Swords and Ploughshares

Can NATO Survive Afghanistan?

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This issue of Swords and Ploughshares represents the published results of a symposium held at the University of Illinois in late April 2008, which posed the question, “Can NATO Survive Afghanistan?” Since 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has led the operation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to “establish conditions in which Afghanistan can enjoy a representative government and self-sustaining peace and security.” However, ISAF has struggled to bring stability to Afghanistan, prompting concerns about its chances for meeting those objectives. Moreover, senior U.S. officials referred in spring 2008 to a possible “existential crisis” for NATO, as a result of tensions within the alliance over member countries’ troop-level and mission task commitments to ISAF. Such statements could be viewed as political posturing prior to the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, designed to leverage greater support from European allies for the Afghanistan campaign. Nevertheless, they cast light on several significant challenges facing NATO as it conducts its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic arena in its nearly sixty-year history. This issue examines those challenges in depth.

In the first article, Stanley Sloan proposes that the transatlantic strategic alliance needs repair after the “shock and awe unilateralism” of the George W. Bush presidency. Sloan rejects the notion that the current challenges facing NATO should be framed in terms of an existential threat. He argues instead that U.S. and European shared values and interests plus a lack of suitable alternative security alignments will help to ensure NATO’s sustainability. Sloan envisions multiple possible scenarios for the future course of US-European relations. The scenario promising the highest pay-offs, but which also comprises the biggest hurdles, will demand conscious efforts from leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to work towards greater policy convergence and new frameworks for cooperative security.

In the next article, Ryan Hendrickson acknowledges the “uncharted political and military territory” accompanying NATO’s Afghanistan operation, but explains that criticism of the alliance’s performance in this specific engagement ignores NATO’s wider global security relevance. He deems NATO membership expansion to twenty-six countries, with more aspiring countries in line, as successful. Coupled with the alliance’s growing numbers of partnerships with non-member countries and out-of-area missions, Hendrickson sees signs of NATO’s appeal and effectiveness for various diplomatic and security tasks.

Next, Paul Diehl discusses several problems confronting NATO’s Afghanistan operation. He questions whether the current force structure is suitable for the wide range of sometimes incompatible peacekeeping mission tasks assigned to the troops, particularly when factoring in the specific demands of the Afghan conflict arena. He also explains how burden-sharing disputes among NATO members have hampered ISAF. Diehl notes the persistent manifestation of such problems in one form or another throughout the alliance’s history, but nevertheless perceives a need for NATO’s carefully conceived evolution if it is to meet future challenges.

Edward Kolodziej’s contribution asserts that more is at stake in Afghanistan than simply the fate of NATO’s military campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda, or for that matter the reconstruction of a country wracked by decades of conflict. The operative question, he contends, is not whether NATO can survive Afghanistan, but rather whether the coalition of actors involved in stabilizing the country can demonstrate the requisite cohesiveness, military resolve, political will, and problem-solving capacities to not only prevail in Afghanistan but also confront a host of other global issues. Kolodziej concludes that how the free, democratic, market states and peoples perform their shared mission in Afghanistan and other parts of the world will do much to shape the security preoccupations of the twenty-first century global society.

Several threads tie these articles together. All four authors remark on the seminal importance of the Afghan peace-building and reconstruction efforts in both symbolic and actual terms for stabilizing the broader global security system. Each either explicitly or implicitly acknowledges the need for responsible global leadership from the United States and European countries in Afghanistan and beyond. And all four contributors agree that although the existing infrastructure of the transatlantic bargain—including but not exclusive to NATO—offers ongoing potential for success, some critical alterations must occur in the US-European relationship if the alliance members aspire to greater future effectiveness in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Finally, I should note that the symposium and this publication were made possible through the collaborative efforts of ACDIS and the European Union Center at Illinois, and were partially supported by the EU Center’s U.S. Department of Education Title VI grant. Laura Hastings and Ryan Hendrickson deserve special mention, as they provided essential help conceptualizing the project.
For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well organized and armed militia is their best security.
—Thomas Jefferson, Eighth Annual Message, November 8, 1808

The Parties to this Treaty] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.
—The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949

My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.
—John F. Kennedy, inaugural address, January 20, 1961

There is no telling how many wars it will take to secure freedom in the homeland.
—President George W. Bush, August 7, 2002 speech

The United States has failed in Afghanistan and is attempting to bring more troops from European nations to this country just in order to hide its failure.
—Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, February 11, 2008

We face a crisis in Afghanistan that is extraordinarily difficult for our country and for the NATO alliance. For NATO, it may be an existential crisis.
—U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns, February 2008, just before stepping down
Why Should We Think NATO Can Survive Afghanistan?

by STANLEY R. SLOAN

The transatlantic alliance has just passed through one of the most difficult periods in the last sixty years of US-European relations. The factors contributing to the recent crisis may never occur in the same combination again. However, there is clearly some wisdom in trying to learn whatever lessons may be available to help understand and guide the relationship in the years ahead.

Now, before the alliance can even celebrate surviving its latest near-death experience, it faces a new question: can it survive its difficult mission in Afghanistan? The task is to try to ensure that this “failed state” becomes, at a minimum, a relatively stable country in which a representative government is able to defend itself and provide for the needs of its people, ensuring that it will no longer serve as a launching pad for international terrorism or as a major source for the illicit international drug trade. Not an easy task, by any stretch of the imagination, and one likely to require many years of sustained effort.

The question addressed in this essay is whether the Bush administration-induced crisis that the alliance has just survived offers any guidance when asking whether or not NATO and transatlantic relations more generally can survive Afghanistan. This analysis concludes with a few modest predictions about the future of transatlantic relations.

One American’s View

There are many “American” perspectives on Europe and transatlantic relations. Some Americans see Europe as the source of America’s most important allies, and the relationship as one that is critical to future US well-being economically, politically, and militarily. Other Americans have become quite cynical about Europe. Like Robert Kagan, they see Europe as “Venus” to America’s “Mars.”

In this latter view, Europe was once very important to the United States. It was the source of many of our troubles in the last century, including two world wars. It became the key battleground in the struggle between the forces for freedom and democracy on the one side and for soul-less, authoritarian communism on the other.

However, in this view, while the United States was successfully leading this coalition in the Cold War, Europe was becoming flabby, relying on the United States for its defense while enjoying the good life of limited responsibilities and unlimited comforts.

Of course, there are other perspectives as well. Some Americans, frankly, simply don’t care, or at least don’t see caring about transatlantic relations, one way or another, as being that important.

For my part, I admit to being a committed Atlanticist.

What does this mean? For me, it means believing that a healthy, mutually beneficial transatlantic relationship is vitally important to the United States and to Europe as well. In the long run, Europeans will need us, and we will need them.

Now, a committed Atlanticist does not mean that I think everything is right in the relationship. Things are broken or worn out, and need to be fixed or replaced.

In some respects, it has always been this way: I only have to look back at reports I wrote for Congress over twenty-five years to see how many times during the Cold War I wrote about “a crisis in the transatlantic alliance.” However, today, my view is that the relationship has suffered more than perhaps at any time since the end of the Second World War, and that it is sorely in need of repair.

But it is also fair to say that, with new leadership on both sides of the Atlantic, the allies will have the opportunity, or perhaps more accurately, the challenge, to improve the situation in the coming years. Their first challenge will be to ensure that NATO survives its mission in Afghanistan. But before I address this problem, what can we learn from the recent crisis in the alliance?

George W. Bush and Europe

George W. Bush came to office with a virtual tabula rasa as far as Europe was concerned, and for that matter with regard to foreign policy more generally. However, the George W. Bush administration from day one applied shock and awe unilateralism to US-European relations. The administration’s positions against US participation in the International Criminal Court, the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol were just a beginning.
The 9/11 attacks were a brutal shock for the American people, but, ironically, they offered the administration a sense of direction it had been sorely lacking in its first year. More importantly, the president and his team had an historic opportunity to build a broad-based international coalition against terrorism. However, after 9/11, the United States virtually ignored initial allied and NATO offers of assistance. The action was even set in a telling philosophy articulated by senior administration officials: for this administration, “the mission would determine the coalition.”

