READING GRIMMELSHAUSEN’S *SIMPLICISSIMUS* AS A POLITICAL TREATISE BETWEEN HOBSES AND LOCKE

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of the political argumentation in the German Baroque writer Hans Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen’s picaresque novel Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch (1668). This thesis argues that the novel contains the three-part political argument found in the contemporary political treatises of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) and John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1689). The three-part argument asks what is the state of nature, what is the natural man, and what is the just political system that emerges from these definitions. Simplicissimus demonstrates political argumentation that refutes Hobbes’ defense of absolutism and anticipates Locke’s liberal political philosophy, while championing the moral hermit’s life above all political systems. The substantial political argumentation in the novel is presented as a series of distopian and utopian worldviews encountered by the protagonist. This thesis also presents a new interpretation both of the novel’s structure and of the novel’s frontispiece in light of the political reasoning in the work.
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INTRODUCTION

Hans Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen’s (1621-1676) picaresque novel *Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch* (1668) appeared between two seminal works in the canon of modern political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) *Leviathan* (1651) and John Locke’s (1632-1704) *Second Treatise of Government* (1689).¹ Like these treatises on political science, the novel also attempts to answer the three-part political question that Hobbes and Locke engage in their treatises: what is the state of nature, who is the natural man in it, and what is the political system that emerges from this state under a social contract. As Dieter Breuer attests in his article “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation,” Grimmelshausen’s *Simplicissimus* contains political argumentation over the course of its five books. Breuer sees Grimmelshausen’s political argumentation as “Skepsis gegenüber der Moralität der absolutistischen Staatsordnung” (Breuer 324). But the novel’s political insight is deeper than a simple rejection of the absolute monarchy championed by Hobbes. My research shows that the novel occupies a halfway point between Hobbes and Locke, rejecting the Hobbesian absolutism framework and anticipating the Lockeian liberal framework. As a literary work appearing between these two political treatises, *Simplicissimus* arrives at the striking conclusion that the previous attempts at structuring society in order to meld Christian morality successfully with what Machiavelli describes as mankind’s natural “desire to acquire” have all failed (Machiavelli 14). Grimmelshausen’s solution is that man must live a solitary life to lead a truly moral life. Thus, *Simplicissimus* prescribes a

¹ Hans J. C. von Grimmelshausen, *Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 2005). This is a reprint of the first edition (1668). All further references are to this edition and will be made parenthetically in the text.
system of government that eliminates all forms of civil society tried to date, claiming that man is better off in the state of nature than in civil society. This conclusion indicates that a new system of government is needed, the same conclusion that Locke will come to and address in the Second Treatise on Government twenty-one years later.

Political argumentation permeates the novel and its presence has ramifications for the interpretation of the novel’s structure and frontispiece, two active areas of research concerning Grimmelshausen’s Simplicissimus. This thesis demonstrates that the protagonist encounters and learns from a series of distopian and utopian worldviews in the second half of the novel that inform his political decisions. According to this model, first half of the novel can been interpreted as Simplicissimus’ familiarization with the immoral and warring society of the Thirty Years’ War and the political system of absolutism, while the novel’s second half, in which he encounters the distopian and utopian worldviews, can be interpreted as his search for alternative political systems to map onto German-speaking territories to relieve them of their ills. The novel’s political solution, which champions the hermit’s life and the solitary individual, also has ramifications for the interpretation of the frontispiece. Grimmelshausen focuses on the morality and happiness of the individual Simplicissimus, who returns to the state of nature, and on the happiness of the individual reader, who according to the frontispiece should achieve “Rhue” after reading the novel (6). Grimmelshausen’s immediate political concern is the happiness of the individual, because a system of government that can provide peace and happiness to society is not yet been reached.

To illustrate Simplicissimus’ thorough and progressive political argumentation and its affect on the interpretation of the novel, it is imperative first to explore Grimmelshausen’s political background and the extent of his knowledge of contemporary
political philosophy. This thesis then defines the three-part structure of the political argument in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the state of nature, the state of natural man and the subsequent prescription of a system of government. Upon close investigation, it becomes clear that Simplicissimus’ rendering of these three parts of the political argument reacts to Hobbes and anticipates Locke. A close examination of the relationship of Simplicissimus to Locke’s work demonstrates that the novel does not simply contain the aspects of a political argument, but instead, that it posits a substantial and progressive political argumentation that functions as a bridge between Hobbes and Locke. This thesis then examines Grimmelshausen’s thorough investigation of the dominant political philosophy of his age as presented in the second half of the novel in a series of distopian and utopian worldviews that Simplicissimus encounters. Finally, I discuss the ramifications of these findings for the interpretation of the novel’s structure and frontispiece. Based on Grimmelshausen’s political argumentation, a new structural scheme emerges that advances previous scholarly structural interpretations of the novel. A new reading of the frontispiece of Simplicissimus frontispiece comparing it to that of Leviathan frontispiece also reveals that Grimmelshausen’s political message permeates the entire work, including the engraved title page.

The implications of this thesis for the interpretation of Simplicissimus are substantial. Grimmelshausen scholarship to date has focused on societal critique in the novel, but has not recognized Grimmelshausen’s prescriptive and progressive political argumentation. He does not simply satirize the society of the Thirty Years’ War, but rather tries to find alternatives to it, much in the same manner as his contemporary political philosophers. Grimmelshausen’s political insights are remarkable because they anticipate the new political paradigms of John Locke, whose arguments lead to the
emergence of the liberal political framework that served as the basis for the founding of the United States of America and the dominant structure of many other political entities today. Grimmelshausen’s insights concerning the state of nature and the natural man would have been significant if he had been a political philosopher, and the fact that they are contained in a work of fiction is even more noteworthy. Thus, the novel *Simplicissimus* can be read as a political treatise with striking insights on the state of nature, the natural man, and the advocation of a just system of government that bridges Hobbes and Locke’s seminal political treatises.
CHAPTER I. GRIMMELSHAUSEN’S POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Hans Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen (1621-1676) was well read, his writings reflect his knowledge of the contemporary political philosophy of his time, and he was even active in politics himself. Nevertheless, the extent of his understanding of political science is unknown. It is uncertain whether he was directly familiar with the works of Thomas Hobbes, including *Leviathan* (1651) and its defense of absolutism, against which his political argumentation argues. Grimmelshausen’s main studies and active period of writing occurred after the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), and this was most likely the time in which Grimmelshausen could have been exposed to works of political philosophy. Breuer explains Grimmelshausen’s studies and writing after the war:


It is doubtful that Grimmelshausen read Hobbes during this time, as the Latin version of *Leviathan*, the first version that Grimmelshausen could have read by using the Latin from his interrupted school days, appeared first in 1668, the same year that *Simplicissimus* was published. A survey of Willi Heining’s dissertation, *Die Bildung Grimmelshausens* (1965), records all the then known works that were in Grimmelshausen’s possession, and does not show him to have owned a copy of Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (Heining). However, Grimmelshausen was familiar with political reference works that most likely included the
philosophy of Hobbes. Breuer summarizes the current knowledge of Grimmelshausen’s awareness of political argumentations of his time in the following manner:

Methodische Schwierigkeiten ergeben sich daraus, daß die Quellenfrage unter dem Aspekt der politischen Argumentation im einzelnen noch nicht genügend geklärt ist und auch im Rahmen dieser Untersuchung nicht geklärt werden kann. Schon jetzt möglich indes ist eine vergleichende Lektüre von staatstheoretischen und staatsrechtlichen Lehrbüchern sowie historisch-politischen Nachschlagewerken der Zeit, auch solcher, die Grimmelshausen nachweislich benutzt hat (Breuer, “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation” 307).

According to Breuer, two of the contemporary reference works with which Grimmelshausen was familiar were Georg Hornius’ Orbis Politicus: Oder Beschreibung Aller Käiserthum, Königreiche, Fürstenthümer und Republiquen so heute zu Tag in der Welt bekant (1669) and Adam Contzen’s Politicorum libri decem in quibus de perfectae […] Bibliopolae Coloniensis (1620). Andrea Wicke establishes that Grimmelshausen would have also been able to gain access to political texts through private collections and libraries to which he would have had access, including: “Die Bestände des Klosters Allerheiligen, eine Buchsammlung von Dr. Johannes Küffer auf der Ullenburg [und] die Bibliothek der Freiherren von Schauenburg” (Wicke 298). Grimmelshausen may also have come into contact with Hobbesian political philosophy through his preparation of a manuscript titled Teutscher Friedensraht (1655), by Claus von Schauenburg, for the printing press (Wicke 297). Walther Ernst Schäfer thinks that through his contact with the Teutscher Friedensraht manuscript, Grimmelshausen may have “die Konzeptionen eines gemäßigten, durch ständische Elemente eingeschränkten und biblische begründeten Absolutismus kennengelernt” (Schäfer 138).
Finally, Grimmelshausen was active in politics and served as the steward in the Ullenburg castle near Strasbourg and as the mayor of Renchen, a small town in present-day Baden-Württemberg (Otto 2-3). Through these positions he knew noblemen from whom he could have learned about political philosophy. Andrea Wicke finds that these relationships may have shaped Grimmelshausen’s political positions more than his role as a public official: “Ich halte die Bedeutung informeller persönlicher Beziehungen [mit mindermächtigen Adlige] für Grimmelshausen und seinen politischen Standort für größer als die seiner formalen Rolle als Verwaltungsbeamter der Straßburger Regierung” (Wicke 300). Grimmelshausen was politically well informed through his extensive reading, his civic duties, and his contact with nobility, which explains the strikingly insightful and progressive political argumentation in Simplicissimus.

While the exact source of Grimmelshausen’s knowledge of Hobbes’ philosophy, or a similar defense of absolutism cannot be confirmed, Breuer identifies in Simplicissimus Hobbesian ideas, such as the “state of nature” and the “war of all against all.” These concepts are present in the novel and point to the fact that Grimmelshausen was probably familiar with the philosophy of Hobbes: “Der Traum [“Traum vom Ständebaum” Grimmelshausen 59-68] veranschaulicht den…Zustand…des Krieges aller gegen alle” (Breuer 325). Breuer also demonstrates that Grimmelshausen was familiar with writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), as indicated by his “antimachiavellistischen Traktats über Staatsräson eines theologisch legitimierten ‘Politischen Regiments’ (Simplicianischer Zweyköpfiger Ratio Status, 1670).” Breuer therefore sees the author as an active critic and student of modern political philosophy (Breuer, “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation,” 304).
Through his knowledge of political philosophy Grimmelshausen placed in *Simplicissimus* much of the fundamental structure of the political argumentation that Hobbes’ *Leviathan* brought to the field of political science. The structure of the political treatise in *Leviathan* laid the groundwork for examining man and nature and for prescribing a system of government. Locke later used this structure to build his own political discourse, refuting Hobbes’ prescriptions. Since the structure of Hobbes’ political treatise appears as literary discourse in *Simplicissimus*, Grimmelshausen must have been familiar enough with political argumentation to map the main aspects of it successfully onto a work of literature. Not only is the Hobbesian structure present in the novel, but Grimmelshausen also seems to have had a sufficiently sophisticated knowledge of Hobbes’ main points to refute them.
CHAPTER II. GRIMMELSHAUSEN, HOBBES, AND LOCKE

1. THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

In the introduction to Locke’s *Second Treatise* the political scientist C. B. Macpherson eloquently summarizes the structure of the political argument of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which both *Leviathan* and the *Second Treatise of Government* share, and which is also represented in *Simplicissimus*.

Every political theory which sets out to justify or advocate a particular system of government, or a limited or unlimited degree of obligation of the citizen to the state, must rest on an explicit or implicit theory of human nature. The theorist must show, or assume that the human beings who will have to submit to and operate the desired system do need it and are capable of running it. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this was often done by postulating a supposed natural condition of mankind, or “state of nature,” from which men had historically or would necessarily move by some sort of agreement into political or civil society (Macpherson, “Introduction,” x).

