SPACE, PLACE, AND NATIONALISM: CONSTITUTING, TRANSMITTING, AND CONTESTING NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE URBAN LANDSCAPE OF ZAGREB, CROATIA FROM 1850 TO 1940

BY

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DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes how urban space in Zagreb, Croatia was used to establish and then contest the trajectory of the Croatia national project between 1850 and 1940. To accomplish this, the study focuses on the extent to which the Croatian national project and the urban project of Zagreb were intertwined in a deliberate effort to establish the city as the “Croatian Metropolis.” The study uses spatiality (the trialectic relationship between real space, imagined space, and lived space) to analyze how the national and urban elites deliberately created a city landscape which they believed would embed the idea of Croatia as a modern, urban, middleclass, Central European nation in the daily lives of the population. The study also analyzes how the population of the city re-imagined the urban space of the city over time, often in ways that the elites had not intended or anticipated.

This study focuses on the interaction of three distinctly identifiable scales, the national, the local, and the micro across the first ninety years of Zagreb’s existence as a unified urban space. The first two scales are essentially defined by the choice of the study site, with Croatia being the national and Zagreb the local. The micro scale site in this study is Ban Josip Jelačić square, which is the main square for the city of Zagreb and was renamed in honor of the Ban (Governor) who led Croatia both politically and militarily through the 1848 crisis in the Hapsburg Empire. A key element of the Ban Jelačić Square micro space is the Ban Jelačić Monument, erected in 1866, which clearly placed a key contemporary Croatian national here at the center of the city of Zagreb and transformed the city’s main square into a monumental space.

At the core of the study is an examination of how these three nominally distinct scales, the national (Croatia), the local (the urban environment of Zagreb), and the micro (Ban Jelačić
Square) are inter-related with each other. Croatian leaders saw the transformation of the city of
the old medieval communities of Zagreb into the “Croatian Metropolis,” a modern city that
would be at the center of all aspects of Croatian political, economic, and cultural life, as a key to
the overall success of their national project. A central part of this plan was the transformation of
significant spaces within Zagreb into national spaces, with a special focus on the city’s main
square. The result was a deliberate effort to place Zagreb at the heart of Croatia, while
simultaneously placing Croatia at the heart of Zagreb. Yet, in the process of placing Croatia at
the heart of Zagreb, the national elite created a key venue that would become a primary
mechanism for contesting and redefining the goals of the national project in the 1930s.

This dissertation uses a somewhat unique approach to examine what is essentially a
dialectic process within the Croatian national project between 1850 and 1940. Rather than
addressing each scale separately, the study investigates the interactions between the scales
chronologically, but not in a direct, historical format. The four empirical chapters of the
dissertation are broken into distinct time frames, but two of the chapters cover the same time
frame. The empirical section of the dissertation begins by showing the development of the initial
“thesis” of the Croatian national project as a modernizing, urbanizing project from 1850 until
1895 and how the urban project of Zagreb was a central part of this effort. The second empirical
chapter then covers the emergence and solidification of an “antithesis” to the existing Croatian
national project, Croatian Peasantism, an ideology which sought to defend the idea of Croatia by
slowing modernization to limit the economic and social dislocation it was causing in the
countryside, between 1895 and 1935. The third empirical chapter covers the same time period,
1895 to 1935, but returns the focus to the efforts of the modernizing elements of the Croatian
national project to continue to implement their plans. The final empirical chapter covers the
contestation between the modernizers and the Peasantists between 1935 and 1940, which results in a new urban preservationist consensus among the urban national elite in Croatia. A key part of this contestation was preventing the construction of a modern skyscraper on Ban Jelačić square, thus “preserving” the square as an historic location. This new urban preservationism, a fusion of the older urban focus of the Croatian national project with Peasantist preservationism, becomes the new “thesis” of the Croatian national project after 1940.

To prove this argument, the study uses a qualitative analysis of a wide range of primary and secondary sources to demonstrate how leaders of the Croatian national project both deliberately and inadvertently mobilized the urban space of Zagreb, and Ban Jelačić Square to advance their goals as well as how the general population in Zagreb responded, and often reinterpreted these efforts. Spatiality provides a key lens for this project, as it provides a framework. By breaking all three scales involved in this study into spaces which are imagined, physically transformed, lived in, and through that process re-imagined, spatiality also provides a structure which illustrates how interconnected the national, local, and micro scales in the study are. Ban Jelačić Square is a prime example of how spatiality helps to analyze the interaction between scales, as it is at once, a key micro space in the daily life of the city, a key local space in the urban structure of Zagreb, linking various parts of the city together, and a key national space through its function as a monument space as well.

Because this project seeks to integrate and show connections between three separate scales, a wide range of sources are engaged. Key primary sources include newspaper and magazine articles and editorials, which seek to communicate specific interpretations and relationships between the idea of Croatia as a national community and urban space in Zagreb. Official documents as well provide insight into the goals of various actors, especially urban plans
and the narratives used to support changes in real space within the city of Zagreb. Secondary sources are also very useful to this project, especially national and local history texts from the late 19th and early 20th century, as they clearly elaborate the historic narrative of the time and can indicate issues seen as important to the national project. More recent histories are useful as well because they often will include indications to spatial relationships that the authors may want to use to enhance their arguments, or may use without being fully aware of the spatial significance. It is important to note that many of these sources focus, in theory, on a single scale. Secondary sources of this type can also be very valuable because they illustrate connections between scales when an author working at one scale begins to address issues of another scale, often without realizing they have drifted out of their primary focus.

This project shines new light on many important issues. This project illustrates the spatial trialectic across time, by showing how imagined space, real space, and lived space interact and transform each other in a continual process. In the field of Croatian history, this project illuminates an interconnectedness between the urban history of Zagreb and the broader history of Croatia that has not previously been investigated. In the field of Yugoslav history, this project indicates that the internal debate within the Croatian national project in the late 1930s may have had a much greater impact on the relationship between Croatia and the socialist Yugoslav project than previously understood. In the field of the study of nationalism, this project shows that urban projects and urban development can be critical components of national projects. This project also helps illuminate how national projects redefine themselves over time to adapt to the new circumstances they confront and illustrates that the antithesis of any given national movement may not be cosmopolitanism or “anti-nationalism,” but rather an alternative form of the same national identity.
To the People and City of Zagreb
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project would not have been possible without the support of many people and institutions. My advisor, David Wilson has guided and mentored me through this process, with diligence and patience. The members of my dissertation committee are also due much thanks. Colin Flint, Keith Hitchins, and Carol Skalnik Leff all provided invaluable help and guidance through this process. Throughout this process the entire Department of Geography at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign has provided both practical and personal support of various kinds, too numerous to mention individually. The Eastern European Reading Group at the University of Illinois provided me an opportunity to present my work in progress and gave me invaluable feedback during the writing process.

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Chapter 1

Metropolis at the Heart of the Nation, Nation at the Heart of the Metropolis
There is no disagreement that nationalism has been ‘around’ on the face of the globe for, at the very least, two centuries. Long enough, one might think, for it to be reliable and generally understood. But, it is hard to think of any political phenomenon which remains so puzzling and about which there is less analytic consensus. No widely accepted definition exists. No one has been able to demonstrate either its modernity or its antiquity. Disagreement over its origin is matched by uncertainty about its future.

Benedict Anderson

Nationalism is a complex process that researchers are only now beginning to deeply understand. Nationalism, as a human phenomenon which is contested, reinforced, reworked, and evolving, has been identified broadly as tied to rural social patterns. The study of nationalism over the last half century has been roughly divided into two broad schools of thought, but both have seen the roots of the nation in rural space, either through the traditions of rural communities, or as a response to the disruptions of those traditional patterns of life. Even those scholars of nationalism who focus on its modernity seem to find root causes as much in the transition from a rural, agrarian society or economy to a modern industrial one, as in modern society itself. In this context, absent from the work of modernist scholars and others of nationalism is any meaningful attention to urban space.

Ironically, simultaneous with the rise of nationalism as an ideology in Europe was a significant increase in urbanization. Given this correlation between growing European urbanization and the ascendency of nationalist sentiment, it is worth investigating if there is a relational link between these two phenomena. In his book World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis, Peter J. Taylor identifies several trends in urban development over time. One such

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trend is the tendency for a single city to gain disproportionately from other cities within a national network from national macro-economic policy. Taylor observes that this is a separate phenomenon to the political phenomenon of state power concentration in a single city, but also observes that:

In combination, they create an extreme primate city pattern within the state. Of course, capital city privileging... has been a general political process, albeit taking different forms in different countries. The end result is that apart from a few large countries, the primate city pattern was nearly universal in twentieth-century urban development.

After making this observation though, Taylor goes on to lament the “Nationalization of the study of cities.” This concern from Taylor about the separation of the study of cities into specific national focuses is understandable given the goal of his work, which is to understand urban networks which transcend national boundaries, but the effect is to perhaps miss the extent to which nationalism may be a key part of this “primate city pattern” which he acknowledges has been “nearly universal” in recent human experience.

Zagreb as Croatia’s Metropolis

The “primate city” trend is defiantly evident in Croatia, where the city of Zagreb is described as the Croatian Metropolis. The Croatian historian Ivo Perić goes so far as to state that “Its [Zagreb’s] affirmation as the Croatian Metropolis is particularly fixed in the time of the Illyrian Movement (Croatian National Revival).” Yet the Illyrian Movement began in the late 1820s, and was a cultural movement which became political in the 1930s. This would indicate that the tendencies towards the formation of a “primate” urban pattern in Croatia are rooted in

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4 Ibid. @ 187.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. @ 188.
7 Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 16.
the 19th century and are more associated with the Croatian national project rather than the city’s economic development. In fact, Zagreb’s economic development in the latter half of the 19th century was driven by its centrality to Croatian cultural development and the city’s perceived central role in the Croatian national project. As the city’s planning office stated in 1930:

…its development to today’s cultural and national center begins to flow from the beginning of the 19th century when the work of the national awakening with which the enthusiasm and belief in the future of southern Slavism overcame beyond the night of the old German and Latin spirit of Zagreb. 8

This statement clearly indicates that until the early 19th century, Zagreb was not identifiable as a Slavic city, but rather a “German and Latin” city. Zagreb’s emergence as Croatia’s “primate city” was directly tied to its transformation into a Croatian national city.

A review of the population data going back into the 19th century supports the argument that the process of Zagreb’s growth into Croatia’s “primate city” was well underway before the beginning of the 20th century.

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<td>-</td>
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<td>3,936,022</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>4,437,460</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
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| Table 1 - Comparative Population Growth in Croatia⁹ |

The census data indicates that Zagreb was growing much more rapidly than Split, and at nearly double the rate of overall population growth in Croatia as a whole well before the development of the city as a center for industrial production around the turn of the 20th century.

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⁹ Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003). @ 466
Objective of Study

This study argues that the production of urban space including, but not limited to specific urban micro-spaces can be central to the process of constituting, transmitting, and contesting nationalism. This project therefore examines the interrelationship between two issues that have generally not been seen as interrelated; the constitution of nationalism and the production of urban space. Though each of these subjects has been extensively studied for decades, few have attempted to make any direct connection between them. This study thus deepens our understanding of nationalism during times of modernism and emerging industrialization, an historic time period which was fertile for the production of diverse nationalisms across Europe and beyond. The empirical focus of this study is the city of Zagreb and its central space, Ban Josip Jelačić Square. I demonstrate that the constitution of the city as a complex organic space, anchored by the construction of this central space, an assiduously constituted and managed terrain, was pivotal to the development of Croatian nationalism between 1850 and 1940.

My study of the city of Zagreb as an empirical case explores the relationship between the main square of the city of Zagreb, the city of Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis, and the trajectory of Croatian nationalism, as manifested by the Croatian national project across 90 years of time, from 1850 to 1940. Specifically, I will examine the spatial dynamic which developed that located Zagreb, as the Croatian Metropolis, at the center of the Croatian national project, while simultaneously placing the main square at the center of the Croatian Metropolis, and placed a conception of nation at the center of the square. Through building a semiotically infused city and set of spaces, the nature of Croatia as a national community came to be seen as reflective of, and reflected in the urban landscape of Zagreb. Ultimately, the city’s main square became a space which exuded the character of both Croatia and Zagreb.

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10 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism
My work examines the process of spatialization (spatial structuration) in the main square and the city and the broader urban landscape of the Zagreb to show how these processes impact and are impacted by the Croatian national project over this time period. This project chronicles the transformation of a specific location (the square) as well as broader urban trends in Zagreb, and how those transformations were affected by and, in turn, affected the Croatian national project. This study thus examines how an imagined space was transformed into real space and how that transformation impacted the lived space of the city. This project is ultimately a study of a specific location (the square) and a specific space (the city and nation-state directly influenced by the square), but with implications for how we may begin theorizing society-space relations across different national settings.

All urban spaces, of course, are transformed spaces. They are changed by deliberate action, but it does not follow that the real space that is produced matches the imagined space as originally conceived, or that the new space will be experienced in a way that will re-enforce the ideology embedded in the original imagining of the space. This, I chronicle, is the source of political resistance. For, as documented, produced spaces are forever mediated by beings which generate unintended lived spaces.\(^\text{11}\) This human product, space, then, will produce unintended outcomes through its being lived by people, ascribed meanings, and being mobilized both in everyday life and political projects.

**Scholarly Definitions of Nation and Nationalism**

The study of nationalism has attracted immense attention for the last two and a half centuries. Nationalism, as “a political principle which holds that the political unit and the

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national unit should be congruent,”12 emerged from the Romantic Movement. The idea of nation was a central element to Romantic understanding of the world. Thinkers such as Herder sought to explain nation as a cultural phenomenon reflective of a national spirit, and focused on language as a key element of national identity. Herder went so far as to argue that:

Does a nationality (Volk), especially a backward nationality, have anything more precious than the language of its fathers? In this language lives a whole world of tradition, history, religion, and principles of life, all of a nationality’s heart and soul. To take this language away from such a people, or to degrade this language, means that you are taking away its one immortal possession, that has passed from generation to generation…13

Herder thus posited a Volk (a nationality or a people) with a collective spirit, a “soul” of its own. This national spirit was expressed in its culture, and became “immortal,” or lived beyond the lives of individual inhabitants, as long as the vessel of that culture, the language, survived. Though Herder has been associated with the German Enlightenment movement of the second half of the 18th century, his view of nation established a foundation upon which the Romantic thinkers who came after him would build.

It was one of the earliest Romantic philosophers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who posited the need to link national identity to political order. Rousseau wrote as early as 1762 on the need for a distinctive “civic religion” for each state.14 Eventually, Rousseau settled on the notion of nation as the form this civic religion should take, though unlike Herder, he did not see nation as an essential element of an individual’s being.15 Rousseau’s view was enshrined in the international political order with the end of the First World War, when the President of the

15 Ibid. @ 82-83.
United States, Woodrow Wilson, implied national self-determination as the key legitimization for governance as a fundamental foundation for his proposed “Fourteen Points” as the fundamental basis for ending the war and writing the peace.\(^\text{16}\)

The ideological response to the Romantic idea of nationalism came initially from Marxists. Yet the Marxist response was more complex than a simple rejection of the idea of nation or nationalism. Marx and Engels were deeply ambivalent on the issue of nation, as this passage from the Communist Manifesto written in 1847 illustrates:

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality.

The Working men have no country. We cannot take from them that which they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put and end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes with the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.\(^\text{17}\)

This deeply conflicted passage argues that workers simultaneously have no nation, yet are also the truest nationals. This ambivalence led to a practical pragmatism with regard to nationalism and national movements. As one recent Marxist writer observed:

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\(^{16}\) None of Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” specifically stated this argument or used the term National Self-determination, but point number X. addressed the need for the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to have some form of “autonomous development,” and point V. called for an equal consideration of the rights and sovereignty of colonial peoples and the claims of colonial powers when determining the post-war status of European colonies. Woodrow Wilson, "President Wilson's Message to Congress, January 8, 1918," ed. Records of the United States Senate (National Archives, 1918).

Thus Marx and Engels did not allow economic criteria to dictate whether they would lend support to specific national movements. Rather, they gave or withheld support on the basis of a *political* assessment of each movement in the international context.  

This ambivalence allowed Marxist thinkers to take various views of nationalism.

One school of Marxism in particular, the Austro-Marxists of the Hapsburg Empire, held a view of nation as a constituent element of the social condition, and the highest cultural product of society. A goal of the socialist transformation, in this perspective, was the fulfillment of nation through the democratization of national culture. Otto Bauer, a prominent Austro-Marxist thinker, argued that it was Capital that sought to demolish nation in pursuit of profit, and Socialism would fulfill the nation by providing the working class access to the production and consumption of national culture. Bauer argued that the concept of national self-determination should be understood as a cultural imperative, not a political one. Therefore, according to Bauer, as it was Capitalism which sought to erase national distinctions, and Socialism which would naturally lead to the fulfillment of nations, true nationalist must support an international socialist order, and abandon the political goal of establishing individual national states.

Based on this line of thinking, some Marxist thinkers outside the Austro-Hungarian Empire, such as Rosa Luxemburg, went further to argue that political issues of national self-determination were, at best, a distraction that Socialist parties should avoid. She therefore criticized the adoption of “the right of nations to self-determination” as embodied by Article 9 of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party adopted in 1903. Luxemburg noted in 1908 that, even where national self-determination was achieved, its effects economically or socially were negligible.

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Can one seriously speak about the ‘self-determination’ of the formally independent Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbs, Greeks, partly even the Swiss, whose independence is itself a result of the political struggle and the diplomatic game of the ‘Concert of Europe’?  

Luxemburg concluded that nation, as a political organizing principle, was a manifestation of a false consciousness which was deliberately propagated to prevent the European working class from recognizing their collective class identity. This concept, she posited, was used to mobilize them for their own self-destruction during the First World War.  

Yet, Marxist movements around the world organized themselves along nationalist lines in offering notions of national self-determination and national liberation as key components of their anti-imperial struggles. This stance can be traced to the use of the concept of “the national question” within the Russian Empire by Lenin to mobilize sympathy for the Bolshevik Party before and during World War I. A key part of the effort was a long essay written by Lenin in 1914, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, in which he succinctly presented a Marxist explanation for the rise of nationalism and its key role in the historical dialectic process:

Therefore, Rosa Luxemburg notwithstanding, the example of the whole of progressive, civilized mankind, the example of the Balkans and the example of Asia prove that Kautsky’s proposition is absolutely correct: the national state is the rule and the “norm” of capitalism; the heterogeneous nation state represents backwardness, or is an exception. From the standpoint of national relations, the best conditions for the development of capitalism are undoubtedly provided by the national state. This does not mean, of course, that such a state, while retaining bourgeois relations, could avert the exploitation and oppression of nations. It only means that “self determination of nations” in the program of the Marxists can not, from a historic-economic point of view, have any other meaning than political self-determination, political independence, the formation of a national state.  

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21 Ibid. @ 500.
24 Ibid. @ 14.
This explicit response to Rosa Luxemburg’s critique sought to circumvent it. While it noted that questions of national self-determination were political rather than social, it placed this political issue at the center of the material dialectic process. Thus, nationalism, as a key political organizing principle, was ostensibly necessary to supplant feudalism, and to advance capitalism within less developed countries. The singular success of Lenin’s Communist Party in Russia in establishing a Marxist Soviet government at the end of World War I resulted in this Leninist model of thought about nationalism and national liberation dominating Marxists movements for the next 50 years. The Communist regimes of post World War II Eastern Europe adopted this philosophy in practice, creating specific justifications for their nationally based socialist regimes by developing nationally specific socialist doctrines derived from distinct national historical experiences.

The Czech Marxist thinker Miroslav Hroch, working in the late 1960s and early 1970s, studied the process of national revival in Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. He also accepted an assumption that elements of nation in some form preceded modern circumstances. His study focused on national revival movements which had both succeeded and failed. But Hroch’s work was more than a set of detailed case studies. At its core it was an effort to bridge the division within the Marxist theory of nationalism. To that end, he posited a new starting point for the study of nationalism:

This conception is decisively to be differentiated from the notion that nationalism is the primary formative factor and the nation is derivative. In contrast with the subjectivist conception of the nation as the product of national consciousness, nationalism, the national will and spiritual forces, we posit the conception of the nation as a constituent of social reality of historical origin.

We consider the origin of the modern nation as the fundamental reality and nationalism as a phenomenon derived from the existence of that nation. However one must not determine the objective character of the nation with a fixed collection of features and attributes given once and for all, just as it is not possible to view the nation as an everlasting category, standing outside the concrete social relations.\(^{26}\)

Marxists were not the only ones to challenge the Romantic vision of nation. The French academic, Ernest Renan wrote a provocative essay in 1882 entitled *What is a Nation?*\(^{27}\) which reflected much French thought at this time. Renan systematically deconstructed the Romantic argument for nation being an essential part of nature. He argued: “The nations are not something eternal. They had their beginnings and they will end.”\(^{28}\) Yet he did not dispute the reality of nation, nor did he dispute the characterization of nation as spirit. Renan argued that nation was a spirit of human creation, a product of human choice which would persist as long as people chose to continue recreating it on a daily basis. Renan concluded that:

> Man is a slave neither of his race nor his language, nor of his religion, nor of the course of rivers nor of the direction taken by mountain chains. A large aggregate of men, healthy in mind and warm of heart, creates the kind of moral consciences we call a nation.\(^{29}\)

In this statement, Renan did not reject all Romantic thinkers,\(^{30}\) only the essentialist view that many Romantic thinkers espoused, that national identity was somehow embedded in an individual from birth, or was a product of the physical environment.

The end of World War II and the rise of Cold War realities, which was marked by a failed nationalist movement seeking global dominance and the entanglement of other nationalisms shortly thereafter, provided an opening for newer critical studies of nationalism. An

\(^{26}\) Ibid. @ 3.


\(^{28}\) Ibid. @ 53.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Qvortrup, *The Political Philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Impossibility of Reason*. @ 84.
influential new strand of thought was inaugurated by Ernest Gellner. In 1964 he wrote persuasively on the conditions in which nationalism becomes the natural forms of political loyalty. Here he offers two central “propositions: (1) Every man a clerk (Universal literacy recognized as a valid norm.) (2) Clerks are not horizontally mobile, they can not normally move from one language-area to another…”31 Bolstering this, his *Nations and Nationalism*32 argued that the nation was a modern concept, the product of the process of social modernization. Nationalism here was not an ideology in its own right, but rather a manifestation of the social transformation required by industrialization. He stated:

> We do not properly understand the range of options available to industrial society, and perhaps we never shall; but we understand some of its essential concomitants. The kind of cultural homogeneity demanded by nationalism is one of them, and we had better make our peace with it. It is not the case… that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that the homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.33

With this theory, Gellner established the foundation of a sociological counter argument to the Romantic visions of nation and nationalism. In response, a new generation of thinkers began building on this modernist argument.

Almost simultaneous to Gellner’s work, Benedict Anderson published a provocative new work on national identity and nationalism, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.*34 This book took a slightly different approach to the question, by using an older Marxist approach (which is to say before Marxism had embraced nation as a political organizing principle) to analyzing the issue. Anderson identified a specific mechanism for the

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32 Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.
33 Ibid. @ 39.
process, “print capitalism.” This fusion of cultural and capital production used the printed word to create a large, nationally defined market for its product, and then filled that market with content which re-enforced the existence of the nation, to both protect and grow the market. This mass consumption print culture created a common understanding of identity among people from different regions, thus allowing people from potentially very different cultural backgrounds to see each other as partners in a single national enterprise. This then was the “imagined community.” Yet Anderson stressed that by imagined he did not mean false, invented, or fabricated, further stating: “In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face to face contact (and perhaps even those) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuiness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”35

In 1990 E. J. Hobsbawm published Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality,36 which furthered the argument about the specifically modern character of nation and even argued that almost all writing about nation and nationalism from previous periods should be ignored:

Not that we should wish to recommend all that much that was written in earlier periods. Our reading list would contain very little that was written in the classic period of nineteenth-century liberalism, for reasons which should become clear later, but also because very little other than nationalist and racist rhetoric was being written then. And the best work produced at the time was actually very brief, like John Stuart Mill’s passage on the subject in his Considerations on Representative Government, and Ernest Renan’s famous lecture ‘What is a nation?’37

Hobsbawm’s argument went beyond simply critiquing the Romantic view of nation. He offered a fundamental critique of nation itself as a legitimate category. He did not argue that nation and nationalism should not be studied, but rather the study of nation and nationalism should focus on

35 Ibid. @ 6.
37 Ibid. @ 2.
the deconstruction of the concept as anything other than modern. Further, Hobsbawm suggested that all Romantic writings on nation should be simply ignored. Hobsbawm’s choice of title, deriving directly as it did from Gellner’s, was an indication that his desire was to build on the modernist argument. Where Gellner had made a sociological argument about why the idea of nationalism came into existence, Hobsbawm was supporting him with an intellectual history of nation and nationalism, showing the steps that had been taken in the process.

Hobsbawm’s work represents the high water mark of the advocates of the modernist paradigm of nationalism studies. This success was based on several factors beyond the high quality of scholarship. In the post war era at least in Western Europe and North America, where many of these critical scholars were located, the historic trends supported the modernists’ contentions. With the rapid integration of the Western European nations into the European Community, it appeared that Renan’s prediction that “A European confederation will very probably replace them [nations]”\(^{38}\) was coming to pass. Beyond Western Europe, Yugoslavia was a scholarly validated success of a multi-national state structure. In 1991, it was easy to accept Hobsbawm’s description of the period between 1918 and 1950 as “The apogee of nationalism” with the ideology on a downward trend for 40 years.\(^{39}\) In addition to the apparent historical trends, there were also very strong social prohibitions to challenging the modernist paradigm. Any effort to explore nation as non-modern ran the risk of being labeled as an effort to apologize for the racially based nationalism of the corporatists movements of the interwar period. As a result, the modernist paradigm dominated western nationalism scholarship almost unchallenged.

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\(^{38}\) Renan, "What Is a Nation." @ 53.

\(^{39}\) Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.* @ Chapter 5.
The decade of the 1990s was not supportive of the modernist outlook towards nationalism. The end of the ideological struggle of the Cold War resulted in what appeared to be a sudden re-emergence of nationalist movements. In addition, the opening up of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to western scholars provided an opportunity to discover just how deeply embedded nationalism was in the governing practices of the Soviet Bloc. Most shocking though, was the violent, and eventually brutal wars that ripped the multi-national Yugoslav state apart into smaller nation states. This event was shocking on many levels. For nearly three decades western scholars had been free to enter and study the Yugoslav system and had judged it a success on social, economic, and to some degree political grounds. Further, and of particular relevance to the modernist scholars of nationalism, was that fact that the Yugoslav system had virtually unchallenged control of the means of cultural production which the modernists had identified as the key means of national identity formation. The failure of the Yugoslav system to produce a pervasive Yugoslav identity, and the persistence of older national identities through four decades of the Socialist Yugoslav system challenged a fundamental premise of the modernist paradigm.

One result of the events of the 1990s and the violence of Yugoslavia’s demise was a turn to scholars of nationalism whose work might shed light on these events. Anthony D. Smith’s work is a primary example of this type of thinking. Smith was not an anti-modernist in his thinking, but rather argued that, though modern nations were a new phenomenon, they were also a modern adaptation of a long standing human tendency to create larger collective community identities. Smith argued that failure to appreciate this pre-modern element of nationalism lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of the phenomenon which undermined efforts to defuse ethno-
national conflicts. Smith’s book, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*,\(^{40}\) first published in 1986, became immensely popular in the 1990s, being reprinted nine times during that decade, twice during 1993, when the war in Bosnia was at its height, and twice again in 1999 when the war in Kosovo spurred NATO intervention and a 78 day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.

Some scholars took a different approach to the events of the early 1990s. Michael Billig sought to explain the failure of the modernists to predict the strong resurgence of nationalism by applying a Gramscian analysis to the issue. Antonio Gramsci had developed the theory of Cultural Hegemony between the First and Second World Wars in an effort to explain why Marx’s theory that revolution would emerge in the most advanced capitalist societies had not proven true over time. Gramsci argued that the reason for this was that bourgeois society had embedded capitalism so deeply in the culture of western industrial society that revolution became impossible.\(^{41}\) Billig used a similar argument to explain the persistence of nationalism in modern western societies, positing that the nation had become embedded in the daily use of language and leisure to the point where it pervaded everything. To explain the modernists’ failure to identify the persistence of nationalism, Billig argued that the nationalist rhetoric was so subtle as to be nearly invisible during periods of political calm, only emerging at times of crisis. Billig termed this phenomenon *Banal Nationalism*.\(^{42}\)

There was one other school of thought that gained some prominence during the 1990s. These were neo-Marxists who had argued against the modernist movement not on the fundamental analysis of the modernity of nations, but rather the fundamentally negative character of national projects. These thinkers were echoing Renan, who had seen nation as a


tremendously progressive force in European society and Otto Bauer’s earlier ideas about nation as a means of dividing and resisting capital, and therefore argued that nation should be embraced by Marxist thinkers in the new post-Cold War order. These thinkers also generally rejected the premise that nationalism was in a terminal decline. The challenge for this school of thinkers was to deal with the reality of brutal violence which had accompanied the national resurgences of the 1990s.

Tom Nairn addressed this issue by locating negative nationalism in rural space. In his essay *The Curse of Rurality: Limits of Modernization Theory*, Nairn posited that the violence currently being perpetrated in the name of nation originated in rural communities:

> However, in none of these examples did the conflict itself originate in the cities… The resultant generational warfare may penetrate or even take over cities, the urban sites to which extended families of land dwellers have moved or, sometimes, been expelled. But the violent side of the conflict appears invariably to have its origins in the peasant or small-town world they have left behind.44

Nairn went further to argue that there were two basic forms of nationalism; civic nationalism and an ethnic nationalism. These distinctions were not new to the study of nationalism, but Nairn argued that the distinction between these two was very different than previously articulated. Nairn argued that civic nationalism was a positive, urban based nationalism, and ethnic nationalism was a distorted form of this civic nationalism:

> Ethnic nationalism is in essence a peasantry transmuted, at least in ideal terms, into a nation. Granted, the formation of modern national identities has notoriously involved a multiplicity of other factors, all attended to by different brands of social scientist: states, frontiers, literacy, industrialization, school systems, symbols and complex cultural artifacts. But it can read along this other axis too. Underneath all the accumulating paraphernalia of the modern lies a prolonged and massive social Calvary out of peasant subsistence and towards eventual urban inter-dependence. On the level of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* journey terrible accidents have been common. Peasantries may be ‘reimagined’ essentially as a form of leverage, a way of helping to erect the modern nation, and

44 Ibid. @ 90-91.
in the end such imagining of communities may turn to green politics and ecology. However, it is not impossible for the instrumental lever to assume a life of its own and, at least for a time, to take over and dominate the processes by which nations are built.45

With this argument, Nairn sought to transfer the negative elements of nation to a particular, “ruralized” form of nation which distorted the form of a positive, older “urban” civic nationalism. Nairn was also straddling the modernist/non-modernist divide, but in a new way, identifying an older national form based on urban civic values, which was more “modern” than the newer, ethnic nationalism, which he saw as a regressive, potentially violent force.

In this argument about the urban origin of nation, Nairn was echoing an argument made three decades earlier by Eugen Weber in his provocative work Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France 1870 – 1914.46 Weber describes the process by which rural communities in France became both modernized and nationalized. What Weber describes is a process by which self sustaining rural communities were transformed into towns dependent on the urban network of France for innovation and cultural production. Referring to the writings of Andre Varagnac he states:

The novelty now [the nineteenth century] was that the renewal process ceased: traditions died and were not replaced; there was no longer any spontaneous innovation in the countryside. A whole mentality was dying – had died – out.47

Though Weber focuses on the nationalizing aspects of this process, embedded in his work is the urbanizing process as well. In fact, it is clear from his statements in the introduction that modernization and urbanization are closely related, if not inseparable. Describing the French historian Thabault’s characterization of the role of the new institution of the school in villages he says:

[45 Ibid. @ 91.
47 Ibid. @ x.]
The school was important because conditions changed, because it served new conditions, and the conditions that it helped to change were no longer local ones but national; they were urban, they were modern.\textsuperscript{48}

In his argument, Weber focused on the nationalizing aspect of this project over the urbanizing aspect. Weber’s work was well received at the time it was written, but it was generally seen as further evidence to support the modernist theory of nation. In the last thirty five years few scholars have explored the link between the urban and the national that Weber’s work would seem to imply.

One continuity in the study of nation does exist between the Romantics and the contemporary scholars. Both of these groups of thinkers start with language as a key point of reference in their thinking. Romantic scholars, building on Herder’s work, identified language as a key defining element of nation. Modern scholars such as Ernest Gellner, and Anthony D. Smith both started in the field of language (Gellner as a linguist and Smith as a classicist) before moving into nationalism studies, and Benedict Anderson and Michael Billig, though not scholars of language, clearly focused on the use of language in mass media for their studies of nationalism.

**Geographic Engagement with Nation and Nationalism**

As a discipline, Geography’s engagement with the idea of nationalism has been as diverse as the general academic debate on the topic, tackling the subject from many different vantage points. In 1985, C.H. Williams offered no less than five separate areas in which geographers had or could contribute to the study of nationalism:

1) The national construction of social space

2) Uneven development and nationalism

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
3) The secular intelligentsia

4) Structural preconditions and triggering factors

5) Ecological analysis\textsuperscript{49}

In 1982, David B. Knight wrote in the \textit{Annals of the Association of American Geographers}:

In some general works by political geographers lip service is given to the emotional bonds of group to politico-territorial identities, generally defined loosely as the nation or nation-state, but remarkably little has been done beyond this. Rather than quickly bypassing such bonds of group as being of little importance, we should focus further attention on the theme…\textsuperscript{50}

Knight’s article, “Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism,” was, as the title suggests, a call for geographers to apply the concept of territory to the issue of nationalism. The theory of Territoriality, as discussed by Robert Sack in the book \textit{Human Territoriality: Its theory and history},\textsuperscript{51} is a broad approach to the human organization of space. As Sack states at the outset of his work:

Territoriality in Humans is best thought of not as biologically motivated, but rather as socially and geographically rooted. Its use depends on who is influencing and controlling whom and on the geographical context of place, space, and time. Territorially is intimately related to how people use the land, how they organize themselves in space, and how they give meaning to place. Clearly these relationships change, and the best means of studying them is to reveal their changing character over time.\textsuperscript{52}

Given this definition and approach to territoriality, its applicability to the study of nation and nationalism is easy to see. In 1986, Anthony D. Smith observed how “poetic spaces” are tied to


\textsuperscript{50}David B. Knight, "Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism," \textit{Annals of the Association of American Geographers} 72, no. 4 (1982). @ 514.


\textsuperscript{52}Ibid. @ 2.
“golden ages” in the process of national mythology creation. Geographers have used territoriality to explore this process and applied it to specific geographic contexts to examine how territory is significant to specific national communities. David Newman, an Israeli geographer who has applied Territoriality to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has succinctly laid out an argument for the relational nature of the material and the symbolic in questions of territory, stating:

The concrete and the symbolic manifestations of territory constitute a single system in which each feeds into, and reinforces, the other. Proponents of one will often use the arguments of the other as a means of strengthening their case for a specific form of territorial policy.

George W. White has applied territoriality to Southeastern Europe in his book *Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe*. White identifies one of the key challenges to effectively using territoriality:

Nations being territorial or having other subjective qualities is not new. Nevertheless, the subjective components of national identity frequently are not addressed because they are difficult to measure, whereas, it is easier to grasp objective criteria. Measuring something more concrete, such as language use or religious affiliation, is attractive because it is seemingly easier to accomplish and less controversial than analyzing the emotional bonds that nations have with particular places and territories. Geographers too have great difficulty “mapping” these subjective components and likewise prefer to map more tangible criteria.

Other geographers have sought to apply scale to territoriality, for example *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale*, edited by Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplin, and O’Lear and Whiting “Which Comes First, the Nation or the State? A Multiple Scale Model

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56 Ibid. @ 6.
Applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Caucasus.”\textsuperscript{58} Some authors have also used territoriality to explore how space is securitized, such as Arnon Soffer and Julian V. Minghi’s “Israel’s Security Landscapes: The Impact of Military Considerations on Land Uses”\textsuperscript{59} and Ami Oren and David Newman’s “Competing Land Uses: The Territorial Dimension of Civil–Military Relations in Israel.”\textsuperscript{60} Though this type of work does not address nationalism directly, it does address it obliquely.

Within geography, a subfield of territoriality has developed, focusing on the study of boundaries and borderlands. Anssi Paasi has been a leading scholar in this field of study, exploring the ways that boundaries are produced and re-produced socially. Paasi has argued that boundaries should “be understood not merely as static lines, but as sets of practices and discourses which “spread” into the whole of society and are not restricted to border areas.”\textsuperscript{61} Paasi and Newman have also argued that narratives are a key part of the production of boundaries, in “Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Rethinking Boundaries in Political Geography.”\textsuperscript{62}

Some geographers have approaches other than territoriality and boundaries to study geopolitical issues, including nationalism. In 1994, John Agnew published “The Territorial

\textsuperscript{58} Shannon O’Lear, Robert Whiting, "Which Comes First, the Nation or the State? A Multiple Scale Model Applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Caucasus," \textit{National Identities} 10, no. 2 (2008).


\textsuperscript{60} Ami Oren, David Newman, "Competing Land Uses: The Territorial Dimension of Civil–Military Relations in Israel," \textit{Israel Affairs} 12, no. 3 (2006).


Agnew argued that:

The end of the Cold War, the increased velocity and volatility of the world economy, and the emergence of political movements outside the framework of territorial states, suggest the need to consider the territoriality of states in historical context. Conventional thinking relies on three geographical assumptions - states as fixed units of sovereign space, the domestic/foreign polarity, and states as 'containers' of societies - that have led into the 'territorial trap'.

Agnew’s piece was not specifically focused on the study of nationalism, but rather a call for a more nuanced approach to geopolitics which questioned these underlying geographical assumptions. Agnew concluded:

The critical theoretical issue, therefore, is the historical relationship between territorial states and the broader social and economic structures and geopolitical order (or form of spatial practice) in which these states must operate. It has been the lack of attention in the mainstream literature to this connection that has led into the territorial trap. In idealizing the territorial state we cannot see a world in which its role and meaning change. In international relations theory territorial space has most definitely conquered time. Only historical-geographical consciousness can release us from its dead hand.

Guntram H. Herb has argued that “The focus of critical geopolitics on boundaries introduces an imbalance in its treatment of the territorial dimensions of nations. It seems to suggest that borders are the sole means through which a national community becomes linked to a given territory.” Herb argues that this imbalance can be corrected for by incorporating the cultural ways in which territorial identification is communicated to members of a national community. In this case, Herb used geography textbooks. He argues that textbooks are of particular value in this type of investigation of nationalism because they have a singular role:

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64 Ibid. @ 53.
65 Ibid. @ 77.
All texts with a wide audience, including popular magazines, schoolbooks, novels, films, or news reports, are important in the “common-sensical construction” of the nation (Sharp 1993, 494–95), but school geography texts are uniquely suited to convey the border between us and the Other that is at the heart of national identity (Paasi 1999, 226–27). Moreover, they are consumed at a crucial stage in the development of sociospatial knowledge of the nation (Schleicher 1993, 23–24; Dijkink 1996, 2–3). Textbooks do not fall neatly into the category of popular geographs, however. Textbooks reflect popular conceptions, but they are written by an intellectual elite, and their content is regulated by “gatekeepers” such as publishers and government ministries (Buttimer, Brunn, and Wardenga 1999, 130). Thus, they are at the intersection of elite and popular geographs and a bona fide reflection of the shared beliefs between elites and national popular masses.

John Agnew has made a more extensive critique of boundary studies recently. In “No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia,” Agnew argues that:

Macedonia’s centrality to the making of Greece over the past century provides the empirical grounding for an exploration of how cultural-symbolic borrowing rather than cross-border othering has been crucial for border making in Modern Greece and, by extension, everywhere in the world.

Agnew also makes this specific critique of the current approach to the study of borders:

The more recent literature on borders has attended much more closely to how borders are socioterritorial constructs reflecting the discourses and practices of national identity and bordering under conditions of globalization (Paasi 2005; van Houtum 2005; van Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhofer 2005; Newman 2006; Rumford, forthcoming). Yet, whether naturalistic or post-structuralist in conception, most border studies still tend to conceive of borders in cross-pressure terms. The emphasis on cross-pressures across a border between adjacent states both making and maintaining it in place reflects a completely territorialized image of spatiality in which territorialized states are seen as monopolizing the geography of power when, as is well known, power can be deployed spatially in various networked as well as territorial forms.

These observations are echoed in a range of new scholarship on the history of nation identity formation in borderlands. Works such as Keely Stauter-Halsted’s The Nation in the Village: The

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68 Ibid. @ 398.
69 Ibid. @ 399.
Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914\textsuperscript{70} (2002), Jeremy King’s 
Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics\textsuperscript{71} (2002), James 
Bjork’s Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in the Central 
European Borderland\textsuperscript{72} (2008), Tara Zahra’s Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the 
Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948\textsuperscript{73} (2008), and Caitlin Murdock’s 
Changing Places: Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870-1946\textsuperscript{74} (2010), explore the dynamics of national identity formation in borderlands and show how 
contingent and problematic this process can be just in the area at the center of Europe.

Another approach which geographers have taken to engaging the subject of nationalism is 
through the study of landscapes. Landscape has been an object of study in the social sciences for 
a long period of time. Direct linkages between the production of urban landscapes and power 
were illuminated by Carl E. Schoreske with the publication of Fin-De-Siecle Vienna: Politics 
and Culture\textsuperscript{75} in 1961, in which he chronicled how the Ringstrasse project was a key part of the 
newly emerging middle class in Vienna transforming the city to reflect their new dominance in 
society. In 1990, James S. Duncan published The City As Text: The Politics of Landscape 
Interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom,\textsuperscript{76} in which he built a strong argument for landscape as a 
key part of cultural communication:

\textsuperscript{71} Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
\textsuperscript{72} James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in the Central European Borderland (Ann Arbor: 2008).
The landscape, I would argue is one of the central elements in a cultural system, for as an ordered assemblage of objects, as text, it acts as a signifying system through which a social system is communicated, reproduced, experienced, and explored. In order to understand this structured and structuring quality of landscape, we must first inquire into what is signified by the landscape.

Geographers have applied this urban landscape approach primarily through the study of street names and monuments. Even before Duncan’s work had been published, David Harvey “Monument and Myth” in which he discussed the Basilica of Sacre-Coeur in Paris and the class struggle that its history illuminates. In 1990 Allan Pred first published his discussion of working class resistance through a popular geography which, among a range of geographic practices in daily life, included the naming of local places and refusing to accept the formal new names for streets in Stockholm. The working class of Stockholm even turned the formal name of the main central park, the Arsenalsgatan, upon which were located the statue of King Gustav II Adolf, the Royal Opera House, the Foreign Ministry, and other important social buildings, into an obscenity describing part of a woman’s body in local slang.

In 1994, Nuala Johnson published “Cast in Stone: monuments, geography, and nationalism,” in which she argued specifically for the use of monuments on the part of geographers to investigate nationalism. Johnson noted “there is an increasing emphasis on the fluid and fragmented nature of political or cultural identity, yet the empirical focus has largely been on minority cultures within states.” In the conclusion of her article, Johnson states:

Using Anderson’s (1983) thesis that nations are ‘imagined political communities’ as a guiding principle, I have argued that the examination of public statues enables the researcher to gain some insight into how the public imagination is aroused and developed in the context of the ongoing task of nation-building.

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77 Ibid. @ 17.
81 Ibid. @ 52.
Statues, as part of the cityscape or rural landscape, act not only as concentrated nodes but also as circuits of memory where individual elements can be jettisoned from popular consciousness. Their role in the geography of the city as points of physical and ideological orientation requires much further research.  

Johnson has written a significant amount of work which demonstrates how Irish national identity has been expressed in monuments, and how the history of those monumental projects illuminate the political contestation between various concepts of Irish national identity during the time of the monuments’ creation. Following Johnson’s lead, other geographers have also adopted the technique of using monuments to investigate other national identities. David Atkinson and Denis Cosgrove have explored the monument to Vittorio Emanuele II in Rome, and Dmitri Sidorov has investigated the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow after the end of the Soviet Union. In the context of Northern Ireland, B. Graham and P. Shirlow’s “The Battle of the Somme in Ulster memory and identity” uses informal monuments to the Irish participation in the battle of the Somme, in the form of local murals, to examine how local paramilitaries worked to “distance the loyalist working classes from the former hegemonic Britishness of official unionism and the sectarianism of the Orange Order.” Though, as Maoz

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82 Ibid. @ 63.
87 Ibid. @ 881.
Azaryahu has pointed out in his article “Mcisrael? On the “Americanization of Israel,”” not all monumentalization is fully conscious or deliberate.  

It is important to note that geographers are not the only ones using monuments to explore questions of identity.  Nuala Johnson relied on previous studies by historians of the post-Civil War South, such as Gaines M. Foster, who have looked at the significance of monuments in various aspects of the South’s reconciliation with defeat.  Historians have also continued to pursue the use of monuments as well, with works such as Monuments to the Lost Cause: Women, Art, and the Landscapes of Southern Memory, edited by Cynthia Mills, and Pamela H. Simpson.  This mode of research is easily transferable to many locations, as Martin Simpson’s “Republicanizing the City: Radical Republicans in Toulouse, 1880-90,” demonstrates, and which also addresses the use of street names as “an ideal, cheap, and effective mechanism for the "republicanization" of public space.”

Street and location names are essentially micro-monuments which signify important ideas or events to an urban community.  The study of street and location names as ideological markers extends to more issues than the study of nationalism and many disciplines beyond geography.  Just a few examples include Maoz Azaryahu’s “Street Names and Political Identity: The Case of East Berlin” (1986), David Young’s “East-End Street Names and British Imperialism” (1992) and J. Carlos Gonzal Faraco and Michael Dean Murphy’s “Street Names and Political

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89 Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy : Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Regimes in an Andalusian Town” (1997). The area of Israel and Palestine has been a particular focus of this type of study, for example, “Cultural-Geographical Aspects of Street Names in the Towns of Israel” (1989), “Mapping the Nation: Street Names and Arab-Palestinian Identity: Three Case Studies” (2002), and “Signifying Passages: The Signs of Change in Israeli Street Names” (2002). In the contemporary United States context, geographer Derek Alderman has focused on efforts to rename streets in the South after Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to analyze the politics of memory.

A significant contribution of geographers in this field has been tying territoriality back to urban street and place naming, such as Helga Leitner and Petei Kang’s work which shows how the Kuomintang government in Taiwan has worked to inscribe place names from mainland China into the broad urban landscape of Taipei. Other geographers have found other links between urban landscape and territoriality. Carol Gallaher and Peter Shirlow have shown how one loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland has used commemorative murals depicting images of a “proper Protestant history of suffering and resistance” to delineate the territory they controlled. These murals therefore served a dual function of both re-enforcing a specific image of an identity, while simultaneously identifying their group as the controlling entity in the

areas where the murals were created. Another innovative approach to the relationship between nationalism and territoriality in an urban setting has been explored by Shaul Cohen in his study “Winning While Losing: The Apprentice Boys of Derry Walk Their Beat,” discusses how ritual “marching” by a loyalist group in Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland, is an effort to symbolically reassert power over areas in which they no longer have real power.

**Capital Cities**

Despite the innovative work that has been done on the symbolic relationship between urban space and national identity, at present, there is very little work on the relationship between nationalism and the urban development of modern cities, especially capital cities. The phenomenon of the national capital growing to dominate in size, economic power, and cultural significance was recognized by Mark Jefferson in 1939. Jefferson proposed “The Law of the Primate City,” which he summarized as “it is the Law of the Capitals that the largest city shall be supereminent, and not merely in size, but in national influence.”¹⁰¹ Jefferson did recognize that the “law” was not universal, and specifically identified the American case as an exception, writing in a footnote: “Outside America “capital” connotes the same thing as “primate city.” It is only in America that the word is limited to political capitals, often very unimportant towns.”¹⁰² Jefferson provided a very basic statistical analysis to demonstrate the basic validity of his observation, at least with regard to size.¹⁰³ Ultimately, Jefferson tied the phenomenon he was identifying directly to nationalism, stating: “Primacy of a leading city is thus an earmark of

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¹⁰² Ibid. @ Footnote 4.
¹⁰³ Ibid. @ 228.
intense nationalism. Here are the nation’s mind and soul.”$^{104}$ Jefferson concluded his piece by stating simply: “Nationalism crystallizes in primate cities.”$^{105}$

Since this article, capital cities have drawn little attention from geographers. Some attention has been paid to the phenomenon of capital relocation in post-colonial states,$^{106}$ and to the phenomenon in the United States, where the political capital is distinctly not the economic or cultural center.$^{107}$ A rare exception was a 1983 special issue of the journal *Ekistics: the problems and science of human settlements*, which was entirely dedicated to the subject of capital cities. At the beginning of the issue, the editor laid out the importance of capital cities:

> A capital city is the center of the whole political and geographical structure of the nation. Its location is crucial to the life of the nation and the management of its politics. The study of capitals, past and present, and of their evolution is therefore and important chapter in the general analysis of human settlements.$^{108}$

Yet geographers have not aggressively engaged capital cities as a subject of inquiry in their own right.

