ σὺ πάλιν . . . ὁ χρηστῆς,
tιν Ἑτᾶν ἐδοκιμᾶτε πορωθείς), et insinuer doucement dans ton propos les embrassements et les
exhalaisons . . . ’” (voir ci-dessous, note 54).
32 5, 396b; 6, 396e–97b; 9, 398c–d; 11, 399b–c; 12, 400a et d; 13, 400d; 14, 401a–b; 17,
402b; 18, 402d–e.
33 Il a en effet la parole, directement ou indirectement, pendant approximativement 104
lignes du texte, contre 89 à Philinos (en laissant de côté le dialogue introductif qui précède la
conversation rapportée à Basiloélètes) et 62 à Boéthos et Diogénianos.
34 Comparer Vie de Démosthène 2. 1.
supérieure à la sienne à la solution des questions débattues dans ses “propos pythiques.”

Si l’on rapproche cette dédicace des vingt et une autres que nous offre l’œuvre conservée de Plutarque, on s’aperçoit qu’aucun des autres dédicataires, pas même les personnalités les plus éminentes ou les plus proches de l’auteur, n’est traité avec autant de faveur que le Stoïcien Sarapion. On est donc amené à se demander pourquoi le seul destinataire stoïcien d’une œuvre de Plutarque est distingué de cette façon.

La comparaison avec le traitement réservé aux autres dédicataires, aussi bien que ce que nous savons du statut social de Sarapion et de la nature de ses relations avec Plutarque, permettent d’exclure toute raison d’opportunité ou de flatterie: si l’auteur du De adulator et amico ne s’est jamais dé parti de sa dignité en s’adressant à des personnages aussi puissants ou influents que Sossius Sénécion, Philopappos, les frères Avidius et Saturninus (ou encore L. Mestrius Florus, à qui il devait sa citoyenneté romaine et son gentilice, et qu’il n’a même pas cru devoir honorer d’une dédicace), on ne voit pas pourquoi il aurait agi différemment envers Sarapion, poète–philosophe qui ne paraît pas avoir exercé de fonctions officielles dans sa cité, et avec lequel ses relations semblent avoir été fondées exclusivement sur une sympathie intellectuelle ou morale. On est donc forcé d’en inférer que c’est justement l’affiliation stoïcienne de Sarapion—même si Plutarque n’en fait pas expressément état dans la dédicace du De E—qui devrait valoir à ce personnage le traitement de faveur dont il bénéficia. Conclusion qui paraîtra doublement paradoxale, si l’on tient compte, d’une part, de l’opposition si souvent marquée par Plutarque à l’encontre de la doctrine stoïcienne, d’autre part de la prédominance, dans les Dialogues pythiques, des personnages qui se réclament plus ou moins explicitement de Platon et de l’Académie, et de l’orientation ouvertement platonicienne de ces

35 Sarapion tient, si l’on se réfère à la comparaison inspirée par les vers d’Euripide, le rôle du “riche,” alors que Plutarque est dans la situation du “pauvre.”

36 Sossius Sénécion (Vies, De projectibus in virtute, Quaestiones convivales); M. Sedatius (De audiendis poetis); Nicandre (De audiendo); Antiochos Philopappos (De adulator et amico); Cornélius Pulcher (De capienda ex inimicis utilitate); Eurydice et Pollianos (Conjugalia praecepta); Cléa (Mulierum virtutes, De Iside et Osiride); Terentius Priscus (De defectu); Paccius (De tranquillitate animi); Avidius Nigrinus et Avidius Quietus (De fraterno amore, et, pour le second, De sera numinis vindicta); Herculanus (De laude ipsius); Ménémaque (Praecepta gerendae rei publicae); Euphanès (An seni res publica gerenda sit); Alexandre (De Herodoi malignitate); Favorinus (De primo frigido); Autobule et Plutarque (De animae procreatione in Timaeo); Saturninus (Adversus Coloitem). Dans la plupart des cas, Plutarque se contente de nommer le destinataire au début de l’œuvre. Parfois, il indique rapidement les raisons ou les circonstances de la dédicace (cf. De aud. poet. 15a–b, De trans. an. 464e–65a, De frat. am. 478b, Praec. ger. reip. 798b, De an. procur. 1012b). Il lui arrive également de faire brièvement allusion aux opinions ou à la personnalité du destinataire (Quaest. conv. 672d, De cap. ex in. util. 86b, An seni 783a–b), ou de lui adresser un compliment poli (Mulier. virt. 242f et 243d, Adv. Col. 1107c).
œuvres. Pour tenter de trouver une explication de ce paradoxe, il convient donc d’examiner la place qui est faite au stoïcisme dans nos trois dialogues.

La traitement exceptionnel réservé à Sarapion dans l’avant-propos du De E implique-t-il que la philosophie dont le poète stoïcien était un adepte convaincu est elle-même l’objet, dans les Dialogues pythiques, d’un jugement plus favorable que dans la plupart des autres œuvres de l’auteur? Un certain nombre de remarques pourraient d’abord le suggérer.

Ainsi, dans le De defectu, Chrysippe est nommé par Philippe aux côtés des philosophes, parmi lesquels Platon et Xénocrate, qui ont admis l’existence de φαολοι δαίμονες. Plus généralement, Philippe, qui est sans doute, on l’a vu, un adepte du stoïcisme, donne implicitement, mais nettement, son approbation à la doctrine démonologique exposée par Cléombrote et admise par l’ensemble de l’assistance. Cet accord entre le représentant probable du stoïcisme dans le dialogue et les autres personnages est du reste confirmé de manière inopinée par Cléombrote, qui n’hésite pas à ajouter, sans exprimer de réserve, que les Stoïciens vont jusqu’à n’admettre qu’un seul dieu “incorruptible et éternel, alors que les autres, selon eux, ont un commencement et auront une fin.”

Des convergences avec des vues stoïciennes peuvent également être relevées dans le De E. Ainsi, les exégèses du nom ou des épithètes d’Apollon qui sont présentées dans ce dialogue sont par “Plutarque” que par Ammonios sont bien dans l’esprit des étymologies fantaisistes si prises par les maîtres du stoïcisme, et coïncident même pour une part avec des spéculations expressément attribuées aux Stoïciens.

37 Voir “La composition des Dialogues pythiques,” passim.
39 Cf. 418d11–12, où il répond à l’objection formulée dans la réponse précédente par le jeune Héracléeon, “quel est le juste le point qui te met mal à l’aise dans les vues avancées par Cléombrote?” Par ailleurs, le récit fameux qu’il rapporte en 419a11–d11 sur la mort du grand Pan est présenté comme la confirmation de ce qu’a dit Cléombrote au sujet de la mortalité des démons.
42 Cf. 420a7–11 (SVF II 1049): Καϊτοι τοὺς Σταυκοῦς... γιγαντόκομοιν ὦ μόνον κατὰ δαιμόνων ἰν ἱέγον δόξαν ἐχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν ὄντων τοσοῦτον ἀνά το ἐν ἴν χρυσάνθεο χάδικα καὶ ἄφαρτα, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ φαράδεσθαι νομίζοντας. Contraster avec la polémique des traités antistoïciens de l’auteur contre la notion de dieux périsposables; cf. notamment De Stoic. rep. 1051e7–9 (Chemiss) φαράταν... καὶ γενήτων οὕδεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπέν διανοεῖται θεὸν, De comm. not. 1074f1–4 τίς γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄλλος ἄνθρωπον καὶ γέγονεν δὲ ἄλλος ἄφαρτον νοεῖ καὶ αἴδιον τὸ θεόν; <ὴ τί> ἐν ταῖς κοιναις πράληψι περὶ θεῶν ἀναπεφυρίθη μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα; 39
43 Cf. 385b8–c1, 388r7–9, 393b11–13.
Plus significatif, peut-être, est le fait que dans la troisième explication de l’énigmatique ou de l’épigramme, que nous offrira le dialogue Théon, ami intime de Plutarque, prend la parole au nom des “dialecticiens,” qu’il entend défendre, avec l’accord d’Ammonios, contre la façade outrageante dont ils viennent d’être traités par le prêtre Nicandre.46 Or ces dialecticiens ne sont autres que les Stoïciens,47 dont Théon, après avoir proclamé qu’Apollon “est le dialecticien par excellence” (386e2), épouse la cause, jusqu’à développer des arguments incompatibles avec les idées professées ailleurs par Plutarque, comme lorsqu’il s’agit que “les animaux ne connaissent que l’existence des choses,” l’homme étant seul à avoir reçu de la nature “la faculté d’apprécier et d’apprécier la liaison des choses,”48 ou que “tout le présent découle et procède du passé, et de même tout l’avenir du présent, suivant une succession qui conduit les choses de leur principe à leur terme.”49 Enfin et surtout, l’auteur du De E met dans la bouche de son propre personnage un exposé de pure théologie stoïcienne (388e9–89e9), qui explique l’association des cultes d’Apollon et de Dionysos dans le calendrier delfique par les “transformations” (μεταβολοποίες) de la divinité, qui tantôt s’assimile toutes choses dans l’embrasement universel (ἐκτύφιωσις), tantôt se diversifie pour donner naissance à l’organisation du monde (διακόσμησις).

Mais c’est dans le De Pyth. orac. qu’on relève les accords les plus significatifs entre les positions d’un représentant de l’école stoïcienne et celles des personnages qui semblent se faire l’écho plus ou moins direct des vues de l’auteur. C’est en effet à Sarapion, champion du stoïcisme, qu’incombe la tâche de réfuter, avec l’appui de Philinos (398c2–d2) et de Diogénianos (398d8–e9), la théorie rationaliste de Boéthos (398b2, 398e10–99a11), qui attribue les apparentes réussites de la divination au jeu du hasard ou à la perspicacité de ceux qui conjecturent l’avenir “en se fondant

de Cléanthe dans ce domaine, ainsi que les subtilités pépantes et peu convaincantes de Chrysippe, accusé de “faire violence” aux mots.

45 Cf., pour “Leschénorios,” Comatus, Theol. Graec. compend. 32 (SVF I 543, p. 124, 1–3); pour “Apollon,” Macrobe, Sat. 1. 17. 7 (SVF II 1095, pp. 319, 41–20, 2). Il est vrai que cette dernière étymologie n’est pas spécifiquement stoïcienne; cf. De Is. et Os. 381f3–4 (Froidefond), qui l’attribue aux Pythagoriciens, Plotin, Enn. 5. 5 [32], 6, 26.
46 Cf. 386d12–e1.
47 Cf. 386e4–8 (Plutarque et le Stoïcisme, 148, avec notes 2 et 3). Voir également De soll. an. 969a10 sq. (Helmhold), à rapprocher de SVF II 726 sq., Quaest. plat. 1009c14, 1011a8 et d3, avec les notes de Chemiss, pp. 107 (d), 121 (d) et 126 (a), Plutarque et le stoïcisme, 232, avec notes 1 et 2.
49 387b2–8 (trad. Flacelière), en contradiction avec la pensée de Plutarque, qui rejette catégoriquement le déterminisme stoïcien; cf. Plutarque et le stoïcisme, 307 sq.
sur les vraisemblances."\(^{50}\) Et c’est encore à Sarapion qu’il revient de prononcer, juste avant l’exposé magistral de Théon, une des phrases essentielles du dialogue, qui marque son accord profond avec ses interlocuteurs (à l’exception notable de Boéthos), et exprime, à coup sûr, la conviction profonde de l’auteur\(^{51}\): "... il ne faut pas s’en prendre au dieu, ni détruire, en même temps que la divination, la providence et la notion du divin, mais bien rechercher la solution des contradictions apparentes, et ne pas abandonner la piété et la foi de nos pères."\(^{52}\) On en retire nécessairement l’impression que, comme le note Robert Flacelière, "en face de l’incrédulité agressive de l’Épicurien Boéthos, le poète stoïcien Sarapion fait figure d’allié... de Théon, c’est-à-dire de Plutarque lui-même."\(^{53}\)

Cependant, à côté de ces convergences entre des idées exprimées par des personnages qui semblent refléter les vues de l’auteur, et des conceptions professées par les Stoïciens, il existe également, dans nos dialogues, des divergences nettement affirmées.

Les Stoïciens y sont d’abord l’objet de critiques qui peuvent être qualifiées de ponctuelles, même s’il arrive qu’elles soient prolongées par des considérations plus générales. Ainsi dans le *De defectu*, quand Démétrios prétend trouver dans les vers d’Hésiode que vient de citer Cléombrotte "une allusion énigmatique à l’embrasement de l’univers," ce dernier, dans sa réponse, rejette à la fois expressément le dogme stoïcien et ironise sur cet embrasement qui "consume" les œuvres d’Hésiode après avoir "fait sa proie" de celles d’Héraclite et d’Orphée.\(^{54}\) Ailleurs (425d–e), Lamprias s’en prend nommément à Chrysippe en lui reprochant à la fois d’avoir assigné au monde une place centrale dans l’univers, comme si l’on pouvait définir un centre dans un vide infini, et d’avoir voulu fonder l’éternité du monde sur cette prétendue position centrale. Or, la même critique, appuyée notamment sur une citation littérale du livre quatre de Chrysippe, *Sur les possibles*, auquel se réfère ici Lamprias, est développée plus longuement dans le traité polémique de Plutarque, *Sur les contradictions des Stoïciens*.\(^{55}\) Et dans la même partie du dialogue

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\(^{50}\) Cf. 399b1–c7. On notera que dans *De defectu* 432c7–d6 Lamprias conteste expressément l’idée, attribuée à Euripide, que "le meilleur devin est l’homme habile aux conjectures" (comme l’affirme Boéthos en 399a4–5), et soutient au contraire que "la faculté divinatoire... parvient, sans le secours du raisonnement, à saisir l’avenir" (trad. Flacelière).

\(^{51}\) Voir "La composition des dialogues pythiques," 212–13, avec n. 85.

\(^{52}\) 402e1–5 (trad. Flacelière légèrement modifiée).


\(^{54}\) 415f1–8. Même genre de critique dans le *De Pyth. orac.* quand Philinos écarte l’explication allégorique appuyée sur la physique stoïcienne que Sarapion vient de proposer au sujet d’une offrande consacrée dans le Trésor des Corinthiens, en se moquant de la propension du Stoïcien à “imposer” partout des explications empruntées à son école et en l’invitant à renoncer aux billevesées chères aux disciples du Portique (400b1–3 et e1, voir ci-dessus, note 31; sur le sens de ἀναφαίνω dans ce dernier passage, cf. Van der Stoek, 164, 3).

\(^{55}\) 1054c–55c.Comparer aussi *De facie* 925f, et voir Plutarque et le stoïcisme, 143.
Lamprias rejette également le dogme stoïcien de l’unicité du monde (425a–c), en insistant sur l’“absurdité” des arguments invoqués en sa faveur.

D’autres critiques, cependant, mettent plus largement en question la conception même que les Stoïciens se faisaient de la philosophie. C’est ce qui ressort, tout d’abord, du traitement qui est réservé en plusieurs occasions à Sarapion dans le *De Pyth. orac.* Car si le poète–philosophe stoïcien d’Athènes fait parfois figure, comme on l’a vu, d’allié de Théon, il arrive aussi que ses interventions soient désavouées plus ou moins explicitement par les autres personnages, y compris par celui qui est le principal porte-parole de l’auteur. C’est notamment le cas dans la discussion qui marque la deuxième étape de la visite du sanctuaire rapportée dans la première partie du dialogue. Sarapion s’y oppose à la fois au jeune étranger Diogénianos et à l’Épicurien Boéthos. Le premier, dont l’avant-propos de l’œuvre a dressé un portrait flateur, vient de dire qu’il s’était souvent étonné de la mauvaise qualité et du niveau modeste de la poésie oraculaire: puisque celle-ci émane du dieu qui est le conducteur des Muses et le patron des poètes, on s’attendrait qu’elle surpassât en beauté les vers d’Hésiode et d’Homère, au lieu de se signaler par une métrique et un style pleins de médiocrité (396c6–d5). À quoi Sarapion rétorque: “Ainsi, nous qui avons la conviction que ces vers sont l’œuvre du dieu, nous avons encore l’audace de continuer à affirmer qu’ils sont inférieurs en beauté à ceux d’Homère et d’Hésiode? N’allons-nous pas les tenir pour les meilleurs et les plus beaux qui soient, en redressant votre jugement subjugué par l’habitude?” (396d6–11). Boéthos interviendra alors pour lui faire remarquer que parler comme il vient de le faire revient à renverser en quelque sorte la procédure normale de raisonnement: au lieu de partir du fait avéré (la médiocrité de la poésie oraculaire) pour en tirer la conclusion logique (l’oracle n’est pas l’œuvre d’un dieu), on commence par affirmer péremptoirement le *quod erat demonstrandum* (l’oracle est l’œuvre du dieu) pour en déduire une proposition contraire à la réalité (la poésie oraculaire est la plus belle qui soit). Et Boéthos en appelle alors, non sans malice, au jugement même de Sarapion: puisque le style des poèmes qu’il compose lui-même “sur des


57 Cf. 425b3, 5 et 10 ἀτόπος, ἀτόπον, et e11–12 ἀτόπον... πολλῷ δηπουθέν ἔσται τὰ ἐκείνων ἄποικάτερα.

58 Cf. 394f4–5 φιλοθέαμων (souvenir de Platon, Rép. 476a12 sq., où les philèkou và φιλοθέάμωνes sont cependant opposés aux philosophes), φιλèkou và (à rapprocher de De *defectu* 410a9–10, où Cléombrote est qualifié lui aussi d’ἀνήφ φιλοθεάμων và φιλομαθής), 394f5 φιλόλογος dé và φιλομαθής ἔστι μᾶλλον...
sujets graves et philosophiques” se rapproche plus, “par le talent, l’agrément et le soin apporté au style,” de celui d’Homère ou d’Hésiode que des productions de la Pythie, n’est-ce pas parce qu’il a malgré tout conscience de l’infériorité de celles-ci (396d12–f8)?

Mais Sarapion ne l’entend pas de cette oreille et maintient intégralement sa position: “c’est que, Boéthos, nous sommes malades aussi bien des oreilles que des yeux, habitués que nous sommes par la sensualité et la mollesse à croire et à proclamer beau ce qui nous plaît le plus. Bientôt, sans doute, nous reprochons à la Pythie de ne pas s’exprimer plus suavement sans intégralement des cardinal bouche qui les exemplent à l’influence de la Pythie; défavorable à l’emploi des d’autrui neutre, cf. (GeoXriyia), ‘inspiration ici, ‘inspiration héritée du temps.” Cf. 396f9–97a4.

Non sans habileté, le Stoïcien cherche ainsi à se justifier en distinguant, conformément à l’enseignement de son école, entre la vraie beauté, qui coïncide nécessairement avec le bien moral,59 et les fausses valeurs qu’on lui substitue en raison de la “perversion” (διωστροφή)60 causée par l’influence du milieu et la force de l’habitude.61 Ainsi s’expliquerait, selon Sarapion, la “médiocrité” dont on taxe les vers de la Pythie et la supériorité que l’on croit devoir reconnaître à la poésie profane: “Ne vois-tu pas... quel agrément ont les vers de Sappho, eux qui charmant et ensorcellent ceux qui les écoutent62? Mais la Sibylle, comme dit Héraclite, profléant d’une bouche délirante des paroles dépourvues de sourires, d’enjolvements et de

59 La formule τά ἡδίω καλά νομίζειν (396f11) s’oppose antithétiquement au principe cardinal de la doctrine stoïcienne selon lequel seul le bien moral a une valeur positive (μόνον τά καλά οἰκεῖον), tandis que les autres “biens,” à commencer par le plaisir, ne sauraient être des “fins.” Cf. les titres d’ouvrages de Chrysippe chez Diogène Laërce 7. 202 (SVF ΙΙ 18).

60 Peri to kalon kai ti sti hodon pros ’Aristokrēnta i, ’Apodeixēs pro's to μη εἶναι τῆς ἥδουν τέλος δ', ‘Apodeixēs pro's to μη έν τῆς ἥδουν ̣γονόν δ'.

61 Cf. SVF ΙΙ 228–36.

62 Cf. Sénèque, Ep. 123. 6: “Une des causes de nos misères, c’est que nous vivons à l’exemple d’autrui et qu’au lieu de nous régler sur la raison, nous nous laissons égarer par le courant de l’usage” (… nec ratione conponimur, sed consuetudine abducimur, trad. H. Noblot).

63 Un peu plus haut (396d7–8), Sarapion a revendiqué hautement la beauté (κάλλος) pour les vers de la Pythie, qui ne le cèdent pas sur ce point, selon lui, à ceux d’Homère et d’Hésiode; ici, en revanche, il parle de la χάρις de la poésie de Sappho, opposée aux prophéties de la Sibylle; le mot a donc nécessairement, dans le contexte, une nuance péjorative, confirmée par l’emploi des verbes κηλέων et κεκαθάλησειν, pris, comme souvent à figurer, au sens défavorable (cf. par exemple Vie d’Antoine 90. 4, et, pour κηλέω, Platon, Ménet. 235b et Protag. 328d, où l’ironie est manifeste). On notera corrélativement qu’à l’inverse de Sarapion, pour lequel la poésie de Sappho symbolise l’agrément suspect de la forme, opposé à l’inspiration divine, Plutarque, dans son dialogue Sur l’amour (763a), voit dans cette poésie (sans doute d’après Platon; cf. Phèdre 235b–c) “un phénomène de possession divine” (θεοληψία), qui témoigne “d’une agitation de l’âme de caractère surnaturel” (δοιμόνιος σέλης τῆς ψυχῆς), et en compare l’inspiration au “transport de la Pythie, quand elle touche au trépied” (trad. Flacélière); le rapprochement suggère donc déjà que l’auteur du De Pyth. orac. est loin de prendre à son compte les vues exprimées ici par Sarapion.
fards,63 fait entendre sa voix depuis mille ans par la grâce du dieu. Et Pindare, de son côté, dit que Cadmos entendit le dieu faire une démonstration de droite musique, et non d'une musique de plaisir, de sensualité, aux mélodies effeminées. Car ce qui est pur et exempt de passion ne laisse pas entrer le Plaisir, mais c'est ici-bas, en même temps que l'Aveuglement, que celui-là a été précipité, et qu'il est venu affluer pour la plus grande part, à ce qu'il semble, dans les oreilles des hommes” (397a4–b4).

Ce plaidoyer passionné de Sarapion ne convainc cependant pas Théon, qui l'accueille avec un sourire significatif,64 et lui répond indirectement en s'adressant délibérément à son adversaire: “Sarapion, en ce qui le concerne, a montré sa tournure d'esprit habituelle,65 en profitant de l'occasion qui se présentait pour parler du Plaisir et de l'Aveuglement. Mais, nous, Boèthos, même si ces vers sont de qualité inférieure à ceux d'Homère,66 n'allons pas

63 Sur ce fragment d'Héraclitique (92 Diels–Kranz, 75 Marcovich), voir le commentaire de M. Marcovich, Heraclitus. Greek text with a short commentary, ed. maior (Meria 1967) 405–06.
64 397b5–6 Θ. 85 εις τοίνυν διαβαθμίσας. Comparer, dans le De E, le “sourire tranquille” (ηρώιξη διεματίσις 386a5) d'Ammonios après la première intervention dans laquelle un de ses jeunes partenaires a tenté une explication de la mystérieuse offrande consacrée au dieu de Delphes. Théon a le même “sourire tranquille” (Κάκευτινος ηρώιξη διαμετέχοι) pour répondre à une question de Sarapion en 401b10. Ce sourire est la marque de la supériorité du philosophe (ou de sa sérénité; cf. déjà Platon, Phédon 86d5, 102d3, Parménide 130a6, et voir aussi Phéd. 84d7 et 115c4, Banquet 202d7–8), comme l'est ailleurs le silence avec lequel sont accueillis ses propos; cf. 396c7, De defectu 411e1, et voir “Le rôle de Cléombrote,” notes 36–37.
65 Τὸ εἰσόδος ἀποδέδωκε τῷ τρόπῳ, expression diversement interprétée; Flacelière (1962, 35) comprend, “a payé à son caractère son tribut habituel”; cf. Valgiglio, “ha indulso alla consuetudine del suo carattere”; Schröder, 148, pense que le datif dépend plutôt de εἰσόδος que de ἀποδέδωκε, tout en reconnaissant que, “mit Sicherheit zu entscheiden ist die Sache wohl nicht.” On peut hésiter d'autre part sur la valeur exacte du verbe ἀποδέδωκα dans le contexte de la phrase: “payer,” “acquitter,” “restituer” (Babbitt, Flacelière, Cilento, Lozza, Valgiglio), ou plutôt “exhiber,” “déployer” (L.Si., s.v., 1.5b; cf. Andocide, Myst. 109, et le passage du De sera num. vnd. 563b5, cité par Schröder, ibid.).? Dans ce dernier cas, le datif τῷ τρόπῳ devrait plutôt être compris comme un “datif de point de vue”; cf. Kühner–Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache I 317, remarque 19; on traduirait donc littéralement: “Sarapion a fait montre de ce qui lui est habituel quant à sa manière de se comporter.”
66 Κάν ἕφωλότερα τῶν Ὡμίρου τάτα τα ἔτη. La plupart des éditeurs ou traducteurs récents (Sieveking, Flacelière, Ziegler, Lozza, Schröder, Valgiglio) ont adopté la correction de Wilamowitz, qui insère μη entre ἕ et φωλότερα. Cette quasi-unanimité (seuls Babbitt et Cilento préfèrent le texte des manuscrits, alors que Bernardakis hésite) s'explique par l'impression que le texte transmis est illogique, la concessive introduite par κάν ne semblant pertinente que s'il en ressort qu'Apollon ne saurait être l'auteur des vers de la Pythie, quand bien même la versification n'en serait pas inférieure à celle d'Homère (la conclusion paraissant aller de soi dans le cas contraire; cf. 396f1). Cf. en dernier lieu Schröder, 150 (“Die Überlieferung ist zweifellos nicht zu halten . . .”), et Valgiglio, n. 73 (“μη η σοβαρον οι ossequo a quanto detto sopra (396e): i versi dozzinali non possono essere del dio”). Mais ce raisonnement méconnait un fait essentiel: bien que la réponse de Théon se démarque à la fois de la position de Sarapion et de celle de Boèthos (voir “La composition des Dialogues pythiques,” 203), elle est expressément adressée au second. Se tournant en effet vers l'Épicureen, qui ne met pas en doute l'infériorité de la poésie oraculaire (396f2–8), Théon se
croire que c’est le dieu qui les a faits, mais plutôt que, s’il a donné le branle
au mouvement, chacune des prophétesses est mue selon ses dispositions
naturelles…” (397b6–c1).

On doit donc admettre que le bilan du premier échange auquel participe
Sarapion (396c–97c) dans le seul dialogue où il est mis en scène est plutôt
négatif. Le Stoïcien y apparaît en effet constamment isolé face à ses
interlocuteurs. Il ne tient pas compte des faits, auxquels il oppose, sans
convaincre personne, les affirmations dogmatiques de son école. Ses
raisonnements ne sont parfois que des paralogismes, puisqu’il se contente
de poser a priori ce qu’il faudrait démontrer. Il préfère se lancer dans les
diatribes moralisantes qui lui sont chères plutôt que d’examiner
objectivement les problèmes proposés à la réflexion des participants du
débat. Enfin, il méconnaît la nature divine, puisqu’il ne doute pas un instant
que les vers de la Pythie soient composés par le dieu en personne.

Ces impressions sont confirmées, de façon directe ou indirecte, par les
étapes suivantes de la discussion. Dans la quatrième, Sarapion intervient à
propos des prophéties de la Sibylle. Citant, sans rien trouver à y redire, des
vers attribués à la prophétesse, il y voit manifestement la justification de la
divination “artificielle,” fondée sur l’examen des entrailles des victimes
sacrifiées, et surtout il est tout prêt à croire que ces entrailles doivent leur
vertu divinatoire à la décomposition du corps de la Sibylle, qui a fourni leur
nourriture aux animaux sacrés (398d2–7). L’ hilarité qui suscitent ces vues
de la part de Boéthos ne choque apparemment pas le reste de l’assistance,
puisque Diogénianos, le seul qui réagisse alors, donne implicitement raison
sur ce point à l’Épicurien, se contentant de lui faire observer que même si
les propos rapportés par Sarapion “ressemblent à des fables, les prophéties,
du moins sont confirmées…”67 On peut enfin ajouter que la position de
Sarapion était en quelque sorte condamnée par anticipation dans la réplique
faite par Philinos à Boéthos au chapitre précédent (398b2 sq.), quand il
rejetait catégoriquement l’idée que le dieu n’ait pas d’autre moyen
déclare d’abord en accord avec lui sur ce point (‘Πμείς δ’, ο Βόηθε répondant à Σαραπίων
μεν), mais c’est pour donner clairement à entendre que cet accord n’apporte aucune
confirmation à la thèse de Boéthos, puisque le dieu en tout état de cause (καὶ … τὰ Ἑρημ!)
ne saurait être directement l’auteur des vers oraculaires, dont il est uniquement l’instigateur.
L’ “illogisme” qu’on a cru déceler dans le texte transmis se dissipe dès que l’on s’avise que la
concessive doit se comprendre par référence à ce qui précède, et non à ce qui suit, comme le
montre la paraphrase suivante: “Laissons de côté les affirmations hasardeuses de Sarapion,
qui a profité de l’occasion pour entonner ses refrains habituels. Quant à nous, Boéthos, même si
ces vers sont de qualité inférieure, comme nous en sommes tous deux convaincus (cf. 396f1
et 405c–d), n’allons pas imaginer, à l’instar de Sarapion, que le dieu les a composés lui-même
…” L’ habileté de Théon consiste à faire d’une pierre deux coups, en montrant successivement
tes deux partenaires que la qualité de la poésie oraculaire n’a aucune incidence,
contrairement à ce qu’ils croient l’un et l’autre (cf. 396d7 et f1), sur la question de savoir si les
prophéties sont véridiques ou non, si elles sont d’inspiration divine ou d’origine humaine.

67 398d7–e1. Cf. Schröder, qui note (222) que “… der Gast dem Epikureer zu Beginn
seiner Rede weit entgegenkommt.”
d'infléchir le cours des événements qu'en manipulant directement les êtres ou les choses. 68

Ainsi, le résultat paradoxal de cet examen de certains épisodes dans lesquels Sarapion prend une part active à la discussion du De Pyth. orac. est que le destinataire de la dédicace exceptionnellement aimable du De E se retrouve, en quelque sorte, seul contre tous, ses vues étant ignorées ou battues en brèche par ses partenaires, qui semblent par ailleurs le traiter le plus souvent avec une sympathie amusée, non dépourvue de quelque condescendance. 69

Si nous examinons maintenant le contenu des critiques de portée plus générale qui visent la doctrine du Portique dans nos trois dialogues, une constatation s'impose immédiatement avec évidence: c'est avant tout la théologie stoïcienne qui se trouve placée sous le feu de ces critiques.

Ainsi, tout d'abord, dans le passage du De Pyth. orac. dans lequel Philinos rejette l'interprétation allégorique proposée par Sarapion au sujet d'un détail d'une offrande consacrée dans le Trésor des Corinthiens, qui avait suscité l'étonnement de Diogénianos et de ses hôtes. Car l'interlocuteur du Stoïcien ne se contente pas de lui reprocher en riant d'"imposer" une fois de plus son stoïcisme en "insinuant" subrepticement dans son propos "les embrasements et les exhalaisons" de son école. 70 Il ajoute aussitôt, en élargissant inopinément sa critique, 71 que l'explication de son partenaire n'est pas sans lui rappeler les agissements des Thessaliennes, 72 qui prétendent "faire descendre la lune et le soleil, 73 comme si c'était d'ici, de la terre et des eaux, que partait leur développement et leur origine" (400b3–c1). Et il lui oppose la conception de Platon, qui "a donné même à l'homme 74 le nom de plante céleste, comme

68 398b9–c2. Sur le sens de cette phrase, que j'ai méconnu dans "La composition des Dialogues pythiques," 204 (cf. ibid., n. 164), voir la discussion de Schröder, 187–91, et Valgiglio, n. 101. La position de Philinos coïncide en substance avec celle que Théon a esquissée au chapitre 7 (397b8–10) et développera longuement dans son discours final. Elle s'accorde par ailleurs avec des vues qui reviennent plusieurs fois dans le De defectu; cf. notamment 414e1–8 (Lamprias) et 416f3–5 (Cléombrotè).

69 Cf. Puech, 4874: "Dans le De Pyth. or. il apparaît comme un moraliste austère, défenseur inconditionnel de la tradition. À ce personnage grave et solennel, d'une respectabilité décourageante, Plutarque témoigne une admiration imperceptiblement teintée d'ironie."

70 400b1–3; cf. ci-dessus, note 31, et p. 211, avec la note 54.

71 Voir Plutarque et le stoïcisme, 156.

72 Όχι δέπερ αὐτὰ Θετελαία 400b3, que la plupart des éditeurs (cf. en dernier lieu Schröder, 280–81) corrigent en supprimant la négation, selon une suggestion de Wilamowitz. Si l'on garde le texte transmis, défendu par Valgiglio, n. 137, le sens n'en est toutefois pas substantiellement modifié; cf. Valgiglio, ibid.

73 La comparaison apparaîtra peu aimable pour Sarapion si l'on se rappelle que les sorcières thessaliennes n'avaient pas bonne réputation et que Plutarque dénonce ailleurs leur supercherie; cf. De defectu 416f3–17a4 (Cléombrotè), Conjug. praec. 145c4–d4.

74 Ο μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐφάγην ωὖμοισε φωτόν 400b5–6; κατ', placé emphatiquement avant τὸν ἄνθρωπον, montre que le raisonnement de Philinos est que si
si c’était en l’air, dans sa tête, qu’était la racine à partir de laquelle il se déploie. Mais vous,” poursuit Philinos, “toujours en vous moquant d’Empédocle parce qu’il prétend que le soleil, né de la réfraction de la lumière céleste autour de la terre, après cela ‘rayonne vers l’Olympe d’un visage qui ne tremble pas,’ vous faites vous-mêmes de ce soleil un animal issu de la terre ou une plante de marais, en l’enregistrant dans la patrie des grenouilles et des serpents d’eau” (400b11–c1). Tout se passe, on le voit, comme si l’allégorie de Sarapion, inoffensive et peut-être partiellement fondée, avait servi de prétexte pour une mise en cause fondamentale de la théologie stoïcienne, accusée d’effacer les limites entre “ciel” et “terre,” entre monde divin et monde humain — autrement dit de méconnaître la transcendance divine.

Parallèlement, dans le De defectu (426a sq.), Lamprias insiste sur l’erreur fondamentale d’une conception qui lie étroitement la nature divine à la matière, ce qui aboutit à la dépoïler non seulement de l’incorrupibilité inhérente à la notion même de dieu, mais encore de l’autonomie et du pouvoir de décision sans lesquels on ne peut parler de “Providence.” Car loin que l’existence d’une Providence divine soit conditionnée par l’unicité du monde, comme le prétendent les Stoïciens (425e8 sq.), la possibilité d’intervenir librement dans un univers diversifié en une pluralité de mondes “convient parfaitement aux dieux. Car il ne faut pas que croire semblables aux chefs d’un essaim qui ne sortent jamais de la ruche,” comme le font implicitement les Stoïciens quand ils disent que le monde est la “demeure” commune aux hommes et aux dieux, ou parlent d’une “cité” dont hommes et dieux seraient les “citoyens.” Corrélativement, si l’on confond les dieux, à l’instar des Stoïciens, avec des concrétions de l’air ou avec des propriétés de l’eau et du feu, cela revient à les tenir confinés et pour ainsi dire emprisonnés dans la matière, c’est-à-dire à les priver de toute initiative et de toute liberté, à les traiter comme des statues rivées à leur piédestal, au lieu de voir en eux les “cochers” et les “pilotes” du monde. “A mon avis,” poursuit Lamprias, “une autre conception plus noble et plus élevée est celle.

l’homme lui-même, selon Platon, est une “plante céleste,” a fortiori des astres comme le soleil et la lune ne peuvent être tenus pour des êtres “issus de la terre” ou des “plantes de marais.”

75 Cf. Schröder, 276: “Sarapius Deutung der Frösche und Schlangen hat Unterstützung von ägyptologischer Seite erfahren.”

76 Cf. De Stoic. rep. 1051e7–f4 (Chemiss), De comm. not. 1074f1–75a3 (ci-dessus, note 42).

77 426b1–2: οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ σμήνους ἡγεμόνες δεῖ ποιεῖν ἀνεξιδώντας (trad. Flacelière). La formule s’oppose antithétiquement à celle qu’a prise à son compte Lamprias un peu plus haut (425f4–26a1) en parlant d’un άρχοντα πρόσων καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ θεοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ νόμον καὶ λόγον, οίος ὁ παρ’ ἡμῶν [sc. τῶν Πλατωνικῶν; cf. 430e10, et voir la deuxième Question platonicienne] κύριος ἀπάντων καὶ πατὴρ ὄνομαζόμενος.

78 Cf. SVF II 528, p. 169, 21–30, et De comm. not. 1076f4–77a3.

79 Lamprias anticipe ici la critique qui sera formulée par Ammonios en 435a3–7 à propos de la théorie du pneuma prophétique — ce qui montre bien que cette critique vise moins, en réalité, la dite théorie que la conception matérieliste avec laquelle il importe de ne pas la confondre; cf. “La composition des Dialogues pythiques,” 227–28.
qui considère les dieux comme des êtres indépendants et autonomes.\textsuperscript{80} Il n’y a donc pas d’intervention providentielle concevable si les dieux n’interviennent pas “d’en haut,” s’ils sont “liés et rivés à la nature matérielle,” participant à cette nature “jusqu’à en connaître toute espèce de désagrégation et de transformation” (κοινωνοῦντας αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ σωματικῷ] μέχρι φθοράς καὶ διαλύσεως ἀπάσης καὶ μεταβολῆς).\textsuperscript{81}

La même conviction, selon laquelle la nature divine exclut toute espèce de “transformation,” est au centre de la réponse très ferme qu’Ammonios oppose, à la fin du discours qui conclut le De E, aux vues de certains “théologiens” dans lesquels on n’a pas de peine à reconnaître des Stoïciens, et dont “Plutarque” s’était fait l’interprète au cours de son intervention (388e9–89c9).\textsuperscript{82} “Quant aux prétendus changements ou transformations (μεταβολὰς) de l’être divin, qui se dissoudrait en feu en même temps que toutes les substances de l’univers, pour se contracter derechef ici-bas et se répandre à travers la terre, la mer, les vents, les êtres vivants, avec les graves vicissitudes qui affectent ces êtres, ainsi que les plantes, voilà ce à quoi l’on ne peut même pas prêter l’oreille sans impitié” (οὐδ’ ἀκούειν ὅσιον). Et, prenant expressément le contrepied de cette théologie immanéntiste, Ammonios, porte-parole de l’auteur, conclut en proclamant que “dans la mesure où le dieu est en quelque façon présent dans le monde, c’est lui qui maintient la cohésion de sa substance et surmonte la faiblesse propre à ce qui est corporel et entrainé vers la corruption.”\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{80} 426c1–2 (trad. Flacélière).
\textsuperscript{81} 426b9–11 (trad. Flacélière légèrement modifiée).
\textsuperscript{83} 393d11–e4 (trad. Flacélière légèrement modifiée). À la première ligne, ἐκστάσεις (leçon des principaux manuscrits) doit certainement être préféré à ἐκστάσεις (X\textsuperscript{1}, D), malgré les arguments de J. M. Mathieu, “Trois notes sur le traité De Et apud Delphos de Plutarque (384e; 391f–93a; 393d–e),” Kenrypton 7 (1991) 20–21; cf., outre le parallèle de 394a1–2, qu’on ne saurait écarter à la légère, Quaesti. conv. 732b13–14 (ἐκστάσεις καὶ μεταβολαὶ ποιοτήτων): ἐκστάσεις, et surtout ἐξεστάθη ης au sens de “dégénérer,” “perdre sa nature propre,” sont fréquemment attestés chez Plutarque (cf. notamment Quaest. conv. 702a2, 725b3, De facie 939c2–3), ce qui n’est pas le cas d’ἐξακτιεύς; ce dernier mot peut du reste difficilement passer pour un “termé technique stoïcien,” puisqu’il ne se trouve qu’une seule fois, semble-t-il, dans les SVF (II 478, p. 157, 31).
\textsuperscript{84} 393c8–11: . . . ὅσον ἐμοισκέπασ ἐγέγονε τὸ κόσμῳ, τούτου συνδεῖ τὴν ὀνύσιν καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς περὶ τὸ σωματικὸν ἀσθενείας ἐπὶ φθοράν φερομένην. Le texte est incertain, mais toûτου est une correction plausible de Paton pour τοῦτο, leçon des manuscrits (τοῦτο dans X\textsuperscript{1}). Par ailleurs les traducteurs ne s’accordent pas sur la construction de la phrase: les uns (Flacélière, Cilento, Lazza) font de ὅσον le sujet de ἐγέγονε (“c’est l’être divin qui tient assimilée la substance de tout ce que peut bien renfermer l’univers” [Flacélière]), tandis que d’autres (Babitt, Ziegler), prenant ὅσον adverbialement (“pour autant que . . .”, “dans la mesure où . . .”), donnent à ἐγέγονε le même sujet qu’à συνδεῖ, à savoir le dieu, auquel se réfère tout le contexte (cf. τοῦ θεοῦ 393d3, τῶν θεῶν d5, αὐτοῦ d7, ἐκείνου d10, αὐτοῦ . . . ἐκατον d11–e1, φακολότερος e5, χρώμενος e7). Cette dernière construction doit certainement être préférée, la première rendant superfétatoire la présence de ἐμοισκέπασ, tandis que cet adverbe prend tout son sens si l’on comprend qu’Ammonios veut indiquer que le dieu est présent, d’une certaine façon, dans le monde, sans se confondre pour autant avec celui-ci ni s’y
Inséparable de cette critique fondamentale de la théologie stoïcienne est un thème qui revient avec une insistance frappante dans les trois dialogues, au sujet de la relation qu'il convient d'établir entre Apollon et le Soleil. On rencontre le plus souvent ce thème dans un contexte voisin des passages où est mis en cause l'immanentisme stoïcien.

Ainsi, dans le *De Pyth. orac.*, Philinos, après avoir profité de l'occasion qui lui était offerte par Sarapion pour opposer à la conception stoïcienne de la divinité une vision du monde inspirée de Platon, qui préserve la transcendance divine, propose sans grande conviction sa propre explication du motif des grenouilles sculpté sur la base du palmier de bronze consacré par les Corinthiens; ces animaux seraient, suggère-t-il, "le symbole de la saison printanière, pendant laquelle le soleil commence à reprendre l'empire du ciel et à dissiper l'hiver, si du moins il faut, selon vous, admettre qu'Apollon et le Soleil ne sont pas deux divinités, mais une seule" (εἰ γε δεί καθ' ἕμας τόν Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ τόν Ἥλιον μὴ δύο θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἕνα νομίζειν). La fin de la phrase montre que l'explication de Philinos n'est recevable que pour ceux qui admettent l'identité des deux dieux, puisque, dans le cas contraire, cette explication ne permettrait pas de comprendre que le motif ait été employé dans une offrande consacrée à Apollon. Ce qui éclaire d'un jour singulier le bref échange qui s'établit alors entre Sarapion et Philinos: "Mais toi, dit Sarapion, 'n'es-tu pas de cet avis et penses-tu que le Soleil soit différent d'Apollon?' 'Autant, répondis-je, 'que la lune est différente du Soleil; et encore ceci-ci ne cache-t-elle pas souvent le soleil, ni à tout le monde, tandis que le soleil est cause que presque tous les hommes méconnaissent Apollon, car il détoure leur

absorber, puisqu'il détient seul la plénitude et la permanence de l'être. La phrase impliquerait alors que la divinité, selon Plutarque, est, en un certain sens, à la fois immanente, dans la mesure où elle intervient dans le monde, et transcendant, comme le soutiennent, contre les Stoïciens, aussi bien Ammonios dans notre passage que Philinos et Lamprias dans les textes du *De Pyth. orac.* et du *De defeictu* commentés ci-dessus. Si cette interprétation est correcte, elle permettrait de réconcilier les vues opposées des historiens modernes du platonisme, qui rangent Plutarque tantôt parmi les représentants d'une théologie de l'immanence (H. Dörrie), tantôt parmi ceux qui professaient la transcendance du divin (C. J. De Vogel). Cf. Donini, "Il *De facie* di Plutarco," 103, avec notes 1 et 2.

85 400b3-c1, ci-dessus, pp. 216–17.
86 400c8-d2 (trad. Flacelière légèrement modifiée).
87 Cf. 400a2–4: on n’attribue à ce dieu "aucune préférence particulière pour les grenouilles" (trad. Flacelière). Cf. Schröder, 284: "Diese Voraussetzung muss der Verfechter der vorgetragenen Deutung machen, denn sonst geht die besondere Verbindung der Weihung zu ihrem Empfänger verloren."
pensée par la perception sensible, de l'être vers l'apparence'.”

Il est clair qu'une fois encore, la seule raison d'être du passage est la volonté de l'auteur de marquer ses distances avec la théologie des amis de Sarapion.

On peut faire une observation comparable à propos du passage du De defectu où est abordé le thème (433d2–e6). Traitant en effet, dans sa dernière intervention, du pneuma prophétique qui explique le fonctionnement de l'oracle pythique, Lamprias est amené à préciser que ce pneuma n'est rien d'autre que l'instrument matériel qui met en action la faculté divinatoire de l'âme. Entre l'un et l'autre, la relation est la même qu'entre la lumière et l'œil. Car la faculté divinatoire de l'âme a besoin d'être “enflammée et stimulée” par l'action d'un agent avec lequel elle a de l'affinité. “C'est pourquoi,” enchaîne alors Lamprias, “la plupart des gens, jusqu'ici, croyaient qu'Apollon et le Soleil étaient un seul et même dieu ("Ωδεν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν προγνοστέρων ἔνα καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἱγουντο θέον Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Ἡλιον). Mais ceux qui connaissaient et révéraient le beau et savant principe de l'analogy conjecturaient que la relation du corps à l'âme, de l'œil à l'intelligence, de la lumière à la vérité, est aussi celle qui existe entre la puissance du soleil et la nature d'Apollon, et ils montraient que le premier est le rejeton et l'enfant, éternellement naissant, du second, éternellement existant. Car l'un donne l'étincelle, l'impulsion et l'élan, dans le domaine de la perception, à la faculté de voir, tout comme fait l'autre, dans le domaine de l'âme, pour la faculté divinatoire.”

La principale difficulté (ignorée des commentateurs) que présente ce texte tient à la connexion qu'est censé établir l'adverbe relatif ὅθεν avec le contexte. Car ce que dit ici Lamprias au sujet de la relation d'Apollon et du Soleil n'explique en aucune façon ses observations précédentes concernant le rôle que jouent respectivement le pneuma et l'âme dans le processus divinatoire. On en a du reste la confirmation dans la suite du texte, puisqu'il y est indiqué que ceux qui croient à l'identité des deux divinités ont eu raison d'attribuer conjointement l'oracle pythique à Apollon et à la Terre, avec l'idée que c'est le soleil qui permet à la terre de libérer le pneuma prophétique (433c6–9). Il est donc clair que le développement consacré à la relation d'Apollon et du Soleil rompt en quelque sorte le fil de l'exposé de

88 400d2–9 (trad. Flacelière légèrement modifiée). Sans doute pourrait-on d'abord estimer, comme le fait Schröder, 285, que la réserve marquée par les derniers mots de Philinos ne rend pas son explication caduque, puisque l'artiste est supposé partager la croyance quasi universelle au sujet de l'identité des deux divinités; mais, outre que cette observation ne tient pas compte de καθ' ἴδιόν (400d1), en tout état de cause cette réserve de Philinos n'avait lieu de s'exprimer que s'il entendait avant tout se démarquer de l'opinion générale—et surtout de la position des Stoïciens.


91 433d7–c5 (trad. Flacelière avec quelques modifications).
Lamprias, celui-ci profitant de l'occasion offerte par les remarques qu'il vient de faire au sujet du *pneuma* et de la faculté divinatoire de l'âme pour introduire, par une simple association d'idées, un thème théologique qui tient tout spécialement à cœur à l'auteur du dialogue.

De fait, ce thème apparaît également dans trois autres passages, qui prennent place à des moments importants de ce dialogue. Tout d'abord, dans la scène qui se termine par la sortie de Planétiade, Lamprias, exhortant le Cynique à ne pas provoquer la colère du dieu, et exaltant la douceur et l'indulgence de ce dernier, ajoute inopinément: "Et qu'il soit le Soleil ou le maître et le père du soleil, au-delà de tout le domaine du visible, il n'est pas plausible qu'il refuse une parole aux hommes d'aujourd'hui..." (413c4–6). La phrase n'a d'autre justification que de préparer le développement que Lamprias consacrera au sujet dans son ultime intervention, et d'attirer l'attention, dès le début de la discussion, sur l'importance déterminante de ce sujet.

Les deux autres passages sont placés symétriquement à la fin de la discussion, comme pour faire écho à celui qui en marque l'ouverture. En 434f, au moment où Lamprias s'apprête à conclure son discours, Ammonios lui fait part de certaines réserves soulevées en aparté par Philippe: "lui aussi, comme la plupart des gens, croit qu'Apollon n'est pas différent, mais bien identique au Soleil. Quant à moi," ajoute-t-il aussitôt, "ma préoccupation est de plus grande conséquence et porte sur des points de plus grande conséquence." Enfin, à la dernière ligne du dialogue, Lamprias estime qu'il faudra reprendre un jour l'examen du problème qui préoccupe Philippe au sujet du Soleil et d'Apollon. Le rapprochement des deux phrases, mises significativement dans la bouche des deux personnaliités les plus éminentes de la compagnie, montre à la fois l'importance particulière que l'auteur attache à cette question et sa conviction que les doutes éprouvés par le Stoïcien Philippe à ce sujet peuvent et doivent être surmontés.

On notera brièvement, pour finir, que ce thème de la vraie nature d'Apollon est traité de la même façon dans le *De E* que dans les deux autres dialogues pythiques: mentionné succinctement par un assistant anonyme au début de la discussion, où il est seulement indiqué que "l'identité du Soleil et d'Apollon est une croyance admise, pour ainsi dire, par tous les Grecs," il revient significativement tout à la fin, où il occupe une place importante dans la conclusion d'Ammonios (393c12–d10), juste avant la sévère condamnation des vues théologiques que "Plutarque" avait empruntées aux

92 Cette remarque apparemment fortuite suggère en réalité déjà qu'il existe un lien essentiel entre la nature transcendant de l'Apollon et sa Providence (cf. 426a–c, et voir ci-dessus, pp. 217–18). Son caractère inopiné ne doit donc pas nous dissimuler qu'elle anticipe un des thèmes centraux du dialogue.


