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PATHS TO PEACE:  
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TRAJECTORIES IN MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTES

BY

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DISSERTATION

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## **Abstract**

When multiple third-parties (states, coalitions, and international organizations) intervene in the same conflict, do their efforts inform one another? Anecdotal evidence suggests such a possibility, but research to date has not attempted to model this interdependence directly. The current project breaks with that tradition. In particular, it proposes three competing explanations of how previous intervention efforts affect current intervention decisions: a cost model (and a variant on it, a limited commitments model), a learning model, and a random model. After using a series of Markov transition (regime-switching) models to evaluate conflict management behavior within militarized interstate disputes in the 1946-2001 period, this study concludes that third-party intervention efforts inform one another.

More specifically, third-parties examine previous efforts and balance their desire to manage conflict with their need to minimize intervention costs (the cost and limited commitments models). As a result, third-parties intervene regularly using verbal pleas and mediation, but rely significantly less frequently on legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies. This empirical threshold to the intervention costs that third-parties are willing to bear has strong theoretical foundations and holds across different time periods and third-party actors. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the first third-party to intervene in a conflict is most likely to use a strategy designed to help the disputants work toward a resolution of their dispute. After this initial intervention, the level of third-party involvement declines and often devolves into a series of verbal pleas for peace. Such findings cumulatively suggest that disputants hold the key to effective conflict management. If the disputants adopt and maintain an extreme bargaining position or fail to encourage third-parties to accept greater intervention costs, their dispute will receive little more than verbal pleas for negotiations and peace.

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## Table of Contents

Chapter 1: The Management of International Conflict.....	1
Chapter 2: The Theory behind Conflict Management Trajectories .....	43
Chapter 3: Data, Measurement, and Methods.....	101
Chapter 4: Conflict Management Trajectories, 1946-2001 .....	143
Chapter 5: The Practical Side of Trajectories .....	202
Chapter 6: Implications and Conclusion.....	238
References.....	262

## Chapter 1

### The Management of International Conflict

As desertification limited access to water resources along the Mauritania-Senegal border, the two states found themselves immersed in an escalating, militarized crisis during the period 1989-1991. The dispute began when Senegalese border guards killed two Mauritanian cattle herders in April 1989. Shortly thereafter, violence broke out between Senegalese and Mauritanian citizens living in the border region. These incidents strained the neighbors' relations, eventually leading the disputing states to declare a state of emergency, sever diplomatic ties with one another, and engage in a series of direct, military confrontations. Throughout the crisis, third-party intermediaries intervened repeatedly, in an attempt to move the disputing states toward a peaceful resolution. For example, Egypt mediated twice during the conflict, and Algeria attempted to mediate once. The Organization of African Union also tried its hand at mediation, while the United Nations dispatched a fact-finding mission. Despite these best efforts, the repeated interventions "had a marginal effect in decreasing tensions and facilitating successful negotiation" (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; see also Frazier and Dixon 2006). In short, conflict management did little to bring peace.

The two-year crisis eventually ended with the restoration of Mauritania-Senegal diplomatic relations. Yet one cannot help but ask why third-parties intervened<sup>1</sup> as they did. Why

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<sup>1</sup> I use the term "intervention" to refer generally to third-party intermediary conflict management attempts. Although I recognize that some may believe that the term intervention should be reserved for military involvement (or coercive diplomacy) specifically, it appropriately describes third-party diplomatic initiatives for two reasons. First, third-party intermediary conflict management attempts are interventions, even though they are not *military* interventions (for example, see Frazier and Dixon 2006 or Regan 2000, who each make a similar point; see also Princen 1992, who uses "intervention" to refer entirely to mediation). Second, the terminology allows me to cover broad categories of conflict management attempts, thereby simplifying the discussion dramatically. I therefore adopt this terminology, and readers should assume that the term "intervention" does *not* refer to military (or other coercive) interventions unless otherwise indicated.

did intermediaries try to mediate repeatedly if it was yielding minimal success? What good did the UN fact-finding mission contribute to conflict management, especially if it was as “low-key” as Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) claim? What factors guided the intervention decisions of third-parties?

More broadly, two research questions motivate this study: how does third-party intervention evolve over the course of a conflict, and what guides the choices that drive this evolution? I attempt to address such questions directly and offer three advancements to our understanding of conflict management over existing work. First, it starts from the premise that numerous third-parties can intervene in the same dispute, and therefore does not focus on only one type of actor as is commonly done (for example, states or intergovernmental organizations). Second, it explicitly recognizes that third-parties have a menu of intervention strategies from which to choose (for example, calls for a ceasefire/troop withdrawal, mediation, peace operations, arbitration).<sup>2</sup> It therefore does not focus on only one strategy (for example, mediation) at the expense of others. Third, it proposes that intervention attempts within the same conflict inform one another; that is, any third-party choosing to intervene in a dispute knows what conflict management effort(s) preceded theirs *and* incorporates information from the earlier intervention(s) when deciding what to do next. These three theoretical advancements therefore begin to integrate much of the fragmented research on international conflict management – across actor types, strategies, and the divide between research on conflict management “onset” and success. Through such integration, I aim to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how the international community cumulatively responds to interstate disputes – one that provides a much more realistic picture of conflict management than we currently have.

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<sup>2</sup> I return to a more detailed discussion of conflict management strategies below.

In addition to the contributions made to the scholarly community, the benefits of the project extend to the policy world as well. Policy-makers often make decisions in the face of significant uncertainty, especially when intervening in conflicts around the globe. Understanding how the international community is likely to respond to these conflicts offers them an opportunity to make more informed decisions that increase the likelihood of achieving their intervention goals. For example, knowing that other third-parties are unlikely to intervene actively to help disputants move toward peace (perhaps by using only verbal pleas for ceasefires) might prompt policy-makers to increase their own involvement. Similarly, certain interventions have downstream consequences, which alter intervention decisions if known in advance. For example, a peace operation may undermine third-party motivations to mediate a dispute, thereby prolonging conflict resolution (Greig and Diehl 2005). Were policy-makers to know about such downstream consequences, they may change how they choose to intervene in interstate conflicts. In short, knowing what to expect from others (and how this influences future interventions) gives policy-makers more information as they create and execute foreign policies in a complex world.

Working toward the goals outlined above requires reorienting the study of third-party intermediary intervention. Intermediary attempts are not independent of one another, as is often assumed in quantitative analyses of the subject. This is because, quite simply, intermediaries do not ignore what others are currently doing or what others (or they) have done in the past to address the conflict at hand. In the Mauritania-Senegal crisis described earlier, the various third-party interventions affected one another. For example, Egypt mediated twice on its own and once under the auspices of the OAU; it therefore at least knew what it had done previously. Egypt also served on the OAU conciliation team, which linked Egyptian mediation efforts to that intervention as well. Finally, Algeria facilitated a mediation session between the two Egyptian

mediation sessions (and within days of when one of these ended), increasing the likelihood that it influenced and was influenced by the Egyptian efforts. Similar interdependence exists when third-parties intervene in other conflicts as well. Therefore, to say that various third-parties are unaware of or do not affect each others' interventions is (at best) empirically naïve and inaccurate.

Although empirics illustrate the connection between conflict management attempts most clearly, there are strong theoretical reasons to suspect such connections as well. These connections originate from two sources: either disputant or third-party behavior. On the one hand, as rational disputants become familiar with third-party intervention techniques (or an opponent's position), they adjust their negotiating strategy to achieve their most preferred outcome. Disputants examine previous third-party interventions, assess how they fared in the process and outcome, and adapt their strategies to do better the next time. Sometimes adjustments move disputants toward peaceful resolution, but not always. For example, through such a process of rationally adjusting to conflict management, it is possible for disputants to become entrenched in their position as successive negotiations occur. Because leaders invest a great deal in creating (and sustaining) a position, the political costs associated with moving from their position may become too great to warrant compromise. This is especially the case after repeated attempts to settle the conflict, as leaders may be forced to take more aggressive (or hardline) stances over time (on a similar point, see Leng 1983). Once these hardline positions are established, it is difficult for leaders to reverse course.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Entrenchment can also occur when disputants either strive to save face (that is, to not retreat from a previously stated position) or use third-party efforts to prepare for further military conflict (Richmond 1998). In the latter, a disputant adopts a non-negotiable (or entrenched) position to prolong negotiations or because the real purpose of negotiations is to prepare for battle, rather than to reach settlement. Neither of these, however, seems to tie negotiating *positions* together across disputes in a coherent, predictable way. For example, face saving techniques can avert the former, while the latter depends on whether the "devious" disputant wants to negotiate or prepare for further military conflict.

Israel often finds itself in this scenario with regard to Israeli settlements in the “occupied territories.” These settlements enhance the negotiating position of Israel by making it less likely that certain disputed land can be returned to the Palestinians in the future (New York Times Magazine 2011). For this reason, Israel has encouraged settlement construction over time. Dismantling existing settlements (or not encouraging additional ones) is now not only unpopular with key domestic groups (see Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Wall Street Journal 2010), but it also creates logistical problems in future peace deals (for example, how to relocate Israeli settlers if Israel relinquishes the land on which settlements exist to Palestine). It therefore becomes more challenging for Israel to change its position. In other words, Israel’s position on settlements became entrenched over time.

Of course, disputants’ negotiating positions do not always harden. One intervention might sow the seeds for a comprehensive agreement to emerge in a later intervention. Greig and Diehl (2006) uncover evidence in support of this proposition. During their investigation of conflict management within rivalries, they find that past experience with diplomatic interventions makes future interventions more likely. This occurs because rivals need time to “soften up” – a process by which the disputing states eventually view diplomatic intervention as a viable, potential solution to their dispute. Disputants need time to experience the costs of conflict and to understand the promise that diplomatic efforts hold. Additionally, disputants often need time to learn about the diplomatic intervention process and to realize that their goals can be achieved through that process. Thus, just as third-parties often learn “on the job” (see below), so too do the disputants. In this way, disputants may become more comfortable with a third-party or understand the intervention process better after repeated attempts, thereby creating the possibility

that disputants will trust the third-parties and commit further to diplomatic (rather than military) avenues for resolving their differences.

Yet it is not merely disputants that link intervention attempts together. Third-parties also pay attention to what is currently being done and what was previously done to address a conflict. In two particular scenarios, such connections are stark. First, it is common for the same third-party to intervene repeatedly in a dispute. For example, in late 1997, Iraq threatened to expel United Nations weapons inspectors from its territory, fueling a dispute with the United States (which was trying to enforce United Nations resolutions at the time). The dispute's intensity ebbed and flowed, and each time it escalated, Russia intervened diplomatically to facilitate negotiations or mediate. Russia was certainly aware of its own previous actions. Further, when the crisis escalated, Russia repeated intervention techniques that had been successful previously at de-escalating the dispute. This suggests that it not only *recalled* what it did previously, but that it possibly *learned* from its previous actions as well. I return to this latter possibility in the next chapter; for now, however, it is worth noting simply that connections exist, regardless of the theoretical mechanism driving them.

Second, even when different third-parties intervene, there is empirical evidence to suggest that they pay attention to the activities of other third-parties. This is most evident when multiple third-party interventions occur simultaneously. For example, in October 1998, Turkey became frustrated with Syria's support of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), requested the immediate extradition of the PKK's leader from Syria, and massed troops at the Syrian border. In the days that followed, both Egypt (beginning on 6 October) and Iran (beginning on 8 October – under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference) started mediating the dispute. The concurrent interventions continued for weeks, and Syria even issued public statements that

the two interventions were not in contravention of each other. Therefore, to assume that Egypt and Iran were not aware of each other's efforts (as most current research efforts would) inaccurately portrays both interventions.

A similar situation occurred during a conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) during 1998-2001. The DRC and its allies (Angola, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) fought rebels within the DRC, the latter of which were backed by forces from Rwanda and Uganda. This division caused states on opposing sides to attack one another at various times. Gaddafi (Libya) mediated a preliminary cease-fire agreement in May 1999 between some disputants<sup>4</sup> and secured an agreement from the involved states to meet again in Zambia. Acting under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community, Zambia then mediated in July 1999 and built upon the Libyan agreement to produce the Lusaka accords. Over the next 18 months, both Libya and Zambia continued to play active roles in mediating the ongoing dispute between the combating states. Public statements issued by leaders from both states frequently referenced one another's efforts, thereby confirming their awareness of those efforts.<sup>5</sup>

A number of *potential* third-parties are also affected by other third-party interventions; more specifically, actors often choose *not* to intervene because of the activities of another third-party. In the Syrian-Turkish dispute mentioned above, Saudi Arabia played a limited role. Saudi leaders conferred with Egypt almost immediately when the dispute began. These consultations occurred *before* Egypt's mediation began. Approximately one week after Egypt started its intervention, Saudi leaders issued a statement in support of the Egyptian efforts and explicitly ruled out an independent Saudi mediation attempt. Thus, Saudi Arabia conditioned its

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<sup>4</sup> Libya excluded Rwanda from the talks.

<sup>5</sup> Data for conflicts that occurred prior to 1993 come from Frazier and Dixon (2006). Data after 1993 result from information available from Frazier and Dixon (2006), as well as data collection efforts undertaken as part of this project. Please see Chapter 3 for more information.

intervention response on the actions of another third-party (namely, Egypt). This left Saudi leaders on the sidelines (in lieu of intervening themselves), although they maintained contacts with all involved parties to remain informed about the dispute and intervention efforts.

As this example shows, actors that are *not* directly involved in interventions often remain abreast of conflict situations, including the conflict management that occurs within disputes. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect those that diplomatically intervene in the dispute to do so as well, whether or not their interventions overlap. Actors that intervene have a stronger incentive (than those not intervening) to understand exactly what has been (or is being) done so that they may productively manage the dispute. The third-parties often must help disputants gradually alter their negotiating position – or to “soften up.” If disputant positions harden instead, third-parties must chip away at the desire to cling to those positions (through the use of various carrots and sticks), so that movement toward resolution is possible. All of this requires that third-parties pay attention to disputant positions over time and the efforts of third-parties to alter these positions from one intervention to the next.

While equating intervention with mediation (that is, facilitated negotiations) is useful to simplify the discussion, the interdependence between interventions is not restricted to mediation alone. Other types of third-party conflict management strategies can affect one another as well. For example, a peace operation potentially affects mediation in myriad ways.<sup>6</sup> The tasks associated with peace operations have expanded greatly over time – from serving primarily as an interpositional force between disputants to monitoring elections and rebuilding a society after

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<sup>6</sup> The term “peace operations” covers a broad umbrella of missions. Traditional *peacekeeping* generally involves the deployment of an interpositional force to separate disputants and contain conflict. Such missions are often deployed before conflict resolution occurs (that is, before mediation). In contrast, *peacebuilding* refers to missions that are designed to address the root causes of conflict and rebuild conflict-torn societies. These missions are often deployed after some amount of conflict resolution occurs (and therefore, after traditional peacekeeping missions). Thus, as above, peace operations can precede or follow mediation. For more information on the terms associated with peace operations, see Diehl (2006a) and Boutros-Ghali (1992, 1995). I will use the term “peace operations” throughout this work to refer broadly to all peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

conflict (see Diehl 2008 for a history of this expansion; see Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998 for a taxonomy of different peace operations tasks). Although the mandates associated with peace operations include a variety of tasks, they usually do *not* include actively working toward a comprehensive resolution of the conflict. Instead, diplomatic efforts to resolve a conflict (for example, mediation) are often kept separate from a peace operation (Greig and Diehl 2005). Yet, as Greig and Diehl (2005) note, peace operations do alter the conflict environment and, therefore, the incentives of disputants. More specifically, peace operations seek to limit open military conflict between disputants. This can create a peaceful backdrop that either encourages further conflict management (that is, disputants are more likely to negotiate if not actively fighting one another) or offers a reprieve from fighting that allows disputants to “regroup” before fighting again (see Greig and Diehl 2005 for a full discussion of the logic behind these mechanisms; on the latter, see also Richmond 1998).

By limiting the outbreak of violence, peace operations create an opportunity for mediation to occur, whether or not the disputes pursue that mediation with the intention of reaching an agreement. Furthermore, the peace operation might uncover information that gets used in a later mediation session. Knowing who violated a previously adopted cease-fire agreement can tell the international community where pressure might be best applied. Similarly, independently gathered information can provide a foundation for agreement, either by verifying specific claims of the disputants (thereby clarifying key information needed for bargaining), confirming or disproving accusations that disputants level at each other, or by serving as a mechanism by which third-parties can monitor compliance with an agreement (for example, troop withdrawal verification). In short, peace operations might provide mediators with information that allows them to influence the course of negotiations.

Besides illustrating the theoretical link between intervention strategies, these avenues connecting peace operations to mediation also account for various orderings of the two interventions. Creating a peaceful environment or collecting information to be used in mediation sessions requires the peace operation to precede the mediation. Verifying claims of disputants can come before, during, or after the mediation itself. Finally, using peace operations to observe compliance with a mediated agreement suggests that the peace operation *follows* the mediation.<sup>7</sup> Thus, there is no pre-determined ordering to conflict management interventions; it is possible to connect interventions in numerous sequences.

As the above discussion indicates, diplomatic interventions within the same conflict are not related by chance. I propose that third-parties strategically select their method of intervention based on the characteristics associated with prior interventions in the same conflict. Such a proposition contains much face validity. Third-party intermediaries likely understand that their intervention decisions influence those of others. Thus, a potential third-party may choose how it will intervene based on previous intervention attempts – whether a specific strategy that was previously tried succeeded, accomplished enough, or outright failed. Intermediaries may try a different strategy when they see one strategy fall short, or they may try the same strategy repeatedly with the belief that it will produce the outcome they seek (as the mediators did when addressing the crisis between Mauritania and Senegal).

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<sup>7</sup> Note that this does not imply that a mediation session that precedes a peace operation *fully* resolves the conflict. Disputants can sign a mediated agreement that authorizes a peace operation without resolving the underlying conflict in its entirety. This situation occurred in the conflict between the DRC and its neighbors (above). Libyan mediation secured an agreement for the deployment of a peace operation, which Libya subsequently deployed in late May 1999. The Libyan agreement also established the foundation for further mediation. In short, the conflict continued despite an agreement for peacekeepers. In a similar vein, the deployment of traditional peace operations requires the consent of the disputants (Diehl 2008). This suggests that peace operations follow some agreement, whether formal or not. Yet this does not imply that such agreements fully settle the conflicts to which peacekeepers go. Mediation efforts often continue under the umbrella of peace operations (Greig and Diehl 2005; see also Wall and Druckman 2003; Wall, Druckman and Diehl 2002).

If third-party interventions are meaningfully interrelated, then two broad questions emerge: how does third-party intervention evolve over the course of a conflict, and what guides the choices that drive this evolution? From these rather overarching questions come a host of smaller ones related to the evolution of intermediaries' attempts to manage a specific conflict. For example, why do third-parties repeatedly use conflict management strategies that fail? When do they change strategies? If they do change strategies, what determines the one that they choose next? The objective of this project is to develop a better understanding of these questions by exploring the interdependence among third-party conflict management attempts in greater detail.

### **Current (Limited) Conceptualizations of Conflict Management**

Developing a theoretical model for how interventions evolve requires the integration of a broad body of conflict management research. Yet two characteristics of current research limit such a process. First, researchers typically focus on one conflict management strategy at the expense of others. Thus, it is common for scholars to focus on mediation (for example, Beardsley 2008; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Greig 2005), peacekeeping (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), or arbitration and adjudication (for example, Allee and Huth 2006; Gent and Shannon 2011), but not on all of these strategies simultaneously. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2001, 2007) provide a comprehensive illustration of the tendency to divide research according to the conflict management strategy under investigation. In their edited volumes, various authors cover a broad range of conflict management strategies (for example, mediation, diplomacy, legal intervention, humanitarian aid) and a spectrum of actors (for example, states, the United Nations, regional organizations), but each strategy (and actor) is generally discussed independently of the others.

As their volume indicates, scholars specialize in particular conflict management strategies, which results in “islands of research” that speak to the use of only one strategy at a time (Most and Starr 1984).

Most and Starr (1984) recognized similar “islands” within research on foreign policy, and their comments are applicable here as well. From their perspective, scholars focused on a series of mid-range, foreign policy questions and became experts in very specific niches, while simultaneously eschewing efforts to connect their work to broader puzzles. This led to a “general failure to conceptualize questions and indicators broadly enough to capture the relationships and processes that scholars are actually interested in studying” (Most and Starr 1984:404). The tendency of conflict management researchers mirrors that of the foreign policy scholars: mid-range questions receive emphasis, causing scholars to specialize in increasingly narrow pockets of research. Such specialization creates islands with few or no bridges between them.

As each island takes shape, scholars also lose sight of the larger questions. For example, those interested in mediation care broadly about the process by which third-parties foster conflict resolution. They simply address this broad question through a limited investigation. Such inquiries play a pivotal role in normal science (Kuhn 1996). For the field to advance, however, researchers must continually return to the broader questions, lest their research remain disconnected from the similar efforts of other scholars in related fields. In short, scholars must connect the “islands.”

That islands of conflict management research exist is not a controversial claim. Yet we know that these islands do not reflect the real world; empirically, it is evident that many strategies can be (and are) used within the same conflict. If one thinks broadly about the role of third-party interventions in conflict management, then a natural question to ask is: how do these

strategies interact? This question is critical to understanding how third-parties work toward successfully managing and resolving conflict, but this question disappears when research fails to account for the possibility that multiple strategies exist (even within the same dispute) and can influence one another. As an example, knowing who mediates – a popular topic among conflict management scholars<sup>8</sup> (see, for example, Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Frazier 2006; Frazier and Dixon 2006; Greig 2005) – may tell us who is most likely involved as a third-party mediator within a conflict, but not *why* they selected mediation, as opposed to another conflict management strategy (for example, arbitration). More importantly, mediation may also *not* be chosen specifically because of the other alternatives available (or the previous intervention decisions) or because another actor is already involved with another intervention strategy; if this is true, then mediation studies miss a significant component of conflict management as actors select out of those studies' samples. Either way, decisions to mediate likely affect, and are affected by, the interventions of other third-parties. This point gets lost to the extent that scholars address only one intervention strategy at a time.

Of course, not all scholars ignore the interactions among conflict management strategies. Greig and Diehl (2005), for example, examine third-party mediation efforts that occur within the context of peacekeeping operations. They conclude that a peace operation makes mediation (and negotiation) significantly less likely; a peace operation that successfully contains conflict removes the urgency of further intervention. Yet the conclusion is also limited. Greig and Diehl focus primarily on enduring rivals, rather than all interstate disputes. In addition, their study does not describe the path that produced either intervention, nor does it consider strategies beyond mediation or peacekeeping (and there are many – see Table 1.1 below). Thus, they may provide

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<sup>8</sup> Other common topics include the effects of more or less coercive mediators on success (e.g., Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Gelpi 1999; Quinn et al. 2006), the proper timing of conflict management (e.g., Greig and Diehl 2006; Zartman 2005), and success itself (see below).

a better snapshot of conflict management than studies that focus on only one strategy, but the picture is still incomplete.

I hasten to note, however, that despite these limitations, Greig and Diehl's (2005) work underscores the importance of connecting conflict management islands of research. Peace operations have downstream consequences that hinder conflict resolution efforts; these effects increase if the peace operation is successful. Such a finding provides additional nuance that gets lost if one examines only peace operations or mediation (but not both). If interventions have downstream consequences on other, future interventions, then one must consider the *process* of conflict management (Diehl 2006b) and account for all intervention strategies simultaneously. Only by doing so can these downstream consequences be uncovered.

The second obstacle to integrating research involves the dichotomy between conflict management "onset" and success. Researchers usually choose to concentrate their efforts on one or the other, but rarely both. For example, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) and Frazier (2006) examine the initiation of mediation attempts, but they suspend the question of whether these attempts were ultimately successful. In contrast, Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005), Bercovitch and Langley (1993), Frazier and Dixon (2006), and Quinn et al. (2006) focus on the success of mediation, rather than just its occurrence. Similar divisions can also be found in the peace operations literature.<sup>9</sup>

Theoretically, the initiation of an intervention relates clearly to intervention outcomes in numerous ways. At a most basic level, there cannot be success without an attempt in the first place (that is, one cannot finish a race they never start). Yet the connections between initiation

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<sup>9</sup> On the deployment of peace operations, see Gilligan and Stedman (2003). On the success of peace operations, see Doyle and Sambanis (2006). Fortna (2004) attempts to examine both deployment and success in the same study, but she gains minimal traction on the former. In the end, she concludes that peace operations are deployed to the "hard cases" and that "we do not have a highly predictive model of peacekeeping deployment" (281).

and success go much deeper than this, particularly when one views intervention as a *process*. For example, assume that there are three interventions in a given conflict. The second and third interventions require the first intervention to fail (at least in part); absent such failure, there is, of course, no conflict in which to intervene later.

Additionally, success or failure may affect strategy selection in later interventions.

Returning to the hypothetical example, if third-parties try to arbitrate the dispute first, but the disputants decide not to abide by the arbiter's ruling, we would expect third-parties to eschew the use of arbitration in the second and third interventions. The disputants have demonstrated an unwillingness to commit to that form of intervention, making it suboptimal to use unless the disputants alter their positions. In this case, failure leads to a subsequent strategy change.

However, success can also influence strategy selection. If mediation partially succeeds in the first intervention, third-parties may try it again, especially if disputants and third-parties need time to familiarize themselves with the process (Greig and Diehl 2006), learn to communicate and build trust through repeated interactions (Moore 1996), or use third-party interventions to construct better relationships (Bush and Folger 1994; Lederach 1997). Alternatively, successful interventions might undercut the value of other strategies. For example, Greig and Diehl (2005) find that once a peace operation contains violence, the impetus for third-parties to initiate mediation disappears. The success of one strategy (peacekeeping) and the initiation of another strategy (mediation) therefore affect one another. Despite these theoretical arguments and empirical findings, studies of conflict management generally do not consider the full intervention process; unfortunately, they instead examine *either* intervention *or* success. As with the previous obstacle, some studies do attempt to overcome this limitation by addressing both onset and outcome (for example, Fortna 2004), but this is extremely rare.

Because of these obstacles, scholars have skirted the question of whether there is a theoretical connection between conflict management efforts, especially across actor and strategy types. Most research, for example, assumes independence among conflict management observations, rather than taking interdependence as a phenomenon to be explored and modeled directly. Researchers therefore adjust the standard errors of their conflict management models to sustain the assumption that intervention attempts are independent of one another, even as they recognize that such an assumption is flawed (Freedman 2006).

An illustration of scholars recognizing such interdependence while explicitly eschewing the direct modeling of that interdependence can be found frequently in the mediation literature. Mediation onset (initiation) models often include a “previous mediation” variable; in theory, scholars believe that previous mediation efforts make additional efforts more likely, either because they allow the disputants to become comfortable with third-parties or the process itself (see, *inter alia*, Frazier 2006; Greig 2005; Greig and Diehl 2006; Greig and Regan 2008; see Bercovitch and Gartner 2006 for a larger discussion of this point). Mediation scholars therefore generally include a dichotomous variable to capture this interdependence crudely and then adjust the standard errors in the models to ensure that mediation attempts within the same dispute do not statistically affect one another. Indeed, the “previous intervention” variable is almost always statistically significant, which signals that there is some interdependence that begs for explanation. Furthermore, this logic, if accurate, applies to more than just mediation. The use of any one strategy might make the use of another strategy more (or less) likely as well – either by demonstrating the promise or futility of a given strategy, uncovering evidence that another strategy might better address the conflict, or directly creating opportunities for other strategies to be implemented. In fact, Bercovitch and Regan (2004) provide *prima facie* evidence in support

of connections across strategies; in their models, they find that as the number of previous conflict management attempts increase, the likelihood of a successful mediation *decreases*. Although their data are dominated heavily by mediation and bilateral negotiations (which are not third-party conflict management efforts by definition), their findings do suggest a possible connection across conflict management strategies – something the mediation literature itself largely misses or ignores.

To a certain extent, the limitations noted above are to be expected. Developing a theory of interrelated conflict management attempts requires researchers to examine multiple actors and strategies simultaneously. As most conflict management studies restrict their attention to one intermediary strategy, a full theory of interrelated conflict management attempts remains beyond their perceived (and defined) scope. To return to Most and Starr's (1984) language, the "island" does not (and cannot) include all actors and strategies. Limited in this fashion (and pushed toward increasing specialization), researchers may do no better than to correct for statistical interdependence among observations.

Although such limits are often understandable, this should not preclude attempts to overcome them by developing a more inclusive model of conflict management, thereby returning conflict management research to the broader questions that fundamentally inform it. The limits described above also conveniently highlight the components necessary for a more thorough model. Constructing a full path of conflict management within a dispute requires one to examine numerous actors and strategies, while accounting for both onset and outcomes (success). In short, one must re-conceptualize conflict management as a *process* of interrelated events throughout the life of a dispute, rather than individual instances of distinct interventions. This is a natural extension of existing work, but an important one that remains overlooked and therefore

underdeveloped. If a variety of third-parties undertake interventions within the same conflict and these interventions are linked in a number of ways (and I propose that they are, as noted above), then advancing our understanding of conflict management demands that we begin to think more broadly about the process of intervention. Existing research has mapped out the islands in some detail; it is now time to connect them.

### **Conflict Management Trajectories**

Conflict management efforts naturally evolve as a conflict unfolds. A dispute between the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the Yemen People's Republic (South Yemen) in the 1970s illustrates this evolution in practice. In 1978, North Yemen accused South Yemen of participating in the assassination of the North Yemeni president, Ahmed ibn Hussein al-Ghashmi. Diplomatic relations with the South were severed, and North Yemen attacked South Yemeni positions shortly thereafter. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attempted to mediate the crisis first in September 1978. This did little to ease tensions, however, and the dispute persisted. In February 1979, South Yemen invaded North Yemen, which led to further interventions. Saudi Arabia immediately appealed for a ceasefire, worrying that the conflict would spill over into its territory. A few days later (in early March), a coalition composed of Iraq, Jordan, and Syria mediated a ceasefire between the disputing states. Within days of the coalition's mediation, the League of Arab States (the LAS), which had been monitoring the situation, demanded the withdrawal of Southern Yemeni troops from the North and established a seven-member military observation commission to oversee the ceasefire and troop withdrawal. The LAS then mediated a ceasefire between the two sides in mid-March. Finally, Kuwait facilitated negotiations at the end of March 1978. The Kuwaiti efforts produced a provisional

agreement that provided the foundation for the merging of the two states (Frazier and Dixon 2006; see also Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).

The evolution of conflict management during the course of a dispute (as demonstrated in the Yemeni case above) can be thought of as a trajectory. The term “trajectory” typically refers to an object’s movement through space and time. Physicists, for example, often speak about the trajectory of a bullet fired from a gun or of a ball that is kicked or thrown. The concept expresses the idea that an object’s location at a specific moment (time  $t$ ) depends on both its position at an earlier time (time  $t-1$ ) and a series of forces that affect its movement (for example, gravity in the case of physics). If the individual positions of an object at each point in time are known and aggregated, the result is a path that the object followed. This path, or trajectory, allows us to state that an object traveled from one point to another and describe each point it touched along the way (and therefore the path that its movement produced).

The term “trajectory” can be used in a similar sense to explain conflict management behavior within a given dispute. Instead of points in space, conflict management trajectories (going forward, simply referred to as trajectories) contain two or more third-party conflict management attempts.<sup>10</sup> In the Yemeni example, these are various mediation sessions, calls for ceasefires and troop withdrawals, and a military observation mission. Based on a number of theoretical arguments (outlined in the next chapter), there is reason to believe that numerous interventions within the same conflict are related to one another; that is, the strategies that an intermediary uses at any given moment depend, in part, on the actions of the most recent, previous intervention within the same dispute. Aggregating the individual attempts of third-

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<sup>10</sup> Two points are needed to create a path (or line) and, therefore, a trajectory. Isolated interventions have no preceding interventions for third-parties to take into account. As such, isolated interventions are not included in the analysis below, but are discussed in the conclusion.

parties to manage a given conflict thus produces a trajectory – a path of intervention throughout the life of a conflict.

As already noted, trajectories are composed of distinct third-party interventions. These interventions possess four noteworthy characteristics. First, each is performed by an actor who is not involved in the conflict as a disputant. For simplicity, such actors can be classified as either an individual state, a coalition of states, or an intergovernmental organization. The Yemeni case nicely illustrates the conflict management role played by each actor type; individual states (for example, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), coalitions of states (for example, the Iraq-Jordan-Syria effort), and intergovernmental organizations (for example, the League of Arab States) each intervened at some point during the dispute.

Interventions by other actors (for example, non-governmental organizations) are currently excluded from trajectories. The rationale for this decision lies in their membership structure. Because non-governmental organizations contain non-state members, they often intervene less publicly than states, coalitions, or intergovernmental organizations, making it harder to track their activities and, therefore, to ensure that all interventions have been collected. Furthermore, the membership structure also means that non-governmental organizations face different incentives for interventions than states, coalitions, or intergovernmental organizations. The former tend to intervene based on functional area of expertise and to use one type of intervention strategy (humanitarian functions, which fall under the administrative category; see below) almost exclusively. These characteristics not only make it challenging to include data on non-governmental organizations in the current study, but they also suggest that non-governmental organizations should behave quite differently from the actors I include. I therefore exclude them from the present work and relegate their interventions to future research.

Second, each actor can intervene using any of a number of conflict management strategies. A strategy refers to the particular method that a third-party uses when trying to manage the conflict. The options available (broadly) include issuing verbal pleas (for example, calls for a ceasefire), conducting mediation, performing legal functions, serving more administrative functions (for example, humanitarian efforts or administering a territory), or deploying peace operations. In the case of the Yemeni dispute, third-parties used various verbal, mediation, and peace operations strategies as the conflict unfolded.

The full menu of strategies, taken from the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset, is presented in Table 1.1.<sup>11</sup> The table lists the five broad categories of conflict management strategies already mentioned: verbal expressions (numbered category 1.0), mediation (category 2.0), legal process (category 3.0), administrative (category 4.0), and peace operations (category 5.0). Under each category heading in the table, I also list the specific conflict management strategies that fall underneath it (according to Frazier and Dixon 2006; see also Dixon 1996). For example, the verbal expression category captures all interventions that amount to the issuance of a public statement; the intervention is confined entirely to this statement. Third-parties can issue statements that request a *ceasefire*, the use of *negotiations* to resolve the dispute (as opposed to military conflict), or a *troop withdrawal*. Offers to either *facilitate negotiations* (that is, use “good offices”) or *mediate* the dispute are also included here if the third-party does not actually facilitate negotiations or mediate (on the latter, see below). Each of these types of statements appears underneath the verbal expression category in Table 1.1, and we can refer to them collectively as verbal (diplomatic) interventions. The other categories in Table 1.1 can be similarly disaggregated, and, as with the verbal category above, doing so provides a list of

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<sup>11</sup> The terminology in Table 1.1 is slightly different than that found in Frazier and Dixon (2006) in two places. These changes were made to keep language use consistent throughout the current manuscript.

specific strategies that fall under each broadly defined category. Because it is important to understand the various conflict management strategies included in this study, it is appropriate to describe each category in slightly greater detail.

The second category, labeled mediation, contains four strategies that are designed to facilitate negotiations between disputing states. First, third-parties can conduct a *fact-finding* mission, in which the third-party investigates the facts pertaining to a dispute. Because disputants often disagree about the facts, such missions hold the potential to open negotiating space for the disputants. At the conclusion of their mission, the third-party often issues a report containing the facts uncovered. The report can then be used to clarify the positions and accusations of disputants. Second, a third-party could exercise *good offices*; in this strategy, a third-party facilitates negotiations between the disputants, but does *not* propose any particular solutions to the dispute.<sup>12</sup> The goal is to bring the parties together for talks. Sometimes a third-party's clout with disputants allows that third-party to orchestrate negotiations without necessarily participating in them. Although usages of the term often references the activities of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, any actor type (discussed above) can undertake good offices (on the role of the Secretary-General, see Skjelsbaek and Fermann 1996).

A third-party might go beyond good offices, however, and actually *mediate* a conflict. Under this strategy, the third-party not only facilitates negotiations, but participates in them as well. According to Frazier and Dixon (2006), mediators must propose specific, substantive options for ending hostilities or resolving the dispute.<sup>13</sup> Yet these suggestions are nonbinding, as

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<sup>12</sup> "Good offices" as conceptualized and operationalized by Frazier and Dixon (2006) comes close to what some scholars would label "non-directive" mediation (Moore 1996:53-5; see also Bercovitch 2007, who makes a similar point). Similarly, Kressel (2006) outlines three types of mediator intervention: reflexive (for example, building rapport), contextual (for example, promoting an environment conducive to conflict resolution), and substantive (for example, dealing directly with the disputants' issues). Good offices might involve the first two, but not the third.

<sup>13</sup> Some scholars might not consider this activity mediation. For example, Slaikeu (2002:45) notes that "on the content, or substantive issues, mediators are typically neutral." Throughout the rest of his work, Slaikeu adopts the

the disputants themselves retain ultimate decision-making authority. This makes mediation a voluntary process; either the third-party or disputants can end it at any time. Finally, third-parties might conduct *conciliation*. Frazier and Dixon (2006) describe conciliation as a process that combines fact-finding with mediation. The third-party investigates the facts involved in the dispute, facilitates negotiations between the disputants, and proposes specific non-binding options that might resolve the conflict.

It is important to note that the categorization of *fact-finding*, *good offices*, *mediation*, and *conciliation* under the larger umbrella of mediation is theoretically defensible and, therefore, appropriate. Skjelsbaek and Fermann (1996), for example, construct and employ a definition of mediation that explicitly does this. Bercovitch and Houston (1996:13) define mediation broadly as well – namely as “a process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (see also Bercovitch 1992, 2002, 2007; Bercovitch and Langley 1993; who use nearly identical definitions). It is clear from Bercovitch and Houston’s definition that the activities associated with fact-finding, good offices, and conciliation could easily fall within their definition, as each involves a third-party helping address a conflict and none resorts to force or law.

The third category contains legal processes of conflict management. Three specific strategies fall into this category. First, *arbitration* is a process whereby disputants elect to submit the dispute to a third-party, whose resolution of the dispute they agree to accept in advance.

Arbitration of an international dispute can be performed by an international court or by a state,

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stance that mediators are “facilitators and coaches,” and should generally not propose substantive options (as evidenced particularly in his discussion of how to break an impasse, which does not mention mediator suggested solutions at all; pp. 149-155).

group of states, or organization. For example, Argentina and Chile settled most of their outstanding territorial disputes bilaterally by 1991. However, they were unable to resolve their disagreement over the Laguna del Desierto region and agreed to submit it to arbitration by the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS then decided the matter in 1995 (Biger 1995:40-42; Frazier and Dixon 2006; Huth and Allee 2002:435-436). Similarly, Argentina and Paraguay submitted their dispute over sovereignty of the Chaco Boreal area to the United States President for arbitration in 1878 (Biger 1995:42-43; Huth and Allee 2002:437), and Colombia and Venezuela submitted their territorial dispute regarding the Goajira Peninsula to first Spanish arbitration in 1883 and then a Swiss Federal Council for further arbitration in 1917 (Biger 1995:173-175; Huth and Allee 2002:444-445). In each case, the disputants decided to allow third-parties to resolve their disagreements. The third-parties responded in an *ad hoc* fashion, creating tribunals, hearing positions, and issuing rulings on the specific issues handed to them.

In contrast to arbitration, *adjudication* is conducted by a standing international court when one disputant brings suit against the other. Although arbitration can also involve an international organization, it differs markedly from adjudication. In arbitration, the disputants must agree to submit the dispute to the organization, which is often not a court. In contrast, adjudication allows one disputant to bring suit against another, regardless of whether the second agrees fully to the court's jurisdiction of the matter. This distinction is clearer in domestic politics, but stands in the international arena as well.<sup>14</sup>

Two examples of adjudication highlight its divergence from arbitration. In December 1986, El Salvador and Honduras referred their border dispute to the International Court of

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<sup>14</sup> To be sure, the parties agreed to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court when accepting the Statutes of the International Court of Justice. This, however, is not the same as agreeing to submit *a particular* dispute to the court. Thus, arbitration is more ad hoc and consensual, while adjudication is more constant and compulsory. (Note that parties can also have specific treaties or reservations that affect the jurisdiction of the Court in particular cases.)

Justice; the court heard the dispute and issued a ruling in 1992 (Day 1987:425-428; Biger 1995:205-206; Huth and Allee 2002:448; International Court of Justice 1986).<sup>15</sup> Although disputants referred the matter to the court, the court acted because it had jurisdiction in the matter (which they confirmed during the proceedings), not simply because they were contacted by the disputing states. Similarly, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) brought suit against Uganda in June 1999 for committing armed aggression on the DRC's territory (during the civil war in the DRC) in violation of the United Nations Charter. The court recognized that it had jurisdiction (regardless of Uganda's position), heard arguments, and concluded that Uganda had violated the Charter and that it could award compensation to the DRC if the disputants could not agree on acceptable compensation on their own. In the latter case (much as in domestic politics) the respondent need not agree to go to court for adjudication to occur. Finally, related to adjudication, a third-party can establish a *war crimes tribunal* to investigate and prosecute violations of international law by the disputants.<sup>16</sup> The international community established such a tribunal in the aftermath of the Bosnian conflict.

The fourth category of strategies includes intervention techniques that involve primarily administrative functions. These include *administering* a given territory (as the United Nations did through the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor during the period

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<sup>15</sup> El Salvador appealed the decision in 2002. It lost this appeal in December 2003 (International Court of Justice 2003).

<sup>16</sup> On a greater elaboration of the distinction between arbitration and adjudication, see Isenhardt and Spangle (2000: chapter 6). For a legal perspective on this distinction, see Goldberg, Sanders, Rogers, and Cole (2003). Finally, a number of studies suggest these legal techniques are useful. Allee and Huth (2006) find that disputing states often elect to use legal mechanisms when they require domestic political cover (that is, when a dispute is salient to a particular domestic group and leaders want to insulate themselves from the resolution of that issue; Fearon 1994). Gent and Shannon (2010) find that legal mechanisms are often more successful at resolving conflict than mediation or negotiations.

1999-2002),<sup>17</sup> providing *humanitarian assistance* to those civilians affected by the interstate conflict, and supervising or monitoring *elections*. Third-parties can also help *delimit or demarcate* the border between disputing states; for example, after the Swiss Federal Council arbitrated the Colombia-Venezuela territorial dispute, a Swiss commission demarcated the boundary on the ground between 1922 and 1924 (Biger 1995:174).<sup>18</sup> Finally, third-parties might verify the *disarmament* of the forces from disputing states or help *repatriate* refugees that were displaced by the conflict. Each of these tasks amounts to providing administrative support to agreements (or understandings) that disputing parties reach. In essence, the third-party helps provide resources (or underwrite an agreement) to ensure that disputants can properly transition from conflict to a state of normalcy.

Finally, the fifth category contains intervention techniques that relate to peace operations.<sup>19</sup> As noted earlier, peace operations have changed substantially over time (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Diehl 2006a, 2008; Mingst and Karns 2000). Traditional peace operations (or “first-generation peacekeeping”) focuses on a few key tasks: *military observation*, in which the third-party deploys lightly-armed forces for the purpose of monitoring a ceasefire or withdrawal agreement reached by the parties; *interpositional peacekeeping*, in which forces create a “buffer zone” between disputants and then patrol that buffer zone to discourage the resolution of hostilities; and *demobilization verification*, in which forces monitor the withdrawal of troops

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<sup>17</sup> I recognize that this was essentially an intrastate dispute. However, this is where examples of the temporary administration of territory could be found. The typology in Table 1.1 is exhaustive, so it is possible that some strategies are not used often (if at all) in interstate disputes.

<sup>18</sup> Delimitation and demarcation are two different activities (Prescott and Triggs 2008:146-148). Delimitation refers to the act of outlining a border on a map (or through detailed description), while demarcation involves marking the (earlier) delimitation on the ground, usually through the use of boundary markers (for example, pillars).

<sup>19</sup> As noted above, military operations are excluded from consideration. Peace operations differ from traditional military involvement in the following ways: 1) those participating in peace operations do not join the conflict as disputants; 2) peace operation forces have a specific mandate, which often involves limiting the outbreak or escalation of violence (rather than contributing to it), and 3) peace operations forces tend to have limited rules of engagement.

according to a previously reached agreement (see Diehl 2006a; Mingst and Karns 2000). The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Sinai Peninsula provides a nice illustration of a traditional mission, as it performed each of these key tasks; UNEF verified the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from the Sinai, created and maintained a buffer zone between Israeli and Egyptian forces, and monitored the cease-fire between Israel and Egypt.

Peacekeepers operating under traditional mandates often were lightly armed and required the consent of the disputing states before and during deployment. This consent played a critical role in the deployment of traditional operations; sponsoring organizations believed that they must withdraw and terminate a peace operation if a disputant revoked consent for its deployment (as Egypt did for the first United Nations Emergency Force in 1973). Additionally, traditional missions often deployed after a ceasefire, but before a comprehensive settlement could be reached. Originally, proponents hoped that having a third-party capable of preventing renewed military hostilities would encourage disputants to use diplomatic avenues to resolve their dispute. Recent empirical (Greig and Diehl 2005) and anecdotal (Mingst and Karns 2000) research suggests, however, that by creating a peaceful environment, peacekeepers actually remove the impetus for negotiations to occur (see preceding discussion). Nonetheless, it is possible for peacekeepers to promote conflict resolution, although this may be difficult for them to do directly, given the various roles they must perform.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to traditional missions, organizations have deployed a number of expanded missions (or “second-generation” and “third-generation” operations). These missions emerged as the Cold War ended and cooperation among the great powers expanded. As actors deployed peace operations to new conflict contexts (for example, failed states like Somalia or civil/ethnic

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<sup>20</sup> See Wall, Druckman, and Diehl (2002), who elaborate on this point and provide suggestions for how peace operations forces might successfully mediate a conflict to which they are deployed.

conflicts such as Rwanda), they mandated additional tasks to peace operations forces. Some of these tasks fall under the administrative category above, such as election monitoring (for example, the United Nations role in Namibia in the late 1980s; see Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998) or verifying disputant disarmament. Yet new tasks were not restricted to administrative roles; many required a stronger military presence, rather than a civilian one. The expansion of humanitarian crises and civil wars, for example, created a need for actors to *protect humanitarian aid delivery* in order to guarantee its delivery to civilians (as in Somalia in 1992-1993). Similarly, actors required assistance to *clear mines* after a conflict ended, so that the conflict did not continue having devastating, accidental effects after the cessation of hostilities. Finally, organizations began to dabble in *preventive* missions after the Cold War – deploying forces strategically in order to prevent a conflict from escalating within or spreading to new areas. This latter mission type is rare, however; one of the only examples of it is the United Nations peace operation to Macedonia in 1995, which was deployed to reduce the possibility of spillover from the Bosnian conflict.

As the discussion so far indicates, third-parties have a broad spectrum of intervention strategies available to them. The typology used in this study comes from Frazier and Dixon (2006), but it is important to note that other scholars have recognized similar typologies, though they have not organized them so exhaustively or attempted to collect data systematically on their usage. For example, Mingst and Karns (2000) note that the United Nations uses strategies from “peaceful settlement” (which they claim includes good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication) to peace operations (which they break into peacekeeping and peacebuilding). Similarly, Claude (1984) uncovers a variety of mechanisms used by international organizations to encourage and facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes. The strategies he

mentions include many of those identified by Mingst and Karns, as well as fact-finding missions and public statements.<sup>21</sup> Although both authors focus upon international organizations, each of the strategies mentioned can also be (and have been) used by states and coalitions of states.

In the analysis presented later, I focus upon the five broad categories (verbal, mediation, legal, administrative, and peace operations), rather than the specific strategies encompassed under each category. For that analysis, it is important to note that the broad categories presented in Table 1.1 are arranged along a relative cost continuum from lower cost (at the top of the table) to higher cost (at the bottom of the table). The relative costs of the strategies are interpreted with respect to the intervening third-party. For example, third-parties incur a lower cost from using verbal expressions as opposed to mediation. The resource and time commitments are much smaller when a third-party simply issues a statement (strategies under category 1.0 in Table 1.1) than when they agree to investigate facts or help the parties reach an agreement that resolves the underlying issues in the dispute (through good offices, mediation, or conciliation; all under category 2.0 in Table 1.1). Similar relative cost comparisons can be made between the other categories. Descriptive statistics on the frequency of each strategy's use (outside of and within trajectories) can be found in Chapter 3.

The menu of intermediary strategies underscores the complexity of third-party intervention. Actors not only decide *whether* to intervene, but also *how* to do so (see Regan 2000:42-48). These decisions are certainly interrelated; deciding how to intervene implies that an actor decided to intervene in the first place. Yet conceptualizing the decision process in this

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<sup>21</sup> Claude (1984) seems particularly interested in legal strategies and does not directly mention public statements. However, he notes that one of the theoretical ways out of conflict is for international organizations to “shine the spotlight of publicity upon disputes, exposing the machinations and deceptions of war-minded leaders” (222). This publicity could conceivably occur through the use of verbal statements; he believed the publicity would then compel the world to demand a “decent and rational solution.” In this way, Claude also suggests a role for public statements, although in his analysis, they occur in a collective form.

manner highlights the importance of considering how actors select from among the various strategies available to them. Intervention strategies vary markedly in cost, as noted above. Third-parties must consider these costs when determining what strategy to select.

Intermediaries that issue *verbal* pleas need very few resources to intervene; it takes very little to issue a statement. In contrast, *mediation* strategies demand that an intermediary become more involved in the negotiation process, either by investigating the facts pertaining to the dispute, dispatching a representative (or team of them) to facilitate the negotiation process, generating substantive proposals, or physically hosting the mediation sessions. The costs of such activities involve the time, salaries, and transport of diplomats, as well as any fees associated with hosting negotiations (the lodging, travel, and security of foreign diplomats or the use of facilities). *Legal* strategies involve still greater costs. Legal proceedings generally take longer than mediation and follow a more formal process. Those deciding a case must hear positions, process documents, research claims, and issue rulings. *Administrative* tasks require the commitment of even more resources. For example, providing humanitarian aid can require actors to collect, transport, and deliver aid. Furthermore, if a receiving state lacks the infrastructure to effectively distribute aid (for example, roads or airports) or requires that aid be protected in transit, actors must deploy vehicles capable of reaching remote locations and a force that can ensure its delivery. Finally, *peace operations* entail still greater costs – namely, the deployment of military personnel for an extended period of time. Regardless of how intermediaries account for these costs in their decision-making, it is clear that they do bear intervention costs according to the strategy they choose to employ. I return to how these costs affect the selection of intervention strategies in Chapter 2.

Cost is not the only factor that influences an intermediary's choice of strategy, however. The concept of a trajectory implicitly assumes that the success or failure of past efforts matter as well. As noted earlier, the continuance of a trajectory depends (in part) on the failure of previous intervention efforts; there must be something left to resolve in order for intermediaries to continue getting involved. Yet this does not imply that failure entirely drives a conflict management trajectory. Small successes short of a comprehensive settlement can still leave space for additional intermediary intervention. For example, when the border dispute between North and South Yemen turned violent in 1972, the League of Arab States mediated on two separate occasions. In both instances, they were able to achieve a ceasefire agreement (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Frazier and Dixon 2006). Such agreements certainly fall far short of a "comprehensive settlement" (that is, all of the issues were not resolved with finality), but it is inaccurate to describe the mediation efforts that produced these agreements as failures. In the case of Yemen, mediation did reach an agreement that led to conflict abatement. It also, however, left space for additional intervention, which Libya subsequently exploited. After the cease-fires were in place, Libya used good offices to help the disputants reach an agreement for unification.

Additionally, failure does not deterministically lead to further intervention. Third-parties persistently weigh the costs and benefits of intervention, and these can change over time. Thus, intervention might be an attractive option at some times and unattractive at others. One mechanism by which this rational calculation changes involves repeated intervention failures. As third-parties address a conflict and fail, the benefits of intervention decline (that is, there is little hope of successful resolution), while the costs remain intact (that is, a third-party incurs costs from intervention, regardless of the intervention's success). Over time, third-parties can therefore

see intervention as a resource trap, which may cause them to “give up” on intervention altogether. In a world of finite resources, third-parties may simply conclude that their efforts and resources are better spent elsewhere.

