SAVAGE RULERS: STATE-SPONSORED MASS KILLING DURING CIVIL WAR

BY

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DISSERTATION

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Abstract

Throughout history, warring parties have contravened norms or laws that prescribe the protection of noncombatant civilians, and wars have often wreaked tremendous havoc on civilian populations. In this dissertation, I investigate conditions under which state leaders embroiled in civil war perpetrate extensive mass killing against their own populations. Extant literature on mass killing does not sufficiently address civilian support for insurgents, which can influence the government’s strategies for subduing the insurgency. Mass killing scholars take civilian support as given, not examining what makes civilians buttress the rebels. My dissertation fills this gap by theorizing and testing the linkage between factors that generate civilian support for insurgents and extensive mass killing committed by the government. I claim that secessionist war, external support for insurgents from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states, severe political and economic marginalization, and history of intense armed conflict are likely to trigger extensive mass killing, whereas rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely to restrain extensive mass killing. I verify my theoretical argument by conducting large-N statistical analyses and comparative case studies (Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and Peruvian Civil War (1982-1992)). The analyses reveal that ethnoreligious support for insurgents, severe political marginalization, and a history of intense armed conflict account well for the outbreak of state-sponsored extensive mass killing. The effect of economic marginalization and rival support for rebels hinges on research methods or model specifications. Insurgent aim and lootable resources exercise little influence on variation in mass killing. My study suggests that civilian support for insurgents affects the behavior or strategies of embattled rulers and some factors that produce strong civilian support for rebels explain and predict the occurrence of the government’s extensive civilian killings.
For Hyunjung, with love
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1 Introduction

Regardless of time and place, norms or laws of war have inhibited savagery against civilians not engaged in war, compelling belligerents to safeguard these civilians. In the ancient Islamic world, Abu Bakr, the first Caliph after Muhammad’s death, enforced the rules of warfare that forbade 1) the killing of children, women, aged men, and monks, 2) the mutilation of dead bodies, and 3) the wanton killing of livestock and animals and the burning or destruction of trees and orchards (Aboul-Enein & Zuhur, 2004). Just War theory, originating from Roman philosophical and Catholic traditions, instituted *jus in bello*, standards of conduct during warfare. Acts of war were not to be directed against non-combatants caught in war. Belligerents were forbidden from bombing civilian residential areas that include no military target and from perpetrating acts of terrorism or reprisal against ordinary civilians (Steinhoff, 2007; Walzer, 1977). Even military targets should not be attacked if warring parties anticipate that the offense would yield excessive civilian deaths and injuries (Steinhoff, 2007; Walzer, 1977). The contemporary Geneva Conventions system crystallizes the principle that people who do not actively engage in warfare should be treated humanely (Shaw, 1997). The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) pertains to the protection of civilians in time of war. It proscribes torture, illegal executions, reprisals, and other cruel or inhumane treatments against civilians (Shaw, 1997; Roberts & Guelff, 2000; Chesterman, 2001).
Throughout history, however, warring parties have sometimes flouted and contravened norms or laws that prescribe the protection of noncombatant civilians, and wars have often wreaked tremendous havoc on civilian populations. Ancient wars of conquest epitomize savagery against civilians. During the Crusades, the Crusaders sought to conquer the Holy Land and wipe out its non-Catholic populations. While laying siege to Antioch and Jerusalem in the late 11th century, the Crusaders ruthlessly massacred Muslims, Jews, and Eastern Orthodox Christians (Riley-Smith, 2003; Peters, 1998). In the 13th century, rulers of the Mongol Empire, Genghis Khan and his descendants, besieged and razed cities in the Middle East, Central and East Asia, and Europe. During the invasions, Mongol troops murdered urban populations that had refused to capitulate (Roux, 2003; Turnbull, 2004). Rummel (1997b) estimated that approximately thirty million civilians perished when the Mongol Empire waged wars of conquest. Beyond the Crusades and Mongol’s conquest, other ancient wars such as the Thirty Years War, wars against Native Americans, and the Taiping rebellion generated rampant violence against civilian populations.

In the modern or so-called civilized world, warfare savagery has continued. During the Second World War, both the Axis and the Allies perpetrated atrocities. The Nazis engineered the Holocaust, Japanese troops massacred the Chinese, and the Allies indiscriminately shelled cities in Germany and Japan. Western colonialists liquidated indigenous populations who demanded liberation and challenged the colonial rule. In the early 20th century, Germans killed 200,000-300,000 natives in Tanzania and 60,000-65,000 Hereros and Namas in Namibia (Valentino, 2004). Ruling Ethiopia and Libya,
Italian colonialists eliminated thousands of indigenous populations (White, 2005; Rummel, 1997b).

After the end of the Second World War, France and Portugal massacred Algerians, Angolans, Madagascans, and Vietnamese. In addition, some state leaders in the Third World projected massive violence against their own populations. During the Cold War, some ideological wars resulted in carnage. For instance, in Afghanistan, Mujaheddin insurgents waged a jihad (holy war) against the communist government and the Soviet Union. Combating the Mujaheddin, Afghan and Soviet forces conducted indiscriminate aerial bombings and massacres, which claimed the lives of at least one million Afghan civilians (Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003; Harff & Gurr, 1988). Some wars between rival ethnic groups also triggered rampant violence against civilians. For example, in Sudan, two civil wars between the government dominated by northern Arab Muslims and insurgents composed of southern black Christians and animists inflicted grave sufferings on southern Sudanese populations. Between one and two million civilians died as a result of the government’s aerial bombardments, torture, summary executions, and denial of access to humanitarian aid (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004; Thyne, 2007; Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003). Since 2003, the Sudanese government has been accused of attempting to eradicate the civilian population in Darfur, which led the International Criminal Court (ICC) to indict current Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, on charge of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (BBC, 2010).

Why do some wars generate rampant violence against noncombatant civilian populations, while others do not? In this dissertation, I will restrict my attention to civil
war and state-sponsored mass killing defined as the deliberate killing of a large number of civilians or noncombatants perpetrated by the government. The scale of mass killing during civil war varies widely. During the Biafran War (1967-1970), the government’s blockade and aerial bombings resulted in over one million Ibo civilian deaths. In the 1980s, 180,000-300,000 Iraqi Kurds perished as a result of the government’s chemical attacks, air strikes, and extrajudicial executions. Combating FMLN guerillas, leaders in El Salvador murdered 40,000-70,000 civilians. In contrast, some civil wars did not yield a large number of (or any) intentional civilian deaths. Waging a war against LTTE rebels, the Sri Lankan government slew 8,000-18,750 Tamil civilians. During the first civil war in Ivory Coast (2002-2004), government forces murdered only a few hundred northern Muslims. Confronting the Dhofar rebellion, Omani rulers eschewed civilian killings. I will explain and predict variation in the scale of the government’s mass killing during civil war. That is, I will investigate the conditions under which state leaders embroiled in civil war orchestrate extensive mass killing.

1.1. Contribution

1.1.1. Theoretical Contribution

My dissertation contributes to sharpening the understanding of state-sponsored mass killing during civil war. Earlier studies do not tackle this subject in a sophisticated manner. Civil war scholars have not paid much attention to the government’s strategies for defeating insurgents. The bulk of the existing literature addresses civil war onset
(e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2004 & 2001; Gurr & Moore, 1997; Gurr, 1993; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004 & 1998), duration (e.g., Fearon, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2004), termination & consequences (e.g., Collier, 1999; Walter, 1997 & 2004; Licklider, 1995), and international dimension of civil war (e.g., Gleditsch, 2007; Regan, 2002 & 2000; Salehyan, 2009, 2007; Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz, 2008). Scholars who study genocide have formulated theories linking factors such as ethnic division (e.g., Kuper, 1981; Fein, 1993), regime type (e.g., Rummel, 1997c, 1994a; Harff, 2003), and ideology (e.g., Harff, 2003) to genocide. A wealth of the genocide literature, however, jumbles atrocities that occur during war and those during peace. In other words, researchers have not explicated the causes of genocide that are specific to war.

Only a fraction of earlier works grapples with mass killing in the context of civil war. For instance, Harff & Gurr (1998) propose various conditions that can lead to genocide and politicide (e.g., strength of group identities, leaders’ commitment to exclusionary ideology, increase in external support for political active groups). Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay (2004) suggest guerilla warfare as the main cause of mass killing perpetrated by the government. Scholarly works on mass killing during civil war, however, do not sufficiently take into account one of the key elements in civil war: civilian support.

Renowned revolutionaries (e.g., Fanon, Mao, and Lenin) claimed that insurgents should strive to build civilian support in order to prosecute the war well and secure victory. The importance of civilian support in insurgency’s success implies that the government may be willing to employ brutal and reprehensible strategies including
mass killing to fracture insurgents’ civilian support bases. Observing massacres of Algerians, Madagascans, and Vietnamese by French troops, Sartre (1968) maintained that colonialists committed genocide when anti-colonial guerillas mustered staunch civilian support. Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) confirm that a high level of civilian support for rebels can trigger state-sponsored mass killing. Kalyvas (2006) and Azam & Hoeffler (2002) argue that state leaders resort to indiscriminate violence in an attempt to terrorize civilian populations and to deter them from supporting insurgents. The existing literature, however, has not systematically addressed civilian support for insurgents. These scholars take civilian support as given, not examining what makes civilian populations bolster insurgency. This signifies that they have not explored the linkage between the sources of rebels’ civilian support and state-sponsored mass killing. 

My research fills this gap by synthesizing factors that generate staunch civilian support for insurgents and the extent of mass killing committed by the government. I identify seven factors germane to insurgent aim, external support for insurgents, lootable resources, and grievances. I theorize on how these factors trigger or restrain extensive mass killing and then empirically test my theory.

1.1.2. Policy Contribution

Mass killing gravely impairs human dignity and thus constitutes crimes against humanity. This type of atrocity claims the lives of civilians including women, children, and aged men. Mass killing also traumatizes surviving civilians who witnessed the deaths of their siblings, parents, relatives, and friends. International humanitarian law proscribes this
crime against humanity, obligating civil war belligerents to endeavor to minimize the suffering of noncombatant civilians. Throughout history, however, some contenders blatantly violated this law and orchestrated extensive mass killing. International actors such as the UN, regional organizations (e.g., African Union, NATO), and major states have not enforced the protection of noncombatants effectively. They have failed to prevent or halt mass killing and to punish the perpetrators. Hence, the scourge of mass killing inflicted severe suffering on Angolans, Bosnian Muslims, Cambodians, Iraqi Kurds, and many others. Rummel (1998) claims that from 1945 to 1999, around 80,000,000 civilians were murdered by states or quasi-states (non-state actors operating like states). Recently, the Sudanese government masterminded atrocities against local populations in Darfur without evoking viable intervention from the international community. In spite of this record of failure, international actors are able to project their clout to stave off extensive mass killing and thus to alleviate the agony of civilians trapped in war.

Understanding the origins of mass killing is the first step to protect civilians and forestall serious attacks on human dignity. Therefore, my dissertation is relevant to policymakers who are concerned about mass killing. By suggesting factors or contexts that pave the way for extensive mass killing, my study can alert international actors to civil wars that run the risk of triggering atrocities against civilians. In other words, my research can contribute to establishing an early warning system for shielding civilians from the scourge of war. Through this system, the UN, regional bodies, and major states can assess in which wars the government is likely to massacre civilians and then intervene in these wars before many civilians perish.
The next section addresses what state-sponsored mass killing is. I will review extant definitions of mass killing and concepts relevant to mass killing, such as geno/politicide and democide. Then, based on these definitions, I will conceptualize state-sponsored mass killing.

1.2. Conceptualizing Mass Killing

In 1944, Raphael Lemkin originated the term ‘genocide,’ a combination of the ancient Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (killing) (Lemkin, 1944; Rummel, 1994a). Genocide refers to ‘a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves’ (Lemkin, 1944: 79). Lemkin’s concept of genocide laid the foundation for the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereafter referred to the UN Genocide Convention) (Rummel, 1994a; Valentino, 2004). In 1951, this treaty went into force, affirming that genocide is a punishable crime under international law (Rummel, 1994a). The UN Genocide Convention defines genocide as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.’ These acts encompass ‘(a) killing members of the group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about

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1 The destruction of essential foundations of the life of national or ethnic groups comprises ‘disintegration of the political and social instructions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups’ (Lemkin, 1944: 79).
its physical destruction in whole or in part, (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’ (OHCHR, 2009).

This definition has several limitations. First, it includes non-killing means, going beyond the etymological meaning of genocide. The methods of destroying an ethnonational group cover both killing and non-killing tactics such as preventing births within the group and transferring children of one group to another group. Conditions leading to killing, however, could depart from those leading to the use of non-killing methods. For example, incumbents bogged down in war might liquidate civilians suspected of supporting insurgents in a desperate attempt to secure victory. In contrast, incumbents who do not face imminent severe threat like intractable war might resort to non-killing tactics to neutralize their nemeses. Placing killing and non-killing under one rubric jumbles different factors or conditions that result in the use of different tactics. Furthermore, encompassing non-killing means begets acute conceptual obfuscation, which makes genocide a normative term. Any episode pertinent to physical and/or psychological damage upon an ethnonational group could be viewed as genocide. For instance, some might argue that Botswana’s government policy of resettling ethnic Sans (Bushmen) and the denial of ethnic Hawaiian culture by the US public school system are genocide because these policies ruined the cultural bases of Bushmen and Hawaiians. These two events, however, obviously diverge from the Rubber Terror in colonial Congo.
and the persecution of Iraqi Kurds by Saddam Hussein in terms of scale, tactics, and perpetrators’ motives.\(^2\)

Second, the UN Genocide Convention focuses exclusively on ethnonational groups, not addressing political groups victimized by the government’s brutal actions. By excluding political groups, this treaty overlooks that throughout history, some incumbent rulers ruthlessly liquidated their political opponents (Harff, 2003). In France, the Reign of Terror (1793-1794), a period of violence that flared up after the onset of the French Revolution, was fraught with mass executions and political purges.

Robespierre and other Jacobin leaders killed thousands of workers, peasants, clergy, bourgeois, and aristocrats branded as anti-revolutionaries (Kerr, 1985; Andress, 2006). In the twentieth century, some ideological confrontations between communism and anti-communism escalated into carnage. During the Spanish Civil War, both Nationalists and Republicans massacred civilians suspected of backing their enemies (Kalyvas, 2008; Herreros & Criado, 2009; Balcells, 2010). In Indonesia, right after aborting an alleged communist coup in 1965, Suharto murdered up to one million communist supporters (Vickers, 2005; Harff & Gurr, 1988). From 1974 to 1979, Mengistu and his Derg

\(^2\) The Rubber Terror in colonial Congo is one of the most outrageous atrocities in human history. In 1885, King Leopold II of Belgium acquired the Congo, a territory 80 times larger than his country (BBC, 2001). He viewed the Congo only as a source of lucrative raw materials and thus aggressively exploited rubber, a highly valued commodity at that time. Indigenous Congolese were coerced to collect this resource. Systematizing forced labor, Belgian colonialists perpetrated heinous atrocities against the indigenous population (Hochschild, 1998; Forbath, 1977). The colonial authority set the quota for Congolese workers and killed or maimed those who failed to meet the quota. To rein in indigenous laborers, the authority held their family members as hostages. When the workers resisted or fled from rubber farms, the colonialists murdered, raped, or mutilated the hostages (Hochschild, 1998; Forbath, 1977). The Rubber Terror produced a massive number of Congolese deaths. Estimates of the fatalities range from two million to ten million (Rummel, 1997b; White, 2005).
comrades in Ethiopia brutally cracked down on political dissidents, which resulted in about 30,000 deaths (Kissi, 2006; Harff & Gurr, 1988).

Third, the UN Genocide Convention is state-centric. That is, it does not consider the possibility that non-state actors can and do wipe out rival ethnic and political groups (Harff, 2003). Of course, most of geno/politicide perpetrators are states or state-sponsored actors. Harff (2003) documented that out of thirty-nine geno/politicides from 1955 to 2002, states were involved in thirty-seven cases. Non-state actors (insurgents) were implicated in only five events: Angola 1975-1994, Angola 1998-2002, Bosnia 1992-1995, Burundi 1965-1973, and Congo-Kinshasa 1964-1965 respectively. This, however, does not suggest that the ability of non-state actors to perpetrate atrocities can be underestimated. Some non-state actors operating like states can and do engineer genocide or politicide. During the Russian civil war (1917-1921), for instance, the White Army composed of various anti-Bolshevik forces massacred communists, Jews, and Ukrainians (Kenez, 1991; Rummel, 1997b). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian nationalists backed by the Yugoslavian government sought to eradicate Bosnian Muslims, which provoked an international outcry (Shewfelt, 2007; Burg & Shoup, 1999).

Scholars attempted to redress the drawbacks of the UN Genocide Convention by either developing the concept of genocide further or formulating new concepts relevant to genocide. Harff (2003) criticized the Genocide Convention for not tackling political victims and non-state actors. Because the term genocide etymologically centers on ethnoreligious victims, she used the term politicide for political victims along with
genocide. Harff (2003: 58) defined genocide and politicide as ‘the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents- or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities- that are intended to destroy, in whole or in part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group.’ By identifying either of the contending parties of civil war as a potential perpetrator, she took into account the possibility of non-state actors committing genocide and politicide. Similar to the UN Genocide Convention, however, Harff’s definition does not strictly conform to the etymological meaning of geno/politicide. She did not restrict her definition to the destruction of a group by killing, which suggests that her definition can also engender conceptual confusion and normativize geno/politicide.

Dissimilar to Harff, Rummel (1994a) framed a new concept germane to genocide. He claimed that the UN definition of genocide mixes the elimination of a group through killing and non-killing methods, which causes acute conceptual obfuscation. Thus, focusing exclusively on killing, he devised the term democide, a combined word of the Greek demos (people) and the Latin cide (killing). Democide refers to ‘the intentional government killing of an unarmed person or people’ (Rummel, 1994a: 36). The government encompasses not only security machinery commanded by governing elites (military, police, and secret service) and private (non-state) actors abetted by these elites (e.g., paramilitaries, vigilantes, criminal gangs), but also de facto governance by rebels, warlords, or multinational corporations (Rummel, 1994a).³ With regard to

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³ Rummel called de facto governance quasi-state and identified eleven quasi-states. They are Amazon rubber companies in the early 20th century, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, Nationalists and warlords during the Chinese civil war, warlords during the Mexican Revolution, the Mozambican National
methods of killing, democide covers both direct and indirect killings. Governments can orchestrate democide not only by shooting or bombing people but also by creating horrendous conditions that result in the death of people. By conceptualizing democide, Rummel rectified the limitations of the UN and Harff’s definitions of genocide. Concentrating on killing mitigates the conceptual confusion. Similar to Harff’s definition, the concept of democide redresses the pitfalls of the UN Genocide Convention by 1) recognizing political victims and addressing politically motivated murder and 2) regarding de facto governance by rebels or warlords as a government and tackling intentional killing of civilians by these non-state actors.

Valentino (2004) also formulated a new concept relevant to genocide. He observed that the UN and Harff’s definitions stress the intentionality of perpetrators, but not establishing a numerical death toll threshold. In other words, regardless of the number of victims, all episodes in which political actors resort to violence with the intent to wipe out a certain ethnic or political group are considered as geno/politicide. On the other hand, Valentino (2004) emphasized the magnitude of intentional killings, arguing that events with a small number of victims are tragic but not comparable to the most outrageous atrocities of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the UN and Harff’s definitions place a great emphasis on underlying motive of destroying a certain ethnic or political group. Thus, the two concepts tend to disregard intentional killings of civilians

Resistance (RENAMO), Bengali rebels in Pakistan, White armies in Russia, Nationalists (Falangists) in Spain, and Chetniks (Serbian nationalist guerillas) and Partisans in former Yugoslavia (Rummel, 1997b; Rummel, 1994a).

Democide includes deaths of unarmed people that result from the government’s intentionally or knowingly reckless and depraved disregard for life. Hence, deaths caused by deadly prisons, concentration or recruitment camps, forced labor or enslavement, torture or beatings, famines and epidemics, and forced deportations or expulsions constitute democide (Rummel, 1994a).
during war that did not result from the intent to eradicate a specific group, even if the size of civilian fatalities was large (Fein, 1994; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). For example, some genocide scholars (e.g., Fein, 1993; Dawidowicz, 1981) do not view the strategic bombings by the Allies during the Second World War as genocide, because Allied forces did not intend to wipe out civilians residing in the Axis countries.

Instead of the term genocide, Valentino adopted the term mass killing and conceptualized it in such a way as to emphasize the magnitude of killing and address diverse intentions. He defined mass killing as ‘the intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants‘ (Valentino, 2004: 10; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004: 377-378). Mass killing must be intentional, but does not necessarily aim to eliminate a certain ethnic or political group. Accidental deaths caused by natural disasters, outbreak of diseases, or crossfire during war do not constitute mass killing (Valentino, 2004). A massive number means ‘at least 50,000 intentional deaths over the course of five or fewer years‘ (Valentino, 2004: 11-12; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004: 378). Valentino (2004) justified the selection of this relatively high threshold by arguing that it helps to confirm that large-scale intentional violence did break out despite the generally poor quality of the data pertaining to civilian deaths. Similar to Rummel’s democide, political actors can perpetrate mass killing by employing both direct and indirect methods. Direct methods include execution, gassing, and bombing. Indirect killing signifies that perpetrators deliberately manufacture conditions that beget widespread death among civilians (Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Examples of indirect methods of killing are food blockade, forced labor, and
forced relocation. A noncombatant is ‘any unarmed person who is not a member of a professional or guerilla military group and who does not actively participate in hostilities by intending to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or property’ (Valentino, 2004: 13; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004: 378-379). Civilians who simply sympathize with belligerents, provide food or other non-lethal supplies to them, or are involved in nonviolent political activities in support of them should be considered as noncombatants, because these activities do not inflict immediate physical harm on combatants (Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).

I conceptualize state-sponsored mass killing by utilizing Valentino’s mass killing and Rummel’s democide definitions because these two concepts focus on killing of noncombatants or civilians. State-sponsored mass killing is defined as the deliberate killing of a large number of civilians perpetrated by the government. The government includes security apparatus commanded by governing elites (military, police, and secret service) and private actors sponsored by these elites (e.g., paramilitaries, vigilantes, criminal gangs) (Rummel, 1994a). Dissimilar to Rummel, I confine the government to actors directed or abetted by state rulers. In other words, I do not consider de facto governance by insurgents, warlords, or multinational corporations as government, even though they perform state tasks such as mobilizing soldiers, collecting taxes, and administering justice. The target of mass killing is civilians. A civilian is any unarmed person who is not a member of armed forces and who does not actively engage in hostilities that aim to inflict physical harm on enemy personnel or property (ICRC, 2005; Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Passive and non-lethal forms
of support, such as participating in nonviolent political activities and supplying shelter, food, or other non-lethal materials, do not transform a civilian into a combatant because these actions do not immediately afflict enemy soldiers (Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).

The government can orchestrate mass killing in both direct and indirect ways. Direct killing contains shooting, bombing, beating, stabbing, and gassing (Rummel, 1994a; Valentino, 2004). Indirect killing signifies that the perpetrators deprive target civilians of items essential to human life, which generates widespread death among these populations (Rummel, 1994a; Valentino, 2004; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Denying access to food or medicine breeds severe famine or disease, which can cause the death of the targets. For instance, during the Biafran War (1967-1970), the Nigerian government enforced a tight blockade of the Biafran region in an attempt to cripple insurgent combatants (Rubenzer, 2007a). This embargo produced an appalling humanitarian catastrophe. Famine and diseases resulting from the blockade claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Biafran civilians (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004; Rubenzer, 2007).

Rummel (1994a) and Valentino (2004) maintained that forced relocation and forced labor constitute indirect methods of killing. These two policies, however, might not be designed to kill the target population. Two examples illustrate this: the deportation of Koreans to Central Asia by Soviet leaders in 1937 and the conscription of Asians into forced labor by Japan during the Second World War. In 1937, Stalin executed the transfer of at least 250,000 Koreans living in the Russian Far East to Central
Asia, alleging that they would be likely to engage in espionage for Japan (Kim, 2004; Rummel, 1997b). The Koreans were transported by overcrowded and squalid trains. During the one-month excruciating journey, several hundreds died of diseases, fatigue, and hunger (Kim, 2004). Prosecuting the war against the Allies, the Japanese military forced millions of Koreans, Chinese, Indonesians, and other Asians to work in construction sites, factories, and mines (Rummel, 1997b). Rummel (1997b) estimated that at least 600,000 Asian conscripts perished as a result of poor working conditions. The perpetrators in these examples did not intend to liquidate their targets. Soviet leaders calculated that resettling the Koreans in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan far away from the Far East would forestall them from spying for Japan. Furthermore, this population transfer would help to reinvigorate agricultural production in these Soviet regions (Kim, 2004). Japanese leaders coerced a large number of Asians into labor force in order to build basic infrastructure and produce war materials. Of course, Soviet and Japanese leaders exhibited a blatant disregard for human life by neglecting those who suffered from hunger, diseases, and exhaustion. This, however, is not murder but negligent homicide because the immediate intention of the perpetrators was not killing their targets. Therefore, dissimilar to Rummel and Valentino, I do not view forced labor and forced relocation as indirect methods of killing.