94 386b2–3 (trad. Flacelière).
Stoïciens. Il se confirme par conséquent que ce thème est organiquement lié, dans l'esprit de l'auteur, à la mise en cause de la théologie du Portique.

Ainsi, l'examen des principales critiques dont la doctrine stoïcienne est la cible dans nos dialogues débouche sur un second paradoxe, venant s'ajouter à celui que nous avions relevé à propos du traitement que reçoit le dédicataire du De E dans le De Pyth. orac. alors que Sarapion est critiqué dans ce dernier dialogue en raison d'une religiosité naïve et excessive, dépourvue d'esprit critique, ne tenant pas compte des faits et faisant fi des explications rationnelles, les Stoïciens se voient inversement reprocher, dans nos trois dialogues, leur méconnaissance de la nature divine, qu'ils confondent avec la matièr et à laquelle ils dénient toute transcendance. Tout se passe comme s'ils étaient implicitement taxés à la fois d'un irrationalisme conduisant à la superstition et d'un matérialisme aboutissant à l'athéisme. N'y a-t-il pas contradiction entre ces griefs, et le stoïcisme n'est-il pas victime, de la part de l'auteur des Dialogues pythiques, d'une sorte de procès de tendance?

La réponse nous est donnée par le rapprochement de deux passages qui se succèdent et se répondent dans le De dejectu. Au début du discours dans lequel il expose ses vues sur la démonologie, Cléombrote fait une déclaration d'une grande portée: "... puisque la difficulté est de comprendre et de déterminer les modalités et les limites de l'intervention de la Providence, manquent également la juste mesure qui s'impose aussi bien ceux qui dénient toute responsabilité à la divinité que ceux qui font d'elle la cause universelle de la quasi-totalité des choses" (οι δ' ὁμοι τι πάντων αἴτιων ποιοῦντες [τὸν θεόν] 414c9–f3). Un texte parallèle du De Iside ne permet pas de douter que la deuxième erreur dénoncée par Cléombrote est imputable aux Stoïciens. Or, ces paroles de Cléombrote répondent, en l'approuvant, à la position que vient de définir Lamprias, refusant d'imputer au dieu la disparition des oracles, au motif que ce n'est pas le dieu qui parle par la bouche des devins, et concluant que "meler le dieu aux besoins humains, c'est faire fi de sa majesté et négliger son rang et sa valeur éminente" (<ὁ γὰρ θεὸν ἕγ>καταμθηκόνας ἄνθρωπινας χρείας υἱς φειδεῖται τῆς σεμνότητος οὐδὲ τηρεῖ τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀρετῆς 414e6–8). Il est donc parfaitement clair que pour Plutarque faire de la divinité la cause de toutes choses, à l'instar des Stoïciens (et par exemple de Sarapion, quand il ne doute pas que le dieu s'exprime directement par la voix de ses oracles), c'est du même coup compromettre la dignité de cette

95 Voir ci-dessus, p. 218.
96 Voir ci-dessus, p. 216.
97 369a6–b1: "il ne faut pas . . . postuler, avec les Stoïciens, une Raison ou Providence unique, souveraine maîtresse de toutes choses, qui serait seule à agir sur une matière dépourvue de qualités. En effet, aucune forme de mal ne saurait apparaître là où Dieu est responsable de tout, aucune forme de bien là où il n'est responsable de rien" (Ἀθωνιτόν γὰρ ἡ φλατινόν ὀτιοῦν ὑπὸ πάντων ἡ χρηστόν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ὁ θεὸς αἴτιος ἐγγενέσθαι, trad. Froidefond).
98 Cf. ὅρθος λέγεις 414e9.
divinité en la mèlant au monde de la matière et du devenir, et, par voie de conséquence, cela conduit inévitablement à nier sa transcendance et à la dépouiller de toute possibilité d’intervenir librement dans le cours des événements.99

En somme, si Dieu doit être cause de tout, il n’est plus cause de rien, car il n’est plus vraiment Dieu, puisqu’il est alors totalement présent dans le monde et confondu par là même avec celui-ci.100 Si bien que les Stoïciens peuvent se voir reprocher à la fois par l’auteur des Dialogues pythiques de tout rapporter à Dieu et d’ignorer sa vraie nature. Les extrêmes se rejoignent, en quelque sorte,101 s’il est vrai que l’on peut s’exposer alternativement au risque de la superstition, tel Sarapion dans le De Pyth. orac., et à celui de l’athéisme, comme ceux qui confondent les dieux avec des propriétés de la matière.102 Et lorsque, à la fin du De defectu (436d10 sq.), Lamprias, faisant écho à Cléombrète,103 dénonce les erreurs symétriques et inverses de ceux qui négligent “les causes nécessaires et physiques” et de ceux qui perdent de vue “le principe noble et divin” de tout ce qui arrive, il semble évident que les Stoïciens sont encore une fois visés par ces deux critiques apparentemment antithétiques. Car le Sarapion du De Pyth. orac. peut sûrement être assimilé aux “théologiciens des temps les plus anciens” que ne s’attachaient qu’à “la seule cause supérieure,” tandis que les philosophes de son école peuvent aussi être accusés de “toute réduire à des corps et à des accidents corporels, chocs, transformations et mélanges” (ἐν σώμασι καὶ πάθεσι σωμάτων πληγαίς τε καὶ μεταβολάζοι καὶ κράπασι τίθενται τὸ σώμαν 436c2–3).104

Mai si cette critique fondamentale de la doctrine religieuse du Portique prend, comme on l’a vu, une place importante dans nos trois dialogues, on

100 Cf. De E 393c8–9, et la note 84 ci-dessus.
101 Cf. Plutarque et le stoïcisme, 525.
102 Cf. De defectu 426b4–6 (ci-dessus, p. 217), et comparer Amat. 763d4–6, De Is. et Os. 367c4–9, et surtout 377d5–e8.
103 Comparer 436e3–4 Ὄθεν ἀμφοτέροις ἡ λόγος ἐνδική τοῦ προσηκοντός ἐστι, et 414f1–3 οἱ δ’ ἀστρονομοὶ του μετριό καὶ πρόκοπος.
104 Les mots μεταβολάζοι et κράπασι ἐνουμοῦν particulièrement la physio stoïcienne; cf., pour le premier, De E 393d11 (Ammonios, répondant à “Plutarque,” 388f3, 389a3, 7 e 9, b9 et ci1), De defectu 426b11 (Lamprias critiquant la théologie stoïcienne; voir ci-dessus, p. 217); pour κράπασι, cf. Amat. 769f, Conjug. praec. 142f5 (SVF II, p. 124, 11–12), où οἱ φιλοσόφοι désigne justement les Stoïciens (cf. De amic. mult. 97a10 sq.—omis dans les SVF—Ad princ. inf. 782c12 sq.: SVF IV 703, p. 203, 14–15), et SVF III, p. 255, 14–16 (Antipater de Tarse). Mais il est juste d’ajouter que Lamprias ne vise spécifiquement, en l’occurrence, aucune école philosophique, son propos s’appliquant indifféremment à tous ceux qui, d’Anaxagore aux Stoïciens en passant par les Épicuriens, ont professé une doctrine matérialiste qui méconnaît, à ses yeux, la “cause supérieure” ou le principe divin. Cf. Plutarque et le stoïcisme, 313, n. 1.
peut remarquer en outre qu'elle domine plus particulièrement le De E, puisque l'intervention finale d'Ammonios, véritable clé de voûte de l'œuvre, est tout entière centrée sur l'affirmation de la transcendance divine. Peut-être tenons-nous dans cette remarque la solution d'un problème qui n'a jamais été vraiment éclairé par les commentateurs: pourquoi Plutarque fait-il endosser par le personnage qui porte son nom des conceptions théologiques typiquement stoïciennes, qui n'ont aucun parallèle dans ses autres œuvres, et qui contredisent manifestement ses convictions? Impossible d'admettre en effet que ces pages témoigneraient d'une influence stoïcienne, même partielle ou momentanée, qu'aurait subie l'auteur du dialogue, puisque les vues exposées là par "Plutarque" sont les seules, parmi celles qu'ont avancées les autres "jeunes gens," avant l'intervention décisive d'Ammonios, auxquelles celui-ci croit devoir opposer une réfutation en règle, et dont il prend même le contrepied avec une certaine véhémence. Et il paraît difficile, en définitive, de voir dans ce passage un hommage au destinataire stoïcien de l'œuvre, comme je l'ai cru naguère, puisque justement l'attention n'y est attirée sur les idées de son école que pour écarter plus catégoriquement celles-ci.

On peut en revanche se demander si en attribuant à son propre personnage des idées proches de celles des Stoïciens et allant directement à l'encontre de la doctrine théologique ensuite exposée par Ammonios, Plutarque n'aurait pas cherché à adresser le plus délicatement possible à Sarapion et à ses amis d'Athènes ce qui était sans doute le message principal des Πυθικοὶ λόγοι qu'il leur dédiait: confondre la divinité avec un monde qui ne cesse de se faire et de se défaire, c'est nier, en définitive, les deux caractéristiques essentielles par lesquelles les Stoïciens eux-mêmes définissaient la notion du divin: l'incorruptibilité et la Providence (c'est-à-dire le libre pouvoir d'intervenir dans le cours des événements). Quelque amitié qu'il éprouvât pour l'honnête Sarapion, l'auteur des Dialogues pytiques se sentait tenu de l'avertir, avec une délicatesse n'excluant pas la fermeté, que c'étaient là des conceptions auxquelles "l'on ne peut même pas prêter l'oreille sans impatiété . . ."

Ainsi il se confirme que la confrontation avec le stoïcisme est au centre de nos trois dialogues. La réflexion menée par Plutarque sur la signification de l'E delphique et sur les problèmes de la divination lui a fourni en effet l'occasion—à moins que ces sujets aient été justement choisis à cette fin—de démontrer, s'il se pouvait, aux destinataires de ces Πυθικοὶ λόγοι qu'une

106 Cf. 393e4 οὐδ' ἀκούειν ὅσιον; voir ci-dessus, p. 218.
107 Cf. Plutarque et la stoïcisme, 153. Le commentaire de Hershbell, 3245, "This may be too simple a dismissal of Stoic influences, but it is at least plausible," me paraît cependant doublement sujet à caution, car si l'hypothèse d'un clin d'œil adressé à Sarapion n'est finalement guère plausible, celle d'"influences stoïciennes" est totalement exclue par la réaction d'Ammonios, comme on l'a vu.
108 Cf. De comm. not. 1075c2—8 (Cheminis).
théologie immanentiste comme celle des Stoïciens impliquait une méconnaissance capitale de la nature divine et aboutissait, qu’on le voulût ou non, à une négation ruineuse de la notion même d’une divinité providentielle.

Cette présence centrale de la théologie du Portique dans les trois dialogues permet enfin de comprendre à la fois le traitement qui y est réservé aux deux personnages stoïciens mis en scène et la dédicace que reçoit Sarapion dans le De E. Car si Philippe et Sarapion nous sont dépeints comme des alliés des personnages qui sont les plus proches de l’auteur et peuvent être considérés, à des degrés divers, comme ses porte-parole, ils n’en apparaissent pas moins, par rapport à ces derniers, dans une position quelque peu subordonnée. C’est ainsi que Philippe, en dépit de son appartenance probable à la “palestre” stoïcienne, est suffisamment impressionné par l’argumentation qu’a développée Lamprias sur la pluralité des mondes pour se déclarer incapable de décider “où se trouve la vérité sur ce sujet, dans l’opinion qui vient d’être exposée ou dans l’opinion contraire”109 (c’est-à-dire celle de sa propre école!). Et Sarapion lui-même, pourtant Stoïcien convaincu, s’en rapporte, le cas échéant, à l’autorité de Théon,110 de la même manière que Philippe, à la fin du De defectu, se tourne respectueusement (malgré son âge!111) vers Ammonios, pour lui faire part des questions qu’il continue à se poser après l’exposé de Lamprias.112 La présentation même de ces deux adeptes du stoïcisme suggère donc que la distance qui les sépare de Plutarque et de ses amis platoniciens n’est peut-être pas à jamais infranchissable, et que l’auteur des Dialogues pythiques ne désespère pas de les rallier un jour à sa cause, en les amenant à une plus juste vision des choses.

Et c’est bien, en définitive, l’impression qui ressort de l’un des passages où est abordé le thème récurrent de la relation d’Apollon avec le Soleil, et dans lequel on peut découvrir, avec l’explication de l’étonnante dédicace du De E, la clé du problème que posent le rôle des Stoïciens et la place du stoïcisme dans ces dialogues.

Sur le point d’achever l’exposé théologique auquel a donné lieu son interprétation personnelle de l’E delphique, Ammonios revient en effet tout à coup, et sans justification apparente, à la question, brièvement évoquée au début du dialogue,113 de l’identité du Soleil et d’Apollon: “Quant à ceux pour qui Apollon et le Soleil ne font qu’un, ils méritent nos égards et notre affection à cause de leurs bonnes dispositions, puisque c’est à l’objet par

110 Cf. 401b7–9.
111 Voir ci-dessus, note 18.
112 434f4 sq.
113 386b2–3, ci-dessus, p. 221.
excellence de leurs hommages, parmi tout ce qu’ils connaissent et à quoi ils aspirent, qu’ils rapportent ainsi la notion du divin. Mais maintenant réveillons-les, comme des gens qui rêvent du dieu dans le plus beau des songes, et exhortons-les à monter plus haut pour avoir de lui une vision réelle et contempler son essence (παρακαλῶμεν ἀνωτέρω προάγειν καὶ θεάσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ άυτοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν), tout en honorant par ailleurs son image et en vénérant la fécondité qui appartient à celle-ci; car, autant qu’un objet sensible et fluctuant peut le faire pour une réalité invisible et stable, cette image fait briller en quelque sorte comme des reflets et des imitations de la bonté et de la félicité du dieu.¹¹⁴

À la lumière des analyses qui précèdent, on ne peut en effet plus douter que cette exhortation s’adresse avant tout à Sarapion, à Philippe et sans doute à d’autres amis stoïciens de Plutarque, et que celui-ci, en dédiant au poète–philosophe athénien et à ses compagnons le premier de ses Πθικοί λόγοι, était animé par l’espoir de les inciter à une réflexion approfondie sur les problèmes religieux qu’il y abordait, afin de les aider à s’élérer “plus haut” et à accéder à une vision épurée de la nature divine. C’est pourquoi on osera conclure que les Dialogues pythiques ont été conçus dans le dessein de “réveiller” Sarapion et ses semblables de leur rêve stoïcien, afin de les convertir, en quelque sorte, à la saine théologie, inspirée de Platon, qui reconnaît pleinement la transcendance du divin.

Université Lumière, Lyon

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Literatura Sapiencial Antigua en la Haggadah
y en Pedro Alfonso

FRANCISCO R. ADRADOS

I. Panorama de la Literatura Sapiencial Antigua

En algunos escritos míos sobre la fábulas antiguas he hecho ver la presencia de la misma en obras tardías o medievales por lo demás penetradas por la tradición oriental: así en el Sendebar, el Calila, las Mil y Una Noches, el Arcipreste de Hita, etc.; y muy concretamente en la literatura rabínica (Haggadah y sus derivados) y en Pedro Alfonso.1 Una veces hallamos fábulas de la antigua tradición, otras fábulas de la tradición cínica; naturalmente, con variantes que pueden venir o bien de fuentes antiguas desconocidas para nosotros o bien de innovaciones.

Aquí querría insistir en el tema haciendo ver que no se trata solamente de fábulas, sino de literatura sapiencial en general: en buena medida de tradición oriental, en otra de tradición de la Antigüedad clásica, cínica concretamente en muchos casos. Para lo que se refiere a la Haggadah, voy a citarla (salvo en algún caso excepcional) a través de una recopilación moderna, pero que remonta a fuentes del fin de la Antigüedad.2

Más concretamente, me interesa el tema de los consejos impartidos al rey por su consejero (o secretario o ministro); más raramente se trata del padre que da consejos a su hijo o del consejero que se los da al hijo del rey por encargo de aquel. Se trata de una variante de la literatura sapiencial, que otras veces consiste en máximas sin destinatario preciso; en Grecia hay otras variantes, como Hesíodo aconsejando a su hermano Perses o Teognis aconsejando a su amigo Cirno. Naturalmente, por lo que al contenido de los consejos se refiere, es indiferente el marco en que estén impartidos.

Pero sí es importante hacer constar que en el género en que esta literatura se expresa, un diálogo o debate o serie de preguntas y respuestas,

2 Me refiero al libro La zarza ardiente, trad. esp. (Buenos Aires 1950), derivado del Sefer Haagada de J. N. Bialik y J. C. Ravnitzky.
es habitual la intervención de la fábulas, el mito, el símil animal, el enigma o problema que es resuelto; además de, habitualmente, la máxima y la definición. Esto no cambio a lo largo de su historia desde Mesopotamia y Egipto a la Edad Media.

El tema que nos interesa es, efectivamente, de origen oriental pero penetró pronto en Grecia y, a partir de un cierto momento, entró en la literatura cinizante bajo la forma del diálogo entre el rey (u otro poderoso) y el filósofo que descubre su ignorancia y predica contra el poder y la riqueza. Me he ocupado de esta evolución del tema en un trabajo especial a él dedicado. Aquí, voy a limitarme a dar una ejemplificación de este género con sus variantes.

Estas son diversas. Frente al tipo habitual, el sabio puede ser otras veces el rey (Salomón, Amasis) que contesta a alguien. A su vez, el rey puede ser sustituido por algún otro poderoso. Y puede tratarse de resolver enigmas o de dar contestaciones a preguntas del tipo “¿Qué es . . . ?” o de impartir doctrinas éticas o filosóficas en general.

En un primer sector de esta literatura el rey o su interlocutor es oriental, lo que responde a los orígenes del género. Éste, en época helenística, es tratado tanto en griego como en lenguas de la India: he hablado de literatura indo-griega. Una parte de esta producción, ya en época helenística, está influida por el cinismo. Y este domina en el segundo sector, el puramente griego. Tenemos, pues:

A. Literaturas orientales y literatura griega influída por ellas

1. Literaturas del Antiguo Oriente. Son bien conocidas obras de las literaturas mesopotámicas y de la egipcia. Del tercer milenio son en Mesopotamia las Instrucciones de Suruppak (a su hijo Ziusudra, salvado del diluvio); en Egipto, las Instrucciones de Ptahhotep (de un visir a su hijo). Hay muchas obras más de este tipo.

2. El Ahikar asirio. Este ministro es consejero del rey Sennaqerib, al que además le resuelve problemas y enigmas; aconseja y reprende a su hijo Nadan. Es obra conocida en Grecia desde el siglo V a. C.; ejerció importante influencia.


4 Cf. un tratamiento más detenido del tema (a propósito de las fuentes de Hesíodo) en mi “Las fuentes de Hesíodo y la composición de sus poemas,” Emerita 54 (1986) 1–36.
4. Diálogos de Bias y Creso, Solón y Creso en Heródoto 1. 27 y 29–33. Los sabios griegos contestan al rey oriental quedando vencedores en sabiduría. Bias le aconseja no invadir a los isleños, Solón le da lecciones sobre la caducidad de la vida y de la felicidad humana. Como paralelos a estos consejos habría que colocar una serie de ellos en la literatura griega: los de Hesíodo a los reyes (y a Perses), los de Teognis a Círno, los de Isócrates en el *A Demónico* y el *A Nicocles*, etc.

5. Temas indios, griegos y otros orientales de edad helenística y romana.

a) Tema del rey y el filósofo y del filósofo que educa a los hijos del rey: así en el *Pañcatantra*, escrito en sánscrito como se sabe. El tema del rey y su filósofo se reencuentra en el *Conde Lucanor*; el tema del padre y el hijo aparece en la *Disciplina Clericalis*; en el *Sendebar* el filósofo convence a la madrastra de su crimen.

b) Diálogo de Alejandro y los gimnosofistás, incluido en la *Vida y hazanas de Alejandro de Macedonia* del ps.-Calístenes (3. 5 ss.). Es obra de clara influencia cínica; en ella los gimnosofistas (equiparados a los cínicos griegos) responden sabiamente al rey, que generosamente perdona su apoyo a un rey enemigo.

c) *Milindapanha*, obra escrita en pali en que el rey Milinda (Menandro) es contestado por el sabio indio Nagasena.

d) *Vida de Esopo*, forma escrita, ya helenística, de la leyenda de Esopo (que pasa por ser un esclavo frigio o tracio) en cuya creación intervinieron elementos orientales (el *Ahikar*) y otros griegos. La versión en prosa está fuertemente cinizada e incluye una serie de diálogos de Esopo y sus antagonistas (el intendente, el filósofo Janto, Creso, los delfíos) en que el primero queda siempre como sabio y los convence de su ignorancia.

e) Diálogo de Apolonio de Tiana y el sabio indio Yarbas, que contesta temas difíciles de moral (en Filóstrato, *V. A.* 3. 18–37).

f) Diálogo de Nilóxeno y Amasis de Egipto (que hace el papel de rey oriental sabio, como Salomón), en Plutarco, *Banquete* 153 c–d. El rey responde a las difíciles cuestiones.

B. Literatura griega propiamente cinizante

Aunque en el grupo anterior hay obras de tendencia cínica, como acabamos de decir y podría explicarse más despacio, hacemos un grupo independiente con obras griegas sin componente oriental y propiamente cinizantes.

Efectivamente, en el tema oriental del enfrentamiento del rey y el filósofo los cínicos descubrieron una buena posibilidad para hacer una exposición popular de su filosofía. Se trata de las conocidas anécdotas en

6 Cf. mis “Elementos cínicos...” arriba citados (también para la obra siguiente).

7 Véase mi “The Life of Aesop...” ya citada.
que Diógenes le pide a Alejandro que no le quite el sol (Diógenes Laercio 5. 38) o Bión de Borístenes desprecia el orgullo de Antígono contándole que él es hijo de una prostituta (ibíd. 4. 46).

El cínico presenta siempre prototipos bien del héroes virtuosos (Hércules es el preferido, pero están también Ciro, Sócrates, Simónides, etc.) bien del rey ávido de poder y vanidad: Alejandro, Antígono, Nino, Creso y tantos más.8 En los diálogos cónicos de Luciano, no solo en los Diálogos de los Muertos, puede encontrarse una amplia galería.9

Hay que notar que dentro de estas “bestias negras” de los cónicos Alejandro es un caso especial. Ya lo hemos visto en el Diálogo de Alejandro y los gimnosofistas, arriba aludido, que destaca la generosidad del rey. En el ps.-Calístenes, en cuya obra se incluye el Diálogo (sin duda independiente en el origen) constantemente se elogian su valor, su generosidad, su humanidad; no que no siempre está de acuerdo con acciones como la destrucción de Tebas. Incluso la anécdota sobre su nacimiento de Olímpiade y el falsario Nectanebo, que se hizo pasar por Amón para acostarse con ella, está retocada para destacar la grandeza de Alejandro. Y, sin embargo, en principio tiene carácter cínico y se burla de la historia oficial que presentaba a Alejandro como hijo de Amón.

Apar e de Alejandro, la literatura cínica o cinizante nos presenta en el papel del rey enfrentado con la superior sabiduría del filósofo al emperador Adriano. Así en la Vida de Secundo, en la que este filósofo responde por escrito (ya que había hecho voto de no hablar) a las preguntas del emperador sobre qué es el Universo, el Océano, Dios, el hombre, la mujer, la belleza, etc.10

Las preguntas no son muy diferentes de las de Nilóxeno en Plutarco y hallan eco, igualmente, en la anónima Altecatio Hadriani et Epicteti, de fines de la Antigüedad, en que el papel del filósofo es desempeñado por Epicteto. En obras como estas y en la Vida de Esopo, el Diálogo de Alejandro y los gimnosofistas y en anécdotas y khréiai diversas atribuidas a Diógenes, Bión, Crates y otros cónicos se encuentran elementos recurrentes que se atribuyen variamente a unos u otros protagonistas. Son anécdotas y sentencias de carácter cínico a veces, pero que otras tienen un fondo más general: el del moralismo antiguo, en que han confluido también el estoicismo y otras filosofías de raíz socrática.

9 Véase la traducción con comentario de estos diálogos en Luciano de Samosata. Diálogos de tendencia cínica, trad. de Francisco García Yagüe (Madrid 1976).
10 Véase la edición de B. E. Perry, Secundus the Silent Philosopher (Ithaca, Nueva York 1964), así como mi artículo ya citado, “Elementos cónicos...”
II. La Literatura Sapiencial Antigua en la Haggadah

Lo anterior no tiene otro objeto que introducir el contexto dentro del cual hay que interpretar los elementos sapienciales greco-latínos de la Haggadah. Recordamos que aquellos que se expresan en la fábula han sido considerados ya por nosotros en un trabajo anterior de que hemos dado referencia.

Es elemental que estos elementos son aditicios al elemento fundamental, que viene de la literatura bíblica y la rabínica. Pero hay elementos de enlace: así, fundamentalmente, los relativos a la sabiduría de Salomón, del que en la obra se refieren varios diálogos con soluciones ingeniosas y consejos. Es sustituido en otras historias por sabios rabinos como Josué, Akiba y Gamaliel, el sumo sacerdote de Jerusalén Eleazar o el prosélito Akylas. Interviniendo estos personajes o los de la tradición greco-latina o unos y otros, es claro, de otra parte, que con la mayor frecuencia se introducen temas de la religión judía. En ocasiones, el debate entre el rey y el sabio judío no es sino un marco para introducir la doctrina de éste.

Hay, pues, un cierto sincretismo del judaísmo con la tradición sapiencial greco-latina, más o menos cinizante; como lo hay de ésta y el Cristianismo en tantos escritos medievales, entre ellos la obra de Pedro Alfonso, que nos ocupará a continuación.

Pero la presencia de la tradición antigua es evidente. Aparece también, aparte de en las fábulas, en anécdotas en que no hay diálogo. Veamos primero algunas de éstas (cito por la página de La zarza ardiente).

Así, las dos historias de p. 150, "La prisión de la lengua" y "La lengua," no son sino derivaciones, como ya hace constar en otro lugar,11 de la anécdota de la Vida de Esopo 51-52 sobre la bondad y maldad de la lengua; tema que también es tratado en la Disputatio y en otros escritos cónicos.

Es también cínica la historia, desconocida en la literatura griega, de "El vuelo de Alejandro" (p. 186): se eleva montado sobre el águila, pero la hace bajar a tierra al darse cuenta de que desde ésta le iban a ver como muy pequeño. Es una historia creada, seguramente, sobre un pasaje del Ahikar que está precisamente en la parte del mismo recogida en traducción griega por la Vida de Esopo (111); pero se ha añadido el tema cínico del orgullo del rey. Y viene de la tradición cinizante, que es misógina, el ardid de las mujeres que lograron que Alejandro no combatiera contra ellas (p. 187); deriva de la historia de Alejandro y las amazonas en el ps.-Calistenes 3. 25.

El tema judío y el cínico se funden en "Alejandro Magno ante las puertas del Paraíso" (p. 188). No se le permite entrar, pues está cubierto de sangre; y se le entrega una calavera, que puesta en balanza pesa más que todo el oro y la plata. El segundo aparece en "La última carta que

11 "Documentación suplementaria..." cit., p. 224.
Josué envió a su madre” (p. 189): Josué le dice a su madre que, a su muerte, organice un gran banquete e invite a él a todos los que no tengan pesares: nadie acude, prueba de que todo hombre los tiene.

Estos ejemplos son, pienso, suficientes. En cuanto a la presencia del género en que un rey se enfrenta a un sabio, prescindiendo del tema de Salomón, tenemos los siguientes diálogos, cuyos protagonistas damos:

Alejandro / los judíos (“Reparaciones tardías,” p. 185)
Alejandro / los indios (“Un juicio sabio,” p. 187)
Tolomeo / Eleazar (“La Septuaginta,” p. 136)
Tolomeo / los setenta y dos intérpretes (“Tolomeo pone a prueba a los setenta y dos sabios,” p. 137)
Adriano / dos ministros (“Hablar y callar,” p. 99)
Adriano / Josué (“Un banquete en honor de Dios,” p. 101)
Turnus Rufus, gobernador romano / Akiba (“Turnus Rufus y el rabí Akiba,” p. 42)
Turnus Rufus / Akiba (“¿Por qué hay indigenes?” p. 116)
Emperador romano / Gamaliel (“La omnipresencia de Dios,” p. 98)
Emperador romano / Josué (“La conversación de Josué con el Emperador,” p. 100)


Lo dicho hasta aquí hace ver que, junto a la doctrina judía, el moralismo cínico o cínico-estoico y el moralismo antiguo en general (a veces coincidente con el judío) ocupan un lugar aquí: hemos hablado de sincretismo. Igual ocurre en otras de estas historias cuyo contenido preciso no hemos dado. Pongamos unos pocos ejemplos de ambos sectores de pensamiento.

Habitualmente, el sabio judío se impone sobre su oponente el rey o poderoso griego o romano, proclamando precisamente el poderío de Dios: así en “Un banquete en honor de Dios”: una ola se lleva el banquete de Adriano; o en “La Septuaginta”: las versiones de los setenta y dos intérpretes coincidían exactamente. O explicando lo que parece inexplicable: hay indigenes para que se pueda socorrerlos (“¿Por qué hay indigenes?”). La mayor ganancia—dice Akylas en “La mayor ganancia”—es hacerse judio; y Alejandro dió la razón a los judíos (“Reparaciones tardías”) cuando los egipcios les pidieron que devolvieran los bienes que se habían llevado cuando el éxodo. Estos son algunos ejemplos.

Otras veces, como decimos, los temas proceden de la tradición greco-romana. Así en “Hablar y callar” sobre el tema cínico de que la palabra es
lo mejor y lo peor: Adriano hace ver al ministro que defendía esta última tesis que tiene que hacerlo con palabras. En “Un juicio sabio” el príncipe hindú pone en los platos de Alejandro pan y aves de oro y ante la protesta de éste dice que los griegos por el oro son capaces de asesinar aunque luego no pueden comerlo y se limitan a mirarlo con avaricia. Los temas de la codicia y la avaricia son, como se sabe, cínicos.

Pero donde mejor se combinan, quizá, las dos fuentes es en la larga serie de preguntas y respuestas de “Tolomeo pone a prueba a los setenta y dos sabios.” Dominan los temas de la fe en Dios, la confianza y obediencia, así como el de la beneficencia. Pero al lado existen temas como el de la compasión por los hombres, el dominio de sí mismo, la sabiduría que trae la alegría y la paz, la distinción del bien y el mal: temas que nos llevan al ámbito de la filosofía griega, sin que algunos de ellos dejen de figurar también en las tradiciones bíblica y rabínica.

III. La Literatura Sapiencial Antigua en Pedro Alfonso

La Disciplina Clericalis, escrita por el judío aragonés Pedro Alfonso hacia 1115, aconseja a los clérigos mediante historias y fábulas que él declara en su prólogo que son procedentes en parte “ex prouerbiis philosophorum et suis castigationibus,” en parte “ex prouerbiis et castigationibus arabis et fabulis et ursibus,” en parte “ex animalium et ursuirium similitudinibus.” Hay fuentes antiguas y orientales, éstas sin duda a través de versiones arábigas.

Pero prescindiendo ahora del material de origen oriental, entre el que destacan narraciones que vienen del Sendebar, el Pahcatantra y el Hitopadesa. El de la antigua tradición greco-latina es igualmente claro: he propuesto12 que a nuestro autor le llega a través de la tradición medieval latina. En una buena medida se trata de fábulas.

Pero también hay trece relatos que son los que aquí nos interesan y que presentan el tema del sabio y el rey. Es evidente su origen en la literatura sapiencial antigua, aunque la vía de transmisión no es desconocida: puede ser latina o árabe. Los exponemos a continuación de manera sumaria.

XXV. Exemplum de Mariano. Se atribuye nada menos que a Platón la historia de un viejo rey cruel que, amenazado por una guerra, congrega a los filósofos para preguntarles cuál era su culpa. Ellos le remiten a un filósofo Mariano. Siete filósofos van a buscarlo y lo encuentran convertido en eremita. La causa de los problemas del rey, según el asceta, es que había gobernado cruelmente, creyendo ser de distinta materia que los demás hombres. Dios había tratado de corregirle, sin éxito. De ahí, como castigo, su muerte, que Mariano revela proféticamente. O sea: el tema del mal rey ha recibido el añadido del castigo divino.

12 Historia . . ., II 552 s.
XXVIII. *Exemplum de Socrate*. Es un claro derivado de la anécdota de Diógenes en el tonel despreciando a Alejandro: pero ahora se atribuye a Sócrates (por cierto, un modelo que ponían los cícnicos) y a un rey innominado. A los cazadores del rey, que lo encuentran en su tonel, les dice que él es el dueño y el rey el siervo. Y cuando llega el rey, le conviene de lo mismo: sólo él es libre, el rey es esclavo. "Es un siervo de Dios," concluye el rey. El antiguo tema de la libertad del sabio y la esclavitud del poderoso confluye aquí con una visión cristiana.

XXXIII. *Exemplum de aurea Alexandri sepultura*. Junto a la sepultura de Alejandro, hecha en oro y visible para todos en un atrio (sin duda el autor piensa en el de una iglesia), se reunieron treinta y dos filósofos, de los cuales cada uno hizo su comentario, todos referentes a la vanidad y caducidad del poder y la riqueza: el oro era su tesoro, ahora es él el tesoro del oro; el mundo no le era bastante y ahora le bastan cuatro ríos; imperaba sobre el pueblo y ésta ahora impera sobre él; antes podía librar a otros de la muerte, ahora nadie puede librarlo; conducía ejércitos, ahora éstos le conducen al sepulcro; oprimía a la tierra, ésta le oprime ahora; las gentes le temían, ahora le desprecian; tenía amigos y enemigos, ahora todos son indiferentes. Una vez más, los temas antiguos y los cristianos se han fundido.

IV. Conclusión

Obras como las que aquí hemos explorado hacen ver hasta qué punto es incompleto nuestro conocimiento directo de la literatura sapiencial antigua. En otros lugares he ejemplificado esto a propósito de la fábula, que en buena medida conocemos sólo por fuentes medievales que, si bien alteran y modifican, conservan cosas antiguas que no conocemos directamente.

Puede verse que es el mismo el caso de un tema tan antiguo y tradicional como el del rey y el sabio: tema de origen oriental y que en época helenística y romana el cinismo adoptó.

Lo adoptaron luego, como se ve, las literaturas judía y cristiana, añadiendo ciertamente doctrinas propias. Pero conservando mucho de lo antiguo. Una exploración como la precedente, para el tema que nos ha ocupado y para otros varios, puede darnos resultado ayudándonos a reconstruir la tradición sapiencial antigua. Y haciéndonos ver cómo continuó creciendo más tarde y cómo se integró en las nuevas sociedades y las nuevas creencias.

*Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid*
The Gospel a Republication of Natural Religion in Justin Martyr

HENRY CHADWICK

A piece dedicated in gratitude and admiration to Miroslav Marcovich may appropriately be concerned in the main with the early Christian writer who advanced the bold suggestion that in Heraclitus one might discern a Christian before Christ.¹

The study of Justin Martyr reveals both the tensions and the affinities between Christian and educated pagan in the middle of the second century, at a stage of Christian expansion when the mission is marked by extraordinary confidence and when thoughtful adherents of pagan culture are coming to recognize in the Church a threat to the old ways. Yet the affinities are given more prominence than the tensions. Argument is never so hotly contentious as when it is being carried on between parties who have much in common and indeed may largely or even entirely share identical premisses. In consequence, during the second and third centuries both pagan critics of Christianity and the Christian defenders appear to the modern reader to manifest an almost bizarre schizophrenia. On the one hand, the polemical argument has to show how different and mistaken, how inconsistent and how dangerous, the opposing position is. On the other hand, each party to the dispute repeatedly insists that the side under attack is already conceding so vast a proportion of the assertions advanced by the critic that all claims to have a novel and distinctive position are throughout implausible. One can easily have the impression that pagan attackers and Christian defenders can hardly allow their left hand to know what their right hand has been writing. So in Justin’s Apologies we encounter direct and candid criticism of pagan religion and morality; yet every nerve is strained to demonstrate that, on assumptions every educated person would share, Christianity is reasonable and wholly tenable by the philosophically minded, at least if the Platonic framework is accepted. (Epicurean

hedonism would be harder for Justin to stomach,² but Epicureans were not numerous.) Criticism from the pagan side is almost entirely confined to the rational arguments of moderate observers, and popular prejudices are pushed well into the background.

Notoriously, Justin's thrust is directed towards splitting apart religion and philosophy. Towards pagan cult and myth³ he is vehemently negative: They are crude, superstitious, and immoral both in content and in practical influence. The cultus of animals among the Egyptians,⁴ the offering of human sacrifices to placate Saturn,⁵ and the womanising adventures of Zeus,⁶ stand for Justin as the typical features of the polytheism to which he and his educated readers take exception. Moreover, Justin sees pagan cult as pervaded by magic and offered to demonic spirits, addicted to sacrifices,⁷ incense and libations, and in his eyes the cause not only of wars, murders, and adulteries,⁸ but also of the unjust persecution of Christians.⁹ Their vicious character seems to him demonstrable from the myths of their lusts and conflicts.¹⁰ Justin could find an explanation of their existence and malevolence in the passage of Genesis 6 speaking of the sons of God who lusted after the daughters of men.¹¹ But in Plutarch¹² or, later, in Porphyry one finds pagan writers allowing that among demons some are not helpful mediatorial beings between man and the gods but malevolent powers needing to be placated by sacrifices. In the Laws (896e) Plato himself had suggested that the omnipresence of evil in the cosmos might be explained by postulating an evil world-soul. Porphyry thought these unsatisfactory unhelpful spirits were ambitious beings aspiring to a divine honour which was above their station in life.¹³ They suffered from envy of higher purity, and attracted damp vapours in the sublunar realm.¹⁴ Porphyry thought Hebrew sages, among whom he was willing to number Jesus, were right to forbid the cult of evil demons and inferior spirits.¹⁵ From such texts it seems natural to deduce that Justin's demonology was not a conception of

² Apol. 2. 7. 3, 12. 5.
³ Apol. 1. 25 and 27, 2. 12.
⁴ Apol. 1. 24.
⁵ Apol. 2. 12. 5.
⁶ Apol. 1. 21. 4–5.
⁷ In the Dialogue with Trypho (35) Justin has to meet the accusation that many who take the name of Christian eat meat offered to idols. He has to disown such people as gnostic heretics.
⁸ Apol. 2. 5. 4.
⁹ Apol. 1. 12. 5, Dial. 131. 2.
¹⁰ Apol. 2. 12. 5 sees Zeus as a dangerous example to follow; cf. Augustine, Conf. 1. 16. 26, citing Terence. The Clementine Homilies (5. 17. 5) include a pagan defence of the myths, based on the plea that free love is healthy.
¹¹ Apol. 2. 5. 3.
¹² De def. orac. 14 (417d–e).
¹⁴ Porphyry in Augustine, De civ. Dei 10. 9–11.
¹⁵ Porphyry in Augustine, De civ. Dei 19. 23.
the spirit-world utterly strange to the late Platonist mind. But by the inheritance of Jewish traditions about the revolt of angels against God—a truth about demons vindicated by the empirical evidence of exorcism, and not denied by Trypho (it is found in the Slavonic Enoch and in the Books of Adam and Eve)—he can present the entire demonic realm as hostile to God and man, not as a divided society in which some inferior members can be cajoled into being propitious by the offering of appropriate sacrifices. Admittedly, without such propitiation, Porphyry believed that they would be malevolent, using magic to deceive, and ready to devise all manner of evil.

Nevertheless, to the educated pagan observer, Christianity appeared alien, "barbarian" in origin and in content. The rejection of polytheistic cults, the scorning of temples and their images, the puritan refusal to join in the celebrations at traditional festivals, the reasonable talk of a kingdom commanding a loyalty beyond that owed to the emperor, easily imparted plausibility to allegations of sexual orgies and child-murder and cannibalism. It was not a nice thing to be labelled an atheist. Yet the Christians made no secret of their abandonment of traditional religious customs, those rites by which celestial favour could be ensured for the fertility of crops and spouses and for the defence of the limes. To the charge of abandoning well-tried ways Justin would retort that truth is surely to be followed rather than custom. But the argument was not perhaps very effective when addressed to people who took it for granted that ancient custom in religion was the ultimate criterion of truth. Academic scepticism had certainly eroded old beliefs. Augustine was to comment that the gods demolished in philosophical lecture-rooms were mercilessly mocked in theatres. Yet scepticism (as in Montaigne) can give potent reinforcement to tradition by undermining confidence that one can produce a coherent alternative.

16 On Justin's demonology, see H. Wey, Die Funktionen der bösen Geister bei den griechischen Apologeten des zweiten Jahrhunderts nach Christus (Winterthur 1957).
17 Apol. 1. 55. 2.
18 A less literary rabbi would no doubt have been less cooperative. For exorcism in the Dialogue, see 30, 85. 2, 121. 3, 131. 5. Justin's belief in its evidential value appears in Apol. 2. 6. 6.
19 Slavonic Enoch 4 and 7, Life of Adam and Eve 12–16. (These texts are given in English translation in The Apocryphal Old Testament, ed. by H. F. D. Sparks [Oxford 1984].)
20 Porphyry, De abstin. 2. 37–43.
21 Apol. 1. 5. 4, 7. 3.
22 Apol. 1. 11.
24 Apol. 1. 4–6.
25 Apol. 1. 12. 6.
26 Celsus in Origen, Cels. 5. 25.
27 Faust. 12. 40. Augustine adds that pagans are ashamed of customs attaching to polytheistic rites; similarly, De cons. evang. 1. 8. 13.
Justin himself is no stranger to the axiom that in matters of religion antiquity is a recommendation of authenticity. The old argument of the Hellenistic synagogue in favour of the priority of Moses over against Greek literature and philosophy is strongly restated: Plato’s *Timaeus* is indebted to Genesis for its cosmogony; the X in the structure of the cosmos (*Tim.* 34a–b and 36b) betrays awareness of the significance of the Cross as a sign of redemption.28 The oracular saying in Plato’s second letter (312e) that the third things are about the third (person)29 refers to the biblical truth that in the second place is the Logos of God, and beside the Logos in the third place the Spirit borne over the water.

Likewise Justin felt sure that the Hebrew prophets were the inspiration of the Greek philosophers who taught the immortality of the soul, punishment of the wicked after death, and the contemplation of celestial realities.30 Thence the philosophers derived “seeds of truth” (a theme adumbrated in Justin’s first *Apologetic* and restated in the second).31 Above all in importance for Justin’s theodicy, Plato’s emphatic exemption of God from responsibility for evil, which originates in mistaken free choices (*Rep.* 10, 617e), must come from Moses (Dt. 30. 15 and 19).32

Sensitivity to the defence against gnosticism made Justin hot in his assertion of free will. He therefore had to take special care with his argument from fulfilled prophecy. Divine foreknowledge, based on foreseen merits, is distinct from fate.33

In his first *Apologetic* Justin is conscious of facing intelligent and educated critics for whom the Christian story is striking by its lack of distinctiveness. What does the Church say that cannot be found in philosophers like Plato?34 The Christians present as sober historical events narratives about Jesus which have close analogies in the pagan myths of which they speak so scornfully. The birth from a virgin is very like the legend of the birth of Perseus, born to Danae when she was made pregnant by Zeus in the disguise of a shower of gold.35 The elevation of Christ to

28 *Apol.* 1. 59–60.
29 *Apol.* 1. 60. 6–7. Justin replaces Plato’s neuter by a masculine (if the manuscript correctly transmits what he wrote).
30 *Apol.* 1. 44. 9.
31 *Apol.* 1. 44. 10, 2. 8. For a good recent discussion of this theme in Justin, see M. J. Edwards in *JTS* 42 (1991) 25 and 33 f.
32 *Apol.* 1. 44. 8.
33 *Apol.* 1. 43, 44. 11, *Dial.* 141. 2. Ancient discussions of determinism were familiar with the question whether correct oracular predictions are compatible with indeterminism. A specimen of the debate occurs in Origen, *Cels.* 2. 20 and in Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De fato* 10 and 31 (ed. R. W. Sharples). See also my *Boethius* (Oxford 1981) 159.
34 *Apol.* 1. 60. 10 meets the complaint that what is true is trite, and what is not trite is not true.
35 *Apol.* 1. 33. 3. Celsus (in Origen, *Cels.* 1. 67) observes that the virgin birth ascribed to Perseus and other heroes is not factually credible, but is good evidence of their noble achievements.
divine dignity by his resurrection and ascension resembles Greek legends of
the divine reward conferred upon models of heroic virtue such as Dionysus,
the Dioscuri, and Heracles. His miraculous healings are paralleled in the
temples of Asclepius, where the sick sleep in the expectation of a
therapeutic vision. Christian baptism, so far from being distinctive, does
not seem to a pagan observer to be in principle or in practice so very
different from the lustrations common in pagan purifications. And might
not the thanksgiving ceremony with bread and wine be paralleled in the rites
of the initiates into the mysteries of Mithras?

And yet when Justin sets out in the first Apology to describe the rituals
practised by the Christians at baptism and eucharist, there is an evident
arrière-pensée: He must defend these ceremonies from the pagan
insinuation that they are dangerous magic, and has to show how moral and
edifying they really are. The accusations of wild nocturnal sexual orgies
and cannibalism are refuted by Justin, so far as the orthodox or great
Church is concerned; but he would not object if the government turned its
unpleasant attentions on some of the gnostic sects of whom such charges are
ture. The charge of magic and sorcery has to be repelled in the case of the
gospel miracles. In pagan eyes belief in the very possibility of a
resurrection of this physical body must appear ludicrous and even
offensive. And the virginal birth of Jesus is hardly less offensive if it
implies that the supreme deity was desirous or even capable of sexual
intercourse with a woman.

So we confront the paradox that the pagan critics of the second century
simultaneously attack the Christian credenda for their apparent crudity and

36 Apol. 1. 21 and 54, Dial. 69. Celsus compares Jesus’ resurrection to the elevation of
Asclepius, Dionysus, and Heracles (Cels. 3. 42), and even at one point to the notorious
Hadrianic favourite, Antinous (3. 36).
37 Cels. 3. 24.
38 Apol. 1. 62. 1.
39 Apol. 1. 66. 4. Celsus demonstrates gnostic (Ophite) borrowing from Mithraism: Cels. 6.
22–25.
40 Apol. 1. 61–67.
41 Apol. 1. 26, 2. 12 and 15. Origen (Cels. 6. 27 and 40) records that, although these
slanders had in his time become generally discredited even among the masses, it was still
possible occasionally to meet people who suspected some truth in the rumours.
42 Apol. 1. 30, Dial. 69. 7.
43 Apol. 1. 30, Dial. 69. 7; cf. Celsus in Origen, Cels. 1. 6 and 38. Justin affirms that magic
is among the diabolical activities which Christians renounce (Apol. 1. 14. 1–2).
44 In comparison with the Dialogue with Trypho, where references to the resurrection of
Jesus are not infrequent (e.g. Dial. 107 f. and 138. 1), the Apologies have little to say about it
except Apol. 1. 45. 1, 46. 5 (birth, death, resurrection, ascension) and 1. 19 (not more incredible
than the development of a human being from a tiny sperm). Of the incarnation, Justin observes
that pagans do not grasp the “mystery” (Apol. 1. 13. 4).
45 Apol. 1. 33. 3; cf. Origen, Cels. 1. 39. The story that at Delphi Apollo entered the body
of the Pythian priestess through her genitals is, for Origen (Cels. 3. 25 and 7. 3), evidence of the
spirit’s impure nature.
superstition and also claim that their basic stories about Jesus are strikingly in line with old Greek myths, of which the Christians held a low opinion. On the latter ground Justin is happy to be able to ask what pagans are objecting to when they have to grant their own gods to be the subject of remarkably similar narratives.

Another feature of Christian belief and practice to which pagans took exception was the obstinacy impelling them towards the virtual suicide of martyrdom, like suicide in being irrational and at the same time perhaps an aggressive form of self-assertion over against society. Justin pertinently instances Socrates as a martyr in a religious cause. Heraclitus’ criticisms of polytheistic cult also made it possible for him to be numbered among witnesses to the truth that evil demons were doing so much to suppress, even if it was not easy to claim that his eccentric death (of which Diogenes Laertius offers a number of unexciting variants) was the climax of his testimony. Justin’s parallel of Musonius Rufus with Socrates was already current in Neopythagorean circles in Justin’s time. Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius of Tyana reports how his hero secretly communicated with Musonius when he was in Nero’s dungeon to ask if he could do anything to get him out: Had not Socrates gone to his death because he refused to let his friends use their influence on his behalf? Musonius replied that Socrates simply failed to defend himself, which he himself had no intention of omitting to do. Origen likewise put Socrates and Musonius in parallel as heroes of integrity. The parallel recurs in the emperor Julian. Fearlessness in face of death was so prominent a theme in Stoic moral exhortation that it was not difficult for Christian apologists to defend their heroes. In practice, of course, persecuted believers were human, and felt powerful temptations to surrender to the trivial demand to offer incense on the altar of the gods or the emperor: It seemed (reports Origen) “superfluous and foolish to endure persecution for Christ’s sake.”


