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Greek Magic, Greek Religion

ROBERT L. FOWLER

What ordinary parlance terms "magic"—the use of spells, charms, and other artificial means to enlist the support of supernatural powers in the furtherance of one's aims—was a normal and ubiquitous part of everyday life in the ancient world. This is an undeniable and important fact; it is hardly surprising that it once formed the starting-point for the investigation of Greek religion. Classicists lost sight of it for a while; among anthropologists, by contrast, its role in primitive societies has always been in the center of discussion. Recently, however, interest among classical scholars has been revived; a spate of publications has forcefully brought to our attention the sheer magnitude of the phenomenon in ancient life.1

1 The basis of this paper is a public lecture delivered on 18 February 1994 at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and on 24 March 1994 at McMaster University. I am grateful to audiences on those occasions for their interest and helpful comments, as well as to C. G. Brown, R. Drew Griffith, B. MacLachlan, and W. J. Slater. Particular thanks to Robert Parker and Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, who by no means share all the views expressed here and offered vigorous and salutary criticism. My paper is intended as an orientation and general survey (if a tendentious one) for the non-specialist, though I hope specialists will find points of interest here too; as such it might be considered alongside Jan Bremmer's excellent Greek Religion, Greece & Rome New Surveys in the Classics 24 (Oxford 1994), in which magic receives only brief mention on p. 93. In a discussion as broad as this, a synchronic perspective is unavoidable; I hope the effacing of some of the finer diachronic distinctions will not invalidate the conclusions.

more the question arises of what relation this material, and the attitudes and beliefs it entails, had with the mainstream of Greek religion.

Although the definition of magic is notoriously difficult,\(^3\) for heuristic purposes its often-noted tendency to be oriented towards the achievement of specific goals (enhancing fertility, securing the attention of one’s beloved, etc.) may serve to focus discussion. In what follows I will suggest that this tendency is also found in some important Greek rituals that are not normally thought of as magical, and that, consequently, the distinction between “magic” and “religion” does not lie so much in the substance of the ritual acts as in their social context. The second half of the paper will explore the implications of this realization for further study, in the light of the history of the question up to the present day.

It will be useful first to establish the premise, that magical activity was extremely prominent in ancient life. The magical papyri afford a convenient starting-point. Recently Hans Dieter Betz has made available a comprehensive translation, a book of over 300 pages with spells for every conceivable ailment and crisis.\(^4\) Spells and curses from papyri and leaden tablets have also been published by John Gager, selecting from a corpus of over 1,500 items.\(^5\) The spread of dates and findspots of this material shows that, extensive though it is, it represents but a fraction of the ancient reality.

The commonest type of magical spell is known as a “defixio,” or “binding spell,” by which the practitioner seeks to “bind” or incapacitate an enemy. Such spells were normally written on a metal tablet and buried in a secret place. They were employed for all manner of purposes: to bankrupt a business rival, incapacitate a rival lover, blight someone’s crops, cripple an athlete, or silence an orator in a crucial court case. Of this last (very useful) kind of spell, 67 Greek examples and some 46 Latin examples are attested in the archaeological finds, and in literature instances are known from Aischylos and Aristophanes in the fifth century B.C., Cicero in the first, and

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\(^3\) Though it might seem a logical priority to define the term “magic” before discussing its relation to religion, the problem of definition is so intractable that treatment must either become a paper in itself or simply be suspended in favor of a plunge in medias res. For a brief survey, see the Excursus below.

\(^4\) See above (note 2).


Libanios in the fourth century A.D.\textsuperscript{7} Demosthenes himself is cursed on one surviving defixio; other famous politicians were not exempt.

To dwell for a moment on the defixiones, a common feature, apart from the keywords “I bind” (or some other reference to binding or restraining), is their negativity: An individual seeks to harm another or make them do something against their will. The practitioner takes no account of rights or wrongs, and proceeds in secret, perhaps precisely in the awareness that what he or she does is reprehensible.\textsuperscript{8} Secrecy is also necessary to obviate the possibility of counter-charms. Other kinds of spells, curses, and imprecations have been found, like the defixiones, on tablets buried in out-of-the-way places, but, lacking the key reference to “binding,” they should not be classified technically as defixiones; however, they share many other features with the defixiones. Some are just as negative in conception, but others appeal to justice, inflicting their curses in the belief that the punishment is deserved.\textsuperscript{9} We find imprecations against people who break laws, defile a sanctuary, commit perjury, or pollute a grave, amongst other things. Moreover, the sense of justice allows these curses to emerge into the light of day, so that they may be found carved on gravestones (like Shakespeare’s “curst be he that moves my bones”), set up in public squares, or enshrined into law.\textsuperscript{10} The language of these curses, and indeed of the less savory defixiones, is often closely similar to the traditional language of good and pious prayer; for instance, they may remind the god of some service rendered in the past, with a strong suggestion that he is thereby obliged to help in the present crisis as well. The procedure is exactly the same as Chryses’ in Book 1 of the \textit{Iliad}, where the priest reminds Apollo of his piety on many occasions, so that the god may feel the readier to punish the Achaeans for their blasphemy.\textsuperscript{11} The point will be important later in our discussion.

Tablets inscribed with magic formulae to guarantee a favorable reception in the next world were sometimes placed in graves with the


\textsuperscript{8} See Versnel (following note) 62 f.


\textsuperscript{10} Curses of this kind are studied by J. H. M. Strubbe in Ch. 2 of \textit{Magika Hiera} (above, note 2). See, for instance, the Teian curses (ca. 470 B.C.), in R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, \textit{A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century} B.C. (Oxford 1969) no. 30 (Strubbe 37 f.). For the similar activity of public oath-swearings, and magical activities connected with it, see C. Faraone, “Molten Wax, Spilt Wine and Mutilated Animals: Sympathetic Magic in Near Eastern and Early Greek Oath Ceremonies,” \textit{JHS} 103 (1993) 60–80.

\textsuperscript{11} Faraone, \textit{Magika Hiera} (above, note 2) 6, 17 ff.; Versnel, \textit{Magika Hiera} 92; cf. also F. Graf, “Prayer in Magic and Religious Ritual,” \textit{Magika Hiera} 188–213.
corpse. The celebrated Orphic tablets are merely a special instance of this practice. From the salvation of the dead we move to the healing of the quick. Ancient doctors were remarkably learned in the lore of herbal medicine, and often knew very good recipes for headaches and other things that ail you; some modern discoveries have proceeded from such wisdom, for instance the heart drug digitalis, which originated in the purple foxglove. But ancient doctors were careful to mix in a healthy dose of incantation, like the two sons of Autolykos in the nineteenth book of the Odyssey (19. 457), who healed Odysseus' wound from the boar. Sokrates in Plato's Charmides (155e) reports a headache remedy in the form of the leaf of a certain plant, which he assures us is useless without the accompanying magic words. To prevent sickness on a daily basis, or to encourage good health and luck generally, the use of amulets and charms was universal.

These instances may suffice to show that magical practices were very common occurrences in ancient life. I have not even touched on things like voodoo dolls, love potions, astrology, witchcraft, necromancy, instructional books, purifications, and so on. The ever-present fear of these dark forces is sufficiently attested by the ancient foundation of Roman law, the Twelve Tables, which specifically outlawed the use of charms to harm the crops. The admonition is repeated in the codes of Theodosius and Justinian in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. From one end of antiquity to the other, then, and in every walk of life, magic was ubiquitous. Almost everybody used it, in every conceivable situation, and constantly, in such a way as would oppress and suffocate us could we go back in time and live in that environment.

In the past, scholars have denigrated magical activities as the domain of the superstitious, and therefore not worth the attention of serious students of religion. They are the sort of thing you expect to find on strange papyri,

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12 See R. Kotansky, "Incantations and Prayers for Salvation on Inscribed Greek Amulets," in Magika Hiera (above, note 2) 107–37, at 108 f. The combination of medicines and incantations is of course well known to anthropologists; see, for instance, E. E. Evans-Pritchard's classic Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azande (Oxford 1937) Part IV.

13 Further material in G. Lanata, Medicina magica e religione popolare in Grecia fino all'età di Ippocrates (Rome 1967).

14 Rituals for purification of bloodguilt are dramatically illustrated in a new inscription from Selinous: M. H. Jameson, D. R. Jordan, and R. D. Kotansky (eds.), A Lex Sacra from Selinous, GRBS Monographs 11 (Durham, NC 1993; reference from Robert Parker). The date is 460–50 B.C. The editors discuss the widespread evidence for such regulations and rituals, and conclude their discussion of the term ἀλάστορες by saying (120) "Archaic and Classical Greece, one is led to think, was a more violent and spirit-infested world than is usually supposed."

or used by the lower classes. It is true that philosophers developed rarefied notions of religion, but they were not at all typical. The universal and commonplace acceptance of magic, among all classes, is easily proved from the evidence. In such a world it is on general grounds not likely that magic was compartmentalized, and its mentality abandoned when the people partook in rituals more readily recognized as "religious" by the modern scholar. The phenomenon of magic, in fact, cannot be separated from any serious understanding of ancient religion. That it tends to be separated in the minds of students is the result of the historical development of the discipline rather than of any inherent necessity. The second half of the paper will trace this development and support this assessment. First, however, let us see whether the general expectation is confirmed in practice—whether magic is merely a self-contained phenomenon, or whether its practices and attitudes are apparent across a broader spectrum of sacred doings. We shall find that public ritual and private magic, though not identical, often overlapped in both style and substance, and that the difference between them should accordingly be interpreted as one of context and social attitudes rather than as a difference in kind.¹⁶

Some of the examples of magic cited above can certainly be recognized as fringe activity even in the ancient world, and at first blush the contention that magic is not important to an understanding of real religion appears justified. On closer examination this view cannot be maintained. The form of curses, as has already been pointed out, is often indistinguishable from ordinary forms of prayer. In the whole gamut from the most vicious defixiones to the most sanctimonious public denunciations, there is much fluidity of boundaries and much similarity of language and technique. Any attempt to distinguish magic from religion in curses and prayers founders at once.

The writings of the doctors afford pertinent material for thought. The most famous of the Hippocratic writings from the fifth century B.C., On the Sacred Disease, is justly celebrated for its rationalistic rejection of spells and other magical procedures. It heaps scorn upon charlatans who claim to be able to cause eclipses of the sun or make it rain. Surely, one might say, this is proof that magic was beginning to be regarded merely as the activity of unenlightened, superstitious peasants. Yet this same doctor is quite willing to believe that sleeping in the sanctuary of Asklepios can cure you, and the writers of these treatises elsewhere display a willingness to call upon divination, dreams, and other quite irrational resources to work their


¹⁶ It will be clear that the phenomena are being viewed at this stage from the outside; to an insider, differences in context and social attitudes might count as a difference in kind. See the Excursus below.
wonders. Moreover, in the place of what they reject, they offer the wildest speculations about the human body, which there was not the slightest reason to believe. Rationality in science is sometimes a chimera, and the border between magic and science is easily crossed; it depends on attitude, information available, and context.\textsuperscript{17} Isaac Newton still devoted much study to alchemy,\textsuperscript{18} and science in his day had far to go before its results could always be confidently differentiated from the mysterious and the magical.\textsuperscript{19}

As for our ancient doctor's contempt of rain-magic, one presumes he refers to individual, unapproved magicians rather than the rain-making rituals carried out on behalf of whole cities in many parts of Greece.\textsuperscript{20} The doctor would also be condemning the great Mysteries of Demeter at Eleusis, which included at their center agrarian magic, as the participants looked to the sky and shouted \( \ddot{\text{u}}e \), "rain," and then poured water into the earth crying \( \kappa\omicron\nu\epsilon \), "conceive." If the author of \textit{On the Sacred Disease} meant to include these publicly sanctioned examples of magic in his contempt, he would have been in a distinct minority of determined and anti-social skeptics such as Diogenes the Cynic. But his book does not strike such a pose; indeed, it implicitly allows for the possibility of divine miracles. Moreover, his attitude towards individual, free-lance practitioners can easily be paralleled, whereas the condemnation of the same activities in the public arena cannot. Almost everyone in ancient Greece believed in the efficacy of oracles, provided that one consulted them in the approved manner. But let an unlicensed oracle-monger appear, and watch him be pilloried by the comic poets for a fraud. The Pythia of Delphi is allowed to hear the voice of god; but let a Sokrates claim to hear it, and see what happens to him. Yet these private activities differ not at all in substance from the public ones. Context and social approval make all the difference.

The magical or goal-oriented aspect of some rituals is indeed readily acknowledged by scholars, if not always put front and center in discussion.


\textsuperscript{18} H. D. Betz, "Magic and Mystery in the Greek Magical Papyri," in \textit{Magika Hiera} (above, note 2) 244–59, at 247.


The rain-making of the Eleusinian Mysteries was mentioned above; this was not the only agrarian connection of the ritual. Another readily granted example is the Thesmophoria for Demeter, the most widespread religious rites in Greece; these involved throwing a dead pig into the earth, to be excavated later, chopped up, and mixed in with the seed corn of every family participating. The pig is Demeter’s fertile animal, and this is simple fertility magic; making the crops grow was a very important purpose of the festival, if not the main one. Although this aspect is usually recognized, modern interpreters normally place more stress on the social function of the festival in providing women an opportunity to express solidarity in the face of oppressive Greek men. This was of course an important part of the festival, but to distribute the stress so may tell us more about our own times and preoccupations than about ancient reality.

Other examples will readily be conceded once pointed out, though they are rarely introduced simply as instances of magic. Scapegoat rituals, by which the evils of a whole city are transferred ceremoniously on to the head of an animal or some unfortunate human, who is then driven beyond the bounds of the country, thus purifying the city, can hardly be described by any other term but magic. Sacred marriages, by which the copulation of humans is ritually performed in the belief that it will enhance the fertility of the crops, are an obviously magical business. The complete destruction of an animal in full view of an enemy army prior to joining battle is another elementary piece of sympathetic magic.

In addition, there are cases in which the magical/instrumental aspect has been quite overlooked. First, the Panathenaia. This festival of all Athenians on Athena’s midsummer birthday involved a spectacular parade through the city up to the Akropolis, where oxen were sacrificed and a new robe, the peplos, was presented to Athena in the form of her ancient statue in the Erechtheum. Modern discussions of the festival stress its social function in uniting all classes, and make much of its location at the beginning of the civic year. It is, beyond doubt, a New Year’s festival of

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22 At ZPE 97 (1993) 35 n. 16 I argued (with many scholars) for a broad application of the term “sacred marriage,” against those who would restrict it to reenactments of the wedding of Zeus and Hera such as were celebrated at the Samian Heraia. The broader definition is a modern construct, but corresponds to something real. I have since been able to see A. Avagianou, Sacred Marriage in the Rituals of Greek Religion (Bern etc. 1991), who argues for the restricted definition; but the few festivals to which she will allow the term to apply show, significantly, little homogeneity, and in the case of the Amphitryon myth she has overlooked the revealing Egyptian parallel and probable source of the story (cf. ZPE 97 [1993] 36 n. 23).

23 It is prudent to stress again that the magical or the goal-oriented aspect is not the whole of the ritual, merely an important function that deserves to be recognized alongside others.

renewal and reintegration. But it is something else too. Scholars who write on the Panathenaia naturally mention the peplos, but seem to regard it merely as a pious gift. Yet it is much more than this. The peplos of ritual is the aegis of myth, Athena’s impenetrable armor won in the battle of the Giants, those older, monstrous forces of chaos who threatened the orderly and just government of the Olympian gods. The aegis rendered Athena invulnerable. The ancient statue of Athena on the Akropolis was a talisman upon whose preservation the safety of the city depended, like the Palladion of Troy which had to be stolen by Odysseus and Diomedes before the city could be taken. The goddess who protects the citadel, housed in the king’s own palace, is a figure already in Mycenaean religion; this statue is Athena. Putting the peplos on the talisman was an act of simple magic. In its fabric was always woven one theme, and one theme only: the battle of the Giants. The message could hardly be plainer: To give Athena a new robe was to secure the protection of the city.\(^{25}\) In the fifth century B.C., this was surely an important purpose of the proceedings; one can imagine the fears of the citizens were anything to go wrong with the presentation.

Secondly, the Arrhephoria. This curious ritual involved two specially chosen girls, who served Athena for some time on the Akropolis, being given a special chest which contained mysterious and secret items, and into which they must not look under any circumstances; the aetiological myth told of the madness and death of the first two naughty girls who did so. They carried this dread burden down from the Akropolis in the dead of night to a sanctuary of Aphrodite; in return they received another, equally mysterious burden, which they returned to the Akropolis. The ritual has been interpreted as a rite of initiation for these pubescent girls. The myth said that the chest originally contained a child, born of an amorous mishap between Hephaistos and Athena; the god’s semen fell to the earth, so Athena’s virginity was preserved, but the child that Earth conceived and bore was adopted as her own by Athena and entrusted to the daughters of Athens’ first king, Kekrops, for safekeeping. The myth speaks of sex, the rite involves girls being separated from their community for months and returning after doing their sacred duty; these slim indications, and a passage in Aristophanes that speaks of the Arrhephoria as a kind of marker of a certain stage of one’s growth on the way to adulthood, seem to offer support for the idea that we are dealing with an initiation rite.\(^{26}\) Of course, any social activity will engender the acclimatization of those involved in it, and if they are young, they will learn something about the ways of their elders; but this is not an initiation or a rite of passage as anthropology understands


the term. It is a very curious initiation indeed if only two girls a year out of the whole city are allowed to participate. The real purpose of this ritual may never be known, but the endpoint, the safe delivery of a newborn child who will grow to be king of Athens, suggests that in general the purpose of the annual rite, if properly carried out (and obviously the point of the myth is that everything depends on that), was to secure the prosperity of the city and (in olden days) its king.27 In other words, the ritual has a specific, concrete goal. Consider also the general character of all these goings on on the Akropolis, involving as they do secret burdens, dark doings in the dead of night, pure young children, and strict rules about the procedure; the ritual has much in common with magical rites, and it would be very hard to maintain any essential difference between them.

Finally, the Arkteia for Artemis at Brauron.28 Young girls played the part of bears and honored the virgin goddess of the hunt. We can infer from the offerings revealed by the excavation of the site that far more girls participated in these rites than did in the Arrhephoria, but whether they involved a majority of Athenian girls or were compulsory cannot be shown. Let us assume for the sake of argument that as many girls as possible participated, and that their parents thought it a highly desirable part of their upbringing.29 Several hints, stronger this time, suggest that this was an initiation ritual: separation from the home; extended service to the goddess in a remote setting; alteration of the normal state (or adoption of "liminality") by acting the role of animals; return to normalcy thereafter; hints of sexuality in the proceedings, including nudity; the passage of Aristophanes already cited. One can readily admit that the cult assumed

27 Fowler (above, note 25) 105 ff.
29 On the number of participants, see Sourvinou-Inwood, Studies (previous note) 111 ff.; E. Simon, Festivals of Attica: An Archaeological Commentary (Madison 1983) 86.
some initiatory aspects in classical times, at least as an expected or desirable
service of a certain age-class, which was therefore bound to provide
opportunities for social acclimatization; and since it must be foolhardy to
distinguish between a ritual with initiatory aspects and an initiation ritual
pure and simple, the common assessment of the Arktiea may be accepted,
however controversial or difficult the interpretation of some details of the
initiation may be.

But was this all the ancient girls were doing? To imitate a bear is a
most peculiar way to prepare for marriage. To say that it was done for the
vague and abstract reason that it seemed a good way to symbolize
liminality, or because the bear symbolized the “untamed” nature of the
virgin, seems to be a common explanation, but it is one that the present
writer has always found unsatisfactory, at least as a complete explanation.
A religion made only of such ingredients as these is thin spiritual fare, and
methodologically (see the second half of this paper) there are grounds for
uneasiness when an interpretation stands or falls on a structural relationship
alone. Now, the goddess in question is the goddess of the hunt, of
childbirth, and the young. The primeval hunting background should be
prominent in any discussion; and, by good fortune, we know that a sacred
hun of some kind did in fact form part of the worship of Artemis
Brauronia.  

In the context of hunting, imitating bears makes immediate
intuitive sense, whereas in the context of preparation for marriage it does
not. In the context of hunting, young girls are the appropriate instrument for
the propitiation of the goddess and the securing of her favor. They are pure
and virginal like her; the closer they come to puberty, the more sexually
attractive they become—like her. The association of the chase of the hunt
and the chase of sex is an anthropological commonplace. This is a better
place to look for the explanation, in the first instance, of the sexuality in the
proceedings, than to Athenian ideas about marriage. One does not preclude
the other; indeed, because of the first, the second is easily grafted on to
the ritual.

The aetiological myth, which we fortunately possess and which must
give us the clue, confirms this analysis of the balance of motifs and
impulses. The myth does say that the girls must perform the ritual before
they are married, thus supporting the interpretation as a rite of passage
(since “before they are married” is an otiose elaboration of a fact already
implicit in the designation παρθένον); but the main stress of the story lies
elsewhere. It speaks of a gentle bear that was wrongly killed, of Artemis’

30 Liban, Hypoth. Dem. 25; Dein. 2. 12.
31 W. Sale, “The Temple-Legends of the Arktiea,” RhM 118 (1975) 265–84; C.
Montepaone, “Il mito di fondazione del rituale munichio in onore di Artemis,” in
Recherches sur les cultes grecs et l’occident I, Cahiers du centre Jean Bérard 5 (Naples
1979) 65–76.
32 In the Suda s.v. ἄρχωτος Ἡ Βραυρωνίος and the related Ravenna scholion on Ar. Lys. 645
some authority has elaborated this hint into the strong statement that no girl could marry unless
she had served as a bear—by decree of the assembly. Such elaborations are suspicious.
anger and a deadly plague, and of her demand to be appeased. It is that obligation that is most important here, not learning about marriage. If young girls are earnestly appeasing an angry Artemis, the natural assumption is that they are appeasing her in her function as the kourotrophos, the goddess in whose hands above all the gods rested the health and vigor of girls.

The age of the participants—from five to ten years old—has never been easy to explain for those who stress the initiatory aspect to the exclusion of others. A typical summary asserts that the girls “entered a temporary state of savagery so as to return prepared for the civilized state of marriage”;\(^33\) when one thinks that this is meant to apply to five-year-old girls, hardly more than babies, one is inclined to withhold credence. But propitiation of the kourotrophos can never start too early; nor can one do it enough. So uncertain was the survival of the young in the ancient world. Artemis the kourotrophos was also the goddess of childbirth, the most dangerous of life’s experiences, more dangerous than battle, as Medea knew; more spirits attended this function than anything else in the everyday religion of the Greek world.\(^34\) Should one fail to honor the kourotrophos, one’s children will not be ἱεριγενεῖς, “strong-born.” This is what the heroine Iphigeneia, the “strong-born one,” is doing at Brauron.\(^35\) In the same sanctuary the clothes of women who had died in childbirth—not a small number—were dedicated to Artemis. The fact illustrates the nature of the goddess, and her cult, well enough.

Robert Garland points out fairly enough that “lowering the age-requirement of a rite of passage is widely attested by anthropologists,”\(^36\) and what seems appropriate to our notions of human nature can be a deceptive guide. Nonetheless, a putatively original rite of puberty, subsequently modified to include girls of many different ages, must lose some of its focus. Why was the age lowered—not just lowered, but modified to exclude pubescent girls? The Brauronia were penteteric, so a range of permissible ages had to be set for practical reasons; but why set the upper limit at an age when the menarche was still some distance away?\(^37\) A simpler explanation


\(^{36}\) Garland (above, note 28) 190.

\(^{37}\) P. Brulé, “Retour à Brauron” (above, note 28) 82, acknowledges the difficulty, but suggests that physical readiness for conception was not part of the Greeks’ notion of nubility. Such an amazing conclusion needs more support than Brulé gives it in his brief remarks. Sourvinou-Inwood (above, note 28) regards the initiation as one from childhood to the period that leads to and culminates in menarche, but the distinction between “period leading to menarche” and “menarche” is one that is often effaced in her own discussion. The difficulty was already acute for Jeanmaire (above, note 26) 260. Incidentally, though Jeanmaire is normally mentioned as the father of this line of interpretation, Lewis Farnell in 1896 advanced
sees these rites as originally and appropriately performed by children of any age up to puberty, rather than originally performed by pubescent children and subsequently modified for unknown reasons. It is worth recalling that worship on the site, which was inhabited in prehistoric times, is probably far older than the polis, which is the necessary context of the prevailing interpretation. As the Athenian polis became more cohesive and bourgeois in the late archaic and early classical ages, the desire to teach the young about their obligations as citizens and wives of citizens can reasonably be expected to have intruded upon older rites such as the Brauronia, because of the age of the participants. New dimensions were added. But the explicit concerns of the worshipers, as attested by the myth, remained straightforward: The goddess of pristine nature and of the young is angry and unless the children do her dance a plague will strike them dead.

So much for our more argumentative examples. Whether or not these interpretations recommend themselves in all particulars to the reader, the general assessment may be allowed to have some validity. Magical activity was commonplace, ubiquitous, and instinctive. It is most improbable that the mass of ordinary people, who did not have the benefit of two hundred years of Enlightenment and modern science, and who were steeped from birth in the kinds of magical doings of which I spoke at the outset, somehow put aside this frame of mind when they gathered together for the most important festivals of the gods. Instead, they re-directed these same attitudes and impulses and gave expression to them in a different setting. The difference between the "magical" and the "religious" acts is thus one of social context and attitude: One is approved, the other almost always is not.

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Where to go from here? We have taken one frequently touted characteristic of "magic"—that its practices are goal-oriented—and found that it crops up repeatedly in "religion"; the exercise could be repeated with other characteristics. If the distinction between magic and religion must vanish

it without ado: *Cults of the Greek States* II (Oxford 1896) 437, with reference to W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (1889) 304, 309, for parallels in other societies for initiation ceremonies involving bears. To be sure, Farnell devotes the bulk of his discussion to a totemistic interpretation.


39 There is the question of how closely related the activities at Brauron were to those of Mounychia; speaking of the latter, W. Burkert, *The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age*, tr. M. E. Pinder and W. Burkert (Cambridge, MA and London 1992) 73 ff., thinks that the festival may have originated in a magical rite by which a pestilence was removed; by the classical period, its nature had changed, so that like other festivals of Artemis it had an "aura" of girls' initiations. This is a progression very much like the one I have posited for the rites at Brauron.
like a soap bubble at the merest touch, it seems fruitless to go past the heuristic stage with any pretense of keeping them separate in point of theory. In purely practical terms, however, there is a well-recognized set of phenomena we all think of in connection with the term "magic"; it is becoming increasingly clear that this huge body of material must be kept in mind when considering the total phenomenon of Greek religion. And heurèsis can take one a long way. The preceding section yielded the understanding that ritual, in broad terms, is twofold: It often entails a straightforward, substantive goal; but as all ritual must inevitably have a place in a social nexus, it will have social purposes, and its forms will be susceptible of reading as a system of signs.40

This understanding seems innocuous enough when so expressed, but it is by no means orthodoxy, and brings with it a surprising number of theoretical implications. In the past sixty years, classical scholars have tended to play down magic as a part of Greek religion, and to underestimate the goal-oriented aspect of ritual.41 Anthropologists do not. Three reasons may be suggested for this state of affairs. Firstly, anthropologists, unlike classicists, have the societies they study before their very eyes and can hardly ignore the patently magical aspects of demonstrative public ritual. A second reason may be snobbery—something of the Frazerian or the Wilamowitzian still lingering; although in a post-Christian age we have found ways to take the Olympian gods seriously, our modernity has subconsciously prevented us from extending this courtesy to the manufacturers of voodoo dolls. A third part has to do with the way discussion of the myth/ritual problem has developed in this century.

In the beginning, which is to say in the days of Jane Harrison and her ritualist followers, the relationship of myth and ritual was thought to be straightforward: The myth was the plot of the ritual, the text that backed up the action. For instance, the main ritual action of the Thesmophoria, the burying of a pig underground, was "explained" by the story of a swineherd who happened to be swallowed up in the chasm created when the lord of the underworld carried off his bride Persephone. Most myth, the ritualists thought, was aetiological in this way. Most ritual, they thought, originated in magical acts, especially those of fertility magic.

The problem of magic and religion also played a vital role in the work of James Frazer. His background lay in nineteenth-century anthropology, which had placed much emphasis on the origins of social customs and the concept of evolution. It was natural for Frazer to see magic as an early and

40 I find Versnel making the same point in the introduction to his new work, which incorporates several articles I have drawn on frequently in the preparation of this one; see Versnel (above, note 21) 12 f.
41 The influence of W. Burkert's great work, Greek Religion, tr. J. Raffan (Cambridge, MA 1985; Germ. original 1977), would be hard to overestimate; it devotes but one paragraph to magic, with a clearly polemical intent to deter anyone who might wish to pursue the topic further.
primitive stage of religion, which gradually evolved into a higher stage, characterized not by superstition but by morality, not by attempts to coerce the gods but by a spirit of humble worship and supplication. Christian notions of true religion, and those of the Enlightenment, are easy to detect in this scheme.\(^2\)

Frazer’s views on magic and religion have long since been abandoned. In not much time too the views of Harrison on myth and ritual were also seen to be simplistic. A great deal of Greek mythology has no attested connection with ritual, and such myth as does relate to known rituals often has a relationship that is more complex than the ritualists seemed to suggest. To take a simple example, one of the more successful structuralist analyses, that of the Prometheus myth, demonstrates that while the strictly aetiological part is straightforward—Prometheus wrapped the bones in fat, and so do we—the kind of story Hesiod invented to account for this central rite of Greek religion is much more significant. Surely many other stories were possible besides this one with its motifs of deception, the jealousy and hostility of the gods, their departure from earth and the implied end of the Golden Age.\(^3\) Greek views of the gods and life generally are revealed by prying a little bit below the surface of the myth.

In time the pendulum swung fully in the opposite direction. Statements such as “myth and ritual do not correspond in details of content but in structure and atmosphere” were typical.\(^4\) The summation is remarkable when one thinks about it. Such clearly attested myth/ritual complexes as we do possess from Greece do not bear this claim out; myth and ritual, wherever we can test their relationship, correspond (albeit imperfectly) in both content and atmosphere.\(^5\)

The problem is that the number of attested myth/ritual complexes is distressingly small, and scholars desperately want a method that will allow

\(^2\) On Jane Harrison and the Cambridge Ritualists, see W. M. Calder III (ed.), The Cambridge Ritualists Reconsidered, ICS Suppl. 2 (Atlanta 1991); R. Ackerman, The Myth and Ritual School: J. G. Frazer and the Cambridge Ritualists (New York and London 1991); on Frazer, see also Ackerman, J. G. Frazer: His Life and Work (Cambridge 1987). Ackerman points out that Frazer’s ideas (insofar as they were consistent) changed with time; in particular, he came to disallow the religious element in magic, regarding it merely as religion’s precursor, since in his view religion had to have a reflective element. He deliberately distanced himself from the ritualist position in the 1920s.


them safely to reconstruct rituals from myths alone, thus creating more of these complexes for them to study. With the advent first of structuralism then of semiotics a key seemed to have been provided. These approaches seemed to offer hope because similar structures and signs shared by two myths will allow the scholar, if a ritual connection is known for one of the myths, to infer a ritual connection for the other one, even if its surface content is quite different.46

The hazards of this procedure are obvious. To take an example that is pertinent to the myths and rituals discussed earlier: One of the commonest structural motifs used to infer the existence of an initiation ritual behind a given myth is that of separation (for instance leaving one’s home and going into the country); this is to produce “liminality” or “marginality,” a well-documented aspect of initiation rituals. It is astonishing how often the word “initiation” occurs in the literature these days, and how many myths are suspected of being vestigially connected with such rituals, on no better grounds than the presence of the separation motif.47 But almost any myth, given enough subtlety of vision and hard arguing, will conform to the desired pattern. As P. M. C. Forbes Irving has pointedly argued, there is usually no independent evidence for the existence of the rituals.48 H. S. Versnel astutely observed how often practitioners of this method, recognizing the weakness of the link between myth and ritual in their schemes, must assume that the myth is a distorted relic of some earlier myth, so that only the keenest of scholarly bloodhounds, with noses attuned to the initiatory scent, can detect the connection.49 The assumption of relics is of course exactly how Frazer and the ritualists uncovered fertility rites

46 Cf. F. Graf’s comments in his learned and valuable Nordionische Kulte (Schweizerisches Institut in Rom 1985) 5: it is “unmöglicher, zu einem ohne Ritual belegten Mythos im komparatistischen Rückgriff auf verwandte Mythen, deren zugehörige Rituale bekannt sind, ein unbekanntes Ritual sozusagen extrapolierend zu erschliessen; wo wenigstens Andeutungen zum Ritual vorhanden sind, kann aber doch auf Stimmung, Struktur und Funktion des Rituals geschlossen werden, wenn auch nur mit grösster Behutsamkeit und im vollen Bewusstsein, wie hypothetisch das Ergebnis ist.” The nuances and caution of this outline are easy to forget in practice.


48 P. M. C. Forbes Irving, Metamorphosis in Greek Myths (Oxford 1990) 50 ff.; cf. F. Graf, HZ 253 (1991) 697–99. At ZPE 97 (1993) 39 n. 39 I pointed out how easily, and how erroneously, the myth of Kephalos and Prokris could be interpreted as an initiation aition. Dowden, to his credit, is genially frank about the lack of evidence, though by the end of his book the joy of discovery has made him look on it as a strength: “In fact, it is one of the pleasures of our inquiry that rituals and a way of life that cannot otherwise be recovered can be discerned in the mythology” (190). Compare also his remarks in “Myth: Brauron and Beyond” (above, note 28) 36 ff.

49 H. S. Versnel, “What’s Sauce for the Goose is Sauce for the Gander: Myth and Ritual, Old and New,” in Approaches to Greek Myth, ed. by L. Edmunds (Baltimore 1990) 23–90, at 50 ff. = Transition and Reversal (above, note 21) 58 ff. See also C. Grottanelli’s remarks in HR 29 (1989–90) 63. A. Moreau, “Initiation en Grèce antique,” DHA 18.1 (1992) 191–244, offers a reply to Versnel, but appears scarcely to have grasped the import of his arguments; his article goes on to claim practically the whole of Greek mythology as initiatory.
behind so many myths—a different set of bloodhounds, and differently trained noses.

Yet the problems identified by Frazer and others remain even if their solutions do not. The huge and impressive bulk of data on magical practices also remains and has to be explained. The successors to Frazerism and ritualism have been principally two: structuralism and semiotics. The admirable Ferdinand de Saussure in his famous *Cours de linguistique générale* (published by pupils after his death in 1913) first declared that language is a system of arbitrary signs, none of which has meaning in itself but only insofar as it contrasts or relates to other signs. Structuralism has made many interesting uses of this insight, but semiotics transferred this tenet about language to other social acts: All social conventions, in fact, form a system of signs like that of language, conveying messages to their users; and in this system, there are no natural signs, only arbitrary ones. The conventional behavior of society, in turn, expresses its values. The tendency, therefore, is to say that values too must be arbitrary. Now this is suspiciously congenial to our Zeitgeist. Claims to absolute truth advanced in this century of ideological nightmare have become deeply and justifiably suspect; semioticians’ argument that all social values are artificially constructed has therefore found ready assent. The idea that a moral value might be either grounded in nature or defensible in metaphysics is instinctively rejected, if not derided by most contemporary scholars. Instead, they argue that the values of any society are merely the product, however complex, of particular historical circumstances. Human nature is not a constant; indeed, there is no such thing as human nature.

Anyone steeped in this manner of thinking ought to be especially alive to the differences in societies, and wary of importing modern ideas into the reconstruction of the past. One school of thought, to be sure, has been especially sensitive to this requirement; the “new historicism” has been with us for some years now. But there is a seductive danger in semiotics. Its object of investigation is social signs; since such signs can only convey social information, on semiotics’ own assumptions, it is inevitable that such meaning as the signs convey will only be about social relations (or, in a particularly desperate version, about other signs, so that meaning is endlessly “deferred”). The danger, therefore, is that one is apt to overemphasize the sociological aspect of ritual and ignore what the participants themselves think they are doing—trying to achieve some substantive goal.50 Instinctively we recoil from taking that seriously; to do

50 The most famous statement of the practical purpose of religion is made by Euthyphro in Plato’s dialogue (14b): prayers and sacrifice ἔσει . . . τούς ἱδίους σίκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἁσβῆ, ἃ δῆ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἄπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν. This is the original meaning of σωτηρία. Many other passages could be quoted; this one is especially important because of the literary context—Euthyphro is meant to be the best possible representative of ordinary, traditional piety. Of course (it should be added at
so might imply we actually believe, for instance, that the crops will grow better if we chop up a pig. Yet it is the attitude of people who do believe that we must see from the inside. It is the same with modern religion; any believer would regard a purely sociological description of their religion as wholly inadequate.

We are particularly apt to overemphasize that aspect of modern society which most preoccupies us at the moment, one might almost say obsesses us: the nature and roles of the sexes. To the semiotician, gender, like everything else, is a social construct. Gender seems the most important social fact to us; ergo, it must have been to the Greeks. Initiation ritual is the prime means whereby early societies pass on the gender-construct to the next generation: ergo, the Greeks must have had lots of these, and myths that talk about the sexes must be the aetiological myths for initiation rituals. Yet to realize the paucity of independent evidence for these rituals is to suspect at once that the widespread assent these interpretations enjoy is itself culturally determined, a product of late twentieth-century predilections.

The tendency of recent years, exactly opposite to the tendency of a century ago, has been to deny the universal aspects of human experience, to deny and even ridicule the concept of human nature, and to develop methods for reconstructing ancient realities that rely as little as possible on

once) passages can also be found that stress the social advantages of religious life in terms of forging and maintaining links between individuals and groups.

51 For some important criticism of this notion, see J. Thorp, "The Social Construction of Homosexuality," Phoenix 46 (1992) 54–61. It may be of interest to compare the trenchant reaction of a conservative Catholic in 1937 to a similar, if not identical proposition: "Works of art are produced by artists," Mr [Anthony] Blunt begins his essay; "artists are men; men live in society and are in a large measure formed by the society in which they live. Therefore works of art cannot be considered historically except in human and ultimately in social terms." By "social" Mr Blunt, as all his colleagues [in The Mind in Chains, ed. by C. Day Lewis], means "economic." It would be equally true and fair to say "Men live on the earth, etc. Therefore works of art cannot be considered historically except in geographical and ultimately in meteorological terms." A metaphysician would have little difficulty in demolishing Mr [Edward] Upward's elementary statement of the origin of life in a material universe." The Essays, Articles and Reviews of Evelyn Waugh, ed. by D. Gallagher (London 1984) 199.

52 A famous and influential article in this category, P. Vidal-Naquet’s "The Black Hunter" of 1968 (reprinted with corrections most recently in The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World [Baltimore 1986] 106–28; see also "The Black Hunter Revisited," PCPS 32 [1986] 126–44), depends entirely on an uncritical acceptance of certain ancient reports that the myth of Melanthos and Xanthios was the aition for the service of Athenian ephebes; but it is nearly certain that the connection with the Apaoturia is an arbitrary invention of Hellanikos designed to bring the Nekleidai of Pylos in line with Athens' claims to be the mother of Ionia. The myth of Melanthos and Xanthios therefore has nothing to do with Attic ephebeia. See further my forthcoming article, "Herodotos and His Contemporaries." The point was already implicit in Jacoby's comment on FGriH 323a F 23; it has since been stressed by N. Robertson, GRBS 29 (1988) 205 ff.; cf. AJP 109 (1988) 284–85. Robertson's vigorous defence of the importance of magic is to be found in numerous articles of recent years, but most provocatively in a review of several influential works on Greek religion in EMC 9 (1990) 419–42 and 10 (1991) 57–79; see now also his Festivals and Legends (above, note 2). Robertson's eye-popping interpretations of myths have not won wide assent, but his reminder of the central position of magic is timely.
our own instincts or common-sense assumptions. The methodological implication seems unobjectionable. Yet the linguistic philosophy underlying all semiological study is anything but invulnerable to criticism and not necessarily more reliable than the imaginative intuition of the learned, patient, sensitive, and intelligent scholar. It is certainly often a good deal less interesting. Although importing modern preconceptions into interpretations of the ancient phenomena is obviously wrong in point of method (as all scholars of all schools since the early nineteenth century have recognized), this is not an argument for abandoning our instincts and common-sense assumptions, since the greatest part of human experience is broadly comparable in all times and places of our history. The basics of life are after all pretty straightforward. Birth and survival; disease, drought, famine, the failure of crops; the pursuit of happiness, the fear of death, the desire for immortality; helplessness in the face of superior, unknown, and hostile powers—these are not social constructs, and they are the very stuff of religion everywhere in human history. To further or hinder them is the goal of goal-oriented ritual. This is why Tylor, Mannhardt, Frazer, Harrison, and the others started where they did; it seemed natural, and is natural.

The shortcomings of the Frazerian and ritualist models are plain enough, and progress since then has been spectacular. But there are difficulties in the current models, and the way forward might lie in combining the best of the new with the best of the old. The positive theoretical framework would take a book to work out; but some negatives can be briefly identified. We ought to be suspicious of the one-sided: Any interpretation of a myth that relies exclusively on structure, just as any interpretation that arbitrarily decodes the surface content by assigning specific referents to its details (for instance—an old instance—saying that a hero represents the rising sun), without any external evidence in either case, must be regarded as no more than an interesting speculation.53 If myth and ritual are not attested together, extreme caution is called for when arguing from one to the other. A reading of ancient religious experience that is insufficiently aware of the contingencies of ancient life is as weak as one that thinks there are only contingencies in human life.

A fruitful approach might be to investigate magic and other broad categories of ancient religious experience, perhaps from a phenomenological perspective; the time might be ripe for a revival of this branch of philosophy. Other categories can readily be suggested: "sacrifice," "prayer," and even "god" spring to mind.54 With respect to magic, it seems an urgent need to investigate the deep-level links that must have existed between the part of religious activity normally designated

53 My interpretation of the myth of Kephalos (above, note 20) is meant as no more.
54 R. Parker's Miasma (Oxford 1983) is an outstanding example of this kind of categorical study.
"magical" and the rest of religion. If the differences between the two are
mainly contextual, much careful attention needs to be devoted to the
description of these contexts. What exactly about Sokrates' connection
with the god of Delphi so provoked people in 399 (and not before)? Why are
the oracle-mongers' books acceptable in Rome but not in Athens (at least in
some circumstances)? What makes the public scapegoat, repulsive and
disgusting though he is, so deeply satisfying, but the private act of spiteful
revenge so morally repellent? In what circumstances would a city call in an
Epimenides? In what circumstances were individuals allowed to say with
impunity that traditional religion is the work of charlatans—to call it, in
effect, nothing but "magic"?

The connections, as I said, are deep-seated; they might find an
explanation in psychology and biology as much as in sociology. The
interplay of religion, experience, and rationality cannot be adequately
studied from any one point of view. Philology, philosophy, and
anthropology all have a contribution to make. But the thing is lifeless if we
do not at bottom think we are studying ourselves. There is little joy in
studying some alien species constructing its own alien reality. The thrill is
in the recognition; they are Menschen wie Du und ich. The historian of
religion, like the historian of politics and any other human endeavor, studies
universal human urges as they are manifested in the particular social
patterns of the ancient world; and the purpose of that study is to achieve
through the imaginative revitalization of our ancestors' mental universe a
better understanding of, precisely, human nature.

Excursus on the Definition of Magic

The problem of definition is clearly central. The bibliography is already
ample. I can hardly begin to discuss the problem and its many solutions.

55 A selection: O. Petterson, "Magic—Religion: Some Marginal Notes to an Old
Problem," Ethnos 22 (1957) 109–19; J. Goody, "Religion and Ritual: The Definition
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 6 (1975) 71–89; K. Thomas, "An Anthropology of
Religion and Magic II," ibid. 91–109; M. Smith, Jesus the Magician (New York 1978); D. E.
"Relationships between Miracle and Prophecy in the Greco-Roman World and Early
Century: Parameters of Groupings," Studia Patristica 18.1 (Kalamazoo 1985) 65–70; idem,
"The Sociology of Religious Knowledge in the Roman Empire to A.D. 284," ANRW II.16.3
ibid. 93–97; A. Segal, "Hellenistic Magic: Some Questions of Definition," in Other Judaism of Late
Antiquity (Atlanta 1987) 79–108; the authorities listed above (note 2); and several
articles in A. D. Nock's Essays on Religion and the Ancient World (Oxford 1972), especially
"Paul and the Magus" (1308 ff.).
Obviously magic can be defined at the very outset as different from true religion. Definition and conclusion are here one. The strict differentiation of the two inevitably involves the view that religion is a higher order of activity than magic, whether it succeeded the other by evolution or not. Modern believers in various religions will share this view. Yet the skeptic is apt to look on the whole apparatus of modern religion as so much mumbo-jumbo, seeing no distinction between, say, the healing rituals of the Azande and the Catholic practice of exorcism. To call this rite "superstition" must seem offensive to the faithful Catholic. Protestantism, on the other hand, prides itself on having discarded such rituals. Yet there can be few good Protestants who would not feel anxious for an unbaptized child's prospects of salvation, particularly their own, and it is precisely in the realm of Protestantism, with its emphasis on faith, that the miracle-working cults of modern times have thrived. The skeptic will point out these considerations; the more skeptical the point of view, the more "magic" will be equated with "religion."

Many scholars have simply given up. In his contribution to *Magika Hiera*, Roy Kotansky quotes (above, note 2) 123 n. 1) J. E. Lowe's *Magic in Greek and Latin Literature*, who already in 1929, on page 1 of his book, declared: "Many definitions . . . have been attempted: none, perhaps, is wholly satisfactory. The word connotes so much, the boundary line between it and religion is so hazy and indefinable, that it is almost impossible to tie it down and restrict it to the narrow limits of some neat turn of phrase that will hit it off and have done with it." More recently, Gager (above, note 2) 24 asserts, " . . . it is our conviction that magic, as a definable and consistent category of human experience, simply does not exist." Others could be quoted to like effect.

Intrepid souls have not been deterred. At various times scholars have explored the validity of a magic/religion distinction based on attempted compulsion vs. supplication of the divine; secret powers and knowledge vs. throwing oneself on the mercy of the gods; a system aiming at the achievement of immediate goals vs. more general spiritual satisfaction; absence or presence of some kind of theology; or private and individual vs. public and group practice. Exceptions can readily be found to any of these formulations. Magic too has its theology. Religion can be directed towards the attainment of practical goals, and it can appropriate many of the devices of magic.56 There are groups of magicians who regard their activities as religious. Magic in early societies is ubiquitous in any case; even if magical acts are predominantly done by individuals, since they are done by practically all individuals it is futile to separate this activity out from the

56 In his book on magic, Graf (above, note 2) devotes a chapter to the manifold interplay between magic and the mystery religions: the same connection allowed Smith to write his book *Jesus the Magician* (previous note), surely one of the few books by a classicist to have earned its author a death threat.
general religious consciousness of the public. There are, moreover, many private and individual religious acts. There are many parts of public religion that depend on a private practitioner performing ritual acts with no witnesses. Compulsion is often found in public religion, especially in such rites as public cursing, or the public use of voodoo dolls.\(^{57}\) Compulsion, or at least the expectation of an obligation on the part of the deity in return for pious service, is still an element in modern religious feeling; it accounts for the instinctive outrage people feel on having Calvin’s doctrine of predestination explained to them.

It being impossible to state one characteristic that magic always has in all places as opposed to religion, several scholars have tried a different approach: Magic does not differ in essence from religion; it differs only in the degree of social approval it enjoys, or does not enjoy.\(^{58}\) This position is congenial to the one espoused in the present paper. Walter Burkert, in an illuminating article on the γόης in the Greek world,\(^{59}\) traces the ambivalent status of this figure—often abused, but sometimes integral to the mainstream of religion, particularly in the various mysteries. His explanation for the origin of the goes’ bad reputation, however—that it began in the context of the Greek polis, which had the effect of clarifying and solidifying what was acceptable to the members of the society in the way of religion—needs a broader perspective, for all societies do this. Deprecation of magic is found already in the Old Testament.\(^{60}\) “Bad magic” vs. “good (religiously sanctioned) magic” is a well-documented anthropological distinction. When Lucius in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses (11. 15) was initiated into the mysteries of Isis, he became proof against black magic by virtue of the powers of the goddess; but when the world converted to Christianity, the rites of Isis became black magic in their turn.

In a word, one man’s magic is another man’s religion. In such circumstances the contexts in which denunciations of magic occur, and the criteria by which the denouncer hopes to persuade his peers that the charge is founded, become more interesting and revealing than what is actually called magic. In a similar way, the criteria for detecting quacks laid out in the treatise On the Sacred Disease, discussed earlier in this paper, are more

\(^{57}\) C. Faraone, “Binding and Burying the Forces of Evil: The Defensive Use of Voodoo Dolls,” CA 10 (1991) 165–220; idem, Magika Hiera (above, note 2) 9, with other examples of public magic.

\(^{58}\) E.g. A. A. Goldenweiser, Early Civilization (New York 1922) 348, quoted by the Waxes (above, note 55) 496; E. R. Goodenough, Jewish Symbols of the Greco-Roman Period (New York 1953) II 159, quoted by Phillips, “Sociology” (above, note 55) 2729; Thomas (above, note 55) 92; Aune (above, note 55) 1545; Phillips, “Magic and Politics” (above, note 55) 67; Luck (above, note 2) 8; Betz (above, note 2) xli; cf. Nock (above, note 55) I 315; Graf, Magika Hiera (above, note 2) 196; Versnel (above, note 2).

\(^{59}\) W. Burkert, “ΓΟΗΣ. Zum griechischen ‘Schamanismus’,” RhM 105 (1962) 36–55. On the term μαγως, see also Graf (above, note 2) 31 ff. The very word, being foreign, designates the outsider.

important than the alternative theories advanced by the Hippocratic doctor, which are mostly bluff.\textsuperscript{61} Or again, when Christianity was sweeping the pagan gods from the field, it is most instructive to see what kinds of sorcery were permitted in the new context, and why. The sign of the cross to this day will keep evil at bay.

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\textsuperscript{61} G. E. R. Lloyd, \textit{Magic, Reason and Experience} (above, note 17) 57.
Ambiguity against Ambiguity: Anacreon 13 Again

HAYDEN PELLICCIA

σφαίρη δηνέτε με πορφυρή
βάλλων χρυσοκόμης "Ερως
νήνι ποικίλοσαμβάλω
συμπαίζειν προκαλείται.
ἡ δ', ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ' εὐκτίτου
Λέσβου, τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην,
λευκὴ γάρ, καταμέμψεται,
πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινά χάσκει.

In the 1993 volume of this journal Robert Renehan devoted an article to rebutting comments that I had made about an earlier article of his on Anacreon 13.1 A particular complaint is that I misrepresented him in various ways. Some of these imputations are of no general interest, so I will address them here only in notes, if at all; the major charge of misrepresentation, however, raises some questions, significant for the interpretation of the poem, about types of ambiguity—by universal agreement a treacherous subject. In dealing with it, even so superficially as we will here, we travel over a spectrum encompassing trick oracles and the like, where the existence and “solution” of the hermeneutic problem are often clarified within the text itself, to ambiguities or potential ambiguities that are not overtly acknowledged in the texts thought to contain them, and thus remain forever obscure and disputable, if to varying degrees. As the definition and boundaries of such ambiguities tend to be both permeable and expansive, we have to take into account the possibility of their extending to include an interpreter’s ambivalences about ambiguities that he or she entertains and discusses as possible.

The quickest way to frame the issue as it is touched by Renehan’s and my discussions of Anacreon 13 is to quote Renehan’s recent criticism of me, and then compare to it the conclusion of his earlier article:

On page 31, in the course of analyzing the structure of verses 5–8, I stated in part: “When one then proceeds to πρὸς δὴ τινὰ (no further), it is all but unavoidable to supply mentally a corresponding κόμην.” Ignoring the crucial qualification “no further,” Pelliccia misrepresents me as arguing that “κόμην . . . must be supplied with πρὸς δ’ άλλην τινα.” My actual point was that, when one then goes on to the last word of the poem, one meets an unexpected verb which makes it quite likely that άλλην τινα does not after all refer to κόμην, but rather to another woman. . . . I thought that I had made it clear in my CP paper that I preferred [this] interpretation, if an absolute choice had to be made (see below). Perhaps not.\footnote{Renehan (1993) 40 f. Cf. S. T. Mace, “Amour, Encore! The Development of δηνε in Archaic Lyric,” \textit{GRBS} 34 (1993) 335–64, at 348 n. 45: “[Renehan (1993)] discusses the issues well, but disappoints in failing to endorse either ‘a girl’ or ‘hair’ and suggesting some intentional ambiguity on the part of the poet.”}

Now the final paragraphs of the earlier article:

There are two possibilities; they depend upon the meaning of ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβοι in lines 5–6. (1) If that statement is taken at face value as a complimentary allusion to the girl’s origins, then κόμην is to be understood with άλλην in line 6, and Anacreon’s revenge consists solely in the use of an unflattering expression (χάσκειν πρὸς) to describe her misdirected attentions (as he sees it). The poem is heterosexual on this reading;\footnote{“The poem is heterosexual”: \textit{sic}. It is interesting that Renehan assumes that the only alternative to the lesbian-mocking interpretation of the poem is one in which the girl is heterosexual. But there is no reason why his interpretation (1) need touch the girl’s sexual orientation at all; all interpretation (1) requires is the \textit{absence} from the poem of a slur against female homosexuality. In this connection some readers might find piquing the observation made to me by Michelle Kwintner that nothing in the text precludes the possibility that the speaker is a woman. Before dismissing this suggestion out of hand, we must think of Alcamen’s poems written for female performers which include expressions of passion for other females (cf. Anacreon 40, Alcaeus 10B, and Theognis 257–60). Kwintner’s suggestion would turn Renehan’s conclusion (“one or the other of these two interpretations of the poem must be correct”) upside down: ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβοι would be “taken at face value as a complimentary allusion to the girl’s origins” and άλλην would “refer to a woman” and there would be no παρὰ προσδοκίαν joke involving female homosexuality.} the sense is acceptable. (2) If the statement that the girl is from Lesbos intimates that she is a lesbian—and that would not become apparent (deliberately so) until the final verse—then άλλην refers to a woman and the παρὰ προσδοκίαν is even more pronounced. If this interpretation is correct, Λέσβοι and άλλην are each intentionally ambiguous: one should not then insist, with most scholars, that άλλην must refer \textit{either} to “hair” \textit{or} to a “girl” to the exclusion of the other. It may refer, at different levels, to \textit{both}. In support of this reading of the poem is the fact that, if such were not Anacreon’s intention, it would be a remarkable coincidence that both Λέσβοι and άλλην admit of such pointed ambiguity.

Nevertheless, when all is said and done, we shall never be quite sure of Anacreon’s meaning, for we are no longer in a position to know with certitude which of the two interpretations of ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου

\footnote{2 Renehan (1993) 40 f. Cf. S. T. Mace, “Amour, Encore! The Development of δηνε in Archaic Lyric,” \textit{GRBS} 34 (1993) 335–64, at 348 n. 45: “[Renehan (1993)] discusses the issues well, but disappoints in failing to endorse either ‘a girl’ or ‘hair’ and suggesting some intentional ambiguity on the part of the poet.”}
Λέσβου is correct. And if such a conclusion [emphasis added] appear unsatisfactory to some, I can but refer them to Grotius: “nescire quaedam magna pars sapientiae est.” To end on a more positive note, it seems to me perfectly safe to assert that one or the other of these two interpretations of the poem must be correct. There is no tertium quid; all other proposals are to be rejected.4

It is clear that there is an inconsistency: Here in the earlier article Renehan speaks of two interpretations between which he says it is impossible on present knowledge to choose; in the more recent article, quoted first, he says he preferred one of the two all along.5 Although I hesitate to suggest it, the possibility seems real (especially in the absence of alternatives) that Renehan has identified the expression of irresolvable ambivalence with which he concludes his first article (exemplifying what we can call “scholar’s ambiguity”) with the ambiguity which, immediately before in his possibility (2), he had ascribed to the meaning of ἀλλήν τινά (which would be an example of poet’s ambiguity). It is perfectly clear, of course, that poetic ambiguity is not the same thing as the judicial or scholarly non liquet: To state that “this poem is ambiguous” is to take an unambiguous position; to state as your conclusion that “we shall never be quite sure of Anacreon’s meaning . . . [but] one or the other of these two interpretations of the poem must be correct” is to take an ambiguous position about the “correct” interpretation of a poem.

These points may or may not be relevant; it seems worth making them just in case they are. We can proceed now to the question of the existence and nature of poetic ambiguity in Anacreon 13 itself.

In the new article Renehan reformulates his (now espoused) interpretation (2) as follows:

As one goes through the sentence, ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου is first understood to refer to the girl’s illustrious homeland. (The epithet εὐκτίτου, because of its usual associations . . . , may itself be deceptive.) Then, especially because of the emphatic “centerpiece” of the sentence, τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην, one instinctively supplies κόμην with the contrasting πρὸς δὲ ἀλλήν τινά—until one sees the unflattering verb χάσκει, at which point one realizes that ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου can admit of a quite different (lesbian) meaning and that κόμην need not be supplied, thereby making ἀλλήν τινός refer to a person.6

5 With regard to the specific issue on which Renehan claims (in the passage from his second article quoted first) that I misrepresented him, it is evident that, in the final restatement of interpretation (1) in his first article (as quoted above), Renehan himself did not include “the crucial qualification ‘no further’” (i.e. “no further” than πρὸς δὲ ἀλλήν τινά): The “heterosexual” interpretation which understands κόμην with ἀλλήν τινά (and whose “sense is acceptable” when that is done) is actually formulated by him to include the words (χάσκειν πρὸς), which the “crucial qualification” was allegedly designed to exclude.
6 Renehan (1993) 46; emphasis in the original.
This passage raises two separate issues that I want to address; the first is whether the interpretation works on its own terms; the second is whether espousing it (as Renehan now does and claims to have done all along) leaves logically open to the interpreter the option of saying that certain other interpretations—for example, Renehan’s interpretation (1) (in his earlier article)—are simultaneously possible.

As to the first question: In his interpretation (2) (as quoted immediately above and also as formulated in his first article) Renehan places his bets on a dramatic change that he thinks will be brought about after the words ἀλλὰν τινά by “the unflattering word χάσκει”: Up to the end of τινά the audience will be supplying κόμην; the rude word χάσκει, however, will make them realize that ἀλλὰν τινά can “refer to a person.” Is this plausible? No, it is not.

For unless we are to imagine that the scene unfolds in a wig emporium, the audience has thought of a person already if ἀλλὰν τινά makes them think of hair at all—because that is what hair comes attached to, persons. What is left to make them think that this person is female rather than male or vice versa? Only χάσκει, which contains nothing that can do this.

The argument from χάσκει is unsatisfactory. But let us grant for the sake of discussing my second question that χάσκει could do what Renehan claims: Where would that leave his interpretation (1) (as formulated at the end of his first article, quoted above)? Can the poem be understood all the way through in the straightforward, “heterosexual” way, or does χάσκει, as Renehan now claims, trigger the “lesbian” interpretation? Does it, or doesn’t it?

Renehan evades this crucial question, and so a crucial fact fails to emerge. Leaving aside Renehan’s ambiguous conclusion about which of the two interpretations posed by him is the right one, an even deeper ambiguity afflicts those two interpretations themselves: They actually number three, and one of these three (the one he now says he preferred all along) is incompatible with the other two.7

The three interpretations which Renehan presents as two are as follows:

(1) The poem proceeds on a single line of meaning: The clause ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου indicates that the girl is, as Lesbian women are generally reputed to be, beautiful, and so in a position to pick and choose;8

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7 Renehan’s failure to acknowledge this fact renders his charge that I misrepresented his argument meaningless: He misrepresented it himself.
8 See Renehan (1993) 44, “... a region associated with beautiful women. Such a woman might well assume a condescending air... She can do better,” and (1984) 30, “the girl can afford to pick and choose; she is beautiful.” That he regards this point as important is shown by his lengthy attempt to refute my arguments that there is no unambiguous evidence for a Lesbian reputation for female beauty (Renehan [1993] 44 n. 7). Renehan basically charges that my arguments are excessively logical; but such a criticism is self-refuting: Either my logic is correct, in which case there is no evidence for a Lesbian reputation for beauty, or the claimed evidence is such as not to admit the drawing of logical inferences from it, which is to say that the evidence is ambiguous. See further note 20 below. Incidentally, one way of defending the
κόμην is understood with ἄλλην τινά, and in the poem as a whole we have nothing more than a lament that the girl rejects the speaker for another, younger partner.9

(2a) Another line of meaning runs parallel to (1): “From Lesbos” can also mean lesbian, and ἄλλην τινά can also mean “another girl.” The ambiguity is complete: Nothing in the poem causes the two lines to intersect.

(2b) As in (2a) “from Lesbos” and ἄλλην τινά are both ambiguous, but χάσκει causes the two lines of meaning to intersect: The audience first understands (1), but then χάσκει directs them to re-interpret “from Lesbos” and ἄλλην τινά as “lesbian” and “another girl,” respectively, as per (2a).

Now if χάσκει10 does what Renehan says it does, then it renders (1) and (2a) untenable. He presents (1) and (2b) as mutually compatible. But if (1) can be sustained in the unqualified way he says it is, then (2b) is not the case, and if (2b) can be sustained in the unqualified way he says it is, then (1) is not the case. You cannot have both simultaneously, at least not without appeal to some further hypothesis (such as that of different audience perceptions, entertained below), an appeal Renehan nowhere makes.11

9 This interpretation has been advocated by, among others, M. L. West, “Melica,” CQ 20 (1970) 209.

Or anything else. The important characteristic that distinguishes (2b) is the claim that there is something in the text that directs the audience to look for the “lesbian” interpretation, i.e. that causes the two lines of meaning to intersect.

10 There is evidence that Renehan sensed the problem here: In both articles the incompatibles are kept apart from one another. In the concluding paragraphs of his first article (quoted above) this separation is achieved through two devices: (a) in presenting interpretation (1) he suppresses the source of the incompatibility, viz. the earlier argument from χάσκει (which he now chides me for failing to report), and (b) after following interpretation (1) with (2b), he immediately transforms (2b) into (2a), which is compatible with (1): “If the statement that the girl is from Lesbos intimates that she is a lesbian—and that would not become apparent (deliberately so) until the final verse [an oblique allusion to the now suppressed argument from χάσκει]—then ἄλλην refers to a woman.” This is interpretation (2b), the interpretation he now claims to have preferred all along. The immediately succeeding sentence effects the transformation into (2a): “If this interpretation is correct, Λέσβον and ἄλλην are each intentionally ambiguous: one should not then insist, with most scholars, that ἄλλην must refer either to ‘hair’ or to ‘a girl’ to the exclusion of the other. It may refer, at different levels, to both.” (Emphasis in the original, and note the logic: If the “correct” interpretation is that ἄλλην refers to a woman, then ἄλλην refers to both hair and a woman.) Contributing also to the evasion of these difficulties is the suppression of the earlier claim that the audience will have made satisfactory sense of the clause εἰσὶν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτῖτον Λέσβον as explaining the girl’s rejection of the speaker by telling us that she is beautiful and so in a position to pick and choose (see above, note 8). Renehan suppresses this claim when he is desirous of advocating the “lesbian” interpretation (2b). Thus in the concluding paragraphs of the first article (quoted above), when he is about to say that the “lesbian” interpretation is possible, his previously given interpretation of the clause (she is beautiful and can pick and choose) is watered down to
Insofar as Renehan now advocates (2b), he would seem to be in agreement with the position taken in my article about the structure of the poem (i.e. that, as per [2b], the lines of meaning are made to intersect). But where I argued that the anticipatory positioning of ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐκτίτου Λέοβου is what triggers the lesbian interpretation, Renehan assigns that task to χάσκει, which, as we have seen, however, cannot function in the way Renehan wants it to. I turn now to my arguments about the anticipatory γάρ-clause.

