Additive and Multiplicative Risk Premiums with Multiple Sources of Risk

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Abstract

This paper considers the risk premium for one risk when other background risk is present. In a mean-variance setting, we examine the conditions under which the risk premium will be negative. These conditions consider the variance of the considered risk in relation to the covariance of the considered risk with the background risk. We consider the cases of both multiplicative and additive risks. A breakdown of the total risk premium into several components is established by removing each source of risk consecutively. The case of multiplicative risks is shown to be quite different from the additive-risk case in that the individual's total willingness-to-pay for the removal of all risk on a sequential basis does not necessarily equal the willingness-to-pay for removal of all risk simultaneously.
I. Introduction

A recent set of papers (Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams (1981), Nachman (1982), Pratt (1982) and Ross (1981)) has examined measures of risk aversion when initial wealth is randomly distributed. These papers deal with aversion to one risk when other risks are present, and their results have already had some far-reaching consequences for insurance markets as evidenced by recent papers by Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) and Turnbull (1983). However, these papers have focused mainly on the local properties of risk aversion. In this paper, we concern ourselves with risk aversion for finite discrete risks. In particular, we examine the nature of risk premiums in a model with multiple sources of risk. We show that willingness-to-pay for the sequential removal of risks is identical to willingness-to-pay for the simultaneous removal of all risk when the multiple risks are additive or when they are multiplicative but with a zero covariance. We also examine conditions under which the risk premium will be negative.

Pratt (1964) demonstrated an equivalence between the sign and ordering of the Arrow-Pratt measure of local risk aversion and the sign and ordering of the risk premium payable on any given risky transaction. A risk averter would pay a positive risk premium and a more-risk-averse person would pay a higher risk premium on the same risky transaction. However, this ordering equivalence need not be preserved when background risk is present, even if the transaction risk and background risk are independent, as was demonstrated by Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams.
(1981—hereafter KRW). Furthermore, once the independence assumption is dropped, this sign equivalence need not be preserved either. KRW showed that risk premium for a risk averter could be negative if there is a negative correlation between sources of risk. However, a positive risk premium is also possible, even with perfect negative correlation. This is not surprising once one considers the stochastic relationship between sources of risk in terms of the total-wealth prospect.

In this paper we derive a method for "adding up" risk premiums (or equivalently "breaking them down") based on the stochastic nature of wealth. This derivation is developed via considering the sequential elimination of sources of risk in two alternative frameworks. In the first framework (section II) additive risks are considered, whereas multiplicative risks are assumed in the second framework (section IV). For each of these models a simple example is provided which illustrates the "adding up" formula and allows for a graphical representation of both positive and negative risk premiums (sections III and V). The main results are summarized in section VI.

II. Risk premiums with additive risks

We define the individual's total wealth prospect as \( \tilde{y} = \tilde{w} + \tilde{x} \) where \((\tilde{w}, \tilde{x})\) is a random pair taking values in \(E^2\). The case where \(w\) is nonrandom represents the standard single risk model. The individual is assumed to be strictly risk averse with preferences...
expressed by the twice differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, $U(Y)$, where $U'(Y)>0$ and $U''(Y)<0$. We consider the following three distinct risk premiums:

(i) The total risk premium for removing all risk from the individual's wealth portfolio, $\pi_y$, which is defined by

$$(1) \quad EU(\tilde{w}+\tilde{x}) = U(E\tilde{w} + E\tilde{x} - \pi_y).$$

The symbol $E$, above, denotes mathematical expectation. For a risk averter, $\pi_y$ is always positive.

(ii) The risk premium of $\tilde{x}$ in the presence of $\tilde{w}$, $\pi_x'$, defined by

$$(2) \quad EU(\tilde{w}+\tilde{x}) = EU(\tilde{w}+E\tilde{x} - \pi_x').$$

Thus, $\pi_x'$ is the premium one is willing to pay to have $\tilde{x}$ replaced by its expectation while retaining the riskiness of $\tilde{w}$. The amount $E\tilde{x} - \pi_x'$ is the certainty equivalent for $\tilde{x}$ in the presence of $\tilde{w}$, which we denote by $C_x$. The individual is willing to replace $\tilde{x}$ by any certain amount exceeding $C_x$, while maintaining the randomness in $\tilde{w}$.

(iii) The conditional risk premium for removing the risk in $\tilde{w}$ after having paid to remove the riskiness in $\tilde{x}$. We denote this risk premium $\pi_{w|C_x}'$, defined by
EU(\(\hat{w} + C_x\)) = U(E\(\hat{w} + C_x - \pi_w|C_x\)).