47 Apol. 2. 7. 3.
48 Apol. 1. 46. 3; cf. 2. 8. 1.
50 Apol. 2. 8. 1 and 10. 8.
51 Philostratus, VA 4. 46. Philostratus’ interest in Musonius appears again in 7. 16. 2.
52 Cels. 3. 66 (Socrates and Musonius are cited by some as instances of moral conversion).
54 Origen, Hom. in Levit. 16. 6.
achieves nothing, Origen could answer that it is far from purposeless to die for virtue, piety, and holiness in resistance to evil powers.\textsuperscript{55} Origen once couples Socrates with Leonidas, the hero of Thermopylae.\textsuperscript{56} The ancient Church experienced acute difficulty in distinguishing between the courage of the person who openly confessed the faith and the suicidal rashness and foolhardiness of the person who went out of his way to provoke the authorities.\textsuperscript{57} Justin can defend martyrdom as consistent with the \textit{militia Christi};\textsuperscript{58} a soldier goes into battle knowing that death is all too possible. But there is a radical difference between the willingness to die and the will to die.\textsuperscript{59}

A common pagan objection to Christian proclamation was the fear of hell. The Christian preacher seemed to be producing a bogey to frighten simple people into joining the Church.\textsuperscript{60} It was difficult for pagan critics to achieve complete consistency at this point. Justin could comfortably observe that the Christian notion of a consuming fire at the end of time was strikingly similar to the Stoic doctrine that at periodic intervals the cosmos is dissolved into fire.\textsuperscript{61} He could observe that (even if the language might be mythological) belief in hell had a highly beneficial effect on personal morality.\textsuperscript{62} The wicked are those reluctant to think there is retribution hereafter.\textsuperscript{63} To affirm a personal moral responsibility for doing good or evil in this life implies for Justin belief in heaven and hell: God's accounts are not settled in this life.\textsuperscript{64} He felt sure that after death souls retain power of sensation\textsuperscript{65} and, moreover, that while there is a waiting state between death and resurrection (only gnostic heretics hold that souls ascend to heaven immediately after death),\textsuperscript{66} it is vain to hope that in hell there will still be

\textsuperscript{55} Cels. 8. 54.
\textsuperscript{56} Cels. 2. 17.
\textsuperscript{57} Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.
\textsuperscript{58} Apol. 1. 39. 4.
\textsuperscript{59} Apol. 2. 4.
\textsuperscript{60} Apol. 2. 9.
\textsuperscript{61} Apol. 1. 57. 1. But for Christians hellfire is not the result of a fatalistic, deterministic process (Apol. 2. 7. 3). Apol. 1. 60. 8 cites Heraclitus as witness to the cosmic fire; cf. M. Marcovich (ed.), \textit{Heraclitus} (Merida 1967) 266.
\textsuperscript{62} Apol. 1. 12. 2. When Celsus observed that Christian teaching on torments hereafter was indistinguishable from that of the mystery-religions, Origen’s answer claimed that Christian teaching differed in actually affecting moral behaviour (Cels. 8. 48).
\textsuperscript{63} Apol. 1. 18. 1, 19. 3.
\textsuperscript{64} Apol. 1. 12, 17. 4, Dial. 88. 5, 117. 3.
\textsuperscript{65} Apol. 1. 18. 2, 20. 4, 57. 3.
\textsuperscript{66} Dial. 80. 4, Acta Justini 5. 1–2. For the rest of problems in finding consistency in Justin’s eschatology, see a clear recent account in C. Hill, \textit{Regnum Caelorum: Patterns of Future Hope in Early Christianity} (Oxford 1992) 22–24.
opportunity for repentance,\(^67\) or that hell will not be everlasting.\(^68\) In particular, it will be the destiny of those who persecute the Church.\(^69\) And why should pagans mock? Plato himself wrote of judgement after death with punishments for evildoers.\(^70\) Those who laugh at Christian eschatological expectation are people who are not serious about morality. But none is more insistent on freedom of choice as lying at the root of evil than Plato who, in this as in many other matters, was indebted to Moses (above, page 240).\(^71\)

Justin saw a threat to moral responsibility in the Stoic language about *heimarmene*.\(^72\) Nevertheless, he was also sure that some angels and some human beings become so deeply wicked as to be unchangeably evil.\(^73\) The end of the world is coming, but is delayed to make up the fixed number of God’s elect;\(^74\) for God foreknows some, perhaps not yet born, who are to be included among the saved.\(^75\) Moreover, the presence of Christian believers in the world is a ground for God to defer its final destruction.\(^76\)

Justin felt bound to allow that the conscience of some has been so corrupted that they suffer from diminished responsibility; they are, so to speak, moral alcoholics unable to help themselves.\(^77\) But the concession is not consistent with his more prominent theme that we go astray because we know what is right and lack the will to do it. Because Justin is an apologist concerned to correct prejudice and misinformation, he can also stress that the sin of the heathen results from ignorance. If everyone really knew what Christianity is and says, no one would sin.\(^78\) Divine revelation abolishes all ignorance,\(^79\) and the incarnation of the divine Word has destroyed the power of the Devil to obscure the truth.\(^80\) For the Logos is constantly at work in the conscience of all.\(^81\) Hence Justin’s conviction that the divine Sower has sown seeds of truth everywhere, and that philosophy itself is among the

\(^{67}\) *Apol.* 1. 52. 8.

\(^{68}\) *Dial.* 130. 2. Gehenna is "a place for unbelievers" (*Apol.* 1. 19. 8). Justin’s strong doctrine of divine revelation in Jesus convinces him that unbelief is a moral offence of gross disobedience.

\(^{69}\) *Apol.* 1. 45. 6.

\(^{70}\) *Apol.* 1. 44; Plato, *Laws* 716c–d; *Ep.* 7, 335a. Celsus unreservedly affirms his belief in punishment for the wicked after death (*Cels.* 3. 16, 8. 49) at the same time as he accuses the Christians of “inventing terrors.”

\(^{71}\) *Apol.* 1. 44, citing *Republic* 617e.

\(^{72}\) *Apol.* 2. 7. 9.

\(^{73}\) *Dial.* 141. 2. Trypho objects to the notion of apostate angels (*Dial.* 69. 1). For the question, “Why has not God destroyed Satan?” see *Apol.* 1. 28.

\(^{74}\) *Apol.* 1. 45. 1.

\(^{75}\) *Apol.* 1. 4. 2, *Dial.* 32. 3.

\(^{76}\) *Apol.* 2. 7. 1.

\(^{77}\) *Dial.* 93: They have “lost the common notions.”

\(^{78}\) *Apol.* 1. 12. 2.

\(^{79}\) Cf. *Dial.* 121.

\(^{80}\) *Dial.* 45.

\(^{81}\) *Dial.* 23 and 92–93.
great gifts sent down to humanity. The presupposition of the first Apology is that divine revelation is not confined to a small elite, but is addressed to the whole of humanity.

In defence of Christian disparagement of polytheistic myth and cult, Justin is glad to appeal to Plato’s expulsion of Homer and other poets from his ideal state; he expelled the demonic spirits of polytheism. Justin’s doctrine of God is characteristically expressed in the terminology of contemporary Middle Platonism: largely abstract, with many negative terms. God is immutable, nameless, unbegotten, utterly transcendent. Plato’s Timaeus owes a large debt to Genesis. In accordance with Platonic principles, God is in no need of anything, not even of the created order; yet his creative power is undiminished in the generosity of his giving.

At this point Justin faced a problem: He belonged to a community which possessed the prophetic inspired scriptures. These could be misinterpreted to mean that God is imagined to have human characteristics, mental or physical. In the Dialogue with Trypho, Justin deplores the anthropomorphism which results from a too literalistic exegesis. To the question, “Why did the Jews fail to recognize the Messiah when he came?” Justin’s answer includes the claim that they did not understand how their own scriptures were to be interpreted. They did not see that the prophets speak of two comings, one in humble suffering, another in glory. That Jesus was born a Jew, and indeed observed the precepts of the Torah, is for Justin a truth to be emphasized. But his teaching is the universal way to the good life, to happiness, and to salvation. “By the mystery of Christ crucified God had mercy on all believers of every race.” Therefore, the Church is expanding throughout the known world. That this Church is the

82 Apol. 2. 10.
85 Apol. 1. 60.
86 Dial. 23. 2.
87 Dial. 61. 2, 128. 4.
88 Dial. 114. 3.
89 In the Dialogue with Trypho, Justin’s main task is to explain how and why Christians accept the law and the prophets as inspired scripture, yet acknowledge no obligation to keep the Mosaic law (Dial. 29 f.). Fear of persecution is not the motive which keeps Christians from observing the Torah (Dial. 19; cf. 39. 6). Christ reveals the meaning of prophecies whose meaning is not understood (Apol. 1. 32. 2).
90 Apol. 1. 52. 3, Dial. 31–33, 49. 2, 52, 110. 2, 111, 121. 3.
91 Dial. 61. 6, 100. 2 ff.
92 Apol. 2. 2. 13, Dial. 142. 3.
93 Dial. 106. 1; cf. 96. 2, “we say to all, You are our brothers...” Baptism is open to all (43. 2) and is rebirth by water and faith (138. 2). At the same time Justin has a firm doctrine of a predestined number of the elect (Apol. 1. 45. 1).
authentic divine society is proved by the fact that the rival sects are not persecuted, while the Church is.\textsuperscript{94} The very improbability of the Christian belief that a crucified man is none other than the firstborn of the unbegotten God and is the judge of all mankind is evidence of its divine authority.\textsuperscript{95} Thereby philosophy has been made accessible to everyone.\textsuperscript{96} The Christian call is addressed even to manual workers and uneducated people.\textsuperscript{97} Through Christian teaching the truths discerned by Platonic and Stoic philosophers (especially about the Trinity, the Cross, and the final conflagration) are discovered by believers who cannot even read or write.\textsuperscript{98} Their eucharist is thanksgiving both for the creation and for redemption from evil through Christ's destruction of the devil's power.\textsuperscript{99}

Justin was aware that the Bible and the tradition of the Christian community contained some very unphilosophical beliefs, a number of essentially "in-house" problems like the second coming of Christ, the millennium, the final judgement of souls. What the biblical writers particularly tell us concerns the beginning and the end of things.\textsuperscript{100} The philosophers can help with matters in between.

Platonism particularly helped Justin by providing a transcendentalist language for talking about God: The \textit{Timaeus} (28c) justified belief in special revelation by the saying that "it is not easy to find the Father of all, and harder still to declare him."\textsuperscript{101} So the incarnation is "mystery," and the scriptures (i.e. the Hebrew scriptures) require special illumination if they are to be rightly interpreted.\textsuperscript{102}

In the \textit{Dialogue with Trypho}, Justin works with the axiom that the Hebrew scriptures contain matter unworthy of God unless they receive a Christian and spiritual interpretation.\textsuperscript{103} To a philosophical mind it is self-evident that God has no need of sacrifices.\textsuperscript{104} If the Mosaic law is final, how can Jeremiah prophesy the gift of a new covenant?\textsuperscript{105} The particularity of the Torah is a barrier preventing the universality of divine revelation reaching all peoples. In another instance of primitivist assumption that in religion the most ancient is the most authentic, Justin can claim that Christianity is identical with pre-Abrahamic religion before circumcision was prescribed.\textsuperscript{106} Circumcision was not applied to Adam, and therefore

\textsuperscript{94} Apol. 1. 26. 1.
\textsuperscript{95} Apol. 1. 53. 2; cf. Irenaeus, \textit{Epideixis} 42.
\textsuperscript{96} Dial. 3. 3.
\textsuperscript{97} Apol. 1. 60. 11, 2. 10. 8. The apostles were uneducated: 1. 39. 3.
\textsuperscript{98} Apol. 1. 60. 11.
\textsuperscript{99} Dial. 41. 1.
\textsuperscript{100} Dial. 7. 2.
\textsuperscript{101} Apol. 2. 10. 6.
\textsuperscript{102} A frequent theme in the \textit{Dialogue}: 7. 3, 58. 1, 92. 1, 100. 2, 119. 1.
\textsuperscript{103} Dial. 30. 1, 111. 4, 112.
\textsuperscript{104} Apol. 1. 10, 13. 1, Dial. 67. 8.
\textsuperscript{105} Dial. 11.
\textsuperscript{106} Dial. 19.
cannot be an expression of the immutable and eternal will of God. In short, God can will a change but does not change his will.

Both Apologies and Dialogue operate on a common strategy, of justifying Christianity by appealing to texts, Jewish or Gentile, which the intended reader will grant to carry authority. When Justin sharply attacks polytheism, he employs arguments that his pagan readers allow to have force on philosophical grounds. When he turns to criticise conservative Judaism, his appeal is to the authority of scriptures which Trypho fully acknowledges. It is significantly observed that his messianic texts are those of the rabbis, not those of the New Testament. But in reply to the unkind criticism that the Christians say only what others have already said, Justin is sure that the others get the truth from the divine Logos in whom the Christians believe. Dependence is the other way round.

Peterhouse, Cambridge

107 Dial. 18.
109 Apol. 1. 60. 10.
Weitere textkritische Nachlese zu Artemidor*

HANS SCHWABL


Hält man den griechischen Text daneben, so ergibt sich, daß διὰ τὴν μάχην die geforderte Begründung nur sehr unvollkommen leistet (die Übersetzung also durch Verdeutlichung Abhilfe schaffen muß und überdies auch das in seiner Bedeutung vorher nicht zweifelhaft scheinende ἐν ἀμφοτέροις (= Boxen und Ringen als die beiden Elemente des Pankration1)


1 Philostrat, Gymn. 11 definiert (ähnlich wie Aristoteles, Rhet. 1. 5, p. 1361b24 ff.) das Pankration als Kombination von Ringen und Boxen (προτετίμηται πάντων τῷ παγκράτιον,
im Kontext nunmehr keinen befriedigenden Bezug mehr hat. Man wird Hercher also Recht geben müssen, daß neben der Nennung der πυγμη auch die der πάλη als Teil des Pankration gefordert ist, den Ort dieser Nennung aber lieber bei der Begründung suchen, die sich als nicht ausreichend herausgestellt hat. Zu schreiben ist also allem Anschein nach: τὸ δὲ παγκράτιον τὰ αὐτὰ τῇ πυγμῇ σημαίνει πλὴν τῆς βλάβης αὐτῆς· ἵσχυροτέρας γὰρ τὰς στάσεις ἐπιφέρει διὰ τὴν πάλην (βλάβην L, μάχην V). αἱ δὲ ἀμείνοι ἐν ἀμφοτέραις νικάν.

Dieser Text findet seine Stützung auch leicht in den Bedeutungsverknüpfungen, die in den vorausgehenden Kapiteln der πυγμη und der πάλη gegeben werden. Zum Boxen heißt es am Beginn des Kapitels 61: πυκτεδειν παντὶ βλαβερόν· πρὸς γὰρ ταῖς ἁίσχυναις καὶ βλάβας σημαίνει κτλ., und das bringt βλάβη als den im Kap. 62 sowohl die Gleichwertigkeit als auch den Unterschied tragenden Begriff. Die Differenzierung aber ergibt sich durch die im Pankration gegebene Verbindung von πυγμη und πάλη, und hier liefert das entsprechende Kapitel (60) die bei der Begründung der Differenzierung im Kap. 62 für πάλη vorausgesetzte Bedeutung "στάσεις" (p. 66, 18 sq.): παλαίειν τινί τῶν ἀφ' αἵματος ἥ φίλῳ στασίασαι πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ φιλονεικήσαι σημαίνει· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἶδιω στασιαζόντων κτλ. Es kann also kein Zweifel daran bestehen, daß p. 68, 4 sq. die begründende und differenzierende Angabe ἵσχυροτέρας γὰρ τὰς στάσεις ἐπιφέρει nur mit der Änderung der schwankenden Überlieferung (βλάβην L, μάχην V) in διὰ τὴν πάλην den geforderten symbolischen Hintergrund erhält.

1. 70, p. 77, 14–18: Diesen Text hat bereits der Glossator nicht verstanden: ὀρνίθεια δὲ καὶ χήνεια κρέα ἐσθείει πᾶσιν ἀναθόν· φέρει δὲ τὰ μὲν


2 Der als Wunsch und besonders memorable Leistung registrierte Doppelsieg im Faustkampf und Pankration (Paus. 6. 6. 5, was charakteristischerweise nicht geglückt ist) bzw. Ringkampf und Pankration (cfd. 5. 8. 4 [Herakles]; 5. 21. 9–11, wo insgesamt sieben von solchen olympischen Siegern nach den Aufzeichnungen der Eleer namentlich aufgezählt werden) kommt hier gewiß nicht in Betracht, auch wenn Del Corno für παγκράτιον und πυγμη als den Bezugspunkt von ἐν ἀμφοτέροις plädiert. Del Corno hat aber recht, daß bei Beziehung auf πυγμη und πάλη eigentlich das Femininum gefordert ist. Man wird dasselbe also am besten herstellen (oder die entsprechenden substantivierten Infinitive sich als Bezugspunkt denken). Einen Pankratiasten, der den olympischen Sieg im Ringen und im Pankration erreicht ("Ολύμπια μέλλον ἀγώνιζεσθαι πάλην ἀμα καὶ παγκράτιον) und dabei scheitert, hat Artemidor 5. 48, p. 312, 15 sqq.
Die Gleichung "Hühner" = "Frauen" ist als solche leicht verständlich, sie läßt aber den Wunsch nach näherer Bestimmung der damit gegebenen Assoziationen offen. Vgl. dazu z.B. die Abschnitte über Löwe und Löwin, 2. 12, p. 122, 1 sqq., wo die aus dem Charakter des Tieres sich ergebenden symbolisierten männlichen Personen (βασιλευόντος, ἄρχων, δικαίωσις) bei der Löwin durch die weiblichen Entsprechungen ersetzt sind. Für die Tendenz, aus dem grammatischen Geschlecht des Tiernamens auf das Geschlecht der symbolisierten Personen zu schließen, vgl. noch den Adler (αετός) p. 136, 3 sq. αετός ἄιπελών ἀνδρός ὄντα ἀπολήθησις σημαίνει (man kann auch hier, wie Kaiser es getan hat, auf den Penelopepetra verweisen) und den darauf folgenden (18 sqq.) Greißvogel ἀρπή (der man seit Krauss meist mit "Falk" übersetzt, während Festugier für "Lammergeier" plädiert), welcher γυναικά σημαίνει βασιλική καὶ πλούσια, μέγα ἔστι κάτι μετά φρονόταν καὶ εὐγνώμων καὶ τοῖς ἥθεσιν εὐ κεκριμένην (wofür man vielleicht besser μέγα μὲν ἐπὶ κάλλει φρονόταν ἄλλα εὐγνώμων καὶ τοῖς ἥθεσιν κεκριμένην schreiben sollte; die Wortstellung legt L nahe, den Rest die Gedankenführung).

3 Vgl. dazu Aristoph., Ran. 509 f. (κρέα ... ὄρνιθεα), Xenophon., Anab. 4. 5. 31 (κρέα ἄρνεα, ἔφυμη, χοῖρεια, μόσχους, ὄρνιθεα) und Anthol. Pal. 9. 377 (Palladas). 9 (ὄρνις καὶ μόσχεα = "Hühner- und Kalbfleisch").


7 Zum allgemeinen Prinzip vgl. besonders 4. 56, p. 278, 18 sqq.
8 Zum Adler vgl. die in Anm. 3 angeführte Stelle.
von Krauss und in der Übersetzung von Del Corno, so daß dort richtig vorausgesetzt wird: τάριχοι δὲ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλατα κρέα [καὶ ἱζθυες] ἐν μὲν τοῖς προκειμένοις παρολάκας καὶ ἀναβολάς σημαίνει. διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἁλῶν ἐπὶ πολὺ τηρεῖται. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁλλοις τηκεδόνα καὶ λύπην, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ νόσον σημαίνει διὰ τὸ υπὸ τῶν ἁλῶν τετήχθαν.9 An dem Text ist nichts in Unordnung, und wenn die arabische Übersetzung als Entsprechung für διὰ τὸ . . . τετήχθαν nach G. M. Browne (Le Muséon 103 [1990] 274) etwas wie “because another than he subdued him, just as salted fish is pressed [i.e. pickled] by salt,” so wird man das besser nicht zum Anlaß der Vermutung nehmen, daß “the clause beginning with διὰ τὸ is corrupt” (Browne), sondern eher sich über die gedanklichen Wege des arabischen Übersetzers Fragen stellen.10

Was den Beginn des Kapitels angeht, so halten Kaiser und Brackertz an der Übersetzung “Gepökeltes und eingesalzenes Fleisch,” die Krauss gegeben hatte, fest. Festugière versucht durch größere Unbestimmtheit Genauigkeit zu erreichen und versteht als ἐν διὰ δυοῖν (“les conserves de toute espèce de viande salée”), während Del Corno mit “le carni seccate ed ogni tipo di salamoia” übersetzt. Am nächsten kommt dem Griechischen aber vielleicht “las salazones [= Salzfleisch; Salzfische] y todas las carnes curadas con sal” (E. Ruiz García), wobei wohl offenbleiben muß, ob τάριχοι als der zunächst gesetzte umfassendere Begriff oder in einer Sonderbedeutung verstanden werden soll. Für das letzte genügt der Verweis auf Herodot 9. 120. 1 f., wo τάριχοι offenbar selbstverständlich den (in Salzfleisch konservierten) Fisch bezeichnet. Es würde eine solche engere Bedeutung gewiß auch sehr gut in den Kontext bei Artemidor passen, in welchem unmittelbar vorher, nach dem Fleisch der verschiedenen Tiere, ja auch die Fische berücksichtigt sind.

1. 73, p. 79, 1 und 3: Die von Pack im Apparat angegebenen Parallelen reichen wohl aus, um das überlieferte διυπνίσας zu stützen, und Brackertz merkt seine Entscheidung dafür hier und analog zu p. 193, 13 auch an (p. 148, 21 ist wohl nur vergessen).11 Im folgenden Satz ist die Lücke

9 Vgl. auch p. 97, 7 sq. ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου ταχέντος τοῦ σώματος.
10 Wenn es sich bei dem Text von Ar nicht um (falsche) gedankliche Ergänzung handelt, so könnte wohl wie die von Browne hergestellte griechische Text zugründen, der auf Verwechslung von ἁλῶν und ἁλλοις (dazu vgl. p. 85, 20) und Bewahrung beider Elemente beruhen, also einen korrupten Zustand darstellen müßte. Für das Gedankliche mag man auch auf p. 85, 20 sq. verweisen: οἱ δὲ τῶν ἁλῶν ἢ τοῦ θηείου (scil. πεπαχμένου οὐσίας) [...] vgl. 85, 20 sq. verweisen: οἱ δὲ τῶν ἁλῶν ἢ τοῦ θηείου (scil. πεπαχμένου οὐσίας) [...] vgl. 85, 20 sq. verweisen: οἱ δὲ τῶν ἁλῶν ἢ τοῦ θηείου (scil. πεπαχμένου οὐσίας) [...]
11 Die Handschriften bieten beide διυπνίσας p. 79, 1 und führen auf den Infinitiv διωπνίσας (διωπνίσας LV) 148, 21, sie haben dagegen διωπνίσει 276, 23. Sonst schwanken sie so, daß L die intransitive aktive und V die mediopassive Form vorzuziehen scheint: 150, 6 (διωπνίσαν L, διωπνίζεσθαι V); 193, 13 (διωπνήσας L = διωπνίσας, wie schon in der Handschrift korrigiert ist); διωπνίζεσθαι V; 207, 15 sq. (διωπνίσας L = διωπνίσας),
sich selbstverständlich nicht mit Sicherheit zu füllen, etwas wie συνέβη αὐτῷ κοίλλα μὲν καὶ ἄλλα κατασκοπεῖν κακά, τέλος δὲ ἀτίμω γενέσθαι wird aber dem Ursprünglichen nicht allzu ferne stehen.


1. 79, p. 95, 13–18: Nochmals die Stelle mit einem Sonderfall von fellatio: εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὸς ἡ ἑρωμένης δόξεις τις ἀρρητοποιεῖθαι, ἐξῆρα ἡ λύσις τοῦ γάμου ἡ τῆς φιλίας ἐσται· οὐ γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ οὕτε τραπέζης οὕτε φιλιματος κοινωνήσαι,12 εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχοι ἡ γυνῆ· φθειρέ γὰρ τὸ κατὰ γαστρὸς διὰ τὸ παρά φύσιν δέχεσθαι τὰ ὀπέρματα. Browne (Le Muséon 103 [1990] 275) meint aufgrund der

διωμοθήθη V (= διωμοθήθη). Man wird bei Übereinstimmung der Handschriften nirgendwo ändern und in den Zweifelsfällen eher der aktiven Form den Vorzug geben.

12 Zur abgründigen Logik dieser Schuldzuweisung, welche nicht den Träumer sondern die Geträumte trifft, mag man sich den Protest zu eigen machen, den an einer anderen Stelle ein Leser zugefügt hat: αἰτία τοῦ ἑδόντος καὶ οὐ τῆς γυναικὸς (p. 146, 21 sq.). In diesem Falle geht es um “Ins-Bett-Machen,” was häufig Trennung zu Folge hat (20 sqq. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ ἑρωμένης διήστης τὸ ὄναρ διὰ τὸ μολύναι τὴν κοίτην).
arabischen Übersetzung, daß “a clause has dropped out after διά’; dort steht nach seiner englischen Übersetzung “for she will cast away her fetus [i.e. φθερεῖ: cf. 128. 2 = Ar 231. 15] because the seed in such deeds as these is cast away uselessly, and it is contrary to nature that the woman receives it,” und Browne versucht als Rekonstruktion der Vorlage διά <τήν εἰς ἄξρηστον ἀπόκρισιν τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ διά> το παρά φύσιν δέχεσθαι αὐτά, was sich an p. 96, 5 sq. διά τήν εἰς ἄξρηστον ἀπόκρισιν τοῦ σπέρματος anlehnt und dort eine deutliche Entsprechung hat. Die Doppelung der Begründung mit zwei Aspekten derselben Sache in der arabischen Übersetzung wirkt aber uneben, und vor allem legt φθερεῖ (“sie wird ruinieren”) eine ganz von der agierenden Frau her gesehene Begründung nahe, wie es denn im überlieferten griechischen Text auch der Fall ist. Man wird also erweiterte Übersetzungsweise als die Grundlage des arabischen Textes für wahrscheinlich halten, jedenfalls aber den kürzeren Text der griechischen Überlieferung für den besseren ansehen müssen. Für φθερεῖ ist “sie wird eine Fehlgeburt haben” (Kaiser) bzw. “die Leibesfrucht verlieren” (Brackertz) die auch bei den übrigen Übersetzern gegebene, sachlich richtige Wiedergabe, bei der man allerdings sich vergegenwärtigen muß, daß die Weise des Ausdrucks aus der eigentümlichen Logik des Traumbuchs kommt, welche das Tun des symbolischen Traumbilds auch als Ursache des symbolisierten Geschehens darstellen kann. Ich habe diesen Aspekt bei dem Vorschlag, eine Negation einzufügen (WS. 102 [1989] 131), wohl nicht genug bedacht und möchte das Dortige jetzt durch das Hiesige ersetzen.

2. 9, p. 110, 13 sqq.: Der für die religiöse Bewertung des Blitz einschlags in der Antike besonders wichtige Text liest sich bei Hercher (und Pack) holprig und unbeschiedigend: ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀκρας ὑπὸ κεραυνοῦ πεπλήχθη οἱ μὲν πάνω παλαιοὶ διξῆ διήρουν λέγοντες πένησι μὲν ἁγαθὸν εἶναι πλουσίοις δὲ κακῶν λόγῳ τῶδε. Εὐκίσσαν οἱ πένητες χωρίς λιτοῖς καὶ ἄσημοις, εἰς θύρᾳ βίπτεται ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν φεύλων· οἱ δὲ πλουσίοι τείμενες θεόν ἡ ἄνθρωπον ἢ νοοίς [ἡ οὐκοίς] θεόν ἡ ἄλλοσ ἡ ἄλλῳ γένει χωρίς ἐλλογίμοι. ὡσπερ οὐν ὁ κεραυνὸς τὰ μὲν ἀσθεμα τῶν χωρίς ἐνίσχυμα ποιεῖ διὰ τοὺς ἐνδυρμένους βωμοὺς καὶ τὰς γνομένας ἐν αὐτοῖς θυσίας, τὰ δὲ πολυτελῆ χωρία ἔρημα καὶ ἄβατα ποιεῖ (οὐδείς γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνδιατρίβειν ἔτι θέλει), οὕτως ὁ ὦνειρος πένητα μὲν ὥφελει, πλουσίον δὲ βλάπτει.

Man sieht leicht, daß in diesem Text die für Reich und Arm unterschiedliche Bewertung des Vom-Blitz-Getroffenwerdens über die Analogie mit prächtigen und mit geringgeschätzten Orten erreicht wird: der

13 Vgl. z.B. (ἐαυτὸν ἀρρητοποιεῖν): τὸ δὲ στόμα τάφῳ (scil. ἔοικε): ὡσα γὰρ ἐν λάβῃ τὸ στόμα, ταῦτα διαφθείρει καὶ οὐ φυλάττει (p. 97, 1 sqq.); (σελήνη ἐπιμιγήνα): ἓττον ὑδρωποίσασι σημαίνει... ἓττον ὡσα διαφθείρει (ebd. 28 sqq.); (der Blitz) τὸν μὲν τὴν πενιάν τοῦ δὲ τὸν πλούσιον φθερεῖ (p. 111, 5 sqq.).
geringe Ort erhält durch die “Heiligung” des Blitzschlags Bedeutung, der prächtige Ort wird dadurch unbetretbar und öde. Diese Grundlage des Gedankens schützt alle Begriffe, bei denen die Vorstellung des Ortes im Vordergrund steht, also in Z. 18 f. teménesi ... ἡ ἀλεσσιν ἡ ἄλλο γένει χωρίων ἐλλογίμων, weniger das in der Überlieferung außerdem noch schwankende Element ἡ ναοῖς ἡ οἶκοις ἡ θεῶν L bzw. ἡ ναῶν οἶκοις ἡ ναοῖς θεῶν V. Wollte man etwas von diesem letzten Element bewahren, so müßte man es wohl in solcher Weise umformulieren, daß eine Art von Analogie zu Z. 17 εἰς ἄ κόπρια ῥίπτεται κτλ. entsteht. Am besten aber ist es wohl, wenn man das alles als Zufügung athenet, und ich möchte zur Abrundung des Ganzen überdies noch annehmen, daß diese Zufügung auch einen die teméne hervorhebenden Ausdruck verdrängt hat, der dann in Z. 22 mit ἡ δὲ πολυτελὴ χωρία als Leitwort und als wünschenswerte Entsprechung zu τὰ μὲν ἄσπιμα τῶν χωρίων (Z. 20, was χωρίοις λιτοῖς καὶ ἀσήμοις in Z. 16 f. aufnimmt) wiederkehrt. Der Text lautet dann: ἐνοίκισον οἱ πέντες χωρίοις λιτοῖς καὶ ἀσήμοις, εἰς ἂ δὴ ἡ κόπρια ῥίπτεται ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν φαύλων· οἱ δὲ πλοῦσιοι τεμένεσι θεῶν ἡ ἀνθρώπων <πολυτελεσιν> ἡ ἀλεσσιν ἡ ἄλλο γένει χωρίων ἐλλογίμων. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ κεραινός τὰ μὲν ἄσπιμα τῶν χωρίων ἐπίστημα ποιεῖ διὰ τούς ἐνιδρυμένους βρόμους καὶ τᾶς γυνομένας ἐν αὐτοῖς θυσίας, τὰ δὲ πολυτελῆ χωρία ἔρημα καὶ ἄβατα ποιεῖ ( ...), σύντος ὁ ὅνειρος πέντα μὲν ῥυφελεῖ, πλοῦσιον δὲ βλάπτει.

2. 12, p. 119, 4 sq.: Πρόβατα [δὲ καὶ αἰγεῖς], ὡς μὲν οἱ παλαιοὶ συνέχεον, λευκὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ, μέλανα δὲ πονηρὰ· ὡς δὲ ἐγὼ ἑτήρσα, πρόβατα καὶ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ἀγαθὰ· κτλ. So Packs Text, der dabei Herchers ἔλεγον statt des überliefersten συνέχεον verschmäht. Zu Unrecht, weil die vorliegende Aussage “die Alten” die Gegebenheiten ja nicht “vermengen” sondern im Gegenteil “auseinanderhalten” läßt. Man muß also etwas der Hercher’schen Konjektur Entsprechendes setzen, und da kommt dem Sinne nach etwa auch διέλαβον (vgl. p. 42, 7) oder ὑπέλαβον, im Hinblick auf das Überlieferte am ehesten aber vielleicht συνέθεντο in Frage.

14 Der Autor zielt mit seiner Ausführung jedoch offenkundig auf den in der Verwandlung der χωρία λιτα καὶ ἄσπιμα zu heiligen Plätzen gegebenen Gegensatz: zuerst Mistplatz, dann Raum für Altäre und Opfer.

15 So Pack im Apparat, wohl mit Recht im Hinblick auf die Überlieferung (εἰς ἂ ἦ V, εἰς δὲi L).

16 "Η ἀλεσσιν könnte der Rest des für diese Stelle wünschenswerten Leitworts sein, es fügt sich aber jedenfalls auf das beste in den Zusammenhang.

17 Festugieres Wiedergabe ("selon les exposés pèle-mêle des Anciens") ebenso wie die daran wohl anschließende von Brackertz ("nach der unzutreffenden Meinung der Alten") kann dem Anstoß gewiß nicht ab helfen.
2. 12, p. 120, 10–25: Die Stelle hat Hercher aus sprachlichen und anderen Gründen athetiert, und sie fehlt auch in der arabischen Übersetzung, was die Athetese glänzend bestätigt. Trotzdem hat die beigebrachte Geschichte ihr Interesse—und sei es nur wegen der literarischen Nachwirkung, an die auch Seferis erinnert hat. Er merkt zu p. 120, 15 (Pack) prospetein autò òti ἡ γνώνη σοι ποιήσει καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον κέρατα αὐτῷ ποιήσει an: θυμάται κανείς τὴν ὀνειρομαντεία του Πονταγρούέλου: “Vostre femme ... a au truy se abandonnera et vous fera coqu. Cestuy point est apertement exposé par Artemidorus.” Den Verweis auf Rabelais (3. 13 f.) gibt auch Del Corno.

2. 12, p. 121, 20–22: Browne (Le Muséon 103 [1990] 276) macht dankenswerterweise darauf aufmerksam, daß das von Hercher an die rechte Stelle versetzte Element in der arabischen Übersetzung dort seinen richtigen Ort hat: τάχυρος δὲ <κίνδυνον> ὥστε τὸν τυχόντα σημαίνει, μάλιστα ἀπειλῶν καὶ διώκων, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑπερεχόντων ἀπειλην, ἐὰν ἡ πένης ὦ ἱδὼν ἡ δούλος. Dem entspricht: “And as for the bull, it indicates extreme adversity, as it especially indicates a threat or a pursuit that arises from one who is superior to that man, if the dreamer is poor or a slave.” Für den griechischen Text läßt sich daraus aber wohl nichts gewinnen, weil das wahrcheinlichste doch wohl ist, daß ziemlich genau der obige griechische Text mit Irrtum bezüglich der Struktur der Aussage und einer daraus folgenden Großzügigkeit übersetzt worden ist: “especially ... a threat or a pursuit” folgt allzu genau der Abfolge von μάλιστα ἀπειλῶν καὶ διώκων, als daß dies Zufall sein könnte.


Daß Bursians Vorschlag nicht die richtige Lösung darstellen kann, vermag jedoch allein schon die am Ende stehende Begründung zu zeigen, welche einen einzigen Gegenstand und dessen Namen als Äquivalent für


19 Vgl. 1. 2, p. 8, 8 sqq. οὖν ἐστι καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν νοσεῖν τὴν μητέρα ἢ τὴν γυναῖκα, ἀσθενεὶς καὶ ἄκόσμους τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν παρέχον ἐργασίας. οὖδὲ γὰρ οὔδὲ διαφωνεῖται τούτῳ γε, ἀλλὰ συμφώνους ἔσκιναι λέγουσι πάντες τέχνην μητρὶ μὲν, ἐπεὶ τρέφει, γυναικὶ δὲ, ἐπεὶ ἱδιαίτερον; 1. 74, p. 80, 21 sq. τρίσπους δὲ (sc. σημαινεῖ) καὶ ἡ ἅμμα τὸν βιον καὶ τὴν ὑλὴν καταστασιαν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα τοῦ ἱδόντος; 25 sq. κλίνη καὶ πάντα τὰ πρὸς κοίτην τὴν γυναίκα τοῦ ἱδόντος σημαίνει καὶ τὸν ὑλὸν βιον; 1. 78, p. 86, 23 sq. ἐστι γὰρ ἡ γυνὴ ἤτοι τέχνη τοῦ ἱδόντος ἡ πραγματεία κτλ.; 2. 24, p. 143, 10 sq. (Orte, wo Getreidesamen bewahrt werden) γυναῖκα σημαινει καὶ τὸν βιον τοῦ ἱδόντος καὶ τὴν ὑπαρξίαν; 4. 42, p. 270, 9 τέχνην δὲ ἡ πραγματείαν τοῦ ἱδόντος τὴν γυναίκα νομίζομεν ἐναίναι; 4. 61, p. 286, 3 sqq. (Frau = πάση ἡ οὐσία).

der Mitte Bienen tragende Eiche als Segenszeichen bei Hesiod, Erga 232 f., auch wirkt bei der Gleichung δρός = ἀνήρ πλούσιος gewiß noch die bei der Eiche selbstverständliche Assoziation des Zeus mit ein (den nicht zuletzt bei Artemidor die Beziehung zu Reichtum und die Verknüpfung mit mächtigen und reichen Leuten auszeichnet, vgl. p. 159, 1 Δία ιδείν... ἄγαθον ἀνδρὶ βασιλεῖ καὶ πλουσίῳ· κρατύνει γὰρ οὗ μὲν τὴν τύχην οὗ δὲ τὸν πλοῦτον).


2. 26, p. 146, 6–15: Bei der Besprechung von Kot (κόπρος) erhält Menschenkot eine ausnehmend schlechte Bedeutung (ἀνθρωπεία δὲ κόπρος πολλῆ ὀρωμένη πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα σημαίνει κακὰ), die dann auch mit Einzelheiten und mit drohender Warnung eingeschärft wird (145, 24–46, 6). Darauf folgt ein Abschnitt, bei dem sich Pack an einer Stelle mit Recht stärker als Hercher am Marcianus (V) orientiert hat: ἄτοπον δὲ ἡ ἔντασι καὶ τὸ μολυνδέα κόπρο ἀνθρωπεία καταρρεούσῃ ποθὲν. οὐδὲ τίνα, ὡς ἐδοξέν ἔταιρον καὶ συνήθει τινὰ πλούσιον, ὄντα αὐτῷ φίλον. 21 ὁ ναρ κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς κατατήρησαι. 22 οὕτως διεθέτατο τὴν οὕταν καὶ ἐκληρονόμησε τὸν ἑταίρον. καὶ παλιν αὐ ἐδοξέ τις ὅπω τίνος γνωρίσω πέντες 23 προστηλθήναι καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ μεγάλα ἐβλάβη καὶ αἰσχύνη 24 τινι μεγάλη περιέπεσεν. ἢν γὰρ εἰκὸς τὸν μὲν εὐποροῦντα τὰ ἔσωτό τῳ ἱδόντες προσθῆσεν, τὸν δὲ πενόμενον καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχοντα καταλιπεῖν καταφρονῆσεν τὸν ἱδόντος καὶ αἰσχύνη περιβαλεῖν αὐτὸν.

21 In L steht dafür αὐτῷ ὄντα (= Z. 8 bei Pack [Druckfehler]).
22 So V; Hercher schrieb κατατηλήθασαι (κατατηλήθασι L, κατατηλήθηναι Reiske).
23 Πέντες fehlt in L (wie in Z. 8 πλουσίον). Ob dasselbe für die griechische Vorlage von Ar galt, ist nicht ganz sicher, da in der Übersetzung immerhin zwei Begriffe ("a friend and acquaintance of his") stehen, von denen der eine in Anlehnung an Z. 8 sinngemäß verlesen sein kann.
24 Αἰσχύνη Reiske, πρὸς αἰσχύνη L, ὑπὸ αἰσχύνη V.
Liest man diesen Abschnitt im Zusammenhang, so ergibt sich sofort, daß für die beiden parallelen Geschichten die Unterscheidung der in gleicher Weise ihren fließenden Fäkalieneguren auf das Haupt des Träumers loslassenden Traumfiguren als reich und arm für den Ausgang konstitutiv ist. Auch ist bei der dortigen Aussage offenbar so auf das Vorherige verwiesen (ο ἐ ν ρ ο ρ ῃ ν ὁ κ αν καὶ κα ν ὁ ν καταλιπεύειν), daß in der Geschichte selbst die entsprechende Angabe nicht fehlen kann. Das bedeutet, daß der Text des Marcianus (V) gegenüber dem des Laurentianus und, wie es scheint, auch der arabischen Übersetzung in einem besonders wichtigen Punkt gestützt wird. Andererseits macht das im Laurentianus gleichfalls fehlende φιλον auch im Marcianus den Eindruck der fast störenden Abundanz,25 und dieser Eindruck findet seine Bestätigung darin, daß mit der Eliminierung dieses Elements der Text sich gewissermaßen vervollständigt und, genau besuchen, erst lesbar wird: οἴδα δέ τινα, δὲ ἔδοξεν ἐταίρον καὶ συνήθη τινά, πλοῦσιον ὄντα, αὐτῷ ὄναρ κατα τῆς κεφαλῆς κατατιλήσαι. Damit tritt die doch wohl geforderte Konstruktion κατατιλάν τινι κατά τῆς κεφαλῆς hervor, und es zeigt sich, daß Pack mit Recht sich für κατατιλήσαι (V) entschieden, den weiteren notwendigen Schritt aber unterlassen hat. Alle weiteren Fragen sind demgegenüber sekundär, so ob ὄντα ursprünglich oder die Stellung von αὐτῷ richtig ist. Das erste wird man ohne Einschränkung bejahen, sobald man ἐταίρος καὶ συνήθης τις πλοῦσιος ἄνω als Zusammenhang liest, und für das zweite wird man wohl sagen, daß bei Ansetzung einer besonderen Betonung die überlieferte Abfolge der Elemente im Satz in jedem Falle gut bestehen kann.

Was den Zusammenhang der beiden Träume mit dem vorangestellten allgemeinen Satz angeht, so liegt es auf der Hand, daß der erste Traum mit dem guten Ausgang der vorausgesagten Erbschaft Kontrast und Ausnahme zu der mit άτοπον gegebenen negativen Bewertung darstellt,26 der zweite ihr dagegen entspricht. Seinem Traummodus nach gehört der erste Traum jedenfalls zur Gruppe der Träume, welche sich als κατά μὲν τὸ ἐντὸς κακοῖ κατά δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ἁγαθοῖ darstellen (p. 15, 13 sq.), zu Träumen also, von


26 Für άτοπον vgl. p. 42, 16; 60, 10 (πονηρὸν καὶ άτοπον); 76, 2 (Gegensatz ἁγαθὸς-άτοπος); 101, 23 (νοσούντι άτοπον, d.h. Tod ankündigend) und die im Index von Hercher ausgewiesenen Stellen: p. 161, 23 und 169, 11 (Pack), wo in der Verbindung von πονηρὸς und άτοπος das eine mehr vom absonderlichen und abwegigen Traumbild und das andere von dessen Bewertung und schlimmerer Wirkung her gedacht sein mag; p. 281, 15 (άτοπα καὶ σκατά); 295, 5 (ἀπόθες καὶ άτοπος); 250, 10 (Personen ehrwürdigen Alters verdienen Vertrauen πλὴν εἰ μὴ τι πράττοιν ἣ λέγοιν άτοπον).
dem einen. Auch das erste dort dafür gegebene Beispiel27 (κεραυνοῦσθαι δόκειν πένητα ὄντα... ἀγαθόν, ebd. 14 sq.) bringt eine recht genaue Analogie zu dem von uns besprochenen Fall. Man kann fragen, ob die Ausnahme von der Regel nicht besser auch schon im allgemeinen Satz angekündigt sein sollte, und könnte einer solchen Forderung wohl auch leicht mit Hilfe einer Ergänzung (wie ἄτοπον δ' ἐν εἴη... ἑστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ἀγαθόν) begegnen. Aber der geforderte Kontrast ist doch auch beim überlieferten Text in vielleicht ausreichendem Maße deutlich, so daß man sich damit zufrieden geben kann. Der Unterschied besteht zunächst in der Unbestimmtheit der allgemeinen Aussage und der Bestimmtheit des Sonderfalls, daß ein guter Bekannter die Quelle der von oben kommenden Beschmutzung ist, mit seinen beiden Varianten, die sich aus der Distinktion von “reich” und “arm” ergeben. Und dabei wird die erste Variante zum Kontrast und zur Ausnahme von der generell negativen Bewertung, während die zweite Variante derselben wiederum entspricht.28

Für den Text des zweiten Traums trägt auch die arabische Übersetzung etwas bei, wie Browne in diesem Fall wahrscheinlich gemacht hat (Le Muséon 103 [1990] 279). Er übersetzt die arabische Entsprechung zu dem zweiten Traum mit: “And also another saw in his dream that a friend and acquaintance of his urinated on his head, and from him great harms befell him, and he fell into extreme disgrace and grief.” Hier fehlt, wie schon gesagt, die für die Geschichte wichtige Aussage der Armut des Freundes, doch über diese Entsprechung zu L ließe sich nur bei genauer Betrachtung des gesamten Zusammenhangs in der Übersetzung urteilen. Wesentlich “he fell into extreme disgrace and grief” angeht, so könnte dies, für sich genommen, leicht ein Beispiel für verdeutlichende Entfaltung und Verdoppelung sein (die dem arabischen Übersetzer offenkundig nicht fremd ist); man wird jedoch, da die griechische Überlieferung vor αἰσχύνη noch eine Präposition (πρός L, ὑπὸ V) hat, die entweder getilgt werden muß oder nach Ergänzung verlangt, den vollen Ausdruck des Übersetzers hier mit Browne als Argument für das letztere verstehen. Sein πρός αἰσχύνη

28 Für die positive und die negative Bewertung mag man auch 3. 52, das Kapitel über Mist und Müll (κόπρια), vergleichen. Es heißt da p. 226, 20 sqq. προσχέεθαι δε κόπρια ὑπὸ τινος γνωρίμου ὄψις ἀγαθόν· ἐχθραν γάρ καὶ διχόνοις καὶ ἀδικίαις ὑπὸ τοῦ προσχέοντος σημαινεῖ, während es für einen Armen günstig erscheint, auf einem Misthaufen zu schlafen (15 sqq.): ἀγαθόν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ κοπρίας καθεύδειν ἄνθρωπον, πολλὰ γάρ κτῆσεται καὶ περιβαλλεῖται χρῆμα.
<λύπη> tivì megalìn periepesen hat einige Wahrscheinlichkeit, das Richtige zu treffen.  

Universität Wien

Bemerkungen zum Text der Kynikerbriefe

MARTIN SICHERL


sind die Kynikerbriefe zweimal transliteriert worden, einmal die vollständige Sammlung, das andere Mal die Auswahl \( \psi \). Wie sich im folgenden zeigen wird, war der Text von \( \chi \) durch eine beträchtliche Zahl von Glossen, die in den Text eingedrungen sind, und Interpolationen korrigiert.\(^2\) Sie geben sich als solche meist schon durch sprachliche Ungeschicklichkeiten, mangelhafte Einpassung in den Text, das Bestreben, den Text zu verdeutlichen, ihn zu verstärken oder eigene Kenntnisse anzubringen, zu erkennen. In allen diesen Fällen ist kein Grund zu erkennen, warum umgekehrt die betreffende Stelle im Hyparchetypus \( \psi \) ausgefallen wäre, wenn sie schon im Archetypus \( \phi \) vorhanden war, wie es sonst des öfteren der Fall ist.\(^3\) Sie lassen sich in aller Regel sauber herauslösen, ohne daß an den Bruchstellen eine Änderung am ursprünglichen Text nötig wird. Die Auswahl \( \psi \) wurde bei der Herstellung des Briefcorpus \( \Omega \), einer wahrscheinlich im 9. Jh. veranstalteten Sammledition von 18 Epistolographen, überarbeitet. Dieser überarbeitete Text ist der Stammvater \( \omega \) der breiten Überlieferung. Aber schon der Archetypus \( \phi \) war nicht frei von Verderbnissen infolge des Eindringens von Glossen in den Text.


1. Diogenes 1, S. 235,3–4

Οἶκῆσετε οὖν (so 398, γοῦν διὰ τοῦτο ω̄ Hercher) ὑμεῖς μὲν Σινώπην, ἐγὼ δὲ Ἅθηνας, schreibt Diogenes den Sinopenern, nachdem sie ihn verbannt haben. Dem Redaktor von \( \omega \) hatte die Verschreibung γοῦν statt οὖν vorgelegen. Statt sie rückgängig zu machen, fügt er διὰ τοῦτο ein.

2. Diogenes 7, S. 237,13–17

Es geht um das Homerzitat, mit dem Diogenes seinen Vater über seinen kynischen Aufzug trösten will (Od. 13. 434–38):

φάρος μὲν οἱ πρῶτα χιτώνα τε εἴματ’ ἔδωκε
λευγαλέα, ῥυπόωντα, κακῷ μεμορυγμένα καπνῷ,
ἀμφὶ δὲ μὲν μέγα δέρμα ταχεῖς ἔσσ᾿ ἑλάφοιο

\(^2\) Vgl. Müseler II.B. 1. Die Reihe dieser Zusätze setzt sich auch dort fort, wo \( \omega \) A81 fehlen, also in Diog. 30–51 (398) und Krat. 15–36 (\( \zeta \)). Man kann annehmen, daß die meisten davon schon in \( \chi \) standen und nicht erst in der Deszendenz von \( \chi \) eingeführt wurden.

\(^3\) Vgl. Müseler II.B. 1; 16. 3 ist durch Diog. Laert. 6. 23 gesichert und wahrscheinlich ebenfalls wegen des Homoioteleutons ausgefallen; 15. 5 ist unentbehrlich, sein Ausfall hinterläßt eine Lücke.
ψιλόν, δῶκε δὲ οἱ σκῆπτρον καὶ ἀεικέα πήρην, πυκνὰ ῥωγαλένην, ἐν δὲ στρόφος ἦν ἀορτήρ.

Die Überlieferung hat von dem Homerzitat nur die ersten vier Verse, den letzten hatte ω in der Form δῶκε δὲ οἱ σκῆπτρον ἀορτήραντε (so die Hyparchetypi β und γ sowie Laur. 57.12ρε, ἀορτηρός τε Harl. 5610, ἀορτήρατε Paris. 3047, ἀορτήρε τε κ = Vat. gr. 1354/Mazar. 4454).

Schafstaedt⁴ glaubt, das Homerzitat habe ursprünglich auch den Vers 438 umfaßt, der Schreiber sei aber im Vers 437 nach δῶκε δὲ οἱ σκῆπτρον zu ἀορτήρ im nächsten Vers geglitten; später habe man die Erwähnung der πήρα vermißt und aus τῆρ τε gemacht: πήραντε. Aber daß das Auge nach σκῆπτρον auf ἀορτήρ abglitt, ist nicht sehr wahrscheinlich, und wenn dies mit τε angeschlossen wurde, hätte auch der Akkusativ ἀορτήρα hergestellt werden müssen. Die Korruptel ist anders zu erklären. Im Original fehlte wie in 398 der Vers 438, weil es dem Verfasser nur um die Kleidung, den Stab und den Ranzen, die Ausstattung des Kynikers, ging, nicht aber um das Tragband, das nie erwähnt wird. Spätestens in ω, wo in 437 ψιλόν ausgefallen war, hat ein Interpolator in unklarer Erinnerung an 438 in 437 καὶ ἀεικέα πήρην durch ἀορτήραντε ersetzt und damit unsinnigerweise das Schwert (ἀορ) hieringebracht, das mit den Kynikern nichts zu tun hat; außerdem wurde die epische Form πήρην durch die attische πήραν ersetzt. In dieser Form haben den Vers die Hyparchetypi β und γ übernommen und wahrscheinlich auch der Hyparchetypus α; so hat ihn auch 57.12. In 5610 ist daraus in Fehlerprogression ἀορτηρός τε geworden, während in κ zu ἀορτήρε τε und in 3047 zu ἀορτήρα τε “verbessert” wurde.

