Philip II, The Greeks, and The King
346–336 B.C.

JOHN BUCKLER

"Gentlemen may cry, Peace, Peace!—
but there is no peace.”
Patrick Henry

The aim of this piece is to examine a congeries of diplomatic, political, and legal arrangements and obligations that linked the Greeks, Macedonians, and Persians in various complicated ways during Philip's final years. The ties among them all were then often tangled and now imperfectly understood and incompletely documented. These matters evoke such concepts as the King's Peace and the Common Peace, and involve a number of treaties, some bilateral between Philip and individual states, others broader, as with the Peace of Philokrates between himself and his allies and the Athenians and theirs, and finally the nature of Philip's settlement with the Greeks in 338/7. In the background there always stood the King, who never formally renounced the rights that he enjoyed under the King's Peace of 386, even though he could seldom directly enforce them. It is an irony of history that Philip used the concept of a common peace in Greece both to exclude the King from Greek affairs and also as a tool of war against him. By so doing, Philip rejected the very basis of the King's Peace as it was originally drafted and later implemented. In its place he resurrected the memory of the days when the Greeks had thwarted Xerxes' invasion, and fanned the desire for retaliation of past wrongs, a theme that Alexander would also later put to good use. 

The original version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Ancient Historians in Los Angeles on 4 May 1990. It is a distinct pleasure to offer heartfelt thanks to my friends and co-panelists Professors Ernst Badian and Stephen Ruzicka for their many helpful and stimulating ideas. We have not always agreed, and they are by no means responsible for any weaknesses of this piece, but their help has been indispensable. Only after this article was in proof did M. Jehne, *Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, Hermes Einzelschr. 63 (Stuttgart 1994) appear, too late for inclusion here. Although a fine piece of scholarship, it does not address many of the specific questions raised in this piece.

1 Proof that the King was instrumental in establishing the concept of a general peace comes from *Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 31–32*, in which he writes ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον...
The year 346 was remarkable for three peace treaties, each separate, although all involved at least some of the same numerous belligerents. The first was the Phokian general Phalaikos’ surrender to Philip that ended the hostilities between them. The next was the Peace of Philokrates between Philip and the Athenians that ended their conflict for control of the northwestern Aegean. The terms of the Peace of Philokrates bound most, but not all, of the major participants of the “War for Amphipolis.” Last-minute efforts to include Phokis failed; and Kersebleptes, who had played such a prominent, if undistinguished, role in the conflict was expressly excluded from it. The only Athenian allies who formally participated in it were the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy. Despite the number of Greeks involved, this treaty can in no way be considered a Common Peace, and was not so referred to in antiquity. That much should have been clear from the testimony of Aischines, who repeatedly mentions the failure of the Athenians to interest other Greeks in peace with Philip. This simple fact is hardly surprising, inasmuch as most of them were not at war with him, which of itself made a peace treaty pointless. Nor did they wish unnecessarily to become embroiled with him. Finally, the Peace of Philokrates did not include the King, who had played no part in these events.

tάς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι. D. M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) 147 and E. Badian in M. A. Flower and M. Toher (eds.), Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell, BICS Suppl. 58 (London 1991) 37 emphasize that he was ending a bilateral war with the Spartans and their allies, basing their argument on the next clause beginning with ὁπότεροι. If limited merely to that goal, one can reasonably expect terminology identical with that found in Thucydidès 8, 37, which includes only “the Lakedaimonians and their allies” on the Greek side. The King encompassed in the Peace of 386 even those states that had not participated in the war, a view independently proposed by R. Sealey, Demosthenes and his Time (New York and Oxford 1993) 13. Lewis and Badian do not realize that the King used his diktat both to end the Corinthian War and also to settle to his satisfaction the affairs of all the Greek states.

2 H. Bengtson, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums II (Munich 1975) 330 [hereafter Bengtson, SdA II].
4 For the term, see Isok. 5. 2; Aischin. 2. 70; Dem. 5. 14.
6 Aischin. 3, 73–74; 2. 84; Buckler (above, note 3) 132–34.
7 Diod. 16. 77. 2, who in fact pays little attention to this treaty. F. Hampl, Die griechischen Staatsverträge des 4. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig 1938) 58–59; G. T. Griffith, JHS 59 (1939) 71–79; Ryder (above, note 3) 149.
8 Aischin. 2. 57–61; 3. 58.
The last treaty came when the Amphiktyonic Council accepted the surrender of the Phokians, and resumed control of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi.9 Himself not then a member of the Delphic Amphiktyony, Philip nonetheless participated in the rites that concluded hostilities, and used the votes of his allies to establish a peace to his and their liking.10 Moreover, a Delphian inscription makes it abundantly clear that only some members of the Amphiktyony were formally involved in these events. Others were conspicuously absent.11 Sparta, Corinth, and Sikyon remained passive in the Peloponnesos; and when Philip explicitly called upon the Athenians for help in liberating the sanctuary, they refused because of fear.12 Furthermore, the term “Common Peace” is nowhere found in the document. Nor should it even be expected, for the Amphiktyony was a religious, not a political, association.13 The King was neither a member of the Amphiktyony nor a participant in the plundering of Apollo’s treasures. Therefore, there was absolutely no reason for him to be a party to these events. Philip had simply made possible a settlement by most, but not all, of the Amphiktyons concerning the sanctuary. He had in fact ended a war that had neither involved all the states of Greece nor had anything to do with the King.

Diodoros (16. 60. 3), however, states that the Amphiktyons established a “common peace and concord of the Greeks” (κοινὴν εἰρήνην καὶ ὀμόνοιαν τοῖς Ἐλλησιν), a phrase reminiscent of Andokides’ “common peace and freedom for all of the Greeks” (παντὸς τοῖς Ἐλλήσι κοινῆς εἰρήνης καὶ ἐλευθερίας, 3. 17). Here again the adjective koine modifies both nouns, and cannot be taken as a technical term. It is thus well to ask what Diodoros meant by a “common peace.” The use of it in the so-called “Reply to the Satraps”14 and by ps.-Demosthenes (17, Concerning the Treaty with Alexander) clearly dates it to the fourth century, and perhaps Diodoros found it in Ephoros. The latter, however, should not be assumed, if only because not one example of the phrase koine eirene appears in the 238 fragments of Ephoros that Jacoby prints in Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. Diodoros’ usage deserves separate treatment, but one best confined to an appendix (see below). The point here is that the Amphiktyonic Council could not officially conclude a “Common Peace,” as that term is generally understood by scholars today, nor did it attempt to do

9 Bengtson, SDA II² 331.
10 Fouilles de Delphes III.5 19, line 74; Dem. 5. 13; 19. 24; Diod. 16. 60. 1. Philip only later became a member of the Council; see ps.-Dem. 11. 4 and G. Roux, L’Amphictionie, Delphes et le temple d’Apollon au IVe siècle (Lyons 1979) 18, 166–67.
11 Fouilles de Delphes III.5 19, lines 71, 75.
12 Dem. 5. 14; 19. 51; Aischin. 2. 137.
13 E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy (London 1893) chapter 3; Roux (above, note 10) chapter 1; E.-J. Gehrke, Jenseits von Athen und Sparta (Munich 1986) 166–68.
14 Bengtson, SDA II² 292.
In short, neither the Peace of Philokrates nor the end of the Sacred War constituted a "Common Peace" analogous to the settlement that Artaxerxes dictated to Antalkidas in 387/6 and again in 375 or to Pelopidas in 367/6. Nor were these treaties of 346 identical with that made after the battle of Mantinea in 362. In 346 there was no single, joint convention of the Greeks and no one formal, general treaty of peace mutually accepted. Instead, most of the major and many of the minor Greek states had simply settled their differences for the moment in separate situations and under separate treaties, and that without the participation of the King.