In his recent article Renehan complains that I did not do justice to his use of the parallel which he cited from Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 37–39: ὁ γὰρ ἀνήρ, ὃς φιλτάτη, ἡ Σαλαμίνιος γάρ ἔστιν ὃς ξύνειμ’ ἐγώ, ἢ τὴν νύχθ’ ὤλην ἡλαυνὲ μ’ ἐν τοῖς στρώμασιν.12 Certainly one of the reasons I wrote my article was because I thought that there was more of interpretative value to be extracted from this parallel than I thought Renehan had done; thus it may be true that I underestimated his implicit suggestions. But it does appear from his new article that our ideas about the parallel differ considerably. I will quote from my earlier article the passages quoted by Renehan himself:

The function ... of the interposed γάρ-clause ... (“for he is from Salamis”) is perfectly clear: it provides the ethnic information that sets up and makes possible the obscene punchline... The first γάρ-clause in Anacreon resembles that in Aristophanes in an even more significant way: both interrupt their sentences in order to tell the ethnic origin of the subject; in Aristophanes this ethnic information serves to set up the obscene punchline that follows, and that is its only purpose. There is an obvious point to be made from all this: an interposed or anticipatory γάρ-clause demands a “pay-off,” comic or otherwise; when the interposed clause contains ethnic information, the pay-off must present action associated with the ethnic group.13

Renehan represents my arguments as follows:

The reader will have observed that in the quotations from Pelliccia’s paper just given he refers twice to “the obscene punchline” in the Aristophanes passage. The two passages from Anacreon and Aristophanes have in common 1) a parenthetic γάρ-clause and 2) an “ethnic” (perhaps better “geographic”) reference in this clause. Aristophanes also has 3) an

“a complimentary allusion to the girl’s origins.” In the second article he says, “as one goes through the sentence, ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐκτίτου Λέοβου is first understood to refer to the girl’s illustrious homeland”—but what else could ἔστιν ἀπ’ ἐκτίτου Λέοβου possibly refer to? Anyone who doubts that we are witnessing a hedging operation here should consider Renehan’s words in support of the “lesbian” interpretation in his next sentence: “... at which point [χάσκει] one realizes that ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ ἐκτίτου Λέοβου can admit of a quite different (lesbian) meaning” (emphasis added)—“different” from what? Surely even with the “lesbian” meaning the words still refer to her “illustrious homeland”?

obscene ending. While Pelliccia does not quite say so in so many words, the reader naturally infers from his language that this is a third detail which the two passages must share, because such a γάρ-clause, specifically containing an ethnic or geographic reference and leading up to an obscene punchline, constitutes, as it were, a formal pattern... Parenthetic γάρ-clauses can be used for humorous effect and doubtless often were. The interesting presence in them, on occasion, of an ethnic word followed by an obscene ending does not prove that an obscene ending must always, or even usually, follow. The formal structure common to Anacreon 13 and Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 37–39 is neutral in this regard. It was of set purpose that I did not draw any further inferences along these lines.\(^4\)

Renehan here conjures up an obviously false claim that anticipatory γάρ-clauses containing ethnic information “must always, or usually” be followed by “obscene punchlines,” and then sets about refuting it. The general principle that underlay my argument from the Aristophanes parallel was that conformity to a clearly defined and rhetorically effective structure, independently attested, can serve as a criterion for a correct reading.\(^5\) In describing the structure that I perceived to be shared by the two passages I distinguished between “punchlines” and “pay-offs” as between sub-set (jokes, including obscene jokes) and set: All anticipatory γάρ-clauses must be followed by pay-offs, which is an analytic truth about “anticipatory γάρ-clauses”: They “anticipate” something, which I call the “pay-off.”\(^6\) The structure which raises and exploits expectation in this way is as I observed “suitable” for the kind of sexual joke exemplified by the Aristophanes passage and the Anacreon poem on the “lesbian” interpretation.\(^7\) But “pay-off” was explicitly characterized as “comic or otherwise,” and I illustrated the “otherwise” with a passage from Herodotus in which an anticipatory ethnic γάρ-clause is followed by a non-humorous and non-obscene pay-off exploiting the ethnic information earlier given, thus satisfying the expectations raised by the use of the anticipatory positioning of the γάρ-clause containing it.\(^8\)

I conclude this section by stressing the point that the clause ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀπ' ἑνκτίτου Λέσβου cannot be demonstrated to have possessed any

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\(^4\) Renehan (1993) 42 f.

\(^5\) My wording here borrows from that of ICS’s anonymous referee.

\(^6\) Pelliccia (1991) 32.

\(^7\) Pelliccia (1991) 33 n. 8.

\(^8\) Pelliccia (1991) 32 n. 6. The presence of this example in my discussion makes clear the illegitimacy of Renehan’s assertion that I implicitly claimed “an obscene punchline” (or “obscene ending”) as a part of the structure described. Renehan complains ([1993] 41 f.) that what is good in my arguments here is already present in his (though I concealed this truth by misquoting his description of the Aristophanes passage as “an exactly parallel sentence-structure” with “structure” omitted); the rest is not to his liking. But it is clear from Renehan’s errors discussed above in the text, and from the wholly irrelevant parallel “γάρ-clauses with an ethnic or geographic element” which he cites ([1993] 43), that he has misunderstood the nature and purpose of my terminology, and my arguments generally.
connotations (e.g. of Lesbian beauty or Lesbian lesbianism) that will have effectively guided the audience to an immediate understanding of what the girl is about to be revealed to do or why she does it. I suggest that this apparent defect is in fact a virtue—the virtue on which the poem’s whole effect depends. The hypothesis that the poet meant for the original audience not to take any immediately exploitable information from the words coheres with the larger one that the poem as a whole is a παρὰ προσδοκίας joke. The clause’s initial contribution is on this argument a function of its being an anticipatory γάρ-clause: The relevance (in the pragmatic sense)¹⁹ of the information it conveys (the girl’s place of origin) is, by the convention of this kind of clause, not perspicuous at the time it is communicated. But the ordinary assumption between speaker and audience is that all information conveyed is relevant: If, as with anticipatory γάρ-clauses, that relevance is not evident when the information is first provided, we assume, and actively expect, that it will emerge when the strands are tied together—at or no later than the pay-off. In the case of Anacreon 13, this expectation is not satisfied by the sentence relating the girl’s rejection of the speaker (τὴν μὲν ἔμην κόμην, / λευκὴ γάρ, καταμέμφεται), and Anacreon ensures that it is not by attaching to that clause its own explanation, independent of the girl’s place of origin: The speaker is old and has grey hair (λευκή γάρ). Since a young girl does not have to be from Lesbos—on one of Renehan’s intermittently advocated arguments, beautiful and stylish, and so able to pick and choose—to spurn the amatory advances of the elderly, so her rejection of the speaker will not satisfy the expectations aroused in the audience by the anticipatory ἔστιν γάρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου.²⁰

¹⁹ As discussed, e.g. by H. P. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge 1989) 28: “Relation. I expect a partner’s contribution to be appropriate to the immediate needs at each stage of the transaction. If I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good book.”

²⁰ There is a secondary question here that enters into Renehan’s complaints against me: Did Lesbian women have a reputation for lesbianism in the time of Anacreon? The answer is important for those who, like M. Marcovich (“Anacreon, 358 PMG,” AJP 104 [1983] 372–83) and me, want to find an overt reference to lesbianism in the poem. Obviously it is in Marcovich’s and my interest if there exists relevant evidence outside of the poem itself. Marcovich thought that the character and fame of Sappho’s poetry constituted this external evidence. I suggested (Pelliccia [1991] 33 n. 8) that, assuming the “lesbian” interpretation, the poem would not succeed as a joke “if the equation” between Lesbos and lesbianism were “so well established as to be automatic”—too much would be given away too soon: What is needed for that interpretation is not the reputation for lesbianism, but a basis for such a reputation, the raw materials out of which the malicious wit (Anacreon) can make the reputation-creating joke. As Marcovich says, Sappho’s poetry provides a basis for such. Renehan complains ([1993] 45) that I misrepresented him by saying that he rejected arguments like Marcovich’s as circular. I leave it to the interested reader to examine his original discussion in its entirety ([1984] 30) and to decide whether I misrepresented Renehan’s position, or he stated it in an unclear and self-contradictory way. The hard-to-support claim that the clause ἔστιν γάρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου can refer to a Lesbian reputation for female beauty (see above, note 8) raises another question: Both that interpretation and the one that has the audience eventually realize that the reference of the anticipatory γάρ-clause is to the supposed lesbianism of Lesbian women involve assumptions difficult to different degrees; why do I think the latter so much easier than the former? First, because it requires only a basis for a
Renehan approaches the finish of his recent article with the following statement: "The problem of conscious ambiguities is of no little importance in poetry. Some twenty years ago the great American Pindaric scholar, Elroy Bundy, wrote of ‘ambiguity of this sort’ as ‘being one of the most powerful instruments of meaning in poetry’."21 If readers are conscious of a failure to live up to Bundy’s pronouncement, they will find their sense of inadequacy alleviated by the discovery in a footnote that Bundy committed the quoted words to “an undated letter” to Renehan.22 Renehan’s presentation of this item from his personal correspondence leaves us with the impression that Bundy, who died in 1975, somehow endorsed the discovery of “ambiguity of this sort” in Anacreon 13 nine years later.23 The question of genuine interest raised and skirted here is how “conscious ambiguity” is defined—for example, whose consciousness counts?

Renehan’s long concluding paragraph is devoted to demonstrating the kinship of the ambiguity he now unambiguously discerns in Anacreon 13 to that of Sophocles, OT 337 f., where Tiresias says to Oedipus, ὥργην ἐμέψω τὴν ἐμὴν, τὴν σήν δ’ ὁμοῦ / ναίουσαν οὐ κατεῖδες, ἀλλ’ ἐμὲ ἐψέγεις.24 That the reference can be to anger or to Jocasta is obvious; but precisely how is this relevant to Renehan’s now preferred (2b) interpretation

reputation rather than the reputation itself and, second, because stereotypes are very easily formed on the basis of (alleged) behavioral characteristics, and very rarely (if ever) on the basis of beauty. That is true about both ancient and modern ethnic stereotyping. For example, in America, Californian women have the greatest reputation for beauty, and there are jokes that exploit this reputation. But in order for them to do so something in the context prior to the punchline must guide the listener to the idea of beauty. If, however, a joke gives no such guidance, but preposes the ethnic information (e.g. “I know this woman—she’s from California—and she . . .”), unusually high beauty is not what will be inferred from it, but behavior associated with the group. (This is not to say that physical characteristics in general are never inferred, because they are; my point has to do with the claim that high beauty is ever generalized for entire ethnic groups or populations to the degree that mere mention of the ethnic identity alone immediately connotes that the given individual representative is “beautiful.”) What is especially odd about the “beautiful Lesbians” interpretation of the γάρ-clause is its superfluousness: That the girl is elegant (her sandals) and attractive (the speaker’s arousal) is already indicated in the first stanza; the γάρ-clause must be telling us something else about her. As to the immediate effect of the clause when first heard (but before being completed in the pay-off), I would say that the language (εὐχτίσου especially) instead of being meant to invoke a (not proven) Lesbian reputation for female beauty, is rather simply intended to sound epic—reminiscent of the way characters in Homer are identified or identify themselves upon first meeting others: “I hail from from horse-nurturing Argos” or the like. It thus sets the girl up high for her impending fall.

22 Renehan (1993) 46 n. 9.
23 Bundy’s exoteric doctrine was somewhat different: “In general, common sense ought to tell us that one thing cannot be another . . . In the judgment of distinction of meaning . . . lies the critic’s task” (E. L. Bundy, “The ‘Quarrel between Kallimachos and Apollonios’,” CSCA 5 [1972] 90 n. 111).
of Anacreon 13, in which the last word of the speaker’s utterance (χάσκει) leads the hearers, according to Renehan, to the solution? Tiresias’ retort exemplifies the ambiguity of the seer or oracle, here adapted to the purposes of “tragic” irony. The ambiguity is evident only to those who know what the two possible meanings are (Tiresias and the theatrical audience), and is not evident at all to the dramatic audience, including, especially, the addressee, for whom the surface meaning satisfies all the pragmatic requirements (i.e. there is nothing performing the function that Renehan assigns to χάσκει in Anacreon 13). By identifying Tiresias’ ambiguity with that of Anacreon 13, Renehan would appear once again to be abandoning his (2b) interpretation of the latter in favor of (2a), whereby nothing overtly points to the possibility of an alternative meaning.

Anacreon 13—on Renehan’s favored (2b) interpretation—seems to work differently. What (2b) and its congeners assume is that there are available to small-scaled, self-contained exercises other resources by means of which to stimulate the audience to look for ambiguity:25 Creating an expectation that is not satisfied, at least not immediately on first hearing, is one of them. The anticipatory positioning of ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου in Anacreon 13 indicates that there is something to be looked for: We accept on faith that such information is going to prove relevant, which sets us to look for that relevance. If by the poem’s end the audience has not hit on something that makes use of the ethnic information, then the defeated expectation itself will incite them to go back and search for a solution.

It is out of these facts that we might construct a good argument that Anacreon 13 is ambiguous in something of the manner Renehan seems to want. The way to do so would be to forget Renehan’s implausible argument from χάσκει, accept my point that ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου conveys no immediately usable explanatory information, but only serves, by virtue of its being preposed, to make the audience sense that something is up and to expect a pay-off, and then just say, “Although this kind of thing cannot be demonstrated with any formal argument, it makes a better poem if we imagine the audience hearing the whole thing through, taking ἄλλην to refer to hair, and thinking at the end, ‘Well . . . ? So what? So he’s mad at the girl—where’s the promised pay-off?’, and then imagine that, as they recur to the unsatisfied promise of ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ’ εὐκτίτου Λέσβου and the bathetic flatness of the hair interpretation, it slowly dawns on them that famous Sappho of Lesbos famously liked girls, and so ἄλλην here might be

25 When I distinguish Anacreon 13 from, e.g. OT, as being “self-contained” I am thinking in particular of the possibilities open to Anacreon in treating a trivial and unnoticed incident involving two anonymous private individuals, as opposed to the possibilities—for tragic ambiguities, e.g.—open to Sophocles in reworking a well-known legend about famous and well-established mythical characters.
a girl, and the first girl is identified as Lesbian in the sense of being ‘like Sappho’ in that respect.”

This interpretation seems to me to be attractive, but it raises the possibility that we might go further and posit different audience responses. Everyone has observed that some people are very highly attuned to witticisms and wit generally, while others are defective in this respect, sometimes not understanding a joke even when it is explained to them. Most people fall somewhere in between. In my earlier paper I pointed out that what led Renehan (and others) to supply κόμην with ἀλλὰν τινά was the assumption that since μέν has κόμην, it was therefore to be supplied with δέ also, and I cited passages illustrating how that kind of assumption about μέν and δέ could be defeated. That evidence and argument were meant to explain how an audience might as soon as they heard it take ἀλλὰν τινά to refer to a girl; we can now add that the evidence might also and perhaps more plausibly be taken as indicating how a less quick-witted audience would understand the particles to work after they had gone back and unravelled the joke, in the manner described in the last paragraph: On the first, unsatisfying run-through they will supply “hair,” on the second, “girl.”

26 I will illustrate my point about the lack of immediate connotation in the ethnic γόρο-clause with an example drawn from the modern world. As I said in my earlier paper, for the purposes of the joke it is necessary that the association of Lesbos with lesbianism must not be so well-established that it would give the joke away before it was concluded. I want to point out now that jokes can be constitutive of stereotypes that do not really exist before they make them exist. As my example I choose a scene from Woody Allen’s film version of Everything You Ever Wanted to Know about Sex. As I recall it, in the last skit of that movie we find ourselves present in the brain of a would-be male seducer out on a date with a young woman. The brain is depicted as a kind of NASA control center, with “scientists” walking around in white lab coats in front of various computers and things. They see their present job to be to assist with the seduction of the dinner companion, and they discuss whether or not the “mission” will be a success. An older scientist then says to a younger, “Have you taken a look at her?,” and they move to some sort of viewing scope that lets them see across the dinner table to the woman, who at that moment says, “I’m a graduate of New York University.” The scientists immediately laugh with pleasure, make the “thumbs up,” and give other indications that this information suggests that the seduction is a done deal. The audience in the theater where I saw the movie in the early 70s found this joke on NYU women students immensely funny. This was in Berkeley, and I would imagine that most members of the audience, like me, came to the movie with absolutely no preconceptions along these lines about NYU students. I do not know to this day if the stereotype had any existence prior to this movie, or after it, and it does not matter if it had not: For those of us who had never heard of it, the joke simultaneously created and exploited the stereotype, and the stereotype did not survive after the joke was over. In other words, when the woman said the words “I’m a graduate of New York University” they had no connotation to us in the audience; but when the scientists reacted in the way they did, and did so in the context to which we were privy, we were able to supply her words retrospectively with the necessary connotation. In this case the joke created a stereotype by giving concrete (and ephemeral) expression to pre-existing general prejudices that large cities are home to sexual promiscuity, and a 1950s-era notion of a kind not uncommon in Allen’s films that women who go to college are likely to be “fast” or “easy.” Similarly, Anacreon’s poem may have opportunistically put together an idea of general Lesbian lesbianism on the basis of Sappho’s poetry.

Three possible audiences correspond to the three character types described:

(A) The ready wit—in particular, the familiar sub-type who sees references to sex everywhere: A hits on the joke as soon as the words ἀλλην τινός are pronounced.

(B) The majority: They do not see the joke so quickly as A does, but stimulated by the anticipatory χάρ-clause (as described above) they go back over the poem until they hit upon the solution.

(C) The obtusely humorless: Insensitive to the implications of the anticipatory χάρ-clause, C takes the poem as in interpretation (1) above (a simple lament that the girl prefers a younger partner); C cannot understand what everyone is laughing about (or, today, expressing indignation about).

B is the ideal audience, the mentality to which the composition has been geared (A might see the point even too quickly). C should not be disqualified from the discussion on the grounds that he or she misinterprets or fails to interpret. Before an audience comprising A, B, and C, the poet might derive the highest gratification from C.

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28 Many today who have not earned membership in this category are assimilated into it by the historical accident that “from Lesbos” has implications or associations that would not have been automatic at the time of the poem’s composition.
3

On Implied Wishes for Olympic Victory in Pindar

THOMAS K. HUBBARD

Scholars have recently appealed to the convention of the Siegeswunsch, or "victory wish," as an explanation for a number of difficult and vexed passages in Pindar's epinician poetry which have not usually been recognized as victory wishes.¹ The obscurity of the wish is explained as a result of the unique glory conferred by victory in the Olympic games, requiring a certain diffidence and indirectness on the part of the laudator: in the formulation of one critic, "where the stakes are highest and the risk of failure most daunting, there the need for a becoming modesty of approach is most pressing."² Accordingly, it seems worth while to reexamine the convention of the epinician Siegeswunsch and also the various passages where scholars have found it implicitly present. In doing so, we find that the passages in question do not in fact conform well with the explicit examples of victory wish in Pindar and Bacchylides. Moreover, consideration of the passage within the broader context of its ode suggests an altogether different explanation in each case. The implied wish for Olympic victory is therefore not a convention which need be added to our grammar book of encomiastic rhetoric.

I. The Explicit Victory Wish

Eight passages in Pindar clearly and unambiguously express wishes for future victory.³ For the reader's convenience, I give below a brief and, I trust, unbiased paraphrase of each:


² Miller, "Apolline Ethics" (previous note) 464.

³ I here adopt the same list as that enumerated by Miller, "Apolline Ethics" (above, note 1) 462 n. 3. However, I have bracketed Bacch. 8, 26–32 because of the uncertainty of the text: this passage is a wish if we read τελέσσωσις and ὀπόσσωσις with Maas, but not if we accept Blass' τελέσσεις and ὀπόσσεις. Maas' readings are those printed in the text of Snell-Maehler, defended in H. Maehler, Die Lieder des Bacchylides (Leiden 1982) 1.2.141. On the other hand, it should be noted that wishes generally are far less common in Bacchylides than in Pindar.
O. 1. 106–11: “If god does not leave you, Hieron, I hope (ἐλπιμα) to celebrate an Olympic chariot victory.”

O. 13. 101–06: “Their previous Olympic victories have been told; their future victories I would tell then; now I merely hope (ἐλπιμα), and it is up to Zeus and Ares to accomplish.”

P. 5. 122–24: “The great mind of Zeus governs the guardian spirit of men. I pray (εὐχομαι) to him to grant this prize at Olympia to the race of Battus.”

N. 2. 6–10: “If propitious Time has given Timodemus as a glory to Athens, it is right that he call the bloom of victory at Isthmia and Pytho.”

N. 10. 29–33: “O Zeus, his mouth is silent about what he inwardly desires. The accomplishment is yours. He does not demand the favor with an untoiling heart. I sing (ἀείθω) things known to god and competing men: Pisa is the highest contest.”

I. 1. 64–68: “May he be lifted up on the Muses’ wings, winning glory for Thebes at Pytho and Olympia. If someone hides his wealth, he goes to Hades without glory.”

I. 6. 3–9: “As at a symposium, the first libation is to Zeus for Nemean victory, the second to Poseidon and the Nereids for Isthmian victory. May the third be to Olympian Zeus, to honor Aegina with songs.”

I. 7. 49–51: “Grant us, O Apollo, a crown at Pytho.”

[Bacch. 8. 26–32: “O Zeus, may you grant our prayer and give him a crown at Olympia.”]

What is immediately discernible about all of these wishes is that they name a specific festival or festivals in which victory is desired, usually one at which this athlete has not yet achieved a victory. The second feature which characterizes all the wishes is the attribution of their accomplishment to a divine power: Zeus (O. 13, P. 5, N. 10, I. 6, Bacch. 8), Apollo (I. 7), the θεὸς ἐπιτρόπος (O. 1). Nemean 2. 7–8 invokes Time (εὐθυπομπός αἰῶν) as a sort of divine fate responsible for the victor’s success. Isthmian 1. 64–65 does not attribute the accomplishment of victory to the Muses, but the celebration and glorification of the desired victories. Both these passages avoid naming a single god and resort to more abstract figures of divine causality, since they are in fact wishes for victory at more than one festival.

4 Of course, O. 1. 106–11 and O. 13. 101–06 are exceptions, since no victory higher than an Olympic victory can be won. But O. 1 does maintain a sense of future anticipation by wishing for a chariot victory (more prestigious than the mere horse victory already achieved), and O. 13 wishes for other members of the family to achieve Olympic victories.
The wishes are about evenly divided between those which use a first-person verb to convey the hope (O. 1, O. 13, P. 5, N. 10) and those which express the prayer directly with an optative (I. 1, I. 6, and perhaps Bacch. 8) or imperative (I. 7). Again, Nemean 2. 6–10 is somewhat exceptional, using neither a direct nor indirect prayer, but an impersonal verb of appropriateness (δόξηλεία); as we have observed, this passage is not really a prayer at all, since it does not name a specific god, but the more abstract notion of Time. The whole is structured as a logical progression in conditional form.

Another element of importance in most of the prayers is the role of the poet himself and allusion to his vested interest in the athlete’s future victories. The poet’s self-involvement may be as slight as the use of a first-person verb (P. 5, N. 10) or pronoun (I. 7), or it may take the form of an explicit declaration that he hopes to be involved as a poetic celebrant of the forthcoming victories (O. 1, O. 13; more implicitly, I. 1 and I. 6). 5 Several of the prayers come at the conclusion of poems (O. 1, P. 5, I. 1, I. 7, Bacch. 8). Especially interesting is the concluding prayer of Isthmian 7. 49–51, which uses the first-person plural pronoun ὑμῖν to unify poet and victor as the beneficiaries of Apollo’s favor in the Pythian games: in a sense, the crown will be the crown of the singing poet as well as that of the victorious athlete. The athlete’s future triumph will be the poet’s future opportunity for a commission.

What we find nowhere in these wishes is a special “modesty of approach” characteristic of wishes for Olympic victory. These are formally indistinguishable from the others. While Nemean 10. 29–33 does characterize the victor himself as modest in his claims, the poet does not hesitate to render his inward desires explicit and petition the god directly. Such verbal intermediation is indeed the poet’s function.

II. Generalized Wishes for Prosperity and Embedded Victory Wishes

Even more common than the explicit victory wish is the generalized prayer for good fortune. 6 Again, a divinity is always involved, either addressed in the vocative or made the subject of an optative verb: Zeus (O. 2. 12–15, O. 5. 18–23, O. 7. 87–93, O. 8. 84–88, O. 13. 24–30, O. 13. 115, P. 1. 29–38, P. 1. 67–75, N. 9. 28–32), Apollo (P. 1. 39–40), Heracles (N. 7. 86–101), the Fates (I. 6. 14–18), the nymph Aegina (P. 8. 98–100), or the abstract

5 The Muses’ role in raising the victor aloft in I. 1. 64–65 obviously points to the element of poetic celebration, as does their prominence in I. 6. 1–3, introducing the series of libations in celebration of the victories of Lampon’s sons. The μελιφθόργοις ἀοιδάς shed over Aegina in I. 6. 9 as a result of Olympic victory are surely meant to be songs of epinician praise.

6 On such wishes, of which victory wishes may be seen as a subclass, see E. L. Bundy, Studia Pindarica (Berkeley 1962) II 77–79; E. Thummer, Pindar. Die Isthmischen Gedichte (Heidelberg 1968) I 103–05. These are discussed under the rubric of “Future Prayer” by R. Hamilton, Epinikion: General Form in the Odes of Pindar (The Hague 1974) 17, 20.
theos (O. 4. 12–16, P. 1. 56–57, P. 10. 17–22). The purpose of these wishes is to contextualize the victor's success in the specific athletic event within a broader good fortune which will reach beyond the athlete to include those around him.

Three of these generalized wishes merit detailed examination here, since they involve future athletic victories as at least part of what is prayed for. The most obvious case of such an embedded victory wish is that of Pythian 1. 29–38:

εἰη, Ζεὺς, τίν εἰη ἀνδάνειν,
οὗ τοῦτῷ ἐφέπτες ὤρος, εὐκήρυκοι γαῖας μέτωπον,
τοῦ μὲν ἐπονυμίαν
κλεινὸς οἰκιστήρ ἐκύδανεν πόλιν
γείτονα, Πυθιάδος δ' ἐν δρόμῳ κάρυς ἀνέειπέ
νιν ἄγγέλλων ἴερων ύπέρ καλλινίκου
ἄρμασι. ναυσιφορήτοις δ' ἀνδράσι πρῶτα χάρις
ές πλόν ἄρχομένοις πομπαίον ἐλθείν οὖρον
εὐτίκητα γὰρ
καὶ τελευτᾷ φερτέρου νόστοι τυχεῖν. ὥ δὲ λόγος
ταύτις ἐτί συντυχίας ὁδίαν δέρει
λοίπων ἑσσεθαι στεφάνους νιν ὑποις τε κλυτάν
καὶ σὺν εὐφῶνοις θαλίσις ὀνομαστάν.

Hieron's present chariot victory (alluded to here for the first time in the ode) is clearly presented as a good omen for the future of the newly founded city of Aetna, whose namesake god is here invoked (Zeus Aetnaeus). The victory is compared to the omen of a favorable wind at the beginning of a sea voyage. From this comes the expectation that Aetna will be famous for crowns, horses, and musical banquets, all the trappings of great victories in the prestigious equestrian contests. However, the prayer does not stop here: it continues with an address to Apollo to take this wish to heart and make Aetna a land of good men (P. 1. 40 ἐφανδρόν τε χώραν). By placing the invocation of Zeus at the beginning and that of Apollo at the end of this

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7 A. Kambylis, "Anredeformen bei Pindar," in Χάρις: Κωνσταντίνος Ι. Βουρβέρη Αφίραιμα (Athens 1964) 104–05 argues that the unspecified θεός in such cases should be understood as the last god addressed. But it may be that the god is intentionally left unspecified if O. 4. 12–16 and P. 10. 17–22 are to be read as, at least in part, victory wishes, since the contests in which victory is desired are not specified and could belong to several gods. On these passages, see below.

8 I. 6. 14–18 is the only clear case of this. O. 4. 12–16 is a wish for the victor Psaimis, but he is praised within the wish for his hospitality and devotion to peace, i.e. his public obligations. Thus, insofar as Psaimis will enjoy good fortune, the whole city of Camarina will also benefit. On this wish, see our more detailed discussion below.

wish sequence, the two gods are effectively linked together as co-guarantors of Aetna’s future prosperity, of which athletic success is merely one tangible manifestation. Invocation of the gods for this purpose is continued as a leitmotif throughout the ode: after gnomic reflections on the power of divine gifts to men (P. 1. 41–46) and a brief myth illustrating divine favor toward Hieron’s fortunes in war (P. 1. 47–55; note especially 48 θεὸν παλάμαις), the theos is asked to be a protector of Hieron in the future (P. 1. 56–57). In Pythian 1. 67–75, Zeus Teleios is invoked to “accomplish” good fortune and peace for the city and its leader. Throughout, Hieron’s fortunes are linked with those of Aetna. The victory wish of Pythian 1. 35–38 is not limited to Hieron or to any specific athletic festival, but is a wish for equestrian victories on behalf of the entire city and is clearly presented within a broader context of divine favor toward this city’s political and military fortunes.

Another such prayer comes soon after the initial announcement of Hippocleas’ victory in Pythian 10. 17–22:

έποιτο μοίρα καὶ υπέρμασιν
ἐν ἄμεραις ἀγάνορα πλοῦτον ἀνθεὶν σφίσιν.
τῶν δ’ ἐν Ἑλλάδι τερπνών
λαχόντες ὅμιλαν δόσιν, μὴ φθονεραίς ἐκ θεῶν
μετατρόπαις ἐπικύρσαιεν. θεός εἰς ἀπήμων κέαρ.

After announcing Hippocleas’ victory (P. 10. 7–9) and linking it with his father’s Olympic and Pythian victories (11–16), fleshed out with a gnome on divine power (10), the poet wishes “them” (σφίσιν) wealth in the future and hopes they will not encounter a reversal of fortune engendered by the jealousy of the gods. “Them” presumably refers not just to Hippocleas and his father, but to the whole family. As part of this wish, the poet prays that they will receive no small measure τῶν . . . ἐν Ἑλλάδι τερπνῶν.10 The geographical designation has led some commentators to see this phrase as a reference to victory in the various contests throughout Greece;11 one could aptly compare Olympian 13. 112–13 πᾶσαν κατὰ Ἑλλάδ’, applied to the Oligaethids’ victories throughout Greece, or Nemean 6. 26 μυχ’ Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσας, in reference to the boxing victories of the Bassidae. Although the term τερπνῶν is often used by Pindar with no specific application to athletic victory, at least one other text does seem to use the word with particular reference to agonistic success (N. 7. 74). It may be that Pindar employs the

10 It should be observed, however, that λαχόντες may not itself be part of the wish, but could refer to good things they have already achieved. Such seems to be the interpretation of Σ P. 10. 26 (Drachmann), which glosses it with the perfect participle μετασχηκότες.
11 Such is the view of L. Dissen, Pindari Carmina quae supersunt (Gotha 1830) II 330 and W. Christ, Pindari Carmina prolsegomenis et commentariis instructa (Leipzig 1896) 218. However, F. Mezger, Pindars Siegeslieder (Leipzig 1880) 257 denies that the meaning of this phrase should be so limited.
vague expression τῶν ... ἐν Ἑλλάδι τερπνῶν because he means us to understand more than just athletic victory here. But even if we are meant to see the phrase as specifically agonistic, it is clearly embedded within a context of wishes for the family’s continued prosperity and freedom from divine jealousy.

Also immediately after the initial victory announcement is the wish of Olympian 4. 12–16:

\[
\text{\(\theta\)ε\(\upsilon\)ς \(\epsilon\)\(\upsilon\)\(\phi\)ρων}
\]
\[
\text{ἐ\(\iota\)\(t\) λοιασ\(\upsigma\)ις \(\epsilon\)\(\upsigma\)\(\alpha\)\(\omicron\)ις.}
\]
\[
\text{ἐπεί \(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(n\) α\(\iota\)\(n\) \(\mu\)\(\alpha\) \(\mu\)\(\nu\) \(\tau\)\(\rho\)\(\o\)\(\mu\)\(\alpha\)\(\iota\)\(s\) \(\epsilon\)\(\tau\)\(\omicron\)\(i\)\(m\)\(\omicron\) \(\iota\)\(p\)\(\omicron\)\(\nu\)\(\omicron\).}
\]
\[
\text{χα\(\iota\)\(r\)\(o\)\(n\)\(t\)\(a\) τε \(\xi\)\(\e\)\(n\)ι\(\iota\)\(s\) π\(\alpha\)\(n\)\(d\)\(o\)\(κ\)\(o\)\(i\)\(s,}
\]
\[
\text{καὶ πρός Ἡσυχίαν φιλόπολιν καθαρά γνώμῃ}
\]
\[
\text{τετραμμένον.}
\]

A number of nineteenth-century commentators considered the λοιασ\(\upsigma\)ις \(\epsilon\)\(\upsigma\)\(\alpha\)\(\omicron\)ις of Psaimis to be wishes for a victory in the equestrian contests, highlighted by the mention of horse breeding as the first item in the poet’s ensuing list of his praiseworthy qualities.\(^\text{12}\) Their view is predicated on Olympian 4 celebrating the same mule-team victory as Olympian 5 and that victory occurring in 456 B.C. or earlier. But it seems unlikely that Pindar would write two equally short and unimpressive odes for the same victory, since most double commissions involve one ode being appreciably larger in scale than the other (e.g. O. 10 and O. 11, O. 2 and O. 3, P. 4 and P. 5); the scholia (Σ\(\text{ABC}\) O. 4 inscr. Drachmann) are probably right in assigning Olympian 4 to Psaimis’ Olympic chariot victory of 452 B.C., in which case the allusion to horses in Olympian 4. 14 is part of the poet’s praise of the present victory and not just a wish for future victories in the chariot race.\(^\text{13}\) Nevertheless, even if we see Olympian 4 as already celebrating an Olympic chariot victory, the “future prayers” of Psaimis could still include further athletic successes as part of what they entail; comparison with the “silent desire” for victory of Theaues in Nemean 10. 29 is appropriate. But there is no reason to think that Psaimis’ prayers are limited to athletic success: the following list of his praiseworthy qualities contextualizes his horse breeding within a broader field of social and political activity, including hospitality and devotion to the goddess Peace.\(^\text{14}\) Competition in equestrian events and the subsequent celebration of victory are themselves activities with


\(^{13}\) For a review of the evidence and defense of the scholiastic date, see Gerber (previous note) 7–8.

\(^{14}\) The arrangement of the three terms listed in O. 4. 14–16 takes the form of an ascending tricolon, and therefore puts the climactic emphasis upon the third and longest term—devotion to Peace. See Gerber (above, note 12) 19 and W. H. Race, Style and Rhetoric in Pindar’s Odes (Atlanta 1990) 22–23.
tremendous social and political resonance, bringing glory to the victor’s city and friends as well as to himself. Psaumis’ prayers are thus likely to be prayers for the good fortune of his city and friends as much as his own.

Our examination of these three passages suggests that prayers for victory which are not tied to a specific named contest (like those listed in Section I) are contextualized within generalized wishes for continued good fortune which extend beyond the victor himself to include his city, family, or friends. They typically occur immediately after the initial announcement of the athlete’s victory, near the beginning of the ode, and serve as a way of sharing the victor’s success with his community. Bearing these considerations in mind, let us now turn to the controversial passages which some critics have seen as implied wishes for Olympic victory.

III. Different Erotes: Pythian 10. 55–63

A number of commentators going back to the nineteenth century have regarded the future infinitive of Pythian 10. 58, combined with the expression ἐτὶ καὶ μᾶλλον . . . θαυτόν, as evidence that Pindar hopes for a future Olympic victory on the part of Hippocleas, which he will be commissioned to celebrate. This view has most recently been defended in an article by Andrew M. Miller.15 To facilitate consideration of this passage, I shall quote the context (P. 10. 55–66):

ἐλπίσμαι δ’ Ἐφυραίον
οπ’ ἀμφὶ Πηνείων γλυκεῖαν προχέοντων ἕμαν
tὸν Ίπποκλέαν ἐτὶ καὶ μᾶλλον σὺν ἀοιδαῖς
έκατι στεφάνων θαυτόν ἐν ἄλιξι θησέμεν ἐν
καὶ παλαιτέροις.
νέασιν τε παρθένοις μέλημα. καὶ γάρ
ἐτέροις ἐτέρων ἐρωτεῖ ἐκκινεῖν φρένας:
tῶν δ’ ἐκαστος ὀρνεύει,
tυχῶν κεν ἀρσελέαν σχέθοι φροντίδα τὰν
πάρ ποδός:
τὰ δ’ εἰς ἐνιαυτόν ἀτέκμαρτον προνοῆσαι.
πέποιθα ξενία προσανεῖ Θώρακος, ὡσπερ ἐμὰν
ποιητῶν χάριν
tὸδ’ ἔξευξεν ἄρμα Πειρέδων τετράροιν,
φιλέων φιλέωντ’, ἄγων ἄγοντα προφρόνως.

This passage comes at the beginning of the poem’s fourth and final triad, after Pindar has closed the myth of Perseus’ fantastic voyage to the Hyperboreans with a gnome declaring that anything is possible with the favor of the gods (48–50), followed by an apologetic break-off formula (51–

15 Miller, “Wish” (above, note 1) 161–72. Among the older critics interpreting the passage this way are C. G. Heyne, Pindari Carmina et Fragmenta (Oxford 1807) 1 336; Fennell (above, note 12) 261; Christ (above, note 11) 221; J. Sandys, The Odes of Pindar, 2nd ed. (London 1919) 287.
Such break-off formulae after myths either lead to a new myth or return us to the present epinician topic, featuring praise of the victor and/or his family for their achievements. I have found no cases in which a myth is broken off, to be followed immediately by a wish for the future. Indeed, our examples of both explicit and implied victory wishes examined in Sections I and II all form part of passages already praising the victor and/or his family; the wishes themselves never constitute the starting point for the focus on the victor. For this reason alone, I think that Farnell and others must be right in seeing the future θησάμεν here as an “encomiastic future,” referring to the present act of choral celebration.

There are additional reasons why the construction of this passage as a wish for future Olympic victory does not seem tenable. Nothing so much as hints at Olympia or any other athletic festival; those who construe it as an Olympic wish do so merely on the basis that this is the only victory more prestigious than the Pythian crown Hippocleas has already won. Nor do we find the prayer form and attribution of success to a god that are conventional in both explicit and embedded wishes for victory: no mention is made of god anywhere in this passage, an omission made all the more curious in a wish following a myth whose chief purpose was to prove the power of the gods to work miracles.

Miller has argued that the limitation gnome of Pythian 10. 61–63 takes the place of the usual divine element by reminding the athlete of the limits to his ambition. But the two conventions (the limitation topos and recognition of divine causality behind human success) are really quite separate; nowhere do we find them used interchangeably and only seldom are they even linked. Indeed, the emphasis of Pythian 10. 61–63 on keeping one’s sight fixed on the near-term perspective and not speculating about things a year away seems to tell definitively against Pythian 10. 55–60 being a wish for an Olympic victory two years down the road. No strong adversative like ἀλλὰ marks the gnomes off as an antithetical check or break-off formula: the connective δ’ in 61 rather casts them as a logical development of what has just been said.

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17 Generalized wishes or prayers for prosperity may provide a transition from mythical material back to the encomiastic theme, as in P. 1. 29–38 or 56–57; in O. 13. 24–30, a prayer for prosperity effects the transition from praise of the city to that of the victor. But victory wishes nowhere serve this function.

18 Farnell (above, note 12) II 219. On the encomiastic future generally, see Bundy (above, note 6) I 21–22; W. J. Slater, “Futures in Pindar,” CQ 19 (1969) 86–94. There is a definite parallel between this phrase and ἐπικοινών ἀνδρῶν κλητῶν Ὑπα (P. 10. 6), which clearly refers to the present choral performance. Even if we are to imagine separate performances at Pelinnaion (P. 10. 4) and Ephyra (55–56), the future θησάμεν would be a real future when sung at Pelinnaion, but an encomiastic future when sung at Ephyra.

19 So, for instance, Miller, “Wish” (above, note 1) 170–71. Not all wishes for victory need be for more prestigious victories, as the example of O. 13. 101–06 demonstrates.

20 Miller, “Wish” (above, note 1) 169–70.
An alternative explanation for the sequence of ideas in this passage does exist. The poet’s hope/expectation is not for an unexpressed future victory, but for the effectiveness of his present praise.\textsuperscript{21} The power of his encomiastic rhetoric is illustrated in terms of the victor’s enhanced attractiveness to other boys, to older men, and to maidens.\textsuperscript{22} The most obvious parallel passage here is not one of the explicit victory wishes cited by Miller, but another text concerning a victorious athlete’s sex appeal (P. 9. 97–100):

\begin{quote}
\textit{πλέστα νικάσαντα σε και τελεταίς ώρίας εν Παλλάδος εἴδον ἄρωνοι θ’ ώς ἕκασται φιλτατον παρθενικοί πόσιν ἢ υἱὸν εὐχοντ’, ὀ Τελεσίκρατες, ἐμμεν...}
\end{quote}

The present passage expands the exclusively female interest of \textit{Pythian} 9 (an ode dominated by marriage motifs)\textsuperscript{23} by also including male homoerotic interests, as appropriate in the case of an adolescent boy. That we are dealing with a variety of eroticisms here is made clear by the summary priamel of \textit{Pythian} 10. 59–60, although translators and commentators have in the past often tried to obfuscate the point out of a misplaced sense of modesty.\textsuperscript{24} Both iconographical and literary evidence suggests that erotic

\textsuperscript{21} Compare the use of \textit{ἐλπίζω} in P. 1. 42–44 and N. 6. 26–28.

\textsuperscript{22} The praise of the poet’s song and its powers, so clearly the subject of P. 10. 55–57, would only be obscured and ambiguited if P. 10. 58–59 turned out to be about a future Olympic victory. Would the athlete be more attractive to boys, men, and girls because of the Olympic victory itself or because of being celebrated by an ode of Pindar? And if the latter, why would a second ode make him so much more attractive than the first?


\textsuperscript{24} See for instance the translation of Sandys (above, note 15) 293: “... cause Hippocleas to be admired still more for his crowns among his fellows and his elders, and to be looked upon with a sweet care by the young maidens.” Or see the paraphrase of W. B. Burton, \textit{Pindar’s \textit{Pythian} Odes} (Oxford 1962) 11: “... will enhance Hippocleas’ distinction among his countrymen and commend him to the hearts of the young girls.” One finds equally watered-down renderings of \textit{θητός} in the translations of Bowra, Lattimore, Swanson, Conway, and Nisitch. But the term \textit{θητός} unquestionably refers to physical beauty when applied to humans (cf. P. 4. 80, P. 9. 108, N. 11. 12); see my remarks in \textit{The Pindaric Mind} (Leiden 1985) 22 n. 34. The point of this statement can hardly be that he will be more beautiful \textit{in comparison} to his agemates and older men, since older men would not be appropriate objects of comparison for the physical beauty of a youth anyway. The point can only be that Hippocleas will be more beautiful \textit{in the eyes} of his agemates and older men; see the translation of Farnell (above, note 12) 1142, although his commentary is uncharacteristically silent here. O. Schroeder, \textit{Pindars \textit{Pythien}} (Leipzig 1922) 98 seems to be the only commentator willing to reveal to his readers that this is indeed what the passage must mean: he aptly compares Horace, C. 1. 4. 19–20 “quo caelo iuventus / Nunc omnis et mox virgines tepebunt.” See R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, \textit{A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book I} (Oxford 1970) 72. Horace read his Pindar with rather less prudery than many moderns.
activity among youths of the same age (ἐν ὀλίγοι) was more common than often supposed. The attractiveness of adolescent boys to older Greek males (ἐν παλαιστέροις), including Pindar himself, was well known; the canonical kouros statues were central in the development of Greek aesthetic sensibility in this period. Homerothic involvement has long been seen as an essential part of Greek paideia and a form of adolescent initiation, preparing boys for adult responsibilities in both the political and sexual spheres. As such, it constitutes a prelude to heterosexual interests and marriage, as we see illustrated most clearly in Pindar’s rendition of the Pelops myth in Olympian 1, where the youth’s homosexual sojourn with Poseidon in Olympus tears him away from his boyhood home and prepares him to compete in the chariot race against Oenomaus to win the hand of Hippodameia. It is thus fitting to have Hippocleas’ potential for marriage (νέοισιν τε παρθένοισι) alluded to as the third and climactic term in the series, prepared for with initiatory homerothic interests.

The homerothic context of this section may explain the emphasis on limiting one’s perspective to the present moment. The theme of fleeting temporality is central to homosexual love poetry, concentrated as it is on glorification of the desired boy’s brief efflorescence of fragile beauty; as Pindar tells himself at the beginning of the famous Theoxenus encomium, χρήστος μὲν κατὰ καλὸν ἐρώτων δρέπανοι, θυμέ, σὺν ἀλκίς (fr. 123. 1). At the opening of Nemean 8, the poet addresses a hymn to Hora, the goddess who distinguishes youths and maidens in beauty, giving preeminence to some and not to others, even as the boy Deinias is preeminent in both beauty and athletic prowess. The close of Olympian 10 praises the boy Hagesidamus as ἐκείνος τε καλὸν ὥρα τε κεκραμένον (O. 10. 103–04); praised by poetry, his brief moment of glory and beauty becomes frozen for eternity, even as Ganymede’s beauty is deathless (O. 10.


29 On the doublet of beautiful appearance and noble deeds in Pindar, see Race (above, note 14) 188–91. On the significance of beauty and eros generally in the epinician, see the discussion of Crotty (above, note 9) 76–103.
104—05). For a youth, the present moment is everything, and τὰ εἰς ἐναυτὸν are ἀτέχμαρτον προνοήσαι and better left that way.31

A scholium tells us that the king Thorax was the ἐταῖρος of the boy victor Hippocleas; the word is probably to be understood in the sense of erastes.32 While this is likely to be no more than an inference on the part of the scholiast, it is a reasonable explanation for the ode’s being commissioned not by the boy’s father, as is usual, but by a non-related nobleman. One can compare the banquet which the rich Callias gives in honor of his eromenos Autolycus after the latter’s Panathenaic victory, which forms the setting for Xenophon’s Symposium and its ensuing discussion of beauty, love, and marriage. It is significant that the gnomes on not looking beyond the present good are immediately followed without any connective particle by Pindar’s praise of Thorax as a trustworthy and kindly friend. The implication may well be that Hippocleas should now devote his attention to his present erastes Thorax rather than gazing several years down the road toward his eventual marriage (adumbrated with the νέας ισίν τε παρθένοις μέλημα in P. 10. 59). Despite the new opportunities for love and approbation available to the boy in virtue of his enhanced stature (55—60), he should keep to the coveted good at hand (61—63), exemplified by his friendship with Thorax, a friend even to the poet (64—66) and a just ruler of Thessaly (67—72). None of this is consistent with the future-oriented perspective that would be set up by a wish for Olympic victory in two years’ time.

IV. Praying for Harmony: Pythian 8. 67—78

Miller argues in another long and stimulating article that better sense can be made of the vexed prayer to Apollo in Pythian 8. 67—69 if we understand it as a “first-person indefinite” request, asking the god for his favor toward the athlete’s next undertaking—the pursuit of victory at Olympia.33 Again, I shall quote the broader context of this passage to facilitate its understanding (P. 8. 61—80):

τὸ δ’, Ἐκαταβόλε, πάνδοκοι
ναὸν εὐκλέα διανέμοιν
Πυθώνος ἐν γυάλοις,

30 For time as a thematic leitmotif in O. 10, see G. Kromer, “The Value of Time in Pindar’s Olympic 10,” Hermes 104 (1976) 420—36 and Hubbard (above, note 24) 61—70.
31 For the elaborated motif of youth’s immersion in present joys and ignorance of future ills, see Mimnermus, fr. 2 W and Simonides, frr. 19—20 W2 (= Simonides, fr. 29 D).
32 Σ P. 10. 99a (Drachmann). Again, Schroeder (above, note 24) 91 is alone among commentators in mentioning this possibility; see also G. Coppola, Introduzione a Pindaro (Rome 1931) 29.
Miller bases his construction of the passage on two original observations: (1) that the prayer to Apollo in 67–69 interrupts a victory catalogue, and the only other objective (i.e. victor-oriented) prayers to do so are Olympian 13. 101–06 and Nemean 10. 29–33, both explicit wishes for Olympic victory (see Section I), and (2) that 67–69 is really the request component of a cult hymn beginning with 61–66. Miller analyzes such cult hymns according to a tripartite structure of (i) invocation, (ii) hypomnemesis, and (iii) request. Since the hypomnemesis in this case is a reminder to Apollo of past instances in which he has helped Aristomenes win athletic victories (64–66), Miller infers that the request must also be on behalf of Aristomenes and his athletic ambitions. Since Aristomenes has already won a Pythian victory, the desired future success must be a victory at Olympia, which alone is more prestigious.

There are problems, however, with both these lines of argument. Victory catalogues may be interrupted for any number of reasons which have nothing to do with wishing for future victories. The poet may interrupt the victory catalogue to praise a secondary laudandus (I. 2. 22–28, on the charioteer Nicomachus), to insert sequences of gnomic reflection (O. 8. 59–64, on the virtues of teaching), or to pause for a brief mythological digression, often justified by extended apologetic self-justification (P. 9. 80–96, on Iolaus and Thebes, or N. 6. 45–57, on the Aeacidae). The general purpose of such passages is to delay the completion of the victory catalogue and thus make it appear longer, through the typical Pindaric technique of foil and deferral.34

Of particular interest for our purposes are those digressive passages which contain an element of wish or prayer. A good example is Nemean 6.

34 For such devices as means of lengthening a victory catalogue, see Bundy (above, note 6) II 69–70.
26–30, which is flanked on each side by extended victory catalogue (11–26 and 31–44). After a climactic assertion that the house of the Bassidae has won more boxing victories than any other in Greece (24–26), the poet pauses for a moment to take aim and invoke the Muse before commencing another crescendo of praise (N. 6. 26–30):

\[ \text{έλπομαι} \]
\[ \text{μέγα εἰπὼν σκοποῦ ἀντα τυχεῖν} \]
\[ \text{ωτ} \\
\text{ ἀπὸ τόδει τείς: εὐθὺν ἐπὶ τοῦτον, ὥγε, Μοῖσα, οὐρον ἐπέων} \]
\[ \text{εὐκλέα: παροιχομένων γὰρ ἄνέρων,} \]
\[ \text{έοιν δὲ καὶ λόγοι τὰ καλὰ σφιν ἔργ \& ἐκόμισαν.} \]

We see here a combination of wish/hope (έλπομαι) with direct prayer to a divinity (the Muse) to intervene, followed by a gnomic rationalization of the prayer which acts as a hypomnemis. Pindar’s bow-and-arrow metaphors, like his javelin casts, serve a focussing function in moving us toward the encomiastic theme: here, the movement is from the more general praise of the clan to the specific praise of the kinsmen Callias and Creontidas. The Muse is also directly associated with the arrow metaphor in Olympian 1. 111–12 and is generally connected with spurring the poet on to his task of praise. This passage stands as a seal of divine authority for the climactic vaunt Pindar has already made in Nemean 6. 24–26 and as a regenerative pause preparing him to launch into a new development of praise. It has nothing to do with future victories, but is entirely concerned to validate the poet’s praise of existing victories.

Equally effective is validation of the poet’s praise is the wish that the victor’s uncle Callicles should hear Pindar’s γλώσσαν κελαδητὶν in the Underworld (N. 4. 85–88). This can only take place if the poet’s voice has supernatural powers of penetration which overcome death. In the extended digression of Pythian 9. 80–96, we find a brief prayer that the Graces not abandon the poet (89–90 Χαρίτων κελαδεννάν / μη με λίποι καθορον φέγγος). I have argued elsewhere that this prayer asks for the Graces’ continued favor as Pindar leads a k homos for the Theban heroes mentioned in the preceding digression as responsible for Telesicrates’ victory at the

35 The victory catalogue actually extends to N. 6. 58–63 and is interrupted a second time by a mythological digression on the Aeacidae in 45–57. Thus virtually the entire poem can be visualized as a victory catalogue punctuated by digressions.

36 On the convention of hypomnemis, the traditional reminder to a god either of past services the supplicant has performed for the god or, as here, of past favors the god has granted the supplicant, see H. Meyer, Hymnische Stilelemente in der frührheichischen Dichtung (Cologne 1933) 4–5; K. Keyssner, Gottesvorstellung und Lebensausfassung im griechischen Hymnus (Stuttgart 1932) 134; Race (above, note 14) 86, 93–94. For the use of γὰρ to signal such a hypomnemis, see my remarks on P. 9. 90–92 in “Theban Nationalism and Poetic Apology in Pindar, Pythian 9. 76–96,” RhM 134 (1991) 35, especially n. 50.


38 Cf. O. 3. 4–6, P. 1. 58–60, P. 4. 1–3, P. 11. 41–45, N. 7. 77–79, fr. 6a(e) S–M.
Iolae.\textsuperscript{39} Again, the prayer invokes the divinity as a guarantor and supporter of the poet’s strategy of praise. Nothing here suggests future victories.\textsuperscript{40}

Miller defends his use of \textit{Olympian} 13. 101–06 and \textit{Nemean} 10. 29–33 as analogues for \textit{Pythian} 8. 67–69 by saying that an “explicit or implicit prayer on behalf of the laudandus and/or his family . . . embedded in a victory-catalogue” must be a \textit{Siegeswunsch}.\textsuperscript{41} But nothing identifies \textit{Pythian} 8. 67–69 as a prayer for the victor and/or his family. The first-person pronoun, at least as conventionally interpreted, points rather to the poet and thus to prayers/wishes of subjective validation such as we have enumerated. Even if \textit{Pythian} 8. 67–69 did involve the victor in a more direct and obvious way, two examples of such prayers being \textit{Siegeswünsche} are hardly enough to justify an ironclad law that they must be such. Pindar is clearly capable of interrupting his victory catalogues for a variety of motives.

More intriguing is Miller’s argument that \textit{Pythian} 8. 67–69 must constitute the final request in a cult hymn which begins with 61–66 and thus asks for future victories as a continuation of the divine benefaction recollected with the hypomnnesia of 64–66 (on Apollo’s grant of previous victories at Pytho and Aegina). Miller’s exposition of the three-part hymn structure here is sound, but one is entitled to question whether a hypomnnesia concerning the god’s previous favor toward the athlete’s agonistic efforts can only preface a request concerning the same. The function of a hypomnnesia is to remind the god of past connections with the prayer’s beneficiary and thus to indicate why this particular god is the appropriate one to invoke. This function is just as well served if we see \textit{Pythian} 8. 64–66 as the hypomnnesia preparing a request for subjective validation of the poet’s strategy of praise: Apollo is the appropriate god to invoke since he has provided the Pythian victory which the poet here celebrates. The benefit recollected by this hypomnnesia reaches both athlete (an athletic victory) and poet (the chance for a poetic commission), even as the request touches both athlete (Pindar’s immediate subject matter among ὡς ας νέομαι) and poet (the \textit{ego} of the prayer). The poet’s own stake in the athlete’s success has been emphasized already in the lines immediately preceding this prayer (56–60), where Pindar receives a prophecy concerning the Pythian victory of Aristomenes as he sets out for Delphi.\textsuperscript{42} The lines which follow the

\textsuperscript{39} Hubbard (above, note 36) 33–36.

\textsuperscript{40} However, Dissen (above, note 11) II 318–20 and Christ (above, note 11) 211 believe this wish does refer to future victories. See my objections to this view in Hubbard (above, note 36) 34 n. 44.

\textsuperscript{41} Miller, “Apolline Ethics” (above, note 1) 462.

\textsuperscript{42} That this is the probable content of the prophecy was suggested by \textit{Σ P.} 8. 78a (Drachmann). See also Dissen (above, note 11) II 291–92; B. L. Gildersleeve, \textit{Pindar, The Olympian and Pythian Odes} (New York 1885) 351; Farnell (above, note 12) II 196; J. Duchemin, \textit{Pindare poète et prophète} (Paris 1955) 90 n. 2; C. M. Bowra, \textit{Pindar} (Oxford 1964) 52; G. Kirkwood, \textit{Selections from Pindar} (Chico, CA 1982) 211. See also my remarks in “The Theban Amphiaraios and Pindar’s Vision on the Road to Delphi,” \textit{MH} 50 (1993) 198–
prayer also emphasize the laudator's interests as well as those of the laudandus: the request is explained, with μέν and δέ, by the poet's assertion of encomiastic propriety (Δίκας) in his komos and by his declaration that he wishes to avert the jealousy of the gods from the victor. There is no reason, either in the prayer itself or in its surrounding context, to limit its application to the interests of the victor alone.

Miller's interpretation of this passage as a prayer only on the athlete's behalf confronts the immediate problem of the first-person in Pythian 8. 67–69, which he explains by appeal to the convention of the "first-person indefinite." But the other examples of the first-person indefinite are uniformly cases in which a wish or declaration is made by a generic "I," speaking for both poet and victor and "all right-thinking persons." The "I" is never identified with the persona of the victor alone, as it would have to be for Pythian 8. 67–69 to constitute a wish for future athletic victories. Nor is it used in highly occasional and context-specific wishes, such as one for Olympic victory; its function in other wish-passages is always gnomic, a kind of moral self-exhortation to conform to a certain pattern of behavioral constraint.

Indeed, the first-person indefinite does not appear to be used in cultic hymns at all. That Pythian 8. 67–69 is unlikely to be spoken in the first-person voice of the victor is confirmed by the victor's father being addressed in the vocative in 72, where the first-person (αἰτεῖο) clearly refers to the poet interceding with the gods on behalf of the victor's family (ὑμετέραις τύχαις); such intercession would hardly be necessary if the victor had already impetrated Apollo's favor in his quest for Olympic victory.

The relationship of this prayer to its general surrounding context is one of the principle obstacles to seeing it as a victory wish. The preceding myth of Amphiaraus' oracle concerning the Epigonoi (P. 8. 39–56) emphasizes

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99; it may also include some political implications concerning Aegina's future, as suggested by T. Krischer, "Pindars achte Pythische Ode in ihrem Verhältnis zu anderen," WS 98 (1985) 123.

43 The illustrative use of μέν/δέ in asyndeton after a preceding general sentence is common in Pindar: see O. 2. 25-30, P. 2. 15–20, 63–67, P. 5. 15–20, P. 9. 118–20, N. 2. 14–15, N. 5. 44–46. The poet's wish for harmonious vision is here illustrated with two examples of it, his encomiastic propriety (μένι) and aversion of θόνος θεῶν (δέ).

44 See Hubbard (above, note 33) 290–91. The θόνος θεῶν topos in Pindar constitutes a declaration of encomiastic propriety in that excessive or undue praise beyond what is fitting for the mortal station is what excites the jealousy of the gods.

45 Miller, "Apolline Ethics" (above, note 1) 472, citing the seminal discussion of this convention by D. C. Young, Three Odes of Pindar: A Literary Study of Pythian 11, Pythian 3, and Olympic 7 (Leiden 1968) 12–58, 61.


47 Miller, "Apolline Ethics" (above, note 1) 473 n. 31 points to N. 1. 31–33 as a parallel, where we have a first-person indefinite statement (Ν. 1. 31–32) followed by a first-person statement in which the "I" is clearly the poet and only the poet (Ν. 1. 33). However, there is in this case an intervening gnomic statement (Ν. 1. 32–33 Κοιναὶ γὰρ ἑρωτεύεται ἐκλογέως / πολυπόνων ἀνδρῶν) and a strong shift in persona as indicated by the emphatic ἔγ' δ' in the poetic statement of Ν. 1. 33, beginning the poem's myth. In P. 8. 70–72, we have neither of these, but a μέν/δέ construction growing directly out of the prayer in P. 8. 67–69.
the variability of human fortune; the lesson is applied to present events by
the lines breaking off the myth (56–60), in which Pindar tells us that
Amphiaraus granted an oracle to the poet himself as he set out for Delphi,
presumably about Aristomenes’ forthcoming victory. The theme of
vicissitude in fortune is continued with the gnomic reflections immediately
after the prayer (73–78) and is implied even in the φήνος θεῶν topos of
71–72. It also constitutes the major theme of the fifth triad (81–100); with
the final prayer of 98–100, wishing for Aeginetan freedom, the motif of
variable fortune is revealed to have political overtones as well. In
the context of this pervasive emphasis on the instability and reversability
of human fortune, a specific prayer for Olympic victory seems out of place.
Nothing in this prayer points to Olympia especially, nor is Apollo even the
right god to invoke if one wished for Olympic victory.

The prayer is far more likely to function as a general wish for continued
prosperity and/or good judgment in the face of the ephemeral fragility of
human achievements. There has been considerable controversy over the
precise meaning of Pythian 8. 67–69: some have taken Apollo as the one
asked to look, others have taken the poet himself as the subject of the
infinite, and many different translations of κατά τίν’ ἀρμονίαν have
been proposed. I have expressed my own view of these lines elsewhere,
but at least three subsequent articles have each adopted a different point of
view, and it must be acknowledged that consensus is not close to being
achieved. If Apollo is to be understood as the subject of the infinitive
βλέπειν, the prayer would seem to ask that he favor the poet’s undertakings
(ὁσα νέομαι), including Pindar’s praise of the fortunes of the victor and his
family (implied in the ὑμετέραις τύχαις of 72 and presumably the object of the
komos in 70–71). Apollo could best favor the poet’s undertaking in this

48 See Hubbard (above, note 42) 193–203 for a fuller explication of these lines.
49 For the political background and significance of this final prayer, see Mezger (above, note
11) 399–401; C. Gaspar, Essai de chronologie pindariquie (Brussels 1900) 165–68; N. O.
Brown, “Pindar, Sophocles, and the Thirty Years’ Peace,” TAPA 82 (1951) 1–6; Krischer
(above, note 42) 119–24; T. J. Figueira, Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization
50 Other wishes specifically for Olympic victory always invoke Zeus; cf. O. 13. 101–06. P.
5. 122–24, N. 10. 29–33, I. 6. 3–9, Bacch. 8. 26–32. The θεός ἔπιτροπος of O. 1. 106–11
should probably be understood as Zeus. I. 1. 64–68 does not name a specific god as
responsible for the victory, since it asks for victory at both Olympia and Pytho.
51 For a list of critics taking Apollo as the subject, see Hubbard (above, note 33) 287 n. 2;
add Verdenius (above, note 33) 367–68 and Taillardat (above, note 33) 228–29. For a list of
those taking the poet as subject, see Miller, “Apolline Ethics” (above, note 1) 473 n. 32.
52 Among English translators of this century one finds a variety of renderings: “keep due
measure in view” (Sands), “see eye to eye with thee” (Farnell), “look even as you look also”
(Lattimore), “look down to my harmonies” (Conway), “let your eyes rain melody”
(Bowra), “look somewhat in harmony” (Ruck and Matheson), “see a harmony” (Swanson),
“see me through my song, in harmony” (Nisetich). My own preference is to take the poet as
subject and translate, “look according to some principle of harmony.” Matters are complicated
further by the tendency of many early editors to accept de Pauw’s emendation κατά τίν’, on
which see Hubbard (above, note 33) 286 n. 1.
53 See the references in note 33 above.
regard by continuing to favor the victor and his family in a general sense. If the poet himself is the subject of \( \beta\lambda\varepsilon\varepsilon\nu \), the prayer would seem to be a self-exhortation to propriety, whether in his strategy of praising the victor, in making transitions, or some other aspect of his art. Amid the vicissitude and mutability of fortune in the mortal world, the poet must know how to qualify his praise so as not to exceed the bounds of encomiastic Δίκαιος (70–71) or excite the jealousy of the gods (71–72): this qualification he proceeds to add in 73–78.\(^{54}\) Finally, even if we were to take the first-person of this prayer as a “first-person indefinite,” as Miller proposes, the wish would have to be a general and gnostic exhortation to self-restraint, not a specific wish for a particular benefit to the victor alone.\(^{55}\) However we choose to translate these lines, their application must be engaged with the broader issues of the ode concerning the transitory and fragile nature of human success and the quickness with which fortune can change.

V. Orion and the Pleiades: Nemean 2. 6–15

The third strophe of the short Nemean 2 has been a hermeneutic crux since the Alexandrian period. The point of the Orion/Pleiades and Ajax/Salamis allusions has been a riddle for commentators, but the solution clearly has something to do with the preceding victory wish, which I quote in full (N. 2. 1–15):

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"Όθεν περ καὶ ὶμηρίδαι
βασιτὼν ἐπέων τὰ πόλλα ἀοιδοῖ
ἀρχονταί, Δίος ἐκ προσιμίου, καὶ ὄθ' ἀνήρ
καταβολὰν ἑρῶν ἀγῶνων νικαφορίας δέδεκται
πρῶτον, Νεμεαῖον
ἐν πολύμνητῳ Δίος ἄλσει.
ὅρειλε δ' ἔτι, πατρίαν
ἐπερ καθ' ὄθον νῖν εὐθυμοπός
σιῶν ταῖς μεγάλαις δέδωκε κόσμον Ἀθάναις,
θαμά μὲν ἱσθμιάδων δρέπεσθαι κάλλιστον
ἀωτὸν ἐν Πυθίασι τε νικάν
Τιμονόου παιδ'. ἔστι δ' ἔοικός
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\(^{54}\) This is basically the view I have adopted in Hubbard (above, note 33) 286–92. Miller, “Apolline Ethics” (above, note 1) 470 objects to a subjective prayer here on the grounds that nothing in this victory catalogue is challenging enough to require such an appeal for divine assistance. I would suggest that the fundamental challenge of P. 8 is how to render praise of a triumphant Aeginetan athlete in a time and political atmosphere in which Aegina as a whole is anything but triumphant. Pindar addresses this problem with a myth and extended meditations on the vicissitude and cyclical variability of human fortune. In this context of general pessimism, the praise of the victor’s present happiness must be tempered without being negated; this delicate balancing of high notes and low notes, bright tones and dark tones, is the immediate encomiastic challenge for which the poet invokes divine assistance.