3. Diogenes 7, S. 237,18–20

Diogenes schreibt an seinen Vater: θάρπει οὖν, ὃ πάτερ, ἐπὶ τῷ ὄνοματι, ὃ καλοῦσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ στολῇ, ἐπεὶ ὃ μὲν κύων ἦστι πρὸς θεόν, ἢ δὲ εὖρημα τοῦ θεοῦ, so Hercher. Statt ὃ μὲν κύων hat 398 τὸ μὲν κοινόν, statt ἢ δὲ hat 398 τὸ δὲ; außerdem fehlen in 398 ἐπεὶ und θεόν. Im Archetypus φ hatte gestanden: ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν (scil. ὄνομα) ἦστι πρὸς θεόν, ἢ δὲ (scil. στολή) εὖρημα θεοῦ und τὸ μὲν war durch κύων glossiert; ψ nahm die Glosse, wie sie war, in den Text und änderte entsprechend den Artikel, 398 verlas sie zu κοινόν und glich ἢ δὲ fälschlich an εὖρημα an.


5. Diogenes 27, S. 241,40–43

Die Lakedaimonier sind bemitleidenswert, weil sie das, was sie zu üben meinen, die Bedürfnislosigkeit und das Ertragen von Widrigkeiten, in Wirklichkeit von Diogenes allein vollbracht wird. Danach fährt Diogenes fort: ἀκόλουθα (so A81 ω, ἀνακόλουθα 398) γούν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦτοις (so A81 ω, τοῦτοις om. 398). ἀπείχειστον γὰρ δοκοῦντες διʼ ἀνδρεῖαν (so A81 ω, γὰρ διʼ ἀνδρείαν δοκοῦντες 398) οἰκεῖν τὴν Σπάρτην ἄφυλακτον τὴν πυνχὴν τοῖς πέπλεοιν ἐκδεδόκομαι. Hercher folgt in allem A81 ω, aber das Richtige hat 398. Denn ἀκόλουθος bezeichnet das, was mit etwas anderem zusammenstimmt, ihm entspricht: Diog. 15. 8 τῷ λόγῳ τὸν βίον (so ω, τῷ βιῷ τὸν λόγον 398) ἀκόλουθον ἐπιδιέκνυσθαι (vgl. Demosth. 18. 257 ἀκόλουθα τοῦτοις πράττειν, Diog. 46. 14 ἀκόλουθα γούν τοῦτοις [seiner αὐτάρκεια καὶ λιτότης] ἐκκαθαρται μὲν ἡ πυνχῆ κακῶν [κακῶν Wilamowitz], ἀφέσταται δὲ κενοδοξίας κτλ.); ἀνακόλουθος dagegen
jedesmalige 

dKoXovGa.

Parallelität avttKoA.o'Ga bezeichnet 
yopa oxav 6.

wiederum ist 
dyopa oxav

diogenes

iiberlieferte 
diog, Aischin.

Diogenes 

cpavEpcoq Diogenes

iiberhaupt (Aischin.

im

iiberhaupt

diog, Aischin.

Hermaia


diog, Aischin.

Diogenes

auch

cpavEpcoq Diogenes

TiEpawEXE.

Dazu den 

dyopa oxav

vgl. Diog. Laert. 28. 1; Denniston, 

Greek Particle S. 59 (3).

6. Diogenes 28, S. 242,39–43

Diogenes wirft in dieser Invektiven den Athenern vor: ev te tois yuvmavsiou, 

otan h tа kaloumena "Ermaia η Παναθήναια, και ev meσh tη όγορα (h – 

όγορα om. A81 ω) еσθιετα και τινετα, mevtheite sournousiаξετα (sournousia

ω) peraiвнете (peraiвнετε 398) ek tωn еναντιων peraiвнεσθε (peraiвнεσθε

398, peraiвнεσθαι A81 ω) гунаиκoпaθετε (∑υνδικoпaθετε A81 ω), ειτ' 

ενασεβετε υμεις ετi (so 398, асеbezis уmеiς oтi A81 ω) кai кpυφα 

και φανερωδος ποιετε ταυτα. Wie schon Schafstaedt (S. 35) geschen hat, is 
sournousiаξετα eine Glosse zu peraiвн€тε und гунаиκoпaθετε eine Glosse 
zu peraiвн€σθε. Von ω ist der obszное Sinn von peraiвнετε nicht 

verstanden und sournousia̱s peraiвнεσθε hergestellt worden. Ein Grund dafür, 

dab h Παναθήναια και ev μεση η όγορα in ϕ gestanden hätte und in ψ 
ausgefallen ist, ist nicht ersichtlich. Original kann es wegen der inhaltlichen 

Anstöße kaum sein.6 Von Zügellosigkeiten, wie sie hier genannt werden, is 

bei den Panathenäen weder etwas bekannt, noch sind sie bei diesem Fest 

überhaupt denkbar, wohl aber würden sie, wenn auch in Übertreibung, zu 

den Hermaia passen, vgl. P. Stengel, RE VIII.1 (1912) 708: "In Athen gab 
es ein solches [Hermesfest], wie es scheint ausgelassenen Charakters, das 

Knaben und eben heranreifende Jünglinge in den Gymnasien und Palästren 

feierten. Den Gymnasiarchen war es bei strenger Strafe verboten, 

Erwachsene zuzulassen, da man die Verführung der Knaben befürchtete 

(Aischin. I § 10; Schol. Plat. Lysis 260C)." Außerdem steht ev μεση η 

όγορα im Widerspruch zu και κρυφα και φανερωδη. Die Passage is 
deshalb als eine Erweiterung in dem Hyparchetypus χ zu streichen. Danach 

stand vermutlich im Archetypus φ ειτα ασεβετε υμεις ετι, was von 398 

mit der Verlesung ειτ' ev- in den Text genommen, von ψ auf seine Weise in

5 Dazu vgl. Müseler II.B. 1.

6 Vgl. dazu Guil. Capelle, De Cynicorum epistulis (Diss. Göttingen 1896) 26: "τа 
kaloumenа "Ermaia η Παναθήναια minus apte dicit, quia hos festos dies esse negat. 

Ceterum verbum Παναθήναια hoc loco non aptum esse Wilamowitzius putat, qui post illud 
lacunam statuit, in qua scripta fuerint, quae in gymnasio fieri solent, tum οταν δ' η 

Διονύσια η ante vocem Παναθήναια supplet."
7. Diogenes 28, S. 243,6–8

Diogenes sagt: διετέλεσα γὰρ ἐνυγχάνων Ἀντισθένει τῷ σοφῷ, ὡς μόνοις (μόνος codd., corr. Laur. 57,45 Hercher) τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτῶν διείλε τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις (καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις A81 ω) τοῖς οὕκ εἰδόσι φύσιν λόγων (λόγων ω) ἀλήθειαν παρεξέβη (παρέβη A81 ω) οὐδὲν φροντίσας κνωδάλων ἢ (ἡ om. A81 ω) νηπίων μὴ ἑπισταμένων ... λόγους κυνός (λόγος κοινός A81). Hier ist τοῖς οὕκ εἰδόσι εἰνα Glossum zu τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις, und dieses war an die falsche Stelle geraten; es gehört zu παρεξέβη, und dann erhält auch διείλε das notwendige Objekt: φύσιν λόγων ἀλήθειαν. Die Lesung τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις (398) verdient gegen καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις des Vorzug. Es entspricht τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτῶν, während ἀλλοτρίοις entweder das, was eines anderen ist, oder "auswärts, fremd" bedeutet und deshalb nicht den Gegensatz zu τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτῶν bildet. Das Verbum παρεξεβάινα, "aus dem Wege gehen," ist zwar nur mit dem Genitiv ("sich von etwas trennen") und dem Akkusativ ("überreichen") belegt, der ἄλλος als ein ἄλλος incommodi ist aber bei der hier erforderlichen Bedeutung natürlich. Danach ist der Text so herzustellen: διετέλεσα γὰρ ἐνυγχάνων Ἀντισθένει τῷ σοφῷ, ὡς μόνοις τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτῶν διείλε φύσιν λόγων ἀλήθειαν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις παρεξέβη οὐδὲν φροντίσας κνωδάλων ἢ νηπίων μὴ ἑπισταμένων ... λόγους κυνός.

8. Diogenes 28, S. 243,22–26

Diogenes sagt: διετέλεσα γὰρ ἐνυγχάνων Ἀντισθένει τῷ σοφῷ, ὡς μόνοις (μόνος codd., corr. Laur. 57,45 Hercher) τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτῶν διείλε τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις (καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις A81 ω) τοῖς οὕκ εἰδόσι φύσιν λόγων (λόγων ω) ἀλήθειαν παρεξέβη (παρέβη A81 ω) οὐδὲν φροντίσας κνωδάλων ἢ (ἡ om. A81 ω) νηπίων μὴ ἑπισταμένων ... λόγους κυνός (λόγος κοινός A81). Hier ist τοῖς οὕκ εἰδόσι εἰνα Glossum zu τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις, und dieses war an die falsche Stelle geraten; es gehört zu παρεξέβη, und dann erhält auch διείλε das notwendige Objekt: φύσιν λόγων ἀλήθειαν. Die Lesung τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις (398) verdient gegen καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις des Vorzug. Es entspricht τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτῶν, während ἀλλοτρίοις entweder das, was eines anderen ist, oder "auswärts, fremd" bedeutet und deshalb nicht den Gegensatz zu τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτῶν bildet. Das Verbum παρεξεβάινα, "aus dem Wege gehen," ist zwar nur mit dem Genitiv ("sich von etwas trennen") und dem Akkusativ ("überreichen") belegt, der ἄλλος als ein ἄλλος incommodi ist aber bei der hier erforderlichen Bedeutung natürlich. Danach ist der Text so herzustellen: διετέλεσα γὰρ ἐνυγχάνων Ἀντισθένει τῷ σοφῷ, ὡς μόνοις τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτῶν διείλε φύσιν λόγων ἀλήθειαν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις παρεξέβη οὐδὲν φροντίσας κνωδάλων ἢ νηπίων μὴ ἑπισταμένων ... λόγους κυνός.


10. Diogenes 36, S. 250,26–29

Diogenes hatte dem Kyniker Timomachos empfohlen, über seine Tür statt Ἡρακλῆς ἐνθάδε κατοικεῖ, μηδὲν εἰσίτω κακὸν zu schreiben: πενία ἐνθάδε κατοικεῖ κτλ. Der wehrt heftig ab, denn gerade die Armut sei ein Übel, weil sie λιμόν, ψυχός, καταφρόνησιν bewirke. Darauf antwortet Diogenes: ἀλλ' οὐδὲν γε τούτων ὃν φῆς πενία ἃρα οὔτε λιμὸς. πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γη φυτεῖ, δι' ᾧν (δι' suppl. Hercher) ὅ τε λιμὸς θεραπεύεται τὸ τε ψυχός, ἐπεὶ οὔτε τὰ ἄλογα (so Hercher, οὐτὰ cod.) γυμνὰ ὄντα αἰσθάνεται ψυχοῦς. Hercher vermutete nach ἃρα eine Lücke, aber schon

Hertlein\textsuperscript{10} hatte δρα <ούτε ψύχος> ούτε λιμόν vorgeschlagen, da in den folgenden Kausalsätzen außer auf λιμός auch auf ψύχος Bezug genommen wird. Emeljanow (S. 175) meint, δρα “is hard to accept as an emendation,” es ist aber eine Variatio zu 24 ποιοῦσαν, und wird wiederum variiert durch 36 ἔργαζεται, und 39 heißt es ausdrücklich ταῦτα ἔδρα ἢ πενία. Daß ψύχος nicht fehlen durfte, hat Hertlein richtig gesehen, aber freilich würde man eher οὔτε λιμόν <οὔτε ψύχος> erwarten, was der Reihenfolge in 25 f. und so auch den nachfolgenden Begründungen entspräche. Capelle (S. 45) empfand, daß τὸ τε ψύχος nicht ohne Prädikat sein könne, und schlug, um zu variieren, “<προμένεται> vel tale quid” vor. Aber der Text wird durch einen minimalen Eingriff geheilt, der die vermutete Lücke und die vorgeschlagenen Ergänzungen evident widerlegt und darüber hinaus noch einen weiteren Fehler der Überlieferung aufdeckt, den Artikel bei ψύχος, während sonst der Artikel weggelassen ist, wie es bei abstrakten Gattungsnamen allgemeine Regel ist\textsuperscript{11}: ἀλλὰ οὔδέν γε ὁν ἡν πενία δρα, οὔτε λιμόν, πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ φύεται, <di.> ὃν ὁ τε λιμὸς θεραπεύεται, οὔτε (τὸ τε cod.) ψύχος, ἔπει οὔδὲ τὰ ἄλογα γυμνὰ ὃντα ψύχους αἰσθάνεται. Dem te entspricht kein zweites te oder καί, weil der vorschwebende Gedanke dann anders ausgedrückt wird.\textsuperscript{12} Aber eben dieses fehlende τε verursachte die Verderbnis τὸ τε statt οὔτε.

11. Diogenes 36, S. 250,39–41

Nachdem Diogenes nachgewiesen hat, daß die Armut weder Hunger noch Frieren noch Verachtung bewirkt, führt er fort: τί δὲ, ἔφην, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔδρα ἢ πενία παρ’ ὑμῖν οὐκ οὐσα, οὐκ ἦν αἱρετή, ἀλλὰ σφοδρότερα κακὰ ἀπελαύνουσα ὑμῖν, so der Codex. Westermann ersetzte ἀλλὰ durch ἀλλὰ ἦν, Schaftsaedt (S. 38) durch ἀλλ’ εἰ, Wilamowitz (bei Schaftsaedt a.O.) οὐκ οὐσα durch οἰκοῦσα, Boissoneau αἱρετή durch ἀρετή, Schaftsaedt fügte οὖν vor ἦν ein und schrieb ἀλλὰ statt des zweiten ἀλλὰ. Emeljanow (S. 177 f.) schließlich schreibt: ἀλλ’ ἦ ταῦτα ἔδρα ἢ πενία παρ’ ὑμῖν οἰκοῦσα; οὐκ ἦν αἱρετή ἄλλα σφοδρότερα etc. und versteht: “What other than these things (i.e. hunger, cold, etc., above) might poverty do, if it dwelt with you?” Aber der Gedanke ist offenbar der: “Wenn (wie nachgewiesen) die Armut diese Übel (λιμός, ψύχος, καταφρόνησις) nicht bewirkte, wenn sie bei euch wohnete, hätten ihr sie dann nicht aufnehmen sollen, da sie doch schlimmere Übel (als die vermeintlichen) von euch vertreiben”: ἀλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα <μὴ> ἔδρα ἢ πενία παρ’ ὑμῖν οἰκοῦσα, οὐκ ἦν αἱρετὴ ἄλλα σφοδρότερα κακὰ ἀπελαύνουσα:

\textsuperscript{10} F. K. Hertlein, “Zu griechischen Prosaisken,” Hermes 9 (1875) 361.
\textsuperscript{12} Kühner-Gerth II.2 (Hannover/Leipzig 1904) 244, A. 4.

14 Capelle 34.
Aber Nihard läßt es damit nicht bewenden, er streicht auch ποτήρας = εὐσκαλές ὕδωρ, weil darin die Diätvorschrift des Antisthenes in fast identischen Ausdrücken wiederholt werde. Es ist aber klar, daß diese Wiederaufnahme im Bild des Weges, das der Begründung der Diät dient, nicht fehlen konnte, der Verfasser variiert aber in ansprechender Weise den Ausdruck. Bei der dritten Tilgung Nihards, der von καὶ ταῦτα - πίνειν δὲ ὕδωρ, liegt eine Interpolation auf der Hand; schon Capelle (34, A. 4) hatte γυμναστέον (oder vielmehr γυμνασκεῖν) – ὕδωρ als Dittographie erklärt. Sodann athetiert Nihard noch einen vierten Satz: ἐστώτα δὲ – βαδίζωσιν; er setzte das Bild von dem Wege zur Glückseligkeit fort, indem er implizit den Gedanken der γυμνότης enthalte. Wenn aber das Bild des Weges nicht interpoliert ist, kann auch dies nicht Zeichen einer Interpolation sein. Schließlich tilgt er in Zeile 20 ἐσθίειν τε καὶ πίνειν nach ἀσκησις als Glosse, aber die Infinitive sind logisch gefordert, vgl. 252,30 οὐκέτι ταῦτα ὡς ἀσκήματα ἰσθον καὶ ἔπινον. Diogenes hat bei Antisthenes die Diät geübt, die zur εὐδαιμονία führt; um diese geht es von 252,1 an. Emeljanow tilgt 252,6–8 ἐν τόπῳ . . . ἰδρύοσοθαι, erklärt παρατόπως als eine Kontamination von παρά, das von παρά Ἀντισθένει vorher (252,2) und nachher (Z. 19) eingedrungen sei (!), streicht mit Hercher οὐκ ἐν παρατόπως, will ὅτι durch ὄποτε ersetzen und hält γυμναστέον (oder vielmehr γυμνασκεῖν) bis κοῦφον für eine Glosse. Das soll dann heißen: “(and to do these things, especially whenever one is in need of walking easily.” Aber ἀμπέχεσθαι δὲ τρίβωνα κοῦφον ist zweifellos echt, vgl. krat. 18. 1 f. πίνειν ὕδωρ καὶ ἐσθίειν μὴ ἄνευρωτε καὶ ἀμπέχεσθαι τρίβωνα. Der τρίβων διπλοὺς ist das Kleidungsstück der Kyniker, hier aber wird der einfache τρίβων κοῦφος gefordert, entsprechend dem γυμνὸν ἀναβήναι im Bild des Weges: in leichter Bekleidung müsse man hinansteigen. Scheidet man aber καὶ ταῦτα bis ὕδωρ aus, so schließt ἀμπέχεσθαι δὲ τρίβωνα wie in krat. 18. 2 bruchlos und der Sache entsprechend an εὐτελές ὕδωρ an, und der ganze Text ist bis hierher in Ordnung, ohne daß weitere Streichungen in Betracht kämen. Die in den Text eingedrungene Glosse wird dann so gelautet haben: καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ, μόλιστα δ’ ὅπη (= ὅποι) δέοι τοῦ ῥάστα βαδίσαι γυμνὸν ἄσκειν (so Nihard 262 einleuchtend für γυμνασκεῖν) ἐσθίειν μὲν κάρδαμον, πίνειν δὲ ὕδωρ: “und dies (nämlich ποτήρας – τροφῆ μὲν πόσα καὶ κάρδαμον, πόμα δὲ εὐτέλες ὕδωρ) nicht an jedem Ort sondern gerade dort, wo man, am leichtesten zu schreiten, sich leichtbekleidet üben muß, Kresse zu essen und Wasser zu trinken.” Der Glossator nimmt also mit γυμνὸν ἄσκειν auf μόλις ἐν δύνασθαι γυμνὸν ἀναβήναι im Bild des Weges Bezug. Im folgenden schreibt Hercher ἀποδειγμένους statt des überlieferten ἀποδειγμάτως, das Nihard trotz des Anakoluths beibehalt,
und mit te an das Vorangehende anschließt. Marcks\textsuperscript{16} fand dieses Wort, das er mit "prae se ferre" übersetzte, wenig passend und wollte es durch ἀποδεξαμένους ersetzen: "miseriam laboremque decumbendi in terrâ in se admittere." Näher läge ἐπίδειξιμένους, was offenbar schon Capelle vorschwebte ("demonstrantem"). Man erwartet aber nicht den Plural, sondern in Übereinstimmung mit φέροντα, βαρούμενον (10) und μετίοντα (12) den Singular, und ἀθλησις heißt nicht "miseria laborque," sondern "Kampf der Athleten." Anstößig ist auch τε vor ἀποδύσεσθαι, das Hercher sehen läßt, aber in der Übersetzung übergeht, Nihard tilgt. Emeljanow findet τὴν ἀθλησιν τοῦ ἀποδύσεσθαι zu Recht anstößig und schreibt deshalb ἀποδεξαμένους (sic) δὲ τὸ ἀποδύσεσθαι πρὸς ἀθλησιν (statt πρὸς γῆν), eine willkürliche Änderung, die durch 24 καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς κομίσθαι und krat. 18. 2 f. κατακλίνεσθαι ἐπὶ γῆς widerlegt wird. Statt des unpassenden ἀθλησιν ist aber ἀσκησιν zu schreiben; mit Recht hatte schon Capelle (S. 34) "exercitationem humi decumbendi" übersetzt, aber das ist ἀσκησιν, nicht ἀθλησιν, und zu ἀσκησιν paßt bestens der Genetiv τοῦ ἀποδύσεσθαι. In Wirklichkeit ist das mehrfach anstößige ἀποδεξαμένους - τοῦ als Glossse zu streichen, und dann schließt ἀποδύσεσθαι te bruchlos an τρίβωνα κουφον an. Der Glossator hat seine Bemerkung mit dem Nominativ dem Kontext syntaktisch nicht angepaßt, und bei der Eingliederung der Glossse in den Text geriet τε an die falsche Stelle. Mit seiner Glossse wollte deren Urheber die ἀσκησις des Schlafens auf dem blossen Erdboden hervorheben, vgl. 20 ἀσκησις, 30 ἀσκήματα. Nihards Streichung von ἐστώτα - βαδίζωσιν stimmt Emeljanow zu ("as it stands, the text does not fit anywhere"), hält es aber für eine Glossse zu 10 ὅτι φέροντα τι, während Nihard (nach Capelle) den ursprünglichen Zusammenhang mit dem Bild des Weges richtig gesehen hat und es gerade deshalb tilgen wollte, und fährt mit ἕνω τε (statt τοῦ) fort. Mit Nihard tilgt er auch ἔσθησιν τε καὶ πίνειν. Aber nach Ausscheidung der beiden sprachlich und sachlich anstößigen Interpolationen καὶ ταῦτα - ὑδρωρ und ἀποδεξαμένος - τοῦ τε ergibt sich ein vollkommen kohärenter Text, ohne daß Retouchen an den Bruchstellen erforderlich wären.


Diogenes schreibt an Alexander: οὐ τοίνυν ἔχοις ἃν ἐπιδείξαι, ὅπως τριοῦτος ἃν ἐπικέχρησαι ἀνθρώπῳ χρηστῷ, τοιοῦτος δὲ ἐπιχρύμενος ὁδὸς πρῶτος γ' ἃν αὐτὸς καὶ μέγιστα κακὰ παθεῖν καὶ νῦν μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν πάσχειν κτλ. Statt οἷος schreibt Boissonade οἷος, aber dem Satz fehlt das Prädikat. Emeljanow (S. 208) meint, "we should understand at least an ellipse of ἔχοις ἃν ἐπιδείξαι + infinitive, the positive of the preceding οἷος ἔχοις, or something similar." Wie schon wiederholt, kann die Korruptel mit einem Minimum an Aufwand geheilt werden: statt οἷος ist οἷον zu

\textsuperscript{16} J. F. Marcks, \textit{Symbola critica ad epistolographos Graecos} (Diss. Bonn 1883) 51.

14. Diogenes 44, S. 256,30–34

Diogenes gibt Metrokles den Rat, den Verkehr mit Frauen zu meiden, weil er viel Zeit koste: τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὰς γυναίκας ἀκρατεῖς ἐντευξεῖς πολλῆς δεομένας σχολῆς ἐα πολλά χαίρειν. οὐ γὰρ σχολή τι μόνον πτωχὸν αἰτεῖν κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ἄλλα τῷ ἐπὶ ἐυδαιμονίαν σύντομον ἐπειγομένῳ ἡ πρὸς γυναίκας ἑντευξεῖς ὄνησιν φέρει, so der Codex. Hercher drückt den schwer gestörten Text ab, wie er ist, und verzichtet auf eine Übersetzung. Emeljanow (S. 218 f.) versucht ihn verständlich zu machen: οὐ γὰρ σχολή <έσ>τι<ν οὐ> μόνον πτωχῷ αἰτεῖν, ἄλλα τῷ ἐπὶ ἐυδαιμονίαν σύντομον ἐπειγομένῳ, wie der Bettler keine Zeit zum Betteln habe, so habe, wer nach der ἐυδαιμονία auf kurzem Wege eilt, keine Zeit mit Frauen zu verlieren, und erklärt: „As it stands, the text says that relations with women are useful to the man taking the short cut to happiness, but presumably under certain conditions.“ Aber das Gegenteil ist der Fall; Metrokles soll ja gerade den Verkehr mit den Frauen lassen, weil er viel Zeit erfordert, und von „certain conditions“ ist keine Rede. Sprachlich ist das sehende καὶ nach ἄλλα trotz Emeljanow nicht zu begründen,17 und das asyndetische ἡ πρὸς γυναίκας ἑντευξεῖς ὄνησιν φέρει hängt bei der Interpunktion nach ἐπειγομένῳ in der Luft. Die Lösung ist, wie schon öfter, sehr einfach, die Ausscheidung einer in den Text aufgenommenen Glossie, die von σχολῆ bis ἄλλα reicht: οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἐπὶ ἐυδαιμονίαν ἐπειγομένῳ ἡ πρὸς γυναίκας ἑντευξεῖς ὄνησιν φέρει. Die Glosse gehört zum vorangehenden Satz: Zeit habe nur der Bettler. Wie schon in früheren Fällen ist die Glosse sprachlich korrumpiert und bei der Eingliederung in den Text durch ἄλλα erweitert worden, um das Pendant zu οὐ μόνον, das gar nicht zu ihr gehört, zu schaffen. Zu der zweifelhaften Berufung auf Platon paßt, daß auch Diog. 17. 8–10 auf Platon (Phaedr. 275c–d) anspielt, das Emeljanow mit Recht als in den Text eindringene Glosse ansieht. Der Glossator von χ will in beiden Fällen seine Kenntnis Platons zur Schau stellen, aber seine Erinnerung ist vage; hier scheint er Platons Verwerfung der Bettelci (Leg. 11. 936c; vgl. auch 8. 552c–d) im Auge zu haben; vgl. auch unten S. 276.

15. Diogenes 50, S. 258, 17–21

Euremon kämpfte wie ein Berserker mit seinem Vater um das mütterliche Erbe, aber einige Passanten machten dem Kampf ein Ende. Dazu sagt Diogenes: ἔδει δὲ, εἴπερ ἄρετῇ συντέθραπτο, ἣ τὴν ἄρχην μιθὲ συστήναι χρημάτων ἐπιθυμιάν περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ πάσης κακίας ἐστὶ νὴ δίᾳ οὐ τῆς σεμνοτάτης φιλοσοφίας ἢς ἀφηρήθαι τὸ σύμπαν πάθος, so der Codex.

17 Vgl. Kühner–Gerth II.2, 257(2) Λ. 1.
Die stark korrupte Stelle haben sich mehrere Kritiker herzustellen bemüht, nur teilweise mit Erfolg. Hercher korrigierte συντέθραπτο zu συντέθραπτο, statt εστίν ἃ διὰ τῆς schlug Marksch (S. 52) estin ἃ διὰ τῆς vor, Hercher schrieb εστίν αἰτία, οὗ τῆς, außerdem tilgte Marksch ἃς, aber Hercher behielt es bei und übersetzte mit Westermann: "Debebat autem, siquidem revera virtute innutritus erat, aut omino procul ab ipso pecuniae aviditas abesse quae omnis improbitatis causa est, aut sanctissima philosophia ab omni affectu libera praestari." Hier ist συστήναi nicht verstanden, und dies verhinderte die notwendige Emendation: ἐδει δὲ, ... ἢ τὴν ἄρχην μηδὲ συστήναι χρημάτων ἐπιθυμία περὶ αὐτῶν (scil. τῶν μητρώων) ἢ διὰ τῆς σεμνοτάτης φιλοσοφίας ἀφήρησθαι τὸ σύμπαν πάθος; "er hätte sich entweder von Anfang an nicht aus Geldgier auf einen Kampf um das Erbe mit seinem Vater einlassen dürfen oder durch die ehrenwerte Philosophie hätte die ganze Begierde danach genommen sein müssen."


Krates rät seinem stets betrunkenen Freund Lysis unter Hinweis auf das Schicksal des Eurytion (Hom. Od. 21. 295 f.), vom Wein einen maßvollen Gebrauch zu machen: παραὶνῷ σοι μαθόντα εὐχρῆστως αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι. Darauf folgt ὡς ἄτοπον ἐστὶ τῷ μὲν πλήκτρῳ μὴ εἰκείν οἰσθαί «δειν», ὡς δὲ χρωμένους αὐτῷ καλῶς ὡκ ἐξίστησι τῶν φρενῶν οὐδ' εἰς μανίαν ἐμβάλλει, τῷ δὲ οἴκων οἰσθαί εἰκείν δεῖν «καί» χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ τῷ πλήκτρῳ ἀποβαινει τοσοῦτον μείζον καὶ τὴν μελετὴν αὐτοῦ ποιητῶν. πειρῶ δὴ τοῖς ἐγκρατεῖσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὀμιλῶν ἐγκρατῶς χρῆσθαι μανθάνειν (δείν suppl. Hercher, καὶ suppl. Aldina). Der Text ist schwer gestört. Nach χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ klaft in 54 und 3050 und demnach auch in der Aldina eine offene Lücke (Fenster) von etwa 10 Buchstaben; der Schreiber des Mut. gr. 54 hat also bereits einen Textverlust konstatiert. Außerdem hat Hercher nach τοσοῦτον μείζον eine Lücke angezeigt, und Westermann hat sich außerstande gesehen, ἢ τῷ πλήκτρῳ μὲ μείζον zu übersetzen.18 Bis χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ (41) ist der Sinn jedoch klar, aber die Passage ὡς ἄτοπον (37) bis ποιητῶν (41), gleich ob man ὡς kausal oder — wahrscheinlicher — im Sinne eines Ausrufs auffaßt,19 wirkt wie ein Fremdkörper. Entfernen man sie, schließt πειρῶ δὴ κτλ. logisch an εὐχρῆστως αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι (37) an; der Satz gibt an, wie man das εὐχρῆστως lernen könne, μανθάνειν nimmt μαθόντα wieder auf. Es handelt sich also wiederum um eine in den Text eingedrungene Glosse. Der


17. Krates 16, S. 211,12–15

Krates ermutert seine Gefährten, sich nicht zu ärgern, wenn sie als Hund und ihre Philosophie als Hundegkläff bezeichnet werden: ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἄγαθός κακὸς λεγόμενος οὐκ ἂν κακοὶ λεγόμενοι ἥσχαλλετε, μηδὲ νυνί, εἰ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν συντόμος κυνίζειν λέγεται καὶ ὁ ὁδε φιλοσοφόν κύων καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία κυνική, so die einheitliche Überlieferung. Boissonade tiltge κακὸς λεγόμενοι, Hercher κακὸς λεγόμενοι und änderte ἄγαθος in ἄγαθοι, aber man vermisst dann ὄντες nach ἄγαθοι. Der Singular ἄγαθός κακὸς λεγόμενος paßt nicht zu ἥσχαλλετε, er ist eine Glosse, die κακοὶ λεγόμενοι von seinem Platz verdrängt hat. Danach ist so zu lesen: ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ κακοὶ λεγόμενοι οὐκ ἂν ἥσχαλλετε κτλ., "wie ihr euch (obwohl ihr gut seid), nicht ärgertet, wenn ihr schlecht genannt werdet, so ärgert euch auch jetzt nicht, wenn der auf diese Weise Philosophierende Hund und die Philosophie (obwohl sie die beste ist) Hundegekläff genannt werden."


Krates lobt seine Frau Hipparchia, die ihm die Geburt ihres Sohnes angezeigt hat, dafür, daß sie sich in der Schwangerschaft nicht wie andere Frauen gehen ließ, sondern sich durch Training auf die Geburt vorbereitet und deshalb leicht geboren hat; während die Mehrzahl der Frauen, ἐπειδὰν ἀποτέκωσι, αἱ δὲ ἂν συμβῇ κἂν συμβῇ περισσῶθηναι, νοσερὰ μένει, Ἰππαρχεία, τὰ βρέφη γεννώντα, so die Überlieferung. Den offensichtlich korrupten Text suchte Boissonade in der Weise zu heilen, daß er κἂν συμβῇ und μένει Ἰππαρχεία strich; Hercher folgte ihm darin und änderte γεννώντα in γεννᾶται. Aber nicht κἂν συμβῇ ist zu tilgen, sondern αἱ δὲ ἂν συμβῇ, das sich bereits durch δὲ, das den vorangehenden Nebensatz ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀποτέκωσι außer acht läßt, als Interpolation verrät. Außerdem muß sich περισσῶθηναι auf die Kinder, nicht die Gebärenden beziehen: wenn sie überleben, bleiben sie krank. Dann aber ist die Stellung von τὰ βρέφη zumindest ungeschickt. Danach ist der Text so herzustellen: ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀποτέκωσι, τὰ βρέφη, κἂν συμβῇ περισσῶθηναι, νοσερὰ μένει.
Der Interpolator bezog falschlicherweise ρεπισωθήναι auf die Gebärenenden und stellte, jedenfalls supra lineam, den Text entsprechend her: αἷς δ' ἄν συμβῇ περισωθήναι, νοσερὰ τὰ βρέφη γεννώνται. Darauf folgt: ἄλλ' ἐπίδειξασα, εἰ όπερ ἔχρην ἥκειν ἁφίκται, μελέτω σοι τούτο τοῦ σκυλακίου. Hier ist ἐπίδειξασα eine Interpolation, die die Anzeige der Hipparchia meint, aber auch syntaktisch und semantisch nicht paßt; es heißt nicht "anzeigen" (das ist δηλοῦν, Z. 2), sondern "aufzeigen, vorzeigen, vorweisen" (Diog. 15. 7, 17. 7, 30. 9, 12, 34. 30, 40. 35, 50. 5, Krat. 30. 7, 34. 44).


Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Münster

20 Gespalten ist sie nur bei ἐλεητικὸν M81, ἐλεγχικὸν μ. (= 483, 1588, 75).
21 Westermann, der Boissonades Konjektur ἄργυριον übernimmt, übersetzt: "Non modo eorum qui arguentum peterent mendacitatem cynicam Diogenes declaravit, verum eorum etiam, qui darent, misericordiam sapientiam." Dies scheint schon am Artikel bei κυνικὸν und σπουδαῖον. Malherbe, der den Text von Hercher gibt, übersetzt: "Diogenes declared that not only those who beg for silver have the Cynic fitness to be a beggar but those, too, who give should have the compassion of a wise man."
Among the patristic writings to which Miroslav Marcovich has devoted his attention are the Greek apologists of the second century. It is fitting, then, that a paper on Theophilus of Antioch and his background be dedicated to the brilliant and tireless scholar whom we honor in this volume of *Illinois Classical Studies*. The focus of this study is provided by the claim made by Robert M. Grant, my own mentor and a scholarly acquaintance of Miroslav Marcovich, that Theophilus of Antioch was a Jewish Christian. Grant and others have richly demonstrated the Hellenistic and Hellenistic-Jewish elements in the apology of Theophilus' *Ad Autolycum*. A further suggestion, however, grows out of Grant's long attention to the cultural and theological world of Theophilus, namely that Theophilus also displays an affinity with more traditional Jewish modes of thought mediated through a distinctive Jewish Christianity.

It would be interesting and for many welcome that one of the early Greek church fathers should emerge from a tradition of a more characteristically Semitic type. In my view, however, the evidence for this is not strong, and it seems to me more likely that we have to do with an encounter between Theophilus and a more highly Hellenized Judaism at the intellectual level. To put it briefly, I shall try to show that in his debate with the pagan world Theophilus fell back on strategies and arguments that had already been developed before his day by Jews like Josephus and Philo who used the methods of Hellenistic philology and historiography to argue for the superiority of the Hebraic tradition.

Grant's arguments are, I believe, essentially three: first, that Theophilus' interpretation of Genesis depends on traditional Jewish exegesis; second, that Theophilus' Christology is distinctively Jewish Christian; and third, that Jewish Christianity of this type had a long history in Antioch. I shall take up these three arguments in order.

I. The Exegesis of Theophilus on Genesis

Theophilus comments on the opening chapters of the book of Genesis in the second book of his *Ad Autolycum (= Aut.*) in order to demonstrate the superiority of the Biblical account of the cosmos and primordial times over
the inconsistent views of the Greek tradition. His analysis covers material from the first twenty-six chapters of Genesis (Aut. 2. 11–32) but is concentrated primarily on Genesis 1. 1–3. 19 (Aut. 2. 11–28). Grant’s investigation of this material goes back to his dissertation, in which he attempted to show that Theophilus’ exegesis could be compared fruitfully with exegesis found in Bereshith Rabba1 and in Philo’s Questions on Genesis.2 In this early work Grant emphasized the parallels with Bereshith Rabba. Some nineteen items were studied, and Rabbinic parallels were offered for thirteen of them, parallels from Philo three times (only one unsupported by other sources), parallels from Scripture four times, and a parallel from Nemesius once (considered as throwing light on “Hebrew” ideas).3 In a more recent survey of roughly the same material (eighteen items), however, the emphasis has changed. Grant now offers parallels from Philo for eleven of the items (most of them unsupported by other sources), parallels from the Rabbis for six of the items (five of them unsupported by other sources), and the same parallel from Nemesius.4 Yet Grant still refers to Bereshith Rabba (= BR) and Philo’s Questions on Genesis (= QG) as the major sources for parallels and still claims that the evidence shows that “Theophilus’ exegesis of the Old Testament is primarily Jewish and even rabbinic.”5 It is the final expression, “and even rabbinic,” that strikes me as especially problematic. It should also be noted that in this context Grant explicitly draws attention to his earlier work (and that of others on which it builds) in spite of the changed emphasis in the more recent investigation.

It is first necessary, then, to survey the parallels from Rabbinic sources provided by Grant to see what can be made of them. I shall list the relevant themes in Theophilus, quote or summarize the relevant parallels, and comment briefly. The items that appear in the more recent study as well as in the earlier study will be marked with an asterisk (*). Clearly these six must be regarded as having special importance for the argument.

(1) Two heavens (“this firmament” and “another heaven which is invisible to us”) are mentioned in Genesis (Aut. 2. 13). Grant recognizes

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5 Grant (previous note) 157.
that the best parallels are in Philo (De opif. mund. 29, the first heaven is incorporeal; 36, the “firmament” of Genesis is our visible heaven). Theophilius’ treatment of the theme is less complex since it does not explicitly involve the contrast between the intelligible world and the sensible world as in Philo. Grant’s undocumented mention of comparable Tannaitic commentary on Deuteronomy 10. 14 may be a reference to B. Hag. 12b (R. Juda declares that there are “two firmaments”). The Talmudic statement is part of a list of opinions in answer to the question concerning the number of heavens that exist. The Philonic parallel is more closely connected with Genesis and seems more to the point.

*(2) Creation began from above, a remark directed against Hesiod, who described creation “by starting from beneath” in the way that human beings build (Aut. 2. 13). The point in BR 1. 13 (referred to by Grant in his earlier study) is that whereas the success of human building is uncertain, that of God is not. Grant recognized that the similarity here depended merely on the fact that the text speaks of how a failed human effort at erecting a building can be corrected only by widening the building below and narrowing it at the top. In his later study Grant dropped this reference and concentrated instead on BR 1. 15, which has to do with the view that heaven was created before earth: “This is parallel to the case of a king who first made his throne and then his footstool” (quoting Isaiah 66. 1). This passage, however, has nothing to do with proclaiming the superiority of the divine builder. It also is more closely connected with the related theme that we take up next and that finds a better parallel in Philo. It seems likely that Theophilius says what he does here simply because he notes an obvious difference between Genesis and Hesiod.

(3) Heaven came first (Aut. 2. 13). In spite of the apparent clarity of the Biblical text there was disagreement among the Rabbis as to whether heaven or earth came first. The followers of Shammai were the ones who insisted on the priority of heaven (BR 1. 15). Theophilius does not argue the point in the manner of the Rabbis but simply takes the priority of heaven for granted as most readers of Genesis are likely to do. The priority of heaven is also taken for granted by Philo (De opif. mund.). In one passage Philo explains how the sentence, “in the beginning God created heaven and earth,” means simply, “he made the heaven first,” in order to avoid any implication that God was subject to time (26). In another passage he states that the visible heaven (the firmament) was “the first of the parts” of the

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6 Commentary on the first creation story in Genesis is missing from QG. The De opificio mundi must serve as something of a substitute for the missing material.

7 I owe the reference to Professor Gary Porton, who has generously assisted me in the investigation of a number of the parallels studied here. (It is uncertain, of course, whether this particular R. Juda is the Tannaitic master, R. Juda ben Il’ai.)

8 Compare Origen (Hom. in Gen. 1. 2): “For he made heaven first, about which he says, ‘heaven is my throne’.”
cosmos since it was the best of all its parts (36). Note that imagery from the sphere of building is not foreign to Philo's description of creation either (17–18). Special reference to Rabbinic sources is not required to explain what we find in Theophilus.

*(4) Half of the waters separated by the firmament was raised up and the other half left on earth (Aut. 2. 13). More than one Rabbi also declared that God took the primordial waters and "poured half in the firmament and half into the ocean" (BR 4. 4; cf. 4. 5). Especially since Philo has nothing like that, the parallel needs to be taken seriously. The possibility remains, however, that Theophilus reached his view of the matter independently. Note first of all that many of the church fathers recognized that the text of Genesis described a literal division of water. (Augustine reflects the exegetical tradition in De Gen. ad litt. 2. 9.) A distinctively Jewish milieu was not required to reach that conclusion. Second, the Septuagint of Genesis 1. 6–8 speaks of the firmament as dividing "between" (άνα μέσον) the water above and the water below. The expression "between" is indefinite and moreover is used two verses before to describe the division between light and darkness (1. 4). Yet the peculiar expression "dividing between water and water" in Genesis 6. 1 may have suggested to a reader like Theophilus that the division was equal. For "midway between" is one of the possible meanings of the expression άνα μέσον in ancient technical Greek.9 It should also be noted that Theophilus is thinking of the division in more "scientific" terms: The half above has to do with rains and showers and dews; the half below has to do with rivers and springs and seas. That is missing from the Rabbinic parallels.

(5) The collection of the waters was made by the Logos (Aut. 2. 13). Grant refers to BR 5. 4: "The voice of the Lord became a guide to the waters" (with a cross reference to Psalm 29. 3, which speaks of the "voice of the Lord over the waters," as opposed to Psalm 13. 4, which speaks of the "voices of many waters"). In the background, however, in Theophilus is the apologist's previous statement concerning the first day of creation, that "the Command (διά τω ζείς) of God, his Logos," made light "apart from the cosmos." Thus wherever God "commands" (cf. Philo, De opif. mund. 38 προστάτε το θες το θωρ), his Logos is at work within the framework of Theophilus' theology. A special discussion about the voice of God prompted by competing verses in the Psalms does not seem particularly relevant.

(6) The creation of plants and seeds before that of the luminaries refutes the naturalistic philosophers (Aut. 2. 15). Grant admits that the theme is

9 LSJ, s.v. μέσος III.1.e (Aristotle, Hist. anim. 496a22; the discussion is about the three cavities of the heart; one is "midway between" the other two; admittedly it is also intermediate in size, with the one on the right being larger and the one on the left being smaller).
“not quite paralleled” in BR 6. 1. On the other hand, as he later recognized, it is almost exactly paralleled in Philo (De opif. mund. 45–46).10

(7) The wild animals will ultimately be restored to gentleness (Aut. 2. 17). Grant refers in this connection to Isaiah 65. 25 (see also 11. 6–8). The theme is also known to us from an early fragment of the Jewish Christian Papias, and in commenting on him Irenaeus saw the relevance of the Isaianic passages (Adv. haer. 5. 33. 3–4). It seems likely that these striking texts would stand out for anyone familiar with Scripture. Irenaeus notes that some before his time thought that they referred to savage people and not to animals. The passages obviously invited considerable discussion.

(8) Man was “the only work worthy of his [God’s] hands” (Aut. 2. 18). In the Abot de-R. Nathan (1. 18) an explanation is given as to how we know “that Adam was made by the two hands of God.”11 The Rabbinic text also seems to stress the high dignity of the human creature. But it should be noted that here the temple as well as man are said to have been created “with both of God’s hands.” It should also be noted that the Rabbinic text is preoccupied with deciding whether one or two hands of God were involved. This preoccupation is absent from Theophilus. The latter simply takes it for granted that “his own hands” refers to God’s Logos and his Sophia. It is perhaps striking that there is a preoccupation with God’s hands in the first place since they are not mentioned in Genesis. Yet it would seem obvious to any reader of Genesis that God used his hands in creating man: “And God formed man of dust from the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul” (Gen. 2. 7). Precisely such a reading of the text is attested before the time of Theophilus by Clement of Rome, who says that God “formed man, his pre-eminent and greatest work, with his holy and blameless hands . . .” (1 Clement 33. 4). Note that Clement also shares with Theophilus the emphasis on the high dignity of man in this connection (and that accordingly both quote Gen. 1. 26). Such a coordination of themes from Genesis seems more or less inevitable after the text had become an object of theological reflection.

*(9) The “two trees of life and knowledge are found in no other land than in paradise alone” (Aut. 2. 24), and “the tree of knowledge . . . did not contain death” (Aut. 2. 25). Grant comments that the “tree of knowledge puzzled the rabbis” and refers to BR 15. 7, where the Rabbis offer several suggestions concerning the type of plant or tree that was involved. One notable view was that God “did not and will not reveal to man what that tree was,” so that humans should not hate it afterwards for having caused death.

11 For translation and commentary see J. Neusner, The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan: An Analytic Translation and Explanation, Brown Judaic Studies 114 (Atlanta 1986) 16. Professor Gary Porton has pointed out to me that the discussion in Aboth is connected with that in BR 8. 1 through the quotation of Psalm 139. 5 (which figures complexly in the discussion as to whether one or two hands of God were involved).
This very comment, however, reflects the fact that most of the suggestions of the Rabbis had to do with an identification of the forbidden fruit in terms of some known natural species.\(^\text{12}\) Theophilus, on the other hand, has something different in mind when he says that "the other plants [in paradise] were like those the world has, but the two trees of life and knowledge no other land has and they are found in paradise alone." That possibly represents a marginal Rabbinic view, but it is more likely to represent a reading of the text of Genesis by Theophilus himself or some Christian predecessor (especially since the apologist makes a blanket statement covering both of the mysterious trees in paradise). That the apologist is facing a new set of problems is suggested also by what appears to be the anti-Marcionite rejection of the description of the tree of knowledge as a tree that brought death.\(^\text{13}\)

(10) According to Grant, "Theophilus treats the rivers of paradise as real. Since this view is rejected by Philo (\textit{QG} 1. 12–13) it was accepted by other Jews."\(^\text{14}\) But many readers took the reality of the garden for granted, and Theophilus' special emphasis on that point (\textit{Aut.} 2. 24, "that paradise is a parcel of earth and was planted on the earth," "that paradise is under this very heaven") is probably prompted by a concern to resist pagan criticism of the story or a Gnostic allegorizing of it. In any event, a retreat to traditional Jewish exegesis need not be the only possible explanation for the emphasis.

\(^\text{11}\) Adam's "work" (Gen. 2. 15) is "to keep the commandment of God" (\textit{Aut.} 2. 24). Grant in his more recent study finds a parallel in \textit{QG} 1. 14. But the line quoted is not clear, and the passage as a whole focuses on other issues. More to the point (though complicated) is Philo's allegorization of Adam's "work" in other passages, where the talk is of tilling and guarding the virtues (\textit{Leg. alleg.} 1. 53–54; 1. 88–89). Grant also refers to \textit{BR} 16. 5, where Adam's work is linked especially to the keeping of the Sabbath. Clearly there was a widespread tendency to redirect the meaning of the text, and it is probably unwise to make too much of any one of the parallels. This is particularly true since "Theophilus may be answering the criticisms of the Marcionites: by requiring Adam to work God was showing his own weakness."\(^\text{15}\) In this connection, however, note that Philo had already discussed the question as to why God commanded man to work and guard the garden "when paradise was not in need of work, for it was complete in all things as having been planted by God . . ." (\textit{QG} 1. 14). Philo does not at this point provide an answer in allegorical terms (he is uncharacteristically satisfied to defend it at the literal level). But the


\(^{13}\) Grant (above, note 10) 67 (the Marcionite Apelles raised just such objections).

\(^{14}\) Grant (above, note 4) 158.

\(^{15}\) Grant (above, note 10) 67.
passage suggests the climate that would call forth non-literal readings of the text.

(12) "In his actual age, Adam was as old as an infant" (Aut. 2. 25). This is not the teaching of the Rabbis. Grant refers to BR 22. 2 but can extract what he wants from it only by reading it in the light of patristic parallels. The standard Rabbinic view was that Adam was formed a completely developed human being (BR 14. 7). Ginzberg summarizes the evidence as follows: "Like all creatures formed on the six days of creation, Adam came from the hands of the Creator fully and completely developed. He was not like a child, but like a man of twenty years of age."16

*(13) God showed his beneficence in allowing Adam's future return to paradise (Aut. 2. 26). Grant appeals to a discussion in BR 21. 7 about whether Adam was or was not sent out of the paradise both in this world and the next. Clearly some Rabbis adopted a view analogous to that of Theophilus. The context of the theme, however, is rather different. The Rabbinic parallel is connected with Genesis 3. 27. Theophilus, on the other hand, is trying to explain why Adam is said to have been placed into the garden twice, first in Gen. 2. 8 and again in Gen. 2. 15. His answer is that the first passage concerns the past and the second passage the future. We shall also see presently that such efforts to explain away an apparent difficulty in the text are intelligible against the background of Hellenistic philological procedures in dealing with the classics. Under these circumstances a distinctive application of the widespread theme of the return to "paradise" (cf. Luke 23. 43; 2 Cor. 12. 4) does not seem to require Rabbinic prototypes. Moreover, the union of an historical and an eschatological reading of the creation story was natural in a tradition that as early as 1 Corinthians 15. 45-49 had contrasted the first Adam with "the second Man from heaven."

(14) Adam had free will (Aut. 2. 27). Grant provides a parallel from BR 14. 3 ("The Lord reasoned: If I created him of the celestial elements he will live [forever] and not die; while if I created him of the terrestrial elements he will die and not live [in the future life]"). But an appeal to free will in pre-Augustian Christianity (especially in opposition to Stoic fatalism or Gnostic predestinarianism) is scarcely remarkable.