In short, success and failure influence the development of trajectories, but the relationship is not straightforward. Success, broadly defined, need not always terminate a trajectory. Depending on the outcome of previous successful attempts, there may still be space for intermediaries to intervene. Third-parties that achieve limited agreements (such as cease-fires) may open the door for other intermediaries to push for a more comprehensive settlement. It is only when such comprehensive agreements are reached that conflict management trajectories necessarily end. Similarly, failure does not guarantee that a trajectory will end. Sometimes third-parties lack the motivation for intervention, either because they do not possess sufficient resources to intervene in all situations, or because the prospect of a successful intervention seems dim (especially after repeated failure). I return to the theoretical role played by success and failure in Chapter 2.

The third characteristic to note about conflict management trajectories derives from the first two: coercive conflict management strategies are excluded from trajectories. Such coercive strategies include military intervention as well as economic sanctions. This is an important point, and one that the Yemeni dispute also illustrates nicely. During the Yemeni conflict, the United States supplied weapons to North Yemen and deployed a naval task force to the region. Such interventions, however, are not included in my current conceptualization of trajectories (and are therefore excluded from the discussion of the case above and the analysis that follows).

There are two reasons for removing coercive interventions from the current analysis. First, as Regan (2000) notes, the costs, goals, and incentives of coercive interventions differ

substantially from non-coercive interventions. Although including both of these types of intervention is important for creating a unified model of conflict management, I postpone that integration for future work. Second, military intervention (a form of coercion) can create situations in which the third-party necessarily becomes involved as a disputant in the conflict. In such scenarios, the intervening state can no longer be called a “third-party” (in the true sense of the term) and their behavior may be viewed differently by the other actors seeking to manage the conflict diplomatically. Thus, the shape of conflict management trajectories that include coercive strategies may be markedly different from the patterns described below for non-coercive intervention. For these reasons, I limit the focus of the current study to non-coercive, or diplomatic, interventions.

The final defining characteristic of trajectories involves the process by which interventions in a trajectory are related to one another. Conflict management trajectories may be thought of as paths of related interventions, but these are not “path dependent” processes. In recent years, scholars have labeled many dynamic political processes as path dependent in order to indicate that “history matters” (Page 2006; Pierson 2000, 2004). Attempts to delineate a more precise definition of path dependence have produced a range of classifications. Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) find three types of path dependence, each of which depends only upon whether the outcome produced by the process is efficient and how much information decision-makers had when deciding between options that set the path in motion. In contrast, Pierson (2000) describes only two types of path dependence – either a broad or narrow conceptualization (see also Pierson 2004 and Mahoney 2000). The broad conception indicates that history matters generally, while the narrow conception proposes a process that produces a lock-in effect whereby current choices constrain the future choices of decision-makers.

Pierson (2000, 2004) believes that the lock-in effect found within the narrow conceptualization of path dependence is caused by increasing returns. That is, once decisions are made at critical points in time, a self-reinforcing process begins that encourages decision-makers to continue down the same path. Institutional design presents a case in point. States designed the United Nations Security Council in the aftermath of World War II. Current efforts to reform it must start and grapple with the existing structure. Thus, serious reform proposals that seek to enlarge the Council include items such as whether the current permanent members keep their veto, whether other members should get a veto (e.g., Germany or Japan, both of which could be considered major states in the current international system; see Correlates of War Project 2008), and whether additional seats would have permanent or rotating status (Weiss 2003). In other words, the decision in 1945 to create permanent/rotating members, as well as to create vetoes for some states, constrains the options available for reform today.<sup>22</sup>

Although increasing returns may play a prominent role in path dependent processes, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for path dependence to occur (Page 2006; Thelen 1999). Path dependence should therefore not merely be equated with processes that generate increasing returns. Instead, path dependent processes display two characteristics that are discussed and demonstrated repeatedly in research on the topic. First, initial conditions have larger effects on a path dependence process than later ones. This extreme sensitivity to early decisions blazes a trail from which it is later hard to deviate (Diehl 2006; Pierson 2000). For this reason, path dependent processes stress (perhaps even overemphasize) early events in a trajectory. Second, the sequencing of events matters. Ordering historical events differently can potentially produce disparate outcomes. Such thinking necessarily leads to a discussion of counterfactuals. For example, one might, as Barnett and Finnemore (2004) do, say that peacekeeping experiences in

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<sup>22</sup> See also Thelen (1999) who discusses path dependence with respect to institutional change.

Somalia and Bosnia led the United Nation's (UN) Secretariat to prefer a policy of non-engagement when the Rwandan genocide began in 1994. The earlier failures led the UN to believe action to be impossible without the consent of the disputing parties. Had the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia been different, significantly delayed, or absent (the counterfactuals), Rwandan intervention might have taken a different form. The order of these conflicts mattered greatly for subsequent decisions.<sup>23</sup>

Using the two defining features of path dependence, Page (2006) divides dynamic series of events into four categories. First, events might be unrelated to each other across time. That is, the probabilities of each of two events occurring could be independent of one another. Second, a process could be state-dependent.<sup>24</sup> Such processes depend on where one is currently (that is, the current state), but not the path taken to get there. Third, a process might depend on the history of events, but not the order in which those historical events occur. Page labels these "path dependent" processes to stress both the similarities to and differences from path dependence. Finally, both historical events and their order may matter, which defines a path dependent process.

The current study focuses on conflict management trajectories as state-dependent processes, as opposed to either independent, path dependent, or path dependent processes. This decision rests on two factors. In the first place, a trajectory implies that events are interrelated.

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<sup>23</sup> In fact, one might say the development of peace operations as a whole exhibits a path dependent process. In laying the groundwork for the first armed peace operation conducted by the United Nations (the United Nations Emergency Force – UNEF), then Secretary-General Hammarskjöld established precedents to which the organization frequently returns – such as obtaining the consent of disputants before inserting a peace operation and maintaining force neutrality and impartiality (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: chapter 5). Thus, the development of peace operations was highly sensitive to initial conditions, and the ordering of peace operations mattered for the trajectory that the development of these missions followed (for example, the failure of the UN in the Congo during the period 1960-1964 led the UN to handle primarily the interstate component of international conflicts for many decades after its occurrence; see the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>).

<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, the term "state" is used in formal statistical methods language to describe the "state of being," as well as in international relations to refer to the units of the international system. I will primarily use the term for the latter purposes, but will note where it is used to refer to the methodology being used.

Third-parties decide when and how to intervene, but to the extent that they incorporate previous interventions into their decision-making calculus regarding a current intervention, third-party interventions are not independent of one another. This eliminates the possibility of modeling third-party interventions simply as independent events (as current research does).

Additionally, decision-makers retain the ability at each intervention to choose among any of the conflict management strategies available in Table 1.1. The history of previous interventions does not eliminate strategies from the table;<sup>25</sup> indeed, third-parties have all options available to them, even if they are relatively unlikely to select them. History therefore matters in conflict trajectories. It is the history of interventions along a trajectory that leads to the present intervention.

Despite the importance of history, however, I propose that the entire history of the trajectory need not be known to predict the next intervention strategy selected. Rather, all that must be known is the current intervention strategy being used. I base this proposition on the fact that conflicts change over time. As conflicts evolve and interventions occur, the negotiating positions, resources, relationships, and needs of the disputants change as well. This means that a recent intervention contains the most accurate information about the dispute, and it is therefore upon this intervention that third-parties should form their decisions. For example, if a mediation failed in the distant past (that is, prior to the last intervention), the reasons for that failure may not apply in the present. Furthermore, any change in the positions, resources, relationships, or needs of the disputants that resulted from that distant intervention was already accounted for in subsequent interventions. The current intervention not only contains such information, but also updates it, thereby allowing third-parties to focus intently on what happened most recently and

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<sup>25</sup> Leaders may eliminate certain strategies from consideration for other reasons. For example, not every state has the resources to undertake high-cost interventions (for example, peace operations). This, however, is not the same as saying that the conflict management trajectory removed the possibility of choosing such a high-cost strategy.

causing them to discount distant interventions heavily.<sup>26</sup> In this way, third-parties access the best information at any given moment efficiently when deciding how to intervene next.<sup>27</sup>

This process stands in stark contrast to path dependent processes, such as the development of organizations. Path dependent processes generally require an entire history of events and their sequential order to matter when predicting the next event. Depending on this history, some options disappear. Furthermore, certain scholars propose that path dependent processes demonstrate a sensitivity to initial conditions and encompass increasing returns (Pierson 2000, 2004) although neither of these is necessary nor sufficient (Page 2006). Organization change represents a nice illustration of a path dependent process that exhibits the characteristics noted here. To predict the next reform of the UN Security Council, for example, one needs to know how the organization was founded, its rules and procedures, any past changes in the Council's composition or rules, and the order in which these past changes occur (as they might create precedents that guide or hinder further changes). Certain options (for example, removing the permanent members' veto without their consent) also disappear, since the organization must follow rules, procedure, and (to a lesser extent) precedent.

Despite the fact that the entire history (and the sequential ordering of events it includes) do not factor into my proposition, note that I do not claim that interventions prior to the previous one have no value; each intervention links to the one before it. Yet information from distant interventions falls into one of two categories. On the one hand, third-parties account for any useful information derived from that distant intervention when making subsequent intervention

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<sup>26</sup> The process I describe somewhat mirrors a decay function. However, in my model, I propose (and therefore assume) that the value of interventions prior to the most recent one approaches zero.

<sup>27</sup> This process is best thought of as a chain. Each intervention (link of the chain) draws on the intervention prior to it and provides information to the one that follows. The entire history (chain) is present, but the links do not depend on the entire history. The process I propose here is often referred to methodologically as a *Markov chain* process, and I will use this term to avoid the confusion associated with the term "state" (see above).

decisions. Since third-parties update their information at each intervention, it makes little sense to return to distant interventions at a later point in the trajectory. The most recent intervention already incorporates any pertinent information needed by the third-parties. On the other hand, distant interventions can yield impertinent information. Third-parties do not need this information, which again discourages them from reexamining distant interventions. Because third-parties continually update their information, third-parties can heavily discount distant interventions.

Although one might reasonably ask whether it is appropriate to assume that potential third-party intermediaries considering an intervention care only (or primarily) about the most recent intervention when deciding what form the next intervention should take, such an assumption is extremely plausible for both theoretical and methodological reasons. First, as noted above, conflict situations change rapidly, which encourages third-parties to gather information largely from the most recent, past intervention when deciding what to do next. Third-parties also continually update their information as interventions unfold, thereby incorporating pertinent information and carrying it forward for future updating. For these reasons, third-parties focus intently on the information that will be of greatest value for their current decision, and this comes from the most recent, previous intervention.<sup>28</sup>

Second, methodological research further supports the modeling of conflict management trajectories as state-dependent processes (Gill 2006; Page 2006).<sup>29</sup> The state-dependent process noted above – in which current decisions are based only on the most recent past decision – are reminiscent of a chain. These *Markov chains* are based upon both a finite number of categories and a transition rule that describes how each category can be reached from any other (Gill 2006).

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<sup>28</sup> One theoretical alternative involves a third-party considering only *their own* intervention actions over the *full life* of a given conflict. I return to this possibility in Chapter 6.

<sup>29</sup> Here, state refers to a particular “state of being.” See footnote 24.

For conflict management trajectories, the number of categories involved is decidedly finite; these are simply the broad categories listed in Table 1.1. Third-parties can choose to intervene in many ways, but their choices are limited. At some point, they exhaust the full list of possibilities. Using these categories, one can then uncover the likelihood of moving from each category to every other category. This produces a distribution that describes the likelihood of moving from any one category to each of the others. Cumulatively, these two characteristics define a Markov process (by definition), and this process can be found within conflict management trajectories. This process is outlined further in Chapter 3.

### **Organization of the Project**

In this chapter, I outlined the concept of a trajectory, as well as its importance to the scholarly study of international conflict management and policy-makers interested in both achieving and maintaining peace. By examining multiple actors and strategies and directly theorizing about the possible connections between interventions, this project greatly advances our understanding of conflict management. It also offers a more realistic picture to policy-makers. Only by understanding the likely responses of third-parties can those in the policy community make informed decisions about their involvement in conflicts.

I also surveyed existing conflict management research and its myopic tendencies. Conflict management research remains highly specialized according to intervention strategy. Thus, there are studies of mediation, arbitration, or peacekeeping, but very few that consider the full menu of intervention strategies available to third-parties. This has produced numerous islands of research. Although many of these islands are well-mapped out, they remain isolated

from the broader conflict management questions that motivate the inquiries associated with them. The remainder of this project is dedicated to connecting these islands.

Chapter 2 examines three general, theoretical mechanisms by which conflict management efforts might be linked. First, rational actors may simply condition intervention decisions on intervention costs. Third-parties may desire peace, but at the cheapest possible price. This *cost model* implies that third-parties begin with less-costly intervention strategies and employ increasingly more-costly strategies as interventions fail. Yet there are reasons to suspect that such a simplistic explanation lacks complete accuracy. Third-parties may indeed consider costs, but competing commitments, resource limitations, carrying capacity challenges, or domestic public opinion may prevent them from escalating their involvement beyond a certain threshold. In this variation on the cost model, intervention costs matter, but *limited commitments* prevail.

Yet rational actors need not consider costs alone. As Russian intervention within the Iraq-United States dispute (presented above) suggests, third-parties might learn from previous efforts. In a most basic sense, a *behavioral learning model* requires third-parties to repeat strategies that previously resolved disputes successfully, while eschewing the strategies that failed. I consider a number of variations on the learning model to account for potential learning across actors, disputes, and interventions. Alternatively, because conflict environments contain great complexity, third-parties might possess imperfect information or uncertainty about the best intervention strategies to use. This may produce seemingly *random* behavior.

After explaining each of these theoretical models in detail, including both their arguments and the specific hypotheses derived from them, Chapter 3 discusses the research design for this analysis. Besides mentioning the operationalization of variables, I explain the empirical construction of trajectories in detail. I also provide some general descriptive statistics about

conflict management trajectories, highlighting notable differences between strategy usage outside of and within trajectories. Finally, because one main contribution of this project involves the collection and refinement of conflict management data for disputes during the 1993-2001 period, I describe these efforts at some length.

Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis of conflict management trajectories. These empirical models evaluate the various hypotheses derived from the competing models in order to determine which comes closest to explaining intervention behavior. Chapter 5 supplements this analysis by taking a more practical tack. While the previous chapter used historical data to understand general trends in trajectories, this chapter contains brief case studies that illustrate each theoretical model in action. It also provides forecasting analysis that may be of interest to policy-makers. Given a conflict with certain characteristics, I then forecast the likelihood of various conflict management paths. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the key findings of this project, points toward potential avenues for future research, and examines the implications of my conclusions for both the scholarly and policy communities.

## Tables

**Table 1.1: Third-Party Conflict Management Intervention Strategies**

<i>Cost</i>	<i>Category</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Strategy</i>
Low  Medium  High	Verbal Interventions	1.1	Ceasefire appeal or demand
		1.2	Negotiations appeal or demand
		1.3	Troop withdrawal appeal or demand
		1.4	Offer to facilitate negotiations
		1.5	Offer to mediate negotiations
	Mediation Interventions	2.1	Inquiry/fact-finding
		2.2	Good offices
		2.3	Mediation
		2.4	Conciliation
	Legal Interventions	3.1	Arbitration
		3.2	Judicial settlement
		3.3	War crimes tribunal
	Administrative Interventions	4.1	Temporary administration
		4.2	Humanitarian assistance
		4.3	Plebiscite/election supervision/monitoring
4.4		Boundary delimitation/demarcation	
4.5		Disarmament verification/inspection	
4.6		Repatriation assistance	
Peace Operations	5.1	Military observation	
	5.2	Preventive peacekeeping	
	5.3	Interpositional peacekeeping	
	5.4	Humanitarian protection	
	5.5	Demobilization monitoring/verification	
	5.6	Mine-clearing/sweeping	

*Notes:* The organization of strategies comes from Frazier and Dixon (2006).

## Chapter 2

### The Theory behind Conflict Management Trajectories

In order to examine trajectories, it is necessary to reframe the study of international conflict management in two ways. First, conflict management must be conceptualized as a *process* that occurs throughout the life of a conflict. Although envisioning conflict management as a process is not entirely new (see, for example, Regan and Stam 2000), it is rarely done and, when it exists, tends to be myopic. Those studies that do consider conflict management as a process examine only certain components of that process (for example, mediation; see Regan and Stam 2000). Trajectories require that this scope be broadened. Second (and related to the first point), the focus of analysis within trajectories shifts from the individual conflict management attempt to the *conflict* itself (see also Regan and Stam 2000 on this point). Third-party interventions do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they exist within a specific conflict context, and this context evolves over time. The theoretical conceptualization of trajectories proposes that third-parties pay attention to the interventions of others within the same conflict when deciding how they should intervene (assuming that they decide to do so). Implicitly, this requires that conflict management research refocus on the conflict itself, as opposed to isolating and studying the individual efforts to manage or resolve it.

In the previous chapter, I outlined some defining characteristics of trajectories – namely, that trajectories include multiple actors, account for a full menu of conflict management strategies, exclude coercive interventions (that is, military interventions or sanctions), and are “state dependent” (rather than path dependent) processes (on this last characteristic, see Page

2006).<sup>1</sup> Trajectories also must include more than one conflict management attempt, as it is impossible to connect interventions if only one occurs within a particular conflict. Building upon these defining characteristics, this chapter explores three broad, competing theoretical models that explain how interventions within a trajectory are interdependent: a *cost* model (and a variation on that model, the *limited commitments* model), a *behavioral learning* model, and a *random* (or baseline) model. After discussing third-party motivations for intervention generally, I outline the logic underlying the above models, as well as the specific hypotheses derived from each.

### **Intervention Decisions**

Two interrelated decisions drive third-party interventions. First, a third-party must decide whether or not to intervene. The outcome of this decision largely reflects the interests of the third-party (Princen 1992: chapter 2). The third-party may have an overall interest in peace, but this need not be the case. Third-parties can also have other interests, which are best realized through a successful, diplomatic intervention. These include preventing the spread of conflict to new areas (perhaps even their own territory), extending their influence throughout the world, developing a reputation as a competent conflict manager, or preserving general security in a region. In addition to such indirect interests, a third-party might also be interested in the particular issue(s) under dispute and therefore possess certain preferences regarding how these issues are resolved (what Princen 1992 calls a “principal mediator”). This gives the third-party an incentive to help shape the substance of a peace agreement or ensure that one disputant “wins” the dispute (or does not). Regardless of the benefit received in any particular

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<sup>1</sup> The term “state” here does not refer to state actors (or countries). Instead, it refers to a particular process by which conflict management attempts are connected within a trajectory. See Chapter 1 for more information.

circumstance, third-parties receive something in exchange for their efforts. Even those third-parties that seem to be neutral have some (indirect) interests at stake – for example, a desire for peace or to build a solid reputation as a competent conflict manager. If third-parties receive absolutely no benefit from intervention, they will almost assuredly not attempt one.<sup>2</sup>

Once third-parties decide to intervene, they must next determine what conflict management strategy to use during their intervention. As noted earlier, third-party intermediary intervention options range from low- to high-cost – from verbal demands to peace operations (see Table 1.1). The selection of a strategy, while presented here as a simple decision, is certainly complex. Not all strategies will be appropriate for each conflict, either because they are unlikely to achieve their desired end, seem inappropriate to disputants (who often must acquiesce to a strategy’s use), or are undesirable for the third-party (who must possess the resources to execute the strategy and a willingness to use those resources for an intervention; Most and Starr 1989).

I focus primarily on this second decision: the choice of intervention strategy. This focus allows me to address why third-parties select intervention strategies at particular moments. The choice of strategy also determines the shape of conflict management trajectories (in other words, this is where the interdependence among third-party interventions lies), as I make more evident below. Despite this focus, I do not ignore the initial decision to intervene. That initial decision is intricately connected to the choice of strategy. In fact, policy-makers often make the two decisions simultaneously – *whether* to intervene comes along with *how* to do so. Therefore, for

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<sup>2</sup> An exception to this general statement occurs if the third-party is altruistic. For example, one could argue that the recent Responsibility to Protect (R2P) movement encourages interventions based solely on the welfare of civilians (Weiss 2007). I do not consider this type of behavior here. Not only does addressing altruistic motives require me to relax the assumption of rationality (see below), but it is not clear that actors base their interventions on such motives. Returning to the R2P movement, Bellamy (2010) finds that the international community applies the norm of “altruistic humanitarian intervention” inconsistently – most likely because the norm has not yet been internalized by international actors. Without being internalized, R2P cannot currently guide intervention decisions. Furthermore, the data used in this study predates the R2P movement, making its influence in this study irrelevant. Despite these limitations, I return to the implications of relaxing the rationality assumption in the conclusion of this work.

analytical ease, I assume that the two decisions are made simultaneously (that is, one cannot determine how to intervene without also deciding to intervene in the first place). I also explore the factors associated with intervention theoretically and empirically before considering strategy selection in greater detail.

Throughout the decision-making process (and the analysis that accompanies it), I make four additional key assumptions. First, I assume that third-parties are rational actors. Scholars regularly make this assumption in international relations research, including in studies of conflict and its management (Greig and Regan 2008; Regan 2000; see also Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith; Fearon 1994, 1995; Powell 2006; Wagner 2000).<sup>3</sup> It is therefore not a controversial assumption, although it does have certain implications for the analysis that follows. In its most basic form, rationality requires that third-parties examine the costs and benefits of intervention (and strategy selection). If the costs of intervention outweigh the benefits (that is, the expected utility of intervention is negative), then rational third-parties do not intervene. On the other hand, if the benefits of intervention outweigh the costs (that is, the expected utility is positive), then the rational third-party will opt to intervene.<sup>4</sup> After deciding whether to intervene, rational third-parties then construct and evaluate cost-benefit

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<sup>3</sup> Other conflict management studies regularly assume something similar to rationality. For example, Beardsley (2008) examines mediators' effects on producing short-term versus long-term agreements. His argument (which emphasizes sharing information with and manipulating the cost functions of disputants) mirrors the bargaining literature on international conflict, which leads one to believe that Beardsley assumes mediator rationality even though he does not explicitly assume it. Taking a somewhat different tack, Princen (1992:16) claims that he wants to move "beyond rationality." To a certain extent, he accomplishes this through his distinction between principal and neutral mediators. Yet the neutral mediator must have interests that compel it to mediate, especially when mediation incurs costs; otherwise, the mediator is altruistic, a quality that Princen explicitly does *not* wish to address. The key, then, is to understand that mediators can have interests (for example, avoiding the expansion of conflict, helping the parties reach agreement, or developing a reputation for being a competent mediator) that are not related to the issues being disputed and that therefore allow the mediator to be both rational and neutral by Princen's definitions.

<sup>4</sup> See Regan (2000:42-48), who presents expected utility equations for this decision. According to his model, the decision to intervene depends on the probability that the conflict can be settled without intervention, the costs of intervening versus not intervening (for example, material and audience costs), the utility of continued fighting, and the probability of a successful intervention.

calculations for the use of each intervention strategy. They select the strategy that provides the greatest expected utility (after accounting for information from previous interventions).

Assuming rational third-party actors leaves room for numerous theoretical explanations of their behavior. There are, however, two behavioral explanations that are specifically excluded. First, rational third-parties do not act altruistically; that is, a rational third-party is not willing to incur large costs purely for the benefit of others. Instead, the third-party must receive some benefit from intervention, even if that benefit is not directly related to the issues under dispute (for example, building a reputation as a conflict manager or preserving peace in a given region). Second, assuming rationality precludes irrational behavior by definition. Beyond altruism, this can occur when a third-party decides to incur large costs (with minimal or no benefits) or makes sub-optimal decisions (that is, decisions that do not maximize expected utility) given certain information. Since diplomatic interventions are usually transparent (at least in the sense that others know they are occurring) and leaders must commit resources to undertake them, decision-makers can face audience costs for inappropriate decisions (Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). This should make irrational interventions extremely rare events. Despite this, I consider the implications of relaxing the rational assumption in the concluding chapter.

The remaining assumptions come from the work of Regan (2000), who examines coercive interventions within civil wars. The second assumption maintains that third-parties reasonably expect their intervention to be successful before undertaking it. Third-parties seek to manage conflict productively. Those that think intervention has a minimal chance of success will not attempt it. This assumption dovetails nicely with rationality; the benefits of intervention come primarily through *successful* intervention because third-parties undertaking unsuccessful interventions incur costs while receiving minimal benefits. This holds for various types of third-

party benefits, as even those third-parties with a substantive interest in the issues under dispute gain benefits only if an agreement can be reached. Therefore, rational actors should avoid interventions that promise more failure than success.

The third assumption proposes that third-parties possess short time horizons for interventions. Third-parties respond to immediate conflict situations. Violence and the negative consequences associated with conflict generally capture their attention, and they therefore seek to address these problems before attempting conflict resolution.<sup>5</sup> The short time horizon stems from more than just a desire to respond to the immediate demands of a conflict, however; it results from the costs and benefits associated with intervention in two ways. First, regardless of the strategy they use, third-parties incur more costs for intervening over a long period than for a short intervention (for example, the peace operations force in Cyprus has been deployed since 1964, and third-parties incur additional costs each time the United Nations extends the mission's mandate). Third-parties certainly want their interventions to be successful, but they also wish to avoid extended conflict management situations. Second, it is possible that as a conflict becomes protracted, third-parties may see intervention as less likely to resolve the underlying dispute (that is, the benefits of intervention decrease). There is still room for conflict management as a protracted dispute ebbs and flows, but such interventions treat the symptoms of conflict, not its root causes. Conflict management requires only a short time horizon (for example, to secure Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2006), while resolution demands a longer one (for example, to create a two-state solution). Because rational third-parties experience fewer benefits and greater costs to intervening in protracted conflicts (that is, those that would require longer time

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<sup>5</sup> Generally speaking, conflict management involves mitigating the immediate effects of conflict. Those that seek conflict management try to end the fighting and address the consequences that accompany such fighting. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, tries to address the root causes of conflict so that it does not occur again (see Burton 1990). The former treats the symptoms of conflict, while the latter treats its fundamental causes.

horizons), it makes sense that third-parties possess short time horizons or eschew intervention altogether.

A number of scholars find empirical support that is consistent with the above logic. Diehl and Goertz (2000), for example, find that when mediation successfully produces a partial or full agreement between enduring rivals during the period 1946-1992, it does not affect the likelihood of a future war (although successful mediation did make future disputes less severe and prolong the time until the next dispute).<sup>6</sup> Similarly, Beardsley (2008) contends that mediated agreements may suffer from time inconsistency problems – that is, they are successful in the short-term but fail in the long-term (see also Greig 2001, who finds that the factors associated with mediation’s short-term differ from those that produce long-term success). Both studies point to effective conflict management (that is, mitigating the effects of violence), but poor conflict resolution (that is, resolving underlying issues); third-parties make gains in the short run that get reversed in the long run, as another dispute occurs or the agreement fails.

Yet conflict management within protracted conflicts may not be successful. For example, Regan and Stam (2000) uncover evidence that third-party interventions can (and often do) *prolong* dispute duration.<sup>7</sup> If true, this suggests that third-party interventions make conflicts somewhat worse (see also Richmond 1998). In short, the evidence suggests that third-parties may not be able to effectively resolve (or, perhaps, manage) protracted conflicts. The termination of such conflicts might instead require a political shock (see Diehl and Goertz 2000) or the

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<sup>6</sup> Other work on conflict management within rivalries tends to use the enduring rivalry classification as a case selection device (Greig 2005; Greig and Diehl 2005), making it difficult to corroborate or obtain additional detail on Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) findings.

<sup>7</sup> Regan and Stam (2000) also find that the effects of mediation vary over the life of a dispute. Mediation is most successful (able to end the dispute) in interstate disputes when conducted very early or late in the dispute; mediations that occur within intermediate conflict phases tend to prolong dispute duration. Interestingly, in their study of civil war, Greig and Regan (2008) discover that disputants are most likely to reject a third-party’s mediation offer early and late in the conflict. Though the two sets of cases are different (interstate vs. civil conflict), there is an implication that deserves greater attention: it seems that disputants may be most likely to reject mediation at the exact times at which it is most likely to succeed in resolving the conflict. This remains to be directly tested.

passage of time (Bennett 1998). It is therefore reasonable for third-parties to see fewer benefits and more costs associated with interventions into protracted conflict. In the end, their time horizon remains short both to address the immediate consequences of conflict and because extending the time horizon seems irrational.

Finally, I assume that the decision to intervene clears any domestic opposition hurdles. Various domestic constituencies have an interest in foreign policy, including diplomatic interventions. Some constituencies will view intervention as a necessary policy under certain conditions, while others will paint it as imprudent or against the national interest. Delving into the domestic forces that shape intervention decisions is important, but it is also beyond the scope of the current work. The mechanisms by which actors reach their intervention decisions comprises a separate (albeit related) research agenda. Because I am not interested in the domestic decision-making apparatus per se, I suspend consideration of this apparatus for now. What matters in this study is that third-parties reach a decision about intervention, regardless of the internal processes that produces that decision.

Thinking of third-party decisions to intervene as a two-step process highlights the idea of a conflict management trajectory presented earlier. A trajectory is the aggregate representation of all third-party intervention decisions within a given conflict. Intermediaries that choose to intervene will be included in the trajectory, while those that do not will be absent. The strategies selected by the intervening intermediaries will determine the shape of the trajectory.

As an example, I return to the Yemeni dispute presented in Chapter 1. In 1978, North Yemen accused South Yemen of participating in the assassination of the North Yemeni President, Ahmed Hussein Ghashmi. After severing diplomatic relations with the south, North Yemen then referred the matter to the League of Arab States, which authorized its members to

suspend diplomatic relations with South Yemen as well. This, however, did little to settle the matter, and North Yemen attacked South Yemeni positions in the days that followed. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attempted to mediate the crisis first in September 1978. Unfortunately, PLO efforts proved unsuccessful, and the dispute persisted. In February 1979, South Yemen invaded North Yemen, which led to further interventions. Saudi Arabia immediately appealed for a cease-fire, worrying that the conflict would spill over into its territory. A few days later (in early March), a coalition composed of Iraq, Jordan, and Syria mediated a cease-fire between the disputing states. Within days of the coalition's mediation, the League of Arab States (LAS), which had been monitoring the situation, demanded the withdrawal of Southern Yemeni troops from the north and established a seven-member observation commission to oversee the cease-fire and troop withdrawal. The LAS then mediated a cease-fire between the two sides in mid-March. Finally, Kuwait facilitated negotiations at the end of March 1978. The Kuwaiti efforts produced a provisional agreement that provided the foundation for merging the two states (Frazier and Dixon 2006; see also Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).

In the Yemeni case, the conflict management trajectory includes the interventions of Saudi Arabia, the Iraq-Jordan-Syria coalition, and the LAS.<sup>8</sup> Each of these actors decided to intervene in the conflict, which explains their inclusion in the trajectory. Additionally, each actor chose a specific strategy to employ while intervening. I sketch this trajectory graphically in Figure 2.1. The horizontal (x) axis represents time, and I display the beginning and end dates of interventions along this axis. The vertical axis (y) indicates the strategy selected. Following the cost structure discussed in Table 1.1, the least costly category of strategies (verbal) appears

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<sup>8</sup> The project currently excludes the role of non-state actors, since many of these actors have motivations that differ substantially from states, coalitions of states, or international governmental organizations. Therefore, the PLO's efforts are not included in the trajectory.

closest to the origin of the graph. As one moves up the vertical axis, the intervention strategies increase in cost. Finally, the shaded boxes indicate the strategy selected by a third-party at a given moment during the dispute.

As Figure 2.1 illustrates, the third-parties that intervened in the Yemeni dispute used a variety of strategies – from verbal pleas to mediation to a peace operation (observation mission). The timing of these interventions suggests that parties started with low-cost strategies first, before moving on to more costly interventions. For example, Saudi Arabia (the first intervener) used a verbal strategy, while the Iraq-Jordan-Syria coalition subsequently tried mediation. Yet the third-parties were not simply focused on costs. The Iraq-Jordan-Syria mediation successfully produced a cease-fire, which perhaps encouraged Kuwait to try mediation a few weeks later. Regardless of the motivations behind each strategy's selection, Figure 2.1 demonstrates that a trajectory can be represented visually and that such graphics provide a concise summary of how strategies are ordered – both temporally (x axis) and with respect to costs (y axis). In other words, figures like the one presented above sketch the *shape* of trajectories. I will use similar figures later in this chapter when discussing the various theoretical shapes that trajectories can take.

The two-step decision process mentioned above mandates a need to explore both why states intervene and how they select specific intervention strategies. I devote the remainder of this chapter to these two broad questions. While I assume that third-parties make these decisions simultaneously, the motivations that guide each decision differ. That is, the incentives that prompt an intervention diverge from those that guide strategy selection. I therefore separate these questions for the purpose of the theoretical discussion that follows. I begin with the decision to intervene, after which I turn to the factors that influence the selection of intervention strategies.

## Why Intervene?

As noted above, third-parties intervene as conflict managers for many reasons. Some third-parties have a substantive interest in the issues under dispute, while others seek more indirect benefits (see Princen 1992). Regardless of the specific motivation for intervention, however, an intervention costs the third-party something – either in time, resources, or both (although these costs vary according to the strategy selected; see Table 1.1). Therefore, if we assume that states are rational actors, then intermediaries must obtain some benefit in exchange for their services – something to offset the costs. Without any such benefits, intervention (regardless of the strategy chosen) would always produce negative utility, be considered irrational, and consequently be avoided. In other words, intervention cannot occur among rationally acting states if no benefits exist.

The fact that intervention occurs at all suggests that benefits do exist.<sup>9</sup> We must then ask where these benefits might be found. Why do third-parties care to intervene in other states' conflicts? What good does diplomatic intervention do for the third-party? What do they receive in exchange for their efforts? In pursuing an answer to these questions, I find that three general benefits seem most likely to motivate third-party intervention.

First, a state may have interest in maintaining the status quo. Ikenberry (2001), for example, argues that states that are victorious in war design institutions to create and preserve order after the war ends. These institutions reassure weaker states that the strong states will not take advantage of them and commit every state to a common set of institutional rules. Although these rules often benefit the strong states disproportionately, all states are likely to agree to the

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<sup>9</sup> The other logical possibility is that states are irrational. Since I assume rationality, I postpone such considerations for future work.

rules, as this creates stable expectations about interstate behavior. We can extend Ikenberry's logic beyond the realm of institutional design to the conflict management behavior of third-parties as well. If the strong want to preserve the status quo, then they need to do more than design institutional rules. They also must resolve disagreements that arise, for these military conflicts represent potential threats to the stability of the status quo.

The desire to maintain the status quo should be strongest among *major* states (as opposed to minor states). Major states possess a large concentration of capabilities (military, economic, or both), global interests and reach, and recognition from other major states that they belong "in the club" (Small and Singer 1982; see also Maoz 1989).<sup>10</sup> The major states are also the ones that design institutions, according to Ikenberry's (2001) argument. This handful of states atop the community of nations has the most to lose from system instability. They therefore strive to preserve the status quo, as well as to extend their influence throughout the world. Their interests provide them with the *willingness* to intervene in international conflicts, while their concentration of capabilities supplies them with an *opportunity* to do so (Most and Starr 1989).

Despite the importance of major states, I do not wish to imply that minor states have no interests or tacitly accept threats to the status quo. Regional powers in particular may also want to preserve the status quo order within their respective neighborhoods (for example, India in southern Asia, Brazil in South America, or Nigeria or South Africa in Africa; see Frazier and Stewart-ingersoll 2010). Similar to major states, regional leaders have the most to gain from *regional* stability and the most to lose from its demise. The special status they enjoy may not hold if conflict restructures the region. Yet, as their name implies, regional powers are limited geographically in both their interests and capabilities; they do not maintain interests in, nor can

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<sup>10</sup> The Correlates of War (COW) Project identifies major states in the international system according to the guidelines set by Small and Singer (1982). See Correlates of War Project (2008).

they project capabilities into, every region of the world.<sup>11</sup> The point is not that minor states have no interest in intervention, but rather that major states have greater motivation (and resources) to conduct interventions than their minor state counterparts.

Second, states may want to prevent the spread of militarized conflict. As Most and Starr (1980) note, states that are contiguous to warring states have an increased likelihood of experiencing a subsequent war themselves. Houweling and Siccama (1985) offer a rationale for this empirical finding, which they then confirm over a longer time period than Most and Starr. They propose that states can only tolerate so many conflicts at a time; therefore, states already involved in conflict are unlikely to get involved in other conflicts that arise. These “preoccupied” states are more likely to use their resources to address an existing conflict, rather than to split their resources by joining additional conflicts, especially since each state possesses finite resources and wants to win the conflicts to which they commit (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). With certain states occupied or weakened due to battle, the door opens for nearby revisionist states to instigate additional conflict in the region. Thus, Houweling and Siccama believe wars cluster regionally, and they find evidence of such a pattern.

Opportunistic states may take advantage of weakened neighbors or of regional leaders who are unable to fight another war. Yet states are not universally revisionist. Indeed, the majority of states do not seek to overturn the status quo most of the time. States have strong incentives to avoid unnecessary militarized conflict – not just because of the costs in terms of resources or human life, but also because conflict creates instability, the outcomes of such conflicts are uncertain, and the mismanagement of conflict potentially contains the seeds for a

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<sup>11</sup> See Buzan and Waever (2003), who use a similar logic during the construction of their regional security complexes. They argue that some security matters rest at the regional (rather than global) level and identify a number of regional leaders.

leader's demise (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000).

Beyond these incentives to avoid participating in conflict, states also have an interest in actively managing nearby conflicts diplomatically for two reasons. First and foremost, states are more likely to become involved in a conflict to which they are contiguous (Siverson and Starr 1990). Put differently, conflicts can spread, and those states that are closest to an existing conflict are at greatest risk for such contagion. The risk results from geographic proximity generally, as well as its effects. States maintain greater ties to nearby states (for example, trade) than to those farther away, and these ties serve as conduits that transmit conflict. Kadera (1998) not only provides a theoretical backdrop for these transmission mechanisms, but also explains their implications for conflict. She finds through a series of simulations that the probability of conflict spreading remains positive, even if states erect stronger barriers to conflict contagion. In other words, one cannot entirely eradicate the possibility that conflict will spread. Therefore, to avoid the costs of conflict entirely, states often must consider intervening as a third-party in neighbors' disputes. The inability to help disputants reach agreement could draw a neighbor into unwanted conflict.<sup>12</sup>

Second, even if the conflict itself does not spread to contiguous states, neighbors experience the consequences of that conflict (see Grieg and Regan 2008 for a similar argument with respect to mediation offers and civil wars; see also Gleditsch 2002 for an argument about the regional dynamics of international politics). The clearest example of such consequences involves the movement of refugees, who often try to escape a conflict environment by crossing into a third-party state. For example, during a dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000, a

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<sup>12</sup> See also Bremer (1992), who finds that contiguity best predicts dispute and war occurrence. While this finding does not address conflict contagion directly, it does suggest that states that worry about getting involved in a conflict should be extremely concerned with their neighbors' behavior.

number of refugees fled to neighboring Sudan. Similarly, after the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Iran set up refugee camps in its territory for those that had fled the conflict zone. These refugees can place great demands on the resources of a host state – not only in terms of land on which to live, but also in the form of food, water, and social services needed by the refugee population.

Beyond this, massive refugee flows can also *cause* militarized disputes between states.<sup>13</sup> For example, in January 1993, the security situation in Togo deteriorated when Togolese soldiers rioted. Because these Togolese soldiers frequently targeted civilians in order to pressure their government, a number of Togolese refugees fled to neighboring Ghana. In response to the refugee flows, Ghana placed its forces on alert, primarily so that the military could assist the refugees crossing its borders. Unfortunately, Togo perceived the alert status as “war mongering,” accused Ghana of attacking it, and eventually closed its border with Ghana. The two neighbors then sporadically fought one another militarily for a couple of years.

In the case of Ghana and Togo, refugee flows produced a dispute. Yet they also provided an incentive for other neighbors to intervene diplomatically as I argue above. Benin, Togo’s neighbor to the east, also received a massive influx of Togolese refugees after the soldiers in Togo rioted (United Nations 2011). In contrast to Ghana’s actions, however, Benin did not put its forces on alert. It opted instead to work diplomatically to manage the conflict. Throughout the various Ghana-Togo disputes that followed, neighboring Benin intervened repeatedly using both verbal pleas and conciliation (a form of mediation that includes fact finding as well as the facilitation of negotiations). Benin’s efforts did not successfully resolve the dispute(s). Instead, a series of bilateral talks between Togo and Ghana eventually restored relations between the formerly disputing states. Regardless of how the dispute ended, however, Benin did have

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<sup>13</sup> This may be one mechanism by which conflict spreads to neighboring states.

incentives to intervene. These incentives were based on the threat of the conflict spreading to Benin, as well as the refugee situation caused by that conflict.

I have outlined two theoretically possible rationales that might motivate third-parties to intervene in nearby conflicts: the direct threat of a conflict spreading and the possibility that the effects of conflict can be felt by neighbors. Whether these rationales work individually or in tandem, they provide mechanisms by which actors might desire a diplomatic solution to an interstate dispute. Of course, each rationale makes the most sense for states that are closest to the conflict. South American states, for example, are unlikely to fear that an African conflict will spread to them. Even within a region, the effects of conflict may not be felt if a potential third-party is located far from that conflict (for example, Egypt and Angola). Thus, states that are *contiguous* to disputing states should have greater incentives than non-contiguous states to intervene as third-parties in an interstate dispute.<sup>14</sup>

The exception to this rule lies in alliance relationships, the third factor that affects third-party intermediary behavior. Numerous works discuss the potential transmission of conflict through alliance relationships. For example, Siverson and Starr (1990) note that alliance partners are more likely to become involved in one another's conflicts. This result holds for both major and minor powers and for various alliance types during the period 1816-1965. Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, Scheffran, Chi, and Rider (2011) reach a similar conclusion in their study of the expansion of World War I. Yet they also stipulate that alliance relationships were not the only mechanism that caused the world war to expand. Kadera (1998) confirms this latter point; she finds that the effects of alliance relationships interact with geographic contiguity to produce an even greater risk of conflict contagion. In short, it appears that alliance partners should fear conflict

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<sup>14</sup> International organizations also worry about conflict contagion. For example, the United Nations deployed a peace operation to Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in the midst of the Bosnian conflict to prevent the conflict from spreading to Macedonia.

contagion. That fear should heighten if they are also immediately contiguous to an alliance partner's ongoing conflict.

Allies can be motivated to intervene in their partner's conflict by more than just a threat of conflict contagion, however. Diplomatic intervention might be needed to preserve the focus of the alliance. Alliances generally form for a particular purpose (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 2002). When a dispute breaks out, at least one alliance member must divert resources and attention to the new dispute. This can cause the alliance to become distracted from its original purpose. If such a distraction occurs, other alliance members then have an incentive to help resolve the dispute, as clearing that dispute from the table will permit the alliance to return to its intended purpose. This result should hold whether the alliance is bilateral or multilateral and regardless of the specific alliance provisions.<sup>15</sup>

In sum, third-parties can receive a number of benefits from intervention. I detailed three of these benefits above – namely maintaining the stability of the status quo, preventing the spread of conflict, and preserving key (alliance) relationships (see also Zartman and Touval 2007 for a discussion of mediator motives). Before proceeding to a discussion of how third-parties might select intervention strategies, I offer a number of observations regarding these benefits – both to clarify their importance and to expound upon their implications.

First, the above discussion implies that diplomatic intervention should not be the norm. Most states will not intervene in most conflicts most of the time. Major states (and regional leaders) comprise a very small subset of the interstate system. Similarly, only a handful of states are contiguous to a given conflict. And even though alliance ties are more common than either major state status or contiguity to a conflict, states do not build alliance relationships with the

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<sup>15</sup> Owsiak and Frazier (2009) break apart this relationship by alliance type. I do not disaggregate the alliance variable in this project.

majority of states in the world. Put differently, only a minority of states accrue benefits from intervention in any given conflict. The small subset of state actors that receives benefits also possesses incentives for third-party intervention. Thus, for any given conflict, the majority of rational states have little motivation to manage the conflict.

Second, what scholars know about conflict management confirms the benefits outlined above. Frazier (2006) and Owsiak and Frazier (2009) find that major states are more likely to perform third-party interventions, both across all strategies and with respect to mediation specifically.<sup>16</sup> Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) confirm this finding for mediation in particular (although they opt to disaggregate major states into the United States and other members of the United Nations Security Council). Similarly, Greig (2005) notes that contiguous third-parties are more likely than non-contiguous states to offer mediation, be asked by disputants to mediate, and to serve as mediators. Greig and Regan (2008) reach a similar conclusion regarding third-party offers to mediate civil wars. Finally, Frazier (2006) and Owsiak and Frazier (2009) conclude that allies are more likely than non-allies to mediate disputes involving their alliance partners.<sup>17</sup> In each case, previous research supports the proposition that intervening states require some sort of benefit to intervene.

Third, I framed the preceding discussion almost entirely from the perspective of states. Yet other types of third-parties must experience similar benefits in order to intervene. Coalitions are merely conglomerations of individual states. To encourage individual states to participate in an intervention, the coalition must receive a benefit from intervention and supply some of those

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<sup>16</sup> For a somewhat contrasting view, see Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005) who find that the superpower states are less likely than other third-parties to successfully mediate ethnic civil wars. Given their focus on intrastate conflict and how they choose to operationalize “major states,” their finding does not exactly refute Frazier’s work. See also Gelpi (1999), who uncovers a potential interaction between major state status and alliance ties.

<sup>17</sup> See also Gelpi (1999), who finds that alliances effectively address intra-alliance disputes (that is, those among members of a multilateral alliance).

benefits to its constituent members. In other words, states participating in a group-led intervention need to see some individual benefit to intervention before agreeing to undertake one. States' choice to act in concert reflects a desire to disperse costs (see below), but the decision to intervene must still generate benefits in order for the action to remain rational. To be fair, dispersing costs among many members may lower the amount of benefits needed to prompt an individual state's participation in an intervention, but states must benefit nonetheless.

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) also experience benefits as a condition of intervention, although IGO action is admittedly more complex than that of states or coalitions of states. On the one hand, most IGOs behavior depends on the (explicit or tacit) agreement of major states or key members (Zartman and Touval 2007). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), for example, cannot act without some support from the permanent member major states, each of which holds veto power over its behavior. Regional organizations may also be hamstrung by members' diverging interests or regionally adopted norms. For example, the African Union's (AU) policy of non-intervention in the domestic matters of member states might prevent its members from authorizing intervention in one another's disputes. Thus, much as in the case of coalitions, key members must see a benefit to intervening. The states' decision to act through an IGO (rather than unilaterally) signifies a desire to disperse costs and responsibility for the intervention; it does not indicate, however, that states experience no benefit from intervention.

On the other hand, IGOs are not merely the pawns of states (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; see also Abbott and Snidal 1998, Mearsheimer 1994/1995). They have individual interests as well. States often task IGOs with the maintenance of peace and security. This makes intervention a top priority; if an organization does not help members peacefully resolve disputes,

the organization fails to fulfill a core objective assigned to it.<sup>18</sup> Further, secretariats of IGOs may have another motivation for intervention. State resources are limited, but the number of IGOs has expanded exponentially since World War II (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). IGOs that demonstrate competence (perhaps as a successful conflict manager) potentially ensure their survival and gain additional resources and autonomy from members (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney 2006). Despite these benefits, however, IGOs often cannot act without member support, especially within the realm of peace and security. Therefore, while some benefits may accrue to the organization, the benefits to member states may be pivotal in the decision to intervene. Any such benefits are likely to mirror those noted above.

Fourth, I predict above that states decide to intervene in order to obtain certain benefits. Yet it might be possible for them to achieve these same benefits by *not intervening*, if another intermediary resolves the conflict. Such free-riding behavior occurs primarily when the state's interest depends only upon achieving a peaceful settlement; those third-parties with a substantive interest in the issues under dispute or in extending their influence throughout the world may still want to intervene. Regardless, an incentive to free-ride exists, and it underscores the rarity of third-party intervention. Third-party actors may want benefits, but to the extent that they can obtain these benefits without intervening, they will forego involvement in the dispute. Non-intervention will therefore remain the norm, as each actor waits for another to manage the conflict.

Although free-riding behavior may be attractive (and possible), it is not a preferred policy for any actor that truly wants to obtain the benefits of successful conflict management. The reason lies within the success rates of intermediary interventions. Generally speaking, conflict

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<sup>18</sup> The logic behind this argument comes from principal-agent theory. On this theory, see Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney (2006).

management attempts are most often unsuccessful. Dixon (1996:663), for example, finds conflict management strategies to be ineffective more often than not at either discouraging dispute escalation or producing a peaceful settlement. On balance, interventions limit dispute escalation 10-20% of the time and produce a settlement 25-40% of the time. In contrast, if no intervention occurs, Dixon reports success rates of 32% and 33% respectively (see also Frazier and Dixon 2006, who report that interventions are statistically more likely than no intervention to result in a negotiated agreement).<sup>19</sup> Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) report similar statistics for mediation, which they claim yields an agreement 35-40% of the time (see also Bercovitch and Houston 1996). Doyle and Sambanis (2000: table 1) echo Dixon's success rates for peacebuilding operations; depending on how one defines success, missions are successful in 35-42% of the cases in which they are tried (see also Fortna 2004). Finally, Greig and Diehl (2005) note that peace operations often reduce the likelihood that a settlement agreement will be reached. If the goal of interstate peace operations is to facilitate a negotiated agreement that settles the underlying conflict, then peace operations fail more often than not.

All of this empirical evidence suggests that third-parties cannot reasonably sit on the sidelines and wait for peace. Even if another third-party accepts responsibility for intervention, their efforts will fail more often than they succeed. Therefore, rational actors seeking specific benefits must often adhere to a common adage: "if you want something done right, you better do it yourself." Of course, this need not imply that free-riding never occurs. Actors sometimes wait for another third-party to intervene. Yet states that want the benefits of successful conflict management have a competing incentive to intervene. They cannot be assured that free-riding

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<sup>19</sup> Dixon (1996) finds that legal interventions produce a settlement in approximately 60% of cases in which they are tried. Given that states must agree to abide by a ruling before submitting the dispute to a legal process, this result is not surprising. It is also an outlier when compared to the other intervention strategies. Using updated data, Frazier and Dixon (2006) run models in which the predicted probability of a negotiated settlement given legal intervention is 40%.

will produce any benefits. Although their involvement may also not yield the desired outcome, it does give them more direct control over the outcome they seek.

Finally, at the outset of this section, I outlined a number of benefits that third-parties receive from intervention. Two of these benefits, however, do not explicitly appear in the detailed discussion above: the enhancement of reputation as a conflict manager and specific interest in the substantive issues under dispute. Reputation remains a difficult concept to pin down, and it provides no clear predictions about specific third-party behavior. Which actors will seek intervention opportunities for reputational purposes? Major states seem an obvious place to start, yet in peacekeeping, it is often *minor* powers (for example, Canada or Nigeria) that vie for a place of prominence in operations. In contrast, many major states intervene frequently as mediators, particularly the United States (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000). Regional powers offer a second possibility, but these states often obtain their status by developing a reputation for conflict management and regional custodianship of security orders (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2011); the identification of regional powers is therefore endogenous to predictions involving reputation. Finally, the inability of reputation arguments to predict third-party intervention behavior extends to coalitions and organizations as well. What organization specializing in peace and security would *not* want states to see it as an expert at facilitating peace? In the end, reputation interests seem secondary to other types of benefits. This conclusion results not merely from the lack of predictability gained from the concept of reputation, but also from the success rates of intervention. If interventions fail more often than they succeed, those actors trying to build reputations as effective conflict managers may find that the costs exceed the benefits. This is especially the case if a solid reputation depends upon repeated successful interventions.

