

UKRAINE'S CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT PAST AND PRESENT: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF 19TH AND 21ST CENTURY VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION IN KIEV

BY

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THESIS

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Abstract

The late imperial period saw the development of a significant and substantial, although somewhat small, civil society in Kiev. After 100 years, the fall of communism gave way to increasing growth of the public sphere again. Now, however, critics are calling Ukraine's recent civil society development a façade. What conditions have changed and new challenges arisen in the last century that have affected the function, composition, and capacity of voluntary associations and organizations? Can history shed some light on Ukraine's current "third sector crisis"?

This thesis examines the development of civil society in both late imperial and post-communist Kiev. A historically diverse and foreign-dominated nation, Ukraine has remained a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-confessional state with large Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and Jewish populations. In the 19th century, rapid urbanization and industrialization, coupled with declining power of Russian imperial rule, led to a growing public sphere and civil society in urban centers such as Kiev. The increasing number of voluntary associations largely included recreational, professional, and social organizations, which functioned as public spaces for individuals to unite around civic causes.

The fall of communism and the collapse of the USSR again allowed for a growing public sphere and civil society in Kiev. The political climate, however, had changed dramatically throughout the 20th century, as had the international system. As voluntary associations increased in number once again, this time much more political in nature, they largely included NGOs, political parties, media groups, and activist organizations, which functioned as information vehicles and mobilizing networks, unifying around nationalist political goals.

Kiev's late imperial civil society developed internally from largely private funding to address social justice issues, whereas Kiev's post-communist civil society developed with strong elite and external influence, funded by many state actors and international governments, to address political issues and provide financial benefits. The former had substance, but lacked power to influence the state, while the latter had power to change the regime, but lacks substance so much that it has been called a façade. Over the last century, conditions have changed in a way that poses increasing challenges to civil society development in Kiev.

This work contributes to the current discourse and understanding of civil society in Ukraine as it has developed historically and in recent years. By placing the case of Kiev in a comparative historical context and a broader regional historical context, it demonstrates how Ukraine's civil society development follows historical patterns and is inextricably linked to political climate, national sentiment, and international influence. It argues that the nature of voluntary associations and institutions--their function, composition, structure, and societal impact--determines the quality of the civil society. It further suggests mechanisms for change, on several levels, which could serve as the first steps toward improving the relevance, autonomy, and impact of third sector organizations in Kiev.

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Preface

The late imperial period saw the development of a significant and substantial, although somewhat small, civil society in Kiev. After 100 years, the fall of communism gave way to increasing growth of the public sphere again. Now, however, critics are calling Ukraine's recent civil society development a façade, complete with Potemkin institutions.¹ What conditions have changed and new challenges arisen in the last century that have affected the function, composition, and capacity of voluntary associations and organizations? Can history shed some light on Ukraine's current "third sector crisis"?

In Ukraine, a country with a population close to 50,000,000, 78% ethnic Ukrainian and 17% Russian,² Kiev, a city with a population of 2.8 million, remains not only the nation's capital, but the heart of Ukrainian culture and national identity. Kiev's civil society has faced periods of growth and repression, credit for its successes, and criticism for its failures. In 2000, the city's rate of NGOs per 10,000 inhabitants the most in Ukraine (1.25-2.46), second only to Lviv (2.46).³ The question remains, however, is this civil society growing in size and scope, increasing its capacity, and impacting society? To understand the nature of today's third sector in Kiev, it is critical to study its history, to study its present condition, and to draw conclusions from its place in Ukrainian society and not only from its place in regional trends.

Throughout the development of civil society in both late imperial and post-communist Kiev, the historically diverse, multi-cultural, and foreign-dominated city has remained a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-confessional state with large Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and Jewish populations. In the 19th century, rapid urbanization and industrialization, coupled with the declining power of Russian rulers, led to a growing public sphere and civil society in urban centers such as Kiev. The increasing voluntary associations largely included recreation, professional, and social organizations, which functioned as public spaces for individuals to unite around civic causes.

The fall of communism again allowed for a growing public sphere and civil society in Kiev. The political climate, however, had changed dramatically throughout the 20th century, as had the international system. As voluntary associations increased in number once again, this time much more national and political in nature, they largely included NGOs, political parties, media

groups, and activist organizations, which functioned as information vehicles and mobilizing networks, unifying around nationalist political goals.

Kiev's late imperial civil society developed internally from largely private funding to address social justice issues, whereas Kiev's post-communist civil society developed with strong elite and external influence, funded by many state actors and international governments, to address political issues and provide financial benefits. The former had substance, but lacked power to influence the state, while the latter had power to change the regime, but lacks substance so much that it has been called a civil society of "Potemkin institutions."⁴ Over the last century, conditions have changed in ways that pose increasing challenges to civil society development in Kiev.

Current political discourse strives to understand civil society in Ukraine in a largely regional and relatively contemporary context. Placing the case of Kiev in a comparative historical context demonstrates how Ukraine's civil society development follows historical patterns and is inextricably linked to political climate, national sentiment, and international influence. Most importantly, it argues that the nature of voluntary associations and institutions--their function, composition, structure, and societal impact--determines the quality of the civil society as a whole.

I. Introduction

Views of Civil Society

To begin with, the very nature of the term civil society requires definition. In Edith Clowes, Samuel Kassow and James West's *Between Tsar and People*, they argue the term implies "a critical mass of educated individuals, voluntary associations, journalistic media, professional societies, universities, and other structures that establish intermediate identities between the family and the state."⁵ Civil society implies a basic attitude about power that implies "agreement on two things: the state should not and cannot do everything, and people are public as well as private creatures."⁶ The idea of a public space or public sphere most clearly surfaced with the rising urbanization and modernization of the 19th century.

In the case of institutionalizing a public sphere in order to develop a civil society, to institutionalize means to establish an organization or society devoted to the promotion of a particular cause or program of a public, educational, or charitable character, OR to maintain a well-established and structured pattern of behavior or relationships that is accepted as a fundamental part of a culture. Further, these institutions must be of a public nature, allowing for the mixing of different people groups, creating cross-cleavages in society based on individuals' voluntary associations in such institutions.

While the former definitions establish the minimal qualifications of a civil society, additional factors are necessary for the ongoing health and growth of a civil society. According to Marc Howard, scholar on Post-Soviet civil society development, civil society organizations must also be legal, influential, and aim to meet a social need. "Civil society refers to the realm of organizations, groups, and associations that are formally established, legally protected, and autonomously run, and voluntarily joined by ordinary citizens...In civil society, individual members can effect or prevent change by acting through their organization" (as opposed to political or economic society, in which elites still hold power)...and ordinary citizens "participate in groups and associations because of their everyday interests, needs, and desires" and..."have neither power nor profit as their objective or rationale."⁷

Many scholars also argue that autonomy from the state is not the only prerequisite of civil society in terms of its relationship to the state, but rather civil society also must keep citizens continually involved and must hold the state accountable. "The contemporary notion of the

public sphere is derived from Jurgen Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, where he describes the sphere as a public place existing between state and society where individuals engage in rational critical debate on political issues, constituting a "public opinion" that exercises influence over the state. The public sphere can provide a form of political participation (and education) necessary to the functioning of democracy even after the social movement has successfully undertaken political action."⁸ Democratization does not culminate in a final, definitive form, but instead is composed of dynamic processes requiring continual participation, contestation, and improvement.⁹ Democratization scholar Leonardo Avritzer emphasizes the importance of "participatory publics," which allow the state to retain its administrative capacities while civil society possesses the continuous institutionalized ability to ensure accountability from state bodies.¹⁰ This argument of continuous citizen membership and institutionalized means of holding government accountable is one often used to criticize claims that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 gave evidence of a growing civil society. The Orange Revolution cannot be described as a function of a strong civil society sector because of the *spontaneous* nature of the mobilization as opposed to being based on "developed modern traditions, practices, and especially institutionalized mechanisms that enable systematic (not spontaneous) citizens' political and social engagement."¹¹

Historical Background of Ukrainian Independence

Although the comparative time periods analyzed below are limited to the late imperial years and the post-communist period, a brief overview of Ukrainian history is critical to understand the cultural context, political traditions, and national sentiments that have driven public participation for decades. An independent Ukrainian state has only existed in its exact current borders since 1991, but similar versions existed from 1648-1785 and 1917-20. "The westernmost Ruthenian¹ territories passed to the Habsburg Empire in the 1770s, however, in addition to the region of Transcarpathia, which had long been under the Hungarian crown. Relatively tolerant Austrian rule, and the intensity of the local competition with the Poles, allowed the west Ruthenians to develop a strong sense of distinct identity by 1914, and during the course of the 19th century, to settle on the name 'Ukrainian.'^{12,"}

¹ "Westernmost Ruthenian territories" refers to the geographic areas inhabited by Ukrainians or speakers of the Ukrainian language who lived outside the Russian Empire.

A Ukrainian national movement developed in 1917, but it was quickly repressed by a brutal Soviet “clampdown from 1929-30, a halt to further Ukrainianization in 1933, and, worst of all, the Great Famine of 1932-3.¹³” There was no repeat of the 1917-18 national movement in 1941, when the Germans invaded the USSR. Under Soviet rule, “Ukraine became less multicultural, with the previously large Polish, German and Jewish minorities succumbing to forced migration and the Holocaust. Conversely, the number of Russians in Ukraine increased, reaching 21% of the population by 1989.¹⁴”

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the former Habsburg territories in the west and the Ukrainian intelligentsia backed *Rukh*, the political party and official anti-communist opposition movement to Moscow’s remote and often ineffective control. In March 1990 *Rukh* won 108 of 450 seats. “The former Habsburg west saw itself as trapped in a mire of post-Soviet corruption and unnaturally cut off from its central European past.¹⁵”

In 1991 a national question on support for Ukrainian sovereignty within a looser ‘Union of Sovereign States,’ was backed by 80.2% across Ukraine. The Rada’s vote for independence was confirmed by popular referendum on December 1, 1991, with 90.3% in favor.¹⁶ Ukraine has since consolidated its independence and remains an independent state today.

Criteria for Comparison

This paper will study the nature of voluntary associations and institutions in Kiev by analyzing the following factors (1) the political and economic environment in which they operate, (2) the functions they serve and values they promote, (3) the composition of leadership and participant membership, (4) the organizational structure, funding and operational capacity, (5) the societal impact, (6) national sentiment, and (7) international influence. While comparing the civil society of historical Kiev with that of contemporary Kiev, it is critical to analyze the facts based on specific criteria for comparison. The criteria that will be used to determine the quality of civil society are the following:

Institutionalization

Organizations or societies must be established to promote a particular cause or program of a public, educational, or charitable character, OR to maintain a well-established and structured pattern of behavior or relationships that is accepted as a fundamental part of a culture.

Duration of relevance

Institutions must maintain long-term sustainability by addressing long-term goals and requiring continual participation, contestation, and improvement.

Degree of impact on society

Institutions must provide a service or serve a function that actively and effectively influences society and reaches broad masses of the general public.

Funding sources

Institutions must receive private funding from individual donors or fees for services, decreasing reliance on the state, individual state actors, and foreign grants, governments, or donors.

Breadth of participation and composition of participants

Institutions must be of a public nature, allowing for the mixing of different people groups, creating cross-cleavages in society based on individuals' voluntary associations in such institutions.

Influence on government policy

Civil society possesses the institutionalized ability to ensure accountability from state bodies and influence policy.

Independence from state interference

Institutions must remain autonomous from the government, independent of government financial support, and free to operate without state repression or excessive regulation.

II. Late Imperial Civil Society Development

The development of Kiev's civil society, as defined by the institutionalization of voluntary associations, differed from other Ukrainian cities at the same time, in that it was spurred by cultural factors and did, in fact, have a robust civil society before political organizations formed. It was only later that the cultural institutions were joined by, and in some cases hijacked by, political activists to take on political issues. To clarify, while these institutions may have emerged politically, that is to say emerged with intent of unifying to gain power and assert the Ukrainian identity, they did not initially form around political issues, that is to say issues relating to universal theories of state governance. This unique development was confronted by emerging civil societies in Poland and Russia proper, both of which strengthened the initial direction of Ukrainian civil society and influenced its later political turn. It is these relationships which can explain why civil society developments in Ukraine were initially hostile to political ideologies like socialism and Marxism, but accepted them as the 1905 revolution approached.

Environment

The importance of the urban space in the emergence of civil society makes Kiev a logical city to explore in Ukraine under Russian rule. The Ukrainian people, however, were largely peasants who resided outside the city. Therefore, while urbanization influenced the genesis of a public sphere in Kiev, the peasantry also shaped the nature of the Ukrainian institutions. The first urban elements that increased public interaction included modernization and industrialization. Unlike many other cities, Kiev actually did not experience as much industrialization, but a booming sugar business did bring many people to the cities and created new networks of communication. Further, Kiev's location as a city located within spheres of both Polish and Russian influence led to decades of policies of Russification and Polonization, which influenced not only ideas in the public sphere, but also the creation of Ukrainian institutions in response. Finally, as a city within the Russian Empire, Kiev felt both the crackdowns of the tsar as well as the weakening of the Russian government as time went on. Ultimately, crackdowns led to increased desire for Ukrainian identity and the weakening tsarist regime led to increased local rule, both influencing civil society development.

The economic environment in 19th century Kiev was one of industry growth and urbanization. From 1865 to 1875 the railway network in Ukraine grew more than threefold, and cities began to grow. In 1860 the population of Kiev was 55,000, and by 1874 it reached 127,000. According to the census, Ukraine-born respondents made up almost 74% of Kiev, and those born in Great Russia made up 21.5%.¹⁷

Needless to say the political environment in 19th century Kiev was one of authoritarian rule of the Russian tsar and limited freedoms, but also of inconsistent policy and, at times, weak enforcement. Russia had a low level of state funding and its “weak administrative system predetermined the inconsistency of Russian policies, which changed significantly not only with the change of the autocrats, but of the governors-general as well.”¹⁸

The greatest repression was censorship of Ukrainian literature. According to Balmuth, “in 1896 the Kiev Censorship Committee banned 42% of Ukrainian writings. If his estimates are correct, then the end of the 1870s was not the most repressive period in censorship policy with respect to Ukrainian publications.”¹⁹

It is worth noting, however, that despite the harsh repressions of the Russian Empire, local leadership did not always maintain such a hard line. Kiev’s governor-general often defended Ukrainophiles, sending a letter in 1874 to the minister of the interior saying that the KGS had Ukrainophile sympathers, but was not necessarily a center of Ukrainophilism. Also, upon popular Ukrainophiles Mykhailo Drahomanov and Chubynskyi’s exiles, he issued Drahomanov a foreign passport and requested Chubynskyi be allowed to stay for six months for business reasons. Further, in 1877, the Kiev civil governor asked if it was necessary to withdraw from bookstores unsold Ukrainian books, and he passed a resolution, “not to respond.”²⁰

19th Century Voluntary Associations and their Functions

The Russian Empire’s small but growing civil society, most visible in large cities like Kiev, was one area where people of different nationalities could come together to improve society.

Recreational

Early 19th century Kiev was just beginning to develop a public sphere, so its institutions were largely recreational, social, and religious at first. It could be said that early institutions of 19th century civil society in Kiev included balls and masquerades. These events were in fact institutionalized in the sense that they were held regularly at the same time each year, the same

people usually attended, and it represented a mixing of nationalities and classes. Late January was the high season for these social extravaganzas, and Kiev's main annual ball was held every January 6. Further, *soslovie* (estate) organizations held an important place in Kiev's social life. The Nobleman's Club and Merchants' Club sponsored many of the balls and masquerades, which "often served as fundraisers for collective needs and for charity."²¹

Professional

Economically, Kiev's Contract Fair served as the most notable public institution for traders and merchants to sell their merchandise. It took place annually in January, and its heyday lasted between about 1843 and 1849. Traders came from all over the empire, but Russian merchants dominated the fair, while "Ukrainian merchants and traders were noticeably absent."²²

Religious

The institution of religion played an ever important role in Kiev's civil society as well, carrying on well-established annual festivals and bringing together the diverse peoples of Kiev. It is important to note, however, that in Imperial Russia the Orthodox Church was subordinated to the state and served to uphold the tsarist political and social order. Peter the Great's reforms eliminated any independence the Church may have had and incorporated it into the state bureaucracy in 1721, abolishing the patriarchate and replacing it with a collective body, the Holy Synod, led by a lay government official. (The Holy Synod was not abolished until the tsarist government fell, following the February Revolution of 1917.)

