THE EFFECTS OF ELITE-LED POWER SHARING ON POSTCONFLICT URBAN RECONSTRUCTION: CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE MOSTAR CASE

BY

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

Cities divided by war and political violence are a global phenomenon. These divided cities become the manifestations of regional, national, or global conflicts. Planners in such cities face a unique set of challenges; however, the effects of specific local governing systems on planning in divided cities remains understudied. Consociational democracy is a system of elite-led, power-sharing government commonly instituted in countries following ethnic conflicts. The benefits and costs of consociational government are well-documented at the national scale, but less so at the municipal level (even though divided cities have instituted consociational governments). This thesis will identify the ways in which consociational municipal government affects the post-conflict reconstruction and planning process. Following the literature, I will theorize four propositions of how ethnic consociationalism affects city-wide urban planning. The central case study will be Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a noteworthy city in which the government was (until recently) consociational at the municipal level. The case study will demonstrate that municipal consociationalism begets unplanned border zones, the non-implementation of rational/technical-styled plans, the reification of conflict into built form, and a power-vacuum into which external, non-municipal-governmental actors enter. Given the importance of urban planning and reconstruction following today’s “urbicidal” wars, these revelations show how post-conflict consociational electoral engineering at the local level creates specific scenarios planners should address with pointed interventions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I generally find long acknowledgements sections to be overwrought and self-indulgent. But writing this thesis was the hardest thing I’ve done in my life. So given the amount of asceticism necessary to produce this thesis, I am going to indulge. There are more than a few people without whom I could have not have produced this thesis. This is by no means an exhaustive list.

First I must thank the PhD students in 310 Noble Hall. They petitioned the department to break policy and allow me and other master’s students to occupy some unused desks in their office. I cannot concentrate on work at home, and also needed a place to store my many source materials and library books. Without those welcoming PhD students, and Sofie Sianis’ pleadings to the department in particular, this thesis could not be written. The work environment provided by these students, and other members of my master’s cohort in 310, was invaluable. I also want to thank Alice Novak in the DURP office for bending these rules.

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The Russian, East European, and Eurasian Center at UIUC funded my graduate education. Their assistance allowed me time (and a lack of stress) to pursue research.

Simon Holoubek, by doing an eleventh hour proofread, made sure this didn’t look sloppy.

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someone who loved to trap students and have rambling conversations. The last conversation I
had with Andy happened around 10:30 on a Tuesday night in the Temple Buell Hall atrium; in
fact, we talked about the former Yugoslavia. I considered Andy a quasi-father figure within the
department and I did not take his death well. Yet my lasting memory of the moments after his
sudden death will not be crying in the lab after the news hit; rather, I will remember going to the
Dr. Ed Feser’s family’s home the night after it happened. Despite the freshness of the news, I
was overjoyed that night to see everyone together at once. I remember sitting around the chiminea in the backyard and talking to faculty members. I remember laughing in the basement with my classmates, recalling not only Andy but also our class’s shared episodes of stress-related outbursts, late night computer lab delirium, and random nights around bonfires. I remember leaving Ed’s house that night with an ear-to-ear smile. Though to this day it is a difficult event with which to deal, Andy’s sudden passing reinforced the familial and human-centered atmosphere of this department. This is an atmosphere that emanates from every level: From faculty offices, from the goofy late nights in the computer lab, and not least from the sentiments of my classmates. It was this atmosphere which made the stresses of daily life, particularly those related to the production of this thesis, not only bearable but sometimes, dare I say it, enjoyable.

Thank you all very much. Hvala vam, i doviđenja.
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NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION OF BOSNIAN-CROATIAN PROPER NOUNS

ć is like the “t” in “future”

č is like the “ch” in “chunk,” and is usually indistinguishable from the č sound to English speakers

dž is the “j” in “jam”

d is like the “j” in “jam,” only softer, and is usually indistinguishable from dž to English speakers

ž is like the “s” in “vision”

š is like the “sh” in “shop”

c is like the “ts” in “cats”

j is like the “y” in “yes”

i is like the “ee” in “feed”
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1a. The problem of planning post-conflict divided cities

In their 2009 book *Divided Cities*, Jon Calame and Esther Charlesworth sought to outline how “new walls are thrown up” in cities worldwide (vii). They argued that divided cities are part of an “emerging global condition” (ibid.) in which conflicting parties set up barricades as a stopgap measure to stymie conflict. These walls eventually ossify, and the result is the divided city and *de facto* (or sometimes *de jure*) segregation.

An astute observer of global cities knows that this description applies to cities worldwide. The five cities which form the case study of *Divided Cities* – Nicosia, Cyprus; Jerusalem, Israel/Palestine; Beirut, Lebanon; Belfast, Northern Ireland; and Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina – are only a small fraction of the cities worldwide suffering from divisions wrought by extended ethnic conflict. For example, the United States’ invasion of Iraq has rendered a divided Baghdad. A bridge built for purposes of wartime expediency became a permanent fixture because it allows Baghdadi Shias to bypass Sunni neighborhoods en route to a local shrine (Shadid, 2010). Recent sectarian riots in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India have accelerated the segregation of that city’s Hindu and Muslim populations (David, 2002). And while American cities have not in recent years seen large-scale ethnic violence, race riots have a historical role in racially segregating American cities¹.

The role of urban planning in post-conflict divided cities has been addressed by a few planning scholars – such as Bollens (2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2000, 1998), Calame and Charlesworth (2009), Sultan Barakat (notably 2005, ed.) – but most of their work concentrated

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on the nature and type of urban interventions necessary in such a city\(^2\). What is examined less is how specific governing systems affect planning in these cities.

Consociational democracy is a system of elite-led electoral democracy commonly instituted in post-war societies. Arend Lijphart, the scholar with whom the creation of consociationalism is credited, succinctly defines consociationalism democracy as “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (1969, qtd. in Andeweg, 2000). This early definition has survived the decades of revision of the theory (Andeweg, 2000). Multiple scholars have cited the importance and eminence of consociationalism. It is “one of the most influential theories of comparative politics” (O’ Leary, 2005, pp. 3). Benjamin Reilly, a prominent scholar on democracy and ethnic conflict, writes that “there is little doubt among scholars that consociationalism represents the dominant model of democracy for divided societies” (2002, pp. 156). However, consociationalism and consociational theory is usually applied to nation-states, as political science scholarship of divided societies tends to focus on post-conflict nations (Bollens, 1998). What is understood less is how consociational theory applies to municipalities.

1b. Outline of the question and research methods
If divided cities are to be understood as a global phenomenon, then planning scholarship and planners should learn the intricacies of planning in a city of territorialized, seemingly antagonistic ethnic groups. While consociationalism may be a popular electoral/political system for divided societies, less is understood regarding how consociationalism is applied at the

\(^2\) It is worth mentioning that only two of these four scholars – Bollens and Calame – are American. Generally, English-language scholarship on post-conflict urban planning is produced by non-Americans, ironic considering our nation’s instigation of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The only research unit in the Anglophone world dedicated to post-war reconstruction is located at the University of York, in England, and chaired by Dr. Barakat. Furthermore, the majority of case study materials (to be reviewed later in this thesis) were written by non-American scholars.
municipal level. In particular, the explicit effects of consociationalism upon planning are under-theorized. Given all of these conditions, there needs to be an investigation of the intersection of consociationalism and urban planning.

This thesis will investigate the effects of consociational government on urban planning in post-conflict cities. While it is admittedly difficult to separate causation and correlation, I will argue that aspects of the consociational system will be reified in urban form. Certain elements of the consociational system – e.g., its elite-led nature, its need to present political problems as rational or “de-politicized” – will be shown to have definite reflections on the practice of urban planning. I conclude that consociationalism, on the municipal level, leads to underdeveloped border spaces, the non-implementation of techno-rational plans, enclave-level ethnonationalist projects, and a power-vacuum which allows non-state and non-local actors to plan the city.

To display the intersection of consociationalism and urban planning, the city of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina was chosen as a case study. I visited Mostar, albeit only as a brief stop between Sarajevo and Dubrovnik, in December of 2007. This was 13 years after the war left Mostar, and much of the city center remained gutted. Compared to other Bosnian cities I had visited in 2007, Mostar’s damage was still the most visible. In the city center I saw immaculate, newly rebuilt buildings (often houses of worship) bordered by shelled-out buildings with landmine warnings pasted on the front (an observation noted by at least one other planning scholar [Bollens, 2007]). Many gutted buildings were so bullet-riddled that they looked as if they had been felled by gunshots alone. Besides the destruction, I saw how, en route to town, the city became visible through Herzegovinian karst hills, how the Neretva River looked turquoise-green, and how architectural styles from four different ruling regimes bordered each other. If one had the chance, he or she could seemingly walk from central Anatolia to mini-Budapest to
Minsk to a suburban American mall during a single stroll. Mostar was, is, and will continue to be a fascinating place. Because my visit was so brief yet piqued such curiosity, I opted to revisit the city via research.

Mostar presents a unique opportunity to view consociational governance at both the municipal and national level. Being the last multiethnic large city left in Bosnia and Herzegovina, international intercessors found it necessary to institute a consociational system within the city. Mostar can be viewed as a microcosm for the entire Bosnian state project, and provides a theater for how issues of nationalist chauvinism, refugee return, and NGO development unfold at the urban level and in the arena of urban planning.

Mostar is also a city about which a lot has been written, particularly a large research literature centered on governance and urban planning. The entrenchment of its divisions and the symbolic weight attached to its wartime destruction attracted worldwide attention. The Mostar-centered work of Scott Bollens, Emily Makaš, Andrea Luchetta, Larissa Vetters, Jon Calame, Esther Charlesworth, Regina Bittner, and Carl Grodach, among others, is used in the case study. In addition, the International Crisis Group issued a series of excellent, thorough reports on governance in Mostar.

Mostar is also a city which has a presence in the web universe. Besides the aforementioned secondary sources, the city council maintains a homepage in which it posts relevant governmental edicts, executive and council decisions, public notices for planning endeavors, and local news. Furthermore, the Croatian-language newspaper *Dnevni List* (“Daily News”) is based out of Mostar and is published regularly online. The newspaper is considered the major paper for Croats in Herzegovina. It is important to note that the newspaper is considered somewhat Croatian nationalist-leaning (see Makaš, 2007). Many of the *Dnevni List*
stories cited in this thesis reflect ongoing developments within the town. My news research ended in March of 2011, hence any developments after that date are not included in this thesis.

Both the newspaper and city documents are written in Bosnian-Croatian. I possess two years of collegiate study of the language. While I am not fluent, I have a working knowledge of Bosnian-Croatian and where my knowledge was insufficient I sought assistance in translating these documents (native speakers, Google Translate, and a Bosnian-Croatian/English dictionary provided crucial assistance). For extended quotes, the original Bosnian-Croatian will be in located in the footnote.

The approach to this research is historical, reflecting an analysis of primary (i.e., newspapers, government documents) and secondary (i.e., scholarly research) source materials. While it undoubtedly would have added depth to the case study, and the ability to name more individual actors, in-person field work was not feasible. Yet by using an archival, historical approach, I aim to better understand how issues of planning and power-sharing evolved over time, from the socialist Yugoslav years to the present. There is a long history of inter-ethnic cooperation in urban Bosnia – and Mostar in particular – and planning scholars have emphasized planners performing the role of local historians. Sandercock, for example, cited the need for planners to “connect to history of struggles over urban space with the poetics of occupying...

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3 The country of Bosnia and Herzegovina has three official languages: Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian (Parlamentara skupština Bosna i Herzegovina, n.d.). These three languages were once officially referred to as “Serbo-Croatian,” with each variant being considered a dialect. Yet with the dissolution of Yugoslavia each of the four nations which spoke Serbo-Croatian have, to varying degrees, placed claims on an official, national language to be seen as distinct from its neighbors. All three languages are mutually intelligible, and the differences between them are mostly variances in pronunciation. Tellingly, the city of Mostar website’s entrance portal gives you the choice to view the main page in either Bosnian or Croatian, yet clicking on each link will show you what appears to be the exact same web page. There is a joke among Yugoslavs that, after the war, they all became polyglots. For the purposes of this thesis, “Bosnian-Croatian” will be used to describe the local language (because Bosniaks and Croats form the vast majority of Mostar’s population, and because those two variants share the Latin alphabet and the most spelling).
particular places” (Sandercock, 1998, pp. 230). It is the making of such a connection that motivates my thesis.

1c. Summary and organization

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will be a review of the relevant literature on planning theory and consociational government. Regarding planning literature, I will first analyze various paradigms for understanding urban planning’s relation to political power. By doing this, I aim to present how planners mobilize these paradigms in post-conflict cities. Lastly (in regards to planning literature) will be an analysis of the literature on planning in diverse societies and post-conflict cities. I will identify the gap in understanding how specific democratic governmental arrangements affect planning. In the finals section of Chapter 2, I will analyze consociational theory – its history, its definition, criticisms of the theory, and how it was applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Chapter 3 will synthesize the planning and consociational literatures in order to formulate four propositions of planning in the consociational city. In other words, I will take municipal consociationalism to the ground level, formulating propositions of how planning under such governance would unfold. This chapter will serve the purpose of framing the case study.

Since these propositions are grounded in the literature, Chapter 4 will present an analysis of the case study of post-conflict planning in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The chapter on the case study will be divided into three sections: 1) the history of Mostar, 2) planning by local state actors (i.e., planning by the local government and local ethnonationalist politicians), and 3) planning by non-local and/or non-state actors (e.g., international NGOs, foreign governments, and local citizens).
Chapter 5 is the conclusion. There, I will present various interpretations of planning in Mostar. I will present policy recommendations and reflections on the problems of elite-led power-sharing.

1d. Goals of Research

By grounding consociationalism in urban form, this thesis will add to scholars’ and policymakers’ understandings of the (literally) concrete effects of consociational democracy. Furthermore, it will contribute to the literature of planning in post-conflict cities, a nascent field which is lacking in empirical analyses on how specific political systems affect the planning process, and how specific planning theories play out on the ground. In essence, the goal of this thesis is to see how planning theory and political science theory are operationalized on the ground.

Modern warfare is characterized by military intercessors participating in institutional rebuilding (usually as a part of the exit strategy). Therefore, knowledge garnered from this thesis will show situations in which a consociationalist system may (or may not) be ideal for a postwar urban administration.

Lastly, many commentators, scholars, and politicians have commented upon the increasingly “urbical” nature of war (Campbell et al., 2007; Coward, 2004). Cities, urbanism, and urban relations have become targets in and of themselves. While there is not scholarly consensus on the existence of “urbicide” as a distinct form of political violence (Shaw, 2004), there is a general agreement that war has moved away from the battlefield and into “living rooms, schools,… supermarkets” and other quotidian spaces (Barakat, 1998, qtd. in Graham, 2004, pp. 137). These urban-based wars warrant urban planners paying attention to the post-conflict reconstruction process, and how certain urban governance systems affect this process.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2a. Introduction
In order to understand the role of consociational democracy in the post-conflict city, we must first understand the relevant planning literature. This literature review has two parts. The first part concentrates on urban planning theory. It is divided into two sections – planning paradigms and the role of political power in planning, and planning in post-conflict cities. The second half of the literature review focuses on consociationalism – its definition and criticisms, and how it is applied in Bosnia. Throughout the literature review, I identify gaps in understanding in the current body of work.

2b. Planning paradigms as considered through political power
At its onset as a discrete discipline in the fin-de-siècle Western world, urban planning was conceived as existing outside of local political processes (Foglesong, 1986). This was largely a product of the era: Especially in America, urbanism in the late 19th century was portrayed to be the realm Tammany Hall-esque political machines, the flouting of graft, and typhoid. This was the world immortalized by Dickens, Engels, Jacob Riis, and the like. In order to plan, bourgeois citizens acted in concert, and intervened where intervention was possible in order to impose design and development standards. These standards would ostensibly alleviate the industrial city’s overcrowding, disease, and pollution (Foglesong, 1986; Peterson, 2003), yet planning’s role in streamlining capitalist production (and exploitation) has also been cited (Foglesong, 1986). In the years following World War I in the United States and elsewhere, planning gradually integrated itself into municipal politics (usually via the appointment of an independent planning commission [Hoch, 1994]). In order to become integrated, planners needed to craft the necessary policy instruments which would serve to reify their plans. Zoning
and subdivision regulation thus became the tools through which planners used their newfound institutional authorities (Hoch, 1994).

In its traditional formulation, planning was believed to be an “applied science” which operated in a clean, perfectly rational universe (Brooks, 2002). As already stated, this clean rationality was often posited against the messy world of urban politics. Democratic political power – with its subservience to the indecisive masses – was to have little relation to this “scientific” planning process.

Of the many problems with the rational model of planning, the role of political power in plan implementation (or non-implementation) has been highlighted by multiple scholars. An illustrative anecdote may be useful here: Imagine a city planner who – after conducting surveys, GIS network analyses, transportation demand studies, property value studies, etc. – completes a mass transit plan for his municipality. This plan would serve currently underserved areas, target potential customers to downtown businesses, and other things deemed “good planning” as per conventional wisdom. The planning commission passes the plan (after a series of well-attended public hearings, the input from which is incorporated into the plans). Yet when presented to the city council, the plan is rejected for any number of reasons: perhaps one councilor is a real estate developer whose developments are not served in the plan, perhaps another thought mass transit was inherently wasteful and sought to sabotage any plans for it. Despite being a conventionally “good” plan, it fails.

