

Using pronouns to construct a European identity: The case of politicians at Davos 2008^{*}

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This article examines how EU leaders position themselves with respect to a European identity through pronoun use. The data for this article were taken from a session from the 2008 meeting of the World Economic Forum (YouTube 2008). It featured a panel of leaders from current and prospective EU member states. I selected a 15-minute segment, which focuses particularly on the concept of a European identity. Of particular interest in this study is the identity expressed by the Turkish member of the panel, as it compares to the other EU leaders.

I use Wortham's (1996) deictic mapping techniques to analyze pronoun use in the data. The analysis reveals that three identities are constructed through pronoun use: neutral, non-European, and European. While leaders from current member states emphasize their Europeanness through pronoun use, the Turkish member portrays an identity in opposition to this European identity.

1. Introduction

This article addresses the indexical effects of pronoun use, specifically as it pertains to European identity.¹ I seek to understand how EU political leaders index, or project, a European identity within the context of a discussion about European identity through their selection of pronouns.

It is important to examine European identity because the concept is a bone of contention for many Europeans. Eurobarometer surveys indicate that EU citizens tend to identify first with their country, not with the EU (European Commission 2004). The survey shows that 47% of EU citizens

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¹ While there may be a difference between a 'European identity' and a 'European Union identity', I use the term 'European identity' to refer to the identity being propagated in the EU (Jansen 1999).

see themselves as citizens of their country *and* citizens of the EU (with priority given to their country). The number of EU citizens who see themselves as EU citizens *first* and citizens of their country second is only 7%. Over 10 years of Eurobarometer surveys, these numbers have maintained relative consistency, indicating that there is no real shift toward “feeling more European.” This appears to constitute non-participation in the European identity endeavor on the part of the citizens.

Pronouns can show how different identity alignments work in the here and now, giving them the theoretical power to function as indexes of those identities. Each use of a pronoun constructs some part of the identity of the speaker in real time. So, as these leaders discuss aspects of European identity, they are also performing some sort of identity.

This article is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the relevant literature on identity construction, European identity, and the indexical use of pronouns. I discuss the data collection and analysis methodology in section 3. The analysis of the data is found in section 4. Section 5 features a discussion of the results. Section 6 serves as a conclusion to the article.

2. Identity construction, European identity, and pronouns

2.1. Identity construction

Many researchers have defined *identity* and provided guidelines about how identities function. A clear definition of identity has been presented by Bucholtz and Hall (2005) – “Identity is the social positioning of the self and other” (2005:586). The authors further indicate that identity is emergent, a construct that surfaces within an interaction. As two speakers engage in discourse, each speaker situates him/herself in a social relationship with people in the interaction and defines his or her own position in the interaction.

The most salient function of identity is as an abstract entity that binds a community (Jansen 1999). When one considers an individual’s identity, however, there is not a one-to-one relationship between person and identity. A person has “a whole variety of partial identities, e.g. in terms of nationality, gender, age, socio-economic status, language use, religion, or particular norms and values” (Extra & Yağmur 2004:11). But despite this multitude of partial identities, a speaker is considered consistent across multiple discourses and throughout the whole of his or her life (Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990:16).

Identities are also dynamic, mutable, and malleable. The development of one's identity is a process, whereby the context within which an individual constructs an identity is the context that defines the identity. Thus, identity construction is a social process, not an individual one (Frogner 1999).

Identity is also related to ethnicity and nationality (Extra & Yağmur 2004). In the process of nation-building, an over-arching identity is considered a key component in creating unity and loyalty amongst citizens. To this end, certain symbols (i.e. flags, anthems) are created with which citizens are expected to identify. The process whereby symbols are constructed and manipulated by political entities is seen as crucial to the development of a national identity (Martinello 1995).

2.2. European identity

This idea of identity as part and parcel to the process of nation-building relates specifically to the notion of a European identity. The EU has undergone some processes that look like nation-building: they have designed a flag, adopted an anthem, and created a single currency.² While the EU likely had goals other than identity creation when designing these symbols, they still aid in establishing a sense of belonging among European citizens in the project of Europe (Martinello 1995).