Other disciplines have begun addressing the topic in the last few years. In 2002, the sociologist Goran Therborn published “Monumental Europe: The National Years. On the Iconography of European Capital Cities,”$^{109}$ which was a comparative study of how major European capital cities have developed, and the types monumentalism they employed. In the region of Central Europe, monographs such as *The Once and Future Budapest* $^{110}$ (2005), and...

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$^{104}$ Ibid. @ 229.
$^{105}$ Ibid. @ 232.
Habsburg Lemberg: Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital\textsuperscript{111} (2009) have examined the complex interaction between public space, national identity, and political power in capital cities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the area of Former Yugoslavia, books such as Sarajevo: A Biography\textsuperscript{112} (2006), Project Zagreb: Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice\textsuperscript{113} (2007), Zagreb: A Cultural History\textsuperscript{114} (2008), and Sarajevo: A Bosnian Kaleidoscope\textsuperscript{115} (2010) all address various aspects of the development of these two capital cities. Other disciplines are also taking the study of urban space and identity beyond capital cities to other major cities, such as Becoming Metropolitan: Urban Selfhood and the Making of Modern Cracow\textsuperscript{116} (2010), which investigates modernization and its impact on identity in Galicia’s ‘second city.’

**Nation, Space, and Place**

The current situation in the study of nation and nationalism presents Geographers with a significant opportunity. Geography has produced significant new scholarship on the issue of place, yet this work has not energetically engaged the idea of nation or nationalism. The concept of place has been a particular focus of human geographers recently. This concept in particular would seem to be very applicable to the issue of nation, yet the scholars of place have focused much more on the local level rather than the national. Tim Cresswell’s recent survey, Place, a short introduction\textsuperscript{117} illustrates this trend. In 123 pages of text, nation is discussed only in one

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three page section, and this section, Regions and nations as places, as the title suggests, is as much about region as nation. Interestingly, though the title of the section leads with regions, the first topic of discussion is nation, which, after one page, segues into region. This construction tends to argue against the legitimacy of nation, by posting nation as a form of place, then, developing the variations between regions as subjects of investigation, thus presenting a field of study which itself calls the legitimacy of nation as a unifying identity further into question. This attitude is also reflected in the recent survey work, Key Thinkers on Space and Place.118 This book covers 52 separate individuals and their work; of these, the only scholar of nationalism profiled is, not surprisingly, Benedict Anderson. These observations are not intended as a critique of the authors’ work, which are fine surveys of the current state of the field, but rather, to use them as a reflection of the way the subject of nation has been addressed within human geography.

The opportunity for geographers is to engage nationalism with the most recent innovations in geographic thought. There is a recognition among some leading geographers that nationalism is an ideology that has changed significantly over time, and may be in the process of another significant transformation. As Colin Flint and Peter Taylor state in Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State, and Locality:

We argued that nationalism underwent a massive metamorphosis in the late nineteenth century. Is there evidence of a second metamorphosis occurring today? A renegotiation of nation can only mean a departure from nationalism’s monolithic tendencies, from national determinism. Quite simply, nationalism from above is under attack. Challenging the unchallengeable can come in many unexpected places.119

118 Phil Hubbard, Rob Kitchin, and Gill Valentine, eds., Key Thinkers on Space and Place (London: SAGE, 2004).
To answer this question, if nationalism today is being challenged from below, will be difficult, as any trend is much easier to identify after the fact, rather than as it unfolds. An important step in the process would be to analyze previous individual cases of national transformation and contestation. Spatiality would seem to be an excellent theoretical frame to use in exploring this process of contestation within national communities.

**Spatiality**

A key concern in this study is the production and deployment of urban space. To operationalize this concern, I turn to one of the key innovations in geographic thought over the last few decades, the notion of spatiality, which seeks to understand the power of space to shape human understanding of realities.

Allen Pred’s articles *Social Reproduction and the Time-Geography of Everyday Life*\(^\text{120}\) and *Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time Geography of Becoming Places*\(^\text{121}\) have been crucial contributions to the development of this idea. These two articles depict space as a central element in the process of structuration, the dialectical process by which individuals participate in the creation of social structures while they are also shaped by those structures. Pred’s work posits space as a centerpiece of this ongoing structuration process. Pred uses the concept of “time geography” to show how “daily life paths” come into contact with and are influenced by larger social “projects.” Space, central to this process, grounds and gives form to every action. Space, to Pred, most notably enables actions to occur and infuses them with meanings and symbolism as a complex semiotic purveyor.

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Henri Lefebvre took a different, but complementary approach to the process of spatial structuration. Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* argued that the human production of space results in three inter-related spatial forms: spatial practice (the physical spaces that society constructs), representations of space (people’s understandings of the proper and improper uses and understandings of space), and representational spaces (space as actually lived by individual members of society). These three elements constituted a spatial trialectic, an intertwined process by which space is continually being created, re-imagined, and lived. These three forms of space can be thought of as real space, imagined space, and lived space. Though each of these forms of space has a distinct definition, they are continually interacting, and no one space exists without interaction with the other two. Thus, real spaces can be re-imagined and transformed into new real spaces, which also can change the way people live in those spaces. Similarly, living within a given space can transform the way people imagine that space, without any physical change to the space. Lefebvre’s argument was that only by examining the interaction between these three forms of space can we fully examine and understand how space is produced and transformed over time. Lefebvre’s work, highly theoretical in nature, focused on the interactions of urban and rural spaces in society.

Edward Soja’s *Third Space: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* furthered Lefebvre’s line of theorizing by operationalizing it and using the spatial trialectic to analyze specific urban sites. But Soja pushed farther, arguing for the use of the city as an analytic object for issues beyond questions of urbanism. This concept, which he called

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122 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*.
123 Ibid. @ 38-39.
“putting cities first,” is presented in *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions*. Soja identifies a particular characteristic of urban environments which he calls *synekism*. This *synekism* references the explosive creativity and productivity of human society in urban environments. Because so much of human society is a product of this *synekism*, Soja argues that cities should be a starting point for the study of modern human phenomenon.

The applications of spatiality to questions of nation by geographers to date have focused on how the imagined space of national territory is transformed into the real space of state territory. Anssi Paasi’s work on the border between Finland and the Soviet Union/Russia shows the spatial trialectic in action. Though he does not expressly invoke spatiality, Paasi does show the border regions being imagined, implemented, and lived spaces which are interactive with each other at every stage of the process. Paasi’s work focuses on the effort to transform a “remote” space, the boundary region, to conform to the national government’s image of how that region should be, and the tensions that are created by people in the boundary region attempting to live in this remotely imagined space in the ways that have been imagined for it. This creates a changed, lived space that is neither the boundary as imagined by the remote core, nor a boundary that had existed previously.

In this project I will apply spatiality to the process of producing the city of Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis. The goal is to examine the emergence of the Croatian Metropolis as an imagined space, and the practical steps that were taken to transform it into a real space. This Croatian Metropolis project was focused as much on defining the nature of Croatia as a nation though the way the population of Zagreb lived, as it was about establishing Croatian sovereignty over specific territories. This project therefore examines how changes in the imagined, real, and

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126 Paasi, "Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse : The Finish-Russian Border."
lived spaces of the city of Zagreb were both driven by and recursively influenced the trajectory of the Croatian national project.

**Conclusion**

Existing scholarship in geography has been fragmented with regard to the relationship between urban space and national identity, and has looked primarily at inscription of meaning in distinct parts and micro-spaces of cities. Geographers have looked at how space is used to evoke existing senses of meaning, as a “text” which is “read” by people. But this assumes a common understand in existence when the text is written. What has not been done to date in the study of urban space and nationalism, is integrating how nationalism transforms people’s understanding of meaning though the use of urban space, how it essentially changes the language in which people communicate, or how people transform an existing meaning into a new understanding. Existing scholarship has looked primarily at how advocates of one nationalism mobilizes urban space to challenge other national identities, it has not examined how urban space has been used to contest and transform the meaning of a nation itself by re-imagining a national identity.

Though the original presentation of the concept of “primate cities” is deeply flawed by its positivist perspective, and the desire to identify a “law” of social science, the basic observation has remained remarkably accurate. We should view the “primate city pattern” not as the result of a “law” of social science, but rather as a phenomenon that needs to be examined and understood. The original observation that primate cities emerge because they are “national cities” is uncritical of the concept of nation and nationalism, and unsupported by any real evidence beyond anecdotes, and therefore must be taken as an assertion, rather than a finding. The Croatian case indicates that there is a strong relationship between the phenomenon of nation
and nationalism, and the emergence of the primate city pattern there. Before 1850, Zagreb was just one of several Croatian towns of similar size and not integrated into, let alone central to a national economy. Yet, by 1900 the city was firmly established as the political, cultural, and economic center of Croatia. The only significant advantage Zagreb possessed as a community over the other large towns of the Triune Kingdom was a local urban elite that saw themselves as a national elite as well, and dedicated themselves to the project of building a nation by building a city capable of being that nation’s metropolis.

By employing spatiality this project looks beyond the use of symbolic landscapes as text which resonates with already understood meanings, to show how symbolic spaces interact with everyday landscapes to transform popular understanding, to transform meaning. In doing so, this project seeks to use spatiality to integrate various strands of geographic enquiry on the relationship between urban space and nationalism. This project demonstrates the connection between the clearly symbolic, the coding of Zagreb as a Croatian city, and the use of everyday urban space, the city’s private buildings and economic infrastructure, to define Croatia and Croats as modern, urban, and bourgeois. This transformation was planned through the construction of key monumental spaces and the promulgation of building codes and city plans, but accomplished through the daily life of the city in these built spaces. This project also shows how symbolic spaces can be successfully contested to redefine a national community from within.

To date, academic work on nationalism has only nominally been informed by the insights of spatiality theory. This project uses spatiality to advance the understanding of how nationalism as an ideology becomes spatialized as something intimately tied to the production of semiotically infused spaces in cities. A key part of the study will be examining the role of urban space in
transmitting and contesting nationalism. Although an urban study in form, this project is thus fundamentally about nationalism -- how it is constituted, transmitted, and contested. To that end, I am applying Soja’s approach by endeavoring to study the phenomenon of nationalism in Croatia using the city of Zagreb as an analytical object. My argument is focused on showing that in Zagreb the project of nation building and the project of city building became two intertwined parts of the same project. To that end, spatial practice and practices in space in Zagreb will be shown to be inseparable from the organizing ideology of nationalism.
Chapter 2

Methodology
Overview

This study uses central and ancillary data sources to interrogate the interconnections between the constitution of nationalism and spatial production and iconography in Zagreb and its main square. I chose qualitative analysis because of the desire to unearth the complex, interconnecting forces and processes that were acting in this time to make urban space. My goal was to excavate the role of groups and institutions in pushing to semiotically code urban space from a range of scales: the national, the regional, and the local. Moreover, I sought to decipher the power of reflexive individuals “on the ground” to mediate diverse forces and to construct their own hermeneutic spatialities.

Data Sources

Central Sources

I reconstructed the social history of Zagreb between 1850 and 1940 using an array of data sources. Two main types of central sources for this project were newspapers and periodicals. These often provide very good insight into the context in which policy debates and decisions were made, as well as discussions of public reaction to these events. Because of the absence of reliable public surveys during this time frame, such documents were viewed as suspect unless its content could be verified from multiple sources. I relied primarily on four newspapers: Narodne novine, Obzor, Večer, and Hrvatski dnevnik as well as two significant periodicals, the magazine Svijet and the social journal Zagreb, and the personal writings of some key actors. Each of these sources was significant for different reasons. It is also important to note that the press in Croatia has always had strong and very open ideological leanings.

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2 Ibid. @ Chapter 5.
*Narodne novine* was the first Croatian language newspaper which focused on local and international news of political interest in Zagreb, and by 1850 was also the Croatian *Službeni list*, which meant that all official government announcements were published in the paper as well. *Obzor* began publication as an opposition newspaper in 1860 under the name *Pozor*, and went through several name changes, but published from 1871 to 1941 under the *Obzor* banner. Though initially an opposition newspaper, over time and especially after the outbreak of World War I, the paper became the voice of the urban elite of Zagreb with a focus on local and international news of political significance. *Večer* began in 1920 from the same publisher as *Obzor* as a complementary product with a focus on local Zagreb news. *Večer*'s local focus meant that major construction projects in Zagreb were addressed extensively in its coverage. *Hrvatski dnevnik* began publication in 1936 as the voice of the right wing of the Croatian Peasant Party. Though formally a national newspaper, it became very involved in debates about urban development in Zagreb.

The two periodicals I used each had their own strengths as sources as well. *Svijet* magazine was a bi-monthly published between 1926 and 1936 in Zagreb. Though the magazine’s subject matter was eclectic, ranging from news to fiction and local to global, it did publish a significant number of pieces on urban development and urban projects in Zagreb. The magazine even proposed specific projects to be implemented. This made it a very valuable resource, despite its short publication history. The journal *Zagreb* was published between 1933 and 1944. This quarterly publication was focused broadly on Zagreb’s history, cultural development, and present and future of Croatian and Yugoslav society. It was essentially written by the city’s elite for the city’s elite, and therefore provides a valuable insight into ideas in circulation at the top level of Zagreb society. In addition to these periodicals, a key central
source for discussions of Stejpan Radić and Croatian Peasantism were his own writings, which were collected and reprinted in the early 1970s and again after 1989.3

At the same time, I used relevant archival materials. Most influential was a complete copy of the Competition Announcement published to support the 1931 international competition to develop a new Urban Plan for the City of Zagreb. This document, located in the Zagreb collection of the City Library of Zagreb was extremely valuable as it represented a complete expression of the Croatian urban elites’ image of Zagreb as a city, its role in Yugoslavia, and their goals for the future of the city. In addition to this document, another valuable archival source was the public presentation materials from the International Completion for a new urban plan held in 1931, which are still in the Croatian State Archive for the City of Zagreb. This archive contains original design proposals for the competition and thus illustrates visions for the future for the urban space of the city. These designs visually illustrated visions of the ideal city, and perceptions of an evolving nationalism and how this interconnected with city purpose and form, and therefore were useful in capturing various concepts of how to fulfill the concept of the Croatian Metropolis.

Ancillary Sources

Ancillary data sources, that is, sources of information that were especially useful as information for cross-verifying initial presuppositions, or providing context to central source material, were also important. I used a mix of written materials by other authors. In particular, two articles, Ivan Rogić’s "What Has Happened in Zagreb,"4 and Dunja Rihtman-Aguštin’s "The

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Monument in the Main City Square: Constructing and Erasing Memory in Contemporary
Croatia,5 provided a starting point for the project, confirming the significance of urban space,
Zagreb’s main square, and the Ban Jelačić monument as a key to understanding social
development in Zagreb. I used other recent academic texts to establish the broader context of
social, economic, and political developments. On the national level, there have been several
recent histories of Croatia in both Croatian and English.6 There are also several older histories
that provide significant insight into events, though the constraints under which the authors were
writing must be taken into account when using them.7

There has also been good contemporary historical work done on the city of Zagreb itself.8
In addition to this recent historical work, there are also several older histories of Zagreb (and
once again, the previous caveats about the limits under which the authors worked are
important).9 One Croatian author, Olga Maruševski has written extensively on the history of
Ban Jelačić square, as well as other sites around Zagreb.10 Maruševski’s detailed historical
work on Ban Jelačić square has been invaluable in providing a basic chronology, as well as

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5 Dunja Rihtman-Aguštin, "The Monument in the Main City Square: Constructing and Erasing Memory in
University Press, 2004).
6 In Croatian, there is an excellent short history of Croatia by Ivo Goldstein: Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest
(Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003). In English there is a large history by Branka Magaš. This has some issues in specific
cases, but overall is a valuable resource for the broad history of Croatia. Branka Magaš, Croatia through History
7 For example: Josip Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska (Zagreb: Binoza-Svjetski Pisci, 1936). Also, the reprint:
Josip Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska 1 (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1990), Josip Horvat, Politička Povijest
Hrvatska 2 (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1990).
8 See Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). For a recent
example of the type of urban history that is available on Zagreb in Croatian.
9 For example: Emilij Laszowski, Stari i Novi Zagreb (Zagreb: Braća Hrvatskog Zmaja, 1925; reprint, 1994, Školska
knjiga). Also: Gjuro Szabo, Stari Zagreb (Zagreb: Spektar, 1971). (note that this is a reprint of the original
published in 1940) and Rudolf Horvat, Zagreb - Povijest Hrvatskoga Glavnog Grada (Zagreb: 1942). There is also
a series of book from the Socialist period, for example: Zdravko Blažina, ed., Zagreb Jučer Danas Sutra, 2 vols.,
(Zagreb: 1965).
10 See Olga Maruševski, Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2006), Olga Maruševski, Od
social context across time. The Croatian architectural and urban planning journal Čovjek i Prostor (Man and Space) also provided a significant number of articles discussing the history of urban development and planning in Zagreb. I also used several political and personal biographies of Stjepan Radić to put his personal writings in context.11

Another source of data that proved important to my study were museum and public exhibition catalogs. These were valuable because they often included collections of source documents which had been photographed and republished. One example of this type of source is Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću (Anton Dominik Fernkorn : The Monument to Ban Josip Jelačić). 12 This document contains narratives and photographs of all the key documents relating to the original efforts to create the Ban Jelačić monument. Its photos and text allowed me to visually reconstruct the changes in the statue, square, and city.

Data Collection

The bulk of the data for this project was collected during 2 three month field research trips to Zagreb, Croatia in the fall of 2006 and the spring of 2007. I made one prior excursion to Zagreb for this project, where I focused on where data could be obtained. This trip enabled me to tap this array of central and ancillary data sources quickly and efficiently. The first field research trip allowed me to focus on central data sources, though ancillary sources were also collected. Central in this was the appraisal of newspaper articles up to the end of World War I (1918). The second trip focused on collecting ancillary sources of data, including the

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aforementioned wealth of articles on Croatian architectural and urban planning, though central sources, including newspaper and periodical articles from the interwar period (1919-1940) were collected as well. Upon obtaining the data, an intense period of deciphering the text involved a constant reading and melding of insights from the central and ancillary data sources.

The prime resources for central sources were the City of Zagreb Library Newspaper collection and the City Museum Library. The City Library has an extensive collection of the main newspapers published in Zagreb for the entire period of the study. The City Museum Library also contained a complete collection of the periodicals Svijet and Zagreb. The main source for Ancillary Sources was the City Library of Zagreb, which, in addition to their general collection, has a separate specialized library dedicated to the subject of the city of Zagreb with over 11,000 non-circulating items.

A challenge with a project like this is both too much, and too little data. The availability of Central Sources increases significantly over the period of this study, as the volume of material published in Zagreb grows. Initially, there were few newspapers and fewer other periodicals published, and those that were published were not very systematically archived. In addition, a significant amount actual source documents from the archives has been lost over time. Even archival copies of many newspapers were missing or incomplete before 1945. Conversely, where the newspapers were available, the nature of the debates involved in this study make it difficult to pin a specific event to a specific date. As a result, every page of the selected newspapers or magazines had to be checked for relevant news stories or opinion pieces. A key resource and assistance in the collection of this data was the Library of the City Museum of Zagreb, which maintains a collection of important newspaper stories relating to the city. This pre-selected collection of articles from Zagreb newspapers dramatically improved my ability to
find relevant information as well as gave me much more targeted time periods for broader searches of newspapers. This collection also proved invaluable as it contained copies of articles from newspapers which had not been considered either significant or newsworthy enough to have been daily archived by the City Library of Zagreb’s Newspaper Library at the time of their original publication.

A second significant data collection challenge was the nature of Croatian print culture. With a Croatian population of less than five million people, Croatian publishers rarely print more than one thousand copies of many books, and rarely reprint them. Thus, it is often difficult to find book copies that have not been recently published, as the limited numbers of library copies were often unavailable. Often, the Antikvaritjati (used book stores), were the only way to locate books important to this study. Fortunately, many older books were republished in their entirety during the “Croatian Spring” period in the early 1970s, and again after 1989.
Chapter 3

The Historical Foundation of Croatia and the Croatian Metropolis
Introduction to the Study Site

This chapter establishes the context for the empirical investigation for this study. It provides background to understand the economic, social, and political situation in Zagreb, Croatia in 1850 (the starting-point for my investigation). This chapter provides important context to this study by providing a survey of the political, economic and social history of the three places that are the core of this study, Croatia, Zagreb, and the main square of Zagreb. This chapter also provides an historical sketch of two key periods before the beginning of the study itself, the Croatian National Awakening of the 1830s, and 40s, and the political turmoil of 1848. This is important to the study because Croatia, Zagreb and the square provided the physical and imaginative raw materials that would become the core of the Croatian Metropolis project once it emerged. The Croatian National Awakening and the events of 1848 shaped the cultural and political environment that enabled the Croatian Metropolis project to emerge.

Croatia

The Croatian national project unfolded amid the influence of some specific historical relationships. The Croatian state, as an independent kingdom, offered the office of king (the crown) to the King of Hungary in 1102.\(^1\) The King of Hungary thus was also the King of Croatia. In the political turmoil and civil war that followed the Hungarian defeat by the Ottoman

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Empire at the Battle of Mohac in 1526, the Emperor of Austria became the King of Hungary, and thus, also, the King of Croatia. As a result, a unified Kingdom was, in principle, established across the entire terrain. Yet, there still existed three separate governments, creating an ambiguous political reality that became important to political processes existent in 1850. The ambiguities within this political geometry were the foundation for much of Croatian politics until 1918 as the political actors within Austria, Hungary, and Croatia continually renegotiated their relationships to one another.

Complicating the political interaction between Austria, Hungary, and Croatia was the diminishing Ottoman threat to the region and the rise of nationalism as a central factor in political life throughout Central Europe in the late 18th century. Within Hungary, the issue of national identity became contentious. Hungary was a multi-ethnic entity, with Magyars (Hungarians) dominating economic and political life, but significant non-Magyar populations of Croats, Slovaks, and Romanians concentrated in peripheral areas on the Kingdom’s borders, and the main urban centers were essentially German in character. The emergence of the Hungarian national project at the end of the 18th century presented a political dilemma to the various non-Hungarian populations of the Kingdom. In Croatia, the dilemma of the elite was whether to actively participate in the Hungarian national project and reap some of its benefits, or to resist the Hungarian project and claim a national distinction for themselves.4

This debate was propelled within Croatia by the actions of the Hungarian government in Pest (Budapest). Language became a significant focus of the national question in Croatia. Because of the Kingdom of Hungary’s multi-ethnic character, Magyar, the Hungarian language, was not initially the state language. Latin was used for official state purposes including debates

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4 Despalatović, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement* @ Chapter II.
in the Hungarian Parliament. In the 1820s, Hungarian law was changed to make Magyar the official state language including for parliamentary debate, effectively silencing the Croatian members of the Hungarian Parliament unless they spoke in Magyar. The issue of language was not the only factor in the Croatian political community’s debate over how to respond to the Hungarian national project. The economic reform agenda of the Hungarian national project, as manifested in a series of laws passed between 1832 and 1836, threatened the position of the landholding aristocracy in Croatia.

Within a decade, the Hungarian national project had alienated two potential allies in Croatia. By pushing the supremacy of Magyar over the other languages within Hungary, they alienated the newly developing urban groups of educated professionals and commercial interests which were sympathetic both ideologically and pragmatically to the liberalizing agenda of changes proposed by Hungarian nationalists. At the same time, the liberalizing agenda had alienated Croatia’s hereditary landed elite, who saw no real threat from Magyar linguistic hegemony; they were typically related to Hungarians by birth or marriage and were often at least bilingual. This is not to imply that the Magyarone party in Croatia was not a significant factor or that there were not members of these identified groups that belonged to it. There were many members of the urban elite that saw Magyarization as a path to liberalization and modernization, and many landed aristocrats that saw it as enhancing their positions politically, even if it did threaten their economic status, a fact evidenced by the Magyarone party’s ability to strongly contest local elections between 1832 and 1847. But, these issues did put the Magyarone party

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6 Ibid. @ 304-308.
in Croatia somewhat on the defensive and sparked a vigorous indigenous cultural movement in response.\footnote{Jelavich, \textit{History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries}. @ 306-308.}

The Croatian cultural response to Magyarization was a movement that identified itself as Illyrian. This project was pan-Slavic in character, but its progenitors were also very public in their sentiment for Croatia as a Homeland, distinctly separate from Hungary. Though primarily cultural in origin, the Illyrian movement quickly developed a political character as well, eventually with an Illyrian political party to carry the banner of the cause. But even before the formal politicizing of the project, it would be impossible to separate the cultural issues from the political, as is clearly illustrated by the process through which the first Croatian language periodicals began publication. Ljudevit Gaj, a driving force behind the Illyrian movement in its initial stages, applied for permission to publish a newspaper and a literary gazette in Croatian. The Hungarian authorities denied his request. Gaj then appealed directly to the Emperor in Vienna, in his role as King of Croatia, to overturn the Hungarian government’s position, which the Emperor did with the comment: “Yes, yes, the Hungarians. They make a lot of trouble. They write too much and don’t want the Croats to write anything.”\footnote{Despalatović, \textit{Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement} @ 74}

The Imperial Government in Vienna at the time was willing to tolerate, and even support to some extent, local resistance within Hungary to the Hungarian national project. But that support had limits, and the Illyrian movement was at the edge of those limits. In 1843 the word Illyrian was banned and the movement forced to transform itself into the National\footnote{The word \textit{narod} has two distinct meaning in Croatian, which can often lead to disputes over the proper translation. The first definition is people, but not as a plural, but as a collective, analogous to the German word \textit{volk}. The second meaning of the word is that of nation. In the case of the \textit{Narodna stranka}, historians have used the meaning of \textit{nation} when translating, while literary scholars have sometimes used the meaning of \textit{peoples}. In this project I will use the historians’ translation of National and National Party, as it is the one used in every English language historical source for this project.} movement, because the Illyrian movement’s pan-Slavic character was seen as potentially subversive to the
political order of the Empire.\textsuperscript{11} This constraint limited one of the Illyrian movement’s stronger arguments; that though the Croatian community was much smaller than the Hungarian community, Croatia could draw on the cultural capital of the entire South Slavic community for a nation building project.

Ultimately though, it was not the relative strength of the arguments that settled the issue of how to respond to the Hungarian national project in Croatia. The issue was settled by events outside of the elites’ control. In 1848, Hungary rebelled against the Imperial Government. Over the following year, the Hungarian rebellion was suppressed (with significant assistance from Croatia), and with it any argument the Magyarone party may have had about benefits to Croatia for joining the Hungarian national project. Also, during intense political maneuvering at the early stages of the Hungarian uprising, Ljudevit Gaj was personally discredited and significant doubt was cast on the Illyrian movement. Given the events of 1848 to 1849, the two major movements contesting the Croatian elite suffered fatal blows.

In terms of territorial definition, Croatia was recognized as the region around the city of Zagreb which had not fallen under Ottoman control (including a small coastal area on the Adriatic Sea). Eventually this area became known official as Civil Croatia. Over time, two additional South Slavic territories came under Hapsburg control; Dalmatia, acquired from the Republic of Venice, and Slavonia, which had been acquired from the Ottoman Empire. Slavonia was politically attached to Croatia through Hungary. Dalmatia was part of the German portion of the Empire, and as such was governed separately. A fourth group of areas physically separated these three regions; the \textit{Vojna krajina}, or Military Border, was a separate entity, with significant rights of self governance. Despite the physical and political separation of the three territories of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, they were grouped together in the imagination of

\textsuperscript{11} Jelavich, \textit{History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries}. @ 307
many people as the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia (or Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia) based on historical associations.\(^\text{12}\)

For a brief period of time during the Napoleonic Wars, Dalmatia and the southwestern half of Croatia were combined with the Croatian portion of the Military Border, Istria and four other areas to form the Illyrian Provinces of the French Empire.\(^\text{13}\) But after Napoleon’s defeat in central Europe in 1813 the territories reverted back to Hapsburg control and their previous administrative divisions were restored. Though the integration with the French Empire was brief, it did open up the region to new ways of imagining themselves. In the same way that interaction with nationalized French soldiers and administrators help to expose Germans to the ideas of nationalism, so too did it begin a new set of intellectual and political processes in Croatia. But the boundary of the Illyrian Provinces was the Sava River, so Zagreb remained within the Hapsburg Empire throughout the period, if just on the border.

The political turmoil of 1848 briefly, but significantly, altered the political structure of the region. The events of 1848 and 1849 will be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter. For the purposes of this overview, what is significant is that through a series of events, the Ban of Croatia was also given responsibility for the Military Border, Dalmatia, and the independent city of Rijeka. As a result, Zagreb briefly became the effective capital of all of the Hapsburg territory south of Hungary proper. Though this situation effectively ended by 1850, the fact that it had existed created an historical territorial reality and future goal for the Croatian national project of making this temporary geo-spatial political unity permanent in the future.

\(^{12}\) Magaš, \textit{Croatia through History}. \@ Chapter Two.

\(^{13}\) Goldstein, \textit{Hrvatska Povijest}. \@ 156-158.
Zagreb

Zagreb lies at the confluence of several natural lines of drift at the most western edge of the Slavonian Plane where the Sava River turns south before turning east again. This position afforded good access to the city, which is advantageous in times of peace, but disadvantageous in times of war. The vulnerability of the city’s position is evidenced by the events of the Mongol invasion of Europe, when the town was sacked by Mongol forces moving along the natural line of drift of the Sava River. Zagreb was not the only city in the region with positional advantages. During the Roman period, the administrative center for the region was located at the town of Sisak southeast of Zagreb, where the Sava River becomes navigable year round, and was thus a natural interface point between the land and water transportation networks servicing the area.

Zagreb’s situation as an urban community was also somewhat distinctive within the territory of the Triune Kingdom. It was not a single urban community, but actually two separate towns each with its own particular interests and fortifications. On the west side of a small stream, on the highest local hill adjacent to the Sava River flood plain was Gradec, and across the stream, on a lower hill to the east was Kaptol. Kaptol was probably established to act as a counter- balance to the semi-autonomous Gradec. Kaptol was granted extensive land holdings to support itself. Gradec, lacking extensive land resources to support itself, turned to industry and became a center of “hand crafts” (mainly wood and metal working). Competition between the two communities was not always peaceful, and the small bridge linking the two towns became known as Kravni most (Bloody Bridge). The Hungarian civil war which followed the battle of Mohacs led to open warfare between the cities, and Kaptol briefly laid siege to Gradec in 1529.14

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By the end of the 16th Century though, the two communities were viewed as a single urban complex by outsiders, and referred to as Agram on map produced by German cartographers.16

Despite the chartering of Gradec as a Free and Royal City, and the growth of Kaptol as a center of ecclesiastic activity, the Hapsburg Empire paid little attention to the towns in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. Despite a specific request from the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) for improved fortifications, none were ever built around the towns by the Imperial government, as they were around Karlovac and Slavonski Brod.17 Gradec briefly lost its role as the home of the

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15 Miljenko Lapaine Drago Novak, Dubravka Mlinarić, ed., *Five Centuries of Maps and Charts of Croatia Pet Stoljeća Geografskih i Pomorskih Karata Hrvatske* (Zagreb: školska knjiga, 2005). @ Fig. / Sl. 1.
16 The name Agram first appears in historical documents in 1134, and became the official name for the community in German once the Hapsburg dynasty became established in the region. Josip Bilić, ed., *Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj.* @ 2-3.
Sabor in 1756, when the Hungarian Ban of Croatia at the time relocated the capital to Varaždin, a town closer to Hungary proper, until fire severally damaged that community in 1776 and the civil government returned to Gradec. By the end of the 18th Century, the Hapsburg military administration for the area moved to Zagreb from Karlovac, thus consolidating the political and security authorities for the region in the city.

“Haller” Map of Agram (Zagreb) circa 1817

Thus, at the end of the 18th Century the community had accumulated all the formal attributes of a capital city. Within Gradec was the seat of legislative and executive power for the region. Kaptol was the Bishopric for the entire region and had several monasteries located within its walls, one of which had been chartered as a Royal Academy to award degrees in

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18 Rudolf Horvat, Zagreb - Povijest Hrvatskoga Glavnog Grada (Zagreb: 1942). @ 118
Theology and Philosophy by the Imperial government. The towns had also expanded outside their earlier fortifications onto the flatter ground of the Sava River valley floor. These areas, now a recognized continuous urban complex, consisted of 4 distinct, but interconnected towns.20

The Square

Before discussing the significance of the main square in Zagreb, a discussion of the role of the public square in local society is essential. The Croatian word for square is *Trg*.21 As a monosyllabic word, *Trg* also forms the root of a family of words which give a clear indication of the symbolically central role of the town square in local society. As the table indicates, this family of words deals with commerce and those who engage in commercial activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trg</th>
<th>Square, Market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trgovac</td>
<td>Shopkeeper, Dealer, Business Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trgovački</td>
<td>Commercial, Business, Merchant, Mercantile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trgovački Centar</td>
<td>Shopping Center, Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trgovački Putnik</td>
<td>Traveling Salesman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The square then was seen as a place of commerce in Croatian society, and the main square in Zagreb was not an exception.

The square itself was formally created in the 17th Century by transforming private gardens into public space. There was urgency to this project; historical records indicate it was done in one to two days, and the private gardens were physically uprooted immediately. The urgency may have actually been the result of local political rather than physical concerns, as Kaptol had been resisting the new square’s development for approximately a century given its ability to siphon off trade.22 Initially the square was referred to as a *Sajam* or *Sajamništa* (fairground). Annual fairs were a significant part of the routine of the community. The creation

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21 In the Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian language group the letter *r* functions as a semi-vowel.
of the new fairground indicates that St. Mark’s square in Gradec was no longer large enough to accommodate the event. It appears though, that merchants had been using the area during the fair even before the beginning of the 17th Century.23

The formalizing of the square was significant because it indicates several important changes in the situation of the communities of Gradec and Kaptol. First, it points to a significant and continuing increase in population size in both communities. The new fairground was necessary because existing market space within both communities was no longer sufficient to support the needs of the community. The location of the square outside both communities indicates that neither community had sufficient space for a new market square within their respective town walls. Also, and perhaps most significantly, the creation of the new, shared fairgrounds indicates a willingness on the part of both communities to work together to solve mutual problems and an end to competing fairs that had been the source of much conflict between the two communities. The new market square therefore was both a political and a practical foundation upon which to begin the process of integration between these two separate urban communities.

Originally, the area of the square was known as Manduševac sajam because of the stream of the same name which ran along the northern and eastern edges of the area.24 By the 19th Century the square was known to the population of the area as Harmica. This name derived from the Harmicad, the Hungarian term for the 3% user fee charged to merchants on the square to pay for its maintenance.25 As the main market, the square was central in the daily life of every household in the community. But the square’s centrality to daily life did not equate to a central position in the political life of the city. Saint Mark’s square, in Gradec, was seen as the political

23 Olga Maruševski, Od Manduševca do Trga Republike (Zagreb: 1987). @ 7
24 Ibid. @ 7-8.
25 Peter Haller map of Zagreb, circa 1817 MGZ, inv. br. 3165
center of the city where locations for both the Sabor (Parliament) and Banski dvor (The Ban’s Castle, which was the center for executive authority) were eventually established.

By the beginning of the 19th century the square had developed an important symbolic role for the city, that of gateway. As Maruševski states of the square at the time:

The fairground of Harmica is not representative [of the city], but it is the most important space upon entry into the city which can be used for various manifestations [symbolic events]. It was that threshold of the city through which must cross all soldiers, all dignitaries, kings and viceroys and their formal retinue, where via the bridge by Manduševac they step on city soil.26

The Arrival of Count Nugent in Zagreb with his Yeomanry27

There is only one significant representation of the square related to any political events prior to 1850; a lithograph produced in 1843 commemorating the installation of a new Ban in 1842. This

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26 Maruševski, Od Manduševca do Trga Republike. @ 26.
27 Josip Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska (Zagreb: Binoza-Svjetski Pisci, 1936). @ Photo plate insert between 72-73.
The image is the first indication of the idea of the square as resonant space for national meaning. The image in question does not actually depict the Ban’s instillation though, which was not performed on the square, but rather the arrival of a Croatian nobleman and his retinue of infantry and cavalry engaging in exactly the type of ceremonial arrival described by Maruševski and being greeted by the population of the city on the square. The particular incident was of so little note that it is not even mentioned in histories of the city. But the image, done by an “Illyrian” artist, is clearly meant as a statement of national distinction (separate from the Ban being installed) and has continued to be included in nearly every illustrated history of the city of Zagreb and of Croatia.

The Illyrian Period

To understand the genesis of the Croatian National Project and the Croatian Metropolis project in Zagreb beginning in the second half of the 19th century it is necessary to understand the impact of the events of 1848 and 1849 on the Croatian National Project. The broader events of 1848 were a transformative moment within the Croatian elite. Until 1848 the Croatian project was a component of a pan-South Slavic movement that identified itself as Illyrian and later National (after the term Illyrian was banned by Hapsburg authorities).28 This movement was a local manifestation of Romanticism and embedded in the broader context of the Romantic milieu as well as the cultural, political, and economic conditions of Central Europe at that time.

To the Romantics language was a manifestation of national spirit which inspired national sentiment within a people. This element of inspiration was a key part of how people became aware of their true identity in the Romantic world view. Romantics did not see nation as strictly

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28 It is impossible to do real justice to the history of the Illyrian movement in the space available here. See Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement for a more complete history of the movement.
or even necessarily an ethnic category. The implications of these attitudes to the Hungarian-
Croatian political dynamic were significant. Hungarians argued that by freely joining into a
political union with Hungary, Croatia had chosen to become part of the Hungarian national
project. Croats rejected this argument, claiming that Croatia had never surrendered its statehood,
but was an equal kingdom which shared the same king with Hungary. Croats further argued that
they had retained a key element of national identity though the persistence of a Croatian political
state in the form of the Sabor (Parliament).

The degree to which the Illyrian project was driven by Croatian national sentiment can be
seen in the writings of the movement’s intellectual driving force, Ljudevit Gaj. Gaj became
enamored with the idea of Croatia as a child growing up in the highlands north of Zagreb.29 Gaj
came of age as the Hungarian national project was accelerating its program of Magyarization.
To Gaj and many others of his generation this program of Magyarization was a direct threat to
the Croatian identity. By transforming the language of Croatia into Hungarian, the
Magyarization project was an effort to transform Croats into Hungarians.30

By the 1830s The Hungarian national project was already an established movement with
a literary language and institutions of cultural production in place by the time the Illyrians began
formulating a response. Gaj’s view of the situation can be seen in one of his most famous pieces
of writing, Još Hrvatska ni Propala (Still Croatia Has Not Perished):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Još Horvatska ni prepala} & \quad \text{No Croatia has not perished,} \\
\text{Jošče živi narod naš} & \quad \text{Still living is our nation} \\
\text{Ako jest i dugo spala,} & \quad \text{But now and long has she slept} \\
\text{Ni još mertva, nije baš!} & \quad \text{Still not dead, not at all!}
\end{align*}
\]

29 Gaj was the product of a mixed family. His father was German and his mother was Slovak. Thus Croatian was
the third language Gaj learned. Ibid. @ Chapter III.
30 Ibid. @ Chapters IV, V, & VI.
31 Nikša Stančić, Gajeva “Još Hrvatska ni Propala” iz 1832-33. Ideologija Ljudevita Gaja u Pripremnom Razdoblju
Hrvatskog Narodnog Preporoda (Zagreb: Globus, 1988). @ 150.
This poem, originally drafted in 1831, embodied the Illyrian perspective that Croatia was at once both a strong nation that had endured tremendous challenges, yet it appeared dead, and was poised at the brink of extinction if strenuous efforts were not made to save it. Given the energy behind the Hungarian national project, and the diligence with which it was pursuing the Magyarization campaign, Gaj’s assessment was understandable.

In contrast, this new Illyrian movement started without any institutions to promote, develop, or even sustain an Illyrian culture. At the time the movement began what actually constituted Croatian as a language was still an issue of academic dispute. The language had no specified literary form and its Latin alphabet was borrowed from other languages, which did not fit the distinctive features of Croatian’s South Slavic linguistic characteristics. Gaj made it his task to resolve these issues, and in a matter of a few years completely transformed the situation. Gaj personally developed a new Latin orthography for Croatian that resolved the issues created by the borrowed system in use at the time. Gaj also convinced the emerging Croatian literary cadre to adopt Štokavian, the same dialect adopted by the members of the Serbian National Project, as the formal literary form of Croatian as well, rather than the Kajkavian dialect spoken in Croatia “proper.” The acceptance of Štokavian accomplished two key goals. First, it re-enforced the argument that, as a language, Croatian was broader than

32 The one exception to this situation was the Catholic Church in Croatia. Croatia had been granted a unique privilege by the Vatican to give mass in the vernacular.
33 From this point forward the term Croatian will be used to identify those specifically national elements of the Illyrian movement to avoid later confusion. Until 1948 the movement used Illyrian to describe all the elements of their project because the term Horvat (Croat) was used by the Magarone party in Civil Croatia to identify themselves. Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement @ 136.
34 One early scholar of Slavic languages had specifically identified Kajkavian, one of the three dialects of modern Croatian and the dialect spoken in and around Zagreb, as “Croatian.” This was an understandable interpretation given that this was the only area formally identified as Croatia in a territorial sense. For a more complete discussion of this dispute see Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). @ 80
35 @ Chapter IV
36 Even to this date the three parts of the old Triune Kingdom, Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia speak distinct dialects.
*Kajkavian*, but rather was a language of three dialects of which *Kajkavian* was one. Second, adopting Štokavian created an intellectual bridge with the more firmly established Serbian national project, providing geographic depth and cultural capital to counter the demographically larger and programmatically more advanced Hungarian national project.

It was through this process of linguistic transformation that Zagreb as a city became central to the efforts of the Illyrian project. Gaj was neither from Zagreb nor had he spent a significant amount of time there. He had completed his orthographic work by 1831, but even though his efforts were praised by those who came in contact with him, it was not being used by Croatian writers. In 1832 Gaj moved to Zagreb to begin his professional career as a lawyer at the urging of a fellow founder of the Illyrian movement because, as Elinor Despalatovic states: “Although Gaj could have served his legal apprenticeship in any major town of the Triune Kingdom, Zagreb provided him with a fertile environment for his other, and more important, work.”37 Unlike the other major towns of the region, Zagreb had a large concentration of literate individuals who were trying to develop a response to the Magyarization program. The city had become a collecting point for this group because of the Royal Academy (the theology, philosophy and law faculties) that had developed out of the complex of monasteries in Kaptol.38 This concentration was further spurred by the need for literate individuals to service the growing bureaucratic apparatus in Zagreb as it grew into Civil Croatia’s functional capital city.

Zagreb was therefore a community with a large enough population of like minded individuals to allow Gaj to transform intellectual capital into financial capital which would support the building of cultural institutions and sustain a national project. The vehicle for this transformation was a pair of Croatian language publications, one a newspaper and the other a

37 Despalatović, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement* @ 63.
38 Gaj himself had not attended any schooling in Zagreb. He had attended *Gimnazium* (high school) in Varaždin and university in Vienna, Graz, and Pest (Budapest). Ibid. @ Chapter III.
literary gazette. These were the first publications of their kind in Croatian, and it was only in Zagreb that evidence of a sufficient readership was available to sustain them economically, as shown by the establishment of a successful German language newspaper in 1826.\textsuperscript{39} It was also through these publications that Gaj implemented his orthographic changes and popularized his use of Štokavian as the Croatian literary language.

Though the Illyrian movement faced many challenges, it also had a significant ally in the Imperial government in Vienna. The Imperial government was very suspicious of the political implications of the Hungarian national project and was supportive of the Illyrian movement as a way of challenging the Hungarian project without direct confrontation. To this end the Imperial government overruled Hungarian officials and allowed Gaj to begin publishing his two periodicals in Croatian in 1835.\textsuperscript{40} But this support from Vienna was not unlimited. The Imperial government in Vienna was just as suspicious of the political implications of the pan-Slavic Illyrian concept as it was of the Hungarian national project, and not without reason. Gaj sent a representative of the Illyrian movement on several trips to Belgrade to establish contacts and obtain financial support for the movement from Serbia in the late 1830s.\textsuperscript{41}

As a political project, Illyrianism was focused on “capturing Zagreb” as a means to gain control of the institutions necessary for nation building.\textsuperscript{42} By 1842 the political situation between the Illyrians and the Magyarones was so strained in Zagreb that the meeting of the “county assembly” (the body of those eligible to vote for country officers and Sabor delegates) erupted into fatal violence, and the Illyrian supporting head of the county used the incident to

\textsuperscript{39} The first efforts at periodical publishing in Zagreb can be traced back as far as the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, but the German language Agramer Zeitung, first published in 1826, was the first newspaper to succeed and remain in publication for more than a short period of time. Josip Bilić, Hrvoje Ivanković, ed., Zagrebački Leksikon M-Z, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2006). @ 131.

\textsuperscript{40} Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 203.

\textsuperscript{41} Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement @ 148-149.

\textsuperscript{42} Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 221-222.
exclude the Magyarones from the assembly. When Hungarian authorities complained that the newly formed Illyrian political party had stolen the 1842 elections and was creating political unrest in Civil Croatia, Vienna responded by banning the word Illyrian from public use and charging many of the local leaders in Zagreb with criminal offenses stemming from the disputed elections. The Illyrians dealt with the new circumstances by renaming themselves the Narodna stranka (National Party), but the movement was effectively put on the defensive politically for several years and suffering a significant defeat in the Zagreb region in the elections of 1845, which were also marred by fatal violence.

The setbacks of the 1845 elections blocked the Illyrians’ political aspirations. In response, the group turned to fulfilling other projects that had become secondary with the group’s political successes. In 1841 Gaj had proposed the creation of a National Center, a building that would house all the cultural institutions of the movement. There was both a symbolic and a practical need for such a structure. On the symbolic level, even though the Illyrian movement had developed a significant following within Zagreb, it was, with the exception of the few Croatian language periodicals being published, essentially invisible to the public. Though “reading rooms” (small private libraries) had been established, they were simply spaces in private houses or apartments with no visible presence. The National Center, therefore, would create a dedicated physical presence for the movement. On a practical level, two institutions that Gaj wanted to permanently establish needed dedicated spaces, the National Museum and the National Theatre. The National Theater could operate using private spaces to

43 It is important here to note that the franchise was very limited in the Hapsburg Empire in the first half of the 19th century, and based on older feudal privileges. As a result, many members of the Illyrian movement were not eligible to vote. This established an electoral dynamic in which the region of Zagreb was at once both the center of the Illyrian project and, at the same time, the most reliable voting district for the Magyarone party. Ibid. @ 224.
44 Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement @ 153.
45 Ibid. @ 164-165.
46 Ibid. @ 130.
present performances, but having its own dedicated auditorium would greatly enhance the organization’s prestige. The National Museum definitely required a permanent space to display exhibits. Despite the clear logic behind Gaj’s concept of the National Center, little practical action besides the collection of funds was taken towards the project. In the aftermath of the 1845 elections though the movement purchased a building which was under construction in Gradec and various National institutions began setting up their offices in the structure before work was even completed on it in February of 1847.47

1848

The trajectory of politics in Croatia was significantly altered in the early months of 1848 when a series of urban revolts swept through the capitals of Europe. The arrival of this general unrest in the Hapsburg Empire brought the triadic political struggles between Vienna, Budapest, and Zagreb to a crisis point which the Illyrian movement seized upon to advance their fortunes. Part of the Illyrians’ aggressiveness in exploiting the situation can be explained by the dire situation the movement faced at the time. In January 1848 the Hungarian parliament was moving towards enacting legal measures that would have formally fulfilled the Magyarization program, including the prohibition of the use of Croatian in any government documents and correspondence, mandating the use of Magyar instead of Latin in Croatia for state business, and mandating the teaching of Magyar in all schools in Croatia.48 Thus, when word of the revolutions sweeping across Europe arrived in Zagreb in March of 1848 the Illyrians were facing total defeat on the issue of Magyarization, and upheavals in Vienna and Budapest appeared to present an opportunity to reverse this setback.

47 Ibid. @ 177.
48 Ibid. @ 185.
Gaj attempted to take advantage of the situation by immediately traveling to Graz in order to lobby for the appointment of his preferred candidate for the vacant office of Ban (Governor or Viceroy) of Croatia. Gaj’s proposed candidate was a Croatian nobleman named Josip Jelačić. Jelačić was a reasonable choice for the Hapsburg government because he was part of a prominent Croatian noble family, had been educated at the elite school for nobles outside of Vienna as a young man, and spent his entire adult life as a career soldier in the service of the Empire. Gaj’s motivation’s for pushing Jelačić’s appointment was different; Jelačić was also an ardent, if quiet, supporter of the Illyrian movement. But that was not the reason Gaj gave to the representatives of the Imperial government he lobbied. To them, Gaj argued that a popular local Ban would be necessary to push through the types of reforms that appeared to be resulting from the political turmoil. Unbeknownst to Gaj, the Imperial officials he was meeting with had already chosen Jelačić as their recommendation before his arrival.  