The movement from the state of nature into political or civil society by means of a social contract is the structure of the political treatise that Hobbes sets forth in *Leviathan* as well as that which Locke uses to build his arguments in the *Second Treatise*. Their theories of the state of nature, natural man, and their justification for specific systems of government vary, but each part of the theory is present in their works, and, as will be demonstrated below, they are also present in *Simplicissimus*. By looking at each of these three components—the state of nature, natural man, and the justification for a system of government in the three works—the position of *Simplicissimus* as a transitional treatise between Hobbes and Locke becomes clear.
1. A. Part One of the Political Argument: The State of Nature

In *Leviathan* Hobbes presents a state of nature that he describes as a “warre of every man against every man” (188):

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain (Hobbes 186).

Hobbes understands the state of nature as a fearful and uncertain condition in which people of roughly the same strength battle each other for scarce resources. The struggle is futile because no one man is so much stronger than another that he can lead a safe existence. According to Hobbes, the natural men in the state of nature emerge from this condition by entering into a social contract with their peers to gain the security of civil society in exchange for giving up some of their liberty to a sovereign leader who possesses absolute power.

Grimmelshausen’s novel also depicts a Hobbesian state of “war of all against all,” but, in contrast, places violent conflict outside of the state of nature into society itself. Breuer sees this as a critique of the absolute state as advocated by Hobbes by pointing out that Grimmelshausen places customs of the absolutistic society, such as determining rank by birth, among the unreasonable aspects of the social world:

According to Breuer, the political discourse presented in the “Traum vom Ständebaum” (Grimmelshausen 59-68) is a version of Hobbes’ war of all against all, showing people trying to climb the social ladder as in a futile war with each other, like the people in the state of nature in permanent combat. This presentation of the war of all against all shows that the governmental system that was supposed to distance people from the state of war did not accomplish its goal – the state of war has continued in society. As Breuer argues, the novel criticizes absolutism and Grimmelshausen accomplishes this by reversing the locations of Hobbes’ state of nature and society in regard to war. In *Simplicissimus*, the state of nature is more peaceful than society. When at the end of the novel Simplicissimus decides to return to the woods to live the life of a hermit, he leaves a state of war (society) for a state of peace (the state of nature). The novel thus turns Hobbes’ political theory on its head, with a clear critique of the absolute state.

In *Simplicissimus*, a more complicated state of nature emerges, however. The first instance of a state of nature in the novel is the episode in which Simplicissimus lives in harmony with the hermit in the woods after his Knan’s farm had been sacked. Simplicissimus’ life in the woods is a time of peace, spiritual learning, and hard work with the help and guidance of the hermit. Simplicissimus describes the meager food they eat, the few tools that they own to survive, and their relationship to God: “Und unter allen diesen Geschäften ließe der Einsiedel nicht ab, mich in allem Guten getreulichst zu
Simplicissimus does not describe a Hobbesian state of nature here; there is no war of all against all, but rather cooperation between the hermit and Simplicissimus, who work very hard to survive. There is also a religious aspect here that is missing in Hobbes’ state of nature. This period serves as a formative time for Simplicissimus, and its importance is further supported by his resolution at the end of the novel to leave society and return to this way of life and become “wieder ein Einsiedel” (Grimmelshausen 571). After having visited all strata of society and having experienced much in the world, Simplicissimus decides in the end that the best place for him is outside of society in the state of nature that formed the most basic foundation of his identity and morality. In contrast to the warlike state of nature in Hobbes, which is not a place to return to but rather to avoid at all costs, the novel presents the state of nature as a place of hard work and peace, and suggests it as a viable place to return to and live.

However, the forest is not a pastoral paradise, but rather poses some danger to Simplicissimus. After the death of the hermit, Simplicissimus ventures into the town where they attended church, only to find it burned to the ground. Upon seeing this, Simplicissimus returns to the woods, vowing never to leave again. Returning to the supposed safety of the woods, he is confronted outside his woodland hut by the very soldiers who plundered the city: “zu meinem Aufenthalt, im Feuer briete, umringten mich bei 40 oder 50 Musketier; diese, ob sie zwar ob meiner Person Seltsamkeit erstauneten, so durchstürmten sie doch meine Hütten, und suchten, was da nicht zu finden war” (Grimmelshausen 54). The soldiers rummage through Simplicissimus’ hut and, if
he had had anything worth stealing, it would have been stolen from him. Reflecting the harsh reality of the Thirty Years’ War, this scene shows that isolation in the woods, the state of nature presented in the novel, is neither a completely safe or exceptionally dangerous place for Simplicissimus.

By depicting the dangers as well as the safety of the hermit’s life, the novel touches on some of the aspects of the state of nature that Locke describes in the *Second Treatise*. Locke’s state of nature, like *Simplicissimus’* harsh but otherwise safe isolation in nature, is not a “war of all against all,” but rather a place of difficult labor and some danger. Macpherson summarizes Locke’s state of nature in the introduction the *Second Treatise*:

> [the law of nature] forbids anyone harming another or destroying himself, and requires each to try ‘when his own preservation come not in competition’ to preserve the rest of mankind (§§4-6). This law of nature would be generally observed, but there would be some transgressors; hence some power to restrain them would be needed; and since there was no government, that power must be left to every man individually (§7), but only as much power as is necessary “for reparation and restraint” (§8). Locke assumes that there are few offenders: he sums up this picture of the state of nature by calling it ‘a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservation’ where men live together according to reason, and contrasting it sharply with a ‘state of war’, which is described as ‘a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction.’ (§19) (Macpherson, “Introduction” xiii-xiv).  

Locke’s description of the state of nature is quite similar to the state of nature in *Simplicissimus* in which the hermit and the boy live. There is “mutual assistance” between the two, and they attempt to “preserve” themselves and not harm others. Locke expands on this view of the state of nature, and therewith explains why man would want

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2 The symbol § refers to the 243 small sections of Locke’s *Second Treatise*, which are marked with this symbol.
to leave it. The “transgressors” of the law of nature, like the musketeers in

*Simplicissimus*, can cause problems for the law-abiding inhabitants of the state of nature.

Macpherson summarizes:

\[
[\text{Locke}]\text{ asserted that one great reason for men quitting the state of nature was that in it ‘every the least difference’ is apt to end in the state of war; and later (in §123), when he had to explain why men would ever leave such a free and equal condition as the state of nature, the reason he gave was that in it each was ‘constantly exposed to the invasion of others’ (Macpherson, “Introduction” xiv).}
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Locke’s prediction that the state of nature can deteriorate into a state of war and that the transgressors will make it unsafe resonates with the state of nature as depicted in *Simplicissimus* where peace usually reigns, but transgressors of natural law can also abound.

1. B. Part Two of the Political Argument: Natural Man

Beyond the complex state of nature that the novel provides, *Simplicissimus* also describes the natural man, who inhabits the state of nature, and thereby the novel provides a sketch of human nature. In *Simplicissimus* human nature has two contradictory parts which are both manifested in the character Simplicissimus. The first is what Machiavelli describes as the “desire to acquire,” and the second is a Christian capacity for love and kindness (Machiavelli 14). In chapter three, “Of Mixed Principalities,” of *The Prince* (1532), Machiavelli writes about conquering other nations and what a prince should do to hold them properly. In this historic argument, Machiavelli attests that it is human nature to want to expand and increase one’s wealth: “And truly it is a very natural and ordinary thing to desire to acquire, and always, when
men do it who can, they will be praised or not blamed” (Machiavelli 14). Machiavelli’s idea of the “desire to acquire” ushers in an new and influential view of human nature that is absorbed by Hobbes, Simplicissimus, and Locke.

Hobbes refines the argument of human nature in Leviathan: “I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death” (Hobbes 161). Hobbes describes this “general inclination” as true for every person, including kings, who seem to have everything, yet still desire more land. In Simplicissimus, a similar form of human nature is described at the beginning of the novel and permeates the story:

Es eröffnet sich zu dieser unsere Zeit (von welcher man glaubt, daß es die letzte seie) unter geringen Leuten eine Sucht, in deren die Patienten, wann sie daran krank liegen und so viel zusammengeraspelt und erschachert haben, daß sie neben ein paar Hellern im Beutel ein närrisches Kleid auf die neue Mode, mit tausenderlei seidenen Banden, antragen können, oder sonst etwan durch Glücksfall manhaft und bekannt worden, gleich rittermäßige Herren und adeliche Personen von uraltem Geschlecht sein wollen; da sich doch oft befindet, daß ihre Voreltern Taglöchner, Karchelzieher und Lastträger: ihre Vettern Eseltreiber: ihre Brüder Büttel und Schergen: ihre Schwestern Huren: Ihre Mütter Kupplerin, oder gar Hexen: und in Summa, ihr ganzes Geschlecht von allen 32 Anichen her, also besudelt und befleckt gewesen, als des Zuckerbastels Zunft zu Prag immer sein mögen; ja sie, diese neue Nobilisten, seind oft selbst so schwarz, als wann sie in Guinea geboren und erzogen wären worden (Grimmelshausen 15).

This picture of the “neue Nobilisten,” the new members of the nobility, who have clawed their way into new positions of power is presented as a “Sucht,” an addiction or ailment, of those people who want to show off their new power with expensive clothing although they really are not of noble lineage. The novel presents this inclination as a diseased way of life for this group. Nevertheless, the author then immediately proceeds to allow his main character to dream and speculate about his own possible noble birth. “Solchen
närrischen Leuten nun mag ich mich nicht gleichstellen, ob zwar, die Wahrheit zu bekennen, nicht ohn ist, daß ich mir oft eingebildet, ich müsse ohnfehlbar auch von einem großen Herrn, oder wenigst einem gemeinen Edelmann, meinen Ursprung haben” (Grimmelshausen 15). Even though Simplicissimus wants to distance himself from these new nobles, he also suspects that he, too, might be of noble birth. The new nobles frame the greed and ambition that Simplicissimus encounters and in which he participates over and over throughout the novel. Therefore this “Sucht” is widespread and infectious, which allows it to be described as a “natural” human desire. This “Sucht” is very similar to the Machiavellian “desire to acquire” and the Hobbesian “desire for power after power,” as it postulates an inclination for all people, including Simplicissimus, to desire more. This inclination for power manifests itself to different degrees throughout the novel and is clearly articulated negatively through the character Olivier.

Olivier is a ruthless killer and robber who justifies his ways by citing Machiavellian philosophy. Simplicissimus says that Olivier’s actions are against the law of nature, the laws of the world, and the law of God. By presenting this argument, the novel widens its view of natural man to define Olivier’s vicious “desire to acquire” as an anomaly whose actions are unnatural and against the word of God. Despite implying near the beginning of the novel that the nobleman’s “desire to acquire” is natural, perhaps even for Simplicissimus, Olivier’s extreme practices are seen as an unnatural exaggeration of this desire. The novel argues that extending the “desire to acquire” to the destruction of others is against the laws of God. Thus, Grimmelshausen presents a more nuanced and therefore more progressive reading of the nature of man than that presented by Hobbes. Grimmelshausen shows while the “desire to acquire” is natural, it can be

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3 Olivier is discussed in detail in Chapter III.
exaggerated to an unnatural level, thereby anticipating the definition later set forth by
Locke.

Locke writes that the natural man is a rational man whose goal is self-preservation
and who recognizes that his own welfare is best served by looking after the self-
preservation of others. This version of the natural man is a more peaceful and less
ruthless version of the Machiavellian and Hobbesian natural man bent on acquisition.
Locke’s natural man is focused more on preservation than expansion and more on peace
than war:

Reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business…Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another (Locke 9).

Locke presents natural men as rational and as created equal and independent by a divine
sovereign to do their work peaceably on earth. This natural man cooperates with his
neighbors, and only the abnormal man disturbs the peace enough to warrant the creation
of a system of government to protect the group. Locke’s natural men live together in
harmony like the hermit and Simplicissimus, and it is the abnormal man, who like Olivier
and the musketeers, disturbs the peace. Dealing with the abnormal actions of a person
like Olivier among rational and God-serving natural men is the basis from which both
Grimmelshausen and Locke (and Hobbes before them) recommend a political system that
allows for a harmonious society, freed from the flawed state of nature. On this issue
Grimmelshausen and Locke both break from the absolutism championed by Hobbes, but take different routes to their conclusions.