What is a planner to do in such a case? Friedmann (1993) envisioned a planning profession in which “implementation is…built into the planning process as a critical dimension” (pp. 4). The planner should thus think about plan implementation “right from the start” of the plan-making process (pp. 5). Planning should, in Friedmann’s eyes, be an activity which admits
its biases and not pretend to operate in a hermetically sealed, rational universe. In other words, planning would not be a science which imagines and creates plans for the better city; rather, planners would work to implement those plans. For Freidmann, planning was defined as linking knowledge to action (1987, pp. 74). This would assume a planner’s embedding into the political process (broadly defined) in order to act upon his or her plans. Brooks (2002), similarly, argued for planners’ integration within the political system. Like Friedmann, Brooks stressed that planners should frame their plans in terms of values, and not in terms of an abstract, disinterested professionalism.

Hoch (1994) argued that planners should “embrace and foster democratic planning.” Planners should drop the title of “objective expert” and instead enter into the democratic community (pp. 20). The role Hoch envisioned for the planner is that of political deliberator. However, most of the planners Hoch interviewed in his case study still conceptualized their planning interventions, even deliberative interventions, as the endeavors of a rational professional (pp. 342). Therefore, unlike Friedmann’s normative planning model, in practice Hoch’s planners rely upon a “rational-professional” argument in framing their role.

Yet other scholars have questioned how rationality is defined in the political arena. According to Flyvbjerg (1998), political power (and power in general) has the power to define “rational.” Political power is not an impediment to plan implementation; it is plan implementation. Likewise, a city planner may be hesitant to challenge political power for many reasons, a major reason being that local politicians have the power to fire him or her (Hoch, 1994).

Like Hoch, Forester (1989) insists upon the insertion of planners into the political process as a communicator. Forester’s communicative action planners can use information and
communication as a source of power. By deploying (or not deploying) certain types of information, framing plans in certain ways, and shaping public attention, the planner exerts power over the planning process (pp. 28). Power is conceived as not being centralized in a single municipal authority, but shared amongst a variety of actors. Young (1990) similarly understood power as being embedded amongst a range of actors (pp. 30-33).

Political power for many planning theorists—particularly those following the insurgent radical planning paradigm—is not defined by elected officials. For radical planning theorists, the power for implementation arises from grassroots organizing and social learning. Planners, in this sense, are broadly defined as any agent in “social transformation” (Beard, 2003). Given its grassroots’ nature, radical planning is inherently confrontational towards top-down political power (Harvey, 1999). Insurgent planning builds upon radical planning theory in order to situate grassroots, radical planning practices in the postcolonial global South. According to Miraftab (2009), insurgent planning, by using counter-hegemonic, transgressive, and imaginative planning processes, aims to expose the inclusion/redistribution fissure of neoliberal governance. In both radical and insurgent planning, a planner does not necessarily need to be a municipal employee to partake in the planning process (Fainstein, 2000; Miraftab, 2009). While the literature on radical and insurgent planning generally refers to citizens mobilizing against authoritarian regimes (Araj, 2010, pp. 3), similar grassroots movements based on local contexts can exist outside of authoritarian contexts.

At this point I have discussed three paradigms of planning thought: A rational, top-down paradigm in which the planner is dependent upon political power for implementation; a radical, bottom-up model in which political power arises from the planners (broadly defined as the citizens who partake in the radical-planning process); and the communicative-actor planner
whose political power arises from how he or she frames communicative acts. Others (Lindblom, 1959) have argued that conflicts in political power cause plans to be implemented incrementally. For example, a grandiose downtown redevelopment plan is proposed. City councilor X likes the idea of eminent domain being used on all abandoned properties, but city councilor Y happens to own two of those properties (which he is holding for speculative reasons). Thus a political compromise is reached without the planner’s input: All buildings except councilor Y’s are eminently-domained and bulldozed. Incremental implementation can be thought of as a “market equilibrium” amongst relevant political players.

All of these theorists expound upon the relation of power to planning. Yet these theories of planning – rational, radical, communicative action, and incremental – do not directly address planning in the post-conflict context. The case study demonstrates how these concepts of planning can be deployed in the post-conflict, consociational city. Before reaching that section, I need to analyze the literature on post-conflict and divided city planning.

2c. Planning in divided and post-conflict societies

There is an extensive planning literature on working across cultural, gender, and class divides. The following literature review on this field is not exhaustive; rather, this review shows the major theories of planning in cities of difference which are relevant to this thesis’s main question. The body of knowledge is large enough that some scholars have advocated making cross-cultural planning a part of the core planning education curriculum (Sandercock, 1998, 2004; Burayidi, 2003).

Using the concepts of complexity theory and communicative rationality, Innes and Booher (1999) proposed a framework for consensus-building processes which planners can employ when working in diverse communities. The authors developed checklists of criteria for
ideal consensus-building practices and outcomes. However, they did not attempt to develop actual practices which planners can use in such situations. As the authors admitted, evaluation according to these criteria can fall victim to the vagaries of the reviewer’s subjectivity.

Forester (1989) attempted to outline some of the practices a planner may use in mediated negotiations. Following his communicative-action approach to planning, he outlined six strategies a planner may use in negotiating between adversarial parties (pp. 82-103). These strategies included the planner as resource of information, the planner as regulator of negotiations, the planner as mediator, and others. While arguing that different contexts require different negotiation strategies, the ultimate aim of these strategies is to turn adversarial negotiations into collaborative problem-solving.

Furthermore, Forester argued that power “inequalities provide and shape the context in which planners…work and act” (ibid, pp. 59). He identified three strategies a planner may use in such a context: Redistribution, empowerment through policy change, and supporting preexisting groups who are working towards social change (pp. 61). The use of these strategies is context-specific, and Forester urged planners to better understand the political-structural contexts in which they work.

Umemoto (2001) outlined the epistemological challenges planners face when working in cultural communities different from the planner’s own. Using a case study of her work on participatory planning in an indigenous Hawaiian community, she showed how various participatory planning practices did (and did not) work in facilitating public engagement. Oddly, after outlining these strategies for working with culturally different communities, in the conclusion Umemoto advocated for “community-led planning” in which the planner largely withdraws from the participatory process. Sandercock (1998) argued that the epistemologies
planners have historically employed are outdated in today’s increasingly diverse cities. Using an
epistemological framework similar to Umemoto, Sandercock presented six ways of
understanding which she called “the epistemology of multiplicity” in planning (ibid., pp. 76-83).
These should be used in order to recognize the “different ways of knowing” how diverse
community members plan.

While providing strategies, suggesting alternative epistemologies, or outlining criteria for
consensus-building processes, none of the works cited above make direct attempts to theorize
how modes of electoral politics affect the strategies or criteria for plan making in the context of
difference. Furthermore, these scholars’ works are not specific to post-conflict or ethnically-
divided societies. The focus is usually on disadvantaged groups or groups outside of the
dominant power system, not groups which are mutually antagonistic and simultaneously
constituent in the dominant power system.

For theories of planning in such contexts, I need to turn the lens towards another group of
literature. The question becomes: what is the condition of planning in the post-conflict city, or
the city suffering from severe ethnic conflict?

The first task is to determine what is meant by the “divided city.” While cities can often
be spatially divided along the lines of gender, race, and/or class (e.g., Fincher and Jacobs, 1998;
Massey and Denton, 1993; Sandercock, 1998), sometimes these divisions reach the point of
intergroup conflict. In this conflict, various groups make antagonistic claims of sovereignty.
Severe, ostensibly intractable intergroup hostilities can subsume the democratic political process,
greatly impeding the consensus necessary for power-sharing (Bollens, 1998). Physical divisions
have had a long role in urban form – e.g., exterior city walls, gates separating Jewish ghettos in
medieval European cities. Yet if the severity of intergroup urban conflict gives way to violence,
partitions can arise within a city as means to contain urban violence (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009). Eventually these divisions harden through a long, incremental process (ibid.), and urban interventions affecting each population’s area become imbued with connotations of conflict. While the term “divided city” can be understood either figuratively or literally, for the purposes of this thesis it should be understood as a spatially segregated city wherein antagonistic identities have control of the municipal political process.

Bollens (2007, 2009) formulated a heuristic for understanding the various stages of division/peace in divided cities. There are four stages on this continuum: Active conflict (e.g., Jerusalem), suspension of violence (Mostar, Nicosia), movement towards peace (Sarajevo), and stability/normalcy (Barcelona). Like Calame and Charlesworth (2009), Bollens argued that there is a temporal dimension to conflict in a divided city, and that cities can move in both directions along his continuum.

Multiple scholars have identified urban planning and post-conflict reconstruction as possessing the possibility of fermenting inter-group cohesion in divided cities. In stressing the importance of local institutions and populations in the reconstruction, Mac Ginty (2005) argued that locally based reconstruction efforts are a crucial dimension of post-conflict peace building. He blamed the failure of many reconstruction processes on international groups co-opting the process. In particular, he called out international intercessors as favoring brick-and-mortar reconstruction over peace building and socio-economic development. Barakat (2005) formulated what he calls the seven “pillars” of post-conflict reconstruction. Reconstruction, according to Barakat, begins before violence even ceases. Local populations still need shelter and other basic human needs, and rely upon their own skills (even if they are not carpenters or engineers) in constructing homes. It is in the medium-term period when reconstruction efforts become
Barakat argued that visioning is a crucial first step of the reconstruction process; visioning of the reconstructed space should consist of an open dialogue in which various groups come to a consensus over reconstruction goals (pp. 252). Intergroup cooperation in reconstruction can sometimes be deceiving, as cooperation may be a matter of pragmatism and not evidence of a sutured intergroup divide. Thus, Barakat argued for reconstruction with a "corrective dimension" (pp. 256); that is, instead of working for a return of the pre-war status quo, reconstruction efforts should aim to ameliorate past socio-economic injustices. Both Barakat and Mac Ginty imagined a normative reconstruction process which is locally rooted, in which residents determine their own reconstruction priorities. This sentiment has been echoed by other scholars (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009). Others have argued that in divided cities the relationship between socio/political conditions and urban interventions is "bi-directional" (Bollens, 2009, pp. 101; 2007). Like the authors above, Bollens argued that urban interventions can either exacerbate or ameliorate the divide which has arisen through local, ethnically charged politics. Citing planning efforts in Barcelona as an example, Bollens (2009) shows how planners can "change the prevailing logic" (pp. 241) of a divided city by partnering with neighborhood groups, social movements, and by connecting their work with larger societal conversations and trends. Bollens (2007, 2009) partially attributed Barcelona’s normalization of intergroup hostilities to such planning actions. Among the types of intergroup peace-building urban interventions identified by Bollens (2009, pp. 237-239) were major, international events which were planned locally (such as the 1992 Olympics); metropolitan area plans issued during times of major political uncertainty (which signified a shared course of future development); massive investments in shared public spaces; and urban design which facilitated interaction between heretofore spatially segregated Catalonians and Spaniards. Bollens was also quick to mention a
Barcelonan political culture which was by and large supportive of intergroup normalization after the dissolution of the Franco regime (ibid., 236-237).

Other scholars have attempted to identify specific strategies which could be used by planners in divided cities. Bollens (1998, 2002) identified four strategies employed by planners in divided cities. A neutral strategy uses technical criteria and language to distance the planning effort from potentially incendiary questions of ethnicity, inequality, and exclusion. A partisan strategy chooses sides in the division, prescribing one group with more power. An equity strategy “gives primacy to ethnic affiliations” and seeks to redistribute towards the less powerful group. Lastly, a resolver strategy seeks to ameliorate the root causes of urban polarization. Calame and Charlesworth (2009) provided a thorough study of the process by which cities become divided, and provided a list of strategies of engagement a planner can use to ameliorate the division. These strategies are centralized planning, collaborative or parity planning, privatization, or historical renovation. The authors did not advocate for any specific approach, and are quick to point out the pitfalls of each, but they concluded that case-specific contexts will call for varying strategies.

The shortcomings of neutral, technical planning in the post-conflict city are well-documented. Bollens (2000, pp. 256-268; 2002) stated that equitable outcomes are often not produced despite claims of neutrality. Scarred by conflict and living in a city of mutual antagonisms, residents of these cities are prone to be suspicious of these plans’ neutrality. Plans should thus explicitly address the concerns of each community. Calame and Charlesworth (2009) echoed this claim, stating that claims of neutrality often beget a planner’s impotence. In addition, the authors addressed how assuming objective is a means by which planners commonly avoid addressing ethnic divisions in the city (pp. 178-180).
If neutrality is insufficient, then how should a planner position him or herself in relation to the parties of the division? Some argue that plans should accommodate each groups’ claims without unnecessarily forcing assimilation (Bollens, 2002). Young (2000), in her concept of relational autonomy, argues a similar position from a Feminist political philosophy perspective. In a system of relational autonomy, diverse groups possess their own autonomy. However, these diverse groups must acknowledge their position in a system of interdependent relationships. Self-determined groups would be regulated so as to prevent domination of those of the out-group.

Bollens (1998; 2000; 2007; 2008; 2009) and Calame and Charlesworth (2009), while providing useful heuristics and typologies for understanding planning in divided cities, are primarily concerned with identifying the nature of urban interventions which serve to ameliorate (or potentially exacerbate) existing divisions. The question is “what are strategies for urban planning interventions in a divided city,” and not “in what unique way does this political system uniquely affect planning?” Their approach to outlining politics’ influence on planning does not call out any specific theories of post-conflict electoral politics.

In order to elaborate on a particularly popular type of electoral arrangement in divided societies – namely consociationalism – the next section presents a background on consociational theory and its controversies.

2d. What is consociationalism?

Consociationalism is a popular type of representative democracy often prescribed upon post-conflict states by international actors. There are, however, plenty of scholarly detractors. The spiritedness of the debate has, as expected, yielded a wealth of scholarly literature.
The theory of consociationalism is the career-horse of Dutch political theorist Arend Lijphart. The theory is so heavily associated with Lijphart that a criticism of the theory can seem ad hominem (a sentiment echoed in O’ Leary, 2005). Lijphart’s entire scholarly career has been devoted to the subject, and his 1977 book *Democracy in Plural Societies* remains the authoritative text on the theory.

According to Lijphart, there are four major parts of a consociational government:

- A *grand coalition* of elite “political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society” cooperating to govern the country (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 25). This is, in Lijphart’s own words, the “first and most important” element of consociational government (ibid.). Central to consociationalism is the idea that elites of conflicting groups bargain and compromise with elites from other parties. These compromises often hinge upon “de-politicization” of decision-making, or “defining the issue as a technical (or economic or legal) problem rather than as an ideological conflict” (Andeweg, 2000).

- A *mutual veto*, through which any group in the grand coalition can cancel any resolution so as to ensure a “complete guarantee of political protection” (ibid., 37). The mutual veto is designed to prevent a tyranny of the majority, and protect the rights of minority groups. In order for centralized political power to be exercised, consensus between all members of the coalition is necessary.

- *Proportional representation*, not only in representative government, but also in civil service appointments and in budgeting (ibid., 38). Representation is contingent upon the citizenry being placed into “pillars”: each citizen is hermetically sealed into a predetermined segment of society (e.g., ethnic group, religious group).
-Segmental autonomy, or “rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern” (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 41). So even though the elites from each group must reach a consensus in order to govern, within their own spaces each elite group governs exclusively. Thus, while intergroup consensus is necessary for political power to be exercised on a society-wide scale, political power can be exercised without inter-ethnic consensus within each segment. However, “on matters of common interest,” decisions should be made by all interests in the grand coalition (ibid., 41).

So the first question is: why is consociationalism so commonly implemented in post-conflict societies?

The answer is simple: consociationalism stops the bloodshed. The conventional wisdom behind consociationalism is that if two groups in an interstate conflict feel that their concerns are being addressed electorally, they will put down their guns. But the argument for consociationalism goes beyond conventional wisdom: consociationalism has been empirically correlated to the cessation and suppression of violent ethnic conflict (Reynal-Querol, 2002; Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008).

Consociationalism arose as a descriptive, empirical theory for a certain set of democratic arrangements in a few specific European countries (Andeweg, 2000). Seeing that these countries – notably Lijphart’s home country of the Netherlands – managed to have functional national democracies in the time of societal segmentation, Lijphart developed the four criteria above in order to describe how the democracies in these countries functioned. In the conclusion of Democracy in Plural Societies, Lijphart explicitly urged political leaders to “engage in a form of political engineering” which would implement the consociational democratic system (pp. 223).
“Engineering” is an interesting word choice: Lijphart argued that the political scientist should be a problem-solver who uses a discrete skill-set to implement democracy upon a troubled society.

Scholars have identified contingencies which are conducive to the success of a consociational arrangement. Throughout his career, Lijphart changed and modified the criteria necessary for success. Without over-analyzing the factors of an ideal-consociational nation-state (since this paper focuses on municipal-level power-sharing), Lijphart identified (among other factors) a multiparty system, a tradition of elite accommodation, a willingness to cooperate, and segmental isolation (Andeweg, 2000). Of the last point, Lijphart argued that “clear boundaries . . . have the advantage of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into hostility” (1977, pp. 88). Or in fewer words, “good fences make good neighbors.” A majoritarian democracy might lead to oppression of a minority group; consociationalism, it is argued, fosters peace by creating discrete, autonomous segments of elite control (O’Leary, 2005).