It remains to observe what Philip and the Greeks made of this state of affairs. The general response of the Greeks, when it can be documented at all, was largely favorable to Philip, as even the Athenians grudgingly admitted. The Boiotians and Thessalians were pleased by Philip's diplomatic accomplishments. Demosthenes and Aischines, for once in agreement on a topic, realized that Athens had virtually simultaneously lost two wars. In the process, Athens had also lost Euboa, and Phokis was already politically dissected. The Peloponnesian allies of Thebes saw in Philip one willing to assist their friend and to continue the policies of Epameinondas. Although consensus elsewhere in the Peloponnesos was lacking, that was nothing more than a reflection of normal Greek politics there, and yet another sign that many states did not consider the treaties of 346 as a "Common Peace." In Elis the citizenry was hotly divided between those who championed Philip and those who opposed him (Dem. 19. 260). In Megara Philip's supporters were so strong that Demosthenes (19. 294–95, 334) claimed that they almost handed the area to him. The Arkadians and the Argives openly honored Philip for his efforts (Dem. 19. 261). Thus, by 346 Philip had won new friends in a region where his influence had previously been negligible, and he was beginning to draw the noose around the Athenian neck. Furthermore, he did so solely on the basis of his own achievements without reference to any "Common Peace" and without drawing unwelcome attention from the King.

If the point needs any further demonstration, the history of the following years readily provides it. As early as 344 Demosthenes complained that Philip was breaking the Peace of Philokrates, which he describes as a treaty only between Macedonia and Athens. Although he

15 In 368 Philiskos tried to restore peace at a meeting in Delphi (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 27; Diod. 15. 70. 2), but his presence there was independent of the Amphiktyonic Council. Delphi, like Geneva today, was presumably chosen as a neutral spot. See also Ryder (above, note 3) 134–35; J. Buckler, The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC (Cambridge, MA 1980) 102–04.

16 Bengtson, Sda II2 242, 265, and (for 371) 269; for Pelopidas, see Buckler (previous note) 151–60.

17 Bengtson, Sda II2 292, with bibliography.


19 Cawkwell (above, note 3) 108–13; Buckler (above, note 15) 145–47; G. Wirth, Philipp II. (Stuttgart 1985) 95–98; M. Errington, Geschichte Makedoniens (Munich 1986) 75–76.

20 Dem. 6. 2; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 30.
also claims that Philip had designs on all of Greece, it is clear that most Greeks thought otherwise, and preferred to let Athens settle its own differences with Philip. Nor for that matter is there any evidence to suggest that Philip then entertained thoughts of the conquest of Greece. He had far too much to do in the northern Aegean to think of further fields of conquest to the south. Decisive proof of the point comes from the embassy of Python by Byzantion to Athens, also in 344.21 Python and other ambassadors from Philip and his allies traveled to Athens to settle a dispute over the possession of Halonnesos. Python proposed to submit the question to the legal procedure of symbole and any other differences between Philip and Athens to arbitration.22 Neither symbole nor arbitration had hitherto been a part of a Common Peace in the classical period. Symbole was a commercial contract between two states in which any dispute was to be settled in court.23 Arbitration was normally a feature of peace treaties between two powers, such as that found in the Thirty Years’ Truce and the Peace of Nikias.24 Halonnesos was itself unimportant, but it provided the occasion to review the clauses of the Peace of Philokrates.25 Some Athenians urged in response that the peace be amended and others that it be rescinded in order to regain Amphipolis, Poteidaia, and other places.26 Still another ps.-Demosthenes, perhaps in this case Hegesippos, states specifically that the peace was limited to Athens, Philip, and their allies, and suggests that other Greeks should be included so that it could become a real and generally shared peace.27 Here is additional contemporary testimony that nothing so

21 Hammond and Griffith (above, note 3) 493–95; Wirth (above, note 19) 115.
22 Dem. 18. 136; ps.-Dem. 7. 7, 12–14; Plut. Mor. 804a–b.
24 Bengtson, SdA II 2 156, 183; M. N. Tod, International Arbitration amongst the Greeks (Oxford 1913) 179. Ryder (above, note 3) 84–85, 140–44 suggests arbitration as part of the Peace of 362 on the authority of S. Accame, La lega ateniese del secolo IV a.C. (Rome 1941) 175, but there is actually no evidence for it. Arbitration cannot be proven an ingredient in the Common Peace even in the late Hellenistic period: W. Dittenberger, Syllago Inscriptionum Graecarum II3 (Leipzig 1917) 665, lines 19–20. See also J. A. O. Larsen, CP 34 (1939) 378; 39 (1944) 160; Ryder 158–59, 161, but even here the evidence is at best inconclusive: M. N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions II (Oxford 1948) 179.
25 If ps.-Dem. 12 truly came from Philip’s hand, it would suggest that Philip also took the occasion to enjoy some fun at Athenian expense; see 12. 13–15, in which the author remorselessly proves the idiocy of the Athenian case. On the authenticity of the letter, see F. Wüst, Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346 bis 338 (Munich 1938) 133–36; H. Bengtson, Griechische Geschichte4 (Munich 1969) 301. According to ps.-Dem. 7. 33, the letter was still in the bouleuterion.
26 Ps.-Dem. 7. 13, 18, 22–23, 26–27; ps.-Dem. 12. 8; 7. 18 alone argues against the statement of Cawkwell (above, note 3) 124) that Philip suggested any amendments to the Peace of Philokrates (see also 7. 7–11). Indeed, Philip claimed (7. 32–33) that he had never agreed to amend the peace, which fully explains his offer only of arbitration.
27 On the authorship of ps.-Dem. 7, see A. Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, Eng. trans. (London 1966) 604. The words of ps.-Dem. 7. 30–31 have special importance: Περί δὲ τοῦ ἐπήρου ἐπανορθώματος, δ ὑμείς ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπανορθοῦσθε, τοὺς ἄλλους "Ελλήνας, ὅσιοι μὴ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς εἰρήνης, ἐλευθέρους καὶ αὐτονόμους εἶναι, καὶ εἰς τις ἐπ’ αὐτοῦς στρατεύῤ, βοήθειν τοὺς κοινωνοῦντας τῆς εἰρήνης, ἠγούμενοι καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο καὶ φιλανθρωπον, μὴ μόνον ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τοὺς ἡμετέρους καὶ Φιλιππον καὶ τοὺς
formal as the previous King’s Peace or the Common Peace of 362 was a feature of the Peace of Philokrates. The evidence is quite to the contrary. Nor did Philip accept the Athenian suggestion to broaden the peace. He obviously preferred to keep his diplomatic relations with other Greek states separate from those with the Athenians and some of their allies. Noteworthy, moreover, is that some Athenians now saw both Philip and the King as threats to Greek liberty (Dem. 6. 6, 11–12).

Immediately pertinent in this connection is yet another embassy to Athens in 344, this one from the King. The Persian ambassadors were received at a time when Macedonian envoys were also in the city. Philochoros, Androton, and Anaximenes report that the Persian ambassadors stated that the King considered it appropriate that the peace and the ancestral friendship between them be maintained. The Athenians replied stoutly that peace would endure between them unless the King attacked the Greek cities. The arrival of the Persian embassy had absolutely nothing to do with that of Philip’s. Artaxerxes at the time was engaged in reconquering Phoenicia and Egypt, and obviously wanted to recruit mercenaries, or, failing that, at least be assured of Athenian neutrality. Nothing better reflects the complexity of the meaning of the concept of the common peace in these years than the Athenian response to these delegations. First, the term *koine eirene* nowhere appears here, merely a reference to hereditary friendship. Yet the reference to peace in the context of the Persian delegation surely refers to previous treaties between the King and the Greeks. The Athenian allusion to the Greek cities obviously echoes the terms of the original King’s Peace, by which Asia was Persian and Europe Greek. It simply repeats the Greek sentiments expressed earlier in the so-called “Reply to the Satraps.” In essence, the Greeks considered a peace to be both *de facto* and also *de jure* in effect among themselves and between themselves and the King so long as he

---


29 E. M. Harris, *CP* 84 (1989) 36–44, denies that the Athenian response was haughty, yet the tone is decidedly firm, and reminiscent of the “Reply to the Satraps.” Sealey (above, note 1) 172 fails even to address Harris’ arguments.