In any event, the Rabbinic parallel may have more to do with the statement of Theophilus that "if God had made him immortal from the beginning, he would have made him God; again, if he had made him mortal, it would seem that God was responsible for his death; therefore God made him neither immortal nor mortal, but, as we have said before, capable of both" (Aut. 2. 27). Here Grant appeals to the fourth-century patristic writer Nemesius, who reports as follows: "The Hebrews say that from the beginning man came into being neither mortal indeed nor immortal but on

16 Ginzberg (above, note 12) 159.
the borderline of each of the two natures.”\textsuperscript{17} Morani, the recent editor of Nemesius, draws attention to Philo, who also identifies man as a “borderline” creature that shares an immortal and a mortal nature (\textit{De opif. mund.} 134–35). Grant rejects the parallel, for he evidently thinks that Theophilus and the “Hebrews” of Nemesius (unlike Philo) both avoid an interpretation of the twofold nature of man dominated by standard philosophical categories. Grant seems correct on this point, especially since Nemesius goes on to discuss a related interpretaton that seems equally independent, “that man was created mortal but capable of becoming immortal when brought to perfection by moral progress.” If I have caught the drift of Grant’s argument, the Rabbinic parallel quoted at the beginning of the previous paragraph may not have been the happiest choice since it could be taken to represent in a less technical form the standard philosophical distinction between higher and lower elements in the nature of human beings. In any event, we must ask whether the “Hebrews” of Nemesius are Jewish thinkers of the Rabbinic type. Or is this simply Nemesius’ way of referring to a traditional (Christian) reading of the Bible? A few pages later he remarks that it is “a dogma of the Hebrews that this whole world came into being for the sake of man.”\textsuperscript{18} Rabbinic as well as Christian parallels could be provided for that view. But it also represents a natural reading of the Bible and would perhaps occur especially to anyone influenced by Stoic views of the centrality of man in the providential scheme of things.\textsuperscript{19} Must Nemesius be in touch with Judaism of a Rabbinic type to have reached such conclusions? Similarly, then, the idea that man though created mortal was capable of achieving immortality may in a general way be compatible with Rabbinic thought; but it is unlikely that many Rabbis would know what to make of the primary suggestion that Adam was created neither mortal nor immortal. When the Rabbis discuss the link between sin and the necessity of death, the pervasive assumption (especially in the early period) is that Adam was created mortal and that death is inevitable and natural.\textsuperscript{20} The Rabbinic parallel quoted at the beginning of the previous paragraph certainly implies as much. Thus the way in which the question is set up by Theophilus and Nemesius reflects in itself a different theological world. At the same time, the fact that a person like Theophilus also retains basic “Hebraic” theological impulses in the teeth of the influence of philosophical anthropology is no more remarkable than the continued insistence in the cosmological thinking of the early

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{De natura hominis} 1 (PG XL 513b; p. 6, ed. Morani).
\textsuperscript{18} P. 11, ed. Morani.
\textsuperscript{20} See, for example, E. E. Urbach, \textit{The Sages, Their Concepts and Beliefs} (repr. Cambridge, MA 1987) 264–66, 279, 420–36.
church that the world has a beginning and an end in the teeth of the influence of philosophical cosmology.

*(15) Adam and Eve were created together (i.e., Eve was created from Adam?) to demonstrate the oneness of God in the face of polytheism (*Aut. *2. 28). Grant refers to the Mishna: "... also that the heretics should not say, ‘There are many ruling powers in heaven’" (*M. San. *4. 5). The creation of Eve is not mentioned in the passage from the Mishna. Instead, the argument relies on the point that only a single individual was created, and the warning against polytheism is but one application of that point. Nevertheless, Theophilus and the Mishna are very close to one another in spirit at this point, especially since the creation of man alone from the earth is also said by Theophilus (in Nautin’s reconstruction of the text) to demonstrate the mystery of the divine unity. This must be considered a stronger piece of evidence than usual. At the same time, it may be considered likely that strategies of this kind were carried over into more highly Hellenized forms of commentary on Scripture. Note, for example, that Philo explains the use of the singular command to Adam in Genesis 2. 16 ("eat") as opposed to the plural command in the next verse ("do not eat") as pointing to the oneness of God, who harmonizes all the many things in the world (*QG *1. 15). This is very close to saying that the oneness of Adam points to the oneness of God (though the polemical implications of the interpretation are much subtler in Philo). In this connection, it should also be recalled that Theophilus treats the first three days of creation prior to the luminaries as "types of the triad of God and his Logos and his Sophia" (*Aut. *2. 15). Thus he seems attuned to the kind of numerological symbolism that plays such an important role in Philo’s commentary on Genesis, and his treatment of the single creation of Adam and Eve may well reflect the same mindset.

(16) Adam "prophesied" the separation of a man from his family to join with his wife (*Aut. *2. 28; cf. *Gen. *2. 23–24). Grant appeals especially to the arguments of Ginzberg on this point.21 The latter provides Rabbinic parallels for treating Adam as a prophet, but argues more especially that the picture of Adam as prophet was connected to the deep sleep ("ecstasy" in the Septuagint) that is said to have fallen on Adam in Genesis 2. 21 (which is reasonably closely connected to the "prophecy" a few verses later that Theophilus discusses). Here, however, the most relevant parallel again seems to be in Philo. The latter in fact has a long discussion of the use of the term "ecstasy" in the Greek Bible in which he distinguishes four types: madness, fear, Adam’s sleep in *Gen. *2. 21, and the prophetic ecstasy of Abraham in *Gen. *15. 12 (*Quis rer. div. her. *249–66). Clearly Adam’s ecstasy does not qualify as prophecy from the point of view of this careful discussion. But it is not hard to imagine that other readers of the Greek Bible were less discriminating and would on some such basis have ascribed

21 Ginzberg (above, note 12) 162, V 83 n. 30.
prophetic status to Adam. If there is something characteristically Rabbinic about ascribing prophetic status to Adam, it seems likely that it was carried across into interpretations of the Greek text of the Bible in a distinctive form.

This discussion of the exegetical work of Theophilus does not decisively rule out contact between the apologist and sources of a Rabbinic or proto-Rabbinic type. Some of the examples studied above still may be taken to point in that direction, and there may be others that could be found if the material were thoroughly reworked. At the same time, Jewish scholarship of a more highly Hellenized type seems to provide the more likely point of contact. I have not felt it necessary to deal in detail with the many other parallels provided by Grant from Philo precisely because they seem to be generally relevant and to support the argument that I have developed here.

The argument developed here may be further reinforced by attending to the larger context within which the points discussed above are found. In the first place, the link between Theophilus’ comments on Genesis and the commentary of Philo on Genesis are comparable in that they both reflect the procedures of Hellenistic philologians in dealing with the classics of ancient Greek literature. As Ralph Marcus says in the introduction to his translation of Philo’s Questions on Genesis: “In its form [it] resembles Hellenistic (pagan) commentaries on the Homeric poems.”22 One notable feature of such work on the classics was the concern to explain (or explain away) what were regarded as linguistic, historical, moral, and theological incongruities in the text. Such difficulties had to do with things said of the gods “unworthy” of them, gross anthropomorphisms, cowardly acts by heroes, apparent contradictions in the narrative, and so forth. Example after example of the same concern can be culled from Philo’s work. He too tries to explain why God is said to descend from heaven, why the patriarchs appear to do immoral deeds, why Moses has God shift from singular commands to plural commands without warning, and so forth. Similarly, as Kathleen McVey has argued, “Theophilus is concerned to safeguard the philosophical acceptability of the sacred text despite anthropomorphism and anthropopathism in the narrative.” Thus he must explain what it means that God “walked” in the Garden, that God “spoke,” that he presumably formed human beings with his hands, that he “planted” a garden, that he questioned Adam as though ignorant of his doings, that he appears to be jealous or angry in his punishment of Adam, that the tree of knowledge seems to bring death, and that the narrative seems to contain disjunctions and needless repetitions.23

22 Marcus (above, note 2) ix.
23 K. E. McVey, “The Use of Stoic Cosmogony in Theophilus of Antioch’s Hexaemeron,” in Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective: Studies in Honor of Karlfried Froehlich on
This view of Theophilus’ purpose can be substantiated by an instructive comment that he makes on the seventh day of creation in *Ad Autolycum* 2.19. The Greek expression ζήτημα ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀνέφερεν occurs here. The translations take it as referring to some “insoluble problem among men” (Dods, Grant) or “un problème insoluble pour les hommes” (Bardy-Sender).24 In this passage, Theophilus glances back to the creation of humans on the sixth day and then leaps ahead from the seventh day to the description in Genesis 2.6–7 of how God breathed the breath of life into the first human. Why suddenly leap ahead? The answer in Theophilus’ own words is this: “so that there might not seem to be an insoluble problem among men since ‘let us make man’ has been spoken by God but man’s formation had not yet been manifested” (Grant). It is hard to see the point of the remark when it is translated in that way. Why talk about a problem that could conceivably affect the human race when the concern is to show how one text of Genesis needs to be supplemented with another text?

A more cogent understanding of the passage depends on recognizing that the word ζήτημα can be used in ancient literary studies to refer to a “question” or “query” about some linguistic, historical, moral, or theological difficulty in the text. Thus it is one of the terms used to describe inquiries into Homeric problems (Porphyry, for example, uses it in the introduction to his study of Homeric problems25), and it is also the term that lies behind the Armenian title of Philo’s “Questions” on Genesis. For, as Ralph Marcus notes, one related fragment from Philo is said in the Greek source to come εκ τῶν ἐν Λεωντικῷ ζητήματος.26

What Theophilus is trying to do here, then, is to deal with what he regards as a perplexing feature of the text of Genesis, namely the fact that the creation of the first human is mentioned in Genesis 1.26 without the special mode of human creation being clearly specified. Implied here is a concern to have stated what it is that sets human beings apart from animals. From his point of view, the situation is saved by the fact that this apparent omission is made good along with the description of the garden of Eden. That Theophilus ties things together in this way is shown when he takes a backward glance a few sections later and says, “God made man on the sixth day, but revealed his formation after the seventh day” (Aut. 2.23). All is well, then, from his point of view, since the second passage from Genesis fills in the blank. It lets us know that God breathed into Adam the breath of

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26 Marcus (above, note 2) xi note a.
life and so bestowed on him the special characteristic of human beings—the immortality of the human soul.

The expression ζήτημα ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀνεύρετον, then, does not refer to some “insoluble problem among men,” or “for men,” but rather to some (presumed) “insoluble query on the topic of human beings” in the text of Genesis that the author sets out to solve. The preposition ἐν here bears the generally recognized meaning, “in respect of.” Theophilus, in short, conceives of himself as exploring in the manner of a Hellenistic philologist the apparent difficulties in the text of Scripture and falls back on Hellenistic Jewish prototypes for assistance.

Before leaving this comparison between the methods of Theophilus and Philo (in QG), one other general similarity should be noted. Both Philo and Theophilus move in a systematic way from a literal reading of a text to an allegorical interpretation of it. Both move more or less systematically through the Biblical text but on occasion skip over some passages. There are exceptions to the rule that our two authors move from a literal reading to an allegorical interpretation, and the procedures in this connection are somewhat looser and less thoroughgoing in Theophilus than in Philo. It is also true, as we have seen, that Theophilus sometimes feels constrained to emphasize the literal meaning of a text. But that occurs in his account of the second story of creation. For the first creation story, on the other hand, clear moves from the literal to the allegorical level are to be found in Theophilus as he consciously provides another level of meaning for the sea (Aut. 2. 14), for the sun, the numbers three and four in connection with the first three and four days of creation, and the stars (Aut. 2. 15), for the sea monsters and carnivorous birds (Aut. 2. 16), and for the wild animals (Aut. 2. 17). The difference in approach may point to the use of different sources.

My impression is that such a systematic move from a literal reading to an allegorical meaning does not find its inspiration in interpretation of a Rabbinic type. In the material that we now have (like BR) there is much that a modern interpreter might consider fanciful and/or allegorical. But the sages themselves do not seem to have viewed their expositions as moving at clearly differentiated levels, and I know of no evidence that they ever moved more or less systematically from one level to another in the early period. Unfortunately, it is equally difficult to say whether such a method characterized the Hellenistic commentaries on the classics. It may have been found in the work of someone like Crates of Mallus. His less technical book on Homer seems to have included discussions about such things as Homer’s knowledge of geography and astronomy, allegorical interpretation of the gods in the manner of the Stoics, and solutions to a variety of different kinds of difficulties in the text.27 This or something like it sounds like a promising mix that may have inspired the Hellenistic Jewish

predecessors of Theophilus. But our knowledge of this material is simply too fragmentary to put very much weight on it. In any event, the methods of Theophilus seem closer to those of Hellenistic scholarship in general and to Philo (or someone like Philo) in particular.

Other recent research suggests that even broader contexts of Hellenistic and Hellenistic Jewish scholarship lie behind Theophilus' interpretation of Genesis. Thus Arthur Droge argues that a major concern of Theophilus was to develop a theory of the emergence of technology and of civilization based on Genesis and that this theory was derived from the work of Hellenistic Jewish predecessors. The latter in turn, according to Droge, were responding to the efforts of Hellenistic monarchies in formerly barbarian territories to increase the prestige of their own regions by supporting scholars who argued for the barbarian origin of Greek technology and civilization. Kathleen McVey, in the paper noted above, extends Droge's analysis. By emphasizing the link between cosmogony and cultural history more generally in Hellenistic historiography, she is able to show that most of what appears in Theophilus' apology was tied together in the work of his predecessors. In this connection, she argues particularly for the impact of Stoic cosmogony on Theophilus' reading of Genesis 1–3. Further research may be able to make clearer the relation between these suggestions and the material presented above. In any event, this research also reads Theophilus against the background primarily of Hellenistic and Hellenistic Jewish scholarship.

II. The Christology of Theophilus

What we have said about Theophilus' exegetical method is not in itself sufficient to deny that he was a Christian with special affinities to some form of Jewish Christianity. But it narrows the evidence on which that judgment is based. We turn, then, to the apologist's Christology to see whether that may suggest such affinities.

Grant has repeatedly argued that Theophilus thinks of Jesus as a prophetic figure exalted by God for his obedience to the divine will. At the heart of the argument is his demonstration that Theophilus modelled his description of Adam on Luke's description of the twelve-year-old Jesus, who made progress in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and humans (Aut. 2. 24–25). Here are the parallels more or less as presented by Grant.

29 McVey (above, note 23).
30 Grant (above, note 4) 171–73, Jesus After the Gospels: The Christ of the Second Century (Louisville, KY 1990) 77–79.
According to Theophilus, Adam was given "an opportunity for progress (Luke 2. 52) so that by growing (Luke 2. 52; 1. 80) and becoming mature (Eph. 4. 13) and furthermore having been declared a god (John 20. 28) he might also ascend into heaven (Luke 24. 51; Acts 1. 9–11) . . . possessing immortality." Adam was "in his actual age an infant (νηπιός)" or minor (Luke 1. 80). Thus he learned obedience since "this is a holy duty not only before God but before men (Luke 2. 52), to obey one's parents in simplicity and without malice (Luke 2. 43), and if children must obey their parents (Luke 2. 43, 51), how much more must they obey the God and Father of the universe (Luke 2. 49)." "For as one grows in age in an orderly fashion so one grows in ability to think" (cf. Luke 1. 80, 2. 40, 52). To these Grant adds a few tenuous parallels having to do with Theophilus' defense of resurrection.

The most important passages from Luke are these: "and the child (παιδίον) grew and became strong in spirit, and he was in the wilderness till the day of his manifestation to Israel" (Luke 1. 80); "and Jesus increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and man" (Luke 2. 52). Thus, as Grant sees it, "Jesus seems to be a second Adam, or rather, Adam seems to be regarded as a first Christ," and "the work of both Adam and Christ" is seen "as exemplary, not efficacious."

The parallels are interesting but should not be pressed too hard. The occasional non-Lukan passages adduced probably detract from the evidence rather than add to it. The reference to Adam as a god is probably no more than a recognition of the statement of God in Genesis 3. 22 ("look, Adam has become as one of us"). References to ascending to heaven and doing one's duty before God and men may well reflect more widely diffused themes. A discussion of the obedience due parents may simply flow naturally from the image of Adam as a child. Grant, to be sure, thinks that the subject of the obedience of the child does not naturally come up for Theophilus at all and thus must go back to Luke. But it is particularly closely tied in with Theophilus' remarks that the tree of knowledge "did not contain death as some suppose" or that "God was not jealous as some suppose" (Aut. 2. 25). The image of the child is part and parcel of Theophilus' whole notion of the pedagogic function of the command to Adam in the garden. It helps rebut the suggestion that there is anything inappropriate about the story. We now know why God ordered Adam not to eat of knowledge: Adam was "in his actual age an infant" and infants need to learn how to acquire knowledge properly. It was not because God was jealous. By putting these themes back into their context in Theophilus we see that the apologist may well have invented the image of Adam as a child himself to explain the text.\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\) Grant argues ([above, note 4] 172) that Theophilus "also takes Paul's comparison of Adam with Christ and rewrites it so that it contrasts man then with man now" (Aut. 2. 27; Rom. 5. 15–21). The most striking reformulation occurs where Theophilus writes, "for as by
The problem is complicated by the fact that Irenaeus seems to have drawn from Theophilus\textsuperscript{32} where he develops a comparable picture of the human race that since the time of Adam grows and progresses to maturity and perfection (Adv. haer. 4. 37–39). According to Irenaeus, “we were not made gods at our beginning, but first we were made men, then, in the end, gods”; God did this out of goodness, \textit{not from envy}; he gave us \textit{free will}; our \textit{initial weakness} was necessary (4. 37. 4); we were gradually\textit{ educated} by means of our rebellion (4. 37. 7); “being newly created they [human beings] are therefore \textit{childish and immature}, and not yet fully trained for an adult way of life”; God “could have offered perfection to man at the beginning, but man, being yet an \textit{infant} (\nu\iota\pi\tau\iota\varsigma), could not have taken it”; “man \textit{gradually advances} and \textit{mounts towards perfection}”; “man has first to come into being, then to \textit{progress}, and by progressing to come to \textit{manhood}, and having reached manhood to \textit{increase}, and thus increasing to persevere, and by persevering be \textit{glorified}, and thus see his Lord” (4. 38. 1–3); what is good is “to \textit{obey} God, to believe in him, and \textit{keep his commandments}” (4. 39. 1). Loofs in a celebrated study attributed little originality to Irenaeus in this as in so much else that appears in his theology.\textsuperscript{33} But the likelihood is that Irenaeus modified his source significantly.\textsuperscript{34} Thus Theophilus does not give a broad evolutionary interpretation to his picture of Adam as a child, and Irenaeus seems not to have dealt with Adam literally as a child. Yet if anything can be made out about lost expositions of Theophilus from their use in Irenaeus, it would seem that reflection on Adam or the human race as a growing child did not rely on impulses primarily from the Gospel of Luke. It should also be noted that in Irenaeus such reflection is linked with a Christology that may sometimes look primitive from a later orthodox point of view but that is not Jewish Christian in Grant’s sense of the term.\textsuperscript{35} In another connection, to be sure, Grant has shown that Irenaeus modified a number of theological themes that he derived from Theophilus.\textsuperscript{36} These changes are not radical changes, however, and the fact that Irenaeus everywhere takes the teaching of the incarnation for granted suggests that disobedience man gained death for himself, so by obedience to the will of God whoever will can obtain eternal life for himself”; Paul, however, wrote, “as by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man’s obedience many will be made righteous to eternal life.” If this is a reformulation, it implies that Christ has been reduced to one link in a chain of obedient men or prophets. But I think it remains very unclear that there actually is an echo of Romans in this passage.

\textsuperscript{32} Not necessarily from the \textit{Ad Autolycum} itself but from a lost writing of Theophilus (see note 33).


\textsuperscript{35} Loofs (above, note 33) 94, 445.

\textsuperscript{36} Grant (above, note 30) 99–103.

we must be careful in attributing a radically different Christology to one of his valued sources.

Theophilus, of course, does not explicitly refer to the incarnation of the Logos. He may, like Athenagoras, have refrained from presenting such doctrine openly for apologetic reasons. In downplaying this possibility, Grant seems to me to put insufficient weight on a passage in Theophilus where segments of John 1. 1–3 are quoted (Aut. 2. 22). For the quotation is followed by this remark: “Since the Logos is God and derived his nature from God, whenever the Father of the universe wills to do so he sends him into some place where he is present and is heard and seen. He is sent by God and is present in a place.” The immediate concern of Theophilus is to explain how it is that God could be said in Genesis to “walk in paradise.” The answer revolves around the theological motif that although God himself “is unconfined and is not present in a place” (Aut. 2. 22), his Logos is generated to communicate with the human race and “is present in a place.” Behind this language of Theophilus is a still older motif with roots deep in Greek philosophy and with rich developments in Philo, namely that God “contains (and fills) all but is not contained by anything.” This and related expressions were intended to explain how God could be both transcendent and immanent without resorting to unacceptable anthropomorphisms. And in Jewish and Christian apologetics they also helped to account for the theophanies of God in the Bible.37

In developed Christian theology, however, the same set of ideas was used in addition to explain the incarnation as an instance of the divine presence of God in the world. This can be found set out in classic form by Athanasius in his treatise On the Incarnation of the Word: “For this reason the bodiless and incorruptible and immaterial Logos of God came to our realm; not that he was previously distant, for no part of creation is left deprived of him, but he fills the universe, being in union with his Father” (8). “He [the Logos] was not enclosed in the body, nor was he in the body and nowhere else. . . . But what is most wonderful is that, being the Word, he was not contained by anything, but rather himself contained everything” (17). In other words, in this period the attributes of the all-embracing spaceless God became the attributes of the Logos without qualification. It strikes me that what we have in Theophilus is a similar application of themes but in a more elementary form: God himself is not in a place, but his Logos is. As we have indicated above, Theophilus does not explicitly

speak of the incarnation in this connection or anywhere else. But the parallels leave that open as a distinct possibility. And when we find that these formulae about God and place follow a quotation of John 1. 1–3, it is natural to think that Theophilus also had in view the Logos made flesh (of John 1. 14) when he goes on to refer to the one who “is sent by God and is present in a place.” His immediate concern, to be sure, is to explain the appearances of God to people in the Old Testament. But the standard teaching of the age (as exemplified in Justin) was that it was the same Logos who appeared to the patriarchs in the Biblical theophanies and who appeared in the flesh.\(^{38}\) It is hard to believe that this was not in the mind of Theophilus after he had just drawn attention to the prologue of the Gospel of John.

Again Irenaeus may be of some help in this connection. In an important passage he quotes an earlier source: “He was right who said (bene qui dixit) that the immeasurable Father is measured in the Son; for the Son is the measure of the Father, since he contains the Father” (Adv. haer. 4. 4. 2). It is clear that for Irenaeus this includes the idea of the incarnation, for “the Father is the invisible of the Son, the Son the visible of the Father” (Adv. haer. 4. 6. 5). We have an early parallel, then, in which the language about God containing and not being contained is modified to cover the case of the incarnation as the visible manifestation of God. Loofs argues that it was Theophilus himself whom Irenaeus had in mind when he said “bene qui dixit.”\(^{39}\) It is hard to know how much to rely on Loofs’ reconstructions, but the appearance of such themes in Irenaeus at least suggests that Theophilus’ Christology is not likely to have been significantly different from that of Irenaeus himself.

It may be that we can also make out something of the earlier history of this reapplication of the language about God and place. For Philo had already dealt with the Logos who mediates between God and the elders of Israel as the “place where the God of Israel was standing” on mount Sinai.\(^{40}\) Philo, of course, is referring to the Logos, itself the “place” of the world of forms,\(^{41}\) as the place on which God stood. Perhaps that is how one gets to the notion that the Logos in some sense “contains” the Father (scales God down, so to speak, to something that can make contact with our world). Conceivably Theophilus has advanced little beyond that in his thinking about the Logos. But it seems more likely that something like Philo’s reflection on the Logos as the place at which God reveals himself in his theophanies was early extended by Christian thinkers to the Logos, who

\(^{39}\) Loofs (above, note 33) 17–18, 393–97.
\(^{40}\) Quaest. Exod. 37; cf. 39, 45 (Exodus 24. 10). The Greek sources of Philo support the interpretation (De conf. ling. 96; De somn. 1. 62).
\(^{41}\) De opif. mund. 20.
became the "visible of the Father" (the "measure of the Father," the one who "contains the Father") and thus, by a natural reapplication of the imagery, himself "present in a place" not only in the theophanies but also in incarnate form. Theophilus' quotation of John 1. 1-3 in this connection should, I think, make it all but certain that he at least includes the incarnation (John 1. 14) as an element in the presence of the Logos in a "place." Christology, then, provides no certain clue to the presumed special Jewish affinities of Theophilus of Antioch.

III. Jewish Christianity in Antioch

We come finally to the question as to whether we have evidence of a long tradition of Jewish Christianity in the city of Antioch where Theophilus lived which may have inspired his work. This possibility has been worked out most fully by Grant in an article published in 1972 in a Festschrift for Père Daniélou.42 The study may be seen as an effort to support Daniélou's emphasis on the importance of Jewish Christianity in the early period.

Here Grant deals with all the names that can be connected with Antioch in the second century: Simon, Menander, Ignatius, Saturninus, Theophilus, and a few others. Behind Simon and Menander (antecedents of the Gnostic movement, according to writers like Justin and Irenaeus) Grant found "a modestly speculative form of Jewish Christianity." The evidence, however, is rather general; and, in the case of Menander, Grant makes this final admission: "We find nothing explicitly Christian. Indeed, there is nothing specifically Jewish." The admission is somewhat alarming in a paper that attempts to specify the Jewish-Christian background of these figures.

Ignatius' discussions of aberrant Judaizing Christians in his letters to the Christian communities of Magnesia and Philadelphia come next. These discussions are taken as probably casting light on the situation in Antioch (rather than Magnesia and Philadelphia) since Ignatius says that he actually found no such problems among the Magnesians and Philadelphians themselves. But Grant admits that Ignatius has a habit of talking in that vein about all the problems confronted in the communities to which he writes and that it does not prove very much (if anything) about the source of his information. Moreover, when it comes to actually describing the Judaizing in Magnesia and Philadelphia, Grant refers to the troublemakers in Magnesia in no more specific terms than that they saw Christianity "as necessarily based on Judaism." He also realizes that in Philadelphia it was (clearly, it seems) a case of "Gentile Judaizers." Since the encounter between Ignatius and the Gentile Judaizers of Philadelphia took place before Ignatius wrote to the Magnesians, it is more likely that Ignatius interpreted what he was told about the situation in Magnesia along the same

lines. In any event, it seems unlikely that we catch clear sight of a distinctive form of Jewish Christianity in Antioch from these notices.

Grant then goes on to deal with Saturninus as an Antiochene Gnostic who was reacting to Christianity in general and to Jewish Christianity in particular. But the evidence for opposition to Jewish Christianity seems to come down to noting the opposition in Saturninus to the God of the Old Testament (and at the level of detail to identifying as Jewish Christian the equating of Satan and the serpent by Saturninus). That is very fragile evidence. Similarly, there seems to be no very obvious connection between Saturninus, his presumed opponents, and the sort of theology that later appears in Theophilus. Yet Grant suggests: “The work of Saturninus implies the prior existence of the Jewish Christianity which Theophilus later expresses.” Grant, of course, knows that if Theophilus shows opposition to Gnosticism, it is to Marcion (or the Marcionite Apelles) and probably Tatian. Numerous notes in his edition and translation of Theophilus make that clear.43 Thus there is no evidence in the details of the text that suggests opposition to Saturninus in particular. And it is purely speculative to argue that the substructure of Theophilus’ theology is the sort of thing to which Saturninus was responding. It is straining the evidence, then, to postulate a continuous thread of development through this material. Finally, when Grant concludes by noting that Axionicus of Antioch later in the century was a Valentinian and that Valentinus in turn was indebted to mystical Jewish speculation, it is clear that the connections being made are simply too tenuous to mean very much. The intermittent influence of various forms of Judaism on various forms of Christianity is what seems to be hinted at in some of this material rather than a continuous development of a distinctive form of Jewish Christianity.

Theophilus, then, is more likely to have derived the Jewish features of his exegesis from an encounter with a Hellenized form of Judaism at the intellectual level rather than from familiarity with Jewish modes of thought filtered through Jewish Christianity. And there is little in the Christology of Theophilus or in the theological environment of Antioch that would point in any other direction.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

43 One example is referred to in note 13 above. Droge (above, note 28) 119–23, on the other hand, thinks that Theophilus is responding to criticisms of the Christian movement made by Celsus. If Droge is right, an even greater gap is opened up between Theophilus and his presumed Antiochene background.
Les Transitions dans le Style
d'Éusèbe de Césarée Apologiste

ÉDOUARD DES PLACES

Dans l'œuvre considérable d'Éusèbe de Césarée (six tomes de la Patrologie grecque, une dizaine dans les Griechische christliche Schriftsteller), deux volumes de Migne et trois du Corpus de Berlin contiennent les traités apologetiques conservés en grec (Extraits prophétiques, Contre Hiéroclès, Préparation et Démonstration évangéliques). La Préparation est maintenant complète dans la collection “Sources chrétiennes,” où a paru également, en 1987, le Contre Hiéroclès; de la Démonstration et des Extraits prophétiques la traduction est prête; on ne pourra guère lui juxtaposer un texte neuf, vu que, dans l'un et l'autre cas, nous sommes réduits à un seul manuscrit: le Parisinus graccus 465, du XIIe siècle, pour la Démonstration; le Vindobonensis theologicus graccus 29, de la première moitié du XIe siècle, pour les Extraits prophétiques. Ceux-ci n'ont eu d'autre édition spéciale que celle de Th. Gaisford (Oxford 1842), reproduite avec des corrections parfois discutables au t. 22 de la Patrologie grecque; l les éditions de K. Mras (Préparation évangélique, 1954–56, 1982–83) et d'I. A. Heikel (Démonstration évangélique, 1913) ont une tout autre valeur critique, et le Wortregister de Mras pour la PE (II, pp. 547–79), celui de Heikel pour la DE (pp. 545–85) permettent d'utiles contrôles.


I. Les Contextes

1° Extraits prophétiques²

1. 8 fin (1049B) τὰ δ' ἔξης... τοῖς φιλομαθέσι ζητεῖν καταλείψομεν. "La suite, nous la laisserons à chercher aux curieux" (en entendant ce dernier mot comme dans le catalogue de librairie intitulé "Intermédiaire des chercheurs et des curieux").

1. 12 fin (1069A) ἰδία κατά καιρόν ὃ μέλει τῆς τούτων ἐρεύνης ἐπιστήσας εἴσεται. "C'est ce que saura en temps voulu, s'il l'examine personnellement, l'amateur de ces enquêtes."

1. 19 fin (1077D) πλείονος... σαφήνειας δειμένων τῶν τόπων, τούτως... εἰρήμενοις ἄρκεσθησόμεθα. "Comme ces textes requièrent plus ample explication, nous nous contenterons d'en avoir dit cela." De même, 1. 23 fin (1085A), où la citation des Paralipomènes reproduit à peu près celle du 2e livre des Rois, Eusèbe renvoie à l'explication de celle-ci: ἄρκεσθησόμεθα τοῖς εἰς ἑκέινα εἰρήμενοις (récurrence avec chiasme de 1077D); et 1. 24 fin (1085A), il juge inutile de commenter un texte du 2e livre des Paralipomènes déjà expliqué à propos du même livre des Rois; il annonçait alors comme une "occasion meilleure" (εὐκαρπότερον 1. 21 [1084A]) l'exégesè (ἐν... ἔξετάζοιτο) du psaume 17.

2. 1 fin (1092C) ὅτι δὴ φίλον διαγνώναι τὸ ἀκριβές τῆς... ἀναφοράς, τοῖς ὑπομνηματισμένοις ἐντυχὼν εἴσεται. "Qui voudra discerner comment s'applique exactement (au Sauveur le contenu du psaume) le saura s'il en lit les commentateurs."

2. 2 fin (1096B) ὅλα δὲ... δηηγείοντα ὑπὸ τοῦ παρόντος τυχάνει καίρον, μάλιστα ὑπὸ πληρέστατης ἢν τετύχηκε σαφήνειας. "Quant à expliquer (la totalité du psaume), ce n'est pas l'affaire du moment, vu surtout qu'elle a déjà reçu une explication très complète."

2. 7 fin (1101D) ἡμῖν... ὡς σκοπός οὐδὲν πλείον τῶν εἰρήμενων λέγειν... ἐπιτρέπει. "Notre propos ne nous permet pas d'ajouter quoi que ce soit à ce qui a été dit."

2. 9 fin (1104D) ἄπερ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν παρέργῳ καὶ παραδρομῇ δέιον ἐξηγήσεως. "Ce ne sont pas questions qu'il faudrait expliquer par-dessus le marché et à la course." Cf. 2. 14 (1112C) παλλής δ' ἐν ἔξετάζεως χρήζοι ἐν τὰ κατὰ τούς τόπους. "C'est une longue enquête que demanderaient ces textes."³

² Pour les Extraits prophétiques, les références comportent le livre, le chapitre et la colonne de Migne (PG 22).
3. 14 fin (1140B) éti σχολής δ' ον ἐκάστη λέξις ἀκριβεστέρας τύχοι σαφνείας. “Avec le temps chaque expression recevrait une elucidation plus précise.”

3. 27 fin (1153D) ὁ καὶ πολλής δεόμενον ἐξετάσεως εἰς ἐπιτήδειον ἀναθησόμεθα καὶ ρόν. “Comme ces textes demandent longue enquête, nous les remettrons à un temps opportun.”

4. 4 fin (1204C) ὧποιον ἔχει νοῦν τοῖς εἰς τοὺς τόπους... ἐξηγητικοῖς ἐντυχὼν ὁ φιλομαθὴς εἰσεῖται. “Quel en est le sens, le curieux le connaîtra s’il lit les commentaires... des textes.”

4. 7 fin (1209B) ἀναπέμποντες τοὺς φιλομαθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ὑπομήματα. “Renvoyant les curieux aux commentaires de ces textes.”

4. 11 fin (1216D) ἦν οὖχ ὁ παρὼν ἀναπτύσσειν καὶ ρός. “Que ce n’est pas le moment présent d’élucider.”

4. 17 fin (1221D) ὅπερ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ὃ μέλει τῆς τούτων γνώσεως ἐρευνήσας εἰσεῖται. “C’est ce que comprendra, s’il s’en enquiert à loisir, celui qu’intéresse cette science.” Cf. plus loin PE 11. 5. 5 fin.

4. 23 fin (1232C) ἐκάστην... λέξιν... ἐξετάζειν οὐ τῆς παρούσης ἐστὶν πραγματείας. “Examiner chaque expression n’est pas l’affaire du présent traité.” Cf. 4. 24 fin (1237C) οὐ τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας τυγχάνει.

4. 26 fin (1241C) ὁ φιλομαθής ἐρευνήσας εἶσεῖται. “(C’est ce que) le curieux saura après enquête.” Cf. 4. 27 fin (1249B) πολλής... δεόμενων ἐρευνήσεως καὶ ἐξετάσεως... ὃ μέλει... ἐπιμελέστερον οὕτως ἐρευνήσας τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἴσεται. “Comme il faudrait (à ce texte) longues recherche et enquête, que celui qui en a souci scrute plus soigneusement les textes, et il en saura la portée.”

2° Préparation évangélique

9. 42. 4 (fin du livre 9) τοῖς φιλομαθεῖς ζητεῖν τε καὶ διερευνῶν ἀπολείποντες... μεταθησόμεθα. “(Ces voix)... nous les laisserons chercher et scruter aux curieux, et passerons...” (au livre 10). Cf. 11. 15. 7 fin ἐρ ὅ... τοῖς φιλομαθεῖς ἀναπέμψω. “J’y renverrai les curieux.”

11. 5. 5 fin ὅτῳ φίλων... τάς βιβλίους ἐπὶ σχολῆς μετὰ χείρας λαβῶν εἴσεται. “On le saura, si on le désire, en prenant en main à loisir les rouleaux” (trad. G. Favrelle).

13 préambule, fin εἰς ὦστερον ἀνατίθεμαι τὸν λόγον. “Je remets la question à plus tard.”
3° Démonstration évangélique

2. 1. 7 (100B) τοὺς φιλομαθεῖς ἐπ’ ἐκείνα ... ἀναπέμψωμεν. “Nous y renverrons les curieux.” Cf. 8. 3. 18 fin (556B).
2. 1. 16 fin (101B) σαφὴ ταῦτα ὑδ᾽ ἐρμηνεύας δεόμενα. “Voilà qui est clair et n’a pas besoin d’explication.” Cf. 2. 1. 17 fin (101C) et 19 fin (101D) καὶ ταῦτα σαφη.
2. 1. 22 fin (104B) ὡς καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν τῆς προσηκούσης τεῦξεται ἐρμηνεύας. “Ce qui en temps voulu recevra l’explication convenable.”
2. 2. 21 fin (112B) ἐπὶ σχολῆς πληρεστάτην αὐτῶν ποιήσωσθαι τὴν ἔξετασιν. “A Louisville les scruter en plénitude.”
2. 3. 29 (120D) ταῖς ... μαρτυρίας ἀρκεσθησόμεθα. “Nous nous contenterons de (c) témoignages.” Cf. 3. 3. 12 fin (192D) ἐκείνοις ἀρκεσθησόμεθα, 8. 5. 6 (648D, fin du livre 8) τοῖς εἱρημένοις ἀρκεσθέντες.
6. 1. 4 fin (416A) κατὰ τὸν προσήκοντα καιρὸν ἔξετασθῆσεται. “On l’examinera en temps opportun.” Cf. 6. 15. 15 fin (448A) ὡς καὶ οὐ νῦν ἔξετάζειν καιρῶς. “Question que ce n’est pas maintenant le moment d’examiner.”
6. 2. 9 fin (416C) καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ἐντελοὺς τεῦξεται διηγήσεως. “Cette question, elle aussi, recevra à loisir une explication complète.” Cf. 6. 20. 22 fin (476B) δὲ ἐπὶ σχολῆς κατὰ τὸν προσήκοντα καιρὸν τῆς προσηκούσης τεῦξεται διηγήσεως. “Qui recevront à loisir, au temps convenable, l’explication convenable.”
6. 18. 53 fin (468A) καὶ σοὶ δὲ ἐπὶ σχολῆς παρέσται ἕκαστην βασανίσασθαι λέξιν ἐπὶ πλάτους θεωρήσαι τὰ νενομένα. “Et tu pourras, en éprouvant à loisir chaque expression, en examiner largement le sens.”
7. 2. 27 fin (544B) ταῦτα δὲ πλείστης ἐρεύνης δεόμενα οὐ νῦν πολυπραγμονεῖν καιρῶς. “Comme cela requiert une ample recherche, ce n’est pas maintenant le moment d’épiloguer là-dessus.”
8. 3. 18 fin (556B) ἐπ’ ἐκείνα τοὺς φιλομαθεῖς ἀναπέμψωμεν, ἐφ’ ἐτέραν ἡμᾶς ὑπόθεσιν κατεπείγοντος τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ. “Nous y renvoyons les curieux, parce que la circonstance présente nous presse d’entamer un autre sujet.”
9. 2. 6 fin (660A) τὰ δὲ ... πλείονος ... δεόμενα πραγματείας ἐπ’ οἰκείας σχολῆς ἐρμηνεύσωμεν. “Mais les questions ... sujets à plus ample examen seront interprétées pour elles-mêmes à loisir.”
10. 2. 19 fin (736A) (τὰ τοῦτοι ἄκόλουθα) ... ὡς καὶ ὅποιας ἔχεται διανοοίας οὐ νῦν σχολὴ διηγείσθαι. “(Et la suite) dont nous n’avons pas maintenant le loisir de commenter le sens.”

Pour la Démonstration évangélique, les références comportent le livre, le chapitre et le paragraphe de Heikel (GCS, Eusebius Werke VI) avec la colonne de Migne.
Les textes transcrits et traduits ci-dessus ont en commun des éléments (substantifs, adjectifs et adverbes ou expressions adverbiales, verbes) qu’il s’agit maintenant de regrouper pour mettre en valeur les voisinsages et les quasi-synonymies.

1° Substantifs

diήγησις “narration, explication”: ύπερ σαφῶς διηγήσεως EP 1. 8 fin (1049B); πληρεστάτης... διηγήσεως EP 2. 2 fin (1096B); ἐντελῶς... διηγήσεως DE 6. 2. 9 fin (417C).

ἐξέτασις “examen, recherche, enquête”: πολλῆς δ’ ἐξετάσεως χρήζοι ἂν EP 2. 14 (1112C); πολλῆς... δεόμενον ἐρευνήσεως καὶ ἐξετάσεως EP 4. 27 fin (1249B); πληρεστάτην... ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξέτασιν DE 2. 2. 21 fin (112).

ἐξήγησις “explication”: δέουτ’ ἂν ἐξήγησις EP 2. 9 fin (1104D).

ἐρεύνης “enquête, recherche”: φ’ μέλει τῆς ἐρεύνης EP 1. 12 fin (1069A); πλείστης ἐρεύνης δεόμενα DE 7. 2. 27 fin (544B).


ἐρμηνεία “interprétation”: οὐδ’ ἐρμηνείας δεόμενα DE 2. 1. 14 fin (101B); τῆς προσηκούσης τεῦξεται ἐρμηνείας 2. 1. 22 fin (104B).

καιρός “occasion, moment”: οὐ νῦν ἐξετάζειν καιρός DE 6. 15. 15 fin (448A); (avec ἀναπτύσσειν) EP 1. 2 fin (1028A); ὁ καιρός οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει DE 2. 3. 125 fin (148D); ὁ παρῶν καιρός EP 4. 11 fin (1216D); cf. 2. 1 fin (1096D); κατὰ καιρὸν EP 1. 12 fin (1069A), DE 2. 1. 22 fin (104B), 5. 19. 5 fin (400C); κατὰ τὸν δέοντα καιρόν PE 4. 2. 4. 5. 5. 4; κατὰ τὸν οἰκετόν καιρὸν DE 5. 18. 3 fin (397C), 5. 21. 3 fin (404B), 9. 18. 16 fin (685C); κατὰ τὸν προσήκοντα καιρὸν DE 6. 1. 4 fin (416A).

πραγματεία “effort, traité”: οὐ τῆς παρουσίας... πραγματείας EP 4. 23 fin (1232C); cf. 4. 24 fin (1237B); πλείονος... δεόμενα πραγματείας DE 9. 2. 6 fin (660A).

σαφήνεια “clarté”: πλείονος... σαφήνειας δεομένων EP 1. 19 fin (1077D); ἀκριβεστέρας τῶχοι σαφήνειας EP 3. 14 fin (1140C).

σχολή “loisir”: οὐ νῦν σχολῆ DE 10. 2. 19 fin (736A); ἐπὶ σχολῆς... ἐρευνήσας εἰσεται EP 4. 17 fin (1221D); cf. 3. 14 fin (1140B), PE 11. 5. 5 fin, DE 6. 2. 9 fin (417C), 6. 18. 53 fin (468A), 6. 21. 23 fin (480B); ἐπ’ οἰκείας σχολῆς DE 9. 2. 6 fin (660A).

2° Adjectifs et adverbes (ou expressions adverbiales)

ἀκριβῆς “exact”: τὸ ἀκριβὲς... εἰσεται EP 2. 1 fin (1092C); ἀκριβεστέρας τῶχοι σαφηνείας 3. 14 fin (1140C).
επιμελώς “avec soin”: επιμελέστερον ... ἐρευνήσασιςEP 4. 27 fin (1249B).
ἐπιτήδειος “convenable, opportun”: εἰς ἐπιτήδειον ... καὶ ῥόνον EP 3. 27 fin (1153D).
εὐκαίρως “opportunément”: εὐκαιρότερον δ’ ἀν ἐξετάζοιτοEP 1. 21 (1084A).
πλήρης “plein, complet”: πληρεστάτης ἢδη τετύχηκε διηγήσεωςEP 2. 2 fin (1096B); πληρεστάτην ... ποιήσσασθαι τὴν ἐξέτασινDE 2. 2. 21 fin (112B).
προσήκων “convenable”: τῆς προσηκούσης τεῦξεται ἐρμηνείαςDE 2. 1. 22 fin (104B).
σαφῆς “clair”: σαφῆ ταῦταDE 2. 1. 14 fin (101B); καὶ ταῦτα σαφῆ DE 2. 1. 15 fin (101C), 17 fin (101D), 19 fin (104A).
φιλομαθής “curieux”: ὁ φιλομαθὴς ἐρευνήσασις εἴσεταιEP 1. 6 fin (1040B); cf. (avec entouchon) 4. 4 (1204C), (avec ἐρευνήσασις) 4. 26 fin (1241C); ἀναπέμψαντες τοὺς φιλομαθὲς 4. 7 fin (1209B); cf. (avec ἀναπέμψημεν)DE 2. 1. 7 fin (100B), (avec ἀναπέμψημεν) 7. 3. 18 fin (556B), (avec ἀναπέμψημεν) PE 11. 15. 7 fin, (avec ἀπολείπαντες) PE 9. 42. 4 fin.
φίλος “agréable”: ὁτι φύλον ... εἴσεταιPE 11. 5. 5 fin.

3° Verbes

ἀναπέμψειν “renvoyer, remettre”: ἀναπέμψαντες τοὺς φιλομαθὲςEP 4. 7 fin (1209B); cf. PE 11. 15. 7 fin, DE 1. 9. 20 (81C), 2. 1. 7 fin (100D).
ἀναφέρεσθαι “renvoyer”: EP 3. 27 fin (1153D); cf. (au moyen)PE 13 préambule, au milieu.
ἀπολείπειν “laisser”: τοῖς φιλομαθέσι ζητεῖν ... ἀπολείπαντεςPE 9. 42. 4 fin. Cf. καταλείπειν.
ἀρκείσθαι “se contenter (de)”: εἰρημένοις ἀρκεθῆσθαιEP 1. 19 fin (1077D); cf. 1. 23 fin (1085A), DE 2. 3. 29 (120D), 3. 3. 12 fin (192D), 8. 5. 6 (648D, fin du livre 8).
βασανίζειν “éprouver”: ἐπὶ συχόλης βασανίσαντεςDE 6. 18. 53 fin (468A).
δείσθαι “manquer, avoir besoin (de)”: ὁ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν παρέργῳ ... δέοιτ’ ἂν ἐξηγήσεωςEP 2. 9 fin (1104D); πολλῆς δεόμενον ἐξετάσεωςEP 3. 27 fin (1153D); ὁδ’ ἐρμηνείας δεόμεναDE 2. 1. 14 fin (101B); cf. 7. 2. 27 fin (544B), 9. 2. 6 fin (660A).
διηγεῖσθαι “expliquer”: διηγεῖσθαι ὁ τοῦ παρόντος τυχάνει καιροῦEP 2. 2. 6 fin (1096B).
eἰδέναι “savoir”: ὁ φιλομαθὴς εἴσεταιEP 4. 4 fin (1204C); cf. 1. 12 fin (1069A), 2. 1 fin (1092C), 4. 17 fin (1221D), 4. 26 fin (1241C), 4. 27 fin (1249B); ὃτι φύλον ... εἴσεταιPE 11. 5. 5 fin.
ἐντυχάνειν “lire”: ἐντυχών εἴσεταιEP 2. 1 fin (1092C).
Édouard des Places

III. Interprétation des données

Dans le souci constant de ne pas anticiper sur une exégèse qui risquerait d’interrompre le développement en cours, Eusèbe sait couper court à une digression intempestive; de là tant d’expressions du type “en temps voulu,” “le moment venu,” sous la forme de substantifs, d’adjectifs ou d’adverbes; parfois à côté de verbes qui signifient “remettre” ou “renvoyer.” Ce style sans grâce, souvent prolixe, excelle pourtant à varier ses formules, par l’emploi de synonymes, la place des mots, l’addition d’un adjectif ou d’un adverbe. Le lecteur ou l’auditeur de ces “leçons” d’exégèse apologetique est ainsi tenu en haleine et invité soit à consulter un exposé précédent, soit à en attendre un qui viendra plus tard. Eusèbe entoure d’attentions les “curieux” qui voudraient en savoir davantage et les dirige parfois vers les “commentaires” de ses maîtres (Origène?) ou de ses émules.

Quelles nuances séparent des substantifs comme έξετάζειν et έρευνα, rendus l’un et l’autre par “enquête”? Ou διήγησις, έξέπλησις et έρμηνευσις, traduits “explication”? Les adjectifs ἐπιτηδεῖος et προσήκον,
“convénable”? Les verbes ἀναπέμπειν et ἀνατιθέναι, “renvoyer”; ἀπολείπειν et καταλείπειν, “laisser”; δεῖσθαι et χρῆσθαι, “avoir besoin”; διηγεῖσθαι et ἐρμηνεύειν, “expliquer, interpréter”; ἔξετάζειν et ἔρευνάν, “scruter”? Chez Platon lui-même, il s’agirait de variations à peine perceptibles à un “moderne”; Eusèbe y attachait-il de l’importance? Reste pour son lecteur ou son auditeur le plaisir de ces variantes. Quant à l’ordre des mots, chiasmes et hyperbates mettent la détermination adverbiale après plutôt qu’avant le verbe, comme il ressort des “contextes” réunis dans la première section; quand deux verbes se suivent, par exemple un participe et un indicatif futur, on se demande parfois sur lequel portent l’ἐπὶ σχολής ou le κατὰ κατάρόν; cf., sous 1°, EP 1. 12 fin, 4. 17 fin; le traducteur doit, autant que possible, conserver l’ambiguïté du texte. De tout temps, les Grecs ont aimé ces énigmes mineures, et des poètes comme Pindare ou Sophocle en sont prodigues; en prose, Platon n’y répugne pas. Peut-être penserait-on, ici ou là, à une construction apo koinou.5

Si Eusèbe de Césarée ne peut passer pour un grand écrivain, il garde le mérite de constamment solliciter ou retenir l’attention; beaucoup de ses procédés conviennent à la chaire, celle du professeur ou du prédicateur: ils s’adressent à des auditeurs plus qu’à des lecteurs.

 Pontificio Istituto Biblico, Rome

Any discussion of Greek Alexandria may properly take its starting point from the work of P. M. Fraser, even if only to dissent from it. In the preface to *Ptolemaic Alexandria* Fraser observes that philosophy was one of the "items" that "were not effectively transplanted to Alexandria." In his chapter on philosophy, talking of the establishment of the main philosophical schools at Athens, Fraser writes that it "remained the centre of philosophical studies down to the closing of the schools by Justinian in A.D. 563." The first of these statements is near enough the truth, since the Alexandria of the Ptolemies was not distinguished in philosophy as it was in literature or science, though even then some important things happened during that period too. But the implication that this situation continued during the Roman and early Byzantine periods is misleading, and by the end of the period simply false. The purpose of this paper is to examine some aspects of the considerable contribution that Alexandria made to the philosophical tradition that continued into the Islamic and Christian middle ages and beyond, and to show that it may lay claim to have been at least equal to that of Athens itself.