Another characteristic identified for the success of consociationalism were politicians having the autonomy to create consociational arrangements themselves (O’Leary and McGarry, 1995). This is not often the case. Many consociational governments in post-colonial states (Bosnia included) were structured under the guidance of international actors. The Arusha Accords – which formed the Rwandan consociational national government that dissolved in the 1994 war – were organized by the United States, France, and other African nations (and signed outside of Rwanda). The Dayton Accords, which settled the peace in Bosnia and created the framework for the national government there, were likewise written and negotiated on an Air Force Base in southwest Ohio. Burundi’s consociational arrangement – considered to be one which adheres almost dogmatically to Lijphart’s formulation – was largely negotiated by South
African mediators (Lemarchand, 2007). And often consociationalism-advocating theorists will offer advice to national governments, as Lijphart did for South Africa in the 1980s (Andeweg, 2000). While these aforementioned agreements ostensibly involved the participation and approval of local actors, the agreements certainly did not evolve endogenously in a discrete, nationally-bounded universe. The “autonomy” of the local politicians is thus questionable.

One more aspect deemed helpful for the success of a consociational government is “an effective and legitimate government and administrative bureaucracy” (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005). But “effective government” and “legitimate government” are messy, relativistic terms: how does one quantify or define the “effectiveness” or “legitimacy” of a government? Roeder and Rothchild defined “effectiveness” and “legitimacy” in terms of the state’s ability to implement policy (ibid., pp. 45). But if consociationalism is a model imposed on a state after severe internal conflict, is this not the exact time at which the state’s institutions are most delicate? Roeder and Rothchild argued that the state can build legitimacy by mediating between competing groups and not visibly favoring a specific group (pp. 44). But, again, such mediation roles are complicated by the fact of recent violence.

Economic prosperity and equality were also identified as being helpful to consociational democracy’s success (ibid.). The logic is that if all groups in the coalition are at similar levels of prosperity, then there would be less of a need to for redistributive policy. If the government is seen as incapable of addressing socioeconomic inequalities between groups, this may embolden the disadvantaged group and thus threaten that group’s participation in the consociational grand coalition. And as with state effectiveness and legitimacy, popular economic prosperity and equality is assumingly harmed in the wake of state violence.
2e. Criticisms of consociational theory

Consociationalism has been the source of a long debate in comparative politics. The debate has two substrates: The debate surrounding which factors are conducive to the success of a consociational arrangement, and the debate over why consociations do or do not succeed (O’Leary, 2005). This section focuses on the former substrate.

Consociationalism is frequently used as a normative prescription for ethnically plural and contentious countries (e.g., Lebanon, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles, South Africa). However, as already mentioned, “consociationalism” was initially an empirical description of the electoral/institutional arrangements for three specific countries: Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1977). Notice that none of these countries experienced an Auschwitz or Srebrenica in the twentieth century; yet, these are the countries which are described as ideal consociational types by Lijphart. Horowitz stated that the conflicts facing these countries were “less ascriptive in character, less severe in intensity, less exclusive in their command of the loyalty of participants, and less preemptive of other forms of conflict” than the ethnic conflicts in states like Lebanon or Nigeria (1985, pp. 572). Since Horowitz’s writing, consociational governments (and governments with consociational elements) were instituted by multinational actors in the post-conflict spaces of Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina, places quite dissimilar from those Central and Western European democracies in the early 20th century.

The core concept of consociationalism contains a glaring paradox. Consociationalism is defined as an elite-led democracy for a deeply-divided state; therefore, consociationalism is both a system of cooperation in a divided state, yet also contingent upon those divisions (Andeweg, 2000). In fewer words, “the problem and the solution are part of the definition” (ibid., pp. 520).

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4 Andeweg (2000) and O’Leary (2005) have both written excellent syntheses of the debate.
Lustick et al. (2004) used agent-based modeling to show that power-sharing arrangements like consociationalism are correlated with fewer secessionist movements. However, their model simultaneously showed that power-sharing democracy has a correlation with increased size of the minority identitarian movements. Therefore, power-sharing may be a good way to dampen secessionist movements, but it will increase the magnitude by which residents will identify with their respective sub-groups. Thus, by being correlated with the creation of unique, semi-autonomous institutions, consociational democracy theoretically can make more salient the divisions which it seeks to amend.

Other scholars believe that power-sharing incentivizes outbidding strategies: Tsebelis (1990) explained how in consociational democracy, elites can exploit their “monopoly of representation” and fail to cooperate with other ethnic elites. Elites fear that cooperation will shrink the electoral base within their own ethnic groups. Thus, act aggressively within the coalition. Therefore, each elite in the arrangement will “outbid” the other so as to not appear weak before their respective electorate, and the arrangement becomes a centrifuge of malfunction.

There is not an agreement on the “outbidding” criticism of consociationalism. Mitchell et al (2009), citing recent political developments in Northern Ireland, showed that the repeated reelection of politicians from nationalist parties did not entail that these politicians engaging in outbidding. Garry (2009) reached a similar finding. He also cited Northern Ireland as a place in which ethnonationalist outbidding failed to materialize in the breakdown of consociational democracy. That both of these exceptions are drawn from only one case is telling, and the robustness of these studies’ findings warrants scrutiny.
A recurring criticism argues that consociational democracy often empowers those nefarious ethnic elites who were the primary agents in instigating ethnic conflict (Aitken, 2007; Campbell, 1999; Horowitz, 1985; Andeweg, 2000). History carries many examples of this. The Serbian representative during the Dayton negotiations for the new Bosnian state, Slobodan Milošević, eventually died in jail in the Netherlands, waiting for his war crimes trial to end. One could make an argument that the other two major representatives, Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović, had resumes worthy of war crimes indictments. Many of the people identified as “leaders” of their respective ethnic groups in post-war Afghanistan have been identified in international criminal networks (Aitken, 2007). Consociationalism hinges on the belief that leaders who were recently fighting will suddenly decide to put down the guns and sit around the same table and cooperate (Horowitz, 1985).

Critics of consociational democracy have repeatedly asserted that reifying ethnic divisions in the government creates a propensity for deadlocks (e.g., Horowitz, 1985; Tsebelis, 1990; Reilly, 2002; O’Leary and McGarry, 1995). To solve the deadlock, accommodative policies may be passed. These policies often take the form of *quid pro quo* policy; that is, a leader will allow a seemingly ethnically disadvantageous policy to pass if there are other benefits to his or her ethnicity worked into the law. Or, if a policy favors an ethnic group besides a certain leader’s, he or she will only support the policy if there are benefits to his or her ethnic group which supplement the policy (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 578).

Another element of consociational democracy – that is, framing political decisions as “technical and legal” rather than in terms of segmental interest – appears at odds with specific theories of democracy in diverse societies. Feminist political theorist Iris Marion Young argued that differentiated social groups working together in a democratic setting should aim for “just
solutions”; rather than framing political agreement in technocratic terms, democratic consensus in a divided society should be framed in terms of justice (Young, 2000a, pp. 7; Young, 2000b). Lijphart often emphasizes stability as the goal of consociationalism; for Young, the aim is justice.

Young’s concept of differentiated solidarity is a Feminist theory-grounded imagination of democratic power-sharing. Differentiated solidarity is a theory of political inclusion grounded in the idea of semiautonomous, segmented groups cooperating in a shared polity. Young emphasized that forcing different groups to fuse into a single, subjective community serves to erase difference and establish exclusive hierarchies (1990, pp. 227). Instead, she argued that a community cannot be considered as a place in which all people share common experiences and values. In this sense, differentiated solidarity shares a likeness with consociationalism. Both ideas are predicated upon democratic power-sharing in the context deep-seeded difference and diversity. Both ideas theorize a polity in which group autonomy and difference are a given.

However, unlike consociationalism, differentiated solidarity is grounded in terms of shared obligation to justice (2000a, pp. 223). Another major difference comes in the different means by which Lijphart and Young theorize group identity. For Lijphart, divisions between groups can coincide or “cut across” certain groups. “Cross-cutting” cleavages among distinct groups can help break down the “bipolar situation” of an us-versus-them divided society (pp. 81). Young, however, argues that one cannot create discrete spheres into which a person’s identity can be placed. People’s identities “shade into one another” (2000a, pp. 225). The image of democracy imagined as a series of autonomous “pillars” – even cross-cutting pillars – would seem anathema to Young’s concept of variegated identity.
However, the largest difference between Lijphart’s and Young’s formulation is the elite-centeredness of the former. At consociationalism’s core is its elite-led nature – elite-centeredness is part of the one-sentence definition of the theory – and the population whom those elites represent are most often referred to in the aggregate. Their agency is solely in the electing of elites. In Young’s democratic formula, democracy should aim to be as “deep” as possible, meaning that the polity should have a broad commitment to social inclusion in democratic decision making (2000a, pp. 6). Social movements, grassroots organizing, and organic intergroup communication are all practices under the aegis of “deep democracy.” Democracy is practiced by the entire polity, not only a group of elites, as is the case in consociationalism.

While Young does not directly address consociational theory in her works, I bring her into this literature review in order to make a larger point about democratic power-sharing. While consociationalism is a common power-sharing arrangement in divided societies, “consociationalism” is not synonymous with “power-sharing.” Power-sharing can take many forms, such as Young’s model of differentiated solidarity. Consociationalism is merely an elite-centered model of power-sharing in the liberal-democratic tradition, not the end-all, be-all definition of “power-sharing.”

2f. Consociationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a brief history

This section describes the application of consociationalism at the national level in Bosnia. Besides showing consociationalism as applied on the ground, this section provides useful context and history for the later case study.

Bosnia’s declaration of independence in 1992 marked the first instance of Bosnian home rule in roughly 500 years. Since the 15th century, the majority of Bosnia’s present territory were part of the Ottoman (15th to 19th century), Austro-Hungarian (19th to early 20th), and Yugoslav
(20th century) multinational political systems. These complicated international intersections yielded a small yet diverse country.

Before the 1992-1995 war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the others being Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia). Bosnia was never a mono-ethnic state. Despite being the home of the majority of Yugoslavia’s Slavic Muslim population, Bosnian Muslims never formed a majority within Bosnia. They were 44 percent of the population at the eve of the war (Silber and Little, 1997, pp. 209), while Serbs were the next biggest group (31 percent), followed by Croats (17 percent) and “Yugoslavs” who identified as generic South Slavs (6 percent) (Zavod za Statistiku, 1991). The demographic category of Bosnian Muslim was not registered as a separate nationality until the 1974 constitutional reform (Silber and Little, 1997). The seeming novelty of the Bosnian Muslim (or “Bosniak”) identity would be invoked by nationalistic Serbs and Croats who asserted that Bosnians were merely Catholic or Eastern Orthodox Slavs who had converted to Islam during the Ottoman occupation.

Nationalist sentiments became salient in the Yugoslav republics throughout the 1980s, and free elections had empowered nationalist politicians with spurious loyalties to the concept of a federalist, socialist Yugoslavia (Silber and Little, 1997). The dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia began with the secession of Slovenia in 1991. Slovenia’s secession entailed a short conflict, known as the “Ten Day War,” which pitted Slovenia against the Yugoslav National

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5 The three largest ethnic groups in Bosnia – Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs – were official census categories and “nations” in Titoist Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav constitution was amended to include “Muslims by nationality” in 1968, and this term was associated with Slavic Muslims who reside in Bosnia. Each ethnic group is associated with a religion: Croats with Catholicism, Serbs with Orthodox Christianity, and Bosnian Muslims with Islam (obviously). The term “Bosniak,” used to describe Bosnian Muslims, became widespread during the 1992-1995 War so as to highlight that Bosnian Muslims were a separate, unique ethnic group (and not merely citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who practiced a religion which differed from their neighbors’). For purposes of this paper, “Bosnian Muslim,” “Muslim,” and “Bosniak” will be used interchangeably to describe the Bosnian Muslim residents of Mostar. For more context on the discussion of the “naming” of Bosnian Muslims, see Malcolm (1994).
Army (commonly referred to as the “JNA,” its Bosnian-Croatian acronym). The Ten Day War featured fewer than 100 casualities – nothing near the bloodletting of the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts. JNA forces withdrew from Slovenia quickly, embarrassed and outsmarted, and began a new conflict with the Croatian state which had declared independence a few months after Slovenia.

Croatia and Slovenia’s secession from rump Yugoslavia left Bosnia with the choice to secede (which would precipitate a sub-secession of its Serbian population) or stay with Yugoslavia (a state which had been hijacked by Slobodan Milošević and other Serbian nationalists). Bosnians widely chose independence in a 1991 referendum (Malcolm, 1994), though the Serb population abstained from voting. The Bosnian war quickly precipitated when Bosnian Serbs, with the tacit help of the JNA, seceded as expected and went on the offensive against Bosniaks and Croats. Those latter two groups were allied at first, but that alliance broke within a year. A three-way war ensued, with both Croatia and Serbia pushing into undersupplied Bosnia (which remained in a Western-imposed arms embargo). In 1994, Croatian and Bosnian leaders went to Washington, D.C. and signed a treaty brokered by the United States government, thus re-uniting them against the armies of the Bosnian Serbs. NATO-led air strikes against Serbian positions happened shortly thereafter. These airstrikes, coupled with Muslim-Croat advances and the split between Bosnian Serb leaders and Slobodan Milošević, precipitated the main representatives of the three ethnic groups negotiating a new Bosnia in Dayton, Ohio. By the end of the war between 100,000 and 200,000 Bosnian citizens were dead, and 500,000 to

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6 This is a curt retelling of something as complicated as this war. For the canonical retelling of the road to the war and its conclusion, see Silber and Little’s *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (1997). For a more human-centered vantage on the war’s effects, see Miljenko Jergović’s *Sarajevo Marlboro* (2004), a fictional collage of short stories set during the Siege of Sarajevo; Slavenka Drakulić’s *S.: A Novel about the Balkans* (2001), a troubling and extremely graphic historical novel about institutionalized rape during the war; and/or My War Gone By, I Miss it So by Anthony Loyd, which is the memoir of a British war journalist dispatched in rural Bosnia during the war.
2,000,000 displaced via ethnic cleansing, the majority of victims being Bosnian Muslims (Bollens, 2007; Dervišbegović, 2004).

The General Framework for Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, commonly referred to as the “Dayton Accords,” was signed in November of 1995 at the Wright Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. Representing each of the three ethnicities were the presidents of each republic, along with a coterie of assistants and other government figures. While the rubble in Mostar, Sarajevo, and the Bosnia countryside was still smoldering, Bosnia’s representative politicians were literally drawing maps while drinking in the Air Force officer’s club (Silber and Little, 2007, pp. 372)7. During their breaks, the Yugoslav politicians were going to football games, and Slobodan Milošević had the opportunity to go to the local mall and buy Timberland boots (ibid.). This was clearly an elite-led deliberation of the geopolitical fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a means by which to define the state literally along ethnic lines.

The elements of the Dayton Accords follow a classic consociational model, with some notable additions. The accord split the country into two halves, the predominately Serbian Republika Srpska, and the Croat-Muslim Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because of ethnic cleansing, these enclaves are more or less ethnically pure segments. The entities, like states in United States, are explicitly granted “all governmental functions not explicitly assigned in this constitution” (The General Framework Agreement, Annex 4). Thus, we have consociational “segmental autonomy.” The executive branch of the country is represented by a three-member presidency consisting of one member from each major ethnic group (ibid.). Following the “mutual veto” of consociationalism, each member has the power to veto any decision which he deems “destructive of a vital interest” of his constituency (ibid.). The Dayton Accords created a

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7 One planned road, linking the cities of Goražde and Sarajevo, was dubbed the “Scotch Road” because that is what Milošević was drinking while negotiating its route with the U.S. delegation.
bicameral legislature, with representation divided into thirds (according to each ethnic group). This deviates slightly from Lijphart’s model, as this equal representation does not mirror the estimated demographics of the country (CIA World Factbook). Other Dayton provisions included the freedom of movement, the creation of a national bank, and assurances of the right-to-return for displaced persons. Authority for implementation was granted to the High Commissioner, an EU-appointed foreigner who has the mandate to veto, override, or institute any Bosnian government action. While intended to be a temporary position which would phase out in a few years, Bosnia still has a High Commissioner as of 2011. Because of this explicit veto, one could easily make the argument that Bosnia is not a sovereign state.

Before moving onto criticisms of the Dayton Accords, it is first worth mentioning that there has been no large-scale conflict in Bosnia since 1995. Whether or not the document itself, but rather the international military intervention, stopped the war is a matter of debate. But Bosnia’s relative peace since 1995 would correspond with Reynal-Querol’s findings correlating consociational democracies with the cessation of violence.

