

ASPECTS OF NEGATION IN CLASSICAL GREEK

by

Daniel J. Taylor
 Department of the Classics
 University of Illinois

Negation in classical Greek has traditionally been assumed to be, as we might expect from the post-neogrammarian approach to syntax, a surface structure phenomenon, although it has long been recognized that the semantic component is in several instances responsible for the pattern of negation. In these latter cases the received interpretation is similar, though naively so, to a generative analysis, but since the syntax of the classical languages is often little more than classification--again based on the surface structure--with no integrated theory or methodology underlying that classification, the resulting description is anything but coherent. In what follows I would like to formalize some obvious and some not so obvious aspects of negation in Greek from both a syntactic and semantic point of view.

In point of fact negation in Greek is determined neither by the surface nor by the deep structure but rather by the intermediate structure.¹ I assume, as most Greek grammarians do, that the basic negative, the negative of the simple deep structure, is ou; the surface structure, however, contains both ou and mé. This means accordingly that in the process of generating sentences Greek converts ou to mé, though only under rather well-defined circumstances.² Let me exemplify.

Consider the following sentences.

- (1) the man does not marry i.e. is not married
 (2) the man does not have evils

In each case the negative is ou in Greek. These sentences can be combined in a number of ways without affecting the negative, but when (1) is subordinate to (2) in the form of a conditional clause, negative conversion (ou+me) occurs obligatorily in the if-clause, producing

(3) if the man does not marry, he (the man) does not have evils

with the negative me occurring in what is now the protasis and ou remaining in the apodosis or main clause. Stated in purely descriptive and traditional terms the negative of conditional clauses is me, but it is clear, I hope, that the presence of me must be accounted for by an obligatory negative conversion rule.³

Furthermore, the presence of an equi-NP in Greek is almost always the immediate catalyst for further structural change of one sort or another.⁴ In (3) the presence of an equi-NP may subsequently induce one of two possible changes, producing either a relative clause or a participial construction.

(4) the man who does not marry does not have evils

(5) the man not marrying does not have evils

Regardless of which optional transformation is chosen, the process of negation is identical in both (4) and (5); me negates the clause which has undergone the structural change, while the main clause, unchanged from the outset of the derivation, retains ou. Since Greek tends for the most part in sentences like this to use the participle,⁵ sentence (5) is precisely what we get in Menander's

ho me gamon anthropos ouk ekhei kaka
the not marrying man not has evils.⁶

The negative me is therefore predicated on a context sensitive rule which converts ou to me. In (4) and (5) the presence of me is determined solely by the underlying conditional in (3), just as the semantic interpretation derives from (3). If the intermediate structure does not contain a conditional or some other string requiring

negative conversion, as in the derivation of merely descriptive relatives and participles, then the deep structure negative ou is retained. Traditional Greek grammars imply that the state of affairs outlined here obtains in sentences of this type but of course do not explicitly describe the sentences in this way, because to state that the particular negative and likewise the semantics of the construction are determined by an actual conditional in the "history" of the sentence is simply beyond the scope of even the footnotes in our received grammars.

A similar analysis can and must be extended to other structures where the presence of me is also determined by the intermediate stages of the derivation but which are treated haphazardly, if at all, by our school and descriptive grammars. We read in Plato's Phaedo (58B): "As soon as the mission has begun, then, it is their law to keep the city pure during that time, and to put no one to death before the ship arrives at Delos and comes back again here; this often takes some time, when the winds happen to delay them."⁷ Notice "it is their law ...to put no one to death," which is in the Greek: nomos estin autois ...medena apoktinnunai, with the negative me.⁸ In accordance with the approach suggested above, negative conversion has taken place at some point in the intermediate structure before this particular string was nominalized and embedded in the higher sentence. The intermediate stage of the derivation which we are seeking is not difficult to find; the law in effect stated, "Do not kill anyone," and this is a negative command or prohibition which, like conditional clauses, requires the negative me. It is the negative command in the underlying structure which is responsible for the negative, and subsequent transformations do not alter the me. The precise form of the law--and law it seems to have been, since Xenophon Mem IV, 8, 2 refers to it--we do not know, but there are only two possibilities in Greek: me plus either an imperative or a subjunctive.⁹ This then is another example in which it is obvious that the surface structure does not determine the choice of negative.

