

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF YOUTH IN POST-SOVIET STATES

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THESIS

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## **Abstract**

The field of political socialization has been generally identified as a useful tool in the study of American political behavior. However, growing number of researchers urge for the expansion of the field due to its high potential for addressing vital issues in the study of comparative and international politics. Utilizing post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine as theoretical model, this study discusses the expediency of political socialization framework in identifying nation-building techniques. Examination and comparison of youth political socialization policies in Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine revealed the unsuccessful attempts of the first post-Soviet government to create politically involved youth to be employed for generating political support. The study further exhibited the shift of the current administrations to create patriotically conscious, rather than politically active, youth to be used for generating and maintaining political approval for the existing regimes.

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## Introduction

History was made when a Tunisian fruit-seller called Muhammad, frustrated by the lack of work and widespread corruption drenched himself in petrol. By lighting himself on fire, Muhammad initiated a revolutionary wave erasing long held preconceptions that Middle Eastern populace is doomed to live under autocratic regimes devoid of democratic ideals. Almost miraculously the people of Tunisia overwhelmed the dictator and inspired uprisings in the region. Braving arrests and beatings, thousands have marched in Tehran. Paying with their lives, protesters resisted governmental forces in tiny Bahrain. In Libya, a divided citizenry has been fighting a ruthless dictator. Egypt erupted in a wave of antigovernment protest forcing the president to flee. Jordan's protesters carried out their mission despite the fearsome suppression. Algeria is unstable and Yemen is seething.

Similarly to Europe's triumphant overthrow of communism in 1989 and recent color revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, this revolutionary wave was a product of a growing generational gap. Inspired by the possibility of change, a young generation has suddenly found its voice. This generational change of mentality, as well as the organizational genius of youthful campaigners, is attributed to be the main force behind these revolutions.

As change swept through the Middle East, this generational revolt has raised questions about youth potential to overthrow entrenched political regimes in other parts of the world. Researchers examined the possibility of similar uprisings erupting in autocratic regimes by monitoring multiple factors such as GDP per person, unemployment rates, and percentage of population under the age of 25. Such factors fail to predict how the youth revolutionary forces will play out across the variety of autocratic regimes, due to each country's unique socioeconomic, political and historic development. To gain a greater insight into the possibility of youth initiated uprising

erupting in a specific country, it is crucial to examine state-society relations; specifically the type of civil society and political values that the administration in power is trying to cultivate within its youth population.

Political socialization is a subfield of political science that examines precisely the type of civil society that the ruling administration is inculcating within its population. Governmental youth doctrines provide an effective method of identifying governmental youth political socialization agenda. The civic education and ideological values imparted to the youth population through the doctrine would serve as a potential indicator of the political philosophy imbibed by the future civic society. Identifying governmental youth politicization agendas allows one to demonstrate the likely political tendencies of future civil society and the degree of governmental vulnerability to youth mobilization.

This study examines Russian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani governments' youth socialization policies. With varying patterns of political institutionalization and degrees of democratization, the countries offer a cohesive comparative dimension. Focusing on youth policy can assist us in forecasting the potential future of the examined country's political regime, particularly its vulnerability to antigovernment mobilization as the youth population comes of age politically.

## Literature Review

For any given country to be able to successfully continue its existing regime, citizens must fulfill their responsibilities to the state. In a democracy, the citizen's task entails communicating to the government, primarily by voting, their concerns and preferences about public policy. For citizens to be able to fulfill their civic responsibilities they must possess a certain amount of political knowledge about the existing regime (Pye, 1972).

Political socialization is a subfield of political science that examines citizens' formal and informal civic education. Herbert Hyman's (1969) *Political Socialization* provided the name as well as initial contributions for a new field. Hyman defined political socialization as "learning of social patterns corresponding to a citizen's societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society" (Sapiro, 2004, 20). Scholars define political socialization as a reproduction and development of political culture in a society, through the process where citizens learn to accept and agree to the existing societal norms, values and models of political behavior).

Political socialization occurs through the major societal institutions such as schools, mass media, families, political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and governmental institutions (Sapiro, 2004, 15). Families play an important role in the first stage of political socialization, as children discover psychological basis for political orientations, attitudes, and models of political behavior. Educational institutions provide formal base for children's civic education introducing such concepts as constitutional rights, political participation, and citizenship responsibilities. Mass media further introduces characteristics of the dominant political culture into the consciousness of a person. Scholars recognize that there is no universal agreement on the content, longevity, and stages in the process of political socialization.

Study of the political learning process can be differentiated into cultural and institutional theories (Mishler, 2007, 825). The cultural theory of political learning emphasizes the importance of youth socialization, arguing that people are taught from an early age to develop regime support. Generational differences therefore are considered important, because different generations acquire their political values during different historical periods as well under different socio-economic conditions. Institutional theories emphasize that attitudes are adaptable and therefore change over the course of a life time (Nikolayenko, 2008, 148). Generational differences tend to diminish as all generations go through the same cycle. Current research in political socialization focuses on a new lifetime learning model which emphasizes the importance of early socialization, but also suggests that, in a society that is undergoing rapid transformation, adult learning becomes a dominant factor in determining political attitudes (Mishler, 2007, 230). Political Socialization could potentially provide a framework for examining issues beyond civic education, such as development of state political ideology and civic engagement. Unfortunately most of the research efforts in political socialization are limited to the study of citizenship in the United States and other industrial western countries. Researchers emphasized the need to explore political socialization beyond areas of American political behavior (Sapiro, 2004, 5). Furthermore, the lack of comparative perspective on the topic indicates a significant gap in political socialization framework.

The fall of many authoritarian regimes in the 1980s provided an ideal research area to expand the study of political socialization. The fall of Soviet Union created newly established democratic regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, within a decade researchers observed that, while some countries were able to strengthen their democratic government, others experienced democratic erosion, or even the re-emergence of authoritarian regimes. Noticeable

shifts away from democracy led many researchers to focus on examining the new political order that replaced previously democratic systems of governance.

Researchers tend to overlook the significance of political socialization when searching for the traces of new political ideology in transitional regimes. The most prominent work related to political socialization in post-Soviet states has been conducted by Douglas Blum (2006A, 2007, 98). Blum describes the evident presence of patriotism in political socialization efforts carried out by the Russian and Azerbaijani governments. Examination of political socialization was not the main focus of Blum's research. Blum acknowledged that further examination of governmental politicization policy was necessary. Richard Rose and William Mishler also contributed to the field by examining the dynamics of political leaning during Russia's post-Soviet transformation utilizing survey research aptly named *The New Russian Barometer* (Mishler, 2007, 832 ).

Unlike the subject of political socialization, scholars have demonstrated greater interest in examining post-Soviet youth. Despite the plethora of research devoted to studying post-Soviet youth, the majority of the literature focuses on describing certain political attitudes of youth<sup>1</sup>, or youth elites; educated young adults that are more active in politics, such as members of Russian youth group NASHI (Frierson, 2007, 12) Limited efforts have been made to examine the development of such attitudes, through the governmental policies. As such, past research has neglected the evolution of post-Soviet youth's political attitudes as a means to understand the larger political reality of transitional regimes.

One stream of very limited research, devoted partially to youth political socialization, focuses on describing the changes within the educational curriculum to inculcate patriotic sentiments amongst Russian<sup>2</sup>, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani youth. Similarly, Taraz Kuzio briefly

mentions Putin's new educational reform and the creation of the pro-governmental youth movement Nashi in his description of increasing nationalistic sentiments among Russian youth.