In order to be a citizen of the EU, one must be a citizen of an EU member state (Martinello 1995). But citizenship does not appear to be the driving force of European identity. Altes (1999) notes that the EU motto "United in diversity" rings true for some citizens who believe that the European identity is based on the idea that Europe is made up of many different ethnicities and cultures. However, some citizens perceive that there is a shared religion, a shared experience, shared customs, and a shared history that binds Europeans (Martinello 1995).

As the EU expands, this idea of shared values becomes more difficult to assure. Those wishing to join must show that they meet the requirements set out for membership, but they must also attempt to mesh their own cultural practices with those of this preconceived Europe. Christianity has long been considered the shared religion of Europe (e.g. Altes 1999, Soares 1999, Frogner 1999). If this is so, then Turkey, a predominantly Muslim nation, presents a problem to this notion of a shared religion.

² Not all EU member states have adopted the Euro as the currency of their nation.

2.3. Pronouns and indexicality

One of the ways identity is marked linguistically is through the differential use of pronouns. Despite the fact that the focus in linguistics had been on the syntactic properties of pronouns, thus ignoring their social (and indexical) nature (Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990), Brown and Gilman (1960) moved toward a sociolinguistic account of their use, focusing on the co-variation between pronouns used and the speaker-addressee relationship.

Since then, many authors have examined the indexical nature of pronouns. The notion of indexicality centers on the “ways that the now-said reaches back to and reaches ahead to, anticipates, and somehow incorporates the to-be-said” (Bauman 2005:145). In his explication of indexicality, Silverstein explains how the indexical meaning of a form has two parts: the pre-established context of the interaction and the contextual factors that arise from the interaction (Silverstein 2003). The use of a form within a context also creates the context.

Working from the notion of indexicality, Wortham (1996) developed a more systematic approach to the analysis of pronouns within a context. His main goal was to present a technique for understanding the patterns of deictic use within an interaction. For Wortham, deictics index pieces of the context and reveal the framework of the interaction.

Wortham developed a framework for mapping deictics in interaction. His framework serves as a tool for analysis in this article. In his framework, Wortham enumerates each instance of a pronoun within an interaction in a clear table, within which a researcher can easily discover the patterns of deictic use in the interaction. These patterns provide evidence for the explicit connection between pronoun use and identity alignment.

But without contextual information, one cannot determine anything about pronominal use. As Wortham notes, the “systematic analysis of shifter use cannot *suffice* to uncover interactional organization” (Wortham 1996:344) because interactions involve more than deictic use and because deictic use does not always conform to our expectations. Contextual information must be used in the analysis to understand what identities are being indexed.

3. Methodology

The data for this study consist of a transcript of a 15-minute excerpt selected from within a 75-minute video of a session from the 2008 annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. The World Economic Forum is an

independent, not-for-profit organization whose goal is to “improve the state of the world” (World Economic Forum 2008). The annual meeting, held in Davos, Switzerland, offers a chance for world leaders to discuss issues of global importance (World Economic Forum 2008). The session selected for analysis focuses on the topic of “Europe’s Purpose.” Leaders from across Europe gathered to discuss issues concerning the progress of the EU, including the role of the EU in international issues, Turkey’s accession into the EU, as well as European identity.

The following panel members are featured in the analysis: Jan Peter Balkenende, Prime Minister of the Netherlands; Hans-Gert Pöttering, President of the European Parliament, Brussels; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark; and Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey. The session was chaired by Josef Ackermann, Chairman of the Management Board and the Group Executive Committee, Deutsche Bank, Germany, whose speech is also analyzed. Members of the audience were also called upon to ask questions, one of which is featured in the analysis.

The video was accessed online at www.youtube.com (YouTube 2008). Like Wortham (1996), I chose to begin with a fine-grained transcription to ensure that I did not miss any significant cues that might be overlooked if only a broad transcription were completed.

I use the deictic mapping techniques developed by Wortham (1996) as a framework for analyzing the use of pronouns in the interaction. When a pronoun is used more than once in a line with the same contextual referent, I have indicated in the map the number of times the pronoun occurred in parentheses. The deictic maps I have included in this analysis address the use of pronouns only (Wortham included other aspects). I searched for all English personal pronouns, possessives, and reflexives: *I, me, my, mine, myself, you, your, yours, yourself, he, him, his, himself, she, her, hers, herself, it, its, itself, we, our, ours, ourselves, yourselves, they, them, their, theirs, and themselves*. The analysis of these pronouns follows.