Gaj did not stay absent from Zagreb long. After a brief trip to Vienna to meet with other Slavic representatives within the Empire he returned to Zagreb to take charge of the revolutionary moment. Once back in town Gaj took charge of a meeting of an ad-hoc National Assembly which had been organized while he was absent. The Assembly was held in the National Center, and Gaj push through several proposals, including the election of Jelačić as Ban. Thus, when Jelačić arrived in Zagreb in late March from his military post in the garrison town of Glina in the Military Border he was Ban by both Imperial appointment and election.

Jelačić immediately set about wresting control of the political situation from the leaders in Zagreb. He called for immediate elections for a new Sabor which he asked to convene in June. Jelačić ruled by decree until the new Sabor could convene, thus rejecting the authority of

49 Ibid. @ 186.
50 The primary purpose of the National Assembly was to approve a petition to the King for reforms in Croat. Ibid. @ 187.
the National Assembly set up before his arrival, but he made clear his decrees would be purely administrative in nature and any decisions of a political nature about the state relationships between the Kingdom and the other political units in the Empire would be in the hands of the new Sabor. He also set about setting up a formal Bansko vijeće (Ban’s Council) to govern the Triune Kingdom.51 This council was necessary for several reasons. First, on a very practical level, governance in the Hapsburg Empire was in a state of collapse until political order could be re-established. Therefore, any governance in the Triune Kingdom was going to have to be done by locals until the political crisis was resolved. A second significant consequence of the breakdown of governance was that Dalmatia came under the political control of the newly forming government in Zagreb for the first time. The second reason for the need of the Bansko vijeće was that Jelačić had not only been appointed Ban, but simultaneously had been promoted from Colonel to General and appointed commander of the Croatian Military Border (roughly half of the entire military border region).52 This meant that if the revolution transformed from a political uprising to a military rebellion, the Ban was going to have to leave his role as civilian governor and take the field as a military commander. To that end, Jelačić also continued efforts to organize a National Guard, which had originated with the organizers of the National Assembly before his appointment, but which was continued because he felt additional soldiers might be necessary.53

The political situation developed rapidly in the spring of 1848. By mid April, Hungary had declared independence from the Empire and abolished the monarchy. In response, Jelačić suspended all political relations with Hungary to prevent the Triune Kingdom from formally

52 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 316.
53 Borošak-Marijanović, ed., 1848 U Hrvatskoj. @ 34-35.
rebelling by association while he waited for the new Sabor to convene. When they Sabor did convene they attempted a rapprochement with the Hungarian government, but the overtures failed due to incompatible visions of how the Hungarian state should be organized and the degree to which the non-Hungarian peoples would have self rule. The negotiations were also complicated by cross negotiations by both parties with the Imperial government in Vienna. At the same time the Croats were negotiating with Hungary for reconciliation, they were also sending a delegation to Vienna to demand recognition that the Triune Kingdom had “always been independent from Hungary” and also that Dalmatia be united with Croatia. Similarly, the government in Budapest, despite having formally eliminated the office of King for Hungary, wrote to the Emperor to demand the Imperial government declare Croatia in illegal rebellion, dismiss Jelačić as Ban, and dissolve the new Sabor. Negotiations dragged on throughout the summer, and by September Croatia had declared war on Hungary. The collapse of diplomatic/political efforts to resolve the situation led to Jelačić being appointed the military commander of all Imperial forces in Hungary, though in fact, this promotion did little but grant him authority over the rest of the Military Border, as the entire Hungarian portion of the Imperial Army in Hungary was supporting the new Hungarian government. Jelačić spent the summer away from Zagreb to focus on preparing as best as possible for an invasion of Hungary, which commenced on 11 September, 1848.

Jelačić’s forces were small by the standards of the time, just over 50,000 infantry, less than 2,000 cavalry, and 48 cannon, because the bulk of the Imperial Army was tied down in

54 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 232.
55 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 317.
56 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 236.
57 Ibid. @ 238.
58 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 317.
59 Borošak-Marijanović, ed., 1848 u Hrvatskoj. @ 37.
60 Ibid.
northern Italy suppressing what had become perennial rebellions and wars among the Empire’s client states there and other Italian polities.\textsuperscript{61} Jelačić took his army north into Hungary, where he was met by a Hungarian military force blocking his advance. The resulting battle has been described as a draw, a Hungarian victory, and a Croatian victory by various commentators at various times. What is clear is that Jelačić’s advance was halted, but rather than falling back into Croatia or Slavonia, he turned west and joined up with another Imperial force that had arrived recently after suppressing a revolt in Prague. The Hungarians followed Jelačić to the west, while, simultaneously, the population of Vienna rebelled again. The now combined Imperial force under the command of a German officer, Marshal Alfred zu Windischgratz, focused on suppressing the new revolt in Vienna before turning back east and invading Hungary again.\textsuperscript{62}

This second invasion of Hungary was more successful, resulting in the storming of the Hungarian capital Budapest in January 1849 and driving the Hungarian forces into the rugged terrain north of the city.\textsuperscript{63} But the fortunes of war turned once more in the spring of 1849 with the arrival of a Polish contingent from Silesia in the service of the Hungarian rebel government, and the Imperial forces were driven out of Budapest and put on the defensive again.\textsuperscript{64} It was at this point that Russia could not longer remain passive in the face of the threat to dynastic order that the Hungarian rebellion represented. The threat of rebel victory prompted the Russians to send an army of their own in to Hungary with the permission of the Hapsburg government, and after some initial success, the Emperor personally asked the Russians to mount a larger intervention. By the end of the summer of 1849 the main rebel army was defeated and on the defensive, withdrawing into Transylvania, where it was defeated again and finally surrendered to

\textsuperscript{61} Magaš, \textit{Croatia through History}. @ 238.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
the Russians. Through the end of the war in late 1849 Jelačić remained a key battlefield commander for the Imperial forces in Hungary and participated in the political negotiations which formally ended the rebellion and established the new political order within the Empire.

The Impact of 1848

Though 1848 is often thought of as one of those turning points in history when history did not turn, it would be hard to overstate the significance of these events within Croatia on many levels. In the space of six months Civil Croatia had gone from a peripheral community within Hungary on the verge of being forced to use only a foreign language in state business to the heart of a self-governing state. Zagreb, which had served as a functional capital city was the home of not only the Sabor, but a fully functional government, the Bansko vijeće, responsible to the Ban and the Sabor rather than the ministers in Budapest or the government in Vienna.

To appreciate the significance of this transformation one need only look at the map of “Jelačić’s Croatia” (image below). The Triune Kingdom, which previously had been a collective unity in rhetoric only, was actually a united geo-political space. In January 1848 Zagreb was the functional capital of Civil Croatia consisted of only the two territories of Croatia and Slavonia. By the summer of 1848 the entire colored portion of the map was governed from Zagreb.

As important as this political transformation was, its implications for the geo-spatial imagining of Croatia were even greater. This consolidation of governance allowed the very concept of the Triune Kingdom to be re-imagined as a unitary whole. At the core of this re-imagination was a fundamentally Zagrebite vision of the Triune Kingdom. Outside of “rump” Croatia the Triune Kingdom was understood to be Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia. This

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65 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 311.
66 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 250-254.
Jelačić’s Croatia

formulation was visually represented on the grb (coat of arms) with the coat of arms of Dalmatia in the upper left position of honor, Croatia, represented by the red and white Šakovnica (little chess board) in the upper right, and Slavonia on the bottom third of the shield. But, in Zagreb the grb was reversed, with the Croatian Šakovnica in the position of honor, reflecting that in Zagreb the Triune Kingdom was referred to as Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia. Given that Croatia was a territory with two distinct definitions, one contemporary and the other historic, the

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67 Zemljovid 10, Jelačićeva Hrvatska (Hrvatski informativni centar); available from http://www.hic.hr/books/pavlicev/images/s10.gif.
68 This is the “position of honor” in heraldic terms because when held by the left arm this is the portion of the shield that covers the heart.
establishment of Zagreb as capital allowed for a reformulation of the Triune Kingdom from Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, to the “Triune Kingdom of Croatia” alone by referencing the historic medieval Croatia, which had encompassed Dalmatia and Slavonia, rather than the territory of “rump” Croatia, that local area recognized as a separate Croatian region because it was the territory which had not fallen to Ottoman expansion in the region as Slavonia had, or had fallen under Venetian control, as most of Dalmatia had.

This re-imagining was legally recognized by “the conclusions of the Croatian Parliament of 1848 regarding the restoration of the Triune Kingdom under the authority of the Banus grounded on the historical, national, and natural rights of the Croatian nation.”69 Combining this unitary Triune Kingdom with Croatia’s political separation from Hungary creates a new geopolitical order dramatically different from before, as illustrated by the images below.

But 1848 was not just a political or military exercise. It was a lived experience and in many ways a defining historical moment for an entire generation of Croats. Tens of thousands of Croats had participated in the military campaigns of 1848-49, including a student regiment

69 Article I. Historic Foundations, Croatian Constitution.
formed from young men enrolled in the Theology, Philosophy, and Law faculties of Zagreb. During that time these soldiers had seen Vienna and Budapest, though not under the most enjoyable of circumstances. But even under these circumstances, seeing these cities, especially Vienna, meant that a great city was no longer something that could only be imagined, but something that was a real, lived experience in the memories of the veterans of 1848.

It is also important to note that while the Illyrian movement was very successful in exploiting the events of 1848 to halt the Magyarazation project in Croatia, the movement itself effectively dissipated rapidly after 1849. Three main causes can be identified for the fading of Illyrianism. First, the Illyrian movement was closely associated with Ljudevit Gaj, and his downfall at the beginning of the revolution of 1848 must be viewed as a significant event in the history of the movement.\(^\text{70}\) A second issue was that the Illyrian perspective was not fully embraced in the newly unified Triune Kingdom of 1848-49. Though widely championed by intellectuals within Civil Croatia, Gaj had difficulty convincing intellectuals from outside this region. Serb intellectuals were very willing to work with the Illyrians on issues of language once the Štokavian dialect was adopted as the shared literary language, but they showed little interest in other elements of Illyrianism. Even in Dalmatia, Gaj had received a cool reception to his ideas when he traveled there to win over local intellectuals in the early 1840s.\(^\text{71}\) A final issue that undermined the logic of Illyrianism was the actual outcome of the events of 1848. A driving force behind the Illyrians was the sense of Croatian vulnerability. To the Illyrians, Croatia was weak in the face of a strong and predatory Hungarian national project. But in 1848 Croatia, as an

\(^{70}\) For a complete discussion of the events leading to Gaj’s personal downfall see Despalatović, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement* @ 195-198.

\(^{71}\) Ibid. @ 132.
autonomous nation, had gone to war with Hungary and emerged victorious.\footnote{This is the Croatian interpretation of events, which focused on their own participation, and minimized the significance of the other Imperial and Russian troops in the conflict.} The events of 1848, therefore, had inverted the Illyrian worldview. This combination of factors meant that the Illyrian movement lost its internal momentum. The institutions the movement created did not disappear though. In fact, they grew and thrived over time, but they became the institutional foundation for the Croatian national project.

Perhaps the most significant result of 1848 was what it provided the Croatian national project which allowed it to move forward after shedding the Illyrian elements. As with all such national projects, a key problem was defining national distinctiveness. This was clearly a problematic endeavor with the Illyrian project which was both Croatian and pan-Slavic simultaneously. Language, which was a key Romantic indicator of national distinctiveness, had become problematic since the adoption of Štokavian, the predominant Serbian form of the language, as the Croatian literary language. Illyrianism had also complicated other issues of distinctiveness due to its pan-Slavic character; territory, people, and history were as much shared as language in many cases. The issue of an Illyrian state was also problematic and had forced the movement to abandon the word Illyrian in place of National. But 1848 had resulted in a Croatian state on a clearly defined territory and a distinctive historic experience (the Croatian-Hungarian War) not shared with the other Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula. Thus 1848 became a defining element of Croatian national distinctiveness. The fact that the word Illyrian itself had been banned for a period of time, and replaced by the term National in most cases, made the transition from the Illyrian project to the Croatian national project appear seamless, as no “name change” was required, and the institutions of the project could re-orient themselves without any need for a public transformation.
Conclusion

The pre 1850 history of Zagreb provides a powerful example of spatiality across time. Zagreb’s rise as a unified community was the product of a transformation of imagined space through lived space. This process was set in motion by a key change in real space, the creation of the new market square in the 17th century. This new square became central to the daily lives of the inhabitants, and as a lived space tied the two competing communities together into a single urban space in the geographic imaginations of the inhabitants. By the beginning of the 19th century, the community defined itself as Zagreb, a single urban space, despite the area’s continued formal political division. This community unification created a city with a unique set of attributes, particularly the coalescence of political and cultural centers, perfectly suited for the intellectual and political environment of the region that emerged in the first half of the 19th century. Zagreb as a city became central to the Croatian response to the emergence of nation as a central organizing principle of the political order of Europe in the 19th century. The city’s position as a center of administration and learning drew people to it, especially those interested in advancing the new Illyrian movement after the 1820s. Zagreb became central to the Illyrian movement, a location where ideas were collected, refined, and then redistributed to the broader Illyrian community.

Even before the city’s unification into a single city, Zagreb played a key role in the successful development of the foundation of the Croatian national project. An urban center was critical because it provided an opportunity for the development of critical masses of both intellectual and financial capital essential for the successful manifestation of the Illyrian project in concrete ways. This is not to say that the Illyrian project was purely a product of Zagreb. As pointed out previously, Ljudevit Gaj collected materials from around the Triune Kingdom, but
without an urban center that provided both a critical mass of individuals who could both produce and consume the physical manifestations of this intellectual effort (newspapers and books), the project could not have become self sustaining. This production and consumption was not merely a product of individuals working on their own. A key part of this process was the Synekism of urban space, embodied by the “reading rooms” and cafes of Zagreb, where these individuals could interact directly and inspire new production from each other and encourage new consumption by each other. This informal system was then re-enforced and embedded in Zagreb specifically with the creation of a physical embodiment, the National Center, for the cultural institutions which were being organized to form the core of the project.

Though the Illyrian movement was culturally successful it was generally a political failure until the crisis of 1848 provided an opportunity for the Illyrians to achieve unchallenged power and establish an autonomous, unified Croatian government across the entire Triune Kingdom and the Military Border regions. This allowed the elite of Zagreb to re-align the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia with its local interpretation of the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia. Once this was successfully accomplished, the second two elements were truncated in common usage, so that it became the Triune Kingdom of Croatia with the territorial definition of all of the older Triune Kingdom and the Military Border.

The leaders of the emergent Croatian national project found several key elements at their disposal in 1850. Croatia’s history provided an important narrative and legal foundation for the project, in particular, the recognition of the Triune Kingdom as a legal entity and a territorial space distinct, if not fully separate, from Hungary and an indigenous political institution, the Sabor, through which their program could be advanced. The Croatian national project also inherited a functional capital city. This urban complex, though locally referred to as Zagreb, was
not a unified entity, and though it had significant potential for development, was far from the
definition of a modern city by the standards of the period. The Illyrian period and 1848 provided
two key elements for a national movement; cultural institutions and national distinctiveness. The
Illyrian movement had created a complex of cultural institutions that were embedded in the
social fabric of Zagreb which had survived the transition from “Illyrian” to “National” and could
be further built upon and mobilized. 1848 had produced a Croatian “historical moment” which
had as a key part a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb as its capital city, “Jelačić’s
Croatia.” This created a reality that would fuel the Croatian geographic imagination for the next
150 years as a goal to be re-achieved.

In 1850 the Croatian national project inherited three key spaces; one important imagined
spaces, one important real space, and one important complex space significant to this study. The
significant imagined space was “Jelačić’s Croatia”, which established a specific geo-spatial
order in the minds of the movement’s participants which they could refer to as the “proper” or
“correct” understanding of Croatia as a political reality. “Jelačić’s Croatia” was not just a
territorial definition, it was a specific geo-political order, which not only redefined Croatia as the
Triune Kingdom unified with the Military Border, but also established Zagreb as the political
center of this united territory. But “Jelačić’s Croatia” went further than a geo-spatial “right” that
needed to be maintained or re-established, it was also a specific historic experience that firmly
separated the Croatian national project from the other national projects in the region, an historic
moment that, in the view of the Croatian elite, belonged solely to the Croats. It gave Croatia a
national distinctiveness that the national project had struggled to articulate up until that point.

73 This discussion of key spaces which focuses on one aspect of the spatial trialectic is not intended to imply that
these spaces were monolithic in character. Each of the spaces possessed all the elements of the spatial trialectic
relationship, but where one is specified here, it is to show the specific significance of a specific element of the
spatial trialectic for this particular space.
The real space was the city of Zagreb which was already a functional political and cultural center. As the core city of the Illyrian/National movement, Zagreb had become central to the production of the cultural products of the movement; the very ideas that drove the project forward. These ideas were not just a product of, nor consumed only in, Zagreb. But Zagreb was central to the collection and dissemination of these ideas as Zagreb was the productive center of the movement, and ideas from the rest of Croatia were consolidated, discussed, debated, and finally reproduced in print in Zagreb for redistribution to the rest of Croatia. Much of the key leadership of the Croatian national project was not, in fact, from Zagreb. They were drawn to the city because of its developing role as the center of Croatian culture in the 1830s and 40s. During that time the Illyrian/National project built the institution infrastructure that would become the foundation of the Croatian national project after 1848.

The complex space 74 was Zagreb’s main square. As an imagined space, the square was Zagreb’s “gateway,” embedded in the city’s urban rituals as the place of passage from outside to inside the city, the symbolic gateway of Zagreb. As a lived space, the city’s main square was mundane as a market place, but was completely embedded in the daily lives of every resident of the city because it was a central element of the perpetuation of life in the city through the distribution of food to the population. Beyond these roles though, the square also served a key real space with the spatial function of linkage point between the various communities of Zagreb, because of its centralizing location between the two older urban communities. This position as linkage point meant that many people would pass through the square even if they had no market business, or even if the market was not in operation on a given day, simply to get from one part of town to another.

74 The term “complex space” is simply meant that more than one aspect of the spatial trialectic for this space is significant for the purposes of this study.
Central to the spatial dynamic that would emerge over the next 90 years in Zagreb was a fundamental logic which was already established by 1850 -- the main square as the center of daily life in Zagreb: Zagreb as the center of cultural and political life in Croatia.
Chapter 4

Being and Becoming the Croatian Metropolis: 1850 – 1895
The period from 1850 until 1895 was crucial in the development of Zagreb as a modern city. Up until 1850 the towns of Zagreb had grown organically, developing in response to the needs of the communities with little deliberate planning. After their political unification, the communities of Zagreb began to develop in a more ordered and systemic way with a new organizing vision: Zagreb as the capital of a unified Croatia. Beyond this vision though was a further role for the city, Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis.

As demonstrated previously, neither of these ideas, Zagreb as Capital City nor Zagreb as Croatian Metropolis, was dramatically new. They were, rather, evolutions of the existing roles of the city. This dualistic concept became a central element in the city’s sense of identity; that it was both being and becoming simultaneously. In this regard, the community of Zagreb, as a city, imagined itself in the same situation they imagined Croatia as a nation; to exist in spirit while simultaneously becoming in reality. The new element of these concepts for the city was the idea that the components of Zagreb’s role as Croatian Metropolis should be embodied in their own spaces, deliberately designed and constructed. The city could be deliberately transformed to physically embody a modern city and fulfill the role of Croatian Metropolis.

**Imagining the Metropolis**

By 1850 the Croatian national project was a firmly established part of Croatian society. The Illyrian movement had established Zagreb as its major intellectual hub. 1848 had further established Zagreb as the political center for the entire Triune Kingdom. But the community of Zagreb itself was little more than two medieval hilltop towns with small communities adjacent to them on the valley floor below. The total population of all the communities in the immediate
vicinity was estimated at “something greater than 15,000 residents.”¹ Zagreb therefore had
some, but not all, of the characteristics of a national metropolis, which is to say a single city that
was the political, administrative, cultural, and economic center for the nation, and which would
be the driving force for national development towards the fulfillment of the national project.

In 1850 Zagreb was formally unified under a single city government.² This was both a
recognition of the reality that the four communities had grown together and become a single
urban complex, as well as a practical necessity to effectively govern this integrated urban space.
Despite the local political situation which had maintained the divisions between Gradec and
Kaptol, foreign cartographers, mainly Germans, had been referencing the community as a single
city with the name Agram for over 200 years. By 1848, Croats themselves were referring to the
city as a single urban space named Zagreb in public statements and declarations.³ Unifying the
city was therefore recognition that the division of the area into separate political spaces was an
historical anachronism. As a practical matter, unified governance was necessary to effectively
manage the city’s future growth. Zagreb had grown in an unplanned manner from two towns
into four due to increasing population further spurred by the consolidation of governing
functions there at the end of the 18th Century and the expansion of the educational faculties at the
beginning of the 19th Century.

The new unified city government faced two significant challenges. First was a very
limited amount of revenue. The lack of an industrial economic base combined with a small urban
population, and the abolition of feudal obligations (which until 1848 had shifted wealth from

¹ Actual population figures are difficult for this period, as various sources provide significantly different population
numbers ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 due to various communities being included or excluded from specific
estimates before the unification of the city in 1850. The first official census of the united city was not conducted
² Ibid.
³ The name Zagreb derived from the wooden palisade which had been the original fortifications for the Bishopric.
Geographers 53, no. 3 (1963). @ 269
rural areas to the city) meant the city’s revenues were small. The city’s final source of income, trade and commerce, were also dramatically diminished, as the entire Hapsburg Empire fell into a deep economic stagnation as a result of the economic disruptions caused by the 1848 rebellion, which were then compounded by the reforms imposed to modernize the economy.⁴

The second issue facing the new municipal government in Zagreb was the imposition of a new administrative regime across the Hapsburg Empire to deal with the issues of decentralization and liberalization of the political system which, in the view of the leadership in Vienna, had led to the uprisings of 1848. Based on the principles of absolutism, which argued that the most effective way to produce economic and social modernization was centralized authoritarian governmental structure which would effectively direct the modernization project, neo-absolutism established direct rule of the Empire from Vienna.⁵ To that end, all national parliaments within the Empire, including the Croatian Sabor, were suspended.⁶

Civil Croatia and Dalmatia were each divided into administrative districts governed by German speaking officials appointed by, and reporting directly to, Vienna. Even under this neo-absolutist regime, the Empire was a fusion of feudal relationships, upon which the legal legitimacy of the system rested, and modern administrative practices. Thus, the office of Ban remained, but the Bansko vijeće (Ban’s Council) government was abolished, and as the neo-absolutist regime was implemented the actual powers of the Ban were more and more constrained.⁷ Though the goal of this regime was to modernize the system of governance within the Empire, initially, rather than improving the political situation, neo-absolutism simply added a

⁶ Ibid. @ 318.
new element of complexity to an already complex internal dynamic of modern bureaucratic
government merged with older feudal rights and obligations.

But the neo-absolutist direct rule did not extend to municipal governments. The newly
unified city of Zagreb therefore governed itself. This circumstance meant that municipal
government was the only political venue where open political contestation was permitted,
resulting an extremely contentious local political environment as all local political energy
became focused on the city government. By 1857 the political situation in Zagreb was so
contentious that the new office of Mayor of Zagreb, created in 1851, was left vacant and was not
filled again until 1861. As a result of these constraints the leaders of the Croatian national
project were forced to either work outside of the Imperial political structures or settle for
essentially symbolic acts.

To that end the efforts at building the Croatian Metropolis were limited to the religious
sphere and acts of imagining and proposing rather than enacting. One goal that was quickly
achieved was the establishment of an autonomous Croatian Catholic Church. Beginning in the
1840s the Bishop of Zagreb, Josip Haulik, with the support of the Ban and the Sabor lobbied the
Catholic Church to elevate Kaptol’s Bishopric to the status of an Archdiocese. These efforts had
been unsuccessful because the issue was closely related to the entire Illyrian project. Up to that
point the Bishoprics of the Triune Kingdom had reported to an Archdiocese in Hungary as an
extension of the Hungarian Church. Elevating a Croatian Bishopric to an Archdiocese was the
equivalent of creating a separate Croatian national Church distinct from the Hungarian Church.
This amounted essentially to a Vatican recognition of Croatia as an independent nation, a
prospect that the government of Hungary had vetoed. In the wake of the defeat of the 1848

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8 Magaš, *Croatia through History*. @ 244.
10 Perić, *Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada*. @ 27-29.
uprising, the Hungarian veto lost its force. In 1850 the Imperial government formally approved
the creation of a separate Croatian Church and opened discussions with the Vatican.\footnote{Ibid.} In 1852
the Vatican formally elevated Zagreb to the rank of Archdiocese.\footnote{Tomislav J. Šagi-Bunić, \textit{Katolička Crkva i Hrvatski Narod} (Zagreb: Kršćanska Sadašnjost, 1983). @ 61.} The newly promoted
Archbishop Haulik saw this as not only as recognition of Croatia’s right to a national Church, but
also as significant in that it “had transformed Zagreb ‘into the metropolis of the homeland.’”\footnote{Ivan Rogić, “What Has Happened in Zagreb,” in \textit{Zagreb Modernity and the City}, ed. Fedja Vukić (Zagreb: AGM, 2003). @ 19.}
In the view of the Catholic Church this was true, because now the entire Church apparatus in
Croatia would look to Zagreb for leadership and guidance. In broader terms the elevation of
Zagreb had significance beyond the Church, as it was yet another consolidation of authority,
adding to the political consolidation accomplished in 1848.

In 1854 the Mayor of Zagreb proposed another step in transforming the city. Mayor
Kamuaf wrote to the City Representatives of Zagreb during his trip to Vienna as part of the city’s
deligation attending the royal wedding of Emperor Franz Joseph and stated:

> Our \textit{ban} has received the rank of Count, therefore it is necessary that this good
fortune be given some visible sign in Zagreb. There should, on the square of
celebration of the \textit{ban}, be placed his statue, which he is due already for his
previous worthy service for the croatian [sic] nation.\footnote{Vladimir Maleković, ed., \textit{Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću} (Zagreb: Muzej za
Umjetnost i Obrt, 1990). @ 61.}

Though this may not seem a transformative act by contemporary standards, it was very much an
effort to transform Zagreb into both a modern city and re-enforce the city’s claim to the role of
Croatian Metropolis. By 1854 monuments to prominent figures of the regime were becoming a
key element of the public spaces of Vienna. Thus, the proposal of the statue was an effort to
raise Zagreb up to the urban standard of the modern Imperial metropolis. The relationship
between Vienna and the inspiration for concept for the statue of \textit{Ban} Jelačić is supported by the
way in which the proposal originated. The mayor of Zagreb mentioned the idea for the statue as part of a report he provided on his stay in Vienna as the leader of a delegation representing the city at the wedding of the Emperor.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1854, Zagreb had only one public monument in the entire city, and it was religious in nature; a statue to the Virgin Mary which was in St. Mark’s Square in Gradec. In contrast, the proposed monument to Ban Jelačić was focused on a contemporary man who had served one particular political order and one particular national cause, rather than a religious symbol. The proposed statue of the Ban would also add to the basic function of the square as it had been understood, from a mainly commercial space with some symbolic function, into a monumental space. The transformation of Harmica into Ban Jelačić Square and the idea to place a statue there combined a key space for the reproduction of daily life, the city’s main market square, into a memorial space of the defining historic moment of contemporary Croatia, 1848. The new name of the square itself was a product of the events of 1848, with the Hungarian sounding Harmica being replaced by the distinctively Croatian Ban Josip Jelačić. Therefore the idea of placing the statue in the square would finalize the transformation of the square and forestall the return of the old name in the future.\textsuperscript{16}

The concept for the statue was quickly approved in principle by the city counsel, but the city did not have the money to fully fund the statue, so the project was deferred.\textsuperscript{17} Progress on the project was very slow until 1859 when Jelačić died and his passing spurred community leaders and wealthy members of society to make the statue a reality.\textsuperscript{18} By the end of 1860,

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} There is a phenomenon of older place names persisting in Zagreb. For example “flower square” which was formally named Preradović square, re-named Brotherhood and Unity Square, and then re-re-named Preradović square, yet remains “flower square” in the public imagining of the city’s population.
\textsuperscript{17} Maleković, ed., \textit{Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću.} @ 7.
efforts were underway to find a sculptor to create the monument.\textsuperscript{19} As the monument project moved forward it became part of a broader project to create the new, modern city that the city’s leaders were imagining.

\textbf{Zagreb and surroundings 1853/54}\textsuperscript{20}

As the 1853/54 map of Zagreb shows, urban development beyond the immediate area of the two walled communities was scattered, but focused on the two main access routes to the city, one from the west and the other to the south both of which led into the main square. Beyond this the area was mostly open fields and farmsteads. This meant the ground south of the existing city

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. @ 15.
to the Sava River was essentially open to development; a blank canvas for the new city’s architects. By the early 1860s this vision of the new city was taking a very specific form. In an 1862 document discussing issues for the 1863 city budget a specific reference is made to the area “between Jelačić square and Savska street, which is known to be the future center of the new lower town (city).”\textsuperscript{21} This concept was further developed in the 1865 building regulations which described this area as “an interior city” between two large squares on the east and west side and gardens to the south.\textsuperscript{22} This eastern square referenced here was not Jelačić square, but Novi Trg (New Square) that was located one city block south of Jelačić square. But as the first statement indicates, Jelačić square was still a significant reference point for defining the new, modern lower town.

This concept of Jelačić square being at the corner of the new part of the city fits with the role the square had played as a linkage point from its creation in the 17\textsuperscript{th} Century. The square was located at the southeast corner of Gradec and the south-southwest corner of Kaptol. In this new city plan it would also be at the northeast corner of the “lower town.” Thus the square’s role as linkage point was preserved in this new concept of the urban space of Zagreb. The transformation of the square into a monumental space further extended this role as a linkage point beyond space and into time. Focusing on the Croatian hero of 1848 froze the square in a specific historic moment. That moment was the point in time when Zagreb also transformed into a unified city. The square then would be a temporal link between the pre-1848 older medieval city and the new, post-1848 modern lower city. This is not to say that there were not other considerations in the planner’s minds. In fact, there were very practical reasons for placing the new “lower town” in this area, but the specific reference to Jelačić square as a reference point for

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
Map of Zagreb circa 1864

City Plan from 1865

24 Base image from Knežević, "Mjesto Zrinjskog Trga u Genezi Zagrebačke "Zelene Potkove"." @ 70.
the plan indicates a specific sensitivity to the role of the square and its relationship to the new lower town project.

The extent to which the concept of metropolis was also part of this new concept for the city is clear in the *regulatoma osnova* (regulatory plan) created in 1865\(^{25}\) to supplement new building regulations enacted in 1857. This map was published in two parts. The northern half was a modification of a map produced in 1864, which laid out the general future road grid for the city. This shows the desire of the planners to create a modern city of large, square blocks along wide boulevards, in contrast to the smaller, irregular blocks with narrow streets that characterized the older, medieval parts of the city. This portion of the map also showed that, while the planners had identified the area to the south and west of Jelačić square as the new “center” of the lower town, they had laid out a grid much wider than that, which was roughly centered east to west on the square. The southern portion of the map was less detailed, having been created specifically for this project, a fact that in itself shows that the city planners were imagining beyond what was considered the space of Zagreb at the time. The main future features represented on this map were not residential, but commercial in nature. They focused on a new, massive rail yard centered on, but south of, the planned “center” of the new lower town and an artificial harbor south of the rail yard.

Taken as a whole, this *regulatoma osnova* was a bold vision of the future for the city. The idea of Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis was at the center of this vision of the city’s future. This plan called for the fulfillment of Zagreb in the role of Croatian Metropolis, by overcoming the city’s shortcomings in fulfilling that role --namely the city’s small population, its archaic character, and the fact that it was not a central force in the national economy. The first of these,

\(^{25}\) Ibid. @ 70.
population was self evident. By 1857, the city’s official population was approximately 27,000.\textsuperscript{26} This was a significant increase from the previous decade, but still the community was not much larger than other large towns in Croatia at the time:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb</td>
<td>27,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijeka</td>
<td>20,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split</td>
<td>16,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osijek</td>
<td>16,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karlovac</td>
<td>9,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varaždin</td>
<td>9,699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2\textsuperscript{27}

The new \textit{regulatorna osnova} was a plan for a city ten times the size of Zagreb in 1865, and if the city grew to that size it would overshadow any other town in the Triune Kingdom. The issue of modernization would also be dealt with primarily though growth. Though acts such a placing the statue of \textit{Ban} Jelačić in the main square would symbolically modernize the city, it would not change the medieval character of Gradec and Kaptol. But as the city grew in the new lower town, the new building regulations insured that the architecture would be in the form of a modern Central European city, with intersections at right angles and building built on the street and connecting, forming a continuous front along broad boulevards.\textsuperscript{28} Once the city had grown to where it filled the \textit{regulatorna osnova}, ninety percent of the population would be living in the new, modern part of the city.

This new plan also shows an effort to establish Zagreb at the center of a Croatian national economy. The issue of Zagreb’s role in the national economy was not an easy issue to solve, particularly because Croatia did not have an integrated national economy to speak of. What

\textsuperscript{26} Numerous unofficial sources estimate the population as still fewer than 20,000 into the 1860s.

\textsuperscript{27} Data taken from table \textit{GRADOVI U HRVATSKOJ} in Ivo Goldstein, \textit{Hrvatska Povijest} (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003). @ 466-467. See also caveat in footnote 26, which would drop Zagreb into the position of the second largest city behind Rijeka.

\textsuperscript{28} Olga Maruševski, \textit{od Manduševca do Trga Republike} (Zagreb: 1987). @ 34-35.
significant trade activity that did exist in the Triune Kingdom was based on water networks; in Civil Croatia trade was based on rivers and in Dalmatia on the Adriatic Sea. Zagreb was at a particular disadvantage in this trade network because, though it was located near the Sava River, the river was not navigable year-round until much further down river where the town of Sisak was located. This problem was partially solved in 1862 when a rail line was completed from Sisak to Zidani Most which passed close to Zagreb. This line linked the water network of Civil Croatia with the rail network connecting Vienna to the Adriatic Sea at Trieste. This rail line did not make Zagreb a transportation hub though, merely a stop between the new water-rail network interface at Sisak and the new rail to rail interface at Zidani Most.\(^{29}\) In fact, the initial plan for the railway did not even consider Zagreb a significant enough community for the added expense of the line to pass through it, and the city had to petition Vienna to have the proposed rail line moved eastward so that Zagreb could have a station close enough to the city to use the line effectively.\(^{30}\) The new *regulatorna osnova* envisioned changing this network dynamic by creating a large rail hub adjacent to a new river port, thus moving the water-rail interface from Sisak to Zagreb and making the city the central point for Croatian trade, at least inland. The completion of this plan would therefore be an important step in creating a true national economy with Zagreb as its central hub.

This new *regulatorna osnova*, was a very practical effort to ensure the development of the city conformed to a very specific image. The new plan laid out clearly where building could, and could not be built. In doing so, it also established a logic by which all new building in the city would have to be approved by the city government to ensure it conformed to the *regulatorna*...

\(^{29}\) Fisher, "Urban Analysis: A Case Study of Zagreb, Yugoslavia." @ 275.

This level of control would ensure the city grew into the modern Croatian Metropolis its designers were envisioning.

The plan was also as much a statement of the present legal and financial constraints the city government faced, as it was a bold plan for the future. The legal structures at the time significantly limited the ability of the city government to take property for public use. The city therefore had to purchase the land it intended to use for roads and public parks as well as pay for the physical construction of the roads. The large blocks in the regulatorna osnova were the product of the limits on city finances to actually build the road network to support the new “Lower Town.”

The addition of the plan for the new rail yard and Sava River port were as much about establishing Zagreb as the center of a new national economy, as they were about establishing a national economy. The financial benefits that would befall Zagreb from this transformation would provide the revenues necessary to transform the city into the Croatian Metropolis and stabilize the city’s financial condition.

**Building the Metropolis**

By 1864, roughly the same time the regulatorna osnova was published, practical steps were being taken in the Ban Jelačić monument project. In 1860, a committee of prominent citizens was formed to manage the statue project, and by 1864, they had chosen a sculptor, Anton Fernkorn, an Austrian sculptor from Vienna. On 2 December 1864, Fernkorn was formally commissioned to create a statue:

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31 Ibid. @ 45.
32 There was some controversy of this selection, as the committee commissioned and paid Fernkorn to create a model of his concept of the monument before formally announcing the open competition for the monument project. When a Croatian sculptor expressed interest in entering the competition, he was told that Fernkorn had already submitted a full model. See Milčec, Povratak Bana. @ 15-18.
…of Ban Jelačić, on a horse, as were presented Archduke Karl and Prince Eugene in Vienna. The Ban must be dressed as he was on the occasion of his “instillation” on 5 June, 1848. In his hand he must be holding a naked [drawn] saber with which he once led Croats into battle. The statue will be in a supernatural [larger than life] size, and made from metal (bronze). The pedestal of the monument must be made from granite from Moslavina, and must carry two bronze tablets: a dedication with the writing: BAN JELAČIĆ, 1848, and an honor guard with the coat of arms of the family Jelačić.  

The reference to both of Fernkorn’s previous equestrian statues in Vienna indicates the desire for the statue to reflect the level of artistic achievement present in the Imperial capital. If a simple reference point were required, then only one would have been needed to be mentioned. The reference to both of them indicates that Jelačić’s statue should be the equal of all such similar statues in Vienna.

These very specific requirements codified what the statue was intended to represent. Two specific and separate roles were to be embodied, Jelačić as Ban and Jelačić as military commander. In this regard, the statue was a monument to both the political and military accomplishments of the Ban. These specific instructions insured that the Ban would be memorialized as neither just a politician nor just a general, but as both. The simplicity of the dedication is also significant. Fernkorn’s first model had included a dedication tablet with a significant amount of verbiage, but the model was too small to include any actual verbiage. But final commission for the statue abandoned any direct verbal expression of Ban Jelačić’s achievements.

The statue was a reflection of the complex political situation the Croatian elite found themselves in at the time. The situation was even more complex in 1864 with the re-emergence of the triadic politics of Vienna, Budapest, and Zagreb due to the failure of the neo-absolutist regime to fulfill the promises of its architects. By 1859, the continued economic stagnation

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33 Maleković, ed., Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću. @ 62
34 See picture. Ibid. @ 5.
within the Empire combined with continued failure in Northern Italy had so damaged the neo-
absolutist model that it was under intense pressure to loosen direct rule. In 1861 the
suspension of national parliaments within the Hapsburg Empire was lifted, and the Sabor
convened in Zagreb, though without much real power, and much of its time was spent debating
and negotiating with Vienna, Budapest, Dalmatia, and other parts of “Jelačić’s Croatia” over
who would or could sit as deputies. The statue itself therefore became a physical
representation of the ambivalence and complexity of the era in which it was being crafted.

In this situation then, producing a narrative for the commemorative tablet faced two
significant issues. First was the challenge of achieving some form of consensus within the
Croatian elite as to what specific actions the narrative would valorize. One thing noticeably
absent from the commissioning of the statue is any direct reference to defeating the Hungarians.
Throughout the 1850s some of the leadership of the National Party had become tacit allies of the
Hungarians in their mutual efforts to loosen the grip of neo-absolutism on the political structures
of their territories. Thus, it was important to remind Vienna of Croatia’s loyalty and
trustworthiness, while at the same time maintaining good relations with Budapest. This need for
good relations with Hungary became more important after Vienna began to formally dismantle
the neo-absolutist regime in the early 1860s. After a decade long hiatus in the national political
discourse of Croatia, the process resumed in a very similar place as where it had left off.

The two main parties in the debate were the National Party and the Unionists, with the
general positions of the two parties were essentially updated versions of where the debate had
been in the 1840s. The National Party was a continuation of the party which had been founded
after the Illyrian Party had been banned in the 1840s, and sought to maximize Croatian political

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35 Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. @ 312.
36 Magaš, *Croatia through History*. @ 269-275.
37 Ibid. @ 312.
autonomy from Hungary and re-establish the territorial unity of the Triune Kingdom established in 1848, though the party itself was now split into feuding branches. One branch looked to Vienna as a protector from potential domination by Budapest. The Other branch of the party looked to Budapest to help dismantle neo-absolutism, believing that co-operation in this effort would lead to Hungarian support for Croatian interests once this struggle was won.38 The Unionists, as the former Magyarone “Horvati” were now referring to themselves sought greater political and economic integration with Hungary.39 Thus, even within the Croatian political elite it would have been hard to produce a narrative that would be acceptable to both parties, as the Unionists would have objected to the celebration of the defeat of Hungary, which was clearly part of the intent of the statue. It is even questionable if a compromise on which languages would be used for such an inscription was possible, as the inclusion or exclusion of Hungarian would have made a key political statement in the context of the time.

The second issue was that a specific narrative would have removed the ambiguity embedded in the statue project from its inception. The initial suggestion for the statue by Mayor Kamuaf in 1854 perfectly encapsulated this ambivalent circumstance. It starts by suggesting that the statue should be built to recognize Jelačić’s promotion to the rank of Count in the Imperial nobility, yet in the very next sentence, Mayor Kamuaf states that the real justification for the statue is Jelačić’s “previous worthy service” to Croatia. The drawn sword was clearly a menacing gesture, as stated, to signifying Jelačić leading Croats into battle. But even in this, the enemy in battle was unidentified. In this way, the statue committee avoided expressly stating the statue commemorated any specific military achievement. Thus, the statue could refer to either the fact that Jelačić had stormed Vienna in 1848 or Budapest in 1849, or to both. Therefore,

39 Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. @ 319
even in the design of the statue the monument committee was navigating the complex internal and external political environment they found themselves in and avoided conflict by cultivating ambiguity.

It is at this point cliché to say that people interpret art from their own perspective and that it is impossible to separate the artist from interpretation of their artwork. In this case, Fernkorn’s origins and previous works helped to protect the monument project from criticisms that it was inciting Croatian separatism. Though there are no clear statements by anyone involved with the monument project suggesting that this was an important reason why Fernkorn was recruited for this project, the fact that he was a German from Vienna worked to insulate the statue from such attacks. Even with as simple a dedication as BAN JELAČIĆ, 1848, the statue could be interpreted, depending on its presentation, as an exhortation to a possibly subversive Croatian separatism. By selecting Fernkorn, the monument project was protected from such attacks which could easily have been leveled against a Croatian sculptor. Beyond this though, the statue was, as commissioned, intended to be multi-interpretable. To the German Imperial authorities in Vienna it was to be seen as an expression of Croatian loyalty, while at the same time being a celebration of Croatian national success in self government and military prowess on the battlefield.

Fernkorn produced a work that precisely matched the task assigned to him. But the statue itself was only a component of the monument. The placement of the statue was also a central element of what the monument was intended to achieve. The general location of the statue in the main square was suggested in the initial proposal of 1854. The monument committee had decided, in conjunction with representatives of the city government, to place the statue in the center of the square, but the question of what direction the statue would face was decided by
Fernkorn himself. He informed the monument committee that the statue should face ‘the liveliest and largest’ part of the city, and thus should point to the north-northeast.\(^{40}\) In making the judgment that ‘the liveliest and largest’ part of the city lay north of the square, Fernkorn seems to have been relying on his memories of Zagreb from a stay in the city in 1842, when there was little development south of the main square.\(^{41}\) He was also apparently unaware of the new city being imagined south of the square. He further seems to have been unaware of how people might interpret this particular orientation. The committee accepted Fernkorn’s recommendation, and the statue was installed perpendicular to the southern edge of the square facing north.\(^{42}\) The statue was formally unveiled in Zagreb in December of 1866 in a large ceremony attended by dignitaries from across Civil Croatia and members of the Sabor.\(^{43}\)

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{unveiling_monument.jpg}
\caption{Unveiling of the Monument of Jelačić-Ban in Zagreb\(^{44}\)}
\end{figure}

\(^{40}\) Maleković, ed., \textit{Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću}. @ 6.

\(^{41}\) Ibid. @ 13.

\(^{42}\) Ibid. @ 8-13.

\(^{43}\) Perić, \textit{Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada}. @ 61

While the statue of Ban Jelačić was a significant act of nation building, and a defining one because it created a physical reminder of the national moment of 1848 in the center of Zagreb, it was not the only such act of nation building undertaken at the time. The 1860s was a period of energetic cultural institution building in Zagreb. It was during this period that initiatives for the founding of the Academy of Arts and Sciences and the establishment of an expanded University to replace the Royal Academy began.45 Both of these projects were clearly designed to dramatically enhance the Croatian national project. The university would allow Croatian scholars to train in Zagreb, rather than having to leave Croatia to advance their educations beyond the high school level in subjects other than theology and philosophy. The Academy of Arts and Sciences would establish an institution that would facilitate the production of knowledge on a wide range of subjects by Croatian scholars in Croatian.

One of the most significant effects of the statue was how it transformed the role and image of the square. The square was Zagreb’s main daily market place and therefore was central to the very existence of the city on a daily basis. The installation of the statue did not change that fact. In fact, one contemporary observer has argued that the decision to place the statue in the market square would lead to it being forgotten because it was embedded in the mundane.46 But, in fact, the reverse occurred. The placement of the statue actually elevated the square in the mind of the Croatian elite and transformed the scalar interpretation of the square as a place from one of local significance, as Zagreb’s symbolic gateway, to one of national significance as well. This is demonstrated by the debate which emerged over development on the north side of the square and how the orientation of the statue came to be interpreted by the population of Zagreb.

45 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 71.
46 Maruševski, od Manduševca do Trga Republike. @ 42. Cited by Rihtman-Aguštin, "The Monument in the Main City Square: Constructing and Erasing Memory in Contemporary Croatia." @ 184.
The general image of the square before 1848 was of “an empty and cheerless place” with only 11 houses on the north side of the square, and the south side completely undeveloped, with only a few houses built, and the square only active during the market; “architectural reports of that time speak of a dirty square, requesting development and regulations from the City Magistrates…”

This issue was addressed by the city in 1857 and 1865 when the new city building regulations created specific requirements for future building on the square, ensuring that it would develop in a more urban and modern way. The 1865 regulations had called for the square to resemble the central squares of medieval and renaissance ‘private’ European cities, with shops on the first floor of buildings facing the square. To that end, the plan envisioned private houses on the northern side of the square, but the newly built homes would have to be built in the modern urban style with flush façades and they would be allowed to have private shops of the ground floor of the buildings.

In 1875, the director of the City Planning Office, Rupert Melkus, offered a new proposal for the north side of the square which “would be a palace truly representing the ambitions of the new city.” His concept was for a unifying façade four stories tall that would join all of the private parcels of land. The property behind the façade would still be privately owned, but the visual impression would be that of a massive public edifice. That same year Iso Kršnjavi wrote a private critique of both of these approaches to the space of the north side of the square. Kršnjavi imagined the square in terms of an ancient Roman forum, surrounded by public

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48 Olga Maruševski, Iso Kršnjavi kao Grđitelj (Zagreb: Društvo Povjетničara Umjetnosti SR Hrvatska, 1986). @ 228.
49 Maruševski, od Manduševca do Trga Republike. @ 45.
50 Kršnjavi's ideas on the square were never published, but he did become one of the most significant architectural critics of the period.
buildings, private mansions, monuments, and public and official meeting halls. He further stated his belief that Jelačić Square would:

…become, at this time, in the new era of the city, the main point [place] – carrying the city this way would be a further beautiful project, but I do not believe that it would be quickly possible to realize it… creating itself now little by little we begin to adorn and arrange our forum gilded with false gold [presumably a reference to the ‘false front’/façade proposal by Melkus]…

This perspective caused Kršnjavi to reject both the private development and the unified façade proposal.

Kršnjavi saw the purely private development of the land on the north side of the square as “immensely meaningless” and felt it would make the square look like a “krezuba baba” (a toothless old woman) because it would allow houses of various height, and even empty plots of land depending on the wishes of individual owners. His choice of this particular image, the toothless old woman, was a powerful one because it evokes an image common in ‘the village’ and thus implied that the collection of private houses making up the north side of the square would diminish the image of Zagreb as a modern city, reducing it to the level of not even a small town but a peasant village. Kršnjavi rejected Melkus’ concept as well because it was merely a façade over private buildings, and not a true public structure. What Kršnjavi believed belonged on the north side of the square was “a model of such a public building as the Academy, the Ban’s Palace, or maybe even the University building such that the surroundings cause Jelačić’s statue to stand in eternal glory.” Therefore, the north side of the square should not just look like a public building; it should be the physical embodiment of a significant national institution. Kršnjavi saw the square as a place that needed to be developed to physically rise up to the level the Ban’s statue had symbolically elevated it.