The evident lack of research devoted to the study of political socialization demonstrates the necessity for further exploration of the subject. Furthermore, introducing a comparative dimension would expand the framework beyond its current use in the study of American political behavior.

## **Execution**

The goal of this section is to discuss the modes of institutionalizing the process of youth socialization and politicization. The section introduces official apparatus for policymaking in each sample county by discussing institutions responsible for the execution and monitoring of state youth policies. In addition, the section provides summary of the major policy legislations which contemplate youth doctrines in each country.

### *Institutions and Policies*

Historically in the Soviet Union, political socialization was carried out in a top-down approach, where government took the lead in citizen's political learning (Balabanov, 1999, 86 ). The Soviet government had a strict policy under which the youth learned fundamental values of communist political ideology. Immediately after independence, authorities recognized the feeble state of youth policies in newly established states. The situation affecting youth, including what was viewed as moral and political degradation, generated significant concern for policymakers. However, the fledgling state structures were overwhelmed by the immediate necessity to establish sovereignty and manage pressing crises in virtually all areas of governance. Consequently, youth policies were hastily formed at the time of Soviet dissolution and consisted mainly of incoherent legislatures. Lacking systematic legal and institutional foundations, early policies served as only temporary solutions and in reality, existed mainly on paper (Blum, 2007, 110). As the old system of institutional oversight slowly disintegrated, youth was left largely unsupervised. Governmental reports and international monitoring projects recognized the limitations of youth policies and the consequences which resulted from the existing situation.

The early 1990s were characterized mainly by the creation of general "concept statements" and "target programs"(Diuk, 2004, 60). The content of youth programs consisted of

only general objectives. Ideological aims were mentioned cautiously in the early post-Soviet context. In addition, the lack of appropriate institutions for executing and monitoring of policies contributed to the general inadequacy of earlier youth policies. After declaring independence, national governments began to restructure Soviet institutions. Newly established ministries often lacked conventional bureaucracies and were frequently restructured. As a result, ministries often disputed authority over execution and monitoring of policies.

Policymakers recognized that the absence of appropriate provisions for youth socialization and the influences of cultural globalization resulted in a generation of youth characterized by the lack of adherences to the state. By the early 2000s, concern over new allegiances of youth, which could undermine the prospect of constructing a coherent national identity, led to the development of official doctrines and in some cases genuine laws regarding youth policies.

### *Azerbaijan*

Azerbaijan's youth policy has been largely unchanged since its establishment by President Gaidar Aliev. From 1994 until 2009, more than 20 initiatives on youth policy including governmental policies, presidential and parliamentary decrees were implemented. However, only two major policies were implemented in 2002 and 2005 (Blum, 2007, 112)(<http://www.guam-youth.info/content/view/78/1/>) The Ministry of Youth and Sports (named Sports, Youth and Tourism from 2001-2006) established in 1994, was tasked with overseeing youth policy which was identified as a vital national task. To accommodate the development of youth policy, Aliev established a Center of Scientific Research of Youth Problems under the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Various outlines and decrees of national youth policy were presented starting from 1996 culminating in a policy titled "On realization of State Youth Policy" in 1999. Aliev personally

oversaw the formation of youth policy. The legislation titled “On Youth Policy” was implemented in 2002. The legislation reflects the dictatorial nature of Aliev regime. The policy lacks juridical accountability, leaving significant power in the hands of central and local officials. Neither the content of youth doctrine, nor the policy mechanisms changed after Ilham Aliev succeeded his father in 2003. A new youth program titled “Azerbaijani Youth (2005-2009)” was signed in 2005. The program followed the principles underlined in the 2002 law on youth policy without any substantial changes. President Aliev also established 2007 as “Youth Year” by a presidential degree.

### *Russia*

In the newly established Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin carried out a series of youth reforms. On June 30th, 1991 The State Committee of Russian Federation on Youth Policy was created. Its structure and functions were finalized in October. However, by November the Committee was liquidated with all of its functions transferred to the Ministry of Education. A new post of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Russian Federation on Youth Affairs was created and quickly abolished by the end of 1992. In September 1992, a new Committee on Youth Affairs was created. In the beginning of 1994, Committee of the Russian Federation on Youth Affairs, Physical Training and Tourism was formed. The previous Committee on Youth Affairs was liquidated only to be formed again in about four months.

In the midst of institutional restructuring, some legislature outlining the principles of youth policy was adopted by the government. The first cohesive policy was introduced only by the middle of 1990s. On June 3, 1992 a first document which clearly indicated the agenda of governmental youth policy titled “Main Directions of the State Youth Policy in the Russian Federation” was introduced to the parliament. By August 1992, a new federal budget attempted to

provide financial assistance for youth policy by including a section titled «Financing of actions in the field of Youth Policy». The next major federal program directed toward youth socialization called “The Youth of Russia (1995-1997)” was adopted by the government on November 25, 1994

President Yeltsin took an active personal role in the formation of youth policy. Yeltsin frequently initiated youth outreach campaigns such as “Letter to the President”. The president also established official youth day and took initiative to meet with leaders of youth organizations. However, the absence of coherent youth legislation and financial provisions persisted. Frequent restructuring of federal agencies, responsible for the formation and implementation of youth policy, served as an additional milestone that resulted in a largely ineffective policy.

Vladimir Putin was able to utilize previously established institutions for executing his youth policy. However, the content of youth policy changed drastically under Putin administration. The first youth policy issued during Putin’s presidency was a decree titled “About military-patriotic youth and children’s associations” (N 551) from July 24, 2001. On December 27, 2000 governmental program “Russian Youth (2001-2005)” was implemented<sup>2</sup>. The program was Vladimir Putin’s first major youth policy. On February 16, 2001, the governmental program “Patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation (2001-2005)” was launched and replaced by “Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens (2006-2010) in 2005.<sup>3</sup> Despite the fact that both programs were oriented toward all social strata and age groups of Russian citizens rather than youth specifically, it is still important to examine the policy due to its inevitable effect on youth. The next youth policy was stated to be “Russian Youth (2006-

2010); however it was never approved. Instead, on December 18, 2006, a new policy was passed titled “The strategy of governmental youth policy of Russian Federation until the year of 2016”<sup>4</sup>.

### *Ukraine*

Since achieving independence, Ukrainian authorities recognized the importance of creating and maintaining a coherent youth policy. Starting from President Leonid Kravchuk, Ukrainian authorities established national youth policy. However, early 1990s period, under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma’s administrations, served primarily as a drafting process, which created concept statements and target youth programs (Kuzio; 2009, 42).

Originally, Ukrainian Ministry of Family, Youth and Sport was responsible for developing and implementing national youth policy. In 1996, the Ministry was restructured to encompass wider responsibilities and was remained Ministry of Youth and Family. Further restructuring resulted in the creation of Governmental Committee on Youth and Family Affairs. It was once again restructured in 2000 with an official title of Ukrainian Governmental Committee on Youth Policy, Sport and Tourism. In 2005, the Committee was restructured once again into a Governmental Ministry of Family, Children and Youth only to be transformed six months later into Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports Affairs. In December 2010 the Ministry was reorganized to include jurisdiction over education and science. The new institution is called Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science, Youth and Sport.