In contrast to reputational benefits, substantive interests remain a prime motivator of third-party behavior. The predictions derived from these benefits, however, match the predictions contained in the earlier discussion. States with substantive interests in the issues under dispute are more likely to have major status or to be either contiguous or allied to disputing states. Major states possess interests throughout the world by definition, making them prime candidates to hold substantive interests in a variety of conflicts. Similarly, states closest to a conflict are more likely to be affected by the outcome of the dispute than states that are far from it. A division of land or resources may alter what is available for neighbors, and policy or regime change goals can create new situations to which neighbors must adjust. Distance diminishes these effects. Finally, allies coordinate security policy with one another. Although the depth of this cooperation ranges substantially according to the specific commitments partners make to one another, allies may have an interest in how the disputed issues get resolved, lest their commitments be altered. In sum, the earlier discussion largely accounts for third-parties seeking a specific resolution of the substantive issues under disputes.

The preceding discussion explains *why* third-parties intervene. It also begins to predict which third-parties are most likely to do so. Yet this is only half of the intervention process. Once third-parties choose to intervene, they must also determine *how* to intervene. I therefore turn now to this latter decision.

### **Not Whether, But How**

Besides deciding whether to intervene, third-parties also choose the method by which they will do so. That is, they must select a conflict management strategy (see Table 1.1) to use during their intervention. These decisions determine the form that a trajectory takes. I propose

three broad, competing theoretical models that explain how interventions within a trajectory are interdependent, which correspond to three general forms (or shapes) of trajectories: a *cost* model (and a variation on that model, the *limited commitments* model), a *behavioral learning* model, and a *random* (or baseline) model. In the pages that follow, I outline the logic underlying of the above models, as well as the specific hypotheses derived from each.

### *Cost Model*

As noted in the previous chapter, intervention strategies can be placed along a relative cost continuum from low- to high-cost (see Table 1.1). If rational actors want to maximize their expected utility (that is, their cost-benefit calculation; see Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 2010), then they will want peace for the lowest possible price. That is, they will seek to minimize the costs associated with intervention. To achieve this goal, third-parties first employ strategies at the low-cost end of the spectrum; this is the easiest way to minimize costs. As low-cost strategies fail to resolve the conflict fully, actors would then resort to relatively more costly strategies, working incrementally and sequentially up the cost scale.

This behavior makes sense for the full array of third-party actors: states, coalitions of states, and intergovernmental organizations. Although distinct types of states often behave differently in conflict (for example, major versus minor states; see Small and Singer 1982), all will likely follow the intervention policy outlined above for three reasons.<sup>20</sup> First, actors possess a finite set of resources. Those states, for example, that have extremely limited capabilities (that is, minor states) will find it much easier to call for a cease-fire than to undertake peace operations, as will organizations with limited resources. Yet major states are not immune to

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<sup>20</sup> On the behavior of major states in conflict, see Bremer (1992) and Vasquez (2009), the latter of which thoroughly reviews literature on this point. For evidence that major states are more likely to intervene as third-parties to a dispute, see, *inter alia*, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) and Frazier (2006).

resource constraints. They also possess limited capabilities, and, as they pursue interests throughout the world (which is a defining characteristic of major states), they will undoubtedly seek to use their resources efficiently. Major states will therefore also focus on less costly options first. Second, actors may face audience costs that compel them to search for a low-cost intervention strategy (Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). Key constituencies might not readily support high-cost interventions. Events such as Somalia, in which a well-publicized tragedy prompted the United States and United Nations to rethink (and subsequently restrict) the deployment of peace operations, underscore this point (see Barnett and Finnemore 2004). High-cost interventions require greater commitment and tend to involve greater risk. Third-parties therefore have more flexibility with interventions when they use less costly strategies, as domestic constituencies are less likely to criticize leaders for limiting the risk borne by their state. Finally, there may be a limit to the number of interventions an actor can undertake at one time (that is, actors may be restricted by carrying capacity). Given a multitude of conflicts throughout the world, actors therefore have an incentive to minimize intervention costs, if for no other reason than that they can help in as many conflicts as possible before reaching the limits of their capacity. This applies to all actor types, although the threshold of this capacity varies according to the actor involved (that is, most organizations have a higher carrying capacity than a minor state).

In general, each of these reasons suggests that third-parties understand that they should not spend more on intermediary intervention when a lesser amount will produce the same outcome. Based on this logic, the cost model anticipates that third-parties will generally intervene using relatively less costly strategies first. If these do not resolve the conflict, they will

then move to higher cost strategies. I label this trajectory the *cost model*, and the following two hypotheses capture its basic logic:

*Hypothesis 1a: Over the course of a conflict, third-party interventions will escalate from the use of relatively low-cost strategies to relatively high-cost strategies.*

*Hypothesis 1b: Relatively high-cost strategies will be used less frequently than relatively low-cost strategies.*

Figure 2.2 depicts graphically the pure, theoretical form of the model behind the above hypotheses. As before, the horizontal (x) axis captures time, while the vertical (y) axis denotes the strategy selected. The strategy categories are numbered according to the Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology presented in Table 1.1. The least costly strategy appears closest to the origin, and the strategies increase in cost sequentially as one moves up the vertical axis. The shaded boxes indicate the strategy employed by a third-party at a particular moment during the dispute.

As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, the (pure) cost model predicts an upward trend over the life of a given conflict; that is, the shaded boxes move along a diagonal from the lower left to the upper right corners of the graph. Third- parties start with the least costly strategies first (lower left corner). More costly strategies are employed later in the conflict (upper right corner), assuming that the early interventions fail to resolve the dispute. Note that the theory underlying this trajectory permits third-parties to repeat the use of a strategy, but it does not anticipate that third-parties will return to lower-cost strategies once they make the decision to escalate. Escalation requires the rational third-party to determine that the less costly strategies will be unlikely to resolve the conflict. It therefore makes little sense for them to return to these

ineffective strategies in the future, unless the third-parties do not know the best strategy to effectively manage the dispute. I return to this possibility below under the discussion of the random model.

The two hypotheses presented above are clearly related, and the second derives from the first. Unless all of the lower-cost strategies fail, many trajectories will end with the successful resolution of the dispute, well before third parties need the higher-cost strategies. This implies that third-parties will use relatively more costly strategies less frequently than less costly strategies. I return to the concepts of success and failure below under the learning model, where they feature more prominently. Before turning to that model, however, there are two variations on the cost model that are worth noting.

First, the costs borne by states are not the same when they act unilaterally, as opposed to when they act multilaterally or within intergovernmental organizations. States may collectively determine the actions of both coalitions and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), but they often pay only a portion of the costs associated with any multilateral intervention they authorize (whether done through an organization or not). This ability to diffuse costs across numerous actors distorts the cost structure that individual states face. They are therefore more willing to authorize and undertake relatively more costly interventions under a multilateral banner, as opposed to a unilateral one. For example, peace operations become an option that states are willing to endorse multilaterally precisely because they need not incur the entire cost of the operation. States may then delay or avoid unilateral lower-cost interventions and opt instead to pursue intervention through collective entities. Although states might lose some control when they (as principals) delegate intervention tasks to a collectivity (as an agent), the fact that they incur only a fraction of the intervention costs makes such delegation an attractive option. In

short, states may pass (or “dump”) certain cases to coalitions or IGOs in order to minimize their individual costs.<sup>21</sup>

The conflicts that do get selected for multilateral intervention often involve more challenging dynamics (for example, see Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), which only underscores the expectation that coalitions and IGOs will use high-cost strategies more frequently than individual states. As the conflict context becomes more complex, not only does the probability of it being handed to a coalition or organization increase, but it is also more likely that legal, humanitarian, or peace operations activities will be necessary to address various facets of the dispute. Because of this difficult context, multilateral interventions often require greater commitment on the part of third-parties, ultimately encouraging them to invest more heavily in any intervention (if one is undertaken). Because costs can be dispersed among many states, such a strategy is both prudent and feasible. These arguments lead to the following, third hypothesis for the pure cost model:

*Hypothesis 1c: IGOs and coalitions will begin their interventions with relatively more costly intervention strategies than individual states.*

The cost-dispersing effects of multilateral intervention have another implication for third-party behavior as well. In multilateral interventions, states face a distorted cost structure; that is, states pay a fraction of the costs associated with the entire intervention. This allows them not only to authorize more costly intervention strategies, but also to permit multiple interventions to

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<sup>21</sup> Multilateral intervention will allow some states to free ride on the “group” intervention. Yet those contributing also have a strong incentive to find free-riders, and contributions to various interventions should be relatively transparent to the organization or coalition. This latter point follows easily from the work of Keohane (1984), who notes that one of the main benefits of institutions (here, IGOs) is their ability to collect and disseminate information for members.

occur simultaneously (I will refer to these as “*simultaneous interventions*”). An additional intervention represents only a marginal increase in costs to each member of the organization or coalition. Individual states, on the other hand, are less likely to perform multiple interventions at the same time. Because they incur the full costs of any intervention, these rational, individual states will likely wait until one intervention has run its course before initiating another one.<sup>22</sup> Otherwise, they run the risk of footing the full bill for two interventions when only one might be needed.<sup>23</sup>

This tendency toward multiple interventions depends, in part, on the number of states involved in the decisions and, therefore, intervention costs are shared. As more states participate in the intervention decision, the costs can be dispersed over more actors, thereby reducing the costs incurred by any one state. Thus, a coalition of three states achieves greater cost dispersion when compared to a unilateral intervention, but it does not disperse costs as widely as the United Nations, whose action requires the authorization (and, in theory, support) of more than three member states. Because organizations can spread costs among more members, the logic of the above argument implies that they should perform simultaneous interventions more often than either coalitions or individual states.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, coalitions should perform simultaneous interventions less frequently than intergovernmental organizations, but more frequently than individual states. In accordance with this argument, one might expect that:

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<sup>22</sup> States also incur fewer reputational costs when coalitions or institutions intervene. As I note later, however, I expect these reputational costs to be minimal regardless of the third-party.

<sup>23</sup> This assumes (for the time being) that the two interventions are not synergistic.

<sup>24</sup> This argument rests on the assumption that the organization contains more members than a coalition. The data suggest this to be the case, as do descriptive statistics reported by Frazier and Dixon (2006).

*Hypothesis 1d: IGOs are more likely than coalitions or individual states to perform multiple interventions simultaneously. Similarly, coalitions are more likely than individual states to perform multiple interventions simultaneously.*

Although the above hypothesis suggests that states are reluctant to undertake an intervention while another one is ongoing, there is one scenario in which they might be inclined to do so: when they are not exclusively performing both interventions simultaneously. States that authorize a multilateral intervention might decide to attempt a subsequent, lower-cost intervention of their own during the collective intervention, especially if it is compatible with the multilateral intervention (I will refer to these as “*overlapping interventions*,” not to be confused with the simultaneous interventions discussed previously). This unilateral effort could lend support to the larger, group one (for example, when pleas for a cease-fire demonstrate support for a peace operation that must try to minimize violence), or it could work separately from the group intervention (for example, when a state sees an opportunity for itself to manage a conflict more successfully than the group effort). Regardless of the circumstances, third-party states intervene against the backdrop of multilateral efforts because they see an opportunity to reap benefits from doing so – namely, controlling the substantive agreement, expanding their influence, or ending the conflict (and therefore, the multilateral intervention) sooner. This argument produces the following prediction:

*Hypothesis 1e: States are more likely to attempt an overlapping intervention during an IGO or coalition-led intervention than a state-led one.*

The second noteworthy variation on the cost model involves the possibility that third-parties face competing incentives. In particular, third-parties may feel an obligation to do *something*, but lack either the resources or the political will to commit large amounts of resources to the management of a conflict. Therefore, rather than use increasingly more costly intervention strategies, actors may escalate their involvement up to a point. Yet to be a useful prediction, this threshold must be identified more explicitly. Beyond which strategies are third-parties unlikely to escalate?

I propose that mediation represents the most appropriate place for a threshold to occur (if there were one) for two reasons. First, mediation balances a desire to signal significant investment in conflict management with an interest in limiting the actual costs incurred by an intervening state. For example, a call for a cease-fire carries no substantial involvement in the conflict. The intervention reduces to a statement and, once over, the third-party's activities cease. Mediation, on the other hand, requires the third-party to become directly involved in the resolution of the conflict. Whether through investigating the facts behind the issues under dispute, facilitating negotiations, or generating substantive proposals to move the disputants toward an agreement, third-parties that choose to mediate must *actively* participate in the conflict management process. Third-parties employing any strategy that includes more than mere words will signal a stronger commitment to help parties reach a resolution.

That said, rational states also have a desire to minimize their costs (described at length above). In this respect, mediation holds the advantage over other non-verbal intervention strategies. The costs of mediation are low, often including only those necessary to establish and facilitate negotiations. In contrast, relatively more costly strategies require a larger commitment of resources, for such tasks as ensuring compliance (for example, demobilization monitoring),

the large-scale distribution of resources (for example, humanitarian interventions), or the deployment of military forces (for example, peace operations). These activities each cost more than sending a diplomatic team abroad or providing a venue in which negotiations might occur. Therefore, a rational third-party interested both in being actively involved in the resolution of the dispute and in limiting its costs would rationally choose to mediate.

Second, mediation provides a good threshold for international actors because it limits the domestic audience costs associated with intervention (see Fearon 1994; Weeks 2008). Mediation generally allows the disputants to retain primary responsibility for reaching a settlement agreement. Thus, any blame for the failure to resolve the conflict can be deflected to the negotiating positions of the disputants. That many mediation sessions occur outside of the media spotlight further protects the intervention from generating domestic backlash against third-parties. Because domestic groups do not know who to blame for mediation failure, it is more challenging for them to use any such failures to criticize those intervening.

For these reasons, one might expect third-parties to use increasingly more costly strategies until they begin mediating, at which point they will use mediation repeatedly. Even though mediation may not successfully manage the dispute, the third-party's desire to save costs prevents it from using more costly strategies, while its desire to participate actively in the management of the conflict precludes it from de-escalating its involvement. I label this variation on the pure cost model the *limited commitments* model, and its logic generates the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1f: Third-parties are highly unlikely to use intervention strategies more costly than mediation.*

The graphical representation of this trajectory appears in Figure 2.3. The figure follows the same format as those used earlier in the chapter. Unlike the pure cost model, Figure 2.3 illustrates that, in the limited commitments variation of the cost model, third-parties use increasingly more costly strategies until they reach the mediation category (y-axis value of 2; see Table 1.1). Once they reach this threshold strategy, they do not (frequently) escalate beyond it.

The limited commitments model differs from the pure cost model in several ways. First, it predicts an upper boundary to the costs that third-parties willingly incur. Third-parties employ increasingly more costly strategies until they reach the threshold (mediation), beyond which they are not likely to go. Second, the pure cost model suggests slightly different patterns for unilateral (that is, states) and multilateral (that is, IGOs and coalitions) interventions. In particular, the pure cost model predicted that IGOs and coalitions would begin with more costly interventions and use more simultaneous interventions than states. The limited commitments model alters these predictions. The state actors that authorize IGO and coalition action should still permit multilateral interventions to use more costly strategies than they would use themselves. Although this seems counterintuitive, the commitments are limited with respect to the actors that bear the costs – namely, individual states. Yet this model also predicts that authorizing states should want to cap their costs. More specifically, if mediation serves as a threshold category, states that underwrite collective interventions should want to pay *less* than they would pay to mediate a dispute unilaterally. Otherwise, they incur *more* costs from intervening.

The exact calculation of the costs borne by members contributing to multilateral interventions varies according to the strategy used in and length of the intervention as well as the number of contributors. It is possible, however, to make a general prediction about the strategies

that states will likely authorize for multilateral interventions. The costs associated with administrative functions (for example, election monitoring or repatriating refugees; see Table 1.1) or peace operations dwarf those of mediation and, to a lesser extent, legal interventions. The former often involve the deployment of military or civilian contingents to distribute humanitarian aid, administer a territory, repatriate refugees, or rebuild society (for example, to oversee elections). In contrast, the latter involve smaller teams of negotiators and diplomats or, in the case of adjudication and arbitration, a marginal cost associated with handling an additional case.<sup>25</sup> Thus, we should expect that if authorizing states want to limit their commitment *and* want the total cost to be less than if they mediated alone, they will authorize mediation or legal interventions most often. In other words, the threshold shifts slightly upward, if at all.

Finally, the pure cost model predicts both simultaneous and overlapping interventions. The limited commitments model, on the other hand, forecasts neither. States that wish to limit their commitments should not authorize a simultaneous intervention, nor should they undertake an overlapping intervention. Such efforts are at best duplicative and at worst unnecessary (for example, if the ongoing intervention proves successful). The possible exception comes from organizations, which might have enough autonomy to initiate an overlapping intervention without explicit authorization from member states (Hawkins et al. 2006). If an organization adheres to the logic underlying the limited commitments model, however, they too should forego overlapping interventions. Organizations often face resource constraints, making the efficient use of resources an essential component for the completion of their tasks. It would therefore make

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<sup>25</sup> The International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, for example, are financed by members of the United Nations. Since these organizations already exist, states need not pay for constituting the organization or the remuneration of staff each time the organization is used. Rather, the marginal cost for using the organization amounts to the specific costs incurred when handling a particular case. A slightly imperfect analogy can be made at the domestic level. Setting up a court and paying justices involve greater costs than asking an existing court to decide one additional case.

sense for them to limit their involvement by participating in only one intervention (per conflict) at a time.

These arguments produce the following, additional hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1g: IGOs and coalitions are highly unlikely to use intervention strategies more costly than mediation.*

*Hypothesis 1h: Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or overlapping interventions, regardless of the actor involved or the strategy used.*

One possible criticism of the limited commitments model concerns reputation costs; some may see it unlikely for third-parties to use mediation repeatedly, lest they be viewed as “bad” or “incapable” mediators. This, however, is not a convincing argument for three reasons. First, the reputation costs associated with higher-cost strategies are much greater. Failing at a peace operation (for example, the United States in Somalia) or a humanitarian intervention (for example, the United Nation’s protection of safe havens in Bosnia) receives much greater attention than failing at a mediation session. When more costs are involved, the media publicizes failure much more extensively. It is this negative publicity that alters a state’s foreign policy (for example, the US disengagement after Somalia, which affected its subsequent intervention decision on Rwanda, or the Belgian disengagement from the United Nations mission in Rwanda; see Albright 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Boutros-Ghali 1999; Mingst and Karns 2000). Of all intermediary strategies that are more costly than verbal interventions, mediation receives the greatest protection against such publicity. Because mediation involves fewer costs than the alternatives (besides verbal pleas), potential critics will view it as more prudent to use relative to

the other higher-cost strategies. This somewhat insulates mediators from the negative effects of reputation costs (and certainly more so than if they had chosen another intervention strategy).

Second, one actor's failure at mediation does not preclude another from serving as a mediator. Trajectories are not limited to one actor's intervention behavior, but rather, they include the intervention behavior of all third-parties. Finally, even if the same state tries mediation repeatedly, it is protected against reputation costs by two characteristics of mediation. The first involves the success rate of mediation; successful mediations are not the norm. For example, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000:156) find that mediation is successful approximately 35% of the time (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of success rates). A state may not want to be viewed as a "bad" or "incompetent" mediator, but it will take more than a few failures to achieve such a reputation. In fact, contrary to the reputation cost criticisms advanced here, mediators often receive credit just for trying to resolve a difficult conflict. In addition to the low success rate of mediation, the proceedings of mediation sessions are often not fully publicized. Much of the negotiations remain private, especially in ongoing disputes. Thus, those that would tarnish the reputation of a mediator (or believe those that would tarnish it) cannot be entirely certain that a given mediation failed due to mediator incompetence. Failure might have resulted from the disputants' unwillingness to negotiate instead. For example, although numerous parties have failed to negotiate an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the disputants, rather than the mediators, are most often blamed for the failures.<sup>26</sup>

Finally, the preceding discussion assumes that third-parties *begin* intervening in the trajectory with low-cost strategies (either verbal pleas or mediation) and avoid the use of relatively more costly strategies. Yet what happens if third-parties begin intervening with a more

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<sup>26</sup> On this point, see also Bercovitch and Langley (1993), who find that difficult conflict contexts are less amenable to mediation than their counterparts.

costly strategy than mediation?<sup>27</sup> The limited commitments model makes two predictions about such cases. First, initial interventions that involve legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies (that is, strategies more costly than mediation) should not happen frequently. Third-parties that truly seek to limit the costs associated with intervention should instead adopt the less costly strategies. Second, if such an initial intervention appears, the third-party *may* not be subject to the threshold. Because the intervening third-party demonstrates a willingness to incur greater intervention costs than those associated with mediation as the trajectory begins, it violates the limited commitment model's predictions. Yet, these third-parties may subsequently decide that their involvement should also be limited (that is, they may conclude that they need to limit their costs). Regardless of the rationale for this decision (for example, limited resources, domestic audience costs, or a lack of political will), it implies a return to strategies that are *at most* as costly as mediation (that is, verbal and mediation strategies) – thereby bringing third-party behavior in line with the model's expectations. While the model therefore cannot make a precise prediction about third-party behavior when a trajectory begins with a more costly strategy than mediation, its logic does clearly indicate that third-parties should not cycle repeatedly between verbal and mediations strategies on the one hand and more costly strategies on the other.<sup>28</sup> Such frequent violations of the mediation threshold illustrate that third-parties are not sensitive to it.

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<sup>27</sup> This occurs less than 9% of the time (see Chapter 5).

<sup>28</sup> Note that the model does not predict that more costly intervention strategies *never* occur, but only that they are (extremely) rare.

### *Learning Model*

Rational intermediaries may respond to more than just costs. Although states may consider the effects of intervention on their budgets, they may be most concerned with achieving success. After all, many of the benefits that third-parties receive from intervention accrue when the dispute is effectively managed. Thus, third-parties should pay attention to the *outcomes* of previous conflict management attempts and condition their (subsequent) interventions on the success or failure of these previous attempts. In other words, perhaps third-parties learn how to be effective conflict managers.

Any type of behavioral learning model requires that actors update their preferences (and, therefore, actions) based on prior experiences (for other types of learning models, see Levy 1994). The experiences may be their own or those of others. Actors can therefore gain insight from prior interventions, regardless of whether they were the third-party during the previous intervention. Such learning seems plausible primarily because the outcomes of interventions are generally available to leaders. Not only are militarized disputes well-publicized, but the response of the international community is as well. This does not imply that leaders have full access to all of the events of an intervention, but rather, to the outcome of the intervention. For example, leaders might not know the full details of negotiations that occur during a mediation, but they likely hear whether the mediation succeeded or failed. As third-parties receive information on the success of prior interventions, they should then adjust their future intervention strategies accordingly. Broadly speaking, third-parties should repeat successful strategies and avoid the repeated use of unsuccessful ones.

The notions of success and failure demand further explication in the context of the learning model. On the surface, it would seem that successful interventions obviate the need for

additional interventions. Yet an intervention can be “successful” without fully resolving a dispute. For example, a plea for a cease-fire succeeds if the disputants stop fighting. Mediation succeeds if the disputants reach an agreement, even if that agreement only partially resolves the issues under dispute. Scholars and practitioners often deem peacekeeping successful if it prevents violence (Fortna 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006), even if these activities damage the prospects for a full resolution of the conflict (Greig and Diehl 2005). In each of these cases, success does not indicate that the dispute has been fully resolved, but rather that the intervention achieved its primary goal (see Frazier and Dixon 2006 or Chapter 3 for a discussion of the operationalization of this concept).

A second point about success concerns its timing. Interventions can vary in their short- and long-term effects (see, for example, Beardsley 2008; Greig 2001). For the purposes of this model, I focus on the short-term evaluation of success – or whether the intervention was perceived to be successful at the time it ended. I limit considerations of success to the short-term because this is the environment in which subsequent interventions occur. Conflict ebbs and flows, making any short-term considerations pertinent for those considering intervention. Additionally, a long-term assessment of an intervention can take years to crystallize; the passage of time often determines whether an intervention had a lasting effect. An example illustrates this complex relationship between success and the passage of time.

During the internationalized civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the late 1990s, the DRC frequently fought Ugandan and Rwandan troops. In July 1999, Zambia brokered the Lusaka Accords, which secured an agreement for the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops from the DRC and established a joint military commission to supervise the agreement. Mediation therefore succeeded in the short-term. It produced an agreement between

disputing states that might reduce violence and bring an end to the interstate dimension of the conflict. Yet the agreed upon troop withdrawal did not *begin* for another year and continued well into 2002 (past the end point of this study).<sup>29</sup> Thus, what was hailed by the international community as a clear victory in July 1999 did not fully come to fruition for quite some time. While these long-term effects of the Lusaka Accords unfolded (between July 1999 and December 2001), the Ugandan and Rwandan forces continued to fight the DRC military, prompting other intervention efforts. Each of these efforts could not wait for a long-term assessment of the Lusaka Accords because none was available. Third-parties face similar situations in other conflicts as well; they often cannot wait for long-term assessments before they desire (or a conflict requires) further intervention.

Finally, short-term assessments make sense empirically. Many militarized disputes last days or months, and interventions generally happen within days of each other. For example, in the Yemeni dispute presented earlier (see Figure 2.1), the Iraq-Jordan-Syria coalition mediated three days after the Saudi Arabian verbal intervention. The LAS interventions occurred four days after that, followed three weeks later by the Kuwaiti mediation. In this case, empirical data suggests that long-term assessments could not possibly be available to the various intervening third-parties. It therefore seems both inaccurate and unrealistic to expect third-parties to consider long-term success when making intervention decisions.

The learning model I propose rests on a key assumption – namely, that I require that learning translate into behavior. In contrast, Levy (1994) notes that learning is neither necessary nor sufficient for policy change. He proposes that learning occurs at the individual, cognitive level and, therefore, that a change in beliefs (that is, learning) need not lead to a change in

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<sup>29</sup> See the United Nations Report of the Security Council mission to the Great Lakes region, 27 April-May 2002 (S/2002/537), available online at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2002/537](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2002/537).

behavior. Although I do not disagree with his points, there are two noteworthy remarks to make about Levy's conceptualization of learning.<sup>30</sup> First, it would be challenging (if not impossible) to evaluate empirically whether actors altered their beliefs independently of behavioral policy changes. Such an evaluation requires the researcher to either interview decision-makers directly or draw psychological inferences from historical records. Neither can be effectively (or, in the case of inferences, reliably) done in the context of a large-n study, which handles a multitude of actors over a large temporal span. This is not to say that such evaluations cannot (or should not) be accomplished, but rather that they lie beyond the scope of the current work.

Second, the current study theoretically *requires* behavioral changes to occur. Because I seek to explain the factors that connect one intervention to another, action (or behavior) comprises a central component of my research question. Third-parties cannot intervene in a conflict without acting, and my goal is to understand how two specific interventions (or actions) are related. Given these goals, one must next determine how learning would create a relationship between interventions if it were at work. At a basic level, it seems reasonable to expect third-parties to repeat what works and to change what does not. Although this is a very general guideline for third-parties to follow, scholars propose and find that actors in international relations carry general lessons from one event to the next (Jervis 1976; see also Reiter 1994). Furthermore, similar conceptualizations of learning to the one that I employ have yielded important insights within international conflict research. Leng (1983, 2000), for example, also posits that actors repeat what works and change what does not; his work suggests that actors seem to follow this general rule. I therefore equate learning with policy change within the current study.

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<sup>30</sup> In addition to the two points that follow, I also note that Levy's definition of learning is by no means the only one. See Levy (1994) for a full discussion of how learning has been defined and applied in international relations.

Learning has been incorporated implicitly into a number of theories of international conflict, lending credence to a potential learning model of conflict management. For example, conceptualizations of rivalry – that is, interstate relationships in which the threat of militarized conflict constantly looms large – rely on learning to link the rival states’ past experiences with each other to their present decisions (see Diehl and Goertz 2000; see also Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). For example, Diehl and Goertz (2000:21) propose that rivalries possess a temporal dimension that demands (at a minimum) that “the militarized competition lasts long enough for the states involved to adjust their behavior and long-term strategy because of the competition.” In other words, rivalries occur when states *learn* that certain other states should be treated with hostility; this causes their foreign policy to adjust in response to the military competition. Similarly, Vasquez (1993, 2009) proposes that state leaders learn to handle territorial disputes differently than disputes over other issues. Socialization (a form of learning) teaches states that territorial disputes can be handled with realist policies, such as building alliances or engaging in arms races, while non-territorial disputes should be handled less aggressively (see also Senese and Vasquez 2008).

The value behind the concept of learning, however, derives from more than its implicit role in conflict theories; it has more direct effects on conflict behavior as well. Towards the exploration of these direct effects, Leng (1983, 2000) examines a series of crises and concludes that states use more coercive bargaining strategies in subsequent crises if they fail to achieve what they want with a less coercive approach. In Leng’s model, states alter their behavior after learning that current policies fail to achieve their foreign policy goals.

Learning can also occur within the context of conflict management. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006), for example, attempt to explore the question of how states might learn from

previous mediation attempts. They find some evidence that successive rounds of mediation lead to more comprehensive settlement outcomes.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, Greig and Diehl (2006) conclude that both rivals and third-parties are more amenable to mediation if it has been used previously in the rivalry. Rival states will even *initiate* negotiations or mediations if these strategies have proven successful in the recent past. Cumulatively, the above research suggests that disputants and third-parties turn to specific conflict management strategies after developing some familiarity with them; that disputants and third-parties construct better agreements after achieving this familiarity; and that the selection of a given strategy might depend on how successful it was recently in handling a similar dispute.

Studies of learning in conflict management, however, do not produce definitive predictions for third-party behavior. Most learning hypotheses regarding conflict management focus on the *disputants* rather than third-parties – particularly those disputants involved in mediation. This places the third-party role in the background. Despite the lack of attention to the third-party, however, a idea of how these third-parties might learn can be gleaned from studies of disputant behaviors in mediation. Hypotheses regarding disputants and conflict management propose that disputants must develop a rapport with mediators over time. Then, as the disputants learn to trust mediators and understand the process of mediation, they become more willing to permit additional mediation attempts. In other words, the disputants must “soften up” (Greig and Diehl 2006). Through such a process, previous mediation attempts make subsequent ones more likely. Yet even this logic has not fully been explored, because previous mediations generally appear as a control variable in studies, rather than a key independent variable worthy of a detailed theoretical explanation (Frazier 2006; Greig 2005; Greig and Regan 2008).

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<sup>31</sup> These findings, however, are inconsistent on two dimensions. They change depending on the intensity of the conflict, and they do not hold across different model specifications.

Not all researchers relegate the role of third-parties to the background, however. A handful of studies consider the implications of learning on third-party conflict management behavior. For example, Regan and Stam (2000) find that as the same mediator repeatedly intervenes in a dispute, the duration of that dispute decreases. Although their work does not test learning directly, the results imply that third-parties may need to familiarize themselves with the disputants, the issues, and the intervention strategy. Those third-parties willing to undertake multiple mediations may be able to shorten the disputes in which they intervene (one of many measures of overall success). Taking a different tack, Greig and Diehl (2005) conclude that successful intervention strategies (namely, negotiation and mediation) promote the future use of those strategies to manage a rivalry. Yet when they disaggregate their models, it seems that the *disputants*, rather than the third-party, drive this finding. Disputants, not third-parties, initiate mediation and negotiation if it was recently used successfully in the dispute. Despite this, there are implications for third-parties. Mediation requires the involvement of a third-party. Therefore, even if the disputants initiate the mediation process, a third-party must agree to facilitate it. This suggests that third-parties may pay attention to recent successes as well.

In contrast to previous studies, I propose in the *learning model* that third-parties learn through repeated interventions. Furthermore, the process of learning might mirror those described above in two respects. First, third-parties may need time to familiarize themselves with the disputants and the issues. Conflict contexts present difficult scenarios. Because the exact issues, negotiating positions, and disputants change from conflict to conflict, third-parties cannot apply a conflict management template when a new dispute erupts, nor should we expect them to do so. They may instead need to try a strategy, see if it works, and adjust their approach after

receiving feedback. Through such a learning process, actors can eventually find the strategy that will work best for a given situation.

Second, third-parties should focus on the most recent intervention to determine what strategy to select next. Greig and Diehl (2005) make a similar argument about disputants; the most recent intervention provides disputants with the best assessment of whether diplomatic efforts will likely succeed. I extend that logic to third-party behavior. The most recent intervention contains the greatest information for the third-party – the most up-to-date assessment of the positions of the disputants, their relative power, and the prospects for successful intervention. These assessments change over time. Thus, while a strategy may have failed in the distant past, it could be successful in the future if conflict conditions change. Third-parties should therefore focus upon the most recent, past intervention.

Based on these two premises, the learning model advocates that third-parties primarily consider the short-term success of the previous intervention when deciding how to intervene next in a dispute (see above for a discussion of short-term versus long-term success). If a strategy recently failed, third-parties should employ a different strategy next time. Alternatively, if a strategy succeeded recently, then third-parties should repeat the use of that strategy in an attempt to push disputants closer to a full resolution of the dispute. This logic produces the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2a: Third-parties repeat strategies that were most recently successful and avoid strategies that were most recently unsuccessful.*

There are three observations to make about the logic behind this hypothesis. First, unlike with the cost model (and its variant), the learning model cannot be easily depicted and therefore does not appear in any figure. The learning process captured by the above hypothesis requires only that third-parties repeat successful strategies and avoid unsuccessful ones. This rule lends itself to any number of trajectory shapes, including those found in Figures 2.1-2.3. As an example, Figure 2.3 illustrates the limited commitments model. The first three interventions in the figure employ verbal strategies, after which third-parties switch to mediation for the remainder of the dispute. The limited commitments model provided one explanation for the depicted trajectory (see above), but the learning model can explain it as well. Assume that the first (verbal) intervention succeeded. According to the learning model, third-parties should then use a verbal strategy again for the second intervention, which is exactly what they did. If the second (verbal) intervention also succeeded, third-parties should again repeat its use during the third intervention. Now assume that the third intervention (verbal) failed. At this point, the third-party should change strategies. They did this in the figure presented, and began using mediation instead of verbal interventions. Finally, if the mediations from interventions 4-6 succeeded, third-parties should repeat them in interventions 5-7. This also occurred. In this way, the learning model can provide an alternative explanation for the trajectory shown in Figure 2.3. It can similarly explain Figure 2.1 and 2.2, as well as a multitude of other shapes. I therefore am unable to depict its pure theoretical form as I did with the other models.

Second, the learning model hypothesis presented above implies that simultaneous and overlapping interventions will not occur. In order to learn, third-parties need a previous intervention to end, so that they can gather information about the outcome of that intervention. Armed with the knowledge that the previous intervention succeeded or failed, the third-party

then selects a strategy for the next intervention. Absent such information, learning cannot occur in the manner predicted by this model. Therefore, third-parties should not initiate another intervention (overlapping or simultaneous) while another is ongoing. This leads to a prediction that matches one from the limited cost model:

*Hypothesis 2b: Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or overlapping interventions, regardless of the actor involved or the strategy used.*

Finally, learning can occur in different ways. The hypothesis above proposes one specific form of learning – namely, that learning occurs within disputes and across actors. That is, third-parties learn from the actions of each other and do not carry lessons from one dispute to the next. Each of these two characteristics has theoretical merit. First, that third-parties learn from each others' behavior derives from the public character of intervention outcomes. Although third-parties may not have access to the full proceedings of an intervention, they likely know an intervention's outcome (see above). This information permits them to adjust their future interventions. The second characteristic (that learning is dispute-specific) stems from the changing nature of conflict contexts. Disputes do not always involve the same issues or disputants, making it challenging for third-parties to apply old lessons to new cases. Furthermore, even if the disputants remain the same, their positions, power, and the issues under dispute can change over time; such changes occur often in rivalry relationships. Despite the theoretical arguments in favor of the learning model variant proposed above, I return to potential, alternative learning models in the conclusion of this work.

### *Random Model*

The cost and learning models propose distinct mechanisms by which interventions might be related to one another. Yet it is theoretically possible that no connections exist for two reasons. First, third-parties simply may not pay attention to previous interventions (either others' or their own) when selecting strategies. If this statement is true, then third-party interventions are actually independent events. Existing research, however, does not lend credence to such a position. As noted earlier, many quantitative studies find that previous interventions increase the statistical likelihood of subsequent conflict management (Frazier 2006; Greig 2005; Greig and Diehl 2006; Greig and Regan 2008; Owsiak and Frazier 2009). This suggests that there is some connection between interventions that begs for an explanation.

Furthermore, to claim that interventions are independent also contradicts empirical evidence in two ways. First, if interventions are independent, this implies that an intervening third-party ignores prior interventions, even when that *same* third-party intervened previously in the same conflict. For example, Russia frequently mediated a dispute in the 1990s between Iraq on the one hand and the United States and the United Kingdom (enforcing a United Nations no-fly zone) on the other. Each time tensions rose between the disputants, Russia stepped in to mediate. There is little reason to suspect that Russian leaders ignored the interventions they performed months earlier. Why should we expect these events to be independent? It makes more sense for leaders to account for their own, earlier actions – at a minimum.

Second, if interventions are independent, this also implies that third-parties either do not collect basic information before intervening abroad (such as what was previously tried in a conflict or whether earlier efforts worked) or collect such information but do not factor it into their intervention decision. Anecdotal evidence, however, fails to support this implication as

well. For example, during a conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighbors (Uganda and Rwanda) in 1998-2001, Libya and Zambia intervened repeatedly (the latter acting on behalf of the South African Development Community), and their efforts reinforced one another. This occurred most clearly in May-July 1999. Libyan mediation secured a cease-fire in May 1999, along with an agreement to meet again in Zambia. Even though Libya's intervention excluded key disputants (most notably Rwanda as well as some of the rebel groups operating in the DRC), the parties subsequently attended a Zambian mediation in July 1999 and signed the Lusaka Accords (a cease-fire and troop withdrawal agreement). These agreements clearly built upon each other, as one set up the other. Furthermore, the statements of leaders in this conflict reveal a connection between interventions. Upon the termination of various mediation sessions, African leaders regularly issued public statements in which they thanked other third-parties and explicitly referenced previous agreements. These actions demonstrate that leaders pay attention to what other third-parties do, particularly if they plan to intervene as well.<sup>32</sup>

The second reason that third-party efforts may not be related involves the uncertainty of conflict. International conflicts contain uncertainty and imperfect information, not just for the disputants (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006; Wagner 2000), but for third-parties as well. Thus, rational third-parties may want to conduct a successful conflict management effort, but they might not know the best way to achieve this. As Zartman and Touval (2007:451) note with respect to mediation, successful conflict resolution hinges on "ripe moments and leveraged buy-offs." Yet third-parties may not know if the moment is ripe (for example, whether a hurting stalemate exists; see Zartman 2000; Zartman and Touval 2007), if the disputants actually want the conflict

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<sup>32</sup> The data for these examples were collected during the dissertation research and build upon the dataset of Frazier and Dixon (2006).

managed (see Richmond 1998), or what buy-offs will produce an agreement (assuming one is wanted; see, for example, Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991). Furthermore, in the face of so much complexity, third-parties cannot be certain that any one strategy is better than the others. Intervening actors may therefore employ strategies randomly, in what appears to be an attempt to stumble upon peace.

I hasten to note that such random behavior need not be considered irrational. Among rational actors, random behavior may result from two sources - imperfect information and uncertainty – both of which are common characteristics found in the political world. Imperfect information refers to a condition in which rational actors do not have access to all of the information that might be pertinent before needing to make a decision (see Fearon 1995; Powell 2006). Thus, the actor must make a somewhat uninformed decision, doing the best they can with the information at hand. In the context of conflict management, the problem of imperfect information suggests that rational actors would prefer to adjust their strategies from one intervention to the next, but lack the critical information needed to do so.

This leads naturally to the question: what information do states need to make an informed decision about the strategy to use? Two pieces of information seem particularly pertinent for such a decision: the strategies previously tried (and the actor that tried them), as well as the outcome of any previous attempts. At first glance, it is difficult to imagine a scenario under which state leaders would *not* know which actors previously intervened in a militarized conflict and what strategies those intermediaries used. Militarized conflict represents a particularly serious interstate interaction that diverges markedly from normal politics. That conflict management attempts within noteworthy, militarized disputes would remain private seems

highly unlikely. Furthermore, in the event that leaders do not themselves know this information, it seems plausible that they could obtain it before deciding on their own intervention.

Yet not all information is readily accessible. In particular, the outcomes of previous conflict management efforts might not be fully transparent at the time that a subsequent third-party wants to intervene. A lack of information in these situations can result from two potential sources. Either conflict management attempts occur concurrently, making the results of a previous attempt unavailable at the time the next intervention begins, or the results of previous attempts are not distributed publicly (for example, mediations conducted in secrecy such as the Oslo Accords; see Pruitt 2005 for more information on the process leading to these accords). Rational actors can avoid the former, since they can wait for an ongoing intervention to end before undertaking another. In contrast, they cannot escape the latter.

It seems unlikely that the outcomes of previous interventions are not available to decision-makers. Militarized disputes and interventions are well-publicized events; the media regularly captures the interventions of third-parties. Certain details of an intervention, however, may be omitted from any publicized reports. For example, disputants may not want to advertise the specific reasons why a mediation session failed, lest they face domestic opposition or weaken their bargaining position for future negotiations. Third-parties may also wish to conceal failures, especially if they hope to intervene successfully in the near future. Towards this end, withholding information (that is, possessing private information) can make other interventions less likely or successful. In situations such as these, other actors may know *that* the intervention did not succeed, but have no details about *why* that outcome occurred.

The earlier models propose that third-parties do not need information about *why* interventions succeed or fail. The logic for such a position rests on the unreliability of such

information (if it were available) and the short time horizon in which subsequent intervention decisions are made. Disputants have strong incentives to misrepresent the proceedings of a negotiation. Negotiations occur internationally, but disputants must take the results of these talks back to a domestic audience (Putnam 1988). Leaders therefore have incentives to paint a favorable picture of themselves – that is, to bolster the reasonability of their position – while stressing the incompatible (perhaps, unreasonable) demands of the other side. Similarly, third-parties have incentives to misrepresent. Third-parties that want to influence the final resolution of issues may not want other third-parties involved. They may also accept blame for failure to prevent the disputants’ domestic audiences from perceiving their leaders and, therefore, potentially removing them from office.<sup>33</sup> For these reasons, I conclude that even if leaders knew why an intervention failed, that information would be unreliable.

Furthermore, any information about why an intervention failed may take awhile to emerge. Organizations (particularly the United Nations) regularly assess their efforts, but any reports appear well after an intervention or conflict ends. For example, in 1999, the United Nations released an assessment of its actions during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (United Nations 1999). Similarly, it published the Brahimi report in 2000, which assessed the benefits and shortfalls of the entire peacekeeping system since its creation in 1948 (United Nations 2000). Third-parties and disputants simply need time to reflect on what went wrong. They also promulgate more honest assessments of interventions as time passes; the distance created by time allows them to minimize audience costs and to gather information used to conduct an accurate assessment from many sources. Because reflection and assessment take time, they are not

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<sup>33</sup> A change in government leadership can breathe new life into conflict management efforts if domestic audiences endorse moderate negotiating positions. Yet it can also slow intervention efforts, since a new team must become acquainted with their counterparts, the issues involved, the third-party, and the process.

immediately available during the conflict, when third-parties are actively determining what intervention they should pursue next to manage the dispute effectively.

In addition to the problem caused by incomplete information, third-parties make decisions in the presence of great uncertainty as well. Quite simply, international conflict presents third-parties with complex situations that demand attention. Different actors, interstate relationships, resources, conflict contexts (for example, fatalities, or length of a dispute), and leaders combine to produce scenarios in which successful strategies do not necessarily travel well from one intervention to the next. This implies that states may not know what intervention will be successful in any given conflict. Indeed, if they did, they would have the ideal formula to produce a peaceful world.

Uncertainty seems much more common than imperfect information, and considering the potential effects of uncertainty yields unique predictions about interventions. In the absence of uncertainty, one might expect interventions to be both more common and successful than they actually are. Rational actors would know exactly what to do under those conditions. In contrast, with much uncertainty in the world, third-parties may not know what to do. Their desire to intervene can trump the uncertainty surrounding conflict and encourage intervention, but that does not mean the selection of an intervention strategy follows any particular pattern. With no clear guidelines, rational third-parties may simply choose intervention strategies randomly, in an attempt to find something that moves the disputants toward a resolution of their dispute.

The arguments associated with imperfect information and uncertainty therefore produce the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 3: There is no discernible pattern in the (successive) interventions of third-parties.*

I label this the *random* (or *baseline*) model and depict it graphically in Figure 2.4. The construction of this figure follows the same parameters as those presented earlier in the chapter. As the figure demonstrates, this model predicts no discernible pattern in the intervention behavior of third-parties; there is no clear pattern to the shaded boxes in Figure 2.4. Instead, third-parties employ strategies randomly.

I argue above that random intervention behavior from rational third-parties seems highly unlikely. Not only do they have access to the pertinent information needed to make informed decisions, but they should also be able to apply cost or learning models to interventions in spite of uncertainty. Although it is highly unlikely for this model to be accurate, I use this theoretically-driven model as a baseline model against which to test the hypotheses derived from the other models. Because the baseline model considers the possibility that third-party intervention decisions are unrelated to one another, it therefore creates a plausible, competing explanation for third-party behavior. Furthermore, it allows me to determine easily whether trajectories are meaningful concepts or not (see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994 on causality and inference). Finding any pattern to third-party intervention behavior undermines the random model, but there is no reason for me to assume *a priori* that such a pattern exists.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I outlined the decision process surrounding third-party intervention. A third-party must decide both *whether* to intervene and *how* to do so. Although I assume that third-parties make these decisions simultaneously, I disaggregated these decisions analytically in order to produce hypotheses about how third-parties select intervention strategies within a


trajectory. In general, I sketched three broad, theoretical models that explain this selection process: a *cost* model (and a *limited commitments* variant), a *learning* model, and a *random* model. Each model proposes a distinct mechanism by which interventions might be interrelated.

After discussing the logic behind each model, I then derived corresponding hypotheses consistent with their logic. To facilitate an easy comparison of the predictions of each model, Table 2.1 lists the hypotheses that appear in the current chapter. I organize each hypothesis in the table according to the broad theoretical model under which it falls (that is, cost, learning, or random), and the variant of the broad model under which it occurs (for example, pure cost versus limited commitments). The third column of the table lists a hypothesis number, which I will use in subsequent chapters to facilitate discussion. Finally, the text of each hypothesis appears in the final column of the table. Table 2.1 therefore provides a quick point of reference when discussing results in the upcoming chapters.


Having derived a number of testable predictions consistent with each model, I devote the remaining chapters of this work to evaluating the relative merits of each model. Before turning to the empirical analysis, however, the next chapter describes the data that I collect and use during the quantitative modeling. Part of the current research project also involves refining and extending the Frazier and Dixon (2006) conflict management dataset for the period 1993-2001. I therefore detail my collection efforts and provide descriptive statistics of the conflict management data gathered, in addition to outlining the research design and variables used in the chapters that follow.



**Figure 2.3: Limited Commitments Model**



**Figure 2.4: Random Model**



**Table 2.1: A Summary of Proposed Hypotheses**

Model	Model Variant	Number	Hypothesis
Cost	Pure	1a	<i>Over the course of a conflict, third-party interventions will escalate from the use of relatively low-cost strategies to relatively high-cost strategies.</i>
		1b	<i>Relatively high-cost strategies will be used less frequently than relatively low-cost strategies.</i>
		1c	<i>IGOs and coalitions will begin their interventions with relatively more costly intervention strategies than individual states.</i>
		1d	<i>IGOs are more likely than coalitions or individual states to perform multiple interventions simultaneously. Similarly, coalitions are more likely than individual states to perform multiple interventions simultaneously.</i>
		1e	<i>States are more likely to attempt an overlapping intervention during an IGO or coalition-led intervention than a state-led one.</i>
	Limited Commitments	1f	<i>Third-parties are highly unlikely to use intervention strategies more costly than mediation.</i>
		1g	<i>IGOs and coalitions are highly unlikely to use intervention strategies more costly than mediation.</i>
		1h	<i>Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or overlapping interventions, regardless of the actor involved or the strategy used.</i>
Learning	(N/A)	2a	<i>Third-parties repeat strategies that were most recently successful and avoid strategies that were most recently unsuccessful.</i>
		2b	<i>Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or overlapping interventions, regardless of the actor involved or the strategy used.</i>
Random	(N/A)	3	<i>There is no discernible pattern in the (successive) interventions of third-parties.</i>

## Chapter 3

### Data, Measurement, and Methods

This chapter introduces the data, variables, and methods used to assess the hypotheses presented in the last chapter. I first describe the conflict management data in some detail, as these data form the foundation for constructing trajectories empirically. Because this project involves data collection efforts, I also discuss the data gathered and how these data tie into the larger dataset to which it is appended. I then outline the procedure by which I create trajectories. Next, I delineate the variables used in the quantitative analysis as well as their measurement. These variables dictate the appropriate quantitative method to use, and I explain this method in depth along the way. Finally, I provide a brief discussion of the quantitative modeling process. Many of the results presented in the next chapter are the more parsimonious product of an iterated modeling procedure; this discussion therefore addresses how I ultimately distill those parsimonious results from more comprehensive models.

#### Conflict Management Data

The conflict management data that I use in my analyses come primarily from Frazier and Dixon (2006), who collect information on conflict management efforts during the period 1946-2000. For each intervention, Frazier and Dixon note the identity of the third-party, the starting and ending dates of the intervention, the strategy used by the third-party, whether the intervention achieved its intended purpose at the time it ended (that is, short-term success), and the specific conflict during which the intervention occurred.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, they construct a

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<sup>1</sup> The dataset captures more variables than this. These variables, however, are the most important for the purposes of the current study. More information on these variables appears below.

comprehensive typology of diplomatic conflict management strategies, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 1 (see Table 1.1). Each intervention strategy falls within one of five broad categories: verbal (for example, demands for a cease-fire or a troop withdrawal), mediation (including conciliation, good offices, and fact-finding missions), legal (that is, arbitration and adjudication), administrative (for example, temporary administering a territory, providing humanitarian aid, overseeing elections, or assisting in the repatriation of refugees), and peace operations (for example, military observation, interpositionary deployments, and forces to monitor the demobilization of combatants) interventions. I work with these broad categories throughout the remainder of the study.

The relative usage of the categories of strategies during the period 1946-2001 appears in Table 3.1.<sup>2</sup> As is evident from the table, third-parties rely most on verbal pleas; 50% of interventions involve third-party requests that the disputants stop the violence, return to the negotiating table, or withdraw troops from a conflict zone, as well as offers from the third-party to facilitate negotiations between the disputants. Second to verbal interventions, third-parties mediate most frequently. In 38% of all interventions, third-parties actively work with the disputants (either by providing a venue for or facilitating negotiations, investigating the facts of the dispute, or generating proposals that might help resolve contentious issues) to manage their dispute through diplomatic (as opposed to violent) channels. Finally, third-parties turn to strategies more costly than mediation a small percentage of the time. Legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies comprise approximately 2%, 4%, and 6% of all interventions respectively.

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<sup>2</sup> I extend the dataset to 2001 and add more interventions during the 1993-2001 period. These additions are discussed below in greater detail.

For the purposes of this study, the Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology offers two advantages over those found within alternative datasets. First, their typology arranges the various strategies along a continuum from relatively less costly to more costly strategies (where costs are interpreted with respect to the third-party using the strategy; see Table 3.1).<sup>3</sup> This arrangement facilitates the theoretical purpose of the study, for it allows me to speak about the relative intervention costs that third-parties willingly incur. Without a discussion of relative costs, it would be unfeasible to evaluate the merits of certain theoretical models presented earlier. For example, if strategies were not ordered by cost, it would be impossible to evaluate the pure cost and limited commitments models, each of which require me to draw conclusions about the relative intervention costs that third-parties choose to bear in successive interventions. Furthermore, the relative cost continuum dictates the appropriate quantitative method to use when evaluating the predictions derived from the theoretical models presented earlier. I return to this point below during the discussion of the dependent variable's measurement and the quantitative method used in the analyses.