It is not so obvious, however, that the deep structure is not involved, since the negative command or prohibition is considered to be

an "independent" subjunctive. It is here that the traditional philological account is especially at odds not only with modern linguistics but also with ancient grammar. The subjunctive (or optative for that matter) independent syntactically and semantically does not exist in the deep structure, and its presence in the surface structure is to be explained in the same way that any other oblique mood usage is explained, i.e. by complementation. Mood--at least in Greek and Latin--is a complementizer, does not mean anything at all per se, and appears in a sentence only by virtue of a transformational process.¹⁰ The deep structure contains an abstract verb which requires a complement sentence with its V in an oblique mood. There is no need here for an extended discussion of abstract syntax, since Robin Lakoff has devoted a considerable amount of attention to the role played by abstract verbs in Latin complementation, and I am content merely to refer to her discussion.¹¹ I am therefore postulating an abstract verb for the deep structure of the Greek sentence in question and for those other Greek sentences which have been claimed to exemplify an independent usage of the subjunctive. To quote Dr. Lakoff: "In this way, all the properties of these independent constructions, which must be treated separately by the philologist, are accounted for by postulating verbs present in the deep structure but absent in the surface structure, verbs whose syntactic properties correspond to those of real verbs of the same meaning-class," and furthermore "What is present in the deep structure is a verb with semantic and syntactic properties similar to those found in real verbs but with no phonological form; such verbs govern the application of complementizer-placement, complementizer-change, and sometimes other rules as well."¹² Ultimately this verb is obligatorily deleted; the negative command or prohibition is an intermediate structure governing negative conversion, not an "independent" subjunctive.

Interestingly the subjunctive was never considered independent by the ancients themselves, as the etymology of 'subjunctive' may well indicate. "The name subjunctive is due to the belief of the ancient grammarians that the mood was always subordinate."¹³ Diomedes states that the mood is so named, because in and of itself it does not

express meaning (quod per se non exprimat sensum), and Priscian states that the subjunctive needs among other things another verb in order to express its full meaning (...altero verbo, ut perfectum significet sensum).¹⁴ In sum then the concept of an abstract verb is not at all antithetical to the study of the classical languages, and as we shall see later, there are structures in Greek which simply cannot be explained except on the basis of an abstract verb in the deep structure.

Another example may suffice to exemplify further the combination of negation and abstract verbs. When a speaker asks what he is to do or say in a given situation, he uses the subjunctive (e.g. ti drasô? what am I to do?). The construction is termed the deliberative subjunctive or, alternatively, a question of appeal and is negated by mê. Often, however, the question is preceded by a verb form, e.g. boulei (do you wish), but of course the presence of boulei is optional.¹⁵ The omission or deletion is traditionally considered ellipse, but it provides an apposite parallel to what we term abstract syntax. Briefly, boulei is the verb of the higher sentence in the deep structure, requires the complementizer subjunctive mood, governs negative conversion in its complement sentence, and may then be optionally deleted. Precisely the same procedure is followed by abstract verbs with but one significant difference--the deletion rule is obligatory.

To recapitulate: I have argued that only one negative, ou, is present in the deep structure of classical Greek, that under certain, specific well-governed syntactic conditions this negative is converted to mê which remains regardless of subsequent transformations and which will therefore appear in the surface structure, that abstract syntax is a sine qua non of any adequate description of Greek grammar, and that abstract syntax is intimately related to the pattern of negation since it is the abstract verbal complex which governs negative conversion in those structures which are traditionally termed independent subjunctives and which are negated on the surface by mê. There are, however, other negative structures which appear to behave aberrantly or at best idiosyncratically, and in what follows I shall attempt to show that this behavior is, on the contrary, not at all odd

and that these structures provide additional proof for negative conversion and abstract syntax as well.