Thus, \(\pi_w|C_x\) represents a willingness-to-pay to remove the riskiness in \(\hat{w}\), given that \(\hat{x}\) has already been replaced by \(C_x\).

We note that both \(\pi_y\) and \(\pi_w|C_x\) are ordinary Arrow-Pratt risk premiums. The former treats \(\hat{w} + \hat{x}\) as a single random variable (i.e., a single source of risk) while the latter has only one source of risk to consider, namely \(\hat{w}\). However, \(\pi_x\) is not the usual Arrow-Pratt type of risk premium; rather, it is the risk premium used by KRW and it removes only part of the total risk.

From equations (1), (2) and (3), the following result is immediate:

**Proposition 1A:** \(\pi_y = \pi_x + \pi_w|C_x\).

This result is fairly obvious, saying that the maximum amount of income an individual would pay to remove all riskiness in \(\hat{w} + \hat{x}\) must equal the sum of the amount he would pay to remove the riskiness in \(\hat{x}\) alone and the amount he would pay to remove the remaining risk in \(\hat{w}\) after having paid \(\pi_x\) to remove the risk in \(\hat{x}\). However, as we shall see in section IV, this nice additivity property does not always hold when risks are multiplicative.\(^1\)
Another result that follows straight from the definitions and from Jensen's inequality is

Proposition 2A: If \( w \) and \( x \) are independently distributed, \( \pi_x > 0 \).

When \( \tilde{w} \) and \( \tilde{x} \) are not independently distributed, it is easy to see that \( \pi_x \) might be negative when the correlation is negative. For example, if \( \tilde{x} = -\tilde{w} \), it is easy to show that \( \pi_y = 0 \), \( \pi_x < 0 \) and \( \pi_w |_{C_x} = -\pi_x \).

We can gain some insight into this situation if we first consider a case where the riskiness of \( \tilde{w} \) and of \( \tilde{x} \) is very small. In a manner similar to Pratt (1964) and Ross (1981), we can take Taylor expansions of each side of (1). This provides an approximation for \( \pi_x \) in terms of the covariance of \( \tilde{x} \) and \( \tilde{w} \). Expanding (1) around \( E\tilde{w} + E\tilde{x} \), we obtain the following approximation:

\[
(4) \quad \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}(\tilde{w} + \tilde{x}) U'' = - \pi_x U' + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}(\tilde{w}) U''
\]

where \( U' \) and \( U'' \) are evaluated at \( E\tilde{w} + E\tilde{x} \). Noting that \( \text{Var}(\tilde{w} + \tilde{x}) = \text{Var}(\tilde{w}) + \text{Var}(\tilde{x}) + 2 \text{Cov}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{x}) \) and dividing by \( -U' \) yields

\[
(5) \quad \pi_x = \left[ \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}(\tilde{x}) + \text{Cov}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{x}) \right] R
\]

where \( R = -U''/U' \) is the local measure of absolute risk aversion evaluated at \( E\tilde{w} + E\tilde{x} \).
Although (5) is an approximation, it indicates that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for $\pi_x$ to be negative is that $\text{Cov}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{x})$ be negative. Indeed, we observe that $\pi_x < 0$ if and only if $\text{Cov}(\tilde{w}, \tilde{x}) < - (1/2) \text{Var}(\tilde{x})$.

III. Additive risks: an illustration

In order to gain some geometric intuition, consider an example where $(\tilde{w}, \tilde{x}) = (w_0, x_1)$ or $(w_1, x_0)$ with probability 1/2 each, and where $w_0 < w_1$ and $x_0 < x_1$. Thus, $\hat{w}$ and $\hat{x}$ have a correlation of $\pi_x > 0$ if and only if $\text{EU}(\hat{w} + E\hat{x}) > \text{EU}(\hat{w} + \hat{x})$. In our case this reduces to

$$U(w_1 + E\hat{x}) - U(w_1 + x_0) > U(w_0 + x_1) - U(w_0 + E\hat{x})$$

or

$$U(w_1 + x_0 + (E\hat{x} - x_0)) - U(w_1 + x_0) > U(w_0 + E\hat{x} + (x_1 - E\hat{x})) - U(w_0 + E\hat{x}).$$

Noting that $E\hat{x} - x_0 = x_1 - E\hat{x}$, one may divide both sides by the same amount and obtain, under the small risk assumption

$$U'(w_1 + x_0) > U'(w_0 + E\hat{x}).$$

and finally, $2(w_1 - w_0) < x_1 - x_0$. 
In other words, even with perfect negative correlation, \( \Pi_x \) will be positive if the spread in \( \tilde{w} \) is relatively small. More generally, it follows from (5) that \( \Pi_x \) will be positive, assuming small risks with a perfect negative correlation, whenever \( \text{Var}(\tilde{w}) < (1/4)\text{Var}(\tilde{x}) \). The above example is illustrated in figures 1-3.