Second, the typology is more comprehensive than that found in any alternative datasets, both in terms of the conflict management strategies and the third-party actors included in the data. As demonstrated by table 3.1, Frazier and Dixon (2006) capture a wide range of third-party conflict management behavior – including verbal pleas, mediation, arbitration and adjudication, administrative activities, and peace operations. Furthermore, this dataset tracks the conflict management efforts of states, coalitions of states, and international organizations with respect to the full range of conflict management behaviors. Although alternative datasets often contain part of this scope (along both dimensions), none overlaps it in entirety. For example, Bercovitch's International Conflict Management (ICM) Data includes detailed information on mediation

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<sup>3</sup> I outline the argument supporting this observation in Chapter 1.

(including conciliation, good offices, and fact-finding missions), arbitration, and adjudication efforts within international conflicts, but contains few third-party strategies beyond these (Bercovitch 2000; Bercovitch and Gartner 2006; Bercovitch and Houston 1996).<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project collects thorough information about mediation efforts within international crises (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).<sup>5</sup> The project also gathers less detailed information on a wider array of strategies used by international organizations (fact-finding, arbitration, good offices, military observation missions, or emergency military force). Despite the slightly wider scope contained within the ICB dataset, I note three limitations to using such data for examining trajectories. First, the ICB project restricts the information available on the broader array of conflict management strategies to international organizations. Yet these organizations are not the only actors that employ good offices, conduct arbitration, or even deploy peace operations. Libya, for example, deployed a military observation mission (a type of peace operation) to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in May 1999, in the midst of the DRC's conflict with Rwandan and Ugandan supported rebels. Although we might suspect organizations to use certain strategies (such as those under the peace operations category) *more often* than states or coalitions, there is therefore no reason *a priori* to ignore the possibility that each actor has access to the full range of conflict management strategies. The ICB project assumes the latter, thereby overlooking many interventions by states and coalitions that the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset captures. These interventions belong within trajectories.

Second, although the ICB project collects information on a broad range of conflict management strategies, those data remain less detailed than the Frazier and Dixon (2006) data. As an illustration, a review of the ICB codebook reveals that their data do not code dates of

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<sup>4</sup> This statement is based on a review of the ICM Codebook (see Bercovitch 2000).

<sup>5</sup> The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data is available online at: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/>.

intervention. This makes it impossible to determine the chronological order of interventions from the ICB data, which is a critical step in the construction of trajectories (see below). Furthermore, when multiple actors intervene in a crisis (or employ multiple strategies), the project codes the corresponding variables as “multiple,” rather than with a specific actor or strategy. Without knowing the identity of the third-party and the strategy they used within each intervention, one cannot speak with certainty about how conflict management efforts evolve over the course of a conflict (that is, trajectories cannot be formed). To be fair, some of this information may be retained within the ICB crisis narratives, but a review of the narratives demonstrates that this is not always the case (for example, the intervention dates often do not appear in the publicly available narratives).

Finally, international crises are based upon perceptions, making any expectations of third-party involvement in them less clear. An international crisis occurs when actors perceive a threat to their basic values, a finite timeframe for a response to that threat, and a heightened probability of a military encounter (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 2000). Because perceptions drive the formation and termination of crises, violence need not accompany them. Indeed, Wilkenfeld and Brecher (2000) note that crises and conflict are not identical concepts and that 25% of crises do not contain any violence. The challenge then is knowing whether third-parties can reasonably be expected to intervene in crises, especially if there is no clear conflict in which to intervene or the main issues are psychological (or perceptive).

Because of this challenge, I focus on conflict management within militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) during the period 1946-2001, rather than crises. A MID occurs when one state threatens, displays, or uses force against another state in the international system (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). In the case of MIDs, disputants

cross a clear threshold of violence, and this threshold can easily be observed by potential third-parties. Employing such a clear threshold provides a set of cases in which one can reasonably expect third-parties to intervene. Militarized threats and actions are generally well-publicized, making the presence of conflict widely known. Unlike in situations where states perceive a crisis in the absence of violence, third-parties know quite clearly when a MID occurs. Furthermore, the MID always provides third-parties with a conflict in which to intervene. The same cannot be said of crises, especially because conflict and crises do not always go together.<sup>6</sup>

Frazier and Dixon (2006) collect conflict management data on interventions within MIDs during the period 1946-2000.<sup>7</sup> Yet, despite this temporal span, their coverage of the period 1993-2001 remained incomplete. Part of this project therefore involved (re)examining all MIDs that occurred between 1993-2001 for additional conflict management efforts. Towards this end, I reviewed world news sources to understand the main events within each MID. I then created a conflict narrative for each dispute based on those news sources.<sup>8</sup> The narratives include information about the MID (for example, different military skirmishes or threats) as well as any interventions that occurred within it (that is, who intervened, what strategy they used, the dates

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<sup>6</sup> For a comparison of MIDs and crises, see Hewitt (2003). According to Hewitt, “most international crises qualify as militarized disputes, but most militarized disputes do not qualify as crises” (681). He reaches this conclusion because he can match most crises with a specific MID, while the majority of MIDs cannot similarly be paired with one crisis. This provides an additional argument in favor of using MIDs; studying MIDs will provide one with substantial insight into crises, but because of how the overlap occurs, the converse is not true.

<sup>7</sup> The end date of the period corresponds to the MID dataset, which currently contains disputes through 2001. Note that Frazier and Dixon (2006) also collect information on conflict management efforts that occur outside of MIDs. I exclude such interventions from consideration in this study. Restricting attention to MIDs creates a uniform conflict context within which interventions occur. This ensures that interventions within trajectories share similar conflict characteristics (the threat, display or use of force in the case of MIDs) and prevents me from comparing dissimilar contexts (MIDs vs. non-MIDs) with one another inappropriately. In other words, trajectories within and outside of MIDs may vary; I postpone this possibility for future research.

<sup>8</sup> The Correlates of War (COW) Project contains brief narratives for MIDs during the period 1993-2001 (Ghosn et al. 2004), but their narratives are limited in three ways. First, they do not provide a narrative for every dispute during this period. Second, the narratives that exist are sometimes vague. For example, many narratives simply note that a MID consisted of “a series of” clashes, border violations or skirmishes. I sought to fill in the details of those events. Third, the MID narratives contain no information on conflict management efforts, which is the main focus of this study (and the Frazier and Dixon 2006 dataset). The narratives created by this project are therefore consistent with those of COW, but are much more detailed than them. To construct my narratives, I do not rely on Ghosn et al. (2004) as a source unless I cannot find other information on the dispute that corroborates their existing narrative.

of intervention, whether the intervention achieved its purpose). An example of such a narrative appears in Figure 3.1 (a dispute in 2000 between Guyana and Suriname). Finally, I coded third-party interventions that I found according to the scheme established by Frazier and Dixon (2006), ultimately adding these observations to their dataset (see Table 3.1 and the discussion of variables that appears later in this chapter).

Tables 3.2-3.4 provide an overview of the Frazier and Dixon (2006) data for the 1993-2001 period, along with the contribution offered to that data by my efforts. I detail the contributions along a number of fronts: by dispute, strategy, and third-party coverage. First, Table 3.2 describes the dispute coverage before and after the data collection process. Prior to this project, the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset contained intervention information on 18 MIDs that occurred between 1993-2001.<sup>9</sup> This project added conflict management data on an additional 36 MIDs to the dataset (additions column) and made changes to 11 of the 18 disputes already in the dataset (changes column). These changes involved adding interventions to the dispute, as well as updating some intervention dates and strategies that were clarified through reviewing additional news sources.

Describing conflict management data by dispute can be slightly misleading, however. Because third-parties frequently intervene repeatedly in the same disputes, categorizing the data in such a fashion does not provide an indication of how many conflict management efforts occur within international disputes. Therefore, to understand the full scope of the data (and the contributions of this project), one must examine the data by interventions as well. Such an examination also uses a more appropriate level-of-analysis for describing the data because each observation within the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset consists of an intervention (rather than a dispute). As noted earlier, these interventions possess two characteristics – a third-party actor

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<sup>9</sup> The vast majority of MIDs experience no intervention.

who intervenes using one of many specific strategies (see Chapter 1). For these reasons, the tables that follow dissect the intervention-level data by the strategy used during the intervention and the actor that performs the intervention.

Table 3.3 depicts the break-down of conflict management strategies used by third-parties in each intervention during the period 1993-2001. The five categories (verbal, mediation, legal, administrative and peace operation) follow the Frazier and Dixon typology shown earlier (in Table 3.1).<sup>10</sup> As illustrated in Table 3.3, the data that I collect during this project contributes 249 new interventions to the dataset (an increase of 82% over the original dataset, which contains 134 observations for this time period). Furthermore, these additions cover the full spectrum of conflict management strategies. The greatest additions clearly appear in the verbal (146 new interventions), and mediation (84 new observations) categories, but there are additions in the legal, administrative, and peace operations categories as well (4, 8, and 6 new interventions respectively).

Table 3.4 takes a different tack; it categorizes the interventions during the 1993-2001 period according to the type of third-party intervening in the dispute. As the table illustrates, the data gathered during the course of this project cover all third-party actors: states, coalitions, and intergovernmental organizations. States lead the majority of interventions added to the dataset (170 new interventions), but the new observations involving non-state third-parties are not negligible. In fact, the data derived from this project nearly double the interventions in the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset that are performed by coalitions (15 new observations) and organizations (63 new observations) during this time period.

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<sup>10</sup> Because I use these five broad categories throughout the empirical analysis that follows, I do not break the data down further.

Although there are a fair number of additions to the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset, these new data do not drastically change the characteristics of the original dataset. I reach this conclusion by comparing the amended data from the 1993-2001 period with the data collected by Frazier and Dixon for the 1946-1992 period. Table 3.5 shows intervention-level data by strategy and time period (1946-1992, 1993-2001, and the combined period of 1946-2001 shown earlier in Table 3.1). The percentages listed within each cell of the table are column percentages; they indicate the percentage of total observations for a given time period that fall within a specific strategy category. For example, third-parties use verbal strategies in 48.09% of interventions that occur between 1946-1992 and in 54.69% of interventions that occur between 1993-2001.

The first two columns demonstrate that the strategy distribution remains relatively constant across the time periods with two slight exceptions. First, the number of verbal interventions increases in the 1993-2001 period. Such a change may result from expanding news coverage (for example, cable networks as opposed to newspapers) and technological advances (that increase the distribution of news) throughout the 1990s; as news coverage and its distribution expand, it potentially carries more public statements on behalf of world leaders that can be picked up by coders. Second, the frequency of peace operations falls somewhat after 1992. This matches the empirical reality, as many peace operations in the post-cold war era address civil wars, rather than the interstate conflict examined in this study. Despite these exceptions, third-parties always rely most on verbal strategies, followed by mediation, peace operations, administrative, and legal strategies (in order of decreasing frequency of use). This pattern does not change as a result of the data contributed by this project.

Besides looking at the distribution of strategies throughout the dataset, I also examine the prevalence of interventions performed by each of the three third-party actor types: states,

coalitions, and international organizations. Table 3.6 displays intervention-level data by third-party actor type and time period. From 1946 to 1992, states conducted 39.28% of interventions, while coalitions only undertook 9.59% of all third-party interventions. International organizations led the most interventions during this time period (51.13%). These values shift somewhat in the 1993-2001 period. The incident of state interventions increases when compared to the previous time period (to 57.81%), while that of coalitions and organizations drops (to 6.25% and 35.94% respectively). These shifts may stem from two factors. First, many state interventions employ verbal strategies. To the extent that media expansion explains the rise in verbal interventions throughout the 1990s (see above), it may also help explain the shift toward greater state intervention. Second, intergovernmental organizations focused much of their attention upon civil wars during the 1990s (for example, see Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995). Although the data demonstrate that these organizations clearly did not ignore interstate conflict after 1992, limited resources may have restricted the attention they could give to interstate conflicts during that period.<sup>11</sup>

### **Constructing Trajectories Empirically**

I argued earlier that the concept of a trajectory denotes a path of third-party intervention throughout the life of a dispute. The conflict management data described above provide the building blocks for trajectories; each trajectory contains two or more third-party interventions. The individual interventions that comprise a specific trajectory are related to one another in three ways, and these relationships determine the process by which I construct trajectories empirically.

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<sup>11</sup> Some may also argue that the end of the cold war permitted third-parties to intervene in disputes more freely. This argument, however, most often applies to organizations, rather than states (see Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl 2010; Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Mingst and Karns 2000). Nonetheless, it is possible that the end of the cold war also provided states with greater autonomy with which to conduct interventions.

First, interventions within a trajectory all occur within the same dispute (by definition). This implies that the trajectory is a dispute-level concept, and it mandates the first step in the trajectory construction process: identifying all interventions within a given dispute. Second, the various interventions within a trajectory can be ordered chronologically. Doing so identifies the proper sequence in which interventions occur. Finally, I proposed in the previous chapter that a third-party's selection of an intervention strategy depends on the most recent intervention strategy used in the trajectory. Third-parties consider characteristics of the previous intervention when deciding what to do next. Therefore, once I determine the chronological order of the interventions, I collect information (variables) about the previous intervention for each intervention that occurs within a trajectory.<sup>12</sup> For example, for every intervention within a trajectory, I note the strategy used during the previous intervention within the trajectory and whether that previous intervention succeeded. I discuss the specifics of these variables below.

As an illustration of this process, I return to the dispute between Guyana and Suriname described in Figure 3.1. The narrative indicates that two third-party interventions occurred within this dispute.<sup>13</sup> First, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) issued a verbal plea for the disputants to resume dialogue on 20 June 2000. Shortly thereafter (3-18 July 2000), CARICOM facilitated negotiations (that is, conducted good offices, which falls within the mediation category; see Table 3.1) in an effort to help the disputants reach a resolution to their conflict. These two interventions comprise the trajectory for the Guyana-Suriname dispute, and it is clear from the narrative that the verbal plea preceded the use of mediation. Furthermore, if successive interventions inform one another (as proposed by almost all of the hypotheses outlined in

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<sup>12</sup> Because the first intervention within a trajectory has no preceding intervention, the information mentioned here cannot be collected for interventions that begin a trajectory.

<sup>13</sup> Bilateral negotiations also occurred, but since these do not involve third-parties, they are not considered interventions.

Chapter 2), then the verbal intervention should in some way affect the subsequent selection of mediation as an intervention strategy. In other words, information from the verbal intervention may help predict the mediation that follows.

Although the process of constructing trajectories appears straightforward, two factors complicate it. First, some observations during the 1946-1992 period do not contain precise intervention dates, and this prevented the creation of a trajectory in a handful of cases. For example, if two interventions occur in February of a specific year, but the day on which one or both of the interventions occur remains unknown, the proper sequence of interventions cannot be ascertained. Rather than assuming a trajectory shape in such cases, I do not include disputes affected by this issue in the analysis. This decision omits four disputes from consideration.<sup>14</sup>

Second, multiple third-parties occasionally intervene on the exact same day. In other words, interventions sometimes begin simultaneously. This can also obscure the construction of trajectories because the precise sequence of interventions cannot be determined in these cases. Note, however, that unlike in the previous cases (when the problem was a lack of precise information dates), the main issue in these cases involves simultaneity. Two possible solutions exist to rectify this dilemma. First, if the third-parties that intervene simultaneously use different intervention strategies, I construct multiple trajectories for the dispute – with intervention pathways that pass through each of the concurrent interventions. An illustration clarifies this process. Suppose, for example, that one third-party intervenes verbally in a dispute on a given day, while another third-party begins to mediate that dispute on the same day. Depending on which intervention precedes the other, the shape of the trajectory will differ. Because it is impossible to determine which of the two interventions occurs before the other, I opt instead to

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<sup>14</sup> The omitted disputes occur between Lebanon and Syria (1949), Ethiopia and Somalia (1963-4), Ethiopia and Sudan (1987), and Senegal and Mauritania (1989). Prior to removing these disputes from the analysis, I conducted additional research in an attempt to determine the exact intervention dates.

create two trajectories. The first trajectory includes the verbal intervention but not the mediation; the second includes the mediation but not the verbal plea.<sup>15</sup>

Such a process preserves the integrity of the data; it correctly captures the fact that the trajectory passed through each intervention. Yet it also potentially inflates the number of transitions that occur within a dispute. As an example, there are 42 interventions that occur during a MID between the United States, United Kingdom, and Iraq over the enforcement of a United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone over Iraq (1997-2001). Because there are a few concurrently beginning interventions during this dispute, I follow the process outlined above and create multiple trajectories for this dispute (a total of 12 are needed to handle all of the concurrently beginning interventions). Each of these 12 trajectories differ from one another *only* when there are concurrently beginning interventions; the remainder of these trajectories are identical to one another. This causes many observations to be repeated in the dataset. In the example above, each intervention that does not have a concurrently beginning counterpart appears 12 times in the data, which thereby inflates (and biases) the true number of interventions.

Three disputes in particular are drastically affected by this process: the Vietnam War; the Eritrea-Ethiopian War; and the dispute noted above between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iraq over the enforcement of a United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone (1997-2001). These three disputes contain 33.5%, 6.1%, and 20.5% of the trajectory-level observations respectively.<sup>16</sup> I address the potential bias caused by these disputes in two ways. First, I drop the outliers from certain models entirely. Second, I leave the disputes in the analysis, but focus only upon the first trajectory path constructed. Every dispute has at least one trajectory, so restricting analysis to only the first trajectory of every dispute ensures that I do not exclude any disputes.

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<sup>15</sup> In effect, I am modeling only one of the concurrently beginning interventions at a time.

<sup>16</sup> No other dispute comprises more than 3.2% of the trajectory-level observations. The vast majority of MIDs each account for less than 1% of the total observations.

Yet it also causes me to lose information about certain intervention paths, as many of the concurrently beginning interventions receive no consideration.

Both of these methods for handling influential data yield similar conclusions (that is, the results are robust; see Chapter 4). Therefore, in the complex modeling presented in the next chapter, I generally opt to address influential observations by dropping the outliers from the analysis entirely. This allows me to balance my desire to retain information about as many trajectory paths as possible with my need to limit the bias that this causes. By allowing for multiple trajectories to exist, I retain the data on those interventions. Yet by removing the three outliers noted above, I also prevent multiple trajectories from inflating the data substantially.

The second method for handling concurrently beginning interventions occurs when the intervening third-parties employ exactly the same intervention strategy. These cases are much easier; the precise order of the interventions need not be known because the shape of the trajectory remains unaffected by their ordering. As an illustration, suppose that two third-parties issue a verbal demand for a troop withdrawal on the same day. Regardless of which verbal plea comes first chronologically, the trajectory path remains the same; it will pass through a verbal intervention on this day. In these cases, I therefore credit each individual third-party with an intervention on the appropriate day as if they intervened together. Note, however, that this does not mean that I consider these to be instances of coalition interventions (see below for more on this point). I retain the information and characteristics of each intervening third-party.

### **Variables and Methods**

In the previous chapter, I proposed that third-party interventions within the same dispute were related to one another, and I advanced a number of mechanisms that might explain how this

occurs. Common to each of these mechanisms is that idea that the intervention strategy used in the previous intervention (and potentially its success) affects the strategy used in the current intervention (that is, the “next” intervention in the trajectory). This makes the relationship between the previous intervention ( $i-1$ ) and the current (or next) intervention ( $i$ ) tantamount to any analysis.<sup>17</sup>

The goal of the various hypotheses is then to predict the *current intervention strategy* used in the trajectory. This remains the dependent variable in all of the quantitative models presented in Chapter 4. I measure this variable using the Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology of strategies presented in Table 3.1. More specifically, I classify each intervention according to the broad category of intervention strategies to which it belongs. These categories (and their corresponding numerical coding values) include: verbal (1), mediation (2), legal (3), administrative (4), and peace operations (5) interventions (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of the precise strategies that fall within the various categories).

As noted earlier, the Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology arranges the various strategies along a continuum from relatively less costly to more costly strategies (with costs being interpreted with respect to the third-party using the strategy). The argument supporting this observation appears in Chapter 1. For the purposes of research design, two characteristics of the dependent variable result from this cost continuum. First, the dependent variable is ordered. Second (and related to the first characteristic), lower values of the dependent variable reflect relatively less costly strategies (see the coding listed above). Conversely, higher values correspond to relatively more costly strategies.

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<sup>17</sup> I will refer to the intervention at ( $i-1$ ) as the “previous” intervention throughout the discussion in Chapters 3 and 4. In contrast, I label the intervention at ( $i$ ) as the “current” or “next” intervention. Because of chronological ordering, the current or next intervention always *follows* the previous intervention.

Because the dependent variable is both ordered and categorical, I use a series of ordered probit regression models to evaluate the hypotheses outlined earlier (Greene 2008; Liao 1994). Despite the use of regression models, however, my main interest does not lie in the coefficients they produce, as is often the case with studies that use such models. This divergence occurs for two reasons. First, the coefficients of an ordered probit model cannot be interpreted directly (see Greene 2008:832-834 for a mathematical argument that yields this conclusion). Unlike in probit or logistic regressions (where one can see general positive or negative effects on a dependent, dichotomous variable), coefficients have no exact meaning when the dependent variable can take on more than two values.

Second, the purpose of this study is to understand how a third-party's choice of conflict management strategy (and therefore the shape of a trajectory) depends on the previous intervention in the trajectory. In other words, I need to know the likelihood with which (or the probability that) a third-party employs each of the five categories of strategies (verbal, mediation, legal, administrative, and peace operations) *conditional upon the previous strategy used in the trajectory*. Given that a verbal intervention just occurred (at  $i-1$ ), how likely is the next intervening third-party (at  $i$ ) to use another verbal strategy? How likely is the next intervening third-party to use mediation (at  $i$ )? What about their likelihood of resorting to a legal, administrative, or peace operations intervention (at  $i$ )? Do these answers change if the previous intervention (that is, at  $i-1$ ) was not a verbal one (for example, mediation)?

To address these questions, I therefore use the ordered probit results to generate *probability distributions over outcomes*.<sup>18</sup> The “outcome” refers to the dependent variable – that is, the current conflict management strategy selected ( $i$ ). The probability distribution over this outcome provides an answer to the general question: how likely is the next third-party (at  $i$ ) to

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<sup>18</sup> I calculate all probabilities in Stata 9.0 using the Clarify software created by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).

use each of the five categories of intervention strategies, given that the previous strategy (at  $i-1$ ) used in the trajectory was  $x$ ? I can then substitute each of the five strategy categories for  $x$  in the previous question to discover how third-party behavior changes according to the previous strategy used. In the end, this allows me to predict how likely third-parties are to follow any one conflict management strategy category (used at  $i-1$ ) with any other (at  $i$ ).

An illustration of a distribution over outcomes helps clarify the concept and its importance to this study. One of the models presented in the next chapter (Model 1; Tables 4.4-4.5) reveals that after a verbal intervention occurs (at  $i-1$ ), third-parties use another verbal strategy next (at  $i$ ) in the trajectory 77% of the time. In contrast, third-parties rely on mediation, legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies after a verbal intervention 19%, 1%, 1%, and 2% of the time respectively. These likelihoods define the distribution over outcomes (at  $i$ ) that transpires after a verbal intervention (at  $i-1$ ). Two characteristics are worth noting about this distribution. First, although the distribution above results after a verbal intervention (at  $i-1$ ), similar (distinct) distributions define behavior after each of the other categories. For example, we could ask how likely third-parties are to use each of the five categories of strategies after a *mediation* instead of a verbal plea. Second, the distribution over outcomes depends on the ordered probit model. Changing the ordered probit model will therefore alter the corresponding distributions over outcomes.

In statistical terminology, these distributions over outcomes imply the use of *Markov transition models* (Cinlar 1975; Gill 2006; for an application, see Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O'Halloran 2006). Markov models estimate the probability of moving (or transitioning) from any one category to any other, given that there are a finite number of categories. Epstein et al. (2006) provide a straightforward illustration of this technique. These

authors examine three types of government: democracy, autocracy and anocracy. By definition, all governments fall into one, and only one, of these three categories (in other words, the typology is exhaustive and the categories are mutually exclusive and finite). Epstein et al. then model the probability that a democracy transitions to either an autocracy or anocracy or remains a democracy in each year. Similar calculations examine the transitioning behavior of autocracies and anocracies. This ultimately tells the authors how likely government types are to persist or change in successive years as well as the factors associated with those governments' transitions or persistence.

The current study follows a similar pattern. The Frazier and Dixon (2006) typology classifies each diplomatic conflict management strategy into one, and only one, of five unique categories (see Table 3.1). Because there are no diplomatic intervention strategies that fall outside their categorization, the typology is exhaustive. The five categories of strategies are also mutually exclusive (that is, no strategy can be placed within more than one category) and finite (that is, there are only five categories). Armed with such a classification system, I then construct trajectories and use them to model the likelihood with which third-parties follow any given strategy (at  $i-1$ ) with any other strategy (at  $i$ ).

In order to use the Markov modeling technique, conflict management trajectories must possess two characteristics (Gill 2006). First, trajectories must be aperiodic, meaning that they do not cycle in time (for example, seasonally or annually). There is no theoretical reason to believe that diplomatic interventions rise and fall regularly on a weekly, monthly, seasonal, or annual basis, so trajectories exhibit this characteristic. Second, trajectories must be irreducible; in other words, third-parties must have access to (and use) each of the five categories of strategies. If this is not the case, then the menu of strategies must be reduced for the analysis to proceed. For

example, if third-parties *never* used peace operations at all, it would be entirely impossible to follow *any* intervention with a peace operation. This would violate the irreducible characteristic, and one would need to “reduce” the classification system of strategies to exclude peace operations to continue with the analysis. Trajectories seem to possess this second characteristic as well. Third-parties can (and do) select from among any conflict management strategy in the typology regardless of what has been previously tried. No strategy is entirely off-limits, as the menu of strategies remains constantly available to third-parties.

As a result of these two characteristics, the Markov process underlying trajectories can be called *ergotic* (Gill 2006). This means that the distributions over outcomes (mentioned above) eventually stabilize (or converge toward an equilibrium) in each model. The practical implications of this cannot be overstated, for such a stable, unique distribution indicates that third-party intervention decisions do not change drastically throughout the course of a trajectory. It does not matter, for example, whether a third-party intervenes second in the trajectory or fifteenth or fiftieth. Because the models produce a stationary distribution over outcomes, the likelihood with which third-parties use each intervention strategy (at *i*) do not depend on the point at which intervention occurs within the trajectory. This permits me to speak of my conclusions in very general terms – without reference to specific points within a trajectory (for example, the third, fourth, or fifth intervention).

### *Key Independent Variables*

Because I am interested in how each intervention affects the one that follows, the main independent variables used in the analysis involve the *lagged conflict management strategies*. For each intervention in a trajectory, I note the strategy category used during the prior

intervention: verbal, mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations.<sup>19</sup> When measuring a series of mutually exclusive categories, researchers normally use dichotomous variables that capture one category at a time. For example, one variable would denote whether the previous intervention employed a verbal strategy, another would indicate whether the previous intervention resorted to mediation, and so on. Rather than follow this more standard approach, however, I take a slightly different tack.

Following the work of Epstein et al. (2006), I create a series of four dichotomous variables that differentiate between the five categories of conflict management strategies. The coding of these variables appears in Table 3.7. Unlike in the approach described above, each variable does not stand for a single category of strategies. Instead, the variable indicates whether the prior intervention used a strategy *no more costly than* a specified category of strategies. The variable labeled Y\*1, for example, notes whether the prior strategy was *no more costly than* a verbal intervention; it is coded 1 only if the prior intervention involved a verbal strategy (because verbal strategies occupy the lowest point along the cost continuum; see Table 3.1). Similarly, the variable named Y\*3 designates situations in which the prior strategy used in the trajectory was *no more costly than* a legal intervention; it is coded 1 if the prior intervention involved a verbal, mediation, or legal strategy. The reference category is peace operations, which occurs when all four of the constructed variables is equal to 0.

As an illustration of the coding process for these variables, I return to the Guyana and Suriname dispute described in Figure 3.1. Third-parties intervene twice in that dispute: first using a verbal intervention and subsequently through mediation. Because the first intervention involves a verbal plea, I therefore code all Y\* variables 1 for this intervention (according to the

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<sup>19</sup> Obviously, this means that the first intervention in a trajectory contains no information on these variables, as there is no prior intervention in the trajectory to examine.

first column of Table 3.7). In contrast to the first intervention, third-parties mediate during the second intervention. According to Table 3.7 (second column), I code a value of 0 for Y\*1 and a value of 1 for the remaining Y\* variables for this intervention. Note that in this second intervention, Y\*1 is coded 0 because mediation is more costly than a verbal plea, and Y\*1 denotes instances in which an intervention uses a strategy that is *no* more costly than a verbal strategy.

Although unconventional, this approach offers a key advantage over the traditional one: it allows me to verify the validity of the typology of conflict management strategies used in the analysis (Epstein et al. 2006). In particular, I can test whether third-parties distinguish between each of the five categories of strategies when making intervention decisions, and, if they do not, I can easily adjust the categorization scheme. For example, assume that third-parties behave as though mediation and legal strategies have similar costs when they make intervention decisions. This implies that mediation and legal strategies should be considered as one category along the cost continuum instead of two (they belong within the same “cost category” according to third-party behavior). Using the Y\* variables (as defined above), I can easily merge (or “collapse”; see Epstein et al. 2006) these two categories into a larger one. In short, if the five categories do not each meaningfully affect the selection of the next strategy in the trajectory, adjacent categories<sup>20</sup> along the cost continuum can be merged (or collapsed) until a larger, meaningful category exists. An illustration highlights this point.

There are relatively few legal interventions within the dataset (n=20; see Table 3.1). This makes it challenging to differentiate between legal strategies and those adjacent to it, as there is not much information available on the use of legal strategies to do so. Indeed, this fact is

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<sup>20</sup> Referring to the positioning along the relative cost continuum (see Table 1.1), adjacent categories are within one value of each other. So the verbal category (numbered 1) is adjacent to mediation (numbered 2). Mediation is adjacent to both the verbal category and the legal category (numbered 3). Etc.

supported by a closer examination of the Y\* variables presented in Table 3.7. The Y\*2 variable (Table 3.7) denotes whether a third-party used a strategy that was *no more costly than* mediation in the previous intervention (that is, a verbal or mediation strategy). Likewise, the Y\*3 variable indicates whether a third-party used a strategy that was *no more costly than* a legal intervention in the previous intervention (that is, a legal, mediation, or verbal strategy). The difference in coding between these two variables is that Y\*3 includes legal strategies, while Y\*2 does not (see Table 3.7; when the previous intervention uses a legal strategy, Y\*3 is coded 1 and Y\*2 is coded 0).

Table 3.8 lists the correlation coefficients between each of the Y\* variable combinations. As this table indicates, the correlation coefficient between Y\*2 and Y\*3 is extremely high (0.953). This reflects the paucity of legal interventions. Y\*2 and Y\*3 differ from one another *only* when a legal intervention occurs (see above). Yet there are so few legal interventions that the two variables cannot be differentiated from one another substantially.<sup>21</sup> They therefore have a strong correlation, which suggests that only one of the two variables should probably be used in any analysis. If it is indeed the case that the Y\*2 and Y\*3 variables should not be used together in the same model (and the empirical modeling confirms such a position), then which variable should remain?

The variable construction process answers this question. The Y\* variables are “nested” in a sense. Each Y\* variable contains the information within the Y\* variables numbered below it. For example, Y\*3 denotes whether the previous intervention involved a strategy *no more costly than* a legal intervention (that is, verbal, mediation, or legal strategies); Y\*2 indicates whether the prior intervention used a strategy *no more costly than* mediation (that is, verbal or mediation

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<sup>21</sup> There is no other substantive interpretation of this correlation coefficient. It is an artifact of the variable construction process.

strategies); and Y\*1 captures instances in which the previous intervention used a strategy *no more costly* than a verbal plea (that is, a verbal strategy). Y\*3 therefore clearly contains the information found within both Y\*2 and Y\*1, for it includes previous mediations and verbal pleas. Yet Y\*3 is also slightly different than these other two variables; it includes information on cases where the prior intervention involved a legal strategy *as well as* when that intervention involved mediation or verbal strategies. Because Y\*3 already contains information on cases where the previous intervention involved mediation, Y\*2 offers nothing unique over Y\*3. Thus, if we had to choose between the two variables, it makes sense to merge (or “collapse”) categories downward. In this case, that means omitting Y\*2 from the models and allowing Y\*3 to pick up prior interventions involving mediation.<sup>22</sup>

The omission of key independent variables does somewhat change the substantive interpretation of those that remain.<sup>23</sup> The precise interpretation, however, depends on which variables stay in the final model. Returning to the example above, suppose that Y\*1 and Y\*3 remain in the model, but we omit Y\*2 and Y\*4. As before, Y\*1 captures third-party intervention decisions (at *i*) following an intervention (at *i-1*) that used a strategy *no more costly than a verbal strategy*. Because there are no strategies *less* costly than verbal ones, I could instead say that Y\*1 represents intervention behavior following a verbal intervention.<sup>24</sup> Y\*3 denotes third-party intervention decisions (at *i*) following an intervention (at *i-1*) that used a strategy *no more costly than a legal strategy* (that is, a verbal, mediation, or legal strategy). With Y\*2 omitted,

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<sup>22</sup> In this case, the Y\*2 and Y\*3 categories merged for a methodological reason: there are not enough legal interventions to allow a substantial distinction to be drawn between them. Above, I propose a substantive interpretation for merging the two categories – namely, that third-parties consider mediation and legal strategies to possess similar costs. Although these two arguments are not mutually exclusive, it is impossible to evaluate the substantive argument when the methodological one prevents both variables from being included in the same model.

<sup>23</sup> This prevents the use of variable names other than Y\*. Although this discussion contains a great deal of information about these variables for the purposes of research design and replication, I move beyond them in the results section and focus instead upon their substantive implications.

<sup>24</sup> I use this more simplified interpretation going forward.

Y\*3 differs from Y\*1 in that it includes cases in which the prior intervention involved mediation or legal cases (the coding in Table 3.7 confirms this).<sup>25</sup> Therefore, Y\*3 actually signifies intervention behavior (at *i*) following a mediation or legal intervention (at *i-1*) when Y\*1 remains in the model.

Finally, omitting Y\*4 causes it to merge with the reference category (similar to the process by which Y\*2 and Y\*3 merge above). The reference category generally covers third-party intervention decisions not covered by the other Y\* variables. Recall that Y\*3 denotes instances in which the prior intervention used a strategy *no more costly than* a legal strategy. Therefore, when the model retains Y\*3 (but not Y\*4), the reference category denotes previous interventions in which the third-party employed strategies *more costly* than legal strategies (or everything along the cost continuum not covered by some Y\* variable). Substantively, this means that third-parties in this reference category used either an administrative or peace operations intervention during the prior intervention (at *i-1*).

I recognize the complexity of these variables, so I offer a visual explanation of their interpretation as well. Figure 3.2 contains a theoretical distribution of interventions arranged along a cost continuum (as in Table 1.1).<sup>26</sup> The Y\* variables discussed above represent “cut points” across the distribution, and they are read somewhat analogously to how one reads *z*-values across a probability density function. As noted above, Y\*1 represents third-party intervention decisions (at *i*) following an intervention (at *i-1*) that uses a strategy *no more costly than* a verbal one. In Figure 3.2, this involves all interventions to the left of Y\*1 (or just previous verbal interventions). Similarly, Y\*3 denotes third-party decisions following an intervention that

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<sup>25</sup> Y\*3 also contains observations in which the prior intervention involved a verbal strategy. Because Y\*1 captures that information as well, we can force Y\*1 to be 0 and let Y\*3 capture the *difference* between it and Y\*1. This difference occurs when the prior intervention used either mediation or a legal strategy.

<sup>26</sup> The exact form of the distribution does not matter for this explanation, although it must satisfy the conditions of a probability distribution function (see Stirzaker 1999 for more information on these conditions).

employs a strategy *no more costly than* a legal one. This includes all interventions to the left of  $Y^*3$  in the figure (that is, verbal, mediation, and legal strategies).

Four things are worth noting about the depicted relationship between  $Y^*1$  and  $Y^*3$ . First,  $Y^*3$  includes the information found within  $Y^*1$  (previous verbal interventions), since  $Y^*1$  is to the left of  $Y^*3$ . This accords with the statement above that higher numbered  $Y^*$  variables contain information from the  $Y^*$  variables numbered below them. Second,  $Y^*3$  differs from  $Y^*1$  in the shaded area (that is,  $Y^*3$  includes previous mediation and legal interventions, while  $Y^*1$  does not). Finally, if we subtract  $Y^*1$  from  $Y^*3$ , we get this shaded area. In other words, we can “turn off”  $Y^*1$  (or force it to 0) to better understand how intervention behavior differs after verbal interventions on the one hand and mediation and legal interventions on the other. Finally, if we need to collapse categories (because third-party decisions or methodological concerns compel us to do so), we should collapse categories to the left in the figure (that is, remove the lower numbered  $Y^*$  variables and keep the higher valued ones). This ability to merge categories is the key advantage to using the  $Y^*$  variables as defined above; it ensures that the analysis most closely matches how third-parties differentiate among the strategy categories’ relative costs.

There is one final thing to note from Figure 3.2. Merging categories (as was done with  $Y^*2$  and  $Y^*3$  above) does not exclude any intervention strategies from the analysis; we can still assess third-party behavior after both mediation and legal interventions, even though we removed  $Y^*2$ . Yet it is not possible to differentiate between (the two) individual merged strategies, and the figure explains why.  $Y^*3$  can cover strategies *no more costly than* legal ones (that is, verbal, mediation, and legal strategies). It is possible to remove verbal strategies from the domain of  $Y^*3$  by “turning off”  $Y^*1$  (that is, forcing  $Y^*1$  to be 0). To distinguish further between mediation and legal strategies, we would need to similarly “turn off” the mediation

category as we did with the verbal one. Y\*2 served this function, and its exclusion makes such a differentiation impossible. Therefore, once we merge two categories, we can describe intervention behavior following all of the strategies contained in the new, merged category *as a group*, but we cannot dissect intervention behavior that follows only one of the strategies in the merged category. Returning to the example, once we drop Y\*2, we cannot ask how the likelihood with which a third-party employs each of the five strategy categories (at *i*) changes when the previous intervention (at *i-1*) involved mediation *as opposed to* a legal strategy.<sup>27</sup>

Because the interpretation of the Y\* variables changes according to which Y\* variables are used in a model, I retain the Y\* variable labels while presenting and discussing the results in the next chapter (following Epstein et al. 2006). This decision, however, should not influence the discussion greatly. I am not primarily interested in the coefficients that result from the ordered probit models, as they cannot be interpreted directly. I therefore move rather quickly from the coefficients to the substantive likelihood with which third-parties use each intervention strategy (at *i*) given the previous intervention (at *i-1*). Although the Y\* variables affect these likelihoods (that is, the distributions over outcomes), the variables themselves disappear from the discussion of them.

### *Success*

The learning model proposes that third-party intervention behavior (at *i*) changes as a result of the success of the strategy used in the previous intervention (at *i-1*). I measure short-term<sup>28</sup> *success* according to the standard set within the Frazier and Dixon (2006) dataset.<sup>29</sup> A

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<sup>27</sup> We can, however, still differentiate between the merged category and other categories of intervention strategies.

<sup>28</sup> See Chapter 2 for the argument behind using short-term, as opposed to long-term, success.

strategy is considered successful if it accomplished its intended purpose (or primary goal) at the time it ended. For example, the purpose of an appeal for a troop withdrawal is to convince the disputants to remove their troops from a specific conflict zone. If the disputants remove their troops within two weeks of such an appeal, the intervention is coded as “successful.”

Alternatively, the intervention is coded as “unsuccessful” if there is no clear evidence that a troop withdrawal occurred within the two weeks after such an appeal. Finally, because I am interested in how the success of the previous intervention ( $i-1$ ) affects the selection of the current strategy ( $i$ ), I lag this variable for each observation within a given trajectory.

It is also worth noting that I do not use this variable within the ordered probit models in a traditional fashion; that is, “success” does not appear as a variable in any of the regression models. Yet I do make use of it to produce modeling results. The learning model proposes that intervention behavior differs after successful and unsuccessful previous interventions. More specifically, it posits that third-parties repeat the use of previously successful strategies and avoid the use of strategies that previously failed. I therefore condition some of the regression models on the “success” or “failure” of the previous intervention (that is, I split the sample into interventions that follow previously successful interventions and those that follow previously failed interventions).

### *Control Variables*

I purposely limit the control variables under consideration for two reasons. First, scholars have recently called for a return to “simpler” models in order to understand better the relationships that they imply. Achen (2002), for example, argues that quantitative researchers

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<sup>29</sup> Frazier and Dixon (2006) code this variable for the 1946-1992 period. They do not, however, record this variable for any interventions they have after 1992. I therefore collect data on each intervention’s success within the 1993-2001 period, according to the coding criteria set by the Frazier and Dixon codebook.

cannot know whether their statistical models accurately fit their data when they employ more than two or three independent variables (see also Achen 1982, 2005). This “rule of three” proposes that scholars spend less effort on generating comprehensive (or “garbage-can”) regression models and more effort on understanding the basic relationships within their data (for example, crosstabulations that sketch bivariate statistical relationships). Ray (2005) advances a similar argument. Although he stops short of restricting models to only three variables, Ray proposes that scholars start by building simple models before moving to more complex ones. The goal becomes understanding the relationship between the key variables of interest, rather than “controlling” for every conceivable factor.

Second, the influence of each control variable can vary according to the conflict management strategy used in the previous intervention. For example, an intergovernmental organization may be more likely than other actors to use mediation (at  $i$ ) after a verbal intervention (at  $i-1$ ). This preference may change, however, after a mediation; in such cases, organizations may be more likely than other actors to deploy a peace operation. Because of this possibility, I interact every control variable with each of the key independent variables noted above (that represent the previous strategy used in the trajectory). This adds five variables to the model for every one control variable included. Therefore, I must restrict the number of control variables included, lest they saturate the models and use too many degrees of freedom.<sup>30</sup>

Despite these arguments in favor of simpler models, I recognize that many will be skeptical of modeling that lacks sufficient controls. Therefore, after developing a series of parsimonious models, I run two series of models that include numerous control variables common to studies of international conflict and its management. The first series examines

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<sup>30</sup> Because I cluster the ordered probit on the MID, the degrees of freedom available are much smaller than the number of observations within the dataset.

differences in intervention behavior by type of third-party actor. In these models, I construct two dichotomous variables. The first denotes whether the intervening third-party in the current intervention is an *intergovernmental organization (IGO)*, while the second indicates whether the intervening third-party in the current intervention is a *coalition* of states. Interventions by individual *states* remain the reference category in these models.

I identify state actors according to the Correlates of War Project's state system membership list (Correlates of War Project 2008). Interventions by individual states occur when one of the state members of the system intervene within a dispute (using any of the intervention strategies identified earlier). In contrast, a coalition of states consists of more than one state member of the international system. For a coalition to receive credit for an intervention, there must be clear evidence that the state members worked together to intervene in the dispute as a cohesive unit, rather than as individuals. An empirical example illustrates this point more clearly.

In 1942, Ecuador and Peru signed the *Protocol of Rio de Janeiro*, which was designed to resolve their territorial dispute with one another. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States guaranteed this agreement by providing assistance to demarcate the border as well as military observers to help keep the peace while the demarcation took place. Ecuador repudiated the agreement by 1950, and the neighboring states fought one another repeatedly in the decades that followed. During one of their more intense battles in 1995-1996 near the Canepa River, the four guarantor nations intervened together repeatedly in an effort to resolve the dispute. This coalition not only mediated talks between the disputants frequently, but also deployed a peace operation to the region – the Mission of Military Observers Ecuador/Peru (MOMEPE). In the end, it was the efforts of this coalition that ultimately produced a comprehensive peace accord in 1999.

Throughout the Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict, the coalition of guarantor states intervened as a unit; individual members did not intervene independently. That is, there was no Argentinean intervention or Chilean intervention that occurred independently of the coalition's efforts. Rather, the four states acted in concert – either by sending representatives to work together on behalf of the coalition or by participating directly in a given intervention. For example, each guarantor state contributed troops to the peace operation and signed agreements that the coalition helped mediate. In short, the interventions were clearly performed cohesively and on behalf of the group.

Finally, I rely upon the Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004) definition to identify intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). According to these authors, an IGO is an organization formed by international treaty that has (more than two) states as members and displays some evidence of institutionalization (for example, a headquarters building or a permanent secretariat or staff). Interventions by an IGO occur when an organization acts through its permanent staff to manage a conflict (for example, when the head of the United Nations sends mediators to a conflict) or authorizes and coordinates a collective response on behalf of member states (for example, when the African Union deploys a peace operations).

The second series of models takes a closer look at the intervention behavior of state actors. Towards that end, I examine the influence of three characteristics of third-party states on intervention decisions. First, *major states* are involved in more conflict management efforts than their minor counterparts (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Frazier 2006; Owsiak and Frazier 2009). Given this finding, and the fact that major states possess more resources with which to intervene, I entertain the possibility that major states intervene differently than minor states

within trajectories.<sup>31</sup> A dichotomous variable indicates whether the third-party is considered a major state according to the Correlates of War (COW) State System Membership Data (Correlates of War Project 2008).<sup>32</sup>

Second, third-parties that are *allied to at least one of the disputants* may have a greater incentive to get more involved in managing their partner's dispute than non-allied third-parties. Such an incentive may stem from an ally's desire to restrain their partners, restore the strength of the alliance, or prevent themselves from getting dragged into a conflict. I rely on the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 2002) to create a dichotomous variable to denote whether the third-party was allied to at least one of the disputants at the time of the intervention.

Finally, *contiguous* third-parties may have a greater incentive to intervene than non-contiguous third-parties (see Greig 2005). Neighboring states are more likely to be affected by a given conflict than those outside the immediate vicinity (see Gleditsch 2002). This results not just from the prospect of conflict spreading to neighbors, but also because the effects of conflicts (for example, refugees) often impact neighbors before non-neighbors. Using the COW Project's Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002), I create a dichotomous variable that captures whether the third-party shares an inland or river boundary (the closest level of contiguity in the COW dataset) with at least one of the disputants.

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<sup>31</sup> I also entertain the possibility that regional powers intervene differently than non-regional powers. This, however, does not change the results reported in Chapter 4 (results not shown). According to Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010), regional powers (and their respective regions) include: the United States (North America); Brazil (South America); Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy (Europe); Nigeria (West Africa); South Africa (Southern Africa); Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel (Middle East); Russia (post-Soviet Union); India (South Asia); and China and Japan (East Asia). There are no regional powers within the Horn of or Central Africa. Using this list, alternative model specifications replace the major state variable with a dichotomous regional power variable.

<sup>32</sup> According to COW, major states (and the periods during which they held this status) during the temporal domain of this study include: the United States (1946-2001), the United Kingdom (1946-2001), France (1946-2001), Germany (1991-2001), the Soviet Union/Russia (1946-2001), China (1950-2001), and Japan (1991-2001).

The two series of models (one on all third-party actors and one on states specifically) cannot be integrated. This stems from the measurement of the state-level variables noted above (major state status, alliance ties, and contiguity). It is unfitting to assign state-level characteristics to coalitions and organizations. I must therefore leave information on state-level characteristics out of interventions involving either coalitions or organizations. Although this decision is appropriate,<sup>33</sup> it causes interventions performed by coalitions or organizations to drop from any model containing the state-level characteristics. As a result of this, I elect to run two series of models. This allows me to explore differences among third-party actors in as great a level of detail as possible.

Despite creating two distinct series of models, there are two dispute-level control variables common to each series. First, third-party intervention behavior may differ when one of the disputing states is a major state. Either the third-party or the *major state disputant* can cause this difference. On the one hand, third-parties may believe that major state disputants can handle their own affairs or will do what they want regardless of any intervention efforts (for example, the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 despite the protest of the United Nations and other major states such as France). On the other hand, major state disputants may purposely restrict the involvement of third-parties, especially when the third-parties appear to contradict their wishes. For example, China regularly reiterates its desire for third-parties to respect its sovereignty and remain out of its affairs. Similarly, during much of the time period of this study, numerous major states in the international system did not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),<sup>34</sup> making it impossible for the court to intervene in the

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<sup>33</sup> See King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve (2001).

<sup>34</sup> The United States withdrew its consent to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in 1986. It is not clear that Russia, France, or China ever granted consent. For more information, see the International Court of Justice website at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3>.

conflicts of a major state without those states' direct consent.<sup>35</sup> Regardless of what causes the limitation, the above discussion suggests that third-party involvement may be restricted to more low-cost strategies (if intervention occurs) when one of the disputants is a major state. Using the same data and operationalization as earlier, I therefore construct a dichotomous variable to indicate whether or not at least one of the disputants is a major state.

Second, the presence of an *enduring rivalry* among the disputants may alter third-party behavior. Enduring rivalries are particularly contentious interstate relationships in which disputants see each other as enemies and the probability of militarized conflict remains consistently high (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Colaresi et al. 2007). Because enduring rivalries contain a disproportionate amount of militarized conflict and persist for decades, third-parties may approach these rivalries differently than they would conflict between non-rivals. This difference can yield two behavioral changes. First, rivals may attract a disproportionate amount of conflict management because they contain the most (and severest) conflict. Furthermore, third-parties may need to use more high-cost strategies within rivalries precisely because these are the "hard cases" (see Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Yet an argument can be made for limited third-party involvement as well. Rivalries often persist for decades, which suggests that any conflict management efforts are unlikely to produce a long-term, comprehensive solution to the rivals' conflict. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (which generated many enduring rivalries between Israel and its neighbors) continues to elude a

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<sup>35</sup> Some may argue that disputants must consent to any diplomatic intervention, but this is not the case. Verbal interventions, for example, never demand disputants' consent. Fact-finding missions (a form of mediation) do not require consent to gather information, although their work is often made easier by the cooperation of disputants. Even the legal interventions undertaken by the ICJ do not necessitate consent for the court to intervene in each particular case. For example, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) both recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. This allowed the DRC to sue Uganda at the ICJ in 1999 for the latter's involvement in the DRC's civil conflict. Although Uganda did not consent to the DRC's lawsuit (and, in fact, actively protested it), the court continued its proceedings, issued a judgment against Uganda in 2005, and required Uganda to make reparations to the DRC.

successful settlement despite the best efforts of numerous third-parties. For these reasons, one might expect third-parties to address conflicts between enduring rivals differently than non-rivals. I therefore construct a dichotomous variable to designate whether disputing states are enduring rivals during the MID in which an intervention occurs. These data come from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), who define an enduring rivalry as a particularly contentious interstate relationship in which more than six disputes occur over a similar set of issues within a short period of time (see also Diehl and Goertz 2000).<sup>36</sup>

Finally, I consider two additional dispute-level control variables during the analysis. First, numerous studies find that territorial disputes differ substantially from non-territorial disputes. Not only do territorial disputes lead more often to war (Vasquez and Henehan 2001), but they also recur more frequently than disputes over non-territorial issues (Hensel 1996, 2001; Quackenbush 2010). Empirical studies hint that conflict management varies between territorial and non-territorial disputes as well (Frazier 2006; Greig 2001). Given that high cost strategies frequently address territorial disputes (for example, legal strategies in Latin America or peace operations in the Middle East), I therefore create a dichotomous variable to indicate whether the MID in which a third-party intervenes involves territorial issues – based upon data from the COW Project’s MID data (Ghosn et al. 2004).

Second, the power (and capabilities) of disputants may affect third-parties’ willingness to intervene in a dispute. In particular, states that possess relatively equal capabilities are more likely to fight one another than those that do not (Bremer 1992; Vasquez 1993). Because disputes

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<sup>36</sup> The exact coding criteria found in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) are not clear. For example, the authors note that the temporal proximity of the militarized disputes matters, but that there are also no concrete rules that outline how this is so. They therefore tell us that six disputes within a short period define an enduring rivalry, but we do not know precisely how short of a period this needs to be. Similar problems occur when coding rivalry termination. A rivalry ends after a certain period of time during which no additional militarized disputes occur, but there are no clear guidelines that identify how long this period of peace must be.

among relative equals involve greater uncertainty, third-parties may have a harder time managing these conflicts. Under conditions of great uncertainty, disputants may believe that they can achieve more from fighting than from non-violent conflict management mechanisms, ultimately limiting the costs that third-parties willingly incur to intervene. To confront this possibility, I construct a ratio of disputant *capabilities* using the COW National Military Capabilities' Composite Index of Military Capabilities (CINC) score (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). More specifically, I divide the weaker disputant's capabilities by the strong state's capabilities. The resulting ratio therefore ranges from 0 (complete inequality) to 1 (complete equality).