Though I do not want to spend long on the Ptolemaic period, a few points should be made before we jump forward into the third century A.D. That Alexandria at this time was not a centre of philosophical activity is true enough, but perhaps unimportant. That may strike some as a strange thing to say, the more so just now when the study of Hellenistic philosophy has become rather fashionable. Nevertheless it is not, I think, difficult to justify. The point is that most of the philosophical endeavour of these times was a dead end. On the one hand much was said and written by disparate groups of so-called philosophers trying to tie up loose ends or exploit suggestions made by the great philosophers of fifth- and fourth-century Athens, people...

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*All references to the Greek commentators on Aristotle are to the Berlin Academy edition, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, unless otherwise specified.

1 P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972) viii.
2 Fraser (previous note) 480
3 I am not here concerned with the date of the alleged closure, which is usually put at 529.
like the Megarians and Cyrenaics, whose very names have been forgotten by all but professional historians of philosophy. More important were the Epicureans and Stoics and those originally labelled Academicians who were members of the Platonic Academy but abandoned Platonism to lay the foundations of the movement known as Scepticism. By the early third century A.D. even these movements were dead. It is by no means clear that Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise *On Fate*, dedicated to the Emperors Caracalla and Severus, and directed against the Stoics,1 was still part of a live debate.2 At about the same time the Sceptic Sextus Empiricus worked at Alexandria, but by the time Augustine wrote his treatise against the Academics Scepticism had been defunct for some two centuries: Augustine’s work is primarily an argument against ideas he found in the pages of Cicero.3 Such influence as Stoicism had was mainly through the adoption of some of its ethical notions by the founder of Neoplatonism.4 Epicureanism too had become defunct—it was in any case outside the ongoing discussion among philosophers of other persuasions—and was not to surface again till the Renaissance, when Lorenzo Valla took up and discussed some of its ideas.5 Both these schools had some appeal to the practical and unmetaphysical minds of the Roman upper classes, but perhaps the main contribution of Stoicism was that some of its nominal adherents, such as Posidonius, espoused Platonic doctrines and helped to keep them alive and topical. Conversely, a nominal Platonist like Antiochus took on so much Stoicism that he was seen by some as a virtual Stoic himself.6 Significantly, both came from the Near East, Posidonius from Apamaea in modern Syria, Antiochus from Ascalon in modern Israel, Seleucid and not Ptolemaic territory. We might note in passing the rather obvious but rarely mentioned fact that philosophy, though sometimes centred at Athens, was not generally an activity of natives of that city. Socrates and Plato (and Epicurus) were exceptions to this rule in the Classical period, Plutarch the son of Nestorius in the revived Academy of the late fourth to early sixth centuries A.D.

The two kinds of philosophy that were to be of lasting importance in the Christian and Islamic worlds remained in the background during the period we have just sketched. Perhaps the most important event in their contemporary history was the editing and organizing of Aristotle’s

5 Though there is some evidence that there were still occupants of the Stoic chair at Athens in the mid-second century A.D.; cf. F. Ueberweg and K. Praechter, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* 1 (1926; repr. Basle 1967) 665.
7 As noticed by Porphyry, *Plot. 4–5.*
rediscovered works at Rome, the most important process the collection of material in the library at Alexandria.

Before we take up the matters which are the main concern of this paper, a word should be said about two figures, one of whom is so shadowy as to be almost unknown, the other well known and accessible through voluminous extant writings, but of relatively little importance in the Platonic tradition to which Alexandria contributed so heavily. The first of these is Eudorus, sometimes called "of Alexandria." Variously described as Platonist, Neopythagorean and "eclectic," Eudorus has been credited with the revival of Platonism after its dormant period. Though most would agree that the credit for that should rather be given to figures like Posidonius and Antiochus—or his teacher Philo, called "of Larissa" to distinguish him from his Alexandrian namesake—Eudorus might be the person who introduced the Platonism of his time to Alexandria and in any case might be the best claimant to the title of founder of Middle Platonism, one of several difficult and controversial matters which there is no time to discuss here. The second is Philo, who certainly absorbed a considerable amount of Platonic thought, but who remains peripheral to the study of pagan Greek philosophy, in spite of the efforts of some French scholars in the last century and the early years of this one to show that he played a major part in the formation of Neoplatonism through his influence on Plotinus. Philo nevertheless deserves a brief digression in so far as he was a typical product of the Hellenistic tradition which continued into early Roman Alexandria. A member of the Jewish community at Alexandria, his work presents the application of a deep Hellenistic Greek philosophical culture to the discussion of the theological problems of Judaism. It is comparable to what was done later by Christians like Clement and Origen, whose minds were, however, clearer on philosophical matters, because the eclectic tendencies of Greek philosophy were on the decline. Philo is sometimes described as an adherent of that philosophical tendency—I am deliberately avoiding referring to it as a school or group—which is labelled Middle Platonism. It was not, for the century and a half or thereabouts between Philo and Plotinus, particularly associated with Alexandria and its importance lies primarily in its contribution to the formation of Neoplatonism.

That kind of philosophy, which was to dominate all pagan and some Christian philosophy for the three centuries after it began, certainly started in Alexandria, even if its founder subsequently lived and taught at Rome. For reasons which we shall see, the precise nature and content of the Alexandrian contribution is extremely difficult to assess. We are dealing with two figures about whose personal lives there is a notorious scarcity of information: Plotinus, who seems on the whole to have avoided talking

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10 On these matters, cf. e.g. J. M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London 1977) 115 ff.
11 Cf. e.g. H. Guyot, Les réminiscences de Philon le Juif chez Plotin (Paris 1906).
about his personal life—Porphyry says that he was apparently ashamed of being in a body—and his teacher Ammonius.

It should be said immediately that there is virtually no evidence about Ammonius and that attempts to reconstruct his philosophy have therefore been uniformly and inevitably unsuccessful. About his life we know even less: There have even been inconclusive discussions about the significance of his name Saccas, which is only securely attested in Theodoret (GAC 6. 60) and lexicon entries derived from him. Theodoret's comment, "he abandoned the sacks in which he used to carry about grain and took up the life of philosophy," is presumably ultimately responsible for the description of Ammonius by an archaeologist whose expertise lay in other fields as "a porter from the Alexandrian docks." The little that we do know is, however, significant.

First there is his name, the Ammonius part, which does indicate Alexandrian, if not necessarily Egyptian, rather than Greek or Roman origins. The Saccas is useless: porter, wearer of a rough cloak, Iranian or what have you. We do know, because Porphyry tells us so in his life of Plotinus, that Plotinus found that he was the only satisfactory teacher after a number of others had been found wanting (Plot. 3. 11–12). That would bear out the view that there was not a great deal of worthwhile philosophy going on at Alexandria at this time, though Porphyry's statement does not rule out the possibility that there were other competent philosophers about who for one reason or another did not attract the intellect or sympathy of their intending pupil. It might also indicate—and here we are not, I think, sufficiently informed—that the Christian philosophers did not wish to take pagan pupils, a situation which probably changed subsequently. The contrary inhibition did not apply, since Ammonius, whom one generally assumes to be a pagan—though that could be wrong—may have taught both Origen the Christian as well as his pagan namesake and Plotinus. It has been suggested, for example by A. K. Bowman in his book on post-Pharaonic Egypt, that Ammonius was perhaps a Christian convert to paganism, but there is no good evidence that I know of for this view. Apart from a very small number of comments with poor credentials in later writers, we know only two things about his instruction. One is that there

12 Cf. Plot. 1. 1–4, but see ch. 3.
14 Otherwise it appears in Ammianus Marcellinus 22. 16. 16, where it is probably a later insertion; cf. H. Dörrie, "Ammonios, der Lehrer Plotins," Hermes 83 (1955) 467.
16 On names of this type, derived from Egyptian gods but also used by Greeks, cf. P. M. Fraser, "Two Studies in the Cult of Sarapis in the Hellenistic World," Opuscula Atheniensia 3 (1960) 15–16.
was an element of the esoteric about it, because Plotinus and Origen (not the Christian\(^{18}\)), as well as one Erennius, a third pupil in the group, made an agreement not to divulge the content of Ammonius’ instruction (Porh. Plot. 3. 24–28). The other is that Plotinus himself not only immediately recognised Ammonius as the teacher he had been seeking and wished for no other (Plot. 12–14), but that in his own philosophizing he introduced—or conveyed—the mind of Ammonius. The precise sense of the Greek is not clear: τὸν ᾿Αμμονίου φέρων νῦν ἐν ταῖς ἑξετάσεσιν is how Porphyry expresses it (Plot. 14. 15 f.). Since the immediately preceding words stress Plotinus’ independence, the point here must be that Plotinus followed Ammonius in approach rather than teaching, but that there was some doctrine or doctrines which Ammonius’ close pupils regarded as very important follows from the story about the agreement to keep them within the philosophical group. What exactly “the mind of Ammonius” means we do not then know: A possibility is that it meant, among other things, interpreting Plato in a highly metaphysical sense with the aid of certain Aristotelian principles, for that is certainly what Plotinus did.

That is about all one can safely say about Ammonius himself. But, if we may believe Porphyry, and there is no reason to think we should not, then it is the case that this almost unknown figure at Alexandria himself rose above what appears to have been a very mediocre level of philosophical activity, and provided the essential stimulus for the development of the greatest mind in Greek philosophy after Plato and Aristotle themselves.

I have expressly referred to Ammonius as someone at Alexandria rather than an Alexandrian, because we know nothing of his life, and he could have come from anywhere: Only his name, as I have mentioned, indicates that he was from Egypt rather than some other part of the Roman empire. I leave to others better able than I am to discuss such matters the question of what constituted being an Alexandrian at this time—or any other—if it was not just a matter of possession of a citizenship whose holders are not usually individually identifiable, and pass on to Plotinus himself, about whom there are similar problems.

We are told by Eunapius (VS 455) that Plotinus came from Lycopolis, modern Asyüt, a town in Upper Egypt some 500 km inland from Alexandria. Readers of the Loeb translation of Eunapius might be misled by the translation, “Plotinus was a philosopher of Egyptian birth”: All the Greek says is that he was from Egypt, ἔξ Ἑλληνίδος. About his early life we know nothing, because, as we learn from his biographer, he was as reluctant to discuss such trivia about the material world as his origins or his home as he was to have his portrait done (Porh. Plot. 1. 1–9). That must, unfortunately, cast some doubt on the correctness of Eunapius’ naming of his birthplace, for which there is no evidence in any earlier source:

\(^{18}\) Cf. e.g. A. H. Armstrong’s note ad loc. in the Loeb Classical Library Plotinus, vol. I.
Eunapius himself is not the most reliable of writers. There are no indications that Plotinus’ culture was other than Greek: The mispronunciations reported by Porphyry (Plot. 13. 1–5) are not, as they have sometimes been claimed to be, evidence to the contrary. His name is uninformative because by now plenty of people of multifarious origins had Roman names. Readers of Lawrence Durrell might “know” that he was black, but there is no evidence for this, and the one portrait bust which is generally assumed to be of Plotinus, but may well not be, would be evidence to the contrary. The only thing we can add about Plotinus’ period in Alexandria is that it lasted at least eleven years, since Porphyry tells us that that was the time he studied with (συνεσχόλος) Ammonius (Plot. 3. 20): Were it not for the statement about the mind of Ammonius we should not even be able to conclude that he shared his teacher’s views, for Aristotle after all stayed with Plato for twenty.

The question which now presents itself is how influential Plotinus was in the formation of the philosophy of his successors, and thus how far we may regard Neoplatonism as a specifically Alexandrian contribution to the history of philosophy. It cannot be said too often that “successors” must be used in a purely chronological sense, if only so as not to beg questions. In the early days of the study of Neoplatonism this might have seemed a pointless question: The pioneer French studies of Neoplatonism in the nineteenth century actually called the whole group “L’école d’Alexandrie.”

Two questions arise. In the first place we must look, at least briefly, at the continuity—or otherwise—of the Neoplatonic tradition. Secondly it is necessary to ask how far Plotinus is actually a full member of that tradition. The first of these questions is actually the more difficult. The second may be answered with a guarded “yes”: Neoplatonism starts with Plotinus, but considerable changes were made to his form of it as time progressed. Let us return to the first.

We know that Plotinus taught Porphyry or, more safely, that Porphyry was a member of Plotinus’ group of associates at Rome: He himself would have us believe that he was the most important of the group (cf. Plot. passim). Porphyry retired to Sicily. At some time, and at some place, he may have taught Iamblichus, who came from Syria but whose movements are not known. Porphyry seems to have followed Plotinus in most matters, though questions have been raised about whether or not he subscribed to Plotinus’ view that there were three intelligible hypostases: Some scholars have argued that he “telescoped” the intelligible world by doing away with the distinctions between them, and Soul and Intellect in particular.

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19 So e.g. E. Vacherot, Histoire critique de l’Ecole d’Alexandrie (Paris 1846–51).
20 Eunapius, VS 458, tells us that he attached himself to Porphyry.
they do have in common is a relatively simple view of the structure of the
intelligible universe, and in that both differ from Iamblichus and, to some
extent, from all later Neoplatonists. Iamblichus’ distinctive contributions
were two. One was a huge elaboration of the complexity of the intelligible
universe by the invention of extra entities to bridge the gaps between the
parts of the earlier and simpler Neoplatonic world. The other was the
admission of an alternative and no longer strictly philosophical system for
that ascent to the One which was the goal of the philosophic life for all
Neoplatonists. Before leaving Iamblichus I should perhaps say why I am
not going to discuss his book, On the Mysteries of Egypt, which might seem
to belong to our subject. In the first place this traditional title is incorrect. Secondly, apart from straight Neoplatonism, it contains a great deal of sub-
philosophical material culled from a variety of sources: Very little of it is
identifiably Egyptian, and, in so far as it is, it does not belong to the
philosophical content of Neoplatonism.

Thereafter there is a gap in the tradition, or at least in our knowledge of
it. The attempts to fill it are not entirely convincing, and our task of
examining the Alexandrian contribution allows us to abstain from
discussing this still unsatisfactory topic. We may, instead, note that most of
those who came after Iamblichus seem to have been influenced by him to
the extent of operating with systems more complex than that of Plotinus,
though it is certainly not the case that he was followed in every detail even
by those who express the greatest admiration for him. Moreover, this
influence does not extend to the Christian Platonists to the same degree.
Among them the simpler Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Porphyry seems to
have held its own. The reasons for this are complex, but the most important
may have been the provision of three clearly—or at least relatively
clearly—defined hypostases corresponding in number if not, in the end, in
relationship to the three components of the Christian god.

Both at Alexandria and at Athens there is a gap, either in activity or in
our information about it, till the end of the fourth century and the turn of the
fifth. We have some names, and some information, about who studied
where and with whom, but virtually nothing about the contents of their
studies or the philosophical views of those who taught them. At Athens the
story resumes in some detail with Plutarch the son of Nestorius, at
Alexandria with Hypatia and her pupil Hierocles. From then on, until the
sixth century, Athens and Alexandria were the major centres of pagan

22 The correct title is “Master Abbamon’s Reply to Porphyry’s Letter to Anebo and
Solutions to the Problems in it”; cf. M. Sicherl, Die Handschriften, Ausgaben und
Übersetzungen von Iamblichos De Mysteriis: Eine kritisch-historische Studie, Texte und
Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Alchristlichen Literatur 62 (Berlin 1957) 166, the Notice
Mysteriis de Jamblique relus avec la Lettre de Porphyre à Anébon,” in H. J. Blumenthal and E.
Neoplatonism, and developed along similar and interconnected lines. The leading masters at both were, for a prolonged period, students and teachers of those at the other, or engaged in controversy with them. So close was the relationship, both personal and intellectual, that some would now maintain that there were no serious differences between the two groups: For reasons which will emerge I do not think they should be referred to as schools. As in many questions where the prevailing view has changed, I think the pendulum has swung too far from the previously accepted opinion, launched by Praechter in a famous article in 1910, that there were, among others, distinct Alexandrian and Athenian movements in Platonism.23

Whatever the intellectual differences between Athens and Alexandria may have been at the end of antiquity—a question to which we shall return—it is certainly true that all the major figures of late Greek Neoplatonism passed through Alexandria in the course of their education. As far as philosophy was concerned it was Alexandria that was the crossroads, focus or whatever other metaphor one might wish to use, of the whole of the philosophical activity of late pagan antiquity, and remained so till certain changes were caused by the Arab conquest just over a century after the alleged ending by Justinian of philosophical teaching by pagans in 529. We may compare its position with that of Paris in the thirteenth century. I mention Paris not merely because it is comparable with Alexandria as the leading centre of its time for the study of philosophy, but also because these two centres are the crucial junctions between the Greek and the Islamic philosophical traditions: Alexandria provided at least the first meeting point at one end, at the other Paris was the main centre for the reassumption of Greek thought, both directly and through the medium of the great Islamic thinkers who had absorbed and to some extent re-thought the work of the Greeks, and then exerted their own considerable influence on Western, if not Eastern, Christian philosophy. Curiously, the writings of the “Arabic” tradition had much more influence in the West than in the East. Thus Latin translations of Aristotle and his Greek commentators appeared at the same period as those of the Islamic philosophers and their commentaries on the Greeks, as well as of some basically Neoplatonic works lost in Greek, like the Theology of Aristotle and the Liber de causis. The best example of this confluence of traditions is perhaps the major ideological dispute about the unicity or otherwise of the human intellect ending in the well-known decree of 1210 banning the teaching of Aristotle.24 The dispute was caused largely by the impact on the medieval West of Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle. The most offensive were those on the De anima, which in turn took as one of their starting points an interpretation of


24 On these matters, cf. F. van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West (Louvain 1955) 66–77.
Alexander maintaining the unicity of the intellect which was reported and discussed by the Alexandrian commentators. Another possibly superficial but perhaps not unimportant characteristic shared by the Greek philosophers of late antiquity and their Arabic successors is that most of them were neither Greeks nor Arabs. As is well known, it is not always easy to establish the national origins of leading figures of late antiquity: These were often obscured by the outward trappings of the Roman citizenship they all shared. Plotinus, the one with the best claim to have been an Egyptian, and whom we have already discussed, is a case in point. Many of the others came from outlying parts and sometimes identifiably from other nations. Porphyry was a Phoenician from Tyre whose name was, in Greek transcription, Malkos (Porph. Plot. 17. 7 f.), and Damascius, perhaps the last original thinker in the Greek tradition, came, as his name implies, from Syria, while Proclus and Simplicius were from parts of Asia Minor not central to the Greek tradition: Their ancestry is unknown. Of the philosophers in the Arabic tradition al-Fārābī was a Turk, ibn-Sīnā (Avicenna) a Persian and ibn-Rushd (Averroes) a Maghrebite of uncertain descent. Why this was so is probably unanswerable, unless the answer is that philosophers are concerned with truths that are not constrained by time or space, but it is interesting to observe that both groups shared these accidental attributes of origin as well as the essential ones of intellectual affinity.

Most of the rest of this paper will be devoted to discussing the special characteristics of Alexandrian Platonism in its final period, and trying to establish how far it was peculiar to Alexandria. According to Praechter’s view, which was the prevailing opinion until about fifteen years ago, Alexandrian Neoplatonism was characterised by a greater structural simplicity and, in particular, the abandonment of the transcendent One at the top of the system. That view was challenged by Ilsetraut Hadot, in a book appropriately entitled Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiérocès et Simplicius, where she argued, and to my mind succeeded in demonstrating, that the main outlines of Alexandrian Neoplatonism were not basically different from the Athenian variety. The basis of Praechter’s differentiation between the two was the absence of the One from two Alexandrian works, Hiérocès’ commentary on the “Pythagorean” Carmen aureum and Simplicius’ on Epictetus, but, as Hadot argued, this can be explained by the subject and purpose of the two works in question. In so far as they are primarily concerned with practical ethics, the higher metaphysics is not essential to the task in hand, though it might, of course, be objected that Neoplatonists normally say everything everywhere. If we accept this

25 Cf. Philoponus, Commentaire sur le De anima d’Aristote, ed. by G. Verbeke (Louvain/Paris 1966) 43-44 (Moerbeke’s translation; Alexander is not named) and (?)Stephanus = [Philoponus] In De an. 535–36.

26 I. Hadot, Le problème (Paris 1978); her conclusions are summarised on pp. 189–91.
argument, then the most striking difference between the two centres disappears.\textsuperscript{27} Nevertheless there are others, some clear ones of external fact, or appearance, as well as some much less clear ones of doctrine and approach.

But before we go on to look at them, let us remind ourselves of the close ties between the pagan philosophers of Athens and Alexandria. Many of them were set out in a well-known article by H.-D. Saffrey in 1954.\textsuperscript{28} They go back to the renewal of the Platonic Academy at Athens by Plutarch: That it was he who was responsible for the revival I have argued elsewhere.\textsuperscript{29} At Athens there was a clear succession: Plutarch taught Syrianus, to whom he handed over his young pupil Proclus.\textsuperscript{30} But Plutarch also taught the Alexandrian Hierocles,\textsuperscript{31} and Syrianus taught another Alexandrian, Hermias,\textsuperscript{32} the commentator on Plato's \textit{Phaedrus} and father of the Aristotelian commentator Ammonius. Ammonius in turn studied with Proclus.\textsuperscript{33} Proclus himself had been to Alexandria in the course of his educational wanderings, but, though he studied rhetoric there happily enough, he became dissatisfied with the philosophical instruction on offer (Marinus, \textit{Vita Procli} 8, 10). If that is true, we may surmise that Hermias had not yet returned from his spell at the feet of Syrianus, likely enough in so far as Syrianus had not yet become the leading teacher at Athens when Proclus himself arrived there. As to his view of Alexandrian philosophy, it is slightly suspect, in so far as it is reported by his "Athenian" biographer Marinus.\textsuperscript{34} There are some other indications that, notwithstanding their close relations, the two groups were not above making critical comments about each other, and in a previous generation Synesius had, if for more easily understandable reasons, pronounced Athens a philosophical desert.\textsuperscript{35}

It may also be significant that the age of 28, at which Porphyry tells us that Plotinus began philosophy, was the age at which Marinus tells us that Proclus composed his commentary on Plato's \textit{Timaeus} (\textit{Vita Procli} 13). That could, of course, simply be the truth. If so, it is a strange coincidence, and since there are signs that Marinus wrote his biography of Proclus with

\textsuperscript{28} "Le chrétien Jean Philopon et la survivance de l'école d'Alexandrie au VIe siècle," \textit{REG} 67 (1954) 396–410.
\textsuperscript{29} "529 and its Sequel: What Happened to the Academy?" \textit{Byzantion} 48 (1978) 373–75.
\textsuperscript{30} Cf. Proclus, \textit{In Rempublicam} 2. 64. 6 for Syrianus and Marinus; \textit{Vita Procli} 12 for Proclus.
\textsuperscript{32} Cf. Damascius, \textit{Vita Isidori} fr. 120 Zintzen.
\textsuperscript{33} Cf. Damascius, \textit{Vita Isidori} fr. 127.
\textsuperscript{34} Marinus originally came from the Neapolis in what is at the time of writing the Israeli-occupied West Bank area of Palestine. Unlike some of the other members of the Athenian group he is not known to have studied in Alexandria.
\textsuperscript{35} Letter 135.
at least half an eye on Porphyry’s *Life of Plotinus*,\(^{36}\) we may wonder just how much in it is intended to show that Proclus was the greatest philosopher, and Athens the best place to study philosophy.

Let us continue with our succession story. Ammonius at Alexandria started what was to all intents and purposes a new school, and a new industry. His pupils included leading figures at both centres. Asclepius continued to work at Alexandria: We do not know where he came from. Simplicius came from Cilicia and subsequently taught at Athens: We do not know whether he had already been there before he went to study with Ammonius. Another was Damascius, the last person whom we know to have been head of the Athenian Academy. And, at about the same time there was John Philoponus, whose standard description, “Alexandrinus,” suggests that he was a native of the city. Let us note that at this stage the traffic seems to have been in one direction. After Ammonius’ period of study with Proclus it looks as if it was Alexandria that was the teacher of the Athenian philosophers, and not the other way round. In this case we can be sure that we have not been misled by biased sources, because our information comes from “Athenian” sources—Damascius and Simplicius—as much as from Alexandrian ones.

After that the friendly relations between the two centres disappear from sight. There are two possible reasons for the change, neither of which we can establish with certainty, but which may not be unconnected. In the first place, there is the alleged closure of the Athenian Academy in 529. That this event, the traditional end of pagan philosophy, took place at all has been denied by Alan Cameron, who argued that the relevant imperial edict was simply ignored.\(^{37}\) I have tried to show that, even if not for the previously accepted reasons, philosophical activity at Athens was not, after all, resumed when the Athenian philosophers returned from the famous trip to Sassanian Persia described by Agathias (2. 30–31).\(^{38}\) If that is correct, there were no Athenians to relate to. Cameron suggested that Simplicius must have returned to Athens, because only there would he have had access to the Presocratic texts which he cites at length, and directly, in commentaries known to have been written after 529.\(^{39}\) Alexandria would probably have satisfied the same conditions, and might have been a place where pagan philosophy would be less exposed than at Athens: That depends on various questions which we shall discuss shortly. Most recently the idea has been promoted, by Michel Tardieu and Ilsetraut Hadot, that Simplicius, and others of the group, settled at Harrān (Carrhae), and that pagan Platonism

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\(^{38}\) In the article cited above (note 29), esp. 377 ff.

\(^{39}\) Cameron (above, note 37) 21–25.
continued there for some four centuries. This initially attractive idea must, however, be regarded as far from proven, if only because it rests heavily on the argument that Simplicius’ reference to a set of calendars in local use indicates that he resided in the town which used those calendars—not a strong argument. It is not the only one, but the others are, if anything, less convincing.

The second reason for the cessation of friendly relations would apply whether “Athenian” Neoplatonism continued there or elsewhere. That is the ferocious controversy that broke out about the eternity or otherwise of the physical world. This controversy, perhaps ignited by the influx of Christian thinking into Philoponus’ previously plain Neoplatonic philosophy, first breaks out in the attack on Proclus contained in Philoponus’ *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*, a series of savage attacks which is securely dated 529 A.D.

Not long afterwards Philoponus wrote a further, now fragmentary, work on the same subject, *Contra Aristotelem*, which concentrated on attacking the notion of a fifth element, divine and permanent. It was followed by a series of attacks on Philoponus by Simplicius in the commentaries on the *De caelo* and *Physics*, launched from an unknown location which might just possibly have been Alexandria itself. Is this date 529 just coincidence? That it is cannot be excluded. If it is not, two explanations of the simultaneity of the composition of the *De aeternitate mundi* and the “events” of 529 are possible. One, which has commended itself to some, is that it was a manifesto of the Alexandrian group, dissociating itself from the offensive paganism of the Athenians as a prophylactic against imperial interference with the activities of the school. If that were the case, one might ask a question which has not to my knowledge been asked by those who have concerned themselves with this matter, and that is why Philoponus directed his attack against someone who had been dead for over forty years? Is it because Proclus was some sort of paradigm of paganism? If so, why do we not hear about it elsewhere? Is it because Philoponus was reluctant to attack fellow pupils in the school of Ammonius? If so, why did Simplicius not feel similar inhibitions?

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41 M. Tardieu, “Les calendriers en usage à Harran d’après les sources arabes et le commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d’Aristote,” in *Simplicius* (previous note) 40–57; his conclusions are given at 55–57. The text in question is at *In Phys.* 18–30.

42 Cf. now P. Foulkes, “Where was Simplicius?” *JHS* 112 (1992) 143.

43 *De aet. m.* 579.13–17 Rabe.

44 The fragments have been collected by C. Wildberg and transliterated in *Philoponus. Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World* (London 1987).

45 Cf. Saffrey (above, note 28) 406–07.
Christian charity can hardly be the answer, since that did not usually inhibit controversialists. There was, of course, a long classical tradition of attacking people who could neither answer nor be harmed by the attacks, and it may be that it is in this context that the answer should be sought. In the end one has to admit that there is no clear solution.

Another possibility is that it was Philoponus' attack which precipitated Justinian's move, having somehow been brought to his attention. Again there is nothing to show that this was the case, but if it were it might have been some sort of wish to express his views without actually causing trouble for former colleagues that lay behind Philoponus' choice of opponent. The urge to express his own views leads us to another, and perhaps more likely, explanation of Philoponus' reasons for writing the *De aeternitate mundi*. Most would now accept that Philoponus was a Christian throughout: If and when he became a convert to that religion is no longer a matter for prolonged discussion. What is now a more serious question is the extent to which in his case Christianity influenced a philosophy which is basically Neoplatonic. I have argued elsewhere that it did not, and that some of the ideas in his work which look at first sight as if they were Christian could equally well be explained as the adoption of perfectly respectable, if in some cases no longer standard, Platonic positions. A good example would be the notion that the world was created in time, a tenable and nowadays increasingly popular interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* which orthodox Neoplatonists in Philoponus' time did not accept. Half a century earlier the controversy was sufficiently important in those circles for Proclus to give an account of the upholders of both views in his commentary on that dialogue. And in Simplicius' attack—or counter-attack—on Philoponus this particular issue is discussed in terms of *Timaeus* exposition. I now think that it must be admitted that his Christian orientation did influence Philoponus' later philosophical works—there is of course no question about the theological work for which he eventually abandoned philosophy.

Where the line is to be drawn is a more difficult matter, but a good case for drawing it through the *Physics* commentary has been made by Koenraad Verrynck: He has tried to show how Philoponus developed from a straight Neoplatonist, following his teacher Ammonius, to something rather

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47 *TIm. 1. 276. 10 ff.*


49 On his theological output see H. Chadwick, "Philoponus the Christian Theologian," in Sorabji (previous note) 42–54.
different. Within this framework the De aeternitate mundi may be understood as Philoponus' public statement of his new philosophical position, without recourse to external causation.

None the less the explanation of Philoponus' motives in writing that work cannot be divorced from consideration of an event which may or may not have happened some thirty years before. That is the deal which Ammonius is alleged to have made with the ecclesiastical authorities to abandon the teaching of Plato because it conflicted with Christianity. This is one of those pieces of common knowledge that would probably be better not known. The evidence for it is slender. It rests partly on circumstance, and partly on a text of Damascius which will not bear the weight that has been put upon it. I have discussed this question in another place, but since belief in the "deal" is still expressed it may be worth returning to it for a few moments. The circumstantial evidence is easily disposed of. In the first place it consists of the apparently changed orientation of teaching as inferred from the massive production of commentaries on Aristotle. Two points should be made: First, the composition of Aristotle commentaries need not imply that teaching was restricted to Aristotle. After all, many modern academics teach subjects on which we do not write. Second, there were good academic reasons for concentrating on Aristotle, namely that Proclus had already written what may have been regarded as definitive commentaries on a major part of the Platonic curriculum, including the two "perfect" dialogues which came at the end of it, namely the Timaeus and Parmenides. He had also expounded some of Aristotle's treatises. The text from Damascius—we have it in Photius' Bibliotheca, which is not irrelevant—runs as follows: ὁ δὲ Ἀμμώνιος σίγχρονοκερδῆς ὁν καὶ πάντα ἐρῶν εἰς χρηματισμὸν ὀντισαῦν ὁμολογίας τιθεται πρὸς τὸν ἐπισκοπόν το τὴν καθαύτα τὴν κρατοῦσαν δόξαν, "Ammonius, who was disgracefully avaricious and looked at all matters from the point of view of making money, made agreements with the man in charge of the prevailing opinion" (Photius, cod. 242. 292). The "prevailing opinion" is, of course, Christianity. The extract comes from Damascius' life of Isidore, and when Rudolf Asmus originally reconstructed that document he combined with it.

53 352a11–14 = Vita Isid. fr. 316 Zintzen.
another sentence from an earlier section of Photius (179), πρός τὸν ἑπισκοποῦντα τὸ τηνικάυτα τὴν κρατοῦσαν δόξαν Ἄθανάσιον, thus identifying the other party of the agreements as the man who was Patriarch of Alexandria from 490 to 497. Asmus, however, thought that the name was a mistake, and that the events, whatever they were, belong to the time of the previous patriarch, Peter Mongo, who was consecrated in 482. In either case we are talking about a time well before 529, but we cannot be sure that the unconnected snippet containing the name really does belong with the reference to Ammonius. It has long been customary to take this text as referring to a deal whereby Ammonius’ “school” abstained from teaching Plato, and, or as a result of which, it turned to work on Aristotle. As far as I can discover this suggestion was first put forward by Paul Tannery in 1896, and was accepted as possible by Saffrey in the influential article mentioned earlier. It must be remembered, however, that the Damascius text says nothing whatsoever about the contents of the agreement. The usual interpretation was questioned, rightly, by L. G. Westerink in 1962. Westerink pointed out that Olympiodorus heard a lecture or lectures on Plato’s Gorgias given by Ammonius in 510. That in itself does not prove that Ammonius had never made the deal he is alleged to have made, for conditions changed with different patriarchs—and emperors. Other possible evidence is similarly indecisive. Thus, though we know that Asclepius heard Ammonius lecture on Plato (cf. In Metaph. 77. 3–4), Asclepius was there for a long time, and his attendance cannot be dated. It is, however, likely to have been later than the agreement.

If, then, there is no good reason to believe that the deal of which Damascius complains was about not teaching Plato, or writing about him, for which we have in any case already suggested more respectable reasons, what was it about? The straight answer is that we have no means of knowing. We should in any case bear in mind that Damascius was given to making acerbic comments on other personalities, so that the matter to which he refers could have been something quite trivial. Perhaps the most reprehensible explanation, from the standpoint of an Athenian Neoplatonist’s ideology, is that Ammonius converted to Christianity, a

54 347a19–20.
55 R. Asmus, Das Leben des Philosophen Isidorus von Damaskios aus Damaskos (Leipzig 1911) 110 and note ad loc.
57 Saffrey (above, note 28) 401.
59 Cf. Olympiodorus, In Gorgiam 183.11 Norvin = 199.8 Westerink. There is an undatable reference to the teaching of Plato in Asclepius, In Metaph. 77. 4.
60 Cf. P. Chuvin, Chronique des derniers païens: La disparition du paganisme dans l’empire romain, du règne de Constantin à celui de Justinien (Paris 1990) 140, who refers to the “mystérieux ‘accord’” reported by Damascius between Ammonius and the patriarch.
61 Cf. Photius, Bibl. cod. 242, 348b20–23 = VI 44. 20–22 Henry = Vita Isid. pp. 276.23–78.1 Z.
suggestion made by Westerink. There is, however, no clear evidence that Ammonius exposed himself to that charge. Indeed, Bishop Zacharias of Mitylene, on a passage in whose Ammonius the supposition is based, would hardly fail to have said so in as many words if a conversion had actually taken place. We might note too that Simplicius, who expressed nothing but contempt for Philoponus, never seems to have lost the high esteem in which he held his teacher Ammonius. So it cannot have been acceptance of Christianity which ignited Damascius' anger.

In any case it would appear that the religious affiliation of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists from this period on was not a matter of great importance. Unlike their Athenian counterparts, all of whom when we know anything about them appear to have been pagans, the Alexandrian group seems to have been more concerned with the teaching of philosophy through the medium of commentary than with maintaining any particular attitude to the "prevailing opinion." Of Ammonius' successors, Asclepius and Olympiodorus appear to have been pagans, while the Christian Philoponus, who clearly saw himself as the intellectual heir of Ammonius and published several of his courses, frequently remained so close to his master that it is extremely difficult to distinguish them. But he separated himself from the philosophical tradition, apparently removed himself from Alexandria and devoted himself to theological controversy, espousing positions which were later condemned as heretical. His sobriquet γραμματικός may in any case indicate that he made his living teaching rhetoric rather than philosophy. His enemies used it as a term of abuse.

In the next generations the Aristotelian commentators at Alexandria seem to have been Christians: David and Elias, whose dates are unclear, and finally Stephanus, who may have written the commentary on Book 3 of the De anima which was transmitted as the third book of Philoponus; he was eventually appointed to a post of oikoumenikoς διδάσκαλος at

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63 1094–1121 Colonna = PG LXXXV 1116B–17B. For a discussion of this text, see "John Philoponus" (above, note 51) 322–23.
64 On this question, cf. "John Philoponus" (above, note 51) 325–28. See now too the dissertation by Verrycken referred to above (note 50) and also his "The Metaphysics of Ammonius son of Hermias" (above, note 27) 199–231 passim.
66 Though Stephanus' authorship has been widely accepted since Hayduck in his edition, CAG XV, p. v, drew attention to the appearance of his name in two of the manuscripts of Book 3 and suggested that he may have written it, the attribution has been challenged by P. Lautner, "Philoponus, In De anima III: Quest for an Author," CQ 42 (1992) 510–22: Lautner, who makes a strong case against Stephanus, inclines to the view that the work was produced by a pupil of Philoponus.
Constantinople under the emperor Heraclius in 610,\textsuperscript{67} thus feeding in—or renewing—Alexandrian influence there too. After that we do not know what happened at Alexandria in the remaining years before the conquest seems to have put an end to Neoplatonic teaching. Its influence on the Islamic world was exerted at other centres.

Let us leave this matter for the moment and return to a question we put aside earlier, namely the distinctiveness or otherwise of Alexandrian Neoplatonism. If we accept that the Alexandrians did not foreshorten their intelligible universe by excluding the One, should we also accept that there were no differences between the philosophical views of Athenians and Alexandrians? I think the answer is "no," but let me say at the start that this is one of the many areas in the study of late Neoplatonism that requires further work before it can be answered definitively. A first difference is that the Athenians were far more interested in what I have called sub-philosophical matters like the Chaldaean Oracles, on which Proclus wrote extensively, and Neopythagorean numerology. In more strictly philosophical matters a first difference appears when one looks at the intelligible hierarchies used by the two broad groups: The Alexandrians used simpler ones. Though they were not compressed by the removal of the highest member, the Alexandrian ones are characterised by the absence of the extremely complicated schemes that appear in the pages of Proclus and Damascius. This seems to be true also of the work of Simplicius, and one must wonder if he is the exception proving the rule, for his ties with Ammonius and thus with Alexandrian Neoplatonism seem to have been strong. Is he then an Athenian behaving in the way that we have suggested is Alexandrian, or is he rather an Alexandrian working at Athens? The question might be more easily answered if we had more information than we do about Simplicius' career. A further difficulty is that it is possible that the deployment of a similar hierarchical structure was inhibited by the task of writing Aristotelian commentary. That would take in both all those normally regarded as Alexandrians and also the doubtful case of Simplicius. The difficulty with such a superficially attractive explanation is the Neoplatonists' notorious habit of putting any of their doctrines into the discussion of almost anything. On the other hand there are some indications that at least some of the Alexandrians did take a different line on the interpretation of Aristotle, and, in particular, on the lengths to which they would go in seeking to establish the fundamental agreement of Plato and Aristotle, which some proclaimed as a principle of their expositions.

We might consider briefly a test case, from the interpretation of the \textit{De anima}, namely the definition of the soul. Here the problem was how to reconcile the Aristotelian view that the soul is the immanent form of the

body with the Platonist one that it is a separate entity of a totally different kind. For a Platonist interpreter that meant that he had to show that Aristotle's definition, "the first actuality of a potentially living natural body . . . equipped with organs" (412a27–28), referred to the Platonic concept of the relation. The usual way of doing this was by misinterpreting the description of body as ὄργανωικόν, equipped with organs, to mean "being an instrument," which the soul used. Simplicius attempted to bridge the inevitable gap by the standard, and some would say characteristically Athenian, device of multiplying entities, and split the soul into a phase that informed the body and another which used it (cf. In De an. 90. 29 ff.). Philoponous, on the other hand, though his explanation suffered from the unclarity of trying to do something that is philosophically impossible (cf. In De an. 224. 12–25. 31), does appear to have tried to offer a genuine explanation of the text before him (217. 9–15). Yet there were also differences among Athenians. 68 Nor can we rule out the possibility that Philoponus did not simply follow Ammonius, on whose lectures his commentary is based, since there are other cases where Philoponus is ostensibly giving us Ammonius' lectures with a few observations of his own, but in fact either indicating that Ammonius was a different person from the author or compiler of the commentary or that he was producing a different kind of explanation from the one that could be expected of Ammonius. 69 We may conclude, tentatively, that Alexandrian Neoplatonism does appear to have differed in some respects from that prevalent elsewhere, but that the differences among individuals may have been at least as important as those among groups working in different locations. A clearer answer still awaits the results of more detailed investigations.

It is time to return, briefly, to the question we set aside before, namely the further history of Alexandrian philosophy after 641, or, for that matter, in the preceding decades. Here again there is a gap in our knowledge. We do not know whether the study of Platonist philosophy was already moribund at the conquest, or whether it survived till then. Nor can we be sure of the sequence of events thereafter. We do know that Greek philosophy appeared in Arabic dress some two hundred years later in Baghdad, where, according to a report of al-Fārābī, 70 it arrived after a temporary sojourn in Antioch. Those who think the exiles from Athens settled there now see Harrān as another route, for the "Athenian" variety. 71

68 Cf. [Philoponus] In De an. 535. 2–37. 4 on Plutarch and Marinus.
71 Cf. Tardieu and Hadot (above, notes 40 and 41).
Eventually, by diverse routes, it found its way to the Latin West. But all that is another story.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{University of Liverpool}

\textsuperscript{72} An earlier version of this paper was read to the Symposium on Alexandrian Civilization: Egyptian and Classical, held at the University of Alexandria in April 1988.
Ad Sylloge Inscriptionum in Codice Urbanensi Traditam*

GERALD M. BROWNE

V. 3–4:

\[\text{angustos aditus venerabile corpus habebat huc, ubi nunc populum largior aula capit.}\]

\textit{huc}: sic ed., Diehl\textsuperscript{1} secutus, sed cod(icem) \textit{Urb(anensem)} \textit{hic} praebere non animadvertit.

VIII Titulus:

\textit{Versus Damasi <de> sancto Felice}


IX. 1–4:

\[\text{Hic posuit cineres genetrix castissima prolis, Agustine, tuis altera lux meriti, qui servans pacis caelestia iura sacerdos commissos populos moribus institutis.}\]


\textsuperscript{2}E. Diehl, \textit{Inscriptiones latinae christianae veteres} I (Berolini 1925) no. 1770.

\textsuperscript{3}E. Diehl, \textit{Inscriptiones latinae Christianae veteres} IV: Supplementum, ed. J. Moreau et H. I. Marrou (Dublini 1967) no. 91.

XI. 7–8:

adsum<pt>is<sup>4</sup> aquilae Christus petit aethera pennis,
conregnatque poli perpes in arce patri.

patri: sic MGH, Poetae latini aevi carolini I (Berolini 1881) 346–47, no. cxvii, sed ed. cod. Urb. patris, quod expectaveris, praebere non animadvertit: vd. Schaller (supra, n. 3) 15.

XIII. 3–4:

vere fide genitus purgavit crimina mundi,
et tibi virginitas inviolata manet.


XV. 1–3:

Splendet apostolici radio locus iste dicatus
nominis, et digne communis honore refulget
ara . . .

Ed. anglice reddidit sic (p. 150):

That consecrated site glitters in the sheen of the apostolic
name, and in beauty fittingly shines bright the public
altar.

Sed forsitan melius sit adverbium <i>digne</i> cum ablativo honore coniungere
(anglice: “in a way worthy of honor”): cf. e.g. Vulg. Eph. 4. 1 <i>ut digne ambuleitis vocatone</i> et vide <i>TLL</i> V 1153.57.

<i>Urbanae, III.</i>

<sup>4</sup> Schaller (supra, n. 3) 15.
Notes on the *Palaea Historica*

HOWARD JACOBSON

The Byzantine biblical chronicle, the *Palaea Historica*, reports that, as a child, the prophet Samuel had a wet nurse by the name of Αρμαθεμ.¹ Neither the biblical account of Samuel’s childhood (1 Sam. 1. 20–24) nor post-biblical expansions mention any wet nurse. Indeed, the Bible says explicitly that Samuel was nursed by his mother (1 Sam. 1. 23). The *Palaea*’s version comes from a misreading of a Greek source that reported that the infant Samuel was raised in Rama or Ramathaim (as is stated in the Bible: 1 Sam. 1. 1, 19, 2. 11). The wording will have been something like Αρμαθεο (ἀνεθρέψε) ουτον. Our author will have understood Αρμαθεμ to be a person and so concluded that Samuel had a wet nurse.

Some twenty years ago David Flusser pointed out that much Jewish legendary material was preserved in the *Palaea*.² I remark here several such passages that have gone unnoticed.

In the biblical narrative Moses descends from Mount Sinai with the tablets of the Law only to witness the Jews worshipping the golden calf. He smashes the tablets. Later he ascends again, receives a second set of tablets, and when he descends his face is shining (Exod. 31. 18–34. 35). The *Palaea* reports these two ascents and descents, but represents the shining of Moses’ face as already taking place after his first descent (p. 242). This is a rabbinic change (see, e.g. Deut. Rab. 3. 12). Furthermore, the Bible says no more than that “the skin of Moses’ face shone” (Exod. 34. 30; cf. 34. 35). The *Palaea* writes ἐλαμπρύνη το πρόσωπον τοῦ Μωσέως ὑπὲρ τὸν ήλιον. The comparison of Moses’ radiance to that of the sun is rabbinic, e.g. “Moses’ face was like the face of the sun” (*Sifre* Nu. 140 ad Nu. 27. 20).

In the biblical story the Canaanite general Sisera flees to the tent of Jael. He requests water; she gives him milk (Ju. 4. 19). The *Palaea*

¹ See A. Vassiliev (ed.), *Anecdota Graeco-Byzantina* (Moscow 1893) 270.
² For this spelling of the name of Samuel’s native city, see the manuscripts at LXX 1 Sam. 1. 1, 19. 7. 17.
³ For τρέω used of a person’s native land or city, see e.g. Xen. *Lac.* 13. 1, Lycurg. 47, Polyb. 11. 28. 6.
⁴ *Scripta Hierosolymitana* 22 (1971) 48–79.
elaborates (p. 272): Jael offers and gives him also food (βούτρον: cheese? butter?) and wine as well. The pseudo-Philonic Jewish work, Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum (= LAB), while not specifying, also introduces food and wine into this episode (31. 3, 6). The Palaea further observes that Sisera was suffering from the great heat of the day. Although the Bible has nothing of this sort, LAB also makes explicit mention of Sisera’s suffering from the heat (31. 4).

In the Bible’s account of Samson and Delilah, there is never any mention of marriage between them (Ju. 16. 4–21). But due to the manner in which the Palaea conflates biblical episodes, they become husband and wife in its version of the story (p. 268). The same is true of LAB (43. 5).

In the famous episode of “the concubine at Gibeah” the gentlemanly host argues with the attacking mob, “Please, my brothers, do not do evil” (Ju. 19. 23). The Palaea (pp. 273–74) has him say something utterly different, ἡμέτερος γάρ ἐστί, which presumably means, “he is our kin,” “he is one of us,” vel sim. This appears to go back to a simple misreading or reinterpretation of the words, “my brothers, do not,” as “these are my brothers,” i.e. ἔσται ἡμῖν ἢ ἔσται ἡμῖν. The same reinterpretation appears to be present in LAB 45. 3 (nonne hi fratres nostri sunt), as well as in Josephus (AJ 5. 144).

University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
Transhumance on Taygetos in the *Chronicle of Morea*

G. L. HUXLEY

This short study examines a passage in the *Chronicle*, of interest to historical geographers. Having described the foundation of the castle at Mistra (Myzethra), the *Chronicle* in its Greek version states that the *zygos* of the Melingoi—that is, the massif of Pentadaktylos or Taygetos—had passes and great villages and people who reverenced no lord. To keep the insubordinate Melingoi in check William II de Villehardouin caused the castle of Maine also to be built.¹

When the castles of Mistra and Maine were complete, the rich *archontes* of the Melingoi were not willing to be subject to the Franks. However, the common people said that they should submit, though with honour and without the performance of *corvées* such as were undertaken by the villages in the plains. Their reason was that since the two castles had been built, they had not been able to come down to the plains to live by trade nor had they been able to live in the mountains.²

Accordingly, the rulers of the Melingoi were compelled to come to terms with Prince William. The events recounted thus far are described in the Greek version. The French version has a lacuna, but now takes up the narrative again (§206): “... ] contre le prince. Et quant il orrent assés debatu leur conseil, si s’accorderent a ce que il envoiassent leurs messages au prince, demandant franchise de non estre tenu de servir comme li villain dou pays, mais qu’il le serviroient en fait d’armes quant il en aurroit mestier.”³ According to the Greek version they also asked to pay no tribute (H. 3025). The Prince then made an agreement with the Melingoi, since he recognized the strength of the land wherein they dwelt—“pour le fort pays ou il demouroient.” But later, the better to constrain and to subject them in the mountains of the Slavs, he had another castle built at Leftro (Beaufort).

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¹ The text was written in 1986 for a colloquium on mountains in historical geography, held in Sofia. No publication followed. A paper concerned with Slavs is an apt vehicle to convey my admiration of Professor Marcovich’s profound and powerful scholarship.

² H. 3008–19.

The commons complained that they could not live in the mountains: The main reason was, we may suppose, that the mountains were too cold in winter. But they also complained that they could not come down to do business in the plains. Here the likely reason was that they needed to trade off their surplus stock and to sell their cheeses—or to barter them. The complaints show that the Slavonic Melingoi were engaged in pastoral transhumance, in accordance with ancient Mediterranean practice, on the Taygetos range.4

The building of the castles enabled the Franks to exercise some control upon the seasonal movement of the Melingoi off the mountain. It is most unlikely that William excused the descending Slavs from all payment of dues as they passed near Mistra on the way to the Lakonian plain. So the request to be enkousatoi (< exkousatoi), alleged to have been made according to the Greek version of the Chronicle, would not have been granted. It is safe to infer that one of the intentions of William II in building his castles was to be able to tax the Melingoi as they moved with their livestock. They dwelt in the mountains but needed to come down to the plains of Lakedaimonia and Messenia. They also needed to go up to the highest pastures when the snows had melted. Their movements may be compared with those of the Chataigneraie of Corsica, whose seasonal migrations begin midway between the summer and the winter pastures. In sixteenth-century Castile there were royal tolls upon the main routes to the sheep-fairs; and in fifteenth-century Apulia taxation was imposed upon transhumant shepherds with their flocks by defining sheep-routes and tracks connecting the resting pastures with the winter pastures.5 Thus the aim of Prince William’s castle-building can be seen to be not only military but also economic. He could not conquer the mountains, but he was able to benefit from the traditional economy of the mountainy people.