31 In terms of hereditary friendship, the Argives had earlier done something similar, when they sent an embassy to Artaxerxes to ask whether the friendship that they had enjoyed with Xerxes was still in effect: Hdt. 7. 151.
confined his activity to Asia. Thus, the Greeks remained willing to abide by their part of the pact made in 386 and later renewed, the failure of the "Peace of Pelopidas" notwithstanding. Even though a multitude of events earlier in the fourth century makes the Athenian stance in 344 convenient, specious, and even sanctimonious, it was nevertheless legally correct.\(^{32}\)

If peace of whatever sort prevailed in Greece in 344, it did not elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. A detailed account of these years would go well beyond the immediate theme of this piece, and can be found elsewhere.\(^{33}\) Nevertheless, certain specific events pertain alike to the history of Philip's career, his relations with the King and some of his subjects, and with the Athenians, as well as to the topic of common peace. In the following years a single Macedonian policy both provoked renewed hostility with Athens and also brought Philip into conflict with the King. That policy was Philip's determination to subdue Thrace in order at the very least to anchor the eastern boundary of his empire on the western shore of the Hellespont. If successful, Philip would eliminate all Athenian influence in the northern Aegean, imperil the vital grain route of Athens, and give the King a powerful and perhaps unwanted neighbor.\(^{34}\) War with Athens, its allies, and perhaps other Greek states was quite likely, and Philip could not readily foresee how wide such a war would be. Granted that possession of the Thermopylae corridor gave him a solid defensive position in the south, and granted that many Greek states felt well disposed towards him, the fact nonetheless remains that he had not yet secured either their loyalty or their obedience.\(^{35}\) Even his settlement in Phokis had its dangers. Although the Phokians were physically and politically divided and garrisoned by Macedonians and Thebans, in terms of power the area was a political vacuum, one that Thebes could fill more quickly, if not permanently, than he, as the Theban occupation of Nikaia amply demonstrated.\(^{36}\) It thus becomes clear that until Philip had conquered Thrace he could not in any reasonable strategical terms think either of moving south against Athens and the rest of Greece or of mounting a major invasion of Persian territory.

\(^{32}\) Convenient: In 344 the Athenians were in no position to aid anyone. Specious: Iphikrates had earlier helped the Persians in precisely the same way that Artaxerxes requested in 344 (Diod. 15. 34). Sanctimonious: The Athenians were forced in 357 to recall Chares because he was leading rebellious Persian forces (Diod. 16. 21–22), but only after Artaxerxes' firm complaint. No diplomatic principles were involved in these episodes, only political expediency.


\(^{34}\) D. Kienast, \textit{Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden} (Munich 1973) 13–15 provides a discussion of Philip's Thracian ambitions and their place in his policy towards Persia.

\(^{35}\) For the strategic importance of Thermopylae, see Aischin. 2. 132, 138; 3. 140 with schol.; ps.-Dem. 11. 4; W. A. Oldfather, "Nikaia 5," \textit{RE} XVII (1936) 222–26; Buckler (above, note 3) 92–97.

\(^{36}\) Philochoros, \textit{FGrH} 328 F 56b.
Philip renewed his operations in Thrace in 342 and by the next year he had dethroned Kerceblepotes and sent aid to Kardia in the Chersonesos to baffle Athenian aspirations there. 37 Despite the vociferous denials of some Athenian orators, Philip had every right to protect his Kardian allies from Athenian depredations. 38 Nonetheless, his intervention in the Chersonesos brought him again in conflict with the Athenians. Moreover, he moved farther north in the defense of the Greek cities of the Hellespont, where he was at first welcomed as an ally and protector (Diod. 16. 71. 2). The Athenians responded by claiming that he had broken the peace, and Demosthenes urged that embassies be sent to various Greek cities and to the King to stop any further Macedonian advance. 39 According to ps.-Demosthenes (12. 6–7), the Athenians had actually proposed to send an embassy to the King seeking a common front against Philip. Whether true or not, such a delegation, if limited only to a defensive alliance, would not violate the terms of the Peace of Philokrates. 40 Nor does ps.-Demosthenes 12 at any time accuse the Athenians of having violated any Common Peace. These factors make the reference to the King especially pertinent in this connection. Gone is the image of the King as the traditional enemy of Greek freedom. Elsewhere as well Demosthenes (10. 52) tells his audience that the King harbors friendly feelings for all of the Greeks except the Athenians. 41 He reminds them that they deserve such treatment for having earlier spurned the King’s overtures (10. 34), an obvious reference to the events of 344. To mend this state of affairs he urges them to send an embassy to the King (10. 33), the latter a reflection of Demosthenes’ earlier policy (9. 71). Ps.-Demosthenes shows no patience with those who call the King “the barbarian and the common enemy of the Greeks.” 42 Although the Athenians apparently rejected his advice, at least some of them had obviously come to fear Philip far more than the King. He is ironically enough depicted as the one best able to protect the common liberty of the Greeks.

37 Kerceblepotes: ps.-Dem. 10. 5, 8; Diod. 16. 71. 1–2; Justin 9. 1. Kardia: Dem. 8. 14; 9. 16; ps.-Dem. 10. 60, 65; ps.-Dem. 12. 11; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 39–45. The two events are linked by ps.-Dem. 10. 15–18 and Dem. 8. 14.
38 Dem. 5. 25 (see also Diod. 16. 34. 4) in 346 admits that the Athenians had renounced any claim to Kardia in the Peace of Philokrates, thus leaving them no legal claim to it. Accordingly, Philip had no reason either to deny or to justify his aid to the city: Dem. 8. 14; 9. 16; ps.-Dem. 12. 11; see also ps.-Dem. 7. 39–45.
39 Dem. 9. 71; the passage referring to these embassies, though lacking in the best mss., is nonetheless printed by W. Dindorf and F. Blass, Demosthenis Orationes 4 (Leipzig 1901) ad loc.; ps.-Dem. 10. 33.
40 If these accusations be true, however, they would be still another sign of the increasing isolation of Athens in Greek politics, and cannot then be taken as typical of the attitude of other Greek states. Since the Athenians had long been sending embassies to the King (Hdt. 7. 151), there is nothing implausible about the claim.
42 Didymos 6. 63–64; Anaximenes, FGrH 72 F 9; see also Jacoby (above, note 28).
The purported reason for this new community of purpose, insofar as it can be documented, is that Philip had wronged both the Greeks and the Persians. In fact, Philip had as yet done nothing of the sort to either. The only flimsy evidence that Philip harbored at that time any hostile designs against the King comes from the inconsiderable cases of Artabazos and Hermeias of Atarneus. After the failure of his revolt against Artaxerxes, Artabazos and his son-in-law Memnon fled to Philip’s court. Yet Artabazos’ other son-in-law, Mentor, served so well as satrap of the Asian coast and overall commander of the Persian forces that he gained pardon for his kinsmen, who thereafter served the King faithfully. The two Persians could at most have provided Philip with information drawn from experience and perhaps with some friendly Persian contacts. Yet they could hardly have served as useful agents for any designs that Philip may have made on the King’s possessions. Nor had Philip harmed the Greeks during these years, his attention having been directed primarily against the Thracians.

The career of Hermeias of Atarneus, for all of its dramatic qualities, could not have prompted hostility between Philip and the King. Hermeias is generally depicted as a political adventurer who took advantage of the turmoil in Asia Minor to turn Atarneus into his own independent principality and to expand his influence into the Troad. Although ps.-Demosthenes calls Hermeias Philip’s agent, privy to the Macedonian’s plots, he probably played no part in Philip’s plans. There is certainly no evidence at all of any formal treaty between the two, and absolutely none to support ps.-Demosthenes’ claims about Philip’s intentions. A mere glance at the map will show that Atarneus could never successfully have served as a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia Minor. The political dimension of this relationship may have been nothing more elaborate than Philip’s desire to remain on friendly terms with Hermeias and his colleagues in the Troad. Hermeias in turn wanted to remain in good standing with his new neighbor in Europe, especially should the failure of his ambitions make it necessary for him to seek asylum. The fate of Hermeias had nothing to do with Philip. Hermeias had independently, briefly, and ultimately unsuccessfully set himself against the King, a part of a larger and common enough pattern in Asia Minor in these years. He paid the price of his failure with his life. Even his famous refusal to divulge anything to the Persians

43 Diod. 16. 52. 3; Buckler (above, note 3) 53 n. 35, with bibliography.
45 Diod. 16. 34. 4; Bengtson, SDA II 308, 318; Wirth (above, note 19) 121–23.
46 Ps.-Dem. 10. 32 and schol. to 10. 7; Didymos 4. 61–67; 8. 26–32; Theopompos, FGrH 115 F 250; Diod. 16. 52. 5. Although Wirth (above, note 19) 118–19 rightly sees an anti-Persian element in this relationship, Errington (above, note 19) 85 is correct in finding no long-cherished ambitions of Philip in the area. See also Sealey (above, note 1) 183.
47 W. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien (Marburg 1892) 298, nonetheless posits a formal alliance between them.
about Philip’s plans may have resulted more from his lack of anything to say than from any philosophical principle or political friendship.