The first Ukrainian youth policy after independence was passed as a declaration on December 15th 1992 titled “On General Principles of State Youth Policy in Ukraine”. The 1992 policy provided legal foundations for further development of the state youth policy. The following year, a more detailed legislature titled “On Promotion of Social Advancement and Youth Development in Ukraine” was implemented. President Leonid Kuchma implemented his

first youth policy during his second term in office. In 2002, a legislature titled “About the Main Concepts of Pre-military Training and Military-Patriotic Education of Youth” outlined the main concepts of governmental patriotic and military education agenda. Only by the end of 2003, Kuchma implemented a coherent governmental youth policy titled “National Youth Support Program for Years 2004-2008”. President Kuchma introduced a separate legislature in 2003 designed to increase professional competitiveness and recruit greater number of youth for governmental service. By the end of Kuchma’s second term, Ukraine had an established youth policy and a semi functioning framework for its implementation. Ukrainian policy under President Victor Yushchenko was mainly a continuation of the previously established doctrine. To accommodate the established youth doctrine, Yushchenko introduced a legislature proclaiming 2009 as national “Youth Year”. Yushenko introduces a new legislature titled “Ukrainian Youth (2009-2015)” which served as a continuation of Kuchma’s youth policy.

## Concepts

This section provides a summary of the main ideological aims reinforced in youth policies. To provide a cohesive overview of governmental politicization agenda, the evaluation focuses on identifying particularly vital political socialization objectives. The study identifies the extent to which each policy aims to promote: nationalistic sentiments, patriotism, civic education, political participation, integration with the EU and western countries. In addition, the evaluation identifies any changes in policy after Color revolutions and governmental relation with NGOs and youth organizations. Evaluation of the above-mentioned ideological objectives would serve as an indicator of the established political regime and give an insight into the potential nature of the future political order in each country.

### *1.Nationalism*

Evaluating the extent to which nationalism is reinforced in youth doctrine would provide an important insight into the governmental ideological ambitions. If nationalism is greatly emphasized in youth policy, it is important to identify the definition that is being utilized in youth doctrines. Nationalism based on anti-Western sentiments could serve as an indicator of potentially hostile and uncooperative youth attitudes. Nationalism based on ethnic superiority could lead to greater tensions for national minorities.

### *2.Patriotism*

Evaluation of patriotism is equally important in identifying ideological aims of governmental political socialization agenda. Promotion of patriotism is not abnormal; however, if the definition of patriotism is designed to reinforce blind support for the established order rather than the

nation, its history and traditions, increase in patriotism would be highly undesirable for the process of democratic development.

### *3.Civism/ Civic education*

Encouraging general interest in politics and greater political participation from the population serves as an indicator of a democratically oriented government. Politically involved citizens tend to voice their opinions and provide check and balances to the government by utilizing voting power during elections. However, encouraging political participation while discouraging interest in politics creates a potentially hazardous situation, where citizens vote without sufficient information to make an intelligent decision. Consequently, administration in power has greater chance of remaining in control of the government.

### *4.Western/European Integration*

Advocacy of western and European integration would serve as an additional indicator of democratically oriented government. However, encouragement of economic integration without advocating political and cultural exchange does not reflect governmental promotion of democratic values.

### *5.Change of policy after Color Revolutions*

Color revolutions provided an important and threatening message to the largely autocratic regimes in the region. Youth played a critical role in the organization and execution of color revolutions. Consequently, it is important to note any change in the nature of youth policies directed toward prevention of youth uprisings.

### *6.Relations with youth organizations/NGOs*

The amount of involvement which youth and nongovernmental organizations had in the formation and execution of youth policies would demonstrate the nature of governmental

relations with such organizations. Autocratic regimes, with strict control over youth doctrine, would not allow third party involvement in the formation of youth policies.

### *7. Other*

It is important to leave room for any particularly interesting governmental youth socialization objectives that can vary between countries and individual youth policies.

### *Azerbaijan*

Azerbaijani youth policy remained largely unchanged from the first major legislature which was implemented by President Gaidar Aliev in 2002. After Ilhan Aliev succeeded his father a continuation of the previously established policy was implemented in 2005. All major legislatures emphasize patriotic education, international youth integration, and encourage the development of youth organizations and NGOs. The examination of governmental youth political socialization objectives revealed ulterior motives of the governmental policies.

1. In the official youth doctrine nationalism was discouraged. Due to the large presence of ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan, significant emphasis is also placed on combating religious and ethnic intolerance.

2. Patriotic education was identified as one of the most vital objectives of youth doctrine. The youth legislation emphasizes the need to instruct principles of patriotism and Azerbaijanism in youth. Patriotism was defined as love for Azerbaijan, its cultural traditions, history and language. Promotion of patriotic education also intended to serve as a preparation for future military service. To execute patriotic education agenda the policy supported organization of military-

patriotic sports games and competitions. Together with the Ministry of Education, Defense and State Border Service the military- patriotic games such as “Shahin”(falcons), and “Cesurlar”(braves) were implemented (Country sheet on youth policy – Azerbaijan, 2010). Variety of media programs such as military themed television and radio programs, movies and plays were designed to provide additional support for the patriotic education agenda. To further promote patriotic education especially designed clubs for patriotic education of youth were established across the country.

3. The development of active civic society was only briefly mentioned in youth doctrine. The creation of favorable conditions for active participation of youth in public and political life of the country was identified as one of overall policy objectives. However, neither specific programs nor further provisions to support the objective were mentioned.

4. International youth cooperation was generally encouraged by the policy. However, only professional and economic integration was mentioned. The policy advocated combating western influences and lifestyle values, while simultaneously encouraging professional integration (Blum, 2007, 122). Development of tourism was particularly mentioned as one of the goals of greater international youth cooperation.

5. The second major youth policy was implemented on August 30th 2005 after the Ukrainian and Kyrgyz color revolutions. No visible changes were made to the youth policy in particular in its relations with youth organizations. Youth organizations were encouraged to take active role in the implementation of youth doctrine. However, it is important to note that majority of

Azerbaijani youth organizations are loyal to the established regime particularly to the president. Under such circumstances there was no need for the government to try to restrict activities of youth organizations.

6. Azerbaijani youth policies are slightly more tolerant of NGOs and youth organizations than many post-Soviet countries. However, majority of NGOs and youth organizations are in direct cooperation with the federal government and often serve as a support group for the President.

7. A substantial part of the policy is dedicated to solving practical socio-economic issues such as youth employment and housing.

#### *Conclusion*

Azerbaijani youth doctrine prioritizes patriotic education and international youth cooperation. Patriotic education was defined as developing sentiments of love for Azerbaijan, its history and traditions. Consequently, the patriotic agenda underlying youth legislation does not trigger large concern. Encouragement of international youth cooperation appears to indicate a more democratic nature of the legislature. However, only professional cooperation is encouraged; largely in order to raise professional qualifications of Azerbaijani youth. Simultaneously, the policy advocates combating western influences and lifestyle values. The policy also supports NGOs and youth organizations; however, the overwhelming majority of such organizations are sympathizers of the regime and President Aliiev. Azerbaijani youth doctrine represents semi authoritarian regime where, according to the policy, patriotic and politically loyal youth would serve to ensure the continuation of the current regime.