1. C. Part Three of the Political Argument: Advocation of a System of Government

The third part of the political theory, beyond the description of the state of nature and the definition of the natural man, is the prescription of a system of government. Like the definition of the state of nature and the natural man, this is a Hobbesian construct. Hobbes’ original conception for the system of government that would free people from the state of nature was based on a social contract to which the group would agree. Although it would infringe on some of their rights, this contract, once formed, would protect and serve them. The system that Hobbes advocated was the Leviathan, a huge commonwealth run by an elected sovereign with absolute powers. Lawrence Burns summarizes the Leviathan, in the following manner:

The commonwealth must be constituted as one legal person by a great multitude of men, each of whom covenants with all the others to regard the will of this legal, civil, or artificial person as his own will. This legal person, the sovereign, “is” the commonwealth. In practical terms this means that every subject should regard all actions of the sovereign power as actions of his own, all legislation by the sovereign as his own self-legislation. In fact, the sovereign power, the power of representing and commanding the wills of all, can be vested in one man or in a council (Burns 404).

Hobbes’ sovereign, who “is,” as Burns writes, the commonwealth, is given absolute power, that is the power of life and death over those who have agreed to the social contract and elected the sovereign. According to Hobbes, the sovereign must reign over all subjects, and the laws of the state or the influence of the church must not limit his
power. The massively powerful sovereign controls the legislative and the executive powers.

Locke also advocates a social contract, but he disagrees with Hobbes on the particular kind of government that should arise from it. For Locke there is danger for the public good if all power is concentrated in the hands of one sovereign, and therefore he advocates the separation of powers:

The legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the common-wealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. But because those laws which are constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always business to do. And because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and government: therefore in well-ordered common-wealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the public good (Locke, Second Treatise of Government 75-76).

While Hobbes advocates the concentration of all powers in the sovereign and places the sovereign above the law, Locke shows this to be dangerous for the public good on two accounts. First, “human frailty” could allow a leader with both executive and legislative powers to create laws in their own personal interest and not in the interest of the public good. If the legislative power resides in the hands of “divers persons,” then the executive could never have the power to create laws “to their own private advantage.” Second,
subjecting all people to the law, including those in the communities with executive or legislative powers, ensures that laws are made for the public good.

Locke’s conception of a government with a separation of powers has had lasting impact on the system of government in liberal democracies since his time. Such a system was not yet conceived in Grimmelshausen’s time, but the tools which Locke later used to create his system of government were available to Grimmelshausen. The three-part political argument as conceived by Hobbes, which Locke expanded upon, was accessible to Grimmelshausen. Although Simplicissimus does not formulate the same political prescriptions as Locke later creates, the novel searches for such a new system of government in the existent political worldviews of the time: the modern, classical and the Christian.

Characters personify these three worldviews throughout Simplicissimus. Olivier personifies the modern worldview, Jupiter the classical, and the hermit the Christian. Further worldviews are presented as physical places that Simplicissimus visits. These worldviews are: France, Switzerland, and the Mummelsee. Grimmelshausen has Simplicissimus encounter and judge each of these worldviews throughout the novel. This narrative strategy represents an attempt to find solid ground on which to build a system of government that will deliver the society of the Thirty Years’ War from its “war of all against all.” Grimmelshausen goes about this search in a way similar to that of Locke in his Second Treatise. Like Locke, Simplicissimus surveys the landscape of political ideas to find a more just system of government. Both Grimmelshausen and Locke conduct their searches as a critical reaction to the imperfect absolutism of their times. Grimmelshausen’s thorough survey of the political landscape of the seventeenth century is the subject of chapter III of this thesis.
According to Breuer, *Simplicissimus* presents a skeptical critique of absolutism:

Wachsende Skepsis gegenüber der Moralität der absolutistischen Staatsordnung führt ihn (Grimmelshausen) zu der nun viel grundsätzlicheren Frage: Gibt es überhaupt eine Ordnungsform des menschlichen Zusammenlebens, die zu ihrer “Selbsterhaltung” (*ratio status*) nicht in Konflikt mit vorrangigen moralischen Prinzipien gerät? (Breuer, “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation” 324).

Breuer shows that Grimmelshausen surveys the existing political worldviews in an attempt to answer the question whether a system of government (“Ordnungsform des menschlichen Zusammenlebens”) can allow for morality and “Selbsterhaltung” and the Machiavellian “desire to acquire” to function side by side. By challenging the model of absolutism, the novel must present its own answer to the question of a prescriptive political system, and it attempts to do so by searching for such a structure in the modern, classical, and Christian worldviews.

For Breuer, each book of *Simplicissimus* holds a political argument that critiques absolutism: “Die politische Fragestellung ist im *Simplicissimus* zwar nicht die vorherrschende, doch enthält, auffällig genug, jedes der fünf Bücher einen Beitrag zum Problem einer gerechten, vor göttlichem und natürlichem Recht verantwortbaren Sozialordnung” (Breuer, “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation” 324). Breuer’s account of political argumentation in each book points to the fact that the “frühabsolutistische Staatslehre” (326) and “Ständeprobleme” (325) places some members of society above others, and therefore people cannot live peaceably together as a group in this society:

Ein friedliches Zusammenleben ist, wenn überhaupt, nur außerhalb der staatlichen Ordnung möglich, und zwar in einer kleineren religiösen Sozietät, die durch strenge Selbstdisziplin die Freiheit zur Sünde
Breuer’s description of the novel’s political insights demonstrates why Simplicissimus decides to return to the life of a hermit. The organization of society has failed him. The system of government built upon a definition of man that places one above another due to social rank or noble birth is inadequate, because its citizens’ “desire to acquire” drives them to emulate the warlike actions of the nobility and turns them against one another, and, in turn, against Christian morals. The moral life, as Simplicissimus seeks it, is only to be found away from society and under strict discipline. Though Breuer does indicate that Simplicissimus answers the third part of the political argument by rejecting all systems of government, he does not take a strong enough stance when he implies that this is simply “grundsätzliche Skepsis” of the absolute state (Breuer 329). My research shows that Simplicissimus is a resounding rejection of all attempted worldviews up to this point in history except the Christian – a daring political statement for the novel.

Simplicissimus tears to shreds the social contract that Hobbes so painstakingly constructed and returns to the state of nature to start over. For Simplicissimus, there is no reliable solid ground in the society to trust. Neither the past, present, nor the promise of the future holds any hope for Simplicissimus, so he leaves society and returns to the state of nature. Breuer asserts that at this point Grimmelshausen ends his political
argumentation in the novel: “Doch hat Grimmelshausen mit diesem Schritt [returning to the “Lebensform der Einsiedelei”] die Ebene der politischen Argumentation bereits verlassen” (Breuer 328). This is not true. Grimmelshausen does not simply reject society; he makes a political argument that there is no existent system of government to be trusted. After this claim, he returns his focus to the second part of the argument, the natural man. Simplicissimus starts his life anew. Simplicissimus’ return to the state of nature shows Grimmelshausen’s attempt to reopen the political argument from the beginning. He literally rewinds the political argument. Society has failed, and the state of nature, despite its hardships and imperfections, is the safest place to be. The attention of the political argument must begin anew with its attention on natural man. This is precisely where Locke later reexamines the political argument, beginning with the state of nature and the natural man with which *Simplicissimus* ends. As a bridge between Hobbes and Locke, the political discourse in *Simplicissimus* dismantles Hobbes’ prescriptions for society and gives new definitions to the state of nature and natural man. Grimmelshausen’s literary work anticipates Locke, who redefines the system of government that should arise from the state of nature. By anticipating Locke with the argumentation in *Simplicissimus*, Grimmelshausen shows that he was not only a skeptic of the absolute state, as Breuer attests, but also, as I argue, a political thinker with remarkable insight for his time.

2. **SUMMARY OF SIMPLICISSIMUS’ ASSOCIATION WITH THE POLITICAL DISCOURSES OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES**

The three parts of the political argument summarize the insightful political treatise set forth in *Simplicissimus*. 

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What is the state of nature? *Simplicissimus* presents the state of nature as the time Simplicissimus spends with the hermit in the woods. This is a life of hard physical work, but cooperation between the hermit and Simplicissimus. It is a spiritual time for the two characters and the most peaceful period for Simplicissimus in the whole novel. However, the forest is not without dangers, as evidenced by the marauding musketeers who plunder his hut.

Who is the natural man? In *Simplicissimus*, the natural man has two contradictory parts that are both manifested in the character Simplicissimus. The first trait of the natural man is what Machiavelli describes as the “desire to acquire,” and the second is a Christian capacity for love and kindness. Simplicissimus demonstrates the “desire to acquire” in his dreams of being of noble birth and demonstrates his capacity for Christian morality as the hermit’s companion. The contradictory nature of man makes him unsuited to live in peace with others. In any societal arrangement other than a small group where Christian self-discipline is enacted, his “desire to acquire” leads him to ruthless behavior.

What is the political system that emerges from this state under a social contract? There is no system that can reconcile the contradictory nature of man. The system of absolute power and divided classes leads to a Hobbesian “war of all against all” in society. *Simplicissimus* advocates the return to the state of nature as the safest alternative for a peaceful life.

The political discourse presented in *Simplicissimus* reflects the political climate of the times in which it was published. Between Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (1651) and Locke’s *Second Treatise of Government* (1689), *Simplicissimus* (1668) rejects the absolutism favored by Hobbes, and anticipates the definitions of the state of nature and of natural
man that Locke later uses to define a system of government founded on the separation of powers. Because *Simplicissimus* contains all the aspects of a political argument as established by Hobbes and because this argumentation anticipates the groundbreaking work of Locke, the novel *Simplicissimus* must be considered a serious treatise of political philosophy and Grimmelshausen a serious political theorist.
CHAPTER III: THE CRITIQUE OF VISIONS OF DISTOPIAN AND UTOPIAN WORLDVIEWS IN SIMPLICISSIMUS

Grimmelshausen’s examination and rejection of all the political systems presented over the five books of *Simplicissimus*, and his final focus on the individual and the Christian worldview, are sufficiently thorough. The *pícaro* Simplicissimus encounters diverse political systems and examples of morality, which have lasting effects on how the novel approaches the three parts of the political argument as outlined above. Simplicissimus encounters a vast number of groups and worldviews on his travels, spending time with the soldiers from Bohemia, Sweden, and troops from Weimar, as well as with witches and thieves. His travels even take him to the farthest borders of Europe. Grimmelshausen uses his role as a novelist, and not simply a political philosopher, to survey not only the existing worldviews of the seventeenth century, but also fantastical worldviews, which shape the contours of his political insights. Locke undertook a similar reassessment of the existing political landscape of the seventeenth century, minus the fantastical worldviews, to establish the basis for his political philosophy twenty-one years later. This chapter focuses on Simplicissimus’ encounters with the six different worldviews that most shape Grimmelshausen’s answers to the political argument concerning the state of nature, the natural man, and a justification for a specific political system. Of these six influential worldviews, three can be considered distopian and three utopian. The three distopian worldviews are: 1) Jupiter and the worldview of Antiquity; 2) the godless court life in France; and 3) Olivier and the modern, Machiavellian worldview. The three utopian worldviews that inform the novel’s political argumentation are: 1) idyllic Switzerland; 2) the otherworldly Mummelsee; and 3) the hermit and the Christian worldview. Through the examination of these worldviews, and Simplicissimus’
subsequent rejections of all of them except the Christian, it becomes evident why
Grimmelshausen comes to the political conclusions he does. The distopian and utopian
worldviews are divided in two waves as Simplicissimus searches first through the
distopias and then the utopias. The chronology of the worldviews provides a crescendo
to the return to the woods and the life of a hermit, which highlights the acceptance of this
final worldview. Furthermore, the rejected distopian and utopian worldviews exhibit the
large scope of Grimmelshausen’s political project and the artist’s unique freedom vis à
vis that of the political scientist in critiquing society and politics. Attention is paid to
how each worldview is presented and critiqued, and to what Simplicissimus learns from it
to inform his return to the Christian life of a hermit.