4. Analysis

I begin by looking at the speech of the chairman of this session, Josef Ackermann. Most of his contributions are those one would expect from a moderator: he takes questions and addresses them to members of the panel. As such, his contributions are balanced and neutral. His first contribution to the interaction can be found in Excerpt 1, in which Ackermann addresses Ali Babacan and the possible accession of Turkey into the EU.

Excerpt 1

1 hh I think- I think it's a very impo:rtant development. (.) Ali Babacan 'hh, (0.8)
 2 you said in a spee:ch (0.5) about f-four or five years ago it's not very important (.)
 3 when you join the EU, it's impo:rtant (.) that we contine: the accession process
 4 it's important (.) for domestic reasons but probably also 'hh (.) from an integration
 5 point of view. 'hh do you think that eh in the last few years:, with all the
 6 discussions we had in Europe about Turkish membership 'hh that- that this uh
 7 (0.8) pressure somewhat has been redu:ced? W- would y- you like to- to activate
 8 it again in- in a more (0.5) um active way?

As one expects in this type of moderator-panelist interaction, Ackermann refers to himself and his addressee with *I* and *you*, respectively. When he presents the topic of Turkey's possible accession into the European Union in line 3, he shifts the referent of *you* from Babacan to Turkey, thereby equating metonymically Babacan with the entire Turkish nation. This instance of *you* could not refer to Babacan individually because an individual does not join the EU, a country does. In line 5, Ackermann switches back to using *you* as a reference for Babacan.

Also in line 3, Ackermann uses *we* to mean Turkey and the European Union. This is clear from the context: Ackermann is talking about the accession process, which requires dialogue between the current EU member states and the candidate country Turkey. Having already indexed Babacan as Turkey through his use of *you* in this line, Ackermann shifts to *we* to index the collaborative nature of accession. His use of *we* in line 6, however, excludes Turkey from the group defined by *we*. Here, *we* must only include current EU members, as the pronoun is embedded in a clause where Ackermann claims discussions were taking place *about* Turkey.

Table 1 features the deictic map of Ackermann's use of pronouns in Excerpt 1. This table explains the interactional patterns just described. Ackermann establishes his role as a neutral moderator. As such, I argue that he does little to promote/construct any type of European identity.

Line	Speaker	1 st Person	2 nd Person	3 rd Person
1	Ackermann	<u>I</u> – Ackermann (2)		<u>it</u> – previous point
2	Ackermann		<u>you</u> – Babacan	<u>it</u> – expletive subject
3	Ackermann	<u>we</u> – Europe, Turkey	<u>you</u> – Turkey	<u>it</u> – expletive subject
4	Ackermann			<u>it</u> – expletive subject
5	Ackermann		<u>you</u> – Babacan	
6	Ackermann	<u>we</u> – Europeans		
7	Ackermann		<u>you</u> – Babacan	
8	Ackermann			<u>it</u> – Turkish EU membership process

Table 1. Deictic map of Excerpt 1

Once Ackermann has given the prompt, Babacan takes over in the discussion of Turkey's possible accession into the EU. He is the only panelist on the stage that does not represent a current EU member state. He has just been asked about his thoughts on Turkey's accession. Babacan has intimate knowledge about the process because he serves as Turkey's negotiator for the accession process.

Throughout the video, Babacan almost exclusively uses first person plural pronouns to refer to Turkey and Turkish people. Most of the focus is on what Turkey has done and will do to become an EU member state. But, at times, Babacan speaks as a frustrated negotiator, one who views the EU accession process as a series of hoops through which Turkey must jump. Excerpt 2 is an example of these sentiments.

Excerpt 2

53 it. but at the end of the road it is going to be a different Trkey. (0.4) looking at
 54 how much we have done, how much we have changed during the last five years it
 55 is not very difficult to (0.5) imagine or project what kind of a country we will see
 56 in five, seven, ten years time. and then probably it will be an easier decision on
 57 the EU side also, (0.2) and then at- at that point I don't know if Turkey will (.)
 58 still be (.) willing to be in all the (0.2) uhh complex structures and the Brussels
 59 and so forth (.) maybe (0.2) eh we will want to be independent in some areas,
 60 (0.3) or who knows? maybe we will som- still find some value (0.2) at the end of
 61 the road, but the important thing is (.) keeping the target over there as a firm target
 62 as a full membership target and moving towards that target for (.) short to medium
 63 term is the best strategy for Turkey and for the (.) European (.) Union as well
 64 (0.4) because sometimes we see some trends (.) in some countries (.) and we
 65 really question do we really want to be like them

Here, Babacan continues to discuss how much Turkey has already done to improve its situation. In line 55, Babacan shifts the referent of *we* from Turkey, as he has spent a great deal of time discussing Turkey's improvements, to one that includes not only the other panel members but the audience as well. In fact, he is claiming that *everyone* will see how advanced Turkey has become after working to meet the EU's standards.