Despite state authority, however, many local religious feasts and festivals served as important institutions for the people of Kiev, and promoted Ukrainian tradition more than the Orthodox religion. For example, the Feast of Epiphany, held on August 1, took place a week or two before the Contract Fair. "Clergy came from every church, and the guildsmen came, and eight squadrons of city militia stood around the hole in the ice.' The metropolitan blessed the water and sprinkled it in all directions, 'because Kiev is the capital for all the Slavs.'"²³ The Epiphany festival was also part of a wider Ukrainian tradition called the "Jordan-Blessing of the Waters," during which crowds would gather at the local river in which a cross had been carved, and a priest would bless the cross and the waters. This celebrated Christ's baptism and was a means of seeking protection from spring floods. The other major festival was held for Maccabeus Day on August 1 to consecrate the Dnipro River. For Maccabeus day, men dressed in

Cossack attire, and Guildsmen held a Cossack-style procession on horseback. After a church service at the Florivsky Monastery, clergy blessed the waters in the Samson Fountain.

Cultural

Secular festivals abounded as well, including Annunciation Day on March 25. This traditional Ukrainian folk festival celebrated the arrival of spring. Others included Bryksy and the Festival of the Candles.

Moreover, the Cave Monastery, Bratsky Monastery and Kiev Academy, as well as the first two gymnasia to open in the early 19th century provided opportunities for choirs and musical ensembles. “Chamber quartets and ensembles were popular, as were touring serf orchestras, which sometimes featured performers who composed their own music.”²⁴ In 1867 a Russian opera troupe was founded in Kiev; many of its musicians had formerly performed in serf orchestras. Some of the most popular operas featured local life and customs from the time of Kievan Rus.

Further, theaters provided an institution in the public sphere through which cultural traditions were preserved. Popular puppet performances were held in *Vertep* theaters, housed inside the amusement carousels that were common in the market squares.²⁵ In general, theater remained popular in Kiev, called “a theater city.” Kiev historian Michael Hamm argues, “It is difficult to gauge the extent to which theater bridged class distinctions in the city.”²⁶ He does, however, point to theaters that were in fact accessible to workers and lower classes. “Railway workers ran a theater in a warehouse at the main railway terminal; arsenal workers had a theater and a small orchestra; and a drama company of fourteen operated at a furniture plant.”²⁷ In the early 19th century Ukrainian folk dramas were popular. After the Kiev theater was subsidized by the government mid-century, however, Polish and Russian plays predominated.²⁸

Of course, the taverns also provided public institutions. In the 18th century Kiev had a tavern on every block. By 1874, the city had about 800 taverns, one for every 112 adults over 20.²⁹ Further, brawls, became institutions of organized sport, which despite efforts to ban them in 1823 and 1832, still attracted thousands in the mid-19th century.³⁰ Fights attracted men from all classes, and often teams represented neighborhoods, villages, occupations, student groups, or other collective identities, which went at each other.

Social

Institutions for women began to increase as well. Kiev's Society to Assist the Poor established a school for indigent girls in 1834, and the Institute for Noble Girls was founded in 1838. With the spread of prostitution in Kiev, new groups sprung up to deal with the increasing number of related problems. In 1856 a committee was established to curb the spread of syphilis in Kiev.³¹

Gambling and lotteries also provided public institutions where individuals could voluntarily mix with peoples of other backgrounds. Gambling was popular among high and low classes, and lotteries were often held by clubs as public fundraising events. "They drew huge crowds and helped finance charities such as day-care centers for the poor, which neither Kiev's city council nor the provincial zemstvo had been willing to fund."³²

Educational

In the latter half of the century, however, Kiev's public sphere had developed quite robustly and a true civil society was beginning to take shape, with a boom of institutions addressing social services and education. By mid-century, reformist committees of public care were running tearooms around the taverns and bazaars where, "the newcomer could learn where to get medical care or how to get his child into school... Tearooms often had reading areas. Educated people sometimes came and shared ideas, offering impressionable children contact with positive role models."³³ By 1905 these committees served over 2,000 students in 26 free evening classes and running 10 tearooms, seven with reading rooms, three shelters for drunks, and a small facility for alcoholics. They also had a choir, dances, plays, and other social events.³⁴ Likewise, in 1904, the Society for the Defense of Women worked to establish inexpensive cafeterias, job-training workshops, day-care centers, and shelter for women.

The education movement has been called "'the central locus of philanthropic efforts."³⁵ Professional and social associations included several workers' clubs, the (bourgeois) Kiev Social Assembly, the Society for Literature and the Press, the Religio-Philosophical Society, the Jewish Literacy Society, the Society of the Lovers of the Hebrew Language, and the Society for the Protection of Women.³⁶

Kiev's Literacy Society, founded in 1882, sponsored 700 lectures in its first 20 years. By 1902, it had founded the Troitsky People's Club, "which had a 1000-seat auditorium, a center for the free distribution of books to the various literacy programs, a children's museum, an

inexpensive tearoom for workers, meeting halls, reading rooms, and a legal aid office. During its first year of operation, its library and reading rooms had 80,000 visitors.”³⁷

By 1905, Kiev had about 80 small bookshops, two of them Ukrainian, and the boulevard or “kopeck” press offered popular tabloids to the public.³⁸

Intellectual Institutions

The increase in educational institutions played a particularly important role in generating ideas and providing a public space for a developing political discourse in Kiev. A closer look at specifically intellectual institutions reveals more about the values and motivations driving political mobilization.

Masonic Lodges

To be fair, the Freemasons had begun forming secret lodges in Ukraine since the 18th century. In 1818 the “United Slavs” lodge was formed in Kiev. The lodge “had links with the Decembrists and, despite a strong mystical element, favored passive opposition to the regime.”³⁹ After several arrests, however, Russia banned the lodges in 1822.

1830s: Kievan University

While the Kievan University opened in 1834, in its first 30 years it gave only 42 doctoral degrees and 44 master’s degrees, and Poles predominated until the 1863 revolution.⁴⁰ By the 1840s, however, the university was home to the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius and producing leading Ukrainian intellectuals. By 1895, the university had 2,300 students and by 1915, over 5,300 students.⁴¹

1840s: Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius

The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius at the Kievan University was founded by Ukrainian intellectuals like Kulish and Kostmorov. Other noted Ukrainophiles, like Taras Shevchenko, attended several meetings. “With about ninety members or sympathizers, it became a significant outlet for Ukrainian intellectuals to express their views on questions of social justice.”⁴² Kulish, one of the leaders of the Kiev circle, described the group as a sort of “early Christian commune,” saying, “The Kievan youth we are talking about was deeply enlightened by holy scriptures; it was youth of great spiritual purity and was enthusiastic about spreading the gospel of neighborly love... From this blessed inclination sprang their idea of preaching the liberation of the peasants from serfdom.”⁴³ Historian Orest Subtelny calls it “the first Ukrainian

ideological organization in modern times.”⁴⁴ According to Kiev historian Michael Hamm, “Ukrainian intellectuals tended to call for the abolition of serfdom and social rank. They envisioned a Ukraine capable of uniting Slavs into a grand, democratic federation whose capital was to be at Kiev.”⁴⁵ If their rhetoric was political, however, it was not revolutionary. Kostmorov, another member, said, “They should all unite under one orthodox tsar, within one orthodox faith.”⁴⁶ Authorities discovered the group in 1847, members were arrested, and Shevchenko was sentenced to ten years in a Siberian labor battalion. Subtelny argues, “It signaled the onset of an anti-Ukrainian policy and marked the beginning of a long, unceasing struggle between the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the imperial Russian authorities.”⁴⁷

1850s: Hromady, Khlopomany, Osnova

Hromady (societies) were begun throughout Ukraine by former members of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius and others. According to Hamm, the groups aimed to “improve the lot of the peasantry... and focused on cultural and educational objectives.”⁴⁸ In 1861 they also published *Osnova*, the first Ukrainian periodical in the Russian Empire.⁴⁹ “In 1861 and 1862 all periodicals, irrespective of their ideological orientation, stood for freedom of speech.”⁵⁰ Kiev’s *hromada*, founded in 1859, “was not only the chief cultural, and to some extent political, society of Ukrainian intelligentsia in Kiev, but also, through its contacts with similar societies in other cities, the most important catalyst of the Ukrainian national revival of the second half of the nineteenth century.”⁵¹

Within the *hromady* were activists known as the *khlopomany* (“peasant lovers”), concerned with emancipation of Ukrainian serfs. *Khlopomany* lived among the Ukrainian peasants, adopting their speech, dress, and customs. Leader of the *khlopomany*, Volodymyr Antonovych, “opposed the exploitation of Ukrainian serfs by Polish landlords and Polish territorial claims on the Ukraine.”⁵² He also worked to get courses taught in Ukrainian at the Kievan University.

The *hromady* had their critics who condemned both their nationalism and liberal ideas. The *hromady*, however, were primarily blamed by Dolgorukov [Kiev’s governor-general] for “the initiative to promulgate liberal ideas through the printing of Little Russian books for the *narod*.”⁵³ In other words, he was more concerned with the social than the nationalistic aspect of *Hromada*’s ideology. The liberal ideas, however, did not often translate into political activism. In the 1870s “the leaders of the Kiev *Hromada* attached paramount importance to the legal aspect

of their activity. They were ready to restrict themselves for a long time to positivist activity (cultural, scientific, economic, etc.).”⁵⁴

Overall, the *hromady* were focused on Ukrainian culture. Despite Polish efforts to involve these activists in the Polish insurrection, “the refusal of the great majority of Ukrainian peasants to aid the Polish insurgents contributed greatly to this insurrections failure.”⁵⁵ Actually, over 400,000 Ukrainians in Kiev took part in patrols against the Poles.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Polish nationalism created fear in Russia of Ukrainophilia as well, and in 1863 publication of all materials in Ukrainian were banned and the *hromada* movement was disbanded until the 1870s.

1860s – 70s: Publication

According to Hamm, “by the mid-1850s, Kiev had come to rival Moscow and St. Petersburg as a center of publication.”⁵⁷ After the publication ban of 1863, however, publication dwindled so much so that by 1871 there were no Ukrainian-language periodicals and as a center of publication, Kiev published only 13 periodicals at all (behind St. Petersburg’s 131 and Moscow’s 39).⁵⁸ By the mid-1870s, however, Kiev was again a center of publishing. “An estimated one-quarter of the product of Kiev’s ten print shops was published in Ukrainian at this time.”⁵⁹ The renewed success was short lived. In 1876 Tsar Alexander II issued the *Ems Manifesto*, which prohibited the printing in Ukrainian, importing Ukrainian-language books, using the language in any public performance, using the language in schools, and holding Ukrainian-language materials in school libraries.

Further, the Kiev branch of the Russian Imperial Geographic Society (KGS) was active in the 1870s in research and publishing. Many of the institution’s members were Ukrainophiles, but in order to avoid repression, the group tried to appear apolitical in its work. The KGS responded to criticism that it rejected candidates proposed by opponents of Ukrainophilism by stating, “that it did not discuss political subjects, it was not responsible for its members’ activities outside the KGS, and that 114 out of 118 admission applications had been satisfied.”⁶⁰

1880s: Radical Political Beginnings

The 1880s saw the beginning of radical movements in Kiev like “Land and Freedom.” Further, Kiev’s Little Russian movement was working to “convince the state to adopt a harder line against Poles and Jews.”⁶¹ New labor movements began to take shape as well, attacking low wages and poor working conditions. Workers began to strike for the first time, and the South

Russian Workers Union was established in 1880. The union was destroyed in 1881, however, and the labor movement died down for the next several years.⁶²

1890s: Brotherhood of Taras

The Brotherhood of Taras, centered at the Kievan University, was a small organization for the purpose of rejuvenating the Ukrainian movement. “Absorbed into the so-called General Ukrainian Organization by 1897, these activists carried out “a more militant form of cultural work within the Ukrainian movement.”⁶³ Boshyk calls them the “first organized expression of modern Ukrainian nationalism” in the Russian Empire.⁶⁴ In 1891 the Brotherhood of Taras formed in Kharkiv. “The student organizers were not satisfied with the apolitical *Hromada* Ukrainophiles.” However, they also did not support joining Russian revolutionary parties, which they felt would cause Ukrainians to be assimilated by the Russians. The group published a statement in Lviv’s *Pravda* newspaper in 1893, which “harshly criticized the culturally oriented Ukrainophiles.”⁶⁵

1900 - : Political Parties

Political parties were no stranger to western Ukraine under Habsburg rule, but only took root in Kiev around the turn of the century. “Ukrainian political parties were emerging in Galicia in the last decade of the 19th century and made their appearance in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th.”⁶⁶ The RUP party (*Revolutsiyna Ukrainska Partiya*), founded in 1900, “took on a definite socialist coloration. . . Mykola Mikhnovskyi and a small number of his sympathizers were disappointed with the RUP’s socialist orientation. They soon formed the *Ukrainskia Narodnia Partiiia* (Ukrainian People’s Party – UPP).” RUP transformed itself into the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1905, and the UPP became the Ukrainian Party of Independent-Socialists in 1917.⁶⁷

Political Activism

The transition from the genesis of a largely apolitical civil society, to the establishment of intellectual institutions, to the creation of political parties, evidenced not only societal and institutional development, but also a shift in the causes around which individuals were rallying and institutions were forming. A chronological look at institutions within a historical political context illuminates a few reasons for the shift from cultural emphasis to political activism and the split between liberal federalists and socialist Marxists.