To recapitulate, state-sponsored mass killing refers to the deliberate killing of a large number of civilians perpetrated by the government. The government comprises security apparatus commanded by governing elites and private actors abetted by these elites. A civilian is any unarmed person who is not a member of armed forces and who
does not participate actively in hostilities that aim to inflict physical damage on enemy personnel or property. The government can engineer mass killing in both direct and indirect ways. Direct killing includes shooting, bombing, beating, stabbing, and gassing. The government indirectly kills civilians by denying them access to food, medicine, or other items essential to human life.

In Chapter 2, I evaluate existing literature on mass killing, which sets the stage for my research. Mass killing scholars have not sufficiently addressed civilian support for insurgent groups. My dissertation fills this void by synthesizing factors that make civilians buttress insurgency and mass killing perpetrated by the government. In Chapter 3, I generate a theoretical model on state-sponsored mass killing during civil war and derive several hypotheses from this model. I claim that factors that engender staunch civilian support for insurgents can propel embattled rulers to engineer extensive mass killing as a strategy for neutralizing insurgent forces and staving off future insurgency. I identify seven variables that account for the occurrence or non-occurrence of extensive mass killing. Chapter 4 explicates how I operationalize variables and test hypotheses. To verify my theoretical model, I employ statistical analyses and comparative case studies. In Chapter 5, I present statistical results and discuss them. Statistical analyses reveal that in general, ethnic support for insurgents, severe political marginalization, and history of intense armed conflict are likely to instigate extensive mass killing. In Chapter 6, I analyze the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and the Peruvian Civil War (1982-1992) for comparative case studies. Chapter 7 summarizes
the previous chapters, address policy implications of my dissertation, and then suggest future direction of mass killing study.
2 Literature Review

Mass killing has been understudied. Only a small number of scholars have addressed, in any way, conditions under which state leaders orchestrate extensive mass killing against their own populations. The extant literature on mass killing can be broadly categorized into two approaches based on structure and leadership (See Table 2.1 for summary.). The structural approach suggests that certain political, economic, or social structures account for the occurrence or non-occurrence of mass killing. Scholars who emphasize structure have grappled with the relationship between ethnic cleavages, regime type, political opportunity, or economic and political interdependence and mass killing. The leadership approach explains the causes of mass killing by focusing on political elites. Some scholars claim that leaders’ psychological conditions affect the outbreak of mass killing. Others stress leaders’ rational choice, maintaining that mass killing is a calculated strategy by which political elites seek to achieve their important goals (Valentino, 2004). Still another group of scholars argues that leaders who are committed to exclusionary ideologies are likely to perpetrate mass killing (Harff, 2003; Harff & Gurr, 1998). In this chapter, I discuss the existing literature and suggest what it omits, which influences my research direction.
2.1. Structural Approach

2.1.1. Ethnic Cleavage

Investigating the causes of genocide, some scholars zero in on ethnic division. They claim that deep persistent cleavages between different ethnic, cultural, or religious groups are likely to trigger genocide (Kuper, 1981; Fein, 1993). Sharp ethnic division can lead to genocide by 1) sparking virulent intergroup conflict and 2) facilitating the identification of enemies and undermining moral scruples (Charney & Rapaport, 1982; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1993; Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003). Further, Kaufmann (1996) explains why wars reflecting ethnic polarization (ethnic war) are bloodier than those reflecting ideological polarization (ideological war). The government and insurgents enmeshed in ideological war share the mobilization base (Kaufmann, 1996). Individual loyalties are quite fluid. Thus, ideological war tends to generate intense competition for civilian support. To obtain this support, belligerents refrain from atrocities and strive to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of civilians (Kaufmann, 1996). In contrast, individual loyalties in ethnic war are rigid and immutable. Each side’s mobilization base is limited to members of its own group, which implies that victory in ethnic war hinges on physical control over the enemy territory, not on appeals to members of the other group (Kaufmann, 1996). In order to capture this territory and secure full control over it, belligerents are willing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing through massacres and forced expulsion.
The emphasis on deep ethnic cleavages, however, is open to certain critiques. Sharp ethnic division does not necessarily degenerate into genocide. During the apartheid era, black South Africans were afflicted by extremely high levels of discrimination and repression for several decades without becoming victims of genocide (Valentino, 2004). The apartheid regime did not employ mass killing in an attempt to neutralize the African National Congress (ANC) insurgents, because 1) white leaders did not feel threatened militarily by black violence and 2) the racist government understood that widespread aggression against black civilians would exacerbate political problems (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).

Genocide can also occur in countries without substantial ethnic divisions. In the 1970s and 80s, Cambodia, a relatively homogenous country, suffered a series of mass killings. During the first civil war (1970-1975), the Lon Nol government and its main supporter, the United States, massacred civilians suspected of backing Khmer Rouge (KR) guerillas (Lee, 2007; Becker, 1998). After seizing power in 1975, Pol Pot and his KR comrades ruthlessly murdered one to two million citizens, which is one of the bloodiest mass killings in modern history (Kiernan, 2002; Chirot, 1994). From 1979 to 1991, the government and Vietnam unleashed massive violence against civilians in a bid to crush Khmer Rouge guerillas (Lee, 2007).

Furthermore, a glance at history reveals that some ideological conflicts escalated into mass killing. In contrast to Kaufmann’s argument, individual allegiances can be rigid and immutable in ideological war, thus this type of war can produce atrocities (Kalyvas, 2008). The Spanish Civil War epitomizes ideological war inundated with bloodshed.
Ideological polarization was entrenched in the Spanish society during the war. Hence, Republicans and Nationalists projected relentless violence to eliminate their rivals (Kalyvas, 2008; Herreros & Criado, 2009). Changing ideological stance was impossible for many people, thus hundreds of thousands of Republicans fled the country after Nationalists won the war (Kalyvas, 2008).

2.1.2. Regime Type

The democratic peace theory has been applied to understand mass killing. Rummel (1997c) asserts that absolute power at the center is the primary cause of mass killing; in other words, highly autocratic leaders are likely to orchestrate mass murder. The tight grip on power removes the checks-and-balances system and norms of tolerance and compromise, which makes it easier for dominant rulers to employ coercive measures and further to exterminate groups that resist their rule (Rummel, 1994a; 1995). Furthermore, leaders who hold absolute power tend to fear that opponents are always plotting to usurp power from them. This paranoia impels the rulers to liquidate (potential) dissents and challengers (Rummel, 1995). By contrast, democracy obviates the risk of mass murder because 1) norms of tolerance, compromise, and non-violence are deeply embedded in democratic societies and 2) the system of checks-and-balances operates well in these societies (Rummel, 1994a & 1994b; Harff, 2003). Further, Heger & Salehyan (2007) reveal that large government coalitions constrain the rulers embroiled in civil war from projecting unbridled force, which signifies that democratic leaders are not likely to engineer genocide and politicide.
Regime type arguments, however, encounter theoretical and empirical challenges. Theoretically, in contrast to Rummel’s argument, the erosion of power can give rise to genocide. By analyzing genocides in Rwanda and the Darfur region of Sudan, Straus (2006) demonstrates that national elites might choose to mastermind genocide as their power wanes or is on the verge of waning. Empirically, many dictatorial regimes did not commit mass killing. Communist leaders in Cuba and Vietnam and monarchs in Saudi Arabia and Oman, for instance, have exercised unfettered power without killing a large number of their citizens.

Regime arguments imply that democratization reduces the likelihood of the outbreak of geno/politicide. Democratization, however, can set the stage for geno/politicide. In democratizing countries, contending elites fiercely jockey for power. In an attempt to win this power competition, governing elites might be willing to unleash extreme violence (Gurr, 1994; Shaw, 2003). In addition, democratic rulers might employ mass killing when they feel threatened by war. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) contend that although democratic states are less likely to orchestrate mass killing during war than autocratic ones, the former might resort to this egregious strategy when confronting popular and strong guerilla insurgents. Addressing interstate war, Downes (2008) maintains that democratic rulers are likely to massacre civilians in their enemy countries in a desperate attempt to lower the costs of war and secure victory. An eyeballing of history shows that democratic regimes perpetrated mass killing, which can dispute the pacifying effect of democracy on geno/politicide. Democratic rulers ruthlessly slaughtered domestic populations treated as second-class
citizens and indigenous populations in their own colonies (Valentino, 2004). In the 19th century, the U.S. government conducted relentless military operations against Native Americans, which resulted in the drastic reduction of their population. In Madagascar, combating anti-colonial insurgency, French troops murdered 10,000 - 100,000 native civilians (Rummel, 1997b; Harff & Gurr, 1988; White, 2005). Furthermore, democratic leaders engaged in mass killing during war against other countries (Valentino, 2004; Downes, 2008). For example, during the World War II, U.S. and British forces indiscriminately bombed cities in Germany and Japan. At least 500,000 German and Japanese civilians died as a result of these bombing campaigns (Valentino, 2004; Downes, 2008).

2.1.3. Political Opportunity

The political opportunity argument suggests that major political upheavals give rise to state-sponsored mass killing (Melson, 1992; Krain, 1997; Harff, 2003). Major political turmoil prompts political elites to gravitate toward power consolidation, which can spark genocide and politicide (Harff, 1986; Melson, 1992; Krain, 1997). Focusing on revolution, Melson (1992) argues that revolution yields the opportunity for radical groups to seize state machinery and to impose their ideology, which makes it easier for them to legitimize mass murder against their opponents. Krain (1997) contends that political upheavals, such as interstate or civil war, extra-constitutional regime change, or decolonization, generate windows of political opportunity during which new elites capturing power or old elites trying to retain their grip on power must consolidate
control quickly and efficiently. Leaders who fail to secure power are not efficient in performing key tasks such as protecting their country from foreign aggression and extracting taxes from the population, which results in the emergence of challengers within the regime who call into question its legitimacy (Tilly, 1978; Krain, 1997). Therefore, elites strive to capitalize on windows of political opportunity to solidify power as quickly and efficiently as possible, which propels them to suppress their opponents brutally (Krain, 1997; Harff, 1986; Harff & Gurr, 1988).

The political opportunity argument, however, has two notable pitfalls. First, the majority of political upheavals did not bring about mass killing (Valentino, 2004). The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) database substantiates this. The PITF identified 148 state failure events comprising ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, genocides and politicides, and adverse regime changes from 1955 to 2006. Out of these episodes, thirty-five involve genocide or politicide. In other words, genocides and politicides account for only about 23% of total state failure events. Second, the political opportunity argument overlooks that different types of political turmoil can produce different outcomes. Investigating mass killing during wars, Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) reveal that 1) most of mass killings occurred during civil war (27 out of 30

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5 According to PITF, ethnic war refers to ‘sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in their status.’ Revolutionary war is defined as ‘sustained violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region.’ Genocide and politicide refer to ‘sustained policies by states or their agents— or, in civil wars, by either of the contending authorities— that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group.’ Adverse regime change is defined as ‘major adverse shifts in patterns of governance, including total or near-total collapse of central state authority, revolutionary change in political elites and the mode of governance, contested dissolution of federated states or secession of a substantial area of a state by extrajudicial means, and substantial shifts away from democratic toward authoritarian rule.’

Source: http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfpset.htm
mass killing episodes) and 2) guerilla warfare is more likely to generate mass killing than non-guerilla warfare. In the 1940s and 1950s, anti-colonial wars against France were bloodier than those against Britain. After the end of the World War II, France engaged in six anti-colonial wars, whereas Britain was embroiled in two wars. France prosecuted wars in Algeria, Cameroon, Madagascar, Morocco, Tunisia, and Vietnam. Britain waged wars in Kenya and Malaysia. Three out of six wars by France (wars in Algeria, Madagascar, and Vietnam) produced over 50,000 intentional civilian deaths, whereas none of the wars by Britain yielded over 50,000 deaths.

2.1.4. Economic & Political Interdependence

Neoliberal scholars place a great emphasis on interdependency by arguing that it often determines political actors’ behavior (Keohane, 1984; Moravcsik, 1997). Using neoliberalism as a fulcrum, Harff (2003) posits that the outbreak of genocide and politicide is contingent upon the degree of economic and political interdependence. A high level of economic interdependence minimizes the likelihood of geno/politicide occurring. Geno/politicide can bring tremendous economic costs to a perpetrating country that has open economic system, because exhibiting brutality can provoke economic sanctions that disrupt its economic ties with foreign states. In contrast, leaders of an isolated country are likely to commit geno/politicide because they perceive that their ruthless behavior will have few international repercussions (Harff, 2003). For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, governments in Uganda and Burundi whose economic status was very low massacred their own citizens while the
international community did not intervene to stop the killing (Harff, 2003). A high degree of political interdependence also reduces the likelihood of the outbreak of geno/politicide. Countries that join many regional and intercontinental organizations are subject to greater international scrutiny and obtain more political support when confronting domestic challenges (Harff, 2003). This restrains the government from orchestrating geno/politicide.

Realists might dispute the inverse relationship between interdependency and geno/politicide. They insist that states strive to maximize their own national interests and interdependency does not hamper states’ pursuit of interests (Grieco, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1994/95). This argument suggests that a high level of economic and political interdependence does not constrain states from perpetrating mass killing if state leaders believe that this brutal strategy will help to achieve their national interests. The First Chechen war (1994-1996) illustrates the irrelevancy of interdependency. A few years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia with a high level of political and economic interdependence combated Chechen insurgents. To suppress the insurrection and preserve territorial integrity, Russian forces conducted indiscriminate air and ground raids and massacred Chechen civilians in spite of worldwide condemnation (Karaman, 2007; Politkovskaia, 2001).
2.2. Leadership Approach

2.2.1. Psychological Arguments

Some scholars have investigated the causes of geno/politicide by focusing on leaders’ psychological conditions. They argue that political leaders do not always commit mass murder in a premeditative manner (Fein, 1993). Elites’ mental and emotive states can influence the outbreak of geno/politicide. A few researchers underscore leaders’ mental pathology. They claim that elites usually do not lean toward mass killing because their conscience deters them from infringing severely upon human dignity. Mental disease or deviation eliminates this qualm, which makes it easier for the elites to perpetrate mass killing (Decalo, 1989). For instance, in the 1970s, then Equatorial Guinean dictator, Francisco Macías Nguema, routinized atrocities and as a result, at least 50,000 citizens were murdered under his rule (White, 2005). Decalo (1989) maintains that Nguema’s mental derangement accounts for his barbarous behavior.

The emphasis on leaders’ mental pathology is subject to certain critiques. First, the fact that mentally ill rulers perpetrated extensive mass killing does not necessarily indicate a causal linkage between mental disorder and mass killing. Second, scholars who support this argument have not proposed clear criteria for ‘mentally ill’ leaders. Thus, determining which leaders had mental disorder is highly arbitrary. Third, the mental pathology argument disregards that elites who do not suffer from mental disease or deviation might be willing to jettison their moral scruples and undertake savage actions in order to achieve their goals. Finally, any human rights violations can
be attributed to mental pathology. That is, leaders’ mental disease can account for not just mass killing, but also any actions that do not entail killing but impinge on human dignity.

Other scholars contend that leaders’ feeling of revenge rather than mental pathology triggers mass killing. The desire for revenge, sought for honor and pride against a collective entity, eradicates whatever moral scruples the avenger may have against committing atrocities (Chirot & McCauley, 2006). In other words, political leaders who think that their honor and pride have been gravely besmirched are willing to take aggressive and cruel retributive actions in an attempt to restore their damaged honor and pride. The obliteration of Hereros by German colonialists in German Southwest Africa (currently Namibia) epitomizes genocide instigated by feeling of revenge (Chirot & McCauley, 2006). In 1904, Hereros launched rebellion against abusive German colonizers and initially succeeded in beating German troops. The defeat enraged German ruling elites and made them perceive that Hereros tarnished the honor of the German Empire. In order to retrieve the sullied honor, German leaders sought ruthless reprisal by orchestrating genocide against Hereros (Chirot & McCauley, 2006). It is estimated that around 65,000 Hereros, at least 75 percent of the total Herero population, were deliberately slain or starved to death in 1904 and 1905 (Pakenham, 1991; Chirot & McCauley, 2006).

Furthermore, Midlarsky (2005) incorporates prospect theory into the study of genocide. Genocide tends to occur within the domain of loss that is created by ‘the experience of either (1) transfer of territory, population, authority, or some combination
thereof to another political entity, or (2) military defeat or significant casualties in political violence (e.g., war) that either are about to be or have already been incurred’ (Midlarsky, 2005: 83). The domain of loss generates fear, vulnerability, resentment, and a desire for revenge, which increases the probability of leaders’ perpetrating genocide (Midlarsky, 2005; Straus, 2007).

2.2.2. Rational Choice Arguments

Those who view genocide from rational choice angle criticize psychological arguments, claiming that psychological factors, such as mental pathology, revenge, and emotion, do not account well for the outbreak of mass killing. Mass killing occurs when political leaders realize that it is the best option to accomplish certain political and military objectives (Valentino, 2004). In other words, mass killing is a rationally calculated strategy to achieve important goals. Two situations can provide political leaders with the strong incentive to engineer mass killing. The first one is when elites attempt to disfranchise segments of their population and to deprive these citizens of their homes and possessions or their way of life. Mass killing can be the best option for these leaders because this reprehensible strategy helps to annihilate the influence of the dissent groups and to overcome or prevent resistance by these groups (Valentino, 2004). Valentino (2004) suggests that radical communist reform (e.g., agricultural collectivization in the Soviet Union), ethnic cleansing (e.g., partition of Bangladesh in 1971), and territorial expansion (e.g., German colonial expansion in Namibia from 1904
to 1907) entail the deprivation of some domestic or indigenous populations, thus giving rise to mass killing.

The second situation is when political leaders are embroiled in war. Kalyvas (1999; 2006) contends that indiscriminate violence operates as a deterrent to civilian defection. Indiscriminate violence collectively penalizes suspected enemy collaborators and those related to them, thus deterring civilians from defecting to the rival actor. In other words, indiscriminate violence is a rational strategy to maximize civilian support (Kalyvas 1999; 2006). Sartre (1968) and Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) argue that incumbent rulers are likely to perpetrate mass killing when they confront guerilla combatants. Guerillas eschew decisive battles and engage in prolonged campaigns through hit-and-run attacks, assassinations, terror bombing, and other tactics. Guerilla forces also rely heavily on the local population for food, shelter, supplies, and intelligence (Guevara, 1998 [orig. 1961]; Mao, 2000 [orig. 1961]; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Therefore, it is extremely difficult for government forces to defeat guerilla combatants directly. This predicament incentivizes embattled rulers to slaughter a great number of civilians suspected of supporting insurgents. The government orchestrates mass killing in a desperate attempt to destroy rebels’ support bases and thus to squelch the insurgency (Sartre, 1968; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).

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\[6 \textit{On Genocide}, \text{Sartre underscores (neo) colonialism as the main cause of genocide. Thus, in the context of his argument, incumbent rulers are Western (neo) colonialists who encountered fierce resistance by the colonized.}\]
2.2.3. Ideological Perspective

Constructivists assert that intangible elements such as identity, idea, and culture shape state preferences and actions (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Constructivism lays the basis for ideological perspective on geno/politicide. Harff (2003) posits that genocide and politicide are likely to break out when political leaders seek to materialize ideologies that advocate an extreme view of the world and the establishment of an idealistic society. These ideologies encompass strict variants of communism, rigid anti-communism, religious extremism, and strict secular nationalism or ethnonationalism. To facilitate the materialization of the ideologies, leaders eradicate certain ethnonational or political groups that they regard as irreconcilable enemies, even if these groups do not pose a real threat to the leaders. After seizing power in 1975, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge comrades who idealized a perfect agrarian communist society relentlessly pursued the radical transformation of the Cambodian society. In an effort to stimulate this process, the Khmer Rouge ruthlessly killed up to two million citizens many of whom were city dwellers, business owners, landlords, intellectuals, and students (Chirot, 1994; Kiernan, 2002).

Some scholars refute ideological perspective. Those who criticize constructivism maintain that ideology is not an independent variable, but an intervening one. Education, socialization, political turmoil, or other factors shape elites’ ideology. Thus, in explaining geno/politicide, these factors are far more important than ideology. Kalyvas (1999) also debunks the role of ideology, charging that 1) one ideological tenet can beget multiple courses of action, 2) political leaders often take advantage of
ideology for the *ex-post facto* justification of their actions, and 3) ideology accounts little for the temporal and spatial variations of massacres. Midlarsky’s criticism is milder than the previous two. Although acknowledging that utopian belief can be an element in sparking genocide, he claims that it alone cannot capture the whole story of genocide (Midlarsky, 2005). Therefore, scholars must delve into variables that link the belief system to genocide in order to comprehend the origins of genocide fully (Midlarsky, 2005).

2.3. Limitation of Literature on Mass Killing

The bulk of extant literature on mass killing pays scant attention to the behavior of civilians caught in civil war. Leadership arguments focus on leaders themselves, addressing psychological, rational, and ideological dimensions of leaders’ savage behavior. Structural arguments zero in on various structures encircling political leaders, discussing how ethnic cleavages, regime type, political opportunity, and economic & political interdependence affect leaders’ decisions to resort to or refrain from mass killing. Only a fraction of the literature tackles the behavior of civilians, but in a superficial manner. For instance, Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) contend that a high level of civilian support for insurgents is likely to produce state-sponsored mass killing. They, however, consider civilian support as given and do not extend their focus to what makes civilians back the rebels.

Of course, political leaders decide to commit or eschew mass killing. Thus, I acknowledge that it is important to inquire into political leaders and structures
surrounding them. Civilian populations, however, play a key role in civil war. They can help belligerents conduct military operations by supplying young recruits, information, food, shelter, and so forth. Therefore, civilian support can influence how well the contenders prosecute the war and which strategies the government exercises to subdue the insurgency. Civilian support is not given. Something leads them to jeopardize their lives and support insurgents. Therefore, to comprehend the origins of state-sponsored mass killing, it is essential to addressing factors that can generate staunch civilian support for insurgency.

Some civil war scholars have examined why civilians risk their lives and participate in rebellion. Gurr & Moore (1997) and Gurr (1993) emphasize grievances as the main cause of civilians’ joining the insurgency. Discontent about unjust treatment agitates people for the change of the status quo and drives them to back insurgent groups (Gurr & Moore, 1997; Gurr, 1993). Wood’s study on the Salvadoran Civil War corroborates the ‘grievance’ argument. She (2003) finds that during the war, peasants supported leftist guerillas not for material gain but for moral and emotional reasons. By participating in the insurrection, indigent farmers sought to redress injustice, defend or restore their dignity, and write a new history for their descendants (Wood, 2003). On the other hand, Gates (2002) and Kalyvas (2006) stress the complexity of civilians’ motives. Exploring the microfoundations of rebellion, Gates (2002) argues that civilians join insurgent groups for a mixture of pecuniary rewards (e.g., money, land) and non-pecuniary rewards of fighting the “good fight.” Kalyvas (2006) suggests various reasons for civilian support for the insurgency. Civilians back rebel groups in a bid to obtain
public goods or individual material benefits, secure their survival, acquire higher status, settle personal or local disputes, take revenge, and/or vent their anger (Kalyvas, 2006).

In the next chapter, I theorize on the linkage between factors that affect civilian support for insurgents and the extent of mass killing orchestrated by the government. I identify seven factors that stimulate or inhibit rebels’ civilian support. Three of them are pertinent to grievances, as the extant literature suggests. Others pertain to insurgent aim, external support, and lootable resources. I synthesize these factors and the scale of state-sponsored mass killing.
3 Theoretical Model

Earlier works on mass killing do not sufficiently address civilian support for insurgents, which can impact leaders’ strategies for suppressing insurgent groups. I rectify this limitation by investigating how factors that engender civilian support for insurgents can propel embattled rulers to unleash massive violence against civilian populations.

I contend that when combating insurgents who garner staunch civilian support, state leaders are likely to engineer extensive mass killing. Civilians or people tend to play a crucial role in civil war, which is reflected in prominent revolutionaries’ thoughts and strategies. Lenin (1969 [orig. 1902]; 1993 [orig. 1917]) asserted that the proletariat class is the pivot of revolution against capitalists. In order for this revolution to succeed, a vanguard party consisting of intellectual elites must direct workers because otherwise, the proletariat would be merely satisfied with trade unionism (Lenin, 1969 [orig. 1902]).

Agitating for war of national liberation, Fanon (2004 [orig.1961]) emphasized the role of the lumpenproletariat defined as the colonized who are not engaged in industrial production (e.g., landless peasants, the unemployed, hooligans). Because industrial workers and town dwellers are susceptible to manipulations by colonialists, nationalist groups should rally support from the lumpenproletariat to subvert the colonial rule (Fanon, 2004 [orig. 1961]; 1988 [orig. 1964]). Mao (2000 [orig. 1961]) and Guevara (1998 [orig. 1961]), the most famous guerilla leaders, claim that without support from the masses, guerillas cannot win the war. Insurgent groups often do not have regular
armies, so they recruit combatants from the civilian population. Rebels also rely heavily on civilians for intelligence, shelter, food, medicine, and other supplies (Mao, 2000 [orig. 1961]; Guevara, 1998 [orig. 1961]; Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Therefore, the guerillas must institute mass support systems to defeat government troops.

The importance of civilian support is also applied to the government. Of course, state leaders have standing professional armies and thus depend on civilian support to a lesser extent. Support from civilians, however, can help states precipitate victory. The civilian support for the government can deprive insurgent groups of recruitment pools, basic amenities, and shelter. Civilians can also provide information on the rebels, which helps incumbents’ military operations. For example, the Peruvian government succeeded in fracturing the Shining Path because peasants offended by the rebels’ disrespect for indigenous culture, imposition of rigid regulations, and harsh punishment formed militias called rondas and lent support to governmental troops (Gorriti, 1999).