The Iraq war created huge political divisions in NATO and the European Union. According to one senior European diplomat, every capitol and ministry in Europe was seriously divided—even in countries that officially came down strongly on one side of the war debate or the other. Bush administration officials acted in ways intended to emphasize and deepen those divisions.

The Bottom Line

The bottom line, however, is that NATO apparently has “survived” the Bush administration. The alliance soldiers on, continuing to expand and leading the international community’s stabilization effort in Afghanistan in spite of the:

• starkly unilateralist policies in the first year of the administration;
• “we are at war” mentality and the fear and anger that captured American thinking and emotions following 9/11;
• explicit rejection by the Bush administration of Europe’s and NATO’s utility following the attacks;
• controversial decision to attack Iraq and the bungled operation there;
• manner in which American policies and attitudes divided European governments; and
• widespread European revulsion at George W. Bush’s policies and his personality.

NATO’s survival cannot be explained in terms of the need for a response to an existential threat. Such a threat from the Soviet Union had been history for a decade before Bush came to office, and had not been reconstituted. It also cannot be explained in terms of European acceptance of the Bush administration’s argument following 9/11 that the United States and its allies were at war with radical Islamic extremism. That argument was not accepted by most Europeans.

However, there are other possible explanations. Without implying order of importance or general acceptance, they arguably include:

• the fact that, in spite of differences over Iraq and international relations generally, the United States and its European allies still share an impressive collection of values and interests;
• US behavior during the Bush administration appeared more revolutionary than it was, and Europe had already begun to get used to some of the inclinations in US policy toward unilateralism and hegemonic behavior during the Clinton administration;
• European governments simply had no alternative to remaining in alliance with the United States, and NATO was still the most important symbol and operational component of the relationship;
• failure of the EU constitution to win popular acceptance suggested the arguments being made for the European Union to become a “balancer” of US power internationally—likely destroying NATO—could not be sustained by reality, at least in the near term;
• European governments remained split concerning the future construction of Europe, and the default position (of European integration within the broader context of transatlantic cooperation) was sufficiently compelling to discourage other options;
• “new” European democracies in Eastern and Central Europe were strongly committed to NATO’s continuation, particularly because their historical and geographic proximity to Russian power and influence convinced them that NATO provided an essential link to US power that was not provided by EU membership;
• European governments decided that, in spite of how difficult the relationship with the United States had become, there were no acceptable alternative power centers with which Europe could align;
• and, the financial and economic fortunes of the United States and Europe had become so mutually interdependent that a political/security break with the United States could put all vital European interests at risk.

All these arguments could be seen as part of the answer to the question “can NATO survive Afghanistan?” The answer would appear to be that, if NATO can survive George Bush, the allies can find a way to survive Afghanistan. A reason that could be added to the list above in the case of Afghanistan is that it is not only NATO’s future that is at risk in the mountains of the Hindu Kush. The future of the United Nations, the European Union and the overall ability of the international system to deal with failed states, terrorism, the illicit drug trade and the clash between traditional societies and modernization all hang in the Afghanistan balance. NATO is not alone in this challenge.
Looking Ahead

The bottom line of this relationship is that the United States, Canada and the European states seem to recognize that none of them can afford to go it alone internationally, even if future differences might tempt them to do so again down the road.

The United States with which European leaders and states will have to deal in the foreseeable future will remain a de facto hegemon with the capacity to do much good or much harm in terms of their interests and international stability. “Europe” will remain a work in progress, acting united in many areas, but with EU members acting very much like nation states particularly in the areas of foreign and defense policy.

Under these circumstances, US-European relations could go in a number of different directions under the new US administration that will come to office in 2009. For ease of discussion, let’s divide those possibilities into three broad categories:

- new burden-sharing debate;
- muddling through;
- building a new foundation.

First, a new burden-sharing debate could break out across the Atlantic with almost no effort at all. Whether Democratic or Republican-led, the administration taking office in the United States in 2009 will want the United States to do more in Afghanistan, but also will want the Europeans to do much more. Given the fact that most European allies believe they are at the limit of their resources with current commitments, this situation could easily deteriorate into a transatlantic blame game.

In this scenario, “who lost Afghanistan?” could be the question in a few years, and the question “who destroyed NATO?” would be close on its heels.

The second possible future is one of muddling through. This option would look a lot like the past three years, with a group of new players on both sides of the Atlantic building new resentments and whispered recriminations, but keeping the relationship civil and ensuring that operations in Afghanistan do not totally collapse.

The third possible future is the most difficult to envision and produce, but also, in my opinion, the most important to seek. This approach could be referred to as “building a new foundation for transatlantic relations.” The approach would be premised on the need for a combination of policy convergence among Euro-Atlantic nations, particularly on key security challenges; practice, especially mutually supportive security efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere; and revised transatlantic posture, including construction of some new frameworks to strengthen US-European and global cooperation on the non-military aspects of international challenges.

The most immediate challenge to allies on both sides of the Atlantic is to rebuild a constructive dialogue to replace the destructive interactions that have characterized handling of the Iraq issue.

This will require the United States to “speak more softly,” as US President Teddy Roosevelt famously recommended. Everyone knows that the United States already carries the “biggest stick.” Future US administrations will be required to be more constructive and creative in the use of international institutions and multilateral cooperation. In short, the United States will have to learn how to be a hegemon without acting like one.

For their part, Europeans will have to bring more resources and capabilities to the transatlantic security table. Europe’s speaking softly while carrying a big carrot simply won’t cut it. The US–European relationship needs a better balance in terms of both authority and capability. However, it is not up to the United States to “give” Europe more authority. European nations and the European Union will wield greater influence in Washington and internationally based on their will and ability to contribute to solutions of international security problems.

Given the current disparities between US and European military capabilities, some have suggested dividing responsibilities in the alliance. However, any formal division of responsibilities (hard power tasks for the United States, soft power jobs for the Europeans) would be a disaster for US–European relations.

It does make sense for individual nations, or groups of nations, to take on specific tasks within the overall framework of transatlantic cooperation. In fact, the special capacities that European allies have for managing stabilization and reconstruction activities could be usefully combined with the potent US ability for war fighting to develop a full spectrum of pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict coalition activities. This would require closer political and strategic cooperation and better integrated planning, including the will to imagine and project reactions to a wide range of contingencies. This would not be easy, but it would substantially enhance US and European capacities for dealing with future security challenges.

Any formal transatlantic division of responsibilities, however, would create even bigger gaps between the United States and Europe concerning how best to respond to international security challenges. Such an approach would only encourage US tendencies toward the unilateral use of military force as well as European tendencies to believe that all problems can be solved without military force backing up diplomacy. In a world of divided Euro-Atlantic responsibilities, responses to every future security challenge would have to overcome growing divergences in appreciation of the problem before effective cooperation could even be imagined.
The bottom line is that there should be a practical division of tasks among the transatlantic partners, but not a formal division of labor across the Atlantic. Ideally, both American and European forces should be engaged in the high intensity and lower intensity ends of future conflicts, sharing responsibility for the strategies required for the entire continuum.

The Likely Future

In mid-2007, I participated in a conference in Norway sponsored by the Oslo Nobel Institute. My assignment was to draft a concluding US perspective for the book that would be produced by the conference papers.

I carefully avoided predictions, following the advice of the many wise individuals who have said, in one way or another, “making predictions is difficult, particularly when they are about the future.”

However, the Institute’s director and expert on transatlantic relations, Geir Lundestad, was not going to let me get away with that. He asked that I produce my best guesses about the directions the transatlantic relationship would take for the next period of history. My best guesses follow.

First, I said that the United States most likely would remain the most important global power. Nevertheless, I suggested, other countries and groupings of countries would gain in relative power and influence, including the European Union. This emerging reality will progressively be reflected in the US approach to its international role.

The European Union will neither be transformed into a United States of Europe nor fall apart at the seams. It will continue to evolve toward a “United Europe of States.”

Neither the United States nor the European nations will be able to identify more effective, compatible, or reliable partners among other global players.