To begin with, politicization in Kiev began as a result of the education and creation of a university and an intelligentsia. “The vast Ukrainian peasant masses were for the most part uneducated, having only a vague sense of national awareness. Thus, the organization of a ‘political’ Ukrainian movement fell on the shoulders of small clandestine groups of students and intellectuals.”⁶⁸ “The political motifs that later emerged among young Ukrainians, in the 1840s, were associated more closely with Kiev and its new Kievan University. In poems written in the mid-1840s, Taras Shevchenko was the first to formulate, with enormous emotional power, the millenarian idea of Ukraine’s revival and its special destiny.”⁶⁹

Founded in the 1830s, the Kievan University was long established before providing the students, intellectuals, and meeting space for the Brotherhood. “The [Cyril and Methodius] Society was Ukrainophilia’s first attempt to make the transition from phase A (the scholarly interest of a group of national activists in distinctive Ukrainian features) to phase B (the articulation of political tasks, the creation of organizational structures, and the widescale promotion of those ideas).”⁷⁰

Initially, however, the political activism was limited to a few individuals and remained weak in Kiev. “Hrushevsky remarks, ‘The very fact that the center of the Ukrainian movement in the 1850s and the early 1860s could be St. Petersburg, the seat of government, located some 1,500 versts from Ukrainian territory, demonstrates how weak that movement still was, and how closely tied to the activity of a few individuals.’”⁷¹

Modest and Democratic Beginnings

The Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1830s and 1840s was “distinguished by its tendency towards democratic reforms and general political and social emancipation.”⁷² Ukrainian historian Kostomarov wrote in 1860 that Ukrainians wished for the completion of abolishing serfdom, all political and social rights for peasants, and removing all obstacles in the way of the development of the Ukrainian language and its use in schools. “More than that,” wrote Kostomarov, “we do not expect for ourselves, beyond the wishes that we have in common with the whole of Russia.”⁷³

Drahomanov, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement, had political views tending towards, “a wide decentralization of the Russian Empire on the basis of national autonomies, a liberal constitution and a parliamentary system.”⁷⁴ “Drahomanov was a warm admirer of the British political system, and always said that English democracy, the oldest and

the strongest in Europe, should serve as an example...He said the British nation stands out by its love of freedom, its respect of human dignity and its readiness to defend right and law.”⁷⁵ “In Russian-ruled Ukraine, the great majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia could not see beyond federalism, until war and revolution opened their eyes.”⁷⁶

New Marxist Separatists (Split)

By the 1890s a split among Ukrainian intellectuals was complete, largely defined by a break between the older generation focused on cultural national identity and the new generation of radicals influenced by socialist and Marxist ideas coming from Poland, Western (Austrian) Ukraine, and Russia. The young radicals also were the first to advocate an independent Ukrainian state. “In the early 1890s, young radicalism was united.” Their leaders advocated Marxism and the creation of an independent Ukraine.⁷⁷ “Even in the best accounts, the genesis of the concept of independent Ukrainian statehood is traced back only as far as Bachynskyi’s pamphlet of 1895, *Ukraina irredenta*, and Mikhnovskyi’s *Samostiina Ukrainna* of 1900.”⁷⁸ In 1900 *Samostiina Ukraina* (Independent Ukraine) was published in Lviv and widely distributed in Galicia. In Galicia in 1895, Iuliian Bachynskyi, of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party, produced *Ukrainia irredenta*, “which called for the creation of an independent Ukrainian nation-state based on Marxist principles. This tract was in part influenced by the Young Czech movement and the Degen Affair.”⁷⁹

It was this radical movement in Galicia in the 1880s and 1890s that encouraged the new generation in Ukraine, while “the older generation of the Ukrainian patriots reproached Drahomanov for his neglect of the nationalistic side of the Ukrainian movement and accused him of attaching too much importance to mutual relations with Russians when Drahomanov insisted a more intimate contact with Russian Liberals. But the young generation from the beginning of the 90s followed Drahomanov, and his influence became decisive in both parts of Ukraine, Austrian and Russian...In 1894 the whole Liberal Ukrainian ‘intelligentsia,’ both in Austria and Russia, unanimously acknowledged him as their leader.”⁸⁰

“It was Drahomanov who had ‘raised the Ukrainian national movement from a purely literary and ethnographical basis to the level of political and social questions, and connected it with the problems of national economy and international justice.’”⁸¹ “Drahomanov was of particular significance in that he was the first Ukrainophile to analyze critically, especially in works written while living abroad, Ukrainophilia’s populist—sometimes even

antimodernizing—orientation. Drahomanov's was a modernizing, Westernizing type of socialism.”⁸²

“Ukrainian radical socialists under the leadership of Mykhailo Drahomanov, including Mykola Ziber and Serhyi Podolynskyi, saw an international socialist movement as the solution to the Ukrainian question.”⁸³ Drahomanov “was the first spokesman of the Ukrainian movement to think politically.” And yet, young radicalism was in essence a revolt against him and his ideas, which objected to Ukrainian statehood because he considered it unrealistic.⁸⁴

“The young Ukrainian radicals themselves had recently participated in the Marxist-oriented Polish socialist movement in Lviv and shared the Polish social democrats' criticism of the radical party program... Unable to force these changes on the party leadership, malcontent young radicals left the party in 1899 and formed the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Social Democratic Party.” (The nationalists among the young radicals founded the Ukrainian National Democratic Party.)⁸⁵

Meanwhile, the older generation maintained a following that continued to focus on Ukrainian culture and liberal federalist aims more progressive in nature. “Antonovych was critical of the social democrats for their disregard of the ‘peasant working class’ and national movements.”⁸⁶

Composition and Leadership

19th century voluntary associations, especially Ukrainophile organizations, were largely composed of commoners rather than elite nobility. Historian of Ukraine Alexei Miller demonstrates that “even in the 1860s the government would find suitable mediators among rich Little Russian nobles to contact Ukrainophiles,”⁸⁷ making clear that Ukrainophiles generally were not in the elite nobility, but belonged to the mass of commoners.

An example of the typical member of a civil society organization was the *khlopomany*. *Khlopomany* were young people from Polish or Polonized families who preferred Ukrainian peasant life. Authorities became interested in Kiev's *khlopomany*, “who foment peasants against their lords [most often Poles] and against government edicts in order to restore Little Russia's independence. Making no secret of their belonging to the society, they wear national costumes in public and travel around villages.”⁸⁸ Members were called the *khlopomany* by Poles, whose hatred of the *khlopomany* “is the best proof of the *khlopomany*'s harmlessness.”⁸⁹

The *khlopomany* not only had their own society, but were active in other civil society organizations as well, especially contributing to journals. *Osnova* had over 50 members, which included many *khlopomany* like Antonovych and Ryl'skyi, and contributors included Kostmarov, Kulish, and Shevchenko. *Osnova* focused on defining the Ukrainian identity and the independence of the Ukrainian language,⁹⁰ so it can be inferred that these issues were important to those Ukrainians assuming membership in *Osnova* and other similar voluntary associations.

Leaders of the Kiev *hromada* included Volodymyr Antonovych, Pavlo Chubynskyi, and Mykhailo Drahomanov. Antonovych was a professor at Kiev University, Drahomanov an assistant professor at Kiev University, and Chubynskyi a full member of the Russian Imperial Geographic Society (RGS) and executive secretary of the KGS, who also made a large income as manager of a sugar refinery.⁹¹ Chubynskyi also wrote the Ukrainian national anthem.

Leaders of late imperial civil society organizations were most often individuals interested in social causes or national issues. "There were numerous and selfless Ukrainophile activists available."⁹² The leadership of institutions was often strongly Ukrainophile. For example, the Kiev Literacy Society's leadership had close ties to the *hromady* and the *Prosvita* Ukrainian enlightenment movement.⁹³

Organizational Structure and Funding

The structure of Kiev's 19th century civil society institutions did include a mix of participants from various social, economic, and religious backgrounds, achieving one of the fundamental requirements of a healthy civil society. The Kiev Literacy Society established in 1882, for example, had Christian parish-based village libraries, but soon opened its doors to Jews as well. Institutions were visited by extraordinarily large numbers of people. The Kiev Literacy Society opened a library and reading hall in 1897 and by 1902 had 54,000 visitors. A new building was funded wholly by the Jewish sugar baron Lazar Brodsky (14,000 rubles), and his daughter Baroness Klara Gintsburg donated significant sums each year for book acquisition. The society published Ukrainian works and presented Ukrainian dramas at its "people's theater." "The society's institutions served as 'neutral territory' where Kievans of all faiths and nationalities could and did mingle in the pursuit of knowledge and leisure."⁹⁴

Many civil society organizations were funded by wealthy individuals in the community. "Kiev's Jewish millionaires were recruited for the boards of all the city's major institutions,"⁹⁵

and “some of the most generous donors to the Literacy Society were Jewish (in 1901 at least one-fifth of the largest contributions originated from Jewish homes).⁹⁶ “One of the few Christian families to support Jewish charitable causes in Kiev was the Ukrainian Tereshchenko family.⁹⁷ Wealthy sugar magnates came together to support professional organizations, like the Kiev Exchange Committee.⁹⁸ M. N. Katkov, a critic of Ukrainophiles, said of the Little Russian literacy dissemination and Little Russian schools that “one famous professor has solely opened a nation-wide fundraising subscription for publishing Little Russian books,”⁹⁹ acknowledging the private funding of many civil society institutions, particularly in the publishing realm. Another example of this occurred when, after *Osnova* failed to sell out and suffered from a serious shortage of finances and subscribers, it “managed to survive for almost two years thanks to the money (20,000 rubles) granted it by Katenin, a relative of Belozerskii.”¹⁰⁰ Further, wealthier organizations, such as the Kiev Social Assembly, assisted other organizations. The Kiev Social Assembly provided space for the other groups to meet and purchased the Kiev community Library after authorities closed it in 1910.¹⁰¹

Some institutions, such as many newspapers and journals, were funded by subscribers. In 1874 Drahomanov started editing a new newspaper, *Kievskii telegraf*, which competed directly with *Kievlianin*, a center for opponents of Ukrainophilism. The two competed not only in ideas, but economically, competing for subscribers and financial sustenance.¹⁰²

The church funded several organizations as well. The Student Aid Society was established by the Blagoveshchenskii parish in 1908 to fund education. Jewish groups funded their own faith-based institutions too. In the early 20th century, Kiev’s Jewish Hospital was one of the city’s largest and most distinguished charitable societies, as was the Society of Day Shelters for Working-Class Children.¹⁰³

Other funding came from Kiev University, as many organization leaders were professors. In the 1870s Drahomanov began to write numerous articles once again “while traveling through Europe on a research trip financed by Kiev University.”¹⁰⁴ Further, governments did provide funding for various individuals, research, or projects. Drahomanov also at times received money both from Russia and from Austria.¹⁰⁵

International Influence: Reactions to Russian Repression

Ukrainians international relations were largely limited to relationships with neighboring Poland and Russia. Arguably, the influence of Russian repression proved most influential on the development, or lack thereof, of Kiev's civil society. A chronological look at intellectual and political institutions shows a clear pattern of repression by tsarist Russia in Kiev followed by an increase in Ukrainian nationalist activity and increasing cooperation with revolutionary elements outside Kiev. Not all Ukrainians agreed with this direction, however, and ultimately as the repressions and reactionary activism progressed, a split between Ukrainian intellectuals occurred. One wing continued to emphasize cultural national identity and liberal democratic views, while the other began to pursue strictly political aims of a socialist and Marxist nature.

Post-1840

To begin with, following the founding of the Brotherhood in 1847, "a crackdown on Ukrainianism commenced and continued for the remainder of the century."¹⁰⁶ "Persecution [in the 1840s] forced the Ukrainian patriots to look to the Russian liberal and revolutionary movements for help. At the time of the general political revival following the Crimean defeat, the Ukrainians worked hand in hand with representatives of liberal Russia."¹⁰⁷

Post-1863

Repression by the Russian authorities increased after the Polish Revolution of 1863, making Ukrainians feel as if their only hope may have been to ally with other Russians to fight for freedoms for the entire empire. "The result of these [post-1863] repressions was only that the more active elements among the Ukrainians joined the ranks of Russian revolutionary parties, in the hope that general political freedom in Russia would also bring national freedom to Ukraine."¹⁰⁸

Post 1870s

Again, as a result of the success of the South-western Section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society in Kiev in the early 1870s, "there was a new wave of repressions: the Kiev Section was dissolved, liberal papers were suspended, and a special decree (1876) forbade the printing of Ukrainian books, Ukrainian performances in theatres, the singing of Ukrainian songs at concerts and the import of Ukrainian books printed in Galicia," followed by personal persecutions.¹⁰⁹ "In 1876 the Ems Ukase further impeded the opportunity to produce work in Ukrainian studies by banning all works written in the Ukrainian language. Also at this time, a

split occurred within the Ukrainian intellectual community. Political activists soon surfaced, while the *Hromada* continued to produce scholarly works in history and culture—the journal *Kievskaia Starina* (1882-1906) representing these non-political ‘culturists.’”¹¹⁰

Post-1881

The political reaction after the murder of Alexander II led to further harsh repressions against Ukrainian national organizations in Kiev, and a clear split emerged among Ukrainians. “As the political repression of the 1880s settled in, the Ukrainian movement continued to be divided between “culturalists” and the more politicized *Dragomantsy*, inspired by Mykhailo Drahomanov and other activists in Galicia.”¹¹¹ Some, like Kostmarov, continued to work for Ukrainian language and literature, and others, like Dragamov, began taking a more revolutionary socialist approach, although even “Drahomanov did not satisfy the still extant revolutionary elements.”¹¹²

National Sentiment

In the 1860s, Kiev’s political movement was still weak, and its focus took on a more national tone. Kostmarov wrote many articles in *Osnova*, founded in 1861, “in which he underscored how different the Ukrainians were from both the Great Russians and the Poles.”¹¹³ Nationalists were not only focused on who they weren’t (Russians and Poles), but were continuing to define the Ukrainian nation and work on nation-building to extend these ideas to peasants. In early 1860, in *Kolokol*, Kostomarov’s article said, as analyzed by Roman Szporluk, “the making of the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian image of an ideal fatherland was also an ‘unmaking’ that negated both competing (Polish and Russian) versions of the ideal fatherland.”¹¹⁴ “The Ukrainian intelligentsia of the late 1860s and 1870s began the work generally referred to as nation-building. Popular educational societies were founded, as were newspapers for peasants, village reading clubs, voluntary artisan associations, and a host of related institutions.”¹¹⁵ By the 1870s, Ukrainian nationalism was growing in Kiev once again, and new institutions were taking hold. “Ukrainophilia in the Russian Empire—now located mostly in Kiev—acquired a new lease on life in the mid-70s. This time around, its legal organizational center was the Kiev Division of the Russian Geographical Society, and its underground center the Kiev *Hromada*.”¹¹⁶

Impact on Government and Society

The impact of Kiev's 19th century civil society can be judged by the positive reaction and participation of the population. By 1905 tearooms served over 2,000 students in 26 free evening classes and running 10 tearooms, seven with reading rooms, three shelters for drunks, and a small facility for alcoholics. They also had a choir, dances, plays, and other social events.¹¹⁷ Kiev's Literacy Society, founded in 1882, sponsored 700 lectures in its first 20 years. By 1902, it had founded the Troitsky People's Club, which, "during its first year of operation, its library and reading rooms had 80,000 visitors."¹¹⁸ Participants came from all walks of life, with varying ethnicities, religions, and economic backgrounds. In 1874 the population of Kiev was 127,000. Put in context, the level of participation in civil society institutions was incredible, and the organizations' impact on society far-reaching.

The impact of the late imperial civil society can also be judged by the negative reactions it received. The harsh repressions on Kiev's voluntary associations by the tsar and Russian imperial authorities were continual and severe. The very reaction of the Russian imperial government illustrates the impact of Kiev's civil society. In fact, at times the state's reaction actually opened the eyes of the public to the significance and impact of Kiev's institutions. For example, in 1863, when the *Valuev Circular* banned the publication of books for the *narod* in Ukrainian, the conflict was "for the first time comprehended in nationalistic categories not by the narrow circle of members of the Cyril-Methodius Society or high state officials as in 1848, but by broader segments of the educated public."¹¹⁹ Implementation of the *Valuev Circular* de facto ended in the early 1870s,¹²⁰ but its effects, and the effects of the numerous other repressions against institutions in Kiev were visible in the impact of Kiev's civil society.

III. Post-Communist Civil Society Development

As a post-communist state, Ukraine's political, economic, and even social environment poses many challenges to civil society development. In Marc Howard's study, "The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe" in 2003, his data shows that the average number of organizational memberships per person in old democracies is 2.39, in post-authoritarian countries 1.82, and in post-communist states .91.¹²¹ Moreover, Ukraine's numbers remain low even among the post-communist states alone.