\(^{55}\) Miller, “Apolline Ethics” (above, note 1) 475–76 seems to acknowledge this as the nature of such first-person wishes, but fails to explain how such a general wish can also be read as a specific wish for Olympic victory.
With some minor variations and occasional eccentricities,⁵⁶ essentially three schools of thought have emerged concerning the Orion comparison. One scholium, followed by many modern commentators,⁵⁷ holds that Timodemus’ victory/victories follow his ancestors’ victories (hinted at in πατρίαν . . . καθ’ οἶδόν) even as naturally as Orion follows the Pleiades. Another scholium holds that his predicted Isthmian and Pythian victories will follow his initial Nemean victory (the καταβολάν ίερών ὁγόνων νικαφορίας), even as Orion follows the Pleiades.⁵⁸ While these two views differ on the precise identity of what is compared, both agree on ἔστι δ’ ἐοικός . . . being used as a formula introducing a comparison. Some more recent critics have taken an altogether different approach, however, suggesting that Nemean 2. 10–12 is not a comparison to the preceding lines, but a progressive continuation of the preceding wish for Isthmian and Pythian victories, making a veiled wish for Olympic victory: Olympic victory is a giant like Orion, dwarfing all previous victories like the tiny Pleiades.⁵⁹

It seems strange that Pindar would choose such a cryptic way of wishing for Olympic victory after making such an explicit wish for victories in the other two contests, where Timodemus’ family had already achieved victories (N. 2. 19–22). And although Olympia was without question the most prestigious of the major Panhellenic festivals, one wonders whether Pindar would really choose so stark a comparison as that between Orion and the Pleiades to describe the degree to which Olympia surpassed the others. Far more in Pindar’s style is the tact of Olympian 1. 1–7, where Olympia is supreme among contests to the same extent that the sun is supreme among

⁵⁶ R. Rauchenstein, Zur Einleitung in Pindar’s Siegeslieder (Aarau 1843) 118 says Orion is in the vicinity of Olympia even as Acharnæ is near Salamis. G. Fraccaroli, Le Odi di Pindaro (Verona 1894) 537 and Farnell (above, note 12) I 164 say that the athlete’s family pursues athletic glory even as Orion pursues the Pleiades.
⁵⁹ Scholz (above, note 1) 20–21 and Instone (above, note 1) 114. Although neither seems aware of it, this interpretation had long ago been proposed by Heyne (above, note 15) I 370–71.
stars or gold among precious metals: the other festivals are assimilated to objects of grandeur and value, but Olympia’s value is greatest. The same consideration of encomiastic propriety also casts doubt on the first proposed solution to the crux: Would Pindar really say that Timodemus’ victories were so much greater in stature than those of his ancestors as to be like Orion in comparison to the Pleiades? The comparison would not be inappropriate, however, if the contrast is between Timodemus’ own first victory and a glorious career of many Panhellenic victories which he has ahead of himself; his later achievements, wished for in Nemean 2. 6–10, will of course dwarf his earliest one.60

What almost all treatments of this passage have neglected is that we have a second mythological allusion immediately following that to Orion and the Pleiades. The mention of Salamis and Ajax has usually been treated as completely irrelevant to what precedes it. The scholia again give a variety of interpretations, mostly speculating about covert allusion to some external fact, such as Timodemus’ membership in the Aiantid phyle, or a childhood spent in Salamis, or a genealogy traced back to Ajax.61 But the connective particles καὶ μὲν are not adversative so much as a progressive continuation of a connected series.62 What we are dealing with here is an analogical sequence, not unlike the famous opening priamel of Olympian 1, in which the Pleiades are to Orion as Salamis is to Ajax, as X is to Y.63 The sequence is closed with the vocative address to the victor and pronominal cap σὲ δ᾿ in Nemean 2. 14, and it is clear that the statement has something to

60 Krischer (above, note 57) 33 objects to this interpretation on the grounds that the Pleiades are multiple, Orion singular, and thus do not properly match Timodemus’ first victory/future victories in terms of number. However, Krischer’s own interpretation (see note 57 above) is open to similar objections: nothing in the lines leading up to this passage emphasizes the plurality of Timodemus’ ancestors, nor even anything in the resumed victory catalogue of N. 2. 17–24, where the focus is on the number of the family’s victories. The emphasis of the preceding passage (6–10) is really not on Timodemus’ ancestors at all, mentioned merely with the vague πατρίαν καὶ θ᾿ ὀδόν. Number is not the issue in 6–10, nor is it the issue in the following Ajax/Salamis allusion. Indeed, it cannot be the point of the Orion/Pleiades contrast either, since Orion is if anything a constellation consisting of more stars (38) than the Pleiades (7), which appeared to the naked eye more like a single spot.

61 Σ. N. 2. 19 (Drachmann). The idea that ‘Timodemus’ father was a clerus and that Timodemus grew up on Salamis has proven a particularly popular assumption among critics: see Mezger (above, note 11) 320; Bury (above, note 57) 29; Fraccaroli (above, note 56) 537; Christ (above, note 11) 246; Farnell (above, note 12) II 251; Scholz (above, note 1) 24; Instone (above, note 1) 115. Wilamowitz (above, note 58) 156–58 even assumes that Timodemus was still a resident of Salamis. It is curious that Pindar makes no explicit mention of Timodemus’ former home (or second home), if it is such; he certainly does not hesitate to make much of Hagesias’ dual citizenship in O. 6 or Ergoteles’ former residence in Crete in O. 12. The emphasis here is entirely on Acharnae and Athens. It is better not to resort to speculation about unexpressed biographical details to explain such passages.

62 See J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1954) 351–53. Fennell (above, note 57) 21 seems to be alone among commentators in paying attention to the particle usage in this passage.

do with Timodemus’ athletic glory. While Pleiades/Orion might conceivably be interpreted as a figural expression for other victories/Olympic victory, it is difficult to see how Salamis/Ajax can be so interpreted. It is also hard to see Salamis/Ajax as an appropriate relationship to illustrate the virtues of heredity, since Ajax’ ancestry derived ultimately from Aegina and was not native to Salamis.

What does seem to be important in both the Pleiades/Orion and Salamis/Ajax relationships is the issue of relative size. The Pleiades (or “Doves”) were a tiny cluster of stars, whereas the giant Orion was one of the biggest constellations in the night sky. The difference in proportion is immediately obvious to even the most casual astronomical observer.64 Salamis was a small island, sending only twelve ships to Troy (II. 2. 557) and thus forming along with Ithaca the smallest military contingent among the Greeks.65 But Ajax was physically the largest of the Greek heroes, comparable in might even to Achilles himself.66 That Salamis is said to be δυνατός of nurturing a warrior (N. 2. 13–14) seems to imply that one might not normally expect it to. The point of both comparisons seems to be that the extremes of small and large are connected, that small beginnings may be followed by large consequences: huge, bright Orion may pursue the tiny, pale Pleiades in the rotation of the night sky, and mighty Ajax may come from little Salamis. The Trojan War itself (emphasized in N. 2. 14) came from small and seemingly trivial beginnings. The metaphor of physical size is preserved in the verb ἀέξειτω, which crowns the end of the strophe, describing how Timodemus’ courage in the pancratium “increases” him.67

64 On Orion’s expanse, see Aratus, Phaen. 324, 636, 752–55; the tiny size of the Pleiades is frequently noted, as by Aratus, Phaen. 255–56 and Manilius, Astron. 4. 522. Equally significant is the contrast between Orion’s brightness (Aratus, Phaen. 518, 586–88) and the Pleiades’ noted paleness (Aratus, Phaen. 256, 264). According to Ptolemy, Almagest 8. 1, out of Orion’s 38 stars, two are of the first magnitude (Rigel, the seventh brightest star in the sky, and Betelgeuse, the twelfth brightest), four of the second magnitude, eight of the third magnitude, fifteen of the fourth magnitude, three of the fifth magnitude, five of the sixth magnitude, and one a nebula; this would indeed make it the brightest constellation in the sky, or at least one of the brightest. In contrast, the Pleiades contain only one star of the fifth magnitude, all others being sixth magnitude.

65 Hesiod, fr. 204, 44–51 M–W alludes to a much larger Salaminian empire, including Aegina, Megara, Corinth, and Troezen. M. Finkelberg, “Ajax’s Entry in the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women,” CQ 38 (1988) 31–41 has argued that this is likely to be a more archaic version consistent with actual Mycenaean reality, whereas the reduced power of Salamis in the Homeric catalogue is more in keeping with the political interests of influential Greek states such as Athens and Corinth in the 6th century. Given that this ode is written for an Athenian audience, its presuppositions would favor the Homeric catalogue’s characterization of Salamis as “small.”

66 Ajax is frequently called μέγας (II. 5. 610, 9. 169, 11. 562, 590, etc.), πελώριος (II. 3. 229, 7. 211, 17. 174, 360), ἐρκας Ἀχαϊῶν (II. 3. 229, 6. 5, 7. 211), and is said to carry a “shield like a tower” (σύκος ἡπεὶ πύργον, II. 7. 219, 11. 485, 17. 128). Achilles says that only Ajax’s armor could fit him (II. 18. 192–93); in II. 13. 321–25, Ajax is said not to yield even to Achilles.

67 On the basic sense of the Greek αὔξο (poet. ἀέξο), cognate with Latin augere, as having to do with growth and increase, see H. Frisk, Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch.
In the broader context of a first strophe which focussed on Timodemus’ first Panhellenic victory as an “earnest deposit of victory in the sacred games” and a second strophe which explicitly claims the fittingness of further victories in even more prestigious contests, it is obvious that the small beginning hinted at in the two allusions of the third strophe must be the present Nemean victory, the great consequence a glorious athletic career in the future.

Small beginnings are thematized as a leitmotif throughout the poem. The allusion to Homeric prooimia at the opening (1–3) reminds us that a short hymn to Zeus or some other god will preface a Homeric rhapsode’s recitation of a longer epic narrative. The text applies this quite explicitly to Timodemus’ Nemean victory, which like a hymn to Zeus, the god of the Nemean games, will presage a longer tale of athletic achievements in time to come. Even so, the ode as a whole may be seen as a small prooimion to the celebratory revel which can be expected to follow: the last two verses (24–25) address Timodemus’ fellow citizens, exhorting them to make a revel for the Nemean victory and “begin” (ἐξάρχετε) with their voices. The poem thus ends with a beginning (of the komos), even as it self-consciously begins with a prooimion about prooimia. Although an ode of brief compass, among Pindar’s shortest, Nemean 2 elevates itself in stature by presenting both itself and the Nemean victory it celebrates as mere first steps in a longer and more glorious enterprise of achievement and praise. Timodemus’ coming achievements might well include victory even at Olympia, but nothing in this text’s proclamation of his future names Olympia or is limited to it.

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To summarize our conclusions, none of the three passages examined in detail (P. 10. 55–63, P. 8. 67–69, or N. 2. 10–12) conforms with the expected conventions of either the explicit wish for victory in a certain contest or the embedded general wish for victory. Explicit victory wishes always allude to a specific festival and give credit to the power of an


68 For this meaning of καταβολάν, see Farnell (above, note 12) II 252. Most earlier commentators took the term as an architectural metaphor for “foundation.” In either case, the word’s sense clearly reflects a beginning, with more to come in the future.

69 For this technical use of προοίμιον as a term for the Homeric hymn, cf. Thuc. 3. 104. 4; Plato, Phaedo 60d. See also the discussions of R. Böhme, Das Prooimion: Eine Form sakraler Dichtung der Griechen (Baden 1937) 10–36 and W. G. Thalmann, Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic (Baltimore 1984) 120–22.

70 For the idea that the poem’s end is meant as a beginning to the komos, see Wilamowitz (above, note 58) 158. On the general distinction between epinician and komos, see Bundy (above, note 6) I 2 and M. Heath, “Receiving the κόμος: The Context and Performance of Epinician,” AJP 109 (1988) 180–95, although the latter sees the komos, wrongly in my view, as typically preceding the formal epinician.
appropriate god: none of these three passages even hints at Olympia, and only one (P. 8. 67–69) names a god, but that god is the wrong god for an Olympic victory wish. Embedded victory wishes always come immediately after the poem’s initial announcement of victory, wish for victories in general (not in any specific venue), form part of a generalized wish for good fortune, and contextualize the athlete’s victories within a broader structure of social relations to his clan and community. Pythian 10. 55–63 and Pythian 8. 67–69 fulfill none of these conditions. Nemean 2. 10–12 fulfills them only to the extent that it is seen as a generalizing continuation of the specific wish for victory at Isthmia and Pytho made in lines 6–10; it does not fulfill them if we try to read it as an additional and independent wish for victory at Olympia.

On those occasions when Pindar desires to express a wish for victory at Olympia or elsewhere, he feels no reluctance about doing so in clear and straightforward terms, as we have illustrated in Section I. He may also express a general wish for the good fortune of the victor, his clan, and his city, and include further athletic victories as part of that general wish, as we have seen in Section II. Why he should ever choose to communicate a wish for victory at Olympia or anywhere else in less than straightforward terms is incomprehensible to me. Miller has speculated it could be a matter of the commissioning family’s preference. But presumably a family would either desire a victory wish to be included in the ode or not; if they wanted it, Pindar would make it immediately clear and effective, and if they did not want it, he would not make it at all. It does not seem likely to me that one of Pindar’s patrons would request a covert victory wish. Brought up in an intensely goal-oriented, agonistic culture, the ancient Greeks had few inhibitions about praying for success.

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71 Miller, “Wish” (above, note 1) 172 n. 31.
72 My thanks to Andrew M. Miller for kindly agreeing to read this essay in advance of its publication, and to the two anonymous referees of Illinois Classical Studies for their helpful comments. None of them should be held responsible for any of its faults or conclusions.
Three subsequent editors of Euripides’ *Heracles* have accepted the suggestions of John Jackson at 858–73, the transposition of 860 to follow 870, alteration of ἐπιρροϊβδὴν θ’ ὀμαρτεὶν to ἐπιρροϊβδεῖν ὀμαρτεὶν θ’ in 860 and of ἀνακαλῶν to ἀνακαλῶ in 870. Before this text becomes even more established as the modern vulgate, it is worth while to speak out in defense of the paradosis. I cite the reading of the Laurentianus with significant corrections noted below:

"Ἡλιόν μερτυρόμεσθα δράσθ’ ἅ δράν οὐ βούλομαι.  
εἰ δὲ δὴ μ’ Ἡραὶ θ’ ὑποτρεπεῖν σοὶ τ’ ἀναγκαῖος ἔχει  
tάχος ἐπιρροϊβδὴν θ’ ὀμαρτεὶν ὡς κυνηγῇτη κυνᾶς,  
εἰμ’ γ’: οὐτὲ πῶντος οὐκ ἴμασι στένων λάβρος  
οὔτε γῆς σεισμὸς κεραυνοῦ τ’ οἴστρος ὁδίνας πνέων  
οὐ’ ἐγώ στάδια δραμοῦμαι στέρνων εἰς Ἡρακλέους  
καὶ καταρρήξω μέλαθρα καὶ δόμοις ἐπεμβάλω,  
tέκν’ ἀποκτεῖνασα πρῶτον ὧ δὲ κανῦν οὐκ ἔπεσται  
παιδεσ ὡς ἔτικτεν ἐναρέν, πρὸν ἀν ἐμάς λύσας αἱμῆ.  
δὲν ἰδοῦ καὶ δὴ τινάσσει κράτα βαλβίδων ἄπα  
καὶ διαστρόφους ἔλισσει σῖγα γοργοποιοῦ κόρας,  
ἀμπνοιὸς δ’ οὐ σωφρονίζει, ταυρὸς ὡς ἐς ἐμβολὴν.  
δεῖν μικάται δὲ κήρας ἀνακαλῶν τὰς Ταρτάρους.  
860  
865  
τάχα σ’ ἐγὼ μάλλον χορεύσω καὶ καταυλήσω φόβοι.  
στείχ’ ἐς Οὐλίμπον πεδαίρουσι’ ἦτρι, γενναίον πόδια·  
ἐς δόμοις δ’ ἡμεῖς ἄφαντος δυσόμεσθ’ Ἡρακλέους.  
870  
ἐναρέν Wilamowitz: ἔτικτ’ ἐναιρ[ο]ν Λ[;] ἔτικτεν αἴρὼν Λ II 870 δεινά  
Canter: ὡς Λ

Jackson’s transposition, like any transposition, should be supported by arguments of two sorts: (a) that the line is awkward or clearly out of place where transmitted; and (b) that it fits well in its new surroundings, adding to rather than detracting from the coherence of the passage.

On the first score (a), Jackson confesses, with his customary dry wit, that the evidence is not all that clear (14):

Since [my views] demand, in the Hercules, that 860 should go elsewhere, it would be agreeable to find that in decency it cannot stay where it is, but the evidence, though not to be ignored, might with advantage have been a little stronger. It is possible that τάχος ἐπιρροίβδην τι is not signal felicitous as a phrase, but it is at least better than ἐπιρροϊβδην τάχος τι; it is possible that ὁμαρτεῖν is not the aptest of all infinitives, since Lyssa neither left the golden floor of Olympus nor entered the chamber of horrors at Thebes in company with Iris, but the word is just defensible; it is possible that a logician of the straitest sect would have preferred κόνας to κόνας, but on more than one occasion Euripides has shown himself less logical than Herwerden.

Bond does not object to the transmitted wording, though he accepts the transposition, albeit in less measured tones than Jackson (293): “ὁμαρτεῖν is inappropriate, for Lyssa does not accompany Iris (872 f.): the noble Iris will not in fact be a huntsman; and the plural κόνας is not particularly appropriate to describe Lyssa, who rather keeps hounds at Ba. 977.” Although scribes are hardly infallible and often have copied a line in the wrong place,² we must nevertheless question whether arguments like those of Jackson and Bond are really strong enough to convince us that there is probably or certainly something wrong with 858–61 in their transmitted order. I will attempt to prove that their arguments are insubstantial.

i) Although a reader may first suppose that the connectives in 859 serve to join Ἡρα and σοί, he soon realizes that the two infinitives are connected apo koinou. Ἀναγκαίως ἔχει thus governs (1) Ἡρα τῷ ὑπουργεῖν and (2) σοὶ τε τάχος ἐπιρροίβδην θ᾽ ὁμαρτεῖν ὡς κυνηγήτη κόνας. Not only is the transmitted reading grammatically possible, but it is also thematically sound. Hera is the prime mover whom both Lyssa and Iris assist: Iris says "Ἡρα προσάψαι κοινὸν αἵματι σφήκας κατακτεῖνατι, συνθέλω δ᾽ ἐγώ (831–32). Lyssa serves Hera but accompanies Iris.

ii) Jackson never explains exactly why he considers τάχος ἐπιρροϊβδην τε as infelicitous. Parallels for τάχος used adverbially for ταχέως are cited by Bond. Likewise, there is no grammatical reason to reject the adverb ἐπιρροιβδην and substitute the infinitive ἐπιρροϊβδεῖν, as Bond also points

² Jackson’s own conjecture seems a bit forced (16): He proposes that this line and an alleged second line (see below) were mistakenly relegated to the margin due to the similarity of line-beginning with 870, and then our line was incorrectly reinserted after 859 while the alleged second line was left aside.
out. Though the adverb is ἀπαξ εἰρήμενον here, the verb apparently does not occur anywhere else in classical literature either. The joining of two adverbs by τε, though not common in poetry, does have precedent. The phrase provides little reason to doubt the soundness of the text.

iii) It is simply not true that Lyssa does not accompany Iris. Rather, she left Olympus (or perhaps the Underworld) in Iris’ company: They appear hovering above the stage, arriving together on the same mechane. In this sense ὤμωρτεῖν is appropriate. To be sure, Lyssa and Iris do not go together into the house of Heracles, but the transmitted text need not imply that they do. ὤμωρτεῖν, though coordinate with ὑπογρεῖν, is easily taken as subordinate in thought: “It is necessary for me to serve Hera by accompanying you (to this place).” The notion of speed and whirring of wings (τάχος ἐπιρροῖβδην τε) refers most naturally to the aerial portion of their journey just completed on the mechane, and not to the remaining few downward steps into Heracles’ house. The verb ὤμωρτεῖν describes Lyssa’s attendance on Iris thus far, and this attendance is likened to the attendance of hunting dogs on a hunter as they approach the scene of the hunt.

iv) Lyssa thus compares her role in the proceedings to that of a hunting-hound in the service of a hunter. Like a hound, she must carry out the orders of her “masters,” in this case Iris and Hera, regardless of her unwillingness, as line 858 indicates. As Wilamowitz has noted, the plural κύνας is entirely suitable in the metaphor, since in the world of hunting there is usually a pack of hounds; but to write κύνα for κύνας is a trifling change if this seems desirable.

v) Given the frequency of hunting metaphors in Greek literature, it is surprising for Bond to say that “the noble Iris will not in fact be a huntsman.” Surely Iris’ nobility cannot be the objection to the use of a hunting metaphor. In fact, the expense involved in hunting suggests, if not “nobility,” at least a certain level of wealth. Although it is true that Iris,

3 H. II. 1. 128 τρισθή τετραπλή τ’, S. EI. 101–02 σού, πάτερ, οὐτος / οἰκώς οἰκτρώς τε θανόντος, 1263 ἀφάστως ἀέλπως τε, E. IA 724 καλῶς ἀναγκαίος τε.

4 I agree with Bond (294) that even the transposition of 860 does not actually require this change: Τάχος ἐπιρροῖβδην θ’ continues to make sense.

5 See 817, spoken by the Chorus: γέροντες, σιῶν φόσμ’ ὑπ’ερ δόμων ὀρᾷ. Iris and Lyssa are therefore between earth and Olympus. On the staging here see D. Mastorandes, CA 9 (1990) 268–69.

6 See 872–73: στείχ’ ἐς Οὐλίμπον πεδαίρουσα, ἤρι, γενναίον πόδα· / ἐς δόμους δ’ ἡμεῖς ἀφάντοι δυσόμεθα, Ἡρακλέους.

7 The arrival of the Oceanids on their mechane produces a similar whirring sound at A. PV 124–26: φεῦ φεῦ τι ποτ’ αὖ κινάθισα κλῦου / πέλας οἰνονών; αἰθήρ δ’ ἐλαφραίας / περύγων ῥίπασις ὑποσυριζεῖ. Bond also cites Eum. 404 and S. Ant. 1004, where the root ροῖβδος is used in connection with flying (in the former case, there may also be a reference to the mechane).

8 Note U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Euripides. Herakles II (Berlin 1895) 195: “860 war sie der hund des jägers, weil sie nicht aus eigener initiative handelte.” Cf. LSJ s.v. κύων III, for “servants, ageats or watchers of the gods.”

9 See Wilamowitz’ comments on 860 (p. 186).
unlike a real huntsman, soon leaves the scene, the use of a single metaphor does not commit the author to sustained allegory.

vi) Lyssa is indeed the possessor of hounds in one Euripidean play, the Bacchae. But a bell-krater of about 440 B.C., which Shapiro argues was inspired by an Aeschylean tragedy,\(^{10}\) provides evidence earlier than Euripides of a Lyssa with canine attributes who apparently is urged on by a goddess.\(^{11}\) Our Lyssa is similar, therefore, to the depiction of her in the latter case. Furthermore, Orestes refers to the Erinyes as dogs at Choephori 1054, only a few lines after he had described them as women wreathed in snakes.\(^{12}\) In comparison, Lyssa as a hound and as a hunter in two separate plays should not pose a problem.

Now I turn to the second criterion (b), the claim that 860 improves coherence in its new setting if transposed to follow 870, with the infinitive ἐπιρροιβδεῖν for the adverb ἐπιρροιβῆν, ἀνακαλῶ for ἀνακαλὼν in 870, and a punctuation change. It may be true that the passage becomes more descriptive. But it cannot be said that one detects the lack of anything after 870, that the arrival of 860 there meets a pre-existing need. More importantly, I will show that the transposition creates several new problems.

i) The first new problem is that if we transpose 860 to follow 870, it fails to join up with 871 and we must assume a lacuna. Here is what Jackson says (15):

How then and by whom should [the Keres] be summoned up? Indirectly by the quarry? Or directly by the huntress? If by the huntress, and directly, it is certain without qualification that ἀνακαλῶ must be written for ἀνακαλὼν, and certain morally that after Ταρτάρου there exists a gap of one verse at least and quite possibly two.

Jackson thus deems it necessary to insert a line:

Personally I should call 860 from its leisured dignity, write it as Kirchhoff, too, suspected that it should be written, restore it to its birthplace, then fabricate a trochaic tetrameter for the more exacting, and shape the passage thus:

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\(^{10}\) See H. A. Shapiro, Personifications in Greek Art: The Representation of Abstract Concepts 600–400 B.C. (Zurich 1993) 169: “Since . . . Lyssa was probably not personified before the fifth century, the immediate source of the dog’s head is most likely the contemporary stage, where the character could have worn such a mask.”


\(^{12}\) A. F. Garvie, Aeschylus. Choephori (Oxford 1986) comments on 1054 that the two descriptions of the Erinyes “need not trouble us.”
A missing line must be assumed, Jackson sees, to explain τάξα σ’ ἐγὼ μᾶλλον χορεύσω (871) if 860 precedes. Without 860 here, by contrast, the reference in μᾶλλον χορεύσω can be to the movements in 867–69, a reference made only slightly difficult by intervening 870. Transposed 860 with Jackson’s requisite lacuna would focus emphasis on the Keres and thus sever the connection of 871 to 867–69. A dilemma arises for subsequent editors: None who adopt Jackson’s transposition marks his lacuna. But, as we have seen, both scenarios (with and without lacuna) present difficulties.

ii) Jackson’s transposition also involves changing L’s ἀνακαλῶν in 870, with Heracles as the subject, to ἀνακαλῶ, with Lyssa as the subject, on the supposition that Lyssa would be the huntress in the following 860. But there are difficulties with this, as Bond, who accepts Jackson’s transposition but retains the transmitted wording, states clearly:

Diggle follows Jackson in changing to ἀνακαλῶ and ἐπιρροιβδεῖν (with θ’ after ὁμαρτεῖν): Lyssa then is the huntsman; she, not Heracles, should summon the dogs she keeps (Ba. 977) from Hell. This is attractive, but the Κῆρες are not explicitly Lyssa’s hounds and L offers us a powerful picture, which should not lightly be altered, of the bellowing of Heracles which attracts them... ἐγὼ at 871 has more point if Lyssa has not been the subject of the preceding sentence.

I agree with Bond that the picture of Heracles calling up the Keres by his bellowing should not be altered, since it is appropriate for Heracles to call upon the Keres as he goes (in his madness) to take bloody vengeance upon Eurystheus. Bond is also correct that ἐγὼ loses all force if it does not indicate a subject change: ἀνακαλῶν is necessary to produce a contrast between Heracles’ mad symptoms and Lyssa’s own activity in the matter, while it avoids the problem of an awkward instance of asyndeton.

But Bond wants 860 to follow unaltered 870. This means that Heracles is calling upon the Keres to “move quickly with a whirring sound and accompany him as hounds do a huntsman.” It seems unlikely that we are

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13 D. Mastronarde, *EMC* 27 (1983) 109, objects that ἀνακαλῶ “is used of deliberate, rational summoning, not of inadvertently attracting something.” One should note, however, that inanimate objects are described as acting on people in ways that, taken literally, imply a purpose, such as αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐφέλθεται ἄνδρα σίδηρος at H. *Od.* 19. 13 or καὶ μὴν τύποι γε σφενδόντις... οὖδε προσσαίνουσι με at *Hipp.* 862–63. At any rate, this issue becomes moot once it is understood that Heracles thinks he is taking vengeance on Eurystheus.
meant to think of Heracles as actually saying such a thing, and as an interpretation of bellowing it seems rather overdone.

Finally we should note that the transposition requires ἄνακτλέω to be construed with an infinitive. This construction is found nowhere in Euripides, and LSJ cites no examples from any other author.14 A transposition that is poorly motivated at both ends of the journey and actually creates anomalies at the point of arrival can be regarded as at best unproved.

As an afterword, it is worth while to examine briefly some interpretive consequences of retaining the lines in their transmitted order. Lyssa’s speech begins with an excuse, “I do not want to do this but I must” (858–59). Then she compares herself running into the breast of Heracles to a raging sea, an earthquake, and the sting15 of lightning (863–66):

οἱ ἑξῆς στάδια δραμοῦμαι στέρνων εἰς Ἰρίς Ἐρακλέους· καὶ καταρρήσων μέλαθρα καὶ δόμους ἐπεμβάλω.

τέκν’ ἀποκτείνωσα πρῶτον· ὥς δὲ κανών οὐκ εἰσεταί παίδας οὕς ἔπικτεν ἐναρών. πρὶν ἀν ἐμᾶς λύσας ἄφη.

Lyssa, therefore, will actually enter the body of Heracles. In 865, Lyssa first uses the feminine aorist participle ἀποκτείνωσα; then the subject dramatically switches in the middle of the line and it is Heracles who is doing the killing (κανῶν). In every other place where the killing of the children is mentioned, a masculine participle or indicator is used.16 This gender switch refers to the moment when Lyssa will affect a change in Heracles.17 As Lee says (48): “... once Lyssa invades the person of Heracles his thoughts and actions are no longer independent of her and vice versa. This is also the reason for the two views taken of Lyssa: as acting herself (cf. 864) and at the same time as manipulating the behavior of Heracles (cf. 871).” I would take this one step further and say that Heracles appropriates the character of Lyssa—she is at once a character and an abstraction.

Lyssa’s double role can also be seen in Iris’ original instructions to her. Iris orders Lyssa to “set in motion”18 the madness on the hero at 837. But

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14 The closest parallel can be found at S. OC 1376, where, however, the verb is in the middle voice.
15 See R. Renehan, CP 80 (1985) 169–70; Mastronarde (above, note 13); and Bond (290–91) on οἴστρος and Wakefield’s conjecture οἴστός. I am convinced by Renehan’s and Mastronarde’s arguments that οἴστρος can mean “sting” instead of its primary meaning of “gadfly.” We need not adopt οἴστος.
16 HF 829–30, 839, 886, 898, 915, 917–18, 1014, etc.
17 See Lee (above, note 11) 49: “Her decision to attack the hero is itself sufficient to set in motion the initial stages of his derangement.” Padel, Whom Gods Destroy (above, note 11) 20, on the other hand, sees Lyssa as a wholly external force and never admits that, although Heracles’ madness is externally instigated, it then becomes a part of Heracles himself.
18 See Bond (284) for his translation of ἔλαυνε, κίνει at line 837.
Heracles will commit the murder αὐθέντη φόνοι (839), “by his own hand.” Once she instigates his madness, Heracles is possessed by Lyssa and she becomes at the same time both an autonomous character and an abstraction describing Heracles. Note, for instance, 866 πρὶν ἀν ἐμὸς λύσσας ἄφητι, “until he lets go of my madness,” implying that Lyssa and her madness will have become part of Heracles. The next line (867) surely supports the opposite notion that Lyssa is at the same time outside of Heracles. The character Lyssa now refers to events in which she acts as an abstraction—she describes Herakles shaking his head and acting mad (now in the vivid present tense). Bond (292) notes that “μᾶλλον (871) indicates that Lyssa will intensify the madness when she enters the house at 874,” acknowledging that the madness has already become part of Heracles.

Thus Lyssa is the instigator, and Heracles “takes over,” so to speak, when he appropriates the character of madness and kills his children. Accordingly, Lyssa does not appear in an epiphany, as Athena does when she saves Amphitryon.19 To a certain extent, Athena’s action against Heracles parallels Lyssa’s: The phrase στέρνον εἰς Ἡρακλέους used of Athena at 1003 is identical to that used of Lyssa at 864. In further contrast to Athena, however, Lyssa descends into Heracles’ house ἄφαντοι, “unseen” (873).20 She becomes one with Herakles: At 873 she goes into his house “unseen” because she is already part of him. Herakles even appropriates Lyssa’s racing imagery: Στάδιον δραμοῦμαι at line 863 refers to Lyssa; in 867, βαλβίδουν ἀπο now refers to Heracles. Finally, at 896–97, Heracles is the huntsman (κυνηγητεί τέκνων διωγμόν), a metaphor which recalls and inverts Lyssa’s simile of 860 (ὡς κυνηγητέη κύνας).

The manuscript’s ἀνὰκαλλῶν thus fits well with the conception of madness visible in the whole speech and acknowledges poetry’s blendings of human and divine aspects. Conversely, Jackson’s prosaic transposition of 860 to follow 870 and its adoption by subsequent editors raises more problems than it solves.21

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19 See 906–08: ἢ ἢ· τι δρῆς, ὥ Διὸς παί, μελάθρως; τάραγμα ταρτάρειον ὡς ἐπ’ Ἐγκελάδαι ποτέ. Παλλᾶς, ἐς δύοντες πέμπεις and 1002–04: ὧλλ’ ἠλθεν εἰκόνιν, ὡς ὀραν ἐφαίνετο / Παλλᾶς, κραδαίνουσα ἐγχος ἔπι λάφω κέαρτ, / κάρρυψε πέτρον στέρνον εἰς Ἡρακλέους.
20 Lyssa’s and Iris’ exiting stage directions in this passage are puzzling. For discussions see Wilamowitz (195) and Mastronarde (above, note 5).
21 I am very grateful to David Kovacs for his helpful advice.
Andron and the Four Hundred

GEORGE PESELY

Shortly after the fall of the Four Hundred in 411, the Athenian Council of Five Hundred resolved to prosecute Archeptolemos, Onomakles, and Antiphon for treason. The motion was proposed by Andron.¹ Most scholars have identified this Andron with the father of Androtion, the fourth-century politician and Attidographer.² For those who believe that Androtion was a major source of historical information for the Aristotelian Athenaión Politeía,³ Andron assumes a role of some significance as a shaper of his son’s supposedly “moderate-conservative” political ideology and as a possible supplier of information about the oligarchic movements of late fifth-century Athens. This view of Androtion’s political outlook has recently come under attack, notably from Phillip Harding,⁴ and I have considered elsewhere the question of whether Aristotle used Androtion’s Atthis.⁵ Here I propose to examine three points: Was the Andron of the

¹ The text of the decree is given in ps.-Plutarch, Life of Antiphon, in the Vitae Decem Oratorum = ps.-Plut. Mor. 833e–f, along with the verdict (834a–b).


³ This belief is very widely held; e.g. Bloch (previous note) 349 n. 3; Rhodes (previous note) 15–30; Chambers (previous note) 84–91 and “Aristotle and his Use of Sources,” in Aristote et Athènes, ed. by M. Piéart (Paris 1993) 41–50, 52; Harding (previous note) 51–52, 95–97, 162.


⁵ In “Did Aristotle Use Androtion’s Atthis?” (Klio 76 [1994] 155–71), I argue that there is no definite evidence for Aristotle’s use of Androtion’s Atthis, and that the Oxyrhynchus Historian, not Androtion, is the most likely source for the anti-democratic coloring in the Ath. Pol.’s treatment of the events of 411 and 404. We know very little about Androtion’s interpretation of the two oligarchical revolutions at Athens.
411/0 decree the father of Androtion? What light does the Decree of Andron shed on the fall of the Four Hundred? And when was the decree adopted?

I. The Identity of Andron

The decree in ps.-Plutarch gives Andron’s name without patronymic or demotic. Ps.-Plutarch cites Caecilius by name as his source; presumably Caecilius obtained the decree from a literary source. Harpokration, s.v. "Ανδρων, combines three pieces of information in one entry:7

'Αντιφών ἐν τῷ πρὸς τὴν Δημοσθένους ἀντιγραφήν. "Ανδρωνά φήσιν εἶναι Κρατέρος ἐν θ' τῶν Ψηφισμάτων τόν γράψαντα το ψήφισμα τό περί 'Αντιφώντος τού ρήτορος. ἢν δὲ εἴς τῶν ν ὁ "Ανδρων.

Antiphon in Against the Indictment by Demosthenes. Krateros in the 9th book of the Decrees says that Andron was the proposer of the decree concerning Antiphon the orator. Andron was one of the Four Hundred.

The Suda entry s.v. "Ανδρων reads like an excerpt from Harpokration: “Andron: He was one of the Four Hundred."8

Krateros introduced the Decree of Andron into the literary tradition, whether by copying it from the stele (if this was still standing) or from the state archive.9 Caecilius probably obtained the text of the decree either from Krateros (directly or by way of an intermediate source) or from another source such as Heliodoros of Athens or another periegete.10 The authenticity of the decree is not questioned, but the repeated copying of the text between 411/0 and the earliest surviving manuscript of ps.-Plutarch (late 13th century A.D.) gives scope for possible errors in transmission.

Harpokration’s source identified the Andron of the 411 decree with the Andron mentioned in Antiphon’s speech, which cannot be later than the winter of 414/3.11 The speech was apparently one of Antiphon’s most admired,12 but unfortunately little is known of its contents; it might have shed some interesting light both on the general Demosthenes and on Andron. There is no way to tell whether Antiphon’s mention of Andron

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7 The text is that of Jacoby, FGrH 342 F 5a.
8 The same entry is found (with the numeral written out) in Bekker, Anecdota Graeca I 394.4.
9 C. Curtius, Das Metron in Athen als Staatsarchiv (Progr. Gotha 1868) 22; B. Keil, “Der Perieget Heliodoros von Athen,” Hermes 30 (1895) 220, believes that the Thirty would have destroyed the original stele.
11 Cf. Thuc. 7. 20. 2: Demosthenes left for Sicily early in the spring of 413.
12 Cf. ps.-Plut. Mor. 833d.
was friendly, hostile, or neutral, but Andron’s eagerness to prosecute Antiphon in 411 may be a result of the earlier speech: He could be taking revenge on an enemy, or, if they had earlier been friends, putting distance between himself and a man who was now regarded as a traitor. Harpokration relied on the work of earlier researchers. His source for this entry may well be the indefatigable Didymos of Alexandria, whom he cites many times. Didymos is thought to have been the first scholar to compose commentaries on the Attic orators (including Antiphon).\textsuperscript{13} Krateros F 17,\textsuperscript{14} concerning the related case of the condemnation of Phrynichos, which now begins “Didymos and Krateros say . . .,” was probably drawn from Didymos alone, who had named Krateros as his source.

It is not certain which authority first asserted that Andron was one of the Four Hundred: perhaps Krateros, but Didymos seems the most likely. Didymos searched the Atthidographers for information, but it is quite unlikely that Andration would have volunteered the information that his father had been a member of the Four Hundred. No lists of the Four Hundred are likely to have survived for later scrutiny, since the Decree of Patrokleides in 405 gave strict orders that such records be destroyed, including private copies.\textsuperscript{15} Unless Krateros could tell from the dates of other documents in the archives that the Four Hundred were still in session on the day of Andron’s proposal, it seems that there would have been no documentary evidence for Andron’s membership in the Four Hundred, and the statement that he was one of the Four Hundred is likely to be a later inference. Given the assumption in the decree that many members of the Boule were eager to pursue this prosecution, and the fact that the decree was approved, we have either a rump of the Four Hundred acting as the Boule\textsuperscript{16} or, much more likely, a new Boule formed after the collapse of the Four Hundred. The statement that Andron was a member of the Four Hundred, then, would be a false inference by a later authority: Andron will have been a member of the new Council of Five Hundred.\textsuperscript{17}

We have no evidence for Andron’s ideological position in the spring of 411 when the democracy was overthrown. Conceivably the lost speech of Antiphon which mentioned Andron would have provided some clues to Andron’s political outlook, but that is unlikely. If we could read the speech, we would probably find nothing to suggest oligarchical leanings on

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\item \textsuperscript{13} RE V.1 (1903) 458 (Cohn); cf. Sealey (above, note 2) 228.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Schol. Aristoph. Lys. 313.
\item \textsuperscript{15} And. 1. 78–79.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ps.-Plut. Mor. 833b says that Antiphon was condemned by the Four Hundred, but surely this is simple carelessness.
\item \textsuperscript{17} For the Council in 411/0 consisting of 500 members as usual, cf. R. Sealey, “Constitutional Changes in Athens in 410 B.C.,” CSCA 8 (1975) 279–82; cf. Thuc. 8. 86. 6. For the likelihood that a proposer of a decree of the Boule would be a current member of the Boule, cf. P. J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford 1972) 63; M. H. Hansen. CP 87 (1992) 52.
\end{itemize}
Andron’s part; even Peisander was considered a zealous democrat before 411. Thucydides observes that among those who joined in the movement to limit the government were men no one would have expected to favor oligarchy. Perhaps Andron was one of those initially attracted by the proposal to limit the government to five thousand, before the coup of the Four Hundred, but we have no evidence in his case. If Andron was a known enemy of Antiphon, we would not expect to find him among the Four Hundred, whatever his thoughts on the Athenian constitution. Clearly Andron took an active role in politics after the fall of the Four Hundred, during the period of the Five Thousand, but his actions at that time may be explained equally well on grounds of policy, personality, or ideology.

Two fourth-century literary sources provide information about Androtion’s father Andron: Demosthenes, in the course of attacking Androtion, makes statements about Androtion’s father in two speeches (Against Androtion [22] and Against Timokrates [24]); Plato mentions an Andron, son of Androtion, in two dialogues, who can hardly be anyone other than Androtion’s father.

Demosthenes repeatedly asserts that Androtion’s father had been imprisoned as a state debtor and had never paid his debt, but had escaped from prison by running away, once adding the detail that he had danced his way out at the procession of the Dionysia. The story of Andron’s imprisonment may be sheer fabrication, or it may be merely exaggerated; such assertions in an Attic orator are best not taken at face value. Demosthenes charges Androtion with having prostituted himself in his youth, and scorns his father for giving him such an upbringing. It may be legitimate to conclude from this that Andron lived to see his son grown or nearly so.

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18 And. 1. 36.
19 8. 66. 5.
20 22. 33–34, 56, 68; 24. 125.
21 22. 21–24, 29, 32, 53, 58, 78; 24. 126, 165, 186.
22 22. 58.
23 Since Demosthenes 22. 66 (cf. 24. 173) speaks of Androtion’s having been involved in politics for more than thirty years, his public career began no later than 385. (For the date of Demosth. 22, cf. R. Sealey, REG 68 [1955] 89–90, 117, and Demosthenes [above, note 2] 127.) Probably this means not mere eligibility to attend the Ekklesia but something more, such as taking an active part in speeches and proposals in the assembly, for which we should expect an age higher than twenty. In the late fourth century, orators were expected to have legitimate children (Din. Demosth. 71). Demosthenes was near his thirtieth birthday when he gave his first speech to the assembly on a question of public policy, On the Symmories (14), in 355/4 or 354/3 B.C. (cf. R. Sealey, REG 68 [1955] 117, CR 7 [1957] 197, and Demosthenes [above, note 2] 126–28, cf. 246–48; F. Kiechle, s.v. “Demosthenes (2),” KL. Pauly I [1964] 1484). Androtion is epistates, therefore at least thirty years old (cf. Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 35; Rhodes [above, note 17] 194–95) in IG II² 61, but unfortunately this decree is not firmly dated; cf. W. Larfeld, Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik II (1898–1902) 76; D. M. Lewis, “Notes on Attic Inscriptions,” BSA 49 (1954) 34. (The story that Plato was shouted down from the bema on account of his youth, when he was at least 27 years old [Justus of Tiberias FGrH 734 F 1 = Diog. Laert. 2. 41], is ben trovato.) The last activity recorded for Androtion is his writing the Athis while in exile in Megara (Plut. Mor. 605c–d = FGrH 324 T 14), after 344/3; he could
Demosthenes fails to insinuate that Andron had an oligarchic past. Had Andron been a member of the Four Hundred, this could hardly have been forgotten by his political opponents, nor would Demosthenes have had any reason to refrain from dredging up this old matter. Demosthenes' silence should not call into question the identity of Andron the decree-proposer with Andron the father of Androtion, but rather the accuracy of the tradition that Andron was a member of the Four Hundred.

Plato introduces Andron, the son of Androtion, in the *Protagoras* (which has an apparent dramatic date of ca. 433) and in the *Gorgias* (which lacks a consistent dramatic date). In both cases he has a non-speaking part, one of many Athenians added as part of the background to Socrates' conversations; this must be the same man as the father of Androtion, who was a well-known politician when Plato was producing these dialogues. The *Protagoras* has Andron as an adult, so his year of birth must not be later than the mid-450s, and could be somewhat earlier. In the *Protagoras* we find him in the house of Kallias, the son of Hipponikos, one of a group questioning Hippias about astronomy (315c). In the *Gorgias* (487c) he is one of four members of a "fellowship of wisdom," along with Kallikles Acharneus (PA 7927), Teisandros Aphidnaios (PA 13459), and Nausikydes Cholargeus (PA 10571); since these three are even less well attested than Andron himself, they do not reveal much about his political ties. Kallikles is a formidable figure in this dialogue, but not certainly mentioned elsewhere; he is portrayed as an active politician who is privately scornful of the masses, and perhaps Andron is supposed to have shared these views.

That Plato recalls Andron as worth remembering in his dialogues, among the young Athenians interested in the studies of the sophists, suggests his identity with the Andron of 411, since many of those active in the events of 411 and 404 show up in similar philosophical contexts. It is not possible to determine this with absolute certainty, but the odds strongly favor identifying the father of Androtion with the decree-proposer of 411.

Andron's deme, Gargettos, was revealed by IG II² 212, an inscription of 347/6 B.C. which mentions Androtion Andronos Gargettos. That Plato refers to Andron in both dialogues by his patronymic need not imply that there was another notable Andron of Gargettos in the same period, but

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have been in his 70s or even 80s at that time. His birth should be placed somewhere in the range 425 to 410 B.C.


25 503c, mentioning Perikles as recently dead, indicates a dramatic date of 429 or soon after, but 473e–74a appears to refer to the Arginoussai trial of 406 as "last year." (A. Martin, *AC* 62 [1993] 457, challenges the common view that 473e–74a is an allusion to the Arginousai trial.)


may reflect the fourth-century fame of his son. It would be hard to demonstrate that Plato's choice of patronymic or demotic to identify Athenians depended in each case on whether a particular man had a contemporary namesake in the same deme.

Phillip Harding has recently put forward another possibility for the Andron who is reported as a member of the Four Hundred and/or as prosecutor of Antiphon, without committing himself to this solution: an Andron the son of Androkles, also of Gargettios ("Ανδρόν "Ανδροκλέος Γαργέττιός), whose name has been found on six ostraka. The ostraka have not been published, so any conclusions drawn from them can only be tentative. They were found in the great Kerameikos deposit uncovered in 1966–68 by the German Archaeological Institute. This deposit does not seem to include any ostraka from the ostracism of Hyperbolos, and relatively few from the ostracism of Thoukydides the son of Melesias; the bulk of the ostraka are from early ostrakophoria in the 480s. It may be that the Andron ostraka can be placed more firmly by letter forms, style of decoration, or joins to other ostraka, but this evidence is not yet available. Given the names and the demotics, it is reasonable to suppose that Andron the son of Androkles is related to Andron the son of Androtion, and if we knew when the ostraka were cast against him that might lend greater plausibility to one relationship over other possibilities. If the ostraka are early, this Andron may easily be the grandfather of the Andron of 411. If the ostraka date to the occasion when Thoukydides was ostracized, then he could be an uncle, a first cousin, or a first cousin once removed.

One other Athenian Andron is on record who may have been old enough in 411 to have proposed a measure in the Boule, Andron Elaiousios (PA 922). This man is named in the Hekatompedon inventory of 398/7 as having dedicated two gold drachmas. There is no evidence that he was an active politician.

28 Harding (above, note 2) 15.
29 See now F. Willemsen and S. Brenne, "Verzeichnis der Kerameikos-Ostraka," MDAI(A) 106 (1991) 149, superseding earlier reports giving a smaller number of ostraka.
30 R. Thomsen, The Origin of Ostracism (Copenhagen 1972) 93.
31 Mattingly, Antichthon 25 (1991) 21–22, assigns the ostraka cast against Andron Androkleous Gargettios to the occasion of the ostracism of Thoukydides the son of Melesias (which he places in 438). Mattingly believes that Plato uses the patronymic when referring to Andron Androtionos because of the need to distinguish him from a contemporary namesake with the same demotic. Mattingly has seen the ostraka but does not say whether he has additional reasons for placing the ostraka with Andron's name in this period.
32 That is, Andron Androkleous may have been a first cousin to Androtion (PA 914), the grandfather of the Athidographer.
II. The Prescript of the Decree of Andron and the Fall of the Four Hundred

Ps.-Plutarch gives the prescript of the Decree of Andron as follows:

εδοξε τῇ βουλῇ μία καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανείας, Δημόνικος 'Αλωπεκήθεν ἐγραμμάτευε· Φιλόστρατος Πελληνεύς ἐπεστάτει, Ἄνδρων εἶπε κτλ.

It was decreed by the Boule on the 21st day of the prytany, Demonikos Alopekethen was secretary, Philostratos Pelleneus was epistates, Andron proposed . . .

There are two apparent irregularities in the prescript: the dating by the day of a prytany, which is unparalleled in decrees of this period34 (although found in financial records) and which should be accompanied by the number of the prytany and the name of the prytanizing tribe, and the demotic of the epistates. Since there was no deme Pellene, John Taylor’s emendation of the demotic to “Palleneus”35 has been generally followed, but it presents a problem, since in that case the tribe holding the prytany would be Antiochis. The epistates would naturally come from the tribe in prytany, while in normal fifth-century practice the secretary would be from a different tribe,36 but Alopeke was also a deme of Antiochis. If Pallene is the deme of the epistates, it is not clear why the rules were disregarded at this time. C. Schäfer proposed emending Pelleneus to Paianieus; Paiaia was in a different tribe, Pandionis, and thus avoids the irregularity.37 In fact, an inscription of 408/7 mentions a Philostratos Paianieus, one of the stonemasons paid for work on the Erechtheion.38 If Taylor’s emendation is correct, his Philostratos Palleneus (PA 14741) is not directly attested otherwise, but he could be the grandfather of a Philostratos Palleneus (PA 14742) of the late fourth century.39

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34 G. F. Schömann, De comitiis Atheniensium (Greifswald 1819) 131 n. 9; cf. A. S. Henry, The Prescripts of Athenian Decrees, Mnemosyne Suppl. 49 (Leiden 1977) 27.
35 In his Lysiae Vita of 1739, accessible in J. J. Reiske (ed.), Oratores Graecorum VI (Leipzig 1772) 120 n. 34.
36 Rhodes (above, note 17) 134–35.
37 De scribis senatus populiique Atheniensium (diss. Greifswald 1878) 17–18. If at some point the demotic was abbreviated, as Schäfer suggests, the origin of the corruption would be even easier to understand. Schäfer’s emendation is favored by Penndorf (above, note 10).
38 IG I² 476.228–29, 312–13.
39 IG II² 410. Possibly the names Philotades and Philostratos alternated in this family: The patronymic Philostratou would be the right length to complete the reading Philotades Philostratou Palleneus in IG II² 136 (354/3 B.C.). See the proposed stemma in PA II 390. A Philotades Palleneus (PA 14926) who could be the father of Taylor’s Philostratos Palleneus and the grandfather of the Philotades of 354/3 was Hellenotamias early in the Peloponnesian War (IG I² 281.4, dated to 430/29 in IG but to 426/5 by Mattingly, “The Athenian Coinage Decree,” Historia 10 (1961) 166–68 and “The Tribute Quota Lists from 430 to 425 B.C.,” CQ 28 (1978) 83, 85).
As C. G. Lowe argues, the manuscripts of the *Vitae Decem Oratorum* go back to an archetype of the ninth century which was "extremely corrupt."\(^{40}\) The precise wording of the text is therefore less secure than if we had the original inscribed version. In the oldest surviving manuscript of this portion of the *Moralia*, Ambr. C 126 inf. (gr. 859), copied in 1294 or 1295,\(^ {41}\) and in the later manuscripts there are a number of misspelled words in the Decree of Andron: In addition to Πελαγηνεὺς, we also find Ὄνομακλέα for Ὄνομακλέα in the prescript, and Ἀρχιφόντα for Ἀντιφόντα in the body of the decree.

Another decree in the *Vitae Decem Oratorum* (Mor. 851f–52e) shows the danger of putting excessive faith in the preserved text of the prescript. Fragments of this decree have been discovered on stone (IG II\(^2\) 457). Ps.-Plutarch’s text of this decree has a prytany-date, imperfectly preserved,\(^ {42}\) but there is none on the stone, which is perfectly legible at this point. This suggests that the texts found in ps.-Plutarch may have been copied from the archive, not from stelai, and the prytany-dates may be part of a system for finding a particular record in the archive; the discrepancy between the manuscript texts of the decrees and normal epigraphical practice may be meaningless.\(^ {43}\) That said, the number 21 in the prescript of the Decree of Andron may still be correct, although there is no way to be sure. At any rate, the dating is incomplete, since the name of the tribe and the number of the prytany are missing.\(^ {44}\)

Thucydides is our fullest and generally our most reliable source for the events of 411. For the fall of the Four Hundred, Thucydides gives us sufficient detail to permit us to draw certain conclusions. From his account it is clear that the Four Hundred were abruptly removed from power following the disastrous naval battle off Eretria and the revolt of Euboia,\(^ {45}\) and that Peisander, Alexikles, and other leaders of the Four Hundred saved themselves by fleeing to Dekeleia.\(^ {46}\) Events moved rapidly in this period, and men like Theramenes were eager to have their viewpoint officially established, that the men who had been negotiating at Sparta had been plotting to betray Eetioneia. Andron’s decree must be placed precisely in.

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\(^{41}\) For the date, see A. Turyn, *Dated Greek Manuscripts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries in the Libraries of Italy I* (Urbana 1972) 81–83. The manuscript was copied for and partly by Maximus Planudes. The *Vitae Decem Oratorum* (63) is found on fol. 348\(^v\)–55\(^v\) of this manuscript (cf. Lowe [previous note] 423), copied by an unknown scribe whom Turyn calls scribe G; an example of his handwriting is provided by plate 65.

\(^{42}\) For attempts to emend the defective text, see Schömann (above, note 34) 134 n. 19; M. H. E. Meier, *Commentatio de Vita Lycurgi quae Plutarcho adscribatur et de Lycurgi orationum religiis* (Halle 1847) Ixxiii.


\(^{44}\) Cf. Hignett (above, note 2) 378; Sealey, *CSCA* 8 (1975) 286.

\(^{45}\) 8. 97. 1.

\(^{46}\) 8. 98. 1.
this period, in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the regime of the Four Hundred. Whatever his motives, Andron was clearly working in cooperation with Theramenes. His proposal refers to "the men whom the generals denounce for sailing on an enemy ship and for passing through Dekeleia while going on embassy to Sparta for the purpose of harming the city and the army of the Athenians." Theramenes was one of the generals and had been most conspicuous among those accusing the men going on embassies of plotting against the city. Later Theramenes could be seen as responsible for the deaths of those found guilty. Unfortunately for Theramenes’ reputation, the chief sources are personally hostile to him—Thucydides, Lysias, and Xenophon’s Kritias—and want to give him no credit for saving Athens. Nevertheless, Theramenes may have genuinely believed that there was a plot to betray the Peiraeus to the Spartans, and more generally that those going on embassies to Sparta were harming the city by so doing. It is even easier to believe that men like Andron were honestly convinced by Theramenes’ accusations against Archeptolemos, Onomakles, and Antiphon. Whatever the truth of the matter, this became the officially accepted version in Athens: Phrynichos and his associates had plotted to betray the city.

Those in charge of the city after the collapse of the Four Hundred took no chances: Not only did they try Phrynichos posthumously for treason, but anyone who spoke in the dead man’s defense was liable to the same penalties. The verdict in the cases of Archeptolemos and Antiphon, once they were arrested, was a foregone conclusion. Andron’s decree set the trial for the next day. In a celebrated passage Thucydides praises Antiphon’s defense speech as the best one ever made by a person facing the death penalty. There is nothing in Thucydides’ words which proves that he had seen a written version of the speech; his remark could be based on reports he had received. The admiration Antiphon evoked may have had less to do with the actual wording of his defense speech than with his demeanor and defiant courage when his condemnation was predetermined. Certainly Antiphon had very little time to write out a speech; perhaps a friend in the audience made notes of his arguments at the time or soon afterwards. Aristotle has an anecdote about Agathon telling Antiphon how much he admired the speech, but that does not guarantee that Aristotle had seen a

47 Ps.-Plut. Mor. 833e–f.
48 Thuc. 8. 92. 9.
49 Thuc. 8. 89. 2; 90. 3; 91. 1, 2; 92. 3; 94. 1.
50 Lysias 12. 67; Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 32, cf. 2. 3. 46.
51 Lycurg. Leocr. 114–15. The stele recording the condemnation of Phrynichos is mentioned in Caecilius fr. 102 Ofenloch (ps.-Plut. Mor. 833f) and Krateros F 17 (schol. Aristoph. Lys. 313).
52 Ps.-Plut. Mor. 833f.
53 8. 68. 2.
54 EE 3. 1232b4–9.
text of the speech. Much later there was a text in existence which purported to be Antiphon’s defense: Ps.-Plutarch seems to refer to it, and there are several brief citations in Harpokration. Since 1907 some papyrus fragments have generally been regarded as belonging to the speech, but they are very meager and the identification is not universally accepted. Caecilius judged 25 of the speeches attributed to Antiphon spurious; we have very little evidence to judge the authenticity of the defense speech.

III. The Date of the Decree of Andron

The prescript dates the Decree of Andron to the 21st day of an unspecified prytany. Given the eagerness of those in charge of the city after the fall of the Four Hundred to brand Phrynichos and his associates as traitors for their negotiations with Sparta, it is extremely unlikely that some of the men who took part in the embassies could have stayed peaceably in Athens for 21 days before any action was taken against them: The prytany mentioned in the prescript could not have begun after the collapse of the Four Hundred. Either the Four Hundred had continued to use prytanies, or the Five Thousand when they took charge calculated where in the prytany year they should now be. In either case, if the reading “the 21st day” is correct, the prytany in question is most likely the second of 411/0, to fit our other information about the Four Hundred.

Aristotle says that Mnasilochos was archon for two months in the year of Theopompos’ archonship. Clearly Mnasilochos was one of those who fled, and his name was so distasteful afterwards that the Five Thousand found a new archon for the rest of the year. Nevertheless they could not ignore Mnasilochos because documents had been created already with his

55 Mor. 833d.
56 Published by J. Nicole as L’Apologie d’Antiphon (Geneva and Basel 1907), and subsequently printed among the fragments of Antiphon in the Teubner, Budé, and Loeb editions.
58 Fr. 100 Ofenloch = ps.-Plut. Mor. 833c.
60 According to Thuc. 8. 70. 1, when the Four Hundred took control, they selected prytanies by lot from among their members. It is possible, therefore, that the normal sequence of prytanies had continued. The Four Hundred later diverged considerably from democratic practices, as Thucydides says in the same passage, but it is not known whether this applies specifically to the system of prytanies. One inscription from the latter part of the rule of the Four Hundred (IG 13 373) is dated by the lunar calendar, Hekatombaion 22, where we would expect dating by the prytany calendar, but it may be going too far to conclude from a single inscription that the Four Hundred had abandoned the use of prytanies. There are inscriptions which omit the information about the prytany when the system of prytanies was in force.
61 Ath. Pol. 33. 1.
name used for dating. Evidently his name was inscribed on the archon list with the notation διμηνίου. Aristotle’s information tells us that the Four Hundred must have fallen during Metageitnion, the second month of the year.\textsuperscript{62} There were (astronomical) new moons on June 23 (about 2:18 P.M.), July 23 (about 5:11 A.M.), and August 21 (about 9:30 P.M.),\textsuperscript{63} with the lunar crescent probably visible on the evenings of June 24, July 24, and August 23.\textsuperscript{64} The second month of 411/0 would then have begun either about July 25 or about August 24; July is more likely on general grounds\textsuperscript{65} and fits more easily the chronological indications of Thucydides’ narrative.

After finishing the story of the fall of the Four Hundred, Thucydides returns to the course of the war in the Hellespont, and then to the activities of Alkibiades. During the time that the Four Hundred were being overthrown, Alkibiades was on a mission to Phaselis and Kaunos.\textsuperscript{66} He returned to Samos, manned additional ships, and proceeded to Halikarnassos and Kos to collect money, and then came back to Samos.\textsuperscript{67} Of this second return to Samos, Thucydides notes that fall was approaching; the term he uses (μετόπωρον) points to mid-September.\textsuperscript{68} To allow time for Alkibiades’ mission to Halikarnassos and Kos, and for the events in the Hellespont recounted in 8. 99–107, the fall of the Four Hundred cannot be later than August, and could be earlier. Combining this with Aristotle’s information that Mnasilochos was reckoned as archon for two months, we may conclude that the second month of 411/0, the month in which the Four Hundred fell, embraced late July and most of August. The Prytany date in the decree of Andron is reckoned differently, on the basis of the 366-day

\textsuperscript{62} G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte III.2 (Gotha 1904) 1508 n. 3.

\textsuperscript{63} These times are calculated from the table of new moons in F. K. Ginzel, Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie I (Leipzig 1906) 553 (reprinted in E. J. Bickerman, The Chronology of the Ancient World [Ithaca 1968] 117), allowing a difference between Greenwich time and Athens time of 1 hour 35 minutes. Ginzel’s figures are in hundredths of a day, so the results can be accurate only to within 7.2 minutes.

\textsuperscript{64} From the observations made at Athens from 1859 to 1880 by Dr. Julius Schmidt, reported in A. Mommsen, Chronologie (Leipzig 1883) 69–80, it appears that the crescent is usually visible at Athens during the twilight which falls between 26.5 and 50.5 hours after astronomical new moon. Dr. Schmidt never observed the crescent at Athens at an age of less than 26.5 hours, but saw it 51 of 58 times between 26.5 hours and 50.5 hours. As of 1989, the youngest well-documented naked-eye sighting of the new moon was 14 hours and 51 minutes after the astronomical new moon, under exceptionally favorable circumstances (see Sky and Telescope 78 [1989] 322–23).

\textsuperscript{65} For the relationship between the summer solstice and the beginning of the Athenian lunar year (i.e. Hekatombaion 1), cf. W. K. Pritchett, The Choiseul Marble (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970) 39–44, 93, 95.

\textsuperscript{66} Thuc. 8. 108. 1.

\textsuperscript{67} 8. 108. 2.

prytany calendar.\textsuperscript{69} Possibly this began for this year on Skirophorion 14,\textsuperscript{70} which would put the 21st day of the second prytany in the vicinity of August 5.

IV. Conclusion: The Place of Andron in the Events of 411 B.C.

There is every reason to accept the usual view, that the Andron who proposed the decree against Archeptolemos, Onomakles, and Antiphon in 411 is the same as Andron of Gargettos, the father of Androtation. The Andron from the same deme whose name has been found on six ostraka belongs to an earlier time but may be a relative, perhaps his grandfather. The Decree of Andron belongs in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Four Hundred, probably towards the end of July or early in August 411. Andron was not a member of the Four Hundred but rather a member of the Five Hundred constituted as the Boule after the collapse of the Four Hundred. Possibly ideology helped shape his course of action in 411; perhaps he believed in limiting the government to 5,000, but unfortunately we have no way of determining whether that was the case. His attack on Antiphon may not have been primarily ideological in motive, but based on practical considerations (belief in the accusations of treason, or at least in the need to establish such treason as the official truth) or personal (to gain revenge for earlier attacks or to dissociate himself from Antiphon).

Louis Gernet wisely points out that it is difficult to know how to judge Antiphon from this distance;\textsuperscript{71} the same is true of Antiphon’s accusers. They may have sincerely believed that they had thwarted the betrayal of their city and were properly punishing traitors, and they may have been right. The Decree of Andron—the oldest substantial piece of evidence bearing on the fall of the Four Hundred—provides us with the public rationale of those who attacked Antiphon and his associates. We should make the most of this document.\textsuperscript{72}

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\textsuperscript{69} For the length of the prytany year at this time, cf. W. K. Pritchett and O. Neugebauer, \textit{The Calendars of Athens} (Cambridge, MA 1947) 95–97; Pritchett (above, note 65) 34, 96–97; A. E. Samuel, \textit{Greek and Roman Chronology} (Munich 1972) 62–63.

\textsuperscript{70} It is not clear how Aristotle’s source discovered this date. It may be correct (cf. Pritchett [above, note 65] 105 n. 5), but if so it was calculated afterwards. I follow L. van der Ploeg (\textit{Theramenes en zijn Tijd} [diss. Utrecht 1948] 77) in rejecting Aristotle’s dates of Thargelion 14 and Thargelion 22 (\textit{Ath. Pol.} 32. 1), because of their incompatibility with the narrative of Thucydidès (8. 63. 3), but the question of when the Four Hundred began their rule is not directly relevant here. I would assign Polystratos’ eight days’ service as registrar of the Five Thousand (ps.-Lysias 20. 13–14) to the final days of the Four Hundred, following the promise reported in Thuc. 8. 93. 2.

\textsuperscript{71} In the introduction to his edition of Antiphon (Paris 1923) 3.

\textsuperscript{72} I would like to thank Mortimer Chambers, Raphael Sealey, and the two anonymous readers for helpful criticism of this paper.
Food for Thought:
Text and Sense in Aristotle, Poetics 19

JOHN T. KIRBY

Perusal of the standard commentaries on the Poetics will show that the difficulties of chapter 19, which is concerned with διάνοια or “thought,” have led to various interpretations. I have supplied a portion of the text, from Kassel’s 1965 Oxford edition, and furnished my own apparatus.

The passage is in essence an exploration of the contours of διάνοια as it applies in the composition of a tragedy. According to his habit, Aristotle offers a dialectical διαίρεσις of the topic of discussion, breaking it down into component parts. In this instance, however, the very syntax makes discernment of the διαίρεσις difficult; and more than one construction is possible. Having cautioned my reader that there is no universally accepted schematization of the train of thought here, I would like to offer my own (Figure 1). From this diagram it will be clear that I understand διάνοια as operative on two levels within the performance of a play: in the words spoken by the characters (ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου) and in their actions (ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν).1 The markers τὰ μὲν and τὰ δὲ (b5) also reflect this major

distinction. What cannot be made clear in the diagram, however, is the fact that over and above both the words and the actions of the dramatis personae is the planning and craft of the playwright, from which the text indeed takes its being. Aristotle conceives of this as well in terms of διάνοια, as will become clear from our examination of b3–4.

I would like to devote some scrutiny to several phrases in this most difficult passage.

καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας: Else considers this phrase a gloss that intrudes upon and destroys an essentially binary construction. Without it, he is free to redistribute τὸ τε ἀποδεικνύοντα καὶ τὸ λύειν and τὸ πάθῃ παρασκευάζειν under the headings of λόγος and πράγματα respectively. This is a bold solution (as so many of Else’s are) and provides a synthetic understanding of our passage; but the adoption of such a solution has repercussions further on, as we shall see.