Babacan envisions that this prosperous Turkey will emerge within the next ten years. If this is achieved, Babacan claims that the accession decision should be easier for the EU. In line 57, Babacan no longer speaks as the negotiator or as the current speaker. He shifts the use of *I* to refer to himself as a representative Turk – one who thinks Turkey will be unwilling to jump through more hoops if it indeed becomes so prosperous.

Seemingly, Babacan has been positioning Turkey in opposition to the EU all along in his response, though he does not do so explicitly until line 65. After mentioning that Turkey has witnessed some unfavorable trends in

certain EU member states, he uses *we* to refer to Turkey and *them* to refer to these EU nations (and, by extension, the whole EU). This serves as a way of distancing Turkey from any unfavorable activities in the EU; just as the EU wants Turkey to be at a certain level before it permits Turkey's accession, Turkey wants its move into the EU to be a positive one.

Table 2 represents the deictic map of Excerpt 2. The *us* vs. *them* dichotomy is made visible through this mapping. In line 65, Babacan's position against the EU is made clear. While Babacan does make at least one shift in the referent of *we* in this excerpt, his overall tendency is to exclude the EU from this delimited group. Therefore, the identity indexed by Babacan could be characterized as non-European, in that he associates almost exclusively with his identity as a Turk, deemphasizing any claim Turkish people have to a European identity.

Line	Speaker	1 st Person	2 nd Person	3 rd Person
53	Babacan			<u>it</u> – fact that approval is required from all members <u>it</u> – Turkey
54	Babacan	<u>we</u> – Turkey (2)		<u>it</u> – expletive subject
55	Babacan	<u>we</u> – panel, audience		
56	Babacan			<u>it</u> – decision about Turkey's accession
57	Babacan	<u>I</u> – Babacan (representative Turk)		
59	Babacan	<u>we</u> – Turkey		
60	Babacan	<u>we</u> – Turkey		
64	Babacan	<u>we</u> – Turkey (2)		
65	Babacan	<u>we</u> – Turkey		<u>them</u> – some EU countries

Table 2. Deictic map of Excerpt 2

After Babacan finishes his discussion of Turkey's accession into the EU, Ackermann opens the floor to questions from the audience. The first question was asked by audience member Nicholas Desantis.³ Excerpt 3 is the entire contribution of Desantis in this interaction.

Excerpt 3

89 Uh hello I am Nicholas Desantis I run a think tank (.) about um the research also
 90 about European identity. (1.0) hh and um um I'd be very interesting to- to hear
 91 we have obviously a very- a huge divide between (.) European politicians and the
 92 citizens understanding 'hh (0.2) the project of Europe, (1.0) they might know their
 93 his- the history but (.) how do you see? (.) and I'd like to open to the panel (1.2)
 94 'hh and then understand how Turkey sees that identity affecting once they come
 95 in, because I think they will. (0.4) 'hh in terms of uh how do we explain such a

³ I am not sure if this is the same person, but there is a Wikipedia entry for 'Nicolas De Santis' at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolas_De_Santis.

96 complex (0.2) concept? (0.2) ah and although we ha- all have Euros in our
 97 pockets (.) uh the meaning of that Euro and where it comes from it's very difficult
 98 to try and sen- to try and have a sense of pride (0.4) about that currency in our
 99 pockets and I'll like to know (.) and hear what you have to say about European
 100 identity becoming more 'hh (0.2) uh easier to understand (0.2) let me put it this
 101 way a bra:nd (.) about Europe.

In this question, Desantis asks about how the European politicians and citizens understand the EU and the idea of a European identity. He wants to know if the panel believes a European identity is coming into fashion. He iconically links the Euro with European identity. Desantis specifically asks to hear how Babacan sees Turkey being affected by this identity (thereby making the difference between Europe and Turkey salient).