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In December 2007, he taught foreign policy analysis and US foreign policy at the Estonian School of Diplomacy under a Fulbright Senior Specialist grant. Stan retired from the US government in 1999 after almost four decades of service as a senior specialist at the Congressional Research Service, intelligence analyst and research manager at the Central Intelligence Agency, and as an intelligence officer in the US Air Force. He is author, among other things, of the book NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
NATO’s Missions Beyond Afghanistan

by Ryan C. Hendrickson

Many analysts have recently maintained that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is at a crossroads. These views tend to be shaped by at least three bodies of criticism toward the alliance. One view maintains that Europe and the United States no longer share similar cultural and political views. Another perspective maintains that the war in Iraq drove this alleged transatlantic wedge even deeper, and that recovery from the war and American unilateralism will take decades. More recently, the new crisis dominating much of the literature on NATO involves its mission in Afghanistan, which began in 2003 and has introduced a new set of political, strategic and military problems for the allies to overcome. Although senior officials within NATO continue to note some of the progress being made in NATO’s Afghanistan operation, it is clear that the mission places the alliance in uncharted political and military territory.

Many of these criticisms of NATO, especially those that point to the challenges in Afghanistan, have real merit and certainly give insight into the immediate and perhaps even long-term challenges faced by what many refer to as the world’s greatest military alliance. At the same time, other evidence indicates that NATO remains quite alive with real security relevance across the globe. This essay examines three facets of NATO’s missions beyond Afghanistan that often get overlooked by NATO’s critics, including the politics of NATO membership enlargement, the development of “global partners,” and the wider array of operations that the alliance is engaged in. In doing so, this essay provides a more comprehensive assessment of NATO’s current role in global security, and maintains that NATO’s critics who focus solely on the mission in Afghanistan miss critical foreign policy and security developments elsewhere in the world, which provides much insight on NATO’s ability to maintain its wider relevance in global security. NATO has serious problems to overcome in Afghanistan, but these problems alone do not define the alliance’s future. This essay begins by first turning to the political impact of membership enlargement.

Alliance Enlargement

In 1997 at its Madrid Summit, NATO extended membership invitation offers to three Central European states: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. This round of expansion was followed in 2002 at the Prague Summit, as invitation offers were granted to seven European states, which included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. These changes produced an alliance in 2004 of twenty-six member states, which is considerably different from the original twelve allies who came together in 1949, as Secretary General Lord Ismay noted, to “get the United States in, keep the Soviets out and keep the Germans down.”

In these two expansion rounds, critics noted that the applicant states provided little added security value to the allies, and more dangerously, potentially invited new security pressures for the alliance. Arguably, more members would make it more difficult to achieve alliance consensus, and these new members had internal political problems of their own, especially with regard to the political integration of large domestic minority populations. Critics within military circles highlighted the applicants’ outdated weaponry, their inability to project force, and the high costs of making their militaries interoperable with the rest of the allies. For the most part, academic commentators and policy analysts argued that expansion was a bad idea that would bring serious harm to the alliance.

Yet now, more than ten years after the Madrid Summit and six years after Prague, it is clear that NATO expansion has been a success. The new member countries have rarely been an obstacle to finding consensus in the alliance, and have managed their domestic minority populations in democratic and fair manners. Much research also points to the significant defense reforms that applicants have implemented in their efforts to become more attractive to NATO, and the positive democratic changes adopted in necessary civil-military reforms. Of particular note is Alexandra Gheciu’s book, NATO in the “New Europe,” which makes a convincing case that both the Czech Republic and Romania responded to diplomatic pressure and ongoing training assistance from NATO to implement the kind of reforms that the alliance sought from its applicant states. Rachel Epstein’s research makes a similarly strong case that democratic and military reforms have been implemented in Poland, the Baltics, and elsewhere as states work toward gaining membership in the alliance. Moreover, while the new members have generally provided only small equipment and troop contributions to Afghanistan and other NATO peacekeeping operations, and their small defense budgets have changed little since becoming full members, a number of their deployments have not been negligible, and in some cases have made important contributions to NATO’s broader peacekeeping mission.

A number of these positive trends were again evident at NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008. Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine all campaigned aggressively for NATO membership in the lead-up to the Summit. Although the level of
reforms vary across each state, it is clear that these aspiring members have all worked in coordination with NATO officials to professionalize and modernize their militaries, and in some cases, have implemented significant reforms to appeal to NATO. The Bucharest Summit ended with invitations extended to Albania and Croatia, and with an invitation to Macedonia being placed on temporary hold, contingent upon its reconciliation with Greece over the country’s formal name. Differences within the alliance surfaced over the wisdom in inviting Georgia and Ukraine into NATO’s Membership Action Program at this time, but the alliance stressed the potential for future membership for them, as both states lobbied aggressively for a closer relationship with the allies. After the Summit, increased lobbying efforts from NATO allies and applicant states have continued on behalf of Macedonia, Georgia and Ukraine, all of which suggests the ongoing attractiveness of alliance membership. Despite the wider criticisms of the alliance’s alleged current condition that permeates much of the academic literature, it seems clear that the movement toward membership expansion has worked, that NATO’s “Open-Door” policy remains as a meaningful facet of NATO’s evolution, and that many states continue to aggressively court NATO in their desire to gain membership.

Global Partners

During his tenure as NATO’s secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has actively campaigned beyond NATO’s traditional borders for a broadening of NATO “partners,” who agree to work alongside the alliance in carrying out its global mission to fight terrorism. De Hoop Scheffer and other NATO officials have made the case that the challenge of terrorism demands global cooperation and a strengthening of multilateral responses; the effort to thwart terrorist movements cannot be viewed through only a regional lens, as NATO must go beyond its traditional borders to cultivate new partners who can aid the alliance in achieving this security objective. In doing so, under De Hoop Scheffer’s leadership, NATO has forged new diplomatic relationships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, all of whom have found ways to assist NATO with Afghanistan. Among these states, Australia is perhaps most noteworthy given its contribution to the operation in Afghanistan of some 1100 troops, who are deployed in the more contentious southern region.

Another notable partner of NATO is Sweden, who is famous for its long-standing position of foreign policy neutrality. In reality, Sweden has been anything but neutral with regard to NATO, and has found a number of means to increase its cooperation with the allies. Sweden currently has 350 troops deployed in Afghanistan, has trained alongside NATO’s Response Force, has worked in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program since 1995, and has approximately 200 troops deployed in NATO’s peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. Similarly, although domestic public opinion remains skeptical of expanding ties with NATO, a number of foreign policy elites in Finland have begun to call for increasing the public dialogue for improved relations with NATO. Although small in number, Finland also has 100 of its own troops deployed in Afghanistan. These developments again stand in strong contrast to the wider criticisms waged against NATO and its current condition, and again suggests the ongoing attractiveness of the alliance and its role in global security—even in Scandinavia where foreign policy neutrality is clearly being replaced by a movement toward de facto partnership with the allies.

In the Middle East, NATO’s outreach efforts have also been responded to generally in a favorable way. At its 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO created its Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which provided a new forum for NATO to increase its diplomatic contacts with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. In late April 2008, all NATO ambassadors and a number of NATO officials met for the second time in Bahrain to continue this dialogue. Bahrain has also agreed to more closely share intelligence with the allies, and has participated in joint military training operations. These new diplomatic relationships should not be exaggerated, but nonetheless demonstrate that the alliance continues to evolve and find additional ways to cultivate different kinds of partnerships in areas where NATO previously would have never even considered. This same argument applies as well to Israel, which has participated in an array of NATO training operations.

To be sure, NATO’s new global “partners” have not developed into official membership status talks for any of these states, and views within the alliance are mixed on how aggressive the organization should be in cultivating these new diplomatic relationships. France especially has expressed concern, and in 2007, openly protested an American-led “Global Partnership Initiative” that would have more formally linked these non-members to the alliance. Yet these mixed views within NATO have not prevented a deepening of dialogue and improved relations with these partners, and again suggest that despite what its critics highlight, NATO remains attractive to a number of states outside the alliance for an array of diplomatic and security reasons.

Expansion of NATO Operations

NATO’s mission in Afghanistan continues to take primacy over all other alliance operations, a point which has repeatedly been highlighted by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and was again noted in NATO’s
legitimacy and international Afghanistan are profound, will continue to produce divi-

sions within the alliance.