1. THE CRITIQUE OF VISIONS OF DISTOPIAN WORLDVIEWS: JUPITER,
FRANCE, AND OLIVIER

After the pícaro has experienced the horrors of the war and the hermit’s Christian
pedagogy, Simplicissimus encounters the series of three distopias beginning in the
novel’s third book. At first the worldviews are not distopian in nature, but rather
symbolic alternatives to the war and absolutism dominating Simplicissimus’ Germany:
the enduring lessons of the antique world, the situation in the neighboring France, and the
new philosophy of the modern, Machiavellian worldview. Simplicissimus’ encounter
with this first series of worldviews is a response to the horrors of a broken German
society, and he hopes to find a solution to their ills, but finds only distopias with their
own problems.
1. A. First Distopia: Jupiter and Antiquity

In this novel, Jupiter is a raving madman who personifies the worldview of antiquity and thus is the personification of the first distopian worldview that Simplicissimus encounters. He presents Simplicissimus with a complicated vision of a utopia, which combines the rhetoric of Roman antiquity with Christian allusions and progressive ideas to promote a parliamentary system of governance. Jupiter’s visionary worldview is vast in its scope and detail, evoking world peace among all peoples. He personifies a seemingly positive worldview, yet the novel suggests the relevance of this view by how it presents him—as a louse-ridden old fool. The worldview he narrates to Simplicissimus begins as a grand plan for saving Germany and the world, but slowly his logic crumbles as Simplicissimus asks him more pointed questions and his answers become more fantastic, ending in an untenable version of utopia. Simplicissimus rejects the outdated worldview of antiquity, which ultimately appears distopian.

Simplicissimus meets Jupiter at an impressionable moment in his development; directly after leaving his life as the thief, the “Jäger von Soest:” “derhalben stellte ich mein vorig gottlos Leben allerdings ab und beflisse mich allein der Tugend und Frömmigkeit” (259). After his change of heart Simplicissimus and his men hear Jupiter’s first words from afar: “Ich will einmal die Welt strafen, es wolle mirs dann das große Numen nicht zugeben!” (260). Jupiter’s first words are indicative of his character: he is angry at the world, and he is intent on receiving the world’s “Numen,” or divine power. The fact that Jupiter seeks divine power shows that he does not have any, and the “strafen” for the world he mentions is part of the worldview he explains to Simplicissimus.
The worldview Jupiter presents at first seems to be strictly of antiquity, as Jupiter invokes Roman heroes and gods. Once Simplicissimus meets Jupiter, he is cast in the role of Ganymede, the Roman God Jupiter’s servant and cupbearer, and informed about the radical changes which the ruler of Gods is going to bring to the earth: “Ich will einen solchen Helden schicken, der keiner Soldaten bedarf und doch die ganze Welt reformieren soll: in seiner Geburtstund will ich ihm verleihen einen wohlgestalten und stärkern Leib, als Herkules einen hatte, mit Fürsichtigkeit, Weisheit und Verstand überflüssig geziert” (263). Once Jupiter begins to speak, the worldview and utopian images he evokes take on a more complicated form, while catching Simplicissimus’ ear.

As Jupiter continues with his speech, it becomes ever clearer that his ideas are impossible and as imaginary as the “Held” he describes. As the wild man Jupiter loses his authority, Simplicissimus takes over the role of the leader and Jupiter takes on the role of the servant: Ganymede becomes Jupiter and vice versa. This change comes about as Simplicissimus takes on the role of an inquisitive political scientist and poses questions to Jupiter about this impossible vision: “Wie wird aber Teutschland bei so unterschiedlichen Religionen ein so langwierigen Frieden haben können?” (269). Jupiter’s answer is vague: “mein Held…wird…die geist- und weltliche Vorsteher und Häupter der christlichen Völker und unterschiedlichen Kirchen mit einer sehr beweglichen Sermon anreden und ihnen die bisherige hochschädliche Spaltung in den Glaubenssachen trefflich zu Gemüt führen” (269). This answer is unsatisfactory; surely a sermon from a bug-infested speaker about an imagined hero cannot solve the deep-seated philosophical differences between the warring religions. Jupiter’s speech falls apart the more he speaks, and interestingly incorporates visions from the Christian tradition and progressive political discourse as it collapses.
Originally, Jupiter seems to evoke only the antique worldview, but then he becomes more Christian, and even progressive, in his polemic. The savior hero he describes begins to take on the characteristics of a second coming of Christ, a single powerful hero who will save the world through leadership and speech. This hero will however create a political system with a parliament: “Also wird er…von jeder Stadt durch ganz Teutschland zween von den klügsten und gelehresten Männern zu sich nemmen, aus denselben ein Parlament machen” (265). Jupiter surprisingly presents the idea of a representative government here, both a progressive idea for the times and also harkening back to the organization of the Roman republic and senate. According to Jupiter, the Christian hero “wird…das Römische Kaisertum wieder aufrichten und sich wieder in Teutschland begeben und mit seinem Parlaments-herren eine Stadt mitten in Teutschland bauen” (268). Thus, Jupiter advocates a republican form of government.

The visions that Jupiter displays are of a stable, fair, united, and powerful Germany that could answer the political argument. His wonderful visions would be wholeheartedly accepted, if they could actually be put into place. The way Jupiter depicts the future as perfect and effectual echoes the optimism of antiquity. The problem is his ideas cannot practically be enacted in German-speaking lands of the Thirty Years’ War; they are only possible with the help of a magic hero. Jupiter’s vision becomes most fantastic when it presents the world at peace, as he predicts his hero will bring about “ein ewiger beständiger Fried zwischen allen Völkern in der ganzen Welt” (267).

Simplicissimus can see the wonderful ideal that the world could be in Jupiter’s vision, but it is impossible and he rejects the worldview of the Roman gods. He claims that: “alle andere Götter in der ganzen weiten Welt vor so verrucht, leichtfertig und stinkend ausgeschrien, daß ihr bei den Menschen allen Kredit verloren; du selbst, sagen sie, seiest
ein filzlausiger ehebrecherischer Hurenhengst” (271). Simplicissimus says that people have lost faith in the Roman gods, because they are immoral. Jupiter shows Simplicissimus a vision of a utopian world, but his judgment cannot be trusted because he is fantastic and immoral.

As Jupiter’s sway on Simplicissimus wanes, the true god is revealed: “Indem Jupiter so drohete, zog er in Gegenwart meiner und der ganzen Partei die Hosen herunder ohn einige Scham, und stöbert die Flöh daraus, welche ihn, wie man an seiner sprenklichten Haut wohl sahe, schröcklich tribuliert hatten” (272). Jupiter literally reveals his naked truth to Simplicissimus and his men as crazy and flea-ridden. World peace and cooperation among the religions is considered the imaginary tale of a madman, impossible, and out of reach for real society.

Oddly, Simplicissimus takes Jupiter along on his travels, and returns to Jupiter as a friend and counselor throughout the novel. It seems that Simplicissimus cannot just throw away the ideas of antiquity, but rather holds onto them for later consultation. Jupiter, unlike Olivier and France, is not completely dispelled. This indicates that Grimmelshausen does not have the heart to throw away all that antiquity may have to offer a contemporary political argument, but recognizes it cannot readily provide the answers needed at that moment. It is interesting that the two oldest worldviews presented in the novel: antiquity and Christianity, are the ones that Grimmelshausen does not reject outright. He gives importance to the worldviews that have stood the test of time, even if Jupiter is louse-ridden and fantastic in his political argumentation.
1. B. Second Distopia: France

Simplicissimus’ time at the French court provides him with a version of godlessness that quickly characterizes France as a distopia. It is a locality of seductive and deceiving appearances and reckless sexual abandon that culminate in the novel condemning both the court and Simplicissimus for having participated in its ways. His departure and ensuing sickness confirm that Grimmelshausen does not see the French society and court culture as a solution to Germany’s political and social disarray. Richard Schade explains the France scene in his article “Simplicissimus in Paris:”

The moral message of the Paris interlude is self-evident to even the most casual reader. Excessive carnality is punishable; it transforms physical beauty to ugliness, tenuous virtue to certain degradation. Viewed as social commentary, the episode is in the nature of Hofkritik, a perspective with particular credibility given the novel’s satirical views on various societal institutions. Some scholars might even glory in Grimmelshausen’s apparent disdain for the French as evidenced, for example, in the implicit critique of the hyperfashionable dress code at court (Schade 33).

The rejection of France and Simplicissimus’ subsequent sickness create a political statement because this distopia does not provide Simplicissimus with any answers to the political argument. In fact, it is nearly fatal, and the protagonist only can recover by leaving France and returning to Germany.

In contrast to the personal distopia of Jupiter, France is portrayed as a place, the physical boundary of the country, and specifically Paris, which Simplicissimus visits. Like his encounter with Jupiter, the new worldview attracts him at first. Upon arrival in France, Simplicissimus begins to change his physical appearance and the perception of his social standing. First he receives a set of secondhand clothes as the noblemen he is accompanying dress themselves in the newest French style: “Und demnach ich mich so
fein anließe, schenkt er [der Edelmann] mir sein Kleid, so er ablegte, dann er sich auf die
neue Mode kleiden ließe” (362-363). At this moment Simplicissimus takes his first step
towards looking and then acting like another person, taking a cue from the other
noblemen who change fashion upon arrival. Simplicissimus also changes his social
standing to that of a nobleman by lying to his new master, Monsignore Canard: “Ich
gedachte wohl, daß ich nicht viel gülte, wenn ich mein Herkommen öffnen sollte, gab
mich derhalben vor einen armen teutschen Edelmann aus, der weder Vatter noch Mutter,
sondern nur noch etliche Verwandte in einer Festung hätte, darin schwedische Garison
läge” (365). Monsignore Canard, whose name speaks for itself, is convinced by his tale
and soon Simplicissimus finds himself in Canard’s circle, including in the presence of the
royal “Zeremonienmeister,” who invites him to sing for the king at the Louvre.
Simplicissimus’ second change in appearance and standing occurs as he is dressed as
Orpheus to appear in a comedy before the king. Simplicissimus explains his
transformation with the help of Monsignore Canard: “meine Schönheit mit Oleo Talci
erhöhen und meine halbkrause Haar, die von Schwärze glitzerten, verpudern wollte,
fande er [M. Canard], daß er mich nur damit verstellte; ich wurde mit einem
Lorbeerkränz bekröne und in ein antikisch meergrün Kleid angetan” (370). The “Kleid”
that Simplicissimus wears is very revealing and once he is on stage he finds that the
women of the court pay special attention to him, as he describes their behavior: “die
Spectatore, und sonderlich die Weiber gewaltig zoge, ihre Augen auf mich zu wenden”
(372) and he soon takes on a new name: “ich kriegte auch einen andern Namen, indem
mich forthin die Franzosen nicht anders als Beau Alman nenneten” (372). As the “Beau
Alman,” Simplicissimus is transformed into a new person in appearance, name, social
standing, and soon actions, leaving his former life and wife temporarily behind to assume
a different worldview. The deceptive appearances in France—theater, new clothes and new monikers—lead Simplicissimus to new actions with similarly disguised, masked women who seduce him.