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51 Kršnjavi cited by Maruševski, Iso Kršnjavi Kao Graditelj. @ 228.
52 Kršnjavi cited by Maruševski, od Manduševca do Trga Republike. @ 45.
53 Kršnjavi cited by Maruševski, Iso Kršnjavi Kao Graditelj. @ 228.
But as the architects and city planners of Zagreb were re-imaging Ban Jelačić Square in response to the monument, the population of the city was re-imaging the meaning of the monument itself. In the decades after the monument was put in place, the idea took hold that the statue was installed to face Hungary, ‘with the sword pointing at Budapest’ among the population of Zagreb.54 This view was, on a factual level, hard to explain. As stated before, it was the sculptor, Anton Fernkorn, a German from Vienna, who had specifically requested the statue’s orientation be turned to the North because of his desire for the statue to face the ‘liveliest’ part of the city.55 But even with this orientation, the statue actually faces more towards Vienna than Budapest, as Zagreb itself sits to the west longitudinally of Vienna and the statue faced north, with a slight inclination to the east.

The most basic explanation for this popular interpretation of the placement of the statue is based on the configuration of the square itself before the statue arrived. Up to the 1840s an Hungarian custom's office had been located on the north side of the square where the 3% Harmicad tax on merchants had been collected.56 But in 1848, all ties to the Hungarian administration had been severed and never reestablished. In a sense then, the statue of Ban Jelačić was directly confronting a symbol of Hungarian power, but only in the memories of those who had been on the square before 1848.

The geo-political situation was more complex and dynamic. The statue was already a concretization of the geo-political order of 1848, with Zagreb as the capital of a self governing Triune Kingdom. At the time the statue was being transformed from idea to reality, there were signs that those specific relationships might be re-achieved. In 1866, the Empire was decisively

54 Milčec, Povratak Bana. @ 23.
55 Maleković, ed., Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću. @ 8.
56 Rihtman-Aguštin, "The Monument in the Main City Square: Constructing and Erasing Memory in Contemporary Croatia." @ 183.
defeated in a war with Prussia, and the last of the Empire’s client states in Northern Italy were integrated into the new Kingdom of Italy, ending the Empire’s centuries long effort to maintain control of the area.\textsuperscript{57} This final failure of neo-absolutism resulted in its final dismantlement. Initially, the Croatian political elite were hopeful that the end of neo-absolutism would lead to the re-establishment of “Jelačić’s Croatia.”\textsuperscript{58} But by 1866, the year the statue was actually installed in Ban Jelačić Square, there were strong indications that the dismantling of neo-absolutism would result in Dalmatia once again being split off from the rest of the Triune Kingdom.\textsuperscript{59} One Croatian politician, Ante Starčević, argued on the floor of the Sabor that seeing Croatia as a Triune Kingdom was endangering Croatia’s political unity, and that the kingdom be understood and referred to as simply the unitary Kingdom of Croatia.\textsuperscript{60} In 1867, the agreement between Vienna and Budapest to re-establish Hungary’s position as a self governing state within the Empire stripped Dalmatia from Zagreb and put it back under the authority of the German portion of the Dual Monarchy.\textsuperscript{61} In 1868, Zagreb negotiated a new formal relationship with Budapest, achieving for Croatia a similar status as that which Hungary had achieved for itself in 1867.\textsuperscript{62}

The Nagodba (agreement) between the Hungarian and Croatian governments was negotiated by the newly appointed Ban Levin Rauch, the leader of the Unionist Party, and, in many ways, took the minimum levels of autonomy that the Croatian elite would accept; an independent civil administration, police force, and court system.\textsuperscript{63} And though the Ban would officially be appointed by the Emperor, in his role as King of Hungary, the Hungarian

\textsuperscript{57} Magaš, \textit{Croatia through History}. @ 289-290.  
\textsuperscript{58} Horvat, \textit{Politička Povijest Hrvatska}. @ 258.  
\textsuperscript{59} Magaš, \textit{Croatia through History}. @ 288.  
\textsuperscript{60} Ante Starčević, \textit{Misli i Pogledi} (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1971). @ 87-90.  
\textsuperscript{61} Magaš, \textit{Croatia through History}. @ 290.  
\textsuperscript{62} Jelavich, \textit{History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries}. @ 320.  
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid. @ 319.
government was given the power to nominate, thus limiting candidates to those acceptable to Budapest. All real power would rest with the office of Ban, who could directly appoint as many members of the Sabor as he wanted, and if that failed to secure a compliant parliament, could simply prorogue the Sabor and rule by decree. Also, this self governing status only applied to Civil Croatia, a fact which denied Zagreb authority over the Military Border as well. Thus, within two years of the installation of the Ban Jelačić monument the leadership of the Croatian national project had suffered a significant setback to their goals of re-achieving the circumstances of 1848, but these setbacks could not be put solely on the Hungarians, as the Imperial government in Vienna was as much to blame.

The response to the Nagodba, in Croatia was very negative. In 1871, new elections were called. These resulted in a significant victory for the National Party, with the Unionist Party so badly defeated it dissolved as a political force. The Sabor sent a new delegation to Budapest to renegotiate the Nagodba, but no substantive changes were made. Later that same year, an armed rebellion against the Nagodba erupted in the Military Border, and had to be violently suppressed.

It was at this time that the idea first emerged that the statue should be seen as representing the present political circumstances rather than just the historic moment of 1848. As the architectural historian Olga Maruševski describes the situation:

Thus, the political passions of the elite, in discussions about the statue, found an outlet, relating the events from 1870, in daily fierce anti-nagodba fever. To supporters of the National party the statue symbolized opposition against the Rauch nagodba government, and with rightists, for whom their motto was,

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64 Ibid. @ 320.
65 Ibid.
66 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 289-292.
67 Ibid. 301.
68 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 320.
69 Magaš, Croatia through History. 302.
70 Olga Maruševski, Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2006). @ 164.
“neither Vienna nor Budapest,” Jelačić was a symbol of betrayal to the homeland…  

Both of these outlooks are intriguing for their inherent contradictions. The interpretation of the Nationalist party’s supporters was understandable. Jelačić had been a member of the Illyrian movement, and the National parties were direct descendants of the Illyrian party. Yet, while the National Party was espousing a Yugoslav perspective on Croatia’s future, a logical extension of their Illyrian roots, Jelačić’s loyalty to the Hapsburg dynasty seemed to contradict the parties’ viewpoint. Yet Jelačić’s loyalty to the Empire made him a valuable symbolic asset to the Nationalists as well, protecting them from the charges of separatism that the evolving Yugoslav idea made very possible.

The “rightists” were a new element in Croatian politics. Ante Starčević had founded the Stranka prava (Party of Right) in 1861, as the political environment was loosening, because of disagreements he had with the National Party leadership. The name Stranka prava was derived from their core philosophy that Croatia should be recognized as a separate kingdom within the Empire; this was the “right” which the party stood for, the right to statehood. The motto “neither Vienna nor Budapest” reflected the party’s view that Croatia should recognize neither of these cities as its capital. Given this outlook, the rejection of the monument of 1848 and Jelačić personally seems odd, given that 1848 was the closest Croatia had come to realize the goals of the new party. The party members’ anger seems to have stemmed more from Jelačić’s continued support for the Empire once the neo-Absolutist regime was implemented, and the statue

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71 Ibid. @ 164-165.
72 The name Stranka prava is usually translated as Party of Right, but is also occasionally translated as the Party of Rights. This situation arises from the fact that the genitive singular and the genitive plural form of masculine nouns in Croatian is identical in written form, and can only be distinguished from context, or through a shift in accent when speaking.
73 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 318.
74 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 286.
celebrating 1848 was, to them, a reminder of all that had been lost, in terms of Croatian autonomy, since that time.

Though the logics supporting each group’s interpretation of the Jelačić monument were somewhat contradictory, the emotions that these interpretations produced were intense. The statue became a favored venue for the smotra (exhibition) of traditional folk songs by various folk performance groups because it amplified the patriotic character of their choral festivals. On one occasion this provoked a violent response from the pravaši. During a musical exhibition by the groups, Zora (Dawn) and Kolo (Circle) a group of high school students who were followers of the Stranka prava that had gathered at one of the cafés on the square became so incensed they left the café and disrupted the performance. This led to a physical altercation in front of the statue that required the police to restore order.75 The incident was significant enough that Ban Rauch fired two prominent high school teachers who were seen as the leading protagonists of the anti-unionist political parties in the schools.76

Neither of these interpretations of the statue actually reflected any interest in its specific orientation. But in 1874, the new leader of the National party, and recently appointed Ban, Ivan Mažuranić, stated that “Jelačić shows the way towards Vienna, extending horizontally his hand armed with a Turkish saber…”77 In this statement, Mažuranić was using the statue of the Ban to support his personal view that the most advantageous way forward for Croatia was a closer association with the German part of the Empire as a way to overcome Hungarian domination.78 He was presenting Jelačić not as attacking Vienna, but leading Croatia forward towards

75 Maruševski, Od Manduševe do Trga Republike. @ 41.
76 Ibid. @ 41-42.
77 Maruševski, Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine. @ 163.
78 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 305.
Vienna. But Mažuranić’s views, despite the fact that he was the leader of the National Party at the time, were a distinct minority view within the National Party ranks. His interpretation of the statue fit with the physical orientation of the statue’s facing north, towards Vienna, and used it to support the political argument he wanted to make. The fact that Jelačić had in fact led his troops in the storming of Vienna and the suppression of a liberalizing uprising which shared many of Mažuranić’s own views and goals was simply ignored.

The setbacks of the Nagodba were partially reversed a decade later when the Hapsburg Empire occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to administer the province for the Ottoman Empire, and as a result, the justification for the special privileges of the Military Border was eliminated; in 1881, authority for the region was returned to Zagreb. Shortly after this success though, a new challenge emerged to the political aspirations of the Croatian national project. In 1883 Count Khuen-Herdervary was appointed Ban. Khuen-Herdervary was the first Hungarian to hold the office of Ban in many decades, and was appointed as part of a renewed effort on the part of the Hungarian government to regain more control over Croatia. Khuen-Herdervary’s tenure as Ban was a very politically contentious period, and therefore it is not surprising that the residents of Zagreb would see their geo-political relationship between Zagreb and Budapest displayed in the orientation of Ban Jelačić’s monument during that period of time. As, Henri Napoleon Begouen, a Frenchman who had been in Zagreb in 1887 and 1888 observed of the statue:

“The Ban’s hand lifts the sword and shows his fellow citizens that it is not yet time to put it in its sheath for Ban Khuen-Herdervary, the struggle between Croats

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79 Maruševski, Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine. @ 163.
80 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 318-320.
81 Count Khuen-Herdervary is nearly universally referred to as Hungarian in Croatian sources, even though he was born in Croatia to a mixed German-Hungarian family and had studied law at the University of Zagreb.
82 Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest. @ 199.
and Hungarians continues. This is not like the first bloody battles. The nation is disarmed. These are political battles.”83

Khuen-Herdervary’s 20 year tenure as Ban combined with the universal unpopularity of the Unionist position he represented gave this interpretation time to settle in with the entire population of the city, regardless of their specific political affiliation as Nationalists or Rightists. Over time this interpretation of the sword as a challenge to Ban Khuen-Herdervary, the agent of Budapest’s interests, became conflated with Budapest itself, so that the image in the public imagination of ‘the sword pointed at Budapest’ persisted into the twentieth century, and long after Ban Khuen-Herdervary had left the city.

**Growing into the Metropolis**

Despite these political conflicts, Zagreb as a city prospered in the three decades following the installation of Ban Jelačić’s statue. This growth was significantly assisted by the Hungarian government which funded the construction of a rail line from Zagreb to Budapest in 1870,84 which allowed goods from Trieste (Vienna’s main port on the Adriatic) to move to Hungary without going through Graz or Vienna. In 1873 the Hungarian government built a rail line from Rijeka to Zagreb,85 thus allowing goods to flow from the Adriatic to Budapest without ever passing through the German portion of the Empire. This rail link created the exact situation the Zagreb city planners had been imagining in the early 1860s; it transformed the city into a central transportation hub, only not in as complete a way as the planners had envisioned. Rather than Zagreb becoming the hub of the rail-water network interface, it became the connection point for two major rail lines.

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84 Perić, *Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada*. @ 99.

85 Goldstein, *Hrvatska Povijest*. @ 195.
The establishment of the city as a major rail hub, combined with the idea of Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis, amplified an economic cycle of growth for the city. Capital was attracted to the city because of the potential for growth and profit, which was invested to produce economic development. The development created a draw for people seeking to relocate from the countryside. These new arrivals to the city provided both a large labor pool and a demand for goods, which made the city an attractive place for further investment by the owners of capital looking to generate greater profits. This cycle of growth was assisted by the emergence of a new economic institution in Zagreb at this time; the Štedionica (Thrift or Savings Bank), the first of which was opened in Zagreb on Ban Jelačić Square in 1870. These new banks catered to the general population, rather than the hereditary wealth of the noble class, and meant that the city itself could produce and agglomerate capital that would then be re-invested in the city. The result was a dramatic grown, with population of Zagreb expanding from approximately 27,000 in 1857 to almost 80,000 by the end of the century.

This economic growth dynamic also produced enough excess capital to fund the cultural development of Zagreb. As mentioned previously, one of the first new institutions proposed was a modern university to replace the Royal Academy. In addition to the university, an Academy of Arts and Sciences was also proposed. A key protagonist of the realization of both of these proposals was Bishop Strossmayer of Đakovo. Bishop Strossmayer became leader of the National Party after Ljudevit Gaj’s departure from politics, and under his leadership the party transformed from an Illyrian outlook to a Yugoslav perspective, but he abandoned formal politics after he was unable to obtain any significant concessions from the Hungarian government over

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86 Maruševski, Od Manduševca do Trga Republike. @ 47
87 Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest. Table @ 466-467.
the *Nagodba*.

His departure from formal politics did not stop his efforts at national institutions building though. He continued to work diligently at turning the institutions he was central in creating in the 1860s into formal places of learning and academic work in the 1870s.

Bishop Strossmayer is an important indicator of how deeply the idea of Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis became embedded with the Croatian elite of the time. He was neither born nor raised in Zagreb nor did he reside there permanently later in life. He had been born in Osijek, in Eastern Slavonia, and then resettled in Đakovo after completing his seminary studies there, as well as advanced studies in Vienna and Budapest. He quickly gained prominence in the teaching ranks at the seminary in Đakovo but was also recognized for his organizational talents and was chosen to serve in positions of the Church administration in both Vienna and Rome before returning to Đakovo as the Bishop. Strossmayer’s focus on science and learning as an important element of the Croatian national project grew out of his own intellectual prowess as a renowned theologian, but his efforts at founding the university and the Academy of Arts and Sciences show his appreciation for learning beyond theology. Bishop Strossmayer not only worked to see the institutions formally established, but raised a significant amount of the funds for the projects, especially the building of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, indicating his belief that it was not enough to have these institutions, but that they needed a significant physical presence in Zagreb as well.

In addition to Bishop Strossmayer’s efforts, many other private individuals and groups worked to build cultural institutions and *javne zgrade* (public buildings) to house these institutions. The contrast between these structures and the private houses of the city was striking. The 1857 building code had required that all new buildings in the new part of the city

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88 Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. @ 320.
89 Goldstein, *Hrvatska Povijest*. @ 183.
be at least two stories tall, with the capacity to be expanded up to three stories tall. Most of the new private housing was built specifically to this standard of two stories. Strossmayer’s Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences building, built in 1880, was technically only three stories tall, but stood five stories above the ground. The Museum of Arts and Crafts, built in 1888 was nearly six stories tall. These structures dwarfed all but a few of the most lavish private residences of the city being built at that time.

Most of this building was not financed by either the city government or the national government, but by private funding. The city’s main contribution was often just the approval to build upon the land on which the buildings would sit, often out of compliance with the building code as it applied to private citizens, or transforming the large public squares into physical monuments to national institutions. This public land was part of the fulfillment of the concept laid out in the original concept for the new center of the Lower Town. By 1888, the “two large squares” initially envisioned in the 1850s had formally become Zagreb’s “Green Horseshoe;” two large multi-block long parks upon which the new physical representations of these cultural institutions were located, connected by a large public ‘garden’ at their southern end. The result was a striking contrast between the private buildings and shops of the city, which were required to connect seamlessly in unified fronts directly on the street, and these privately funded javne zgrade (public buildings), which sat individually on large blocks of public parkland.

On a practical level, these massive public buildings were an extravagance. Many of the organizations that would occupy these institutional palaces had venues already or were

90 Aleksander Laslo, "Between Two Building Codes," in Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2007). @ 90. It is important to note the difference in terminology here between European and American convention. Central Europeans begin numbering the floors of buildings with the second story above the ground. In American terminology the “first floor” is, in European terms, the “ground floor.” Thus, when the Zagreb building regulations state that the buildings were required to be “at least one story high” they are referring to a second story above the “ground floor.”

91 Blau, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 58-77.

92 Rogić, "What Has Happened in Zagreb." @ 23.
functional without the existence of a separate structure. The National Theater did performances in a theater in Gornji grad, on St. Mark’s Square. The Academy of Arts and Sciences had functioned as an institution since its founding in 1866 without a dedicated building. But the construction of the Academy of Arts and Sciences building in Donji grad established a precedent for the use of the space, and over time, the city encouraged other institutions to migrate to Donji grad as well. The result was the nationalization of the new part of the city as the institutions of national culture relocated there.

At the same time these grand public buildings were being constructed in Donji grad, another dynamic of city building was underway. The new building regulations had resulted in large hollow blocks, with buildings on the street, but large open spaces known as a dvorište, or courtyard behind them. Within these private and semi private courtyard spaces people could build without regard for the regulations. In 1882 the city enacted new regulations allowing temporary buildings but prohibiting permanent construction more than 14 meters deep from the front of the main buildings on the street. As Blau and Rupnik state “The center of the block was to remain open green space.” But the city’s land owners never considered this a binding regulation. “This specification was generally interpreted as a recommendation rather than a legal prescription of the code, and largely ignored.” This perception that the courtyard aspects of the code were voluntary was reinforced by the fact that this aspect of the building regulations was never enforced by the city government. But, the land owners’ characterization of the courtyard restrictions on building as purely voluntary is contradicted by the fact that in 1887 they were

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93 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 134.
94 Blau, Project Zagreb: Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 66.
95 Ibid. @ 104.
96 Ibid.
officially waived for many civic and religious institutions, an act that would have been unnecessary had the codes been truly voluntary. The result was the development of “parallel cities,” one uniform and orderly in appearance on display for the public, and the other, much more individualistic and disorderly, concealed from public view.

The process of establishing the uniform nature of Donji grad was not only accomplished through the establishment of the building regulations and the regulatory plan. The city government took a significant action to ensure that sacred ground did not disrupt the pattern of urban development. Established cemeteries had been a significant issue challenging urban development in many European cities. These places of consecrated ground could not simply be built over without offending community sensibilities. A second and more immediate issue was that of the need for more burial space in the city as the population grew rapidly. As early as 1860 the city government sought to solve both of these problems by initiating efforts to establish a multi-confessional city cemetery outside of the planned new Donji grad. The city also passed an ordinance requiring all existing cemeteries be closed and emptied, with their graves moved to the new location. To accomplish this though, the city government needed to find a location that would be sufficiently symbolic to justify the efforts involved.

The location they chose was Ljudevit Gaj’s estate, named Mirogoj, which he had established on a hill north of Kaptol. This estate included a large vineyard and English garden. Gaj lived at this estate until his death in 1872. In 1873 the city bought the land and developed it into the city’s new cemetery, opening it in 1876 with the transfer of the graves from other parts

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97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 77-78.
100 Rudolf Horvat, Zagreb - Povijest Hrvatskoga Glavnog Grada (Zagreb: 1942). @ 121.
101 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 78.
of the city. There was a certain poetic propriety to the idea that all the people of Zagreb would be buried in the very soil that Ljudevit Gaj had cultivated. But there was also an additional outcome to the location of the city cemetery. For the majority of the city (all the neighborhoods except for Kaptol), the most expedient routes to the new location passed through Ban Jelačić Square. The square therefore became a new symbolic gateway; a gateway between life and death, which most inhabitants of the city would pass through on their way to their final resting place in Mirogoj.

During this period the city of Zagreb also transformed the city’s fairs into expressions of the national project as well. The annual fairs had diminished as an economic institution as the economic situation in Croatia had modernized. In the nineteenth century the fair was transformed into an exhibition, more cultural than economic in character. Beginning in 1852, Zagreb organized trade fairs for Croatia and Slavonia. In 1864, the city organized the “first Dalmatian-Croatian-Slavonian exhibition,” which was intended to showcase both the economic and cultural characteristics of the various parts of the Triune Kingdom. This exhibition formally established Dalmatian participation in the exhibitions held in Zagreb, and also reinforced the city’s claim to the role of cultural center of the entire Triune Kingdom. The participation of Dalmatia in the exhibition also supported Zagreb’s political claims on Dalmatia just as it was becoming clear the neo-absolutist order would soon end.

Despite the success of the first Dalmatian-Croatian-Slavonian exhibition, it was almost 30 years before another large scale exhibition could be organized in Zagreb. In 1891 the Croatian-Slavonian Economic Society planned a significant exhibition. The official reason for

102 Horvat, Zagreb - Povijest Hrvatskoga Glavnog Grada. @ 121-123.
104 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 58-59.
105 Ibid. @ 51-53.
the exhibition was the 50th anniversary of the founding of the society. But underlying this reason was a desire to present a symbol of public dissent against Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s Unionist policies with Hungary. This subtext was demonstrated by the participation of many delegations from Dalmatia and Istria in the exhibition, thus challenging the formal political separation of those territories. The point was displayed at the formal opening of the exhibition as well, when the song *Ljepa naša domovina* (Our Beautiful Homeland) was sung for the first time as the Croatian National Anthem, thus reinforcing Croatia’s status as an independent state within the Empire.

New National Theater Building Completed in 1895

In 1895 the city built a huge new theatre building to be the permanent home for the Croatian National Theatre on the square where the 1891 exhibition had been held across from the

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106 Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj. @ 278.
107 Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest. @ 208.
108 Rudolf Horvat, Prošlost Grada Zagreba (Zagreb: Hrvatski Rodoljub, 1942). @ xviii.
new university. The building was massive, filling an entire park block by itself. It was the culmination of 50 years of imagining and practical effort dating back to Gaj’s proposal for the National Center in the 1840s. To celebrate the opening of the Croatian National Theater the Emperor was invited to formally christen the building and attend the inaugural performance in his role as King of Croatia. Though the trip centered on a significant cultural achievement for the Croatian capital city, the Hungarian government in Budapest and their local agent, Ban Khuen-Herdervary, planned to use the trip to impress upon the Emperor the extent to which Croatia had been integrated into Hungary.

For the weeks prior to the visit the planning and preparations for the Emperor’s arrival was at the top of every front page of Narodne novine (National News), which was also the Službeni list (Official Newspaper) of the Croatian government. On the day of the Emperor’s arrival in Zagreb Narodne novine published a special front page with blue and red highlighting (an exceptional extravagance for the paper) which was dedicated to an open letter of welcome to Franz Josef I entitled Živio kralj! (Long live the King!). The first paragraph of this letter was an homage to the Emperor and his entourage. The second paragraph was an homage to Zagreb:

Zagreb is not just the capital city of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia; it is much more, it is the heart of our nation; it is the origin of all of our national and cultural efforts. That is why every worthy son of [the] ancestors always with love thinks, with pride looks on the city of Zagreb;…

The letter goes on to argue that because of this special role for Zagreb in the national life of Croatia, all of the “happiness and glory” bestowed by the visiting delegation on the city and its inhabitants was also bestowed on “all of the nation, Croats and Serbs.” The paragraph

109 Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj. @ 379-380.
110 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 159.
111 The practice of establishing a non-government owned Official Newspaper was common in the Hapsburg Empire at the time. These papers were paid a subsidy to public official government notices and pronouncements which were clearly marked as official.
112 “Živio Kralj!,” Narodne novine, 12 Listopad (October) 1895.
113 Ibid.
concludes: “And those, who have the circumstances of that fortune, with us as one, directly bestowed in warm line of this ruler’s blessing, all shall, in these days, in spirit and heart before us, in our white Zagreb.” Thus, it was in Zagreb and through Zagreb that the glory of the Emperors praise would be bestowed on everyone in Croatia. Croatia had become Zagreb writ large.

Conclusions: Nation Building as City Building: City Building as Nation Building

The first half century of Zagreb as a unified city is a fascinating narrative on many levels, but it also provides significant points for illuminating theoretical issues relating to space and the constitution, transmission, and contestation of national identity. Two specific issues are clear from the narrative. The first is how significant the urban center of Zagreb, and its transformation into the Croatian Metropolis, was to the Croatian National Project. The second is the degree to which the space of the city of Zagreb itself, and the main square in particular, became important spaces which both reflected and informed residents’ understanding of the trajectory of the Croatian national project.

It is also important to note the extent to which the transformation of Zagreb into the Croatian Metropolis was a recursive one. Bishop Strossmayer’s decision to focus his institution building efforts in Zagreb is a significant example of how the deliberate effort to create the Croatian Metropolis in Zagreb was central to the nation building project. Strossmayer was neither from Zagreb, nor did he spend the majority of his professional life in the city. As both the head of the seminary and the Bishop of Đakovo, he had distinct personal and professional interests in that historic city. He could have used his position as the leader of the National Party to try to shift institutions and resources to his adopted city of Đakovo, but instead, he was

114 Ibid.
instrumental in the project that expanded the Royal Academy into a modern University in Zagreb, and he was the driving force behind establishing the Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb.

The institution building efforts of the Croatian national project in Zagreb were supported by the effort to symbolically establish the circumstances of 1848 as the natural order of Croatian geo-politics. The city’s main square was already a unique and distinctive space because of its size and being a shared space between the two communities of Kaptol and Gradec. But up until this point its symbolic function was only that of a ‘gateway’ into the city; the space though which everyone who wished to enter must pass. Functionally, the square had only been used as a market place and occasionally used for public spectacles. The decision to place a statue of Ban Jelačić in the square was a deliberate effort to transform Zagreb into a modern city with modern symbolic public monuments, as were present in Vienna. The decision to monumentalize Ban Jelačić and dedicate the statue specifically to his efforts in 1848 clearly was an effort to “concretize” that historical moment which was a key element of Croatian national distinctiveness.

The transformation of Zagreb into the Croatian Metropolis was very much a physical as well as an institution building and symbolic endeavor. Beyond Stosmayer’s organization efforts as a leader of the National Party in politics, he worked very hard and contributed enormous sums of money to the physical building of both the new University and the Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb. The idea of metropolis extended beyond the cultural significance of Zagreb. The new urban plan of 1865 was as significant as these physical symbols of national culture. This was a deliberate design for a modern Croatian Metropolis, which imagined not just a cultural and political role for the city, but a central economic one as well, as evidenced by the
new, large rail yard and Sava River port the plan included. The urban plan of 1865 gave form to the modern building regulations promulgated previously and imagined a massive new urban space, built in a modern style. But this modern city was to be connected to the older city through Ban Jelačić Square, thus maintaining a continuity of the city in time and space while simultaneously transforming it.

The centrality of the square to the Croatian Metropolis project is evidenced at both the imaginary and physical level. First, the renaming of the square was an important act of separation from the Hungarian influence in Zagreb, an act of claiming the square, the center of daily life in the city, for Croatia. The placement of the statue of Ban Jelačić solidified this transformation. These acts did not change the functional role of the square as means of daily social reproduction as main market place, but it did elevate the space from a “dirty square” to a space that needed to “cause Jelačić’s Statue to stand in eternal glory.” This ‘nationalization’ of the square did not diminish its symbolic function of gateway either, rather it announced to those who were ritually obligated to pass through the square upon entry to the city that they were entering clearly Croatian place. The Ban Jelačić monument project was about more that just the square; it was also about modernizing Zagreb, even if this modernization was only symbolic. The square as linkage point between the two existing elements of the city, Gradec and Kaptol, and the imagined new, modern city to be built to the south, embedded the national at the center of Zagreb. Simultaneously, the national square as main market place embedded the nation in the practice of daily life in the city and ensured that even as the city grew further and further and further from the square, the population would still be drawn to it on a daily basis.

It is clear that what was understood by the population using the square was not necessarily what those who had placed the statue there had intended. The statue, with its
dedication to BAN JELAČIĆ, 1848 was intended to make the statue a permanent reminder of the specific geo-spatial order of an autonomous, unified Croatia with Zagreb as its capital. But the population of the city re-interpreted the statue and added to its meaning, transforming it into a physical manifestation of not the past, but their present geo-political reality. The understanding of ‘the sword pointed at Budapest’ became embedded in the local understanding of the statue’s meaning, despite the fact that the sword did not, in fact, point towards Budapest nor was it ever intended that it should be viewed that way by those who created and erected it. But the continued political tensions with Hungary combined with the absence of “official” resistance as a result of the political agreement between Croatia and Hungary created a social need for a symbol of resistance. The re-interpretation of the Ban Jelačić monument became a community response to the ongoing political friction.

**Urban Space as Productive of and a Product of Social Understanding**

The development of the urban landscape of Zagreb during the period from 1850 to 1895 clearly illustrates spatiality in action over time. At the core of this process were two overarching efforts to convert an imagined space into a real space. At the macro level, this was the effort to transform the new city of Zagreb into a true Croatian Metropolis. At the micro scale this was an effort to transform the city’s main square into a space that would concretize the historic moment of 1848. But this project resulted in a drive to then raise the physical presence of the square up to meet the significance of the monument. This micro project was an embedded part of the greater macro project in that the emplacement of the monument to Ban Jelačić was clearly intended to create a physical improvement that would assist in bringing Zagreb up to the cultural level of the Imperial metropolis of Vienna.
On a macro scale, the entire Donji grad project was about producing not just a larger city but a particular kind of new city. This was accomplished through the promulgation of the regulatronia osnova, which created a regular, modern urban pattern, and the building regulations, which forced a particular modern style of architecture to be built within this new urban pattern. As Ivan Rogić has pointed out, this was urban space deliberately designed not to reflect Croatian society as it was, but as it should be, and in doing so transform the society through the space it inhabited.\footnote{Rogić, "What Has Happened in Zagreb." @ 28.} The flush façades of the buildings created an impression of both bourgeois equality and uniformity, but with individual distinctiveness. Yet the regulations were also reflective of the bourgeois society which exempted religious institutions and national institutions from the requirements imposed on the rest of the society. But as a lived space, the city came to reflect the dualistic nature of bourgeois society as well. The emergence of the ‘parallel cities,’ the building of illegal buildings within the courtyards of the city blocks, formally prohibited, but also tolerated if it did not breach the façade, was reflective of bourgeois society which prized public conformity yet tolerated private deviation provided it remained private. In this way then, Donji grad was a successful transformation of imagined space into a real space which did reflect the values imagined by the designers, a modern Central European urban space. And yet Donji grad also became an example of re-imagined space enabling the creation of real space as well, the illegal courtyard buildings, which reflected a reality that was outside the imagined conformity the designers envisioned.

All of this new urban space was tied to the national project through Ban Jelačić Square. The emplacement of the Ban Jelačić monument had established a prominent physical reminder of 1848 at the center of daily life for the city, the main market. The statue was intended to not just transform Zagreb into a modern city, but into a national city as well, one firmly defined as
Croatian, by embedding the national moment of 1848 in the routine of daily life. This marker was placed at the center of daily life in the city, so that it became a marker to the population that they used to explain their own political circumstances. Even though the statue was clearly defined as a memorial specifically to 1848, the population re-interpreted the statue to reflect the continued contentious relationship with Hungary.

The Ban Jelačić monument once again also illustrates the transformation of imagined space, the square as monumental space, into real space, the monument to 1848. It also shows how that real space, once experienced as lived space is redefined by those who experience it. The monument, which was envisioned by its advocates as a symbol of the historic moment of 1848 came to be seen as the symbol of the daily political struggle with the Hungarian government. Though this new understanding of the statue did not result in a change in the real space of the square in the same way that the re-imagining of “Lower Town” resulted in the “parallel city,” it did transform the imagined space of the square, making it a place reflecting popular understanding of the present as well as the past. This new understanding of the statue did change people’s physical understanding of the statue, turning it from Vienna to face Budapest, but without physically moving the monument.

During the period of 1850 to 1895 a key change to the previously established dynamic of Zagreb at the center of Croatia took place. By placing the monument of Ban Jelačić in the main square, the leaders of Zagreb had put Croatia at the center of the city. The central position of the square was not just a physical reality, it was a lived reality. The square was the center of daily life in the city, and the presence of the Ban Jelačić monument ensured that Croatia would be present in the practice of daily life for the entire population of the city.
Chapter 5

Contesting the Urban Character of the Croatian National Project:

Stjepan Radić 1895 - 1935
The four decades from 1895 until 1935 saw the emergence of significant contestation within the Croatian national project. This contestation was taking place in a now well chronicled context of significant social, economic, and political change in Croatia. One movement in particular became central to this process: the Peasantists. This movement built up over decades, eventually becoming the dominant political party in Croatia and challenging the urban and modernizing focus of the Croatian national project. This contestation is an important element in this study; it was instrumental in shaping the semiotic qualities of the statue, its encompassing square, and other key icons in the city. What emerges from applying the lens of spatiality to the events of this period is how the symbolic power of the square and the Ban Jelačić statue became important. Political acts (i.e., organizing a constituency and structuring a rhetoric) pivoted around the use of the square and statue as a central resource.

October 16th, 1895: The Beginning of a New Politics

The Imperial state visit of October 1895 was intended to be a coming of age for Zagreb; a recognition of the city’s development into a modern, Central European metropolis.¹ This visit was a significant moment for Croatian political development, but for reasons that were not anticipated by the organizers of the Emperor’s visit. In fact, the visit itself progressed as planned, beginning with a traditional honored procession from point of arrival, in this case the new Main Train Station, at the south end of the eastern portion of the “Green Horseshoe,” then through Ban Jelačić Square on to St. Mark’s Square in Gradec.² On his first evening in the city, the Emperor formally opened the new National Theater, helping the Croatian national project

¹ See chapter Chapter 4.
² "Naputak," Narodne novine, 12 Listopad (October) 1895.
realize a five decade-long goal. The bulk of the stay was taken up with visiting the many cultural monuments that had been built during the development of Zagreb since the 1864 urban plan had sketched out the new, modern Lower Town.

But the organizers of the visit had also inadvertently created a situation that enabled some opponents of Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s regime to stage a dramatic protest. The government had cleared Ban Jelačić Square of market activity. This action was necessary on a practical level, because market activity on the square would have impeded the movement of the Emperor and his retinue as it traveled from event to event in different parts of the city. In addition to the closing of the main market, the university was also closed during the visit, to accommodate a planned

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3 "Njegovo Veličanstvo Kralj u Zagrebu," *Narodne novine*, 15 Listopad (October) 1895.
4 "Naputak."
5 Josip Horvat, *Politička Povijest Hrvatska* (Zagreb: Binoza-Svjetski Pisci, 1936). @ Photo insert between pages 304-305.
event with the Emperor at the university building. This meant that one of the most agitated anti-regime groups, the students of Zagreb University, were free of obligations to be in class. On the 15th of October the university students shouted anti-Hungarian slogans along the routes that the Emperor was scheduled to travel along escorted by Ban Khuen-Herdervary. These efforts, to embarrass Ban Khuen-Herdervary, failed to spark any significant response from the government, and no action was taken by the police against the students.

At some point the university students, under the leadership of a former student Stjepan Radić, who had previously been expelled for anti-government activity, decided they needed to do something more significant to draw attention to their opposition to Ban Khuen-Herdervary and his policies of more firmly integrating Croatia into Hungary. In this desire, the students were aided by the fact that the Emperor’s visit was scheduled to extend over the anniversary of Ban Jelačić’s birth on 16 October. The students decided that Ban Jelačić’s birthday presented a particular opportunity for action. Ban Jelačić Square also provided an excellent venue for a public demonstration. Ban Jelačić’s monument was already being interpreted by the city’s population as an expression of confrontation with Ban Khuen-Herdervary and the Hungarian government in general. In addition to this, if the demonstration were properly timed, there would be a significant audience who would be present in the square to catch a final glimpse of the Emperor in his visit. The square and the statue, then, were not innocent sites to conduct the rally. Rather, this selection was strategic; seizing upon this space’s recently modified

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6 During their trial all the students stated that their reason for being at the university building that day was to attend classes, but they discovered on arrival that the doors to the building had been locked. Mirko Mador, ed., Hrvatski Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski Izvještaj o Glavnoj Razpravi Proti Hrvatskim Sveučilišnim Djacima Održanoj Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom u Zagrebu Dne 11 – 16. Studenoga 1895. (Zagreb: Dom i svjet; reprint, 1995).
iconography. Here, it was believed, the most stalwart of nationalist symbols could be used to challenge the Hungarian vision of the assimilation of Croatia.

On the morning of October 16, the students took the flag of the “Student Legion,” the regiment of mobilized university students who had fought under Jelačić’s command in the 1848 campaign, from the university building and marched to Ban Jelačić Square. They arrived there at approximately 10:30 in the morning. Once on the square, which was completely empty of merchants due to the holiday declared for the Imperial visit, the students converged at the front of the Ban Jelačić monument. Stjepan Radić then stepped forward and made three short, declarative statements: Živo Franz Josip Kralj Hrvatske! (Long live Franz Joseph, King of Croatia!) Slava Jelačiću! (Glory to Jelačić!) Abcug Mđari! (Hungarians get out!) Once Radić had finished his brief statements, the leaders of the groups raised a Hungarian flag up on the points of their swords and set it on fire. “The entire demonstration lasted no longer than a pair of minutes.”

This was not a particularly extreme demonstration by Croatian standards, as it was non-violent. It was not uncommon for small groups of people to throw stones at police and court houses to protest the arrest or trial of friends and family. Stjepan Radić himself had previously done things much more disruptive. In 1888, he had interrupted a performance of the National Theater by shouting an anti Ban Khuen-Herdervary statement in the third act of an opera, an act for which Radić was arrested but never charged. In 1893, Radić had disrupted a ceremony commemorating the 300th anniversary of the Croatian victory at Sisak by shouting down a speaker who had spoken positively of Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s tenure, an act for which he was charged and sentenced to 4 months in prison as well as being expelled from the university in

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10 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 298
Zagreb.\textsuperscript{12} This act of political theater in Ban Jelačić Square, by contrast, was relatively non-provocative, being both non-violent and not having directly disrupted the Emperor’s visit.

But the political atmosphere during the Imperial visit was “explosive.”\textsuperscript{13} The powerlessness of the Sabor to effectively challenge the new Hungarian program of political integration and the degree to which even the governing Narodna stranka (National Part) felt compelled to co-operate with Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s regime were key issues frustrating many of the university students.\textsuperscript{14} This drove a large number of the university students to support the Stranka prava (Party of Right).\textsuperscript{15} These longstanding issues were accented by Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s government, which had taken several symbolic actions that exacerbated the situation and elevated tensions as the visit approached. These actions served to add insult to the perceived injury of Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s program of greater integration with Hungary. One of these decisions was to use the Hungarian national colors of Red, White, and Green, and the Hungarian national coat of arms, rather than the Croatian tri-color of Red, White, and Blue and the coat of arms of the Triune Kingdom to decorate the Main Railway Station and the public buildings in the city.\textsuperscript{16} This decision was compounded by allowing institutions that were identified with the local Serbian population in the city to use the Serbian national colors on their buildings.\textsuperscript{17}

The demonstration itself was carefully planned to send a very specific message; one that was at once both pro-Imperial and anti-Hungarian, while at the same time touching on the immediate controversy surrounding the Emperor’s visit. To accomplish this, the leaders of the

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. @ 35.
\textsuperscript{13} Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 309.
\textsuperscript{14} Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 @ 256-258.
\textsuperscript{15} Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 160.
\textsuperscript{16} Ivo Perić, Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928. (Zagreb: Dom i Sijet, 2003). @ 96.
\textsuperscript{17} Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 311.
demonstration had chosen the site of the demonstration, their words, and their actions very carefully. Choosing the Ban Jelačić statue and marching under the banner of the Student Legion of 1848 were clearly meant to display loyalty to the ruling dynasty, just as Ban Jelačić and the students who had served in the Legion had in 1848. But the flag was also in the tri-color red, white, and blue pattern that Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s government had suppressed. The declaration of long life to the Emperor as King of Croatia re-enforced that point in unambiguous terms. The celebratory “Glory to Jelačić!” legitimized the gathering as a celebration of the anniversary of his birth, but could also have been taken as a reference to his service to the dynasty and his participation in the conquest of Budapest. It was the final statement that left no doubt as to the demonstrators’ purpose. “Abcug Mđari!” was directed at the idea of Hungarian power and influence as it was at any individual Hungarian, but it was also a reference to Ban Khuen-Herdervary personally. The choice of the word abcug was also significant, as it was not a Croatian word, but rather German, thus re-enforcing the Croatian loyalty to the German Hapsburg dynasty and leveraging Croatia’s past service in an effort to impart an Imperial authority to the command “Get out!”18 The burning of the Hungarian flag addressed the issues of the day, national colors, as the Hungarian flag was a tri-color of red, white, and green. Though the demonstration was well timed for a large audience and well choreographed to make a powerful symbolic point, two elements of it diminished its power locally.

Paradoxically, the choice of venue (ie., the recognizing of its recently ascendant symbolic prowess) also worked as much against the demonstration as for it. The circumstances made the Ban Jelačić monument a logical choice for the demonstration, both because the demonstrators wanted to make a clearly pro-Imperial and anti-Hungarian statement of which Ban Jelačić was

18 The word abcug is not used in Croatian, and contemporary Croatian histories of the incident feel required to provide a translation for Croatian readers. See for example, Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 161.
the perfect embodiment, and because it was the anniversary of Jelačić’s birth. The statue, ‘with the sword pointing at Budapest,’ was already seen as a physical representation of the current political situation between Croatia and Hungary. Yet, that is very possibly why the residents of Zagreb saw little remarkable in the student’s actions. To burn the Hungarian flag at the Ban Jelačić monument was to merely bring the popularly understood meaning of the statue briefly to life. In the spatial context of Zagreb it would have been much more shocking to have performed the same action in St. Mark’s Square in front of the Sabor and the Banski dvor, the seats of legislative and executive power and the city’s traditional site of political demonstrations both in support and opposition of the government.

Additionally, there was nothing shocking about the views of the participants of the demonstration. It was general knowledge at the time that many university students were supporters of the Stranka prava and deeply opposed Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s goals of integrating Croatia into Hungary. The students’ efforts at provoking the authorities of the previous day may have worked against them as well, further diminishing the shock effect of the demonstration. Consequently, the initial Croatian response was very matter of fact, rather than sensationalistic. The demonstration was reported on the 17th in Narodne novine but on page 5 in a small two paragraph news item in the “non-official” portion of the paper. A partial reason for this restraint may have been the government censors, who refused to let the main opposition newspaper, Obzor, publish any word on the incident until after the Emperor had left the city. But it is also important to note that the university students’ actions were as much a demonstration against the ineffectual Croatian political elite, which had been unable to get the Croatian national colors displayed for the Emperor’s visit, as it was against Ban Khuen-Herdervary.

19 “Spaljena Magjarska Zastava,” Narodne novine, 17 Listopad (October) 1895.
20 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 312.
Reaction in Vienna, Budapest, and across Europe was much less subdued. Hungarian reaction was understandable; the demonstration was a clear challenge to their program and an effort to embarrass the Hungarian government during the Imperial visit. Consequently, the Hungarian press was outraged by the insult. But the Hungarians portrayed the demonstration as not simply anti-Hungarian, but also as an insult to the Imperial state in the person of the Emperor. Papers in Vienna adopted a similar attitude, but were much more supportive of the Croatian government view of the incident as an aberration and not reflective of general Croatian sentiment. This was somewhat surprising because, to some extent, the demonstration supported elements within the Imperial government who were concerned that Hungarian efforts at greater political integration of Croatia into Hungary would lead to unrest and destabilize the fragile Hapsburg political structure. By the same token though, any toleration of this type of symbolic defiance, even if it confirmed concerns the government in Vienna might have about Hungarian policy, was dangerous to the regime and could not be taken lightly. The disparate responses between local and outside observers also indicate how different audiences understood Ban Jelačić square. To outside observers, the burning of the Hungarian flag in the city’s main square seemed a much more significant act than it did to the local population in Zagreb.

As a result of the external reaction, the demonstration became front page news in Zagreb as well on the 19th of October, when Narodne novine reported on the local and European press response. Narodne novine then became a major part of the government’s efforts at damage control once it became apparent that ignoring the protest would not be effective. This put the paper in an uncomfortable position because as Croatia’s Službeni list the paper was constrained

21 “Demonstracija,” Narodne novine, 18 Listopad (October) 1895.
22 “Ustavan Kralj,” Narodne novine, 21 Listopad (October) 1895.
24 “Opet Demonstracije,” Narodne novine, 19 Listopad (October) 1895.
in the editorial positions it could take. Any strong expression of opinion which contradicted the government’s positions put the paper’s role as *Službeni list* (and its government subsidy which went along with that status) in jeopardy. Yet, as a commercial enterprise, *Narodne novine* needed to cover stories that were of interest to the public, or lose its readership. As a result of this dilemma *Narodne novine* published nearly daily stories on the political fallout of the demonstration, while as the same time arguing editorially that the event was of limited consequence.

Within a matter of days, the local authorities had identified and arrested 54 university students who had participated in the demonstration.25 This put Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s government in a very inconvenient situation. The local circumstances called for leniency, as the students’ actions were really no more provocative than the general public understanding of the Ban Jelačić statue, and there was no real need to cow the Croatian political establishment which was already essentially compliant in the Hungarian government’s integration project. Ban Khuen-Herdervary had no desire to make political martyrs out of the students, and yet, failure to deal harshly with them might produce the very outcome the students had been striving for; a diminishing of his power and prestige within the Imperial hierarchy and possibly even pressure to remove him from office. The Ban chose the concerns of Budapest and Vienna over the local situation in Zagreb.

A month after the demonstration, the students were put on trial for their actions, charged with having “committed malfeasance disturbing the public peace and order” by shouting “*Abcug Mđari!*” and burning the Hungarian flag.26 Radić was a lead defendant, listed second in the bill

25 Perić, *Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada.* @ 161.
of indictment behind the student who had carried the flag of the Student Legion. Radić stood accused of organizing and leading the demonstrations as well as participating in it. He confessed to many of the details of the allegations, but denied being the ringleader of the plan and burning the flag. Radić also strenuously objected to the phrasing of the charges, complaining that they took his statement “Abcug Mđari!” out of context, because his adjoining statements of “Živo Franz Josip Kralj Hrvatske! (Long live Franz Joseph, King of Croatia!) and Slava Jelačiću! (Glory to Jelačić!)” had not been included, thus leading to a false impression of the purpose of the demonstration. The trial also presented Radić with an opportunity to make a public political declaration, which the court indulged up to a point. The court was not persuaded by Radić’s protestations of innocence and convicted him and almost all of the other students. Radić, as the leader, was given the harshest sentence of 6 months in prison. Most of the students received sentences of 2 to 3 months, but a few of them, including the two sons of one of the leaders of the Stranka prava, received more prison time.

The trial of the students was of particular interest to the population of Zagreb. Narodne novine published extensive daily accounts of the court proceedings and Obzor printed daily transcripts of the trial, a unique treatment of court activity at the time. Within a month of the trial’s conclusion, Obzor, the press of the Narodna straka (National Party) published a detailed

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27 Ibid. (reprint, 1995). @ 13.
28 Ibid. @ 31-32.
29 Ibid. @ 34-35.
30 Ibid. @ 277-285.
31 Ibid. @ 278.
32 The daily issues of Narodne novine following each day of the trial (November 11-16 & 21, 1895) carried an extensive narrative of the events of the trial.
33 Obzor published daily transcripts of the trial, which became the source for the subsequent complete transcript that was published in Zagreb: Hrvatski Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski Izvještaj o Glavnoj Razpravi Protiv Hrvatskim Sveučilišnim Djacima Održanoj Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom u Zagrebu Dne 11 – 16. Studenoga 1895. (Zagreb: Dionička Tiskara u Zagrebu, 1895). @ Title Page.
transcript of the entire trial in Zagreb in book form.\textsuperscript{34} Despite this intense public interest in the trial of the student demonstrators, the Croatian political establishment showed little interest in their fate, and generally expressed no support. This indifference led to a split within the \textit{Stranka prava}, the party most associated with the students before the demonstration, with Dr. Josip Frank, the father of two of the students convicted and sent to prison over the demonstration, establishing a more radical, dissident branch of the party.\textsuperscript{35} This split in the \textit{Stranka prava}, though it did not have much immediate practical significance on Croatian politics, did indicated the beginning of a significant shift towards a much more contentious political environment in Zagreb. This new, confrontational approach espoused by the \textit{Prava strakna prava} (True Party of Right) eventually led to violent nationalist riots in 1902 and 1903.\textsuperscript{36} It was in retrospect then, that this demonstration took on its significance as a watershed moment in Croatian political history, rather than its immediate outcome.