Environment

Ukraine's post-communist environment, whether political, economic or social, remains largely reactionary to the traumas caused by communism throughout the 20th century. Fear and distrust have dramatically impacted the development of civil society today. With their public sphere entirely controlled by the Communist Party and its corollary organizational apparatus, including the secret police, trade unions, and many mass membership organizations, most communist citizens developed a cautious relationship to public and formal activities.¹²² Not only are citizens cautious, but the various post-communist governments' own fears have led to several campaigns against NGOs under several different administrations. Taras Kuzio refers to this as a Soviet culture of spy-mania. "Yuriy Smeshko, chairman of the Security Service (SBU), stated that the SDPU-o believes that NGOs and Western assistance are potential avenues for the overt collection of intelligence data (2000, April 30)," and under Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) "the activities of NGOs were being restricted and curtailed in more covert ways."¹²³

Factors of low levels of organizational membership in post-communist Europe, according to Howard, consist of "(1) the prior experiences that people have with organizations, and particularly the legacy of mistrust of all formal organizations caused by forced participation in communist organizations, (2) the persistence of informal private networks, which function as a substitute for, or alternative to, formal and public organizations, and (3) the disappointment with the new democratic and capitalist systems of today, which has led many people to avoid the public sphere."¹²⁴

The CIVICIS 2006 report found that only 8.3% of Ukrainians volunteer for a civil society organization (CSO), and 49.3% of citizens volunteer outside of a CSO. The overall number of NGOs in Ukraine also remains low (about 1 NGO per 1000 people).¹²⁵

In the years leading up to the Orange Revolution the environment illustrated the peak of the post-communist political discontent and economic downfall. Tudoroiu identifies the predominant structural factors, not only in Ukraine, but across most post-communist states, as: (1) a moderately authoritarian regime that tolerated limited political competition and some civil liberties; (2) development of the civil society; (3) a major split within the ruling elite (opposition leaders were the dictator's former prote'ge's); (4) popular discontent due to poverty, rising social inequalities, rampant corruption and mismanagement; and (5) delegitimization of the regime and especially of its leader, mostly due to the previous three factors.¹²⁶

The Ukrainian government, regardless of who is in power, has remained relatively weak and unsupportive of civil society development. According to Howard, "For the countries with the lowest levels of participation—such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine—which generally have weak and unsupportive states and unstable economies, it is unlikely that citizen participation in voluntary organizations will increase significantly."¹²⁷ Nicklaus Laverty, a scholar of civil society in Ukraine, adds that, "In Ukraine there exists a deeper institutional problem where the political system excludes and stifles civil society, maintaining stark structural divisions of Ukrainian political society."¹²⁸

The political environment is one of corruption and hostility to civil society. Periodic state campaigns against NGOs, such as Kuchma's "attack on 'grant eaters' [*hrantoidy*],"¹²⁹ have continued following the Orange Revolution under the new administration. "As those who experienced such harassment describe the situation, organizations that supported the Orange mobilizations were able to operate freely. The resulting perception was one of continued corruption, this time at the hands of Orange politicians."¹³⁰ Harassment of civic associations in the post-Orange period took a number of forms—in Kharkiv, repossession of computers and other equipment obtained from state agencies through a competitive grant process; in demands for recertification and relicensing of long-established organizations' and in unannounced 'checks' (*proverka*) at a shelter for women who suffer from domestic violence (such shelters are, of necessity, at undisclosed locations and do not ordinarily receive visitors).¹³¹

Concerns have increased since Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in 2010. Of particular concern are the intimidation tactics being used on businesses, politicians and political parties, and civil society institutions. “Investors complain of businesses being shaken down by Mr Yanukovich’s men. Alexander Lebedev, a Russian businessman who owns hotels in Kiev and Crimea, says his properties have been raided... Yulia Tymoshenko says some of her party members have been intimidated into giving up their parliamentary seats. Several of her former ministers, including Yuri Lutsenko, are in detention for crimes allegedly committed in office.”¹³² Tymoshenko is unable to leave the country, or even to travel within it, despite investigations turning up few accusations, albeit minor grievances such as buying ill-equipped ambulances.

The political environment is one of state-client relations between the government and civil society organizations. Therefore elections pose challenges for NGOs. Electoral turnover brings both new opportunities for patronage relationships and punishment for NGOs affiliated with the previous regime.¹³³ Further, organizations, whether supportive of the government or not, have very little dialogue with state officials. The respondents of a regional stakeholder survey considered the level of dialogue with government officials to be either limited (58%) or moderate (37%), naming the cases of creating the CSOs public councils in regions. Again this process was not recognized transparent and equal: only pro-governmental CSOs were invited to participate.¹³⁴ Further, in the Ukrainian system, the president has more power than in most parliamentary systems, and the president appoints the heads of local administrations.¹³⁵ Therefore, organizations feel pressure not only to align with the president and his party, but are then also obligated to align with local politicians as well, creating virtually no environment in which organizations can remain autonomous from the state.

The environment in regards to freedom and human rights likewise appears dim. Howard found a direct corollary relationship between political rights and civil liberties and organization membership, in which Ukraine, with a poor Freedom House score of 3.5 (1 best to 7 worst), had an average of .6 organizational memberships per person. (The average was a score of 3.1 with an average of 1.26 memberships per person.)¹³⁶ Further, according to *Nations in Transit 2003* published by Freedom House, over the last years, press freedom in Ukraine was becoming more restricted: in 1997 the score was 4.50, while in 2003 the score was 5.50 (scale from 1 (highest) to 7 lowest).¹³⁷

The legal and tax environment for civil society organizations is difficult. Ukraine's Law on Associations of Citizens (Article 24) requires CSOs to "establish themselves as either an organization based on the Civil Code or the Economic Code [and] can constrain the financial sustainability of the CSOs, depending on the tax status of the organization and its legal interpretation by local authorities."¹³⁸ Government attempts to keep the unclear regulation of NGOs' advocacy work (no clear provisions for advocacy) and the virtual prohibition of their service provision role, which limits civil society's ability to reach out to the population.¹³⁹ Other administrative difficulties faced by the NGOs can be attributed to unfair taxation and non-uniform application of the law which made survivability nearly impossible. A Civicus Index on civil society paper published in 2001 stated that formal CSOs had to attain the approval of and be registered with the government and in the process were frequently pressed to alter their stated purposes -- where they refused to comply they had to undertake protracted court battles which drained them of their already meager resources.¹⁴⁰ "Stringent and seemingly arbitrary regulatory and tax regimes compel many civic associations to keep their operational costs extremely low and avoid major projects... The status of a 'non-profit organization' in Ukraine means the absence of even a minimal item of income, even in the case when the received funds go toward prescribed activity. In this way, NGOs turn out to be radically unviable and weak."¹⁴¹ Organizations are forced to exist in non-registered, semi-legal status or pay heavy taxes which undercut their viability.

Not only have taxes kept an environment of corruption alive and well, but also organizations operate in, and often rely on, an environment of economic incentives. "In contrast to many of today's associations, the thriving informal society of the 1980s received no external funding and stood against, or at least apart from, state ideology. Today's 'fake' institutions, however, bear a formal resemblance to socialist-era official culture, even as the reasons for their existence are in part rooted in post-socialist economic incentives."¹⁴²

The economic environment was dismal after the fall of communism. New Ukrainian authorities continued economic nationalism and central planning, "pushed the country into 'one of the deepest post-Soviet recessions experienced by any of the transition economies not affected by war.'"¹⁴³ Following Kuchma's 1994 reforms inflation decreased and trade liberalization and small-scale privatization improved, but Ukraine's GDP continued to fall until a 6% recovery in 2000.¹⁴⁴ Although the economy improved dramatically with the liberal reforms of 2001, Ukraine

continues to face economic hardship. Howard found a direct corollary relationship between economic well-being and organizational membership, in which Ukraine, with a GDP per capital of 2,500 USD (1997) had an average of .66 organizational memberships per person, falling well below average. (The group mean was GDP of 4,128 per capita with an average of 1.15 memberships per person.)¹⁴⁵ Howard also found corollaries between organizational membership and individual members' income level and educational level.¹⁴⁶ “Amidst a prolonged economic crisis and growing differentiation between wealthy and poorer portions of the population, most people had few incentives to join civic associations.”¹⁴⁷ In 2004, however, GDP grew by 12.1 percent, and the self-confidence of the growing middle class increased.¹⁴⁸ This led to increased public participation, and the Orange Revolution.

Orange Revolution and Political Climate

At their height, the 2004 protests against election fraud mobilized an estimated half million Ukrainians. The Orange Revolution featured 17 days of mass rallies in Kiev and other major cities. Kiev alone housed a tent city of 1,546 tents with more than 15,000 residents.¹⁴⁹ These mass demonstrations, in combination with evidence of large-scale fraud, led the Supreme Court to require a third round of elections, in which former prime minister Viktor Yushchenko defeated Viktor Yanukovich by 52 to 44 percent, and he was inaugurated as independent Ukraine's third president on January 23, 2005.¹⁵⁰

The Ukrainian government was already considered a democracy, albeit not as strong or liberal as some might have liked. “There was political pluralism in the parliament, so the necessary prerequisites for some social change existed,” said Leonard Bernardo, regional director of the Open Society Institute.¹⁵¹ Even in the face of claims of election fraud, some, like scholar Lucan Way, argue that Ukraine under Kuchma was a competitive authoritarianism in which “elections were regularly held and remained competitive, and opposition candidates could and sometimes did win...and there was a limit to the number and percentage of votes that the government could steal outright.”¹⁵²

Further the core issues of liberalization, namely free speech, free market economics, rule of law, and often human rights, were not necessarily the deciding factors of Ukrainian voters. “Economic issues as such did not play a major role in the 2004 elections; if they had,

Yanukovych may have won. Ukraine was different from both Serbia and Georgia in that it had a strong state and a rapidly growing economy, with the highest growth rate in Europe in 2004.”¹⁵³

Scholar of Ukraine Anders Aslund, visiting Kiev at the time of the revolution, said, “No one talked about social or economic issues. This was pure politics.”¹⁵⁴ Although the discourse in Ukraine included ideas of free market economics, human rights, civil society, or free media, it centered mainly on the failure and corruption of Kuchma and the old regime, and the desire for a new clean government led by former prime minister Yushchenko and former deputy prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The revolution, its history, rhetoric, and campaign paraphernalia reflect most prominently a referendum on the old regime and a call for new leadership.

The Orange Revolution saw both the incumbent regime and the opposition movement center around single candidates. The election became one of personalities rather than parties, ideologies, or issues. Major opposition leaders put aside their personal political ambitions to support a single candidate.¹⁵⁵ This proved disadvantageous to the incumbent regime both because it lacked a strong coalition and a popular candidate. Prior to the Orange Revolution, “instead of creating a single pro-presidential party, Kuchma, much like Boris Yeltsin, relied on support from a variety of smaller parties, led by often-competing oligarchs...there was a short-lived attempt before the 2002 parliamentary elections to create a pro-presidential party called ‘For a United Ukraine,’ apparently modeled on Putin’s United Russia and headed by Kuchma’s former chief of staff Volodymyr Lytvyn. But soon after the 2002 election, this group quickly disintegrated into separate factions.”¹⁵⁶ Also problematic, was that the dominant pattern of politics in Ukraine from 1994 to 2004 has been labeled machine politics. For those in power, the goal of machine politics is to gain the legitimacy provided by democratic elections without being subjected to the checks on power that competitive elections can provide. The problem is machine politics do not guarantee fool-proof results. The candidate of the incumbent regime must be able to gain enough votes so that the election can be decisively skewed without resort to outright fraud. The problem for Kuchma’s machine in 2004, in trying to pass the presidency to Viktor Yanukovych, was that it had a very unpopular candidate, while the opposition had a very popular candidate.¹⁵⁷ “Voters looked at the elections as a referendum on the previous decade.”¹⁵⁸ Seventy-seven to 85 percent of Ukrainians wanted change and did not back a continuation of the status quo.¹⁵⁹ Sixteen percent trusted astrologers while only 13 percent trusted the president. “Fifty-five percent said they would never vote for Kuchma, and a higher number said they would

like to see him impeached.”¹⁶⁰ This did not bode well for the regime’s candidate and provides evidence that regime change was a likely primary catalyst of the Orange Revolution.

Kuchma’s corruption had a long track record, and only picked up speed as he felt the pressure of opposition growing in 2000. He had his deputy prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, sacked in January 2001 and imprisoned in February. His prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko, was brought down by a corrupt no-confidence vote in parliament in April 2001.¹⁶¹ This caused voluntary associations to kick things into high gear.

After her expulsion from government, Tymoshenko organized a National Salvation Forum, which was intended to force Kuchma out of office. She was arrested four days later. “Her leadership was then contested by the Ukraine without Kuchma movement (mainly a youth organization), set up earlier in December 2000, and more controversially, by the For Truth group,” led by several leaders of Rukh, the post-Soviet anti-communist political party and opposition movement to Moscow control.¹⁶² These groups’ members also received brutal treatment by the Kuchma administration. Over 150 opposition activists were detained and interrogated leading up to the Oct. 31 election.¹⁶³ It was after Kuchma’s consent to the murder of muckraker Heorhiy Gongadze, that Kuchma’s popularity plummeted to single digits, beginning a string of opposition movements.¹⁶⁴ Over 1,000 hours of Kuchma’s private conversations regarding Gongadze led to the formation of Ukraine Without Kuchma and For Truth, which held demonstrations and petition campaigns aimed specifically at impeaching Kuchma.¹⁶⁵ “More than any other event, Gongadze’s murder exposed the illegitimacy of Kuchma and his allies.”¹⁶⁶

Kuchma did not stop with the murder of Gongadze either, and in early September 2004 it is widely accepted as fact that people in his administration had Yushchenko poisoned. “The poisoning of Yushchenko had a catalytic effect on civic and political activists,” only increasing the public’s view of Kuchma’s corruption.¹⁶⁷ Protests began to be planned ahead by the opposition after the poisoning convinced the public that the Kuchma regime was ruthless and capable of holding power.¹⁶⁸ “People were mobilized by the personal popularity of Yushchenko, their growing awareness of the criminality and corruption of the incumbent ruling elite.”¹⁶⁹ In a June 2004 poll, less than 10 percent of voters fully trusted Kuchma, while nearly 56 percent did not trust him at all.¹⁷⁰ “Yushchenko himself became a radical after he was poisoned...after round one, many voters saw the halting of the election of Yanukovych as of equal importance as the election of Yushchenko.”¹⁷¹ “Polls showed that, of Ukraine’s ten prime ministers since 1991,

[Yushchenko] was regarded as Ukraine's most successful,¹⁷² and a 2003 poll cited in *Ukrayinska Pravda* found that 48 percent of respondents supported Yushchenko.¹⁷³ This revolutionary environment gives reason for the increased public participation in 2004, but the environment has proven fairly temporary. Voluntary associations are again under attack and apathy and cynicism are on the rise. By and large, participants in many of the mass protests and demonstrations did not continue to pursue involvement in civil society institutions.

National Sentiment

Many people in post-communist states distrust any kind of public organization, remain satisfied with their own personal networks, and feel disappointed in the developments of post-communism.¹⁷⁴ Howard suggests this is because many communist era organizations were “neither voluntary nor autonomous, and participation in them was often forced, coerced or undertaken for instrumental or careerist purposes.”¹⁷⁵ Ironically communist emphasis on the collective has produced a society where individualism is highly valued. According to a June 2003 poll by the foundation Democratic Initiatives, the most trusted social institution in Ukraine is the church. NGOs are more distrusted (49.8%) than trusted (15.2%). Trade unions are more distrusted (41.6%) than trusted (16.3%). Political parties are also more distrusted (59.9%) than trusted (8.5%).¹⁷⁶

In the years preceding the Orange Revolution, opinion polls illustrate that 70 percent of Ukrainians felt they had no influence on the authorities, 92 percent felt that their human rights were regularly being infringed, and 75 percent wanted greater democratization.¹⁷⁷

Clearly, the stimulus event of Ukraine's Orange Revolution was the election fraud of the 2004 presidential election. Following 2002 election violations, only 20 percent of Ukrainians trusted authorities to hold free and fair elections in 2004.¹⁷⁸ NGO efforts between elections included “voter education and information, election monitoring, and preparation for social mobilization.”¹⁷⁹ Only 6 percent of Ukrainians disagreed with a right to protest election fraud, and 18.1 percent were ready to take part in protests (10.6 percent would protest strongly if their candidate did not win).¹⁸⁰ After the 2004 election, Yushchenko's team knew “it was the steal itself, which everybody knew the authorities were planning, that would provoke protests,” which is why he planned ahead to gather people in the Maidan (Kiev's main public square) for the announcement of exit polls and a parallel count in public.¹⁸¹ Over 250,000 people crowded the

Maidan on November 22. By the end of the week, they were joined by an estimated 50,000 more Ukrainians from the west.¹⁸²

In public opinion surveys conducted in February 2004, however, already “fewer people were prepared to participate in authorized rallies and demonstrations (19.2 percent, as compared with 26.6 percent in 2001), to picket government buildings (5.1 percent, as compared with 8.4 percent in 2001), or join unauthorized protests (1.3 percent, as compared with 4.3 percent in 2001).”¹⁸³

When deciding about the recipients of donations, businesses prefer to give without mediators: 87% of business giving goes directly to the recipients of the support usually people in need, 22% of business giving is distributed via NGOs and another 11% provides support to state maintained social care institutions, according to a 2005 survey. This tendency testifies that businesses prefer non-institutionalized charity presumably because of the distrust of the institutions.¹⁸⁴

The 2010 presidential campaign, which brought Yanukovich back into office, “induced widespread apathy and cynicism. Citizen mobilization became something of a mockery, as crowds hired by the major campaigns produced a façade of citizen involvement, while the protesters of 2004 tuned out, convinced that one side was just as bad as the other.”¹⁸⁵

Voluntary Associations and their Functions

The Early Years: 1980-1990

Glasnost was accompanied by the growth of numerous unofficial and semi-official groups, whose combined numbers amounted to upwards of half a million individuals. The two key cities remain Kiev and Lviv.¹⁸⁶ In the early years of Ukraine’s independence Zbigniew Brzezinski said in his book, “Both in Kiev and Lviv quasi-underground Ukrainian political, religious and cultural activity has increased, taking advantage of the openings created by glasnost. Its thrust has been to emphasize the damage inflicted on the Ukraine by past Soviet policies and the national imperative of resisting further Russification.”¹⁸⁷

Political NGOs

The **Ukrainian Helsinki Union** formed to monitor Soviet compliance with the human rights clauses of the Helsinki Accords. The group boasted 40 members, but imprisonment and forced emigration of members in the 1970s and 1980s caused the group to disband until it re-launched

in the late 1980s. The newly active group supported a confederation of independent states, democratically elected officials, Ukrainianization of education, military and government in Ukraine, diplomatic relations with foreign countries, development of a mixed economy and de-collectivization. By 1989, the group had over 1,000 members and regional branches in every oblast. It published seven journals as well as individual regional weekly publications. UHU meetings attracted thousands (50,000 in June 1989 and 20,000 in July 1989) and called for formation of a Democratic Front in Support of *Perestroika*.¹⁸⁸ Soon after, however, August and September meetings were brutally dispersed.