Philip did give both the Athenians and the King cause for alarm, when he attacked Perinthos and Byzantion without clear provocation. The details are obscure, but the complaints against the two cities are doubtless specious.\textsuperscript{48} Philip and later Alexander claimed that Perinthos had wronged Macedonia and that Byzantion had failed to honor its treaty obligations, when it refused to take up arms against Perinthos. In terms of alliances, Byzantion had seceded from the Second Athenian Confederacy, and Perinthos had apparently followed its lead.\textsuperscript{49} Hence, they were bound neither by the agreements that had created the Athenian sea-league nor had they participated in the Peace of Philokrates. Byzantion had in the meantime agreed to an alliance with Philip that it interpreted as purely defensive in nature.\textsuperscript{50} The Byzantines clearly did not believe that Perinthos was the aggressor, and accordingly refused to answer Philip’s call to arms. Lastly, since Artaxerxes had never renounced his right to do what he considered “just,” he could consider it proper for him to intervene against Philip to defend the “autonomy of Greek states small and great.” Thus, in this incident at least two different treaties could be invoked, with each party interpreting the situation in the way that it wished.

Philip’s attacks on Perinthos and Byzantion drew Athens and the King, albeit independently, closer to a common goal of thwarting Philip’s ambitions in the area. At least one Athenian orator (ps.-Dem. 11. 6) even hoped that the King would become the paymaster of the Athenians in the effort to repel Philip. Although the King had never since the original King’s Peace attempted directly to enforce his will militarily in Greece, he was now in a situation in which he could do so with very slight risk. He intervened so effectively that the orator (ps.-Dem. 11. 5) averred that the mercenary soldiers of the satraps of Asia Minor had compelled Philip to raise the siege of Perinthos.\textsuperscript{51} Support for his claim comes from a variety of sources, some of them contemporary. Theopompos (\textit{FGrH} 115 F 222) reports that one Aristodemos of Pherai, who later commanded Greek mercenaries against Alexander the Great, had also served with the generals of the King against Philip. Anaximenes (\textit{FGrH} 72 F 11b.5) also testifies to mercenaries in the pay of the King operating against Philip in defense of Perinthos. Diodoros (16. 75. 1–2) states that the King ordered his satraps on the coast to assist Perinthos with mercenaries, funds, food, and material. One of the mercenary commanders was Apollodoros of Athens, who was

\textsuperscript{48} In the \textit{Letter of Philip} (ps.-Dem. 12) no mention of Perinthos is made, even though the matter figures prominently in the \textit{Answer to Philip’s Letter} (ps.-Dem. 11. 3, 5); Dem. 18. 87; ps.-Dem. 12. 2; Diod. 16. 74. 2; \textit{Arr. Anab.} 2. 14. 5; Justin 9. 1. 2–5.
\textsuperscript{50} Bengtson, \textit{Sda II} 2 318.
\textsuperscript{51} Philochoros, \textit{FGrH} 328 T 54; Diod. 16. 75. 1.
dispatched by Aristes, the satrap of Phrygia. An important aspect of this incident is that whatever the Greeks might make of the concept of the Common Peace, Artaxerxes still thought in terms of his original King's Peace. If he acted in 340 and not earlier, it was because these events provided him with a unique situation. He had never before enjoyed such a favorable opportunity directly to use military might to enforce his will in Greece without at the same time alarming the Greeks. Moreover, there was no one to stop him, and the scene of action was far removed from the mainstream of Greek politics. He could even justifiably argue, although there is no evidence that he did, that he protected Greek freedom from Macedonian aggression.

Sometimes associated with these events is the alleged treaty of alliance and friendship between Philip and the King, which surfaces in a very suspicious context. According to Arrian (Anab. 2. 14. 2), after the battle of Issos, Dareios sent Alexander a letter in which, among other things, he mentioned such a treaty. He also claimed that when Arses, son of Artaxerxes, became King, Philip first wronged him. The letter also observes that Alexander had sent no envoy to the King to confirm their ancient friendship and alliance. The events of 340 argue forcibly that the letter cannot be authentic. Nevertheless, even should one wish to accept it, it is obvious that the situation compelled Dareios to be as conciliatory and as aggrieved as possible. Alexander had just defeated him in pitched battle, Egypt was in the Macedonian's grasp, and even as Alexander read the letter he had the King's wife, children, and mother in his power. Dareios had every reason to bend the truth and to fabricate generalities of past amicable Persian and Macedonian relations. Furthermore, in his purported reply Alexander never acknowledges the existence of this treaty, much less does he defend his conduct by accusing the Persians of having been the first to violate it. Instead, he retails the various wrongs that the Persians had done the Macedonians and Greeks, a defense of Philip's publicly proclaimed reason for having invaded Persian territory in the first place. Alexander's letter provides no evidence whatsoever that the Macedonian was even aware of a treaty, which, even had it existed, would have had nothing to do either with the King's Peace or the Common Peace.

In his letter Alexander is himself guilty of trying to falsify history. He claims that Ochos at some unspecified time had sent a force into Thrace, then under Macedonian rule (Arr. Anab. 2. 14. 5). Yet it is virtually

52 Paus. 1. 29. 10, on which see J. G. Frazer, Pausanias's Description of Greece II (London 1898) 382–83; Strabo 16. 3. 5.
54 Bengtson, SDA II 333; Bosworth (above, note 44) I 228–33, with earlier bibliography. Wirth (above, note 19) 115 associates the treaty with the King's Egyptian campaign. Neither R. Bernhardt, Chiron 18 (1988) 181–98 nor Sealey (above, note 1) 308 n. 40 can prove a formal alliance.
impossible to substantiate the accusation. Theopompos mentions that Philip launched an attack on a Thracian tribe, the Tetrachoritai, also identified with the Bessoi, and the city of Agessos, to which Polyainos (4. 4. 1) adds that Antipatros played a prominent part in the operations. Some have put this incident in 340. Yet even without questioning the authenticity of a Macedonian campaign in this area, one cannot link the Persians to it. Geography alone is against any alleged Persian intervention in northern Thrace in this or, for that matter, any other time. Moreover, there is no comprehensible way that a Persian expedition to assist the Bessoi could be strategically significant to an effort to bring relief to Perinthos and Byzantium, even as a diversionary tactic. For the Persian-paid forces the distances were too great, the lines of supply too long, and the invading army too vulnerable to the danger of being cut off from its base. If Alexander’s complaint has any validity at all, which is extremely doubtful, he must have referred to the actions around Perinthos. If so, he was doing nothing more than gilding the lily, and so that particular claim should not be taken as a separate grievance. Perhaps the important aspect of his allegation, despite its meretricious nature, is that it brings the point of friction between Philip and the King once again to Thrace. The soundest conclusion of all, however, is that the entire matter of a Persian-Macedonian alliance as related by Arrian is an ancient fabrication.

The only other piece of evidence available also supports the view that Philip had no official ties with Persia. Plutarch reports a Persian embassy to Philip that cannot be dated. Philip himself was absent at the time, and obviously nothing came of the matter. It need not be doubted that Philip maintained contact with the satraps in Asia Minor and also with the King, but that hardly constitutes a treaty. Nor have historians found an appropriate and convincing place in Philip’s career for such a treaty. The only contemporary evidence to bear upon the matter comes from Demosthenes (4. 48). In 351 he claimed that some Athenians had spread the rumor that Philip had sent an embassy to the King, and immediately added (4. 49) that these rumor-mongers were a pack of fools. The important point in this connection is that the only contemporary witness, who was certainly no friend of Philip, displays no knowledge of any treaty between Philip and the King. Therefore, there is no need to postulate one.