Despite the interest in the outcome of the events of the demonstration of 16 October, 1895, public attitude in Zagreb about the social function of Jelačić square did not change drastically. Clear evidence of this is the fact that the violent riots that swept Zagreb in the summers of 1902 and 1903 ignored the square as a site because the targets of the riots were mainly the city’s small Serb population, and rioters focused on their shops and offices.\textsuperscript{37} Only one group would use the square for overtly political purposes before the end of World War I. This group was clearly associated with the events of the first demonstration in the square in 1895; students and supporters of Radić’s political views. The student association was natural,\textsuperscript{34,35,36,37}

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\textsuperscript{34} Mador, ed., \textit{Hrvatski Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski Izveštaj o Glavnoj Razpravi Protiv Hrvatskim Sveučilišnim Djacima Održanoj Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom u Zagrebu Dne 11 – 16. Studenoga 1895.}. \\
\textsuperscript{35} Branka Magaš, \textit{Croatia through History} (London, San Francisco, Beirut: SAQI, 2007). @ 362. \\
\textsuperscript{36} Glenny, \textit{The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999} @ 263-265. \\
\textsuperscript{37} The 1902 riots had been deliberately instigated by \textit{Ban} Khuen-Herdervary to enable him to dramatically reduce civil government power and enhance his own authority. The riots in 1903 were calculated to embarrass the \textit{Ban} by showing the government in Budapest that his claims to have calmed the situation by direct rule had failed and were intended to lead to his removal from office.
\end{flushright}
but it did not include the square alone, but also the university and was only mobilized once, in
the summer of 1912 when tensions over the first Balkan War inflamed the already tense situation
in Zagreb. The political situation in Hapsburg Empire was already at a high pitch due to very
deep divisions over social, economic, and political reform. Despite the persistently tense
relationship in Zagreb between Croatian and Serb politicians, there was a strong sympathy for
the idea of a Balkan federation which would unite the South Slavic populations once the
Ottoman presence in the region had been expelled. One key incident in the string of public
actions taken during 1912 to pressure the Habsburg government was a middle school student
strike. In Zagreb one group of students assembled in front of the university building and then
marched to Jelačić square to demonstrate thus re-enacting in part the university student protest of 1895.

Stjepan Radić’s relationship to the square was complex. The burning of the Hungarian
flag is now viewed as significant because it launched Radić’s political career. But in his
autobiography, Radić, makes no mention of the specific location of the incident. Instead, he
refers solely to the burning of the flag, and claims he did it “before the eyes of Franz Josef
I…” During the riots of 1902, the incident would be important to saving Radić from an angry
mob when he sought to protect his Serbian neighbor from violence. The mob tuned on Radić as
well until one young man spoke up, saying: “Calm down, this is the Radić who six years ago
burned the Hungarian flag…” This indicates that to Radić, and to the general population as

38 The Hungarian government in Budapest and Ban Khuen-Herdervary had exploited this situation very effectively
39 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 417-418 & photographic in insert between pages 408-409.
41 Stjepan Radić, Politički Spisi Autobiografija/Članci/Govori Rasprave, ed. Dubravko Jelčić, Hrvatska Politička
Misao Xix I Xx Stoljeća (Zagreb: Znanje, 1971). @ 72.
well, it was the act of publicly burning the flag that mattered, and the location was not significant.

Stjepan Radić and the Emergence of a Peasant Based Politics

In the three decades following the demonstration on Ban Jelačić Square, Stjepan Radić would become a pivotal and transformative figure in Croatian politics. Radić was both a clear product of Croatian society and at the same time a rejection of the intensely urban focus of the Croatian elite. He was born in a peasant village, but came to Zagreb to attend Gimnazium (high school) in 1883 at the age of 12. Radić clearly had natural talent in both persuasion and leadership. This is evident from his ability to simultaneously become a protégé of both Ante Starčević and Bishop Strossmayer, the two leading nationalists in Croatia, who were at the time bitter political rivals.

Radić was an intense Croatian patriot, but his vision of Croatia was dramatically at odds with the image of Croatian national identity that dominated at the time. As discussed previously, the Croatian national project was intensely focused in, and on, the urban space of Zagreb. Radić, having grown up a peasant, found this focus misplaced. This is not to say that he completely rejected Zagreb. The city was certainly a critical part of his own awakening sense of national identity. There is no indication that Radić had a particularly strong sense of Croatian identity when he arrived in Zagreb as a young boy to attend school in 1883, but by 1888 he was willing to risk jail to agitate for the Croatian national cause. Attending Gimnazium certainly contributed to this national awakening, but Radić was attending school at precisely the time when Ban Khuen-Herdervary was assuming office, and the Ban’s education policies were not

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42 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ Chapters 3 & 4.
designed to impart a strong sense of Croatian identity. Radić’s arrival in Zagreb also coincided with a period of intense national institutional monument building. The Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, the newly established university in Donji grad, and the Hrvatski Sokol (Croatian Falcon) gymnasium were all intended to transmit a sense of Croatian national achievement and greatness.

Radić was educated from more sources than his coursework, which is evident by his relentless traveling. During his summer breaks from school in Zagreb, Radić would travel the rural regions of Croatia, including Dalmatia, meeting and learning from local people about their conditions and circumstances.43 Through his travels Radić came to understand that rural poverty was not simply a local condition where he grew up, but was endemic throughout the Croatian countryside. He also concluded that the real strength and power of Croatia was not in the metropolis of Zagreb, but in the rural countryside and population, whose customs and traditions provided the means to persevere through this privation. This is where Radić broke with Croatian politics and politicians of the time. Other peasants had risen to public prominence in Croatian society, but all had abandoned the countryside in the process. Radić’s break with one of his mentors, Ante Starčević, who was born a peasant as well, had been specifically over this point. Radić had asked Starčević ‘who will politically educate the peasants?’ To which, Starčević had responded that all the education they needed was in the party newspaper. When Radić responded that this was insufficient because most peasants were illiterate and simply could not read the paper, Starčević had responded “Let the peasants go to the Devil or God, I will not teach them.”44 This attitude fit the political context of Croatia at the time, where peasants had no vote

43 Perić, Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928. @ 32-44.
and, in the view of the Croatian elite in Zagreb, contributed little of value either culturally or economically to the Croatian national project.

Radić clearly disagreed with this attitude, but was faced with two significant challenges. First was the limited franchise in Croatia, which excluded the vast majority of the peasantry though they comprised approximately 80 percent of the population. The second challenge was that even if the peasants could vote, the vast majority of them had no real political or national consciousness. Thus, as Radić had pointed out to Starčević, the common practice of political mobilization in Croatia at the time, through published materials, would have limited effect due to widespread illiteracy among the peasant population. Radić would have to develop a new form of politics to mobilize the peasantry.

But all of this effort would not begin until years after the demonstration in Jelačić square in October 1895. In the wake of his trial, Radić would spend the next 6 months in jail and then begin several years as an expatriate trying to finish his university education, which he finally accomplished in Paris in 1899. He then lived in Prague until the summer of 1900 before returning to Croatia, but not Zagreb. Radić finally returned to Zagreb just in time to be swept up in the anti-Serb riots of September 1902, which resulted in his earning another 4 month prison sentence for redirecting an angry mob form attacking his Serbian neighbor to marching on the main train station to tear down Hungarian language signs there. Despite all these setbacks, Radić was able to begin a successful political career after Ban Khuen-Herdervary left Zagreb to become President of the Government (Prime Minister) of Hungary in 1903. Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s departure resulted in a significant opening up of the political process in Croatia with new parties and coalitions developing. By the end of 1904 Radić was able to found an open

45 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ 65.
46 Ibid. @ 59.
political party, the Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka (Croatian People’s Peasant Party) and become an active member of the political process.\textsuperscript{47} By 1908 the HPSS was able to win seats and was present in the Sabor after every election leading up to World War I.\textsuperscript{48} Even though the number of HPSS seats was small, their presence at all was significant given that peasants still could not vote. Therefore, these victories represented members of the elite which Radić, with the help of his older brother Antun, who ran the party newspaper, had persuaded to support their populist cause.\textsuperscript{49}

It was during this decade before the First World War that Radić and the other leaders of the new party, especially his brother Antun, developed the bulk of the Peasantist program. This program was focused on social and economic issues in the countryside, but embedded in the fundamental justification of this program was an implicit critique of the overall trajectory of the Croatian national project. Radić’s views on nationalism can be divided into two broad areas; Croatia’s place in the community of nations, and the nature of Croatia as a nation. In both of these areas Radić’s views were distinctly at odds with the Croatian national elite of the time.

Radić’s view of Croatia within the community of nations was drawn from the views of both of his mentors as a young man, Ante Starčević and Bishop Strossmayer, which were diametrically opposed to each other. Starčević had argued strongly for the historic right of Croatia to separate statehood. Conversely, Bishop Strossmayer had been an advocate of the concept of Yugoslavianism, which called for a broader, South Slavic state in which Croatia would play a key role. Within the Croatian elite, Yugoslavianism was justified under a principle termed narodno jedinstvo (national unity), which was generally agreed to mean that the Slavs of

\textsuperscript{47} Perić, Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928. @ 200.
\textsuperscript{48} Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ table 4.1, page 95.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. @ 14.
Croatia and Serbia were all part of the same larger Narod (nation or people), but had become culturally differentiated through their more recent political histories. Radić’s approach to the issue was to make both arguments simultaneously. He accepted the concept of narodno jedinstvo. But he also argued that this situation did not call for a unitary South Slavic state, but the exact opposite. Radić argued that the recent historical experiences had created a separate živo pravo (living law) for the Croats and the Serbs. Radić argued that Croats, having lived within the Hapsburg Empire had developed a European political culture, which differed significantly from the Serbs, who had been under Ottoman rule for 500 years, then achieved their independence through armed rebellion and created their own political institutions. To Radić, these differences were irreconcilable, and as a result, though Serbs and Croats were one nation, they would require two state structures to accommodate this fundamental difference in political culture between them. This did not preclude a Yugoslav state in Radić’s view, but rather required that any Yugoslav state recognize and accommodate these fundamental differences. But Radić was very skeptical that such a Yugoslav state could be organized, and therefore supported Croatia’s continued association with Austria-Hungary, though under a completely reorganized structure where Croatia would become one of five equal state members within a federal structure based on democratic governing principles.

Radić’s views on Croatia as a nation were more central to the Peasantist program. Though Peasantism clearly had a social justice foundation in the desire to improve the social and economic condition of the peasants of Croatia, that social justice goal was in pursuit of a

50 Ibid. @ 91-99.
51 Stjepan Radić made this point very directly in a short book, Živo Hrvatsko Pravo na Bosni i Herzegovinu, arguing for the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia when the Hapsburg Empire annexed the territory from the Ottoman Empire in 1908. Radić argued that the Slavs of Bosnia were politically Croatian in character rather than Serbian because they had lived under Austro-Hungarian civil administration for 30 years. Stjepan Radić, Živo Hrvatsko Pravo Na Bosni I Herzegovinu (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1908; reprint, 1993).
52 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ 102.
53 Ibid. @ 106.
nationalist one. This fact was a reflection of how Radić came to politics as a student in Zagreb, inspired by nationalist fervor and anger over the failure of Croatia’s political elite to effectively defend the national project from Hungarian efforts to constrain it. Peasantism emerged therefore as a solution not just to the poverty of the countryside, but as a solution to the weakness of the Croatian national political establishment as well. As Radić stated in an early essay, “Our present-day misfortune is truly a national misfortune.”

The first challenge for Stjepan Radić was arguing for the existence of a relationship between the peasantry and the national project in Croatia. It would be hard to overstate the extent to which Croatian society of the pre-World War I period was bifurcated between the rural and urban. As Radić himself stated: “In Croatia even a foreigner notices at first glance that there are two peoples here: the gentlemen and the common people.” By gentlemen, Radić was not referring to a status of birth, but rather “Everyone who wears a black coat…” or essentially, the educated urban population of Croatia. The key to becoming a ‘gentleman’ in Croatia at the time was education. Men of peasant birth, such as Ante Starčević, could rise to the highest levels of Croatian society if they could become educated and find a place for themselves within the urban economy, the imperial bureaucracy, or the artists and wordsmiths of Croatia, especially in Zagreb.

Urban centers in Croatia, Zagreb in particular, were experiencing a period of significant growth and expansion, along with the integration of new technologies, which created the sense of an ever improving standard of living. In contrast, the effects of economic and social modernization were causing intense hardship in the countryside. This economic hardship was

55 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ 62.
56 Ibid.
evidenced in the large numbers of Croatian young men who left the countryside looking for work. The low level of industrialization within Croatia limited the jobs available within Croatian towns and cities, so many of these men were forced to travel all the way to the United States to find urban employment. Between 1880 and 1914, an estimated 400,000 Croats emigrated to the United States.\textsuperscript{57} This number is somewhat staggering given the total population of Croatia at the time was approximately two to two and a half million.\textsuperscript{58} The vast majority of these emigrants were young men, and over half may have returned to Croatia eventually, but the impact was still significant in the countryside.\textsuperscript{59} The result was general insulation of Croatian urban society from the economic hardship in the countryside. Radić, though, was deeply aware of the economic circumstances in the countryside which were driving emigration, having both seen it personally in his traveling as a student, and having written his doctoral dissertation in Paris on the phenomenon of Slavic emigration to North and South America.\textsuperscript{60}

By 1895 Zagreb was seen by the Croatian elite as “the heart of our nation” and “the origin of all of our national and cultural efforts.”\textsuperscript{61} The Peasantists rejected this view and argued the exact opposite. To the Peasantists, it was the peasantry who were “the only true representatives of Croatdom”\textsuperscript{62} and the true bearers of Croatian national culture.\textsuperscript{63} This culture was embodied in a “village society” which bound all the people of the countryside, regardless of


\textsuperscript{61} "Zivio Kralj!," \textit{Narodne Novine}, 12 listopad (October) 1895.

their actual economic status, into a single peasant community. The Peasantists based their argument on the very simple reality of numbers. The peasantry was over 80 percent of the population of Croatia. It was impossible to have a true national project that failed to recognize the culture of the vast majority of the population. Radić went so far as to argue that because of this disparity, “we Croats still are not a real nation.”

But Radić’s Peasantist program was not a class war against the “gentlemen” of Croatia. In the Peasantist view, the Croatian nation would not be fully realized until the gulf between the urban “gentlemen” and the peasantry had been bridged, and the two groups merged, or as his brother Antun stated: “that from the gentlemen and the peasants we finally form a nation.” To accomplish this did not mean tearing down the urban class of “gentlemen,” but socially raising up the peasantry and transforming the countryside into an area as economically viable as Croatia’s urban centers. Radić blamed the current situation not on the urban elite, but rather on capitalism, and a specific segment of the urban elite, the Jewish population. This approach allowed Radić to absolve the vast majority of Croatia’s urban population of responsibility for the economic and social conditions of the time. This allowed for an ideology that called for

64 Ibid. @ 65.
65 Ibid. @ 64.
68 The Peasantist concept of “capitalism” was much different from the Marxist interpretation. The Peasantist movement viewed “capitalism” in a purely financial sense, as focused on the accumulation of money. The Peasantists did not oppose private property. Private ownership of land was central to their concept of raising the social status of the peasantry through land reform that would make each peasant the owner of sufficient land to be economically self sufficient. Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ 76.
69 The Jewish population of Croatia was highly urbanized by the time the Peasantist moment came into being. By 1910 Jews were the largest non-Catholic minority in Zagreb, outnumbering even the Eastern Orthodox Serbs. Both Antun and Stjepan Radić used the relatively high level of the Jewish populations’ participation in the financial sector of the Croatian economy as reason to blame them for many of the ill effects of economic modernization in the countryside. Ibid. 76-77.
embracing the elite, without compromising with those he viewed as responsible for the current conditions.

In making this argument for unity with the urban population the Radić brothers faced some resistance from many of the members of their own party who, understandably, resented the contempt for the peasantry the “gentlemen” of Croatia publicly expressed. One incident in particular illustrated this tension. In 1909 an HPSS delegate proposed that Zagreb should not be used as a venue for the party’s congress in the future because of the disrespect the urban population had had shown the Peasantist delegates. Stjepan Radić acknowledged the legitimacy of the delegate’s complaint, but rejected the call to abandon the city.70

Ultimately then, the Peasantist approach was one which sought to preserve the countryside and “village society,” but not in a reactionary sense. There was no desire to see a return to the feudal structures that had existed previously, but preservation in the sense of protection from further harm. In fact, some of the Peasantists’ goals, such as the extension of the franchise to the entire population, were considered very radical within the Empire. The leaders of Croatian Peasantism did not make this argument on the basis of social justice, but on the basis of national necessity. Without action, they argued, the economic privation in the countryside risked damaging the true foundation of Croatian national culture, the peasantry and their way of life.

The Great War and the End of an Empire: 1914 to 1918

Despite the conflagration that engulfed Europe in the late summer of 1914, the period of the First World War was locally very peaceful in Zagreb. Unlike the pro-Serbian agitation that had existed in 1912, prior to and during the First Balkan War, there was little reaction in Zagreb

70 Ibid. @ 67.
to the events of the late summer of 1914. The Croatian population accepted the Hapsburg
government’s argument that this war was forced on the Empire by Serbia’s support for the
assassination of the heir to the Imperial throne in Sarajevo by the Serbian nationalist group the
Black Hand. Radić himself argued in the HPSS newspaper Dom “that Serbia, Russia, and France
had provoked the war and that the monarchy could not lose, for its peoples were united behind
the war cause.”71 Those prominent Croatians who disagreed with Croatian support for the war
effort left almost immediately after war was declared.72 In general the Croatian population
supported willingly, and in some cases enthusiastically, the war effort, and Croatian units fought
as reliably as any other soldiers in the Imperial Army, and often with distinction.73 As the war
dragged on some students did stage demonstrations, but these were small and scattered around
the city, and none produced significant or mass support for an anti-war moment.74

By 1917, though, some Croatian politicians, including Stjepan Radić, had abandoned
support for Imperial victory, and were calling for an armistice to end the war, which appeared to
promise only endless stalemate.75 In mid September of 1918 the political situation in the
Hapsburg Empire entered a period of crisis. On the 14th of September the Imperial government
had offered an armistice to end the fighting.76 One week later Allied forces, mostly Serbian and
French, attacked north out of Salonika (Thessaloniki) in Greece and the Empire’s Bulgarian

71 Ibid. @ 123.
73 The enthusiasm of the Croatian population in their support for the Empire was a focus of the famous Croatian
author Miroslav Krleža in his novel Hrvti Bog Mars (The Croatian God Mars) and many of his short stories and
plays written after 1914. Ralph Bogert, The Writer as Naysayer: Miroslav Krleža and the Aesthetic of Interwar
Reprinted in Hrvoje Matković, ed., Studije Novije Hrvatske Povijesti (Zagreb: Golden marketing - Tehnička knjiga,
2004).
75 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ 125-126.
76 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984). @ 127.
allies defenses’ on the southern front failed to contain them. As the negotiations dragged on through the next few weeks the local governments within the Empire began staking out their positions for the post war period. In the first week of October the politicians in Zagreb came to agreement on the formation of a *Narodno vijeće* (National Council) government, and a special session of representatives of the various parties was called to convene in the *Sabor* in Zagreb from the 17th to the 19th of October, to formalize the formation of the new government. On the 19th of October, the final day of the meeting, this *Sabor* declared the formation of a *Narodno vijeće* for the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. This action was a response to the United States’ President Woodrow Wilson’s publicly espoused principles for ending the war, which included the principle of National Self-determination as a key element of a post war international order in Europe. Under such a settlement as President Wilson was proposing the Slavs of the Hapsburg Empire would have, at the least, significant self government, if not outright independence. A vigorous Yugoslav effort had been underway since early in the war, and the Allies had already committed to some form of Yugoslav state after the fighting ended. The political leadership in Zagreb was not party to these efforts, being part of the Central Powers. Therefore, the effort to establish a new political reality in the form of their own *Narodno vijeće* was an effort by the government in Zagreb to have some meaningful input on the future political structure before the fighting ended.

The creation of the *Narodno vijeće* was not a declaration of independence from the Empire, or even a commitment to seek independence. The *Narodno vijeće* was a declaration of

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79 Ibid. @ 76-77.
sovereignty, with Zagreb asserting the right to speak for all the Slavs of the southern part of the Empire. By declaring the political community of the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs the Sabor was speaking for peoples without reference to precise territory, which was an important vagueness, as Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, had consented to participate, and with it the “German” portions of the old Triune Kingdom.\(^\text{82}\) The new Narodno vijeće was also recognition of the reality that the process of governance within the Empire was failing, and that local governments were going to have to assume responsibility for their own day to day governance.\(^\text{83}\) The new Narodno vijeće changed little in the daily life of the population though.

Given the somewhat modest degree of actual impact the declaration of the Narodno vijeće government made in the daily lives of the people of Zagreb, the population’s response was still dramatically supportive. As word spread the on the 21\(^\text{st}\) of the Sabor’s actions people gathered in St. Mark’s Square outside the Sabor to show support for their decision. By evening approximately 20,000 people had gathered, packing the square and the streets approaching it. The crowed expressed their support for the Sabor’s actions by singing patriotic Croatian songs.\(^\text{84}\) This expression of national sentiment was not limited to the crowd on the square. At the café Corso, the Croatian patrons confronted a group of ‘German’ officers who refused to stand when the crowd began singing the unofficial Croatian national anthem.\(^\text{85}\)

Spurred on by events in Prague, where the Czechs had declared independence the previous day, the Sabor declared formal independence on the 29\(^\text{th}\) of October, 1918.\(^\text{86}\) Once again, a huge crowd formed on St. Mark’s Square, but this gathering was not as spontaneous as

\(^{82}\) Ibid. @ 127.
\(^{83}\) Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 488.
\(^{84}\) "Manifestacije u Zagrebu," Obzor, 22 Listopad (October) 1918, "Zagreb, 21 Listopad," Obzor, 22 Listopad (October) 1918.
\(^{85}\) "Upadica u Kavani "Corso"," Obzor, 22 Listopada (October) 1918.
\(^{86}\) Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 493.
the gathering on the 21st. The Sabor’s intentions to declare independence were reported by the Zagreb press the day prior.87 This declaration of intent was an extremely practical matter because there were a significant number of important issues that needed to be settled, such as the loyalty of the Hapsburg Army regiments stationed in the city, to ensure that the formal declaration of independence did not spark uncertainty or violence.

The Proclamation of Liberation 29 October 1918 in Zagreb

The Narodno vijeće’s efforts for a peaceful transition were generally successful in Zagreb, but the uncertainty about the future and meaning of current events produced widespread unrest in much of Slavonia and the Italian Navy began seizing coastal towns and raising the Italian flag to lay claim to the territory. And despite the implications of the declaration of

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87 “Na Put k Slobodi,” Obzor, 29 Listopad (October) 1918.
88 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ Photographic insert between pages 456-457.
statehood, the *Narodno vijeće* government in Zagreb was already in negotiations with the Serbian government in exile about unification and the formation of a Yugoslav state of some kind. The delayed formal announcement of independence was barely in time to be meaningful, as the Hapsburg Empire collapse the next day, with Hungary engulfed in revolution.\(^89\)

In contrast to the strong support the urban population showed for the new government in Zagreb, peasants in the countryside demonstrated and in some cases rioted against local officials in communities throughout Zagorije, north of Zagreb, and Slavonia to the east. These acts were not support for the new “revolutionary” national government, but were against the fact that the change in government had in fact resulted in no change in local policies. The *Narodno vijeće’s* decision to continue the administrative practices of the old Imperial order temporarily until the political situation stabilized caused significant disappointment in peasant communities.\(^90\) By mid November the countryside was roiling, with provincial officials reporting that peasants “refuse to till their fields, because they are saying ‘we have enough for ourselves, let the gentlemen die.’”\(^91\) Despite these disturbances and specific requests for troops to help keep order, the *Narodno vijeće* keep their soldiers in their barracks and waited for the arrival of Serbian army units moving north through Belgrade and into Croatia to restore order if necessary.

Political tensions rose in Zagreb as well in November as negotiations over the unification of the new Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs continued with the Royal government of Serbia (which had only been able to return itself from exile in early November). The declaration of independence from Austro-Hungary had created political chaos in Zagreb as all the political parties in Croatia had spent decades developing programs and platforms for Croatia as part of the

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\(^89\) “Prevrat u Beču,” *Obzor*, 31 Listopad (October) 1918. & "Rivolucija u Budimpešti," *Obzor*, 31 Listopad (October) 1918.


\(^91\) Mark Biondich, "The Politics of Peasantism: Stjepan Radić, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Intelligentsia, 1904-1928" (University of Toronto, 1997). @ 232.
Empire. Independence had made almost every party’s political program obsolete overnight.

Stjepan Radić came out against a quick unification, and called for Croatia to be organized as a sovereign republic. This attitude was at odds with most of the political class in Zagreb, who were willing for, and some even hopeful of, some form of unification provided the terms were reasonable. Radić’s stand on unification also fueled suspicions that he was somehow involved in fomenting the peasant unrest. On 20 November a large group of supporters of unification with Serbia and Montenegro demonstrated at Radić’s book store just off of Jelačić square while another group demonstrated in front of the Sabor on St. Mark’s Square demanding Radić’s arrest. Radić’s objections to the incorporation of Croatia into Yugoslavia were technical though, rather than ideological at this point. The rush to unification and the unclear nature of the state structure that would emerge from the unification project were, in his view, a flawed process which would eventually lead to a fatally flawed state. He argued that Croatia should not join Yugoslavia without a clear agreement on basic issues before hand, including recognition of some form of Croatian state autonomy within the new ‘Yugoslav’ Kingdom.

By the end of November, the negotiations between the Narodno vijeće in Zagreb and the Serbian royal government reached a level of resolution to allow for the declaration of a new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on the 1st of December, 1918. In contrast to the previous declarations of sovereignty on the 21th of October and independence on the 29th, there were no mass gatherings to celebrate the announcement. In practical matters the declaration in fact changed nothing locally; the Narodno vijeće in Zagreb continued to govern. Daily life did
not change at all. The announcement of the new state did resolve the political uncertainty about the future, but it would be weeks, if not months, before the two states would be unified in practical ways.

**Jelačić Square as a Political Space in a Time of Crisis**

Jelačić square had evolved into a potent political space rife with nationalist meanings since the construction of the Ban Jelačić statue. At the end of World War I the first overt use of the square for political purposes occurred on October 22, 1918 and involved Stjepan Radić. Despite the fact that it was a Tuesday, a normal work day, the population of Zagreb treated it as a holiday in the wake of the announcement of the new *Narodno vijeće* government, with many people not going to work or opening their offices and shops. Approximately 30,000 people gathered in Jelačić square, where several politicians addressed the crowd, including Radić. The gathering on the square was not the actual venue for the demonstration, but a staging area. Once the leaders had spoken, the crowd marched to St. Mark’s Square carrying the flags of various South Slavic nations to show support for the new *Narodno vijeće* government and the Yugoslav project.97

On the 24th and 25th of November, the *HSS* held a large meeting in Zagreb to deal with the pressing issues confronting the party. At the meeting, Radić came out strongly against quick unification with Serbia and for the formation of a Croatian republic which could then later be integrated into some form of Yugoslav federation. At the conclusion of the meeting, Radić led the 2,300 attendees in the singing of the national anthem, then Radić led a peaceful demonstration which consisted of marching from the meeting hall to Jelačić square shouting various slogans such as “long live the Yugoslav republic”, “long live out brother Serbs” and

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97 Horvat, *Politička Povijest Hrvatska* 2. @ 79.
similar calls of long life to the other Slavs of the former Hapsburg Empire. Once on the square, the party leaders stood in front of Jelačić’s monument, where Radić and another leader gave brief speeches then led the party members in singing patriotic songs. The march and the gathering at the Jelačić monument were essentially a re-enactment of the events of 23 years earlier when Radić had led the university students to the same spot to challenge Hungarian dominance in Croatian politics. That event was seen as the beginning of Radić’s political career. This new gathering in front of the Jelačić monument was a symbolic re-launching of Radić’s career in a new political era which was devoid of the question of the relationship with Hungary.

The final political use of the square occurred a week and a half later. On December 3rd and 4th pro-unification activists staged small demonstrations around Zagreb to show support for the new Yugoslav state. These demonstrations provoked the only incident of direct combat in Zagreb during the entire period of World War I and its immediate aftermath. On the afternoon of the 5th of December, soldiers from the former Hapsburg 25th and 53rd infantry regiments, which were now in the service of the Narodno vijeće government, marched out of their barracks in the western part of the city in uniform and under arms, including several heavy, crew served machine guns. As the soldiers moved east, into the center of the city, they were confronted by a group of “armed sailors” (possibly from a group of sailors who had arrived in Zagreb on the 3rd of December with a “Yugoslav” Admiral). The first confrontation took place at the intersection of Frankopan Street and Ilica, where the sailors attempted to block the soldiers from advancing further into the city. After the soldiers fired into the air, the sailors withdrew and the

98 “Glavna Skupština Seljačke Stranke,” Obzor, 26 Studena (November) 1918.
99 Perić, Zagreb Od 1850. Do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 204.
100 “Krvavi Dan u Zagrebu,” Obzor, 6 Prosinaca (December) 1918.
soldiers continued marching into the heart of the city. At this point, the soldiers had the option of moving north along Mesnička, which would have taken them directly to St. Marks Square and the seat of the Narodno vijeće government, or continuing down Ilica, which would take them to Jelačić square. The soldiers took the second option, arriving at Jelačić square shortly there after. Because of the time of day, the market had already closed and the square was open for them to gather, though there were still many people there at the tram stop and at the several cafés located on the edge of the square. Before the soldiers arrived at the square though, the group of “armed sailors” had occupied two of the buildings on the square. How gunfire erupted is not clear, but a gun battle ensued, resulting in 13 dead and 17 wounded among the Croatian soldiers and civilians, and the rest of the soldiers dispersed. At first the events were reported as a “Bolshevik uprising” but that claim quickly collapsed as more information was discovered. The more information that developed though, the less clear the actual cause of the events became. The only clear consequences of these events were the disbanding of the former Hapsburg regiments in service of the Narodno vijeće government and an increase of support for Radić and his idea of a sovereign Croatian republic.

Each of these three events on the square during the politically charged period at the end of World War I showed how it was transforming into not just a national space, but a political space as well. Though Radić himself had essentially opened the square up as a political space

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102 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska 2. @ 138.
103 Ibid.
104 There are many dramatically conflicting versions of the events on the square. Given the degree to which the government was censoring publications, and the degree to which this even in particular took on important political overtones, it would be very problematic to privilege any of the various accounts of the events and claim with any certainty how the actual events transpired.
105 “Krvavi Dan u Zagrebu.”
106 Ibid.
107 “Izgredi o Četvrtni,” Obzor, 8. Prosnica (December) 1918.
108 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska 2. @ 138.
109 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 508.
with the burning of the Hungarian flag, it was only mobilized once between 1895 and 1918. Yet in the 6 weeks between the end of October and the beginning of December, 1918, the square was used three times for political mobilization. Of the three efforts to mobilize it, two were directly connected with Radić as well. The first efforts seems to have been based on the potential for the square as a political space, but due more to its centrality to daily life in the city. The march on October 22\textsuperscript{nd} appears to have been organized very hastily, and in such a situation setting Jelačić square as the gathering point would help ensure the largest possible crowd for the subsequent march to St. Mark’s Square.

In contrast to the first effort, the second mobilization, the march to the square of the \textit{HSS} delegates, led by Radić personally at the conclusion of the party congress, was a planned piece of political theater. It carried many symbolic messages. By, in essence, reenacting the events of 1895, Radić was reminding the population of Zagreb that he had risen to prominence as a young nationalist leader, not a Peasantist. The changes to the previous demonstration on the square were also significant. By leading \textit{HSS} delegates in the singing of nationalist songs in front of the \textit{Ban Jelačić} monument, Radić informed the “gentlemen” that the Peasantist delegates were Croats first and Peasantists second.

The event also struck at a fundamental inconsistency of the urban-centric nationalism of the Zagreb elite. From the time of the \textit{Ban Jelačić} monument’s instillation in the square, folk performance groups in traditional peasant dress had sung in front of the statue at their periodic \textit{smotra} (exhibitions) of folk culture. These performances had always been seen as expressions of patriotic fervor. The Peasantists delegates’ performance implicitly asked how people dressed as peasants singing peasant songs could be part of national culture and inspire patriotism, yet, real peasants were not thought of as part of the nation. But the event was also targeted to some extent
at the HSS delegates, many of whom had spent little, if any time in Zagreb. The performance in Jelačić square introduced these delegates to the nationalist habitus of the city. This was then an effort by Radić to bridge, though practice in space, the urban-rural divide in Croatian society, even if in a minor way.

The final effort to mobilize the square, the march of the Narodno vijeće soldiers on December 5th, is the most curious. It has never been clearly established what the goals of the Narodno vijeće soldiers were. The leaders were later charged and convicted of planning a coup against the Narodno vijeće, yet if that was their intent, then the decision to go the square would seem to be based on something other than the logic of such an effort. It is clear that the decision to gather in the square was meant as a political statement. This would indicate that the choice of the square demonstrated a sympathy for Radić’s ideas, as he was the most significant political figure most directly associated with the square and had just re-established that association less than two weeks earlier. It is also significant that even if the soldiers had been intent on staging a coup against the Narodno vijeće government they chose to go through Jelačić square first. The square was not on any direct rout between the soldiers’ barracks and St. Mark’s Square where the government was located. This indicates that the square had become a politically significant space that needed to be engaged for this political action to be successful.

Croatia in Yugoslavia

With the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Zagreb entered a new, and uncertain, set of political and economic relationships. Politically, the new state was already organizing on a centralized structure around the Royal government in Belgrade. As a result, Croatia lost many of the political privileges of self government that it had, at least

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110 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska 2. @ 138.
formally, possessed in the Hapsburg Empire. The much broader franchise in the new Kingdom also put many of the Croatian political parties at a disadvantage, because they had little organization or experience in political organization or communication with the general public outside Croatia’s cities and towns. This shifted a significant amount of political power out of the urban centers and into the countryside. The result was a dramatic increase in political power for Radić’s HSS\textsuperscript{111} with the party wining 50 of the 93 seats for the constitutional assembly allocated to Croatian areas of the new Kingdom in the 1920 elections.\textsuperscript{112} The wake of the election victory, Radić formally changed the name of the party from the HPSS (\textit{Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka}/Croatian People’s Peasant Party) to the HRSS (\textit{Hrvatska republika seljačka stranka}/Croatian Republic Peasant Party) in December of 1920.\textsuperscript{113} It did not pass unnoticed that the new name of the part, the HRSS, included the letter R, which many saw as not just a reference to Radić’s idea of republic, but to his own name as well, which brought the name of the party closer to the popular reference of the \textit{HSS} as “the party of Radić.”\textsuperscript{114}

Radić’s new political success was initially limited mostly to the countryside. The \textit{HSS} received just under 7 percent of the vote in Zagreb.\textsuperscript{115} Radić’s initial resistance to unification clearly cost the party many votes in Zagreb in 1920, even though the idea of a Croatian republic within a larger Yugoslav state was not a total rejection of unification. The Croatian urban elite were very ambivalent about the Yugoslav project. Croatian national thinkers going all the way back to Ljudevit Gaj had been pan-Slavic in their outlook. As discussed previously, the Croatian urban elite in Zagreb was therefore both intensely patriotic for Croatia, and simultaneously very

\textsuperscript{111} For simplicity most scholars simply refer to the party as the \textit{HSS} during the Yugoslav period to avoid confusion.
\textsuperscript{112} Horvat, \textit{Politika Povijest Hrvatska} 2. @ 196.
\textsuperscript{113} Perić, \textit{Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928.} @ 327.
\textsuperscript{114} This tendency to personalize political parties was evident in Croatia long before Radić founded the HSS. The \textit{Stranka prava} (Party of Right) was often referred to as “the party of Starčević.” Banac, \textit{The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics}. @ 230.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. @ 227.
pro-Yugoslav. In contrast to the urban population, many of Radić’s peasant followers viewed support for Yugoslavia as a rejection of Croatia. One leader of the HSS lamented in 1920 “After the revolution [prevrata, 1 December 1918] everyone in the city of Zagreb became a Yugoslav. The peasant world has remained Croat. The Croats have become for our gentlemen a tribe.”

The political growth of the HSS was nearly destroyed before it really started. In 1920, a peasant revolt swept the Croatian countryside because of a disastrous miscommunication between the central government in Belgrade and the rural population of Croatia over the registration of draft animals for potential military service. Many HSS party members were implicated in attempting to organize local spontaneous uprisings into a formal armed rebellion. Radić avoided being tied to the revolt because he had already been jailed for “anti-unification” statements before the uprisings began. The uprising sowed deep doubts within the governing elite in Belgrade, the capital of the new Kingdom, as to the trustworthiness of not only the HSS and the Croatian peasantry, but of the Croatian political elite in general who some believed had “behaved disloyally during the crisis.”

This distrust was reciprocated by the Croatian elite towards the government in Belgrade because of the Kingdom’s response to Italian claims to Istria and the Dalmatian coast. Italy had been promised all of Istria and most of Dalmatia by Britain and France in 1915 to enter the First World War on their side. At the end of the war, Italy had occupied much of the territory they had been promised, and the city of Rijeka (Fiume), the terminus for Croatia’s rail network with the Adriatic Sea. Over the next two years, Italy and the new Kingdom negotiated off and on

118 Perić, Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928. @ 302-319.
119 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. @ 393.
120 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 469.
to resolve the dispute, but the advantage was distinctly with the Italians, as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes simply did not have the military capacity to use force to eject the Italian troops.\footnote{Magaš, \textit{Croatia through History}. @ 500-506.} The new government in Belgrade finally surrendered all of Istria, several Dalmatian islands, and the city of Zadar to Italy in December of 1920, but in exchange Rijeka, would become an independent international city.\footnote{Goldstein, \textit{Hrvatska Povijest}. @ 236.}

Though this resolution appeared to be a compromise which restored most of Dalmatia and half the Dalmatian Islands to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the loss of sovereignty over Rijeka held real economic peril for Croatia, and Zagreb in particular. Rijeka was Zagreb’s only direct outlet to the Mediterranean, and thus represented the capability to export directly to any country with a harbor. The loss of Rijeka meant that any exports from Zagreb to Central or Western Europe or the Americas would have to go through Austrian, Hungarian, or Italian territory, with each nation capable of putting tariffs on the goods and putting them at a distinct price disadvantage on the international market. Croats feared this would dramatically slow industrial development.\footnote{Glenny, \textit{The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999}. @ 371.} In practical terms the compromise was not as great as it seemed. The Italian nationalist Gabriele D’Annunzio had seized the government of Rijeka by force in September of 1919, declaring Rijeka a free city state and establishing himself as dictator.\footnote{Ibid. @ 173-177.} As part of the agreement, Italy removed D’Annunzio’s government and replaced it with a regime less flamboyant, but even more compliant to Rome, so that Rijeka was technically independent, but for all practical purposes existed under Italian sovereignty.\footnote{Ibid. @ 177.}
Map of the Treaty of London and Final Resolution of Dalmatian Territorial Boundaries

The process of writing a constitution for the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes began in the immediate wake of the resolution of the confrontation with Italy. In fact, the Constituent Assembly held its first meeting on the 12th of December, shortly after the

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Kingdom announced the agreement with Italy.131 Between December of 1920 and June of 1921 the elected delegates worked to produce a draft constitution. But the process proved very divisive, as a slim majority of the 419 delegates put together a document that established a highly centralized state structure, with very little power or authority vested in the lower levels of government.132 Radić’s response to the direction the constitutional assembly was taking was to first draft a memorandum to the Alexander, the Prince-Regent, in February demanding concessions towards a decentralized state, and, when that failed to produce any reaction, to draft his own Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic, which he proposed would apply only to the former Hapsburg territories of Croatia and Slavonia.133 By 12 May, all the main Croatian political parties had walked out of the Assembly.134

Despite the absence of 99 delegates, the Assembly approved the centralist outline of the constitution the same day that the last of the Croatian parties walked out.135 By early June more delegates had walked out for various ideological reasons as individual articles were submitted to a vote. By the time the final vote on the completed draft of the constitution was taken 161 delegates were no longer participating in the Assembly.136 The final vote was scheduled for the 28th of June, Vidovdan (St. Vidus Day) a day a specific significance to the Serbian population. Vidovdan was the anniversary of the battle in 1389 which had crippled the medieval Serbian Kingdom. In case there was any confusion about the symbolism of the passage of the new constitution on Vidovdan, the official paper of the Narodna radikalna stranka (National Radical Party) or NRS which was a new incarnation of the older Serbian Radikalna stranka, and one of

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131 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. @ 394.
132 Ibid. @ 395-399.
133 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ 173-175.
134 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. @ 399-400.
135 Ibid. @ 400.
136 Ibid. @ 403.
the main forces behind the centralist effort stated it clearly in an editorial: the events of St Vidus Day 1921 had “restored an empire to us.”

The loss of Rijeka in the territorial dispute with Italy and the Vidovdan constitution seemed to many in Croatia to validate Radić’s skepticism about quick unification. This, combined with Radić’s leadership in advocating for the defense of Croatian interests drew more support for the party from the urban population as well. As a consequence the HSS continued to improve its electoral strength, though many of the party’s new supporters voted out of nationalist sentiment, rather than a belief in Peasantism. As a result of the parliamentary elections of 1923, Radić’s party was not just the largest party in Croatia, but the second largest party in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as a whole. The HSS repeated its strong performance again in the elections of 1925, despite the fact that Radić and most of the leadership of the party were in jail for the party’s decision to join the Krestintern (Peasant International), a Peasantist organization analogous to the Comintern (Communist International), and also based in the Soviet Union. The party’s continued electoral strength persuaded the government in Belgrade to abandon their efforts to suppress the party, and later that same year the HSS became a key partner in a government with the NRS that included 4 HSS members as cabinet ministers, and eventually Radić himself joined the cabinet. The Radical Coalition government ended 1927, and Yugoslav politics became even more dysfunctional. At the end of 1927, the HSS formed a coalition with the Independent Democratic Party (Samostalna demokratska stranka, SDS). This new coalition, the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (Seljačko-demokratska koalija, SDS).
or SDK) was significant because the SDS was predominantly a Serbian party from the former Hapsburg portions of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.\textsuperscript{144} This meant that the HSS efforts to resist the strong central government model of the Vidovdan constitution could no longer be attributed to just the Croats, but was now an ideological divide of federalism versus centralism which crossed national lines.\textsuperscript{145} This new ideological divide had a distinct geographic and historical element as well, as the SDS was based in areas formerly under Hapsburg authority. The new coalition also gave Radić, as the leader of the new SDK, the opportunity to aggressively seek votes in predominantly Serbian districts because the new coalition was no longer an expressly Croatian party. The formation of the SDK had the potential to fundamentally change the political dynamic. In February of 1928, King Alexander offered Radić the opportunity to form a government, which would have made Radić the Prime Minister, but negotiations between the various parties failed.\textsuperscript{146}

In June, 1928 a Radical Party deputy shot five HSS deputies on the floor of the parliament in Belgrade, killing two and wounding three, including Stjepan Radić.\textsuperscript{147} News of the attack sparked violent riots in Zagreb.\textsuperscript{148} When Radić arrived in Zagreb after his release from a Belgrade hospital he was greeted as a national hero. In the wake of the assassination attempt, however, Radić never recovered from his wounds and died in Zagreb on the 8\textsuperscript{th} of August, 1928.\textsuperscript{149}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Magaš, \textit{Croatia through History}. @ 520.
\item Ibid.
\item Biondich, \textit{Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928}. @ 233
\item Perić, \textit{Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928}. @ 441.
\item Goldstein, \textit{Hrvatska Povijest}. @ 249.
\item Perić, \textit{Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928}. @ 451.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The Magnificent Celebration for S. Radić and his Comrades in Zagreb

Radić was buried in Mirogoj cemetery after a funeral procession in which approximately 60,000 people participated while another 150,000 lined the streets of Zagreb from the “Peasant House”

154 „Veličanstveni Sprovod Stjepana Radića," Svijet, 18 Kolovoz (August) 1928. @ 166.
where his body had laid in state to the cemetery, which included a passage along both the south and north side of Jelačić square.\textsuperscript{155}

Radić’s death did not end his impact on Yugoslav politics. On the 1\textsuperscript{st} of December, 1928, the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom, Croatian students staged a demonstration at the ceremonies to celebrate the event in Zagreb. The students used three black flags, a traditional act of mourning, with each representing a separate event. The first was for the founding of the state which the events were meant to celebrate, the second was to mourn the 14 people killed on Jelačić square on the 5\textsuperscript{th} of December, 1918, and the third was for Stjepan Radić. In the rioting that ensued, three students were killed.\textsuperscript{156} One month later, the King abolished the 1921 \textit{Vidovdan} constitution and disbanded the parliament, establishing a Royal Dictatorship in response to the collapse of political discourse. In abolishing the constitution, the King also formally changed the name of the state from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. A main goal of these efforts was to silence the most extreme nationalist groups on all sides and allow time for the raw wound of Radić’s assassination to heal. As a result, many of the more extreme nationalist politicians left the country to live in exile.\textsuperscript{157}

The Royal Dictatorship did not end the nationalist politics in Yugoslavia. Once in exile the nationalists began to organize as expatriate movements. In Zagreb, this was manifested in acts of political violence against the Yugoslav regime organized by an expatriate organization calling itself the \textit{Ustaše}. These violent attacks spurred a strong reaction from the Yugoslav security apparatus, resulting in arrests of many prominent political figures that were suspected of

\textsuperscript{155} Perić, \textit{Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada}. @ 223.
\textsuperscript{156} Glenny, \textit{The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999} @ 412.
sympathies with the expatriates. In 1934 a coalition of these expatriate movements succeeded in assassinating King Alexander on a royal trip to France. Rather than enhancing the image of the expatriate nationalists though, the assassination resulted in a demonstration of the deep affection Croats had for King Alexander as a person, if not for Yugoslavia as a state. Over 200,000 Croats paid tribute to the slain monarch by coming to view his body while it lay in state for three days in Zagreb. This number is significant as it represented such a large portion of the Croatian population at the time, and indicates that almost the entire population of Zagreb, approximately 100,000 people, as well as many people from the sounding area, were willing to wait for hours to pay their respects. If the Ustaše had believed their act would be lauded in Croatia as justice for the murder of Stjepan Radić and they would be seen as the avengers of Croatia’s wounded honor, they were clearly mistaken.

Conclusions

In analyzing Radić’s political goals and his impact, it is critical to understand the centrality of Croatian nationalism to his outlook. He was, very clearly, a nationalist before he was a Peasantist. In fact, his Peasantism was an outgrowth of his nationalism, a way to solve what Radić viewed as the crisis of the Croatian nation. The social justice elements of Peasantism were not ends in and of themselves; they were a tool to be used in solving the national crisis in Croatia by resolving the crisis in the rural economy. One could argue that this nationalist element was a veneer necessary to gain access to the Croatian political structure of the time, which was focused on issues of nationalism, but Radić’s own biography challenges this line of argument. Though mobilizing the peasantry into the political process was important to him from

159 Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* @ 176.
160 Ibid.
a young age, this initially manifested itself in trying to engage them in the nationalist cause. Radić was recognized and followed as a leader of the university students in Zagreb, not for calls of social justice, but for calls of action to confront Hungarian authority and the further integration of Croatia into Hungary. The actual tenets of Croatian Peasantism would not be developed until a decade after Radić had become a national hero for leading the protests on Ban Jelačić Square in 1895.

Though the HSS did well as a political party once universal manhood suffrage became law in Croatia, it had little support in Zagreb itself. The growth for support of Radić’s party after 1920 in the urban centers of Croatia was due to his fierce efforts to protect Croatian national interests, not a groundswell of Peasantist sentiment. Throughout the Yugoslav period, Radić was much more engaged in questions of Croatian national interest than in the Peasantist cause. This was not because he preferred nationalism over Peasantism, but rather because the political conditions of the time put nationalist issues at the forefront. In this way, Radić did bridge the urban-rural political divide, but not by creating a national consensus on Peasantism, but rather by deferring the issues of Peasantism until more immediate questions about Croatia’s place within the community of nations had been addressed, in particular, its place within the Yugoslav project.

Radić’s desire to bridge the gulf between the dynamic urban society of Zagreb and the struggling rural society of the Croatian countryside was clearly deep and sincere. This goal was also a reflection of the two strains of his politics; Croatian Nationalism and Peasantism. Zagreb was the core of the Croatian national project and where Radić himself had become an ardent nationalist. Radić also had experience with the ambivalence of Zagreb’s urban society towards peasants. The city looked down on the countryside with disdain, but Zagreb society also
embraced individual peasants who came to the city for education, such as Radić’s older brother Antun, who had come to the city a peasant boy to attend school and been appointed to the faculty of the University of Zagreb when he completed his studies.

For Radić, the challenge was to persuade Zagrebites to accept the countryside and the peasantry in the abstract as they had already proven they could accept some peasants on an individual level (provided the individual proved they could contribute to society in a cultural or economic way). The key to this would be convincing urban society that the countryside and the peasantry as a whole did contribute culturally and economically to Croatian society. On the other side of this equation, Radić faced the challenge of establishing a sense of nationalism within the peasantry themselves. Given that the peasantry’s main concerns centered on their difficult economic situation, any call to nationalism would have to require little from them materially to find any receptive ears. Radić’s solution was simple and elegant. By locating the national character in the peasantry and “village society,” Radić asked nothing from the peasantry than that they continue to live their lives, while simultaneously providing the social contribution of the countryside to the Croatian national project.