After his performance at the French court, Simplicissimus is informed that he should instruct the young son of a nobleman on the lute, a charge that he accepts. However, once he arrives at the designated location to meet his new student, he finds an older noblewoman of the French court who convinces him to accompany her to a secret chamber, where he is seduced by several women. This older noblewoman personifies the sexual abandon of the French court. She refers to his body as an object that can be flaunted for the country of France: “ein solcher Leib, mit welchem unsere ganze Nation prangen kann” (376) whereas he refers to himself as “einem unschuldigen Teutschen” (376). The borders of sound morality are drawn with the national border of France. The German is drawn into a location of sexual immorality in France, as the noblewoman comments: “die verehelichte Cavallier ziehen selten in Frankreich” (378). Simplicissimus is seduced and stays in the secret quarters with multiple women: “Dergestalt bracht ich acht Täg und so viel Nächt an diesem Ort zu, und glaube, daß die andern drei [Frauen] auch bei mir gelgen seien” (380). Although Simplicissimus describes the seductive noblewoman as “gottlose” (377), he gladly assumes the role that the noblewoman has provided him. The godlessness that Simplicissimus encounters in France is sexual immorality.

The novel criticizes this promiscuous French sexuality and Simplicissimus’ role in it, by having him leave Paris and immediately fall ill. Sickness is a reoccurring theme in the novel, first tied to the new nobles on the first page of the novel who exemplify the unhealthy “desire to acquire” that threatens the social order. In the Paris episodes of
Book IV sickness characterizes both France and Simplicissimus’ actions there. Simplicissimus’ master Monsieur Canard, who is a doctor, has even taken on the sickness of the French court, as Simplicissimus explains: “war er auch überaus hoffärtig und wollte sich sehen lassen; welche Krankheit er von großen Herren an sich genommen [hat]” (366). Simplicissimus falls sick directly after leaving France: “Im zweiten Nachtläger von Paris aus…mein Kopf tät mir so grausam wehe, daß mir unmöglich war aufzustehen” (383). Simplicissimus goes on to lose his beautiful hair, becomes covered with spots “als ein Tiger” (384), and becomes “so häßlich” (385). The sickness that characterizes the new nobles striving for social mobility at the beginning of the novel persists in France and affects Simplicissimus there, showing that the answers to Germany’s ills and social problems cannot be found in a land characterized by the same ailments.

Simplicissimus and France, with their deceiving appearances and reckless sexual abandon, are punished through sickness. Simplicissimus recognizes the change in himself and wishes to reform his ways by rejecting the lifestyle of the French court: “o schnelle und unglückselige Veränderung! vor vier Wochen war ich ein Kerl, der die Fürsten zur Verwunderung bewegte, das Frauenzimmer entzückte, und dem Volk als ein Meisterstück der Natur, ja wie ein Engel vorkam, jetzt aber so ohnwert, daß mich die Hund anpißten” (386). France’s sexual disorder appears to be symptomatic of its poor social order. In an ironic twist, Simplicissimus learns that he had in fact acquired not a sexual disease, but a childhood pox, i.e., he is not a fully adult male.

Simplicissimus has found nothing in France that can help him answer the political argument; he has only found bad examples of morality and these will lead him back to the Christian worldview and a new emphasis on the individual. The worldview presented
in France is considered godless and unnatural, and cannot be used as a model to reform Germany.

1. C. Third Distopia: Olivier and the Modern Worldview

Olivier personifies the modern, Machiavellian worldview, which is the most powerful distopian vision that Simplicissimus encounters. This is the final distopia that Simplicissimus meets before encountering the series of utopian worldviews. This worldview is untenable for Grimmelshausen, because it leads to overindulgence in the Machiavellian “desire to acquire,” which, if lived out by everyone the way it is by Olivier, would result in a chaotic society and the damnation of all souls who participate. As Olivier explains his acquaintance with Machiavelli and his choice to live according to his writings: “Mein lieber Simplici, du hast den Machiavellum noch nicht gelesen; ich bin eines recht aufrichtigen Gemüts, und treibe diese Manier zu leben frei öffentlich ohne allen Scheu” (419). Olivier’s function in the novel’s plot illuminates how Grimmelshausen examines the Machiavellian worldview as a possible alternative to absolutism. First, Grimmelshausen must find a way for Simplicissimus to encounter this distopian vision. Because the modern worldview represents a theoretical vision, and not a geographical space, it necessarily must be personified by a person who exemplifies its ideals. Thus, while Antiquity is personified by Jupiter, Modernity is personified by Olivier. Simplicissimus admonishes the ruthless Olivier’s actions as being: “wider das Gesetz der Natur,...wider wie weltliche Gesetz, ...[und] auch wider Gott“ (419). This is the first indication that Grimmelshausen criticizes the modern worldview. The final indication that Grimmelshausen does not champion Olivier’s distopia, is when Olivier meets a brutal death after being attacked by musketeers: “einen solchen Streich kriegte
Olivier von dem siebenden, und zwar mit solchem Gewalt, daß ihm das Hirn herausspritzte” (448). Olivier dies by the sword by which he has lived. Because Olivier personifies the modern, Machiavellian worldview this distopia is dismissed when Olivier dies.

The rejection of Olivier’s worldview shows that Grimmelshausen’s vision of a just society cannot include the ruthless behavior of an Olivier, who parasitically lives off others by robbing and attacking them. Olivier sees himself as a prince, with only his immediate belongings as his kingdom. Grimmelshausen’s rejection of Olivier’s way of life is open to multiple interpretations. First, if Olivier is admonished for his actions, nobles might also be admonished for this behavior. This is problematic, as any society, which wishes to protect itself, would need to be ruthless in war to maintain its security. The charge that Olivier is acting against God’s rules indicates that the members of a just society must follow divine laws. This is indeed the main thrust of Grimmelshausen’s final judgment that the Christian life of the hermit is best.

2. THE CRITIQUE OF VISIONS OF UTOPIAN WORLDVIEWS: SWITZERLAND, MUMMELSEE, AND HERMIT

The second wave of worldviews that Simplicissimus encounters after the series of distopias is a series of utopias which lack the intrinsic problems of the distopian worldviews, and, with the exception of the Christian worldview, are also of no help in providing answers to the social problems that plague Simplicissimus’ Germany. Switzerland and the Mummelsee are functioning societies, but it is not possible to map them onto German society, and therefore they do not provide Simplicissimus with the political answers he seeks. Chronologically, these views contain political insights for
Simplicissimus on the way to his culminating decision to leave society and return to the hermit’s Christian worldview and life.

2. A. First Utopia: Switzerland

Simplicissimus’ trip to utopian Switzerland is a turning point that sets him on the track towards his final decision to return to the state of nature as a hermit and begin the political argument anew. The turning point begins with Olivier’s death, and therewith the death of the Machiavellian worldview, and Simplicissimus’ reunification with his true friend Herzbruder. Olivier guides Simplicissimus in the final distopia of the novel, and after his death, Herzbruder leads Simplicissimus to the novel’s first utopia in Switzerland. The juxtaposition of Olivier and Herzbruder with their corresponding distopian and utopian worldviews at Simplicissimus’ turning point highlights his attraction to the two characters, despite their polar opposition. In the article “Simplicius zwischen Herzbruder und Olivier,” Aurnhammer characterizes Simplicissimus’ attraction to these two characters:

Simplicissimus ist…mit Herzbruder und Olivier in einer Weise verbunden, die dem antikisierenden Ideal unzertrennlicher, heroischer Freundschaft entspricht […] Denn demgemäß stilisiert Simplicius alle seine freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zu inniger “Bruderschaft” und ordnet sie als lebenslangen Bund sogar der Ehe über. So begleitet er Herzbruder auf seiner Wallfahrt nach Einsiedeln und weiter nach Wein, statt zu seiner Ehefrau nach Lippstadt zurückzukehren (Aurnhammer 51).

Simplicissimus’ attraction to Olivier and Herzbruder is interpreted as a version of a “Bruderschaft” by Aurnhammer, as a friendship that is more important than other relationships, including marriage. Simplicissimus’ strongly influential “Bruderschaft” with Olivier and Herzerburder can be seen as his attraction to the worldviews that they
personify (Machiavellian) or to which they lead him (Switzerland). After Olivier’s death, Simplicissimus’ relationship with him, the Machiavellian worldview, and the series of distopias comes to an end, and instead of returning home to his wife, the more dominant attraction to Herzbruder and his search for the political and social solutions to the ills of Germany continues through the examination of a series of utopian worldviews. Herzbruder does not personify a worldview like the hermit or Olivier, but he is a good friend to Simplicissimus and a pious influence on him, who leads him to the first vision of a utopia in the novel in Switzerland.

Like the distopian France, the utopian Switzerland is a physical place that Herzbruder and Simplicissimus explore. Their pilgrimage to Einsiedeln, in Switzerland offers an idyllic view of a German-speaking society that is functioning the way Simplicissimus wishes Germany would work. Simplicissimus explains:

Das Land kame mir so fremd vor gegen andern teutschen Ländern, als wenn ich in Brasilia oder in China gewesen wäre; da sahe ich die Leute in dem Frieden handen und wandlen, die Ställe stunden voll Viehe, die Baurnhöf lieffen voll Hühner, Gänns und Enten, die Straßen wurden sicher von den Reisenden gebraucht, die Wirtshäuser saßen voll Leute, die sich lustig machten; da war ganz keine Forcht vor dem Feind, keine Sorg vor der Plünderung, und keine Angst, sein Gut, Leib noch Leben zu verlieren; ein jeder lebte sicher unter seinem Weinstock und Feigbaum, und zwar gegen andern teutschen Ländern zu rechnen, in lauter Wollust und Freud, also daß ich dieses Land vor ein irdisch Paradies hielte, wiewohl es von Art rauch genug zu sein schiene (465-466).

Simplicissimus sees a functioning utopia, “ein irdisch Paradies,” and he points out that this is a German-speaking land without the problems that he is used to seeing in Germany. Switzerland has no war to interrupt its economy nor to set its citizens in fear for their lives. The Swiss are happy, their society is in working order, and Switzerland is as “fremd” to Simplicissimus as Brazil or China. This passage suggests that
Simplicissimus links German-speaking lands with an inherently broken society, but in Switzerland he sees the possibility of functioning German-speaking community.

In the midst of this utopia Simplicissimus returns to the political argument and specifically the natural man. For Simplicissimus the natural man in this functioning society is a Catholic, as Einsiedeln is a Catholic pilgrimage site. He sees an exorcism upon arriving in Einsiedeln: “Solchgestalt langten wir zu Einsiedlen an, und kamen eben in die Kirch, als ein Priester einen Besessenen exorzisieret” (467). The spirit that the priest is exorcizing calls out to Simplicissimus: “Oho, du Kerl, schlägt dich der Hagelauch hier? Ich hab vermeint, dich zu meiner Heimkunft bei dem Olivier in unserer höllischen Wohnung anzutreffen; so sehe ich wohl, du läßt dich hier finden, du ehebrecherischer mörderischer Hurenjäger, darfst du dir wohl einbilden, uns zu entrinnen?” (468). The fact that the spirit knows his relationship with Olivier unnerves to Simplicissimus. Here in the middle of a utopia, Simplicissimus’ recent sins are brought to light. To leave this past behind and to return to the political argument and the natural man, Simplicissimus converts to Catholicism and at once receives absolution of his previous sins and takes on the religion of the natural man in the Swiss utopian.

Simplicissimus’ conversion to Catholicism is a step towards his final action of leaving society and becoming a hermit. As a hermit and natural man in the state of nature Simplicissimus takes a part of the Swiss utopia with him. The version of the natural man with which Grimmelshausen restarts the political argument at the end of the novel is a pious Catholic hermit in the state of nature. The origin of the actual town of Einsiedeln, Switzerland, depicted in the novel is central to the Swiss utopia. Rosmarie Zeller explains the origin of Einsiedeln in her article “Die Wallfahrt nach Einsiedeln. Zum Kontext simplicianischer Frömmigkeit:”

Einsiedeln, Switzerland, retains the name of its origin as a Catholic hermitage. The fact that it was created from a hermitage, just like the one Simplicissimus creates at the end of the novel, and that it grew into a thriving pilgrimage location, central to the utopian Switzerland presented in the novel, indicates that Simplicissimus may be able to create a similar utopia in Germany by following the same method. Simplicissimus has found part of his answer to the political argument regarding the natural man in idyllic Switzerland and has taken a step towards emulating this natural man through his conversion to Catholicism. While it cannot be proven that Grimmelshausen knew the exact story of Einseideln’s development and its parallel to the actions of his main character, his choice of a utopian pilgrimage site connected in name to Simplicissimus’ final political decision seems hardly coincidental. Simplicissimus’ conversion to Catholicism in Switzerland is his first step towards attempting to repeat the results of a utopia in Germany by starting a hermitage of his own.