Inherently negative verbs have long been recognized for what they are by the classical grammatical tradition; e.g. every grammar provides separate treatment for many of these verbs under 'hindering' or some other semantically equivalent rubric. The classification of inherently negative verbs, although sophisticated in many respects, misses at least one very important generalization. Consider the following sentences:¹⁶

- (6) a) eirgei se $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ graphein
 b) eirgei se graphein
 c) eirgei se to $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ graphein
 d) eirgei se to graphein
 e) eirgei se tou $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ graphein
 f) eirgei se tou graphein

- (7) a) ouk eirgei se graphein
 b) ouk eirgei se $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ ou graphein
 c) ouk eirgei se to $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ graphein
 d) ouk eirgei se to $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ ou graphein

All forms of (6) mean "he prevents you from writing," and all forms of (7) mean "he does not prevent you from writing."¹⁷ The variety of constructions may not completely boggle the mind, but it does engender a certain amount of confusion; nevertheless the salient characteristics of the surface structures can be found in almost any grammar of Greek. With regard to the negatives in the lower sentence, it can be seen at a glance that 1) no negative is obligatory, 2) $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ may accompany the complement, and 3) if the higher S is itself negated and if the lower S has $\hat{m}\acute{e}$, then ou also usually occurs in the lower S, although as (7c) proves, it need not occur. Therefore, the embedded complement sentence may contain no negative, the negative $\hat{m}\acute{e}$, or both $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ and ou. These negatives are termed "redundant" or "sympathetic" and "confirm" the negative idea (i.e. the inherent negation) in the

leading verb.

Such a description omits the observation that the complement sentence can not itself be negated. Quite simply then, verbs of this class do not admit a negated complement, and this is a fact of the native speakers' innate competence, not merely of their subjective Sprachgefühl. It is for this reason that, regardless of the presence or the absence of negative(s) in the complement sentence, semantic ambiguity could not arise under any circumstances in this environment.

What I have added to the traditional analysis of these verbs is simply the crucial generalization which accounts for the variation in the surface structure and yet also for the stability in the deep structure or meaning and which relates the speakers' performance to their competence. Yet it is not clear on the one hand what allows this negative pattern to exist in the first place and on the other hand how it is involved in the process of negative conversion, and these are questions which deserve answers. The point of departure is in my opinion to be found in a recent treatment of inherent negators in Latin. It has been suggested that certain complementizers in Latin "contained in them the negatives that these verbs [sc. inherently negative verbs] have as part of their meaning."¹⁸ This suggestion is, I believe, correct.

In Greek the complementizer in sentences of the type under consideration is the accusative-infinitive; therefore negative-attachment is ruled out, and if the inherent negation of the negative-meaning verb is to be represented in any fashion in the surface structure, it must be realized in the form of an actual negative. I suggest then that the presence of mē (optional as was indicated above) in complements after negative-meaning verbs of the class of verbs of preventing in Greek is parallel to the presence of a negative element attached to the complementizer in Latin in sentences of this kind. The mē is therefore, according to this interpretation, simply the segmental representation of the negative element of the inherently negative verb. In short, the traditional assumption that mē confirms or affirms the negative idea of the main verb is seen to be eminently sound and entirely correct,

but it requires the more extensive theoretical point of view of generative grammar and an analysis such as the one presented here in order to interrelate the syntax and semantics of the negative patterns found in structures containing inherently negative verbs.

Of the questions posed above, however, only the first has been answered, and that only partially; $\hat{m\acute{e}}$ is accounted for, but the ou which usually follows that $\hat{m\acute{e}}$ after a doubly negated (ou + inherently negative verb) higher sentence still remains as a "sympathetic" negative, and this is only minimally adequate unless it can be shown that the pattern corresponds to negative patterns elsewhere in the language. I therefore propose to consider $\hat{m\acute{e}}\ uo$ here as a quasi-compound, since ou , if present, obligatorily accompanies $\hat{m\acute{e}}$ and cannot appear without it in this environment. As a compound negative following the simple negative of the higher S it is only natural, even apart from the fact that the lower sentence cannot be negated, that the $\hat{m\acute{e}}\ uo$ does not affect the meaning of the sentence inasmuch as it is no different from any other compound negative.¹⁹ My proposal then relates the negative pattern here to the normal syntactic and semantic behavior of negatives elsewhere, for negative reinforcement is a commonplace in Greek. The key to understanding the behavior of negatives after verbs of "hindering" is the generalization, consistently overlooked by the traditional grammars, which notes that these verbs do not tolerate negation of their complements. Without this, it seems that we must be content with a description, and a not very good one at that, of the surface structure.