In a nutshell, civilian support is crucial for civil war belligerents in that war outcomes can be contingent upon the level of this support. Therefore, rebels and the government tend to vie for civilian support (Guevara, 1998 [orig. 1961]; Kalyvas, 1999).

When insurgent groups succeed in obtaining staunch civilian support, they are able to combat the government effectively (Mao, 2000 [orig. 1961]; Guevara, 1998 [orig. 1961]). The insurgents can receive young recruits, logistical items, and information pertaining to incumbent forces. The rebel forces can evade detection by vanishing into the civilian population (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Confronting people’s war, state leaders might come to fear that they will fail to defeat the rebels and in
worst-case scenario, the insurgents will win the war. In this situation, the embattled rulers might conclude that in order to subdue the insurgency, they need to dismantle rebels’ civilian support bases.

The government has diverse strategic options for undermining civilian support for insurgent groups. It can incentivize civilians to abandon their allegiance to the rebels. State leaders might give pecuniary rewards or execute land reform. The incumbents might elevate political and social status of suspected or potential rebel supporters. Embattled rulers can also resort to coercion. The government might dispatch a large number of troops to areas in which insurgents operate actively and monitor and restrict the activities or movements of residents. The rulers might imprison (potential) rebel supporters or relocate them to designated territories or camps in an attempt to sever rebel combatants from the civilians. Furthermore, the government might massacre civilian populations suspected of rebel supporters and those related to them.

Embattled rulers might consider or implement counter-insurgency strategies that do not involve extensive mass killing. Under certain conditions, however, these strategies fail to stimulate mass civilian defection to the government and to fracture insurgent support bases. Certain factors make civilians intransigent supporters of insurgency and thus non-mass killing strategies are not sufficient to deter civilians from sponsoring the rebellion. Ardent rebel supporters do not waver when the government offers material incentives. They even perceive that the government is attempting to bribe them and is thus insulting them. Forced relocation and massive troop deployment exacerbate animosity toward the rulers. Thus, despite the government’s close
surveillance, intransigent civilians strive to grab every opportunity to assist insurgent forces.

Conditions that vitiate non-mass killing strategies can lead embattled rulers to consider extensive mass killing as an attractive strategy. Extensive mass killing can bring both immediate and long-term benefits to the government. By massacring (potential) rebel supporters, the government can sabotage insurgent support bases and debilitate insurgent combatants. Killing youths, children, and women can shatter future recruitment pools and thus prevent rebellion from recurring. Of course, mass killing can engender negative consequences. By committing extensive mass killing, the government flagrantly contravenes international norms of civilian protection during warfare. The international community might seek to punish the perpetrator by imposing economic and arms embargoes and/or launching military intervention on the rebel side. Mass killing might also instigate a fervent desire for revenge among the victimized, which makes the government bogged down in an endless cycle of violence. Combating popular insurgents, however, state leaders become overwhelmed by fear of losing the war and thus disregard the potential costs of mass killing. Furthermore, the government might judge that extensive mass killing drains insurgent recruitment pools, which prevents international intervention from translating into the enhancement of rebels’ military capacity. Staunch civilian support for rebels can drive government supporters who might otherwise object to extensive mass killing to uphold or acquiesce in this heinous strategy, which removes an obstacle to the use of extensive mass killing.
Because civilian support for insurgents is related to state-sponsored mass killing, scholars need to examine factors or contexts that generate civilian support so strong as to make futile strategies that do not involve extensive mass killing. Some scholars address sources of rebels’ civilian support. For instance, Weinstein (2007) maintains that insurgents with social endowments (ethnic, religious, or ideological ties) develop internal structures that yield strong civilian support, whereas insurgents with economic endowments (external patronage and natural resource) do not. Gurr (1970; 1993; 1997 with Moore) stresses deep-seated grievances as a source of staunch civilian support for rebel groups. These scholars, however, do not explore how factors that give rise to ardent civilian support for insurgents account for state-sponsored mass killing. In this chapter, I theorize on the linkages between sources of rebels’ civilian support and extensive mass killing perpetrated by the government. I suggest seven factors as potential predictors of mass killing during civil war: insurgent aim, external support for insurgents from their ethnic brethren and the government’s rivals, lootable resources, political and economic marginalization, and armed conflict history.

3.1. Insurgent Aim

Insurgent aim can be broadly categorized into secession and regime change.\(^7\) Insurgent groups may aim to dislodge the government from their territory and to institute self-governance in the form of either an independent country or an autonomous region. For

\(^7\) I focus my attention on insurgent aim at the macro level. At the micro level, rebels’ goals often pertain to the distribution of local political power and economic resources (e.g., Violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria and Indonesia).
example, in the 1960s and 1970s, Angolans and Mozambicans engaged in war against Portugal in a bid to achieve independence. Kurdish insurgents aim to establish an independent state of Kurdistan comprising Kurdish territories in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria (e.g., PKK in Turkey) or greater autonomy within existing borders (e.g., KDP and PUK in Iraq) (Strakes, 2007; Finn, 2007). Rebels may aim to overthrow the current government and seize political power. For instance, communists or leftists in El Salvador, Greece, and the Philippines launched rebellion to usurp power from their anti-communist governments. In Chad, Lebanon, and South Africa, insurgent ethnic groups staged uprisings, aiming to subvert the rule by dominant groups.

In secessionist war, violence tends to be localized. In other words, the battlefields in secessionist war are restricted to certain remote regions over which ethnic minority insurgents want to exercise authority in the future. The localization of violence might motivate secessionists to concentrate on local populations most of whom share ethnic ties with them, which makes it easier for the insurgents to solidify civilian support. Appealing to common heritage or grievances and distributing a significant amount of resources to locals could help secessionist rebels garner civilian support. In this situation, the government might judge that the ardent support for insurgents will foil strategies that do not involve extensive mass killing, such as disbursing material rewards and enforcing population transfer (resettlement). Therefore, embattled leaders might engage extensively in mass killing in an attempt to wipe out rebel support bases and thus to paralyze rebel combatants and stave off future insurgency. The Second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) illustrates how secessionist war
begs relentless violence against civilians. Although initially advocating the creation of a “new” united Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) sought the secession of southern Sudan (Sambanis, 2004; Thyne, 2007; Ali, Elbadawi & El-Batahani, 2005). The secessionist agenda incentivized SPLA/M leaders to focus on their ethnic brethren and rally support from them. The insurgents capitalized on deep-seated grievances, such as religious persecution and economic discrimination, and nurtured nationalist sentiments (Ali, Elbadawi & El-Batahani, 2005; Thyne, 2007). The solid support for the SPLA/M propelled the government to kill one to two million southern Sudanese in an attempt to cripple rebel combatants and forestall future insurgency (Harff, 2003; Thyne, 2007).

In contrast, in a regime change war, rebel groups try to expand battlefields and to capture regions adjacent to the capital. In order to prosecute the war effectively in broad areas and lay the foundation for future rule, these insurgents need to receive strong support from a wide range of civilian populations. Rebel leaders, however, might have difficulty in constructing extensive civilian support systems. It can be very cumbersome to convince highly diverse populations to converge around the insurgent cause. Targeting a broad range of civilians can constrict the amount of resources that the rebels offer. In this situation, the government might be able to curtail civilian support for insurgents by applying material or nonmaterial incentives. As a result, combating insurgents who aim to seize power, the rulers might not have the incentive to perpetrate extensive mass killing as a strategy for destroying rebel support bases. The Contra war (1982-1990) in Nicaragua epitomizes how regime change war restraints
state-sponsored massive violence against civilians. The Contra rebels strove to topple the Sandinista government without widespread civilian support. Although sponsored by some segments of the society (e.g., former elites, the Catholic Church, Miskito Indians), the Contras failed to induce the majority of the population to join them because many Nicaraguans harbored bitter animosity toward the ousted Somoza regime (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Simon, 2007). By contrast, the Sandinista government succeeded in mustering widespread support by implementing policies that aimed to redress social and economic inequalities, which inhibited embattled Sandinistas from orchestrating extensive mass killing (Simon, 2007).

**H1 (Insurgent aim): State-sponsored mass killing is more extensive in secessionist war than in regime change war.**

**Secessionist war**

![Diagram](image)

**Regime change war**

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.1: Insurgent Goal and State-sponsored Mass Killing**
3.2. External Support for Insurgents

In civil war, actors are not necessarily restricted to insurgent groups and the government. A civil war can elicit external intervention, becoming internationalized. Outside actors may intervene in the war on rebel’s side (Gleditsch, 2007; Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz, 2008; Regan, 2000 & 2002). This external support assumes various forms. Third party states favoring insurgency may carry out direct support or intervention, dispatching their own troops to fight alongside insurgents (Regan, 2000 & 2002; Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz, 2008). For instance, during the recent civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda deployed their soldiers inside the Congolese territory to support Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) insurgents. The Rwandan and Ugandan armies joined forces with these rebels and battled the Congolese army (Ndikumana & Emizet, 2005; Wilson, 2007a). Insurgent-friendly states may exercise indirect support or intervention (Gleditsch, 2007; Gleditsch, Salehyan & Schultz, 2008; Salehyan, 2009). They may supply weapons, money, food, and other war materials to the insurgents. The intervening states may help train rebel combatants, and allow insurgent groups to use their territories as safe havens (Salehyan, 2009 & 2007). After initiating an armed struggle in 1961, the African National Congress (ANC) succeeded in obtaining significant support from various African states (Holland, 1990; Byman et al., 2001). Fighting against racism inspired these countries to sponsor the ANC. Zambia channeled Soviet and Chinese weapons to ANC combatants. The ANC also established its main political headquarters in Zambia (Rubenzer, 2007b). Leaders of Angola and
Tanzania allowed the ANC to install military and non-military bases in their territories (Meli, 1988; Rubenzer, 2007b). In addition, non-state actors such as diasporas or refugees may lend support to insurgents. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, for example, fostered fundraising networks among Tamil communities residing in Western Europe, North America, and Australia (Horowitz & Jayamaha, 2007). It is estimated that Tamil diasporas in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia donated up to 1.5 million dollars a month to the LTTE rebels (Byman et al., 2001).

The bulk of extant research on civil war intervention has addressed the effects of external support or intervention on civil war onset, duration, and outcomes (e.g., Regan, 2000 & 2002; Gleditsch, 2007; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). Only a few scholars explored the relationship between external support and belligerents’ behavior during civil war. Harff & Gurr (1998) identify increases in external support for politically active groups as an accelerator of genocide and politicide. Weinstein (2007) argues that natural resources and external support make rebel groups less dependent on civilian support, which deprives the insurgents of the incentive to treat civilians well. Thus, rebels with economic endowments tend to rule the civilian population through coercive measures (Weinstein, 2007). Harff & Gurr, however, does not elaborate on the causal linkage between external support and geno/politicide. Weinstein’s argument revolves around rebel violence, not state violence. This indicates that the existing literature has not sufficiently tackled the linkage between external support for insurgents and state-sponsored mass killing. Here, I examine how external support for insurgents accounts for variation in the scale of mass killing. Sources of external support are diverse.
Insurgent groups may receive support from their ethnoreligious brethren. Rebels may obtain support from the government’s rivals. Interveners may be major states or former colonial masters. Different sources of external support might exercise different influences on variation in the extent of mass killing. In this section, I consider rebels’ external support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states and explain how these sources of external support can instigate state-sponsored extensive mass killing.

Insurgent groups may obtain support from their ethnoreligious brethren. For instance, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) insurgents garnered support from Uganda in which president Museveni was a Tutsi and Tutsis wielded significant political influence. Tutsi diasporas also sponsored the RPF (Asselin, St-Pierre & Carment, 2007; Prunier, 1995). In Afghanistan and Bosnia, insurgent groups rallied support from their Muslim brothers. Countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia supplied money and weapons to the insurgents and thousands of Muslim volunteers battled alongside the rebels. Rebel groups may also receive support from the government’s rival states. For example, when Jordan engaged in a war against the PLO in 1970, Syria, Jordan’s rival, intervened on the PLO side (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004). Combating French colonialists, the Viet Minh guerillas gained support from China, France’s rival.

Ethnoreligious and rival supports tend to be tenacious, which signifies that ethnoreligious brothers and the government’s rivals are not likely to reduce or withdraw their support for insurgents. Blood or religious ties impose a sense of duty on intervening actors. That is, the interveners believe that it is their obligation to uphold
their brothers’ struggle. For instance, a sense of Jihad duty (Muslim’s duty of protecting Islam and other Muslims) accounts partly for why Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Libya have backed various Muslim insurgents around the world. Furthermore, witnessing plights of those with the same ethnicity, domestic constituents in foreign states might urge their political leaders to intervene on the side of their brethren (Davis & Moore, 1997; Saideman, 1997). Rivalry entails feelings of threat and hostility between external states and the conflict state (Goertz & Diehl, 2000). Third party states engage in their rival’s war on the side of rebels in an attempt to debilitate the rival and gain some leverage (Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz, 2008). Feelings of threat and hostility can make the interveners resolute and intransigent. In other words, rival support for insurgents is not likely to abate or evaporate.

Insurgents with external support might be able to rely less on civilians for intelligence, weapons, shelter, food, and other supplies. Civilians, however, are still a valuable asset in that local youths who are familiar with battlefields are the backbone of rebel armies. Even if foreign troops engage in combat on the rebel side, the insurgents cannot prosecute the war effectively without the locals. External support might help insurgent groups build civilian support. By capitalizing on external support, they can deliver the message that their brothers and/or enemy’s enemies consistently back them; therefore they are able to beat government forces. Furthermore, foreign sponsors might monitor insurgent groups and constrain them from abusing civilians. A sense of brotherhood could drive ethnoreligious interveners to regulate rebel leaders’ behavior. Rival interveners calculate that their help could project image of rebels as
foreign puppets and thus antagonize civilian populations, which hampers rebel recruitment. To assuage civilians’ animosity, the rival sponsors might urge insurgent leaders to treat civilians well.

The rigidity of ethnoreligious and rival supports could make embattled rulers judge that it is very difficult to stop foreign actors from bolstering insurgencies. In other words, diplomatic or military efforts to vitiate external support would be futile. Therefore, the government might turn its attention on civilian populations and massacre them. Of course, this strategy runs the risk of increasing outside support for insurgents. Infuriated by the government’s flagrant behavior, external actors might intervene deeper in the war by dispatching (more) troops and/or channeling more munitions and supplies to the rebels. Embattled rulers, however, could accept this risk, judging that without extensive mass killing, rebels would continue both to receive external support and to mobilize local youths, which could inflict defeat on the government. By eliminating potential rebel soldiers (youths or even children), the government can wreak havoc on insurgent recruitment pool. This can be detrimental to rebel groups because despite (increasing) foreign support, insurgents cannot conduct the war effectively without competent local fighters. In short, the destruction of the local recruitment pool can offset the increase of external support. To justify their heinous action, the incumbents might take advantage of the ‘foreignness’ of rebel support. Branding the

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8 Some military strategists emphasize the importance of manpower in war. For instance, Mao (2000 [orig. 1961]) claims that man is the basic element of guerilla war. Man is more complex than military machines in that he or she possesses intelligence, emotions, and will. Man’s qualities determine how well or poorly guerilla warfare is performed (Mao, 2000 [orig. 1961]).
insurgents as foreign puppets could foment nationalistic sentiment and thus mitigate domestic opposition to the employment of extensive mass killing.

H2a (Ethnoreligious support): State-sponsored mass killing is more extensive when insurgents receive support from their ethnoreligious brethren than when insurgents obtain non-ethnoreligious support or do not gain any external support.

H2b (Rival support): State-sponsored mass killing is more extensive when insurgents receive support from the government’s rival states than when insurgents obtain non-rival state support or does not gain any external support.

Figure 3.2: External Support for Insurgents and State-sponsored Mass Killing

3.3. Lootable Resources

The relationship between natural resources and civil war has been a popular subject for civil war scholars. For instance, Collier & Hoeffler (2004; 1998) reveal that heavy
reliance on primary commodities increases the probability of civil war onset. Fearon (2004) claims that rebels’ exploitation of contrabands such as diamonds, opium, or coca tends to prolong civil wars. Ross (2004) tests various resource-conflict nexuses by analyzing thirteen civil wars and finds that various mechanisms are interposed between resource wealth and the onset, duration, and intensity of civil war. The bulk of the existing literature, however, has not explored how rebels’ exploitation of natural resources affects the government’s behavior or strategies. Weinstein (2007) contends that rebels with natural resources tend to depend less on civilian support, which can lead them to abuse civilian populations. He, however, does not address how rebel violence exercises an influence on the government’s behavior. In this section, I posit a theoretical argument linking lootable resources and the extent of state-sponsored mass killing.

Insurgent groups can exploit lootable resources, such as diamonds, opium, and timber. They extract or cultivate these resources, sell them in international markets, and generate huge profits. For instance, during the Sierra Leone civil war (1991-2000), Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels engaged in the production of diamonds. It is estimated that they earned at least thirty million dollars per year from the exploitation of diamonds. Insurgents can also delegate the development of lootable resources to multinational or local producers and collect ‘tax’ from them. During the Liberian civil war (1989-1996), Charles Taylor who led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel group conceded multinational corporations the right to produce timber in return

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9 http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/diamond-sl.htm
for money and weapons. The Oriental Timber Company that ran the largest logging business remunerated Taylor about three to five million dollars for control of the 1.6-million-hectare forest area (United Nations, 2001; Wei, 2007). Furthermore, some insurgent groups engage only in trafficking of lootable resources. For example, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgents in Turkey transported illicit narcotics produced in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan to European markets (Finn, 2007). This activity brought a substantial amount of money to the PKK.\(^\text{10}\)

The exploitation of lootable resources is labor intensive in that it does not require technology, a skilled workforce, or a large amount of capital (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005). To produce or smuggle these resources, rebel groups can take advantage of civilian populations. In other words, civilians can provide a labor force to the insurgents. Rebel leaders also enlist combatants from among local youths. This indicates that resource-rich insurgents still need the civilian population, even though they rely less on civilians for money, food, and other supplies. Resource wealth might restrain rebel groups from incentivizing civilians. Exploiting lootable resources easily generates huge revenues, which could spoil the rebel leadership. That is, insurgent leaders become greedy and prioritize their own affluence. Therefore, the rebels might be reluctant or unwilling to disburse resource wealth to civilians. Instead, to mobilize labor force and combatants, resource-rich insurgents resort to coercion, abusing civilian populations. Furthermore, to maximize resource profits, insurgent leaders frequently abstain from regulating multinational companies and local producers, which paves the way for

\(^\text{10}\) http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/mfa-t-pkk.htm
rampant civilian abuses. The rebels’ outrageous behavior can spawn deep resentment among civilians residing in rebels’ territories. In Sierra Leone, for instance, RUF leaders who exploited diamonds and timber and amassed a vast fortune monopolized their wealth and perpetrated flagrant human rights abuses, such as summary execution, torture, and the amputation of limbs, which provoked widespread animosity toward the RUF (Nimbus, 2003; Keen, 2005). The presence of disaffected civilians might make embattled rulers conclude that it is possible to stimulate mass defection to the government by offering tangible benefits, which helps to subdue the insurgency. The possibility of triggering mass civilian defection could rid the government of the incentive to eradicate the civilian population.

*H3 (Lootable resources): State-sponsored mass killing is less extensive when rebels exploit lootable resources than when rebels do not exploit these resources.*

![Figure 3.3: Lootable Resources and State-sponsored Mass Killing](image-url)
3.4. Grievances

Grievance has been emphasized as the primary cause of violence or war. For instance, Fanon (2004 [orig. 1961]), an influential revolutionary theorist, insists that political, economic, and cultural oppression by racist colonial authorities enrages colonized populations, which steers them to violence. Violence is a means of physical and psychological liberation. By unleashing violence, aggrieved natives can not only subvert colonial rule and achieve physical freedom, but also obliterate their inferiority complex and servile attitude implanted by colonial masters (Fanon, 2004; 2008). Galtung (1969; 1990) also addresses grievance in the form of structural violence. Structural violence signifies that a certain social structure or institution inflicts damage on people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs or developing their potentials (e.g., racism, ethnocentrism, classism) (Galtung, 1969). Unequal power distribution and social injustice are embedded in the concept of structural violence. Galtung (1969; 1990) contends that structural violence often kindles direct violence, such as racial clashes, terrorism, war, and genocide. In addition, Gurr constructs the linkage between grievance and violent conflict. He (1970; 1993; & Moore, 1997) stresses relative deprivation or grievance as the primary cause of rebellion. A communal or political group harbors a deep sense of relative deprivation or grievance when the government perpetrates systematic discrimination and repression against the group members. Profound grievances prompt the disaffected group to gravitate toward insurrection (Gurr, 1970; 1993; & Moore, 1997).
The extant literature focuses on grievance as a predictor of civil war onset. Grievance, however, may account for not only the outset of civil war, but also the government’s behavior or strategies during the war. Harff & Gurr (1998) posit that economic hardship that is relevant to grievance could increase the risk of geno/politicide. Other factors pertinent to grievance, however, have not been examined. Furthermore, there are few studies on grievance and mass killing in the context of civil war. In this section, I fill these voids by identifying diverse sources of grievances and investigating how they can generate state-sponsored extensive mass killing during civil war. The gist of my argument is that severe political and economic marginalization and the history of intense armed conflict breed or exacerbate grievances and thus yield civilian support for insurgents, which can propel embattled rulers to orchestrate extensive mass killing as a strategy for defeating rebel combatants and staving off future insurgency.

3.4.1. Political Marginalization

During civil war, embattled rulers might marginalize the majority of or a certain segment of their citizens from political process. Dictators often enforce their favorite policies and suppress political rights. Political marginalization is not confined to autocratic rulers. Some democratic leaders have disfranchised those whom they treat as second-class citizens or indigenous populations in their colonies. Democratic Israel, for instance, has severely repressed Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Democratic France
restricted political rights of native populations in its colonies, such as Algeria, Madagascar, and Vietnam.

Governments’ attempts to impose severe political marginalization spawn or exacerbate grievances among target populations. This could urge the victims to accept the risk of physical harm and join an insurgency to achieve political liberation. In other words, political grievance enables rebel leaders to muster civilian support. Civilian supporters supply insurgent groups with young recruits, shelter, financial resources, and information pertaining to government troops, which helps the rebels prosecute the war effectively.

To drive a wedge between aggrieved citizens and insurgent combatants, incumbent rulers might ponder or implement the distribution of pecuniary rewards. Applying material incentives, however, can fail to stimulate mass defection to the government because civilians enraged by severe political marginalization could perceive that the government is attempting to buy them off and is thus insulting them. Simultaneously, these civilians might judge that if they accept the government’s offer, they will keep suffering, which deters them from defecting to the government side. Therefore, combating insurgents who acquire staunch civilian support, the government has an incentive to engineer extensive mass killing. This strategy wipes out rebels’ civilian support bases, thus helping to suppress the insurrection. Further, by massacring noncombatants including youths, children, and women, incumbent rulers can fracture the future recruitment pool and ward off future insurgency. During the first civil war in Somalia (1988-91), Said Barre who had imposed a despotic rule revolving around his
Marehan clan sought to maintain the political status quo. He continued to exclude Isaaq, Hawiye, Majerteen, and other clans from politics and to suppress their political rights (Wilson, 2007b; Adam, 1995). This policy antagonized members of marginalized clans further, which propelled them to back various insurgent groups, such as the Somali National Movement (SNM), the United Somali Congress (USC), and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).\(^{11}\) Solid civilian support for the rebels drove Barre to massacre enemy clan members. His military and paramilitary forces not only shot and bombed those civilians, but also denied them water and food by destroying water reservoirs and grazing lands (Metz, 1992; Adam, 1995). It is estimated that 50,000-60,000 citizens died as a result of the government’s brutal campaigns (Valentino, 2004). By orchestrating extensive mass killing, Barre attempted not only to cripple the insurgent forces but also to forestall insurgency from recurring.

\(H4\) (**Political marginalization**): The more severe political marginalization is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is.

### 3.4.2. Economic Marginalization

During civil war, state leaders might marginalize the majority of or a certain segment of their citizens in terms of economic well-being. While themselves enjoying affluence, a small group of elites may not disburse wealth to the populations plagued by the war.

\(^{11}\) The Somali National Movement (SNM) consisted of Isaaq clan members and operated in northern Somalia (Wilson, 2007b; Sambanis, 2004). The United Somali Congress (USC) was composed of Hawiye clan members and combated government forces in central and southern Somalia including Mogadishu. The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) was formed by Ogaden clan soldiers and officers who defected from Barre’s army and active in southern Somalia (Wilson, 2007b; Sambanis, 2004).
The government may even deny its citizens the opportunity to enhance their economic status. Severe economic marginalization can prompt the pauperized to support violent activities that aim to overthrow the established political system (Fanon, 2004; Gurr, 1970). The wretched living conditions breed or exacerbate grievances on which insurgent leaders can capitalize to rally public support for their actions. Under this circumstance, the aggrieved citizens might be willing to jeopardize their lives and back insurgent groups, anticipating that the rebels will change the economic status quo (Walter, 2004). To sever disaffected civilians from rebel combatants, state leaders might consider or employ coercive measures that do not involve extensive mass killing, such as forced relocation, massive troop deployment, and close surveillance. This coercion, however, can antagonize the civilians further and thus increase support for insurgents. Therefore, the government might perpetrate extensive mass killing in an attempt to neutralize insurgent combatants and to prevent the rebellion from resurging in the future.