In the 1980s members of the underground **Ukrainian Catholic Church** had formed The Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine. In 1988 the group was renamed The Committee in Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church (CDUCC), which published two samizdat journals. The groups received widespread support, and in 1989 hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians participated in prayers services and vigils for Ukrainian religious freedom.¹⁸⁹ Further, the Initiative Committee in Support of a Revival of the Ukrainian Orthodox church was launched in Kiev in 1989 with support from the Ukrainian Catholic church.

The **Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia (UANTI)**, the second informal group established in Ukraine, was formed in 1987 with a founding declaration signed by 14 well-known dissidents and former political prisoners. The group held its first congress in Lviv in 1989 with 26 participants from throughout Ukraine.¹⁹⁰ UANTI first demanded the reburial in Ukraine of cultural figures murdered during the period of stagnation and supported émigré publishing and *samizdat* journals in Ukraine.

The **Ukrainian Culturological Club**, formed in 1987 in Kiev, was organized by former political prisoners to spread democratization in the capital. It worked to campaign for the release of all remaining political prisoners and to fill in the blank spots in Ukrainian history. In 1988 the group held meetings with the editorial board of *Iunost (Youth)*, after which they called for legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic church. On April 26, 1988 the Club organized a demonstration in central Kiev to mark the second anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, but authorities arrested and imprisoned several people. Leaders of the Club became the head of the Kiev branch of the UHU.¹⁹¹

The unofficial student organization **Hromada** began at Kiev University in the spring of 1988 and began publishing the *samizdat* journal *Dzvin (Bell)* and the regular bulletin *Chronicle of Opposition*. The young student members represented a new generation, but also cooperated closely with more senior dissidents in the Culturological Club. The group organized a demonstration in Kiev in 1988 in support of the formation of a Ukrainian Popular Front and in opposition to nuclear power, which drew over 10,000 participants.¹⁹² The group argued for a system of republican cost accounting, Ukrainization of all spheres of life in Ukraine, the formation of Ukrainian military units, liquidation of Communist party privileges and an end to new nuclear plants. The group helped with pre-election meetings, leafleting, and organizing rallies. Official reactions to the group were hostile, however, and numerous attacks were published and student expulsions caused a decline in membership so great that the group disbanded, although many activists regrouped and formed new smaller bodies.¹⁹³

The **Lviv Trust Group** was the first unofficial peace group in Ukraine, which was pacifist in its principles but also espoused political demands for public accountability for security forces, representation of opposition groups in local Soviets, and freedom of speech. The group of 30-50 members included mainly students, hippies, young workers, unofficial artists and musicians. It was one of the founding groups to join the Democratic Front to Support *Perestroika* in 1988.¹⁹⁴

The **Ukrainian Democratic Union**, later renamed the **Ukrainian People's Democratic League**, planned its founding congress for January 1989 in Kiev, but authorities prevented it from taking place. Regional groups already existed, and the union, stood for state independence. As opposed to the UHU, the UPDL was purely political. It aimed to consolidate different democratic socio-political organizations into a united bloc, “in opposition to the totalitarian communist regime” and for a multi-party democratic system in a sovereign Ukraine. Its program outlined the socio-political, legal, religious, constitutional and economic reforms that need to be undertaken in Ukraine. The union had over 100 members with another 200 sympathizers, mainly among the more radical younger generation.¹⁹⁵

The **Social Democratic Federation of Ukraine** (Kiev) and the **Association of Social Democrats** (Lviv) joined to form the **Social Democratic Confederation of Ukraine**. The group was small but did publish three journals.¹⁹⁶

The **Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front**, formed in November 1988, was headed by former political prisoners and stood for complete state independence for Ukraine and a multi-party system. The UCDF promoted the revival of the youth organization *Plast*. The group claimed over 500 members in Lviv and another 500 elsewhere in Western Ukraine. They organized a nationalistic demonstration in July 1989 that turned out 100,000 demonstrators. Their strong stance on independence did cause them to be attacked not only by the Communist party but by “confederalist” groups like the UHU.¹⁹⁷

A 1989 study found over 800 **youth groups**, or socio-political clubs operating in Ukrainian higher education institutes. “While the popularity index of such amateur organizations as groups for the protection and restoration of historical and cultural movements, ecological societies, associations for the development of national culture, clubs of lovers of amateur songs and others had reached 60 to 70 percent,” the survey concluded, while traditional unofficial groups, like rockers and hippies, represented only 3 to 7 percent. As Taras Kuzio notes, “Unofficial youth groups had proliferated and taken on a more radical and political orientation.”¹⁹⁸ Informal youth groups included *Molod Ukrainy* (Youth of Ukraine), *Rukh*, *Vilna Khvyliia* (Free Wave), Democratic Union to Promote *Perestroika*, *Pivdenna Hromada* (South Society - Odessa), *Miloserdie* (Compassion), Odessa Ecology club, *Leleka* (Stork), Society of Cyril and Methodius, *Diia* (Action), *Nebaiduzhi* (The Concerned Ones), Neosphere in Kiev, Pluralism in Donetsk, *Vertep* (Manager) Society in Ternopil, the cultural Enlightenment Society of Kobilnyk in Sambir, Election—89, and April in Kharkiv. In May 1988, fifteen youth groups, and 100 participants, met to form a Democratic Assembly and began publishing the *samizdat* newspaper *Unity*. The most important youth groups were: **Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM), Association of Ukrainian Youth, and Plast**. SNUM had over 200 members in Lviv oblast, and the Student Brotherhood had over 500 members in Lviv oblast.¹⁹⁹

Despite the largely dissident quality of voluntary associations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, semi-official groups did emerge. The main semi-official groups were *Rukh* (Popular Movement for Restructuring), Memorial, Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, Green World, *Spadshchyna* (Heritage), *Tovarystvo Lev*, Ukrainian Youth Club, and Club of Ukrainian Deputies, all which published regular newspapers or bulletins.²⁰⁰

Taras Shevchenko/Prosvita Ukrainian Language Society (TYM)

On February 12, 1989 Kiev hosted the founding conference of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society. Later named ‘*Prosvita*’ (Enlightenment), this first among Ukrainian non-governmental organizations was a civic body designed to promote the ideas of national self-awareness. It involved publishing houses and a network of clubs and reading rooms.²⁰¹ In 1990 the second congress of the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society was held, with 1,000 delegates from throughout Ukraine. It was at this congress that the organization also changed its name to the *Prosvita* Ukrainian Language Society.²⁰² The Society produces the high-circulation bi-monthly *Slovo, Prosvita* (in both Lviv and Rivne) and *Mova Ye Natsia*.²⁰³ It was the first legal pro-Ukrainian organization in the former Soviet Union, and by 1992 boasted 140,000 members. The vast majority of pro-Ukrainian and non-communist groups and organizations that have appeared in independent Ukraine, from NGOs to the political party *Rukh* all trace their roots back to the reemergence of *Prosvita* in the late 1980s.²⁰⁴ Further, because under Soviet rules political candidates could only be put forth by apolitical organizations, the Ukrainian Language Society became the organization by which Ukrainian political candidates were nominated and able to run in elections. Since the organization’s renaissance in Ukraine during *glasnost* (1988–1989), the Society has continued to play an active part in the social and cultural life of independent Ukraine. Currently, almost all higher education institutions in Ukraine are affiliated with *Prosvita*. Teachers and students are members of the society, and the society also includes Young *Prosvita* branches for the country’s youth.

The **Ukrainian Association for the Defense of the Historical Community (UAZIS)** was founded in Kiev in May 1989. Its activities aimed to preserve the “traditional, historical and natural community, ancient population centers, and separate regions of Ukraine.”²⁰⁵

Memorial was an organization that aimed to “achieve historical justice in connection with those who suffered, were lost, or fell during both World Wars, during the Stalinist terror and time of neo-Stalinism, to show them respect with monuments.”²⁰⁶

Kievan members of the **Congress of People’s Deputies**, supporters of Boris Yeltsin’s Inter-Regional Group and strong supporters of the *Rukh*, began publishing *Holos (Voice)* in 1989. The first issue called for a republican referendum to decide on new laws and suggested: one person one vote, direct proportional elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, and direct elections for president of the republic. The statement was signed by *Hromada, Spadshchyna*,

Nevaiduzhi, Neosphere, *Zelenyi Svit*, UHU, and UAZIS. A **Club of Deputies** also began meeting in Kiev and established commissions to work on drafting legalization and organizing forums for representatives from the party, government, ministers, and informal organizations. Following the new draft law on elections, the group called on citizens of Ukraine to attend a large scale meeting on September 2, 1989 in Kiev, which 40,000 people attended.²⁰⁷

Spadshchyna Society in Kiev published a *samizdat* almanac of Ukrainian studies titled *Chasopys* (Newspaper). The group aimed to raise the intellectual and cultural level of members, increase respect for history and heritage, and expand the use of the Ukrainian language.²⁰⁸

Rukh held its inaugural congress in Kiev in September 1989 and began to publish numerous bulletins and newspapers throughout Ukraine. Kiev *Rukh* had four publications of its own. Other regional *Rukh* divisions included: Dniroderzhynsk *Rukh*, Lviv *Rukh*, Ivano-Frankivsk *Rukh*, Chernivtsi *Rukh*, Sub-Carpathian oblast *Rukh*, Kharkiv *Rukh*, Odessa *Rukh*, and Sumy oblast *Rukh*, each of which have their own publications, creating widespread influence throughout Ukraine.²⁰⁹

Contemporary Ukraine: 1990 - Present

In contemporary Ukraine, among community civil society organizations, the largest group is represented by local affiliations of political parties (72.6%), then NGOs (15.6%). At the national level the largest group is represented by NGOs (63%) and charitable organizations (23%). On the local level, the number of NGOs is the largest in Kiev (4,000 of 22,000 registered).²¹⁰ According to the data from the Democratic Initiatives 2004 opinion poll, of the 16.2% of Ukrainians who are members of a CSO, people mostly are the members of religious organizations (4.2%), professional unions (2.9%), sports clubs (2.1%), political parties (1.9%) and youth organizations (14%). Other groups are ranged less than 1%.²¹¹ According to the registration data of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine there are 140,500 community CSOs (including branches of political parties) and 3,155 national CSOs registered in Ukraine. In total there are 143,655 CSOs in Ukraine including political parties and their branches, among them there are 608 trade unions, 8,728 charitable organizations, and 32,192 NGOs (public associations).

Strikes

The miners' strikes in the Donbas, beginning in 1987, created perhaps the first form of organized voluntary association in post-communist Ukraine. By 1989, 173 of 226 Donbas collieries went

on strike, and the overall number of strike participants in Ukraine exceeded 500,000 workers.²¹² The miners initiated cooperation with the Kiev intelligentsia when a delegation of Donbas miners attended the inaugural congress of the Ukrainian Popular Movement, *Rukh*.²¹³ The First and the Second All-Union Congresses of Miners, held in Donetsk in June and October 1990 respectively, became political rather than trade-unionist events. Donbas miners established the Independent Miners' Union of Ukraine in 1992. Leonid Kuchma became prime minister in October 1992, and his term ended controversially, with another mass wave of strikes in east Ukraine in June 1993.²¹⁴ These strikes were one of the first mass displays in support of liberalization.

Labor Unions

Although trade unions serve one of the largest functions of civil society organizations, to organize and protect workers, membership in The Ukrainian Federation of Trade Unions (FPU) has dropped from a total membership of 26 million at its foundation in 1990 to 14.4 million in 2001.²¹⁵ Labor unions have failed to fulfill the role of an arbiter between the workers, the employer and the state and leadership did not advance workers' interests. Labor unions in Ukraine were created from the same administrative staff that managed companies under the communist regime. Labor unions were not truly independent, democratic organizations.

Media Organizations

In the years leading up to the Orange Revolution, protests were often held on anniversaries of the disappearance of muckraking journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, who most believe Leonid Kuchma had murdered during his presidency for publishing opposition articles. The anniversary protests reflect Ukrainian desire for more freedom of speech and independent media.²¹⁶ Further, this grew into a full blown movement by journalists to oppose censorship by the authorities. "Forty-two journalists from six of the most popular national TV channels publicly denounced censorship and political pressure and vowed to follow professional principles. On the website Telekritika published 350 signatures from over 20 regional TV companies in support."²¹⁷

"While media organizations have made attempts at serving as independent institutions of civil society, the Yushchenko government has resisted efforts to transform state media into an autonomous body much like the United States' PBS, presumably seeing this as a loss of control over a politically useful asset. The difference between these two examples betrays the way in

which the Ukrainian government views civil society: a useful tool for achieving its ends rather than a valuable contributor to the deliberative process.”²¹⁸

Political NGOs

Political NGOs have also increased over the last decade, and serve to monitor elections and inform voters, playing a large role in the Orange Revolution. Since 1994, NDI helped a network of mainly young people all over the country form the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) the country's largest non-partisan politically active NGO. With more than 100 branches throughout the country, CVU has attracted tens of thousands of young people into Ukrainian political life through the experience of monitoring elections, promoting linkages between citizens and government bodies, and citizen education programs.²¹⁹ Exit polling organizations included the Western-funded Ukrainian NGO Democratic Initiatives.

Protest Rallies

In 2002, on the second anniversary of Georgi Gongadze’s disappearance, tens of thousands took to the streets in Kiev and around the country, calling for Kuchma’s resignation and early presidential elections.²²⁰ Other rallies were focused on Yushchenko, whether in location or format. The first mass rally for Yushchenko took place in Kiev where he announced his candidacy on July 4, 2004. Another mass event on September 18, 2004 included a mass and virtual rally held simultaneously in 25 oblasts where Yushchenko’s campaign speech was beamed to giant screens. The rallies were primarily held to support Yushchenko.