τὰ μὲν ... τὰ δὲ: Having disposed of καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας, Else seeks to make τὰ μὲν and τὰ δὲ refer to ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινά and μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα respectively: ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινά are to be “brought home (to the spectator) without (explicit) exposition”; μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα are to be “deliberately produced in speech.” This, however, is unnecessarily restrictive: it limits ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινά to events, whereas things spoken may also be ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινά, and it does not acknowledge that of course events in the play, as well as points of argument, may be μεγάλα or εἰκότα. I think rather that τὰ δὲ should be read with the words that follow, i.e. τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, “things spoken” or “argumentation,” as opposed to πράγματα, “things done.” Else attempts to discredit this construction: he assumes that τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν must mean “verbal effects gotten through action.” But I find it more sensible to understand τὰ μὲν (sc. ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν) as = τὰ πράγματα themselves, which may be ἡ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα. The actual phrase ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν is used in precisely the same way at 1454b6–7 as here at 1456b2; and it is important to keep in mind that Aristotle’s common term for the construction of the μῦθος is σύνθεσις πραγμάτων, the “assembling of πράγματα.” I have schematized the διάφορος according to this understanding; but I question the authenticity of the reading ἡ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα, and to that I now turn.

ἡ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα: ἡ ἐλεεινὰ ἢ δεινὰ (1456b3) make a pair here, and correspond (under the heading of πράγματα) to the mention of the πάθῃ at 1456a38–b1 (under the heading of effects provided ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου).


3 Else (previous note) 561, 564–65.

4 As the ancients also recognized; cf. e.g. Eur. Hipp. 498 ὃ δεινά λέξεω.

5 Or even ἀνογχαῖα—on which see below.

6 Else (above, note 2) 566 n. 12: “This is what has reduced the passage to the inanity we spoke of earlier.”
Vahlen in his *Beiträge* delineates three μέρη of διάνοια here: τὸ τε ἀποδεικνύοναι καὶ τὸ λύειν, τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, and μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας. In coming to 1456b3–4, he seeks to preserve this tripartite concept, and holds that ἡ ἐλεεινά ἡ δεινά corresponds to τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, μεγάλα τὸ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητας, and εἰκότα τὸ τὸ τε ἀποδεικνύοναι καὶ τὸ λύειν.  

This provides a neat response, but it requires us to accept that μεγάλα and εἰκότα are each being used as a kind of shorthand for the longer phrases. In the interest of such a balance, I would have expected a simple παθητικά (or the equivalent) instead of the explicit pair ἡ ἐλεεινά ἡ δεινά in b3, which demands to be balanced with the pair ἡ μεγάλα ἡ εἰκότα as another dyad.

What seems unnatural is the pair μεγάλα/εἰκότα, for several reasons: (1) When Aristotle pairs μέγας with another concept, it is regularly (as might be expected) with μικρός. In fact he has just done so at 1456b1–2. (2) “Probabilities” or “the probable,” on the other hand, typically go in tandem with “necessary consequences” or “necessity,” so that εἰκότα would typically be paired with ἀναγκαῖα; cf. 1451a38, *Rh.* 1357a22–b25, *APr.* 70a. (3) Aristotle has just remarked, at 1456a34–36, that διάνοια has an

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9 Though, as we have seen, the authenticity of the phrase there has been questioned.
especially close connection with rhetoric. Now both pairs, μέγας/μικρός and εἰκότα/ἀναγκαῖα, have close connections with rhetorical invention:

(a) μέγας/μικρός embodies the rhetorical motif of size or degree. We are told at Rhetoric 1403a17–25 that τὸ αὖξειν καὶ μειοῦν is πρὸς τὸ δεῖξιν ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν. Furthermore, it is a concern of all three species of oratory (Rh. 1391b31–92a1), though αὖξησις is especially suited to epideictic (Rh. 1368a22–27). Related, though distinct, is the line of argument known as the τόπος τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ήττον (Rh. 1358a14, 1397b12–27).10 Castelvetro, in his 16th-century commentary on the Poetics, was to my knowledge the first to suggest the possibility of repeating the μέγας/μικρός pair from b1–2 here at b4. He, however, prints εἰκότα in his text. Else (the “gloss” notwithstanding) also perceives the binary structure of the sentence; but he too prints εἰκότα at b4.

(b) εἰκότα and ἀναγκαῖα are the materials for the προτάσεις or premises of syllogism. We see this treated extensively at Rhetoric 1357a–b, Prior Analytics 70a–b, Posterior Analytics 74b–75a, and Topics 112b. On the verbal level this is the way a speaker will reason and offer rationale for assertions; but at Poetics 1451a36–38 Aristotle has stipulated that in composing a μῦθος, the author should take care to see that the events of the story flow one from another κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. This is crucial for our understanding of 1456b4, because (as I understand the διάφρασις there) it is presented as of fundamental importance that the plot-structure be organized syllogistically—i.e. in such a way that the audience can make sense of why one event occurs as the result of another.

I submit, then, that ἢ μεγάλα ἢ εἰκότα at b4 is corrupt. But while either substantive could be replaced to make a dyad that is relevant in a rhetorical framework, the topic more germane to the discussion of what is needed ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν is that of rationale in plot-structure—διάνοιας par excellence on the part of the author. Thus it is more likely that Aristotle originally wrote ἢ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰκότα here.

ἀνευ διδασκαλίας: διδασκαλία is commonly taken as equivalent to ἀπόδειξις, i.e. the giving of information (whether to a dramatic character or to the audience). D. W. Lucas maintains that it has “nothing to do with production,”11 but it may possibly be a technical theater-term referring to the words of a play-script, the actors’ “lines”: LSJ s.v. διδασκαλία Π.11

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10 Τὸ αὖξειν καὶ μειοῦν is said at 1403a to be, not a τόπος, but rather the subject-matter (περὶ αὐτὸς) of a certain kind of enthymeme. The μᾶλλον καὶ ήττον is a general line of argument used to shape enthymemes, while αὖξειν καὶ μειοῦν are applications of particular enthymemes. They differ further in that αὖξησις and μείωσις are each capable of independent formulation, while an argument a fortiori consists in the very connection drawn between the μᾶλλον and ήττον. However, Aristotle recognized the kinship of these concepts: at Rh. 1359a23 we find μέγεθος and μικρότης mentioned in conjunction with τὸ μεῖζον and τὸ ἔλαττον. The reader should mark that Aristotle uses the word τόπος in more than one sense; see G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton 1963) 100–01.

11 Lucas (above, note 1) 196.
shows that by the time of the epigrammatist Dioscorides, whose *floruit* was only a century or so after Aristotle’s own, the word could be metonymic for the plays produced; and even before Aristotle’s time, χοροδιδάσκαλος was the term for the person who taught the chorus their lines. So it is simplest and clearest to understand ἄνευ διδασκαλίας as = “without dialogue.”

The gist of the passage as I understand it, then, is as follows. (1) διάνοια in drama functions on two levels: in the playwright’s mind, as the work is being composed, and in the characters’ minds, as the μῦθος unfolds onstage. (2) As regards the characters, dramatic dialogue has three μέρη: (a) proof and refutation, (b) stimulation of the emotions, and (c) degrees of importance. (3) As regards the playwright, in putting together the events of the story—ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν—διάνοια should be used in the same way—ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἰδεῶν δεῖ χρήσθαι (sc. τῇ διανοίᾳ)—as when deciding about dialogue, except that πράγματα must achieve their effect without the vehicle of language (ἄνευ διδασκαλίας): “Events, on the one hand (τὰ μέν), must be perceived independent of verbal explanation, while argumentation, on the other (τὰ δὲ ἐν τῶι λόγωι), must (by definition) be provided orally by the speaker, and must come into being as a result of speech.” Thus (a) the piteous or fearful events themselves elicit pity and fear from the audience, and (b) the flow of causality in the plot must be recognizably clear as coming from connections that are either necessary or probable.12

12 The text of this study was completed in February 1993. I am grateful to Professor Miroslav Marcovich, Professor Neil O’Sullivan, and the late Father William M. A. Grimaldi for their helpful critiques of an earlier version of this essay, and to Professor David Sansone for his expert editorial help.
Myrsilus of Methymna and the White Goddesses

STEVEN JACKSON

In this article I examine Felix Jacoby’s commentary on three of the fragments of the third-century B.C. paradoxographer and local historian Myrsilus of Methymna. The three fragments we are concerned with are FGrH 477 F 10, 14 and 15. And the question is whether there is any connection between them. On the face of it there appears to be very little. F 10 refers to Ino as Leucothea (the White Goddess) and to the Nereids as Leucotheae, F 14 to the story of an Aeolian called Enalus, who is rescued at sea by a dolphin and carried in safety to Lesbos, and F 15 to the fact that Myrsilus thought of the Hyades as the daughters of Cadmus. However, Ino is a daughter of Cadmus, and by her marriage to Athamas, son of Aeolus, she is also linked to the Aeolid line, with which the character in the dolphin tale, Enalus, is also connected. Ino is therefore an obvious link between the three fragments. It is with her, I think, that we must make a start. It is my contention here that all three fragments are indeed connected and that in them we see an attempt by the eighth-century Aeolian colonists of Lesbos, who were the direct ancestors of Myrsilus of Methymna’s contemporaries, to adapt certain myths to enhance their island’s ties with the mainland.

Tradition has it that Ino, daughter of Cadmus, leaped into the sea and drowned, only to be deified by Zeus as Leucothea, or the White Goddess. The story was an old one and our first reference to it appears in the Odyssey (5. 333–35):

τὸν δὲ ἔδειν Κάδμου θυγάτηρ, καλλίσφυρος Ἦνω, 
Λευκοθέη, ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἔην βροτὸς αὐθήεσσα, 
νῦν δ’ ἄλος ἐν πελάγεσσι θεῶν ἔξ ἐμμορε τιμῆς.

Reinhold Merkelbach and M. L. West believe that Hesiod, too, refers to it in his Catalogue (fr. 70. 2–5 M–W):

μ]εγάροις λιπ[ 
εὐ]μ]άδεν ἀθανάτ]οισι 
πατή]ρ] ἀνδρῶν τε θ[εῶν τε 
] ἴνα οἱ κλέος ἄφθιτ]ον εἰ[η

Merkelbach (Fragmenta Hesiodea [Oxford 1967] 43) completes thus:

Ἄθάμαντα ἐνὶ μ]εγάροις λιπ[οῦσα
Having left Athamas in his palace she lives in the sea, and has become
deloved by the gods. For the father of men and gods honoured her with
the name Leucothea, so that her fame might be everlasting.

According to Merkelbach and West’s reckoning of the order and structure
of the Catalogue’s genealogies Ino was Athamas’ third wife after Nephele
and Themisto. 1 It now seems fairly certain also that fr. 91 M–W refers to
the same part of Ino’s story: 2

\[
\text{'Iwò δὲ Λευκοθέα}
\text{ποντίαν ὁμοθάλαμε Νηρηίδων.}
\]

Myrsilus of Methymna (FGrH 477 F 10) not only says that the White
Goddess was Ino but also calls the Nereids White Goddesses:

\[
\text{Μυρσίλος δὲ οὐ μόνον τὴν Λευκοθέαν 'Ινώ φησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς}
\text{Νηρηίδας Λευκοθέας ὀνομάζει.}
\]

Clearly, then, Myrsilus is telling us that Ino and the daughters of Nereus
share the same attributes and, presumably, perform the same functions. 3
Myrsilus therefore further elucidates the words of Pindar, and in effect he is
saying that Ino became a Nereid.

One of the most important functions of the Nereids was the saving of
mariners in storms, 4 and in our passage from the Odyssey already mentioned

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2 West (previous note) 64 n. 75.
3 The Etymologicum Genuinum (s.v. Λευκοθέα) ascribes Ino’s new nomenclature to the fact
that becoming mad and running (theousa) across the White (Leukou) plain somewhere near the
Megarid she hurled herself into the sea: Λευκοθέα· ἦ 'Ινώ· ὧτι ἐμμανής γενομένη, διὰ τοῦ
Λευκοῦ πεδίου θέουσα (ὁ ἐστι περὶ τὴν Μεγαρίδα) ἐαυτὴν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἔρρησε.
Nonnus, too, gives a similar reason for her new name (D. 10. 76–77): καὶ Λευκοῦ πεδίο
διακατάγουσα κοινήν / Λευκοθήθε περάτιστο φερόνμοις. The characteristic qualities shared
by Ino and the Nereids are unlikely to include any form of running across a white plain. But
this reasoning does not preclude the possibility that “White-Runner” is an accurate description
of both Ino and the Nereids. Such a description can be applied to the small white breakers one
sees on an otherwise generally calm sea. Hesychius (s.v. Λευκοθέα) describes the “White
Goddesses” as belonging to all the seas.

4 The same applies to the Dioscuri, who are described by Pindar (Pyth. 1. 66) as leukopoloi.
"White-horses" is still an expression used today to describe the small breakers on the sea.
Ino saves Odysseus from the violence of the sea (5. 333–53 and 458–62). Apollodorus (Bibl. 3. 4. 3) also mentions Ino’s capacity for saving sailors (together with that of her baby son):

καὶ Λευκόθενα μὲν αὐτῇ καλεῖται, Παλαίμων δὲ ὁ παῖς, οὕτως ὄνομασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν πλέοντων· τοῖς χειμαζομένοις γὰρ βοήθουσιν.

So, too, Nonnus (D. 10. 121–25):

Λευκόθενα δὲ
πεπταμέναις παλάμησιν ἑδέσειτο κυνοχαίτης
dαιμοσιν ὑγροποροσιν ὀμέστιον· ἐνθεν ἄρηγει
ναύταις πλαζομένοις, καὶ ἐπλετό ποντάς Ἰνὼ
Νηρείς ἀφλοίσθοι κυβερνήτειρα γαλήνης.5

We know that for Myrsilus of Methymna (FGrH 477 F 14) the Nereids were an integral part of the Lesbian colonisation myth celebrating the eighth-century settlement on the island of Aeolian Greeks.6 Plutarch, who almost assuredly is using Myrsilus as his source,7 tells us that an oracle had demanded from the colonists a bull for Poseidon and the human sacrifice of a virgin for Amphitrite and for the Nereids in return for a safe voyage:

χρησμοῦ γὰρ γενομένου τοῖς οἰκίζουσι Λέσβοις Ποσειδώνι μὲν ταύρον Ἀμφιτρίτη ἔδεε καὶ Νηρήσι ζώαν καθεῖναι παρθένον.

The lot fell to the daughter of Smintheus, who was duly dressed for the occasion and ceremoniously thrown overboard, no doubt destined to be carried safely to the Nereids’ underwater chambers. Enalus, a young nobleman who was in love with the girl, jumped into the sea to effect a rescue in some manner which he could not have hoped to fathom. Happily, the wretched lad was rescued by a dolphin, which carried him safely to Lesbos. Dolphins and the Nereids are synonymous with sea rescue. The Nereids are mentioned only collectively in this fragment (Amphitrite is regarded as Poseidon’s consort), but we may reasonably assume Ino’s involvement here, since she was, after all, by definition one of them. And she would have had a special association with the insular colonisation of the

Nereids and the Dioscuri were invariably invoked for protection by sailors about to set off on a voyage. The two groups are mentioned in the same breath at Eur. IT 270–71.

5 Apollonius of Rhodes gives us a fine example of the Nereids helping sailors in distress in his most pleasing description of the Argonauts trying to pass through the Wandering Rocks (4. 930 ff.):

ός δ’ ὃπόταν δελφίνες ὑπὲξ ἄλως εὐδιώκοντες
σπερμομένην ἀγεληθὸν ἐλύσονται περὶ νῆσα,
ἀλλοτε μὲν προσάροθὲν ὀργομενοὶ ἀλλοτε ὑπίσθεν
ἀλλοτε παρβολάδην, ναύτησι δὲ χάριμα τέτυκται.

For Ino/Leucothea’s possible connection with the Samothracian mysteries, a focal point of which was salvation at sea, see W. Burkert, Greek Religion (Oxford 1985) 281–85.


7 See Plut. Sept. Sap. conv. 163a–d, quoted by Jacoby in his Commentary (Text) on 477 F 14, p. 381.
Aeolians in that, until her changing into a sea-goddess, she was the wife of Athamas, son of Aeolus. We find, perhaps, a clearer indication of this association in the case of Tenedos.

According to Pausanias (10. 14. 2–4), the early name for Tenedos was "Leukophrys" (white-browed). We find the word leukophrys appearing only once elsewhere—in an oracular utterance of Pythian Apollo (quoted by Herodotus 3. 57). Pythian Apollo was of prime importance to the Aeolian Greeks, who took his cult with them wherever they colonised, and this included Tenedos. According to some (Apollod. Bibl. 3. 23), Apollo was the father of Tenes, the island's eponymous hero. Eustathius and the scholiast on Homer (Il. 1. 38) tell us that the sister of Tenes was called Leucothea. Plutarch (Quaest. Graec. 28) recounts that Leucothea was seduced by Achilles despite warnings from his mother Thetis that Apollo would take his revenge. A clear attestation, then, of Leucothea's association with Tenedos.

It is, I think, reasonable to suppose that the Myrsilian fragments 10 and 14 are connected. Jacoby, in his note on F 10 (477 Commentary [Text], p. 380), wonders whether F 15, where Myrsilus says that the Hyades were the daughters of Cadmus, is also similarly connected, although in the same note he adds a specific concern regarding F 14: "F 15 aus dem gleichen zusammenhang? Der name Leukothea ist für Tenedos, aber nicht für Lesbos bezeugt; die Nereides kamen in der Enalosgeschichte (zu F 14) vor."

To comment firstly on his note of concern, I think that this can be alleviated simply enough. The Nereids played a significant role in the Aeolian colonisation myths of the eastern Aegean, which, we know, interested Myrsilus. Ino with her marital link to the Aeolian genos would have been of prime importance in navigating her kinsfolk to safety. This would have applied equally to Lesbos, to Tenedos, or to any other of the relevant Aeolian colonies. The fact that there is attestation for Leucothea's association with one island of this colonisation and not with another should provide us with little worry.

8 I have already described elsewhere (see above, note 6) how the Aeolian–Lesbian colonisation myth of Enalus and the Dolphin was quite possibly the prototype for the Corinthian tale of Arion and the Dolphin, after Periander was told the tale by the Aeolian–Lesbian colonists of the mainland during the time of the tyrant's arbitration in the Sigeum dispute. Interestingly, Athamas' brother was Sisyphus, king of Corinth, who instituted the Isthmian games at Corinth in honour of Palaemon (otherwise known as Melicertes), the son of Ino, who was carried by his mother as she went into the sea (Paus. 1. 44. 11). There is a statue of Palaemon riding a dolphin at Taranto, and Arion of Methymna set out from there on his ill-fated voyage to Corinth.


10 See C. Morgan, Athletes and Oracles (Cambridge 1990) 172–78.
On the question of F 15 being also similarly linked, my feeling is that it is indeed similarly connected. When Aratus (Phaen. 173) speaks of the Hyades, he says that they are to be observed within the constellation of Taurus. The scholiast remarks that the sisters were thus named because they had nursed Dionysus, an epithet of whom was Hyas: ἡ δὲ προσωνυμία ὅτι τὸν Διόνυσον ἀνεθρέψαντο, "Ὡς δὲ Ὅ Διόνυσος. Euphorion (fr. 14 Powell = 15 van Groningen) says: "Ὡς ταυροκέρωτι Διονύσῳ κοτέσσα. This was after his father Zeus Hyas (Herodian I. 59 L and Hesychius s.v. "Hyas"). Plutarch (Is. et Os. 34, 364d) explains that the Greeks called Dionysus Hyas because he was God of Wet (hydro). In Homer hydro means "the sea." Kleidemos (FGrH 323 F 27) records that a sacrifice is made to Dionysus when the god brings the rain. The scholiast on Aratus (= Eur. fr. 357 Nauck) goes on to say that for Euripides in his Erechtheus the Hyades were three in number and were the daughters of Erechtheus: Εὐριπίδης μὲν οὖν Ἐρεχθεί τὰς Ἐρεχθέως θυγατέρας Ὁγάς φησὶ γενέσθαι τρεῖς οὐσίας. But, the scholiast continues, Myrsilus (= FGrH 477 F 15) says that the Hyades were the daughters of Cadmus and were so named because of Dionysus' title Hyas: ὃ δὲ Μυρσίλος τὰς Κάδμου θυγατέρας κληθήναι δὲ οὕτως δι᾽ Ἡν προείπομεν αιτίαν. Homer (Il. 6. 130 ff.) tells how Lycurgus, son of Dryas, chased the nurses of Dionysus through the holy hills of Nysa and smote them with his ox-goad. Dionysus fled and jumped into the sea and was taken into safety by Thetis. This is our earliest reference to the nurses of Dionysus. Despite subsequent references by various authors to a relatively large number of places called Nysa, this earliest reference in Homer, where Lycurgus and Thetis are involved, points to the area of the northern Aegean. Undoubtedly Homer is referring to the earlier Dionysus Zagreus, son of Zeus and Persephone, and not to the later son of Semele, sister of Ino, Agaue and Autonoë. The former was the legend with which the Hyades were concerned. Hesiod (fr. 291 M–W) names five of them—Phaisyla, Coronis, Cleeia, Phaio and Eudora; and Theon of Alexandria (Schol. Arat. Phaen. 172, p. 166 Martin) names six—Ambrosia, Cleita, Bromeia, Cisseis, Phaismela and Eudora. The Semele story became the accepted form throughout Greece but undoubtedly was false. The composer of the Homeric Hymn to Dionysus makes this abundantly clear at lines 5–6: ἀλλοί δὲ ἐν Θηβαίσιν ἄνας σὲ λέγουσι
γενέσθαι / ψευδόμενοι. The same applies to the tale of Ino’s nursing of her sister’s son—widely accepted but false.14

If Ino and her sisters were not bona fide Hyades, why does Myrsilus say that they were? There may well be an indication to the answer in what Myrsilus clearly sees as their association with Dionysus Hyas. In the Iliad, remember, Dionysus Hyas (God of Wet) jumped into the sea to escape destruction and was saved by the Nereids and taken by Thetis to their underwater chambers. Not only was Ino a Nereid but so too were her sisters Agae and Autonoe (Hes. Th. 247 and 258 respectively),15 and Pherecydes of Leros (FGrH 3 F 90a) calls Semele Hya. The daughters of Cadmus were Hyades in that they could be counted among the number of Nereids who saved and nursed Dionysus Hyas. Another example of this is Eudora, who was both Nereid (Hes. Th. 244) and Hyad (Hesiod’s and Theon of Alexandria’s lists; see previous page).

Just as Homer was referring to an earlier Dionysus, so too are we speaking here of an earlier Ino, the Ino who belonged to heroic saga and who was connected with the Aeolid line by marriage to Athamas, son of Aeolus. This was the Ino who became a Nereid,16 and who was of interest to Myrsilus.

The connection, then, between our three fragments is a complex one. Ino was the third wife of Athamas, son of Aeolus. She became a Nereid and was therefore important for the safety at sea of the Aeolian voyagers and colonists. The Nereids were heavily involved in the colonisation stories of the Aeolians, as Myrsilus in turn records for us. Homer tells us (II. 24. 78 ff.) that Thetis and her nymphs dwell in the sea halfway between Samos and Imbros, in other words around Lesbos, the heart of Aeolian colonisation in the eastern Aegean.

When Myrsilus of Methymna not only says that the White Goddess was Ino but also names the Nereids as White Goddesses, he is referring to the


15 Agae is also listed as a Nereid at II. 18. 42. But there she is part of a shortened list of Nereids (lines 39–49), which is generally regarded as an interpolation. See further M. L. West, Hesiod. Theogony (Oxford 1966) 236.

16 Although she is portrayed elsewhere as the cruel stepmother of Phrixus and Helle (Herodotus 7. 197; Apollod. Bibl. 1. 7. 3 and 3. 4. 3; Hyg. Fab. 1–5; Paus. 1. 44. 11 and 9. 34. 5; Nonnus, D. 10. 1 ff.; Ovid, Met. 4. 480 ff., Fast. 3. 853) and the murderess of her own children (Eur. Med. 1284 f.; but see D. L. Page, Euripides. Medea [Oxford 1938] ad loc.), the evidence in the earliest sources tends to suggest that Ino/Leucothoe was, simply, a mortal queen who became a marine deity. Interestingly, neither Pindar (Pyth. 4. 162; ματρυτας) nor Apollonius Rhodius (2. 1182; μητρωμης) mentions Ino as the stepmother of Phrixus and Helle. And the Pindaric scholarist’s remarks are worth noting in this respect (Schol. Pind. Pyth. 4. 288a, II 136 Drachmann): ταύτην δὲ ὁ μὲν Πίνδαρος ἐν Ἰμνοίς Δημοδίκην, ἵππις δὲ Γοργώπιν· Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Ἀθάμαντι Νεφέλην· Φερεκύδης Θεμιστ.ω.
most ancient of legends concerning Ino, which represented her as the wife of Athamas, son of Aeolus, who, like her sisters Agae, Autonoe and Semele, became a Nereid helping sailors and others in distress at sea, among whom were Odysseus and Dionysus Hyas. In the case of the latter, Ino and her sisters with other Nereids for a while became nurses of Dionysus, or Hyades. Hence Myrsilus' declaration that the daughters of Cadmus were Hyades because they saved the life of Dionysus Hyas (God of Wet).

Our supposition must be, and it is quite feasible, that Myrsilus was describing, presumably in his Lesbiaca, the history and myth surrounding the Aeolian colonisation of Lesbos, in which the Nereids reputedly played a significant role and in which Ino with her marital link to the Aeolian genos would have been of prime importance in navigating her kinsfolk to safety. Myrsilus would naturally have told the story of Ino and her sisters, including their part in the Nereid sea rescue of Dionysus Hyas. All of this should, I think, answer Jacoby's question and alleviate his concern; and at the same time we see something of Myrsilus' history of Aeolian colonisation off the Asian coast.17

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17 I wish to record my thanks to the two anonymous referees and to the editor for their helpful and useful comments on this paper, but, of course, responsibility for any possible errors in the thesis remains with me.
On The Content and Structure of the Prologue to Cato's *Origines*

J. BRADFORD CHURCHILL

Cicero three times paraphrases a passage from Cato's *Origines* concerning an ancient Roman quasi-historical tradition. The fullest paraphrase is in the fourth book of the *Tusculan Disputations* (4. 3):

> gravissimius auctor in Originibus dixit Cato morem apud maiores hunc epularumuisse, ut deinceps qui accurabant canerent ad tibiarn clarorum vironum laudes atque virtutes.

He also paraphrases the passage in Book 1 of the same work, and in the *Brutus*.¹ In none of the citations does Cicero provide any indication from where in Cato's history the passage is taken. Most of the editors who


This paper is concerned with the use to which Cato put this statement, not the question of its accuracy or the validity of any of the reconstructions of Roman tradition (e.g. Jordan's *Niebuhrri consilium* in the passage below quoted from his introduction) which have been suggested on its basis. For a discussion (which is biased toward the possibility that it was a Catonian fabrication) of the arguments, see H. Dahlmann, "Zur Überlieferung über die altromischen Tafellieder," AAWM (1950) 1191–1202, repr. in Kleine Schriften, Collectanea 19 (Hildesheim 1970) 23–34. A. Momigliano, *The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography* (Berkeley 1990) 92–94, also discusses the possible nature and ultimate fate of these songs, as well as a means by which Cato might have discovered their existence.

Two earlier versions of this thesis were delivered orally: at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, October 15, 1993, under the title "The Prologue to Cato, *Origines*: Why a Good Roman Would Want to Write History in Latin," and at the American Philological Association Annual Meeting, December 28, 1994, under the title "Cato, *Origines*, HRR fr. 118 in Tacitus and Cicero: A Fragment of the Prologue?" This article has benefitted greatly from suggestions offered and questions raised on those occasions, and in particular I would like to thank Christina Kraus for her encouraging comments and useful suggestions. For hazarding the question which catalyzed this entire line of inquiry and for his encouragement and suggestions along the way, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to David Sansone. Thanks are also due J. K. Newman and William M. Calder III for their criticisms and suggestions, and I must express special appreciation for the immensely useful and thought-provoking suggestions of James S. Ruebel, who helped to bring this analysis to a more confident and, I hope, more competent conclusion. For any omissions or errors which remain, I bear the sole responsibility.
approached the fragments of the *Origines* in the nineteenth century have, accordingly, not attempted to attribute the fragment to any particular portion of the work.² Karl Ludwig Roth, however, attributed the fragment to the prologue, without explanatory comment.³ Henri Jordan reacted, in the introduction to his edition (p. lix), with some vehemence and even contempt:

mirifice enim de operis Catoniani ratione et indole falsus est Rothius, cum Catonem, Niebuhrii consilium, si dis placet, praesagientem, testimonium illud in ipso prooemio tamquam aliquod criticae artis instrumentum proposuisse coniecit.

Jordan offered no further evidence against Roth, but he attributed the fragment to Book 7, and Martine Chassignet has followed his lead.⁴ In fact, there is no good evidence that the fragment ought to be attributed to Book 7, and there are strong reasons to take Roth’s attribution seriously.

Neither Jordan nor Chassignet has any persuasive reason for putting the fragment in Book 7. Jordan explains his reasoning (p. lix):

me quidem ea quae Festus septimo libro deprompsit (fr. 7 et 8 [= HRR 111, 113]) moverunt ut Catonem praeter res gestas morum a prisa simplicitate declinatorum censum egisse arbitrarer; quare adscripsi eiusdem argumenti verba 9–13, quorum quod est numero 12 [= HRR 118], inlustre de carminibus convivalis testimonium, cum ex originibus fluxisse diserte traditum sit, quo libro potius adscribendum fuerit, equidem non video.

Chassignet (p. xli) includes this and several otherwise unassigned fragments in Book 7 because they concern “des coutumes de Rome, anciennes ou contemporaines de Caton, visiblement de la même veine que les fragments VII, 7 et 9 [= HRR 111, 113], parvenus précisément avec la référence au livre VII.” It is quite true that the fragments of Book 7 cited by Jordan and Chassignet contain cultural details. Fragment 111 concerns the kinds of shoes worn by the holders of certain magistracies.⁵ Fragment 113 is little

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² *M. Porci Catonis Originum fragmenta*, ed. by A. Wagener (Bonn 1849) fr. 120; *M. Porci Catonis Originum libri septem*, ed. by A. Bormann (Brandenburg 1858) fr. 123; *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*, ed. by H. Peter (Leipzig 1914, 1906, 1870 [Stuttgart 1967]) fr. 118. Peter’s numeration (e.g. “HRR 118”) will be followed throughout.


⁵ Fest. p. 142 M: “mulleos genus calcceorum aiunt esse; quibus reges Albanorum primi, deinde patricii sunt usi. M. Cato Originum lib. vii: qui magistratum curulem cepisset calceos mulleos aluta laciniatos, ceteri perones.”
more than a list of women’s finery.\textsuperscript{6} Between the two fragments, taken out of context, there is little indication of a general digression on culture, much less cultural decline. As Cesare Letta points out, there is no support for the conclusion that there must have been a digression, since “in ogni caso, notizie di contenuto morale dovevano essere disseminate in tutta l’opera.”\textsuperscript{7}

On the other hand, Chassignet further attempts to justify her inclusion of fragment 119 in Book 7 by connecting it to a contemporary controversy involving two sumptuary laws. As she makes no comment regarding fragment 118, it may be that she intends the argument concerning fragment 119 to apply to it by extension.\textsuperscript{8} She suggests (106) that, in the hypothetical cultural digression in Book 7 of the \textit{Origines} (which she apparently accepts from Jordan), Cato recorded his polemic against the loosening of the restrictions of the \textit{lex Orchia} or the \textit{lex Fannia}. One might alternatively suggest that one or both debates found their way into the narrative of the \textit{Origines}.

The \textit{lex Orchia} was passed in 182 B.C.E. to regulate the number of dinner-guests allowed on any given occasion. The ineffectiveness of the law in controlling convivial expenditures occasioned the passage in 161 of the \textit{lex Fannia}, which added provisions limiting the amount of money which could be spent.\textsuperscript{9} We know that Cato spoke against the repeal of the \textit{lex Orchia}.\textsuperscript{10} If the last four books of the \textit{Origines} were organized chronologically, Cato would most probably have included this speech in Book 5 (if at all), since his speech on behalf of the Rhodians, which we know he included in Book 5,\textsuperscript{11} was delivered in 167. If he recorded the debate surrounding the \textit{lex Fannia}, which took place six years or so after the Rhodian speech, it would presumably have been included late in Book 5 or early in Book 6. If these late books were organized according to theatres of war, there is little room to speculate where these controversies might have

\textsuperscript{6} Fest. pp. 262, 265 M: “ruscum est, ut ait Verrius, amplius paullo herba, . . . cuius coloris rebus uti mulieres solitas commemorat Cato Originum lib. vii: mulieres opertae auro purpureaque; arsinea, rete, diademam, coronas aureas, rusceae fascias, galbeas lineas, pelles, redimicula.”

\textsuperscript{7} Letta (above, note 3) 30 n. 156.

\textsuperscript{8} It is tempting to assume that the two fragments, since they happen to mention details of dining practice, come from the same passage. There is, however, no evidence that they are even from the same work; see below, note 13.

\textsuperscript{9} Macr. 3. 17. 2–5; Gel. 2. 24. 4–6; cf. Cic. \textit{Fam.} 7. 26. 2, 9. 15. 5; \textit{Att.} 13. 7. 1.


\textsuperscript{11} Gel. 6. 3. 7.
found their way into the text, if at all, since they would seem of limited relevance to any particular military conflict.\(^{12}\)

However plausible or otherwise it may appear that these controversies found their way into the *Origines* at some point or another, there is no clear connection between the issues of these laws and fragment 118 of the *Origines*. Fragment 119, as it refers to older and more simple dining practices, could belong to such a discussion. Unfortunately, fragment 119 is reported by Servius without any indication that it stems even from the *Origines*.\(^{13}\) Fragment 118 is relevant to dinner practices only because the songs of praise follow dinner. There is no obvious connection to the expense of the dinner itself, much less the number of guests. Fragment 118 cannot be assigned to Book 7 or any other place in the later books except by speculation. On the other hand, it can be shown to be perfectly appropriate to the purpose and probable structure of the prologue, and there are indications that it may belong there.

A careful comparison between the prologue to the *De Agricultura* and the existing fragments of and testimonium for the prologue to the *Origines* can be used to construct the most probable paradigm for the kinds of arguments Cato was likely to have used in the remainder of the latter prologue. We know from the testimony of an ancient rhetorical handbook that Cato’s prologue defends in general terms the value of history:

> principiorum ad historiam pertinentium species sunt tres: de historia, de persona, de materia. aut enim historiae bonum generaliter commendamus, ut Cato, aut pro persona scribentis rationem eius quod hoc officium adsumpserit reddimus, ut Sallustius eo loco, ubi dicit “sed ego adulescentulus initio, sicuti plerique, studio ad rem publicam latus sum,” aut eam rem, quam relaturi sumus, dignam quae et scribatur et legatur ostendimus, ut Livius ab urbe condita.\(^{14}\)

We can safely draw several conclusions from this testimonium. First, the distinctions the rhetorician draws between the three authors are obviously not as absolute as they are stated; he is drawing general distinctions between particularities unique to each of the three, not necessarily ruling out parallels which are not related to the three kinds of arguments he contrasts between them. Indeed, Livy does not give any particular reason why he is qualified to take up the task of writing a Roman history, and Sallust (limiting our scope to the *Caioline*, as the author seems to do) does not give

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13 Serv. A. 1. 126: “nam, ut ait Cato, et in atrio et duobus ferculis epulabantur antiqui”; Bormann relegates this fragment to his list of “quaesolo nomine Catonis feruntur, prorsus incerta,” fr. hh. Malcovati includes it, with reservations, in the *Dissuasio ne lex Orchia derogaretur* (fr. 144); Janzer (above, note 10) 56, attributes it to the *Carmen de moribus*.

any more rationale for the relevance of his topic or its scope than to make the statement (Cat. 4. 2–5) that it is one of the things memoria digna. Each of these authors, however, alludes, at least in general terms, to what might be called a historiae bonum: that it provides exempla both negative and positive (Liv. 1. pr. 10) or that in preserving human memories it helps distinguish men from beasts (Sal. Cat. 1. 3). The contrast, then, seems to indicate a more general approach by Cato as compared to the more involved and distinct approaches taken by Livy and Sallust. Given the brevity of the prologue to the De Agricultura, and the fact that it would quite aptly be said agriculturae bonum generaliter commendasse, this is not in any way surprising. The testimonium thus suggests that the prologue to the Origines was in general outlines similar to the prologue to the De Agricultura.\(^\text{15}\)

Three elements important for our analysis can be isolated from the prologue to the De Agricultura. The first has already been mentioned—that the main assertion is of the general value of agriculture, hinging on the contrast between farming and the two other competing profit-making ventures to show that agriculture is superior to both.\(^\text{16}\) The second element, the support of the maiores, is adduced to demonstrate the moral superiority of farming over usury.\(^\text{17}\) The third element, a pragmatic set of proverbial notions, is introduced to support the practical and moral benefits of farming as contrasted with the risks of commerce.\(^\text{18}\)

A proverbial statement of a similarly pragmatic notion is attested as having stemmed from the prologue to the Origines. Cato paraphrases the opening sentence of Xenophon’s Symposium: “clarorum virorum atque magnorum non minus otii quam negotii rationem exstare oportere.”\(^\text{19}\) Cato means something different from what Xenophon intended the statement to imply. Xenophon claims simply that it is worth remembering what great men do with their leisure time, presumably because it reveals things about them which would not be revealed in any other way. His statement justifies

\(^{15}\) It is likely that the prologue to the De Agricultura was composed prior to that of the Origines, or that they were composed at about the same time. The De Agricultura was probably begun after 198, and work was apparently still in progress in 164; the Origines were underway by 168 and not completed until 149, the year of Cato’s death; cf. Astin (above, note 12) 190–91, 212. The suggestion here is not that the two prologues were connected to one another except in the concepts and organizing principles upon which they were based.

\(^{16}\) Agr. pr. 1: “est interdum praestare mercaturis rem quaerere, nisi tam periculosus sit, et item fenerari, si tam honestum sit.”

\(^{17}\) Agr. pr. 1: “maiores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posiverunt: furem dupli condemnari, feneratorem quadrupli. quanto peiorem cievem eximiamarit feneratorem quam furem hinc licet existimare.”

\(^{18}\) Agr. pr. 4: “at ex agricolis et viri fortissimi et milites strenuissimi gignuntur, maximeque pius quaestus stabilissimusque consequitor minimeque invidiosus, minimeque male cogitantes sunt qui in eo studio occupati sunt.”

his intention to write an account of the leisure activities of several important men. Cato, it will be argued, is not defending the notion of narrating leisure activities (which is not to say that such narratives would not have been part of his history); there is no trace in his history that *otium* ever becomes a dominant theme. Cato uses the balance between *σπουδή* and *παιδία* to assert the responsibility of an important man to make a use of his leisure time which will stand up to serious scrutiny.\(^{20}\) There is a clear connection between a leisure which stands up to scrutiny and the general assertion of the value of history: The writing of history was a leisure activity. The statement was intended to lead to a justification of the writing of history as a worthy leisure pursuit.

In his article on the *Origines*, Letta makes several assertions which it will be worth while to refute carefully in order to build the argument outlined above. He argues ([above, note 3] 25–30) that Cato did not mean himself when he wrote *clarorum virorum atque magnorum*, but was announcing a historical method which would illustrate the *mores* of *clari maiores atque magni* by narrating how they spent their leisure time, and that he did not mean to include literary endeavor when he wrote *otium*. Neither of these assertions is persuasive.

The argument (Letta 27–29) that Cato in the prologue states a program including the examination of the leisure practices of great historical figures is to be rejected. Letta refers the interpretation of the phrase *clarorum virorum* (he reads *hominum* with Chassignet) *atque magnorum* to Plutarch’s *tōn μὲν ἐνδόξον καὶ μεγάλον* (*Cat. Mai.* 11. 3), a translation of a phrase which he asserts Cato used with specific reference to the nobility, and thus has special reference to great Roman nobles of history, and does not refer to Cato himself.\(^{21}\) It should first be noted that historians are generally in agreement that the incident narrated by Plutarch in the cited passage did not take place.\(^{22}\) Furthermore, it is not clear from the context that Cato was referring exclusively to those who were born into a certain class, but to those who had achieved prominence either by birth or renown. He put himself among the ἁσπιστευτοὶ who attempted to outdo those who had advantages τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ. For that matter, Cato may not have written *clarorum virorum atque magnorum*. Dietmar Kienast has argued


\(^{21}\) We should note in passing that Cato, haud detrectator laudum suarum (*Liv. 34. 15. 9*), would doubtless not hesitate to number himself, explicitly or implicitly, among the *clari* and *magni* (quite rightly, of course, as he was both).

that the phrases *clari viri* and *magni viri* are unusual enough in Catonian
diction (they are not attested elsewhere) to suggest that Cicero’s quotation is
imprecise;\(^{23}\) although the suggestion is not necessarily persuasive, it does
remind us that Cicero might have supplied something in the paraphrase
which was only implied, or was expressed in slightly different terms, in the
original. There is no evidence to support Letta in saying (30): “di fatto, i
suoi *clari viri* dovevano figurare come un sinonimo di *maiores* e illustre la
sua visione dei *mores* nazionali in maniera corale.”

There is moreover no support from other sources for Letta’s assertion
that Cato provided a statement of his “programma” (29). There is no
indication in the extant fragments of the *Origines* that such a program was
executed, which is not to say that we can safely conclude it was not. One
might also question the quality and quantity of evidence of leisure activity
which would have been available to Cato, at least about people of earlier
periods, but this, too, fails *a priori* to invalidate the assumption. There is,
however, reason to reject the expectation that, even if such a theme was part
of the executed plan of the *Origines*, there would have been any mention of
it in the prologue. If there is one thing about the prologue to the *De
Agricultura* which has been the subject of scholarly criticism, it is the lack
of any clear statement of purpose, scope, or method.\(^{24}\) For the orator who
counseled his son (*Ad M. fil. fr. 15* Jordan, p. 80) *rem tene, verba sequentur*,
it may have seemed superfluous (not to say tedious) to state one’s method
and aims ahead of time in any systematic way, since it would all “come out
in the wash,” clearly visible for exactly what it was. Cato was content in the
prologue to the *De Agricultura* simply to write a few well-chosen words to
gain the readers’ attention and convince them that what they were about to
read was worth while, and then set to the task at hand. Given his reputation
for brevity, this is no surprise. One cannot rule out the possibility that the
prologue to the *Origines* was more developed in some respects than that of
the *De Agricultura*, but Letta’s hypothesis is based on assumptions which
cannot be corroborated and seem unlikely in the face of existing indications.

Letta’s argument that Cato’s *otium* cannot include the writing of history
also fails to persuade. In his attempt to show that Cato could not have
included literary endeavor in his concept of *otium*, Letta makes
unsupportable claims about the meaning of the word. He asserts, for
example (27–28), that Cato’s *otium* represents all private engagements,
including marriage, reproduction, earning a living, and holding parties,
based on the fact that Plutarch (*Cat. Mai.* 16. 2) points out that the Romans
believed (it seems to be a truism) that these areas of conduct revealed more
about a man than his public acts. The *dictum* of Appius Claudius which

\(^{23}\) D. Kienast, *Cato der Zensor: Seine Persönlichkeit und seine Zeit* (Heidelberg 1954; repr.
Darmstadt 1979) 107. Cicero’s paraphrase, at any rate, is not likely to have taken liberties with
Cato’s meaning, even if he changed the wording.
\(^{24}\) Cf. Astin (above, note 12) 200–01.
Letta cites (28 n. 143) as supportive of the idea that *otium* represents everything outside of the public sphere is rather more clearly in support of the idea that Cato’s *otium* represents those activities which are not driven by necessity (Val. Max. 7. 2. 1):

Appium Claudium crebro solitum dicere accepimus negotium populo Romano melius quam otium committi, non quod ignoraret quam iucundus tranquillitatis status esset, sed quod animadverteret praepotentia imperia agitationone rerum ad virtutem capessendam excitari, nimia quiete in desideriam resolvi.

Appius’ statement shows that the distinction between *negotium* and *otium* is the difference between *agitatio rerum* (being forced to action) and *nimia quies* (not being required to do anything). Cato’s statement about the balance in importance between the *otium* and *negotium* of famous men reflects an attitude which tends to rehabilitate *otium* from being a source of decline and weakness into an additional source of benefit for the society.

Letta further argues that literary activity was excluded from the realm of *otium* during the early second century, but the evidence will not bear him out. He cites Terence’s equation of *negotium* with literary endeavor (*Hec.* 25–28). Terence, however, was a professional poet, and thus poetry was his *negotium* (not to mention that the inversion of *otium* and *negotium* at line 26 may have been ironic and intended to amuse the Roman audience). There is no indication that Cato excluded literary endeavor from *otium*, and good evidence that he included it. He implies that he did not approve of poetry as *negotium* in the *Carmen de moribus* (fr. 2 Jordan = Gel. 11. 2. 5), pointing out that those who devoted themselves to poetry were called *grassatores*. According to Plutarch (*Cat. Mai.* 24. 8), writing books and farming were Cato’s favorite leisure activities.25 He did most of his writing, as Cugusi (265) points out, during the later years of his life, when he was less busy with *negotia*. Obviously, on the other hand, Cato does not limit the scope of *otium* to literary endeavor or the *vita contemplativa*, since farming is neither.26 *Otium* represents a whole complex of activities outside the public

25 Cf. E. Gruen, *Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome* (Ithaca, NY 1992) 61 n. 69. Letta’s refusal ([above, note 3] 28 n. 140) to credit Plutarch’s statement would be more credible if there were actually a statement in Cicero’s *De Senectute* which Plutarch was quoting directly, though even then it would depend upon the presumption that Cicero’s portrayal of Cato was significantly distorted. If Cato did not write books in his leisure time, it is hard to imagine when he did write them, and if he did not enjoy it, it is hard to imagine why he wrote them; cf. Cugusi (above, note 3) 265. Letta’s further claim (ibid.) that Xenophon’s παιδία does not include literary activity, requires the assumption that Cato’s use of the passage was faithful to Xenophon’s original intent, which is certainly not necessary, and that his understanding of cultural matters was the same as Xenophon’s, which is doubtful. The Rome of the second century B.C.E. was a very different place from the Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries.

26 L. Alfonsi, “Catone il Censore e l’umanesimo romano,” *PP* 9 (1954) 165. J.-M. André, *L’otium dans la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine* (Paris 1966) 46, suggests that Cato was furtively the founder of the *otium litteratum*; Gruen (previous note) 61, derives from Cato’s equation of *otium* and *negotium* the combination of the *vita contemplativa* with the *vita activa*. 
sphere and outside the exigencies of making a living, including writing books and, for a man who need not work for a living, managing a farm. Letta’s attempt to exclude literary endeavor from otium does not hold up.

On the other hand, the productive use of leisure is a recurrent theme in Roman literature. Sallust, as part of his accounting for his own choice in taking up the task of writing history, claims that the Roman state will derive considerable benefit from his leisure (lug. 4. 4):

> qui si reputaverint et quibus ego temporibus magistratus adeptus sim et quales viri idem adsequi nequiverint et postea quae genera hominin in senatum pervenerint, profecto exstumabunt me magis merito quam ignavia iudicium animi mei mutavisse maiusque commodum ex otio meo quam ex aliorum negotiis rei publicae venturum.

In a larger context which will receive closer treatment presently—the prologue to Book 1 of the Tusculan Disputations—Cicero (Tusc. 1. 5) paraphrases the same notion in defending his use of leisure time to write philosophy in Latin: “illustranda et excitanda nobis est [sc. philosophia] ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi.” The idea is attested as having derived from Cato. Justinus certainly refers to this fragment when he writes that he wanted his work to be examined in part in order to supply an account of how he himself has used his leisure time, “cuius et Cato reddendam operam putat.” In the passage in which fragment 2 of the Origines is quoted, Cicero uses the Catonian dictum to illustrate the motivation behind his practice of using his otium in a publicly productive way.29

Letta’s point ([above, note 3] 29) that Cato did not offer a specific explanation of his personal choice to write history is well made, but he takes it too far. Cato does not refer to himself personally in the extant fragments of the prologue, and it is probably safe to assume that he made no specific reference to himself elsewhere in the prologue (as he does not in the prologue to the De Agricultura). This does not rule out a general reference to the usefulness of leisure, and there are many indications, which will be illustrated presently, that this is precisely the point of departure of the passage. The only reasonable conclusion is that he asserts in fragment 2 that important men should be ready to be called to account for their use of leisure time, and leaves it to be implied, as he goes on to justify the writing

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27 The point, of course, is not that Cato did not either need or want the income from a farm, but that his constant personal efforts were not necessary to its functioning.
28 Cited above, note 20.
29 Cic. Planc. 66: “equid ego dicam de occupatis meis temporibus, cui fuerit ne otium quidem unquam otiosum? nam quas tu commemoras, Cassi, legere te solere orationes, cum otiosus sis, has ego scripsi ludi et feris, ne omnino unquam esses otiosus. etenim M. Catonis illud, quod in principio scripsit Originum suarum, semper magnificum et praeclarum putavi, clarorum virorum atque magnorum e.q.s.”
of history in leisure time, that this use of his leisure time is useful and may be counted to the good.

The first fragment of the prologue to the *Origines* lends further support to the idea that justifying the leisure pursuit of writing history was a prominent element in the prologue as a whole. On this point Letta is also of a different opinion, suggesting (29) that as part of the programmatic outline it indicates that Cato will bring prose history into the mix. Fragment 1 of the *Origines*, however, is not clearly to be associated specifically with prose history: “si ques homines sunt quos delectat populi Romani gesta discribere.”\(^{30}\) What is notably attested in the fragment is the idea that pleasure (delectat) has a role in the writing of history. Even if there were not another fragment attested which mentioned *otium*, this phraseology would suggest that the writing of history is conceived of as the task of an amateur (in the truest sense of the word). Like the other acts which come under the rubric of *otium*, the writing of history is not motivated as much by necessity as by desire and inclination. There is no need to look any further for a connection between the two extant fragments of the prologue to the *Origines*; history as the task of an amateur dovetails with the assertion that *otium*—that time which can be devoted to amateurism—should be useful.

Before we move on to consider the way these lines of reasoning will tend to support the inclusion of fragment 118 among the fragments of the prologue, it will be useful to take the analysis of fragment 1 one step further and suggest that it subtly announces a break with the established poetic historical tradition at Rome. As was suggested in the previous paragraph, Letta’s assertion (29) that the *populi Romani gesta* refer to prose history neglects the fact that when Cato wrote those words, there were no Latin prose works on that subject. The only Latin literature on the accomplishments of the Roman people were the saturnians of Naevius and the hexameters of Ennius. There were also the Greek prose histories of Fabius Pictor and Postumius Albinus. If *populi Romani gesta* calls any prior literature to mind, it is not Latin prose, but either Greek prose or Latin poetry. There is reason to suggest that the fragment is subtly pointed at the latter.

The opening sentence of the *Origines* is probably hexametrical. Luca Cardinali argues that *homines* is a gloss which should be removed to yield a spondaic hexameter.\(^{31}\) If, however, *homines* is placed after *sunt* as by pseudo-Sergius, the line is still hexametrical to a point: “Si ques sunt homines quos delectat populi Ro-.“\(^{32}\) The fact that the hexametrical scheme


\(^{32}\) The fact that two of the three sources (cited above, note 30) quote the words *si ques sunt* without a break between them tends to support this reading, which was suggested to me by
breaks down is perhaps more suggestive than problematical. Cato is not writing poetry, but he does acknowledge the poetic tradition which has preceded him in his own language. He was not avverse to using poetic elements from the Latin tradition in his work.\(^{33}\) By beginning with a broken hexameter, he reminds the reader of the poetic tradition, and signals that his work will be somewhat different. The possibility that Cato supplied a precedent may open the door to a fresh look at the vexing controversy over the putative hexameters beginning Livy and Tacitus’ \textit{Annals}. It is not prudent to reject the testimony of Quintilian, who tells us that Livy’s phraseology was hexametrical, even though the extant manuscripts are in agreement in reading “facturusne simul operae pretium.”\(^{34}\) The form of the opening of Tacitus’ \textit{Annals} is not in dispute, but it is unclear whether it would have been seen as a hexameter by Tacitus or his contemporaries: “ursum Romam a principio reges habuere.”\(^{35}\) It is a difficult question, but there are hexameter verses written by skilled poets which are very similar in many respects.\(^{36}\)

David Sansone. In Servius, it appears that the several words between \textit{sunt} and \textit{populi} simply dropped out of the text.


\(^{34}\) Quint. \textit{Inst.} 9. 4. 74: “T. Livius hexametri exordio coepit: facturusne operae pretium sim; nam ita edidit estque melius quam quo modo emendatur.” Quintilian’s wording suggests that he had reason to believe that this was the genuine form of the original work (\textit{edidit}) and that a later editor or editors had decided to change the form as he had found it (\textit{emendatur}), apparently under an impression at variance with Quintilian’s. Of course, the reading of the surviving mss. requires only one ancient editor to have made that decision.


\(^{36}\) The caesura in the fifth foot, and the jarring lack of coincidence of word accent and ictus, find a parallel in Ennius (\textit{Ann.} 43): “corde capessere; semita nulla pedem stabilitat.” Another case of a glaring lack of coincidence in ictus and accent is found in Juvenal (7. 238): “ut si quis cera volturn faciat; exigite ut sit.” The lack of caesura in the third foot may be regarded as slightly irregular, but not unheard-of, as Juvenal writes (15. 81): “victrix turba nec ardentis decoxit aeno,” and Vergil writes (\textit{Aen.} 2. 606): “caligat, nubem eripiam; tu ne qua parentes.”

There are more parallels to be adduced, but this is not the place for the argument. Suffice it to say that the first words of the \textit{Annals} of Tacitus might not have rung hexametrical to the ear of a Roman, but if they did not, there may be several actual lines of hexameter which might also not have rung hexametrical. It is safer to conclude that the first words of the \textit{Annals} sounded vaguely like a hexameter. There are indications that poetic sequences, even if somewhat unusual or even fundamentally flawed, would have been noticeable and even jarring to a listening audience. In cautioning the orator against an excessive poetic element in his rhetoric, Cicero writes (\textit{De Or.} 3. 182) that one must avoid “the poetic line or the likeness of a poetic line” (\textit{versum aut similitudinem versus}). The phrase \textit{similitudo versus} presumes that a string of syllables which is not technically a \textit{versus} can, nevertheless, sound like one. A writer who accidentally falls into extended poetic rhythms might simply be holding himself to a different standard, but arguably the place where one would least expect to find a possibly jarring coincidence is in the first sentence of a \textit{magnus opus}. Such an identical accident in several authors’ \textit{magna opera} seems unlikely. None of this, of course, rules out a simple coincidence, but as we have seen, there is a reasonable explanation for why Cato would have consciously constructed his sentence this way, and that might be explanation enough why two later historians would have done the same thing. Tacitus alludes to Cato’s \textit{Origines} in the prologue to the \textit{Agricola}, and might just as well have had Cato, next to Sallust, in mind when
At any rate, as we have seen, two of the three major thematic elements identified from the prologue to the De Agricultura are explicitly attested in the prologue to the Origines: the general purpose to assert the value of the operative endeavor, and a proverbial statement encompassing or enabling a justification of that endeavor. The only element missing from the extant fragments of the Origines is any overt reference to the practices of the maiores, which, for Cato, would supply ample precedent for virtually anything which was suitable for other reasons. Intuitively, one almost expects to find a reference to the maiores on any question in which such a reference is possible. Such an element is, of course, to be found in fragment 118. The Latin-speaking maiores used historical discourse in their leisure time, presumably for the edification and education of their peers and families. If the legal precedents set by the maiores demonstrate the evils of usury and, in contrast to them, the virtues of agriculture (Agr. pr. 1), the practice of telling the virtues and accomplishments of great men after dinner among the maiores will provide at least as fundamental support for the Roman who chooses to write in Latin about the development of the Roman state.

Furthermore, since the fragment speaks about a quasi-historical leisure practice of the maiores, it fits in with the most probable reconstruction of the succession of ideas in the first few sentences of the prologue itself. We have seen that in fragment 1 history is cast as the task of an amateur. The importance of leisure time, which encompasses the activities of the amateur, comes to the fore in fragment 2. That the maiores used their leisure time in a quasi-historical pursuit tends naturally to complete the thoughts begun independently in the two extant fragments of the prologue. Moreover, this practice of the maiores also tends to support the value of history, the assertion of which is fundamental to the prologue, in just the same way that the importance of agriculture was supported by the alleged tendency of the maiores to reserve as their highest compliment the bestowal of the title of “a good farmer and a good homesteader” (Agr. pr. 2: bonum agricolam bonumque colonum). Finally, beside the subtle “announcement” in the first sentence of a break with the Roman poetic tradition, the practice of “history” by Roman maiores announces a break with the prose histories

he sat down to compose the Annals. Of those many histories whose openings do not survive, we can, of course, say nothing. It is noteworthy, however, that the opening words of the narrative of Sallust’s Bellum Jugurthinum (5. 1) form a spondaic hexameter: “bellum scripturus sum quod populi Romani.” When in the Coniuratio Catilinae he begins his narrative of the beginnings of Rome, he also strings together several syllables in a hexametrical scheme, though again an undeniably atypical one (Cat. 6. 1): “urbem Romam, sicuti ego accepi.” Opinions on this matter have been, and doubtless will remain, divided, but the notion that there is a topos of some limited scope at work here cannot be summarily dismissed.

37 To the evidence already quoted from the prologue to the De Agricultura, add the arguments in speeches which refer to the practices of the maiores as persuasive precedents: Cato, fr. 58, 206 M.

38 Cf. Letta (above, note 3) 30; Astin (above, note 12) 222.
written in Greek by Romans. Subtly, Cato hints at a greater authenticity to his history by tying it to the language and practice of the maiores. Fragment 118 fits the paradigm of a Catonian prologue, despite Jordan's protestation. There is, however, even more collateral support for the hypothesis that it belongs to the prologue.

Two of the three citations in Cicero of fragment 118 of the Origines fall in prologues, and Tacitus echoes the sentiment in a prologue as well. Tacitus begins the Agricola (1. 1): “clarorum virorum facta moresque posteris tradere, antiquitus usitatum...” R. M. Ogilvie and Ian Richmond, in their edition of the Agricola (Oxford 1967), want to demonstrate that Tacitus' clarorum virorum paralleled the “opening words” of the Origines (HRR 2), and, at the same time, fragment 118. Letta ([above, note 3] 26) tries to advance the argument that fragment 118 belongs to the prologue solely on the basis of the parallel construction between the two fragments and Tacitus’ allusion (HRR 2, 118; Tac. Agr. 1), separating the public side (negotium–facta–laudes) from the private side (otium–virtutes–mores). The argument is procrustean. Schröder, in his comment on fr. 1. 2 (= HRR 2) of the Origines, is rightly skeptical of such complex connections:

... die anderen von Ogilvie–Richmond angeführten Parallelen für taciteische Entlehnungen aus den Werken von Vorgängern sind anderer Art: Eine Kombination zweier Stellen wäre singulär.

There is an understandable, and perhaps justified, temptation to look for the allusion of Tacitus’ prologue to have been drawn from a prologue, but it is not reasonable to connect it to fragment 2. There is no particular echo of the opening words of the Origines, since the first words of the Origines were apparently si ques sunt. Furthermore, the manuscripts of the Pro Plancio do not make it clear whether the text of fragment 2 should read clarorum virorum or clarorum hominum. As Bertil Wijkström has shown, however, Tacitus’ allusion is clearly connected to fragment 118, where both the clarorum virorum and the facta moresque are paralleled—by clarorum virorum and laudes atque virtutes, respectively. Tacitus’ allusion, then, lends additional support to the idea that fragment 118 is from the prologue.

Cicero’s use of fragment 118 of the Origines suggests that it is from a prologue which tended to justify literary endeavor in Latin. Two of Cicero’s three paraphrases of the fragment are from the prologues to Books

39 The number of allusions to the passage can also suggest, but only suggest, that it was from the prologue rather than buried in the narrative of a legal controversy or the like.
40 In their comment (p. 126 of their edition), they make the error of citing Cato, HRR 2 as fr. 1. Their reasoning seems to follow from this error.
41 Cf. Gruen (above, note 25) 61 n. 69.
42 Despite C. W. Mendell, “Literary Reminiscences in the Agricola,” TAPA 52 (1921) 56.
43 B. Wijkström, “Clarorum Virorum Facta Moresque...,” in Apophoreta Gotoburgensia Vilhelm Lundström Oblata (Göteborg 1936) 167; Schröder (above, note 20) ad loc., follows Wijkström.
1 and 4 of the *Tusculan Disputations*. The first one will occupy our attention, as Cicero uses it to help make his argument that Roman writers and Latin literature are not inferior to their Greek counterparts. The structure of a portion of Cicero’s argument pivots around Cato, and, if fragment 118 is from the prologue to the *Origines*, the argument is bracketed by subtle allusions to that prologue. The argument begins and ends with anonymous paraphrases from Cato’s prologue (again on the operating assumption that fragment 118 stems from the prologue), and in the sentence following and preceding the beginning and ending paraphrase, respectively, Cato is named explicitly in his capacity as an orator. Cicero writes (*Tusc*. 1. 3):

quamquam est in Originibus solitos esse in epulis canere convivas ad tibicinem de clarorum hominum virtutibus; honorem tamen huic generi non fuisse declarat oratio Catonis, in qua obiecit ut probrum M. Nobiliorem quod is in provinciam poetas duxisset.

Cicero goes on to argue the point that it was lack of *honos* which prevented the flowering of the arts, and not a lack of native ability or talent. His use of both fragments is independent of Cato’s. Cicero considers the quotation from Cato to be widely known, since the only reason he is compelled to bring it up is to dismiss the idea, presumably based on this fragment alone, that poetry had a legitimate place among the Romans of bygone days. These arguments, contemporary with Cicero, did not necessarily have anything at all to do with Cato’s original meaning. Cicero, however, uses Cato as a fortuitous point of departure for his argument, since Cato the orator also supplies Cicero’s evidence that the Romans of his day did not consider poetry worthy of *honos*.\(^{44}\) Cato then occupies the pivotal place in Cicero’s argument (*Tusc*. 1. 5) that the Romans were, on the other hand, natural orators, and accorded oratory a value which caused it to thrive among them.\(^{45}\) This statement is followed immediately by a concluding sentence which incorporates a paraphrase from Cato’s prologue, with no overt reference either to that work or to the author (*Tusc*. 1. 5):

philosophia iacuit usque ad hanc aetatem nec ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum, quae inlustranda et excitanda nobis est ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi.

\(^{44}\) Cicero’s argument on this point might also be anachronistic. Cato’s criticism of Nobilior was more basic than the fact that he associated himself with poets; the argument can be made (though here is not the appropriate place) that Cato’s objection was that Nobilior’s entourage of poets indicated an excessively self-interested approach to provincial administration.

\(^{45}\) Cato stands alone at the pivotal point in the period, with a relative clause attached to his name, between two lists of three names each: “at contra oratores celeriter complexi sumus, nec eum primo eruditum, aptum tamen ad dicendum, post autem eruditum. nam Galbam, Africanum, Laelium doctosuisse traditum est, studiosum autem eum, qui iis aeteanteibat, Catonem, post vero Lepidum, Carbonem, Gracchos, inde ita magnos nostram ad aetatem, ut non multum aut nihil omnino Graecis cederetur.”
Cicero uses Cato to illustrate the Romans’ ability to engage in any literary endeavor they valued as useful and worth while. Cato does not seem to have made this point explicitly in his prologue, so Cicero is not imitating Cato. On the other hand, Cato’s prologue is likely to have implied a break with Latin poetry and Greek prose, as we have seen, and to have used the content of fragment 118 to justify the value of history as the leisure practice of an amateur. Cicero begins a prominent argument in his prologue with the acknowledgement, from the prologue to the *Origines* (as is being argued), that there was a quasi-poetic, quasi-historical tradition in Rome in a bygone era, and he ends it with a statement that he intends to adhere to the assertion, developed from the same prologue, that leisure ought to be productive. Both of these ideas were well known and attributed to Cato.\(^{46}\) If both of them were from the prologue to the *Origines*, that, too, was probably well known. It would not escape the notice of a careful reader that Cicero’s relatively brief argument began and ended in the prologue to Cato’s *Origines*, the first preface to a literary work of Latin prose. Even though Cato’s prologue (probably) did not assert the suitability of Latin (as opposed to Greek) for prose writing, it certainly did provide a precedent for it, in the same way that Cato’s *maiores* provided a precedent for him to write history in his leisure time. Cato was blazing new trails, as was Cicero. They were blazing trails at different levels of literary production, and their techniques were different in subtle but important ways, but a clever allusion to Cicero’s ultimate predecessor would doubtless have elicited a knowing smile from a like-minded Roman who believed that a Roman was no less talented by nature than a Greek, and that Cato was a fine example to use to support that assertion.

Roth’s placement of fragment 118 was sound. The structure and content of the fragments of the prologue to the *Origines* are similar to the intact prologue to the *De Agricultura*.\(^{47}\) Three of the four literary

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46 Cf. above, pp. 96 and 99 with notes 20 and 29.

47 Cugusi (above, note 3) 267–72 includes two other fragments (Cic. *Off.* 3. 1, *Rep.* 2. 1) in the prologue to the *Origines*, in both cases because he sees them as fitting with or elaborating upon elements present in the other fragments we have discussed. His reconstruction (270) of the prologue, based on the five fragments, is interesting, but there is no way to be confident, much less sure, that the fragments he uses to fill out the reconstruction were actually part of the prologue. The first, from the *De Officis* (3.1), simply echoes in a different sense Cato’s quote (*HRR* 2) from Xenophon: “Scipionem... qui primus Africanus appellatus est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato... numquam sese minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus solum, quam cum solus esset.” The quotation would add very little to Cato’s point besides the authority of Africanus, which, we will argue in another forum, was probably not the kind of authority Cato would ordinarily rely on. It will serve here simply to remark that Cugusi’s suggestion (268) that Cato cited Africanus, if at all, in “termini lusinghieri” begs the question whether Cato, who was accustomed to barking at Scipio’s greatness, according to Livy (38. 54. 1); certainly a rhetorical elaboration, but it does seem that there was significant hostility between the two toward the end of Africanus’ life, and precisely the kind of hostility which would indicate that Cato did not think Africanus was worthy of any special consideration; cf. Astin (above, note 12) 70–73), would have elevated Scipio to the status of an *exemplum* on a par with the *maiores*, especially if it was a certain lack of respect for the authority of a name which motivated Cato to
paraphrases of the fragment occur in prologues. Cicero’s prologue to the first book of the *Tusculan Disputations* demonstrates an intricate construction which also suggests that the fragment is from the prologue to the *Origines*. Analyses of the structure, content, and style of the *Origines* must rest on the realization that Jordan erred when he assumed that Cato was not likely to have used fragment 118 in the way Roth’s attribution suggested. The fact is that we need look no further than another prologue written by Cato to discover parallels for exactly the kind of *instrumentum criticae artis* Jordan accuses Roth of foolishly attributing to Cato. So pivotal a figure in the origin and development of Latin prose literature deserves more consideration than Jordan accorded him in this case.