The most vociferous criticism of the Dayton Accords is the over-emphasis the document gives to ethnic identities. A frequent criticism is that it cements Bosnian identity into three discrete, exclusive groups despite the presence of other ethnic communities in Bosnia (e.g., Roma, Jews, Albanians, and Yugoslavs; Novak, 2005; Campbell, 1999). The consequences of this are manifold: being a minority group in the “other’s” enclave bars you from holding major political office, which theoretically serves as a disincentive for refugee return because the “other’s” politicians would be in power (Nowak, 2005). Furthermore, the strong role of the High Commissioner has been seen to undermine the state, as has the federalist system which gives too much autonomy to the Bosnian-Croat and Serbian entities. In addition, neoliberal economic
reforms administered by the international community, implemented coincidentally with the Dayton Accords, have been shown to undermine Bosnia’s state capacity (Pugh, 2002). Bosnia’s economic woes are, by some analysts, blamed on its bloated public sector: public expenditures are, as of 2005, 60 percent of the country’s GDP, the largest of all southeast European countries (Tomaš, 2005).

2g. Conclusion

In all of the consociational literature identified, there is one simple yet large oversight: the city. The unit of analysis in the cited consociational theory texts is always explicitly or implicitly the nation-state. Likewise, theories of planning in ethnically divided societies are guilty of ignoring how electoral democratic structures formulate political power. Seeing that consociationalism is so commonly implemented in divided societies, and seeing how the influence of consociationalism on urban planning is understudied, it is necessary to unite the two strands of thought and ask a previously unaddressed question: how does consociationalism affect urban planning in the post-conflict, divided city?

This chapter provided the theoretical groundwork for the formation of that question. First, I outlined theories of political power in planning. I presented planning paradigms, along with these paradigms’ relationships to political power, then outlined existing literature on post-conflict planning and planning in diverse societies. In the section which followed, I defined consociationalism in depth and explained factors identified as helpful in solidifying a consociational arrangement. I presented the arguments against consociationalism, followed by a description of how consociational theory was deployed in the formation of the Bosnian state. The next chapter approaches consociationalism from a planning theory perspective, integrating
the two lines of thought in order to formulate propositions of planning in a consociational city like Mostar.
CHAPTER 3: PROPOSITIONS OF URBAN PLANNING IN THE CONSOCIATIONAL CITY

3a. Introduction

The foundation in planning and consociational theory prompts the next question: what urban/spatial and planning conditions can we theoretically expect in the consociational city? How will the role of “planner” be apportioned? In what spaces can we expect post-war reconstruction to happen first? Such questions are not included in consociational theory, nor in planning theorists who do not implicate specific theories of electoral arrangements. Now we adjust the zoom on the lens and sharpen our gaze on the city.

In this section, I outline four propositions of how planning unfolds in the consociational city. Applying theory discussed in the previous section, and supplemented when necessary with theories on nationalism, I describe how planning will unfold in the consociational municipality. I outline these propositions using the following structure: 1) a question about how planning would unfold, 2) using the literature about that question in order formulate a proposition, and 3) showing how this condition manifests itself on the ground. This chapter concludes with a restatement of these propositions. This chapter is, both figuratively and literally, a bridge from the literature to the case study, as the following Chapter 4 will largely be structured around these propositions. In addition, applying these propositions to the case study shows that there is theoretical precedent for the conditions of planning in Mostar.

3b. Proposition #1: De-politicization of decision making

In identifying the conditions favorable for consociational democracy, Lijphart made a contradiction that warrants elaboration. Lijphart (1996) identified geographical concentration as

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8 I choose to use the term “proposition” rather than the typical “hypothesis.” These propositions were partially informed by my research on Mostar. They were not formed without knowledge of planning and reconstruction in Mostar. Therefore, the usage of the term “hypothesis” would be disingenuous, as it would infer these ideas arose in a knowledge vacuum. I am choosing not to feign ignorance of the case.
a favorable condition for an elite-led power-sharing democracy. Yet earlier, Lijphart (1985) asserted that geographical concentration of ethnicity in a consociational democracy undermines the nation-building project of the neophyte state. Thus there is an unresolved question: is municipal consociational compromise hindered or helped by geographic concentration of ethnicity?

Saideman et al. (2005) theorize that territorial identity is the identity which best unifies residents around demands for self-determination. It is easier for ethnic elites to coalesce support when a discrete territory is the object of defense. Furthermore, recall the discussion from the previous chapter on the *quid pro quo* nature of consociational compromise (see pp. 25). Compromise in the consociational system often takes the form of tit-for-tat benefits, with one side agreeing to seemingly self-effacing policy only if other benefits for their side are written into the policy. Remember that de-politicization, or presenting policy problems as technical or rational, is a key element of consociational compromise (Andeweg, 2000). However, de-politicization of planning decision making would thus be difficult in a consociational city since policies with any spatial implications (such as urban plans) cannot be easily de-politicized.

In a territorially-divided, post-conflict city, the non-excludable character of a public good is compromised. Urban planning can be defined as public goods allocation (Moore, 1978; Brooks, 2002), but if a certain planning public good is allocated to a discretely ethnic neighborhood, residents not of that ethnicity are de facto excluded from consumption (since they do not live in that neighborhood). Political theorists Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) describe this phenomenon as the “ethnicization of public goods,” a fitting moniker.

In the consociational city, where the ethnic and the political are intertwined, ethnic territorialization means that plans “take sides.” For example, planning for reconstruction of one

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9 “Nation-building” should be understood as “city-building” in the context of this thesis.
ethnicity’s side of the city would necessitate a *quid pro quo* policy of reconstruction in the other ethnicity’s half. Whether one side is more damaged than the other would be irrelevant since, assuming these are two antagonistic parties in the grand coalition, a *quid pro quo* compromise would be necessary to pass any policy whatsoever. What results is each side having equal pace of municipal-led reconstruction, while simultaneously having an uneven apportionment of reconstruction need. A planning policy favoring development on one ethnicity’s turf, without a subsequent benefit for the other written into the policy, would seem antagonistic.

Assuming ethnic territorialization, the ethnicization of public goods, and the difficulty of consociational compromise, I arrive at the first proposition:

> **Proposition 1:** In the consociational city, ethnic turf formation hinders the “de-politicization” of planning decision making.

3c. **Proposition #2: The fate of boundary spaces**

What is the character of planning in the “unethnic” places of the city, such as boundary zones? Scholars have emphasized the “boundary-drawing” character of nationalisms, both literally and figuratively. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) emphasize that in a plural society of ethnic politics, “the lines of conflict are drawn, hardened, in full view of everyone” (pp. 72). In a post-conflict city, the former “lines of conflict” are gutted buildings, cratered streets, or walls like those in Nicosia or Belfast. In a plural, ethnically-divided city, these urban boundaries take on the characteristic of national boundaries (especially in cases where the conflict was predicated upon drives for independent nationhood). Beissinger (1996) specifically defines nationalism as the actor which draws the “physical, human, or cultural boundaries of the polity.” In the consociational city, those boundaries can split right through the city center.
These urban ethnic boundaries represent a “neither zone”: being the lines drawn between certain ethnicities, they represent neither ethnicity X nor ethnicity Y. The consociational city is governed by elites with segmental autonomy over their areas. These elites’ power is predicated upon votes from residents of those segments. Therefore, areas not under the sole jurisdiction of ethnic politicians will receive less attention. If public goods allocation is targeted only to certain ethnic spaces, then it seems logical that the “unethnic” spaces are those which will receive the least investment and the least material reconstruction.

Thus, a condition of underdeveloped boundary spaces will ensue. Given that these spaces were often the former front-lines of combat (as is the case with Mostar), the boundary zones are often the areas which are most spectacularly damaged. Yet the shelled-out buildings will remain, as discretely ethnic spaces will receive precedence. Ethnic spaces are where consociational politicians draw their support; in essence, nobody represents the spaces which are non-ethnic.

Assuming that ethnic conflict creates discrete physical boundary spaces between antagonistic identities; that these boundary spaces are thus “unethnic”; and that consociational politicians draw their support from a monoethnic constituency, I infer the next proposition.

*Proposition 2: In the consociational, post-conflict city, boundary spaces will remain underdeveloped and underplanned.*

3d. Proposition #3: Enclave planning and ethnonationalism

In the consociational city, political power and political action arises out of elite-led cooperation and consensus. Top-down municipal planning implementation is thus contingent upon cooperation. If this is the case, then what is the nature of the compromise? Within this framework, plans which will be implemented are those plans that forward each respective
ethnicity’s nationalist project. Because consociational democracy has been argued to empower nationalist ethnic elites, then the plans which receive precedence will be those which buttress the control base of the ethnic elite. If the elite is “ethnic,” then those projects which are most transparently “ethnic” will receive precedence.

At this point in the discussion it is crucial to bring in Kaufman’s (2006) discussion of the “symbolic politics” of ethnic conflict. Throwing out the “rational choice” model of ethnic conflict, Kaufman argued that the causes of extreme ethnic violence are not utility-maximizing decisions posited by various rational actors; rather, ethnic violence is caused by the mobilization of chauvinist nationalist mythologies. In other words, symbols and emotions are more powerful than objective rationality as agents in violence. By overplaying the “incompatible values” of other ethnic groups, ethnic elites mobilize their base into violence.

Tit-for-tat rebuilding projects, and the reconstruction of symbolic structures (e.g., houses of worship, historic buildings indicative of the style of a certain ethnicity), will serve to amplify interethnic hostilities. Monuments which narrate a certain perspective on the former conflict, or projects which give specific material benefits to only a certain side of the city (e.g., ethnicity-specific services), will receive precedence over infrastructure which links both sides or shared public space. This follows Bollens (2009) in his assertion that the construction of certain parts of the urban landscape, in interethnic contested cities, can be a means of exacerbating interethnic tensions. I do not imply that urban planning is inherently violent, or an instrument to amplify violence; rather, I hypothesize that the “logic” of the warfare (i.e., incompatible symbols and mythology, mythological ethnic grievances) is served by planning in the consociational city.
Since ethnic elites within the consociational city support projects which buttress their ethnic base, and since symbols are major agents in the causation of ethnic warfare, I arrive at the following proposition.

Proposition 3: Enclave urban planning in the consociational city propagates, rather than dampens, ethnonationalist sentiments.

3e. Proposition #4: The role of exterior actors

These propositions follow a causation model. First, there is ethnic territorialization, which leads to underdeveloped boundary spaces and planning projects which forward the ethnonationalist project. All of these scenarios refer to planning within each ethnic enclave. However, what remains of planning for the entire city? Who plans for that?

More than likely it will not be the local government. Even though specific parts of the city are attributed to specific ethnic groups, the entire city cannot be so easily categorized. It belongs to all ethnic groups and, paradoxically, belongs to none. In consociational democracy, the “nation-building” (or “city-building”) project presupposes that the state (however defined) is not monoethnic. However, it is primarily ethicized planning projects which receive attention.

Thus the “planning power vacuum” left will be filled by non-state groups. Groups such as international governmental and non-governmental organizations, domestic NGOs, the national government, grassroots citizens groups, and/or private business interests will serve to fill in the “planning vacuum.” These aforementioned groups can provide crucial funds (which may not be allocated by the local consociational government), implement building projects of key infrastructure which serves the entire city, and/or provide heavy financial incentives for the local government to perform the aforementioned tasks. This is a succinct introduction for the next
(and final) proposition, which largely follows Alesina et al. (1999), who empirically found an inverse relationship between local public goods spending and ethnic polarization.

Given the entrenchment of segmental autonomy in a consociational system, and the fact that the city as-a-whole is not monoethnic, I formulate the final proposition.

Proposition 4: Consociational deadlock will cause planning to be performed by actors outside the municipal government.

3f. Conclusion

This chapter presented four propositions, predicated upon political and planning theory, of how urban planning would unfold in the consociational city. The four are:

- “De-politicization” of planning decision-making is hindered by post-conflict territorialization of the city.
- In the consociational, post-conflict city, boundary spaces will remain underdeveloped and underplanned.
- Enclave urban planning in the consociational city propagates, rather than dampens, ethnonationalist sentiments.
- Consociational deadlock will cause planning to be performed by actors outside the municipal government.

The next chapter presents the Mostar case study, which is then related back to these propositions.
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY: MOSTAR

4a. What and where is Mostar?

According to the Federal Office of Statistics (2008), Mostar has a population of 111,116\(^{10}\), making it the fifth-largest city in Bosnia and Herzeogvina. Mostar is the largest city in Herzegovina, a region in southern Bosnia with no separate administrative/legal/political category. Herzegovina is a historical term designated for the realm of a medieval Bosnian dynasty started by Herzeg ("duke") Stepjan Vukčić Kosača. This dynasty was conquered during the invasion of the Ottoman Turks in the 15\(^{th}\) century, and Herzegovina has not been a distinct independent political-territorial entity since.

Mostar is located on the Neretva River, which bisects the town. It goes on a north-south path through the town, and the urban conurbation reaches directly up to the Neretva’s steep banks. The town is built on karst and is surrounded by large hills which are impediments to developments. Hum and Brdovac hills bound the town to the south, with Hum Hill in particular being visible throughout the town, while the Podvelež hill bounds the east of the city.

\(^{10}\) Please note: this is an estimate, as there has been no official census since 1991.
Figure 1: Bosnia and Herzegovina, located. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2011.
Figure 2: Mostar, located. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 2011. Location of Mostar emphasized by author.
4b. History: Pre War Mostar

Mostar’s history is archetypically Balkan, marked by overlapping conquests and partitions brokered by global powers. Pagan Slavic tribes entered the region in the 6th and 7th century (Malcolm, 1994, pp. 6). Yet record of modern settlement of the Mostar area dates back to at least 533, when a Roman Christian diocese was set up in what is now the Mostar suburbs.
Franciscans took over the diocese in the Middle Ages, beginning the order’s long history in the city (a history which continues to the present day).

The city’s strategic location as a Neretva River crossing made it contentious spot: the Ottomans eventually captured the city in the 15th century, bringing with them the religion of Islam. During the Ottoman period the east bank of the Neretva was developed into a typical Ottoman town center, replete with bazaars, mosques, madrassas, and maze-like streets. It was in 1566, roughly 100 years after the initial Ottoman occupation, that the famous Old Bridge, or Stari Most, was built in the town center. It was bridges that gave Mostar its name, “most” being the local Slavic word for “bridge” and “mostari” meaning “bridgekeepers.” This bridge is still today the major symbol of the city – a postcard from Mostar will undoubtedly have a picture of the bridge, and city’s seal is a drawing of it.

Figure 4: The (reconstructed) Old Bridge over the Neretva. Source: Makaš, 2007. Used with permission. Original image cropped and contrast-adjusted by author in order to emphasize the Old Bridge.
Mostar was a crucial settlement in Ottoman Herzegovina. Yet towards the end of the
Ottoman era, Mostar was largely at odds with the central Ottoman administration (mostly over
issues pertaining to tax collection). According to one historian, Mostar existed in “a state of
almost permanent resistance to the central [Ottoman] government until the 1830s” (Malcolm,
1994, pp. 91)

British Egyptologist John Gardner Wilkinson visited Mostar in 1844, and his visit is
recorded in his two-volume *Dalmatia and Montenegro* travelogue from 1848. Wilkinson
observed Mostar’s multiethnic character, citing a population of “7300 souls, of whom 2000 are
Turks, 3560 Greeks, and 1440 Roman Catholics. There are also 300 Gipsies [sic], or Ziingga,
and three Jews” (Wilkinson, 1848, pp. 57). The references to “Turks” and “Greeks” are
misleading as the vast majority of the population was Slavic-language speakers, and those labels
certainly mean that these residents were Slavs who were Muslim and Eastern Orthodox in faith.
Wilkinson also cites the unusually tolerant character of the local administration (pp. 67-68),
seeing such cosmopolitanism as unusual for the area\(^\text{11}\).

Roughly thirty years after Wilkinson’s visit, the Congress of Berlin was signed in 1878.
This treaty ensured that Bosnia (including Mostar) was granted to the Austro-Hungarian Empire
and that the Ottomans withdrew from the area. This was the second major period of the town’s
expansion. Besides new legal arrangements and administrative systems, the west bank of the
Neretva developed in a typically continental urban fashion: the Hapsburg administrators
constructed wide boulevards, monumental buildings, and transportation corridors such as
railroads and highways (Yarwood, 1999). They also installed modern utilities (e.g., power, gas,

\(^\text{11}\) Wilkinson’s account is a fascinating one, an uber-Orientalist travel account written by a British academic during
the peak years of British colonialism. Wilkinson, as one might expect, misattributes the Old Bridge to being the
work of Roman engineers, and praises it for being a relic of Roman finery situated in an otherwise boorish Ottoman
town.
and waterworks). Most of these new urban forms did not, however, come at the expense of the older Ottoman city, which remained largely untouched on the east bank and parts of the west bank immediately near the Neretva. As under Ottoman rule, the Austro-Hungarian administration also attracted the ire of the Mostar residents. When the Hapsburgs attempted to qualify the strength of the local Muslim vakuf administrators, Mostar residents organized a secessionist political party based upon the creation of an autonomous “Vakuf Assembly” for southern Herzegovina (Malcolm, 1994, pp. 147).