Enough remains, however, to prove Philip’s distinct interest in Asian affairs but nothing more. Even his response to the King’s intervention in

---

56 Beloch, GG III2.1 548–51; Bosworth (above, note 44) 231.
57 Alex. 5. 1; Mor. 342b; J. R. Hamilton, Plutarch. Alexander: A Commentary (Oxford 1969) 13.
58 A. Momigliano, Filippo il Macedone (Florence 1934) 139 n. 1; Wüst (above, note 25) 89; Wirth (above, note 19) 148.
the Perinthian affair was defensive in nature. His new advances in Thrace
gave Philip additional reason to seek friendly relations with his immediate
Asian neighbors, as the incident with Pixodaros proves.\textsuperscript{59} Pixodaros of
Karia made overtures to Philip, seeking a marriage alliance. Philip treated
the matter with his usual caution. Nothing came immediately of the contact,
although Alexander would later reap the harvest of friendly relations
between Macedonia and Karia. Nevertheless, this otherwise insignificant
incident demonstrates both Philip's interest in Asia Minor and the
realization of dynasts there that Philip could be a potential friend against
the King. Yet nothing could be done in Asia until Philip had settled
Greek affairs.

In Greece meanwhile the Athenians declared war on Philip in 340.\textsuperscript{60}
The Macedonian victory over the Athenians and Thebans at Chaireoneia in
338 ended the period of open warfare. Victory also gave Philip the
opportunity to secure the obedience of the other Greek states. He first made
peace with his two opponents and their allies.\textsuperscript{61} He next entered the
Peloponnesos, where he settled a number of territorial disputes.\textsuperscript{62} Having
done so, he announced his intention to wage a war of revenge against
Persia, and summoned the Greeks to a congress at Corinth.\textsuperscript{63} Philip's
conduct can be put into a traditional context. It was by no means unusual
for Greeks to settle their differences and to choose a hegemon before
embarking upon a war. Some had done so before Xerxes' invasion.
Afterwards, without a formal peace having been concluded, some Greeks
joined with Athens to establish the Delian Confederacy.\textsuperscript{64} In the fourth
century the Athenians called upon the Greeks to form a coalition under the
hegemony of Athens to maintain the existing King's Peace. Similarly, in
378 Agesilaos had ordered Sparta's allies to suspend their various hostilities
before his invasion of Boiotia (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6. 4. 37). With the exception of
the creation of the Delian Confederacy, in which peace was not a factor, the
other examples display similarities. First, there is the concept of a generally
perceived external threat; next, the necessity for Greeks to pool their
resources against it; and lastly agreement among them on a leader that
commanded overall respect. Those assembled at Corinth in 337 concluded

\textsuperscript{59} Plut. \textit{Alex.} 10. 1–3; Hamilton (above, note 57) 25–26. \textit{Arr. Anab.} 1. 23. 7; Bosworth
(above, note 44) 1 152–53. With (above, note 19) 151–52 rightly points out that Halikarnassos
was too far removed to serve as a bridgehead for a Macedonian invasion of Asia.

\textsuperscript{60} Ellis (above, note 3) 179–80, with full references at 288, correctly interprets Philip's
seizure of the grain fleet as the last straw. Nevertheless, the Athenians are hardly innocent of
blame for the deterioration of relations, if only because they had earlier and needlessly
antagonized Philip in the Chersonesos: ps.-Dem. 12. 23; Dem. 8. 2; ps.-Dem. 9. 20, 23; schol.
Dem. 10. 1 et passim.


\textsuperscript{62} Polybios 9. 33. 7–12; 18. 14; Aelian, \textit{VH} 6. 1; F. W. Walbank, \textit{A Historical Commentary

\textsuperscript{63} Diod. 18. 89. 1–2; \textit{FGrH} 255, 5; Justin 9. 5. 5, 8.

\textsuperscript{64} Bengtson, \textit{Sda} II\textsuperscript{2} 130, 132, 257.
an alliance and elected Philip both hegemon and strategos autokrator of it. Philip immediately set quotas of soldiers and supplies to be contributed by the cities for the campaign against the King.

These conclusions lead to the question of whether Philip's settlement was considered a Common Peace. The answer, unfortunately, is not as simple as the question. Contemporary literary sources do not use the term until 330 (see below) and only two later secondary sources, Plutarch and Justin, apply it to this treaty. Plutarch (Phok. 16. 5) states that Demades introduced a bill enjoining the Athenians to participate in the common peace and the synhedron of the Greeks (η πόλις μετέχοι τής κοινῆς εἰρήνης καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου τοῦς Ἐλλήσιν), which he could perhaps have found in Krateros' collection of Athenian decrees. Justin's testimony is far less important, for in his eyes any large meeting of the Greeks could be seen as universal or common, and any state of peace that ensued would also therefore be general or common (9. 5. 2). Thus, he had earlier referred (8. 1. 4) to the Amphiktyonic Council as the "common council of Greece," which it decidedly was not. In fact, most contemporaries do not use the phrase koinē eirene in connection with the "Charter of the League of Corinth." Demosthenes (18. 201) speaks of Philip as lord of all Greece, and Aischines (3. 132) refers to the Macedonian hegemony of Greece against the Persians. Polybios (9. 33. 7) saw Philip as such a benefactor of Greece that he was given hegemony on land and sea. He further observed (9. 33. 11–12) that Philip forced the Greeks to settle their differences in a common body. Even Diodoros (16. 89. 1–5), who has at least once manufactured a Common Peace for posterity, the "Peace of Pelopidas," never applies the term to the settlement of 337. In brief, he states that after Chaironeia Philip wanted to be the hegemon of all Greece. In order to discuss with the Greeks matters of individual and general concern, he convened a common congress (koinon synhedron) at Corinth, at which he was elected strategos autokrator. Both Plutarch (Mor. 240a–b) and the Oxyrhynchus Chronicle (FGrH 255, 5) record the creation of a common congress and the election of Philip as hegemon and strategos autokrator, but nowhere is peace mentioned.

Despite this body of testimony, there is ample reason to conclude that Philip's settlement indeed included a de facto and de jure Common Peace as part of his settlement of Greek affairs. Likewise, common or general peace in Greece now certainly has become a well-understood notion without,

---

66 Roux (above, note 10) 1–59.
67 Walbank (above, note 62) II 171–73.
68 Ryder (above, note 3) 137–39; Buckler (above, note 15) 198–201.
however, *koine eirene* having become a technical term. The best monument to the complexity of Philip’s settlement and the most important is the contemporary inscription often referred to as the “Charter of the League of Corinth.” Here one finds peace. The question becomes, “Of what sort?” The answer is complicated by the fact that most of the left-hand side of the inscription and some of the right are lost. Hence, resort must be made to restoration. Yet with so much of the original wording gone, virtually any restoration amounts to speculation. It is moreover unsound method to base a historical interpretation on one restoration, especially when others are equally possible. For example, M. N. Tod prints the following text of lines 3–5 of the inscription:

\[
[ν 'Άρη θεούς πάντας και πάσας]ς· ἐμμενὼ [ἐν τῇ]
[i εἰρήνης. καὶ σύ λύσω τὰς σ]υνθήκας τὰ [ς πρ]
[δ]ὲ Φιλίππου Μακεδόνα, σύδ]ὲ ὀπλα ἐποί[ς ὦ ἔ]
\]

The stoichedon-count of the inscription is 33 but with irregularities. The extant parts of these lines read

\[
[... 22 ...]ς· ἐμμενὼ [...]
[... 21 ...]συνθήκας τὰ [...]
[... 21 ...]ὲ ὀπλα ἐποί[...]\]

Hence, there are 26 letters missing from line 3, 24 from line 4, and 24 from line 5, although the restorations of [σ]υνθήκας τὰ[ς] in line 4 and [οὐδ]ὲ ὀπλα ἐποί[ς 1 ἔ] in line 5 are obvious. Even though some formulaic material helps to fill the gap at the beginning of line 3, its end and the beginning of line 4 remain a mystery. In fact, most restorations of lines involving *eirene* in this inscription are among the most intractable. Restorations of line 4 range from Wilcken’s [τῇ οἰκουμένῃ] through Schwahn’s [ἐν τοῖς ὀρκοῖς] and Calabi’s [τὰς ι ποιναίς] to Tod’s and Wilcken’s [ἐν τῇ εἰρήνης]. H. H. Schmitt (SdA III 403) wisely rejects all of them. The same problem occurs in lines 7–8, where two possibilities are equally acceptable. Once again, with due caution Schmitt rejects the one involving *eirene* and prints another, though with hesitation. Likewise, in lines 9–10 Köhler suggests οὕθεν ὑπὸ τῶν Τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνούντων, a phrase that is indeed unrestored in Tod, GHI II 192, lines 12–13: οὕτῳ ξε ἀπασών τῶν πόλεων τῶν Τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνούσων, the inscription

---


concerning Alexander's restoration of the Chian exiles.\(^\text{72}\) Raue, however, posits [τκαὶς σπονδαῖς ἐμμενόντι]ων.