According to my earlier argument $\hat{m\acute{e}}$ occurs in the surface structure only after a negative conversion rule of the type $ou \rightarrow \hat{m\acute{e}}$ had been applied. In the environment under discussion it is clear that the lexical feature "inherently negative" is the context which triggers the negative conversion rule, but the origin of the ou in the deep structure which is converted to $\hat{m\acute{e}}$ as a result of the lexical marking of that verb is not to be found in any of the assumptions of traditional grammar. That ou is the negative of the abstract IS NOT SO which underlies verbs of preventing and so forth and which is the negative-

meaning element in the deep structure of inherently negative verbs,²⁰ and Greek, unlike some other languages, allows optionally for the representation of that negative in its surface as well as its deep structure. In view of this analysis it is almost otiose to note that the deep structures of Greek and English and Latin are very similar indeed.

The mé ou pattern operates in other related structures but in a different manner. Certain verbal constructions consist of a verb plus a negative--either ou or the alpha-privative (a bound morpheme in word-formation which negates or counters, e.g. dunatos "possible" but adunatos "impossible"). These expressions are virtually equivalent semantically to non-negated inherent negators and are treated together with negative-meaning verbs in our grammars. They are of a different class, however, because their complements may be negated. In this mé ou construction the mé is considered the real negative and ou is again termed redundant or sympathetic. It should be clear by now that this is an incorrect statement of the syntactic and semantic facts. The mé here is the same mé, the (converted) negative element of the deep structure, which follows real inherently negative verbs, and the ou negates the complement. In other words the sympathetic ou is a figment of the received grammatical tradition and is not a viable and operable grammatical entity. Again, a closer analysis of the sentence types reveals a consistent pattern of negation. Mé ou behaves strictly in accordance with the lexical and grammatical features which mark the verb of its higher sentence, and it is the admissibility or inadmissibility of negation in the lower sentence which determines the precise manner in which mé ou is to be construed. The verbs or verbal expressions are of the same general class, as witness the presence and function of mé in an identical fashion in all the instances examined, but within that general class they are subcategorized differently, as witness the semantic variation with regard to ou.²¹

One other class of verbs behaves in a manner so similar to those verbs we have been discussing that it would be remiss not to take them into consideration, although it is necessary to point out at the outset

that verbs of fearing have never been classed with verbs of negative meaning by classical philologists. Nevertheless the surface structure of fearing expressions manifests sufficient a priori evidence to do so.

- 8) phoboumai $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ tauta gen \acute{e} tai I fear this will happen
 9) phoboumai $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ ou tauta gen \acute{e} tai I fear this won't happen

We recognize here the same pattern of negation found after those verbal expressions which are virtual inherent negators and which admit negation in the complement sentence.²² Here, however, the complementizer is the oblique mood, either subjunctive or optative depending on sequence, not the accusative-infinitive/infinitive as in the previous instances, but the presence and function of $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ after verbs of fearing cannot be distinguished from its presence and function in those other sentences. They should therefore be considered a negative-meaning verbal expression of some sort, since the $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ is surely the negative element of the deep structure, and ou is the negative which negates the complement. I suggest that the verb of fearing is a real rather than a virtual inherently negative verb²³ which differs from verbs of hindering in that it allows negation in its complement; in any case the pattern of negation forces us to consider verbs of fearing as members of that general class of verbs which are negative-meaning.