*Russia*

Post-Soviet youth policies of Yeltsin and Putin's administrations, engaged in a top-down approach towards youth political socialization. Both administrations were motivated in their policies due to the continuing socio-political degradation of Russian youth. Due to the fundamental differences in the main objectives of Yeltsin and Putin's youth doctrine it is necessary to examine them independently. Yeltsin's policies focused on establishing methodological, legislative and financial framework for executing coherent youth doctrine (Belyaeva, 2004, 38 ). His policies served mainly to outline the necessary direction of youth policy without the appropriate means for implementation. Yeltsin's reforms encouraged greater political involvement of youth in political and social life of the country. The main objectives of his legislation focused on creating positive socioeconomic conditions that would allow adolescents to realize their full potential. An emphasis was put on encouraging youth to take initiative in achieving economic independence through entrepreneurship activities rather than civic activism (Ob Osnobnix Napravleniakh Gosydarstvennoi Molodezhnoy Politiki v Rocciickoi Federazii, 1993). Putin was able to use the established institutions and laws to begin executing his own youth doctrine. Putin's youth policies focused on utilizing youth potential to advance his governmental aims by maintaining the political status quo (Colton, 2000). Focusing on promoting patriotic education, Putin's policies aimed to control and use youth as a strategic resource for strengthening the established regime. According to youth doctrine patriotic sentiments would serve as a unifying block for building Russia's new national identity. Under Putin's administration, western integration was allowed only on a professional level in order to raise youth competitiveness on an international scale. Simultaneously youth was expected to counter foreign ideological influences.

*Boris Yeltsin*

1. Yeltsin's policies focused on promoting sentiments of unity among youth while discouraging nationalism (O Federalnoi Programme 'Mologezh Rossii', 1994). Youth policies also promoted the development in youth sentiments of respect for other nations and observance of human rights. However, due to the absence of coherent youth legislation majority on programs focused on developing a legal and theoretical framework for executing policy objectives.

2. Developing patriotic sentiments in youth was viewed as a particularly vital aspect of youth policy. After the fall of Soviet Union, governmental official recognized the need to redefine the notion of patriotism to signify love for Russia, its history, culture, and traditions. Youth programs suggested organizing festivals with patriotic theme and other similar events. However, even with priority given to the promotion of patriotic education agenda, youth policy gave much greater urgency to promoting socio-economic agenda.

3. Civic education was mentioned briefly in Yeltsin's youth political socialization agenda without any specific provisions for executing the objective. Early 1990s period was marked by rapid transformation of Russian political system making civic education almost impossible to execute. Without stable constitution and established system of governance civic education was largely ignored in educational system.

4. The beginning of 1990s generated a large fascination with western and European nations in Russia(Robinson, John, 1993, 519). Yeltsin's youth policies reflected this growing interest.

Youth legislation encouraged Russian youth to integrate with adolescence from European and other western nations. Multiple exchange programs and international youth forums were created to advance greater integration.

6. Yeltsin's youth programs encouraged NGOs including international agencies and youth organizations to take an active role in developing and executing youth legislation. Yeltsin's legislation particularly encouraged the formation of new youth organizations. Adolescence were encouraged to voice their opinion about their most pressing concerns that should be included in youth legislature.

### *Putin*

Putin's youth policies reflect greater governmental preoccupation with adolescents. Putin's uniform state policies were designed to consolidate and coordinate all previous youth policies of the federal and local governments. The new youth doctrine demonstrated governmental desire to control all aspects of youth political, moral, and socioeconomic development. Putin's numerous policies devoted to patriotic education signified growing concern of his administration over the lack of military-patriotic values in Russian youth(Sakwa, 2008).

1.Putin's youth doctrine demonstrated governmental concern over the growing nationalistic sentiments among Russian youth. Putin's youth policies seek to eradicate nationalistic sentiments; however the definition of patriotism and some of the language used in his policies unintentionally promoted further development of nationalistic sentiments. The reliance of youth doctrine on utilizing patriotic consciousness, rather than more inclusive values such as multiculturalism, as the main unifying block for Russian society indirectly promoted nationalism

among youth. The main programs for patriotic education were centered on perpetration of pride for Russian state, its citizens, and the government. The emphasis on Russia and Russian citizens in patriotic education legislation excludes non citizens such as migrant workers and other from identifying themselves with the new Russian society.

2. Putin devoted significant attention to increasing patriotic sentiments not only among Russian youth, but also the general public<sup>1</sup>. According to youth doctrine, reestablishment of largely eradicated patriotic sentiments was alleged to serve as a base for consolidation of the population and strengthening of the state. The main strategic objective of patriotic education programs was formation of patriotic consciousness that would become the most important value for Russian citizens and thus lead to spiritual-moral unity of the country. Patriotism was intended to serve as a unifying base for Russian population.

Starting for the first policy, Putin established military-patriotic associations which were defined as voluntarily organized, self-governing, non-commercial citizen's association directed toward patriotic education of youth and children. The associations were sponsored by federal funding and were designed to execute governmental patriotic education agenda. Patriotic education was defined as "a systematic and purposeful governmental activity in the formation among citizens of a patriotic mentality, the feeling of loyalty to the fatherland, and readiness to fulfill civic duty and constitutional responsibilities on protection of the interests of the fatherland". Specific goals of patriotic education agenda included development of the sense of fidelity to Russia, and readiness to fulfill military service. The associations also served to execute wider ideological and moral objectives of Putin's youth policy. The centers were supposed to eradicate potential youth displays of political and religious extremism by promoting

governmentally approved patriotic education agenda. Later programs devoted to patriotic education of youth served to continue execution of the established socialization objectives. However, a growing effort was devoted to the enhancement of methodological framework for further patriotic education programs.

The vehicles for implementation of the policy included governmental and public organizations, educational institutions, and mass media. The use of mass media to execute patriotic education agenda was particularly noticeable. Media was to be used as a tool for propaganda of patriotism. Multiple programs recommended the creation of special programs to counteract what was seen as an inadequate depiction of Russian achievements in historical events such as World War 2. The use of mass media also included creation of patriotic movies, literature work, plays, and educational textbooks etc. It was also openly suggested that educational institutions would serve as the main base for patriotic education of the next generation of Russian youth. All policies were designed to use innovative technology as well as newly researched and expanded methodological base for successful incorporation of patriotic upbringing into the educational system. The need was also expressed for greater patriotic emphasis in the social science departments of higher education.

Unlike previous youth programs, financing for programs devoted to patriotic education were largely provided from the federal budget. For example total financing of the program amounted to 177, 95 million rubbles, from which 130, 78 million (around 74%) was provided by the federal budget, and only 14, 50 million from sources outside of federal budget.

3 Similarly to Ukrainian and Azerbaijani youth policies, the civic education agenda was largely absent from Putin's legislation (Cherkezova, 1999, 41). Despite the fact that numerous

<sup>1</sup>Programs devoted to military-patriotic education include: "About military-patriotic youth and children's associations" (N 551) from July 24, 2001, "Patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation (2001-2005)", Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens (2006-2010)<sup>5</sup>

governmental reports indicated the growing concern over politically disengaged youth tendencies, Putin's policies lacked civic education programs. The policy recognized that a strategy should be developed to increase youth participation in elections, and the overall political life of the country; however, no specific means for implementation were identified.