The Salvadoran civil war (1979-1992) epitomizes the effect of severe economic marginalization on state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Since the colonial period, a small group of ruling elites had retained a large portion of fertile land and monopolized profits generated by the export of coffee. The government had refused the demand for redistributing economic resources and improving working conditions (Rosenblum, 2007; Talentino, 1999). Leaders’ greed for wealth had engendered profound economic

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12 Fanon analyzes violence in the context of colonialism. He claims that severe economic exploitation under colonial rule impels the colonized to unleash violence against colonialists.
inequality and impoverished the majority of Salvadorans. Severe economic marginalization continued unabated during civil war. After the war erupted in 1979, the government sought to execute land reform in a bid to mitigate poverty and restrain peasants from supporting Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels. Wealthy landowners, however, impeded the implementation of land redistribution, thus the reform eventually foundered (Rosenblum, 2007). Persistent economic marginalization exacerbated grievances, which produced ardent civilian support for the insurgents. Combating popular FMLN guerillas, Salvadoran rulers projected massive violence against their own populations. The government’s relentless campaign claimed the lives of 40,000-70,000 civilians (Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003).

*H5 (Economic marginalization): The more severe economic marginalization is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is.*

### 3.4.3. History of Armed Conflict

Belligerents in civil wars sometimes have history of armed conflict against one another. That is, prior to the current war, the rebel side may have engaged in armed conflict against the government. A history of intense armed conflict will help insurgents build civilian support. By evoking prior intense violence, they are able to foment deep animosity toward the government and agitate the population for the purposes of revenge or the accomplishment of their ‘unachieved’ goals. The profound hostility provoked by the prior violence can breed or exacerbate grievances against the status quo among populations who supported the insurgent side during the previous conflict.
Hence, these citizens rally around the rebel leadership. Confronting insurgents who garner strong civilian support, state leaders calculate that offering material incentives and resorting to ‘non-mass killing’ coercion would not facilitate mass civilian defection to the government. This can propel the rulers to commit extensive mass killing as a strategy aimed at both crushing insurgent forces and warding off future rebellions.

The Madagascan War of Independence (1947-1948) illustrates how a history of intense armed conflict produces extensive mass killing at the hand of embattled rulers. During the war, Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renovation (MDRM) insurgents capitalized on previous wars against France to elicit support from indigenous populations (Aldrich, 1996; Thompson & Adloff, 1965). In the late 19th century, France attempted to conquer Madagascar in which the Merina dynasty reigned. Queen Ranavalona III and Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony vehemently resisted French troops, but France ultimately won the war, deposed the Merina rulers, and colonized Madagascar (Aldrich, 1996). MDRM leaders such as Joseph Raseta and Joseph Ravoahangy evoked bitter memory of the French invasion and subsequent abolition of the Merina dynasty (Aldrich, 1996; Thompson & Adloff, 1965). By doing that, the insurgent leadership attempted to instigate profound resentment toward the French and generate grievances against the colonial rule. This contributed to solid civilian support for insurgents, which prompted French rulers to massacre indigenous populations. It is estimated that 10,000 – 80,000 Madagascans were killed by French forces (White, 2005; Aldrich, 1996).
**H6 (History of armed conflict):** The more intense previous armed conflict is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is.

![Diagram of Grievances and State-sponsored Mass Killing](image)

**Figure 3.4: Grievances and State-sponsored Mass Killing**

### 3.5. Summary

In this chapter, I argue that factors that generate strong civilian support for insurgents are likely to trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing. I suggest seven factors that can account for the extent of mass killing. Not all these factors are necessary for extensive mass killing. One factor is sufficient to predict the extent of mass killing. I posit hypotheses relevant to my theoretical model: 1) state-sponsored mass killing is more extensive in secessionist war than in regime change war, 2) state-sponsored mass killing is more extensive when insurgents receive support from their ethnoreligious brethren than when insurgents obtain non-ethnoreligious support or do not gain any
external support, 3) state-sponsored mass killing is more extensive when insurgents receive support from the government’s rival states than when insurgents obtain non-rival state support or do not acquire any foreign support, 4) state-sponsored mass killing is less extensive when rebels exploit lootable resources than when rebels do not exploit these resources, 5) the more severe political marginalization is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is, 6) the more severe economic marginalization is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is, and 7) the more intense previous armed conflict is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is (See Table 3.1 for summary.).
4 Research Design

I theorize on the linkage between factors that affect civilian support for insurgents and the extent of state-sponsored mass killing. I hypothesize that secessionist war, insurgents’ external support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states, severe political and economic marginalization, and history of intense armed conflict are likely to trigger extensive mass killing at the hands of embattled rulers, whereas rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely to restrain extensive mass killing. In this chapter, I discuss how I operationalize my variables and test my hypotheses.

4.1. Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis in my dissertation is civil war. The spatial domain covers all major regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Americas, and Europe) and the temporal domain spans 1945 to 2007.

To identify civil wars, I employed Correlates of War (COW) database, which was updated in 2010. COW defines civil war as ‘any armed conflict that involves (1) military action internal to the metropole, (2) the active participation of the national government, (3) effective resistance by both sides, and (4) a total of at least 1,000 battle deaths during each year of the war’ (Small & Singer, 1982; Sarkees, 2000; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). COW distinguishes civil war from extrastate war. According to COW, extrastate
war refers to ‘war between a member of the system and a colony, dependency, or protectorate composed of ethnically different people and located at some geographical distance from the given system member’s central government’ (Small & Singer, 1982; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Some scholars, however, point out that the distinction between civil war and extrastate war is murky. Gleditsch (2004) argues that judging whether a war occurs within or outside the core territory of a state is subjective. For example, France insisted that its colonies were an integral part of France. Based on this view, one may consider anti-colonial wars against France as wars inside the French empire or the core territory of France (Gleditsch, 2004). Furthermore, colonialism is not restricted to aggression and brutal rule by Western states. Secessionists in the non-Western world tend to perceive themselves as the colonized and the central government as colonizer. For example, Eritrean and Somali insurgents blamed the Ethiopian government for seeking ‘black’ colonialism, suppressing their political rights and ruining their economy and culture. The Polisario Front charges that after Spain’s withdrawal, Morocco has attempted to colonize Western Sahara. This claim was endorsed by the Organization of African Unity (currently the African Union) (Shelly, 2004; Jensen, 2005). Therefore, extrastate war can be categorized as civil war or, more narrowly, secessionist war. Coinciding with Gleditsch, Fearon and Laitin (2003) count anti-colonial wars as civil wars within the colonial empire. They remark that excluding anti-colonial wars would be similar to dropping secessionist wars, such as war in Chechnya (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Taking into account that the distinction between civil
war and extrastate war blurs, I included anti-colonial wars in the list of civil wars. For a robustness check, I will also analyze civil wars without anti-colonial wars.

COW lists 196 civil and extrastate wars from 1945 to 2007 and records many cases of multiple wars in one country. For some multiple wars, it is very difficult to estimate the number of intentional civilian deaths respectively. For instance, COW divided complex violence in Lebanon that raged in the 1970s and 1980s into four civil wars (1975-1976, 1978, 1983-1984, and 1989-1990). Although this classification is reasonable, secondary sources suggest only fatalities of the entire war period (1975-1990) and give little clue on the number of deaths in each war. To address this problem, I have no alternative but to merge separate civil wars in a country if 1) the wars had the same belligerents fighting over the same agenda and 2) information on civilian fatalities is not available for each war. Furthermore, I dropped the Afghan Resistance of 2001-present and the Iraqi Resistance of 2003-present because the number of deaths in these

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13 Extrastate war consists of anti-colonial war and imperial war. Anti-colonial war is defined as war occurring in colonies between colonial masters and independence movements. The adversary in this war was ‘already a colony, dependency, or a protectorate composed of ethnically different people and located at some geographical distance from the given system member, or at least peripheral to its center of government’ (Sarkees, 2000: 121). Imperial war erupts when a member of the international system mobilizes military forces to colonize territories that are not ruled by another member and faces violent resistance from the indigenous population in these territories. Imperial war involves an adversary that ‘was an independent political entity, that was seeking to maintain that independence, and that did not qualify as a member of the interstate system’ (Sarkees, 2000: 121).

ongoing wars keeps changing. Regarding extrastate war, the Sino-Tibetan War of 1950 and the Indo-Hyderabad War of 1948 are not anti-colonial but imperial, thus I excluded them. Therefore, the number of civil wars included in my dataset boils down to 157 (Appendix).

4.2. Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is the extent of state-sponsored mass killing, defined as the deliberate killing of a large number of noncombatants or civilians perpetrated by the government. I evaluated severity of mass killing by using the number of intentional civilian deaths. For some civil wars, experts (e.g., Valentino, 2004; Harff, 2003; Rummel, 1997b; Eck & Hultman, 2007) estimated the number or range of intentional civilian deaths over the duration of war and in many cases, the numbers or ranges converge (e.g., civil war in Rwanda (1994), civil war in Pakistan (1971)). For other wars, I found only information on total civilian deaths or total civilian plus military deaths, from which I inferred the range of intentional civilian deaths. At first, I conjectured how many civilian deaths were intentional. If I locate any evidence of massacres, indiscriminate violence, or egregious human rights violations, I consider 50% of the deaths as

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15 The Indo-Hyderabad war of 1948 and the Sino-Tibetan war of 1950 are imperial because India and China invaded and conquered Hyderabad and Tibet whose independence had not been recognized by the international community.

16 If only information on total deaths is available, I surmise how many deaths are civilian. If sources state that civilians account for ‘most or many’ fatalities, I consider 75% of the total deaths as civilian. If sources provide little clue on the proportion of civilian deaths, I consider 50% of the total deaths as civilian.
intentional. Otherwise, the number of intentional deaths is zero. After estimating the scale of intentional deaths, I judged how many fatalities the government holds accountable for. Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004) claim that government forces are more likely to commit mass killing than insurgent combatants. Some rebel groups, however, did project massive violence against civilian populations (e.g., RENAMO in Mozambique, RUF in Sierra Leone, communist insurgents in China). If I do not find any evidence of rebels’ atrocities, I posit that the government holds responsible for all intentional deaths. If there is evidence of both government and insurgent atrocities, 50% of all intentional deaths are attributed to the government. With evidence of only rebel violence, I suppose that the government does not hold accountable for any intentional deaths. To infer the range of intentional civilian deaths, I consulted secondary sources, such as White 2005, Sambanis 2004, Bercovitch & Fretter 2004, DeRouen Jr. & Heo (eds) 2007, and Collier & Sambanis (eds) 2005.

4.3. Independent Variables

4.3.1. Insurgent Aim

Insurgent aim can be broadly categorized into secession and regime change. Rebel groups may aim to eject the government from their home territory and achieve independence or greater autonomy. Insurgents may aim to topple the current government and capture political power. Secessionist war is coded as one (1) and

\[17\] I set the 50% criterion because during war, military operations often cause unintentional civilian deaths (collateral damage).
regime change war as zero (0). To judge what goal rebel groups pursued, I used the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which contains information on what warring parties are (or claim to be) fighting over (UCDP/PRIO, 2009). For wars that this database does not address, I evaluated insurgent aim by relying on Ploughshares’ Armed Conflicts Report. This source categorizes types of armed conflict into state control and state formation. State control wars revolve around ‘struggles for control of the governing apparatus of the state’ and state formation wars ‘center on the form or shape of the state itself and generally involve particular regions of a country fighting for a greater measure of autonomy or for outright secession’ (Ploughshares, 2010).

4.3.2. External Support

I posit that insurgents’ external support from their ethnoreligious brethren (ethnoreligious support) and the government’s rival states (rival support) can propel embattled rulers to orchestrate extensive mass killing. To assess whether rebel groups received external support and, if so, to identify sources of this support, I consulted the Non-State Actor (NSA) data compiled by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009). This dataset contains information on both state and non-state support for insurgencies. Rebel support is ethnoreligious if insurgent groups share ethnoreligious heritage with their patrons. Ethnicity encompasses a wide range of physical and cultural attributes, such as common ancestry, history, religion, language, kinship, shared territory, nationality, and physical appearance (Horowitz, 2000; Smith, 1987). Rwanda’s support for Tutsi RCD rebels in the Congo (Kinshasa), African states’ support for ANC in South
Africa, and Iran’s support for Shia insurgents in Iraq epitomize ethnoreligious support. Ethnoreligious support is not restricted to states. Non-state actors such as diasporas, refugees, or foreign volunteers can sponsor rebel groups. During the Kosovo war, for instance, Albanian diasporas bankrolled Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) insurgents and volunteers from Muslim countries fought alongside the rebels. I assigned a 1 to a civil war in which insurgents obtained external support from their ethnoreligious brethren and a 0 to a civil war in which insurgents did not receive this kind of support.

To determine whether foreign states that buttressed insurgency were the government’s rival, I utilized Klein, Goertz, & Diehl’s 2006 rivalry dataset. Enduring rivals experienced three or more militarized interstate disputes (MID). Rivalry starts from the initiation of the first dispute and ends in 10-15 years after the termination of the last dispute (Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006). For rivalries that emerge after the start of war, it is possible for external support to engender a rivalry relationship. In order to mitigate this endogeneity problem, I considered rivalries that arose before war or in two or less years after the initiation of war. One (1) is coded if the government engaging in civil war had a rivalry relationship with foreign rebel supporters and zero (0) is coded otherwise.

For civil wars that the NSA dataset does not cover, I judged the presence or absence of external support by using Regan’s 2002 intervention dataset. For civil wars in which foreigners intervened on the rebel side, I identified sponsors and evaluated whether they shared ethnoreligious heritages with the insurgents and they were the government’s rival states. To identify rebel supporters, I referred to multiple sources

4.3.3. Lootable Resources

I hypothesize that rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely to restrain state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Lootable resources are defined as natural resources that ‘have low economic barriers to entry and can be profitably exploited by small-scale artisans’ (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005: 568). In other words, lootable resources are exploited with little cost, and with huge profits. These resources encompass mineral resources (e.g., alluvial diamonds, gemstones, gold), agricultural resources (e.g., opium, coca, cocoa), animal products (e.g., ivory, game meat), and timber. One (1) is coded if rebels exploited lootable resources and zero (0) if not. There are two forms of resource exploitation. Insurgent groups may engage in both production and smuggling of lootable resources (e.g., New Forces (FN)’ exploitation of cocoa and diamonds in Ivory Coast). Rebels may not produce resources but engage in the trafficking of the resources (e.g., drug trade operated by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey). To determine whether insurgents exploited lootable resources or not, I used various sources. I referred to Fearon’s (2004) indicator of contraband financing of rebels, which shows whether rebels gained access to funds from opium, diamonds, or coca. Because the Fearon indicator is confined to these three resources, I also consulted Collier & Sambanis (eds) 2005, DeRouen, Jr. & Heo (eds) 2007, news articles, and Global Witness
reports to find out whether insurgent groups exploited resources other than diamonds, opium, and coca.

4.3.4. Grievances

Independent variables pertaining to grievances consist of political marginalization, economic marginalization, and history of armed conflict. I claim that severe political and economic marginalization and previous intense conflict breed or exacerbate grievances and thus engender civilian support for insurgents, which can prompt embattled rulers to massacre civilian populations. To gauge variation in political marginalization, I employed the political competition score from the Polity IV dataset (version 2007). The political competition score combines ‘the degree of institutionalization or regulation of political competition and the extent of government restriction on political competition’ and ranges from 1 (suppressed) to 10 (institutionalized open electoral) (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009). Because my dataset is not longitudinal but cross-sectional, I recorded the score of the first year of a war.\(^{18}\) This coding rule does not take into account the possibility of significant improvement or deterioration of political environment over the duration of war, but in most civil wars, the scores do not change much.\(^{19}\) The political competition indicator, however, does not cover pre-independence years of Third World

\(^{18}\) For some civil wars, the score of the first year is -66 (interruption period), -77 (interregnum period), or -88 (transition period) (e.g., the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990, the Somalia War of 1991-1997). I addressed these cases by using the score of t-1 (one year before the start of war) or a score closest to the start year if the score of t-1 is -66, -77, or -88.

\(^{19}\) Some civil wars manifest sharp score changes. For instance, over the duration of the Second Sudanese war, the political competition score is 1 for 1983-1984, 6 for 1986-1988, 1 for 1989-2001, 2 for 2002-2004, and 3 for 2005. Although the scores fluctuate significantly in the 1980s, most of the conflict years record 1 or 2.
countries. The scores of European colonial states in those years are not adequate for anti-colonial wars, because these states guaranteed political rights of their own citizens, but disfranchised indigenous populations in their colonies. Therefore, I determined the values of political competition for anti-colonial wars against Europeans, based on the Polity IV score adjusted to the empire by Fearon & Laitin (2003). The Fearon & Laitin score demonstrates how democratic or autocratic the colonial rule was and thus captures the political grievance of the colonized. Because the colonial authority disfranchises native populations and restricts their political rights, the political competition score for European colonies is either 1 (suppressed) or 2 (restricted). I equated 1 with the Fearon & Laitin scores of -10 to -6 and 2 with the scores greater than -6.

To operationalize economic marginalization, I utilized GDP per capita. This indicator captures the level of economic underdevelopment or poverty in a country and thus reflects economic marginalization. GDP per capita data are available and reliable for most countries. I derived the GDP data from Gleditsch’s Expanded Trade and GDP dataset (5.0 beta). Because of the cross-sectional analysis, I reported the value of the first year of a war. Gleditsch did not document GDP per capita for pre-independence years of Third World countries. For anti-colonial wars, applying the GDP of European colonial states for those years ignores that these states systematically exploited and pauperized their colonial subjects in order to enrich their own citizens. Thus, I inserted the GDP of independence years of colonies into anti-colonial wars against Europeans because these values reflect the legacy of colonialism. Furthermore, because the
temporal domain of Gleditsch’s dataset spans 1950 to 2004, I imputed GDP of 1950 to wars that broke out before 1950.

History of armed conflict signifies that prior to the current war, belligerents had engaged in armed conflict against one another. The insurgent side may have combated the government not long before the current war. For example, secular Republicans and conservative Royalists, contenders of the Yemeni war of 1962-1969, waged a war against each other in 1948. Armed conflict(s) may have erupted long before the current war. Prior to the Rhodesian War of 1972-1979 (the Second Chimurenga), black Africans composed mainly of Shonas and Ndebeles staged an uprising against white settlers in 1896 (the First Chimurenga). I confined the temporal domain of previous armed conflict to the 19th century and thereafter, which conforms to COW’s domain (1816-2007). I operationalized history of armed conflict in an ordinal manner. Intense previous conflict is coded as 2, minor conflict is coded as 1, and no conflict is coded as 0. Intense armed conflict results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year and minor armed conflict results in at least 25 battle deaths but less than 1,000. Armed conflict does not require the involvement of government. In other words, both belligerents can be non-state actors (e.g., the 1959 conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda under Belgian colonial rule). The absence of violence should be interposed between the end of previous armed conflict and the start of current war. Thus, I do not consider minor

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armed conflict that escalates into war as previous armed conflict. In the Eritrean region of Ethiopia, for instance, minor armed conflict that started in the 1960s culminated in war in 1972 (Sambanis, 2004; Gleditsch et al., 2002). Because this conflict is an extension of the 1972 war and history of conflict does not exist before the 1960s, I assigned a 0 to the Eritrean War of Independence. I examined whether belligerents had engaged in armed conflict prior to the current war and assessed the intensity of previous conflicts by consulting COW’s list of wars, UCDP/PRIO database, Rummel 1997b, and White 2005. I relied on COW to find out whether contending parties had waged an intense armed conflict against each other. Because COW does not address armed conflicts that yielded less than 1,000 battle-related deaths, I employed UCDP/PRIO database to inspect whether belligerents had engaged in minor armed conflict prior to the current war. UCDP/PRIO, however, deals only with post-1945 conflicts. Thus, I consulted Rummel 1997b and White 2005 to investigate whether contenders had been embroiled in minor armed conflict before 1945.

4.4. Control Variables

Factors other than independent variables may account for variation in mass killing perpetrated by the government. I selected level of civilian support, ethnic polarization, state military capacity, population size, and the cold war as control variables. Incorporating these variables into the statistical equation helps to isolate the effect of my independent variables on variation in mass killing. I argue that factors or contexts
that generate strong civilian support for insurgents can trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing. To verify the relationship between rebels’ civilian support and mass killing, I controlled for the level of civilian support. The data for this level come from Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004. Level of civilian support is assigned a 1 if a rebel group enjoyed a high level of civilian support, defined as having more than 100,000 active supporters, and is assigned a 0 if the rebel group enjoyed a low level of support (having less than 100,000 supporters) (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004: 390-391). For civil wars that these scholars did not address, I evaluated the level of insurgents’ civilian support by consulting multiple qualitative sources. These sources do not provide information on the number of rebel supporters, but hint whether insurgent groups rallied civilian support. I coded 1 only when I detected information that indicates insurgents’ high popularity (e.g., increase of the number of rebel combatants, mass protests in support of insurgents).

I also controlled for ethnic polarization. Some scholars have emphasized sharp ethnic divisions as the main cause of massive violence unleashed by state. For example, Kuper (1981) argues that deep ethnic cleavages are likely to produce genocide. Kaufmann (1996) contends that states embroiled in ethnic conflict tend to perpetrate atrocities. As a proxy for ethnic polarization, I employed the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index from Fearon & Laitin 2003, which spans 1945 or year of independence to 1999. This indicator exhibits the probability that two people chosen at

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random are from different ethnic groups, ranging from 0 (highly homogeneous) to 1 (highly heterogeneous) (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The ELF value of a country is constant throughout years, which makes me infer that a country’s score can be extended to post-1999 years and pre-independence years.

State military capacity can affect variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Fearon and Laitin (2003) claim that states with inferior military capacity are likely to wreak havoc on civilians because weak states are not able to distinguish combatants from non-combatants nor to rein in local commanders who are eager to pillage. I assessed state military capacity by using the total number of military personnel in a country, percentage of mountains in regions affected by war, and distance between a war zone and the capital. Geographical features such as mountains and distance can represent state military capacity in that if conflict areas are mountainous and/or far from the capital, the state is not likely to project its military force effectively (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, 2009). I acquired the data for troop size from COW’s National Material Capabilities (NMC version 4.0) and for mountains and distances (logged) from Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala (BGL) 2009. NMC 4.0 documents the total number of ‘active, regular military units of the land, naval, and air components’ in a country, excluding irregular forces such as civil defense units and gendarmerie (COW, 2010). Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala employed GIS tools to generate percentage of mountains in conflict zones. They estimated the distance between the conflict center and the capital by using a geodesic distance calculator (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, 2009). The BGL dataset does not contain information germane to 31 civil wars that UCDP/PRIO database does not cover. To fill in
mountain values for these wars, I relied on Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) indicator of percentage of mountainous terrain in a country. Regarding distance, I recorded 0 if insurgents aim at toppling the government and seizing political power, because regime change war tends to engulf the entire country. For a secessionist war, I located the major city of conflict zones and calculated the geodesic distance between the major conflict city and the capital.  

During war, countries with large populations might have a large number of civilian fatalities (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Thus, I controlled for population size (logged), the data for which is derived from Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay 2004. For wars that this dataset does not address, I utilized COW’s National Material Capabilities (NMC version 4.0) for population data. In addition, I controlled for the Cold War. One may argue that after the end of the Cold War, chauvinistic ethnonationalism emerged and fueled conflicts among ethnic groups in the Third World from which superpowers retreated. Some of these conflicts produced extensive mass killing without triggering viable interventions from the international community. I created a dummy variable coded 1 for civil wars that occurred during the Cold War (1945-89) and 0 for those that erupted after the Cold War.  

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22 I found a geodesic distance calculator at [http://www.movable-type.co.uk/scripts/latlong-vincenty.html](http://www.movable-type.co.uk/scripts/latlong-vincenty.html).
23 I determined 1989 as the final year of the Cold War because the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolizes the end of the Cold War.
4.5. Research Methods

To verify my theoretical model, I conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Large-N statistical analysis and comparative case studies complement each other, thus employing both ensures credibility of outcomes. Quantitative studies address all observations within a specific temporal and spatial domain, which eliminates selection bias (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). Further, statistical analysis can help to detect the general dynamics of a given phenomenon. Qualitative studies scrutinize a few selected cases, thus helping to capture intervening processes interposed between independent and dependent variables (Tarrow, 2004; Van Evera, 1997). Therefore, case studies provide more nuanced insights into findings generated by quantitative investigation (Tarrow, 2004).

4.5.1. Statistical Analysis

For quantitative analyses, I employed both a negative binomial regression model (NBRM) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The number of intentional civilian deaths is widely scattered and its variance far exceeds the mean. King (1989) and Long (1997) claim that a negative binomial model is suitable for overdispersed dependent variable. By addressing unobserved heterogeneity and contagion that generate overdispersion, NBRM produces consistent and efficient parameter estimates (King, 1989; Long, 1997).\(^\text{24}\)

\(^{24}\) Heterogeneity means that the probability of events occurring varies among observations. Contagion signifies that the occurrence of events in one observation is contingent upon whether they occurred in other observations (King, 1989; Long, 1997).
On the other hand, Valentino, Huth, & Croco (2006) argue against using count models. The number of civilian fatalities by single attacks exhibits great variation, ranging from a few deaths resulting from execution to thousands killed by indiscriminate aerial bombardment or scorched earth strategy (Valentino, Huth, & Croco, 2006). War duration also varies widely from a few days (e.g., Anti-Ceausescu rebellion in Romania in 1989) to several years (e.g., First Angolan Civil War (1976-1994)). Therefore, instead of count models, Valentino, Huth, & Croco advocate the use of Ordinary Least Squares.