Desantis begins his question by introducing himself. He quickly aligns himself with the leaders on the stage – he mentions that he runs a think tank (thus he is highly educated) and that he is interested in European identity (a topic likely of interest to the panel). The most meaningful way in which he aligns with the leaders as opposed to the citizens in this interaction is simply by referring to European citizens as *they* in line 92. In so doing, Desantis positions himself as above other Europeans; because he works in a think tank that researches European identity, Desantis suggests he has a better understanding of the European project than others.

Desantis makes the distinction between Turkey and the European Union clear with his use of *we* and *they* in lines 94-96. Even though Desantis expresses in the context that he is in favor of Turkey's accession into the EU, he refers to Turkey as *they*, which is in stark contrast to his use of *they* previously in line 92 to mean European citizens. He shifts his usage and refers to Europeans as *we*, thus incorporating himself into that group.

Table 3 represents the deictic map of this excerpt. The shifts in indexicality are more evident here, particularly Desantis's use of third person pronouns. Once he begins to discuss Turkey, his language changes; he is no longer indexing an identity of "better-than-average European."

Line	Speaker	1 st Person	2 nd Person	3 rd Person
89	Desantis	<u>I</u> – Desantis (2)		
90	Desantis	<u>I</u> – Desantis		
91	Desantis	<u>we</u> – European politicians and citizens		
92	Desantis			<u>they</u> – European citizens <u>their</u> – European citizens
93	Desantis	<u>I</u> – Desantis	<u>you</u> – panel	
94	Desantis			<u>they</u> – Turkey
95	Desantis	<u>I</u> – Desantis <u>we</u> – Desantis, panel		<u>they</u> – Turkey
96	Desantis	<u>we</u> – Europeans <u>our</u> – Europeans		
97	Desantis			<u>it</u> – Euro <u>it</u> – expletive subject
98	Desantis	<u>our</u> – Europeans		
99	Desantis	<u>I</u> – Desantis	<u>you</u> – panel	
100	Desantis	<u>me</u> – Desantis		<u>it</u> – Desantis’ question

Table 3. Deictic map of Excerpt 3

Ackermann takes it upon himself to address Desantis’s question first to Hans-Gert Pöttering. Additionally, Jan Peter Balkenende and Anders Fogh Rasmussen are invited to answer. Interestingly, Babacan does not get an opportunity to respond, despite the fact that Desantis specifically requested to hear Turkey’s position on the question. We will examine the answers given by these three men in sequence. We begin by examining Pöttering’s response, a section of which can be found in Excerpt 4.

Excerpt 4

116 hh and I regret very much (1.0) that it was necessary and fortunately or
 117 apparently necessary (0.2) to ta:ke (.) the sym:bols (.) out of the reform treaty.
 118 (0.8) I am not criticizing Jan Peter Balkenende whom I (.) like very much with his
 119 policy how he helped (.) to overcome this problem, hh (1.6) but taking out the
 120 symbols, the hymn- hymnthem (0.2) and the flag (0.2) should never mean (0.2)
 121 that we give the symbols up and I appreciate that the new president of France had
 122 not only the *tri-colore* but the European flag on his uh (.) official photo as well,
 123 and you know what? (.) I suggested for the European parliament, (0.2) when all
 124 this happened to take the symbols out, (0.2) I said let us (0.5) expect when we
 125 have visitors (.) presidents of countries, (0.3) let’s have them when they come to
 126 our red carpet in Strasbourg, (0.2) let’s play (.) the European anthem (.) and the
 127 national one. (0.2) and so we did it (0.2)

The most salient aspect of Pöttering’s pronoun usage is his shifting in the referent for *I*. In many cases, he simply uses *I* to refer to himself as the current speaker, as in line 118. But, when he begins his discussion about removing the symbols, such as the flag and anthem, from the reform treaty, his use of *I* shifts to refer to his identity as European Parliament

President in line 121. He uses this switch to indicate his power in the situation (i.e. he can reintroduce the symbols at the European Parliament).

Pöttering also criticizes Balkenende (lines 118-119) because of his involvement in removing the symbols. Balkenende will later defend his position. What is interesting is that even though Balkenende is on the stage, Pöttering does not speak directly to him (by using *you*); instead, he refers to Balkenende in the third person, further distancing himself from Balkenende's supposed position on the symbols while still respecting Balkenende's negative face (*à la* Brown and Levinson 1987).