It is recognised in the Chronicle that the leaders of the Melingoi were rich. Being rich they were more exposed than the commons to the social influence of powerful neighbors—Byzantine, Frankish, and later Byzantine again after the East Roman recovery in the Morea. An illustration of exposure to external influence among the Melingan archontes is the dedicatory inscription of 1331/2 from Oitylos.6 Herein is recorded the rebuilding of a church of St. George at the expense of the Melingoi Kyr Konstantinos Spanis and Kyr Laringkas [S]avouris and a lady Anna. Also mentioned are a certain Kopôgis and his wife Eleune. Of the names

4 There is a helpful description of the physical characteristics of the Taygetos range in P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300–362 B.C.* (London, Boston and Henley 1979) 21–22.
[S]avouris certainly, and Kopőgis almost certainly, are Slavonic. Both Konstantinos Spanis and Laringkas [S]avouris use the title Kyr; moreover, the inscription is dated in the name of the Emperor Andronikos Palaiologos. The influence of Byzantium among archontes downhill at Oitylos is manifest.

Yet the Slavs of Pentadaktylos kept still to their old ways, their conservatism being typical of highlanders living far from administrators based in the plains or close to them. In the fifteenth century their Slavonic tongue was still alive up in the mountains, as we learn from the Greek traveller Laskaris Kananos.7 In about 1438 he visited a Slavounia near Lübeck; there, he thought, was the original home of the Peloponnesian Zygiotai—that is, of the inhabitants of the Taygetan zygos. He also remarked that in many villages of the Sth[lavounia (Wendenland) the same language was spoken as that of the Zygiotai. We do not have to accept that the two tongues, of the Wends and of the Zygiotai, were identical in the fifteenth century, but they were recognisably similar; and Laskaris Kananos provides secure evidence for the continued presence of Slavonic-speakers on the Pentadaktylos in his time.8 The persistence of Slavonic speech is also consonant with the names of certain upland villages in the Taygetos range. Orovo, Trikotsovo, Liaasinova are among such names to be found on the western flanks still today; on the eastern there are Longanikos, Polovitsa, Longastra and others.9 Among the locally nomadic highlanders of Taygetos there was linguistic and social continuity long after the restoration of Byzantine power in the plains of the Peloponnesse from the ninth century onwards. The continuity extended in time even beyond the building of castles at Mistra, Mâine and Lefrio in the thirteenth century. In the mountains, among mobile and elusive pastoral folk, old ways and old


8 Laonikos Chalkokondyles I 31, 14 and 19–20 (ed. E. Darkó [Budapest 1922]) was also aware of their presence; he connects their speech with that of Croats and Poles. Concerning Taygetos and the west Arkadian Skorta as Slavonic Rückszugsgebiete see also the useful remarks of M. W. Weithmann, Münchner Zeitschrift für Balkankunde 2 (1979) 159–60, but we must bear in mind the possibility that there were already transhumant Slavs on Taygetos before the Byzantine reconquest of lowland Lakonia and Messenia began in the ninth century. Before the reconquest not all the Slavonic incomers were necessarily lowlanders such as the Ezteritai of the Helos plain; some even of the Ezteritai dwelt on Mount Taygetos (Const. Porph., DAI 50, p. 232, 20–21 M/J), and in Lakonia mountain Slavs may well have been coeval with settled Slavs in the plains from the time of their first arrival in the late sixth century. On the Slavonic settlement see Lakonikai Spoudai 3 (1977) 84–110.

speech, despite the efforts of lowland administrators and builders of castles, died hard.

*Trinity College, Dublin*
Amtsmissbrauch im Patriarchat von Konstantinopel
um die Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts:
Der Megas Chartophylax Ioannes Amparis

HERBERT HUNGER

"... und wo ihrs packt, da ists interessant."
Goethe über das Patriarchatsregister


In das letzte Jahrzehnt des 14. Jahrhunderts fallen zwei krasse Belege der φιλαρχυρία von Hierarchen. 1396 ließ sich der Bischof von Cherson durch eine ansehnliche Geldsumme (λαβὼν ἀσπρα ἱκανά) bestechen und segnete eine fünfte Ehe (πενταγαμία) ein. Der ihm vorgesetzte Metropolit von Gothia erstattete dem Patriarchen Bericht, der Kläger und Beklagten vor das Synodalgericht zitierte.² Um das Jahr 1394 ist die Generalbeichte des Paulos Tagaris anzusetzen, jenes Mönchs, der vom ἕρως τῶν χρημάτων, der Geldgier, besessen, vielfach unter Anwendung brutaler

² MM I, Nr. 135, S. 307, Z. 49 ff.: ... τὴν μὲν γλώσσαν ἐπιρρεπὴ πρὸς τὸ γεῦδος ἔχειν αὐτῶς, φιλαργύρους δὲ φαίνεσθαι καὶ οἰνοπότας, πλεονεξίας χαίροντας καὶ φιλοκαρδεῖς ἀσχημόνως καὶ τὸ μέγα τῆς ἱερωσύνης ύψος φεῦ κατασπάντας εἰς ἐμπορίαν προδήλως κατεγυρωμένην, ὅλιγα τοῦ κατὰ ψυχήν ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος φροντίζοντας, τὸν δ' ἔξω καὶ σωματικὸν θεραπεύειν μόνον προθυμομένους κτλ.
³ MM II, Nr. 505, S. 270.
Simonie, eine unwahrscheinliche Karriere durchlief, um nach seiner Konversion zum Katholizismus es bis zum lateinischen Patriarchen von Konstantinopel zu bringen.4


Im Jänner 1354, unter dem ersten Patriarchen des Philotheos Kokkinos, prozessierte nämlich der Hieromonachos Gennadios um die ihm vom Patriarchen von Antiocheia zugewiesenen Kellia im Hodegonkloster zu Konstantinopel, die während seiner Verhaftung und seinem Aufenthalt im Gefängnis der Chartophylax mit Beschlag belegt hatte. Amparis berief sich ungeniert auf ein Prostagma des Kaisers Johannes VI. Kantakuzenos, der damals nicht in Konstantinopel weilte, konnte aber, als die Stunde der Wahrheit schlug, kein Prostagma vorweisen. So verlor er den Prozeß, und Gennadios konnte wieder seine Kellia beziehen.7

Schließlich ereilte den Amparis sein Schicksal: 1355—das genaue Datum ist nicht festzustellen; der Text ist verloren; Darrouzès plädiert für die zweite Amtsperiode des Kallistos8—wurde er von der Synode abgesetzt (καθαρίσεως). An Stelle des verlorenen, vielleicht absichtlich entfernten Textes findet sich nur eine anonyme Auflistung von Fällen des Amtsmissbrauchs. Die Mehrzahl dieser Fälle bezieht sich auf unkanonische Eheschließungen (μαριγιασιστικα, ehebrecherische Verbindungen). Da der Verweis bei Theodoros Agalianos—100 Jahre später in dessen Apologie—ebenfalls auf μαριγιασιστικα und τετραγραμμιστι zielt, ist der Schluß naheliegend, die genannte Auflistung mit Amparis in Verbindung zu bringen.9

Die mit dem Registerführungsvermerk des zweiten Patriarchats des Kallistos verbundene Erzählung über die boshaftere Vernichtung des originalen

6 Dar. Reg. 2345.
7 MM I, Nr. 152, S. 340–42; Dar. Reg. 2356.
8 S. jetzt auch Darrouzès im Supplement zu den Regestes, fasc. VII (Paris 1991), Nr. 3423, Crit. 3 (gegen Ende).
In Kontoskalion wurde der Anagnostes Ioannes ο του Πεζού zum Diakon geweiht. Er gab ihm (= Amparis) eine dreifache Kerze (Trikerion) im Wert von 14 Kokkia, ein Vögelchen (Huhn) im Wert von 6 Kokkia, ein Viertel Wein im Wert von 3 Kokkia, einen Hasen im Wert von 12 Kokkia und nochmals Wein für 3 Kokkia, und für die Genehmigung 6 Kokkia.

Der Diakon, der 25 Jahre alt war, versuchte nach drei Monaten, Priester zu werden. Da der Kanon jedoch bestimmt, daß niemand vor einem Alter von 30 Jahren zum Priester geweiht werden darf, log er (= Amparis) dem Patriarchen vor, es seien vier Jahre vergangen, seit er Diakon geworden war, und auf Grund dieses falschen Zeugnisses wurde er zum Priester geweiht.

Er selbst (= Amparis) sagte, er solle mittels einer einzig Zahlen erreichen, was er sonst nur mittels vieler Zahlungen durchsetzen würde. Deshalb kaufte er eine Kerze von dem Laden des Nikolaos Sapunus um ein Hyperpyron und brachte sie ihm (= dem Amparis). Dann schrieb dessen Sohn Konstantinos die Genehmigung, nicht der arme Maurianos, der damit


[40] ζητεῖ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς μονῆς τοῦ Παντοκράτορος μοναχὸν, ὡς εἶπεν διάκονος καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ὑπέρπυρον ἦν.

μοιχοζευξία τοῦ Βαρβαλέους [45] Θεοδώρου τοῦ μοιχεύοντος τὴν γυναίκα Σανδαμαρίου τοῦ Συναδήνη ἐπὶ ξόντος καὶ προτρῆσεν αὐτοῦ ἐξωρίσθη καὶ ἐλαβε τοὺς μοιχοὺν.


tοῦ Σικέλου ἡ Θυγάτηρ ἀπὸ τοῦ 'Ασετοῦ εἶχεν ἄνδρα, καὶ ἀπεδήνυσεν ὑπελήσαν οἱ γονεῖς αὐτῆς ἣν φέροσαν αὐτῇ ἄλλον. ἔλαβεν τὴν συνοδικὸς καὶ οὐδὲν παρεχωρήθη, ἔτει ἐξε ὁ αὖρ χρόνος αὐτός δὲ ἀδετήσας τὴν [65] συνοδικὴν ἀπόφασιν προέτρεψε καὶ ἀπῆρ τὸν μυλότεκταν, ἔλαβεν || ε' καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ Κωνσταντίνος καὶ θ' καὶ ἡ Φακὴ || α' καὶ ||

[70] θεληματάριος ὁ Κατακαλῶν ὁ εἰς τὸν ἄγιον Ῥωμανὸν ἔλαβε γυναίκα δευτέραν, ἦτεν καὶ ἥθεν. ||

35 χειρομέριον cod. || 47 ἐτὶ supra lineam scriptum || 55 μοιχοζευξία || ζ̄ ex corr. (Ξ) || 70 Κατακαλῶν || ω̄ ex corr. (ο)
scheiden lassen wollte. Die heilige Synode gestattete das jedoch nicht. Er aber (= Amparis) nahm von dem Katakolon, was immer er nahm, und verfaßte ein Schriftstück (des Inhalts), die Mitgiftgegenstände sollten der Frau gegeben werden. Dem Katakolon aber genehmigte er die Trennung von ihr (= seiner ersten Frau) und die Heirat mit der anderen.

Die Euphemiane aus dem Hieron, die den Muspuludes zum Mann hat, mit dem sie auch Kinder hat, wurde geschieden und sie brachte 6 Kokkia und nicht wenige Gefälligkeiten. Und während der Mann noch lebte, brachte er (= Amparis) einen anderen.

Ehebrecherische Verbindung des Iatropulos, Sohnes der Protopestaria, die der Priester Michael Balsamon kennt. Der Obsthandler in Kyneiros wurde von seiner Frau geschieden auf Grund einer Verleumdung, und er nahm eine andere. (Dafür) gab er ein Hyperpyron, was der Papas Eudokimos aus dem Kyneiros weiß.
Das war nur wenig von vielem.

Vor Beginn des Textes lesen wir marginal die Worte ζήτει ωδε und darunter nach einer völlig verblaßten Silbe καὶ ἑτερα κε(φά)λ(α)ιω, beides von der Hand des Kopisten, des (jüngeren?) Georgios Galesiotes.12 Die "anderen Kapitel" könnten sich im Zusammenhang mit den verstümmelten Schlußworten des Textes (ταυτα δ' ἀπὸ πολλῶν) darauf beziehen, daß der Schreiber noch mehr Punkte für seine Liste in petto hatte. Im PRK wurde eine solche Fortsetzung bis jetzt nicht gefunden.

Die Verfehlungen des Amparis zerrinnen in zwei Gruppen: 1) Simonie; 2) Verstöße gegen das Eherecht.
   c) Diakonsweihe eines Mönches: Bezah lung I Hyperpyron.
2. a) Ehebrecherische Verbindung (μοιχοζευξία): Amparis genehmigt die Scheidung einer Frau, die bei Lebzeiten ihres Mannes mit einem anderen zusammenlebt und die Ehe bricht.

14 MM I, Nr. 138, S. 319, Z. 5-9: ... καὶ οὖδὲν τολμήσῃ τις ξητῆσαι καὶ λαβεῖν βοῦλλαν ἀλλαχόθεν συνοικεστιν μέλλοντος προβαίνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνατρέχῃ ὁ ζητῶν μετὰ συν (= Skutariotes) εἰς τὴν ἡμῶν μετρίτησι καὶ δοκιμασίας πρότερον κατὰ τὸ ὑπελάμενον τῇ χριστιανικῇ καταστάσει ἐννόμου γινομένης διδᾶται ἡ προτροπή καὶ ἡ βοῦλλα ἐντεῦθεν, ἵνα κτλ.; Dar. Reg. 2329.
Bei dem übernächsten Fall (e) erhält “die Phake” 1 1/2 Kokkia, einen sehr bescheidenen Betrag, für die Übermittlung der Bulle oder die Einsegnung selbst (?).

d) Der Priester Photios setzt die Reihe jener Priester fort, die—im Einverständnis mit dem Chartophylax—eine Einsegnung mit Bullen ohne die Überprüfung und Genehmigung seitens des Patriarchen durchführen.

e) Ausführlich wird im volkstümlichen Erzählstil mit Anakoluth begonnen (sie hatte einen Mann; der machte sich aus dem Staub). Die Eltern versuchten, unter Einschaltung der Synode, eine Dispens zur Scheidung ihrer Tochter zu erhalten, natürlich vergeblich, da über den Tod des Mannes nichts bekannt war. Amparis jedoch setzte sich über die Entscheidung der Synode hinweg und brachte einen Anwärter für die “verlassene” Ehefrau herbei. Daß ein Chartophylax auf Grund seiner Stellung innerhalb der Hierarchie des Patriarchats gegenüber der Synodos endemusa eine Gegenposition einnahm, lag allerdings in der Verteilung der Einflußbereiche und kam nicht selten vor.\(^{15}\)

f) Auch im Fall des Katakalon konterkariert Amparis die Entscheidung der Synode. Er entwirft eine Urkunde, welche dem Katakalon—nach Zahlung einer nicht genannten Summe\(^{16}\)—die Scheidung von seiner ersten Frau ermöglicht, wobei dieser die Mitgiftgegenstände erhalten bleiben.

g) Die Euphemiane zahlte 6 Kokkia und erwies dem Amparis eine Reihe von “Gefälligkeiten,” um bei Lebzeiten ihres Mannes, mit dem sie Kinder hatte, einen anderen heiraten zu können. Hier ermöglicht Amparis—wie in (f)—gegen seine Pflichten die Bigamie.

h) Diesmal werden keine näheren Umstände für die μοιχοζευξία genannt. Dafür wird ein Priester namentlich als Zeuge angeführt. Der Sohn einer Protobestiaria dürfte nicht mittellos gewesen sein.

i) Auch für den letzten Fall wird ein Papa als Zeuge namentlich genannt. Die mit Hilfe einer Verleumdung durchgeführte Scheidung kostete l Hyperpyron.

Die Lektüre dieser Liste macht die Absetzung des Megas Chartophylax mehr als verständlich. Ohne auf den verstümmelten Schlußsatz einzugehen, der eine intendierte Ergänzung und Erweiterung des Siündenregisters voraussetzt, genügt jedes einzelne der hier angeführten peccata für eine Verurteilung des Amparis. So wurde z. B. der Hieromonachos Mankphas 1370 abgesetzt, weil er eine Ehe geschieden und den Mann mit einer anderen Frau verheiratet hatte.\(^{17}\)

Man hat den Eindruck, daß der Megas Chartophylax sein unkanonisches Verhalten routinemäßig ausnutzte, um sich zusätzliche Geldmittel und


\(^{17}\) MM I, Nr. 276, S. 531 f.; Dar. Reg. 2569.
Naturalien zu verschaffen. Für die Gefälligkeiten des Amparis scheint es gewisse, zumindest ungefähre "Sätze" gegeben zu haben. Die Weihe zum Diakon, aber auch zum Priester kostete in der Regel 1 Hyperpyron (1. a, b, c), nicht anders als eine Scheidung (2. i). Die Ausfertigung einer Genehmigung durch den Sohn des Megas Chartophylax kostete einmal 6 Kokkia (1. b), ein andermal 4 Kokkia (2. e). Wie ein Steuereinnehmer teilte der Megas Chartophylax seine "Nebenbezüge" in die Geldforderung und die Naturalien, die in etwa dem κοινωνίαν des Steuerbeamten entsprechen. Manchmal sind diese Naturalien gewichtiger als der Geldbetrag (1. a: 38 Kokkia Naturalien, 6 Kokkia in Geld). Während bei den Weinvierteln das Äquivalent in Geld wiederholt genannt wird (3 Kokkia: 1. a, b) und ähnlich bei den anderen Naturalien (besonders in 1. a), fällt dies bei den Fleischstücken weg. Die Wachskerzen spielen bei den "Naturalien" eine Rolle (1. a, b).

In summa erscheinen uns die Beträge, welche der Megas Chartophylax einnahm, recht bescheiden gewesen zu sein. Es entzieht sich freilich unserer Kenntnis, wie groß die Klientel des korrupten Archon wirklich war. Im ganzen ergibt sich ein trauriges Bild des Amtsmißbrauchs, das bei einem so hochrangigen Funktionär des Patriarchats umso abstoßender wirkt. Was hätte ein Theodoros Balsamon dazu gesagt, er, der das Amt des Megas Chartophylax in rhetorischer αὐξησῖς in den höchsten Tönen pries und den Exokatakoilos fast dem Patriarchen zur Seite stellen wollte!

Abkürzungen


Eigennamen


Βαλσαμών, Μιχαήλ: PLP 2122.


Εὐθόκιμος: Häufiger Name, aber nicht unter PLP 6237–43.

Möglicherweise mit PLP 91.892 (Addenda et Corrigenda zu Fasz. 1–8 Wien 1988) S. 93 identisch.

Εὐσημιανή: PLP 6364.

Θεολογίτης: PLP 7511.

Ιατρόπόουλος: PLP 7964.

Κατακαλόν: PLP 11.423. Der ausgediente freiwillige Soldat Katakalon bezog eine bestimmte Zeit hindurch eine jährliche Rente von 8 Hyperpyra vom Elias-Kloster, die aber seit Ende 1349 entfiel: Dölger, Regesten 2611, 2956.

Μαυριανός: PLP 17.411.

Μαυρομμάτης: Häufiger Name, aber nicht unter PLP 17.461–72.

Μουσπολούδης: Fehlt in PLP; vgl. aber Μεσπιλούδης PLP 17. 959; in der Exarchenliste Hist. gr. 47, f. 175v.

Πεζός: PLP 22.241.

Σαπουνάς, Νικόλαος: PLP 24.835; s. kritischer Apparat.

Σανδαμάριος Συναδηνός: PLP 24.796. Hier ist Βάρδας in Βερδαλής zu verbessern.

Σικελός: PLP 25.316.

Toponyme


2) Εὐγένιος: η πόρτα τοῦ Εὐγενίου, Janin, Constantinople byz., S. 293.


7) 'Ρωμανός, 'Αγιος: Janin, Églises, S. 448–49.
Sonstiges

δομέστικος: Die Domestikoi waren sowohl im Truppendienst wie in der zivilen Verwaltung, aber auch in der Kirche eingesetzt und erscheinen in verschiedenen hohen Rängen.


*Universität Wien*
The *Mazaris*: Reflections and Reappraisal

BARRY BALDWIN

I shall waste no time redoing what others have done well. Editors and historians have dissected much of the *Mazaris*’ historical content. Some details call for friendly augmentation or corrections, thanks to new (or newly noticed) evidence. Identification of narrator with author needs scrutiny; the equation is frailer than is presently admitted. Above all, the literary side demands attention. The general denigration of the *Mazaris*¹ is without warrant. It is partly the result of residual prejudice against Byzantine literature and the changes that had occurred and were still occurring in the Greek language. Another factor is widespread dislike of the extravagant puns in which the author indulges, also his endless streams of abuse, occasionally verging on the obscene. Little or no credit has been granted to his more subtle manifestations of humour. It is not enough simply to dub the piece “Lucianic” and leave it at that. Paradoxically, those who do this have not always divined the full Lucianic features. Our satire does (of course) owe debts to Lucian. But in respect of content, style, and vocabulary, the only fair way is to analyse it in its own contemporary terms. Judged thus, the *Mazaris* emerges as no strange and lamentable oddity, but an effective contribution to the rich late Byzantine tradition of imaginative comic writing.

The modern world was first made aware of the *Mazaris* by C. B. Hase,² a savant of Napoleon. The first text, with notes more valuable on philological than on historical matters, was printed eighteen years later by Boissonade.³ Next came the edition (with German translation) of Ellissen,⁴ a work of versatile virtue. But the really giant step was taken in our own time, with the publication in 1975 of a new text enriched with English

¹ As I shall style it for brevity’s sake, a procedure that does not beg the question of authorship, on which see below.
² *Notices et Extraits de Manuscrits* IX.2 (Paris 1813) 131–41.
translation and detailed commentary by a quartet of scholars at Buffalo led by the late Leendert Westerink.5

Other significant contributions6 include Treu's publication of an epilogue to the *Mazaris* found only in a manuscript not used by Boissonade or Ellissen,7 Tozer's pioneering study of its language and style,8 Trapp's ingenious prosopographical identifications,9 and the Russian translation and commentary by S. P. Kondrat'ev and T. M. Sokolova.10 However, little has been done in recent years, a 1976 item11 being the only post-Buffalo study listed in the 1991 notice in the *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*.12

The *Mazaris* is a valuable document for students of the reign and writings of Manuel II and for the history of both Constantinople and the Morea in that period. As such, it has been duly appreciated and exploited by the best of them, notably Barker13 and Dennis.14 Thus, for Barker the *Mazaris* is "fascinating" and "remarkable," whilst Dennis aptly reminds us to consider the original impact of now obscure items in it: "While the names and allusions are lost on us, they may once have called forth snickers or even gales of laughter at the Byzantine court."15 Another expert plaudit is that of Nicol: "The picture is clearly exaggerated, its accuracy is often questionable, and many of the personal allusions remain enigmatic. But the dreams of Mazaris declare rather more of the truth than the dreams of Plethon."16 Even for a writer17 to whom it is "a curiously disjointed work,"

5 The other participants in the seminar that produced this edition (no. 5 in the Arethusa Monographs series) were J. N. Barry, M. J. Share, and A. Smithies; for brevity's sake I hereafter refer to it and them as the Buffalo edition/editors. All references to the *Mazaris* are by page and line of this text.
6 The Buffalo edition (xxxv–xxxviii) provides bibliography down to 1975.
16 D. M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium* 1261–1453 (London 1972) 363; see below for the notion that Plethon is actually satirised in the *Mazaris*.
the Mazaris and Plethon are “two of the most interesting products of late Byzantine literature.”

Cheetham’s comments indicate the modern divide. Although it is an obvious compliment to be exploited as an historical source, it is rarely promising when a satire is valued more for this than its literary merits. At the latter level, the Mazaris has come in for much modern disparagement. “Die Hadesfahrt des Mazaris ist zweifellos die schlechteste der bis jetzt bekannten gewordenen Imitationen des Lukian,” opined Krumbacher. Approving this harsh verdict, the Buffalo editors themselves (vii) draw a firm distinction between its historical interest and “dubious literary merits.” Tozer, although willing to concede some praise to its humour, pronounced that “the Greek of Mazaris, however, is considerably debased from that of Timarion, a natural result of nearly three centuries of misfortune and degradation which elapsed between them.” Wilson, introducing an extract from the Timarion, dubs the Mazaris “rather similar but inferior.” The less judgemental Talbot says not a word about the literary qualities of the piece, whilst the equally sober Hunger permits himself such little grumbles as: “Frostige Assonanzen und Paronomasien finden sich allenthalben.” Perhaps the unkindest cut of all is the ignorance of a distinguished scholar who refers to the Mazaris as a “thirteenth-century poem.”

The Timarion with its similar setting and themes is a natural point of comparison. But it cannot be assumed that the author of the Mazaris necessarily knew the earlier piece. Most Byzantine literature had a small circulation and short “shelf life;” the Timarion survives in a single manuscript. Yet it lasted long enough to be abused by Constantine Acropolites (dead by May 1324) for its supposed blasphemies. No such reaction to the Mazaris survives, indeed no known reaction at all, though it shares with the Timarion a Hades made up of both pagan and Christian elements, one of the offending characteristics.

The dramatic dates of the constituent parts of the satire are clear. The main narrative falls between January and July 1414; the following dream and letter to Holobolus fall on and shortly before September 21, 1415; the ensuing correspondence between Holobolus and Malaces is dated October

19 Tozer (above, note 8) 264.
21 Talbot (above, note 12).
16 and 21 in the same year.\textsuperscript{25} These various precisions (the \textit{Timarion} has no such element) may constitute parody of Byzantine chroniclers’ style. Here we can point to the notable similarity between the opening of the \textit{Mazaris} and the early stages (5. 1–2) of George Sphrantzes’ \textit{Chronicon Minus} on the subject of the plague and the personal misfortunes it caused.\textsuperscript{26} It is not hard to spot other consonance between the \textit{Mazaris} and Sphrantzes, who (born in 1401 and a precocious courtier of Manuel II) was a younger contemporary. Both provide July as the month in which Manuel sailed for Thasos, although Sphrantzes (4. 1) gets the year wrong and only the \textit{Mazaris} (80. 23–24) specifies the day (July 25, 1414). Both (\textit{M}. 82. 5–13; S. 4. 1–2) single out the Hexamilion fortifications. Both (\textit{M}. 78. 18–21; S. 39. 8) bear down heavily upon the multiple vices of Albanians, an attitude with modern resonance.\textsuperscript{27} Both (\textit{M}. 22. 16–17; S. 32. 9) include such specifics as imperial documents signed in red ink. Holobolus (22. 17–18) has a special wooden box for his files; Sphrantzes (13. 4) waxes ecstatic over a large chest given to him by the emperor. Incidentally, such details, along with Holobolus’ list of things stolen from his house (bridles, saddles, books, swords, cauldrons, chairs, clothes, carpets, even the nails in the walls), help to answer a good question recently posed: \textsuperscript{28} “Basically, we don’t know much about Byzantine space, interior or exterior. Where did people keep things?” In punning and personal abuse, Sphrantzes is the equal of the \textit{Mazaris}, as when (40. 9–11) he observes that Crocondylus should have been called Crocodile (\textit{M}. 84. 12 has a similar joke), and when he describes Sgouromalles’ death as “sending his soul to the sewer with his excrement.” Finally, both share some stylistic elements. As Talbot puts it

\textsuperscript{25} Albeit Cheetham (above, note 17) 199 assigns Mazaris’ letter to Holobolus to 1416; cf. the Buffalo edition viii–xiii for a detailed exposition. Despite some confident modern assumptions, it is uncertain whether the various pieces were composed at different times or the same time. The references to them in the epistolary epilogue make it clear that they ultimately make up a single work.

\textsuperscript{26} Sphrantzes, who has frequent references to plagues (3. 1 mentions one in the capital before the end of 1413), here alludes to an epidemic of the winter of 1416 which raged through the Black Sea area; Mazaris (2. 10) states that the islands were affected before Constantinople. Descriptions of plagues, inevitably tinged by Thucydides, were frequent in Byzantine historians; cf. Wilson (above, note 20) 13 n. 1 for a survey.

\textsuperscript{27} E.g. J. Amery, \textit{Sons of the Eagle} (London 1948) 12, writing with first-hand experience of Albanians in the second world war, calls them (amongst many other things) “ungovernably proud, impatient of all restraint, utterly unteachable, hard to lead, great robbers, prizing honour above honesty, gold more than both and power beyond them all.” The Buffalo editors stress that “the Albanians, the Despot’s protégés and protectors, are the only group to be given any sort of positive evaluation.” Their claim is based on the adjective \textit{λατός}, describing Albanian attitudes to clothes and luxuries. But this epithet can bear the pejorative sense of “mean” or “pastry” (examples in LSJ) and, in any case, if the author wanted to put in a good word for the Despot’s followers, why abuse them so mercilessly in the rest of the sentence?

in her ODB notice, Sphrantzes' language is "surprisingly colloquial and includes a number of Turkish and Italian words."

Lampros²⁹ long ago suggested that our Mazaris might be identified with the monk Maximus Mazaris, who composed grammatical canons, and/or with Manuel Mazaris, author of a legend of St. Irene. Barker, Cheetham, Dennis, and Nicol all equate the narrator's name with the author's. Krumbacher³⁰ complained that the identification of author with monk could not work because Mazaris in the satire is married with children. The Buffalo editors counter by observing that he could have become a monk later in life. If so, on the usual³¹ principle that one took a monkish name with the same initial as one's former name, the author's may very well have begun with an M. Cheetham³² objects that a monk would be "out of character, surely, with the waspish satirist." Now, Cheetham must be naive if he supposes that a holy man is incapable of waspish satire. The scurrilities of a Luther come easily to mind, not to mention the extraordinary grossness of the Spanos, perhaps the work of a cleric and possibly contemporary with or a little earlier than the Mazaris.³³ A converted monk might have looked back with some embarrassment to the satire which so sharply pilloried fraudulent holy men and lecherous nuns. But monks in particular had long been fair game in Byzantine writing of all kinds,³⁴ hence no particular conclusions can here be drawn.

Nothing precludes the notion that the satire is anonymous, Mazaris being only the name given to the narrator, chosen for its relative rarity and its punning possibilities.³⁵ There are significantly more anonymous works in Byzantine literature than in classical. It might be thought a foolhardy man who would attack so many luminaries of the time, not excluding the emperor himself. Although it opens with the claim that the work is intended more as an amusement than serious comment, the author's epilogue suggestively requests that the royal addressee only have the thing read aloud

²⁹ S. P. Lampros, "Mazaris und seine Werke," BZ 5 (1896) 63–73; his suggestions are taken up by the Buffalo editors (xx, where other identifications are also canvassed) and Talbot in her ODB notice.
³⁰ Krumbacher (above, note 18) 494–95.
³¹ It was not invariable; cf. Talbot's notice of monks in ODB II 1395.
³² Cheetham (above, note 17) 323 n. 11.
³³ See the modern edition (Berlin and New York 1977) of this work by H. Eideneier.
³⁵ Mazaris is twice (24. 3. 26. 15) called "Meizares" by Padiates, this perversion being explained by the Buffalo editors as an insult to his greed; cf. Hunger (above, note 22) II 157 n. 211, "der zuviel nimmt." Holobolus is likewise ridiculed as "Holobodos" ("whole beef" Buffalo, "Riesenrindvieh" Hunger). But greed is not the issue. "Holobodos" is lambasted as a "moronic, drivelling, caught-in-the-act adulterer." Stupidity is here his dominating characteristic. One thinks easily of Sir Andrew Aguecheek in Twelfth Night blaming beef for his dull wits. In the case of Mazaris–Meizares, there may be a pun on the rare but Christian term μοζήρος, "bastard." If gluttony be insisted upon, μοζήρον, not in LSJ but registered by Lampe as a hapax for "bread basket," might help.
whilst at sea, not to an audience in the Morea, which would include at least some of its victims. Moreover, if he were aware of the Timarion and the counterblast from Acropolites, he might have thought twice about reproducing under his real name the offending medley of pagan and Christian elements in his Hades. As to the Timarion itself, most take it to be anonymous, not equating narrator with author.  

Beginning with Treu, most writers have taken the addressee of the epilogue to be Manuel II himself, thereby drawing large inferences about the relationship between author and emperor, transmuting the satire into a kind of court entertainment. Thus Barker: "This fact may add authority to its comments and prosopography, but it perhaps softens the seriousness of its vituperation and violent tone. This fact may also suggest that Manuel had a considerable sense of humour and was quite capable of enjoying a good literary joke at his court's expense, if not also his own to some extent." This last remark reflects the various allusions made to Manuel's short temper and irascible treatment of subordinates, criticisms said by Barker to be unique, albeit in the light of the emperor's own complaint that personal attacks on himself were ubiquitous, the compliment must be modified to read, "unique in extant literature."

However, the Buffalo editors (xiv) make a plausible case for the recipient being not the emperor but his son, Theodore II, Despot of the Morea. Apart from the criticisms of Manuel, they base their view on the recipient's being addressed as γαληνότατε καὶ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων χαρίτων κεκοσμημένε, precisely the formula used earlier (74. 31–32) to appeal to the Despot, where his identity is unambiguous. Barker's vision of Manuel and the Mazaris is thereby invalidated. However, the animadversions upon Manuel must hint at this son's attitude towards him.

"Wie dem auch sei." Barker does nudge us the right contemporary way. Satirist and emperor give similar accounts of Manuel's troubles with rebellious local leaders during and after the Hexamilion construction. Barker concludes from the Mazaris' version (82. 14–88. 7) that "we have a valuable complement to the relevant sections in Manuel's own letter and, indeed, a remarkable echo of the emperor's own attitude, which suggests perhaps a personal acquaintance with it." There are indeed several eye-

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37 Barker (above, note 13) 407 n. 19.

38 Barker (above, note 13) 406–07, where the relevant passages are collected and translated.

39 Ep. 17 (53 Dennis), written in 1391.

40 As would be Dennis' reconstruction (above, note 14) lx n. 126 of the circumstances in which Demetrius Skaranos left Constantinople.

41 Hunger's comment (above, note 22) II 156 on this issue.

42 Ep. 68 (207–12 Dennis); also translated with commentary by Barker (above, note 13) 302–09.

43 Barker (above, note 13) 316 n. 30.
catching correlations between Manuel’s letters and the satire. The dialogue concludes (60. 22) with the phrase σπουδάζων μᾶλλον ἦ παίζων, a sentiment reversed earlier (26. 19) and at the epilogue’s opening (98. 2); Manuel begins his second letter with παίζων μᾶλλον ... σπουδάζοντες. In a missive to Triboles, he cracks a Mazaris-like joke about being able to sit and jump at the same time. The satirical tirading against the fractious belligerence of the Morea’s inhabitants is (understandably) a major theme with Manuel (Epp. 51, 68). Corruption, simony, and associated evils, another Mazaris refrain, feature in Ep. 13, where public office is sadly defined as a springboard to wealth and glory. At 46. 12–14, the Mazaris rates the job of administering the salt mines above that of interpreter, albeit vulnerable to corrupt auditing. Manuel (Ep. 8) calls this job “a position of no importance, but still a position.” Taken together, these consonances bear out Barker’s view of the satirist as someone au fait with Manuel’s attitudes and (we may reasonably add) his way of speaking and writing.

The satire’s title is Ἐπιδημία Μᾶζαρι ἐν Ἄιδοι. As with the Timarion, neither classical katabasis nor Lucianic kataplous is used. Epidemia is a well-chosen noun, given its Hippocratic sense of rampant disease and the classical and patristic meanings of imperial and divine advent and presence. It does not seem to feature in the title of any other Byzantine Hadesfahr. It is subtitled as a πεζὸς of dead men concerning certain court officials; the last word in the Greek, συνομονατρεφομένων, is repeated about a dozen times in the text, a reiteration that functions as a kind of refrain.

The narrator is brought down to Hades before his time by a plague raging in the capital, a mise-en-scène reminiscent of the Timarion. He promptly meets Manuel Holobolus, a disgraced ex-imperial secretary, who savagely recounts his rise and fall, including mention of accompanying Manuel II on his famous mission for help to France and Britain. He has just begun to abuse another deceased royal secretary, Padiates, when the latter leaps out from a nearby myrtle bush and denounces them both. After a violent altercation, Padiates bangs Holobolus on the head with a stick. In response to the call for help, there rushes in Pepagomenos, a doctor said to have been an adept poisoner. He, followed by a series of other loquacious dead, engage Mazaris in mutually brutal conversation and tirades about rivals on earth, the corruption of justice, defalcations of the medical profession, and immoral monks and nuns. Finally, Holobolus requests

44 If a source for these contrasts is needed, it is likely to be Aristophanes, Ran. 392–93.
45 Ep. 9 (25–27 Dennis).
46 Dennis’ translation.
47 The author has a particular animus against the Xanthopoulou monastery—in this I agree with the Buffalo editors (see their note on 20. 23) against Boissonade, Ellisen, and Tozer, who took the allusion to be to the Xanthopoulos family. Such criticism may comport a crack at the emperor, whose spiritual father and testamentary executor was Macarius, a Xanthopoulos monk from c. 1397–1431; cf. Sphrantzes 15. 2, Dennis (above, note 14) 150 n. 6. This
Mazaris to take to the upper world a message to the emperor’s relative Asan, advising him also to settle in the Peloponnese, where there are prospects of a happy life.

Mazaris recurs there a year or so later, complaining to Holobulus in a dream and a letter that things have not worked out. The epistle inventories and denounces the seven ethnic groups of the Morea; it also lauds the emperor for crushing a revolt on Thasos and building the Hexamilion.48

In a further pair of documents, Holobulus ridicules the rich, highborn doctor Nicephorus Ducas Palaeologus Malaces, who has had to exchange the comforts of the capital for Peloponnesian misery. Malaces retorts that his stay there is enforced but temporary, and he prefers to hang on rather than go down to Hades.

The Buffalo editors (xiii) regard this exchange as “rather puzzling. Its only purpose seems to be to poke fun at Malaces.” But this in itself is always sufficient purpose: Vilipending individuals is the author’s greatest love. The sequence also allows him to encapsulate this penchant for mocking medicals and denouncing (to adapt a pun of his) the mores of the Morea. One might further surmise some personal grudge against Malaces. Allusions to buried gold, Malaces’ preparations of special medicines (poisons?), and profits made out of hospitals and officialdom (92. 19–24) all smack of malice or contemporary scandal.49

Some modern disquiet has been voiced50 at the Mazaris' format with its various pieces. But there is a very obvious model for this, namely the Saturnalia of Lucian, whose comic gallimaufrey encompasses a principal dialogue postulated by five letters: six related items, precisely as in the Mazaris.

Half a century or so earlier, the Saturnalia had been a marked influence on the Dialogue Between the Rich and the Poor by Alexius Macrembolites, who also tried in an essay to invest the Lucianic Asinus with Christian allegorical meaning, an enterprise doomed to failure.51 Now, the Asinus is

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48 As earlier seen, this section complements and is complemented by Manuel’s own accounts, esp. Ep. 68. Other sources confirm their picture, e.g. I. Zamputi and L. Malttezi, Dokumente për Historinë e Shqipërës të Shek. XV I (Tirana 1987) no. 303 (provenance Ragusa, from the Venetian State Archives), in which a ship is commandeered for the High Constable of Shkodra apropos of Manuel’s request for transport to the Morea to ascertain the local state of affairs and to solicit the views of Vlach, Albanian, Slav, and other local leaders to whom he had sent his envoys.

49 Malaces is included in a brief and confused notice in D. I. Polenis, The Doukai (London 1968) 142, a standard work oddly unmentioned by the Buffalo editors.

50 By, e.g., Tozer (above, note 8) 261; his criticisms of its disjointed nature are groundless.

dragged into the *Mazaris* (38. 15) by title to make a pun on a victim, Alousianos. The author, then, is alert to recent trends. Similarly with his attack (26. 25) on the “evil” Angelus family; some anonymous thirteenth-century political verses condemn this clan as entirely νόθον καὶ κακομυθές.

The Buffalo editors, Barker, and Dennis between them cover all the characters. By inadvertence or design, many of them are omitted from the *ODB*, including Holobolus, who is attested elsewhere. I subjoin two improvements of detail. The deceased Pepagomenos (34. 26) cannot be the homonymous doctor who was with Manuel in the Morea in 1415–1416, since he was still writing in 1433. Nor is Gemistus Plethon likely to be one of the judges punningly mentioned at 18. 31, for he had been exiled c. 1410 to Mistra, where he stayed until his death. Gemistus was not a common name, but one contemporary bearer of it is the addressee (perhaps a monk) of the seventh letter of Theodore Potamius.

This last also shows how the *Mazaris* enriches our knowledge of its period. Theodore Potamius is a denizen of Hades (44. 7–10), thus giving a *terminus post quem non* for his death. He is passed over by Boissonade and Ellissen, and does not make the *ODB*. Since the Buffalo edition came out, his letters have been published by Dennis. The *Mazaris* describes him as an orator who specialised in invective. This quality is not conspicuous in his letters, but *Ep.* 10 provides clear evidence that his rough humour and philippics had made him many enemies.

The author’s kaleidoscope of grotesques imbues the Byzantine, Latin, and Arab worlds with a vividly raffish atmosphere. Various effects are used, e.g. a tag from Aristophanes to describe the boudoir antics of an unholy nun (20. 5–6, 50. 20–21), a unique jawbreaker (42. 8 γυναικοφρενολήπτος) for a sex-maniac, or exotic words from French, Italian, Turkish—even perhaps English. The rumpleless Kassianos, the cuckold Malacenus, Machetaris of the lead-and-copper complexion, Pegonites the sodomite, and Klaudiotes the *soupasis* of pigs are but a few of the jostling crowd.

Mostly, they are “walk-ons.” But some are developed to effect. Take Andronicus the *myrtaites*, an obscure late Byzantine official, very rarely

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52 As will be seen, Lucian’s influence is considerably greater than this.
53 See on this Polemis (above, note 49) 13 n. 2.
54 As a correspondent of Joseph Bryennius; cf. Buffalo edition xvi.
55 See the *ODB* notice of him (III 1627) by R. J. Macrides, also the preceding one on the family at large by A. Kazhdan; the *Mazaris* is mentioned in neither.
56 Hunger (above, note 22) I 140 mentions only a monody by Potamius, and neglects the *Mazaris* reference.
57 Cf. note 15 above.
58 The author’s descriptive compound, μολιβδοχαλκόχρωος (36. 29), is in no dictionary: Did he know that lead was a whore’s cosmetic in classical Athens?
59 This Turkish official’s title is surely chosen to play on Homeric σῶς, making him not just the man in charge of pigs but the pig of pigs.
seen in literary texts. He is invoked three times60 (10. 14–15, 26. 3, 26. 28–29), always by a different character, always for a “sound bite” expressed in colloquial or punning Greek. This Andronicus had clearly been a quotable wag at court. Then there is the old statesman and lecher Antiochus, “hurrying from the shithouse as though from a boudoir”—a memorable image (40. 28–29). Dennis61 equates him with the homonymous old man gibed at by Manuel (Ep. 44) for being so dozy that he would nod off on horseback. Whore’s back is more the satirist’s impression, but the consonance between Manuel and the Mazaris is again striking.

This Hades has the pagan judges Minos, Aeacus, and Rhadamanthys (6. 3, 58. 1), and several glimpses of Cerberus, also (unlike the Timarion) of Charon. Prayers to the Almighty and obtruded mentions of the Last Trump boost Christianity amidst the infernal jumble. Unlike the Timarion, there are no great heroes or villains from the classical past, no Byzantine emperors or sympathetic characters; and nobody is being tried or punished.62

In a comparison disadvantageous to the Mazaris and Timarion, Ševčenko63 wrote: “Both the West and the East inherited the motif of a mortal’s descent to limbo from the apocryphal gospels, in the West, the utilization of the motif led to Dante’s Divine Comedy . . .” He is obviously right in saying that there is no Byzantine Dante.64 Still, apart from the “big two,” literary descents are quite pervasive in late Byzantine writing, e.g., the Apocalypse of Anastasia,65 an anonymous Lucianic dialogue of the dead,66 and later still the Apokopos of Bergadis and the Dirge on the Bitterness and Insatiability of Hades by John Pikatoros.67

Byzantine Hadesfahrten had a pagan tradition too. It stretches back to Odyssey 11. Some parody of this is no doubt intended in the scenes between Mazaris and his enquiring interlocutors, whilst Malaces’ preference for earthly misery over life in Hades smacks of Achilles’ famous preference for the same.

Although excluded by the Buffalo editors from their formal inventory of debts to Aristophanes (Clouds and Plutus dominate the register), the Frogs is a palpable influence both in details (e.g. cripples and myrtle bushes) and the general mise-en-scène—Hades, the encounters, the quarrels,

60 Not twice, and not for wise statements, as in the ODB notice (II 1448) of the myrtales.
61 Dennis (above, note 14) lv.
63 Three Byzantine Literatures (Brookline, MA 1985) 3.
64 For points of comparison and contrast between Dante and the Timarion, cf. Baldwin’s translation of the latter (above, note 12) 18–20, 22–23, and passim.
65 Salient points in the ODB notice (I 86) by Immscher and Kazhdan.
66 Cf. Hunger (above, note 22) II 155, for synopsis and bibliography.
67 On these, see, e.g., L. Politis, A History of Modern Greek Literature (Oxford 1973) 41–42.
the finales. To the author, Aristophanes is simply "The Comic Poet," as he is to Manuel.68

Lucian is naturally the most predictable inspiration. Descent to and return from Hades is a motif of his Philopseudes. The Mazaris owes him a good number of precise debts not acknowledged in the Buffalo edition.69 Others are a matter of opinion. The whip-marked and mark-free arrivals in Hades (6. 11–13) are traced by the Buffalo editors to Plato, Gorgias 524d7–25a4, but Lucian, Cataplus 24 is at least an equally likely source. This comports a generally important point. It is frequently unclear just where a tag comes from in a Byzantine author. For pertinent instance, when Manuel, Ep. 38 (103. 14 Dennis), quotes the aphorism "our treasures are ashes," Dennis derives it from the paroemiographer Zenobius, whereas Barker70 traces it to Lucian, Zeuxis 2.

"Mazaris" diversity of language is somewhat bizarre. In addition to numerous quotations from classical authors and from the Scriptures and an extravagant use of poetic and comic vocabulary, we find such distinctly modern elements as mediaeval terms as well as words and names of Western or Turkish origin." Thus the Buffalo editors (vii), justifying their low opinion of the Mazaris' literary merits. Tozer71 had taken the same tack, also dubbing the stylistic mélangé bizarre. In fact, what is odd is this modern reaction. A medley of pagan and Christian sources is commonplace in educated Byzantine writing. We see it, for relevant example, in Manuel's letters. In Hunger's words,72 "the mixture of pagan and Christian quotations was a pattern that was popular with many writers and can be traced back even to Clement of Alexandria."

As to the foreign words that stud the Mazaris, Tozer and company forget that some of the offending Latinisms had been established many centuries earlier in patristic Greek.73 Nor is the satirist unique in sprinkling loan words from elsewhere over his prose. Manuel sometimes did it, so did Anna Comnena and many other late Byzantine writers in various genres.74 And they deserve praise for such linguistic reality. It is the hyperatticism of a Tozer that is reprehensible. Our author lived at a time when French and Italian were strong influences on contemporary Greek, especially in the Morea, a time when, e.g., "monsieur" had entered the vernacular as μισέρ.75

68 Ep. 19 (59. 32 Dennis), where both share a reference to Chremylus' change of fortune in the Plutus.
69 See, e.g., Necyomant. 1, 6, 11, 20, 22 for some patent similarities.
70 Barker (above, note 13) 179; cf. 309.
71 Tozer (above, note 8) 264–68.
73 E.g. δομέστικος, δραυγάριος, κοβαλλάριος; cf. Lampe for details.
74 For convenient lists of examples, cf. R. Browning, Medieval and Modern Greek (London 1969) 89–90, not using the Mazaris.
As to more outré items such as "sir" and (if the text is right)76 "fox," English words in Greek are plausible enough in the aftermath of Manuel's visit to England. Moreover, the alternative to such foreign seasonings would be prolix circumlocution in the manner of classicising historians of late antiquity. The Mazaris is heir to the generous linguistic spirit of Tzetzes' little poem77 written to show off his phrasebook acquaintance with Latin and other tongues. He may not have really known much of these languages; it is the boast that counts.

Contemporary idiom and interest enliven many of the author's stale satirical themes. Greek writers had been grumbling about injustice and corruption ever since Hesiod. But it was a markedly popular topic in late Byzantine literature. Apart from, e.g., the Opsarologos and Porikologos, scathing criticism of the court was voiced by Grigorij Camblik, doubly significant in that he was metropolitan of Kiev from 1415–1419, hence coeval with the Mazaris, in which a collateral family member, Alexius Tzamblakon Caballarius, is vilified (10. 31–32). There is also novelty in Holobulus' onomastic mockery (18. 29–32) of the four kritai katholikoi, nicely harmonised with his own four misadventures. Again, nothing could be older hat than satirising the medical profession, but the author achieves a certain impact by applying to it the distinctively Homeric term βροτολογός, one that may comport some obscenity.78

Tozer is also hard on the Mazaris for its "farfetched expressions" and polysyllabic vocabulary, especially its jawbreaking abusiveness. Chacun à son gout, but, again, there is nothing novel about this in Byzantine writing, and not just comic writing.79 A fair number of words in the Mazaris either elude all modern dictionaries or are registered as unique or very rare. Examples include ἀβαρβαριστή, ἀναιμωτή, ἀρπακτικώς, ἀσολοικιστή, διαπορθμεῦς, δροπακίζομαι, κλεψία, νεκρέγερτος, οὐρέσιτροφος, φουμίζω, χαμαλευτικός, χειραλγοπόδαγρο, γευδουλάβεια.

A bit of detail will demolish Tozer. He brands as farfetched expressions ἀρχιθύτης for the Patriarch (2. 7) and πίστιν χαμαλευτικήν (70. 22–23) for "untrustworthy allegiance." Now, ἀρχιθύτης is a very rare word, not in LSJ or Lampe, and only once elsewhere according to Stephanus. We have it in the Mazaris' opening, applied to Euthymius II for his prayers to God to change the plague into a less lethal quinsy. The Buffalo editors observe that the canon by Mark Eugenicus in Euthymius'
honour does not commemorate this event. The point is surely that the author is here being humorous at the Patriarch’s expense. Moreover, though not in this plague context, this canon does apostrophise Euthymius to the effect that εἰρηνικάς τε θυσίας ἔθνες τὰς ἄνωμάκτους. It also has the expression ἐστετημένα πιμελή τῆς πιστεως, quite in tune with the one objected to by Tozer. The canon’s very first words, τῶν ἐγκωμίων ἡ μεγίστη θάλασσα, offer a specimen of overheated prose consonant with the Mazaris’ punning allusion to the rivers of Potamius’ rhetoric. Either the author is taking off this kind of thing or he is conforming to contemporary norms of style.