Taking into account arguments for and against the use of count models, I applied both NBRM and OLS to estimate models on the number of intentional civilian deaths. For OLS, I transformed raw numbers into logged ones in order to reduce the overdispersion of the dependent variable. Because I did not pinpoint the number of intentional deaths but suggested the range, I performed the same analyses with lowest, middle, and highest estimated numbers. I will analyze negative binomial and OLS models, ascertaining whether they substantiate my hypotheses and exhibit some consistency. Furthermore, I conducted two analyses for robustness check. Achen (2007) claims that when performing statistical analyses on a small number of observations, researchers should avoid injecting too many variables into an equation. Otherwise, they would fail to capture how explanatory variables account for the dependent variable. Because my model estimation is based on 157 civil wars, I considered Achen’s argument and conducted analyses only with control variables that

25 For instance, the deaths of civilians in Afghan civil war (1979-1989) range from 162,000 (lowest) to 1,800,000 (highest) and the middle number is 981,000. In Zimbabwe, from 1983-1987, the Mugabe government massacred 20,000 (lowest) – 30,000 (highest) ethnic Ndebeles (25,000 is the middle number.).
are statistically significant. By doing this, I want to observe whether models with all control variables are consistent with those only with statistically significant variables. I also ran regressions with all civil wars and using a definition of civil war that does not include anti-colonial wars to see whether excluding anti-colonial wars makes any difference.

4.5.2. Case Studies

In conducting case studies, I eschewed a thick description of historical events, which makes it very difficult to capture the causal process between independent and dependent variables. Therefore, I relied on process tracing that is a method of building a causal linkage between explanatory factors and outcomes through the careful analysis of sequences of episodes (Van Evera, 1997; George & Bennett, 2005). Process tracing urges researchers to ponder how intervening factors connect independent variables to the dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005). By tracing the process that leads to the outcome, scholars can also spot alternative causal paths to the same outcome and thus check for the spuriousness of the relationship (George & Bennett, 2005).

Because my dependent variable is variation in mass killing, I will examine civil war episodes that manifest different levels of mass killing. A large portion of extant studies on mass killing dealt exclusively with cases of extensive mass killing or genocide, not taking into account variation (Straus, 2007). Scholars have focused on several prominent cases, such as the Rwandan genocide, the Cambodian genocide, and the Holocaust. Without addressing episodes of small-scale mass killing, researchers cannot
test hypotheses nor discover variables that can account for extensive mass killing.

Considering variation in mass killing, I selected cases by employing a ‘most different’
design that tackles cases of a given phenomenon that diverge as much as possible
(Przeworski & Teune, 1970; George & Bennett, 2005). Qualitative studies with this
design conform to large-N quantitative studies in two ways. First, both compel
researchers to extract from highly diverse cases common factors that bring about a
certain outcome. Second, both methods are predicated on the logic of falsification
holding that science progresses by dismissing plausible causes for observed phenomena
(Popper, 1959; Peters, 1998).

In my dissertation, I will analyze the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962)
and the Peruvian civil war (1982-1992). These two cases exhibit diversity on several
dimensions (See Table 4.1 for summary.). First, the scale of violence diverges. The
Algerian War of Independence yielded a massive number of intentional civilian deaths.
France ruthlessly massacred indigenous Algerians suspected of backing National
Liberation Front (FLN) insurgents by wielding indiscriminate bombing raids, summary
executions, and torture. According to Valentino (2004), 70,000 – 570,000 Algerians
perished as a result of France’s heinous counter-insurgency operations. In contrast, the
civil war in Peru did not produce large-scale civilian deaths. The government committed
human rights violations against civilians whom it suspected of supporting Shining Path
rebels (Cunningham, 2007). These violations, however, did not translate into massive
civilian fatalities. Rummel (1997b) estimated that 8,000 - 15,000 civilians were
deliberately killed by the government, which is far smaller than mass killing scale in Algeria.

Second, spatial and temporal domains of the two cases vary. Algeria is located in North Africa and Peru in South America. The Algerian War of Independence erupted during the Cold War in which the influence of European colonialists waned in the Third World and the United States and the Soviet Union strove to fill this void. Dissimilar to the Algerian war, the war in Peru straddles the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. It escalated in the 1980s and subsided after the arrest of rebel leadership in 1992 (Cunningham, 2007; Gorriti, 1999).

Third, I take into account the ethnic dimension. Ethnic vs. ideological war is one of the main classification distinctions for civil war. Sambanis (2001) stresses the differences between ethnic war and non-ethnic (ideological) war, suggesting that ethnic wars result from political grievance rather than lack of economic opportunity. The Algerian War of Independence is considered as ethnic, whereas the Peruvian civil war ideological. Belligerents in Algeria were polarized along ethnic lines. Insurgents consisted of indigenous Algerians most of who were Arab and Berber Muslim. The government side was composed of French colonial rulers and pieds-noirs, Algerians of European or Jewish descent. Of course, some natives called Harkis fought alongside French troops and intra-ethnic violence among Muslim Algerians intensified (e.g., the Café wars) (Horne, 2006; Hutchinson, 1978). Despite this complexity, I claim that the Algerian war is an ethnic one because the majority of the war was waged between ethnically distinct populations: indigenous Algerians vs. French and pieds-noirs.
Conversely, contending parties in Peru were sharply carved along ideological lines. The Shining Path espoused a strict idiosyncratic variant of communism, whereas the government denounced this kind of communism and pursued center and later rightist policies (McClintock, 1998; Cunningham, 2007). It cannot be denied that ethnic division is reflected in the Peruvian war to a certain degree. Many Shining Path supporters were Amerindians or mestizos, while governing elites were predominantly descendants of Spanish conquerors and European settlers (Rochlin, 2003; Gorriti, 1999). This ethnic cleavage, however, is eclipsed by the ideological one. Shining Path rebels attempted to rally public support by promoting their communist ideology and capitalizing on economic grievances. Thus, rebel leaders often enforced ideology-driven policies that disrespect or offend indigenous culture (Rochlin, 2003; Gorriti, 1999). The government attempted to suppress the insurgency by mustering support from Amerindians and mestizos. Therefore, I view the Peruvian civil war as primarily ideological rather than ethnic.

Finally, variations in insurgent goal and war outcome are ensured. In Algeria, FLN insurgents aimed to eject French colonialists and obtain independence. Their armed struggle bore fruit. In 1962, after eight years of internecine war, indigenous Algerians succeeded in defeating French forces and achieving national liberation. In Peru, on the other hand, the Shining Path aimed to usurp political power. The rebels, however, lost the war and their influence has declined sharply since the 1990s.

While diverging on several dimensions, the Algerian War of Independence and the Peruvian Civil War share some characteristics, which enables me to draw
conclusions about my key variables. First, these two wars epitomize guerilla warfare. Avoiding direct battles, the FLN and the Shining Path engaged in hit-and-run attacks, terror bombings, assassinations, and sabotage. By resorting to guerilla tactics, they attempted to wear down their enemies and win the war. Second, the FLN and the Shining Path launched insurgency in rural areas and expanded it to urban areas. In Algeria, violence started in the Aurès, a mountainous inland area, and diffused to urban areas including Algiers (Hegoy, 1972; Horne, 2006). The Battle of Algiers illustrates fierce urban conflict between the FLN and France. In Peru, the Shining Path initiated rebellion in remote highlands of Ayacucho. As the war progressed, the insurgents penetrated Lima and strove to destabilize the government by mounting terror attacks and abetting strikes and protests (Smith, 1994b; Burt, 1998). Third, Algeria and Peru experienced colonial rule characterized by sharp cleavages between indigenous populations and European settlers. After conquering Algeria in 1830, France encouraged the settlement of Europeans and Jews in the Algerian colony (Naylor, 2000). French colonial rulers enforced discriminatory policies, favoring settlers (pieds-noirs) and alienating native Arabs and Berbers (Fanon, 2004; Fanon, 1988). In 1532, Spanish troops subverted the Inca Empire and colonized Peru. During the Spanish rule, a large number of Spaniards settled in Peru. Since independence in 1824, descendants of Spanish and other European settlers have wielded political and economic power, whereas Amerindiands, mestizos, and Afro-Peruvians have been marginalized (Radcliff, 1995). Finally, the durations of the two wars are similar. The war in Algeria broke out in 1954 and terminated in 1962, enduring for eight years. The Peruvian Civil War (1982-
1992) persisted for 10 years. I explored cases with similar durations in order to remove the effect of duration on mass killing scale.
5 Statistical Analysis

I identified seven factors that can predict the extent of mass killing perpetrated by the government: insurgent aim, ethnic and rival support for insurgents, lootable resources, political and economic marginalization, and a history of armed conflict. In this chapter, I perform statistical analyses to observe whether the expected relationships between these factors and state-sponsored extensive mass killing are substantiated or not. I estimated four models of mass killing. First, the Insurgent Aim Model contains the insurgent aim variable and control variables and tests whether secessionist war is more likely to generate extensive mass killing than regime change war. Second, the Insurgent Capacity Model is composed of insurgents’ external support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states, lootable resources, and control variables. This model examines whether ethnoreligious and rival external supports trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing, whereas rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources restrains mass killing. Third, the Grievance Model consists of political and economic marginalization, armed conflict history, and control variables and determines whether these grievance-related variables exercise an influence on variation in mass killing. Finally, the Combined Model addresses all independent variables and controls as well. By comparing this model with the previous three models, I can find out whether the effect of an independent variable holds or changes when other independent variables are incorporated in the model.
5.1. Descriptive Statistics

As shown in Table 5.1, the middle number of intentional civilian deaths ranges from zero to 3,280,050, the lowest number from zero to 1,205,200 and the highest number from zero to 5,354,900. Twenty-eight civil wars (e.g., Mozambican war (1979-1992), Western Sahara war (1975-1983), civil war in Costa Rica (1948)) did not produce any intentional deaths, because 1) the government actually abstained from targeting civilians or 2) there was no evidence of the government’s deliberate killing of civilians. The Chinese civil war (1946-1950) generated the highest number of fatalities (lowest: 1,205,200, middle: 3,280,000, highest: 5,354,900). The averages of death numbers are about 35,526 (lowest), 93,593 (middle), and 150,965 (highest), which are close to the number of deaths from La Violencia (1948-1958) in Colombia (lowest: 35,000, middle: 92,500, highest: 150,000).

Out of 157 civil wars, 65 wars are secessionist. Insurgent groups received external support from their ethnoreligious brethren in 59 civil wars and from the government’s rival states in 72 wars. Insurgents rallied both ethnoreligious and rival supports in 42 wars. In 33 civil wars, rebel groups exploited lootable resources. Political competition score for 86 wars (out of 157) is 1 or 2, which signifies that embattled rulers suppressed or restricted political rights of their citizens. In 60 civil wars, contending parties bore a history of intense armed conflict. 108 civil wars have GDP lower than average (1,411). Furthermore, insurgents enjoyed a high level of civilian support in 57 civil wars.
5.2. Insurgent Aim Model

The Insurgent Aim Model tests whether state-sponsored mass killing is more extensive in secessionist wars than in regime change wars. My results reveal that models containing all control variables (full models) do not capture the effect of insurgent aim on variation in mass killing. In these models, insurgent aim is not statistically significant and its sign of the coefficient estimate is inconsistent, which suggests that whether insurgents seek regime change or independence/greater autonomy exercises little influence on variation in mass killing. This outcome reflects that many regime change wars generated a large number of intentional civilian deaths, as exemplified by the Afghan civil war (1978-1989), the Angolan war (1976-1994) and the Vietnam War (1960-1975). As shown in Table 5.2, ELF and distance are not statistically significant in any full model. Thus, I reran the analyses without these two variables (simplified models). Dropping ELF and distance boosts the effect of insurgent aim in negative binomial models based on middle and highest numbers. The rest of the simplified models, however, do not detect the effect of insurgent aim on the extent of state-sponsored mass killing. Thus, I conclude that in general, statistical analyses do not support my hypothesis with respect to the relationship between insurgent aim and state-sponsored extensive mass killing.

In terms of control variables, the level of civilian support is statistically significant in all specifications. When rebel groups enjoy a high level of civilian support, state leaders are likely to massacre the civilian population, which dovetails with my theoretical argument. State military capacity represented by mountains and troop size,
the Cold War, and population size are statistically significant in negative binomial models. The results of state military capacity are particularly noteworthy. Table 5.2 demonstrates that embattled rulers are likely to commit extensive mass killing when they possess a small number of armies and conflict zones are mountainous. This indicates the inverse relationship between state military capacity and severity of state-sponsored mass killing, which corresponds to Fearon & Laitin’s argument (2003) that confronting insurgency, weak states tend to inflict damage on civilians.

As a robustness check, I re-estimated the Insurgent Aim Model without anti-colonial wars. Table 5.3 demonstrates that the Model without anti-colonial wars does not depart much from that with all civil wars. In most of the specifications, dropping anti-colonial wars does not change the effect of insurgent aim on the scale of mass killing. Only in the simplified negative binomial models based on middle and highest numbers, the influence of insurgent aim increases when anti-colonial wars are excluded. Therefore, based on the results without anti-colonial wars, I can reach the same conclusion that statistical analyses generally do not verify my expectation that secessionist wars are more likely to produce massive violence than regime change wars.

5.3. Insurgent Capacity Model

The Insurgent Capacity Model substantiates whether rebels’ support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states instigates state-sponsored extensive mass killing and rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources inhibits it. Table 5.4 reports that in most of full models, ethnoreligious support is statistically significant and
its sign of the coefficient estimate is positive. Even in the OLS model based on lowest numbers, p-value for ethnoreligious support is 0.151, which is close to the 0.1 threshold of statistical significance. This suggests that models addressing all control variables capture the effect of ethnoreligious support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing.

I also performed the analyses without ELF, mountain, troop size, and distance. The simplified models also detect the effect of ethnoreligious support, which signifies that even when statistically insignificant controls are removed, ethnoreligious support still exercises an influence upon the scale of mass killing. Furthermore, percentage changes in expected count derived from a negative binomial regression manifest the effect of ethnoreligious support. When ethnoreligious support shifts from 0 to 1, the expected number of intentional civilian deaths increases by 214.1% for lowest number specification, 347.5% for middle number specification, and 380.9% for highest number specification, holding all other variables constant.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, I conclude that statistical analyses corroborate my hypothesis with respect to the relationship between rebels’ external support from their ethnoreligious brethren and state-sponsored extensive mass killing.

Ethnoreligious support tends to be rigid, which makes embattled rulers judge that their efforts to stem this support would not bear fruit. Furthermore, support from co-ethnics or co-religionists helps insurgent leaders induce civilians to join the insurgency and deters the rebel leadership from mistreating civilians. The tenacity of ethnoreligious support and strong civilian support for insurgents might propel the

\textsuperscript{26} These rates are calculated based on full models. The percentage change rates for simplified models do not diverge much from those for full models.
government to massacre civilian populations and fracture insurgents’ recruitment pool as a strategy for crippling rebel forces and forestalling the resurgence of rebellion. For instance, during the Burundian civil war (1993-2003), Hutu insurgent groups received support from their co-ethnics in neighboring Rwanda (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005).27 Rwandan Hutus, ex-soldiers and Interahamwe militias who fled Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, backed the Burundian insurgents, fighting alongside them and supplying them with weapons (Lemarchand, 2009; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 1998). This kindred support can account for strong civilian support for the rebels. Insurgent leaders might convince their co-ethnics to join the armed struggle against Tutsis by stressing that Rwandan Hutu brothers would never abandon them; therefore, the rebels would be able to win the war. Rwandan Hutu sponsorship might also constrain the insurgents from committing widespread abuses against the Hutu population. Embattled Tutsi rulers were not able to stymie the activities of Rwandan Hutus who frequently operated outside Burundi, which propelled the government to project massive violence against its Hutu citizens. It is estimated that combating Hutu insurgencies, Tutsi elites murdered 100,000 - 200,000 Hutu civilians (Valentino, 2004).

Table 5.4 reveals that models containing all control variables capture the effect of rival support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. In most of full models, rival support is statistically significant and its sign of the coefficient estimate is positive. In the negative binomial model based on highest numbers, p-value for rival support is .117,

27 Hutu insurgents comprised the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), the National Forces of Liberation (FNL), the National Liberation Front (FROLINA), the Union of National Liberation (ULINA), and other minor groups (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005).
which is very close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance. Models excluding statistically insignificant control variables still detect the influence of rival support. In the OLS specification with highest numbers and negative binomial specifications with middle and highest numbers, dropping those variables enhances the effect of rival support on severity of mass killing. Furthermore, percentage changes in expected count also exhibit the influence of rival support. When rival support moves from 0 to 1, the expected number of intentional civilian deaths increases by 174.3% (lowest number specification), 132.3% (middle number specification), and 125.8% (highest number specification), holding all other variables constant. Therefore, I conclude that statistical results substantiate my hypothesis germane to rebels’ support from the government’s rival states.

Support from the government’s rival states tends to endure, even if the government exerts diplomatic and military efforts to vitiate this support. Furthermore, rival states harbor strong desire for rebel victory, thus seeking to regulate insurgents’ behavior and to make civilians bolster the insurgency. The rigidity of rival support and civilian support for insurgents might propel embattled rulers to orchestrate extensive mass killing and wipe out rebels’ recruitment pool. The First Indochina war (1946-1954) illustrates this point. Viet Minh guerillas enjoyed a high level of civilian support, which prompted French colonial forces to massacre Vietnamese civilians. Rival support can explain why the Viet Minh rallied civilian support. This insurgent group received

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28 These rates are calculated based on full models. The rates for simplified models are 224% (lowest numbers), 174.8% (middle numbers), and 163.8% (highest numbers). This indicates that when removing control variables that are not statistically significant, percentage changes in expected count rise by about 40-50%.
significant support from communist China, France’s arch rival, which aspired to dislodge France from Indochina and eliminate (potential) capitalist threats (Zhai, 1993 & 2000). Mao Zedong sought to regulate Viet Minh’s military operations and implant his guerilla war doctrines into the Viet Minh, one of which was treating civilians well. Chinese military advisors deployed in Vietnam helped the guerillas mobilize the masses, ensuring that Viet Minh insurgents build civilian support (Zhai, 1993 & 2000).

Table 5.4 demonstrates that the effect of lootable resources hinges somewhat on model specifications. None of the OLS models detects the effect of lootable resources on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Even dropping statistically insignificant controls does not boost the influence of lootable resources. In contrast, in the negative binomial models, lootable resources exert some effect upon the extent of mass killing. Of course, the p-values for lootable resources exceed the .1 threshold of statistical significance in full models based on middle and highest numbers. The p-values for those specifications are .145 (middle numbers) and .152 (high numbers), which is not far from the .1 threshold of statistical significance. When excluding variables that are not statistically significant, the effect of lootable resources inflates. This suggests that only negative binomial analyses vindicate my expectations regarding rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources. Resource wealth can spoil the rebel leadership. Hence, when recruiting labor force and combatants, resource-rich insurgents eschew the distribution of their wealth and resort to coercive measures. Furthermore, rebel leaders might give free rein to resource producers, which clears the...
way for rampant civilian abuses. Rebels’ heinous behavior begets deep animosity toward the insurgents, which can inhibit embattled rulers from targeting civilians.

As shown in Table 5.4, all models capture the effect of insurgents’ civilian support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. A high level of civilian support for insurgents is likely to propel the government to engineer extensive mass killing, which corresponds to my theoretical argument. In some OLS and negative binomial models, population size and the Cold War are statistically significant and their signs of the coefficient estimate are positive, which indicates that 1) during civil war, countries with large populations are likely to have a large number of intentional civilian deaths and 2) civil wars in the Cold War era generated more extensive mass killing than those in the post-Cold War era.

As shown in Table 5.5, statistical analyses without anti-colonial wars diverge little from those with all civil wars. Most specifications capture the effects of ethnoreligious support and rival support on the severity of state-sponsored mass killing. Only in negative binomial models, lootable resources exercise an influence on variation in mass killing. Hence, when dropping anti-colonial wars, the Insurgent Capacity Model still confirms my hypotheses on ethnoreligious support and rival support and partly confirms my hypothesis on lootable resources.

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29 In the OLS and negative binomial specifications based on middle numbers, the p-values for ethnoreligious support are .105 (full model) and .103 (simplified model), which is very close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance.
5.4. Grievance Model

The Grievance Model examines how well political and economic marginalization, as well as armed conflict history, account for the scale of state-sponsored mass killing. Table 5.6 reveals that when injecting all control variables into an equation, political competition, a proxy for political marginalization, is statistically significant and its sign of the coefficient estimate conforms to my theoretical argument. The models that exclude ELF, troop, mountain, and population also capture the effect of political marginalization on the extent of state-sponsored mass killing.\(^{30}\) In other words, removing statistically insignificant control variables does not suppress the effect of political marginalization. This suggests that political marginalization exerts an effect on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Furthermore, percentage changes in expected count manifest the influence of political marginalization. A one-unit increase in political competition score decreases the expected number of intentional civilian deaths by 19.4% (lowest numbers), 21.7% (middle numbers), and 21.8% (highest numbers).\(^{31}\) Therefore, statistical analyses confirm my hypothesis that the more severe political marginalization is, the more extensive state-sponsored mass killing during civil war is. A high level of political marginalization breeds or exacerbates grievances among civilians, which can generate civilian support for insurgents. Encountering this predicament, embattled

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\(^{30}\) In the OLS models, none of the control variables are statistically significant. Some negative binomial models, however, manifest the influence of ELF, mountain, and population. Therefore, I performed both OLS and negative binomial analyses using these three control variables.

\(^{31}\) These rates are computed based on full models. The percentage changes for simplified models do not depart much from those for full models.
rulers might massacre civilians as a strategy for paralyzing insurgent combatants and forestalling future rebellion.

The results also report that in the models addressing all control variables, history of armed conflict is statistically significant and its sign of the coefficient estimate is positive, which indicates that the full models capture the effect of armed conflict history on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Even when excluding control variables that are not statistically significant, the influence of armed conflict history persists. Furthermore, when armed conflict history shifts from 0 (no conflict) to 1 (minor conflict) or 1 to 2 (intense conflict), the expected number of civilian deaths rises sharply. The rates of percentage changes for full models are 122.9% (lowest numbers), 116.2% (middle numbers), and 113.7% (highest numbers). The rates for simplified models are higher than those for full models (144.3% (lowest numbers), 130.2% (middle numbers), and 127.3% (highest numbers)). Thus, based on statistical analyses, I can claim that history of intense armed conflict is likely to engender state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Intense prior conflict helps insurgents kindle animosity toward the government, which can spawn or aggravate grievances against the status quo. Hence, civilians who supported the insurgent side during the previous conflict rally around the rebel leadership. Combating popular insurgents, state leaders orchestrate extensive mass killing in an attempt to neutralize insurgent forces and to prevent insurrection from recurring.

The second Kurdish insurgency in Iraq (1985-1988) illustrates how severe political marginalization and history of intense armed conflict can prompt the
government to unleash massive violence against civilian populations. Confronting the insurrection, Saddam Hussein continued to suppress political rights of Kurds, excluding them from political realm, which aggravated grievances among the Kurdish population (Strakes, 2007; O’Ballance, 1996). Furthermore, in the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdish insurgents engaged in an internecine war against the government, which helped them foment hostility and grievances against the Hussein regime (Strakes, 2007). Sharp grievances drove Kurds to support Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) insurgents. In a bid to cripple insurgent combatants and ward off future rebellion, the Iraqi government murdered 180,000-300,000 Kurdish civilians through poison gas attacks, summary executions, and starvation (Harff, 2003; Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004).

Dissimilar to political marginalization and armed conflict history, the impact of economic marginalization on the extent of mass killing is not consistent across OLS and negative binomial specifications. Table 5.6 reveals that in most of full models, GDP per capita representing economic marginalization is not statistically significant. Only the negative binomial model with highest numbers captures the marginal effect of GDP on the scale of mass killing. Hence, in full models, economic marginalization generally exercises little influence upon variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Dropping statistically insignificant control variables does not change the effect of GDP in OLS models. In the negative binomial models, however, the removal of those variables boosts the impact of GDP on the scale of mass killing. Therefore, based on the simplified negative binomial models, I can maintain that severe economic
marginalization is likely to engender state-sponsored extensive mass killing during civil war. Severe economic marginalization spawns or aggravates grievances, which can help insurgent leaders garner strong support from aggrieved populations. This predicament can lead embattled rulers to project massive violence against civilians. In a nutshell, the effect of economic marginalization depends on model specifications. The OLS analyses disconfirm my hypothesis linking economic marginalization and the extent of state-sponsored mass killing. In contrast, the negative binomial analyses generally corroborate that severe economic marginalization is likely to instigate state-sponsored massive violence against civilians. It is, however, premature to generalize this conclusion because economic marginalization can be represented by measures other than GDP per capita. One can develop other indicators for economic marginalization and employ them for statistical analysis, which may account better for severity of state-sponsored mass killing. This suggests that the effect of economic marginalization on mass killing scale needs to be examined further.