Josip Broz Tito’s brand of socialism came after the Second World War, following the dissolution of the brief Yugoslav monarchy. The socialist administration introduced more modern architecture and residential development, mostly on the western and northern edges of the city. Typical East European, Le Corbusier-inspired socialist apartment blocks came to Mostar during this period. Mostar also quickly industrialized. Of particular note is the construction of the Alumniji Mostar in the 1970s, forming the manufacturing backbone of the city.

Despite the one-party political system, Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito was characterized by a decentralization uncommon in other East European socialist states. Following Yugoslavia’s split with the Soviet-centered Cominform in the late 1940s, the country instituted a series of reforms with the aim of differentiating itself from the Stalinist, centralized development and governance model. Yugoslavia instituted a system known as samoupravljanje, which translates to “self-management.” Self-management extended to many forms of production and governance. Factories were formally run by worker collectives, and relatively autonomous “communes” of elected officials and professional civil servants ran many cities, including Mostar (Permanent Conference of Towns in Yugoslavia, 1957).
According to the 1991 Census (Federalni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991), Mostar was 35 percent Muslim, 19 percent Serbian, 34 percent Croatian, and 10 percent “Yugoslav.” Out of the 100-odd Bosnian municipalities for which I have data from the 1991 census, Mostar has the sixth-largest share of Yugoslavs. It also had Yugoslavia’s second-highest share of mixed-ethnic marriages (behind only Vukovar, another city which was heavily targeted during the war, Matejcić, n.d.). One can see how “pillarizing” of such a mixed populace—as a consociational system demands—may be difficult.

Regarding urban planning in pre-war Mostar, urban and regional planning was popularly institutionalized later in Yugoslavia than in America. The urban destruction wrought by World War II warranted the creation of planning departments in most Yugoslav cities, whereas prior urban planning was a function of either the colonial administrators or the stray planning department in Yugoslavia’s largest cities (Fisher, 1972). Besides wartime destruction, urban planners in Yugoslavia were busy with a massive urban influx. In the course of 25 years – from 1945 to 1970 – the country’s population went from being 23 percent to 63 percent urban (ibid.). In comparison, the same demographic shift took 100 years in Western Europe and fifty years in the United States. It should be noted that this influx was more pronounced in the north (e.g., Slovenia, Serbia) and not the relatively rural south (of which Mostar was a part).

4c. History: The 1992-1995 War

Nationalist sentiments bubbled in Yugoslavia towards the end of Tito’s reign, and eventually precipitated the breakup of Yugoslavia roughly a decade after his death. Simmering hostilities boiled over in April of 1992. In Mostar, the war came in two phases: the first being the local Croat and Muslim forces fighting those of the Republika Srpska (which were backed by the Yugoslav National Army). Republika Srpska forces bombarded the city from the eastern
hills, forcing East Mostar residents to evacuate and rendering large swaths of that area uninhabitable. Local Serbian and Croatian nationalist leaders brokered a deal a few months after combat began, and Serbian forces withdrew (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009). Soon afterwards, Croatian forces began their attempt to force Muslim residents from the city. An estimated 15,000 – 23,000 Muslim residents of West Mostar were forcibly removed from their homes, and many Muslim males were taken to detention and extermination camps east of the city (Bollens, 2007; Bittner, 2011). Women, children, and the elderly escaped with only what they could carry to East Mostar. The second phase of violence began in May of 1993, this time with the formerly-allied Croatian and Muslim populations as the combatants.

Due to ethnic cleansing, the city was by and large segregated into a Croatian West and Muslim East. Furthermore, these areas’ populations were supplemented by rural Bosnians whose home villages were cleansed: an estimated 30,000 Muslims and 17,000 Croatians would move from their home villages into Mostar (Bollens, 2007). The front line of conflict became the Boulevard of the National Revolution, now marked as the Boulevard of the Croatian Defenders on the map (or known as the “Boulevard” for the sake of this paper), a major north-south arterial which bisects the city center on the west bank of the river. It was crucial that Muslim forces did not allow the front line to push east to the Neretva River, as that would mean an end to their water supply (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009). It was during this period of Croat-Muslim fighting that the Old Bridge was purposefully destroyed by Croatian mortars. This period of fighting was fiercer, more protracted, and more destructive than earlier battles against Serbian forces, and the Boulevard still has not fully recovered.

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12 Bollens cites the 15,000 low estimate; Bittner cites the 23,000 estimate. Both estimates arise from interviews with different local officials and are not statistical canon.
Fighting did fully not cease until a Washington-brokered peace accord between Croats and Muslims in March of 1994, roughly a year and a half before the Dayton Accords formally ended the war in Bosnia. The Washington Agreement included a special provision on Mostar, which ordered that an international body would govern Mostar for a two year period in order to normalize administration of the war-torn city.

4d. History: Immediate post-war administration

Four months after the Washington Agreement, the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM) began. The EUAM entered into a destroyed city; according to EUAM estimates, 87 percent of the buildings in Mostar were damaged and 22 percent “heavily” damaged beyond repair (Yarwood, 1999). Of those labeled “heavily damaged,” roughly four-fifths were located on the Muslim side (ibid.). Six thousand and five hundred housing units were damaged or destroyed (Bollens, 2007).

Hans Koschnik, the former mayor of Bremen, was appointed by the German government (then the head of the EU) to be the head administrator for Mostar. The EUAM’s job was by no means an enviable one: they had placed themselves in a still-smoldering warzone (of which they were not the belligerents), and shouldered themselves with the task of providing materials and finances for rebuilding, along with the task of building local institutional capacity. While these goals are seemingly innocuous, many of the institutional divisions which came to plague Mostar’s consociational prescription were begat during this administration. And these divisions’ effects on urban planning were salient.

John Yarwood, EUAM director of reconstruction, needed local planning experts in order to implement the reconstruction projects for which the EUAM had funds. Yarwood stated in his memoir of the project (1999):
It was obvious from the start that the most important factor in our success would be the creation of an appropriate relationship with the local technical elite...We were reliant on their cooperation to get things done. (pp. 11)

This sort of planning practice warranted the hiring of a geographically and ethnically fractured planning department. According to his memoirs, Yarwood’s first proposal for citywide planning came in October of 1994. At this point in time, there was neither a Mostar government nor even a plan for one (pp. 28). Yarwood proposed separate so-called “borough” councils handling planning matters in their respective areas, with city-wide plans being implemented by a city council. This plan was initially rejected by his boss, head administrator Koschnik, who favored a single-tier, centralized administration and planning department.

In 1995, however, Yarwood had already identified a joint strategic planning team of Croat and Muslim planners. Yarwood is quick to mention that the planners constructively cooperated amongst each other. However, a riot in February of 1996 created a “tremendous political convulsion.” There was an assassination attempt by Croatian nationalists upon EUAM head administrator Koschnik (this despite some Croatian nationalists greeting him with a sincere Nazi salute upon his arrival in town, pp.5). The fallout from these riots caused the planning office to temporarily disband, and the EUAM’s two-year mandate in Mostar ended before the planning division could present a unified city plan. As of 2011, there is still no entire-city plan.

By early 1996, according to Yarwood, it was evident a single-tier municipal government was not practical: intergroup hostilities were too salient. An interim agreement proposed a total of six municipalities—three Croatian, three Muslim—with a joint-administered core district. The boundaries of the central zone became the contentious issue: Muslims (who at the time formed the majority of the town) wanted a large zone, and the Croat leaders did not. The town planners proposed situating city administration and key civic institutions (the railway station, the
main post office, schools, etc.) within the zone, while excluding housing. It was also designed to include plentiful vacant land and destroyed property (which would theoretically be the site of municipal civic institutions). Surprisingly, Croat leaders agreed to this plan but Muslim leaders did not (as this agreement minimized the number of Muslim residents in the central zone).

Thus there was an interethnic deadlock, and Koschnik imposed central zone boundaries using an EU-mandated decree (which caused the aforementioned riot) (Luchetta, 2009; Yarwood, 1999). An Italian delegation was in Mostar during the riot, and their alarm prompted them to invite Croat and Muslim leaders to Rome to agree on the new charter. In Rome, the Muslim leaders agreed to a new central zone delineation (drawn by the United States mediators, Makaš, pp. 192) and the city was formally divided into six ethnic municipalities over which nationalists retained control, with three municipalities being Croatian and three being Bosnian Muslim. Boundaries for the municipalities mirrored post-war lines of conflict (Bollens, 2007).
The Rome Agreement had a few curious fallouts. First, Hans Koschnik resigned from his position as EUAM administrator; the Italian government had essentially usurped his decree. Furthermore, the agreement communicated to Muslim and Croat leaders that if they press their nationalist demands hard enough, the European Union would break. The riot had communicated enough.

Despite not having a formally consociational government during the EUAM period, the divisions which would rife municipal planning became salient during this period. While the EU
brokered contracts with local companies to rebuild destroyed buildings and infrastructure, ethnic leaders took control of services within their respective segments. Municipalities attended to the collection of their own taxes, and established their own utilities (Luchetta, 2009). The EUs efforts were directed towards reconstruction projects, while city administration was eventually put back into control of the ethnic elites who were from nationalist political parties (I.C.G., 2000). And given their desire to work with local construction firms (Yarwood, 1999), the EU was reliant upon contracting with locals whose loyalties were ethnic. The EU frustration about creating a city-wide construction materials pool was well summarized by Yarwood’s quote that “even a bulldozer was to be either Catholic or Muslim” (1999, pp. 75). The EUAM thus needed to create two different materials pools on each side of the river.

The EUAM departed in June of 1996, following the first city-wide elections in Mostar. It was a year before a city council was actually formed (Luchetta, 2009). These elections cemented into place the six municipality, joint-administered core system. However, most specialists on Mostar consulted rarely posit each municipality as an individual actor in urban development (Luchetta, 2009; Vettes, 2007; Makaš, 2007; Bollens, 2009; I.C.G., 2000; I.C.G., 2009; Office of the High Representative, 2003).

The Interim Charter of Mostar, written by the EU and cemented into place by the Rome Agreement in 1996, has many aspects of a consociational model (Finsveen, 2006). It was an elite-led model, where politicians representing each of the six ethnic municipalities jointly govern the city center and (ostensibly) the entire city. Segmental autonomy was also assured by the six municipality system. Each municipality was enabled to have a local administration which was supposed to be subservient to the will of the main, pan-municipal interethnic council. While not explicitly enshrining a municipal veto, for matters of fundamental interest to one of
the peoples a majority of votes amongst each ethnic group was needed. This formed a de facto veto, since a majority within both the Muslim and Croat representatives was necessary. Council seats for the joint city council were divided into thirds – 16 for Muslims, 16 for Croats, and 16 for “Others.” The even split between Muslim and Croats is indicative of the town’s demographics. The seats for “others” were set aside for Serbs and minorities yet, tellingly, for most the interim period fewer than half these seats were filled (Bollens, 2007; I.C.G., 2009).

The interim statute was dissolved in 2004 following a constitutional crisis in the country. Mostar is located in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the jointly Croatian and Muslim-governed half of the country. In 2002, the Federation constitution was amended to make the Serbs a “constituent people” of the Federation, this being done as an attempt to highlight the multi-ethnic ideal of the Bosnian state. This amendment, however, served to make the interim Mostar statute unconstitutional, as it only recognized the Muslim and Croatian communities. This constitutional amendment occurred roughly the same time that the federal statistical bureau published its findings that Mostar had a slight Croatian majority, mostly due to refugee influx and intentional resettlement sponsored by the Croatian government (Luchetta, 2007; Bollens, 2007).

The EU worked to write a new statute for Mostar: Given their newfound majority status, Croatian leaders suddenly switched sides and favored a purely-proportional city administration. The EU, hesitant to enforce this because it would seem a reward for ethnic cleansing, instead drafted a city statute in which the council would have an equal number of Croatian and Muslim seats, with five seats set aside for Serbs and “Others” (Office of the High Representative, 2004). This new city statute was imposed via EU decree, to the consternation of Croatian leaders, in 2004.
This new charter still follows a consociational structure. Decisions involving budgeting, amendments to the statute, and the ratification of urban plans require a supermajority of two-thirds of councilors voting in favor (ibid.), which becomes a de facto mutual veto between Croatians and Muslims. While “segmental autonomy” is not enshrined into the new statute (as it was in the interim statute through the municipalities), the networks of local power have, according to observers, remain entrenched in the city (Bollens, 2009, 2007; Luchetta, 2007; Makaš, 2007; Bieber, 2005). These old networks are even more obvious given the lack of cooperation in the new city government: it recently took the council 13 tries to pass a citywide budget (Luchetta, 2007). An EU decree towards the end of that year was needed to install a mayor and a working budget (Luchetta, 2009, Office of the High Representative, 2009).

Furthermore, there were two planning departments in each of the halves of the city. The union of the municipalities greatly bloated the civic administration, including planning. As of 2007 there were a total of roughly 200 planners employed in the city of Mostar (Bollens, 2007).

This brings us to the present day. Mostar is still operating under its 2004, EU-imposed charter. The mayor as of Spring, 2011 is Ljubo Beslić, an ethnic Croat from the Croat-nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (commonly known by its Bosnian-Croatian acronym, “HDZ”). The HDZ is cross-border political party, formed by former Croatian president Franjo Tuđman. In Mostar, the HDZ is the most powerful political party, yet it faces opposition from a splinter party, the HDZ 1990, and the ostensibly multinational NS (I.C.G., 2009). The HDZ 1990, while still answering to the same HDZ leadership in Croatia, is endorsed by the Roman Catholic Church and prominent Croatian politicians (Bajrušić, 2007).

The Party of Democratic Action (known by its native language acronym, “SDA”) is the primary Bosniak political party in Mostar. The SDA is relatively centrist compared to the HDZ,
yet its support base is almost entirely of Bosnian Muslims in Mostar (I.C.G., 2009). Like the HDZ, it was founded during the breakup of Yugoslavia by a state president (i.e., former Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović). The SDA faces less political opposition than its Croat counterpart, and therefore has more seats than any other political party in Mostar. However, local Mostarian Bosniaks largely feel disconnected from the SDA – that party is headquartered in Sarajevo, while the local HDZ base is strong in Mostar. Its leader within Mostar is Suad Hasandedić, who recently lost the mayoral position to Mr. Beslić from the HDZ (ibid.).

I shall now advance towards specific case studies of municipal planning efforts within the city.

4e. State-based planning actors in Mostar

In this section, I elucidate the recent history of the planning department in Mostar. Through this, I show how potentially peace-building planning efforts in Mostar are at odds with the ideals of consociational decision making, particularly the goal of “de-politicizing” decision making. This section relates to the first proposition: In the consociational city, ethnic turf formation hinders the “de-politicization” of planning decision making.

Up until 2004, the city space had multiple planning departments, while a largely impotent central planning authority operated throughout the entire city (ICG, 2003; Bollens, 2007). In 2004 these planning departments were formally united, in the process creating an office with roughly 200 planners under its domain. Recently the city has begun an earnest, city-wide spatial planning effort. In 2008 the city formally resolved to draft a spatial plan for the city (Gradsko Vijeće Grada Mostara, 2008). The drafting and implementation of these plans is to be funded by the World Bank, with a guarantee from the central Bosnian government (ibid.).
Discussions pertaining to planning remain contentious within the city council. Councilors from various ethnicities have walked out of meetings, and as of November 2010 discussions for approving a planning council were tabled (again) from the city council’s meeting (Drlje, 2010). A Mostar planner interviewed by Calame and Charlesworth (2009) mentioned that often during planning meetings for the municipal planning commission, the planners from the Croatian side simply did not show up [because of Croatian politicians’ orders].

As of February of 2011, the city is focused on adopting plans for specific districts within the city while the master plan is being drafted (Drlje, 2011b). Most of these plans emphasize spaces for commercial development, highlighting mixed-use commercial and residential properties. There are currently six spatial plans under review by the city council, each being physical plans for five specific areas within the Mostar urban conurbation. These plans were created in the central, united planning office. Four are in the central city – two in Croatian West Mostar, two in East Mostar. A fifth is for a largely destroyed industrial area in the south of Mostar. In addition, there is a sixth spatial plan for a theme resort in Mostar’s outskirts. This resort, “Ethnovillage Borina (Etno Selo Borina),” aims to recreate a 19th century Herzegovinian village, complete with uncomfortable beds for the guests (Kokor, 2010).

As of February 2011, the city had not passed any of these plans (Drlje, 2011b).
They are typical land use maps, recognizable to any planner regardless of his or her mastery of Bosnian-Croatian. According to Bollens’ framework (1998), these plans would fall under the aegis of a “technical” strategy. Urban development is framed as a “value-free technical [issue]” in order avoid taking sides…with the respective ethnic groups (ibid.). Ostensibly the entirety of the plan can be witnessed within the image itself, as the colors and lines represent means of framing future development within each planned zone. Buildings are
colored so as to be identified as currently existing or planned, war-damaged or intact, multifamily residential or mixed-use, etc. Demolitions are colored brown, buildings to be built are colored red, etc.

Yet these seemingly innocuous documents are strewn with connotations of larger issues. Journalists from *Dnevni List* frequently cite the passage of plans as means to secure foreign investment (Drlje, 2011b, Drlje 2011c). In the minds of the newspaper reporter, these plans are “information that is useful in making interdependent decisions within a particular cultural context” (Hopkins and Zapata, 2007, pp. 12). Those “interdependent decisions,” in the reporter’s mind, are the contingent investments of capital into Mostar. Investment will not come into Mostar until investors’ dreads are ameliorated by the city stating that it intends to guide, regulate, and streamline development. The impediments to capital investment, according to the reporters, are the politicians who refuse to pass these spatial plans.