The lack of emphasis on civic education became more apparent in Putin's later policies (Evans, 2005). After color revolutions in the region revealed youth potential for mobilization, Putin's youth policy indicated an attempt to limit and control youth participation in political affairs. Youth doctrine was centralized on the objective of creating economically successful and patriotically conscious, while concurrently politically uneducated and inactive youth.

4. Putin's youth doctrine demonstrated a rapid shift in governmental policy toward western integration. Unlike Yeltsin's youth policies, Putin's doctrine actively discouraged promotion of western political and cultural influences. Youth doctrine emphasized the need to counter what was portrayed as immoral foreign influences and any attempt by foreign power to influence Russia's political regime. A combination of patriotically conscious and politically unintelligent youth was seen as a strategic resource that would serve to counter any potential foreign attempt to threaten Russia's political order. European and western integration was only tolerated in the professional realm. Professional integration of Russia's youth into European and western societies was designed to increase competitiveness of Russian youth on an international level.

5. Color revolutions revealed the tremendous youth potential to change an established governmental regime. After the turbulent events in the region took place, politicized youth was viewed by the administration as threatening. Consequently, largely symbolic prior emphasis of

the youth policy on encouraging political involvement from youth gradually diminished. In a conflicting policy objective, the new youth doctrine identified adolescents as the main societal group that will be responsible for the pace of Russia's future democratic development. Youth's beliefs in the stable immediate future was said to be the determining factor in successful continuation of Russia's regime. According to the policy, youth should be trained to resist political manipulations and extremist appeals of the sort that were operating in the Orange Revolution. The policy demonstrates governmental desire to mobilize youth in case of political unrest as a counter revolutionary force. The two policy objectives appear contradictory. The strive to create apolitical yet easily mobilized youth that would be responsible for preserving Russia's political order demonstrate governmental desire to utilize youth as an easily manipulated resource. The creation of politically uneducated and highly patriotic youth would eliminate the possibility of an antigovernment mobilization.

6. In the early stages of development, Putin's youth doctrine was relatively tolerant of non-governmental organizations' attempt to influence the formation of youth legislation. The Department of Youth encouraged direct participation of youth and other actors in policymaking. Opinion of the Department of Youth about the formation process and content of youth doctrine was not shared by Putin's administration. According to the State Council's, which represented Putin's opinion, the process of youth socialization should be strictly under state control ("Doktrinamolodezhi Rossii"). By 2002 the two opposing opinions were expressed in the form of separate documents outlining the desired youth policy objectives. Gradually, State Council's vision of the proper socialization process prevailed. Approved non-governmental organizations were encouraged to participate in the execution of patriotic education policy; however they were

largely ignored during the drafting stages of legislation on the subject. The state remained the leading and uniting source behind youth policies. As Douglas Blum argues, Putin's youth policy "...corresponds to and directly furthers Putin's view of how to transform Russian state and society from the top down, while seeking to limit grassroots democratization and freedom of expression." (Blum 2006 B)

7. Youth doctrine aimed to create financially and economically self-sufficient youth capable of solving problems without further governmental assistance. Independent, economically successful, apolitical youth would lead to further strengthening of Russian state without political threat to the current administration.

### *Conclusion*

Implementation of youth policies was recognized as an essential feature of the government strategy to overcome the increasingly negative tendencies among youth. Negative inclinations were identified as a degradation of cultural and moral capital, and amplified mistrust of power institutions amongst the younger population.

Russian youth doctrine under Yeltsin's administration reflects democratic socialization objectives. Yeltsin's policies encouraged political participation, and the development and resurrection of democratic values such as: civism, respect for human rights, other nations, as well as the history and culture of Russia.

Putin's essentially authoritarian youth doctrine has remained largely unchanged since the beginning of his administration. The main objectives of Putin's youth policies were to discourage interest in politics, imposing a patriotic ideology through mass propaganda, mobilizing selected youth for political support and countering foreign ideological influences (Mendelson, 2008,

141). Putin's youth doctrine was focused on promoting a patriotic socialization programs. The new youth doctrine was designed to strengthen the Russian state by unifying the population under a patriotic mentality. Youth policies aimed to promote the widespread adoption of a national patriotic consciousness using the means of mass propaganda, educational institutions, and specifically designed youth associations. Patriotically conscious youth were viewed as a strategic resource that should be utilized to preserve the established political order. After the color revolutions in the region, Putin's youth doctrine aimed to mobilize youth to combat any potential foreign ideological influences from seeping into mainstream Russian society. Integration with Western thought and ideology was particularly discouraged after the turbulent events in the region. Similarly to Ukrainian and Azerbaijani youth doctrines, Putin's legislation lacks significant emphasis on promoting a civic education agenda. The growth of an apolitical mentality and general disinterest in political life of the country amongst Russian youth was alarming for many governmental officials; however, at the same time, the youth doctrine remained unconcerned with the issue. Furthermore the policy seems to encourage apolitical attitudes among youth.

### *Ukraine*

Ukrainian first independent youth policies, implemented by President Kravchuk, focused primarily on four central objectives: identifying the existent socioeconomic conditions of youth, developing legal and material framework for successful development and self-realization of youth potential, increasing active participation of adolescents in the national and cultural revival as well as the overall social and economical life of the country. The majority of youth policies that followed Kravchuk's initial initiative simply added more objectives to the existing youth

doctrine. President Kuchma solidified the main governmental youth socialization objectives in his youth legislation. Yushchenko's youth policies serves as a continuation of the preexisting policies.

Ukrainian policies had moderate emphasis on developing patriotic sentiments among youth. Youth policies accentuated the need to develop educated and engaged civil society. However, civil activism was defined as social rather than political engagement. The majority of youth policies emphasized the importance of creating separate regional youth policies based on the main federal doctrine. Examination of multiple regional legislatures demonstrated virtually identical correlation between federal and local policies. Regional governments served mainly as implementers of the federally approved youth agenda (Youth policy of Lugansk region 2007-2010). Federal and local governments provided financial support for the state youth policy. Further contributions from private individuals and approved non-governmental organizations and well as private enterprises were encouraged.

1. Ukrainian youth policies promote ethnic tolerance and actively discourage nationalism. Many of the original youth policies greatly emphasize the concept of Ukrainian sovereignty. In first policies youth was portrayed as serving major role in preserving the newly acquired independence. The creation of national unity was not based on ethno-nationalistic sentiments due to the large presence of ethnically diverse population.

2. Youth doctrine prioritized patriotic education, in particular developing in youth sentiments of national pride, patriotism, and willingness to protect Ukraine's sovereignty. However, patriotism was framed as passive and apolitical love for Ukraine as a nation and its symbols. The doctrine

defined patriotic education as formation in youth sentiments of national pride, ethnic tolerance, respect for Ukrainian history and constitution. Patriotism was equated to passivity, predictability, and order (Kuzio, 2005, 109). In order to achieve the desired patriotic objectives the policy identified necessary steps that needed to be enforced by the government. Such steps included: reforming, with the help of military representatives, pre military-patriotic education of youth, providing additional support for patriotic youth organizations, promoting traditional cultural values of Ukrainian nation, and popularizing patriotic values through creation of patriotic computer games.

Yushchenko devoted even greater emphasis to patriotic education in his youth doctrine. Yushchenko signed a presidential decree establishing 2009 the year of youth. Among other goals, the decree called for a formation and implementation of national-patriotic youth education doctrine and the development of an all-Ukrainian center for patriotic education. Similarly to previous policies, the decree promoted utilizing passive patriotic education techniques. The national-patriotic doctrine prioritized the development of national pride sentiments, respect for history and constitution among youth. Yushchenko's increased attention to patriotic education could be interpreted as a possible attempt of creating a new youth support group during a turbulent democratic transformation of the country.