As seen in Table 5.6, all specifications capture the effect of civilian support on variation in mass killing, which indicates that a high level of civilian support for insurgents can generate state-sponsored extensive mass killing during civil war. This gives leverage to my theoretical argument revolving around the positive relationship between civilian support for rebels and the severity of mass killing. Similar to Insurgent Aim and Insurgent Capacity Models, some negative binomial specifications manifest the effect of the Cold War on variation in mass killing. In some negative binomial specifications, distance between a war zone and the capital exert an effect on the scale
of mass killing, which bolsters Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) argument that states with inferior military capacity are likely to inflict damage on civilian populations.

I re-estimated the Grievance Model without anti-colonial wars to observe whether the two outcomes display some consistency. Table 5.7 reveals that the Model without anti-colonial wars does not depart much from that with all civil wars. The removal of anti-colonial wars does not suppress the effects of political marginalization and armed conflict history on the scale of mass killing. In other words, without anti-colonial wars, specifications still detect the influence of these two variables. In terms of economic marginalization, OLS models do not capture the effect of GDP on the severity of mass killing. In the negative binomial models, dropping anti-colonial wars reduces the influence of GDP but not to the extent that the effect evaporates. Therefore, based on the analyses without anti-colonial wars, I can still conclude that the Grievance Model substantiates my hypotheses regarding political marginalization and armed conflict history and partly substantiates my hypothesis on economic marginalization.

5.5. Combined Model

Independent variable(s) in one model may sway those in other models. For instance, variables relevant to grievances can influence the effects of rebels’ external support and lootable resources on variation in mass killing or vice versa. To examine whether or how independent variables affect each other across the models, I estimated the Combined

32 In the simplified negative binomial model with lowest numbers, the p-value for GDP is .109 and in the full negative binomial model with highest numbers, the p-value for GDP is .162. Both values are close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance.
Model that addresses all independent variables and controls as well. One can argue that incorporating fourteen variables runs the risk of distorting the outcomes. Taking into account this claim, I also performed analyses without control variables that are not statistically significant. By comparing Combined Model with Insurgent Aim, Insurgent Capacity, and Grievance Models, I can find out whether the effect of an independent variable holds or changes when other independent variables are injected in the model.\textsuperscript{33}

Table 5.8 reveals that OLS and negative binomial models capture the effects of ethnoreligious support, political competition, armed conflict history, and insurgents’ civilian support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Ethnoreligious support is statistically significant in all but the OLS specifications with lowest numbers. Even in these two specifications, p-values for ethnoreligious support are close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance.\textsuperscript{34} This indicates that in the Combined Model, ethnoreligious support exercises an influence on severity of mass killing. Therefore, the Combined Model vindicates that insurgents’ support from their ethnoreligious brethren is likely to trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing. These findings conform to those of Insurgent Capacity Model, which suggests that a set of insurgent aim, political and economic marginalization, and armed conflict history does not generate significant change in the effect of ethnoreligious support. OLS and negative binomial models generally detect the effect of political competition on variation in state-sponsored mass killing, which establishes the relationship between political marginalization and severity.

\textsuperscript{33} I juxtapose only Models with all control variables because each Model displays a different set of control variables that are statistically significant.

\textsuperscript{34} The p-value for ethnoreligious support is .129 in the model that contains all control variables and .153 in the model excluding control variables that are not statistically significant in the Insurgent Capacity Model.
of mass killing. Even in the negative binominal models that do not contain statistically insignificant controls, the p-values for political competition are very close to the .1 threshold, which indicates that political competition exercises some influence upon the extent of state-sponsored mass killing. Therefore, based on the Combined Model, I can claim that severe political marginalization is likely to engender state-sponsored extensive mass killing during civil war. Comparing the Combined Model with the Grievance Model, I found that a set of insurgent aim, ethnoreligious and rival support, and lootable resources does not neutralize the effect of political marginalization. Only in the simplified negative binomial specifications, adding this set of variables abates the influence of political marginalization, but not to the extent that the effect completely vanishes. Furthermore, Table 5.8 reports that armed conflict history is statistically significant in most OLS and negative binomial models, which indicates that armed conflict history accounts for mass killing scale. In other words, the Combined Model corroborates that intense previous conflict is likely to instigate state-sponsored extensive mass killing during civil war. The relation between armed conflict history and mass killing in the Combined Model displays similar patterns to that in the Grievance Model. That is, when a series of variables pertaining to insurgent aim and capacity is injected in the model, the effect of armed conflict history holds. Finally, all specifications capture the effect of civilian support for insurgents on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. As with Insurgent Aim, Insurgent Capacity, and Grievance Models, Combined Model indicates that a high level of rebels’ civilian support is likely to

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35 In the highest number OLS specification that addresses all control variables, the p-value for conflict history is .119, very close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance.
prompt embattled rulers to unleash massive violence against their own citizens. This suggests that incorporating other independent variables into the model does not sway the effect of civilian support for insurgents on mass killing scale.

The Combined Model reveals that the effect of economic marginalization on the severity of mass killing is contingent upon model specifications. All OLS models do not detect the impact of GDP on variation in mass killing. In negative binomial models, however, economic marginalization accounts for the extent of mass killing. These outcomes correspond to those of the Grievance Model, which suggests that when injecting insurgent aim, ethnoreligious and rival support, and lootable resources into the model, most of negative binomial analyses still capture the influence of economic marginalization on the scale of mass killing. In contrast, the Combined Model generally does not detect the effects of insurgent aim, rival support, and lootable resources on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. In all OLS and negative binomial specifications, insurgent aim is not statistically significant and its sign of the coefficient estimate is negative, which indicates that this variable does not predict severity of mass killing. In other words, the outbreak of state-sponsored extensive mass killing hinges little on whether insurgent groups seek secession or regime change. These outcomes coincide with those of Insurgent Aim Model, which suggests that inserting other independent variables into the analysis does not promote the influence of insurgent aim on the scale of mass killing. Table 5.8 also demonstrates that all specifications do not capture the effect of rival support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Hence, the

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36 In the negative binomial models based on lowest numbers, the p-values for GDP are .152 (full model) and .148 (simplified model), which is not far from the .1 threshold of statistical significance.
Combined Model does not confirm that rebels’ support from the government’s rival states is likely to instigate extensive mass killing committed by the government. The Combined Model and the Insurgent Capacity Model exhibit different patterns in terms of rival support. In the Insurgent Capacity Model, rival support exercises an influence on the extent of mass killing. Adding insurgent aim and variables related to grievances suppresses the effect of rival support on mass killing scale. In most specifications, lootable resources exert little effect on variation in mass killing. Hence, the Combined Model disconfirms my hypothesis that rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely to constrain state-sponsored extensive mass killing. In terms of OLS analyses, the Combined Model displays similar patterns as the Insurgent Capacity Model. Negative binomial analyses in the Combined Model, however, diverge from those in the Insurgent Capacity Model in that the effect of lootable resources evaporates when a series of variables pertaining to insurgent aim and grievances is inserted in the model.

As a robustness check, I re-estimated the Combined Model without anti-colonial wars. Table 5.9 indicates that the Model without anti-colonial wars does not differ much from that with all civil wars. Even when dropping anti-colonial wars, the effects of ethnoreligious support, political marginalization, and armed conflict history endure. As shown in Table 5.9, economic marginalization is not statistically significant in all specifications. In most of the negative binomial models, however, p-values for this variable almost reach the .1 threshold of statistical significance. This suggests that

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37 In the OLS specifications based on middle and highest numbers, p-values for ethnoreligious support are close to the .1 threshold of statistical significance. Therefore, I conclude that without anti-colonial wars, the models generally capture the effect of ethnoreligious support on the scale of mass killing.
economic marginalization exercises some influence on the severity of mass killing only in negative binomial models. The analyses do not capture the effects of Insurgent aim, rival support, and lootable resources on the severity of mass killing. Therefore, juxtaposing the Combined Model using all civil wars and that without anti-colonial wars proves the robustness of the Model based on a comprehensive classification of civil war.

5.6. Conclusion

The statistical analyses detect the effect of civilian support on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Significant civilian support for insurgents is likely to propel embattled rulers to engineer extensive mass killing. This finding bears importance because I theorize that variables that generate staunch civilian support for insurgents can trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Insurgent Capacity, Grievance, and Combined Models generally capture the effects of ethnoreligious support, political marginalization, and armed conflict history on severity of mass killing. Therefore, I conclude that the statistical results confirm my hypotheses germane to these variables. In other words, based on the outcomes, I can claim that insurgents’ support from their ethnoreligious brethren, severe political marginalization, and prior intense conflict can engender extensive mass killing perpetrated by the government. Grievance and Combined Models detect the influence of economic marginalization on mass killing scale only in negative binomial specifications. This suggests that model specifications
determine whether my hypothesis pertaining to economic marginalization is corroborated or not.

In contrast, the statistical analyses do not substantiate my hypotheses with respect to rival support, lootable resources, and insurgent aim. The Insurgent Capacity Model manifests the effect of rebels’ support from the government’s rival states, but when independent variables pertinent to insurgent aim and grievances are injected in the model, the effect of rival support evaporates. In most of Insurgent Capacity and Combined Models, rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources does not account for variation in state-sponsored mass killing. Insurgent aim generally exercises little influence upon severity of mass killing. Therefore, the statistical analyses constrain me from arguing that 1) insurgents’ support from the government’s rivals and secessionist wars are likely to trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing and 2) rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources are likely to inhibit extensive mass killing.
6 Case Studies

The statistical analyses confirm my hypotheses germane to insurgents’ support from their ethnoreligious brethren, political marginalization, and armed conflict history. The results partially substantiate my hypothesis on economic marginalization. That is, the effect of economic marginalization is contingent upon which method is employed and which control variables are incorporated (or excluded). In contrast, the statistical analyses do not substantiate my hypotheses with respect to insurgent aim, insurgents’ support from the government’s rival states, and rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources. In this chapter, I conduct qualitative analyses to complement the quantitative studies. I examine the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) and the Peruvian Civil War (1982-1992). By juxtaposing these two wars, I intend to find out which hypotheses case studies confirm, whether case analysis results correspond to statistical analysis results, and which alternative explanations case studies capture.

6.1. Background

The Algerian War of Independence erupted when decolonization movement was sweeping Africa and Asia. After the First World War, Algerian nationalism arose and Muslim populations began to agitate for independence from French colonialists (Horne, 2006; Heggoy, 1972). Nationalist leaders attempted to persuade France to decolonize
their homeland through non-violent actions such as petition and lobbying (Horn, 2006; Heggoy, 1972). The French, however, were unwilling to grant independence and ruthlessly repressed independence movement as the Sétif massacre exemplifies. France’s oppression radicalized Algerian nationalists and propelled them to shift their strategy to violence (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004; Fanon, 1988; Gillespie, 1976). In November 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) launched an insurgency against France. Combating superior French troops, FLN insurgents relied on guerilla warfare and urban terrorism (Polk, 2007; Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972). In response, France wielded brutal strategies. Colonial rulers not only executed forced relocation and strict surveillance (quadrillage), but also engineered extensive mass killing through torture, indiscriminate bombings, and summary executions (Fanon, 1988; Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978; Gillespie, 1976).

Massacring Arabs and Berbers rendered France a military victory, but a political loss (Gillespie, 1976). Extensive mass killing fractured FLN’s civilian support bases and thus undermined rebel military capacity. This egregious strategy, however, swelled sympathy and support for the FLN inside and outside Algeria (Gillespie, 1976; Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972). Therefore, the insurgents were able to sustain the war, which became intractable. In 1958, Charles De Gaulle took power and transformed policy toward Algeria from harsh military repression to negotiation. This shift infuriated pieds-noirs and some segments of the military. They sought to derail De Gaulle’s efforts to achieve an honorable exit from Algeria. The Secret Army Organization (OAS), for instance, unleashed bombing and assassination campaigns on both Muslim Algerians
and the metropole French and staged an aborted coup (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 1976; Heggoy, 1972). Despite violent resistance from pieds-noirs and army dissidents, a series of negotiations with the FLN produced the Evian Accords that stipulated ceasefire, the recognition of the full sovereignty of Algeria, cooperative exchange between independent Algeria and France, and equal treatment of pieds-noirs (Horne, 2006). In the 1962 referendums, the majority of French citizens and indigenous Algerians approved this treaty, and De Gaulle finally declared the independence of Algeria on the same year (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004; Heggoy, 1972).

The Algerian War of Independence is considered as one of the bloodiest wars in the post-World War II era. Thousands of FLN insurgents and French soldiers perished in battle (Horne, 2006; Polk, 2007). Both sides targeted civilian populations. France murdered 70,000-570,000 Muslim Algerians, while the FLN killed 70,000-235,000 pieds-noirs and pro-French Muslims (Harkis) (Valentino, 2004; Hutchinson, 1978; Horne, 2006). Even after the war ended, bloodshed continued in Algeria. Post-independence elites sought revenge against pieds-noirs and Harkis. The majority of these populations fled Algeria or lost their lives (Horne, 2006).

The Peruvian civil war broke out when ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism engulfed the Third World. Founded in the late 1960s, the Shining Path gained influence by promoting its own version of Marxism that focused on economic distress of indigenous peasants (McClintock, 1998; Gorriti, 1994). In 1980, leaders of the Shining Path refused to participate in multiparty elections and initiated a rebellion against the government. Prosecuting guerilla war, the insurgents succeeded in
wresting control of rural highlands and enforced their Marxist ideology in these ‘liberated’ zones (Cunningham, 2007; Palmer, 1994). The rebels’ rule was harsh. Leaders of the Shining Path did not tolerate any dissent but ruthlessly punished anyone who challenged or defied their authority and law (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998). In the mid-1980s, the Shining Path infiltrated urban areas and mounted terrorist attacks.

By 1991, the Shining Path controlled central and southern Peru and deployed a large number of combatants in the outskirts of Lima (McClintock, 1998).

At the onset of the war, governing elites perceived that the rebellion would not pose a grave threat to their rule. As the Shining Path’s aggression escalated, however, the government jettisoned its lukewarm stance and combated the rebellion actively (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998; Palmer, 1994). In 1982, President Belaúnde designated Ayacucho and other rebel-active provinces as a ‘military emergency zone’ and restricted freedoms and civil rights of peasants in these regions (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998). The government arrested and incarcerated anyone suspected of supporting the Shining Path. Some detainees were subject to torture and rape.

Government forces also perpetrated several massacres (McClintock, 1998; Palmer, 1994). This strategy, however, failed to subdue the insurrection. Therefore, in 1989, the government changed its counter-insurgency strategies, endeavoring to distinguish rebel supporters from government-friendly or neutral civilians and to capture key insurgent leaders (Cunningham, 2007). In 1992, Abimael Guzmán, a ringleader of the insurgency, was arrested, after which violence tapered off.
The Peruvian civil war inflicted sufferings on civilian populations. Civilians trapped in the war were often subject to execution, torture, imprisonment, and other human rights abuses. According to Rummel (1997b), the government murdered 8,000 – 15,000 civilians. The Shining Path has been accused of killing more civilians. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2003) concluded that the rebels hold responsible for two-thirds of all civilian fatalities.

6.2. Extensive Mass Killing

To suppress FLN’s struggle for independence, French rulers resorted to reprehensible and brutal strategies. The colonial authority implemented forced relocation and strict surveillance (quadrillage) in an attempt to sever the FLN from locals (Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978; O’Ballance, 1967). France dislodged indigenous populations from their villages and relocated them to designated camps with squalid conditions. Between 15 and 20% of the rural population in Algeria were uprooted from their homes (Heggoy, 1972). Anyone who entered abandoned villages were regarded as rebels and shot dead (Heggoy, 1972). Simultaneously, France carved up entire Algeria into small units and garrisoned them (O’Ballance, 1967; Heggoy, 1972). The French security machinery closely observed civilians residing in the unit to deter them from backing the FLN (O’Ballance, 1967; Heggoy, 1972).

In conjunction with forced relocation and quadrillage, colonial rulers perpetrated extensive mass killing in a bid to neutralize the insurgents. One of the killing methods was torture. French troops lacked local knowledge that would help to detect and
capture or kill rebel combatants. To extract information on the FLN quickly, French rulers routinized torture (Fanon, 1988; Hutchinson, 1978; Polk, 2007). They inflicted torture on any Algerians suspected of knowing something about the rebels. Thousands of torture victims died in prison (Fanon, 1988; Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972). The French military also carried out indiscriminate air raids and summary executions. It enforced the principle of collective punishment throughout Algeria (Horne, 2006; Fanon, 2004). When French troops suspected some residents in a village of helping the FLN, they killed all inhabitants and razed the whole village (Fanon, 2004; Gillespie, 1976; Heggoy, 1972; Polk, 2007). The Battle of Algiers epitomizes extensive mass killing committed by France. In 1956, FLN leaders initiated urban terrorism and expanded their battlefields to Algiers in an attempt to attract more international and domestic French attention. FLN agents assassinated civilian and military administrators and exploded bombs in civilian locations such as cafés, nightclubs, and soccer stadiums (Horne, 2006; Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978). To crush FLN’s urban terrorism, French soldiers besieged residential areas in which insurgents were suspected of hiding, which resulted in many civilian deaths. Casbah, the old quarter of Algiers, was subject to intense bombings and summary executions (Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978).

Simultaneously, the French Army arrested and tortured suspected rebel supporters, many of who perished in torture chambers (Fanon, 1988; Heggoy, 1972; Polk, 2007). In the entire war period, torture, indiscriminate bombing raids, and summary executions by French forces produced the deaths of 70,000 – 570,000 Muslim civilians (Valentino, 2004).
Why did colonial rulers employ extensive mass killing along with forced relocation and *quadrillage*? The primary reason is that the FLN mustered vehement support from Muslim Arabs and Berbers. In other words, staunch civilian support for the FLN propelled France to massacre indigenous Algerians. In 1954, the FLN recruited a few hundred combatants from Muslims. As the war proceeded, rebel recruitment thrived. The number of insurgent combatants reached 40,000 in 1956 and 100,000 in 1958 (Gillespie, 1976). Noncombatant Muslims aided the FLN with shelter, supplies, and intelligence. Urban Algerians exhibited solidarity with the insurgents by participating in strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations (Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972). Civilian support for the FLN hampered France’s efforts to spot and capture rebel combatants (Polk, 2007; Hutchinson, 1978; Heggoy, 1972).

Combating popular FLN insurgents, French forces orchestrated extensive mass killing against local populations. The first mass killing incident took place in 1955. After the FLN attacked and killed pied-noir civilians near Philippeville (currently Skikda), colonial troops and pied-noir gangs retaliated by slaying about 12,000 Algerians. Since then, France frequently unleashed relentless violence against Muslim Algerians, as the Battle of Algiers illustrates. By massacring hostile populations, France sought to fracture FLN’s civilian support bases and cripple the guerillas (Hutchinson, 1978; Horne, 2006; Fanon, 1988; Polk, 2007). Further, by killing youths, children, and women, colonial rulers attempted to wipe out future rebel recruitment pool and forestall independence struggle from resurging. In 1957, French rulers began to exercise forced relocation and close surveillance (*quadrillage*) to constrain Arabs and Berbers from backing the
insurgents. These two strategies, however, failed to stem civilian support for the FLN (Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978; Gillespie, 1976). Forced relocation uprooted peasants from their lands and plunged them into unemployment, which exacerbated their economic grievances (Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978). This policy also traumatized the displaced populations. Therefore, resettlement camps became breeding grounds for rebel recruitment. *Quadrillage*, strict monitoring through heavy military presence, involved frequent security checks and severe restriction of movement. This exasperated local populations and spawned resentment against the French (Heggoy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978). The FLN clandestinely penetrated internment camps and villages and recruited supporters, which neutralized forced resettlement and *quadrillage* strategies (Hutchinson, 1978). The limitations of forced relocation and *quadrillage* drove French rulers to maintain the extensive mass killing strategy.

In Peru, the government’s counterinsurgency strategy was repressive and brutal (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998; Palmer, 1994). When leaders of the Shining Path initiated rebellion in 1980, Belaúnde, then president, did not consider the Shining Path as a national security threat. As violence intensified, he designated Ayacucho, a bastion of insurgency, as an emergency zone and deployed armed forces there. The security apparatus exercised authority over this area and suspended civil rights of local populations (McClintock, 1998). Landless peasants who formed most of the inhabitants were often subject to mistreatment. Alan García, successor of Belaúnde, continued wielding military strategy against the Shining Path (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998). Government troops raided villages and executed or massacred individuals
suspected of insurgent collaborators. Other human rights violations, including arbitrary
detention, forced disappearance, and torture, were rampant (Cunningham, 2007;  
McClintock, 1998; Gorriti, 1992). In 1989, however, government forces began to  
eschew somewhat indiscriminate violence and attempt to distinguish enemy civilians  
from friendly and neutral ones (Cunningham, 2007). Simultaneously, the government  
paid more attention to the arrest of key rebel leaders (Cunningham, 2007). In 1992,  
security forces succeeded in capturing Guzmán in Lima, which expedited the collapse of  
the Shining Path. In other words, after Guzmán’s arrest, the war petered out. Similar to  
the Algerian war, the Peruvian government’s strategy of subduing the Shining Path  
insurgency involved human rights violations. Civilians suspected of collaborating with  
the rebels were subject to arbitrary incarceration, torture, rape, and extrajudicial killings.  
Rummel (1997b) estimated that during the war, the government murdered  
approximately 8,000 – 15,000 civilians. Dissimilar to Algeria, however, embattled rulers  
in Peru abstained from projecting violence so massive as to annihilate suspected or  
potential insurgent supporters. In other words, state-sponsored extensive mass killing  
did not occur during the Peruvian civil war.

This is attributed mainly to the lack of widespread civilian support for the Shining  
Path. In other words, the paucity of rebels’ civilian support inhibited Peruvian leaders  
from wiping out civilian populations. Even though sympathizing with rebels’ cause,  
many indigenous peasants and urban residents were reluctant to join the insurgency,  
which impelled leaders of the Shining Path to exhibit extreme brutality. Of course, the  
rebels’ ideology championed the use of violence to overthrow incumbent rulers and
institute a peasant-based communist society. Lack of strong civilian support for insurgency also radicalized the rebel leadership and prompted it to wield indiscriminate violence against civilian populations. By perpetrating atrocities, the Shining Path aimed to terrorize civilians and deter them from supporting the government or compel them to back the insurgency (Cunningham, 2007; McClintock, 1998; Smith, 1994a). At the onset of the war, rebel leaders dispensed ‘people’s justice’ by liquidating political and economic elites such as landowners, businessmen, and government officials. Simultaneously, the insurgents targeted civilians suspected of collaborating with the government. As the war progressed and civilian support for the insurgency did not multiply, rebel leaders turned to indiscriminate violence. McClintock (1998) remarked that from 1980 to 1992, a large number of people killed by the Shining Path were unarmed civilians. The rebels executed or massacred sympathetic peasants who objected to or violated insurgents’ stringent rule. In Lima and other major cities, the rebels mounted terrorist attacks, which claimed the lives of innocent civilians. In addition, the Shining Path murdered nuns, priests, journalists, aid workers, teachers, and social activists (Cunningham, 2007). The insurgents often perpetrated killings in a savage manner (McClintock, 1998). Victims were decapitated, mutilated, or disemboweled. Corpses were displayed in public. Besides murder, the Shining Path also pillaged many rural villages and kidnapped numerous civilians for ransom (Poole & Renique, 1992; Gorriti, 1992). Insurgents’ atrocities intimidated some civilians into buttressing the rebellion. A large number of citizens, however, abhorred indiscriminate violence and came to harbor animosity toward the rebels (Taylor 2006; Palmer, 1994).
Even poor peasants jettisoned their sympathy for the insurrection and resisted the
Shining Path (McClintock, 1998; Berg, 1994).

Judging that this rebel organization did not enjoy extensive civilian support, state
leaders tried to engage or utilize civilian populations. The government offered various
economic incentives that aimed to entice civilians to its side. García, for example,
increased economic aid to southern highlands, in which the insurrection originated and
gained momentum. He also sought to redress peasants’ grievance by refurbishing the
previous land reform to their advantage (McClintock, 1998). Furthermore, embattled
rulers used local populations for military purposes. The government mobilized peasants
disaffected by the Shining Path and formed militias (rondas) (McClintock, 1998; Starn,
1998). The rondas who were familiar with battlefield conditions helped the government
conduct military operations effectively. Acting as an intermediary between Amerindian
farmers and government forces, the militias also contributed to mitigating local
animosity toward the government (Starn, 1998; Poole & Renique, 1992).

6.3. Insurgent Aim

Insurgent groups seek either secession or regime change. Insurgents may aim to obtain
independence or greater autonomy. Rebels may aim to subvert the current government
and seize political power. I hypothesize that state-sponsored mass killing is more
extensive in secessionist war than in regime change war. In Algeria, FLN insurgents
aimed to dislodge France from their homeland and achieve independence (Hutchinson,
1978; Fanon, 1988). Leaders of the FLN prosecuted war in both Algeria and French
mainland. In November 1954, the FLN launched war in the Aurès, a mountainous inland area, and strove to spread violence into other regions. By the end of that year, the Kabylie region populated by Berbers in which anti-French uprisings had erupted became a bastion of the FLN (Heggoy, 1972). Later, the war diffused into Algiers, the capital of colonial Algeria. Soon after the insurgency started, violence penetrated most of Algeria (Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006).