#### **A (Brief) Digression on the Modeling Process**

The results presented in Chapter 4 are the product of an iterated modeling process. For each model presented, I first create a “fully saturated” model that contains all of the key independent variables, the appropriate control variables, and the interactions between the included controls and the key independent variables. From this comprehensive model, I then “test down” by removing variables affected by multicollinearity and insignificant interactions from the analysis (Epstein et al. 2006). This explains why the models presented later do not include every variable discussed above (or each higher order interaction term).

Model 1 of Table 3.9 provides an illustration of this process. It includes only the key independent variables for all interventions during the period 1946-2001. I begin by initially including all key independent ( $Y^*$ ) variables in the model. Doing so yields a statistically significant coefficient on the  $Y^*1$  variable and insignificant coefficients on the remaining variables ( $Y^*2$ ,  $Y^*3$ , and  $Y^*4$ ). Because  $Y^*1$  differentiates verbal strategies from the other

categories of strategies (see the coding in Table 3.7), I conclude that when a third-party previously used a verbal strategy in a trajectory ( $i-1$ ), the third-party intervening next (at  $i$ ) will employ each of the five categories of strategies with different likelihoods than if the previous intervention included a non-verbal, diplomatic intervention (that is, mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations); in other words, third-party intervention decisions (at  $i$ ) are unique when following a verbal intervention (as opposed to other intervention strategies).

To ensure that third-party behavior is not similarly distinct after a previous intervention employs other categories of intervention strategies, I subsequently performed a Wald test on the Y\*2, Y\*3 and Y\*4 variables. The Wald test considers the possibility that Y\*2, Y\*3, and Y\*4 all equal 0 and therefore contribute nothing to the model. The results of this test suggest that the true value of the coefficients associated with all three of these variables may be zero ( $\chi^2 = 4.68, p < 0.197$ ). Yet the Y\* variables are also highly correlated with one another, as noted earlier (see Table 3.8). In particular, the correlation coefficient between Y\*2 and Y\*3 is 0.953. Because of this, I remove the Y\*2 variable from the model (to collapse the Y\*3 category downward – see the earlier discussion under the “key independent variables” section).

Re-running the model again produces insignificant coefficients on the Y\*3 and Y\*4 variables. An additional Wald test then addresses the possibility that the true value of both of these two coefficients is zero; unlike previously, the test reveals that one of the coefficients may not be zero ( $\chi^2 = 4.55, p < 0.103$ ).<sup>37</sup> The Wald test, however, does not indicate which of the variables should remain in the model. I therefore run two models. The first contains Y\*1 and Y\*3, and this model yields statistically significant coefficients on both variables. The second model incorporates Y\*1 and Y\*4 and results in a statistically significant coefficient on only Y\*1. Based on these results and general indicators of each model’s goodness of fit (for example,

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<sup>37</sup> The  $p$ -value here approaches the 0.10 threshold.

pseudo- $R^2$  and log likelihood statistics), I conclude that the model containing  $Y^*3$  is best. This leaves a model containing only  $Y^*1$  and  $Y^*3$ .

Omitting  $Y^*2$  and  $Y^*4$  leaves three categories into which prior interventions can fall (see Figure 3.2).<sup>38</sup> The first contains information on intervention decisions (at  $i$ ) after verbal interventions (at  $i-1$ ). The second (through “turning off” the  $Y^*1$  variable) describes intervention decisions after either a mediation or legal intervention. Finally, the third category (reference category) portrays intervention decisions that follow either an administrative or peace operations intervention (by “turning off” the  $Y^*1$  and  $Y^*3$  variables). In Figure 3.2, these are depicted by the unshaded area on the left, the shaded area in the middle, and the unshaded area on the right respectively. I specify the exact process by which categories merge (and the interpretation of these merged categories) above during the discussion of the  $Y^*$  variables.

I follow a similar, iterative process to construct each of the models that I present throughout the next chapter, although I do not detail the construction of each model as I have here. There is, however, one additional thing to note about this process. Using controls generates interaction terms between the controls and  $Y^*$  variables. When the modeling process suggests that a control variable (or related interactions) does not statistically significantly affect the selection of a conflict management strategy (at  $i$ ), as with the capability ratio between disputants, I occasionally remove the control from the model entirely to save space within the results tables. This allows me to distill a more parsimonious model and accounts for the fact that none of the models contains the full set of controls mentioned earlier.

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
<sup>38</sup> The discussion associated with Figure 3.2 describes the end result of Model 1 exactly.  $Y^*3$  merged with  $Y^*2$ , and  $Y^*4$  merged with the reference category.

## Figures and Tables

**Figure 3.1: Sample Conflict Narrative – Guyana and Suriname, June-August 2000**

Guyana and Suriname disputed the exact placement of their maritime boundary, as well as a concession awarded by Guyana to the Canadian oil company CGX Energy Inc. in 1998. The dispute became militarized in 2000. On 2 June 2000, Suriname protested the fact that Guyana granted CGX permission to drill for oil in the disputed maritime area. On 3 June, the Suriname air force spotted CGX preparing an oil rig in the disputed waters. Suriname’s navy then forced CGX to move the rig outside the territorial waters that it claimed. The two parties began bilateral talks on 6-7 June 2000 to address the matter. Despite progress being made in the talks, Guyana deployed military troops to the disputed Corentyne River on 8 June. The parties met again 13-14 June 2000 and 18 June 2000. These talks broke down before agreement could be reached. Shortly thereafter, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) issued a plea for the parties to resume a dialogue (20 June 2000). CARICOM subsequently facilitated talks between the parties from 3-5 July 2000 and 14-18 July 2000 (the latter were hosted and facilitated by Jamaica, acting on behalf of CARICOM). The last talks failed when the parties were unable to agree on the distribution of resources within the disputed maritime zone. Suriname then changed governments at the beginning of August 2000, and Guyana waited to resume dialogue until the new administration took office.

**Figure 3.2: Interpretation of the Y\* Variables**



**Table 3.1: Third-Party Conflict Management Intervention Strategies and Their Relative Usage, 1946-2001**

<i>Cost</i>	<i>Category</i>	<i>Specific Conflict Management Strategy</i>	<i>Dependent Variable Value</i>	<i>Relative Usage</i>
<p>Low</p> <p style="text-align: center;">↓</p> <p>Medium</p> <p style="text-align: center;">↓</p> <p>High</p>	Verbal Interventions	Ceasefire appeal or demand	1	571 (50.31%)
		Negotiations appeal or demand		
		Troop withdrawal appeal or demand		
		Offer to facilitate negotiations		
		Offer to mediate negotiations		
	Mediation Interventions	Inquiry/fact-finding	2	435 (38.33%)
		Good offices		
		Mediation		
		Conciliation		
	Legal Interventions	Arbitration	3	20 (1.76%)
		Judicial settlement		
		War crimes tribunal		
	Administrative Interventions	Temporary administration	4	47 (4.14%)
		Humanitarian assistance		
		Plebiscite/election supervision/monitoring		
		Boundary delimitation/demarcation		
		Disarmament verification/inspection		
		Repatriation assistance		
	Peace Operations	Military observation	5	62 (5.46%)
		Preventive peacekeeping		
Interpositionary peacekeeping				
Humanitarian protection				
Demobilization monitoring/verification				
Mine-clearing/sweeping				

Notes: The organization of strategies comes from Frazier and Dixon (2006).

**Table 3.2: Conflict Management Data – Dispute Coverage, 1993-2001**

	Frazier and Dixon (2006)	Owsiak (2011) Changes	Owsiak (2011) Addition	Total
MIDs Containing Conflict Management	18	11	36	54

**Table 3.3: Conflict Management Data – Strategy Coverage, 1993-2001**

Strategy	Frazier and Dixon (2006)	Owsiak (2011) Addition	Total
Verbal	64	146	210
Mediation	59	84	143
Legal	1	4	5
Administrative	4	8	12
Peace Operations	8	6	14
<i>Total</i>	<i>136</i>	<i>248</i>	<i>384</i>

**Table 3.4: Conflict Management Data – Third-Party Coverage, 1993-2001**

Actor Type	Frazier and Dixon (2006)	Owsiak (2011) Addition	Total
State	52	170	222
Coalition	9	15	24
Intergovernmental Organization	75	63	138
<i>Total</i>	<i>136</i>	<i>248</i>	<i>384</i>

**Table 3.5: Conflict Management Data – Strategy Coverage, 1946-2001**

Strategy	1946-1992 (Column Percent)	1993-2001 (Column Percent)	1946-2001 (Column Percent)
Verbal	361 (48.09%)	210 (54.69%)	571 (50.31%)
Mediation	292 (38.88%)	143 (37.24%)	435 (38.33%)
Legal	15 (2.00%)	5 (1.30%)	20 (1.76%)
Administrative	35 (4.65%)	12 (3.13%)	47 (4.14%)
Peace Operations	48 (6.39%)	14 (3.64%)	62 (5.46%)
<i>Total</i>	<i>751</i>	<i>384</i>	<i>1,135</i>

**Table 3.6: Conflict Management Data – Third-Party Coverage, 1946-2001**

Actor Type	1946-1992 (Column Percent)	1993-2001 (Column Percent)	1946-2001 (Column Percent)
State	295 (39.28%)	222 (57.81%)	517 (45.55%)
Coalition	72 (9.59%)	24 (6.25%)	96 (8.46%)
Intergovernmental Organization	384 (51.13%)	138 (35.94%)	522 (45.99%)
<i>Total</i>	<i>751</i>	<i>384</i>	<i>1,135</i>

**Table 3.7: Coding of Y\* Variables**

Variable	Previous Strategy Used in the Trajectory (at <i>i-1</i> )				
	Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Y*1	1	0	0	0	0
Y*2	1	1	0	0	0
Y*3	1	1	1	0	0
Y*4	1	1	1	1	0

**Table 3.8: Correlation Coefficients among Y\* Variables**

	Y*1	Y*2	Y*3	Y*4
Y*1	1.000	-	-	-
Y*2	0.386	1.000	-	-
Y*3	0.368	0.953	1.000	-
Y*4	0.277	0.717	0.753	1.000

**Table 3.9: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, 1946-2001**

	Model 1
<i>Time Period</i>	1946-2001
<i>Data</i>	All
<i>Variables</i>	
Y*1	-0.723*** (0.206)
Y*2	-
Y*3	-0.383** (0.184)
Y*4	-
<i>Parameters</i>	
Cut 1	-0.332
Cut 2	0.746
Cut 3	0.803
Cut 4	1.035
<i>Model Information</i>	
Obs.	2,432
$\chi^2$	14.66***
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.057

Notes: \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID).

## Chapter 4

### Conflict Management Trajectories, 1946-2001

The previous chapter established the construction of trajectories, the measurement of variables, and the background behind the quantitative methods that will be used in this study. The purpose of this chapter is to use the foundation laid by the previous chapter to empirically test the competing hypotheses about interventions derived from the theoretical models presented earlier. The central goal of this analysis is to determine which of the theoretical models best predicts the intervention behavior of third-parties during the period 1946-2001. Towards that end, I first describe third-party behavior within trajectories. I then present a series of general statistical models to test the competing arguments advanced by the theoretical models, after which I vary third-party characteristics to ensure the robustness of the conclusions that I reach. In the end, I find strong support for the limited commitments model (and to a lesser extent, the pure cost model), while dispelling the validity of the learning and random model's predictions.

#### Trajectory Length and Content

There are three characteristics that differentiate trajectories from one another: their length, their content, and their shape. I begin the analysis with a general description of third-party intervention within militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), which addresses the first two characteristics. Statistics on trajectory length appear in Table 4.1. Each row of the table lists the number of disputes that experience *at least* a given level of intervention, as well as the probability of any one MID receiving such a level of intervention.

Of the 1,524 MIDs that occur during the period 1946-2001, only 15.62% experience diplomatic intervention of some kind (that is, at least one diplomatic intervention).<sup>1</sup> The remaining 84.34% of MIDs do not receive any third-party attention. At first glance, this number seems particularly low. Yet many MIDs are relatively short, which may explain the low incidence of intervention within these disputes. A number of fishing disputes, for example, last only one day, making the window for a potential intervention very narrow.<sup>2</sup> This interpretation is further supported by the MID data, which indicates that the median length of a MID during the period 1946-2001 is between 13-25 days.<sup>3</sup> When disputes do not persist for a long period of time, third-parties do not have an opportunity to contribute to the management of the disputes, even if they want to do so.<sup>4</sup> Regardless of the exact reason, however, it is clear that the vast majority of MIDs do not experience the involvement of third-party conflict managers.

The current study, however, is not concerned with *any* interventions, but rather conflict management trajectories in particular. Although 238 disputes receive at least one intervention, only 128 MIDs experience *at least* two interventions. This cut-off separates conflict management trajectories (comprised of at least two diplomatic interventions) from individual, isolated diplomatic interventions. As Table 4.1 highlights, these figures indicate that a trajectory develops within only 8.40% of all MIDs during the period 1946-2001. Furthermore, trajectories emerge in

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<sup>1</sup> The likelihood of intervention does vary slightly between the 1946-1992 and 1993-2001 periods (15.00% and 17.17% respectively).

<sup>2</sup> An example of a fishing dispute occurred between Thailand and Myanmar on 12 January 1999. On this date, a Myanmar patrol vessel chased three Thai fishing boats. The Thai boats issued a distress call, and the Thai navy responded. Upon arriving in the vicinity of the Myanmar patrol boat, the Thai naval vessel chased and shot at the Myanmar boat, damaging it in the process. Thailand claims that the incident occurred within its territorial waters and that the Myanmar vessel could not be identified. Myanmar claims that the incident occurred within its waters and therefore protested Thailand's actions. Similar incidents occur throughout the world and generally involve two (or more) states fighting over the appropriate maritime boundary between them. In some cases, states also seize the fishing vessels of another state after it allegedly violates their territorial waters.

<sup>3</sup> I calculate this using the median of the minimum and maximum duration variables within the MID 3.1 dataset for all disputes that occur during the 1946-2001 period (Ghosn et al. 2004).

<sup>4</sup> Note that this does not mean that disputants are *resolving* their short disputes. Over 60% of MIDs end in a stalemate (Ghosn et al. 2004).

approximately half of all conflicts that attract third-party involvement (8.40% of disputes receive at least two interventions, and 15.62% of all disputes receive at least one intervention;  $8.40/15.62=53.78\%$ ).<sup>5</sup> These figures demonstrate two characteristics of trajectories. First, trajectories are not common events. They occur in less than 10% of all disputes. Second, when third-parties do get involved in a MID, a trajectory is just as likely to occur as a single, isolated intervention.<sup>6</sup>

Moving farther down Table 4.1 provides a more detailed description of the length of trajectories. Only 90 disputes experience at least three interventions. Because 128 MIDs received at least two interventions, roughly 30% of trajectories ( $n=38$ ) end before the third intervention. Another 20% end before the fourth intervention ( $n=28$ ), and an additional 15% of trajectories terminate before the sixth intervention. These figures suggest that trajectories are generally not very long. Although there are some outliers (for example, two trajectories contain more than 40 interventions, and another possesses over 50 interventions), two-thirds of all trajectories contain five interventions or less, and the median trajectory ends before the fourth intervention. Third-parties therefore do occasionally intervene repeatedly within MIDs, but their level of intervention remains limited.

These statistics provide *prima facie* evidence in favor of the rational actor assumption. At some point (which may vary according to the specific third-party), the costs of intervention exceed the benefits, making intervention an undesirable policy. In other words, third-parties are

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<sup>5</sup> The prevalence of trajectories also varies slightly between the 1946-1992 and the 1993-2001 periods (7.42% and 11.44% of all MIDs within these two periods experience trajectories respectively).

<sup>6</sup> It is reasonable to ask how these isolated interventions differ from those found within trajectories. Although a thorough examination of this question lies beyond the scope of the current study, two distinguishing characteristics are worth noting. First, isolated interventions are more likely to involve mediation; 60% of isolated interventions involve third-party mediations, while only 39% of interventions within trajectories contain mediation efforts. Second, isolated interventions contain slightly higher success rates. Approximately 63% of isolated interventions are successful in the short-term, as opposed to about 46% of interventions within trajectories. This makes sense, since success during an initial intervention should be one factor that prevents a trajectory from forming.

not altruistic – interested in conflict management merely for the sake of making the world more peaceful. Were they altruistic instead of rational, we might not expect the length of trajectories (and the associated probability of a MID receiving a certain level of intervention) to decline so rapidly *unless* third-parties successfully bring disputes to an end quickly. Unfortunately, both previous research and this project find that interventions succeed only 30-45% of the time. It is therefore more likely that third-parties behave rationally by electing to eschew intervention once it is no longer a sound policy.

The second characteristic of trajectories is their content. The previous chapter began explaining this content by outlining the frequency with which third-parties use each of the strategies when intervening. In particular, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 identified 1,135 diplomatic interventions within the period 1946-2001. In the first column of Table 4.2, I reproduce the strategy distribution presented earlier for all observations that occur specifically *within trajectories*. During the 128 disputes in which trajectories occur, third-parties intervene on 2,639 separate occasions. From these figures (and Table 4.2), it becomes immediately apparent that the trajectory construction process inflates the number of observations (from 1,135 to 2,639; see Tables 3.5 and 4.2 respectively).<sup>7</sup> Because this inflation results (in part) from a handful of outlying disputes, the second column of Table 4.2 regenerates the strategy distribution without these outliers.<sup>8</sup> This reduces the number of interventions within trajectories to 1,047, although even this figure retains some inflation. These 1,047 diplomatic interventions comprise the 128 trajectories that I analyze throughout the remainder of this study.

Despite the potential inflation of observations that results from creating trajectories, I note that the distribution presented in the second column of Table 4.2 closely mirrors that

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<sup>7</sup> See also the previous chapter, which explains the trajectory construction process.

<sup>8</sup> See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of how I handle outlying trajectories/disputes.

presented earlier (Table 3.5).<sup>9</sup> Third-parties use verbal strategies more frequently than any other strategy – in roughly 47% of their interventions. They mediate in 39% of their interventions, deploy peace operations in 8% of their interventions, and resort to administrative and legal strategies in 3% and 2% of their interventions respectively. Thus, in order from most frequently to least frequently used strategy, third-parties rely on: verbal pleas, mediation, peace operations, administration interventions, and legal strategies. This ordering does not change by time period (1946-1992 vs. 1993-2001; see Table 3.5) or when the outliers are factored back into the data (see the first column of Table 4.2).

Such an ordering undercuts some of the predictions of the pure cost model. In particular, this model proposed that third-parties would use relatively more costly strategies less often than they would use relatively less costly strategies (Hypothesis 1b). This does not seem to be consistently true. Third-parties do use the least costly strategy (verbal pleas) most often, and they rely on the second least costly strategy (mediation) regularly after that. Beyond this point, however, the ordering preference contradicts the predictions of the cost model. The third most frequently used strategy is peace operations, which is also the *most costly* strategy available. This means that although there are other less costly options available (for example, legal or administrative strategies), third-parties turn instead to *more* costly alternatives. Hypothesis 1b therefore receives weak support.

One can also find a glimmer of support for the limited commitments model within the strategy distribution. The likelihood with which third-parties use verbal pleas or mediation vastly exceeds the likelihood with which they use either legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies. This suggests that there is a precipice along the cost continuum of strategies (see Table 1.1) that lies just past mediation. In other words, third-parties are very willing to intervene

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<sup>9</sup> The percentages across corresponding cells of the tables differ by at most 0-3%.

verbally or through mediation, but when the costs of using a strategy exceed those that accompany mediation, their willingness decreases drastically. The preference of third-parties is clearly to rely on strategies that cost no more than mediation does.

Of course, various types of third-parties do not behave identically within trajectories. Therefore, in order to understand better how intervention decisions differ by third-party type (that is, state, coalitions, or intergovernmental organizations), Table 4.3 presents a series of statistics that describe the first and most costly strategy used by each actor type within each trajectory.<sup>10</sup> The numeric values that appear in the table correspond to the categories of conflict management strategies described earlier (see Table 3.1; 1=verbal, 2=mediation, 3=legal, 4=administrative, 5=peace operations). Lower values signify less costly strategies, while higher values indicate more costly strategies.

Two conclusions emerge from reviewing Table 4.3. First, coalitions and IGOs employ more costly strategies than individual states. This behavior occurs primarily within the first intervention that each actor type undertakes (as predicted by Hypothesis 1c). For example, states generally resort to verbal strategies first in a trajectory (median/mode=1). In contrast, coalitions and IGOs employ slightly more costly strategies on their first interventions. More specifically, they seem to resort to mediation first, rather than verbal strategies. This provides strong support to Hypothesis 1c and, therefore, the logic behind the cost model. When states can disperse costs across more actors, they seem to authorize (or allow) more costly (initial) interventions.

Second, the precipice noted above reappears, and it seems to exist for *each actor type* (in support of Hypothesis 1g). Looking at the highest level of third-party involvement within

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<sup>10</sup> For each third-party type, I consider the first and most costly intervention strategy that they use in each trajectory, regardless of the point in the trajectory at which those interventions occurred. For example, suppose that states intervened three times in a dispute using verbal strategies before an IGO deployed a peace operation. The first verbal intervention becomes the first intervention of states within the trajectory, while the peace operation becomes the first intervention of the IGO. Coalitions would not be credited with intervention at all within this hypothetical trajectory.

trajectories, states regularly restrict themselves to interventions that are no more costly than mediation (median/mode=2).<sup>11</sup> Coalitions and IGOs do likewise (median/mode=2).<sup>12</sup> These data suggest that the threshold advanced by the limited commitments model does not exist for states alone. Although coalitions and IGOs sometimes receive authorization (or at least, not resistance) to undertake more costly interventions (as evidenced by their slightly higher averages for the most costly strategy they use within each trajectory – 2.62 and 2.69 respectively), most of their involvement uses strategies no more costly than mediation. These findings lend strong support to the limited commitments model (particularly Hypothesis 1g).

After viewing Table 4.2, it seems reasonable to ask one additional question: do third-parties ever *start* their involvement in a trajectory with the most costly strategy that they will use during the course of that trajectory (that is, does the strategy used in the first intervention ever match the most costly strategy used within a trajectory). This behavior actually occurs quite often. During their first intervention within a trajectory, states use the most costly strategy that they will employ during that trajectory 54% of the time. For coalitions and IGOs, this rises to 76% and 62% respectively.<sup>13</sup> This suggests two things. First, third-parties may not escalate their involvement over the course of a trajectory – at least not once the trajectory is disaggregated by third-party type (state, coalition, or IGO). Such a finding provides some evidence that contradicts the pure cost model, particularly its prediction that third-parties escalate their involvement from the use of relatively less costly strategies to relative more costly strategies (Hypothesis 1a).<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The average of 1.96 suggests a large number of verbal interventions that bring the average below 2.

<sup>12</sup> Averages greater than 2 suggest that coalitions and IGOs do occasionally undertake more costly interventions than mediation.

<sup>13</sup> This behavior has increased somewhat after 1992. Beginning in 1993, States, coalitions, and IGOs begin their involvement in a trajectory with the most costly strategy that they will use in the trajectory 66%, 56%, and 89% of the time respectively.

<sup>14</sup> Note, however, that there is a subtle distinction here. Behavior *across* third-party types may indicate an escalation toward more costly strategies over the course of a trajectory, even while behavior *within* third-party types finds no such behavior. For example, suppose a trajectory consists of a state that used a verbal plea, followed by a coalition

Second, interested parties (disputants or other potential third-parties) should watch the first intervention made by third-parties, especially those conducted by coalitions and IGOs. In most cases, once we know the first move by these third-parties, we also know the extent of the intervention costs that they are willing to bear during the *entire* dispute. For example, if a coalition's first intervention within a trajectory uses mediation, the coalition will only move to a more costly strategy than mediation 25% of the time. Thus, the first move by coalitions and IGOs within a trajectory signals the limits of these actors' intervention efforts to the world community.

The analysis presented so far considers interventions to be distinct events. Yet numerous hypotheses speak to overlapping and simultaneous interventions. Overlapping interventions occur when a third-party starts an intervention while another is ongoing. Simultaneous interventions are a subset of overlapping interventions in which the *same third-party* begins an intervention while it has another ongoing. What can be said of the prevalence and characteristics of such interventions within trajectories? The data suggest three noteworthy findings.<sup>15</sup>

First, simultaneous interventions lie almost entirely within the domain of intergovernmental organizations. There are 176 instances of simultaneous interventions. Of these, 97% are undertaken by IGOs (n=170). States perform the remaining 3% (n=6). Together, these statistics present mixed support for the pure cost model (Hypothesis 1d). IGOs are clearly more likely than coalitions or states to carry out simultaneous interventions; coalitions, however, are *not* more likely than states to conduct simultaneous interventions. In fact, coalitions *never* intervene again while they have an intervention underway. It therefore seems that coalitions (and

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mediation, and then an IGO-led peace operation. Across all actor types, third-parties moved from less costly to more costly strategies during the trajectory (verbal > mediation > peace operations). Yet each disaggregated third-party type did *not* escalate their involvement. States used only verbal pleas and no more. Similarly, the coalition relied on only mediation, while the IGO used only a peace operation.

<sup>15</sup> I exclude outlying disputes from the statistics presented on overlapping and simultaneous interventions.

to a slightly lesser extent, states) execute one intervention at a time. In contrast, when state actors can disperse intervention costs widely by acting through an IGO, they frequently authorize multiple interventions at a time.

A clear illustration of an organization performing simultaneous interventions occurs during a dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in 1957 over the border town of Mocomon, Honduras. As the disputants fought over the town, the Organization of American States (OAS) intervened three times (Frazier and Dixon 2006). It initially established a commission of inquiry to investigate the dispute. While the commission collected facts (and before it officially issued its report), the OAS deployed a military observation force to the disputed area. Finally, with the military observation team in the field, the OAS created a conciliation commission to mediate an agreement between the disputants. In each of the latter two interventions, the OAS already had an ongoing intervention in the field – either collecting the facts pertaining to the dispute or keeping the peace – and it began another intervention anyway. These interventions more than likely complemented one another.<sup>16</sup> Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the organization conducted concurrent interventions, while coalitions and states (including OAS members) did not individually intervene at all.

Second, although states and coalitions avoid simultaneous interventions, they do perform overlapping ones.<sup>17</sup> Of the 443 instances of overlapping interventions found within trajectories, states, coalitions, and IGOs conduct 38% (n=168), 3% (n=12), and 59% (n=263) respectively. Contrary to the prediction of the limited cost model (Hypothesis 1h), third-parties do not seem particularly *unlikely* to use overlapping interventions. In fact, overlapping interventions (as a

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<sup>16</sup> Detailed case analysis would need to confirm this with certainty.

<sup>17</sup> Because simultaneous interventions are a subset of overlapping interventions (in which the *same third-party* intervenes concurrently), the overlapping intervention data therefore include the simultaneous interventions noted above. I examine overlapping interventions without simultaneous ones below.

whole) comprise 42% of the interventions contained within trajectories.<sup>18</sup> This suggests that third-parties do not regularly wait for one intervention to end before beginning another. It also provides support against a learning model (Hypothesis 2b). If third-parties are not waiting for one intervention to end before beginning another, they cannot be accounting for the *success* of the previously started intervention when making decisions about the next intervention.

Indeed, cases of overlapping interventions demonstrate that the learning model's prediction lacks empirical validity. For example, during a dispute in 1998 between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighbors (Rwanda and Uganda, who the DRC claimed supported rebels seeking to overthrow the DRC government), the South African Development Community (SADC) dispatched a fact-finding mission to the conflict zone. The day after the SADC intervention began, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also sent a fact-finding team to the area (thus, beginning an overlapping intervention). The two teams simultaneously gathered information for almost two weeks before issuing their reports (within a week of each other). As this case highlights, the OAU could not have learned from the SADC intervention. Not only had the SADC intervention begun only the day before the OAU one, but the SADC fact-finding mission would not issue its report until *after* the OAU team submitted its report. Simply put, third-parties that intervene before the success of the previously started intervention is known (as the OAU did) cannot be learning in the manner proposed by the learning model. It is impossible for third-parties to account for the success or failure of the previous interventions when that outcome is unknown at the time the next intervention decision is made.

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<sup>18</sup> I derive this value from the 443 instances of overlapping interventions within the 1.047 total interventions that occur within trajectories (see Table 4.2).

Finally, it is possible to be slightly more specific about *when* overlapping interventions occur. The vast majority of these (76%) occur during an ongoing IGO-led intervention (as occurred, for example, in the Nicaraguan-Honduras or DRC disputes above). In other words, once an IGO intervenes (and while it is still actively involved in intervention), other third-parties follow immediately in their wake – before the IGO has an opportunity to complete their intervention. This is true for all types of third-party actors, although the relationship is strongest for IGO interventions. When IGOs begin an overlapping intervention, 86% occur during an ongoing IGO-led intervention. In contrast, overlapping interventions conducted by states and coalitions occur during an ongoing IGO-led intervention 64% and 50% of the time respectively. These findings provide empirical support to the pure cost model’s predictions (particularly Hypothesis 1e). States do perform overlapping interventions and when they do, these interventions occur more often during an ongoing IGO-led intervention than not.<sup>19</sup>

A dispute between Syria and Turkey in 1998 illustrates this tendency. As Syria and Turkey began amassing troops at their mutual border in October 1998, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Egypt each tried simultaneously to mediate. During these overlapping mediation attempts, three states (China, Oman, and Iraq) separately issued verbal pleas for the disputants to agree to a cease-fire. In other words, four states intervened at the same time (overlapping) as an organization (the OIC) using more than one strategy. Of course, states

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<sup>19</sup> One might ask whether the interventions that overlap (that is, occur during) an IGO-led intervention complement the IGO’s efforts. Two difficulties complicate the answer to such a question. First, to answer whether interventions complement one another requires the use of detailed case studies, which are beyond the scope of the current project. It might be possible, however, to obtain a preliminary answer to the question by asking whether an IGO’s *members* intervene during an intervention that it leads. Yet this is complicated by the high intervention rate of the United Nations, whose membership includes the vast majority of states in the international system. Despite this limitation, I note that IGO members intervene alongside an IGO in some cases, particularly with some regional organizations (for example, the Arab League). I return to this question in Chapter 6 – during the discussion of a future research agenda involving trajectories.

can intervene during state-led or coalition-led interventions instead, but they intervene more frequently while an IGO is working to manage a conflict – as they did during this dispute.

Although these findings support the pure cost model's prediction, it is worth addressing one additional point. Recall that simultaneous interventions are a subset of overlapping ones – a special case in which the *same third-party* performs an overlapping intervention. What happens to the findings on overlapping interventions once the simultaneous interventions (subset) are removed from consideration? After excluding these simultaneous interventions, 60% of the remaining overlapping interventions are performed by states, 4% by coalitions, and 36% by organizations. In other words, IGOs tend to intervene *simultaneously* (that is, the same organization undertakes more than one intervention at a time; see the Honduras-Nicaragua dispute above), while states resort to *overlapping* (but not simultaneous) interventions (see the Syria-Turkey dispute above). Furthermore, of the overlapping interventions that occur specifically during an IGO-led one (and still excluding simultaneous interventions), 62% are conducted by states, 3% by coalitions, and 35% by organizations. The composition of third-party actor types (states, coalitions, and organizations) does not change markedly depending on whether or not the overlapping intervention occurs during an IGO-led one. Finally, I note that of the overlapping interventions conducted by third-party states (n=162), nearly 64% occur during an IGO-led intervention (n=104), as opposed to either a coalition-led (6%; n=9) or a state-led one (30%; n=49). That is, when a state performs an overlapping intervention, that intervention is *twice* as likely to appear during an IGO-led intervention than a state-led one. It therefore appears that the pure cost model's prediction (Hypothesis 1e) receives consistent, strong support; states conduct overlapping interventions, and they are more likely to do so while an IGO is already trying to manage the conflict.

## Trajectory Shape: General Results

The previous section handles two of the three characteristics that distinguish trajectories from one another: length and content. I now move beyond these traits (and descriptive statistics) to consider the third differentiating characteristic: shape. The theoretical models outlined earlier each predict a unique (competing) trajectory shape. It is therefore this analysis that proves pivotal in an assessment of these models' relative merit.

I begin the analysis by considering simple ordered probit regression models that contain no control variables. The simplest models available for this study include only the series of key (Y\*) independent variables; these variables distinguish among the previous conflict management strategy (categories) used in the trajectory (at  $i-1$ ; see Table 3.1 for more information on these variables' coding). As noted earlier, I use these variables to predict the conflict management strategy selected for the current intervention (at  $i$ ). In essence, these models consider how the previous intervention strategy used in the trajectory (at  $i-1$ ) affects the selection of the next conflict management strategy (at intervention  $i$ ).<sup>20</sup> The results from these models describe how likely a third-party is to select each of the five intervention strategy categories during the current intervention (at  $i$ ), given the strategy used previously in the trajectory (at  $i-1$ ).

Table 4.4 presents the results from a number of simple ordered probit models. These models vary along two dimensions (listed in rows across the top of the table). First, I modify the temporal scope across models to check for differences between cold war (1946-1989) and post-cold war (1990-2001) intervention patterns. Although it is not common for scholars to test for

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<sup>20</sup> As noted earlier, the "previous intervention" ( $i-1$ ) moves one intervention back in the trajectory. The "current" or "next" intervention (at  $i$ ) always immediately follows the previous one (that is, there is no other intervention between the previous and current one).

variation in conflict management behavior across these two time periods,<sup>21</sup> one can make a theoretical argument for doing so. After the cold war ended, a spirit of optimism permeated the international system. States increasingly authorized the United Nations (UN) to intervene in a variety of conflicts (see, for example, Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Mingst and Karns 2000). At the same time, the exponential growth in the number of regional organizations continued (Pevehouse et al. 2004). These regional organizations not only increased in number, but became gradually more involved in conflict management as well (see Diehl and Leggold 2003; Powers 2005). It is therefore feasible that intervention behavior changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, especially in so far as international organizations are concerned.

Second, as noted earlier, the data are affected by three outlying disputes: the Vietnam War; the Eritrea-Ethiopian War; and a dispute between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iraq over the enforcement of a United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone (1997-2001). I address the potential bias caused by these disputes in two ways. First, I drop the outliers from the analysis entirely (Models 2-4 in Table 4.4; labeled “without outliers”). Second, I leave the disputes in the analysis, but focus only upon the first trajectory path constructed (Models 5-7 in Table 4.4; labeled “first trajectory”). Because every dispute has at least one trajectory, this latter method ensures that I do not exclude any disputes. Yet it also causes me to lose information about certain intervention paths, as only the first of many potential paths receives consideration. The results are robust to the two methods for handling outliers. Thus, going forward, I only present results from models that exclude the outliers.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> For an exception, see Fortna (2004), who finds slight differences in United Nations peacekeeping behavior and effectiveness across the two periods. In particular, her analysis reveals that UN peacekeeping creates longer lasting periods of peace in the post-cold war era.

<sup>22</sup> I outline the rationale for this decision in the previous chapter.

Model 1 of Table 4.4 includes all data within the entire temporal domain of the study (1946-2001). According to the results produced by this model, third-parties do select current intervention strategies (at  $i$ ) based (at least, in part) on the previous strategy used in the trajectory (at  $i-1$ ). After a verbal intervention (at  $i-1$ ) for example, third-parties select each of the five categories of strategies (at  $i$ ) differently than they do after interventions consisting of mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, third-parties select each of the five categories of strategies (at  $i$ ) differently after either a mediation or legal intervention (at  $i-1$ ) than they do after interventions involving verbal, administrative, or peace operations strategies. Finally, third parties seem to select each of the five categories of strategies (at  $i$ ) differently after either an administrative or peace operations intervention (at  $i-1$ ) than they do after a verbal, mediation, or legal intervention. These results indicate that third-parties base intervention decisions on the strategy used in the previous intervention. Yet they do not say *exactly* how these intervention decisions are affected. How likely is the third-party to use each of the five categories of strategies (at  $i$ ) after a verbal intervention (at  $i-1$ )? How does this change when the prior intervention involves a mediation or legal strategy?

Table 4.5 addresses such questions directly. It presents the probability distributions underlying Model 1 (Table 4.4).<sup>24</sup> Each row represents the previous strategy (category) used in the trajectory (at  $i-1$ ), while each column corresponds to the current strategy (category) selected by a third-party (at  $i$ ). The table therefore describes how likely a third-party is to select each of the five categories of strategies for use in the current intervention (at  $i$ ), given the use of a

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<sup>23</sup> This is all that the coefficients from the ordered probit model indicate (Greene 2008; Long 1997). I cannot (generally) say anything about which strategies third-parties are likely to use without additional analysis. I conduct such an analysis below. Because ordered probit model coefficients reveal such limited information, I generally dispense with their discussion throughout the remainder of the chapter and focus instead on the more substantive findings. The full ordered probit results, however, still appear in the tables contained in this chapter for those interested in them.

<sup>24</sup> I generate all probabilities using the Clarify software in Stata 9.0 (see King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

specific strategy in the previous intervention (at  $i-1$ ). For example, the probability that a third-party will follow a verbal strategy (the previous strategy; row 1) with another verbal strategy (the current strategy; column 1) is 0.773. Note that there is still some chance that third-parties will follow a verbal strategy with a non-verbal one ( $1.000-0.773 = 0.227$ ), and the first row makes predictions about the use of such non-verbal strategies in detail. More specifically, if a third-party previously used a verbal strategy in the trajectory (at  $i-1$ ), a third-party will subsequently use either mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies next in the trajectory (at  $i$ ) 19.3%, 0.4%, 1.3%, and 1.7% of the time respectively (moving left to right across row 1 of the table; the row sums to 1.000 or 100%).<sup>25</sup> The other rows of the table can be read similarly. Each row therefore provides a probability *distribution over outcomes* (that is, the likelihood with which third-parties select each of the five categories of strategies for the current intervention), and these distributions depend (or are conditional) upon the strategy previously used in the trajectory. In the aggregate, the entire table displays a *probability transition matrix*, which describes the likelihood that any one intervention strategy (category) follows any other.

Of course, the probabilities contained in Table 4.5 are merely estimates and therefore contain some uncertainty. To provide more information about this uncertainty, the table also includes the 95% confidence interval bounds in parentheses below each point estimate. I note above, for example, that the probability with which a third-party will follow a verbal strategy (at  $i-1$ ) with another verbal strategy (at  $i$ ) is 0.773. For this particular (point) estimate, there is a 95% chance that the true probability with which a third-party follows a verbal intervention with

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<sup>25</sup> The rows of a probability transition matrix will sum to 1.000 (Cinlar 1975; Gill 2006). This, however, does not mean that third-parties must always intervene. Rather, the rows indicate that when a third-party decides to intervene diplomatically in an interstate dispute, they will select a strategy from one of the five categories outlined earlier – verbal, mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations (that is, there are no other diplomatic intervention strategies outside of Table 1.1 from which to choose). The likelihood of an *intervention* at specific point in the trajectory is a separate matter; I outline these probabilities in Table 4.1.

another verbal intervention lies somewhere between 0.627 and 0.888 (see the range listed in parentheses below the 0.773 estimate in Table 4.4).

I rely on these confidence intervals throughout the chapter to supply information about whether differences between various estimates are statistically significant (or “meaningfully different” from one another). When confidence intervals overlap, the corresponding estimates cannot be distinguished empirically from one another; they are therefore not meaningfully distinct from each other. For example, after a verbal intervention (at  $i-1$ ), the model predicts that there is a 1.3% chance that the next third-party uses an administrative strategy and a 1.7% chance of a third-party deploying a peace operation (at  $i$ ). The confidence intervals for these two estimates overlap one another, which suggests that the two values could be identical. That is, after a verbal intervention, third-parties are *just as likely* to select an administrative strategy as they are to select a peace operation. In contrast, if two confidence intervals do *not* overlap, then a distinction can be made between the estimates; such estimates meaningfully differ from one another. For example, after a verbal intervention (at  $i$ ), a third-party is *less likely* to use mediation next (at  $i-1$ ) than they are to issue another verbal plea. This statement follows from both the estimates (which are 77% and 19% respectively for verbal pleas and mediation) as well as the fact that the confidence intervals associated with these estimates do not overlap.

Returning to Table 4.5, four conclusions stand out.<sup>26</sup> First, verbal strategies demonstrate cyclical tendencies. After a third-party uses a verbal strategy, there is a 77% chance that the next third-party to act in the trajectory will also use a verbal strategy. It seems that once third-parties decide to remain relatively aloof, they consistently remain there. A dispute between China and

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<sup>26</sup> In addition to the conclusions that follow, astute observers will notice that rows 2-3 of Table 4.5 are identical to one another, as are rows 4-5. This occurs because the variables differentiating different categories of prior intervention strategies merged. I outline the process by which this occurs and the interpretation of such categories in Chapter 3. For this discussion, I simply note that the repetition occurs on purpose as a result of the modeling process.

the Philippines illustrates this point. In January 1995, China detained a number of Philippine fishing boats and allegedly established a military base on Mischief Reef – a reef within the Spratly Islands over which both disputants claim sovereignty. As the dispute ebbed and flowed during the months that followed, the Philippines regularly deployed military forces to the disputed area. Each time such a deployment occurred, a third-party (the United States, Japan, Indonesia, or Malaysia) issued a verbal plea for the disputants to pursue negotiations instead of militarized conflict. Despite these repeated calls for negotiations to occur, no third-party became more actively involved in managing the dispute. As intervention within this dispute demonstrates, pleas for peace do not necessarily precede active involvement on its behalf.<sup>27</sup>

Second, the cyclical tendency decreases as third-parties escalate their involvement. If a third-party previously used a mediation or legal strategy instead of a verbal strategy (at  $i-1$ ), the likelihood that the next third-party to act in the trajectory (at  $i$ ) will try a verbal strategy falls from 0.773 to 0.523. If the previous intervention used an administrative or peace operations strategy, this probability drops further to 0.374 (a statistically significant decrease over the original 0.773). For example, during a dispute between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda in 1999, Libya deployed a military observation team to monitor a cease-fire it brokered. During the next intervention in the trajectory, South Africa mediated between the disputants as opposed to issuing a verbal plea. Such a pattern is not unique to this dispute, and its rationale more than likely involves one of two plausible scenarios. Either third-parties are already productively handling the conflict (thereby obviating the need to plead for negotiations or peace, as in the dispute involving the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda) or potential third-parties believe that some other actor has a higher stake in the conflict than they do (for example, the

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<sup>27</sup> These pleas may establish new or re-enforce existing norms. I reserve an investigation of this possibility for future research.

third-party that most recently performed the more costly intervention). In both cases, we would expect the use of verbal pleas to decrease after more costly interventions. Whether the optimistic or pessimistic interpretation possesses greater credence requires more detailed case analysis.

Third, a precipice exists between the mediation and legal categories (see the differences between columns 2-3). This precipice first appeared during the descriptive discussion of trajectories, but it is much more pronounced here. The model predicts that third-parties will use a verbal or mediation strategy 77-97% of the time (depending on the previous intervention in the trajectory). After a verbal intervention, for example, third-parties *almost never* use a strategy more costly than mediation next in the trajectory. In contrast, after a strategy that is more costly than a verbal plea (at  $i-1$ ), they will employ strategies more costly than mediation (at  $i$ ) in only 3-23% of all cases (again, depending on the intervention at  $i-1$ ). This not only suggests that third-parties generally do not wish to incur high intervention costs, but also that they prefer to limit their involvement to either verbal or mediation strategies. There is therefore a clear upper boundary to the costs (and strategies) third-parties seem willing to employ.

There is no shortage of cases in which this threshold appears. For example, during a dispute between Russia and Georgia throughout 1996, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the United States each intervened (sometimes more than once). Yet their interventions involved only a mix of verbal pleas and mediation tactics. These third-parties did not try more costly interventions strategies, even though the dispute persisted for over seven months. Similar behavior occurs during disputes between Guyana and Suriname (2000), Guinea and Liberia (2000-2001), Turkey and Syria (1998), Eritrea and Yemen (1995-1996), and China and the Philippines (1999). Although this list is not exhaustive, it does demonstrate that the

tendency of third-parties to limit themselves to intervention strategies no more costly than mediation is both common and pervasive.

Finally, peace operations tend to follow one another. This conclusion might seem obvious to those that study civil war; third-parties regularly deploy numerous peace operations to states ravaged by civil conflict (for example, Ethiopia, Haiti, Angola, or the former Yugoslavia each received more than one peace operation). Yet the willingness to send multiple missions occurs within interstate conflicts as well. In fact, Table 4.5 demonstrates that once third-parties commit to using relatively more costly strategies, they remain more likely to do so in the future. After an administrative or peace operation, the next intervening third-party is consistently more likely to use mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations than if the previous intervention involved a less costly strategy (either mediation/legal or verbal strategies; comparing the fifth row of the table to the first and third rows). Combined with the first finding (on the cyclical trends in using verbal strategies), these results imply that the key obstacle to intervention involves securing the commitment of *any* third-party. Once someone clears that hurdle, others are more likely to remain heavily involved in the future.

#### *Evaluating the Cost Model (and its Variant)*

Table 4.5 also provides general evidence with which to evaluate three of the hypotheses contained within the cost model (and its variant – the limited commitments model). I begin with the pure cost model. Its first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) proposes that third-parties will escalate their involvement in successive interventions. In practical terms, this implies that third-parties should use a strategy in the current intervention (at *i*) that is *at least* as costly as the last one used in the trajectory (at *i-1*). If third-parties instead use a less costly strategy in a successive

intervention (that is, third-parties de-escalate their involvement), such evidence would undermine both the logic behind and the predictions of the pure cost model.

Table 4.5 provides mixed support for this prediction. Third-parties are likely to follow a verbal intervention with another verbal intervention 78% of the time. Because there is no less costly strategy than a verbal strategy available to third-parties, this finding (and the entire first row) is therefore consistent with the model's prediction. In contrast, the other rows of Table 4.2 demonstrate the limitations of the empirical support for this hypothesis. Third-parties are most likely to follow a mediation or legal intervention with a verbal one (52% of the time).<sup>28</sup> Similarly, after an administrative or peace operations intervention, third-parties turn most frequently to verbal ( $pr = 0.374$ ) or mediation ( $pr = 0.396$ ) strategies.

This suggests that third-parties are more likely to reduce their intervention costs in successive interventions than they are to escalate (or even maintain) them. Hypothesis 1a therefore receives evidence that both supports and contradicts it. Yet the bulk of the evidence generally runs counter to the hypothesis. The only evidence that clearly supports it comes in the first row of the table, when third-parties have no other option than to employ a strategy that is at least as costly as the previous one. Once third-parties have an option to use less costly strategies, they do so more often than not (see the latter four rows of Table 4.5).

A dispute between China and the United States in 2001 highlights this tendency. In April 2001, a US reconnaissance aircraft collided in mid-air with a Chinese fighter, causing the Chinese plane to crash. The US plane executed an emergency landing in China, at which point Chinese officials held both the plane and its crew. Japan became involved in the dispute first and dispatched a fact-finding mission (a mediation strategy) to investigate the particulars of the

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<sup>28</sup> I use  $pr$  as an abbreviation for probability. This is distinct from  $p$ , which I use to refer to  $p$ -values associated with regression coefficients.

collision. This investigation ended quickly, however, and it is not clear that it provided any meaningful information to the disputants. In the days that followed, Taiwan and Pakistan each issued verbal pleas to encourage the disputants to settle the matter through negotiations rather than violence. No third-parties got more actively involved in the management of the dispute, which was eventually settled through bilateral negotiations.

The trajectory in this dispute consisted of a mediation strategy followed by two verbal pleas. Furthermore, these interventions were not instrumental in managing the dispute. Yet this is not what stands out most about this case. Rather, it is noteworthy that third-parties *chose* not to be instrumental. After the Japanese intervention (mediation strategy), third-parties could have maintained or escalated their involvement. They elected instead to *de-escalate* their involvement (from mediation to verbal pleas), a decision that occurs frequently within trajectories. This violates one of the main predictions of the pure cost model (Hypothesis 1a).

In addition to predicting that third-party involvement escalates (that is, uses more costly strategies) over the course of a trajectory, the pure cost model proposes that third-parties will use relatively more costly strategies less frequently than they use low cost strategies (Hypothesis 1b). The empirical evidence confirms this prediction, although it clearly depends on the strategy used in the previous intervention. For example, after a verbal intervention, third-parties are less likely to use mediation than another verbal strategy (19.3% versus 77.3% respectively; row 1 of Table 4.5). In this case, third-parties are clearly using more costly strategies (mediation) less frequently than the low-cost alternatives (verbal pleas). Yet the frequency with which third-parties employ more costly interventions does not decrease consistently across the table. Returning to decisions after a verbal intervention occurs (the first row of the table), third-parties use legal strategies less frequently than mediation (0.4% versus 19.3% respectively). Beyond that, the likelihood with

which third-parties use more costly strategies *increases* slightly (or at least does not significantly decrease). Third-parties intervening after a verbal intervention use administrative and peace operations strategies *more* frequently than they use legal strategies (1.3% and 1.7% compared to 0.4%). Unfortunately, the analysis indicates that the latter three estimates may all be similar in value (that is, their confidence intervals overlap). Despite this, we can conclude that third-parties are not *less likely* to use administrative or peace operations after a verbal intervention than they are to use a legal strategy. The evidence therefore contradicts the pure cost model's prediction.<sup>29</sup>

Clearer evidence of the hypothesis' shortcomings can be ascertained from other values in the table. For example, after a mediation or legal intervention (rows 2 and 3 of Table 4.5), third-parties are more likely to employ administrative or peace operations strategies than they are to use a legal strategy (pr = 0.039, pr = 0.080, and pr = 0.012 respectively). The difference between the use of peace operations and legal strategies in this case (pr = 0.080 and 0.012 respectively) is statistically significant; third-parties are therefore *statistically* more likely to use peace operations strategies than legal strategies. A similar effect occurs when third-parties previously used either administrative or peace operations strategies (see the final row of Table 4.5). Each of these findings provides evidence that is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1b and, therefore, the pure cost model.

Finally, even among the strategies used most frequently by third-parties (that is, verbal and mediation strategies), there is not always a clear difference between the use of relatively more and less costly strategies. For example, after an administrative or peace operations intervention, third-parties select a verbal strategy in the next intervention 37% of the time, while

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<sup>29</sup> The desire to avoid legal interventions may result from the lack of control that it leaves disputants. Once committed to binding arbitration or adjudication, disputants generally cannot control the outcome of the process. They therefore may prefer to acquiesce to the use of mediation, administrative, or peace operations strategies, since they retain some control over the outcomes produced by such interventions.

they employ mediation in such cases 40% of the time (row 4 and 5 of Table 4.2). Not only are these values similar to one another, but their confidence intervals also clearly overlap. This implies that third-parties are just as likely to employ a verbal strategy as they are to use mediation (at  $i$ ) when the previous intervention (at  $i-1$ ) involved an administrative or peace operations strategy. In other words, third-parties do not distinguish between the less costly verbal pleas and the more costly mediations when choosing how to intervene after an administrative or peace operation.

The strongest evidence against Hypothesis 1b, however, comes from comparing the verbal and peace operations columns, particularly in the final rows of Table 4.5. The analysis reveals that the likelihood with which third-parties follow an administrative or peace operation strategy (at  $i-1$ ) with a verbal ( $pr = 0.374$ ) or peace operations ( $pr = 0.155$ ) strategy (at  $i$ ) could be identical (their confidence intervals overlap). This suggests that, in some cases, third-parties do not distinguish between the *least* and *most* costly strategies available to them. In other words, even at the *extremes* (when a cost comparison should be easiest to make), third-parties do not always use relatively more costly strategies less frequently than the lower cost alternatives.