That the planning departments of Mostar were reunited has little effect on the actual implementation stage of the plan. Plans must be approved by the city council, who under the current charter must form a two-thirds majority in order to ratify plans. While discrete reasons cannot be identified, ethnic antagonisms are frequently identified by local *Dnevni List* journalists as the reasons why city plans cannot be passed. Construction lobbies (“*građevinskih lobijima*”) are another reason cited (Drlje 2011b). Whatever interest is determined in the non-implementation of the plan – ethnic, monetary, or perhaps some combination of both – it is clear that there is a fracturing of political power within Mostar. Given that consensus is necessary for a consociational system to work, plans remain unimplemented.

Flyvberg provided an explanation for such a case, and he deserves to be quoted at length only because his words aptly define the shortcomings of the Mostar technical plans:
Because rationality yields to power in open, antagonistic confrontations, the power of rationality...is weak or nonexistent [under the confrontation of power]. The force of reason gains maximum effect in stable power relations characterized by negotiations and consensus-seeking. Hence, the power of rationality can be maintained only insofar as power relations are kept nonantagonistic and stable. (1998, pp. 223).

Mostar municipal technician-planners thus have little influence if there is a fracturing of the political will. They, as planning professionals, can choose to embed themselves into the fractured polity and attempt to negotiate with power (Forester, 1989; Brooks, 2002), or withdraw entirely, claiming their role as that of an apolitical “technician” like some post-conflict planners (e.g., says one Belfast planner quoted in Bollens, 1998: “it can be useful for planners to adopt the technical role...because it allows [us] to avoid confrontation,”).

A Dnevni List article from January 22, 2011 is focused on the Mostar physical planning council’s (vijeće prostornog plana) pending approval of a comprehensive 10-year plan13 (Drlje, 2011a). In order to go up for public review, the comprehensive plan must first be approved by the planning council, a body appointed by the city council (Gradsko Vijeće Grada Mostara, 2008). Salem Salko Bubalo is the director of the planning department of Mostar. When asked by a reporter about what he foresees for the approval of these plans by the council, Bubalo responded: “See, this is no longer up to [my department of urban planning]. Everything is now the responsibility of the physical planning council, which sets the guidelines14” (qtd. in Drlje, 2011a). Later in the same story, Bubalo was asked about the fate of the six area plans cited above, which had passed the physical planning council but had yet to be ratified by the city council. He responded simply with “We did the plans,” followed by a statement of the plan’s ratification is the mayor’s, and not his, responsibility. Bubalo seemed surprised that the plans

13 n.b. this article is in reference to a 10-year comprehensive plan, not the six area plans cited above. It has not been approved by the planning council yet and is thus not available for public review.
14 Vidite, to više nije do Žavoda. Sve je sada na Vijeću prostornog plana koji treba dalje postaviti smjernice.
did not pass – “there’s nothing controversial in them” – and implied that the Office of the High Representative might intercede in order to ensure the plans’ passing. These are clearly planners operating under a politically impotent, rational-technical paradigm.

The fate of rational, technical analysis also reaches a barrier in regards to Mostar’s utility delivery. A study, performed by Habitat International, analyzed the problems of wastewater and groundwater pollution in Mostar (Calo and Parise, 2008). A coal mine, in addition to the improper disposal of solid waste, was proven to have greatly contributed to the amount of harmful chemicals in the local water system. In addition, two waste collection agencies (for each side of the river) begat the overuse of improper landfills and the underuse of the one suitable landfill in the area. The World Bank refurbished this landfill and granted it to the city on the condition that the two waste management utilities were unified (Calo and Parise, 2008, pp. 69). Evidently, the argument of water pollution alone was not sufficient.

As stated in Chapter 2, crucial to the operation of a consociational consensus is the framing of political decisions as rational and de-politicized. That is, by removing the ethnic element from the equation, the members of the grand coalition can thus discuss the issues in terms which would not make ethnic divisions salient. However, as shown in the literature review, theorists of planning in divided cities argue that neutrality can beget a planner’s impotence (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009). Bollens (2000) argued that a policy which seeks neutrality “creates a gap in community connectedness that is filled in by conspiratorial theories on both sides of the ethnic divide” (pp. 282).

What exists is a gap between two theories: Namely consociational theory, which advocates de-politicization of decision making, and a certain string of post-conflict planning theory, which argues that de-politicized urban policy in divided cities does little to ameliorate

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15 Po njemu, ne bi trebalo ništa čekati jer na njima nima ništa sporno
inter-group conflict (Bollens, 2000, 2002, 2009; Calame and Charlesworth, 2009). As Mostar shows us, while city-wide planners may attempt to be neutral and rational actors, their counterparts in city government (and the nationalist actions of respective groups) are anything but neutral. In Mostar the roles are reversed – instead of rational-technical consensus-building politicians and dynamic planners making pointed interventions which address the ethnic divide, we have the exact opposite situation. As evident in this section, the de-politicization of planning office plan-making in Mostar has helped plans to not be implemented. However, the onus of responsibility is not only the planners’ – a local institutional structure which prioritized rebuilding, plan making, and interethnic cooperation would aid in plan implementation. But having a mutual veto for plan implementation, as is the case for consociational Mostar, has forbade the passing of plans.

Is this non-passage of plans an inevitability? Rather than using mediation or other communicative strategies as a means to shape power (Forester, 1989), taking an action-based approach to planning (Freidmann, 1987), or embedding themselves in the political process (Brooks, 2002; Hoch, 1994), the planners handed in their plans and then pled helplessness. Perhaps, as Hoch argues (1994), the public planners in Mostar fear for their jobs. Given that the public employment sector is bloated (Bollens, 2007), and the mayor’s issuance in late 2010 of a “redundancy list” of unnecessary municipal employees (Previšić, 2011b), a Mostar planner’s fear of unemployment would be reasonable.

Yet, how does this failure of de-politicized decision making relate to post-conflict territorialization, a crucial element of the first proposition? Muslims and Croats make up at least 95 percent of the population of each of their halves of the river (Bollens, 2007). An ostensibly rational policy intervention – the uniting of the waste management systems, for example – must
first address the fact of territorialization of ethnic segments. Mostar shows us that when planners fail to address this territorialization, they invite irrelevance.

In this section, I demonstrated how the first proposition\(^{16}\) of planning in the consociational city reifies itself in Mostar. The next section pertains to the city center and the second proposition.

**4f. State-based actors in the city center.**

Of the six plans opened for public review by the city of Mostar, one which demands particular attention is the plan for the redevelopment of the “central zone” on the east side of the river. It is worth mentioning that this central zone plan covers only a miniscule East Mostar radiation\(^{17}\) of the contentious central zone – i.e., the former EU-administered center - over which each group makes claims. In this section, I show that the urban interventions in the city center, however defined, more often than not serve projects which undermine the concept of a shared, inclusive Mostar citizenship. In order to do this, first it is necessary to detail the massive demographic shift Mostar experienced during and after the war, followed by an explanation of the town center planning process. This section pertains to proposition #2: *In the consociational, post-conflict city, boundary spaces will remain underdeveloped and underplanned.*

The last census performed in Bosnia – in 1991 – cited Mostar as having a population of 126,066, a number which decreased to 111,116 as of 2008 (Zavod za Statistiku)\(^{18}\). While the overall population decreased, an estimated 47,000 refugees (commonly known as “IDPs,” short for “internally displaced persons”) poured into town from the war-ravaged countryside (Bollens, \(^{16}\) *In the consociational city, ethnic turf formation hinders the “de-politicization” of planning decision making.*

\(^{17}\) See pp. 54

\(^{18}\) This 2008 statistic, like all other statistics cited in that paragraph, must be viewed cautiously as they are only estimates. The federal government has not undergone a national census since the war, for politicians fear that new census numbers may qualify their as-of-now irrefutable claims to ethnicized territories (Vetters, 2007, pp. 197).
Doing the math on these estimations, it seems that roughly half of the present-day Mostar population are post-war immigrants from rural areas. Likewise, many prewar Mostarians fled the country during the onset of the war. One estimate is that 70,000, or slightly more than half the prewar population, is no longer in the city (Bittner, 2011).

Those old residents who remain often display resentment towards the rural IDPs, on the grounds that the newcomers receive a disproportionate amount of foreign aid from NGOs and foreign governments (Vetters, 2007, pp. 195). Vetters quoted a middle-aged Croatian-Mostarian who vented about the new ethnically Croatian residents living in the outskirts of the town.

The Croat government built these settlements…You see how big the houses are, they all have two floors. Who owns a house with two floors nowadays? But it is good they settled outside the city, they are people from the country and it will take them a generation or so to get used to the city. (pp. 196)

In this quote the long-time Mostarian makes a clear statement of difference between old and new residents: small homes vs. big homes, central city dweller vs. country bumpkin, own home vs. Croatian government-funded home. These new homes are an attempt to “Croatize” Mostar. Theories of nationalization and nation-forming have associated the urbanization of peasants with burgeoning nationalist sentiments (see Gellner, 1983); a similar process is at work in the new Croatian settlements. By settling rural refugees – many of whom are war veterans (ESI, 2004) – in Mostar, the Croatian nationalist movement is attempting to penetrate Mostar with Croatian loyalists.

One important way in which ethnicity is signaled in Mostar is through the built environment (Grodach, 2003). It is important to remember that the three groups all speak the same language, and no group has a particular set of readily identifiable physical features ascribed upon it. On the other hand, the architectural style associated with each group is considerably more distinct. The Ottoman architectural tradition and the Austro-Hungarian continental
tradition are noticeably different, as are the traditional forms of each group’s house of worship. Thus a major means of asserting group identity, in Bosnia, becomes the built environment and the alterations made to it.

While this idea will be explored more fully in the next section on historical restoration, it pertains to central city development. Throughout all of Mostar’s demographic shifts caused by inter- and intra-urban ethnic cleansing, the core area remained disproportionately multiethnic, with Serbs, Muslims, and Croats living together in large flats (Vetters, 2007). It is thus difficult for a single ethno-political group to make an uncontested claim on the central zone. The central zone – particularly the areas around the former front line on the Boulevard – remains disproportionately unrepaired (Bollens, 2007, 2009; Bittner, 2011; Vetters, 2007; ICG, 2009). By being a damaged built environment, the central zone can be seen as symbolic of the denigration of the idealized multiethnic Bosnian national identity.
Figure 7: Damaged buildings in the city center. Source: Michael Sherman, 2007. Used with permission.
Figure 8: Damaged buildings in the city center, 13 years after cessation of violence. Source: Michael Sherman, 2007. Used with permission.

Since the EUAM period, the central zone has received a disproportionate amount of attention from the European Union and other members of the international community. The central zone was the home of the EUAM’s headquarters in the Hotel Ero. An EU planner explicitly stated that the central zone was an administrative district which was first formulated to “provide a basis for international investment” (Yarwood, 1999, pp. 30).

Historic and monumental projects in the Mostar center are seen by residents to have received the bulk of international reconstruction assistance (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009), and certainly the most visible kind of assistance. The revival of the Mostar tourism industry has been one of the goals of these renovations. Before the war, Mostar was estimated to have received one million tourists yearly, an important income source which was harmed by the war (Pašić, 1994, cited in Grodach, 2003). These tourists were drawn towards Mostar’s Ottoman old town and the famous Old Bridge, and government capital was invested during the Yugoslav years in restoring historic buildings. That it was outsiders who were drawn to central Mostar’s Ottoman character, and outsiders funding the post-war repair of this area, also points to a clear international interest in the central zone.

Throughout the EU administration and afterwards the city center, the only actual “Mostar-administered” part of Mostar (as it was administered by both Croatian and Bosnian councilmen), remained underdeveloped. Even though the city did have a planning department during this time, the six municipalities ignored the edicts of this central planners (Bollens, 2007).

Nationalist incursions into the central zone took the form of unsanctioned, informal occupations. Bollens (2009) commented on the failure of the joint-administration of the city core, noting how the municipalities which bordered the core have effectively redrawn the border and developed core property without asking for municipal approval. The International Crisis
Group (2003) confirmed this story: While the central city planning department was in charge of issuing building permits, the surrounding Croat municipalities would issue their own permits – in exchange for money – in order to develop central zone land beyond their jurisdiction. The Muslim municipalities which bordered the central zone, seeing a Croatian incursion into this space, proceeded to issue illegal permits as well. Since the central city government lacked the authority or political will to punish illegal construction permits, illegal construction boomed in Mostar and the issuing of permits became a source of wealth for the municipalities. Urban development and reconstruction by one side helped to exacerbate interethnic tensions. Bricks and mortar, rather than artillery mortars, became the means of asserting ethnic dominion over urban space.

The EU made multiple attempts to establish the core as a real municipal institutional hub: one attempt, in 1996, involved the EU funding the reconstruction of the pre-war courthouse in the city center. The head Croat and Muslim city-center mayors agreed on a plan to make this building the official Mostar courthouse. However, shortly before completion, the keys to the building disappeared. The next day a sign was mounted on the building reading “Higher Court of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna,” named after the de facto Bosnian Croat state established in southern Bosnia during the war. The building remained a Bosnian Croatian courthouse until 1999 (ICG, 2000).

Besides simply occupying land in the central zone for institutional purposes, there are clear attempts to have these land occupations forward a national-cultural project. Makaš (2007) related how Croatian groups attempted to develop the Croatian National Theatre building, even citing a passage in the city statute which designated land in the central district for cultural activities. There was another aborted attempt, in 1996, to build a large, modernist Catholic
cathedral in central Mostar. The International Crisis Group (2000) identified Croats as being the more egregious offenders of such practices – rebuilding or attempting to rebuild schools, churches, and other Croat institutions within the core, while simultaneously blocking measures enabling tax collection and the revitalization of Muslim-held properties.

This claiming of central city space by Croatian nationalists neatly falls into Bollens’ (1998) category of partisan urban planning. The case of the courthouse represents a claiming not only of city space, but of symbolic national space. The wartime Croatian political entity of Herceg Bosna is still a dream for Croatian nationalists. Herceg Bosnian leaders have used Mostar as their headquarters, not only for the short-lived courts but also for meetings of their “national assembly” (Kebo, 2001). The goal of these leaders is recognition of the Croatian-majority areas of Bosnia as a separate entity within Bosnia, or this area’s annexation by Croatia. Mostar, thus, can be seen as existing in two national realms – Bosnian and Croatian – and claims of sovereign space by Croats are essentially votes of no-confidence for the Bosnian central state as it exists under the Dayton Accords.

In 2010, the city placed a public notice for evaluation of a new, central zone plan. This plan, as already stated, covers only part of that original EUAM-administered central zone, the area near the train/bus station that is on the east side of the river. There are three maps to the physical plan: one identifying existing conditions, one identifying sites to be demolished, and one identifying the new buildings and land uses. There are more sites slated for demolition (nine) in this area plan than with any other area plan, though only a few of the buildings are marked as damaged in the existing conditions map (Grad Mostar, 2010a).

Like the other area plans, this central zone district plan ostensibly represents a technical-neutral planning strategy under Bollens’ framework. We have the similar colorful maps, land
area calculations, etc. The de-personalized representation of urban space inherent in such a plan serves to mask the ethno-political connotations of this contentious core. Rather than being treated as a special opportunity to unite people, or a site of symbolic significance in Mostar’s geography, or a site of urban reconciliation which can serve the purpose of national reconciliation (Bollens, 2000; 2007), the core is rendered only as pretty and colorful as a similar plan for an industrial field.

When considering the neutrality of the plans, it is important to consider the six plans as a whole. Of the four of the six plans which regulate land in central Mostar, two are in West Mostar and two in East Mostar. There was likely some effort to equally apportion planning endeavors between the two ethnicities’ turfs, an indication of the quid pro quo compromise prescribed for consensus building in a consociational system. The plans may be neutral in a sense that they equally apportion the use of central city resources, yet that neutrality is predicated upon a division which is anything but value-neutral. In other words, this action represents only a
neutrality of distribution without taking into account which side of the river is proportionally more damaged and in need of reinvestment (i.e., the east side).

Regardless of the fact that it is within one country (and entirely within the Croatian-Bosnian Federation), the Mostar central zone exists as a symbolic national boundary. Given how much ethnic identification plays into the Dayton and the Mostar model of democracy, citizenship rights are in essence only guaranteed when one is living in a space in which his or her ethnic group is the majority (Guzina, 2007). Even though there are formal protections enshrined in the
city and national charter, local authorities are known to insufficiently protect rights and stymie equality between the groups (ibid.). In other words, citizenship in Bosnia is determined exclusively – you are one of the three ethnic groups, and your rights and representation are determined as such. Other identities – Yugoslav, woman, Roma, working class – simply do not fit into the equation or do so only speciously.