3. The policy devoted even greater attention to the creation of active youth civic society. President Kuchma developed policy to encourage higher level of youth involvement in federal and local government. The policy created a framework for standardized recruitment and training of highly qualified youth for future governmental service. Selected individuals were qualified for special rotational programs within governmental offices. Successful candidates also received

educational training in the form of advanced degrees in Public Administration at the National Academy of Public Administration under the Ukrainian President. The long term aim of the policy was creation of qualified managerial elites and overall increase in the number of young civil servants. In addition, legislation identified facilitation greater youth involvement in social, political, and economic transformation process, as well as Ukraine's integration into the global community as the main policy goals.

4. Promotion of greater integration of Ukrainian youth into European and International community was greatly emphasized in youth policies (Society in transition. social change in Ukraine in western perspective, 2003). Integration of Ukrainian youth into the EU in particular was emphasized in nearly every youth policy. In addition, the EU identified youth integration through educational and cultural exchanges, as an important priority for the EU-Ukrainian neighborhood policy. Ukraine and the EU developed a strategic EU funded partnership, which focuses on creating educational youth exchanges between Ukraine and various EU member states. Unlike Ukraine such integration was viewed as highly negative in Russia. Russian policies emphasize the importance of combating foreign political influences.

5. Surprisingly, the Orange revolution had no significant effect on national youth policy. Unlike Russian policy which was changed drastically to prevent the emergence of a similar youth revolutionary movements, Ukrainian policy under Victor Yushchenko was mainly a continuation of the previously established doctrine.

6. Ukrainian youth legislation devotes significant attention to increasing cooperation between political youth organizations, federal, and local government. Youth doctrine aims to facilitate

greater youth involvement in the creation of youth policy through providing financial assistance and governmental sponsored training and annual competitions for youth organizations.

7. Youth legislation included broader goals to facilitate the overall improvement in the socioeconomic standards of Ukrainian youth.

### *Conclusion*

The national youth doctrine remained largely untouched throughout various governmental regimes. Youth legislation highlighted the importance of creating an active civil society, promoting patriotic education, developing international youth cooperation, integrating Ukrainian youth into the European and International community, and promoting Ukrainian values. Financing of the youth policy was assigned to federal and local governments. In addition, non-governmental involvement in creation of youth legislation is identified as highly desirable. The policy also mandates the creation of regional youth programs.

Ukrainian youth doctrine reflects an attempt by government officials to create a democratically oriented socialization agenda. However, the absence of sufficient emphasis on the creation of an educated and active youth civic society is evident. Of particular note, is the lack of programs devoted to civic education of youth. Due to a lack of substantial knowledge regarding the constitution and various governmental institutions, it seems likely that the youth will not be able to efficiently and intelligently execute their civic duties. The definition of patriotism also generates a degree of concern since the youth doctrine equated the definition of patriotism to signify passive love for Ukraine, its culture and traditions. Consequently to be a patriot in Ukraine means passively accepting the status quo of economic and political affairs. Defined in such a manner, patriotism contradicts the civic activism agenda of the youth doctrine. Moreover,

prioritization of patriotic education over other governmental socialization objectives, demonstrates the flaws of what, on face value, is deemed to be a democratic youth doctrine.

## Evaluation

The goal of this section is to provide comprehensive evaluation of governmental capabilities to execute successful political socialization policies. The evaluation focuses on assessing the strength of institutions responsible for the execution of policies, including budgetary provisions. The section provides additional assessments of governmental youth policies by monitoring youth attitudes<sup>1</sup>. Empirical assessment of youth attitudes attempts to demonstrate whether any change in youth sentiments were consistent with policy objectives. Ideally, an empirical analysis should focus on assessing youth attitudes on all of the most crucial ideological objectives of governmental youth policies. However, due to the limitations of available data, this study focuses on demonstrating youth interest in politics and their willingness to actively participate in political activities (sign a petition, attend a lawful demonstration etc.) over the past two decades.

The collapse of communist regimes and consequential breakdown of Komsomol monopoly left post-Soviet republics without an established framework for the execution of youth policies. Countries lacked institutional, methodological, and budgetary provisions that would allow for the creation and implementation of youth legislation. The situation affecting youth was quickly recognized by authorities. However more pressing crises in nearly all areas of governance took precedence. Most youth policies constructed in the 1990s period consisted of a mixture of archaic or incoherent legislation serving mainly as temporary measures.

<sup>1</sup>Data source and methodology:

The World Value Survey Five Wave Aggregated File (WVS5) (1981-2005) database used in this study contains the surveys conducted by the WVS from 1981 to 2008 in 87 societies, totaling more than 256.000 interviews. The World Values Survey is an ongoing academic project by social scientists to assess the state of sociocultural, moral, religious, and political values of different cultures around the world. For the purpose of this study, data were limited to the available studies for Russia: 1990 , 1996 ( sample size: 2,040), and 2006 (sample size: 2033). Ukraine: 1996 (sample size: 2,811) 2006, and Azerbaijan: 1997 (2,002).

Meanwhile, the previous system of institutional oversight had disintegrated, leaving youth unsupervised and adrift. Growing alienation of youth from the national traditions and essential political values threatened the prospect for constructing a new national identity.

By the late 1990s the process was under way to transform initial “concept statements” into cohesive youth doctrines. Strengthening of youth legislation was accommodated by restructuring of the institutions responsible for the execution of youth policies.

### *Azerbaijan*

Similarly to other post-Soviet republics, Azerbaijan’s youth policies were dominated by Komsomol. The breakdown of communist monopoly left countries without functioning youth policies (Zulfugarov, 2007). Majority of literature concurs that early youth policies were unsuccessful. Failure of youth legislation was attributed to the lack of national legislation, weak institutions, and the absence of a methodological and budgetary framework for the implementation of youth policies (Blum, 2007, 121). Azerbaijani authorities slowly developed and implemented a comprehensive youth policy in 2005. Improvements were made to the bureaucratic institutions and the methodological framework used for the execution and evaluation of youth legislation. Despite the improvements, major problems remained intact. The lack of proper civic education continues to foster growing apolitical youth. Interest in politics and political participation continue to decline (Gardashkhanova). Only small group of political elites, loyal to the current governmental administration, take part in political life of the country. Patriotism and anti-western sentiments are escalating.

Rapid restructuring of post-Soviet institutions responsible for youth policy led to the establishment of Ministry of Sport and Youth in 1994. However, the Ministry lacked the ability to implement youth policy due to the absence of a national youth doctrine, inefficient financing

and logistics (the ministry still consists of 21 employees), and the general absence of any methodological framework (Muller, 1994, 637).

Shortage of sufficient funding designated for the implementation of youth policy prevented the successful execution of policy objectives. Strict regulations were imposed on organizations that requested funds for their youth programs (Swietochowski, 1999, 423). The state provided financial assistance only to organization with more than 100 members. Furthermore, total awarded funding must not have exceeded half of the total cost of a project. As the result, from 1991 to 1999, due to the lack of proper financing, a third out of more than 110 youth organizations stopped their activities. The situation gradually improved after the implementation of a comprehensive governmental youth policy (Roberts, 2010, 548). In 2009 the number of youth and NGOs increased to 170 registered organizations.