In the aggregate, the results used to evaluate Hypothesis 1b indicate that third-parties do not fail to differentiate between relatively more and less costly strategies at only one point along the cost spectrum. Rather, a comparison of adjacent<sup>30</sup> categories at both ends of the spectrum, as well as a comparison of the most and least costly categories, reveals that third-parties do not regularly use more costly strategies less often than low cost strategies. The pure cost model's

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<sup>30</sup> Adjacent categories are within one number of each other along the dependant variable scale. Thus, for example, the verbal category (numbered 1) is adjacent to the mediation category (numbered 2). Mediation is adjacent to both the verbal category and the legal category (numbered 3), and so on. It would be easiest for third-parties to fail to differentiate between the costs of adjacent categories, since they are (by definition) closest to one another in cost.

prediction is therefore largely inaccurate. Although third-parties may factor costs into their decision-making calculus, they do not do so in the manner predicted by this model.

Although the pure cost model receives limited empirical support, the limited commitments model fares better. This model argues that third-party involvement only escalates up to a point (or threshold), and it predicts that this threshold occurs just beyond the mediation category (Hypothesis 1f). In other words, third-parties should regularly intervene verbally within or mediate disputes, but they should resort infrequently to strategies that are more costly than mediation. This appears to generally be true.<sup>31</sup> After a verbal intervention (at  $i-1$ ), for example, third-parties generally mediate or, less frequently, intervene verbally (at  $i$ ) next in the dispute ( $pr = 0.773$  and  $pr = 0.193$  respectively; see the first row of Table 4.5). The likelihood of using more costly strategies than mediation after a verbal intervention (legal, administrative, or peace operations) falls dramatically (to 0.4%, 1.3%, and 1.7% respectively). The difference between the former two categories and the latter three categories is statistically significant. The same general behavior occurs if the third-party previously used any other intervention strategy (the exception lies in the inability to distinguish between verbal and peace operations strategies after an administrative or peace operations intervention; see above and rows four and five of Table 4.2). This suggests that a clear precipice exists between the use of verbal and mediation strategies on the one hand and those strategies that entail greater costs than mediation on the other. Third-parties have a limit to the intervention costs they are willing to bear.

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<sup>31</sup> Earlier, I listed a number of empirical cases that are consistent with this model, including a dispute between Guinea and Liberia (2000-2001), Guyana and Suriname (2000), Turkey and Syria (1998), Eritrea and Yemen (1995-1996) and China and the Philippines (1999).

### *Evaluating the Random Model*

In contrast to the cost model, the random model claims that there is no discernible pattern within the intervention behavior of third-parties (Hypothesis 3). Support for such a prediction could be found in one of two ways. First, third-parties may be equally likely to employ *any* strategy (at *i*), regardless of the previous strategy used in the trajectory.<sup>32</sup> As the discussion above indicates, however, this is not the case. After a verbal intervention, for example, third-parties are less likely to employ legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies (see Model 1; Table 4.4). Second, any potential patterns may not match the predictions made by the other models; in other words, third-parties may condition their subsequent intervention decisions on previous interventions, but it might not be possible to explain these findings in a theoretically coherent manner. This does not seem to be the case either. The findings noted above generally match the expectations of the limited commitments (and to a lesser extent, pure cost) model.

The data contained in Table 4.5 thoroughly undermine the random model. By both finding statistical patterns within the data and explaining those patterns theoretically, I conclude quite confidently that the random model does not explain third-party intervention behavior within trajectories. The models presented throughout the remainder of this chapter further confirm this conclusion.

### *A Note on Robustness*

In order to ensure the robustness of the general results presented thus far, I run a series of additional models that vary the time period (cold war and post-cold war) as well as how I handle outliers (dropping the three outlier disputes versus examining only the first trajectory within each

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<sup>32</sup> In statistical terms, the confidence intervals might all overlap, which would suggest that third-parties do not condition their subsequent decisions on the previous intervention.

dispute). These models appear in Table 4.4 (Models 2-7). Model 2 examines third-party intervention behavior across the entire temporal domain of the study (1946-2001) after dropping the outlier disputes (the Vietnam War; The Eritrea-Ethiopian War; and a dispute during the period 1998-2001 between Iraq, the United States, and the United Kingdom regarding the enforcement of a United Nations sanctioned no-fly zone over Iraq). Models 3 and 4 then break the second model into the cold war (1946-1989) and post-cold war periods (1990-2001) respectively. Finally, Models 5-7 mirror Models 2-4, but handle outlying disputes differently during each of the three time periods. The former models (5-7) focus on just the first trajectory within a dispute, while the latter (2-4) drop the outliers entirely.

Tables 4.6-4.8 present the probability distributions underlying Models 2-4 respectively.<sup>33</sup> In order to determine whether meaningful differences exist across different models, I compare each cell within Tables 4.6-4.8 to its corresponding cell in Table 4.5.<sup>34</sup> For example, after a verbal intervention, Table 4.5 reveals that the likelihood with which third-parties use another verbal intervention is 0.773 (the first row, first column of the table). The 95% confidence interval associated with this estimate is 0.627-0.888. Once outliers are removed from the analysis, Table 4.6 reports that this probability falls to 0.597, and the confidence interval associated with this new estimate adjusts to 0.503-0.689. Because these two intervals overlap, it is plausible that the values within the two cells are really identical to one another (in other words, they cannot be distinguished from each other statistically). The comparison therefore indicates that the general results hold. Similar comparisons can be made for each cell of Table 4.6-4.8. In almost every

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<sup>33</sup> I do not display the probability distributions underlying Models 5-7. Despite this, I examine these distributions and construct a comparison similar to the one described below.

<sup>34</sup> In statistical terms, I check corresponding cells to see if the confidence intervals overlap. If these intervals overlap, then the corresponding cells could be identical in value. In contrast, if the intervals do not overlap, this suggests a meaningful variation across models. Note that as the number of observations in a given model fall, the confidence intervals attached to the probability estimates widen. This makes sense statistically, since fewer observations leads to greater uncertainty in predictions. Yet it also makes it harder for any differentiation to be found.

case, the comparison reveals that the results of the general model remain consistent across time periods and for different methods of handling outliers.<sup>35</sup>

The robustness checks yield three general conclusions. First, the outliers cause no discernible effect on the analysis. These outliers may generate additional trajectory data, but that data does not alter the conclusions reached.<sup>36</sup> Second, intervention behavior within militarized interstate disputes does not change substantially after the cold war ends. For example, when Tunisia blockaded the French naval base at Bizerte (Tunisia) in July 1961, third-parties first issued a series of verbal warnings and then began mediating.<sup>37</sup> A similar pattern of third-party intervention occurred within both a dispute between Guyana and Suriname in 2000 regarding the exact location of their maritime boundary<sup>38</sup> and a dispute between China and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands in 1999.<sup>39</sup> As these examples illustrate, trajectories did not change abruptly when the cold war ended. To be sure, intervention behavior may have changed with respect to *civil* conflicts, but the affect on intervention within interstate conflicts remained marginal at best. Such a finding may explain why testing for differences between intervention behavior across these two time periods is not commonly done.

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<sup>35</sup> The one exception occurs in the probability of a third-party using a peace operation after a verbal intervention (the first row, fifth column of the tables). In the cold war period (Table 4.7), this probability is 0.065 (confidence interval: 0.021-0.148). The probability decreases to 0.011 in the post-cold war period (confidence interval: 0.005-0.020; Table 4.8). In both cases, however, the confidence intervals overlap that contained in the similar, overall model (see Table 4.7;  $pr = 0.038$ , confidence interval: 0.013-0.082). This finding matches the empirical evidence. After 1989, universal and regional organizations more frequently deployed peace operations to intrastate (civil) conflicts than to interstate conflict (see Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl 2010).

<sup>36</sup> Despite this, the outlying disputes generate a large amount of data. I therefore exclude these outliers from the models presented in the remainder of the chapter. Note that handling the outliers differently does not change the conclusions. I ultimately exclude the outliers based on the argument presented in Chapter 3.

<sup>37</sup> The United Nations Security Council first issued a cease-fire demand. In the month that followed, the United States, United Kingdom, and the UN each called for peaceful negotiations to resolve the dispute. Finally, the ICJ sent a fact-finding mission to the conflict zone (a form of mediation). The fact finding mission helped lead to a bilateral agreement between France and Tunisia.

<sup>38</sup> In this case, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM, an IGO) issued the verbal plea and tried to mediate the dispute. The mediation failed to bring the disputants to agreement.

<sup>39</sup> The United States offered to mediate and issued a plea for negotiations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) subsequently conducted good offices (a form of mediation), which helped the parties produce a “code of conduct” for the Spratly Island area.

Finally, although the general results do not seem to be affected by alternative modeling, I also ensure that the conclusions I reach about the pure cost, limited commitment, and random models remain intact. With this goal in mind, I revisit each of the conclusions presented above to ensure that they hold across each modeling specification. I find that the conclusions about third-party intervention behavior remain consistent, regardless of the model. This is true of both the overall conclusions as well as those specific to each model's prediction.

### *Evaluating the Learning Model*

Assessing the accuracy of the learning model's theoretical predictions requires slight variations on the models presented above. In particular, one must know how third-parties behave within trajectories after successful and unsuccessful interventions. Table 4.9 presents models that address both situations. Model 8 considers third-party intervention decisions after a previously successful intervention, while Model 9 examines these decisions after a previously unsuccessful intervention. Both models include the entire temporal domain of the study (1946-2001) and exclude the three outlying disputes noted above. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 then contain the details of third-party intervention decisions that are associated with Model 8 and 9 respectively. Because my main interest lies in these intervention decisions, I turn now to the latter two tables.

The main prediction of the learning model (Hypothesis 2a) contains two related propositions: that third-parties should repeat the use of strategies that were most recently successful and avoid the use of strategies that were most recently unsuccessful. Table 4.10 addresses the first prediction; it provides the likelihood with which third-parties will follow a given strategy (at  $i-1$ ) with any other (at  $i$ ) given that the previous intervention was successful. For the learning model to be accurate, the largest probabilities in this table should occur in the

cells where third-parties repeat the same strategy in successive interventions.<sup>40</sup> This does not appear to occur consistently, however.

The first cell of Table 4.10 (first row, first column) reveals that the chance of a third-party following a successful verbal intervention with another verbal plea is 48.1%. Although this value seems high, third-parties are just as likely to follow a previously successful verbal intervention with mediation ( $pr = 0.376$ , with a confidence interval that overlaps that of the first cell). In other words, if a previous verbal intervention succeeded in achieving its goal, subsequent third-parties were equally likely to try a verbal strategy again as they were to switch to mediation. The same happens after a previously successful mediation (see row 2 of Table 4.7). When a prior mediation (at  $i-1$ ) succeeded, third-parties were just as likely to try mediation again as they were to switch to a verbal strategy. Therefore, at the low cost end of the spectrum, it appears that third-parties are equally likely to resort to verbal or mediation strategies, regardless of the success of the last intervention. This evidence contradicts the prediction of the learning model. Third-parties may use a previously successful strategy frequently, but they are just as likely to try something else.

As an illustration of this finding, consider a dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria in 1996. During February 1996, the disputants' troops clashed on the Bakassi Peninsula (a contested area of land along the Cameroon/Nigeria border). In response to this military skirmish, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) appealed for peaceful negotiations.<sup>41</sup> President Eyadema of Togo then mediated a cease-fire agreement a few weeks later. When that agreement failed to avoid further military battles, the United Nations reverted to appeals for peaceful negotiations. In other words, although mediation recently proved a successful tool for managing

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<sup>40</sup> In Table 4.10, all previous interventions (at  $i-1$ ) were successful.

<sup>41</sup> Other third-party verbal pleas preceded this one. I omit them here to keep the example simpler. Including them does not alter the point being made.

the dispute, third-parties opted *not to use it* when further conflict management efforts were needed.<sup>42</sup> They chose instead to use strategies less costly than mediation.

The evidence strengthens further against the learning model when one considers prior interventions involving strategies more costly than mediation. Following a previously successful administrative intervention (the fourth row of Table 4.10), third-parties are more likely to turn to verbal pleas (24.1% of the time) mediation (41.9% of the time) and peace operations (27.2% of the time) than to another administrative intervention (4.0% of the time).<sup>43</sup> Similarly, after a successful peace operation (the fifth row of Table 4.10), third-parties turn more frequently to mediation ( $pr = 0.406$ ) than another peace operation ( $pr = 0.167$ ). These findings supply consistent evidence that third-parties are *not* repeating the use of previously successful strategies. This failure to repeat successful strategies in successive interventions occurs across the full spectrum of strategies, thereby supplying convincing evidence that undercuts the predictions of the learning model.

This, however, comprises only one part of the learning model's main prediction. What about third-party behavior after unsuccessful interventions? Do third-parties avoid the use of unsuccessful strategies in successive interventions? Table 4.11 attempts to answer this question; it displays third-party intervention decisions (at  $i$ ) when the previous intervention (at  $i-1$ ) did *not* succeed. In order for the evidence to support the learning model, the *smallest* probabilities in Table 4.11 should occur in the cells where third-parties repeat the same strategy in successive interventions.<sup>44</sup> Were this to happen, it would indicate that third-parties were moving

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<sup>42</sup> Third-parties did eventually return to mediation, but the point is that third-parties are not repeating successful strategies (at  $i-1$ ) in *successive* interventions (at  $i$ ).

<sup>43</sup> Third-parties are equally likely to employ verbal pleas, mediation, and peace operations in these cases (the confidence intervals of the estimates overlap).

<sup>44</sup> This is because all prior interventions were unsuccessful in this table. Third-parties should therefore avoid the use of the same strategy in successive interventions.

significantly away from the use of strategies that most recently failed. Once again, the evidence does not generally support the hypothesis' prediction.

Across the entire spectrum of strategies, Table 4.11 reveals that third parties frequently reuse strategies that recently failed to productively manage a conflict. For example, after a verbal intervention failed to achieve its purpose (that is, to stop the fighting, encourage negotiations, or produce a troop withdrawal), the model predicts that third-parties will use another verbal strategy in the next intervention 65.1% of the time. This estimate is statistically significantly higher than the estimates associated with the use of *any other strategy* that might immediately follow a failed verbal intervention (row one of Table 4.11). Such a finding demonstrates that third-parties are more likely to repeat verbal strategies when they fail than to alter their intervention behavior.

This cyclical tendency of verbal interventions appeared earlier (see the discussion of the cost model), but Tables 4.10 and 4.11 provide greater insight about it. After a verbal intervention, third-parties generally intervene again verbally in the dispute. This behavior appears regardless of the success of the previous intervention. Yet the cycling behavior seems slightly stronger after an *unsuccessful* verbal intervention than after a *successful* one (compare the first cells of Table 4.10 and 4.11).<sup>45</sup> In other words, when verbal pleas fail to stop the fighting, secure a troop withdrawal, or encourage negotiations, third-parties generally ask again. They are unwilling to increase their involvement in managing the dispute until a verbal plea can somewhat tame the conflict (for example, by stopping the violence). For example, when the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) intervened in a dispute between Guyana and Suriname in 2000, they issued a verbal plea for negotiations before mediating the dispute a few weeks later.

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<sup>45</sup> The confidence intervals of the first cells of Tables 4.10 and 4.11 overlap, which suggests that they might be identical. Notice, however, that after a successful verbal intervention, a third-party is just as likely to try a verbal plea as they are to mediate (see above). After a failed verbal strategy, a third-party is more likely to try another plea than *any other strategy*. This suggests that the cyclical tendency is stronger after a failed verbal intervention.

More than likely, such behavior occurs because third-parties are waiting for a signal that more costly interventions might succeed. Verbal pleas offer a low-cost way to receive such a signal from the disputants. If the violence stops, a troop withdrawal occurs, or the parties begin (even bilateral) negotiations as a result of a verbal intervention, third-parties may believe that there is an increased opportunity for effective conflict management (Zartman 2000). Returning to the Guyana-Suriname dispute, the disputants did not escalate their violence (that is, either fight or increase their demonstration of force) after CARICOM's plea, which may have indicated to the organization that the disputants were ready for mediation.<sup>46</sup>

Cycling is not unique to verbal interventions, however. A similar phenomenon occurs after a failed mediation. Third-parties return to mediation immediately after a failed mediation 50.2% of the time. To be fair, they are equally likely to turn to verbal strategies as they are to return to mediation ( $pr = 0.373$ ; the confidence intervals overlap). Yet even if this is true, it still suggests that third-parties are not specifically *avoiding* the use of the failed mediation strategy. In fact, third-parties are more likely to follow a failed mediation with another mediation than they are to use either legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies in the next intervention. During a dispute between Uganda and Sudan in 1996-1997, for example, Iran tried to mediate repeatedly (and successively), even though its efforts did not yield meaningful results. Quite simply, when a mediation fails, third-parties often try again.

Finally, intervention behavior that follows a failed administrative or peace operations intervention supplies weak evidence of learning (as defined previously). Immediately after one of these two strategies fail (rows four and five of Table 4.11), third-parties select another administrative ( $pr = 0.187$  and  $pr = 0.095$  in rows four and five respectively) or peace operation

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<sup>46</sup> The parties had been escalating their show of force just prior to CARICOM's plea. Thus, there was a clear change of behavior after the plea. This is not to say that the plea *caused* the behavioral change, only that CARICOM could interpret the behavioral change as a signal given the timing of its intervention.

( $pr = 0.318$  and  $pr = 0.069$  respectively) frequently. Yet neither of these strategies is their consistently preferred behavior; instead, third-parties are either (statistically significantly) more likely to use mediation than any other strategy (as after a failed administrative intervention) or just as likely to mediate as to repeat the previously failed strategy (as after a failed peace operation). This evidence supports the claims advanced in the learning model, as third-parties significantly alter their behavior after a failed administrative or peace operation intervention. Yet their use of the previous failed strategy is not entirely negligible (it may be as much as 32%), they may be equally likely to use the failed and an alternative strategy (as after a failed peace operation) and the switch to mediation can be better explained by a competing model (the limited commitments model).

If the evidence contained in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 does not provide strong, consistent support for the learning model, what does it reveal about the relative merits of the other competing theoretical models? Looking across these two tables, a number of patterns are conspicuous. First, the findings clearly support the limited commitments model (Hypothesis 1f). A stark precipice exists once again between the use of verbal and mediation strategies on the one hand and the use of legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies on the other.<sup>47</sup> In fact, the likelihood with which third-parties employ mediation remains statistically significantly higher than the use of other strategies across many rows of the tables. One can therefore safely conclude that third-parties return to mediation often. According to the limited commitments model, third-parties do this because mediation offers them a nice balance between getting meaningfully involved in a dispute's resolution and limiting the costs associated with their involvement. Thus, third-parties pay less attention to the success and failure of the previous intervention than they do to balancing their competing interests.

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<sup>47</sup> The precipice becomes less clear after a failed administrative intervention. See Table 4.11.

Second, more costly strategies are not always employed less frequently than the lower cost strategies. The easiest way to reach this conclusion involves comparing the first (least costly) and fifth (most costly) columns of each table. For example, in Table 4.10, third-parties follow a successful mediation with a verbal intervention 32% of the time; in contrast, they turn to peace operations 20% of the time in such situations. Despite these different estimates, the results also suggest that third-parties are *equally likely* to use a verbal strategy as they are to deploy a peace operation following a successful mediation (the confidence intervals overlap). Similar findings obtain after successful legal, administrative, and peace operations (the third-fifth rows of Table 4.10), as well as after failed administrative and peace operations (the fourth and fifth rows of Table 4.11). These findings therefore provide the clearest evidence against two predictions of the pure cost model: that third-parties escalate their involvement over the course of a trajectory (Hypothesis 1a) and that relatively less costly strategies are used more frequently than higher cost alternatives (Hypothesis 1b).

Finally, Tables 4.10 and 4.11 demonstrate that the random model wrongly predicts third-party behavior (that is, the data undermine Hypothesis 3). The previous two points mention specific patterns found within the data. Furthermore, although evidence in favor of the learning model is not substantial, it does receive some weak empirical support. Each of these conclusions suggests that third-party intervention behavior is not entirely random. Statistical patterns do exist within the data, and these patterns seem consistent with at least one of the theoretical explanations – particularly the limited commitments model.

### Variation across Third-Party Actor Types

After examining the general results, I next construct a series of models that attempt to examine how the general results change (if at all) as a result of third-party characteristics. I begin with the models containing all three types of third-party actors, which appear in Table 4.12. Each model contained in the table covers the entire time period of the study (1946-2001) and excludes the three outlier disputes. Model 10 presents results regardless of the success obtained in the previous intervention, while Models 11 and 12 consider third-party behavior after previously successful and unsuccessful interventions respectfully. The reference category with respect to third-party actor type is state interventions.

At first glance, these models do not appear impressive, as many coefficients fail to achieve statistical significance. The reported coefficients are once again misleading, however. As noted earlier, the coefficients of the ordered probit model cannot be interpreted directly (Greene 2008). Furthermore, the interaction terms require one to consider linear combinations of coefficients, rather than the direct coefficients reported in the model's output (see also Epstein et al 2006).<sup>48</sup> Once one considers such linear combinations, the coefficients are significant in many cases. For example, IGO intervention behavior differs from states after a verbal intervention.<sup>49</sup> Similar effects can be found for other linear combinations of variables throughout the table. Because of this, I stress that any conclusions about third-party intervention decisions cannot be drawn from Table 4.12 directly. Rather, such conclusions require an examination of the

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<sup>48</sup> This occurs because of the way that the Y\* variables are coded (see Chapter 3). An example will illustrate this point. In Model 10, all of the coefficients associated with IGO intervention (direct and interactive) are statistically insignificant. After a verbal intervention, however, all Y\* variables are coded 1 (that is,  $Y^*1=Y^*3=Y^*4=1$ ). Therefore, to ascertain IGO intervention behavior after a verbal intervention, one must sum all of the IGO coefficients ( $IGO+IGO*Y^*1+IGO*Y^*3+IGO*Y^*4$ ) and test the significance of the summed coefficient. In this case, the summed coefficient is 0.0904, and it is statistically significant (standard error=0.201;  $p<0.000$ ).

<sup>49</sup> This is the only information that can be gleaned from the coefficients. More precise descriptions of third-party behavior require additional analysis. I conduct such an analysis below.

likelihood with which third-parties use each of the strategies, conditional on the prior intervention.

With this in mind, Table 4.13 provides the detailed information about third-party behavior that underlies Model 10 (Table 4.12). To recover these probabilities, I set all coefficients at their modal values. Thus, the probabilities refer to a conflict that does not contain a major state disputant or involve an enduring rivalry between disputants.<sup>50</sup> These dispute-level characteristics remain constant in Tables 4.13-4.15. This allows me to uncover changes in intervention behavior that result from the identity of the third-party, rather than from changes in dispute characteristics. Table 4.13 provides information on third-party states, while Tables 4.14 and 4.15 supply statistics about third-party coalition and IGO behavior respectively.

Upon reviewing and comparing Tables 4.13-4.15, four conclusions stand out. First, the differences between third-party actors are minimal once a trajectory begins. Third-party states are more likely than coalitions and IGOs to use verbal strategies after a verbal intervention (see below for more on this); they are also less likely to turn to peace operations at that time. After more costly interventions, however, the distinction between unilateral and multilateral interventions weakens and eventually dissipates. For example, after a mediation or legal strategy, states are more likely than coalitions to intervene verbally in a dispute and less likely than coalitions to employ a peace operation (see the second and third rows of each table). Yet a similar difference does not exist statistically between states and IGOs after a mediation or legal intervention. There is then no statistically significant difference between the behavior of third-

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<sup>50</sup> Additional control variables used in the modeling include whether or not the dispute was over territory and the relative capabilities of the disputants. These did not change the results. Therefore, to conserve degrees of freedom in the models, as well as to save space in the tables, I do not report models containing these variables in Tables 4.12 and 4.16.

party states, coalitions, or IGOs following an administrative or peace operations strategy. Each turns most frequently to either a verbal plea or mediation.

Second, as noted above, states more often resort to verbal strategies successively than do organizations or coalitions. For example, during a dispute between China and the Philippines in 1995 over the Spratly Islands in 1995, a handful of states (the United States, Malaysia, Japan, and Indonesia) issued successive verbal pleas for negotiations. The same pattern emerged during a dispute between the same parties in 1999 – with one exception. In this latter dispute, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (an organization) mediated after the United States requested the parties to pursue diplomatic conflict management mechanisms, but ASEAN itself did not issue verbal pleas.

The results presented in Tables 4.13-4.15 suggest that third-party states' recurring reliance on verbal pleas is not unique to the China-Philippines dispute. More broadly, after a verbal intervention occurs, states will resort to verbal strategies again 70% of the time (the first row, first column of Table 4.10). In similar situations, coalitions and IGOs employ verbal strategies 39% and 35% of the time respectively (see the first row, first column of Tables 4.11 and 4.12 respectively). The difference between state behavior on the one hand and coalition and IGO behavior on the other is statistically significant, and it suggests that the cyclical tendency of verbal interventions noted earlier derives primarily from the behavior of third-party *states*. Such a finding also supports the logic of the pure cost and limited commitments models. Since verbal interventions cost the least and states bear the full costs of their unilateral interventions, they employ verbal strategies repeatedly and reserve more costly interventions for the multilateral banner.

Third, the likelihood of a coalition or organization performing a peace operation does not generally depend significantly on the prior intervention strategy used.<sup>51</sup> This implies that third-party organizations and coalitions may not always deploy a peace operation immediately upon the coattails of a mediated, arbitrated, or adjudicated agreement.<sup>52</sup> Yet a review of the descriptive statistics also reveals that they do not try to deploy peace operations as early as possible in a trajectory either. In fact, it is quite rare for a peace operation to begin a trajectory (n = 4).<sup>53</sup> I therefore suspect that this finding has to do with the length of time required for a third-party to authorize and organize a peace operation. While the authorization and deployment process unfolds, other interventions appear between mediated agreements and the peace operations, making it seem as though peace operations do not follow them. Thus, it might be true that peace operations deploy in response to mediated agreements, but these deployments do not *come next* in the trajectory.

As an illustration of this possibility, I return to the dispute between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighbors (Uganda and Rwanda). The disputing states signed the Lusaka Accords in July 1999. These accords envisioned a joint military commission (JMC), which was to be supported financially and logistically by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Zambia, and South Africa. Before the JMC began meeting in October 1999, however, the DRC filed suit against Uganda in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Thus, the ICJ intervention interrupts the agreement that produced the JMC (the Lusaka accords) and the intervention of the JMC within the trajectory. Because it takes time to create and deploy a peace

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<sup>51</sup> The one exception to this occurs after an administrative intervention. Coalitions are *more* likely to use a peace operation in such scenarios than after any other intervention strategy.

<sup>52</sup> A peace operation usually requires a cease-fire to precede its deployment. This cease-fire may result from either bilateral negotiations or third-party intervention. Such a question deserves attention in the future. For now, I simply note that peace operations do not immediately follow a mediation or legal strategy (that is, in the next intervention after the mediation or legal one).

<sup>53</sup> Only the United Nations deploys a peace operation at the beginning of a trajectory.

operation, other interventions may prevent the peace operation from immediately following the agreement that produced it.<sup>54</sup>

Finally, the conclusions reached earlier about the competing hypotheses hold within these models as well. Third parties do not escalate their involvement over the life of a trajectory. They instead frequently employ less costly strategies after higher cost ones (see the lower rows of Tables 4.13-4.15). Third-parties are also not always less likely to use higher cost strategies than lower cost strategies. For example, third-party IGOs are equally likely to use a peace operation (the most costly strategy) as they are to use a verbal strategy (the least costly strategy) after a mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations intervention (see the lowest four rows of Table 4.15). In other words, in most cases, IGOs resort as often to cheaper interventions as they do to more costly ones. This may occur because it is easier for the IGO to achieve consensus on the deployment of an impartial peace operation than on a resolution that might display biased language. Regardless of the reason for the findings, however, they suggest once again that the pure cost model's predictions are largely inaccurate (see Hypothesis 1a and 1b).

The findings also support the earlier conclusions on the limited commitments model. It seems again that a clear precipice exists between verbal and mediation strategies on the one hand and legal, administrative, and peace operations on the other (Hypothesis 1f). Generally, third-parties prefer to resort to verbal or mediation strategies, as opposed to the more costly strategies. This preference is often (though not always) statistically significant and remains robust to changes in the identity of the third-party (thereby supporting Hypothesis 1g). For example, IGOs are statistically more likely to follow a mediation, legal, or peace operations intervention with

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<sup>54</sup> A similar situation happened with the United Nations (UN) in this dispute. The UN created a peace operation (MONUC) for the DRC in November 1999, but did not authorize the deployment of that operation until February 2000. Before the deployment was authorized, Zambia presided over a regional summit that addressed the conflict in the DRC (a form of mediation). Thus, Zambia's intervention appeared between when the UN signaled its desire to intervene and when it actually did so.

mediation. This allows them to remain actively involved in the management of the dispute (which requires them to undertake more than a verbal intervention) while also limiting the costs of their involvement. States behave similarly after all but administrative interventions (Table 4.10). The findings are less clear with respect to coalitions, primarily because there are less data points involving this type of third-party (and therefore, the confidence intervals around the estimates widen substantially). Despite this limitation, however, the results underscore the tendency of third-parties to return regularly to verbal interventions and mediation, as well as their hesitancy to move to more costly strategies.

Finally, although the limited commitment model receives additional empirical support, the learning model does not. Models 11 and 12 of Table 4.12 present third-party behavior after successful and unsuccessful interventions respectively. Reviewing the probability transition matrices associated with these models (not shown), I discover that the failure to learn noted above does not depend on any one type of third-party actor. Neither states, coalitions, nor organizations significantly repeat recently successful strategies or significantly avoid recently unsuccessful ones. Instead, they often return to verbal and mediation strategies (as noted above). This undercuts the logic of the learning model (Hypothesis 2a), while also providing additional evidence in favor of the limited commitments model.

### **Variation across Third-Party States**

The analysis presented above assumes that state actors all behave similarly. Yet there are a number of reasons to suspect that differences in state intervention behavior depend upon certain state characteristics. For example, major states might intervene differently than minor states, as might those states either allied or contiguous to at least one of the disputants. I

therefore consider this possibility in Models 13-15 (Table 4.16). These models include only the current interventions (that is, at *t*) performed by states. As before, the models in Table 4.16 encompass the entire temporal domain of the study (1946-2001) and exclude the three outlying disputes.

Tables 4.17-4.20 provide the detailed information about third-party behavior that underlies Model 13 (Table 4.16). To recover these probabilities, I set all coefficients at their modal values. Thus, the probabilities refer to a conflict that does not contain a major state disputant or involve an enduring rivalry between disputants. I then vary the characteristics of the third-party state across Tables 4.17-4.20. Table 4.17 contains the modal third-party state – one that is a minor state and neither allied nor contiguous to the disputants. Table 4.18 then considers major states, while Tables 4.19 and 4.20 examine the behavior of states that are allied or contiguous to the disputants respectively.

After reviewing and comparing these tables, I find only one instance in which a state-level characteristic altered intervention behavior. Following an administrative intervention, third-party states allied to at least one disputant are significantly less likely to mediate ( $pr = 0.341$ ) than their non-allied counterparts ( $pr = 0.643$ ). In every other situation, third-party states behave similarly in trajectories, regardless of their individual characteristics. This may result from selection into the trajectory. For example, if major states are more likely than minor states to intervene in the first place (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Frazier 2006), perhaps they are the only states involved in trajectories. Yet this seems unlikely, as I find many instances in which minor states intervene, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (for example, Libya). In the

end, these results suggest that once a trajectory begins, intervention decisions do not vary significantly according to state-level characteristics.<sup>55</sup>

Although the findings contained throughout Tables 4.17-4.20 do not uncover variation within the behavior of third-party states, they do reaffirm the conclusions reached earlier. First, the pure cost model receives weak support. States generally prefer to use less costly strategies, but their involvement does not escalate throughout the trajectory (contrary to Hypothesis 1a). For example, after an administrative or peace operations intervention, states employ mediation (for minor states,  $pr = 0.643$ ) more often than any other strategy, and this difference is statistically significant. Because low cost strategies regularly follow high cost ones (as when mediation follows an administrative intervention), third-parties do not seem to escalate their involvement over the course of a dispute (from low cost to high cost strategies).

Second, states do not always rely on relatively less costly strategies more often than the high cost alternatives (as predicted by the pure cost model, Hypothesis 1b). As before, the clearest evidence against this hypothesis emerges when third-parties fail to distinguish between the least and most costly strategies. Tables 4.17-4.20 indicate that such failures occur often. After an administrative or peace operation, for example, minor states are equally likely to employ a peace operation as they are to verbally intervene in the dispute (see the fourth and fifth row of Table 4.17; the confidence intervals within the verbal and peace operations columns overlap one another). Major states, allies, and contiguous third-parties exhibit similar behavior. Thus, even when it is easiest for third-parties to distinguish between the relative costs of strategies (that is,

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<sup>55</sup> States do not intervene in disputes using legal strategies during this time period. Despite this fact, legal strategies are available to third-party states, and they have employed them frequently throughout history (see Chapter 2). It seems, however, that they rely on the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and similar institutions for legal interventions in the post-World War II era. I hasten to note that this empirical pattern does not affect my analysis. More specifically, since the mediation and legal categories collapse in the models, the Markov chain remains ergodic (Gill 2006).

when they are choosing between the least and most costly strategies), third-parties do not always employ more costly strategies less often than their lower cost counterparts.

Third, the evidence contained in Tables 4.17-4.20 generally supports the limited commitments model (Hypothesis 1g). States regularly turn to verbal and mediation strategies more often than higher cost strategies, regardless of the previous strategy used. For example, minor states are always more likely to use mediation than legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies (Table 4.17); these same states are also more likely to use verbal strategies than legal, administrative, and peace operations in many cases. The findings become less clear for other third-party states (Tables 4.18-4.20). The state actors found within these latter tables habitually employ verbal and mediation strategies at high rates, but the estimates cannot always be distinguished from the higher cost strategies (particularly peace operations). Despite this, I note that variation in state level characteristics did not significantly alter the data presented in Table 4.17, which suggests that similar findings to those contained within this table may prevail within Tables 4.18-4.20 as well.<sup>56</sup>

Finally, the learning model again received no empirical support (Models 14-15; probability transition matrices not shown). States are not more likely to repeat recently successful strategies than to try something different in the next intervention. They are also not more likely to change strategies when one recently fails than they are to repeat the failed strategy (Hypothesis 2). It therefore seems that states do not learn in the way predicted by the learning model presented in Chapter 2. I return to this point in the concluding chapter.

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<sup>56</sup> I compared corresponding cells of Tables 4.18-4.20 with Table 4.17 to discern whether state-level characteristics change state intervention behavior. The confidence intervals of corresponding cells almost always overlap, which suggests that the estimates across the tables may be identical.

## Summary

As a result of this analysis, what have we learned about third-party intervention behavior and the relative merits of the competing theoretical models that seek to explain it? Table 4.21 summarizes the findings for each prediction made in Chapter 2. As the table demonstrates, the results contained in this chapter provide evidence most consistent with the limited commitments model (and, to a lesser extent, the pure cost model). Across the general models (and each of their variants), a precipice continually emerges, and it is robust to changes in third-party characteristics. Third-parties use verbal and mediation strategies more frequently than more costly alternatives, and these tendencies are often statistically significant. Such results suggest that third-parties pay attention to costs, but will not escalate their involvement linearly or indefinitely. Faced with limited resources and competing interests, third-parties must instead determine a boundary beyond which they are unwilling to invest further in the productive management of a conflict. This boundary appears between the mediation and legal strategies; generally speaking, third-parties hesitate to incur greater costs than those associated with mediation.

In contrast to the limited commitments model, the pure cost model did not fare well. I find that third-parties do not regularly escalate their involvement in disputes from the use of relatively less costly strategies to more costly ones. Furthermore, third-parties do not even use less costly strategies more frequently than the higher cost alternatives. This suggests that third-parties factor more than a simple cost comparison into their intervention decision calculus. The limited commitments model hints at what else third-parties might consider. It proposes that third-parties balance their interest in meaningful intervention with a desire *to restrain costs*. Thus, in practical terms, it is not that third-parties make simple cost comparisons between any two

strategies at their disposal, but that they care about comparing the costs between strategies *no more costly than* mediation and those that exceed the costs of mediation.

Despite these shortcomings, the pure cost model did receive some empirical support. It accurately forecasts that organizations and coalitions will begin their involvement in trajectories with a more costly strategy than states. It also correctly predicts that simultaneous interventions almost always results from multilateral action. Finally, the cost model proposes that states will attempt overlapping interventions, particularly during an IGO-led ongoing intervention. Each of these suggests that the cost model has some merit, even if some of its central predictions remain unsupported. I therefore attempt to reconcile these results with the limited commitments model in the conclusion of this work.

Finally, the empirical evidence consistently undermines two other competing theoretical models: the learning model and the random model. With respect to the former, third-parties do not regularly pay attention to the success of a previous intervention when deciding what to do next in a trajectory. They do not retain strategies that recently succeeded or replace strategies that recently failed with any statistical regularity. Furthermore, third-parties often do not wait for an intervention to end before beginning a new one. This provides the strongest evidence against the learning model. It is not merely that third-parties fail to learn from the previous intervention when deciding what to do next, but that they often chose not to have an *opportunity* to learn because they intervene before the success of the prior intervention can be known. To be fair, the conflicts in which this occurs may demand additional intervention before a prior intervention ends. This, however, does not change the fact that learning does not occur as the model predicts.

In addition to undercutting the learning model's predictions, the results provide a clear indication that the random model is inaccurate. Evidence of random behavior can emerge either

when there are no statistical patterns within the data (that is, third-parties never distinguish between the use of strategies) or when those results that do appear cannot be explained by theoretical expectations. Neither is true here. Each of the models suggests that there are statistical patterns behind third-party interventions within trajectories, thereby negating the claim that intervention strategies are entirely interchangeable in the eyes of third-parties. Furthermore, these statistical patterns find explanation (and therefore, meaning) in the limited commitments and pure cost models. It seems that there is “a method to the madness” of intervention within trajectories.

The aggregation of the results contained in Table 4.21 suggests that intervention need not be thought about entirely in terms of the identity of the third-party. Unfortunately, such thinking has been a common theme in the conflict management literature, and has led to questions about which states are most likely to mediate, where United Nations peacekeepers go, and so on. My analysis indicates, however, that third-parties do not make drastically different intervention decisions according to their own identity. Rather, intervention (and therefore, conflict management) can be thought of a process that applies similarly to all types of third-parties. If nothing else, such a finding should encourage conflict management scholars to think about how all third-parties work together to manage a conflict, instead of how specific types of third-parties behave independently of the others.

The remainder of this work details the practical implications of my findings. In the next chapter, I explore how the models presented earlier can inform policy decisions about intervention. I also demonstrate that the theoretical arguments contained in Chapter 2 exist in practice, even if they receive limited empirical support in a large-n analysis. For example, although the learning model received no support in the above models, there is evidence that

actors do learn within specific disputes. It is therefore wrong to reject the learning model in its entirety; although it may not be most prevalent across all disputes and actors, it can explain some intervention behavior. I therefore provide empirical examples consistent with each theoretical model, regardless of the support it received in this chapter. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I synthesize the theoretical and policy contributions and answer a series of questions related to their importance. For example, why does it matter if there's a threshold to third-party involvement? Does this threshold imply more than that third-parties are simply reluctant to deploy troops? With these larger questions in mind, I now turn to the more practical side of trajectories.

## Tables

**Table 4.1: Third-Party Conflict Management within Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1946-2001**

Number of Interventions	Number of Disputes Experiencing <i>at Least</i> This Level of Intervention	Probability of Reaching at Least This Level of Intervention
0	1,286	0.8438
1 (or more)	238	0.1562
2 (or more)	128	0.0840
3 (or more)	90	0.0591
4 (or more)	62	0.0407
5 (or more)	53	0.0348
6 (or more)	43	0.0282
7 (or more)	30	0.0197
8 (or more)	26	0.0171
9 (or more)	23	0.0151
10 (or more)	16	0.0105
11 (or more)	14	0.0092

**Table 4.2: Strategy Use within Trajectories, 1946-2001**

	All Trajectory-Level Observations (Column Percent)	Excluding Outlying Disputes (Column Percent)
Verbal	1,779 (67.41%)	497 (47.47%)
Mediation	678 (25.69%)	412 (39.35%)
Legal	20 (0.76%)	20 (1.91%)
Administrative	55 (2.08%)	31 (2.96%)
Peace Operations	107 (4.06%)	87 (8.31%)
Total	2,639	1,047

**Table 4.3: Conflict Management Behavior by Third-Party Type**

<i>Intervening Party</i>	<i>State</i>		<i>Coalition</i>		<i>IGO</i>	
	First	Highest	First	Highest	First	Highest
Average	1.43	1.94	1.97	2.62	1.83	2.69
Median	1	2	2	2	2	2
Mode	1	2	2	2	1	2

Notes: Numbers correspond to category values on the dependent variable, where 1=verbal, 2=mediation, 3=legal, 4=adminstrative, and 5=peace operations.

**Table 4.4: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, 1946-2001**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Time Period</i>	1946-2001	1946-2001	1946-1989	1990-2001	1946-2001	1946-1989	1990-2001
<i>Data</i>	All	Without outliers	Without outliers	Without outliers	First trajectory	First trajectory	First trajectory
<i>Previous Strategy Used</i>							
Y*1	-0.723*** (0.206)	-0.639*** (0.227)	-0.368 (0.300)	-1.041*** (0.224)	-0.934*** (0.135)	-0.793*** (0.203)	-1.087*** (0.165)
Y*2	-	-	-	-0.788*** (0.271)	-	-	-
Y*3	-0.383** (0.184)	-0.541*** (0.209)	-0.356 (0.308)	-	-	-	-
Y*4	-	0.505* (0.261)	0.242 (0.379)	0.827* (0.421)	-	-	-
<i>Parameters</i>							
Cut 1	-0.332	-0.433	-0.395	-0.530	-0.610	-0.368	-0.548
Cut 2	0.746	0.084	0.805	0.893	0.709	0.892	0.830
Cut 3	0.803	0.928	0.908	0.975	0.781	0.983	0.884
Cut 4	1.035	1.135	1.068	1.283	1.023	1.128	1.238
<i>Model Information</i>							
Obs.	2,432	872	504	368	678	343	335
$\chi^2$	14.66***	22.35***	4.69	43.93***	49.09***	15.20***	43.20***
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.057	0.042	0.016	0.107	0.074	0.054	0.097

Notes: \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID).

**Table 4.5: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 1 (from Table 4.4)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.773 (0.627-0.888)	0.193 (0.093-0.312)	0.004 (0.000-0.009)	0.013 (0.003-0.028)	0.017 (0.008-0.031)
	Mediation	0.523 (0.379-0.680)	0.346 (0.246-0.441)	0.012 (0.001-0.025)	0.039 (0.013-0.068)	0.080 (0.037-0.137)
	Legal	0.523 (0.379-0.680)	0.346 (0.246-0.441)	0.012 (0.001-0.025)	0.039 (0.013-0.068)	0.080 (0.037-0.137)
	Administrative	0.374 (0.248-0.512)	0.396 (0.326-0.467)	0.017 (0.001-0.035)	0.058 (0.022-0.097)	0.155 (0.065-0.273)
	Peace Operations	0.374 (0.248-0.512)	0.396 (0.326-0.467)	0.017 (0.001-0.035)	0.058 (0.022-0.097)	0.155 (0.065-0.273)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.6: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 2 (from Table 4.4)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.597 (0.503-0.689)	0.335 (0.267-0.408)	0.011 (0.002-0.022)	0.019 (0.008-0.034)	0.038 (0.013-0.082)
	Mediation	0.348 (0.244-0.457)	0.458 (0.377-0.542)	0.025 (0.003-0.048)	0.047 (0.017-0.080)	0.122 (0.090-0.159)
	Legal	0.348 (0.244-0.457)	0.458 (0.377-0.542)	0.025 (0.003-0.048)	0.047 (0.017-0.080)	0.122 (0.090-0.159)
	Administrative	0.179 (0.083-0.300)	0.445 (0.351-0.527)	0.035 (0.005-0.066)	0.071 (0.026-0.121)	0.270 (0.152-0.422)
	Peace Operations	0.335 (0.164-0.529)	0.454 (0.352-0.540)	0.027 (0.002-0.056)	0.050 (0.015-0.093)	0.135 (0.067-0.229)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.7: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 3 (from Table 4.4)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.537 (0.427-0.642)	0.361 (0.293-0.428)	0.016 (-0.003-0.032)	0.021 (0.003-0.044)	0.065 (0.021-0.148)
	Mediation	0.390 (0.245-0.537)	0.426 (0.331-0.513)	0.027 (-0.003-0.064)	0.036 (0.003-0.076)	0.121 (0.082-0.166)
	Legal	0.390 (0.245-0.537)	0.426 (0.331-0.513)	0.027 (-0.003-0.064)	0.036 (0.003-0.076)	0.121 (0.082-0.166)
	Administrative	0.271 (0.111-0.470)	0.433 (0.349-0.511)	0.034 (-0.003-0.080)	0.048 (0.005-0.096)	0.213 (0.087-0.397)
	Peace Operations	0.349 (0.165-0.572)	0.429 (0.323-0.512)	0.031 (-0.002-0.078)	0.041 (0.004-0.087)	0.149 (0.071-0.259)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.8: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 4 (from Table 4.4)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.680 (0.550-0.794)	0.290 (0.175-0.420)	0.005 (-0.001-0.015)	0.013 (0.002-0.028)	0.011 (0.005-0.020)
	Mediation	0.283 (0.179-0.396)	0.516 (0.385-0.639)	0.021 (-0.005-0.043)	0.067 (0.014-0.133)	0.112 (0.054-0.200)
	Legal	0.283 (0.179-0.396)	0.516 (0.385-0.639)	0.021 (-0.005-0.043)	0.067 (0.014-0.133)	0.112 (0.054-0.200)
	Administrative	0.095 (0.026-0.209)	0.431 (0.267-0.581)	0.031 (-0.006-0.071)	0.112 (0.022-0.207)	0.331 (0.160-0.544)
	Peace Operations	0.323 (0.061-0.692)	0.467 (0.267-0.617)	0.020 (-0.003-0.052)	0.063 (0.006-0.159)	0.127 (0.009-0.397)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.9: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, 1946-2001 (Outliers Excluded; Variation on Model 2)**

	Model 8	Model 9
<i>Restrictions</i>	After successful intervention	After unsuccessful intervention
<i>Previous Strategy Used</i>		
Y*1	-0.428 (0.319)	-0.718*** (0.179)
Y*3	-0.241 (0.237)	0.350*** (0.350)
Y*4	0.366 (0.315)	1.034** (0.457)
<i>Parameters</i>		
Cut 1	-0.349	-0.616
Cut 2	0.794	0.869
Cut 3	0.869	1.016
Cut 4	0.990	1.531
<i>Model Information</i>		
Obs.	393	479
$\chi^2$	8.45**	54.57***
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.065

Notes: \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID).

**Table 4.10: Probability Transition Matrix after Successful Intervention (Model 8, Table 4.9)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.481 (0.357-0.602)	0.376 (0.300-0.452)	0.016 (-0.007-0.042)	0.021 (0.008-0.038)	0.106 (0.037-0.220)
	Mediation	0.321 (0.188-0.476)	0.423 (0.325-0.514)	0.025 (-0.007-0.065)	0.035 (0.008-0.065)	0.196 (0.134-0.274)
	Legal	0.321 (0.188-0.476)	0.423 (0.325-0.514)	0.025 (-0.007-0.065)	0.035 (0.008-0.065)	0.196 (0.134-0.274)
	Administrative	0.241 (0.132-0.382)	0.419 (0.329-0.513)	0.027 (-0.010-0.068)	0.040 (0.011-0.073)	0.272 (0.164-0.410)
	Peace Operations	0.372 (0.159-0.614)	0.406 (0.279-0.510)	0.023 (-0.006-0.066)	0.031 (0.007-0.065)	0.167 (0.068-0.305)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.11: Probability Transition Matrix after Unsuccessful Intervention (Model 9, Table 4.9)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.651 (0.553-0.746)	0.317 (0.233-0.403)	0.009 (0.001-0.020)	0.016 (0.005-0.032)	0.007 (0.002-0.017)
	Mediation	0.373 (0.279-0.475)	0.502 (0.421-0.576)	0.026 (0.005-0.048)	0.061 (0.019-0.108)	0.037 (0.016-0.071)
	Legal	0.373 (0.279-0.475)	0.502 (0.421-0.576)	0.026 (0.005-0.048)	0.061 (0.019-0.108)	0.037 (0.016-0.071)
	Administrative	0.059 (0.010-0.166)	0.380 (0.209-0.519)	0.055 (0.008-0.102)	0.187 (0.063-0.302)	0.318 (0.133-0.554)
	Peace Operations	0.279 (0.113-0.470)	0.520 (0.429-0.595)	0.036 (0.005-0.076)	0.095 (0.018-0.204)	0.069 (0.018-0.160)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.12: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, All Third-Party Actors, 1946-2001 (Outliers Excluded)**

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
<i>Restrictions</i>	None	After successful intervention	After unsuccessful intervention
<i>Variables</i>			
Y*1	-0.621*** (0.233)	-0.508* (0.250)	-0.525 (0.323)
Y*3	-1.234** (0.582)	-0.477 (0.362)	-0.956 (0.855)
Y*4	1.000** (0.470)	-	-
IGO	0.337 (0.382)	-0.147 (0.280)	0.121 (0.535)
IGO*(Y*1)	0.323 (0.295)	0.402 (0.285)	0.095 (0.356)
IGO*(Y*3)	0.571 (0.541)	0.598 (0.369)	0.660 (0.714)
IGO*(Y*4)	-0.327 (0.589)	-	-
Coalition	1.468** (0.605)	1.276*** (0.454)	1.651*** (0.607)
Coalition*(Y*1)	-0.674* (0.390)	-0.294 (0.617)	-1.037 (0.649)
Coalition*(Y*3)	0.016 (0.749)	-	-
Disputing Major State	-1.099 (0.710)	-0.902 (0.604)	-1.383 (1.038)
Disputing Major State*(Y*1)	0.242 (0.374)	0.763* (0.453)	-0.463 (0.339)
Disputing Major State*(Y*3)	0.704 (0.640)	0.090 (0.454)	1.623 (1.117)
Disputing Major State*(Y*4)	0.064 (0.737)	-	-
Enduring Rivalry Disputants	0.283 (0.427)	0.273 (0.470)	0.271 (0.549)
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*1)	-0.403 (0.306)	-0.510 (0.350)	-0.292 (0.348)
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*3)	0.164 (0.644)	-0.227 (0.454)	-0.415 (0.617)
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*4)	-0.455 (0.562)	-	-
<i>Model Information</i>			
Obs.	872	393	479
$\chi^2$	204.20***	49.38***	90.91***
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.108	0.083	0.131

Notes: \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID); to save space, parameterized cut points are not reported in this table.