Lines 19–20 have the most direct bearing on the question of a Common Peace in 338/7. Schmitt is quite alive to the difficulties involved, when he prints [οἱ ἀδικοῦμενοι (?)] καὶ πολεμήσω τῶ[ι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην (?) παροβαίνοντι. If correct, this restoration would constitute only the second fourth-century epigraphical appearance of the phrase \textit{koine eirene}. Three other equally suitable restorations have also been proposed, none of them involving the word \textit{eirene}. Schwahn suggested instead τῶ[ι τὰς κοινὰς συνθήκας], with line 4 as support,\(^\text{73}\) Schehl τῶ[ι τάσσε τὰς συνθήκας], with lines 15–16 as support,\(^\text{74}\) and Raue τῶ[ι τούσδε τοὺς ὄρκους], unsupported by anything on the stone.\(^\text{75}\) Lastly, Heisserer prints \textit{koine eirene} without comment.\(^\text{76}\)

Only in line 14 is there an unequivocal reference to a sworn peace: τ[ῷς ὄρκους τοὺς περὶ τής εἰρήνης διήνυον. It is instructive that \textit{eirene} cannot be modified by \textit{koine} because of the stoichedon-count. The imperfect of the verb adds its own complications. Regarding the exchange of these oaths, it is impossible "to distinguish between the progress of an action and its mere occurrence"\(^\text{77}\) or as an act or process not yet completed. It is conceivable, but not demonstrable, that the process of formally concluding the peace had not been completed when the delegates met at Corinth. For example, the Spartans stubbornly refused to participate in these affairs.\(^\text{78}\) The epigraphical debut of the term may help to solve the problem. In Bengtson, \textit{SdA II}\(^\text{2}\) 292 one reads in lines 2 and 5 of a \textit{koine eirene}. Thereafter the noun is without any modifier but the article. At the beginning of this document, the Greeks were determined to emphasize the common nature of the peace among them and their desire to remain at peace with the King, so long as he refrained from interfering in Greek affairs. One does not find the same usage in line 14 of \textit{SdA III} 403, the first time in the inscription when peace is undeniably mentioned. The absence of the phrase \textit{koine eirene} in this context proves that it was not a technical term. As in 362 many Greeks and now the Macedonians had concluded peace without including the King. In fact, Philip had done precisely what the Athenians had urged in 344. The greater number of states involved made Philip’s settlement even a more extensive and general peace than that concluded after Mantinea in 362. Because peace preceded the formal


\(^{73}\) \textit{Klio}, Beih. 21 (1930) 2, 37.

\(^{74}\) \textit{ÖJh} 27 (1932) 115–45.

\(^{75}\) H. O. Raue, \textit{Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des korinthischen Bundes} (diss. Marburg 1937) 5–6, 72–74.

\(^{76}\) Heisserer (above, note 72).

\(^{77}\) W. W. Goodwin and G. B. Gulick, \textit{Greek Grammar} (Boston 1958) 1261b.

\(^{78}\) Plut. \textit{Mor.} 240a–b; Arr. \textit{Anab.} 1. 1. 1–2; 1. 16. 7; C. Roebuck, \textit{CP} 43 (1948) 84–89; M. Clauss, \textit{Sparta} (Munich 1983) 75.
congress at Corinth, at least in most cases, it could reasonably be called a common peace in a way that would generally be understood in Greece.

If the inscription recording Philip's settlement with the Greeks says nothing about a *koine eirene*, the phrase is likewise conspicuously absent elsewhere in contemporary Greek inscriptions, except in restorations that admit of other possibilities. The closest analogies come from Tod, *GHI* II 183 (= Schmitt, *SdA* III 403.112), lines 10–11, which is Alexander's renewal of Philip's treaty. Wilhelm, Tod, and Schmitt refuse restoration. Yet A. J. Heisserer in a masterful restoration prints [ἀλλὰ ἀπασαὶ αἰς κοινωνοῦσαν τῆς εἰρήνης], which is reminiscent of Tod, *GHI* II 192, lines 12–13: ὀτότους ἔξι ἀπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τῶν τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνοῦσῶν.79 Heisserer was the first to observe the four-bar sigma at the beginning of line 11, yet he also notes that in line 11 a sigma and a tau occupy the same *stoichos*, which suggests that similar irregularities are possible elsewhere on the stone, thus making certain restoration ultimately impossible.80 One will also seek the phrase in vain in the longer inscription printed by Schmitt (*SdA* III 446, the treaty between Antigonos and Demetrios and the Greeks). Although peace is mentioned several times (lines 22, 67, 72), it is never modified by *koine*, whereas war is (ὁ κοινὸς πόλεμος, lines 71, 77, 91). In these diplomatic contexts, *koine* and *koinos* are obviously as exclusive as they are inclusive.81

The problem of the nature of Philip's settlement is further complicated by still another technicality. There has long been a dispute as to whether the "Charter" is one of a Common Peace or only of alliance. Among recent scholars T. T. B. Ryder and S. Perlman claim that it is a Common Peace, largely on the basis of ps.-Demosthenes 17, but J. A. O. Larsen and A. J. Heisserer argue that the document is an instrument of alliance.82 The very clauses of the inscription support the position of Larsen and Heisserer. The first of them, lines 4–7, concerns non-aggression among those who had sworn the oaths sealing the agreement. A similar clause appears earlier in Bengtson, *SdA* II 280, lines 23–30, an alliance between Athens and Dionysios I of Syracuse, in which both parties agree not to attack each other. This stipulation is also found in the Peace of Nikias (Bengtson, *SdA* II 188), which alone suggests that things may not be as clear-cut as one would like. Lines 12–13 require that no state overthrow a constitution then

79 Heisserer (above, note 72) 4, 9, 80.
80 Heisserer (above, note 72) 81–95, where Heisserer remarks that "the lettering is undistinguished."
81 Compare Bengtson, *SdA* II 262, lines 21–22, referring to members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, as opposed to those outside it; Tod, *GHI* II 137, line 16, a reference to the common practices of the Greeks; and note 27 above.
in existence of a member state. This clause was very common in treaties among Athens and its allies.\(^3\) One finds a version of it in the “Charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy,” where each ally has the right to live under whatever constitution it wants (Bengtson, *SdA* II\(^2\) 257, lines 10–12). This right is repeated in a treaty between Athens and Chalkis (Bengtson, *SdA* II\(^2\) 259, lines 21–26) and in the alliance between Athens and Dionysios (above, lines 23–30). Lines 15–19 of *SdA* III 403 pledge to provide mutual assistance to any of the parties that had been wronged or attacked. This clause is standard in alliances, as can be seen from a host of inscriptions. The reference to peace, such as that found in line 14 of *SdA* III 403, is also common, parallels being *IG* II\(^2\) 34, 35, and 103. Finally, a fragment of *SdA* III 403 gives a partial list of the participants of the agreement, which again has an epigraphical precedent in Bengtson, *SdA* II\(^2\) 257.