Once we have noticed that one sub-group of negative-meaning expressions tolerates negation in its complement and that verbs of fearing are of this type, we may then posit for classical Greek an abstract inherently negative verb and in that way account for the structure of that "independent" subjunctive termed variously a cautious or modest or doubtful assertion. The construction is apparently not inherited since it appears first in Herodotus and most frequently in Plato;²⁴ it consists of $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ + subjunctive for a positive statement and $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ ou for a negative one:

- 10) $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ tauta gen \acute{e} tai : (I suspect) this may happen
 11) $\hat{m}\acute{e}$ ou tauta gen \acute{e} tai (I suspect) this may not happen

The same pattern of negation operates here²⁵ as in the previously discussed structures, and this is the clearest example in either Greek or Latin of both the validity and the necessity of abstract verbs in grammatical analysis. Every syntactic and semantic feature of sentences (10) and (11) --the mood, the negative(s), the meaning -- can be described, but only if an abstract verb is postulated as the higher sentence and only if that abstract verb is inherently negative in the same manner as verbs of fearing. No other structure so clearly exemplifies the close relationship between negation, inherent or otherwise, and the deep structure, abstract or otherwise.

To conclude this discussion it is necessary only to reiterate the several conclusions reached at various stages of the separate analyses, and this I shall forego. Our traditional grammars have obscured or omitted many significant features of negation patterns in classical Greek, and these inadequate descriptions must be improved. I have tried to show how I think this improvement may be attained; from my discussion it is clear that syntactic as well as semantic factors are extensively involved, and of these factors some are thoroughly embedded in the traditional approach to grammar, while others are derived from concepts totally unfamiliar to philology. It seems to me that the analysis presented here is superior at least to the traditional ones which are couched in non-linguistic terms; cf. eg. Smyth's statement: "The simple negative particles are ou and me. Ou is the negative of fact and statement, and contradicts or denies; me is the negative of the will and thought, and rejects or deprecates" [*italics his*].²⁶ Whatever form a complete and total description of negative patterns may ultimately take is still a matter of doubt, but I am confident that among other features it will include a negative conversion rule, a formal description of abstract syntax at least insofar as it is applicable, and an in-depth discussion of inherently negative verbs which subcategorizes those verbs into two classes on the basis of the behavior of the negative in their complements.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- ¹In general, cf. the situation with regard to concord, which has usually been considered a surface structure phenomenon, as discussed and revised by George Lakoff, "Global Rules," Lg. 46 (1970) 627-639, especially 628-9.
- ²I say and mean well-defined, even though a cursory glance at almost any Greek grammar might seem to belie my assertion; this, of course, only proves that negation in Greek poses serious problems for linguists and philologists alike.
- ³This is the normative statement; cf. e.g. W.W. Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb (Boston 1893) 138: "The negative particle of the protasis is regularly me, that of the apodosis is ou." But ou does occur in protases, and this variation has engendered much debate, to say the least. For a review--though of a curiously personal nature--of scholarly opinions on me and ou in protases, see B. Th. Koppers, Negative Conditional Sentences (The Hague, n.d.) 34-38. Koppers' analysis of these negative patterns sounds hollow at best. She started "from the knowledge that Greek ou does not mean the same as me" and "found that the use of the different negations can only be explained psychologically not formally" (both quotes from p. 13). Her knowledge and psychological insight are, evidently, nothing short of amazing, but it is her conclusion which is particularly disturbing; at the end of her survey of the various opinions on the problem (p. 13) she maintains that "there seems to be no need to underline that the difference has nothing to do with the structure of the sentence." In spite of statements such as these it is altogether clear that the normal negative of the protasis was regularly me, and perhaps the most telling evidence in favor of this conclusion is Plato's striking ellipse at Meno 80 C: ei de me, ou ("but if not, not").
- ⁴For example, equi-NP-deletion is a commonplace in accusative-infinitive (roughly for-to) complementation and is in addition

accompanied by obligatory concord readjustments under certain circumstances, and there are numerous other types of sentences whose surface structures either imply or prove the presence of coreferential noun phrases in the underlying structure.