**Table 4.13: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 10 (from Table 4.12; Third-Party State)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.699 (0.576-0.814)	0.272 (0.171-0.380)	0.006 (0.000-0.014)	0.009 (0.003-0.019)	0.013 (0.004-0.028)
	Mediation	0.466 (0.307-0.639)	0.434 (0.311-0.538)	0.016 (0.002-0.033)	0.028 (0.011-0.054)	0.056 (0.017-0.123)
	Legal	0.466 (0.307-0.639)	0.434 (0.311-0.538)	0.016 (0.002-0.033)	0.028 (0.011-0.054)	0.056 (0.017-0.123)
	Administrative	0.114 (0.010-0.359)	0.401 (0.155-0.547)	0.037 (0.003-0.074)	0.079 (0.026-0.139)	0.369 (0.076-0.748)
	Peace Operations	0.376 (0.157-0.631)	0.461 (0.335-0.540)	0.022 (0.002-0.054)	0.041 (0.009-0.095)	0.100 (0.014-0.276)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.14: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 10 (from Table 4.12; Third-Party Coalition)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.388 (0.202-0.570)	0.469 (0.363-0.557)	0.023 (0.001-0.054)	0.039 (0.013-0.072)	0.082 (0.027-0.183)
	Mediation	0.074 (0.008-0.255)	0.352 (0.133-0.531)	0.037 (0.003-0.071)	0.084 (0.030-0.141)	0.453 (0.147-0.772)
	Legal	0.074 (0.008-0.255)	0.352 (0.133-0.531)	0.037 (0.003-0.071)	0.084 (0.030-0.141)	0.453 (0.147-0.772)
	Administrative	0.014 (0.000-0.110)	0.122 (0.001-0.477)	0.019 (0.000-0.058)	0.051 (0.001-0.136)	0.794 (0.269-0.998)
	Peace Operations	0.071 (0.001-0.344)	0.304 (0.035-0.550)	0.033 (0.002-0.071)	0.073 (0.011-0.134)	0.519 (0.072-0.942)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.15: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 10 (from Table 4.12; Third-Party IGO)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.354 (0.234-0.482)	0.486 (0.414-0.555)	0.023 (0.002-0.048)	0.042 (0.016-0.075)	0.094 (0.036-0.180)
	Mediation	0.252 (0.157-0.366)	0.509 (0.445-0.569)	0.030 (0.003-0.059)	0.060 (0.020-0.107)	0.149 (0.089-0.222)
	Legal	0.252 (0.157-0.366)	0.509 (0.445-0.569)	0.030 (0.003-0.059)	0.060 (0.020-0.107)	0.149 (0.089-0.222)
	Administrative	0.123 (0.004-0.442)	0.385 (0.103-0.547)	0.035 (0.002-0.072)	0.075 (0.018-0.136)	0.382 (0.051-0.811)
	Peace Operations	0.268 (0.075-0.540)	0.483 (0.356-0.560)	0.060 (0.002-0.068)	0.058 (0.013-0.119)	0.161 (0.035-0.395)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.16: Ordered Probit Regression of Conflict Management Intervention Strategy Selection, State Actors, 1946-2001 (Outliers Excluded)**

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
<i>Restrictions</i>	None	After successful intervention	After unsuccessful intervention
<i>Variables</i>			
Y*1	-0.801** (0.351)	-1.380** (0.633)	-0.346 (0.337)
Y*3	-0.538 (0.409)	-0.164 (0.413)	-
Third-party Major State	0.570** (0.263)	0.677 (0.424)	0.521* (0.292)
Third-party Major State*(Y*1)	0.360 (0.466)	0.732 (0.762)	-0.205 (0.461)
Third-party Major State*(Y*3)	-0.516 (0.363)	-0.899* (0.525)	-
Third-party Alliance	-1.233* (0.679)	0.275 (0.631)	0.237 (0.341)
Third-party Alliance*(Y*1)	0.273 (0.399)	1.255** (0.562)	0.135 (0.410)
Third-party Alliance*(Y*3)	1.370* (0.767)	-0.986 (0.884)	-
Third-party Contiguous	0.477 (0.343)	-0.770 (0.520)	0.184 (0.371)
Third-party Contiguous*(Y*1)	0.185 (0.385)	0.103 (0.724)	-0.071 (0.521)
Third-party Contiguous*(Y*3)	-0.370 (0.481)	0.995 (0.740)	-
Disputing Major State	-0.604 (0.653)	0.310 (0.495)	-0.441 (0.364)
Disputing Major State*(Y*1)	-0.388 (0.599)	-0.282 (0.793)	-0.495 (0.545)
Disputing Major State*(Y*3)	0.007 (0.786)	-1.189 (0.708)	-
Enduring Rivalry Disputants	0.141 (0.545)	-0.654 (0.484)	-0.265 (0.365)
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*1)	-0.201 (0.407)	0.216 (0.625)	-0.653 (0.457)
Enduring Rivalry Disputants*(Y*3)	-0.673 (0.674)	0.138 (0.508)	-
<i>Model Information</i>			
Obs.	370	123	247
$\chi^2$	219.53***	84.09***	76.39***
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.167	0.166	0.165

Notes: \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; robust standard errors reported in parentheses; observations clustered on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID); to save space, parameterized cut points are not reported in this table.

**Table 4.17: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 13  
(from Table 4.16; Minor, Non-Allied, Non-Contiguous State)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.668 (0.496-0.814)	0.321 (0.176-0.491)	0.000	0.007 (-0.000-0.022)	0.004 (0.01-0.012)
	Mediation	0.365 (0.168-0.615)	0.565 (0.363-0.727)	0.000	0.034 (-0.003-0.101)	0.036 (0.003-0.120)
	Legal	0.365 (0.168-0.615)	0.565 (0.363-0.727)	0.000	0.034 (-0.003-0.101)	0.036 (0.003-0.120)
	Administrative	0.191 (0.094-0.325)	0.643 (0.483-0.758)	0.000	0.067 (-0.005-0.162)	0.099 (0.012-0.288)
	Peace Operations	0.191 (0.094-0.325)	0.643 (0.483-0.758)	0.000	0.067 (-0.005-0.162)	0.099 (0.012-0.288)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.18: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 13 (from Table 4.16; Major State Variation)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.513 (0.345-0.668)	0.457 (0.314-0.613)	0.000	0.018 (-0.001-0.058)	0.013 (0.002-0.038)
	Mediation	0.349 (0.181-0.557)	0.579 (0.397-0.734)	0.000	0.036 (-0.003-0.102)	0.037 (0.004-0.119)
	Legal	0.349 (0.181-0.557)	0.579 (0.397-0.734)	0.000	0.036 (-0.003-0.102)	0.037 (0.004-0.119)
	Administrative	0.088 (0.014-0.263)	0.573 (0.276-0.768)	0.000	0.106 (-0.009-0.238)	0.233 (0.023-0.616)
	Peace Operations	0.088 (0.014-0.263)	0.573 (0.276-0.768)	0.000	0.106 (-0.009-0.238)	0.233 (0.023-0.616)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.19: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 13 (from Table 4.16; Alliance Variation)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.521 (0.305-0.731)	0.446 (0.261-0.625)	0.000	0.019 (-0.001-0.073)	0.014 (0.001-0.049)
	Mediation	0.327 (0.099-0.629)	0.584 (0.345-0.755)	0.000	0.040 (-0.003-0.106)	0.049 (0.003-0.175)
	Legal	0.327 (0.099-0.629)	0.584 (0.345-0.755)	0.000	0.040 (-0.003-0.106)	0.049 (0.003-0.175)
	Administrative	0.608 (0.125-0.975)	0.341 (0.025-0.328)	0.000	0.019 (-0.001-0.119)	0.032 (0.000-0.228)
	Peace Operations	0.608 (0.125-0.975)	0.341 (0.025-0.328)	0.000	0.019 (-0.001-0.119)	0.032 (0.000-0.228)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.20: Probability Transition Matrix Accompanying Model 13 (from Table 4.16; Alliance Variation)**

		Current Strategy Used				
		Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
Previous Strategy Used	Verbal	0.556 (0.412-0.699)	0.422 (0.280-0.562)	0.000	0.012 (-0.001-0.033)	0.009 (0.001-0.026)
	Mediation	0.327 (0.098-0.627)	0.581 (0.344-0.748)	0.000	0.045 (-0.002-0.148)	0.047 (0.004-0.160)
	Legal	0.327 (0.098-0.627)	0.581 (0.344-0.748)	0.000	0.045 (-0.002-0.148)	0.047 (0.004-0.160)
	Administrative	0.098 (0.023-0.255)	0.598 (0.334-0.771)	0.000	0.103 (-0.008-0.236)	0.201 (0.023-0.517)
	Peace Operations	0.098 (0.023-0.255)	0.598 (0.334-0.771)	0.000	0.103 (-0.008-0.236)	0.201 (0.023-0.517)

Notes: 95% confidence interval in parentheses.

**Table 4.21: A Summary of Proposed Hypotheses and Empirical Results**

Model	Model Variant	Number	Hypothesis	Empirical Support
Cost	Pure	1a	<i>Over the course of a conflict, third-party interventions will escalate from the use of relatively low-cost strategies to relatively high-cost strategies.</i>	Weak
		1b	<i>Relatively high-cost strategies will be used less frequently than relatively low-cost strategies.</i>	Weak
		1c	<i>IGOs and coalitions will begin their interventions with relatively more costly intervention strategies than individual states.</i>	Strong
		1d	<i>IGOs are more likely than coalitions or individual states to perform multiple interventions simultaneously. Similarly, coalitions are more likely than individual states to perform multiple interventions simultaneously.</i>	Strong (Prediction is inaccurate about coalitions.)
		1e	<i>States are more likely to attempt an overlapping intervention during an IGO or coalition-led intervention than a state-led one.</i>	Strong (Prediction does not include overlapping interventions performed by coalitions or IGOs.)
	Limited Commitments	1f	<i>Third-parties are highly unlikely to use intervention strategies more costly than mediation.</i>	Strong
		1g	<i>IGOs and coalitions are highly unlikely to use intervention strategies more costly than mediation.</i>	Strong
		1h	<i>Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or overlapping interventions, regardless of the actor involved or the strategy used.</i>	None
Learning	(N/A)	2a	<i>Third-parties repeat strategies that were most recently successful and avoid strategies that were most recently unsuccessful.</i>	Very Weak
		2b	<i>Third-parties are unlikely to initiate simultaneous or overlapping interventions, regardless of the actor involved or the strategy used.</i>	None
Random	(N/A)	3	<i>There is no discernible pattern in the (successive) interventions of third-parties.</i>	None

## **Chapter 5**

### **The Practical Side of Trajectories**

Trajectories are theoretical constructs, but they are rooted in the empirical world. It is therefore important to extend the discussion of competing theoretical models (Chapter 2) and their evaluation (Chapter 4) to the realm of policy-makers. How can trajectories inform those who practice conflict management within international disputes? When a militarized dispute occurs between states, what can potential third-parties expect from those that might get involved in the management of that dispute? Finally, are there specific cases that illustrate the various theoretical models proposed earlier?

I devote the current chapter to these three broad questions. To answer them, I pursue two different lines of inquiry. First, I simulate a trajectory based on the results of the previous chapter. This simulation offers policy-makers a number of insights into how third-party behavior evolves over the course of an interstate dispute. Second, I provide an illustration (that is, an empirical example) of each of the theoretical trajectory models outlined in Chapter 2. Through this exercise, I demonstrate how each of the trajectories might look in practice. I also highlight a series of factors that might help identify the disputes to which each model applies.

#### **Forecasting Intervention Behavior**

One of the best ways that this project can be of use to decision-makers involves its forecasting potential. Towards that end, I simulate a trajectory from the results presented in the previous chapter. This trajectory begins with an initial intervention by some third-party. Table 5.1 describes what form that initial intervention will most likely take; the table displays the

strategy distribution for initial interventions during the period 1946-2001 across the five broad categories discussed earlier – verbal pleas, mediation, legal, administrative, and peace operations. These initial interventions include the first intervention within each trajectory, as well as the isolated interventions that do not develop into trajectories.<sup>1</sup>

According to Table 5.1, approximately 50% of all initial interventions involve mediation. Third-parties clearly prefer to begin their interventions within militarized disputes by mediating; they employ this strategy more often than any other when beginning to manage a dispute. Second to mediation, third-parties are most likely to intervene verbally during an initial intervention (41.45%). Such verbal pleas for a cease-fire, troop withdrawal, or negotiations are not only common, but they may also be a way for third-parties to test the waters for the possibility of greater intervention. If disputants stop the violence, proceed to the negotiating table, or withdraw forces in response to a verbal intervention, third-parties have reason to believe that disputants are prepared for a peaceful settlement and, therefore, that more costly (and active)<sup>2</sup> conflict management strategies will effectively manage the dispute. In this way, the disputant response to verbal pleas can signal third-parties that the time is right for greater intervention, thereby explaining the prevalence of verbal intervention during the initial interventions of third-parties (see also Zartman 2000). Finally, the use of verbal pleas and mediation dwarf the use of the other more costly, alternative strategies. For example, the likelihood that third-parties will use either legal, administrative or peace operations strategies in an initial intervention is 3.42%, 1.71%, and

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<sup>1</sup> I include isolated interventions in this distribution because it is unknown whether they will develop into trajectories at the time of the initial intervention. Each initial intervention has approximately a 50/50 chance of developing into a trajectory (see the previous chapter).

<sup>2</sup> “Active” here refers to the involvement of the third-party. Verbal pleas only require a third-party to issue a statement. Every other strategy (which also happen to be more costly than verbal interventions) demands that third-parties become *directly involved* in the management of the dispute or its effects (for example, refugee flows).

3.42% respectively. Each of these likelihoods is substantially lower than the probability that third-parties will turn to either mediation or verbal pleas.

Using this strategy distribution as a starting point (and the general results from the previous chapter), I construct a simulated trajectory, which appears in Table 5.2.<sup>3</sup> Each row represents a specific intervention within the trajectory, while the columns display the likelihood with which third-parties will use each of the intervention strategies during that given intervention. The distribution of strategies from Table 5.1 begins the trajectory, and it appears across the first row of the table (which describes intervention behavior within the first, or initial, intervention).<sup>4</sup> Moving row by row down the table, one can see how the likelihood with which a third-party selects from among the various strategies changes over the course of the trajectory.

The data contained in Table 5.2 produce three general conclusions. First, as a trajectory unfolds, the likelihood of third-parties being actively involved in the management of a dispute *declines*. Instead of intervening in ways that would actually *assist* the disputants in managing their conflict or its consequences (for example, through mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations), third-parties are increasingly likely to intervene *verbally* as a trajectory develops. More specifically, third-parties intervene verbally in 41% of initial interventions (the first row of Table 5.2). By the second intervention, the likelihood of a verbal intervention rises sharply to 62% (the second row) and continues climbing slowly until it reaches 68% by the fifth

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<sup>3</sup> In methodological terms, I multiply the original distribution of values (Table 5.1) by the likelihood with which third-parties use each of the five strategies (at *i*) given the previous intervention strategy (at *i-1*). In other words, I use matrix multiplication to multiply Table 5.1 (transposed to create a 1x5 matrix) by Table 4.4 (general results table). I then multiply the resulting matrix (a 1x5 matrix containing a distribution of strategies) by Table 4.4 again and repeat the process. Table 5.2 reports the results produced by the first nine multiplications. Because trajectories are ergodic, Table 4.4 describes intervention behavior at all points within a trajectory (see Gill 2006). Therefore, I use Table 4.4 throughout the entire multiplication process. On matrix multiplication, see Leon (2006).

<sup>4</sup> The rows of Table 5.2 sum to 1. As before, this does not indicate that third-parties *must* intervene at each point in the trajectory. Rather, it signifies that *if third-parties choose to intervene*, they will use one of the five diplomatic strategies listed in Table 5.2 (that is, there are no alternative, diplomatic strategies from which to choose). The likelihood of intervention at each point in the trajectory appears in Table 4.1. All intervention behavior in Table 5.2 is therefore conditional upon the probabilities of intervention listed in Table 4.1.

intervention. This suggests either that third-parties have short attention spans for active intervention over time or that many potential third-parties eventually “give up” (or at least, do not “try harder”). Either scenario seems plausible. As new events demand the attention of world leaders, an ongoing conflict can easily shift to the back burner. Furthermore, as a conflict persists, third-parties may simply not want to invest the resources necessary for effective conflict management. A verbal intervention presents them with an opportunity to advocate for peace when they do not want to work actively to achieve it.

Of course, as the likelihood of verbal interventions rises, the probability of more costly strategies must fall. Such a decline happens for all non-verbal intervention strategies over the life of the trajectory. For example, third-parties mediate in 50% of their initial interventions. By the second intervention, the likelihood of mediation falls sharply to 29%. It eventually settles around 25% by the fourth intervention. Such a finding contains two noteworthy implications. First, it suggests that as a dispute persists (and numerous interventions occur), there is about a one in four chance (at each intervention) that third-parties will help the disputants to forge an agreement in the pursuit of peace. Although additional case study analysis would be needed to uncover the rationale for why third-parties scale back their involvement in conflict management during a trajectory, it is again plausible that third-parties either believe that mediation will not work (that is, they choose to “give up” on active conflict management strategies) or must shift their attention to other world events.<sup>5</sup> Second, this finding implies that the greatest chance for a

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<sup>5</sup> It may also be possible that early mediation efforts succeed, thereby ending a series of trajectories and leaving the difficult cases behind (which third-parties are then more hesitant to mediate). Such an argument is consistent with the other two presented here. If third-parties are hesitant to mediate, this amounts to “giving up” on active strategies or “not wanting to try harder” in the remaining disputes. Furthermore, evaluating this argument lies beyond the scope of this study. Because I focus upon short-term success (that is, whether the intervention achieved its purpose at the time that it ended), it is possible for mediation to succeed and for the trajectory to continue (see also Beardsley 2008; Greig 2001). For example, during a dispute between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbors (Rwanda and Uganda), third-parties regularly mediated cease-fire and troop withdrawal agreements. Although mediation succeeded numerous times in this case, the trajectory persisted. To determine whether mediation

mediation occurs as early in the trajectory as possible. Note, however, that this does not mean that the greatest likelihood of mediation exists early in the *dispute*. Rather, when third-parties intervene (regardless of when in the dispute they do so), mediation is most likely to occur initially. Then, as more third-parties intervene, the likelihood of mediation drops to about half of what it was at the outset of the trajectory.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, if disputants need time to “soften up” (to borrow a phrase from Greig and Diehl 2006) before signing an agreement, third-parties may be less willing to intervene when the disputants are ready for it.

Third-party usage of legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies within the simulated trajectory follow a similar pattern to mediation. By the fifth intervention, the chance of third-parties using each of these strategies falls to about 33-66% of their initial values. Despite this similarity, however, administrative and peace operations strategies display an additional, unique behavior. The likelihood with which third-parties use each of these latter two strategies hits its peak during the *second* intervention (rather than the first). That is, third-parties have only a 3% chance of deploying a peace operation in the initial intervention. The likelihood of a peace operation then rises to 6% in the second intervention before slowly declining until it stabilizes around 4%. Although 6% is still a small substantive value, note that the chance of a third-party deploying a peace operation climbs 100% from the first to the second intervention and then falls 33% from the second to the third intervention. These are large changes in behavior, even though the likelihood of a peace operation remains substantively low.

These findings make sense empirically. Peace operations rarely deploy at the outset of a trajectory.<sup>7</sup> Instead, they (and similarly, administrative interventions) often require a mediated

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produced a successful outcome that decisively ended a dispute (and the trajectory), one would need to examine the *long-term* outcomes of mediation instead. I leave this for future research.

<sup>6</sup> The likelihood of mediation falls from 50% to about 25% during the course of the simulated trajectory.

<sup>7</sup> There are only four cases in which a peace operation begins a trajectory. All are performed by the United Nations.

agreement to precede it at some point in the trajectory, since parties frequently consent to a peace operation within these agreements.<sup>8</sup> The earliest we should see peace operations would therefore be during the second intervention within a trajectory. Note, however, that peace operations could theoretically come later than the second intervention in the trajectory; that is, mediation has a chance to precede any peace operation (or administrative strategy) that does not occur in the first intervention. Yet the simulation suggests that the likelihood of an operation drops after the second intervention in the trajectory. What causes this decline? The answer may lie in the success of initial mediations. Additional analysis reveals that when a mediation strategy begins a trajectory, it is more likely to succeed (roughly 70%) than if it comes within the trajectory itself (approximately 50%). Initial mediations therefore increase the opportunity for peace operations to occur in the second intervention. As the likelihood of mediation (and its success) fall, so too does the selection of a peace operations strategy.

In practical terms, these findings give disputants and potential third-parties something to consider. The chances of mediation, arbitration, and adjudication<sup>9</sup> decline over a trajectory's lifetime. Similarly, if an administrative intervention or peace operation has not deployed by the second intervention, the chances of one occurring in subsequent interventions also decline. There is therefore no wisdom in free riding (that is, waiting for another third-party to handle a dispute) because the active involvement of third-parties decreases steadily after the initial two interventions. Disputants that desire assistance or potential third-parties that have an interest in effectively managing a conflict can certainly wait for the second intervention to occur.<sup>10</sup> If no

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<sup>8</sup> This does not contradict the findings in Chapter 4. While a peace operation may need to follow a mediated (or other) agreement, it may not appear in the intervention *immediately after* the mediation. See Chapter 4 for more information.

<sup>9</sup> Arbitration and adjudication are strategies within the legal category (see Table 1.1).

<sup>10</sup> To provide a sense of real time to this analysis, during the period 1993-2001, the median wait time between interventions within a trajectory was 11 days (mode=1, first quartile=2, third quartile=42). Waiting for two interventions therefore amounts to a period of about 22 days.

active third-party intervention materializes by that point, however, either disputants in need must strongly court potential third-parties to encourage more active intervention or interested third-parties must step up to take a more active role. Otherwise, the trajectory will more than likely devolve into a series of appeals for cease-fires and negotiations.

The danger of a trajectory transitioning into a series of verbal pleas is not entirely theoretical. It occurs in practice as well. For example, when a United States plane collided with a Chinese plane in 2001, Taiwan and Pakistan followed the (failed) Japanese fact-finding mission (a form of mediation) with verbal interventions. The trajectory therefore ended with multiple verbal interventions. Other trajectories begin with a verbal plea and never escape from the grasp of cyclical verbal interventions. During two disputes between India and Pakistan in 1999, for example, eight different third-parties (made up of states, coalitions, and organizations) issued verbal pleas for the disputants to resolve their issues through diplomatic instead of military strategies.<sup>11</sup> Both trajectories began with a verbal plea, after which third-parties refused to adopt more costly (and more involved) strategies in the management of the dispute. Thus, disputants (and third-parties) that seek the active involvement of third-parties must exercise caution. If disputants stall agreement early in the dispute (for example, by adopting a hard-line negotiating position and refusing to offer concessions) or if potential third-parties delay their own involvement too long in the hopes of free-riding, there is a great chance that third-parties will not become actively involved later in the dispute. In such situations, disputants and interested third-parties may find themselves without the assistance of others.

The second conclusion derived from Table 5.2 involves the stabilization of third-party behavior. A comparison of the rows of Table 5.2 reveals few changes after the seventh

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<sup>11</sup> These third-parties included: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the United Arab Emirates, the United Nations, the European Union, the Commonwealth of Nations, and a coalition of European Union foreign ministers.

intervention in a trajectory. In other words, the likelihood with which third-parties use each of the five intervention strategies becomes consistent after about six interventions. This implies that once third-parties reach a certain point in the trajectory, their intervention decisions do not drastically change from one intervention to the next *and are unlikely to change in the future*. It therefore underscores one of the substantive conclusions noted above: there is no sense in waiting a long time for a specific, meaningful intervention to materialize. The probability of such a meaningful intervention (that is, a third-party intervening actively – with either a mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations strategy) not only declines throughout a trajectory, but it never increases again. Instead, the likelihood of meaningful intervention (regardless of the particular, non-verbal strategy used) reaches an equilibrium at its lowest value in the trajectory. The message is fairly clear: we should not expect that repeated interventions or prolonged disputes will lead more often to the active involvement of third-parties to manage a conflict than their passive observance of that conflict.

Finally, the simulated trajectory reaffirms the results noted in the previous chapter, particularly with respect to the merits of the limited commitments model.<sup>12</sup> Third-parties regularly resort to verbal interventions and mediations. In fact, at any given intervention, the forecasted trajectory predicts that third-parties will use one of these two strategies over *90% of the time*. Strategies that are more costly than mediation account for the remaining 10% of expected third-party behavior. Thus, there is a clear precipice between verbal and mediation strategies on the one hand and legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies on the other. Third-parties strongly prefer to limit the intervention costs they incur, and their limit seems to be

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<sup>12</sup> This is not entirely surprising, since I use some of those results to simulate the trajectory. Note, however, that the precipice within the simulated trajectory sharpens in contrast to that contained earlier. Table 4.4, for example, notes that third-parties rely on verbal pleas or mediation 77-96% of the time (depending on the prior strategy used in the trajectory). In contrast, Table 5.2 expects third-parties to resort to these two strategies over 90% of the time, and this expectation remains constant throughout the entire trajectory.

at the mediation category. Very rarely do third-parties foray beyond mediation and employ more costly intervention strategies.

Each of the three conclusions presented so far depends (in part) on a starting assumption used to generate the simulated trajectory. In particular, the trajectory contained in Table 5.2 assumes that the first move in the trajectory is not yet known. That is, it uses historical data to construct a historical distribution of initial interventions across the five broad categories. This distribution then sets the trajectory in motion. It is therefore reasonable to ask how a *known* starting point affects a potential trajectory path. If the initial intervention definitely involves a verbal plea, does that initial intervention forecast a different trajectory path than if third-parties first mediate in a dispute? Such an inquiry is extremely relevant, for potential third-parties might wait to see the initial intervention behavior of other third-parties before making their own intervention decision. Furthermore, these third-parties will examine the future based on their current position; in this case, that means future decisions will proceed with the initial intervention being known.

In an effort to shed light on this matter, Table 5.3 simulates a trajectory in which third-parties initially intervene verbally, while Table 5.4 forecasts a trajectory that begins with mediation.<sup>13</sup> These tables offer two additional insights into third-party behavior. First, the likelihood of active (that is, non-verbal) diplomatic intervention *rises* over the course of a trajectory that begins with a verbal plea (although it stabilizes after the sixth intervention). For example, the likelihood with which third-parties use mediation grows from 19% in the second intervention to 24% by the fourth intervention. Similar patterns can be found within the legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies. This suggests that some of the more pessimistic

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<sup>13</sup> I focus only upon the initial use of verbal and mediation strategies because they cumulatively comprise over 90% of all initial interventions. Both trajectories rely on Table 4.4 for information about how third-parties move from one intervention to the next. I construct these trajectories using the same process as the one outlined in footnote 2.

findings above depend on the first move of the trajectory. For example, when third-parties first intervene verbally in a dispute, the greatest likelihood of administrative or peace operations no longer occurs in the second intervention. Instead, the probability that third-parties use these strategies rises throughout the trajectory, reaching its maximum value around the sixth intervention (at its equilibrium value of approximately 4%).

Table 5.4 confirms that predicted behavior depends highly on the initial intervention. If mediation occurs first in a trajectory, that trajectory behaves almost identically to the one presented in Table 5.2. More costly (and involved) interventions (that is, those that use mediation, legal, administrative or peace operations to actively assist the disputants) decline over the life of the trajectory. For example, if a trajectory begins with mediation, the likelihood of a subsequent mediation falls to 35% by the second intervention, and 25% by the fourth intervention. Furthermore, the chances of a verbal intervention steadily climb, while administrative and peace operations strategies reach their peak likelihood in the second intervention. It therefore appears that initial mediations drive the results presented in Table 5.2.<sup>14</sup>

Despite uncovering some sensitivity of a trajectory's shape to the initial intervention, I hasten to note that each predicted trajectory reaches a similar equilibrium. By the sixth intervention, the likelihood of a verbal intervention stabilizes at approximately 68% across Tables 5.2-5.4. Similarly, mediation, legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies reach equilibrium values as well (likelihoods of about 25%, 1%, 2%, and 4% respectively). This reaffirms the earlier finding that intervention decisions stabilize by about the sixth intervention.<sup>15</sup> Any large shifts in the likelihood with which third-parties will use each intervention strategy therefore seem to occur *early* in the life of a trajectory. Initial interventions may cause third-party

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<sup>14</sup> This should not be surprising, since mediation occurs more often in initial interventions than any other strategy.

<sup>15</sup> Despite this, notice that only 2.8% of all militarized disputes receive six or more interventions (see Table 4.1). Thus, many trajectories never reach this equilibrium.

behavior to approach the common equilibrium in different ways (for example, compare the top rows of Tables 5.3 and 5.4), but each simulated trajectory eventually reaches that same equilibrium.

Finally, each of the simulated trajectories uses historical information to predict third-party behavior. These predictions therefore possess two notable limitations. First, the simulations are probabilistic, not determinative. As an example, Tables 5.2-5.4 do not imply that peace operations are *impossible* at the eighth intervention, only that third-parties are less likely to deploy a peace operation at that point in the trajectory than they are to rely on verbal or mediation strategies. Thus, while I can get a general idea of third-party intervention behavior from the simulated trajectories, the simulation does not predict the strategies that third-parties employ at each point in the trajectory with absolute certainty.

Second, because the simulations result from historical data, their predictions assume that third-party behavior remains constant for the foreseeable future. This assumption, however, does not seem problematic. One of the greatest structural changes to the international community involved the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war (1989-1991). Despite such a systemic shock, I find that third-parties select intervention strategies similarly during and after the cold war.<sup>16</sup> If strategy selection did not change at this watershed moment, it seems unlikely to do so any time soon. Regardless, if third-parties significantly alter their behavior, the predictions would need to be updated as well. For example, if third-parties begin relying on legal strategies (that is, arbitration and adjudication) more often than they have been, this information would need to be factored into the analysis in order to yield accurate predictions.

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<sup>16</sup> Note that I am referring here specifically to the selection of intervention patterns. The frequency of intervention may have changed across the two periods, even if third-parties make similar decisions regarding the strategies that they will employ in those interventions.

Despite these limitations, the simulations offer policy-makers a number of insights about third-party intervention behavior. First, when a dispute breaks out (and no intervention has yet occurred) the greatest opportunities for third-parties to intervene actively in the dispute (including through mediation) occur early in a trajectory.<sup>17</sup> This provides important information to those hoping to free ride off of another third-party's actions. If a non-verbal intervention does not occur by the second or third move in the trajectory, third-parties that desire one should not wait for another third-party, as the likelihood of such an intervention falls and does not increase again. Second, third-parties can update their expectations once the initial intervention is known. If the first intervention involves a verbal plea, the probability of a non-verbal intervention may rise slightly during the trajectory. In contrast, if the first intervening third-party mediates, the likelihood of a non-verbal intervention falls sharply after the first few interventions. Finally, intervention behavior eventually stabilizes, regardless of the initial intervention. This suggests that the first move of a trajectory matters, but that intervention behavior eventually reaches an equilibrium. After about six interventions, decision-makers can consistently expect third-parties to rely upon each of the strategies in a consistent fashion from one intervention to the next.

Of course, disputants can draw implications from these conclusions as well. In order to simplify this discussion, suppose that there are two types of disputants: those that genuinely want third-parties to help them achieve a peaceful resolution of their dispute through diplomatic channels and those that exploit third-party intervention to achieve militaristic ends (that is, those with devious objectives; Richmond 1998). For the former, the above simulations suggest two policy prescriptions. First, disputants that desire peace through diplomatic channels should not adopt too extreme or inflexible of a bargaining position early in the dispute. Although disputants

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<sup>17</sup> Future research might investigate whether initial interventions of a trajectory occur *too early* in a dispute (that is, before the conflict is ripe for management; Zartman 2000). If these initial interventions do occur "too early," then this might explain (in part) why intervention success rates are lower within trajectories than in isolated interventions.

may often fear that concessions or moderate positions (that is, flexibility in bargaining) will portray weakness or set precedents, there is a danger to being too inflexible. The greatest opportunity for disputants to receive the active involvement of third-parties occurs during the *initial* interventions. Yet if disputants' positions are too extreme or inflexible, these initial efforts will be squandered, eventually leaving the disputants to manage the conflict themselves.

Disputants that desire a peace brokered by third-parties must therefore balance the flexibility of their position with the knowledge that third-parties are most likely to help them early in the trajectory.

Second, these disputants should actively seek the help of third-parties. Generally, third-parties turn away from more involved (and costly) forms of intervention after the initial few interventions in a trajectory. Yet this decision is probabilistic, not determinative. Disputants can therefore actively pursue the involvement of third-parties if they seek it, knowing that a chance for greater involvement exists. Such a policy should aim to encourage more costly interventions, which is most likely to succeed if the disputants appear committed to diplomatic channels. In other words, third-parties that are already hesitant to incur greater intervention costs may only be persuaded to do so if the fighting has stopped, the disputants have tried bilateral negotiations, and the disputants take the initiative to request assistance. Without such signals, it may be difficult to convince third-parties to relinquish verbal pleas in favor of greater involvement.

Finally, what about those disputants that prefer to use diplomatic channels as a means to further their militaristic goals (for example, by using mediation to recover from and prepare for battle)? At the risk of furthering such an objective, the simulations suggest a policy prescription for these disputants as well. Specifically, disputants in this situation should *accept* initial third-party help but *reject* any proposed settlement. This is especially true if the third-party offers

initially to mediate. Because disputants retain the authority to accept any agreement produced in mediation (unlike in binding arbitration or adjudication) and mediation does not involve the deployment of a mission that might curb a disputant's autonomy<sup>18</sup> (unlike in administrative or peace operations strategies), mediation offers disputants the perfect strategy by which to achieve their objectives. By allowing mediation to occur, they buy time to recover militarily and plan for the next battle. Yet they also preserve a maximum amount of policy autonomy (including the ability to reject any proposed settlement produced in negotiations). Furthermore, with an initial mediation, the likelihood of more costly intervention strategies *falls* as the trajectory unfolds, while with a verbal intervention, that likelihood *rises* (slightly). Thus, mediation not only preserves a disputant's policy autonomy now, but it also does so into the future of the trajectory by reducing the likelihood that a third-party will get more actively involved in managing the dispute. Through such a process, third-parties that want to avoid peace can manipulate third-parties to produce the outcome that they prefer.

### **Illustrations of the Trajectory Models**

The previous section highlights the predictive power of trajectories. Yet the concept of trajectories can do more than forecast future interventions. It can explain past intervention behavior as well. In this section, I therefore revisit each of the theoretical models presented earlier: the pure cost model, the limited commitments model, the learning model, and the random model. For each model, I describe a dispute during the period 1993-2001 in which the

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<sup>18</sup> An administrative or peace operation does restrict a state's policy autonomy somewhat (although the exact amount may vary according to the mission's mandate). For example, allowing a peace operation to observe a cease-fire implies that disputants face a cost (of some sort) for violating the cease-fire. The disputant is therefore less free to violate the cease-fire – or at least cannot do so without incurring this additional cost.

intervention behavior of third-parties is best explained by that model.<sup>19</sup> As the discussion below demonstrates, each of the models can find some referent in the empirical world.<sup>20</sup>

### *The Pure Cost Model*

Since 1971, the Philippines has disputed Chinese sovereignty<sup>21</sup> over several of the Spratly Islands (Huth and Allee 2002; Frazier and Dixon 2006). These competing claims have produced a series of militarized disputes between the two states (Jones et al 1996; Ghosn et al 2004), one of which occurred in 1998. On 4 August 1998, the Philippines sighted Chinese and Vietnamese ships in the disputed area and ordered increased patrols of the Spratly Islands. During the course of their patrols in the months that followed, Philippine forces noted two peculiarities. First, they identified seven Chinese naval ships in the disputed area during a short period of time (28 October to 1 November). The Philippines interpreted this high concentration of Chinese vessels as a potential security threat to Philippine sovereignty. Second, the Philippine government documented the construction of unknown Chinese structures in the disputed area, which they subsequently protested. China claimed that the structures were rebuilt fishing shelters; the Philippines, however, was convinced that the structures functioned as a military barracks. Combined with the increased sighting of Chinese naval vessels, the Philippine

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<sup>19</sup> I focus on the 1993-2001 period because this project involves data gathering and the construction of narratives for this period.

<sup>20</sup> Certain models appear less frequently than others (for example, the random model rarely appears). This matches the findings presented in Chapter 4. Future research would need to determine the *conditions* under which the various models should develop through detailed case analysis. For example, the random model appears in the response of third-parties to the dispute between the United States and Afghanistan over the September 11 attacks (see below). This dispute, however, was extraordinarily unique. The international community immediately rallied behind the United States. For example, the United Nations Security Council unanimously expressed its willingness to help bring those responsible to justice and recognized the right of (presumably, the United States') self-defense (Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001; voting records available at <http://un.org>). The high level of worldwide support for the United States may have significantly altered third-party intervention behavior in this dispute, thereby making it random. Detailed case analysis would be needed, however, to confirm whether worldwide support affected intervention behavior within this dispute.

<sup>21</sup> The conflict over the Spratlys also involves Malaysia and Vietnam. Neither of the latter two states was involved in this particular dispute.

government therefore concluded that China intended to build a permanent presence in the disputed area, thereby increasing the Chinese *de facto* claim over the islands and undermining the Philippine claim.

Believing that China posed an increasing threat to its sovereignty, the Philippines ordered additional patrols of the Spratly Islands on 10 November. These patrols persisted despite a bilateral attempt to resolve the matter (in March 1999; see below). Although such patrols often proved uneventful on a day-to-day basis, they periodically produced information or actions that heightened tensions between the disputants. For example, during the course of the patrols, the Philippine navy arrested Chinese fishermen (29 November 1998 and 7 June 1999), spotted Chinese frigates carrying missiles near one of the disputed islands (18 January 1999), collided with a Chinese fishing boat (23 May 1999), accused Chinese warships of threatening to attack the Philippines (May/June 1999, and chased, fired upon, and sank Chinese fishing boats operating in the South China Sea (19 July 1999). Such a description paints the picture of an aggressive China, but the Chinese also perceived and protested against Philippine aggression during the dispute. For example, China at one point thought the Philippines was constructing permanent military facilities on the disputed islands, which produced a Chinese protest (2 March 1999). With persistent accusations and militarized encounters, the dispute continued.

Efforts to address the dispute were minimal and generally failed. On 7 January 1999, the United States (US) offered to mediate, but China was vehemently opposed to such an intervention. The parties then tried bilateral negotiations on March 23, but these did not yield an agreement. The United States issued a plea for peaceful negotiations on 3 October. Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) orchestrated the drafting of a “code of conduct” for the disputed area (good offices – a form of mediation) during their meeting from

24-28 November 1999. China rejected the ASEAN code, however. Once ASEAN's efforts failed to secure the support of China, third-parties removed themselves from the dispute altogether and allowed the dispute to persist unaddressed.

Minor military skirmishes and protests continued through early 2000. In January 2000, the Philippines expelled Chinese fisherman from the disputed area, prompting another Chinese protest. On 16 January, the Philippines protested to China over the continued presence of Chinese fisherman near Scarborough Shoal (part of the disputed area). Philippine officials then discovered four more Chinese fishing vessels in the area on 26 January and an additional two on 29 February. Throughout the dispute, the Chinese repeatedly claimed unconditional sovereignty over the Spratlys and pushed for a bilateral solution, while the Philippine government advocated a multilateral solution and placed the issue on the agenda of numerous international organizations.<sup>22</sup> The parties were unable to reconcile their opposing positions on both the issue and the appropriate method for handling it.

According to the preceding narrative, the involvement of third-parties remained very limited, primarily at China's behest. The United States intervened verbally on two occasions – once to offer mediation services and later to urge the disputants to return to diplomatic solutions. After these verbal interventions, ASEAN then exercised good offices (a form of mediation) and facilitated the creation of a “code of conduct” for those operating in the disputed area. The pattern of these interventions adheres to the predictions of the pure cost model.<sup>23</sup> From a cost perspective (see Table 1.1 for the cost continuum of strategies), third-parties tried low-cost,

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<sup>22</sup> The actions of the Philippines may have been part of a strategy to equalize its power imbalance with China.

<sup>23</sup> A similar pattern can be found within a dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Numerous third-parties (states, organizations, and a coalition) issued verbal pleas repeatedly (approximately 10 verbal interventions emerge in a row). After the barrage of verbal pleas, a coalition mediated a cease-fire agreement. Finally, once the mediation occurred, the coalition then established the Mission of Military Observers, Ecuador/Peru (MOMEPE) – a peace operation. Third-parties therefore successively moved from relatively less costly to more costly strategies throughout the trajectory, exactly as the pure cost model predicts.

verbal interventions first. When those efforts failed to manage the dispute (that is, limit violence and encourage diplomatic solutions), third-parties escalated their involvement and used more costly strategies (in this case, mediation). Over the course of the dispute, we can therefore say that third-parties moved generally from relatively less costly strategies to more costly ones, exactly as the pure cost model expects (see Hypothesis<sup>24</sup> 1a).<sup>25</sup>

The greatest factor inhibiting third-party intervention (and its success) in this case was China. The Chinese government did not want third-parties to mediate its dispute. This precluded the US from mediating initially, but it also undermined the success of ASEAN's efforts. Based on this case, future research might investigate whether the cost model develops when a major state disputant does not want third-parties involved. To avoid a strong protest from the major state, third-parties may start off with low-cost strategies that allow disputants to preserve a maximum amount of autonomy. They may then escalate their involvement slowly as the dispute persists (and disputants become comfortable with their involvement).

Of course, the cost model does not always appear within major states' disputes. A conflict between Ecuador and Peru also produced this model (see footnote 23). While this latter dispute did not involve a major state, it shared two key characteristics with the Chinese-Philippine conflict. First, both disputes involved territorial claims. Because territorial disputes are more salient than non-territorial ones (see Hensel 2001), disputants may not want third-parties to unduly influence the final settlement (that is, the land over which they exercise sovereignty). They may therefore restrict third-party involvement until they "soften up" to the

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<sup>24</sup> Hypotheses are numbered throughout this chapter according to Table 4.21.

<sup>25</sup> The pure cost model predicts that intergovernmental organizations will begin their involvement in a trajectory with a more costly intervention strategy than that used initially by states (Hypothesis 1c). The China-Philippines dispute also supports that expectation. The United States first used a verbal intervention in the trajectory, while ASEAN first tried mediation.

idea of intervention. Such a restriction would allow third-parties to intervene initially using only low-cost strategies and to escalate their involvement slowly.

Second, both disputes required a multilateral, regional intervention to move beyond verbal pleas. During the Chinese-Philippine dispute, a regional organization (ASEAN) escalated involvement beyond the verbal level. Similarly, in the Ecuador-Peru dispute, a regional coalition (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US) pushed the trajectory beyond cyclical verbal interventions. It is therefore possible that the pure cost model appears when: (a) a trajectory involves territorial claims, (b) large (universal membership) organizations lack the will to address the conflict (perhaps because they are hamstrung by the veto of a major state disputant), and (c) a regional, multilateral organization possess the resources and desire to slowly escalate third-party involvement. Future research might consider these factors when investigating the conditions under which the pure cost model might appear.

#### *Limited Commitments Model*

In the mid-1990s, Uganda and Sudan each accused the other of supporting rebel groups operating within its borders. On 26 August 1994, Uganda deployed troops to its border with Sudan in an effort to prevent arms smuggling from Sudan to rebel groups inside Uganda. This deployment began a militarized dispute between the two states – one that was fueled not just by interstate actions, but by the violence of rebel groups as well.

The disputants held bilateral talks to address the situation on 16 January 1995, but little changed as a result of these talks. Within two weeks of the bilateral meeting (on 5 February 1995), Uganda accused Sudan of conducting air attacks within Ugandan territory. This violation of sovereignty prompted Sudanese and Ugandan representatives to meet subsequently with

Libyan mediators in Tripoli on 3-5 April 1995. The parties signed an agreement at this meeting that called for the end of military assistance to rebel groups in both countries.

Although the Libyan mediation successfully produced an agreement, it did little to address a key, practical reality of the dispute – namely, that rebel groups often mounted attacks from one state against the other because they did not respect international boundaries. For example, Ugandan rebels attacked targets within Uganda from Sudanese territory on 20 April 1995. As a result of this incident (which killed over 100 people), Uganda severed diplomatic relations with Sudan on 23 April 1995 and expelled Sudanese diplomats from their territory the next day.

The severance of diplomatic relations captured the attention of regional conflict managers and encouraged intervention. The Malawian president, acting as chairman of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), began to mediate the dispute on 11 May 1995. COMESA then subsequently led talks over the next three months, during which the parties agreed to work toward the gradual resumption of diplomatic relations and signed an agreement to create a joint commission between Sudan, Uganda, and Malawi that would work toward the establishment of normal diplomatic relations. In the midst of COMESA's efforts, Libya attempted to facilitate an easing of tensions through its good offices (a form of mediation). Beginning on 23 May 1995 (during COMESA's intervention), Libya offered for the two parties to use its embassies in Sudan and Uganda as a go-between for diplomatic communication until normal relations were restored.

Unfortunately, the successes of COMESA were short-lived. Within two weeks of the second COMESA agreement (that promised a path toward normal diplomatic relations), Uganda reported (on 17 August 1995) that Sudan was shelling its territory in an effort to attack Sudanese

rebels. This not only undermined the previous agreements, but further strained relations between the disputants as well. After a brief lull, Sudanese troops and Ugandan troops clashed near the border again on 29 October 1995.

As the dispute persisted, so too did the efforts to manage it. Iran offered to mediate (a verbal intervention) in September 1995 and February 1996, but no talks moved forward under its auspices at those times. Libya continued exercising its good offices throughout this period, but began additional mediation efforts as well. Gaddafi claimed to reach an agreement with Uganda (through the additional mediation efforts) on 5 November. In this agreement, Uganda pledged again to work toward normal relations with Sudan. Libya then met separately with Sudan on 14 November and continued meeting with the disputants throughout early 1996 (for example, Libya met with Sudan on 2-3 January 1996 and with Uganda on 16 June 1996). Finally, Russia appealed for a peaceful political solution on 14 December 1995.

Despite the gains made by mediators, rebel actions (and the response to them) once again exacerbated the dispute. Uganda accused Sudan of shelling its territory in April 1996, and the two sides exchanged additional artillery fire in May 1996. Iran again offered to mediate the conflict, and this time, the disputants accepted. Iran therefore began mediating on 6 September 1996. The parties met in Iran on 8-9 September and agreed at that time to create a mechanism for addressing the border conflict between them. Yet within two weeks, Uganda claimed that Sudan bombed its territory. Because Sudan denied the incident, Iran sent a delegation to investigate the claim (conciliation – a strategy within the mediation category). The parties met again with Iran in New York on 28 September and in Tehran from 1-5 October. These latter meetings, also attended by Malawi, produced a preliminary agreement. At a meeting with Iran and Malawi

shortly thereafter (on 3-4 November 1996), the parties signed a letter of agreement/draft peace agreement.

Almost immediately, however, Uganda stipulated that it did not sign a peace agreement with Sudan. Within months, the violence mounted yet again. Sudan accused Uganda of massing troops at the border in January 1997. Iran immediately offered to mediate again, and the disputants accepted its offer. After additional bombing throughout February-March 1997, Iran and Malawi met with the parties on 13-14 March. These meetings failed to dampen the conflict, however, and Sudan mobilized its military forces on 15 March. Libya then tried again to mediate on 3-5 April and on 13 April. Finally, the Kenyan president, Daniel Arap Moi, acting as head of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), facilitated negotiations between the parties on 10 May. As a result of this final meeting, the disputing states agreed to stop hurling accusations at one another, and a summit was planned for later that month to discuss the conflict on a regional basis. The summit was eventually cancelled, however, as the leaders prepared for a meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This left the dispute unresolved, and by the following fall (September 1998), violence broke out again (under a separate militarized dispute).

Throughout the dispute, numerous third-parties displayed a willingness to intervene actively to help the disputants restore diplomatic relations and reduce the violence between them. Yet this involvement had clear limits. Third-parties fluctuated between verbal pleas (for example, those made by Russia and Iran) and mediation strategies (good offices, mediation, and conciliation), but at no point were they willing to employ strategies more costly than mediation.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Detailed case analysis would need to investigate the *motives* of intervening third-parties to understand why they limited their involvement in this conflict.

This pattern conforms most clearly to the expectations of the limited commitments model.<sup>27</sup>

Third-parties demonstrated that they were unwilling to incur intervention costs greater than those associated with mediation (Hypothesis 1f). This unwillingness applied to both state actors and intergovernmental organizations (Hypothesis 1g).

Furthermore, the pattern runs contrary to the predictions of the other models. Once third-parties begin mediating, the pure cost model does not predict a return to less costly (verbal) strategies. Yet this is precisely what Russia did after Libyan mediation in 1996. The intervention behavior in this dispute also defies the logic of the learning model. If a strategy fails, the learning model expects third-parties to avoid its use in the next intervention. Yet when Iranian mediation failed in March 1997, first Libya and then IGAD tried to mediate shortly thereafter. Finally, intervention behavior does not appear to be entirely random either. Rather, it seems that third-parties are turning regularly to verbal pleas and mediation, while eschewing strategies that are more costly (that is, there is never the random usage of a more costly strategy during the trajectory). Thus, the limited commitments model seems to best explain the intervention behavior found within this dispute.

Why did third-parties limit their involvement in this dispute? Although understanding the motives behind third-parties' decisions to limit their involvement requires more detailed case analysis, the limitation in this dispute may stem from the large *intrastate* component of the conflict. A dispute certainly existed between Uganda and Sudan, but it was fueled on the *sub-state* level – by rebel groups seeking to overthrow the government of both states. These rebel groups do not respect international norms or agreements in the same way that states do (for

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<sup>27</sup> Similar patterns emerge in disputes between Eritrea and Yemen (1995-1996), Russia and Georgia (1996), Turkey and Syria (1998), Guyana and Suriname (2000), and Guinea and Liberia (2000-2001).

example, rebels regularly violate international boundaries without punishment in the international community).

Third-parties that intervene in disputes such as this face a unique challenge: the parties responsible for the continued conflict may not care about the international community's response or be present at the negotiating table (either because nobody considered inviting them or, more likely, because the disputants refuse to negotiate with them). This makes it possible for the sub-state actors to spoil any progress the third-parties achieve. Because of this, third-parties might reasonably restrict their involvement in disputes that contain a heavy intrastate component (for example, Sudan-Uganda, Syria-Turkey, Guinea-Liberia, Russia-Georgia). The limited commitments model may therefore appear when the conflict: (a) is an internationalized civil war, (b) contains a significant sub-state actor capable of spoiling agreements (for example, a significant rebel group), or (c) includes a disputing state that was once governed by the other disputing state (for example, Russia-Georgia). Future research might consider these factors when investigating the conditions under which the limited commitments model develops.

### *Learning Model*

As occurred during the Uganda-Sudan dispute (above), Eritrea and Sudan each accused the other of supporting rebel groups that sought the destruction of their respective states (Frazier and Dixon 2006). In December 1994, Eritrea asserted that Sudan was supporting anti-Eritrean rebels by establishing military training camps for the rebels near the Eritrean border. Sudan similarly claimed that Eritrea was providing military assistance to the *Sudan People's Liberation Army* (SPLA) rebels within Sudan.<sup>28</sup> Because of these two sets of accusations, Eritrea broke off diplomatic relations with Sudan on 5 December 1994. The dispute then became militarized in

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<sup>28</sup> Eritrea denied this charge.

July 1996. On 21 July, Sudanese and Eritrean forces clashed near their border, killing two Sudanese soldiers in the process. In the months that followed, Sudan fortified its border with Eritrea (October 1996; as the Ethiopian-Eritrean dispute intensified) and placed its forces on alert in one of the border provinces (December 1996).

The militarized dispute persisted for many years. As it continued, third-parties tried to restore diplomatic relations between the neighboring states.<sup>29</sup> Qatar mediated first from 9-10 November 1998. As a result of their efforts, the disputants signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which they agreed to resolve the dispute peacefully through additional, future talks. The success of Qatar's efforts was short-lived, however, as Sudan claimed shortly thereafter that Eritrea was amassing troops along its border and placed its forces on alert. Gaddafi (Libya) then mediated between the presidents of Eritrea and Sudan in Tripoli on 16-17 April 1999. Libya secured an agreement for further talks at this meeting. Finally, the presidents of Eritrea and Sudan held negotiations in Doha, Qatar on 2-3 May 1999. This Qatari mediation resulted in the signing of a reconciliation accord. Eritrea and Sudan subsequently resumed diplomatic relations on 4 January 2000.