Although the word “alliance” never appears in this document, even in a restoration, the fact of alliance is proven by the clear reference to the hegemon of the signatories in lines 21–22. A peace treaty did not have a hegemon, as witnessed by the Peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5. 18). The reference in lines 13–14 to a peace that was already considered sealed or in the process of being sealed strengthens the conclusion that peace and alliance were two separate parts of the same settlement, and that *SdA* III 403 dealt only with alliance. In fact, the “Charter of the League of Corinth” most closely resembles that of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which was also made within the framework of an existing peace.

Two other fourth-century sources later support the conclusion that Philip’s settlement, taken as a whole, was considered a Common Peace. The first is the Athenian orator known only as ps.-Demosthenes (17, *On the Treaty with Alexander*). In his speech, which is normally dated to 331, he repeatedly refers to a Common Peace with Alexander, and accuses him of several violations of it.\(^4\) One serious difficulty with the use of ps.-Demosthenes in connection with the events of 337 is the question of whether Alexander’s arrangements were a simple renewal of Philip’s pact or something new. Alexander, as had Philip before him, made some adjustments to the situation in Greece, especially in the Peloponnese.\(^5\) Other literary sources maintain that upon Philip’s death Alexander immediately demanded that the Greeks recognize him as hegemon, and that

\(^3\) Bengtson, *SdA* II\(^2\) 290, lines 24–34, an alliance among Athens, Arkadia, Achaia, Elis, and Phleious, which guarantees the existing constitutions of the participants.

\(^4\) Common Peace: 1. 2, 4, 16–17; violations: 4, 8, 10, etc.; G. L. Cawkwell, *Phoenix* 15 (1961) 74–78. Heisserer (above, note 72) xxvii, is quite right to note that no modern, systematic examination of this speech is available.

\(^5\) Polybios 18. 14. 6–13, on which see Walbank (above, note 62) II 568–70. On this problem, Schmitt, *SdA* III 403 (p. 14) provides an extensive earlier bibliography, and Seibert (above, note 82) 74–76 an excellent discussion of the problem. My thanks to Professor Dr. Ralf Urban, who is in no way responsible for my conclusions, for his letter of 19 March 1990, with his helpful comments on this topic.
he assumed all of his father's other rights. All of the evidence indicates that Alexander simply renewed Philip's settlement, and that he made his decisions regarding Peloponnesian affairs under its aegis. Furthermore, Alexander doubtless lacked the time, inclination, and the need radically to recast Philip's treaty. The second contemporary source is Aischines (3. 254), who in 330, immediately before the celebration of the Pythian Games and the meeting of the synhedrion of the Greeks, spoke against any Athenian decision to honor Demosthenes. Aischines' ostensible reason is that such a gesture would make it appear that the Athenians were sympathetic with those who violate the Common Peace. Hence, these two Athenian sources link the concepts of the Common Peace, the synhedrion of the Greeks, and the hegemons of an alliance with Macedonia.

Another episode, though not from a contemporary source, is singularly pertinent to this topic. Diodoros reports an incident that occurred in 335 during Alexander's siege of Thebes. Before launching his assault on the city, Alexander sent a herald to invite the Thebans "to share in the peace that was common to the Greeks" (καὶ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς τοῖς Ἑλλησιν εἰρήνης). The Thebans responded that anyone who wished to free the Greeks from tyranny should rather join them and the King. Although the Theban retort could conceivably refer to the abortive "Peace of Pelopidas" or more probably to the original King's Peace and its renewals, it is preferable to understand it as a denouncement of the state of peace in which the king of Macedonia had not only assumed the role of the King in Greek affairs but had also become the guarantor of the Common Peace. Significant also is that peace with the King is contrasted with a Common Peace shared by Greeks and Macedonians.

The evidence, taken as a whole, presents a reasonably clear picture of the settlement in 338/7. In effect, Philip did several things in quick succession. He brought about a state of peace among the Greeks in which the King had played no part. Next, he established a broad Greek alliance of which the King was not a member. Philip thus excluded the King from Greek affairs, and freed the concept of a general Greek peace from the notion of the King's control. Lastly, he intended to use this situation against the King. The peace was only a component, albeit an important one, of Philip's policy towards the Greeks and Persians. Hegemony was the

---

86 Diod. 17. 3. 1–2, 4. 9; Plut. Alex. 14. 1; Arr. Anab. 1. 1. 1–2.
87 Diod. 17. 9. 5; see also Plut. Alex. 11. 8.
88 As hegeomon of the League of Corinth, Alexander had the right and the duty to maintain the peace and alliance that Philip had established. It was also utterly necessary for him to assert his position in the face of the first serious opposition to it. Yet more was involved than mere propaganda or rationalization. By invoking the Common Peace, Alexander issued a singular ultimatum to the Thebans, as well as a practical way in which to end the rebellion. If the Thebans surrendered and honored the Common Peace, they would return to the fold of the Greeks. If not, they would betray the Greeks, just as their forebears had done during the invasion of Xerxes, this at a time when Alexander was preparing to take his father's war of revenge into Asia itself.
essential element in Philip’s plans, peace a means to make them possible of fulfillment, and war against Persia a traditional Greek way to bring them to completion.

The novel component of Philip’s policy was to use the concept of general peace in Greece for ends certainly not envisaged in 386 and later. Both in 362 and again in 344 Greeks had said that they were at peace with the King, and thus would not take military or naval action against him so long as he honored the peace. Yet for Philip peace in Greece formed the foundation for a war to avenge the depredations of Xerxes, a grievance that had nothing to do with the conditions that had led to the original King’s Peace. Since during the fourth century the King had not harmed the Greeks to any significant degree, a *casus belli* not covered by the King’s original edict must be found to justify Philip’s planned attack on Asia. For that purpose Xerxes’ invasion served his needs well enough.

Once he had made peace and alliance with the Greeks, Philip turned his attention to the King, so it remains to ask what his intentions were in this area.

It may be . . . that [he] never had a blue-print of expansion and conquest, complete with dates, but instead often responded opportunistically to crises brought about by the drift of events or the actions of others.

That is actually the opinion of A. J. P. Taylor of the ambitions of Adolf Hitler, but the evaluation seems far more appropriate to Philip.89 If Philip ever had a “master-plan,” he never revealed it to anyone who subsequently repeated it, nor lived long enough to implement it. Hostile sources hinder understanding and baffle speculation. Nothing of the extant evidence suggests that he had had any ambitions in Asia until the King interfered with his Thracian operations, specifically the King’s aid to Perinthos. Philip’s Asian contacts further suggest that the Macedonian’s ambitions were limited to the coast and to the environs of Asia Minor. The available evidence points to one reasonable conclusion. All of Philip’s known contacts with the King’s subjects and his rebels were with those in the immediate vicinity of the expanded Macedonian kingdom. As hegemon of the Greeks, he pursued a traditional Greek policy, one limited to the Aegean basin. There is absolutely no reason to think that he ever seriously looked beyond the Ionian coast. Seen in this light, one can justifiably conclude that Philip used the concepts of hegemony and peace in Greece to pursue a traditional and limited policy against the Persians. There is nothing to

---

suggest that he, like his son, ever seriously planned to conquer the entire Persian Empire.\textsuperscript{90}

**Appendix: King’s Peace and Koine Eirene**

The term *koine eirene* is as remarkably absent from extant fourth-century sources as it is prominent in Diodoros’ later account of Greek affairs. The most useful approach to the problem is perhaps to compare Diodoros’ interpretations of the treaties with the evidence of the fourth century. By casting Diodoros’ testimony in schematic form, one sees the following:

1. 14. 110. 3; 15. 5. 1 (387/6): The Greek cities of Asia are subject to the King, but all other Greeks shall be autonomous. Those refusing to accept these terms suffer war at the hands of the King and those who support him. The Greeks enjoy the *koine eirene* of Antalkidas.

2. 15. 38. 1 (375): The King sent ambassadors to Greece to conclude a *koine eirene*.

3. 15. 42. 2 (374): The Greeks no longer honor the *koine eirene* that had been made. Greek cities should be autonomous and free.

4. 15. 50. 4 (372/1): The King sent ambassadors to renew a *koine eirene* in accordance with former agreements.

5. 15. 51. 1 (371/0): Thebes not a participant in the *koine eirene* of 15. 50. 4.