The question then becomes: if one is living in a mono-ethnic enclave within Bosnia, to what state are they a citizen? Does a Bosnia Croat war veteran who lives in a Croatian state-funded home in Mostar consider himself a Bosnian citizen? According to the classic liberal democratic theorists of citizenship like T.H. Marshall (1965), citizenship is defined as access to a community which guarantees the protection of civil, political, and social rights. Currently this Croatian war veteran is receiving social rights (i.e., welfare in the form of housing assistance) from a state government outside of Bosnian borders. His political rights are only salient in the Bosnian Croat community, as it is only those leaders for whom he votes (given the consociational system). His civil rights are relatively protected in the Croatian parts of Mostar, and are (theoretically) guaranteed nationally under the Dayton constitution. So two of the three types of his classic liberal democratic citizenship rights – i.e., political and social – are determined solely along ethnic lines. If one considers the secessionist aspirations of many Herzegovinian politicians, these two types of citizenship are secured more by Croatian nation-state, not the Bosnian one. Given that the goal of Dayton was to instill liberal democratic values into the nascent Bosnian state (Guzina, 2007; Nowak, 2005), this severely qualifies the success of the Dayton project.

These shortcomings of Dayton are on spectacular display in the Mostar central zone. The residents exist in what can be considered a non-national space, as the Bosnian state is defined by
Dayton as consisting of multiple, discrete, mono-ethnic entities (or, to use Lijphart’s term, *pillars*). If you are not part of these entities, then what is your role in the Bosnian state?

Thus we return to consociationalism and planning Mostar. If power is ensured by belonging to a certain ethnic pillar, then the urban spaces which are multiethnic go underconstructed. These spaces require consensus among all actors in Mostar, while mono-ethnic spaces do not. If consociational decision making is predicated upon de-politicization, then how come so many urban interventions in the core (namely, the incursions by Croatian nationalists) have been the exact opposite of de-politicized? It is clear that de-politicized decision-making has had little salient effect either on the urban core or on the implementation of municipal spatial plans. A de facto mutual veto in the city council has obstructed the implementation of these places. Meanwhile, spaces within the ethnic segments of the city – e.g., new homes for war veterans – remain the targets for development.

Thus, the second proposition is clearly demonstrated in Mostar. The central zone – the only legally non-ethnic zone in Interim Statute Mostar, and the buffer space between the ethnicized halves of Mostar – has received little attention from municipal authorities. The center remains underfunded, under-repaired, and more gutted than other parts of the city. While there were clearly plans for the city center (in a general sense), these plans derived from each side and were ethno-nationalist plans for ethnicizing the city center. The placing of Croat institutions in the center are examples of this condition. Following Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, since the boundary spaces in Mostar are sites which are not considered ethnic, they receive the smallest provision of now-ethnicized public goods.

If rebuilding the central zone were a priority for both parties, it would be built up and invested in. Calame and Charlesworth (2009) cited how antagonistic factions will sometimes

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19 In the consociational, post-conflict city, boundary spaces will remain underdeveloped and underplanned.
cooperate on some projects which they deem mutually advantageous. For example, they cited the uniting of the sewer system in Nicosia, Cyprus. Both the Greek and Turkish halves of the city could not afford their own sewer utilities; therefore, they found it necessary to cooperate and unify the sewers. Such mutual advantage, evidently, does not seem to be the case in Mostar.

In these past two sub-sections on state-based planning endeavors, I explained how the planning departments have come to be restricted by the lack of consensus among the municipal government. First, I showed how the Mostar planners’ technocratic, objective, seemingly neutral plans have reached an impasse in a city council which is anything but objective and neutral. Neutrality has begat plan non-implementation. Then, I showed how development of the multiethnic city center was hindered by several factors. These factors included nationalist land invasions, the prioritizing of symbolic reconstruction projects, the aforementioned neutral strategy of the Mostar planners, and a Dayton-based definition of citizenship which under-valued multiethnic spaces.

The next two sections of the case study will concentrate on non-local or non-state based actors in Mostar’s post-war planning.

4g. Non-state actors: Historical restoration and the anti-politics machine

This section and the next examine planning efforts by non-municipal or non-state actors within Mostar. The first section analyzes how historical restoration projects problematize municipal planning interventions within the city. Particular attention is paid to the famous Stari Most, or Old Bridge, the 16th century Ottoman bridge which was reconstructed under the auspices of UNESCO in 2004. This section draws heavily from the research of Dr. Emily Makaš (2007). The next section features the case of the tenant union of central Mostar, a multiethnic
citizens group who protested and petitioned in order to secure development funds for their war-ruined apartments. Both sections show how the municipal planning vacuum is filled by both exogenous and endogenous actors, and how this problematizes the legitimacy of the Mostar government. These sections demonstrate both the third and fourth propositions: *Enclave urban planning in the consociational city propagates, rather than dampens, ethnonationalist sentiments*; and *Municipal, city-wide planning will be performed by actors outside the municipal government.*

To begin is the discussion on historical restoration.

Mostar is an incredible city to look at: Ottoman-era stone buildings, antique bridges, mosques, *hans* (or travellers’ inns) are a walking distance from monumental, continental structures from the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Neretva River has a greenish-turquoise color. And the craggy hills which bind the city frame all these sites together. There is a very good reason the city used to receive one million tourists a year before the war. It is, simply put, a beautiful place.

This beauty obviously turned ugly during the war, and distress beacons were sent out by Mostarians who saw their city’s architectural heritage and uniqueness compromised by mortal shells. *Mostar ’92: Urbicid* (1992) was an international clarion call by Mostar artists and architects who wanted to show the extent to which their town had been damaged by Serbian shelling. The majority of the book is pictures of half-crumbed walls, gutted buildings, toppled minarets, and broken glass where once were architectural treasures. Ironically, this book was published before the more intense Muslim-Croatian fighting and the destruction of the Old Bridge. But efforts like this book served the purpose of alerting the international community of the fact that heritage was at stake. After the war, the international community responded in kind.
The most famous of post-war architectural restoration projects was the Old Bridge, destroyed in 1993 by the Croatian military. The bridge is the icon of the city and is arguably the most recognizable piece of architecture in all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With its destruction, the bridge came to represent (in the international community’s eyes) not only the extent of the war’s destructive tendency, but also the symbolic destruction of a multicultural, pluralist Bosnia (Makaš, 2007; Grodach, 2002). The director of UNESCO praised the reconstruction of the bridge, hailing the bridge as highlighting “the important role of cultural heritage in the reconstruction of a culture of peace” (Matsuura 2004, qtd. in Makaš, 2007). Donors frequently cited this symbolism in their donation letters (Makaš, 2007).

UNESCO made the bridge a pet project, seemingly at the expense of any other architectural project in Bosnia (Barry, 1999, qtd. in Makaš, 2007). The World Bank provided the majority of the financing for the project, an odd fact given the organization’s typical focus (at the time) on economic development. Many international groups, NGOs, and foreign governments donated funds, and the beneficiaries’ names were often hung on the scaffolding surrounding the bridge during reconstruction (Makaš, 2007; pp. 224).

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20 Besides a historical “culture of peace” in Mostar, someone else could easily cite the Mostar’s historical culture of not kowtowing towards foreign occupiers (as cited in section 4a.).

21 Ironically, the Croatian government donated money even though Croatian troops had blown up the bridge less than a decade prior.
However, locals from both ethnicities jokingly deride the reconstructed bridge as the “Novi Stari Most,” literally “New Old Bridge” (Makaš, 2007; Luchetta, 2009; Grodach, 2003). Most of the original stones were unsalvageable, and foreign engineers and a Turkish construction team were employed for the restoration. Furthermore, given the self-advertising of the donors and UNESCO during the construction process (which culminated in a bombastic opening ceremony at which no Mostarian spoke), locals came to see the project as a hobby horse of international interventionists who had little regard for structural economic and political problems in the city (Makaš, 2007).

Not all restoration projects are so easily embedded with metaphors of cooperation and interethnic unity, and the tensions in the Mostar city council can become reified in restoration projects. The New Old Bridge, despite being hailed as a metaphoric “bridging” of the two communities, was derided by some Croatian nationalists who instead saw the Ottoman-era
bridge as symbolizing historic Ottoman domination over the local Christian populace. The West Mostar Franciscan Church of Sts. Peter and Paul is another notable example of historic restoration. The 19th century church was heavily damaged during the war, and its reconstruction – unlike the New Old Bridge’s – was almost entirely funded locally (Makaš, 2007). Foreign funding came partially from a German Franciscan charity, but this was a small share of the total. The project attracted controversy not in what was being restored, but how it was being restored. The church’s bell tower was reconstructed to a much larger height than the original, destroyed tower, and with a proportion to the church unusual for most bell towers. At 107 meters, it dominates the Mostar skyline including, notably, any minarets.

![Figure 13: Mostar skyline. Nationalism takes to the air: the Franciscan bell tower is the tall structure towards the right. In addition, though not fully discernable, the cross on top of Hum Hill is the faint structure on top of the hill on the left. Source: Michael Sherman, 2007. Used with permission.](image-url)

On the other side of the former frontline, East Mostar has seen a flurry of mosque construction and historical renovations of Ottoman-era structures (though admittedly nothing as seemingly aggressive as the bell tower or the massive cross built on Hum Hill, which overlooks Muslim East Mostar). Thirty-eight mosques exist as of 2002, more than double what were there in the 1980s (Strandenes, 2003). In some cases, funds to restore and construct these mosques
come from abroad. The Sheik of Sharja donated money to restore one of the historic mosques in the Old Town (Makaš, 2007; IRCICA, 1999). Another 16th century mosque, the famous Karadoz-beg Mosque, was reconstructed using funds from for a wealthy former member of the Saudi government (IRCICA, 2004). Such donations from Arab states presumably play into Croat chauvinist mythologies of Bosnian Muslims being pawns in a Jihad against Christian Europe. The Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC) is one organization which has been heavily involved in Mostar’s restoration and reconstruction. Amir Pašic is heavily affiliated with the AKTC. Pašic, a native Mostar architect and globally-educated consmopolite, frequently invites foreign architects and preservationists to Mostar to participate in collaborative design and planning projects (AKTC, 2004; Calame and Charlesworth, 2009). Most of the AKTC projects have been centered in the Ottoman-era core. A map in a brochure shows the sites which AKTC aimed to restore, and 13 of the 21 are located in East Mostar (and two more not in East Mostar are Ottoman-era construction, ibid.). Most often the case is of mosques being reconstructed, and usually via Arab funds.
The above map illustrates the spatial distribution of cultural heritage structures (defined as religious structures and cultural centers) constructed after the war. While this is not an exhaustive spatial analysis or catalog of such structures, some insights can be drawn from it. First, Bosniak structures outnumber Croatian structures. This should not be surprising given the aforementioned accelerated speed of mosque construction (and that mosques are seemingly more often spurred by foreign investment, Carabelli, 2011). Secondly, Croatian structures, while
fewer, visibly straddle the former front line of conflict (and the de facto line between the two halves of Mostar). Such siting can easily be seen as antagonistic, especially since two of these four structures – a theatre and an aborted cathedral – did not exist in pre-war Mostar (Makaš, 2007). Thirdly, with the exception of three mosques in West Mostar, these institutions are divided into each enclave. Such spatial analysis of cultural structure siting shows us that historic restoration can have partisan, ethno-cultural ends.

This post-war focus on historic preservation planning – and the pomp and circumstance given to projects like the Old Bridge – has raised the ire of urbanists and planners in Mostar. City officials, such as one planner interviewed by Calame and Charlesworth (2009), have criticized the EU and World Bank for favoring symbolic reconstruction projects over economic investment and aid. Mostar was recently cited by the World Bank as the single worst city in Southeastern Europe in which to do business (2008, qtd. in I.C.G., 2009). In addition, Mostar is estimated to have an unemployment rate as high as 70 percent (Luchetta, 2009). However, since the international community has more resources (and power) to accomplish their will in Mostar, local planners have little recourse besides venting.

Thinking about these historic and cultural restorations in terms of consociationalist theory yields interesting conclusions. First, these “dueling restorations” can be seen as a byproduct of segmental autonomy. Since these groups have respective dominion over each zone, and since the built world is the means by which to assert a national claim, it follows that projects of a nationalist ilk would be the projects constructed (especially if these projects can, like the bell tower, project a group’s identity across the city). Group-based claims are made in bricks. Secondly, the de-politicization of spatial decision making is the exact opposite of what actually happens. These restoration projects – noticeably the Old Bridge and the ethno-heritage sites –
appear to have discrete political agendas in a consociational system, as they are means by which each group in the coalition lays their claim on their space. In fewer words, it is impossible to depoliticize an ethno-cultural building in a political system predicated upon ethnicity. \textbf{Thirdly,} and most importantly, the largesse and pomp of the foreign donors stands in stark contrast to the deadlocked, squabbling city council. We see here how foreign intervention fills the gap of power where municipal planning and reconstruction fails. Even though these restoration projects may promote the nationalizing projects of local politicians, the source of funding often comes from abroad.

Rather than asking why the government is being ineffective, it may be more useful to consider what these donors gain by intervening in Mostar. For the West in general but particularly Western Europe, the war in Bosnia was a crisis which tested the resolve of the European Community project. The European Commission (or “EC,” the predecessor to the EU) took a particular interest in Bosnia and the breakup of Yugoslavia. EC leaders saw the instability there to be a threat to their project of pan-European economic integration (Campbell, 1999; Silber and Little, 1997). Bosnia was to be a challenge of the collective will of the EC, a test of its “singleness of purpose” (Silber and Little, 1997, pp. 159). As EC foreign minister Jacques Poos famously stated, “the Hour of Europe has dawned” with the dissolution of Yugoslavia (ibid.).

At least one hundred thousand Bosnians were killed during this “hour,” and considering that the Bosnian peace was negotiated under American (and not European) auspices, Europe needed to find other means to ingratiate itself into the Bosnian political sphere. Funding projects like the Mostar Old Bridge were a means of doing that. As a bonus, the EU got free publicity in the form of the banners which get hung on scaffolding.
If the EU rebuilds cultural sites, administers the city for its first two years, imposes the Mostar city statute by decree, and continues to hang onto the High Representative post for years longer than expected; and if the World Bank finances the lion’s share of the Old Bridge restoration and the city’s planning endeavors; and if the United States is the party drawing the boundaries of the central zone; and if the local Aluminij Mostar factory is privatized and sold to Croatian nationals (Donais, 2002); and if Saudis fund mosque reconstruction and German Franciscans fund church restorations; and if the World Bank agrees to waste system improvements only if the two waste utilities in the city combine…if all these groups intervene in specific, pointed ways, then how does the impotent, squabbling city council come across to the residents? Not well, certainly.

Because consociational deadlock emasculates the council, various global interests are served: geopolitical (the EU, the United States), ethnocultural (German, Arab), and profit (e.g., the Greek firm). If there is a local interest served by the deadlock, it is likely those same politicians, especially given the notorious state of corruption in the Mostar city council (I.C.G. 2000, 2003, 2009). For example, the average timespan for construction permit approval is 535 days. However, the I.C.G. (2009) tells one story of one contractor who, after waiting for a permit for more than year, purchased one via local criminal networks. One need not stretch his or her deductive intellect to figure out how criminal elements acquired municipal permits.

One sees, in Bosnia, a twist on Ferguson’s (1990) “anti-politics machine”. In arguing the idea of development as an “anti-politics machine,” Ferguson asserted that a development initiative’s unintended consequences often serve to depoliticize state power while simultaneously institutionalizing its strength. In instituting a consociational arrangement in Bosnia, the EU ensured a deadlocked state with massive unemployment. It is no mistake that Bosnians leave the
country for opportunity and subsidize the West with labor: Bosnia has one of the world’s largest shares of remittances as a percent of gross domestic product (World Bank, 2010).

In the Mostar case, we see a microcosm of Bosnia: the beneficent foreigner donating money to build spectacular buildings (while seemingly ignoring a 70 percent unemployment rate), while simultaneously institutionalizing a political institution which induces deadlock (along with that quasi-criminal politicians in that institution). Mostar spends roughly twice as much of its other Bosnian cities its size on public employee salaries, and those city jobs are coveted (ICG, 2003).

Ferguson’s (1990) idea of the anti-politics machine was conceived against the backdrop of an ongoing economic development project in Lesotho. The Lesotho project represented a more traditional development endeavor, while the international efforts in Mostar focus on developing peace-building political institutions. However, the results of both efforts are similar: a criminalized (yet deeper-entrenched) state in which democratic politics is undermined (and criminalized) while international organizations increasingly play the role of the state, doling out material aid. The EU and others force the institution of a consociational democracy in a city whose divisions are not becoming to elite compromise. In Mostar, it is not development which is the anti-politics machine; rather, the anti-politics machine is politics itself.

In the case of historical restoration, one sees how proposition #3 - Enclave urban planning in the consociational city propagates, rather than dampens, ethnonationalist sentiments – is operationalized. Emily Makaš (2007) used the concept of “dissonant heritage” to explain how symbols of heritage in the public domain come to be interpreted and understood differently. Thus historic symbols like the too-tall Franciscan bell tower, restored historic mosques, and of
course the New Old Bridge take on different meanings for different persons. Likewise, Bollens (2007, 2009) argued that urban interventions can serve the purpose of ameliorating or exacerbating intergroup hostilities.