While the challenges in Afghanistan are profound, the evidence is clear that the mission has considerable legitimacy and international support.

Bucharest Summit Declaration. Yet even with the alliance increasingly engaged in Afghanistan, it is clear that the alliance has continued to evolve in response to new security challenges beyond alliance borders. In 2005, NATO agreed to assist the African Union (AU) in transporting peacekeeping troops to Sudan. In the same year, NATO also assisted the United Nations and some humanitarian non-governmental organizations in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to earthquake victims in Pakistan. In both cases, evidence exists that these operations were entered with considerable caution and some hesitancy, but NATO nonetheless was called upon and eventually responded to these security needs.

In 2005, after considerable debate within the alliance, NATO agreed to place a small group of military experts to train senior Iraqi defense officials. Other NATO members have provided similar military advice and training on a bilateral basis. Although this operation remains small, consisting of only ninety NATO trainers, and also highlights the different views existing within NATO over Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki recently visited NATO headquarters in Brussels and reiterated his request for a wider NATO presence in Iraq. In this respect, NATO is demonstrating its different kinds of capabilities that it can potentially provide, which Iraqi leaders want.

More recently, the rapidly deteriorating political climate in Somalia demonstrates how NATO is being called upon to provide other kinds of assistance. In 2008, NATO has again agreed to provide transport assistance to AU peacekeeping troops. Moreover, Somalia’s coastal waters have become ripe for Somali pirates, who recently took a Spanish merchant ship hostage, which triggered Spain’s calls for NATO to consider an active naval policing role in the region. NATO also maintains its peacekeeping presence of 16,000 troops in Kosovo, and by many accounts, continues to foster stability in the wake of the recent secessionist and independence movement.

This wide variety of military operations demonstrates that NATO has ongoing and increasing relevance in addressing an array of existing security challenges. Among the explanations for this expanding role, Celeste Wallander’s research published in the journal International Organization in 2000 makes a strong case that NATO is an institution with a variety of political and military assets. Although the organization was created primarily to defend against an attack from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its long history of joint and diversified training operations have allowed it to demonstrate its institutional flexibility and ability to evolve to meet new post Cold War challenges.

In addition to Wallander’s views, John Duffield maintained in an article published in 1994 in Political Science Quarterly that NATO benefits from a dearth of other multilateral military organizations that are capable of responding to the diverse set of global security challenges that are now present. Even though his article is now over a decade old, his argument continues to have much merit, as the world watches the African Union struggle in Sudan and Somalia, and as the European Union is only able to conduct relatively small and limited peacekeeping operations. These EU operations, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and now in Chad, also demonstrate the necessity of French military leadership, and thus implicitly, the EU’s institutional military and peacekeeping limitations, which French President Nicolas Sarkozy has highlighted on a number of occasions.

In addition to Wallander’s and Duffield’s insights, it seems clear that many security crises continue to prompt calls for multilateral responses, which likely become possible only due to the existence of multilateral institutions such as NATO. In a number of the security crises noted above, it is difficult to imagine resolving the crises with unilateral intervention, which would have been objected to by the governments where the crises occurred, and may have not been supported domestically by the states who were providing the assistance. For all of these reasons, NATO continues to be called upon for assistance, and this trend seems likely to continue in the future.

Afghanistan

NATO’s mission in Afghanistan faces tremendous political challenges. The surge in opium production and growth of the narco-economy, the increased levels of violence and suicide terrorism, the uneven military contributions from the allies, and the Europeans’ inadequate military capabilities have all brought out the difficult challenges for the allies. However one measures “success” in Afghanistan, it is clear that NATO is engaged in a long-term challenge that will continue to produce divisions within the alliance.

Yet even with these challenges, the mission continues to receive strong endorsement from the United Nations Security Council. In addition, while the military contributions are uneven within the alliance, NATO’s decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, continues to support all elements of NATO’s peacekeeping and combat presence. Forty countries, including all NATO allies, contribute to the mission, and no NATO ally has removed its troops from the operation. While the troop contributions fall short of what NATO officials seek, member states have slowly added and built upon their existing presence. France, under President Sarkozy, is especially noteworthy given his decision to increase France’s military presence by more than 1,000 troops. Sarkozy has also repositioned French aircraft such that they are able to more actively participate in combat operations. While the challenges in
Afghanistan are profound, the evidence is clear that the mission has considerable legitimacy and international support. When these more positive trends are placed alongside NATO’s success in membership enlargement, its growth in new “partner” allies, and the organization’s institutional flexibility and wider set of military assets that are relevant to current political crises, it seems evident that NATO’s struggles in Afghanistan do not completely define its relevance in modern global security affairs.

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Looking back at the problems and controversies that dogged NATO twenty-five or thirty years ago, a number of them are now artifacts of the cold war. Disputes over nuclear targeting doctrine and the deployment of intermediate range nuclear (INF) missiles in Europe were the subject of much political debate within and outside the alliance. Although these issues are faded, others have persisted including those related to American leadership in NATO and the enlargement of the alliance. In this essay, I focus on two multidimensional problems for NATO that have been manifest during its operation in Afghanistan (the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF): force suitability and burden sharing. Each of the concerns has arisen periodically throughout NATO’s history. Nevertheless, the repetition of these issues over time, albeit in different forms, suggests that they have implications beyond the present Afghan operation.

**Force Suitability**

In earlier decades, NATO debates centered on different types of nuclear and conventional forces and whether their type, size, and configuration were sufficient for deterrence and defense. With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the assumption of new missions by NATO forces, the old debates are largely moot. Nevertheless, the adoption of peace operations, or what NATO and others call “stability and support missions,” has reawakened concerns about the match between NATO forces and the tasks they are supposed to achieve. As the oft-quoted phrase of former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld indicates, NATO is carrying out its missions in Afghanistan with the national armies it has rather than the forces that it wishes it had.

**Problems of Context** • NATO forces were configured and trained primarily for conflict within the context of an interstate war. Afghanistan presents a very different context. It is essentially a civil war with the battleground extending to, and sometimes across, the Pakistani border. NATO forces face counterinsurgency tasks as well as facing bombings and other terrorist acts. The civil war context and the geography of the deployment pose special problems for NATO and indeed any agency charged with carrying out a peace operation in similar contexts.

Civil conflicts pose special problems for peace operations, and especially for NATO in Afghanistan. Civil conflicts often involve more than two
identifiable groups in conflict. In Afghanistan, there are not merely national government forces and the Taliban, but various tribal militias whose support of NATO objectives varies across the different groups as well as time. As the number of actors in the dispute increases so does the likelihood that one or more of them will object to a cease-fire and the objectives of the peace forces; they may take military action against other actors (e.g., other militias, humanitarian assistance personnel) or NATO troops. Thus, there is more potential for “spoilers” in civil conflicts than interstate ones.

Beyond the difficulty of aggregating multiple preferences in support of a peace operation, the geographic requirements are different in a civil conflict than in an interstate one. Civil instability means that several groups are operating in different parts of the country. This necessitates that the peace operation covers a broader territory, opening up the possibility of more violent incidents. Furthermore, unlike an identifiable international border or cease-fire line, it may be impossible to demarcate a line or area that separates the many sides in the conflict. The battle lines in Afghanistan are ill-defined and warfare is far from conventional. Suicide bombings or mortar attacks may be equally likely threats. The only clear border, Afghanistan’s with Pakistan, is actually a hindrance rather than a help to NATO forces; Pakistan provides a safe haven for the Taliban to supply its forces and to escape when pursued by American and NATO troops.

Not wearing military uniforms (indeed, sometimes not being traditional military or para-military units at all), participants in the Afghan civil conflict are hard to identify, much less to separate when they occupy the same geographic area. In contrast, disputants that can be more easily identified and separated across recognized borders or militarily defined cease-fire lines, such as Serb forces along Kosovo’s borders, are much easier to regulate.