In conjunction with guerilla attacks in Algeria, the FLN leadership unleashed violence in metropole France. The FLN extended its liberation struggle to the metropole in an attempt to 1) instill fear among the French public and impel French citizens to call for retreat from Algeria, 2) subjugate its rival group, the Algerian National Movement (MNA), and secure the status of the sole representative of Algerian people, and 3) elicit support from Algerian expatriates (Polk, 2007; Hutchinson, 1978). In August 1958, the FLN began conducting terrorist attacks in France. Police and military personnel and facilities were attacked. The rebels exploded oil refineries and storage tanks to sabotage the French economy (Gillespie, 1976; Hutchinson, 1978). Several assassination attempts targeting politicians occurred (Hutchinson, 1978; Horne, 2006). The FLN also targeted fellow Algerians. Its leaders perceived that the MNA hindered them from swaying the independence struggle. Hence, FLN insurgents sought to fracture their rival by unleashing violence (Horne, 2006; Clark, 1960). In Café Wars, FLN agents carried out rampant bombing attacks and assassinations targeting leaders and supporters of the
MNA. Simultaneously, FLN leaders intimidated and even brutally punished Algerians who refused to buttress the war of national liberation. FLN agents ruthlessly killed pro-French Algerians. The FLN extracted money from the diaspora community, which often entailed violence. 500 francs a month in taxes were imposed on students, 3,000 on workers, and 50,000 and more on shop owners and businessmen (Horne, 2006). The rebels inflicted harsh punishment on those who did not pay this tax (Clark, 1960).

Although FLN leaders projected violence in both homeland Algeria and metropole France, they succeeded in building Arab and Berber support. Appealing to common ethnoreligious heritage, FLN fostered Algerian nationalism (Heggoy, 1972). Insurgent leaders vowed to redress colonial grievances and injustices by establishing a democratic system based on Islamic principles, securing liberties, and implementing socialist economic reform (Heggoy, 1972; Clark, 1960). Furthermore, FLN terrorist attacks compelled some indigenous populations to jettison their pro-French or neutral stance and support the independence struggle. Waging a war against popular FLN, French forces massacred Arabs and Berbers in an attempt to wipe out insurgent civilian support bases (Horne 2006; Fanon, 1988; Heggoy, 1972).

In Peru, the Shining Path aimed to subvert current governing elites and to establish a peasant-based revolutionary regime (McClintock, 1998; Degregori, 1994). In other words, this rebel organization sought regime change. Shining Path insurgents initiated war in a central highland region of Ayacucho and expanded battlefields to other rural regions and cities including Lima. Battling government forces, Shining Path

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38 The bitter conflict between FLN and MNA is called Café Wars because of the location of violence. Both groups engaged in bombings and assassinations against each other in cafés.
leaders failed to build nationwide civilian support. At the outset of the war, the peasant populations supported the Shining Path because it espoused the creation of a peasant-based communist society. As the war progressed, however, more peasants withdrew their support for the Shining Path because the rebel leaders enforced a strict and idiosyncratic variant of Marxism-Leninism (Gorriti, 1992; Isbell, 1994). The insurgent leadership banned commercial activities on which small-scale farmers relied for their survival. The rebels also implemented policies that disregarded or offended indigenous culture (Degregori, 1994).

To make matters worse, Shining Path leaders failed to muster urban support. They perceived that in order to win the war, they needed to capture Lima, the capital, and other urban areas. Thus, the insurgents endeavored to penetrate urban regions and gain support from urban residents (Smith, 1994b; McClintock, 1998). Although some segments of workers and intellectuals backed the rebellion, many city dwellers did not join the Shining Path because the rebel leadership did not offer attractive incentives (Woy-Hazelton & Hazelton, 1994; Smith, 1994b). Of course, the Shining Path championed equal distribution of wealth and eradication of poverty. Shining Path leaders, however, were preoccupied with their ideology revolving around peasantry and did not formulate incentives or policies that dovetailed with interests of the urban population. To recapitulate, while expanding battlefields, the Shining Path failed to institute nationwide support systems because 1) its leaders imposed a radical communist ideology and 2) they did not offer incentives that accommodated urban
interests. The absence of widespread civilian support for the rebels restrained the
government from obliterating civilian populations.

In both Algeria and Peru, insurgent groups expanded battlefields. Although
pursuing independence, FLN insurgents prosecuted war in both their homeland and
metropole France. The Shining Path strove to control rural provinces as well as major
cities. FLN leaders succeeded in mustering support from both local Algerians and
Algerian expatriates by nurturing nationalism and resorting to coercion. This prompted
French forces to project massive violence against Muslim Arabs and Berbers. In contrast,
leaders of the Shining Path failed to rally widespread civilian support because they had
difficulty in making diverse populations converge on the rebel cause, which deterred the
government from orchestrating extensive mass killing. The two cases illustrate that
secessionist war results in more extensive civilian killings than regime change war. The
Algerian war, however, does not correspond to my theoretical argument in that zones of
violence were broad but insurgents garnered widespread civilian support. Therefore,
similar to the statistical analyses, I cannot conclude that case studies corroborate my
hypothesis with respect to insurgent aim and state-sponsored extensive mass killing.

6.4. Ethnoreligious and Rival Support

Insurgent groups may obtain foreign support from their ethnoreligious brethren. The
rebels may be sponsored by the government’s rival states. I suggest that ethnoreligious
and rival supports generate strong civilian backing for insurgents, which propels
embattled rulers to commit extensive mass killing.
During the Algerian War of Independence, the FLN received significant support from outside Algeria. Clark (1960) claimed that without external support, FLN insurgents could have neither sustained the war nor attained national liberation. Neighboring Muslim Arab states vehemently backed the FLN. Tunisia and Morocco that had fought France and gained independence in 1956 naturally sympathized with the violent struggle by Algerians, their ethnoreligious brethren. Furthermore, at that time, Tunisia had a rivalry relationship with France. After Tunisian independence, France’s desire for maintaining military presence within Tunisia ignited violent incidents between the two countries. Tension continued unabated until a complete French pullout in 1963 (Bercovitch & Fretter, 2004). Bourguiba in Tunisia and King Mohammed V in Morocco sponsored the FLN in various ways. They provided safe sanctuaries to FLN insurgents. The FLN smuggled young recruits into Tunisia and Morocco and trained them while evading France’s crackdown (Heggy, 1972; Horne, 2006). The presence of these safe havens enabled insurgent leaders to reenergize their combatants and prepare for operations inside Algeria. From Tunisia and Morocco, FLN combatants infiltrated Algeria and launched numerous ‘hit and run’ attacks in spite of wire border fences built by France (Heggy, 1972; Horne, 2006; Clark, 1960). The FLN also established political bases in these countries and utilized them to publicize and internationalize its war against imperialist France (Gillespie, 1976; Heggy, 1972; Horne, 2006). Furthermore, Bourguiba and King Mohammed V buttressed the Algerian war by channeling weapons to FLN combatants operating inside Algeria (Heggy, 1972; Horne, 2006). Egypt, another neighboring Muslim Arab country, also backed the FLN. Nasser, then Egyptian
President, who nationalized the Suez Canal and waged a war against France, Britain, and Israel agitated for pan-Arab nationalism. Helping Algerians flush out French forces corresponded to his goal of eliminating colonial rule and promoting unity throughout the Arab world. Thus, Egypt sponsored the FLN by supplying ammunitions and financial resources (Heggoy, 1972).

External support was not confined to states. Non-state actors also supported FLN’s war against France. Algerian emigrants in France voluntarily or forcibly furnished the insurgents with a huge amount of cash. The colonial authority estimated that the monthly contribution of the Algerian diaspora community amounted to 500 million francs, which was equivalent to 1,428,000 dollars (Clark, 1960). Some non-Algerian individuals joined Algerians’ struggle for national liberation. Frantz Fanon who formulated theory of anti-colonial revolution translated his theory into action. During the war, he worked for the FLN as a psychiatrist, war strategist, and diplomat (Macey, 2000; Fanon, 1988; Fanon, 2004). The Jeanson network, a group of French communist militants, raised funds for the FLN and helped French army deserters and rebel agents to hide (Horne, 2006).

Support from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algerian diasporas was rigid and consistent despite France’s efforts to sabotage this support. French colonialists attempted to stymie the inflow of weapons and rebel combatants by beefing up border security and enforcing sea interdictions. For instance, France constructed the Morice Line along the boundaries with Tunisia and Morocco, which consisted of electric fences, minefields, and radar alarm systems (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 1976). Simultaneously,
French colonialists took aggressive actions that encroached on the sovereignty of Morocco and Tunisia. In 1956, the French Air Force intercepted a Tunis-bound Moroccan plane carrying exiled FLN leaders and forced it to land in Algiers to arrest them (Horne, 2006). In 1958, seeking revenge for FLN’s attacks from Tunisia, France raided Sakiet, a Tunisian village near the border with Algeria, which the insurgents used as a military base. Daylight bombing and strafing razed this frontier village and killed Tunisian civilians as well as FLN fighters (Horne, 2006; Clark, 1960). Reinforcing border security and mounting military attacks failed to deter Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt from sponsoring Algerian nationalists. Furthermore, the French authority found it difficult to obstruct Algerian expatriates from bankrolling the FLN because financial transactions were often done in a clandestine and intricate manner.

Significant support from Muslim Arab brothers and France’s rival state helped FLN leaders build civilian support. At the outset of the war, indigenous Algerians were not enthusiastic about the rebel cause. They assumed a wait-and-see attitude, reckoning that they would join the FLN if it had a higher chance of winning (Heggooy, 1972; Clark, 1960). The FLN took advantage of external support to convince hesitant civilians to buttress the struggle for independence. Insurgent leaders conveyed the message that their Muslim Arab brothers and France’s arch enemy were consistently sponsoring them and thus they were able to defeat French forces. The tenacity of this foreign support and civilian backing for the FLN propelled France to liquidate a large number of indigenous Algerians.
Contrary to FLN in Algeria, the Shining Path in Peru did not receive external support from its ethnoreligious brothers and the government’s rivals. The Peruvian civil war reflects ethnic division of belligerents to a certain extent. Amerindians and Mestizos accounted for the majority of the peasant population, whereas descendants of Spaniards and other European settlers occupied the upper echelons of the society. Shining Path leaders who were communists did not take advantage of ethnic inequality. Emphasizing class division and transnational solidarity of workers, Marxism-Leninism claims that ethnicity can be manipulated by the ruling bourgeoisie to impede proletariat unity (Lenin, 1969). Thus, ethnicity should be despised and overcome. Following this communist tenet, Shining Path leaders disregarded ethnic dimension of the war, which implies that they did not envisage receiving support from Amerindians or Mestizos in neighboring countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador (McClintock, 1998). In addition, Amerindians and Mestizos living in Peru’s neighbors did not wield significant political power. Therefore, even if they sympathized with the Shining Path’s communist revolution, they were not able to lend support to their co-ethnics in Peru. During the war, the Peruvian government had hostile relations with the United States and Ecuador. Animosity toward Peru, however, did not lead these two countries to sponsor the Shining Path. Leaders of the United States and Ecuador feared that rebel victory would galvanize the diffusion of communist revolution across South America. Furthermore, Shining Path’s involvement in drug production and trafficking vexed the two countries and inhibited them from backing this group (Gonzales, 1992). Illicit drug business also
generated enormous profits, which deprived the insurgents of the incentive to seek
outside support (Gorriti, 1994).

The absence of external support may account for why the Shining Path did not
obtain widespread civilian support. Some peasants, workers, and intellectuals
dedicated themselves to the revolution. Conversely, many civilians caught in war
calculated which side they would take in order to ensure survival (Palmer, 1994). To
these ‘opportunistic’ civilians, the lack of external support might signal that rebel
combatants did not have the capabilities of defeating stronger government troops.
Hence, even if sympathizing with the rebel cause, these citizens were reluctant to back
the Shining Path. Furthermore, no foreign actors regulated or monitored rebels’
behavior, which removed an obstacle to rebels’ brutality against the civilian population.
The Shining Path often unleashed violence against civilians in order to intimidate them
into complying with the rebels. Violence, however, eventually antagonized civilians
further and stimulated defection to the government. This led embattled rulers to
abstain from extensive mass killing.

Similar to statistical analyses, the two cases substantiate my hypothesis germane
to ethnoreligious support for insurgents. Case analyses also find support for rival
support, which does not conform to quantitative results. The FLN in Algeria received
significant support from its Muslim Arab brothers (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algerian
expatriates) and France’s rival state (Tunisia). The rigidity of this support helped the
insurgents mobilize Arab and Berber civilians for guerilla warfare, which triggered
France’s extensive mass killing. In contrast, the Shining Path in Peru did not obtain any
external support, which made civilians keep doubting rebels’ capacity. Outside actors
did not monitor the insurgents’ behavior, which paved the way for civilian abuses by the
rebels. Therefore, civilian support for insurgents was not broad, which restrained the
government from engineering extensive mass killing.

6.5. Lootable Resources

Rebel organizations may extract or cultivate lootable resources and make enormous
profits. I posit that exploitation of these resources curtails civilian support for
insurgents, which deters the government from engaging in extensive mass killing.

During the Algerian war, the FLN did not exploit any lootable resource. Although lacking
lootable resources, the Algerian territory possessed abundant oil (Gillespie, 1972; Horne,
2006). In 1945, French oil corporations began searching the Saharan desert. Shortly
after the onset of the war, they discovered oil deposits at Edjelé and Hassi Messaoud. In
1958, the French authority started transporting oil from Hassi Messaoud to the
metropole through a pipeline (Horne, 2006). FLN’s sabotage on the pipeline, however,
obstructed this oil shipment, preventing a large quantity of oil from reaching France
(Gillespie, 1972).

The presence of oil in the Saharan desert made France cling more to Algeria.
French rulers believed that extracting oil would help to revitalize the domestic economy
strained by the World War II and the Indochina War and thus to restore the lost glory
(Gillespie, 1972; Horne, 2006). Simultaneously, oil helped the FLN catalyze civilian
support. By claiming that independent Algeria would thrive due to oil resources,
insurgent leaders alleviated natives’ apprehension of life in the post-independence era and fostered nationalism, which engendered staunch local support for the insurgency (Gillespie, 1972). Potential benefits of oil and popular support for the FLN steered French leaders to carnage against Muslim Algerians.

In Peru, the Shining Path exploited coca, the raw material of the cocaine drug. In the mid-1980s, the Shining Path exerted control over the Upper Huallaga Valley, a major coca-producing region in Peru (Rochlin, 2003; Cunningham, 2007). Its leaders forged a strategic alliance with coca cultivators and drug traffickers. The Shining Path collected ‘revolutionary’ taxes from those who engaged in the drug industry. In exchange for the taxes, Shining Path insurgents protected coca producers from coca eradication or drug interdiction campaigns conducted by the Peruvian and U.S. governments (Gonzales, 1992). It is estimated that the Shining Path earned between 20 million to 550 million dollars annually from the illicit drug production and trade (McClintock, 1998).

The exploitation of coca, however, led to the abuse of civilian populations. Shining Path leaders wanted to maximize resource profits and use them to enhance their capacity. Therefore, to promote coca production, rebel leaders gave free rein to coca cultivators and drug traffickers (Taylor 2006; Woy-Hazelton & Hazelton, 1994). The Shining Path acquiesced in dismal working conditions and the abuse of civilians in coca fields. Even the insurgents themselves inflicted harm on local populations (Taylor, 2006). As a result, although coca production and drug trade generated a significant amount of revenues, civilian abuse that was concomitant with resource exploitation made the
Shining Path lose civilian support. This restrained embattled rulers from maximizing human rights violations and annihilating civilian populations.

Examining the two wars lends partial support to my theoretical argument. The Peruvian civil war conforms to my logic that links rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources to no extensive mass killing by state. The Shining Path promoted the exploitation of coca, which led to rebels’ abuse of civilian populations. This contributed to deterring governing elites from eradicating indigenous peasants and poor urban dwellers. On the other hand, the Algerian war does not corroborate my theoretical logic. Of course, the FLN did not exploit lootable resources and French troops perpetrated carnage. Massive violence against Arabs and Berbers, however, resulted from the presence of oil, not the absence of lootable resources. The Algerian territory did not contain lootable resources, but was abundant in oil, a nonlootable resource. Although the FLN did not extract oil and earn profits, this group capitalized on the presence of oil to foster nationalism. Furthermore, oil made French leaders intransigent. Both factors account for France’s massive violence against Muslim Algerians. This suggests that the Algerian war offers alternative explanations for state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Therefore, I conclude that similar to statistical analyses, case studies do not confirm my hypothesis pertinent to rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources.
6.6. Political Marginalization

I suggest that severe political marginalization breeds or exacerbates grievances and thus yields ardent civilian support for insurgents, which propels embattled rulers to orchestrate extensive mass killing. In colonial Algeria, political discrimination was rampant during and before the independence war. Colonizing Algeria, France systematically marginalized Arabs and Berbers from politics (Heggoy, 1972; Fanon, 1988). French rulers imposed an apartheid-style political system on Algeria, restricting political rights of indigenous populations and systematizing racial discrimination against them (Wall, 2001; Bonora-Waisman, 2003). Under the colonial rule, Muslim Algerians played little role in administering their own affairs and their voices were disregarded or suppressed (Polk, 2007; Heggoy, 1972). France did not allow indigenous populations to elect their representatives for central consultative assemblies. Officials handpicked by the French authority represented the natives (Heggoy, 1972). French military chiefs exerted firm control over native communes in which the majority of population was Arabs or Berbers. Caïds, native administrative officials, were relegated to the role of assisting the French chiefs, possessing no significant power (Heggoy, 1972). To inhibit indigenous participation in politics, French rulers enforced discriminatory citizenship laws that required Muslims to abandon their culture to acquire French citizenship (Heggoy, 1972; Polk, 2007; Horne, 2006). After the end of the First World War, Algerians’ demands for redressing political marginalization gained momentum, which compelled French leaders to seek some political reforms (Gillespie, 1976). The Lamine-Gueye law of 1946, for instance, stipulated that all inhabitants of Algeria were entitled
to French citizenship. The 1947 Statute created the Algerian Assembly in which Muslims had sizeable representation (Gillespie, 1976; Clark, 1960). These reforms, however, failed to alleviate native Algerians’ discontent. Although granting French citizenship to Muslims, France did not obliterate the discriminatory political system. Votes held in the Algerian Assembly were often rigged to favor French colonialists and pieds-noirs (Gillespie, 1976; Heggoy, 1972).

During the war, French rulers who viewed Algeria as an inalienable part of France were unwilling to relinquish substantial political power and to equalize Muslims and pieds-noirs (Fanon, 1988; Hutchinson, 1978). Of course, France promulgated several political reforms in an attempt to assuage embittered natives and sabotage FLN’s support bases. The colonial authorities sought to implement the 1947 Statute that would concede Muslims a larger voice in the colonial government and enfranchise Muslim women (Heggoy, 1972; Horne, 2006). At the same time, colonial rulers attempted to induce more Arabs and Berbers into government job (Heggoy, 1972). These reforms, however, fizzled out and political marginalization continued unabated. To pieds-noirs and Jews, the execution of the reforms would advantage the Muslim population and undermine their political status. Hence, they conducted intense lobbying to frustrate France’s attempts to mitigate political marginalization of Muslims (Gillespie, 1976; Heggoy, 1972). Furthermore, the political incentives by France did not satisfy Arabs and Berbers. The reforms aimed at assimilating native Algerians, not guaranteeing them significant political autonomy. Continuing political marginalization exacerbated grievances among indigenous Algerians. They perceived that political
marginalization would not subside under the French rule, which urged them to jeopardize their lives and join the FLN (Heggoy, 1972). Therefore, French forces unleashed massive violence against Arabs and Berbers in an attempt to ruin insurgents’ civilian support bases and strangle the struggle for independence.

In contrast, political discrimination did not prevail during the Peruvian civil war. Throughout the 1980s, Peruvian leaders did not marginalize a certain segment or the majority of citizens from political process. The elites retained a democratic political system. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held regularly and considered free and fair. Opposition parties rarely disputed election results (McClintock, 1998). Those who criticized the government were given plenty of leeway. In other words, even though confronting the Shining Path insurgency, the government refrained from imposing political restriction or repression (McClintock, 1998; Taylor, 2006). Through elections, opposition parties publicized their alternative opinions or policies and competed for political power. Civic organizations, labor unions, and churches operated with little restraints. Even the government tolerated organizations sympathetic to the Shining Path. In addition, racism entrenched in the Peruvian society was neither politicized nor institutionalized (Taylor, 2006; Degregori, 1994). Throughout history, Amerindians were subject to racial discrimination. Caucasians and even Mestizos disparaged them and denied them economic and social opportunities. This socioeconomic discrimination, however, did not translate into systematic political discrimination. This suggests that peasants and other citizens who leaned toward the Shining Path were guaranteed the right to participate in politics and to advance their
interests. Therefore, the Shining Path did not identify political marginalization as a main cause of its communist revolution (McClintock, 1998). In the 1990s, however, the democratic political system collapsed. In 1992, President Fujimori staged a self-coup backed by the military and enforced authoritarian rule. He did not prohibit dissident groups, but restricted their activities to a certain degree (Cunningham, 2007).

A low level of political marginalization constrained the Shining Path from gaining widespread civilian support. Although the democratic system did not function perfectly and racism was rampant, ordinary citizens enjoyed political freedom and rights. Political organizations that represented diverse voices operated with little fear of repression (McClintock, 1998). Therefore, many citizens perceived that violence was not the only way to address Peru’s problems. Free and fair elections provided the populace with the opportunity to judge incumbents and vent their discontents. Without unleashing violence, citizens could advance their interests by supporting opposition parties, labor unions, or civic organizations (Woy-Hazelton & Hazelton, 1994). The electoral system and alternative political outlets hampered the Shining Path’s attempts to expand its support bases. The rebels obtained support only from some segments of peasants, workers, and intellectuals who believed that exercising political rights would be futile. Therefore, the government steered clear of massive violence against civilians.

As with statistical analyses, comparison of the Algerian War of Independence and the Peruvian civil war confirms my hypothesis pertaining to political marginalization. In Algeria, the colonial authority suppressed political and civil rights of indigenous Algerians and maintained racial discrimination system. This political marginalization
urged aggrieved Algerians to rally around the FLN, which instigated extensive mass killing by the French government. On the other hand, Peruvian leaders did not impose extensive and ruthless restriction on political and civil rights of peasants, workers, and leftist intellectuals. The presence of a sound electoral system and alternative organizations vitiated the Shining Path’s attempts to build widespread support, which deterred embattled rulers from orchestrating extensive mass killing.

6.7. Economic Marginalization

I maintain that severe economic marginalization spawns or aggravates grievances and thus generates strong civilian support for rebels, which can trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing. In Algeria, economic discrimination reigned before and during the independence war. French colonial rule pauperized indigenous Arabs and Berbers, the majority of whom relied heavily on agriculture for survival. In the 19th century, the colonial authority confiscated a large portion of fertile land and redistributed it to European settlers (Gillespie, 1976; Polk, 2007; O’Ballance, 1967). This land grab was enforced in reprisals for anti-French resistance, and often entailed brutal force. For instance, after subduing insurrection in Kabylie, France seized 453,000 hectares of Berbers’ land and flushed out local peasants (Polk, 2007; Gillespie, 1976). The confiscation of arable land wreaked great havoc on indigenous populations. Thousands of Arab and Berber peasants flocked to cities in search of work. Often unemployed or engaging in low-wage jobs, they suffered from chronic poverty (Gillespie, 1976; Polk,
With land seizure, France instituted typical colonial economic system in which raw materials were exported to the metropole and value-added manufactured products were imported to Algeria (Gillespie, 1976). This system was based on the exploitation of indigenous labor force, thus exacerbating Muslims’ living conditions (Fanon, 2004; Fanon, 1988). In the 20th century, abject poverty of Arabs and Berbers did not abate. In other words, the colonial rule continued impoverishing and marginalizing native populations, while benefiting pieds-noirs and Jews. The French did not industrialize Algeria but sustained the exploitative economic system because of pieds-noirs’ resistance. Wealthy European settlers who generated huge revenues from the colonial system believed that industrialization would damage their economic interests and enhance economic status of Muslims (Gillespie, 1976). France also neglected the education of indigenous populations. Up until 1954, their illiteracy rates were over 90% (Gillespie, 1976). The paucity of education blocked Arabs and Berbers from acquiring public service and high-salary jobs, restricting them to agriculture and other physical labor positions (Gillespie, 1976). Economic hardship was aggravated by a population explosion. During the French occupation, the Muslim population in Algeria significantly swelled. From 1876 to 1954, the number of Muslims increased by about 7 million, and an overwhelming majority of Muslims were young (Gillespie, 1976). Rapid population growth strained economic resources and raised unemployment rates further.

After the outbreak of the war, France proposed measures that aimed to alleviate the wretched conditions of indigenous Algerians and deter them from supporting FLN guerillas. Jacques Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria, attempted to implement
economic reforms that included land redistribution, financial assistance, and the improvement of basic infrastructure. To execute these reforms efficiently, he established Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS) throughout Algeria (Clark, 1960; Heggy, 1972; Horne, 2006). French Army officers exercised authority over the SAS, tasked with building local ties and addressing natives’ economic grievances. Although marking some successes, the SAS program failed to eradicate economic marginalization of Muslims that was entrenched in the colonial society; therefore, economic marginalization persisted (Heggy, 1972; Hutchinson, 1978). SAS administrators often performed poorly because of 1) lack of coordination and funds and 2) their condescending or racist attitude toward the locals (Hutchinson, 1978; Heggy, 1972). Furthermore, European settlers who aspired to retain their firm grip on power ardently defied SAS chiefs’ efforts to mitigate economic grievances of Muslim Algerians (Heggy, 1972). Continuing economic marginalization galvanized civilian support for the nationalists. Indigent Arabs and Berbers believed that they would continue to live in misery if France maintained its colonial presence, which propelled them to participate in the independence struggle. Strong civilian support for the FLN drove French leaders to engineer extensive mass killing as a strategy for stifling the insurgency.