- ⁵Greek, unlike Latin, has a full set of participles available for use in a variety of structures. In addition to the relative and participle, the protasis of (3) could also be rendered by a temporal clause with, of course, the negative me.
- ⁶I should point out that the negative which I am rendering ou actually consists of three variants: ou, ouk, and oukh; the conditioning is phonological: ouk/__V, ou/__C^m, oukh/__C^h.
- ⁷The translation is that of W.H.D. Rouse, Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: Mentor paperback, 1956) 460-61.
- ⁸In addition to its simple negatives ou and me Greek has a series of compound negatives which consist of the simple negative plus some other word, e.g. ounote and me^hnote "never" and oudeis and me^hdeis "no one." In the Greek quotation medena is a compound negative (accusative case). The compound negatives are used in precisely the same environments as their corresponding simple negatives, and whatever syntactic and semantic features accrue to the simple negatives adhere to their compounds also. When they occur together in the same clause, word order becomes important, and a compound negative following a simple negative only reinforces the original negation, whereas when the word order is reversed and the simple negative follows the compound, then each retains its own negative force.
- ⁹The rule is somewhat more specific, and the choice between subjunctive or imperative is predicated on an aspectual distinction. Excluding the first person where there can be no choice (traditional grammars seem not to understand why there are no first person imperatives), the choice is between progressive imperative or aoristic subjunctive but not vice-versa, although there are rare exceptions. The law could

therefore have been stated in any of several ways, but since my concern is with the subjunctive, the imperative need not detain us. In either case the negative is always mē.

- ¹⁰ Needless to say, this statement is directly at odds with traditional philology, but then so is this entire discussion.
- ¹¹ Robin T. Lakoff, Abstract Syntax and Latin Complementation (Cambridge, Mass. 1968) 157-217. All subsequent references to Lakoff are to this monograph.
- ¹² Lakoff, op. cit., 160 and 161 respectively. For the theoretical significance of Mrs. Lakoff's proposals, see the review by Georgia M. Green, Lg 46 (1970) 149-167. Cf. also the review by Fred W. Householder, Language Sciences, No. 6, August, 1969, pp. 11-18; then cf. further Robin T. Lakoff, "More on Abstract Syntax," Language Sciences, No. 10, April, 1970, pp. 30-35 and Fred W. Householder, "Reviewer's Reply," *ibid.*, pp. 35-6. For the judgement of one of this country's most distinguished Latinists on Dr. Lakoff's contribution to Latin grammatical studies, see the review by Maurice P. Cunningham, Classical Philology 65 (1970) 273-77.
- ¹³ H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, revised by G. M. Messing (Cambridge, Mass. 1956) 403.
- ¹⁴ Diomedes and Priscian are Latin grammarians of the late 4th and late 5th/early 6th centuries respectively, and their statements are quoted from H. Keil, Grammatici Latini (Leipzig, 1855-1932, 8 vol.) vol. I, p. 340 and vol. II, p. 424 respectively. The context in Priscian makes it abundantly clear that verbo must be rendered by "verb." There are a considerable number of statements of a similar nature scattered throughout the Greek and Latin grammarians in whose works the general phenomenon of ellipse played a considerable theoretical and pragmatic role. See e.g. the R. Schneider and G. Uhlig edition of Apollonius Dyscolus (Leipzig, 1902-1910, 3 vol.) vol. 3, pp. 93-94, for some parallels. In dealing with concepts such as these in the ancient

grammatical treatises, it is never superfluous to note that the concepts were not necessarily applied in a systematic fashion, and this methodological caveat is a not unimportant distinction. Inasmuch as I am in a position to speak with a certain amount of authority on the subject of the ancient Greek and Latin grammarians, I feel constrained to note that several, perhaps many, of the claims made by modern linguists under the guise of Quellenforschung are unfortunately sometimes extravagant and excessive and should in many instances be considered merely as tentative suggestions, though I would hasten to add that most of these suggestions as I have termed them are uniformly interesting and some fundamentally correct. For one such sober statement, see the review of Lakoff by G. M. Green (op. cit., above, n.12) p. 156, and for several perceptive observations, see the review of Lakoff by M. P. Cunningham (op. cit., above, n.12). See also Luigi Romeo and Gaio E. Tiberio, "Historiography of Linguistics and Rome's Scholarship," Language Sciences, No. 17, October, 1971, pp. 23-44.

¹⁵ On this point see e.g. E. S. Thompson's note to Plato Meno 75 A in his edition of the Meno (Cambridge, 1901).

¹⁶ Sentences (6) and (7) are adapted from Smyth, op. cit., pp. 623-4.

¹⁷ In sentences (6) and (7) the higher sentences are eirgei and ouk eirgei respectively, and everything following eirgei is in each instance the complement sentence.