The geography of civil conflicts may be quite dangerous to peace forces and the situation more difficult to control. Peace missions are most successful when deployed so as to detect cease-fire violations and monitor compliance with other mandates adequately. Often this is well beyond the control of the operation. Afghanistan is an extremely large country, 647,500 square kilometers, sharing borders with six other states in Asia. Even with an extremely large peace force, it is largely impractical to secure all areas of the country. In fact, ISAF has only 1/80 the number of soldiers per kilometer and twenty times fewer soldiers per capita in terms of local population than operations in Kosovo. The weak state of Afghan national forces provides limited supplemental assistance to NATO troops. Furthermore, a limited transportation system further complicates the ability of an international force to monitor activities.

Vast amounts of territory to cover are not the only problem for the NATO peace operation. Topography must also be conducive to monitoring and other operational activities. An open terrain and a lightly populated area are conducive to the detection of improper activity by disputants. If the parties believe that they can get away with violations, then sniper fire, smuggling, and other actions will be more likely to occur. Afghanistan’s terrain is very rugged, and many villages are remote from the national capital Kabul. Inclement winter weather also causes problems for the peace operations and represents something of a “homefield” advantage for the Taliban and other insurgent elements. This is not to say that an urban warfare environment would necessarily be preferable, as US forces in Iraq understand well.

Still, the deployment areas for NATO troops are not friendly to the different missions that need to be performed, and stand in contrast to flat, open desert areas, the terrain of the Sinai where many NATO countries contribute troops to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) operation.

The problems with carrying out peace operations in civil war contexts are not unique to NATO. Any agency, including other regional organizations and the United Nations, are subject to similar difficulties. Yet neither is NATO immune. As NATO continues its evolution from a standard military alliance committed to conventional deterrence and defense in the central European theatre to a regional organization carrying out multiple missions “out of area,” its force structure will need further modifications to adapt to new situational contexts.

Problems of Multiple and Incompatible Missions

The mandate for ISAF includes several different missions. Along with some conventional military components, there are several other missions that are often included in contemporary peacebuilding operations. The problem arises in that the missions may be incompatible with one another, from operational as well as training standpoints.

Several of the mission tasks assigned to the ISAF force might be described as requiring neutral roles in which the soldiers are only third parties in the conflict; the former means that the force is not inherently biased or supportive of any local combatant whereas the latter indicates that ISAF is not an active participant in the dispute or conflict. Supporting humanitarian assistance operations and assisting in reconstruction needs (e.g., rehabilitation of medical facilities, restoring water supplies) are consistent with this orientation. At the same time, ISAF’s mandate includes tasks that are of a distinctly non-neutral character, specifically those parts of the mission that involve the development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). These include conducting military operations with those forces, training the
national army, helping disarm opposition groups, and assisting in counter-narcotics operations. These are clearly actions in which NATO can and does assume primary party roles in the conflict.

How well can NATO perform missions that are quite different from one another in role and conflict orientation? Complicating this, there is some disagreement among NATO members about the relative priority that should be assigned to reconstruction versus security functions. Most soldiers receive extensive military training in basic combat skills. These may be fine for some peace operation activities on the coercive end of the scale. Yet other missions depend for their effectiveness on a complex set of what has been referred to as “contact” (more diplomatic) skills. For example, missions whose primary purpose is monitoring call for observational and analytical skills. Those that attempt to restore countries to functioning civil societies (peacebuilding) require a much broader range of skills, including interpersonal and intergroup relations, communication, negotiation, and, in the case of military operations, a mix of combat and political skills. A key question, however, is whether NATO soldiers are actually being trained in these contact skills, and this varies significantly by member state and the extent of peacekeeping experience of the soldiers involved. Can a given soldier master all the skills and behaviors necessary for the missions above, assuming that present or expanded training regimens could accommodate them? Will training in one approach undermine the training required in another approach? Another concern is with the ability of soldiers to shift orientations and techniques as the mission evolves.

More critically, the local population or the combatants may also have difficulty in deciding whether to cooperate with peace soldiers when they perform divergent and seemingly contradictory missions, such as humanitarian assistance and pacification. Indeed, as civilian casualties have increased in Afghanistan, often from strategic bombing attacks, local support for NATO forces and actions has declined. Further complicating this is that the United States maintains a military operation—Operation Enduring Freedom—separate from the ISAF operation. The former includes traditional military units and special operations personnel. It is unlikely that the coercive actions by American forces can be separated from neutral support for public goods (e.g., building roads), at least in the minds of Afghan warlords and local populations.

NATO is likely to assume increasingly complex missions with multiple tasks that require different roles and conflict orientations. The Afghan experience suggests that NATO will need to make some adjustments in its training and mission specification. Some of the problems might be solved by assigning some of the peacebuilding functions to units from certain designated countries and saving more coercive tasks to other NATO members. Yet this exacerbates some of the burdening sharing problems elucidated below. It may also mean that greater reliance on non-governmental organizations and other entities for some peacebuilding functions may be necessary. The United Nations, specifically its UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), has been underutilized. Of course, such actors need to have a secure environment in which to operate, complicating the ability of NATO to escape from this dilemma.

**Burden Sharing**

During the cold war period, there was great debate in NATO over the distribution of contributions to the common defense. Most notably, American commentators and politicians claimed that the United States was bearing a disproportionate burden and that the European allies were “free-riding,” and therefore not paying their share. Traditionally, gaps in defense spending/GNP between the United States and its allies were cited as evidence. Accordingly, there were numerous symbolic attempts by the American Congress to pressure the Europeans to spend more on defense, including failed Senate resolutions to withdraw US troops from Europe unless the allies increased contributions.

With the end of the cold war and the dissipation of the security threat from the east, defense spending concerns have been less salient in the alliance. Furthermore, the expansion of NATO has increased the potential pool of support on which to draw for any operation. Nevertheless, defense burden concerns have been reawakened in NATO for its operation in Afghanistan. Rather than defense spending per se, it is troop contributions that are now a source of controversy.

Table 1 lists troop contributions to the ISAF operation from NATO members and other states. The United States contributes over 40 percent of the military forces in this mission. This figure actually

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO Member</th>
<th>Troop Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>19,000*</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>7,750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3,490</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Others—37 states (including non-members)</td>
<td>14,260</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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*does not include military personnel in Operation Enduring Freedom
underestimates the full contribution of the United States to the war in Afghanistan; beyond the official 19,000 troops committed to ISAF, the US also has more than 13,000 troops under the separate, but coordinated, Operating Enduring Freedom fighting the Taliban and hunting insurgents in the eastern part of the country. There is also a large American civilian contingent. Leaving aside whether the size of this contribution is appropriate or not, it is clear that the United States has continued to carry most of the operational burden, even after NATO expanded its responsibilities in 2003. Beyond the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada—two other large contributors—have been most vocal about the relative imbalance of their contributions vis-à-vis other members.

We know from analyses of “public goods,” those benefits that cannot be excluded from group members regardless of contribution, that certain states will almost always bear a disproportionate share of the costs of the goods. Absent a central government to enforce contributions (e.g., taxes), this is difficult to avoid. In addition, NATO’s principle of “costs lie where they fall” means that states have an incentive not to contribute more troops and equipment, lest they assume the full costs of those contributions (in contrast to UN peacekeeping costs, which are shared by all members). Nevertheless, there will always be certain group members, in this case the United States, that have a private interest in providing the good even at the expense of paying more than its share. This does not necessarily lessen the controversy over differential contributions.

Adding to the conflict over personnel contributions are disputes over the deployment of those troops. Some states have resisted the deployment of their troops in areas of instability and in combat roles. Thus, not only have some states contributed fewer troops than might be predicted by their size, but NATO members have been reluctant to place personnel in harm’s way. Specifically, troops from Italy, Spain, and Germany are restricted to northern Afghanistan, an area of greater stability and less risk to those deployed than in the southern part of the country.

Some form of specialization within NATO is logical given differential capabilities of national armies. Yet when force allocations and restrictions are based on domestic political concerns to avoid casualties, tensions are bound to increase between alliance members. The net effect is that NATO risks becoming a two-tiered alliance with different roles and burdens for different states. As Robert Kaplan pointed out in an op-ed in the *New York Times* (2008), this is not necessarily undesirable and indeed could have a number of benefits. Nevertheless, it is likely to promote contention in the alliance unless such differential roles emerge from collective negotiation and agreement, rather than unilateral national actions.