In figure 1, \( \tilde{w} + E\tilde{x} \) is preferred to \( \tilde{w} + \tilde{x} \). Consequently, we can subtract \( \pi_x \) from each of the \( \tilde{w} + E\tilde{x} \) values to obtain a new prospect, \( (w_o + C_x) \) or \( (w_1 + C_x) \) each with probability 1/2, which is indifferent to \( \tilde{w} + \tilde{x} \). Once \( \pi_x \) is determined, it is easy to illustrate the "adding-up" formula given by Proposition 1A. To avoid clutter, this is shown in figure 2, which reproduces some essentials from figure 1. Both figures 1 and 2 illustrate the case where \( \pi_x = 0 \). An example where \( \pi_x < 0 \) is illustrated in figure 3.

IV. Risk premiums with multiplicative risks

It has been shown by Turnbull (1983) that the stronger risk aversion measure proposed by Ross (1981) is not strong enough to provide meaningful results when risks are multiplicative rather than additive. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to investigate whether the results obtained in section II under the additivity assumption are preserved under multiplicative risks.
We redefine the individual's final wealth prospect as 
\[ \hat{Y} = w + z\hat{x}, \] where

\begin{itemize}
  \item \( w \) is his nonrandom initial wealth;
  \item \( x \) is a speculative risk faced by the individual, for example the random market value of a property at risk;
  \item \( z \in [0,1] \) is a pure risk, for example, the extent of a damage threatening the individual's property.
\end{itemize}

As before, we may define three distinct risk premiums:

i) The total risk premium \( \pi_Y \) which the individual would be willing to pay for removing both risks inherent in \( \hat{Y} \), defined by

\[ (6) \quad EU(\hat{W} + z\hat{x}) = U(w + E(\hat{z}\hat{x}) - \pi_Y). \]

By Jensen's inequality, \( \pi_Y > 0 \) for all strictly concave \( U \).

ii) The risk premium for \( \hat{x} \) in the presence of \( z \), \( \pi_x \), which is the premium that the individual would be willing to pay to obtain the expected value of \( x \) instead of the random amount \( x \), while maintaining the randomness of \( z \). It is given by
\[ (7) \quad EU(w + \tilde{z}\tilde{x}) = EU(w + \tilde{z}E\tilde{x} - \pi_x) \]
\[ = EU(C_x + \tilde{z}E\tilde{x}), \]

where \( C_x = w - \pi_x \). In this case \( C_x \) is non-random again, but it is not the certainty equivalent of \( \tilde{x} \), as in section II.

iii) The condition risk premium \( \pi_z|C_x \), which is the amount that the individual would be willing to pay to eliminate the pure risk \( \tilde{z} \) and replace it by \( E\tilde{z} \), after having replaced the risk \( \tilde{x} \) by its expected value. It is given by

\[ (8) \quad EU(C_x + \tilde{z}E\tilde{x}) = U(C_x + E\tilde{z}E\tilde{x} - \pi_z|C_x). \]

By Jensen's inequality \( \pi_z|C_x > 0 \) for all strictly concave \( U \).

From these definitions, we obtain the following result:

**Proposition 1M:** \( \pi_y = \pi_x + \pi_z|C_x + \text{Cov}(\tilde{z}, \tilde{x}) \).

Thus, when risks are multiplicative, Proposition 1A does not hold in general: the global risk premium differs from the sum of the two partial risk premiums. The additivity property of risk premiums holds only under independence of risks, or under the somewhat less restrictive assumption of zero correlation. If, for example, \( \text{Cov}(\tilde{z}, \tilde{x}) < 0 \), Proposition 1M indicates that the individual would pay less to remove both risks simultaneously than to remove them one after the other. Lest we think arbitrage
opportunities would prevent this from occurring, we must point out that we do not end up at the same replacement for \( z \) in the two cases. When the risk is removed all at once, we replace \( z \) with \( E(z) \). On the other hand, replacing the random variables sequentially leaves us with \( (Ez)(Ex) \). Thus, the amount we are willing to pay for these replacements is not expected to be the same. It is trivial to show that the total amount we would pay to remove the risks sequentially does not depend upon the order of their removal.