¹⁸ Lakoff, p. 135.

¹⁹ Cf. n.8 above. As the occurrence, even though optional, of the articles to and tou proves, the complementation process after verbs of preventing differs from the normal procedure, and were it not for this difference, my suggestion would be even more tentative than it is.

²⁰ I make this point separate and distinct from my earlier argument that the mé is the negative-meaning element only because a tree-diagram

representing (6) as something like "he causes it that you write it is not so" is so far removed conceptually from the traditional philological account.

²¹For a discussion of these constructions which is somewhat more enlightened than the customary account, see A. C. Moorhouse, "The Construction with $\overset{\wedge}{\text{ME}} \text{OU}$," Classical Quarterly 34 (1940) 70-77. Moorhouse arrives at the same classification as I do, but this is not at all surprising since the two classes are kept distinct in all grammars. Needless to say, he does not hit upon the crucial generalization which I have insisted upon and which is the one syntactic and semantic characteristic which verifies the validity of establishing the two classes of verbs. There are, as one might expect from the date of Moorhouse's article, considerable differences between our analyses of the $\overset{\wedge}{\text{me}} \text{ou}$. Moorhouse (p. 72) believes that after doubly negated verbs "the function of ouk in $\overset{\wedge}{\text{me}} \text{ouk}$ is to cancel the $\overset{\wedge}{\text{me}}$." I confess that at an earlier stage in my study of these structures I too, though unaware of Moorhouse's conclusion, adhered to this explanation. This position, however, is not tenable, because Greek negatives do not cancel one another. We are compelled to retract the theory of cancellation, for it requires suspending or transgressing an otherwise comprehensive rule of the language. As a strictly ad hoc solution, it may have some pseudo-value pedagogically, but if applicable anywhere, it is applicable in Latin rather than in Greek and in a slightly different context. For those who may be interested in some of the ramifications of the application of generative grammar to the teaching of the Greek and Latin languages, I discuss these, in a context dealing with some of the specific structures under discussion here, in an article entitled "Mures, immo homines: Rationalism in Language Learning," forthcoming in Classical Outlook. We can with justification dismiss cancellation as an answer to the problem at hand; yet we should probably consider it, though incorrect, as a step in the right direction. Moorhouse is himself aware that his position cannot be maintained in the structures

following what I have termed virtual inherent negators and for all practical purposes gives up in despair when he states (p. 73) that "me ou here is simply an illogical copy of the use of me ou after verbs of class (I), verbs of denying, preventing, etc." This statement is in manifest violation of the facts, and it is with more confidence than might be normally expected that I offer my own solution to the use of me ou in the complements after the two classes of negative-meaning verbs and verbal expressions.

²²The examples are again adapted from Smyth, p. 501. There are two explanations of constructions involving verbs of fearing in Greek (and Latin also) which may be called traditional, but neither merits serious consideration. The first states that me is not a negative but is a conjunction meaning "that" or "lest;" confusion begets confusion. The second analyzes the sentence as consisting of two independent entities which are then paratactically conjoined; neither of these entities exists elsewhere in the language, of course, and this explanation derives directly from the assumption of a verifiable "me Tarzan you Jane" stage in diachronic syntax.

²³The distinction may not be necessary except insofar as the neogrammarian habit of attaching labels to grammatical constructions is concerned. The important distinction is that verbs of fearing tolerate negation in their complements; this, of course, is a characteristic which they do not share with real inherent negators such as verbs of preventing. On the other hand their inherently negative meaning, as evidenced by the negation pattern, is not dependent on a negative morpheme, as is the case with virtual inherent negators. The choice in classifying therefore seems determined by the system of classification and not essential to an understanding of the structural description.

²⁴Goodwin, op cit., p. 92.

²⁵These examples are mine. The negative construction here is usually compared, correctly, to that with verbs of fearing, but the negative

and subjunctive construction as a whole is, unfortunately, treated separately.

²⁶Smyth, p. 608. I certainly do not intend to pick on Smyth to the exclusion of other Greek grammars; Smyth's grammar is probably the most widely used one in the country, and for that reason, one of convenience, I have tried wherever possible to confine my references to his rather than to some other grammar.