The tensions over defense burdens have been exacerbated by several, interrelated factors. First, the US and UK are already stretched to the military limit from military commitments in Iraq and therefore are more sensitive to increased burdens elsewhere. Second, the loss of gains in security in Afghanistan made in the early years of the operation has highlighted the need for more troops, not fewer to meet increasing threats. Although Afghanistan does not yet resemble Iraq in terms of security (or lack thereof), the situation has deteriorated over the past year and only a few states have responded to calls for more troop contributions. Third, and in a related fashion, the prospects for a long deployment have dampened enthusiasm for continuing contributions, much less expanding commitments even as the latter may be necessary to fulfill the operation's mandate. Even optimistic assessments envision ISAF deployment until at least 2011, and such predictions have been notoriously inaccurate in the past with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO members, and their domestic publics, are reluctant to undertake what are essentially open-ended commitments to a conflict at a great distance from their homelands.

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**Conclusion**

The problems of force suitability and burden sharing have been manifest in different forms over the life of the NATO alliance. One possible implication is that the persistence of such issues is not a threat to the alliance itself. They did not bring down the alliance before and are unlikely to do so now. Of course, during the cold war era, these concerns were not viewed as serious enough to lead to a reevaluation of security commitments in the face of a common external threat. In the absence of a common external threat and a greater divergence of interests between members, problems in NATO deserve renewed attention and negotiation. They will certainly reappear as NATO conducts future operations divorced from its original mandate and away from its geographic center.

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After Afghanistan: Whither the Coalition of Democratic States?

by EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ

Will the coalition of free, democratic, market states and peoples survive Afghanistan?

Currently, and misleadingly given the high stakes at risk, the Afghan challenge has been narrowly cast as whether NATO can survive Afghanistan. NATO, as a military organization, is a necessary but scarcely a sufficient condition to defeat the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies in Afghanistan and to cope with the multiplying challenges of the twenty-first century.

What is needed is the creation of a new alliance of democratic states and peoples extending around the globe. Before that ambitious transformation of global politics can be entertained, a new administration in Washington must pointedly repudiate the Bush Doctrine and its flawed strategies and failed policies. Absent that crucial precondition, there is little likelihood that allies will provide more human and material resources and incur increased political obligations at home and abroad to turn the tide in Afghanistan. Nor are they likely to be disposed to fashion new institutions capable of the needed levels of cooperation to address their shared global interests.

Specifically, the incoming administration must jettison the misguided assumption, shared by the Right and the Left and reflected in the campaign rhetoric of both parties and candidates, that the United States is a superpower. It cannot impose its preferences for global order on other states and peoples or induce them to bandwagon on American power and purposes. Abandoning the notion of a compelling American hegemony in no way diminishes the United States as a formidable global power. It is destined neither inexorably to decline and demise nor, as others suggest, to triumph over history as the world’s populations were expected to inevitably embrace its liberal credo.

Like the United States, other global powers—China, India, and an incipiently uniting European Union—are also incapable, alone and unilaterally, either of eliciting universal support for their preferred notions of global order or of compelling others to adopt or to adapt to them. The costly civil and international wars of the twentieth century—many still ongoing—clearly frustrated those ambitions. The emergence of a global society for the first time in the evolution of the species precludes them.

The diffusion of power among the multiple and multiplying actors of the world society is beyond the capacity of any state or people to capture or control. This revolutionary human condition is the unintended outcome of a long, trial-and-error globalizing process of socio-economic and political engagement. The existence of this society is now consciously acknowledged and understood by a growing number of the world’s increasingly entangled and contesting states and peoples. The challenge confronting the United States and the democratic coalition is to pool their resources and power to ensure their collective leadership of the six billion diverse and divided peoples of the world whose fates and fortunes have never been so interdependently entwined.

Two long-term policy goals should be pursued to reverse the catastrophic consequences of the Bush Doctrine in weakening American influence and power, soft and hard, around the globe, in mindlessly squandering scarce human and material resources better spent on strengthening the domestic fabric of the nation, and in damaging, arguably permanently, the moral integrity of the United States and American people.

First, the Atlantic Alliance should be enlarged and transformed into an Alliance of Democratic States and Peoples. Second, this alliance should build on the military assets of the NATO organization. These include NATO’s integrated organization, planning, and command structures, its formidable military capabilities and capacity for conducting joint operations, the professional competence of its officer and enlisted corps, and the hard-earned mutual respect that cooperation among national militaries, engaged on the battle field, engenders among allies. An expanded alliance would be supplemented by the creation of a truly effective European Union rapid strike force of global reach, a capability that still eludes a EU population greater than that of the United States and with a Gross Domestic Product roughly equal to it.

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This process of inclusion of democratic peoples around the world is intended to bring Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and other democratic or aspiring democratic states into this global alliance of free states and peoples. The realization of this alliance will not be achieved any time soon. The splits within the democratic coalition, exacerbated by the Bush Doctrine, are presently too deep: the lures of free riding too compelling. Recognition of the urgent necessity of this alliance can only arise from a clear-headed diagnosis of the failure of a divided democratic coalition to cope with multiplying and synergistically reinforcing global issues. Let's begin with Afghanistan.

Surviving Afghanistan?

Afghanistan is a global challenge. It is not simply an out-of-area NATO mission. Obscured in reducing Afghanistan to a NATO military operation are the global dimensions of the Afghan war and their implications for the coalition of democratic states. The Western democracies emerged ascendant from the Cold War as the collective hegemon of global politics. The Cold War struggle, dating as early as the outbreak of World War II, posed the issues of what global order, economic system, and political and moral values would inform the states and regimes of the world. With the defeat of imperial, fascist, Nazi, and Communist solutions to these issues by a coalition of democratic states, led by the United States, it was convenient and comforting to believe that the governance of the world was resolved definitively in favor of this powerful coalition of free peoples. What is now clear to even the casual observer of global disarray is that the issue of how the world will be ruled remains the overriding challenge of this century.

While the Afghan war does not pose all of the obstacles and constraints impeding the realization of a democratically dominated and –led global society, it does raise formidable challenges that must be adequately addressed if the democratic coalition is to survive and thrive. Afghanistan is a failed state from the perspective of a Western-oriented global society. Its political disintegration after over a generation of wars facilitated the Taliban's highjack of the Afghan state and its imposition of a rigid, socially retrograde system of rule on the Afghan people.

There arose an affinity of Taliban ideology with al Qaeda's pogrom of nihilistic violence against the West and, specifically, against the American people. In the immediate wake of 9/11, Americans and Europeans


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abrupt end of the Cold War, as the dominant axis around which global politics revolved and evolved, opened the way for these hitherto suppressed global forces to be pushed to the forefront of the world society’s principal concerns.

It is important to recognize what history and human social evolution has produced: a world society profoundly divided by religion, culture, national, ethnic, and tribal loyalties, language, gender, status and race. To get its way on the urgent global issues of today—terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, sustainable economic growth, the end of poverty and gross income inequality, or ecological and environmental protection—the democratic coalition must work through this resistant material to elicit the cooperation of other actors, whether by consent or, if blandishments and threats fail, by force. There is no clear endpoint to what is a dual process of political engagement. Through ongoing negotiations and give-and-take, the coalition confronts two challenges: to develop a consensus about what and how to shape and shove a seemingly intractable world society to its advantage, while sustaining that consensus through expected setbacks and defeats wrought by non-democratic opponents. Either the states and peoples will hang together or they will hang separately.

How democratic states solve the Afghanistan conundrum will have a significant impact on producing the favorable political conditions to collectively confront their shared issues of the global commons. Specifically, the virulent and violent forms of Islamic Jihad must not only be defeated by force but in a way that does not galvanize the larger Islamic community.

The Limited Capacity of NATO in Its Current Form to Produce a Stable Afghanistan

On several fronts, NATO is falling short of what is needed to protect the Afghan population from Taliban and al Qaeda attacks and rule. According to the assessment of senior American officials, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and President Bush, NATO is not doing a very good job at present in Afghanistan. They have admonished NATO members to devote more human and material resources and political capital to the fight. Most NATO states are free riders on those allies, which have troops, deployed in Afghanistan.