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omit names of leading men in the text of the *Origines* (cf. Astin 232–33). If the Scipionic *dictum* is included in the prologue, it occasions some uncomfortable questions, and yet changes nothing else materially in terms of either content or structure; a discussion of its implications is virtually moot. The second fragment—the assertion from Cicero’s *Republic* (2. 1) that Cato saw the Roman state’s superiority from the perspective that it had been built not by one man in one lifetime, but by the collective effort and genius of the Roman people over the centuries—contains an admittedly provocative idea which may well have played a significant role, implicitly or explicitly, in the *Origines* as a whole, but which we cannot even say was *ipso facto* likely to have found its way into the prologue (cf. Astin 225–26; as we have earlier asked, why should we expect the prologue to the *Origines* to be any more “programmatic” than that to the *De Agricultura*?). We are in danger of writing the prologue for Cato, unless we can find some independent indication (such as we have for *HRR* 118) that it belongs here. Such speculation is not necessary. We can be conservative, stick to the evidence at hand, and not be left without direction in our desire to understand the prologue. As we have seen, there is no need to go much beyond the two attested fragments and *HRR* 118, in comparison with the prologue to the *De Agricultura*, to find a satisfying and plausible picture, at least in rough outline, of what the prologue almost certainly contained and how it was most probably used.
Quo, Quo Scelesti Ruitis: 
The Downward Momentum of Horace’s Epodes*

DAVID H. PORTER

I. The Epodes’ Structure of Descent

It is clear that Horace has carefully arranged his collection of Epodes.¹ Most obviously, there is the metrical sequence, with the first ten poems using an iambic couplet and the concluding seven ranging widely—combinations of iambic and dactylic elements in 11 and 13–16, dactyls in 12, straight iambic trimeters in 17. There is also, as in Horace’s other collections, the placement of Maecenas poems in positions of special importance. Epode 1, addressed to Maecenas as he sets off for Actium, begins the collection, and Epode 9, also to Maecenas, but this time celebrating the victory at Actium, is at the exact center. Moreover, these two “public” Maecenas poems (compare the more private 3 and 14) interlock with the two other Epodes that have a national theme, 7 and 16, both of which focus on the agony of the civil wars.² From a different

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¹ I am pleased here to record my gratitude to ICS’s two anonymous readers. Their comments and suggestions have led to significant improvements in this final version.

perspective, the arrangement of these four poems creates closely parallel sequences in the two halves of the book, with a Maecenas poem (1 and 9) leading to a civil war poem (7 and 16) within each half. In addition, the second poem, in which Alfius dreams of escaping Rome for a pastoral utopia, balances the penultimate poem, in which Horace urges the Romans to abandon their city for a utopia very similar to Alfius'. Finally, as I shall show, numerous motifs—animals, feasts, fire and burning, the search for release, etc.—run through the book, binding its diverse poems into a cohesive and coherent whole.

To note these relationships, however, is to understand only part of Horace’s organizational strategy in the Epodes. Architectural in character, even static, they fail to explain the sense of rapid but controlled movement that the collection evokes. For the headlong momentum that characterizes Quo, quo celesti ruitis finds expression elsewhere as well. The Epodes are punctuated throughout by departures—Maecenas in 1, Alfius in 2, Mevius in 10, Achilles in 13, the citizens of Rome in 16; fittingly the collection begins with Ibis and ends with exitus. Furthermore, the poet goes out of his way to suggest forward movement between poems. In Epode 1 Maecenas is departing for Actium; by the time we reach 9, Horace is looking to celebrate Roman victory there with Maecenas. Epode 7 focuses on the past history, the ancient causes, of Roman civil strife; its companion piece, Epode 16, turns to the future, to what lies ahead for the war-ravaged Romans. The mention of Canidia in Epode 3 leads to the extended portrait of her in Epode 5, this in turn to the recantation in 17. In addition, there are the jarring juxtapositions, the unexpected turns that permeate the book. Horace’s poem on Maecenas’ departure for serious national business is followed by the pastoral satire of Alfius’ imagined departure from the serious business of Rome, this in turn by the jesting 3, so different from 1 in its stance toward Maecenas. The lengthy and dark 5 is enclosed by the short and sniping 4 and 6. The grossly parodic 8 serves as transition between 7, Horace’s anguished lament over the civil wars, and 9, his joyous response to the victory at Actium—and so on into the second half of the book. Given this ubiquity of movement and change, given these dynamic contrarieties,


4 Oliensis (above, note 1) 127, who also notes many other links between 1 and 17.

5 See Büchner (above, note 1) 51–52. K. F. Quinn, “Two Crises in Horace’s Poetical Career,” AUMLA 5 (1956) 35–38, finds the divergences among poems so severe that he can only assume Horace lumped old and new together to constitute the Epodes, a hypothesis which, to my mind, neglects the book’s many indications of careful construction.
there is the greater need for an overall sense of direction, a defining gesture, a controlling “curve of movement.”  

In this article I shall suggest that such a “curve of movement” does indeed shape the Epodes—a downward curve, initially felt in the progression of the first half of the book (1–8), mirrored in the parallel progression of the second half (9–17), and present as well in the movement of the book as a whole from the hopes of 1 and 2 to the despair of 16 and 17. I shall additionally show that numerous seemingly unrelated aspects of the book—the recurrent motifs, the metrical arrangement, the jarring juxtapositions, the prominent role accorded Canidia—contribute to and are part of this overall movement. Finally, I shall suggest that Horace builds into his collection a contrapuntal movement focused on poetry that, while not negating the downward trajectory of the book as a whole, nonetheless colors its conclusion with a characteristically Horatian complexity (as well as foreshadowing the thematic role poetry will play in Odes 1–3 and Odes 4).

The animal motifs, prominent throughout the Epodes, offer a useful starting point in that they so clearly chart the descending movement of the opening eight poems. The motif first appears in Epode 1 in the rather commonplace simile of the bird and the serpents (19–22) and in Horace’s assurances to Maecenas that his devotion is not motivated by the hope for material rewards—such as more cattle on his estates (25–28)! In both instances the thrust of the motif is positive, suggesting the depth and the disinterest of the poet’s affection for his patron. In a motivic link typical of the Epodes, the flocks Horace does not want in Epode 1 lead in Epode 2 to the flocks for which Alfius longs—bubus 3, mugientium... greges 11–12, infirmas ovis 16, laetum pecus 45, pastas ovis 61, fessos... boves 63. Other animate creatures also fill Alfius’ rural utopia—birds (26, 34, 35, 54), boars and dogs (31–32), the hare (35), fish and shellfish (49–50), wolf, lamb, and goat (59–60); and again, as in 1, the motif carries positive connotations throughout; even the slaughtered lamb and the wolf-snatched kid (59–60) contribute to a festive meal.

Animals take on somewhat darker colors, albeit in a jauntily humorous context, in Epode 3, as Horace tries to suggest the virulence of the garlic he has ingested by alluding to the blood of vipers (6), to Jason yoking the bulls (11), and to Medea’s winged serpent (14). The opposition of wolf and lamb, implicit only in 2. 59–60 (agna... lupo), returns explicitly in the

7 See Fitzgerald (above, note 1) 188 ff.
8 On the ways 1. 23 ff. leads into 2, see S. J. Heyworth, “Horace’s Second Epode,” AJP 109 (1988) 73–74; F. Nóvoa, “El epodo II de Horacio,” Argos 3 (1979) 31–40. Motivic ties link adjoining poems throughout the book—e.g. dura... ilia 3. 4, dura compede 4. 4; the toga in 4. 7–8 and 5. 7; dente livido 5. 47, atro dente 6. 15 (cf. dens aier 8. 3); solvere, end of 9, soluta, beginning of 10; mollibus and mollitie 11. 4 and 24, mollis 12. 16.
sneering words with which Epode 4 begins, *Lupis et agnis quanta sortito obtigit, tecum mihi discordia est*, and the snide reference in 4. 13 to the upstart plowing his thousand acres recalls the allusions to flocks and fields in 1. 25–28. Animals are as ubiquitous in *Epode 5* as they were in *Epode 2*, but where in 2 they delineated Alfius’ pastoral fantasy, in 5 they underscore the black humor and the malignancy of Horace’s portrait of the witches. The sporting hunt of 2. 31–36 is replaced by *petita ferro belua 5. 10,ieiunae canis 5. 23* (cf. *multa cane 2. 31*), and the *currens aper* to which Horace compares Sagana in 5. 28 (cf. *acris . . . apros 2. 31–32*). The *viperinus . . . cruor (3. 6)* to which Horace compares the garlic becomes the vipers in Canidia’s hair (5. 15) and the frog’s and owl’s blood she uses in her vile concoctions (19–20). In contrast to 2, the only peaceful animals in 5 are the sleeping beasts (55–56), and even they provide the backdrop for Canidia’s dark machinations. Otherwise, dogs harass humans (57–58), wolves and birds scatter unburied bodies (99–100), and the *puer* himself threatens to haunt Canidia as a predatory bird (93 and 95). And Canidia herself, both in name and in character, is decidedly doglike.9

The descent of the motif from benign to malignant continues in 6 with the canine imagery that pervades the entire poem.10 In addition, what was simile in 4. 1–2 and 5. 27–28 becomes metaphor in 6. 1 ff.—a natural evolution from the implied metaphors of 5. 93 and 95. As in 4 there is obvious humor in Horace’s outrage, but the humor is unpleasant, even nasty in tone, an effective prelude to *Epode 7*, where the motivic chain we have been following reaches its climax (7. 11–12): *neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus umquam nisi in dispar feris*. To read these lines is to understand the destination of the ever more savage animal references of the previous six poems: Horace’s indictment of the animal behavior evoked by the civil wars.11 It is also to see how the poet has used this motif to limn the descent from the hopes of 1 and the bright vision of 2 to the grim reality of 7—a powerful way of working the downward, destructive rush of *Quo, quo scelesti ruitis* into the very fabric of the poems and the collection.

Other motifs chart a similar progression, and to a similar purpose. In the language and imagery of liquids, the wine which will adorn Alfius’ imagined feasts (2. 47) leads to the viper’s blood (3. 6) that Horace suspects in the garlic-permeated feast, to *uncia turpis ova ranae sanguine* (5. 19) and the witches’ love potions (5. 38, 73, 78), and finally to Latin blood spilled on land and sea (7. 3–4) and *Remi sacer nepotibus cruor* (7. 19–20).12 The

9 See Oliensis (above, note 1) 110 ff. and passim.
11 Given the reference in 7. 17–20 to Romulus’ slaying of Remus, may not the *lupis* of 11 recall the she-wolf of the same legend? The passages enclose the second half of the poem.
12 Cf. the decline from *dapes ineptas apparat* (2. 48) to *malas Canidia tractavit dapes* (3. 7–8) and *bis terque mutatae dapis* (5. 33); *Thyestes preces* (5. 86) continues the motif.
land itself, mentioned in passing at 1. 33 and portrayed as a fruitful paradise throughout 2, becomes the source of the plants and trees which the witches collect for their brew (5. 17-22, 67-68) and turns into a wasteland polluted by Remus’ blood (7. 19-20; note the identical position of terram in 1. 33 and 7. 19, the penultimate lines of 1 and 7; cf. 7. 3-4). Alfius imagines the sacrum . . . fucum of his new home (2. 43), but the sacred becomes sinister in Canidia’s mouth (arcana . . . sacra 5. 52) and accursed in the sacer nepotibus cruor of 7. 20.

These recurrent motifs—and others behave in a similar fashion 13—clearly underscore the descent from the first Epode to the seventh. They also persist throughout the book, and their effect there, as in the first half, is to emphasize the downward movement from Epode 9 through Epodes 16 and 17. The animal motif is positive in 9. 17 and 22 (the frementes . . . equos of the Galli and the intactas boves of the victory sacrifices), takes on darker colors in the intermediate poems (10. 21-24; 12. 1, 5-6, 11, 17, 25-26; 15. 7-8, 19), and reaches its nadir in the two concluding poems. In 16 animals are important to Horace’s utopian vision (49-52, 61-62), but above all they underscore his denunciation of Rome’s decline (10, 12) and the finality of the abandonment he urges (19-20, 30-34). 14 As in Epode 5, animals loom large throughout 17, and in contexts that emphasize Canidia’s power. Horace may offer to sacrifice bullocks (39) and may cite the authority of myth for humans’ escape from mutilation by animals (11-12) and from transformation into animals (15-17), but in the end Canidia’s animal powers will triumph. She too cites myth—Prometheus forever subjected to his bird (67)—and promises that she will as eques ride Horace’s umerus . . . inimicis (74).

As the wine, milk, and honey of Epode 2 turn to poisonous substances and thence to blood in subsequent poems of the first half, so in the second half the wine with which Horace plans to celebrate victory in 9. 1-4 and 33-38 yields to the wine which reveals his amorous subjection in 11. 13-14, to the sleep-inducing pocula which he feels he has drunk in 14. 3-4, and, in the final poem, to the black blood of Nessus (17. 31-32), the (feigned?) blood of Canidia’s birthings (17. 50-51), and the pocula which Canidia tempers (17. 80). Just as the dapes which Alfius imagines in 2. 47 ff. become the garlicky dapes which inflame Horace’s innards in 3—as if Canidia herself had handled them (7-8)—and the daps by which the puer is tantalized in 5. 33 ff., so in the second half the festae dapes imagined by

13 E.g., fire and burning. Favorable in 1. 27-28 and 2. 43-44 (cf. 66), progressively more negative in 3. 17-18, 4. 3, 5. 24, 65-66, and 81-82, the motif climaxes in the reference to the burning of Carthage in 7. 5-6, one of the details by which Horace indict the Romans. The motif is absent from 8, then reappears in positive guise in 9. 8 before again taking on darker colors in 10. 13, 11. 4 and 27, 14. 9 and 13-14, 16. 11 (cf. 55 and 62) and 17. 30-35 (cf. 79).

14 Cf. indocill . . . grege (37) with gregem (62); both recall similar motifs early in the book.
Horace in 9. 1 yield to the feast of Tantalus with which Canidia threatens him in 17. 66, the final appearance of this minor but important motif.\textsuperscript{15}

Horace thus underscores the parallel downward trajectories of 1 to 7 and 9 to 16–17 by his controlled use of recurrent motifs in both halves of the book. What about \textit{Epode} 8, which stands at the juncture between these parallel sequences? This placement may seem strange but is in fact brilliant, for \textit{Epode} 8 provides a skillful join between the two halves of the book—no easy task, given the tonal gulf between \textit{Epodes} 7 and 9. The ugly theme and language of 8 (note the marked continuation of negative animal imagery in lines 5–8) sustain the disgust and despair expressed in \textit{Epode} 7: The Rome of the civil wars is vile, and so is \textit{Epode} 8. But by the time the poem reaches the Stoic \textit{libelli} amidst the Persian pillows (15–16) and the \textit{illiterati} . . . \textit{nervi} (17), it has become so exaggerated, so overdone as to be patently absurd, a parody of itself (as of its genre), a mode that leads naturally into the gross jest with which the poem concludes. This dark humor wrested from ugliness prepares the way for the lighter mood of \textit{Epode} 9, though not without leaving its unpleasant aftertaste. This residue is itself part of Horace's scheme—a hint that the seeming brightness of 9, like the hopes of 1, will soon dissipate as the second half of the book begins its descent to the pessimism of the final two poems.

This daring use of 8 as transition between 7 and 9 works partly because Horace has woven such close motivic ties into the three poems. Thus the animals to which he compares the woman in 8 recall the animal images he uses of the Romans in 7; the \textit{superbo} . . . \textit{inguine} of 8. 19 picks up the \textit{superbas} . . . \textit{arces} of 7. 5–6; the snide reference to the woman's triumph—\textit{funus atque imagines ducant triumphales tuum} (8. 11–12)—echoes the \textit{Britannus} led in triumph down the Sacred Way in 7. 7–8; and Horace's enervated \textit{vires} (8. 2) recall the \textit{vis acrior} which has seized the Romans in 7. 13. And just as Horace transforms the grim motifs of 7 into the ugly parody of 8, so he transmutes the grossness of 8 into the joyous language of 9. The woman's "triumphal" procession (8. 11–12) becomes the \textit{io Triumphhe} of Roman victories past and future (9. 21–26); the bovine and equine slurs of 8. 6 and 8 become the horses and heifers of 9. 17 and 22; and the sneering \textit{esto beata} of 8. 11 becomes the \textit{beate Maecenas} of 9. 4. In the \textit{fluentem nauseam} of 9. 35, though, there remains a telling reminder of the disgust that animated the previous poem.

In addition to effecting the transition from 7 to 9, \textit{Epode} 8 also extends the parallelism of 1 to 7, 9 to 16. For both 8 and 17, the poems that follow 7 and 16, address women with whom Horace has had a previous—and

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. note 12 above. In the same way, the positive \textit{terra marique} of 9. 27 yields to the despairing \textit{o mare et terra} of 17. 30; cf. \textit{campis atque Neptuno} (7. 3).
There is a crucial distinction between these two halves, however. The vileness of 8 is promptly dispelled by the seeming brightness of 9—and we have seen how Horace eases this transition. In contrast, Epode 17, in so many ways the counterpart to 8, differs significantly in that nothing follows: It has no Epode 9 to wrest from its ugliness a more balanced view of the world.

II. Corollaries to the Structure of Descent

That the Epodes end with Canidia’s rejection of Horace’s plea relates directly to a central theme, that of hopes, plans, illusions that are shattered, unfulfilled, unattainable. The theme is introduced in the very first poem, where Horace’s promise to follow Maecenas to the ends of the earth (11–14) is phrased in terms so hyperbolic as to invite disbelief. Similarly, in Epode 9 Horace asks Maecenas when together they will drink the Caecuban in honor of Caesar’s victory—a question which remains pointedly unanswered in the Epodes that follow. The theme is even more apparent in Epode 2, where the final lines of the poem reveal that Alfius’ grandiloquent musings are just that—musings (67–70).

The same theme is central to Epode 16, the poem that balances 2. There is, to begin with, the simple fact that what the vates offers is only words—a vision, a dream. And that dream, despite its eloquence and passion, is manifestly of a no-place, a utopia, impossible of realization, concocted of the commonplaces of the genre—the blessed fields, the rich isles, the crops that grow at all seasons, the cattle that unbidden return with udders full, the absence of hostile animals and human malefaction. The reference near the end (64) to the golden age merely seals the point: The place to which Horace invites the Romans exists only in the past, only in myth—a hauntingly lovely vision, but no reality.

Horace underscores this point by relating 16 both to Epode 2, its structural counterpart, and to Êpode 17, its immediate sequel. He links 2 and 16 not only by similar size and balanced placement but also by striking verbal and thematic ties. Both paint vivid, enchanting pictures of a world too good to be true. Granted, 2 makes more concessions to reality than does 16—humans still must contend with the changing seasons (2. 17–18, 29–30;

16 On the parallelism of 1–7–8 and 9–16–17, see Carrubba (above, note 1) 82; Dettmer (above, note 1) 80, 101–02. On the parallel movement of the two halves, see Porter (above, note 1) 255–59.
17 As many have commented, Odes 1. 37 finally responds to the Quando . . . bibam of Epode 9; see, e.g., É. Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford 1957) 159; C. W. Macleod, “Horace and his Lyric Models: A Note on Epode 9 and Odes 1,37,” Hermes 110 (1982) 373.
18 See Nisbet (above, note 2) 6: “But unlike the Sibyl of the [fourth] eclogue, this prophet sees the good society not as something that is now being inaugurated in Rome, but as an unrealisable fantasy to be set before the beginning of history or outside the known world”; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Profile of Horace (Cambridge 1982) 8: “The Islands of the Blest in context with the grim realities of the period are at best a pleasing whimsy.”
the land still requires plowing (2. 3 and 63; cf. 16. 43) and
trees grafting (2. 13–14 and 19; cf. 16. 46); domestic animals do get killed
upon occasion (2. 60; cf. 16. 51); life involves work as well as play.
Nonetheless, the similarities are far more significant than the differences.
Cattle with bulging udders figure prominently in both poems (2. 45–46, 16.
49–50). In both honey flows (2. 15, 16. 47) and falling waters sound (2. 25
and 27, 16. 47–48). Both are secluded (cf. reducta valle 2. 11, Iuppiter illa
... secretit litora 16. 63), insulated from the unseemly sides of human
existence (2. 1 and 5–8, 16. 57–60), and both are throwbacks to an older and
better time (cf. prisca gens mortality 2. 2, tempus aureum 16. 64). Finally,
there is the striking link between the distant beata ... arva to which Horace
invites the Romans (16. 41–42) and the Beatus ille, qui procul negotiis with
which 2 begins. Their many similarities of theme and language, their
balanced placement within the book, and their similarity of length all
inextricably link 2 and 16 to each other in any consecutive reading of the
Epodes, and the effect of this linking is strongly to underscore the unreality
of the vates’ promised land in 16. Just as Alfius paints an enchanting
picture of a world that will never be his, a world modeled on Rome’s past,
so Horace holds out to the Romans a vision of a place, also modeled on the
past, that can never be theirs.20
An obvious difference between the two poems is that in the final four
lines of 2 Horace explicitly shows up Alfius’ picture for what it is—an
imaginary escape—while in 16 he leaves readers to draw this conclusion for
themselves. Indeed, the fact that 16 stops after 66 lines, precisely the length
of Epode 2 without its final tag, underscores this difference. But the end of
16 is not, of course, the end of the book. Epode 17, and Canidia, are still to
come, and they undercut the vision created in Epode 16 even more
devastatingly than the final four lines of Epode 2 undercut Alfius’ dream.
For from the noble vates of 16, confident in his powers of leadership, we
abruptly descend to the pathetic poet of 17, begging absolution from
Canidia and confessing himself reduced to total submission. For the poet
urging courage and resolution in 16 and laying powerful oaths upon the
Romans (25 ff.) we have the poet offering his hands in surrender and
swearing by the tools and divinities of Canidia’s own craft. Replacing the
everlasting joys to which Horace invites the Romans in the last 28 lines of
16 are the everlasting horrors to which Canidia consigns Horace in the last
29 lines of 17. There may be no Medea in Horace’s promised land (neque
impudica Colchis intulit pedem, 16. 58), but Medea’s presence is surely felt
in the next poem (cales venenis officina Colchicis, 17. 35). And while

19 On the seasons of Epode 2, see Heyworth (above, note 8) 74 ff.
20 Cf. K. J. Reckford, Horace (New York 1969) 83: “... Epode 16: a cri de coeur at the
unbridgeable gap between what ought to be and what unalterably is.” On the balance between
2 and 16, see Schmidt (above, note 1) 404; Dettmer (above, note 1) 77–79, 97–99; Fitzgerald
(above, note 1) 179.
Horace offers the Romans an end to their *malis . . . laboribus* in 16. 15–16, in 17. 64 he finds himself condemned to *novis . . . laboribus*. What more effective way of negating Horace’s vision of freedom than by this sudden shift from the daring *vates* of 16 to the enslaved poet of 17? As if to seal the point, Horace places in the first line of *Epode* 17, which immediately follows the 66-line 16, a clear echo of the final four lines of 2—the very lines which contain its surprise ending. The 68th line of 2 describes Alfius as *iam iam futurus rusticus*, words echoed in 17. 1—the 67th line of 16, had 16 continued: *iam iam efficaci do manus scientiae*.

*Epodes* 2 and 17, which at first glance seem virtuosic set pieces of Horatian wit, thus turn out to be integral thematic signposts. The surprise conclusion to *Epode* 2 sets the pattern for the whole book, in which everywhere high hopes, sounding words, lead to naught, and the counterpoise of *Epodes* 2 and 16 provides the key to understanding that the *vates’* words in 16 project as unreal a vision as do Alfius’. In the same way, the transition from 16, where Horace creates a vision so powerful as almost to seem real, to 17, where the poet’s seemingly irresistible pleas to Canidia prove of no avail, reiterates the point. So does 17 itself, as Horace spins out an elaborate poetic construct in the first 52 lines, only to have it founder on the reality of the final 29.

The parallel courses of the book’s two halves, considered above, relate to this same theme, with the hopes of 1 and 9 leading to the realities of 7 and 16. With respect to Rome’s future, *Epode* 9 seems an advance over *Epode* 1, but the hopeful anticipations of 9 are cruelly undercut by the final national poem, 16, where Horace urges his fellow citizens to abandon all hope for their city—a stance even more despairing than that adopted in 7. Other poems play variations on the same theme. In 4 and 6 in the first half, 10 and 15 in the second, Horace threatens various adversaries with dire revenge—but his threats remain mere words, do not become reality; the *puer*’s threats in 5. 87–102 are similarly hollow. 13 explicitly points out that Achilles’ high hopes and brilliant promise will be cut short (12–16). Both 11 and 14 deal with purposes foiled: Horace, love-smitten, can no longer write, and even when he resolves to mend his ways, he finds himself unable to do so, drawn back to his self-destroying patterns (11. 19–22). Even the woman whom Horace reviles in 12 sounds the same theme: Her friend had recommended Horace to her as a bull, but he turns out *mollis*—and for this she gave up the tree-like Amyntas (12. 17–20)!

Contributing also to this theme of expectations foiled are the significant differences between the two halves of the book. While the recurrent motifs of the first half create an almost linear progression leading from the hopeful

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21 Cf. the same motif in the final line of 8: *ore allaborandum est tibi*. With *labor* in 8, 16, and 17, cf. Horace’s willingness to share Maecenas’ *labor* in 1. 9 and 15. With Canidia as *eques*, establishing her power over the earth (17. 74–75), cf. the barbarian *eques* who will rampage over the land of Rome (16. 11–12); Oliensis (above, note 1) 132–33.
illuminations of 1 to the pessimism of 7 and the grossness of 8, in the second half these same motifs continue to appear, but the poems move by fits and starts. These very non sequiturs—in character not unlike the rude shock provided by the final four lines of Epode 2—themselves embody this theme by constantly jarring us with the unexpected. Horace’s joyous anticipation of Maecenas’ return in 9 leads to his nasty send-off for Mevius in 10. In 10 Horace revels in the power of his curses to destroy Mevius; in 11 he finds himself unable to write. From puellae candidae at the end of 11 Horace moves to mulier nigris dignissima barris at the start of 12. The epic depths of 12 yield as abruptly to the lyric heights of 13, a poem that celebrates the power of poetry and ends in a quasi-heroic vein. 13 leads in turn to the decidedly unheroic 14, a love poem in which again poetry is silenced (cf. the sequence of 10–11), and this to 15, in which the poet who was the victim of mollis inertia and of love in 14 now stresses his vigor and manliness in the service of hate. And from the highly personal invective of 15 Horace jumps to the lofty public stance of 16, from there back to the personal, satiric voice of 17. 15 ends with laughter (ast ego vicissim risero), 16 begins with anguish (Altera iam tertiur bellis civilibus aetas); 16 ends with fuga, 17 with huius clos.

These jagged thematic and tonal clashes play yet one more variation on the theme of hopes foiled, expectations denied, undercutting any illusion of predictable thematic or tonal sequence. The book’s metrical pattern points in the same direction, for whereas the first ten poems are metrically consistent, this regularity begins to dissipate with 11—shortly after the midpoint—and we get, in the final seven poems, six different meters. Once more, the final poem contains the climactic surprise. Not only is its meter one not previously encountered in the Epodes, but for the first time the distichs that have been the rule throughout yield to simple iambic trimeters. Moreover—the ultimate irregularity!—the book’s final poem has an uneven number of lines, the only such occurrence in the Odes or Epodes.

Several corollary themes complement this ubiquitous jolting of expectations. For one thing, hopes for the future are constantly drawn back into the past. The relative placement of the two pairs of national poems, 1 + 9 and 7 + 16, grounds this principle in the structure of the collection. In both real and dramatic time, 7 and 16 clearly antedate 1 and 9. Horace so organizes the book that as we read its successive poems we move


24 See Carrubba (above, note 1) 20, on 11 as metrical transition from 1–10 to 11–17; Hierche (above, note 22) 90–91, on 14–16 as transition back to the iambics of 17.
backwards in time, drawn from the “later” pair back to the “earlier.” This movement also shapes each half of the book. In 1 Horace asks how he should respond to Maecenas’ departure, and the poem is filled with futures (*persequemur, laturi, feremus, sum futurus, militabitur, paravero*) and with questions about what lies ahead. By the time we reach 7, however, the focus is firmly on destructive patterns that are long established, that have become habitual. Horace looks back to the history of the civil wars, to the blood that has been spilled, and concludes that the Romans are fatally gripped by the curse of the past. The pattern is even more marked in the relationship between 9 and 16. 9 begins with Horace looking ahead to celebrating with Maecenas the victory at Actium (*Quando...bibam*) and ends with him ordering his *puer* to bring wine for his own present celebration. In contrast, 16 begins with Horace placing the present against the grim history of the past—yet *another* age is being worn down by civil wars!—and ends with him urging the Romans to embrace a utopia from the past (63–66).

As so often, *Epode* 2 establishes the pattern. Alfius looks to a new and better future only to find himself drawn inescapably back to the established ways of his past. Once again, there are many subsidiary reflections of the same movement, especially in the second half. In 9 and 10 Horace looks to the future; in 11 he finds himself, like Alfius, irresistibly drawn back to the past (note especially 11. 5 ff.), a pattern extended in the retrospective glimpses of the next poem (12. 16 ff.). 13 reproduces the pattern within itself as the poet begins by recommending present action (*nunc...nunc, rapiamus, solvatur, move*), then looks toward a better future (*deus haec fortasse benigna reducet in sedem vice*), but ends by singing of the ancient heroes Chiron and Achilles (11–18).25

The movement also shapes the two final poems. In 16 Horace enjoins the Romans to abandon the land they have known for so long, to reject the past, to embrace new patterns and new possibilities. And yet he turns to the past—to the legendary Phocaeans—for his model (17 ff.), and where will he lead the Romans but to a prelapsarian (there are no serpents: 52!) golden age of the past, before the time of the Argo, Medea, and Ulysses (note the perfects of 57–60)? The pattern repeats in 17 as Horace again endeavors to create a better future, this time for himself, promising the punishments he will endure, the expiations he will accomplish, the boons he will bestow on Canidia (note the futures of 37–41). But again, past patterns reassert themselves. Just as the curse of a bitter past condemns the Romans in 7. 17 ff. (*acerba fata Romanos agunt*), so what awaits Horace represents no such change as he had sought: *tardiora fata te votis manent* (17. 62). Canidia too can imagine the future, but her future, not unlike that which

Horace envisions for the Romans in 7, entails the endless repetition of past agonies. In the first part Horace amasses mythological exempla which argue for mercy and suggest the possibility of change—Telephus and Achilles, Priam and Achilles, Ulysses and Circe, Castor and Pollux; Canidia responds with exempla also, but hers point in the opposite direction—to the finality of judgment, the impossibility of change: Tantalus, Prometheus, Sisyphus, figures for whom the most excruciating torture is that their past will always be their future.

As hopes and illusions fade, as visions of a better and brighter future are pulled back to the dark past, human capacity also falters. This movement is especially pronounced in the second half of the book, and especially focused on the theme of poetry. In 10 Horace boasts that his words will destroy Mevius’ ship, but in 11 the power of poetry suddenly fails him: *Petti, nihil me sicut antea iuvat scribere versiculos amore percussum gravi.* The pattern repeats in the progressions from 13 to 14 and from 16 to 17. 13 ends with a ringing assertion of the power of song: *ilic omne malum vino cantuque levato, deformis aegrimoniae dulcisbus alloquis;* 14 answers with Horace again unable to write: *deus, deus nam me vetat inceptos, olim promissum carmen, iambos ad umbilicum adducere.* 16 ends with the *vates*’ promise of *fuga,* a promise negated by 17, where Horace’s best efforts to contrive his own escape—through song—fail absolutely. And in 17 Horace’s own words turn into lies as he promises to sing on *mendax lyra* (39) whatever Canidia may wish.

Related to this repeated erosion of poetry’s power is another pervasive sub-theme. Early in the book Horace introduces the opposition of masculine strength and effeminate weakness (*mente laturi decet qua ferre non mollis viros,* 1. 9–10; *imbellis ac firmus parum,* 1. 16), and he recalls this theme frequently in subsequent poems, especially in the second half. The opposition between manly and effeminate, weak and strong, is central both to his description of the Roman victory at Actium (9. 11–16) and to his appeal to the Romans in 16. 37–39: *mollis et exspes inominata perprimat cubilia! vos quibus est virtus, muliebrem tollite luctum.* In 10, perhaps to suggest his manly resolve, Horace promises to sacrifice a lusty goat (10. 23), and he imagines *illa non virilis eiulatio* that will arise from Mevius’ doomed ship (10. 17). But in the very next poem he is prone *mollibus in pueris aut in puellis urere* (11. 4), the slave of the mollities of the effeminate Lyciscus (11. 23–24), a theme continued into 12 as the woman complains that Horace, in contrast to Amyntas, is *semper ad unum mollis opus* (12. 15–16; note also how *nec firmo iuveni,* 12. 3, recalls *firmus parum,* 1. 16). The pattern repeats from 13 to 14 as Horace in 13 crafts a

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26 See Fitzgerald and Oliensis (above, note 1).
27 See Macleod (above, note 17) 373–74.
28 For other connotations of the *caper* (Mevius’ smelliness and lecherousness), see S. J. Harrison, “Two Notes on Horace, Epodes (10, 16),” *CQ* 39 (1989) 271–73.
song of clearly heroic cast only to portray himself again in the next poem the victim of *mollis inertia* (14. 1).\(^{29}\) In 15. 11–12 and 16. 37–40 Horace again stresses his manliness, but in 17 he is exhausted (24–26),\(^{30}\) white-haired (23), totally in the power of a woman (note especially *do manus* 1, *vincor* 27, *quae finis aut quod me manet stipendium* 36). Whereas in 8 Horace can sneer at his female adversary, secure in his own liberty,\(^{31}\) in 17—the parallel poem—he is in thrall. Now it is Horace who is *emancipatus feminae* (cf. 9. 12),\(^{32}\) the woman who has the power (*potes nam* 17. 45). And whereas male divinities preside over Alfius’ rural utopia (2. 21–22), in 17 the female divinities of Canidia’s world hold sway (17. 2–3). In retrospect we see that a theme introduced humorously in the first poem, Horace’s lack of manliness (1. 16), proves prophetically apt as the book, especially in its second half, repeatedly reduces his claims of masculine vigor to naught.\(^{33}\)

Furthermore, the *Epodes* intimate something more all-encompassing than merely the decline of individual powers. Both halves of the collection move in such a way as progressively to suggest a universe falling into chaos, humans declining to the level of animals.\(^{34}\) We have tracked this descent into the animal closely in the first eight poems. Though in the poems of the second half the progression is less measured and less clear, it carries even further. Whereas in 7 humans are compared unfavorably to animals (*neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus unquam nisi in dispar feris, 7. 11–12*), in the parallel poem animals will actually take over the land (*impia perdemus devoti sanguinis aetas, ferisque rursus occupabitur solum, 16. 9–10*).\(^{35}\) In the succeeding lines Horace envisions the barbarian trampling the land and scattering to the winds the bones of Romulus, and he urges the Romans to abandon their historic city to the beasts (11–14, 19–20).

Other seemingly insignificant features in the poems of the second half reinforce this theme. 10. 13–14 and 14. 13–14 allude to the burning of

\(^{29}\) Cf. Maecenas’ queries about *mollis inertia* (14. 1) with Horace’s *mente laturi decret qua ferre non mollis viros* (1. 9–10; cf. 16); see Fitzgerald (above, note 1) 180–81.

\(^{30}\) On the sexual nature of Horace’s exhaustion—and his *labor*—in *Epode* 17, see E. W. Bushala, “*Laboriosus Ulixes,*” *CJ* 64 (1968) 7–10.

\(^{31}\) Cf., however, notes 33 and 53 below.

\(^{32}\) On the phrase, see R. H. Brophy, “*Emancipatus Feminae: A Legal Metaphor in Horace and Plautus,*** TAPA 105 (1975) 1–11.

\(^{33}\) See C. L. Babcock, “*Si certus intrarit dolor: A Reconsideration of Horace’s Fifteenth Epode,*” *AJP* 87 (1966) 413 ff., who notes the frequent innuendo in *mollis* and suggests a contradiction between Horace’s claims to potency and the reality presented by the poems. Cf. also Horace’s bull-like threats (6. 12) with *taurum ... inertem* (12. 17); and note *impotentia* (16. 62), on which see Oliensis (above, note 1) 121 ff., 134–35.

\(^{34}\) See Fitzgerald (above, note 1) 185: “a human order disrupted by civil war”; Oliensis (above, note 1) 110: “... the upheaval is general and encompasses all spheres of life.” The word play in *Roma ... ruit* (16. 2) contributes to this sense of societal collapse; see C. W. Macleod, “Horace and the Sibyl (*Epode* 16. 2),” *CQ* 29 (1979) 220–21.

\(^{35}\) Note how the grave *impia ... aetas* of 16. 9 recalls the jesting *impia manu* of 3. 1.
Troy, that city so closely connected in myth with the fate of Rome (cf. also 13. 13–16). 15. 3 ff. focuses on the breaking of oaths, that bulwark of society, a prelude to the shattering of civilization evoked so powerfully in the opening lines of 16. That the Epodes conclude in Canidia’s world of fire, furor, and dementia underscores this sense of collapse; the powers of darkness are now in control (17. 2–3). The theme gains further reinforcement through those structural features of the second half already noted—the shift from the metrical predictability of the first ten poems to the metrical wanderings of the last seven, from the relatively sequential motivic and tonal development of the first eight to the constant para prosdokian of the last nine.

Not only is the collapse in the second half more marked, more suggestive of universal breakdown; it also focuses on Horace himself and turns against him his own words. Epode 3 is typical in the way its motifs subsequently boomerang upon the poet. In 3. 17–18 Horace alludes to the gift which burned (inarsit) Hercules; in 11. 4 and 27 and 14. 9 ff. it is Horace who burns, in 17. 30–32 Horace who says, ardeo quantum neque atro delibatus Hercules Nessi cruore. In 3. 3 and 5 Horace compares the garlic to poisons, in 3. 9–14 to the substances with which Medea worked her magic;36 in 11. 2 Horace succumbs to the disease of love, in 14. 3–4 he speaks of himself as drugged, and in 17. 35 he himself is beset by Canidia’s Medean poisons (cf. 17. 61). Horace in 3. 5 humorously speaks of the garlic raging (saevit) in his innards; in 11. 6 he describes his own raging (furere), and in 17. 45 he is the victim of dementia.37

Other poems similarly introduce motifs which later recoil upon Horace. In 1. 3 Horace speaks of Maecenas as parattus to undergo any danger on behalf of Caesar. In 17. 38 it is Horace who is paratus to do whatever Canidia demands (cf. Canidia’s maius parabo 5. 77). In 1. 9 and 15 Horace declares himself willing to bear whatever labor may await him, to assist Maecenas labore . . . meo, and in 1. 5–6 he attests that without Maecenas his vita would be gravis. In 17. 63–64 these motifs return with a vengeance as Canidia spells out Horace’s future: ingrata misero vita ducenda est in hoc, novis ut usque suppletas laboribus.38 In 1. 25 ff. Horace assures Maecenas that his friendship is not motivated by the wish that his fields may be plowed by iuvencis . . . pluribus; in 17. 39 he is willing to sacrifice centum iuvencos if that is what Canidia requires. And while in 1. 31–32 he declares that Maecenas has enriched him satis superque, in 17. 19 he uses

36 Fraenkel (above, note 17) 68 notes the special attention given Medea in these six central lines of a 22-line poem. The emphasis is appropriate given her importance in 5, 16, and 17.

37 Cf. 3. 1–2 (the threat of garlic to a parent’s guttur) and 6. 13–14 (poets who drove their enemies to hang themselves) with 17. 72: Horace will long to throttle his own guttur.

38 With the emphatic ingrata of 17. 63, cf. also 1. 24, in tuae spem grattiae.
the same phrase of the punishments he has paid Canidia: *dedi satis superque poenarum tibi.*

Even phrases from Alfius’ imagined paradise circle back upon Horace himself. Alfius imagines a retreat where one can forget the cares of love (2. 37–38); in *Epodes* 11 and 14 Horace finds himself unable to escape those same cares. Alfius’ utopia will provide health to body as well as spirit (see esp. 2. 57–58, *gravi malvae salubres corpori*); Horace in later poems is *amore percussum gravi* (11. 2), the victim of *languor* (11. 9) and of *vulnus . . . malum* (11. 17), and in 17. 21–23 he gives a clinical description of the dire effects Canidia’s powers have had upon his body (cf. also *macerat*, 14. 16). Alfius praises the sleep-inducing powers of the country streams (2. 27–28); Horace in 14. 3–4 finds himself dragged by the Lethe-like sleep of love, in 17. 24–26 the victim of agonies in which day presses upon night, night upon day. Horace satirizes Alfius as *iam iam futurus rusticus*, but the satire comes home in his own appeal to Canidia in 17: *Iam iam efficaci do manus scientiae.*

The curses Horace hurls upon Mevius in 10 also boomerang in 17. In 10. 1 Mevius’ ship goes forth accompanied *mala . . . alite*; in 17. 67 Canidia uses Prometheus, *obligatus aliti*, as an image of the perpetual anguish in store for Horace.\(^39\) In 10. 16 Horace envisions the *pallor luteus* which awaits Mevius; in 17. 21 he speaks of the flight of his own *verecundus color*. Mevius as he seeks to avoid shipwreck will direct his *preces . . . aversum ad lovem* (10. 18); Canidia tells Horace that his *preces* will fall upon ears deader than those Neptune extends to beleaguered sailors (17. 53–55) and that *leges lovis* prohibit any respite (17. 69). Mevius will see no friendly star in the sky (10. 9); Horace is at the mercy of a witch who controls—indeed, will walk!—the stars (17. 5, 41; cf. 78). In 10. 3 ff. Horace prays that Mevius’ ship may be buffeted by winds; in 17. 33–34 he compares himself to a cinder borne on hostile winds.\(^41\) And *illa non virilis eiulatio* which Horace predicts for Mevius well describes the plaint to which the poet is reduced in 17.\(^42\)

Above all, however, it is the language, imagery, and situations of *Epode* 5 that prove prophetic of the poet himself. Whereas in 5 Horace merely reports on the pathetic plight of the *puer*, by the time we reach 17 Horace himself has become Canidia’s victim.\(^43\) We saw earlier how motifs introduced jestingly in 3 take on sinister connotations in 5; almost without

\(^{39}\) On this echo, see Oliensis (above, note 1) 127.

\(^{40}\) Cf. also 16. 23–24, *secunda . . . alite*, the same image as in 10. 1.

\(^{41}\) Once more 17 picks up a motif from 16; cf. the winds in 17. 33–34 and 16. 21–22.

\(^{42}\) Cf. the sacrifice Horace promises for Mevius’ destruction in 10. 23–24 with the sacrifice he promises Canidia in 17. 38–39. Note also how his description of the defeated enemy, *fertur incerto mari* (9. 32), circles back upon himself in 11. 20: *ferebar incerto pede*. On the identity of the enemy in 9. 27–32, see Cairns (above, note 2) 85–90.

fail these motifs, directed against the puer and against Canidia’s recalcitrant lover in 5, recoil on Horace himself in 17. Her venoms and spells now poison and burn him; the animal forces of 5 are now directed at him; it is to Horace that Canidia now boasts of her love potions (cf. amoris . . . pocusum and maius . . . pocusum 5. 38 and 77–78, desideri . . . pocusum 17. 80). And as with the puer, Horace’s efforts at persuasion are of no avail. At least the boy could threaten to return as a nocturnal Furor (5. 92) and, besieging Canidia’s praecordia (95), to banish sleep; in 17 Horace is at the mercy of a nocturnal fury, his praecordia beset day and night (17. 1 ff., 25–26).44

Indeed, the puer of 5, buried to the chin in the earth (32–36), is an apt image for both the Romans of 7 and 16 and for the Horace of 17. Just as the earth holds the puer, so too the tainted soil holds the Romans (7. 19–20), and the escape Horace offers in 16 leads nowhere—to ou-topia. In the final poem Horace devotes his all to contriving an escape only to find that for him too there is no release. Indeed, the specific image used of the puer in 5 recoils upon Horace. The puer was to be starved to death, tortured by the ever-renewed feasts placed before him. In 17. 66 Canidia evokes egens benignae Tantalus semper dapis to describe the future she plans for Horace: so much for his hope in 9. 1 of festae dapes.45 And whereas the puer of 5 at least has, in his Thyestean threats, the last word, the exitus on which 17 ends are those contrived by Canidia. That Horace has become the puer, and that he has seemingly no recourse against Canidia, is particularly ironic in light of Horace’s final words in 6—yet another threat that circles back upon himself: inultus ut flebo puer.46

The language of the Epodes underscores this theme of imprisonment. Not surprisingly, the verb solvo and other language of freeing and binding play a significant role throughout. Allius longs for a life in which he may be solutus omni faenore (2. 4) and speaks of the freedom from cares one will find in the country (2. 37–38). Canidia laments that Varus solutus ambulat veneficae scientioris carmine (5. 71–72). Horace in 9. 9–14 emphasizes the chains and the demeaning servitude associated with Sextus Pompeius and with Antony and Cleopatra and ends the poem with the god who sets free: curam metumque Caesaris rerum iuvat dulci Lyaeo solvere.47 In 16 Horace offers the Romans surcease from their labors (malis carere quaeritis laboribus, 16. 16) and in the final line of the poem returns to the escape he can give them (piis secunda vate me datur fuga).

44 Hahn (previous note) 219–20. Cf. also 5, 81–82 (Varus will burn) with 11 and 14 (Horace burns); the witches’ pocusum (5. 38 and 78) with Horace’s pocusum (14. 3).
45 In the same way, Horace’s Quand o . . . bibam in 9. 1 leads to Canidia’s pocusum in 17. 80.
46 S. J. Harrison, “Horace, Epode 6. 16.” CQ 37 (1987) 523–24, suggests inultus flebo puer and points out the resonance of this reading with insignibus raptis puer in 5. 12.
47 See Nisbet (above, note 2) 17: “. . . Lyaeo, ‘the Liberator’ . . . is pointedly combined with solvere. Horace is not just thinking of the conventional ‘release’ of the symposium but implying that the Caecuban, the token of victory, is bringing liberation from foreign bondage (cf. 11–14).”
But in this book escape proves impossible. 9 ends with Bacchus Lyaeus and with solve; Horace picks up this final word in the first line of the next poem, but with a difference, as he sends forth Mevius’ ship, binding it to destruction: Mala soluta navis exit alite. In 11 it is Horace who seeks release, Horace whom, despite his best intentions, neither his own libera bilis nor the libera consilia of his friends can liberate (expedire: 11. 15–18, 24–26). In 14 he is again in bondage—ironically to the libertina Phryne! Finally, while in 5. 71 Varus solutus ambulat, in 17 Horace must seek escape: citunque retro solve, solve turbinem (7); solve me dementia (45). As for the respite from labors which Horace promises in 16. 16 (malis carere quaeritis laboribus), Canidia again has the last word, both for Horace himself and for the book: novis ut usque suppetas laboribus (17. 64).

We have seen that at every level the Epodes display a persistent and powerful downward pull. In the first poem Horace hopes to play a man’s role in labors with Maecenas; in the last he finds himself condemned to eternal labors in service of a woman. The iam iam futurus rusticus at the end of Epode 2 may deftly parody Alfius’ dreams of a brighter and seemingly imminent future, but the altera iam teritur at the start of 16 evokes the reality of an evil and ever-repeating present. In 3 Horace alludes in passing and in jest to Canidia, in 5 he recounts her deeds from a distance; in 17 he is in her grasp. As if to drive the point home, the final poem itself repeats the downward trajectory yet once more, beginning in a cautiously hopeful vein (and with words reminiscent of Alfius in 2. 68: iam iam . . .) but ending with Horace’s hopes denied and with Canidia’s promise that Horace’s sufferings will be eternal. Other aspects of the book—the parallel descents of the two halves, the recurrent verbal motifs, the sequence of meters—underscore this ubiquitous downward movement and work it into the fabric of the collection. It is clear also that the downward pull relates to public concerns as well as to private: The collection ends respectively with the accursed Romans obliged to abandon their land and the powerless poet enslaved to Canidia. The animals which gradually infiltrated the poems of the first half will now take over Rome, and the poet who elsewhere threatens others now finds himself the target of threats, himself placed in the position of the helpless puer of 5.

48 Note also the negative connotations of pene soluto in 12. 8.
49 The iam of 16. 1 relates also, of course, to line 1 of Eclogue 4. On the relative date of the poems, Nisbet (above, note 2) 2–9 adds strong arguments for the priority of Eclogue 4; on the other side, see G. E. Duckworth, “Animae Dimidium Meae: Two Poets of Rome,” TAPA 87 (1956) 289–90; Büchner (above, note 1) 85–88.
III. And Finally, Poetry

We have noted the progressive decline in the power of poetry, including Horace's own, a decline which, like so much else in the book, reaches its nadir in 17. True, poetry is Horace's weapon against his adversaries, and through poetry he promises to celebrate Actium (9. 5–6). But in 11 and 14 the poet finds himself unable to sing, in 16 the flight he fashions as vates is, like Alfius' vision, mere words, and in 17 his elaborate recantation leads to naught. Horace may speak in 6. 13–16 of poets' power to drive their enemies to suicide and in 13. 18 of poetry as a cure for aegrimonia, but in 17. 70–73 Canidia tells Horace that in her hands he will become a victim of aegrimonia and will be unable even to kill himself. The occurrences of carmen underscore the same pattern. In 9. 5 Horace promises a carmen in celebration of Actium, but in 14. 7 he is unable to complete his promissum carmen; and in 17. 4 and 28 the carmina in control, and against which he is struggling, are Canidia's.

The sequence of meters in the collection is again relevant. In the opening ten poems—up through his threats against Mevius—Horace uses nothing but iambs. Beginning with 11, the first of the two poems dealing with his "writer's block," he turns from iambs to meters which use dactyls as well as iambs (indeed, dactyls alone in 12).50 As if to mark this shift, Horace in 14 specifically relates his "writer's block" to iambic poetry: deus, deus nam me vetat inceptos . . . iambos ad umbilicum adducere (6–8). And in the final poem, where the carmina of Canidia now hold sway, the straight iambic trimeters are turned against Horace, and Canidia, speaking of Horace's powerlessness to change his fate, echoes his words about his inability to write iambs: sed vetant leges lovix (17. 69; cf. deus, deus nam me vetat, 14. 6).51 The poet who prided himself on the destructive force of his iambs now finds himself the victim of Canidia's iambs, and the words he used of Rome in 16. 2, suis et ipsa Roma viribus ruit, like so much else in the book, turn upon himself: Like Rome, Horace is being destroyed by his own powers.52

There is, however, more to be said about poetry in the Epodes—and about the persona the poet assumes in them. For if he uses several poems of the second half to suggest a gradual diminishment of his powers, poetic and otherwise, by way of counterpoint he assigns to himself a dramatic role that becomes increasingly prominent as the collection progresses. Several aspects of the opening Epode seem to suggest that Horace's natural place is on the sidelines—his characterization of himself as imbellis ac firmus


51 In 5. 71–72 Canidia laments the ineffectiveness of her carmina: in 17 they work.

52 On the reversals between 16 and 17, see Oliensis (above, note 1) 130 ff.; on the shift to iambs in 17, ibid. 128–29. Oliensis also explores passim the resonance of Canidia with cano: That 17 should revolve around her carmina, her iambs, is appropriate.
parum, the simile of the concerned but ineffective avis (19–22), even the promises of 11–14, whose exaggerated character assures us that these words (like those of Alfius in the next poem) are unlikely to be realized (do we really expect Horace to visit the Alpium iuga inhospital et Caucasum?). And it is largely on the sidelines that Horace locates himself in the next four poems. In 2 and 5 he is merely the narrator, and in 3 and 4 he explicitly marks his dramatic presence only by the me of 3. 7 and the mihi of 4. 2. Furthermore, his threat of action in 3. 19–22 is hardly weighty, and any action that may issue from his outrage in 4 remains implicit. In 6, by contrast, he emphasizes throughout his dramatic presence (4, 7, 11–12, 15–16), his threat is explicit, and his feisty readiness for the fray differs sharply from his self-characterization in 1. 16. This new voice prepares for 7, where his persona breathes an assurance not previously encountered in the book. The poet who cast himself so much as an onlooker in 1 here delivers an impassioned jeremiad, upbraiding the Romans for their sins, demanding their response, and authoritatively identifying the source of their woes.

This strong dramatic presence continues into the transitional Epode 8. Here again Horace is fully involved, fully confident—even arrogant. The Horace of 9, like that of 7, speaks out confidently on issues of state; there is nothing of the fawning, self-effacing bystander of 1. His voice becomes yet more assured in 10, and he remains the dominating presence in the remainder of the book. The Horace of 11 and 14 may lament the temporary loss of poetic momentum, that of 17 may find himself subject to Canidia, but there is no question that the poet we meet in these poems is comfortable playing a lead role. 11 and 14 are focused on Horace—his loves, his poetry, his life: fabula quanta fui (11. 8)—and the same is true of 17; for while in 5 Horace cast himself merely as narrator, in 17 he is a central player. The voice assumed in other poems of the second half coheres with this confident stance. In 12, as in 8, he takes the position of power and casts the woman in that of victim, and in both 10 and 15 he speaks with assurance of the revenge he will work. And just as the final lines of 6 lead naturally into 7, so the strong ending of 15 prepares the way for 16, where Horace commands the stage even more authoritatively than he did in 7, boldly taking the role of vates and promising his people to lead the way. The contrast with the retiring persona assumed in 1 is even more striking than it was in 7.54

If Horace gives himself an ever more prominent dramatic role as the book progresses, he does the same with the theme of poetry. There is no direct mention of this theme in the first four poems. Surprisingly, Horace alludes explicitly to poetry neither in 1 or 3, both to Maecenas, nor—where

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53 Oliensis (above, note 1) 122 ff. notes, however, that Horace's stance is not altogether convincing: Both 8 and 12 "betray the logical priority of impotence" (123).

54 Fitzgerald (above, note 1) 177 calls 16 "the most forceful claim of an effective role for the poet in a collection that is predominantly concerned with the problem of the poet's efficacy."
again one would expect it—among the commonplaces which fill Alfius’ pastoral reverie. The book’s first explicit mention comes in 5, and here the song is not Horace’s but the witches’ (5. 45, 72). Horace specifically mentions his own poetry first in 6, and here only indirectly, via the reference to Archilochus and Hipponax—and the concluding hint that Horace too can use poetry as a weapon. He may speak as vates in 7, but he does so only implicitly, and neither in this poem nor in 8 is there any explicit mention of verse (indeed, in 8. 17–18 Horace seems if anything to side with the illiterati!).

In Epode 9 Horace’s own verse receives explicit mention for the first time. From here on, it is focal in all of the remaining poems except 12. In 9. 5–6 Horace promises poetry in celebration of Actium. In 10 he clearly believes that his words can turn the winds against Mevius’ ship. His poetry is central in 11 and 14, and the power of poetry, be it Horace’s or another’s, is at the heart of 13 (9, 11, 17–18). Moreover, if in 14. 7 Horace denies his power to “bring his iambs to completion,” the final three poems of the book themselves controvert this statement. In 15 it is clear that Horace’s revenge on Neaera and her lover will come through the power of his words—that the virtus of line 11 is his virtus as a poet. Although Horace calls himself vates only at the end of 16, that role has been implicit throughout the poem in the character and eloquence of his language and the stance adopted toward the citizens of Rome. And although the carmina mentioned in 17. 4 and 28 are Canidia’s, the focus of this last poem is clearly on a poet attempting, Stesichorus-like, to appease an offended divinity by the power of his poetic recantation. And, despite 14. 7–8, the poem which brings the book ad umbilicum is pure iambs!

It is true that in 17 Horace’s poetry falls short, and the fact that it does so is central to Horace’s shaping of the collection. On the other hand, there is a striking contrast in tone between this poem and Epode 5. 5 is not without its macabre humor, but its portrayal of the young boy remains grim and even pathetic. In contrast, 17, despite its negative conclusion, contains humorous touches throughout; like 8, its structural counterpart, 17 becomes at times a parody of itself. Horace may claim that he has paid satis

55 Note, e.g., the centrality of poetry in Odes 1. 17, also set in reducta valle (cf. 1. 17. 17. Epode 2. 11); or its place in Georgics 2. 475 ff., in the passage (458 ff.) that may have provided the model for Epode 2; see Duckworth (above, note 49) 291; A. Pieri, “L’Epodo 2 di Orazio e le Georgiche,” SIFCU 44 (1972) 244–66.
56 Cf. the same theme later in the poem: Galli, canentes Caesarem (9. 18).
57 Horace’s emphasis on virtus and his rejection of womanly softness in 16. 37 and 39 recall his claim to virtus in 15. 11; see Fitzgerald (above, note 1) 177–78.
58 Leading up to Horace’s association of himself with Stesichorus in 17 are his references to Archilochus and Hipponax (6. 13–14), to Anacreon (14. 10), and to himself as vates (16. 66). The whole book, of course, represents an early demonstration of his ability to adapt the Greek poets to Latin, on which see esp. Fraenkel (above, note 17) 24–75.
superque for his sins and that his youth and color are gone, his hair turned white (19–23), but when in the midst of these statements he addresses Canidia as amata nautis multum et institoribus, we cannot miss the note of satire. The same is true of his description of Canidia at 35—cales venenis officina Colchicis; of his promise, true to his Stesichorean persona, that by the power of his lying lyric Canidia, Helen-like, will walk the stars pudica and proba;60 and above all of his peroration, so full of oblique and not so oblique insults, so like praeteritio in its reiteration of the very slanders he professes to recant (17. 46–52):

o nec paternis obsoleta sordibus,  
neque in sepulcris pauperum prudens anus  
novendialis dissipare pulveres.  
tibi hospitale pectus et purae manus,  
tuusque venter Pactumeius, et tuo  
cruore rubros obstetricia pannos lavit,  
uctumque fortis exsilis puerpera.

The tone of these words colors the solve me dementia which precedes them, the quid obseratis auribus fundis preces which follows. And Horace puts into Canidia’s mouth more words of the same ilk—her description of Horace as Esquilini pontifex venefici (58); her self-condemning question, quid proderit ditasse Paelignas anus? (60); her threat to be borne as eques on Horace’s unfriendly shoulders (74); even the questioning cast of her final words: plorem artis in te nil agentis exitus?61 This patently satiric language gives to 17 a lift that pulls against its dark theme and its explicit meaning. The words Horace scripts for Canidia also underscore the fact that this Canidia is Horace’s creation. She may reject his recantation, may prophesy all manner of future ills for him, but the way the poem is written reminds us constantly that it is Horace who has shaped its every detail.

The same is true of 16. There can be no question about its deep pessimism, its evocation of a Rome destroyed by her own powers, fit only to be abandoned to the animals; nor does the poem permit us to doubt that the beata arva to which Horace invites the Romans are poetic fiction, not reality, a vision as illusory as Alfius’. But that, of course, is in a sense the whole point. Horace in the last line proclaims himself, for the first time in the Epodes, vates to the Romans, and what he has given them, both in this poem and in the Epodes as a whole, is real, not illusory, an artistic construct which expresses a complex understanding of Rome’s condition and the human condition. That this construct is deeply pessimistic, with a downward pull woven into its every thread, does not negate the fact of its creation. Horace cannot undo the horror of the civil wars, cannot lead the


61 On the tone of 17, see F. Cairns, “The Genre Palinode and Three Horatian Examples: Epodes, 17; Odes, 1,16; Odes, 1,34,” AC 47 (1978) 549.
Romans to a utopia beyond the seas, cannot negate the evil that is within us. But he can mold his dark insights into an organized and beautiful whole that is real and lasting; this is the fuga the vates can and does offer. Though the Epodes in the end seem to deny the poet’s power, to emphasize the illusory nature of human ambition, this strangely fascinating, deeply troubling hall of mirrors itself bespeaks by its very existence the poet’s creative capacity. Canidia, powerful though she be, is but an illusion called forth by the craft of her victim. And though the beata arva which Horace offers the Romans are illusory and unattainable, the beata arva he offers in his poetry, not least in Epode 16 itself, are real. The Romans cannot escape their past, we cannot escape our animal nature, Horace cannot escape Canidia—and yet the imaginative range and sweep of the Epodes themselves vigorously affirm that very freedom which the poems seem expressly to deny.

With respect to this theme, Epode 13 plays a special role, and Horace stresses its importance by the reference to his own birthday in line 6. In addition, he gives 13 a central position in that part of the collection where poetry and Horace himself are becoming more focal and by arranging the remaining poems of the collection in such a way as to isolate 13. The Epodes fall into interlocking and overlapping pairs. Thus 1 and 9, the two public Maecenas poems, form a natural pair, as do 7 and 16, the two civil war poems, and 5 and 17, the two long Canidia poems. 8 and 12 have obvious ties of tone and subject, as do 4 and 6 in the first half, 10 and 15, 11 and 14 in the second. Both 2 and 3 also line up naturally with a poem located in one of these other pairs: As we have seen, 2 is in several ways the counterpart to 16; and 3, which introduces Canidia and many of the motifs of 5, pairs up naturally with 5 within the poems of the first half.

62 Cf. the fine comments of Lowrie (above, note 25) 430 ff. on mirroring in Epode 13.
64 On the isolation of 13, see Dettmer (above, note 1) 79–80, who adduces numerical as well as structural arguments in support of its “non-corresponding” nature. Its special character has made itself felt even apart from its unique place in the structure of the collection; see G. Pasquali, Orazio Lirico (Florence 1964) 300; Franke (above, note 17) 65–66; Büchner (above, note 1) 50; Oliensis (above, note 1) 133. R. S. Kilpatrick, “An Interpretation of Horace. Epodes 13.” CQ 20 (1970) 135–41, would link 13 to Philippi.
65 On 3 and 5, see Dettmer (above, note 1) 79, 83–87. Dettmer (77–109, esp. 77–81, 101–03) was the first to suggest that the Epodes consist of two overlapping ring patterns, and in this respect my analysis builds on hers. We differ, however, in that her analysis focuses on the architectonics of the Epodes, mine on the dynamic movement of the cycle. Furthermore, the ingenious numerical schemes which Dettmer (79–80) adduces in support of her structural analysis strike me as too mechanical to be fully convincing. I have the same problem with comments such as that on pp. 80–81 (on the fact that Epode 2 is a “non-corresponding poem” in the second of Dettmer’s two ring structures): “The following rule applies to situations like this one. When a Horatian book or cycle is ordered in more than one ring, the correspondences of some poems may remain the same in both patterns (e.g., Epodes 3–6 and 10–15), or one or at the most two poems which were corresponding in the first scheme may be non-corresponding in the second.” I may well be wrong, but my intuition tells me that Horace did not use “rules” of this sort in writing his poems and constructing his books.
The diagram points up the unique character of 13—its central position within the second half, framed by enclosing pairs, and the fact that alone among the seventeen *Epodes*, 13 does not naturally pair up with another poem. Horace has given 13 this focal, stand-alone character to underscore its thematic importance. For *Epode* 13 suggests in its central (9–10) and final (17–18) lines the theme that is implicit in the book as a whole:

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et fide Cyllenea
levare diris pectora sollicitudinibus;
   
   illic omne malum vino cantuque levato,
dehoris aegrimoniae dulcibus alloquis.
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Just as for Achilles, and for humans in general, poetry is the one secure refuge, so the *Epodes* themselves offer one lift amidst the prevailing momentum of descent—that represented by the poems themselves, by the creative act through which Horace has cast his dark vision into this comprehensive and satisfying whole.66

There remains one final point to make about *Epode* 13. The speaker of its final lines is Chiron, the *nobilis . . . Centaurus* (11). That in a book which progressively pits the human against the animal, not least in its final poems, Horace has chosen a composite animal/human to speak these crucial lines is significant. As Chiron’s words offer a measure of resolution to the bleak cast of the collection, so the fact that they are sung (*cecinit* 11) by a creature who unites the human with the animal itself suggests a resolution between two sectors which elsewhere in the collection are pitted against each other. It is probably also not accidental that in the final lines of the *Epodes* Canidia’s words turn Horace himself into a quasi-centaur (74): *vectabor umenis tunc ego inimicis eques*.67 We have seen that in this final poem Horace strongly suggests his own shaping hand, his own governing

66 Cf. Lowrie (above, note 25) 432, on 13: “. . . for the poet and his addressee, compensatory song is not just the exemplum sung on the *fide Cyllenea* (9), but the epode in its entirety.”