Table 4 represents the deictic map of this excerpt. The interactional pattern for Pöttering reveals that he focuses on his identity as European Parliament President for the purposes of appearing more European, despite having to uphold treaty reforms that remove symbols of European identity. His distancing from the removal further emphasizes his Europeanness.

Line	Speaker	1 st Person	2 nd Person	3 rd Person
116	Pöttering	<u>I</u> – Pöttering (current speaker)		
118	Pöttering	<u>I</u> – Pöttering (current speaker) (2)		<u>his</u> – Balkenende
119	Pöttering			<u>he</u> – Balkenende
121	Pöttering	<u>we</u> – Europeans <u>I</u> – Pöttering (Pres. of the European Parliament)		
122	Pöttering			<u>his</u> – French pres.
123	Pöttering	<u>I</u> – Pöttering (Pres. of the European Parliament)	<u>you</u> – audience	
124	Pöttering	<u>I</u> – Pöttering (Pres. of the European Parliament) <u>us</u> – European Parliament <u>we</u> – European Parliament		
125	Pöttering	<u>let's</u> (= let us) – European Parliament		<u>them</u> – presidents <u>they</u> – presidents
126	Pöttering	<u>our</u> – European Parliament <u>let's</u> (= let us) – European Parliament		
127	Pöttering	<u>we</u> – European Parliament		<u>it</u> – playing EU, national anthem

Table 4. Deictic map of Excerpt 4

Balkenende responds by defending his position in relation to the EU symbols. He reifies the symbols, values, and principles of the European Union. To support his claim that values are important, he begins to draw

on his experience in the Netherlands by shifting his use of *we* from Europeans to the Dutch (lines 161-162). Excerpt 5 features this discussion.

Excerpt 5

158 that is (.) a feature (.) why we work together. (0.4) and it is true what you say we
 159 have to talk more I think about values in Europe because usually we talk about
 160 practical aspects. (.) we talk about the- the- the- the- our currency and economic
 161 issues and they are important. (0.8) but also we need a moral reflection. and we
 162 had our presidency we organized a conference about that question what do we
 163 have in common? Europe () values in Europe. and uh Hans-Gert made it very
 164 clear I think that it's also another dimension. because you need the reflectional
 165 values to know what do we have in common?

We see a reversal of Pöttering's use of indexicals. When pointing to Pöttering's idea that more talk about values is needed, Balkenende uses *you* in line 158, specifically addressing Pöttering on the stage, thus diminishing the distance Pöttering had implied in his response. However, at line 163, Balkenende switches his approach again and uses Pöttering's first name. While using his first name is more intimate than using his last name, Balkenende returns to the distancing strategy by not addressing Pöttering directly. Table 5 represents the deictic map of Excerpt 5.

Line	Speaker	1 st Person	2 nd Person	3 rd Person
158	Balkenende	<u>we</u> – Europeans	<u>you</u> – Pöttering	<u>it</u> – the statement
159	Balkenende	<u>I</u> – Balkenende (current speaker) <u>we</u> – Europeans		
160	Balkenende	<u>we</u> – Europeans <u>our</u> – Europeans		
161	Balkenende	<u>we</u> – Europeans <u>we</u> – the Netherlands		<u>they</u> – economic issues
162	Balkenende	<u>our</u> – the Netherlands <u>we</u> – the Netherlands <u>we</u> – Europeans		
163	Balkenende			<u>it</u> – the point
164	Balkenende	<u>I</u> – Balkenende (current speaker)	<u>you</u> – generic subject	<u>it</u> – expletive subject
165	Balkenende	<u>we</u> – Europeans		

Table 5. Deictic map of Excerpt 5

Finally, we come to a discussion of Rasmussen's response to Desantis's question, part of which can be found in Excerpt 6. Recall that Desantis pointed to the Euro as a shared symbol of importance for the European identity. I think it is important to note that Rasmussen may not have had Euros in his pockets, as Denmark has yet to join the Eurozone. Possibly

because of this fact, Rasmussen focuses more on values than on symbols, unlike the first two respondents. In fact, his response does not seem to add much to the idea of a European identity, in that he claims all of the “European values and principles” are also universal values and principles.