2. B. Second Utopia: Mummelsee

The second utopia that Simplicissimus encounters is the underwater and otherworldly Mummelsee. The Mummelsee connects all the waters of the world through the center of the earth and is inhabited by mermen and mermaids who live long, healthy
lives in harmony with each other under the rule of a king who manages the inner workings of their highly developed society. Simplicissimus visits the Mummelsee with the help of a magical stone that allows him to breathe underwater and a merman guide who explains the ways of the Mummelsee society. Of particular interest to my investigation of political and social systems is that Simplicissimus’ curiosity about the Mummelsee corresponds to his conversion to Catholicism and his dedication to a “gottseligen Leben” (507):

Ich resolvierte mich, weder mehr nach Ehren noch Geld, noch nach etwas anders das die Welt liebt, zu trachten; ja ich nahme mir vor zu philosophieren, und mich eines gottseligen Lebens zu befleißen, zumalen meine Unbußfertigkeit zu bereuen, und mich zu befleißen, gleich meinem Vatter sel. auf die höchste Staffeln der Tugenden zu steigen (506-507).

After deciding finally to leave his godless past behind him and to “philosophize,” Simplicissimus is also struck with “[d]ie Begierde den Mummelsee zu beschauen” (507). Simplicissimus displays an earnest curiosity in visiting the Mummelsee, thereby supporting the argument that he is looking for viable alternatives to the social order that could fix the ills he has come to know in first half of the novel. Simplicissimus’ new intention to “philosophize” correlates strongly to his interest in exploring the Mummelsee, which is investigated in great detail as a possible answer to the political argument. The utopian society of the Mummelsee first strongly appeals to Simplicissimus, until he learns that the inhabitants’ souls die with their bodies and that they never achieve an eternal life in heaven, a state only afforded to humans. Two aspects of the Mummelsee episode deserve further investigation within the framework of this study. First, it is crucial to understand that the Mummelsee cannot be mapped onto human society as a possible system of government, as suggested by the metaphor of its
entirely aquatic environment. Without the magic stone, Simplicissimus cannot survive there. Second, it is striking that the Mummelsee utopia is presented to Simplicissimus in the exact same order as the political argument: first he is acquainted with the state of nature in the Mummelsee, then with the natural man, and finally with the structure of government that organizes their aquatic society. Finally, the lessons that Simplicissimus learns in the Mummelsee reinforce the cornerstone of his political thinking, i.e., that a just political system must allow for eternal salvation and be built upon the proper definition of the natural man, who, in turn, must be holy.

The Mummelsee is situated in an improbable location: “auf einem von den höchsten Bergen” (502). The location of a sea at the top of a mountain indicates the impossibility of such a utopia interacting meaningfully with human society, yet some political lessons may be learned from it. After his trip to Switzerland, Simplicissimus returns to the Spessart, and first hears about the Mummelsee from townspeople living nearby. The townspeople explain that noblemen had examined the mysterious sea and tried to harness its strange powers but failed to even find out much about it: “es fanden sich […] Baursleut, […] die erzählten, daß noch bei ihrem und ihrer Vätter Gedenken hohe fürstliche Personen den besagten See zu beschauen sich erhoben, wie denn ein regierender Herzog zu Württenberg, etc. einen Floß machen, und mit demselbigen darauf hineinfahren lassen, seine Tiefe abzumessen” (503-504). The townspeople continue to explain that the Herzog zu Würtenberg failed to find out anything about the lake before his boat mysteriously sank (503), and another nobleman, the Erzherzog von Österreich, had planned to remove the water from the sea to learn more about it, but was dissuaded by the people living nearby for fear of being inundated (504). The inability of the noblemen to uncover secrets about the Mummelsee reveals two political aspects about
this utopia. First, it is a critique of absolutism; the noblemen are not the people best equipped to discover utopian political systems. In striking contrast to their failed attempts, the picaresque hero Simplicissimus is later able to discover its secrets. Second, the Mummelsee utopia exists entirely in a different medium, underwater. Translating it to human society could only result in flooding and ruin.

Unlike the noblemen, Simplicissimus is granted access to the Mummelsee and its utopian secrets. The strange, mermen creatures literally rise from the depths to meet him. Following his newfound promise to philosophize, Simplicissimus, with the magic stone in his pocket, descends with his guide and gains knowledge about the Mummelsee by asking in order the three main questions of the political argument. First, he learns about the state of nature in the Mummelsee through a lengthy description by his guide. Simplicissimus’ guide explains that all the water of the world is connected through the hollow earth in a “großen Wunderwerk” (513). Like a good political scientist, Simplicissimus then acquires knowledge about the individuals who inhabit the Mummelsee: “fragte [Simplicissimus], ob sie sterbliche Kreaturen wären” (514). He finds out from his guide that: “[die Wassermänner der Mummelsee] sind keine Geister, sondern sterbliche Leutlein, die zwar mit vernünftigen Seelen begabt, welche aber samt den Leibern dahinsterben und vergehen” (514). Simplicissimus presses his guide for more answers about the inhabitants of the Mummelsee and finds that they know neither sin nor sickness and live very well in their utopia:

der allergütigste Schöpfer uns genugsam beseligt, als mit einer guten gesunden Vernunft […] mit gesunden Leibern, mit langem Leben, mit der edlen Freiheit, mit genugsamer Wissenschaft, Kunst und Verstand aller natürlichen Dinge; und endlich, so das allermeiste ist, sind wir keener Sünd, und dannenhero auch keener Straf, noch dem Zorn Gottes, ja nicht einmal der geringsten Krankheit unterworfen” (516).
Simplicissimus appears deeply impressed by the wonderful lives of individuals in the aquatic utopia, whose enviable lives contrast sharply with the misery of German-speaking lands in the Thirty Years’ War. He then inquires about next step of the political argument, the system of government that organizes their society. The guide answers: “sie hätten ihren König nicht, daß er Justitiam administrieren, noch daß sie ihm dienen sollten, sondern daß er […] ihre Geschäfte dirigiere” (516). The king of the Mummelsee does not have to see that justice is served in his kingdom, because the inhabitants do not commit crimes and sin, he simply serves as manager of their affairs. Simplicissimus is prompted to ask whether they might be a higher form of life than humans in God’s eyes: “Wenn es mit euch so beschaffen, so ist euer Geschlecht von unserm Schöpfer weit höher geedelt und beseligt, als das unserige” (517). The guide answers that: “ihr seid weit mehreres beseligt als wir, indem ihr zu der seligen Ewigkeit, und das Angesicht Gottes unaufhörlich anzuschauen erschaffen” (517). Simplicissimus discovers that the utopia of the Mummelsee exists without God’s promise of eternal life. No matter how wonderful the Mummelsee may seem, heaven is closed to mermen; their utopia is not perfect, and therefore not fit for humans. By carefully studying the Mummelsee, Simplicissimus has established that a utopia for humans must include the promise of eternal life. Without the possibility of heaven, even the greatest earthly utopia on earth is insufficient. The idea that a utopia must include the promise of the afterlife answers the political argument that Simplicissimus establishes as the cornerstone of his later decision to leave society. A holy existence that allows for an eternal life in heaven must be the first component of a working political system and the ideal attribute of the natural man on which the system is built. Even the inhabitants of the utopian Mummelsee envy the humans who have the
chance of a “ewigen seligen Leben und den unendlichen himmlischen Freuden” (522). The mermen’s utopian, yet finite, earthly existence is nothing compared to eternal life in heaven.

The *Mummelsee* represents a utopia that cannot exist in Simplicissimus’ Germany. While the underwater world inhabited by mermen and mermaids is a highly functioning civilization without the problems that plague Germany, it is in a different medium and constituted of different beings that inhibits mapping its utopian system onto the war-torn German society. Simplicissimus explores this utopia after his trip to Switzerland and after deciding to commit to a “gottseligen Leben” (507). Following his conversion to Catholicism in Switzerland, the reemphasis on changing his own life is Simplicissimus’ next step towards returning to the life of a hermit. After stating his intent to reform his life, Simplicissimus travels to the *Mummelsee* in a reinvigorated search for the utopian system that could reform his Germany. Simplicissimus’ emphasis on purifying his life and his curiosity of finding a utopia reflect the novel’s engagement with the political argument and the role of the natural man and the just political system. While the highly evolved society of the Mummelsee deeply attracts the protagonist, the impossibility of using the *Mummelsee* framework to reform Germany is emphasized. Simplicissimus does however learn from his interaction with this utopia that the cornerstone of a just society must begin with a natural man who has the possibility of achieving eternal salvation. Simplicissimus takes this important notion to heart once he sets out to return to the life of a hermit and begin anew the political argument.
2. C. Third Utopia: The Hermit's Life

The final utopia engaged in the novel is Simplicissimus’ return to the woods and the life of the hermit. The fifth and final book of the novel ends with this utopia and emphasizes it as the best answer to the political argument that Simplicissimus can achieve. The return to the state of nature marks his decisive break with society and his renewal of the initial political argument. Simplicissimus has found neither the dominant political system of his time, absolutism, nor the any of the distopian or utopian worldviews he has examined, other than the Christian worldview, to be adequate for supporting a just society. Therefore, he uses what he has learned from his exhaustive examination of Europe during the Thirty Years’ War to create a just society from the bottom up. The elements of the hermit utopia developed at beginning of the novel under the tutelage of the paternal hermit serve as the template for the founding of his own hermitage. Grimmelshausen’s depiction of Simplicissimus’ final travels foreshadows his return to the life of a hermit and the culminating political decisions Simplicissimus makes before returning to a solitary Christian life.

Simplicissimus’ formative years in the woods were discussed above as a time of peace, spiritual learning, and hard work with the help and guidance of the hermit. The woods were far safer than the war-torn society beyond them. Grimmelshausen’s depiction of their cooperative relationship in the woods is an inversion of Hobbes’ society and state of nature, in which nature is a “war of all against all” that can only be alleviated by escape into society. The solitary Christian life of the hermit is not without its difficulties as hard work is necessary for survival and the threat of attack is ever present, even in the milder Lockian state of nature. Grimmelshausen and Locke
acknowledge that “transgressors” will disturb that peace of the state of nature. Despite the hard work and the threat of “transgressors,” Simplicissimus favors this solitary life above any other political system he has encountered in the European society during the Thirty Years’ War.

Simplicissimus’ adventures continue in rapid fashion between leaving the Mummelsee and deciding to return to the hermit’s life. Between these two final utopias Grimmelshausen has his hero travel to the farthest edges of the European world. Simplicissimus sets out from Germany for Russia and from there a series of short adventures take him through Egypt, Constantinople, Venice, and finally to Rome. From Rome, Simplicissimus makes his way back to Germany with a group of pilgrims:

Demnach begab ich mich den nächsten Weg auf Rom […] nachdem ich mich ungefähr sechs Wochen daselbst aufgehalten, nahme ich meinen Weg mit Pilgern, darunter auch Teutsche und sonderlich etliche Schweizer waren, die wieder nach Haus wollten (562).

Simplicissimus’ return to Germany as a pilgrim fittingly foreshadows his final decision to return to the woods as a hermit. Simplicissimus progresses from being a pilgrim in the greater European setting to becoming a settled hermit in a German setting.