Canada, with the largest non-American military contingent next to the United Kingdom in Afghanistan, threatened to withdraw its forces unless other NATO states increased their commitments. Of the 62,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan, approximately 33,000 are American and the remainder is a wide scattering of NATO and non-NATO troops. An additional 7,000 American troops are expected to be deployed in early 2009, bringing the total of U.S. fighting forces to 40,000.7

By all accounts these forces are too small to cope with a resurgent Taliban in southern and eastern Afghanistan. American troop levels cannot be appreciably increased because most American combat forces are bogged down in Iraq. Multiple deployments of these troops have further stretched U.S. fighting forces available to Afghanistan. The recent decision not to draw down additional levels in Iraq for the immediate future decreases the likelihood that substantial numbers of American troops will be sent to Afghanistan besides the small contingent of marines that have been recently dispatched and the 7,000 scheduled for 2009.

The shortfalls are not only in numbers. The split command between NATO and American special forces complicates the coordination and efficient deployment of NATO-American military assets. The turnover in NATO and American commanders suggests, too, that officers are rotated out at about the time that they are gaining some understanding and control of the security problems their forces confront.

These limitations imposed by NATO states on their participation in the Afghan war say volumes about the weakness of the Western response. The so-called caveats attached to the German, Italian, and Spanish forces forestall their being assigned to combat missions. These states claim to be contributing to the NATO mission, largely by occupying relatively safe havens in Afghanistan, overseeing Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and providing relatively modest developmental assistance to Afghans. Most of the actual troop contributions of participating coalition partners are fewer than 100 personnel. This amounts to little more than a symbolic gesture to assuage American frustrations about the adequacy of the NATO effort than an effective contribution to offer its good offices to resolve differences between Syria and Israel.7

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to ensure Afghanistan’s security and the stability of the Kabul government. The creation of Provisional Reconstruction Teams to address the non-military and reconstruction needs of Afghans throughout the country is laudable, but their number, ad hoc proliferation, and the modest-sized programs they support do not add up to a comprehensive, integrated, and effective socio-economic development program for Afghanistan as a whole.

To these drawbacks must be added the failure of the Karzai government to extend its control over the country. National and local police forces and the Afghan National Army are not equipped to provide security or combat the Taliban alone in the south and east of the country, nor seal Pakistan’s western border. Tribal communities there provide sanctuary and bases for Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. The siphoning off of aid funds to corrupt officials and warlords further hampers the successful achievement of a stable Afghanistan, torn by centuries of ethnic conflict. Widespread corruption undercuts the government’s ability to deliver secure and needed services to the population and undermines the legitimacy of the Karzai regime. Reports that Afghanistan will be secure by 2011, issuing from NATO commanders, could be viewed as correctives to this skeptical evaluation of progress in Afghanistan. Facts on the ground in Afghanistan contradict these optimistic projections.

The Precondition for an Enhanced Footprint of an Enlarged Democratic Coalition in Afghanistan: Rejection of the Bush Doctrine

If the United States and the American people are to restore the damaged and, in some quarters, the lost confidence in American leadership of the democratic coalition, the assumptions about American power and purpose—outlined in the White House publication of the National Security Strategy of the United States of September 2002 and reaffirmed in 2006—have to be radically revised. American power must be calibrated to what is possible, not to what might be desirable. The formidable reach of American power must be one within its grasp.

There is little doubt that the implementation of the Bush Doctrine, most notably in Iraq but hardly limited to that folly, has had serious adverse impacts on Western cohesion. The Bush administration chose to accept a split in the NATO alliance, between old and new Europe, to effect the Iraq invasion. In counterpoint, it cobbled together a transitory “coalition of the willing” to legitimize its overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in the face of U.N. and widespread European opposition. This defection from reliable alliance behavior has had the predictable effect of seeding widespread doubt and division within the democratic coalition. These rifts, grave enough on pure policy grounds of effectiveness, have been widened and deepened by two other factors: the Bush administration’s deliberate lack of candor about its specific policy aims in Iraq and its gross incompetence in managing the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion.

What were key changes in the assumptions made about the reach of American power and what were some of its major effects, well beyond the disastrous intervention into Iraq, that were rationalized by the Doctrine? The National Security document and speeches of the President, the Vice-President and their top advisors, notably President Bush’s address to the graduating class of West Point in the spring of 2002, provide a wide window into the administration’s thinking, its global strategy, particularly in using and threatening American military power, and its ambitious plans to transform world order to its liking.

The Doctrine assumed that the U.S. was a superpower, capable of imposing its preferences on rivals or inducing allies to bandwagon on them. The President’s West Point speech mapped his vision of an American global order. The President stipulated

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10 Limits of space preclude citation of the voluminous and expanding literature, which supports both propositions. Among the insider accounts, Scott McClellan’s expose is among the most informed and credible concerning the disimulation of the Bush administration; see Scott McClellan, What Happened: Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008). See also the informed renderings of incompetence in the conduct of the American invasion of Iraq and its aftermath by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2005); and Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006). These findings have now been partially validated recently by the official Army history of the war, reported in the New York Times, June 30, 2008.
11 The scope of the Bush Doctrine and a critical evaluation of its implementation are elaborated in Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger Kanet, eds., From Superpower to Besieged Global Power: Restoring World Order after the Failure of the Bush Doctrine (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2008). See especially Chapters 1 and 15, which summarize the findings of the volume’s evaluation of the Bush administration’s global and regional policies. These conclude that the Bush Doctrine was an abject failure. It squandered enormous military and economic resources, diminished American power around the world, and undermined America’s moral reputation as a defender of democratic values and human rights.
that the United States was in the unprecedented position, since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century, to create a balance of power favoring peace over war. This claim was later echoed in the National Security paper, which affirmed that the United States was poised by its unmatched military power to “create a balance of power that favors human freedom; conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.”

The unsurpassed military power of the United States could not be balanced by any one state or combination of states. The President spelled out the global implications of American military supremacy:

Competition between great nations is inevitable, but armed conflict in our world is not. More and more, civilized nations find ourselves on the same side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge—(applause)—thereby, making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.

Based on this assumption of undisputed and uncontested military prowess, the defensive strategies of the past that relied on containing adversaries and deterring them from using force against American and allied interests were no longer serviceable. First, American power would be used for the collective good of the international system, and not simply for the realization of discrete American national interests. The President stipulated that American power was no threat to free and peace-loving states, scarcely reassuring to some key NATO allies like France and Germany, which opposed the Iraq war.

Second, and in response to the 9/11 disaster, foreign adversaries, both state and non-state actors, would not be deterred by the Cold War strategies of the past. Instead, the United States would be obliged to rely on a strategy of pre-emption and, by extension, preventive war to preclude terrorist attacks before they could arise. These perpetrators were judged to be inured to deterrence threats, since they were prepared to commit suicide in attacking American and Western strategic targets and vulnerable cities. The potential link between terrorists and their acquisition of weapons of mass destruction advised a fundamental shift in U.S. strategy.

The President explained why the shift from deterrence to pre-emption was imperative:

13 President Bush’s speech to the graduating class at West Point, June 1, 2002.
14 Quoted in McClellan, p. 6.
15 Quoted in McClellan, p. 6.
Global NATO. of an expanded NATO—a operational representation operation as the incipient characterize this military law at home.
moral restraint, and the rule international law and civil conduct, the strictures widely practiced norms of itself by treaty commitments, greater than when it binds American power is never through consensus, not coercion, in using its power. It is appropriate to concerns and interests. The United States would act would take into account their particular security would be a reliable partner. Before, they could act on the assumption that, by and large, American policy issues. First, the members of NATO cannot assume, as they could during the Cold War, that the U.S. action would also constrain the use of American power much harder than when it forms the 协同作用 of other international states and peoples. European participation moves to dismiss hard-won international understandings and to act unilaterally over the opposition of key NATO allies and members of the U.N. Security Council were consistent with Bush Doctrine strategic principles and political aims to assert and reinforce what has proven to be a false claim of superpower and hegemonic status of the international system and global politics. In retrospect, it should come as no surprise that the Bush administration rejected NATO’s offer to assist the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and ignored the invocation of Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance Treaty for the first time in the history of the pact that an attack on one state was an attack on all. The administration and its civilian leadership of the military were convinced that the Europeans had little to offer that was not already available to the United States in military capabilities. European participation would also constrain the use of American power wherever and whenever it was needed and in what amounts. Notwithstanding recent signs by the administration to distance itself from some of its extreme claims of unilateralism, witnessed in demands for NATO and allied support for the war in Afghanistan and in subsequent negotiations with North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, the Bush Doctrine is still embedded in the thinking and strategies of the administration. This has a dual damaging effect on NATO cohesion and support for the Afghan war and for cooperation on other important global issues. First, the members of NATO cannot assume, as they could during the Cold War, that the U.S. would be a reliable partner. Before, they could act on the assumption that, by and large, American policy would take into account their particular security concerns and interests. The United States would act through consensus, not coercion, in using its power.16