Excerpt 6

178 (.) gender equality. (.) I consider that (.) one of our basic (.) uh values. (.) and
 179 thirdly, (0.4) um which is (.) a heritage from (.) the European age of
 180 Enlightenment (0.4) a wide ranging (.) eh freedom of expression. (0.8) um and
 181 (0.5) in Europe we distinguish- eh distinguish clearly uh between religion and
 182 politics. (0.2) I consider uh these uh principles and values very important (.) in

Rasmussen’s response focuses solely on the three values he deems important. He uses *we* and *our* exclusively to refer to Europeans. His use of *I* focuses on his role as current speaker. Table 6 is the deictic map for this excerpt.

What is interesting about his response is the mention of religion and politics in lines 181-182. While possibly related to the discussion, it seems to be an off-handed remark, possibly directed at Babacan. He uses *we*, indicating that the separation of religion and politics is valued by Europeans. While Turkey is a secular state, this statement seems to suggest that religion is the most important issue for Turkey’s accession.

Line	Speaker	1st Person	2nd Person	3rd Person
178	Rasmussen	<u>I</u> – Rasmussen (current speaker) <u>our</u> – Europeans		
181	Rasmussen	<u>we</u> – Europeans		
182	Rasmussen	<u>I</u> – Rasmussen (current speaker)		

Table 6. Deictic map of Excerpt 6

5. Discussion

In the analysis, we see several trends among the participants in this panel. Based on their pronoun usage, we can treat these men as representatives of three different groups: neutral, non-European, and European. Ackermann represents the neutral group. This neutrality is with respect to a European identity. His role as moderator constrains his speech patterns more so than the panel members. His speech contains mostly address pronouns typical of interviews. In his interaction with Babacan, for instance, he uses *you* and *I* in a way that indicates he is the moderator and Babacan is the panel member he is addressing. Thus, his pronoun usage does not appear to

reveal much about his identity as a European. His pronoun usage more closely represents his assimilation to a moderator's identity.

Babacan represents the non-European group. His pronoun usage indicates that he is not there just to discuss Turkey as a prospective EU member state. He positions himself as Turkish and not as European for the purposes of this panel, so as to accentuate the line in the sand drawn by the EU officials who have made Turkey's accession process rather difficult. Babacan makes at least one clear *us vs. them* comment, further indexing his identity as non-European. He consistently uses *we* to refer to Turks and focuses on the process of accession as a difficult feat Turkey has to accomplish if it wants to be one of *them*. But it is clear from his negative description of the trends in some European countries that Babacan currently does not associate with a European identity.

The others (Desantis, Balkenende, Pöttering, and Rasmussen) can be categorized as European. Even though they often draw on their other identities (i.e. as Prime Ministers), the most prominent identity indexed by their pronoun usage is of being European. All four men use *we* to mean Europeans on most occasions. They align themselves not only with the symbols, values, and beliefs they discuss in the context but also with the people they are classifying as European. They claim to be "just like you," the average European listening to this conversation, through their use of *we*. They do not just want to talk about being European; they actually do "being European" through their use of these pronouns.

6. Conclusions

I have shown that some leaders do "being European" while discussing the concept of a European identity. The Turkish member of the panel, however, exhibits a non-European identity, thus positioning himself in opposition to the European identity. It is through the differential use of pronouns that these patterns become clear. By mapping out the deictics, we see how interactional patterns are established and how speakers align themselves with particular identities through pronoun usage.

The fact is that Turkey is not currently an EU member state. But this fact need not keep Turkey from exerting a European identity. If we consider Le Page and Tabouret-Keller's (1985) notion of *Acts of Identity*, it is easy to see that Turkey can identify the EU as the group it wishes to join, can gain access through, for instance, the accession process, and can modify its behavior so as to, in this case, use pronouns to display this identity. However, perhaps Turks do not have the strong motivation required to

possess this European identity. The motivation seems to be reversed, rather than strengthened, by the feedback from this panel of Europeans. More research on the motivations behind adopting a European identity could aid in our understanding of the Turkish position.

Though European identity is an oft-debated topic, this study shows that some type of European identity exists, at least in the pronominal usage of these speakers. These data show that the situation is more complicated than a simple dichotomy of *us* vs. *them*. A European identity is complex, but this analysis gives us some insight on certain aspects of it.

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