Despite the improvements made to the Azerbaijan's youth doctrine in the past decade, many issues remain unsolved. The shortage of proper resources, absence of clear objectives, and the lack of coordinated actions from the government continues to prevent the successful implementation of youth policy (Kirmse, 2010, 382).

### *Russia*

#### *Evaluation of Boris Yeltsin's youth policy*

The outcomes of Yeltsin's youth policy were examined in numerous studies carried out by governmental agents, as well as academic institutions. Most of the reports described Yeltsin's effort of carrying out youth reforms as largely unsuccessful (Program of Social Reforms in the Russian Federation For 1996-2000).

The biggest failure of Yeltsin's reforms was attributed to the lack of proper funding available for the financing of the programs (Kuprijanova, 1999, 12). During the five years of operation (1995-1999) the program "Youth of Russia" received only 65.8% of the funds approved in the federal budget, which constituted 21,2 % of the initially requested funds (Report about a course of fulfillment of the program "Youth of Russia" Table 1) .Majority of the goals of Yeltsin's youth policy were supposed to be achieved by actions of numerous social organizations. However lack of proper funding created many restrictions that organizations had to face in order to receive governmental support for their programs. For example, in order for an organization to receive funds from the Ministry of Youth it had to have at least 3000 members or provide services to equal amount of people (Zinovieva, 2002).

The Vice-President of the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Youth Affairs G.V. Kuprijanova reported that the overall policy was seen as unsuccessful by majority of the youth, 55-69%. One of the reasons for such perceived failure was a large gap between the goals of the programs and what could actually be achieved (Nehaev, 2005).

By the end of 1990s, the majority of the youth was characterized as apolitical. Only 11% of them took any interest in the political life of the country. More than half of the youth population also expressed their disbelief in the basic democratic values such as elections. The general trend among youth indicated a gradual drift away from politics and growing disbelief in Russian democracy (Zinovieva, 2002 ). In 1999, youth identified patriotism as the least important association of the term "Civism". Only 39.3% of the youth identified themselves as being proud of their country. Majority of the youth (81,9%) agreed to the statement "there are so many uncertainties in political life of the country that the average person, like me, cannot understand them". Growing political indifference was a consequence of the general belief among

youth that they couldn't influence politicians. Overwhelming majority of the sampled youth (86, 9 %) agreed to the statement "average person, like me, does not possess any power to influence the decisions of authorities". At the same time politicians were viewed as corrupted by 91, 2 % of the sampled youth. (Zubok; 2005)

Data from the World Value Survey supports the argument that Russia's youth was becoming more irrelevant to the political situation in the country. From 1990 to 1999 youth confidence in the overall government remained the same with only 1,1 % of the sampled population having a great deal of confidence in the government, and 37,9% having none at all. Similar results can be seen in the amount of confidence attributed to the political parties. In 1999 only 0, 3 % of the sampled youth expressed having a great deal of confidence in political parties, and 4, 2 % in the justice system.

#### *Evaluation of Vladimir Putin's youth policies.*

In 2004 the analytical journal of the Russian parliament devoted an issue to examining Putin's youth policy (2001-2005). Contributions to the issue were made from the officials involved with the policies as well as academics in the field. According to the experts, the 2001-2005 youth policy was relatively successful, especially in laying the foundations for further programs (Nexayev, 2005). Military-patriotic education policy objectives were particularly successful (Blum, 2006B). Mistrust among youth of the institutions of power increased, while the general interest in politics decreased. Youth consistently demonstrated less willingness to take part in political activities, such as participating in a lawful demonstration. Such political attitudes are consistent with governmental youth doctrine, which lacks civic education agenda, encourages patriotism, and promotes apolitical sentiments.

Inference about the success of patriotic education programs can be drawn from empirical data made available by the Levada Analytical Center. The Levada Center is one of the largest non-governmental agencies carrying out public opinion and market research in Russia. The main goal of patriotic education was to increase the level of patriotism among Russian population, in particular the youth cohort. A study, conducted by Levada center, indicated that more than 60% of the surveyed adolescents thought of themselves as patriots and expressed a feeling of growing patriotism in the country (Borysyak, 2004). The high level of patriotism among Moscow's youth indicates the relative success of patriotic education agenda.

The same study raised an important concern about governmental patriotic education agenda. Reduction of the growing ethno-nationalism and the level of intolerance to ethnic minorities among Russian youth was one of the fundamental goals of the patriotic education agenda (Evans, 2008). Despite the efforts to create greater tolerance through patriotism, research carried out by Levada center indicated that Moscow's youth is becoming more intolerant and nationalistic (Levada, 2005). The majority of the surveyed youth expressed a xenophobic view toward the non-Russian population. Subjects of the study justified their intolerance by stating that due to increased immigration "life for Russians is becoming frightening (51%)". The majority of surveyed youth also agreed with the statement "Russia for Russians". The study concluded that increase in the level of patriotism generated a simultaneous increase in nationalism. Amplifying the level of patriotism has the potential to increase the level of nationalism and intolerance in Russian youth.

Putin's youth policies were largely unsuccessful in generating a greater level of support for political and social institutions (Hahn, 2008). Opinion data collected in 2003, indicated that an overwhelming 82% of Russian youth expressed support for the president. However, 76% of

surveyed youth expressed a lack of trust in political parties. About 63 % of youth expressed mistrust in the Russian Duma. Only 39% of youth indicated approval of the Russian Army. Such lack of trust could be attributed to the absence of proper civic education. The trend further indicates the future constraints to Russia's democratic development.

Political involvement of Russian youth remains negligible. Only 9% of the youth expressed active interest in politics (Table 2). A significant part of youth could not identify a political party that held similar views to their own. More than half of the youth didn't vote in 1999 parliamentary elections. The willingness of youth to take part in a lawful political demonstration also decreased significantly (Table 3). The level of support for democratic government fell to a record low of 15% (2008) which is significantly lower than previous 24% in 2004. However, levels of support for the existing model of governance grew from 19 % in 2004 to 36 % in 2008.

Large portion of Putin's youth policies proved to be largely unsuccessful. Some of the failures were attributed to the ambitious and fundamentally unrealistic policy objectives, significant budgetary restraints, and lack of clearly defined legal and methodological framework. The lack of a clear legal base for youth policy resulted in many conflicts of jurisdiction between governmental and public organizations leading to unnecessary competition. Constant reformations of federal institutions placed a major constraint on the activities of non-governmental organization that had to justify their existence to the newly restructured institutions.


Table 1

Financing of the president's program "Youth of Russia". In the prices of the current year (Million rbl.)

Years	Declared	Finding approved to be provided by the federal budget	Actual financing
1994	20,691	No findings provided	-
1995	51,346	21,212	15,694
1996	161,0	26,712	16,270
1997	106,725	29,370	10,435
1998	43,695	16,760	6,007
1999	52,155	39,56	39,56


Data Taken from : Program of Social Reforms in the Russian Federation For 1996-2000

Table2



Data taken from: the World Values Survey

Table 3



*Ukraine*


Consistent with Russian and Azerbaijani youth policies, Ukrainian legislation was operating under major financial, legal, institutional, and methodological constraints, generating limited success (Dilemmas of state-led nation building in Ukraine, 2002). Programs, implemented directly after independence, were negatively affected by the lack of clear stated objectives. Constant restructuring of institutions, responsible for the implementation of youth policies, contributed to the lack of cohesive programs. Theoretical framework established by previous institutions was frequently neglected, as ministries were established and quickly closed. Youth policies remained mainly unchanged throughout changing presidential administrations.