It is my argument that, in the consociational city, reconstruction within urban enclaves serves the latter function. Examples of this are found within Mostar. First, targeted reconstruction of heritage sites plays into nationalist mythologies on both sides. The propagation of mosques and Croat efforts to penetrate the skyline with ostentatious religious symbols (e.g., the Franciscan Church bell tower) are examples of this condition. Also notable is the propagation of ethno-cultural structures along the former front lines (see Fig. 14, pp. 82). Secondly, there are Croatian state government efforts to populate with ethnic Croatian refugees (particularly refugee veterans). Thirdly, there is the case of the expansion of the enclaves, wherein land invasions in the city center served to amplify intergroup hostilities and created a war of bricks in which the two groups mutually invaded the center. Given the quid-pro-quo nature of consociational compromise, gains for one group would be posited as gains needed by another. It should be stated that many of these interventions were not framed as such compromises; rather, construction of religious structures and land invasions occurred outside the realm of electoral politics and compromise. Given that the concept of segmental autonomy dictates that each group is sovereign over its own space, there is officially no check on what goes on in the other’s segment. Consociational outbidding (Tsebelis, 1990) may not only occur in electoral realms; it can also, evidently, occur via construction.

The next section will concentrate on the role played by a citizens’ protest group. After that section, proposition four will be integrated into the case study.
4h. Non-state actors: the central zone tenant union

The final section of the case study focuses on a citizen’s movement based in the central zone. As a prominent grassroots citizen movement, the tenant union has had varying success in their petitioning for government funding of their housing blocks. Case study data from this section is largely indebted to Vetters (2007). This section shows how citizens are able to provide a force against consociational “pillarizing” by mobilizing using a shared appeal for justice.

As already mentioned, the central zone remained (and still remains) one of the most under-repaired areas of Mostar. Land invasions and illegal permits were common, while efforts to formally plan for that area remain deadlocked in the city council.

The issue of housing in the central district is obviously problematic. Being the site of the former front line, buildings in this area were heavily damaged. In addition, the population of this zone was more mixed-ethnic than other parts of the city (Vetters, 2007, pp. 199). This diversity was seen to have contributed to the lack of official action in this zone, as city councilors from each ethnicity had little to gain by addressing the central zone population. Furthering the political unattractiveness of the central zone resident’s plight is the nature and history of the apartment buildings. Many of these apartment complexes, prior to the secession of Bosnia, belonged to state-owned companies and enterprises such as public utilities, the police, or the Yugoslav army. Apartments were granted to workers of these companies (Vetters, 2007). Since these were state-owned apartments, a new political regime meant that ownership of the buildings became unclear.

Simultaneously, international and national aid for housing was concentrated on the issues of IDPs and minority return (“minority return” meaning the return of residents ethnically cleansed from their homes back to their original areas in which they are now minorities). Given the multiethnic character of central core housing, it was not particularly easy to determine who
was a minority (Vetters, 2007). Residents saw themselves as overlooked by the international community. One central zone resident, a Muslim male currently unable to enter his damaged apartment, expressed his frustration at the influx of refugees:

[The recent Muslim arrivals from ethnically cleansed areas] have taken over the town, they have all built their nice houses here with donation money and now they run the town. (Vetters, 2007, pp. 196)

The residents of the damaged Santičeva Street apartments, seeing that their demands were met neither by the international community nor their elected officials, decided to take matters into their own hands. After a speciously legal effort in 2001 to demolish one of these apartments, the residents mobilized and started protesting in front of city hall. They formed a group called Moj dom (“My home”). A popular slogan for the group was “Displaced in our own town” (“Raseljeni u svom gradu,” Vetters, 2007, pp. 201). Rather than “displaced” being used in its usual context – i.e., to refer to a rural-urban migrant who was ethnically cleansed from his or her home – the terms is subverted and reworked to refer to older, native Mostarians who are forced to scatter throughout the city because their state-owned complexes remain gutted (Vetters, 2007). Other longtime Mostarians, some not from Santičeva street, joined the multiethnic movement. Residents were able to mobilize the identity of “displaced person” to appeal for state funds, and eventually a special fund was set up by the city to pay for renovations of the apartment buildings.

However, results are mixed. As of March, 2011, the city is having difficulties gathering all the funds needed to renovate the facilities (Drlje, 2011d). As of January 2011, 470 units in central Mostar are still in need of restoration (Bečić, 2011). The city is currently 2.2 million KM short of financing the project renovation. Seeing that the city is of insufficient assistance – and
suspecting graft being the reason why – *Moj dom* president Muradif Kurtović is appealing to international organizations for funding assistance (Previšić, 2011a).

While the success of the protest movement is currently uncertain, there is, in *Moj dom*, a clear effort to work across ethnicities and voice collective demands in terms of justice. Here is inclusive democracy in action. The *Moj dom* group members are working towards just ends by “finding solutions…to their collective problems from across their situated positions” (“situated position” to be understood in Mostar’s context as ethnic group [Young, 2000a]). That justice is the aim for this democratic movement is evident in the inequities of how housing was provided in Mostar after the war, with rural refugees receiving priority in assistance. In addition, there is an attempt by the residents to undermine the pillarization of the consociational democracy, which assumes ethnic identity is the primary agent in determining political identity and position in Mostar. The *Moj dom* protestors are subsuming their ascribed ethnic identity in order to mobilize the identity of “displaced in our own town.” By framing their argument in terms of justice – i.e., that they are an aggrieved group who has not received a similar recompense to other aggrieved groups – they appeal to something more uniting than a hermetically sealed ethnicity (Young, 2000b).

Yet the news is not all good. The city government is broke, and almost 500 units remain gutted years after the protest movement began. Despite having a greater say in city politics, the goals of the group are largely unmet. By and large, they remain “displaced in their own town.” The *Moj dom* group cannot be oversimplified as wholly contrarian. Their claims are for money from the local government, not necessarily a critical rearrangement of that government. Furthermore, the *Moj dom* members utilize the traditional current NGO donor system by asserting their identity as “displaced,” and also by refusing to take the keys the city offers them
on their unfinished apartments (Bečić 2011). By accepting keys the Moj dom members would presumably no longer have “displaced persons” status. Furthermore, these are members of the old, Socialist-era elite. While the protest movement has a grassroots orientation and arose as a reaction to governmental inefficacy, it would be difficult to label it as an effort at “social transformation” (Beard, 2003). While seemingly at odds with the city government, Moj dom actually buttresses the government’s authority by petitioning through official channels for money.

The prior two sections show how proposition #4 – Municipal, city-wide planning will be performed by actors outside the municipal government – holds true in Mostar. The necessity of these urban interventions – particularly the reconstruction of historical structures – has been questioned. Barakat (2005) and Mac Ginty (2005) asserted that post-conflict intervention needs to include socio-economic and peace building interventions. However, Mostar planners have complained about the undue spending on historic restoration at the expense of economic development. Furthermore, scholars have argued that the neoliberal reforms instituted along with the Dayton Accords have begat corruption and clientelism at the local level, stymieing local economic development (Divjak and Pugh, 2008). The development of a consociational model, and the simultaneous ostentatious set piece restoration of historic Mostar, has served to undermine the credibility of the city government. Simultaneously, international efforts serve to bolster and cement the Mostar government: City charters were written overseas, Croatian politicians with specious alliance to the Bosnian state were cemented into power, the World Bank issued loans for the city to create plans, in addition to forcing a show of intergroup unity as a condition for improving solid waste infrastructure. Politics itself, in Mostar, becomes the agent
of anti-politics. In the meantime, citizens groups attempt grassroots mobilizations on behalf of the city center, yet the efficacy of one notable movement is, as of now, not wholly successful.

The past two sections reviewed non-state planning endeavors in Mostar. Both endeavors – historical restoration efforts and the *Moj dom* organization – showed how non-state-based planning serves to support municipal political power while seemingly undermining it. In the next section – the conclusion – I will offer recommendations and concluding thoughts, and posit a series of questions regarding further research.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This thesis elaborated on the relationship between consociational democracy (at the municipal level) and urban planning in the post-conflict, divided city. Using relevant literature from the fields of comparative politics and urban planning, I created four propositions of planning in such a context. These propositions were evaluated in case study of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a city which had (until 2004) consociational governance at both the national and municipal level.

Mostar shows us that consociational democracy, while a popular electoral system for divided societies, has direct spatial implications in the post-conflict city. Previous works in comparative politics have under-regarded consociationalism’s effect on urban space, while scholars on postwar planning have not implicated specific power sharing arrangements in creating the post-war planning environment. I argue that consociationalism, a popular post-conflict power sharing system, is written into the city via the ruins in the border zones, ethno-nationalist structures, and identity-marking buildings. This thesis showed that elite-led political consensus building, mutual veto, and excessive segmental autonomy begat chauvinist rebuilding projects, political deadlock vis-à-vis plan (non-)implementation, underdeveloped border zones, displaced persons, and non-municipal plan making (despite the fact that 200 planners work in the city). The core of my argument is that consociationalism creates these specific planning realities in those cities in which it is implemented. The character of planning in Mostar can be linked, both in theory (as demonstrated by the propositions) and in actuality (as demonstrated by the case study), to the application of consociational democracy in that space. Since these are the conditions one can expect in post-conflict municipal consociationalism, then planners, politicians, and policymakers within such a city can craft specific interventions which aim to ameliorate these issues.
Scholars have argued that consociational arrangements work best when elites enter into such arrangements by their own volition (O’Leary and McGarry, 1995). But this was absolutely not the case in Mostar. Not only did the elites not enter the arrangements independently but the international community cemented these arrangements via decree, such as in 2004 when the new city charter was forced upon Mostar by the EU’s High Representative. Mostar is a case of consociationalism imposed from afar. Scholars, citing how chauvinist politicians cemented power with the first elections, have commented on how Mostar may not have been ready for electoral democracy in 1996 (Bollens, 2007; Luchetta, 2009). In seeking to develop a neophyte country and a destroyed city, the international community should allow electoral arrangements to be created locally. This may be easier in the case of municipal consociationalism. In a municipal context, the “local” is much easier to define than in the context of an imagined community (Anderson, 1991) like a nation-state.

Yet in a city as divided as Mostar in 1994, the ethnic elites likely would have not entered into an agreement to peacefully and jointly govern the city. This raises the second point: the elite problem. A very simple point is that if the international community is going to bring elites into a consociational arrangement, they should take great care in picking these elites. Generals from a genocidal war, military officers with inevitable war crimes trials, and politicians with evident connections to criminal underworlds or corrupt monied interests will likely not have a positive impact on the health of the grand coalition. Someone with an inevitable indictment at a war crimes tribunal is not an ideal candidate for brokering inter-ethnic agreement. But enforcing the person’s removal from politics could be complicated, as he or she may have genuine local public support.
Furthermore, the international community and local politicians should be careful in defining the pillars of the consociational arrangement. A lesson from the *Moj dom* case is that urban residents are capable of defining their political position themselves; instead of relying on ethnic identity, they frame their political concerns in terms of justice. By creating an electoral system defined by a citizenry of antagonistic identities, the possibilities of electoral politics thus become limited to these identities. A softening of the pillars, perhaps by allowing one ethnicity to vote via preferential ranking of politicians in the other’s ethnicity, will allow a more moderate political atmosphere to develop.

In regards to planning, I argue that it is important to remember Umemoto’s (2001) advocacy of community-led planning. In crafting electoral arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community could follow a similar framework. Instead of imposing electoral systems and commandeering the development and reconstruction process, or working through quasi-criminal politicians, the international community can “seek out willing residents *who can work with different constituencies within a community*” (ibid., pp. 27, emphasis added). These residents would have a wide range of autonomy in planning for their society. I argue that in a consociational arrangement, segmental autonomy greatly inhibits a planner’s ability to work with other members of the community.

Lastly, while scholars cited in this thesis have advocated the planner being embedded and in local systems of political power (e.g., Brooks, 2002), if Mostar shows anything it is the danger planners have being involved in municipal government. If, following Hoch (1994), municipal planners fear bold planning interventions because of job security, and if Mostar is seeking to trim its public employment rolls, then I stress it is unlikely that planners within the city government will take bold steps in ameliorating wartime divisions. Considering that the structure of the
municipal government itself is contingent upon these divisions, the risk of job loss is doubled. To phrase the paradox simply: Why would politicians empowered by division want to employ planners who seek to ameliorate that division? From a consociational politician’s point of view, peace-building urban interventions would ostensibly be self-defeating. Planners in consociational cities should instead work within other, non-municipal preexisting groups who are working towards social change. There the planner will have the freedom to use resolver strategies of peacebuilding without a politician figuratively dangling the planner’s paycheck over his or her head like a carrot.

The link between consociational governance and the cessation of violence, however, cannot be understated. Therefore, I argue that an independent planning organization, outside of city government, which draws funds and materials from the international community (and leverages these funds on the planning organization’s own terms) should exist outside of the local government. Such an independent organization can be free to implement peace-building urban interventions without fearing reprisal from their bosses.

Furthermore, a local planning organization working outside of politics would contrast internationally led reconstruction efforts. It is one matter if the international community rebuilds a symbolic (yet comparatively less-used) bridge in a historic core embedded with dissonant heritage. It is another matter if local planners, using funds and materials donated from the international community, implements the reconstruction of a more-utilized bridge on a major thoroughfare. This hypothetical project would serve to bolster the local economy (via the hiring of local workers, not Turkish engineers like those who rebuilt the Old Bridge) and create vital infrastructure, along with providing cross-ethnic traffic across both sides of the city. Rather than
donating funds to local, inherently divisive politicians with the intention that these people will create plans, the World Bank could fund the planners themselves.

Such a scenario may seem over-idealistic: Who is to say that the planners will want to serve peace-building in their city, or that residents will support them, or that they will actually be independent of divisive politics? Or why should the matters of peacebuilding be solely the planners’ responsibility? Should not the entire political formation of Mostar be culpable? It is not as if “hero planners” are a realistic hope. Yet municipal consociationalism, in Mostar, has proven to be a barrier to peace-building, curative urban planning. Some kind of alternative is needed.

Avenues for further research on the intersection of elite-led power sharing and post-conflict planning include comparative studies. The case of Mostar can be compared to other post-conflict municipalities with consocationally modeled local governments (Baghdad being a notable example). Such studies could be qualitative or even quantitative, if the researcher is creative regarding how variables for consociationalism, division, or urban redevelopment can be coded. Comparative study could show how conditions such as antagonistic plans are uniquely caused by consociationalism, or whether they are simply endemic of divided cities. Testing the propositions in other contexts can bolster their robustness, or perhaps present new insights into the intersection of municipal consociational governance and urban planning. Knowledge from such studies can help inform policy makers, military strategists, urban planners, development agencies, and local politicians in creating effective plans for divided cities, or in crafting more just electoral arrangements in such places.

To conclude I will ask a series of questions. These questions can potentially form the nexus of future comparative studies:
- How does severity of the conflict affect post-conflict urban planning? Mostar is an extreme case in many ways: the scope of the war damage, the extent to which demographics were changed by conflict, and the amount of involvement by the international community not only in reconstructing the built world, but in creating the local government. Perhaps peace-building urban interventions identified in places like Barcelona or Belfast are not applicable in Mostar.

- How does consociational power sharing governance differ in a city which is not post-conflict, and a city which is? What sort of plans are made in the peaceful city, and how are they implemented? Brussels presents an interesting counterexample to Mostar, as Brussels’ city council system follows an intergroup power-sharing model which borrows many consociational elements (proportional representation, segmental autonomy). While the severity of Brussels’ intergroup tensions pales in comparison to Mostar’s, it would be a worthwhile comparative study to see how plans are implemented in Brussels. Are the barriers to plan implementation similar to Mostar’s? If the barriers are lacking in Brussels, then why? Lessons can be learned which may apply to the Mostar case. Also, both cities are in countries in danger of dissolving – how do difficult questions of national sovereignty become enacted in the local government and in urban spaces? How does the EU – who is crucial to the existence of both cities, albeit in very different ways – differently factor into local decision-making?

- Lastly, assuming that municipal plans could be implemented in Mostar, what should be their substance? This question may seem presumptuous given the essentially inactive state of municipal plan implementation in Mostar. Yet a discourse focused on ideal plans, rather than implementable plans, may be a means by which the planning department could frame the discourse of urban development in Mostar. A plan emphasizing social justice or economic
development may garner greater grassroots support. Plans for shared public space, or plans which emphasize intergroup exchange in urban space would seem to be ideal (given the aforementioned Barcelona example), but how such ideals would be realized in Mostarian concrete would be up for the locals to decide.

I wish to conclude on that note: A lot of this research focused on pointing out the problem surrounding politics\textsuperscript{22} and planning in Mostar. Determining hypothetical solutions to these problems is, I admit, a much more difficult task. It could be a route for future research. Yet it is also a task I hesitate to take on, being located thousands of miles from Mostar. While work of previous scholars of postwar planning and politics may prove useful in providing contextual examples, best practices, and theoretical starting points for framing the reconstruction discourse, it is only the citizens of Mostar who can determine what is the best, the most just, and the most ideal future for that city.

\textsuperscript{22} It is not as if the problem of political deadlock is unique to Mostar. During the course of writing this thesis, the American federal government teetered on the brink of shutdown because of legislative deadlock.
CHAPTER 7: WORKS CITED


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