Of course, the 2004 mass protests on the Maidan are arguably the largest of all protest rallies. To illustrate how these protests were a revolt particularly against non-democratic leadership is seen in how the Yushchenko campaign chose the Maidan for their protest, the public square where hundreds of student hunger strikers had set up their tent city under the shadow of the Lenin statue in 1990,²²¹ and a Soviet-era building, the former Lenin Museum, housed protesters during the Revolution.²²² This rejection of authoritarian leadership was likewise reflected in the rhetoric of the opposition leadership. “Now the issue is will we go the way of dictatorship or be a democratic state. In answering this, we’ll find all the other answers,” said Yushchenko.²²³

Oleh Skrypka, one of the pop stars who sang concerts for the Yushchenko camp, described it this way: “We ended up in a somewhat unusual situation – something in between a concert and a political meeting. This united the energy of a concert with that of a political

meeting. There was a flavor of Latin America – that you are something akin to Che Guevara, who appears and brings truth to the people. These are strong emotions.²²⁴»

Election Groups

Pora, a group formed specifically to carry out the revolution, largely focused their actions on the electoral process. *Pora*'s campaign tasks included “providing accurate information about the electoral process; increasing the voter turnout of democratically minded and Western-oriented social groups; making a democratic appeal to politically neutral or insufficiently informed voters; forming a volunteer network to cover the campaign; and rallying society in the event of electoral fraud” (presented at a *Pora* meeting on March 9, 2004).²²⁵

Pro-Yushchenko Organizations

The anti-regime platform was seen clearly in the uniting of various opposition groups around this common goal. The revolution's unofficial anthem was “*Razom nas bahato. Nas ne podalaty*” – “Together we are many. We won't be defeated.”²²⁶

One of opposition group *Pora*'s wings, yellow *Pora*, pursued a more moderate campaign focused on ensuring free and fair elections through information, get-out-the-vote and monitoring activities. At the same time, another wing, black *Pora*, espoused more radical demands and openly advocated the expulsion of President Kuchma's government. Black *Pora* was a “continuation of the radical wing of the unsuccessful ‘Ukraine Without Kuchma’ and ‘For Truth’ movements of 2001.”²²⁷ Veterans of these previous movements were remolded into the single entity of *Pora*, united by a common goal.²²⁸

Pora's name meant ‘It's Time,’ i.e. it's time for the old guard to go.²²⁹ *Pora*'s strategies included a ticking clock, showing Kuchma's remaining time in office, and stickers asking, ‘What is Kuchmizm?’ followed by stickers answering ‘Kuchmizm is banditry’ or ‘Kuchmizm is corruption.’ And this group was not small in number. A 2004 meeting put *Pora* membership at about 20,000.²³⁰

Pora and *Znayu* activists held protests in the Maidan specifically focused on attacking the sitting administration. Protest campaigns included mock trials of the authorities. *Pora* and *Znayu* activists dressed in prison uniforms and campaigned on behalf of Yanukovich. Jokes about Yanukovich, called Yanukdote, were published in Kiev. They also insulted his intelligence with a 13-episode internet film called “Operation Proffessor,” making fun of his poor command of the Ukrainian language. The popular song “*Spovid*” (Confession) interlaced Yanukovich's words so

he admitted to being crooked and ended with “Ukrainians, now make your choice.”²³¹”

Yanukovych’s use of prison slang became legendary. His most well known phrase was his depiction of his opponents as *kozly* (swine or bastards), a highly derogatory term. “A popular rap song sung by the previously obscure Ivano-Frankivsk hip-hop band Sleigh became the Orange Revolution’s unofficial theme song. ‘We aren’t scum [*bydlo*]! We aren’t stupid swine [*kozly*]! We are Ukraine’s daughters and sons!’²³²” Yushchenko told the crowds that “bandits will not formulate the future of this country. They want to teach us, tens of millions of us, every Ukrainian family, my family, to live in accordance with the rules of criminals, to learn prison slang and wear prison uniforms.”²³³”

“Though *Znayu* was supposedly non-partisan, Yushchenko campaign paraphernalia decorated its office walls.”²³⁴ “The orange *Tak!* Banner was everywhere, as was *Pora*’s yellow flag, along with the red and white emblems of Georgia and Belarus.”²³⁵ (The color orange was used because it had no prior ideological connotation and stayed from reflecting Ukraine’s blue and yellow or Russia’s blue, red, and white.) Dozens of tents, oranges, headbands, scarves and stickers of orange color became the “symbol of resistance against the Kuchma regime and electoral fraud.”²³⁶ “*Pora* members scaled the trucks, waving yellow flags and chanting ‘Yushchenko-nash president’ (Yushchenko is our president), and cars drove by honking beep-beep-BEEP for Yu-shen-KO!”²³⁷”

Pro-Yanukovych Groups

On the other hand, Yanukovych groups were equally candidate-focused, both in opposing Yushchenko and promoting Yanukovych. In Simferopol, Crimea, Yanukovych supporters drove by, “drivers leaning on their horns and waving the white, blue and red flag of the Russian Federation out of their windows. Citizens declared a ‘Yushchenko-free zone’ in the city.”²³⁸” Putin strongly backed Yanukovych, and Kremlin image-makers played a crucial role in advising and directing the Yanukovych campaign, and the Yushchenko camp believes Russia spent several hundred million dollars to help Yanukovych win. “Most-repeated estimate is that about half of Yanukovych’s \$600 million war chest came from Russian sources.”²³⁹” Further, the Yanukovych campaign used increasingly heavy-handed, Soviet-style tactics and rhetoric against the opposition, denouncing them as “destructive elements,” “extremists,” “radicals,” “political pygmies,” and “fascists.” Given his criminal record, Yanukovych’s campaign had “little option but to rely on a large volume of negative media attacks against Yushchenko as a ‘Nazi,’ a

‘nationalist,’ and an ‘American puppet.’²⁴⁰” Thirty-eight singers or bands played for Viktor Yanukovich, 16 of which were from Russia and one from Belarus.²⁴¹

Political Parties

Political parties have functioned as the predominant political organizations in civil society. Over the last decade some of the most significant of the many Ukrainian parties have included: the Socialist Party (SPU), the Communist party (KPU), the Labour Party (PP), the Liberal Party (LP), the Party of Slavonic Unity (PSE), and the Civic Congress of Ukraine (HKU), *Rukh*, Greens, People’s Democratic, *Hromada*, Progressive Socialist, United Social-Democratic, Agrarian, Reform and Order, Working Ukraine, National Front, Labour-Liberal, Forward Ukraine, Christian-Democratic, and DemPU-NEP.

In the decade after the collapse of communism, parties on both sides were led by the former communist nomenclature who, after the fall of communism, turned its former political power into economic power, after which the new oligarchs re-entered politics as leaders of new political parties. “These parties were ideologically amorphous and merely ‘roofs’ (*kryshy* in Russian criminal slang) for regional and business interests.²⁴²” “In July 2001, [Yushchenko] created the ‘Our Ukraine’ bloc, which sought to unite disparate and factious national-democratic and liberal parties around a common anti-regime platform.²⁴³” Prior to 2004, the splits within the opposition made it unable to produce common policy proposals, which in turn limited its capacity to mobilize popular support. “In a combined poll by four of Ukraine’s leading survey organizations, 64 percent of respondents said they did not know the views of the opposition, and when asked if they wished to learn more, only half of them said yes.²⁴⁴”

Scholar Taras Kuzio said, “Because of its motley make-up, the opposition could not agree on a positive message, focusing instead on negative slogans and catchphrases... It would not be until 2004 that the opposition was able to unite and agree on a common anti-Kuchma platform.²⁴⁵” At the height of protests in Kiev in early February, politicians from a broad ideological spectrum formed the Forum of National Salvation. For the first time in Ukraine’s history, political leaders representing both right-wing (Yulia Tymoshenko, Levko Lukianenko, Anatoliy Matvienko) and left-wing (Oleksandr Moroz) parties agreed to a concerted action aimed at bringing down the ruling regime. Their immediate goal was Kuchma’s resignation and early presidential and parliamentary elections.²⁴⁶ “The coalition of forces that opposed Kuchma and Yanukovich was united only by the goal of getting rid of Kuchma.²⁴⁷” Since the revolution

various parties have attempted to create new bloc coalitions. Parties themselves, however, generally remain small, divided, and ineffective on their own.

Voluntary Associations: Functions in Reality

While some organizations serve to target enduring social issues, many of the groups that emerged in Ukraine after the fall of communism aimed to achieve short-term political goals, such as regime change in the Orange Revolution. Unlike social movements that target specific problems as objects of sustained collective action, the Orange Revolution did not demand mass involvement for a protracted period.²⁴⁸ Jessica Allina-Pisano, scholar of Ukraine's civil society today, says, "It may be useful to distinguish between event-centered mobilization, in which participation coheres around specific protests or other actions, and forms of association that provide ongoing, everyday access to social, political, or material goods. The events of late 2004 belong to the former category; the activities of most civic associations belong the latter one."²⁴⁹

Further, many voluntary associations function, in reality, as instruments of state power. "Without the means or independence to conduct programmatic activities, civic associations become an instrument of state power, rather than a link between state and society that allows the expression of societal interests."²⁵⁰ "State and societal actors interact to produce government-organized NGOs, state-funded civic organizations, and a variety of other hybrid forms of social association. In this context, 'civil society,' thus can imply partnership or another type of close relationship with state institutions or international governance organizations."²⁵¹ For example, during the Orange Revolution, city councils and mayors sided with candidates. "Kiev's mayor, Oleksandr Omelchenko, also sided with Yushchenko's team, making the two floors of the Kiev City Council building available for the needs of protestors."²⁵²

Some social mobilization and organizations function only as a façade by which the state can create the illusion of civil society development and support for various political actions. "Institutional facades in what is here termed the 'third sector' take a variety of forms: nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that exist only on paper; putatively independent associations that are in fact deeply embedded in state networks; and social mobilization that bears a formal resemblance to civic activism but is in fact a massive theatrical exercise coordinated by state actors, with some members of the public as paid extras."²⁵³ Post-Soviet institutional development has been characterized by two processes: first, the construction of

formal, paper records that suggest the existence of liberal institutions (democracy, markets, civil society); and second, efforts on the part of those individuals charged with overseeing institutional reform to pursue strategies that, intentionally or unintentionally, undermine those very institutions.”²⁵⁴

Another unfortunate function of civil society organizations is as a source of funding for personal financial gain. “Across post-Soviet space, the creation of civic organizations themselves was widely regarded as an avenue for improving one’s standard of living. Civic associations, in other words, sought funding not only to support operational activities, but also to give their founders money for life.”²⁵⁵

Composition and Leadership

To begin with, leaders of civil society organizations are often elites with ties to the state. This was especially true in the groups that orchestrated the Orange Revolution. For example, the Forum of National Salvation, created in February 2001, “brought together the socialist leader Moroz, ex-deputy prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and many members of parliament, some of whom had supported Kuchma just a few months earlier. Ioulia Shukan shows how Ukrainian state actors played central roles in planning the popular demonstrations of 2004.”²⁵⁶ Shukan emphasizes the central role of “protest entrepreneurs” who planned and executed the events of the Orange Revolution, including Taras Stets’kiv and Volodymyr Filenko, themselves members of the national legislature. “Stets’kiv, Filenko, and others set and met quotas for public mobilization; created scripts and stagings for protest events; coordinated actions with youth organizations; and tightly orchestrated marches, rallies, and other mass demonstrations. Their state management of the rallies gave them the appearance of popular celebrations.”²⁵⁷ The 2004 mass protest at the Parliament on April 7, 2004 was staged by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to prevent deputies from approving the constitutional bill to increase presidential power. “Only about 5,000 people, largely party activists, came to the Parliament of April 7.”²⁵⁸ These [revolutions] were in fact initiated, led, controlled, and finally subordinated by former members of the authoritarian regimes’ political elite. The supposedly democratic revolutions proved to be little more than a limited rotation of ruling elites within undemocratic political systems.²⁵⁹

The leadership and structure of those organizations significantly more autonomous of state leadership varies, but *Pora* provides an interesting example. *Pora*, co-founded by 25-year-

old Volodymyr Vyatrovych, was run by a national coordinating council composed of 10 to 12 people and did not have an individual leader (to avoid corruption and power grabbing). The council makes decisions and, depending on the organization's needs in a given situation, will either increase or decrease in size. Each member of the council is tasked with a given area of expertise, whether communications, fundraising, or mobilization. At its height, during the first weeks of the revolution, *Pora* was made up of 12,000 people, though by 2005 the organization had dropped to 6,000 to 7,000 members, and by now is effectively inactive.²⁶⁰ “The first group, Black *Pora*, was composed of veterans of the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign and took responsibility for some of the more subversive anti-regime actions and refused to openly associate with the opposition coalition of Our Ukraine, Yushchenko’s party, and Blok Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT). Black *Pora*’s members were generally younger student activists of the *Otpor/Kmara* type. Yellow *Pora* was much more organized and media savvy and overtly coordinated with the political opposition, especially after electoral fraud was committed. Yellow *Pora*’s members were older, linked to the Lviv-based For Truth NGO, and included individuals with operational links to Yushchenko, such as Taras Stetskiv.”²⁶¹

At a lower level, positions of leadership within local NGOs are often held by local elites with ties not only to the state, but perhaps more often, to international NGOs. For example, within Romani communities in Ukraine, an elite circle of grant recipients has managed to retain control of development-based financial aid and representational power, “while the majority of impoverished Roma—for whom, in theory, the grants are intended—continue to live in marginalized shantytowns on the edges of towns and villages.”²⁶² “Romani NGO leaders are not elected by Romani communities but instead rise through the ranks with the aid of grants provided by Westerners...and usurp the traditional authority of community elders...some who have representative power on the national level. It has allowed a small percentage of educated, affluent Roma to reap the benefits of philanthropic aid.”²⁶³

The 2001 Civicus Index on civil society reported that “83 [percent] of citizens have never participated in any CSO activities.” The 17 percent of Ukrainians involved in organizations tend to be from western or central Ukraine, a divide that was clearly visible in mobilization during the Orange Revolution. The spontaneity of citizens joining the Orange Revolution from western-central Ukraine is very different from the 'managed democracy' model of civil society found in oligarch-controlled eastern-southern Ukraine. The difference can be found in the attitudes of

Yushchenko voters, who tend to be younger and better educated, while Yanukovych voters tend to be over 55 and less educated. 62% of Yushchenko voters believe that NGOs are necessary, while only 35% of Yanukovych voters agree. 30% of Yushchenko voters would take action to protect their rights, compared to only 10% of Yanukovych voters.²⁶⁴

Of those that do participate in civil society organizations, many Ukrainians will participate in an organizations' activity or protest without becoming a member. Howard argues that these participants "can be involved in activities that are usually associated with some sort of voluntary organizations, whether religious, athletic, or political, without wanting or needing to join the organization that coordinates those activities."²⁶⁵ This theory is consistent with the way several CSOs, like *Pora*, functioned in the Orange Revolution, which engaged nearly 20 percent of Ukraine's population.²⁶⁶

Participants in protests, however, are often creating little more than a façade. During the protests in the Maidan, for instance, some participated out of genuine concern for political change, while others joined in more out of a desire to experience the fanfare. "The number of protestors in Kiev alone may have reached 1 million."²⁶⁷ Further, in 2007, individual protestors were paid about 130 hryvnias (\$26) per day to attend demonstrations in Kiev.²⁶⁸

Even surveys of membership in organizations often produce exaggerated results. It is likely that a significant amount of the claimed membership from the 1990-91 survey was still a residue of the communist organizations and therefore was not genuinely voluntary or autonomous. "The 1990-91 survey was generally conducted during a period of high mobilization and political activity, during which many people did participate in various social and political movements but only for a relatively short period of time."²⁶⁹ It is important to note that following the collapse of communism, many unions remained and retained much of their membership rolls. Membership rates, however, have been dropping consistently.²⁷⁰ A more recent national NGO survey in 2004 found that around 80% of CSOs are membership organizations, however, membership numbers remain low. 24% of CSOs have 11-30 members, and 26% have more than 100 members.²⁷¹

On a more positive note, however, surveys and opinion polls show that civil society organizations do reach cross-cutting cleavages of society. Different social groups are represented in civil society, and only a few groups, such as rural citizens, still remain underrepresented.²⁷²

Organizational Structure and Funding

In the post-communist period, the structure of many new organizations has often been one of mobilization around political discontent. Specifically during the 2004 Orange Revolution, “the opposition acted to convert unprecedented political discontent into greater societal mobilization.”²⁷³ Yushchenko’s chief of staff, Oleh Rybachuk, claimed that the opposition had “no other resources but protests.”²⁷⁴

Although organizations are more or less equally scattered around the country, a significant portion of them are no longer operating or have very little capacity or financial viability.²⁷⁵ “Without a social basis for financial support, civic organizations in Ukraine faced three options for financing their operations: international organizations, domestic and international state linkages, and oligarchic capital. This structure of funding, together with the underlying economic situation of post-socialism, created an environment in which few civic associations were able to function independently.”²⁷⁶