Though this approach of arguing for a social balance between the urban and the rural on the one hand, while placing no material demands on the countryside fit the challenges of nationalizing the peasantry well, it did not garner significant support in urban Croatian society, as it was a fundamental rejection of the Croatian metropolis vision of the nation. Radić’s general indifference to urban issues was understandable. Compared to the countryside, urban Croatia, and Zagreb especially, was thriving economically and culturally, and therefore seemed to him to demand little attention. Yet, this indifference to the city was in some ways only superficial. Radić was a product of Zagreb as much as the countryside and he understood the
city’s importance to the national elite, as illustrated by his refusal to allow the HSS to abandon the city despite the abuse the party delegates received at the hands of the city’s population. To abandon Zagreb would have been to abandon Croatia in the minds of the national elite.

Radić’s commitment to keeping the HSS congresses in Zagreb was an example of one of his most unique attributes among his contemporaries in Croatian politics; and understanding of the political power of symbolic space. Radić’s own biography was tied directly to Zagreb and Ban Jelačić square as much, if not more, than to the Croatian countryside. It was his exploitation of the symbolic power of the Ban Jelačić monument and the square that had catapulted Radić to prominence with the general public in Zagreb, and it was this space he had used to re-launch the Peasant Party in 1918 after the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire. This understanding of the power of symbolic space may have been intuitive rather than intellectual, as Radić never actually mentioned Ban Jelačić Square when referring to the incident, and the choice of the square as the site of the demonstration in 1895 was as much a product of a confluence of circumstances, such as the coincidence of the 16th of October being the anniversary of Jelačić’s birth and the square being a venue for the Emperor’s promenade that day.

In this context, Radić’s two political uses of Jelačić square were strategic and planned but in very different ways. The choice of the square as a venue for the 1895 demonstration was centered on the desire for the largest possible audience for the act of burning the Hungarian flag. The fact that the Ban Jelačić monument provided an opportune frame for the event on the anniversary of Jelačić’s birth was a stroke of luck for the students, but not a central focus of the event. The choice of the statue as a venue for the flag burning seems to have been defensive, allowing the students to declare their loyalty to the Imperial system while simultaneously rejecting Hungarian efforts at political assimilation. What transformed this act from a university
students’ prank into a major political event was less the act, than the reaction by outsiders. Absent the broader European response and the pressure from Vienna and Budapest, Ban Khuen-Herdervary was poised to let the incident pass into obscurity. But the trial and the prison sentences of the students fractured the passive Croatian political elite and catapulted Radić to the status of a national in Zagreb.

The demonstration in 1918 with the HSS delegates was distinctly different. Though the event took a very similar form to the 1895 demonstration -- a street march to the Ban Jelačić statue -- there were key differences. In 1895, the statue had been a venue of opportunity, but in 1918, it was clearly chosen for its symbolic national value. The Peasantist delegates singing of patriotic songs at the monument brought the contradictions of the Croatian Metropolis model of national development into sharp focus. Radić’s demonstration was a direct challenge to the Croatian political elite, implicitly asking them how they could claim to be the nation’s leaders when they ignored 80% of the nation’s population. But Radić’s demonstration was not an angry or confrontational march on St. Mark’s Square, the clearly recognized space for public political action: it was a mobilization of the urban elites’ own use of urban space for evoking national sentiment, Ban Jelačić statue as site of singing patriotic songs. By 1918 Radić understood how the national character of the square and statue could be used to symbolically leverage a political argument.

The decision to bury Stjepan Radić in Mirogoj cemetery can be seen in the same light. The lavish funeral procession followed by the interment of Radić in Zagreb’s main cemetery illustrated the degree to which the city had come to embrace him as a nationalist leader. It tied the countryside to Zagreb in a very deep, emotional sense. But the practical effect was also to reinforce the Croatian Metropolis vision the city of Zagreb had cultivated because the burial of
Stjepan Radić as a national hero transformed Mirogoj into a Croatian national cemetery in the imagination of the entire population of Croatia.

Ultimately, the urban population of Zagreb could not embrace Stjepan Radić so completely without also embracing some elements of his Peasantism, but it would be almost a decade after his death that this outcome would manifest itself.
Chapter 6
Building a New Zagreb: 1895 to 1935
In contrast to the intense contestation in the political arena in Croatia between 1895 and 1935, the process of urban development followed an uncontested trajectory of modernization. But this was a modernist building project attuned to the possibilities of etching into the city fabric resonant representations of Croatian national identity. The previous crafting and symbolic coding of the square and the Ban Jelačić statue as its centerpiece was a poignant development for the Croatian Metropolis project. As I chronicle in this chapter, the subsequent modernist city building project sought to build on this. A flurry of new development and restructuring that I detail in this chapter can be seen as inspired by the success of the physical and symbolic producing of the square. Physical and symbolic changes, not surprisingly, also included continued modernization of the square.

**Zagreb as the Growing Metropolis**

Just as during the 1850 to 1895 period of urban development, the growing level of political tensions between 1895 and 1914 did not seem to negatively affect the city’s growth. The city continued to build, but in many cases the building was upward instead of outward as older buildings were improved or completely replaced with taller, more modern structures. This vertical expansion was the result of a combination of several factors, including advances in architectural design in the city, a growing bourgeois with financial resources to afford larger and more elaborate construction, and a change in the local governmental structure which limited the city government’s authority to regulate land outside the city proper. The city added two significant palaces of national culture in Donji grad. The Art Pavilion, located south of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Science, was completed in 1898. Part of the pavilion had been used in the Croatian Pavilion at the Hungarian Millennial Exhibition in Budapest in 1896, and
then transported by rail to Zagreb.\(^1\) The National and University Library was completed in 1913, and sat at the southern end of the western leg of the “green horseshoe.”\(^2\) The city also modernized by building of a system of public transportation using first horse drawn, and later electric trams. Economically, the city also began building a significant industrial base. In 1885 the city had only 19 total “industrial enterprises;” by 1910 the number had grown over 500% to 108. But this industrialization process was still in its early stages, as even by 1910 the industrial labor force only made up approximately 8.3% of the city’s total population.\(^3\)

*Ban* Jelačić Square was very much a microcosm of the city in all these regards. One architectural historian of Zagreb referred to the square in the period up to 1895 as a place of “Palaces, Shops, and Banks,”\(^4\) but that is even more descriptive of the period between 1895 and 1914. Though one large mansion was built on the north side of the square in 1889, the rest of the houses there, though they were large by comparison to many houses in the rest of town, were hardly palatial. By 1914 though, almost all the older houses had been replaced on the square by new multi-story buildings with elaborate façades. Not all of these buildings were private residences. In this way, the square reflected the very mixed use of urban space in the city. In fact any single building would often have a shop or café on the ground floor with a mix of private apartments and offices on the upper floors. The significant exceptions to this pattern were the financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies, which often occupied their own buildings. The element of the economic fabric of the city not specifically represented in the square was the industrial sector, but that component was present indirectly with the

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\(^1\) Ivo Perić, *Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada* (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 171.
\(^2\) Ibid. @ 191.
\(^3\) Percentages derived from data in tables 3 & 4 in Jack C. Fisher, "The Continuity of Urban Patterns under Socialism: The Yugoslav Experience" (Syracuse University, 1962). @ 74 & 76.
\(^4\) Olga Maruševski, *Od Mandaševeca do Trga Republike* (Zagreb: 1987). @ 44.
installation of tram tracks in 1892 and then overhead electric wiring when the tram system was converted from horse to electric power in 1910.\textsuperscript{5}

In 1907, a significant modification was made to the square which both modernized it, and emphasized the statue as a central feature of the square. Asphalt was laid on it and a pedestrian island was built on the southern portion of the square on either side of the Ban Jelacic monument.\textsuperscript{6} The result was to give the square a more dynamic and user-integrated presence, while focusing people on the square even more directly towards the statue. At the same time, this change was necessary because increasing population density was leading to increased traffic density in both trams and private vehicles on the square. As the trams took up space private vehicles had used on the street at the south side of the square, those vehicles needed a place to go that would not block pedestrian access to the trams when they arrived. The pedestrian island created a space where people could enter and exit the trams on the northern track without interference from horse drawn and motorized carriages. But to make the new traffic system on the square work, the Manduševac Well was removed and paved over on the square’s eastern side.

None of these changes affected the square’s role as the city’s main market space, but planners were also thinking about changing this aspect of the square as well. The square, as the linkage point between the older and newer parts of the city, was a significant point of intersection for the city’s traffic pattern. The presence of the city’s main daily market there was beginning to impede that function. As both the size and density of the population grew in the city, the number of merchants, and consequently the amount of space they occupied on the square, grew along with the number of vehicles trying to use the square to get from one part of

\textsuperscript{5} "Kronologija Trga Republike u Zagrebu," \textit{Čovjek i Prostor, Ožujak} (March) 1977.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
the city to the other. In 1908 Victor Kovačić, a rising star in the Croatian architectural
community, developed various plans for the regulation of the eastern side of the square, the
neighborhood of Dolac (just north of the square), and Kaptol. One of these plans called for two
new market spaces, one north and one east of the square, which would allow for moving the
merchants off of the square and freeing it up for the free flow of vehicle traffic.

Another subtle change in the square at this time was its emergence as a symbolic
touchstone of all aspects of life, which was deeply connected to Croatian geo-politics. This new
symbolic dynamic for the square was exemplified at the end of World War I, when the square
was used by the local media to illustrate concern over the deteriorating social order in the city.
In October of 1918 the newspapers carried daily stories of armed robbery, assaults, and even an
occasional home invasion. On the 26th of October Obzor reported “…one merciless event, which
may have heavy consequences, and used as an illustration of the contemporary era.” The
incident was the non-fatal shooting of a waiter at a café on Jelačić square. The attack seemed to
have no reason or cause. Given the daily reports of crime in the city, with armed robbery
becoming a daily occurrence, this event seems unremarkable. But the fact that the attack had
happened at a café on Jelačić square represented an emergence of random, potentially deadly,
violence into the daily life of the entire city. Though random violence was a fact of life through
out the city during the crisis days at the end of World War I, it was not until this even on the
square that the urban society of Zagreb recognized the threat to social order such violence posed.
Up until this event, individual acts of violence were acknowledged, yet the broader pattern was
ignored.

7 "Regulacia Zagreba," Svijet, 12 Ožuljak (March) 1927.
8 "Pucao na Konobara," Obzor, 26 Listopad (October) 1918.
Zagreb as a Yugoslav City

Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Croatia had always been a peripheral part of the Hapsburg economic structure. Croatia in general had been of little concern to the Hungarian government’s plans for economic development. Zagreb’s industrialization and urban growth had been primarily the product of local investment and neither of the two rail lines running through the city had been built to service Zagreb and integrate it into the Imperial economy, but rather to establish links between the German part of the Empire and the Sava River port town of Sisak, or between Budapest and the Dalmatian coast.\(^9\) Zagreb had therefore been something of a laggard in economic development compared to the core of the Hapsburg lands. In the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes though, Zagreb was one of the two most industrialized cities with more capital at its disposal than the new capital city of Belgrade.

The city’s relative economic strength was demonstrated early on, when the banks in Zagreb effectively ignored the new Central Bank in Belgrade and established their own methods of investment and debt refinancing.\(^10\) By 1926, just seven years after unification, Zagreb had four times as many industrial enterprises as Belgrade and twice as much capital at its disposal.\(^11\) With all of the new capital available in the city, a new wave of construction and modernization began in earnest.

One of major modernization projects was focused on moving the city’s main market off of Jelačić square. The city government decided to implement part of Victor Kovačić’s 1908 plan which called for a new market in the Dolac neighborhood. This was not just a new market square, but a space intended to allow the main market to move off of Jelačić square. In order to

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\(^11\) Ibid.
provide sufficient space for the same number of merchants in a location less than half the size of Jelačić square, the market would be built on two levels, one a standard open air market square, and the other a modern, enclosed market below.

The Dolac neighborhood was the perfect location for such a market, as it was built on the hillside leading up to Kaptol, which allowed for a design in which people could enter the lower market at ground level from the south, and the upper market at ground level from the north and east. Construction on the new market began in 1926 and when it was completed in 1930. The consequence of building the market though was the destruction of the Dolac neighborhood. Dolac had been an area of mostly small private houses on a few short, winding, narrow roads

**Artist Conception of the Dolac Market Square as Approved for Construction**

12 "Novi Trg na Dolcu," *Jutarnji List*, 7 Veljače (February) 1926.
with a small square of its own. The new market had removed the center of the neighborhood.
But that was not the only effect; many of the rest of the houses had also been removed and
replaced with modern multi-story buildings similar to those in the rest of Donji grad.

There was a significant amount of privately funded modernization taking place on Jelačić
square itself as well. In 1925 the southern portion of the Gradske Šedionice (City Savings Bank)
building was completed. In 1929 one of the more famous houses on Jelačić square, Hatzova
kuća (the Hatzov house) in which a local landmark, Velika kavana (the Great Café), had been
located since 1863,13 was torn down to make way for a modern seven story hotel.14 Now, this
richly symbolic square was to carry the clear imprint of architectural modernity. The changes to
the appearance of the square were not limited to new construction. Many of the older elaborate
façades from the historicist period were replaced with starkly un-elaborate modernist ones. The
completion of the Dolac Market in 1930 ended the role of the square as the city’s main
marketplace, and only a limited number of vendors who could fit onto part of the pedestrian
island around the Jelačić monument were allowed to operate on the square.

To some in Zagreb, the Dolac market project was merely a first step in the transformation
of the older parts of the city in the immediate vicinity of Jelačić square. Early in 1927 Croatian
magazine Svijet (World) published an article ostensibly about the challenge of managing the
exploding growth Zagreb was experiencing, but the core of the article was actually about the
situation in the city center.15

Dolac is already half demolished, yet we don’t see that the city is doing anything.
The beautiful plan of architect Kovačić looked at the regulation of Kaptol, Dolac,
and Vlaška street was received 15 whole years ago by the city leaders, but today
no one thinks about it. Dolac and Tkalčićeva are the ugliest parts of the city, and it

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13 Olga Maruševski, Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2006). @ 155.
14 “Kronologija Trga Republike u Zagrebu.”
15 “Regulacija Zagreba.”
has been 20 years since the destruction of the Bakačeva tower, and Kaptol still stands crippled and unspeakable today...\textsuperscript{16}

This critique echoed Iso Kršnjavi’s critiques of the plans for the development of the north side of Ban Jelačić Square five decades earlier. Kršnjavi had argued that simply allowing new building was not enough, but that the plans for urban development needed to be meaningful.\textsuperscript{17} This critique by \textit{Svijet} was similar, in that it attacked the failure to modernize some areas, such as the rest of the Dolac neighborhood and Tkalčićeva street, while simultaneously criticizing what it considered a failed improvement, the removal of the fortifications directly in front of the Cathedral (the Bakačeva tower) in allow easier access for the general populations.

\textbf{Cathedral Prior to the 1880 Earthquake}\textsuperscript{18}

The ultimate focus of the article was on a proposal to remove a collection of buildings just northeast of Ban Jelačić Square, between the square and the Biskupski dvor (Bishop’s Castle) which surrounded the main Cathedral in Kaptol. The Cathedral had been a particular

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. \textsuperscript{@} 218.
\textsuperscript{17} Olga Maruševski, \textit{Iso Kršnjavi Kao Gradiitelj} (Zagreb: Društvo Povjetničara Umjetnosti SR Hrvatska, 1986). \textsuperscript{@} 228.
\textsuperscript{18} Rudolf Horvat, \textit{Prošlost Grada Zagreba} (Zagreb: Hrvatski Rodoljub, 1942). \textsuperscript{@} X.
focus of improvement beginning in 1880, when a strong earthquake had seriously damaged the structure. The current Cathedral had initially been built in the thirteenth century, and then heavy stone fortifications built around it in the sixteenth century.¹⁹

![Rebuilt Cathedral 1905](image)

Rebuilt Cathedral 1905²⁰

After the earthquake severely damaged the structure, it was rebuilt, but in a Baroque style, reflecting the patterns of spatial power within other Hapsburg city of the Empire.²¹ As the city’s population expanded dramatically, the Cathedral became a popular venue for Catholics within the city. The fortifications presented a significance impediment on two levels. First, they

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²⁰ Horvat, Prošlost Grada Zagreba. @ XII.
significantly restricted access to the Cathedral itself, making it difficult for parishioners to enter and leave. Additionally, the high walls blocked the public view of the elaborate Baroque façade, defeating a significant part of the reason for using this style in the first place. As a result, the portion of the fortifications, known as the Biskupski dvor because it also housed the office of the Bishop, and later the Archdiocese of Zagreb, directly in front of the Cathedral had been removed in 1906.22

_Svijet_ published two plans, Kovačič’s pre-war plan from 1908, and a new one designed by _Svijet_ itself. Kovačič’s plan for Kaptol was part of an integrated concept including the Dolac market. It called for a wall of large archways that would replace the wall section removed in front of the Cathedral, as well as build a similar arched wall to recreate the old walled city boundary between Kaptol and _Ban_ Jelačić square, but made no significant changes to the surrounding streets.

Comparison of the Kovačić (left) and _Svijet_ (right) Plans for Kaptol and Vlaška Street23

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22 Josip Bilić, ed., _Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj_. @ 486.
23 "Regulacija Zagreba." @ 217.
The Svijet plan was much more ambitious than the primarily cosmetic changes proposed by Victor Kovačić. The Svijet plan called for a dramatic change to the local area by removing an entire block of private property in order to create a new public park just south of the Biskupski dvor, and opening up a direct view of the Cathedral from Ban Jelačić Square. Rather than recreating the historical separation between the ecclesiastical enclave of Kaptol, and the commercial part of the city, as symbolized by the old Harmica, now Ban Jelačić Square, Svijet’s plan sought to visually integrate Kaptol into the space of the square.

Artist’s Rendition of the Svijet Plan for Kaptol as Viewed from Jelačić square

24 Ibid.
But rather than acknowledge these significant differences between the plans, the writers at *Svijet* sought to portray their plan as a true fulfillment of Kovačić’s vision.

How well we know from conversations with Kovačić, his main idea was to close off Kaptol and the church on all sides so that it evoke in the viewer a picture of medieval works, such as the church once was the most beautiful palace in Zagreb: the archiepiscopal palace rid of all development so that throughout his door he could have an unobstructed view. This is what our picture shows. From Jelačić square it would be possible to see the entire palace and the entire park before the castle.25

To support this interpretation, it was necessary to argue that all of Kovačić’s plans and writings reflecting this aspect of his vision had been lost, but that the intent could be derived from his other plans and writings.26 Thus, the writers of *Svijet* transformed Kovačić’s vision of a Kaptol returned to its historical isolation from the rest of the city, into a justification for visually integrating it into Ban Jelačić Square, while simultaneously removing another block of disorderly individual housing plots from the center of the city and replacing it with orderly public space. Another significant public modernization project involved removal of the city’s main hospital on the southwest corner of Ban Jelačić Square, with the intention of replacing it with a modern hospital building in a new location elsewhere in the city. The hospital itself was over 120 years old and was clearly in need of replacement or significant modernization.

In October of 1927 *Svijet* published a proposal to use part of the land for a new City Council building which would be built on both sides of Ilica, the main commercial street leading into the square from the west.27 One feature of this proposed building was a multi-story connecting segment with 5 arches across Ilica which would resemble a gateway, thus transforming the square from an imagined gateway into the city into a real, if only symbolic, one. But this plan never gained sufficient traction, possibly because it did not take full advantage of

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25 Ibid. @ 218-219.
26 Ibid.
the significant rise in commercial value to the land the hospital occupied. Instead the city
developed a plan which called for transforming the hospital plot into an “endowment block”
which would then be sold to a developer to pay for the building of the new hospital.28

The Proposal to Build a City Hall in Zagreb29

In 1930 the City Regulation Office held a competition for a plan to build on the
“endowment block.”30 One entry, by prof. arh. Drago Ibler, called for a tower or Neboder
(skyscraper) centered between two smaller buildings on the south side of Ilica. The concept of a
tower was not unique to this design. In fact several entries in the competition had envisioned a
tower either on the north side or the south side Ilica. Several of the entries had also proposed a
multi-story “gate” like the one published in Svijet in 1927. Ultimately none of the 25 entries in
the competition were accepted, but the idea of the Neboder would re-occur again. Since none of

28 Eve Blau, Ivan Rupnik, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2007). @ 130.
29 "Predlog za Gradnju Gradske Vijećnice u Zagrebu ".
30 Blau, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 132.
the actual entrants in the competition were selected the city continued to seek a unified design for the entire space of the old hospital.

**prof. arh. Drago Ibler’s Proposal for the “Endowment Block”**  

Design Examples from the “Endowment Block” Competition (unidentified designers)  

Urban investment was not limited to the immediate vicinity of Jelačić square. Once the economic dislocation of war had ended and the political instability of the founding process had stabilized, many projects which had been deferred were implemented. One of these projects was the establishment of a large public park on the eastern side of the city. To accomplish this, the

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31 "Futurističke Osnove," *Svijet*, 18. I. 1930. @ 89.
32 Ibid. @ 88-89.
city purchased the *Maksimir* park from the Zagreb Catholic Archdiocese in 1922, and improved it by establishing a zoological park there as well in 1925.\(^{33}\)

**The Practical Challenges of Growth**

The rapid economic development and industrialization resulted in an explosion of the urban population of Zagreb. The population of the city roughly doubled from approximately 100,000 in 1910 to approximately 200,000 by 1931\(^{34}\). The economic boom of the 1920s provided a significant amount of new capital which could be used for a new phase of urban modernization. But this new wave of urban growth also confronted the city with something of a crisis in spatial management. All this urban development had broadly conformed to the concept of the original plan established in 1864/65 and further embellished in the subsequent 1887/88 plan. There was little change in the older parts of the town, Gradec and Kaptol. In the hills north of the old *Gornji grad* (Upper Town) area the Croatian economic elite built individual houses on the meandering roads leading into town. The new *Donji grad* (Lower Town), between the hills and the rail lines, developed as the new, bourgeois area with a mix of multi-story apartment buildings, mansions, and “public” buildings interspersed with public squares and parks. Industrial enterprises primarily occupied the land between the rail lines and the Sava River.\(^{35}\) This part of the city was also a growing residential area because this land fell outside of the jurisdiction of the Zagreb city government, and therefore the building regulations did not

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\(^{33}\) Perić, *Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada*. @ 220.

\(^{34}\) Specific population numbers are difficult to assess as those assembling population figures included or excluded parts of the area around Zagreb for their own purposes. Because of this, population data can vary by as much as 20% for the same year. The city population data ranges from approximately 79,000 to 100,000 in 1910 and approximately 185,000 to 217,000 in 1931.

\(^{35}\) Fisher, "The Continuity of Urban Patterns under Socialism: The Yugoslav Experience". @ 77-81.
Regulatory Plan from 1889 (never enacted)\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{36} Base Image from Ivo Maroević, \textit{Zagreb Njim Samim} (Zagreb: Dureux, 1999). @ 35
apply there. As a result, poorer, working class people could build small houses close to the industrial enterprises that they often worked in.

The issues caused by rapid urban growth and the change in urban character in Zagreb were not unanticipated by the city’s planners. As early as 1889 the city’s planners had created a regulatoria osnova that imagined Zagreb extending all the way to the Sava River, but without the authority to impose the regulations outside of the existing city territory, the plan was never implemented. In 1907 a member of the city engineering staff had proposed a new regulatoria osnova which envisioned dramatically reconfiguring the city based on its emerging industrial character. This plan was as bold in its vision as the 1865 plan had been. It called for removing the railroad tracks that were acting as a barrier to the city’s southward expansion, and re-routing them south of the Sava River. This would free up movement and allow for the development of all the land up to the northern bank of the Sava without obstruction. To deal with the issues of potential flooding along the Sava’s banks, the plan called for the river to be completely canalized as it passed through Zagreb. Because the land south of the existing railroad tracks was now needed for industrial production, the plan moved the proposed Sava River harbor of the original plan out to the southeast of the city. This plan was ultimately rejected by the Hungarian government, in significant part because of the enormous cost that removing and rebuilding the rail lines would entail, which would have been paid for either by the Hungarian government or the railroads themselves, which were Hungarian owned enterprises.

In 1922, the central government in Belgrade promulgated a new law on local governance, which diluted the very strict division of authority that had been established by the Austro-

37 Ibid. @ 35.
38 Snješka Knežević, "Milan Lenuci and the Urbanism of Zagreb," in Project Zagreb: Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice (Zagreb: ACTAR, 2007). @ 88 and image @ 102.
Hungarian Empire.\textsuperscript{39} In 1923 the city published a new \textit{regulatornia osnova} which expanded the space available for building to the east. This plan was not a re-conception of the city, but rather an extension of the existing pattern with very little attention given to the area south of the rail lines, but it did link the city directly with its eastern suburbs. Though the plan did provide immediate relief for the needs of the city to expand housing inventory, it was clearly not sufficient as a permanent solution to the significant problems that urban growth were beginning to cause.

\textsuperscript{39} Perić, \textit{Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada}. @ 215.
\textsuperscript{40} Base Image from Maroević, \textit{Zagreb Njim Samim}. @ 59.
This plan was only a stop-gap measure, designed to ease the immediate need for more housing. This was evidenced by the almost immediate call from elements of the urban establishment for a new regulatornia osnova. In 1927, the Svijet article entitled Regulacia Zagreba (Regulation of Zagreb) which opened by identifying the key problem facing the city: “After the war Zagreb began to grow rapidly. On all sides there were many refugees who sought refuge here and many outsiders arrived to seek wealth.”41 The result had been a dramatic 40,000 person increase in the city’s population since the end of the war in 1918.42 Though the city had made efforts to accommodate these people, to the author those efforts had been poorly planned and shortsighted. As a result:

Instead the city enabled construction on the first empty site, has put on hold expropriating empty construction sites, allowing speculation to build where it was clear that for several years, you have to clear the area. Rather than remove the first war huts on the Brickyard, the city in several places is unsystematically building houses in bad taste.43

The article then took the city to task for the situation:

Eight years have passed since then, the city still has no regulatory plan to deal with the situation, and particularly on the periphery people still built as they want and are thus creating new townships, which are bad in every respect: for those who must reside there and for the city of Zagreb, which to these great victims must sooner or later provide regulation of these neighborhoods, give them roads, power and water.44

This introduction to the article was followed up by a strong attack on the city building and planning office and their management of areas already under city regulation, which had allowed construction in the “commercial quarter” (the area regulated by the 1923 plan) which was “quite unfortunate and tasteless, which in the foreseeable future will not be able to be

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41 "Regulacia Zagreba." @ 217.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
repaired.” The magazine then addressed a deeper issue, an apparent disconnect between the appearance of the city, and the reality of the challenges facing it:

We love to hear from strangers, as a major city Zagreb is so nice and neat, and this is probably the first and legitimate view the city gives, a cozy feel, but what we the citizens see best of Zagreb is our large mistakes, which have not been corrected and are awaiting a regulatory plan, which again can not be compiled until the issue of the railway stations and tracks are resolved and the issue of the regulation of the Sava.

Yet after making this broad critique of the city’s management of growth after the end of the First World War, and its continued complacency about the condition of the city, the article shifts attention to the heart of the city, and focuses on the area immediately north of Jelačić square. This dramatic shift in the focus of the article indicates that, though managing the growth of the city was important to the city’s opinion makers, it was the core of the city, in and around Jelačić square, was still their main concern.

The city government responded to the need for dealing with the developing needs of the city by creating the City Regulation Office from the existing City Building Office. Though the new organization’s first project was the competition for the development of the “endowment block,” the plot of land on Jelačić square where the old hospital had stood until the 1920s, one of the primary purposes of this new organization was to develop a long term plan for Zagreb that could manage the phenomenal growth the city was experiencing. To accomplish this task, the City Regulation Office once again proposed to use an open project competition. The concept of such architectural competitions was very popular in Zagreb at that time, but the scope of this project was much larger than anything previously announced in the city’s history: a competition

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45 Ibid. @ 218
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. See pages 8-12 of this chapter for a complete discussion of this portion of the article.
48 Blau, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 106.
for a new urban plan for the entire city. The competition was initially proposed in 1928, and formalized in 1930, with an exhibition of the entrants’ plans to be carried out in 1931.50

In support of the competition, the city published the formal announcement of the competition in 1930: the *Competition for the Remaking of the General Plan for Redeveloping, Broadening and Regulation of the City of Zagreb Data and Directives*51 which provided the guidance to competition entrants as to what the city was looking for in their proposals. Not surprisingly, given the scope of the project, the document ran to 69 pages of text and over a dozen pages of illustrations and pictures of the city. Because the competition was international in character, the document also went to great length to describe the city, assuming that many firms that might be interested in competing would have little personal knowledge of Zagreb. The result was a document that both described Zagreb as its city leaders wanted it to be seen by the world, but also confronting the challenges the city needed to overcome if it was to continue growing successfully.

At the very beginning, the document provided an overview of the current situation the city confronted, which the document directly calls a “crisis,” and the goals for the competition, including solutions to all the “problems which prevent the normal and rational growth of the city.”52 These issues included “the railway problem; which will resolve the question of crossing streets and traffic in general”, as well as “the question of the Sava and the Sava port,” and the “longitudinal growth of the city.”53 Pages 4 to 49 describe the city and its perceived place in Croatian and Yugoslav society. It is not until the last 20 pages that the document elaborates specifically what it is looking for in the new plan for the city.

50 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid. @ 3.
The 45 pages of background information consist of 22 separate sections describing Zagreb. These sections provide a significant insight into how the city leadership of Zagreb understood the city’s role as a city both as they themselves perceived it, and as they wanted it to be perceived from the outside. Section 9, “Zagreb as an economic center”, discusses the logic of the city’s dominant economic position within Yugoslavia, stating that this was both a result of the city’s “geographic position” and the connections stemming from the period when Croatia had been part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The document goes further to elaborate that “Then, Zagreb was the seat of the Croatian, Slavonian, and Dalmatian government, and a large number of central offices…” which “every day” drew large numbers of people to the city. This argument is interesting on two separate levels. First, it creates an impression of the political order of 1848 as the persistent reality of the entire Hapsburg period. Second, it ties economic success for the city to a specific geo-political order, Zagreb as the capital of the Triune Kingdom. It is important to note that this argument is raised in the section on the economic role of the city, not the political role.

The section which specifically discusses the city’s political function is section 12, “Zagreb as a national, cultural, and political center.” This section, in fact, mentions almost nothing about Zagreb’s historic role politically, instead focusing on the cultural role of Zagreb in “south Slavism.”

Although Zagreb, already from older times was an important city in Croatia from the political and cultural viewpoint, its development to today’s cultural and national center begins to flow from the beginning of the 19th century when the work of the national awakening with which the enthusiasm and belief in the future of southern Slavism overcame beyond the night of the old German and Latin spirit of Zagreb.

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54 Ibid. @ 13.
55 Ibid. @ 18.
In this way the document formally avoids and, in fact seeks to obscure the issue of which particular nation Zagreb was a “national center” for.

The issue is addressed by identifying the period of the “Illyrian revival” as resulting in the founding of the “most important cultural institutions of Zagreb.” As the document states:

It [the Illyrian revival] was the precursor of a part of the great phenomenon of Bishop Strossmayer, which was the idea of the revival realized in real life things[,] the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts and the University, which placed Zagreb in the cultural center of the Slavic south.

This passage is notable because it ties the Illyrian movement, which was already waning when they were founded, to these two institutions, using Bishop Strossmayer as the specific linkage. Bishop Strossmayer was one of only three individuals mentioned by name in the entire document, so the choice to do so was obviously significant. The reason for this recognition is related to his standing as not only a significant figure in the Croatian national project, but also his strong support of Yugoslavianism as leader of the National party. This invocation of Bishop Strossmayer allowed the authors to then describe the large number of cultural institutions in Zagreb as part of a broader Yugoslav cultural project.

In this way, the authors of the Competition Announcement established an argument for Zagreb being not only the Croatian Metropolis, but the Yugoslav Metropolis as well. That implication is further re-enforced by a passage near the end of the background portion of the document, Section 22. “Nearby surroundings,” states that “The local area of Zagreb has, as with our entire state, a predominantly peasant character.” This statement implies, while also being vague enough to deny the implication, that Zagreb is the only true urban center in Yugoslavia.

\[56\] Ibid.
\[57\] Ibid.
\[58\] Ibid. @ 48.
Though the Competition Announcement provides illuminating insight into the city leadership’s understanding and framing of the relationship between Zagreb and Yugoslavia, the document’s primary focus was on the city itself; its current conditions and its future needs as an urban landscape and social system. To that end the document was very clear and direct in its discussions of the authors’ present understanding and the future goals of the city.

Section 14. Structure and parts of the city, establishes the core of the city, as seen by the authors, both in its physical form and its function in the opening paragraph:

The core of the daily life of Zagreb is Jelačić square. Around it are located the business and commercial parts of the city and along Ilica to Pejačević square, along Jurišićeva street and the start of Vlaška street, along Marovska and Nikolićeva and the north and west sides of Zrinki square. From this commercial center, where the business life from day to day more completely concentrates itself, shops locate themselves… along the main exit thoroughfares of Ilica, Vlaška street and Maksimir way and further down Savska way to the city’s boundaries.59

This clearly presents Zagreb as a city where daily life revolves around business, commerce, and consumption. Daily life is also clearly depicted as centered in Lower Town generally, and Jelačić Square specifically.

The remainder of this section describes the city in a way that shows the significance of the urban political elites attached to each part of Zagreb’s urban landscape. The next three paragraphs describe the remainder of Lower Town. Industry is not mentioned until the fourth paragraph, and even here the point is to re-enforce Zagreb’s commercial character, referring to the concentration of “offices of various industries” in the newly developed eastern portion of the city, rather than the productive portions of the enterprises. Gradec and Kaptol are discussed in the sixth and seventh paragraphs with the elite enclave of privates houses to the north of the city.

59 Ibid. @ 22.
discussed in the eighth paragraph.60 The text then turns to the less wealthy part of the city. The
ninth paragraph details the area south of the railroad tracks and north of the Sava River, which is
described as the location of “old rural communities (Horvati, Trnje, Petruševac, Žitnjak,
Vukomarec).” This portion of the city consisted of primarily one and two story houses. But in
addition to these older rural towns, this paragraph discusses a newer phenomenon which had
emerged after the end of the First World War; the “divlje kuće” or “wild houses.” These were
houses built on “county land” without city permits on the periphery of the older villages and the
city itself. It is not until the 10th paragraph that the industrial development of the city is directly
addressed. Neither the number of industrial enterprises nor the significant growth in their
numbers is even mentioned, simply the matter of fact description that most of this activity is
concentrated along the rail lines and in close proximity to the city natural gas plant, with a
mention that the leather tanning industry is located separately from the rest.61

It is not until after the discussion of the new industrial parts of the city that one
historically significant economic sector of the city is finally mentioned. Obrt (skilled
craftsmanship) receives only one stand-alone sentence/paragraph of discussion: “Craftsmen’s
workshops are located throughout the city, but mainly in direct proximity of the commercial
district and along the main access roads.”62 The contrast here to the opening of this section and
the elaborate discussion of commerce is striking on several levels. Throughout the previous
periods of Zagreb’s development obert had been considered a key part of the city’s economic
activity and an important element of its cultural identity, evidenced by the founding of the
Museum of Arts and Crafts in 1880 and the construction of the museum’s building (one of the
larges of the city’s privately funded “public” buildings) in 1888. By the authors’ own

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. @ 23.
62 Ibid.
description, the main concentration of artisan workshops coincided with the city’s commercial activity, so it is significant that this sentence was not simply included in the first paragraph, but rather set off completely separate, and as the last entry on the city’s economic organization.

After a brief paragraph on the military sites located in the city, the authors return to the issue of “wild” construction:

“Wild buildings”, which except in the southern parts of the city, where they are mainly, stand in small groups, more or less along the entire periphery, the result of the great influx of population into the city and from which originated the great housing misfortune. Constructed in total close to 4,000 of this type of houses, and has been counted that in them live around 40,000 people. 63

This clearly was a significant concern to the city government, and though not stated here in as stark terms, was the “crisis” the city was facing. This massive housing deficit was one of both quantity and quality. Over 20% of the city’s population was living in housing not built to the city code despite the significant expansion of the area zoned for residential construction in 1923. And this was not for a lack of building either, as by 1930 most of the land newly zoned for housing in 1923 had already been developed with high density, multi-story apartments.

The authors then dedicated a significant amount of text on how the city planned to deal with this issue. The problem was not one of simply building more housing. The area where the city envisioned more high density apartments was already occupied by the “wild” buildings, and though the city might have the authority to demolish them if they did not meet minimum standards, doing so would displace 40,000 people without anywhere for them to go. The city government fully appreciated the dilemma it faced with this situation, and had already developed a plan to deal with it. Property owners in the affected areas were given the opportunity to apply for a “temporary permit” for their property which would give them until 1948 to bring it up to the city building standards that would be imposed by the new regulatory plan. If they chose not

63 Ibid.
to upgrade their property they would be given a building permit for a “small house” in an undeveloped area of the city that would be specifically designated for low density residential building. Residents who did not own the properties they lived in were to be given priority for new apartments in the city as they became available, thus allowing them to move out and giving the owners the chance to rebuild to the new building standards for the area. The final paragraph of this section explains the areas of the city where building would be prohibited until the regulatory plan was adopted. These two paragraphs are worth particular note because they appear distinctly out of place, as they deal not specifically with the existing “Structure and parts of the city” but rather with the goals of the plan, which technically are not addressed for another 25 pages. Clearly the authors in the City Planning Office found it impossible to discuss Zagreb as it existed without also discussing the city as they imagined it in the future.

The next 25 pages of the Announcement discusses in great detail every aspect of the city before beginning the specific requirements that entrants to the competition must meet in Part C on page 50. Section 1 covers “The scope of territory for which is sought a plan,” and defines this as the “entire contemporary territory of the city of Zagreb” and states that the plan should provide sufficient housing for a population of 350,000 residents. Section 2 is titled simply the “Railway question” and deals with the overall issues involved in improving traffic flow between the parts of the city north of the railroad tracks and the portions of the city south and west of the tracks while simultaneously maintaining the capacity of the rail system to function.

Mere functionality for the rail system was not all the city planners were concerned with. This section of the Announcement is a six page, detailed discussion of the significant improvements they envisioned for the city’s rail network. This included a new Main Railroad

64 Ibid. @ 23-24.
65 Ibid. @ 50-56.
Station for passenger travel in the same location as the existing one, but designed to allow people and cars to cross under it, so the station would no longer block access to the newer parts of the city between the railroad station and the Sava River. In addition to the new passenger station, the requirements for two more new rail facilities were spelled out: one new station dedicated completely to freight traffic was envisioned, and a separate new rail yard for parking train engines and rail cars was also written into the requirements. In total, this discussion of the “Railway question” takes up nearly one third of the entire text for the actual requirements for the submissions to the competition, giving an indication of how central the city planners saw the solution to this issue as a key to expanding the city.

The contrast between the very elaborate details of the proposed solution to the “Railway question” and the rest of the requirements for proposals is driven home by the next section, entitled the “River Sava and Sava harbor.” This section laying out the requirements for planning the new harbor and the areas along the river banks is only five sentences long. Given that these two issues, “the railway problem” and “the question of the Sava and the Sava port,” were giving equal weight at the very beginning of the document, the preponderance of detail for dealing with one, and the total lack of detail in dealing with the other points to a very different view of the significance of them. “The railway problem” was a real, critical issue facing the city that the city planners had already envisioned a very detailed solution to. “The question of the Sava and the Sava port” was an aspiration, one to be achieved, but not clearly envisioned as to how, and thus left to the competitors to design.

The next section was truly the heart of the competition guidance with regard to the future city plan: “The division of the city and surrounding areas for future use.” This section provided

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66 Ibid. @ 56-57.
67 Ibid. @ 57-58.
the broad, macro-vision of the future city, and called for the designers to provide plans for all the basic requirements for a modern urban community. The key to this section was the final part, which provided guidance to the designers on “Types of construction zone the designer can at his discretion, change…”\(^68\) The designers were specifically prohibited from any prospective changes to Gornji grad: “Gornji grad … is to be excluded from any regulation, so as to retain its historical-cultural characteristics and individuality.”\(^69\) In contrast, areas of “wild houses” were to be a particular target for regulation. This guidance showed an interesting ambivalence about private property. Two types of areas were to be protected, private housing designed around “small block houses, which will be easily able to adapt to the situation.” and “to the extent possible, take into account existing [economic] facilities…”\(^70\) Beyond these limitations though, the areas of “wild houses” were a blank canvas for designers to work upon. And the designers were reassured that the private property issues of the owners of these “wild houses” would not be an impediment to the realization of their plans:

> Implementation of the regulatory basis in these areas is known to be facilitated by the new Construction Law, which is now done, and which provides for expropriation and compensation of land for this purpose. Individual wild houses are not though indicated in the plans, but these settlements of houses can be easily distinguishable from the small plots…\(^71\)

Thus, commercial interests were to be protected, and private housing which could easily be conformed to a regular, orderly urban grid was to be preserved. But the small, disorderly arranged private houses were to give way to a modern urban grid.

The reminder of the Competition Announcement covered the details of what the future plan should include. New public squares and parks, several new public buildings (mostly in

\(^{68}\) Ibid. @ 58.
\(^{69}\) Ibid.
\(^{70}\) Ibid.
\(^{71}\) Ibid.
Gornji grad), schools, libraries, theaters and sports facilities were all to be part of the plan. Also, space was to be provided for new churches to support the growing population, and a new city cemetery was called for, as Mirogoj was thought to be too small to be sufficient for the future population of the city. One significant issue of note in this broad set of guidance: a specific call for a decentralization of the city’s markets. The Competition Announcement intended that: “…the area of [urban] expansion of course have access to decentralize marketplaces according to a rational and economical system, and ensure an equal division among the urban areas of the daily marketplaces and so situate them.”72 In this regard, the planners were establishing a preference for a “rational and economical system” over the existing social pattern, which the author’s themselves had identified previously, of Dolac and Jelačić square as the center of daily life in the city.

The final pages raised a particular challenge to the competition designers. As the authors of the competition announcement stated:

From the aesthetic side, one of the most important questions which needs to be resolved in Zagreb is the organization of Kaptol and its surroundings. Because as is historically known in Zagreb, Kaptol, with Gornji grad is the most important part of the city.73

The Announcement then recounted the recent history of the Cathedral and the Bishop’s Castle, expressing the view that the decision to remove the wall in front of the Cathedral had been a significant mistake, and one goal of the new plan was to address the problem. The authors did mention Victor Kovačić’s vision for a project that would fuse the old imagery with a modern functionality, but also that it was still unrealized. The author’s description of the goals established in relation to the Cathedral bore a striking resemblance to the general goals of the Svijet magazine plan from three years earlier, though there was not direct call for the removal of

72 Ibid. @ 58.
73 Ibid. @ 68.
the private houses south of the Bishop’s Castle.\textsuperscript{74} Beyond the esthetic issues, the Competition Announcement raised a new set of concerns. These were the practical issues of the need for the local road network to handle the truck traffic necessary to service the new market at Dolac. This required addressing the entire area of Kaptol, the remaining part of the Dolac neighborhood, and Tkalčićeva street to ensure easy access to and from the market for larger vehicles. But this functionality needed to be accomplished in a way that kept with the “esthetic” of the area and did no further damage in the view of the city residents.\textsuperscript{75} This note of caution was the final statement of the Competition Announcement.

In 1931, fifty two entries were put on display and evaluated by the competition judging panel.\textsuperscript{76} As with the competition for the Endowment Block project the year prior, no first place winner was chosen, but prizes were awarded for a number of the entries.\textsuperscript{77} The City Regulation Office then took the plans and used them for inspiration in the development of what would become the official proposal for the new regulatoria osnova for the city, though there would be a five year wait for the final product of that effort to be produced.

\textbf{Continued Development after 1931}

The international design competition did not mean an end to development projects until the new official urban plan was developed and approved. The housing crisis in particular required immediate attention, and the city could not wait years to address it. There were also other projects already underway, such as the “Endowment Block,” which needed to move forward. But by 1931 the challenges to continued urban development were significant. The

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. @ 69.
\textsuperscript{76} Laslo, "Internacionalni Natječaj za Gernerálnu Regulatorньu Osnovu Grada Zagreba, 1930-31.." @ 27.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
primary issue facing the city was the impact of the world wide economic crisis of the Great Depression, which dramatically reduces the amount of private capital available to fund building or modernization projects. The Endowment Block project was one of the first casualties of the crisis. In 1931 the city’s main hospital was torn down, but a lack of capital prevented progress on the plan to replace the building. This plan called for a large, unified structure that would cover one and a half blocks, and included a 16 story Neboder in the same location as the one proposed by prof. arch. Ibler.

![Svijet Magazine Cover: the Yugoslav Royal Standard over Jelačić square](image)

The extent to which the Neboder became imbedded in the spatial imagination of the Zagreb elite was illustrated, literally on Svijet magazine’s cover. The iconography of the cover

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78 Blau, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 130.
80 Svijet, 13. VI. 1931.
was a combination of the perspective of Jelačić square from the top of the future Neboder with the Yugoslav Royal Standard over the city, celebrating the royal visit by the King of Yugoslavia to Zagreb. The image was intriguing, because as the coverage of the King’s visit within the magazine indicated, the King participated in no major events on the square during his visit. The image was allegorical. It reflected the image implied in the Competition Announcement a year prior; a modern Yugoslavia (the Kings Standard) resting on the foundation of a modern Croatia (the Neboder on Jelačić square).

On the 26th of March, 1932, the Saturday of Easter weekend, the newspaper Večer published an opinion piece entitled “Easter hope” headlined: “Of which we are expecting alleviation of unemployment and poverty” with the first line of the sub-headline reading “resurrection from new construction.”

Of which we are expecting alleviation of unemployment and poverty

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81 “Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica.”
82 “Od Čega Očekujemo Ublaženje Nezaposlenosti i Bijede,” Večer, 26 Ožujka (March) 1932.
The piece was illustrated with a sketch of the new design for the Neboder from the “endowment block” as well as other sketches illustrating concepts for the project. Though the item was illustrated with images of the imagined future of the “endowment block,” it was about much more; it was a modernist, urbanist manifesto for economic recovery. The writers of Večer argued that the key to economic recovery was in urban development projects, such as the Endowment Block, which would lead to a broad recovery though employment of skilled labor and the need for materials that such construction projects demanded. The solution to Zagreb’s economic crisis, they argued, would be found by pursuing solutions to Zagreb’s urban issues. To accomplish this, the paper called for a partnership of public investment with private developers, through the city government’s provision of loans to developers. These loans were to be used for both “rebuilding neighborhoods” and “building modern neighborhoods in the city,” which would help alleviate the housing crisis. In addition, Večer called for fulfillment of commitments for money to be invested to both maintain and improve the city tram system.

Three days after the Večer piece ran, a public exhibition opened for the proposed plan for the Endowment Block. This exhibition included the three of the images used to illustrate the Večer piece, which were parts of the architects formal design proposal, as well as an architectural model of the project. Despite this concerted effort to build momentum behind the unified Endowment Block project, funding for such a massive endeavor was impossible to find in 1932. Rather than wait for economic conditions to improve, the city moved forward by maintaining the design in principle, but breaking the actual plan down into thirteen component plots of land and selling them off to individual developers, with one of the plots reserved for the Neboder that had been part of the unified project. With the land thus subdivided, half of the plots were sold and

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83 Ibid.
84 Plavšić, "Izložba Projekta za Izgradnju Zakladnog Zemljišta na Jelačićevom Trgu."
developed immediately, including two of the three plots facing Jelačić square, with six of the buildings completed by the end of 1933, another completed in 1934, and an eighth completed in 1935. But the Neboder itself remained un-built.

The Endowment Block was not the only development plan the city put forward after announcing the international design competition. In January of 1932, the city announced an effort to alleviate the housing problem by converting the city’s motorcycle racing track into a new housing area. The proposed housing area was generally undesirable, being on the far west side of the city, far from the commercial center in Donji grad and the new industrial development south of the main train station, and separated from the rest of the city by both a canal and the rail lines running west out of the city. The focus of the Večer story about the project though focused on the popularity of the motorcycle racing track and the problems with placing a residential neighborhood in the area. The paper’s headline for the story was: “The Fate of the Motorcyclists Track…” indicating more concern about the popular entertainment venue, rather then excitement over the new housing area. Yet, the land was a space that the city government could regulate, and therefore, it represented an opportunity for the city to manage continuing growth and get ahead of another round of “wild building” construction on the periphery of the city while waiting for the new general plan still years in the future.