Once arriving home in the Black Forest, Simplicissimus reflects upon what he learned while on his final travels:

Ich war drei Jahr und etlich Monat ausgewesen, in welcher Zeit ich etliche unterschiedliche Meer überfahren, und vielerlei Völker gesehen, aber bei denenselben gemeiniglich mehr Böses als Gutes empfangen, von welchem allem ein großes Buch zu schreiben wäre; indessen war der teutsche Fried geschlossen worden […] ich aber setzte mich wider hinder die Bücher, welches dann beides meine Arbeit und Ergötzung war (562).
Simplicissimus’ adventures have shown him “mehr Böses als Gutes,” and his examination of three distopias and three utopias have given him fewer concrete answers to the political argument than he would have hoped for. Of great interest to this study, Simplicissimus only mentions the “teutsche Fried” in passing. His strikingly indifferent reaction to resolution of the central conflict of the novel, the Thirty Years’ War, emphasizes that the war itself is not the root of society’s ills, but rather the underlying absolutist system that leads to such wars. Simplicissimus is ambivalent to the news and sets about reading to look for further answers to society’s ills without giving the end of the war any further thought. Fittingly, the autodidact Simplicissimus reads about political science in his books directly after hearing about the “teutsche Fried:”

Ich lase einsmals, wasmaßen das Oraculum Apollinis den römischen Abgesandten, als sie fragten was sie tun müßten, damit ihre Untertanen friedlich regiert würden, zur Antwort geben: Nosce te ipsum, das ist, es sollte sich jeder selbst erkennen: Solches machte daß ich mich hindersonne, und von mir selbst Rechnung über mein geführtes Leben begehrtc, weil ich ohnedas müßig war (562).

Simplicissimus has taken the oracle’s message to heart throughout his political inquiry, and his final decision to live the life of a hermit and begin the political argument anew shows his dedication to finding a just political system through his own means. Simplicissimus takes stock of his life and tells himself: “Dein Leben ist kein Leben gewesen, sondern ein Tod” (562). Simplicissimus finds the words he is looking for to describe his feelings in the work of Antonio de Guevara (1490-1545), an ascetic writer, whom Grimmelshausen quotes in the final chapter of Simplicissimus:

Adieu Welt, dann auf dich ist nicht zu trauen, noch von dir nichts zu hoffen, in deinem Haus ist das Vergangene schon verschwunden, das Gegenwärtige verschwindet uns unter den Händen, das Zukünftige hat nie
Simplicissimus’ world, in war and in peace, has failed him. He has searched for a just political system, and has not found one that could be mapped onto his native Germany. Simplicissimus responds by taking what he has learned from his investigation of the utopias and distopias that constitute the second half of the novel and applying it to the political argument. His findings show that a complete restructuring of the political system from the definition of the state of nature, to the definition of the natural man, to the prescription of a just political must be revisited. Simplicissimus accepts the charge of creating a just political system from the ground up. Simplicissimus returns to the woods, where he is most insulated from the uncontrollable pressures of the world, to live as the first natural man of a just political system. This man must be pious above all things to insure his afterlife. Simplicissimus’ parting words to the reader are:


For Simplicissimus to reach “ein seliges Ende,” he must leave the society he has examined and focus on himself as the first building block of a just society. It can
also be argued that Simplicissimus renews the political argument at this point, having reached a conclusion that living in a just way that will lead to eternal salvation can only be accomplished personally. His renewed emphasis on his own life establishes a return to the definition of the natural man. Coupled with his return to the woods, Simplicissimus begins the political argument anew with a revised definition of the state of nature and of natural man. This is the revision of the political argument that anticipates Locke’s *Second Treatise*. 
CHAPTER IV: GRIMMELSHAUSEN'S POLITICAL ARGUMENTATION AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE NOVEL

The far-reaching role of political discourse in *Simplicissimus* brings new insights to the interpretation of the novel’s message and secondarily to the interpretation of the novel’s structure. The six distopian and utopian worldviews that Simplicissimus explores are all located in the second half of the novel and are presented to the reader as three distopias (Jupiter, France, Oliver) followed by three utopias (Switzerland, Mummelsee, the life of a hermit). These worldviews are spaced evenly throughout the second half of the novel and culminate in Simplicissimus’ return to the woods as a hermit.

*Simplicissimus’* structure has been the focus of considerable scholarly research, and this paper proposes a new structural interpretation of the novel’s composition based on the political argumentation in the text. I propose that the first half of the novel constitutes Simplicissimus’ familiarization with the state of the German-speaking territories during the Thirty Years’ War, while the second half constitutes Simplicissimus’ search for a fitting answers to the political argument.

The debates concerning the novel’s structure have not previously examined the distopian-utopian structural principle. Volker Meid summarizes the problem of interpreting of the novel’s form:

Grimmelshausen’s *Simplicissimus* ist ein umfangreicher, vielschichtiger Roman, auf den verschiedene literarische Formen und Traditionen eingewirkt haben. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob sein Komplexität in einem überordneten Kompositionsprinzip aufgehoben und wie das Problem der epischen Intergration gelöst wird (Meid 140).

The novel’s complexity invites multiple interpretations. *Simplicissimus* is above all a picaresque novel and a satirical critique of society during the Thirty Years’ War in the
German-speaking territories, and many of the previous structural approaches to understanding the novel shed light on interesting aspects of the text. Scholars have proposed frameworks in an attempt to interpret the novel’s underlying structure. Meid states that the novel was also interpreted with the “Denkformen der Literatur der Goethezeit” and classified as a “Bildungs- bzw. Entwicklungsroman” (Meid 140). Jan Hendrik Scholte interpreted the novel’s five books as following the fives acts of a classical drama in an inverted form (Meid 140). Scholte writes: “Die Gliederung der Handlung des Simplicissimus Teutsch in fünf Bücher verdient unsere Aufmerksamkeit. Der Psychologe Jung ist der Meinung, daß im fünfgliedrigen Bau des klassischen Dramas eine Urform alles menschlichen Träumens und Dichtens vorliegt. Diese Ansicht könnte auch für den Simplicissimus Teutsch zutreffen” (Scholte 12). Scholte complicates his structural interpretation by depicting two opposing curves, the “moralische-Kurve” and the “Erfolgskurve,” which follow Simplicissimus’ life and correlate his success in the society of the Thirty Years’ War with moral depravity:
Scholte names the five books for the five acts in a classical drama with first chapter corresponding to the “Exposition,” the second to the “steigende Handlung,” and so forth. The peak of Simplicissimus’ success as a solider and thief, shown as the “Erfolgskurve,” occurs when he is the Jäger von Soest. In an inverted reading, this period marks the corresponding depths of his morality, depicted in the “Moralische-kurve.”

Another notable structural interpretation is Johannes Alt’s “Gesamtschema des Simplicissimus-Aufbaues” that shows “ein Strukturschema, das einen Lebensbogen mit Aufstieg und Fall nachzeichnet” (Meid 141). Alt refers to the structure of the novel as “Typenaufbau:” “An diesem Schema können wir klar ablesen, daß Grimmelshausen seinen Roman bewußt nach einem bestimmten Typenaufbau geformt hat” (Alt 199).
Alt’s curve highlights the beginning and end of the novel as times in which Simplicissimus is a hermit and tracks his development over four phases: “Narr-Simplicissimus,” “Jäger von Soeß,” “Galanter Abenteurer,” and “Olivier-Herzbruder” (Alt 203). Through the use of these phases Alt argued that *Simplicissimus* could be classified as a “deutscher Entwicklungsroman” (Alt 204).

Karl F. Otto explains the newest structural attempt applied to the novel: “The latest, and perhaps the most controversial, theory has to do with a planetary structure. Both the American Germanist Helmut Rehder and the German academic Günther Weydt
proposed this theory more or less simultaneously. Particularly important in this regard are the ‘Planeten-kindschafts-Bilder,’ a series of woodcuts illustrating each of the known planets and a number of characteristics of each as well” (Otto 7). According to Weydt and Rehder, the novel’s composition is divided into “Planetenphasen […] Saturn, Mars, Sonne, Jupiter, Venus, Merkur, Mond” (Meid 146). While no single interpretation of the novel’s structural underpinnings can encompass the novel’s full complexity, but structural investigations can shed light on trends in the novel.

I propose a new structural interpretation of the text in light of the novel’s political argumentation. Like Alt’s diagram, the political structure begins and ends with Simplicissimus’ life as a hermit. Like Scholte’s diagram, the midpoint occurs when Simplicissimus is the Jäger von Soest. Simplicissimus learns about the German-speaking territories during the Thirty Years’ War during the first half of the novel. During this period Simplicissimus spends time with soldiers from all around Europe and persons from all walks of life. These characters do not present alternative political worldviews, but rather constitute the world of the German-speaking territories during the Thirty Years’ War. They are the actors in Simplicissimus’ vision of society as a tree that he pictures in a dream very early in the novel:

In solchen Gedanken entschlief ich […] da dünkte mich, gleichwie in einem Traum, als wenn sich alle Bäume, die um meine Wohnung stunden, gähling veränderten, und ein ganz ander Ansehen gewönnen; auf jedem Gipfel saße ein Cavallier, und all Äst wurden anstatt der Blätter mit allerhand Kerlen geziert; von solchen hatten etliche lange Spieß, andere Musketen, kurze Gewehr, Partisanen, Fähnlein, auch Trommel und Pfeifen. Dies war lustig anzusehen, weil alles so ordentlich und fein grad weis sich auseinander teilte; die Wurzel aber war von ungültigen Leuten, als Handwerkern, Taglöhnern, mehrenteils Bauren und dergleichen, welche nichtsdestoweniger dem Baum seine Kraft verliehen und wieder von neuem mitteilten, wann er solche zuzeiten verlor (59).
The tree shows the hierarchy of society and the difficulty of those members in the lower ranks to rise up within it. The struggle in this tree is mirrored in the society that Simplicissimus encounters in the first half of the novel. Absolutism is the dominant political system and throughout the first half of the novel Simplicissimus acquaints himself with all of problems under this system that prevents the farmers and workers from rising in society. Simplicissimus thrives in this system and rises to the top through his deeds as a soldier and his trickster alter ego the Jäger von Soest.

As the Jäger von Soest, Simplicissimus steals and robs his way to fortune and fame. Scholte indicates in his diagram that the nadir of Simplicissimus’ moral development is as the Jäger von Soest. Simplicissimus himself admits that during this time he is farthest from the moral teachings of the hermit: “Darbei fieng ich an, nach und nach mit Fressen und Saufen ein epikurisch Leben zu führen, weil ich meines Einsiedlers Lehr vergessen [habe]” (253). Simplicissimus decides to right his ways after this episode: “[ich] stellte mein vorig gottlos Leben allerdings ab und beflisse mich allein der Tugend und Frömmigkeit” (259). Immediately after reaching both the height of his fortune and the nadir of his morals, Simplicissimus decides to change his ways. Directly after this decision he meets Jupiter, who is followed by the other distopias and utopias, which lead him back to the life of a hermit. Simplicissimus’ pinnacle in the society of the Thirty Years’ War corresponds to his rejection of it and the beginning of his search for alternative models to the absolutist political system.

The following diagram elaborates the interpretation of the political argumentation in Simplicissimus.
This diagram depicts Simplicissimus’ departure from, and return to, the hermit’s life. After leaving the woods and the hermit’s life, Simplicissimus familiarizes himself with the society of the Thirty Years’ War and becomes successful within this society. As Scholte also points out, Simplicissimus reaches the height of his success as the Jäger von Soest. This is the turning point for him, after which he tries to lead a better life. To Scholte this turning point also corresponds to Simplicissimus’ moral nadir. I propose that precisely at this point Simplicissimus recognizes that his success in society has come at the cost of his morality, and in light of the hermit’s teachings decides that he will change his life. At this moment he realizes the truth of the broken society that caused his lowest moral point and begins to search for alternatives to the absolutist system. The second half of the novel corresponds to the distopian and utopian worldviews Simplicissimus examines to establish an alternative system of government. The search culminates in a return to the hermit’s life.

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Figure 3.
CHAPTER V: THE POLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FRONTISPICLES

The famous copper frontispiece from the first edition of Simplicissimus has been
the topic of much research in the last century, due to its numerous details and
multifaceted layout. Sibylle Penkert explains: “Die Frage nach der Bedeutung der
Grimmelshausen-Titelkupfer und besonders das Problem des sogenannten Phönix-
Chimären-Kupfers ist als konsequenter Untersuchungsansatz keineswegs so alt wie die
Grimmelshausenforschung” (Penkert 257). Recent scholarship maintains that the
frontispiece is an integral part of the novel and necessary for understanding the text.
Shannon Keenan Greene demonstrates that Grimmelshausen wants his readers to
approach the text and frontispiece simultaneously:

Grimmelshausen, as he writes about reading, seeing, drawing, letters,
alphabets, and writing in Simplicissimus, sets up an analytical framework
that can itself be applied to reading the Grimmelshausen book corpus. In a
very concrete sense, the Grimmelshausen corpus consists of books that
contain both words and pictures—illustrations—that express the events
and meaning of the stories. Because Grimmelshausen himself invites a
reading that is also a viewing, it is fruitful to apply this analytic
framework, his own, in a reading of his, Grimmelshausen’s, texts in
conjunction with their illustrations (Greene 334).

Greene is not alone in her approach to interpreting the novel with the frontispiece:
“Within Grimmelshausen scholarship, scholars such as Sibylle Penkert, Alan Menhennet,
Jeffrey Ashcroft, and others have proposed emblematic models for understanding the
Grimmelshausen illustrations in conjunction with their texts, and conversely, for
understanding the Grimmelshausen texts in conjunction with their illustrations” (337).
Greene points out that Simplicissimus himself reads the pictures and the words of an
Figure 4.
illustrated bible while living with the hermit and experiences “a visual engagement with books” (Greene 334). Simplicissimus tries at first to speak directly to the book’s pictures: “ich fragte dieselbige Bilder seltsame Sachen, weil mir aber kein Antwort widerfahren wollte, wurde ich ungedultig” (43). The hermit must explain to Simplicissimus that the letters complement the pictures: “diese Bilder können nicht reden was aber ihr Tun und Wesen sey kann ich auß diesen schwartzen Linien sehen welches man lesen nennet” (43). Greene explains: “From these black lines of print, he explains, thereby lending color and shape to the words on the page, one sees the actions and essence of the pictures” (Greene 333). Owing to the strong association between reading and illustrations in the text, it has been speculated that Grimmelshausen himself drew or designed the frontispiece.

Greene summarizes the opinions in the research on the authorship of the frontispiece: “Jörg Jochen Berns considers it most likely that Grimmelshausen was the ‘Inventor seiner Titelgraphiken’ (Berns 1988, 315), and Menhennet calls the Phoenix illustration ‘in all probability [Grimmelshausen’s] own work’ (Menhennet 1995, 278) (Greene 344). Greene herself believes that “[t]he amateur quality itself points to Grimmelshausen as the artist” (Greene 344). It cannot be proven that Grimmelshausen is the author of the frontispiece, but it most probable that he designed it to compliment the novel and should be interpreted with the text.

Much research has focused on identifying the odd hybrid character in the frontispiece. Generally the frontispiece is referred to as the “Phoenix copperplate,” however, not all scholars identify the figure as a phoenix. Greene summarizes:

Of the chief interpretations of this figure, a prevalent strain makes reference to the composite monster in Horaces’s *Ars poetic*. Karl-Heinz
Habersetzer cites passages from *Vogelnest I* as well as *Ratio Status* and the *Satyrischer Pilgram* (76-77) to demonstrate that Grimmelshausen was intimately familiar with Horace’s *Ars poetica* text. In the *Ars poetica*, a creature composed of mixed parts is summoned as an exemplum of an unpleasant image. The Horatian creature has a man’s head, feathers, a fish’s lower body, a woman’s breasts, and so on; that is to say, it is consistent with Grimmelshausen’s Phoenix design (Greene 345-346).

Beyond the Horatian hybrid, different scholars have identified the figure as other creatures: “Schade (1987) asserts that there exists an iconography of the picaresque. By this he means a composition comprised of disparate parts;” “Fritz Halfter in 1924, Hellmut Rosenfeld in 1935, and Walter Ernst Schäfer in 1972 saw, in the Phoenix, horns, ears, hand gesture, and “feet” a satyr figure, and connected the satyr beast to satirical texts;” and “Berns concludes that a satirical and satyresque Über-Ich, a superego, embodied in the Phoenix image, controls the whole cycle in a play of onstage masking and de-masking that ultimately points to Grimmelshausen himself (316-17)” (Greene 346-347). Despite these multiple attempts to identify the figure on the frontispiece, scholarship has reached no consensus interpretation.

The frontispiece can be analyzed by approaching its three distinct parts as an emblem. The emblematic character of the frontispiece was first proposed by Albrecht Schöne: “Schöne asserts that an illustrated text is like an emblem: the subscriptio, or text, explicates the pictura, that is, the frontispiece” (Greene 337). The first edition frontispiece also includes an inscriptio: “Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch.” Taken together these three parts contain a message relevant for the political interpretation of the novel.

The political argumentation in the text suggest another possible interpretation of the frontispiece. I identify the figure in the frontispiece as Simplicissimus himself. The
*inscriptio* reads “Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch” and therefore, I argue, signifies the figure, regardless of form or hybridity, as the protagonist of the novel. Throughout the novel Simplicissimus travels effortlessly through the earth. He flies in the company of witches, swims in the company of the mermen in the Mummelsee, travels great distances over land, and even survives fire. His ability to traverse these environments may explain the figure’s bird, fish, and hoofed mammalian hybridity. However, the figure’s form is of less importance than its identity as Simplicissimus, its actions, and the *pictura*’s relationship to the *subscriptio*.

In the frontispiece Simplicissimus holds a book and to which he points. This book can be understood to be the novel *Simplicissimus*, and hence the figure’s autobiography in novel form. In the text, Simplicissimus mentions writing down his story after returning to the Black Forest and soon thereafter to a hermit’s life (562). The book of his life is also mentioned in the *subscriptio* of the frontispiece:

Ich wurde durchs Fewer wie Phoenix geborn.  
Ich flog duch die Lüffte, wurd doch nit verlorn.  
Ich wandert durchs Wasser, raiß über Landt,  
in solchem Umbschwermen macht ich mir bekandt,  
was mich offt betrüebet und selten ergetzt,  
was war das? Ich habs in diß Buche gesetzt  
damit sich der Leser gleich wie ich  
entferne der Thorheit und lebe in Rhue (6).

Reading the *inscriptio* to identify the figure as Simplicissimus and the book to which he is referring as the novel *Simplicissimus*, and the novel (“diß Buche”) in the *subscriptio* as a tool for the reader to “entferne der Thorheit und lebe in Rhue,” then the novel has an analogous aim to that of the political argument. If by reading this novel the reader may personally be delivered from having to live through the horrible experiences that form
Simplicissimus’ existence and is left in peace, then Grimmelshausen has achieved what
he could not achieve through political argumentation, providing peace to others.
Shannon Keenan Greene’s study on the performative of the frontispiece supports this
argument:

As I have argued in my dissertation (18), seventeenth-century book illustrations, particularly book frontispieces, are performative in a number of senses: a performative of promise (a promise as to what topic the book will treat), a performance in the sense of an advertisement (the frontispiece will to some extent determine a book’s representation in the marketplace), and a performative in the sense of actually staging the book’s contents (339).

According to Greene, the frontispiece presents “a promise as to what topic the book will
treat” (Greene 339). In this case, the novel’s frontispiece promises to relate
Simplicissimus’ story with all of his adventures and his political findings, to the readers, who, hopefully, will not have to experience these events themselves. In this manner, Grimmelshausen advances the goal of the political philosopher to bring peace and
security to the world. The political philosopher suggests a just form of government in
order to establish peace for an entire society. Grimmelshausen does not have a just
political system to advocate, instead he offers a novel that may bring peace to his readers
one at a time.

The novel ends with Simplicissimus returning to the state of nature and focusing
on his own life and eternal salvation. The emphasis on the Self restarts the definition of
natural man, of the individual. The frontispiece attests that Grimmelshausen seeks to
bring his individual reader to peace, thereby echoing the emphasis on the natural man,
and hence, the individual. Society has failed Simplicissimus, and Grimmelshausen
suggests that it has failed his readers as well, as they need to be set in “Rhue.” Instead of
attempting to create a just society to bring about peace for the multitudes, Grimmelshausen uses his poetic skill to bring about peace for the individual reader. The single figure on the frontispiece reflects the novel’s emphasis on the individual.

Grimmelshausen’s focus on the single person, the lone individual, constitutes a clear break from the political philosophy of Hobbes. A comparison of the frontispiece of Grimmelshausen’s *Simplicissimus* and Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (1651) illustrates the shift in emphasis from the many to the individual in a compelling manner. The Phoenix figure in the *Simplicissimus* frontispiece is an individual composed of animal appendages that evoke the figure’s ability to traverse all earthly environments. The towering figure on the *Leviathan* frontispiece is composed of many individuals whose power increases when joined in civil harmony. The *Simplicissimus* figure holds a copy of the novel that conveys Grimmelshausen’s individualized political philosophy. The crowned *Leviathan* figure holds a sword and scepter, symbolizing the centralized control of army and religious institutions. Symbols of society that adorn the bottom half of the *Leviathan* frontispiece, such as the canon, tower, and crown, are also present in the figure’s book on the title engravings of *Simplicissimus*. The presence of these exact same societal symbols in the picaresque autobiographical novel reveals that the elements of the political treatise are literally mapped onto this fictional work.

Grimmelshausen, however, breaks with Hobbes’ defense of absolutism and revisits the three parts of the political argument. His political findings shift his emphasis to the first two parts of the political argument, the state of nature and the natural man. The focus on the individual is physically presented in the single figure in the *Simplicissimus* frontispiece and the textual emphasis Grimmelshausen places on the individual reader’s “Rhue.” Taken together with the text, the *Simplicissimus* frontispiece
reflects Grimmelshausen’s return to the political argument and the emphasis on the individual.
Figure 5.
CONCLUSION

Building on Dieter Breuer’s article “Grimmelshausens Politische Argumentation: Sein Verhältnis zur absolutistischen Staatsaufassung,” this thesis presents Grimmelshausen’s substantial political argumentation in his novel Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch (1668) and its relationship to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) and John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1689). Through a narrow focus on the political aspects of the novel, my research reveals previously unnoticed ramifications of the political arguments in the text on its interpretation. First, mapping the three-part political argument of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onto the novel confirms that Grimmelshausen’s insights goes beyond a simple rejection of Hobbesian absolutism and anticipates Locke’s political philosophy. Grimmelshausen’s anticipation of Locke’s groundbreaking work shows him to be a remarkable political thinker. Second, political argumentation plays a far-reaching role in the novel, not only building Grimmelshausen’s political advocation of leaving society for the solitary hermit’s life, but also reshaping the structure of the text. The political argumentation uncovers a structure of the novel in which the protagonist spends the first half of the novel familiarizing himself with the treacherous society of the Thirty Years’ War and the second half looking for alternative political models presented in a series of distopian and utopian worldviews. Finally, the novel’s political reasoning and Grimmelshausen’s rejection of Hobbes are reflected in the novel’s frontispiece. The Simplicissimus frontispiece shows a single hybrid creature that emphasizes Grimmelshausen’s focus on the individual and rejection of society that sharply contrasts to Hobbes’ frontispiece that emphasizes the absolute power of a Leviathan composed of citizens. The new interpretation of the Simplicissimus
frontispiece reveals that Grimmelshausen’s goal throughout the novel is analogous to that of a political philosopher: to bring peace to humankind. A novel and political treatise in one, Grimmelshausen’s *Simplicissimus* deserves recognition as a bridge between Hobbes’ *Leviathan* and Locke’s *Second Treatise of Government*. 