The pattern of interventions contained within this dispute most closely matches the predictions of the learning model. From the outset, third-parties found that mediation effectively produced short-term success. For example, the first Qatari mediation produced an agreement that recommitted the disputants to diplomatic conflict management. Although this agreement failed in the long-term, it succeeded in its short-term goal of getting the parties to the table and obtaining a pledge to adhere to peaceful conflict management mechanisms. Given Qatar's initial success, Libya turned to mediation when they intervened next in the trajectory. The Libyan mediation

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<sup>29</sup> In addition to the mediators that follow, Eritrea requested additional mediation efforts by Yemen. There is no evidence that Yemen acted upon this request.

once again produced a recommitment to negotiations (rather than violence). Qatar then used mediation shortly after Libya's intervention to facilitate the signing of a reconciliation agreement. Thus, third-parties repeatedly employed strategies that recently proved successful, in accordance with the expectations of the learning model (Hypothesis 2a).

As noted earlier, the trajectory shape predicted by the learning model can look similar to the shapes predicted by other models. Distinguishing between the learning model and its alternatives can therefore be challenging, but it depends primarily on the repeated use of previously successful strategies and the avoidance of previously unsuccessful strategies. For example, the pure cost model and limited commitments model can account for the general shape of the intervention pattern within the Eritrea-Sudanese dispute. Third-parties did not use *less costly* strategies over the course of the dispute (the converse of Hypothesis 1a; pure cost model prediction), nor did they foray beyond mediation into more costly strategies (Hypothesis 1f; limited commitments model). Similarly, it is plausible that random behavior might occasionally produce three mediations in a row<sup>30</sup> (thereby allowing the random model to explain this trajectory's shape). Yet none of the alternative models can account for both the trajectory's shape *and* the finding that third-parties always re-used a strategy that was previously successful in the trajectory. Because the learning model can account for both factors, it explains this trajectory better than the alternative explanations.

This, however, does not address the question of when the learning model might occur. The Eritrea-Sudan and Uganda-Sudan disputes both share a key characteristic: the involvement of rebel groups that sought to overthrow the disputing states. They also contain a common

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<sup>30</sup> Within a trajectory, the probability of an initial mediation followed by two additional mediations is 0.0599 (or  $0.500 * 0.346 * 0.346$ ; see Tables 4.5 and 5.1).

disputant (Sudan). Therefore, it seems reasonable to ask why third-parties learned in the Eritrea-Sudan dispute but not the Uganda-Sudan one.

Although a definitive answer to such a question requires additional casework, two key features separate these disputes. First, the Eritrea-Sudan case only involved third-party *states*. Unlike in the Uganda-Sudan dispute, organizations remained out of the Eritrea-Sudan conflict. Perhaps learning occurs poorly within coalitions and organizations. This seems plausible, as lessons may not be thoroughly felt by all state members (within a multilateral body) that collectively authorize multilateral action. State leaders may instead learn lessons only from events that affect them directly (Jervis 1978). If this is true, learning occurs best among third-party states.<sup>31</sup>

Second, all of the states that intervened within the Eritrea-Sudanese dispute came from the same *region* (the Middle East and North Africa; see Buzan and Waever 2003 for regional definitions). In contrast, the Uganda-Sudan dispute experienced intervention efforts by third-parties from multiple regions (for example, Russia, Malawi, and Iran, among others). A similar regional context may facilitate learning across third-parties. When third-parties belong to the same region, they may view information through a similar cultural lens, understand the complexity of regional relationships, and subscribe to a similar interpretation of both security issues and how to address them (Buzan and Waever 2003). Each of these helps third-parties convey information to one another, particularly about regional security issues.

Based on these premises, it therefore seems likely that the learning model occurs within disputes that: (a) contain a minimal number of multilateral interventions, and (b) elicit interventions from states within the same region. Future research might consider these factors

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<sup>31</sup> I note, however, that Chapter 4 did not find evidence of state actors learning in the manner proposed by the learning model.

when investigating the conditions under which the learning model might occur. I return to potential variations on this model in the next chapter.

### *Random Model*

On 11 September 2001, two terrorist attacks occurred in the United States – one in New York and another in Washington, DC. Osama bin Laden (as the head of al-Qaeda) took responsibility for these attacks, and because he was allegedly in Afghanistan, a militarized dispute began between Afghanistan (the Taliban government) on the one hand and the United States (which wanted retribution for the attacks) and its allies on the other. In the days immediately after the attacks, the US proposed military attacks against the Taliban government (Afghan state) if the Taliban did not turn bin Laden over to them. On 15 September, the US, Britain, and France deployed naval forces to the Indian Ocean – both as a show of force and to prepare for any potential military action.

In the first week after the 9/11 attacks, a stalemate developed between the US, which demanded bin Laden, and Afghanistan, which sought to preserve its government and protect one of its key constituents (Bueno de Mesquita 2010). The Taliban government responded to the deployment of western military forces by publicly protesting the threat of a military attack (on the grounds that such an action violated its sovereignty) and threatening its neighbors that providing any assistance to the US was essentially an act of war against Afghanistan. On 17 September, US President George W. Bush reissued its demand that Afghanistan surrender bin Laden or face military strikes. In response to this second threat, Afghanistan placed its forces on alert and constructed anti-aircraft units around Kandahar.

As the stalemate solidified, Afghanistan's neighbors both prepared for a US-led attack and tried to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Tajikistan (Afghanistan's neighbor to the north), for example, placed its forces on alert immediately after the western deployment. Russia placed its forces in Tajikistan on alert shortly thereafter. Pakistan (Afghanistan's southern neighbor) closed its border with Afghanistan. It also tried to mediate the dispute expeditiously. By 17-18 September, Afghan-Pakistani talks produced a list of conditions under which Afghanistan agreed to extradite bin Laden.

President Bush would not agree to these conditions, however, arguing that bin Laden must be expedited unconditionally in order to be held responsible for the terrorist attacks upon the US. Without further movement from Afghanistan, the US moved military planes within striking distance of Afghanistan and threatened further military build-ups. Meanwhile, the international community tried to derail the impending attack and handle its potential consequences. Iran established camps for refugees that fled from Afghanistan to Iran, the Turkmen president offered to mediate (24 September), and the United Arab Emirates defense minister urged negotiations rather than violence (26 September). Despite these efforts, the Taliban foreign minister finally ruled out the extradition of bin Laden on 29 September 2001.<sup>32</sup>

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan proceeded in two phases. First, approximately one week after the Taliban refused to consider bin Laden's extradition (on 7 October), the US began its air campaign against Afghanistan and signed an agreement to use Uzbek territory, airfields and airspace. Afghanistan threatened the US and Uzbekistan not to launch a ground operation from Uzbekistan and deployed troops to the Afghan-Uzbek border (in the north) to preclude such an attack. As the air campaign unfolded, Japan sent humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in Iran

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<sup>32</sup> On 29 September, a 10-member delegation of religious scholars from Pakistan visited Afghan officials to discuss various proposals for resolving the Afghan-US crisis. Because this intervention is not performed by a state, coalition, or intergovernmental organization, I do not currently include it within the trajectory analysis.

on 9 October. Second, after the aerial assault had continued for two weeks (on 19 October), the US started ground operations against Afghanistan. Japan again sent humanitarian aid – this time to Afghan refugees in Tajikistan (20 October).<sup>33</sup>

On 14 November, the Taliban withdrew from Kabul and opposition forces captured the Afghan capital. This formally terminated the US dispute with the Afghan government, and the conflict converted to an intrastate nation-building operation. Throughout the dispute, various members of the US-led international coalition against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks entered and exited the dispute, as troops were deployed, attacked, or placed on alert. These participants included: Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Tajikistan, Canada, France, Turkey, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Australia, in addition to those already mentioned.

In retrospect, third-parties intervened regularly in the US-Afghan dispute. Yet these interventions follow no clear pattern. The interventions began with a Pakistani mediation, after which Iran offered humanitarian assistance to refugees (an administrative intervention – a more costly strategy than mediation). As the possibility of military action climbed, third parties turned to the least costly strategy at their disposal: verbal interventions. The UAE and Turkmenistan offered assistance and plead for negotiations. Finally, as the verbal pleas failed to halt the threats and violence, Japan sent humanitarian aid to Iran and Tajikistan (administrative interventions). Both of these latter interventions involved more costly strategies than either verbal interventions or mediation.<sup>34</sup>

Lacking a clear pattern, the interventions within this dispute lend support to the random model (Hypothesis 3). Further support derives from the inability of the other models to explain

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<sup>33</sup> Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres) sent humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees via Turkmenistan on 13 November. Because this intervention is not performed by a state, coalition, or intergovernmental organization, I do not currently include it within the trajectory analysis.

<sup>34</sup> There is also no evidence that these efforts were coordinated.

them. For example, the pure cost model predicts that third-parties escalate their intervention over the course of a trajectory, from relatively less costly strategies to more costly ones. This expectation, however, does not describe third-party behavior within the US-Afghan dispute. Third-parties cycled regularly between relatively more costly strategies (for example, administrative interventions) and less costly strategies (for example, verbal pleas). No consistent escalation occurred. Similarly, the limited commitments model fails to fully account for third-party behavior in this dispute. It predicts that third-parties do not regularly turn to intervention strategies that are more costly than mediation. Yet of the six interventions in this dispute, three of them (or 50%) involved strategies whose costs exceed mediation's (that is, the administrative strategies). Such behavior does not display sensitivity to a critical threshold (at the mediation category), as the limited commitments model predicts. Finally, the learning model cannot account for this dispute's intervention patterns either. It predicts that third-parties should repeat successful strategies in successive interventions. Yet when Pakistani good offices caused the Taliban to waiver on their initial position and offer conditions under which bin Laden might be extradited, the next third-party did not try mediation again. It therefore appears that third-parties did not learn in this dispute as the learning model might expect. Absent a clear pattern that describes the interventions within this dispute, it therefore appears that third-parties behaved randomly.<sup>35</sup>

The random model rarely appears empirically, so why did it develop in this case? Most likely, it results from the consensus within the international community about what actions the US could take in retaliation for the terrorist attacks. In the weeks after September 11 (but before the US invasion), the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted two resolutions that

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<sup>35</sup> Most trajectories do not contain random behavior, as evidenced by the empirical results presented in the previous chapter.

condemned the attacks, pledged support to bring those responsible to justice, and recognized the right of *individual* and collective self-defense.<sup>36</sup> Although each of these implies international support for the US (and the United Nations regularly condemns violence), the latter point suggests that the international community tacitly (and unanimously) agreed to a US *military* response against bin Laden and, if necessary, Afghanistan.<sup>37</sup>

Given such a clear consensus, it is not surprising that third-party behavior followed a random pattern. The international norm is for *peaceful* dispute resolution (for example, see the UN Charter).<sup>38</sup> When the international community decides to suspend that norm, third-parties can no longer develop expectations or make intervention decisions based upon it. For example, third-parties cannot ascertain in such cases whether the community expects them to intervene diplomatically or non-diplomatically (that is, coercively). The absence of a stable norm creates a series of interventions that do not seemingly go together. It therefore appears that the random model may apply best to disputes in which the international community decides to permit (explicitly or implicitly) violent conflict management mechanisms.

## Conclusion

At the outset of this chapter, I asked three broad questions that were designed to connect the concept of trajectories with the empirical world. First, how can trajectories inform those who practice conflict management within international disputes? Second, when a militarized dispute occurs between states, what can potential third-parties expect from those that might get involved in the management of that dispute? Finally, can the theoretical models of trajectories describe

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<sup>36</sup> See United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001. These resolutions and the voting record are available at: <http://un.org>.

<sup>37</sup> Many major states assisted in the US military response, particularly members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

<sup>38</sup> The United Nations Charter is available online at: <http://un.org>.

empirical cases of conflict management within individual disputes? This chapter demonstrates that the concept of trajectories has something meaningful to say in response to each.

Simulations address the first two questions directly, and they yield a number of concrete predictions to those making intervention decisions. These predictions offer policy-makers insight into how other third-parties are expected to intervene within a dispute, as well as information with which to make more informed intervention decisions. For example, one key finding of the simulations notes that the likelihood of a future mediation falls over the course of a trajectory when the initial intervention in that trajectory involved mediation. From such a finding, third-parties understand what to expect from other potential third-parties at each point in a trajectory as well as how third-party behavior will likely evolve during a trajectory. Armed with these insights, they can then make more informed decisions. For example, the mediation finding above dispels the myth that interested third-parties (that is, those that want the dispute managed diplomatically) can afford to wait for someone else to intervene. In the end, these simulations do not change the reality that third-parties have limited resources with which to intervene. They do, however, offer third-parties more information that may permit them to deploy those resources more efficiently in the pursuit of peace.

I address the final question through brief empirical illustrations of the theoretical models. Drawing off of the narratives constructed for this project, I demonstrate that each of the theoretical models listed earlier finds at least one empirical referent during the period 1993-2001. Thus, while the last chapter asserts that the limited commitments model and pure cost model best explain third-party intervention behavior *overall*, this chapter concludes that the remaining models (the learning and random models) have at least some empirical validity. The learning and random models may only explain a small percentage of trajectories, but their ability to explain

even this small set of cases cautions against discarding them entirely. Future research will need to develop the conditions under which these various models appear.

## Tables

**Table 5.1: Initial Intervention – Distribution over Strategies**

	All Initiation Interventions (Trajectory and Non-Trajectory)
Verbal	97 (41.45%)
Mediation	117 (50.00%)
Legal	8 (3.42%)
Administrative	4 (1.71%)
Peace Operations	8 (3.42%)
Total	234

**Table 5.2: Simulated Trajectory Path (Starting Point – Distribution over Strategies)**

Intervention Number	Likelihood of Using Each Strategy				
	Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
1	0.4145	0.5000	0.0342	0.0171	0.0342
2	0.6190	0.2851	0.0089	0.0292	0.0577
3	0.6648	0.2556	0.0075	0.0246	0.0475
4	0.6785	0.2479	0.0070	0.0231	0.0435
5	0.6827	0.2455	0.0069	0.0226	0.0423
6	0.6840	0.2448	0.0069	0.0225	0.0419
7	0.6844	0.2446	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417
8	0.6845	0.2445	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417
9	0.6846	0.2445	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417
10	0.6846	0.2445	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417

**Table 5.3: Simulated Trajectory Path (Starting Point – Verbal Plea)**

Intervention Number	Likelihood of Using Each Strategy				
	Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
1	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
2	0.7730	0.1930	0.0040	0.0130	0.0170
3	0.7118	0.2292	0.0060	0.0195	0.0336
4	0.6930	0.2397	0.0066	0.0215	0.0391
5	0.6872	0.2430	0.0068	0.0221	0.0409
6	0.6854	0.2440	0.0068	0.0223	0.0414
7	0.6849	0.2443	0.0068	0.0224	0.0416
8	0.6847	0.2444	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417
9	0.6846	0.2444	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417
10	0.6846	0.2445	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417

**Table 5.4: Simulated Trajectory Path (Starting Point – Mediation)**

Intervention Number	Likelihood of Using Each Strategy				
	Verbal	Mediation	Legal	Administrative	Peace Operations
1	0.0000	1.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
2	0.5230	0.3460	0.0120	0.0390	0.0800
3	0.6360	0.2719	0.0084	0.0277	0.0560
4	0.6695	0.2529	0.0073	0.0241	0.0462
5	0.6799	0.2471	0.0070	0.0229	0.0431
6	0.6831	0.2453	0.0069	0.0226	0.0421
7	0.6841	0.2447	0.0069	0.0225	0.0418
8	0.6845	0.2445	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417
9	0.6846	0.2445	0.0068	0.0224	0.0147
10	0.6846	0.2445	0.0068	0.0224	0.0417

## Chapter 6

### Implications and Conclusion

“If conflicts have gone unresolved, it is not because techniques for peaceful settlement were unknown or inadequate.”

– Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*

What have we learned about third-party intervention behavior as a result of this study, and what are the implications of these findings for conflict management research and for those making policy decisions? Four broad conclusions follow from a synthesis of the material discussed earlier. First (and most importantly), third-party intervention behavior is not random over the course of a dispute. Instead, I find that there is a “method to the madness.” When third-parties select intervention strategies (within a trajectory), they pay attention to two things: the efforts of the third-party that previously intervened in the dispute and the relative costs of intervention strategies available to them (the pure cost model).<sup>1</sup> In the vast majority of interventions, third-parties overwhelmingly adopt low-cost strategies, rather than the relatively more costly alternatives. Furthermore, when they desire a relatively more costly strategy (especially for an initial intervention), third-party states frequently turn to coalitions and intergovernmental organizations. This multilateral action allows them to disperse the intervention costs over a number of state actors, thereby reducing the costs borne by any one state. Simply put, third-parties care greatly about intervention costs.

Yet costs are not the only factor third-parties consider when making intervention decisions. If they were, we would expect to see low-cost verbal pleas used almost exclusively

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<sup>1</sup> The results of this study suggest that third-parties do *not* pay attention to the success or failure of previous interventions (the learning model). I discuss potential variants of the learning model below. Testing the predictions of those variants would allow more definite conclusions regarding the validity of a behavioral learning model.

(when intervention occurs), a consistent adoption of relatively less costly strategies (as opposed to the higher cost alternatives), or an escalation of third-party involvement that proceeds from low-cost to high-cost strategies over the course of a trajectory. I find none of these things. Instead, I note that third-parties rely on mediation frequently – in some cases, as often as they issue verbal pleas – and are significantly less likely to use *any* strategies more costly than mediation. A precipice (or threshold) emerges between the frequent use of verbal and mediation strategies on the one hand and the much rarer use of legal, administrative, and peace operations strategies on the other.

Why does this precipice occur? Two potential explanations exist that offer insight into the phenomenon. The first focuses upon the third-party, whose behavior may result from two sources – a lack of *opportunity* or *willingness* (Most and Starr 1989). On the one hand, it is possible that third-parties do not possess the resources to intervene in disputes with more costly strategies either because their resources are tied up in separate interventions (that is, third-parties have reached their carrying capacity) or because they simply have no resources with which to intervene. In other words, perhaps third-parties do not have the opportunity to intervene with the relatively more costly strategies. While certainly a possible explanation, it seems unlikely that third-parties frequently want to intervene, but lack the resources to do so. Were this true, we might expect verbal pleas (which cost little substantively) to reference a lack of intervention resources or encourage the involvement of another third-party with excess resources (for example, the United States). In other words, if third-parties care to have the conflict managed more actively by *someone*, they should be intervening with the resources they have while simultaneously campaigning for a more costly strategy – perhaps even encouraging potential

third-parties with resources to get involved. I do not, however, observe this behavior within verbal pleas.

On the other hand, third-parties may have the resources with which to intervene but may not *want* to do so. This argument is admittedly more pessimistic than the previous one, but it makes sense empirically. Potential third-parties are aware of the full menu of conflict management strategies, but many of those strategies remain underutilized nonetheless (see Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; see also Claude 1984). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that the failure of a key constituency to support intervention regularly undercuts third-party action. This holds for state actors, as well as coalitions and organizations. For example, during the Rwandan genocide, neither individual members of the United Nations (Albright 2003) nor the organization itself (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) desired or advocated on behalf of greater third-party involvement. Although an intrastate conflict setting, Rwanda demonstrates that constituencies that do not support intervention efforts can successfully block third-party action.

Of course, responsibility for inaction does not lay entirely with third-parties. A second possible explanation for the precipice therefore involves the disputants' desires. Most of the strategies contained in the full menu (see Table 1.1) require the consent (either active or passive) of disputants in order to function well or occur at all. For example, a third-party can conduct a fact-finding mission (a form of mediation) without the disputants' consent, but the intervention proceeds more easily when the disputants cooperate. Other forms of mediation (in which the third-party facilitates negotiations between the disputants), arbitration, adjudication, administrative strategies (for example, overseeing elections), and peace operations cannot occur without the disputants' permission.<sup>2</sup> It is therefore possible that the disputants, not the third-

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<sup>2</sup> Adjudication does not demand the disputants' consent in each case, but it does require states to grant the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction (in some capacity) before the ICJ can hear a case. States can also

parties, create the precipice.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the disputants withhold permission for third-parties to use strategies that are more costly than mediation.<sup>4</sup>

Whether third-party or disputant behavior produces the observed precipice, it exists in the same place along the cost continuum of strategies. Third-parties regularly rely upon mediation and verbal strategies, but limit their use of strategies that are more costly than mediation. I argue earlier that mediation serves as the threshold because it offers the third-party a way to balance its desire to intervene actively (that is, to get directly involved in the management of a dispute, as opposed to issuing verbal pleas) with their preference to reduce intervention costs. It also generates fewer resource and audience costs for the third-party.

In addition to the advantages afforded to third-parties, disputants benefit from mediation as well. As third-parties move from relatively less costly to more costly strategies, disputants lose an increasing amount of control over the conflict management process. For example, in mediation, disputants retain final veto authority over any agreement. Although the mediator can assist the disputants with crafting an agreement and pressure them to sign it, the disputants must ultimately accept it. In contrast, arbitration usually requires disputants to agree *in advance* that they will accept the arbiter's decision, even if they do not like that subsequent decision. Similarly, adjudication can produce rulings that disputants do not support (and can even force disputants to make restitution, as the International Court of Justice did with Uganda regarding its involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's civil war). Finally, administrative tasks

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attach conditions to their acceptance of the court's jurisdiction (for example, that it is valid for only a certain period of time). For more information, see the Statutes of the ICJ, which are available online at: <http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0>.

<sup>3</sup> Disputants may especially restrict the use of legal strategies, since arbitration and adjudication generally require them to give up control over both the conflict management process and outcome (that is, ruling). See Gent and Shannon (2011).

<sup>4</sup> A third explanation might note that relatively more costly strategies are not amenable to repeated use within a trajectory. Yet this explanation is not satisfying, for the precipice exists consistently across every intervention within the trajectory. In other words, it is not the case that each trajectory has one more costly intervention and cannot sustain another. Third-parties *always* choose to rely significantly less on the more costly strategies.

(for example, temporary administration of a territory, election monitoring, repatriation of refugees) and peace operations require disputants to accept a civilian or military mission that inhibits their policy autonomy. With a third-party overseeing elections, providing aid to civilians, or overseeing a cease-fire, disputants cannot pursue *any* policy they choose, at least not without flagging the attention of and (possibly a) response by the third-party (see Claude 1984).

As third-parties adopt more costly intervention strategies, they therefore become more involved in the dispute itself, thereby limiting the policy options available to disputants. It stands to reason, then, that disputants can maximize their policy alternatives (and autonomy) by restricting the role of third-parties. Yet third-parties will often want to manage disputes actively (for the reasons outlined in Chapter 2), which suggests that disputants need to allow more than mere verbal pleas. Disputants can therefore balance the third-party's desire for active conflict management and their preference for a limited third-party role by consenting to intervention strategies that are no more costly than mediation. This allows third-parties a larger, more direct role in the management of the dispute, but preserves the greatest number of policy options and amount of autonomy possible for the disputants.

More than likely, a combination of third-party (un)willingness and disputant consent work together to generate this result, for both factors are required for an intervention to occur. Whatever the explanation for the precipice, it consistently appears throughout the analyses contained in this study and therefore lends strong support to the limited commitments model.<sup>5</sup> Note, however, that finding empirical support for the limited commitments model is not simply a statement that third-parties do not like to send troops abroad. Such a statement is consistent with the conclusions of this study, but the findings I present go beyond this statement. In particular, I

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<sup>5</sup> Future research might consider investigating whether third-parties or disputants play a larger role in causing this precipice.

identify a *precise threshold* (both theoretically and empirically) that third-parties are generally unwilling to cross. When conflict management strategies are arranged along a cost continuum, the analysis suggests that third-parties are reluctant to employ strategies that are more costly than mediation. This certainly includes the deployment of military forces under a peace operation, but third-parties avoid other strategies as well. For example, third-parties generally do not employ legal or administrative strategies either, even though neither one demands the deployment of troops.

The identification of a precise threshold is novel, and it offers a number of policy implications. First, disputants that *want* more active involvement from third-parties need to seek it. Similarly, potential third-parties that would like a more active intervention must undertake one. These seem like rather obvious statements, but they are necessary to articulate nonetheless. Absent such findings, potential third-parties might believe that they can afford to wait for someone else to conduct an intervention on their behalf (that is, free ride). After all, peace is a public good, and the cheapest intervention is the one for which an actor pays nothing. The results of this study, however, strongly undercut such free-riding arguments. Third-parties may believe that they can wait for another actor to intervene, but this is highly unlikely to occur. Disputants might similarly expect third-parties to come to their aid with costly interventions (especially if they are weaker than their opponent), but such interventions are not the norm. As this analysis shows, third-parties are highly unlikely to do anything more than mediate.

Although this is bad news for those that *want* third-parties to be more involved, it is good news for disputants that seek to *constrain* third-party interventions. Richmond (1998), for example, proposes that states can use mediation sessions as a reprieve from battle and to prepare for renewed military hostilities. If it is true that third-parties will do little more than mediate, then

the implication is that disputants can safely use mediation for such “devious objectives.” In fact, disputants may even authorize the involvement of “weak” mediators (that is, those that lack leverage over the disputants) to accomplish this goal (Beardsley 2009). As the disputants prepare for further hostilities, they can then rest assured not only that the mediator will be unable to compel them to accept an agreement, but also that third-party involvement will likely not escalate.

Second, once third-parties begin using strategies that are more costly than mediation, they are more likely to continue doing so. In practical terms, this implies that the main obstacle to costly interventions involves getting *any* third-party to use legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies. Once one intervention exceeds that threshold, others are more likely to follow. Disputants that *want* greater third-party intervention might therefore strategically focus upon the potential third-parties that they believe are most likely to cross the threshold. Even if the first third-party to cross that threshold lacks the resources for a long-term commitment or is not the disputant’s first preference for an intervening third-party, the disputant may have an easier time securing a commitment for intervention from a more desirous third-party once the threshold has been breached. Similarly, third-parties that have a vested interest in a dispute’s management but prefer to free-ride on another’s intervention should watch this threshold closely. If it is crossed, the chances increase that another third-party will intervene with a relatively costly strategy (that is, using strategies more costly than mediation *if they intervene*), and this might allow them to remain on the sidelines.

In addition to the policy implications, this finding raises a theoretical issue as well. Although it is understandable that third-parties may not want to deploy large civilian or military missions (for administrative and peace operations interventions respectively), the failure to use

legal strategies causes some concern. I consistently find that legal strategies are used less frequently than *any other strategy*. In practical terms, this means that third-parties deploy peace operations more often than they turn to arbitration or adjudication. Such a finding echoes the work of others. For example, Bercovitch and Jackson (2009) note that arbitration is rare, especially within the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Furthermore, they find that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) averages two decisions a year and remained out of every serious conflict during the twentieth century (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009:56).<sup>6</sup>

Given the low marginal cost of adding an additional case to a docket, one would expect this strategy to be used much more often than it is.<sup>7</sup> More than likely, the infrequent resort to legal strategies rests in the hands of disputants, who do not want to lose control over the resolution of their dispute by permitting arbitration or adjudication (Gent and Shannon 2011; see also Claude 1984). Regardless of which actor(s) causes the trend, it is clear that international legal bodies (for example, the PCA or ICJ) have been established to handle international disputes, that they are not at their carrying capacity, and therefore, that third-parties might make better use of them. This will undoubtedly require third-parties to pressure disputants to work through legal channels, but given the success of legal strategies at addressing interstate territorial disputes (for example, that between Honduras and El Salvador), these channels hold great promise for helping manage international disputes over numerous issue areas.

A second conclusion drawn from the synthesis of this study's results involves the (lack of a) connection between third-party characteristics and intervention decisions. Simply put, third-

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<sup>6</sup> ICJ hearings also proceed very slowly, which partially explains the low decision rate.

<sup>7</sup> Not all disputes will involve legal issues. Yet this does not mean that third-parties cannot make use of legal strategies. For example, arbitration need not involve legal issues (although it often does). As Isenhardt and Spangle (2000) note, arbitration is an informal process that does not (need to) follow standard rules for introducing evidence or issuing rulings. Furthermore, the disputants can choose the arbitrator if they like. It therefore differs substantially from adjudication, which is often more formal, follows strict legal procedures, documents the rationale for rulings thoroughly, and does not permit disputants to select the judge(s) that will hear the case.

party characteristics do not seem to strongly affect the selection of intervention strategies within trajectories (given that the decision to intervene has already been made). In other words, once a trajectory is underway, intervening third-party IGOs select strategies in a manner similar to coalitions and states. Furthermore, major states intervene similarly to minor states, allies like non-allies, and neighbors like non-neighbors.<sup>8</sup> Although there are certainly *minor* variations in behavior that depend upon third-party characteristics, these differences are not (statistically) significant. This is an important revelation, for much of the existing conflict management research tends to focus upon third-party characteristics. It asks questions about which third-parties are most likely to intervene (for example, Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Frazier 2006; Greig 2001, 2005; Greig and Regan 2008) or restricts its attention to the behavior of only one third-party (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006). The (sometimes implicit) assumption is that third-party characteristics drastically change intervention behavior.

This study demonstrates, however, that such an assumption is not always valid. I find that when one examines multiple third-parties and focuses upon *strategy selection* within trajectories (instead of the initial decision to intervene), third-party characteristics do not matter. Instead, third-parties make similar decisions about how to intervene, despite the different characteristics and resources that they possess. From a theoretical perspective, this finding calls upon scholars to rethink their assumption that third-party characteristics always affect intervention decisions.

Such a conclusion, however, does not refute the earlier work that finds third-party characteristics important, as I ask a slightly different question than they do. In particular, I focus upon strategy selection decisions within trajectories, given that the decision to intervene has already been made. In contrast, most conflict management research examines the decision to intervene while (often) holding the selection of strategy constant (the converse of this study; see

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<sup>8</sup> The results do not change if I consider regional powers instead of major powers.

Chapter 2 for more information on these decisions).<sup>9</sup> It is entirely plausible that third-party characteristics matter for the former decision, but not the latter.

Despite this limitation, a number of theoretical implications result from my finding. First, although examining variation in third-party characteristics has provided a number of insights about their intervention behavior, it only tells part of the story. Third-party characteristics do not matter in every context; therefore, researchers need to consider in more detail the conditions under which third-parties might behave similarly and those under which intervention behavior should differ. We should not always assume that third-party characteristics affect intervention decisions.

Second, from a more practical perspective, disputants that want a particular intervention need not court only one actor. For example, the United Nations is as likely to select mediation along each point of a trajectory as a major power, a neighboring state, an ally, or even a minor power. This holds for relatively low-cost and high-cost strategies, and suggests, as before, that disputants desiring third-party intervention should cast their net wide. There is no need to wait for a *specific* third-party, as third-parties will make similar decisions once they commit to intervention.

Finally, although the United Nations (UN) holds a place of prominence in the international community and has extensive experience with certain strategies (for example, peace operations), potential third-parties should not rely on it as a panacea for producing peace. Once involved in a dispute, the UN makes decisions that are similar to those of other third-parties.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, if the UN (or regional organizations or major powers) is unable or unwilling to act,

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<sup>9</sup> When researchers restrict a study to include only one conflict management strategy, they are, in effect, holding the selection of strategy decision constant.

<sup>10</sup> I also note that this finding echoes realist arguments that institutions simply reflect the desires of state members. See Mearsheimer (1994/1995).

the international community can turn to other actors, confident that those other third-parties will make similar intervention decisions. Relying on other third-parties may cause the UN's (or another's) experience to go to waste in a given dispute, but sometimes intervening matters more to conflict management than withheld expertise.

The third broad conclusion addresses the timing of intervention. The greatest chances of mediation generally occur early in a dispute. In fact, between the first and sixth interventions within a trajectory, the likelihood that mediation will occur at each intervention gets cut in half. This finding (derived from simulated trajectories in Chapter 5) contains policy implications for both disputants and third-parties. First, although some disputants may use mediations to plan for future hostilities (Richmond 1998), others may legitimately need the involvement of a third-party to effectively manage their dispute. Yet desiring third-party involvement does not translate easily into a greater likelihood of reaching an agreement. Even if disputants want third-parties to help them, they may need multiple mediations before even approaching an agreement – either because they adopt an extreme negotiating position, fear making concessions (due to domestic audience costs or the potential precedent that those concessions might create), or simply need time to understand the mediation process (on this latter point, see Greig and Diehl 2006). Unfortunately, this study finds that the chance of multiple mediations is not great.<sup>11</sup> Disputants therefore should exercise caution when withholding consent for mediation or adopting tough bargaining positions early in a dispute. Although these actions may appease domestic constituents or avoid a precedent-setting concession, they also may let the chance for an agreement slip away.

Second, by monitoring the first two moves in the trajectory, the international community learns quickly whether the chances of a meaningful intervention (that is, something involving

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<sup>11</sup> The reason for this needs to be examined further. Earlier, I propose two potential avenues to investigate – namely, that third-parties either must turn their attention to other events (which moves the dispute to a back burner) or simply “give up” on the dispute altogether (that is, decide not to “try harder”).

more than a verbal plea) are increasing or decreasing.<sup>12</sup> As noted above, the chances of mediation generally fall over the course of a trajectory. Furthermore, the likelihood of a legal, administrative, or peace operation tends to decline after the second intervention in a trajectory. Simply by watching the first two interventions, then, third-parties receive a strong indication of whether others are likely to meaningfully handle a dispute. Armed with such knowledge, the international community can better decide where to deploy its limited resources. An overburdened (or free-riding) third-party (for example, the UN) may decide to let others handle a dispute, but if it persists, these third-parties may need to step in, lest the trajectory devolve into a cycle of verbal pleas.

It is worth reiterating that this conclusion results from simulations. In order for it to retain its accuracy, intervention behavior must remain relatively constant in the future. If it does not, then the simulation may inaccurately predict third-party behavior. For example, if third-parties suddenly increase the frequency with which they resort to legal strategies, this may alter the simulation's forecasts. Despite this (minor) limitation, any drastic changes in intervention behavior could be incorporated into a revised simulation that would then produce updated predictions.

As a final conclusion derived from a synthesis of this project's findings, I note that the selection of strategies within trajectories does not change drastically after the cold war ends. At first glance, this seems like a benign finding. Yet scholars and practitioners regularly assert that the cold war's end brought a new spirit of cooperation to international conflict management (for example, see Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Mingst and Karns 2000). Although this watershed moment may have affected the decision to intervene and caused third-parties to intervene more

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<sup>12</sup> To provide a sense of real time to this analysis, during the period 1993-2001, the median wait time between interventions within a trajectory was 11 days (mode=1, first quartile=2, third quartile=42). Waiting for two interventions therefore amounts to a period of about 22 days.

frequently in intrastate conflicts (as opposed to interstate ones), it does not seem to have affected their selection of intervention strategies. This finding provides a sense of stability to the conclusions noted above. If the selection of intervention strategies does not change as a result of such a systemic shock, we should not expect it to change significantly in the future. Policy-makers can therefore take solace in the fact that the conclusions and predictions listed above should retain validity for the foreseeable future.

### **Toward A (Future) Research Agenda of Trajectories**

Although this project demonstrates that researching conflict trajectories can provide insight into the diplomatic behavior of third-parties, it also uncovers a number of theoretical questions that remain to be answered. In particular, four questions seem particularly important for a future research agenda involving trajectories.<sup>13</sup> First, what is the exact role of verbal interventions? Third-parties regularly intervene verbally in interstate disputes – either to plead for the use of diplomatic conflict management mechanisms instead of violence, to demand a cease-fire or troop withdrawal, or to offer their assistance in resolving a dispute. In fact, the preceding analysis suggests that such verbal interventions are used more often than any other category of strategies *within* trajectories (48% of all interventions; see Table 4.2) and comprise a significant number of *initial* interventions (that is, those that potentially begin trajectories – 41%; see Table 5.1). The empirical analyses also suggest that trajectories can easily devolve into a cycle of verbal strategies. It is therefore critical to understand these interventions better.

The current project provides some preliminary insight into why verbal interventions may be used so often – both at the outset of a (potential) trajectory and as a trajectory unfolds. I

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<sup>13</sup> In addition to the questions listed below, one might also relax the rationality assumption and investigate altruistic interventions. Although I suspect that there are few such interventions during the 1946-2001 period, such interventions may grow if the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) movement grows (see Bellamy 2010).

proposed earlier that third-parties may try to first manage a dispute through a verbal intervention as a way to indicate their interest in a dispute and to allow disputants to signal back to the third-party regarding their readiness for a more involved diplomatic intervention. If disputants cease the violence, return to the negotiating table, or withdraw troops in response to verbal pleas, this may signal to potential third-parties that more costly interventions (using mediation, legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies) are likely to yield successful results. In a world of limited resources, such signals may have an important place, as they would allow third-parties to efficiently deploy conflict management resources within conflict contexts that involve great uncertainty.<sup>14</sup>

If it is true that initial verbal interventions and the response to them function as signals of the third-party's interest in and the disputants' readiness for more involved forms of diplomatic intervention, we might expect to see two intervention behaviors after *successful* verbal interventions. First, third-parties should intervene faster after successful verbal interventions than after unsuccessful ones. Furthermore, during such interventions, these third-parties should use more costly conflict management strategies than verbal pleas. Having received the signal from disputants that third-parties should get more actively involved in managing the dispute, third-parties should do just that – and more quickly than if the signal indicated that greater third-party involvement was not yet appropriate (that is, a failed verbal intervention). If support for this prediction can be found, it would suggest that disputants tell potential third-parties when the conflict is “ripe” for effective management efforts (see Zartman 2000), thereby giving third-parties an added incentive to issue verbal demands initially and to watch the disputants' response.

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<sup>14</sup> Verbal pleas may also play a role in norm development or reinforcement or might complement more costly, ongoing interventions. I leave the former possibility for future research to consider and address the latter below.

Second, the preceding logic suggests that the *same third-party* should intervene (using more involved strategies and more quickly than other third-parties) after it successfully intervened verbally in a dispute. This prediction stems from the verbal intervention as an indication of a third-party's interest in a conflict, rather than the disputant's desire for intervention (as above). Simply put, if it is true that verbal interventions imply that a third-party would like to get more involved in a dispute, we should see them (as opposed to other third-parties) get more involved in the management of a conflict when disputants give them the green light to do so. By testing these two related predictions, it will be possible to determine whether initial verbal interventions have a strategic role in third-party intervention or merely amount to "cheap talk."<sup>15</sup>

In addition to using verbal strategies during initial interventions, third-parties also rely on them regularly as a trajectory develops. For example, verbal strategies are always among the top two strategies chosen by third-parties, regardless of the previous intervention strategy used in the trajectory. Furthermore, simulated trajectories reveal that the likelihood of third-parties using a verbal strategy at any given point in a trajectory is about 70%. This suggests that verbal strategies occupy a place of prominence in third-parties' intervention toolbox.

The theoretical models presented earlier suggest an explanation for this behavior as well. In particular, the limited commitments model predicts that third-parties regularly use both verbal and mediation strategies (as opposed to more costly strategies) to intervene in disputes because these strategies limit the intervention costs they bear. Future research could delve deeper into individual cases to determine whether the same third-parties are cycling between mediation and verbal interventions and whether verbal interventions come during mediation (or other interventions) as a way to complement the mediator's (or other third-party's) activities (see

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<sup>15</sup> On cheap talk within mediation, see Kydd (2003).

below). Only with more in depth case analysis can we understand why certain third-parties issue verbal pleas (and others do not) and appreciate what value these statements have.

The second question in a research agenda on trajectories involves overlapping interventions. I find that third-parties regularly perform overlapping interventions (that is, third-parties intervene during another ongoing intervention). To what extent are these overlapping interventions *complementary*? Preliminary evidence suggests that connections exist between overlapping interventions. The most obvious connection occurs when the same third-party performs more than one intervention at a time.<sup>16</sup> For example, during a dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in 1957 over the border town of Mocoron, Honduras, the Organization of American States (OAS) intervened three times (Frazier and Dixon 2006). It first established a commission of inquiry to investigate the dispute. While the commission collected facts (and before it officially issued its report), the OAS deployed a military observation force to the disputed area. Finally, with the military observation team in the field, the OAS created a conciliation commission to mediate an agreement between the disputants. In cases such as these, where a third-party intervenes during another ongoing intervention *conducted by it*, we would expect these interventions to complement one another.<sup>17</sup> Returning to the Honduras-Nicaragua dispute, the military observation team more than likely facilitated the efforts of both the fact-finding and conciliation teams.

A second manner in which overlapping interventions might be related involves the connection between intergovernmental organizations (IGO) and their members. As noted earlier,

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<sup>16</sup> Earlier, I referred to these as *simultaneous* interventions. Such interventions are a subset of overlapping interventions.

<sup>17</sup> The United Nations performs overlapping interventions regularly.

76% of overlapping interventions occur during an IGO-led intervention.<sup>18</sup> If the IGO members that authorized the collective intervention are also intervening during it, that behavior could offer a second connection between overlapping interventions. For example, during a dispute between North and South Yemen in 1972, the Arab League created a conciliation commission composed of representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, and Syria (Frazier and Dixon 2006). This team mediated two cease-fires, after which the Arab League deployed a military observation commission to monitor the cease-fire. It was during that team's deployment that Libya mediated again between North and South Yemen, building upon the earlier efforts of the conciliation committee (of which it was a member) and ultimately securing a merger agreement between the two Yemen states. In this case, a member that authorized and participated actively (and prominently) within the IGO-led interventions undertook its own mediation while the IGO intervention kept the peace.

A cursory review of the data suggests that this second explanation could account for a significant number of overlapping interventions that occur during an ongoing IGO-led intervention. Once cases of simultaneous interventions<sup>19</sup> are removed, 62% of overlapping interventions that occur during an IGO-led intervention are conducted by *state* actors. This provides *prima facie* evidence that IGO members might be intervening alongside the organization (states, rather than other organizations or coalitions, perform the majority of these interventions). Yet this alone does not indicate a clear (complementary) connection between overlapping interventions. It is one thing to observe a state intervening alongside an IGO to which it belongs, but it is quite another to assert that those interventions *complement* (or

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<sup>18</sup> Because simultaneous interventions are a subset of overlapping interventions, they are included in this figure. If simultaneous interventions (described above) are excluded, the reported statistic falls to 62%.

<sup>19</sup> These are cases in which the same third-party performs multiple concurrent interventions. In this case, because I am examining behavior during IGO-led interventions, these are instances of IGOs conducting concurrent interventions.

*contradict*) one another.<sup>20</sup> Detailed case research would need to explore these interventions in depth in order to establish whether a complementary relationship truly exists between them.<sup>21</sup>

Third, a research agenda focused upon trajectories needs to address the possibility that there are variants of the learning model that explain third-party behavior better than the one advanced earlier in this project. In particular, I proposed earlier (Chapter 2) that a simple, behavioral learning model required third-parties to repeat successful intervention strategies and avoid failed ones in successive interventions. This model implicitly makes two assumptions.<sup>22</sup> First, it assumes that third-parties learn from each other's interventions (that is, learning occurs *across* actors). Third-parties can see what strategies others have employed and adjust their interventions based on how the previous intervention fared, regardless of who performed that previous intervention. Second, it presumes that actors do not carry lessons from one dispute to the next (that is, learning occurs *within* disputes). When a new dispute begins, third-parties "start from scratch."

These assumptions have solid theoretical grounding. On the one hand, militarized disputes are well-publicized events, as are the interventions within them. Because third-parties therefore have access to information about the success or failure of the previous intervention (or can obtain it), it seems plausible that learning can occur across actors. On the other hand, each

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<sup>20</sup> Interventions need not complement one another. It is also possible that a third-party intervention *undermines* (that is, works against the goals of) an ongoing one. Case analysis would help identify such instances and the factors that differentiate them from complementary overlapping interventions.

<sup>21</sup> Another reason for detailed case analysis involves universal membership organizations (Pevehouse et al. 2004). To the extent that the IGO interventions involve universal membership organizations (such as the United Nations), we get no additional information by considering the relationship between the IGO and its members. For example, because all states are members of the UN, *any* state intervention can be connected to the organization. It therefore becomes meaningless to identify potential, complementary interventions according to state membership within such organizations (in methodological terms, we lose the control group because there are no potential non-members). Detailed casework, however, *can* determine whether interventions are complementary, even if they involve universal membership organizations.

<sup>22</sup> This model also presumes that a comprehensive resolution has not been achieved (or the trajectory ends). Given the focus on short-term success, however, this is not a problematic assumption for the construction and analysis of trajectories.

dispute presents a slightly unique set of circumstances. The disputants, their relative positions (both with respect to the issues under dispute and the location of military units), the issues under dispute, and numerous other factors change from one dispute to the next. It therefore seems plausible that third-parties do not merely apply old templates to new situations, but rather that they approach each dispute as if it was unique.

Despite theoretical arguments in support of the assumptions behind the learning model, it is possible to alter these assumptions in three ways and obtain slightly different predictions of how third-parties learn from interventions. First, instead of assuming that learning occurs across actors, it is possible to assume that learning is actor-specific. In other words, maybe disputants learn only from *their own* previous intervention, thereby restricting the interventions from which a third-party might draw inferences. Under such an assumption, a third-party must perform an intervention itself to learn the lessons about the strategies that succeed or fail in a given conflict. I suspect that this variant is rather myopic, since it requires third-parties to draw no lessons from others' behavior. Yet it is theoretically plausible. Jervis (1976), for example, proposes that actors learn from direct experience with dramatic events (see also Reiter 1994). Conducting an intervention provides a more direct and dramatic experience to a third-party than merely watching the activities of others.

Second, perhaps disputants learn from one another, but lessons are not dispute-specific. In other words, maybe third-parties carry lessons from one dispute to the next. Such a model predicts that third-parties pay attention to the most successful intervention strategy overall, rather than the one achieving the most success within a specific conflict. More specifically, one strategy will have a better track record than the others at any given moment in time – across third-party actors and disputes. As new conflicts arise, third-parties might simply apply this most successful

overall strategy to the nascent dispute. For example, suppose that mediation attains a higher success rate than the alternatives. As new disputes arise, third-parties may simply rely on mediation – until it is either no longer the most successful overall strategy or it fails within a dispute (and is therefore not a feasible strategy to use in that dispute).

Although plausible, I also suspect this variant to be rather myopic as well. It comes dangerously close to arguing that third-parties ignore conflict context and apply old templates to new conflicts, a behavior that policy makers explicitly reject.<sup>23</sup> To say that third-parties do not care where they are intervening does not match empirical reality. In the aftermath of Somalia, for example, the United States avoided Rwanda precisely because leaders perceived it as similar to Somalia. In contrast, the United States became more involved in Bosnia because it differed from Rwanda in many respects (particularly geographic location). Similarly, states send organizations to difficult conflict contexts (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003), which suggests that they do distinguish between different conflict contexts. Nonetheless, because it is plausible, future research should consider whether learning might occur across disputes.

Finally, a research agenda about conflict management trajectories needs to eventually address intrastate conflicts. Do trajectories within intrastate conflicts develop in ways that are similar to those found within interstate disputes, or do they display unique characteristics? Extending this project into the realm of civil conflicts is both natural and relevant. Not only do intrastate conflicts consistently outnumber interstate conflicts (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002; Harboom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Sarkees and Wayman 2010), but third-parties regularly intervene within them (Bercovitch and Derouen 2005; Doyle

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<sup>23</sup> For example, former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (2003:161) notes that “One of the most basic lessons taught by our experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti was that an arbitrarily rigid or cookie cutter approach would not work. Each situation was different, with a unique blend of history, personality, culture and politics.”

and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2004; Greig and Regan 2008; Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009). In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that diplomatic interventions within intrastate conflicts may exceed those found within interstate conflicts. For example, as early as 1992, the United Nations felt its peace operations resources shift substantially from interstate to intrastate conflict (Boutros-Ghali 1992).<sup>24</sup> Similarly, regional organizations deploy peace operations almost exclusively to intrastate conflicts (Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl 2010). Furthermore, the publicity received by conflicts within Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan (among others) suggests that intrastate conflicts both capture the attention of the public and have at least some place on the agenda of policy-makers.

How might trajectories differ within intrastate conflicts, as opposed to the interstate disputes analyzed in this project? Although a definitive answer requires further research, two factors derived from this project deserve consideration. First, it is highly likely that the limited commitments model generally explains intrastate trajectories as well. The more costly intervention strategies (for example, administrative and peace operations) generate additional costs when applied to intrastate conflict, since they often require the third-party to rebuild the institutions that undergird a functioning government and the provision of social services (see Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Diehl 2006a). The incentive of third-parties to get involved may be high, but so too should their desire to limit intervention costs, which can easily balloon out of control.

Yet the limited commitments model may not explain everything. I proposed in Chapter 5 that this model might apply best to interstate disputes that contain a significant sub-state actor

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<sup>24</sup> Although this implies that the UN did not deal with civil conflicts prior to 1992, such an implication is misguided. UN peace operations within the Congo (MONUC, 1960-1964), Lebanon (UNOGIL, 1958; UNIFIL 1978-present), and Yemen (UNYOM, 1963-1964) indicate that the organization did intervene in intrastate conflicts prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Coalitions and other organizations did likewise. For more information, see the data on peace operations compiled by the Henry L. Stimson Center at: <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/>.

capable of spoiling interstate cooperation. When applied to intrastate disputes, this prediction changes somewhat. In particular, we might expect the limited commitments model to do best when there exists more than one significant rebel group (that is, more than one rebel group capable of competing for power against other rebel groups). In the intrastate setting, these competing sub-state groups may undermine any potential agreements. Their presence may therefore make third-parties weary of costly interventions. For example, one of the obstacles to effective intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s involved warlords that competed for local power and interfered with (United States) intervention goals. As the potential for violence becomes more decentralized (that is, the number of rebel groups increase), third-parties may choose to limit their involvement, lest they incur casualties.

Second, I noted that the intervention behavior of regional powers did not differ from non-regional powers (at least concerning strategy selection). Yet third-parties within the same region as an intrastate conflict may pay that conflict greater attention than an interstate conflict. Interstate conflicts often must follow certain norms (for example, against killing civilians, respecting or returning to agreed upon international boundaries, abiding by international agreements). Intrastate conflicts do not generally follow such norms. Civilians are often not just killed, but also specifically targeted (for example, in Rwanda or Bosnia). International boundaries do not exist within states (by definition), so there is no reference point to which parties can return. And international agreements do not apply, since sub-state actors cannot create them. In short, many of the “rules of war” do not hold in intrastate conflicts.

This greater level of uncertainty may prompt regional actors to behave differently than non-regional actors within *intrastate* conflicts (even though they do not do so in interstate conflicts). In particular, regional actors may get more involved in the management of civil

conflicts using relatively more costly strategies. Preliminary empirical evidence supports this speculation. For example, Balas, Owsiak, and Diehl (2010) find that regional organizations deploy peace operations almost exclusively to intrastate conflicts. Future research should therefore investigate the intervention behavior of regional actors (states, coalitions, and organizations) within intrastate disputes in greater detail. Their lack of unique behavior at the interstate level may change substantially when one considers intrastate disputes. As this possibility makes clear, understanding intervention within interstate conflicts covers significant ground, but the picture remains incomplete without also accounting for interventions within intrastate conflict.

### **Some Concluding Thoughts**

At the outset of this study, I asked two related research questions. First, how does third-party intervention evolve over the course of a conflict? Second, what guides the choices that drive this evolution? I proposed that the answer lay in the construction and evaluation of conflict management trajectories. After outlining and testing a number of competing theories, I uncover an explanation of and predictions for how third-party interventions evolve during interstate disputes. Furthermore, I propose the mechanism by which third-parties select strategies from among a menu of possible options. Although the conclusions I reach are not the final word on this topic, they provide a strong foundation for future research and indicate that the concept of conflict management trajectories deserves greater attention.

Perhaps more importantly, one of the central goals of this project is to encourage scholars to broaden their approach to studying conflict management. Researchers regularly think in terms of one conflict management strategy at a time (as if mediation were unrelated to arbitration,

peace operations, or verbal pleas) and study instances of isolated interventions. Quite simply, this approach does not match the empirical reality. As I argue earlier, policy-makers, third-parties and disputants do not think in terms of isolated interventions, but rather, they pay attention to each others' interventions as they strive to manage interstate disputes. Therefore, in order to provide relevant advice to those making decisions, researchers need to broaden the scope of their investigations and theorize at a level above the isolated conflict management attempt. Only by doing this will scholars align theory with practice, thereby assisting those that actively work in the field in pursuit of peace.

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