In 2001 many CSOs lived on a very limited budget: More than 40% of organizations report annual revenues of \$500 or less. Another 21% have annual revenues of between \$500 and \$2,000. Seventeen percent of organizations have revenues of between \$2,000 and \$10,000. The main income sources are international donors (26% of total income) and charitable donations from businesses (19 percent). Income-generating activities (13 percent) and funds from local and/or national governments (13 percent) also play an important role in the support of the sector. However, the financial situation of Ukrainian CSOs was improving gradually, and in 2002-2003 only a quarter of CSOs operated on a budget of less than \$500, but the majority still operated on a budget of less than \$1,000.²⁷⁷

Most of the groups active in the Orange Revolution do not fully qualify as independent CSOs. Although no Western groups contributed financially to *Pora*, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) only spent about \$350,000 in Ukraine from 2001–04²⁷⁸, many groups received support from Viktor Yushchenko’s camp in the form of “tents, mobile military kitchens and old busses to use as barricades if necessary.”²⁷⁹ Even today, a CCC survey shows that around 33% of CSOs reported that they received financial assistance from the state in 2003. Sixty percent of that group received funding in the amount less than \$1000.²⁸⁰

State funding is not only from Ukraine, but from foreign governments as well. “By some estimates, at least 80 percent of NGO funding in Ukraine comes from foreign donors and foundations,” and many international NGOs receive funds from state budgets.²⁸¹

In the year 2000, 80-85 percent of funding for registered NGOs in Ukraine came from foreign sources.²⁸² Still the capacity and effectiveness of such centers is estimated as low: they mostly depend on donors funding, cannot get fees for their services, shift their priorities according to donors’ priorities.²⁸³ An observer noted that, “all of their qualifications, knowledge, and labor go towards the struggle to obtain those resources, and concrete social changes in Ukrainian society are far from the main task that they set before themselves.”²⁸⁴ Dependency on foreign donations had normalized apathy and prevented organizations from developing broad membership bases from which to draw independent funding. Such dependency on foreign funding created a situation where any scaling back of donor funds results in the atrophying of the organization. Further, this cycle produces little motivation for social improvements, as continuity of social problems ensures continued funding. For example, leaders of Romani NGOs recognize that as long as there are “poor Roma,” they will continue to receive donor aid, so they refuse to use funds to actually improve the impoverished masses in their communities.²⁸⁵

Critics argue the persistence of close links between state institutions and civic associations, as well as the mobilization of support for political parties that can result from these links, proceeds primarily from the structure of funding opportunities faced by NGOs. “Organizations are aware that at some point they may need to turn to the state for funding, and this awareness shapes the choices they make about the character of the work they undertake and the links they forge with other civic associations.”²⁸⁶

Lack of funding further inhibits hiring of employees, leaving organizations dependent on volunteers, who have little time to donate. A 2004 national NGO survey shows that on average 15 volunteers work in the organization. Fifty percent of respondents commented that less than nine volunteers worked in their organizations. The most common number of the volunteers working in the CSO is four. A typical volunteer would work seven hours for the organization; but often the volunteers work for two hours a week in the organization.²⁸⁷

Civil society organizations continue to operate as instruments of state power. For example, the Kharkiv regional farmers’ association had been a robust organization with a council that met weekly to exchange information and advice about credit, commodities markets,

bureaucratic entanglements, and other challenges. The association had access to state resources: an office in the regional administration building and bureaucratic support. In 2006, however, with new Orange appointees installed, the association no longer had access to state resources and came under increasing regulation, operating as an instrument of state power, by which the state could more easily regulate farming.²⁸⁸

Self-regulation of the NGO sector also remains lacking, although a handful of NGOs recognize the need for transparency, a code of ethics, annual reports with budget information and other tools to strengthen the credibility of the third sector. A CCC survey (2002-2004) indicated that 86% of NGOs acknowledge the necessity of ethics code but only 36% have them in place.²⁸⁹

Further, organizations fail to cooperate with other civil society groups, leaving a divided and weak third sector. For example, in the early years, although miners cooperated with Ukrainian pro-independence and anti-communist groups and voted overwhelmingly for Ukraine's independence, miners and intellectuals "failed to establish a common mobilizing structure...No joint opposition institution emerged."²⁹⁰ Today, this trend continues, as civil society organizations have arguably further limited cooperation with other CSOs. According to the CIVICUS report from 2006, the reasons for division include: CSO leaders' ambitions create conflicts (48%), lack of professionalism of CSOs (44%), and competition for funds and resources (39%).²⁹¹

Given the structure of many contemporary organizations, Allina-Pisano argues that Ukraine's civil society is merely a façade. "First, the statistics on the number of organizations are misleading, as many of the organizations counted either have disappeared as quickly as they appeared or have been leading a 'pseudo-existence' that corresponds little with their putative goals and activities. Second, since so many organizations are completely dependent on Western grants for their funds and support, they are often more beholden to the requirements of Western donor agencies than to the larger public whose interests they are supposed to serve. This further contributes to the prevalence of an elitist form of democracy throughout much of post-communist Europe. Third, and perhaps most important, without the energy, sense of purpose, and legitimacy that an active membership provides, many organizations can have only a limited influence on the policy-making process...In post-communist Europe, there are few members to be counted, and as a result, the organizations are rarely successful."²⁹²

Funding Sources of the Orange Revolution

While some argue the Orange Revolution was funded by the U.S. in an attempt to impose democracy abroad, “the total cost of the Maidan was UAH20 million (about \$3.8 million) plus \$1 million in U.S. money, nearly all of which was made up from small donations and not a penny of which came from abroad.²⁹³” This is perhaps further evidence that the primary catalyst was not a foreign desire for liberalization, but a domestic desire for regime change, as the revolution was domestically funded.

Large funders of the revolution had personal interests in the election of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. “Home-grown millionaires like Petro Poroshenko, David Zhvania, and Yulia Tymoshenko [are] willing to put their money where their political careers are.” Poroshenko was part owner of 5th Channel, nicknamed “Orange TV” for its blatant support of Yushchenko, and Zhvania was “Yushchenko’s treasurer,” who raised \$150 million at least “in part to save his own business,” the Brinkford business group.²⁹⁴

National Identity

Some argue that the Orange Revolution was primarily a desire to create or redefine a Ukrainian national identity that fueled the revolution. “We saw the emergence of a new kind of nationalism,” said color revolution expert Pavol Demes.²⁹⁵ The desire for independence and distinct national identity is completely valid and historically clear. It is evident Ukraine has long seen itself as independent and unique in culture. Further, the theory that the revolution was supported by a push to reassert or redefine national identity is validated in that the revolution was national, funded by Ukrainians, widely participated in, and proportionally participated in across many segments of society. One in five Ukrainians participated in the Orange Revolution, making it the largest protest movement in Europe since the end of the Cold War.²⁹⁶

Further, the rhetoric of US officials promoted the idea of the revolution as a sign of renewed national identity, specifically one committed to liberalization. Brzezinski told BBC Russian that Ukraine was witnessing a process of historic significance: “a sort of marriage between Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian democracy. There were many nationalist movements in the history of Ukraine, however not all of them were democratic. But one can talk about the unification of Ukrainian patriotism, Ukrainian self-perception and Ukrainian democracy, freedom and liberalism.²⁹⁷”

According to a KIIS poll in mid-December 2004, 18.4% of the adult population claimed to have taken part in the protest (in the west 35.5% and in west-central Ukraine 30.1%) with about half from large cities, 27.5% 18-29 years old, and 23.7% 30-39 years old.²⁹⁸ “The epicenter of this change in political culture, for the first time in modern Ukrainian history, was in Kiev and in central Ukraine...It was Yanukovych who looked like the regional politician.²⁹⁹”

Initial protests in 2002, however, had a much more national focus and failed. “‘Ukraine Without Kuchma’ protests had failed because the organizers couldn’t build a wide enough coalition and put sufficient numbers on the streets. The protesters’ ranks had included too many questionable ‘nationalists,’ with too many agents provocateurs in their ranks.³⁰⁰” It is this intentional shift away from nationalism and creation of a national identity that suggests that regime change was the primary motivation of the revolution, while national identity was a secondary cause and perhaps also an effect of the revolution. Further, continuing conflicts, such as regional divisions between east and west Ukraine and divisions within the Orthodox church patriarchates, pose challenges to a unified national identity in Ukraine.

International Influence

US Rhetoric

In the decade following the collapse of communism, and clearly in the years leading up to the Orange Revolution, there was certainly a cry for liberalization from the Ukrainian people, but US government and other Western leaders also made their voice clear and their influence felt. The U.S. supplied Ukraine with extensive funding, much of which was designated for democracy assistance and much of which went to civil society organizations. “All U.S. government agencies spent \$280.48 million in aid to Ukraine in the fiscal year 2002, including \$157.92 million under the 1992 Freedom Support Act. The latter included \$74 million through USAID, and \$25 million for the US State Department Public Diplomacy program... funding [in 2003] was now \$227.48 million, with \$55.11 million for democratic reform programs. The figure for the fiscal year 2004 was \$143.47 million, including \$34.11 million for democracy assistance.³⁰¹” “‘Our money doesn’t go to candidates; it goes to the process, the institutions that it takes to run a free and fair election,’ State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, said.³⁰²” Because of the structure of U.S. funding, perhaps it was more prevalent in US rhetoric to shape the discourse of the Orange Revolution in terms of a Ukrainian movement to fight for liberalization.

Western leaders used public statements to support Ukraine's revolution, and thereby support a more open society in which voluntary associations could act freely. Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright called for "the Bush administration and Europe to unite behind the cause of 'saving democracy in Ukraine'" in a *New York Times* article.³⁰³ Likewise former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said, "If Ukrainian democracy prevails, Russia has no choice but to go to the West and to be a democracy. If Ukrainian democracy fails, Russia and imperial ambitions are awakened."³⁰⁴

Besides US officials' public statements, meanwhile in early 2004, "more than two dozen Western ambassadors interested in seeing change in Ukraine started having monthly meetings... 'There wasn't one of these 28 countries that didn't see the advantage of free and fair elections in Ukraine for the security and stability of Europe. And one couldn't deny that if there were free and fair elections, it would be to the benefit of one candidate,' said Andrew Robinson, Canadian ambassador and coordinator of the group of Western ambassadors."³⁰⁵ They supported the candidate they felt would bring more freedom to Ukraine, and no doubt hoped would trickle down into civil society.

International Influence

It is argued by many color revolution experts, including Mark MacKinnon and Pavol Demes, that the Orange Revolution was a result of the wave of revolutions sweeping Eastern Europe. They point to the training *Pora* received by former leaders of Serbia's Otpor and Georgia's Kmara as proof of the influence of Ukraine's neighbors. Others, including Lucan Way, however, argue that because Ukraine's ouster happened through its natural election cycle and was predicted years before (even before the Georgia revolution that preceded it), the Orange Revolution most likely would have been accomplished regardless of the revolutions in neighboring states leading up to it. Further, its strategies were modeled more on correcting past failed strategies rather than adopting foreign tactics.³⁰⁶

Further, many scholars argue that the influence and funding of foreign governments may have led to the success of the Orange Revolution. The Ukrainian opposition, however, received an overwhelming share of their campaign resources from major domestic businesses and other national actors rather than foreign sources. In fact, it is estimated that foreign funding accounted for just 2 percent of the resources of the youth movement *Pora*.³⁰⁷ Moreover, claims that the Orange Revolution was an American plot were often made by Yanukovich's Regions of

Ukraine, the SDPUo, and KPU and were widely accepted in Russia. Anti-American xenophobia of this kind was often more of a convenient distraction for the Yanukovych camp than a valid supported argument.³⁰⁸

While training by neighbors and funding from abroad are unlikely to have played a deciding role in the Orange Revolution, mediation by the European community and the contributing ideology and solidarity of the West as a whole, were important factors in its success.

The 2004 election campaign was declared by the international community as neither ‘free nor fair.’ The International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), a joint undertaking of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, issued its preliminary assessment of the elections on the afternoon of November 22. The IEOM stated that “the second round of the Ukrainian presidential election did not meet a considerable number of OSCE commitments and Council of Europe and other European standards for democratic elections. . . . Overall, state executive authorities and the Central Electoral Commission displayed a lack of will to conduct a genuine democratic election process.”³⁰⁹

“The White House issued a statement expressing concern about the ‘extensive and credible indications of fraud’ . . . Secretary of State Colin Powell, in unusually direct language, told reporters that the United States “cannot accept this result as legitimate.” Powell said that he had urged Kuchma to explore openings to settle the crisis and not use force.³¹⁰

With hopes of mediation, three roundtables composed of various international leaders took place November 26, December 1, and December 6. “The mediators— Kwaoniewski, Solana, Adamkus, Kubis, and Gryzlov—joined Kuchma, Yushchenko, Yanukovych, Lytvyn, former Rada speaker Ivan Plyushch, and former president Leonid Kravchuk. Kuchma acted as informal chair . . . The mediators stressed three principles: political talks, no violence, and a solution consistent with Ukrainian law.”³¹¹

The main credit for the peaceful resolution, however, belongs to Ukrainians. As one mediator put it: “The way out of the crisis was reached by the Ukrainians . . . the elements of the settlement package—including agreement to constitutional reform—these came from within Ukraine, and were thought up by and agreed to by the Ukrainians themselves.”³¹²

“Despite having grown up under Kuchma’s corrupt semi-authoritarianism, this generation, thanks to the Internet, satellite television, and popular culture, has acquired an essentially Western mindset. Many young people have traveled, studied, and worked in Europe or North America, and most of them take the desirability of democracy as a given.³¹³”

Yushchenko’s wife, Kateryna, says, “We are truly grateful for the international solidarity that we felt, for all the countries and NGOs and individuals throughout the world who supported us at that crucial moment in our history.³¹⁴”

Had Ukraine not been in a revolutionary environment influenced by Western liberal democratic ideology, with supportive neighbors in the region and solidarity of like-minded governments abroad, it is difficult to say if the Orange Revolution would still have succeeded. One thing, however, is clear. While ideas and support from outside influenced the Ukrainian people, it was the finances, efforts, and passionate fervor of the Ukrainian people themselves, that accomplished the regime change they sought.

Today, however, 7 years after the revolution, critics question the fact that, although Western support and financial aid remain strong, Ukraine’s civil society has declined. In his new book analyzing the post-Orange decline, Paul D’Anieri says, “To the extent that external support for these [civil society] groups strengthened them before the Orange Revolution... what is the explanation for why the groups should have weakened subsequently, when aid continued to flow and the environment was considerably more hospitable.”³¹⁵ It can be assumed that international influence, then, is not the only factor, and perhaps not the most important factor, in creating and maintaining a healthy civil society.