As before, we are interested in the conditions under which 
\[ \pi_X < 0. \]

**Proposition 2M:** If \( x \) and \( z \) are independently distributed,
\[ \pi_X > 0. \]

**Proof:** Straightforward from Jensen's inequality Q.E.D.

If \( x \) and \( z \) are not independently distributed, Proposition 2 will clearly not hold in all cases. An example is provided in the illustration below. We also note that the relationship between \( \pi_x \) and \( \pi_y \) is not as simple as it was in section II. In some cases, the global risk premium \( \pi_y \) may be smaller than the partial risk premium \( \pi_x \). From Proposition 1M, we see that this will occur whenever 
\[ \text{Cov}(z, x) < -\pi \text{ } z|C_x. \]
V. Multiplicative risks: an illustration

Using the model presented in the preceding section, we provide here a two-state illustration. Let \( x \in \{ x_0, x_1 \} \), \( x_1 > x_0 \), and let \( z \in (0,1) \), i.e. full loss or no damage at all. Moreover assume perfect positive correlation, i.e. \( x = x_1 \) when \( z = 1 \) and \( x = x_0 \) when \( z = 0 \). We thus have:

\[
\tilde{Y} = \begin{cases} 
  w + x_1 \\
  w 
\end{cases}
\]

From (7), the condition for \( \pi_x < 0 \) is

\[
EU(w + \tilde{z}x) > EU(w + \tilde{z}E\tilde{x}).
\]

Using the assumptions above, this reduces to \( x_1 > E\tilde{x} \), which is always satisfied. Thus \( \pi_x \) is negative under perfect positive correlation. By a similar argument, it may be shown that \( \pi_x \) is necessarily positive under perfect negative correlation.

These results are easily explained. Under positive correlation, the damage is high when the market value of the property is low. The individual is not prepared to pay much to remove the volatility in \( \tilde{x} \) because he would lose on positive deviations without earning something on negative deviations. Hence \( \pi_x \) is low and may even be negative. Inversely, under
negative correlation, the individual is prepared to pay a high \( v^x \) because this would remove the negative deviations on \( \tilde{x} \), without having to incur a loss on positive deviations.

VI. **Concluding remarks**

We have presented some results on risk premiums with multiple sources of risks by considering first an additive risk framework and then a multiplicative risk framework. In the first case we find that the risk premium for the removal of all risks equals the sum of the risk premium for removing one risk while retaining the other and the risk premium for removing the remaining risk after having paid the risk premium to remove the first risk. This nice relationship does not hold any longer when risks are multiplicative. The covariance between the risks is then also a component of the total risk premium. In addition, we show that the risk premium for removing one risk while retaining the other may be negative, both in the additive and multiplicative risk frameworks. Negative correlation is a necessary condition for this result to hold when risks are small additive. Inversely, a simple illustration shows that the result is associated with positive correlation under multiplicative risks.

Most previous work concerns itself with extending canonical results concerning an individual being "more risk averse" to the case of multiple sources of risk. For example, Pratt (1982) considers \( \pi(\tilde{x}|w) \), defined by \( \text{EU}(w+\tilde{x}) = U(w+E\tilde{x} - \pi(\tilde{x}|w)) \) where \( w \) is a nonrandom realization of \( \tilde{w} \). Pratt then shows that the usual
measure of risk aversion, $-U'(Y)/U''(Y)$ is not sufficient to
guarantee that "more risk averse" implies: "$\pi_x$ is larger"--even
when $\tilde{w}$ and $\tilde{x}$ are independent. Pratt goes on to show that
additional assumptions concerning $\pi(\tilde{x}|w)$ are sufficient to yield
the desired conclusions.

The focus of this paper is not on comparing different
individuals exposed to the same risky prospect. We focus on the
nature of the risk; in particular, on the relationship between
the sources of risk. The Arrow-Pratt measure of local risk
aversion works well for what it is designed to do; namely, place
a subjective value on the risk inherent in the total-wealth
prospect. When considering the removal of only one of many
sources of risk, it is not surprising that we do not necessarily
preserve the sign and ordering equivalence between the risk
premium and the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion.
Figure 3
Footnotes

1. Although we only consider two risky sources, the results are extendable to three or more sources of risk in a straightforward, but tedious, manner. It is also possible to examine the distribution of \( y \) compared with the convolution of the marginal distributions of \( x \) and \( w \) to derive stochastic dominance rules for additive risk premiums. See Doherty and Schlesinger (1986).

2. Note that we have approximated the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (1) with a first-order expansion, while we used a second-order expansion for the right-hand side (RHS). This yields errors of asymptotic orders \( O(\pi^2) \) and \( o[\text{Var}(x)] \) respectively. Thus, a higher-order expansion of the LHS would not increase the accuracy of the approximation for small \( \text{Var}(x) \). See Pratt (1964) and Ross (1981) for a further discussion.
References