In 1933 several Croatian architects participated in the fourth Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (The International Congress of Modern Architecture or CIAM). This particular congress was a significant one, as it focused not on just architecture, but “the Functional City” and the relationship between architecture and urban planning. The participants

85 Blau, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 141.
87 Ibid.
88 Blau, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 170.
engaged in a comparative study of 33 cities (including Zagreb) in an effort to establish a scientific foundation for universal rules of urban planning.\textsuperscript{89} One of the key outcomes of the congress was a new view of the most effective form of urban structure. This new view called for individual buildings, with significant green space surrounding them. This was diametric opposite of the previous views which had guided the regulation of Zagreb up to that point, with its unified façades and open interior courtyards. Such a building pattern as the CIAM congress was proposing was not totally alien to the city either. Small, stand alone multi-unit apartment buildings with centralized open spaces had been used as a basis for quickly built refugee housing in the city since 1921.\textsuperscript{90} But these buildings were seen as somewhat temporary structures, built and paid for by the city government, and designed for easy and quickness of construction, rather than ideal solutions for long term housing.

In 1935, the city approved the development of a townhouse project, which did break significantly from previous methods of urban building in the city. The First Savings Bank Cooperative settlement was an effort to deal with the housing crisis by creating a new form of domicile.\textsuperscript{91} Rather than apartments, this development would consist of privately owned row houses. In the economic environment of the Great Depression, where private capital for larger development projects was difficult to organize, this project had an eminent logic, allowing for micro-capital to fill the void. The project also allowed owners to choose one of three floor plans for their unit.\textsuperscript{92} The row houses of this project served both and economic and social function. On an economic level, this form of construction allowed to maximize the number of units per parcel of land, while simultaneously reducing the cost per unit over a stand alone house. On a social

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid. @ 168.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid. @ 172.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
level, the continuous façade of the row house supported the use of space to transmit the ideal image of bourgeois citizenship, in the same way that the flush façades of the larger, multistory buildings of Donji grad had up until that point. Even the choice of multiple floor plans served this dual economic and social purpose, creating desirability to the units through a sense of agency and individuality inside, out of public view, while at the same time imposing the conformity of the ideal bourgeois citizen externally.

Also 1935, an effort was made to prepare the public for the impact the new regulatornia osnova would have on Kaptol. Svijet published a cover story entitled simply, Regulatica Kaptola u Zagerbu.93 This article, unlike the one published in 1927 focused only on Victor Kovačić’s vision for Kaptol. In contrast to the 1927 article, there was no attempt to visually connect the Cathedral and the Bishop’s Castle with Jelačić square.

Victor Kovačić’s 1910 Plan for Dolac, Kaptol, and Vlaška Street 94

93 “Regulacija Kaptola u Zagrebu,” Svijet, 9, Veljača (February) 1935.
94 Ibid. @ 135.
But the article did reproduce two of Kovačić’s plans, both of which called for the removal of the private houses built on irregular plots of land just south of the Bishop’s Castle. Beyond this though, the article portrayed Kovačić’s ideas as deeply patriotic. One of his proposals was for a statue of Nikoli Zrinski, a Croatian nobleman made famous for his defeat of an Ottoman invasion, to be place in the vicinity of the Cathedral.

Kovačić’s own patriotic feeling were expressed in the same reasoning as follows: "The order of such construction and raising of a monument to Nikola Zrinski, glorious fighter for Christianity against the Turks, would be developed for the Croatian people in the shadows of the Christian Cathedral on the site, which once served to defend against the Turks, a famous historical place.

This was used to argue for an explicitly Croatian, rather than a simply Catholic focus to his desires.

In addition to this argument buttressing the nationalist character of Kovačić’s ideas, the point was made that these plans were also all nearly a quarter of a century old, thus establishing an historical element to them. Beyond this though, Svijet made a visual argument. Svijet magazine had a practice of publishing two covers, and outer cover, which was purely visual, and an inner cover, which was the beginning of the feature article of the issue. In this case, the magazine used two different images of the Cathedral. On the outer cover, they presented an image of the rebuilt Cathedral from a particularly striking view on Tkalčićeva street which was well known to the current population of the city. But this image was contrasted with the inner cover, which showed the Cathedral as it had existed before the 1880 earthquake. The images were a subtle reminder that the “historic” Cathedral in the popular imagination was, in fact, a relatively new building, barely half a century old. In this vein, Kovačić’s ideas for the regulation of Kaptol were nearly as historic as the Cathedral itself. As a result, Kovačić’s

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95 Ibid. @ 134-135.  
96 Ibid. @ 148.  
97 Ibid.
concepts, which were clearly modern in design and function, were now presented as historical in character and an overtly nationalist statement. Modern, rational urban planning was to be implemented as the fulfillment of an historical, national project.

Conclusions

After erecting the Ban Jelačić statue and inscribing the square with potent Croatian national meaning in the late nineteenth century, the drive to modernize and implant Croatian national meaning in broader Zagreb continued unabated from 1895 until 1935. The modernist project to fulfill the idea of the Croatian Metropolis progressed essentially unchallenged in practical terms from the 1895 until 1935. But this project was piecemeal, rather than a unified,

98 Ibid.
coherent plan. It was economic conditions, rather than political or social conditions that challenged those who sought to pursue the Croatian Metropolis project. Elements were added to the urban landscape as economic conditions permitted. But the dramatic success of the Croatian Metropolis project was one of its own worst enemies in terms of rational urban development. The massive influx of population, especially after the end of the First World War, overwhelmed the existing *regulatornia osnova*. It was the response to this challenge that eventually brought criticism of the management of urban development into the open.

The piecemeal approach allowed an attack on two levels, one practical, the other esthetic. On the practical level, the lack of a coherent long range plan resulted in the city always reacting, rather than preparing for the next influx of population. Even the 1923 *regulatornia osnova* was a partial measure, focusing on only a portion of the city’s territory, and even though the plan produced a dramatic increase in the city’s housing inventory, the continued growth of population resulted in no net change in the number of people living in “sub-standard” housing. The lack of a long range plan had also resulted in the phenomenon of “wild houses” outside of the older parts of the city, and the fully regulated *Donji grad* area. This is what allowed the practical objections to the city’s management of development to segue into an esthetic critique as well. Beyond the practical matter of the irregular patter of development, these buildings were also a distinct contrast from the well ordered *Donji grad*. These wild buildings were built to individual needs and they were placed where space allowed, rather than according to the exacting building code of the city of Zagreb.

On the practical level, these neighborhoods of “wild houses” were a challenge to the city that needed to provide services, and the building code was also somewhat a guarantee of safe living conditions. But the esthetic of these areas was one of “the village” rather than a modern
city as well. The significance of this esthetic is reinforced by the fact that despite the deep concern over the “wild buildings” of the periphery, no mention was made of the illegal buildings of the “parallel city” which had been built between 1850 and 1895, and continued to be built, in Doniji grad. The buildings of the “parallel city” were every bit as “wild” as the “wild houses” of the periphery, but were invisible to the public, and therefore, apparently, of much less concern. Another element of the esthetic critique focused on the older, irregular buildings of the older parts of town. The description of Dolac and Tkalčićeva street as the “ugliest” parts of the city indicate a deep desire to see these older parts of the city rebuilt in a modern, orderly way.

The city leadership responded to these challenges by creating the City Regulation Office in 1928, and embarking on a program of deliberate, long term planning. The Endowment Block project was a clear example of this on the micro level, and the plan for a new regulatornia osnova was an effort to create a new, long term plan to manage the city’s growth from approximately 200,000 up to 350,000 residents. But once again, economic challenges impeded the implementation of these plans. The collapse of private capital forced the Endowment Block to be piecemealed. The guidance for the Competition Announcement did lay out a broad vision for a modern, orderly metropolis, but despite the success of the international competition for a new general plan for the city did not produce an actual plan to fulfill it.

Though the modernists were continuously pragmatic in their approach, two significant changes did take place near the end of the period. First, the modernists began to portray their plans for modernization as the fulfillment of historic development. The repeated reference to Victor Kovačić’s plans provided a vehicle for this. The city’s decision to implement Kovačić’s plan for the Dolac market provided a basis for this argument, leading to further calls to implement his other plans for the area in and around Jelačić square. The second significant shift
that did begin to manifest itself at the end of this period was a more explicit statement of their patriotic and nationalist views. This indicates that those holding the modernist position could no longer take for granted that their views would be understood as supporting the Croatian national project. The decision to support the concept of a strong Yugoslavia built on the foundation of a modern Croatia, as expressed in the Competition Announcement of 1930, was now one that need to be defended, along with the Croatian patriotism of those who supported that idea.
Chapter 7

The Struggle for the Character of the City and the Nation: 1936 – 1940
The period from 1936 to 1940 witnessed a new period of significant public contestation over the future of Zagreb’s urban development. This chapter chronicles both the urban focus of this contestation and its use as a means to debate Croatia’s role in Yugoslavia. I thus show the emergence of a new form of Croatian nationalism, one that symbolically rejected modernization as a means of national development and embraced preservation as a means to ensure Croatia’s survival as a national community. This contestation, pivoting around modernizing older Zagreb, was initiated by publication of the city’s proposal for the new *regulatornia osnova*. This new proposal was in the tradition of the 1864 Urban Plan rather than the 1923 Urban Plan. It was a grand re-imagining of the city which would once again transform Zagreb into a modern urban space, particularly the area between the city’s railroad tracks and the Sava River. The focus of the public contestation that emerged was not over the broad sweep of the proposed plan, but rather over the plan’s impact on the older parts of the city. This public contestation represented a significant shift in public view over the appropriate way to deal with the city’s urban spaces, away from modernization and towards preservation. In this regard, the public contestation over the 1936 *regulatornia osnova* was embedded in, and part of, a significant shift within the Croatian national project. This chapter illuminates these dynamics.

The timeframe of this chapter is not intended to suggest that efforts to preserve older parts of the city began in 1936. The efforts discussed here and the contestation they produced grew out of an older set of efforts and struggles. This chapter focuses on this timeframe because it represents a significant shift in the general public support, and eventually success of these efforts at preservation. Prior to this period, the preservationists were essentially tilting at windmills, with a very occasional success, but generally losing their battles. By 1931 though, they had established the general idea of historical preservation of older parts of the city as a basis.
for future urban planning. The significant change in the period from 1936 to 1940 was the fact that the preservationists were able to expand the imagined extent of ‘historic’ Zagreb to include Ban Jelačić square, a space never previously viewed as ‘historic’ or subject to preservation. The emergence of this new social consensus among the general population of Zagreb, that Ban Jelačić Square was a site of historical significance which needed to be preserved, represented a diametric shift from the previous view of the square as a showcase of modernization and national progress.

The significance of this shift in view is in the both real and imagined roles of Ban Jelačić Square at the time. The square was both the center of social life within Zagreb, and a deeply national place, which was seen to reflect the charter of Croatia through its physical form. The shift in popular understanding of the square, from a place that should be continually improved and modernized, to a place that should be viewed as historical, and therefore preserved from damage, represented more than a shift in architectural taste. It was a fundamental shift in the popular understanding of the role of the Croatian national project, as the population saw Croatia itself reflected in Ban Jelačić Square. This shift in public sentiment was publicly chronicled and debated, yet that debate has been largely overlooked to date because it was essentially rendered moot in the spring of 1941 by Yugoslavia’s defeat and occupation. But it is important to remember that, though the debate ultimately had little impact on future urban development in Zagreb, those participating in it had no way to know that at the time.

The 1936 Proposed Regulatornia Osnova

After the conclusion of the 1931 international competition for a new regulatornia osnova, the City Regulation Office consolidated the entries and began working on a formal, official
proposal. Five years later, the plan was completed and revealed for the public. The official proposal bore a strong resemblance to several of the proposals.\footnote{Eve Blau, Ivan Rupnik, \textit{Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice} (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2007). @ 166.}

![General Regulator Plan for the City of Zagreb (1936)](image)

**General Regulator Plan for the City of Zagreb (1936)**\footnote{Base Image from Ivo Maročević, \textit{Zagreb Njim Samim} (Zagreb: Dureux, 1999). @ 87.}

The plan was distinctly in the tradition of the grand design, as exemplified by the 1864, 1887, and 1907 proposals. Some key features of the plan were a new road grid for the area between the railroad tracks and the Sava river, an extension of the long Zrinjevac park south of
the main railroad station to the river, and a large sports complex south of the Sava River. The plan also included a Sava river port to the southeast of the city, and a major new rail yard to support the new port. The plan for the new residential areas between the railroad tracks and the river called for essentially removing all the existing private housing on the meandering streets and roads, and replacing it with modern buildings on a modern road grid.

The reaction to this plan did not focus on any of these broad projects, but rather on proposed changes to the older part of the city. The frame of the debate that would evolve was taking shape before the plan was actually published. In 1935, the newspaper Večer published an article with the title: “Over the previous 800 years Zagrebites had more success fighting the demolition of historical buildings and sights, than today”3 The article recounted a series of disputes in the city’s history where the population had successfully prevented the destruction of older buildings for new construction. The article therefore presented resistance of, and constraints to new construction as “historic” or “traditional” urban behavior for the residents of Zagreb, a characteristic of the city’s population that the modernists were now ignoring in their relentless efforts to transform older parts of the city.

The Večer article indicated the extent to which modernization was becoming a significant concern within the urban population Zagreb, but also the degree to which the preservationists had been generally unsuccessful in challenging the broad push to continue to modernize the older parts of the city. This concern with preservation was reflected in a broad shift taking place across the Croatian elite. Many Croatian writers and artists were beginning to use the peasantry as a lens to illuminate the Croatian national experience, just as many Croatian politicians had been drawn into Peasantism as a means to express their nationalist sentiments.

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The extent to which elite views of the peasant had changed could be seen in the way peasants were presented in Croatian literature by the mid 1930s. One of the clearest examples of this was Miroslav Krleža, who had become widely recognized as a key leader in the Croatian community of writers. Krleža had become famous for his works of fiction, both stories and plays, which had been compelling drama, and also strong social criticism. His early works had focused on the Croatian elite and the urban population of Zagreb. But in 1936, Krleža published an epic poem, *Balade Petrice Kerempuha* (Ballads of Petrica Kerempuh), which recounted hundreds of years of Croatian history. But unlike his previous works, this grand narrative was told from the perspective of the peasant, not the landed elite or the urban gentry. The main character of this epic, Petrica Kerempuh, has been described as the “traditional figure of a wily peasant.”\(^4\) This choice of characterization was even more striking, as Krleža was engaging in “a Marxist critique of restrictive, middle-class society on all levels of his literary activity…”\(^5\) and therefore, much more sympathetic to the urban working class rather than the rural peasantry. Krleža’s choice of a peasant as his subject for telling his sweeping narrative of Croatian history reflected two significant social realities of the period. First, the peasant was increasingly becoming a focal point of Croatian elite thinking about the issues of nation and nationalism. Second, the urban working class was a relatively new phenomenon within Croatian society, and therefore, attempting to tell the story of Croatian history across centuries from a new perspective (one not focused on the social elite) could not use the urban proletariat as a vehicle; it simply had not existed except for the last few decades.

\(^4\) This particular work was also notable in that it used the older Kajkavian dialect used in and around Zagreb, rather than the literary standard Štokavian. Ralph Bogert, *The Writer as Naysayer: Miroslav Krleža and the Aesthetic of Interwar Central Europe*, vol. 20, *UCLA Slavic Studies* (Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1990). @ 55 & 77.

\(^5\) Ibid. @ 113.
Writers, such as Krleža, had the luxury of shifting the focus of their narratives and characters to embrace a new idea of Croatian national identity which reflected Stjepan Radic’s focus on preservation rather than modernization as the key to national fulfillment. The general urban population of Zagreb did not have such an option. There was no “peasantry” or “village society” in Zagreb to preserve. The Croatian Metropolis project had focused on the physical reality of the city as the community’s means of both participating in and expressing the Croatian national project since 1850. In the quest for something to apply the new nationalist desire for preservation upon, the city itself became a viable object of focus. This new impetus towards preservation, combined with the very public, though somewhat limited, contestations over urban development of the previous decade provided a field upon which those who wanted to contest the modernizing trajectory of the Croatian national project within Zagreb could engage the previously hegemonic modernist vision. The new proposed regulatorna osnova of 1936 provided an object of contestation, but not the only object. The symbolic struggle would also be carried out on Jelačić square.

This shift in public expressions of support for preservation within Zagreb coincided with a significant new push by Croatian politicians to extract concessions from the central government in Belgrade. In 1932, the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (SDK), which was the product of a political merger of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) and the Independent Democratic Party (SDS), had issued a statement declaring the new constitution and government promulgated under the Royal Dictatorship in 1931 as illegitimate and calling for Yugoslavia to be transformed into some form of confederation. This established the SDK as the de facto opposition party of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslavenska nationalna stranka, or JNS), the unofficial party of government. In the elections of 1935 the

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SDK took nearly 38% of the votes across Yugoslavia (the JNS took just over 60%), and 75% of the vote within the Croatian majority portions of the country. The leadership of the SDK, still heavily dominated by members of the HSS, used this strong electoral showing to renew the push for dismantling the centralized government structure and establishing some form of self government for Croatia. Thus, the emergence of popular support for the preservationist perspective coincided with the renewed Croatian push for political autonomy.

The Origins of the Urban Preservationist Efforts

The outlines of this struggle were established early on. The preservationists presented their attack on the modernists vision as a narrow critique, rather than a broad assault on the project overall. The 1935 Večer article cited previously was an example of the direction this mode of contestation would take. The article did not challenge the goal of modernizing Zagreb. Rather, it challenged specific projects as damaging to the historic character of the city. This argument had power because it was based on ideas which had already been established within the consciousness of the urban population of Zagreb, including the modernist camp.

The concept of spatially transforming the city from its old dyadic division between Gradec and Kaptol, into a new dyad of Novi (New) and Stari (Old) was codified in the mid 1920s, when the local historian Emilij Laszowski published an updated history of Zagreb entitled simply Stari i Novi Zagreb. This work had clearly divided the city into historic and a modern parts, with Donji grad, the grand, modern city envisioned in 1864, as “Novi Zagreb” and Gradec and Kaptol as “Stari Zagreb.” This construction was not an invention of Laszowski’s, but rather reflected the way the population of the city had come to see Zagreb’s urban space by the 1920s.

7 Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003). @ 259.
8 Emilij Laszowski, Stari i Novi Zagreb (Zagreb: Braća Hrvatskog Zmaja, 1925; reprint, 1994, Školska knjiga).
Laszowski’s book also showed the extent to which the Croatian Metropolis vision of Croatian nationalism was embedded in the urban elite of Zagreb. The first paragraph of the book stated:

Are there anywhere Croats, for whom would not be dear Zagreb-city, the heart of all the Croats, the heart of Croatian culture and national consciousness. All the history of Zagreb is closely connected with the history of the Croatian people and its culture. Therefore it must be that every Croat has an interest in the history of Zagreb and its traditions.9

But this work also showed how the Croatian Metropolis vision was already beginning to change into a preservationist trajectory by 1925. The work was published by the Braća Hrvatskog Zmaja (the Brotherhood of the Croatian Dragon), an organization which had been founded in 1905. The organization saw itself as “a guardian of Croatian sacred objects and traditions,”10 and spent much of its time collecting and preserving archival materials, but it also engaged in efforts to preserve historic buildings. The book itself recounts one such effort that ultimately failed; a house in Dolac which had some historic significance. Laszowski recounts the history of the Plemić house, and the efforts to save it.11 The preservation efforts began in 1908, when Victor Kovačoć's plans for a new market in Dolac were first produced.12 But, as Laszowski admits, “The energy behind destruction [of the Plemić house] was very strong.”13 The goal of this effort was limited, and not intended to halt the new market project or save the entire Dolac area, only this single building. Yet despite this limited goal and the support of several prominent individuals, including a personal appeal by Iso Kršnjavi to the mayor in 1911, the final plans published in 1925 called for the demolition of the Plemić house to make way for the new Dolac marketplace.14

9 Ibid. @ 3.
11 Laszowski, Stari i Novi Zagreb. @ 22-32.
12 Ibid. @ 30.
13 Ibid. @ 31.
14 Ibid.
The struggle over this historic house in Dolac illuminates several important realities about the preservationist perspective in Zagreb before 1936. First, the movement had its origins in the urban elite of Zagreb, and thus it was not just Stjepan Radić and his fellow Peasantists who were contemplating preservation as an important element of the Croatian national project. Secondly, though the movement was established by ‘insiders’ of the Croatian Metropolis project, these preservationists in Zagreb did not have much power or influence initially. Even with more than a decade to plan and the backing of a few very significant individuals in Croatian society, they could not mobilize enough support to save a single building. The preservationists themselves admitted that the modernists had a ‘very strong energy’ supporting them, and that the preservationist camp was fighting against a more powerful opinion in support of modernization at the time.

Despite this balance in their favor, the modernists themselves had generally accepted this new division of the city and the goal of the preservation of Stari Zagreb in the 1931 competition announcement. But to the modernists, Stari Zagreb was seen as limited to a specifically defined area. The competition announcement had specifically exempted Gradec from any new regulation, and specifically recognized the historic character of Kaptol and cautioned planners to take this into consideration in solving the traffic issues around Dolac. The call to respect the historic character of Stari Zagreb was very much a call to the modernists to abide by the guidelines and goals they had already set out. But the preservationists also appropriated unto themselves the power to define which areas fell within these ‘historic’ older parts of the city.

15 "Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica," (Narodne Novine, 1930). @ 58 & 68.
16 Though, this view was not universally held among the modernists, as the calls to completely redesign parts of the older city in S Vijet Magazine indicated.
The modernist initial response was an effort at accommodation. They seem to have viewed the debate over the preservation of Stari Zagreb as a minor detail which had already been addressed in a broader culmination of the latest grand modernizing design. The preservationists made no effort to derail the massive land clearing project south of the railroad tracks. The city even went so far as to add the phrase “and historic preservation of Kaptol” to the end of the official title of the regulatoria osnova proposal when it was formally sent to Belgrade for approval from the central government. But this accommodation did not satisfy the preservationists. Once the general principle had been conceded by the modernists, the preservationists began to argue for a broader definition of Stari Zagreb.

A Shift in Public Sentiment

The incident that appears to have sparked the preservationist into stronger action did not relate to the new regulatoria osnova, but was a skirmish developed unexpectedly in the spring of 1938 over construction on Jelačić square. The contestation itself erupted in a matter of days, and was over almost as soon as it began, but it was very significant because it revolved around the space of Jelačić square, which even though it was no longer the city’s daily market, had remained central to the daily life of the city. By 1930, Zagreb had six distinct sets of tram lines comprising 17 kilometers of track, all of which either originated in or passed through Ban Jelačić Square. Thus, not only did the city’s road system depend on Ban Jelačić Square to function as a linkage point between the older and newer parts of the city, but the public transportation system had established the square as the central linkage point as well. This created a structural pattern that “pushed” the general population into the square. In addition to

18 "Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica." @ 39.
this structural “push” the emergence of the numerous cafes on the square through the second half of the 19th century also produced a cultural “pull” that augmented the main market as a reason to go to the square. The result was the emergence of Ban Jelačić Square as a place for people to meet in a social setting.

As the city grew larger, the logic of Jelačić square as the community’s space for social gathering grew stronger as the population growth was driven significantly by large migrations from the countryside. This meant that much of the city’s population was very unfamiliar with the city itself. But because of Jelačić square’s dual function as market and as transportation hub for the city, even the newest arrivals quickly became acquainted with the square’s location. Even after the main market had moved to Dolac, the square’s role as transportation hub meant that people going to Dolac would pass through the square on their way. Thus, even newcomers with limited knowledge of the local geography would come to know the square very quickly. The square’s position as one of the city’s very few universally recognized locations and the fact that the city transportation system literally pulled people there led logically to Jelačić square being established as the city’s recognized meeting place.

The population of the city did not just choose the square, though. The population of Zagreb chose a specific space on the square as the recognized place for social connection: the tail of the statue of Ban Jelačić. This social consensus was described by an Austrian who had arrived in Zagreb as a five year old child in 1938. In his memoirs Wolfgang Georg Fischer described his experiences upon arrival in Zagreb: “…first I came to know the city’s landmarks… before
anything else the huge statue on the main city square devoted to Ban Jelačić.”¹⁹ Fischer includes this passage in his description of his personal fondness for the statue:

Winking to each other, the people of Zagreb call out:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Po grbom, po lepom,} & \quad 
\text{Come rain or come shine,} \\
\text{Rendes pod repom!} & \quad \text{Let’s meet under the tail!}
\end{align*}
\]

By that they mean the bronze tail on the horse….²⁰

The choice of the statue as meeting place is understandable, as it was located in the center of the square, and, with the removal of the Maduševac Well in 1912, was the only definitive landmark left on the square until the installation of a public clock in the late 1920s. The choice of “under the tail” may seem odd at first glance, but there is logic to this particular location. The back of the statue was the closest part of the monument to the largest part of the city and the tram lines on the south side of the square. Thus, the tail was the closest part of the statue to the points where the majority of the city’s population would be arriving to the square.

In this way, the square took on a new role in the lives of the residents of Zagreb. The square became not only a functional space, where the necessities of survival were available. The square now served a social function which drew the population to it, even if they did not intend on staying there once they had gathered in their social group. In this way the square remained central to the daily life of the city past the end of its functional centrality as the main market space for the city. It was this new social role of the square in the practice of daily life in Zagreb that ensured its importance would not diminish after the departure of the main market place.

²⁰ Ibid. @ 185.
In 1937 a new building project was announced that would replace one of the older houses built on the north side of the square and replace it with a new building owned by Assicurazioni Generali, an Italian insurance company. The building had been designed by a well known Italian architect in Rome, in the Italian modernist style. The public reaction to the project was not a product of the concept of a new building, but the result of the process of building it. For the new building to be built, the old one had to be removed. This was accomplished in the spring of 1938 with the result that a new view of Gradec, now more often called Gornji grad (Upper Town), was created. For the first time in almost eight decades, people could stand on Ban Jelačić Square and see the older part of the city.

The response from the population of the city was intense interest in the new view. On the 18th of May Hrvatski dnevnik (Croatian Diary), the “Organ of the right wing of the HSS,” published a piece with a photograph of the view entitled “From Jelačić square is opened a view onto Gornji grad.” The article argued that the new situation should be made permanent and the permit to build on the location be withdrawn. In presenting this idea, the paper specifically contrasted the image of the old city with the modern buildings being built on the square, extolling the “romantic location” of the older part of the city and declaring that “This contrast between the new and modern Jelačić square and the old Upper Town distinguishes deeply and impressively.”

Three days later, Hrvatski dnevnik published another article with the same photograph entitled “The View From Jelačić Square” and a headline which stated: “Zagrebites wish [hope]
that the view from Jelačić Square to Upper Town won’t be cutoff by a tall building.” The article was described as a consolidation of a large number of letters to the paper from the public.

We received several letters from citizens, from which we bring in short this:

The view from Jelačić square as can be seen today after the demolition of buildings on the corner and Radic [street] and Jelačić square, is the same as it was in 1851. In those days ban Jelačić issued the provision, by which to carry out the project with the foundation and construction of a walking park around the entire Gronji grad. These files still exist and were transferred into the regulatornia osnova of the Zagreb City program among other walks still raise a nice view of Gronji grad from Jelačić square. The city's government, as a general obligation for the case of building a skyscraper, should call public proceedings before dividing society with a building permit, so that citizens who are interested in the vicinity, and those who are interested in this question as citizens of Zagreb, may make statements about this project.

This effort to tie the preservation of the new view of Gronji grad to Ban Jelačić himself represented a deliberate effort to present the goals of the preservationist as a necessary act of respect for the Ban and his vision of the city.

Shortly after the piece ran, another, larger article appeared in the Zagreb press by Gjuro Szabo, a local historian, titled “The Resurrection of Old Zagreb.” In this piece, Szabo argued that the new view was important because it connected the population of Zagreb to their forgotten past. He lamented of the current generation of Zagrebites that “They pass along the streets of Lower Town as if they no nothing of the existence of Upper Town, which in truth, not long ago was Zagreb, which built Lower Town.” The piece included two photographs, to show how the new view compared to the view of Gronji grad in earlier times. But the photographs themselves actually illustrate how little interest there had been in this particular visual connection in the past. The photograph of the “Former Jelačić Square” was not taken from ground level, but from either the top floor or roof of a building on the south side of the square.

25 “Pogled s Jelačičevog Trga,” Hrvatski dnevnik, 21 Svibnja (May) 1938.
26 Gjuro Szabo, ”Uskrs Staroga Zagreba,” 22, V. 1938.
27 Ibid.
The View Upon *Gornji Grad* From The Former *Jelačić Square*\textsuperscript{28}

The View Upon *Gornji Grad* Today\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.

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This is clear when the two photographs are compared, as the photograph taken in 1938 was from a much lower angle. The absence of an actual image, either as an artist's drawing or a photograph, of the view as it had existed before the first building blocking the view of Gornji grad from the square indicates that interest in the view was only piqued after it had been blocked.

On the 25th of May, the newspaper Obzor, now the voice of the urban establishment in Zagreb, voiced support for the proposal of leaving the view open as well, arguing that there must be some way to reach an accommodation with the land's new owners to leave the plot open. Obzor did not completely support the idea of leaving the site vacant, but rather supporting building a shorter building that would not block the view, perhaps with a café on the roof so people could relax and enjoy the view in comfort. Despite this broad consensus across the political spectrum opposing it, no public hearings were held and the Assicurazionni Generali building project proceeded on schedule.

This broad agreement across the entire spectrum of the Zagreb press supporting a call for historic preservation was new, and represented a broad shift in general sympathy for the preservationist perspective. Perhaps, because the issue in question was not even a technical matter of historic preservation, some parts of the urban establishment felt comfortable supporting the call to leave the new view intact. But the core of the argument to preserve the view, as expressed by prof. Gjuro Szabo, was not just to enhance the aesthetic of Jelačić square, but to counteract to some degree the success of the modernists in establishing the new, modern parts of the city as the lived space of Zagreb. By maintaining a direct view of the older part of the city in Jelačić square, the preservationists sought to establish a permanent reminder of the 'historic'

29 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
character of the city, and thus make Stari Zagreb part of the lived space of the city for its entire population.

The emergence of a broad consensus in support of preserving the historic view of Gornji grad seems to have encouraged them to engage in even more efforts and directly challenged the portions of the regulatornia osnova which they saw relating to Stari Zagreb. On 24th of June, 1938 the city government formally proposed a package of three laws to enact the new urban plan:

- Regulation for the execution of the general regulation plan for the city of Zagreb
- Regulation for the execution of the general and conservation plan for the historical part of Zagreb
- Building Regulations for the City of Zagreb

These three separate proposals indicate how significant the preservationist challenge was becoming, by the proposal of a separate law specifically focused on historic preservation of the older part of the city. The law’s specific wording also indicated the extent to which the preservationists were making progress. The 1936 proposal had included the phrase, “historical preservation of Kaptol.” This new law was less definitive in title, and therefore encompassed a larger part of the city than just Kaptol.

The challenge to the new urban plan began before the laws were even formally proposed. Building on the momentum of the Assicurazionni Generali efforts, one Dr. Petar Knoll wrote an extensive critique of the new plan entitled, Stari Zagreb (A Review of the Regulatory Plan), which was published in the journal Zagreb, the “The Social Review for Zagrebians” in June.33 A summary of the same plan was published in Večer on the 14th of June, 1938. The paper billed

32 Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 238.
33 Petar Knoll, "Stari Zagreb (Osvrt Na Regulatorni Osnovu)," Zagreb : Revija Društva Zagrepčana VI., no. 6. (1938).
the review as the “cries from the heart of every good citizen of Zagreb «Leave Stari Zagreb in Peace»”\(^{34}\) The sub-headline asked “Is Zagreb unable, from its enormous territory, to preserve a small place for the monuments of its own cultural past?” The significant aspect of Dr. Knoll’s critiques of the new plan was how it sought to shift the debate. Despite the attention grabbing headline of the story, the new *regulatorija osnova* did not impose any physical changes on *stari* Zagreb. The preservation of Gradec and the limits on new regulation for Kaptol had been accepted as a foundation of any new plan going back to the 1931 competition announcement, which had stated very clearly that “*Gornji grad* … is to be excluded from any regulation, so as to retain its historical-cultural characteristics and individuality.”\(^{35}\) and “Because as is historically known in Zagreb, Kaptol, with *Gornji grad* is the most important part of the city.”\(^{36}\)

Dr. Knoll was not arguing for merely preserving the areas where there was now public consensus, but for expanding the zone of regulatory protection to areas that had a spatial influence on the ‘historic’ parts of the city. The reference to *Gornji grad* in the critique was not limited to the hilltop community, but the streets surrounding it, *Ilica, Bregovita ulica, Duga ulica*, and *Mesnička ulica*.\(^{37}\) This approach was clearly illustrated by Dr. Knoll’s call for restrictions on development along *Ilica*. This street was a main thoroughfare from the western part of the new *Donji grad* into Jelačić square, and owed it significant growth as a middle class shopping center to the fact that it connected Jelačić square to Savska street, and was therefore the

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\(^{34}\) “Pustite Stari Zagreb na Miru,” *Večer*, 14 Lipnja (June) 1938.

\(^{35}\) “Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica.” @ 58.

\(^{36}\) Ibid. @ 68.

\(^{37}\) The use of the name *Duga ulica* was itself an anachronism, as the street had been re-named Radičeva ulica (Radić Street) in honor of Pavel Radić, the nephew of Stjepan Radić, who had been killed on the floor of the Yugoslav Parliament in the same incident in which Stjepan Radić had been wounded. Zoran Gregl, Božena, Zadro Josip Šentija, ed., *Zagrebačke Ulice* (Zagreb: Nakada Zadro, 1994). @ 232-233.
northern boundary of the area “which is known to be the future center of the new lower town” from the original concept of Zagreb’s development dating back to the early 1860s. By the late 1930s, the street was already fully developed. The new building regulations put no limit on how tall buildings on Ilica could be. As a result, Dr. Knoll argued that because Ilica ran along the bottom of the hill upon which Gronji grad sat, future construction of tall buildings would block the view of the older part of town, as well as well as leave those on the walking park around Gronji grad nothing to see but the back side of new building, which would block the view of the newer parts of Zagreb. This concern was clearly based not in preserving the physical integrity of Stari Zagreb, but in preserving the spatial connection between Stari and Novi Zagreb; an echo of prof. Gjuro Szabo’s argument as to why the Assicurazionni Generali project on Jelačić square needed to be blocked. Dr. Knoll argued that he did not oppose the establishment of a new regulatory plan for the city, nor did he oppose the dramatic expansion for the city envisioned in the existing regulatoria osnova plan. The core of Dr. Knoll’s argument was an effort to expand the idea of urban preservation beyond simply preventing the destruction of the older parts of the city. This new concept of preservation called for also maintaining certain aspects of the visual and spatial relationships between both the older and newer parts of the city.

The challenge presented by the publication of Dr. Knoll’s views was significant enough that the authors of the new regulatoria osnova published a detailed response on the 22nd of June, two days before the new laws were formally proposed. Večer billed the response by the city planners as the joining of “The battle over stari Zagreb.” The response was a very detailed effort to refute the preservationist arguments. Prof. Bauer, the chief city planner, referred to very
specific issues, and addressed them in very concrete terms. The very first point of rebuttal illustrates the logic of the response:

Moving on to some criticism of the objections must be stated:

1. That for practical reasons the proposed protection is completely inappropriate for the block of houses between Ilica, Mesnička street and the Dežman passage. This block does not contain even a single house worth protecting unless it is possibly the house at Mesnička street no. 1 (The Rosenfeld House), which must eventually fall to expand Ilica. The unconditional need for the expansion of Ilica is probably not doubted by any rational person in Zagreb, and after the expansion there will be a more general debate about the historical character which the Ilica criticisms mentioned.

   Even suggesting putting a portion of Ilica under the stricter regulations encountered for the construction of historical areas would undoubtedly justify the fiercest resistance to the legitimate owners and the public. [emphasis in the original]\(^{41}\)

Clearly the modernist position was that there were two issues involved in the regulation of Ilica, one of necessity, and the other of public consensus. The street needed to be expanded, and to that end some small sacrifices might be required. But, there was no public consensus on the idea that Ilica itself was an historic part of town, and to suggest that the street was would simply fuel resistance to progress, rather than a rational public debate about the proposition.

The response also specifically addressed the broader issue of the walking park and the view, both from and to the park. The Prof. Bauer countered that the proposed development, which the preservationist argument decried, would actually produce attractive buildings that would be nice views of their own. Prof. Bauer also argued that the side of the new buildings facing the hill upon which Gradec was located would be just as attractive as those facing the street, and cited the recently built Obrin Bank building as proof this phenomenon. Prof. Bauer concluded his response to the critique of the impact of development on the view to and from the Strossmayer walking park by stating: “The prominent law of architecture stating that houses should not be built under a hill with a view to the crest refers to a single house but does not apply

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
to the entire street or blocks separated by a hill (Prague, Salzburg, Graz)."42 This was an effort to mobilize both a recognized consensus on architecture and city planning with a direct reference to cities where these principles had been applied successfully in the same way the city planners of Zagreb wanted to apply them here. The core of these responses was more than a simple factual rebuttal. The tone shows an underlying view that the modernists believed the preservationists were not being sincere or intellectually honest in their arguments.

The preservationist position amounted to a clear effort to expand the footprint of Gornji grad beyond the hilltop portion of the town, the very reason it was known as the Upper Town, onto the streets surrounding it. At the core of this debate was a shifting of ground under the modernist position. The preservationists were attempting to extend the definition of ‘historic’ beyond the previous consensus of Kaptol and Gornji grad, to all of Stari Zagreb. Such a shift in the definition of what was an ‘historic’ part of the city, if successful, would have a significant impact on future modernist plans for development in the older parts of the city. The most immediate effect of such a change would be the area between Gradec and Kaptol, which one modernist writer had described as the “ugliest parts of the city.”43 This new equation of ‘old’ with ‘historic’ would prevent any effort to modernize this part of the city, which was clearly on the modernist agenda.

The debate between Professor Bauer and Dr. Knoll showed how the debate over the modernization of the city had shifted. The preservationists had advanced from a position of focusing on a single building project, to confronting the entire building program in the older parts of town. Dr. Knoll’s arguments with regard to the impact of the new regulations on the walking park around Gornji grad also showed how the preservationists had learned to mobilize

42 Ibid.
43 "Regulacija Zagreba," Svijet, 12 Ožuljak (March) 1927. @ 228.
the aesthetic arguments against modernization previously used by the modernists. In the 1920s and early 30s the modernists had pushed urban redevelopment in the older parts of Zagreb as a way to remove “ugly” buildings and disorderly areas to beautify the city. By 1938, the preservationists were mobilizing the aesthetic value of the views to and from the walking park to justify limits on new development.

It is important to note the preservationists showed absolutely no interest in saving the hundreds of buildings which would be demolished throughout the periphery of the city under the new plan. In addition, many of the buildings on the streets surrounding Gornji grad were newer than some of the “wild buildings” on the periphery. Some of the roughly 200 older buildings in Stari Zagreb which were endangered by the new regulatornia osnova were in fact, little more than peasant houses themselves, though they were tightly packed together, giving them an urban form. They could not be improved up to the modern building codes, but would have to be completely demolished if the owners wished to make any improvements to them. Yet, in the minds of the preservationists, these houses were to be protected because of their location in the oldest part of the city.

It is in the contrast of attitudes about the different parts of the city that the meaning of ‘historic’ for the preservationists can be gleaned. Those areas the preservationists considered ‘historic’ were those areas built in an urban context before the founding of the new Yugoslav state. These buildings were not being saved for their architectural value; many were in fact in very poor shape and of little architectural interests. They were being preserved because they were evidence of an urban Croatia that predated even the idea of Yugoslavia. The ‘wild buildings’ on the periphery of the city had mostly been built since then end of World War One and the founding of the new Yugoslav state. Though there were a few older structures in the
area on the periphery, for the most part, clearing these areas and replacing them with a modern street grid and modern buildings would simply replace one form of the Yugoslav part of the city with another. Therefore, what ‘historic’ really meant for the preservationists, even if they could not articulate it, was pre-Yugoslav.

The new strength and broader goals of the preservationist movement coincided with growing popularity for the SDK. That increasing strength was reflected in the results of parliamentary elections held in December of 1938, where the SDK’s share of the vote grew to 45% across Yugoslavia. Of significant concern to the regime in Belgrade was the fact that this growth in electoral power came not just from further solidifying the HSS support in Croatian areas, but also with SDS gains in Serbian parts of Yugoslavia as well. This fact threatened the ability of the regime in Belgrade to ensure future electoral victories.

In addition to this mounting domestic political pressure, the government in Belgrade was also facing a rapidly deteriorating international environment. Yugoslavia had cultivated close ties with France after World War I. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s Yugoslavia, along with Poland and Czechoslovakia, had been a key part of Anglo-French efforts to contain, initially the Soviet Union, and later a resurgent Germany as well. In March of 1938, Germany had annexed Austria, creating a mutual border between Yugoslavia and Germany and raised the specter of a new irredentist claim to Slovenia, in addition to the Italian claims on Dalmatia, the Hungarian claims against Croatia and Slavonia, and Bulgarian claims to Macedonia. Yugoslavia’s position deteriorated further in September of 1938, when France and England compelled Czechoslovakia to accede to German demands and surrender the Sudetenland, and then remained passive in March of 1939 when Germany annexed Bohemia. By the summer of

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44 Magaš, *Croatia through History*. @ 536.

45 Ibid.
1939 it was conceivable that disaffection in Croatia could be used as a pretext to engineer an effort to dismantle the Yugoslav state as well, which could lead to open war.

This combination of domestic and international pressures led to serious negotiations on decentralizing the government of Yugoslavia. In the summer of 1939 the Sporazum (agreement) was worked out between the SDK representatives and the government in Belgrade on Croatian autonomy. By the end of August, 1939, the various laws required were passed through the Yugoslav parliament to create an autonomous Croatian Banovina with broad self-governing powers. This effectively brought into reality Stjepan Radic’s vision of a Croatian republic within a Yugoslav state, and the SDK with the HSS as the majority member of the coalition, became the governing party of this territory.

The political uncertainty revolving around the new political push for Croatian autonomy had essentially put any other contentious political issues to the side, including the approval of the new regulatormia osnova. No significant action was taken to move the three laws required for the implementation of the plan after they were proposed in the summer of 1938. This delay allowed more time for other alternatives to be proposed. One significant alternative plan was published in 1939, in the journal Zagreb. The proposals was an new plan to resolve the “railway question” by removing the tracks that separated Donji grad from the newly planned residential district to the south, but leave the main train station in its original position.

The author of the plan, Eng. Mondecar, opened his argument for the change by stating:

Recently, Hrvatski dnevnik reported on the solution of the railway junction in Zagreb as presented in the regulatormia osnova. I therefore offer this proposal, if the regulatormia osnova is for change - a change in my belief is absolutely a must

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47 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 540.
48 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 236-238.
49 Mondecar, "Grad Zagreb i Željezničko Pitanje," Zagreb : Revija Društva Zagrepčana VIII (1939).
- let it be a basic question or backbone of the plan, the railway issue resolved **radically**… [bold in original]  

This “radical” plan would abandon the concept proposed in the original competition announcement of three separate rail stations and re-route the main rail lines outside around the city. Though the author called his concept radical, it was similar in many ways to the *regulatororna osnova* proposed in 1907, which had envisioned removing the railroad track entirely from the center of town and placing three separate train stations in the eastern, western, and southern outskirts of the city.

![Map of Alternative Plan for the Solution to the Railroad Question](image)

The new plan retained the now five decade old Main Train Station, which would now be located in nearly the exact center of the expanded city. The railroad tracks would reach the main train

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50 Ibid. @ 396.
51 "Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica." @ 50-56.
53 Mondecar, "Grad Zagreb i Željezničko Pitanje."
station by running north-south in the area which had been designed in the official *regulatornia osnova* as a long park running south of the train station to the Sava River, essentially an extension of the *Zrinjevac* park north of the railroad station.

Initially, this plan would seem to have little connection to the desire to preserve the ‘historic’ parts of the city, but preservation was very much at the core of the proposal. *Zrinjevac* and the rest of the Green Horseshoe in *Donji grad* had become a home for Croatia’s national institutions. The new city plan implied this new park area was to serve the same function for the future. Though no specific institutions were identified as planned to move to the new park, that this was already being envisioned was clear from some of the competition entries in 1931. One entry by a Croatian architectural firm in particular expressly called for moving all the key national and city institutions into a consolidated national mall south of the Main Train Station.

By replacing the new park with a new rail yard, the Zagreb journal proposal essentially forestalled the movement of older institutions from older parts of the city as had been the deliberate policy of the city for over half a century. This would ensure that *Gornji grad* would remain the physical home of Croatia’s key seats of power, and the Green Horseshoe would remain the home of the city’s cultural institutions. The removal of the new central park thus would prevent key institutions from being embedded in the most modern, Yugoslav part of the city. Therefore, what appeared on the surface to be a practical effort at a better solution to the “railroad question,” was also a very effective way of preserving Zagreb’s symbolic spatial order and ensuring that Croatia’s national institutions remained in the Croatian part of Zagreb.56

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55 Blau and Rupnik, *Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice.* @ 66.
56 It is important to note here that the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, though it carried the name Yugoslav, was an historic part of the Croatian national project from a time when the Yugoslav project was seen by many in the Croatian elite as a possible means to Croatian cultural and political fulfillment outside the Hapsburg Empire.
A Defining Defeat for the Modernists

The creation of the Croatian *Banovina* at the end of 1939 established the HSS in power in Croatia. One of the effects of this was to put the HSS in a much stronger position in relation to local governance in Zagreb itself. This lead to a struggle with the modernists over the completion of key element of the *endowment block* project: the *Neboder*. As discussed in Chapter 6, the *endowment block* project was initiated as a way to accomplish several of the city’s goals simultaneously. The land for the project was located on the southwest corner of Jelačić square, where the testament hospital had been located. The plan had been to sell off the land to private developers to pay for the construction of a new, modern hospital. In 1932 a new, detailed, plan for the *endowment block* was displayed for the public. Part of this plan included a

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57 HDGZ-GPZ, "Natječaj Za Generalu Regulatornu Osnovu, 12 Projekta 1931g," (Br. 1-12, veza sv. 59-68: F 24.). # 6
59 Perić, *Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada*. @ 237-238.
16 story skyscraper or *Neboder* on Jelačić square. ⁶⁰ With the advent of the global economic downturn of the Great Depression, investment capital for such a large building project as the one proposed was very hard to raise. As a result, the city adopted the new design in principle, but broke the actual plan down into 13 component plots and sold them off individually, with one of the plots reserved for the *Neboder* that had been part of the unified project. With the land thus subdivided, 6 of the plots were sold and developed immediately, and another 5 were sold and developed by 1937. ⁶¹ But the *Neboder* remained un-built.

In 1937, the same year as the *Assicurazionni Generali* announced their new building, the Czech firm *Bata* announced that they intended to build a *Neboder* designed by Drago Ibler on the empty plot they had purchased the year previously. ⁶² This new project, was approved by the city in 1938, but began facing several challenges. The first challenge was the political uncertainty surrounding the situation in Czechoslovakia at the time. From the spring of 1938 until the spring of 1939 Czechoslovakia was locked in a territorial dispute with Germany which brought Europe to the brink of open war. Germany’s annexation of all of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939 ended the crisis, but it was months before Bata, the firm which wanted to build the *Neboder* could move forward with the project. By then the HSS was firmly in control of the governing apparatus in Croatia, including the local government in Zagreb, and they moved to block the construction.

The reason for the move to prevent the construction of the *Neboder* was a fundamental shift in public perception of the character of Ban Jelačić square. An indication of this shift was evident in the 1937 article in *Hrvatski dnevnik* calling attention to the new view of *Gornji grad*:

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⁶¹ Blau and Rupnik, *Project Zagreb: Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice.* @ 141.
⁶² Ibid. @ 135.
At the time of the removal of Testament Hospital on Jelačić square, there were many discussions and proposals, what types of houses and buildings needed to be built on the grounds of the former Testament Hospital. Many were misled from one proper standpoint, that on this place needed to be built houses, which would in an architectural view appear in collective unity with the buildings on Jelačić Square... [Ellipses in original] But – how that question was resolved – we know. We received those modern “boxes”, which to every layman, who is not [even] acquainted with architectural culture, bothers and stings in the eyes. They appear only for material use – and in the unity and beauty of Jelačić square no one can imagine.63

The “boxes” in question were the two plain brick and glass buildings built on either side of the plot of land reserved for the Neboder in the original endowment block project. This shows a sentiment that modern buildings were no longer an appropriate form on the square, but it does not explain why.