67 Oliensis (above, note 1) 133–34 contrasts the noble centaur of 13. 11 with the evil centaur (Nessus) of 3. 17–18 and 17. 31–32. Canidia as *eques* probably glances at the fact that both Maecenas and Horace were *equites*; on Horace as *eques*, see D. Armstrong, “Horatius Eques et Scriba: Satires 1. 6 and 2. 7,” TAPA 116 (1986) 255–63.
wit, his own creation of all that Canidia is. The infernal Canidia may literally "supersede" Horace, subsume his powers to her purposes, in these final lines of the book. But it is only by Horace's own act that this union takes place, and in so ending the book Horace joins himself—literally—with those potent animal and female forces so strongly associated with Canidia throughout the *Epodes*. The "centaur" of 17. 74 not only unites human and animal, male and female, not only merges the two singers, the two iambists, of *Epode* 17 into a force the earth must recognize; it also recalls the noble centaur of 13 and his theme of poetry's power to confront and counter those forces, both within and without, that would pull down and destroy us, that would enslave the human to the animal.^^

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^^ On the dynamics of the *Epodes*, and the final equilibrium achieved, see Büchner (above, note 1) 94–96; cf. Rosenthal and Gall (above, note 6) 15: "The balance of affects—radiant tonal centers of specific qualities, and intensities, of emotionally and sensuously charged awareness—in Browning's poem ["The Englishman in Italy"] provides the germ of how a sequence works. It precisely indicates the nature of lyrical structure, which is based on dynamics: the succession and interaction of units of affect."
Horace, C. 3. 17: A Flawed Genealogy

TIMOTHY S. JOHNSON

*Carmen* 3. 17 appears a simple invitation to take a holiday, but Aelius and his genealogy have proven to be anything but simple:

Aeli, vetusto nobilis ab Lamo,
quando et priores hinc Lamias ferunt
denominatos et nepotum
per memores genus omne fastos
auctore ab illo ducis\(^1\) originem,
qui Formiarum moenia dicitur
princeps et innantem Maricae
litoribus tenuisse Lirim
late tyrannus: cras foliis nemus
multis et alga litus inutili
demissa tempestas ab Euro
sternet, aquae nisi fallit augur
annosa cornix. dum potes, aridum
compone lignum. cras Genium mero
curabis et porco bimestri
cum famulis operum solutis.

Peerlkamp, finding little sense in the ode, rejects the whole as being beneath Horace.\(^2\) The main difficulty that troubles him, as well as editors before and after, is the incongruity between the lofty genealogy (marked by the documentation of the *fasti memoriae* in true antiquarian manner and the separation of the vocative from the verb, a typical practice of the Greek

\(^1\) *Ducis* | *ducit* D. Heinsius (Bentley): *duces* Shackleton Bailey. Excluding the restoration of the manuscript reading, *ducis*, the text is from Shackleton Bailey’s Teubner edition (*Q. Horatii Flacci Opera* [Stuttgart 1985]).

hymn-form) and the mundane commands that the poet directs to the same Aelius in the last half of the ode: *aridum / compone lignum* and *curabis . . . porco bimestri / cum famulis* (13–16). This is not to mention the difficulty in the sense of lines 2–5: "since your ancestors took their name from Lamus, you trace your ancestry back to Lamus," a tautology that caused Meineke to excise the lines from the ode.

This discrepancy in the treatment of Aelius was reason enough for Bentley to follow the lead of Heinsius, who emended *ducis* to *ducit*. *Omne genus* replaces Aelius Lamia as the subject, which makes the lineage a parenthesis, so that, while the ancestry of the Lamiae is honored, the poet can direct Aelius to prepare the wood. Not only is the sense restored, by Bentley’s account, but further the ode reads more smoothly when *denominatos* does not have to do double duty with both *priors Lamias* and *omne genus* and the seemingly obtrusive second person is removed.

*Ducit* satisfied Bentley, but not more recently Shackleton Bailey, and rightly so. Certainly the point of the lineage, even accepting *ducit*, is still the *nobilitas* of Aelius, stated in the first line; therefore, *ducit* does not close the wide gap between the solemnity of the first half of the ode and the domestic details of the latter. Further, Shackleton Bailey would disallow the “unseemly hyperbole” in the genealogy. Aelius Lamia, the son of a Roman knight, did not become consul until A.D. 3, twenty years after the publication of *Carmina 1–3*, and therefore *per memores fastos* implies a fame that is not appropriate to Aelius’ ancestors. To correct the difficulty, he proposes *ducet*, which transforms the genealogy into a prophecy of future greatness for Aelius and his family.

The above objections are all predicated on Horace’s praising Aelius, but the pattern of convivial/*carpe diem* invitations (overlooked by all but

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3 S. Commager, *The Odes of Horace: A Critical Study* (New Haven 1962) 261: “The grand roll call of Aelius’ lineage (1–9) founders upon the homely reminder of leaves, seaweed, and aging raven (9–13). After the lofty rhetoric of the first two stanzas, the repeated monosyllable *eras* (9, 14) and the mention of a pig, who can boast only a pedigree of two months (15), are shattering.”

4 J. Meineke (*Q. Horatius Flaccus* [Berlin 1854]) was not the first nor the last to do so: Dacier (*Oeuvres D’Horace* [Hamburg 1861]), Peerlkamp (above, note 2), H. Schütz (*Oden und Epoden* [Berlin 1874]), and L. Müller (*Q. Horatius Flaccus. Oden und Epoden* [Leipzig 1900]).

5 Bentley’s central argument: “Tu Ael Lamia, a vetusto Lamo denominate; *tu, inquam, originem ducis a Lamo illo Formiarum rege:* cras magna pluvia erit; ligna sicca, dum licet hodie, sub tecto repone; cras enim domi bibes otiosus, quia ob pluviam foras exire non poteris. Nonne iam vides absurdum et ineptum esse, quod in medio inculcatur? Adeone directo et in os laudandus erat ob nobilitatem Lamia, ut rem leviculam de lignis inferret. . . . Non illa puti alem intervieniunt; *neque enim προηγουμένως et ex professo, sed obiter et per parenthesin inferuntur, quae ad genus et nobilitatem Lamiae spectant.*” Also accepting Heinsius’ emendation (*Q. Horati Flacci Opera* [London 1612]) are Peerlkamp (although he prefers to remove the lines altogether) and A. Y. Campbell (*Q. Horati Flacci Carmina cum Epodis* [London 1945] ad loc.).

6 "Obtrusive" is T. E. Page’s adjective (*Horace. Odes and Epodes* [London 1883] ad loc.).

Commager)\(^8\) is to criticize the addressee for reluctance to take advantage of the moment. One need only recall Sestius (1. 4), Thaliarchus (1. 9), the slave of 1. 38, Dellius (2. 3), Quintus (2. 11), Postumus (2. 14), and later Maecenas (3. 29) to realize that Horace's treatment of Aelius is likely to be negative,\(^9\) and that accordingly the hyperbole and faulty reasoning in the genealogy (enhanced by the rough syntax and the obtrusive second person, ducis), which editors have tried to remedy by emendation, change from inaccuracy on the part of the poet to intentional komische Parodie, joking that Aelius' genealogy is highly exaggerated.\(^10\) The greatest satirical force, therefore, is achieved by placing the overblown lineage in the mouth of Aelius, which is just what the manuscript reading ducis does.

The startling contrast of nobilis Aelius to the raven, to the pig with no pedigree, as well as to the company that Aelius will enjoy at the party, the household slaves unable to work because of the storm, all are intended to induce a satirical shock that will shake Aelius out of the past to the enjoyment of the present.\(^11\) Shackleton Bailey's ducet, predicting a glowing future for Aelius, would lessen the punch by making dum potes insignificant, and is, in general out of character with carpe diem invitations in Horace, which advise against trusting an unpredictable future.\(^12\)

C. 3. 17 is not inept once it is placed among its convivial counterparts. Its structure is similar to that of C. 2. 11, which divides itself into two equal parts, criticism of the addressee for not enjoying the present and insistence on a party. It recalls the initial summons to carpe diem in C. 1. 11 by setting aside the past and the future in favor of the present: The genealogy (past) is an extended distraction and the predictions of the raven are not to be trusted totally. Horace instructs Leuconoë to strain the wine (vina liques) and he tells Aelius to stock-pile the wood for a party (compone lignum); for

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9 Cf. J. Orelli, Q. Horatius Flaccus (Berlin 1837) ad loc.
10 A. Kiessling and R. Heinze (Q. Horatius Flaccus. Oden und Epoden [Berlin 1898]) note the irony and humor of the genealogy in the introduction to the ode; cf. G. Williams, The Third Book of Horace's Odes (Oxford 1969) 104–05. Williams sees in line 5 the illogical argument from Aelius that he is descended from Lamus because his family estate is near Formiae, where Lamus by legend ruled. If correct, Williams also supposes that the realm of Lamus was extended to include Maturnae so that the estate of Aelius would lie in the territory assigned to Lamus. It is unnecessary to resort to any reading between the lines to demonstrate the exaggerated nature of the genealogy.
11 True enough, there were occasions on which Roman masters prepared feasts for their slaves, most notably the Saturnalia, and even waited on them. Still, on these festival days the Romans often made sure to maintain the distinction between themselves and the slaves by various means, such as having their children instead of themselves wait on the tables (Athen. 14. 639b; for this and other examples, see J. H. D'Arms, "Slaves at Roman Convivia," in W. J. Slater [ed.], Dining in a Classical Context [Ann Arbor 1991] 176–77). In any case, there is no particular holiday in this ode to explain why Aelius should prepare a feast for his slaves as well as himself. Horace must be lowering Aelius' nobility.
12 Cf. C. 1. 11. 7 (dum loquimur), 2. 11. 16, and 4. 12. 26 (dum licet); cf. 1. 9. 9–14, 2. 3. 15–16, 3. 29. 25–40.
both, the advice behind the similarly domestic commands is the same, enjoy
the present. The ode in comparison to other *carpe diem* invitations is rather
typical, and suffers not from a lack of poetic craftsmanship, but from critics
who have attempted to interpret it in isolation without reference to its wider
context.

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The Textual Transmission of the *Sortes Astrampsychi*¹

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Virtually everything has been said that can be said about who wrote the Greek book of fate known today as the *Sortes Astrampsychi*.² But several new observations need to be made about its date and a great deal remains to be written concerning the manuscript tradition that has preserved the book.

No new viable evidence about the author of the *Sortes Astrampsychi* has come to light since G. M. Browne observed that "the work is a patent forgery."³ Although it has not previously been noted that Codex Bononiensis 3632 ascribes the *Sortes* to Leo the Wise, this ascription too is spurious and unhelpful. This witness lacks the introductory epistle, which purports to be from Astrampsychus to Ptolemy. Instead it offers only the list of days with their respective hours of inquiry, which is a feature of the medieval manuscripts of the *Sortes*, and a unique explanation of the process of consultation. At the beginning of this prefatory material is the label συγγραφέον Αλεωντος ἔργον Θεσαλωνίκης (sic). The codex also offers a full-page illumination of this Leo, portraying him as a bearded man dressed in imperial robes, seated next to a small building. A superscription reads Λέων ὁ σοφότατος. This is probably Leo the Mathematician, archbishop of Thessaloniki in the ninth century. This Leo, who was also known as Leo the Philosopher, was a noted scholar with an interest in astronomy and astrology.⁴ However, because of an accident of names, dates, offices, and talents, the Byzantine emperor Leo VI (866–912) also comes into consideration. To Leo VI, who was also known as Leo the Philosopher and Leo Sapiens, are attributed several collections of oracula.⁵ The biographical

¹ Though this article counters some of what Professor G. M. Browne has written about the *Sortes Astrampsychi*. I am indebted to Professor Browne for introducing the text to me, for explaining its structural complexities, and for providing unwavering support and encouragement as I have labored on this task. Without his kind and generous help, my work on the *Sortes* would have been impossible.


³ G. M. Browne, "The Origin and Date of the *Sortes Astrampsychi*," *ICS* 1 (1976) 53–55.

⁴ *Lexikon des Mittelalters V* (Munich 1991) 1892, s.v. "Leon der Mathematiker."

⁵ PG CVII 1121–50.
data of these two Leos were confused so often that Maraccus, in his biography of Leo VI, felt it necessary to explain that Leo VI “nunquam fuit archiepiscopus Thessalonicensis, sed solum imperator Constantinopolitanus,” while the other Leo “nunquam tamen fuit imperator Constantinopolitanus, sed archiepiscopus Thessalonicensis.”� But this very confusion argues that the designation Θεσσαλωνίκης, while used correctly only for Leo the Mathematician, could have been used erroneously for Leo VI. Nonetheless, despite the interest of Leo VI in oracular literature and Leo the Mathematician’s great learning, a book which is attested in third-century papyri could not have been composed by a man who lived in the ninth century.

Absence of credible information about the author of the Sortes forces one to turn to internal considerations for clues about its date. Browne, arguing that the syntax of the questions in the Sortes bespeaks an Egyptian origin, concluded that the work was written in the third century of our era, the only period in which the office of δεκάπρωτος (question 95: εἰ γίνομαι δεκάπρωτος;) was functional in Egypt.⑦ However, as demonstrated elsewhere, the syntax of the questions admits of a simpler explanation, one which does not bind the work to Egypt, but leaves open the question of provenance.⑧ Furthermore, the theory of a third-century Egyptian origin has been questioned by T. C. Skeat, who maintains that (1) “the late introduction of the decemprimi into the administration of Egypt left very little time before the appearance of actual manuscripts at Oxyrhynchus by about 300 A.D.” and (2) “it is clear that the attainment of municipal and other offices was obviously thought of as desirable in Astrampsychus, and this was certainly not the case in the 3rd century.”⑨

The following two pieces of evidence, which have come to light since Browne’s article on the date and origin of the Sortes, combine to make Skeat’s first objection insurmountable: (1) J. D. Thomas has argued persuasively that it was not until between 242 and 246 that the office of δεκάπρωτος was introduced into Egypt;⑩ (2) the verso of P. Leid. inv. 573, dated via a document on the recto to “possibly not more than five or ten years after A.D. 231,” has been identified and published as a portion of the table of correspondences (see below) from the Sortes.⑪ Thus, the Sortes Astrampsychi is attested in Egypt even before the introduction of the office

� Hippolytus Maraccus, Vita Leonis Imperatoris cognomento Philosophi, PG CVII xx.
⑦ Browne (above, note 3) 56–58.
⑨ T. C. Skeat, unpublished personal letter to G. M. Browne, dated 18 March 1982. In a subsequent letter to Browne, dated 13 April 1982, Skeat declined Browne’s invitation to publish these notes and graciously added, “However, if you yourself wish to make any use of my observations, you are entirely free to do so—indeed I should feel most gratified.” Browne passed this correspondence along to me and encouraged me to include it in this article.
⑪ P. Lugd. Bat. XXV (Leiden 1991) no. 8, p. 17.
of δεκάπρωτος into that country. As Browne once noted, "The Sortes Astrampsychi was a practical book; its compiler would not bother to include questions which had no immediate application."

Skeat's second objection is also incontrovertible. In A.D. 200, a boule, or town council, was established in each nome capital by order of Septimius Severus. Of this system Alan Bowman states, "Certainly, after the middle of the third century the evidence shows that the boulai experienced ever-increasing difficulty in administration, particularly in finding people to fill posts." Nahtali Lewis adds, "There is now abundant evidence showing that, beginning in the latter half of the second century and increasingly thereafter, ... the honorific offices, once so eagerly sought, began to be avoided on one pretext or another, and office-holders had sometimes to be coerced into serving." We can safely conclude that the Sortes was not composed in Egypt.

Having rejected a third-century Egyptian origin for the Sortes Astrampsychi, Skeat argues that the work is based on a no-longer extant first-century book of fate, a work which also gave rise to the Latin Sortes Sangallenses. His reasoning is as follows: Verbal considerations make it apparent that the Sortes Sangallenses and the Sortes Astrampsychi are related. That the Latin is odd at many points in the Sortes Sangallenses, but becomes clear when compared with the Greek of the Sortes Astrampsychi, is evidence that it, rather than the Greek of the Sortes Astrampsychi, is derivative. However, although the Sortes Sangallenses is a more extensive system than the Sortes Astrampsychi, its structure, inasmuch as its decades are not shuffled, is more primitive than that of the Sortes Astrampsychi. Since it is unlikely that "anyone producing a Latin manual based on Astrampychus . . . would have gone to the trouble of unshuffling the groups of answers and thereby destroying one of the most effective means of producing an air of mystification," one can conclude that the Sortes Astrampsychi is "a sophisticated version of an earlier Greek system in which the groups of answers were not shuffled," and that this earlier system also underlies the Sortes Sangallenses.

Skeat goes on to argue that mention of the office of aedile in some of the answers in the Sortes Sangallenses indicates that the Urtext on which it is based was written before the end of the second century, when Alexander Severus abolished the office. Skeat, therefore, feels that this Urtext may be a product of the first century of our era. This theory, if correct, would establish the late first century as the terminus post quem for the Sortes

13 A. K. Bowman, The Town Councils of Roman Egypt (Toronto 1971) 123.
15 Sortes Sangallenses, ed. by H. Winnewedt (Bonn 1887). See also J. Rendel Harris, The Annotators of the Codex Bezae (Cambridge 1901).
Astrampsychi. The terminus ante quem, as established by P. Lugd. Bat. XXV no. 8, is about 236. Until new evidence is available, a more precise date for the Sortes is impossible.

Not only are the date and provenance of the Sortes Astrampsychi uncertain, but the serpentine course by which the text, in what appears to be two ecodes, has been transmitted through the centuries to our age is as mysterious at first glance as the workings of that oracular book must have been to those who consulted it for counsel and prognostication. It is, however, the very workings of the text, its structure and mechanics, that allow one to strip away much of the mystery surrounding its transmission. Consequently, although the structure of the Sortes has been explained elsewhere,17 it is fitting to repeat some of these details here before explaining their ramifications for the transmission.

The book begins with a list of ninety-two questions, numbered 12 through 103, such as “Am I going to sail safely?” and “Is my wife to bear a child?” In the body of the work, ten responses to each question as well as some “fake” answers, which could not be attained by the user and which were intended to make the work more baffling,18 are arranged in groups of ten (decades). Because the answers were staggered in composition—once again, to make the work more intricate than it would have been if each decade of answers contained ten responses to the same question—the answers in each decade follow in inverse order the sequence of the questions. In other words, if the first answer in a decade responds to question 20, the second will respond to question 19, the third to question 18, etc. In those decades in which an answer to question 103 occurs anywhere other than in the first line, fake answers fill the slots above that answer. Conversely, when a response to question 12 occupies any slot other than the tenth answer, fake answers fill the slots below that answer.

One other element was introduced to complicate further the workings of the text. Upon reaching the stage of composition delineated above, the author of the Sortes shuffled the order of the decades and added a table of correspondences to the text between the questions and the answers which shows the original, unshuffled position of the decades. The need for this table becomes apparent when one considers how the book is used.

To obtain an oracle, the inquirer chooses a question of personal interest from the list and adds to the number of that question a number from 1 to 10 chosen at random or perhaps by some kind of sortition (herein enters the notion of lots or sortes). He then locates this sum in the table. Next to the sum is written the number of the decade in which the user will find his response and in that decade the response with the same line number as the

18 Hercher, the first editor of the text (above, note 2), was baffled by the fake answers. His attempts to emend them vitiate his edition.
number between 1 and 10 chosen earlier will be his answer. For example, if
the user picks question 71 and chooses 2 as his lot number, he will find, by
locating number 73 (71 + 2) in the table, that his answer is in decade 22.
This decade contains answers to questions 72–63. By adding the line
number of any response in that decade to the number of the question which
it answers, one arrives at the sum 73. Thus, before shuffling, decade 22 was
decade 73. The table simply reverses the process of shuffling by directing
the user to that decade which has a response to question 71 in the second
line.

When G. M. Browne set out to produce a new critical edition of the
Sortes Astrampsychi, he discovered that the text of one manuscript, Ambrosianus A 45 sup., ff. 59r, 64v–94v (hereafter “A”), was so aberrant,
both syntactically and structurally, from the text of the remaining
manuscripts (hereafter designated collectively as “p”) that it seemed to
preserve a separate recension or edition of the work. The differences
between A and p are as follows:

1. A has 91 questions (it lacks no. 103: εἰ ὁ συνεχόμενος ἀπολύτατος;) and
100 decades of answers, whereas p has 92 questions and 103 decades.
2. The fake answers in A are in random order, while in p they follow the
same sequence as real answers.
3. In A, decades 36, 47, 51, 69, 80, 84, and 97 have positions in the
table of correspondences different from their places in p.
4. The answers in A often differ from those in p. Also, A’s answers
tend to be shorter and more succinct than those of p.
5. The Christian interpolations in A are different from those in p. 19

These are not variations which can be attributed to scribal error. Rather,
each text seems to be the result of purposeful composition. Browne noted
further that whereas the text of P. Oxy. 1477 and another unpublished
Oxyrhynchus papyrus (hereafter P. Oxy. ined.) of the Sortes seem to be
syntactically closer to the text of p than to that of A, for P. Oxy. 2832, 2833,
and 3330 the situation is reversed and that in 3330 decade 51 is unshuffled
decade 74 as in A. He also discovered that portions of A, in a state which
antedated the Christian interpolation, had been copied into a Byzantine book
of fate preserved in Codex Barberinianus 13, ff. 38–62v. Realizing that the
variations between A and p bespeak recensonal activity, since they are too
extensive to be attributed to scribal error, Browne theorized that the text of
A, with its shorter answers and fewer decades, was the first version and that
a short time after its composition someone, probably the original compiler,
rewrote the text, adding question 103 as well as three new decades (two of

19 The papyri of the Sortes and the fake answers in all witnesses show that at some point in
the transmission of the text questions of a risqué nature were Christianized. For example,
question 66 is εἰ γίνομαι ἐπίσκοπος; in A and εἰ γίνομαι κληρικός; in p, but answers to the
question in an unpublished papyrus from Oxyrhynchus (P. Oxy. ined.) make it clear that the
original question was εἰ καταλάθοιμαι τῇ φίλῃ;
which contain only fake answers), reshuffling several decades, ordering the fakes, and lengthening the answers.\textsuperscript{20}

The theory seems to be a plausible explanation of the obvious differences between the two versions, but careful consideration of the evidence uncovers the following anomalies which it cannot resolve. Though A does not include question 103 (ει ὁ συνεχόμενος ἀπολύεσαι;) in the list of queries, it has five answers to the question distributed in the proper places in the decades to make them functional were the question in the list (80. 1, 28. 2, 69. 3, 63. 4, 82. 5). In three other places where a response to question 103 would stand, were the question available, we encounter fake answers to question 56, which reads ει ἀπολύομαι τῆς συνοχῆς; These three answers are 88. 6 and 91. 7 (ἀπολύεσαι τῆς συνοχῆς) and 92. 8 (κινδυνεύεις συνεχόμενος). With only slight emendation these answers can be transformed into responses to 103 (cf. 92. 8 in p: κινδυνεύει ὁ συνεχόμενος καὶ τελευτᾷ). If question 103 was not an original part of the text represented by A, the only explanation for the occurrence of answers to it in A is contamination with p. But if contamination were to blame, we should expect the copyists responsible to have added an answer to question 103 at 84. 9, where the ninth answer to the question would have been required, and we should not expect to find an answer to it at 97. 9, where in A it is a fake, but in p the ninth answer to the question. Furthermore, 97. 9–10 in A constitutes the only instance in that manuscript of two fake answers which respond, in reverse sequence, to questions which are consecutive in the list of queries. This whole issue is further clouded by the fact that in six of the eleven manuscripts comprising p question 103 does not occur in the list of queries even though a full complement of answers to the question is available, and in yet another one of the eleven manuscripts question 103 reads ει ἀπολύομαι τῆς ἐνοχῆς; (cf. question 56: ει ἀπολύομαι τῆς συνοχῆς:).

It is also difficult to explain why someone would produce a new edition which differed only slightly from the original and to determine the rationale behind the reshuffling of the decades. For while the addition of three decades would have necessitated some changes—especially if the compiler did not want simply to add them to the end of the table, where they would have the appearance of a spurious addition—the reshuffling was far more extensive than necessary.

I believe it can be shown that (1) the text of A derives from the text of p and was produced from a manuscript of this longer version from which the table of correspondences had been lost; (2) p represents the original structure of the text with respect to the number of questions, the number of decades, and the arrangement of the shuffled decades, with the exception of the correspondence oδ = π and ρδ = να; (3) A preserves the simple sentence-

\textsuperscript{20} For Browne's argument, see Browne (above, note 12) 3–14.
structure of the answers and the random ordering of fakes characteristic of the autograph; and (4) all of the papyri of the Sortes thus far brought to light are witnesses of the text of p before its answers were lengthened and, with few exceptions, before its fakes were set in sequence.

Even if the introductory epistle in the Sortes Astrampsychi did not speak as if the questions, the table, and the decades were in three different books, i.e. papyrus rolls or codices, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that these units of the text were often separated in this fashion so as to reduce the amount of searching back and forth in the book that repeated consultation would entail. If the possessor of such a tripartite book lost the section that contained the table of correspondences, he would either have to copy the table from another manuscript or discard the rest of the text as useless, unless he understood the mechanics of the Sortes well enough to reproduce the table from the decades.  

However, from a text of the longer version in which the list of questions lacked number 103 and in which the answers in the two decades of fake answers (47 and 69) were in the same sequence as real answers, while the fake answers elsewhere were in the same random configuration as that which still obtains in A, he would, by following the simplest method of restoration, produce a table having the same correspondences as the table in A and he would lose three decades in the process. In short, he would create the so-called first edition.

The three features which would be necessary in this Vorlage are not as chimerical as they may appear. That six of the eleven manuscripts comprising p have all of the answers to question 103, but do not include the question in the list, makes plausible the notion that the question could have been lacking in this hypothetical text. The fact that P. Oxy. ined. has in decade 97 (which is unshuffled 112) almost the same random arrangement of fakes as A and has in decade 69 the same answers (with the possible exception of 69. 1, of which only one letter and some traces remain) as decade 69 in p, where it is a complete fake, argue that the original text had the very arrangement of fakes described above and that A, for the most part, still preserves this arrangement, while in the text of p, a redactor has set the fakes in sequence.

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21 P. Lugd. Bat. XXV no. 8 appears to preserve a makeshift copy of the table of correspondences. The table was copied onto the back of a document probably by or for someone who owned a text of the Sortes, but had lost his table.


23 That this may have been a gradual process and not the work of a single redactor is suggested by the fact that in this same papyrus decade 93 shows a sequential ordering of fakes. P. Gent inv. 85 (W. Clarysse and R. Stewart, "P. Gent inv. 85: A New Fragment of the Sortes Astrampsychi," Chronique d'Egypte 63 [1988] 309–14), dated to the third century, also shows a sequential ordering of fakes in 20. 5–10.
To restore the table on the basis of the decades, one must ascertain the unshuffled position of each decade. The easiest way to accomplish this is to determine the number of the question to which the first answer in the decade responds and to add one to that number. For example, the first answer in decade 26 is to question 84. The equation $84 + 1 = 85$ shows that what became decade 26 after shuffling was originally decade 85, containing in descending order answers to questions 84–75. The number of the question to which each answer in that decade responds plus the number of the slot which the answer occupies equals 85. A user of the text would arrive at the first response in this decade by selecting question 84 as his query and choosing 1 as his random number; he would arrive at the second answer by selecting question 83 and choosing 2 as his random number.

The owner of the defective text uses this method to determine the position of each decade in the table. He begins by listing the numbers $\gamma$ through $\pi\varepsilon$ in columns. Then, taking the first decade in his text and discovering that its first response is to question 68, he enters $\alpha$ next to $\xi\varepsilon$ on his list. Looking at the second decade he finds that its first answer is to question 102, so he enters $\beta$ next to $\rho\gamma$. He then continues this process for each decade in the text. Table 1 shows the results of his work, including the corrections he would have to make for mistaken first impressions. These corrections, as well as the other correspondences marked with superscript letters, are explained below, with the superscript letters keying the correspondences to their explanations.

a When he comes to decade 28, the restorer does not realize that the first answer is a fake. To determine what answer he saw there, we must turn to A where, as argued above, the fakes are still in their original formulation. We find there, just as our restorer must have found in his text, an answer to question 63. So he writes $\kappa\eta$ next to $\xi\delta$. But later, when he comes to decade 42, he finds that it too begins with an answer to 63. So he looks at the last answer in that decade and discovers that it responds to question 54. By adding 10 to this number he confirms that this decade, and not decade 28, is the real unshuffled decade 64. So, next to the lemma $\xi\delta$ on his list, he crosses out the $\kappa\eta$ he had written earlier and writes in $\mu\beta$. Going back to 28, he adds 10 to the number of the question answered by its last response, thereby ascertaining that that decade is unshuffled 105, and he records this on his table.

b In decade 36, he sees that the first answer is to question 75, so he records $\lambda\varepsilon$ next to $\omega\varepsilon$, not realizing that the answer is a fake and that decade 36 is actually unshuffled 106. This error is not corrected when he gets to decade 84, the real unshuffled 76, for the following reason: Upon finding

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24 This assumes that the restorer knew in advance of his restorative labors that the table began with $\gamma$ instead of $\alpha$ and that it extended to $\pi\varepsilon$, but the results would not be affected by the listing of numbers which later were found to be unnecessary or by the initial omission of numbers which later had to be added.
that decade 84 begins with an answer to question 75 and that λζ has already been recorded as unshuffled decade 76, he looks to the tenth answer of decade 84 for some enlightenment. There he reads an answer to question 66, but to the original question 66, not the interpolated form which appears in the text of p. An answer to this question in P. Oxy. 3330, a papyrus which antedates the Christian interpolation, is [ c. 11 ] η φίλη. In P. Oxy. ined., the answer to this question at 95. 4 is καταλλάσσῃ τῇ φίλη. These early witnesses suggest that the original form of question 66 was εἰ καταλλάσσομαι τῇ φίλη. I believe that the restorer thought it was an answer to question 102 (εἰ καταλλάσσομαι τῇ γυναικὶ; the question in p is corrupt)²⁵ that he saw in the tenth position of decade 84, and this led him to believe the decade was unshuffled 112. This same confusion between the original form of question 66 and question 102 is evidenced in decade 103 in p, where the sequence of responses suggests that an answer to question 102 should be in the first slot. But an interpolator, thinking the response was to

²⁵ In p, the question is εἰ ἀπαλλάσσομαι τῇ φίλῃ; In all witnesses of the Sortes Astrampsychi, scribal error results in the interchange of ἀπαλλάσσομαι and καταλλάσσομαι.
question 66, changed the answer to όυ καθίστασαι κληρικός, which corresponds to the interpolated form of question 66.

c When he comes to decade 47, he sees an answer to question 29 in the first position, so he writes μζ next to λ on his table without realizing that the decade is a complete fake. This correspondence is not replaced by that which originally stood in the text for reasons which will be explained below.

d Decade 63 is recorded as unshuffled 18, because a fake answer to 17 stood in its first slot (as in A), but it is later ousted when the restorer arrives at decade 93 and, by checking the final answers in each decade, discovers that 93 is unshuffled 18 and 63 is unshuffled 107.

e The fact that in the text of A the correspondence oδ = π and ρδ = να is transposed cannot be laid to the charge of the restorer. If we assume that this correspondence is original, there is no apparent reason for its reversal in A. But if we start with the hypothesis that oδ = να and ρδ = π, as we find it in A and P. Oxy. 3330, is the original correspondence, its transposition in the text of p admits of a simple explanation and, in turn, helps to account for the anomalous situation that in p, 51. 1 is an answer to question 73 (corrected in R to an answer to question 103),26 despite the demand of the text for an answer to 103 in this position. In A, where decade 51 is unshuffled 74, the answer to 73 is necessary in this position. The explanation is that an early copyist confused oδ and ρδ while copying the table and wrote π next to oδ rather than next to ρδ. In some hands ρ and o have a similar appearance and an arrangement of the table with oδ and ρδ at the head of adjacent columns may have precipitated the error. Upon discovering his mistake, the copyist went ahead and wrote να next to ρδ and made a note to himself in the appropriate places in his Vorlage to copy decade 80 for 51 and 51 for 80. Then when he arrived at decade 51 in his copying, he saw his note and flipped ahead to decade 80. But because his list of questions did not contain question 103, he viewed the first answer in decade 80, which is a response to question 103, not only as an unobtainable fake, but also as a fake that corresponded to no question in the text. Consequently he copied the first answer of decade 51 in his Vorlage as the fake answer at 51. 1 in his new copy and then copied the remaining nine answers from 80. 2–10. When he reached decade 80 in his copying, he turned back to decade 51 in his Vorlage and copied it as his decade 80. That question 103 is missing from so many manuscripts of the text helps explain why the loss of an answer to 103 at 51. 1 was not noticed and remedied; without the question in the list of queries, no user would ever arrive at 51. 1 by looking for an answer to question 103. Thus, the correspondence oδ = να and ρδ = π, which we find in A, is original and the text from which A was derived still had this original version, though the

26 For identification of R, see above, note 22.
transposition had probably already been made in many manuscripts (see below).

When the restorer came to decade 69, he saw, I believe, an answer to question 101 in the first position, and not the answer to 12, which heads the decade in p. As shown above, the new Oxyrhynchus papyrus argues that in decades where a series of real answers begins within the decade, a redactor has rewritten the fakes in such a way that the real answer to question 103 is preceded by a fake answer to 12, which is preceded by a fake answer to 13 and so on until the decade is filled. It is likely that the pattern as it appears in p for decade 69 is not a mere coincidence, but is also the work of this redactor, even though the answers are all fakes.

In decade 69 in A, the series of answers beginning with 103 occupies slots 3–10 and is preceded by an answer to 101, which is preceded by another answer to 103. Thus, the tenth answer is to question 96 and not to 95 as in the new papyrus27 and in p. If we assume that the original sequence of answers was 101, 103, 102–95, the new arrangement of the answers in A and the identification of the decade as unshuffled 106 can be explained along the following lines: The restorer sees 101 as the first answer, but he has already identified decade 16 as unshuffled 102, so he looks at the final answer in 69 and finds an answer to 95. He adds 10 to this number, but then discovers that decade 28 has already proved to be unshuffled 105. So he makes a note next to the table that decade 69 remains to be assigned and he continues. When he has gone through all of the decades, he observes that he has not found a decade which could be the unshuffled 106, since, as indicated above, decade 36, the original unshuffled 106, was identified as unshuffled 76 because its first answer, a fake, was to 75. This correspondence was not changed when the restorer came upon decade 84, the original 76, because, as shown above, the final question of 84 was misidentified. So he records 69 as unshuffled 106 and, dropping the answers down one slot so as to make the decade functional in that position (and thereby losing the answer to 95), he adds as a fake answer to the head of the decade another response to question 103.

On the basis of the fakes which head decades 82, 88, 91, and 92, these decades would have been identified as unshuffled 55, 15, 32, and 88 respectively, but by the time the restorer reached these late decades, the positions they would have taken had already been filled by the proper attributions. Upon discovering that these slots were already taken, the

27 The reading of the new papyrus at 69, 1 is uncertain as only one letter, an upsilon, can be read with certainty. I read the line as [οὗ] πλετί νών. However, an answer to question 12 in this place in this papyrus does not establish that this was the original answer since, as already indicated (above, note 23), the ordering of the fakes in some decades had taken place by the time this papyrus was copied. Even if this answer to 12 is original, the identification of decade 69 as unshuffled 106 would have taken place much as described above, since the restorer would already have identified two other decades as unshuffled decades 13 and 105, the two obvious possibilities for 69, by the time he arrived at decade 69 in his examination.
When he examines decade 97, the restorer finds that the first answer is a response to question 13 (as in P. Oxy. ined.) and he records the decade as unshuffled 14. From this position decade 97 is not dislodged by decade 101, the real unshuffled 14, because when the restorer gets to decades 101, 102, and 103, he sees that all of the spaces on his table through 112 are already filled except for 106 and that decade 69 is still unattributed. At this point he makes decade 69 the unshuffled 106 as described above. Simple mathematics tells him that he has no need for the three remaining decades because the last question on his list is number 102 and since 102 + 10 equals 112, he need have no number higher than 112 on his table. So he simply leaves the extra three decades off the table and crosses them out in his text.

The result of this process is a text of the Sortes which has 100 decades shuffled in the same manner as indicated by the table in A. To make the new text fully operational, 97. 2 was changed to an answer for question 12 and 36. 2–10 had to be rewritten with answers to questions 74–66, but these changes may have been made later as use of the new text revealed its few deficiencies. Though use of the book did not require it, 84. 2–9 were rewritten with a random assortment of fakes, with the result that the first answer, once a real response to 75, now appears to be just one of the random fakes.

This explanation illuminates not only the factors which gave rise to the production of a second edition so similar to the first, but also the causes for each of the structural differences between the two editions. The implications of this explanation for the establishment of a critical edition are great. Once it has been demonstrated that the text of A was derived from the text of p by means of a reshuffling of a few decades and that \( \delta \rho = \nu \alpha \) and \( p \delta = \pi \) is the original correspondence, it is evident that none of the papyri can shown to be a carrier of the text of A. The verbal criteria used to identify P. Oxy. 2832, 2833, and 3330 as witnesses of the shorter version are not valid, since all extant witnesses ultimately derive from just one autograph. The similarity in verbal structure between the papyri and A may attest to the syntactic fidelity of A to the autograph, but it cannot be interpreted as proving the existence of carriers of the shorter version of the text as early as the fourth century. For a papyrus to lay claim to such a role, it would have to show not just verbal, but also structural, similarity with A. Though, as noted above, P. Oxy. 3330 might lay claim to such structural similarity in that it shares with A the correspondence \( \delta \rho = \nu \alpha \) and \( p \delta = \pi \), this has been shown to be a feature of the autograph and hence of the earliest manuscripts of the text represented by p.

However, the fact that A has the original correspondence, and not the reversal of it which is found in p, contributes to the evidence that A preserves an early form of the text and that its archetype was produced at an
early point in the transmission. The portion of the table of correspondences preserved in P. Lugd. Bat. XXV no. 8 has the altered correspondence and is evidence that the alteration was made no later than about A.D. 236. The shorter version represented by A need not have been produced before this date in order to have the original form, but it must have come not much later, for p shows that the altered form became the standard.

It is still correct to refer to A as the first edition, since verbally it is closer to the original than is p, but it must be remembered that p, though soon to be edited and published as the second edition, preserves the original structure of the text except for the order of the fake answers and the correspondence $o\delta = \pi$ and $p\delta = v\alpha$. Inasmuch as A and p are witnesses of the same archetype, they can be used together, along with the papyri, to establish a hypothetical reconstruction of this archetype.

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Plotinian Ancestry*

JAAP MANSFELD

"Who are you and from where among men? Where are your town and your parents?" These are the first questions addressed to a stranger in the Homeric epics.¹ The answer informs the questioner as to the other's place of origin and social status. We are dealing with an important traditional custom. Xenophanes tells us that questions of this kind were put to him on social occasions.² Authors identified themselves by giving their name and ethnicon at the beginning of their work ("Alcmeon of Croton," "Herodotus of Halicarnassus," "Thucydides of Athens"). In the fragments of the Physicorum Opiniones, i.e. in the first book of his Physics, Theophrastus gives the name of the philosopher he discusses and as a rule adds the name of his native city and sometimes that of his father; he speaks of master-pupil relationships and provides relative dates.³ We are told that a great

* This paper was written as an addendum to the second Festschrift (ICS 19 [1994]) in honour of Miroslav Marcovich.

¹ ll. 21. 150 (the only instance in the Iliad), Od. 7. 238: τίς πόθεν εἰς ἄνδρων; (quoted already by Xenophanes, see next note, then e.g. at Clem. Protr. 1. 9. 1. at Themist. In An. Pr. p. 49.1 f. Wallies, and at Ammon. In De Inv. p. 2.15 Busse). Od. 1. 170, 10. 325, 14. 187, 15. 264, 19. 105. 24. 298: τίς πόθεν εἰς ἄνδρων; πόθι τοι πόλις ἦδε τοκῆς; (quoted e.g. as a question put to Bion of Borysthenes apud D.L. 4. 46 = fr. 1A. 12 and apud Stob. Flor. 4. 29a. 13 = fr. 2. 3 Kindstrand [J. F. Kindstrand, Bion of Borysthenes. A Collection of the Fragments with Introd. and Comm. (Stockholm 1976) 176 gives a list of parallels for this quotation which is not complete; Bion's reply is capped by another Homeric line, see below, note 23], at Sen. Apocol. 5. 4, at Luc. Icarom. 23, at Clem. Strom. 6. 2. 11. 3–4, who argues that the Homeric line is paraphrased by Euripides in the Aigeus: "What country must we say you have left to be a guest in this city? What is the border of your native land? Who begat you? After what father are you called?" [fr. 1 N: ποίαν ἐν φάμεν γαῖαν ἐκλεισσότα / πόλει ἐξενοῦσθαι τῆς; τίς πάτρας ὄρος; τίς ἔσσθ' ὁ φίλος; τοῦ κεκρήξαται πατρός;] at Olymp. In Alc. § 187.15 Westerink, and at Philop. In An. Pr. p. 23.6 Wallies). Compare the similar questions from tragedy cited by Leaf ad ll. 21. 150 and Denniston ad Eur. El. 779–80, to which add Soph. Trach. 421 and Eur. Phoen. 123.

² Fr. 18. 4–5 Diehl = 21 B 22. 4–5 D–K apud Athen. 2. 54e: "Who are you and from where among men, and what is your age, my friend? How old were you when the Mede came?"

³ The verbatim quotation (Phys. Op. fr. 6 Diels = fr. 227C FHSG) apud Alex. In Met. p. 39. 8 ff. Diels, peri Parmenidon kai ti f. deou kai Theodorastos estw to protw Peri tw phusikon styw legei tov tov khiugovononos Parmenidon Puphros o elamptos kai ("after him came Parmenides son of Pyres, of Elea") inspires confidence that similar data in the other fragments of the so-called Phys. Op. derive from Theophrastus as well. Aristotle too mentions the ethnicon in important contexts, though not the father's name, e.g. in the first book of Met..
number of cities competed for the honour of being Homer's birthplace, so that in jest he could be called a "cosmopolite." According to the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, the emperor Hadrian asked the Pythia "from where and whose son" Homer was, and received an answer which began with "you ask me about the unknown family and fatherland of the immortal siren," and told him what they were. And so on; examples can be multiplied ad lib.

Information of this nature is also a feature of Greek biographies, which as a rule begin with a genos, that is to say with an account of (1) the protagonist's city of birth, (2a) the name of his father and occasionally that of his mother, a characterization of (2b) his background, e.g. by details about his family tree, and about (3) his education and (4) his date. The order of these items may vary from case to case. The biographical sections in Diogenes Laertius' Lives and Apophthegms of those who have Distinguished themselves in Philosophy and the Doctrines of each School always begin with a genos, which may be very brief (name, patronymic, ethnicon) but which more often is quite detailed. I prefer to quote another typical example, viz. the opening of ps.-Soranus' Προκράτους γένος καὶ βίος:

(1) Hippocrates was of Coan origin (γένει ... Κόιος). (2a) son of Heraclides and Phainarete. (2b) He traced his family (γένος) back to Heracles and Asclepius, being the twentieth (in line of descent) from the former and the nineteenth from the latter. ... (3) He was a pupil of his father Heraclides, then of Herodicus, according to some authorities also of the rhetorician Gorgias of Leontini, and of the philosopher Democritus of

or at Mete. 365a18–20. A number of dorai discussed in Arist. Met. A are treated with greater precision in Theophr. Phys. A; the patronymics are instances of this precision. See further e.g. the reverberations of this practice in Actius 1.3.

4 Procl. Chest. V p. 99.13 f. Allen: καὶ καθόλου πάσα πόλις ἀντιπαρατίκη τάνδρον ἅθεν εἰκότας ἀν κοσμοπολίτης λέγοιτο. The various Lives of Homer too cite sources concerned with purported native cities. The word κοσμοπολίτης is rare. We may cite D.L. 6.63: "Asked where he was from, Antisthenes said, 'I am a citizen of the cosmos'" (ἐφαρμοσθεὶς πόθεν εῦχος, "κοσμοπολίτης" ἔρη, perhaps, however, we should emend to κόσμου πολίτης).

5 Cert. 34 ff. Allen: τοῦ γὰρ βασιλέως πυθομένου πόθεν Ὄμηρος καὶ τίνος, ἀπεφοίτησε δι᾽ εξαμέστρου τόνδε τὸν τρόπον; ἄγνιστόν μι ἔρεις γενεῆ καὶ πατρίδα γαίαν / ἀμβροσίου σειρῆνος κτλ.

6 The Greek word γένος may indicate this section of a biography (or even a very brief "life"), but may also mean "origin" in the sense of "native city," "family," "ancestry," or "clan"; see e.g. Porph. Isag. pp. 1.18–2.10 Busse: (a) τὸ Ἡρακλειδαῖς ... γένος ("clan," "family"). (b) η ἐκάστου τῆς γενέσεως ἁρχή (b1) εἶτε ὑπὸ τοῦ τεκόντος (patronymic) (b2) εἶτε ὑπὸ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ὧ τὶς γέγονεν, instances for the place-from-where being ethnica (Πνεύμαρον μὲν Θεβαίοιν εἶναι τὸ γένος, Πλάτωνα δὲ Ἀθηναίον, καὶ γάρ η πατρίς ἁρχή τις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκάστου γενέσεως). For the standard information about a person's family, parents and city of origin in encomia, see e.g. Quint. 3. 7.15, Menander Rh. Περὶ ἐπιθετικῶν pp. 78.18 ff., 174. 20 ff. Russell-Wilson. For biography, see e.g. Nepos, Epam. 1.4, "dicemus primum de genere eius, deinde quibus disciplinis et a quibus sit eruditus," Alc. 1.1–2, DION 1.1.

Abdera. (4) His floruit was during the Peloponnesian wars; he was born in the first year of the eightieth Olympiad [460/59], as Ischomachus says in book one of his On the Sect of Hippocrates.

The custom is followed by Porphyry in his Life of Pythagoras, a large fragment from his lost Philosophos Historia, which combined biography with doxography. He informs us about Pythagoras’ father, who according to most authorities was called Mnesarchus, though Douris said his name was Arimnæus and others that his real father was Apollo. Opinions as to Mnesarchus’ γένος differed, some saying that he was a Samian, whereas Næthæs, who said he was an immigrant from Tyre who became a Samian citizen, also reported the view that originally he was a Tyrrenian from Lemnos. A report about Pythagoras’ city of origin is cited, according to which there was a dispute whether this was Samos, Phlius or Metapontum. We are also informed about the various traditions concerning his teachers, etc. He is dated by several synchronisms, among which is Polycrates’ tyranny at Samos.

But in Porphyry’s On the Life of Plotinus and the Ordering of his Books important parts of this information are lacking.9 We are given Plotinus’ dates: According to his close friend Eustochius (cited V. Plot. 2) he died at the age of sixty-six in 270 C.E., which allows Porphyry to compute the year of birth as 205 C.E. But we are told that Plotinus never revealed the month or day of his birth, though (V. Plot. 3) he recounted a story from his childhood of which he was ashamed (he allowed himself to be suckled by his wet-nurse at a comparatively advanced age),10 and spoke of his education: his disappointment with other teachers of philosophy and his joy in discovering the great Ammonius Saccas, with whom he remained for eleven years. We also hear about his attempt to travel to the East in search of the philosophy of the Persians and Indians, and of his arrival at Rome at the age of forty. This silence about his month and day of birth is typical. It is what one expects after the remarkable opening lines of the Vita Plotini:

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9 Cf. L. Brisson et al., Porphyre, La Vie de Plotin II (Paris 1992) 191 f. For Porphyry on the various meanings of γένος, see above, note 6.

10 This confirms that his parents were not poor. As to Plotinus’ being ashamed, wet-nurses were seen as a potentially harmful influence; see e.g. Quint. 1. 1. 4 = SVF III 734 (on Chrysippus’ lullabies) and 1. 1. 16 = SVF III 733 (Chrysippus thought three years of suckling were enough).
Plotinus, the philosopher who lived in our time, seemed to be ashamed of being in a body.\textsuperscript{11} Because of this attitude he refused to speak of his origins, his parents and his native city.\textsuperscript{12}

For this reason, Porphyry is unable to begin his biography in the usual way, that is to say, by listing Plotinus' city of origin, giving the names of his parents or describing the earlier history of his family. This part of the genos-element of the biography is lacking, though in a sense it is still there, viz. in the negative sense. Plotinus' refusal to provide this information shows us what sort of man he was, and confirms the observation that he seemed to be ashamed to be in a body. This contempt for his appearance and for his physical condition in general also appears from what Porphyry tells us next about his life and habits.

The \textit{Vita Plotini} is the introduction to Porphyry's edition of the \textit{Enneads}.\textsuperscript{13} As is well known, this edition is not in chronological order but according to a systematic arithmetical sequence which is explained and justified in this introduction (\textit{V. Plot.} 24–26). The final \textit{Ennead} contains the treatises which deal with the highest subjects. The last of these (6, 9), \textit{On the Good or the One}, is the culmination of the exposition of Plotinus' philosophy according to the design imposed by his editor, though it is a relatively early piece, viz. number nine according to the chronological ordering (\textit{V. Plot.} 4).\textsuperscript{14} It had already been composed and distributed among the pupils before Porphyry's arrival in Rome. We should look at its final sentence:\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{quote}
And this is the way of life of gods and of divine and happy men: an escape from the other things, the things here on earth, a way of life which does not take pleasure in the things here on earth, a flight of the alone to the Alone.
\end{quote}

The end, or \textit{telos}, as for other Greek philosophers, is well-being,\textsuperscript{16} but for Plotinus this consists in leaving behind all earthly things and taking refuge

\begin{footnotes}
\item[11] As A.-J. Festugière. \textit{Corpus Hermeticum} I (Paris 1946 and later repr.) 78, points out, keeping the body at the required distance is a "théme banal en Grèce depuis Platon."
\item[12] ou\i\ e peri to\'o\ \teta\'\nu\ o\ a\u\to\o\ d\i\y\e\i\s\th\ai\ h\ne\i\x\et\e\ o\u\te\ peri ta\nu\ z\on\e\\o\nu\ o\u\te\ peri\ ti\z\ pat\ri\d\o\s. A. H. Armstrong's bizarre question (\textit{Plotinus V: Enneads V} 1–9 [Cambridge, MA 1984] 38 n. 2), "Did he consider himself inferior to his parents?" is based on a wrong translation of ἐνταῦθα at \textit{Enn.} 5. 1 [10]. 7. 39.
\item[13] See my \textit{Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text} (Leiden 1994) 108 ff., also for references to the literature.
\item[14] This fact may or may not have contributed to its position of honour: arithmology again (9 = 3 \times 3).
\item[15] \textit{Enn.} 6. 9 [9]. 11. 49–51: kai ou\i\ o\z\et\o\s\ θε\o\n\ kai \a\n\t\rho\o\p\o\k\o\n\ θ\e\i\o\n\ kai \e\u\d\e\i\m\o\n\o\n\ β\i\o\s, \a\p\a\l\l\a\c\e\g\i\ t\o\n\ \a\l\l\o\n\ t\o\n\ \t\i\d\e, \b\i\o\s\ \a\n\h\i\d\o\n\o\n\ t\o\n\ \t\i\d\e, \f\u\y\g\h\ \m\o\n\o\n\ pr\o\s\ \m\o\n\o\n. Cf. 5. 1 [10]. 6. 11, on approaching the first principle in prayer, μόνους πρὸς μόνον (cf. below, note 22 and text thereto).
\item[16] See D. T. Runia, \textit{Bios eudaimoon}, inaugural lecture, Leiden University, 17 Sept. 1993, where he argues that the \textit{telos} often occurs as the climax of philosophical writings.
\end{footnotes}
in the Alone.\textsuperscript{17} At \textit{Enneads} 1. 6 [1]. 8. 16 (the earliest treatise according to the chronological ordering), citing part of a Homeric line, he had already said, “let us flee to the beloved fatherland.”\textsuperscript{18} Such a “coming home to the fatherland after long wandering” is the reward of “godlike humans” who succeed in raising themselves above the lower world.\textsuperscript{19} Behind this expression lies the allegorical interpretation of the \textit{Odyssey}, a quite common motif in Middle Platonist and Neoplatonist philosophy, Odysseus being seen as the human soul which after its wanderings finally comes home to where it belongs.\textsuperscript{20}

The final sentence of the \textit{Enneads} agrees and links up with the first sentence of the \textit{Vita}. I believe that this is not a coincidence. In his biography Porphyry describes Plotinus’ way of life as that of an exemplary philosopher who so to speak lived his doctrine,\textsuperscript{21} as is clear in retrospect already from the opening words of the \textit{Vita}. The real self is an exile who should not be proud of his body or indulge in the pleasures it affords, for happiness lies elsewhere.

In the treatise which according to the chronological ordering came immediately after the one with which Porphyry’s edition ended, viz. 5. 1 [10], \textit{On the Three Primary Hypostases}, this idea is worked out further and advice as to how to attain the \textit{telos} given. It is quite interesting indeed to read these two tracts in their original order,\textsuperscript{22} for in the opening chapter of 5.

\textsuperscript{17} P. Hadot, \textit{Plotin. Traité 9} (Paris 1994) 51 (cf. also 217) rightly points out that “Notre traité, et par la volonté de Porphyre [my italics] classant les \textit{Ennées} dans un ordre systématique, toute l’œuvre de Plotin, se termine sur les mots fameux: ‘fuir seul vers le Soleil’.” Yet one should include what is left behind; cf. the use of the “alone – Alone” formula at 1. 6 [1]. 7. 8 ff. and 6. 7 [38]. 34. 6 ff. concerning the soul, and μόνοι at 5. 1 [10]. 6. 50 ff. concerning the longing and love of the begotten for its begetter (here Intellect and the \textit{One}). E. Peterson, “Herkunft und Bedeutung der ΜΟΝΟΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΜΟΝΟΝ-Formel bei Plotin,” \textit{Philologus} 42 (1933) 30, correctly points out: “Der ‘Aufstieg’ [sic—I would prefer ‘Rückkehr’] ist ein sich ‘Entkleiden’.” Peterson (34 ff.) proves that Plotinus uses an originally colloquial formula meaning “without witnesses” or “intimately.” His denial (37 ff.) that Numenius fr. 2. 11 ff. des Places (apud Eus. \textit{P.E.} 11. 22. 1) ομιλήσαι τῷ ἄγαθῳ μόνῳ μόνον κτλ. provides a precedent for Plotinus’ usage goes too far; see E. des Places, \textit{Numénios. Fragments} (Paris 1973) 104, who however misunderstood what Peterson meant.


\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Enn.} 5. 9 [5]. 1. 16 ff., esp. εἰς πολλῆς πλάνης (cf. \textit{Od.} 1. 1–2, πολλὰ / πλάναθη) εἰς πατρίδα εὔνοιμον αφικόμενος ἄνθρωπος.


\textsuperscript{21} For this widespread motif, see my \textit{Prolegomena} (above, note 13) 183 ff.

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. also the uses of the formula “alone – Alone” in 5. 1, cited above, notes 15 and 17.
Plotinus tells us what our—and so his own—true *genos* is, that is to say provides the information which when conversing with his pupils he withheld as to “the things here on earth.” The souls have forgotten their *father* (5. 1. 1. 2, πατρός θεοῦ), Intellect, and fail to honour themselves through ignorance of their *ancestry*, their *genos* (5. 1. 1. 12, ὁγνωτος τοῦ γένους). The point is illustrated by a simile which at first glance looks a bit homely (5. 1. 1. 8–10):

They [sc. the souls] did not know that they themselves too came from hence, just as children immediately torn from their fathers and raised far away do not know who they are and who their fathers are.

But this is a motif from folklore, legend, or myth, whatever name you wish to give to it. One should think of Oedipus, the foundling prince brought up abroad, who knew neither his father nor himself, or of Cyrus, whom

23 Compare, in this same treatise (5. 1. 7. 27 ff.), the argument concerning the origin of Intellect which cites part of a Homeric line (II. 6. 211 = 20. 241, ταυτής τοι γενής τε και αὑματος εὑρομαι εἶναι—also quoted by Bion Borysth. apud D.L. 4. 47 = fr. 1A. 12 K., see above, note 1): ταυτής τοι γενής ὁ νοῦς οὗτος κτλ., on which see Cilento (above, note 18) 283 f. = 221. As editors and commentators point out—e.g. Armstrong (above, note 12) 37 n. 1 and M. Atkinson, *Plotinus. Ennead V. 1: On the Three Principal Hypostases* (Oxford 1983) 175—this is quoted from Plat. Resp. 8. 547a (both Plotinus and Plato have γενεῆς whereas our text of Homer reads γενῆς). Plato’s context however is different; στάσις near the half-line in Plato means “civil strife,” in Plotinus “immobility.” Rather than assuming that Plotinus is sloppy I would argue that a purely verbal agreement is sufficient for his purpose.

24 This has not been observed by the translators and commentators I have seen; for purported parallels and references to the literature dealing with this simile, see the commentary of Atkinson (previous note) 12 f. But at Dio Chrysost. Ὄρ. 12. 61, Plot. Enn. 6. 9 [9]. 9. 33 ff. and Procl. *In Tim.* I p. 208.12 f. Diehl the crucial ingredient of forgetting, or ignorance, is lacking. *Enn.* 6. 9 [9]. 7. 32 ff. is better, though here insanity is the cause of the son’s not knowing his father. R. Ferwerda, *La signification des images et des métaphores dans la pensée de Plotin* (Groningen 1965) 76 ff., deals mainly with the “father”—image and points at Gnostic views which are to some extent comparable; cf. e.g. *The Gospel of Truth*, *NHG* 1.3 24.28 ff. on ignorance and its disappearance. One may also cite *Corp. Herm.* 7, “Ὅτι μέγιστον κακόν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἦ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὁγνωσία.


25 Cf. the example of the patricide on whose voluntary nature views may differ if the culprit “does not know it is his father whom he kills,” *Enn.* 6. 8 [39, *On the Voluntary*]. 1. 36 ff., ἐν τοῦ πατέρα ἡγνοίς τοῦτον εἶναι, a clear allusion to the Oedipus legend. Alex. *De Fato* 31, p. 202.16–21 Bruns (= *SVF* II 941), cites a determinist argument (of Stoic origin; see R. W. Sharples, *Alexander on Fate* [London 1983] 166 f., also for parallels) concerned with Oedipus’ killing his father “without knowing (him) and without being known (to him),” ὁγνωτος τοῦ και
Astyages ordered to be killed but who was raised by humble foster-parents. A more recent example is the piteous hero of Hector Malot’s novel Sans famille, who at the end of this splendid tear-jerker turns out to be the missing son of an English lord. Knowledge of his genos revealed his misery to Oedipus, but Cyrus became King of Kings. Perhaps Plotinus has the happier variety of the motif in mind, although the words he uses appear to be more closely associated with the story of Oedipus. Another and better explanation is that he uses the Oedipus motif without bothering about the part of the story which concerns the patricide. In a similar way, he adapts the tale from “the mysteries and the myths” about Kronos and Zeus to the begetting of Soul by Intellect without bothering about the part of the story dealing with Zeus’ dethronement of his father.

At any rate, to assist the soul in overcoming its forgetfulness two ways of addressing men are said to be feasible. One may demonstrate that the things the soul honours here and now are worthless, or teach and remind it how great are its ancestry (5. 1 [10]. 1. 28, γένους) and worth.

Plotinus is consistent, as Porphyry understood very well and made very clear. One’s true father is not a human being, as one’s true genos is not some human family or other, and one’s true place of origin is not a πατρίς somewhere here on earth. To know oneself, and to be known by others, as the person one is, one continuously has to remind oneself, and them, of our real but generally forgotten origin in what lies beyond the world we have come down to. It is this world whose seductions Plotinus wants us to reject

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26 See previous note and Plut. De Cur. 522bc, who sort of rebukes Oedipus for “keeping on trying to find himself” (πάλιν ἔκτων ἔγνωσε) as described in the Oedipus Rex, i.e. for trying to discover his identity.

27 Enn. 5. 1 [10]. 7. 31 ff., esp. 7. 36 ff.; cf. Atkinson ad loc. (above, note 23) 179, who points out that “Plotinus’ use of myth can be very selective.”
and which in his view we must flee from even during our temporary sojourn in the body.

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Better Late than Early: Reflections on the Date of Calpurnius Siculus

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Back in 1978, Champlin\(^1\) fluttered the dovecotes by relocating Calpurnius Siculus from the reign of Nero to that of Alexander Severus. First in the rush to “refute” him were Mayer\(^2\) and Townend,\(^3\) followed at a more considered distance by Wiseman.\(^4\) Also unmoved was the veteran Calpurnian editor, Verdière.\(^5\) His paper might (or might not) have restrained the producers\(^6\) of flowery essays on the literary Zeitgeist, wherein the Neronian date was assumed but not discussed.

Gathering an ally, Champlin remained unrepentant. In 1986, he and Armstrong (the latter providing a thorough and late-leaning linguistic examination of the poems) declared: “What more is there to be said?”\(^7\) Quite a lot, as it turned out. The most recent editors, Amat in the Budé series and Schröder in his agreeably titled\(^8\) commentary on the fourth of the eclogues, upheld the Neronian position. On the other side, Armstrong and Champlin received a powerful boost from the rigorous analysis of language

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and style by Courtney, showing a large repertory of Calpurnian borrowings from the likes of Lucan, Martial, Silius Italicus, and Statius. Contra Townend’s reliance on the munus Neronis, a palmary paper on such matters expresses brief, albeit unargued, doubt. Most recently, Horsfall in a characteristically learned and witty round-up of the latest editions has proposed (if I understand his sometimes elliptical prose aright) a new wrinkle: Calpurnius is full of Neronian detail, but in a diction that puts him in a later period. As Horsfall concludes, “It does not help to run away from the problems posed by Calpurnius and there is a lot more work to be undertaken.”

A number of Champlin’s Neronian opponents professed to be upholding the “traditional” date. An imprudent, if not impudent, claim. Before Haupt in 1854, developing the adumbrations of Sarpe in 1819, the third century was the traditional date. Ultimately, it harks back to the anonymous individual who first bound Calpurnius and Nemesianus together in the same volume. The eighteenth century had no doubts. In the excitement engendered by Champlin, it was overlooked, by inadvertence or design, that Edward Gibbon had Calpurnius firmly settled in the late third century, detecting about half a dozen allusions in his verses to the times of Aurelian, Probus, and Carus. There was also Samuel Johnson who, passing the Eclogues of Virgil under individual review, opined that, “If we except Calphurnius (sic), an obscure writer of the lower ages, I know not that a single pastoral was written after him by any poet, till the revival of literature.” A number of professional scholars converged on the same century, if not the same reign. Alii alia tentaverunt. As a matter of disconcerting, though often forgotten fact, using exactly the same small body of evidence, people have variously assigned our poet to the reigns of Claudius, Nero, Domitian, Commodus, the younger Gordian, Probus, Carus, and sons, and Diocletian–Constantine.

12 M. Haupt, De carminibus bucolicis Calpurnii et Nemesianii (Berlin 1854).
13 G. Sarpe, Quaestiones philologicae (Rostock 1819).
14 All occur in chapters 11 and 12 of his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; they will be inspected later.
15 Adventurer no. 92, September 22, 1753.
16 Thus modifying the remark of Armstrong (above, note 7) 122, about Calpurnius being “left in the company of Tertullian, where indeed, until 1854, the instinct of scholars of Latin poetry usually placed him.”
17 To save what would be a lot of space, I shall not enumerate them all here. Apart from the surveys in Amat and Schröder, the various datings and their proponents are inventoried by, e.g. C. H. Keene in his edition (London 1887; repr. Hildesheim 1969), by M. D. Reeve, “The Textual Tradition of Calpurnius and Nemesianus,” CQ 28 (1978) 223-38, esp. 223 n. 1, and by
On the historical side, the Neronians (Townend being perhaps the prime example) lay great store on Calpurnius’ accounts of a comet (1. 77–83), a set of games in an unspecified amphitheatre (7. 23–84), and a young prince who (1. 45) pleaded a successful case for the Iuli: _maternis causam qui vicit Iulis_. This last, indeed, is often seen as their ace in the hole, being equated with the stripling Nero’s speech on behalf of the people of Ilium in A.D. 53, an event mentioned both by Suetonius (_Nero_ 7. 2) and Tacitus (Ann. 12. 58). They are, however, obliged to admit that _Iuli_ in the sense of Trojans is a most unusual, perhaps unique,¹⁸ usage. This in itself is no great problem: Calpurnius is no stranger to innovative diction. What is less often observed is that _Iulis_ is not necessarily the right reading. Some manuscripts have _in ulnis_, a reading actually printed by Keene, quoting hyperbolic parallels from authors as diverse as Manilius, Petronius, and (in Greek) Themistius. A suitable young prodigy can be found in Numerian, said by the _Historia Augusta_ (Car. 11. 1) to have been _eloquenta etiam praepollens, adeo ut puer publice declamaverit_. This connection was made by Wernsdorf in his edition (Altenburg 1780). A third reading, _in ulmis_, was printed by Adelung (Petersburg 1804), who saw in it some reference to an anecdote of Numerian’s youth. I am not, of course, saying that _Iulis_ must be wrong, simply that, given this textual uncertainty, the Neronians are too confident.

I do, however, wonder what “maternal Trojans” is supposed to mean. According to Suetonius (_DJ_ 6. 1; cf. Dio 43. 43), Julius Caesar distinguished between his maternal and paternal ancestry, tracing his mother’s side back via Ancus Martius to the kings, his father’s side to Venus. There is also Ovid, _Amores_ 1. 8. 42, _at Venus Aeneae regnat in urbe sui_, in the “shocking”¹⁹ context of hedonism at Rome. For a parallel to what Calpurnius is supposedly saying, we have to go to a late poet, Rutilius Namatianus, _De reeditu_ 1. 67–68: “auctores generis Venerem Martemque fatemur, / Aeneadum matrem Romulidumque patrem.”