Economic marginalization was also rampant in Peru. When the war raged in the 1980s, the majority of the population suffered from poverty. In rural regions, severe land and income inequalities, the economic legacy of Spanish colonialism, persisted. A small number of landlords, mostly descendants of European settlers, owned a large portion of arable land (hacienda) and monopolized profits from agricultural production.
(Taylor, 2006; Smith, 1994a). In contrast, peasants, mostly Amerindians and Mestizos, were subservient to these landowners and mired in chronic poverty. Some past rulers attempted to address this problem. In the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, left-leaning president Velasco aggressively implemented agrarian reform programs, expropriating haciendas and distributing them to the peasant population (Smith, 1994a; Taylor, 2006). This reform, however, benefited only a fraction of the peasantry (some ex-hacienda workers) (McClintock, 1998; Smith, 1994a). Most indigenous populations engaging in subsistence farming did not enjoy benefits from the agrarian reform. Combating the Shining Path, the García government followed Velasco’s footstep and carried out land redistribution. As with the previous reform, however, Garcia’s policy failed to mitigate economic marginalization of landless peasants (Smith, 1994a). Economic plight was not restricted to rural highlands. In the 1980s, severe economic crisis swept the entire country. Inflation surged from 70 percent in 1982 to 1,722 percent in 1988 and 7,650 percent in 1990 (Tarazona-Sevillano, 1994). National debts soared and the government’s finances became moribund. Not only peasants but also lower- and middle-class city dwellers were hit hardest by the economic turbulence. More urban citizens were plunged into poverty (Tarazona-Sevillano, 1994).

Leaders of the Shining Path took advantage of economic marginalization to rally public support. They claimed that only communist revolution would smash the economic status quo and redress economic grievances. This message induced some peasants, workers, and leftist intellectuals to support the Shining Path. Severe economic marginalization, however, did not lead to the expansion of rebel support
bases. Many urban residents blamed the government for their economic hardship, but were reluctant or unwilling to join the Shining Path because of its peasant-based ideology and the presence of alternative organizations. Shining Path’s ideology heavily influenced by Mao’s communism zeroed in on peasants, disregarding urban interests (Degregori, 1994; McClintock, 1998). Diverse leftist groups struggled for lower- and middle-class citizens, which frustrated rebel attempts to build urban support. Even in rural regions, severe economic plight did not stimulate massive support for the insurgency because the rebel leadership not only offended local indigenous culture, but also enforced extreme policies such as banning all commercial activities and the consumption of alcohol (Degregori, 1994). The absence of widespread support for the rebels deprived the government of the incentive to perpetrate extensive mass killing.

The case studies disconfirm my hypothesis with respect to economic marginalization, which differs somewhat from statistical analyses that lend partial support to this hypothesis. Muslim Algerians and Peruvian peasants suffered from dire poverty. In other words, both groups were marginalized in terms of economic well-being. In Algeria, severe economic marginalization produced strong civilian support for the independence war, which led the French to massacre native populations. Conversely, many impoverished citizens in Peru disengaged from the Shining Path because 1) they were able to advance their interests by participating in elections and joining alternative organizations and 2) rebel leaders enforced their own communist ideology based on an extreme and strict interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore,
embattled rulers abstained from escalating human rights violations to large-scale mass killings.

6.8. Armed Conflict History

I theorize that a history of intense armed conflict helps insurgents foster grievances and build civilian support, which can steer the government to extensive mass killing. In Algeria, before 1954, Arabs and Berbers had violently resisted French colonial rule. In 1832, two years after French troops occupied Algeria, Abd al-Qadir, a devout Muslim leader, launched an insurgency against France (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 1976; Polk, 2007). By fomenting religious fervor, he rallied tribes and religious brotherhoods from all over Algeria (Polk, 2007; Gillespie, 1976). In an attempt to defeat superior French troops, al-Qadir forces conducted guerilla warfare, taking advantage of steep mountains (Horne, 2006; Polk, 2007). The insurgents won numerous battles and threatened Algiers until 1842. After military setbacks, France implemented a troop surge and applied scorched-earth tactics, which contributed to weakening insurgent forces (Horne, 2006; Gillespie, 1976). In 1847, Abd al-Qadir ultimately capitulated and the rebellion ended (Polk, 2007; Horne, 2006). This intense conflict generated about 300,000 total deaths.\textsuperscript{39}

After the Abd al-Qadir insurgency, anti-colonial violence erupted sporadically. For instance, in 1871, anti-French rebellion broke out in Kabylie and spread to other regions, but petered out the next year. In 1945, anti-French demonstrations in Sétif

\textsuperscript{39} I referred to COW for the number of total deaths in the war between Abd al-Qadir insurgents and France.

These previous conflicts helped FLN insurgents obtain support from indigenous populations. Insurgent leaders admired Abd al-Qadir as the national hero and sought to recall his valiant struggle. For instance, the insurgents adopted his white and green flag and hung his portrait in their headquarters (Horne, 2006). The FLN also evoked the memory of the Sétif massacre. By calling up previous anti-colonial resistance, the FLN leadership attempted to foment profound resentment toward the French and rekindle Muslim grievances against the colonial rule. This attempt succeeded in galvanizing civilian support for the independence struggle, which incentivized French rulers to perpetrate carnage.

In Peru, the Shining Path was established in the late 1960s by Abimael Guzmán, a former university philosophy professor. After inception, this communist organization focused its attention on universities (Cunningham, 2007; Taylor, 2006). Shining Path leaders sought to disseminate their ideology and recruit university students. After failing to reign in universities, the Shining Path began resorting to violence (Cunningham, 2007). In 1980, the rebel leadership boycotted elections and unleashed violence, which escalated into war. This indicates that the war flaring up in the 1980s and early 1990s was the first armed conflict between the Shining Path and the government. Even before
the Shining Path was founded, communist insurgency did not erupt. Since communism emerged in the early 1920s, various communist parties had refrained from projecting violence against the government (McClintock, 1998). They operated within the existing political system and some of them were even involved in electoral competition.

The absence of intense previous conflict might account for lack of extensive civilian support for the Shining Path. In other words, a large number of peasants, workers, or political dissidents would have buttressed the Shining Path insurgency if communist revolution broke out in the past. Previous armed conflict can be useful to foment hostility and grievances, agitate aggrieved populations, and draw support from them. Hence, it can be claimed that the Shining Path failed to build widespread civilian support because this rebel group lacked fighting experience, a useful tool for mobilizing civilians. In other words, the absence of prior armed conflict makes it very difficult for rebel leaders to generate civilian support significant enough to deliver a severe blow to the government. This constrained embattled rulers from orchestrating extensive mass killing.

Similar to statistical results, the study of the two cases substantiates my hypothesis pertaining to armed conflict history. By capitalizing on past armed conflicts including the Abd al-Qadir insurgency, the FLN inflamed hostility against French colonialists and grievances against the status quo, which engendered civilian support for the insurgents. This propelled colonial forces to massacre suspected or potential FLN supporters. Conversely, communist insurgencies did not erupt in Peru before the Shining Path launched violence. The absence of previous conflicts signifies that this
rebel group did not possess a useful tool for agitating populations against the

government, which might explain why the insurgents did not obtain widespread civilian

support and thus the government refrained from committing extensive mass killing.

6.9. Summary

In general, the case analysis results coincide with statistical ones (See Table 6.1 for

summary.). Examining the Algerian War of Independence and the Peruvian civil war
corroborates my hypotheses germane to ethnoreligious support for insurgents, political

marginalization, and armed conflict history. The case studies do not support my

hypotheses pertaining to insurgent aim and lootable resources, which also corresponds
to the statistical analyses. In terms of economic marginalization, conclusions from the
qualitative analysis do not coincide with those from the quantitative analysis in that the

case studies disconfirm my hypothesis on economic marginalization, while the statistical
analyses partially confirm it. With regard to insurgent aim, lootable resources, and

economic marginalization, the case analysis captures some alternative explanations for

state-sponsored extensive mass killing. The Algerian war reveals that 1) secessionist

insurgents can expand battlefields and construct civilian support systems and 2) the

presence of precious natural resources itself can trigger state-sponsored extensive mass

killing. The Peruvian war demonstrates that severe economic marginalization does not

translate into massive civilian support for insurgency when political rights are
guaranteed and rebel leaders impose a radical ideology, which restrains the government from orchestrating extensive mass killing.

In terms of rival support, however, conclusions from the case analysis do not conform to those from the statistical one. Analyzing the two cases confirms my hypothesis linking rival support for insurgents to state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Conversely, the statistical analysis based on a large number of civil wars disconfirms this hypothesis.
7 Conclusions

7.1. Dissertation Summary

Throughout history, warring parties contravened norms and laws of civilian protection and wreaked great havoc on civilian populations. In the contemporary so-called ‘civilized’ world, massive violence against civilians broke out in Ethiopia, Iraq, Indonesia, Sudan, Bosnia, and elsewhere. Why do belligerents massacre civilians? In this dissertation, I explored this question, focusing on the behavior of state leaders during civil war. That is, I investigated conditions under which state leaders embroiled in civil war commit extensive mass killing against their own populations. State-sponsored mass killing is defined as the intentional killing of a large number of civilians perpetrated by the government. The government comprises the security apparatus (e.g., military, police) and non-state actors abetted by governing elites (e.g., militias, vigilantes). The perpetrators engage in direct killing such as execution, bombing, and beating and/or indirect killing such as food or aid blockade.

Influential revolutionaries, such as Fanon, Mao, and Lenin, emphasized civilian support as a key element for the success of insurgency or revolution. This implies that insurgents’ civilian support can affect the government’s strategies of defeating rebel combatants. Extant literature on mass killing has not sufficiently taken into account civilian support for insurgents. Some scholars (e.g., Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay (2004)) have argued that a high level of rebels’ civilian support can propel the
government to orchestrate mass killing. These scholars, however, took civilian support as given, not addressing exogenous factors that generate or constrain civilian support for insurgents. In other words, the existing literature overlooks that civilian support can be an intervening variable interposed between the exogenous factors and the extent of state-sponsored mass killing. My dissertation fills this gap, theorizing and testing the linkage between factors that boost or stem civilian support for insurgents and extensive mass killing committed by the government during civil war.

I claim that secessionist war, insurgents’ support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states, severe political and economic marginalization, and history of intense armed conflict catalyze civilian support for insurgents, which can trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Conversely, the rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources curtails civilian support for insurgency, which can inhibit the government from unleashing massive violence against civilians. In secessionist war, violence tends to be localized, which makes it easier for insurgent leaders to build local support. In contrast, insurgents who seek regime change tend to expand battlefields and to find it very difficult to make diverse populations rally around them. Insurgent support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rivals can generate strong civilian support for the insurgency. By emphasizing the rigidity of ethnoreligious and rival supports, rebel leaders can convince the civilian population of their ability to defeat government forces. Furthermore, foreign supporters can monitor insurgents and constrain them from abusing local populations. Severe political and economic marginalization and history of intense armed conflict breed or exacerbate
grievances against the government, which can drive aggrieved citizens to buttress the insurgency. The exploitation of lootable resources can spawn greed among the rebel leadership, which restrains insurgent leaders from incentivizing civilians. Furthermore, to maximize profits, rebels eschew reining in resource producers, which can pave the way for civilian abuses. Therefore, civilians become reluctant or unwilling to support resource-rich insurgents. Combating popular insurgents, state leaders might judge that non-mass killing strategies such as economic incentives and forced relocation would not deter civilians from backing the rebels, which can lead the incumbents to perpetrate extensive mass killing. By massacring suspected or potential insurgent supporters, the government can wipe out insurgent support bases and thus cripple insurgent combatants. Killing youths, children, and women can fracture insurgents’ future recruitment pool, which helps to stave off future insurgency. In contrast, when rebels do not enjoy strong civilian support, embattled rulers might calculate that it is possible to stimulate mass civilian defection to the government by offering tangible and/or intangible incentives. Therefore, the government abstains from projecting massive violence against civilians.

In order to verify my theory, I performed statistical analysis and comparative case studies. Both analyses reveal the positive relationship between civilian support for insurgents and severity of state-sponsored mass killing, which dovetails with my theoretical argument. The statistical results and the cases of Algeria and Peru confirm my hypotheses germane to ethnoreligious support, political marginalization, and armed conflict history. Therefore, based on the two analyses, I can claim that insurgent
support from their ethnoreligious brethren, severe political marginalization, and a history of intense armed conflict are likely to instigate state-sponsored extensive mass killing. The outcomes about rival support and economic marginalization are ambivalent. Statistical analyses disconfirm my hypothesis that rebel support from the government’s rivals is likely to produce extensive mass killing, but case studies find support for this hypothesis. Statistical results partially corroborate my hypothesis that severe economic marginalization is likely to generate extensive civilian killings, whereas case studies refute this hypothesis. Furthermore, both quantitative and qualitative studies do not substantiate my hypotheses pertinent to insurgent aim and lootable resources, which constrains me from arguing that secessionist war is likely to trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing and rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources is likely to restrain massive violence. Case studies locate some alternative explanations for state-sponsored extensive mass killing. The Algerian War of Independence illustrates that 1) secessionist violence is not necessarily localized and even in broad war zones, secessionist groups can muster strong civilian support and 2) the presence of valuable natural resources itself can incentivize the government to orchestrate carnage. The Peruvian Civil War shows that harsh economic marginalization does not necessarily catalyze civilian support for insurgency. When political rights are ensured and rebel leaders seek to materialize a radical ideology, abject economic conditions do not translate into widespread civilian support for insurgents, which dissuades the government from wielding massive violence against civilians.
7.2. Theoretical and Policy Implications

In my dissertation, I synthesize factors that engender civilian support for insurgents and the extent of mass killing perpetrated by the government. I theorize about and test the relationship between these factors and the severity of mass killing. My study has some theoretical implications. First, as Lenin, Mao, and Fanon’s emphasis on civilian support implies, civilian support for insurgents can dictate the government’s strategies for subduing the insurgency. My research affirms that massive civilian support for insurgents prompts embattled rulers to contravene international humanitarian law and engage in extensive civilian killings, which coincides with Sartre’s and Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay’s arguments. Second, not all factors that can yield civilian support for insurgents trigger state-sponsored extensive mass killing. My analyses suggest that ethnoreligious support for insurgents, political marginalization, and armed conflict history explain and predict the extent of mass killing well. Some of the analyses capture the effects of rival support for insurgents and economic marginalization on variation in state-sponsored mass killing. In contrast, insurgent aim and rebels’ exploitation of lootable resources do not account well for the severity of mass killing.

The results of my dissertation are relevant to policymakers. Conducting both quantitative and qualitative studies, I find that ethnoreligious support for insurgents, severe political marginalization, and history of intense armed conflict can propel embattled rulers to orchestrate extensive mass killing. Rival support for insurgents and economic marginalization account somewhat for the extent of mass killing. Furthermore, the presence or exploitation of precious natural resources can steer the
government to extensive civilian killings. Based on these findings, I propose some policies for international policymakers to prevent civil war from culminating in carnage. Of course, sovereignty of a state should be respected. Outside actors should refrain from breaching a state’s sovereignty and interfering with its domestic affairs. Nevertheless, if internal events are so egregious as to inflict enormous sufferings on the populace, humanitarian concern can be prioritized over state sovereignty. Therefore, when civil wars manifest conditions that can give rise to state-sponsored massive civilian killings, third-party actors can intervene in these wars to shield civilians from the scourge of war.

First, because transnational ethnoreligious or rival support for insurgents increases the risk of states’ employing massive violence against civilians, international actors need to stymie the externalization of the war. In other words, UN, regional bodies, or major states should exert some efforts to dissuade rebels’ co-ethnics or religionists and the government’s rival states from intervening on the rebel side. The international community can endeavor to address concerns of potential interveners or enforce arms embargoes or sea interdictions against the conflict state. Second, my study suggests that alleviating political and economic marginalization reduces the risk of state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Therefore, in order to weed out the possibility of the government’s atrocities, international policymakers need to reinforce human rights monitoring systems and encourage or compel state leaders to redress political and economic discrimination. UN, regional organizations, or major states can engage in diplomacy and offer political or economic incentives. If this strategy fails to induce
change, the third parties can ‘name and shame’ the ruling elites and impose some form of sanctions on them (e.g., overseas asset freezing, travel ban). Third, my research implies that instituting durable peace after the end of war is essential to forestalling extensive mass killing from occurring in the future. Thus, international policymakers need to pay close attention to post-war countries and keep them from sliding back to war. UN and regional organizations can help these states revitalize their economy, install political systems that ensure freedoms and rights of all citizens, and expedite disarmament process. These transnational bodies can also foster reconciliation between ex-warring parties and the restoration of mutual trust. Finally, the presence of lucrative natural resources can escalate a war to the extent that international law is frequently violated and atrocities are rampant. The international community needs to encourage the government to dispense (potential) resource revenues fairly. If embattled rulers do not abandon their resource greed but intensify the war, UN, regional bodies, or individual countries can take measures that aim to hinder commercial activities revolving around the conflict-zone resources.

7.3. Future Research Agenda

In this section, I lay out a future research agenda derived from my dissertation. State leaders embroiled in civil war can kill civilians through direct methods (e.g., shooting, bombing, beating) or through indirect methods (e.g., food or aid blockade, scorched earth policy). Some rulers may engage more in direct killings, whereas others may resort more to indirect killings. For instance, direct killing tends to be more conspicuous
than indirect killing. Thus, democratic leaders who are sensitive to reputation may deny civilians food or items essential to human life, while desisting from shooting and bombing civilians. It would be interesting to investigate conditions under which the government prefers wielding indirect violence or direct one. The study of mass killing is pertinent to the study of ethnic cleansing and conflict severity. When narrowing focus to ethnic group as a victim, the concept of mass killing is somewhat similar to that of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing refers to the removal of a certain ethnic group from its territory. State leaders dislodge members of an ethnic group by killing or expelling them, which indicates that ethnic cleansing has more extensive dimensions than mass killing. Although ethnic cleansing merits attention, scholars have not addressed this subject in a systematic or sophisticated manner. Therefore, it is worth exploring conditions under which ethnic cleansing transpires and ascertaining domestic and external factors that can prompt the government to eliminate citizens of certain ethnic origin. Mass killing is also relevant to conflict severity in that the outbreak of extensive mass killing during civil war indicates the escalation of the war. Only a fraction of earlier works on civil war tackles severity of civil conflict (e.g., Heger & Salehyan, 2007; Lacina, 2006). Scholars can examine conditions under which state leaders embroiled in civil conflict project unbridled force, focusing on leaders’ militarism (leaders’ tendency to admire or glorify military force). Previous military successes and military background instill militarism in the rulers, which can steer them to unfettered violence against insurgent combatants and supporters.
My analysis refutes the hypothesis that state-sponsored mass killing is more extensive in secessionist war than in regime change war. One can restrict attention to secessionist war and examine conditions under which secessionist wars generate massive violence against local populations. Tangible values of the disputed territory (e.g., natural resources, access to sea or neighboring states) may account for the government’s extensive civilian killings, as the Eritrean War of Independence and southern Sudanese insurgencies illustrate. When secessionists aim at merging their home territory into neighboring countries, state leaders may project unfettered force against civilians (e.g., Somali insurgencies in Ethiopia). To understand the causes of civilian killings, scholars can address not only secessionist war but also secessionist violence that does not reach the level of war. Covering both minor conflicts and wars can help to capture the dynamics of violence against civilians. With regard to regime change war, it would be interesting to investigate behavior of ‘new’ leaders (insurgents who succeed in subverting the government and seizing power). Leadership change through war can entail revenge or accommodation. Some new rulers seek ruthless retaliation against former elites and their supporters (e.g., killing and expulsion of Harkis and pieds-noirs in post-independence Algeria). In contrast, other new leaders embrace former enemies and facilitate reconciliation (e.g., ANC leaders in post-apartheid South Africa). Characteristics of past war may account for variation in leaders’ behavior. For instance, if the war was so brutal to the extent to produce massive casualties, new leaders may seek revenge in order to build legitimacy among their followers or even
vent their personal anger. If the war terminates with military victory and without peace agreement, new leaders may purge ex-leaders and their supporters from political realm.

In this dissertation, I explore how insurgents’ support from their ethnoreligious brethren and the government’s rival states can engender state-sponsored extensive mass killing. Other types of rebels’ external support may account for the extent of mass killing. For instance, agitating for global proletariat revolution, Marxist-Leninist ideologies emphasize transnational solidarity of oppressed peoples. From this Marxist tenet, one can deduce that Marxist-based bond between insurgents and foreign supporters is rigid, which can propel embattled rulers to substitute massacring civilian populations for striving to curtail rebels’ outside support. External support can be classified into direct support (troop support) and indirect support (non-troop support). The scale of state-sponsored mass killing may hinge on whether foreign support is direct or indirect. One may argue that if foreign sponsors do not dispatch their troops but supply money and weapons, rebels rely entirely on local youths for combatants, which can prompt the government to engineer extensive civilian killings. It would be interesting to examine whether indirect support for insurgents is more likely to trigger massive violence against civilians than direct support.

The relationship between natural resources and mass killing also warrants attention. My theoretical argument zeroes in on lootable resources such as diamonds, timber, and cocaine. As the Algerian War of Independence illustrates, however, nonlootable resources such as oil, copper, and uranium can account for variation in state-sponsored mass killing. These resources raise the stake of war, which can make
embattled rulers jettison their moral scruple and willing to exhibit brutality. Precious nonlootable resources can spark secessionist demands and the government may attempt to preserve territorial integrity by eliminating local populations. It would be interesting to establish plausible linkages between nonlootable resources and the extent of mass killing. In addition, type of nonlootable resources that insurgent groups exploit may determine whether the government perpetrates atrocities or not. For instance, the effect of mineral resources (e.g., gold, copper) on the severity of mass killing may diverge from that of oil. Agricultural and non-agricultural resources may exert different effects on the scale of the government’s violence. Scholars can categorize natural resources in various ways and ascertain what types of natural resources that the rebels exploit account for the government’s extensive civilian killings.

Finally, my study addresses the relationship between factors that breed or exacerbate grievances and the extent of state-sponsored mass killing during civil war. Here, I zero in on political and economic grievances. Other sources of grievance, however, may explain and predict the severity of mass killing. For instance, cultural discrimination or persecution infringes upon victims’ identity and exacerbates grievances against the government, which can produce strong civilian support for insurgents. Encountering this predicament, embattled rulers might resort to extensive civilian killings in an attempt to suppress insurgents and ward off future insurgency.

Culture plays a crucial role in politics as Marxist-influenced theorists stress. Gramsci (1992) formulated the concept of cultural hegemony, which suggests that the bourgeoisie class consolidates their grip on power by imposing their beliefs, perceptions,
and values on the proletariat class. In a similar vein, Fanon (2004 [orig. 1961]) argued
that colonialists seek to wipe out indigenous cultures and implant their own culture as a
strategy for perpetuating their rule. Both Gramsci and Fanon called for cultural
liberation for the success of proletariat or anti-colonial revolution. Due to the influence
of realism and rational choice approach, scholars who study war and violence have not
paid much attention to culture. Therefore, it is worth analyzing the relationship
between cultural grievances and the scale of the government’s civilian killings during
civil war. Cultural grievances result from religious persecution, language restriction or
banning, forced name change, among others. Researchers can investigate which
sources of cultural grievances account well for the outbreak of extensive mass killing.
### Tables

#### Table 2.1: Categorization of Literature on Mass Killing

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#### Table 3.1: Independent and Dependent Variables

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<tr>
<td>Rival support for insurgents</td>
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<td>Severe political marginalization</td>
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<td>Severe economic marginalization</td>
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Table 4.1: Differences Between the Two Wars

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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics

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Table 5.2: Insurgent Aim Model

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Lowest: Estimation with the lowest number of intentional civilian deaths
Middle: Estimation with the middle number of intentional civilian deaths
Highest: Estimation with the highest number of intentional civilian deaths
Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 9.0
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1
Table 5.3: Insurgent Aim Model without Anti-Colonial Wars

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Lowest: Estimation with the lowest number of intentional civilian deaths  
Middle: Estimation with the middle number of intentional civilian deaths  
Highest: Estimation with the highest number of intentional civilian deaths  
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimations performed using Stata 9.0  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1
Table 5.4: Insurgent Capacity Model

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Lowest: Estimation with the lowest number of intentional civilian deaths
Middle: Estimation with the middle number of intentional civilian deaths
Highest: Estimation with the highest number of intentional civilian deaths
Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 9.0, ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1
Table 5.5: Insurgent Capacity Model without Anti-Colonial Wars

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Lowest: Estimation with the lowest number of intentional civilian deaths
Middle: Estimation with the middle number of intentional civilian deaths
Highest: Estimation with the highest number of intentional civilian deaths
Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 9.0, ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1
Table 5.6: Grievance Model

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Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 9.0
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1
Table 5.7: Grievance Model without Anti-Colonial Wars

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Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 9.0
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, †p<.1
### Table 5.8: Combined Model

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Table 6.1: Comparison of case and statistical analyses

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