NATO allies could also expect—lapses like Vietnam or Star Wars notwithstanding—that the United States would not act in ways that would be a direct threat to their security interests and aims. Second, while terrorism and terrorists were, indeed, threats to the security interests of all NATO allies, many were prompted to view the United States as a rogue state rather than the Bush administration’s axis of evil (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea). This view cannot be said to have arisen from any one action taken by the Bush administration. It was the accumulation of initiatives in implementing the Bush Doctrine that gradually weakened the democratic coalition and inflamed international public opinion against the United States.

The catalogue of Bush administration defections from traditional American foreign and security policies is long and disquieting: the invasion of Iraq on grounds later proved wrong, notably the connection of the Hussein regime to 9/11; the gross mismanagement of the occupation; the many documented abuses of human rights, involving the torture of combatants at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and other prison facilities under U.S. control; the lengthy detentions of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo without formal charges being brought against them in violation of the Geneva Convention and international law; the creation of special military courts to try detainees at odds with traditional American legal practices; the rendition of prisoners to their homelands where they faced torture, imprisonment, and execution; secret prisons in complicit NATO countries; and the continued insistence of the President that he alone is the final judge of what constitutes torture under international norms and legal proscriptions.17

A clean break with the hegemonic and expansionist assumptions of the Bush Doctrine and its privileged reliance on a pre-emptive strategy of its own making is a necessary, if not sufficient, move to restore some of the lost confidence and respect of NATO allies and other democratic states and peoples in the United States. As long as the Bush Doctrine remains the announced strategy of the United States, allies will continue to harbor reservations about how closely they wish to align on U.S. power and will set conditions, as Germany, Italy, and Spain have done, in contributing to the Afghan war and reconstruction.

17 See the Chapter by Trine Flockhart, on U.S.-European security relations in NATO during the Cold War in From Superpower to Besieged Global Power: Restoring World Order after the Failure of the Bush Doctrine, n. 11, pp. 137-154.
Even with the jettisoning of the Bush Doctrine, a return to the mutual confidence that characterized European-U.S. security relations during the Cold War will not be automatic. Nor can previous levels of strategic cooperation be easily achieved under conditions of a global society of complex interdependencies of states and peoples. Threats today are greater in number and more diffused that that of a possible Soviet attack on Europe. The Bush Doctrine can be credited with having attempted to develop a global strategy for the twenty-first century. It was the right step, but in the wrong direction. It has fallen woefully short in pivoting that strategy narrowly around a global war on terror—a tactic rather than a defined political threat. An adversary can be defeated; terrorism, as a tactic of the weak, cannot. Meanwhile, an effective strategy to address the many challenges to open societies, as noted earlier, has yet to be devised.

The record of U.S.-allied cooperation during the Cold War reveals a seeming paradox. American power is never greater than when it binds itself to treaty commitments, widely practiced norms of civil conduct, the strictures of international law and moral restraint, and the rule of law at home. It relinquishes influence when the American government acts unilaterally in pursuit of narrowly conceived American security and global interests, unmindful of the damaging impacts of American power on allies and on the people of the United States. Jack Goldsmith, a former Justice Department Assistant Attorney General who defected from administration policies on torture, forcefully makes this latter point.19

Transforming NATO from a Transatlantic Alliance to an Alliance of Democratic States and Peoples

If the object of the Afghanistan war and the defeat of the Taliban and al Qaeda are understood as a challenge—not just to NATO, but to the coalition of democratic, open market states dedicated to the protection and promotion of human rights—then it is misleading to reduce the stakes of the war to “Will NATO survive Afghanistan?” Some NATO allies appear to grasp its global dimensions. If the military make up of the Afghan coalition is parsed, it is readily apparent that the forces of some non-NATO countries, like the Australian contingent, are significant. Included are contributions from New Zealand, Japan, and Sweden and, until recently, Switzerland and South Korea (the latter having withdrawn its troops in a swap deal for South Korean citizens held hostage by the Taliban). These states and all open societies have a stake in the outcome of the war and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Then why an expanded military alliance patterned on the NATO model? First, the experience in joint planning, operations, command, communications and control, and weapons development and acquisition are very precious, scarce resources available to the democratic states. The military of NATO states can do a lot. As Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier remind us, NATO can “deliver supplies to disaster zones and evacuate the injured; command, control and reconnaissance capabilities to sustain peacekeeping missions; and experienced military officers to train local security forces.”20

An expanded NATO of democratic states and peoples can do more than discharge these important local security functions and humanitarian efforts. If the shaky coalition hastily organized to meet the Taliban/al Qaeda challenge waddles and quacks like a duck, then it must be a duck; that is, it seems appropriate to characterize this military operation as the incipient operational representation of an expanded NATO—a global NATO in the words of Daalder and Goldgeier.

The difficulty of reforming and enlarging the NATO military organization should not be underestimated. The coalition of democratic states which would be parties to the alliance have, even in its present form of twenty-six states, widely different conceptions of the security threats they confront, the strategies and military capabilities required to address them, and the bearing of costs and burdens that each would shoulder to underwrite an effective strategy. The utility of an expanded alliance is the existence of an institutional framework to thrash out these differences and to develop military contingency plans that take account of these differences in the perception and salience of security threats without paralyzing the capacity of democratic peoples to defend their shared interests.

It is paramount to underline the shared interest of free people to retain their ascendancy within a fractious and fractured world society. The more than one billion members of states and societies that meet a democratic/human rights test—two billion if India is included—will inhabit a planet of nine to ten billion in less than a half decade. This zone of freedom and openness is not a free good but demands the continued attention and commitment of its members. NATO, as it is now organized, is not equipped, alone, to confront the many challenges of a global society and its increasingly complex politics and challenges. These go well beyond military threats to encompass international crime, ecological degradation, and sustainable economic growth to respond

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20 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2006): 105-114.
to the demands of populations for “more now,” most notably by those two and half billion people who presently live on less than $2 a day. To effectively grapple with these global issues, there is a need to start now on negotiating a grand bargain between the democratic states and peoples that, while recognizing their particular interests, also strengthens their collective will to get the world they want.

Conclusion

Although historical analogies limit themselves, it may still be useful to reflect on the creative response of the democratic states of the Atlantic coalition to the threat posed by the Soviet Union after World War II. From a global perspective, the issue was joined on the question of how an emerging world society, negatively reflected in the global reach and destructive power of a violent world war, would be ordered: whether organized around authoritarian Communist parties and centrally directed economic systems or around open, democratic regimes founded on free economic exchange markets and dedicated to the protection and promotion of human rights.

The Atlantic Alliance and later the NATO military organization were the security guarantee of the democratic coalition within the confining limits of the Cold War struggle. The implosion of the Soviet Union and China’s break with centralized economic planning confirmed its ascendancy in world politics. That coalition is now again under stress by anti-democratic and anti-market forces. The Afghan war is but one significant sector of a global battleground between these antagonistic forces and democratic-market states and peoples that extends to every continent. The logical consequence of this transformation of global politics and the shared interests of democratic peoples is to organize a military coalition to suit their interests and the times.

QED: If the threats confronting democracies are global, not just that of a big power, like a once formidable Soviet Union, then NATO should be transformed into a global alliance and military organization of free, democratic, market states and peoples to confront their shared global threats and, just as importantly, to seize opportunities to advance their collective interests and values to ensure their leadership of a world society at sixes and sevens.

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