6. 15. 70. 2 (369/8): Artaxerxes sent Philiskos to Greece to establish a *koine eirene*.

7. 15. 76. 3 (366/5): The King sent envoys to Greece to make a *koine eirene*.

8. 15. 89. 1 (362/1): After the battle of Mantineia the Greeks met to conclude a *koine eirene* and *symmachia*.

9. 15. 90. 2 (362): The Spartans were estranged from Artaxerxes because he had included the Messenians in the *koine eirene* on the same terms as the other Greeks.

10. 15. 94. 1 (362): Reference to *koine eirene* after Mantineia, obviously referring to 15. 89. 1, 90. 2.

11. 16. 60. 3 (346): The Amphiktyons established a *koine eirene* and *homonoia* among the Greeks.

12. 20. 46. 6 (307): Demetrios called upon the Rhodians to engage in war, but they refused to break the *koine eirene*.

\textsuperscript{90} For Philip’s ambitions, see S. Ruzicka, *AJAH* 10 (1985 [1992]) 84–91, whom I gladly thank for his kindness in having shared an earlier draft of his paper with me. The question is an old one: E. Badian in W. M. Calder III and A. Demandt (eds.), *Eduard Meyer* (Leiden 1990) 18–19. Perhaps the most nihilistic view ever presented comes from G. Clemenceau, *Demosthenes*, Eng. trans. (Boston 1926) 14–15, who claims that Philip waged his war against Persia "for ends that he never took the trouble to determine."
It is immediately obvious that in Diodoros' mind the meaning of *koine eirene* has not changed from his first use of it in 14. 110. 3 to his last in 20. 46. 6. Although by Demetrios' day there was no longer a Great King or a political system in Greece quite like that obtaining before Philip's victory at Chaironeia, Diodoros could nonetheless write of a *koine eirene* throughout the period, as though nothing at all had changed. The precise details of these various agreements differed, but Diodoros was indifferent to them.

The very concept of a Common Peace as a technical term is probably Diodoros' own creation, perhaps the result of his acceptance of Stoic ideas of universality, which range from the deity bringing nature into κοινήν ἀναλογίαν (1. 1. 3), the commonality of life (τὸν κοινὸν βίον 1. 1. 1, 2. 1), common affairs (1. 1. 3), and benefactors for the common good (27. 18. 2).91 Diodoros may very well have seen these fourth-century treaties in this very same light—pacts made for the common tranquility of mankind.

Whatever the interpretation of Diodoros' thought, fourth-century evidence tells a dramatically different story, one that can again be told most conveniently schematically in terms of nomenclature, participants, and treaty obligations:

1. The Peace of 386 (*SdA* II² 242) is called the Peace of Antalkidas (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 36; Plut. *Artox.* 21. 5) and the peace that the King sent down (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 32, 35–36). It may also have been called a *koine eirene*, if the restoration of line 13 of *SdA* II² 257 be accepted. *Basileus* (line 14) is preserved, as is part of syn[thekas]. The treaty put an end to the Corinthian War (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 35; 5. 3. 27; see also Plut. *Ages.* 23. 1–5). All states, with some specific exceptions, were to be autonomous, whether or not they had been belligerents (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 31; Plut. *Artox.* 21. 5–6; *Ages.* 23. 1).

2. The Peace of 375 (*SdA* II² 265): It is called a King's Peace (Philocharos, *FGrH* 328 F 151). The participants included the King (Dem. 19. 253), Sparta, Athens, Thebes, Amyntas of Macedonia, and most of the Greeks (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 2. 1; Isok. 15. 109–10; Aischin. 2. 32; Dem. 3. 16; 19. 253; Nepos, *Tim.* 2. 2). All cities were to be free of garrisons and autonomous (Isok. 14. 10).

3. First Peace of 371 (*SdA* II² 269): Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 18 mentions only *eirene*. The participants included the King, Sparta, Athens, and their allies. Thebes abstained. Terms called for general disarmament, and autonomy for all Greek states (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 12).

4. Second Peace of 371 (*SdA* II² 270): This treaty was called a King's Peace (*IG* II² 103, line 24). Although Athens, Sparta, and their allies attended (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 1, 3), Thebes presumably remained aloof. The terms were the same as those that the King had earlier sent down

91 For an excellent study of this aspect of Diodoros' thinking, see K. S. Sacks, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century* (Princeton 1990) 23–54, which supplants Ryder (above, note 3) xiv–xv.
(Xen.  Hell. 6. 5. 1–3). Included was an enabling clause whereby participants swore to take the field against anyone breaking the peace.

5. So-called Peace of Pelopidas (SdA II 2 282): Xen.  Hell. 7. 1. 39 refers to this pact between those Greeks who wanted to be friends of the King and the Thebans. Participation by the King is well attested, as is that of other Greeks (Xen.  Hell. 7. 1. 36; Plut.  Pel. 30; Artox. 22). Stipulations called for a recognition of Messenian independence, a disarmament clause aimed at the Athenian fleet, and an enabling clause that bound participants to enforce the peace militarily, if necessary.

6. Peace of 362 (SdA II 2 292): The first treaty unequivocally to be called a koine eirene in contemporary inscriptions, it is also described as spondai (Polyb. 4. 33. 8) and eirene among the Greeks (Plut.  Ages. 35. 3). Neither the King nor the Spartans were participants (Polyb. 4. 33. 8–9). The terms embraced general peace and alliance. The terms declared that since the Greeks had concluded a general peace, they had no quarrel with the King, who had not harmed them.

7. Peace of Philokrates (SdA II 2 329): Given its name by contemporaries (Aischin. 3. 54; Dem. 19; see also Dion.  Hal.  Epist.  ad  Ammaeum 1. 11). The treaty was one of peace and alliance between Philip and his allies and Athens and its maritime confederacy. The King did not participate, nor did Phokis or Kersebleptes (Dem. 19. 49). Aischines (2. 57–61; 3. 58) urged that other Greeks be allowed to participate. The terms recognized the principle of holding what one possessed (Dem. 19. 143; ps.-Dem. 7. 26), and included an enabling clause.

8. Peace of 346 (SdA II 2 331): It ended the Third Sacred War. The King played no part in the peace, which was limited to Philip and most members of the Delphic Amphiktyony, with Athens, Sparta, and Corinth being conspicuously absent: Dem. 5;  Fouilles de Delphes  III.5, nos. 19–20.

9. Founding of the so-called Hellenic League (SdA II 2 343): The pact was an alliance of the Athenians, Thebans, several Peloponnesian cities, and various islands opposed to Philip, with Athens serving as hegemon. The King was not involved, nor is the alliance called a koine eirene.

10. The League of Corinth (SdA III 403): Often called a koine eirene (ps.-Dem. 17. 2, 4; Justin 9. 5. 1; see Plut.  Phok. 16. 5), it was a treaty of alliance and peace. The participants included Philip and “the Greeks,” and excluded the King. The terms involved peace, alliance, and recognition of Philip’s hegemony. One of its principal aims was war with the King (Justin 9. 5. 6;  FGrH 255, 5).

Some conclusions follow from these sketchy observations, relating primarily to terminology and participants. Contemporaries obviously had no technical term for the peace treaties that the Greeks made either with the King or among themselves. The original Peace of 386 (no. 1) could be called either “peace” or “the so-called Peace of Antalkidas.” It could even
be called a *koine eirene*, should one accept the dubious restoration of the term in line 13 of *SdA II* 257. Both the Peace of 375 (no. 2) and both of those of 371 (nos. 3–4) could be named the "King’s Peace." In two cases (nos. 6 and 10) contemporaries referred to a *koine eirene*, but in neither instance was the King directly involved. Yet each peace was founded upon the basic stipulations of the earlier treaties. *Koine* is merely descriptive. When modifying *eirene*, it means nothing more than a general treaty of peace, whether or not the King was directly involved, in which the majority of the leading Greek cities settled their differences along the lines that had become traditional following the original treaty of 386. Therefore, it is erroneous to take Diodoros’ *koine eirene* as a technical term, sanctioned by diplomatic usage and so understood by all parties in the fourth century. Rather, it is a modern, anachronistic, and incorrect concept, a major misinterpretation of the evidence.

*University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign*