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THE ORIGINS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN EGYPT: A REAPPRAISAL

In the historiography of Egypt it has long been accepted that private ownership of land was introduced in the nineteenth century.¹ This development in statute law has often been linked analytically to a process of ‘‘modernization.’’² Modernization theory posits a fundamental dichotomy between two ideal-type societies, the traditional and modern, which implies an equally sharp discontinuity between historical eras: before and after the beginning of modernization. In this view, traditional societies lack the potential for generating significant social change from within. Change results rather from the expansion of communications and diversification of technology worldwide from modern Europe and North America. In the process of modernization, traditional norms and structures break down in the host societies, and new, rational values and institutions emerge in their place. The development of Egypt’s new land regime is usually considered one such change.

In most historical studies to date, the impact of Europe and/or the rise of powerful reformers influenced by European ideas have been seen as crucial to the beginnings of modernization in the Middle East. For Egypt, the two events most symbolic of this are the French occupation of 1798–1801 and the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha, 1805–1848, the ‘‘founder of modern Egypt.’’³ On closer examination of the sources, however, the evidence shows not historical discontinuity but its opposite; not the shattering and replacement of institutions but their dynamic evolution, due as much to indigenous forces as to outside influences.⁴ This calls for a reappraisal of socioeconomic change in Egypt, of its relationship to European influences, and of the significance to it of reform legislation.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RELATIONS

Contrary to the received tradition in most history texts, the transformation of property relations in Egypt and other Ottoman lands was already underway, and had led to the appearance of forms of private ownership of land, long before the famous reforms of the nineteenth century. This becomes evident upon examination of the behavior of landholding elements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of their struggles to acquire or maintain control of the land at three levels: as a source of revenue, as a disposable source of income, and as a means of production and subsistence.

As these different levels of utility of the land indicate, a hierarchy of shared rights or claims to it and/or its produce existed in the period before Muhammad Ali's rise to power, similar to other precapitalist orders in Europe and Asia.⁵ Political, economic, and social relations were intimately connected with property relations. Or to put it another way, property relations were social relations in the broadest sense of the term, sanctified in law.

The establishment of private ownership of land in place of this system was not the creation of "rights" where none existed before, nor simply a matter of their transfer from the state to individuals. Rather it involved the consolidation of these shared claims into one sphere and their appropriation by individuals. It represents the establishment of exclusive control of the land by individuals as the prevailing system of property relations in place of shared control.

Ottoman administration of land tenure in Egypt embodied the principle of shared rights.⁶ The sultan (i.e., the state) was by law "owner" of most agricultural land. State authority over the land was in fact limited to taxation and enforced maintenance of the irrigation works through use of the *corvée*. Second, to carry out taxation and administration in the countryside, the state had turned to a variety of intermediaries who were made responsible for one or more villages, and who received a portion of the revenues from them and from privately held sections of land in them in return for their services. Finally, peasants held traditional rights to till the land and remain on it.

In Lower Egypt and parts of Middle Egypt peasants held their land sections for life, and passed them on to their heirs, as long as taxes were paid (hence the term *athar* or *athariyya*, loosely: "that which remains"). The annual Nile flood caused more extreme variations in the area of cultivable land in Upper Egypt and the remainder of Middle Egypt, and so land here was annually surveyed and redivided within the village community (*arḍ misāḥa*, "survey land"). Thus individual security of tenure was guaranteed the holder of *athar* land, and village clans must have maintained a similar continuous claim to their due portion of *misāḥa* land. Neither the state nor intermediaries interfered in the production process except indirectly, through tax demands and irrigation works.

J. C. Scott has noted that peasants value greatest and defend most tenaciously these two conditions: security of tenure and control of decisionmaking in the production process. The peasant community's direct control of land and production is its means of maintaining security in face of unpredictable forces—such as weather, or a market economy—and of guaranteeing to itself a culturally defined, minimum, acceptable subsistence. Interference with these traditional rights, or rigid tax/rent demands which threaten to push peasants below the acceptable subsistence level, are more resented and more likely resisted than systems of exploitation which are more flexible but which siphon off a greater amount of their surplus.⁷ Ottoman law, significantly, provided for lowered taxes in years of drought or disastrous floods, and also guaranteed the terms of traditional peasant tenure.⁸

Ottoman regulations likewise provided for checks on the intermediaries, to prevent them from tyrannizing the peasantry, from usurping state prerogatives in control of the land, and from pocketing more than their legal share of reve-

nues. Salaried officials were originally employed to oversee cultivation and the collection of taxes. During the seventeenth century tax farms, *iltizāms*, appeared.⁹ They were acquired for a year or more through an auction held by the Treasury. With the *iltizām*, its holder, the *multazim*, received a tax-free section of land, *ūsya*, which he had cultivated for his own profit by wage or corvée labor, or which he rented out. His personal profit, *fā'id*, from *ūsya* land and excess taxes collected could come to four or five times the taxes remitted, indicating the profitability of *iltizāms*.¹⁰

Law must be backed by force to be effective, however, and in a situation such as this where the state is weak, its formal regulations provide little indication of actual practices. Each party to the shared rights to the land of Ottoman Egypt, as elsewhere, could assert or defend them only according to its command of means of coercion – its political power. As Ottoman authority in the provinces weakened, its land laws became increasingly irrelevant, while intermediaries gained increasing control of the land at the state's expense. By the early eighteenth century they had acquired landholding rights in Egypt that established them as landlords in every sense of the term. These included: (1) lifetime possession of the *iltizām*, as long as taxes were paid; (2) inheritance of it by descendants, wives, or white slaves; (3) the ability to convert land into waqf, thereby guaranteeing the family's continued possession of it; (4) the ability to mortgage the land, (5) to pawn it, or (6) to sell it outright.¹¹

These criteria are precisely those used in previous studies of nineteenth-century Egypt to show a movement toward private ownership.¹² Paradigms that see private ownership as appearing in Egypt during the nineteenth century at the earliest should thus be discarded.

The intermediaries' usurpation of state authority over the land was marked by a proliferation of legal fictions used to get around the formal, legally inalienable status of the land. Mortgage and pawning were conducted under the euphemism of "transfer," *isqāt*; sales were called "indefinite transfer," *isqāt ilā al-abad*.¹³ Similar fictions were employed in transactions involving waqf land.¹⁴ The resort to legal fictions should not be surprising since they were used in various times and places, for example, to circumvent Qur'ānic prohibitions of risk-taking and interest,¹⁵ and were also used to circumvent restrictions on land-ownership in parts of contemporary Europe.¹⁶ Developments that caused land to be treated as an alienable commodity led to the use of these fictions, but the continuation of old legal terminology for land tenure on the surface has obscured this transformation.

The reestablishment of a strong state in nineteenth-century Egypt arrested the development toward private ownership in part. Yet, paradoxically, it facilitated this movement over the long term. The state concentrated control of the land as never before in a single sphere, in its own hands. Second, it violated the traditional terms of peasant tenure by interfering in production and transferring tenures as it saw fit. Finally, the weakening of the state after 1840 allowed a new generation of intermediaries and privileged landholders it had created to influence land tenure policies to their own benefit.

If land tenure issues can be appreciated in terms of competition or struggle

among various actors over the land and its product, then developments in the nineteenth century appear as but a continuation of trends in the eighteenth century. The legislation of private ownership of land came toward the end of this long-term struggle for control of the land. It legitimized the new order this struggle had wrought, firmly establishing the positions of those who had gained in the process: the large landowners in particular, but also a stratum of wealthy peasants. Finally, it represents a late stage in the transition from shared to exclusive rights to the land.

The circumstances that led to this transformation will require extensive investigation in the future. Here is presented evidence that this process was, in fact, in train, as well as the factors that appear to have influenced it and its outcome. Local and regional economic trends are considered, as well as changes in the nature of the state and its ability to regulate land tenure. The changing relationships among peasants, intermediaries/landlords, and the state, and between them and the land are also followed.

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE 1800

The lands of the eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman rule, while separated politically and culturally from Europe, appear to have been linked to it as part of a larger region subject to similar broad economic and demographic trends. The Ottoman Empire felt the effects of the sixteenth-century "price revolution" and experienced a rise in population then at approximately the same time as did Europe. Population in Europe, at least, began to increase again in the eighteenth century.¹⁷ This and the beginnings of industrial revolution led to a nearly century-long rise in the absolute price of agricultural commodities which is visible in both Europe and the Middle East. The price of land increased in turn, and speculative trading in it – even where legally prohibited – appeared in both regions.¹⁸ New elements shouldered their way in among the landholding classes, and local landholding and/or commercial aristocracies often were able to increase their political strength vis-à-vis their monarch and peasantry.

The changing composition of landowning classes is marked in Europe by commoners acquiring noble estates – sometimes openly – even where it was prohibited by law, and in the Ottoman Empire by the entry of merchants into landholding.¹⁹ Landed aristocracies (or their equivalents) were enticed by rising prices and enabled by weakened state authority to increase their control over their holdings. The established sociopolitical orders, connected closely with property relations, were being undermined, and at the same time state authority over land tenure was being whittled away. Both developments laid the bases for institutional change at a later date.

In the sixteenth century, rising prices in the Mediterranean region had led to increased exports of foodstuffs and raw materials from the Ottoman Empire. Venetian ships loaded grain in Egypt's ports at midcentury. Thereafter the Empire's population seems to have caught up with production, and the export of grain to the West was prohibited. The Greek archipelago then became a center for contraband grain trade which flourished in the eighteenth century.²⁰ Egyp-

tian wheat, rice, and beans found their way to the West according to shifting market demand and the relative ability of the Porte to enforce its trade regulations.

Industrial crops – wool, silk, cotton, flax, leather, oils, and dyestuffs – acquired a new importance in the eighteenth century owing to Europe's industrial expansion.²¹ In addition, both regional and European demand for the Levant's fine cottons and silks, and for its spun cotton and wool, led to increased textile production in certain areas. All of this resulted in expanded cash crop production, especially in cotton, producing yet another effect: a trend toward greater regional specialization. The planting of mulberry trees in the Lebanon and Macedonia and expansion of cotton cultivation in Macedonia, Anatolia, and Palestine were accompanied by the development of food and vegetable dye production in other areas. The Biqā' and Hawrān became important grain-producing regions fought over by the amirs of the Lebanon and the wālīs of Sidon and Damascus. Egyptian foodstuffs supplied Syria, Macedonia, and Istanbul, as well as being marketed in Egypt and the West. Egypt also produced indigo and safflower dyes for internal and export markets. Crop specialization in Egypt is somewhat problematic, as more than one crop per year could be raised in many areas. Different districts did tend to specialize, however, in cotton, flax, dyestuffs, oilseeds, sugar cane, or food crops.²²

While only a small part of Egypt's external trade was conducted directly with the West, price movements in Cairo during this century clearly show that the country was feeling the effects of the overall increase in trade and the rise in agricultural commodity prices, suggesting that the factors behind the price rise may have been generalized, and not simply a matter of Europe's influence. The price of beans, wheat, rice, cattle, and camels rose two and a half times during the century. Mutton increased three times. Butter, oils, cheese, sugar, and honey rose twofold. Industrial commodities also show price increases: the price of raw cotton increased nearly fivefold, while the price of flax and spun cotton doubled.²³ The export price of safflower dye increased nearly threefold.²⁴ In Egypt as elsewhere, rising prices enhanced the value placed on land, a major factor in its transformation into private property.

In the sixteenth century the Ottomans had begun to convert Balkan and Anatolian *timār* lands into iltizāms which court circles and urban "commercial-usury capital" acquired. At the same time these elements began to illegally purchase timārs. Weakening state control and economic opportunities also led those *timār*lis who could, to convert their holdings, illegally, into iltizāms. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the appearance of life-term tax farms, *malikānes*, following the development of a speculative market in landholdings. These centuries also saw the appearance of the Balkan *çiftlik*s, privately owned commercial estates devoid of any obligations to the state. The *çiftlik* holder owned the land outright, and often the tools, animals, and seeds his tenants used.²⁵ Here, the process of usurpation of state control was complete, and the terms of peasant tenure had also been altered. *Çiftlik*s spread rapidly throughout the Balkans in the late eighteenth century, associated closely with "the diffusion of the cultivation of new colonial products: cotton and maize."²⁶

The production and trade of such cash crops were the economic basis of the rise of powerful provincial notables, the *a'yān*.²⁷

In the Lebanon, the expansion of sericulture was organized by Maronite and Druze shaykhs and the Maronite monastic orders. As in the Balkans, the concentration of land in fewer hands and the increased exploitation of tenants are associated with the spread of market-oriented agriculture. In both regions the conversion of holdings into waqf – property set aside for the ostensible support of pious works – played an important role in the alienation and concentration of land.²⁸

The rise of Shaykh Zāhir al-'Umar in Palestine is associated with the spread of cotton cultivation. As multazims, Zāhir and other shaykhs were able to monopolize cotton by serving as middlemen between peasants and French merchants. His successor as local strongman, the Wālī of Sidon Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzār, sought to acquire as much land as possible in the form of malikāne. His monopolization of all production and trade anticipates the methods of Muhammad Ali.²⁹

Ottoman officials were aware of the fiscal and political dangers of developments in landholding, though not always able to stop them. Attempts to reform the land regime which appear "modern" in inspiration were actually efforts to reestablish a greater degree of state control over the land. In the seventeenth century, reform-minded Ottomans criticized the malikāne system, and it was decreed abolished under Ahmad III in 1714/1715.³⁰ Military reverses weakened his position and led to the decree's reversal three years later. He later attempted yet another reform, turning malikāne lands back into short-term *iltizāms* and placing some under the administration of salaried state officials. Also, "for the first time in over a century extensive cadastral surveys were made. . . ."³¹

Efforts to curb the power of local notables and reestablish state control over the land were revived under Sultans Mustafa III and Abdulhamid I.³² Administrative and military reforms were always accompanied by fiscal reforms affecting landholding: the well-known reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II followed this pattern. To study Ottoman landholding in this period is to study a multifaceted struggle for the land itself, both between the political center and the provinces, and among the actors in each locale.

THE SITUATION IN EGYPT

While the agrarian history of Egypt in this period has yet to receive detailed examination, it is possible to reconstruct a partial picture of it from the evidence already available. The two, more-or-less constant political-economic factors favoring change in late Ottoman Egypt were the secular rise in agricultural prices and the weakness of state authority. But if conditions favor change, it is still human action and interaction which determines its course and outcome.

Under the conditions of the eighteenth century, intermediaries and peasants responded in a variety of ways affecting landholding and land use. Parallel to

changes elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, multazims in Egypt succeeded in transforming their iltizāms into a form of private property in land. Early in the eighteenth century, their new rights of disposition were expressed in the term “malikâne,” indicating that lifetime tenure had become common. Conversion of the land into waqf, and bequest, mortgage, pawning, or sale of it – through the device of isqāt – were within the multazim’s power. The earliest register devoted to isqāt in Egypt dates from 1728, indicating that by this time this legal fiction was commonly used in transactions involving landholdings.³³

Cairo’s merchants appear among the holders and purchasers of iltizāms in these registers, and speculative transactions appear to have often occurred within an absentee landholding class there. A merchant appears in court records as a holder of three villages in Daqahliyya province as early as 1673,³⁴ and the Sharā’ibī merchant dynasty in particular increased their landholdings throughout the eighteenth century.³⁵ T. Walz’s study of the *gallāba* merchants, those engaged in the Sudan trade, shows that some lesser merchants also acquired iltizāms. Others rented sections of iltizām or waqf lands, or held mortgages of fallah land.³⁶ Egypt’s wealthier ulama were also active in acquiring iltizāms, primarily in their home districts, in addition to their administration of waqf lands.³⁷

The wealthy merchants’ involvement in land was part of a general trend of investment in urban and rural properties and tax farms.³⁸ The wealthiest ulama are hardly distinguishable from the large merchants in these financial dealings.³⁹ Such investments made sense. The relative stagnation of coffee and textile prices undermined the most profitable commerce in the hands of indigenous merchants,⁴⁰ while agricultural commodity prices rose. It is presently impossible to ascertain the extent of merchant involvement in landholding. A. A. Abd al-Rahim’s figures show merchants comprising only slightly more than one percent of the total number of multazims on the eve of the French invasion, as opposed to none a century and a half earlier.⁴¹ But the size of their holdings is unfortunately not indicated, nor is the number and extent of the mortgages that they undoubtedly held.

The evidence is also inconclusive concerning the accumulation of iltizāms. Many holdings appear to have been small and scattered: between 1658–1660 and 1797 the total number of multazims increased by more than 250 percent, although the extent of fractionalization of their holdings varied from one area to the next.⁴² On the other hand, some multazims were converting fallah land into ūsya land,⁴³ a process reminiscent of the engrossment of *demesne* holdings in contemporary eastern Europe, under similar conditions.

The conversion of holdings into waqf is another example of the growth of de facto private property in land through the use of legal fictions. Waqf lands paid only a “protection tax” in this period to safeguard their status. Legally, they could not be divided or sold, nor were they commonly subject to confiscation. “Family,” or *ahli*, waqfs, furthermore, remained in the possession of the makers’ descendants. They received the bequest’s income until the extinction of the line, and only then did the revenues from an *ahli* waqf revert to the designated charitable work. Thus conversion of land into *ahli* waqf guaranteed the

family's continued possession of it, along with important tax exemptions, and many multazims were able to convert their ūsya holdings into waqf. Here, too, the growth of a market in land resulted in the exchange of waqf lands – despite the law – by what amounted to sale. Waqf lands were exploited in a way similar to ūsya lands: the *nāzīr*, administrator, either leased them to a village shaykh or had them cultivated by means of wage labor.⁴⁴

Jabarti reports that waqf lands surveyed in 1813 came to 600,000 faddans in Upper Egypt and the Cairo vicinity. Thus the amount of land converted to waqf in these areas alone came to some 20 percent of all of Egypt's cultivated land,⁴⁵ a measure of the extent to which land was taken out of the state's control in this period. If Jabarti's remarks are any guide, the concentration of waqf lands in the hands of wealthy *nāzīrs* and notables was indeed common. He mentions one Shams al-Dīn b. Ḥamūda, a shaykh of the village of Birmā, Minufiyya, who told him that his family held 1,000 faddans of waqf land for which no tax was paid, in addition to other lands for which he paid a nominal amount.⁴⁶

Despite the consolidation of property rights and a tendency toward concentration of the land, multazims and *nāzīrs* do not appear to have been directly engaged in agricultural production nor did they attempt to alter the relations of production. Under the right conditions, investment to raise the productivity of land would have been a plausible response to the era's price trends. But the adequately large income that many *iltizāms* appear to have offered, and the possibility of losing an *iltizām* with a change of rulers in Cairo, probably discouraged investment. As occurred in the Balkans, the evidence so far indicates that increased exploitation rather than an increase in surplus production was the most common result of these *rentiers'* activities.⁴⁷

At the village level a variety of responses to the conditions of this century can also be observed. These encompass not only competition for control of the land, but also activities in the sphere of production which indicate a potential for agricultural development. At the present state of our knowledge it will have to suffice to present three situations illustrating these responses.

In Giza and much of the central Delta the Mamluk beys were able to maintain the greatest authority, indicated by the presence of "Mamluk houses" – residences for their local representatives – in the villages.⁴⁸ These regions produced a variety of crops for the market – cotton, flax, oilseeds, dyestuffs, and various food crops.⁴⁹ Here, social stratification was visible at the time of the French occupation, the result of control of local political and economic resources. Local police and administrative offices were monopolized by the wealthier village families and tended to be hereditary, starting with the position of village shaykh. He usually represented the most powerful clan in the village and was the supreme police and judicial authority in the village.⁵⁰

In villages where the multazim rented out his ūsya land, it was leased by one of the village shaykhs at a price reflecting the market in land. This varied according to its quality and proximity to a market town: the ūsya lands near Bulaq went at the highest rate. If the multazim had the ūsya cultivated for his own account through wage labor or *corvée*, the shaykhs and *khūlīs* were responsible for assigning the land and were paid for their services. The *khūlī*, an official

drawn from the village, was also charged with checking the survey and assessment of village lands performed by the multazim's officials – a position of considerable power and potential wealth.⁵¹

The economic position of the wealthy families was also strengthened through important tax exemptions. The shaykhs, khūlis, and *shāhids* (local, professional witnesses for tax purposes) were exempt from *barrānī* taxes on portions of their land. These were extraordinary taxes in kind which the multazims levied in different villages according to their ability to impose them and the villagers' ability to pay. Butter, sheep, cheese, grain, honey, chickens, and other farm products were taken, all of whose prices were increasing in absolute terms and drastically so in terms of the continually debased coinage. *Barrānī* accounts appear in the tax registers from the seventeenth century on, but along with other taxes they increased greatly during the eighteenth.⁵²

The financial and political power of these families also enabled them to acquire additional lands which were kept off the tax registers with the connivance of other local officials.⁵³ This was facilitated by the land system in the villages of Lower Egypt, since transactions also took place at this level, though legally only concerning usufructuary rights. In these districts, then, a wealthy peasant stratum in alliance with the ruling elite used its political and economic resources to acquire additional lands and tax exemptions, and were also in a position to rent land from absentee holders, either to produce more for the market or to profit from the rising price of land by subleasing.

A quite different phenomenon was the appearance of what could be termed militant peasantries in certain areas. As a political-economic phenomenon, these peasants were protecting and sometimes extending their control over areas of market-oriented agriculture and commerce, as well as using their strength to resist the increasing burden of taxes and fees levied by the multazims and the provincial administration. As a sociological phenomenon, this development is associated with the sedentarization of certain bedouin tribes. Once they have become cultivators, bedouin are nearly indistinguishable from peasants – some even adopted the fallahin's brown woolen dress. Still, they retained a tribal identity and solidarity vis-à-vis outsiders. "Bedouin influence" seems to have been the common factor in those areas which maintained a quasi-independence from the beys.⁵⁴

In parts of lower Sharqiyya and Daqahliyya a sort of bedouin-fallah symbiosis occurred. North of Bilbays, bedouin were described as the "caste preponderante . . . sans être le plus nombreuse. . . ." ⁵⁵ They camped adjacent to fallah villages, engaging in stockbreeding and cultivation as well as in escorting caravans along the route to Syria and the Hijaz. French observers described this region as rich in various field crops, orchards, and especially date groves. The peninsula of Manzala rivaled Damietta as a rice-growing region.⁵⁶

The mutual interests of the bedouin and fallahin here led to military alliances. "Village wars" were jointly conducted against neighboring districts, and the frequent mention of peasants carrying arms to the fields and of fortified towns and villages attest to this strife.⁵⁷ Despite such conflict these reports are silent about any resultant "devastation." Village wars were fought for control of

water and land, no doubt provoked by the increasing value of land and herds and by occasional variations in the flood level.

An equally important dimension of this symbiosis was the ability to resist the bey's exactions. Tax payments and other relations were a matter of negotiation between the bedouin shaykhs and the Mamluks.⁵⁸ Unlike the central Delta region, there is no mention of "Mamluk houses" for lower Sharqiyya and Daqahliyya, indicating that the beys and their subordinates could establish no permanent presence there.

The presence of a militant peasantry in Middle Egypt also appears to be related to the increasing importance of cash crops, but here the settled bedouin, "arabes cultivateurs," subjugated the fallahin and usurped their land. From about the middle of the century one tribe had established itself and taken up cultivation on the right bank of the Nile in the regions of Atfih, Ashmunin, and Manfalut. At the time of Jomard's observations (1799–1801) they were expanding their control of land across the river. Already they held most of the islands of Middle Egypt and a strip of land a quarter league wide on the left bank. The land seized was planted in tobacco, indigo, sugar cane, date palms, and forage crops, as well as melons, grains, and legumes. The first group of crops was the most important, grown for local and regional markets. Sugar, indigo, and wool were the principal industries of the villages, and these as well as dates were sold to Cairo merchants. Large tracts of forage crops were also planted, as summer cultivation required a supply of cattle to turn the waterwheels, and the military power and communications of these villages depended upon large herds of horses and camels.⁵⁹

In these and other bedouin villages of Middle and Upper Egypt the shaykhs acquired a preponderant political and economic role. It is primarily in these regions that small amounts of village shaykhs' *masmūh* land appeared, land held by them free of any tax, said to be "vols faits par des Arabes qui sont établis par force dans divers villages," and passed on to their heirs.⁶⁰ This observation lays bare the way in which privileged landholding rights could be created at the village level through the exercise of local political power. The displacement of fallahin by bedouin in these districts is one of the most obvious forms that the struggle or competition for land between cultivators took. It was no less real, however, where wealthy peasants, here or in the Delta, acquired land through receiving pawns or mortgages, or through purchase of usufructuary rights – again, aided by their command of local political and economic resources.

In the militant peasant districts of Middle Egypt, "Mamluk houses" were also unknown, and at the time of the French occupation taxes were collected from them with difficulty or not at all.⁶¹ Here and in lower Sharqiyya the extent of the bey's authority versus the villagers' independence must have been fluid, depending on the military strength either side could marshal at any time. Title to the land in these areas remained in the hands of multazims and taxes were paid,⁶² although these peasants may well have escaped the full weight of the period's increasing taxation, which would have enabled them to benefit more from the secular price rise.

In Damietta's rice-growing region, Girard's reports indicate that peasant

farmers were responding positively to the market opportunities of the time. Peasants leased land from the multazims for either a cash rent per faddan or a portion of the harvest, the farmer being responsible for all costs. As rice farming required considerable working capital for waterwheels, animals and drivers to turn them, canal maintenance, and planting, thinning, and harvesting, the farmer next turned to Damietta's rice merchants for a loan at interest. After the harvest these merchants purchased the crop, had it milled, and placed it on the market. The farmer employed a permanent work force as well as seasonal migrant labor, all of whom were paid wages. Girard noted that by such arrangements, "the exploitation of the rice farms resembles more or less that of our farms of Europe."⁶³ This is the clearest example of peasant entrepreneurship and development toward a capitalist organization of the relations of production in agriculture.

To summarize, peasants behaved under the conditions of the times in a variety of ways which reflected their material interests. Peasants acquired and/or protected their holdings through the exercise of local power, including at times armed force. Security of tenure may not have seemed threatened to Damietta's rice farmers, since predictable flood waters and the steady demand for rice must have ensured satisfaction of rental and credit arrangements, and must have made their automatic renewal relatively easy. This, at any rate, is indicated by their willingness to go heavily into debt at the beginning of each season. In each case, peasants retained or enforced security of tenure, and sufficient freedom of action in production to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the rising prices of commodities and land.

POLITICS AND LAND TENURE:
FROM ALI BEY TO MUHAMMAD ALI

Both the Ottomans and their local rivals for power in Egypt confronted land-holding and commercial interests, and attempted to enlist their support through a mixture of coercion and cooption. But to the extent that these interests were thereby strengthened, the rulers were correspondingly weakened through loss of revenues and at times the loss of control of the countryside. To the extent that the rulers suppressed them, however, they undermined their own political and financial bases of support. It was a dilemma that Egypt's rulers would also face in the nineteenth century.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a struggle for Egypt's revenues on two levels. Intermediaries were largely successful in acquiring rights to the land, reducing the fiscal and administrative control of the state. Second, the contest between the wālī of Cairo and local political forces would determine who controlled and exploited the urban and rural tax structures.

In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a number of strong wālīs were able to adjust state taxes to inflation, to extend them to land that had been concealed from the registers, and to reduce diversions of imperial revenues by middlemen, all of which raised state revenues for a time.⁶⁴ In the period of Mamluk ascendancy, when strong rulers were able to establish themselves in

Cairo, the tendency was also to attempt to tighten control over and take a larger share of the lands' revenues.

With Ali Bey al-Kabir (ruled 1760-1772, with interruptions) came the first of a number of attempts at political and economic centralization. Control of customs and land-tax collection was the economic basis of his power. He intervened in the customs houses, ousting the Jewish agents and turning them over to Syrian merchant allies.⁶⁵ As for land taxes, the treasury now received them

as a result of direct negotiations between the Vâlî and the Şeyh ul-Beled [of Cairo, de facto ruler of Egypt] of the time rather than by the [former] system of imposition and collection. [Assessment] and collection of the taxes from the cultivators was controlled and executed entirely by the Seyh ul-Beled and his Mamlûks, who delivered to the Imperial Treasury the amounts agreed on in the negotiations.⁶⁶

Ali Bey and his successors also increased the number and weight of extraordinary taxes levied in the towns and rural areas.⁶⁷

As efforts to establish greater central control affected land tenure, they took the form of replacing multazims of the opposition party with one's own followers. Ali Bey had his rivals banished or killed, and distributed their landholdings among his followers, an unprecedented interference in the land regime.⁶⁸ The tightening of control over the intermediaries – while still working through them – was a strategy also followed in the short-lived attempts of Hasan Pasha (1786) and Yusuf Pasha (1801) to reassert Imperial control over the province, as it was in Napoleon's reorganization.⁶⁹ Muhammad Ali followed a similar route in his first years as wâlî until the fruition of these short-term policies and new economic circumstances allowed and induced him to take more drastic measures.

The pace of his reform of the land regime, part of an overall drive for centralization, varied according to the balance of political forces in the country, as it had under his predecessors. But short-term economic and political conditions also pushed policy in the direction of centralization. More than two decades of war in Europe proved a windfall for the rulers of this food-exporting country. Thus Murad Bey had profited from the war of the First Coalition,⁷⁰ and Muhammad Ali was in a similar position when war broke out anew. Egyptian grain began to flow to Malta in 1808, the volume increasing two years later when the export price of wheat rose from 26 to 80 piasters per ardeb in less than twelve months under the Pasha's new monopoly. Wheat prices in Cairo at the time ranged from 12 to 18 piasters. In 1811 the export price reached 100 piasters and remained high until 1813. In 1816–1817, due to European crop failures, the export price of wheat rose again, during a short export boom, from 60 to 120 piasters per ardebb.⁷¹ Second, the war in Arabia required a transport fleet and maintenance of a large force of mercenaries, adding urgency to the search for new revenues.

The boom in grain sales no doubt enabled Muhammad Ali to pursue his preparations for the Hijaz expedition more quickly, and helped finance the concluding phases of his struggle with the Mamluk amîrs. In addition to the Mamluks' dealings with the English, their control of the grain of Upper Egypt must have drawn him into putting an early end to them. The Citadel massacre followed the

Mamluks' repeated violation of agreements to pay tribute – in wheat.⁷² Thus the trade boom strengthened the Pasha's hand, and along with the costs of military preparations accelerated his program of centralization. But major changes in the land regime were likely to be attempted in any event. That they were on the way is indicated by the gradual tightening of control over the land which began in 1806, and by the importance that control of the land had taken in the struggles of the previous century.

As the area of Egypt under his control expanded, Muhammad Ali followed a policy toward land tenure which – on the surface – may appear contradictory, owing to the double-edged strategy of coercion and cooption. On the one hand, he allowed the *iltizām* system to remain during his first ten years in power, granting *iltizāms* anew to his family and followers. On the other, he pursued a policy aimed at undermining the authority of the *multazims* over the *fallahin*, collecting some taxes directly from the latter, and encouraging them to voice their grievances against the *multazims*.⁷³ The appearance of randomness in the land policy belies the political strategy employed. The aim was control of all the country's resources, but in order to accomplish this, it was necessary to piece together a ruling elite of family, officers, bureaucrats, and merchants, many of whom were placed in charge of tax farms and tracts of land under varying arrangements, including in some cases an obligation to restore uncultivated land to productivity. Consolidation of power also involved coming to terms with other political forces too powerful or indispensable to suppress entirely – certain *ulama*, the village *shaykhs*, and certain *bedouin shaykhs*. Piecemeal moves to extend his authority reflect Muhammad Ali's understanding that any wholesale changes would have encountered too much resistance. Instead, he proceeded against the weaker targets first, temporizing when strong opposition was met, in order to keep a united opposition from forming.

In 1806, half the *multazims' fā'īd* was claimed. By 1807, *masmūh* lands were being taxed. Toward the end of the same year, Jabarti reports that lands held by the *ulama* and those under their protection were put under the regular tax. In 1808, receiving reports that many *multazims* were unable to pay the sums demanded, Muhammad Ali had their villages reassigned to his family and followers. Many of these were in underpopulated Buhayra province. To correct the labor shortage, town dwellers bearing *nisbas* from that province's villages were forcibly relocated there.⁷⁴

In 1809, the Pasha ordered the compiling of a register for the taxation of *waqf* and *ūsyā* lands and attempted to apply it first in Buhayra. Along with new market taxes, this measure brought a protest from some of the *ulama*. On more than one occasion deputations were assured that the new taxes would not be imposed, but the persistence of the delegations indicates that some in fact may have been collected. Land taxes were thus selectively and unequally applied in this period, a legacy from the previous century and a reflection of political realities. Jabarti records a meeting of *ulama*, officers, and notables convened the following year to consider means of improving the country's revenues. The *shaykhs* were enraged at the suggestion that their lands be taxed at a rate equal with that of the others. Yet shortly thereafter, registers were drawn up to in-

clude all land for taxation, including ūsya, waqf, and land held by the village shaykhs untaxed until then.⁷⁵

After 1810 the reorganization of the land regime and agriculture entered a more intensive phase. Even before this time, multazims had faced extreme pressure to meet their tax obligations on time, even if it meant paying out of their pockets or borrowing at interest. If a multazim was unable to meet his obligations he had to surrender the land without being freed of his debt. In 1812, with the conquest of Upper Egypt, nearly all lands there were seized by the state and taxed directly. Waqf lands attached to mosques were taxed at half rate. These taxes were taken in kind, and wheat was already being accepted in place of cash payments in other parts of the country. Wheat not taken in taxation was subject to a state monopoly. Rice was monopolized from 1812. The rice-producing lands were put under the supervision of salaried officials who took the place of merchants in advancing capital to the peasants and purchasing their harvests.⁷⁶

The cadastral survey of Lower Egypt, 1813–1814, was the culmination of this phase of centralization. All cultivated and uncultivated land was surveyed. Land was recorded in the names of its holders, or cultivators, or those indicated as tenants at the time – that is, the names of all with a claim to the land were registered.⁷⁷ The surveyors used a standard faddan reportedly smaller than most customary ones which ranged in size from 200 to 400 square *qasabas* (a linear measure originally taken from a sugar cane); the new faddan equaled $333 \frac{1}{3}$ *qasabas*. Land was classified according to its fertility and a corresponding scale of taxation set.⁷⁸ At the cadaster's completion, most intermediary landholders were to be dispossessed for a promised pension.

The organization of a pyramidal administration was completed along with the cadaster and the land confiscations. All officials above the village level were salaried. They were charged with public security, maintenance of the irrigation system, and supervision of cultivation – including the allocation of seeds, implements, and animals as needed – as well as collection of taxes, and the purchase of crops subject to state monopolies.⁷⁹ Taxes were unified but not necessarily reduced, and the old intermediate structure, already partly bypassed, was eliminated.

During 1814 the multazims were allowed to collect the harvest on their ūsya lands, although they found that the peasants had heard of the confiscations and now resisted the *corvée*. The bureau charged with reviewing *ahli waqfs* required their holders to present their deeds with supporting statements. Those with titles verified after the Ottoman reconquest of 1801 were to be taxed at half rate. Waqfs assigned to charitable works were incorporated into village lands and taxed accordingly.⁸⁰ The rigorous procedure of verification no doubt was designed to bring the maximum amount of land under government control.

It appears that many of Muhammad Ali's mercenaries and their wives had acquired *iltizāms* by 1815. Their confiscation that year, and an attempt to introduce European-style drill, caused several units in Cairo to mutiny and to riot. As one result, many of these multazims were allowed to retain their ūsya lands, but without any of the old rights to *corvée* labor to farm them.⁸¹ These and

other multazims were promised a pension in compensation for their lost lands, but it was smaller than expected and slow in coming. Ūsya lands were to be tax free, yet Amin Sami's account of the 1817/1818 budget shows these being taxed at the full rate. Finally, in the case of all lands retained by the old intermediaries, they found that their holdings had shrunk due to the new, smaller feddan employed in the survey.⁸²

Helen Rivlin has noted the similarity of Muhammad Ali's reorganization to previous plans for reform. "The revolution in Egyptian land tenure, envisioned in part by Selim III, Napoleon, and Menou," she writes, "had been executed by Muhammad Ali. . . ." ⁸³ In fact, this was more a resurrection of the Ottoman land system originally established in Egypt. That system had also been designed to maximize the flow of revenue to the capital. It had also consisted of an administrative structure of salaried officials who collected taxes and oversaw irrigation and cultivation.⁸⁴ Ottoman attempts to reverse the process of loosening central control in various provinces during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had aimed at curtailing if not abolishing tax farming, to return to something like the original system. But the Ottomans lacked the strength to carry this reform through. Instead they were forced to seek the support of the same elements who had usurped state authority over the land, in their efforts to suppress the Mamluk beys. Only vestiges of the original Ottoman land system survived in Egypt by the late eighteenth century, but the scribes who collaborated with the French undoubtedly drew inspiration from that system in helping the French devise their "new" system.

Muhammad Ali's administrative centralization *was* revolutionary in that it completely altered the structure of political power in Egypt. The notion that in its methods it was something fundamentally new or European-inspired, however, should be discarded. It was but a phase in the recurring pattern of a central authority's struggle with local rivals for control of the land revenues of the country.

1816–1837: CENTRALIZATION AND EXPANSION

Agrarian policy under Muhammad Ali was part of a program of economic expansion in all spheres. At the same time, financial straits resulting from campaigns, diplomatic crises, and fluctuations in international markets added to the pressure on the agricultural sector, always the chief source of revenues.

The relationship of state commerce and industry to agriculture cannot be overemphasized. Muhammad Ali's tightening of control over the land followed and complimented his control of commerce. He acquired control of Cairo's customs in 1805, and the Mediterranean ports' customs in 1807, with the addition of these cities to his domain. The development of the state as a commercial enterprise is symbolized by the career of Boghos Yusufian of Izmir, a member of one of the era's far-flung Armenian merchant families. In Muhammad Ali's service he rose from merchant and farmer of Alexandria's customs to "minister" of commerce and foreign affairs by the mid 1820s, in step with the development of Egyptian state administration.⁸⁵

The Pasha himself brought to Egypt a considerable knowledge of the eastern Mediterranean's commerce and politics. As one who combined the roles of soldier and merchant in Cavalla, Macedonia, he was typical of his times.⁸⁶ Once in control of Egypt, he set about organizing state and parastatal commerce as opportunity permitted. Egypt's Mediterranean fleet was from the beginning a merchant fleet, the acquisition of large warships dating from the Greek revolt of 1821.⁸⁷ By patronizing a group of Armenian, Greek, Syrian, Maghribi, and local merchants, Muhammad Ali received important financial services, and tied into a network of commercial and diplomatic intelligence.⁸⁸ Before "modern" state banking and diplomatic structures appeared, then, their functions were being performed by such associates. The flow of information permitted the Pasha to manipulate exports and export prices to his advantage, and to devise policies—including agrarian policies—in light of international conditions.

Nonmilitary industrial projects were undertaken with just such knowledge of past and contemporary economic trends. State efforts to develop Egypt's textile industries led to the introduction of sericulture and the expansion of cotton and indigo production. This entailed the deepening of old canals and the digging of new ones for summer irrigation, even before the discovery of "Jumel" long-fiber cotton. According to Mustafa Fahmy's figures, of the total cotton-processing capacity installed (not accounting for replacement), 49 percent of the cards, 22 percent of the mule jennies, and 57 percent of Egypt's looms were set up in 1817–1821. Five of nine bleaching works and the only two printing works were also established before 1821, the first year of Jumel production.⁸⁹ All of this indicates an early intent to modernize and expand cotton textile production.

Food crops and other traditional crops such as flax and oil seeds remained important for internal consumption, industry, and export. In addition, large new tracts of olives and vines were planted, opium culture was revived, and merino sheep were imported to supply a new woolen industry. Skilled foreigners were employed to establish or improve the production of silk, indigo, and opium.⁹⁰ Land was granted tax free, as *rizqa bi-lā māl*, to those who would plant either acacia trees or horticultural gardens along the new Mahmudiyya Canal. Acacias produced a hardwood used in construction. Tax exemptions on date palms were similarly intended to encourage their cultivation. Experiments were also made in acclimatizing coffee, cochineal, and teak, but were disappointing.⁹¹

A variety of sources contain estimates and official accounts of the area of land under cultivation, or taxed, in this period. Most reliable accounts for the period 1800–1850 indicate that the total cultivated area was between 3 and 4 million faddans (see table 1). All evidence points to increasing areas of land cultivated during this period. Three projects which extended the area of cultivation were completed by 1820: the Mahmudiyya Canal, running from the Rosetta branch of the Nile to Alexandria, the repair of the sea dike near Alexandria, and the reclamation of the Wadi Tumaylat for sericulture, which alone involved the construction of 1,000 *sāqiya*s (waterwheels).⁹²

How did the agrarian and land tenure systems evolve in this period? Once the

TABLE I Accounts of Egypt's cultivated and taxed land, 1880-1952^a

	Taxed			"Cultivated"	"Cultivable"
	Lower Egypt	Upper Egypt	Total		
1800			3,970	4,038	
1813 (1)	2,373				
1813 (2)					2,905
1813 (3)				3,055	
1815/1816	1,904				
1817/1818	1,970	1,033	3,003		
1820/1821		1,315	3,219		
1822	1,900	1,748	3,647		
1835					3,500
1830s				3,856	
1840				4,491	
1843				3,672	
1844			3,590		
1852			3,525	4,160	

^a In 1,000s of faddans. Cf. Patrick O'Brien, "The Long-Term Growth of Agricultural Production in Egypt," in P. M. Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (Oxford, 1968), p. 172, table.

Sources:

1800: Pierre Jacotin, "Tableau de la superficie de l'Egypte," *Description de l'Egypte, Etat moderne*, XVIII, 2, pp. 102-105. Note that by Jacotin's method, his figures are subject to a large degree of error, after any inaccuracies in the preparation of the French maps of Egypt. The figures used here have been modified by Helen Rivlin to equal "new" faddans (*The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad Ali in Egypt* [Cambridge, Mass., 1961], p. 265).

1813 (1): Omar Toussoun, *La Géographie de l'Egypte à l'époque Arabe*, Mémoires de la Société Royale de Géographie d'Egypte, VIII, 3 (Cairo, 1928), p. 508.

1813 (2): Yacoub Artin, *La Propriété foncière en Egypte* (Cairo, 1883), p. 325.

1813 (3): Idem, "Essai sur les causes de rencherissement de la vie matérielle au Caire dans le courant du XIXe siècle," *Mémoires présentées à l'Institut Egyptien*, V, 2 (Cairo, 1907), 67.

1815/1816: Ali Barakat, *Tatawwur al-Milkiyya al-Zirā'iyya fī Miṣr wa Atharuh 'alā al-Haraka al-Siyāsiyya 1813-1914* (Cairo, 1977), pp. 26-28. See also n. 103.

1817/1818: Sami, *Taqwīm al-Nīl*, II, 266-270.

1820/1821: Barakat, *Tatawwur al-Milkiyya*, pp. 26-28.

1822: Sami, *Taqwīm al-Nīl*, II, 298-302. The increase for Upper Egypt is due at least in part to the extension of the land tax to areas where previously only trees and water lifting devices were taxed.

1835: John Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia," *Parliamentary Papers* 1840, XXI, as cited in O'Brien, "Long-Term Growth of Agricultural Production," p. 172.

1830s: A. B. Clot, *Aperçu général sur l'Egypte* (2 vols.; Paris, 1840), II, 264-265.

1840: Artin, "Essai," p. 68.

1843: de Regny, *Statistique de l'Egypte* (Alexandria, 1870), as cited in O'Brien, "Long-Term Growth of Agricultural Production," p. 172.

1852: Butros Ghali, "Rapport présenté à la commission d'enquête de l'impôt foncier en 1880," cited in Artin, "Essai," p. 68, for the area taxed. The area cultivated is Artin's own figure.

cadaster of 1813–1814 had been completed, and with a pattern of extensive state involvement in commerce and industry taking shape, pivotal changes in the agrarian regime were a short and complimentary step. In 1816, state monopolies were extended: the fallahin were forbidden to sell their harvests of hemp, sesame, indigo, cotton, wheat, beans, and barley to anyone but government agents. These were taken to government warehouses in each village, bought at a fixed price, and credited to each peasant's account after deductions of taxes. The rice monopoly continued along the lines previously set.⁹³

That year the state also entered directly into production – planting and cultivation – as evidenced by an order to the mudirs to see to the doubling of the area devoted to hemp, chick-peas, sesame, and cotton, although the order was unevenly enforced. Scribes were charged with keeping track of crops on the stalk, and were to follow them through each stage of cultivation – not because the fallahin needed instruction but to thwart the thievery which was their response to the new controls. This system was continued through the late 1830s, although the internal trade in grain was freed in 1830.⁹⁴

Land tenure in this period took several forms, with different motives and consequences. State policy was influenced by a desire to increase production, to take from it the maximum surplus possible, but also to insure the loyalty of bureaucratic and military cadres. It was not Muhammad Ali's policy to reward his followers' services with land: “. . . j'en ai trouvé le moyen en leur prodiguant l'argent et les présents, mais en les empêchant de devenir propriétaires et de se créer eux-mêmes une influence personnelle sur la population.”⁹⁵

Yet a certain amount of land was alienated. The contradictory aspect of land grants to individuals in a period of increased central control of the land again highlights the compromises necessary to offset opposition to the new order and to attach indispensable elements to it. And the state could confidently grant limited amounts of land as long as it was capable of dictating the terms of land tenure. This, of course, in no way contradicts the thesis that many grants in this period were also aimed at encouraging agricultural investment, experimentation, and land reclamation.

Grants of rizqa bi-lā māl were offered from 1827. Much of the area along the Mahmudiyya Canal had lost population, and cultivation there had declined during the previous century. The capital required to set up waterwheels and plant trees means that these grants must have gone to wealthier individuals.

Uncultivated land, surveyed in the cadasters but not included in the tax registers (hence the term *ib'ādiyya*, “set apart”) was granted under two different sets of circumstances. One type was granted to individuals who would bring them into production. They were given a deed entitling them to lifetime tenure, although the land was to revert to the state upon their death. The first such grant occurred in 1826; they appear to have been granted both as tax exempt for life and tax exempt for the first few years. They were undertaken by officials, officers, and foreigners, the latter forfeiting any capitulatory privileges. By 1837, these lands came to 103,175 faddans, and by 1848, to 164,960 faddans, nearly exclusively in Middle Egypt. In the registers inspected by Ali Barakat, nearly all recipients of these grants occupied high administrative or military po-

sitions.⁹⁶ A small amount of cultivated, *ma'mūr*, land was also granted: 8,703 feddans between 1827 and 1848.⁹⁷

Bedouin pastoralists were also granted lands classified as *ib'ādiyya*, as an inducement to settling, on condition that they cultivate them. But these tribes often found it more convenient to sublet to tenants. Decrees in 1837, 1846, and later prohibited this practice. Bedouin *ib'ādiyya* grants involved no title deed, but only the Pasha's promise not to tax the bedouin directly, nor to subject them to *corvée* or conscription.⁹⁸ By such arrangements these grants appear to have been a kind of treaty: in return for their special status, bedouin served as auxiliaries in the army. Their revolt and migration were provoked by Abbas's and Said's efforts to tax their lands in the 1850s.⁹⁹

Personal estates held by members of the ruling family came to be called *jifliks* (*çiftlik*s). Their extent in this period is unknown, but it was probably limited due to the alienation of revenues involved. Contemporary sources mention estates held by Muhammad Ali, for example, at Shubra, Ibrahim's estate on Rūḍa Island, and others.¹⁰⁰ These early estates do not appear in the registers of *jifliks*, all dating from 1838, which Barakat examined (discussed in the following section). In the case of the early personal estates and the new *jifliks* granted from 1838, the principle of land given a member of the ruling family is the same. But the later grants were part of a strategy of continuing state control of agriculture in the wake of the Treaty of Balta Liman the same year. The different circumstances and intent of the new *jifliks* account for the separate registers.

While Muhammad Ali's reorganization had established a salaried bureaucracy in the countryside, state administration at the village level continued to be carried out by prominent villagers much as it had under the old regime. Village shaykhs were appointed from among the wealthier families as before. Not a few such families must have held the office under the beys.¹⁰¹ Under Muhammad Ali, the village shaykhs received grants of tax-free land, *masmūh*, in lieu of salaries. Grants of *masmūh* were made in Upper Egypt as early as 1813.¹⁰² The cadaster of Lower Egypt was not completed until 1814, and whether *masmūh* lands were granted there at the time is uncertain. Jabarti first mentions *masmūh* in reference to the cadaster of 1820–1821.¹⁰³

Two types of *masmūh* were granted, *masmūh al-mashāyikh* and *masmūh al-maṣṭaba*. The former was intended as compensation for official duties explained below. The latter, sometimes assigned to the same individual, was to support the costs of visitors' and officials' lodging and board. Most shaykhs received four to five faddans of land as *masmūh* out of every 105 faddans of *ma'mūr* land belonging to the village. The most prominent shaykhs, or *muqaddims*, received 10 faddans out of every 100 faddans of *ma'mūr* in the village.¹⁰⁴ Differing local conditions and the different periodicity and modes of fiscal and administrative reorganization, however, preclude an assumption of complete uniformity in this system's application. The quality of the *masmūh* lands the shaykhs received, and/or their activities in improving them, caused these lands to be assessed at the highest rates in the villages when Said taxed them in 1857.¹⁰⁵

In addition to their acquisition of these lands, the shaykhs, their families and

protégés continued to be in a position to amass wealth and accumulate additional land, despite the more stringent supervision of land registration and exploitation than before. With the increased involvement of the state in production, the shaykhs' power increased. They were made responsible for assessing and collecting taxes (as in the past), for reassigning athar land on a fallah's death or conscription, for apportioning corvée duty, and for assigning the cultivation of cash crops among the fallahin once the quota to be grown had been fixed.¹⁰⁶ The shaykhs' abuse of their role in reassigning lands is said to have led Said to transfer this function to the provincial governments in 1854.¹⁰⁷ It was these families, the wealthy peasantry, whose members were recruited when the lower provincial offices were opened to native Egyptians in the 1830s.¹⁰⁸ Hamont reports that one such official who rose in the provincial administration of Tanṭa held some 500 to 600 faddans of ib'ādiyya land in 1839. It was found that 300 faddans of this land had been "stolen" from one of Abbas Pasha's jifliks several years earlier.¹⁰⁹ Whether a victim of political intrigue, a real villain, or both, this fallah's career indicates the scale of wealth that a few of the rural elite could reach.

In 1837, noting that there were many landless fallahin in the villages who worked as day laborers, Duhamel observed that ". . . il n'est pas rare de trouver des Sceiks, qui possèdent. . . mille et plus de feddans. . . ." of athar land.¹¹⁰ This was an exaggeration in terms of the typical amount of land held, but further testifies to the existence of a distinct stratum of wealthy peasants which, despite the changes in the land regime, was able to maintain and even improve its position.

How did the condition of the peasantry change in this period? To say that under the Mamluk beys the peasants were sheltered from direct contact with the state, implying that this made life easier for them,¹¹¹ is to misunderstand the nature of the old and new regimes. Both exploited the peasantry. Under both a peasant family's ability to withstand the burdens imposed and/or to shift them onto others' shoulders was a matter of relative strength. The weak, poor, and unprotected fared the worst in face of the state and the rural elite in both periods. One rough indicator of overall conditions in this period is an upturn in population. "Civil order," in the opinion of a recent writer, accounts for lowered mortality.¹¹² On the other hand, the gains made by wealthy peasants could only have come at their poorer neighbors' expense. In addition, peasants were expropriated in the creation of large estates in the 1840s, and reduced there to wage laborers and tenants.

The new regime did affect the fallah's life more directly in many ways, with the introduction of conscription, the organization of corvée labor for distant projects, the relocation of population on reclaimed land, and the control of agriculture and village industries. Taxation increased and was more effectively enforced. But these new demands did not go without resistance. The later years of Jabarti's chronicle contain references to black marketing and strenuous efforts to suppress it.¹¹³ Resistance to increasing demands on the populace took the form of indifferent work or sabotage in factories and on the farms, and self-mutilization, endemic stealing, or outright revolt.¹¹⁴

Revolt occurs less from absolutely intolerable conditions than from conditions perceived to be intolerable – that is, one's condition and response to it are matters of subjective appraisal. Adequately fed peasants who have recently improved their lot or have something to gain are more likely to revolt than those who are completely ground down.¹¹⁵ The great peasant revolts of Upper Egypt and the one in Sharqiyya occurred in areas which had enjoyed a quasi-autonomy a generation earlier. These revolts followed the more thorough cadaster of 1820 – 1821 and an increase in rural taxation, and were set off by the beginning of conscription.

THE GROWTH AND ENTRENCHMENT OF PRIVILEGED LANDHOLDINGS FROM 1838

The landholding system as it developed between the first cadaster and the late 1830s was not uniform in regard to the principle of ownership, but rather it reflected the priorities of the state: to increase production, both to fuel the economy and provide revenues, and to provide for and conciliate certain elements indispensable to maintaining the state. The bulk of village lands were taxed and administered directly through the bureaucracy in cooperation with prominent village families. Exempt from taxation were the *masmūḥ* lands in the hands of the shaykhs, bedouin *ib'ādiyya* grants, *rizqa bi-lā māl* and *ib'ādiyya* grants belonging to officers, officials, and other wealthy individuals, and the personal estates of royal family members and a few high officers and officials.

As long as the state created by Muhammad Ali remained strong it could resist any pressure to remove these lands from its ultimate control. Once created, however, the new bureaucratic machinery was potentially at the disposal of landed interests, should they gain control over it.

The changes in Egypt's land regime during Muhammad Ali's final decade reflect the weakening of the state due to the defeat in Syria (1840) and the imposition of free trade according to the provisions of the Treaty of Balta Liman (1838). The state had also been weakened by a fiscal crisis.

The increasing demands of capital investment, a growing military establishment and constant wars, along with a far from perfect bureaucracy, epidemics, and a capricious Nile, had caused many villages to fall into tax arrears by this time.¹¹⁶ Agriculture and the land tax accounted for the lion's share of revenue and had to be maintained. At first, a short-lived attempt was made to merge the responsibilities of villages in arrears with those still able to meet their obligations.¹¹⁷ Finally in 1840, a decree was issued which in essence resurrected the *iltizām* system of old, in the form of *'uhda* grants: high officers, officials, and family members were required to take over responsibility for the bankrupt villages, paying the arrears, and collecting and forwarding each year's taxes thereafter. They were charged with providing working capital as needed by the fallahin, with supervising cultivation and harvesting, and were to act as local arbiters, replacing the middle level of state bureaucracy in these capacities. The creation of the *'uhdas* accomplished a forced contribution from the wealthy with the payment of the arrears, and was designed to insure future rev-

enues, while at the same time cutting administrative costs. Peasants on the 'uhdas were also thereby relieved of the accumulation of tax arrears. The recipients of these grants, the *muta'ahhids*, received a section of land in each 'uhda to cultivate for their own profit.¹¹⁸

Following the Treaty of Balta Liman and the defeat in Syria, an acceleration of jiflik grants also took place, and these are said to have included the best cotton lands in the country.¹¹⁹ Muhammad Ali himself acquired most of these, 239,426 of a total of 334,216 faddans granted between 1838 and 1846. Nearly all the new jifliks created were in Lower Egypt.¹²⁰ Administration of the new jifliks was patterned after the bureaucratic regime previously established over the entire country, and all peasants on these estates were reduced to tenancy or wage labor.¹²¹

Both the 'uhdas and new jifliks enabled Muhammad Ali to circumvent the intent of Balta Liman tariffs, which would henceforth prevent use of the customs to control the import-export trade, or the use of trade monopolies to manipulate commodity prices. Now that these options were closed, the Pasha retreated into the sphere of production in order to maintain the monopoly of commodities in a new form. As evidence of this he acquired by far the largest amount of his new jifliks in 1841–1845, only one jiflik grant in this period going to someone else.¹²²

Peasants on 'uhdas also were expropriated. The *muta'ahhids* were required to take over athar lands which destitute peasants lacked the means to cultivate, with the stipulation that as their condition improved these peasants would regain direct responsibility for their lands step by step.¹²³ It appears in fact that little effort was made to improve the fallahin's lot. The pressure on *muta'ahhids* to meet tax payments worked against this in any event, and many fallahin on these estates found themselves reduced to tenancy. Barakat found that of the 'uhdas held by the royal family in 1846–1847, only 99,301 of a total of 228,461 feddans were recorded as remaining in peasant hands.¹²⁴

The apparent lack of resistance to these changes in their status may reflect the truly desperate straits of peasants on 'uhda and jiflik lands, in which relief from tax arrears and a continued guaranteed livelihood as tenants and laborers would seem to them an improvement. But this rather tranquil picture may also reflect the inadequacy of our sources in showing the peasants' response.

In addition to the obvious fiscal motivations, the pattern of land grants in the 1840s may also reflect court factionalism, which became more pronounced, and a desire to attach the political elite more firmly to the Pasha, in light of this division. New jiflik grants are recorded for the Pasha's two daughters, a nephew, sons Said and Halim, and grandson Abbas, but none for Ibrahim.¹²⁵ While the aim of encouraging investment was never absent from policy,¹²⁶ the extension of *ib'adiyya* holders' rights may also have been a political concession to them. These lands had been made inheritable in 1836; in 1842, full rights of disposition over them were granted.¹²⁷

Aside from *ib'adiyya* lands and the new jifliks, further forfeiture of control of the land was avoided. No rights of disposal were given the *muta'ahhids*. The law of 1846 codified some of the fallahin's traditional rights over their land – including its transfer – and may have been intended in part as a counterpoise to

the muta'ahhid's power. By reaffirming the fallah's right to return to athar land he had abandoned it appears designed to lure back fugitives, and it dovetails with the intent that destitute peasants were to take back land taken over by the muta'ahhids as soon as they were able.¹²⁸

This blend of old and new arrangements indicates that while the administration of land tenure was adjusted to meet new exigencies, the aims of policy remained essentially as before: maximization of production and revenue with tight state control over the land. Although the genesis of the land regime of the next generation – with its large estates – is apparent here, such was not the intent. If the state had been able to maintain its policies and to regain sufficient authority over the landholders it had created, then landholding in Egypt after mid-century would have evolved differently from the way in which it actually did.

UNRESOLVED CONTRADICTIONS

The further legislation of formal landownership rights in nineteenth-century Egypt resulted not only from the tendency of larger landholders to take and ask for more, but also from rulers' efforts to resolve a basic contradiction in the very process of state formation. It was the same dilemma faced earlier by Ottoman reformers and their local rivals in Cairo. Maximization of revenue was the sine qua non of building and maintaining a strong state, whether one considers Ottoman policy or the efforts of local strongmen attempting to build successor states. This requirement lies behind the variety of fiscal reform schemes the period witnessed, and it tended to push policy in the direction of administrative centralization, the elimination of tax-farming middlemen, and tighter, more direct control of the land. The same principle applied to commerce, as expressed in state policy in regard to *apaltos* and tax farms of the customs. Thus administrative and fiscal reform went hand in hand with "military reform," the creation of forces capable of dominating the countryside and of eliminating independent focuses of power.

On the other hand, the process of reviving a state or of building one anew also required the collaboration of indispensable elements in the society: village shaykhs, merchants, bureaucrats, officers, and so on, many if not all of whom held lands and/or tax-farming offices. To the extent that the state had to rely on their support it could not afford to confiscate or tighten control over their landholdings, mercantile activities, or offices – at least not without significant concessions and exemptions. But to the extent that revenues were needed, the ruler was drawn in this direction, into direct confrontation with landed interests in particular.

Egypt's rulers sought to resolve this dilemma in two ways. One was to establish military dominance in the countryside, and then to allow supporters and collaborators to establish themselves, or remain, as landlords. But this strategy simply reproduced the contradiction in a new form, postponing its resolution. Thus under Ali Bey and his successors, and in Muhammad Ali's early years, such a policy was accompanied by increased tax pressure on the landholders.

Similarly, we read of the seemingly erratic behavior of rulers who alternately “favored” a merchant group and subjected them to degrees of extortion.¹²⁹

The second way out was military expansion. It is not proposed here that this is the only factor behind expansion. But successful conquest might help fill the state’s coffers in the short run through booty, and in the long run through control of trade routes and the exploitation of imperial possessions, the latter relieving – at least temporarily – the pressure to raise greater revenues at home. The role of different rulers’ merchant allies in Egypt’s expansion thus deserves attention. They knew the regions worth conquering and exploiting, they possessed the expertise with which to milk them, and they had an interest in relieving pressure on themselves at home and in trading in conquered territories under state patronage.¹³⁰ Expansion also involved – and could pay for – an expanded military, which would enhance the ruler’s ability to apply coercion at home.

Conquest, however, was a risky affair. The returns were potentially great, but only if conquered territory could be held and administered without major cost.

Thus the Powers’ intervention in 1840 to confine Muhammad Ali’s forces to Egypt takes on an added dimension of importance. This event has been seen as confirming the region’s movement along the road to economic dependence and underdevelopment. The substantial truth of this proposition, should not, however, be allowed to obscure the importance of sociopolitical processes within Egypt which reinforced this trend. Efforts to retain control of the land and obstruct free trade after 1840 indicate that Egypt’s rulers had not given up the game. Administrative reform, education, exploration for minerals, and the irrigation works – that is, the creation of a modern state – continued under Abbas and Said. As before, such activities were intended to meet the requirements of contemporary conditions and were subject to the shifting strength of the rulers and different political factions. Both Abbas and Said sought to consolidate their positions, to increase the state’s control of the land, and to raise revenues. Reminiscent of Muhammad Ali, Abbas confiscated from two-thirds to three-quarters of the ‘uhdas for nonpayment of taxes, and attempted to tax bedouin *ib’ādiyya* lands. He was also accused of attempting to recreate Muhammad Ali’s monopolies.¹³¹

Yet by the late 1840s the state had lost its ability to milk commerce through the customs, its army had been reduced, and future military expansion was ruled out except in the direction of Africa. Such constraints limited the independent maneuverability of Egypt’s rulers and enhanced the relative power of indigenous political interests, as reflected in the obvious use of land grants for political patronage.¹³² These groups in turn sought to consolidate their positions as landholders, from members of the ruling family and high officials at the top to the rural elite which increasingly rose in the middle levels of the bureaucracy. The value attached to land increased, especially in the 1850s, the result of the irrigation works and rising export prices for cotton and grain.¹³³ As one indication of the wealthy landholders’ increased leverage on the state, the right of fallahin to return to *athar* land they had abandoned was reduced step by step in this decade. Furthermore, the fallahin’s abandonment of land to the state for

sale to investors was facilitated.¹³⁴ Both measures were a significant reversal of traditional state policy which hastened the concentration of land in fewer hands.

Among all groups able to influence state policy, there was a direct interest in free trade and a more liberal definition of landholders' rights. Indeed, as Baer writes, there was "a need . . . felt to facilitate land transactions," but not, as he states, simply "to encourage the development of agriculture."¹³⁵ A century earlier, de facto rights of ownership had appeared in usage, the result of the increased value attached to land in a situation where the state was unable to maintain effective control over its disposition. Agricultural development intensified in the nineteenth century, but in a situation where the state's authority had considerably increased and where many of the larger landholders themselves were high state officials. Thus the arena where the struggle for land was played out shifted to the state, and its results were expressed in legislation.

New fiscal needs, large tracts of land alienated by earlier grants, and the continued concealment of athar land from the tax registers led Said to take the well-known measures of the 1850s, which had the effect of further defining and strengthening landholders' rights. He imposed a mild tax, the 'ushur, on jilfik, ib'ādiyya, and on the remaining 'uhda lands, but at the price of granting full ownership rights to their holders.¹³⁶ He succeeded in subjecting bedouin ib'ādiyya lands to the much higher *kharāj* tax, which required a series of expeditions to coerce the tribes. Masmūh lands were subjected to the *kharāj* in 1857 and assimilated to village lands in 1858. But the shaykhs retained most of their local prerogatives, including the duty to assess lands for taxation¹³⁸ – that is, they remained able to protect what they held and acquire more – while traditional rights of disposition over peasant lands were confirmed but not extended to absolute private ownership.

The legislation of 1854–1858 reflects the ascendancy, once again, of landed classes in Egypt, able to influence land-tenure policy in their own interests. These classes were to prove more powerful and enduring than their counterparts of the eighteenth century. They were able to prosper, the more powerful gaining formal ownership rights over large estates in exchange for extremely low rates of taxation.¹³⁷ This, and Egypt's lack of control over customs rates, meant that the full weight of the state's increasing fiscal needs was born by the small peasantry. Despite the increased exploitation of the peasantry, state expenditures outstripped revenues. Said and Ismail were obliged to look outside of Egypt for financing, to the point of heavy borrowing and eventual bankruptcy.

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NOTES

Author's Note: I wish to thank Dr. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot and Yahya Sadowski for their many helpful suggestions and criticisms during the successive drafts of this paper.

¹ See Gabriel Baer, "The Development of Private Ownership of the Land," in his *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt* (Chicago, 1969); and idem, *A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt 1800–1950* (Oxford, 1962).

² For a more extensive discussion of modernization theory and its inadequacies, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," *Comparative Politics*, 3, 3 (April 1971), 283–322. A statement of the theory and its application in an Egyptian context is found in Robert Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1880–1914* (Princeton, 1966). Writers of this school have differed over whether a change in values is primary, or whether technological change first produces the necessary change from traditional to modern values. See, e.g., Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, 1963); Daniel J. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958); James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *The Middle East: Politics and Power* (Boston, 1974); and, on the subject of "technicalization," Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam* (3 vols.; Chicago, 1974), I, 52–53.

³ A recent challenge to the periodicity of the modernization thesis is Peter Gran's *The Islamic Roots of Capitalism* (Texas, 1979).

⁴ This is not to pose the question of whether "internal forces" had more effect than "external" influences in this period. The internal-external dichotomy is as false as the traditional-modern, since in reality processes in both realms were intertwined and cannot be separated.

⁵ See, for example, Jerome Blum, *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe* (Princeton, 1978); and James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (Yale, 1976).

⁶ This discussion follows the land system's detailed description in Stanford Shaw, "Landholding and Land-Tax Revenues in Ottoman Egypt," in P. M. Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 91–103; idem, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 1–50; and Abd al-Rahim Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Misri fī al-Qarn al-Thāmin al-Thāmin 'Ashar* (Cairo, 1974), pp. 65–124.

⁷ Scott, *Moral Economy*, Introduction.

⁸ Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Misri*, pp. 65–124.

⁹ The evolution of the role of Egypt's intermediaries is best described in Shaw, "Landholding and Land-Tax Revenues in Ottoman Egypt."

¹⁰ Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Misri*, p. 78.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 83–86.

¹² In particular, Baer, "The Development of Private Ownership of the Land."

¹³ Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Misri*, pp. 83–84.

¹⁴ Michel-Ange Lancret, "Memoire sur le systeme d'imposition territoriale et sur l'administration des provinces d'Egypte, dans les derniers années du gouvernement des Mamlouks," *Description de l'Egypte, Etat moderne*, XI, 474–475 (hereafter cited as *DE*).

¹⁵ See Maxime Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* (Pantheon, 1973).

¹⁶ Blum, *The End of the Older Order*, pp. 19–20.

¹⁷ On sixteenth-century population and prices: Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World of Philip II* (2 vols.; Harper Torchbooks, 1975), I, 402–410, 517–519. On eighteenth-century population in Europe: Blum, *The End of the Older Order*, p. 241. Given the evidence for a shared demographic experience in the sixteenth century, Middle Eastern population may have begun to increase along with Europe's in the eighteenth. This possibility is also raised in Braudel's provocative discussion of the "weight of numbers" in *Capitalism and Material Life 1400–1800* (2 vols.; Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 1–20. Egypt's population in 1800 has been underestimated by as much as one-third; see Justin A. McCarthy, "Nineteenth-Century Egyptian Population," *Middle East Studies*, 12, 3 (Oct. 1976), 1–39.

¹⁸ "Between the 1730s and the first decade of the nineteenth century, cereal prices went up by 283 percent in Denmark, 259 percent in Austria, 210 percent in Germany, and 163 percent in France" (Blum, *The End of the Older Order*, p. 242; on land prices and speculation: pp. 17–20; 170; 241–242). In Cairo, the average prices of wheat, rice, and beans in 1791–1798 were approximately two and a half times what they were during 1680–1690 (see n. 23 below).

¹⁹ For Europe: *ibid.*, pp. 17–20.

²⁰ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, I, 584, 591–594; Robert Paris, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille de 1660 à 1789*, vol. 5, *Le Levant*, ed. Gaston Rambert (Paris, 1957), pp. 537–539.

²¹ The growth of French commerce in the eastern Mediterranean during the eighteenth century can be followed in Paris (*ibid.*; Paul Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIIe siècle* [Paris, 1896]). Textile production in parts of the eastern Mediterranean was expanding during this period, only partly in response to Europe's expansion. See Yahya Sadowski, "Eighteenth-Century Syrian Social Revolution: 1720–1840," paper read at the 1978 Middle East Studies Association conference, Ann Arbor, Mich. The Egyptian Delta silk-finishing industry was organized by Syrians who penetrated the Egyptian economy early in the century (M. P. S. Girard, "Memoire sur l'agriculture, l'industrie, et le commerce de l'Égypte," *DE*, XVII, 208–209, 219–223; Albert Hourani, "The Syrians in Egypt in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Colloque Internationale sur l'Histoire du Caire* (1969), pp. 222–224.

²² The economic history of the eastern Mediterranean in this period has yet to be approached with a region-wide perspective. The study of the Balkans is most advanced; see Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354–1804* (Seattle and London, 1977), part 4. On the Lebanon: Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon 1711–1845* (Princeton, 1968); William R. Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788–1845* (Harvard, 1963). On Palestine: Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century* (Jerusalem, 1973). For Egypt the best discussions of countrywide production and distribution are still to be found in various articles of the *Description de l'Égypte*, especially Girard, "Memoire sur l'agriculture, l'industrie, et le commerce de l'Égypte." Production and trade in Cairo is discussed in Andre Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe siècle* (2 vols.; Damascus, 1973).

²³ Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, I, 53–65. Raymond stresses local conditions and events as determining fluctuations in the prices of basic commodities. Yet the century-long rise in commodity prices is roughly in accord with that of contemporary Europe. See n. 18, above, and Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse, eds., *Histoire économique et sociale de la France* (2 vols.; Paris, 1970), I, 383–391.

²⁴ Paris, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, p. 523.

²⁵ Bistra Cvetkova, "Quelques problèmes du féodalisme ottoman à l'époque du XVIIe siècle au XVIIIe siècle," *Actes du premier congrès international des études balkaniques et sud-est européennes*, Sofia, 1966 (5 vols.; Sofia, 1966–1970), III, 709–720.

²⁶ Trian Stoianovich, "Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy," *Journal of Economic History*, 13 (Fall, 1953), 402–403.

²⁷ Deena R. Sadat, "Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Modern History* 44 (Sept. 1972), 346–363. The literature discussing this has been summarized in Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule*, pp. 211–221.

²⁸ Dominique Chevallier, "Aspects sociaux de la question d'Orient," *Annales*, 14 (1959) 35–64; Harik, *Politics and Change*, on waqf, pp. 83–85, 93–95.

²⁹ Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, *passim*.

³⁰ Cvetkova "Quelques problèmes du féodalisme," pp. 717–718.

³¹ Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (2 vols.; Cambridge, 1976), I, 232, 238.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 246–247, 256–257.

³³ Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Miṣrī*, pp. 83–84.

³⁴ Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, II, 721.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 721–722; Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Miṣrī*, pp. 113–114.

³⁶ Terence Walz, *The Trade between Egypt and Bilād al-Sudān 1700–1820* (Cairo, 1978), pp. 110–112, 115.

³⁷ Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Miṣrī*, p. 95.

³⁸ Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, II, 722–726, and I, 292.

³⁹ Afaf Marsot, "Political and Economic Functions of the Ulama in the 18th Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 16 (Dec. 1973), 130–154; *idem*, "The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., *Scholars, Saints and Sufis* (California, 1972), pp. 149–166; *idem*, "The Wealth of the Ulama in Late Eighteenth Century Cairo," in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds., *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Southern Illinois, 1977), pp. 205–216.

⁴⁰ Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, I, 79–80.

⁴¹ Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Miṣrī*, pp. 87–91.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 87–91.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 80. Cf. Blum, *The End of the Old Order*, pp. 206–207.

⁴⁴ Lancret, "Memoire sur le systeme d'imposition territoriale," pp. 474–475, 483.

⁴⁵ Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, *Merveilles biographiques et historiques ou chroniques du Cheikh Abd-el-Rahman el-Djabarti* (Cairo, 1888–1896), VIII, 320–321; using Jacotin's figures (see table).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, VIII, 95–96.

⁴⁷ Sadat, "Rumeli Ayanlari," p. 348.

⁴⁸ MM. Dubois-Aymé and Jollois, "Voyage dans l'intérieur du Delta, contenant des recherches géographiques sur quelques villes anciennes, et des observations sur les moeurs et les usages des Égyptiens modernes," *DE*, XII, 188–189.

⁴⁹ The existence of production for the market should not be taken as abandonment of subsistence-oriented agriculture. Peasants satisfied subsistence needs first. Some cash cropping and household industry may well have been necessary to maintain the family's subsistence and to pay taxes.

⁵⁰ On the village shaykh in general, see Gabriel Baer, "The Village Shaykh 1800–1950," in *Studies*, pp. 30–61; on the shaykh, khūlī and other village officials: Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Miṣrī*, pp. 18–36.

⁵¹ Lancret, "Memoire sur la systeme d'imposition territoriale," pp. 477–483.

⁵² Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Miṣrī*, p. 111; Lancret, "Memoire sur la systeme d'imposition territoriale," pp. 469–470.

⁵³ F. Mengin, *Histoire de l'Égypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly* (2 vols.; Paris, 1823), II, 338.

⁵⁴ Egyptian peasants at various times had recourse to violence in defense of their interests. What makes these cases remarkable is their degree of success. See Gabriel Baer, "Submissiveness and Revolt of the Fallah," in *Studies*, pp. 93–108.

⁵⁵ Le Citoyen Shulkowski, "Description de la route du Kaire à Salehhyéh," *La décade égyptienne*, Vol. 1 (Cairo, Year VII), p. 25.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–26; Le Général Anderossy, "Memoire sur le lac Menzaléh," *La décade égyptienne*, Vol. 1 (Cairo, Year VII [1798–99]), p. 193.

⁵⁷ Le Citoyen Malus, "Memoire sur un voyage fait a la fin de frimaire sur la Branche Tantique du Nil," *La décade égyptienne*, Vol. 1 (Cairo, Year VII), pp. 136–137, 138–139; Shulkowski, "Description," p. 24; Général Reynier, *Mémoires du général Reynier sur les opérations de l'armée d'orient, ou de l'Égypte après la bataille d'Héliopolis* (Paris, 1827), pp. 50–52.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*; Shulkowski, "Description," pp. 26, 28.

⁵⁹ E. Jomard, "Observations sur les Arabes de l'Égypte moyenne," *DE*, XII, 269–272, 278–280.

⁶⁰ Lancret, "Memoire sur la systeme d'imposition territoriale," p. 491.

⁶¹ Jomard, "Observations," p. 280.

⁶² See Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Miṣrī*, pp. 80, 113; and Ali Barakat, *Taṭawwur al-Milkiyya al-Zirā'iyya fī Miṣr wa Atharuh 'alā al-Ḥaraka al-Siyāsiyya 1813–1914* (Cairo, 1977), p. 15.

⁶³ Girard, "Memoire sur l'agriculture, l'industrie, et le commerce de l'Égypte," pp. 117, 172 ff.; idem, "Notice sur l'amenagement et le produit des terres de la province de Damietta," *La décade égyptienne*, Vol. 1 (Cairo, Year VII), pp. 229–245.

⁶⁴ Stanford Shaw, trans. and ed., *Ottoman Egypt in the Age of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 123. For a survey of the politics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, I, 1–16; P. M. Holt, "The Pattern of Egyptian Political History from 1517 to 1798," in *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt*, pp. 79–90.

⁶⁵ J. W. Livingstone, "Ali Bey al-Kabir and the Jews," *Middle East Studies*, 7 (1971), 221–228.

⁶⁶ Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 78.

⁶⁷ Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt in the Age of the French Revolution*, pp. 145–146, 157–158.

⁶⁸ Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 7–8.