This canon also combines personal abuse with a derisive pun (τοὺς πολυκινδύνους Ἀκινδύνου τὸν λήρου κακόφρονας) on the victim’s name. An important point, because it is the Mazaris’ addiction to elaborate paronomasia that has earned it much modern condemnation. As George Eliot remarked, “a difference of taste in jokes is a great strain upon the affections.” Puns tend to attract strong reactions. I myself like them, though will admit that there are too many of the same sort.

Nowadays, many will be offended by the author’s racial humour, but I doubt this is really very harmful; after all, ethnic jokes are often invented and cracked by their victims. Those upset by slapstick humour and cartoon violence will not relish such episodes as Padiates smashing Holobolus on the head. Still, funny or not, these things do happen, hence may be deemed realistic. As Will Rogers put it, “everything can be funny as long as it happens to someone else.” Vulgar abuse of women is now pretty well outlawed in “correct” circles, but it was ubiquitous in classical and Byzantine writing (not just humour) and has always been a fact of life. The following real example is on a par with what the Mazaris alleges against the randy nun who captivated Holobolus: “Everyone shouts aloud, ‘Tosi is a whore, she failed in her duty, she got drunk, she had herself fucked all night by her new lover’.”

Jokes on sex are often puerile. The Mazaris is no exception with its poor pun on συνοπσία (28. 20–21). But the previously cited description of Antiochus and the merry details of his prodigal and promiscuous vintner

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80 Published by E. Legrand, REG 5 (1892) 420–26.
81 Just as the author has a tin ear for other kinds of repetition, e.g. of such linking phrases as ὡς ἔφη πεῖ (2. 13, 4. 22, 6. 4, 8. 26 etc.). In contrast, the style is effectively adorned by, e.g., the occasional use of the dual (24. 28).
82 Take, e.g., this example from J. Rosselli, Singers of Italian Opera (Cambridge 1993), via R. Parker’s review in TLS (May 7, 1993): “He (a dismissed singer) lurked behind a pillar and hit the conductor a mighty blow on the head with a stick; luckily a bowler hat muffled the blow.”
83 Also from Parker’s review of Rosselli (previous note).
84 The best comment on which may be this reminiscence from the London Sunday Telegraph (May 23, 1993): “The chaplain gave the traditional Grace, ‘Lord bless our intercourse.’ In those literate days, nobody in the kirk thought it worth a snigger.”
lady friend who lived by the Gate of St. Romanos (42. 10–13) show how much better he can do.

The author’s humour can often be scholarly and subtle whilst keeping in contemporary touch. He has a few sequences on food, a prime item amidst the Realia of Byzantine satire and epistolography. Holobolus advises Mazaris (8. 8–11) to feed off the meat and olives of the Morea, along with bread and nectar (a nice collocation of the diets of poor men and the gods), ham, and what the Buffalo editors render as “a very special soup.” The author’s term for it is actually “Panathenaic,” a seemingly unique description but one earning no comment from editors. We are clearly expected to remember ancient Spartan black broth. The humour may reside partly in geographical incongruity, partly in classical lore. And, when we recall that a noble family of late Byzantium associated with this district was called Maurozomes, some personal allusion might also be divined.

No doubt there are any number of recondite items which the modern reader is doomed to miss. This paper does not claim to be the last word on everything. But enough has been said to show that, judged on its own literary and contemporary Byzantine terms, the Mazaris becomes far more comprehensible and therefore far more enjoyable.

University of Calgary

86 See Athenaeus 688f and Pliny, NH 13. 6, for Panathenaic perfume; the former also alludes to Panathenaic amphorae (199d) and bowls (495a).
87 See the ODB notice (II 1319–20) by Kazhdan.

I am grateful for the opportunity to offer this token of appreciation to Miroslav Marcovich, an inexhaustible source of inspiration and learning for Byzantinists, a veritable—to use a phrase the Byzantines liked—living library.
Nuda Veritas:
William Abbott Oldfather on Classics at Columbia

WILLIAM M. CALDER III

I. The Document

The document consists of six typed pages of Columbia University, Department of Greek and Latin stationery with occasional handwritten corrections and additions. On the first page is written "Columbia Univ" in Oldfather's hand. The original is among the Oldfather papers at the University of Illinois. My doctoral student, Mr. Michael Armstrong, while composing a life and a full bibliography of Oldfather came upon it. The date is most easily early April 1938. Oldfather was guest professor at Columbia spring semester 1938. He had been invited 6 February 1937 by President Nicholas Murray Butler "to come to Columbia as visiting professor for the year 1937–38." The salary would be $7500. Because Oldfather had already agreed to be "Visiting Professor at the American School of Classical Studies in Athens during the first semester of 1937–1938" he was able to accept only for the spring semester. He accepted on 11 March 1937 "at a stipend of $3,750, together with an allowance for travelling expenses of $250." Clinton W. Keyes became executive officer of the Department of Greek and Latin on 1 July 1937, succeeding Clarence...

1 This paper was delivered as a public lecture at Columbia University on 21 February 1992. I am grateful for the animated discussion that followed. The paper has been much improved by the late Mrs. Moses Hadas, Dr. Donna W. Hurley, D. J. Kramer, Professors Charles Rowan Beye, Ward W. Briggs, Jr., Dirk Obbink, David Sider, Seth Schein, Laura M. Slatkin, and John Vaio. Most of all I am indebted to my student, Dr. Michael Armstrong (Kalamazoo College). I cite him throughout within. I have not entirely obliterated the style of oral presentation.

2 Nicholas Murray Butler to William A. Oldfather, 6 February 1937, William A. Oldfather Papers, 1904–1945, Record Series 15/6/20, Box 2, University of Illinois Archives. All subsequent citations of unpublished documents are from this collection. I am grateful to the Director of the Archives for permission to publish the documents they hold.


4 Oldfather to Butler (11 March 1937).
Young, who retired. Kurt von Fritz and Gilbert Highet were both appointed as visitors for the full year.

The document is not a letter but an aide-mémoire, presumably composed by Oldfather for use at a conference. Its origin can be reconstructed. In his original invitation Butler wrote:5 "We are carefully studying the future of this department and hope to be able to work out a plan that will preserve the distinction that Columbia has long held in this field. Such a study cannot be made hurriedly if the recommendations and decisions are to be wise." In a letter dated 714 Philosophy Hall, April 2nd 1938 to Frank D. Fackenthal, Secretary of the University, Oldfather writes:

From the general phrasing of President Butler's letter of last spring, though not indeed from any specific statement in it, I gathered the impression that it might be part of my duties while here to prepare myself to make an informal report to some appropriate officer of the University upon the organization and personnel of the Department of Classics.

Now I do not at all wish to do this, for it is an awkward and unpleasant thing to engage in, but if the making of some kind of comment is really a service that I am expected to render I am willing to see the thing through.

Fackenthal replied on 4 April 1938:

I have your letter of April 2 and am sure the President will understand your attitude as to reporting on the Department of Greek and Latin and will be glad to excuse you from doing so.

What seems to have happened is that Oldfather correctly surmised that Butler desired him to inform on the Department in which he was a guest. Oldfather drew up ca. 2 April 1938, that is after he had been there two months, his candid opinion but demurred from communicating his views to the administration. Butler, or at least Fackenthal, let him off the hook. Oldfather preserved the document among his papers. It is first made public here.

There is further information to confirm this. We know that 1937 was a watershed for classics at Columbia. Charles Knapp died that year and three of the old guard retired: Clarence Young, Frank Gardner Moore, and Nelson McCrea. Moses Hadas writes in his history of the department:6 "A University committee was appointed to plan the reorganisation of the

5 See previous note.
Department.” A working hypothesis is that the Committee wanted Oldfather to present his views. This manuscript then would be what he would have taken with him to the meeting.

I invited two distinguished senior scholars, present at Columbia in the thirties, and each still fully *compos menis* to control Oldfather’s evaluations. Professor Meyer Reinhold (b. 23 August 1909), whose famous Columbia dissertation, *Marcus Agrippa: A Biography* (1933) is still authoritative, declined. He wrote (15 October 1991), of what he knows, “Some of it I shrank from, some of it I have swept under my memory rug.” Fred W. Householder, Jr. (b. 1 February 1913), M.A. Columbia 1934, Ph.D. 1941 and lecturer in classics at Columbia 1938–46, now emeritus professor at Indiana, wrote a seven-page response of great value which with his permission (*per litteras* 16 June 1991) I shall cite throughout. His Columbia dissertation, written under LaRue Van Hook was the famous one: *Literary Quotation and Allusion in Lucian* (King’s Crown Press, 1941). Because I am not a village pastor, I shall not deliver moral judgments on Oldfather nor shall I speculate on whether his judgment was impaired for some unattested personal reason. There exists no evidence that it was.

II. Who Was Oldfather?

Historians of American classics attribute the origin of scientific philology in this country to three great German-trained men: B. L. Gildersleeve (1831–1924), Paul Shorey (1857–1934), and William Abbott Oldfather (1880–1945). Together they directed the dissertations of 170 American scholars. There were several women but not a single obvious Jew among them. The one surviving is Revilo P. Oliver. These scholars held leading positions in US classics for some 100 years and shaped the discipline. Hopkins and Chicago, where Gildersleeve and Shorey taught, were late foundations purposely modeled on Prussian research universities rather than on English boys’ finishing schools. Oldfather turned Illinois into a third Prussian university. Many American scholars today, myself for example, are their grandstudents. Both my dissertation directors were taught by Shorey. Let us look more closely for a moment at Oldfather. I have used in what I shall say the biographies of Professor Buckler and Dr. Armstrong as well as the


latter's bibliography of Oldfather's works, which I hope will soon introduce a volume of selected *Kleine Schriften*.9

Oldfather was born in what today is Iran on 23 October 1880. His parents were both Presbyterian missionaries. He remained a Presbyterian and a deeply religious man all his life.10 This accounted for his strong moral convictions. He was a descendant of Daniel Boone on his mother's side and he was of Silesian origin (Altvater) on his father's. His nephew was Edwin O. Reischauer, American ambassador to Japan. I have called him "German Scholar in America."11 He took a B.A. from Harvard in 1901 and an M.A. in 1902. He studied there under the grammarians William Watson Goodwin (1831-1912), Charles Burton Gulick (1868-1962), and H. Weir Smyth (1857-1937). From 1903 to 1906 he was instructor in Classics at Northwestern in Evanston (Illinois). He used his free time to become bilingual in German and to familiarize himself with German scholarship. In 1906 he matriculated at the University of Munich, receiving the doctorate in 1908. Armstrong has rightly called the German years "the central formative experience of his life." One recalls Gildersleeve. He heard the Hellenist and biographer of Nietzsche's friend, Erwin Rohde, Otto Crusius (1857-1918),12 the Latin text critic, Friedrich Vollmer (1867-1923),13 the ancient historian and socialist, Robert von Pöhlmann (1852-1914),14 and the great art historian and father of the conductor, Adolf Furtwängler (1853-1907).15 Like Gildersleeve, he remained a Germanophile throughout his life. This has caused Americans to call him a closet Nazi. The fact is that Pöhlmann


11 CW 74 (1980-1981) 249 = Studies (above, note 7) 11. Cf. Buckler (above, note 9) 346: "...his efforts to introduce German principles of higher education influenced not only his own University of Illinois but also the general development of modern American education."


13 See H. Rubenbauer, *BiogJahr* 202 (1924; publ. 1925) 68-103. He concentrated on the editing of Latin poetry.


15 See Andreas E. Furtwängler, "Adolf Furtwängler," in Briggs and Calder (above, note 9) 84-92.
converted him to socialism and his early political writings might have cost him his career in the McCarthy period. Some of these will be published in his *Kleine Schriften*. They differ considerably from Gildersleeve’s Civil War editorials. His dissertation was modeled on Karl Otfried Müller’s *Aegina*. It was entitled *Lokrika* and had been suggested by Smyth but was directed by Crusius. An expanded version later became the great Pauly–Wissowa article.\(^{16}\) The dissertation exemplified the *Totalitätsideal*, with Oldfather employing all sorts of available evidence, epigraphical, philological, archaeological, numismatic, and topographical. Because of what he says of epigraphy, one should recall that he was an expert at the editing of Greek dialectal inscriptions. The article was later praised by Wilamowitz, who normally had only contempt for P–W articles and people who wrote them.\(^ {17}\)

In 1908 Oldfather returned to Northwestern, but in 1909 went to Illinois to become czar of Classics there. He became full professor in 1915 and Head of the Department, i.e., *supremus inter inferiores*, in 1926 until his death by accidental drowning in 1945. This is no place to list his publications. Armstrong’s bibliography includes 252 items and omits the some 500 articles in P–W. No American approaches this. In my own library I have his Loeb of Aeneas Tacticus and the military writers, his great two-volume Loeb Epictetus with the two-volume bibliography to Epictetus, his *indices verborum* to Seneca Tragicus, Apuleius, and the rhetorical works of Cicero. Oldfather wrote books that last. He held that no one had the *bona fides* to write about ancient literature or thought until he had published at least one critical *index verborum* and a critical text “from the ground up” of one Latin and of one Greek author. Oldfather sensibly preferred authors off the beaten track because there were not so many manuscripts and there still was a lot to be done with the text.

He wrote much else, often articles of great brilliance, like his famous one arguing that Socrates was silent on trial.\(^ {18}\) He seems the first to have taught ancient athletics.\(^ {19}\) His lectures survive. He was Sather Professor\(^ {20}\) in spring 1934 and spoke on “The Decline of Culture within the Roman Empire.” In 1938, the year of his guest-professorship at Columbia, he was

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\(^{16}\) *RE* XIII.1 (1926) 1135–1288. For the dissertation, see *Philologus* 67 (1908) 412–72. For authoritative recent criticism, see E. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidæa* (Baltimore 1993) 164–65.


\(^{18}\) “Socrates in Court,” *CW* 31 (1937–38) 203–11. Oldfather’s thesis was accepted by Sterling Dow and long presented as truth to Harvard undergraduates in Greek History.


president of the American Philological Association and delivered the presidential address on “Some Ancient Thoughts on Progress and Decadence.” An extensive summary of the address was published in the *New York Times* of 29 December 1938. He asserted there that “gross maldistribution of wealth” had brought about the collapse of ancient civilization—a vestige of Pöhlmann. He drew parallels to the decadence of modern culture. The address received wide press coverage and Oldfather writes a friend: “... but it is frightful the way I have lost caste with my fellow classicists by saying anything that the ‘public prints’ could be interested in.”

He held a number of administrative posts within the University of Illinois and, as I have already observed, had time to direct 46 dissertations. At his unexpected death eleven large projects were left unfinished. His active participation in American classics on the national scale is clear in his over 30 years’ correspondence with A. S. Pease, preserved at The Houghton Library, Harvard. He was an eloquent speaker, an outstanding athlete, and a man of charismatic personality. His students called him “der Herr.” This was the man who in 1937–38 was invited to be guest professor at Columbia and whose opinion of the Department, with suggestions on what to do, was elicited.

The aide-mémoire begins with an evaluation of departmental members. First is the Jay Professor, followed by others in the Department in alphabetical order and ending with those affiliated with classics but in other departments. He continues with suggestions for further appointments and some general suggestions for improvement. The uncensored text follows. I have documented Oldfather’s comments with the remarks of Professor Householder and some exegetical scholia of my own. What he says is of interest not only for Columbia but because it reveals the opinion of America’s leading classical scholar on what a good department should be.

III. The Text

Van Hook. Once competent, gone lazy & superficial, popular in the bad sense, and now merely having a good time. A distinctly 2nd rate man holding the titular professorship in a first class institution.

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23 E. B. Harrison, who took courses from LaRue Van Hook (1877–1953) several years later remarks: “Probably fair.” Householder observes: “I agree pretty much with what Oldfather says. A nice guy, but not terribly bright.” He is remembered today for his Loeb Isocrates
W. L. Carr.\textsuperscript{25} Breezy and energetic; talks pedagogy and probably thinks it, too; working hard for the cause, but is a small man personally with cheap, poor taste, and pathetically incompetent to represent, or even to understand, the high cultural values with which it is his task to deal. Should certainly be made a member of the University Department of Classics and subjected to the control of colleagues who are also scholars.

Edith Clafflin [sic].\textsuperscript{26} Not particularly productive; a weak personality. M. Hadass.\textsuperscript{27} Cheerful and open-minded; apt to be fanciful; unnecessarily ingratiating; has neither the bearing nor the personality of a university professor; but has a good mind, if only he would use it seriously.

G. A. Hight.\textsuperscript{28} Brash, wise-cracking, garrulous, full of endless funny stories told in a smart-alec fashion; has never done anything of any volume. Oldfather at the time was living in Van Hook's New York apartment (39 Claremont Avenue). See \textit{New York Times} (7 September 1953) 19.

\textsuperscript{24} Oldfather first wrote "third" and then crossed it out replacing it with "2nd."

\textsuperscript{25} Wilbert Lester Carr (1875-1974) never took a doctorate although a fellow in Latin at the University of Chicago (1902-06). He was professor of Latin at Teachers College (Columbia) 1930-42. He was president of the American Classical League (1931-37) and began in 1938 his long associate editorship of \textit{Classical Outlook}. He edited or revised numerous schoolbooks. In short he successfully devoted his life to encouraging Latin in the schools. He never existed for scholarship. On 18 June 1937 he wrote a friendly letter to Oldfather briefly in New York before sailing for Europe.

\textsuperscript{26} For Edith Frances Clafflin (1876-1953), see \textit{School and Society} 77 No. 1995 (14 March 1953) and B. Bloch, "Edith Frances Clafflin," \textit{Language} 29 (1953) 219-20. She had taught Greek at girls' schools and was lecturer in Greek and Latin at Barnard College (1936-45) and special lecturer since 1945 at Columbia. E. B. Harrison observes that she taught C.U. Extension, later General Studies. She did not exist for scholarship.

\textsuperscript{27} For Moses Hadass (1900-1966), see W. M. Calder III, \textit{Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Eight 1966-1970} (New York/London 1988) 235-37 and "Moses Hadass 1900-1966;" \textit{CO} 69 (1991) 8-9. Oldfather's remark that Hadass was "unnecessarily ingratiating" must be seen in context. Hadass was 38 years old. He had been kept an instructor for 13 years and would not be made a member of the faculty until 1952. After James Loeber, Hadass is the most blatant example of anti-semitism in American classics. How other than ingratiating could he possibly behave toward the personification of the American Classical Establishment? For the difficulties incurred by Hadass' Columbia friend and colleague in English, Lionel Trilling, see S. Klingenstein, \textit{Jews in the American Academy 1900-1940: The Dynamics of Intellectual Assimilation} (New Haven/London 1991) 137-98, 232-40. The book is often superficial and poorly informed but certainly worth reading. Mrs. Hadass recalls that when Trilling was tenured he telephoned Moses Hadass to express the hope that his tenure would not adversely affect Hadass' future. Householder observes: "Hadass. I would rate him a little higher than O. did; he seemed to me to personify the virtues of a university professor. Of course he is also far and away the most productive of the lot. He and his wife (his first wife; I also knew his second wife, who had been a student in one of my classes) entertained us more than once, and we visited him at his summer place in Vermont. I would rate him as the second brightest of the lot."

\textsuperscript{28} For Gilbert Arthur Hight (1906-1978), see W. M. Calder III, \textit{Gnomon} 50 (1978) 430-32; R. J. Ball (ed.), \textit{The Classical Papers of Gilbert Hight} (New York 1983) 1-11; and T. A. Suis, "Gilbert Hight," in Briggs and Calder (above, note 9) 183-91. Hight was 32 years old at Columbia on a one-year appointment as Visiting Associate in Greek and Latin. Butler had hired him on the recommendation of C. M. Bowra, who had been offered a post but declined.
consequence, and never will; might perhaps succeed Carr, but is certainly not of professorial caliber.

C. W. Keyes.\textsuperscript{29} Shrewd but timid New England Yankee; amiable but defeatist; without requisite qualities of leadership or enthusiasm\textsuperscript{<>}, capable of doing fair work, but has finished very little in 25 years; lacks drive, inspiration, and willingness to accept responsibility; a fair second rate man, but not an exponent of Classical Studies of whom everyone should be proud. He is essentially a canny rustic who has quite surprised himself by appearing to make good in a great metropolitan university, and is afraid of being found out some day.

K. von Fritz.\textsuperscript{30} Learned but fanciful, writing too much, and without adequate thoughtfulness; exaggerating the importance of slight

Within the year he was tenured as a full professor, although six years younger than Hadad. Householder adds: "Here Oldfather was way off. Hightet was indeed full of funny stories, which he used to advantage in his lectures. And he did produce some work of consequence... And he had no particular interest in Carr's specialty, teaching future high-school Latin teachers." Ball (4) writes: "When the Scotsman arrived at Columbia, he joined a faculty including such senior scholars as Frank Gardner Moore, LaRue Van Hook, and Kurt von Fritz." In fact Moore had retired. Van Hook was on sabbatical and not in New York. Von Fritz was only six years older than Hight and like Hight and Oldfather a guest professor.

\textsuperscript{29} Of Clinton Walker Keyes (1888–1943) Householder adds: "He was chairman when I was hired, and was always friendly and helpful. He taught the Proseminar in things like editing, papyrology, epigraphy, etc., and did it well. I learned a lot. When I went to work for Westermann, I took over Keyes' edition and translation of the Columbia papyri. It was completely finished, with six or seven interesting excursus on the arithmetic of the papyri and other topics. When Oldfather wrote, K. already had a Loeb volume in print; not all Loeb volumes are real works of scholarship but I think that Keyes' was and still is." Householder refers to Cicero, \textit{De re publica}, \textit{De legibus} (Cambridge/London 1928 and later reprints).

Because Keyes is 50 years old and chairman, he is severely judged. See N. G. McCrea, \textit{CJ} 39 (1943–44) 319–20.

\textsuperscript{30} For Kurt von Fritz (1900–1985), see \textit{In memoriam Kurt von Fritz 1900–1985: Gedenkrede von Walther Ludwig mit einem von Gerhard Jäger zusammengestellten Schriftenverzeichnis} (Munich 1986) and E. Vogt, \textit{Jahrbuch der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften} 1987 (Munich 1988) 247–53. Ludwig (9) attributes without citing evidence the suggestion for von Fritz' Columbia appointment to Margarete Bieber. Householder observes: "I have no idea why Oldfather is so negative about von Fritz; I think he was undoubtedly the best classicist at Columbia, and the best scholar. I admired him very much... Perhaps I should be angry at him because, when I received an offer more than doubling my salary (from Allegheny College) he just wished me luck, but I suspect I am better off now than I would have been staying at Columbia. His article on the discovery of incommensurability struck me (and still strikes me) as a masterpiece." He means "The Discovery of Incommensurability by Hippamus of Metapontum," \textit{Annals of Mathematics} 46 (1945) 242–64. I also find Oldfather's evaluation inexplicable. One would have thought that he would praise a representative of German \textit{Wissenschaft} and a fellow contributor to \textit{RE}. The idea that he should have stayed at Rostock reveals utter ignorance of the circumstances of his departure, all the more inexplicable because Oldfather had spent the previous summer in Nazi Germany; see D. W. Hurley, \textit{TAPA} 120 (1990) 372 n. 65 and "Alfred Gudeman in Berlin, 1935–1942," \textit{Latein und Griechisch in Berlin} 35 (1991) 121–27. Or did Oldfather disapprove of his resignation? Von Fritz was 37 years old and Visiting Associate Professor for the year. His
considerations and much too confident about his conclusions, lacking in personal forcefulness and impressiveness; a distinctly second rate German professor, who might much better have stayed at home.

H. T. Westbrook. Has never done anything in the way of scholarship and never will. An affected accent and little mannerisms compromise seriously whatever effectiveness he might otherwise have. He is a mere teacher. No great university can afford to fill up with dainty dilettantes of that kind.


W. B. Dinsmoor, W. L. Westermann, and L. H. Gray. These are the only men of truly university caliber connected with any aspect of Classical Studies. They should perhaps be consulting members of a general university Department of Classics where their joint influence could be made to count, but no one individual be allowed to drown out either the department itself or the other two consultants.

English may have been feeble. Von Fritz certainly was the greatest classical scholar who ever taught at Columbia. Oldfather was simply wrong. Why?

An autobiographical document of great importance by Kurt von Fritz, entitled Die Gründe, die zu meiner Emigration i. Jahre 1936 geführt haben, now in the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich illuminates his departure from Rostock and his early American experience. See Appendix, below.

I have no idea who Westbrook was nor does Householder. He appears in contemporary catalogues as H. Theodoric Westbrook, A. M. with the title Instructor in Greek and Latin.

For John Day (1902–61), see C. B. Welles, AJA 66 (1962) 411. Householder delivers the Todesurteil: "After I left Columbia, Westermann gave the papyrus job to Day, and a few years later the volume came out, without any mention of Keyes, who had done the whole thing. This is the worst case of scholarly dishonesty I have ever encountered."

I know nothing of her other than that she appears in contemporary Columbia catalogues as Katherine Campbell Reiley, Ph. D. with the title Associate in Greek and Latin in Barnard College.

James H. Oliver (1905–81), a native New Yorker, was assistant professor of history in Barnard College (1936–46). He was denied tenure and went on to a distinguished career at the Hopkins. His publications were largely in Greek epigraphy. Michael Armstrong notes: "Oldfather here condemns the scholar who can't teach." Householder observes: "I never knew him well, and O.'s estimate seems reasonable." I knew him rather well and agree with Oldfather's estimate. See J. W. Poultney, AJP 102 (1981) 242.

Oldfather first wrote but crossed out "and no appointment or advancement of any consequence should be made without their approval." That is the greatest scholars in ancient studies were outside the department. This bizarre state of affairs continued into my time when Elias Bickerman, Morton Smith, the Roman Lawyer Arthur Schiller, O. J. Brendel and E. B. Harrison were all outside of the Department of Greek and Latin. Householder agrees with Oldfather's assessment of Dinsmoor and Westermann and remarks of Gray: "I worked with him on details of his book on linguistics (Foundations of Language), which I found full of mistakes of many kinds. He was a nice guy, and I spent many hours at his house going over the book. I would not count him in the same league as Dinsmoor and Westermann, or even von Fritz and Hadas." For Louis Herbert Gray (1875–1955), see Who was Who in America?
In general I should judge that von Fritz, Hight, Westbrook, Hadass, and Day should be invited to seek advancement elsewhere. Older persons like Carr, Hirst, Reiley, and Clafffin [sic] ought to be retired as soon as the legal age is reached. Two or three men of professorial rank should be brought in at once. The best available, who would give the institution a high standing at once, as full professors would, in my judgment be R. P. Robinson, A. D. Fraser, and B. E. Perry. Benjamin Dean Meritt is worthy of the University, but his range of interests is pathetically narrow and it is doubtful if he could properly be called a humanist at all. C. J. Kramer [sic] is a man of great energy and personal effectiveness. He is, however, well placed and is perhaps, if anything, a little too drastic and assertive.

Three or four men should be added of the rank of instructor or assistant professor. The choice here is rather wide, and since it is impossible to tell whether men at that age will really make good, they should be appointed for strictly limited periods, with the understanding that they must make distinctly good in a really conspicuous fashion, within five years, in order to be reappointed.

The Department is too stiff and rigid in its course offerings, puts much too heavy a burden of instruction on its older and abler men, as the pedantic notion that every course ought to be given every year makes no allowance for the particular gifts and interests of visiting professors, who are fitted rigidly to an unreasonable system, and it lays far too much emphasis upon mere erudition and examinations. It needs a great draft of fresh air to blow through it, wake it up, cause it to believe in itself again, forget its pedantry, become more elastic, devote itself to sound scholarship and stimulating

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37 Rodney Potter Robinson (1890-1950), the earliest doctoral student of Oldfather, specializing in Latin palaeography and prose authors, long professor at Cincinnati.


40 For Benjamin Dean Meritt (1899-1989), see R. S. Stroud, American National Biography (forthcoming). For a party-line necrology, see AJA 94 (1990) 483-84. Oldfather's characterization hits the mark. He would become arrogant, vengeful, and unscrupulous.

41 He means the papyrologist C. J. Kraemer, (1895-1958), who professed at New York University (1923-1958) and chaired the department (1930-48).
teaching, and pay some attention to what the rest of the country and even the rest of the world is actually thinking and doing. In other words, it is rigid, timid, defeatist, feeble, pedantic, provincial, unproductive, and generally old-maidish. It simply ought to be wholly reconstructed anew. On both occasions when I have been invited to teach here I have been given a schedule 50% higher than that which I taught in my own University, and courses were simply assigned me with little or no regard for my preferences or particular abilities.\(^{42}\) On the present occasion I was given four different courses, three of them new to me, and asked to assume a Seminar in addition, but this last and wholly preposterous burden I managed eventually to escape, but not until I had been compelled to carry the matter almost to the limit of a point-blank refusal.

The men called here year after year for the summer session are common third raters whose repeated reappointment is nothing less than a source of wonder to outsiders. A more feeble and futile lot of appointments during the past 40 years I have never seen anywhere. The explanation is of no concern, but only the incontestability of the fact.\(^{43}\)

One or two lesser matters might be considered. The full force of the best men in the Department should be turned to the new required course in the humanities, no matter if that should make it impossible to give every year a course in every subject that has ever been offered here before. Without according linguistics anything like the inordinate emphasis which it claims for itself, at least some moderate degree of attention should be devoted in a large university department to the study of the classical languages as such.\(^{44}\)

\(^{42}\) The reference is to his correspondence with Clarence Young. In his letter to Young of 11 May 1937 he agrees to teach an undergraduate course on Herodotus, one on Tacitus and Martial (selections), graduate ones on Pl. Gorgias and Republic (selections), and Terence for graduates. Of the latter he writes: "The six plays will be read, two or three being interpreted in class. Lecture on the literary history of the period in Rome, the sources, the syntax, and the dramatic technique, together with some consideration of the general social criticism of Terence and his originals." The fifth course he refused to teach was Greek composition. The courses had between two and ten students each. He was never asked what he would teach. He was told what he would teach.

\(^{43}\) Householder adds: "Some of the outsiders brought in were of some note. I don't know who the repeated reappointees were that he found 'a source of wonder'. I taught every summer myself, and remember only one 'common third rater,' an Englishman whose name I forget, who was indeed not very bright. I think Keyes originally hired him out of pity, and later gave him a regular appointment."

\(^{44}\) Hadas (above, note 6) 177 explains: "But far more important [than John Erskine's Honors Course established in 1919] for the concept of general education is the fact that since 1937 virtually the same list of books has been the basis of the so-called Humanities course, which is required of all freshmen in Columbia College and occupies almost a third of their total class program. The course is administered interdepartmentally, and the Department of Greek and Latin has no special responsibility in its direction, but members of the Department do participate in the organization and in the teaching of the Humanities." Householder observes: "Hadas taught this every year, Highet taught it, eventually I taught it. We (all three) also
The Department ought also to be consolidated, reduced in size, the courses alternated, and the salaries of the younger men increased. The newly constituted department should be made up of American scholars. There is absolutely no need of going abroad when we have better men available here. If foreigners are to be imported at all, then they ought not to be second or third raters.45

The entire Classical collections of books ought to be brought together in some place where they can be readily reached and used by the faculty and advanced students. Under present arrangements it takes me from two to three times as many hours to do a piece of work here as in my own University, and it is not surprising that relatively little is actually produced by members of the staff, at least by those who are not able to own a large private library.46

I regard it as nothing less than a catastrophe that the control of appointments of the Department of Classics should be so distinctly in the hands of one single man, W. L. Westermann,47 a competent historian,

45 The xenophobia of an educated man of so international an outlook is unexpected. Household writes: "The paragraph about foreigners seems to be another attack on Hight and von Fritz." But one must see the remark in context. Oldfather was 58 years old. Until the Hitler purges no first-rate European classical scholar left Europe for America. There were occasional visiting lecturers, such as Dörpfeld or Gilbert Murray, or even under the Kaiser Wilhelm-Theodore Roosevelt Exchange professorships a guest professor. Eduard Meyer at Harvard in 1909–10 was the greatest. Before the purges, in ancient studies only the archaeologist Valentin Müller (1889–1945) emigrated to America. This is a case not yet fully explained. With the opening of the East Berlin archives I hope to be able to clarify it. There was a personal scandal, possibly a homosexual one, that caused Müller, extraordinarius at Berlin, to resign in 1931 and take an associate professorship at what for a German was the Mädchengenossenschat, Bryn Mawr. Hight was still very young. He had been appointed by Nicholas Murray Butler (a Stalin figure at Columbia) after Bowra refused the professorship offered him and had recommended Hight to Butler. Hight as a Scot in Oxford was mutatis mutandis in the position of a Jew at Columbia. Success in New York would be easier. I have discussed von Fritz (above, note 30). We must recall that neither von Fritz nor Hight had yet published their great works.

46 Oldfather had created at Illinois a Prussian Seminarbibliothek. He arranged the purchase of two great libraries which still form the nucleus of the collection. With the help of Wilamowitz he purchased the library of the Berlin Latinist, Johannes Vahlen (1830–1911), as he had earlier that of the Halle Hellenist, Wilhelm Dittenberger (1840–1906). For details concerning the Vahlen purchase see W. M. Calder III, CJ 72 (1976–77) 115–27. He writes the above obviously with Illinois in mind. With the building of a new library shortly after Oldfather's visit this problem was alleviated.

47 William Linn Westermann (1873–1954), an Illinois native and Berlin Ph.D. (1902) was professor of history at Columbia (1923–48). He was the friend of Arnold Toynbee; see A. J. Toynbee, "Professor W. L. Westermann," in Acquaintances (London 1967) 198–207 (an evaluation utterly different from Oldfather's) and W. H. McNeill, Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life (New York/Oxford 1989) 155. He was the last American classicist to play a role in the
Indeed, but only in an extremely narrow and unimportant aspect of ancient history, he is utterly without understanding of or taste for the aesthetic, literary, philosophical, and linguistic aspects of Greek and Roman culture. He systematically decries and belittles those humanistic values, which alone justify the continued existence of the Classics at all, in comparison with the trivial minutiae of the price of pigs, and the methods of writing fractions, or the barbarous bookkeeping in some wholly obscure and damnable village in decadent Egypt. Such narrow-minded specialists there must be, & of course, they must be fanatical about the value of their own work, or else nothing could possibly induce them to do it, but to allow a man of such domineering temper and such utter lack of cultural interests to control the entire future of the Classics, whose values are surely cultural if they possess any values at all, is just a kind of tragedy.48

There is but one thing, in my judgment, to do, and that is to turn to some classical scholar of judgment and standing, who has no personal ax to grind and absolutely nothing to gain or lose from the consequences of telling the truth—and then trust him implicitly.49 Such a man may be wrong, of course, but the present set-up is without any peradventure of a

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48 In defence of Westermann, he was not just interested in the price of pigs. He would publish, thanks to the intervention of Rostovtzeff, the article “Sklaverei” in Pauly-Wissowa, a masterpiece and certainly concerned with a central subject of ancient history. On the other hand Oldfather’s view of papyrology, and by implication of the sister discipline, epigraphy, agrees with those of Th. Mommsen and Wilamowitz. Mommsen regularly said “Dumm wie ein Epigraphiker” and Wilamowitz “Dumm wie Hiller,” a reference to his epigraphical son-in-law Hiller von Gaertringen. “DM-Wissenschaft” in the letters of Diels, Ed. Schwartz, and Wilamowitz is utterly pejorative. It means the mindless preoccupation with dis manibus inscriptions. Such work was done in Germany by wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter in the Academies, people of no importance at all in the academic hierarchy, under the leadership certainly of Mommsen for CIL and Wilamowitz for IG. Wilamowitz writes to Schwartz (30 June 1906), “Die Epigraphik als Specialität ist wirklich verdummend”; see W. M. Calder III and R. L. Fowler, “The Preserved Letters of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff to Eduard Schwartz, Edited with Introduction and Commentary,” Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften philosophisch-historische Klasse Sitzungsberichte (1986) 63 (No. 21).

49 The following year (1938–39) Giorgio Pasquali (1885–1952) was announced Visiting Professor of Greek and Latin at Columbia in Columbia University Bulletin of Information 38 (June 4, 1938) Announcement of the Division of Ancient and Oriental Languages and Literatures for the Winter and Spring Sessions 1938–1939 (New York 1938) 3. He was to teach Plato’s letters (“textual problems and those of authorship are considered”) and Greek text criticism and metrics “studied through the medium of the lyric portions of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon” (19). In Latin he announced Horace, Odes (20) and a year-long seminar on Plautus, Mostellaria. “The seminar is largely concerned with the attempt to distinguish between the material derived from Plautus’ Greek model and the Roman elements in the play. Attention is also paid to prosody and metrics” (21). If we may judge from the silence of his distinguished biographer, the visit never took place; see L. Canfora, “Giorgio Pasquali,” in Briggs and Calder (above, note 9) 367–75. He certainly fits Oldfather’s criteria.
doubt, utterly and hopelessly wrong, and is certain to perpetuate for at least another generation the present futile mediocrity of the Department of Classics in Columbia University.

IV. Conclusion

Why is this new document, the Oldfather evaluation, so important? I can think of four reasons.

1. Its author was in 1938 the greatest living American classical scholar. He had survived Gildersleeve and Shorey, his only competitors. There was no one more competent to judge an American department. A German scholar might arguably have been greater but he would not have known the American situation. If his judgment is wrong, it is wrong at the highest level and for revealing reasons. If it is wrong, we want to know: Why is it wrong?

2. The Columbia Department was and remains a leading American department. The Columbia case, expertly evaluated, therefore, is an invaluable witness to the state of US classics just before the impact of the Hitler refugees.

3. The document exemplifies an extinct genre. I do not think there is any American classicist alive today with either the competence or the courage to write what Oldfather did in the style he did. A bleeding-heart liberal could not do it. Conservatives would fear litigation. They would only say this sort of thing by telephone, which leaves no paper-trail.

4. A number of the problems addressed by Oldfather in this document are not limited to the 1938 Columbia Department. They are hotly debated today.

A. The role of Nebenwissenschaften. Is it better to write a doctoral dissertation on three boring papyri or on "Justice in Aeschylus"? Is a papyrologist capable of competently judging scholars for whose work he often has only contempt or which he has never proven he can evaluate? Roger Bagnall, a distinguished papyrologist become Dean of the Graduate Faculties at Columbia, is today's Westermann.


B. Should there be a place in a large classics department for courses on the teaching of Latin? Der Fall Carr: He taught at Teachers College but his courses were open to classical graduate students.

C. "He is a mere teacher." This is typically American. It is not German. Wilamowitz writes that he was first a teacher and his 72 books were done on the side. It is the fundamental problem in the profession today. One is paid to teach but promoted on the basis of publications.

D. The problem of women professors did not exist for Oldfather and so he does not address it. Their teaching was confined to women’s colleges. One of the most controversial issues in the profession today is the importation of foreign, usually English, sometimes German, rarely French (Princeton!) or Italian, classical scholars. Oldfather was dead set against it. The endowment of the three Gildersleeve and Lane chairs by Gildersleeve’s grand-daughter at Harvard, Hopkins, and Virginia is the largest single bequest in the history of US classical philology. It is comparable to what Loeb did for archaeology. Until now (June 1993) these chairs have only been offered to foreigners. This has caused much ill feeling. The last, current, and future presidents of the American Philological Association were all born in Europe. The question is, should American citizenship and American education rule over purely scholarly expertise? Should we buy Japanese cars because they are better made? American assistant professors to whom I have spoken agree entirely with Oldfather. Certent philologi!

I shall end by citing Professor Householder’s eminently sane summary:

I feel also that (in his view) the Columbia Classics faculty failed to treat Oldfather with the respect and courtesy which he deserved so much more than they did. In short, he was annoyed and angry with them all, for no clear reason.

My own view now, in comparing that group of classicists with other groups I have encountered in stays at Vermont, Cornell, Michigan, Colorado, Hawaii and Harvard and visits to Hopkins, Illinois, Dartmouth, Princeton and Michigan State, is that the 1938 Columbia Classics Department was about par for the course, with a few excellent people, a few duds and several in between.

52 The Oldfather biographer, Michael Armstrong, writes (2 March 1992): “I think the accent is on the adjective, not the noun. I don’t know whether Oldfather thought of himself, as Wilamowitz did, as primarily a teacher, but he certainly put immense energy into teaching and his students were devoted. Oldfather clearly believed teaching to be of great importance. Wilamowitz’ 72 volumes grew out of his teaching—but would we think him quite so great a man if nothing had grown out of his teaching? I suspect that to Oldfather a 'mere' teacher was one who put in his time in the classroom and then knocked off for the day.”


54 Fortunatas illas! The Canadians had no women’s colleges and hence no women professors of classics until the 1950s.
The reason for my emigration was that I was dismissed from my position as extraordinary Professor at the University of Rostock and entrance into any further academic position was made impossible for me, and in the end even the use of the University of Munich library was forbidden.

The immediate cause for my dismissal, but not the official stated reason, was a letter that I sent to the Mecklenburg Minister of Culture at the request of the Minister of Education and the Arts, about taking an oath of absolute obedience to serve the Führer. In this letter I explained that I could only take the requested oath if it was confirmed for me in writing by the highest authorities that on the basis of this oath an order could not be placed on me to teach anything at all that would contradict my beliefs.

The question of the oath had been discussed in the circles of the higher officers at the Rostock garrison as well as in the circles of my colleagues, who were not enthusiastic supporters of National Socialism. The predominant opinion among the high officers was that it would be a great advantage if the oath would be linked personally to the Führer, and not to National Socialism. So then it would say, "We need Hitler now in order to raise arms. He is such a fool, that surely he will be assassinated someday." To me this seemed a most dangerous calculation if these gentlemen did not want to take on the assassination themselves. Incidentally, it was characteristic of the morale and manner of the highest officers that the commander of the regiments stationed in Rostock, Colonel von Tippelkirch, allowed the Bavarian Minister of Culture, Schemm, to be arrested by a corporal and led out of the lecture hall, when at the request of the party before the garrison soldiers he gave a lecture and delivered a speech which displeased Colonel von Tippelkirch. The latter sent a report about this event to his superiors in Berlin, who completely approved of his conduct.

Among my colleagues at the University of Rostock, it was suitable for someone to swear the oath of obedience without reservations of conscience because the oath was made "by God" and consequently could commit one

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56 For earlier classics at Rostock see O. Kem, Die Entwicklung der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft an der Universität Rostock (Rostock 1906).

57 The humanist Werner Jaeger and even the Jew Eduard Norden hastened to sign the oath. Karl Barth is the only cited parallel to von Fritz for refusal on moral grounds.
to nothing that would contradict the laws of God. I did not challenge the
correctness of this interpretation; however, I was of the opinion that one
must give a loud and public expression to it; otherwise, everyone would
believe that the oath by everyone who has standing and influence in the
State would be made without restrictions and that, in turn, would bring to
the National Socialists an increase in power against which one could no
longer prevail.

In addition there was a lack of open opposition. As an example, the
following is interesting. The Nazi leader of the student organization,
Schinke by name, was baptized and raised as a Catholic. After the Roehm
affair,\(^8\) he went to the Catholic priest and explained that he was in a moral
dilemma. In reality many more men were murdered in connection with the
alleged Putsch than the Führer admitted. Here, therefore, the Führer had
lied. The priest answered that he had also heard such a thing, but he could
not verify it. At the insistence of Schinke, he finally admitted that the
Führer could have lied. At that the student denounced him: He had called
the Führer a liar. The priest was arrested and locked up. On the following
day, my friend, Professor Julius Ebbinghaus,\(^9\) who had taken the oath to
the Führer, demanded that Herr Schinke leave his lecture amid the wild
applause of his students. After a weak attempt at protest, he then did.

With me, who had not taken the oath, the Mecklenburg Ministry
attempted to negotiate many months by giving me orally all possible
reassuring explanations. I, however, insisted on a written and binding
explanation from the highest authorities. Finally, Governor Hildebrand of
Mecklenburg learned of the situation. He was so beside himself in rage that
a professor had held lectures for more than four months without having
taken the required oath, that the Ministry was almost brought down by this.
He ordered my immediate suspension from my post and the beginnings of
disciplinary proceedings “with the goal of dismissal from office.” At the
same time he announced my refusal in an address to the shipyard workers in
Warnemünde; he claimed that I was to blame for the fact that the secondary
school teachers in Mecklenburg did not want to hang the swastika flags out
of the windows. He closed with these words: “And the students still support
him!”

Since the National Socialists still at that time obeyed the law that
disciplinary proceedings with the goal of dismissal from office must be
publicly held, for the moment I was to undergo private questioning in order
to find out what I would say in the public interrogation. In this private

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\(^8\) The Röhm Putsch (= Night of the Long Knives) refers to the purge of 30 June–2 July
1934 resulting in the murder of Hitler’s earlier companion, the SA leader, Röhm (1887–1934).

\(^9\) The Ordinarius for Philosophy was also a political activist and had offered lecture courses
at Rostock on controversial subjects such as "Die Kriegsschuldsfrage als rechtspolitisches
Problem" (summer 1931) and "Wehrwille und Friedenspolitik" (1937–38); see G. Heidom et
al., Geschichte der Universität Rostock 1419–1969 I: Die Universität von 1419–1945 (Berlin
1969) 210, 288. That he in fact sided with the church against Schinke is revealing.
questioning they asked me all kinds of trick questions to which I gave for the most part very unpleasant answers. Unfortunately I have forgotten them, with one exception. This one was probably the decisive one. To the question of whether I believed the Führer could make mistakes, I answered: "To my knowledge not once did the Pope claim infallibility except in questions of dogma, and whoever believed that he could claim infallibility beyond that would certainly commit the worst mistakes."

After this pre-interrogation, the disciplinary proceedings against me were dropped—obviously because the Governor did not want to risk that such things would be said in public: a most remarkable sign of insecurity. Some three months later I received from the Federal Minister of Culture, Dr. Rust, a memo that I was dismissed on the grounds of paragraph six of the law concerning replacement of civil servants with tenure. This paragraph states that a civil servant could be dismissed if his position were no longer needed. At the same time, however, the Rostock philosophical faculty was ordered to suggest a successor for me. I permitted myself to inform the Minister of Culture that it seemed illogical to me to dismiss a civil servant because his position was no longer needed and simultaneously to ask for a nomination for his successor. His answer reads: "As in all cases of dismissal on the basis of the law concerning replacement of civil servants with tenure, the reason cannot go beyond the very reference to the paragraph in question." But I did receive "temporary wages" for six months.

Since I was now officially innocent as a lamb, my former teachers, Ernst Fabricius and Dragendorff, persuaded the faculty at the University of Freiburg to nominate me in the first place for an available chair in Freiburg. The faculty, however, were of the opinion that I was "politically intolerable." So I was forced to look for shelter abroad because I had saved little money and beyond the aforementioned six months' wages had nothing to live on.

Meanwhile there were however still several incidents, positive and negative, which threw a bright light on the situation at the time.

My passport was still valid for two years and was not to be confiscated in connection with my "transgressions." On the other hand, my wife's passport was about to expire; she applied immediately for a new one. As was customary then, the passport officials made inquiries of the maid concerning us. She was married to one of the shipyard workers to whom

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60 For Bernhard Rust (1883–1945), see R. Eilers, Die nationalsozialistische Schulpolitik: Eine Studie zur Funktion der Erziehung im totalitären Staat (Köln 1963) 112 ff. Werner Jaeger collaborated with him; see W. M. Calder III, "Werner Jaeger," in Briggs and Calder (above, note 9) 221. He was the only classicist at so high a level in the Nazi government.


the governor had given the aforementioned address. But she gave to the police an enthusiastic report about us. The passport official shared this with my wife, but then decided to ask my wife herself whether she was "politically trustworthy." My wife's answer was, "No one can really know that nowadays," whereupon the official issued a new pass for her.

The notice concerning my final dismissal came in mid-summer 1935. In order to save some money, we wanted to move immediately to my wife's relatives in Upper Bavaria. But the rental agreement for our apartment in Rostock was such that we could not terminate it until December 31st. We were greatly concerned about that because the rent for an apartment in Rostock would have exhausted nearly two-thirds of my available temporary funds. Since the owner of the apartment building was an enthusiastic SA man and had to know about the reasons for my move, we did not think at all about looking for a favor. But when I informed him that we wanted to move out in a week he voluntarily informed us that he wanted no rent from us beyond the day of our move, in the circumstances of the time, a completely unexpected and overwhelming act of generosity.

I went then to Upper Bavaria and worked daily on research at the University of Munich library, until at the end of 1935 I received from the director of the library a memo—without giving any reason—that in the future entrance to the library was forbidden to me. The director refused to reveal the reason for his measures. But my revered teacher, Prof. Eduard Schwartz,63 learned after his energetic protest that I was being denounced for having been seen together with a Jewish colleague <reading> in a French newspaper and having laughed at something in it.64 The ban on entering the library was carried out on the recommendation of the dean of the philosophical faculty. Luckily, two days after my expulsion from the library, I received an invitation to come to Oxford for two terms at Corpus Christi College and hold lectures on the history of ancient mathematics.65 There I also met the above-mentioned Jewish colleague, the historian Hellman.66 Unfortunately he, although he could have remained at Oxford, returned to Munich later and after several years was gassed at Auschwitz.

During my stay in Oxford I learned that the only friend67 whom I had in America and who shortly before had become professor at the University of

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63 For Eduard Schwartz (1858–1940), see Calder and Fowler (above, note 48), with literature there cited. For von Fritz' loyalty to Schwartz see Ludwig (above, note 30) 6. Because he was also President of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, Schwartz had influence.

64 This is confirmed at Ludwig (above, note 30) 8.

65 This was due to the initiative of Eduard Fraenkel: Ludwig (above, note 30) 8.


67 Professor John Vaiò, after inspection in May 1992 of the von Fritz file at Reed College, has identified the friend as William R. Dennes, Professor of Philosophy at Berkeley. In a letter
California, had arranged for me the offer of an "instructorship" (with the title "Professor") at Reed College in Portland (Oregon). In spite of the very small salary of $150.00 per month, I immediately took it. It was not easy to survive on this salary with wife and child. But the college proved itself, as far as colleagues and students go, the nicest institution where I have taught in almost 50 years of teaching.

University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign

of 26 April 1936 to the Reed philosopher Kirby-Miller, Dennes first suggests von Fritz as a one-year replacement for Kirby-Miller. The suggestion was realized by D. M. Keezer, president of the college at the time. Hermann Fränkel played no role. I thank Professor Vaio for this information.

^68 His stepson was later drafted and sent to post-war Munich, where he committed suicide.

^69 This said by a scholar who had taught at Rostock, Columbia, West Berlin, and Munich.
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