Underlying this shift in sentiment was a transformation of the meaning of the Ban Jelačić monument in the minds of the population of Zagreb since the end of the First World War. The end of World War I had also ended the central focus of Croatian political life up to that point, the perpetually contentious relationship with Hungary. This emptied the Ban Jelačić monument of its popular meaning as the symbol of that perpetual struggle with the Hungarians. Ban Jelačić’s monument was now seen by the population of Zagreb as reflecting all of Croatian history. As Rebecca West describes the statue in 1937:

For this is one of the strangest statues in the world. It represents Yellatchitch[sic] as leading his troops on horseback and brandishing a sword in the direction of Budapest, in which direction he had indeed led them to victory against the Hungarians in 1848; and this is not a new statue erected since Croatia was liberated from Hungary. It stood in the market-place, commemorating a Hungarian defeat, in the days when Hungary was master of Croatia, and the explanation does not lie in Hungarian magnanimity. It takes the whole of Croatian history to solve the mystery.64

63 "S Jelačićevog Trga Otvorio se Pogled na Gornji Grad."
From this point, West begins a six page history of the Croats beginning with the arrival of the Slavic tribes in Southeastern Europe in the 7th century. Despite the impression she gives before this passage to have just discovered the subject of the statue (her feigned ignorance can be attributed to literary license), this was West’s third trip to Yugoslavia and she had many friends among the Yugoslav elite, including in Zagreb. The interpretation that “It takes the whole of Croatian history to solve the mystery.” was not just hers; it was her interpretation of how those in Zagreb had explained the statue to her, which she was now explaining it to the reader. A new generation of Zagrebites had re-interpreted the Ban Jelačić monument to represent contemporary political circumstances.

This shift in the public understanding of the Ban Jelačić monument is not surprising, as it is simply the continuation of the pattern that had been established shortly after the monument had been installed.65 The significance of the resistance to the Neboder project is that it indicates that the understanding of the statue as monument to all Croatian history had been extended beyond the statue itself, and now was imbedded in the entire space of the square as well. This thread of the debate over the Neboder was clearly articulated in the spring of 1940, in Večer, which published a full page editorial expressing deep frustration with the situation. The paper was especially vexed by the fact that the city government was now resisting the implementation of the very plan that it had approved in 1932 and again in 1938. The editorial directly confronted the preservationist argument by stating:

Now look upon our Jelačić Square. And say, what is on that square still that can be saved? And what is on the square that needs to be saved? And what on it, except the horse and rider, is historical? And the city authority just [say] on that Jelačić Square [there is] something to save. What, nobody knows.66

65 See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the shifting of the orientation of the Ban Jelačić monument in the public imagination of the population of Zagreb.

66 "Je li Opravdana Borba Protiv Neboderu," Večer, 8, IV. 1940.
In a purely factual sense, the paper was correct. By 1940, the statue of Ban Jelačić was the oldest and most historical element of the square. Almost every other element of the square had been removed, replaced, or somehow rebuilt in the 74 years since the statue’s installation. But the paper also understood this issue was not entirely one of fact. Večer acknowledged that the government resisting the Neboder project was a response to a shift in public opinion about development on the square, admitting with incredulity: “And now it is in fashion to fight against the skyscraper on Jelačić square!”67

Večer’s use of the term “in fashion” was an indication that the modernists saw the shift in public opinion as merely temporary, and subject to change, as with any other popular fashion. Yet there is evidence within their own arguments that the modernists may have lost the debate over the Neboder because they themselves were already half preservationist in their thinking. The question “And what on it, except the horse and rider, is historical?” has embedded in it an understanding of the statue that was ultimately an inversion of its original purpose. When the Ban Jelačić statue had been originally imagined and installed it had two clear purposes, which were aspirational, rather than “historical.” One was to modernize the city of Zagreb, to symbolically elevate it from the collection of medieval towns into a national metropolis. Another was to concretize the specific geo-spatial political order of 1848; a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb as its capital. The Ban Jelačić statue was therefore as much, if not more of a challenge for the future as it was a monument to the past. It was a challenge to build a city worthy of the idea of the Croatian Metropolis, and a challenge to become a unified, autonomous state once again.

The modernist acceptance of the Ban Jelačić statue as “historical” was an inversion of the statue’s original purpose. When it was imagined and installed, the statue had been about the

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67 Ibid.
future, much more than the past. The acceptance of the “historical” nature of the statue by the modernists is particularly significant, because the original purpose of the statue itself could have been a powerful argument in support of their goals. The presence of the statue, when tied to its original purposes, could have been used to point to Jelačić square as the “historic” showcase of Croatian modernity. By not making this point, the modernists allowed the Neboder to be imagined as a challenge, rather than a complement to the Ban Jelačić monument.

The population of Zagreb was re-orienting the Ban Jelačić statue in time in the same way a previous generation had reoriented the statue in space. Between the 1870s and 1900, the population of the city had reoriented the statue from facing Vienna to facing Budapest. In that process, they had also reoriented the statue in time, from the future, to the present: from the statue leading forward into the future, to the statue representing the present circumstance of Croatia and its relationship with Hungary. But by the late 1930s, the statue looked back, into all of Croatia’s history.

This transformation in the public image of the statue is completely understandable based on two specific aspects of the statue; first as a place of history, and second as a place of memory. As a place of history, the Ban Jelačić statue had been a key piece of the public political theater which Stjepan Radić had used to launch his political career 1895. The statue had also been a key place in Radić’s re-launching of the HSS at the end of World War One.68 These events had created a place in Croatian history for the Ban Jelačić monument. Radić’s role as both the most prominent Croatian politician of the time, and his role as both national here and national martyr clearly reinforced this historic element of the statue as a place. Where Stjepan Radić’s exploits may have been interesting, but abstract, to the general population, Radić’s funeral was not. And

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68 See Chapter 5 for an extensive discussion of these issues.
even if they had not been on Jelačić square for the event, the photographs published afterwards focused on the square.\textsuperscript{69}

Perhaps, more important than the historical nature of the square in the era of Stjepan Radić, was the significance of the square, and the Ban Jelačić statue, in daily life. On a level that was much more personal though, the emergence of the statue as a central element of the daily life of the city meant that it would become embedded in the memory of the population. As the square and the statue itself became central to the social life of the city, the statue became part of their individual life of much of the population of the city. Once this transformation in social space was effected, the statue would become embedded in many personal memories. This was particularly true of the urban elite, those for whom the rituals of daily life in the city would be most embedded. Thus, as the statue became a key site of memory, the ability to imagine it as a place of the future became much more problematic.

These changes in the meaning of the statue both complemented and masked the new meaning of ‘historic’ in the debate over urban development in Zagreb at the time. The modernists’ (which were essentially the entire national elite of Croatia) tight embrace of Yugoslavia at the end of World War One and through the 1920s economic boom had been pronounced. The economic rewards to Zagreb from their entry into Yugoslavia had been immense as well, with the city rapidly surpassing the capital of Belgrade in industrial development and capital accumulation.\textsuperscript{70} By 1930, the modernists were even suggesting that Zagreb was not just the Croatian Metropolis, but the Yugoslav metropolis as well, at least in terms of economic and cultural power.\textsuperscript{71} In 1931, the magazine \textit{Svijet} had gone so far as to

\textsuperscript{69} "Veličanstven Sprovod Stjepana Radića," \textit{Svijet}, 18 Kolovoz (August) 1928.
\textsuperscript{70} Lampe, \textit{Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country} @ 120.
\textsuperscript{71} "Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica." @ 18, 48.
directly tie the idea of the Neboder to the idea of Yugoslavia by using the image of the Yugoslav Royal Standard over Ban Jelačić Square, flying from the imagined top of the new building.\textsuperscript{72} Thus, modern had been paired with Yugoslav in the public imagination in Zagreb through the first decade of Yugoslavia.

As general sentiment turned against the centralized governing model of the Yugoslav system in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the term historic began to change into not just a term connoting importance to the past in the context of urban development in Zagreb. By the late 1930s the term historic was used to describe anything that predated Yugoslavia’s founding in 1918 regardless of its architectural significance or connection to events of historic significance. But even using this broad new definition of historic it would have been difficult to apply it to Ban Jelačić square in total. By 1940, the only building that was both historic in character and appearance on the square was the Felbinger house.\textsuperscript{73} Every other building had been replaced or significantly changed since installation of the Ban Jelačić monument. Even the grand palaces which had been built on the square’s north side before the First World War had been stripped of their elaborate façades and now were starkly modernist in appearance. This indicates that the extension of the designation of historic to the square, and the use of that designation to block the building of the Neboder was about something deeper.

By 1940, the term historic, in the context of Zagreb’s urban debate, was seen as Croatian, the opposite of modern and Yugoslav. Thus, the square was now historic because it was a definitively Croatian national space. Building a modern, and thus Yugoslav, Neboder was therefore a transgression of the square. It did not matter that the older building had been removed a decade earlier and that the space for the Neboder project was a temporary one story

\textsuperscript{72} Svijet, 13. VI. 1931.
\textsuperscript{73} "Kronologija Trga Republike u Zagrebu," Čovjek i Prostor, Ožujak (March) 1977.
The problem with the Neboder was its modernity. Its height would dominate the square and overshadow the Ban Jelačić monument. The Neboder’s form would be embedded in the daily life of the city, embedding Yugoslavia at the heart of the Croatian Metropolis. Thus, the fact that it was “in fashion” to oppose the building of the Neboder was as much about resistance to Yugoslavia as it was about resistance to the project itself.

Ultimately, the HSS government gave the modernists almost everything they desired. In April of 1940, just before the first municipal elections in the new autonomous Croatian Banovina, the new leadership of the city government approved the three key laws which were the legal foundation for implementing the 1936 regulatoria osnova. But the small part they held back, approval to build the Neboder, was the most critical symbolically. By expanding the imaginative definition of ‘historical’ to Ban Jelačić Square, the preservationists had taken control of the center of daily life in the city. The square was no longer to be a showcase of the modernity of the Croatian nation, but a monument to its history. The center of daily life in Zagreb now reinforced the preservationist vision of the Croatian national project. But this was not simply a top down decision, as even the modernists confessed. It was a reflection of the views of the broad majority of the city’s population. The shift in the imagined space of the square reflected a fundamental shift in the core trajectory of the entire Croatian national project had shifted from one of modernization to historical preservation. On a practical level, modernization would continue, but the key symbolic space of Zagreb would be a place of history, not continued modern development.

How the modernists could deal with the loss of the square as a key symbolic space was illustrated by a piece published in Večer on 20 June, 1940, described as a “letter from a

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72 Blau, Project Zagreb: Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 135.
73 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 238
citizen.”76 It took the city government to task for its failure to maintain the square in a condition befitting its significance.

All the citizens of Zagreb looked with joy on the beautiful masonry building of the Assicurazioni Generali on Jeličić square. The delight of Zagrebians was even greater when the building was finished. - However, just as the building was finished, they began to dig a sap, a canal and that construction lasted for months, delaying traffic, besides, everyone can calculate the damage, which is borne by traders, inaccessibility to individual stores and about the windows, do not speak ... They dug a canal, covered a canal, but what is the most beautiful: earth, which is piled on those gullies, and the Zagreb citizens and pensioners have remained until now good natured – disappointed – about this land, and such plans for the north eastern part of Jelačić square ...

For months and months in front of the most beautiful and most important Palace on Jelačić square in many places the ground is unpaved, uneven and dangerous for the dainty feet of the fairer sex ... During the rains the pit fills with water, mud is created, the same at the various town merchants, customers in the surrounding stores, all in the heart of our white Zagreb-city.

I believe as soon as relevant and as soon as possible to put right this part of Jelačić square and finally pave the north-eastern side of Jelačić square so it is really beautiful and the pride of the Croatian metropolis. It is time to put it in order, I have no doubt, that the government and the mayor will take care of the heart of Zagreb and put it in order as required. Your constant reader and subscriber. L.77

This letter demonstrates how the HSS government’s stewardship of the square could be mobilized against it, and how embedded the idea of the Croatian Metropolis was in the discourse of the city. In fact, the letter reprises the same verbiage of the welcome to the Emperor in 1895, referring to the “our white Zagreb” as well. But at the core is a challenge to the current city government to maintain the square in a state that befitted the Croatian Metropolis. Despite the final statement of confidence in the city government to “put it in order as required,” the tone of the letter was a lack of confidence. It was, in a sense, the modernists turning the tables back on the preservationists, demanding the new HSS government maintain the square to the standards of the ‘historic’ site they claimed to hold it as. If the new government could not maintain the

76 “Zidanje Skadara na Jelačićevoj Trgu,” Večer, 20 Lipnja (June) 1940.
77 Ibid.
square, the modernists would use that fact as a reminder in the daily life of the city to contrast the preservationists with the modernists. The modernists wished to build grand buildings on the square and could accomplish that task, as they just had with the *Assicurazioni Generali* building. The preservationists could not even keep the street paved or maintain access to the shops on *Ban Jelačić* Square.

**Conclusions**

The period of 1936 to 1940 was one in which there was a significant contestation over the symbolic trajectory of the Croatian national project, from a modernizing direction to one of preserving Croatian society while maintaining the material modernizing aspects of the Croatian Metropolis project. This contestation was carried out across Croatian society, but one of the significant areas of this contestation was the future development of the urban space of Zagreb, and *Ban Jelačić* Square in particular. By 1938, the idea of urban preservation had become embedded across the entire spectrum of the urban elite. By 1940, the preservationists had shifted public perceptions to the point where *Ban Jelačić* Square itself was seen as an historic site in need of protection from modernist designs.

The focus on preserving spaces in Zagreb allowed the urban elite to shift the symbolic trajectory of the Croatian national project from modernization to preservation. This symbolic shift did not require abandoning the Croatian Metropolis model of nationalism or practical steps for continued modernization. Since the focus of this urban preservation was limited to the old core of the city, this new urban preservationism did not impede the actual growth of the city; therefore there was no threat to Zagreb’s place as the Croatian Metropolis. This urban preservationism therefore represented a powerful synthesis of the urban centered national project.
of the Croatian elite with the Peasantist vision of strengthening Croatia through active efforts to preserve key parts of society. Urban preservationism was a way to symbolically embrace a key element of peasantism, without practically changing the urban focused modernizing trajectory of the Croatian Metropolis. Eventually, urban preservationism changed into a means to symbolically oppose Yugoslavia’s political order.

It is interesting to note the extent to which this synthesis affected both sides of the political debate. The Croatian Peasant Party saw itself as an institution for the broad rural population of Croatia. *Hrvatski dnevnik* (Croatian Diary), as the name implies was meant to be a national newspaper. Yet it became a key voice in the effort to block the *Assicurazioni Generali* project on Ban Jelačić Square. The extent to which Stjepan Radić, the founder of the Peasantist movement was associated with Ban Jelačić Square may partially explain this, but only partially. The arguments mobilized by the paper were much more on the level of both the history of the city, and the current concerns of the population of Zagreb, rather than tied to the square as a key part of Radić’s biography. This implies that the Peasantist movement itself was accepting, and becoming an active part of the Croatian Metropolis model of the national project.

Though the debate over the 1936 urban plan was important at the time, it was ultimately irrelevant on a practical level. By the time the plan was approved in the spring of 1940, World War Two was already underway. In roughly a year, Yugoslavia would cease to exist until re-emerging again in 1945. The significance of the debate was that it provided a forum to push the boundaries of what parts of the city were ‘historic.’ This would eventually allow Ban Jelačić Square to be included in the ‘historic’ space of the city, and thus a place that needed to be preserved. This is the fundamental change in the imagining of space that would have long term
consequences. It would color every attempt to modernize the square after 1945 as a symbolic slight to Croatia in the name of Yugoslavia.

The role of the urban space of Zagreb in this process is significant. The mobilization of the Ban Jelačić statue by Stjepan Radić during his life meant that the monument was now embedded in the Croatian historic narrative. This combined with the end of the political relationship with Hungary resulted in a temporal shift in the orientation of the statue, from the present, to the past. This was compounded with the emergence of the Ban Jelačić statue as a central element of social life in the city, turning the statue into a place of personal memory for the population of Zagreb. This is not to claim that this shift in popular understanding of the statue drove the symbolic shift from modernization to preservation, but rather that it created a powerful symbolic element within the city that could reflect that shift. The preservationist did not have to work to convince people the statue was historic, the space of the city did the work for them. But this shift should not be taken as merely a product of the shifting politics. It is also clear that the shift in understanding of the statue facilitated the broader public shift towards preservationism as well. The fact that the modernists themselves saw the statue as historic shows how powerful the logic of Zagreb’s urban space had become.
Chapter 8

Conclusions
This study has argued that the production of an “urban space” (Zagreb) and specific urban micro-spaces (the central square and the Ban Jelačić statue in central Zagreb) was crucial in the constitution, transmission, and contestation of Croatian national identity between 1850 and 1940. Space here proved to be more than a simple passive container. Alternatively, it was a made product whose endowed symbolic content became a routinely negotiated element in many people’s lives which helped shape their political beliefs. At work was a process of spatiality – the human appropriation and construction of symbolic space – that proved a formidable political resource.

My work suggests that spatiality is a powerful tool to illustrate the connections between nation, city, and square. Ultimately, the population of Zagreb collapsed the imagined spaces of the national and the local into a single place. Zagreb was both a representation of Croatia, while the idea of what Croatia should be was central to the development of the real space of the city. Further, the population of the city collapsed this unified imagined space into Ban Jelačić square, creating a place that was understood to be a reflection of both the nation and the city, while simultaneously being the center of daily life for the community.

In this context, this urban space became a significant place of contestation over the character of the Croatian national project. Beginning with the Illyrian movement, and continuing through the implementation of the Croatian Metropolis vision of the national project, the broad trajectory had been one of protecting Croatia though cultural, social and economic modernization. This modernizing trajectory remained unchallenged until the emergence of the Peasantist movement at the beginning of the 20th century. The Peasantist vision of Croatia was essentially diametrically opposed to the modernist vision. The Peasantists saw cultural and economic modernization not as protecting or advancing Croatia as a nation, but as destroying the core of Croatia’s national distinctiveness, the ‘village society’ of the rural countryside. This contestation between those who supported a modernizing
view and those who supported a preservationist view of the trajectory of the Croatian national project was played out in Zagreb through debates over the proper way to deal with older parts of the city in terms of urban development, and eventually in the debate over building a *Neboder* (skyscraper) on *Ban Jelačić* square. The popular support for blocking of the *Neboder* project that emerged at the end of the 1930s indicates the emergence of a new symbolic trajectory for the Croatian national project, an urban preservationism, which combined the urban focus of the older modernization vision, with the preservationist elements of Peasantism.

**National Identity Constitution - Metropolis at the Heart of Nation**

This study shows that the imagined space of Croatia was an integral part of the imagined space of Zagreb as Croatian Metropolis. The focus on Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis was, in itself, an important statement about how the Croatian national elite imaged Croatia as it should be: a modernizing urban nation. The goal from the outset was to transform Zagreb into a city that would be the center of all aspects of Croatian life. All Croatian economic, cultural, and political activity would be tied to the city.

An indication of how this need to centralize all significant aspects of life in Croatia is the idea of the Port of Zagreb. When initially formalized in the 1864/65 regulatory plan for the city, the port would have been necessary to accomplish the goal of creating a national economic network centered in Zagreb. By the 1880s, the rise of Zagreb as the main rail hub in Croatia had made the need for a port in Zagreb much less pressing. Developments over the next 40 years, as Zagreb’s population growth dramatically outpaced every other city in Croatia and made it the dominant urban center, made the port even less relevant to establishing Zagreb as the economic center. Yet the idea of the port persisted, and was a requirement in the 1931 international competition for a new regulatory plan and a key part of the new plan proposed in 1936. The idea of Zagreb as Croatian Metropolis was so embedded in the Croatian
elite’s idea of Croatia as a nation, that they simply could not imagine Zagreb without a port on the Sava River, regardless of the necessity or practicality of such a port facility.

More significant that the economic image of Zagreb as metropolis was the cultural and political image. Within the Croatian elite, the idea was embedded that Zagreb was both the proper and the only location where one could be effective in influencing national development. This idea predated even the formal unification of the city, going back to the Illyrian period of the Croatian national project, when the city had been the burgeoning core of Croatian print culture, collecting writings reflecting national sentiment from across the Triune Kingdom, then publishing and redistributing them across Croatia. But the Croatian Metropolis model changed this interpretation of the city’s role in Croatian national culture, making Zagreb not a collection point, but the fount of Croatian culture.

The Croatian Metropolis project also blurred, to some extent deliberately, the lines between culture and politics. Many cultural figures also became important political actors, especially in the 19th century, when the Hapsburg Empire at times dramatically curtailed political activity. It is interesting to note that many of the most prominent cultural and political actors of this time period were not from Zagreb. Ljudevit Gaj, Bishop Strossmayer, Ante Starčević, and Stjepan Radić were all from various parts of Croatia, and all eventually dedicated themselves to building Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis. Though, it could be argued that in the case of Ante Starčević and Stjepan Radić, they had little choice as peasants but to go to Zagreb to further their education, and remained there to further their efforts. But the facts do not support that contention, at least not past high school. No such argument captures Ljudevit Gaj or Bishop Strossmayer, both of whom were from fairly wealthy families and both had completed their educations elsewhere before choosing Zagreb as a place to partake in nation building. Even Stjepan Radić, the great advocate of the Croatian peasantry, would not let the Croatian Peasant Party abandon Zagreb for its party congresses, thus re-enforcing the city as the center of Croatian
national politics. His decision to be buried in Mirogoj, Zagreb’s main city cemetery, tied the Croatian peasantry emotionally to the city in a way that was unprecedented.

**National Identity Transmission - Nation at the Heart of Metropolis**

From the beginning of the Croatian Metropolis project, Ban Jelačić Square was a central physical and symbolic part of the endeavor. The square’s location and role as the city’s main market placed it at both physically and practically in the center of the daily life of Zagreb. Simply changing the name from the older Harmica was an act of national identification, as that name was derived from the Hungarian government tax charged to the merchants who operated on the square. The installation of the Ban Jelačić monument solidified the transformation of the square into a national place. It also was intended to symbolize the city’s transformation into a modern, national city by placing a modern, national hero at its center. The statue was not just a monument to Ban Jelačić though, it was also a monument to the geospatial order he had established as Ban: a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb as its capital. The statue was also seen as a challenge to elevate the square and the city to be worthy of the monument at its center.

Beyond the square, the space of the city itself was meant to transmit a sense of Croatian national identity. This dynamic began before the city’s unification and the building of the National Center in Upper Town during the Illyrian period, but was dramatically intensified with the development of the “Green Horseshoe” after the 1870s. Over the next 50 years, grand palaces of Croatian national culture were erected in Lower Town, including the Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Croatian National Theater, the Art Pavilion, and the National and University Library. These many grand palaces of culture ensured that where ever someone went in Lower Town, they would be reminded of the Croatian character of the city.

But the city was not just intended to transmit a sense of Croatian identity. The city was designed
to convey a specific image of Croatian society. This was not Croatia as it existed at the time, but Croatian as the national elite imagined it should exist: modernizing, Central European, and bourgeois.

The means to accomplish this task was the combination of the general urban plan and the building regulations. The urban plan of 1864/65 established a city of regular, large geometric city blocks with wide, straight streets. The building regulations required all private buildings be built on the street, and flush with one another, so that the residential portions of the town presented a unified face to the public. Buildings were also to be a minimum of two stories tall, with the ability to be expanded upward in the future. There would be no place for small, individual houses, which could be reminiscent of the countryside, in this new urban landscape.

Ban Jelačić Square became a focal point for the transmission of national identity. Very quickly after the installation of the statue, plans began to circulate to elevate the square to a level of grandness worthy of the monument at its center. Though no grand, unified plan was ever adopted for the square, special building regulations were established specifically to ensure that all buildings on the square would be appropriate to the significance of the space. In the late 1920s the modernists sought to ensure that not just the buildings on the square, but also those that could be seen from the square, were appropriately modern and orderly. Also in the late 1920s, the idea of building a modern skyscraper or Neboder emerged as part of a broader modernization project. To the modernizers in Zagreb, such a building would be an important representation of the modernity of Croatia as a nation.

National Identity Contestation – The Image of Croatia in Ban Jelačić Square

The modernizing urban vision of Croatia faced little challenge until the end of the nineteenth century. Yet, as with all ideological movements, the urban focused modernizing Croatian national project faced some important inherent contradictions. The modernizing Croatian national project had been nearly completely focused on urban society and urban development. Its politics were mainly
focused on questions surrounding the relationship between Croatia and other national communities in the region, and the main venue for political expression was through party newspapers and pamphlets. This model of Croatian nationalism and Croatian national politics essentially ignored the roughly 80% of the population of the identified territories of Croatia who were rural and illiterate peasants. This had a pragmatic political logic, as the right to the franchise in the Hapsburg Empire was based on either membership in the nobility or levels of taxes paid, which excluded many lower income urban residents, let alone almost the entire peasantry. But this intense urban focus created significant potential for the formation of an alternative concept of the Croatian nation focused on the as yet unaddressed peasantry. Furthermore, while economic modernization in Croatia had meant an ever improving standard of living and quality of life in Croatian urban centers, the effect was exactly the opposite in the countryside. By the end of the 19th century, the urban national elite in Croatia were also seeing themselves much more aligned with the broader Yugoslav project, and at the end of World War I would embrace the new Yugoslav state very quickly.

The response that emerged to contest the urban focused Croatian national project was an ideology that addressed specifically the contradictions of the ideology. Where the urban national elite envisioned Croatia as modernizing, Central European, and *bourgeois*, Croatian Peasantism posited a nation that was traditional, culturally rooted in Croatia’s rural countryside, and predominantly peasant in character. To the Peasantists, urban concerns should be at least balanced with those of the countryside. To that end, the Peasantists argued that the rapid modernization of the country should be slowed until adequate safeguards had been put in place to halt and reverse the economic dislocation that modernization was causing.

Though a key part of the Peasantist program was to establish a proper balance within Croatian society between the urban and rural elements, this effort remained unrealized. The Peasantists did make
significant electoral inroads in urban areas of Croatia after the founding of the Yugoslav state, but this new popularity was based much more on the Peasantist’s leader, Stjepan Radić, being identified as a staunch defender of Croatian national interests in the new Yugoslav system, rather than any sympathy for the Peasantist’s social program. Though the call to preserve the countryside and ‘village society’ never gained much traction with the Croatian urban elite, Stjepan Radić himself was embraced by the population of Zagreb. His resistance to a quick unification set him distinctly apart from the rest of the Croatian political establishment. As opinion in Zagreb soured on the Yugoslav project, Radić's initial skepticism and ardent advocacy for Croatia's position and interests earned him immense popularity in the city. His death in 1928 as a result of wounds suffered on the floor of the national parliament in Belgrade shocked all of Croatia, and his burial in Zagreb’s main cemetery essentially converted Mirogoj into Croatia’s national cemetery. But the extent to which the cities population embraced Radić as one of their own, while rejecting his broader social program of Peasantism created an inherent contradiction of its own which would have to be resolved.

The entry of Croatia into the Yugoslav state project in 1918 was broadly embraced at the time by the Croatian urban elite. Almost literally over night Croatia went from being a junior partner in Hungary, a state that was itself a partner in the Hapsburg Empire, to being at least an equal, and in economic terms senior partner in the Yugoslav state. The broad global economic expansion of the 1920s drove rapid growth in Zagreb, and through the 1920s and into the early 1930s the modernists continued to develop plans to both expand the city of Zagreb and redevelop the older parts of the city. The modernists were not shy in tying Croatian development to a positive image of Yugoslavia as well. The idea was even proposed, though somewhat indirectly, that Zagreb was in fact the Yugoslav Metropolis now. But by 1935 the modernist embrace of Yugoslavia was becoming problematic, and they worked to burnish the patriotic credentials of renowned past modernist thinkers such as Victor Kovačić.
The modernist vision for most of the older parts of town can be seen in the Dolac market project. This project was not just about building a new, modern market space for the city, but transforming the entire area around the market by removing the older houses and replacing them with modern multi-story apartment buildings. The Dolac market project was seen by the modernists as merely the first step in completely modernizing the part of the city between Gradec and Kaptol. Plans of this type were not limited to the Dolac neighborhood either. The proposed plans for the modernization of Vlaška street just south of Kaptol in the late 1920s demonstrate the broader goals of the modernists: to remove the older, irregular construction in the older parts of town and replace it with modern, orderly spaces.

Whereas the modernist goals were simply a continuation of a well established modernizing project dating back at least to the 1860s, the first hints of urban preservationism emerged in 1905 with the founding of the Braća Hrvatskog Zmaja, though this organization, with a few rare exception, was not initially successful in its urban preservation efforts (though it must be noted, that physical preservation of historic buildings was only a part of the group’s overall purpose). Beginning with the Bakačeva tower in front of the Cathedral in Kaptol in 1906, and continuing on through the effort to save the Plemić house in 1925, the group met will little success at mobilizing public opinion for the preservation of buildings of ‘historic’ significance. Yet by 1935 the preservationist position was becoming prevalent enough to put the modernists somewhat on the defensive. By 1938, the preservationists were calling not just for preservation of single buildings, but entire streets, and by 1940, the modernists were forced to admit, at least with regard to the Neboder project on Ban Jelačić Square, the preservationist opinion was dominant.

There is no indication that the urban preservationist movement started out with the intention of ‘capturing’ Ban Jelačić Square. Yet, there were social factors that empowered the movement, and an inherent logic to the movement that would eventually lead it in that direction. One key social factor was the emergence of a consensus for the need to preserve specific, ‘historic’ parts of the city. The
indication of this consensus was the response by many of the modernists, including Victor Kovačić, a leading modernizer, to the removal of the Bakačeva tower. Once this consensus formed, the debate that emerged would not be about the desirability of historic preservation, but its limits. A second social factor supporting the preservationists was that the Croatian national project, like all such projects in Europe, had used older peasant folk tales and folk songs as vital intellectual capital from its very earliest period. The urban national elite, now challenged by a Peasantist national ideology could employ the older buildings and streets of Zagreb as their own urban form of culture, their historic contribution to the national project. This meant that over time, a space such as Jelačić square, which had been central to the growth and integration of the city through its role as daily market since the 17th century, would be seen as an historic space. Ultimately, this was a contest in which the modernists were at a distinct disadvantage due to their own successes in the past. Having successfully transformed the physical spaces of Zagreb into representations of Croatia, the modernists’ willingness to demolish places they acknowledged had some degree of cultural value made them appear willing to sacrifice the nation for modern efficiency. Their program, which had initial been seen as modernization in the name of nation, became viewed as modernization at the cost of nation.

The Neboder project was not about removing any existing structure though, it was a symbol of the trajectory of the Croatian national project. By blocking it, the preservationists were making a statement about the very nature of Croatia as a nation. The highly charged political environment in Yugoslavia after Radić's death made open debate over Croatia's participation in Yugoslavia very problematic. The Neboder project therefore became a proxy for the debate over Croatia's role in Yugoslavia. To the preservationists, the Neboder exemplified the modernist vision of the late 1920s and early 1930s of a strong Yugoslavia built on the foundation of a modern Croatia. To build such a modern, Yugoslav structure on an ‘historic' Croatia place such as Ban Jelačić Square was unacceptable.
To the preservationists, the *Neboder* would not further elevate the *Ban* Jelačić monument, as previous new buildings on the square had, but overshadow and diminish it. The emergence of broad opposition to the *Neboder* project within the population of Zagreb indicates a significant shift in sympathy away from the modernist trajectory and towards the preservationist trajectory by 1940.

**Landscape and Monuments**

Recent work on monuments has emphasized how monument projects have been used to adapt historical narratives and solidify a dominant political party or social groups’ view of history. The *Ban* Jelačić monument project illustrates that in the Croatian case there was a different dynamic at work. Local leaders deliberately cultivated ambiguity in a monument’s design. In this case, the deeply divided national political establishment in Zagreb chose not to use the monument to attempt to impose a single image of national identity supporting a particular view of Croatia’s geopolitical position, but rather to seek a common basis of agreement and to deliberately avoid points of contention to ensure the success of the monument project. This compromise, and inherent ambiguity within the meaning of the monument, made it particularly susceptible to re-interpretation. Thus, rather than solidifying a particular view re-enforcing either the pro-Vienna or the pro-Budapest perspective, the statue was continually re-defined to express the popular understanding of Croatia’s geopolitical position. The goal of the *Ban* Jelačić monument was to enshrine a particular geospatial order, a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb as its capital, not a particular political perspective as to how best to achieve that goal.

Over time, the monument turned to face Hungary because the statue came to symbolize Croatian resistance to Hungarian efforts at political integration in the public imagination of Zagreb. Once this understanding of the statue’s meaning took hold in the public’s imagination it seemed symbolically proper that the statue confronting Hungary should face Hungary, and that *Ban* Jelačić’s sword should
point at Budapest, and so in their minds, it did. Once Hungary was no longer a significant element in
Croatian politics the statue’s meaning expanded to encompass all of Croatian history. Neither of these
meanings was originally intended, but rather emerged from the popular understanding of Croatia’s
geopolitical challenges, and the emergence of a social consensus that the statue’s purpose was to reflect
those challenges. The statue’s original ambiguity aided the process. But this process was cumulative,
in that the new understanding of the statue’s meaning did not cause people to lose their belief that the
statue pointed towards Hungary, even though that particular detail was no longer expressly relevant to
the statue’s new symbolic purpose.

Beyond the formal monumentalization of Zagreb, this project demonstrates that monuments can
be more than embedded in local space; they can be transformative to local space. The Ban Jelačić
monument was intended to elevate Zagreb in the minds of the population of the city, to transform the
populations’ view of the city, from an older, medieval city, into a modern city. The monument was not
envisioned in isolation. It was one part of a broader modernization project. The new building codes
and the new urban plan were the other main components of this effort. Through these administrative
measures, Zagreb was transformed into a modern Central European city. In effecting this
transformation, the city also came to define Croatian national character as modern, urban, and
bourgeois. The Ban Jelačić monument defined the city as both modern and Croatian in the imagination
of the population, and the city newly built to the new code and in the new pattern of the urban plan
made that sense of modernity a lived reality. In this way, the monument and the urban space of Lower
Town became dual elements of a landscape which transformed how the residents of Zagreb saw their
city and themselves.

**Shifting in Space and Time without Moving**

The core of this study has explored the intricate inter-relationship between the Croatian national
project, the urban project of Zagreb, and the lived space of the city. The goal was to illuminate the
compact interactions between these elements. Over the 90 years covered in this study, the balance of
influence between the three shifted significantly. What was originally a dynamic of imagined space
(Croatia) embodied in real spaces (the urban landscape of Zagreb) which was meant to transform the
lived space of the city, became inverted. By living the spaces of the city as national spaces, the
population began to re-read the nation through their understanding of the present. The population
transformed the imagined city’s real spaces to reflect their understanding of the current situation. Thus,
Ban Jelačić’s statue turned to face Budapest, and Ban Jelačić Square became a space of historic
significance, not because that was how the urban elite wanted people to see the square and the statue,
but because that is how the population interpreted them due to their central role in the daily lived space
of the city.

One of the most interesting aspects regarding spatiality in this study is the process through
which the population of Zagreb over time re-imagined the physical and temporal orientation of the Ban
Jelačić monument. As initially conceived, the statue of Ban Jelačić was as much a challenge to the
population of Zagreb and Croatia as it was statement about the past. On the national scale, the
monument clearly called to a high water mark of Croatian political achievement, a unified, autonomous
Croatia. The loss of that brief achievement, first through the imposition of neo-absolutism, and then the
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the Hungarian-Croatian Agreement of 1868 was clearly a
disappointment to the Croatian political elite. The 1874 statement by Ban Ivan Mažuranić that the Ban
Jelačić monument showed the way forward for Croatia towards Vienna referenced both the statue’s
physical orientation to the North, with a slight cant to the East, along with its temporal orientation as a
guide to the future. But just over a decade later, the statue was seen as a challenge to the new
‘Hungarian’ Ban, Count Khuen-Herdervary, and by the time he had left office in 1903, the statue was
now seen in Zagreb with the tip of the sword clearly pointing towards Budapest.
The reorientation of the statue in the imagination of the population of Zagreb from Vienna to Budapest is important, but just as significant was the reorientation of the statue in time, from the future to the present. The change in temporal reference was also in a sense a change in tone as well. The orientation towards the future was one that was hopeful for a restoration of the status of 1848. The orientation towards the present was a reflection of continued frustration and confrontation with Hungary over the longstanding issues of Croatian autonomy. After independence from Hungary in 1918, the population of Zagreb shifted the statue again, though not in space (they still imagined it facing Budapest) but in time. By the 1930s the statue was a symbol of all of Croatian history.

These shifts in imagined space and time were a product of complex interactions in imagined space, real space, and lived space. In 1866, when the Ban Jelačić statue was installed, the events it commemorated were less than 20 years past. Most of the political leadership of Croatia at the time had not just been alive in 1848, but participated in one way or another in the political or military aspects of the events. For the urban elite of Zagreb, the Ban Jelačić monument was not just a moment to Jelačić, but a monument to themselves, what they had accomplished, and what they hoped they could accomplish again. The monument was an effort to transform the real space of the city into one that referenced a lived memory of 1848. But by 1887, the events of 1848 were a distant memory, if a memory at all for the population of Zagreb. The population of the city could no longer personally remember the sense of accomplishment of 1848 nor the sense that that accomplishment could be re-achieved. Yet, the population of the city was confronted with a monument embedded in the center of the city’s main market, at the center of the city’s daily life. To make sense of it, they found meaning in how the statue could represent their present experience, the frustration of the political relationship with Hungary.

Stjepan Radič's use of the statue to frame his burning of the Hungarian flag in 1895, and then to re-launch his Peasantist party at the end of World War I, changed the dynamic once again. Though not
really apparent at the time, these events embedded the Ban Jelačić monument in the Croatian historic narrative. Radić's death at the hands of a political opponent, and his subsequent funeral, included a full promenade of the funeral procession completely around the statue solidified the monument's role as a part of Croatian history. Simultaneous with the transformation of the Ban Jelačić monument as a Croatian historic space, was its transformation into a key social space in Zagreb, thus firmly conflating the historic with personal memory. Thus, by 1939, at a moment when Croatia as a national community had finally achieved exactly what the Ban Jelačić monument had originally been intended to symbolize, a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb as its capital, few, if any in Zagreb, saw the statue as a symbol of either the future or the fulfillment of the past glory in the present achievement, but simply a symbol of the historic character of Croatia as a nation.

The process by which Ban Jelačić Square itself became ‘historic’ is tied closely to the evolution of the Ban Jelačić monument. In practical, lived ways, the square was as historic a site as possible, having literally united Gradec and Kaptol into one community through the role of daily central marketplace for both communities. Yet this mundane element of its purpose seems to have left its significance unrecognized in the community. It was the installation of the statue that elevated the square in the minds of the cities leaders and residents. Throughout the period after the statue was installed, the square was under continual development, with new mansions, banks, and other improvements. By 1918 tram tracks had been installed, the square had been repaved, and the Mandušavac well had been improved, and then later removed. This relentless change on the square passed with little comment until the Dolac market project moved the daily market off of the square in 1930. By the time the market was moved off the square, other social aspects, the cafes and the emergence of the Ban Jelačić monument as a common social meeting place, had transformed its function while retaining the square’s role at the center of social life in the city. This emergence of the square into daily life, but not in a mundane way, coincided with the emergence of the Ban Jelačić statue
as a purely historic site. Thus, memory and history become commingled in the square. Lived space became central to the transformation of the square into an historic space.

The statue and the square were not the only place in Zagreb where this phenomenon took place. Throughout the city the physical structures built by generations of modernizers were no longer new and modern, but becoming part of the history of the city and the lived memories of its inhabitants. By 1935, the Yugoslav Academy building was already 55 years old, the Croatian National Theater was 40 years old, and the Art Pavilion at the southern end of Zrinjevac was 37 years old. Even the National and University Library building was over 20 years old at this point. Novi Zagreb was quickly becoming part of the past. This left the modernists with two options, expansion and the creation of a new Novi Zagreb, and redevelopment in the older parts of town, a dynamic which would essentially form the foundation for urban development in Zagreb for the next half a century.

**Territoriality**

The fact that territoriality has not been central to this study is not to imply that the Croatian national project was not territorial in nature, as it clearly was. In particular, the desire to achieve a degree of sovereignty over Dalmatia was a central goal dating back to the Illyrian period. This project, rather, has highlighted the degree to which territoriality is not just about establishing recognized boundaries, but also about establishing geopolitical order. The concept of “Jelačić’s Croatia” as embodied by the Ban Jelačić monument was not just about transforming the disparate parts of the Triune Kingdom into a unified Croatia and establishing claim to those territories. The monument was also establishing Zagreb as the indisputable metropolis of this unified territory. In the Croatian case, territoriality was as much about the center, Zagreb, establishing itself as the core, and the rest of the old Triune Kingdom as the periphery.

This process was re-enforced through the national exhibitions which were periodically staged in
Zagreb after 1850. These national exhibitions accomplished two territorial functions. First, they reasserted Zagreb’s claims on these territories, as well as familiarizing the population of Zagreb with these various regions at a time when the vast majority of the population could not easily travel to see them for themselves. But the exhibitions also served to re-enforce in the rest of the old Triune Kingdom, the role of Zagreb as center. This was not about establishing a particular region as the center, but the city itself as the center, with the regions connected to each other through the new national metropolis. Ultimately, in the Croatian case, the development of the national core was a deliberate outcome of the urban-national project of the Croatian Metropolis.

**Contingency**

Though not expressly discussed in the main text of this study, it is important to appreciate that the entire process of the development of the Croatian Metropolis was, to use Allen Pred’s terminology, an historically contingent process. As a small nation embedded in larger, multi-national political and economic structures, Croatia was often subject to changes far outside the capacity of local actors to prevent or significantly modify. Over time, many of these changes both constrained and enabled local actors in their efforts to constitute, transmit, and contest the idea of Croatia as a national community.

This first major contingent event occurred well before even the Illyrian period, with the return of the *Sabor* to Gradec in 1776 after fire seriously damaged the town of Varaždin where it had been moved in 1756. Absent the fire, there is no indication when, or if the *Sabor* would have returned, and without the *Sabor*, Zagreb would have had not political claim to the role of capital city. The urban revolts of 1848 was another set of events that the emergent national elite in Zagreb had no control over. Given the significance of 1848 in the formation of the geospatial order of a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb as its capital, it is important to recognize that the circumstances which produced it were far beyond local control. The imposition of the neo-absolutist system in the Hapsburg Empire in 1850 also
created a situation that focused the elite of Zagreb on urban development rather than national political development. By 1866, when the neo-absolutist regime was being dismantled, the core elements of the Croatian Metropolis project, the Ban Jelačić monument, the new building regulations, and the urban plan, were already in place. The earthquake of 1880 was also a significant contingent event, as it dramatically increased the rate at which older buildings were replaced with new construction which had to comply with the new building regulations. The earthquake also set in motion the process of rebuilding the Cathedral in Kaptol, and the removal of the section of wall in front of it, which was significant because it sparked the emergence of urban preservationism with the Croatian elite in Zagreb.

The list of key contingent events could continue throughout the period of this study. World War I (both its onset and its end), the assassination of Stjepan Radić, and the Great Depression, to name just a few, were all events that the leaders and participants of the Croatian national project had little or not control over. The events that I have analyzed in this study are not a chronicle of predetermined actions and reactions, but rather a process of the Croatian national project’s leaders navigating the circumstances they were confronted with. The leaders of the Croatian national project were adept at shifting focus over time to deal with new circumstances. Going as far back as the Illyrian period, the Croatian national project had effectively shifted focus when progress in one particular field was blocked.

It is also important to note that contingency extends to more than specific events or conditions that provided opportunities for the Croatian national project to pursue their goals. This study has demonstrated a dialectic process, in which the initial urban, modernist thesis of the Croatian national project was challenged by a rural, preservationist thesis as espoused by the Peasantist movement. Though the inherent contradictions of the urban, modernizing thesis of the Croatian national project provided fertile ground for the development of a new, counter thesis, what that thesis would be was in no way predetermined. Across Central and Southeastern Europe Peasantism only achieved governing
party status in Croatia and Bulgaria, despite a broad agrarian crisis across the region during the inter war period. There was a definite logic as to why Peasantism would become the counter vision for the Croatian national project, but it was not the only possible logic.

Ultimately, as Allen Pred clearly argued, spatial structuration itself is a contingent process. Lived space transforms imagined space when a sufficient number of people redefine a given space through their practice of daily life and their expressions of the proper use of space. In Zagreb, though there was a logic to the progression of urban preservationism towards the contestation over the proper use of Ban Jelačić Square, there was no certainty that a majority of the city’s population would adopt or agree with that logic. The fact that the population did accept that logic is as much due to the failure of the modernizers to mobilize the symbolic resources at their disposal to contest it, as to the power of the preservationists to persuade. The contest over the appropriateness of the Neboder on Ban Jelačić Square was lost by the modernists not at the time it was taking place, but before it was even proposed, when the social consensus about the meaning of the Ban Jelačić monument was transformed after World War I. By not contesting the new consensus that the Ban Jelačić monument was a symbol of all Croatian history, the modernists surrendered their most powerful symbolic resource. The fact that there were strong spatial forces pushing in the direction of re-imagining the statue as a purely historic symbol also does not mean that this was the only interpretation possible. Nor does the fact that the new consensus about the Ban Jelačić monument formed without visible contestation mean that the new interpretation it was inevitable, it merely indicates that no group chose to mount a significant contest it at the time.

**Implications for Understanding Former Yugoslavia**

This study provides significant new insights into the dynamics of Former Yugoslavia. There was a significant symbolic shift in the trajectory of the Croatian national project in the 1930s away from
the modernist trajectory. That shift away from modernization and towards preservation became
embodied in the physical space of Stari Zagreb, and eventually extended to Ban Jelačić Square. The
extension of the imagined ‘historic’ space of Zagreb to the square meant that after 1945 actions which
the new Socialist regime took to change the square to advance ideas of socialism and Yugoslavia would
be cast in a dyadic light by the city’s population: to advance Yugoslavia was to diminish Croatia. Two
significant acts in this regard were the removal of the Ban Jelačić monument in 1947 and the
construction of the Neboder on the square in the early 1950s.

This also meant that the mobilization of architectural history and urban space by Croatian
academics and city planners in both the “Croatian Spring” and the 1980s was a reprise of what had been
done in the late 1930s. This created an environment where specific terms and spaces could be used to
conduct a national debate over Croatia’s place in Yugoslavia without drawing direct criticism for being
anti-Yugoslav. Thus, discussion about if Zagreb should be considered a metropolis, or the appropriate
way to renovate Republic (formerly Ban Jelačić) Square, or discussions of the historic character of the
older parts of the city became a way of engaging in political debate by other means. It is only with a
sensitivity to how embedded the idea of the Croatian Metropolis was in Croatia before World War II,
and how national these types of debates were in the first Yugoslavia, that the embedded national
discourse in these later debates becomes apparent.

Ultimately, in an environment where important political debates can not be conducted openly,
alternate forms of debate must emerge. In Zagreb, through both the Hapsburg and the Yugoslav
experiences, the limits on political debate led to the emergence of debates over urban space as a form of
national politics by other means. To fully appreciate the true nature of the debates over nationalism and
national identity in Croatia requires sensitivity to how urban space in Zagreb was mobilized to support
and contest the national project, without overtly challenging the larger, multinational projects into
which Croatia was embedded at the time.
Implications for the Study of Nationalism

As stated at the outset, nation and nationalism are concepts which have been a conundrum for a large number of scholars across a large number of disciplines. This project has not sought to resolve the debates between competing paradigms of nationalism scholarship. Rather, it has sought to investigate the processes by which national identity is constituted, transmitted, and contesting within a national community. This study has sought to illustrate the way many disparate elements of a society are integrated into a national project, and the constitution of a national identity. A key example of this in the Croatian case is the building of the rail network which put Zagreb at the interchange point of two separate rail lines. The decision to create this rail junction in Zagreb was not purely economic. In fact, pure economic imperatives had initially caused one of the rail lines to essentially bypass Zagreb. Building the rail lines was a critical element of modernizing the Croatian economy and building a modern transportation network to ensure further economic growth with Croatian territory. Ensuring the rail lines passed through Zagreb was not necessary for the purely economic goal of improving Croatia’s transportation infrastructure, but it was necessary to ensure the broader goals of the leaders of the Croatian national project that Zagreb should become the center of the future, modern Croatian economy.

It is not clear at this point to what extent the use of cities as analytical objects for the study of nationalism and national identity can be applied to cases beyond Croatia. Though the Croatian case does share many commonalities with many national projects, it possesses many unique features as well. The general recognition of the Triune Kingdom as legitimate entity which was both part of and separate from Hungary within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, even if merely rhetorical, was important in reducing the territorial imperative for the Croatian national project, which provided intellectual space for developing other ways to advance the national discourse. The Croatian national projects emergence within an existing multi-national structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire also provided an environment where cultural development of national distinctiveness was tolerated, and even
encouraged, provided it did not become “political.” Within this context, urban development became a particularly fruitful way to advance the national project without breaching the “political” boundaries placed upon it by higher powers. The Croatian experience also represents the emergence of a national project in a territory without an urban core, with the production of an urban core becoming a key element of the project.

Having said all that, Croatia does also bear similarities with many national communities around the world which have developed out of an imperial governmental structure. Many of the world’s national communities are also limited in size in terms of both territory and population. It is also important to note that the national projects in the late colonial and post-colonial periods were also taking place in an environment of efforts at economic modernization and significant urbanization. Therefore, the simple fact that the Croatian case presented here is located in a different time and place than more recent national experiences, should not be taken on its face as a significant impediment to applying this form of integrated urban-national analysis to other locations.
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