Impact on Government and Society

Civil society organizations have been able to have a limited, yet at times significant, impact on society and the state. For example, after years of miners’ strikes in the Donbas and the reorganization of miners’ labor unions, during the 1999 presidential campaign, Kuchma did visit the Donbas several times, promising economic independence and campaigning heavily in the media in regards to his support for the Donbas.³¹⁶ Moreover, the effectiveness of 2000’s civic protest movement “became clear when the president suddenly agreed to meet with their organizers and to have them express their demands on the floor of the Parliament.”³¹⁷ Further, in 2004, “a group of leading journalists from the largest private television network “1+1” and the

state television network UT-1 refused to continue biased news broadcasting... other private television channels, like Inter and ICTV, followed suit. In a matter of days, opposition politicians gained access to all the major media.”³¹⁸

However, like in the late imperial years, impact has often been met with repression. “In the late summer of 2002, Medvedchuk introduced the most severe censorship in the national media since Ukraine’s independence. As a result the opposition virtually disappeared from the nation’s television screens.”³¹⁹ In 2004, as the opposition was gaining strength and increasing its followers, authorities again “cracked down on civic activists, censored media coverage, and obstructed opposition rallies.”³²⁰

Moreover, new research argues that civil society groups actually have never had much impact since the fall of communism, despite the surge in public participation in 2004. If this is true, then the lack of impact from the “third sector” today is unfortunate, but not surprising. According to D’Anieri, “Civil society groups played a less significant role in 2004 than is widely believed. If this is true, 2004 did not represent an upsurge in civil society, and the years since have not represented a puzzling diminishing of civil society activity.”³²¹ Allina-Pisano agrees, saying, “To the extent that the Orange social mobilizations represented a genuine product of civic engagement—a brief glimpse of a robust civil society that most analysts had not previously observed or predicted—we might expect third-sector development to have received support and encouragement under Orange leadership, during the period between January 2005 and the ‘Universal’ Or Declaration of National Unity of August 2006. However, beyond many Ukrainian citizens’ newfound belief in the power of civic action, there is little evidence that the underlying organization of Ukrainian civil society was transformed under Yushchenko. Instead, some third-sector organizations came under increasing state control.”³²²

It was expected that an effective program of deep political change would mark Yushchenko presidency’s first months. On the contrary, the number of draft laws initiated by the new president and Prime Minister was the lowest ever submitted to parliament by the executive branch for any one legislative session since independence. Furthermore, the ambivalent attitude toward the law did not change. Kuchma’s repressive state agencies were not reformed. Thousands of criminal cases were opened against persons associated with the former regime (including Yanukovich himself). The judicial system remained as selective as before, changing only the political color of its targets. In a way, this is not completely surprising, as the new

leaders had all been closely associated with the old regime.³²³ “The momentum gained by Yushchenko in the Orange Revolution did not produce the dramatic results so many Ukrainians had hoped for, further deepening the degree of the general post-communist disappointment. In the 100 days after the revolution the Yushchenko administration had submitted the lowest number of draft laws to parliament of any administration to date.”³²⁴ Further, Yushchenko decided in early August 2006 to nominate as Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, Kuchma’s former protégé and the very symbol of what the Orange Revolution was supposed to have defeated.³²⁵ Moreover, in 2010 Yanukovich was elected president.

In labor unions, union leaders have been ineffective as lobbying agents in the political process and the workers’ concerns most often remain unheard. “Employers still belong to many FPU unions, and some FPU leaders will concede that they have yet to really understand their role in the market, finding it more convenient to ally with the employers.”³²⁶ In reality, union leaders have weak leverage against the interests of company owners and many have reported being pressured to suppress the workers’ concerns. Labor unions have not emerged as strong political actors. Unions have been left on the margins of the political process. For example, even in the 1994 parliamentary elections, when labor unions remained stronger due to continuation from communism, the FPU’s candidates had limited success with 24 of 242 candidates winning.³²⁷

Further, not only has state control increased, but societal change is noticeably absent. In the CIVICIS 2006 report, Ukraine’s scored low in the “impact” category. Ukraine received--from 1 (low) to 3 (high)--2s for empowering citizens and influencing policy, 1s for holding state and private sector accountable and meeting societal needs, and .5 for responding to social interests.³²⁸ A poster in a Kiev tent city in the summer of 2006, read: “Ask the politicians! Where are the rights of Ukrainians? Are there in Ukraine: Ukrainian-language magazines? NO. Ukrainian-language films? NO. Ukrainian-language schools? ONLY ON PAPER. DEMAND ANSWERS!”³²⁹ This is just one example of societal demands that have been voiced over and over and yet which remain unmet, perhaps in large part due to the ineffectiveness of civil society.

Moreover, Citizens’ access to CSOs is poor, as many CSOs do not have offices, and do not manage membership and clients bases. Organizations do not conduct public events and activities and they do not issue appeals for donations and membership outreach.³³⁰ Further, in competition for resources, “elite class power is strengthened, the organized power of the labor force is usurped, and the poor become poorer.”³³¹

Even with gains in media freedom, its impact in society remains minimal. “Increased freedom of state television channels under Yushchenko has failed to combat these beliefs [that these public channels remain biased], mostly because the citizens of the East believe the television stations are lying to them, caught up in the machinations of traitorous Kiev bureaucrats. They do not watch the state channels, instead opting for the pro-Yanukovych TRK Ukraine or Russian channels.”³³²

Laverty voiced his concern that Ukraine would end up in a situation like Serbia, where the previous authorities were also able to make a comeback that stalled democratic reform. “It would be tragically ironic if *Pora* was forced to suffer the same kind of purgatory-like fate as *Otpor*.”³³³ He said this would demonstrate that civil society organizations were unable to have a significant impact on society and unable to influence the state, allowing the government to resume its repression of civil society development. This appeared to become reality with Yanukovych’s election in 2010. Only time will tell how much civil society will improve or continue to decline under his administration.

Sustainability and the Current Administration

In conclusion, USAID released an annual NGO Sustainability Index in 2003 taking into consideration seven critical dimensions of NGOs functioning: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure and public image, in which Ukraine received 3.9 (1 best). This is a very poor score, as can be noted when compared with the similar score received by Kyrgyzstan (4.2).³³⁴ The CIVICUS 2006 report also notes, “The low breadth of citizen participation is a key weakness for civil society’s structure, indicating the limited engagement of Ukrainian citizens in formal CSOs. Also, civil society’s level of organization is assessed as only moderate, due to the weakness of CSO umbrella bodies, support infrastructure, international linkages and rather weak cooperation among CSOs.”³³⁵ On a scale of 1 to 3 (low to high), Ukraine scored a 1.9 for applying democratic values both internally and externally, a 1.7 for the structure of CSOs, a 1.6 for the environment in which CSOs operate, and a 1.4 for CSOs’ impact on society.³³⁶

These scores may continue to worsen as the 2010 election brought Yanukovych to the presidency, and his administration has further tightened its grip on civil society, making conditions more difficult for the third sector. A recent article in the *Economist* stated, “The free

spirit that once characterized Ukraine is evaporating as quickly as it did in Russia a decade ago. Ukraine, until recently rated by Freedom House as the only free ex-Soviet country (apart from the three Baltic states), has been downgraded to partially free. Mr. Yanukovich has consolidated more power than any of his predecessors enjoyed. He has forced through constitutional changes to restore old presidential powers and add new ones. As in Russia in the early Putin years, the influence of parliament, prime minister and government has been cut back. Decisions belong in the presidential administration. Prosecutors, the constitutional court and the central bank have lost any semblance of independence.”³³⁷ Only time will tell if the intimidation will continue or not and if civil society organizations will become more or less sustainable in Ukraine.

IV. Analysis: Past to Present

Changing conditions and effects on associations

To begin with, the contrast of Ukraine under the Russian Empire with Ukraine as an independent state clearly impacts the nature of voluntary associations. The late imperial period's harsh threat of repression and lack of political influence explains late imperial civil society's tendency to focus on social, professional, intellectual or cultural organizations, whereas today's increased freedoms and civil rights combined with citizen's ability to affect political leadership explains contemporary civil society's tendency to focus on political and national activism. The change in political context also accounts for the change from the former revolt against external authorities, namely the Russian tsarist regime, to the contemporary revolt against internal authorities, namely the opposition to Ukrainian political leadership, which was so evident in the 2004 revolution.

The change from 19th century early industrialization and limited regional ties to today's modern economy with global ties accounts for the shift from funding by local private donors to funding by government and international NGO grants. Further, the post-communist transition to a free market economy that made many elites very wealthy very quickly also created a new Ukrainian elite with increasing wealth and power that has contributed to funding by oligarchs and state actors, whose funding is often contingent on compliance with their own political goals.

Further, the composition and capacity of Kiev's civil society changed based on the shift from a largely rural Ukrainian population in the late imperial period to the growing urban Ukrainian population. The larger concentration of Ukrainians in city centers today allows for more participants in organizations and more frequent participation therein. It also allows for a broader spectrum of participants, coming from a wider variety of classes, ethnicities, religions, and political backgrounds. The density and proximity of the masses in cities like Kiev allows civil society groups to reach more people to solicit membership and to offer services.

Finally, the change from the underground nature of late imperial civil society to the official registration and public nature of contemporary civil society accounts for the increasing legal regulations and taxation restraints facing organizations today. It should, however, also result in greater freedom and less repression, which has not always been the case.

Consistent or reoccurring trends in civil society development

Perhaps most notable, is the recurring reaction of Kiev's civil society to repression. Whether repression from the Russian Empire or from opposition politicians in today's Ukrainian government, voluntary associations have consistently taken hard blows that continue a culture of corruption and fear, but have also consistently instilled a will to assert the power of civil society and to impact society and bring about change.

Arguably one of the most constant goals of Kiev's civil society has been to preserve Ukraine's national identity and language. This was illustrated in the emphasis on publication in the late imperial years as well as in the conflict over which Ukrainian identity will govern post-communist independent Ukraine as represented by elected officials and ruling parties.

Likewise, political activism has remained a constant feature of Kiev's civil society. Beginning with the creation of political parties in Kiev at the end of the 19th century, politics again proved front and center in the Orange Revolution, during which not only political parties, but NGOs and election groups made political activism their central mission.

Kiev's civil society, past and present, has consistently made use of media both as a way to assert freedom of speech, preserve and use the Ukrainian language, and to reach masses of people. In the late imperial years, newspapers like *Osnova* received wide circulation, while in the post-communist era, a wide variety of media, including newspaper, TV, radio, and internet, have educated voters and stimulated dialogue about national and political issues.

Further, while democratic language has been a notable feature of Ukrainian civil society in recent years, it also predominated the national and political discourse of the late imperial period. Drahomanov and other civil society leaders consistently rejected both authoritarian and socialist government and embraced federalism and democratic principles.

Finally, regional division has proven an unfortunate staple of Ukraine's civil society, often preventing institutions from having members from both east and west Ukraine. The lack of sufficient cross-cutting regional cleavages has inhibited unity and ultimately inhibited the capacity and impact of civil society in Kiev.

Comparison against the criteria

Compared to today, Kiev's civil society in the late imperial period arguably boasted institutions that had longer-term relevance in society, a broader and deeper impact on society, funding from

largely private sources, somewhat greater independence from state interference, and an equally broad base of participants.

On the other hand, compared to the 19th century, Kiev's contemporary civil society arguably boasts a more official legal system of institutionalization, broad participation (despite limited membership), a significant influence on political leadership (although not government policy), and independence from state inference in theory.

Overall, Kiev's late imperial civil society met more criteria for a strong civil society, and despite the political conditions and restrictions, had a significant effect on society. No doubt 19th century institutions cannot and should not be recreated, but the nature of their organizational function, composition, structure, and societal impact could provide lessons for achieving a healthier and stronger civil society today.

Conclusions

In conclusion, looking back throughout history, the genesis of the 19th century civil society in Ukraine under Russian rule, that is to say the institutionalization of its public sphere and voluntary associations of diverse peoples, was spurred by cultural factors. The first institutions to take root in urban Kiev were recreational, professional, and commercial. By mid-century, new institutions began to take on social issues, like education and peasant emancipation. Following tsarist crackdowns, new Ukrainophile institutions were founded to support the Ukrainian language and publication in Ukrainian. Although political ideas began to form a discourse in the Brotherhood of St. Cyril and Methodius in the 1840s, only in the 1880s, did institutions based on political activism arise, and only in the wave of revolution across the empire at the turn of the century, did socialist and Marxist groups take hold in Kiev. By studying the institutional history of Kiev's civil society, and further looking into the intellectual institutions in particular, the time frame and the context of these changes can be illuminated. It becomes clear that urbanization and modernization in the early 19th century produced the initial recreational, professional and commercial associations of Kiev's emerging civil society. With the founding of the Kievan University, and increasing educational institutions in general, intellectual associations began forming, and the discourse grew to include social issues. Most notable, however, is the cycle of repression and reaction that introduced and strengthened Ukrainophile institutions to support national identity. Finally, the eventual hopelessness after a long line of these repressions,

combined with the growing revolutionary socialist movements in Russia, at last led to institutions in Kiev supporting Marxism and revolution.

Michael Hamm argued, “Researching the popular culture of Kiev is a challenge, for there are no political platforms or secret police reports to rely on, no great revolts, pogroms, or strikes to spur outpourings of description and analysis.”³³⁸ Despite this supposed lack of political documentation, however, the history of the city’s institutions reveals the very nature of the developing civil society. Further, Kiev’s civil society differed not only from the institutions in neighboring Poland and Russia, but also from the other Ukrainian cities. While all around it, revolutionary political organizations were advocating revolutionary socialism and Marxism, Kiev remained focused on cultural and national aims and held much more liberal federalist views. Whether due to its location between two powers, continual tsarist crackdowns, or a population newer to urban life and closer to the peasantry and true Ukrainian identity, Kiev did not become home to political institutions until the “new generation” of Ukrainians began to look outside Kiev for ideas and leaders in the last decades of the century, and even those young Ukrainians did not join the socialist revolution until revolution in Russia was imminent.

In contrast, in the decade following the collapse of communism, Ukraine’s civil society was filled with predominantly political voluntary associations. During Ukraine’s 2004 election the Maidan was filled with 1,546 tents with more than 15,000 residents and hundreds of thousands of protesters.³³⁹ Ukraine boasts over 143,655 CSOs, 73 percent of which are political parties. Kiev alone is home to the largest number of political NGOs (4,000 of 22,000 registered).³⁴⁰ Meanwhile, however, critics are condemning Ukraine’s civil society as a weak, unsubstantial, and ineffective facade. Allina-Pisano questions, “What explains the simultaneous development of a paper record that would seem to suggest a thriving civil society, with a multitude of organizations, and a crisis in the third sector, which—apart from the Orange sport—has little if any influence on social or political life?”³⁴¹

Kiev’s late imperial civil society developed internally from largely private funding to address social justice issues, whereas Kiev’s post-communist civil society developed with strong elite and external influence, funded by many state actors and international governments, to address political issues and provide financial benefits. The former had substance, but lacked power to influence the state, while the latter had power to change the regime, but lacks substance so much that it has been called a façade filled with “Potemkin institutions.”³⁴² Over the last

century, conditions have changed in a way that poses increasing challenges to civil society development in Kiev.

If Kiev's present civil society hopes to succeed and grow, it might take a look back at its own past. The following mechanisms for change, on several levels, could serve as the first steps toward improving the relevance, autonomy, and impact of third sector organizations in Kiev:

Ukrainian Government Officials

The state should simplify and clarify laws regarding civil society organizations and decrease excessive legislation that restricts many groups from receiving official registration. The state should also decrease taxation on civil society organizations and change the financial stipulations for non-profit organizations that limit the means of fundraising and the amount of income allowed. If organizations are able to make a more significant amount of money to use for the activities of the organization, they can have a more substantial and valuable presence in their communities.

Western Democracies

The U.S. and Western European democracies should continue to support civil society growth and improvement in Kiev and continue to speak out when Ukraine's government acts to restrict third sector activity. It is critical that heads of state from Western democratic countries, and especially the U.S., emphasize the importance of a free and autonomous civil society in high level talks with Ukrainian officials, as well as in public statements, to make clear to the Ukrainian government that the West is aware of its actions and views this issue as a top priority.

Western Donors

Western donors and grant-giving organizations may want to consider funding apolitical organizations, such as libraries, recreational clubs, professional organizations, or social services (for women, children, the poor, the sick, etc.) rather than political organizations centered around candidates or elections. Apolitical organizations often have better long-term sustainability, remain more relevant in their communities, and require more consistent participation than spontaneous political associations, proving to be better assets to civil society growth as a whole. Further, donors should require more frequent and more detailed documentation of organizational activities and services in order to prevent individuals from using organizations merely as fronts by which they can personally profit financially.

Ukrainian CSO Leaders

Organizational leaders should ensure that their institutions and services have a recognizable presence in their communities and are accessible and welcoming to those they seek to help. Leaders of institutions should work to establish a strong base of members, with whom they communicate regularly, and offer long-term services that benefit society to members of the community. Finally, leaders should make sure that their groups, as much as possible, remain apolitical, independent of political affiliation and independent of the state. They should work to avoid or decrease state funding and international funding when possible.

Although late imperial Kiev's civil society was small and faced continual repression, it succeeded in offering a substantial public sphere in which Ukrainians could interact, voice opinions, meet with people of similar interest or profession, and partake of services, whether medical, educational, or financial. If contemporary Ukraine, can take a page from history, not only in regards to the functions of late imperial organizations, but their composition, structure, and impact, then perhaps Kiev's civil society today can reverse its decline and replace the façade with a robust third sector of substance.

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