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¹⁸ Depending on how one interprets _ullos_ in Valerius Flaccus 1. 9: _oceanus Phrygius prius indignatus Iulos_. Champlin (above, note 1) 98, who states categorically that “nowhere in Latin literature does the word signify the people of Troy, and indeed such an equation would be decidedly inept,” takes Valerius as referring to the Julio-Claudian dynasty. By contrast, the _Oxford Latin Dictionary_ couples these passages from Calpurnius and Valerius, giving them both the Trojan allusion.

¹⁹ The adjective is that of G. W. Williams, _Change and Decline: Roman Literature in the Early Empire_ (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1978) 62.
A speech about Iuli could encompass any number of themes, and certainly does not have to be about Trojans. Champlin argues for Julia Soaemias and Julia Mammaea, sisters and mothers respectively of Elagabalus and Alexander Severus. The lukewarm verdict accorded to the oratorical abilities of the younger Gordian by the Historia Augusta\textsuperscript{20} does not help those who see him as the recipient of Calpurnius’ praises. The elder Gordian, by contrast, was prolific in epic poetry as a puerulus, and turned to public debating in his pre-imperial adolescence.\textsuperscript{21}

Townend claimed the games as “most decisive for a Neronian date.” Much hinges on their venue, unspecified by the poet. Nowadays, the choices are boiled down to two: either the wooden amphitheatre erected by Nero in the year 57, or the Colosseum. If the latter, that is the end of the Neronian date, for obvious reasons. This dichotomy, it should be emphasised, is false. There are other possibilities. Probus, who offered both wild beast shows and gladiators in the Colosseum, also staged a magnificent venatio in the Circus. Gibbon, believing that Calpurnius is describing the games staged by Carinus in the Colosseum,\textsuperscript{22} compared the poet’s awe at the building’s height to that evinced by Constantius in the account of Ammianus (16. 10. 14). There may be more to be got out of this comparison. Calpurnius (7. 24) describes the theatre as Tarpeium prope descendentia culmen. Keene objected that the Colosseum is too far from the Tarpeian rock to merit this compliment. Champlin countered that the poet’s words simply convey the height of the building. Now, in the Ammianean narrative, the Colosseum is a structure _ad cuuis summittatem aegre visio humana conscendit_, juxtaposing this with a mention of _Iovis Tarpei delubra, quantum terrenis divina praecellunt_.

It was quite natural that the Colosseum should attract expressions of wonder at its size. The very first two poems in Martial’s Liber spectaculorum dwell upon it. With regard to what went on there, Champlin established another link between Calpurnius and Martial, namely their joint use (Mart. Sp. 21. 5; Calp. 7. 57) of the phrase _genus omne ferrarum_. This can be enhanced by Suetonius, Tit. 7. 3 _omne genus ferrarum_, not indeed of the Colosseum but in a section on Titus’ games that includes it.

Nothing now remains of Nero’s wooden amphitheatre. It is most unlikely that it was so colossal as to evoke such awe at its height, even from the most lickspittle of poetic flatterers. Tacitus (Ann. 13. 31) pours scorn on those who would praise its _fundamenta et trabes_, and by implication on the building itself.\textsuperscript{23} Suetonius who, it should be remembered, includes the

\textsuperscript{20} Gord. 20. 6 non magna non minima sed media.
\textsuperscript{21} Gord. 3. 1–4, dubbing the verses diserìssimis, withholding comment on the orations.
\textsuperscript{22} As described by the HA (Car. 19), these spectacles have nothing in common with the one described by Calpurnius. There are also far more differences than similarities between the show narrated by the poet and the one put on by Probus.
\textsuperscript{23} “Pauca memoria digna evenere, nisi cui libeat laudandis fundamentis et trabibus, quis molem amphitheatri apud campum Martis Caesar extruxerat.”
item in the section devoted to Nero’s commendable deeds, emphasises only the speed with which it was thrown up (Nero 12. 1 intra anni spatum fabricato)—not a word on its size or any other splendours. The biographer’s silence is not the only instructive one here. The elder Pliny has two impressive things to say about Nero’s amphitheatre: It contained a larchwood log 120 feet long and 2 feet thick, a natural wonder preserved from the reign of Tiberius (NH 16. 200), and its various equipments were lavishly encrusted with amber especially brought back from the German littoral by the knight Julianus (37. 45). Calpurnius has none of this. His mention of the woodwork is confined to the opening phrase trabibus . . . textis, nothing to do with size, but similar to Martial, Sp. 2. 2 et crescent media pegr mata celsa via (of the Colosseum’s scaffoldings), also to the initial arrangements made for Probus’ great games in the Circus: “genus autem spectaculi fuit tale: arbores validae per milites radicitus vulsae conexit late longeque trabibus adfixae sunt, terra deinde superiecta totusque Circus ad silvae consitus speciem gratia novi vioris effronduit” (HA, Prob. 19. 3).

There are more relevant silences. Calpurnius goes into rhapsodies over bejewelled partitions, inlaid ivory beams, nets of gold wire, and some new-fangled device called a rotulus (the term is unique to this passage). Why none of this in Suetonius? As to the games witnessed by the speaker in Calpurnius, they could not possibly have been the gladiatorium munus mentioned and described by Suetonius (Nero 11. 1, 12. 1), for how could the flattering poet have failed to mention not only gladiators of any kind but the mercy of an emperor who the biographer says neminem occidit, ne noxiorum quidem?24

Calpurnius’ spectator is quite clear on what he saw: snow-white hares, horned boars, the “rare” elk, two exotic kinds of bull, sea calves either fighting with or striving in play against bears (cum certantibus ursis), and hippopotamuses. No gladiators, no bestiarii, no naumachiae, no pyrrhic dances—in other words, none of the things itemised by Suetonius.

A number of the creatures mentioned by Calpurnius repay inspection.25 In Varro’s days (De re rust. 3. 3. 2), the snow-white hare was rarely seen in Rome. Pliny mentions them (NH 8. 217), but not in any arena connection; likewise Pausanias (8. 17. 3). Only Calpurnius has them in a public show. This is also the case with his horned boars. The poet’s allusion to the rarity

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24 The debate over whether the spectacles described by Suetonius, Nero 12. 1–2, comprise one entertainment or several seems needless. A munus is, strictly speaking, a gladiatorial show. Moreover, in his list of 11. 1, Suetonius rounds off a list of pluralis with an explicit singular: “spectaculorum plurima et varia genera edidit: iuvenales, circenses, scaenicos ludos, gladiatorium munus.” The epitomated accounts of Dio Cassius (61. 9. 1–5) do include a mention of fishes swimming with sea monsters, also bulls and bears, but it is made clear that all these spectacles included gladiators, bestiarii, naumachiae, and the like.

25 For the full treatment, see the aforementioned books of Jennison and Toynbee (above, note 17), also the excursus in L. Friedländer, Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire, tr. A. B. Gough (London 1913) IV 181–88.
of the elk is on the mark. Julius Caesar (BG 6. 27) retails absurd stories of their sleeping in trees. Pausanias (9. 12. 1) comments on how hard they were to catch and train. Pliny (NH 8. 38–39) has little on elk, and nothing about them being in shows, adding that their Scandinavian relative, the hippocotamus,achlis, had never been seen in Rome. The only emperors outside Calpurnius credited with displaying elk are the Gordians and Aurelian. A hippopotamus was first exhibited at Rome in 58 B.C. Pliny’s account of the creature (NH 8. 96) mentions no public appearances. Although Ammianus (22. 15. 21) says it was often brought to Rome, it was unobtainable in his own time. Outside Calpurnius, the only emperors we hear of in its connection are Antoninus Pius, Commodus, Elagabalus, Gordian III, and Philip. Only our poet has performing seals; Pliny (NH 9. 41) describes their somnolence, their roaring, their ability to be trained to greet the public and respond to their own names, and the difficulty of killing them: Some of this may imply arena performances, but there is no explicit mention of same.

Bears were no novelty in the arenas of Rome. Pliny (NH 8. 130, 34. 127) has casual allusions to their being killed at shows, but the only specific exhibition mentioned (NH 8. 131) is that of Domitius Ahenobarbus in 61 B.C., a cue if ever there was one for importing any possible reference to the emperor Nero.

It is assumed that Calpurnius’ swimming bears were of the polar variety. If so, a unique mention, one promoted by Jennison as evidence for a third-century date, given the failure of Pliny to mention the species. His silence is certainly notable. Not, however, decisive, for these aquatic bears do not absolutely have to be polar. A local ursologist tells me that other kinds of bears swim well and could, albeit with difficulty, be trained to romp in water alongside other creatures.

Calpurnius’ description of a comet in his first poem is another lynchpin of the Neronian dating. Champlin, however, has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that the poet’s account is irreconcilable with the contemporary evidence of Seneca, Apocolocyntosis 2, also with Pliny, NH

26 LSJ cite the Greek word for elk only from Pausanias 5. 12. 1, an obvious testimony to the rarity of references to this beast.
27 On the sole evidence of the HA: Gord. 33. 1; Aur. 33. 4.
28 Apart from Dio 72. 10. 3 for Commodus, we again rely on the HA: AP 10. 9; Elag. 28. 3; Gord. 33. 1–2.
29 See above (note 17) for Jennison. Toynbee (above, note 17) 94 reasonably says that Pliny was not infallible on the subject of bears, noting his ignorance of the ancient evidence for the African species. But complete silence on a subject is not the same as making a mistake about one, and his failure to mention polar bears remains eloquent. Overall, it is striking, if not conclusive, how many of the animals mentioned by Calpurnius are otherwise only attested for considerably post-Neronian emperors.
30 Mr. Steven Herrero of Calgary, to whom I am most grateful for information about bears, relayed in a telephone conversation on February 9, 1995.
31 As with the games and some other issues, I am not wasting space repeating points unimprovably made by Champlin in his two articles.
2. 92, “sidus terrificum . . . quo Claudius Caesar imperium reliquit Domitio Neroni, ac deinde principatu eius adsiduum prope ac saevum,” this latter standing in flagrant contrast to Calpurnius’ (78) placida radiantem luce cometem.32

There is more to be said, all on Champlin’s side. Thanks to the Chinese records and the tables drawn up by modern astronomers,33 we can be quite precise about the comet of 54. It was a broom star comet in Gemini with a white vapour trail, seven degrees long, pointing southeast. It appeared on June 9, moved toward the northeast, and disappeared from view after thirty-one days. Thus, it was not visible after early in July. Calpurnius specifically mentions its twentieth night of appearance. This figure has no scientific significance. At the beginning of his seventh poem, Lycotas has been waiting for twenty nights for the return of Corydon from Rome, while the very last line of the Laus Pisonis says of its author,34 coeperit et nondum vicesima aestas.

A huge number of comets appeared during the period between A.D. 54 and the age of Diocletian and Constantine, being recorded for the years 55, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 71, 75, 76, 77, 79, 84, 85, 101, 104, 110, 117, 125, 126, 128, 132, 133, 141, 149, 153, 154, 158, 161, 178, 180, 182, 186, 188, 191, 193, 200, 204, 205, 206, 207, 213, 217, 218, 222, 225, 232, 236, 238, 240, 245, 247, 248, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265, 268, 269, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 283, 287, 290, 295, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 305, 315, 329, 336. Relatively few of these are recorded in extant Roman sources. The Historia Augusta, it should be stressed, has surprisingly few (perhaps one of its contrived quirks), and does not even employ the word cometes.35 As Garnett saw, the epiphanies in both August and September of the year 238 could tie in with the accession of the younger Gordian. Other such third-century connections might be possible.

There is another aspect of the matter, seldom remarked. Referring to one of the comets that appeared in Nero’s reign, Seneca (NQ 7. 17. 2) says categorically36 that this is one which cometas detraxit infamiam. In the light of this, how feasible is it that Calpurnius should choose to make so much out of a notoriously feared phenomenon back in 54, even allowing for the way in which it is twisted into happy anticipation of the new ruler? For his part, Pliny (NH 2. 94) observes that only Augustus made a favorable fetish

32 Garnett (above, note 17) long ago raised doubts that Calpurnius’ description of the comet fitted what we know from elsewhere about the one that appeared in 54; an ineffectual rejoinder was made by J. P. Postgate, “The Comet of Calpurnius Siculus,” CR 16 (1902) 38–40.
34 Thought by some to be Calpurnius himself, but that is another story, not one for the present investigation.
35 Cf. Clod. Alb. 12. 3; AS 14. 5; Car. 8. 5.
36 Surely not ironically, as the Loeb editor Corcoran suggests.
out of a comet. Most people continued to fear them: As Seneca (NQ 7. 1. 5) remarks, “non enim desunt qui terreant, qui significationes eius graves praedicent.”

In lines 49–50 of the first poem, the prophetic Faunus proclaims of Bellona that “modo quae toto civilia distulit orbe, / secum bella geret.” On this, Champlin makes what seems to me an incontrovertible point: “Under no circumstances is it possible to see the reign of Claudius as a period of civil war.” Townend could only feebly counter with vague talk of the conventions of imperial panegyric, sidestepping the precision of the poet’s modo. Wiseman made a (to use the term he applied to Champlin’s original thesis) heroic attempt to overcome the problem by connecting it with the abortive rebellion of Camillus Scribonianus back in 42. But this was ancient history by 54, and I do not see how a failed coup that began and ended within five days (Suet. Claud. 13) can possibly be accommodated to Calpurnius’ language.

In an otherwise close and often perceptive analysis of this part of the poem, Wiseman stops just short of lines 50–51: “... nullos iam Roma Philippos / deflebit, nullos ducet captiva triumphos.” Again, by no stretch of the imagination can this be made to suit the reign of Claudius. It is no use looking to the charge sheet of executed senators and knights presented in the Apocolocyntosis: That was lampoon, this is panegyric. Although in very guarded language, the late ruler of the end of Calpurnius’ poem is praised, not reviled. And even supposing him to have been Claudius, it was too soon to start casting aspersions upon him: We have it upon the authority of Tacitus (Ann. 14. 11) that the temporum Claudianorum obliqua insectatione did not get underway until the year 59, a consequence of Agrippina’s liquidation. Edward Gibbon, as is rarely remembered, saw in these verses “a very manifest allusion and censure,” to do with Aurelian’s leading of Tetricus in his triumphal procession, paraphrasing in addition the words of the Historia Augusta (Aur. 34. 4): “senatus, etsi aliquantulo tristior, quod senatores triumphari videbant.” I am not saying that Gibbon is necessarily right. But at the very least it is interesting to see how the great historian interpreted these verses, which most certainly suit the third century infinitely more than the reign of Claudius.

Calpurnius goes on (63–68) to make Faunus proclaim that the new age of peace shall bring back the fiery spirit of Romulus and the pacificatory genius of Numa. “Why Numa?” asks Wiseman, going on to answer his own question by finding in the reference a (for Calpurnius) necessary allusion to the family of the poet’s patron, supposedly already cloaked under the dramatic name of Meliboeus throughout the poems. I should prefer to return to Gibbon: “The voice of congratulation and flattery was not silent; and we may still peruse, with pleasure and contempt, an eclogue which was

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37 Tacitus, Ann. 14. 22, observes, of the year 60, “sidus cometes effulsit; de quo vulgi opinio est tamquam mutationem regis portendat.”
composed on the accession of the emperor Carus.” To this notion, we may link the following rigmarole on this emperor as the saviour of Rome in the Historia Augusta (Car. 2. 3): “quid deinde Numa loquar, qui frementem bellis et gravidam triumphis civitatem religione munitiv.” One could almost think the author had been reading Calpurnius here. And indeed, there may even be a planted clue to this effect: the bogus author of a bogus letter, namely Julius Calpurnius (Car. 8. 4). Furthermore, with the perennial debate over the precise meaning of Siculus in the poet’s nomenclature in mind, we should recall that the ostensible author of this biography is none other than Flavius Vopiscus of Syracuse.

Mayer’s claim that “the diction of Calpurnius is wholly classical” was absurd at the time, being both a misrepresentation of Haupt and a demonstration of ignorance of the contrary findings of Merone and Paladini made many years before.38 It looks even sillier now, after the further work of Novelli and Armstrong; I here append in a footnote some gleanings to supplement the latter.39

Mayer also set much store by Calpurnius’ prosody, in particular his supposedly “rigid practice” with regard to final o, shortening this only in the cases of puto and nescio, two verbs licensed for this procedure by Augustan poetry. Again, Armstrong has laid out the statistical evidence, and there is no need to repeat it here. In brief, since there are only about half a dozen verbs with first person o in Calpurnius, and not a single gerund long or short, we are hardly entitled to say what the poet’s practice was, rigorous or otherwise.40 As to Nemesianus, while it is true (as has often been pointed out) that he is much freer than Calpurnius in his own eclogues, it is equally true (an observation not previously prominent) that in his Cynegeticus he is much more “rigid”: only two unusual shortenings in 325 hexameters.41

39 Above all, praetorrida at 2. 80. Armstrong rightly denotes this adjective as a hapax; it should be added, to enhance the point, that the cognate verb praetorreo is found only in the 5th-century medical writer Caelius Aurelianus, Chron. 3. 8. 112. Other rarities include oleastrum (2. 44), the application of gemmeus to fons (2. 57), the figurative use of scintillare (5. 22), and the proper name Petason (6. 51, and nowhere else). This is also the place to clear up a cognate linguistic point. Horsfall and Schröder make much of the grammar and ramifications of quid tacitus, Corydon? in Calpurnius 4. 1 and quid tacitus, Mystes? in Carm. Eins. 2. 1. As to ramifications, I see nothing beyond possible echoes of, e.g. Virgil, Aen. 6. 841 quis . . . tacitum? or Horace, Epod. 5. 49 quid tacuit? Horsfall says that the expression is “a dactylic equivalent to the comic quid taces? for which I have not yet found exact parallels elsewhere.” In the case of Calpurnius, the phrase can easily be taken as going with the following verb sedes (3), causing no grammatical oddity. In the Carm. Eins. line, there is no such verb, but we can easily understand es. Or dare we say that we here have another bit of late Latin?
40 In addition, one or two more -o forms occur in the last foot of a line; Calpurnius often has ego, its o always unelided and short. There are very few elisions (none in poems 2, 4, 6) and one hiatus (7. 79). 
41 Cano in the opening line, devoto in the 5th foot of line 83. If the two fragments of a hexametric De avip us attributed to him by Gybertus Longolius in a dialogue De avibus (Cologne 1544) are genuine, then he is shown to have allowed himself the unclassical
Still in thrall to Haupt, Mayer further proclaimed that "so far as Calpurnius is concerned Statius might not have written." A doubly foolish proposition. First, Keene had pointed out some parallels nearly a century earlier, and we now have Courtney's demonstration of the breadth and depth of Calpurnius' debts to a variety of first-century poets. Second, why should a large Statian influence be presumed mandatory for Calpurnius, a writer of pastoral, as Statius was not? We have before our eyes on every page the blatant and dominating model we would expect: Virgil.\(^{42}\)

Finally, some apparently novel questions and observations which I hope may attract some response: (1) If Calpurnius is Neronian, why do we know nothing at all about him from any ancient quarter? (2) Why, despite his relative disdain for the bucolic genre, does Quintilian not mention him in Book 10?\(^{43}\) (3) Why does Juvenal not parody pastoral as he does contemporary epic? (4) Why would a poet from the first century get attached to the late-third-century Nemesianus? (5) Why would Nemesianus go back to an obscure Neronian for his borrowings? (6) The most blatant pillaging of Calpurnius by Nemesianus occurs in only one poem, his second, in which a substantial number of lines and phrases are imitated or repeated from the third of Calpurnius' eclogues.\(^{44}\) Unlike modern plagiarism, ancient debts of this sort were meant to be recognised. But how many of Nemesianus' readers could be expected to know a shadowy Calpurnius from two centuries ago? A Calpurnius much closer to his own time makes far more sense. If the Historia Augusta (Car. 11. 1) can be trusted, Nemesianus in omnibus colonitis inlustratus enicuit for his didactic epics,\(^{45}\) and had a royal competitor in Neronian. Thus, a third-century date (the precise reign or reigns must still be left open) is by far the most economical explanation for Calpurnius' poems being implicated with those of Nemesianus.\(^{46}\)

A last thought, varying Horsfall's notion of Neronian themes in a later poet. To what extent are we obliged to look for precise Roman history in these pastoral exercises? Are the imperial themes and characters the lengthening of the *u* in *gula*. There is, however, a late parallel in another African poet, Luxorius 17. 1: A touch of Africitas?

\(^{42}\) With the occasional dash of other classical poets, e.g. Noctifer (5. 121, the last line) is owed to Catullus 62. 7 where (Fordyce thinks) it was coined.

\(^{43}\) 10. 1. 55: "admirabils in suo genere Theocritus, sed musa illa rustica et pastoralis non forum modo, verum ipsum etiam urbem reformidat." There is not the slightest sign here that Quintilian was aware of any Latin pastoral poetry containing overt political and personal references.

\(^{44}\) All are conveniently indicated in the Loeb Minor Latin Poets edited by J. W. and A. M. Duff.

\(^{45}\) Is it sheer perversity that induces the HA to omit mention of Nemesianus' eclogues and to give the titles of his didactic works in Greek?

\(^{46}\) One last detail can be inserted here. Unlike most of his other editors, the Duffs indicate by the use of bold print (I use capitals) how in 4. 164–66 Calpurnius spells out the word *fatum* in a suitable context: "respiciat nostros utinam Fortuna labores / pulchrior et meritae faveaAT deus ipse iuventae! / nos tamen interea tenerUM mactabimus haedum." Such verbal tomfoolery is more characteristic of later Latin poetry than classical.
realities of the poet's own age or conventions required by Virgilian *imitatio*? Do we have to assume the "unmasking" approach of (to take the most notoriously quirky example) Léon Herrmann? Much ink has been spilled over the question of the real identity of Meliboeus in Calpurnius. But when we contemplate the last line of the first poem, *forsitan augustas feret haec Meliboeus ad aures*, is there anything more to see than an intentionally recognisable adaptation of Virgil, *Ecl. 3. 73 divum referatis ad aures*? This is a real, not a rhetorical question.48

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48 After this article was written and sent to press, there appeared, only in 1995 despite its published date, F. Williams, "Polar Bears and Neronian Propaganda," *LCM* 19.1 (Jan. 1994) 2-5. This paper abounds in information about exotic beasts and Roman shows. It does not, however, shift Calpurnius out of Nero's reign, preferring simply to regard his description of the spectacle as (in Williams' words) an artful blending of the actual and the fictional.
Eight More Conjectures on the *Cyranides*¹

DAVID BAIN

The text of the *Cyranides*² urgently requires re-editing. This is not just because of the technical inadequacies of the current edition, which was produced in 1976 by Dimitris Kaimakis.³ Important new material has become available since then in the shape of a Venetian manuscript (M), which contains several new chapters, additions to the chapters already known and also in many places interesting alternatives to the existing text.⁴ The problems for the editor are not exactly the same as those which confront the editor of, say, Galen. There can be no question of restoring or seeking to restore the *ipissisma verba* of a single author. The *Cyranides* is a compilation of a compilation of a compilation⁵ and it is therefore somewhat hazardous⁶ to make regularising emendations based upon observation of linguistic usage within the work. In addition, the *Cyranides* is the kind of

¹ Cf. D. Bain, “An Emendation in the *Cyranides* (2. 45. 6 Kaimakis),” *Sileno* 19 (1993) 383–85 and “Περιγραφα as a Medical Term and a Conjecture in the *Cyranides*,” in H. Hine, D. Innes and C. Pelling (eds.), *Ethics and Rhetoric* (Oxford 1995). Professors J. N. Adams and C. A. Faraone kindly read and commented on an earlier draft of this article. I am extremely grateful to them and also to Professor K.-D. Fischer, who located for me the paper by Kroll referred to in note 22 and sent me a copy.

² The *Cyranides*, despite its notoriety in the middle ages (see, for example, D. M. Nicol, *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium* [Cambridge 1979] 102 f.), remains an obscure work and has largely been neglected by scholars working in the fields to which it relates. The article on the *Cyranides* in Pauly–Wissowa is out of date and in some respects misleading. I am at present engaged in preparing an entry for the *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* which will appear under the title “Koeranides.” In the meantime, see my paper, “‘Treading Birds’: An Unnoticed Use of πατέω (*Cyranides*, I. 10. 27, I. 19. 9),” in E. M. Craik (ed.), *Owls to Athens*: *Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover* (Oxford 1990) 295–304.


⁶ But not necessarily misconceived. Much of the work consists of highly formulaic recipes comparable to (and sometimes actually derived from) those found in Dioscurides and the pharmacologists quoted by Galen.
text which copyists felt free to tamper with by adding recipes and rephrasing existing ones. The principal activity of the editor will not lie in the field of emendation. He will be concerned more with problems of organization, with making decisions about orthography, with disentangling the various different versions of the work and endeavouring to present an apparatus more orderly and less unhelpful than that which is to be found in Kaimakis (cf. note 37). Nevertheless there are places where the transmitted text in one or more or all of the various branches of the tradition is demonstrably corrupt or at least questionable and where it is necessary for the editor to resort to conjecture. I discuss some of these below. Not all of my suggestions are intended for advancement further than the apparatus criticus of any future edition. The starting point on each occasion is either the text printed by Kaimakis (referred to by his book and chapter numbers and the line-number of the page on which the passage appears and sometimes tacitly corrected or repunctuated by me) or, with regard to the new material from Marc. Gr. 512, that of Anna Meschini. In the latter case, “M” is added to the reference (where more than one passage appears under that numeration I have added an “a” or “b” etc.). The Latin translation is cited by page and line number from Delatte (see note 21). For a description of the manuscripts of the *Cyranides*, the reader is referred to the introduction to Kaimakis’s edition and to my article in *RFIC* (see note 4), where I provide additional detail and bibliography. Anna Meschini has promised a complete collation of M, which is yet to appear. In the meantime I have made my own collation with the aid of photographs and from time to time I refer to the readings of M in passages not edited by Meschini. Where I do not cite M verbatim I make use of two symbols: “+M” indicates that M agrees with Kaimakis’s text; “+M*” indicates that M lends support to the reading of the text quoted but does not display exact verbal correspondence.

I. 2. 2. 33 f.

οδοὺς δὲ ἀλώπεκος περιαρθεῖς ἐσχαρὰς ὥφελεί καὶ παιδᾶς ἀνωδύνως ὡδοντοφυεῖ.

Recipes for (painless) teething are fairly common in the work and the verb regularly employed in them with reference to the condition of the infant is ὡδοντοφυεῖν: τής οὖν δίξης τῆς βοτάνης μετὰ λίθου τοῦ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς τοῦ ἱχθύος περίαπτε ἐν ράκει πρὸς ὀδύνας τῶν ὡδοντοφυοῦντων παιδῶν (1. 22. 17–18); πάλιον δὲ ὁ πρῶτος πεσὼν ὡδοὺς εὐρεθεῖς ἐν τῇ φάτνῃ καὶ περιαρθεῖς παιδῶι ἀνωδύνως ποιεῖ ὡδοντοφυήσαι (2. 24 [b] M); ὁ

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7 Such texts have been categorised by Robert Halleux as “textes vivants” (see R. Halleux and J. Schamp, *Les lapidaires grecs* [Paris 1985] xvi). Compare also M. L. West, *Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique* (Stuttgart 1973) 12 f.
égékéfalos περιτριβόμενος ὤφελεί ὠδόντοφυοῦσι παιδίοις (3. 34. 7 f. +M); τούτοι οἱ ὁδόντες φοροῦμενοι ἁνωδύνως ποιοῦσιν ὠδόντοφυεῖν τὰ παιδία (4. 3. 2 f.); οἱ δὲ ὁδόντες αὐτοῦ περιπατομένοι παισίν ὠδόντοφυοῦσιν ἁμοδίοι (4. 15. 8 f. +M); τῆς οὖν ζυμαρίνης οἱ ὁδόντες ἁμοδῶσουσιν ὠδόντοφυοῦσιν παιδίοις περιαρβήνετες (4. 20. 8 f. τούτοι οἱ ὁδόντες ἁμοδίοι τοῖς ὠδόντοφυοῦσι παιδίοις περιαρβήνετες ἜJ); καὶ ὠδόντοφυοῦσι παιδίοις ἁμοδίοι (sc. οἱ μάργαροι τῶν ὀσθαλμῶν) (4. 39. 7 f. +M*); τούτου οἱ ὁδόντες παισίν ὠδόντοφυοῦσι περιπατομένοι ἁνωδύνως φύουσι καὶ πάσας ὠδόνταλγίαν περιπατόμενοι ἰόνται (4. 59. 2–3). Here, however, apparently we have a transitive/causative use.\(^8\)

Ostensibly there is a parallel for this in the chapter on the eagle (2. 1. 10): οἱ δὲ ὁδόντες ὠδόνταλγίαν καὶ περιαρβήνετες παιδίοις ἁνωδύνως ὠδόντοφυοῦσιν.\(^9\)

But this is just as likely to be an anacoluthon (cf. below) so that there exists no secure parallel for the transitive use of the verb in this work.\(^10\)

Instead of the indicative ὠδόντοφυεῖ five manuscripts have the infinitive ὠδόντοφυεῖν.\(^11\) This suggests the existence of a version which

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\(^9\) ὠδόντοφυοῦσιν IODN: ὠδόντας φύουσιν AGHF. R has a different phraseology, in which ὠδόντοφυοῦσι functions as a participle: ὠδόντοφυοῦσιν περιαρβήνετες ἁνωδύνως φύουσιν ποιοῦσιν. A passage similar to 2. 1. 10 is found at 4. 59. 2 f. τούτου οἱ ὁδόντες παισίν ὠδόντοφυοῦσιν περιπατομένοι ἁνωδύνως φύουσιν (οἱ τῶν παιδίων ὁδόντες) καὶ πάσαν ὠδόνταλγιαν περιπατόμενοι ἰόνται, where again I would think in terms of an anacoluthon, although the coordination with ἰόνται might be thought to make this more difficult. The Latin unusually is rather far from the Greek here and does not settle the view: "synagridos dentes facit ad orum dentium et ad omnem dolorem dentium" (199. 2 f.).

Clearly de Mély takes φύουσι as causative when he translates, "ses dents, suspendues au cou des enfants qui font leurs dents, les font sortir sans douleur et guerissent tous les maux de dents" (F. de Mély, Les lapidaires de l’antiquité et du moyen âge III [Paris 1902] 135). For the normal use of φύουσι in the work, compare ταύτης τοῦ αἴμα ἐν ἐπιχήρεις προεκτίσας τάς τῶν βλεφάριν τρίχας, οὐκέτι ἄλλα φυσάντω (2. 28. 4 f.); ταύτης τοῦ αἴμα ἐν ἐπιχήρεις τόπως (? π.) ἦ προεκτίσας τάς εὐρισκομένας τρίχας, οὐκέτι αὐθίν πέστε φυσάντω (3. 33. 4 f.); βεβηλλάν καυθείς τήν τέφραν ὕξει λείας καὶ ἐκτίλας τάς ἐν βλεφάριοι τρίχας ἢ ἄλλου τίνος μέρους τοῦ σώματος οὐ βούλει, υπόχρει καὶ οὐκέτι φυσάντω (4. 8. 2 f.).

\(^10\) AGHF: this is a less impressive array than it at first sight appears since, as I shall argue elsewhere, GHF have no independent value. They are very closely related to A and, in view of their total non-contribution to the restoration of the text, it is unnecessary to cite them along with A.

\(^11\) ὠδόντοφυεῖ is found five times in the Corpus Hippocraticum, twice as an articul inframmary and three times as a participle agreeing with the word for child (understood). Of the seven occurrences of the verb in Galen—three in fact are from Archigenes cited by Galen and one (the infinitive) is found in a quotation from the Hippocratic Aphorisms—one is in the form of an infinitive, five are participial and agree with a word for child. The only indicative occurrence (from Archigenes) has as its subject τὰ βρέφη (understood).
contained a main verb which has subsequently dropped out. I would add therefore, either at the end of the sentence or directly before the infinitive, <ποιεῖ>: cf. 1. 14. 29 f. ἢ δὲ κεφαλὴ τοῦ ἰχθύος ἐπιθυμιωμένη καὶ μετὰ σμύρνης ἐνθουσιάζεται ποιεῖ τοὺς ὀσφραινομένους, 2. 24 (b) M and 4. 3. 2 f. quoted above. Alternatively, read παρασκευάζει rather than ποιεῖ. The construction will then be the same as that found in όνυχες δὲ καυθέντες ἀλοπεκίας τριχοποιεῖν παρασκευάζουσι (2. 3 [b] M). In suggesting this I do not intend to deny the possibility that other branches of the tradition contained ὀδοντοφυεῖν used causatively.

II. 2. 4 (d) M

In one of the new extracts from the Cyranides edited by Anna Meschini a further medicinal quality of the fox is described:

πλὴν δὲ ζώσαν εἶναν ἐλαϊώ τις ἐνήση ἐὼς οὗ τὰ ὀστὰ μόνα ὑπολειφθοσι τοὺς ποδαλγοῦς καὶ ἀρθριτικοὺς ἀπαλλάττει ἀλειφόμενος. (This follows directly on 2. 2. 39–41 Kaimakis: ἢ δὲ κόπρος αὐτοῦ μετ᾽ ὄξους λειωμένη λειχήνας θεραπεύει, σὺν δὲ στέατι ἐπιπαθείσα ἀλωπεκίας δασύνει.)

Πλὴν here cannot mean “except” or “except that.” As it stands it must be functioning as a progressive particle, a usage of πλὴν that can be illustrated

12 Cf. also 1. 2. 9 f. (quoted below), 2. 22. 18 τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπως παχύνεσθαι όπότο παρασκευάζουσι (WKS simply have ἀνθρώπως παρασκευάζουσι [ποιοῦσι Κ]; it is worth considering emending ἀνθρώπως to ἀνθρώπως on the assumption that παχύνεσθαι όπότο has accidentally been omitted in this branch of the tradition, a circumstance that may have led to the “correction” ἀνθρώπως), 4. 39. 5 ξηρὰ δὲ φορουμένη λαμπρᾶς ἐσθείες καὶ ἐνηδόνως παρασκευάζει (Κ + Μ*): for λαμπρῶς Μ has λαξὺρως, i.e. λάξυρος = forter in the Latin translation, 194. 10; it omits καὶ ἐνηδόνως), and Orphica Lithica Kerygmata 7. 7 (p. 151 Halleux–Schamp) τοιούτῳ δὲ ψυχρῷ τυχόντων ταχύτερον τούτων παρασκευάζειν ζέειν τε καὶ ἀναπαφλάζειν (sc. λέγοντα). The same construction figures in the difficult text 4. 5 (a) Μ: ἰκαναὶ δὲ <ἐν> ἄγγειοι φρυγεῖσαι μετ᾽ ὄξους καταχριθεῖσαι μέλιτος πάχος (suspectum) τῶς ἐλκυσμένας τρίτας μηκέτι αὐθίς ἐκβλαστήσαι παρασκευάζειν. Παρασκευάζει is the reading of Μ. Is Meschini right to change it to the infinitive? I assume she construes it with ἰκανάν, which is not the most obvious way of interpreting the sentence, even allowing that ἰκανάν means “sufficient” here. Often in later texts ἰκανάν means “lots of,” “plenty of,” rather than “sufficient” or “enough to” (see W. Bauer, Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neues Testaments und der übrigen archaischen Literatur s.v.). There are only two further examples of the adjective in the Cyranides: κεδαρίας ἦ ῥοδίνῳ τὸ ἰκανόν (1. 21. 22), where it retains its original meaning, and, significantly perhaps, in a passage in Μ, κακόθρονον εἶδο ἰκανά (2. 30. 2 Μ), where ἰκανά must be the equivalent of πολλά. Have we not here another case of lack of concord of the kind to which Meschini herself draws attention and which she defends (p. 151, on 2. 3 [a] 6 Μ καυθείσαι δὲ καὶ πίσση συμμιχεῖσαι αἰμορραγίαν ρῖνόν ἔστησιν)?

13 For ποδαλγός, given by LSJ only from Lycus apud Oribas. 9. 43. 1, cf. Cyr. 2. 6. 8, 3. 1. 75, 3. 29. 5.
in prose from Aristotle onwards.\(^\text{14}\) The presence of the following δὲ, which performs the same function as πλὴν, is surprising. Πλὴν followed by δὲ (where πλὴν functions as a particle rather than as a preposition) is not signalled as a combination by the lexica or mentioned in Blomqvist's discussion of the use of the particle in later Greek.\(^\text{15}\) With the help of the CD-ROM of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae I have unearthed a single, apparent, example: ps.-Galen, \textit{De urinis ex Hipp. Gal. et aliis quibusdam} 19. 615 Kühn, όφον μὲν όνον ἄριστον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ύγείαι καὶ εὐεξίας διακειμένων ἀνθρώπων ὑπόπυρρόν τε ἢ ὑπάξανθων καὶ τῶι πάχει σύμμετρον κείμενον, τοιοῦτον τῇ χροιαὶ οἴον ὀπουριηθῆ, λειαν δὲ καὶ λευκὴν καὶ ὁμάλην ὑπόλοσταιν ἤχον παρὰ πάντα τὸν χρόνον, πλὴν δὲ κατὰ λόγον τοῦ πινομένου. The two examples may be thought to protect each other, but I find that πλὴν in the ps.-Galen is not as void of meaning as in the Cyranidean (it does connote the sense “except”) and I remain suspicious about the collocation in the \textit{Cyranides}. The most obvious solution would be to delete δὲ. More speculatively, one might read πάλιν δὲ, “and again,” “and in turn.”\(^\text{16}\) The corruption posited (the sense, however, being different) is to be found elsewhere in M, where, in the part of the chapter on the crane corresponding to 3. 11. 3 ff., M reads ὅταν γὰρ χειμῶνες βριοροὶ μέλλουσι (sic) γίνεσθαι καταλιπόντες τὸ βόρεια φεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον καὶ σπερμολογοῦντες διατρέφονται πλὴν δὲ τὸ ἔχρ υποστρέφουσιν εἰς πάσας τὰς χώρας οὕτως ἤπειρα. The other two manuscripts transmitting this passage have πάλιν δὲ.\(^\text{17}\)

Πλὴν is found three times elsewhere in the work heading a sentence or clause, in each case in isolation introducing a statement or instruction which modifies what preceded: ή οὖν βοτάνη σὺν οἶνοι πινομένῃ ὀδοποιήσε τὰ νεμόμενα. πλὴν ὑποτεθείσα ἐμβρυα κατασπάι καὶ δυσουρητικοὺς αἵμα ὀφείλει παρασκευάζει (1. 2. 9 f.); ἐάν οὖν τις πρὸ ὀρας τῆς συνοισίας πᾶσῃ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αἰδιὸν ἐκ τοῦ γινομένου ξηρίου ἀπὸ τῆς βοτάνης εἴθ' οὕτως συνέλθη τῇ γυναικὶ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὴν ἐγράφαται. πλὴν πρὸ τοῦ πάσαι τὸ αἰδιὸν, ὁφείλει χρῖσαι τὸῦτο μέλιτι (1. 18. 15-17); εἴτε ὰθόποικες καὶ ὀπτίσαντες διδόσιν ἔσθειν τῷ μέλλοντι παχυνθῆναι καὶ γίνεται παχοῦς. πλὴν μηδὲν τῶν τῆς ὄρνθος καταλειπτέον, μόνον δὲ τὰ ἐνδοθέν αὐτῆς σὺν τοῖς ἐντέροις ῥιπτέον ἵνα μὴ βλάβης γένωται πρόξενα (2. 22. 21-24).

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\(^{14}\) See J. Blomqvist, \textit{Greek Particles in Hellenistic Prose} (Lund 1969) 88 ff. I follow Blomqvist in referring to πλὴν simply as a particle (rather than a conjunction or adverb) in cases where it is not a preposition.

\(^{15}\) Blomqvist (previous note) 91 finds single examples of πλὴν ὄλλα and πλὴν μέντοι, but in each instance πλὴν is adversative.

\(^{16}\) Πάλιν δὲ is common enough in technical writing, but I have been unable to find an instance where it simply moves us on to a new topic. It tends to head clauses containing verbs of adding or moving.

\(^{17}\) See my discussion in the RFIC article (above, note 4) 444.
Another new extract describes an additional way of curing colic by using deer’s dung:

ομοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν κόπρον τοῦ ζώιον ξηράνας κόψας σείσας, τὸ αὐτὸ
δράνε φασί. (The passage follows 2. 11. 13 Kaimakis.)

The anacoluthon consisting of a nominative participial construction, τὴν
κόπρον τοῦ ζώιον ξηράνας κόψας σείσας, followed by a change of subject
in the main clause is characteristic of the work and presents no problem,\(^\text{18}\)
but what is the meaning of σείσας? Unless σείω is to be given an
unattested meaning, we should write σήσας. The manuscripts are full of
etacistic errors, although “errors” with reference to a work of this character
is perhaps a misnomer.\(^\text{19}\) It is perfectly possible and even quite likely that
the man who first committed this sentence to writing did indeed spell it in
the way we find it spelt in the Venetian manuscript. What he meant by it,
however, was certainly “having sieved,” not “having shaken.” The modern
editor of a work like the Cyranides is constantly faced with difficult
decisions regarding questions of orthography. Meschini makes it her
practice to correct etacistic errors; Kaimakis has no stated policy and in
practice is totally inconsistent.\(^\text{20}\) The appearance in the text of a word like
σείσας in this context can only confuse the reader and it ought, at the very
least, to be pointed out in the apparatus that in effect it represents σήσας.

That σήσας represents a form of σήθω and means “having sieved” can
be established by consideration of three parallel passages, one from Book 1
and two from Book 2:

1) A recipe for dry myrrh is given: κόστου ὅγ. γ’, νάρδου στάχυὸς
ὅγ. ἡμίσειαν, καρπῶν βαλάκιμου ὅγ. γ’, ἀμώμου ὅγ. ἡμίσειαν,
καρυοφύλλου ὅγ. β’, κασσίας ὅγ. β’ ἡμίσιν, στῦρακος ὅγ. ε’, μόσχου
καλοῦ γραμμάρια β’, ροθῶν ἐξονυχισμένων ὅγ. δ’ ταῦτα ἁλρά κόψον
καὶ σεῖσον καλῶς (1. 18. 30 ff.). The Latin translator\(^\text{21}\) renders ταῦτα

\(^{18}\) 2. 10 is a good example if the interpretation of ὄδοντόταφον ὁσίν offered above is
correct. (Cf. also 4. 9. 10 f., quoted above: a participial phrase containing μίξας is followed by
a main clause containing the verb δόξουσιν.) I discuss the phenomenon in the study
mentioned in the following note.

\(^{19}\) A comprehensive discussion of the phonology and orthography of the Cyranides will
form part of an extended study of the work which I hope to publish in the near future.

\(^{20}\) See Meschini (above, note 4) 151. On Kaimakis, see the work referred to in the previous
note. He is equally inconsistent regarding the confusion of ω and ω and of ο and ο.

\(^{21}\) The text of the Latin version, an extremely important witness for the text, totally and
unaccountably neglected by Kaimakis, is to be found in L. Delatte, Textes latins et vieux
français relatif aux Cyranides (Liège and Paris 1942). In this same chapter, in a passage
preserved by only two manuscripts, these divide between συνθεῖς and σείσας (1. 18. 38). The
Latin here supports the former: et omnibus permixtis (79. 1). The text of this passage as printed
by Kaimakis differs quite radically in several respects from the Latin and demands a separate
discussion.
ξηρά κόψων καὶ σείσον καλὸς by “tere arida tenuissime et cribra diligenter” (78. 15). Clearly he took σείσον to be σήσον.

2) In the chapter on the mole a recipe for a special magic potion reads as follows: σκευάζεται δὲ ἐκ τούτου καὶ γευστόν, μεγάλην ἐνέργειαν ἐμποιοῦν τῷ γευσμένῳ. έναν γὰρ τις ἀπογευεῖται τοῦ ήλίου ἀνατέλλοντος δάκτυλον ἕνα, προγνώσσε τὰ γινόμενα ἐώς ὅù δύσει ὁ ἥλιος. έστι δὲ ἡ σκευὴ τῆς ἀπογεύεσσας αὐτή· λαβῶν ξύνων τὸν ἀσφάλακο ἀπόπνιξον ἐν ὑδάτι ομβρίοι κοτύλας γ’· εἶτα ἔνε ἕως ὃù τακτῆ καὶ κηρωθῆ. εἶτα δυσλίας τὸ ὕδωρ ἔψε ἐν χαλκῷ ἁγγείως ἐπιβαλὼν εἶδή ταύτα· εἶτα σκεύαζε οὕτως· θεογόνου ῥίζης (ἐν ἄλλας γράφει) θεόπνου) οὐγ. δ’, ἀρτεμισίας μονοκλώνου οὐγ. δ’, στύρακος καλαμίτου οὐγ. δ’, σμύρνης τρωγλοδυτικῆς οὐγ. δ’, βδελλίου οὐγ. δ’, σφαιρίου οὐγ. δ’, λιβάνου ἄρρενου οὐγ. η’, ταῦτα κόψας, σείσας καὶ ἐνώσας τῶι ἐννηθέντι ἀσφάλαικι ἐπιβαλλε μέλιτος πρώτῳ κοτύλην α’ καὶ πάλιν ἔψε ἕως ὃù γενήται μέλιτος πάχος καὶ οὕτως ἁνελόμενος ἀπόθου ἐν ὑλινῶι ἁγγείοι καὶ χρῶ ὡς εἰρήται (2. 3. 15 ff.). Here the Latin translator renders ταύτα κόψας, σείσας καὶ ἐνώσας by “tere et cribra.” Clearly once more he took σείσας to be σήσας.

3) In the chapter on the cow a further recipe involving dung is set out: ταύτης τὴν κόψρων λαβῶν ξηράν λείωσον καὶ σείσας (+M) στήσον λίτρον α’, κηροῦ οὐγ. ζ’, κράμβης χυλοῦ οὐγ. ζ’ (ἢ γ’ ὡς ἐν ἄλλωι), ὥλα ωμά γ’, ἔλαιου καλοῦ λίτρον α’, λείσσαν τὰ ξηρὰ καὶ τῆσθιν τὰ τηκτατεῖτα καθελῶν καὶ χλιάνας βάλλε τὰ ὀλλα καὶ συλλείσι καλῶς· καὶ ἐκ τούτου κατάπλασσε σπληνικοῦς, ἱππατικοῦς, ὑδρωπικοῦς, ὄμοιας καὶ ὑδροκοίλους καὶ ποδαλγοὺς, καὶ πάραυτα μεγάλως ὡφελησίς. τούτῳ κρύβε ὡς μέγα δώρον (2. 6. 3 ff.). Here the Latin runs: “huius stercus acceptum siccum tere, cribra, pensa libram unam” etc. (100. 12 f.). Once again it is clear that the translator regards σείσας as the aorist of σήσω. Note that this passage also contains a reference to drying the dung (ξηρᾶν). This corresponds to ξηράνας in the passage under discussion.

Unfortunately there is nothing in the Latin to match the new Venetian extract.23 It is noticeable that in all three parallel passages the translator apparently renders the imperative of κόπτω with “rub.” (It may be, however, that he had before him a verb other than κόπτω, τρίβω for instance. However that may be, the argument concerning σείσας is not affected.) For the collocation of κόπτω and σήσω, compare e.g. Cyr. “5” (see note 35). 1. 8 κοπείσα καὶ σεισθείσα (sic), Dioscurides 5. 49 (3. 30.

22 Cf. below in the same chapter ἐν ἄλλοι γράφει τὴν ἐπ’ αἰῶνων (2. 3. 38 f.), where W. Kroll reasonably suggests reading γράφεται (“Analecta Graeca,” Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Vorlesungsverzeichniss der Universität Greifswald [1901] 14). Should we not also read γράφεται here?

23 None of the new material concerning land animals or quadrupeds (that is to say the parts that correspond to Book 2 of the Cyranides) is reflected in the Latin version. On the other hand, the new material found in the sections dealing with birds and fish has presented us with the Greek text of passages hitherto known only from the Latin.
A malicious use of the donkey’s rump-hairs is described:

\[ \text{τρίχας δὲ ἐκ τῆς πυγῆς τοῦ ὄνου ἓν καύσης καὶ λειώσας δώσης ἐν ποτῶ γυναικί, οὐ παύσεται πέρδεσθαι.} \]

\[ Λύσις δὲ αὐτῆς ὃνου θηλείας τρίχας καύσας δίδου πιεῖν ὀμοίως. \]

\[ \text{Λύσις δὲ αὐτῆς would have to mean “the release of her,” “to release her” (the woman), but this expression raises suspicion. One expects in a magical prescription the technical term λύσις to be used not with a dependent genitive denoting the victim of a spell, but one which denotes the spell itself or the condition of the victim. In other words one expects a separative rather than an objective genitive.} \]

\[ \text{There are two clear examples in the magic papyri of λύσις used of the breaking of a spell. Neither of these supports λύσις αὐτῆς: ἕν πρὸς λύσιν φαρμάκων (PGM 13. 253); γραφέτω δὲ τὴν λύσιν αὐτοῦ ὀπίσω πετάλου} \]

\[ \text{24 The language of Greek medical recipes is extremely conservative. For the use of σῆμα in the Hippocratic Corpus, see D. Golitz, Studien zur altorientalischer und griechischer Heilkunde: Therapie, Arzneibereitung, Rezeptsstruktur, Sudhoffs Archiv, Beiheft 16 (Wiesbaden 1974) 183, where she notes its tendency to follow κόπτειν.} \]

\[ \text{25 Πέρδεν R: πέρδουσα I (a regularising conjecture attempting to restore more classical syntax?). I shall be arguing elsewhere that it is unnecessary to regularise by emending πέρδεν to its normal middle form, πέρδεσθαι, as Kaimakis does. Compare ZPE 63 (1986) 104.} \]

\[ \text{26 Λύω does not appear to be used with a direct object of releasing someone from a spell (or at least the lexica do not single out this usage). C. A. Faraone, however, points out that ἀναλῶ is used in this way, adducing Men. Her. fr. 5 (curiously misinterpreted in Gomme–Sandbach) and Lucian, Vit. auct. 25.} \]

\[ \text{27 Panayiotou (above, note 8) appears to be unaware of these passages since he registers (322) the meanings “counterspell,” “spell-breaker,” “antidote” for λύσις as “new.”} \]

\[ \text{28 “The spell to annul this spell should be written on the reverse of the lamella” (M. Smith in H. D. Betz [ed.], The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, 2nd ed. [Chicago 1992] 194).} \]

\[ \text{29 At 7. 178 (from the παίγνια of “Democritus”) we find the expression λύσις ἔλαιοι with no genitive depending on λύσις. This has been rendered “to relieve him” (R. Kotansky in The Greek Magical Papyri [previous note] 120). Perhaps, in view of the absence of a parallel for the objective genitive following λύσις, it is better to offer a more non-committal translation such as Preisendanz’s “Mittel zur Erlösung.” Λύσις ἔλαιοι recurs in P. Oxy. 3835 (= Supplementum Magicum II, edited with translations and notes by R. W. Daniel and F. Maltonini [Opladen 1991] no. 86) fr. A. ii. 7, where again the editor understands a genitive referring to the victim of the spell (in this case a thief). I do not fully understand a further passage in which λύσις is to be found (15. 2); compare The Greek Magical Papyri 251 n. 1.} \]
Compare also Hipp. Berl. 33. 9, CHG 1. 170. 4 ff. (drawn to my attention by J. N. Adams): τοιούτων γὰρ προσφερομένων, λύσις γίνεται τοῦ κνησμοῦ . . . (λύσις γίνεται τοῦ κνησμοῦ is translated in the Mulomedicina 459 by solutio fit vulsionis).

In our work we may contrast the two other places where we meet λύσις:

1) 1. 24. 113 ἐὰν δὲ τῆς μανινίδος τὴν γλώσσαν νεαρᾶς οὐσίας δόσης τινὶ λειανθέσιαν μεθ᾽ ὤδατος, βαλὼν δὲ τὸν δακτύλιον κάτω δόσης πιεῦν μανιμομένωι, σωθήσεται: ei δὲ νήφοντι,30 μανήσεται. τούτου λύσις-μανινίδα ὑπήν δῶς φαγεῖν: μανήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄγνων τὰ λεχθέντα ἄπαντα, ὡς φράζει Κυρανίς θεία βροτοῖς.

2) 3. 50. 9 ei δὲ καὶ δόσης πιεῦν ἐκ τῆς τέφρας (sc. τοῦ χελιδόνος), μανήσεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔροτος. λύσις δὲ τούτου· λαβὼν ἐκ τῆς τέφρας τῶν νεοσσῶν τῶν ἀποστρεφομένων ἀλειψον ἡ πότισον, καὶ ἀποστραφήσεται ὁ ἐρώς ἡ πολύς.

Further suspicion attaches to the text under discussion when one looks at the Latin version: “solutio autem eius rei est, si asinae feminae pilos combusseris et ad potandum dederis” (123. 13–24. 2).

In fact λύσις δὲ αὐτῆς is weakly attested. Six of the nine manuscripts transmitting this chapter omit its last sixteen lines and one the last fifteen. Only one of the two remaining manuscripts (I) transmits λύσις δὲ αὐτῆς. The other (R) has ἐὰν ἐστὶν ἡ θριξ ὁνοῦ θηλείας following πέρδειν. Wellmann,31 apparently without access to the reading of I and starting from the Latin and R, assumes that R omits λύσις by accident and reads accordingly: λύσις δὲ ἐστιν ἡ θριξ ὁνοῦ θηλείας καυθείσα καὶ ἐν ποταί δοθείσα. I think he may be correct to assume the existence of a lacuna in R, but this is a clear instance, typical of the transmission of this work, where scribes present us with alternative versions and where a single, original, authentic text cannot be restored with certainty. All the editor can do is correct each version where it is corrupt. In this instance I believe that the text of I offers a corruption of λύσις δὲ τούτου.32 ὁνοῦ θηλείας τρίχας καύσας δίδου πιεῦν ὑμοίως. This would be extremely close to the Latin version, in which too we find a second person verb, albeit in the form of a conditional clause: “solutio autem eius rei est, si asinae feminae pilos combusseris et ad potandum dederis.”

30 For νήφον meaning “sane,” cf. Cyr. 2. 4. 4.
31 M. Wellmann, Marcellus von Side als Arzt und die Koiraniden des Hermes Trismegistos, Philologus Suppl. 27.2 (Leipzig 1934) 31 n. 90.
32 It is also conceivable that the scholar-scribe in question, Constantine Laskaris, rather than corrupting his exemplar or faithfully transcribing a corrupt exemplar, mistakenly “corrected” τούτου to αὐτῆς, basing himself on the context rather than on usage. Laskaris copied I in 1474 in Messina, whence it travelled to Madrid. See J. M. F. Pomar, “La colección de Uceda y los manuscritos griegos de Constantino Láscharis,” Emerita 34 (1966) 211–88, 233.
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V. 3. 23. 4

tovutov h kardia fofoumena metata kissov rizhys taz spoumenas ynnaiqas pawei. omiois de therapeuei kai duouroian.

'Omiois de kai is a common collocation in the work (as is omiois kai). Only here, however, do we find a sentence or clause opening with omiois de33 in which the collocation is broken up by another word. For omiois de kai, see omiois de kai airomuthous (sc. apalladzei) (1. 1. 12); omiois de kai th kropos tou thetou perichromeni apallassei kai o lithos periaforeis h to steaier tou iexhous diachromenon diosewcei34 (sc. murempikias) (1. 1. 49 f.); omiois de kai h thleia to auto poiei (1. 2. 15 f.); omiois de kai oi onuxhes meta rodinou leiospontes otalgian idontai (2. 4 [c] M); omiois de kai ev toin evwnymon (sc. periaigon) (2. 24. 32 f.); omiois de kai oi sitoforoi arourai to auto poioudsan (2. 25. 11 f.); omiois de kai h aix kerasa mi exousa to auto drai en auto forh (2. 39. 10 f.); omiois de kai toin petrygon apo toin omon (sc. lebain to petrapa) (3. 1. 33: de om. M); omiois de kai ischia therapeuei (3. 24. 5); omiois de kai epaleipomenon thriodhtkous ofelei (3. 31. 5); omiois de kai toin pelarogon kai toin pelekanw oin oligous kai toin ev autois allon onen (sc. idoic an) (3. 36. 18-19); omiois de kai to auto khxos kai to auto tawos (sc. poiei proo chrusopoin) (3. 55. 14); omiois de kai to auto tis xeliadonos kai melainousi trichas kai leukomata (3. 55. 17); omiois de kai nh or thalassion miqas duouxous thalassan oran (4. 9. 10-11). In view of these examples it is perhaps worth considering the possibility that something is missing before therapeuei; read, for example, omiois de <kai lithourian> therapeuei kai duouroian (cf. 3. 46. 5, where lithouria and duouroia are coupled).35 The word-order, object + verb of healing +

33 According to E. Gherro, "L'Aquila nella farmacopoea medioevale e Bizantina. Con testi inediti dal Marc. gr. 512," Atti e memorie dell'Acc. Patavina di Science, Lettere e Arti, Memorie 88 (1975-76), III, 125-35, 130, M, at the equivalent of 3. 1. 33 Kaimakis, reads omiois de tout court. This is incorrect. What it has is clearly the ligature symbolising kai. In Dioscurides there are four examples of sentences or clauses beginning omiois de kai, two with simply omiois de. These two are Dioscurides 1. 34 (1. 38. 13-15 Wellmann) omiois de skevaqetai tois proeiomevnous to te seismon ev to seismon kai to karinon ev to karinon (as 30 32. 2 (3. 24. 8-10 Wellmann) omiois de ev diastramata ekloymbanetai to teataron kai pempton apobyregma oxiqen, oin anti to oxiqen charontai. In the latter instance, Wellmann's apparatus indicates that the manuscript E reads omiois de kai.

34 I suspect diosewcei. Who wants to preserve warts? I would delete and understand apallassei.

35 Or, perhaps, stragouria; compare 4. 14. 16, 4. 28. 24, "5." 15. 5 (quoted at the end of the following note), "5." 17. 9 (in the two central examples stragouria is coupled with duouroia). "5" indicates that I do not accept the attribution to Book 5 of the Cyranoides of the extracts on the curative powers of plants found in the manuscripts D and N under the heading eperon peri bozetou kato stoichion ev tou Lextiou. I hope shortly to publish my reasons for this. In the meantime, see Halleux-Schamp (above, note 7) xxviii n. 1.
second object introduced by καί, is common enough in the work, though with ἵπται rather than θεραπεύει. For an example with θεραπεύει, see Dioscurides 1. 105 (= 1. 99. 5–7 Wellmann): ἀναγράφεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φθαρτικοῖς, ἀγεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐμβρύα καὶ λειχήνας θεραπεύει καὶ λέπραν.

VI and VII. 3. 34. 21 ff.

In the section on the domestic fowl, περὶ ὀρνιθῶς, the last sentence is preserved in a single manuscript (K):

ἐν φρενίτιδι δὲ ἡ ὀρνις σφαγείσα καὶ ἑτί ζέουσα σχισθείσα τῶν ἐγκάτων αὐτῆς πάντων ὁμοίων αὐτῆς δὲ ἐπιτιθεμένη τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ πάσχοντος μεγάλως ὀνύνησιν.

There are two puzzles here. 1) Why should a creature that has had its throat cut be described as “still boiling”? 2) What is the significance of αὐτῆ; Why stress that the bird be placed on the “very head” of the patient?

The second puzzle is easily resolved. We should read αὐτῆ, the bird itself being contrasted with the parts of it which have been thrown away (ῥίπτω is regular in this meaning in the Cyranides and elsewhere in works containing prescriptions). This use of the pronoun αὐτοῦ to distinguish the creature from its body parts (or to indicate one of the ingredients of an amulet being used on its own rather than in conjunction with other elements) is widespread in the work (sometimes in combination with καθ’ ἐαυτὸν/-ήν/-ό): λίθος δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐχῖνου μετὰ ἐνός κόκκου σατυρίου.

36 See podáγραν ἱόντας καὶ δυσουρίαν (1. 21. 51); ἐν ὀλίγῳ δὲ ὀβείδοι η νάρδοι συνεψηθείς ὑπάλαγια iόται καὶ ῥαγάδας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ποισὶν (2. 16. 8 f.); τῆς δὲ θηλέας ἡ κόπρος σὺν μέλιτι καταχρησιμὴν λεία χορίας τάς iόται καὶ πάσαν σκληριάν μαστῶν (2. 35 13 f.); σὺν ὅξει δὲ καὶ κυμαλίας συμπχειμόνω ἀλφροὺς μελανοῦς iόται καὶ φακοὺς ὥσεως (2. 39. 4 f.); τὸ δὲ ἵπτα τῆς ξηρῆν ἐσθιομένων τεταρταϊόντων iόται καὶ τρουμίκως καὶ καρδίακος (2. 40. 32 f.); καὶ ὁ πνεύμων καὶ ὁ ἀπλήν ξηρὰ ἐν ποτό ἐπιπάσοδον τὰ ὄμοια ιόνται καὶ πάν πάθος (2. 41. 22 f.); τὸ δὲ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐφροσύπλατα καὶ χίμελα iόται καὶ τοὺς θαλάσσιους λαχοὺς φαγόντας (3. 3. 6 f.); ὀστά ὑ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτοῦ περφυθέντα ἐν μίας πορφυρί πέρι τὸν ἄγκωνα κεφαλάληγαν iόται καὶ χρονιάν σκώσασιν κεφαλῆς (3. 9. 3 f.); ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλος αὐτοῦ λειωθεὶς σὺν κεηρίᾳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ παλαιώ καὶ περιχρισθεῖς τοῖς κρόταφοις πάσαν κεφαλάληγαν iόται καὶ κάρωσιν (3. 9. 6 f.); τούτου οἱ ὄψιναι περιστρομένοι ὄρθαλμια ιόνται καὶ τρήταν καὶ τεταρταῖον (3. 35. 2 f.); λειωθεία καὶ καταχρησιμία μετάπτω κεφαλάληγαν ἄκρως iόται καὶ χιμελα καὶ πυρικτιστα καὶ τὰ ἔξ ἱλίου (3. 37. 20 f.); ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἀγρίου χνῦνός κόπρος θυμωμένη δαιμόνας ἀπελεύνει καὶ λήθεργον iόται καὶ ὠστερὶ ἐπιγάδα (3. 51. 20 f.); ταύτῃς ἡ τέφρα ἐπιπασομένῃ ἑλκους σηπεδόνας iόται καὶ στόματα (4. 38 M). Compare also “5.” 15. 5 καὶ ἐφθή δὲ πυνομένη δυσουρίαν παυέν καὶ στραγγουρίαν . . .

37 The way this information is conveyed in Kaimak's apparatus is unfortunately all too characteristic: “ἐν . . . ὄνινησιν om. AGHFIOTDNWS.”

38 1. 12. 9. 1. 21. 25. 2. 13. 4. 2. 22. 24; cf. also Dioscurides 5. 17. 1 (3. 17. 7 Wellmann) αὐτῆ (sc. τὴν σκίλλαν) μὲν ῥίγον, τὸ δὲ ὄρος ὑλίας καταγγέλει καὶ ἀποτίθεσο and P. Holm. 759 (R. Halleux, Les alchemistes grecs I [Paris 1981] 138) αὐτὰ μὲν ῥίγον, τὰ δὲ ἔρια ἑστιμένα χαλάσας ποίησον.
keklasménos kai dióðménos én póseis hí bróswi megísth enántas poieitá, málistà tôn mì duvaménon svnuosiazein méte svxhýn àntì svxhýn ktiéin. áutòs dé o lýthos kath' éauton periantóménos megísthn éntpezían paréchei kai ènttasen tois mì duvaménon svnuosiazein (1. 18. 45 ff.); árhoxhí pétasos eis pán ënnavon èaktivéménos èpisachtikós èstín, málistà dé èpi tôn peri toús daktylóis prouskroumáton. áutì (áutì M; copexi) dé állevhésia khrwí, kai málistà o kalóuménon lýkos, kai èpitéhésia èpi tôn krotafrōu, tritaióu àpolóuei (2. 5. 2 ff. M); toútou (sc. tôn batráxhou) tôn hλósasan éan tis kómpsi, áutòn dé àpolóúsi ζónta ... (2. 5. 3-4); tôús dé órcheis áutìs ápótemen én àpokrouseí, áutính dé ζóssan áfes (2. 7. 19 f.); ó dé sýlelos tôn kochlìwn ánakkollai tríxhá blyeráron. áutòs dé sín tôn oístrákois leios trithés meta oínon kalou kai svýrnhs kai foitínkón sarkh kai potheis kallikous thersapeúei (2. 31. 11 ff. M); tâ dé èntòs áutòu kai h kóprhos thumívome na vàn fàulon àpodiókousi kai magían. áutòs dé èshthímenos duxentrikou thersapeúei (3. 42. 11-12); tô dé aîma áutìs therrhòn ènstaàёмénon onbashóimwn ùpsosfiýmata (I. ùpsosfiýmata?) ístai kai h àfrodos stn rodínni leioúmeni kai xrioménì ýstéran thersapeúei. trughw dé àutì èshthímén soufrosúnni kai andríasai kai gynaiéon àllhlois èregázetai <kal> álfoús melaínas ístai (3. 43. 6 f.); h dé térra àutôn te kai tôn mhtérwn stn méliit diachríomiéne svnuochikous ístai kai bròchhòn èlkta stn melikratía piineumh. áutì dé h xelidhwn svnexhos èshthímén ierán nómwn thersapeúei (3. 50. 12 ff.); táutìs to hípar òlon stn tìi xholi éan leiwásas stn oínon dòmìs piein lēthra tinì, oúdeptote dýnhsaitai piein oínon. áutình dé òllh ζóssan eis oínon émbhlteisín ... (4. 16. 4 ff.); éxhínou thalassóion h sárph èshthiromén koihian malássai kai nefrhí kai lithúrián åkros thersapeúei stn kouditài lamblanomh. áutòs dé o éxhínos kautheis kai leiotheìs tis tèrras kai smhoxménnas lépran ístai (4. 17. 3 ff. +M); toúto (sc. tìs xímpraihíis) oì ódóntes ármodoi tois ódontofousoi paiidias periáthentec. áutì (áutì M: copexi) dé meta peperozwmou èshthiromén nefrhou ístai kai èlefántiásin kai tà pswrði páthi (4. 20. 8 ff. M's reading); prhíhcs dé eì tìs to gèneion kéiri èti zòsas áutìhs, áutính dé ζóssan àpolóúsi èn tì thalásstí apelbeí ... (4. 62. 8 f.); o dé zómmos áutìs pínóménos òmowos kai áutì èshthiomén tois dhlitérimon pepwókíso bohshí (4. 63. 6 f.).