⁶⁹ Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Miṣrī*, pp. 117–119; Jabarti, *Merveilles*, VIII, 206–207; Ibrahim el-Mouelhy, "L'Enregistrement de la propriété en Égypte durant l'occupation française (1798–1801)," *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte*, 30 (1947–1948), 197–228.

⁷⁰ Girard, "Memoire sur l'agriculture, l'industrie, et le commerce de l'Égypte," p. 368; Le

Compte Estève, "Mémoire sur les finances de l'Égypte, depuis sa conquête par le sultan Selymer, jusqu'à celle du général en chef Bonaparte," *DE*, XII, 148.

⁷¹ Edouard Driault, *Mohamed Aly et Napoléon (1807-1814). Correspondence des consuls de France en Egypte* (Cairo, 1925), pp. 59, 73, 97, 132-133, 227; Jabarti, *Merveilles*, VIII, 297; Mengin, *Histoire*, II, 397-398.

⁷² Driault, *Mohamed Aly et Napoléon*, pp. 8, 12-13, 25, 32-33, 54-55, 59, 69-71, 81-82.

⁷³ Jabarti, *Merveilles*, VIII, 313.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130, 132, 148-149, 176-178. Whether a significant number were relocated to Buhayra is unknown.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 206-215, 277-279.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 244-245, 320-323, 347-348.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, IX, 92.

⁷⁸ Yacoub Artin, *La propriété foncière en Egypte* (Cairo, 1883), pp. 311-312, 89; Jabarti, *Merveilles*, IX, 91.

⁷⁹ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, p. 89; Helen Rivlin, *The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad Ali in Egypt* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 89 ff.

⁸⁰ Jabarti, *Merveilles*, IX, 87-93.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138; Mengin, *Histoire*, II, 49-55.

⁸² Jabarti, *Merveilles*, IX, 90-93, 122-123; Rivlin, *Agricultural Policy*, pp. 57, 121; Amin Sami, *Taqwim al-Nil* (4 vols.; Cairo, 1915-1936), II, 266-270.

⁸³ Rivlin, *Agricultural Policy*, p. 59.

⁸⁴ Abd al-Rahim, *Al-Rif al-Misri*, pp. 71-73; Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 1-7; idem, "Landholding and Land-Tax Revenues," pp. 93-94.

⁸⁵ Levon Marashlian, "The Armenian Boghos Bey Yusufian in the Viceregency of Muhammad Ali Pasha," forthcoming in *Armenian Review*.

⁸⁶ For example, Raymond describes how Cairo's beys engaged in commercial activities: *Artisans et commerçants*, II, 717-719. Cavalla itself was an entrepot to the rich region of cotton, rice, tobacco, and silk farming dominated by the commercial center of Salonica. During Muhammad Ali's thirty years there the area saw the rapid development of çiftlik cotton farming (Stoianovich, "Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy," pp. 402-404).

⁸⁷ Descriptions of this fleet and its activities before the 1820s show its function to be primarily commercial-diplomatic: Georges Durand-Viel, *Les campagnes navales de Mohammad-Aly et d'Ibrahim* (2 vols.: Paris, 1935), I, 100-102, 152, 155-157, 210; Driault, *Mohammad Aly et Napoléon*, pp. 132-133, 136, 188; idem, *La formation de l'empire de Mohamed Aly de l'Arabie au Soudan (1814-1823)* (Cairo, 1927), pp. 104-105.

⁸⁸ Rubin Adalian, "The Armenian Colony in Egypt during the Reign of Muhammad Ali," paper read at the Middle East Studies Association conference, 1978, Ann Arbor, Mich.; A. G. Politis, *L'Hellenisme et l'Egypte moderne* (2 vols.: Paris, 1928), I, 179-180, 189, 194; Auriant, "Mehemet-Ali et les grecs," *Arcopole*, 1 (Jan.-March 1927), 24-43 - all give some examples. No systematic treatment of Egyptian commerce in this period exists, and references to non-European merchants' roles are scattered. This picture of commerce under state patronage has emerged from work still in progress.

⁸⁹ Moustafa Fahmy, *La révolution de l'industrie en Egypte et ses conséquences sociales* (Leiden, 1954), pp. 23-25.

⁹⁰ John Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia," *Parliamentary Papers* 1840, XXI, pp. 23, 24; Georges Douin, *La mission du Baron de Boislecote. L'Egypte et la Syrie en 1833* (Cairo, 1927), p. 85; Driault, *Formation de l'empire*, pp. 60, 63, 89, 99.

⁹¹ Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia," p. 25; Artin, *Propriété foncière*, pp. 26-27, 181-182, 195, 257-259.

⁹² Jabarti, *Merveilles*, IX, 198-199, 233-234, 305-306, 310. Rivlin conjectures that the total cultivated area declined is untenable (*Agricultural Policy*, p. 270).

⁹³ Jabarti, *Merveilles*, p. 185.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 191; Mengin, *Histoire sommaire de l'Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohamad Ali (1823-1838)* (Paris, 1839), pp. 119-121.

⁹⁵ Douin, *La mission de Baron de Boislecote*, p. 111.

⁹⁶ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, pp. 254, 256; Baer, *Landownership*, pp. 16–17; Rivlin, *Agricultural Policy*, p. 62; E. R. J. Owen, *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820–1914* (Oxford, 1969), p. 61; Barakat, *Taṭawwur al-Milkiyya*, pp. 33–34.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 34–38.

⁹⁸ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, pp. 261–262.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 263–264; idem, "Essai sur les causes de renchérissement de la vie matérielle au Caire dans le courant de XIX siècle," *Memoires présentées à l'Institut Egyptien*, V, 2, (Cairo, 1907), 71–72; Ra'uf Abbas Hamid, *Al-Nizām al-Ijtimā'ī fī Miṣr fī Ẓill al-Milkiyyāt al-Zirā'iyya al-Kabīra 1837–1914* (Cairo, 1973), p. 68.

¹⁰⁰ Jabarti, *Merveilles*, VIII, 352; Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia," p. 26.

¹⁰¹ See Baer, "The Village Shaykh," passim.

¹⁰² Sami, *Taqwīm al-Nīl*, II, 245.

¹⁰³ Jabarti, *Merveilles*, IX, 316. Others have implied that *masmūh* was granted in Lower Egypt during the first cadaster, but there is no evidence for this. The Royal Council's register, *Sijill al-Dīwān al-Khidīwī*, written at some time after the grants in question were made and quoted by Barakat, contains a contradictory account. First, it mentions 440,127 faddans in Lower Egypt not taxed in 1815–1816, and 1,775,611 faddans in Upper Egypt not taxed in 1820–1821, "because it was *būr* [meaning either fallow or waste land] at that time." Then, in summing up, it states, "The total of the land of Upper and Lower Egypt upon which no tax was assessed, then, was 2,215,738 faddans, including *ib'ādiyyas*, the *multazims' ūsya*, *masmūh al-mashaikh*, . . . *masmūh al-mastaba*, . . . and *būr* . . ." (Barakat, *Taṭawwur al-Milkiyya*, pp. 27–28).

¹⁰⁴ Jabarti, *Merveilles*, IX, 316; Barakat, *Taṭawwur al-Milkiyya*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁵ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, p. 293.

¹⁰⁶ Baer, "The Village Shaykh," pp. 37–46.

¹⁰⁷ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, pp. 100–102.

¹⁰⁸ Mengin, *Histoire sommaire*, pp. 100–102.

¹⁰⁹ P. N. Hamont, *L'Égypte sous Méhémet-Ali* (2 vols.; Paris, 1843), I, 103–104.

¹¹⁰ René Cattau Bey, *La règne de Mohamed Aly d'après les archives russes en Égypte* (4 vols.; Cairo and Rome, 1931–1936), II, part 2, 373.

¹¹¹ See Rivlin, *Agricultural Policy*, pp. 117–118.

¹¹² McCarthy, "Nineteenth-Century Egyptian Population," pp. 28–29.

¹¹³ Jabarti, *Merveilles*, IX, 115, 224–227, 229, 231–232.

¹¹⁴ Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia," pp. 28 ff.; Edward Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (London, 1966 ed.) pp. 133–134; Bayle St. John, *Village Life in Egypt, with Sketches of the Said* (2 vols.; London, 1852), I, xvii; Rivlin, *Agricultural Policy*, p. 205; Baer, "Submissiveness and Revolt of the Fallah," passim.

¹¹⁵ See Barrington Moore's remarks in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966), pp. 453 ff., esp. pp. 471–475.

¹¹⁶ Natural disasters were not decisive, however, as they occurred both earlier and later without producing crises of these proportions.

¹¹⁷ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, p. 129.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 129–130; Rivlin, *Agricultural Policy*, p. 64; Baer, *Landownership*, pp. 13–14.

¹¹⁹ Owen, *Cotton*, p. 62.

¹²⁰ Barakat, *Taṭawwur al-Milkiyya*, p. 94.

¹²¹ Rivlin, *Agricultural Policy*, pp. 68–69.

¹²² Barakat, *Taṭawwur al-Milkiyya*, pp. 85–94. The Balta Liman tariffs were not actually put into effect in Egypt until after the retreat from Syria in the spring of 1841, and various delaying tactics.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 106–107.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 85–94. The evidence for court factionalism has been uncovered by Dr. Afaf Marsot in the course of current research.

¹²⁶ See Baer, *Landownership*, p. 17.

¹²⁷ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, pp. 333–336.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 100; Baer, *Landownership*, p. 7.

¹²⁹ See John W. Livingstone, "Ali Bey al-Kabir and the Mamluk Renaissance in Egypt, 1760–1772," unpublished Ph. D. diss., Princeton, 1968, chap. 4.

¹³⁰ Note the role of the Mouelhy family, soldiers and silk merchants established in the Hijaz and in Cairo, in Muhammad Ali's early campaigns in Arabia: Ibrahim el-Mouelhy, "Ibrahim el-Mouelhy Pacha. Les Mouelhy en Égypte," *Cahiers d'histoire égyptienne*, 2, 2–3 (Feb., 1950), 313–328.

¹³¹ 'Uhdas: Artin, *Propriété foncière*, p. 131. Bedouin ib'ādiyyas: idem, "Essai," pp. 71–72. Monopolies: Angelo Sammarco, *Précis de l'histoire d'Égypte*, vol. 4, *Les règnes de Abbas de Saïd et d'Ismail (1848–1879)* (Rome, 1935), pp. 10–11.

¹³² Barakat, *Tatawwur al-Milkiyya*, pp. 97 ff.

¹³³ Export price of wheat:

1850 50 P. T./ardebb

1852 66 P. T./ardebb

1859 74 P. T./ardebb

Source: Owen, *Cotton*, p. 80.

Export price of cotton:

average, 1851–1855 9.85 dollars/qantar

average, 1856–1860 13.45 dollars/qantar

Source: Mahmoud el Darwish, "Note on the Movement of Prices of Egyptian Cotton, 1820–1899," in Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800–1914* (Chicago, 1975), p. 448.

¹³⁴ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, pp. 280–281, 283, 287.

¹³⁵ Baer, "The Development of Private Ownership of Land," p. 68.

¹³⁶ Artin, *Propriété foncière*, p. 161.

¹³⁷ Baer, "The Village Shaykh," pp. 40–41.