Experts identified budgetary constraints as the main barrier that prevented fully successful realization of the youth programs. Lack of funding was especially recognized at the regional level. The absence of coordinated and consistent political socialization actions from all governmental institutions also served as a negative factor affecting youth program. Additionally, governmental inability to provide sufficient technical and methodological support to public youth organizations, contributed to the limited success of policies (Güneş-Ayata, 2005). Ukrainian youth doctrine emphasized that independent youth organizations and NGOs were expected to play a curtail role in executing youth policy objectives. However, due to the lack of proper logistical and financial support, many youth organizations were forced to terminate their activities.

Despite the improvements made to youth legislation, major constraints prevented any significant change to take place in the political and social conditions of youth. The lack of coordinated and supervised political socialization policy with clear stated objectives resulted in a widespread of largely untargeted programs (Way, 2005). Insufficient funding of the youth policy

resulted in the lack of proper logistical support for youth programs and public youth organizations. Most youth legislation generated only limited success. Ukrainian youth remains largely apolitical. Mistrust in the institutions of power is amplified (Wselvod, 2003).

Table 4



Data taken from the World Values Survey

## Conclusion

The transition from a post-Communist society created numerous social, political and economic problems for all generations of citizens. Particular concerns were expressed over the moral and cultural degradation of the first post-Soviet generation. Authorities recognized the rising youth problem causing a decay of moral values, and threatening the social, economic, political, and cultural development of the nation. Early youth policies, particularly in Russia and Ukraine, were designed to assist youth in realizing their social, political, and economic potential. For example, in Russia, Yeltsin's administration endeavored to foster democratic ideals amongst Russian youth. One of the foremost goals of Yeltsin's youth program was encouragement of greater youth participation in political and social life of the country. Despite the relatively democratic goals of early youth program, the policies were unsuccessful in all three countries, due to a combination of factors from low funding levels and lack of a legal platform to the lack of a procedural foundation for the implementing of youth policies.

By the end of the decade, the majority of youth was classified as apolitical in all three countries (Table 4). For example in Russia, 82 percent of youth expressed unfamiliarity with the political situation in the country. Studies from 2000 indicated that youth valued money, good education, power, and social status as the most important objectives in life. Confidence in governmental institutions continued to decline, accompanied by an overall degradation of cultural and moral wealth amplifying mistrust, amongst youth, towards political institutions.

As countries developed comprehensive youth doctrines, authorities once again engaged in enacting paternalistic policies modeled after the Soviet Union approach. Russian and Azerbaijani administrations defined the younger age group as a strategic resource that should be utilized to battle foreign influences and ensure the prolonged continuation of the political status quo. Ukrainian youth policies were more tolerant of foreign political influences, exhibiting a

more democratic tendency. In the aftermath of Ukraine's Orange revolution, Russian and Azerbaijan youth were additionally viewed as a potentially undesirable source of popular discontent that needed to be tempered; mainly through the imposition of a patriotic ideology. Consequently, youth policies focused on creation of a more patriotic youth polity that would embrace nationalistic values, while remaining loyal to the incumbent regimes and resist manipulations from political opponents.

In addition to their ideological focus, all youth policies endeavored to create an economically active youth populace with decreased dependency on state sponsored welfare handouts. Moreover, youth in all three countries was motivated to take part in the social rather than political life of the country.


The efficacy of national reforms to youth policy is contentious and debatable. Due to the recurring problems of inadequate funding, many of the programs were once again ineffectively implemented leading to a gradual degradation of youth's trust in government. Youth continue to have little faith in the institutions of power, with the exception of the presidency. However, the most important goal of national youth policies--patriotic education--proved to be successful, as there is a general rise in the level of patriotism. In Russia, this has been accompanied by an increasing nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes amongst the youth; both could be a direct result of the increase in patriotic indoctrination. It should be noted that this rise in patriotism could have been caused by certain other factors beyond the scope of this investigation

Post-Soviet youth policies of Russian, Azerbaijani and to a lesser degree Ukrainian, administrations engaged in a top-down approach to youth political socialization. Administrations were motivated in their policies due to what they interpreted as the continual socio-political degradation of youth. While Ukrainian reforms encouraged some degree of political involvement

of youth; Russian and Azerbaijani youth policies focused on utilizing that very potential of youth to advance governmental political aims by maintaining the status quo. Azerbaijani and particularly Russian youth policies were implemented in order to increase the level of youth patriotism and political support, while assisting the administration in combating extremism and foreign influences.

Interestingly, none of the youth policies focused on political education of youth, an important factor in alleviating the pains of a newly established political regime. A politically educated citizenry possesses knowledge regarding the framework and structure of a political regime in order to assist them in better fulfillment of their civic duties. Moreover, due to the fact that youth is generally apolitical, even in established democratic regimes, civic education should be not only encouraged it must also be accompanied by efforts to generate greater youth interest in the political life of the country. In post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine none of the youth policies identify political education as an important goal, with all administrations simply ignoring civic education as an important aim of youth policy.

Table 5



Data taken from the World Values Survey

## Discussion

Political socialization has been largely associated with the study of American political behavior. However, a growing stack literature has indicated that the field could prove to be beneficial in studying comparative and international politics.

This study focused on expanding the field of political socialization research by using the framework to examine youth socialization in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine. There has been a growing concern over an increasing socio-political drift in the populace towards more authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet states. This study indicates that political socialization framework is a useful analytical tool for analyzing the ideological nature of newly established regimes. Utilizing the political socialization framework, this study identified a new patriotic youth ideology which the current administrations are implementing.

The results of the study have implications beyond expanding the field of political socialization. The new largely patriotic youth policy should raise concerns for international observers of post-Soviet democratic development. An increase in the level of patriotism among youth, particularly in Russia, indicates that governmental socialization policies are beginning to show results. Furthermore, Russian and Azerbaijani nationalistic socialization policies are likely to produce youth intolerant of western democratic influences. Regional studies already indicate a drastic decrease in youth approval of a western style democratic model in Russia and Azerbaijan. Assuming that no actions are taken by international community to provide greater education for youth about western values, Azerbaijani, Russian, and to a lesser degree Ukrainian political future is likely to take an authoritative character when the patriotic and largely nationalistic youth come of age politically.

An interesting development and a potential limitation to political socialization framework is the interaction between successful implementation of political socialization with the economic stabilization and growth in a country. As evidenced by Russian youth socialization policies, implemented during rising per capita income levels, it is hard to determine what the penetration of such policies would have been under a more economically unstable environment. Further research should focus on how economic stability affects implementation of authoritarian socialization policies, particularly what kind of affect does the economic condition of the individual have on his ability to submit to state-sponsored socialization. The idea is simple; how willing would individuals be to forego personal freedom and accept the state's civic education if their economic needs and wants are not properly met by the state. National youth socialization policies were prescient due to their focus on providing economic opportunities for the youth. As such, it is hard to examine the exact affects of youth socialization independent of the economic preconditions in this particular case. Further research should focus characterizing and evaluating the interaction between political socialization and economics.

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