The first question is less easy to answer. Zéousa could, I suppose, be explained as a combination of metaphor and metonymy. Just as blood can be said to boil, so the creature itself in its death throes might be described as boiling.39 But, since most of the last three books of the Pyranides is written

39 Compare 3. 43. 6, quoted above, where hot blood is demanded (cf. also 1. 21. 119) and note 2. 20. 8 f. skplhna dé kuvós therrhów èpítheis skplnikou èn tôn skplh, iothìsetai, where
in highly formulaic language, such boldness would be unparalleled and surprising. An easy correction from the point of view of palaeography would be to read ζώσα. Living animals play an important part in magic40 and there are many prescriptions in this work which involve seizing and slaughtering or mutilating, or in some other way making use of the live animal;41 cf. 1. 21. 103; 2. 2. 4; 2. 2. 18 f.; 2. 3. 18; 2. 3. 31; 2. 4 (d) M; 2. 5. 5 M; 2. 7. 22–23; 2. 8. 44; 2. 10. 5; 2. 12. 3; 2. 12. 4 M; 2. 14. 8; 2. 16. 6; 2. 22. 28 ff.; 2. 24. 10; 2. 26. 6; 2. 26. 15; 2. 31. 14 f.; 2. 31. 7 M (live sheep’s ticks); 2. 40. 35; 2. 42. 4 f.; 3. 1. 18; 3. 4. 7 f.; 3. 18. 6 f.; 3. 21. 2 f. 3. 22. 15; 3. 29. 2 f.; 3. 36. 41; 3. 41. 4; 3. 51. 3; 4. 8. 9 f.; 4. 18. 5; αὐτή (sc. ἡ νάρκη) τοῖς κεφαλαλγοῦσιν έτει ζώσα προστεθείσα έτι χρονίων νοσημάτων τόν περὶ κεφαλῆς πραύνει τὸ σφοδρὸν τοῦ ἀλγήματος (4. 44. 2 ff.); ἐν ἐλαίῳ δὲ ζώσα ἐνθετείσα ἐώς οὗ τακῆ (4. 44. 4 f.); τοῦτον (sc. τὸν ὅνων θαλάσσιον) βαλῶν ἐν καυνή χύτραι έτει ζώντα έκζεσον (4. 48. 3 f.); τρίγυλης δὲ εὖ τις τὸ γένειον κείρη έτει ζώσης αὐτῆς (4. 62. 8).42 It might be objected that it would be illogical to have “still living” following σφαγέσα. But here we are dealing with a dying creature. Compare τά δὲ ὧπο τῶν ὦρεων γιγνόμενα δήμιμα ἰδάτα βάτραχος ὑδρίτης ζῶν, σχισθεῖς καὶ ἐπιτεθείς καὶ δεθείς (2. 30. 15 f.). How long would the creature remain alive? The stress is on the fact that whatever operation is required it is not to be performed on a dead animal and that immediate action is to be taken directly after the death blow.43

VIII. 4. 28. 16

καρκίνων ποταμίων καέντων ἡ τέφρα κοχλιαρίων δυνότι πλήθος σὺν γεντικής ῥήσης κοχλιαρίω ένι καὶ οὐνοὶ ποθείσα ἐπὶ ἡμέρας τρεῖς βοηθὲτ λυσσοδήκτος ἐναργῆς.

This comes from a passage found in the margin of a single manuscript (K). Ἐνεργώς should be read for ἐναργῶς: cf. 2. 4. 13 καὶ τοὺς τά τοξικὰ φάρμακα πίνοντας σώζει ἐνεργῶς (ἐναργῶς IR) = “efficaciter sanat” 99. 2.

40 See G. Björck, Apsyrtus, Julius Africanus et l’hippiatrique grecque, Uppsala Arsskrift, 1944 no. 4 (Uppsala and Leipzig 1944) 60 f.
41 In the case of the former the use of the participle “living” is formulaic and, strictly speaking, redundant.
42 Cf. also some of the passages quoted above in connection with the use of αὐτὸς / αὐτή of the animal as distinct from its parts: 2. 5. 3–4; 2. 7. 19 f.; 4. 16. 4 f.; 4. 62. 8 f.
43 Compare the prescriptions which require the use of a still beating heart: τὴν τούτου καρδίας ἐτι σπαίρουσαν καὶ ζώσαν (1. 7. 55; n.b. the variant in DN καὶ ζώσαν καταπέτας); καρδίας ἐτι θερμὴν καὶ σπαίρουσαν (1. 21. 119); κατάπετε ἐτι σπαίρουσαν (1. 21. 121); εἰ τις τὴν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ ἐτι σπαίρουσαν . . . (2. 3. 37); ἢ δὲ καρδία αὐτῆς ἐτι σπαίρουσα περιαφθείσα μηρὼι ὀκτάκοιν ἐστιν ἄριστον (3. 34. 9).
At the end of the same chapter, where the other manuscripts read καὶ οἱ τρίχες καπνιζόμενοι τὰ αὐτὰ ποιοῦσι κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, I has ἐναργῶς instead of κατ’ ἐνέργειαν. At 4. 18. 2 Kaimakis wrongly prefers the reading of I against the reading of the majority of Greek manuscripts and the Latin version: ἐχενης ἰχθύς ἐστίν ἐναργῆς, οὗτος τοιαύτην φυσικὴν δύναμιν ἔχει . . . Clearly ἐναργῆς is a corruption of ἐνεργῆς. (For the adjective, cf. 2. 3. 13 f. ἡ γάρ δύναμις τούτου ἐνεργῆς.) It is in fact transmitted only by one manuscript (I). Of the other eight manuscripts three omit it (WKS), the rest (AGHFO) have ἐνεργῆς. In effect we have a situation where the manuscripts are two to one in favour of the correct reading (on GHF, see note 10). They are supported by the Latin version, which reads “echeneis piscis est efficacissimus” (186. 13: οὗτος τοιαύτην φυσικὴν δύναμιν ἔχει is not translated; there is a corresponding omission in AGHFIO).

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44 There is no equivalent for κατ’ ἐνέργειαν in the Latin version, which reads “et pili suffumigati idem praestant” (100. 8 f.). Reference to the ἐνέργεια of particular ingredients pervades the work.
Jerome’s Use of Scripture Before and After his Dream

NEIL ADKIN

Jerome’s famous dream continues to stimulate discussion. Some commentators have doubted whether the dream actually took place. However most now accept its historicity. Without exception these scholars concentrate their attention on Jerome’s “vow,” which is seen to be the real significance of this experience. In the course of his dream Jerome was haled before a judge and scourged; in order to escape from this extremity Jerome then swore that if he ever “read or possessed” classical texts, such action would constitute a denial of the judge. Jerome’s quotations from the pagan classics after the time of his dream have accordingly been subjected to minute scrutiny in an attempt to determine the extent to which he kept this “vow.” There is significantly no agreement on the question.

It has recently been argued elsewhere that the real importance of Jerome’s dream is not his supposed renunciation of the classics, but rather the assiduous study of the bible which he undertook from then on. As a result of the dream Jerome overcame his aversion to the uncouth language of the Old Testament. The “vow” to abandon the classics on the other hand

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1 Citation of works follows the method of Thesaurus Linguae Latinae: Index Librorum Scriptorum Inscriptionum, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1990).
4 Epist. 22. 30. 5: si umquam habuero codices saeculares, si legero, te negavi.
5 Cf. the review of opinion in Eiswirth (above, note 3) 12–29; Hagendahl (above, note 3) 320–28. For the most recent pronouncement on the subject, cf. Feichtinger (above, note 2).
7 The dream is introduced as an illustration of the precept not to be diserta multum (29. 6). Jerome then opens his account by describing how he himself was put off by the linguistic crudity of the Old Testament prophets: si quando . . . prophetam legere coepissem, sermo horrebat incultus (30. 2). It was of course this uncouthness which made him prefer the
is merely a tableau of the vivid narrative: Jerome was quite right to protest later that it was preposterous to take seriously a vow made in one’s sleep (Adv. Rufin. 1. 30 f.). If then Jerome’s “vow” is simply a somnii sponsio (ibid.), his initial distaste for the Old Testament and the exclusive preoccupation with it which subsequently ensued belong firmly to the realm of reality. It is here that the true significance of Jerome’s dream lies: his problem was not with the classics, but with the bible.

It would seem therefore that in concentrating solely on Jerome’s quotations from the classics scholarship has traditionally approached the problem from the wrong end. The question to ask is not whether Jerome may have quoted pagan authors less frequently after his dream, but rather to what extent his citations from the Old Testament increase. It is the purpose of the present article to undertake such an enquiry. Scholarship has so far ignored the question entirely. Since Jerome specifically states that it was above all the uncouthness of the prophets which put him off, his quotations from these books deserve particular attention.

The chronology of Jerome’s life in the period at issue is somewhat obscure. It would seem however that Jerome’s dream is to be located in 376 during his stay in the desert. The first fourteen of Jerome’s letters are accordingly earlier than his dream. Letter 1 is dated by Frede to 369–73, while letters 2–14 are assigned to 374. It will therefore be appropriate to classics. Finally the concluding words of the account state emphatically that the effect of the dream was an intensive study of scripture: tanto dehinc studio divina legisse (30. 6). It has also been suggested that Jerome’s decision to learn Hebrew should be connected with the dream (“Gregory of Nazianzus and Jerome” [previous note] 16); acquaintance with the original language enabled him to come to grips with the stylistic idiosyncrasy of the Old Testament.

8 It occupies only 5 out of a total of 42 lines.

9 It is instructive in this connection to cite a recent comment on Jerome’s use of scripture in J. Fontaine, “L’esthétique littéraire de la prose de Jérôme jusqu’à son second départ en Orient,” in Jérôme entre l’Occident et l’Orient: XVIe centenaire du départ de l’Occident et de son installation à Bethléem, ed. by Y.-M. Duval (Paris 1988) 335 n. 23: “L’écriture, dès ses premières lettres, est pour lui comme une langue qu’il possède assez à fond pour en combiner les éléments, afin d’en bâtir un discours cohérent et personnel.” Fontaine fails to distinguish between the time before and after Jerome’s dream; nor does he differentiate between the Old and New Testaments.


12 H. J. Frede, Kirchgeschichtsteller: Verzeichnis und Sigel, Vetus Latina 1/1 (Freiburg 1981) 357. In the same author’s Kirchgeschichtsteller: Aktualisierungsheft 1988, Vetus Latina 1/1B (Freiburg 1988) 64, one finds the following comment on these letters: “erst 387 nachträglich geschrieben?” Here the reference is to the theory of P. Nautin, “Hieronymus,” in Theologische Realenzyklopädie XV (1986) 304. Nautin maintains that these letters are a subsequent forgery by Jerome, who wished to convince his detractors that he had really lived among monks.
investigate Jerome’s use of the Old Testament in these letters; the findings can then be compared with Jerome’s practice after his dream.\textsuperscript{13} The preliminary point may be made that almost all the letters in question are addressed to monks and clerics; citation of Old Testament texts would accordingly be entirely in place. It is therefore all the more noteworthy that these letters show virtually no sign of a serious study of the Old Testament.

Jerome’s first letter is a substantial piece; however Hilberg’s \textit{apparatus fontium} identifies in it only one reference to the Psalms and three allusions to the Book of Daniel.\textsuperscript{14} Two of the Danieline passages are apocryphal; all three are widely cited in the later fourth century.\textsuperscript{15} The verse from the Psalms is quoted in Hebrews 13. 6.\textsuperscript{16} No allusion to the Old Testament whatever occurs in Jerome’s second letter. In the third of his letters the number of New Testament texts that are adduced is not inconsiderable; this frequency merely highlights the paucity of references to the Old Testament. Four stories are mentioned. All were very famous.\textsuperscript{17} Again there is not a single verbatim quotation.

The fourth of these letters concludes with a cluster of biblical texts; such picturesque agglomerations are a characteristic feature of Jerome’s compositional technique. Among passages from the New Testament he has inserted two allusions to the Psalms and one quotation from Isaiah.\textsuperscript{18} The texts from the Psalms consist of three words each; both were popular.\textsuperscript{19} The half-verse from the final chapter of Isaiah (66. 2) occurs twice in Cyprian’s collection of \textit{Testimonia} (3. 5; 3. 20). Jerome’s fifth letter contains only one

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{footnote} However the evidence to be adduced in the present article shows Nautin’s thesis to be untenable.
\bibitem{footnote} The reasons for concentrating attention on the letters are conveniently set out by A. S. Pease, “The Attitude of Jerome towards Pagan Literature,” \textit{TAPA} 50 (1919) 157 f. n. 57. The letters would seem in any case to be the only works which Jerome produced before his dream; the date of the \textit{Vita Pauli}, which is sometimes assigned to this period, is open to debate.
\bibitem{footnote} I. Hilberg, \textit{Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi Epistulae} I, CSEL 54 (Vienna and Leipzig 1910).
\bibitem{footnote} Hilberg detects a further reference to a Psalm (7. 10) at \textit{Epist.} 1. 3. 3; however the allusion is rather to Apoc. 2. 23.
\bibitem{footnote} The verse in question (Ps. 117. 6) was in any case a very popular text; cf. Cyprian, \textit{Fort.} 10; \textit{Testim.} 3. 10.
\bibitem{footnote} On the apocryphal story of Habakkuk’s visit to Daniel in the lions’ den, cf. Allenbach (above, note 15) 247 f.; on Jacob’s ladder, cf. ibid. 149 f.; on Moses’ brazen serpent, cf. ibid. 168; on Jonah in the whale’s belly, cf. ibid. 198 f.
\bibitem{footnote} Hilberg also finds an echo of Job 30. 19. Jerome’s wording is close to the Vulgate, but not to the Septuagint; an allusion is therefore rightly discounted by J. Labourt, \textit{Saint Jérôme. Lettres} I (Paris 1949) 17.
\bibitem{footnote} For Ps. 50. 9, cf. \textit{TLL} V. 1, col. 81.16–21 (s.v. “dealbo”; Jerome’s wording differs somewhat from the scriptural text); for Ps. 145. 7, cf. ibid. III, col. 2027.1–4 (s.v. “compedio”).
\end{thebibliography}
reference to the Old Testament; it is a paraphrase of the second verse of the first Psalm. This verse also figures in Cyprian’s *Testimonia* (3. 120).20

The same letter includes a request for the works of several Church Fathers (5. 2. 2 f.). The selection is highly significant, since it reflects a taste for stylistic refinement rather than for serious study of the bible: such a sensibility would naturally be repelled by the crude language of the prophets. Jerome asks first for Reticius of Autun’s commentary on Song of Songs. Here it is the author’s rhetorical finesse that is commended (*sublimi ore disseruit*). Ten years later Jerome denounces the same work for its *ineptiae sensuum* (*Epist. 37. 1. 1*). Jerome’s second request is for treatises of Tertullian which he does not already possess. No reason is given for this choice; it is however clear from his very extensive borrowings of Tertullian’s phraseology that literary considerations were paramount.21 Finally Jerome asks for Hilary’s commentary on the Psalms; this work is also extolled for its stylistic elegance.22 On the other hand there is significantly no mention of the commentaries on Pentateuch and Prophets by Victorinus of Pettau. These were distinguished works of exegesis, but stylistically uncouth.23

Like Jerome’s second letter his sixth contains no reference to the Old Testament whatsoever. The seventh includes another cluster of scriptural texts, in which passages from New and Old Testaments alternate (7. 3. 1 f.). Here Jerome opens with an allusion to the curse pronounced on the serpent in the account of the Fall at the beginning of Genesis; references to this passage are exceedingly common.24 There follow brief quotations from three verses of the Psalms together with an echo of a fourth.25 The third of these verses (Ps. 145. 7) had already been cited in the similar cluster in letter four. It may be recalled further that the Psalms will have been familiar to Jerome from liturgical usage.26 The same section of this letter also includes references to Job, Jeremiah and Kings. None of them is a

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20 It forms the final words of the treatise. The verse was exceedingly popular; cf. Allenbach (above, note 15) 202.


22 Cf. *Epist.* 58. 10. 2: *sanctus Hilarius Gallicano coturno adollitetur et, cum Graeciae floribus adornetur, longis interdum periodis involvitur et a lectione simpliciorum fratrum procul est.*

23 Cf. *Vir. ill.* 74: *opera eius grandia sensibus viliora videntur compositione verborum.*

24 Cf. Allenbach (above, note 15) 143.

25 Hilberg detects two further echoes of verses 14 and 22 of Psalm 106. Here however Jerome’s language would seem to be too general to permit identification as an allusion to a specific passage: Labourt (above, note 18) 23 is accordingly right to rule out a biblical reference.

verbatim quotation. The letter ends with an allusion to *Samuhel nutritus in templo* (7. 6. 2).

There is not the slightest trace of the Old Testament in letters eight and nine. The tenth letter begins with a brief summary of human history from the Fall to the flood; it also contains two quotations from the Psalms. Jerome’s eleventh letter is full of scriptural citation; however virtually all of it comes from the New Testament. Hilberg notes only two echoes of the Old Testament. For the first he compares Ezekiel 18. 23 and 33. 11; the two verses are practically identical. It is however significant that here Jerome does not cite the biblical text; instead he employs a paraphrase (*mavult paenitentiam peccatoris quam mortem*) which had already occurred in several passages of Tertullian and in Cyprian’s collection of *Testimonia* (3. 114). The scriptural text itself is quite different. The second reference to the Old Testament which Hilberg professes to detect is rightly dismissed by Labourt: Jerome’s wording is quite different. The twelfth and thirteenth letters are similarly packed with scriptural allusion; however both of them together significantly contain only a single reference to the Old Testament. The passage in question is Isaiah’s description (40. 15) of the gentiles as a *stilla situalae* (*Epist*. 12. 2). The text had already been quoted with great frequency by Tertullian. Jerome’s fourteenth letter is the last to have been written before his dream. It is the very long exhortation to Heliodorus to embrace the eremitic life. References to the Old Testament are again noticeably scarce. In the first

27 The passage of IV Kings 25 which concerns the fall of Jerusalem is frequently quoted; cf. J. Allenbach et al., *Biblia Patristica: Index des citations et allusions bibliques dans la litterature patristique IV*: Eusèbe de Césarée, Cyrille de Jérusalem, Epiphane de Salamine (Paris 1987) 90 f.; idem (above, note 15) 180. The Job passage (40. 11 = 40. 16 LXX) had already been cited in Athanasius’ famous *Life of Antony* (ch. 5) and in Basil of Ancyra’s *De virginitate* (ch. 7). It had also been frequently adduced by Origen; cf. J. Allenbach et al., *Biblia Patristica: Index des citations et allusions bibliques dans la litterature patristique III*: Origène (Paris 1980) 200. In Jerome’s own oeuvre the text occurs a dozen times; its sexual reference (*in lumbo*) naturally attracted him.

28 The second (Ps. 11. 7) is quoted with some frequency; cf. Allenbach (above, note 15) 205; idem (previous note) IV 142. Some scholars would assign a later date to this letter; cf. C. C. Mierow and T. C. Lawler, *The Letters of St. Jerome I*, Ancient Christian Writers 33 (Westminster, MD and London 1963) 201 f.

29 *Adv. Marc.* 2. 8 p. 345.3 f.; ibid. 2. 13 p. 353.22 f.; ibid. 4. 32 p. 529.21; ibid. 5. 11 p. 610.18 f.; *Pudic*. 18 p. 261.20, *Scorpi*. 1 p. 145.27 f. Jerome’s preoccupation with Tertullian at this period was noted above.

30 Apud (e.g.) pseudo-Cyprian, *Ad Novat.* 10. 4: *vivo ego, dicit dominus, quia non desidero mortem peccatoris, sicut desidero ut avertatur peccator a via sua pessima et vivat.*

31 Labourt (above, note 18) 30; here Hilberg compared Prov. 14. 12 and Ezek. 18. 25.

32 Hilberg identifies a further reference in *Epist*. 12. 2 (ls. 14. 12–15). Jerome’s language is however far too vague to constitute an echo; cf. Labourt (above, note 18) 31. At *Epist*. 13. 1 Hilberg refers to Ps. 4. 5; however the same text is found in Eph. 4. 26.

eight chapters Hilberg detects only a quotation from a Psalm, a maxim from the opening chapter of Wisdom and an allusion to Deuteronomy.  

Chapter nine of the letter then introduces another cluster of biblical texts which again comprises material from both Old and New Testaments. The first reference to the Old Testament is a laconic allusion to the apocryphal story of Susanna; the same episode is already found in Jerome’s very first letter (1. 9. 2). Jerome then refers to the prophetic call which Amos received while dressing sycamore trees; the incident is mentioned frequently. It is followed by David’s appointment to the kingship as he kept the sheep; this event too enjoys considerable popularity with contemporary writers. Finally Jerome adds two literal citations. Both are short. The first is Isaiah 66. 2; Jerome had already adduced this text in the comparable cluster at the end of his fourth letter. The second quotation is another striking phrase from Wisdom (6. 7); it belongs to Cyprian’s collection of Testimonia (3. 112). The remaining chapters of the letter to Heliodorus show no further trace of the Old Testament.

The results of the foregoing enquiry may be briefly summarized. Jerome produced fourteen letters before his dream; some of them are very long. References to the Old Testament are however distinctly sparse. It is also noteworthy that hardly any of them are literal quotations. Only the Psalms form an exception here; the point was made earlier that their use in the liturgy ensured a certain degree of familiarity. The present article began from Jerome’s avowal that before his dream it was the prophets in particular who repelled him. It is no surprise therefore to find that these fourteen letters contain only two verbatim quotations from the entire prophetic literature of the Old Testament. Both are short. Moreover each text comes from Isaiah and is cited with great frequency elsewhere; one of them is repeated by Jerome himself. All these findings present a very significant contrast with Jerome’s later practice.

Jerome’s fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth letters belong to the end of his stay in the desert. No conclusions can be drawn from them as to Jerome’s use of the Old Testament, since they were written too soon after his dream and are in any case too insubstantial. They each contain a number of Old Testament references; most are quoted frequently elsewhere. Between the end of Jerome’s sojourn in the desert and his move to Rome

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34 Deut. 17. 12 had been quoted repeatedly in Cyprian’s letters; cf. 3. 1; 4. 4; 43. 7; 59. 4; 66. 3. These letters have clearly influenced Jerome’s own letter to Heliodorus; cf. Hilberg’s *apparatus fontium* to ch. 10. At 3. 4 of the letter Hilberg also identifies a reference to Exod. 20. 12; however Jerome’s wording here is closer to Eph. 6. 1 and Col. 3. 20.

35 Cf. Allenbach (above, note 15) 198.

36 Cf. Allenbach (above, note 15) 175.

37 The texts in question are Is. 40. 15 and 66. 2; Jerome cites the first in *Epist.* 12. 2 and the second at both *Epist.* 4. 2. 2 and 14. 9. 2.

38 Frede, *Verzeichnis* (above, note 12) 357 assigns a date of 376/7 to the first two; he places the third in 379. There would seem however to be no reason for detaching the last letter from the other two; cf. Cavallera (above, note 11) II 16.
there is a gap in the correspondence. Only one letter survives from the intervening period which he spent in Constantinople (Epist. 18). Here the content is exegetical. While this novel subject-matter certainly reflects Jerome’s new interest in the Old Testament, it also disqualifies the letter from comparison with the kind of scriptural citation that was employed in the letters examined above. The first letters to be written in Rome are similarly inadmissible as evidence; they too are concerned with exegesis.39

The first letter which allows a valid comparison is accordingly the twenty-second; this is the long letter to Eustochium on the preservation of virginity. Fontaine concludes his recent study of Jerome’s literary style up to his departure from Rome by suggesting that a careful comparison be undertaken of letters fourteen and twenty-two.40 They are closely related in theme. When such an investigation is conducted into Jerome’s use of the Old Testament in these two letters, the results are highly revealing. Whereas Jerome’s fourteenth letter contains no more than eight Old Testament references, there are altogether some two hundred in the twenty-second. Moreover approximately a quarter of these passages come from the prophets;41 many of them are seldom or never quoted elsewhere.42 Significantly it is also in this letter that Jerome recounts his dream. The evidence just adduced provides overwhelming corroboration of Jerome’s statement in this account that as the result of his dream he conquered his distaste for the language of the Old Testament prophets and began to study them intensively.

A number of observations may be made in conclusion. The change that has been documented above in Jerome’s quotations from the Old Testament is a further argument against the minority of scholars who have been inclined to doubt the reality of Jerome’s dream.43 It also confirms the interpretation of the dream offered at the start of the present article. Contrary to the communis opinio the significance of this experience lies—as Jerome himself says—in his conversion to scripture, not in any putative repudiation of the classics.44 Finally the foregoing examination would also

39 Viz. letters 20 and 21; letter 19 is from Pope Damasus.
40 Fontaine (above, note 9) 342.
41 To the passages identified by Hilberg can be added the following (page and line numbers are from his edition): Ezek. 28. 13 (p. 148.17); Jer. 13. 26 (p. 151.9 f.); Jer. 2. 16 (p. 151.11 f.); Jer. 2. 32 (p. 151.16); Jer. 27. 16 (p. 152.7 f.); Jer. 15. 17 (p. 152.17 f.); Obad. 3 f. (p. 160.4 ff.); Is. 3. 16 (pp. 160.9 and 161.7); Ezek. 1. 15 ff. (p. 168.20 f.); Is. 28. 24 (p. 170.9); Jer. 17. 14 (p. 182.14).
42 Cf. (e.g.) Is. 34. 5 (p. 146.14 f.); Hab. 1. 16 (p. 148.13); Am. 5. 2 (p. 150.3 f.); Am. 8. 13 (p. 150.7 f.); Is. 47. 1 ff. (p. 150.17 ff.); Ezek. 16. 25 (p. 151.10 f.); Is. 1. 21 (p. 151.14); Jer. 3. 3 (p. 161.9 f.); Hos. 7. 4 (p. 165.18 f.); Zech. 9. 16 (p. 168.19); Is. 28. 24 (p. 170.9); Jer. 4. 7 (p. 172.15); Lam. 4. 4 (p. 172.17).
43 Cf. note 3 above.
44 Hagendahl (above, note 3) 320 notes that during Jerome’s stay in Rome his reminiscences of the classics “are neither particularly frequent nor conspicuous”; he of course assumes that in this period Jerome is keeping his “vow.” Two other reasons may be suggested which would seem to be more plausible. In the first place Jerome’s new preoccupation with the Old
seem to refute Nautin’s recent assertion that Jerome’s first seventeen letters were not written until 387. If this had been the case, they would certainly have reflected his new preoccupation with the Old Testament.

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Testament and the concurrent study of Hebrew will have kept him too busy to read the classics (cf. “Gregory of Nazianzus and Jerome” [above, note 6] 16). Secondly citation of the classics in contexts heavily coloured by Old Testament quotation would have generated an intolerable clash of styles.

45 Cf. Nautin (above, note 12).

46 On the other hand the present analysis confirms Nautin’s view that the juvenile commentary on Obadiah to which Jerome refers later at In Abd. prol. is in fact a fabrication for apologetic purposes; cf. P. Nautin, “La liste des oeuvres de Jérôme dans le De viris illustribus,” Orpheus 5 (1984) 326. Jerome alleges that this commentary was written quando ego et Heliодorus carissimus pariter habitare solitudinem Syriae Chalcidis volebamus (In Abd. prol., lines 45 ff.). Evidently it never existed.
Ancient Jewry—Modern Questions: German Historians of Antiquity on the Jewish Diaspora

CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN

When Adolf Hitler justified the antisemitic policies of his National Socialist government at the Reichsparteitag of 1935, he quoted, among others, the famous historian Theodor Mommsen. In his Roman History Mommsen had called the Jews of Caesar’s time the “Ferment der nationalen Dekomposition” and at the Reichsparteitag, which introduced the so-called Nuremberg Laws excluding “non-Aryans” from German citizenship, Hitler made use of that statement. He saw the Jews as corrupt beings undermining national unity and the highest values of the German people and the “Aryan race,” and he believed that Mommsen had the same in mind when he wrote about ancient Jewry. Already in Mein Kampf Hitler had quoted Mommsen’s words several times. In addition, National Socialist agitators, such as Goebbels and Rosenberg, used the slogan for antisemitic propaganda. In 1933, the Prussian minister-president Hermann Göring visited the Prussian Historical Institute in Rome. At a reception he was introduced to the German medieval scholar Theodor E. Mommsen, the grandson of the famous historian of antiquity. Göring was very pleased. He addressed the younger Theodor, who later emigrated to the United States, referring to the old Mommsen: “The German people will always be grateful to your grandfather for his words about the decomposing spirit of Judaism.”

It is quite obvious that Nazi leaders tried to exploit the prestige and international reputation of Mommsen for their own propaganda purposes. But the question remains: How could it happen that criminal politicians, like Hitler, Goebbels or Göring, based their antisemitic propaganda

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2 Völkischer Beobachter 261 (18 September 1935) 2.
precisely on Theodor Mommsen, the greatest German historian of antiquity and Nobel Prize winner for literature? Is it true that, as a German journalist said in 1965, “there was a direct connection between Mommsen’s description of the Jews as the ‘element of decomposition’ and Hitler’s description of the Jews as anti-German elements of national destruction?”

To put it more generally: Was there an anti-Jewish tradition in German intellectual life of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, encouraging antisemitism and thus finally preparing the way for Hitler and his criminal policy of genocide? I will try to answer these questions by analyzing the ways in which three important ancient historians of the nineteenth century presented history. Johann Gustav Droysen, Theodor Mommsen and Eduard Meyer dealt not only with Greek and Roman history in their works, but were also concerned with Jewish history to varying degrees. The portraits they painted of ancient Judaism hint at the way the Jews and Judaism were perceived and evaluated in the German Bildungsbürgertum, the educated middle class of the nineteenth century. Two questions have to be asked: (1) What impact did secularisation have on the interpretation of Jewish history? When the theological interpretation of history in general, and of Judaism in particular, lost its influence, what was it replaced by? (2) How important was the ongoing political debate concerning the emancipation of the Jews and the “Jewish question” for historiographical interpretation? Did the widespread political and cultural antisemitism emerging in the 1880s influence historiography? In my paper, I will concentrate on a single aspect of ancient Jewish life and its evaluation by nineteenth-century German historians: the Jewish diaspora. Historians felt especially interested in and challenged by the fact that the Jews of antiquity lived not only in Palestine, but had populated the whole Mediterranean world since Persian and Hellenistic times. Moreover, the Jewish diaspora in ancient times formed an obvious parallel to the condition of Jewish minorities in the national states of the nineteenth century. Thus, the presentation and evaluation of the Jewish diaspora in German historians of antiquity give insight into their views on the Jews and Judaism in general.

Johann Gustav Droysen:
The Synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem as Praeparatio Christiana

Johann Gustav Droysen⁶ was born in 1808 in a small town in Pomerania, the son of an army chaplain. He died in 1884 in Berlin after long and wide-

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ranging activities as an historian of ancient and modern times, and as a liberal politician. He is above all well known in the history of classical scholarship for his conception of the Hellenistic Period. When Droysen studied at the University of Berlin in the late 1820s, he saw the university in its golden age. August Boeckh, the classical philologist, and Georg Friedrich Hegel, the philosopher, were his most important teachers. Whereas Droysen adopted Boeckh’s method of philological criticism and his interest in the field of methodology, it was Hegel who inspired the young Droysen with the philosophical interpretation of history.\(^7\) However, Droysen never became a dedicated disciple of Hegel. His unorthodox but strong religious beliefs counterbalanced philosophical fashions.\(^8\)

Already at the age of 25 Droysen worked out his discovery of the Hellenistic Period in his Geschichte Alexander des Grossen and in the following two-volume Geschichte des Hellenismus (1836 and 1843). With these studies he created a new understanding of the period between Alexander the Great and the beginning of Christianity. Whereas the traditional approach understood this period of history as a time of decadence and decline—compared to the heights of Greek culture in the fifth century B.C.—Droysen called it a period of progress and movement, thus preparing for Christianity. The Hellenistic Period was to Droysen essentially that stage in the evolution of paganism which led from classical Greece to Christianity. With this positive view Droysen revised the traditional interpretation.\(^9\)

How did the Jews and Judaism function in this conception of history? How did Droysen assess the role of the Jewish diaspora in the historical process leading to Christianity? It is striking that at first Droysen did not consider Judaism to be of any importance for the rise of Christianity. At that time, in the 1830s, he was strongly influenced by classicism and in particular Grecophilia, which was widespread in the German educated middle class. Accordingly, in his dissertation he defended the thesis that Christian doctrine is closer to the Greek than to the Jewish religion.\(^10\) In 1838 he wrote: “It was the mission of Greek culture to achieve the transition from a pagan to a Christian world. Greek culture succeeded in the most difficult and productive task in the history of mankind.”\(^11\) When Droysen speaks of Christianity, the emphasis is invariably on the encounter between Greeks and non-Jewish Orientals: The Jews are left out.

Only in 1843, at the end of the second volume of his Geschichte des Hellenismus, did Droysen deal with the Jewish religion. He mentions


\(^8\) See Southard (above, note 6) 32–68.

\(^9\) On Droysen’s conceptualization of the Hellenistic Period, see R. Bichler, “Hellenismus”: Geschichte und Problematik eines Epochenbegriffs (Darmstadt 1983).

\(^10\) J. G. Droysen, Kleine Schriften zur alten Geschichte II (Leipzig 1894) 431.

\(^11\) Droysen (previous note) 63.
Judaism as an important factor in the origin of Christianity. His pattern of interpretation is clearly influenced by Hegel: Historical change does not develop in a straight line, but dialectically by way of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In Droysen’s view, Judaism forms the antithesis to the Greco-pagan world. Whereas totality is the essence of Greek paganism, Judaism makes a sharp distinction between terrestrial worldliness and an extra-worldly God. Because of the Jewish diaspora, a confrontation arises in the Hellenistic period between the two principles, the Greek principle of worldliness and the Jewish principle of extra-worldliness. Only Christianity brings the confrontation to an end and synthesis takes place: “Along with the gospel mankind finds consolation and hope and new strength. It is the deepest elements of the Jewish and Greek nature that—reconciled and melted into each other—form a new beginning. There is no longer the rigid, extra-worldly God of the Jews, no longer the infinite distracted diversity of Greek anthropomorphism.” Unfortunately, Droysen did not elaborate his concept of the melting—or the cultural exchange—between Greek and Jewish elements in Hellenistic times. At the end of the 1840s he turned completely to modern history and contemporary politics. After the revolution of 1848 he was deputy of the liberal faction in the German National Assembly at Frankfurt.

For our question it is important to keep in mind the fact that Droysen viewed the Jewish diaspora only according to its theological and cultural importance. He does not refer to political or national criteria. Although Droysen was heavily involved in contemporary politics, and his historiography generally reflects his liberal political ideas, this is not the case with his interpretation of the Jews and Judaism. Why not? Why did Droysen not elaborate in detail the intercultural exchange between Jewish and Greek ideas in Hellenistic times, as he had originally planned? An interesting answer to this question was given by Arnaldo Momigliano, who pointed out that Droysen’s closest friends during this period, as well as his first wife, were of Jewish origin and had converted to Protestantism. Silence on Judaism was the official line in this circle. Droysen seems to have conformed absolutely to this convention in his relations with his friends of Jewish origin. The taboo, says Momigliano, also influenced Droysen as an historian:

He had started from the notion that Christianity can be explained with little reference to Judaism. He had perhaps come to realize the weakness of such an exclusive approach. The work of the Tübingen school had indeed shown that it was difficult to talk seriously about the origins of Christianity without a prolonged study of the Jewish background. Droysen did some work on Jewish texts, but he never brought himself to face the whole

problem of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. It was the
problem which at a personal level had deeply concerned his best friends,
his wife and his relatives—and it was going to affect his own children. He
must have known that his friends were thinking about it in their silences.
He remained silent, too. The *History of Hellenism* was never finished.\(^{14}\)

Fascinating as it is, Momigliano’s thesis is based to a large extent on
speculation. There are obviously also other reasons which may have kept
Droysen from finishing his *Geschichte des Hellenismus*. In particular, his
move to the University of Kiel, his involvement in politics and, resulting
from this, his turning to modern history. Moreover, the inner contradictions
in Droysen’s conceptualization of the Hellenistic Period as a glorious time
on the one hand, and a time in need of rescue on the other, also may have
made a resumption more difficult.\(^{15}\) In addition, the discrepancy between
two different subjects or “agents” in Droysen’s conceptualization of
*Heilsgeschichte*, the Greeks and the Jews, could, by making use of Hegel’s
dialectics, easily be reconciled in a brief sketch. In historiographical detail,
for example in portraying the Wars of the Maccabees, it would have been
much more difficult.\(^{16}\) Be it as it may, Droysen’s assessment of the Jewish
diaspora is clearly influenced by his theological interpretation of history.
His Christian belief made him prefer a traditional religious perspective and
prevented him from portraying the Jews and Judaism according to modern
standards. In Theodor Mommsen we meet a different point of view.

Theodor Mommsen: National State and Minorities

Theodor Mommsen\(^{17}\) is the most famous nineteenth-century German
historian of antiquity. His *Roman History* was translated into many
languages and in 1902, one year before his death, the Nobel Prize for
literature was awarded to Mommsen for this publication, written nearly 50

\(^{14}\) A. Momigliano, “J. G. Droysen between Greeks and Jews,” in *Essays in Ancient and

\(^{15}\) Bichler (above, note 9) 107–09.

\(^{16}\) See Hoffmann (above, note 3) 85 ff.

\(^{17}\) On Mommsen’s life and works, see K. Christ, *Von Gibbon zu Rostovtzeff: Leben und
Werk führender Althistoriker der Neuzeit*, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt 1979) 84–118; L. Wickert,
*Theodor Mommsen: Eine Biographie*, 4 vols. (Frankfurt am Main 1959–80); A. Heuß,*Theodor
Mommsen und das 19. Jahrhundert* (Kiel 1956); A. Wucher, *Theodor Mommsen: Geschichtsschreibung
und Politik*, 2nd ed. (Göttingen 1968); A. Demandt, “Theodor Mommsen (30 November 1817 – 1
November 1903),” in W. W. Briggs and W. M. Calder III (eds.), *Classical Scholarship: A
Zu Theodor Mommsens ‘Römischer Geschichte’,” in R. Koselleck et al. (eds.), *Formen der
Geschichtsschreibung* (Munich 1982) 201–44. On Mommsen’s presentation of the Jews and Judaism, see
L. Wickert, “Theodor Mommsen und Jacob Bernays: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Juden
Baer
Institute Yearbook* 17 (1972) 237–41; W. Bochlich (ed.), *Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit*
(Frankfurt am Main 1965).
years earlier. Mommsen was not only an outstanding scholar. As a political writer, and later as a Member of the Prussian Diet and of the Reichstag, he committed himself to a liberal, progressive policy, strongly resenting and opposing Bismarck’s conservative government. At the University of Kiel, Mommsen studied Roman law, classical philology and history. He was taught by, among others, Droysen. After finishing at the university, Mommsen went on long excursions through Italy, working in the field of epigraphy. In this way he laid the foundation for what would become one of the most important projects in German classical scholarship of the nineteenth century, the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. In 1851 Mommsen was dismissed as extraordinarius in Leipzig for his political commitment in the revolution of 1848. He was offered a chair in Zurich, where he began writing his Roman History. The political emotions of the years following the failed revolution and the still unrealized unification of Germany are reflected in this work. Between 1854 and 1856 the first three volumes appeared. They cover the period up to Caesar. Only in 1885 was Volume 5 published, containing the history of the Roman provinces during the Roman Empire. Volume 4, which was supposed to cover the history of the Empire, never appeared. In his Roman History Mommsen refers to the Jewish diaspora only twice: In Volume 3 (1856) he reflects on the role of the Jews in Caesar’s empire, and the famous chapter, “Judaea and the Jews,” in Volume 5 (1885) concentrates on the causes and roots of the war between Rome and the Jews in the first century A.D.

How does Mommsen assess the role of the Jews in the Roman Empire at the time of Caesar? His point of departure is the fact that founders of empires such as Alexander the Great and Caesar supported and granted specific privileges to the Jewish minority. Obviously, the Jews were able to play an important role in the process of transforming Greek and Latin national culture into a cosmopolitan world culture. According to Mommsen, they were the “ferment of cosmopolitanism and national decomposition,” and thus encouraged the process of dissolving different ethnicities and accelerating the intended synthesis of nations. Mommsen assumes that Alexander and Caesar used the Jews as instruments for their plans to build an Empire. In the Jews they saw the “historical element . . . which the statesman could neither ignore nor combat.”\(^ {18} \) Only because of this did Alexander and Caesar protect the Jewish religion and offer the Jews privileges. Their attitude was not based on philosemitism but on political realism:

The two great men [i.e. Alexander the Great and Caesar] of course did not contemplate placing the Jewish nationality on an equal footing with the Hellenic or Italo-Hellenic. But the Jew who has not like the Occidental

\(^ {18} \) T. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, 9th ed. III (Berlin 1904) 549. The translation is from T. Mommsen, The History of Rome (Glencoe, IL 1957) V 418.
received the Pandora’s gift of political organisation, and stands substantially in a relation of indifference to the state; who moreover is as reluctant to give up the essence of his national idiosyncrasy, as he is ready to clothe it with any nationality at pleasure and to adapt himself up to a certain degree to foreign habits—the Jew was for this very reason as it were made for a state, which was to be built on the ruins of a hundred living polities and to be endowed with a somewhat abstract and, from the outset, toned-down nationality. Even in the ancient world Judaism was an effective leaven [Ferment] of cosmopolitanism and of national decomposition, and to that extent a specially privileged member in the Caesarian state, the polity of which was strictly speaking nothing but a citizenship of the world, and the nationality of which was at bottom nothing but humanity.  

One cannot fail to notice Mommsen’s ambivalent description of the Jews. On the one hand, the reader is aware of a clearly pejorative evaluation. Explicitly, Mommsen calls Judaism “not the most pleasing feature in the nowhere pleasing picture of the mixture of nations,” and stresses that “the Latin and Hellenic nationalities continued to be exclusively the positive elements of the new citizenship.” On the other hand, Mommsen concedes the Jews—precisely because of their adaptability and homelessness—a historical role in Caesar’s empire. Summarizing Mommsen’s argument, one might say that Judaism—according to its appearance—is a mainly negative element disliked by the Westerners of the old as well as of the new world. However, when one looks at it from a higher historical point of view, Judaism fulfilled an important mission in the development of the Roman Empire and had finally to be judged positively. Here, Mommsen makes use of the dialectical pattern of Hegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie. The new and most remarkable feature in Mommsen’s characterisation of the Jewish diaspora is his secular and modern point of view. The intellectual tradition of Judaism and the importance of the Jewish religion in the Hellenistic Period are for Mommsen of no interest at all. Whereas Droysen stressed the religious-cultural development leading to Christianity, Mommsen focusses on the political development of a secular cosmopolitan culture. Thereby, he explains ancient history with the help of modern terms. He uses nineteenth-century attitudes when writing about the Jews of antiquity. Because of this technique, Mommsen takes up arguments which played a prominent role in his contemporaries’ view of the Jewish minority, e.g. Jews have no homeland, they constitute a nation of their own and assimilate with difficulty to foreign nations. To Mommsen, ancient and modern conditions explain each other. However, his intention is by no means antisemitic, in the sense of the contemporary antisemitic movement. He does not want to

19 Mommsen (previous note) 550 (translation, V 418 f.).
20 Mommsen (above, note 18) 550 (translation, V 418 f.).
exclude the Jews as foreigners, but rather to reinterpret their historical mission. Here Mommsen makes use of Hegelian speculation: Jews become agents of the Weltgeist, they accelerate the historical development and are representatives of a secular Heilsgeschichte. The reason Mommsen stressed the importance of the Jews only, disregarding people like the Syrians, Egyptians, Arabs and Phoenicians (including them would historically have been more plausible), might be found in the traditional Christian interpretation of history, which singles out the Jews as “chosen people” and which was even in a secular way still effective. Moreover, Mommsen was probably influenced by his Jewish friend Jacob Bernays. In Bernays as well as in other Jewish intellectuals of the nineteenth century, for example Moses Hess, we meet the idea of the Jews as catalyst (Ferment) of historical developments. It is likely that Mommsen was influenced by these ideas.\(^{21}\)

Hence, Mommsen’s interpretation was speculative and shaped by contemporary ideas of nationalism, but it was not at all antisemitic. But if that was the case, why did Mommsen’s characterization of the Jews as “ferment of national decomposition” develop into one of the most effective antisemitic slogans? For nearly a quarter of a century Mommsen’s statement was not interpreted in an antisemitic way. Only in 1880, when the new political movement of antisemitism gained prominence and when the so-called Berliner Antisemitismusstreit\(^{22}\) reached its peak, did the slogan become widely known. It happened in the following way: After the foundation of the German Reich in 1871, a collapse of the stock market followed due to excessive speculation. The economic crisis led to a revival of anti-Jewish sentiments among the public. The rapidly growing antisemitic movement demanded the repression of the “predominance” of the Jews and the retraction of Jewish emancipation.\(^{23}\) At that time the historian Heinrich von Treitschke justified antisemitic agitation on principle. Although he pretended not to be an antisemite, he nevertheless took over the main antisemitic arguments. He criticised the alleged Jewish predominance in the press and in finance and went so far as to state: “The Jews are our misfortune.”\(^{24}\) Treitschke thereby made antisemitic arguments safe for

\(^{21}\) See Hoffmann (above, note 3) 95 f.


\(^{24}\) Boehlich (above, note 17) 11.
polite society, especially for academia. Based on his authority, students founded antisemitic fraternities which excluded Jews.25

Right from the outset Mommsen condemned Treitschke’s articles. Together with other liberal professors, among them Droysen, Mommsen initiated a public declaration against antisemitism. Although the declaration did not directly address Treitschke, everyone knew that it was meant for him. Treitschke responded by imputing to Mommsen an inconsistent attitude, and it was he who dug out Mommsen’s sentence and made use of it in a polemical way. In a letter to a newspaper Treitschke wrote: “I do not agree with my colleague’s pessimistic opinion of Jewry’s activity as ferment of cosmopolitanism and national decomposition all over the world, but do hope that in the following years social integration and reconciliation will follow the already attained emancipation.”26 It was part of Treitschke’s polemical strategy to impute to Mommsen an anti-Jewish implication. He deliberately quoted Mommsen’s words out of context. He did not mention Mommsen’s positive intention concerning the term “process of decomposition” (leading to a cosmopolitan world culture) and used the term “corruption/demoralization” (Zersetzung) instead of “decomposition.” By doing so Treitschke alluded to a central antisemitic accusation against the Jews, i.e. their national unreliability and undermining of the dominant culture.27 Treitschke’s reply to Mommsen was eagerly taken up by the antisemitic press and by conservative politicians. Soon Mommsen was quoted as chief witness for antisemitism. After that, Mommsen tried to clear up the situation by publishing his booklet, Another Word about our Jewry,28 in November 1880. He transferred his idea of “decomposition” to the present time, stressing the Jews’ positive influence on loosening German regional identities and in this way helping to form a German identity in the newly founded nation-state. However, Mommsen’s analogy was not really convincing. To nationalistic critics, the cosmopolitanism of the Jews did not manifest itself in their being above German tribalism, but in their international relations, i.e. living in Frankfurt, Paris and London. Mommsen’s attempt at clarifying the situation failed also because the acceptance and propagation of antisemitic stereotypes were already widespread in the society of the Second Empire. Mommsen’s description of the Jews as “ferment of national decomposition” became an essential part of

26 Boehlich (above, note 17) 211 f.
antisemitic rhetoric and nearly all antisemitic agitators made use of it. It would, however, be wrong to blame Mommsen for a process that occurred only because of deliberate misrepresentation.

The intensity of the dispute between Treitschke und Mommsen led to a final break-off of their friendship. This makes us overlook their rather similar attitudes towards the "Jewish question" in general. Mommsen too was of the opinion that the Jews should fully assimilate to the German dominant culture. Due to his liberal and anticlerical ideology, Mommsen had no sympathy for retaining religious forms of life. So he advised the Jews to be baptized or, at least, to have their children baptized—not for religious reasons, but for the sake of the unity of the German nation. Mommsen declared:

Admission into a large nation has its price. The people of Hanover, Hessen and Schleswig-Holstein are prepared to pay the price, and we all feel that they are giving up a part of themselves. But we make this sacrifice to our common fatherland. The Jews, too, will not be led by another Moses into the Promised Land; ... it is their [the Jews'] duty to do away with their particularities, wherever they can do so without offending their conscience. They must make up their minds and tear down all barriers between themselves and their German compatriots.²⁹

In Mommsen's view, the Jews should give up their ethnicity, which was regarded as responsible for their position as outsiders. This demonstrates that even German liberalism of the time did not accept any form of ethnic pluralism. Mommsen's analysis of the Roman-Jewish conflict in the first century A.D. (in the fifth volume of his Roman History) was influenced by this very point of view. The Jewish War is seen as a conflict between state and church, between the Roman secular great-state and the Jewish rabbinical state: As religion was not restrained in the Jewish community by public authority, tension arose between religious fanatics and representatives of the Empire. Therefore, there were problems with Herod and later on with the Roman procurators. Even the Jewish diaspora was of no help in mitigating religious fanaticism. Although there were many Jews in the diaspora who had assimilated to Hellenistic culture, their common bond as Jews was in crucial questions after all stronger: "In all essential matters, especially when confronted with oppression and persecution, the differences of Judaism disappeared; and, unimportant as was the Rabbinical state, the religious communion over which it presided was a considerable and in certain circumstances formidable power."³⁰ Thus, war between Rome and Jerusalem seemed inevitable. "The question concerned was one not of faith but of power; the Jewish church-state, as head of the Diaspora,

²⁹ Mommsen (previous note) 16 (translation, 287).
Examining Mommsen's historical analysis in relation to his contemporary conflict, one gets the impression that Mommsen warns his Jewish contemporaries of another catastrophe like the one in A.D. 70. He was convinced that only by giving up their position as outsiders and by fully assimilating to their environment could the Jews prevent a similar catastrophe and be safe from antisemitism and persecution.

Unlike his predecessors, Mommsen was not interested at all in the cultural importance of ancient Judaism, but proceeded from a consideration of the coexistence of Christians and Jews in nineteenth-century Germany. The focus of historical perception is not the intellectual-religious tradition and the impact of Judaism, but the socio-political situation of the Jews as a national minority. With Mommsen, the transition from a religious into a national and political way of argumentation for Jewish history becomes evident. In Mommsen's politically oriented historiography, the nineteenth-century "Jewish question" and ancient events explain one another. In both cases Mommsen's view is formed by nationalistic and liberal ideas which generally characterize his political Weltanschauung. Due to nationalistic ambitions, he demands the Jews' total assimilation and integration into the dominant culture; because of his liberal attitude he rejects religious forms of life and vehemently attacks clericalism. Mommsen's political struggle against the rising antisemitism in the German Empire derives from the same idea. Mommsen was disturbed about the unity of the young German national state and about its political culture. Therefore, he vehemently opposed the antisemitic "civil war" against the Jews. This attitude, however, did not mean an acceptance of ethnic pluralism and of a Jewish national sub-culture within Germany.

Eduard Meyer: National Culture and Sectarian Loyalties

In the annals of the study of ancient history, the name Eduard Meyer stands for a bold attempt by a single scholar to present a comprehensive history of antiquity, from its Oriental beginnings down to Roman times, on the basis of independent study of the sources. Actually, Meyer's conception of a universal history of antiquity was not new; what was unique was how

31 Mommsen (previous note) 542 (translation, 239).
32 See Liebeschütz (above, note 17) 197.
he succeeded in combining a far-reaching, synchronist point of view with a great precision of detail. He brought the history of Egypt and the Near East, including Israelite and Jewish history, within the purview of the historian of antiquity. Meyer liberated the history of individual peoples and countries from their isolation. Thus, the historical epochs of Menes and Hammurabi, Moses, Homer, Diocletian and Justinian, were presented in their own context. When Meyer died in 1930 it was clear to all experts in the field that, given the increasing wealth of material and the specialization of research, no individual historian would ever again be capable of mastering such an extensive field of research.

Meyer’s upbringing and education formed the foundation of his impressive academic work. At the Johanneum in Hamburg, Meyer learned Hebrew and the rudiments of Arabic, in addition to the classical languages. Continuing his studies in Bonn and Leipzig, he then proceeded to acquire the other important ancient Oriental languages: Egyptian, Persian, Turkish and Sanskrit. He also learned to read cuneiform texts. Meyer was interested in the ancient Orient as the first epoch in the development of the human intellect. He was convinced that he could use the methods of positivist research to illuminate areas that had previously been in the domain of religious or philosophical speculation—the descent and prehistory of humankind and the origins of language, religion, culture and morality. In the tradition of the rationalist critique of religion, the young student regarded the history of religion as “the most interesting aspect of the history of illusions.” He attended Christian services “in order to undertake cultural studies” and was outraged at the “sham, hypocrisy and immorality which religion has brought to the human race.” Despite this critical, even polemical, attitude towards the influence of religion on public and intellectual life, Meyer was forever fascinated by the history of religion as an academic discipline. When he was twenty, he wrote his dissertation under the supervision of the Egyptologist Georg Ebers on the Egyptian god Seth-Typhon. The history of religion was also prominent in his main academic work, the five-volume Geschicht des Altertums, which first appeared during the years 1884–1902. Further editions occupied Meyer until his death in 1930, and he also published monographic studies on the history of individual religions, such as the Mormons and the beginnings of Christianity. Meyer’s study of ancient Jewish history also resulted from

36 See Hoffmann (above, note 3) 136.
his general interest in religious history. Meyer believed that the general structure and development of ancient religious history were demonstrated with particular clarity in the relatively well-preserved history of the Jewish religion. In approaching Jewish history as an integral part of general history, Meyer clearly deviated from the mainline of contemporary biblical criticism, especially as represented by the great Göttingen scholar Julius Wellhausen. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that Meyer agreed with Wellhausen's fundamental evaluation of ancient Judaism. Meyer too saw "Judaism" as no more than a religious sect that reduced the great ideas of the early Israelite national period to a narrow-minded system. The prophets were just as ambivalently judged. On the one hand, they were immense personalities, full of creative individuality; on the other, they exerted a paralyzing influence on state and political life. They were "idealistic critics" who "never went beyond negation." Overall, Judaism, as it established itself after the Babylonian exile, was for Meyer a petty "religion of laws," through the primacy of which every "natural" national, political and intellectual development was stifled.

In Meyer's opinion, the Jewish diaspora is a direct consequence of what he called "Judaism." "By detaching the confessors of the national religion from their native country and their local cult, by their strictly separating themselves from all non-Jews, it became possible to hold on to each member, wherever he might have been dispersed." Meyer's attitude towards the Jewish diaspora is extremely negative. He seems to envision the attempt of a religious sect materially defrauding and exploiting an environment considered by them to be inferior. As the Jews define their difference from the environment in a religious and not in a national way, they are able, as Meyer sarcastically writes, to "adapt themselves to all circumstances and to make a profit from them; Jahwe provided his people with this legitimate advantage over the pagan. Everywhere Jews proved to be a clever people knowing how to get on." Thus, Meyer derived the (supposed) Jewish affinity for financial dealings and cheating of the non-Jewish world from the religious structure of Judaism. Like "all exclusive sects," the Jews too had developed "a lively activity" in business affairs, "which considered the ruthless exploitation of non-believers to be the God-given right of the Jews." According to this view, ancient antisemitism was nothing but an understandable reaction to the unsocial behavioral patterns of the Jewish religion. Obviously, Meyer's view is biased and cannot withstand scientific analysis. Meyer tries, for instance, to prove his thesis of the "typical profit-making Jew who is greedy for money" by

38 For a detailed discussion, see Hoffmann (above, note 3) 159-65.
40 Meyer (previous note).
41 Meyer, Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums (above, note 37) II 32.
42 Meyer, Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums (above, note 37) II 129.
hinting at the novel-like narratives of Joseph and Hyrcanus by Josephus; Meyer states: "the figure of Shylock is clearly evident in these characters." Meyer draws his conclusion from pure fiction when applying the above statement to the Jews’ behaviour in the diaspora—not a really convincing method. Due to his biased view, Meyer considers the Jews’ acculturation to Greek culture as superficial and opportunistic. Meyer writes extremely negatively as well about the Hellenistic party in ancient Jewry, calling it "Reform-Judaism" and hinting at the "parallel" phenomenon at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Meyer does not ascribe the motives of this movement to real conviction but to opportunism: "The intelligent ‘Reform-Jewry’ has always had an instinctive feel for the way of the ruling class and how to make a profit; their aim of staying on top by any means has always been relevant to them." For Meyer, there never existed real contact between Greek and Jewish culture, not even in Philo’s time. For the ancient Jews, Greek education always remained superficial and misunderstood, in the same way—and here he draws an interesting parallel to his own times—as high German culture remained superficial and misunderstood for the Polish Jews who had immigrated to Germany. Meyer considered the Jews’ survival in the diaspora after the catastrophe of A.D. 70 to be proof that they were an "unchivalrous" people. A "chivalrous" people would have remained faithful to their country and perished with it.

With his use of cliché and caricature, Meyer’s judgements of the Jewish diaspora clearly deviate from the historiographic tradition of German classical studies in the nineteenth century. His assessments are formed according to the following criteria:

1. Meyer’s critical, and in part polemical, assessment of ancient Judaism follows in the tradition of Enlightenment religious criticism. In essential points, it also agrees with the clichés about a "degenerate religion of laws" that were widespread in the Protestant theology of the time. However, Meyer’s more favourable alternative was found not in Christianity, but in the enlightened, secular Greek culture of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. In Meyer’s view, ancient Judaism’s post-exilic development represented an aberration of history: It developed no forms of independent political culture, but contented itself with serfdom and heteronomy. Its intellectual life was formed by restraint of conscience and by clerical regimentation; it was no full national unit, but lived dispersed as a "state within states" among other nations. Meyer’s assessment of ancient Judaism was greatly intensified by the fact that Jewish ideas had, via Christianity and Islam, exerted significant influence upon the course of

44 Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* (above, note 37) II 146.
history. For him, ancient Judaism in this way became an intellectual factor, certain characteristics of which influenced even contemporary religion—for example, English and North American Calvinism—and as such had to be taken seriously. Thus, Meyer never tired of emphasizing the negative effects of the “Jewish heritage” on Western history. In his view, religious fanaticism, intolerance, persecution of heretics and religious disputes and wars in the Christian world were the fatal consequences of an intellectual attitude that arose from and was preserved in Judaism. The polemical harshness of Meyer’s historical writing was thus in large part based on the realization that these origins could be detected in ancient Judaism; that Judaism should be viewed as a negative paradigm and ideologically opposed. Here Meyer’s anti-Judaism was essentially based on his anti-religious and anti-clerical attitudes. His assessments of religious phenomena in England and the United States were equally negative.47

2. Meyer’s negative view towards Judaism is based not only on religious criticism; the political aspect also plays an important role. Normative ideas concerning national honour and patriotism as well as a conservative, culturally based anti-capitalism and anti-modernism shaped Meyer’s view on the Jewish diaspora. To Meyer, the Jewish diaspora reveals the absence of loyalty, the opportunism and the greed of the Jews. Because they do not feel responsible for a native country, Jews are profit-seeking and constitute a foreign group in their host-countries. On the one hand, this leads to an adaptiveness, on the other hand to exploitation of the environment. Here, Meyer’s attitude clearly reflects contemporary antisemitic ideas. His political denunciation of the ancient Jewish diaspora, calling it a stateless group of exploiters, reflects Meyer’s criticism of the Jewish minority of the twentieth century. His pejorative treatment of Hellenistic “Reform-Judaism” was also—and perhaps mainly—aimed at the Jewish revolutionary intelligentsia of the Weimar period. This is demonstrated in his correspondence.48 However, as he was convinced that the Jewish character had not changed since antiquity, it made no difference to him. Before 1918 Meyer kept away from political antisemitism and clearly distanced himself from racist views. He had many Jewish friends and students, among them Eugen Täubler, Victor Tscherikover, Elias Bickermann and Victor Ehrenberg. However, after the German defeat, the revolution and the creation of parliamentary democracy, which the conservative and nationalistic Meyer considered a catastrophe and a “national disgrace,” he spoke out publicly as rector of the Berlin University against East European Jewish immigration and “Jewish participation” in the

revolution. His work took on obvious antisemitic undertones. It required only a small number of deletions and changes of emphasis to turn Meyer’s negative cultural assessment of ancient Judaism, which he had already presented in 1896, into a polemical caricature aimed at the political situation of the present.

With his conservative, nationalist attitudes, Meyer sympathized with Jewish national aspirations and saw in Zionism a possible solution to the “Jewish question.” In 1925–26 Meyer took a long-awaited tour of the Orient, viewing the sites of the ancient history to which he had devoted his academic life. During this trip, Meyer spent several weeks at the beginning of 1926 in Palestine, where he gave a lecture at the new Hebrew University, viewed Zionist settlements as well as ancient sites and met with several former students. Upon his return, he presented his impressions of his journey to the “Zionistische Vereinigung” of Berlin. Here he made a positive assessment of Jewish colonization work. The pioneers in the Jewish agricultural settlements and the educators in the schools were aware, said Meyer, “that the decisive question for the existence of a people is a sound peasantry.” On the other hand, the immigrant city of Tel Aviv made an “unpleasant impression” on Meyer. Here the defects of the diaspora simply continued. Each of the immigrants, mainly from Eastern Europe, tried to open a “store” as quickly as possible, and the ladies who were “overdressed” and richly made-up on the Sabbath reminded him of Lodz or Warsaw. “No nation can be built up like this,” was how he summarized his impressions of Tel Aviv.

Conclusion

The way ancient Judaism and the Jewish diaspora are presented in German historiography of the nineteenth century depends mainly on two factors: the attitude towards religion in general and the political judgement on the “Jewish question” and antisemitism. As long as Christianity appeared as the fulfillment of ancient history—think e.g. of Droysen—ancient Judaism kept its particular importance because of the Jews as the chosen people. Consequently, the Jewish diaspora was seen as a necessary preparation for Christianity. By the interpenetration of Greek and Jewish ideas in the diaspora, in particular of Greek polytheism and Jewish monothelism, the ground was prepared for the triumph of Christianity. Historians who, like Mommsen and Meyer, had a more secular orientation, could no longer agree with this theological interpretation. From their point of view, the triumph of

49 Meyer’s statement in Deutscher Geist und Judenhass: Ein Werk des Volkskraftbundes (Berlin 1920) 83.
51 Hoffmann (previous note) 144.
Christianity was rather a decline from the heights of classical culture. They based their view of history on the modern ideal of a secularly enlightened national state. Therefore, they disapproved of the development as it took place among post-exilic Jewry, placing religion over the state, nation and politics. Assessing the Jewish diaspora, Mommsen and Meyer no longer followed religious, but national and political thoughts. Their attitude towards the contemporary “Jewish question” and contemporary Jewry played a decisive role. Mommsen and Meyer analyzed the Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman cities according to their own nineteenth-century standards. However, their views on the Jewish diaspora differed. Mommsen’s view was influenced by the liberal concept of the emancipation of the Jews. The “Jewish question” could only be solved by the Jews’ complete assimilation to the dominant culture. Consequently, he approved of the acculturated Jewry of ancient Alexandria as culturally important representatives of Hellenism. Meyer, on the other hand, was influenced by chauvinistic and antisemitic ideas. He criticised the Jews’ acculturation as superficial and opportunistic. He stressed the so-called differences in character between the Jews and the peoples among whom they lived, and this made them outsiders. Although Meyer did not consider himself an antisemite, by stressing the Jews’ otherness he supported those political forces that tried to rescind emancipation and used antisemitism as a political tool.

Thus, the historiography of ancient Judaism reflects the political development of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Germany: Liberalism declined and its place was taken by nationalistic and partially antisemitic ideologies. The model of a liberal, integrationist nation-state, including minorities and previously disadvantaged classes, had been replaced since the founding of the Reich in 1871 by a more narrow definition of national identity. It aimed to create unity through exclusion, defining “German nature” in opposition to all kinds of enemies. This self-definition by branding the enemy only rarely went as far as the irrational, racist world view of the radical antisemites. But the three exclusionary campaigns of the 1870s (against Catholics, Social Democrats and Jews) had firmly established the “internal enemy” as a constitutive element of this form of nationalism, which became typical of the right-wing “German nationalist” camp. This change in political and national self-understanding is also reflected in Mommsen’s and Meyer’s assessments of the Jewish diaspora in antiquity. Whereas Mommsen still clung to the ideal of Jewish integration and assimilation, Meyer in the final analysis advocated ethnic separatism and dissimilation. In his view, intercultural exchange destroys the essence of the German nation. It was these ethnocentric views which finally paved the way for the radical antisemitic and racial politics of the Nazis.

University of California, Berkeley
CORRIGENDUM

The following communication was received from Professor Christos Theodoridis of the Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki:


Professor Fowler replies:

I am sorry to have missed the note in the preface to Professor Theodoridis’ excellent edition. I did not, of course, imply that the citation “deserved any credence,” but rather stated the opposite, and named the forger.
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